{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_27571/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_27571","id":"gutenberg_27571","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27571","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christianity","Church history -- Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600","Philosophy, Ancient"],"text":"Produced by Juliet Sutherland, R\u00e9nald L\u00e9vesque and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreaders Europe at\nhttp://dp.rastko.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHRISTIANITY\n\nAND\n\nGREEK PHILOSOPHY;\n\nOR, THE RELATION BETWEEN\nSPONTANEOUS AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT IN GREECE\nAND THE POSITIVE TEACHING OF\nCHRIST AND HIS APOSTLES.\n\n\nBY B.F. COCKER, D.D.,\n\nPROFESSOR OF MORAL AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN\n\n\"Plato made me know the true God, Jesus Christ showed me the way to\nhim.\"\n                                                        ST. AUGUSTINE\n\n\n\n\nNEW YORK: CARLTON & LANAHAN.\nSAN FRANCISCO: E. THOMAS.\nCINCINNATI: HITCHCOCK & WALDEN.\n\n1870.\n\n\n\nEntered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, by HARPER &\nBROTHERS, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United\nStates for the Southern District of New York.\n\n\n\n\nTO\n\nD.D. WHEDON, D.D.,\n\nMY EARLIEST LITERARY FRIEND, WHOSE VIGOROUS WRITINGS HAVE\nSTIMULATED MY INQUIRIES, WHOSE COUNSELS HAVE GUIDED\nMY STUDIES, AND WHOSE KIND AND GENEROUS WORDS\nHAVE ENCOURAGED ME TO PERSEVERANCE\nAMID NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES,\nI DEDICATE THIS VOLUME AS A TOKEN OF MY MORE THAN ORDINARY AFFECTION\n\n_THE AUTHOR_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIn preparing the present volume, the writer has been actuated by a\nconscientious desire to deepen and vivify our faith in the Christian\nsystem of truth, by showing that it does not rest _solely_ on a special\nclass of facts, but upon all the facts of nature and humanity; that its\nauthority does not repose _alone_ on the peculiar and supernatural\nevents which transpired in Palestine, but also on the still broader\nfoundations of the ideas and laws of the reason, and the common wants\nand instinctive yearnings of the human heart. It is his conviction that\nthe course and constitution of nature, the whole current of history, and\nthe entire development of human thought in the ages anterior to the\nadvent of the Redeemer centre in, and can only be interpreted by, the\npurpose of redemption.\n\nThe method hitherto most prevalent, of treating the history of human\nthought as a series of isolated, disconnected, and lawless movements,\nwithout unity and purpose; and the practice of denouncing the religions\nand philosophies of the ancient world as inventions of satanic mischief,\nor as the capricious and wicked efforts of humanity to relegate itself\nfrom the bonds of allegiance to the One Supreme Lord and Lawgiver, have,\nin his judgment, been prejudicial to the interests of all truth, and\nespecially injurious to the cause of Christianity. They betray an utter\ninsensibility to the grand unities of nature and of thought, and a\nstrange forgetfulness of that universal Providence which comprehends all\nnature and all history, and is yet so minute in its regards that it\nnumbers the hairs on every human head, and takes note of every sparrow's\nfall, A juster method will lead us to regard the entire history of human\nthought as a development towards a specific end, and the providence of\nGod as an all-embracing plan, which sweeps over all ages and all\nnations, and which, in its final consummation, will, through Christ,\n\"gather together all things in one, both things which are in heaven and\nthings which are on earth.\"\n\nThe central and unifying thought of this volume is _that the necessary\nideas and laws of the reason, and the native instincts of the human\nheart, originally implanted by God, are the primal and germinal forces\nof history; and that these have been developed under conditions which\nwere first ordained, and have been continually supervised by the\nprovidence of God_. God is the Father of humanity, and he is also the\nGuide and Educator of our race. As \"the offspring of God,\" humanity is\nnot a bare, indeterminate potentiality, but a living energy, an active\nreason, having definite qualities, and inheriting fundamental principles\nand necessary ideas which constitute it \"the image and likeness of God.\"\nAnd though it has suffered a moral lapse, and, in the exercise of its\nfreedom, has become alienated from the life of God, yet God has never\nabandoned the human race. He still \"magnifies man, and sets his heart\nupon him.\" \"He visits him every morning, and tries him every moment.\"\n\"The inspiration of the Almighty still gives him understanding.\" The\nillumination of the Divine Logos still \"teacheth man knowledge.\" The\nSpirit of God still comes near to and touches with strong emotion every\nhuman heart. \"God has never left himself without a witness\" in any\nnation, or in any age. The providence of God has always guided the\ndispersions and migrations of the families of the earth, and presided\nover and directed the education of the race. \"He has foreordained the\ntimes of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundaries\nof their habitations, _in order that they should seek the Lord_, and\nfeel after and find Him who is not far from any one of us.\" The\nreligions of the ancient world were the painful effort of the human\nspirit to return to its true rest and centre--the struggle to \"find Him\"\nwho is so intimately near to every human heart, and who has never ceased\nto be the want of the human race. The philosophies of the ancient world\nwere the earnest effort of human reason to reconcile the finite and the\ninfinite, the human and the Divine, the subject and God. An overruling\nProvidence, which makes even the wrath of man to praise Him, took up all\nthese sincere, though often mistaken, efforts into his own plan, and\nmade them sub-serve the purpose of redemption. They aided in developing\namong the nations \"the desire of salvation,\" and in preparing the world\nfor the advent of the Son of God. The entire course and history of\nDivine providence, in every nation, and in every age, has been directed\ntowards the one grand purpose of \"reconciling all things to Himself.\"\nChristianity, as a comprehensive scheme of reconciliation, embracing\n\"all things,\" can not, therefore, be properly studied apart from the\nages of earnest thought, of profound inquiry, and of intense religious\nfeeling which preceded it. To despise the religions of the ancient\nworld, to sneer at the efforts and achievements of the old philosophers,\nor even to cut them off in thought from all relation to the plans and\nmovements of that Providence which has cared for, and watched over, and\npitied, and guided all the nations of the earth, is to refuse to\ncomprehend Christianity itself.\n\nThe author is not indifferent to the possibility that his purpose may be\nmisconceived. The effort may be regarded by many conscientious and\nesteemed theologians with suspicion and mistrust. They can not easily\nemancipate themselves from the ancient prejudice against speculative\nthought. Philosophy has always been regarded by them as antagonistic to\nChristian faith. They are inspired by a commendable zeal for the honor\nof dogmatic theology. Every essay towards a profounder conviction, a\nbroader faith in the unity of all truth, is branded with the opprobrious\nname of \"rationalism.\" Let us not be terrified by a harmless word.\nSurely religion and right reason must be found in harmony. The author\nbelieves, with Bacon, that \"the foundation of all religion is right\nreason.\" The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but the\nconfession of despair. Sustained by these convictions, he submits this\nhumble contribution to theological science to the thoughtful\nconsideration of all lovers of Truth, and of Christ, the fountain of\nTruth. He can sincerely ask upon it the blessing of Him in whose fear it\nhas been written, and whose cause it is the purpose of his life to\nserve.\n\nThe second series, on \"Christianity and Modern Thought,\" is in an\nadvanced state of preparation for the press.\n\n      NOTE.--It has been the aim of the writer, as far as the\n      nature of the subject would permit, to adapt this work to\n      general readers. The references to classic authors are,\n      therefore, in all cases made to accessible English\n      translations (in Bohn's Classical Library); such changes,\n      however, have been made in the rendering as shall present\n      the doctrine of the writers in a clearer and more forcible\n      manner. For valuable services rendered in this department of\n      the work, by Martin L. D'Ooge, M. A., Acting Professor of\n      Greek Language and Literature in the University of Michigan,\n      the author would here express his grateful acknowledgment.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n     CHAPTER I.\n     ATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS.\n\n     CHAPTER II.\n     THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.\n\n     CHAPTER III.\n     THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS.\n\n     CHAPTER IV.\n     THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL\n     ASPECTS.\n\n     CHAPTER V.\n     THE UNKNOWN GOD.\n\n     CHAPTER VI.\n     THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_).\n       IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON?\n\n     CHAPTER VII.\n     THE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_).\n       IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_).\n\n     CHAPTER VIII.\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS.\n       PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n     _Sensational_: THALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER\n     LEOCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS.\n\n     CHAPTER IX.\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n       PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_)\n     _Idealist_: Pythagoras--Xenophanes--Parmenides--Zeno. _Natural\n     Realist_: Anaxagoras.\n       THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n       Socrates.\n\n     CHAPTER X\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n       THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n       Plato.\n\n     CHAPTER XI.\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n       THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n       Plato.\n\n     CHAPTER XII.\n\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n       THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n       Aristotle.\n\n     CHAPTER XIII.\n     THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n       POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n       Epicurus and Zeno.\n\n     CHAPTER XIV.\n     The Prop\u00e6deutic Office of Greek Philosophy.\n\n     CHAPTER XV.\n     The Prop\u00e6deutic Office of Greek Philosophy (_continued_).\n\n\n\n\n\"_Ye men of Athens_, all things which I behold bear witness to your\ncarefulness in religion; for, as I passed through your city and beheld\nthe objects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with this\ninscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD; whom, therefore, ye worship, though ye\nknow; Him not, Him declare I unto you. God who made the world and all\nthings therein, seeing He is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in\ntemples made with hands; neither is He served by the hands of men, as\nthough he needed any thing; for He giveth unto all life, and breath, and\nall things. And He made of one blood all the nations of mankind to dwell\nupon the face of the whole earth; and ordained to each the appointed\nseasons of their existence, and the bounds of their habitation, that\nthey should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him,\nthough he be not far from every one of us: for in Him we live, and move,\nand have our being; as certain of your own poets have said, _For we are\nalso His offspring_. Forasmuch, then, as we are the offspring of God, we\nought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or\nstone, graven by the art and device of man. Howbeit, those past times of\nignorance God hath overlooked; but now He commandeth all men everywhere\nto repent, because He hath appointed a day wherein He will judge the\nworld in righteousness by that Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He\nhath given assurance unto all, in that He hath raised Him from the\ndead.\"--Acts xvii. 22-31.\n\n\n\n\nCHRISTIANITY\nAND\nGREEK PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nATHENS, AND THE MEN OF ATHENS.\n\n\n\"Is it not worth while, for the sake of the history of men and nations,\nto study the surface of the globe in its relation to the inhabitants\nthereof?\"--Goethe.\n\nThere is no event recorded in the annals of the early church so replete\nwith interest to the Christian student, or which takes so deep a hold on\nthe imagination, and the sympathies of him who is at all familiar with\nthe history of Ancient Greece, as the one recited above. Here we see the\nApostle Paul standing on the Areopagus at Athens, surrounded by the\ntemples, statues, and altars, which Grecian art had consecrated to Pagan\nworship, and proclaiming to the inquisitive Athenians, \"the strangers\"\nwho had come to Athens for business or for pleasure, and the\nphilosophers and students of the Lyceum, the Academy, the Stoa, and the\nGarden, \"_the unknown God_.\"\n\nWhether we dwell in our imagination on the artistic grandeur and\nimposing magnificence of the city in which Paul found himself a solitary\nstranger, or recall the illustrious names which by their achievements in\narts and philosophy have shed around the city of Athens an immortal\nglory,--or whether, fixing our attention on the lonely wanderer amid the\nporticoes, and groves, and temples of this classic city, we attempt to\nconceive the emotion which stirred his heart as he beheld it \"wholly\ngiven to idolatry;\" or whether we contrast the sublime, majestic theism\nproclaimed by Paul with the degrading polytheism and degenerate\nphilosophy which then prevailed in Athens, or consider the prudent and\nsagacious manner in which the apostle conducts his argument in view of\nthe religious opinions and prejudices of his audience, we can not but\nfeel that this event is fraught with lessons of instruction to the\nChurch in every age.\n\nThat the objects which met the eye of Paul on every hand, and the\nopinions he heard everywhere expressed in Athens, must have exerted a\npowerful influence upon the current of his thoughts, as well as upon the\nstate of his emotions, is a legitimate and natural presumption. Not only\nwas \"his spirit stirred within him\"--his heart deeply moved and agitated\nwhen he saw the city wholly given to idolatry--but his thoughtful,\nphilosophic mind would be engaged in pondering those deeply interesting\nquestions which underlie the whole system of Grecian polytheism. The\ncircumstances of the hour would, no doubt, in a large degree determine\nthe line of argument, the form of his discourse, and the peculiarities\nof his phraseology. The more vividly, therefore, we can represent the\nscenes and realize the surrounding incidents; the more thoroughly we can\nenter into sympathy with the modes of thought and feeling peculiar to\nthe Athenians; the more perfectly we can comprehend the spirit and\ntendency of the age; the more immediate our acquaintance with the\nreligious opinions and philosophical ideas then prevalent in Athens, the\nmore perfect will be our comprehension of the apostle's argument, the\ndeeper our interest in his theme. Some preliminary notices of Athens and\n\"the Men of Athens\" will therefore be appropriate as introductory to a\nseries of discourses on Paul's sermon on Mars' Hill.\n\nThe peculiar connection that subsists between Geography and History,\nbetween a people and the country they inhabit, will justify the\nextension of our survey beyond the mere topography of Athens. The people\nof the entire province of Attica were called Athenians (_Ath\u00eanaioi_) in\ntheir relation to the state, and Attics _(Attikoi_) in regard to their\nmanners, customs, and dialect.[1] The climate and the scenery, the forms\nof contour and relief, the geographical position and relations of\nAttica, and, indeed, of the whole peninsula of Greece, must be taken\ninto our account if we would form a comprehensive judgment of the\ncharacter of the Athenian people.\n\nThe soil on which a people dwell, the air they breathe, the mountains\nand seas by which they are surrounded, the skies that overshadow\nthem,--all these exert a powerful influence on their pursuits, their\nhabits, their institutions, their sentiments, and their ideas. So that\ncould we clearly group, and fully grasp all the characteristics of a\nregion--its position, configuration, climate, scenery, and natural\nproducts, we could, with tolerable accuracy, determine what are the\ncharacteristics of the people who inhabit it. A comprehensive knowledge\nof the physical geography of any country will therefore aid us\nmaterially in elucidating the natural history, and, to some extent, the\nmoral history of its population. \"History does not stand _outside_ of\nnature, but in her very heart, so that the historian only grasps a\npeople's character with true precision when he keeps in full view its\ngeographical position, and the influences which its surroundings have\nwrought upon it.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Niebuhr's \"Lectures on Ethnography and Geography,\" p. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ritter's \"Geographical Studies,\" p. 34.]\n\nIt is, however, of the utmost consequence the reader should understand\nthat there are two widely different methods of treating this deeply\ninteresting subject--methods which proceed on fundamentally opposite\nviews of man and of nature. One method is that pursued by Buckle in his\n\"History of Civilization in England.\" The tendency of his work is the\nassertion of the supremacy of material conditions over the development\nof human history, and indeed of every individual mind. Here man is\npurely passive in the hands of nature. Exterior conditions are the\nchief, if not the _only_ causes of man's intellectual and social\ndevelopment. So that, such a climate and soil, such aspects of nature\nand local circumstances being given, such a nation necessarily\nfollows.[3] The other method is that of Carl Ritter, Arnold Guyot, and\nCousin.[4] These take account of the freedom of the human will, and the\npower of man to control and modify the forces of nature. They also take\naccount of the original constitution of man, and the primitive type of\nnations; and they allow for results arising from the mutual conflict of\ngeographical conditions. And they, especially, recognize the agency of a\nDivine Providence controlling those forces in nature by which the\nconfiguration of the earth's surface is determined, and the distribution\nof its oceans, continents, and islands is secured; and a providence,\nalso, directing the dispersions and migrations of nations--determining\nthe times of each nation's existence, and fixing the geographical bounds\nof their habitation, all in view of the _moral_ history and spiritual\ndevelopment of the race,--\"that they may feel after, and find the living\nGod.\" The relation of man and nature is not, in their estimation, a\nrelation of cause and effect. It is a relation of adjustment, of\nharmony, and of reciprocal action and reaction. \"Man is not\"--says\nCousin--\"an effect, and nature the cause, but there is between man and\nnature a manifest harmony of general laws.\"... \"Man and nature are two\ngreat effects which, coming from the same cause, bear the same\ncharacteristics; so that the earth, and he who inhabits it, man and\nnature, are in perfect harmony.\"[5] God has created both man and the\nuniverse, and he has established between them a striking harmony. The\nearth was made for man; not simply to supply his physical wants, but\nalso to minister to his intellectual and moral development. The earth is\nnot a mere dwelling-place of nations, but a school-house, in which God\nhimself is superintending the education of the race. Hence we must not\nonly study the _events_ of history in their chronological order, but we\nmust study the earth itself as the _theatre_ of history. A knowledge of\nall the circumstances, both physical and moral, in the midst of which\nevents take place, is absolutely necessary to a right judgment of the\nevents themselves. And we can only elucidate properly the character of\nthe actors by a careful study of all their geographical and ethological\nconditions.\n\n[Footnote 3: See chap. ii. \"History of Civilization.\"]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ritter's \"Geographical Studies;\" Guyot's \"Earth and Man;\"\nCousin's \"History of Philosophy,\" lec. vii., viii., ix.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Lectures, vol. i. pp. 162, 169.]\n\nIt will be readily perceived that, in attempting to estimate the\ninfluence which exterior conditions exert in the determination of\nnational character, we encounter peculiar difficulties. We can not in\nthese studies expect the precision and accuracy which is attained in the\nmathematical, or the purely physical sciences. We possess no control\nover the \"materiel\" of our inquiry; we have no power of placing it in\nnew conditions, and submitting it to the test of new experiments, as in\nthe physical sciences. National character is a _complex_ result--a\nproduct of the action and reaction of primary and secondary causes. It\nis a conjoint effect of the action of the primitive elements and laws\noriginally implanted in humanity by the Creator, of the free causality\nand self-determining power of man, and of all the conditions, permanent\nand accidental, within which the national life has been developed. And\nin cases where _physical_ and _moral_ causes are blended, and\nreciprocally conditioned and modified in their operation;--where primary\nresults undergo endless modifications from the influence of surrounding\ncircumstances, and the reaction of social and political\ninstitutions;--and where each individual of the great aggregate wields a\ncausal power that obeys no specific law, and by his own inherent power\nsets in motion new trains of causes which can not be reduced to\nstatistics, we grant that we are in possession of no instrument of exact\nanalysis by which the complex phenomena of national character may be\nreduced to primitive elements. All that we can hope is, to ascertain, by\npsychological analysis, what are the fundamental ideas and laws of\nhumanity; to grasp the exterior conditions which are, on all hands,\nrecognized as exerting a powerful influence upon national character; to\nwatch, under these lights, the manifestations of human nature on the\ntheatre of history, and then apply the principles of a sound historic\ncriticism to the recorded opinions of contemporaneous historians and\ntheir immediate successors. In this manner we may expect, at least, to\napproximate to a true judgment of history.\n\nThere are unquestionably fundamental powers and laws in human nature\nwhich have their development in the course of history. There are certain\nprimitive ideas, imbedded in the constitution of each individual mind,\nwhich are revealed in the universal consciousness of our race, under the\nconditions of experience--the exterior conditions of physical nature and\nhuman society. Such are the ideas of cause and substance; of unity and\ninfinity, which govern all the processes of discursive thought, and lead\nus to the recognition of Being _in se_;--such the ideas of right, of\nduty, of accountability, and of retribution, which regulate all the\nconceptions we form of our relations to all other moral beings, and\nconstitute _morality_;--such the ideas of order, of proportion, and of\nharmony, which preside in the realms of art, and constitute the\nbeau-ideal of _esthetics_;--such the ideas of God, the soul, and\nimmortality, which rule in the domains of _religion_, and determine man\na religious being. These constitute the identity of human nature under\nall circumstances; these characterize humanity in all conditions. Like\npermanent germs in vegetable life, always producing the same species of\nplants; or like fundamental types in the animal kingdom, securing the\nsame homologous structures in all classes and orders; so these\nfundamental ideas in human nature constitute its sameness and unity,\nunder all the varying conditions of life and society. The acorn must\nproduce an oak, and nothing else. The grain of wheat must always produce\nits kind. The offspring of man must always bear his image, and always\nexhibit the same fundamental characteristics, not only in his corporeal\nnature, but also in his mental constitution.\n\nBut the germination of every seed depends on conditions _ab extra_, and\nall germs are modified, in their development, by geographical and\nclimatal surroundings. The development of the acorn into a mature and\nperfect oak greatly depends on the exterior conditions of soil, and\nmoisture, light, and heat. By these it may be rendered luxuriant in its\ngrowth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under\none class of conditions, or it may perish under another. The Brassica\noleracea, in its native habitat on the shore of the sea, is a bitter\nplant with wavy sea-green leaves; in the cultivated garden it is the\ncauliflower. The single rose, under altered conditions, becomes a double\nrose; and creepers rear their stalks and stand erect. Plants, which in a\ncold climate are annuals, become perennial when transported to the\ntorrid zone.[6] And so human nature, fundamentally the same under all\ncircumstances, may be greatly modified, both physically and mentally, by\ngeographical, social, and political conditions. The corporeal nature of\nman--his complexion, his physiognomy, his stature; the intellectual\nnature of man--his religious, ethical, and esthetical ideas are all\nmodified by his surroundings. These modifications, of which all men\ndwelling in the same geographical regions, and under the same social and\npolitical institutions, partake, constitute the _individuality_ of\nnations. Thus, whilst there is a fundamental basis of unity in the\ncorporeal and spiritual nature of man, the causes of diversity are to be\nsought in the circumstances in which tribes and nations are placed in\nthe overruling providence of God.\n\n[Footnote 6: See Carpenter's \"Compar. Physiology,\" p. 625; Lyell's\n\"Principles of Geology,\" pp. 588, 589.]\n\nThe power which man exerts over material conditions, by virtue of his\nintelligence and freedom, is also an important element which, in these\nstudies, we should not depreciate or ignore. We must accept, with all\nits consequences, the dictum of universal consciousness that man is\n_free_. He is not absolutely subject to, and moulded by nature. He has\nthe power to control the circumstances by which he is surrounded--to\noriginate new social and physical conditions--to determine his own\nindividual and responsible character--and he can wield a mighty\ninfluence over the character of his fellow-men. Individual men, as\nLycurgus, Solon, Pericles, Alexander, C\u00e6sar, and Napoleon have left the\nimpress of their own mind and character upon the political institutions\nof nations, and, in indirect manner, upon the character of succeeding\ngenerations of men. Homer, Plato, Cicero, Bacon, Kant, Locke, Newton,\nShakspeare, Milton have left a deep and permanent impression upon the\nforms of thought and speech, the language and literature, the science\nand philosophy of nations. And inasmuch as a nation is the aggregate of\nindividual beings endowed with spontaneity and freedom, we must grant\nthat exterior conditions are not omnipotent in the formation of national\ncharacter. Still the free causality of man is exercised within a narrow\nfield. \"There is a strictly necessitative limitation drawing an\nimpassable boundary-line around the area of volitional freedom.\" The\nhuman will \"however subjectively free\" is often \"objectively unfree;\"\nthus a large \"uniformity of volitions\" is the natural consequence.[7]\nThe child born in the heart of China, whilst he may, in his personal\nfreedom, develop such traits of character as constitute his\nindividuality, must necessarily be conformed in his language, habits,\nmodes of thought, and religious sentiments to the spirit of his country\nand age. We no more expect a development of Christian thought and\ncharacter in the centre of Africa, unvisited by Christian teaching, than\nwe expect to find the climate and vegetation of New England. And we no\nmore expect that a New England child shall be a Mohammedan, a Parsee, or\na Buddhist, than that he shall have an Oriental physiognomy, and speak\nan Oriental language. Indeed it is impossible for a man to exist in\nhuman society without partaking in the spirit and manners of his country\nand his age. Thus all the individuals of a nation represent, in a\ngreater or less degree, the spirit of the nation. They who do this most\nperfectly are the _great_ men of that nation, because they are at once\nboth the product and the impersonation of their country and their age.\n\"We allow ourselves to think of Shakspeare, or of Raphael, or of Phidias\nas having accomplished their work by the power of their individual\ngenius, but greatness like theirs is never more than the highest degree\nof perfection which prevails widely around it, and forms the environment\nin which it grows. No such single mind in single contact with the facts\nof nature could have created a Pallas, a Madonna, or a Lear; such vast\nconceptions are the growth of ages, the creation of a nation's spirit;\nand the artist and poet, filled full with the power of that spirit, but\ngave it form, and nothing but form. Nor would the form itself have been\nattained by any isolated talent. No genius can dispense with\nexperience.... Noble conceptions already existing, and a noble school of\nexecution which will launch mind and hand upon their true courses, are\nindispensable to transcendent excellence. Shakspeare's plays were as\nmuch the offspring of the long generations who had pioneered the road\nfor him, as the discoveries of Newton were the offspring of those of\nCopernicus.\"[8] The principles here enounced apply with equal force to\nphilosophers and men of science. The philosophy of Plato was but the\nripened fruit of the pregnant thoughts and seminal utterances of his\npredecessors,--Socrates, Anaxagoras, and Pythagoras; whilst all of them\ndo but represent the general tendency and spirit of their country and\ntheir times. The principles of Lord Bacon's \"Instauratio Magna\" were\nincipient in the \"Opus Majus\" of Roger Bacon, the Franciscan friar. The\nsixteenth century matured the thought of the thirteenth century. The\ninductive method in scientific inquiry was immanent in the British mind,\nand the latter Bacon only gave to it a permanent form. It is true that\ngreat men have occasionally appeared on the stage of history who, like\nthe reformers Luther and Wesley, have seemed to be in conflict with the\nprevailing spirit of their age and nation, but these men were the\ncreations of a providence--that providence which, from time to time, has\n_supernaturally_ interposed in the moral history of our race by\ncorrective and remedial measures. These men were inspired and led by a\nspirit which descended from on high. And yet even they had their\nprecursors and harbingers. Wyckliffe and John Huss, and Jerome of Prague\nare but the representatives of numbers whose names do not grace the\nhistoric page, who pioneered the way for Luther and the Reformation. And\nno one can read the history of that great movement of the sixteenth\ncentury without being persuaded there were thousands of Luther's\npredecessors and contemporaries who, like Staupitz and Erasmus, lamented\nthe corruptions of the Church of Rome, and only needed the heroic\ncourage of Luther to make them reformers also. Whilst, therefore, we\nrecognize a free causal power in man, by which he determines his\nindividual and responsible character, we are compelled to recognize the\ngeneral law, that national character is mainly the result of those\ngeographical and ethological, and political and religious conditions in\nwhich the nations have been placed in the providence of God.\n\n[Footnote 7: See Dr. Wheedon's \"Freedom of the Will,\" pp. 164, 165.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Froude, \"Hist. of England,\" pp. 73, 74.]\n\nNations, like persons, have an _Individuality_. They present certain\ncharacteristic marks which constitute their proper identity, and\nseparate them from the surrounding nations of the earth; such, for\nexample, as complexion, physiognomy, language, pursuits, customs,\ninstitutions, sentiments, ideas. The individuality of a nation is\ndetermined mainly from _without_, and not, like human individuality,\nfrom within. The laws of a man's personal character have their home in\nthe soul; and the peculiarities and habits, and that conduct of life,\nwhich constitute his responsible character are, in a great degree, the\nconsequence of his own free choice. But dwelling, as he does, in\nsociety, where he is continually influenced by the example and opinions\nof his neighbors; subject, as he is, to the ceaseless influence of\nclimate, scenery, and other terrestrial conditions, the characteristics\nwhich result from these relations, and which are common to all who dwell\nin the same regions, and under the same institutions, constitute a\nnational individuality. Individual character is _variable_ under the\nsame general conditions, national character is _uniform_, because it\nresults from causes which operate alike upon all individuals.\n\nNow, that man's complexion, his pursuits, his habits, his ideas are\ngreatly modified by his geographical surroundings, is the most obvious\nof truths. No one doubts that the complexion of man is greatly affected\nby climatic conditions. The appearance, habits, pursuits of the man who\nlives within the tropics must, necessarily, differ from those of the man\nwho dwells within the temperate zone. No one expects that the dweller on\nthe mountain will have the same characteristics as the man who resides\non the plains; or that he whose home is in the interior of a continent\nwill have the same habits as the man whose home is on the islands of the\nsea. The denizen of the primeval forest will most naturally become a\nhuntsman. The dweller on the extended plain, or fertile mountain slope,\nwill lead a pastoral, or an agricultural life. Those who live on the\nmargin of great rivers, or the borders of the sea, will \"do business on\nthe great waters.\" Commerce and navigation will be their chief pursuits.\nThe people whose home is on the margin of the lake, or bay, or inland\nsea, or the thickly studded archipelago, are mostly fishermen. And then\nit is a no less obvious truth that men's pursuits exert a moulding\ninfluence on their habits, their forms of speech, their sentiments, and\ntheir ideas. Let any one take pains to observe the peculiarities which\ncharacterize the huntsman, the shepherd, the agriculturist, or the\nfisherman, and he will be convinced that their occupations stamp the\nwhole of their thoughts and feelings; color all their conceptions of\nthings outside their own peculiar field; direct their simple philosophy\nof life; and give a tone, even, to their religious emotions.\n\nThe general aspects of nature, the climate and the scenery, exert an\nappreciable and an acknowledged influence on the _mental_\ncharacteristics of a people. The sprightliness and vivacity of the\nFrank, the impetuosity of the Arab, the immobility of the Russ, the\nrugged sternness of the Scot, the repose and dreaminess of the Hindoo\nare largely due to the country in which they dwell, the air they\nbreathe, the food they eat, and the landscapes and skies they daily look\nupon. The nomadic Arab is not only indebted to the country in which he\ndwells for his habit of hunting for daily food, but for that love of a\nfree, untrammelled life, and for those soaring dreams of fancy in which\nhe so ardently delights. Not only is the Swiss determined by the\npeculiarities of his geographical position to lead a pastoral life, but\nthe climate, and mountain scenery, and bracing atmosphere inspire him\nwith the love of liberty. The reserved and meditative Hindoo, accustomed\nto the profuse luxuriance of nature, borrows the fantastic ideas of his\nmythology from plants, and flowers, and trees. The vastness and infinite\ndiversity of nature, the colossal magnitude of all the forms of animal\nand vegetable life, the broad and massive features of the landscape, the\naspects of beauty and of terror which surround him, and daily pour their\nsilent influences upon his soul, give vividness, grotesqueness, even, to\nhis imagination, and repress his active powers. His mental character\nbears a peculiar and obvious relation to his geographical\nsurroundings.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ritter, \"Geograph. Studies,\" p. 287.]\n\nThe influence of external nature on the imagination--the _creative_\nfaculty in man--is obvious and remarkable. It reveals itself in all the\nproductions of man--his architecture, his sculpture, his painting, and\nhis poetry. Oriental architecture is characterized by the boldness and\nmassiveness of all its parts, and the monotonous uniformity of all its\nfeatures. This is but the expression, in a material form, of that\nshadowy feeling of infinity, and unity, and immobility which an unbroken\ncontinent of vast deserts and continuous lofty mountain chains would\nnaturally inspire. The simple grandeur and perfect harmony and graceful\nblending of light and shade so peculiar to Grecian architecture are the\nproduct of a country whose area is diversified by the harmonious\nblending of land and water, mountain and plain, all bathed in purest\nlight, and canopied with skies of serenest blue. And they are also the\nproduct of a country where man is released from the imprisonment within\nthe magic circle of surrounding nature, and made conscious of his power\nand freedom. In Grecian architecture, therefore, there is less of the\nmassiveness and immobility of nature, and more of the grace and dignity\nof man. It adds to the idea of permanence a _vital_ expression. \"The\nDoric column,\" says Vitruvius, \"has the proportion, strength, and beauty\nof man.\" The Gothic architecture had its birthplace among a people who\nhad lived and worshipped for ages amidst the dense forests of the north,\nand was no doubt an imitation of the interlacing of the overshadowing\ntrees. The clustered shaft, and lancet arch, and flowing tracery,\nreflect the impression which the surrounding scenery had woven into the\ntexture of the Teutonic mind.\n\nThe history of painting and of sculpture will also show that the varied\n\"styles of art\" are largely the result of the aspects which external\nnature presented to the eye of man. Oriental sculpture, like its\narchitecture, was characterized by massiveness of form and tranquillity\nof expression; and its painting was, at best, but colored sculpture. The\nmost striking objects are colossal figures, in which the human form is\nstrangely combined with the brute, as in the winged bulls of Nineveh and\nthe sphinxes of Egypt. Man is regarded simply as a part of nature, he\ndoes not rise above the plane of animal life. The soul has its\nimmortality only in an eternal metempsychosis--a cycle of life which\nsweeps through all the brute creation. But in Grecian sculpture we have\nless of nature, more of man; less of massiveness, more of grace and\nelegance; less repose, and more of action. Now the connection between\nthese styles of art, and the countries in which they were developed, is\nat once suggested to the thoughtful mind.\n\nAnd then, finally, the literature of a people equally reveals the\nimpress of surrounding cosmical conditions. \"The poems of Ossian are but\nthe echo of the wild, rough, cloudy highlands of his Scottish home.\" The\nforest songs of the wild Indian, the negro's plaintive melodies in the\nrice-fields of Carolina, the refrains in which the hunter of Kamtchatka\nrelates his adventures with the polar bear, and in which the South Sea\nIslander celebrates his feats and dangers on the deep, all betoken the\ninfluence which the scenes of daily life exert upon the thoughts and\nfeelings of our race. \"To what an extent nature can express herself in,\nand modify the culture of the individual, as well as of an entire\npeople, can be seen on Ionian soil in the verse of Homer, which, called\nforth under the most favorable sky, and on the most luxuriant shore of\nthe Grecian archipelago, not only charms us to-day, but bearing this\nimpress, has determined what shall be the classic form throughout all\ncoming time.\"[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: See Ritter, pp. 288, 289. Poetic art has unquestionably\nits _geographical_ distributions like the fauna and flora of the globe.\n\"If you love the images, not merely of a rich, but of a luxuriant fancy;\nif you are pleased with the most daring flights; if you would see a\npoetic creation full of wonders, then turn your eye to the poetry of the\n_orient_, where all forms appear in purple; where each flower glows like\nthe morning ray resting on the earth. But if, on the contrary, you\nprefer depth of thought, and earnestness of reflection; if you delight\nin the colossal, yet pale forms, which float about in mist, and whisper\nof the mysteries of the spirit-land, and of the vanity of all things,\nexcept honor, then I must point you to the hoary _north_.... Or if you\nsympathize with that deep feeling, that longing of the soul, which does\nnot linger on the earth, but evermore looks up to the azure tent of the\nstars, where happiness dwells, where the unquiet of the beating heart is\nstill, then you must resort to the romantic poetry of the\n_west_.\"--\"_Study of Greek Literature_,\" Bishop Esaias Tegn\u00e9r, p. 38.]\n\nIn seeking, therefore, to determine correctly what are the\ncharacteristics of a nation, we must endeavor to trace how far the\nphysical constitution of that people, their temperament, their habits,\ntheir sentiments, and their ideas have been formed, or modified, under\nthe surrounding geographical conditions, which, as we have seen, greatly\ndetermine a nation's individuality. Guided by these lights, let us\napproach the study of \"_the men of Athens_.\"\n\n_Attica_, of which Athens was the capital, and whose entire populations\nwere called \"Athenians,\" was the most important of all the Hellenic\nstates. It is a triangular peninsula, the base of which is defined by\nthe high mountain ranges of Cith\u00e6ron and Parnes, whilst the two other\nsides are washed by the sea, having their vertex at the promontory of\nSunium, or Cape Colonna. The prolongation of the south-western line\ntowards the north until it reaches the base at the foot of Mount\nCith\u00e6ron, served as the line of demarkation between the Athenian\nterritory and the State of Megara. Thus Attica may be generally\ndescribed as bounded on the north-east by the channel of the Negropont;\non the south-west by the gulf of \u00c6gina and part of Megara; and on the\nnorth-west by the territory which formed the ancient Boeotia, including\nwithin its limits an area of about 750 miles.[11]\n\nHills of inferior elevation connect the mountain ranges of Cith\u00e6ron and\nParnes with the mountainous surface of the south-east of the peninsula.\nThese hills, commencing with the promontory of Sunium itself, which\nforms the vertex of the triangle, rise gradually on the south-east to\nthe round summit of Hymettus, and onward to the higher peak of\nPentelicus, near Marathon, on the east. The rest of Attica is all a\nplain, one reach of which comes down to the sea on the south, at the\nvery base of Hymettus. Here, about five miles from the shore, an abrupt\nrock rises from the plain, about 200 feet high, bordered on the south by\nlower eminences. That rock is the Acropolis. Those lower eminences are\nthe Areopagus, the Pmyx, and the Museum. In the valley formed by these\nfour hills we have the Agora, and the varied undulations of these hills\ndetermine the features of the city of Athens.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: See art. \"Attica,\" _Encyc. Brit._]\n\n[Footnote 12: See Conybeare and Howson's \"Life and Epistles of St.\nPaul,\" vol. i. p. 346.]\n\nNearly all writers on the topography of Athens derive their materials\nfrom Pausanias, who visited the city in the early part of the second\ncentury, and whose \"Itinerary of Greece\" is still extant.[13] He entered\nthe city by the Peiraic gate, the same gate at which Paul entered some\nsixty years before. We shall place ourselves under his guidance, and, so\nfar as we are able, follow the same course, supplying some omissions, as\nwe go along, from other sources. On entering the city, the first\nbuilding which arrested the attention of Pausanias was the Pompeium, so\ncalled because it was the depository of the sacred vessels, and also of\nthe garments used in the annual procession in honor of Athena (Minerva),\nthe tutelary deity of Athens, from whom the city derived its name. Near\nthis edifice stood a temple of Demeter (Ceres), containing statues of\nthat goddess, of her daughter Persephone, and of Iacchus, all executed\nby Praxiteles; and beyond were several porticoes leading from the city\ngates to the outer Ceramicus, while the intervening space was occupied\nby various temples, the Gymnasium of Hermes, and the house of Polytion,\nthe most magnificent private residence in Athens.\n\n[Footnote 13: The account here given of the topography of Athens is\nderived mainly from the article on \"Athens\" in the _Encyc. Brit._]\n\nThere were two places in Athens known by the name of Ceramicus, one\nwithout the walls, forming part of the suburbs; and the other within the\nwalls, embracing a very important section of the city. The outer\nCeramicus was covered with the sepulchres of the Athenians who had been\nslain in battle, and buried at the public expense; it communicated with\nthe inner Ceramicus by the gate Dipylum. The Ceramicus within the city\nprobably included the Agora, the Stoa Basileios, and the Stoa Poecile,\nbesides various other temples and public buildings.\n\nHaving fairly passed the city gates, a long street is before us with a\ncolonnade or cloister on either hand; and at the end of this street, by\nturning to the left, we might go through the whole Ceramicus to the open\ncountry, and the groves of the Academy. But we turn to the right, and\nenter the Agora,--the market-place, as it is called in the English\ntranslation of the sacred narrative.\n\nWe are not, however, to conceive of the market-place at Athens as\nbearing any resemblance to the bare, undecorated spaces appropriated to\nbusiness in our modern towns; but rather as a magnificent public square,\nclosed in by grand historic buildings, of the highest style of\narchitecture; planted with palm-trees in graceful distribution, and\nadorned with statues of the great men of Athens and the deified heroes\nof her mythology, from the hands of the immortal masters of the plastic\nart. This \"market-place\" was the great centre of the public life of the\nAthenians,--the meeting-place of poets, orators, statesmen, warriors,\nand philosophers,--a grand resort for leisure, for conversation, for\nbusiness, and for news. Standing in the Agora, and looking towards the\nsouth, is the _Museum,_ so called because it was believed that _Mus\u00e6us_,\nthe father of poetry, was buried there. Towards the north-west is the\n_Pnyx,_ a sloping hill, partially levelled into an open area for\npolitical assemblies. To the north is seen the craggy eminence of the\n_Areopagus_, and on the north-east is the _Acropolis_ towering high\nabove the scene, \"the crown and glory of the whole.\"\n\nThe most important buildings of the Agora are the Porticoes or\ncloisters, the most remarkable of which are the Stoa Basileios, or\nPortico of the king; the Stoa Eleutherius, or Portico of the Jupiter of\nFreedom; and the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch. These Porticoes were\ncovered walks, the roof being supported by columns, at least on one\nside, and by solid masonry on the other. Such shaded walks are almost\nindispensable in the south of Europe, where the people live much in the\nopen air, and they afford a grateful protection from the heat of the\nsun, as well as a shelter from the rain. Seats were also provided where\nthe loungers might rest, and the philosophers and rhetoricians sit down\nfor intellectual conversation. The \"Stoic\" school of philosophy derived\nits name from the circumstance that its founder, Zeno, used to meet and\nconverse with his disciples under one of these porticoes,--the Stoa\nPoecile. These porticoes were not only built in the most magnificent\nstyle of architecture, but adorned with paintings and statuary by the\nbest masters. On the roof of the Stoa Basileios were statues of Theseus\nand the Day. In front of the Stoa Eleutherius was placed the divinity to\nwhom it was dedicated; and within were allegorical paintings,\ncelebrating the rise of \"the fierce democracy.\" The Stoa Poecile derived\nits name from the celebrated paintings which adorned its walls, and\nwhich were almost exclusively devoted to the representation of national\nsubjects, as the contest of Theseus with the Amazons, the more glorious\nstruggle at Marathon, and the other achievements of the Athenians; here\nalso were suspended the shields of the Scion\u00e6ans of Thrace, together\nwith those of the Lacedemonians, taken at the island of Sphacteria.\n\nIt is beyond our purpose to describe all the public edifices,--the\ntemples, gymnasia, and theatres which crowd the Ceramic area, and that\nportion of the city lying to the west and south of the Acropolis. Our\nobject is, if possible, to convey to the reader some conception of the\nancient splendor and magnificence of Athens; to revive the scenes amidst\nwhich the Athenians daily moved, and which may be presumed to have\nexerted a powerful influence upon the manners, the taste, the habits of\nthought, and the entire character of the Athenian people. To secure this\nobject we need only direct attention to the Acropolis, which was crowded\nwith the monuments of Athenian glory, and exhibited an amazing\nconcentration of all that was most perfect in art, unsurpassed in\nexcellence, and unrivalled in richness and splendor. It was \"the\npeerless gem of Greece, the glory and pride of art, the wonder and envy\nof the world.\"\n\nThe western side of the Acropolis, which furnished the only access to\nthe summit of the hill, was about 168 feet in breadth; an opening so\nnarrow that, to the artists of Pericles, it appeared practicable to fill\nup the space with a single building, which, in serving the purpose of a\ngateway to the Acropolis, should also contribute to adorn, as well as\nfortify the citadel. This work, the greatest achievement of civil\narchitecture in Athens, which rivalled the Parthenon in felicity of\nexecution, and surpassed it in boldness and originality of design,\nconsisted of a grand central colonnade closed by projecting wings. This\nincomparable edifice, built of Pentelic marble, received the name of\nPropyl\u00e6a from its forming the vestibule to the five-fold gates by which\nthe citadel was entered. In front of the right wing there stood a small\nIonic temple of pure white marble, dedicated to Nik\u00e9 Apteros (Wingless\nVictory).\n\nA gigantic flight of steps conducted from the five-fold gates to the\nplatform of the Acropolis, which was, in fact, one vast composition of\narchitecture and sculpture dedicated to the national glory. Here stood\nthe Parthenon, or temple of the Virgin Goddess, the glorious temple\nwhich rose in the proudest period of Athenian history to the honor of\nMinerva, and which ages have only partially effaced. This magnificent\ntemple, \"by its united excellences of materials, design, and decoration,\ninternal as well as external, has been universally considered the most\nperfect which human genius ever planned and executed. Its dimensions\nwere sufficiently large to produce an impression of grandeur and\nsublimity, which was not disturbed by any obtrusive subdivision of\nparts; and, whether viewed at a small or greater distance, there was\nnothing to divert the mind of the spectator from contemplating the unity\nas well as majesty of mass and outline; circumstances which form the\nfirst and most remarkable characteristic of every Greek temple erected\nduring the purer ages of Grecian taste and genius.\"[14]\n\n[Footnote 14: Leake's \"Topography of Athens,\" p. 209 et seq.]\n\nIt would be impossible to convey any just and adequate conception of the\nartistic decorations of this wonderful edifice. The two pediments of the\ntemple were decorated with magnificent compositions of statuary, each\nconsisting of about twenty entire figures of colossal size; the one on\nthe western pediment representing the birth of Minerva, and the other,\non the eastern pediment, the contest between that goddess and Neptune\nfor the possession of Attica. Under the outer cornice were ninety-two\ngroups, raised in high relief from tablets about four feet square,\nrepresenting the victories achieved by her companions. Round the inner\nfrieze was presented the procession of the Parthenon on the grand\nquinquennial festival of the Panathen\u00e6a. The procession is represented\nas advancing in two parallel columns from west to east; one proceeding\nalong the northern, the other along the southern side of the temple;\npart facing inward after turning the angle of the eastern front, and\npart meeting towards the centre of that front.\n\nThe statue of the virgin goddess, the work of Phidias, stood in the\neastern chamber of the cella, and was composed of ivory and gold. It had\nbut one rival in the world, the Jupiter Olympus of the same famous\nartist. On the summit or apex of the helmet was placed a sphinx, with\ngriffins on either side. The figure of the goddess was represented in an\nerect martial attitude, and clothed in a robe reaching to the feet. On\nthe breast was a head of Medusa, wrought in ivory, and a figure of\nVictory about four cubits high. The goddess held a spear in her hand,\nand an \u00e6gis lay at her feet, while on her right, and near the spear, was\na figure of a serpent, believed to represent that of Erichthonius.\n\nAccording to Pliny, the entire height of the statue was twenty-six\ncubits (about forty feet), and the artist, Phidias, had ingeniously\ncontrived that the gold with which the statue was encrusted might be\nremoved at pleasure. The battle of the Centaurs and Lapith\u00e6 was carved\nupon the sandals; the battle of the Amazons was represented on the \u00e6gis\nwhich lay at her feet, and on the pedestal was sculptured the birth of\nPandora.\n\nThe temple of Erechtheus, the most ancient structure in Athens, stood on\nthe northern side of the Acropolis. The statue of Zeus Polieus stood\nbetween the Propyl\u00e6a and the Parthenon. The brazen colossus of Minerva,\ncast from the spoils of Marathon, appears to have occupied the space\nbetween the Erechtheium and the Propyl\u00e6a, near the Pelasgic or northern\nwall. This statue of the tutelary divinity of Athens and Attica rose in\ngigantic proportions above all the buildings of the Acropolis, the\nflashing of whose helmet plumes met the sailor's eye as he approached\nfrom the Sunian promontory. And the remaining space of the wide area was\nliterally crowded with statuary, amongst which were Theseus contending\nwith the Minotaur; Hercules strangling the serpents; the Earth imploring\nshowers from Jupiter; and Minerva causing the olive to sprout, while\nNeptune raises the waves. After these works of art, it is needless to\nspeak of others. It may be sufficient to state that Pausanias mentions\nby name towards three hundred remarkable statues which adorned this part\nof the city even after it had been robbed and despoiled by its several\nconquerors.\n\nThe Areopagus, or hill of Ares (Mars), so called, it is said, in\nconsequence of that god having been the first person tried there for the\ncrime of murder, was, beyond all doubt, the rocky height which is\nseparated from the western end of the Acropolis by a hollow, forming a\ncommunication between the northern and southern divisions of the city.