{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_27531/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_27531","id":"gutenberg_27531","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27531","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Ethics"],"text":"A Manual of Moral Philosophy\n\n                               Designed For\n\n                        Colleges and High Schools.\n\n                                    By\n\n                      Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D.\n\n       Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University.\n\n                          New York and Chicago:\n\n                         A. S. Barnes And Company\n\n                                   1873\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface.\nChapter 1. Action.\nChapter II. The Springs Of Action.\n   Section I. The Appetites.\n   Section II. The Desires.\n   Section III. The Affections.\nChapter III. The Governing Principles Of Action.\nChapter IV. The Right.\nChapter V. Means And Sources Of Knowledge As To Right And Wrong.\n   Section I. Conscience.\n   Section II. Sources Of Knowledge. 1. Observation, Experience, And\n   Tradition.\n   Section III. Sources Of Knowledge. 2. Law.\n   Section IV. Sources Of Knowledge. 3. Christianity.\nChapter VI. Rights And Obligations.\nChapter VII. Motive, Passion, And Habit.\nChapter VIII. Virtues, And The Virtues.\nChapter IX. Prudence; Or Duties To One\u2019s Self.\n   Section I. Self-Preservation.\n   Section II. The Attainment Of Knowledge.\n   Section III. Self-Control.\n   Section IV. Moral Self-Culture.\nChapter X. Justice; Or, Duties To One\u2019s Fellow-Beings.\n   Section I. Duties To God.\n   Section II. Duties Of The Family.\n   Section III. Veracity.\n   Section IV. Honesty.\n   Section V. Beneficence.\nChapter XI. Fortitude; Or Duties With Reference To Unavoidable Evils And\nSufferings.\n   Section I. Patience.\n   Section II. Submission.\n   Section III. Courage.\nChapter XII. Order; Or Duties As To Objects Under One\u2019s Own Control.\n   Section I. Time.\n   Section II. Place.\n   Section III. Measure.\n   Section IV. Manners.\n   Section V. Government.\nChapter XIII. Casuistry.\nChapter XIV. Ancient History Of Moral Philosophy.\nChapter XV. Modern History Of Moral Philosophy.\nIndex.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThis book has been prepared, particularly, for the use of the Freshman\nClass in Harvard College. The author has, at the same time, desired to\nmeet the need, felt in our high schools, of a manual of Moral Science\nfitted for the more advanced classes.\n\nIn the preparation of this treatise, the author has been at no pains to\navoid saying what others had said before. Yet the book is original, so far\nas such a book can be or ought to be original. The author has directly\ncopied nothing except Dugald Stewart\u2019s classification of the Desires. But\nas his reading for several years has been principally in the department of\nethics, it is highly probable that much of what he supposes to be his own\nthought may have been derived from other minds. Of course, there is no\nsmall part of the contents of a work of this kind, which is the common\nproperty of writers, and must in some form reappear in every elementary\nmanual.\n\nShould this work be favorably received, the author hopes to prepare, for\nhigher college-classes, a textbook, embracing a more detailed and thorough\ndiscussion of the questions at issue among the different schools\u2014past and\npresent\u2014of ethical science.\n\n\n\n\n\n                                Chapter 1.\n\n\nACTION.\n\n\nAn act or action is a voluntary exercise of any power of body or mind. The\ncharacter of an action, whether good or bad, depends on the intention of\nthe agent. Thus, if I mean to do my neighbor a kindness by any particular\nact, the action is kind, and therefore good, on my part, even though he\nderive no benefit from it, or be injured by it. If I mean to do my\nneighbor an injury, the action is unkind, and therefore bad, though it do\nhim no harm, or though it even result to his benefit. If I mean to perform\nan action, good or bad, and am prevented from performing it by some\nunforeseen hindrance, the act is as truly mine as if I had performed it.\nWords which have any meaning are actions. So are thoughts which we\npurposely call up, or retain in the mind.\n\nOn the other hand, the actions which we are compelled to perform against\nour wishes, and the thoughts which are forced upon our minds, without our\nown consent, are not our actions. This is obviously true when our\nfellow-men forcibly compel us to do or to hear things which we do not wish\nto do or to hear. It is their action solely, and we have no more part in\nit than if we were brute beasts, or inanimate objects. It is, then, the\nintention that gives character to the action.\n\nThat we commonly do what we intend to do there can be no doubt. We do not\nact under _immediate_ compulsion. We are, therefore, free _agents_, or\nactors. But are our intentions free? Is it in our power to will otherwise\nthan we will? When we choose to perform an act that is just or kind, is it\nin our power to choose to perform an act of the opposite character? In\nother words, is the _will_ free? If it be not so, then what we call our\nintentions are not ours, but are to be attributed to the superior will\nwhich has given direction to our wills. If God has so arranged the order\nof nature and the course of events as to force my will in certain\ndirections, good or evil, then it is He that does the good or evil which I\nseem to do. On this supposition God is the only agent or actor in the\nuniverse. Evil, if it be wrought, is wrought by Him alone; and if we\ncannot admit that the Supreme Being does evil, the only alternative is to\ndeny the existence of evil, and to maintain that what we call evil bears\nan essential part in the production of good. For instance, if the horrible\nenormities imputed to Nero were utterly bad, the evil that was in them is\nchargeable, not on Nero, but on God; or if it be maintained that God\ncannot do evil, then Nero was an instrument for the advancement of human\nhappiness and well-being.\n\nWhat reasons have we for believing that the human will is free?\n\n1. We have the direct evidence of consciousness. We are distinctly\nconscious, not only of doing as we choose, but of exercising our free\nchoice among different objects of desire, between immediate and future\nenjoyment, between good and evil. Now, though consciousness may sometimes\ndeceive us, it is the strongest evidence that we can have; we are so\nconstituted that we cannot refuse our credence to it; and our belief in it\nlies at the basis of all evidence and of all knowledge.\n\n2. We are clearly conscious of merit or demerit, of self-approval or\nself-condemnation, in consequence of our actions. If our wills were acted\nupon by a force beyond our control, we might congratulate or pity\nourselves, but we could not praise or blame ourselves, for what we had\ndone.\n\n3. We praise or blame others for their good or evil actions; and in our\nconduct toward them we show that we believe them to have been not merely\nfortunate or unfortunate, but praiseworthy or blameworthy. So far as we\nsuppose their wills to have been influenced by circumstances beyond their\ncontrol, we regard them with diminished approval or censure. On the other\nhand, we give the highest praise to those who have chosen the good amidst\nstrong temptations to evil, and bestow the severest censure on those who\nhave done evil with virtuous surroundings and influences. Now our judgment\nof others must of necessity be derived from our own consciousness, and if\nwe regard and treat them as freely willing beings, it can only be because\nwe know that our own wills are free.\n\nThese arguments, all derived from consciousness, can be directly met only\nby denying the validity of consciousness as a ground of belief. The\nopposing arguments are drawn from sources independent of consciousness.\n\n1. The most obvious objection to the freedom of the human will is derived\nfrom the power of motives. It is said, We never act without a motive; we\nalways yield to the strongest motive; and motives are not of our own\ncreation or choice, but are brought to bear upon us independently of our\nown action. There has been, from the creation until now, an unbroken\nseries of causes and effects, and we can trace every human volition to\nsome anterior cause or causes belonging to this inevitable series, so\nthat, in order for the volition to have been other than it was, some\nmember of this series must have been displaced.\n\nTo this it may be answered:\u2014\n\n(_a_) We are capable of acting without a motive, and we do so act in\nnumberless instances. It was a common saying among the Schoolmen, that an\nass, at equal distances from two equal bundles of hay, would starve to\ndeath for lack of a motive to choose either. But have we any motive\nwhatever in the many cases in which we choose\u2014sometimes after the vain\nendeavor to discover a ground of preference\u2014between two equally valuable,\nbeautiful, or appetizing objects, between two equally pleasant routes to\nthe same terminus, or between two equally agreeable modes of passing a\nleisure day or hour? Yet this choice, made without motive, may be a\nfruitful cause of motives that shall have a large influence in the future.\nThus, on the route which one chooses without any assignable reason, he may\nencounter persons or events that shall modify his whole plan of life. The\ninstances are by no means few, in which the most decisive results have\nensued upon a choice thus made entirely without motive.\n\n(_b_) Motives of equal strength act differently on different temperaments.\nThe same motive, when it stands alone, with no opposing motive, has not\nthe same effect on different minds. There is in the will of every human\nbeing a certain reluctance to action\u2014in some greater, in others\nless\u2014corresponding to the _vis inerti\u00e6_ in inanimate substances; and as\nthe impulse which will move a wooden ball may not suffice to move a leaden\nball, so the motive which will start into action a quick and sensitive\ntemperament, may produce no effect on a person of more sluggish nature.\nThus, among men utterly destitute of honesty, some are tempted by the most\npaltry opportunities for theft or fraud; others, not one whit more\nscrupulous, have their cupidity aroused only by the prospect of some\nsubstantial gain. So, too, some sincerely benevolent persons are moved to\ncharitable actions by the slightest needs and sufferings; others, equally\nkind and generous, have their sympathies excited only on grave occasions\nand by imperative claims. Motives, then, have not a determinate and\ncalculable strength, but a power which varies with the previous character\nof the person to whom they are addressed. Moreover, the greater or less\nsusceptibility to motives from without is not a difference produced by\neducation or surroundings; for it may be traced in children from the\nearliest development of character. Nor can it be hereditary; for it may be\nfound among children of the same parents, and not infrequently between\ntwins nurtured under precisely the same care, instruction, and discipline.\n\n(_c_) External motives are not the causes of action, but merely its\noccasions or opportunities. The cause of the action already exists in the\ncharacter of the agent, before the motive presents itself. A purse of gold\nthat may be stolen without detection is an irresistible motive to a thief,\nor to a person who, though not previously a thief, is covetous and\nunprincipled; but the same purse might lie in the way of an honest man\nevery day for a month, and it would not make him a thief. If I recognize\nthe presence of a motive, I must perform some action, whether exterior or\ninternal; but whether that action will be in accordance with the motive,\nor in the opposite direction, is determined by my previous character and\nhabits of action.\n\n(_d_) The objection which we are considering assumes, without sufficient\nreason, that the phenomena of human action are closely analogous to those\nof motion in the material world. The analogy fails in several particulars.\nNo material object can act on itself and change its own nature,\nadaptations, or uses, without any external cause; but the human mind can\nact upon itself without any external cause, as in repentance, serious\nreflection, religious purposes and aims. Then again, if two or more forces\nin different directions act upon a material object, its motion is not in\nthe direction of either, or with the momentum derived from either, but in\na direction and with a momentum resulting from the composition of these\nforces; whereas the human will, in the presence of two or more motives,\npursues the direction and yields to the force of but one of those motives.\nWe are not, then, authorized to reason about the power of motives from the\naction of material forces.\n\n(_e_) Were the arguments against the freedom of the will logically sound\nand unanswerable, they would be of no avail against the testimony of\nconsciousness. Axioms, intuitive beliefs, and truths of consciousness can\nbe neither proved nor disproved by reasoning; and the reasoning by which\nthey seem to be disproved only evinces that they are beyond the range and\nreach of argument. Thus it may be maintained with show of reason that\nmotion is impossible; for an object cannot move where it is, and cannot\nmove where it is not,\u2014a dilemma which does not disprove the reality of\nmotion, but simply indicates that the reality of motion, being an\nintuitive belief, neither needs nor admits logical proof.\n\n2. It is urged against the freedom of the human will that it is\ninconsistent with God\u2019s foreknowledge of future events, and thus\nrepresents the Supreme Being as not omniscient, and in that particular\nfinite and imperfect.\n\nTo this objection we reply:\u2014\n\n(_a_) If human freedom and the Divine foreknowledge of human acts are\nmutually incompatible, we must still retain the freedom of the will as a\ntruth of consciousness; for if we discredit our own consciousness, we\ncannot trust even the act of the understanding by which we set it aside,\nwhich act we know by the testimony of consciousness alone.\n\n(_b_) If the acts of a freely willing being cannot be foreknown, the\nignorance of them does not detract from the perfectness of the Supreme\nBeing. Omnipotence cannot make two and two five. Omnipotence cannot do\nwhat is intrinsically impossible. No more can Omniscience know what is\nintrinsically unknowable.\n\n(_c_) If God\u2019s foreknowledge is entire, it must include his own acts, no\nless than those of men. If his foreknowledge of men\u2019s acts is incompatible\nwith their freedom, then his foreknowledge of his own acts is incompatible\nwith his own freedom. We have, therefore, on the theory of necessity,\ninstead of a Supreme Will on the throne of the universe, mere fate or\ndestiny. This is equivalent to the denial of a personal God.\n\n(_d_) It cannot be proved that God\u2019s foreknowledge and man\u2019s free will are\nincompatible with each other. The most that we can say is that we do not\nfully see how they are to be reconciled, which is the case with many pairs\nof undoubted truths that might be named. But while a perfect explanation\nof the harmony of the Divine foreknowledge and human freedom is beyond the\nscope of our faculties, we may explain it in part, from our own\nexperience. Human foreknowledge extends very far and with a great degree\nof certainty, without abridging the freedom of those to whom it relates.\nWhen we can foresee outward events, we can often foretell, with little\ndanger of mistake, the courses of conduct to which they will give rise. In\nview of the extent and accuracy of human foresight, we cannot pronounce it\nimpossible, that He who possesses antecedent knowledge of the native\nconstitution of every human being, and of the shaping circumstances and\ninfluences to which each being is subjected, may foreknow men\u2019s acts, even\nthough their wills be entirely free.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter II.\n\n\nTHE SPRINGS OF ACTION.\n\n\nThere are certain elements of the human constitution, in part natural, in\npart acquired, which always prompt and urge men to action, without\nreference to the good or evil there may be in the action, and without\nreference to its ultimate effects on the actor\u2019s well-being. These are the\nAppetites, the Desires, and the Affections.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nThe Appetites.\n\n\nThe Appetites are cravings of the body, adapted, and undoubtedly designed,\nto secure the continued life of the individual and the preservation of the\nspecies. They are common to man with the lower orders of animals, with\nthis difference, that in man they may be controlled, directed, modified,\nin part suppressed, while in brutes they are uncontrollable, and always\ntend to the same modes of gratification.\n\nAppetite is intermittent. When gratified, it ceases for a time, and is\nrenewed for the same person nearly at the same intervals, and under\nsimilar circumstances. It is, while it lasts, an uneasy, even a painful\nsensation, and therefore demands prompt relief, and leads to action with a\nview to such relief. It is also a characteristic of appetite that its\nindulgence is attended, not merely by relief, but by positive pleasure.\n\nThe appetites are essential to the well-being of men, individually and\ncollectively. Were it not for the pain of hunger and thirst, and the\npleasure of gratifying them, both indolence and engrossing industry would\ndraw off the attention of men from their bodily needs; nourishment would\nbe taken irregularly, and with little reference to quality; and one would\noften become aware of his neglect only too late to arrest its\nconsequences. A similar remark applies to the appetite designed to secure\nthe preservation of the species. But for this, it may be doubted whether\nmen would willingly take upon themselves the cares, labors,\nresponsibilities, and contingent disappointments and sorrows involved in\nthe rearing of children.\n\nIn a life conformed to nature, hunger and thirst recur only when the body\nactually needs the supply which they crave. But stimulating food, by the\nreaction that follows strong excitement of any portion of the nervous\nsystem, may create hunger when there is no need of food, and in like\nmanner not only intoxicating, but highly stimulating liquids, may occasion\nan excessive, morbid, and injurious thirst.\n\nAppetite is modified by habit. There is hardly any substance so offensive\nthat it may not by use become agreeable, then an object of desire, and, at\nlength, of intense craving.\n\nThe craving for repose and that for muscular action, though not classed\namong the appetites, have all their characteristics, and serve similar\nends in the economy of human life. After a certain period of activity,\nrest is felt as a bodily necessity, as food is, after long fasting; and in\nlike manner, when the wearied muscles have had their due repose, there is\nan irresistible tendency to their exercise, without reference to any\nspecial employment or recreation. It is by the alternation of these\ntendencies that the active and industrious are saved from the ruinous\nconsequences of overtasked limbs or brain, and that the indolent are urged\nto the reluctant activity without which health and life itself would be\nsacrificed.\n\nThe appetites, being mere bodily impulses, and being all liable to excess\nor misdirection, need the control of the will, and of the principles of\naction by which the will is determined and regulated.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nThe Desires.\n\n\nThe Desires are distinguished from the Appetites, first, in their not\noriginating from the body; secondly, in their not being necessarily\nintermittent; and thirdly, in their tendency to increase indefinitely,\noften through the whole of life, and to gain strength by the attainment of\ntheir specific objects. If classified by their objects, they might seem\ntoo numerous to be specified; but they may all be embraced under the\ntitles of the Desire for Knowledge, for Society, for Esteem, for Power,\nand for Superiority. These all may be traced, in a more or less\nrudimentary form, in the inferior animals. Many of these animals show an\nactive curiosity. Many are gregarious in their native state, and most of\nthe domestic animals delight in the society of their kind; some take\nmanifest pleasure in human society; and the instances are by no means\nrare, in which animals, by nature mutually hostile, become strongly\nattached to each other, and render to each other the most friendly\nservices. The dog, the horse, and the cat evidently crave the esteem of\nhuman beings, and show tokens of genuine grief when they incur rebuke or\ndiscern tokens of disapproval. The dog maintains with watchful jealousy\nhis own authority in his own peculiar domain; and in the chase or on the\nrace-ground the dog and the horse are as emulous of success as their\nmasters.\n\n*1. The Desire of Knowledge.* This in the human being is manifested with\nthe earliest dawn of intelligence. The infant is busy with eye and hand\nthroughout his waking hours; and that the desire of knowledge is innate,\nand has no reference to the use that is to be made of the things known, is\nmanifest from the rapid growth of knowledge in the first years of life,\nbefore the child has any distinct conception of the uses of objects, or\nany conscious capacity of employing them for his own benefit. It may be\ndoubted whether in any subsequent year of life so much knowledge is\nacquired as during the first year. The child but a year old has learned\nthe nature of the familiar objects of the house and the street, the faces\nand names of a large number of relatives, domestics, and acquaintances,\nthe regular succession of seasons and events in daily domestic life, and\nthe meanings of most of the words that are addressed to him or employed\nconcerning him and the objects around him. In more advanced life this\ndesire grows by what it feeds on, and never ceases to be active. It\nassumes, indeed, different directions, in part determining, and in part\ndetermined by, condition, profession, or employment. Even in the most idle\nand frivolous, it is strong, often intense, though its objects be\nworthless. Such persons frequently are as sedulous in collecting the\npaltry gossip of society as the naturalist in acquiring the knowledge of\nnew species of plants or insects, and as ingenious in their inferences\nfrom what they see and hear as the philosopher in his inductions from the\nfacts of science.\n\nNot only in infancy, but through life, knowledge is sought evidently for\nits own sake, and not merely for its uses. But a very small part of what\none knows can be made of practical utility as to his own comfort or\nemolument. Many, indeed, voluntarily sacrifice ease, gain, position, in\nthe pursuit of science or literature. Fame, if it accrues, is not\nunwelcome; but by the higher order of minds fame is not pursued as an end,\nand there are many departments of knowledge in which little or no\nreputation is to be attained. Then, too, it is not the learner, but the\nteacher, not the profound scholar, merely, but the able expositor,\nspeaker, or writer, who can expect a distinguished name; while there are\nmany who content themselves with acquiring knowledge, without attempting\npublicity. Nor yet can benevolence account for the love of knowledge.\nMany, indeed, make their attainments the property of others, and are\nzealous in diffusing their own scientific views, or in dispensing\ninstruction in their own departments. But there are also many solitary,\nrecluse students; and it may be doubted whether, if a man who is earnestly\nengaged in any intellectual pursuit were shut out entirely from human\nsociety, and left alone with his books or with nature, his diligence would\nbe relaxed, or his ardor abated.\n\n*2. The Desire of Society.* This, also, is manifested so early as to show\nthat it is an original, and not an acquired principle. Little children\ndread solitude, crave the presence of familiar faces, and evince pleasure\nin the company of children of their own age. A child, reared in\ncomparative seclusion and silence, however tenderly, suffers often in\nhealth, always in mental vigor and elasticity; while in a large family,\nand in intimate association with companions of his own age, the individual\nchild has the fullest and most rapid development of all his powers. There\nis, indeed, in the lives of many children, a period when the presence of\nstrangers is unwelcome; but this state of feeling\u2014seldom of long\nduration\u2014can in most instances be traced to some sudden fright, harsh\nvoice, or imagined neglect or unkindness.\n\nThe natural course of human life proves that man is by the necessity of\nhis nature a social being. The young of other animals are at a very early\nperiod emancipated and forsaken by their parents, while the human child\nhas many years of dependence, and is hardly prepared to dispense with the\nshelter and kind offices of his native home, when he is moved to create a\nnew home of his own.\n\nThere is no pursuit in life in which a community of interest fails to give\nadded zest and energy. There is no possible ground of association on which\nsocieties are not formed, and the trivial, fictitious, or imaginary\npretences on which men thus combine, meet, and act in concert, are\nmanifest proofs of a social proclivity so strong as to create reasons for\nits indulgence where such reasons do not already exist. Even in science\nand in the most abstruse forms of erudition, men of learning seek mutual\ncountenance and encouragement, and readily suspend their solitary research\nand study for the opportunity of intercommunication on the subjects and\nobjects of their pursuit. The cases in which society is voluntarily\nshunned or forsaken are as rare as the cases of congenital disease or\ndeformity; and for every such instance there may generally be assigned\nsome grave, if not sufficient, cause. Religious asceticism has, indeed,\ninduced many persons, especially in the early Christian ages, to lead a\nsolitary life; but the c\u0153nobites have always vastly outnumbered the\nhermits; _monasteries_ (solitary abodes) have become _convents_\n(assemblages); and those who are shut out from the rest of the world find\ncomfort in social devotion, in the common refectory, and in those seasons\nof recreation when the law of silence is suspended. For prisoners solitary\nconfinement has been found deleterious both to body and mind, and this\nsystem, instituted with philanthropic purpose, and commended on grounds\nthat seemed intimately connected with the reformation of the guilty, is\nnow generally repudiated as doing violence to human nature. Even for the\ninsane, society, with judicious classification and restriction, is an\nessential part of curative treatment, and the success of asylums, as\ncompared with the most skilful and humane private treatment, is due in\ngreat part to the social element.\n\nIt cannot be maintained that the desire of society results from fear, and\nfrom the felt need of mutual protection; for it exists in full at the most\nfearless periods of life, and among those who are the least timid, and is\nequally manifest in the strong and the weak, in those who can proffer and\nin those who might crave protection.\n\n*3. The Desire of Esteem.* It is almost superfluous to say that this is a\nnative and indestructible element of the human constitution. Its first\nmanifestations bear even date with the earliest displays of intelligence\nand affection. To the infant, approval is reward; rebuke, even by look, is\npunishment. The hope of esteem is the most healthful and effective\nstimulant in the difficult tasks of childhood and of school-life. Under\nthe discipline of parents both wise and good, it is among the most\nimportant and salutary means of moral discipline. It is seldom deficient\nin young persons. Their chief danger lies in its excess; for when it is\ntoo strongly developed, it inclines them to seek at all hazards the\napproval of their associates for the time being. Hence the chief danger\nfrom vicious or unscrupulous associates. The first steps in vice are\noftener prompted, no doubt, by the desire for the complacent regard of\none\u2019s companions than by an antecedent disposition to evil. Indeed, the\nconfession is often made, that these steps were taken with compunction and\nhorror, solely from the fear of ridicule and from the desire to win the\napproval and favor of older transgressors.\n\nOn the other hand, the desire of the esteem of good men is one of the\nstrongest auxiliary motives to virtue; while a yearning for the Divine\napproval forms an essential part of true piety towards God.\n\n*4. The Desire of Power.* This is manifested in every period of life, and\nin the exercise of every faculty, bodily, mental, and moral. It is this\nwhich gives us pleasure in solitary exercises of physical strength, in\nclimbing mountains, swimming, lifting heavy weights, performing difficult\ngymnastic feats. It is this, more than deliberate cruelty, that induces\nboys to torture animals, or to oppress and torment their weaker or more\ntimid companions.\n\nIn intellectual pursuits, the love of power leads to many exercises and\nefforts that have no ulterior result. The mathematician will turn aside\nfrom his course of study to master a problem, which involves no new\nprinciple, but is merely difficult and perplexing. The reading of books\nobscurely written, or in languages that task the utmost power of analysis,\nfrequently has no other result, and probably no other object, than the\ntrial of strength. What can be attained only by strenuous mental labor, is\nfor that very reason sought, even if it promise no utility.\n\nIn the affairs of practical life, every man desires to make his influence\nfelt. With persons of the highest character, the love of power is manifest\nin connection with the aim to be useful. Even the most modest men, while\nthey may spurn flattery, are gladdened by knowing that they are acting\nupon the wills and shaping the characters of those around them.\n\nThe love of property belongs in great part under this head. Money is\npower, pre\u00ebminently so at the present day. Property confers influence, and\nputs at one\u2019s command resources that may be the means of extended and\ngrowing power alike over inanimate nature and the wills of men. Avarice,\nor the desire of money for its own sake, is not an original desire. Few or\nnone are avaricious in very early life. But money, first sought for the\npower it confers, from being a means becomes an end, to such a degree\nthat, in order to possess it, the miser will forego the very uses for\nwhich he at the outset learned to value it.\n\n*5. The Desire of Superiority.* This is so nearly universal in all\nconditions of society, and at all periods of life, that it must be\nregarded as an original element of human nature. Without it there would be\nlittle progress. In every department of life, men stimulate one another\ntoward a higher standard of endeavor, attainment, or excellence. What each\ndoes, his neighbor would fain outdo; what each becomes, his neighbor would\nfain surpass. It is only by perversion that this desire tends to evil. It\nfinds its proper satisfaction, not in crushing, depressing, or injuring a\nrival, but barely in overtaking and excelling him; and the higher his\npoint of attainment, the greater is the complacency experienced in\nreaching and transcending it. On the race-ground, I do not want to compete\nwith a slow runner, nor will it afford me the slightest satisfaction to\nwin the race by tripping up my competitor; what I want is to match myself\nwith the best runner on a fair field, and to show myself his equal or\nsuperior. The object striven for is the individual\u2019s own ideal, and those\nwhom he successively passes on his course mark but successive stages on\nhis progress toward that ideal. Thus, in the pursuit of moral excellence,\nit is only a mean and a bad man who can imagine that he gains anything by\ndetracting from the merit of others; but he who is sincerely contending\nfor a high place among virtuous men, rejoices in the signal examples of\ngoodness of every kind which it is his privilege to emulate, and rejoices\nmost of all that the ideal of perfect excellence\u2014once only actualized in\nhuman form\u2014is so pure and lofty that it may be his life-work to approach\nit without reaching it.\n\nEmulation is not envy, nor need it lead to envy. Among those who strive\nfor superiority there need be no collision. The natural desire is to _be_,\nnot to _seem_, superior; to have the consciousness, not the mere outward\nsemblance, of high attainment; and of attainment, not by a conventional,\nbut by an absolute standard; and this aim excludes none,\u2014there may be as\nmany first places as there are deserving candidates for them. Then, too,\nthere is so wide a diversity of ideals, both in degree and in kind, there\nare so many different ruling aims, and so many different routes by which\nthese aims are pursued, that there need be little danger of mutual\ninterference. Even as regards external rewards, so far as they depend on\nthe bounty of nature, the constitution of society, or the general esteem\nand good will of men, the success of one does not preclude the equal\nsuccess of many; but, on the other hand, the merited prosperity and honor\nof the individual cannot fail to be of benefit to the whole community. It\nis only in offices contingent on election or appointment that the aspirant\nincurs a heavy risk of failure; but when we consider how meanly men are\noften compelled to creep into office and to grovel in it, it can hardly be\nsupposed that a genuine desire of superiority holds a prominent place\namong the motives of these who are willingly dependent on patronage or on\npopular suffrage.\n\nThese desires, according as one or another has the ascendency, prompt to\naction, without reference to the good or the evil there may be in the\naction; and they therefore need the control of reason, and of the\nprinciples which reason recognizes in the government of conduct.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nThe Affections.\n\n\n*The Affections are distinguished from the Desires*, mainly in these two\nparticulars: first, that the Desires are for impersonal objects, the\nAffections, for persons; and secondly, that the Desires prompt to actions\nthat have a direct reference to one\u2019s self; the Affections, to actions\nthat have a direct reference to others.\n\nThe Affections are *benevolent* or *malevolent*.\n\n1. The *benevolent affections* are Love, Reverence, Gratitude, Kindness,\nPity, and Sympathy.\n\n*Love* needs no definition, and admits of none. It probably never exists\nuncaused; though it survives all real or imagined ground for it, and in\nsome cases seems rendered only the more intense by the admitted\nunworthiness of its object. When it is not the reason for marriage, it can\nhardly fail to grow from the conjugal relation between one man and one\nwoman, if the mutual duties belonging to that relation be held sacred. It\nis inconceivable that a mother should not love her child, inevitably cast\nupon her protection from the first moment of his being; the father who\nextends a father\u2019s care over his children finds in that care a constant\nsource of love; and the children, waking into conscious life under the\nministries of parental benignity and kindness, have no emotion so early,\nand no early emotion so strong, as filial love. It may be doubted whether\nthere is among the members of the same family a _natural_ affection,\nindependent of relations practically recognized in domestic life. It is\nvery certain that at both extremities of the social scale family affection\nis liable to be impaired, on the one hand, by the delegation of parental\nduties to hirelings, and, on the other, by the inability to render them\nconstantly and efficiently. We may observe also a difference in family\naffection, traceable indirectly to the influence of climate. Out-of-door\nlife is unfavorable to the intimate union of families; while domestic love\nis manifestly the strongest in those countries where the shelter and\nhearth of the common home are necessary for a large portion of the year.\n\n*Friendship* is but another name for love between persons unconnected by\ndomestic relations, actual or prospective.\n\n*Love for the Supreme Being*, or piety, differs not in kind from the\nchild\u2019s love for the parent; but it rightfully transcends all other love,\ninasmuch as the benefits received from God include and surpass all other\nbenefits. To awake, then, to a consciousness of our actual relation to\nGod, is \u201cto love Him with all the heart, and with all the understanding,\nand all the soul, and all the strength.\u201d\n\n*Reverence* is the sentiment inspired by advanced superiority in such\ntraits of mind and character as we regard with complacency in ourselves,\nor with esteem in our equals. Qualities which we do not esteem we may\nbehold with _admiration_ (that is, wonder), but not with reverence. Our\nreverence for age is not for advanced years alone, but for the valuable\nexperience which they are supposed to have given, and especially for the\nmaturity of excellence which belongs to the old age of good men, of which\ntheir features generally bear the impress, and which, in the absence of\nknowledge, we are prone to ascribe to a venerable mien and aspect. A\nfoolish or wicked old man commands no reverence by his years.\n\nGod, as possessing in infinite fulness all the properties which we revere\nin man, must ever be the worthy object of supreme reverence.\n\nGratitude, though it can hardly be disjoined from love, is seldom\ncherished for the same person in the same degree with love. We love our\nbeneficiaries more than our benefactors. We love those dependent upon us\nmore than those on whom we depend. The mother\u2019s love for her child is the\nstrongest of human affections, and undoubtedly exceeds that even of the\nchild for the mother to whom he owes every benefit and blessing under\nheaven. We may be fervently grateful to persons whom we have never seen;\nbut there cannot be much vividness in our love for them. Love to God, whom\nwe have not seen, needs to be kindled, renewed, and sustained by gratitude\nfor the incessant flow of benefits from Him, and by the promise\u2014contingent\non character\u2014of blessings immeasurable and everlasting.\n\n*Kindness* is benevolence for one\u2019s _kind_,\u2014a delight in their happiness\nand well-being, a readiness to perform friendly offices whenever and\nhowever they may be needed. In its lower forms it is designated as _good\nnature_; when intense and universal, it is termed _philanthropy_. It\nbefits the individual man as a member of a race of kindred, and is deemed\nso essential an attribute of the human character, that he who utterly\nlacks it is branded as _inhuman_, while its active exercise in the relief\nof want and suffering is emphatically termed _humanity_.\n\nPity is the emotion occasioned by the sight or knowledge of distress or\npain. While without it there can be no genuine kindness, it may exist\nwithout kindness. There are persons tenderly sensitive to every form of\nsuffering, who yet feel only for the sufferer, not with him, and who would\nregard and treat him coldly or harshly, if he were not a sufferer. In such\ncases, pity would seem to be a selfish feeling; and there can be no doubt\nthat some men relieve distress and poverty, as they would remove weeds\nfrom a flower-bed, because they are offensive to the sight.\n\n*Sympathy* is feeling, not for, but with others.(1) It has for its objects\nsuccesses and joys, no less than sufferings and sorrows; and probably is\nas real and intense in the case of the former as of the latter, though its\nnecessity is less felt and its offices are less prized in happy than in\nsad experiences. Kindness alone cannot produce sympathy. In order to feel\nwith another, we must either have passed through similar experiences, or\nmust have an imagination sufficiently vivid to make them distinctly\npresent to our thought. This latter power is by no means necessary to\ncreate even the highest degree of kindness or of pity; and among the most\nactive and persevering in works of practical beneficence, there are many\nwho feel intensely for, yet but faintly with, the objects of their\ncharity. On the other hand, sympathy sometimes finds its chief exercise in\nsensational literature, and there are persons, profoundly moved by\nfictitious representations of distress, who yet remain inactive and\nindifferent as regards the real needs and sufferings around them that\ncrave relief.\n\n2. The *malevolent affections* are Anger, Resentment, Envy, Revenge, and\nHatred.\n\n*Anger* is the sense of indignation occasioned by real or imagined wrong.\nWhen excited by actual wrong-doing, and when contained within reasonable\nbounds, it is not only innocent, but salutary. It intensifies the virtuous\nfeeling which gives it birth; and its due expression is among the\nsafeguards of society against corruption and evil. But when indulged\nwithout sufficient cause, or suffered to become excessive or to outlast\nits occasion, it is in itself evil, and it may lead to any and every form\nof social injustice, and of outrage against the rights of man and the law\nof God.\n\n*Resentment* is the feeling excited by injury done to ourselves. This also\nis innocent and natural, when its occasion is sufficient, and its limits\nreasonable. It may prevent the repetition of injury, and the spontaneous\ntendency to it, which is almost universal, is an efficient defence against\ninsult, indignity, and encroachment on the rights of individuals. But,\nindulged or prolonged beyond the necessity of self-defence, it is prone to\nreverse the parties, and to make the injured person himself the\nwrong-doer.