\nThe court of the Areopagus was simply an open space on the highest\nsummit of the hill, the judges sitting in the open air, on rude seats of\nstone, hewn out of the solid rock. Near to the spot on which the court\nwas held was the sanctuary of the Furies, the avenging deities of\nGrecian mythology, whose presence gave additional solemnity to the\nscene. The place and the court were regarded by the people with\nsuperstitious reverence.\n\nThis completes, our survey of the principal buildings, monuments, and\nlocalities within the city of Athens. We do not imagine we have\nsucceeded in conveying any adequate idea of the ancient splendor and\nglory of this city, which was not only the capital of Attica, but also\n\n     \"The eye of Greece, mother of art and eloquence.\"\n\nWe trust, however, that we have contributed somewhat towards awakening\nin the reader's mind a deeper interest in these classic scenes, and\nenabling him to appreciate, more vividly, the allusions we may hereafter\nmake to them.\n\nThe mere dry recital of geographical details, and topographical notices\nis, however, of little interest in itself, and by itself. A tract of\ncountry derives its chief interest from its historic _associations_--its\nimmediate relations to man. The events which have transpired therein,\nthe noble or ignoble deeds, the grand achievements, or the great\ndisasters of which it has been the theatre, these constitute the living\nheart of its geography. Palestine has been rendered forever memorable,\nnot by any remarkable peculiarities in its climate or scenery, but by\nthe fact that it was the home of God's ancient people--the Hebrews and\nstill more, because the ardent imagination of the modern traveller still\nsees upon its mountains and plains the lingering footprints of the Son\nof God. And so Attica will always be regarded as a classic land, because\nit was the theatre of the most illustrious period of ancient\nhistory--_the period of youthful vigor in the life of humanity, when\nviewed as a grand organic whole_.\n\nHere on a narrow spot of less superficies than the little State of Rhode\nIsland there flourished a republic which, in the grandeur of her\nmilitary and naval achievements, at Marathon, Thermopyl\u00e6, Plat\u00e6a, and\nSalamis, in the sublime creations of her painters, sculptors, and\narchitects, and the unrivalled productions of her poets, orators, and\nphilosophers, has left a lingering glory on the historic page, which\ntwenty centuries have not been able to eclipse or dim. The names of\nSolon and Pericles; of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; of Isocrates and\nDemosthenes; of Myron, Phidias, and Praxiteles; of Herodotus, Xenophon,\nand Thucydides; of Sophocles and Euripides, have shed an undying lustre\non Athens and Attica.\n\nHow much of this universal renown, this imperishable glory attained by\nthe Athenian people, is to be ascribed to their geographical position\nand surroundings, and to the elastic, bracing air, the enchanting\nscenery, the glorious skies, which poured their daily inspiration on the\nAthenian mind, is a problem we may scarcely hope to solve.\n\nOf this, at least, we may be sure, that all these geographical and\ncosmical conditions were ordained by God, and ordained, also, for some\nnoble and worthy end. That God, \"the Father of all the families of the\nearth,\" cared for the Athenian people as much as for Jewish and\nChristian nations, we can not doubt. That they were the subjects of a\nProvidence, and that, in God's great plan of human history, they had an\nimportant part to fulfill, we must believe. That God \"determined the\ntime of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical bounds of\nits habitation,\" is affirmed by Paul. And that the _specific_ end for\nwhich the nation had its existence was fulfilled, we have the fullest\nconfidence. _So far, therefore, as we can trace the relation that\nsubsists between the geographical position and surroundings of that\nnation, and its national characteristics and actual history, so far are\nwe able to solve the problem of its destiny; and by so much do we\nenlarge our comprehension of the plan of God in the history of our\nrace_.\n\nThe geographical position of Greece was favorable to the freest\ncommercial and maritime intercourse with the great historic\nnations--those nations most advanced in science, literature, and art.\nBounded on the west by the Adriatic and Ionian seas, by the\nMediterranean on the south, and on the east by the \u00c6gean Sea, her\npopulations enjoyed a free intercommunication with the Egyptians,\nHebrews, Persians, Phoenicians, Romans, and Carthaginians. This\npeculiarity in the geographical position of the Grecian peninsula could\nnot fail to awaken in its people a taste for navigation, and lead them\nto active commercial intercourse with foreign nations.[15] The boundless\noceans on the south and east, the almost impassable mountains on the\nwest and north of Asia, presented insurmountable obstacles to commercial\nintercourse. But the extended border-lands and narrow inland seas of\nSouthern Europe allured man, in presence of their opposite shores, to\nthe perpetual exchange of his productions. An arm of the sea is not a\nbarrier, but rather a tie between the nations. Appearing to separate, it\nin reality draws them together without confounding them.[16] On such a\ntheatre we may expect that commerce will be developed on an extensive\nscale.[17] And, along with commerce, there will be increased activity in\nall departments of productive industry, and an enlarged diffusion of\nknowledge. \"Commerce,\" says Ritter, \"is the great mover and combiner of\nthe world's activities.\" And it also furnishes the channels through\nwhich flow the world's ideas. Commerce, both in a material and moral\npoint of view, is the life of nations. Along with the ivory and ebony,\nthe fabrics and purple dyes, the wines and spices of the Syrian\nmerchant, there flowed into Greece the science of numbers and of\nnavigation, and the art of alphabetical writing from Phoenicia. Along\nwith the fine wheat, and embroidered linen, and riches of the farther\nIndias which came from Egypt, there came, also, into Greece some\nknowledge of the sciences of astronomy and geometry, of architecture and\nmechanics, of medicine and chemistry; together with the mystic wisdom of\nthe distant Orient. The scattered rays of light which gleamed in the\neastern skies were thus converged in Greece, as on a focal point, to be\nrendered more brilliant by contact with the powerful Grecian intellect,\nand then diffused throughout the western world. Thus intercourse with\nsurrounding nations, by commerce and travel, contact therewith by\nimmigrations and colonizations, even collisions and invasions also,\nbecame, in the hands of a presiding Providence, the means of diffusing\nknowledge, of quickening and enlarging the active powers of man, and\nthus, ultimately, of a higher civilization.\n\n[Footnote 15: Humboldt's \"Cosmos,\" vol. ii. p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Cousin, vol. i. pp. 169, 170.]\n\n[Footnote 17: The advantageous situation of Britain for commerce, and\nthe nature of the climate have powerfully contributed to the perfection\nof industry among her population. Had she occupied a central, internal\nstation, like that of Switzerland, the facilities of her people for\ndealing with others being so much the less, their progress would have\nbeen comparatively slow, and, instead of being highly improved, their\nmanufactures would have been still in infancy. But being surrounded on\nall sides by the sea, that \"great highway of nations,\" they have been\nable to maintain an intercourse with the most remote as well as the\nnearest countries, to supply them on the easiest terms with their\nmanufactures, and to profit by the peculiar products and capacities of\nproduction possessed by other nations. To the geographical position and\nclimate of Great Britain, her people are mainly indebted for their\nposition as the first commercial nation on earth.--See art.\n\"Manufactrues,\" p. 277, _Encyc. Brit_.]\n\nThen further, the peculiar configuration of Greece, the wonderful\ncomplexity of its coast-line, its peninsular forms, the number of its\nislands, and the singular distribution of its mountains, all seem to\nmark it as the theatre of activity, of movement, of individuality, and\nof freedom. An extensive continent, unbroken by lakes and inland seas,\nas Asia, where vast deserts and high mountain chains separate the\npopulations, is the seat of immobility.[18] Commerce is limited to the\nbare necessities of life, and there are no inducements to movement, to\ntravel, and to enterprise. There are no conditions prompting man to\nattempt the conquest of nature. Society is therefore stationary as in\nChina and India. Enfolded and imprisoned within the overpowering\nvastness and illimitable sweep of nature, man is almost unconscious of\nhis freedom and his personality. He surrenders himself to the disposal\nof a mysterious \"_fate_\" and yields readily to the despotic sway of\nsuperhuman powers. The State is consequently the reign of a single\ndespotic will. The laws of the Medes and Persians are unalterable. But\nin Greece we have extended border-lands on the coast of navigable seas;\npeninsulas elaborately articulated, and easy of access. We have\nmountains sufficiently elevated to shade the land and diversify the\nscenery, and yet of such a form as not to impede communication. They are\nusually placed neither in parallel chains nor in massive groups, but are\nso disposed as to inclose extensive tracts of land admirably adapted to\nbecome the seats of small and independent communities, separated by\nnatural boundaries, sometimes impossible to overleap. The face of the\ninterior country,--its forms of relief, seemed as though Providence\ndesigned, from the beginning, to keep its populations socially and\npolitically disunited. These difficulties of internal transit by land\nwere, however, counteracted by the large proportion of coast, and the\naccessibility of the country by sea. The promontories and indentations\nin the line of the Grecian coast are hardly less remarkable than the\npeculiar elevations and depressions of the surface. \"The shape of\nPeloponnesus, with its three southern gulfs, the Argolic, Laconian, and\nMessenian, was compared by the ancient geographers to the leaf of a\nplane-tree: the Pagas\u00e6an gulf on the eastern side of Greece, and the\nAmbrakian gulf on the western, with their narrow entrances and\nconsiderable area, are equivalent to internal lakes: Xenophon boasts of\nthe double sea which embraces so large a portion of Attica; Ephorus, of\nthe triple sea by which Boeotia was accessible from west, north, and\nsouth--the Euboean strait, opening a long line of country on both sides\nto coasting navigation. But the most important of all Grecian gulfs are\nthe Corinthian and Saronic, washing the northern and north-eastern\nshores of Peloponnesus, and separated by the narrow barrier of the\nIsthmus of Corinth. The former, especially, lays open \u00c6tolia, Phokis,\nand Boeotia, as the whole northern coast of Peloponnesus, to water\napproach.... It will thus appear that there was no part of Greece proper\nwhich could be considered as out of the reach of the sea, whilst most\nparts of it were easy of access. The sea was thus the sole channel for\ntransmitting improvements and ideas as well as for maintaining\nsympathies\" between the Hellenic tribes.[19] The sea is not only the\ngrand highway of commercial intercourse, but the empire of movement, of\nprogress, and of freedom. Here man is set free from the bondage imposed\nby the overpowering magnitude and vastness of continental and oceanic\nforms. The boisterous and, apparently, lawless winds are made to obey\nhis will. He mounts the sea as on a fiery steed and \"lays his hand upon\nher mane.\" And whilst thus he succeeds, in any measure, to triumph over\nnature, he wakes to conscious power and freedom. It is in this region of\ncontact and commingling of sea and land where man attains the highest\nsuperiority. Refreshing our historic recollections, and casting our eyes\nupon the map of the world, we can not fail to see that all the most\nhighly civilized nations have lived, or still live, on the margin of the\nsea.\n\n[Footnote 18: Cousin, vol. i. pp. 151, 170.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Grote's \"Hist, of Greece,\" vol. ii. pp. 221, 225.]\n\nThe peculiar configuration of the territory of Greece, its forms of\nrelief, \"so like, in many respects, to Switzerland,\" could not fail to\nexert a powerful influence on the character and destiny of its people.\nIts inclosing mountains materially increased their defensive power, and,\nat the same time, inspired them with the love of liberty. Those\nmountains, as we have seen, so unique in their distribution, were\nnatural barriers against the invasion of foreign nations, and they\nrendered each separate community secure against the encroachments of the\nrest. The pass of Thermopyl\u00e6, between Thessaly and Phocis, that of\nCith\u00e6ron, between Boeotia and Attica; and the mountain ranges of Oneion\nand Geraneia, along the Isthmus of Corinth, were positions which could\nbe defended against any force of invaders. This signal peculiarity in\nthe forms of relief protected each section of the Greeks from being\nconquered, and at the same time maintained their separate autonomy. The\nseparate states of Greece lived, as it were, in the presence of each\nother, and at the same time resisted all influences and all efforts\ntowards a coalescence with each other, until the time of Alexander.\nTheir country, a word of indefinite meaning to the Asiatic, conveyed to\nthem as definite an idea as that of their own homes. Its whole\nlandscape, with all its historic associations, its glorious monuments of\nheroic deeds, were perpetually present to their eyes. Thus their\npatriotism, concentrated within a narrow sphere, and kept alive by the\nsense of their individual importance, their democratic spirit, and their\nstruggles with surrounding communities to maintain their independence,\nbecame a strong and ruling passion. Their geographical surroundings had,\ntherefore, a powerful influence upon their political institutions.\nConquest, which forces nations of different habits, characters, and\nlanguages into unity, is at last the parent of degrading servitude.\nThese nations are only held together, as in the Roman empire, by the\niron hand of military power. The despot, surrounded by a foreign\nsoldiery, appears in the conquered provinces, simply to enforce tribute,\nand compel obedience to his arbitrary will. But the small Greek\ncommunities, protected by the barriers of their seas and gulfs and\nmountains, escaped, for centuries, this evil destiny. The people, united\nby identity of language and manners and religion, by common interest and\nfacile intercommunication, could readily combine to resist the invasions\nof foreign nations, as well as the encroachments of their own rulers.\nAnd they were able to easily model their own government according to\ntheir own necessities and circumstances and common interests, and to\nmake the end for which it existed the sole measure of the powers it was\npermitted to wield.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Encyc. Brit_, art. \"Greece.\"]\n\nThe soil of Attica was not the most favorable to agricultural pursuits.\nIn many places it was stony and uneven, and a considerable proportion\nwas bare rock, on which nothing could be grown. Not half the surface was\ncapable of cultivation. In this respect it may be fitly compared to some\nof the New England States. The light, dry soil produced excellent\nbarley, but not enough of wheat for their own consumption. Demosthenes\ninforms us that Athens brought every year, from Byzantium, four hundred\nthousand _medimni_ of wheat. The alluvial plains, under industrious\ncultivation, would furnish a frugal subsistence for a large population,\nand the mildness of the climate allowed all the more valuable products\nto ripen early, and go out of season last. Such conditions, of course,\nwould furnish motives for skill and industry, and demand of the people\nfrugal and temperate habits. The luxuriance of a tropical climate tends\nto improvidence and indolence. Where nature pours her fullness into the\nlap of ease, forethought and providence are little needed. There is none\nof that struggle for existence which awakens sagacity, and calls into\nexercise the active powers of man. But in a country where nature only\nyields her fruits as the reward of toil, and yet enough to the\nintelligent culture of the soil, there habits of patient industry must\nbe formed. The alternations of summer and winter excite to forethought\nand providence, and the comparative poverty of the soil will prompt to\nfrugality. Man naturally aspires to improve his condition by all the\nmeans within his power. He becomes a careful observer of nature, he\ntreasures up the results of observation, he compares one fact with\nanother and notes their relations, and he makes new experiments to test\nhis conclusions, and thus he awakes to the vigorous exercise of all his\npowers. These physical conditions must develop a hardy, vigorous,\nprudent, and temperate race; and such, unquestionably, were the Greeks.\n\"Theophrastus, and other authors, amply attest the observant and\nindustrious agriculture prevalent in Greece. The culture of the vine and\nolive appears to have been particularly elaborate and the many different\naccidents of soil, level, and exposure which were to be found, afforded\nto observant planters materials for study and comparison.\"[21] The\nGreeks were frugal in their habits and simple in their modes of life.\nThe barley loaf seems to have been more generally eaten than the wheaten\nloaf; this, with salt fish and vegetables, was the common food of the\npopulation. Economy in domestic life was universal. In their manners,\ntheir dress, their private dwellings, they were little disposed to\nostentation or display.\n\n[Footnote 21: Grote, \"Hist. of Greece,\" vol. ii. p. 230.]\n\nThe climate of Attica is what, in physical geography, would be called\n_maritime_. \"Here are allied the continental vigor and oceanic softness,\nin a fortunate union, mutually tempering each other.\"[22] The climate of\nthe whole peninsula of Greece seems to be distinguished from that of\nSpain and Italy, by having more of the character of an inland region.\nThe diversity of local temperature is greater; the extremes of summer\nand winter more severe. In Arcadia the snow has been found eighteen\ninches thick in January, with the thermometer at 16\u00b0 Fahrenheit, and it\nsometimes lies on the ground for six weeks. The summits of the central\nchains of Pindus and most of the Albanian mountains are covered with\nsnow from the beginning of November to the end of March. In Attica,\nwhich, being freely exposed to the sea, has in some measure an insular\nclimate, the winter sets in about the beginning of January. About the\nmiddle of that month the snow begins to fall, but seldom remains upon\nthe plain for more than a few days, though it lies on the summit of the\nmountain for a month.[23] And then, whilst Boeotia, which joins to\nAttica, is higher and colder, and often covered with dense fogs, Attica\nis remarkable for the wonderful transparency, dryness, and elasticity of\nits atmosphere. All these climatal conditions exerted, no doubt, a\nmodifying influence upon the character of the inhabitants.[24] In a\ntropical climate man is enfeebled by excessive heat. His natural\ntendency is to inaction and repose. His life is passed in a \"strenuous\nidleness.\" His intellectual, his reflective faculties are overmastered\nby his physical instincts. Passion, sentiment, imagination prevail over\nthe sober exercises of his reasoning powers. Poetry universally\npredominates over philosophy. The whole character of Oriental language,\nreligion, literature is intensely imaginative. In the frozen regions of\nthe frigid zone, where a perpetual winter reigns, and where lichens and\nmosses are the only forms of vegetable life, man is condemned to the\nlife of a huntsman, and depends mainly for his subsistence on the\nprecarious chances of the chase. He is consequently nomadic in his\nhabits, and barbarous withal. His whole life is spent in the bare\nprocess of procuring a living. He consumes a large amount of oleaginous\nfood, and breathes a damp heavy atmosphere, and is, consequently, of a\ndull phlegmatic temperament. Notwithstanding his uncertain supplies of\nfood, he is recklessly improvident, and indifferent to all the lessons\nof experience. Intellectual pursuits are all precluded. There is no\nmotive, no opportunity, and indeed no disposition for mental culture.\nBut in a temperate climate man is stimulated to high mental activity.\nThe alternations of heat and cold, of summer and of winter, an elastic,\nfresh, and bracing atmosphere, a diversity in the aspects of nature,\nthese develop a vivacity of temperament, a quickness of sensibility as\nwell as apprehension, and a versatility of feeling as well as genius.\nHistory marks out the temperate zone as the seat of the refined and\ncultivated nations.\n\n[Footnote 22: Guyot, \"Earth and Man,\" p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Encyc. Brit._, art. \"Greece.\"]\n\n[Footnote 24: The influence of climatic conditions did not escape the\nattention of the Greeks. Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Aristotle speak of\nthe climate of Asia as more enervating than that of Greece. They\nregarded the changeful character and diversity of local temperature in\nGreece as highly stimulating to the energies of the populations. The\nmarked contrast between the Athenians and the Boeotians was supposed to\nbe represented in the light and heavy atmosphere which they respectively\nbreathed.--_Grote_, vol. ii. pp. 232-3.]\n\nThe natural scenery of Greece was of unrivalled grandeur--surpassing\nItaly, perhaps every country in the world. It combined in the highest\ndegree every feature essential to the highest beauty of a landscape\nexcept, perhaps, large rivers. But this was more than compensated for by\nthe proximity of the sea, which, by its numerous arms, seemed to embrace\nthe land on nearly every side. Its mountains, encircled with zones of\nwood, and capped with snow, though much lower than the Alps, are as\nimposing by the suddenness of their elevation--\"pillars of heaven, the\nfosterers of enduring snows.\"[25] Rich sheltered plains lie at their\nfeet, covered with an unequally woven mantle of trees, and shrubs, and\nflowers,--\"the verdant gloom of the thickly-mantling ivy, the narcissus\nsteeped in heavenly dew, the golden-beaming crocus, the hardy and\never-fresh-sprouting olive-tree,\"[26] and the luxuriant palm, which\nnourishes amid its branches the grape swelling with juice. But it is the\ncombination of these features, in the most diversified manner, with\nbeautiful inland bays and seas, broken by headlands, inclosed by\nmountains, and studded with islands of every form and magnitude, which\ngives to the scenery of Greece its proud pre-eminence. \"Greek scenery,\"\nsays Humboldt, \"presents the peculiar charm of an intimate blending of\nsea and land, of shores adorned with vegetation, or picturesquely girt\nwith rocks gleaming in the light of aerial tints, and an ocean beautiful\nin the play of the ever-changing brightness of its deep-toned wave.\"[27]\nAnd over all the serene, deep azure skies, occasionally veiled by light\nfleecy clouds, with vapory purple mists resting on the distant mountain\ntops. This glorious scenery of Greece is evermore the admiration of the\nmodern traveller. \"In wandering about Athens on a sunny day in March,\nwhen the asphodels are blooming on Colones, when the immortal mountains\nare folded in a transparent haze, and the \u00c6gean slumbers afar among his\nisles,\" he is reminded of the lines of Byron penned amid these scenes--\n\n[Footnote 25: Pindar.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Sophocles, \"oedipus at Colonna.\"]\n\n[Footnote 27: \"Cosmos,\" vol. ii. p. 25.]\n\n     \"Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild;\n     Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields,\n     Thine olives ripe as when Minerva smiled,\n     And still his honeyed wealth Hymettus yields;\n     There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,\n     The freeborn wanderer of the mountain air;\n     Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds,\n     Still in his beams Mendeli's marbles glare;\n     Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but nature still is fair.\"[28]\n\n[Footnote 28: Canto ii., v. lxxxvi., \"Childe Harold.\"]\n\nThe effect of this scenery upon the character, the imagination, the\ntaste of the Athenians must have been immense. Under the influence of\nsuch sublime objects, the human mind becomes gifted as with inspiration,\nand is by nature filled with poetic images. \"Greece became the\nbirth-place of taste, of art, and eloquence, the chosen sanctuary of the\nmuses, the prototype of all that is graceful, and dignified, and grand\nin sentiment and action.\"\n\nAnd now, if we have succeeded in clearly presenting and properly\ngrouping the facts, and in estimating the influence of geographical\nposition and surroundings on national character, we have secured the\nnatural _criteria_ by which we examine, and even correct the portraiture\nof the Athenian character usually presented by the historian.\n\nThe character of the Athenians has been sketched by Plutarch[29] with\nconsiderable minuteness, and his representations have been permitted,\nuntil of late years, to pass unchallenged. He has described them as at\nonce passionate and placable, easily moved to anger, and as easily\nappeased; fond of pleasantry and repartee, and heartily enjoying a\nlaugh; pleased to hear themselves praised, and yet not annoyed by\ncriticism and censure; naturally generous towards those who were poor\nand in humble circumstances, and humane even towards their enemies;\njealous of their liberties, and keeping even their rulers in awe. In\nregard to their intellectual traits, he affirms their minds were not\nformed for laborious research, and though they seized a subject as it\nwere by intuition, yet wanted patience and perseverance for a thorough\nexamination of all its bearings. \"An observation,\" says the writer of\nthe article on \"_Attica_,\" in the Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, \"more\nsuperficial in itself, and arguing a greater ignorance of the Athenians,\ncan not easily be imagined.\" Plutarch lived more than three hundred\nyears after the palmy days of the Athenian Demos had passed away. He was\na Boeotian by birth, not an Attic, and more of a Roman than a Greek in\nall his sympathies. We are tempted to regard him as writing under the\ninfluence of prejudice, if not of envy. He was scarcely reliable as a\nbiographer, and as materials for history his \"Parallel Lives\" have been\npronounced \"not altogether trustworthy.\"[30]\n\n[Footnote 29: \"De Pr\u00e6cept.\"]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Encyc. of Biography_, art. \"Plutarch.\"]\n\nThat the Athenians were remarkable for the ardor and vivacity of their\ntemperament,--that they were liable to sudden gusts of passion,--that\nthey were inconstant in their affections, intolerant of dictation,\nimpatient of control, and hasty to resent every assumption of\nsuperiority,--that they were pleased with flattery, and too ready to\nlend a willing ear to the adulation of the demagogue,--and that they\nwere impetuous and brave, yet liable to be excessively elated by\nsuccess, and depressed by misfortune, we may readily believe, because\nsuch traits of character are in perfect harmony with all the facts and\nconclusions already presented. Such characteristics were the natural\nproduct of the warm and genial sunlight, the elastic bracing air, the\nethereal skies, the glorious mountain scenery, and the elaborate\nblending of sea and land, so peculiar to Greece and the whole of\nSouthern Europe.[31] These characteristics were shared in a greater or\nless degree by all the nations of Southern Europe in ancient times, and\nthey are still distinctive traits in the Frenchman, the Italian, and the\nmodern Greek.[32]\n\n[Footnote 31: \"As the skies of Hellas surpassed nearly all other\nclimates in brightness and elasticity, so, also, had nature dealt most\nlovingly with the inhabitants of this land. Throughout the whole being\nof the Greek there reigned supreme a quick susceptibility, out of which\nsprang a gladsome serenity of temper, and a keen enjoyment of life;\nacute sense, and nimbleness of apprehension; a guileless and child-like\nfeeling, full of trust and faith, combined with prudence and forecast.\nThese peculiarities lay so deeply imbedded in the inmost nature of the\nGreeks that no revolutions of time and circumstances have yet been able\nto destroy them; nay, it may be asserted that even now, after centuries\nof degradation, they have not been wholly extinguished in the\ninhabitants of ancient Hellas.\"--\"_Education of the Moral Sentiment\namongst the Ancient Greeks_.\" By FREDERICK JACOBS, p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 32: These are described by the modern historian and traveller\nas lively, versatile, and witty. \"The love of liberty and independence\ndoes not seem to be rooted out of the national character by centuries of\nsubjugation. They love to command; but though they are loyal to a good\ngovernment, they are apt readily to rise when their rights and liberties\nare infringed. As there is little love of obedience among them, so\nneither is there any toleration of aristocratic pretensions.\"--_Encyc.\nBrit._, art. \"Greece.\"]\n\nThe consciousness of power, the feeling of independence, the ardent love\nof freedom induced in the Athenian mind by the objective freedom of\nmovement which his geographical position afforded, and that\nsubordination and subserviency of physical nature to man so peculiar to\nGreece, determined the democratic character of all their political\ninstitutions. And these institutions reacted upon the character of the\npeople and intensified their love of liberty. This passionate love of\npersonal freedom, amounting almost to disease, excited them to a\nconstant and almost distressing vigilance. And it is not to be wondered\nat if it displayed itself in an extreme jealousy of their rulers, an\nincessant supervision and criticism of all their proceedings, and an\nintense and passionate hatred of tyrants and of tyranny. The popular\nlegislator or the successful soldier might dare to encroach upon their\nliberties in the moment when the nation was intoxicated and dazzled with\ntheir genius, their prowess, and success; but a sudden revulsion of\npopular feeling, and an explosion of popular indignation, would overturn\nthe one, and ostracism expel the other. Thus while inconstancy, and\nturbulence, and faction seem to have been inseparable from the\ndemocratic spirit, the Athenians were certainly constant in their love\nof liberty, faithful in their affection for their country,[33] and\ninvariable in their sympathy and admiration for that genius which shed\nglory upon their native land. And then they were ever ready to repair\nthe errors, and make amends for the injustice committed under the\ninfluence of passionate excitement, or the headlong impetuosity of their\ntoo ardent temperament. The history of Greece supplies numerous\nillustrations of this spirit. The sentence of death which had been\nhastily passed on the inhabitants of Mytilene was, on sober reflection,\nrevoked the following day. The immediate repentance and general sorrow\nwhich followed the condemnation of the ten generals, as also of\nSocrates, are notable instances.\n\n[Footnote 33: When immense bribes were offered by the king of Persia to\ninduce the Athenians to detach themselves from the alliance with the\nrest of the Hellenic States, she answered by the mouth of Aristides\n\"that it was impossible for all the gold in the world to tempt the\nRepublic of Athens, or prevail with it to sell its liberty and that of\nGreece!\"]\n\nIn their private life the Athenians were courteous, generous, and\nhumane. Whilst bold and free in the expression of their opinions, they\npaid the greatest attention to rules of politeness, and were nicely\ndelicate on points of decorum. They had a natural sense of what was\nbecoming and appropriate, and an innate aversion to all extravagance. A\ngraceful demeanor and a quiet dignity were distinguishing traits of\nAthenian character. They were temperate and frugal[34] in their habits,\nand little addicted to ostentation and display. Even after their\nvictories had brought them into contact with Oriental luxury and\nextravagance, and their wealth enabled them to rival, in costliness and\nsplendor, the nations they had conquered, they still maintained a\nrepublican simplicity. The private dwellings of the principal citizens\nwere small, and usually built of clay; their interior embellishments\nalso were insignificant--the house of Polytion alone formed an\nexception.[35] All their sumptuousness and magnificence were reserved\nfor and lavished on their public edifices and monuments of art, which\nmade Athens the pride of Greece and the wonder of the world.\nIntellectually, the Athenians were remarkable for their quickness of\napprehension, their nice and delicate perception, their intuitional\npower, and their versatile genius. Nor were they at all incapable of\npursuing laborious researches, or wanting in persevering application and\nindustry, notwithstanding Plutarch's assertion to the contrary. The\ncircumstances of every-day life in Attica, the conditions which\nsurrounded the Athenian from childhood to age, were such as to call for\nthe exercise of these qualities of mind in the highest degree. Habits of\npatient industry were induced in the Athenian character by the poverty\nand comparative barrenness of the soil, demanding greater exertion to\nsupply their natural wants. And an annual period of dormancy, though\nunaccompanied by the rigors of a northern winter, called for prudence in\nhusbanding, and forethought and skill in endeavoring to increase their\nnatural resources. The aspects of nature were less massive and\nawe-inspiring, her features more subdued, and her areas more\ncircumscribed and broken, inviting and emboldening man to attempt her\nconquest. The whole tendency of natural phenomena in Greece was to\nrestrain the imagination, and discipline the observing and reasoning\nfaculties in man. Thus was man inspired with confidence in his own\nresources, and allured to cherish an inquisitive, analytic, and\nscientific spirit. \"The French, in point of national character, hold\nnearly the same relative place amongst the nations of Europe that the\nAthenians held amongst the States of Ancient Greece.\" And whilst it is\nadmitted the French are quick, sprightly, vivacious, perhaps sometimes\nlight even to frivolity, it must be conceded they have cultivated the\nnatural and exact sciences with a patience, and perseverance, and\nsuccess unsurpassed by any of the nations of Europe. And so the\nAthenians were the Frenchmen of Greece. Whilst they spent their \"leisure\ntime\"[36] in the place of public resort, the porticoes and groves,\n\"hearing and telling the latest news\" (no undignified or improper mode\nof recreation in a city where newspapers were unknown), whilst they are\ncondemned as \"garrulous,\" \"frivolous,\" \"full of curiosity,\" and\n\"restlessly fond of novelties,\" we must insist that a love of study, of\npatient thought and profound research, was congenial to their natural\ntemperament, and that an inquisitive and analytic spirit, as well as a\ntaste for subtile and abstract speculation, were inherent in the\nnational character. The affluence, and fullness, and flexibility, and\nsculpture-like finish of the language of the Attics, which leaves far\nbehind not only the languages of antiquity, but also the most cultivated\nof modern times, is an enduring monument of the patient industry of the\nAthenians.[37] Language is unquestionably the highest creation of\nreason, and in the language of a nation we can see reflected as in a\nmirror the amount of culture to which it has attained. The rare balance\nof the imagination and the reasoning powers, in which the perfection of\nthe human intellect is regarded as consisting, the exact correspondence\nbetween the thought and the expression, \"the free music of prosaic\nnumbers in the most diversified forms of style,\" the calmness, and\nperspicuity, and order, even in the stormiest moments of inspiration,\nrevealed in every department of Greek literature, were not a mere happy\nstroke of chance, but a product of unwearied effort--and effort too\nwhich was directed by the criteria which reason supplied. The plastic\nart of Greece, which after the lapse of ages still stands forth in\nunrivalled beauty, so that, in presence of the eternal models it\ncreated, the modern artist feels the painful lack of progress was not a\nspontaneous outburst of genius, but the result of intense application\nand unwearied discipline. The achievements of the philosophic spirit,\nthe ethical and political systems of the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa,\nand the Garden, the anticipations, scattered here and there like\nprophetic hints, of some of the profoundest discoveries of \"inductive\nscience\" in more modern days,--all these are an enduring protest against\nthe strange misrepresentations of Plutarch.\n\n[Footnote 34: These are still characteristics of the Greeks. \"They are\nan exceedingly temperate people; drunkenness is a vice remarkably rare\namongst them; their food also is spare and simple; even the richest are\ncontent with a dish of vegetables for each meal, and the poor with a\nhandful of olives or a piece of salt fish.... All other pleasures are\nindulged with similar propriety; their passions are moderate, and\ninsanity is almost unknown amongst them.\"--_Encyc. Brit._, art.\n\"Greece.\"]\n\n[Footnote 35: Niebuhr's Lectures, vol. i. p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Eukaire\u00f4 corresponds exactly to the Latin _vacare_, \"to be\nat leisure.\"]\n\n[Footnote 37: Frederick Jacobs, on \"Study of Classic Antiquity,\" p. 57.]\n\nIn Athens there existed a providential collocation of the most favorable\nconditions in which humanity can be placed for securing its highest\nnatural development. Athenian civilization is the solution, on the\ntheatre of history, of the problem--What degree of perfection can\nhumanity, under the most favorable conditions, attain, without the\nsupernatural light, and guidance, and grace of Christianity?[38] \"Like\ntheir own goddess Athene the people of Athens seem to spring full-armed\ninto the arena of history, and we look in vain to Egypt, Syria, and\nIndia, for more than a few seeds that burst into such marvellous growth\non the soil of Attica.\"[39]\n\n[Footnote 38: It has been asserted by some theological writers, Watson\nfor example, that no society of civilized men has been, or can be\nconstituted without the aid of a religion directly communicated by\nrevelation, and transmitted by oral tradition;--\"that it is possible to\nraise a body of men into that degree of civil improvement which would\nexcite the passion for philosophic investigation, without the aid of\nreligion... can have no proof, and is contradicted by every fact and\nanalogy with which we are acquainted.\" (_Institutes_, vol. i. p. 271;\nsee also Archbishop Whately, \"Dissertation,\" etc., vol. i. _Encyc.\nBrit._, p. 449-455).\n\nThe fallacy of the reasoning by which this doctrine is sought to be\nsustained is found in the assumption \"that to all our race the existence\nof a First Cause is a question of philosophy,\" and that the idea of God\nlies at the end of \"a gradual process of inquiry\" and induction, for\nwhich a high degree of \"scientific culture\" is needed. Whereas the idea\nof a First Cause lies at the beginning, not at the end of philosophy;\nand philosophy is simply the analysis of our natural consciousness of\nGod, and the presentation of the idea in a logical form. Faith in the\nexistence of God is not the result of a conscious process of reflection;\nit is the spontaneous and instinctive logic of the human mind, which, in\nview of phenomena presented to sense, by a necessary law of thought\nimmediately and intuitively affirms a personal Power, an intelligent\nMind as the author. In this regard, there is no difference between men\nexcept the clearness with which they apprehend, and the logical account\nthey can render to themselves, of this instinctive belief. Spontaneous\nintuition, says Cousin, is the genius of all men; reflection the genius\nof few men. \"But Leibnitz had no more confidence in the principle of\ncausality, and even in his favorite principle of sufficient reason, than\nthe most ignorant of men;\" the latter have this principle within them,\nas a law of thought, controlling their conception of the universe, and\ndoing this almost unconsciously; the former, by an analysis of thought,\nsucceeded in defining and formulating the ideas and laws which\nnecessitate the cognition of a God. The function of philosophy is simply\nto transform al\u00eath\u00eas doxa into itist\u00eam\u00ea--right opinion into science,--to\nelucidate and logically present the immanent thought which lies in the\nuniversal consciousness of man.\n\nThat the possession of the idea of God is essential to the social and\nmoral elevation of man,--that is, to the civilization of our race, is\nmost cheerfully conceded. That humanity has an end and destination which\ncan only be secured by the true knowledge of God, and by a participation\nof the nature of God, is equally the doctrine of Plato and of Christ.\nNow, if humanity has a special end and destination, it must have some\ninstinctive tendings, some spermatic ideas, some original forces or\nlaws, which determine it towards that end. All development supposes some\noriginal elements to be unfolded or developed. Civilization is but the\ndevelopment of humanity according to its primal idea and law, and under\nthe best exterior conditions. That the original elements of humanity\nwere unfolded in some noble degree under the influence of philosophy is\nclear from the history of Greece; there the most favorable natural\nconditions for that development existed, and Christianity alone was\nneeded to crown the result with ideal perfection.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Max Muller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 404, 2d series.]\n\nHere the most perfect ideals of beauty and excellence in physical\ndevelopment, in manners, in plastic art, in literary creations, were\nrealized. The songs of Homer, the dialogues of Plato, the speeches of\nDemosthenes, and the statues of Phidias, if not unrivalled, are at least\nunsurpassed by any thing that has been achieved by their successors.\nLiterature in its most flourishing periods has rekindled its torch at\nher altars, and art has looked back to the age of Pericles for her\npurest models. Here the ideas of personal liberty, of individual rights,\nof freedom in thought and action, had a wonderful expansion. Here the\nlasting foundations of the principal arts and sciences were laid, and in\nsome of them triumphs were achieved which have not been eclipsed. Here\nthe sun of human reason attained a meridian splendor, and illuminated\nevery field in the domain of moral truth. And here humanity reached the\nhighest degree of civilization of which it is capable under purely\n_natural_ conditions.\n\nAnd now, the question with which we are more immediately concerned is,\nwhat were the specific and valuable results attained by the Athenian\nmind in _religion_ and _philosophy_, the two momenta of the human mind?\nThis will be the subject of discussion in subsequent chapters.\n\nThe order in which the discussion shall proceed is determined for us by\nthe natural development of thought. The two fundamental momenta of\nthought and its development are spontaneity and reflection, and the two\nessential forms they assume are religion and philosophy. In the natural\norder of thought spontaneity is first, and reflection succeeds\nspontaneous thought. And so religion is first developed, and\nsubsequently comes philosophy. As religion supposes spontaneous\nintuition, so philosophy has religion for its basis, but upon this basis\nit is developed in an original manner. \"Turn your attention to history,\nthat living image of thought: everywhere you perceive religions and\nphilosophies: everywhere you see them produced in an invariable order.\nEverywhere religion appears with new societies, and everywhere, just so\nfar as societies advance, from religion springs philosophy.\"[40] This\nwas pre-eminently the case in Athens, and we shall therefore direct our\nattention first to the Religion of the Athenians.\n\n[Footnote 40: Cousin, \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 302.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.\n\n\n      All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness\n      in religion deisidaimonesterois.--ST. PAUL.\n\nAs a prelude and preparation for the study of the religion of the\nAthenians, it may be well to consider religion in its more abstract and\nuniversal form; and inquire in what does religion essentially consist;\nhow far is it grounded in the nature of man; and especially, what is\nthere in the mental constitution of man, or in his exterior conditions,\nwhich determines him to a mode of life which may be denominated\n_religious?_ As a preliminary inquiry, this may materially aid us in\nunderstanding the nature, and estimating the value of the religious\nconceptions and sentiments which were developed by the Greek mind.\n\nReligion, in its most generic conception, may be defined as a form of\nthought, feeling, and action, which has the _Divine_ for its object,\nbasis, and end. Or, in other words, it is a mode of life determined by\nthe recognition of some relation to, and consciousness of dependence\nupon, a _Supreme Being_. This general conception of religion underlies\nall the specific forms of religion which have appeared in the world,\nwhether heathen, Jewish, Mohammedan, or Christian.\n\nThat a religious destination appertains to man as man, whether he has\nbeen raised to a full religious consciousness, or is simply considered\nas capable of being so raised, can not be denied. In all ages man has\nrevealed an instinctive tendency, or natural aptitude for religion, and\nhe has developed feelings and emotions which have always characterized\nhim as a religious being. Religious ideas and sentiments have prevailed\namong all nations, and have exerted a powerful influence on the entire\ncourse of human history. Religious worship, addressed to a Supreme Being\nbelieved to control the destiny of man, has been coeval and coextensive\nwith the race. Every nation has had its mythology, and each mythologic\nsystem has been simply an effort of humanity to realize and embody in\nsome visible form the relations in which it feels itself to be connected\nwith an external, overshadowing, and all-controlling Power and Presence.\nThe voice of all ancient, and all contemporaneous history, clearly\nattests that the _religious principle_ is deeply seated in the nature of\nman; and that it has occupied the thought, and stirred the feelings of\nevery rational man, in every age. It has interwoven itself with the\nentire framework of human society, and ramified into all the relations\nof human life. By its agency, nations have been revolutionized, and\nempires have been overthrown; and it has formed a mighty element in all\nthe changes which have marked the history of man.\n\nThis universality of religious sentiment and religious worship must be\nconceded as a fact of human nature, and, as a universal fact, it demands\nan explanation. Every event must have a cause. Every phenomenon must\nhave its ground, and reason, and law. The facts of religious history,\nthe past and present religious phenomena of the world can be no\nexception to this fundamental principle; they press their imperious\ndemand to be studied and explained, as much as the phenomena of the\nmaterial or the events of the moral world. The phenomena of religion,\nbeing universally revealed wherever man is found, must be grounded in\nsome universal principle, on some original law, which is connate with,\nand natural to man. At any rate, there must be something in the nature\nof man, or in the exterior conditions of humanity, which invariably\nleads man to worship, and which determines him, as by the force of an\noriginal instinct, or an outward, conditioning necessity, to recognize\nand bow down before a Superior Power. The full recognition and adequate\nexplanation of the facts of religious history will constitute a\n_philosophy of religion_.\n\nThe hypotheses which have been offered in explanation of the religious\nphenomena of the world are widely divergent, and most of them are, in\nour judgment, eminently inadequate and unsatisfactory. The following\nenumeration may be regarded as embracing all that are deemed worthy of\nconsideration.\n\nI. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in SUPERSTITION, that is,\nin a _fear_ of invisible and supernatural powers, generated by ignorance\nof nature.\n\nII. The phenomenon of religion is part of that PROCESS or EVOLUTION OF\nTHE ABSOLUTE (i.e., the Deity), which gradually unfolding itself in\nnature, mind, history, and _religion_, attains to perfect\nself-consciousness in philosophy.\n\nIII. The phenomenon of religion has its foundation in FEELING--_the\nfeeling of dependence and of obligation_; and that to which the mind, by\nspontaneous intuition or instinctive faith, traces this dependence and\nobligation we call God.\n\nIV. The phenomenon of religion had its outbirth in the spontaneous\napperceptions of REASON, that is, the necessary _\u00e0 priori ideas of the\nInfinite, the Perfect, the Unconditioned Cause, the Eternal Being_,\nwhich are evoked into consciousness in presence of the changeful and\ncontingent phenomena of the world.\n\nV. The phenomenon of religion had its origin in EXTERNAL REVELATION, to\nwhich _reason_ is related as a purely passive organ, and _heathenism_ as\na feeble relic.\n\nAs a philosophy of religion--an attempt to supply the rationale of the\nreligious phenomena of the world, the first hypothesis is a skeptical\nphilosophy, which necessarily leads to _Atheism_. The second is an\nidealistic philosophy (absolute idealism), which inevitably lands in\n_Pantheism_. The third is an intuitional or \"faith-philosophy,\" which\nfinally ends in _Mysticism_. The fourth is a rationalistic or\n\"spiritualistic\" philosophy, which yields pure _Theism_. The last is an\nempirical philosophy, which derives all religion from instruction, and\nculminates in _Dogmatic Theology_.\n\nIn view of these diverse and conflicting theories, the question which\nnow presents itself for our consideration is,--does any one of these\nhypotheses meet and satisfy the demands of the problem? does it fully\naccount for and adequately explain all the facts of religious history?\nThe answer to this question must not be hastily or dogmatically given.\nThe arbitrary rejection of any theory that may be offered, without a\nfair and candid examination, will leave our minds in uncertainty and\ndoubt as to the validity of our own position. A blind faith is only one\nremove from a pusillanimous skepticism. We can not render our own\nposition secure except by comprehending, assaulting, and capturing the\nposition of our foe. It is, therefore, due to ourselves and to the cause\nof truth, that we shall examine the evidence upon which each separate\ntheory is based, and the arguments which are marshalled in its support,\nbefore we pronounce it inadequate and unphilosophical. Such a criticism\nof opposite theories will prepare the way for the presentation of a\nphilosophy of religion which we flatter ourselves will be found most in\nharmony with all the facts of the case.\n\nI. _It is affirmed that the religious phenomena of the world had their\norigin in_ SUPERSTITION, _that is, in a fear of unseen and supernatural\npowers, generated from ignorance of nature_.\n\nThis explanation was first offered by Epicurus. He felt that the\nuniversality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a cause;\nand he found it, or presumed he found it not in a spiritual God, which\nhe claims can not exist, nor in corporeal god which no one has seen, but\nin \"phantoms of the mind generated by fear.\" When man has been unable to\nexplain any natural phenomenon, to assign a cause within the sphere of\nnature, he has had recourse to supernatural powers, or living\npersonalities behind nature, which move and control nature in an\narbitrary and capricious manner. These imaginary powers are supposed to\nbe continually interfering in the affairs of individuals and nations.\nThey bestow blessings or inflict calamities. They reward virtue and\npunish vice. They are, therefore, the objects of \"sacred awe\" and\n\"superstitious fear.\"\n\n                           Whate'er in heaven,\n     In earth, man sees mysterious, shakes his mind\n     With sacred awe o'erwhelms him, and his soul\n     Bows to the dust; the cause of things conceal\n     Once from his vision, instant to the gods\n     All empire he transfers, all rule supreme,\n     And doubtful whence they spring, with headlong haste\n     Calls them the workmanship of power divine.\n     For he who, justly, deems the Immortals live\n     Safe, and at ease, yet fluctuates in his mind\n     How things are swayed; how, chiefly, those discerned\n     In heaven sublime--to SUPERSTITION back\n     Lapses, and fears a tyrant host, and then\n     Conceives, dull reasoner, they can all things do,\n     While yet himself nor knows what may be done,\n     Nor what may never, nature powers defined\n     Stamping on all, and bounds that none can pass:\n     Hence wide, and wider errs he as he walks.[41]\n\n[Footnote 41: Lucretius, \"De Natura Rerum,\" book vi. vs. 50-70.]\n\nIn order to rid men of all superstitious fear, and, consequently, of all\nreligion, Epicurus endeavors to show that \"nature\" alone is adequate to\nthe production of all things, and there is no need to drag in a \"divine\npower\" to explain the phenomena of the world.\n\nThis theory has been wrought into a somewhat plausible form by the\nbrilliant and imposing generalizations of Aug. Comte. The religious\nphenomena of the world are simply one stage in the necessary development\nof mind, whether in the individual or the race. He claims to have been\nthe first to discover the great law of the three successive stages or\nphases of human evolution. That law is thus enounced. Both in the\nindividual mind, and in the history of humanity, thought, in dealing\nwith its problems, passes, of necessity, through, first, a\n_Theological_, second, a _Metaphysical_, and finally reaches a third, or\n_Positive_ stage.\n\nIn attempting an explanation of the universe, human thought, in its\nearliest stages of development, resorts to the idea of living personal\nagents enshrined in and moving every object, whether organic or\ninorganic, natural or artificial. In an advanced stage, it conceives a\nnumber of personal beings distinct from, and superior to nature, which\npreside over the different provinces of nature--the sea, the air, the\nwinds, the rivers, the heavenly bodies, and assume the guardianship of\nindividuals, tribes, and nations. As a further, and still higher stage,\nit asserts the unity of the Supreme Power which moves and vitalizes the\nuniverse, and guides and governs in the affairs of men and nations. The\n_Theological_ stage is thus subdivided into three epochs, and\nrepresented as commencing in _Fetichism_, then advancing to\n_Polytheism_, and, finally, consummating in _Monotheism_.\n\nThe next stage, the _Metaphysical_, is a transitional stage, in which\nman substitutes abstract entities, as substance, force, Being _in se_,\nthe Infinite, the Absolute, in the place of theological conceptions.\nDuring this period all theological opinions undergo a process of\ndisintegration, and lose their hold on the mind of man. Metaphysical\nspeculation is a powerful solvent, which decomposes and dissipates\ntheology.\n\nIt is only in the last--the _Positive_ stage--that man becomes willing\nto relinquish all theological ideas and metaphysical notions, and\nconfine his attention to the study of phenomena in their relation to\ntime and space; discarding all inquiries as to causes, whether efficient\nor final, and denying the existence of all entities and powers beyond\nnature.