\n\nBoth anger and resentment are *painful emotions*, and on this account are\nself-limited in a well-ordered mind. He who makes happiness his aim will,\nif wise, give these disturbing forces the least possible hold upon him,\nwhether in intensity or in duration.\n\n*Envy* has been defined as the excess of emulation. It seems rather to be\na deficiency in the genuine principle of emulation. The instinctive desire\nof superiority leads us, as we have seen, to aim at _absolutely_ high\nattainments, and to measure ourselves less by what others are, than by our\nown ideal. It is only those of lower aims, who seek to supplant others on\ntheir career. Envy is the attempt, not to rise or excel, but to stand\ncomparatively high by subverting those who hold or seek a higher position.\nNo just man voted for the banishment of Aristides because he was always\ncalled the Just; but his ostracism was the decree of those who knew that\nthey could obtain no reputation for justice till he were put out of their\nway.\n\n*Revenge* is the desire to inflict evil for evil. In principle it is\nalways wrong; for the evil-doer, though he may merit transient anger and\nresentment, is not therefore placed beyond our benevolence, but is rather\ncommended to our charity as one who may be reformed and may become worthy\nof our esteem. In practice, revenge can scarce ever be just. Our self-love\nso exaggerates our estimate of the wrong we receive, that we could hardly\nfail to retaliate by greater wrong, and thus to provoke a renewal of the\ninjury. There are, no doubt, cases in which self-defence may authorize the\nimmediate chastisement or disabling of the wrong-doer, and in an unsettled\nstate of society, where there is no legal protection, it may be the right\nof individuals to punish depredation or personal outrage; but acts of this\nkind are to be justified on the plea of necessity, not of revenge.\n\n*Hatred* is the result of either of the malevolent affections above named,\nwhen carried to excess, or suffered to become permanent. It precludes the\nexercise of all the benevolent affections. No man can rightfully be the\nobject of hatred; for there is no man who has not within him some element\nor possibility of good, none who has not rights that should be respected,\nnone who is not entitled to pity for his sufferings, and, still more, for\nhis sins.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nThe affections, benevolent and malevolent, are common to man with lower\nanimals. Love and hatred are manifested by all of them whose habits are\nopen to our inspection; anger, by not a few; gratitude, kindness, pity,\nsympathy, resentment, and revenge, by the more intelligent; envy, by those\nmost completely domesticated; reverence, perhaps, by the dog towards his\nmaster.\n\nThe affections all prompt to action, and do not discriminate the qualities\nof actions. Hence they need the control and guidance of reason, and can\nsafely be indulged only in accordance with the principles which reason\nrecognizes as supreme in the conduct of life.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter III.\n\n\nTHE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.\n\n\nThe appetites, desires, and affections constitute the *impelling force* in\nall action. Were we not possessed of them, we should not act. There is no\nact of any kind, good or bad, noble or base, mental or bodily, of which\none or another of them is not the proximate cause. They are also\nimperative in their demands. They crave immediate action,\u2014the appetites,\nin procuring or using the means of bodily gratification; the desires, in\nthe increase of their objects; the affections, in seeking or bestowing\ntheir appropriate tokens or expressions, whether good or evil. Were there\nno check, the specific appetite, desire, or affection to which\ncircumstances gave the ascendency for the time being, would act in its\nappropriate direction, until counteracted by another, brought into\nsupremacy by a new series of circumstances. This is the case with brutes,\nso far as we can observe their modes of action. Here, in man, reason\nintervenes, and takes cognizance of the tendencies and the qualities of\nactions.\n\n*Reason* considers actions under two points of view,\u2014interest and\nobligation,\u2014expediency and right. The questions which we inwardly ask\nconcerning actions all resolve themselves into one of these,\u2014Is the act\nuseful or desirable for me? or, Is it my right or my duty? He who is wont\nto ask the former of these questions is called a prudent man; he who\nhabitually asks the latter is termed a virtuous or good man. He who asks\nneither of them yields himself, after the manner of the brutes, to the\npromptings of appetite, desire, and affection, and thus far omits to\nexercise the reason which distinguishes him from the brutes.\n\nThere can be no doubt that *expediency and right coincide*. Under the\ngovernment of Supreme Benevolence, it is impossible that what ought to be\ndone should not conduce to the welfare of him who does it. But its\nbeneficent results may be too remote for him to trace them, nay, may\nbelong to a life beyond death, to which human cognizance does not reach;\nwhile what ought not to be done may promise substantial benefit so far as\nman\u2019s foresight extends. Then, too, it is at least supposable that there\nmay be cases, in which, were they solitary cases, expediency might diverge\nfrom right, yet in which, because they belong to a class, it is for the\ninterest of society and of every individual member of society that general\nlaws should be obeyed. It is obvious also, that there are many cases, in\nwhich the calculation of expediency involves details too numerous and too\ncomplicated to be fully understood by a mind of ordinary discernment,\nwhile the same mind can clearly perceive what course of conduct is in\naccordance with the strict rule of right. Still farther, in a question of\nconduct in which appetite, desire, or affection is concerned, we cannot\ntake as calm and dispassionate a view of our true interest, as we should\nof the interest of another person in like case. The impelling force may be\nso strong, that for the time being we sincerely regard it as\nexpedient\u2014though we know that it is not right\u2014to yield to it.\n\nFor these reasons there is an *apparent conflict between the useful and\nthe right*. Though a perfectly wise and dispassionate man might give\nprecisely the same answer in every instance to the question of interest\nand that of duty, men, limited and influenced as they are, can hardly fail\nin many instances to answer these questions differently. The man who makes\nhis own imagined good his ruling aim does many things which he would not\ndefend on the ground of right; the man who determines always to do right\nsometimes performs acts of reputed and conscious self-denial and\nself-sacrifice.\n\nNor yet can more *general* considerations of *expediency*, reference to\nthe good of others, to the greatest good of the greatest number, serve as\na guide to the right or a test of the right. We have less foresight as\nregards others than as regards ourselves; the details involved in the true\ninterest of any community, society, or number of persons, are necessarily\nmore numerous and complicated than those involved in our own well-being;\nand, if not appetite or desire, the benevolent or malevolent affections\nare fully as apt to warp our judgment and to misdirect our conduct in the\ncase of others as in our own case.\n\nWe perceive then that *expediency*, whether with reference to ourselves or\nto others, *is not a trustworthy rule of conduct*. Yet while it cannot\nhold the first place, it occupies an important place; for there are many\ncases in which the question before us is not what we ought to do, but what\nit is best for us to do. Thus, if there be several acts, all equally\nright, only one of which can be performed, we are evidently entitled to\nperform the act which will be most pleasing or useful to ourselves. If\nthere be an end which it is our right or duty to attain, and there be\nseveral equally innocent modes of attaining it, the question for us is, by\nwhich of these modes we may find the least difficulty or gain the highest\nenjoyment or advantage. If there be several duties incumbent upon us at\nthe same time and place, all of which have equal intrinsic claims, yet one\nof which must necessarily take precedence of the rest, the question which\nshall have precedence is a question of expediency, that by which we may do\nthe most good being the foremost duty.\n\n*Expediency is not a characteristic of actions.* An act is not in itself\nexpedient or inexpedient, but is made one or the other by varying\ncircumstances alone; while there are acts in themselves good which no\npossible circumstances could make bad, and there are acts in themselves\nbad which no possible circumstances could make good. If, therefore, there\nbe a science which has for its province the intrinsic qualities of\nactions, questions of expediency have no place in such a science.\n\n*Moral Philosophy, or Ethics* (synonymous terms), is the science which\ntreats of human actions. The term _morals_ is often applied to external\nactions; but always with reference to the intentions from which they\nproceed. We can conceive of the treatment of actions under various\naspects, as wise or unwise, agreeable or disagreeable, spontaneous or\ndeliberate; but by the common consent of mankind, at least of the\ncivilized and enlightened portion of mankind, the distinction of actions\nas right or wrong is regarded as of an importance so far transcending all\nother distinctions, as to render them of comparatively little moment.\nTherefore Moral Philosophy confines itself to this single distinction, and\ntakes cognizance of others, only as they modify this, or are modified by\nit. The questions which Moral Philosophy asks and answers are these:\u2014What\nconstitutes the right? How is it to be ascertained? Wherein lies the\nobligation to the right? What are the motives to right action? What\nspecific actions, or classes of actions are right, and why? What specific\nactions, or classes of actions are wrong, and why?\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter IV.\n\n\nTHE RIGHT.\n\n\nEvery object, by virtue of its existence, has its *appropriate place,\npurpose, uses, and relations*. At every moment, each specific object is\neither in or out of its place, fulfilling or not fulfilling its purpose,\nsubservient to or alienated from its uses, in accordance or out of harmony\nwith its relations, and therefore in a state of _fitness_ or _unfitness_\nas regards other objects. Every object is at every moment under the\ncontrol of the intelligent will of the Supreme Being, or of some finite\nbeing, and is by that will maintained either in or out of its place,\npurpose, uses, or relations, and thus in a state of fitness or unfitness\nwith regard to other objects. Every intelligent being, by virtue of his\nexistence, bears certain definite relations to outward objects, to his\nfellow-beings, and to his Creator. At every moment, each intelligent being\nis either faithful or unfaithful to these relations, and thus in a state\nof fitness or unfitness as regards outward objects and other beings. Thus\nfitness or unfitness may be affirmed, at every moment, of every object in\nexistence, of the volition by which each object is controlled, and of\nevery intelligent being, with regard to the exercise of his will toward or\nupon outward objects or his fellow-beings. Fitness and unfitness are the\nultimate ideas that are involved in the terms _right_ and _wrong_. These\nlast are metaphorical terms,\u2014right (Latin, _rectus_), straight, upright,\naccording to rule, and therefore _fit_; wrong, _wrung_, distorted,\ndeflected, twisted out of place, contrary to rule, and therefore _unfit_.\nWe are so constituted that we cannot help regarding fitness with\ncomplacency and esteem; unfitness, with disesteem and disapproval, even\nthough we ourselves create it or impersonate it.\n\n*Fitness* is the only standard by which we regard our own actions or the\nactions of others as good or evil,\u2014by which we justify or condemn\nourselves or others. Duty has fitness for its only aim and end. To\nwhatever object comes under our control, its fit place, purpose, uses, and\nrelations are _due_; and our perception of what is thus due constitutes\nour _duty_, and awakens in us a sense of obligation. To ourselves, and to\nother beings and objects, our fidelity to our relations has in it an\nintrinsic fitness; that fitness is _due_ to them and to ourselves; and our\nperception of what is thus due constitutes our _duty_, and awakens in us a\nsense of obligation.\n\n*Right and wrong are not contingent on the knowledge of the moral agent.*\nUnfitness, misuse, abuse, is none the less intrinsically wrong, because it\nis the result of ignorance. It is out of harmony with the fitness of\nthings. It deprives an object of its due use. It perverts to pernicious\nresults what is salutary in its purpose. It lessens for the agent his\naggregate of good and of happiness, and increases for him his aggregate of\nevil and of misery. In this sense\u2014far more significant than that of\narbitrary infliction\u2014the well-known maxim of jurisprudence, \u201cIgnorance of\nthe law excuses no one,\u201d(2) is a fundamental law of nature.\n\nThere is, however, an important distinction between *absolute and relative\nright*. In action, the absolute right is conduct in entire conformity with\nbeings and objects as they are; the relative right is conduct in\naccordance with beings and objects as, with the best means of knowledge\nwithin our reach, we believe them to be. The Omniscient Being alone can\nhave perfect knowledge of all beings and things as they are. This\nknowledge is possessed by men in different degrees, corresponding to their\nrespective measures of intelligence, sagacity, culture, and personal or\ntraditional experience. In the ruder conditions of society, acts that seem\nto us atrociously wrong, often proceed from honest and inevitable\nmisapprehension, are right in their intention, and are therefore proper\nobjects of moral approbation. In an advanced condition of intelligence,\nand especially under high religious culture, though the realm of things\nunknown far exceeds that of things known, there is a sufficiently clear\nunderstanding of the objects and relations of ordinary life to secure men\nagainst sins of ignorance, and to leave in their wrong-doing no semblance\nor vestige of right.\n\nThe distinction between absolute and relative right enables us to\n*reconcile two statements that may have seemed inconsistent* with each\nother, namely, that \u201cthe character of an action, whether good or bad,\ndepends on the intention of the agent,\u201d and \u201cthat unfitness, misuse,\nabuse, is none the less wrong because the result of ignorance.\u201d Both these\npropositions are true. The same act may be in intent right and good, and\nyet, through defect of knowledge, wrong and evil; and it may, in virtue of\nits good intent, be attended and followed by beneficent results, while at\nthe same time the evil that there is in it may be attended or followed by\ninjurious consequences. We may best illustrate this double character of\nactions by a case so simple that we can see through it at a single glance.\nI will suppose that I carry to a sick person a potion which I believe to\nbe an efficient remedy, but which, by a mistake for which I am not\naccountable, proves to be a deadly poison. My act, by the standard of\nabsolute right, is an unfitting and therefore a wrong act, and it has its\ninevitable result in killing the patient. But because my intention was\nright, I have not placed myself in any wrong relation to God or man. Nay,\nif I procured what I supposed to be a healing potion with care, cost, and\ntrouble, and for one whose suffering and need were his only claim upon me,\nI have by my labor of love brought myself into an even more intimate\nrelation, filial and fraternal, with God and man, the result of which must\nbe my enhanced usefulness and happiness. If on the other hand I had meant\nto poison the man, but had by mistake given him a healing potion, my act\nwould have been absolutely right, because conformed to the fitness of\nthings, but relatively wrong, because in its intention and purpose opposed\nto the fitness of things; and as in itself fitting, it would have done the\nsick man good, while, as in its purpose unfitting, it would have thrown me\nout of the relations in which I ought to stand both with God and man.\n\n*Mistakes as to specific acts of duty* bear the closest possible analogy\nto the case of the poison given for medicine. The savage, who sincerely\nmeans to express reverence, kindness, loyalty, fidelity, may perform, in\nthe expression of those sentiments, acts that are utterly unfitting, and\ntherefore utterly wrong; and if so, each of these acts produces its due\nconsequences, it may be, baleful and lamentable. Yet because he did the\nbest he knew in the expression of these sentiments, he has not sunk, but\nrisen in his character as a moral being,\u2014has become better and more\ncapable of good.\n\n*Ignorance of the right*, however, *is innocent, only when inevitable*. At\nthe moment of action, indeed, what seems to me fitting is relatively\nright, and were I to do otherwise, even though my act were absolutely\nright, it would be relatively wrong. But if I have had and neglected the\nmeans of knowing the right, I have violated the fitnesses of my own nature\nby not employing my cognitive powers on subjects of vital importance to my\nwell-being. In this case, though what are called the sins of ignorance may\nbe mistakes and not sins, the ignorance itself has all the characteristics\nthat attach themselves to the term _sin_, and must be attended with\nproportionally *harmful consequences to the offender*.\n\n\n\n\n\n                                Chapter V.\n\n\nMEANS AND SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO RIGHT AND WRONG.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nConscience.\n\n\n*Conscience is a means*, not a source, *of knowledge*. It is analogous to\nsight and hearing. It is the power of perceiving fitness and unfitness.\nYet more, it is consciousness,\u2014a sense of our own personal relation to the\nfitting and the unfitting, of our power of actualizing them in intention,\nwill, and conduct. It is in this last particular that man differs from the\nlower animals. They have an instinctive perception of fitness, and an\ninstinctive impulse to acts befitting their nature. But no brute says to\nhimself, \u201cI am acting in accordance with the fitness of things;\u201d while man\nvirtually says to himself, in every act, \u201cI am doing what it is fit for me\nto do,\u201d or, \u201cI am doing what it is unfitting for me to do.\u201d\n\n*Conscience is a judicial faculty.* Its decisions are based upon such\nknowledge as the individual has, whether real or imagined, and from\nwhatever source derived. It judges according to such law and evidence as\nare placed before it. Its verdict is always relatively right, a genuine\nverdict (_verum dictum_), though, by the absolute standard of right, it\nmay be wrong, through defect of knowledge,\u2014precisely as in a court of law\nan infallibly wise and incorruptibly just judge may pronounce an utterly\nerroneous or unjust decision, if he have before him a false statement of\nfacts, or if the law which he is compelled to administer be unrighteous.\n\nWe may *illustrate the function of conscience* by reference to a question\nnow agitated in our community,\u2014the question as to the moral fitness of the\nmoderate use of fermented liquors. In civilized society, intoxication is\nuniversally known to be opposed to the fitnesses of body and mind, an\nabuse of alcoholic liquors, and an abuse of the drinker\u2019s own personality;\nand it is therefore condemned by all consciences, by none more heartily\nthan by those of its victims. But there still remains open the question\nwhether entire abstinence from fermented liquors be a duty, and this is a\nquestion of fact. Says one party, \u201cAlcohol, in every form, and in the\nleast quantity, is a virulent poison, and therefore unfit for body and\nmind.\u201d Says the other party, \u201cWine, moderately used, is healthful,\nsalutary, restorative, and therefore fitted to body and mind.\u201d Change the\nopinion of the latter party, their consciences would at once take the\nother side; and if they retained in precept and practice their present\nposition, they would retain it self-condemned. Change the opinion of the\nformer party, their consciences would assume the ground which they now\nassail. Demonstrate to the whole community\u2014as it is to be hoped physiology\nwill do at no distant day\u2014the precise truth in this matter, there would\nremain no difference of conscientious judgment, whatever difference of\npractice might still continue.\n\n*Conscience*, like all the perceptive faculties, *prompts to action in\naccordance with its perceptions*. In this respect it differs not in the\nleast from sight, hearing, taste. Our natural proclivity is to direct our\nmovements with reference to the objects within the field of our vision, to\ngovern our conduct by what we hear, to take into our mouths only\nsubstances that are pleasing to the taste. Yet fright, temerity, or\ncourage may impel us to incur dangers which we clearly see; opiniativeness\nor obstinacy may make us inwardly deaf to counsels or warnings which we\nhear; and motives of health may induce us to swallow the most nauseous\ndrugs. In like manner, our inevitable tendency is to govern our conduct by\nthe fitness of things when clearly perceived; but intense and unrestrained\nappetite, desire, or affection may lead us to violate that fitness, though\ndistinctly seen and acknowledged.\n\n*Men act in opposition to conscience only under immediate and strong\ntemptation.* The great majority of the acts of bad men are conscientious,\nbut not therefore meritorious; for merit consists not in doing right when\nthere is no temptation to evil, but in resisting temptation. But, as has\nbeen said, it is as natural, when there is no inducement to the contrary,\nto act in accordance with the fitness of things, as it is to act in\naccordance with what we see and hear. It is the tendency so to act, that\nalone renders human society possible, in the absence of high moral\nprinciple. In order to live, a man must so act with reference to outward\nnature; still more must he so act, in order to possess human fellowship,\nphysical comfort, transient enjoyment, of however low a type; and the most\ndepraved wretch that walks the earth purchases his continued being and\nwhatever pleasure he derives from it by a thousand acts in accordance with\nthe fitness of things to one in which he violates that fitness.\n\n*Conscience*, like all the perceptive faculties, *is educated by use*. The\nwatchmaker\u2019s or the botanist\u2019s eye acquires an almost microscopic keenness\nof vision. The blind man\u2019s hearing is so trained as to supply, in great\npart, the lack of sight. The epicure\u2019s taste can discriminate flavors\nwhose differences are imperceptible to an ordinary palate. In like manner,\nthe conscience that is constantly and carefully exercised in judging of\nthe fit and the unfitting, the right and the wrong, becomes prompt, keen,\nsearching, sensitive, comprehensive, microscopic. On the other hand,\nconscience, like the senses, if seldom called into exercise, becomes\nsluggish, inert, incapable of minute discrimination, or of vigilance over\nthe ordinary conduct of life. Yet it is never extinct, and is never\nperverted. When roused to action, even in the most obdurate, it resumes\nits judicial severity, and records its verdict in remorseful agony.\n\nConscience is commonly said to be educated by *the increase of knowledge*\nas to the relations of beings and objects, as to the moral laws of the\nuniverse, and as to religious verities. This, however, is not true.\nKnowledge does not necessarily quicken the activity of conscience, or\nenhance its discriminating power. Conscience often is intense and vivid in\nthe most ignorant, inactive and torpid in persons whose cognitive powers\nhave had the most generous culture. Knowledge, indeed, brings the\ndecisions of conscience into closer and more constant conformity with the\nabsolute right, but it does not render its decisions more certainly in\naccordance with the relative right, that is, with what the individual,\nfrom his point of view, ought to will and do. It has the same effect upon\nconscience that accurate testimony has upon the clear-minded and uncorrupt\njudge, whose mind is not made thereby the more active or discriminating,\nnor his decision brought into closer accordance with the facts as they are\npresented to him. Knowledge is indeed an indispensable auxiliary to\nconscience; but this cannot be affirmed exclusively of any specific\ndepartment of knowledge. It is true of all knowledge; for there is no fact\nor law in the universe that may not in some contingency become the\nsubject-matter or the occasion for the action of conscience. Nothing could\nseem more remote from the ordinary field of conscience than the theory of\nplanetary motion; yet it was this that gave Galileo the one grand\nopportunity of his life for testing the supremacy of conscience,\u2014it may\nbe, the sole occasion on which his conscience uttered itself strongly\nagainst his seeming interest, and one on which obedience to conscience\nwould have averted the only cloud that ever rested on his fame.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nSources Of Knowledge. 1. Observation, Experience, And Tradition.\n\n\nExcept so far as there may have been direct communications from the\nSupreme Being, all *man\u2019s knowledge* of persons, objects, and relations\n*is derived*, in the last resort, *from observation*. Experience is merely\nremembered self-observation. Tradition, oral and written, is accumulated\nand condensed observation; and by means of this each new generation can\navail itself of the experience of preceding generations, can thus find\ntime to explore fresh departments of knowledge, and so transmit its own\ntraditions to the generations that shall follow. Now what we observe in\nobjects is chiefly their properties, or, what is the same thing, their\n_fitnesses_; for a property is that which fits an object for a specific\nplace or use. What we observe in persons is their relations to other\nbeings and objects, with the fitnesses that belong to those relations.\nWhat we experience all resolves itself into the fitness or unfitness of\npersons and objects to one *another* or to ourselves. What is transmitted\nin history and in science is the record of fitnesses or unfitnesses that\nhave been ascertained by observation, or tested by experience. The\nprogress of knowledge is simply an enlarged acquaintance with the\nfitnesses of persons and things. He knows the most, who most fully\ncomprehends the relations in which the beings and objects in the universe\nstand, have stood, and ought to stand toward one another. Moreover, as\nwhen we see a fitness within our sphere of action, we perceive intuitively\nthat it is right to respect it, wrong to violate it, our knowledge of\nright and wrong is co-extensive with our knowledge of persons and things.\nThe more enlightened and cultivated a nation is, then, the more does it\nknow as to right and wrong, whatever may be its standard of practical\nmorality.\n\nFor instance, in the most savage condition, men know, with reference to\ncertain articles of *food and drink*, that they are adapted to relieve the\ncravings of hunger and thirst, and they know nothing more about them. They\nare not acquainted with the laws of health, whether of body or of mind.\nThey therefore eat and drink whatever comes to hand, without imagining the\npossibility of wrong-doing in this matter. But, with the progress of\ncivilization, they learn that various kinds of food and drink impair the\nhealth, cloud the brain, enfeeble the working power, and therefore are\nunfit for human use; and no sooner is this known, than the distinction of\nright and wrong begins to be recognized, as to what men eat and drink. The\nmore thorough is the knowledge of the human body and of the action of\nvarious substances on its organs and tissues, the more minute and\ndiscriminating will be the perception of fitness or unfitness as to the\nobjects that tempt the appetites, and the keener will be the sense of\nright or wrong in their use.\n\nFor another illustration of the same principle, we may take *the relation\nbetween parents and children*. In the ruder stages of society, and\nespecially among a nomadic or migratory people, there is not a sufficient\nknowledge of the resources of nature or the possibilities of art, to\nrender even healthy and vigorous life more than tolerable; while for the\ninfirm and feeble, life is but a protracted burden and weariness. At the\nsame time, there is no apprehension of the intellectual and moral worth of\nhuman life, still less, of the value even of its most painful experiences\nas a discipline of everlasting benefit. In fine, life is little more than\na mere struggle for existence. What wonder then, that in some tribes\nfilial piety has been wont to relieve superannuated parents from an\nexistence devoid equally of joy and of hope; and that in others parental\nlove may have even dictated the exposure\u2014with a view to their perishing\u2014of\nfeeble, sickly, and deformed children, incapable of being nurtured into\nself-sustaining and self-depending life? But increased conversance with\nnature and art constantly reveals new capacities of comfort and happiness\nin life, and that, not for the strong alone, but for the feeble, the\nsuffering, the helpless, so that there are none to whom humanity knows not\nhow to render continued life desirable. At the same time, a higher culture\nhas made it manifest that the frailest body may be the seat of the\nloftiest mental activity, moral excellence, and spiritual aspiration, and\nthat in such a body there is often only a surer and more finished\neducation for a higher state of being. Filial piety and parental love,\ntherefore, do all in their power to prolong the flickering existence of\nthe age-worn and decrepit, and to cherish with tender care the life which\nseems born but to die. There is, then, to the limited view of the savage,\nan apparent fitness in practices which in their first aspect seem crimes\nagainst nature; while increased knowledge develops a real and essential\nfitness, in all the refinements and endearments of the most persevering\nand skilful love.\n\nThese examples, which might be multiplied indefinitely, show *the\ndependence of conscience on knowledge*, not for relatively right\ndecisions, but for verdicts in accordance with the absolute right. There\nis no subject that can be presented for the action of conscience, on\nwhich, upon precisely the same principles, divergent and often opposite\ncourses of conduct may not be dictated by more or less accurate knowledge\nof the subject and its relations.\n\nIt will be seen, also, that *with the growth of knowledge, conscience has\na constantly wider scope of action*. The number of indifferent acts is\nthus diminished; the number of positively right or wrong acts, increased.\nAn _indifferent_ act is one for the performance of which, rather than its\nopposite, no reason, involving a question of right or wrong, can be given.\nThus, if the performance or the omission of a specific act be equally\nfitted to the time, place, circumstances, and persons concerned, the act\nis an indifferent one; or, if two or more ways of accomplishing a desired\nend be equally fitted to time, place, circumstances, and persons, the\nchoice between these ways is, morally speaking, a matter of indifference.\nBut with a knowledge both more extensive and more minute of the nature,\nrelations, and fitnesses of beings and objects, we find an increasing\nnumber of instances in which acts that seemed indifferent have a clearly\nperceptible fitness or unfitness, and thus acquire a distinct moral\ncharacter as right or wrong.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nSources Of Knowledge. 2. Law.\n\n\n*Law is the result of the collective experience*, in part, of particular\ncommunities, in part, of the human race as a whole. It encourages,\nprotects, or at least permits whatever acts or modes of conduct have been\nfound or believed to be fitting, in accordance with the nature of things\nand the well-being of men, and therefore right; it forbids and punishes\nsuch acts or modes of conduct as have been found or believed to be\nunfitting, opposed to nature and to human well-being, and therefore wrong.\nIt is far from perfect; it is below the standard of the most advanced\nminds; but it represents the average knowledge or belief of the community\nto which it belongs. *The laws* of any particular state cannot rise far\nabove this average; for laws unsustained by general opinion could not be\nexecuted, and if existing in the statute-book, they would not have the\nnature and force of law, and would remain on record simply because they\nhad lapsed out of notice. Nor can they fall far below this average; for no\ngovernment can sustain itself while its legislation fails to meet the\ndemands of the people.\n\nWhile *law* thus expresses the average knowledge of belief, it *tends to\nperpetuate its own moral standard*. The notions of right which it embodies\nform a part of the general education. The specific crimes, vices, and\nwrongs which the law marks out for punishment are regarded by young\npersons, from their earliest years, as worthy of the most emphatic censure\nand condemnation; while those which the law leaves unpunished are looked\nupon as comparatively slight and venial. Not only so, the degree of\ndetestation in which a community learns to look on specific crimes and\noffences is not in proportion to their actual heinousness, but to the\nstress of overt ignominy attached to them by legal penalties. Instances of\nthis effect of law on opinion will be readily called to mind. Thus a\ncommon thief loses, and can hardly regain his position in society; while\nthe man who by dishonest bankruptcy commits a hundred thefts in one, can\nhold his place unchallenged, even in the Christian church, while it is\nknown to every one that he is living\u2014it may be in luxury\u2014on the money he\nhas stolen. The obvious reason is that from time immemorial simple theft\nhas been punished with due, when not with undue, severity, while the\ncomparatively recent crime of fraudulent bankruptcy has as yet been\nbrought very imperfectly within the grasp of penal law. Again, no man of\nclear moral discernment can doubt that he who consciously and willingly\nimbrutes himself by intoxication is more blameworthy than he who sells\nalcoholic liquors without knowing whether they are to be used internally\nor externally, moderately or immoderately, for medicine or for luxury. Yet\nbecause the latter makes himself liable to fine and imprisonment, while\nthe former\u2014unless he belong to the unprivileged classes\u2014has legal\nprotection, instead of the disgraceful punishment he deserves, there is a\npopular prejudice against the vender of strong drink, and a strange\ntenderness toward the intemperate consumer. Yet another instance. There\nare crimes worse than murder. There are modes of moral corruption and\nruin, whose victims it were mercy to kill. But while the murderer, if he\nescape the gallows, is an outcast and an object of universal abhorrence,\nno social ban rests upon him whose crime has been the death of innocence\nand purity, yet, if reached at all by law, can be compounded by the\npayment of money.\n\nBut though law is in many respects an imperfect moral teacher, and its\ndeficiencies are to be regretted, its *educational power* is strongly felt\nfor good, especially in communities where the administration of justice is\nstrict and impartial. It is of no little worth that a child grows up with\nsome fixed beliefs as to the turpitude of certain forms of evil,\nespecially as the positive enactments of the penal law almost always\ncoincide with the wisest judgments of the best men in the community.\nMoreover, law is progressive in every civilized community, and in\nproportion as it approaches the standard of absolute right, it tends to\nbring the moral beliefs of the people into closer conformity with the same\nstandard. It is, then, a partial and narrow view of law to regard it only\nor chiefly as the instrument of society for the detection and punishment,\nor even for the direct prevention of crime. Its far more important\nfunction is so to train the greater part of each rising generation, that\ncertain forms and modes of evil-doing shall never enter into their plans\nor purposes.\n\nThe *civil*, no less than the criminal *law is a source of knowledge as to\nthe right*. The law does not create, but merely defines the rights\nappertaining to persons and property. The laws of different nations are,\nindeed, widely different; but there may be that in their respective\nhistories which makes a difference in the actual rights of citizens, or\ntheir civil codes may present different stages of approach toward the\nright. Thus the laws as to the conveyance and inheritance of property are\nin some respects unlike in France, England, and the United States, and\nvary considerably in the several States of our Union; but there generally\nexist historical reasons for this variation, and it would be found that\nthe ends of justice are best served, and the reasonable expectations of\nthe people best met in each community, by its own methods of procedure. By\nthe law of the land, then, we may learn civil rights and obligations,\nwhich we have not the means of ascertaining by our own independent\nresearch.\n\nIt remains for us to speak of the *factitious rights and wrongs*, supposed\nto be created by law. Of these there are many. Thus one mode of\ntransacting a sale or transfer is in itself as good as another; and it\nmight be plausibly maintained that, if the business be fairly and\nhonorably conducted, it matters not whether the legally prescribed\nforms\u2014sometimes burdensome and costly\u2014be complied with or omitted. The\nlaw, it may be said, here creates an obligation for which there is no\nground in nature or the fitness of things. This we deny. It is\nintrinsically fitting that all transactions which are liable to dispute or\nquestion should be performed in ways in which they can be attested; and\nthis cannot be effected except by the establishment of uniform methods. He\nwho departs from them performs not only an illegal, but an immoral act;\nand the legal provisions of the kind under discussion have an educational\nvalue in enlarging the knowledge of the individual as to the conditions\nand means of security, order, and good understanding in human society.\n\nSimilar considerations apply to the *crimes created by law*. Smuggling may\nserve as an instance. Undoubtedly there are smugglers who would not steal;\nand their apology is that they are but exercising the rights of ownership\nupon their own property. But the public must have property, else its\ncommunity is dissolved; government must be able to avail itself of that\nproperty, else its functions are suspended. Men need to be taught that the\nrights of the state are inseparable from those of individuals, and no less\nsacred, and the laws that protect the revenue are among the most efficient\nmeans of teaching this lesson. Their only defect is that they attach less\nignominy to frauds upon the revenue than to other modes of theft, and thus\nfail to declare the whole truth, that there is no moral difference between\nhim who robs the public and him who robs any one of its individual\nmembers.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section IV.\n\n\nSources Of Knowledge. 3. Christianity.\n\n\n*Religion*, in its relation to ethics, may be regarded both as *a source\nof knowledge*, and as supplying motives for the performance of duty. We\nare now concerned with it in the former aspect; and it will be sufficient\nfor our present purpose to ascertain how much *Christianity* adds to our\nknowledge of the fitnesses that underlie all questions of right and duty.\nWe by no means undervalue the beneficent ministry of natural religion in\nthe department of ethics; but the most sceptical admit that Christianity\nincludes all of natural religion, while its disciples claim that it not\nonly teaches natural religion with a certainty, precision, and authority\nwhich else were wanting, but imparts a larger and profounder knowledge of\nGod and the universe than is within the scope of man\u2019s unaided reason.\n\n*Christianity covers the entire field of human duty*, and reveals many\nfitnesses, recognized when seen, but discovered by few or none\nindependently of the teachings and example of its Founder; while it gives\nthe emphasis and sanction of a Divine revelation to many other fitnesses,\neasily discoverable, but liable to be overlooked and neglected.\n\nIn defining *the relations of the individual human soul to God*,\nChristianity opens to our view a department of duty paramount to all\nothers in importance and interest. His fatherly love and care, his moral\ngovernment and discipline, his retributive providence, define with\nunmistakable distinctness certain corresponding modes, in part, of outward\naction, and in still greater part, of action in that inward realm of\nthought whence the outward life receives its direction and impulse.