\n\nThe first stage, in its religious phase, is _Theistic_, the second is\n_Pantheistic_, the last is _Atheistic_.\n\nThe proofs offered by Comte in support of this theory are derived:\n\nI. _From Cerebral Organization_. There are three grand divisions of the\nBrain, the Medulla Oblongata, the Cerebellum, and the Cerebrum; the\nfirst represents the merely animal instincts the second, the more\nelevated sentiments, the third, the intellectual powers. Human nature\nmust, therefore, both in the individual and in the race, be developed in\nthe following order: (1.) in animal instincts; (2.) in social affections\nand communal tendencies; (3.) in intellectual pursuits. Infant life is a\nmerely animal existence, shared in common with the brute; in childhood\nthe individual being realizes his relation to external nature and human\nsociety; in youth and manhood he compares, generalizes, and classifies\nthe objects of knowledge, and attains to science. And so the infancy of\nour race was a mere animal or savage state, the childhood of our race\nthe organization of society, the youth and manhood of our race the\ndevelopment of science.\n\nNow, without offering any opinion as to the merits of the phrenological\ntheories of Gall and Spurzheim, we may ask, what relation has this order\nto the law of development presented by Comte? Is there any imaginable\nconnection between animal propensities and theological ideas; between\nsocial affections and metaphysical speculations? Are not the\nintellectual powers as much concerned with theological ideas and\nmetaphysical speculations as with positive science? And is it not more\nprobable, more in accordance with facts, that all the powers of the\nmind, instinct, feeling, and thought, enter into action simultaneously,\nand condition each other? The very first act of perception, the first\ndistinct cognition of an object, involves _thought_ as much as the last\ngeneralization of science. We know nothing of _mind_ except as the\ndevelopment of thought, and the first unfolding, even of the infant\nmind, reveals an intellectual act, a discrimination between a self and\nan object which is not self, and a recognition of resemblance, or\ndifference between _this_ object and _that_. And what does Positive\nscience, in its most mature and perfect form, claim to do more than \"to\nstudy actual phenomena in their orders of resemblance, coexistence, and\nsuccession.\"\n\nCerebral organization may furnish plausible analogies in favor of some\ntheory of human development, but certainly not the one proposed by Aug.\nComte. The attempt, however, to construct a chart of human history on\nsuch an _\u00e0 priori_ method,--to construct an ideal framework into which\nhuman nature must necessarily grow, is a violation of the first and most\nfundamental principle of the Positive science, which demands that we\nshall confine ourselves strictly to the study of actual phenomena in\ntheir orders of resemblance, coexistence, and succession. The history of\nthe human race must be based on facts, not on hypotheses, and the facts\nmust be ascertained by the study of ancient records and existing\nmonuments of the past. Mere plausible analogies and _\u00e0 priori_ theories\nbased upon them, are only fitted to mislead the mind; they insert a\nprism between the perceiving mind and the course of events which\ndecomposes the pure white light of fact, and throws a false light over\nthe entire field of history.\n\n2. _The second order of proof is attempted to be drawn from the\nanalogies of individual experience_.\n\nIt is claimed that the history of the race is the same as that of each\nindividual mind; and it is affirmed that man is _religious_ in infancy,\n_metaphysical_ in youth, and _positive_, that is, scientific without\nbeing religious, in mature manhood; the history of the race must\ntherefore have followed the same order.\n\nWe are under no necessity of denying that there is some analogy between\nthe development of mind in the individual man, and in humanity as a\nwhole, in order to refute the theory of Comte. Still, it must not be\noverlooked that the development of mind, in all cases and in all ages,\nis materially affected by exterior conditions. The influence of\ngeographical and climatic conditions, of social and national\ninstitutions, and especially of education, however difficult to be\nestimated, can not be utterly disregarded. And whether all these\ninfluences have not been controlled, and collocated, and adjusted by a\nSupreme Mind in the education of humanity, is also a question which can\nnot be pushed aside as of no consequence. Now, unless it can be shown\nthat the same outward conditions which have accompanied the individual\nand modified his mental development, have been repealed in the history\nof the race, and repeated in the same order of succession, the argument\nhas no value.\n\nBut, even supposing it could be shown that the development of mind in\nhumanity has followed the same order as that of the individual, we\nconfidently affirm that Comte has not given the true history of the\ndevelopment of the individual mind. The account he has given may perhaps\nbe the history of his own mental progress, but it certainly is not the\nhistory of every individual mind, nor indeed, of a majority even, of\neducated minds that have arrived at maturity. It would be much more in\nharmony with facts to say childhood is the period of pure receptivity,\nyouth of doubt and skepticism, and maturity of well-grounded and\nrational belief. In the ripeness and maturity of the nineteenth century\nthe number of scientific men of the Comtean model is exceedingly small\ncompared with the number of religious men. There are minds in every part\nof Europe and America as thoroughly scientific as that of Comte, and as\ndeeply imbued with the spirit of the Inductive Philosophy, which are not\nconscious of any discordance between the facts of science and the\nfundamental principles of theology. It may be that, in his own immediate\ncircle at Paris there may be a tendency to Atheism, but certainly no\nsuch tendency exists in the most scientific minds of Europe and America.\nThe faith of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and\nPascal, in regard to the fundamental principles of theology, is still\nthe faith of Sedgwick, Whewell, Herschel, Brewster, Owen, Agassiz,\nSilliman, Mitchell, Hitchcock, Dana, and, indeed of the leading\nscientific minds of the world--the men who, as Comte would say, \"belong\nto the \u00e9lite of humanity.\" The mature mind, whether of the individual or\nthe race, is not Atheistical.\n\n3. _The third proof is drawn from a survey of the history of certain\nportions of our race._\n\nComte is far from being assured that the progress of humanity, under the\noperation of his grand law of development, has been uniform and\ninvariable. The majority of the human race, the vast populations of\nIndia, China, and Japan, have remained stationary; they are still in the\nTheological stage, and consequently furnish no evidence in support of\nhis theory. For this reason he confines himself to the \"\u00e9lite\" or\nadvance-guard of humanity, and in this way makes the history of humanity\na very \"abstract history\" indeed. Starting with Greece as the\nrepresentative of ancient civilization, passing thence to Roman\ncivilization, and onward to Western Europe, he attempts to show that the\nactual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with\nhis law. To secure, however, even this semblance of harmony between the\nfacts of history and his hypothetical law, he has to treat the facts\nvery much as Procrustes treated his victims,--he must stretch some, and\nmutilate others, so as to make their forms fit the iron bed. The natural\norganization of European civilization is distorted and torn asunder. \"As\nthe third or positive stage had accomplished its advent in his own\nperson, it was necessary to find the metaphysical period just before;\nand so the whole life of the Reformed Christianity, in embryo and in\nmanifest existence, is stripped of its garb of _faith_, and turned out\nof view as a naked metaphysical phenomenon. But metaphysics, again, have\nto be ushered in by theology; and of the three stages of theology\nMonotheism is the last, necessarily following on Polytheism, as that,\nagain, on Fetichism. There is nothing for it, therefore, but to let the\nmedi\u00e6val Catholic Christianity stand as the world's first monotheism,\nand to treat it as the legitimate offspring and necessary development of\nthe Greek and Roman polytheism. This, accordingly, Comte actually does.\nProtestantism he illegitimates, and outlaws from religion altogether,\nand the genuine Christianity he fathers upon the faith of Homer and the\nScipios! Once or twice, indeed, it seems to cross him that there was\nsuch a people as the Hebrews, and that they were not the polytheists\nthey ought to have been. He sees the fact, but pushes it out of his way\nwith the remark that the Jewish monotheism was 'premature.'\"[42]\n\n[Footnote 42: Martineau's Essays, pp. 61, 62.]\n\nThe signal defect of Comte's historical survey, however, is, that it\nfurnishes no evidence of the general prevalence of Fetichism in\nprimitive times. The writings of Moses are certainly entitled to as much\nconsideration and credence as the writings of Berosus, Manetho, and\nHerodotus; and, it will not be denied, they teach that the faith of the\nearliest families and races of men was _monotheistic_. The early Vedas,\nthe Institutes of Menu, the writings of Confucius, the Zendavesta, all\nbear testimony that the ancient faith of India, China, and Persia, was,\nat any rate, pantheistic; and learned and trustworthy critics, Asiatic\nas well as European, confidently affirm that the ground of the\nBrahminical, Buddhist, and Parsist faith is _monotheistic_; and that\n_one_ Being is assumed, in the earliest books, to be the origin of all\nthings.[43] Without evidence, Comte assumes that the savage state is the\noriginal condition of man; and instead of going to Asia, the cradle of\nthe race, for some light as to the early condition and opinions of the\nremotest families of men, he turns to Africa, the _soudan_ of the earth,\nfor his illustration of the habit of man, in the infancy of our race, to\nendow every object in nature, whether organic or inorganic, with life\nand intelligence. The theory of a primitive state of ignorance and\nbarbarism is a mere assumption--an hypothesis in conflict with the\ntraditionary legends of all nations, the earliest records of our race,\nand the unanimous voice of antiquity, which attest the general belief in\na primitive state of light and innocence.\n\n[Footnote 43: \"The Religions of the World in their Relation to\nChristianity\" (Maurice, ch. ii., iii., iv.).]\n\nThe three stages of development which Comte describes as necessarily\nsuccessive, have, for centuries past, been simultaneous. The\ntheological, the metaphysical, and the scientific elements coexist now,\nand there is no real, radical, or necessary conflict between them.\nTheological and metaphysical ideas hold their ground as securely under\nthe influence of enlarged scientific discovery as before; and there is\nno reason to suppose they ever had more power over the mind of man than\nthey have to-day. The notion that God is dethroned by the wonderful\ndiscoveries of modern science, and theology is dead, is the dream of the\n\"_profond orage c\u00e9r\u00e9bral_\" which interrupted the course of Comte's\nlectures in 1826. As easily may the hand of Positivism arrest the course\nof the sun, as prevent the instinctive thought of human reason\nrecognizing and affirming the existence of a God. And so long as ever\nthe human mind is governed by necessary laws of thought, so long will it\nseek...\n\n[Transcriber's note: In the original document, page 64 is a duplication\nof page 63. The real page 64 seems to be missing.]\n\n....eur, and consequently to develop its true philosophy. Its\nfundamental error is the assumption that all our knowledge is confined\nto the observation and classification of sensible phenomena--that is, to\nchanges perceptible by the senses. Psychology, based, as it is, upon\nself-observation and self-reflection, is a \"mere illusion; and logic and\nethics, so far as they are built upon it as their foundation, are\naltogether baseless.\" Spiritual entities, forces, causes, efficient or\nfinal, are unknown and unknowable; all inquiry regarding them must be\ninhibited, \"for Theology is inevitable if we permit the inquiry into\ncauses at all.\"\n\nII. The second hypothesis offered in explanation of the facts of\nreligious history is, _that religion is part of that_ PROCESS OR\nEVOLUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE (_i.e._, the Deity) _which, gradually\nunfolding itself in nature, mind, history, and religion, attains to the\nfullest self-consciousness in philosophy_.\n\nThis is the theory of Hegel, in whose system of philosophy the\nsubjective idealism of Kant culminates in the doctrine of \"_Absolute\nIdentity_.\" Its fundamental position is that thought and being, subject\nand object, the perceiving mind and the thing perceived, are ultimately\nand essentially _one_, and that the only actual reality is that which\nresults from their mutual relation. The outward thing is nothing, the\ninward perception is nothing, for neither could exist alone; the only\nreality is the relation, or rather synthesis of the two; the essence or\nnature of being in itself accordingly consists in the coexistence of two\ncontrarieties. Ideas, arising from the union or synthesis of two\nopposites, are therefore the _concrete realities_ of Hegel; and the\n_process_ of the evolution of ideas, in the human mind, is the process\nof all existence--_the Absolute Idea_.\n\n_The Absolute_(die Id\u00e9e) thus forms the beginning, middle, and end of\nthe system of Hegel. It is the one infinite existence or thought, of\nwhich nature, mind, history, religion, and philosophy, are the\nmanifestation. \"The absolute is, with him, not the infinite _substance_,\nas with Spinoza; nor the infinite _subject_, as with Fichte; nor the\ninfinite _mind_, as with Schelling; it is a perpetual _process_, an\neternal thinking, without beginning and without end.\"[44] This _living,\neternal process of absolute existence is the God of Hegel_.\n\nIt will thus be seen that the _Absolute_ is, with Hegel, the sum of all\nactual and possible existence; \"nothing is true and real except so far\nas it forms an element of the Absolute Spirit.\"[45] \"What kind of an\nAbsolute Being,\" he asks, \"is that which does not contain in itself all\nthat is actual, even evil included?\"[46] The Absolute, therefore, in\nHegel's conception, does not allow of any existence out of itself. It is\nthe _unity_ of the finite and the infinite, the eternal and the\ntemporal, the ideal and the real, the subject and the object. And it is\nnot only the unity of these opposites so as to exclude all difference,\nbut it contains in itself, all the differences and opposites as elements\nof its being; otherwise the distinctions would stand over against\nabsolute as a limit, and the absolute would cease to be absolute.\n\nGod is, therefore, according to Hegel, \"no motionless, eternally\nself-identical and unchangeable being, but a living, eternal _process_\nof absolute self-existence. This process consists in the eternal\nself-distinction, or antithesis, and equally self-reconciliation or\nsynthesis of those opposites which enter, as necessary elements, into\nthe constitution of the Divine Being. This _self-evolution_, whereby the\nabsolute enters into antithesis, and returns to itself again, is the\neternal _self-actualization_ of its being, and which at once constitutes\nthe beginning, middle, and end, as in the circle, where the beginning is\nat the same time the end, and the end the beginning.\"[47]\n\n[Footnote 44: Morell, \"Hist, of Philos., p. 461.\"]\n\n[Footnote 45: \"Philos. of Religion,\" p. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ibid., chap. xi. p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Herzog's _Real-Encyc._, art. \"Hegelian Philos.,\" by\nUlrici.]\n\nThe whole philosophy of Hegel consists in the development of this idea\nof God by means of his, so-called, dialectic method, which reflects the\nobjective life-process of the Absolute, and is, in fact, identical with\nit; for God, says he, \"is only the Absolute Intelligence in so far as he\nknows himself to be the Absolute Intelligence, _and this he knows only\nin science_ [dialectics], _and this knowledge alone constitutes his true\nexistence._\"[48] This life-process of the Absolute has three \"moments.\"\nIt may be considered as the idea _in itself_--bare, naked, undetermined,\nunconscious idea; as the idea _out of itself_, in its objective form, or\nin its differentiation; and, finally, as the idea _in itself_, and _for\nitself_, in its regressive or reflective form. This movement of thought\ngives, _first_, bare, naked, indeterminate thought, or thought in the\nmere antithesis of Being and non-Being; _secondly_, thought\nexternalizing itself in nature; and, _thirdly_, thought returning to\nitself, and knowing itself in mind, or consciousness. Philosophy has,\naccordingly, three corresponding divisions:--1. LOGIC, which here is\nidentical with metaphysics; 2. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE; 3. PHILOSOPHY OF\nMIND.\n\n[Footnote 48: \"Hist, of Philos.,\" iii. p. 399.]\n\nIt is beyond our design to present an expanded view of the entire\nphilosophy of Hegel. But as he has given to the world a _new_ logic, it\nmay be needful to glance at its general features as a help to the\ncomprehension of his philosophy of religion. The fundamental law of his\nlogic is the _identity of contraries or contradictions_. All thought is\na synthesis of contraries or opposites. This antithesis not only exists\nin all ideas, but constitutes them. In every idea we form, there must be\n_two_ things opposed and distinguished, in order to afford a clear\nconception. Light can not be conceived but as the opposite of darkness;\ngood can not be thought except in opposition to evil. All life, all\nreality is thus, essentially, the union of two elements, which,\ntogether, are mutually opposed to, and yet imply each other.\n\nThe identity of Being and Nothing is one of the consequences of this\nlaw.\n\n1. _The Absolute is the Being_ (das Absolute ist das Seyn), and \"the\nBeing\" is here, according to Hegel, bare, naked, abstract,\nundistinguished, indeterminate, unconscious idea.\n\n2. _The Absolute is the Nothing_ (das Absolute ist das Nichts). \"Pure\nbeing is pure abstraction, and consequently the absolute-negative, which\nin like manner, directly taken, is _nothing_.\" Being and Nothing are the\npositive and negative poles of the Idea, that is, the Absolute. They\nboth alike exist, they are both pure abstractions, both absolutely\nunconditioned, without attributes, and without consciousness. Hence\nfollows the conclusion--\n\n3. _Being and Nothing are identical_ (das Seyn und das Nichts ist\ndasselbe), Being is non-Being. Non-Being _is_ Being--the\nAnders-seyn--which becomes _as_ Being to the Seyn. Nothing is, in some\nsense, an actual thing.\n\n_Being_ and _Nothing_ are thus the two elements which enter into the one\nAbsolute Idea as contradictories, and both together combine to form a\ncomplete notion of bare production, or the _becoming_ of something out\nof nothing,--the unfolding of real existence in its lowest form, that\nis, of _nature_.\n\nThe \"_Philosophy of Nature_\" exhibits a series of necessary movements\nwhich carry the idea forward in the ascending scale of sensible\nexistence. The laws of mechanics, chemistry, and physiology are resolved\ninto a series of oppositions. But the law which governs this development\nrequires the self-reconciliation of these opposites. The idea,\ntherefore, which in nature was unconscious and ignorant of itself,\nreturns upon itself, and becomes conscious of itself, that is, becomes\n_mind_. The science of the regression or self-reflection of the idea, is\nthe \"_Philosophy of Mind_.\"\n\nThe \"_Philosophy of Mind_\" is subdivided by Hegel into three parts.\nThere is, first, the subjective or individual mind (_psychology_); then\nthe objective or universal mind, as represented in society, the state,\nand in history (_ethics, political philosophy,_ or _jurisprudence_, and\n_philosophy of history_); and, finally, the union of the subjective and\nobjective mind, or _the absolute mind_. This last manifests itself again\nunder three forms, representing the three degrees of the\nself-consciousness of the Spirit, as the eternal truth. These are,\nfirst, _art_, or the representation of beauty (\u00e6sthetics); secondly,\n_religion_, in the general acceptation of the term (philosophy of\nreligion); and, thirdly, _philosophy_ itself, as the purest and most\nperfect form of the scientific knowledge of truth. All historical\nreligions, the Oriental, the Jewish, the Greek, the Roman, and the\nChristian, are _the successive stages in the development or\nself-actualization of God_.[49]\n\nIt is unnecessary to indicate to the reader that the philosophy of Hegel\nis essentially pantheistic. \"God is not a _person_, but personality\nitself, _i.e._, the universal personality, which realizes itself in\nevery human consciousness, as so many separate thoughts of one eternal\nmind. The idea we form of the absolute is, to Hegel, the absolute\nitself, its essential existence being identical with our conception of\nit. Apart from, and out of the world, there is no God; and so also,\napart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no Divine\nconsciousness or personality.\"[50]\n\n[Footnote 49: See art. \"Hegelian Philosophy,\" in Herzog's _Real-Encyc._,\nfrom whence our materials are chiefly drawn.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Morell, \"Hist. of Philos.,\" p. 473.]\n\nThis whole conception of religion, however, is false, and conflicts with\nthe actual facts of man's religious nature and religious history. If the\nword \"religion\" has any meaning at all, it is \"a mode of life determined\nby the consciousness of dependence upon, and obligation to God.\" It is\nreverence for, gratitude to, and worship of God as a being distinct from\nhumanity. But in the philosophy of Hegel religion is a part of God--a\nstage in the development or self-actualization of God. Viewed under one\naspect, religion is the self-adoration of God--the worship of God by\nGod; under another aspect it is the worship of humanity, since God only\nbecomes conscious of himself in humanity. The fundamental fallacy is\nthat upon which his entire method proceeds, viz., \"the identity of\nsubject and object, being and thought.\" Against this false position the\nconsciousness of each individual man, and the universal consciousness of\nour race, as revealed in history, alike protest. If thought and being\nare identical, then whatever is true of ideas is also true of objects,\nand then, as Kant had before remarked, there is no difference between\n_thinking_ we possess a hundred dollars, and actually _possessing_ them.\nSuch absurdities may be rendered plausible by a logic which asserts the\n\"identity of contradictions,\" but against such logic common sense\nrebels. \"The law of non-contradiction\" has been accepted by all\nlogicians, from the days of Aristotle, as a fundamental law of thought.\n\"Whatever is contradictory is unthinkable. A=not A=O, or A--A=O.\"[51]\nNon-existence can not exist. Being can not be nothing.\n\n[Footnote 51: Hamilton's Logic, p. 58.]\n\nIII. The third hypothesis affirms _that the phenomenon of religion has\nits foundation in_ FEELING--_the feeling of dependence and of\nobligation_; and that to which the mind, by spontaneous intuition of\ninstinctive faith, traces that dependence and obligation we call God.\n\nThis, with some slight modification in each case, consequent upon the\ndifferences in their philosophic systems, is the theory of Jacobi,\nSchleiermacher, Nitzsch, Mansel, and probably Hamilton. Its fundamental\nposition is, that we can not gain truth with absolute certainty either\nfrom sense or reason, and, consequently, the only valid source of real\nknowledge is _feeling--faith, intuition_, or, as it is called by some,\n_inspiration_.\n\nThere have been those, in all ages, who have made all knowledge of\ninvisible, supersensuous, divine things, to rest upon an internal\n_feeling_, or immediate, inward vision. The Oriental Mystics, the\nNeo-Platonists, the Mystics of the Greek and Latin Church, the German\nMystics of the 14th century, the Theosophists of the Reformation, the\nQuietists of France, the Quakers, have all appealed to some _special_\nfaculty, distinct from the understanding and reason, for the immediate\ncognition of invisible and spiritual existences. By some, that special\nfaculty was regarded as an \"interior eye\" which was illuminated by the\n\"Universal Light;\" by others, as a peculiar sensibility of the soul--a\n_feeling_ in whose perfect calm and utter quiescence the Divinity was\nmirrored; or which, in an ecstatic state, rose to a communion with, and\nfinal absorption in the Infinite.\n\nJacobi was the first, in modern times, to give the \"faith-philosophy,\"\nas it is now designated, a definite form. He assumes the position that\nall knowledge, of whatever kind, must ultimately rest upon intuition or\nfaith. As it regards sensible objects, the understanding finds the\nimpression from which all our knowledge of the external flows, ready\nformed. The process of sensation is a mystery; we know nothing of it\nuntil it is past, and the feeling it produces is present. Our knowledge\nof matter, therefore, rests upon faith in these intuitions. We can not\ndoubt that the feeling has an objective cause. In every act of\nperception there is something actual and present, which can not be\nreferred to a mere subjective law of thought. We are also conscious of\nanother class of feelings which correlate us with a supersensuous world,\nand these feelings, also, must have their cause in some objective\nreality. Just as sensation gives us an immediate knowledge of an\nexternal world, so there is an internal sense which gives us an\nimmediate knowledge of a spiritual world--God, the soul, freedom,\nimmortality. Our knowledge of the invisible world, like our knowledge of\nthe visible world, is grounded upon faith in our intuitions. All\nphilosophic knowledge is thus based upon _belief_, which Jacobi regards\nas a fact of our inward sensibility--a sort of knowledge produced by an\nimmediate _feeling_ of the soul--a direct apprehension, without proof,\nof the True, the Supersensuous, the Eternal.\n\nJacobi prepared the way for, and was soon eclipsed by the deservedly\ngreater name of Schleiermacher. His fundamental position was that truth\nin Theology could not be obtained by reason, but by a feeling,\n_insight_, or intuition, which in its lowest form he called\n_God-consciousness_, and in its highest form, _Christian-consciousness._\nThe God-consciousness, in its original form, is the _feeling of\ndependence_ on the Infinite. The Christian consciousness is the perfect\nunion of the human consciousness with the Divine, through the mediation\nof Christ, or what we would call a Christian experience of communion\nwith God.\n\nRightly to understand the position of Schleiermacher we must take\naccount of his doctrine of _self_-consciousness. \"In all\nself-consciousness,\" says he, \"there are two elements, a Being ein Seyn,\nand a Somehow-having-become (Irgendweigewordenseyn). The last, however,\npresupposes, for every self-consciousness, besides the ego, yet\nsomething else from whence the certainty of the same\n[self-consciousness] exists, and without which self-consciousness would\nnot be just this.\"[52] Every determinate mode of the sensibility\nsupposes an _object_, and a _relation_ between the subject and the\nobject, the subjective feeling deriving its determinations from the\nobject. External sensation, the feeling, say of extension and\nresistance, gives world-consciousness. Internal sensation, the _feeling\nof dependence_, gives God consciousness. And it is only by the presence\nof world consciousness and God-consciousness that self consciousness can\nbe what it is.\n\nWe have, then, in our self-consciousness a _feeling of direct\ndependence_, and that to which our minds instinctively trace that\ndependence we call God. \"By means of the religious feeling, the Primal\nCause is revealed in us, as in perception, the things external, are\nrevealed in us.\"[53] The _felt_, therefore, is not only the first\nreligious sense, but the ruling, abiding, and perfect form of the\nreligious spirit; whatever lays any claim to religion must maintain its\nground and principle in _feeling_, upon which it depends for its\ndevelopment; and the sum-total of the forces constituting religious\nlife, inasmuch as it is a _life_, is based upon immediate\nself-consciousness.[54]\n\n[Footnote 52: Glaubenslehre, ch. i. \u00a7 4.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Dialectic, p. 430.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Nitzsch, \"System of Doctrine,\" p. 23.]\n\nThe doctrine of Schleiermacher is somewhat modified by Mansel, in his\n\"_Limits of Religious Thought_.\" He maintains, with Schleiermacher, that\nreligion is grounded in _feeling_, and that the _felt_ is the first\nintimation or presentiment of the Divine. Man \"_feels_ within him the\nconsciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct to worship, before he\ncan argue from effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and\nbenevolence scattered through the creation.\"[55] He also agrees with\nSchleiermacher in regarding the _feeling of dependence_ as _a_ state of\nthe sensibility, out of which reflection builds up the edifice of\nReligious Consciousness, but he does not, with Schleiermacher, regard it\nas pre-eminently _the_ basis of religious consciousness. \"The mere\nconsciousness of dependence does not, of itself, exhibit the character\nof the Being on whom we depend. It is as consistent with superstition as\nwith religion; with the belief in a malevolent, as in a benevolent\nDeity.\"[56] To the feeling of dependence he has added the _consciousness\nof moral obligation_, which he imagines supplies the deficiency. By this\nconsciousness of moral obligation \"we are compelled to assume the\nexistence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right\nand wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity.\"[57] \"To these two\nfacts of the inner consciousness the feeling of dependence, and\nconsciousness of moral obligation may be traced, as to their sources,\nthe two great outward acts by which religion, in its various forms, has\nbeen manifested among men--_Prayer_, by which they seek to win God's\nblessing upon the future, and _Expiation_, by which they strive to atone\nfor the offenses of the past. The feeling of dependence is the instinct\nwhich urges us to pray. It is the feeling that our existence and welfare\nare in the hands of a superior power; not an inexorable fate, not an\nimmutable law; but a Being having at least so far the attribute of\npersonality that he can show favor or severity to those who are\ndependent upon Him, and can be regarded by them with feelings of hope\nand fear, and reverence and gratitude.\"[58] The feeling of moral\nobligation--\"the law written in the heart\"--leads man to recognize a\nLawgiver. \"Man can be a law unto himself only on the supposition that he\nreflects in himself the law of God.\"[59] The conclusion from the whole\nis, there must be an _object_ answering to this consciousness: there\nmust be a God to explain these facts of the soul.\n\n[Footnote 55: Mansel, \"Limits of Religious Thought,\" p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Id., ib., p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Id., ib., p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Id., ib., pp. 119, 120.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Id., ib., p. 122.]\n\nThis \"philosophy of feeling,\" or of faith generated by feeling, has an\ninterest and a significance which has not been adequately recognized by\nwriters on natural theology. Feeling, sentiment, enthusiasm, have always\nplayed an important part in the history of religion. Indeed it must be\nconceded that religion is a _right state of feeling towards\nGod_--religion is _piety_. A philosophy of the religious emotion is,\ntherefore, demanded in order to the full interpretation of the religious\nphenomena of the world.\n\nBut the notion that internal feeling, a peculiar determination of the\nsensibility, is the source of religious ideas:--that God can be known\nimmediately by feeling without the mediation of the truth that manifests\nGod; that he can be _felt_ as the qualities of matter can be felt; and\nthat this affection of the inward sense can reveal the character and\nperfections of God, is an unphilosophical and groundless assumption. To\nassert, with Nitzsch, that \"feeling has reason, and is reason, and that\nthe sensible and felt God-consciousness generates out of itself\nfundamental conceptions,\" is to confound the most fundamental\npsychological distinctions, and arbitrarily bend the recognized\nclassifications of mental science to the necessities of a theory.\nIndeed, we are informed that it is \"by means of an _independent_\npsychology, and conformably to it,\" that Schleiermacher illustrates his\n\"philosophy of feeling.\"[60] But all psychology must be based upon the\nobservation and classification of mental phenomena, as revealed in\nconsciousness, and not constructed in an \"independent\" and \u00e0 priori\nmethod. The most careful psychological analysis has resolved the whole\ncomplex phenomena of mind into thought, feeling, and volition.[61] These\norders of phenomena are radically and essentially distinct. They differ\nnot simply in degree but in kind, and it is only by an utter disregard\nof the facts of consciousness that they can be confounded. Feeling is\nnot reason, nor can it by any logical dexterity be transformed into\nreason.\n\n[Footnote 60: Nitzsch, \"System of Doctrine,\" p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Kant, \"Critique of Judg.,\" ch. xxii.; Cousin, \"Hist, of\nPhilos.,\" vol. ii. p. 399; Hamilton, vol. i. p. 183, Eng. ed.]\n\nThe question as to the relative order of cognition and feeling, that is,\nas to whether feeling is the first or original form of the religious\nconsciousness, or whether feeling be not consequent upon some idea or\ncognition of God, is one which can not be determined on empirical\ngrounds. We are precluded from all scrutiny of the incipient stages of\nmental development in the individual mind and in collective humanity. If\nwe attempt to trace the early history of the soul, its beginnings are\nlost in a period of blank unconsciousness, beyond all scrutiny of memory\nor imagination. If we attempt the inquiry on the wider field of\nuniversal consciousness, the first unfoldings of mind in humanity are\nlost in the border-land of mystery, of which history furnishes no\nauthentic records. All dogmatic affirmation must, therefore, be\nunjustifiable. The assertion that religious feeling precedes all\ncognition,--that \"the consciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being,\nand the instinct of worship\" are developed _first_ in the mind, before\nthe reason is exercised, is utterly groundless. The more probable\ndoctrine is that all the primary faculties enter into spontaneous action\n_simultaneously_--the reason with the senses, the feelings with the\nreason, the judgment with both the senses and the reason, and that from\ntheir primary and simultaneous action arises the complex result, called\nconsciousness, or conjoint knowledge.[62] There can be no clear and\ndistinct consciousness without the cognition of a _self_ and a\n_not-self_ in mutual relation and opposition. Now the knowledge of the\nself--the personal ego--is an intuition of reason; the knowledge of the\nnot-self is an intuition of sense. All knowledge is possible only under\ncondition of plurality, difference, and relation.[63] Now the judgment\nis \"the Faculty of Relations,\" or of comparison; and the affirmation\n\"_this_ is not _that_\" is an act of judgment; to know is, consequently,\nto judge.[64] Self-consciousness must, therefore, be regarded as a\nsynthesis of sense, reason, and judgment, and not a mere self-feeling\n(coen\u00e6sthesis).\n\n[Footnote 62: Cousin, \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 357; vol. ii. p.\n337.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Hamilton, \"Metaphys.,\" p. 277]\n\nA profound analysis will further lead to the conclusion that if ideas of\nreason are not chronologically antecedent to sensation, they are, at\nleast, the logical antecedents of all cognition. The mere feeling of\nresistance can not give the notion of without the \u00e0 priori idea of\nspace. The feeling of movement of change, can not give the cognition of\nevent without the rational idea of time or duration. Simple\nconsciousness can not generate the idea of personality, or selfhood,\nwithout the rational idea of identity or unity. And so the mere \"feeling\nof dependence,\" of finiteness and imperfection, can not give the idea of\nGod, without the rational \u00e0 priori idea of the Infinite, the Perfect,\nthe Unconditioned Cause. Sensation is not knowledge, and never can\nbecome knowledge, without the intervention of reason, and a concentrated\nself feeling can not rise essentially above animal life until it has,\nthrough the mediation of reason, attained the idea of the existence of a\nSupreme Being ruling over nature and man.\n\nMere feeling is essentially blind. In its _pathological_ form, it may\nindicate a want, and even develop an unconscious appetency, but it can\nnot, itself, reveal an _object_, any more than the feeling of hunger can\nreveal the actual presence, or determine the character and fitness, of\nany food. An undefinable fear, a mysterious presentiment, an instinctive\nyearning, a hunger of the soul, these are all irrational emotions which\ncan never rise to the dignity of knowledge. An object must be conjured\nby the imagination, or conceived by the understanding, or intuitively\napprehended by the reason, before the feeling can have any significance.\n\nRegarded in its _moral_ form, as \"the feeling of obligation,\" it can\nhave no real meaning unless a \"law of duty\" be known and recognized.\nFeeling, alone, can not reveal what duty is. When that which is right,\nand just, and good is revealed to the mind, then the sense of obligation\nmay urge man to the performance of duty. But the right, the just, the\ngood, are ideas which are apprehended by the reason, and, consequently,\nour moral sentiments are the result of the harmonious and living\nrelation between the reason and the sensibilities.\n\nMr. Mansel asserts the inadequacy of Schleiermacher's \"feeling of\ndependence\" to reveal the character of the Being on whom we depend. He\nhas therefore supplemented his doctrine by the \"feeling of moral\nobligation,\" which he thinks \"compels us to _assume_ the existence of a\nmoral Deity.\" We think his \"fact of religious intuition\" is as\ninadequate as Schleiermacher's to explain the whole phenomena of\nreligion. In neither instance does feeling supply the actual knowledge\nof God. The feeling of dependence may indicate that there is a Power or\nBeing upon whom we depend for existence and well-being, and which Power\nor Being \"we call God.\" The feeling of obligation certainly indicates\nthe existence of a Being to whom we are accountable, and which Being Mr.\nMansel calls a \"moral Deity.\" But in both instances the character, and\neven the existence of God is \"_assumed_\" and we are entitled to ask on\nwhat ground it is assumed. It will not be asserted that feeling alone\ngenerates the idea, or that the feeling is transformed into idea without\nthe intervention of thought and reflection. Is there, then, a _logical_\nconnection between the feeling of dependence and of obligation, and the\nidea of the Uncreated Mind, the Infinite First Cause, the Righteous\nGovernor of the world. Or is there a fixed and changeless co-relation\nbetween _the feeling_ and the _idea_, so that when the feeling is\npresent, the idea also necessarily arises in the mind? This latter\nopinion seems to be the doctrine of Mansel. We accept it as the\nstatement of a fact of consciousness, but we can not regard it as an\naccount of the genesis of the idea of God in the human mind. The idea of\nGod as the First Cause, the Infinite Mind, the Perfect Being, the\npersonal Lord and Lawgiver, the creator, sustainer, and ruler of the\nworld, is not a simple, primitive intuition of the mind. It is\nmanifestly a complex, concrete idea, and, as such, can not be developed\nin consciousness, by the operation of a single faculty of the mind, in a\nsimple, undivided act. It originates in the spontaneous operation of the\nwhole mind. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the universe,\nand the primitive intuitions of the reason,--a logical inference from\nthe facts of sense, consciousness, and reason. A philosophy of religion\nwhich regards the feelings as supreme, and which brands the decisions of\nreason as uncertain, and well-nigh valueless, necessarily degenerates\ninto mysticism--a mysticism \"which pretends to elevate man directly to\nGod, and does not see that, in depriving reason of its power, it really\ndeprives man of that which enables him to know God, and puts him in a\njust communication with God by the intermediary of eternal and infinite\ntruth.\"[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" p. 110.]\n\nThe religious sentiments in all minds, and in all ages, have resulted\nfrom the union of _thought_ and _feeling_--the living and harmonious\nrelation of reason and sensibility; and a philosophy which disregards\neither is inadequate to the explanation of the phenomena.\n\nIV. The fourth hypothesis is, _that religion has had its outbirth in the\nspontaneous apperceptions of_ REASON; that is, in the necessary, \u00e0\npriori ideas of the infinite, the perfect, the unconditioned Cause, the\nEternal Being, which are evoked into consciousness in presence of the\nchangeful, contingent phenomena of the world.\n\nThis will at once be recognized by the intelligent reader as the\ndoctrine of Cousin, by whom _pure reason_ is regarded as the grand\nfaculty or organ of religion.\n\nReligion, in the estimation of Cousin, is grounded on _cognition_ rather\nthan upon feeling. It is the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of duty\nin its relation to God and to human happiness; and as reason is the\ngeneral faculty of all knowing, it must be the faculty of religion. \"In\nits most elevated point of view, religion is the relation of absolute\ntruth to absolute Being,\" and as absolute truth is apprehended by the\nreason alone, reason \"is the veridical and religious part of the nature\nof man.\"[66] By \"reason,\" however, as we shall see presently, Cousin\ndoes not mean the discursive or reflective reason, but the spontaneous\nor intuitive reason. That act of the mind by which we attain to\nreligious knowledge is not a _process of reasoning_, but a pure\nappreciation, an instinctive and involuntary movement of the soul.\n\n[Footnote 66: Henry's Cousin, p. 510.]\n\nThe especial function of reason, therefore, is to reveal to us the\ninvisible, the supersensuous, the Divine. \"It was bestowed upon us for\nthis very purpose of going, without any circuit of reasoning, from the\nvisible to the invisible, from the finite to the infinite, from the\nimperfect to the perfect, and from necessary and eternal truths, to the\neternal and necessary principle\" that is God.[67] Reason is thus, as it\nwere, the bridge between consciousness and being; it rests, at the same\ntime, on both; it descends from God, and approaches man; it makes its\nappearance in consciousness as a guest which brings intelligence of\nanother world of real Being which lies beyond the world of sense.\n\nReason does not, however, attain to the Absolute Being directly and\nimmediately, without any intervening medium. To assert this would be to\nfall into the error of Plotinus, and the Alexandrian Mystics. Reason is\nthe offspring of God, a ray of the Eternal Reason, but it is not to be\nidentified with God. Reason attains to the Absolute Being indirectly,\nand by the interposition of truth. Absolute truth is an attribute and a\nmanifestation of God. \"Truth is incomprehensible without God, and God is\nincomprehensible without truth. Truth is placed between human\nintelligence, and the supreme intelligence as a kind of mediator.\"[68]\nIncapable of contemplating God face to face, reason adores God in the\ntruth which represents and manifests Him.\n\n[Footnote 67: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Id., ib., p. 99.]\n\nAbsolute truth is thus a revelation of God, made by God to the reason of\nman, and as it is a light which illuminates every man, and is\nperpetually perceived by all men, it is a universal and perpetual\nrevelation of God to man. The mind of man is \"the offspring of God,\"\nand, as such, must have some resemblance to, and some correlation with\nGod. Now that which constitutes the image of God in man must be found in\nthe reason which is correlated with, and capable of perceiving the truth\nwhich manifests God, just as the eye is correlated to the light which\nmanifests the external world. Absolute truth is, therefore, the sole\nmedium of bringing the human mind into communion with God; and human\nreason, in becoming united to absolute truth, becomes united to God in\nhis manifestation in spirit and in truth. The supreme law, and highest\ndestination of man, is to become united to God by seeking a full\nconsciousness of, and loving and practising the Truth.[69]\n\n[Footnote 69: Henry's Cousin, p. 511, 512.]\n\nIt will at once be obvious that the grand crucial questions by which\nthis philosophy of religion is to be tested are--\n\n1st. _How will Cousin prove to us that human reason is in possession of\nuniversal and necessary principles or absolute truths?_ and,\n\n2d. _How are these principles shown to be absolute? how far do these\nprinciples of reason possess absolute authority?_\n\nThe answer of Cousin to the first question is that we prove reason to be\nin possession of universal and necessary principles by the analysis of\nthe contents of consciousness, that is, by psychological analysis. The\nphenomena of consciousness, in their primitive condition, are\nnecessarily complex, concrete, and particular. All our primary ideas are\ncomplex ideas, for the evident reason that all, or nearly all, our\nfaculties enter at once into exercise; their simultaneous action giving\nus, at the same time, a certain number of ideas connected with each\nother, and forming a whole. For example, the idea of the exterior world,\nwhich is given us so quickly, is a complex idea, which contains a number\nof ideas. There is the idea of the secondary qualities of exterior\nobjects; there is the idea of the primary qualities; there is the idea\nof the permanent reality of something to which you refer these\nqualities, to wit, matter; there is the idea of space which contains\nbodies; there is the idea of time in which movements are effected. All\nthese ideas are acquired simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, and\ntogether form one complex idea.\n\nThe application of analysis to this complex phenomenon clearly reveals\nthat there are simple ideas, beliefs, principles in the mind which can\nnot have been derived from sense and experience, which sense and\nexperience do not account for, and which are the suggestions of reason\nalone: the idea of the _Infinite_, the _Perfect_, the _Eternal_; the\ntrue, the beautiful, the good; the principle of causality, of substance,\nof unity, of intentionality; the principle of duty, of obligation, of\naccountability, of retribution. These principles, in their natural and\nregular development, carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and\nreveal to us a world of real being beyond the world of sense. They carry\nus up to an absolute Being, the fountain of all existence--a living,\npersonal, righteous God--the author, the sustainer, and ruler of the\nuniverse.\n\nThe proof that these principles are absolute, and possessed of absolute\nauthority, is drawn, first, from the _impersonality of reason_, or,\nrather, the impersonality of the ideas, principles, or truths of reason.\n\nIt is not we who create these ideas, neither can we change them at our\npleasure. We are conscious that the will, in all its various efforts, is\nenstamped with the impress of our personality. Our volitions are our\nown. So, also, our desires are our own, our emotions are our own. But\nthis is not the same with our rational ideas or principles. The ideas of\nsubstance, of cause, of unity, of intentionality do not belong to one\nperson any more than to another; they belong to mind as mind, they are\nrevealed in the universal intelligence of the race. Absolute truth has\nno element of personality about it. Man may say \"my reason,\" but give\nhim credit for never having dared to say \"_my_ truth.\" So far from\nrational ideas being individual, their peculiar characteristic is that\nthey are opposed to individuality, that is, they are universal and\nnecessary. Instead of being circumscribed within the limits of\nexperience, they surpass and govern it; they are universal in the midst\nof particular phenomena; necessary, although mingled with things\ncontingent; and absolute, even when appearing within us the relative and\nfinite beings that we are.[70] Necessary, universal, absolute truth is a\ndirect emanation from God. \"Such being the case, the decision of reason\nwithin its own peculiar province possesses an authority almost divine.\nIf we are led astray by it, we must be led astray by a light from\nheaven.\"[71]\n\n[Footnote 70: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Id., \"Lectures,\" vol. ii. p. 32.]\n\nThe second proof is derived from _the distinction between the\nspontaneous and reflective movements of reason_.\n\nReflection is voluntary, spontaneity is involuntary; reflection is\npersonal, spontaneity is impersonal; reflection is analytic, spontaneity\nis synthetic; reflection begins with doubt, spontaneity with\naffirmation; reflection belongs to certain ones, spontaneity belongs to\nall; reflection produces science, spontaneity gives truth. Reflection is\na process, more or less tardy, in the individual and in the race. It\nsometimes engenders error and skepticism, sometimes convictions that,\nfrom being rational, are only the more profound. It constructs systems,\nit creates artificial logic, and all those formulas which we now use by\nthe force of habit, as if they were natural to us. But spontaneous\nintuition is the true logic of nature,--instant, direct, and infallible.\nIt is a primitive affirmation which implies no negation, and therefore\nyields positive knowledge. To reflect is to return to that which was. It\nis, by the aid of memory, to return to the past, and to render it\npresent to the eye of consciousness. Reflection, therefore, creates\nnothing; it supposes an anterior operation of the mind in which there\nnecessarily must be as many terms as are discovered by reflection.\nBefore all reflection there comes spontaneity--a spontaneity of the\nintellect, which seizes truth at once, without traversing doubt and\nerror. \"We thus attain to a judgment free from all reflection, to an\naffirmation without any mixture of negation, to an immediate intuition,\nthe legitimate daughter of the natural energy of thought, like the\ninspiration of the poet, the instinct of the hero, the enthusiasm of the\nprophet.\" Such is the first act of knowing, and in this first act the\nmind passes from _idea to being_ without ever suspecting the depth of\nthe chasm it has passed. It passes by means of the power which is in it,\nand is not astonished at what it has done. It is subsequently astonished\nwhen by reflection it returns to the analysis of the results, and, by\nthe aid of the liberty with which it is endowed, to do the opposite of\nwhat it has done, to deny what it has affirmed. \"Hence comes the strife\nbetween sophism and common sense, between false science and natural\ntruth, between good and bad philosophy, both of which come from free\nreflection.\"[72]\n\nIt is this spontaneity of thought which gives birth to _religion._ The\ninstinctive thought which darts through the world, even to God, is\nnatural religion. \"All thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, and\nthere is no such thing as natural atheism. Doubt and skepticism may\nmingle with reflective thought, but beneath reflection there is still\nspontaneity. When the scholar has denied the existence of God, listen to\nthe man, interrogate him, take him unawares, and you will see that all\nhis words envelop the idea of God, and that faith in God is, without his\nrecognition, at the bottom, in his heart.\"[73]\n\nReligion, then, in the system of Cousin, does not begin with reflection,\nwith science, but with _faith_. There is, however, this difference to be\nnoted between the theory of the \"faith-philosophers\" (Jacobi,\nSchleiermacher, etc.) and the theory of Cousin. With them, faith is\ngrounded on sensation or _feeling_; with him, it is grounded on\n_reason_. \"Faith, whatever may be its form, whatever may be its object,\ncommon or sublime, can be nothing else than the _consent of reason_.\nThat is the foundation of faith.\"[74]\n\n[Footnote 72: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 73: \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Ibid., vol. i. p. 90.]\n\nReligion is, therefore, with Cousin, at bottom, pure Theism. He thinks,\nhowever, that \"true theism is not a dead religion that forgets precisely\nthe fundamental attributes of God.\" It recognizes God as creator,\npreserver, and governor; it celebrates a providence; it adores a\nperfect, holy, righteous, benevolent God. It holds the principle of\nduty, of obligation, of moral desert. It not only perceives the divine\ncharacter, but feels its relation to God. The revelation of the\nInfinite, by reason, moves the feelings, and passes into sentiment,\nproducing reverence, and love, and gratitude. And it creates worship,\nwhich recalls man to God a thousand times more forcibly than the order,\nharmony, and beauty of the universe can do.\n\nThe spontaneous action of reason, in its greatest energy, is\n_inspiration_. \"Inspiration, daughter of the soul and heaven, speaks\nfrom on high with an absolute authority. It commands faith; so all its\nwords are hymns, and its natural language is poetry.\" \"Thus, in the\ncradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his\nfellows the gift of inspiration, passed for the confidant and the\ninterpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself;\nand he is so, in fact, in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin\nof prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship.\"[75]\n\n[Footnote 75: \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 129.]\n\nAs an account of the genesis of the idea of God in the human\nintelligence, the doctrine of Cousin must be regarded as eminently\nlogical, adequate, and satisfactory. As a theory of the origin of\nreligion, as a philosophy which shall explain all the phenomena of\nreligion, it must be pronounced defective, and, in some of its aspects,\nerroneous.\n\nFirst, it does not take proper account of that _living force_ which has\nin all ages developed so much energy, and wrought such vast results in\nthe history of religion, viz., the _power of the heart_. Cousin\ndiscourses eloquently on the spontaneous, instinctive movements of the\nreason, but he overlooks, in a great measure, the instinctive movements\nof the heart. He does not duly estimate the feeling of reverence and awe\nwhich rises spontaneously in presence of the vastness and grandeur of\nthe universe, and of the power and glory of which the created universe\nis a symbol and shadow. He disregards that sense of an overshadowing\nPresence which, at least in seasons of tenderness and deep sensibility,\nseems to compass us about, and lay its hand upon us. He scarcely\nrecognizes the deep consciousness of imperfection and weakness, and\nutter dependence, which prompts man to seek for and implore the aid of a\nSuperior Being; and, above all, he takes no proper account of the sense\nof guilt and the conscious need of expiation. His theory, therefore, can\nnot adequately explain the universal prevalence of sacrifices, penances,\nand prayers. In short, it does not meet and answer to the deep longings\nof the human heart, the wants, sufferings, fears, and hopes of man.