\n\n*The brotherhood of the whole human race*, also, reveals obligations which\nwould exist on no other ground; and for the clear and self-evidencing\nstatement of this truth we are indebted solely to Christianity. The\nvisible differences of race, color, culture, religion, and customs, are in\nthemselves dissociating influences. Universal charity is impossible while\nthese differences occupy the foreground. Slavery was a natural and\ncongenial institution under Pagan auspices; nor have we in all ancient\nextra-Christian literature, unless it be in Seneca (in whom such\nsentiments may have had indirectly(3) a Christian origin), a single\nexpression of a fellowship broad enough to embrace all diversities of\ncondition, much less, of race. But the Christian, so far as he consents to\nreceive the obvious and undoubted import of Christ\u2019s mission and\nteachings, must regard all men as, in nature, in the paternal care of the\nDivine Providence, in religious privileges, rights, and capacities, on an\nequal footing. With this view, he cannot but perceive the fitness, and\ntherefore the obligation, of many forms of social duty, of enlarged\nbeneficence, of unlimited philanthropy, which on any restricted theory of\nhuman brotherhood would be neither fitting nor reasonable.\n\n*The immortality of the soul*, in the next place, casts a light at once\nbroad and penetrating upon and into every department of duty; for it is\nobvious, without detailed statement, that the fitnesses, needs, and\nobligations of a terrestrial being of brief duration, and those of a being\nin the nursery and first stage of an endless existence, are very wide\napart,\u2014that the latter may find it fitting, and therefore may deem it\nright, to do, seek, shun, omit, endure, resign, many things which to the\nformer are very properly matters of indifference. Immortality was, in a\ncertain sense, believed before the advent of Christ, but not with\nsufficient definiteness and assurance to occupy a prominent place in any\nethical system, or to furnish the point of view from which all things in\nthe earthly life were to be regarded. Indeed, some of the most virtuous of\nthe ancients, among others Epictetus, than whom there was no better man,\nexpressly denied the life after death, and, of course, could have had no\nconception of the aspects of human and earthly affairs as seen in the\nlight of eternity.\n\nChristianity makes yet another contribution to ethical knowledge in *the\nperson and character of its Founder*, exhibiting in him the very fitnesses\nit prescribes, showing us, as it could not in mere precept, the\nproportions and harmonies of the virtues, and manifesting the unapproached\nbeauty and majesty of the gentler virtues,(4) which in pre-Christian ages\nwere sometimes made secondary, sometimes repudiated with contempt and\nderision. We cannot overestimate the importance of this teaching by\nexample. The instances are very numerous, in which the fitness of a\nspecific mode of conduct can be tested only by experiment; and Jesus\nChrist tried successfully several experiments in morals that had not been\ntried before within the memory of man, and evinced, in his own person and\nby the success of his religion, the superior worth and efficacy of\nqualities which had not previously borne the name of virtues.\n\nChristianity still further enlarges our ethical knowledge by declaring the\n*universality of moral laws*. There are many cases, in which it might seem\nto us not only expedient, but even right, to set aside some principle\nacknowledged to be valid in the greater number of instances, to violate\njustice or truth for some urgent claim of charity, or to consent to the\nperformance of a little evil for the accomplishment of a great good. But\nin all such cases Christianity interposes its peremptory precepts,\nassuring us on authority which the Christian regards as supreme and\ninfallible, that there are no exceptions or qualifications to any rule of\nright; that the moral law, in all its parts, is of inalienable obligation,\nand that the greatest good cannot but be the ultimate result of inflexible\nobedience.\n\nThat *Christianity gives a fuller knowledge of the right* than can be\nattained independently of its teachings, is shown by the review of all\nextra-Christian ethical systems. There is not one of these which does not\nconfessedly omit essential portions of the right, and hardly one which\ndoes not sanction dispositions and modes of conduct confessedly wrong and\nevil; while even those who disclaim Christianity as a Divine revelation,\nfail to detect like omissions and blemishes in the ethics of the New\nTestament. Thus, though there is hardly a precept of Jesus Christ, the\nlike of which cannot be found in the ethical writings of Greece, China,\nIndia, or Persia, the faultlessness and completeness of his teachings give\nthem a position by themselves, and are among the strongest internal\nevidences of their divinity. They are also distinguished from the ethical\nsystems of other teachers by their positiveness. Others say, \u201cThou shalt\nnot;\u201d Jesus Christ says, \u201cThou shalt.\u201d They forbid and prohibit; He\ncommands. They prescribe abstinence from evil; He, a constant approach to\nperfection. Buddhism is, in our time, often referred to as occupying a\nhigher plane than Christianity; but its precepts are all negative, its\nvirtues are negative, and its disciple is deemed most nearly perfect, when\nin body, mind, and soul he has made himself utterly quiescent and inert.\nChristianity, on the other hand, enjoins the unresting activity of all the\npowers and faculties in pursuit of the highest ends.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter VI.\n\n\nRIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.\n\n\nOf the things that are fitting and right, there are some which, though\nthey may be described in general terms, cannot be defined and limited with\nentire accuracy; there are others which are *so obvious and manifest, or\nso easily ascertained*, that, in precise form and measure, *they may be\nclaimed* by those to whom they are due, *and required* of those from whom\nthey are due. These last are rights, and the duties which result from them\nare *obligations*. Thus it is right that a poor man should be relieved;\nand it is my duty, so far as I can, to relieve the poor. But this or that\nindividual poor man cannot claim that it is my duty rather than that of my\nneighbor to minister to his needs, or that I am bound to give him what I\nmight otherwise give to his equally needy neighbor. He has no specific\nright to any portion of my money or goods; I have no specific obligation\nto give him anything. But if a man has lent me money, he has a right to as\nmuch of my money or goods as will repay him with interest; and I am under\nan obligation thus to repay him. Again, it is right that in the public\nhighway there should be, among those who make it their thoroughfare,\nmutual accommodation, courtesy, and kindness; but no one man can prescribe\nthe precise distance within which he shall not be approached, or the\nprecise amount of pressure which may be allowable to his abutters in a\ncrowd. Nor yet can the individual citizen occupy the street in such a way\nas to obstruct those who make use of it. He has no exclusive rights in the\nstreet; nor are others under obligation to yield to him any peculiar\nprivileges. But he has a right to exclude whom he will from his own\ngarden, and to occupy it in whatever way may please him best; and his\nfellow-citizens are under obligation to keep their feet from his alleys\nand flower-beds, their hands from his fruit, and to abstain from all acts\nthat may annoy or injure him in the use and enjoyment of his garden.\n\n*Rights*\u2014with the corresponding obligations\u2014might be divided into\n*natural* and *legal*. But the division is nominal rather than real; for,\nin the first place, there are no natural rights, capable of being defined,\nwhich are not in civilized countries under the sanction and protection of\nlaw; secondly, it is an open question whether some generally recognized\nrights\u2014as, for instance, that of property\u2014exist independently of law; and,\nthirdly, it may be maintained, on the other hand, that law is powerless to\ncreate, competent only to declare rights.\n\nOne chief agency of law as to rights is exercised in limiting *natural\nrights*. Considered simply in his relation to outward nature, a man has a\nmanifest right to whatever he can make tributary to his enjoyment or\nwell-being. But his fellow-men have the same right. If, then, there be a\nrestricted supply of what he and they may claim by equal right, the\nalternative is, on the one hand, usurpation or perpetual strife, or, on\nthe other, an adjustment by which each shall yield a part of what he might\nclaim were there no fellow-claimant, and thus each shall have his\nproportion of what belongs equally to all. To make this adjustment\nequitably is the province of law. The problem which it attempts to solve\nis, How may each individual citizen secure the fullest amount of liberty\nand of material well-being, consistent with the admitted or established\nrights of others? Under republican institutions, this problem presents\nitself in the simplest form, society being in principle an equal\npartnership, in which no one man can claim a larger dividend than another.\nBut where birth or condition confers certain peculiar rights, the problem\nmust be so modified, that the rights conceded to the common citizens shall\nnot interfere with these inherited or vested rights. In either case, the\nrights of each member of the community are bounded only by the\nconterminous rights of others. Obligations correspond to rights. Each\nmember of the community is under obligation, always to refrain from\nencroachment on the rights of others, and in many cases to aid in securing\nor defending those rights, he on like occasions and in similar ways having\nhis own rights protected by others.\n\nWe will consider separately *rights appertaining to the person, to\nproperty, and to reputation*.\n\n1. *Rights appertaining to the person.* The most essential of these is the\nright to life, on which of course all else that can be enjoyed is\ncontingent. This right is invaded, not only by direct violence, but by\nwhatever may impair or endanger health. The corresponding obligation of\nthe individual member of society is to refrain from all acts, employments,\nor recreations that may imperil life or health, and of society\ncollectively, to furnish a police-force adequate to the protection of its\nmembers, to forbid and punish all crimes of violence, to enact and\nmaintain proper sanitary regulations, and to suppress such nuisances as\nmay be not only annoying, but harmful.\n\nBut the citizen is entitled to protection, only so long as he refrains\nfrom acts by which he puts other lives in peril. If he assault another man\nwith a deadly weapon, and his own life be taken in the encounter, the\nslayer has violated no right, nay, so far as moral considerations are\nconcerned, he is not even the slayer; for the man who wrongfully puts\nhimself in a position in which another life can be protected only at the\nperil of his own, if his own be forfeited, has virtually committed\nsuicide. Nor is the case materially altered, if a man in performing an\nunlawful act puts himself in a position in which he may be reasonably\nsupposed to intend violence. Thus, while both law and conscience would\ncondemn me if I killed a thief in broad daylight, in order to protect my\nproperty,\u2014if a burglar enter my house by night with no intention of\nviolence, and yet in the surprise and darkness of the hour I have reason\nto suppose my life and the lives of my family in danger from him, the law\nregards my slaying of such a person as justifiable homicide; and my\nconscience would acquit me in defending the right to life appertaining to\nmy family and myself, against one whose intention or willingness to commit\nviolence was to be reasonably inferred from his own unlawful act.\n\nSociety, through the agency of law, in some cases and directions limits\nthe right of the individual citizen to life, and this *to the contingent\nbenefit of each,\u2014to the absolute benefit of all*. So long as men are less\nthan perfect in character and condition, there must of necessity be some\nsacrifice of life; but this sacrifice may be reduced to its _minimum_ by\njudicious legislation. Now, if without such legislation the percentage of\ndeaths would be numerically much higher than under well-framed laws, the\nlives sacrificed under these laws are simply cases in which the right of\nthe individual is made to yield to the paramount rights of the community.\nThus, there can be no doubt, that contagious disease of the most malignant\ntype could, in many cases, be more successfully treated at the homes of\nthe patients than in public hospitals. But if by the removal of patients\nto hospitals the number of cases may be greatly diminished, and the\ncontagion speedily arrested, this removal is the right of the\ncommunity,\u2014yet not under circumstances of needless privation and hardship,\nnot without the best appliances of comfort, care, and skill which money\ncan procure; for the public can be justified in the exercise of such a\nright, only by the extension of the most generous offices of humanity to\nthose who are imperilled for the public good.\n\nIt is only on similar grounds that the *death-penalty for murder* can be\njustified. The life of the very worst of men should be sacrificed only for\nthe preservation of life; for if it be unsafe to leave them at liberty,\nthey may be kept under restraint and duress, without being wholly cut off\nfrom the means of enjoyment and improvement. The primeval custom of the\nearlier nations required the nearest kinsman of the murdered man to kill\nthe murderer with his own hand, and in so doing to shed his blood, which\nwas believed to have a mysterious efficacy in expiating the crime. This\nform of revenge was greatly checked and restricted by the institutions of\nMoses; it fell into disuse among the Jews, with their growth in\ncivilization; and was certainly included in the entire repeal of the law\nof retaliation by Jesus Christ.(5)\n\nBut if with the dangerous classes of men the dread of capital punishment\nis a dissuasive from crimes of violence, so that the number of murders is\nless, and the lives of peaceable citizens are safer, than were murder\nliable to some milder penalty, then it is the undoubted right of the\npublic to confiscate the murderer\u2019s right to life, and thus to sacrifice\nthe smaller number of comparatively worthless lives for the security of\nthe larger number of lives that may be valuable to the community. Or again\nif, by the profligate use of the pardoning power, the murderer sentenced\nto perpetual imprisonment will probably be let loose upon society\nunreformed, and with passions which may lead to the repetition of his\ncrime, it is immeasurably more fitting that he be killed, than that he be\npreserved to do farther mischief. Yet again, if there be in the\ndeath-penalty for murder an educational force,\u2014if by means of it each new\ngeneration is trained in the greater reverence for human life, and the\ngreater detestation and horror of the crime by which it is destroyed,\u2014then\nis capital punishment to be retained as a means of preserving an\nincalculably greater number of lives than it sacrifices. On these grounds,\nthough in opposition to early and strong conviction, we are constrained to\nexpress the belief that, in our time and country, the capital punishment\nof the murderer is needed for the security of the public, and is justified\nas a life-saving measure.\n\nIn *enforced military service*, also, legal authority exposes the lives of\na portion of the citizens for the security of the greater number. It is an\nunquestionable truth that, in its moral affinities, war is generated by\nevil, is allied to numberless forms of evil, and has a countless progeny\nof evil. But it is equally true that war will recur at not unfrequent\nintervals, so long as the moral evils from which it springs remain\nunreformed. Such are the complications of international affairs, that the\nmost righteous and pacific policy may not always shield a people from\nhostile aggressions; while insurrection, sedition, and civil war may\nresult not only from governmental oppression, but from the most salutary\nmeasures of reform and progress. In such cases, self-defence on the part\nof the nation or the government assailed, is a right and an obligation,\ndue even in the interest of human life, and still more, in behalf of\ninterests more precious than life. Moreover, even in a war of unprovoked\naggression, the aggressive nation does not forfeit the right of\nself-defence by the unprincipled ambition of its rulers, and, war once\ndeclared, its vigorous pursuit may be the only mode of averting disaster\nor ruin. Thus war, though always involving atrocious wrong on the part of\nits promoters and abettors, becomes to the nations involved in it a\nnecessity for which they are compelled to provide.\n\nThis provision may, in some cases, be made by voluntary enlistment; but in\nmost civilized countries, it has been found necessary to fill and recruit\nthe army by conscription, thus forcibly endangering the lives of a portion\nof the citizens, in order to avert from the soil and the homes of the\npeople at large the worse calamities of invasion, devastation, and\nconquest. So far as this is necessary, it is undoubtedly right, and the\nlives thus sacrificed are justly due to the safety and well-being of the\nwhole people. But in making this admission, we would say, without\nabatement or qualification, that war is essentially inhuman, barbarous,\nand opposed to and by the principles and spirit of Christianity, and that\nshould the world ever be thoroughly Christianized, the ages when war was\npossible, will be looked back upon with the same horror with which we now\nregard cannibalism.\n\nAssociated with the right to life, and essential to its full enjoyment, is\nthe *right to liberty*. This includes the right to direct one\u2019s own\nemployments and recreations, to divide and use his time as may seem to him\ngood, to go where he pleases, to bestow his vote or his influence in\npublic affairs as he thinks best, and to express his own opinions orally,\nin writing, or through the press, without hindrance or molestation. These\nseveral rights belong equally to all; but as they cannot be exercised in\nfull without mutual interference and annoyance, the common sense of\nmankind, uttering itself through law, permits each individual to enjoy\nthem only so far as he can consistently with the freedom, comfort, and\nwell-being of his fellow-citizens.\n\n*Slavery* is so nearly extirpated from Christendom, that it is superfluous\nto enter into the controversy, which a few years ago no treatise on Moral\nPhilosophy could have evaded. It was defended only by patent sophistry,\nand its advocates argued from the fact to the right, inventing the latter\nto sustain the former.\n\n*Personal liberty is legally and rightfully restricted* in the case of\nminors, on the ground of their *immature* judgment and discretion, of\ntheir natural state of dependence on parents, and of their usual abode\nunder the parental roof. The age of mature discretion varies very widely,\nnot only in different races, but among different individuals of the same\nrace, as does also the period of emancipation from the controlling\ninfluence of parents, and of an independent and self-sustaining condition\nin life. But, as it is impossible for government to institute special\ninquiries in the case of each individual, and as, were this possible,\nthere would be indefinite room for favoritism and invidious distinctions,\nthere is an intrinsic fitness in fixing an average age at which parental\nor _quasi_-parental tutelage shall cease, and after which the man shall\nhave full and sole responsibility for his own acts. It is perfectly\nobvious that the liberty of the insane and feeble-minded ought to be\nrestricted so far as is necessary for their own safety and for that of\nothers. There is, also, in most communities, a provision by which\nnotorious spendthrifts may be put under guardianship, and thus restrained\nin what might be claimed as their rightful disposal of their own property.\nThis may be justified on the ground that, by persistent wastefulness, they\nmay throw upon the public the charge of their own support and that of\ntheir families.\n\n*Imprisonment* is, on the part of society, a measure, not of revenge, but\nof self-defence. The design of this mode of punishment is, first, to\nprevent the speedy repetition of the crime on the part of the person\npunished; secondly, so to work, either upon his moral nature by\nconfinement, labor, and instruction, or at the worst, on his fears, by the\ndread of repeated and longer restraint, that he may abstain from crime in\nfuture; and lastly, to deter those who might otherwise be tempted to crime\nfrom exposing themselves to its penal consequences. As regards the\nprisoner, he has justly forfeited the right to liberty by employing it in\naggression on the rights of others.\n\nAs regards acts not in themselves wrong, the freedom of the individual is\nrightfully restrained, when it would interfere with the health, comfort,\nor lawful pursuits of his neighbors. Thus no man has the right, either\nlegal or moral, to establish, in an inhabited vicinage, a trade or\nmanufacture which confessedly poisons the air or the water in his\nneighborhood; nor has one a moral right (even if there are technical\ndifficulties in the way of declaring his calling a nuisance), to annoy his\nneighbors by an avocation grossly offensive or intolerably noisy. It is on\nthis ground alone that legislation with reference to the Lord\u2019s day can be\njustified. Christians have no right to impose upon Jews, Pagans, or\ninfidels, entire cessation of labor, business, or recreation on Sunday,\nand the attempt at coercive measures of this kind can only react to the\ndamage of the cause in which they are instituted. But if the majority of\nthe people believe it their duty to observe the first day of the week as a\nday of rest and devotion, they have a right to be protected in its\nobservance by the suppression of such kinds, degrees, and displays of\nlabor and recreation as would essentially interfere with their employment\nof the day for its sacred uses.\n\n2. *The right to property* is an inevitable corollary from the right to\nliberty; for this implies freedom to labor at one\u2019s will, and to what\npurpose can a man labor, unless he can make the fruit of his labor his\nown? All property, except land, has been created by labor. Except where\nslavery is legalized, it is admitted that the laborer owns the value he\ncreates. If it be an article made or produced wholly by himself, it is his\nto keep, to use, to give, or to sell. If his labor be bestowed on\nmaterials not his own, or if he be one of a body of workmen, he is\nentitled to a fair equivalent for the labor he contributes.\n\n*Property in land*, no doubt, originated in labor. A man was deemed the\nproprietor of so much ground as he tilled. In a sparse population there\ncould have been no danger of mutual interference; and in every country,\ngovernments must have been instituted before there was a sufficiently\nclose occupation of the soil to occasion collisions and conflicts among\nthe occupants. The governments of the early ages, in general, confirmed\nthe titles founded in productive occupancy, and treated the unoccupied\nland as the property of the state, either to be held in common, to be\nceded to individual owners in reward of loyalty or services, or to be sold\non the public account.\n\nIt is manifest that the *security of property is essential to civilization\nand progress*. Men would labor only for the needs of the day, if they\ncould not retain and enjoy the fruits of their labor; nor would they be at\npains to invent or actualize industrial improvements of any kind, if they\nhad no permanent interest in the results of such improvements. Then, too,\nif there were no protection for property, there could be no accumulation\nof capital, and without capital there could be no enterprise, no combined\nindustries, no expenditure in faith of a remote, yet certain profit. Nor\nyet can the ends of a progressive civilization be answered by a community\nof goods and gains. Wherever this experiment has been tried, it has been\nattended by a decline of industrial energy and capacity; and where there\nhas not been absolute failure, there have been apathy, stupidity, and a\ndecreasing standard of intelligence. In fine, there is in man\u2019s bodily and\nmental powers a certain _vis inerti\u00e6_, which can be efficiently aroused\nonly by the stimulus of personal interest in the results of industry,\ningenuity, and prudence.\n\nThe right of property implies *the right of the owner, while he lives*, to\nhold, enjoy, or dispose of his possessions in such way as may please him.\nBut his ownership necessarily ceases at death; and what was his becomes\n*rightfully the property of the public*. Yet in all civilized countries,\nit has been deemed fitting that the owner should have the liberty\u2014with\ncertain restrictions\u2014of dictating the disposal of his property after his\ndeath, and also that, unless alienated by his will (and in some countries\nhis will notwithstanding), his property should pass to his family or his\nnearest kindred. It is believed that it would discourage industry and\nenfeeble enterprise were their earnings to be treated as public property\non the death of the owner; and that, on the other hand, men are most\nsurely trained to and preserved in habits of diligence and thrift, either\nby the power of directing the disposal of their property after death, or\nby the certainty that they can thereby benefit those whom they hold in the\ndearest regard. Laws with reference to wills and to the succession of\nestates are not, then, limitations of the rights of private property, but\na directory as to what is deemed the best mode of disposing of such\nproperty as from time to time accrues to the public.\n\n*The law limits the right of property* by appropriating to public uses\nsuch portions of it as are needed for the maintenance, convenience, and\nwell-being of the body politic. This is done, in the first place, by\ntaxation, which\u2014in order to be just\u2014must be equitable in its mode of\nassessment, and not excessive in amount. As to the modes of assessment, it\nis obvious that a system which lightens the burden upon the rich, and thus\npresses the more heavily on the poor (as would be the case were a revenue\nraised on the necessaries of life, while luxuries were left free), cannot\nbe justified. On the other hand, it may be maintained that the rate of\ntaxation might fairly increase with the amount of property; for a very\nlarge proportion of the machinery of government is designed for the\nprotection of property, and the more property an individual has, the less\ncapable is he of protecting his various interests by his own personal\ncare, and the more is he in need of well-devised and faithfully executed\nlaws. Taxation excessive in amount is simply legalized theft. Sinecures,\nsupernumerary offices, needless and costly formalities in the transaction\nof public business, journeys and festivities at the public charge,\nbuildings designed for ostentation rather than for use, have been so long\ntolerated in the municipal, state, and national administrations, that they\nmay seem inseparable from our system of government; but they imply gross\ndishonesty on the part of large numbers of our public servants, and guilty\ncomplicity in it on the part of many more. Under a system of direct\ntaxation, assessments can be more equitably made, and their expenditure\nwill be more carefully watched, than in the case of indirect taxation;\nwhile the latter method is more likely to find favor with those who hold\nor seek public office, as encouraging a larger freedom of expenditure, and\nsupporting a larger number of needless functionaries at the public cost.\n\nThe law, also, authorizes *the appropriation of specific portions of\nproperty to public uses*, as for streets, roads, aqueducts, and public\ngrounds, and even in aid of private enterprises in which the community has\na beneficial interest, as of canals, bridges, and railways. This is\nnecessary, and therefore right. It is obvious that, but for this, the most\nessential facilities and improvements might be prevented, or burdened with\nunreasonable costs, by the obstinacy or cupidity of individuals. The\nconditions under which such use of private property is justified are, that\nthe improvement proposed be for the general good, that a fair compensation\nbe given for the property taken, and that as to both these points, in case\nof a difference of opinion, the ultimate appeal shall be to an impartial\ntribunal or arbitration.\n\n3. *The right to reputation.* Every man has a right to the reputation he\ndeserves, and is under obligation to respect that right in every other\nman. This obligation is violated, not only by the fabrication of slander,\nbut equally by its repetition, unless the person who repeats it knows it\nto be true, and also by silence and seeming acquiescence in an injurious\nreport, if one knows or believes it to be false. But has a man a right to\na better reputation than he deserves? Certainly not, in a moral point of\nview; and if men could be generally known to be what they are, few would\nfail to become what they would wish to seem. Yet the law admits the truth\nof a slanderous charge in justification of the slanderer, only when it can\nbe shown that the knowledge of the truth is for the public benefit. There\nare good reasons for this attitude of the law, without reference to any\nsupposed rights of the justly accused party. There is, in many instances,\nroom for a reasonable doubt as to evil reports that seem authentic, and in\nmany more instances there may be extenuating circumstances which form a\npart of the case, though almost never, of the report. Then, too, the\nfamily and kindred of the person defamed may incur, through true, yet\nuseless reports to his discredit, shame, annoyance, and damage, which they\ndo not merit. Evil reports, also, even if true, disturb the peace of the\ncommunity, and often provoke violent retaliation. The wanton circulation\nof them, therefore, if a luxury to him who gives them currency, is a\nluxury indulged at the expense of the public, and he ought to be held\nliable for all that it may cost. Finally, and above all, the slanderer\nbecomes a nuisance to the community, not only by his reports of real or\nimagined wrong and evil, but by the degradation of his own character,\nwhich can hardly remain above the level of his social intercourse.\n\nBy the law, defamation and libel are, very justly, liable both to\n*criminal prosecution*, as offences against the public, and to *action for\ndamages* by civil process, on the obvious ground that the injury of a\nman\u2019s character tends to impair his success in business, his pecuniary\ncredit, and his comfortable enjoyment of his property.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter VII.\n\n\nMOTIVE, PASSION, AND HABIT.\n\n\nThe appetites, desires, and affections are, as has been said, the\n*proximate motives* of action. The perception of expediency and the sense\nof right act, not independently of these motives, but upon them and\nthrough them, checking some, stimulating others. Thus they, both, restrain\nthe appetites, the former, so far as prudence requires; the latter, in\nsubserviency to the more noble elements of character. The former directs\nthe desires toward worthy, but earthly objects; the latter works most\nefficiently through the benevolent affections, as exercised toward God and\nman.\n\nExterior motives are of a secondary order, acting not directly upon the\nwill, but influencing it indirectly, through the springs of action, or\nthrough the principles which direct and govern them.\n\n*The action of exterior motives* takes place in three different ways. 1.\nWhen they are in harmony with any predominant appetite, desire, or\naffection, they at once intensify it, and prompt acts by which it may be\ngratified. Thus, for instance, a sumptuously spread table gives the\nepicure a keener appetite, and invites him to its free indulgence. The\nopportunity of a potentially lucrative, though hazardous investment,\nexcites the cupidity of the man who prizes money above all things else,\nand tempts him to incur the doubtful risk. The presence of the object of\nlove or hatred adds strength to the affection, and induces expressions or\nacts of kindness or malevolence. 2. An exterior motive opposed to the\npredominant spring of action often starts that spring into vigorous and\ndecisive activity, and makes it thenceforth stronger and more imperative.\nIt is thus that remonstrances, obstacles, and interposing difficulties not\ninfrequently render sensual passion more rabid; while temptation, by the\nacts of resistance which it elicits, nourishes the virtue it assails. 3.\nAn exterior motive may have a sufficient stress and cogency to call forth\ninto energetic action some appetite, desire, or affection previously\ndormant or feeble, thus to repress the activity of those which before held\nsway, and so to produce a fundamental change in the character. In this way\nthe sudden presentation of vice, in attractive forms, may give paramount\nsway to passions which had previously shown no signs of mastery; and, in\nlike manner, a signal experience of peril, calamity, deliverance, or\nunexpected joy may call forth the religious affections, and invest them\nwith enduring supremacy over a soul previously surrendered to appetite,\ninferior desires, or meaner loves.\n\n*An undue influence* in the formation or change of character *is often\nascribed to exterior motives.* They are oftener the consequence than the\ncause of character. Men, in general, exercise more power over their\nsurroundings, than their surroundings over them. A very large proportion\nof the circumstances which seem to have a decisive influence upon us, are\nof our own choice, and we might\u2014had we so willed\u2014have chosen their\nopposites. A virtuous person seldom finds it necessary to breathe a\nvicious atmosphere. A willingness to be tempted is commonly the antecedent\ncondition to one\u2019s being led into temptation. Sympathy, example, and\nsocial influences are second in their power, whether for good or for evil,\nto no other class of exterior motives; and there are few who cannot choose\ntheir own society, and who do not choose it in accordance with their\nelective affinities. It is true, indeed, that the choice of companions of\ndoubtful virtue is often the first outward sign of vicious proclivities;\nwhile a tenacious adherence to the society of the most worthy not\ninfrequently precedes any very conspicuous development of personal\nexcellence; but in either case the choice of friends indicates the\npredominant springs of action, and the direction in which the character\nhas begun to grow. So far then is man from being under the irresistible\ncontrol of motives from without, that these motives are in great part the\nresults and the tokens of his own voluntary agency.\n\nChristianity justly claims pre\u00ebminence, not only as a source of knowledge\nas to the right, but equally as presenting the most influential and\npersistent motives to right conduct. These motives we have in its\nendearing and winning manifestation of the Divine fatherhood by Jesus\nChrist; in his own sacrifice, death, and undying love for man; in the\nassurance of forgiveness for past wrongs and omissions, without which\nthere could be little courage for future well-doing; in the promise of\nDivine aid in every right purpose and worthy endeavor; in the certainty of\na righteous retribution in the life to come; and in institutions and\nobservances designed and adapted to perpetuate the memory of the salient\nfacts, and to *renew* at frequent intervals the recognition of the\nessential truths, which give the religion its name and character. The\ndesires and affections, stimulated and directed by these motives, are\nincapable of being perverted to evil, while desires with lower aims and\naffections for inferior objects are always liable to be thus perverted.\nThese religious motives, too, resting on the Infinite and the Eternal, are\nof inexhaustible power; if felt at all, they must of necessity be felt\nmore strongly than all other motives; and they cannot fail to be adequate\nto any stress of need, temptation, or trial.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n*Passion* implies a _passive_ state,\u2014a condition in which the will yields\nwithout resistance to some dominant appetite, desire, or affection, under\nwhose imperious reign reason is silenced, considerations of expediency and\nof right suppressed, and exterior counteracting motives neutralized. It\nresembles insanity in the degree in which the actions induced by it are\nthe results of unreasoning impulse, and in the unreal and distorted views\nwhich it presents of persons, objects, and events. It differs from\ninsanity, mainly in its being a self-induced madness, for which, as for\ndrunkenness, the sufferer is morally accountable, and in yielding to\nwhich, as in drunkenness, he, by suffering his will to pass beyond the\ncontrol of reason, makes himself responsible, both legally and morally,\nfor whatever crimes or wrongs he commits in this state of mental\nalienation.\n\n*There is no appetite, desire, or affection which may not become a\npassion*, and there is no passion which does not impair the sense of\nright, and interfere with the discharge of duty. The appetites, the lower\ndesires, the malevolent affections, and, not infrequently, love, when they\nbecome passions, have their issues in vice and crime. The nobler desires\nand affections when made passions, may not lead to positive evil, but can\nhardly fail to derange the fitting order of life, and to result in the\ndereliction of some of its essential duties. Thus, the passion for\nknowledge may render one indifferent to his social and religious\nobligations. Philanthropy, when a passion, overlooks nearer for more\nremote claims of duty, and is very prone to omit self-discipline and\nself-culture in its zeal for world-embracing charities. Even the religious\naffections, when they assume the character of passions, either, on the one\nhand, are kindled into wild fanaticism, or, on the other, lapse into a\nself-absorbed quietism, which forgets outside duties in the luxury of\ndevout contemplation; and though either of these is to be immeasurably\npreferred to indifference, they both are as immeasurably inferior to that\npiety, equally fervent and rational, which neglects neither man for God,\nnor God for man, and which remains mindful of all human and earthly\nrelations, fitnesses, and duties, while at the same time it retains its\nhold of faith, hope, and habitual communion, on the higher life.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n*Habit* also involves the suspension of reason and motive in the\nperformance of individual acts; but it differs from passion in that its\nacts were in the beginning prompted by reason and motive. Indeed, it may\nbe plausibly maintained that in each habitual act there is a virtual\nremembrance\u2014a recollection too transient to be itself remembered\u2014of the\nreasoning or motive which induced the first act of the series. In some\ncases the habitual act is performed, as it is said, unconsciously,\ncertainly with a consciousness so evanescent as to leave no trace of\nitself. In other cases the act is performed consciously, but as by a felt\nnecessity, in consequence of an uneasy sensation\u2014analogous to hunger and\nthirst\u2014which can be allayed in this way only. Under this last head we may\nclass, in the first place, habits of criminal indulgence, including the\nindulgence of morbid and depraved appetite; secondly, many of those\nmorally indifferent habits, which constitute a large portion of a regular\nand systematic life; and thirdly, habits of virtuous conduct, of industry,\nof punctuality, of charity.\n\n*Habit bears a most momentous part in the formation and growth of\ncharacter*, whether for evil or for good. It is in the easy and rapid\nformation of habit that lies the imminent peril of single acts of vicious\nindulgence. The first act is performed with the determination that it\nshall be the last of its kind. But of all examples one\u2019s own is that which\nhe is most prone to follow, and of all bad examples one\u2019s own is the most\ndangerous. The precedent once established, there is the strongest\ntemptation to repeat it, still with a conscious power of self-control, and\nwith the resolution to limit the degree and to arrest the course of\nindulgence, so as to evade the ultimate disgrace and ruin to which it\ntends. But before the pre-determined limit is reached, the indulgence has\nbecome a habit; its suspension is painful; its continuance or renewal\nseems essential to comfortable existence; and even in those ultimate\nstages when its very pleasure has lapsed into satiety, and then into\nwretchedness, its discontinuance threatens still greater wretchedness,\nbecause the craving is even more intense when the enjoyment has ceased.\n\n*The beneficent agency of habit no less deserves emphatic notice.* Its\noffice in practical morality is analogous to that of labor-saving\ninventions in the various departments of industry. A machine by which ten\nmen can do the work that has been done by thirty, disengages the twenty\nfor new modes of productive labor, and thus augments the products of\nindustry and the comfort of the community. A good habit is a labor-saving\ninstrument. The cultivating of any specific virtue to such a degree that\nit shall become an inseparable and enduring element of the character\ndemands, at the outset, vigilance, self-discipline, and, not infrequently,\nstrenuous effort. But when the exercise of that virtue has become\nhabitual, and therefore natural, easy, and essential to one\u2019s conscious\nwell-being, it ceases to task the energies; it no longer requires constant\nwatchfulness; its occasions are met spontaneously by the appropriate\ndispositions and acts. The powers which have been employed in its culture\nare thus set free for the acquisition of yet other virtues, and the\nformation of other good habits. Herein lies the secret of progressive\ngoodness, of an ever nearer approach to a perfect standard of character.