\n\nCousin claims that the universal reason of man is illuminated by the\nlight of God. It is quite pertinent to ask, Why may not the universal\nheart of humanity be touched and moved by the spirit of God? If the\nideas of reason be a revelation from God, may not the instinctive\nfeelings of the heart be an inspiration of God? May not God come near to\nthe heart of man and awaken a mysterious presentiment of an invisible\nPresence, and an instinctive longing to come nearer to Him? May he not\ndraw men towards himself by sweet, persuasive influences, and raise man\nto a conscious fellowship? Is not God indeed the _great want_ of the\nhuman heart?\n\nSecondly, Cousin does not give due importance to the influence of\nrevealed truth as given in the sacred Scriptures, and of the positive\ninstitutions of religion, as a divine economy, supernaturally originated\nin the world. He grants, indeed, that \"a primitive revelation throws\nlight upon the cradle of human civilization,\" and that \"all antique\ntraditions refer to an age in which man, at his departure from the hand\nof God, received from him immediately all lights, and all truths.\"[76]\nHe also believes that \"the Mosaic religion, by its developments, is\nmingled with the history of all the surrounding people of Egypt, of\nAssyria, of Persia, and of Greece and Rome.\"[77] Christianity, however,\nis regarded as \"the summing and crown of the two great religious systems\nwhich reigned by turn in the East and in Greece\"--the maturity of\nEthnicism and Judaism; a development rather than a new creation. The\nexplanation which he offers of the phenomena of inspiration opens the\ndoor to religious skepticism. Those who were termed seers, prophets,\ninspired teachers of ancient times, were simply men who resigned\nthemselves wholly to their intellectual instincts, and thus gazed upon\ntruth in its pure and perfect form. They did not reason, they did not\nreflect, they made no pretensions to philosophy they received truth\nspontaneously as it flowed in upon them from heaven.[78] This immediate\nreception of Divine light was nothing more than the _natural_ play of\nspontaneous reason nothing more than what has existed to a greater or\nless degree in every man of great genius; nothing more than may now\nexist in any mind which resigns itself to its own unreflective\napperceptions. Thus revelation, in its proper sense, loses all its\npeculiar value, and Christianity is robbed of its pre-eminent authority.\nThe extremes of Mysticism and Rationalism here meet on the same ground,\nand Plotinus and Cousin are at one.\n\n[Footnote 76: \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Ibid., vol. i. p. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Morell, \"Hist. of Philos.,\" p. 661.]\n\nV. The fifth hypothesis offered in explanation of the religious\nphenomena of the world is that they had their origin _in_ EXTERNAL\nREVELATION, _to which reason is related as a purely passive organ, and\nEthnicism as a feeble relic_.\n\nThis is the theory of the school of \"dogmatic theologians,\" of which the\nablest and most familiar presentation is found in the \"Theological\nInstitutes\" of R. Watson.[79] He claims that all our religious knowledge\nis derived from _oral revelation alone_, and that all the forms of\nreligion and modes of worship which have prevailed in the heathen world\nhave been perversions and corruptions of the one true religion first\ntaught to the earliest families of men by God himself. All the ideas of\nGod, duty, immortality, and future retribution which are now possessed,\nor have ever been possessed by the heathen nations, are only broken and\nscattered rays of the primitive traditions descending from the family of\nNoah, and revived by subsequent intercourses with the Hebrew race; and\nall the modes of religious worship--prayers, lustrations,\nsacrifices--that have obtained in the world, are but feeble relics,\nfaint reminiscences of the primitive worship divinely instituted among\nthe first families of men. \"The first man received the knowledge of God\nby sensible converse with him, and that doctrine was transmitted, with\nthe confirmation of successive manifestations, to the early ancestors of\nall nations.\"[80] This belief in the existence of a Supreme Being was\npreserved among the Jews by continual manifestations of the presence of\nJehovah. \"The intercourses between the Jews and the states of Syria and\nBabylon, on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, powers which rose to\ngreat eminence and influence in the ancient world, was maintained for\nages. Their frequent dispersions and captivities would tend to preserve\nin part, and in part to revive, the knowledge of the once common and\nuniversal faith.\"[81] And the Greek sages who resorted for instruction\nto the Chaldean philosophic schools derived from thence their knowledge\nof the theological system of the Jews.[82] Among the heathen nations\nthis primitive revelation was corrupted by philosophic speculation, as\nin India and China, Greece and Rome; and in some cases it was entirely\nobliterated by ignorance, superstition, and vice, as among the\nHottentots of Africa and the aboriginal tribes of New South Wales, who\n\"have no idea of one Supreme Creator.\"[83]\n\n[Footnote 79: We might have referred the reader to Ellis's \"Knowledge of\nDivine Things from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature;\" Leland's\n\"Necessity of Revelation;\" and Horsley's \"Dissertations,\" etc.; but as\nwe are not aware of their having been reprinted in this country, we\nselect the \"Institutes\" of Watson as the best presentation of the views\nof \"the dogmatic theologians\" accessible to American readers.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Watson, \"Theol. Inst,\" vol. i. p. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 82: See ch. v. and vi., \"On the Origin of those Truths which\nare found in the Writings and Religious Systems of the Heathen.\"]\n\n[Footnote 83: Ibid., vol. i. p. 274.]\n\nThe same course of reasoning is pursued in regard to the idea of duty,\nand the knowledge of right and wrong. \"A direct communication of the\nDivine Will was made to the primogenitors of our race,\" and to this\nsource _alone_ we are indebted for all correct ideas of right and wrong.\n\"Whatever is found pure in morals, in ancient or modern writers, may be\ntraced to _indirect_ revelation.\"[84] Verbal instruction--tradition or\nscripture--thus becomes the source of all our moral ideas. The doctrine\nof immortality, and of a future retribution,[85] the practice of\nsacrifice--precatory and expiatory, are also ascribed to the same\nsource.[86] Thus the only medium by which religious truth can possibly\nbecome known to the masses of mankind is _tradition_. The ultimate\nfoundation on which the religious faith and the religious practices of\nuniversal humanity have rested, with the exception of the Jews, and the\nfavored few to whom the Gospel has come, is uncertain, precarious, and\neasily corrupted tradition.\n\n[Footnote 84: Watson, \"Theol. Inst.,\" vol. ii. p. 470.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 26.]\n\nThe improbability, inadequacy, and incompleteness of this theory will be\nobvious from the following considerations:\n\n1. It is highly improbable that truths so important and vital to man, so\nessential to the well-being of the human race, so necessary to the\nperfect development of humanity as are the ideas of God, duty, and\nimmortality, should rest on so precarious and uncertain a basis as\ntradition is admitted, even by Mr. Watson, to be.\n\nThe human mind needs the idea of God to satisfy its deep moral\nnecessities, and to harmonize all its powers. The perfection of humanity\ncan never be secured, the destination of humanity can never be achieved,\nthe purpose of God in the existence of humanity can never be\naccomplished, without the idea of God, and of the relation of man to\nGod, being present to the human mind. Society needs the idea of a\nSupreme Ruler as the foundation of law and government, and as the basis\nof social order. Without it, these can not be, or be conserved.\nIntellectual creatureship, social order, human progress, are\ninconceivable and impossible without the idea of God, and of\naccountability to God. Now that truths so fundamental should, to the\nmasses of men, rest on tradition _alone_, is incredible. Is there no\nknown and accessible God to the outlying millions of our race who, in\nconsequence of the circumstances of birth and education, which are\nbeyond their control, have had no access to an oral revelation, and\namong whom the dim shadowy rays of an ancient tradition have long ago\nexpired? Are the eight hundred millions of our race upon whom the light\nof Christianity has not shone unvisited by the common Father of our\nrace? Has the universal Father left his \"own offspring\" without a single\nnative power of recognizing the existence of the Divine Parent, and\nabandoned them to solitary and dreary orphanage? Could not he who gave\nto matter its properties and laws,--the properties and laws through\nwhose operation he is working out his own purposes in the realm of\nnature,--could not he have also given to mind ideas and principles\nwhich, logically developed, would lead to recognition of a God, and of\nour duty to God, and, by these ideas and principles, have wrought out\nhis sublime purposes in the realm of mind? Could not he who gave to man\nthe appetency for food, and implanted in his nature the social instincts\nto preserve his physical being, have implanted in his heart a \"feeling\nafter God,\" and an instinct to worship God in order to the conservation\nof his spiritual being? How otherwise can we affirm the responsibility\nand accountability of all the race before God? Those theologians who are\nso earnest in the assertion that God has not endowed man with the native\npower of attaining the knowledge of God can not, on any principle of\nequity, show how the heathen are \"without excuse\" when, in involuntary\nignorance of God, they \"worship the creature instead of the Creator,\"\nand violate a law of duty of which they have no possible means to attain\nthe barest knowledge.\n\n2. This theory is utterly inadequate to the explanation of the\n_universality_ of religious rites, and especially of religious ideas.\n\nTake, for example, the idea of God. As a matter of fact we affirm, in\nopposition to Watson, the universality of this idea. The idea of God is\nconnatural to the human mind. Wherever human reason has had its normal\nand healthy development[87], this idea has arisen spontaneously and\nnecessarily. There has not been found a race of men who were utterly\ndestitute of some knowledge of a Supreme Being. All the instances\nalleged have, on further and more accurate inquiry, been found\nincorrect. The tendency of the last century, arbitrarily to quadrate all\nthe facts of religious history with the prevalent sensational\nphilosophy, had its influence upon the minds of the first missionaries\nto India, China, Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific. They\n_expected_ to find that the heathen had no knowledge of a Supreme Being,\nand before they had mastered the idioms of their language, or become\nfamiliar with their mythological and cosmological systems, they reported\nthem as _utterly ignorant of God_, destitute of the idea and even the\nname of a Supreme Being. These mistaken and hasty conclusions have,\nhowever, been corrected by a more intimate acquaintance with the people,\ntheir languages and religions. Even in the absence of any better\ninformation, we should be constrained to doubt the accuracy of the\nauthorities quoted by Mr. Watson in relation to Hindooism, when by one\n(Ward) we are told that the Hindoo \"believes in a God destitute of\n_intelligence_\" and by another (Moore) that \"Brahm is the one eternal\n_Mind_, the self-existent, incomprehensible Spirit\". Learned and\ntrustworthy critics, Asiatic as well as European, however, confidently\naffirm that \"the ground of the Brahminical faith is Monotheistic;\" it\nrecognizes \"an Absolute and Supreme Being\" as the source of all that\nexists.[88] Eugene Burnouf, M. Barth\u00e9lemy Saint-Hilaire, Koeppen, and\nindeed nearly all who have written on the subject of Buddhism, have\nshown that the metaphysical doctrines of Buddha were borrowed from the\nearlier systems of the Brahminic philosophy. \"Buddha.\" we are told, is\n\"_pure intelligence_\" \"_clear light_\", \"_perfect wisdom_;\" the same as\nBrahm. This is surely Theism in its highest conception.[89] In regard to\nthe peoples of South Africa, Dr. Livingstone assures us \"there is no\nneed for beginning to tell even the most degraded of these people of the\nexistence of a God, or of a future state--the facts being universally\nadmitted.... On questioning intelligent men among the Backwains as to\ntheir former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and of a future state,\nthey have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a\ntolerably clear conception on all these subjects.\"[90] And so far from\nthe New Hollanders having no idea of a Supreme Being, we are assured by\nE. Stone Parker, the protector of the aborigines of New Holland, they\nhave a clear and well-defined idea of a \"_Great Spirit_,\" the maker of\nall things.\n\n[Footnote 87: Watson, \"Theol. Inst.,\" vol. i. p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Maurice, \"Religions of the World,\" p. 59: _Edin.\nReview_,1862, art \"Recent Researches on Buddhism.\" See also M\u00fcller's\n\"Chips from a German Workshop,\" vol. i. ch. i. to vi.]\n\n[Footnote 89: \"It has been said that Buddha and Kapila were both\natheists, and that Buddha borrowed his atheism from Kapila. But atheism\nis an indefinite term, and may mean very different things. In one sense\nevery Indian philosopher was an atheist, for they all perceived that the\ngods of the populace could not claim the attributes that belong to a\nSupreme Being. But all the important philosophical systems of the\nBrahmans admit, in some form or another, the existence of an Absolute\nand Supreme Being, the source of all that exists, or seems to\nexist.\"--M\u00fcller, \"Chips from a German Workshop,\" vol. i. pp. 224,5.\n\nBuddha, which means \"intelligence,\" \"clear light,\" \"perfect wisdom,\" was\nnot only the name of the founder of the religion of Eastern Asia, but\nAdi Buddha was the name of the Absolute, Eternal Intelligence.--Maurice,\n\"Religions of the World,\" p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 90: \"Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa,\" p.\n158.]\n\nNow had the idea of God rested _solely_ on tradition, it were the most\nnatural probability that it might be lost, nay, _must_ be lost, amongst\nthose races of men who were geographically and chronologically far\nremoved from the primitive cradle of humanity in the East. The people\nwho, in their migrations, had wandered to the remotest parts of the\nearth, and had become isolated from the rest of mankind, might, after\nthe lapse of ages, be expected to lose the idea of God, if it were not a\nspontaneous and native intuition of the mind,--a necessity of thought. A\nfact of history must be presumed to stick to the mind with much greater\ntenacity than a purely rational idea which has no visible symbol in the\nsensible world, and yet, even in regard to the events of history, the\npersistence and pertinacity of tradition is exceedingly feeble. The\nSouth Sea Islanders know not from whence, or at what time, their\nancestors came. There are monuments in Tonga and Fiji of which the\npresent inhabitants can give no account. How, then, can a pure, abstract\nidea which can have no sensible representation, no visible image, retain\nits hold upon the memory of humanity for thousands of years? The Fijian\nmay not remember whence his immediate ancestors came, but he knows that\nthe race came originally from the hands of the Creator. He can not tell\nwho built the monuments of solid masonry which are found in his\nisland-home, but he can tell who reared the everlasting hills and built\nthe universe. He may not know who reigned in Vewa a hundred years ago,\nbut he knows who now reigns, and has always reigned, over the whole\nearth. \"The idea of a God is familiar to the Fijian, and the existence\nof an invisible superhuman power controlling and influencing nature, and\nall earthly things, is fully recognized by him.\"[91] The idea of God is\na common fact of human consciousness, and tradition alone is manifestly\ninadequate to account for its _universality_.\n\n[Footnote 91: \"Fiji and the Fijians,\" p. 215.]\n\n3. A verbal revelation would be inadequate to convey the knowledge of\nGod to an intelligence \"_purely passive_\" and utterly unfurnished with\nany _\u00e0 priori_ ideas or necessary laws of cognition and thought.\n\nOf course it is not denied that important verbal communications relating\nto the character of God, and the duties we owe to God, were given to the\nfirst human pair, more clear and definite, it may be, than any knowledge\nattained by Socrates and Plato through their dialectic processes, and\nthat these oral revelations were successively repeated and enlarged to\nthe patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament church. And\nfurthermore, that some rays of light proceeding from this pure fountain\nof truth were diffused, and are still lingering among the heathen\nnations, we have no desire, and no need to deny.\n\nAll this, however, supposes, at least, a natural power and aptitude for\nthe knowledge of God, and some configuration and correlation of the\nhuman intelligence to the Divine. \"We have no knowledge of a dynamic\ninfluence, spiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction.\" Matter can\nnot be moved and controlled by forces and laws, unless it have\nproperties which correlate it with those forces and laws. And mind can\nnot be determined from without to any specific form of cognition, unless\nit have active powers of apprehension and conception which are governed\nby uniform laws. The \"material\" of thought may be supplied from without,\nbut the \"form\" is determined by the necessary laws of our inward being.\nAll our cognition of the external world is conditioned by the _\u00e0 priori_\nideas of time and space, and all our thinking is governed by the\nprinciples of causality and substance, and the law of \"sufficient\nreason.\" The mind itself supplies an element of knowledge in all our\ncognitions. Man can not be taught the knowledge of God if he be not\nnaturally possessed of a presentiment, or an apperception of a God, as\nthe cause and reason of the universe. \"If education be not already\npreceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative\npredisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to act\nupon.\"[92] A mere verbal revelation can not communicate the knowledge of\nGod, if man have not already the idea of a God in his mind. A name is a\nmere empty sign, a meaningless symbol, without a mental image of the\nobject which it represents, or an innate perception, or an abstract\nconception of the mind, of which the word is the sign. The mental image\nor the abstract conception must, therefore, precede the name; cognition\nmust be anterior to, and give the meaning of language.[93] The child\nknows a thing even before it can speak its name. And, universally, we\nmust know the _thing_ in itself, or image it by analogies and\nresemblances to some other thing we do know, before the name can have\nany meaning for us. As to purely rational ideas and abstract\nconceptions,--as space, cause, the infinite, the perfect,--language can\nnever convey these to the mind, nor can the mind ever attain them by\nexperience if they are not an original, connate part of our mental\nequipment and furniture. The mere verbal affirmation \"there is a God\"\nmade to one who has no idea of a God, would be meaningless and\nunintelligible. What notion can a man form of \"the First Cause\" if the\nprinciple of causality is not inherent in his mind? What conception can\nhe form of \"the Infinite Mind\" if the infinite be not a primitive\nintuition? How can he conceive of \"a Righteous Governor\" if he have no\nidea of right, no sense of obligation, no apprehension of a retribution?\nWords are empty sounds without ideas, and God is a mere name if the mind\nhas no apperception of a God.\n\n[Footnote 92: Nitzsch, \"System of Christian Doctrine,\" p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 93: \"Ideas must pre-exist their sensible signs.\" See De\nBoismont on \"Hallucination,\" etc., p. iii.]\n\nIt may be affirmed that, preceding or accompanying the announcement of\nthe Divine Name, there was given to the first human pair, and to the\nearly fathers of our race, some visible manifestation of the presence of\nGod, and some supernatural display of divine power. What, then, was the\ncharacter of these early manifestations, and were they adequate to\nconvey the proper idea of God? Did God first reveal himself in human\nform, and if so, how could their conception of God advance beyond a rude\nanthropomorphism? Did he reveal his presence in a vast columnar cloud or\na pillar of fire? How could such an image convey any conception of the\nintelligence, the omnipresence, the eternity of God? Nay, can the\ninfinite and eternal Mind be represented by any visible manifestation?\nCan the human mind conceive an image of God? The knowledge of God, it is\nclear, can not be conveyed by any sensible sign or symbol if man has no\nprior rational idea of God as the Infinite and the Perfect Being.\n\nIf the facts of order, and design, and special adaptation which crowd\nthe universe, and the _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of an unconditioned Cause and an\ninfinite Intelligence which arise in the mind in presence of these\nfacts, are inadequate to produce the logical conviction that it is the\nwork of an intelligent mind, how can any preternatural display of\n_power_ produce a rational conviction that God exists? \"If the universe\ncould come by chance or fate, surely all the lesser phenomena, termed\nmiraculous, might occur so too.\"[94] If we find ourselves standing amid\nan eternal series of events, may not miracles be a part of that series?\nOr if all things are the result of necessary and unchangeable laws, may\nnot miracles also result from some natural or psychological law of which\nwe are yet in ignorance? Let it be granted that man is _not_ so\nconstituted that, by the necessary laws of his intelligence, he must\naffirm that facts of order having a commencement in time prove mind; let\nit be granted that man has _no_ intuitive belief in the Infinite and\nPerfect--in short, no idea of God; how, then, could a marvellous display\nof _power_, a new, peculiar, and startling phenomenon which even seemed\nto transcend nature, prove to him the existence of an infinite\n_intelligence_--a personal God? The proof would be simply inadequate,\nbecause not the right kind of proof. Power does not indicate\nintelligence, force does not imply personality.\n\n[Footnote 94: Morell, \"Hist. of Philos.\" p. 737.]\n\nMiracles, in short, were never intended to prove the existence of God.\nThe foundation of this truth had already been laid in the constitution\nand laws of the human mind, and miracles were designed to convince us\nthat He of whose existence we had a prior certainty, spoke to us by His\nMessenger, and in this way attested his credentials. To the man who has\na rational belief in the existence of God this evidence of a divine\nmission is at once appropriate and conclusive. \"Master, we know thou art\na teacher sent from God; for no man can do the works which thou doest,\nexcept God be with him.\" The Christian missionary does not commence his\ninstruction to the heathen, who have an imperfect, or even erroneous\nconception of \"the Great Spirit,\" by narrating the miracles of Christ,\nor quoting the testimony of the Divine Book he carries along with him.\nHe points to the heavens and the earth, and says, \"There is a Being who\nmade all these things, and Jehovah is his name; I have come to you with\na message from Him!\" Or he need scarce do even so much; for already the\nheathen, in view of the order and beauty which pervades the universe,\nhas been constrained, by the laws of his own intelligence, to believe in\nand offer worship to the \"Agnostos Theos\"--the unseen and\nincomprehensible God; and pointing to their altars, he may announce with\nPaul, \"this God _whom ye worship_, though ignorantly, him declare I unto\nyou!\"\n\nThe results of our study of the various hypotheses which have been\noffered in explanation of the religious phenomena of the world may be\nsummed up as follows: The first and second theories we have rejected as\nutterly false. Instead of being faithful to and adequately explaining\nthe facts, they pervert, and maltreat, and distort the facts of\nreligious history. The last three each contain a precious element of\ntruth which must not be undervalued, and which can not be omitted in an\nexplanation which can be pronounced complete. Each theory, taken by\nitself, is incomplete and inadequate. The third hypothesis overrates\n_feeling_; the fourth, _reason_; the fifth, _verbal instruction_. The\nfirst extreme is Mysticism, the second is Rationalism, the last is\nDogmatism. Reason, feeling, and faith in testimony must be combined, and\nmutually condition each other. No purely rationalistic hypothesis will\nmeet and satisfy the wants and yearnings of the heart. No theory based\non feeling alone can satisfy the demands of the human intellect. And,\nfinally, an hypothesis which bases all religion upon historical\ntestimony and outward fact, and despises and tramples upon the\nintuitions of the reason and the instincts of the heart can never\ncommand the general faith of mankind. Religion embraces and\nconditionates the whole sphere of life--thought, feeling, faith, and\naction; it must therefore be grounded in the entire spiritual nature of\nman.\n\nOur criticism of opposite theories has thus prepared the way for, and\nobviated the necessity of an extended discussion of the hypothesis we\nnow advance.\n\n_The universal phenomenon of religion has originated in the \u00e0 priori\napperceptions of reason, and the natural instinctive feelings of the\nheart, which, from age to age, have been vitalized, unfolded, and\nperfected by supernatural communications and testamentary revelations_.\n\nThere are universal facts of religious history which can only be\nexplained on the first principle of this hypothesis; there are special\nfacts which can only be explained on the latter principle. The universal\nprevalence of the idea of God, and the feeling of obligation to obey and\nworship God, belong to the first order of facts; the general prevalence\nof expiatory sacrifices, of the rite of circumcision, and the observance\nof sacred and holy days, belong to the latter. To the last class of\nfacts the observance of the Christian Sabbath, and the rites of Baptism\nand the Lord's Supper may be added.\n\nThe history of all religions clearly attests that there are two orders\nof principles--the _natural_ and the _positive_, and, in some measure,\ntwo authorities of religious life which are intimately related without\nnegativing each other. The characteristic of the natural is that it is\n_intrinsic_, of the positive, that it is _extrinsic_. In all ages men\nhave sought the authority of the positive in that which is immediately\n_beyond_ and above man--in some \"voice of the Divinity\" toning down the\nstream of ages, or speaking through a prophet or oracle, or written in\nsome inspired and sacred book. They have sought for the authority of the\nnatural in that which is immediately _within_ man--the voice of the\nDivinity speaking in the conscience and heart of man. A careful study of\nthe history of religion will show a reciprocal relation between the two,\nand indicate their common source.\n\nWe expect to find that our hypothesis will be abundantly sustained by\nthe study of the _Religion of the Athenians_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS.\n\n\n\"All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion\n(deisidaimonesterous). For as I passed through your city, and beheld the\nobjects of your worship, I found amongst them an altar with this\ninscription--'TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.' Whom therefore ye worship....\"--ST.\nPAUL.\n\nThrough one of those remarkable counter-strokes of Divine Providence by\nwhich the evil designs of men are overruled, and made to subserve the\npurposes of God, the Apostle Paul was brought to Athens. He walked\nbeneath its stately porticoes, he entered its solemn temples, he stood\nbefore its glorious statuary, he viewed its beautiful altars--all\ndevoted to pagan worship. And \"his spirit was stirred within him,\" he\nwas moved with indignation \"when he saw the city full of images of the\ngods.\"[95] At the very entrance of the city he met the evidence of this\npeculiar tendency of the Athenians to multiply the objects of their\ndevotion; for here at the gateway stands an image of Neptune, seated on\nhorseback, and brandishing the trident. Passing through the gate, his\nattention would be immediately arrested by the sculptured forms of\nMinerva, Jupiter, Apollo, Mercury, and the Muses, standing near a\nsanctuary of Bacchus. A long street is now before him, with temples,\nstatues, and altars crowded on either hand. Walking to the end of this\nstreet, and turning to the right, he entered the Agora, a public square\nsurrounded with porticoes and temples, which were adorned with statuary\nand paintings in honor of the gods of Grecian mythology. Amid the\nplane-trees planted by the hand of Cimon are the statues of the deified\nheroes of Athens, Hercules and Theseus, and the whole series of the\nEponymi, together with the memorials of the older divinities; Mercuries\nwhich gave the name to the streets on which they were placed; statues\ndedicated to Apollo as patron of the city and her deliverer from the\nplague; and in the centre of all the altar of the Twelve Gods.\n\n[Footnote 95: Lange's Commentary, Acts xvii. 16.]\n\nStanding in the market-place, and looking up to the Areopagus, Paul\nwould see the temple of Mars, from whom the hill derived its name. And\nturning toward the Acropolis, he would behold, closing the long\nperspective, a series of little sanctuaries on the very ledges of the\nrocks, shrines of Bacchus and \u00c6sculapius, Venus, Earth, and Ceres,\nending with the lovely form of the Temple of Unwinged Victory, which\nglittered in front of the Propyl\u00e6a.\n\nIf the apostle entered the \"fivefold gates,\" and ascended the flight of\nstone steps to the platform of the Acropolis, he would find the whole\narea one grand composition of architecture and statuary dedicated to the\nworship of the gods. Here stood the Parthenon, the Virgin House, the\nglorious temple which was erected during the proudest days of Athenian\nglory, an entire offering to Minerva, the tutelary divinity of Athens.\nWithin was the colossal statue of the goddess wrought in ivory and gold.\nOutside the temple there stood another statue of Minerva, cast from the\nbrazen spoils of Marathon; and near by yet another brazen Pallas, which\nwas called by pre-eminence \"the Beautiful.\"\n\nIndeed, to whatever part of Athens the apostle wandered, he would meet\nthe evidences of their \"carefulness in religion,\" for every public place\nand every public building was a sanctuary of some god. The Metroum, or\nrecord-house, was a temple to the mother of the gods. The council-house\nheld statues of Apollo and Jupiter, with an altar to Vesta. The theatre\nat the base of the Acropolis was consecrated to Bacchus. The Pnyx was\ndedicated to Jupiter on high. And as if, in this direction, the Attic\nimagination knew no bounds, abstractions were deified; altars were\nerected to Fame, to Energy, to Modesty, and even to Pity, and these\nabstractions were honored and worshipped as gods.\n\nThe impression made upon the mind of Paul was, that the city was\nliterally \"full of idols,\" or images of the gods. This impression is\nsustained by the testimony of numerous Greek and Roman writers.\nPausanias declares that Athens \"had more images than all the rest of\nGreece;\" and Petronius, the Roman satirist, says, \"it was easier to find\na god in Athens than a man.\"[96]\n\n[Footnote 96: See Conybeare and Howson's \"Life and Epistles of St.\nPaul;\" also, art. \"Athens,\" in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, whence our\naccount of the \"sacred objects\" in Athens is chiefly gathered.]\n\nNo wonder, then, that as Paul wandered amid these scenes \"his spirit was\nstirred in him.\" He burned with holy zeal to maintain the honor of the\ntrue and only God, whom now he saw dishonored on every side. He was\nfilled with compassion for those Athenians who, notwithstanding their\nintellectual greatness, had changed the glory of God into an image made\nin the likeness of corruptible man, and who really worshipped the\ncreature _more_ than the Creator. The images intended to symbolize the\ninvisible perfections of God were usurping the place of God, and\nreceiving the worship due alone to him. We may presume the apostle was\nnot insensible to the beauties of Grecian art. The sublime architecture\nof the Propyl\u00e6a and the Parthenon, the magnificent sculpture of Phidias\nand Praxiteles, could not fail to excite his wonder. But he remembered\nthat those superb temples and this glorious statuary were the creation\nof the pagan spirit, and devoted to polytheistic worship. The glory of\nthe supreme God was obscured by all this symbolism. The creatures formed\nby God, the symbols of his power and presence in nature, the ministers\nof his providence and moral government, were receiving the honor due to\nhim. Over all this scene of material beauty and \u00e6sthetic perfection\nthere rose in dark and hideous proportions the errors and delusions and\nsins against the living God which Polytheism nurtured, and unable any\nlonger to restrain himself, he commenced to \"reason\" with the crowds of\nAthenians who stood beneath the shadows of the plane-trees, or lounged\nbeneath the porticoes that surrounded the Agora. Among these groups of\nidlers were mingled the disciples of Zeno and Epicurus, who\n\"encountered\" Paul. The nature of these \"disputations\" may be easily\nconjectured, The opinions of these philosophers are even now familiarly\nknown: they are, in one form or another, current in the literature of\nmodern times. Materialism and Pantheism still \"encounter\" Christianity.\nThe apostle asserted the personal being and spirituality of one supreme\nand only God, who has in divers ways revealed himself to man, and\ntherefore may be \"known.\" He proclaimed that Jesus is the fullest and\nmost perfect revelation of God--the _only_ \"manifestation of God in the\nflesh.\" He pointed to his \"resurrection\" as the proof of his superhuman\ncharacter and mission to the world. Some of his hearers were disposed to\ntreat him with contempt; they represented him as an ignorant \"babbler,\"\nwho had picked up a few scraps of learning, and who now sought to palm\nthem off as a \"new\" philosophy. But most of them regarded him with that\npeculiar Attic curiosity which was always anxious to be hearing some\n\"new thing.\" So they led him away from the tumult of the market-place to\nthe top of Mars' Hill, where, in its serene atmosphere, they might hear\nhim more carefully, and said, \"May we hear what this new doctrine is\nwhereof thou speakest?\"\n\nSurrounded by these men of thoughtful, philosophic mind--men who had\ndeeply pondered the great problem of existence, who had earnestly\ninquired after the \"first principles of things;\" men who had reasoned\nhigh of creation, fate, and providence; of right and wrong; of\nconscience, law, and retribution; and had formed strong and decided\nopinions on all these questions--he delivered his discourse on the\n_being_, the _providence_, the _spirituality_, and the _moral\ngovernment_ of God.\n\nThis grand theme was suggested by an inscription he had observed on one\nof the altars of the city, which was dedicated \"To the Unknown God.\" \"Ye\nmen of Athens! every thing which I behold bears witness to your\n_carefulness in religion_. For as I passed by and beheld your sacred\nobjects I found an altar with this inscription, 'To the Unknown God;'\nwhom, therefore, ye worship, though ye know him not [adequately], Him\ndeclare I unto you.\" Starting from this point, the manifest carefulness\nof the Athenians in religion, and accepting this inscription as the\nevidence that they had some presentiment, some native intuition, some\ndim conception of the one true and living God, he strives to lead them\nto a deeper knowledge of Him. It is here conceded by the apostle that\nthe Athenians were a _religious people_. The observations he had made\nduring his short stay in Athens enabled him to bear witness that the\nAthenians were \"a God-fearing people,\"[97] and he felt that fairness and\ncandor demanded that this trait should receive from him an ample\nrecognition and a full acknowledgment. Accordingly he commences by\nsaying in gentle terms, well fitted to conciliate his audience, \"All\nthings which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in religion.\" I\nrecognize you as most devout; ye appear to me to be a God-fearing\npeople,[98] for as I passed by and beheld your sacred objects I found an\naltar with this inscription, \"To the Unknown God,\" whom therefore ye\nworship.\n\n[Footnote 97: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_.]\n\n[Footnote 98: \"\u00d4s before deisid.--so imports. I recognize you as\nsuch.\"--Lange's Commentary.]\n\nThe assertion that the Athenians were \"a religious people\" will, to many\nof our readers, appear a strange and startling utterance, which has in\nit more of novelty than truth. Nay, some will be shocked to hear the\nApostle Paul described as complimenting these Athenians--these pagan\nworshippers--on their \"carefulness in religion.\" We have been so long\naccustomed to use the word \"heathen\" as an opprobrious\nepithet--expressing, indeed, the utmost extremes of ignorance, and\nbarbarism, and cruelty, that it has become difficult for us to believe\nthat in a heathen there can be any good.\n\nFrom our childhood we have read in our English Bibles, Ye men of Athens,\nI perceive in all things ye are _too superstitious_ and we can scarcely\ntolerate another version, even if it can be shown that it approaches\nnearer to the actual language employed by Paul. We must, therefore, ask\nthe patience and candor of the reader, while we endeavor to show, on the\nauthority of Paul's words, that the Athenians were a \"religious people,\"\nand that all our notions to the contrary are founded on prejudice and\nmisapprehension.\n\nFirst, then, let us commence even with our English version: \"Ye men of\nAthens, I perceive that in all things ye are _too superstitious_.\" And\nwhat now is the meaning of the word \"superstition?\" It is true, we now\nuse it only in an evil sense, to express a belief in the agency of\ninvisible, capricious, malignant powers, which fills the mind with fear\nand terror, and sees in every unexplained phenomenon of nature an omen,\nor prognostic, of some future evil. But this is not its proper and\noriginal meaning. Superstition is from the Latin _superstitio_, which\nmeans a superabundance of religion,[99] an extreme exactitude in\nreligious observance. And this is precisely the sense in which the\ncorresponding Greek term is used by the Apostle Paul. Deisidaimonia\nproperly means \"reverence for the gods.\" \"It is used,\" says Barnes, \"in\nthe classic writers, in a good sense, to denote piety towards the gods,\nor suitable fear and reverence for them.\" \"The word,\" says Lechler, \"is,\nwithout doubt, to be understood here in a good sense; although it seems\nto have been intentionally chosen, in order to indicate the conception\nof _fear_(deid\u00f4), which predominated in the religion of the apostle's\nhearers.\"[100] This reading is sustained by the ablest critics and\nscholars of modern times. Bengel reads the sentence, \"I perceive that ye\nare _very religious_\"[101] Cudworth translates it thus: \"Ye are every\nway _more than ordinarily religious.\"[102]_ Conybeare and Howson read\nthe text as we have already given it, \"All things which I behold bear\nwitness to your _carefulness in religion_.\"[103] Lechler reads \"very\ndevout;\"[104] Alford, \"carrying your _religious reverence very\nfar_;\"[105] and Albert Barnes,[106] \"I perceive ye are greatly devoted\nto _reverence for religion_.\"[107] Whoever, therefore, will give\nattention to the actual words of the apostle, and search for their real\nmeaning, must be convinced he opens his address by complimenting the\nAthenians on their being more than ordinarily religious.\n\n[Footnote 99: Nitzsch, \"System of Christ. Doctrine,\" p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Lange's Commentary, _in loco_.]\n\n[Footnote 101: \"Gnomon of the New Testament.\"]\n\n[Footnote 102: \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 626.]\n\n[Footnote 103: \"Life and Epistles of St. Paul,\" vol. i. p. 378.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Lange's Commentary.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Greek Test.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Notes on Acts.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Also Clarke's Comment., _in loco_.]\n\nNor are we for a moment to suppose the apostle is here dealing in hollow\ncompliments, or having recourse to a \"pious fraud.\" Such a course would\nhave been altogether out of character with Paul, and to suppose him\ncapable of pursuing such a course is to do him great injustice. If \"to\nthe Jews he became as a Jew,\" it was because he recognized in Judaism\nthe same fundamental truths which underlie the Christian system. And if\nhere he seems to become, in any sense, at one with \"heathenism,\" that he\nmight gain the heathen to the faith of Christ, it was because he found\nin heathenism some elements of truth akin to Christianity, and a state\nof feeling favorable to an inquiry into the truths he had to present. He\nbeheld in Athens an altar reared to the God _he_ worshipped, and it\nafforded him some pleasure to find that God was not totally forgotten,\nand his worship totally neglected, by the Athenians. The God whom they\nknew imperfectly, \"_Him_\" said he, \"I declare unto you;\" I now desire to\nmake him more fully known. The worship of \"the Unknown God\" was a\nrecognition of the being of a God whose nature transcends all human\nthought, a God who is ineffable; who, as Plato said, \"is hard to be\ndiscovered, and having discovered him, to make him known to all,\nimpossible.\"[108] It is the confession of a _want_ of knowledge, the\nexpression of a _desire_ to know, the acknowledgment of the _duty_ of\nworshipping him. Underlying all the forms of idol-worship the eye of\nPaul recognized an influential Theism. Deep down in the pagan heart he\ndiscovered a \"feeling after God\"--a yearning for a deeper knowledge of\nthe \"unknown,\" the invisible, the incomprehensible, which he could not\ndespise or disregard. The mysterious _sentiments_ of fear, of reverence,\nof conscious dependence on a supernatural power and presence\novershadowing man, which were expressed in the symbolism of the \"sacred\nobjects\" which Paul saw everywhere in Athens, commanded his respect. And\nhe alludes to their \"devotions,\" not in the language of reproach or\ncensure, but as furnishing to his own mind the evidence of the strength\nof their _religious instincts_, and the proof of the existence in their\nhearts of that _native apprehension_ of the supernatural, the divine,\nwhich dwells alike in all human souls.\n\n[Footnote 108: Tim\u00e6us, ch. ix.]\n\nThe case of the Athenians has, therefore, a peculiar interest to every\nthoughtful mind. It confirms the belief that religion is a necessity to\nevery human mind, a want of every human heart.[109] Without religion,\nthe nature of man can never be properly developed; the noblest part of\nman--the divine, the spiritual element which dwells in man, as \"the\noffspring of God\"--must remain utterly dwarfed. The spirit, the personal\nbeing, the rational nature, is religious, and Atheism is the vain and\nthe wicked attempt to be something less than man. If the spiritual\nnature of man has its normal and healthy development, he must become a\nworshipper. This is attested by the universal history of man. We look\ndown the long-drawn aisles of antiquity, and everywhere we behold the\nsmoking altar, the ascending incense, the prostrate form, the attitude\nof devotion. Athens, with her four thousand deities--Rome, with her\ncrowded Pantheon of gods--Egypt, with her degrading\nsuperstitions--Hindostan, with her horrid and revolting rites--all\nattest that the religious principle is deeply seated in the nature of\nman. And we are sure religion can never be robbed of her supremacy, she\ncan never be dethroned in the hearts of men. It were easier to satisfy\nthe cravings of hunger by logical syllogisms, than to satisfy the\nyearnings of the human heart without religion. The attempt of Xerxes to\nbind the rushing floods of the Hellespont in chains was not more futile\nnor more impotent than the attempt of skepticism to repress the\nuniversal tendency to worship, so peculiar and so natural to man in\nevery age and clime.\n\n[Footnote 109: The indispensable necessity for a religion of some kind\nto satisfy the emotional nature of man is tacitly confessed by the\natheist Comte in the publication of his \"Catechism of Positive\nReligion.\"]\n\nThe unwillingness of many to recognize a religious element in the\nAthenian mind is further accounted for by their misconception of the\nmeaning of the word \"religion.\" We are all too much accustomed to regard\nreligion as a mere system of dogmatic teaching. We use the terms\n\"Christian religion,\" \"Jewish religion,\" \"Mohammedan religion,\" as\ncomprehending simply the characteristic doctrines by which each is\ndistinguished; whereas religion is a mode of thought, and feeling, and\naction, determined by the consciousness of our relation to and our\ndependence upon God. It does not appropriate to itself any specific\ndepartment of our mental powers and susceptibilities, but it conditions\nthe entire functions and circle of our spiritual life. It is not simply\na mode of conceiving God in thought, nor simply a mode of venerating God\nin the affections, nor yet simply a mode of worshipping God in outward\nand formal acts, but it comprehends the whole. Religion (_religere_,\nrespect, awe, reverence) regulates our thoughts, feelings, and acts\ntowards God. \"It is a reference and a relationship of our finite\nconsciousness to the Creator and Sustainer and Governor of the\nuniverse.\" It is such a consciousness of the Divine as shall awaken in\nthe heart of man the sentiments of reverence, fear, and gratitude\ntowards God; such a sense of dependence as shall prompt man to pray, and\nlead him to perform external acts of worship.\n\nReligion does not, therefore, consist exclusively in knowledge, however\ncorrect; and yet it must be preceded and accompanied by some intuitive\ncognition of a Supreme Being, and some conception of him as a free moral\npersonality. But the religious sentiments, which belong rather to the\nheart than to the understanding of man--the consciousness of dependence,\nthe sense of obligation, the feeling of reverence, the instinct to pray,\nthe appetency to worship--these may all exist and be largely developed\nin a human mind even when, as in the case of the Athenians, there is a\nvery imperfect knowledge of the real character of God.\n\nRegarding this, then, as the generic conception of religion, namely,\n_that it is a mode of thought and feeling and action determined by our\nconsciousness of dependence on a Supreme Being_, we claim that the\napostle was perfectly right in complimenting the Athenians on their\n\"more than ordinary religiousness,\" for,\n\n1. They had, in some degree at least, that faith in the being and\nprovidence of God which precedes and accompanies all religion.\n\nThey had erected an altar to the unseen, the unsearchable, the\nincomprehensible, the unknown God. And this \"unknown God\" whom the\nAthenians \"worshipped\" was the true God, the God whom Paul worshipped,\nand whom he desired more fully to reveal to them; \"_Him_ declare I unto\nyou.\" The Athenians had, therefore, some knowledge of the true God, some\ndim recognition, at least, of his being, and some conception, however\nimperfect, of his character. The Deity to whom the Athenians reared this\naltar is called \"the unknown God,\" because he is unseen by all human\neyes and incomprehensible to human thought. There is a sense in which to\nPaul, as well as to the Athenians--to the Christian as well as to the\npagan--to the philosopher as well as to the peasant--God is \"_the\nunknown_,\" and in which he must forever remain the incomprehensible.\nThis has been confessed by all thoughtful minds in every age. It was\nconfessed by Plato. To his mind God is \"the ineffable,\" the unspeakable.\nZophar, the friend of Job, asks, \"Canst thou by searching find out God?\nCanst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?\" This knowledge is \"high\nas heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?\"\nDoes not Wesley teach us to sing,\n\n                 \"Hail, Father, whose creating call\n                    Unnumbered worlds attend;\n                  Jehovah, comprehending all,\n                    Whom none can comprehend?\"\n\nTo his mind, as well as to the mind of the Athenian, God was \"the great\nunseen, unknown.\" \"Beyond the universe and man,\" says Cousin, \"there\nremains in God something unknown, impenetrable, incomprehensible. Hence,\nin the immeasurable spaces of the universe, and beneath all the\nprofundities of the human soul, God escapes us in this inexhaustible\ninfinitude, whence he is able to draw without limit new worlds, new\nbeings, new manifestations. God is therefore to us\n_incomprehensible_.\"[110] And without making ourselves in the least\nresponsible for Hamilton's \"negative\" doctrine of the Infinite, or even\nresponsible for the full import of his words, we may quote his\nremarkable utterances on this subject: \"The Divinity is in part\nconcealed and in part revealed. He is at once known and unknown. But the\nlast and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar 'to\nthe unknown God.' In this consummation nature and religion, Paganism and\nChristianity, are at one.\"[111]\n\n[Footnote 110: \"Lectures,\" vol. i. p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 111: \"Discussions on Philosophy,\" p. 23.]\n\nWhen, therefore, the apostle affirms that while the Athenians worshipped\nthe God whom he proclaimed they \"knew him not,\" we can not understand\nhim as saying they were destitute of all faith in the being of God, and\nof all ideas of his real character. Because for him to have asserted\nthey had _no_ knowledge of God would not only have been contrary to all\nthe facts of the case, but also an utter contradiction of all his\nsettled convictions and his recorded opinions. There is not in modern\ntimes a more earnest asserter of the doctrine that the human mind has an\nintuitive cognition of God, and that the external world reveals God to\nman. There is a passage in his letter to the Romans which is justly\nentitled to stand at the head of all discourses on \"natural theology,\"\nRom. i. 19-21. Speaking of the heathen world, who had not been favored,\nas the Jews, with a verbal revelation, he says, \"That which may be known\nof God is manifest _in_ them,\" that is, in the constitution and laws of\ntheir spiritual nature, \"for God hath showed it unto them\" in the voice\nof reason and of conscience, so that in the instincts of our hearts, in\nthe elements of our moral nature, in the ideas and laws of our reason,\nwe are taught the being of a God. These are the subjective teachings of\nthe human soul.\n\nNot only is the being of God revealed to man in the constitution and\nlaws of his rational and moral nature, but God is also manifested to us\nobjectively in the realm of things around us; therefore Paul adds, \"The\ninvisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead, from the\ncreation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are\nmade.\" The world of sense, therefore, discloses the being and\nperfections of God. The invisible attributes of God are made apparent by\nthe things that are visible. Forth out of nature, as the product of the\nDivine Mind, the supernatural shines. The forces, laws, and harmonies of\nthe universe are indices of the presence of a presiding and informing\nIntelligence. The creation itself is an example of God's coming forth\nout of the mysterious depths of his own eternal and invisible being, and\nmaking himself apparent to man. There, on the pages of the volume of\nnature, we may read, in the marvellous language of symbol, the grand\nconceptions, the glorious thoughts, the ideals of beauty which dwell in\nthe uncreated Mind, These two sources of knowledge--the subjective\nteachings of God in the human soul, and the objective manifestations of\nGod in the visible universe--harmonize, and, together, fill up the\ncomplement of our natural idea of God. They are two hemispheres of\nthought, which together form one full-orbed fountain of light, and ought\nnever to be separated in our philosophy. And, inasmuch as this divine\nlight shines on all human minds, and these works of God are seen by all\nhuman eyes, the apostle argues that the heathen world \"is without\nexcuse, because, knowing God (gnontes ton Theon) they did not glorify\nhim as God, neither were thankful; but in their reasonings they went\nastray after vanities, and their hearts, being void of wisdom, were\nfilled with darkness. Calling themselves wise, they were turned into\nfools, and changed the glory of the imperishable God for idols graven in\nthe likeness of perishable man, or of birds, and beasts, and creeping\nthings,...and they bartered the truth of God for lies, and reverenced\nand worshipped the things made rather than the Maker, who is blessed\nforever. Amen.\"[112]\n\n[Footnote 112: Rom. i. 21-25, Conybeare and Howson's translation.]\n\nThe brief and elliptical report of Paul's address on Mars' Hill must\ntherefore, in all fairness, be interpreted in the light of his more\ncarefully elaborated statements in the Epistle to the Romans. And when\nPaul intimates that the Athenians \"knew not God,\" we can not understand\nhim as saying they had _no_ knowledge, but that their knowledge was\nimperfect. They did not know God as Creator, Father, and Ruler; above\nall, they did not know him as a pardoning God and a sanctifying Spirit.\nThey had not that knowledge of God which purifies the heart, and changes\nthe character, and gives its possessor eternal life.\n\nThe apostle clearly and unequivocally recognizes this truth, that the\nidea of God is connatural to the human mind; that in fact there is not\nto be found a race of men upon the face of the globe utterly destitute\nof some idea of a Supreme Being. Wherever human reason has had its\nnormal and healthful development, it has spontaneously and necessarily\nled the human mind to the recognition of a God. The Athenians were no\nexception to this general law. They believed in the existence of one\nsupreme and eternal Mind, invisible, incomprehensible, infeffable--\"the\nunknown God.\"\n\n2. The Athenians had also that consciousness of dependence upon God\nwhich is the foundation of all the primary religious emotions.\n\nWhen the apostle affirmed that \"in God we live, and move, and have our\nbeing,\" he uttered the sentiments of many, if not all, of his hearers,\nand in support of that affirmation he could quote the words of their own\npoets, for we are also his offspring; [113] and, as his offspring, we\nhave a derived and a dependent being. Indeed, this consciousness of\ndependence is analogous to the feeling which is awakened in the heart of\na child when its parent is first manifested to its opening mind as the\ngiver of those things which it immediately needs, as its continual\nprotector, and as the preserver of its life. The moment a man becomes\nconscious of his own personality, that moment he becomes conscious of\nsome relation to another personality, to which he is subject, and on\nwhich he depends.[114]\n\n[Footnote 113:\n\n           \"Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball;\n            All need his aid; his power sustains us all,\n              _For we his offspring are_.