\nThe primal virtues are first made habits of the unceasing consciousness\nand of the daily life, and the moral power no longer needed for these is\nthen employed in the cultivation of the finer traits of superior\nexcellence,\u2014the shaping of the delicate lines, roundings, and proportions,\nwhich constitute \"the beauty of holiness,\" the symmetry and grace of\ncharacter that win not only abounding respect and confidence, but\nuniversal admiration and love.\n\n*What has been said of habit, is true not only as to outward acts, but\nequally as to wonted directions and currents of thought, study,\nreflection, and reverie.* It is mainly through successive stages of habit\nthat the mind grows in its power of application, research, and invention.\nIt is thus that the spirit of devotion is trained to ever clearer\nrealization of sacred truth and a more fervent love and piety. It is thus\nthat minds of good native capacity lose their apprehensive faculties and\ntheir working power; and thus, also, that moral corruption often, no\ndoubt, takes place before the evil desires cherished within find the\nopportunity of actualizing themselves in a depraved life.\n\n\n\n\n\n                              Chapter VIII.\n\n\nVIRTUES, AND THE VIRTUES.\n\n\n*The term virtue* is employed in various senses, which, though they cover\na wide range, are yet very closely allied to one another, and to the\ninitial conception in which they all have birth. Its primitive\nsignification, as its structure(6) indicates, is _manliness_. Now what\npre\u00ebminently distinguishes, not so much the human race from the lower\nanimals, as the full-grown and strong man from the feebler members of his\nown race, is the power of resolute, strenuous, persevering conflict and\nresistance. It is the part of a man worthy of the name to maintain his own\nposition, to hold his ground against all invaders, to show a firm front\nagainst all hostile force, and to prefer death to conquest. All this is\nimplied in the Greek and Roman idea of virtue, and is included in the\nLatin _virtus_, when it is used with reference to military transactions,\nso that its earliest meaning was, simply, _military prowess_. But with the\ngrowth of ethical philosophy, and especially with the cultivation by the\nStoics of the sterner and hardier traits of moral excellence, men learned\nthat there was open to them a more perilous battle-ground, a severer\nconflict, and a more glorious victory, than in mere physical warfare,\u2014that\nthere was a higher type of manliness in self-conquest, in the resistance\nand subdual of appetite and passion, in the maintenance of integrity and\npurity under intense temptation and amidst vicious surroundings, than in\nthe proudest achievements of military valour. Virtue thus came to mean,\nnot moral goodness in itself considered, but goodness militant and\ntriumphant.(7)\n\nBut *words which have a complex signification always tend to slough off a\npart of their meaning*; and, especially, words that denote a state or\nproperty, together with its mode of growth or of manifestation, are prone\nto drop the latter, even though it may have given them root and form. Thus\nthe term _virtue_ is often used to denote the qualities that constitute\nhuman excellence, without direct reference to the conflict with evil,\nwhence it gets its name, and in which those qualities have their surest\ngrowth and most conspicuous manifestation. There is still, however, a\ntacit reference to temptation and conflict in our use of the term. Though\nwe employ it to denote goodness that has stood no very severe test, we use\nit only where such a test may be regarded as possible. Though we call a\nman virtuous who has been shielded from all corrupt examples and\ninfluences, and has had no inducements to be otherwise than good, we do\nnot apply the epithet to the little child who cannot by any possibility\nhave been exposed to temptation. Nor yet would we apply it to the perfect\npurity and holiness of the Supreme Being, who \u201ccannot be tempted with\nevil.\u201d\n\nVirtue then, in its more usual sense at the present time, denotes *conduct\nin accordance with the right*, or with the fitness of things, on the part\nof one who has the power to do otherwise. But in this sense there are few,\nif any, perfectly virtuous men. There are, perhaps, none who are equally\nsensitive to all that the right requires, and it is often the deficiencies\nof a character that give it its reputation for distinguished excellence in\nsome one form of virtue, the vigilance, self-discipline, and effort which\nmight have sustained the character in a well-balanced mediocrity being so\nconcentrated upon some single department of duty as to excite high\nadmiration and extended praise. There may be a deficient sensitiveness to\nsome classes of obligations, while yet there is no willing or conscious\nviolation of the right, and in such cases the character must be regarded\nas virtuous. But if in any one department of duty a person is consciously\nfalse to his sense of right, even though in all other respects he conforms\nto the right, he cannot be deemed virtuous, nor can there be any good\nground for assurance that he may not, with sufficient inducement, violate\nthe very obligations which he now holds in the most faithful regard. This\nis what is meant by that saying of St. James, \u201cWhosoever shall keep the\nwhole law, and yet offend in one point, is guilty of all,\u201d\u2014not that he who\ncommits a single offence through inadvertency or sudden temptation, is\nthus guilty; but he who willingly and deliberately violates the right as\nto matters in which he is the most strongly tempted to wrong and evil,\nshows an indifference to the right which will lead him to observe it only\nso long and so far as he finds it convenient and easy so to do.\n\nHere we are naturally led to inquire whether there is any essential\n*connection between virtue and piety*,\u2014between the faithful discharge of\nthe common duties of life and loving loyalty toward the Supreme Being. On\nthis subject extreme opinions have been held, sceptics and unbelievers, on\nthe one side, Christians with a leaven of antinomianism on the other,\nmaintaining the entire independence of virtue on piety; while Christians\nof the opposite tendency have represented them, in spite of ample evidence\nto the contrary, as inseparable. We shall find, on examination, that they\nare separable and independent, yet auxiliary each to the other. Virtue is\nconduct in accordance with the right, and we have seen that right and\nwrong, as moral distinctions, depend not on the Divine nature, will or\nlaw,(8) but on the inherent, necessary conditions of being. The atheist\ncannot escape or disown them. Whatever exists\u2014no matter how it came into\nbeing\u2014must needs have its due place, affinities, adaptations, and uses. An\nintelligent dweller among the things that are, cannot but know something\nof their fitnesses and harmonies, and so far as he acts upon them cannot\nbut feel the obligation to recognize their fitnesses, and thus to create\nor restore their harmonies. Even to the atheist, vice is a violation of\nfitnesses which he knows or may know. It is opposed to his conscientious\njudgment. He has with regard to it an inevitable sense of wrong. We can,\ntherefore, conceive of an atheist\u2019s being rigidly virtuous, and that on\nprinciple. Though among the ancient Stoics there were some eminently\ndevout men, there were others, men of impregnable virtue, whose theology\nwas too vague and meagre to furnish either ground or nourishment for\npiety. While, therefore, in the mutual and reciprocal fitnesses that\npervade the universe we find demonstrative evidence of the being, unity,\nand moral perfectness of the Creator, we are constrained to acknowledge\nthe possibility of these fitnesses being recognized in the conduct of life\nby those who do not follow them out to the great truths of theology to\nwhich they point and lead.\n\nBut, on the other hand, where there is a clear knowledge of, or an\nundoubting belief in the being and providence of God, and especially for\npersons who receive Christianity as a revelation of the truth, though, as\nan affection, piety is independent of virtue, the duties of piety are an\nessential part of virtue. If God is, we stand in definable relations to\nHim, and those relations are made definite through Christianity. Those\nrelations have their fitnesses, and we see not how he can be a thoroughly\nvirtuous man, who, discerning these fitnesses with the understanding,\nfails to recognize them in conduct. Conscience can take cognizance only of\nthe fitnesses which the individual man knows or believes; but it does take\ncognizance of all the fitnesses which he knows or believes. Virtue may\ncoexist with a very low standard of emotional piety; but it cannot\ncoexist, in one who believes the truths of religion, with blasphemy,\nirreverence, or the conscious violation or neglect of religious\nobligations. He who is willingly false to his relations with the Supreme\nBeing, needs only adequate temptation to make him false to his human\nrelations, and to the fitnesses of his daily life. Moreover, while, as we\nhave said, virtue may exist where there is but little emotional piety,\nvirtue can hardly fail to cherish piety. Loyalty of conduct deepens\nloyalty of spirit; obedience nourishes love; he who faithfully does the\nwill of God can hardly fail to become worshipful and devout; and while men\nare more frequently led by emotional piety to virtue, there can be no\ndoubt that with many the process is reversed, and virtue leads to\nemotional piety. Then again, we have seen that religion supplies the most\nefficient of all motives to a virtuous life,\u2014motives adequate to a stress\nof temptation and trial which suffices to overpower and neutralize all\ninferior motives.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nVirtue is one and indivisible in its principle and essence, yet *in its\nexternal manifestations presenting widely different aspects*, and\neliciting a corresponding diversity in specific traits of character. Thus,\nthough intrinsic fitness be equally the rule of conduct at a\npleasure-party and by a pauper\u2019s bed-side, the conduct of the virtuous man\nwill be widely different on these two occasions; and not only so, but with\nthe same purpose of fidelity to what is fitting and right, his\ndispositions, aims, and endeavors on these two occasions will have little\nor nothing in common except the one pervading purpose. Hence virtue may\nunder different forms assume various names, and may thus be broken up into\nseparate _virtues_. These are many or few, according as we distribute in\nsmaller or larger groups the occasions for virtuous conduct, or analyze\nwith greater or less minuteness the sentiments and dispositions from which\nit proceeds.\n\n*The cardinal*(*9*)* virtues* are the _hinge_-virtues, those on which the\ncharacter _hinges_ or turns, those, the possession of all which, would\nconstitute a virtuous character, while the absence of any one of them\nwould justly forfeit for a man the epithet _virtuous_. There are other\nless salient and essential qualities\u2014minor virtues\u2014the possession of which\nadds to the symmetry, beauty, and efficiency of the character, but which\none may lack, and yet none the less deserve to be regarded as a virtuous\nman. Thus, justice is a cardinal virtue; gentleness, one of the lesser\nrank.\n\nWe propose to adopt as a *division of the virtues* one which recognizes\nfour cardinal virtues, corresponding to four classes under which may be\ncomprehended all the fitnesses of man\u2019s condition in this world, and the\nduties proceeding from them respectively.(10) There are fitnesses and\nduties appertaining, first, to one\u2019s own being, nature, capacities, and\nneeds; secondly, to his relations to his fellow-beings; thirdly, to his\ndisposition and conduct with reference to external objects and events\nbeyond his control; and fourthly, to his arrangement, disposal, and use of\nobjects under his control. It is difficult to find names which in their\ncommon use comprehend severally all the contents of each of these four\ndivisions; but yet they are all comprised within the broadest significance\nof the terms Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Order. Thus employed,\nPrudence, or providence, includes all the duties of self-government and\nself-culture; Justice denotes all that is due to God and man, embracing\npiety and benevolence; Fortitude, which is but a synonyme for strength, is\nan appropriate general name for every mode, whether of defiance,\nresistance, or endurance, in which man shows himself superior to his\ninevitable surroundings; and Order is extended to all subjects in which\nthe question of duty is a question of time, place, or measure.\n\n*We can conceive of no right feeling, purpose, or action, which does not\ncome under one of these heads.* It is obvious, too, that these are all\n_cardinal_ virtues, not one of which could be wanting or grossly deficient\nin a virtuous man. For, in the first place, he who omits were it only the\nduties of self-culture, and thus leaves himself ignorant of what he ought\nto know, takes upon himself the full burden, blame, and penalty of\nwhatever wrong he may commit in consequence of needless ignorance;\nsecondly, he who is willingly unfaithful in any of his relations to God or\nman, cannot by any possibility be worthy of approbation; nor, thirdly, can\nhe be so, who is the slave, not the master, of his surroundings; while,\nfourthly, fitnesses of time, place, and measure are so essential to\nright-doing that the violation of them renders what else were right,\nwrong.\n\nMoreover, *each of these four virtues*, if genuine and highly developed,\n*implies the presence of all the others*. 1. There is a world of wisdom in\nthe question asked in the Hebrew Scriptures: \u201cHave all the workers of\niniquity no knowledge?\u201d There is in all wrong-doing either ignorance, or\ntemporary hallucination or blindness, and imprudence is but ignorance or\ndelusion carried into action. Did we see clearly the certain bearings and\nconsequences of actions, we should need no stronger dissuasive from all\nevil, no more cogent motive to every form of virtue. 2. There is no\nconceivable duty which may not be brought under the head of justice,\neither to God or to man; for our duties to ourselves are due to God who\nhas ordained them, and to man whom we are the more able to benefit, the\nmore diligent we are in self-government and self-improvement. 3. Our\nwrong-doing of every kind comes from our yielding to outward things\ninstead of rising above them; and he who truly lives above the world, can\nhardly fail to do all that is right and good in it. 4. Perfect order\u2014the\ndoing of everything in the right time, place, and measure\u2014would imply the\npresence of all the virtues, and would include all their work.\n\nWith this explanation we shall use the terms *Prudence*, *Justice*,\n*Fortitude*, and *Order* in the titles of the four following chapters, at\nthe same time claiming the liberty of employing these words, as we shall\nfind it convenient, in the more restricted sense which they commonly bear.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter IX.\n\n\nPRUDENCE; OR DUTIES TO ONE\u2019S SELF.\n\n\nCan there be *duties to one\u2019s self*, which are of absolute obligation?\nDuties are dues, and they imply two parties,\u2014one who owes them, and one to\nwhom they are due,\u2014the debtor and the creditor. But the creditor may, at\nhis will, cancel the debt, and release the debtor. In selfward duties,\nthen, why may I not, as creditor, release myself as debtor? Why may I\nnot\u2014so long as I violate no obligation to others\u2014be, at my own pleasure,\nidle or industrious, self-indulgent or abstinent, frivolous or serious?\nWhy, if life seem burdensome to me, may I not relieve myself of the\ntrouble of living? The answer is, that to every object in the universe\nwith which I am brought into relation I owe its fit use, and that no being\nin the universe, not even the Omnipotent, can absolve me from this\nobligation. Now my several powers and faculties, with reference to my\nwill, are objects on which my volitions take effect, and I am bound to\nwill their fit uses, and to abstain from thwarting or violating those\nuses, on the same ground on which I am bound to observe and reverence the\nfitnesses of objects that form no part of my personality. Moreover, this\nearthly life is, with reference to my will, an object on which my\nvolitions may take effect; I learn\u2014if not by unaided reason, from the\nChristian revelation\u2014that my life has its fit uses, both in this world and\nin preparation for a higher state of being, and that these uses are often\nbest served by the most painful events and experiences; and I thus find\nmyself bound to take the utmost care of my life, even when it seems the\nleast worth caring for.\n\nThe *duties due to one\u2019s self* are self-preservation, the attainment of\nknowledge, self-control, and moral self-culture.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nSelf-Preservation.\n\n\nThe *uses of life*, both to ourselves, and to others through us, suffice,\nas we have said, to render its preservation a duty, enjoined upon us by\nthe law of fitness. This duty is violated not only by suicide\u2014against\nwhich it is useless to reason, for its victims in modern Christendom are\nseldom of sound mind\u2014but equally by needless and wanton exposure to peril.\nSuch exposure is frequently incurred in reckless feats of strength or\ndaring, sometimes consummated in immediate death, and still oftener in\nslower self-destruction by disease. There are, no doubt, occasions when\nself-preservation must yield to a higher duty, and humanity has made no\nimportant stage of progress without the free sacrifice of many noble\nlives; but because it may be a duty to give life in the cause of truth or\nliberty, it by no means follows that one has a right to throw it away for\nthe gratification of vanity, for a paltry wager, or to win the fame of an\naccomplished athlete.\n\nThe duty of self-preservation includes, of course, *a reasonable care for\nhealth*, without which the uses of life are essentially restricted and\nimpaired. Here a just mean must be sought and adhered to. There is, on the\none hand, an excessive care of the body, which, if it does not enfeeble\nthe mind, distracts it from its true work, and makes the spiritual nature\na mere slave of the material organism. This solicitude is sometimes so\nexcessive as to defeat its own purpose, by creating imaginary diseases,\nand then making them real; and the number is by no means small of those\nwho have become chronic invalids solely by the pains they have taken not\nto be so. On the other hand, there is a carelessness as to dress and diet,\nto which the strongest constitution must at length yield; and the intense\nconsciousness of strength and vigor, which tempts one to deem himself\ninvulnerable, not infrequently is the cause of life-long infirmity and\ndisability. Of the cases of prolonged and enfeebling disease, probably\nmore are the result of avoidable than of unavoidable causes, and if we add\nto these the numerous instances in which the failure of health is to be\nascribed to hereditary causes which might have been avoided, or to\ndefective sanitary arrangements that may be laid to the charge of the\npublic, we have an enormous amount of serviceable life needlessly wasted\nfor all purposes of active usefulness; while for the precious examples of\npatience, resignation, and cheerful endurance, the infirmities and\nsufferings incident to the most favorable sanitary conditions might have\nbeen amply sufficient.\n\nThere are, no doubt, such wide diversities of constitution and temperament\nthat *no specific rules of self-preservation can be laid down*; and as\nregards diet, sleep, and exercise, habit may render the most unlike\nmethods and times equally safe and beneficial. But wholesome food in\nmoderate quantity, sleep long enough for rest and refreshment, exercise\nsufficient to neutralize the torpifying influence of sedentary pursuits,\nand these, though not with slavish uniformity, yet with a good degree of\nregularity, may be regarded as essential to a sound working condition of\nbody and mind. The same may be said of the unstinted use of water, which\nhas happily become a necessity of high civilization, of pure air, the\nworth of which as a sanitary agent is practically ignored by the major\npart of our community, and of the direct light of heaven, the exclusion of\nwhich from dwellings from motives of economy, while it may spare carpets\nand curtains, wilts and depresses their owners. These topics are inserted\nin a treatise on ethics, because whatever has a bearing on health, and\nthus on the capacity for usefulness selfward and manward which constitutes\nthe whole value of this earthly life, is of grave moral significance. If\nthe preservation of life is a duty, then all hygienic precautions and\nmeasures are duties, and as such they should be treated by the individual\nmoral agent, by parents, guardians, and teachers, and by the public at\nlarge.\n\n*Self-preservation is endangered by poverty.* In the lack or\nprecariousness of the means of subsistence, the health of the body is\nliable to suffer; and even where there is not absolute want, but a\ncondition straitened in the present and doubtful as to the future, the\nmind loses much of its working power, and life is deprived of a large\nportion of its utility. Hence the duty of industry and economy on the part\nof those dependent on their own exertions. It is not a man\u2019s duty to be\nrich, though he who in acquiring wealth takes upon himself its due\nobligations and responsibilities, is a public benefactor; but it is every\nman\u2019s duty to shun poverty, if he can, and he who makes or keeps himself\npoor by his own indolence, thriftlessness, or prodigality, commits a sin\nagainst his own life, which he curtails as to its capacity of good, and\nagainst society, which has a beneficial interest in the fully developed\nlife of all its members.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nThe Attainment Of Knowledge.\n\n\nInasmuch as knowledge, real or supposed, must needs precede every act of\nthe will, and as the adaptation of our actions to our purposes depends on\nthe accuracy of our knowledge, *it is intrinsically fitting ** that our\ncognitive powers should be thoroughly developed and trained, and\ndiligently employed.* Especially is this fitting, because\u2014as has been\nalready shown\u2014it is through knowledge alone that we can bring our conduct\ninto conformity with the absolute right, and there is nothing within the\nrange of our possible knowledge, which may not become in some way\nconnected with our agency as moral beings.\n\nIt is of prime importance that what we seem to know we know accurately;\nand as it is through the senses that we acquire our knowledge, not only of\nthe outward objects with which we are daily conversant, but of other minds\nthan our own, *the education of the senses* is an obvious duty. There are\nfew so prolific sources of social evil, injustice, and misery, as the\nfalsehood of persons who mean to tell the truth, but who see or hear only\nin part, and supply the deficiencies of perception by the imagination. In\nthe acquisition of knowledge of the highest interest and importance this\nsame hindrance is one of the most frequent obstacles. The careless eye and\nthe heedless ear waste for many minds a large portion of the time\nostensibly given to serious pursuits, and render their growth pitifully\nslow and scanty as compared with their means of culture. The senses may,\nespecially in early life, be trained to alertness and precision, so that\nthey shall carry to the mind true and full reports of what they see and\nhear; and it is only by such training that the perceptive faculties can\naccomplish the whole work for which they are designed and fitted.\n\nThere are, also, interior senses, *apprehensive powers of the mind*, which\nequally crave culture, and which depend for their precision and force on\ncareful education and diligent use. Mere observation, experience, or\nstudy, cannot give knowledge that will be of any avail. One may have a\nlargely and variously stocked memory, and yet be unable to employ its\ncontents to his own advantage or to the benefit of others. Indeed, there\nare minds that are paralyzed by being overloaded,\u2014by taking in freight\nfaster than they have room for it. It is only materials which the mind has\nmade its own, incorporated into its substance, that it can fully utilize.\nKnowledge must be acted upon by the understanding, the reason, the\njudgment, before it can be transmuted into wisdom, and employed either in\nthe acquisition of new truth or in the conduct of life. Mental activity,\nthen, is a duty; for if we are bound to preserve life, by parity of\nreason, we are bound to improve its quality and increase its quantity, and\nthis cannot be done unless the intellectual powers are strengthened by\ndiligent exercise, as well as nourished by the facts and truths which are\nthe raw material of wisdom.\n\nThe fit *objects of knowledge* vary indefinitely with one\u2019s condition in\nlife. Things in themselves trivial or evanescent may, under certain\ncircumstances, claim our careful attention and thorough cognizance. We\nought, on the one hand, to know all we can about matters concerning which\nwe must speak or act, and, on the other hand, to refrain from voluntarily\nspeaking or acting in matters of which we are ignorant. Thus our social\nrelations and our daily intercourse may render it incumbent on us to\nobtain for current use a large amount of accurate knowledge which is not\nworth our remembering. Then a man\u2019s profession, stated business, or usual\noccupation opens a large field of knowledge, with which and with its\nallied provinces it is his manifest duty to become conversant to his\nutmost ability; for the genuineness and value of his work must be in a\ngreat degree contingent on his intelligence. At the same time, every man\nis bound to make his profession worthy of respect; in failing to do so, he\nwrongs and injures the members of his profession collectively; and no\ncalling can obtain respect, if those who pursue it show themselves\nuncultivated and ignorant. Thus far, then, should knowledge be extended on\ngrounds of practical utility. Beyond and above this range, there is an\nunlimited realm of truth, the knowledge of which is inestimably precious\nfor the higher culture of the mind and character. In this realm, of which\nonly an infinitesimal portion can be conquered during an earthly lifetime,\nthere is no unfruitful region,\u2014there is no department of nature, of\npsychology, or of social science, through which the mind may not be\nexpanded, exalted, energized, led into more intimate relations with the\nSupreme Intelligence, endowed with added power of beneficent agency.\nWhile, therefore, knowledge of things as they are, and of their underlying\nprinciples and laws, so far as we are able to acquire it, is not only a\nprivilege beyond all price, but an absolute duty, there are no moral\nconsiderations which need direct or limit our choice of the themes of\nresearch or study. These may properly be determined by native or acquired\nproclivity, by opportunity, or by considerations of usefulness. Nor, if\nthe love of truth be formed and cherished, can it of be of any essential\nimportance whether this or that portion of truth be pursued or neglected\nduring the brief period of our life in this world; for, at best, what we\nleave unattained must immeasurably exceed our attainments, and there is an\neternity before us for what we are compelled to omit here. At the same\ntime, the unbounded scope and the vast diversity of things knowable and\nworthy to be known are adapted to stimulate self-culture, and in that same\nproportion to invest human life with a higher dignity, a larger intrinsic\nvalue, and a more enduring influence.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nSelf-Control.\n\n\n*A man must be either self-governed, or under a worse government than his\nown.* God governs men, only by teaching and helping them to govern\nthemselves. Good men, if also wise, seek not, even for the highest ends,\nto control their fellow-men, but, so far as they can, enable and encourage\nthem to exercise a due self-control. It is only unwise or bad men who\nusurp the government of other wills than their own. But the individual\nwill is oftener made inefficient by passion, than by direct influence from\nother minds. Man, in his normal state, wills either what is expedient or\nwhat is right. Passion suspends, as to its objects, all reference to\nexpediency and right, even when there is the clearest knowledge of the\ntendencies of the acts to which it prompts. Thus the sensualist often\nknows that he is committing sure and rapid suicide, yet cannot arrest\nhimself on the declivity of certain ruin. The man in whom avarice has\nbecome a passion is perfectly aware of the comforts and enjoyments which\nhe is sacrificing, yet is as little capable of procuring them as if he\nwere a pauper. Anger and revenge not infrequently force men to crimes\nwhich they know will be no less fatal to themselves than to their victims.\nNow if a man will not put and keep himself under the government of\nconscience, it concerns him at least to remain under the control of\nreason, which, if it do not compel him to do right, will restrain him\nwithin the limits of expediency, and thus will insure for him reputation,\na fair position, and a safe course in life, even though it fail of the\nhighest and most enduring good.\n\n*Self-control is easily lost*, and is often lost unconsciously. The first\nsurrender of it is prone to be final and lifelong. Indeed, in many cases,\nthe passion destined to be dominant has nearly reached the maturity of its\npower previously to any outward violation of the expedient or the right.\nWhere the restraining influences of education and surroundings are strong,\nwhere important interests are at stake, or where conscience has not been\nhabitually silenced or tampered with, the perilous appetite, desire, or\naffection broods long in the thought, and is so largely indulged in\nreverie and anticipation, that it becomes imperious and despotic before it\nassumes its wonted forms of outward manifestation. Hence, the sudden\ninfatuation and rapid ruin which we sometimes witness,\u2014the cases in which\nthere seems but a single step between innocence and deep depravity. In\ntruth there are many steps; but until they become precipitous, they are\nveiled from human sight.\n\n*Self-control*, then, in order to be effective, *must be exercised upon\nthe thoughts and feelings*, especially upon the imagination, which fills\nso largely with its phantasms and day-dreams our else unoccupied hours.\nLet these hours be as few as possible; and let them be filled with\nthoughts which we would not blush to utter, with plans which we could\nactualize with the approving suffrage of all good men. The inward life\nwhich would dread expression and exposure, already puts the outward life\nin peril; for passion, thus inwardly nourished and fostered, can hardly\nfail to assume sooner or later the control of the conduct and the shaping\nof the character. Let the thoughts be well governed, and the life is\nemancipated from passion, and under the control of reason and principle.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section IV.\n\n\nMoral Self-Culture.\n\n\nIt is evident that, *whatever a man\u2019s aims may be, the attainment of them\ndepends more upon himself than upon any agency that he can employ*. If his\naim be extended influence, his words and acts have simply the force which\nhis character gives them. If his aim be usefulness, his own personality\nmeasures in part the value of his gifts, and determines entirely the worth\nof his services. If his aim be happiness, the more of a man he is, the\nlarger is his capacity of enjoyment; for as a dog gets more enjoyment out\nof life than a zo\u00f6phyte, and a man than a dog, so does the fully and\nsymmetrically developed man exceed in receptivity of happiness him whose\nnature is imperfectly or abnormally developed. Now it is through the\nthorough training and faithful exercise of his moral faculties and powers\nthat man is most capable of influence, best fitted for usefulness, and\nendowed with the largest capacity for happiness. History shows this. The\nmen whose lot (if any but our own) we would be willing to assume, have\nbeen, without an exception, good men. If there are in our respective\ncircles those whose position we deem in every respect enviable, they are\nmen of pre\u00ebminent moral excellence. We would not take\u2014could we have it\u2014the\nmost desirable external position with a damaged character. Probably there\nare few who do not regard a virtuous character as so much to be desired,\nthat in yielding to temptation and falling under the yoke of vicious\nhabits they still mean to reform and to become what they admire. Old men\nwho have led profligate lives always bear visible tokens of having\nforfeited all the valuable purposes of life, often confess that their\nwhole past has been a mistake, and not infrequently bear faithful\ntestimony to the transcendent worth of moral goodness. To remain satisfied\nwithout this is, therefore, a sin against one\u2019s own nature, a sacrifice of\nwell-being and happiness which no one has a right to make, and which no\nprudent man will make.\n\nSelf-culture in virtue implies and demands reflection on duty and on the\nmotives to duty, on one\u2019s own nature, capacities and liabilities, and on\nthose great themes of thought, which by their amplitude and loftiness\nenlarge and exalt the minds that become familiar with them. The mere\ntongue-work or hand-*work, of virtue slackens and becomes deteriorated,\nwhen not sustained by profound thought and feeling. Moreover, it is the\nmind that acts, and it puts into its action all that it has\u2014and no more\u2014of\nmoral and spiritual energy, so that the same outward act means more or\nless, is of greater or less worth, in proportion to the depth and vigor of\nfeeling and purpose from which it proceeds. It is thus that religious\ndevotion nourishes virtue, and that none are so well fitted for the duties\nof the earthly life as those who, in their habitual meditation, are the\nmost intimately conversant with the heavenly life.\n\nIn moral self-culture great benefit is derived from example, whether of\nthe living or the dead. Perhaps the dead are, in this respect, more useful\nthan the living. In witnessing the worthy deeds and beneficent agency of a\nperson of superior excellence, the tendency is to an over-exact imitation\nof specific acts and methods, which, precisely because they are\nspontaneous and fitting in his case, will not be so in the case of his\ncopyist; while the biography of an eminently good man enlists our sympathy\nwith his spirit rather than with the details of his life, and stimulates\nus to embody the same spirit in widely different forms of duty and\nusefulness. Thus the school-master who in Dr. Arnold\u2019s lifetime heard of\nhis unprecedented success as an educator, would have been tempted to go to\nRugby, to study the system on the ground, and then to adopt, so far as\npossible, the very plans which he there saw in successful operation,\u2014plans\nwhich might have been fitted neither to his genius, the traditions of his\nschool, nor the demands of its patrons. At the same time, the interior of\nRugby School was very little known, the principles of its administration\nstill less, to persons other than teachers. But Arnold\u2019s biography,\nrevealing the foundation-principles of his character and his work, raised\nup for him a host of imitators of all classes and conditions. Price, who\nconverted his immense candle-factory near London into a veritable\nChristian seminary for mutual improvement in knowledge, virtue, and piety,\nprofessed to owe his impulse to this enterprise solely to the \u201cLife of\nArnold,\u201d and like instances were multiplied in very various professions\nthroughout the English-speaking world. In fine, example is of service to\nus, not in pointing out the precise things to be done, but in exhibiting\nthe beauty, loveliness, and majesty of moral goodness, the possibility of\nexalted moral attainments, and the varied scope for their exercise in\nhuman life. Even he whose example we, as Christians, hold in a reverence\nwhich none other shares, is to be imitated, not by slavishly copying his\nspecific acts, which, because they were suitable in Jud\u00e6a in the first\ncentury, are for the most part unfitting in America in the nineteenth\ncentury, but by imbibing his spirit, and then incarnating it in the forms\nof active duty and service appropriate to our time and land.\n\nFinally, and obviously, *the practice of virtue* is the most efficient\nmeans of moral self-culture. As the thought uttered or written becomes\nindelibly fixed in the mind, so does the principle or sentiment embodied\nin action become more intimately and persistently an element of the moral\nself-consciousness.\n\n\n\n\n\n                                Chapter X.\n\n\nJUSTICE; OR, DUTIES TO ONE\u2019S FELLOW-BEINGS.\n\n\nJustice, in the common use of the word, refers only to such rights and\ndues as can be precisely defined, enacted by law, and enforced by legal\nauthority. Yet we virtually recognize a broader meaning of the word,\nwhenever we place law and justice in opposition to each other, as when we\nspeak of an _unjust law_. In this phrase we imply that there is a supreme\nand universal justice, of whose requirements human law is but a partial\nand imperfect transcript. This justice must embrace all rights and dues of\nall beings, human and Divine; and it is in this sense that we may regard\nwhatever any one being in the universe can fitly claim of another being as\ncoming under the head of justice. Such, as we have already intimated, is\nthe sense in which we have used the term in the caption of a chapter which\nwill embrace piety and benevolence no less than integrity and veracity.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nDuties To God.\n\n\nWhile we cannot command our affections, we can so *govern and direct our\nthoughts* as to excite the affections which we desire to cherish; and if\ncertain affections must inevitably result from certain trains or habits of\nthought, those affections may be regarded as virtually subject to the\nwill, and, if right, as duties. It is in this sense that gratitude and\nlove to God are duties. We cannot contemplate the tokens of his love in\nthe outward universe, the unnumbered objects which have no other possible\nuse than to be enjoyed, the benignity of his perpetual providence, the\nendowments and capacities of our own being, the immortality of our natural\naspiration and our Christian faith and hope, the forgiveness and\nredemption that come to us through Jesus Christ, and the immeasurable\nblessings of his mission and gospel, without fervent gratitude to our\ninfinite Benefactor. Nor can we think of him as the Archetype and Source\nof all those traits of spiritual beauty and excellence which, in man, call\nforth our reverence, admiration, and affection, without loving in Him\nperfect goodness, purity, and mercy. These attributes might, indeed, of\nthemselves fail to present the Supreme Being to our conceptions as a\ncognizable personality, were it not that the personal element is so\nclearly manifest in the visible universe and in God\u2019s constant providence.\nBut there are numerous objects, phenomena, and events in nature and\nprovidence which have\u2014so to speak\u2014a distinctive personal expression, so\nthat the familiar metaphors of God\u2019s countenance, smile, hand, and voice\ndo not transcend the literal experience of him who goes through life with\nthe inward eye and ear always open.\n\nThe omnipresence of God makes it the dictate of natural piety to address\nHim directly in *thanksgiving and prayer*,\u2014not, of necessity, in words,\nexcept as words are essential to the definiteness of thoughts, but in such\nwords or thoughts as constitute an expression to Him of the sentiments of\nwhich He is fittingly the object. As regards prayer, indeed, the grave\ndoubts that exist in some minds as to its efficacy might be urged as a\nreason why it should not be offered; but wrongly. It is so natural, so\nintrinsically fitting to ask what we desire and need of an omnipresent,\nomnipotent, all-merciful Being, who has taught us to call him our Father,\nthat the very appropriateness of the asking is in itself a strong reason\nfor believing that we shall not ask in vain. Nor can we ask in vain, if\nthrough this communion of the human spirit with the Divine there be an\ninflow of strength or of peace into the soul that prays, even though the\nspecific objects prayed for be not granted. That these objects, when\nmaterial, are often not granted, we very well know; yet we know too little\nof the extent of material laws, and of the degree to which a discretionary\nProvidence may work, not in contravention of, but through those laws, to\npronounce dogmatically that the prayers of men are wholly unrecognized in\nthe course of events.\n\nAs the members of the same community have very numerous blessings and\nneeds in common, it is obviously fitting that they should unite in *public\nworship, praise, and prayer*; and if this be a duty of the community\ncollectively, participation in it must, by parity of reason, be the duty\nof its individual members. Public worship involves the fitness, we may\neven say the necessity, of appropriating exclusively to it certain places\nand times. Associations attach themselves to places so indelibly, that it\nwould be impossible to maintain the gravity and sacredness of devotional\nservices in buildings or on spots ordinarily devoted to secular purposes,\neither of business or of recreation. Nor could assemblies for worship be\nconvened, otherwise that at predetermined and stated intervals; nor could\ntheir devotional purpose be served, were there not stated portions of time\nsequestered from ordinary avocations and amusements. Hence the duty\u2014on the\npart of all who admit the fitness of public worship\u2014of reverence for\nconventionally sacred places, and of abstinence from whatever is\ninconsistent with the religious uses of the day appropriated to\nworship.