\"\n                            Aratus, \"The Ph\u00e6nomena,\" book v. p. 5.\n\nAratus was a poet of Cilicia, Paul's native province. He flourished B.C.\n277.\n\n       \"Great and divine Father, whose names are many,\n        But who art one and the same unchangeable, almighty power;\n        O thou supreme Author of nature!\n        That governest by a single unerring law!\n                      Hail King!\n        For thou art able, to enforce obedience from all frail mortals,\n        _Because we are all thine offspring,_\n        The image and the echo only of thy eternal voice.\"\n                                        Cleanthes, \"Hymn to Jupiter.\"\n\nCleanthes was the pupil of Zeno, and his successor as chief of the Stoic\nphilosophers.]\n\n[Footnote 114: \"As soon as a man becomes conscious of himself, as soon\nas he perceives himself as distinct from other persons and things, he at\nthe same moment becomes conscious of a higher self, a higher power,\nwithout which he feels that neither he nor any thing else would have any\nlife or reality. We are so fashioned that as soon as we awake we feel on\nall sides our dependence on something else; and all nations join in some\nway or another in the words of the Psalmist, 'It is He that made us, not\nwe ourselves.' This is the first _sense_ of the Godhead, the _sensus\nnuminis_, as it has well been called; for it is a _sensus_, an immediate\nperception, not the result of reasoning or generalization, but an\nintuition as irresistible as the impressions of our senses.... This\n_sensus numinis_, or, as we may call it in more homely language,\n_faith_, is the source of all religion; it is that without which no\nreligion, whether true or false, is possible.\"--Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of\nLanguage,\" Second Series, p. 455.]\n\nA little reflection will convince us that this is the necessary order in\nwhich human consciousness is developed.\n\nThere are at least two fundamental and radical tendencies in human\npersonality, namely, to _know_ and to _act_. If we would conceive of\nthem as they exist in the innermost sphere of selfhood, we must\ndistinguish the first as _self-consciousness_, and the second as\n_self-determination_. These are unquestionably the two factors of human\npersonality.\n\nIf we consider the first of these factors more closely, we shall\ndiscover that self-consciousness exists under limitations and\nconditions. Man can not become clearly conscious of _self_ without\ndistinguishing himself from the outer world of sensation, nor without\ndistinguishing self and the world from another being upon whom they\ndepend as the ultimate substance and cause. Mere _coenoeesthesis_ is not\nconsciousness. Common feeling is unquestionably found among the lowest\nforms of animal life, the protozoa; but it can never rise to a clear\nconsciousness of personality until it can distinguish itself from\nsensation, and acquire a presentiment of a divine power, on which self\nand the outer world depend. The _Ego_ does not exist for itself, can not\nperceive itself, but by distinguishing itself from the ceaseless flow\nand change of sensation, and by this act of distinguishing, the _Ego_\ntakes place in consciousness. And the _Ego_ can not perceive itself, nor\ncognize sensation as a state or affection of the _Ego_ except by the\nintervention of the reason, which supplies the two great fundamental\nlaws of causality and substance. The facts of consciousness thus\ncomprehend three elements--self, nature, and God. The determinate being,\nthe _Ego_, is never an absolutely independent being, but is always in\nsome way or other codetermined by another; it can not, therefore, be an\nabsolutely original and independent, but must in some way or another be\na _derived_ and _conditioned_ existence.\n\nNow that which limits and conditions human self-consciousness can not be\nmere _nature_, because nature can not give what it does not possess; it\ncan not produce what is _toto genere_ different from itself.\nSelf-consciousness can not arise out of unconsciousness. This new\nbeginning is beyond the power of nature. Personal power, the creative\nprinciple of all new beginnings, is alone adequate to its production.\nIf, then, self-consciousness exists in man, it necessarily presupposes\nan absolutely _original_, therefore _unconditioned, self-consciousness_.\nHuman self-consciousness, in its temporal actualization, of course\npresupposes a nature-basis upon which it elevates itself; but it is only\npossible on the ground that an eternal self-conscious Mind ordained and\nrules over all the processes of nature, and implants the divine spark of\nthe personal spirit with the corporeal frame, to realize itself in the\nlight-flame of human self-consciousness. The original light of the\ndivine self-consciousness is eternally and absolutely first and before\nall. \"Thus, in the depths of our own self-consciousness, as its\nconcealed background, the God-consciousness reveals itself to us. This\ndescent into our inmost being is at the same time an ascent to God.\nEvery deep reflection on ourselves breaks through the mere crust of\nworld-consciousness, which separates us from the inmost truth of our\nexistence, and leads us up to Him in whom we live and move and\nare.\"[115]\n\n[Footnote 115: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. p. 81.]\n\nSelf-determination, equally with self-consciousness, exists in us under\nmanifold _limitations_. Self-determination is limited by physical,\ncorporeal, and mental conditions, so that there is \"an impassable\nboundary line drawn around the area of volitional freedom.\" But the most\nfundamental and original limitation is that of _duty_. The\nself-determining power of man is not only circumscribed by necessary\nconditions, but also by the _moral law_ in the consciousness of man.\nSelf-determination alone does not suffice for the full conception of\nresponsible freedom; it only becomes, _will_, properly by its being an\nintelligent and conscious determination; that is, the rational subject\nis able previously to recognize \"the right,\" and present before his mind\nthat which he _ought_ to do, that which he is morally bound to realize\nand actualize by his own self-determination and choice. Accordingly we\nfind in our inmost being a _sense of obligation_ to obey the moral law\nas revealed in the conscience. As we can not become conscious of self\nwithout also becoming conscious of God, so we can not become properly\nconscious of self-determination until we have recognized in the\nconscience a law for the movements of the will.\n\nNow this moral law, as revealed in the conscience, is not a mere\nautonomy--a simple subjective law having no relation to a personal\nlawgiver out of and above man. Every admonition of conscience directly\nexcites the consciousness of a God to whom man is accountable. The\nuniversal consciousness of our race, as revealed in history, has always\nassociated the phenomena of conscience with the idea of a personal Power\nabove man, to whom he is subject and upon whom he depends. In every age,\nthe voice of conscience has been regarded as the voice of God, so that\nwhen it has filled man with guilty apprehensions, he has had recourse to\nsacrifices, and penances, and prayers to expatiate his wrath.\n\nIt is clear, then, that if man has _duties_ there must he a\nself-conscious Will by whom these duties are imposed, for only a real\nwill can be legislative. If man has a _sense of obligation_, there must\nbe a supreme authority by which he is obliged. If he is _responsible_,\nthere must be a being to whom he is accountable.[116] It can not be said\nthat he is accountable to himself, for by that supposition the idea of\nduty is obliterated, and \"right\" becomes identical with mere interest or\npleasure. It can not be said that he is simply responsible to\nsociety--to mere conventions of human opinions and human\ngovernments--for then \"_right_\" becomes a mere creature of human\nlegislation, and \"_justice_\" is nothing but the arbitrary will of the\nstrong who tyrannize over the weak. Might constitutes right. Against\nsuch hypotheses the human mind, however, instinctively revolts. Mankind\nfeel, universally, that there is an authority beyond all human\ngovernments, and a higher law above all human laws, from whence all\ntheir powers are derived. That higher law is the Law of God, that\nsupreme authority is the God of Justice. To this eternally just God,\ninnocence, under oppression and wrong, has made its proud appeal, like\nthat of Prometheus to the elements, to the witnessing clouds, to coming\nages, and has been sustained and comforted. And to that higher law the\nweak have confidently appealed against the unrighteous enactments of the\nstrong, and have finally conquered. The last and inmost ground of all\nobligation is thus the conscious relation of the moral creature to God.\nThe sense of absolute dependence upon a Supreme Being compels man, even\nwhile conscious of subjective freedom, to recognize at the same time his\nobligation to determine himself in harmony with the will of Him \"in whom\nwe live, and move, and are.\"\n\n[Footnote 116: \"The thought of God will wake up a terrible monitor whose\nname is Judge.\"--Kant.]\n\nThis feeling of dependence, and this consequent sense of obligation, lie\nat the very foundation of all religion. They lead the mind towards God,\nand anchor it in the Divine. They prompt man to pray, and inspire him\nwith an instinctive confidence in the efficacy of prayer. So that prayer\nis natural to man, and necessary to man. Never yet has the traveller\nfound a people on earth without prayer. Races of men have been found\nwithout houses, without raiment, without arts and sciences, but never\nwithout prayer any more than without speech. Plutarch wrote, eighteen\ncenturies ago, If you go through all the world, you may find cities\nwithout walls, without letters, without rulers, without money, without\ntheatres, but never without temples and gods, or without _prayers_,\noaths, prophecies, and sacrifices, used to obtain blessings and\nbenefits, or to avert curses and calamities.[117] The naturalness of\nprayer is admitted even by the modern unbeliever. Gerrit Smith says,\n\"Let us who believe that the religion of reason calls for the religion\nof nature, remember that the flow of prayer is just as natural as the\nflow of water; the prayerless man has become an unnatural man.\"[118] Is\nman in sorrow or in danger, his most natural and spontaneous refuge is\nin prayer. The suffering, bewildered, terror-stricken soul turns towards\nGod. \"Nature in an agony is no atheist; the soul that knows not where to\nfly, flies to God.\" And in the hour of deliverance and joy, a feeling of\ngratitude pervades the soul--and gratitude, too, not to some blind\nnature-force, to some unconscious and impersonal power, but gratitude to\nGod. The soul's natural and appropriate language in the hour of\ndeliverance is thanksgiving and praise.\n\n[Footnote 117: \"Against Kalotes,\" ch. xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 118: \"Religion of Reason.\"]\n\nThis universal tendency to recognize a superior Power upon whom we are\ndependent, and by whose hand our well-being and our destinies are\nabsolutely controlled, has revealed itself even amid the most\ncomplicated forms of polytheistic worship. Amid the even and undisturbed\nflow of every-day life they might be satisfied with the worship of\nsubordinate deities, but in the midst of sudden and unexpected\ncalamities, and of terrible catastrophes, then they cried to the Supreme\nGod.[119] \"When alarmed by an earthquake,\" says Aulus Gellius, \"the\nancient Romans were accustomed to pray, not to some one of the gods\nindividually, but to God in general, _as to the Unknown_.\"[120]\n\n[Footnote 119: \"At critical moments, when the deepest feelings of the\nhuman heart are stirred, the old Greeks and Romans seem suddenly to have\ndropped all mythological ideas, and to have fallen back on the universal\nlanguage of true religion.\"--Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language.\" p. 436.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Tholuck, \"Nature and Influence of Heathenism,\" p. 23.]\n\n\"Thus also Minutius Felix says, 'When they stretch out their hands to\nheaven they mention only God; and these forms of speech, _He is great_,\nand _God is true_, and _If God grant_(which are the natural language of\nthe vulgar), are a plain confession of the truth of Christianity.' And\nalso Lactantius testifies, 'When they swear, and when they wish, and\nwhen they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth,\nby a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them whether they\nwill or no;' and again he says, 'They fly to God; aid is desired of God;\nthey pray that God would help them; and when one is reduced to extreme\nnecessity, he begs for God's sake, and by his divine power alone\nimplores the mercy of men.'\"[121] The account which is given by Diogenes\nLaertius[122] of the erection of altars bearing the inscription \"to the\nunknown God,\" clearly shows that they had their origin in this general\nsentiment of dependence on a higher Power. \"The Athenians being\nafflicted with pestilence invited Epimenides to lustrate their city. The\nmethod adopted by him was to carry several sheep to the Areopagus,\nwhence they were left to wander as they pleased, under the observation\nof persons sent to attend them. As each sheep lay down it was sacrificed\nto _the propitious God_. By this ceremony it is said the city was\nrelieved; but as it was still unknown what deity was propitious, an\naltar was erected _to the unknown God_ on every spot where a sheep had\nbeen sacrificed.\"[123]\n\n[Footnote 121: Cudworth, vol. i. p. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 122: \"Lives of Philosophers,\" book i., Epimenides.]\n\n[Footnote 123: See Townsend's \"Chronological Arrangement of New\nTestament,\" note 19, part xii.; Doddridge's \"Exposition;\" and Barnes's\n\"Notes on Acts.\"]\n\n\"The unknown God\" was their deliverer from the plague. And the erection\nof an altar to him was a confession of their absolute dependence upon\nhim, of their obligation to worship him, as well as of their need of a\ndeeper knowledge of him. The gods who were known and named were not able\nto deliver them in times of calamity, and they were compelled to look\nbeyond the existing forms of Grecian mythology for relief. Beyond all\nthe gods of the Olympus there was \"one God over all,\" the Father of gods\nand men, the Creator of all the subordinate local deities, upon whom\neven these created gods were dependent, upon whom man was absolutely\ndependent, and therefore in times of deepest need, of severest\nsuffering, of extremest peril, then they cried to the living, supreme,\neternal God.[124]\n\n[Footnote 124: \"The men and women of the Iliad and Odyssey are\nhabitually religious. The language of religion is often on their\ntongues, as it is ever on the lips of every body in the East at this\nday. The thought of the gods, and of their providence and government of\nthe world, is a familiar thought. They seem to have an abiding\nconviction of their _dependence_ on the gods. The results of all actions\ndepend on the will of the gods; _it lies on their knees_ (The\u00f4n ev\ngounasi keitai, Od. i. 267), is the often repeated and significant\nexpression of their feeling of dependence.\"--Tyler, \"Theology of Greek\nPoets,\" p. 165.]\n\n3. The Athenians developed in a high degree those religious emotions\nwhich always accompany the consciousness of dependence on a Supreme\nBeing.\n\nThe first emotional element of all religion is _fear_. This is\nunquestionably true, whether religion be considered from a Christian or\na heathen stand-point. \"The _fear_ of the Lord is the beginning of\nwisdom.\" Associated with, perhaps preceding, all definite ideas of God,\nthere exists in the human mind certain feelings of _awe_, and\n_reverence_, and _fear_ which arise spontaneously in presence of the\nvastness, and grandeur, and magnificence of the universe, and of the\npower and glory of which the created universe is but the symbol and\nshadow. There is the felt apprehension that, beyond and back of the\nvisible and the tangible, there is a _personal, living Power_, which is\nthe foundation of all, and which fashions all, and fills all with its\nlight and life; that \"the universe is the living vesture in which the\nInvisible has robed his mysterious loveliness.\" There is the feeling of\nan _overshadowing Presence_ which \"compasseth man behind and before, and\nlays its hand upon him.\"\n\nThis wonderful presentiment of an invisible power and presence pervading\nand informing all nature is beautifully described by Wordsworth in his\nhistory of the development of the Scottish herdsman's mind:\n\n     So the foundations of his mind were laid\n     In such communion, not from terror free.\n     While yet a child, and long before his time,\n     Had he perceived the presence and the power\n     Of greatness; and deep feelings had impressed\n     So vividly great objects, that they lay\n     Upon his mind like substances, whose presence\n     Perplexed the bodily sense.\n                        ... In the after-day\n     Of boyhood, many an hour in caves forlorn,\n     And 'mid the hollow depths of naked crags,\n     He sat, and even in their fixed lineaments,\n     Or from the power of a peculiar eye,\n     Or by creative feeling overborne,\n     Or by predominance of thought oppressed,\n     Even in their fixed and steady lineaments\n     He traced an ebbing and a flowing mind....\n     Such was the Boy,--but for the growing Youth,\n     What soul was his, when, from the naked top\n     Of some bold headland, he beheld the sun\n     Rise up, and bathe the world in light! He looked:\n     Ocean and earth, the solid frame of earth\n     And ocean's liquid mass, in gladness lay\n     Beneath him; far and wide the clouds were touched.\n     And in their silent faces could he read\n     Unutterable love. Sound needed none,\n     Nor any voice of joy; his spirit drank\n     The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form\n     All melted into him; they swallowed up\n     His animal being; in them did he live,\n     And by them did he live; they were his life,\n     In such access of mind, in such high hour\n     Of visitation from the living God.[125]\n\nBut it may be said this is all mere poetry; to which we answer, in the\nwords of Aristotle, \"Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightier\nthan history.\"[126] The true poet is the interpreter of nature. His soul\nis in the fullest sympathy with the grand ideas which nature symbolizes,\nand he \"deciphers the universe as the autobiography of the Infinite\nSpirit.\" Spontaneous feeling is a kind of inspiration.\n\nIt is true that all minds may not be developed in precisely the same\nmanner as Wordsworth's herdsman's, because the development of every\nindividual mind is modified in some measure by exterior conditions. Men\nmay contemplate nature from different points of view. Some may be\nimpressed with one aspect of nature, some with another. But none will\nfail to recognize a mysterious _presence_ and invisible _power_ beneath\nall the fleeting and changeful phenomena of the universe. \"And sometimes\nthere are moments of tenderness, of sorrow, and of vague mystery which\nbring the feeling of the Infinite Presence close to the human\nheart.\"[127]\n\n[Footnote 125: \"The Wanderer.\"]\n\n[Footnote 126: Poet, ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Robertson.]\n\nNow we hold that _this feeling and sentiment of the Divine_--the\nsupernatural--exists in every mind. It may be, it undoubtedly is,\nsomewhat modified in its manifestations by the circumstances in which\nmen are placed, and the degree of culture they have enjoyed. The African\nFetichist, in his moral and intellectual debasement, conceives a\nsupernatural power enshrined in every object of nature. The rude Fijian\nregards with dread, and even terror, the Being who darts the lightnings\nand wields the thunderbolts. The Indian \"sees God in clouds, and hears\nhim in the wind.\" The Scottish \"herdsman\" on the lonely mountain-top\n\"feels the presence and the power of greatness,\" and \"in its fixed and\nsteady lineaments he sees an ebbing and a flowing mind.\" The\nphilosopher[128] lifts his eyes to \"the starry heavens\" in all the depth\nof their concave, and with all their constellations of glory moving on\nin solemn grandeur, and, to his mind, these immeasurable regions seem\n\"filled with the splendors of the Deity, and crowded with the monuments\nof his power;\" or he turns his eye to \"the Moral Law within,\" and he\nhears the voice of an intelligent and a righteous God. In all these\ncases we have a revelation of the sentiment of the Divine, which dwells\nalike in all human minds. In the Athenians this sentiment was developed\nin a high degree. The serene heaven which Greece enjoyed, and which was\nthe best-loved roof of its inhabitants, the brilliant sun, the mountain\nscenery of unsurpassed grandeur, the deep blue sea, an image of the\ninfinite, these poured all their fullness on the Athenian mind, and\nfurnished the most favorable conditions for the development of the\nreligious sentiments. The people of Athens spent most of their time in\nthe open air in communion with nature, and in the cheerful and temperate\nenjoyment of existence. To recognize the Deity in the living powers of\nnature, and especially in man, as the highest sensible manifestation of\nthe Divine, was the peculiar prerogative of the Grecian mind. And here\nin Athens, art also vied with nature to deepen the religious sentiments.\nIt raised the mind to ideal conceptions of a beauty and a sublimity\nwhich transcended all mere nature-forms, and by images, of supernatural\ngrandeur and loveliness presented to the Athenians symbolic\nrepresentations of the separate attributes and operations of the\ninvisible God. The plastic art of Greece was designed to express\nreligious ideas, and was consecrated by religious feeling. Thus the\nfacts of the case are strikingly in harmony with the words of the\nApostle: \"All things which I behold bear witness to your carefulness in\nreligion,\" your \"reverence for the Deity,\" your \"fear of God.\"[129] \"The\nsacred objects\" in Athens, and especially \"the altar to the Unknown\nGod,\" were all regarded by Paul as evidences of their instinctive faith\nin the invisible, the supernatural, the divine.\n\n[Footnote 128: Kant, in \"Critique of Practical Reason.\"]\n\n[Footnote 129: See Parkhurst's Lexicon, under _Deisidaimonia_, which\nSuidas explains by eulabeia peri to Theion--_reverence for the Divine_,\nand Hesychius by Phubutheia--_fear of God_. Also, Josephus, Antiq., book\nx. ch. iii, \u00a7 2: \"Manasseh, after his repentance and reformation, strove\nto behave himself (t\u00ea deisidaimonia chr\u00eastheia) in the _most religious\nmanner_ towards God.\" Also see A. Clarke on Acts xvii.]\n\nAlong with this sentiment of the Divine there is also associated, in all\nhuman minds, an _instinctive yearning_ after the Invisible; not a mere\nfeeling of curiosity to pierce the mystery of being and of life, but\nwhat Paul designates \"a feeling after God,\" which prompts man to seek\nafter a deeper knowledge, and a more immediate consciousness. To attain\nthis deeper knowledge--this more conscious realization of the being and\nthe presence of God, has been the effort of all philosophy and all\nreligion in all ages. The Hindoo Yogis proposes to withdraw into his\ninmost self, and by a complete suspension of all his active powers to\nbecome absorbed and swallowed up in the Infinite.[130] Plato and his\nfollowers sought by an immediate abstraction to apprehend \"the\nunchangeable and permanent Being,\" and, by a loving contemplation, to\nbecome \"assimilated to the Deity,\" and in this way to attain the\nimmediate consciousness of God. The Neo-Platonic mystic sought by\nasceticism and self-mortification to prepare himself for divine\ncommunings. He would contemplate the divine perfections in himself; and\nin an _ecstatic_ state, wherein all individuality vanishes, he would\nrealize a union, or identity, with the Divine Essence.[131] While the\nuniversal Church of God, indeed, has in her purest days always taught\nthat man may, by inward purity and a believing love, be rendered capable\nof spiritually apprehending, and consciously feeling, the presence of\nGod. Some may be disposed to pronounce this as all mere mysticism. We\nanswer, The living internal energy of religion is always _mystical_, it\nis grounded in _feeling_--a \"_sensus numinis_\" common to humanity. It is\nthe mysterious sentiment of the Divine; it is the prolepsis of the human\nspirit reaching out towards the Infinite; the living susceptibility of\nour spiritual nature stretching after the powers and influences of the\nhigher world. It is upon this inner instinct of the supernatural that\nall religion rests. I do not say every religious idea, but whatever is\npositive, practical, powerful, durable, and popular. Everywhere, in all\nclimates, in all epochs of history, and in all degrees of civilization,\nman is animated by the sentiment--I would rather say, the\npresentiment--that the world in which he lives, the order of things in\nthe midst of which he moves, the facts which regularly and constantly\nsucceed each other, are not _all_. In vain he daily makes discoveries\nand conquests in this vast universe; in vain he observes and learnedly\nverifies the general laws which govern it; _his thought is not inclosed\nin the world surrendered to his science_; the spectacle of it does not\nsuffice his soul, it is raised beyond it; it searches after and catches\nglimpses of something beyond it; it aspires higher both for the universe\nand itself; it aims at another destiny, another master.\n\n[Footnote 130: Vaughan, \"Hours with the Mystics,\" vol. i. p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Id. ib., vol. i. p. 65.]\n\n      \"'Par del\u00e0 tous ces cieux le Dieu des cieux r\u00e9side.'\"[132]\n\nSo Voltaire has said, and the God who is beyond the skies is not nature\npersonified, but a supernatural Personality. It is to this highest\nPersonality that all religions address themselves. It is to bring man\ninto communion with Him that they exist.[133]\n\n[Footnote 132: \"Beyond all these heavens the God of the heavens\nresides.\"]\n\n[Footnote 133: Guizot, \"L'Eglise et la Societ\u00e9 Chretiennes\" en 1861.]\n\n4. The Athenians had that deep consciousness of sin and guilt, and of\nconsequent liability to punishment, which confesses the need of\nexpiation by piacular sacrifices.\n\nEvery man feels himself to be an accountable being, and he is conscious\nthat in wrong-doing he is deserving of blame and of punishment. Deep\nwithin the soul of the transgressor is the consciousness that he is a\nguilty man, and he is haunted with the perpetual apprehension of a\nretribution which, like the spectre of evil omen, crosses his every\npath, and meets him at every turn.\n\n     \"'Tis guilt alone,\n       Like brain-sick frenzy in its feverish mode,\n       Fills the light air with visionary terrors,\n       And shapeless forms of fear.\"\n\nMan does not possess this consciousness of guilt so much as it holds\npossession of him. It pursues the fugitive from justice, and it lays\nhold on the man who has resisted or escaped the hand of the executioner.\nThe sense of guilt is a power over and above man; a power so wonderful\nthat it often compels the most reckless criminal to deliver himself up,\nwith the confession of his deed, to the sword of justice, when a\nfalsehood would have easily protected him. Man is only able by\npersevering, ever-repeated efforts at self-induration, against the\nremonstrances of conscience, to withdraw himself from its power. His\nsuccess is, however, but very partial; for sometimes, in the moments of\nhis greatest security, the reproaches of conscience break in upon him\nlike a flood, and sweep away all his refuge of lies. \"The evil\nconscience is the divine bond which binds the created spirit, even in\ndeep apostasy, to its Original. In the consciousness of guilt there is\nrevealed the essential relation of our spirit to God, although\nmisunderstood by man until he has something higher than his evil\nconscience. The trouble and anguish which the remonstrances of this\nconsciousness excite--the inward unrest which sometimes seizes the slave\nof sin--are proofs that he has not quite broken away from God.\"[134]\n\n[Footnote 134: M\u00fcller, \"Christian Doctrine of Sin,\" vol. i. pp. 225,\n226.]\n\nIn Grecian mythology there was a very distinct recognition of the power\nof conscience, and a reference of its authority to the Divinity,\ntogether with the idea of retribution. Nemesis was regarded as the\nimpersonation of the upbraidings of conscience, of the natural dread of\npunishment that springs up in the human heart after the commission of\nsin. And as the feeling of remorse may be considered as the consequence\nof the displeasure and vengeance of an offended God, Nemesis came to be\nregarded as the goddess of retribution, relentlessly pursuing the guilty\nuntil she has driven them into irretrievable woe and ruin. The Erinyes\nor Eumenides are the deities whose business it is to punish, in hades,\nthe crimes committed upon earth. When an aggravated crime has excited\ntheir displeasure they manifest their greatest power in the disquietude\nof conscience.\n\nAlong with this deep consciousness of guilt, and this fear of\nretribution which haunts the guilty mind, there has also rested upon the\nheart of universal humanity a deep and abiding conviction that\n_something must be done to expiate the guilt of sin_--some restitution\nmust be made, some suffering must be endured,[135] some sacrifice\noffered to atone for past misdeeds. Hence it is that men in all ages\nhave had recourse to penances and prayers, to self-inflicted tortures\nand costly sacrifices to appease a righteous anger which their sins had\nexcited, and avert an impending punishment. That sacrifice to atone for\nsin has prevailed universally--that it has been practised \"_sem-per,\nubique, et ab omnibus,_\" always, in all places, and by all men--will not\nbe denied by the candid and competent inquirer. The evidence which has\nbeen collected from ancient history by Grotius and Magee, and the\nadditional evidence from contemporaneous history, which is being now\nfurnished by the researches of ethnologists and Christian missionaries,\nis conclusive. No intelligent man can doubt the fact. Sacrificial\nofferings have prevailed in every nation and in every age. \"Almost the\nentire worship of the pagan nations consisted in rites of deprecation.\nFear of the Divine displeasure seems to have been the leading feature of\ntheir religious impressions; and in the diversity, the costliness, the\ncruelty of their sacrifices they sought to appease gods to whose wrath\nthey felt themselves exposed, from a consciousness of sin, unrelieved by\nany information as to the means of escaping its effects.\"[136]\n\n[Footnote 135: Punishment is the penalty due to sin; or, to use the\nfavorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it is\nthe payment of a debt incurred by sin. When he is punished, the criminal\nis said to pay off or pay back (apotinein) his crimes; in other words,\nto expiate or atone for them (Iliad, iv. 161,162),\n\n      syn te megal\u00f4 apetisan syn sph\u00easin kephal\u00easi gynaixi te kai\n      tekeessin.\n\nthat is, they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc., for their treachery\nwith a great price, with their lives, and their wives and\nchildren.--Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Magee, \"On the Atonement,\" No. V. p. 30.]\n\nIt must be known to every one at all acquainted with Greek mythology\nthat the idea of _expiation_--atonement--was a fundamental idea of their\nreligion. Independent of any historical research, a very slight glance\nat the Greek and Roman classics, especially the poets, who were the\ntheologians of that age, can leave little doubt upon this head.[137]\nTheir language everywhere announces the notion of _propitiation_, and,\nparticularly the Latin, furnishes the terms which are still employed in\ntheology. We need only mention the words ilasmos, ilaskomai, lytron,\nperips\u00eama, as examples from the Greek, and _placare, propitiare,\nexpiare, piaculum_, from the Latin. All these indicate that the notion\nof expiation was interwoven into the very modes of thought and framework\nof the language of the ancient Greeks.\n\n[Footnote 137: In Homer the doctrine is expressly taught that the gods\nmay, and sometimes do, remit the penalty, when duly propitiated by\nprayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparations (\"Iliad,\" ix.\n497 sqq.). \"We have a practical illustration of this doctrine in the\nfirst book of the Iliad, where Apollo averts the pestilence from the\narmy, when the daughter of his priest is returned without ransom, and a\n_sacrifice_ (elatomb\u00ea) is sent to the altar of the god at sacred\nChrysa.... Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, accepts\nthe sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs and\nlibations, and sends back the embassy with a favoring breeze, and a\nfavorable answer to the army, who meanwhile had been _purifying_\n(apelymainonto) themselves, and offering unblemished hecatombs of bulls\nand goats on the shore of the sea which washes the place of their\nencampment.\"\n\n\"The object of the propitiatory embassy to Apollo is thus stated by\nUlysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring back thy daughter\nChryses, and to offer a sacred hecatomb for (yper) the Greeks, that we\nmay _propitiate_ (ilasomestha) the king, who now sends woes and many\ngroans upon the Argives\" (442 sqq.).--Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\"\npp. 196, 197.]\n\nWe do not deem it needful to discuss at length the question which has\nbeen so earnestly debated among theologians, as to whether the idea of\nexpiation be a primitive and necessary idea of the human mind, or\nwhether the practice of piacular sacrifices came into the post-diluvian\nworld with Noah, as a positive institution of a primitive religion then\nfirst directly instituted by God. On either hypothesis the practice of\nexpiatory rites derives its authority from God; in the latter case, by\nan outward and verbal revelation, in the former by an inward and\nintuitive revelation.\n\nThis much, however, must be conceded on all hands, that there are\ncertain fundamental intuitions, universal and necessary, which underlie\nthe almost universal practice of expiatory sacrifice, namely, _the\nuniversal consciousness of guilt, and the universal conviction that\nsomething must be done to expiate guilt_, to compensate for wrong, and\nto atone for past misdeeds. But _how_ that expiation can be effected,\nhow that atonement can be made, is a question which reason does not seem\ncompetent to answer. That personal sin can be atoned for by vicarious\nsuffering, that national guilt can be expiated and national punishment\naverted by animal sacrifices, or even by human sacrifices, is repugnant\nto rather than conformable with natural reason. There exists no\ndiscernible connection between the one and the other. We may suppose\nthat eucharistic, penitential, and even deprecatory sacrifices may have\noriginated in the light of nature and reason, but we are unable to\naccount for the practice of piacular sacrifices for substitutional\natonement, on the same principle. The ethical principle, that one's own\nsins are not transferable either in their guilt or punishment, is so\nobviously just that we feel it must have been as clear to the mind of\nthe Greek who brought his victim to be offered to Zeus, as it is to the\nphilosophic mind of to-day.[138] The knowledge that the Divine\ndispleasure can be averted by sacrifice is not, by Plato, grounded upon\nany intuition of reason, as is the existence of God, the idea of the\ntrue, the just, and good, but on \"tradition,\"[139] and the\n\"interpretations\" of Apollo. \"To the Delphian Apollo there remains the\ngreatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions--the\nerection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the gods,... and\nwhat other services should be gone through with a view to their\n_propitiation_. Such things as these, indeed, _we neither know\nourselves, nor in founding the State would we intrust them to others_,\nif we be wise;... the god of the country is the natural interpreter to\nall men about such matters.\"[140]\n\n[Footnote 138: \"He that hath done the deed, to suffer for it--thus cries\na proverb thrice hallowed by age.\"--\u00c6schylus, \"Cho\u00ebph,\" 311.]\n\n[Footnote 139: \"Laws,\" book vi. ch. xv.]\n\n[Footnote 140: \"Republic,\" book iv. ch. v.]\n\nThe origin of expiatory sacrifices can not, we think, be explained\nexcept on the principle of a primitive revelation and a positive\nappointment of God. They can not be understood except as a\ndivinely-appointed symbolism, in which there is exhibited a confession\nof personal guilt and desert of punishment; an intimation and a hope\nthat God will be propitious and merciful; and a typical promise and\nprophecy of a future Redeemer from sin, who shall \"put away sin by the\nsacrifice of himself.\" This sacred rite was instituted in connection\nwith the _protevangelium_ given to our first parents; it was diffused\namong the nations by tradition, and has been kept alive as a general,\nand, indeed, almost universal observance, by that deep sense of sin, and\nconsciousness of guilt, and personal urgency of the need of a\nreconciliation, which are so clearly displayed in Grecian mythology.\n\nThe legitimate inference we find ourselves entitled to draw from the\nwords of Paul, when fairly interpreted in the light of the past\nreligious history of the world, is, that the Athenians were a religious\npeople; that is, _they were, however unknowing, believers in and\nworshippers of the One Supreme God_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL ASPECTS.\n\n\n\"That there is one Supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even\nthe vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves frequently acknowledge;\nwhich because the assertors of gods well understood, they affirm these\ngods of theirs to preside over the several parts of the world, yet so\nthat there is only one chief governor. Whence it follows, that all their\nother gods can be no other than ministers and officers which one\ngreatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed, and\nconstituted so as to serve his command.\"--LACTANTIUS.\n\nThe conclusion reached in the previous chapter that the Athenians were\nbelievers in and worshippers of the One Supreme God, has been challenged\nwith some considerable show of reason and force, on the ground that they\nwere _Polytheists_ and _Idolaters_.\n\nAn objection which presents itself so immediately on the very face of\nthe sacred narrative, and which is sustained by the unanimous voice of\nhistory, is entitled to the fullest consideration. And as the interests\nof truth are infinitely more precious than the maintenance of any\ntheory, however plausible, we are constrained to accord to this\nobjection the fullest weight, and give to it the most impartial\nconsideration. We can not do otherwise than at once admit that the\nAthenians were _Polytheists_--they worshipped \"many gods\" besides \"the\nunknown God.\" It is equally true that they were _Idolaters_--they\nworshipped images or statues of the gods, which images were also, by an\neasy metonymy, called \"gods.\"\n\nBut surely no one supposes that this is all that can be said upon the\nsubject, and that, after such admissions, the discussion must be closed.\nOn the contrary, we have, as yet, scarce caught a glimpse of the real\ncharacter and genius of Grecian polytheistic worship, and we have not\nmade the first approach towards a philosophy of Grecian mythology.\n\nThe assumption that the heathen regarded the images \"graven by art and\ndevice of man\" as the real creators of the world and man, or as having\nany control over the destinies of men, sinks at once under the weight of\nits own absurdity. Such hypothesis is repudiated with scorn and\nindignation by the heathens themselves. Cotta, in _Cicero_, declares\nexplicitly: \"though it be common and familiar language amongst us to\ncall corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one so mad as\nto take that to be really a god that he feeds upon?\"[141] And _Plutarch_\ncondemns the whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to\ninanimate objects, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: \"they who give\nthe names of gods to senseless matter and inanimate things, and such as\nare destroyed by men in the using, beget most wicked and atheistical\nopinions in the minds of men, since it can not be conceived how these\nthings should be gods, for nothing that is inanimate is a god.\"[142] And\nso also the Hindoo, the Buddhist, the American Indian, the Fijian of\nto-day, repel the notion that their visible images are real gods, or\nthat they worship them instead of the unseen God.\n\n[Footnote 141: Cudworth's \"Intell. System,\" vol. ii. p. 257, Eng. ed.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Quoted in Cudworth's \"Intell. System,\" vol. ii. p. 258,\nEng. ed.]\n\nAnd furthermore, that even the invisible divinities which these images\nwere designed to represent, were each independent, self-existent beings,\nand that the stories which are told concerning them by Homer and Hesiod\nwere received in a literal sense, is equally improbable. The earliest\nphilosophers knew as well as we know, that the Deity, in order to be\nDeity, must be either _perfect_ or nothing--that he must be _one_, not\nmany--without parts and passions; and they were scandalized and shocked\nby the religious fables of the ancient mythology as much as we are.\n_Xenophanes_, who lived, as we know, before Pythagoras, accuses Homer\nand Hesiod of having ascribed to the gods every thing that is\ndisgraceful amongst men, as stealing, adultery, and deceit. He remarks\n\"that men seem to have created their gods, and to have given them their\nown mind, and voice, and figure.\" He himself declares that \"God is\n_one,_ the greatest amongst gods and men, neither in form nor in thought\nlike unto men.\" He calls the battles of the Titans and the Giants, and\nthe Centaurs, \"the inventions of former generations,\" and he demands\nthat God shall be praised in holy songs and nobler strains.[143]\nDiogenes Laertius relates the following of _Pythagoras_, \"that when he\ndescended to the shades below, he saw the soul of Hesiod bound to a\npillar of brass and gnashing his teeth; and that of Homer, as suspended\non a tree, and surrounded by serpents; as a punishment for the things\nthey had said of the gods.\"[144] These poets, who had corrupted\ntheology, _Plato_ proposes to exclude from his ideal Republic; or if\npermitted at all, they must be subjected to a rigid expurgation. \"We\nshall,\" says he, \"have to repudiate a large part of those fables which\nare now in vogue; and, especially, of what I call the greater\nfables,--the stories which Hesiod and Homer tell us. In these stories\nthere is a fault which deserves the gravest condemnation; namely, when\nan author gives a _bad representation of gods and heroes_. We must\ncondemn such a poet, as we should condemn a painter, whose pictures bear\nno resemblance to the objects which he tries to imitate. For instance,\nthe poet Hesiod related an ugly story when he told how Uranus acted, and\nhow Kronos had his revenge upon him. They are offensive stories, and\nmust not be repeated in our cities. Not yet is it proper to say, in any\ncase,--what is indeed untrue--that gods wage war against gods, and\nintrigue and fight among themselves. Stories like the chaining of Juno\nby her son Vulcan, and the flinging of Vulcan out of heaven for trying\nto take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all other\nbattles of the gods which are found in Homer, must be refused admission\ninto our state, _whether they are allegorical or not_. For a child can\nnot discriminate between what is allegorical and what is not; and\nwhatever is adopted, as a matter of belief, in childhood, has a tendency\nto become fixed and indelible; and therefore we ought to esteem it as of\nthe greatest importance that the fables which children first hear should\nbe adapted, as far as possible, to promote virtue.\"[145]\n\n[Footnote 143: Max Muller, \"Science of Language,\" pp. 405, 406.]\n\n[Footnote 144: \"Lives,\" bk. viii. ch. xix. p. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 145: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xvii.]\n\nIf, then, poetic and allegorical representations of divine things are to\nbe permitted in the ideal republic, then the founders of the state are\nto prescribe \"the moulds in which the poets are to cast their fictions.\"\n\n\"Now what are these moulds to be in the case of _Theology?_ They may be\ndescribed as follows: It is right always to represent God as he really\nis, whether the poet describe him in an epic, or a lyric, or a dramatic\npoem. Now God is, beyond all else, _good in reality_, and therefore so\nto be represented. But nothing that is good is hurtful. That which is\ngood hurts not; does no evil; is the cause of no evil. That which is\ngood is beneficial; is the cause of good. And, therefore, that which is\ngood is not the cause of _all_ which is and happens, but only of that\nwhich is as it should be.... The good things we must ascribe to God,\nwhilst we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evil\nthings.\"\n\nWe must, then, express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet,\nwho is guilty of such a foolish blunder as to tell us (Iliad, xxiv. 660)\nthat:\n\n     'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed\n     Two casks--one stored with evil, one with good:'\n\nand that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both--\n\n     'He leads a life checkered with good and ill.'\n\nBut as for the man to whom he gives the bitter cup unmixed--\n\n                                         'He walks\n     The blessed earth unbless'd, go where he will.'\n\nAnd if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties by the\nact of Pandarus was brought about by Athen\u00e9 and Zeus (Iliad, ii. 60), we\nshould refuse our approbation. Nor can we allow it to be said that the\nstrife and trial of strength between tween the gods (Iliad, xx.) was\ninstigated by Themis and Zeus.... Such language can not be used without\nirreverence; it is both injurious to us, and contradictory in\nitself.[146]\n\nInasmuch as God is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, _he\nabides ever the same_, and without any variation in his form. Then let\nno poet tell us that (Odyss. xvii. 582)\n\n                   'In similitude of strangers oft\n     The Gods, who can with ease all shapes assume,\n     Repair to populous cities.'\n\nAnd let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies, or\nany other poems, Hera transformed into the guise of a princess\ncollecting\n\n     'Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos,'\n\nnot to mention many other falsehoods which we must interdict.[147]\n\n\"When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angry\nwith him, and refuse him a chorus. Neither shall we allow our teachers\nto use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have\nour guards grow up to be as god-like and god-fearing as it is possible\nfor men to be.\"[148]\n\nWe are thus constrained by the statements of the heathens themselves, as\nwell as by the dictates of common sense, to look beyond the external\ndrapery and the material forms of Polytheism for some deeper and truer\nmeaning that shall be more in harmony with the facts of the universal\nreligious consciousness of our race. The religion of ancient Greece\nconsisted in something more than the fables of Jupiter and Juno, of\nApollo and Minerva, of Venus and Bacchus. \"Through the rank and\npoisonous vegetation of mythic phraseology, we may always catch a\nglimpse of an original stem round which it creeps and winds itself, and\nwithout which it can not enjoy that parasitical existence which has been\nmistaken for independent vitality.\"[149]\n\n[Footnote 146: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 147: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xx. Much more to the same effect\nmay be seen in ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 148: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" 2d series, p. 433.]\n\nIt is an obvious truth, attested by the voice of universal consciousness\nas revealed in history, that the human mind can never rest satisfied\nwithin the sphere of sensible phenomena. Man is impelled by an inward\nnecessity to pass, in thought, beyond the boundary-line of sense, and\ninquire after causes and entities which his reason assures him must lie\nbeneath all sensible appearances. He must and will interpret nature\naccording to the forms of his own personality, or according to the\nfundamental ideas of his own reason. In the childlike subjectivity of\nthe undisciplined mind he will either transfer to nature the phenomena\nof his own personality, regarding the world as a living organism which\nhas within it an informing soul, and thus attain a _pantheistic_\nconception of the universe; or else he will fix upon some extraordinary\nand inexplicable phenomenon of nature, and, investing it with\n_super-natural_ significance, will rise from thence to a religious and\n_theocratic_ conception of nature as a whole. An intelligence--a mind\n_within_ nature, and inseparable from nature, or else _above_ nature and\ngoverning nature, is, for man, an inevitable thought.\n\nIt is equally obvious that humanity can never relegate itself from a\nsupernatural origin, neither can it ever absolve itself from a permanent\ncorrelation with the Divine. Man feels within him an instinctive\nnobility. He did not arise out of the bosom of nature; in some\nmysterious way he has descended from an eternal mind, he is \"the\noffspring of God.\" And furthermore, a theocratic conception of nature,\nassociated with a pre-eminent regard for certain apparently supernatural\nexperiences in the history of humanity, becomes the foundation of\ngovernments, of civil authority, and of laws. Society can not be founded\nwithout the aid of the Deity, and a commonwealth can only be organized\nby Divine interposition. \"A Ceres must appear and sow the fields with\ncorn.\" And a Numa or a Lycurgus must be heralded by the oracle as\n\n     \"Dear to Jove, and all who sit in the halls of the Olympus.\"\n\nHe must be a \"descendant of Zeus,\" appointed by the gods to rule, and\none who will \"prove himself a god.\" These divinely-appointed rulers were\nregarded as the ministers of God, the visible representatives of the\nunseen Power which really governs all. The divine government must also\nhave its invisible agents--its Nemesis, and Themis, and Dik\u00e9, the\nministers of law, of justice, and of retribution; and its Jupiter, and\nJuno, and Neptune, and Pluto, ruling, with delegated powers, in the\nheavens, the air, the sea, and the nethermost regions. So that, in fact,\nthere exists no nation, no commonwealth, no history without a Theophany,\nand along with it certain sacred legends detailing the origin of the\npeople, the government, the country itself, and the world at large. This\nis especially true of India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Their primitive\nhistory is eminently _mythological_.\n\nGrecian polytheism can not be otherwise regarded than as a\npoetico-historical religion of _myth_ and _symbol_ which is under-laid\nby a natural Theism; a parasitical growth which winds itself around the\noriginal stem of instinctive faith in a supernatural Power and Presence\nwhich pervades the universe. The myths are oral traditions, floating\ndown from that dim; twilight of _poetic_ history, which separates real\nhistory, with its fixed chronology, from the unmeasured and unrecorded\neternity--faint echoes from that mystic border-land which divides the\nnatural from the supernatural, and in which they seem to have been\nmarvellously commingled. They are the lingering memories of those\nmanifestations of God to men, in which he or his celestial ministers\ncame into visible intercourse with our race; the reality of which is\nattested by sacred history. In all these myths there is a theogonic and\ncosmogonic element. They tell of the generation of the celestial and\na\u00ebrial divinities--the subordinate agents and ministers of the Divine\ngovernment. They attempt an explanation of the genesis of the visible\nuniverse, the origin of humanity, and the development of human society.\nIn the presence of history, the substance of these myths is preserved by\n_symbols_, that is, by means of natural or artificial, real or striking\nobjects, which, by some analogy or arbitrary association, shall suggest\nthe _idea_ to the mind. These symbols were designed to represent the\ninvisible attributes and operations of the Deity; the powers that\nvitalize nature, that control the elements, that preside over cities,\nthat protect the nations: indeed, all the agencies of the physical and\nmoral government of God. Beneath all the pagan legends of gods, and\nunderlying all the elaborate mechanism of pagan worship, there are\nunquestionably philosophical ideas, and theological conceptions, and\nreligious sentiments, which give as meaning, and even a mournful\ngrandeur to the whole.\n\nWhilst the pagan polytheistic worship is, under one aspect, to be\nregarded as a departure from God, inasmuch as it takes away the honor\ndue to God alone, and transfers it to the creature; still, under another\naspect, we can not fail to recognize in it the effort of the human mind\nto fill up the chasm that seemed, to the undisciplined mind, to separate\nGod and man--and to bridge the gulf between the visible and the\ninvisible, the finite and the infinite. It was unquestionably an attempt\nto bring God nearer to the sense and comprehension of man. It had its\norigin in that instinctive yearning after the supernatural, the Divine,\nwhich dwells in all human hearts, and which has revealed itself in all\nphilosophies, mysticisms, and religions.[150] This longing was\nstimulated by the contemplation of the living beauty and grandeur of the\nvisible universe, which, to the lively fancy and deep feeling of the\nGreeks, seemed as the living vesture of the Infinite Mind,--the temple\nof the eternal Deity. In this visible universe the Divinity was partly\nrevealed, and partly concealed. The unity of the all-pervading\nIntelligence was veiled beneath an apparent diversity of power, and a\nmanifoldness of operations. They caught some glimpses of this universal\npresence in nature, but were more immediately and vividly impressed by\nthe several manifestations of the divine perfections and divine\noperations, as so many separate rays of the Divinity, or so many\nsubordinate agents and functionaries employed to execute the will and\ncarry out the purposes of the Supreme Mind.[151] That unseen,\nincomprehensible Power and Presence was perceived in the sublimity of\nthe deep blue sky, the energy of the vitalizing sun, the surging of the\nsea, the rushing wind, the roaring thunder, the ripening corn, and the\nclustering vine. To these separate manifestations of the Deity they gave\n_personal names_, as Jupiter to the heavens, Juno to the air, Neptune to\nthe sea, Ceres to the corn, and Bacchus to the vine. These personals\ndenoted, not the things themselves, but the invisible, divine powers\nsupposed to preside over those several departments of nature. By a kind\nof prosopopoeia \"they spake of the things in nature, and parts of the\nworld, as persons--and consequently as so many gods and goddesses--yet\nso as the intelligent might easily understand their meaning, _that these\nwere in reality nothing else but so many names and notions of that one\nNumen,--divine force and power which runs through all the world,\nmultiformly displaying itself._\"[152] \"Their various deities were but\ndifferent names, different conceptions, of that Incomprehensible Being\nwhich no _thought_ can reach, and no _language_ express.\"[153] Having\ngiven to these several manifestations of the Divinity personal names,\nthey now sought to represent them to the eye of sense by _visible\nforms_, as the symbols or images of the perfections of the unseen, the\nincomprehensible, the unknown God. And as the Greeks regarded man as the\nfirst and noblest among the phenomena of nature, they selected the human\nform as the highest sensible manifestation of God, the purest symbol of\nthe Divinity. Grecian polytheism was thus a species of _mythical\nanthropomorphism_.\n\n[Footnote 150: The original constitution of man is such that he \"seeks\nafter\" God Acts xvii. 27. \"All men yearn after the gods\" (Homer,\n\"Odyss.\" iii. 48).]\n\n[Footnote 151: \"Heathenism springs directly from this, that the mind\nlays undue stress upon the bare letter in the book of creation; that it\nseparates and individualizes its objects as far as possible; that it\nplaces the sense of the individual part, in opposition to the sense of\nthe whole,--to the _analogia fidei_ or _spiritus_ which alone gives\nunity to the book of nature, while it dilutes and renders as transitory\nas possible the sense of the universal in the whole.... And as it laid\ngreat stress upon the letter in the book of nature, it fell into\npolytheism. The particular symbol of the divine, or of the Godhead,\nbecame a myth of some special deity.\"--Lange's \"Bible-work,\" Genesis, p.\n23.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Cudworth, \"Intellect. System,\" vol. i. p. 308.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 431.]\n\nA philosophy of Grecian mythology, such as we have outlined in the\npreceding paragraphs, is, in our judgment, perfectly consistent with the\nviews announced by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He intimates\nthat the Athenians \"thought that the Godhead was _like unto_ (e nai\nomoion)--to be imaged or represented by human art--by gold, and silver,\nand precious stone graven by art, and device of man;\" that is, they\nthought the perfections of God could be represented to the eye by an\nimage, or symbol. The views of Paul are still more articulately\nexpressed in Romans, i. 23, 25: \"They changed the glory of the\nincorruptible God into the _similitude of an image_ of corruptible\nman,.... and they worshipped and served the thing made, para--_rather_\nthan, or _more_ than the Creator.\" Here, then, the apostle intimates,\nfirst, that the heathen _knew_ God,[154] and that they worshipped God.\nThey worshipped the creature besides or even more than God, but still\nthey also worshipped God. And, secondly, they represented the\nperfections of God by an image, and under this, as a \"_likeness_\" or\nsymbol, they indirectly worshipped God. Their religious system was,\nthen, even to the eye of Paul, a _symbolic_ worship--that is, the\nobjects of their devotion were the _omoi\u00f4mata_--the similitudes, the\nlikenesses, the images of the perfections of the invisible God.\n\n[Footnote 154: Verse 21.]\n\nIt is at once conceded by us, that the \"sensus numinis,\" the natural\nintuition of a Supreme Mind, whose power and presence are revealed in\nnature, can not maintain itself, as an influential, and vivifying, and\nregulative belief amongst men, without the continual supernatural\ninterposition of God; that is, without a succession of Divine\nrevelations. And further, we grant that, instead of this symbolic mode\nof worship deepening and vitalizing the sense of God as a living power\nand presence, there is great danger that the symbol shall at length\nunconsciously take the place of God, and be worshipped instead of Him.\nFrom the purest form of symbolism which prevailed in the earliest ages,\nthere may be an inevitable descent to the rudest form of false worship,\nwith its accompanying darkness, and abominations, and crimes; but, at\nthe same time, let us do justice to the religions of the ancient\nworld--the childhood stammerings of religious life--which were something\nmore than the inventions of designing men, or the mere creations of\nhuman fancy; they were, in the words of Paul, \"a _seeking after God_, if\nhaply they might feel after him, and find him, who is not far from any\none of us.\" It can not be denied that the more thoughtful and\nintelligent Greeks regarded the visible objects of their devotion as\nmere symbols of the perfections and operations of the unseen God, and of\nthe invisible powers and subordinate agencies which are employed by him\nin his providential and moral government of the world. And whatever\nthere was of misapprehension and of \"ignorance\" in the popular mind, we\nhave the assurance of Paul that it was \"_overlooked_\" by God.\n\nThe views here presented will, we venture to believe, be found most in\nharmony with a true philosophy of the human mind; with the religious\nphenomena of the world; and, as we shall subsequently see, with the\nwritings of those poets and philosophers who may be fairly regarded as\nrepresenting the sentiments and opinions of the ancient world. At the\nsame time, we have no desire to conceal the fact that this whole\nquestion as to the origin, and character, and philosophy of the\nmythology and symbolism of the religions of the ancient world has been a\nsubject of earnest controversy from Patristic times down to the present\nhour, and that even to-day there exists a wide diversity of opinion\namong philosophers, as well as theologians.\n\nThe principal theories offered may be classed as the _ethical_, the\n_physical_, and the _historical_, according to the different objects the\nframers of the myths are supposed to have had in view. Some have\nregarded the myths as invented by the priests and wise men of old for\nthe improvement and government of society, as designed to give authority\nto laws, and maintain social order.[155] Others have regarded them as\nintended to be allegorical interpretations of physical phenomena--the\npoetic embodiment of the natural philosophy of the primitive races of\nmen;[156] whilst others have looked upon them as historical legends,\nhaving a substratum of fact, and, when stripped of the supernatural and\nmiraculous drapery which accompanies fable, as containing the history of\nprimitive times.[157] Some of the latter class have imagined they could\nrecognize in Grecian mythology traces of sacred personages, as well as\nprofane; in fact, a dimmed image of the patriarchal traditions which are\npreserved in the Old Testament scriptures.[158]\n\nIt is beyond our design to discuss all the various theories presented,\nor even to give a history of opinions entertained.[159] We are fully\nconvinced that the hypothesis we have presented in the preceding pages,\nviz., _that Grecian mythology was a grand symbolic representation of the\nDivine as manifested in nature and providence_, is the only hypothesis\nwhich meets and harmonizes all the facts of the case. This is the theory\nof Plato, of Cudworth, Baumgarten, Max M\u00fcller, and many other\ndistinguished scholars.\n\n[Footnote 155: Empedocles, Metrodorus.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Hecat\u00e6us, Herodotus, some of the early Fathers, Niebuhr,\nJ.H. Voss, Arnold.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Bochart, G.J. Vossius, Faber, Gladstone.]\n\n[Footnote 159: To the English reader who desires an extended and\naccurate acquaintance with the classic and patristic literature of this\ndeeply interesting subject, we commend the careful study of Cudworth's\n\"Intellectual System of the Universe,\" especially ch. iv. The style of\nCudworth is perplexingly involved, and his great work is unmethodical in\nits arrangement and discussion. Nevertheless, the patient and\npersevering student will be amply rewarded for his pains. A work of more\nprofound research into the doctrine of antiquity concerning God, and\ninto the real import of the religious systems of the ancient world, is,\nprobably, not extant in any language.]\n\nThere are two fundamental propositions laid down by Cudworth which\nconstitute the basis of this hypothesis.\n\n1. _No well-authenticated instance can be furnished from among the Greek\nPolytheists of one who taught the existence of a multiplicity of\nindependenty uncreated, self-existent deities; they almost universally_\n_believed in the existence of_ ONE SUPREME, UNCREATED, ETERNAL GOD,\n\"_The Maker of all things_\"--\"_the Father of gods and men_,\"--\"_the\nsole Monarch and Ruler of the world_.\"\n\n2. _The Greek Polytheists taught a plurality of_\"GENERATED DEITIES,\"\n_who owe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, who\nare by Him invested with delegated powers, and who, as the agents of his\nuniversal providence, preside over different departments of the created\nuniverse_.\n\nThe evidence presented by Cudworth in support of his theses is so varied\nand so voluminous, that it defies all attempts at condensation. His\nvolumes exhibit an extent of reading, of patient research, and of varied\nlearning, which is truly amazing. The discussion of these propositions\ninvolves, in fact, nothing less than a complete and exhaustive survey of\nthe entire field of ancient literature, a careful study of the Greek and\nLatin poets, of the Oriental, Greek, and Alexandrian philosophers, and a\nreview of the statements and criticisms of Rabbinical and Patristic\nwriters in regard to the religions of the pagan world. An adequate\nconception of the varied and weighty evidence which is collected by our\nauthor from these fields, in support of his views, could only be\nconveyed by transcribing to our pages the larger portion of his\nmemorable _fourth_ chapter. But inasmuch as Grecian polytheism is, in\nfact, the culmination of all the mythological systems of the ancient\nworld, the fully-developed flower and ripened fruit of the cosmical and\ntheological conceptions of the childhood-condition of humanity, we\npropose to epitomize the results of his inquiry as to the _theological_,\nopinions of the Greeks, supplying additional confirmation of his views\nfrom other sources.\n\nAnd first, he proves most conclusively that Orpheus, Homer, and\nHesiod,[160] who are usually designated \"the theologians\" of Greece, but\nwho were in fact the depravers and corrupters of pagan theology, do not\nteach the existence of a multitude of _unmade, self-existent, and\nindependent deities_. Even they believed in the existence of _one_\nuncreated and eternal mind, _one Supreme God_, anterior and superior to\nall the gods of their mythology. They had some intuition, some\napperception of the _Divine_, even before they had attached to it a\nsacred name. The gods of their mythology had all, save one, a temporal\norigin; they were generated of Chaos and Night, by an active principle\ncalled _Love_. \"One might suspect,\" says Aristotle, that Hesiod, and if\nthere be any other who made _love_ or _desire_ a principle of things,\naimed at these very things (viz., the designation of the efficient cause\nof the world); for Parmenides, describing the generation of the\nuniverse, says:\n\n     'First of all the gods planned he _love_;'\n\nand further, Hesiod:\n\n     'First of all was Chaos, afterwards Earth,\n     With her spacious bosom,\n     And _Love_, who is pre-eminent among all the immortals;'\n\nas intimating here that in entities there should exist some _cause_ that\nwill impart motion, and hold bodies in union together. But how, in\nregard to these, one ought to distribute them, as to the order of\npriority, can be decided afterwards.[161]\n\n[Footnote 160: We do not concern ourselves with the chronological\nantecedence of these ancient Greek poets. It is of little consequence to\nus whether Homer preceded Orpheus, or Orpheus Homer. They were not the\nreal creators of the mythology of ancient Greece. The myths were a\nspontaneous growth of the earliest human thought even before the\nseparation of the Aryan family into its varied branches.\n\nThe study of Comparative Mythology, as well as of Comparative Language,\nassures us that the myths had an origin much earlier than the times of\nHomer and Orpheus. They floated down from ages on the tide of oral\ntradition before they were systematized, embellished, and committed to\nwriting by Homer, and Orpheus, and Hesiod. And between the systems of\nthese three poets a perceptible difference is recognizable, which\nreflects the changes that verbal recitations necessarily and\nimperceptibly undergo.]\n\n[Footnote 161: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. iv.]\n\nNow whether this \"first principle,\" called \"_Love_,\" \"the cause of\nmotion and of union\" in the universe, was regarded as a personal Being,\nand whether, as the ancient scholiast taught, Hesiod's love was \"the\nheavenly Love, which is also God, that other love that was born of Venus\nbeing junior,\" is just now of no moment to the argument. The more\nimportant inference is, that amongst the gods of Pagan theology but\n_one_ is self-existent, or else none are. Because the Hesiodian gods,\nwhich are, in fact, all the gods of the Greek mythology, \"were either\nall of them derived from chaos, love itself likewise being generated out\nof it; or else love was supposed to be distinct from chaos, and the\nactive principle of the universe, from whence, together with chaos, all\nthe theogony and cosmogony was derived.\"[162] Hence it is evident the\npoets did not teach the existence of a multiplicity of unmade,\nself-existent, independent deities.\n\n[Footnote 162: \"Cudworth,\" vol. i. p. 287.]\n\nThe careful reader of Cudworth will also learn another truth of the\nutmost importance in this connection, viz., _that the theogony of the\nGreek poets was, in fact, a cosmogony_, the generation of the gods\nbeing, in reality, the generation of the heavens, the sun, the moon, the\nstars, and all the various powers and phenomena of nature. This is dimly\nshadowed forth in the very names which are given to some of these\ndivinities. Thus Helios is the sun, Selena is the moon, Zeus the\nsky--the deep blue heaven, Eos the dawn, and Ers\u00ea the dew. It is\nrendered still more evident by the opening lines of Hesiod's\n\"Theogonia,\" in which he invokes the muses:\n\n     \"Hail ye daughters of Jupiter! Grant a delightsome song.\n     Tell of the race of immortal gods, always existing,\n     Who are the offspring of the earth, of the starry sky,\n     And of the gloomy night, whom also the ocean nourisheth.\n     Tell how the gods and the earth at first were made,\n     And the rivers, and the mighty deep, boiling with waves,\n     And the glowing stars, and the broad heavens above,\n     And the gods, givers of good, born of these.\"\n\nWhere we see plainly that the generation of the gods is the generation\nof the earth, the heaven, the stars, the seas, the rivers, and other\nthings produced by them. \"But immediately after invocation of the Muses\nthe poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the first\nprinciples, and then proceeds to the production of the earth and of\nnight out of chaos; of the ether and of day, from night; of the starry\nheavens, mountains, and seas. All which generation of gods is really\nnothing but a poetic description of the cosmogonia; as through the\nsequel of the poem all seems to be physiology veiled under fiction and\nallegory.... Hesiod's gods are thus not only the animated parts of the\nworld, but also the other things of nature personified and deified, or\nabusively called gods and goddesses.\"[163] The same is true both of the\nOrphic and Homeric gods. \"Their generation of the gods is the same with\nthe generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all\nprobability, derived it from the Mosaic cabala, or tradition.\"[164]\n\nBut in spite of all this mythological obscuration, the belief in one\nSupreme God is here and there most clearly recognizable. \"That Zeus was\noriginally to the Greeks the Supreme God, the true God--nay, at some\ntime their only God--can be perceived in spite of the haze which\nmythology has raised around his name.\"[165] True, they sometimes used\nthe word \"Zeus\" in a physical sense to denote the deep expanse of\nheaven, and sometimes in a historic sense, to designate a hero or\ndeified man said to have been born in Crete. It is also true that the\nHomeric Zeus is full of contradictions. He is \"all-seeing,\" yet he is\ncheated; he is \"omnipotent,\" yet he is defied; he is \"eternal,\" yet he\nhas a father; he is \"just,\" yet he is guilty of crime. Now, as M\u00fcller\nvery justly remarks, these contradictions may teach us a lesson. If all\nthe conceptions of Zeus had sprung from one origin, these contradictions\ncould not have existed. If Zeus had simply and only meant the Supreme\nGod, he could not have been the son of Kronos (Time). If, on the other\nhand, Zeus had been a mere mythological personage, as Eos, the dawn, and\nHelios, the sun, he could never have been addressed as he is addressed\nin the famous prayer of Achilles (Iliad, bk. xxi.).[166]\n\n[Footnote 163: Cudworth, vol. i. pp. 321, 332.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 478.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Max M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 457.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Id., ib., p. 458.]\n\nIn Homer there is a perpetual blending of the natural and the\nsupernatural, the human and divine. The _Iliad_ is an incongruous medley\nof theology, physics, and history. In its gorgeous scenic\nrepresentations, nature, humanity, and deity are mingled in inextricable\nconfusion. The gods are sometimes supernatural and superhuman\npersonages; sometimes the things and powers of nature personified; and\nsometimes they are deified men. And yet there are passages, even in\nHomer, which clearly distinguish Zeus from all the other divinities, and\nmark him out as the Supreme. He is \"the highest, first of Gods\" (bk.\nxix. 284); \"most great, most glorious Jove\" (bk. ii. 474). He is \"the\nuniversal Lord\" (bk. xi. 229); \"of mortals and immortals king supreme,\"\n(bk. xii. 263); \"over all the immortal gods he reigns in unapproached\npre-eminence of power\" (bk. xv. 125). He is \"the King of kings\" (bk.\nviii. 35), whose \"will is sovereign\" (bk. iv. 65), and his \"power\ninvincible\" (bk. viii. 35). He is the \"eternal Father\" (bk. viii. 77).\nHe \"excels in wisdom gods and men; all human things from him proceed\"\n(bk. xiii. 708-10); \"the Lord of counsel\" (bk. i. 208), \"the all-seeing\nJove\" (bk. xiii. 824). Indeed the mere expression \"Father of gods and\nmen\" (bk. i. 639), so often applied to Zeus, and him _alone_, is proof\nsufficient that, in spite of all the legendary stories of gods and\nheroes, the idea of Zeus as the Supreme God, the maker of the world, the\nFather of gods and men, the monarch and ruler of the world, was not\nobliterated from the Greek mind.[167]\n\n[Footnote 167: \"In the order of legendary chronology Zeus comes after\nKronos and Uranos, but in the order of Grecian conception Zeus is the\nprominent person, and Kronos and Uranos are inferior and introductory\nprecursors, set up in order to be overthrown, and to serve as mementos\nof the powers of their conqueror. To Homer and Hesiod, as well as to the\nGreeks universally, Zeus is the great, the predominant God, 'the Father\nof gods and men,' whose power none of the gods can hope to resist, or\neven deliberately think of questioning. All the other gods have their\nspecific potency, and peculiar sphere of action and duty, with which\nZeus does not usually interfere; but it is he who maintains the\nlineaments of a providential government, as well over the phenomena of\nOlympus as over the earth.\"--Grote, \"Hist. of Greece,\" vol. i. p. 3.\n\nZeus is not only lord of heaven but likewise the ruler of the lower\nworld, and the master of the sea.--Welcher, \"Griechische G\u00f6tterlehre,\"\nvol. i. p. 164. The Zeus of the Greek poets is unquestionably the god of\nwhom Paul declared: In him we live and move, and have our being, as\ncertain of your own poets have also said--\n\n     \"'For we are his offspring.'\"\n\nNow whether this be a quotation from Aratus or Cleanthes, the language\nof the poets is, \"We are the offspring of Zeus;\" consequently the Zeus\nof the poets and the God of Christianity are the same God.\n\n\"The father of gods and men in Homer is, of course, the Universal Father\nof the Scriptures.\"--Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" p. 171.]\n\n\"When Homer introduces Eumaios, the swineherd, speaking of this life and\nthe higher powers that rule it, he knows only of just gods 'who hate\ncruel deeds, but honor justice and the righteous works of men' (Od. xiv.\n83). His whole life is built up on a complete trust in the divine\ngovernment of the world without any artificial helps, as the Erinys, the\nNemesis, or Moira. 'Eat,' says the swineherd, 'and enjoy what is here,\nfor _God_[168] will grant one thing, but another he will refuse,\nwhatever he will in his mind, for he can do all things' (Od. xiv. 444;\nx. 306). This surely is religion, and it is religion untainted by\nmythology. Again, the prayer of the female slave, grinding corn in the\nhouse of Ulysses is religious in the truest sense--'Father Zeus, thou\nwho rulest over gods and men, surely thou hast just thundered in the\nstarry sky, and there is no cloud anywhere. Thou showest this as a sign\nto some one. Fulfill now, even to me, miserable wretch, the prayer which\nI now offer'\" (Od. xx. 141-150).[169]\n\n[Footnote 168: No sound reason can be assigned for translating _Theos_\nby \"_a_ god\" as some have proposed, rather than \"_God_.\" But even if it\nwere translated \"a god,\" this god must certainly be understood as Zeus.\nPlato tells us that Zeus is the most appropriate name for God. \"For in\nreality the name Zeus is, as it were, a sentence; and persons dividing\nit in two parts, some of us make use of one part, and some of another;\nfor some call him Z\u00ean, and some Dis. But these parts, collected together\ninto one, exhibit the nature of the God;... for there is no one who is\nmore the cause of living, both to us and everything else, than he who is\nthe ruler and king of all. It follows, therefore, that this god is\nrightly named, through whom _life_ is present in all living\nbeings.\"--Cratylus, \u00a7 28.\n\nTheos was usually employed, says Cudworth, to designate _God_ by way of\npre-eminence, Theoi to designate inferior divinities.]\n\n[Footnote 169: M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 434.]\n\nThe Greek tragedians were the great religious instructors of the\nAthenian people. \"Greek tragedy grew up in connection with religious\nworship, and constituted not only a popular but a sacred element in the\nfestivals of the gods.... In short, strange as it may sound to modern\nears, the Greek stage was, more nearly than any thing else, the Greek\npulpit.[170] With a priesthood that offered sacrifice, but did not\npreach, with few books of any kind, the people were, in a great measure,\ndependent on oral instruction for knowledge; and as they learned their\nrights and duties as citizens from their orators, so they hung on the\nlips of the 'lofty, grave tragedians' for instruction touching their\norigin, duty, and destiny as mortal and immortal beings.... Greek\ntragedy is essentially didactic, ethical, mythological, and\nreligious.\"[171]\n\n[Footnote 170: Pulpitum, a stage.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" pp. 205, 206.]\n\nNow it is unquestionable that, with the tragedians, Zeus is the Supreme\nGod. \u00c6schylus is pre-eminently the theological poet of Greece. The great\nproblems which lie at the foundation of religious faith and practice are\nthe main staple of nearly all his tragedies. Homer, Hesiod, the sacred\npoets, had looked at these questions in their purely poetic aspects. The\nsubsequent philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, developed them more fully\nby their didactic method. \u00c6schylus stands on the dividing-line between\nthem, no less poetic than the former, scarcely less philosophical than\nthe latter, but more intensely practical, personal, and _theological_\nthan either. The character of the Supreme Divinity, as represented in\nhis tragedies, approaches more nearly to the Christian idea of God. He\nis the Universal Father--Father of gods and men; the Universal Cause\n(panaitios, Agamem. 1485); the All-seer and All-doer (pantopi\u00eas,\npanerget\u00eas, ibid, and Sup. 139); the All-wise and All-controlling\n(pankrat\u00eas, Sup. 813); the Just and the Executor of justice (dik\u00eaphoros,\nAgamem. 525); true and incapable of falsehood (Prom. 1031);\n\n     pseud\u00eagorein gar ouk epistatai stoma\n     to dion, alla pan epos telei,--\n\nholy (agnos, Sup. 650); merciful (preumen\u00eas, ibid. 139); the God\nespecially of the suppliant and the stranger (Supplices, passim); the\nmost high and perfect One (teleion upsiston, Eumen. 28); King of kings,\nof the happy, most happy, of the perfect, most perfect power, blessed\nZeus (Sup. 522).[172] Such are some of the titles by which Zeus is most\nfrequently addressed; such the attributes commonly ascribed to him in\n\u00c6schylus.\n\nSophocles was the great master who carried Greek tragedy to its highest\nperfection. Only seven out of more than a hundred of his tragedies have\ncome down to us. There are passages cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens\nAlexandrinus, and others which are not found in those tragedies now\nextant. The most famous and extensively quoted passage is given by\nCudworth.[173]\n\n     Eis tais al\u00eatheiaisin, eis estin Theos,\n     Os ouranon t' eteuxe kai gaian makran,\n     Poniou te karapon oidma, kan\u00eam\u00f4n bian, k. t. l.[174]\n\nThis \"one only God\" is Zeus, who is the God of justice, and reigns\nsupreme:\n\n     \"Still in yon starry heaven supreme,\n     Jove, all-beholding, all-directing, dwells--\n     To him commit thy vengeance.\"--\"Electra,\" p. 174 sqq.\n\nThis description of the unsleeping, undecaying power and dominion of\nZeus is worthy of some Hebrew prophet--\n\n     \"Spurning the power of age, enthroned in might,\n     Thou dwell'st mid heaven's broad light;\n     This was in ages past thy firm decree,\n     Is now, and shall forever be:\n     That none of mortal race on earth shall know\n     A life of joy serene, a course unmarked by woe.\"\n\n     \"Antigone,\" pp. 606-614.[175]\n\n[Footnote 172: Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" pp. 213, 214.]\n\n[Footnote 173: \"Intellectual Syst.,\" vol. i. p. 483.]\n\n[Footnote 174: \"There is, in truth, one only God, who made heaven and\nearth, the sea, air, and winds,\" etc.]\n\n[Footnote 175: \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" p. 322.]\n\nWhether we regard the poets as the principal theological teachers of the\nancient Greeks, or as the compilers, systematizers, and artistic\nembellishers of the theological traditions and myths which were afloat\nin the primitive Hellenic families, we can not resist the conclusion\nthat, for the masses of the people Zeus was the Supreme God, \"the God of\ngods\" as Plato calls him. Whilst all other deities in Greece are more or\nless local and tribal gods, Zeus was known in every village and to every\nclan. \"He is at home on Ida,[176] on Olympus, at Dodona.[177] While\nPoseidon drew to himself the \u00c6olian family, Apollo the Dorian, Athene\nthe Ionian, there was one powerful God for all the sons of\nHellen--Dorians, \u00c6olians, Ionians, Ach\u00e6ans, viz., the Panhellenic\nZeus.\"[178] Zeus was the name invoked in their solemn nuncupations of\nvows--\n\n     \"O Zeus, father, O Zeus, king.\"\n\nIn moments of deepest sorrow, of immediate urgency and need, of greatest\nstress and danger, they had recourse to Zeus.\n\n     \"Courage, courage, my child!\n     There is still in heaven the great Zeus;\n     He watches over all things, and he rules.\n     Commit thy exceeding bitter griefs to him,\n     And be not angry against thine enemies,\n     Nor forget them.\"[179]\n\n[Footnote 176: \"Iliad,\" bk. iii. 324.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Bk. xvi. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 178: M\u00fcller, p. 452.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Sophocles, \"Electra,\" v. 188.]\n\nHe was supplicated, as the God who reigns on high, in the prayer of the\nAthenian--\n\n     \"Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, on the land of the Athenians and on their\n     fields.\"\n\nIt has been urged that, as Zeus means the sky, therefore he is no more\nthan the deep concave of heaven personified and deified, and that\nconsequently Zeus is not the true, the only God. This argument is only\nequalled in feebleness by that of the materialist, who argues that\n\"spiritus\" means simply breath, therefore the breath is the soul. Even\nif the Greeks remembered that, originally, Zeus meant the sky, that\nwould have no more perplexed their minds than the remembrance that\n\"thymos\"--mind--meant originally blast. \"The fathers of Greek theology\ngave to that Supreme Intelligence, which they instinctively recognized\nas above and ruling over the universe, the name of Zeus; but in doing\nso, they knew well that by Zeus they meant more than the sky. The\nunfathomable depth, the everlasting calm of the ethereal sky was to\ntheir minds an image of that Infinite Presence which overshadows all,\nand looks down on all. As the question perpetually recurred to their\nminds, 'Where is he who abideth forever?' they lifted up their eyes, and\nsaw, as they thought, beyond sun, and moon, and stars, and all which\nchanges, and will change, the clear blue sky, the boundless firmament of\nheaven. That never changed, that was always the same. The clouds and\nstorms rolled far below it, and all the bustle of this noisy world; but\nthere the sky was still, as bright and calm as ever. The Almighty Father\nmust be there, unchangeable in the unchangeable heaven; bright, and\npure, and boundless like the heavens, and like the heavens, too, afar\noff.\"[180] So they named him after the sky, _Zeus_, the God who lives in\nthe clear heaven--the heavenly Father.\n\n[Footnote 180: Kingsley, \"Good News from God,\" p. 237, Am. ed.]\n\nThe high and brilliant sky has, in many languages and many religions,\nbeen regarded as the dwelling-place of God. Indeed, to all of us in\nChristian times \"God is above;\" he is \"the God of heaven;\" \"his throne\nis in the heavens;\" \"he reigns on high.\" Now, without doing any violence\nto thought, the name of the abode might be transferred to him who dwells\nin heaven. So that in our own language \"heaven\" may still be used as a\nsynonym for \"God.\" The prodigal son is still represented as saying, I\nhave sinned against \"_heaven_.\" And a Christian poet has taught us to\nsing--\n\n     \"High _heaven_, that heard my solemn vow,\n     That vow renewed shall daily hear,\" etc.\n\nWhenever, therefore, we find the name of heaven thus used to designate\nalso the Deity, we must bear in mind that those by whom it was\noriginally employed were simply transferring that name from an object\nvisible to the eye of sense to another object perceived by the eye of\nreason. They who at first called God \"_Heaven_\" had some conception\nwithin them they wished to name--the growing image of a God, and they\nfixed upon the vastest, grandest, purest object in nature, the deep blue\nconcave of heaven, overshadowing all, and embracing all, as the symbol\nof the Deity. Those who at a later period called heaven \"_God_\" had\nforgotten that they were predicating of heaven something more which was\nvastly higher than the heaven.[181]\n\n[Footnote 181: See \"Science of Language,\" p. 457.]\n\nNotwithstanding, then, that the instinctive, native faith of humanity in\nthe existence of one supreme God was overlaid and almost buried beneath\nthe rank and luxuriant vegetation of Grecian mythology, we can still\ncatch glimpses here and there of the solid trunk of native faith, around\nwhich this parasitic growth of fancy is entwined. Above all the\nphantasmata of gods and goddesses who descended to the plains of Troy,\nand mingled in the din and strife of battle, we can recognize an\novershadowing, all-embracing Power and Providence that dwells on high,\nwhich never descends into the battle-field, and is never seen by mortal\neyes--_the Universal King and Father,--the \"God of gods_.\"\n\nBesides the direct evidence, which is furnished by the poets and\nmythologists, of the presence of this universal faith in \"_the heavenly\nFather_,\" there is also a large amount of collateral testimony that this\nidea of one Supreme God was generally entertained by the Greek pagans,\nwhether learned or unlearned.[182] Dio Chrysostomus says that \"all the\npoets call the first and greatest God the Father, universally, of all\nrational kind, as also the King thereof. Agreeably with which doctrine\nof the poets do mankind erect altars to Jupiter-King (Dios Basile\u00f4s) and\nhesitate not to call him Father in their devotions\" (Orat. xxxvi.). And\nMaximus Tyrius declares that both the learned and the unlearned\nthroughout the pagan world universally agree in this; that there is one\nSupreme God, the Father of gods and men. \"If,\" says he, \"there were a\nmeeting called of all the several trades and professions,... and all\nwere required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think that\nthe painter would say one thing, the sculptor another, the poet another,\nand the philosopher another? No; nor the Scythian neither, nor the\nGreek, nor the hyperborean. In regard to other things, we find men\nspeaking discordantly one to another, all men, as it were, differing\nfrom all men... Nevertheless, on this subject, you may find universally\nthroughout the world one agreeing law and opinion; _that there is one\nGod, the King and Father of all, and many gods, the sons of God,\nco-reigners together with God_\"(Diss. i. p. 450).\n\n[Footnote 182: Cudworth, vol. i. pp. 593, 594.]\n\nFrom the poets we now pass to the philosophers. The former we have\nregarded as reflecting the traditional beliefs of the unreasoning\nmultitude. The philosophers unquestionably represent the reflective\nspirit, the speculative thought, of the educated classes of Greek\nsociety. Turning to the writings of the philosophers, we may therefore\nreasonably expect that, instead of the dim, undefined, and nebulous form\nin which the religious sentiment revealed itself amongst the\nunreflecting portions of the Greek populations, we shall find their\ntheological ideas distinctly and articulately expressed, and that we\nshall consequently be able to determine their religious opinions with\nconsiderable accuracy.\n\nNow that Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles,\nSocrates, Plato, and Aristotle were all believers in the existence of\none supreme, uncreated, eternal God, has been, we think, clearly shown\nby Cudworth.[183]\n\n[Footnote 183: Vol. i. pp. 491-554.]\n\nIn subsequent chapters on \"_the Philosophers of Athens_,\" we shall enter\nmore fully into the discussion of this question. Meantime we assume\nthat, with few exceptions, the Greek philosophers were \"genuine\nTheists.\"\n\nThe point, however, with which we are now concerned is, _that whilst\nthey believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, they at the same\ntime recognized the existence of a plurality of generated deities who\nowe their existence to the power and will of the Supreme God, and who,\nas the agents and ministers of His universal providence, preside over\ndifferent departments of the created universe_. They are at once\nMonotheists and Polytheists--believers in \"one God\" and \"many gods.\"\nThis is a peculiarity, an anomaly which challenges our attention, and\ndemands an explanation, if we would vindicate for these philosophers a\nrational Theism.\n\nNow that there can be but one infinite and absolutely perfect Being--one\nsupreme, uncreated, eternal God--is self-evident; therefore a\nmultiplicity of such gods is a contradiction and an impossibility. The\nearly philosophers knew this as well as the modern. The Deity, in order\nto be Deity, must be one and not many: must be perfect or nothing. If,\ntherefore, we would do justice to these old Greeks, we must inquire what\nexplanations they have offered in regard to \"the many gods\" of which\nthey speak. We must ascertain whether they regarded these \"gods\" as\ncreated or uncreated beings, dependent or independent, temporal or\neternal We must inquire in what sense the term \"god\" is applied to these\nlesser divinities,--whether it is not applied in an accommodated and\ntherefore allowable sense, as in the sacred Scriptures it is applied to\nkings and magistrates, and those who are appointed by God as the\nteachers and rulers of men. \"_They are called gods_ to whom the word of\nGod came.\"[184] And if it shall be found that all the gods of which they\nspeak, save _one_, are \"generated deities\"--dependent beings--creatures\nand subjects of the one eternal King and Father, and that the name of\n\"god\" is applied to them in an accommodated sense, then we have\nvindicated for the old Greek philosophers a consistent and rational\nTheism. In what relation, then, do the philosophers place \"_the gods_\"\nto the one Supreme Being?\n\n_Thales_, one of the most ancient of the Greek philosophers, taught the\nexistence of a plurality of gods, as is evident from that saying of his,\npreserved by Diogenes Laertius, \"The world has life, and is full of\ngods.\"[185] At the same time he asserts his belief in one supreme,\nuncreated Deity; \"God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade,\nor ungenerated.\"[186] All the other gods must therefore have been\n\"generated deities,\" since there is but one unmade God, one only that\nhad \"no beginning.\"[187]\n\n[Footnote 184: See John x. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 185: \"Lives,\" bk. i.; see also Aristotle's \"De Anima,\" bk. i.\nch. viii. panta Thi\u00f4n pl\u00ear\u00ea.]\n\n[Footnote 186: \"Lives,\" bk. i.]\n\n[Footnote 187: \"Lives,\" bk. i.]\n\n_Xenophanes_ was also an assertor of many gods, and one God; but his one\nGod is unquestionably supreme. \"There is one God, the greatest amongst\ngods and men;\" or, \"God is one, the greatest amongst gods and men.\"[188]\n\n_Empedocles_ also believed in one Supreme God, who \"is wholly and\nperfectly mind, ineffable, holy, with rapid and swift-glancing thought\npervading the whole world,\" and from whom all things else are\nderived,--\"all things that are upon the earth, and in the air and water,\nmay be truly called the works of God, who ruleth over the world, out of\nwhom, according to Empedocles, proceed all things, plants, men, beasts,\nand _gods_.\"[189] The minor deities are therefore _made_ by God. It will\nnot be denied that _Socrates_ was a devout and earnest Theist. He taught\nthat \"there is a Being whose eye pierces throughout all nature, and\nwhose ear is open to every sound; extending through all time, extended\nto all places; and whose bounty and care can know no other bounds than\nthose fixed by his own creation.\"[190] And yet he also recognized the\nexistence of a plurality of gods, and in his last moments expressed his\nbelief that \"it is lawful and right to pray to the gods that his\ndeparture hence may be happy.\"[191] We see, however, in his words\naddressed to Euthydemus, a marked distinction between these subordinate\ndeities and \"Him who raised this whole universe, and still upholds the\nmighty frame, who perfected every part of it in beauty and in goodness,\nsuffering none of these parts to decay through age, but renewing them\ndaily with unfading vigor;... even he, _the Supreme God_, still holds\nhimself invisible, and it is only in his works that we are capable of\nadmiring him.\"[192]\n\n[Footnote 188: Clem. Alex., \"Stromat.\" bk. v.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Aristotle, \"De Mundo,\" ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Xenophon's \"Memorabilia,\" i. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 191: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 152.]\n\n[Footnote 192: \"Memorabilia,\" iv. 3.]\n\nIt were needless to attempt the proof that _Plato_ believed in one\nSupreme God, and _only_ one. This one Being is, with him, \"the first\nGod;\" \"the greatest of the gods;\" \"the God over all;\" \"the sole\nPrinciple of the universe.\" He is \"the Immutable;\" \"the All-perfect;\"\n\"the eternal Being.\" He is \"the Architect of the world; \"the Maker of\nthe universe; the Father of gods and men; the sovereign Mind which\norders all things, and passes through all things; the sole Monarch and\nRuler of the world.[193]\n\nAnd yet remarkable as these expressions are, sounding, as they do, so\nlike the language of inspiration,[194] there can be no doubt that Plato\nwas also a sincere believer in a plurality of gods, of which, indeed,\nany one may assure himself by reading the _tenth_ book of \"the Laws.\"\n\n[Footnote 193: See chap. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Some writers have supposed that Plato must have had\naccess through some medium to \"the Oracles of God.\" See Butler, vol. ii.\np. 41.]\n\nAnd, now that we have in Plato the culmination of Grecian speculative\nthought, we may learn from him the mature and final judgment of the\nancients in regard to the gods of pagan mythology. We open the _Tim\u00e6us_,\nand here we find his views most definitely expressed. After giving an\naccount of the \"generation\" of the sun, and moon, and planets, which are\nby him designated as \"visible gods,\" he then proceeds \"to speak\nconcerning the other divinities:\" \"We must on this subject assent to\nthose who in former times have spoken thereon; who were, as they said,\nthe offspring of the gods, and who doubtless were well acquainted with\ntheir own ancestors..... Let then the genealogy of the gods be, and be\nacknowledged to be, that which they deliver. Of Earth and Heaven the\nchildren were Oceanus and Tethys; and of these the children were\nPhorcys, and Kronos, and Rhea, and all that followed these; and from\nthese were born Zeus and Hera, and those who are regarded as brothers\nand sisters of these, and others their offspring.\n\n\"When, then, _all the gods were brought into existence_, both those\nwhich move around in manifest courses [the stars and planets], and those\nwhich appear when it pleases them [the mythological deities], the\nCreator of the Universe thus addressed them: 'Gods, and sons of gods, of\nwhom I am the father and the author, produced by me, ye are\nindestructible because I will.... Now inasmuch as you have been\n_generated_, you are hence _not_ immortal, nor wholly indissoluble; yet\nyou shall never be dissolved nor become subject to the fatality of\ndeath, because _so I have willed_.... Learn, therefore, my commands.\nThree races of mortals yet remain to be created. Unless these be\ncreated, the universe will be imperfect, for it will not contain within\nit every kind of animal.... In order that these mortal creatures may be,\nand that this world may be really a cosmos, do you apply yourselves to\nthe creation of animals, imitating the exercises of my power in\n_creating_ you.'\"[195]\n\n[Footnote 195: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xv.]\n\nHere, then, we see that Plato carefully distinguishes between the sole\nEternal Author of the universe, on one hand, and the \"souls,\" vital and\nintelligent, which he attaches to the heavenly orbs, and diffuses\nthrough all nature, on the other. These subordinate powers or agents are\nall created, \"_generated_ deities,\" who owe their continued existence to\nthe _will_ of God; and though intrusted with a sort of deputed creation,\nand a subsequent direction and government of created things, they are\nstill only the _servants_ and the _deputies_ of the Supreme Creator, and\nDirector, and Ruler of all things. These subordinate agents and\nministers employed in the creation and providential government of the\nworld appear, in the estimation of Plato, to have been needed--\n\n1. _To satisfy the demands of the popular faith_, which presented its\nfacts to be explained no less than those of external nature. Plato had\nevidently a great veneration for antiquity, a peculiar regard for\n\"tradition venerable through ancient report,\" and \"doctrines hoary with\nyears.\"[196] He aspired after supernatural light and guidance; he longed\nfor some intercourse with, some communication from, the Deity. And\nwhilst he found many things in the ancient legends which revolted his\nmoral sense, and which his reason rejected, yet the sentiment and the\nlesson which pervades the whole of Grecian mythology, viz., that the\ngods are in ceaseless intercourse with the human race, and if men will\ndo right the gods will protect and help them, was one which commended\nitself to his heart.\n\n[Footnote 196: Ibid., ch. v.]\n\n2. These intermediate agents seem to have been demanded to _satisfy the\ndisposition and tendency which has revealed itself in all systems, of\ninterposing some scale of ascent between the material creation and the\ninfinite Creator_.\n\nThe mechanical theory of the universe has interposed its long series of\nsecondary causes--the qualities, properties, laws, forces of nature; the\nvital theory which attaches a separate \"soul\" to the various parts of\nnature as the cause and intelligent director of its movements. Of these\n\"souls\" or gods, there were different orders and degrees--deified men or\nheroes, a\u00ebrial, terrestrial, and celestial divinities, ascending from\nnature up to God. And this tendency to supply some scale of ascent\ntowards the Deity, or at least to people the vast territory which seems\nto swell between the world and God, finds some countenance in \"the\nangels and archangels,\" \"the thrones, and dominions, and principalities,\nand powers\" of the Christian scriptures.[197]\n\n3. These inferior ministers also seemed to Plato to _increase the\nstately grandeur and imperial majesty of the Divine government._ They\nswell the retinue of the Deity in his grand \"circuit through the highest\narch of heaven.\"[198] They wait to execute the Divine commands. They are\nthe agents of Divine providence, \"the messengers of God\" to men.\n\n[Footnote 197: \"The gods of the Platonic system answer, in office and\nconception, to the angels of Christian Theology.\"--Butler, vol. i. p.\n225.]\n\n[Footnote 198: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 56,7.]\n\n4. And, finally, the host of inferior deities interposed between the\nmaterial sensible world and God seemed to Plato as _needful in order to\nexplain the apparent defects and disorders of sublunary affairs_. Plato\nwas jealous of the Divine honor. \"All good must be ascribed to God, and\nnothing but good. We must find evil, disorder, suffering, in some other\ncause.\"[199] He therefore commits to the junior deities the task of\ncreating animals, and of forming \"the mortal part of man,\" because the\nmortal part is \"possessed of certain dire and necessary passions.\"[200]\n\n[Footnote 199: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. p.18.]\n\n[Footnote 200: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" xliv.]\n\nAristotle seems to have regarded the popular polytheism of Greece as a\nperverted relic of a deeper and purer \"Theology\" which he conceives to\nhave been, in all probability, perfected in the distant past, and then\ncomparatively lost. He says--\"The tradition has come down from very\nancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations,\nthat these (the heavenly bodies) are gods, and that the Divinity\n_encompasses the whole of nature_. There have been made, however, to\nthese certain fabulous additions for the purpose of winning the belief\nof the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, and\ntheir co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state.\nThese additions have been to the effect that these gods were of the same\nform as men, and even that some of them were in appearance similar to\ncertain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course,\nhowever, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditions\nthe false element, and to embrace that which is true; and the truth lies\nin that portion of this ancient doctrine which regards the first and\ndeepest ground of all existence to be the _Divine_, and this he may\nregard as a divine utterance. In all probability, every art, and\nscience, and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the\nfarthest extent possible, and then again lost; and we may conceive these\nopinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of these\nlost philosophers. We see, then, to some extent the relation of the\npopular belief to these ancient opinions.\"[201] This conception of a\ndeep Divine ground of all existence (for the immateriality and unity of\nwhich he elsewhere earnestly contends)[202] is thus regarded by\nAristotle as underlying the popular polytheism of Greece.\n\n[Footnote 201: \"Metaph.,\" xi. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Bk. xi. ch. ii. \u00a7 4.]\n\nThe views of the educated and philosophic mind of Greece in regard to\nthe mythological deities may, in conclusion, be thus briefly stated--\n\nI. _They are all created beings_--\"GENERATED DEITIES,\" _who are\ndependent on, and subject to, the will of one supreme God_.\n\nII. _They are the_ AGENTS _employed by God in the creation of, at least\nsome parts of, the universe, and in the movement and direction of the\nentire cosmos; and they are also the_ MINISTERS _and_ MESSENGERS _of\nthat universal providence which he exercises over the human race_.\n\nThese subordinate deities are, 1. the greater parts of the visible\nmundane system animated by intelligent souls, and called \"_sensible\ngods_\"--the sun, the moon, the stars, and even the earth itself, and\nknown by the names Helios, Selena, Kronos, Hermes, etc.\n\n2. Some are _invisible powers_, having peculiar offices and functions\nand presiding over special places provinces and departments of the\nuniverse;--one ruling in the heavens (Zeus), another in the air (Juno),\nanother in the sea (Neptune), another in the subterranean regions\n(Pluto); one god presiding over learning and wisdom (Minerva), another\nover poetry, music, and religion (Apollo), another over justice and\npolitical order (Themis), another over war (Mars), another over corn\n(Ceres), and another the vine (Bacchus).\n\n3. Others, again, are _ethereal_ and _a\u00ebrial_ beings, who have the\nguardianship of individual persons and things, and are called _demons,\ngenii_, and _lares_; superior indeed to men, but inferior to the gods\nabove named.\n\n\"Wherefore, since there were no other gods among the Pagans besides\nthose above enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols should\nbe accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called\n'gods'), which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or\nwithout beginning, they being the workmanship of their own hands, we\nconclude, universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods which\nmake so great a show and noise was really either nothing but several\nnames and notions of one supreme Deity, according to his different\nmanifestations, gifts, and effects upon the world personated, or else\nmany inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one supreme:\nso that one unmade, self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged\nby the more intelligent Pagans, and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism\n(or idolatry) consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of unmade\nminds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and\nindependent upon one Supreme, but in mingling and blending some way or\nother, unduly, creature-worship with the worship of the Creator.\"[203]\n\n[Footnote 203: Cudworth, \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 311.]\n\nThat the heathen regard the one Supreme Being as the first and chief\nobject of worship is evident from the apologies which they offered for\nworshipping, besides Him, many inferior divinities.\n\n1. They claimed to worship them _only_ as inferior beings, and that\ntherefore they were not guilty of giving them that honor which belonged\nto the Supreme. They claimed to worship the supreme God incomparably\nabove all. 2. That this honor which is bestowed upon the inferior\ndivinities does ultimately redound to the supreme God, and aggrandize\nhis state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 3.\nThat as demons are mediators between the celestial gods and men, so\nthose celestial gods are also mediators between men and the supreme God,\nand, as it were, convenient steps by which we ought with reverence to\napproach him. 4. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over\nkingdoms, cities, and persons, and being many ways benefactors to us,\nthanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 5. Lastly, that it can\nnot be thought that the Supreme Being will envy those inferior beings\nthat worship or honor which is bestowed upon them; nor suspect that any\nof these inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves\nagainst the Supreme God.\n\nThe Pagans, furthermore, apologized for worshipping God in images,\nstatues, and symbols, on the ground that these were only schetically\nworshipped by them, the honor passing from them to the prototype. And\nsince we live in bodies, and can scarcely, conceive of any thing without\nhaving some image or phantasm, we may therefore be indulged in this\ninfirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to worship God under\na corporeal image, as a means of preventing men from falling into\nAtheism.\n\nTo the Christian conscience the above reasons assigned furnish no real\njustification of Polytheism and Idolatry; but they are certainly a tacit\nconfession of their belief in the one Supreme God, and their conviction\nthat, notwithstanding their idolatry, He only ought to be worshipped.\nThe heathen polytheists are therefore justly condemned in Scripture, and\npronounced to be \"_inexcusable_.\" They had the knowledge of the true\nGod--\" they _knew God_\" and yet \"they glorified him not as God.\" \"They\nchanged the glory of the incorruptible God into a likeness of\ncorruptible man.\" And, finally, they ended in \"worshipping and serving\nthe creature _more_ than the Creator.\"[204]\n\n[Footnote 204: Romans i. 21, 25.]\n\nIt can not, then, with justice be denied that the Athenians had some\nknowledge of the true God, and some just and worthy conceptions of his\ncharacter. It is equally certain that a powerful and influential\nreligious sentiment pervaded the Athenian mind. Their extreme\n\"carefulness in religion\" must be conceded by us, and, in some sense,\ncommended by us, as it was by Paul in his address on Mars' Hill. At the\nsame time it must also be admitted and deplored that the purer theology\nof primitive times was corrupted by offensive legends, and encrusted by\npolluting myths, though not utterly defaced.[205] The Homeric gods were\nfor the most part idealized, human personalities, with all the passions\nand weaknesses of humanity. They had their favorites and their enemies;\nsometimes they fought in one camp, sometimes in another. They were\nsusceptible of hatred, jealousy, sensual passion. It would be strange\nindeed if their worshippers were not like unto them. The conduct of the\nHomeric heroes was, however, better than their creed. And there is this\nstrange incongruity and inconsistency in the conduct of the Homeric\ngods,--they punish mortals for crimes of which they themselves are\nguilty, and reward virtues in men which they do not themselves always\npractise. \"They punish with especial severity social and political\ncrimes, such as perjury (Iliad, iii. 279), oppression of the poor (Od.\nxvii. 475), and unjust judgment in courts of justice (Iliad, xvi. 386).\"\nJupiter is the god of justice, and of the domestic hearth; he is the\nprotector of the exile, the avenger of the poor, and the vigilant\nguardian of hospitality. \"And with all the imperfections of society,\ngovernment, and religion, the poem presents a remarkable picture of\nprimitive simplicity, chastity, justice, and practical piety, under the\nthree-fold influence of moral feeling, mutual respect, and fear of the\ndivine displeasure; such, at least, are the motives to which Telemachus\nmakes his appeal when he endeavors to rouse the assembled people of\nIthaca to the performance of their duty (Od. ii. 64).\"[206]\n\n[Footnote 205: \"There was always a double current of religious ideas in\nGreece; one spiritualist, the other tainted with impure\nlegends.\"--Pressens\u00e9.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Tyler, \"Theology of Greek Poets,\" pp. 167, 168;\nPressens\u00e9, \"Religion before Christ,\" p. 77.]\n\nThe influence of the religious dramas of \u00c6schylus and Sophocles on the\nAthenian mind must not be overlooked. No writer of pagan antiquity made\nthe voice of conscience speak with the same power and authority that\n\u00c6schylus did. \"Crime,\" he says, \"never dies without posterity.