(11)\n\nIt remains for us to consider *the obligations imposed by an acknowledged\nrevelation from God*. The position in which we are placed by such a\nrevelation may best be illustrated by reference to what takes place in\nevery human family. A judicious father\u2019s commands, precepts, or counsels\nto his son are of two kinds. In the first place, he lays emphatic stress\non duties which the son knows or might know from his own sense of the\nfitting and the right, such as honesty, veracity, temperance. These duties\nwill not be in reality any more incumbent on the son because they are\nurged upon him by his father; but if he be a son worthy of the name, he\nwill be more profoundly impressed by their obligation, and will find in\nhis filial love an additional and strong motive toward their observance.\nThe father will, in the second place, prescribe either for his son\u2019s\nbenefit or in his own service certain specific acts, in themselves morally\nindifferent, and these, when thus prescribed, are no longer indifferent,\nbut, as acts of obedience to rightful authority, they become fitting,\nright, obligatory, and endowed with all the characteristics of acts that\nare in themselves virtuous. Now a revelation naturally would, and the\nChristian revelation does, contain precepts and commands of both these\nclasses. It prescribes with solemn emphasis the natural virtues which are\nobligatory upon us on grounds of intrinsic fitness; and though these are\nnot thus made any the more our duty, we have, through the teachings and\nexample of Jesus Christ, a more vivid sense of our obligation, a higher\nappreciation of the beauty of virtue, and added motives to its cultivation\nderived from the love, the justice, and the retributive providence of God.\nThe Christian revelation, also, contains certain directions, not in\nthemselves of any intrinsic obligation, as, for instance, those relating\nto baptism and the eucharist. So far as we can see, other and very\ndifferent rites might have served the same purpose with these. Yet it is\nfitting and right that these, and not others, should be observed, simply\nbecause the Divine authority which enacts them has a right to command and\nto be obeyed. Duties of this class are commonly called _positive_, in\ncontradistinction from natural obligations. Both classes are equally\nimperative on the ground of fitness; but with this difference, that in the\nlatter class the fitness resides in the duties themselves, in the former\nit grows out of the relation between him who gives and those who receive\nthe command.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nDuties Of The Family.\n\n\n*The inviolableness and permanence of marriage* are so absolutely\nessential to the stability and well-being of families, as to be virtually\na part of the law of nature. The young of other species have but a very\nbrief period of dependence; while the human child advances very slowly\ntoward maturity, and for a considerable portion of his life needs, for\nboth body and mind, support, protection, and guidance from his seniors.\nThe separation of parents by other causes than death might leave it an\nunsolvable question, to which of them the custody of their children\nappertained; and in whichever way they were disposed of, their due nurture\nand education would be inadequately secured. The children might be thrown\nupon the mother\u2019s care, while the means of supporting them belonged\nexclusively to the father. Or in the father\u2019s house they might suffer for\nlack of a mother\u2019s personal attention and services; while if he contracted\na new matrimonial connection, the children of the previous marriage could\nhardly fail of neglect, or even of hatred and injury, from their mother\u2019s\nsuccessful rival, especially if she had children of her own.(12)\n\nThe life-tenure of the marriage-contract contributes equally to the\n*happiness of the conjugal relation*, in the aggregate. There are, no\ndoubt, individual cases of hardship, in which an utter and irremediable\nincompatibility of temper and character makes married life a burden and a\nweariness to both parties. But the cases are much more numerous, in which\ndiscrepancies of taste and disposition are brought by time and habit into\na more comprehensive harmony, and the husband and wife, because unlike,\nbecome only the more essential, each to the other\u2019s happiness and welfare.\nWhere there is sincere affection, there is little danger that lapse of\nyears in a permanent marriage will enfeeble it; while, were the contract\nvoidable at will, there might be after marriage, as often before marriage,\na series of attachments of seemingly equal ardor, each to be superseded in\nits turn by some new attraction. Where, on the other hand, the union is\nthe result, not of love, but of mutual esteem and confidence, aided by\nmotives of convenience, the very possibility of an easy divorce would\nrender each party captious and suspicious, so that confidence could be\neasily shaken, and esteem easily impaired; while in those who expect\nalways to have a common home the tendency is to those habits of mutual\ntolerance, accommodation, and concession, through which confidence and\nesteem ripen into sincere and lasting affection.\n\nAs in many respects each family must be a unit, and as the conflict of\nrival powers is no less ruinous to a household than to a state, *the\nfamily must needs have one recognized head* or representative, and this\nplace is fittingly held by the husband rather than by the wife; for by the\nlaws and usages of all civilized nations he is held responsible\u2014except in\ncriminal matters\u2014for his wife and his minor children. But in the\nwell-ordered family, each party to the marriage-contract is supreme in his\nor her own department, and in that of the other prompt in counsel,\nsympathy, and aid, and slow in dissent, remonstrance, or reproof. These\ndepartments are defined with perfect distinctness by considerations of\nintrinsic fitness, and any attempt to interchange them can be only\nsubversive of domestic peace and social order.\n\n*The parent\u2019s duties to the child* are maintenance in his own condition in\nlife, care for his education and his moral and religious culture, advice,\nrestraint when needed, punishment when both deserved and needed, pure\nexample and wholesome influence, aid in the formation of habits and\naptitudes suited to his probable calling or estate in his adult years, and\nprovision for his favorable entrance on his future career. Some of these\nduties are obviously contingent on the parent\u2019s ability; others are\nabsolute and imperative. The judicious parent will, on the one hand,\nretain his parental authority as long as he is legally responsible for his\nchild; but, on the other hand, will train him gradually to self-help and\nself-dependence, and will concede to him, as he approaches years of\nmaturity, such freedom of choice and action as is consistent with his\npermanent well-being.\n\n*The child\u2019s duty* is unqualified submission to the parent\u2019s authority,\nobedience to his commands, and compliance with his wishes, in all things\nnot morally wrong, and this, not only for the years of minority, but so\nlong as he remains a member of his parent\u2019s family, or dependent on him\nfor subsistence. Subsequently, it is undoubtedly his duty to consult the\nreasonable wishes of his parent, to hold him in respect and reverence, to\nminister assiduously to his comfort and happiness, and, if need be, to\nsustain him in his years of decline and infirmity.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nVeracity.\n\n\n*The duty of veracity* is not contingent on the rights of any second\nperson, but is derived from considerations of intrinsic fitness. If\nrepresentations of facts, truths, or opinions are to be made, it is\nobviously fitting and right that they should be conformed to one\u2019s\nknowledge or belief; and no one can make representations which he knows to\nbe false without the consciousness of unfitness and wrong.\n\n*The most important interests of society depend on the confidence which\nmen repose in one another\u2019s veracity.* But for this, history would be\nworth no more than fiction, and its lessons would be unheeded. But for\nthis, judicial proceedings would be a senseless mockery of justice, and\nthe administration of law and equity, the merest haphazard. But for this,\nthe common intercourse of life would be invaded by incessant doubt and\nsuspicion, and its daily transactions, aimless and tentative. Against this\ncondition of things man is defended by his own nature. It is more natural\nto tell the truth than to utter falsehood. The very persons who are the\nleast scrupulous in this matter utter the truth when they have no motive\nto do otherwise. Spontaneous falsehood betokens insanity.\n\n*The essence of falsehood lies in the intention to deceive*, not in the\nwords uttered. The words may bear a double sense; and while one of the\nmeanings may be true, the circumstances or the manner of utterance may be\nsuch as inevitably to impose the false meaning upon the hearer. A part of\nthe truth may be told in such a way as to convey an altogether false\nimpression. A fact may be stated with the express purpose of misleading\nthe hearer with regard to another fact. Looks or gestures may be framed\nwith the intent to communicate or confirm a falsehood. Silent acquiescence\nin a known falsehood may be no less criminal than its direct utterance.\n\n*But has not one a right to conceal facts which another has no right to\nknow?* In such a case, concealment is undoubtedly a right; but falsehood,\nor equivocation, or truth which will convey a false impression, is not a\nright. This question has not unfrequently arisen with regard to anonymous\npublications. It might be a fair subject of inquiry, whether anonymous\nwriting is not in all cases objectionable, on the ground that a sense of\npersonal responsibility for statements given to the public would insure a\nmore uniform regard to truth and justice, as well as greater care in the\nascertainment of facts, and more mature deliberation in the formation of\njudgments and opinions. But if anonymous writing be justified, the writer\nis authorized to guard his secret by employing a copyist, or by covert\nmodes of transmission to the press, or by avoiding such peculiarities of\nstyle as might betray him. But if, notwithstanding these precautions, the\nauthorship be suspected and charged upon him, we cannot admit his right to\ndenial, whether expressly, or by implication, or even by the utterance of\na misleading fact. He undertook the authorship with the risk of discovery;\nhe had no right to give publicity to what he has need to be ashamed of;\nand if there be secondary, though grave reasons why he would prefer to\nremain unknown, they cannot be sufficient to justify him in falsehood.\n\n*Is truth to be told to an insane person*, when it might be dangerous to\nhim or to others? May not he be deceived for his benefit, decoyed into a\nplace of safe detention, or deterred by falsehood from some intended act\nof violence? Those who have the guardianship of the insane are unanimous\nin the opinion that falsehood, when discovered by them, is always attended\nwith injurious consequences, and that it should be resorted to only when\nimperatively required for their immediate safety or for that of others.\nBut in such cases the severest moralist could not deny the necessity, and\ntherefore the right, of falsehood. But it would be falsehood in form, and\nnot in fact. Truth-telling implies two conscious parties. The statement\nfrom which an insane person will draw false inferences, and which will\ndrive him to an act or paroxysm of madness, is not truth to him. The\nstatement which is indispensable to his safety, repose, or reasonable\nconduct, is virtually true to him, inasmuch as it conveys impressions as\nnearly conformed to the truth as he is capable of receiving.\n\n*Is falsehood justifiable for the safety of one\u2019s own life or that of\nothers?* This is a broad question, and comprehends a very wide diversity\nof cases. It includes the cases, in which the alternative is to deny one\u2019s\npolitical or religious convictions, or to suffer death for the profession\nof them. Here, however, there can be no difference of opinion. Political\nfreedom and religious truth have been, in past ages, propagated more\neffectively by martyrdoms, than by any other instrumentality; and no men\nhave so fully merited the gratitude and reverence of their race as those\nwho have held the truth dearer than life.\n\nBut the form which the question ordinarily assumes is this: *If by false\ninformation I can prevent the commission of an atrocious crime, am I\njustified in the falsehood?* It ought first to be said, that this is\nhardly a practical question. Probably it has never presented itself\npractically to any person under whose eye these pages will fall, or in any\ninstance within his knowledge. Nor can the familiar discussion of such\nextreme cases be of any possible benefit. On the other hand, he who\nfamiliarizes himself with the idea that under such a stress of\ncircumstances what else were wrong becomes right, will be prone to apply\nsimilar reasoning to an exigency somewhat less urgent, and thence to any\ncase in which great apparent good might result from a departure from\nstrict veracity. Far better is it to make literal truth the unvarying law\nof life, and then to rest in the assurance that, should an extreme case\npresent itself, the exigency of the moment will suggest the course to be\npursued. Yet, in ethical strictness, falsehood from one self-conscious\nperson to another cannot be justified; but we can conceive of\ncircumstances in which it might be extenuated. There are no degrees of\nright; but of wrong there may be an infinite number of degrees. One\nstraight line cannot be straighter than another; but we can conceive of a\ncurve or a waving line that shall have but an infinitesimal divergence\nfrom a straight line. So in morals, there may be an infinitesimal\nwrong,\u2014an act which cannot be pronounced right, yet shall diverge so\nlittle from the right that conscience would contract from it no\nappreciable stain, that man could not condemn it, and that we cannot\nconceive of its being registered against the soul in the chancery of\nheaven. Such may be the judgment which would properly attach itself to a\nfalsehood by which an atrocious crime was prevented.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n*Promises* belong under the head of veracity for a double reason, inasmuch\nas they demand in their making the truthful declaration of a sincere\npurpose, and in their execution an equal loyalty to the truth, even though\nit involve inconvenience, cost, or loss. The words of a promise may often\nbear more than one interpretation; but it is obviously required by\nveracity that the promiser should fulfil his promise in the sense in which\nhe supposed it to be understood by him to whom it was made.\n\nThere are *cases in which a promise should not be kept.* The promise to\nperform an immoral act is void from the beginning. It is wrong to make it,\nand a double wrong to keep it. The promise to perform an act, not\nintrinsically immoral, but unlawful, should be regarded in the same light.\nIf both parties were aware, when the promise was made, of the unlawfulness\nof the act, then neither party has the right to deem himself injured by\nthe other. If, however, the promiser was aware of the unlawfulness of his\npromise, while the promisee supposed it lawful, the promiser, though not\nbound by his promise, is under obligation to remunerate the promisee for\nhis disappointment or loss. If the act promised becomes unlawful between\nthe making and the execution of the promise, the promise is made void, and\nthe promisee has no ground of complaint against the promiser. Thus, if a\nman promised to send to a correspondent goods of a certain description at\na certain time, and before that time the exportation of such goods were\nprohibited by law, he would be free both from his promise and from\nresponsibility for its non-fulfilment.\n\nA promise neither immoral nor unlawful, but made under a mistake common to\nboth parties, and such as\u2014had it been known\u2014would have prevented the\npromise, is void. An extorted promise to perform an immoral or unlawful\nact cannot be binding. One has, indeed, no moral right to make such a\npromise, though if the case be one of extreme urgency and peril,\nextenuating circumstances may reduce the wrong to an infinitesimal\ndeviation from the right; but, when the duress is over, no considerations\ncan justify the performance of what it was wrong to promise. But a\npromise, not in itself immoral or unlawful, is binding, though made under\nduress. Thus, if a man attacked by bandits has had his life spared on\ncondition of a pecuniary ransom, he is bound to pay the ransom; for at the\nmoment of peril he thought his life worth all he promised to give for it,\nand it is neither immoral nor unlawful to give money, even to a robber. In\na case like this, regard for the safety of others should, also, have\nweight; for in a country liable to such perils, the breach of a promise by\none man might cost the community the lives of many.\n\n*Contracts* are mutual promises, in which each party puts himself under\nspecific obligations to the other. They are to be interpreted on the same\nprinciples, and to be regarded as void or voidable on the same grounds,\nwith promises.\n\n*An oath* is an invocation of the protection and blessing of God, or of\nhis indignation and curse, upon the person swearing, according as his\nassertion is true or false, or as his promise shall be observed or\nviolated. \u201cSo help you God,\u201d the form in common use in this country,\nexpresses the idea that underlies an oath,\u2014_so_ being, of course, the\nemphatic word. Oaths are exacted of witnesses in courts of justice in\nconfirmation of their testimony, and of incumbents of public offices in\npledge of their fidelity. They are required, too, in attestation of\ninvoices, inventories of estates, returns of taxable property, and various\nfinancial and statistical statements made under public authority. There\nare, also, not a few persons of whom, and occasions on which an oath of\nallegiance to the government of the state or nation is demanded.\n\n*An oath does not enhance one\u2019s obligation* to tell the truth, or to\nfulfil his promise. This obligation is entire and perfect in all cases, on\nthe ground of intrinsic fitness, and of the known will and command of God.\nBut the tendency of oaths is to establish in the minds of men two classes\nof assertions and promises, one more sacred than the other. He who is\nrequired under the solemn sanction of an oath merely to tell the truth or\nto make a promise in good faith, arrives naturally at the conclusion that\nhe is bound to a less rigid accuracy or fidelity in ordinary statements or\npromises. The law of the land, as we have seen, bears an important part in\nthe ethical education of the young; and by means of the legal distinction\ncreated between assertions or promises under oath and those made without\nthat sanction, children and youth are trained to regard simple\ntruth-telling and promise-keeping as of secondary obligation. This effect\nof legal oaths is attested by the prevalence of profane swearing, and by\nthe frequent use of oath-like forms of asseveration, not regarded as\nprofane, by persons of a more serious character. Except in the religious\nsects that abjure the use of oaths, nine persons out of ten swear more or\nless, and spontaneously confirm statements which are in the least degree\nstrange or difficult of belief, or promises to which they wish to give an\nair of sincerity and earnestness, by the strongest oaths they dare to use.\nThis comes of a felt necessity, which will exist as long as pre\u00ebminent\nsanctity is attached to legal oaths.\n\n*Oaths are notoriously ineffective in insuring* truth and fidelity. So far\nas their educational influence is concerned, they tend, as we have seen,\nto undermine the reverence for truth in itself considered, which is the\nsurest safeguard of individual veracity. Then too, so far as reliance is\nplaced upon an oath, the attention of those concerned is directed with the\nless careful scrutiny to the character for veracity borne by him to whom\nit is administered. In point of fact, men swear falsely whenever and\nwherever they would be willing to utter falsehood without an oath. In\ncourts of justice, the pains and penalties of perjury undoubtedly prevent\na great deal of false swearing; but precisely the same penalties are\nattached to the affirmation of persons who, on the ground of religious\nscruples, are excused from swearing, and they certainly are none too\nsevere for false testimony, in whatever way it may be given.\nNotwithstanding this check, however, it is well known that before a\ncorrupt or incompetent tribunal, an unprincipled advocate never finds any\ndifficulty in buying false testimony; and even where justice is uprightly\nand skilfully administered, it is not rare to encounter between equally\ncredible witnesses such flagrant and irreconcilable contradictions as to\nleave no room for any hypothesis other than perjury on one side or both.\nPerjury in transactions with the national revenue and with municipal\nassessors is by no means unprecedented among persons of high general\nreputation. False oaths of this description are, indeed, not infrequently\npreceded by some fictitious formalism, such as an unreal and temporary\ntransfer of property; but this is done, not in order to evade the guilt of\nperjury, but, in case of detection, to open a technical escape from its\nlegal penalty. Promissory oaths are of equally little worth. There is not\na public functionary from the President of the United States to the\nvillage constable, who does not take what is meant to be a solemn oath\n(though often administered with indecent levity) to be loyal to the\nconstitution of the country or state, and faithful in the discharge of his\nofficial duties. Yet what effect has this vast amount of swearing, if it\nbe not to make perjury so familiar an offence as to be no longer deemed\ndisgraceful? Not a bribe is taken by a member of Congress, not a contract\nsurreptitiously obtained by a municipal official, not an appointment made\nto the known detriment of the public on personal or party grounds, without\nthe commission of a crime, in theory transcendentally heinous, in practice\nconstantly condoned and ignored. Nor can we be mistaken in regarding the\nsacrilege and virtual blasphemy resulting from the institution of\njudicial, assertory, and promissory oaths, as holding no secondary place\namong the causes of the moral decline and corruption of which we witness\nso manifest tokens.\n\nTo one who does not carry foregone conclusions of his own to the\ninterpretation of the New Testament, it can hardly appear otherwise than\ncertain that the Founder of Christianity intended to prohibit all oaths.\nHis precept, \u201cSwear not at all,\u201d occurs in a series of specifications of\nmaxims drawn from the standard morality of his day, under each of which he\nsets aside the existing ethical rule, and substitutes for it one covering\nprecisely the same ground, and conformed to the intrinsic right as\nrepresented in his own spirit and life. \u201cYe have heard that it hath been\nsaid, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, that\nye resist not evil.\u201d \u201cYe have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt\nlove thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, Love your\nenemies.\u201d The analogy of these and other declarations of the same series\ncompels us to believe that when Jesus said, \u201cYe have heard that it hath\nbeen said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt\nperform unto the Lord thine oaths,\u201d the precept which followed, \u201cI say\nunto you, Swear not at all,\u201d must have applied to the same subject-matter\nwith the maxim which precedes it,\u2014that Jesus must have intended to\ndisallow something that had been previously permitted. If so, not trivial\nor profane oaths alone, but oaths made in good faith and with due\nsolemnity must have been included in the precept, \u201cSwear not at all.\u201d(13)\nIt is historically certain that the primitive Christians thus understood\nthe evangelic precept. They not only refused the usual idolatrous forms of\nadjuration, but maintained that all oaths had been forbidden by their\nDivine Lawgiver; nor have we any proof of their having receded from this\nposition, until that strange fusion of church and state under Constantine,\nin which it is hard to say whether Christianity mounted the throne of the\nC\u00e6sars or succumbed to their rule.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section IV.\n\n\nHonesty.\n\n\n*Honesty* relates to transactions in which money or other property is\nconcerned. In its broadest sense, it forbids not only the violation of the\nrights of individuals, but, equally, acts and practices designed to gain\nunfair emolument at the expense of the community, or of any class or\nportion of its members. It enjoins not merely the paying of debts and the\nperformance of contracts, but rigid fidelity in every trust, whether\nprivate or public. Its ground is intrinsic fitness; and a sense of fitness\nwill suggest its general rules, and will always enable one to determine\nhis duty in individual cases. Its whole field may be covered by two\nprecepts, level with the humblest understanding, and infallible in their\napplication. The first relates to transactions between man and man,\u2014Do\nthat, and only that, which you would regard as just and right, if it were\ndone to you. The second embraces concerns that affect numbers or classes\nof persons,\u2014Do that, and only that, which, were you the responsible\ntrustee and guardian of the public good, you would prescribe or sanction\nas just and right.\n\n*Notwithstanding the undoubted increase of dishonesty* in recent times and\nits disastrous frequency, there can be no doubt that *the majority of men\nare honest*, and that the transactions in which there is no deception or\nwrong, largely outnumber those which are fraudulent. Were this not so,\nthere could be neither confidence nor credit, enterprise would be\nparalyzed, business would be reduced to the lowest demands of absolute\nnecessity, and every man would be the sole custodian of what he might\nmake, produce, or in any way acquire. There can, therefore, be no element\nmore directly hostile to the permanence, not to say the progress, of\nmaterial civilization and of the higher interests which depend upon it,\nthan fraud, peculation, and the violation of trust, in pecuniary and\nmercantile affairs, and with reference to public funds and measures. Yet\nthere are methods, for which to a large degree honest men are responsible,\nin which dishonesty is created, nourished, and rewarded. In political\nlife, if few office-holders are inaccessible to bribes, it is not because\nmen of impregnable integrity might not, as in earlier times, be found in\nample numbers for all places of trust; but because the compromises,\nhumiliations, and concessions through which alone, in many of our\nconstituencies, one can become the candidate of a party, are such as an\nhonest man either would spurn at the outset, or could endure only by\nparting with his honesty. So long as men will persist in electing to\nmunicipal trusts those whose sole qualification is blind loyalty and\nunscrupulous service to a party, they can expect only robbery under the\nform of taxation; and, in fact, the financial revelations that have been\nmade in the commercial metropolis of our country are typical of what is\ntaking place, so far as opportunity serves, in cities, towns, and villages\nall over the land. As regards embezzlements, forgeries, and frauds in the\nmanagement of pecuniary trusts, there can be no doubt that the number is\ngreatly multiplied by the morbid sympathy of the public with the\ncriminals, by their frequent evasion of punishment or prompt pardon after\nconviction, and by the ease with which they have often recovered their\nsocial position and the means of maintaining it.\n\nIn addition to this complicity with fraud and wrong on the part of the\npublic, there are many ways in which *dishonesty engenders*, almost\nnecessitates *dishonesty*. A branch of business, in itself honest, may be\nvirtually closed against an honest man. The adulterations of food, so\nappallingly prevalent, will suggest an illustration of this point. There\nare commodities in which the mixture of cheaper ingredients cannot be\ndetected by the purchaser, and which in their debased form can be offered\nat so low a price as to drive the genuine commodities which they replace\nout of the market; and thus the alternative is presented to the hitherto\nhonest dealer to participate in the fraud, or to quit the business. The\nformer course is, no doubt, taken by many who sincerely regret the seeming\nnecessity.\n\n*Dishonesty* not only injures the immediate sufferer by the fraud or\nwrong, but when it becomes frequent, *is a public injury* and calamity. In\none way or another it alienates from the use of every honest man a very\nlarge proportion of his earnings or income. In this country, at the\npresent time, we probably fall short of the truth in saying that at least\na third part of every citizen\u2019s income is paid in the form of either\ndirect or indirect taxation, and of this amount a percentage much larger\nthan would be readily believed is pillaged on its way into the treasury or\nin its disbursement. Then, as regards bad debts (so-called), most of them\nfraudulently contracted or evaded, they are not, in general, the loss of\nthe immediate creditor, nor ought they to be; he is obliged to charge for\nhis goods a price which will cover these debts, and honest purchasers must\nthus pay the dues of the insolvent purchaser. Nor is this a solitary\ninstance in which innocent persons are obliged to suffer for wrongs with\nwhich they seem to have no necessary connection. There are very few\nexceptions to the rule, under which, however, we have room but one more\nexample. It is a well known fact that many American railways have not only\ncost very much more money than was ever laid out upon them, but are made,\nby keeping the construction-account long and generously open, to represent\non the books of the respective corporations much larger sums than they\ncost,\u2014especially in cases where the enterprise is lucrative and the\ndividends are limited by statute.\n\nNow in some sections of our country a transaction of this kind\u2014essentially\nfraudulent, under however respectable auspices\u2014is a disastrous check on\nproductive industry by the heavy freight-tariff which it imposes,\u2014so heavy\nsometimes as to keep bulky commodities, as wheat and corn, out of the\nmarkets where, at a fair cost for transportation, they might find\nremunerative sale. Thus the very means devised for opening the resources\nof a region of country may be abused to their obstruction and hindrance.\nIn fine, dishonesty in all its forms has a diffusive power of injury, and,\non the mere ground of self-defence, demands the remonstrance and\nantagonism of the entire community.\n\nWhile in most departments of conduct there is a wide neutral *ground\nbetween the right and the condemnably wrong*, there are matters of\nbusiness in which there seems to be no such intermediate territory, but in\nwhich what is fair, honorable, and even necessary, is closely contiguous\nto dishonesty. Thus, except in the simplest retail business, all modern\ncommerce is speculation, and the line between legitimate and dishonest\nspeculation is to some minds difficult of discernment. Yet the\ndiscrimination may be made. A man has a right to all that he earns by\nservices to the community, and these earnings may in individual instances\nreach an immense sum. We can easily understand how this may be, nay, must\nneeds be the case with the very high salaries paid to master\nmanufacturers. Such salaries would not be paid, did not the intelligence,\nskill, and organizing capacity of these men cheapen by a still larger\namount the commodities made under their direction. The case is precisely\nsimilar with the merchant engaged in legitimate commerce. By his knowledge\nof the right times and best modes of purchasing, by his enterprise and\nsagacity in maintaining intercourse with and between distant markets, and\nby his outlay of capital and skill as a carrier of commodities from the\nplace of their production to the place where they are needed for use, he\ncheapens the goods that pass through his hands by a greater amount than\nthe toll he levies upon them, which\u2014however large\u2014is his rightful due.\n\nThus also, when, in anticipation of a scarcity of some one commodity, a\nmerchant so raises the price as essentially to diminish the sale, *he\nearns his increased profits*; for an enhanced price is the only\npracticable check on consumption. For instance, if at the actual rate of\nconsumption the bread-stuff on hand would be consumed a month before the\nnew harvest could be made availing, no statistical statement could prevent\nthe month of famine; but experienced grain-merchants can adjust the price\nof the stock in hand so as to induce precisely the amount of economy which\nwill make that stock last till it can be replaced. They will, indeed,\nobtain a large profit on their sales, and will be accused by ignorant\npersons of speculating on scarcity and popular apprehension; but it will\nbe due wholly to their prescience that the scarcity did not become famine,\nand the apprehension suffering; and they will have merited for this\nservice more than the largest profits that can accrue to them.\n\nThe same principles will apply to *speculation in stocks*, which is in\nmany minds identified with dishonest gain. Stocks are marketable\ncommodities, equally with sugar and salt. They are liable to legitimate\nfluctuations in value, their actual value being affected, often by facts\nthat transpire, often by opinions that rest on assignable grounds. Now if\na man possess skill and foresight enough to buy stocks at their lowest\nrates and to sell them when they will bring him a profit, he makes a\nperfectly legitimate investment of his intelligence and sagacity, and in\nfacilitating sales for those who need to sell, and purchases for those who\nwish to buy, and thus preventing capital from lying unused, or remaining\ninconvertible at need, he earns all that his business yields him by the\nsubstantial services which he renders.\n\n*The legitimate business of the merchant and the broker is contingent, as\nwe have seen, on fluctuations in the market*, and he who has the sagacity\nto foresee these fluctuations and the enterprise to prepare for them,\nderives from them advantage to which he is fairly entitled. But it is\nprecisely at this point that the stress of temptation rests, and the\nopportunity presents itself for dishonesty in ways of which the laws take\nno cognizance, and on which public opinion is by no means severe. The\ncontingencies which sagacity can foresee, capital and credit can often\ncreate. Virtual scarcity may be produced by forestalling and monopoly.\nWhen there is no actual dearth, even famine-prices may be obtained for the\nnecessaries of life by the skilful manipulation of the grain-market. So\ntoo, in the stock-market, bonds and shares, instead of being bought or\nsold for what they are worth, of actual owners and to real purchasers, may\nbe merely gambled with,\u2014bought in large amounts in order to create a\ndemand that shall swell their price, or so thrown upon the market as to\nreduce their price below their real value, and all this with the sole\npurpose of mutual contravention and discomfiture. By operations of this\nkind, not only is no useful end subserved, but the financial interests and\nrelations of the community are injuriously, often ruinously, deranged;\nwhile not a few private holders of stock have their credit essentially\nimpaired by a sudden fall of price, or by the inflation of nominal value\nare led into rash speculations.\n\nIn the cases cited it may be seen how closely *the right abuts upon the\nwrong*, so that one may over-pass the line almost unconsciously. Yet it is\nbelieved that a man may determine for himself on which side of the line he\nbelongs. The department of business, or the mode of transacting business,\nwhich cannot by any possibility be of benefit to the community, still\nmore, that which in its general course is of positively injurious\ntendency, is essentially dishonest, even though there be no individual\nacts of fraud. He really defrauds the public who lives upon the public\nwithout rendering, or purposing to render any valuable return; and if\nthere be any profession or department of business to which this\ndescription applies, it should be avoided or forsaken by every man who\nmeans to be honest.\n\nAmong the many mooted cases in which the question of honesty is involved,\nour proposed limits will permit us to consider only that of usury(14)\n(so-called). There can be no doubt that usury laws and the opinion that\nsustains them sprang from the false theory, according to which money was\nregarded, not as value, but merely as the measure of value. It is now\nunderstood that it owes its capacity to measure value solely to its own\nintrinsic value; that its paper representatives can equal it in purchasing\npower only when convertible at pleasure into coin; and that paper not\nimmediately convertible can obtain the character of money only so far as\nthere is promise or hope of its ultimate conversion into coin. It follows\nthat money stands on the same footing with all other values,\u2014that its use,\ntherefore, is a marketable commodity, varying indefinitely in its fitting\nprice, according as money is abundant or scarce, the loan for a long or a\nshort period, and the borrower of more or less certain solvency. For\nordinary loans the relations of supply and demand are amply competent to\nregulate the rate of interest, while he who incurs an extra-hazardous risk\nfairly earns a correspondingly high rate of compensation. There is,\ntherefore, no intrinsic wrong in one\u2019s obtaining for the use of his money\nall that it is worth; and while we cannot justify the violation of any\nlaws not absolutely immoral, dishonesty forms no part of the offence of\nthe man who takes more than legal interest.(15)\n\n\n\n\n                                Section V.\n\n\nBeneficence.\n\n\n*We have a distinct consciousness of the needs of human beings.* If we\nhave not suffered destitution in our own persons, we yet should deprecate\nit. What we should dread others feel. The things which we find or deem\nessential to our well-being, many lack. We, it may be, possess them or the\nmeans of procuring them, beyond our power of personal use. This larger\nshare of material goods has come to us, indeed, honestly, by the operation\nof laws inherent in the structure of society, and thus, as we believe, by\nDivine appointment. At the same time we are conscious, in a greater or\nless degree, of the benevolent affections. We are moved to pity by the\nsight or knowledge of want or suffering. Our sense of fitness is painfully\ndisturbed by the existence of needs unsupplied, of calamities unrelieved.\nWe cannot but be aware of the adaptation of such superfluity of material\ngoods as we may possess to beneficent uses; and it can hardly be that we\nshall not rest in the belief that, in the inevitable order of society, it\nis the predetermined design and purpose of abundance to supply\ndeficiency,\u2014of the capacity of service, to meet the ever pressing demands\nfor service. Beneficence, then, is a duty based on considerations of\nintrinsic fitness.\n\nBut *beneficence must be actual*, not merely formal, *good-doing*. Some of\nthe most easy and obvious modes of supply or relief are adapted to\nperpetuate the very evils to which they minister, either by destroying\nself-respect, by discouraging self-help, or by granting immunity to\npositively vicious habits. The tendency of instinctive kindness is to\nindiscriminate giving. But there can be very few cases in which this is\nnot harmful. It sustains mendicants as a recognized class of society; and\nas such they are worse than useless. They necessarily lose all sense of\npersonal dignity; they remain ignorant or become incapable of all modes of\nregular industry, and it is impossible for them to form associations that\nwill be otherwise than degrading and corrupting.\n\nOf equally injurious tendency are the various modes of *relief at the\npublic charge*. They affix upon their beneficiaries the indelible brand of\npauperism, which in numerous instances becomes hereditary, and in not a\nfew cases has been transmitted through several generations. Experience has\nshown that recovery from a condition thus dependent is exceedingly rare,\neven with the young and strong, who, had they been tided over the stress\nof need by private and judicious charity, would shortly have resumed their\nplace among the self-subsisting members of the community. Public alms,\nwhile they are thus harmful to their recipients, impose upon society a far\nheavier burden than private charity. This is due in part to the permanent\npauperism created by the system, in part to the wastefulness which\ncharacterizes public expenditures of every kind. By special permission of\nthe national legislature, the experiment was tried in Glasgow, under the\ndirection of Dr. Chalmers, of substituting private munificence for relief\nfrom the public chest, in one of the poorest territorial parishes of the\ncity, embracing a population of ten thousand, and the result was the\nexpenditure of little more than one third of what had been expended under\nlegal authority. At the same time, the poor and suffering were so much\nmore faithfully and kindly cared for, that there was a constant overflow\nof poverty from the other districts of the city into this. Public charity,\nwhen thoroughly systematized, is liable to the still stronger objection,\nthat those who are able to give relief, in ceasing to feel the necessity,\nlose the will and the capacity of benevolent effort. Yet, were there no\npublic provision for the poor, there would be cases of destitution,\ndisease, disability, and mental imbecility, which would elude private\ncharity, however diligent and generous. It must be remembered, too, that\nthe same causes may at once enhance the demand for beneficent aid, and\ncripple its resources. Thus, in a conflagration, a flood, a dearth, or a\ncommercial panic, while the stress of need among the poor is greatly\nintensified, the persons on whose charity, under ordinary circumstances,\nthey could place the most confident reliance, may be among the chief\nsufferers. Thus, also, during the prevalence of infectious disease, a\nlarge proportion of those who are wont to perform the offices of humanity\nfor the suffering, are withdrawn by their own fears, or those of their\nfriends, from their wonted field of service. Then, too, there are various\nforms of disease and infirmity, which demand special treatment or a\npermanent asylum; and while institutions designed to meet these wants are\nmore wisely and economically administered under private than under public\nauspices, the state should never suffer them to fail or languish for lack\nof subsidy from private sources. The most desirable condition of things\nundoubtedly is that\u2014more nearly realized in France than in any other\ncountry in Christendom\u2014in which the relief of the poor and suffering in\nordinary cases, and the charge of charitable institutions to a large\ndegree, are left to individuals, voluntary organizations, and religious\nfraternities and sisterhoods, while government supplements and subsidizes\nprivate charity where it is found inadequate to the need.\n\nThe demands upon beneficence are by no means exhausted, when material\nrelief and aid have been bestowed. Indeed, alms are often given as a\npurchase of quitclaim for personal service. But the manifestation and\nexpression of sympathy may make the gift of immeasurably more worth and\nefficacy. Considerate courtesy, delicacy, and gentleness are essential\nparts of beneficence. There are very few so abject that they do not feel\ninsulted and degraded by what is coldly, grudgingly, superciliously, or\nchidingly bestowed; while the thoughtful tenderness which never forgets\nthe sensibilities of those whom it relieves, inspires comfort, hope, and\ncourage, arouses whatever capacity there may be of self-help, and is often\nthe means of replacing the unfortunate in the position from which they\nhave fallen.\n\n*Beneficence has a much broader scope than the mere relief of the poor and\nsuffering.* In the daily intercourse of life there are unnumbered\nopportunities for kindness, many of them slight, yet in their aggregate,\nof a magnitude that eludes all computation. There is hardly a transaction,\nan interview, a casual wayside meeting, in which it is not in the power of\neach person concerned to contribute in an appreciable degree to the\nhappiness or the discomfort of those whom he thus meets, or with whom he\nis brought into a relation however transient. In all our movements among\nour fellow-men, it is possible for us to \u201cgo about doing good.\u201d What we\ncan thus do we are bound to do. We perceive and feel that this is fitting\nfor us as social and as mutually dependent beings. We are conscious of the\nbenefit accruing to us from little, nameless attentions and courtesies,\noften of mere look, or manner, or voice; and from these experiences we\ninfer that the possibility, and therefore the duty of beneficence is\ncoextensive with our whole social life.\n\nThe *measure of beneficence*, prescribed for us on the most sacred\nauthority, \u201cAll things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do\nye even so to them,\u201d needs only to be stated to be received as authentic.\nIt supplies a measure for our expectations also, as well as for our\nduties. We have a right to expect from others as much courtesy, kindness,\nservice as, were they in our place and we in theirs, we should feel bound\nto render to them,\u2014a rule which would often largely curtail our\nexpectations, and in the same proportion tone down our disappointments and\nimagined grievances.\n\nThere is another scriptural precept, \u201c*Thou shalt love thy neighbor as\nthyself,*\u201d which might at first sight seem impracticable, yet which, as we\nshall see on closer examination, represents not only a possible\nattainment, but one toward which all who heartily desire and love to do\ngood are tending. There are various conditions under which, confessedly,\nhuman beings love others as well as themselves, or better. What else can\nwe say of the mother\u2019s love for her child, for whose well-being she would\nmake any conceivable sacrifice, nay, were there need, would surrender life\nitself? Have we not also sometimes witnessed, a filial devotion equally\nentire and self-forgetting?\n\nNor are instances wanting, in which brothers and sisters, or friends who\nhad no bonds of consanguinity, have shown by unmistakable deeds and\nsufferings that their love for one another was at least equal to their\nself-love. This same love for others, as for himself, is manifested by the\nself-devoting patriot, the practical philanthropist, the Christian\nmissionary. There is ample ground for it in the theory of humanity which\nforms a part of our accustomed religious utterance. We call our fellow-men\nour brethren, as children of the same Father. So far as sayings like these\nare sentiments, and not mere words, there must be in our feelings and\nconduct toward and for our fellow-men in general a kindness, forbearance,\nself-forgetfulness, and self-sacrifice similar to that of which, toward\nour near kindred, we would not confess ourselves incapable. Here it must\nbe borne in mind that the precepts of Christianity represent the\nperfection which should be our constant aim and our only goal, not the\nstage of attainment which we are conscious of having reached, or of being\nable to reach with little effort.\n\n*The love of enemies* is also enjoined upon us by Jesus Christ. Is this\npossible? Why not? There are cases where one\u2019s nearest kindred are his\nworst enemies; and we have known instances in which love has survived this\nrudest of all trials. Were the Christian idea of universal brotherhood a\nprofound sentiment, it would not be quenched by enmity, however bitter.\nEnmity toward ourselves need not affect our estimate of one\u2019s actual merit\nor claims. If we should not think the worse of a man because he was the\nenemy of some one else, why should we think the worse of him because he is\nour enemy? He may have mistaken our character and our dispositions; and if\nso, is he more culpable for this than for any other mistake? Or if, on the\nother hand, he has some substantial reason for disliking us, we should\neither remove the cause, or submit to the dislike without feeling\naggrieved by it. At any rate we can obey the precept, \u201cDo good to them\nthat hate you;\u201d and this is the only way, and an almost infallible way, in\nwhich the enmity may be overcome, and superseded by relations of mutual\nkindness and friendship.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter XI.\n\n\nFORTITUDE; OR DUTIES WITH REFERENCE TO UNAVOIDABLE EVILS AND SUFFERINGS.\n\n\nThere are, in almost every prolonged human experience, *privations and\nsufferings to be endured, disappointments to be submitted to, obstacles\nand difficulties to be surmounted and overcome*. From whatever source\nthese elements of experience proceed, even if from blind chance, or from\n_fate_ (which denotes the _utterance_ or decree of arbitrary and\nirresponsible power), the strong man will brace himself up to bear them;\nthe wise man will shape his conduct by them; the man of lofty soul will\nrise above them. But the temper in which they will be borne, yielded to,\nor surmounted, must be contingent on the belief concerning them. If they\nare regarded as actual evils, they will probably be endured with\nsullenness, or submitted to with defiance and scorn, or surmounted with\npride and self-inflation. Even in the writings of the later Stoics, which\nabound in edifying precepts of fortitude and courage under trial, there is\nan undertone of defiance, as if the sufferer were contending with a\nhostile force, and a constant tendency to extol and almost deify the\nenergy of soul which the good man displays in fighting with a hard\ndestiny. If, on the other hand, physical evils are regarded as wise and\nbenign appointments of the Divine love and fatherhood, the spirit in which\nthey are borne and struggled against is characterized by tenderness,\nmeekness, humility, trust, and hope. It is instructive in this regard to\nread alternately the Stoics and St. Paul, and to contrast their\nmagnanimous, but grim and stern resignation, with the jubilant tone in\nwhich, a hundred times over, and with a vast variety of gladsome\nutterance, he repeats the sentiment contained in those words, \u201cAs\nsorrowful, yet always rejoicing.\u201d As ours is the Christian theory as to\nthe (so-called) evils of human life, we shall recognize it in our\ntreatment of the several virtues comprehended under the general title of\nFortitude.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nPatience.(16)\n\n\n*Patience* is incumbent on us, only under inevitable sufferings or\nhardships, or under such as are incurred in the discharge of manifest\nduty, or for the benefit of our fellow-men. Needless sufferings or\nprivations we are bound to shun or to escape, not to bear. The caution and\nforesight by which they may be evaded hold an essential place among the\nduties of prudence. Nor does reason or religion sanction self-imposed\nburdens or hardships of any kind, whether in penance for wrong-doing, as a\nmeans of purchasing the Divine favor, or as a mode of spiritual\ndiscipline.\n\nPatience implies *serenity, cheerfulness, and hopefulness*, under burdens\nand trials. It must be distinguished from apathy, which is a temperament,\nnot a virtue. There are some persons whose sensibilities are so sluggish\nthat they are incapable of keen suffering, and of profound and lasting\nsorrow. We can hardly call this a desirable temperament; for its capacity\nof enjoyment is equally defective, and, as there is more happiness than\nmisery in almost every life, he whose susceptibility of both pain and\npleasure is quick and strong is, on the whole, the gainer thereby. The\nserenity of patience requires vigorous self-command. It is essential,\nfirst of all, to control, and as far as possible to suppress, the outward\ntokens of pain and grief. They, like all modes of utterance, deepen the\nfeeling they express; while a firm and self-contained bearing enhances the\nfortitude which it indicates. Control must also be exercised over the\nthoughts, that they be abstracted from the painful experience, and\nemployed on themes that will fill and task them. Mental industry is the\nbest relief that mere philosophy has for pain and sorrow; and though it\ncertainly is not a cure, it never fails to be of service as a palliative.\nEven when bodily distress or infirmity renders continuous thought\nimpossible, the effort of recollection, or the employment of the mind in\nmatters too trivial for its exercise in health, may relieve the weariness\nand lighten the stress of suffering. Nor let devices of this sort be\ndeemed unworthy of a place even among duties; for they are often essential\nmeans to ends of high importance. They assert and maintain the rightful\nsupremacy of the mind over the body; they supersede that morbid brooding\nupon painful experiences which generates either melancholy or\nquerulousness; and they leave in the moral nature an unobstructed entrance\nto all soothing and elevating influences.\n\n*Cheerfulness* in the endurance of pain and hardship must result in great\npart from the belief. If I regard myself as irresistibly subject to an\nautomatic Nature, whose wheels may bruise or crush me at any moment, I\nknow not why or how I could be cheerful, even in such precarious health or\nprosperity as might fall to my lot; and there could certainly be no\nreassuring aspect to my adverse fortune. But if I believe that under a\nfatherly Providence there can be no suffering without its ministry of\nmercy, no loss without its greater gain within my reach and endeavor, no\nhardship without its reflex benefit in inward growth and energy, then I\ncan take and bear the inevitable burdens of this earthly life in the same\nspirit in which I often assume burdens not imposed upon me from without,\nfor the more than preponderant benefit which I hope to derive from them.\nBut if I have this faith in a benignant Providence which will not afflict\nme uselessly, I am under obligation not to let my faith, if real, remain\ninactive in my seasons of pain, loss, or grief. I am bound so to ponder on\nmy assured belief, and on such proofs of it as may lie in my past\nexperience, that it shall give its hue to my condition, its tone to my\nthought, its direction to the whole current of my sentiment and feeling.\nThus may endurance be not only calm, but cheerful, because pervaded by the\nconviction that at the heart of all that seems evil there is substantial\ngood.\n\nYet, it cannot be denied that there are life-long burdens and\ngriefs,\u2014incurable illnesses, irretrievable losses, bereavements that will\nnever cease to be felt, and cannot be replaced. Especially in advanced\nyears there are infirmities, disabilities, and privations, which cannot by\nany possibility have a resultant revenue equivalent to what they take from\nus; for in old age the growth of character is too slow to be worth the\nsacrifice which in earlier life may be more than compensated by the\nconsciousness of spiritual enlargement and increase. How shall these\nburdens be borne cheerfully? They cannot, unless they be also borne\nhopefully. But if there be presented to the faith, beyond the earthly\nlife, a future, the passage into which is to be made the easier by loss\nand sorrow here; if families are there to be reunited, and void places in\nthe affections filled again; if worthy hopes, seemingly disappointed, are\nonly postponed for a richer and happier fulfilment,\u2014there is in that\nfuture exhaustless strength for solace and support under what must be\nendured here. Earthly trial must seem light and momentary in view of\nperfect and eternal happiness; and thus the hope that lays hold on an\ninfinite domain of being is coined into utilities for the daily needs of\nthe tried, suffering, afflicted, and age-bowed, supplying to patience an\nelement without which it cannot be made perfect.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nSubmission.\n\n\nThere are events, seemingly adverse, which in themselves are transient,\nand inflict no permanent discomfort, but which necessitate the surrender\nof cherished expectations, the change of favorite plans, it may be, the\nlife-long abandonment of aims and hopes that had held the foremost place\nin the anticipated future. Here submission of some sort is a necessity.\nBut the submission may be querulous and repining; it may be bitter and\nresentful; it may be stern and rigid. In the last of these types only can\nthere be any semblance of virtue; and this last can be virtuous, only\nwhere inevitable events are attributed to Fate, and not to Providence. But\nif a wise and kind Providence presides over human affairs, its decrees are\nour directory. The very events which hedge in, mark out our way. The tree\nwhich has its upward growth checked spreads its branches; that which is\ncircumscribed in its lateral expansion attains the greater height. The\ntendrils of the vine are guided by the very obstacles placed in its way.\nThus, in human life, impassable barriers in one direction prescribe aims\nand endeavors in a different direction. The things that we cannot do\ndetermine the things that we ought to do. The growth which is impeded must\ngive place to growth of a different type, and to us undoubtedly more\nwholesome, more congenial with our capacities, more conducive to our true\nwell-being. What seem obstacles may be supports, giving the best possible\ndirection to our active powers, and so training our desires and affections\nas to lead to higher happiness and more substantial good than could have\notherwise been attained.\n\n*Submission*, then, *must be grounded in faith*. The inevitable must be to\nus the appointment of Omniscient Love. In our childhood the very regimen\nand discipline that were least to our taste proceeded often from the\nwisest counsels, and in due time we acquiesced in them as judicious and\nkind, nor would we in the retrospect have had them otherwise. As little as\nwe then knew what was best for our well-being in the nearer future, we may\nnow know as to what is best for us in a remote future, whether in the\npresent or in a higher state of being. All that remains for us is\nacquiescence, cheerful and hopeful, in a Wisdom that cannot err, in a Love\nwhich can will only the best of which we are capable.\n\n*Submission* is not merely a passive, but equally *an active virtue*.\nInevitable events impose imperative duties. In the direction which they\nindicate there is work for us, of self-culture, of kindness, of charity.\nOur characters can be developed, not by yielding, however cheerfully, to\nwhat seem misfortunes, but by availing ourselves of the opportunities\nwhich they present, in place of those of which they have deprived us. When\nthe way we had first chosen is barred against us, we are not to lie still,\nbut to move onward with added diligence on the way that is thus opened to\nus. If outward success is arrested and reverted, there is only the more\nreason for improving the staple of our inward being. If those dearest to\nus have passed beyond the reach of our good offices, there are the more\nremote that may be brought near, and made ours, by our beneficence. If our\nearthly life is rendered desolate, the affections, hopes, and aims thus\nunearthed may by our spiritual industry and thrift be trained heavenward.\nAll this is included in full submission to the will of the Divine\nprovidence; for that will is not our loss, disappointment, or suffering,\nbut our growth, by means of it, in quantity of mental and spiritual life,\nin capacity of duty, and in the power of usefulness.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nCourage.\n\n\nPatience, as its name imports, is a passive quality; Submission blends the\npassive and the active; while *Courage* is pre\u00ebminently an active virtue.\nPatience resigns itself to what must be endured; submission conforms\nitself to what it gladly would, but cannot reverse; courage resists what\nit cannot evade, surmounts what it cannot remove, and declines no conflict\nin which it is honorable to engage. It is obvious that the occasions for\nthese virtues are widely different. Patience has its place where calm and\ncheerful endurance is the only resource; submission, where there must be\nvoluntary self-adaptation to altered circumstances; courage, where there\nis threatened evil which strenuous effort can avert, mitigate, or subdue.\n\n*Courage is a virtue, only when it is a necessity.* There is no merit in\nseeking danger, in exciting opposition, in courting hostility. Indeed,\nconduct of this description more frequently proceeds from persons who know\nthemselves cowards and fear to be thought so, than from those who are\nactually possessed of courage. But there are perils, encounters, enmities,\nwhich cannot by any possibility be avoided, and there are others which can\nbe avoided only by the sacrifice of principle, or by the surrender of\nopportunities for doing good, and which, therefore, to a virtuous man are\ninevitable.\n\nThe *physical courage*, commonly so called, which is prompt and fearless\nin the presence of imminent danger, or in armed conflict with enemies, may\nbe, or may not be, a virtue. It may proceed from a mind too shallow and\nfrivolous to appreciate the worth of life or the magnitude of the peril\nthat threatens it; it may, as often in the case of veteran soldiers, be\nthe result of discipline without the aid of principle; or it may depend\nwholly on intense and engrossing excitement, so that he who would march\nfearlessly at the head of a forlorn hope might quail before a solitary\nfoe. But if one be, in the face of peril, at the same time calm and\nresolute, self-collected and firm, cautious and bold, fully aware of all\nthat he must encounter and unfalteringly brave in meeting it, such courage\nis a high moral attainment. Its surest source is trust in the Divine\nprovidence,\u2014the fixed conviction that the inevitable cannot be otherwise\nthan of benignant purpose and ministry, though that purpose may be\ndeveloped and that ministry effected only in a higher state of being. To\nthis faith must be added a strong sense of one\u2019s manhood, and of his\nsuperiority by virtue of that manhood over all external surroundings and\nevents. We are conscious of a rightful supremacy over the outward world,\nand deem it unworthy to succumb, without internecine resistance, to any\nforce by which we may be assailed, whether that force be a power of nature\nor a wrongful assault from a fellow-man. It is the presence of this\nconsciousness that wins our admiration for all genuine heroism, and the\nabsence of it at the moment of need that makes cowardice contemptible.\n\nThere is a *moral courage* required in pursuing our legitimate course in\nlife, or in discharging our manifest duty, notwithstanding straitnesses,\nhindrances, obstacles, to which the feeble and timid could not but yield.\nThe constituent elements of this type of courage are precisely the same\nthat are needed in the encounter with physical peril. In both cases it is\nequally unmanly to succumb until we have resisted to the utmost. But while\nphysical courage can at best only insure our safety, moral courage\ncontributes essentially to the growth of mind and character; and the\nlarger the opportunity for its exercise, the greater will be the mass of\nmind, the quantity of character, the power of duty and of usefulness.\nStraitnesses develop richer resources than they bar. Hindrances nurture\nhardihood of spirit in the struggle against them, or in the effort to\nneutralize them. Obstacles, when surmounted, give one a higher position\nthan could be attained on an unobstructed path. The school of difficulty\nis that in which we have our most efficient training for eminence, whether\nof capacity or of moral excellence. What are accounted inevitable evils\nare, when met with courage, only benefits and blessings, inasmuch as they\nbring into full and vigorous exercise the hardier muscles and sinews of\nthe inner man, to measure strength with them or to rise above them.\n\nCourage is needed in *the profession and maintenance of the true and the\nright*, when denied, assailed, or vilipended. Communities never move\nabreast in the progress of opinion. There are always pioneer minds and\nconsciences; and the men who are in advance of their time must encounter\nobloquy at least, often persecution, loss, hardship, sometimes legal\npenalties and disabilities. Under such circumstances, there are doubtless\nmany more that inwardly acknowledge the unpopular truth or the contested\nright, than there are who are willing to avow and defend their belief.\nMany are frightened into false utterance or deceptive silence. But there\nmust be in such minds a conscious mendacity, fatal to their own\nself-respect, and in the highest degree detrimental to their moral\nselfhood. It demands and at the same time nurtures true greatness of soul\nto withstand the current of general opinion, to defy popular prejudice, to\nmake one\u2019s self \u201cof no reputation\u201d in order to preserve his integrity\nunimpaired. Therefore is it that, in the lapse of time, the very men who\nhave been held in the lowest esteem rise into eminence in the general\nregard, sometimes while they are still living, oftener with a succeeding\ngeneration. Martyrs in their day, they receive the crown of martyrdom when\nthe work which they commenced is consummated. The history of all the great\nreforms which have been successive eras in the moral progress of\nChristendom is full of names, once dishonored, now among the foremost of\ntheir race.\n\nThis type of courage has, in less enlightened ages than our own, been made\nillustrious by *those who have sacrificed life rather than deny or\nsuppress beliefs* which they deemed of vital moment. It can hardly be\nanticipated that the civilized world will recede so far into barbarism as\nto light again the death-flame of persecution; but it may be questioned\nwhether the chronic sacrifice of all which men most desire in life\nrequires or manifests less of heroism than in earlier times furnished\nvictims for the arena or the stake.\n\nIn the moral hierarchy the first rank is probably due to *the courage that\ninspires and sustains arduous and perilous philanthropic enterprise*. The\nmartyr for opinion suffers or dies rather than stain his soul with the\npositive guilt of falsehood; while the philanthropist might evade toil and\ndanger without committing any actual sin, or making himself liable to\ncensure or disapproval either from God or man. In the former case,\nhardship or danger is rendered inevitable by the felt necessity of\nself-respect; in the latter, by the urgency of a love for man equal or\nsuperior to the love for self. As examples of this highest type of\ncourage, it may suffice to name Howard, whose labors for prison-reform\nwere pursued at the well-known risk and the ultimate cost of his life;\nFlorence Nightingale and the noble sisterhood inaugurated by her, who have\nwon all the untarnished and undisputed laurels of recent wars on both\nsides of the Atlantic; and the Christian missionaries to savage tribes and\nin pestilential climates, who have often gone to their work with as clear\na consciousness of deadly peril as if they had been on their way to a\nbattle-field.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter XII.\n\n\nORDER; OR DUTIES AS TO OBJECTS UNDER ONE\u2019S OWN CONTROL.\n\n\nThere are many duties that are self-defined and self-limited. Thus, the\nordinary acts of justice and many of the charities of daily life include\nin themselves the designation of time, place, and measure. There are other\nduties, of equal obligation, which admit of wide variance as to these\nparticulars, but which can be most worthily and efficiently performed only\nwhen reference is had to them. There are, also, many acts, in themselves\nmorally indifferent, which acquire their moral character as right or wrong\nsolely from one or more of these particulars. Thus recreations that are\ninnocent and fitting on Saturday, may be inconsistent with the proprieties\nof Sunday; conversation and conduct perfectly befitting the retirement of\nhome may be justly offensive in a place of public concourse; or there may\nbe great guilt in the excessive use of that which used in moderation may\nbe blameless, fitting, and salutary.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section I.\n\n\nTime.\n\n\n*A life-time is none too long for a life\u2019s work.* Hence the fitness, and\ntherefore the duty, of a careful economy of time. This economy can be\nsecured only by a systematic arrangement of one\u2019s hours of labor,\nrelaxation, and rest, and the assignment to successive portions of the\nday, week, or year, of their appropriate uses. The amount of time wasted,\neven by an industrious man who has no method or order in his industry,\nbears a very large proportion to the time profitably employed. In the\nneedlessly frequent change of occupations, there is at each beginning and\nending a loss of the working power, which can neither start on a new\ncareer at full speed, nor arrest itself without previous slackening. This\nwaste is made still greater by the suspense or vacillation of purpose of\nthose who not only have no settled plans of industry, but often know not\nwhat to do, or are liable, so soon as they are occupied in one way, to\nfeel themselves irresistibly drawn in a different direction.\n\nBut in the distribution of time *a man should be the master, not the slave\nof his system*. The regular work and the actual duty of the moment do not\nalways coincide. Due care for health, the opportunity for earned and\nneeded recreation, the claims of charity, courtesy, and hospitality, in\nfine, the immediate urgency of any duty selfward, manward, or Godward,\nshould always take precedence of routine-work however wisely planned.\nObstinate adherence to system may lead to more and greater criminal\nomissions of duty than would be incurred, even in the spasmodic industry\nwhich takes its impulse from the passing moment. It must be remembered\nthat timeliness is the essential element of right and obligation in many\nthings that ought to be done, especially in all forms of charity, alike in\ngreat services, and in those lesser amenities and kindnesses which\ncontribute so largely to the charm of society and the happiness of\ndomestic life. There are many good offices which, performed too late, were\nbetter left undone,\u2014courtesies which, postponed, are\nincivilities,\u2014attentions which, out of season, are needless and wearisome.\n\n*Every day, every waking hour has its own duty*, either its special work,\nor its due portion of one\u2019s normal life-work. Procrastination is,\ntherefore, as unwise as it is immoral, or rather, it is immoral because it\nis unwise and unfitting. The morrow has its own appropriate duties; and if\nto-day\u2019s work be thrown into it, the massing of two days\u2019 good work into\none exceeds ordinary ability. The consequence is, either that both days\u2019\nworks are imperfectly performed, or that part of what fitly belongs to the\nmorrow is pushed farther on, and the derangement of duty made chronic.\nThus there are persons who are always in arrears with their engagements\nand occupations,\u2014in chase, as it were, after duties which they never lose\nfrom sight, and never overtake.\n\n*Hardly less grave,* though less common, *is the error of those who\nanticipate duty*, and do to-day what they ought to do to-morrow. The work\nthus anticipated may be superseded, or may be performed under better\nauspices and with fewer hindrances in its own time; while it can hardly\nfail to interfere injuriously with the fit employment or due relaxation of\nthe passing day. Moreover, the habit of thus performing work before its\ntime at once betokens and intensifies an uneasy, self-distrusting frame of\nmind, unfavorable to vigorous effort, and still more so to the quiet\nenjoyment of needed rest and recreation. There are those, who are\nperpetually haunted by the forecast shadows, not only of fixed, but of\ncontingent obligations and duties,\u2014shadows generally larger than the\nsubstance, and often wholly destitute of substance.\n\n*Punctuality*(17) denotes the most scrupulous precision as to\ntime,\u2014exactness to a moment in the observance of all times that can be\ndesignated or agreed upon. In matters with which we alone are concerned,\nwe undoubtedly have of right, and may often very fittingly exercise, the\ndispensing power. Thus, in the arrangement of our own pursuits, the clock\nmay measure and direct our industry, without binding us by its stroke. It\nis often of more consequence that we finish what is almost done, than that\nwe change our work because the usual hour for a change has arrived. But\nwhere others are concerned, rigid punctuality is an imperative duty. A\nfixed time for an assembly, a meeting of a committee or board of trust, or\na business interview, is a virtual contract into which each person\nconcerned has entered with every other, and the strict rules that apply to\ncontracts of all kinds are applicable here. Failure in punctuality is\ndishonesty. It involves the theft of time, which to some men is money\u2019s\nworth, to others is worth more than money. It ought not to surprise us if\none wantonly or habitually negligent in this matter should prove himself\noblivious of other and even more imperative obligations; for the dullness\nof conscience and the obscure sense of right, indicated by the frequent\nbreach of virtual contracts as to time, betoken a character too feeble to\nmaintain its integrity against any strong temptation.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section II.\n\n\nPlace.\n\n\nThe trite maxim, *A place for everything, and everything in its place*, so\ncommends itself to the sense of fitness, as hardly to need exposition or\nenforcement; yet while no maxim is more generally admitted, scarce any is\nso frequently violated in practice. In duty, the elements of time and\nplace are intimately blended. Disorder in place generates derangement in\ntime. The object which is out of place can be found only by the waste of\ntime; and the most faithful industry loses a large part of its value when\nits materials are wanting where they ought to be, and must be sought where\nthey ought not to be.\n\nApart from considerations of utility, order is an \u00e6sthetic duty. It is\nneeded to satisfy the sense of beauty. Its violation offends the eye,\ninsults the taste. The \u00e6sthetic nature craves and claims culture. It has\nabundant provision made for it in external nature; but so large a part of\nlife must be passed within doors, at least in a climate like ours, that it\nis starved and dwarfed, if there be not in interior arrangements some\nfaint semblance of the symmetry and harmony of the universe. To effect\nthis needs neither abundance nor costliness of material. A French man or\nwoman will charm the eye at a cost which in England would be represented\nby bare and squalid poverty. A Parisian shop-window will make with a few\nfrancs\u2019 worth of goods an exhibition of artistical beauty which might\nchallenge the most fastidious criticism. These effects are produced solely\nby prime reference to fitness of place,\u2014to orderly arrangement,\u2014to a\nsymmetry which all can understand, and which any one might copy. Our very\ncapacity of receiving gratification from this source is the measure of our\nduty in this regard. If with the simplest materials we can give pleasure\nto the soul through the eye by merely assigning its fit place to every\nobject, order is among the plainest dictates of beneficence.\n\n*Order is essential to domestic comfort and well-being*, and thus to all\nthe virtues which have their earliest and surest nurture in domestic life.\nThere are homes at once affluent and joyless, groaning with needless waste\nand barren of needed comfort, in which the idea of repose seems as\nirrelevant as Solomon\u2019s figure of lying down on the top of a mast, and all\nfrom a pervading spirit of disorder. In such dwellings there is no love of\nhome. The common house is a mere lodging and feeding place. Society is\nsought elsewhere, pleasure elsewhere; and for the young and easily\nimpressible there is the strongest inducement to those modes of\ndissipation in which vice conceals its grossness behind fair exteriors and\nunder attractive forms. On the other hand, the well-ordered house affords\nto its inmates the repose, comfort, and enjoyment which they crave and\nneed, and for those whose characters are in the process of formation may\nneutralize allurements to evil which might else be irresistible.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section III.\n\n\nMeasure.\n\n\nThere are many objects, as to which *the question of duty is a question of\nmore or less*. To this class belong not only food and drink, but all forms\nof luxury, indulgence, recreation, and amusement. In all these the choice\nlies between excess, abstinence, and temperance. The tendency to excess is\nintensely strong, when not restrained by prudence or principle. This\ntendency is by no means confined to the appetite for intoxicating liquors,\nthough modern usage has restricted to excess in this particular the term\n_intemperance_, which properly bears a much more extended signification.\nThere is reason to believe that there is fully as much intemperance in\nfood as in drink, and with at least equally ruinous consequences as to\ncapacity, character, health, and life,\u2014with this difference only, that\ngluttony stupefies and stultifies, while drunkenness maddens; and that the\nglutton is merely a dead weight on the community, while the drunkard is an\nactive instrument of annoyance and peril. There are probably fewer who\nsink into an absolutely beastly condition by intemperance in food than by\nintemperance in drink; but of persons who do not expose themselves to open\nscandal, those whose brains are muddled, whose sensibilities are\ncoarsened, and whose working power is impaired by over-eating, are more\nnumerous than those in whom similar effects are produced by over-free\nindulgence in intoxicating drinks. Intemperance in amusements, also, is\nnot uncommon, and would undoubtedly be more prevalent than it is, were not\nthe inevitable necessity of labor imposed on most persons from a very\nearly period. In this matter the limit between temperance and excess is\naptly fixed by the term _recreation_, as applied to all the gay and\nfestive portions of life. _Re-creation_ is making over, that is, replacing\nthe waste of tissue, brain-power, and physical and mental energy\noccasioned by hard work. Temperance permits the most generous indulgence\nof sport, mirth, and gayety that can be claimed as needful or conducive to\nthis essential use, but excludes all beyond this measure.\n\n*Abstinence* from all forms of luxury and recreation, and from food and\ndrink beyond the lowest demands of subsistence, has, under various\ncultures, been regarded as a duty, as an appropriate penance for sin, as a\nmeans of spiritual growth, as a token of advanced excellence. This notion\nhad its origin in the dualistic philosophy or theology of the East. It was\nbelieved that the sovereignty of the universe was divided between the\nsemi-omnipotent principles of good and evil, and that the earth and the\nhuman body were created by the evil principle,\u2014by Satan or his analogue.\nHence it was inferred that the evil principle could be abjured and defied,\nand the good principle propitiated in no way so effectually as by\nrenouncing the world and mortifying the body. Fasting, as a religious\nobservance, originated in this belief. It was imported from the East. The\nHebrew fasts were not established by Moses; they were evidently borrowed\nfrom Babylon, and seem to have been regarded with no favor by the\nprophets. The Founder of Christianity prescribed no fast, nor have we any\nreason to believe that his immediate disciples regarded abstinence as a\nduty. Christian asceticism in all its forms is, like the Jewish fasts, of\nOriental origin, and had its first developments in close connection with\nthose hybrids of Christianity and Oriental philosophy of which the dualism\nalready mentioned forms a prominent feature.\n\nWith regard to all objects of appetite, desire, and enjoyment,\n*temperance* is evidently fitting, and therefore a duty, unless there be\nspecific reasons for abstinence. Temperance demands and implies moral\nactivity. In the temperate man the appetites, desires, and tastes have\ntheir continued existence, and need vigilant and wise control, so that he\nhas always work to do, a warfare to wage; and as conflict with the\nelements gives vigor to the body, so does conflict with the body add\nstrength continually to the moral nature. The ascetic may have a hard\nstruggle at the outset; but his aim is to extirpate his imagined enemies\nin the bodily affections, and when these are completely mortified, or put\nto death, there remains no more for him to do, and moral idleness and\nlethargy ensue. Simon Stylites, who spent thirty-seven years on pillars of\ndifferent heights, had probably stupefied his moral faculties and\nsensibilities as effectually as he had crushed to death the appetites and\ncravings of the body. It must not be forgotten that the body no less than\nthe soul is of God\u2019s building, and that in his purpose all the powers and\ncapacities of the body are good in their place and uses, and therefore to\nbe controlled and governed, not destroyed or suppressed. The medi\u00e6val\nsaint, feeding on the offal of the streets, was unwittingly committing\nsacrilege, by degrading and imbruting an appetite for which God had\nprovided decent and wholesome nutriment.\n\nTemperance is better than abstinence, also, because *the moderate use of\nthe objects of desire is a source of refining and elevating influences*.\nIt is not without meaning that, in common speech, the possession or loss\nof the senses is made synonymous with mental sanity or derangement. By the\ntemperate gratification of the senses the mind is sustained in its\nfreshness, vigor, and serenity; while when they are perverted by excess,\nimpaired by age, or deadened by disease, in that same proportion the\nmental powers are distracted, enfeebled, or benumbed. Taste, the faculty\nthrough which we become conversant with the whole realm of beauty, and\nthan which devotion has no more efficient auxiliary, derives its name from\nwhat the ascetic deems the lowest animal enjoyment, which, however, has\nits range of the very highest ministries. The table is the altar of\nhome-love and of hospitality, and there are clustered around it unnumbered\ncourtesies, kindnesses, and charities that make a large part of the charm\nand joy of life. So far is thoughtfulness for its graceful and generous\nservice from indicating a low type of character, that there is hardly any\nsurer index of refinement and elegant culture than is furnished by the\nfamily meal. Similar remarks apply to the entire range of pleasurable\nobjects and experiences. While there are none of them in which excess is\nsafe, they all, when enjoyed in moderation, stimulate the mental powers,\ndevelop and train the \u00e6sthetic faculty, and multiply beneficial relations\nalike with nature and with society.