\" \"Blood\nthat has been shed congeals on the ground, crying out for an avenger.\"\nThe old poet made himself the echo of what he called \"the lyreless hymn\nof the Furies,\" who, with him, represented severe Justice striking the\nguilty when his hour comes, and giving warning beforehand by the terrors\nwhich haunt him. His dramas are characterized by deep religious feeling.\nReverence for the gods, the recognition of an inflexible moral order,\nresignation to the decisions of Heaven, an abiding presentiment of a\nfuture state of reward and punishment, are strikingly predominant.\n\nWhilst \u00c6schylus reveals to us the sombre, terror-stricken side of\nconscience, Sophocles shows us the divine and luminous side. No one has\never spoken with nobler eloquence than he of moral obligation--of this\nimmortal, inflexible law, in which dwells a God that never grows old--\n\n        \"Oh be the lot forever mine\n            Unsullied to maintain,\n         In act and word, with awe divine,\n            What potent laws ordain.\n\n     \"Laws spring from purer realms above:\n      Their father is the Olympian Jove.\n      Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime,\n      Th' indwelling god is great, nor fears the wastes of time.\"[207]\n\nThe religious inspiration that animates Sophocles breaks out with\nincomparable beauty in the last words of oedipus, when the old banished\nking sees through the darkness of death a mysterious light dawn, which\nillumines his blind eyes, and which brings to him the assurance of a\nblessed immortality.[208]\n\n[Footnote 207: \"oedipus Tyran.,\" pp. 863-872.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religion before Christ,\" pp. 85-87.]\n\nSuch a theology could not have been utterly powerless. The influence of\ntruth, in every measure and degree, must be salutary, and especially of\ntruth in relation to God, to duty, and to immortality. The religion of\nthe Athenians must have had some wholesome and conserving influence of\nthe social and political life of Athens.[209] Those who resign the\ngovernment of this lower world almost exclusively to Satan, may see, in\nthe religion of the Greeks, a simple creation of Satanic powers. But he\nwho believes that the entire progress of humanity has been under the\ncontrol and direction of a benignant Providence, must suppose that, in\nthe purposes of God, even Ethnicism has fulfilled some end, or it would\nnot have been permitted to live. God has \"_never left himself without a\nwitness_\" in any nation under heaven. And some preparatory office has\nbeen fulfilled by Heathenism which, at least, repealed the _want_, and\nprepared the mind for, the advent of Christianity.\n\n[Footnote 209: The practice, so common with some theological writers, of\ndrawing dark pictures of heathenism, in which not one luminous spot is\nvisible, in order to exalt the revelations given to the Jews, is\nexceedingly unfortunate, and highly reprehensible. It is unfortunate,\nbecause the skeptical scholar knows that there were some elements of\ntruth and excellence, and even of grandeur, in the religion and\ncivilization of the republics of Greece and Rome; and it is\nreprehensible, because it is a one-sided and unjust procedure, in so far\nas it withholds part of the truth. This species of argument is a\ntwo-edged sword which cuts both ways. The prevalence of murder, and\nslavery, and treachery, and polygamy, in Greece and Rome, is no more a\nproof that \"the religions of the pagan nations were destructive of\nmorality\" (Watson, vol. i. p. 59), than the polygamy of the Hebrews, the\nfalsehoods and impositions of Mediaeval Christianity, the persecutions\nand martyrdoms of Catholic Christianity, the oppressions and wrongs of\nChristian England, and the slavery of Protestant America, are proofs\nthat the Christian religion is \"destructive of morality.\" What a fearful\npicture of the history of Christian nations might be drawn to-day, if\nall the lines of light, and goodness, and charity were left out, and the\ncrimes, and wrongs, and cruelties of the Christian nations were alone\nexhibited!\n\nHow much more convincing a proof of the truth of Christianity to find in\nthe religions of the ancient world a latent sympathy with, and an\nunconscious preparation for, the religion of Christ. \"The history of\nreligions of human origin is the most striking evidence of the agreement\nof revealed religion with the soul of man--for each of these forms of\nworship is the expression of the wants of conscience, its eternal thirst\nfor pardon and restoration--rather let us say, its thirst for\nGod.\"--Pressens\u00e9, p. 6.]\n\nThe religion of the Athenians was unable to deliver them from the guilt\nof sin, redeem them from its power, and make them pure and holy. It gave\nthe Athenian no victory over himself, and, practically, brought him no\nnearer to the living God. But it awakened and educated the conscience,\nit developed more fully the sense of sin and guilt, and it made man\nconscious of his inability to save himself from sin and guilt; and \"the\nday that humanity awakens to the want of something more than mere\nembellishment and culture, that day it feels the need of being saved and\nrestored from the consequences of sin\" by a higher power. \u00c6sthetic taste\nhad found its fullest gratification in Athens; poetry, sculpture,\narchitecture, had been carried to the highest perfection; a noble\ncivilization had been reached; but \"the need of something deeper and\ntruer was written on the very stones.\" The highest consummation of\nPaganism was an altar to \"the unknown God,\" the knowledge of whom it\nneeded, as the source of purity and peace.\n\nThe strength and the weakness of Grecian mythology consisted in the\ncontradictory character of its divinities. It was a strange blending of\nthe natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine. Zeus, the\neternal Father,--the immortal King, whose will is sovereign, and whose\npower is invincible,--the All-seeing Jove, has some of the weaknesses\nand passions of humanity. God and man are thus, in some mysterious way,\nunited. And here that deepest longing of the human heart is met--the\nunconquerable desire to bring God nearer to the human apprehension, and\ncloser to the human heart. Hence the hold which Polytheism had upon the\nGrecian mind. But in this human aspect was also found its weakness, for\nwhen philosophic thought is brought into contact with, and permitted\ncritically to test mythology, it dethrones the false gods. The age of\nspontaneous religious sentiment must necessarily be succeeded by the age\nof reflective thought. Popular theological faiths must be placed in the\nhot crucible of dialectic analysis, that the false and the frivolous may\nbe separated from the pure and the true. The reason of man demands to be\nsatisfied, as well as the heart. Faith in God must have a logical basis,\nit must be grounded on demonstration and proof. Or, at any rate, the\nquestion must be answered, _whether God is cognizable by human reason_?\nIf this can be achieved, then a deeper foundation is laid in the mind of\nhumanity, upon which Christianity can rear its higher and nobler truths.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE UNKNOWN GOD.\n\n\n\"As I passed by, and beheld your sacred objects, I found an altar with\nthis inscription, _To the Unknown God_.\"--ST. PAUL.\n\n\"That which can be _known_ of God is manifested in their hearts, God\nhimself having shown it to them\" [the heathen nations].--ST. PAUL.\n\nHaving now reached our first landing-place, from whence we may survey\nthe fields that we have traversed, it may be well to set down in\ndefinite propositions the results we have attained. We may then carry\nthem forward, as torches, to illuminate the path of future and still\nprofounder inquiries.\n\nThe principles we have assumed as the only adequate and legitimate\ninterpretation of the facts of religious history, and which an extended\nstudy of the most fully-developed religious system of the ancient world\nconfirms, may be thus announced:\n\nI. A religious nature and destination appertain to man, so that the\npurposes of his existence and the perfection of his being can only be\nsecured in and through religion.\n\nII. The idea of God as the unconditioned Cause, the infinite Mind, the\npersonal Lord and Lawgiver, and the consciousness of dependence upon and\nobligation to God, are the fundamental principles of all religion.\n\nIII. Inasmuch as man is a religious being, the instincts and emotions of\nhis nature constraining him to worship, there must also be implanted in\nhis rational nature some original _\u00e0 priori_ ideas or laws of thought\nwhich furnish the necessary cognition of the object of worship; that is,\nsome native, spontaneous cognition of God.\n\nA mere blind impulse would not be adequate to guide man to the true end\nand perfection of his being without rational ideas; a tendency or\nappetency, without a revealed object, would be the mockery and misery of\nhis nature--an \"ignis fatuus\" perpetually alluring and forever deceiving\nman.\n\nThat man has a native, spontaneous apperception of a God, in the true\nimport of that sacred name, has been denied by men of totally opposite\nschools and tendencies of thought--by the Idealist and the Materialist;\nby the Theologian and the Atheist. Though differing essentially in their\ngeneral principles and method, they are agreed in asserting that God is\nabsolutely \"_the unknown_;\" and that, so far as reason and logic are\nconcerned, man can not attain to any knowledge of the first principles\nand causes of the universe, and, consequently, can not determine whether\nthe first principle or principles be intelligent or unintelligent,\npersonal or impersonal, finite or infinite, one or many righteous or\nnon-righteous, evil or good.\n\nThe various opponents of the doctrine that God can be cognized by human\nreason may be classified as follows: I. _Those who assert that all human\nknowledge is necessarily confined to the observation and classification\nof phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and\nresemblance_. Man has no faculty for cognizing substances, causes,\nforces, reasons, first principles--no power by which he can _know_ God.\nThis class may be again subdivided into--\n\n1. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification\nof _mental_ phenomena (_e. g_., Idealists like J. S. Mill).\n\n2. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification\nof _material_ phenomena (_e. g_., Materialists like Comte).\n\nII. _The second class comprises all who admit that philosophic knowledge\nis the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, and of qualities as\ninherent in substances; but at the same time assert that \"all knowledge\nis of the phenomenal_.\" Philosophy can never attain to a positive\nknowledge of the First Cause. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, we\nknow nothing. The infinite can not by us be comprehended, conceived, or\nthought. _Faith_ is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond\nknowledge. We believe in the existence of God, but we can not _know_\nGod. This class, also, may be again subdivided into--\n\n1. Those who affirm that our idea of the Infinite First Cause is\ngrounded on an _intuitional_ or subjective faith, necessitated by an\n\"impotence of thought\"--that is, by a mental inability to conceive an\nabsolute limitation or an infinite illimitation, an absolute\ncommencement or an infinite non-commencement. Both contradictory\nopposites are equally incomprehensible and inconceivable to us; and yet,\nthough unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher\nlaw--the \"Law of Excluded Middle\"--to admit that one, and only one, is\nnecessary (_e. g_., Hamilton and Mansel).\n\n2. Those who assert that our idea of God rests solely on an _historical_\nor objective faith in testimony--the testimony of Scripture, which\nassures us that, in the course of history, God has manifested his\nexistence in an objective manner to the senses, and given verbal\ncommunications of his character and will to men; human reason being\nutterly incapacitated by the fall, and the consequent depravity of man,\nto attain any knowledge of the unity, spirituality, and righteousness of\nGod (_e. g_., Watson, and Dogmatic Theologians generally).\n\nIt will thus be manifest that the great question, the central and vital\nquestion which demands a thorough and searching consideration, is the\nfollowing, to wit: _Is God cognizable by human reason_? Can man attain\nto a positive cognition of God--can he _know_ God; or is all our\nsupposed knowledge \"a learned ignorance,\"[210] an unreasoning faith? We\nventure to answer this question in the affirmative. Human reason is now\nadequate to the cognition of God; it is able, with the fullest\nconfidence, to affirm the being of a God, and, in some degree, to\ndetermine his character. The parties and schools above referred to\nanswer this question in the negative form. Whether Theologians or\nAtheists, they are singularly agreed in denying to human reason all\npossibility of _knowing_ God.\n\n[Footnote 210: Hamilton's \"Philosophy,\" p. 512.]\n\nBefore entering upon the discussion of the negative positions enumerated\nin the above classification, it may be important we should state our own\nposition explicitly, and exhibit what we regard as the true doctrine of\nthe genesis of the idea of God in the human intelligence. The real\nquestion at issue will then stand out in clear relief, and precision\nwill be given to the entire discussion.\n\n(i.) _We hold that the idea of God is a common phenomenon of the\nuniversal human intelligence_. It is found in all minds where reason has\nhad its normal and healthy development; and no race of men has ever been\nfound utterly destitute of the idea of God. The proof of this position\nhas already been furnished in chap, ii.,[211] and needs not be re-stated\nhere. We have simply to remark that the appeal which is made by Locke\nand others of the sensational school to the experiences of infants,\nidiots, the deaf and dumb, or, indeed, any cases wherein the proper\nconditions for the normal development of reason are wanting, are utterly\nirrelevant to the question. The acorn contains within itself the\nrudimental germ of the future oak, but its mature and perfect\ndevelopment depends on the exterior conditions of moisture, light, and\nheat. By these exterior conditions it may be rendered luxuriant in its\ngrowth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under\none class of conditions; it may be distorted and perverted, or it may\nperish utterly under another. And so in the idiotic mind the ideas of\nreason may be wanting, or they may be imprisoned by impervious walls of\ncerebral malformation. In the infant mind the development of reason is\nyet in an incipient stage. The idea of God is immanent to the infant\nthought, but the infant thought is not yet matured. The deaf and dumb\nare certainly not in that full and normal correlation to the world of\nsense which is a necessary condition of the development of reason.\nLanguage, the great vehiculum and instrument of thought, is wanting, and\nreason can not develop itself without words. \"Words without thought are\ndead sounds, _thoughts without words are nothing_. The word is the\nthought incarnate.\"[212] Under proper and normal conditions, the idea of\nGod is the natural and necessary form in which human thought must be\ndeveloped. And, with these explanations, we repeat our affirmation that\nthe idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal human\nintelligence.\n\n[Footnote 211: Pp. 89,90.]\n\n[Footnote 212: M\u00fcller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 384.]\n\n(ii.) _We do not hold that the idea of God, in its completeness, is a\nsimple, direct, and immediate intuition of the reason alone, independent\nof all experience, and all knowledge of the external world_. The idea of\nGod is a complex idea, and not a simple idea. The affirmation, \"God\nexists,\" is a _synthetic_ and _primitive_ judgment spontaneously\ndeveloped in the mind, and developed, too, independent of all reflective\nreasoning. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the outer world\nof nature and the primary intuitions of the inner world of reason--a\nlogical deduction from the self-evident truths given in sense,\nconsciousness, and reason. \"We do not _perceive_ God, but we _conceive_\nHim upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to view, and upon the\nother world, more admirable still, which we bear in ourselves.\"[213]\nTherefore we do not say that man is born with an \"innate idea\" of God,\nnor with the definite proposition, \"there is a God,\" written upon his\nsoul; but we do say that the mind is pregnant with certain natural\nprinciples, and governed, in its development, by certain necessary laws\nof thought, which determine it, by a _spontaneous logic_, to affirm the\nbeing of a God; and, furthermore, that this judgment may be called\n_innate_ in the sense, that it is the primitive, universal, and\nnecessary development of the human understanding which \"is innate to\nitself and equal to itself in all men.\"[214]\n\n[Footnote 213: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful and Good,\" p.102.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Leibnitz.]\n\nAs the vital and rudimentary germ of the oak is contained in the acorn;\nas it is quickened and excited to activity by the external conditions of\nmoisture, light, and heat, and is fully de developed under the fixed and\ndeterminative laws of vegetable life--so the germs of the idea of God\nare present in the human mind as the intuitions of pure reason\n(_Rational Psychology_); these intuitions are excited to energy by our\nexperiential and historical knowledge of the facts and laws of the\nuniverse (_Phenomenology_); and these facts and intuitions are developed\ninto form by the necessary laws of the intellect (_Nomology_, or\n_Primordial Logic_).\n\nThe _logical demonstration_ of the being of God commences with the\nanalysis of thought. It asks, What are the ideas which exist in the\nhuman intelligence? What are their actual characteristics, and what\ntheir primitive characteristics? What is their origin, and what their\nvalidity? Having, by this process, found that some of our ideas are\nsubjective, and some objective that some are derived from experience,\nand that some can not be derived from experience, but are inherent in\nthe very constitution of the mind itself, as _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of reason;\nthat these are characterized as self-evident, universal, and necessary\nand that, as laws of thought, they govern the mind in all its\nconceptions of the universe; it has formulated these necessary\njudgments, and presented them as distinct and articulate propositions.\nThese _\u00e0 priori_, necessary judgments constitute the major premise of\nthe Theistic syllogism, and, in view of the facts of the universe,\nnecessitate the affirmation of the existence of a God as the only valid\nexplanation of the facts.\n\nThe _natural_ or _chronological order_ in which the idea of God is\ndeveloped in the human intelligence, is the reverse process of the\nscientific or logical order, in which the demonstration of the being of\nGod is presented by philosophy; the latter is _reflective_ and\n_analytic_, the former is _spontaneous_ and _synthetic._ The natural\norder commences with the knowledge of the facts of the universe,\nmaterial and mental, as revealed by sensation and experience. In\npresence of these facts of the universe, the _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of power,\ncause, reason, and end are evoked into consciousness with greater or\nless distinctness; and the judgment, by a natural and spontaneous logic,\nfree from all reflection, and consequently from all possibility of\nerror, affirms a necessary relation between the facts of experience and\nthe _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of the reason. The result of this involuntary and\nalmost unconscious process of thought is that natural cognition of a God\nfound, with greater or less clearness and definiteness, in all rational\nminds. The _\u00e0 posteriori_, or empirical knowledge of the phenomena of\nthe universe, in their relations to time and space, constitute the minor\npremise of the Theistic syllogism.\n\nThe Theistic argument is, therefore, necessarily composed of both\nexperiential and _\u00e0 priori_ elements. An _\u00e0 posteriori_ element exists\nas a condition of the logical demonstration The rational _\u00e0 priori_\nelement is, however, the logical basis, the only valid foundation of the\nTheistic demonstration. The facts of the universe alone would never lead\nman to the recognition of a God, if the reason, in presence of these\nfacts, did not enounce certain necessary and universal principles which\nare the logical antecedents, and adequate explanation of the facts. Of\nwhat use would it be to point to the events and changes of the material\nuniverse as proofs of the existence of a _First Cause,_ unless we take\naccount of the universal and necessary truth that \"every change must\nhave an efficient cause;\" that all phenomena are an indication of\n_power_; and that \"there is an ultimate and sufficient reason why all\nthings exist, and are as they are, and not otherwise.\" There would be no\nlogical force in enumerating the facts of order and special adaptation\nwhich literally crowd the universe, as proofs of the existence of an\n_Intelligent Creator_, if the mind did not affirm the necessary\nprinciple that \"facts of order, having a commencement in time, suppose\nmind as their source and exponent.\" There is no logical conclusiveness\nin the assertion of Paley, \"that _experience_ teaches us that a designer\nmust be a person,\" because, as Hume justly remarks, our \"experience\" is\nnarrowed down to a mere point, \"and can not be a rule for a universe;\"\nbut there is an infinitude of force in that dictum of reason, that\n\"intelligence, self-consciousness, and self-determination necessarily\nconstitute personality.\" A multiplicity of different effects, of which\nexperience does not always reveal the connection, would not conduct to a\nsingle cause and to _one_ God, but rather to a plurality of causes and a\nplurality of gods, did not reason teach us that \"all plurality implies\nan ultimate indivisible unity,\" and therefore there must be a _First\nCause_ of all causes, a _First Principle_ of all principles, _the\nSubstance_ of all substances, _the Being_ of all beings--_a God_ \"of\nwhom, in whom, and to whom are all things\" (panta ek tou Theou, en t\u00f4\nThe\u00f4 eis ton Theon).\n\nThe conclusion, therefore, is, that, as the idea of God is a complex\nidea, so there are necessarily a number of simple _\u00e0 priori_ principles,\nand a variety of experiential facts conspiring to its development in the\nhuman intelligence.\n\n(iii.) _The universe presents to the human mind an aggregation and\nhistory of phenomena which demands the idea of a God--a self-existent,\nintelligent, personal, righteous First Cause--as its adequate\nexplanation._\n\nThe attempt of Positivism to confine all human knowledge to the\nobservation and classification of phenomena, and arrest and foreclose\nall inquiry as to causes, efficient, final, and ultimate, is simply\nfutile and absurd. It were just as easy to arrest the course of the sun\nin mid-heaven as to prevent the human mind from seeking to pass beyond\nphenomena, and ascertain the ground, and reason, and cause of all\nphenomena. The history of speculative thought clearly attests that, in\nall ages, the inquiry after the Ultimate Cause and Reason of all\nexistence--the arch\u00ea, or First Principle of all things--has been the\ninevitable and necessary tendency of the human mind; to resist which,\nskepticism and positivism have been utterly impotent. The first\nphilosophers, of the Ionian school, had just as strong a faith in the\nexistence of a Supreme Reality--an Ultimate Cause--as Leibnitz and\nCousin. But when, by reflective thought, they attempted to render an\naccount to themselves of this instinctive faith, they imagined that its\nobject must be in some way appreciable to sense, and they sought it in\nsome physical element, or under some visible and tangible shrine. Still,\nhowever imperfect and inadequate the method, and however unsatisfactory\nthe results, humanity has never lost its positive and ineradicable\nconfidence that the problem of existence could be solved. The resistless\ntide of spontaneous and necessary thought has always borne the race\nonward towards the recognition of a great First Cause; and though\nphilosophy may have erred, again and again, in tracing the logical order\nof this inevitable thought, and exhibiting the necessary nexus between\nthe premises and conclusion, yet the human mind has never wavered in the\nconfidence which it has reposed in the natural logic of thought, and man\nhas never ceased to believe in a God.\n\nWe readily grant that all our empirical knowledge is confined to\nphenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance.\n\"To our objective perception and comparison nothing is given but\nqualities and changes; to our inductive generalization nothing but the\nshifting and grouping of these in time and space.\" Were it, however, our\nimmediate concern to discuss the question, we could easily show that\nsensationalism has never succeeded in tracing the genetic origin of our\nideas of space and time to observation and experience; and, without the\n_\u00e0 priori_ idea of _space_, as the place of bodies, and of _time_, as\nthe condition of succession, we can not conceive of phenomena at all.\nIf, therefore, we know any thing beyond phenomena and their mutual\nrelations; if we have any cognition of realities underlying phenomena,\nand of the relations of phenomena to their objective ground, it must be\ngiven by some faculty distinct from sense-perception, and in some\nprocess distinct from inductive generalization. The knowledge of real\nBeing and real Power, of an ultimate Reason and a personal Will, is\nderived from the apperception of pure reason, which affirms the\nnecessary existence of a Supreme Reality--an Uncreated Being beyond all\nphenomena, which is the ground and reason of the existence--the\ncontemporaneousness and succession--the likeness and unlikeness, of all\nphenomena.\n\nThe immediate presentation of phenomena to sensation is the _occasion_\nof the development in consciousness of these _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of reason:\nthe possession of these ideas or the immanence of these ideas, in the\nhuman intellect, constitutes the original _power_ to know external\nphenomena. The ideas of space, time, power, law, reason, and end, are\nthe logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, event,\nconsecution, order, and adaptation. The latter can not be conceived as\ndistinct notions without the former. The former will not be revealed in\nthought without the presentation to sense, of resistance, movement,\nchange, uniformity, etc. All actual knowledge must, therefore, be\nimpure; that is, it must involve both _\u00e0 priori_ and _\u00e0 posteriori_\nelements; and between these elements there must be a necessary relation.\n\nThis necessary relation between the _\u00e0 priori_ and _\u00e0 posteriori_\nelements of knowledge is not a mere subjective law of thought. It is\nboth a law of thought and a law of things. Between the _\u00e0 posteriori_\nfacts of the universe and the _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of the reason there is an\nabsolute nexus, a universal and necessary correlation; so that the\ncognition of the latter is possible only on the cognition of the former;\nand the objective existence of the realities, represented by the ideas\nof reason, is the condition, _sine qua non_, of the existence of the\nphenomena presented to sense. If, in one indivisible act of\nconsciousness, we immediately perceive extended matter exterior to our\npercipient mind, then Extension exists objectively; and if Extension\nexists objectively, then Space, its _conditio sine qua non_, also exists\nobjectively. And if a definite body reveals to us the _Space_ in which\nit is contained, if a succession of pulsations or movements exhibit the\nuniform _Time_ beneath, so do the changeful phenomena of the universe\ndemand a living _Power_ behind, and the existing order and regular\nevolution of the universe presuppose _Thought_--prevision, and\npredetermination, by an intelligent mind.\n\nIf, then, the universe is a created effect, it must furnish some\nindications of the character of its cause. If, as Plato taught, the\nworld is a \"created image\" of the eternal archetypes which dwell in the\nuncreated Mind, and if the subjective ideas which dwell in the human\nreason, as the offspring of God, are \"copies\" of the ideas of the\nInfinite Reason--if the universe be \"the autobiography of the Infinite\nSpirit which has also repeated itself in miniature within our finite\nspirit,\" then may we decipher its symbols, and read its lessons straight\noff. Then every approach towards a scientific comprehension and\ngeneralization of the facts of the universe must carry us upward towards\nthe higher realities of reason. The more we can understand of Nature--of\nher comprehensive laws, of her archetypal forms, of her far-reaching\nplan spread through the almost infinite ages, and stretching through\nillimitable space--the more do we comprehend the divine Thought. The\ninductive generalization of science gradually _ascends_ towards the\nuniversal; the pure, essential, _\u00e0 priori_ reason, with its universal\nand necessary ideas, _descends_ from above to meet it. The general\nconceptions of science are thus a kind of _ideoe umbratiles_--shadowy\nassimilations to those immutable ideas which dwell in essential reason,\nas possessed by the Supreme Intelligence, and which are participated in\nby rational man as the offspring and image of God.\n\nWithout making any pretension to profound scientific accuracy, we offer\nthe following tentative classification of the facts of the universe,\nmaterial and mental, which may be regarded as hints and adumbrations of\nthe ultimate ground, and reason, and cause, of the universe. We shall\nventure to classify these facts as indicative of some fundamental\nrelation; (i.) to Permanent Being or Reality; (ii.) to Reason and\nThought; (iii.) to Moral Ideas and Ends.\n\n(i.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to\nPermanent Being or Reality_.\n\n1. _Qualitative_ Phenomena (properties, attributes, qualities)--the\npredicates of a _subject_; which phenomena, being characterized by\nlikeness and unlikeness, are capable of comparison and classification,\nand thus of revealing something as to the nature of the _subject_.\n\n2. _Dynamical_ Phenomena (protension, movement, succession)--events\ntranspiring in _time_, having beginning, succession, and end, which\npresent themselves to us as the expression of _power_, and throw back\ntheir distinctive characteristics on their _dynamic_ source.\n\n3. _Quantitative_ Phenomena (totality, multiplicity, relative unity)--a\nmultiplicity of objects having relative and composite unity, which\nsuggests some relation to an absolute and indivisible _unity_.\n\n4. _Statical_ Phenomena (extension, magnitude, divisibility)--bodies\nco-existing in _space_ which are limited, conditioned, relative,\ndependent, and indicate some relation to that which is self-existent,\nunconditioned, and absolute.\n\n(ii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to\nReason or Thought_.\n\n1. _Numerical and Geometrical Proportion_.--Definite proportion of\nelements (Chemistry), symmetrical arrangement of parts\n(Crystallography), numerical and geometrical relation of the forms and\nmovements of the heavenly bodies (Spherical Astronomy), all of which are\ncapable of exact mathematical expression.\n\n2. _Archetypal Forms_.--The uniform succession of new existences, and\nthe progressive evolution of new orders and species, conformable to\nfixed and definite ideal archetypes, the indication of a comprehensive\n_plan_(Morphological Botany, Comparative Anatomy).\n\n3. _Teleology of Organs_.--The adaptation of organs to the fulfillment\nof special functions, indicating _design_(Comparative Physiology).\n\n4. _Combination of Homotypes and Analogues_.--Diversified homologous\nforms made to fulfill analogous functions, or special purposes fulfilled\nwhilst maintaining a general plan, indicating _choice_ and\n_alternativity_.\n\n(iii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation\nto Moral Ideas and Ends_.\n\n1. _Ethical Distinctions_.--The universal tendency to discriminate\nbetween voluntary acts as right or wrong, indicating some relation to an\n_immutable moral standard of right_.\n\n2. _Sense of Obligation_.--The universal consciousness of dependence and\nobligation, indicating some relation to Supreme _Power_, an Absolute\n_Authority_.\n\n3. _Feeling of Responsibility_.--The universal consciousness of\nliability to be required to give account for, and endure the\nconsequences of our action, indicating some relation to a Supreme\n_Judge_.\n\n4. _Retributive Issues_.--The pleasure and pain resulting from moral\naction in this life, and the universal anticipation of pleasure or pain\nin the future, as the consequence of present conduct, indicate an\n_absolute Justice_ ruling the world and man.\n\nNow, if the universe be a _created effect_, it must, in some degree at\nleast, reveal the character of its Author and cause. We are entitled to\nregard it as a created symbol and image of the Deity; it must bear the\nimpress of his _power_; it must reveal his infinite _presence_; it must\nexpress his _thoughts_; it must embody and realize his _ideals_, so far,\nat least, as material symbols will permit. Just as we see the power and\nthought of man revealed in his works, his energy and skill, his ideal\nand his taste expressed in his mechanical, artistic, and literary\ncreations, so we may see the mind and character of God displayed in his\nworks. The skill and contrivance of Watts, and Fulton, and Stephenson\nwere exhibited in their mechanical productions. The pure, the intense,\nthe visionary impersonation of the soul which the artist had conjured in\nhis own imagination was wrought out in Psych\u00e9. The colossal grandeur of\nMichael Angelo's ideals, the ethereal and saintly elegance of Raphael's\nwere realized upon the canvas. So he who is familiar with the ideal of\nthe sculptor or the painter can identify his creations even when the\nauthor's name is not affixed. And so the \"eternal Power\" of God is\n\"clearly seen\" in the mighty orbs which float in the illimitable space.\nThe vastness of the universe shadows forth the infinity of God. The\nindivisible unity of space and the ideal unity of the universe reflect\nthe unity of God. The material forms around us are symbols of divine\nideas, and the successive history of the universe is an expression of\nthe divine thought; whilst the ethical ideas and sentiments inherent in\nthe human mind are a reflection of the moral character of God.\n\nThe reader can not have failed to observe the form in which the Theistic\nargument is stated; \"_if_ the finite universe is a created effect, it\nmust reveal something as to the nature of its cause: _if_ the existing\norder and arrangement of the universe had a commencement in time, it\nmust have an ultimate and adequate cause.\" The question, therefore,\npresents itself in a definite form: \"_Is the universe finite or\ninfinite; had the order of the universe a beginning, or is it eternal_?\"\n\nIt will be seen at a glance that this is the central and vital question\nin the Theistic argument. If the order and arrangement of the universe\nis _eternal_, then that order is an inherent law of nature, and, as\neternal, does not imply a cause _ab extra:_ if it is not eternal, then\nthe ultimate cause of that order must be a power above and beyond\nnature. In the former case the minor premise of the Theistic syllogism\nis utterly invalidated; in the latter case it is abundantly sustained.\n\nSome Theistic writers--as Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Saisset--have\nmade the fatal admission that the universe is, in some sense, _infinite_\nand _eternal_. In making this admission they have unwittingly\nsurrendered the citadel of strength, and deprived the argument by which\nthey would prove the being of a God of all its logical force. That\nargument is thus presented by Saisset: \"The finite supposes the\ninfinite. Extension supposes first space, then immensity: duration\nsupposes first time, then eternity. A sudden and irresistible judgment\nrefers this to the necessary, infinite, perfect being.\"[215] But if \"the\nworld is infinite and eternal,\"[216] may not nature, or the totality of\nall existence (to pan), be the necessary, infinite, and perfect Being?\nAn infinite and eternal universe has the reason of its existence in\nitself, and the existence of such a universe can never prove to us the\nexistence of an infinite and eternal God.\n\n[Footnote 215: \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. ii. p. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Ibid, p. 123.]\n\nA closer examination of the statements and reasonings of Descartes,\nPascal, and Leibnitz, as furnished by Saisset, will show that these\ndistinguished mathematicans were misled by the false notion of\n\"_mathematical_ infinitude.\" Their infinite universe, after all, is not\nan \"absolute,\" but a \"relative\" infinite; that is, the indefinite. \"The\nuniverse must extend _indefinitely_ in time and space, in the infinite\ngreatness, and in the infinite littleness of its parts--in the infinite\nvariety of its species, of its forms, and of its degrees of existence.\nThe finite can not express the infinite but by being _multiplied_\ninfinitely. The finite, so far as it is finite, is not in any reasonable\nrelation, or in any intelligible proportion to the infinite. But the\nfinite, as _multiplied_ infinitely,[217] ages upon ages, spaces upon\nspaces, stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, is a true expression\nof the Infinite Being. Does it follow, because the universe has no\nlimits,--that it must therefore be eternal, immense, infinite as God\nhimself? No; that is but a vain scruple, which springs from the\nimagination, and not from the reason. The imagination is always\nconfounding what reason should ever distinguish, eternity and time,\nimmensity and space, _relative_ infinity and _absolute_ infinity. The\nCreator alone is eternal, immense, absolutely infinite.\"[218]\n\n[Footnote 217: \"The infinite is distinct from the finite, and\nconsequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself; that is,\nfrom the _indefinite_. That which is not infinite, added as many times\nas you please to itself, will not become infinite.\"--Cousin, \"Hist, of\nPhilos.,\" vol. ii. p. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Saisset, \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. ii. pp. 127, 128.]\n\nThe introduction of the idea of \"the mathematical infinite\" into\nmetaphysical speculation, especially by Kant and Hamilton, with the\ndesign, it would seem, of transforming the idea of infinity into a\nsensuous conception, has generated innumerable paralogisms which\ndisfigure the pages of their philosophical writings. This procedure is\ngrounded in the common fallacy of supposing that _infinity_ and\n_quantity_ are compatible attributes, and susceptible of mathematical\nsynthesis. This insidious and plausible error is ably refuted by a\nwriter in the \"North American Review.\"[219] We can not do better than\ntransfer his argument to our pages in an abridged form.\n\n[Footnote 219: \"The Conditioned and the Unconditioned,\" No. CCV. art.\niii. (1864).]\n\nMathematics is conversant with quantities and quantitative relations.\nThe conception of quantity, therefore, if rigorously analyzed, will\nindicate _\u00e0 priori_ the natural and impassable boundaries of the\nscience; while a subsequent examination of the quantities called\ninfinite in the mathematical sense, and of the algebraic symbol of\ninfinity, will be seen to verify the results of this _\u00e0 priori_\nanalysis.\n\nQuantity is that attribute of things in virtue of which they are\nsusceptible of exact mensuration. The question _how much_, or _how many_\n(_quantus_), implies the answer, _so much_, or _so many_ (_tantus_); but\nthe answer is possible only through reference to some standard of\nmagnitude or multitude arbitrarily assumed. Every object, therefore, of\nwhich quantity, in the mathematical sense, is predicable, must be by its\nessential nature _mensurable._ Now mensurability implies the existence\nof actual, definite limits, since without them there could be no fixed\nrelation between the given object and the standard of measurement, and,\nconsequently, no possibility of exact mensuration. In fact, since\nquantification is the object of all mathematical operations, mathematics\nmay be not inaptly defined as _the science of the determinations of\nlimits_. It is evident, therefore, that the terms _quantity_ and\n_finitude_ express the same attribute, namely, _limitation_--the former\nrelatively, the latter absolutely; for quantity is limitation considered\nwith relation to some standard of measurement, and finitude is\nlimitation considered simply in itself. The sphere of quantity,\ntherefore, is absolutely identical with the sphere of the finite; and\nthe phrase _infinite quantity_, if strictly construed, is a\ncontradiction in terms.\n\nThe result thus attained by considering abstract quantity is\ncorroborated by considering concrete and discrete quantities. Such\nexpressions as _infinite sphere, radius, parallelogram, line,_ and so\nforth, are self-contradictory. A sphere is limited by its own periphery,\nand a radius by the centre and circumference of its circle. A\nparallelogram of infinite altitude is impossible, because the limit of\nits altitude is assigned in the side which must be parallel to its base\nin order to constitute it a parallelogram. In brief, all figuration is\nlimitation. The contradiction in the term _infinite line_ is not quite\nso obvious, but can readily be made apparent. Objectively, a line is\nonly the termination of a surface, and a surface the termination of a\nsolid; hence a line can not exist apart from an extended quantity, nor\nan infinite line apart from an infinite quantity. But as this term has\njust been shown to be self-contradictory, an infinite line can not exist\nobjectively at all. Again, every line is extension in one dimension;\nhence a mathematical quantity, hence mensurable, hence finite; you must\ntherefore, deny that a line is a quantity, or else affirm that it is\nfinite.\n\nThe same conclusion is forced upon us, if from geometry we turn to\narithmetic. The phrases _infinite number, infinite series, infinite\nprocess_, and so forth, are all contradictory when literally construed.\nNumber is a relation among separate unities or integers, which,\nconsidered objectively as independent of our cognitive powers, must\nconstitute an exact sum; and this exactitude, or synthetic totality, is\nlimitation. If considered subjectively in the mode of its cognition, a\nnumber is infinite only in the sense that it is beyond the power of our\nimagination or conception, which is an abuse of the term. In either case\nthe totality is fixed; that is, finite. So, too, of _series_ and\n_process_. Since every series involves a succession of terms or numbers,\nand every process a succession of steps or stages, the notion of series\nand process plainly involves that of _number_, and must be rigorously\ndissociated from the idea of infinity. At any one step, at any one term,\nthe number attained is determinate, hence finite. The fact that, by the\nlaw of the series or of the process, _we_ may continue the operation _as\nlong as we please_, does not justify the application of the term\ninfinite to the operation itself; if any thing is infinite, it is the\nwill which continues the operation, which is absurd if said of human\nwills.\n\nConsequently, the attribute of infinity is not predicable either of\n'diminution without limit,' 'augmentation without limit,' or 'endless\napproximation to a fixed limit,' for these mathematical processes\ncontinue only as we continue them, consist of steps successively\naccomplished, and are limited by the very fact of this serial\nincompletion.\n\n\"We can not forbear pointing out an important application of these\nresults to the Critical Philosophy. Kant bases each of his famous four\nantinomies on the demand of pure reason for unconditioned totality in a\nregressive series of conditions. This, he says, must be realized either\nin an absolute first of the series, conditioning all the other members,\nbut itself unconditioned, or else in the absolute infinity of the series\nwithout a first; but reason is utterly unable, on account of mutual\ncontradiction, to decide in which of the two alternatives the\nunconditioned is found. By the principles we have laid down, however,\nthe problem is solved. The absolute infinity of a series is a\ncontradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably and\ninconceivably great, is impossible unless _unity_ is given as its basis,\nso every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a _first\nterm_ is given as a commencement. Through a first term alone is the\nunconditioned possible; that is, if it does not exist in a first term,\nit can not exist at all; of the two alternatives, therefore, one\naltogether disappears, and reason is freed from the dilemma of a\ncompulsory yet impossible decision. Even if it should be allowed that\nthe series has no first term, but has originated _ab \u00e6terno_, it must\nalways at each instant have a _last term_; the series, as a whole, can\nnot be infinite, and hence can not, as Kant claims it can, realize in\nits wholeness unconditioned totality. Since countless terms forever\nremain unreached, the series is forever limited by them. Kant himself\nadmits that it _can never be completed_, and is only potentially\ninfinite; actually, therefore, by his own admission, it is finite. But a\nlast term implies a first, as absolutely as one end of a string implies\nthe other; the only possibility of an unconditioned lies in Kant's first\nalternative, and if, as he maintains Reason must demand it, she can not\nhesitate in her decisions. That _number is a limitation_ is no new\ntruth, and that every series involves number is self-evident; and it is\nsurprising that so radical a criticism on Kant's system should never\nhave suggested itself to his opponents. Even the so-called _moments_ of\ntime can not be regarded as constituting a real series, for a series can\nnot be real except through its divisibility into members whereas time is\nindivisible, and its partition into moments is a conventional fiction.\nExterior limitability and interior divisibility result equally from the\npossibility of discontinuity. Exterior illimitability and interior\nindivisibility are simple phases of the same attribute of _necessary\ncontinuity_ contemplated under different aspects. From this principle\nflows another upon which it is impossible to lay too much stress,\nnamely; _illimitability and indivisibility, infinity and unity,\nreciprocally necessitate each other_. Hence the Quantitative Infinites\nmust be also Units, and the division of space and time, implying\nabsolute contradiction, is not even cogitable as an hypothesis.[220]\n\n\"The word _infinite_, therefore, in mathematical usage, as applied to\n_process_ and to _quantity_, has a two-fold signification. An infinite\nprocess is one which we can continue _as long as we please_, but which\nexists solely in our continuance of it.[221] An infinite quantity is one\nwhich exceeds our powers of mensuration or of conception, but which,\nnevertheless, has bounds and limits in itself.[222] Hence the\npossibility of relation among infinite quantities, and of different\norders of infinities. If the words _infinite, infinity, infinitesimal_,\nshould be banished from mathematical treatises and replaced by the words\n_indefinite, indefinity,_ and _indefinitesimal_, mathematics would\nsuffer no loss, while, by removing a perpetual source of confusion,\nmetaphysics would get great gain.\"\n\n[Footnote 220: By the application of these principles the writer in the\n\"North American Review\" completely dissolves the antinomies by which\nHamilton seeks to sustain his \"Philosophy of the Conditioned.\" See\n\"North American Review,\" 1864, pp. 432-437.]\n\n[Footnote 221: De Morgan, \"Diff. and Integ. Calc.\" p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Id., ib., p. 25.]\n\nThe above must be regarded as a complete refutation of the position\ntaken by _Hume_, to wit, that the idea of nature eternally existing in a\nstate of order, without a cause other than the eternally inherent laws\nof nature, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of an\neternally-existing and infinite mind, who originated this order--a God\nexisting without a cause. The eternal and infinite Mind is indivisible\nand illimitable; nature, in its totality, as well as in its individual\nparts, has interior divisibility, and exterior limitability. The\ninfinity of God is not a _quantitative_, but a _qualitative_ infinity.\nThe miscalled eternity and infinity of nature is an _indefinite_\nextension and protension in time and space, and, as _quantitative_, must\nnecessarily be limited and measurable, therefore _finite_.\n\nThe universe of sense-perception and sensuous imagination is a\nphenomenal universe, a genesis, a perpetual becoming, an entrance into\nexistence, and an exit thence; the Theist is, therefore, perfectly\njustified in regarding it as disqualified for _self-existence_, and in\npassing behind it for the Supreme Entity that needs no cause. Phenomena\ndemand causation, entities dispense with it. No one asks for a cause of\nthe _space_ which contains the universe, or of the Eternity on the bosom\nof which it floats. Everywhere the line is necessarily drawn upon the\nsame principle; that entities _may_ have self-existence, phenomena\n_must_ have a cause.[223]\n\n[Footnote 223: \"Science, Nescience, and Faith,\" in Martineau's \"Essays,\"\np. 206.]\n\nIV. _Psychological analysis clearly attests that in the phenomena of\nconsciousness there are found elements or principles which, in their\nregular and normal development, transcend the limits of consciousness,\nand attain to the knowledge of Absolute Being, Absolute Reason, Absolute\nGood_, i.e., GOD.\n\nThe analysis of thought clearly reveals that the mind of man is in\npossession of ideas, notions, beliefs, principles (as _e.g._, the idea\nof space, duration, cause, substance, unity, infinity), which are not\nderived from sensation and experience, and which can not be drawn out of\nsensation and experience by any process of generalization. These ideas\nhave this incontestable peculiarity, as distinguished from all the\nphenomena of sensation, that, whilst the latter are particular,\ncontingent, and relative, the former are _universal_, _necessary_, and\n_absolute_. As an example, and a proof of the reality and validity of\nthis distinction, take the ideas of _body_ and of _space_, the former\nunquestionably derived from experience, the latter supplied by reason\nalone. \"I ask you, can not you conceive this book to be destroyed?\nWithout doubt you can. And can not you conceive the whole world to be\ndestroyed, and no matter whatever in existence? You can. For you,\nconstituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies\nimplies no contradiction. And what do we call the idea of a thing which\nwe can conceive of as non-existing? We call it a _contingent_ and\n_relative_ idea. But if you can conceive this book to be destroyed, all\nbodies destroyed, can you suppose space to be destroyed? You can not. It\nis in the power of man's thought to conceive the non-existence of\nbodies; it is not in the power of man's thought to conceive the\nnon-existence of space. The idea of space is thus a _necessary_ and\n_absolute_ idea.\"[224]\n\n[Footnote 224: Cousin's \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. ii. p. 214.]\n\nTake, again, the ideas of _event_ and _cause_. The idea of an event is a\n_contingent_ idea; it is the idea of something which might or might not\nhave happened. There is no impossibility or contradiction in either\nsupposition. The idea of cause is a _necessary_ idea. An event being\ngiven, the idea of cause is necessarily implied. An uncaused event is an\nimpossible conception. The idea of cause is also a _universal_ idea\nextending to all events, actual or conceivable, and affirmed by all\nminds. It is a rational fact, attested by universal consciousness, that\nwe can not think of an event transpiring without a cause; of a thing\nbeing the author of its own existence; of something generated by and out\nof nothing. _Ex nihilo nihil_ is a universal law of thought and of\nthings. This universal \"law of causality\" is clearly distinguishable\nfrom a _general_ truth reached by induction. For example, it is a very\ngeneral truth that, during twenty-four hours, day is succeeded by night.\nBut this is not a necessary truth, neither is it a universal truth. It\ndoes not extend to all known lands, as, for example, to Nova Zembla. It\ndoes not hold true of the other planets. Nor does it extend to all\npossible lands. We can easily conceive of lands plunged in eternal\nnight, or rolling in eternal day. With another system of worlds, one can\nconceive other physics, but one can not conceive other metaphysics. It\nis impossible to imagine a world in which the law of causality does not\nreign. Here, then, we have one absolute principle (among others which\nmay be enumerated), the existence and reality of which is revealed, not\nby sensation, but by reason--a principle which transcends the limits of\nexperience, and which, in its regular and logical development, attains\nthe knowledge of the Absolute Cause--the First Cause of all causes--God.\n\nThus it is evident that the human mind is in possession of two distinct\norders of primitive cognitions,--one, contingent, relative, and\nphenomenal; the other universal, necessary, and absolute. These two\ndistinct orders of cognition presuppose the existence in man of two\ndistinct faculties or organs of knowledge--_sensation_, external and\ninternal, which perceives the contingent, relative, and phenomenal, and\n_reason_, which apprehends the universal, necessary, and absolute. The\nknowledge which is derived from sensation and experience is called\n_empirical_ knowledge, or knowledge _\u00e0 posteriori_, because subsequent\nto, and consequent upon, the exercise of the faculties of observation.\nThe knowledge derived from reason is called _transcendental_ knowledge,\nor knowledge _\u00e0 priori_, because it furnishes laws to, and governs the\nexercise of the faculties of observation and thought, and is not the\nresult of their exercise. The sensibility brings the mind into relation\nwith the _physical_ world, the reason puts mind in communication with\nthe _intelligible_ world--the sphere of _\u00e0 priori_ principles, of\nnecessary and absolute truths, which depend upon neither the world nor\nthe conscious self, and which reveal to man the existence of the soul,\nnature, and God. Every distinct fact of consciousness is thus at once\n_psychological_ and _ontological_, and contains these three fundamental\nideas, which we can not go beyond, or cancel by any possible\nanalysis--the _soul_, with its faculties; _matter_, with its qualities;\n_God_, with his perfections.\n\nWe do not profess to be able to give a clear explication and complete\nenumeration of all the ideas of reason, and of the necessary and\nuniversal principles or axioms which are grounded on these ideas. This\nis still the grand desideratum of metaphysical science. Its achievement\nwill give us a primordial logic, which shall be as exact in its\nprocedure and as certain in its conclusions as the mathematical\nsciences. Meantime, it may be affirmed that philosophic analysis, in the\nperson of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Cousin, has succeeded in\ndisengaging such _\u00e0 priori_ ideas, and formulating such principles and\nlaws of thought, as lead infallibly to the cognition of the _Absolute\nBeing_, the _Absolute Reason_, the _Absolute Good_, that is, GOD.\n\nIt would carry us too far beyond our present design were we to exhibit,\nin each instance, the process of _immediate abstraction_ by which the\ncontingent and relative element of knowledge is eliminated, and the\nnecessary and absolute principle is disengaged. We shall simply state\nthe method, and show its application by a single illustration.