\n\n*Temperance*, rather than abstinence, *is needed on grounds connected with\nsocial economy*. Labor for the mere necessaries of life occupies hardly a\ntithe of human industry. A nation of ascetics would be a nation of idlers.\nIt is the demand for objects of enjoyment, taste, luxury, that floats\nships, dams rivers, stimulates invention, feeds prosperity, and creates\nthe wealth of nations. It is only excess and extravagance that sustain and\naggravate social inequalities, wrongs, wants, and burdens; while moderate,\nyet generous use oils the springs and speeds the wheels of universal\nindustry, progress, comfort, and happiness.\n\nBut there are *cases in which abstinence*, rather than temperance, *is a\nduty*.\n\n*Past excess* may render temperance hardly possible. From the derangement\nconsequent upon excess, an appetite may lose the capacity of healthy\nexercise. In such a case, as we would amputate a diseased and useless\nlimb, we should suppress the appetite which we can no longer control.\nPhysiological researches have shown that the excessive use of intoxicating\ndrinks, when long continued, produces an organic condition, in which the\nslightest indulgence is liable to excite a craving so intense as to\ntranscend the control of the will.\n\n*Inherited proclivities* may, in like manner, render temperance so\ndifficult as to make abstinence a duty. It is conceivable that a nation or\na community may, by the prevalence of excess in past generations, be\ncharacterized by so strong a tendency to intemperance as to render general\nabstinence a prerequisite to general temperance.\n\nAbstinence may also become a duty, if to many around us our *example* in\nwhat we may enjoy innocently would be ensnaring and perilous. The\nrecreation, harmless in itself, which by long abuse has become a source of\ncorruption, it may be our duty to forego. The indulgence, safe for us,\nwhich would be unsafe for our associates, it may be incumbent on us to\nresign. The food, the drink which would make our table a snare to our\nguests, we may be bound to refrain from, though for ourselves there be in\nit no latent evil or lurking danger. This, however, is a matter in which\neach person must determine his duty for himself alone, and in which no one\nis authorized to legislate for others. It may seem to a conscientious man\na worthy enterprise to vindicate and rescue from its evil associations an\namusement or indulgence in itself not only harmless, but salutary; and\nthere may be an equally strong sense of right on both sides of a question\nof social morality falling under this head. The joyous side of life must\nbe maintained. The young, sanguine, and happy will at all events have\nrecreations, games, festivities, and of these there is not a single\nelement, material, or feature that has not been abused, perverted, or\ninvested with associations offensive to a pure moral taste. To disown and\noppose them all in the name of virtue, is to prescribe a degree of\nabstinence which can have the assent of those only who have outlived the\ncapacity of enjoyment. The more judicious course is to favor, or at least\nto tolerate such modes of indulgence as may for the present be the least\nliable to abuse, or such as may in prospect be the safest in their moral\ninfluence, and by sanctioning these to render more emphatic and efficient\nthe disapproval and rejection of such as are intrinsically wrong and evil.\n\n\n\n\n                               Section IV.\n\n\nManners.\n\n\nThe ancients had but one word for *manners and morals*. It might be well\nif the same were the case with us,\u2014yet with this essential difference,\nthat while they degraded morals to the level of manners, a higher culture\nwould lead us to raise manners to the level of morals. The main\ncharacteristics of good manners are comprised in the three preceding\nSections. They are the observance, in one\u2019s demeanor and conduct toward\nothers, of the fitnesses of time and place, and of the due and graceful\nmean between overwrought, extravagant, or fantastic manifestations of\nregard on the one hand, and coldness, superciliousness, or indifference on\nthe other. Courtesies, like more substantial kindnesses, are neutralized\nby delay, and, when slow, seem forced and reluctant. Attentions, which in\ntheir place are gratifying, may, if misplaced, occasion only mortification\nand embarrassment, as when civilities befitting interior home-life are\nrehearsed for the public eye and ear. Nor is there any department of\nconduct in which excess or deficiency is more painfully felt,\u2014a redundance\nof compliments and assiduities tending to silence and abash the recipient,\nwhile their undue scanting inflicts a keen sense of slight, neglect, and\ninjury.\n\n*Politeness* must, indeed, in order even to appear genuine, be the\nexpression of sincere kindness. There is no pretence so difficult to\nmaintain as the false show of genial and benevolent feeling. The mask\ncannot be so fitted to the face as not to betray its seams and sutures.\nYet kindness is not of itself politeness. Its spontaneous expressions may\nbe rude and awkward; or they may take forms not readily understood and\nappreciated. There are conventional modes of polite demeanor no less than\nof courteous speech. These modes may have no intrinsic fitness, yet they\nacquire a fitness from their long and general use; and while the mere\nrepetition of stereotyped formulas whether in word or deportment is justly\noffensive, he who would have his politeness recognized and enjoyed must\nbeware lest he depart too widely from the established sign-language of\nsociety. There is a _brusquerie_ often underlying hearty kindness and good\nfellowship, which at the outset pains, wounds, and repels those brought\nwithin its sphere, and which the most intimate friends endure and excuse\nrather than approve.\n\n*Politeness is to be regarded as an indispensable duty.* It is believed\nthat from its neglect or violation more discomfort ensues than from any\nother single cause, and in some circles and conditions of society more\nthan from all other causes combined. There are neighborhoods and\ncommunities that are seldom disturbed by grave offences against the\ncriminal law, but none which can insure itself against the affronts,\nenmities, wounded sensibilities, rankling grievances, occasioned by\nincivility and rudeness. Moreover, there are persons entirely free from\nvice, perhaps ostentatious in the qualities which are the opposites of\nvices, and not deficient in charitable labors and gifts, who cultivate\ndiscourtesy, are acrid or bitter in their very deeds of charity, and carry\ninto every society a certain porcupine selfhood, which makes their mere\npresence annoying and baneful. Such persons, besides the suffering they\ninflict on individuals, are of unspeakable injury to their respective\ncircles or communities, by making their very virtues unlovely, and piety,\nif they profess it, hateful. On the other hand, there is no truer\nbenefactor to society\u2014if the creation of happiness be the measure of\nbenefit\u2014than the genuine gentleman or gentlewoman, who adds grace to\nvirtue, politeness to kindness; who under the guidance of a sincere\nfellow-feeling, studies the fitnesses of speech and manner, in civility\nand courtesy endeavors to render to all their due, and in the least\ndetails that can affect another\u2019s happiness, does carefully and\nconscientiously all that the most fastidious sensibility could claim or\ndesire.\n\n\n\n\n                                Section V.\n\n\nGovernment.\n\n\n*The establishment and preservation of order is the prime and essential\nfunction of government*; the prevention and punishment of crime, its\nsecondary, incidental, perhaps even temporary use. In a perfect state of\nsociety, government would still be necessary; for it would be only by the\nobservance of common and mutual designations of time, place, and measure,\nthat each individual member of society could enjoy the largest liberty and\nthe fullest revenue from objects of desire, compatible with the just\nclaims and rights of others. These benefits can, under no conceivable\ncondition in which finite beings can be placed, be secured except by\nsystem, under a central administration, and with the submission of\nindividual wills and judgments to constituted and established authority. A\nbad government, then, is better than none; for a bad government can exist\nonly by doing a part of its appropriate work, while in a state of anarchy\nthe whole of that work is left undone and unattempted.\n\n*Obedience to government is*, then, fitting, and therefore a duty,\nindependently of all considerations as to the wisdom, or even the justice\nof its decrees or statutes. If they are unwise, they yet are rules to\nwhich the community can conform itself, and by which its members can make\ntheir plans and govern their expectations, while lawlessness is the\nnegation alike of guidance for the present and of confidence in the\nfuture. If they are unjust, they yet do less wrong and to fewer persons,\nthan would be done by individual and sporadic attempts to evade or\nneutralize them. Nay, unwise and inequitable laws, to which the habits and\nthe industrial relations of a people have adjusted themselves, are to be\npreferred to vacillating legislation, though in a generally right\ndirection. Laws that affect important interests should be improved only\nwith reference to the virtual pledges made by previous legislation, and so\nas to guard the interests involved against the injurious effects of new\nand revolutionary measures. The tariff regulations of our own country will\nillustrate the bearing of this principle. It forms no part of our present\nplan to discuss the mooted questions of free trade and protection. But in\nthe confession of even extreme partisans on either side, the capital and\nindustry of our people could never have suffered so much from any one\ntariff of duties, however injudicious, as they suffered for a series of\nyears from sudden changes of policy, by which investments that had been\ninvited by the legislation of one Congress were made fruitless by the\naction of the next, and manufactures stimulated into rapid growth by high\nprotective duties, were arrested and often ruined by their sudden repeal.\nThe stability of laws is obviously a higher good than their conformity to\nthe theoretical views of the more enlightened citizens. Except under a\ndespotism, laws are virtually an expression of the opinion or will of the\nmajority; and laws which by any combination of favoring circumstances are\nenacted in advance of the general opinion, are always liable to speedy\nrepeal, with a double series of the injurious consequences which can\nhardly fail to ensue immediately on any change.\n\nBut are there no *limits to obedience*? Undoubtedly there are. A bad law\nis to be obeyed for the sake of order; an immoral law is to be disobeyed\nfor the sake of the individual conscience; and of the moral character of a\nparticular law, or of action under it, the individual conscience is the\nonly legitimate judge. Where the law of the land and absolute right are at\nvariance, the citizen is bound, not only to withhold obedience, but to\navow his belief, and to give it full expression in every legitimate form\nand way, by voice and pen, by private influence and through the\nballot-box. But in the interest of the public order, it is his duty to\nconfine his opposition to legal and constitutional methods, to refrain\nfrom factious and seditious resistance, to avoid, if possible, the\nemergency in which disobedience would become his duty, and in case his\nconscience constrains him to disobedience, still to show his respect for\nthe majesty of law by quietly submitting to its penalty. The still recent\nhistory of our country furnishes a case in point. By the Fugitive-Slave\nLaw\u2014which the Divine providence, indeed, repealed without waiting for the\naction of Congress\u2014the private citizen who gave shelter, sustenance, or\ncomfort to a fugitive slave; who, knowing his hiding-place, omitted to\ndivulge it, or who, when called upon to assist in arresting him, refused\nhis aid, was made liable to a heavy fine and a long imprisonment. Now as\nto this law, it was obviously the duty of a citizen who regarded the slave\nas entitled to the rights of a man, to seek its repeal by all\nconstitutional methods within his power. It was equally his duty to\nrefrain from all violent interference with the functionaries charged with\nits execution, and to avoid, if possible, all collision with the\ngovernment. But if, without his seeking, a fugitive slave had been cast\nupon his humane offices, the question then would have arisen whether he\nshould obey God or man; and to this question he could have had but one\nanswer. Yet his obedience to God would have lacked its crowning grace, if\nhe had not meekly yielded to the penalty for his disobedience to the law\nof the land. It was by this course that the primitive Christians attested\ntheir loyalty at once to God and to \u201cthe powers that be,\u201d which were\n\u201cordained of God.\u201d They refused obedience to the civil authorities in\nmatters in which their religious duty was compromised; but they neither\nresisted nor evaded the penalty for their disobedience. Similar was the\ncourse of the Quakers in England and America almost down to our own time.\nThey were quiet and useful citizens, performing the same functions with\ntheir fellow-citizens, so far as their consciences permitted, and, where\nconscience interposed its veto, taking patiently the distraining of their\ngoods, and the imprisonment of their bodies, until, by their blameless\nlives and their meek endurance, they won from the governments both of the\nmother country and of the United States, amnesty for their conscientious\nscruples.\n\nThere may be a state of society in which it becomes *the duty of good\ncitizens to assume an illegal attitude, and to perform illegal acts, in\nthe interest of law and order*. If those who are legally intrusted with\nexecutive and judicial offices are openly, notoriously, and persistently\nfalse to their trusts, to such a degree as to derange and subvert the\nsocial order which it is their function to maintain, good citizens, if\nthey have the power, have undoubtedly the right to displace them, and to\ninstitute a provisional government for the temporary emergency. A case of\nthis kind occurred a few years ago in San Francisco. The entire government\nof the city had for a series of years been under the control of ruffians\nand miscreants, and force and fraud had rendered the ballot-box an\nineffectual remedy. No law-abiding citizen deemed his life or property\nsafe; gross outrages were committed with impunity; and thieves and\nmurderers alone had the protection of the municipal authorities.\nDespairing of legal remedy, the best citizens of all parties organized\nthemselves under the direction of a Committee of Safety, forcibly deposed\nthe municipal magistrates and judges, brought well-known criminals to\ntrial, conviction, and punishment, re\u00ebstablished the integrity of\nsuffrage, and resigned their power to functionaries lawfully elected,\nunder whom and their successors the city has enjoyed a degree of order,\ntranquillity, and safety at least equal to that of any other great city on\nthe continent.\n\n*The right of revolution* undoubtedly is inherent in a national body\npolitic; but it is an extreme right, and is to be exercised only under the\nmost urgent necessity. Its conditions cannot be strictly defined, and its\nexercise can, perhaps, be justified only by its results. A constitutional\ngovernment can seldom furnish occasion for violent revolutionary measures;\nfor every constitution has its own provisions for legal amendment, and the\npublic sentiment ripe for revolution can hardly fail to be strong enough\nto carry the amendments which it craves, through the legal processes,\nwhich, if slow and cumbrous, are immeasurably preferable to the employment\nof force and the evils of civil war. On the other hand, a despotic or\narbitrary government may admit of abrogation only by force; and if its\nadministration violates private rights, imposes unrighteous burdens and\ndisabilities, suppresses the development of the national resources, and\nsupersedes the administration of justice or the existence of equitable\nrelations between class and class or between man and man, the people\u2014the\nrightful source and arbiter of government\u2014has manifestly the right to\nassert its own authority, and to substitute a constitution and rulers of\nits own choice for the sovereignty which has betrayed its trust. Under\nsimilar oppression, the same right unquestionably exists in a remote\ncolony, or in a nation subject by conquest to a foreign power. If that\npower refuses the rights and privileges of subjects to a people over which\nit exercises sovereignty, and governs it in its own imagined interests,\nwith a systematic and persistent disregard to the well-being of the people\nthus governed, resistance is a right, and may become a duty. In fine, the\nfunction of government is the maintenance of just and beneficent order; a\ngovernment forfeits its rights when it is false to this function; and the\nrights thus forfeited revert to the misgoverned people.\n\n\n\n\n\n                              Chapter XIII.\n\n\nCASUISTRY.\n\n\nCasuistry is the application of the general principles of morality to\nindividual _cases_ in which there is room for question as to duty. The\nquestion may be as to the obligation or the rightfulness of a particular\nact, as to the choice between two alternative courses, as to the measure\nor limit of a recognized duty, or as to the grounds of preference when\nthere seems to be a conflict of duties. A large proportion of these cases\ndisappear under any just view of moral obligation. Most questions of\nconscience have their origin in deficient conscientiousness. He who is\ndetermined to do the right, the whole right, and nothing but the right, is\nseldom at a loss to know what he ought to do. But when the aim is to evade\nall difficult duties which can be omitted without shame or the clear\nconsciousness of wrong, and to go as close as possible to the boundary\nline between good and evil without crossing it, the questions that arise\nare often perplexing and complicated, and they are such as, in the\ninterest of virtue, may fittingly remain unanswered. There are always\nthose whose aim is, not to attain any definite, still less any\nindefinitely high, standard of goodness, but to be saved from the penal\nconsequences of wrong-doing; and there are even (so-called) religious\npersons, and teachers too, with whom this negative indemnity from\npunishment fills out the whole meaning of the sacred and significant term\n_salvation_. It must be confessed that questions which could emanate only\nfrom such minds, furnish a very large part of the often voluminous and\nunwieldy treatises on casuistry that have come down to us from earlier\ntimes, especially of those of the Jesuit moralists, whose chief endeavor\nis to lay out a border-path just outside the confines of acknowledged\nwrong and evil.\n\nYet there are *cases in which the most conscientious persons may be in\ndoubt as to the right*. We can here indicate only the general principles\non which such cases are to be decided, with a very few specific\nillustrations.\n\n*The question of duty is often a question*, not of principle, but *of\nfact*. It is the _case_, the position and relations of the persons or\nobjects concerned, that we do not fully understand. For instance, when a\nnew appeal is made for our charitable aid, in labor or money, the question\nis not whether it is our duty to assist in a work of real beneficence, but\nwhether for the proposed object, and under the direction of those who make\nthe appeal, our labor or money will be lucratively invested in the service\nof humanity. There are, certainly, benevolent associations and enterprises\nfor the very noblest ends, whose actual utility is open to the gravest\ndoubt. It is sometimes difficult even to determine a question of justice\nor equity, simply because the circumstances of the case, so far as we can\nunderstand them, do not define the right. Instances of this class might be\nmultiplied; but they are all instances in which there is no obscurity as\nto our obligation or duty, and therefore no question for moral casuistry.\nWe are, however, obviously bound, by considerations of fitness, to seek\nthe fullest information within our power in every case in which we are\ncompelled to act, or see fit to act; nor can we regard action without\nknowledge, even though the motive be virtuous, as either safe or\nblameless.\n\n*The measure or limit of duty* is with many conscientious persons a\nserious question. Here an exact definition is hardly possible, and a\ngenerous liberty may be given to individual taste or judgment; yet\nconsiderations of fitness set bounds to that liberty. Thus direct and\nexpress self-culture is a duty incumbent on all, yet in which diversity of\ninclination may render very different degrees of diligence equally fitting\nand right; but all self-centred industry is fittingly limited by domestic,\nsocial, and civic obligations. Thus, also, direct acts of beneficence are\nobviously incumbent on all; but the degree of self-sacrifice for\nbeneficent ends need not, nay, ought not to be the same for every one; and\nwhile we hold in the highest admiration those who make the entire\nsurrender of all that they have and are to the service of mankind, we have\nno reason to scant our esteem for those who are simply kind and generous,\nwhile they at the same time labor, spend, or save for their own benefit.\nIndeed, the world has fully as much need of the latter as of the former.\nWere the number of self-devoting philanthropists over-large, a great deal\nof the necessary business and work of life would be left undone; and did\nself-denying givers constitute a very numerous body, the dependent and\nmendicant classes would be much more numerous than they are; while the\nwithdrawal of expenditure for personal objects would paralyze industrial\nenterprise, and arrest the creation of that general wealth which\ncontributes to the general comfort and happiness, and the accumulation of\nthose large fortunes which are invaluable as safety-funds and\nmovement-funds for the whole community.\n\nThere are cases in which there is manifestly a *conflict of duties*. This\nmost frequently occurs between prudence and beneficence. Up to a certain\npoint they coincide. No prudent man will suffer himself to contract\nunsocial, or selfish, or miserly habits, or to neglect the ordinary good\noffices and common charities of life. But is one bound to transcend the\nlimits of prudence, and, without any specific grounds of personal\nobligation, to incur loss, hardship, or peril, in behalf of another\nperson? One is no doubt bound to do all that he could reasonably expect\nfrom another, were their positions reversed; but is it his duty to do more\nthan this? In answer, it must be admitted that he who in such a case\nsuffers prudence to limit his beneficence has done all that duty\nabsolutely requires; but, in proportion to the warmth of his benevolence\nand the loftiness of his spirit and character, he will find himself\nconstrained to transcend this limit, and to sacrifice prudence to\nbeneficence. Thus\u2014to take an instance from a class of events by no means\ninfrequent\u2014if I see a man in danger of drowning, it is obviously my duty\nto do all that I can do for his rescue without putting my own life in\njeopardy. But I owe him no more than this. My own life is precious to me\nand to my family, and I have a right so to regard it. I shall not deserve\ncensure or self-reproach, if I decline exposing myself to imminent peril.\nYet if I have the generosity and the courage which belong to a truly noble\nnature, I shall not content myself with doing no more than this,\u2014I shall\nhazard my own safety if there is reason to hope that my efforts may have a\nsuccessful issue; and in so doing I shall perform an act of heroic virtue.\nThe same principle will apply to exposure, danger, and sacrifice of every\nkind, incurred for the safety, relief, or benefit of others. We transgress\nno positive law of right, when we omit doing for others more than we could\nrightfully expect were we in their place. Prudence in such a case is our\nright. But it is a right which it is more noble to surrender than to\nretain; and the readiness with which and the degree in which we are\nwilling to surrender it, may be taken as a fair criterion of our moral\ngrowth and strength.\n\nUnder the title of *Justice*, with the broad scope which we have given to\nit, there may be an apparent conflict of duties, and there are certain\nobvious laws of precedence which may cover all such cases. We should first\nsay that our obligations to the Supreme Being have a paramount claim above\nall duties to inferior beings, had we not reason to believe that God is in\nno way so truly worshipped and served as by acts of justice and mercy to\nhis children. The Divine Teacher has given us to understand, not that\nthere is no time or place too sacred for charity, but that holy times and\nplaces have their highest consecration in the love to man which love to\nGod inspires.\n\nToward men, it hardly needs to be said that justice (in the limited and\nordinary acceptation of the word) *has the precedence of charity*. Indeed,\nwere it not for the prevalence of injustice\u2014individual, social, and\ncivic\u2014there would hardly be any scope for the active exercise of charity.\nWant comes almost wholly from wrong. Were justice universal, that is, were\nthe rights and privileges which fitly belong to men as men, extended to\nand made available by all classes and conditions of men, there would still\nbe great inequalities of wealth and of social condition; but abject and\nsqualid poverty could hardly exist. In almost every individual instance,\nthe withholding or delay of justice tends more or less directly toward the\ncreation of the very evils which charity relieves. No amount of\ngenerosity, then, can palliate injustice, or stand as a substitute for\njustice.\n\nAs regards the persons to whom we owe offices of kindness or charity, it\nis obvious that *those related to us by consanguinity or affinity have the\nfirst ** claim*. These relations have all the elements of a natural\nalliance for mutual defence and help; and it is impossible that their\nessential duties should be faithfully discharged and their fitnesses duly\nobserved, without creating sympathies that in stress of need will find\nexpression in active charity. In the next rank we may fittingly place our\nbenefactors, if their condition be such as to demand a return for their\nkind offices in our behalf. Nearness in place may be next considered; for\nthe very fact that the needs of our neighbors are or may be within our\ncognizance, commends them especially to our charity, and enables us to be\nthe more judicious and effective in their relief. Indeed, in smaller\ncommunities, where the dwellings of the rich and of the poor are\ninterspersed, a general recognition of the claims of neighborhood on\ncharity would cover the field of active beneficence with an efficiency\nattainable in no other way, and at a greatly diminished cost of time and\nsubstance. There is yet another type of neighborhood, consecrated to our\nreverent observance by the parable of the Good Samaritan. There are from\ntime to time cases of want and suffering brought, without our seeking,\nunder our immediate regard,\u2014cast, as it were, directly upon our kind\noffices. The person thus commended to us is, for the time, our nearest\nneighbor, nay, our nearest kinsman, and the very circumstances which have\nplaced him in this relation to us, make him fittingly the foremost object\nof our charity.\n\nThe question sometimes presents itself *whether ** we shall bestow an\nimmediate, yet transient benefit, or a more remote, but permanent good*.\nIf the two are incompatible, and the former is not a matter of absolute\nnecessity, the latter is to be preferred. Thus remunerative employment is\nmuch more beneficial than alms to an able-bodied man, and it is better\nthat he suffer some degree of straitness till he can earn a more\ncomfortable condition, than that he be first made to feel the dependence\nof pauperism. Yet if his want be entire and urgent, the delay of immediate\nrelief is the part of cruelty. On similar grounds, beneficence which\nembraces a class of cases or persons is to be preferred to particular acts\nof kindness to individuals. Thus it seems harsh to refuse alms to an\nunknown street beggar; but as such relief gives shelter to a vast amount\nof fraud, idleness, and vice, it is much better that we should sustain, by\ncontributions proportioned to our ability, some system by which cases of\nactual need, and such only, can be promptly and adequately cared for, and\nthat we then\u2014however reluctantly\u2014refuse our alms to applicants of doubtful\nmerit.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter XIV.\n\n\nANCIENT HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nThe numerous *ethical systems* that have had currency in earlier or later\ntimes, may be divided into two classes,\u2014the one embracing those which make\nvirtue a means; the other, those which make it an end. According to the\nformer, virtue is to be practised for the good that will come of it;\naccording to the latter, for its own sake, for its intrinsic excellence.\nThese classes have obvious subdivisions. The former includes both the\nselfish and the utilitarian theory; while the latter embraces a wide\ndiversity of views as to the nature, the standard, and the criterion of\nvirtue, according as it is believed to consist in conformity to the\nfitness of things, in harmony with an unsophisticated taste, in accordance\nwith the interior moral sense, or in obedience to the will of God. There\nare, also, border theories, which blend, or rather force into\njuxtaposition, the ideas that underlie the two classes respectively.\n\nIt is proposed, in the present chapter, to give an outline of *the history\nof ethical philosophy in Greece and Rome*, or rather, in Greece; for Rome\nhad no philosophy that was not born in Greece.\n\n*Socrates* was less a moral philosopher than a preacher of virtue.\nSelf-ordained as a censor and reformer, he directed his invective and\nirony principally against the Sophists, whose chief characteristic as to\nphilosophy seems to have been the denial of objective truth, and thus, of\nabsolute and determinate right. Socrates, in contrast with them, seeks to\nelicit duty from the occasions for its exercise, making his collocutors\ndefine right and obligation from the nature of things as presented to\ntheir own consciousness and reflection. Plato represents him, whenever a\nmoral question is under discussion, as probing the very heart of the case,\nand drawing thence the response as from a divine oracle.\n\n*Plato* held essentially the same ground, as may be seen in his\nidentifying the True, the Beautiful, and the Good; but it is impossible to\ntrace in his writings the outlines of a definite ethical system, whether\nhis own, or one derived from his great master.\n\nThe three *principal schools of ethical philosophy in Greece* were the\nPeripatetic, the Epicurean, and the Stoic.\n\nThe *Peripatetics* derived their philosophy from Aristotle, and their name\nfrom his habit of walking up and down under the plane-trees of the Lyceum.\nAccording to him, virtue is conduct so conformed to human nature as to\npreserve all its appetites, proclivities, desires, and passions, in mutual\ncheck and limitation. It consists in shunning extremes. Thus courage\nstands midway between cowardice and rashness; temperance, between excess\nand self-denial; generosity, between prodigality and parsimony; meekness,\nbetween irascibility and pusillanimity. Happiness is regarded as the\nsupreme good; but while this is not to be attained without virtue, virtue\nalone will not secure it. Happiness requires, in addition, certain outward\nadvantages, such as health, riches, friends, which therefore a good man\nwill seek by all lawful means. Aristotle laid an intense stress on the\ncultivation of the domestic virtues, justly representing the household as\nthe type, no less than the nursery, of the state, and the political\nwell-being of the state as contingent on the style of character cherished\nand manifested in the home-life of its members.\n\nThere is reason to believe that *Aristotle\u2019s personal character* was\nconformed to his theory of virtue,\u2014that he pursued the middle path, rather\nthan the more arduous route of moral perfection. Though much of his time\nwas spent in Athens, he was a native of Macedonia, and was for several\nyears resident at the court of Philip as tutor to Alexander, with whom he\nretained friendly relations for the greater part of his royal pupil\u2019s\nlife. Of his connection with the Macedonian court and public affairs,\nthere are several stories that implicate him dishonorably with political\nintrigues, and though there is not one of these that is not denied, and\nnot one which rests on competent historical authority, such traditions are\nnot apt so to cluster as to blur the fair fame of a sturdily incorruptible\nman, but are much more likely to cling to the memory of a trimmer and a\ntime-server.\n\n*Epicurus,* from whom the Epicurean philosophy derives its name, was for\nmany years a teacher of philosophy in Athens. He was a man of simple,\npure, chaste, and temperate habits, in his old age bore severe and\nprotracted sufferings, from complicated and incurable disease, with\nsingular equanimity, and had his memory posthumously blackened only by\nthose who\u2014like theological bigots of more recent times\u2014inferred, in\ndespite of all contemporary evidence, that he was depraved in character,\nbecause they thought that his philosophy ought to have made him so.\n\nHe represented *pleasure as the supreme good*, and its pleasure-yielding\ncapacity as the sole criterion by which any act or habit is to be judged.\nOn this ground, the quest of pleasure becomes the prime, or rather the\nonly duty. \u201cDo that you may enjoy,\u201d is the fundamental maxim of morality.\nThere is no intrinsic or permanent distinction between right and wrong.\nIndividual experience alone can determine the right, which varies\naccording to the differences of taste, temperament, or culture. There are,\nhowever, some pleasures which are more than counterbalanced by the pains\nincurred in procuring them, or by those occasioned by them; and there are,\nalso, pains which are the means of pleasures greater than themselves. The\nwise man, therefore, will measure and govern his conduct, not by the\npleasure of the moment, but with reference to the future and ultimate\neffects of acts, habits, and courses of conduct, upon his happiness. What\nare called the virtues, as justice, temperance, chastity, are in\nthemselves no better than their opposites; but experience has shown that\nthey increase the aggregate of pleasure, and diminish the aggregate of\npain. Therefore, and therefore alone, they are duties. The great worth of\nphilosophy consists in its enabling men to estimate the relative duration,\nand the permanent consequences, as well as the immediate intensity, of\nevery form of pleasure.\n\nEpicurus specifies *two kinds of pleasure*, that of rest and that of\nmotion. He prefers the former. Action has its reaction; excitement is\nfollowed by depression; effort, by weariness; thought for others involves\nthe disturbance of one\u2019s own peace. The gods, according to Epicurus, lead\nan easy, untroubled life, leave the outward universe to take care of\nitself, are wholly indifferent to human affairs, and are made ineffably\nhappy by the entire absence of labor, want, and care; and man becomes most\ngodlike and most happy, therefore most virtuous, when he floats through\nlife, unharming and unharmed, idle and useless, self-contained and\nself-sufficing, simple in his tastes, moderate in his requirements, frugal\nin his habits.\n\nIt may be doubted *whether Epicurus denoted by pleasure,*(*18*)* mere\nphysical pleasure alone*. It is certain that his later followers regarded\nthe pleasures of the body as the only good; and Cicero says that Epicurus\nhimself referred all the pleasures of the intellect to the memory of past\nand the hope of future sensual gratification. Yet there is preserved an\nextract of a letter from Epicurus, in which he says that his own bodily\npains in his years of decrepitude are outweighed by the pleasure derived\nfrom the memory of his philosophical labors and discoveries.\n\n*Epicureanism numbered among its disciples*, not only *men of approved\nvirtue*, but not a few, like Pliny the Younger, of a more active type of\nvirtue than Epicurus would have deemed consistent with pleasure. But in\nlapse of time it became the pretext and cover for the grossest sensuality;\nand the associations which the unlearned reader has with the name are only\nstrengthened by conversance with the literature to which it gave birth.\nHorace is its poet-laureate; and he was evidently as sincere in his\nphilosophy as he was licentious in his life. There is a certain charm in\ngood faith and honesty, even when on the side of wrong and vice; and it is\nhis perfect frankness, self-complacency, nay, self-praise, in a sensuality\nwhich in plain prose would seem by turns vapid and disgusting, that makes\nHorace even perilously fascinating, so that the guardians of the public\nmorals may well be thankful that for the young the approach to him is\nwarded off by the formidable barriers of grammar and dictionary.\n\nWhile Epicureanism thus generated, on the one hand, in men of the world\nlaxity of moral principle and habit, on the other hand, in minds of a more\ncontemplative cast, it *lapsed into atheism*. From otiose gods, careless\nof human affairs, the transition was natural to a belief in no gods. The\nuniverse which could preserve and govern itself, could certainly have\nsprung into uncaused existence; for the tendencies which, without a\nsupervising power, maintain order in nature, continuity in change,\never-new life evolved from incessant death, must be inherent tendencies to\ncombination, harmony, and organization, and thus may account for the\norigin of the system which they sustain and renew. This type of atheism\nhas its most authentic exposition in the \u201cDe Rerum Natura\u201d of Lucretius.\nHe does not, in so many words, deny the being of the gods,\u2014he, indeed,\nspeaks of them as leading restful lives, withdrawn from all care of mortal\naffairs; but he so scoffs at all practical recognition of them, and so\njeers at the reverence and awe professed for them by the multitude, that\nwe are constrained to regard them as rather the imagery of his verse than\nthe objects of his faith. He maintains the past eternity of matter, which\nconsists of atoms or monads of various forms. These, drifting about in\nspace, and impinging upon one another, by a series of happy chances, fell\ninto orderly relations and close-fitting symmetries, whence, in\nsuccession, and by a necessity inherent in the primitive atoms, came\norganization, life, instinct, love, reason, wisdom. This poem has a\npeculiar value at the present day, as closely coincident in its cosmogony\nwith one of the most recent phases of physical philosophy, and showing\nthat what calls itself progress may be motion in a circle.\n\nThe *Stoics*, so called from a portico(19) adorned with magnificent\npaintings by Polygnotus, in which their doctrines were first taught, owe\ntheir origin to Zeno, who lived to a very great age, illustrious for\nself-control, temperance, and the severest type of virtue, and at length,\nin accordance with a favorite dogma and practice of his school, when he\nfound that he had before him only growing infirmity with no hope of\nrestoration, terminated his life by his own hand.\n\nAccording to the Stoic philosophy, *virtue is the sole end of life*, and\nvirtue is the conformity of the will and conduct to universal nature.\nVirtue alone is good; vice alone is evil; and whatever is neither virtue\nnor vice is neither good nor evil in itself, but is to be sought or\nshunned, according as it is auxiliary to virtue or conducive to vice,\u2014if\nneither, to be regarded with utter indifference. Virtue is indivisible. It\ndoes not admit of degrees. He who only approximates to virtue, however\nclosely, is yet to be regarded as outside of its pale. Only the wise man\ncan be virtuous. He needs no precepts of duty. His intuitions are always\nto be trusted. His sense of right cannot be blinded or misled. As for\nthose who do not occupy this high philosophic ground, though they cannot\nbe really virtuous, they yet may present some show and semblance of\nvirtue, and they may be aided in this by precepts and ethical\ninstruction.(20) It was for the benefit of those who, on account of their\nlack of true wisdom, needed such direction, and were at the same time so\nwell disposed as to receive and follow it, that treatises on practical\nmorality were written by many of the later Stoics, and that in Rome there\nwere teachers of this school who exercised functions closely analogous to\nthose of the Christian preacher and pastor.\n\nStoicism found *its most congenial soil* in the stern, hardy integrity and\npatriotism of those Romans, whose incorruptible virtue is the one\nredeeming feature of the declining days of the Republic and the effeminacy\nand coarse depravity of the Empire. Seneca\u2019s ethical writings(21) are\nalmost Christian, not only in their faithful rebuke of every form of\nwrong, but in their tender humanity for the poor, the slaves, the victims\nof oppression, in their universal philanthropy, and in their precepts of\npatience under suffering, forbearance, forgiveness, and returning good for\nevil. Epictetus, the deformed slave of a capricious and cruel master,\nbeaten and crippled in mere wantonness, enfranchised in his latter years,\nonly to be driven into exile and to sound the lowest depths of poverty,\nexhibited a type of heroic virtue which has hardly been equalled, perhaps\nnever transcended by a mere mortal; and though looking, as has been\nalready said, to annihilation as the goal of life, he maintained a spirit\nso joyous, and has left in his writings so attractive a picture of a soul\nserenely and supremely happy, that he has given support and consolation to\nmultitudes of the bravest and best disciples of the heaven-born religion,\nwhich he can have known\u2014if at all\u2014only through its slanderers and\npersecutors. Marcus Aurelius, in a kindred spirit, and under the even\nheavier burdens of a tottering empire, domestic dissensions, and defeat\nand disaster abroad, maintained the severest simplicity and purity of\nlife, appropriated portions of his busiest days to devout contemplation,\nmeditated constantly on death, and disciplined himself to regard with\ncontempt alike the praise of flatterers and the contingency of posthumous\nfame. We have, especially in Nero\u2019s reign, the record of not a few men and\nwomen of like spirit and character, whose lofty and impregnable virtue\nlacked only loving faith and undoubting trust in a fatherly Providence to\nassimilate them to the foremost among the Apostles and martyrs of the\nChristian Church.\n\n*The Sceptical school of philosophy* claims in this connection a brief\nnotice. Though so identified in common speech with the name of a single\nphilosopher, that Pyrrhonism is a synonyme for Scepticism, it was much\nolder than Pyrrho, and greatly outnumbered his avowed followers. It was\nheld by the teachers of this school that objective truth is unattainable.\nNot only do the perceptions and conceptions of different persons vary as\nto every object of knowledge; but the perceptions and conceptions of the\nsame persons as to the same object vary at different times. Nay, more, at\nthe same time one sense conveys impressions which another sense may\nnegative, and not infrequently the reflective faculty negatives all the\nimpressions derived from the senses, and forms a conception entirely\nunlike that which would have taken shape through the organs of sense. The\nsoul that seeks to know, is thus in constant agitation. But happiness\nconsists in imperturbableness of spirit, that is, in suspense of judgment;\nand as it is our duty to promote our own happiness, it is our duty to live\nwithout desire or fear, preference or abhorrence, love or hatred, in\nentire apathy,\u2014a life of which Mohammed\u2019s fabled coffin is the fittest\nsymbol.\n\nThe *New Academy*, whose philosophy was a hybrid of Platonism and\nPyrrhonism, while it denied the possibility of ascertaining objective\ntruth, yet taught that on all subjects of speculative philosophy\nprobability is attainable, and that, if the subject in hand be one which\nadmits of being acted upon, it is the duty of the moral agent to act in\naccordance with probability,\u2014to pursue the course in behalf of which the\nmore and the better reasons can be given. There are moral acts and habits\nwhich seem to be in accordance with reason and the nature of things. We\nmay be mistaken in thinking them so; yet the probability that they are so\ncreates a moral obligation in their favor. The New Academy professed a\nhypothetical acquiescence in the ethics of the Peripatetic school,\nmaintaining, therefore, that the mean between two extremes is probably in\naccordance with right and duty, and that virtue is probably man\u2019s highest\ngood, yet probably not sufficient in itself without the addition of\nexterior advantages.\n\n*Cicero* considered himself as belonging to the New Academy. His instincts\nas an advocate, often induced by professional exigencies to deny what he\nhad previously affirmed, made the scepticism of this school congenial to\nhim; while his love of elegant ease and luxury and his lack of moral\ncourage were in closer harmony with the practical ethics of the\nPeripatetics than with the more rigid system of the Stoics. At the same\ntime, his pure moral taste and his sincere reverence for the right brought\nhim into sympathy with the Stoic school. His \u201cDe Officiis\u201d is an\nexposition of the Stoic system of ethics, though by the professed disciple\nof another philosophy. It is as if a Mohammedan, without disclaiming his\nown religion, should undertake an exposition of the ethics of\nChristianity, on the ground that, though Mohammed was a genuine prophet,\nthere was, nevertheless, a higher and purer morality in the New Testament\nthan in the Koran.\n\n\n\n\n\n                               Chapter XV.\n\n\nMODERN HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n*For several centuries after the destruction of the Western Empire*,\nphilosophy had hardly an existence except in its records, and these were\npreserved chiefly for their parchment, half-effaced, covered by what took\nthe place of literature in the (so called) Dark Ages, and at length\ndeciphered by such minute and wearisome toil as only medi\u00e6val cloisters\nhave ever furnished. For a long period, monasteries were the only schools,\nand in these the learned men of the day were, either successively or\nalternately, learners and teachers, whence the appellation of _Schoolmen_.\nThe learned men who bear this name were fond of casuistry, and discussed\nimagined and often impossible cases with great pains (their readers would\nhave greater); but, so far as we know, they have left no systematic\ntreatises on moral philosophy, and have transmitted no system that owes to\nthem its distinguishing features. Yet we find among them a very broad\ndivision of opinion as to the ground of right. The fundamental position of\nthe Stoics, that virtue is conformity to nature, and thus independent of\nexpress legislation,\u2014not created by law, human or divine, but the source\nand origin of law,\u2014had its champions, strong, but few; while the\nAugustinian theology, then almost universal, replaced Epicureanism in its\ndenial of the intrinsic and indelible moral qualities of actions. The\nextreme Augustinians regarded the positive command of God as the sole\ncause and ground of right, so that the very things which are forbidden\nunder the severest penalties would become virtuous and commendable, if\nenjoined by Divine authority. William of Ockham, one of the most\nillustrious of the English Schoolmen, wrote: \u201cIf God commanded his\ncreatures to hate himself, the hatred of God would be the duty of man.\u201d\n\nThe *earliest modern* theory of morals that presented striking\npeculiarities was that of *Hobbes* (A. D. 1588-1679), who was indebted\nsolely to the stress of his time, alike for his system and for whatever\nslender following it may have had. He was from childhood a staunch\nroyalist, was shortly after leaving the University the tutor of a loyal\nnobleman, and, afterward, of Charles II. during the early years of his\nexile; and the parliamentary and Puritan outrages seemed to him to be\naimed at all that was august and reverend, and adapted to overturn\nsociety, revert progress, and crush civilization. According to him, men\nare by nature one another\u2019s enemies, and can be restrained from\ninternecine hostility only by force or fear. An instinctive perception of\nthis truth in the infancy of society gave rise to monarchical and absolute\nforms of government; for only by thus centralizing and massing power,\nwhich could be directed against any disturber of the peace, could the\nindividual members of society hold property or life in safety. The king\nthus reigns by right of human necessity, and obedience to him and to\nconstituted authorities under him is man\u2019s whole duty, and the sum of\nvirtue. Might creates right. Conscience is but another name for the fear\nof punishment. The intimate connection of religion with civil freedom in\nthe English Commonwealth no doubt went far in uprooting in Hobbes all\nreligious faith; and while he did not openly attack Christianity, he\nmaintained the duty of entire conformity to the monarch\u2019s religion,\nwhatever it might be, which is of course tantamount to the denial of\nobjective religious truth.(22)\n\nHobbes may fairly be regarded as *the father of modern ethical\nphilosophy*,\u2014not that he had children after his own likeness; but his\nspeculations were so revolting equally to thinking and to serious men, as\nto arouse inquiry and stimulate mental activity in a department previously\nneglected.\n\nThe gauntlet thus thrown down by Hobbes was taken up by *Cudworth* (A. D.\n1617-1688), the most learned man of his time, whose \u201cIntellectual System\nof the Universe\u201d is a prodigy of erudition,\u2014a work in which his own\nthought is so blocked up with quotations, authorities, and masses of\nrecondite lore, that it is hardly possible to trace the windings of the\nriver for the d\u00e9bris of auriferous rocks that obstruct its flow. The\ntreatise with which we are concerned is that on \u201cEternal and Immutable\nMorality.\u201d In this he maintains that the right exists, independently of\nall authority, by the very nature of things, in co-eternity with the\nSupreme Being. So far is he from admitting the possibility of any\ndissiliency between the Divine will and absolute right, that he turns the\ntables on his opponents, and classes among Atheists those of his\ncontemporaries who maintain that God can command what is contrary to the\nintrinsic right; that He has no inclination to the good of his creatures;\nthat He can justly doom an innocent being to eternal torments; or that\nwhatever God wills is just because He wills it.\n\n*Samuel Clarke* (A. D. 1675-1729) followed Cudworth in the same line of\nthought. He was, it is believed, the first writer who employed the term\n_fitness_ as defining the ground of the immutable and eternal right,\nthough the idea of fitness necessarily underlies every system or theory\nthat assigns to virtue intrinsic validity.\n\n*Shaftesbury* (A. D. 1671-1713) represents virtue as residing, not in the\nnature or relations of things, but in the bearing of actions on the\nwelfare or happiness of beings other than the actor. Benevolence\nconstitutes virtue; and the merit of the action and of the actor is\ndetermined by the degree in which particular affections are merged in\ngeneral philanthropy, and reference is had, not to individual\nbeneficiaries or benefits, but to the whole system of things of which the\nactor forms a part. The affections from which such acts spring commend\nthemselves to the moral sense, and are of necessity objects of esteem and\nlove. But the moral sense takes cognizance of the affections only, not of\nthe acts themselves; and as the conventional standard of the desirable and\nthe useful varies with race, time, and culture, the acts which the\naffections prompt, and which therefore are virtuous, may be in one age or\ncountry such as the people of another century or land may repudiate with\nloathing. Las Casas, in introducing negro slavery into America, with the\nfervently benevolent purpose of relieving the hardships of the feeble and\novertasked aborigines, performed, according to this theory, a virtuous\nact; but had he once considered the question of intrinsic right or natural\nfitness, a name so worthily honored would never have been associated with\nthe foulest crime of modern civilization.\n\nAccording to *Adam Smith* (A. D. 1723-1790), moral distinctions depend\nwholly on sympathy. We approve in others what corresponds to our own\ntastes and habits; we disapprove whatever is opposed to them. As to our\nown conduct, \u201cwe suppose ourselves,\u201d he writes, \u201cthe spectators of our own\nbehavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would in this light\nproduce in us.\u201d Our sense of duty is derived wholly from our thus putting\nourselves in the place of others, and inquiring what they would approve in\nus. Conscience, then, is a collective and corporate, not an individual\nfaculty. It is created by the prevalent opinions of the community.\nSolitary virtue there cannot be; for without sympathy there is no\nself-approval. By parity of reason, the duty of the individual can never\ntranscend the average conscience of the community. This theory describes\nsociety as it is, not as it ought to be. We are, to a sad degree,\nconventional in our practice, much more so than in our beliefs; but it is\nthe part of true manliness to have the conscience an interior, not an\nexternal organ, to form and actualize notions of right and duty for one\u2019s\nself, and to stand and walk alone, if need there be, as there manifestly\nis in not a few critical moments, and as there is not infrequently in the\ninward experience of every man who means to do his duty.\n\n*Butler* (A. D. 1692-1752), in his \u201cEthical Discourses,\u201d aims mainly and\nsuccessfully to demonstrate the rightful supremacy of conscience. His\nfavorite conception is of the human being as himself a household [_an\neconomy_],\u2014the various propensities, appetites, passions, and affections,\nthe members,\u2014Conscience, the head, recognized as such by all, so that\nthere is, when her sovereignty is owned, an inward repose and\nsatisfaction; when she is disobeyed, a sense of discord and rebellion, of\nunrest and disturbance. This is sound and indisputable, and it cannot be\nmore clearly stated or more vividly illustrated than by Butler; but he\nmanifestly regards conscience as legislator no less than judge, and thus\nfails to recognize any objective standard of right. It is evident that on\nhis ground there is no criterion by which honestly erroneous moral\njudgments can be revised, or by which a discrimination can be made between\nthe results of education or involuntary prejudice, and the right as\ndetermined by the nature of things and the standard of intrinsic fitness.\n\nOf all modern ethical writers since the time of Cudworth and Clarke, none\nso much as approaches the position occupied by *Richard Price* (A. D.\n1723-1791), a London dissenting divine, a warm advocate of American\nindependence, and the intimate friend of John Adams. He maintained that\nright and wrong are inherent and necessary, immutable and eternal\ncharacteristics, not dependent on will or command, but on the intrinsic\nnature of the act, and determined with unerring accuracy by conscience,\nwhenever the nature of the case is clearly known. \u201cMorality,\u201d he writes,\n\u201cis fixed on an immovable basis, and appears not to be in any sense\nfactitious, or the arbitrary production of any power, human or divine; but\nequally everlasting and necessary with all truth and reason.\u201d \u201cVirtue is\nof intrinsic value and of indispensable obligation; not the creature of\nwill, but necessary and immutable; not local and temporary, but of equal\nextent and antiquity with the Divine mind; not dependent on power, but the\nguide of all power.\u201d(23)\n\n*Paley* (A. D. 1743-1805) gives a definition of virtue, remarkable for its\ncombination of three partial theories. Virtue, according to him, is \u201cthe\ndoing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake\nof everlasting happiness.\u201d Of this definition it may be said, 1. The doing\ngood to mankind is indeed virtue; but it is by no means the whole of\nvirtue. 2. Obedience to the will of God is our duty; but it is so, because\nhis will must of necessity be in accordance with the fitting and right.\nCould we conceive of Omnipotence commanding what is intrinsically unfit\nand wrong, the virtuous man would not be the God-server, but the\nPrometheus suffering the implacable vengeance of an unrighteous Deity. 3.\nThough everlasting happiness be the result of virtue, it is not the ground\nor the reason for it. Were our being earth-limited, virtue would lose none\nof its obligation. Epictetus led as virtuous a life as if heaven had been\nopen to his faith and hope.\u2014Paley\u2019s system may be described in detail as\nShaftesbury\u2019s, with an external washing of Christianity; Shaftesbury\nhaving been what was called a free-thinker, while Paley was a sincere\nbeliever in the Christian revelation, and contributed largely and\nefficiently to the defence of Christianity and the illustration of its\nrecords. The chief merit of Paley\u2019s treatise on Moral Philosophy is that\nit clearly and emphatically recognizes the Divine authority of the moral\nteachings of the New Testament, though in expounding them the author too\nfrequently dilutes them by considerations of expediency.\n\n*Jeremy Bentham* (A. D. 1747-1832) is Paley _minus_ Christianity. The\ngreatest good of the greatest number is, according to him, the aim and\ncriterion of virtue. Moral rules should be constructed with this sole end;\nand this should be the pervading purpose of all legislation. Bentham\u2019s\nworks are very voluminous, and they cover, wisely and well, almost every\ndepartment of domestic, social, public, and national life. The worst that\ncan be said of his political writings is that they are in advance of the\nage,\u2014literally Utopian;(24) for it would be well with the country which\nwas prepared to embody his views. But, unfortunately, his principles have\nno power of self-realization. They are like a watch, perfect in all other\nparts, but without the mainspring. Bentham contemplates the individual man\nas an agency, rather than as an intellectual and moral integer. He must\nwork under yoke and harness for ends vast and remote, beyond the\nappreciation of ordinary mortals; and he must hold all partial affections\nand nearer aims subordinate to rules deduced by sages and legislators from\nconsiderations of general utility. Bentham\u2019s influence on legislation,\nespecially on criminal law, has been beneficially felt on both sides of\nthe Atlantic. In the department of pure ethics, there are no essential\npoints of difference between him and other writers of the utilitarian\nschool.(25)\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nIn *France* there has been a large preponderance of sensualism,\nexpediency, and selfishness in the ethical systems that have had the most\nextensive currency. There was a great deal of elaborate ethical\nspeculation and theory among the French philosophers of the last century;\nbut among them we cannot recall a single writer who maintained a higher\nground than Bentham, except that Rousseau\u2014perhaps the most immoral of them\nall\u2014who was an Epicurean so far as he had any philosophy, sometimes soars\nin sentimental rhapsodies about the intrinsic beauty and loveliness of a\nvirtue which he knew only by name.\n\n*Malebranche* (A. D. 1638-1714), whose principal writings belong to the\nprevious century, represents entirely opposite views and tendencies. He\nhardly differs from Samuel Clarke, except in phraseology. He resolves\nvirtue into love of the universal order, and conformity to it in conduct.\nThis order requires that we should prize and love all beings and objects\nin proportion to their relative worth, and that we should recognize this\nrelative worth in our rules and habits of life. Thus man is to be more\nhighly valued and more assiduously served than the lower animals, because\nworth more; and God is to be loved infinitely more than man, and to be\nalways obeyed and served in preference to man, because he is worth\nimmeasurably more than the beings that derive their existence from him.\nMalebranche ascribes to the Supreme Being, not the arbitrary exercise of\npower in constituting the right, but recognition, in his government of the\nworld and in his revealed will, of the order, which is man\u2019s sole law.\n\u201cSovereign princes,\u201d he says, \u201chave no right to use their authority\nwithout reason. Even God has no such miserable right.\u201d\n\nAt nearly the same period commenced the ethical controversy between\n*F\u00e9n\u00e9lon* (A. D. 1651-1715) and *Bossuet* (A. D. 1627-1704), as to the\npossibility and obligation of disinterested virtue. F\u00e9n\u00e9lon and the\nQuietists, who sympathized with him, maintained that the pure love of God,\nwithout any self-reference, or regard for one\u2019s own well-being either here\nor here-after, is the goal and the test of human perfection, and that\nnothing below this\u2014nothing which aims or aspires at anything less than\nthis\u2014deserves the name of virtue. Bossuet defended the selfish theory of\nvirtue, attacked his amiable antagonist with unconscionable severity and\nbitterness, and succeeded in obtaining from the court of Rome\u2014though\nagainst the wishes of the Pope\u2014the condemnation of the obnoxious tenet.\nThe Pope remarked, with well-turned antithesis, that F\u00e9n\u00e9lon might have\nerred from excess in the love of God, while Bossuet had sinned by defect\nin the love of his neighbor.\n\nAmong the recent French moralists, the most distinguished names are those\nof *Jouffroy* and *Cousin*, who\u2014each with a terminology of his own\u2014agree\nwith Malebranche in regarding right and wrong as inherent and essential\ncharacteristics of actions, and as having their source and the ground of\ntheir validity in the nature of things. The aim of Cousin\u2019s well-known\ntreatise on \u201cThe True, the Beautiful, and the Good,\u201d is purely ethical,\nand the work is designed to identify the three members of the Platonic\ntriad with corresponding attributes of the Infinite Being,\u2014attributes\nwhich, virtually one, have their counterpart and manifestation in the\norder of nature and the government of the universe.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nIn *Germany*, the necessarian philosophers of the Pantheistic school\nignore ethics by making choice and moral action impossible. Man has no\ndistinct and separate personality. He is for a little while detached in\nappearance from the soul of the universe (_anima mundi_), but in reality\nno more detached from it than is a boulder or a log of drift-wood from the\nsurface on which it rests. He still remains a part of the universal soul,\nthe multiform, all-embracing God, who is himself not a self-conscious,\nfreely willing being, but impelled by necessity in all his parts and\nmembers, and, no less than in all else, in those human members through\nwhich alone he attains to some fragmentary self-consciousness.\n\nAccording to *Kant*, the reason intuitively discerns truths that are\nnecessary, absolute, and universal. The theoretical reason discerns such\ntruths in the realm of ontology, and in the relations and laws that\nunderlie all subjects of physical inquiry. In like manner, the practical\nreason intuitively perceives the conditions and laws inherent in the\nobjects of moral action,\u2014that is, as Malebranche would have said, the\nelements of universal order, or, in the language of Clarke, the fitness of\nthings. As the mind must of necessity contemplate and cognize objects of\nthought under the categories intuitively discerned by the theoretical\nreason, so must the will be moved by the conditions and laws intuitively\ndiscerned by the practical reason. This intuition is law and obligation.\nMan can obey it, and to obey it is virtue. He can disobey it, and in so\ndoing he does not yield to necessity, but makes a voluntary choice of\nwrong and evil.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\nIt will be perceived from the historical survey in this and the previous\nchapter, that\u2014as was said at the outset\u2014*all ethical systems resolve\nthemselves into the two classes of which the Epicureans and the Stoics\nfurnished the pristine types,*\u2014those which make virtue an accident, a\nvariable, subject to authority, occasion, or circumstance; and those which\nendow it with an intrinsic right, immutableness, validity, and supremacy.\nOn subjects of fundamental moment, opinion is of prime importance. Conduct\nresults from feeling, and feeling from opinion. We would have the youth,\nfrom the very earliest period of his moral agency, grounded in the belief\nthat right and wrong are immutable,\u2014that they have no localities, no\nmeridians,\u2014that, with a change of surroundings, their conditions and laws\nvary as little as do those of planetary or stellar motion. Let him feel\nthat right and wrong are not the mere dicta of human teaching, nay, are\nnot created even by revelation; but let their immutable distinction\nexpress itself to his consciousness in those sublime words which belong to\nit, as personified in holy writ, \u201cJehovah possessed me from the beginning\nof his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from\nthe beginning, or ever the earth was. When He prepared the heavens, I was\nthere. When He appointed the foundations of the earth, then was I by Him.\u201d\nThis conception of the Divine and everlasting sacredness of virtue, is a\nperennial fountain of strength. He who has this does not imagine that he\nhas power over the Right, can sway it by his choice, or vary its standard\nby his action; but it overmasters him, and, by subduing, frees him, fills\nand energizes his whole being, ennobles all his powers, exalts and hallows\nall his affections, makes him a priest to God, and a king among men.\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nAbstinence, when to be preferred to temperance, 175\n\nAcademy, the New, 205\n\nAction, defined, 1\n  springs of, 10\n  governing principles of, 30\n\nAffections, the, 22\n\nAnger, 26\n\nAnonymous publications, 123\n\nAppetites, the, 10\n\nAristotle, character of, 197\n\nBeneficence, 143\n\nBentham, Jeremy, 215\n\nBossuet, controversy of, with F\u00e9n\u00e9lon, 217\n\nBrotherhood, human, in its ethical relations, 56\n\nButler, 212\n\nCapital punishment, 66\n\nCasuistry, 187\n\nChildren, duties of, 121\n\nChristianity, a source of knowledge, 55\n  exhibiting moral perfection in the person of its Founder, 68\n  compared, as to its ethics, with other religions, 59\n  as a motive power, 81\n\nCicero, philosophical relations of, 206\n\nClarke, Samuel, 210\n\nConscience, a judicial faculty, 41\n  educated by use, 44\n  relation of knowledge to, 45\n\nContracts, 128\n\nCourage, defined, 158\n  physical, 159\n  moral, 160\n\nCousin, 218\n\nCudworth, 209\n\nDesire, defined, 12\n  of knowledge, 13\n  of society, 15\n  of esteem, 17\n  of power, 18\n  of superiority, 19\n\nDuties, conflict of, 190\n\nDuty, limit of, 189\n\nEnemies, love of, possible, 149\n\nEnvy, 27\n\nEpictetus, character of, 203\n\nEpicureanism, 198\n\nExample, ethical value of, 111\n\nExpediency, an insufficient rule of conduct, 31\n  when to be consulted, 33\n\nExtreme cases in morals, 125\n\nFalsehood, 151\n\nFamily, duties of the, 118\n\nF\u00e9n\u00e9lon, controversy of, with Bossuet, 217\n\nFitness, the ground of right, 36\n\nForeknowledge, Divine, consistent with human freedom, 8\n\nFreedom of the will, arguments for, 2\n  objections to, 4\n\nGovernment, the essential function of, 180\n  obedience to, how limited, 182\n  when to be opposed, 184\n\nGratitude, 24\n\nHabit, 84\n\nHatred, 28\n\nHobbes, 208\n\nHome-life, order requisite in, 169\n\nHomicide, justifiable, 64\n\nHonesty, 134\n\nHorace, the poet of Epicureanism, 200\n\nIgnorance, sins of, 39\n\nImmortality, ethical relations of, 57\n\nIntemperance, 170\n\nJouffroy, 218\n\nJustice, 113\n\nKant, ethical system of, 219\n\nKindness, 25\n\nKnowledge, attainment of, a duty, 102\n\nLaw, the result of experience, 50\n  an educational force, 51\n\nLiberty, the right to, 69\n\nLove, 22\n\nLucretius, philosophy of, 201\n\nMalebranche, 216\n\nManners, a department of morals, 177\n\nMarcus Aurelius, character of, 204\n\nMarriage, 120\n\nMeasure, duties appertaining to, 170\n\nMilitary service, 68\n\nMoral philosophy, defined, 34\n\nMotive, 79\n\nOaths, 129\n\nObservation, a source of ethical knowledge, 46\n\nOrder, 164\n\nPaley, 215\n\nPantheism, ethics of, 218\n\nParents, duties of, 121\n\nPassion, 82\n\nPatience, 152\n\nPauperism, 144\n\nPeripatetics, the, 193\n\nPiety toward God, 113\n\nPity, 25\n\nPlace, duties appertaining to, 168\n\nPlato, as a teacher of ethics, 193\n\nPoliteness, 178\n\nPositive duties, 117\n\nPrice, Richard, 214\n\nPromises, 126\n\nPrudence, 98\n\nPunctuality, 167\n\nResentment, 27\n\nRevenge, 28\n\nReverence, 23\n\nRevolution, when justifiable, 185\n\nRight, the, 35\n  absolute and relative, 37\n\nRights, defined, 61\n  how limited, 62\n  personal, 64\n  of property, 72\n  of reputation, 76\n\nSabbath, the, 16\n\nSceptical school of philosophy, 204\n\nSchoolmen, ethics of the, 207\n\nSelf-control, 106\n\nSelf-culture, moral, 109\n\nSelf-preservation, 99\n\nSeneca, writings and character of, 203\n\nShaftesbury, 210\n\nSlavery, 70\n\nSmith, Adam, 211\n\nSocrates, as a teacher of ethics, 195\n\nSpeculation in business, when legitimate, 138\n  when dishonest, 140\n\nSpinoza, 209\n\nStoics, philosophy of the, 201\n  eminent Roman, 203\n\nSubmission, 155\n\nSympathy, 25\n\nTaxation, 75\n\nTemperance, 173\n\nTime, duties appertaining to, 165\n\nUsury, 142\n\nVeracity, 122\n\nVirtue, defined, 88\n  connection of, with piety, 91\n\nVirtues, the, 94\n  cardinal, 96\n\nWorship, public, 115\n\nZeno, character of, 202\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n_    1 Compassion_ ought from its derivation to have the same meaning with\n      _sympathy_; but in common usage it is synonymous with pity.\n\n    2 \u201cIgnorantia legis neminem excusat.\u201d\n\n    3 The theory that Seneca was acquainted with St. Paul, or had any\n      _direct_ intercourse with Christians in Rome or elsewhere, has no\n      historical evidence, and rests on assumptions that are contradicted\n      by known facts.\n\n_    4 Virtutes leniores_, as Cicero calls them.\n\n    5 The duty of society to inflict capital punishment on the murderer\n      has been maintained on the ground of the Divine command to that\n      effect, said to have been given to Noah, and thus to be binding on\n      all his posterity. (Genesis ix. 5.) My own belief\u2014founded on a\n      careful examination of the Hebrew text\u2014is, that the _human_ murderer\n      is not referred to in this precept, but that it simply requires the\n      slaying of the beast that should cause the death of a man,\u2014a\n      precaution which was liable to be neglected in a rude state of\n      society, and was among the special enactments of the Mosaic law.\n      (Exodus xxi. 38.) If, however, the common interpretation be\n      retained, the precept requires the shedding of the murderer\u2019s blood\n      by the _brother_ or nearest kinsman of the murdered man, and is not\n      obeyed by giving up the murderer to the _gallows_ and the _public\n      executioner_. Moreover, the same series of precepts prescribes an\n      abstinence from the natural juices of animal food, which would\n      require an entire revolution in our shambles, kitchens, and tables.\n      If these precepts were Divine commandments for men of all times,\n      they should be obeyed in full; but there is the grossest\n      inconsistency and absurdity in holding only a portion of one of them\n      sacred, and ignoring all the rest.\n\n    6 Latin, _virtus_, from _vir_, which denotes not, like _homo_, simply\n      a human being, but a man endowed with all appropriate manly\n      attributes, and comes from the same root with _vis_, strength. The\n      Greek synonyms of _virtus_, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae, is derived from \u1f08\u03c1\u03b7\u03c2, the god of\n      war, who in the heroic days of Greece was the ideal man, the\n      standard of human excellence, and whose name some lexicographers\n      regard\u2014as it seems to me, somewhat fancifully\u2014as allied through its\n      root to \u1f00\u03bd\u03ae\u03c1, which bears about the same relation to \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 that\n      _vir_ bears to _homo_.\n\n    7 In the languages which have inherited or adopted the Latin _virtus_,\n      it retains its original signification, with one striking exception,\n      which yet is perhaps an exception in appearance rather than in\n      reality. In the Italian, virtu is employed to signify taste, and\n      _virtuoso_, which may denote a virtuous man, oftener means a\n      collector of objects of taste. We have here an historical landmark.\n      There was a period when, under civil despotism, the old Roman\n      manhood had entirely died out on its native soil, while\n      ecclesiastical corruption rendered the nobler idea of Christian\n      manhood effete; and then the highest type of manhood that remained\n      was the culture of those refined sensibilities, those ornamental\n      arts, and that keen sense of the beautiful, in which Italy as far\n      surpassed other lands, as it was for centuries inferior to them in\n      physical bravery and in moral rectitude.\n\n    8 It is obviously on this ground alone that we can affirm moral\n      attributes of the Supreme Being. When we say that he is perfectly\n      just, pure, holy, beneficent, we recognize a standard of judgment\n      logically independent of his nature. We mean that the fitness which\n      the human conscience recognizes as its only standard of right, is\n      the law which he has elected for his own administration of the\n      universe. Could we conceive of omnipotence not recognizing this law,\n      the decrees and acts of such a being would not be necessarily right.\n      Omnipotence cannot make that which is fitting wrong, or that which\n      is unfitting right. God\u2019s decrees and acts are not right because\n      they are his, but his because they are right.\n\n    9 From _cardo_, a hinge.\n\n   10 It is virtually Cicero\u2019s division in the _De Officiis_.\n\n   11 The points at issue with regard to sabbatical observance hardly\n      belong to an elementary treatise on ethics. I ought not, however, to\n      leave any doubt as to my own opinion. I believe, then, the rest of\n      the Sabbath a necessity of man\u2019s constitution, physical and mental,\n      of that of the beasts subservient to his use, and, in some measure,\n      even of the inanimate agents under his control, while the\n      sequestration of the day from the course of ordinary life is equally\n      a moral and religious necessity. The weekly Sabbath I regard as a\n      dictate of natural piety, and a primeval institution, re-enacted,\n      not established, by Moses, and sanctioned by our Saviour when he\n      refers to the Decalogue as a compend of moral duty, as also in\n      various other forms and ways. As to modes of sabbatical observance,\n      the rigid abstinences and austerities once common in New England\n      were derived from the Mosaic ceremonial law, and have no sanction\n      either in the New Testament or in the habits of the early\n      Christians. I can conceive of no better rule for the Lord\u2019s day,\n      than that each person so spend it as to interfere as little as\n      possible with its fitting use by others, and to make it as availing\n      as he can for his own relaxation from secular cares, and growth in\n      wisdom and goodness.\n\n   12 It was the malignity displayed toward the children of divorced wives\n      by the women who succeeded them in the affections and homes of their\n      husbands, that in Roman literature attached to the name of a\n      stepmother (_noverca_) the most hateful associations, which\n      certainly have no place in modern Christendom, where the stepmother\n      oftener than not assumes the maternal cares of the deceased wife as\n      if they were natively her own.\n\n   13 When Jesus forbids swearing by heaven, because \u201cit is God\u2019s throne,\u201d\n      and by the earth, because \u201cit is his footstool,\u201d the inference is\n      obvious that, for still stronger reasons, all direct swearing by God\n      himself is prohibited. The word \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5, which introduces the oaths by\n      inferior objects specified in the text under discussion, not\n      infrequently corresponds to our phrase _not even_. With this sense\n      of \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5, the passage would be rendered, \u201cBut I say unto you, Swear\n      not at all, not even by heaven,\u201d etc.\n\n      I find that some writers on this subject quote in vindication of\n      oaths on solemn occasions the instances in the Scriptures in which\n      God is said to have sworn by Himself. The reply is obvious, that no\n      being can swear by himself, the essential significance of an oath\n      being an appeal to some being or object other than one\u2019s self.\n      Because God \u201ccan swear by no greater,\u201d it is certain that when this\n      phraseology is used concerning Him, it is employed figuratively, to\n      aid the poverty of human conceptions, and to express the certainty\n      of his promise by the strongest terms which human language affords.\n      In like manner, God is said by the sacred writers to repent of\n      intended retribution to evil-doers, not that infinite justice and\n      love can change in thought, plan, or purpose, but because a change\n      of disposition and feeling is wont to precede human clemency to\n      evil-doers.\n\n   14 The odious meaning of _excessive_ interest, as attached to _usury_,\n      is of comparatively recent date. In the earlier English, as in our\n      translation of the Bible, it denotes any sum given for the use of\n      money.\n\n   15 In this country usury laws are fast yielding to the growth of\n      intelligence in monetary affairs. Wherever they exist in their\n      severer forms, they only enhance the rate of interest paid by the\n      major portion of the class of borrowers, as the lender must be\n      compensated, not only for the use of his money, and for the risk of\n      his creditor\u2019s inability to repay it, but also for the additional\n      risk of detection, prosecution, and forfeiture.\n\n   16 The reader need not be told that _patience_ and _passion_ are\n      derived from different participles of the same verb. _Patience_\n      comes from the present participle, and fittingly denotes the spirit\n      in which present suffering should be met; while _passion_ comes from\n      the perfect or past participle, and as fittingly denotes the\n      condition ensuing upon any physical, mental, or moral affection,\n      induced from without, which has been endured without protest or\n      resistance.\n\n   17 From _punctum_, a point.\n\n   18 \u1f29\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae.\n\n   19 \u03a3\u03c4\u03bf\u03ac.\n\n   20 The words employed by the Stoics to indicate specific duties, as\n      presented to the common understanding, recognize intrinsic fitness\n      as the ground of right. These duties are termed in Greek, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ae\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\n      that is, _be-fitting_, and in Latin, _officia_, from _ob_ and\n      _facio_, that which is done _ob aliquid_, for some assignable\n      reason.\n\n   21 How far Seneca\u2019s character was represented by his philosophy is, we\n      believe, a fairly open question. That the beginning and the close of\n      his career were in accordance with his teachings, is certain. That\n      as a courtier, he was in suspicious proximity to, if not in\n      complicity with, gross scandals and crimes, is equally certain. The\n      evidence against him is weighty, but by no means conclusive. He may\n      have lingered in the purlieus of the palace in fond memory of what\n      Nero had been in the promise of his youth, and in the groundless\n      hope of bringing him again under more humane influences. This\n      supposition is rendered the more probable by the well-known fact,\n      that during his whole court life, and notwithstanding his great\n      wealth, Seneca\u2019s personal habits were almost those of an anchorite.\n\n   22 Spinoza\u2019s ethical system was closely parallel to that of Hobbes. He\n      denied the intrinsic difference between right and wrong; but he\n      regarded _aristocracy_ as the natural order of society. With him, as\n      with Hobbes, virtue consists solely in obedience to constituted\n      authority; and so utterly did he ignore a higher law, that he\n      maintained it to be the right of a state to abjure a treaty with\n      another state, when its terms ceased to be convenient or profitable.\n\n   23 Price\u2019s theory of morals is developed with singular precision and\n      force in one of the Baccalaureate Addresses of the late President\n      Appleton, of Bowdoin College.\n\n   24 \u0395\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2.\n\n   25 The reader who is conversant with the literature of ethics in\n      England and America will miss in this chapter many names which merit\n      a place by the side of those that have been given. But within the\n      limits proposed for this manual, the alternative was to select a few\n      writers among those who have largely influenced the thought of their\n      own and succeeding times, and to associate with each of them\n      something that should mark his individuality; or to make the chapter\n      little more than a catalogue of names. The former is evidently the\n      more judicious course. Nothing has been said of living writers,\u2014not\n      because there are none who deserve an honored place among the\n      contributors to this department of science, but because, were the\n      list to be once opened, we should hardly know where to close it.","title":"A Manual of Moral Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":55190}