\n\nThere are unquestionably _two_ sorts of abstraction: 1. \"_Comparative_\nabstraction, operating upon several real objects, and seizing their\nresemblances in order to form an abstract idea, which is collective and\nmediate; collective, because different individuals concur in its\nformation; mediate, because it requires several intermediate\noperations.\" This is the method of the physical sciences, which\ncomprises comparison, abstraction, and generalization. The result in\nthis process is the attainment of a _general_ truth. 2. \"_Immediate_\nabstraction, not comparative; operating not upon several concretes, but\nupon a single one, eliminating and neglecting its individual and\nvariable part, and disengaging the absolute part, which it raises at\nonce to its pure form.\" The parts to be eliminated in a concrete\ncognition are, first, the quality of the object, and the circumstances\nunder which the absolute unfolds itself; and secondly, the quality of\nthe subject, which perceives but does not constitute it. The phenomena\nof the me and the not-me being eliminated, the absolute remains. This is\nthe process of rational psychology, and the result obtained is a\n_universal_ and _necessary_ truth.\n\n\"Let us take, as an example, the principle of cause. To be able to say\nthat the event I see must have a cause, it is not indispensable to have\nseen several events succeed each other. The principle which compels me\nto pronounce this judgment is already complete in the first as in the\nlast event; it can not change in respect to its object, it can not\nchange in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or\nless number of applications. The only difference that it is subject to\nin regard to us is that we apply it, whether we remark it or not,\nwhether we disengage it or not from its particular application. The\nquestion is not to eliminate the particularity of the phenomenon wherein\nit appears to us, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the murder of a\nman, in order immediately to conceive, in a general and abstract manner,\nthe necessity of a cause for every event that begins to exist. Here it\nis not because I am the same, or have been affected in the same manner\nin several different cases, that I have come to this general and\nabstract conception. A leaf falls; at the same moment I think, I\nbelieve, I declare that this falling of the leaf must have a cause. A\nman has been killed; at the same instant I believe, I proclaim that this\ndeath must have a cause. Each one of these facts contains particular and\nvariable circumstances, and something universal and necessary, to wit,\nboth of them can not but have a cause. Now I am perfectly able to\ndisengage the universal from the particular in regard to the first fact\nas well as in regard to the second fact, for the universal is in the\nfirst quite as well as in the second. In fact, if the principle of\ncausality is not universal in the first fact, neither will it be in the\nsecond, nor in the third, nor in the thousandth; for a thousandth is not\nnearer than the first to the infinite--to absolute universality. It is\nthe same, and still more evidently, with _necessity_. Pay particular\nattention to this point; if necessity is not in the first fact, it can\nnot be in any; for necessity can not be formed little by little, and by\nsuccessive increments. If, on the first murder I see, I do not exclaim\nthat this murder had necessarily a cause, at the thousandth murder,\nalthough it shall be proved that all the others had causes, I shall have\nthe right to think that this murder has, very probably, also a cause,\nbut I shall never have the right to say that it _necessarily_ had a\ncause. But when universality and necessity are already in a single case,\nthat case is sufficient to entitle me to deduce them from it,\"[225] and\nwe may add, also, to affirm them of every other event that may\ntranspire.\n\n[Footnote 225: Cousin, \"True, Beautiful, and Good,\" pp. 57, 58.]\n\nThe following _schema_ will exhibit the generally accepted results of\nthis method of analysis applied to the phenomena of thought:\n\n(i.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments from\nwhence is derived the cognition of Absolute Being_.\n\n1. _The principle of Substance_; thus enounced--\"every quality supposes\na _subject_ or real being.\"\n\n2. _The principle of Causality_; \"every thing that begins to be supposes\na _power_ adequate to its production, _i.e._, an efficient cause.\"\n\n3. _The principle of Unity_; \"all differentiation and plurality supposes\nan incomposite unity; all diversity, an ultimate and indivisible\nidentity.\"\n\n4. _The principle of the Unconditioned_; \"the finite supposes the\ninfinite, the dependent supposes the self-existent, the temporal\nsupposes the eternal.\"\n\n(ii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from\nwhich is derived the cognition of the Absolute Reason_.\n\n1. _The principle of Ideality_; thus enounced, \"facts of order--definite\nproportion, symmetrical arrangement, numerical relation, geometrical\nform--having a commencement in time, present themselves to us as the\nexpression of _Ideas_, and refer us to _Mind_ as their analogon, and\nexponent, and source.\"\n\n2. _The principle of Consecution_; \"the uniform succession and\nprogressive evolution of new existences, according to fixed definite\narchetypes, suppose a unity of _thought_--a comprehensive _plan_\nembracing all existence.\"\n\n3. _The principle of Intentionality or Final Cause_; \"every means\nsupposes an _end_ contemplated, and a choice and adaptation of means to\nsecure the _end_.\"\n\n4. _The principle of Personality_; \"intelligent purpose and voluntary\nchoice imply a personal agent.\"\n\n(iii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from\nwhence is derived the cognition of the Absolute Good_.\n\n1. _The principle of Moral Law_; thus enounced, \"the action of a\nvoluntary agent necessarily characterized as _right_ or _wrong_,\nsupposes an immutable and universal standard of right--an absolute moral\nLaw.\"\n\n2. _The principle of Moral Obligation_; \"the feeling of obligation to\nobey a law of duty supposes a _Lawgiver_ by whose authority we are\nobliged.\"\n\n3. _The principle of Moral Desert_; \"the feeling of personal\naccountability and of moral desert supposes a _judge_ to whom we must\ngive account, and who shall determine our award.\"\n\n4. _The pnnciple of Retribution_; \"retributive issues in this life, and\nthe existence in all minds of an impersonal justice which demands that,\nin the final issue, every being shall receive his just deserts, suppose\na being of _absolute justice_ who shall render to every man according to\nhis works.\"\n\nA more profound and exhaustive analysis may perhaps resolve all these\nprimitive judgments into one universal principle or law, which Leibnitz\nhas designated \"_The principle or law of sufficient reason_,\" and which\nis thus enounced--there must be an ultimate and sufficient reason why\nany thing exists, and why it is, rather than otherwise; that is, if any\nthing begins to be, something else must be supposed as the adequate\nground, and reason, and cause of its existence; or again, to state the\nlaw in view of our present discussion, \"_if the finite universe, with\nits existing order and arrangement, had a beginning, there must be an\nultimate and sufficient reason why it exists, and why it is as it is,\nrather than otherwise_.\" In view of one particular class of phenomena,\nor special order of facts, this \"principle of sufficient reason\" may be\nvaried in the form of its statement, and denominated \"the principle of\nsubstance,\" \"the principle of causality,\" \"the principle of\nintentionality,\" etc.; and, it may be, these are but specific judgments\nunder the one fundamental and generic law of thought which constitutes\nthe _major_ premise of every Theistic syllogism.\n\nThese fundamental principles, primitive judgments, axioms, or necessary\nand determinate forms of thought, exist potentially or germinally in all\nhuman minds; they are spontaneously developed in presence of the\nphenomena of the universe, material and mental; they govern the original\nmovement of the mind, even when not appearing in consciousness in their\npure and abstract form; and they compel us to affirm _a permanent being_\nor _reality_ behind all phenomena--a _power_ adequate to the production\nof change, back of all events; a _personal Mind_, as the explanation of\nall the facts of order, and uniform succession, and regular evolution;\nand a _personal Lawgiver_ and _Righteous Judge_ as the ultimate ground\nand reason of all the phenomena of the moral world; in short, to affirm\n_an Unconditioned Cause of all finite and secondary causes; a First\nPrinciple of all principles; an Ultimate Reason of all reasons; an\nimmutable Uncreated Justice, the living light of conscience; a King\nimmortal, eternal, invisible, the only wise God, the ruler of the world\nand man_.\n\nOur position, then, is, that the idea of God is revealed to man in the\nnatural and spontaneous development of his intelligence, and that the\nexistence of a Supreme Reality corresponding to, and represented by this\nidea, is rationally and logically demonstrable, and therefore justly\nentitled to take rank as part of our legitimate, valid, and positive\n_knowledge_.\n\nAnd now from this position, which we regard as impregnable, we shall be\nprepared more deliberately and intelligibly to contemplate the various\nassaults which are openly or covertly made upon the doctrine that _God\nis cognizable by human reason_.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_).\n\nIS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON?\n\n\n\"The abnegation of reason is not the evidence of faith, but the\nconfession of despair.\"--LIGHTFOOT.\n\nAt the outset of this inquiry we attempted a hasty grouping of the\nvarious parties and schools which are arrayed against the doctrine that\nGod is cognizable by human reason, and in general terms we sought to\nindicate the ground they occupy.\n\nViewed from a philosophical stand-point, we found one party marshalled\nunder the standard of Idealism; another of Materialism and, again,\nanother of Natural Realism. Regarded in their theological aspects, some\nare positive Atheists; others, strange to say, are earnest Theists;\nwhilst others occupy a position of mere Indifferentism. Yet,\nnotwithstanding the remarkable diversity, and even antagonism of their\nphilosophical and theological opinions, they are all agreed in denying\nto reason any valid cognition of God.\n\nThe survey of Natural Theism we have completed in the previous chapter\nwill enable us still further to indicate the exact points against which\ntheir attacks are directed, and also to estimate the character and force\nof the weapons employed. With or without design, they are, each in their\nway, assailing one or other of the principles upon which we rest our\ndemonstration of the being of God. As we proceed, we shall find that\nMill and the Constructive Idealists are really engaged in undermining\n\"the _principle of substance_;\" their doctrine is a virtual denial of\nall objective realities answering to our subjective ideas of matter,\nmind, and God. The assaults of Comte and the Materialists of his school\nare mainly directed against \"_the principle of causality_\" and \"_the\nprinciple of intentionality_;\" they would deny to man all knowledge of\ncauses, efficient and final. The attacks of Hamilton and his school are\ndirected against \"the _principle of the unconditioned_,\" his philosophy\nof the conditioned is a plausible attempt to deprive man of all power to\nthink the Infinite and Perfect, to conceive the Unconditioned and\nUltimate Cause; whilst the Dogmatic Theologians are borrowing, and\nrecklessly brandishing, the weapons of all these antagonists, and, in\naddition to all this, are endeavoring to show the insufficiency of \"_the\nprinciple of unity_\" and the weakness and invalidity of \"the _moral\nprinciples_,\" which are regarded by us as relating man to a Moral\nPersonality, and as indicating to him the existence of a righteous God,\nthe ruler of the world. It is necessary, therefore, that we should\nconcentrate our attention yet more specifically on these separate lines\nof attack, and attempt a minuter examination of the positions assumed by\neach, and of the arguments by which they are seeking, directly or\nindirectly, to invalidate the fundamental principles of Natural Theism.\n\n(i.) _We commence with the Idealistic School_, of which John Stuart Mill\nmust be regarded as the ablest living representative.\n\nThe doctrine of this school is that all our knowledge is necessarily\nconfined to _mental_ phenomena; that is, \"to _feelings_ or states of\nconsciousness,\" and \"the succession and co-existence, the likeness and\nunlikeness between these feelings or states of consciousness.\"[226] All\nour general notions, all our abstract ideas, are generated out of these\nfeelings[227] by \"_inseparable association_,\" which registers their\ninter-relations of recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The\nresults of this inseparable association constitute at once the sum total\nand the absolute limit of all possible cognition.\n\n[Footnote 226: J. S. Mill, \"Logic,\" vol. i. p. 83 (English edition).]\n\n[Footnote 227: In the language of Mill, every thing of which we are\nconscious is called \"feeling.\" \"Feeling, in the proper sense of the\nterm, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought are the\nsubordinate species.\"--\"Logic,\" bk. i. ch. iii. \u00a7 3.]\n\nIt is admitted by Mill that one _apparent_ element in this total result\nis the general conviction that our own existence is really distinct from\nthe external world, and that the personal _ego_ has an essential\nidentity distinct from the fleeting phenomena of sensation. But this\npersuasion is treated by him as a mere illusion--a leap beyond the\noriginal datum for which we have no authority. Of a real substance or\nsubstratum called Mind, of a real substance or substratum called Matter,\nunderlying the series of feelings--\"the thread of consciousness\"--we do\nknow and can know nothing; and in affirming the existence of such\nsubstrata we are making a supposition we can not possibly verify. The\nultimate datum of speculative philosophy is not \"_I think_,\" but simply\n\"_Thoughts or feelings are_.\" The belief in a permanent subject or\nsubstance, called matter, as the ground and plexus of physical\nphenomena, and of a permanent subject or substance, called mind, as the\nground and plexus of mental phenomena, is not a primitive and original\nintuition of reason. It is simply through the action of the principle of\nassociation among the ultimate phenomena, called feelings, that this\n(erroneous) separation of the phenomena into two orders or\naggregates--one called mind or self; the other matter, or not\nself--takes place; and without this curdling or associating process no\nsuch notion or belief could have been generated. \"The principle of\nsubstance,\" as an ultimate law of thought, is, therefore, to be regarded\nas a transcendental dream.\n\nBut now that the notion of _mind_ or _self_, and of _matter_ or not\n_self_, do exist as common convictions of our race, what is philosophy\nto make of them? After a great many qualifications and explanations, Mr.\nMill has, in his \"Logic,\" summed up his doctrine of Constructive\nIdealism in the following words: \"As body is the mysterious _something_\nwhich excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious _something_\nwhich feels and thinks.\"[228] But what is this \"mysterious something?\"\nIs it a reality, an entity, a subject; or is it a shadow, an illusion, a\ndream? In his \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" where it\nmay be presumed, we have his maturest opinions, Mr. Mill, in still more\nabstract and idealistic phraseology, attempts an answer. Here he defines\nmatter as \"_a permanent possibility of sensation_,\"[229] and mind as \"_a\npermanent possibility of feeling_.\"[230] And \"the belief in these\npermanent possibilities,\" he assures us, \"includes all that is essential\nor characteristic in the belief in substance.\"[231] \"If I am asked,\"\nsays he, \"whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner\naccepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: and so\ndo all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm\nwith confidence that this conception of matter includes the whole\nmeaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical,\nand sometimes from theological theories. The reliance of mankind on the\nreal existence of visible and tangible objects, means reliance on the\nreality and permanence of possibilities of visual and tactual\nsensations, when no sensations are actually experienced.\"[232]\n\"Sensations,\" however, let it be borne in mind, are but a subordinate\nspecies of the genus feeling.[233] They are \"states of\nconsciousness\"--phenomena of mind, not of matter; and we are still\nwithin the impassable boundary of ideal phenomena; we have yet no\ncognition of an external world. The sole cosmical conception, for us, is\nstill a succession of sensations, or states of consciousness. This is\nthe one phenomenon which we can not transcend in knowledge, do what we\nwill; all else is hypothesis and illusion. The _non-ego_, after all,\nthen, may be but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the\npossible modifications of the _ego_.\n\n[Footnote 228: \"Logic,\" bk. i, ch. iii. \u00a7 8.]\n\n[Footnote 229: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Ibid., vol. i. p. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Ibid., vol. i. p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 243, 244.]\n\n[Footnote 233: \"Logic,\" bk. i. ch. iii. \u00a7 3.]\n\nAnd now that matter, as a real existence, has disappeared under Mr.\nMill's analysis, what shall be said of mind or self? Is there any\npermanent subject or real entity underlying the phenomena of feeling? In\nfeeling, is there a personal self that feels, thinks, and wills? It\nwould seem not. Mind, as well as matter, resolves itself into a \"series\nof feelings,\" varying and fugitive from moment to moment, in a sea of\npossibilities of feeling. \"My mind,\" says Mill, \"is but a series of\nfeelings, or, as it has been called, a thread of consciousness, however\nsupplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness, which are not,\nthough they might be, realized.\"[234]\n\n[Footnote 234: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 254.]\n\nThe ultimate fact of the phenomenal world, then, in the philosophy of\nMill, is neither matter nor mind, but feelings or states of\nconsciousness associated together by the relations, amongst themselves,\nof recurrence, co-existence, and resemblance. The existence of self,\nexcept as \"a series of feelings;\" the existence of any thing other than\nself, except as a feigned unknown cause of sensation, is rigorously\ndenied. Mr. Mill does not content himself with saying that we are\nignorant of the _nature_ of matter and mind, but he asserts we are\nignorant of the _existence_ of matter and mind as real entities.\n\nThe bearing of this doctrine of Idealism upon Theism and Theology will\nbe instantly apparent to the reader. If I am necessarily ignorant of the\nexistence of the external world, and of the personal _ego_, or real\nself, I must be equally ignorant of the existence of God. If one is a\nmere supposition, an illusion, so the other must be. Mr. Mill, however,\nis one of those courteous and affable writers who are always conscious,\nas it were, of the presence of their readers, and extremely careful not\nto shock their feelings or prejudices; besides, he has too much\nconscious self-respect to avow himself an atheist. As a speculative\nphilosopher, he would rather regard Theism and Theology as \"open\nquestions,\" and he satisfies himself with saying, if you believe in the\nexistence of God, or in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. \"As a\ntheory,\" he tells us that his doctrine leaves the evidence of the\nexistence of God exactly as it was before. Supposing me to believe that\nthe Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings\nprolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God's\nexistence to be _as real as my own_[235]. And as for evidence, the\nargument of Paley's 'Natural Theology,' or, for that matter, of his\n'Evidences of Christianity,' would stand exactly as it does.\n\nThe design argument is drawn from the analogies of human experience.\nFrom the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings,\nit infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar,\nbut superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings. _If_ it prove\nthese, nobody but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves a\nmysterious _substratum_ for them.[236] The argument from design, it\nseems to us, however, would have no validity if there be no external\nworld offering marks of design. If the external world is only a mode of\nfeeling, a series of mental states, then our notion of the Divine\nExistence may be only \"an association of feelings\"--a mode of Self. And\nif we have no positive knowledge of a real self as existing, and God's\nexistence is no more \"real than our own,\" then the Divine existence\nstands on a very dubious and uncertain foundation. It can have no very\nsecure hold upon the human mind, and certainly has no claim to be\nregarded as a fundamental and necessary belief. That it has a very\nprecarious hold upon the mind of Mr. Mill, is evident from the following\npassage in his article on \"_Later Speculations of A. Comte_.\"[237] \"We\nventure to think that a religion may exist without a belief in a God,\nand that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an\ninstructive and profitable object of contemplation.\"\n\nAnd now let us close Mr. Mill's book, and, introverting our mental gaze,\ninterrogate _consciousness_, the verdict of which, even Mr. Mill assures\nus, is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal.[238]\n\n[Footnote 235: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 236: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Westminster Review, July, 1835 (American edition), p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 238: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 161.]\n\n1. We have an ineradicable, and, as it would seem, an intuitive faith in\nthe real existence of an external world distinct from our sensations,\nand also of a personal self, which we call \"I,\" \"myself,\" as distinct\nfrom \"my sensations,\" and \"my feelings.\" We find, also, that this is\nconfessedly the common belief of mankind. There have been a few\nphilosophers who have affected to treat this belief as a \"mere\nprejudice,\" an \"illusion;\" but they have never been able, practically,\nso to regard and treat it. Their language, just as plainly as the\nlanguage of the common people, betrays their instinctive faith in an\nouter world, and proves their utter inability to emancipate themselves\nfrom this \"prejudice,\" if such it may please them to call it. In view of\nthis acknowledged fact, we ask--Does the term \"_permanent possibility of\nsensations_\" exhaust all that is contained in this conception of an\nexternal world? This evening I _remember_ that at noonday I beheld the\nsun, and experienced a sensation of warmth whilst exposing myself to his\nrays; and I _expect_ that to-morrow, under the same conditions, I shall\nexperience the same sensations. I now _remember_ that last evening I\nextinguished my light and attempted to leave my study, but, coming in\ncontact with the closed door, experienced a sense of resistance to my\nmuscular effort, by a solid and extended body exterior to myself; and I\n_expect_ that this evening, under the same circumstances, I shall\nexperience the same sensations. Now, does a belief in \"a permanent\npossibility of sensations\" explain all these experiences? does it\naccount for that immediate knowledge of an _external_ object which I had\non looking at the sun, or that presentative knowledge of _resistance_\nand _extension_, and of an extended, resisting _substance_, I had when\nin contact with the door of my study? Mr. Mill very confidently affirms\nthat this belief includes all; and this phrase expresses all the meaning\nattached to extended \"matter\" and resisting \"substance\" by the common\nworld.[239] We as confidently affirm that it does no such thing; and as\n\"the common world\" must be supposed to understand the language of\nconsciousness as well as the philosopher, we are perfectly willing to\nleave the decision of that question to the common consciousness of our\nrace. If all men do not believe in a permanent _reality_--a substance\nwhich is external to themselves, a substance which offers resistance to\ntheir muscular effort, and which produces in them the sensations of\nsolidity, extension, resistance, etc.--they believe nothing and know\nnothing at all about the matter.\n\n[Footnote 239: \"Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 243.]\n\nStill less does the phrase \"_a permanent possibility of feelings\"_\nexhaust all our conception of a personal self. Recurring to the\nexperiences of yesterday, I _remember_ the feelings I experienced on\nbeholding the sun, and also on pressing against the closed door, and I\nconfidently _expect_ the recurrence, under the same circumstances, of\nthe same feelings. Does the belief in \"a permanent possibility of\nfeelings\" explain the act of memory by which I recall the past event,\nand the act of prevision by which I anticipate the recurrence of the\nlike experience in the future? Who or what is the \"I\" that remembers and\nthe \"I\" that anticipates? The \"ego,\" the personal mind, is, according to\nMill, a mere \"series of feelings,\" or, more correctly, a flash of\n\"_present_ feelings\" on \"a background of possibilities of present\nfeelings.\"[240] If, then, there be no permanent substance or reality\nwhich is the subject of the present feeling, which receives and retains\nthe impress of the past feeling, and which anticipates the recurrence of\nlike feelings in the future, how can the _past_ be recalled, how\ndistinguished from the present? and how, without a knowledge of the past\nas distinguished from the present, can the _future_ be forecast? Mr.\nMill feels the pressure of this difficulty, and frankly acknowledges it.\nHe admits that, on the hypothesis that mind is simply \"a series of\nfeelings,\" the phenomena of memory and expectation are \"inexplicable\"\nand \"incomprehensible.\"[241] He is, therefore, under the necessity of\ncompleting his definition of mind by adding that it is a series of\nfeelings which \"_is aware of itself as a series_;\" and, still further,\nof supplementing this definition by the conjecture that \"_something\nwhich has ceased to exist, or is not yet in existence, can still, in a\nmanner, be present_.\"[242] Now he who can understand how a series of\nfeelings can flow on in time, and from moment to moment drop out of the\npresent into non-existence, and yet be _present_ and _conscious of\nitself as a series_, may be accorded the honor of understanding Mr.\nMill's definition of mind or self, and may be permitted to rank himself\nas a distinguished disciple of the Idealist school; for ourselves, we\nacknowledge we are destitute of the capacity to do the one, and of all\nambition to be the other. And he who can conceive how the _past_ feeling\nof yesterday and the _possible_ feeling of to-morrow can be in any\nmanner _present_ to-day; or, in other words, how any thing which has\nceased to exist, or which never had an existence, can _now_ exist, may\nbe permitted to believe that a thing can be and not be at the same\nmoment, that a part is greater than the whole, and that two and two make\nfive; but we are not ashamed to confess our inability to believe a\ncontradiction. To our understanding, \"possibilities of feeling\" are not\nactualities. They may or may not be realized, and until realized in\nconsciousness, they have no real being. If there be no other background\nof mental phenomena save mere \"possibilities of feeling,\" then present\nfeelings are the only existences, the only reality, and a loss of\nimmediate consciousness, as in narcosis and coma, is the loss of all\npersonality, all self-hood, and of all real being.\n\n[Footnote 240: \"Exam. of Hamilton,\" vol. i. p. 260.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Ibid, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 242: Ibid.]\n\n2. What, then, is the verdict of consciousness as to the existence of a\npermanent substance, an abiding existence which is the subject of all\nthe varying phenomena? Of what are we really conscious when we say \"I\nthink,\" \"I feel,\" \"I will?\" Are we simply conscious of thought, feeling,\nand volition, or of a self, a person, which thinks, feels, and wills?\nThe man who honestly and unreservedly accepts the testimony of\nconsciousness in all its integrity must answer at once, _we have an\nimmediate consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of mind, but of a\npersonal self as passively or actively related to the phenomena_. We are\nconscious not merely of the act of volition, but of a self, a power,\nproducing the volition. We are conscious not merely of feeling, but of a\nbeing who is the subject of the feeling. We are conscious not simply of\nthought, but of a real entity that thinks. \"It is clearly a flat\ncontradiction to maintain that I am not immediately conscious of myself,\nbut only of my sensations or volitions. Who, then, is that _I_ that is\nconscious, and how can I be conscious of such states as _mine?_\"[243]\n\n[Footnote 243: Mansel, \"Prolegomena Logica,\" p. 122, and note E, p.\n281.]\n\nThe testimony of consciousness, then, is indubitable that we have a\ndirect, immediate cognition of _self_--I know myself as a distinctly\nexisting being. This permanent self, to which I refer the earlier and\nlater stages of consciousness, the past as well as the present feeling,\nand which I know abides the same under all phenomenal changes,\nconstitutes my personal identity. It is this abiding self which unites\nthe past and the present, and, from the present stretches onward to the\nfuture. We know self immediately, as existing, as in active operation,\nand as having permanence--or, in other words, as a \"_substance_.\" This\none immediately presented substance, myself, may be regarded as\nfurnishing a positive basis for that other notion of substance, which is\nrepresentatively thought, as the subject of all sensible qualities.\n\n3. We may now inquire what is the testimony of consciousness as to the\nexistence of the extra-mental world? Are we conscious of perceiving\nexternal objects immediately and in themselves, or only mediately\nthrough some vicarious image or representative idea to which we\nfictitiously ascribe an objective reality?\n\nThe answer of common sense is that we are immediately conscious, in\nperception, of an _ego_ and a _non-ego_ known together, and known in\ncontrast to each other; we are conscious of a perceiving subject, and of\nan external reality, as the object perceived.[244] To state this\ndoctrine of natural realism still more explicitly we add, that we are\nconscious of the immediate perception of certain essential attributes of\nmatter objectively existing. Of these primary qualities, which are\nimmediately perceived as real and objectively existing, we mention\n_extension_ in space and _resistance_ to muscular effort, with which is\nindissolubly associated the idea of _externality_. It is true that\nextension and resistance are only qualities, but it is equally true that\nthey are qualities of something, and of something which is external to\nourselves. Let any one attempt to conceive of extension without\nsomething which is extended, or of resistance apart from something which\noffers resistance, and he will be convinced that we can never know\nqualities without knowing substance, just as we can not know substance\nwithout knowing qualities. This, indeed, is admitted by Mr. Mill.[245]\nAnd if this be admitted, it must certainly be absurd to speak of\nsubstance as something \"unknown.\" Substance is known just as much as\nquality is known, no less and no more.\n\n[Footnote 244: Hamilton, \"Lectures,\" vol. 1. p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 245: \"Logic,\" bk. i. ch. iii. \u00a7 6.]\n\nWe remark, in conclusion, that if the testimony of consciousness is not\naccepted in all its integrity, we are necessarily involved in the\nNihilism of Hume and Fichte; the phenomena of mind and matter are, on\nanalysis, resolved into an absolute nothingness--\"a play of phantasms in\na void.\"[246]\n\n(ii.) We turn, secondly, to the _Materialistic School_ as represented by\nAug. Comte.\n\nThe doctrine of this school is that all knowledge is limited to\n_material_ phenomena--that is, to appearances _perceptible to sense_. We\ndo not know the essence of any object, nor the real mode of procedure of\nany event, but simply its relations to other events, as similar or\ndissimilar, co-existent or successive. These relations are constant;\nunder the same conditions, they are always the same. The constant\nresemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences\nwhich unite them, as antecedent and consequent, are termed _laws_. The\nlaws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential\nnature and their ultimate causes, _efficient_ or _final_, are unknown\nand inscrutable to us.[247]\n\n[Footnote 246: Masson, \"Recent British Philos.,\" p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 247: See art. \"Positive Philos. of A. Comte,\" _Westminster\nReview_, April, 1865, p. 162, Am. ed.]\n\nIt is not our intention to review the system of philosophy propounded by\nAug. Comte; we are now chiefly concerned with his denial of all\ncausation.\n\n1. _As to Efficient Causes_.--Had Comte contented himself with the\nassertion that causes lie beyond the field of sensible observation, and\nthat inductive science can not carry us beyond the relations of\nco-existence and succession among phenomena, he would have stated an\nimportant truth, but certainly not a new truth. It had already been\nannounced by distinguished mental philosophers, as, for example, M. de\nBiran and Victor Cousin.[248] The senses give us only the succession of\none phenomenon to another. I hold a piece of wax to the fire and it\nmelts. Here my senses inform me of two successive phenomena--the\nproximity of fire and the melting of wax. It is now agreed among all\nschools of philosophy that this is all the knowledge the senses can\npossibly supply. The observation of a great number of like cases assures\nus that this relation is uniform. The highest scientific generalization\ndoes not carry us one step beyond this fact. Induction, therefore, gives\nus no access to causes beyond phenomena. Still, this does not justify\nComte in the assertion that causes are to us absolutely _unknown_. The\nquestion would still arise whether we have not some faculty of\nknowledge, distinct from sensation, which is adequate to furnish a valid\ncognition of cause. It does not by any means follow that, because the\nidea of causation is not given as a \"physical qu\u00e6situm\" at the end of a\nprocess of scientific generalization, it should not be a \"metaphysical\ndatum\" posited at the very beginning of scientific inquiry, as the\nindispensable condition of our being able to cognize phenomena at all,\nand as the law under which all thought, and all conception of the system\nof nature, is alone possible.\n\n[Footnote 248: \"It is now universally admitted that we have no\nperception of the causal nexus in the material world.\"--Hamilton,\n\"Discussions,\" p. 522.]\n\nNow we affirm that the human mind has just as direct, immediate, and\npositive knowledge of _cause_ as it has of _effect._ The idea of cause,\nthe intuition _power_, is given in the immediate consciousness of _mind\nas determining its own_ operations. Our first, and, in fact, our only\npresentation of power or cause, is that of _self as willing_. In every\nact of volition I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form a\nresolution or to refrain from it, to determine on this course of action\nor that; and this constitutes the immediate presentative knowledge of\npower.[249] The will is a power, a power in action, a productive power,\nand, consequently, a cause. This doctrine is stated with remarkable\nclearness and accuracy by Cousin: \"If we seek the notion of cause in the\naction of one ball upon another, as was previously done by Hume, or in\nthe action of the hand upon the ball, or the primary muscles upon the\nextremities, or even in the action of the will upon the muscles, as was\ndone by M. Maine de Biran, we shall find it in none of these cases, not\neven in the last; for it is possible there should be a paralysis of the\nmuscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes it\nunproductive, incapable of being a cause, and, consequently, of\nsuggesting the notion of one. But what no paralysis can prevent is the\naction of the will upon itself, the production of a resolution; that is\nto say, the act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of all\ncausality, of which all external movements are only symbols more or less\nimperfect. The first cause for us, is, therefore, the _will_, of which\nthe first effect is volition. This is at once the highest and the purest\nsource of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that of\npersonality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause,\nas revealed in will and personality, which is the condition for us of\nthe ulterior or simultaneous conception of external, impersonal\ncauses.\"[250]\n\n[Footnote 249: \"It is our _immediate consciousness of effort_, when we\nexert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralize force,\nwhich gives us this internal conviction of _power_ and _causation_, so\nfar as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe that\nwhenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, or\ndeflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocities\nif already in motion, it is in consequence of such an _effort_ somehow\nexerted.\"--Herschel's \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" p. 234; see Mansel's\n\"Prolegomena,\" p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 250: \"Philosophical Fragments,\" Preface to first edition.]\n\nThus much for the origin of the idea of cause. We have the same direct\nintuitive knowledge of cause that we have of effect; but we have not yet\nrendered a full and adequate account of the _principle of causality_. We\nhave simply attained the notion of our personal causality, and we can\nnot arbitrarily substitute our personal causality for all the causes of\nthe universe, and erect our own experience as a law of the entire\nuniverse. We have, however, already seen (Chap. V.) that the belief in\nexterior causation is _necessary_ and _universal_. When a change takes\nplace, when a new phenomenon presents itself to our senses, we can not\navoid the conviction that it must have a cause. We can not even express\nin language the relations of phenomena in time and space, without\nspeaking of causes. And there is not a rational being on the face of the\nglobe--a child, a savage, or a philosopher--who does not instinctively\nand spontaneously affirm that every movement, every change, every new\nexistence, _must_ have a cause. Now what account can philosophy render\nof this universal belief? One answer, and only one, is possible. The\n_reason_ of man (that power of which Comte takes no account) is in fixed\nand changeless relation to the principle of causation, just as _sense_\nis in fixed and changeless relation to exterior phenomena, so that we\ncan not know the external world, can not think or speak of phenomenal\nexistence, except as _effects_. In the expressive and forcible language\nof Jas. Martineau: \"By an irresistible law of thought _all phenomena\npresent themselves to us as the expression of power_, and refer us to a\ncausal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, nor\nhear, nor feel; it is given in _thought_, supplied by the spontaneous\nactivity of mind as the correlative prefix to the phenomena\nobserved.\"[251] Unless, then, we are prepared to deny the validity of\nall our rational intuitions, we can not avoid accepting \"this subjective\npostulate as a valid law for objective nature.\" If the intuitions of our\nreason are pronounced deceptive and mendacious, so also must the\nintuitions of the senses be pronounced illusory and false. Our whole\nintellectual constitution is built up on false and erroneous principles,\nand all knowledge of whatever kind must perish by \"the contagion of\nuncertainty.\"\n\n[Footnote 251: \"Essays,\" p. 47.]\n\nComte, however, is determined to treat the idea of causation as an\nillusion, whether under its psychological form, as _will_, or under its\nscientific form, as _force_. He feels that Theology is inevitable if we\npermit the inquiry into causes;[252] and he is more anxious that\ntheology should perish than that truth should prevail. The human will\nmust, therefore, be robbed of all semblance of freedom, lest it should\nsuggest the idea of a Supreme Will governing nature; and human action,\nlike all other phenomena, must be reduced to uniform and necessary law.\nAll feelings, ideas, and principles guaranteed to us by consciousness\nare to be cast out of the account. Psychology, resting on\nself-observation, is pronounced a delusion. The immediate consciousness\nof freedom is a dream. Such a procedure, to say the least of it, is\nhighly unphilosophical; to say the truth about it, it is obviously\ndishonest. Every fact of human nature, just as much as every fact of\nphysical nature, must be accepted in all its integrity, or all must be\nalike rejected. The phenomena of mind can no more be disregarded than\nthe phenomena of matter. Rational intuitions, necessary and universal\nbeliefs, can no more be ignored than the uniform facts of\nsense-perception, without rendering a system of knowledge necessarily\nincomplete, and a system of truth utterly impossible. Every one truth is\nconnected with every other truth in the universe. And yet Comte demands\nthat a large class of facts, the most immediate and direct of all our\ncognitions, shall be rejected because they are not in harmony with the\nfundamental assumption of the positive philosophy that all knowledge is\nconfined to _phenomena perceptible to sense_. Now it were just as easy\nto cast the Alps into the Mediterranean as to obliterate from the human\nintelligence the primary cognitions of immediate consciousness, or to\nrelegate the human reason from the necessary laws of thought. Comte\nhimself can not emancipate his own mind from a belief in the validity of\nthe testimony of consciousness. How can he know himself as distinct from\nnature, as a living person, as the same being he was ten years ago, or\neven yesterday, except by an appeal to consciousness? Despite his\nearnestly-avowed opinions as to the inutility and fallaciousness of all\npsychological inquiries, he is compelled to admit that \"the phenomena of\nlife\" are \"_known by immediate consciousness_.\"[253] Now the knowledge\nof our personal freedom rests on precisely the same grounds as the\nknowledge of our personal existence. The same \"immediate consciousness\"\nwhich attests that I exist, attests also, with equal distinctness and\ndirectness, that I am self-determined and free.\n\n[Footnote 252: \"The _inevitable tendency_ of our intelligence is towards\na philosophy radically theological, so often as we seek to penetrate, on\nwhatever pretext, into the intimate nature of phenomena\" (vol. iv. p.\n664).]\n\n[Footnote 253: \"Positive Philos,\" vol. ii. p. 648.]\n\nIn common with most atheistical writers, Comte is involved in the fatal\ncontradiction of at one time assuming, and at another of denying the\nfreedom of the will, to serve the exigencies of his theory. To prove\nthat the order of the universe can not be the product of a Supreme\nIntelligence, he assumes that the products of mind must be characterized\nby freedom and variety--the phenomena of mind must not be subject to\nuniform and necessary laws; and inasmuch as the phenomena presented by\nexternal nature are subject to uniform and changeless laws, they can not\nbe the product of mind. \"Look at the whole frame of things,\" says he;\n\"how can it be the product of mind--of a supernatural Will? Is it not\nsubject to regular laws, and do we not actually obtain _prevision_ of\nits phenomena? If it were the product of mind, its order would be\nvariable and free.\" Here, then, it is admitted that _freedom is an\nessential characteristic of mind_. And this admission is no doubt a\nthoughtless, unconscious betrayal of the innate belief of all minds in\nthe freedom of the will. But when Comte comes to deal with this freedom\nas an objective question of philosophy, when he directs his attention to\nthe only will of which we have a direct and immediate knowledge, he\ndenies freedom and variety, and asserts in the most arbitrary manner\nthat the movements of the mind, like all the phenomena of nature, must\nbe subject to uniform, changeless, and necessary laws. And if we have\nnot yet been able to reduce the movements of mind, like the movements of\nthe planets, to statistics, and have not already obtained accurate\nprevision of its successions or sequences as we have of physical\nphenomena, it is simply the consequence of our inattention to, or\nignorance of, all the facts. We answer, there are no facts so directly\nand intuitively known as the facts of consciousness; and, therefore, an\nargument based upon our supposed ignorance of these facts is not likely\nto have much weight against our immediate consciousness of personal\nfreedom. There is not any thing we know so immediately, so certainly, so\npositively, as this fact--_we are free_.\n\nThe word \"force,\" representing as it does a subtile menial conception,\nand not a phenomenon of sense, must also be banished from the domains of\nPositive Science as an intruder, lest its presence should lend any\ncountenance to the idea of causation. \"Forces in mechanics are only\n_movements_, produced, or tending to be produced.\" In order to \"cancel\naltogether the old metaphysical notion of force,\" another form of\nexpression is demanded. It is claimed that all we do know or can\npossibly know is the successions of phenomena in time. What, then, is\nthe term which henceforth, in our dynamics, shall take the place of\n\"force?\" Is it \"Time-succession?\" Then let any one attempt to express\nthe various forms and intensities of movement and change presented to\nthe senses (as _e.g._, the phenomena of heat, electricity, galvanism,\nmagnetism, muscular and nervous action, etc.) in terms of\nTime-succession, and he will at once become conscious of the utter\nhopelessness of physics, without the hyperphysical idea of force, to\nrender itself intelligible.[254] What account can be rendered of\nplanetary motion if the terms \"centrifugal force\" and \"centripetal\nforce\" are abandoned? \"From the two great conditions of every Newtonian\nsolution, viz., projectile impulse and centripetal tendency, eject the\nidea of _force_, and what remains? The entire conception is simply made\nup of this, and has not the faintest existence without it. It is useless\nto give it notice to quit, and pretend that it is gone when you have\nonly put a new name upon the door. We must not call it 'attraction,'\nlest there should seem to be a _power_ within; we are to speak of it\nonly as 'gravitation,' because that is only 'weight,' which is nothing\nbut a 'fact,' as if it were not a fact that holds a power, a true\ndynamic affair, which no imagination can chop into incoherent\nsuccessions.[255] Nor is the evasion more successful when we try the\nphrase, 'tendency of bodies to mutual approach.' The approach itself may\nbe called a phenomenon; but the 'tendency' is no phenomenon, and can not\nbe attributed by us to the bodies without regarding them as the\nresidence of force. And what are we to say of the _projectile impulse_\nin the case of the planets? Is that also a phenomenon? Who witnessed and\nreported it? Is it not evident that the whole scheme of physical\nastronomy is a resolution of observed facts into dynamic equivalents,\nand that the hypothesis posits for its calculations not phenomena, but\nproper forces? Its logic is this: _If_ an impulse of certain intensity\nwere given, and _if_ such and such mutual attractions were constantly\npresent, then the sort of motions which we observe in the bodies of our\nsystem _would follow_. So, however, they also would _if_ willed by an\nOmnipotent Intelligence.\"[256] It is thus clearly evident that human\nscience is unable to offer any explanation of the existing order of the\nuniverse except in terms expressive of Power or Force; that, in fact,\nall explanations are utterly unintelligible without the idea of\ncausation. The language of universal rational intuition is, \"all\nphenomena are the expression of power;\" the language of science is,\n\"every law implies a force.\"\n\n[Footnote 254: See Grote's \"Essay on Correlation of Physical Forces,\"\npp. 18-20; and Martineau's \"Essays,\" p. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 255: \"Gravity is a real _power_ of whose agency we have daily\nexperience.\"--Herschel, \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Martineau's \"Essays,\" p. 56.]\n\nIt is furthermore worthy of being noted that, in the modern doctrine of\nthe Correlation and Conservation of Forces, science is inevitably\napproaching the idea that all kinds of force are but forms or\nmanifestations of some _one_ central force issuing from some _one_\nfountain-head of power. Dr. Carpenter, perhaps the greatest living\nphysiologist, teaches that \"the form of force _which may be taken as the\ntype of all the rest_\" is the consciousness of living effort in\nvolition.[257] All force, then, is of one type, and that type is mind;\nin its last analysis external causation may be resolved into Divine\nenergy. Sir John Herschel does not hesitate to say that \"it is\nreasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect\nresult of a consciousness or will exerted somewhere.\"[258] The humble\nChristian may, therefore, feel himself amply justified in still\nbelieving that \"power belongs to God;\" that it is through the Divine\nenergy \"all things are, and are upheld;\" and that \"in God we live, and\nmove, and have our being;\" he is the Great First Cause, the\nFountain-head of all power.\n\n[Footnote 257: \"Human Physiology,\" p. 542.]\n\n[Footnote 258: \"Outlines of Astronomy,\" p. 234.]\n\n2. _As to Final Causes_--that is, reasons, purposes, or ends _for_ which\nthings exist--these, we are told by Comte, are all \"disproved\" by\nPositive Science, which rigidly limits us to \"the history of _what is_,\"\nand forbids all inquiry into reasons _why it is_. The question whether\nthere be any intelligent purpose in the order and arrangement of the\nuniverse, is not a subject of scientific inquiry at all; and whenever it\nhas been permitted to obtrude itself, it has thrown a false light over\nthe facts, and led the inquirer astray.\n\nThe discoveries of modern astronomy are specially instanced by Comte as\ncompletely overthrowing the notion of any conscious design or\nintelligent purpose in the universe. The order and stability of the\nsolar system are found to be the _necessary_ consequences of\ngravitation, and are adequately explained without any reference to\npurposes or ends to be fulfilled in the disposition and arrangement of\nthe heavenly bodies. \"With persons unused to the study of the celestial\nbodies, though very likely informed on other parts of natural\nphilosophy, astronomy has still the reputation of being a science\neminently religious, as if the famous words, 'The heavens declare the\nglory of God, had lost none of their truth... No science has given more\nterrible shocks to the doctrine of _final causes_ than astronomy.[259]\nThe simple knowledge of the movement of the earth must have destroyed\nthe original and real foundation of this doctrine--the idea of the\nuniverse subordinated to the earth, and consequently to man. Besides,\nthe accurate exploration of the solar system could not fail to dispel\nthat blind and unlimited admiration which the general order of nature\ninspires, by showing in the most sensible manner, and in a great number\nof different respects, that the orbs were certainly not disposed in the\nmost advantageous manner, and that science permits us easily to conceive\na better arrangement, by the development of true celestial mechanism,\nsince Newton. All the theological philosophy, even the most perfect, has\nbeen henceforth deprived of its principal intellectual function, the\nmost regular order being thus consigned as necessarily established and\nmaintained in our world, and even in the whole universe, _by the simple\nmutual gravity of its several parts_.\"[260]\n\nThe task of \"conceiving a better arrangement\" of the celestial orbs, and\nimproving the system of the universe generally, we shall leave to those\nwho imagine themselves possessed of that omniscience which comprehends\nall the facts and relations of the actual universe, and foreknows all\nthe details and relations of all possible universes so accurately as to\nbe able to pronounce upon their relative \"advantages.\" The arrogance of\nthese critics is certainly in startling and ludicrous contrast with the\naffected modesty which, on other occasions, restrains them from\n\"imputing any intentions to nature.\" It is quite enough for our purpose\nto know that the tracing of evidences of _design_ in those parts of\nnature accessible to our observation is an essentially different thing\nfrom the construction of a scheme of _optimism_ on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds\nwhich shall embrace a universe the larger portion of which is virtually\nbeyond the field of observation. We are conscious of possessing some\nrational data and some mental equipment for the former task, but for the\nlatter we feel utterly incompetent.[261]\n\n[Footnote 259: In a foot-note Comte adds: \"Nowadays, to minds\nfamiliarized betimes with the true astronomical philosophy, the heavens\ndeclare no other glory than that of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all\nthose who have contributed to the ascertainment of their laws.\" It seems\nremarkable that the great men who _ascertained_ these laws did not see\nthat the saying of the Psalmist was emptied of all meaning by their\ndiscoveries. No persons seem to have been more willing than these very\nmen named to ascribe all the glory to Him who _established_ these laws.\nKepler says: \"The astronomer, to whom God has given to see more clearly\nwith his inward eye, from what he has discovered, both can and will\nglorify God;\" and Newton says: \"This beautiful system of sun, planets,\ncomets could have its origin in no other way than by the purpose and\ncommand of an intelligent and powerful Being. We admire him on account\nof his perfections, we venerate and worship him on account of his\ngovernment.\"--Whewell's \"Astronomy and Physics,\" pp. 197, 198.]\n\n[Footnote 260: \"Positive Philosophy,\" vol. ii. pp. 36-38; Tulloch,\n\"Theism,\" p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 261: Chalmers's \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. pp. 117,\n118.]\n\nThe only plausible argument in the above quotation from Comte is, that\nthe whole phenomena of the solar system are adequately explained by the\nlaw of gravitation, without the intervention of any intelligent purpose.\nLet it be borne in mind that it is a fundamental principle of the\nPositive philosophy that all human knowledge is necessarily confined to\nphenomena _perceptible to sense_, and that the fast and highest\nachievement of human science is to observe and record \"the invariable\nrelations of resemblance and succession among phenomena.\" We can not\npossibly know any thing of even the existence of \"causes\" or \"forces\"\nlying back of phenomena, nor of \"reasons\" or \"purposes\" determining the\nrelations of phenomena. The \"law of gravitation\" must, therefore, be\nsimply the statement of a fact, the expression of an observed order of\nphenomena. But the simple statement of a fact is no _explanation_ of the\nfact. The formal expression of an observed order of succession among\nphenomena is no _explanation_ of that order. For what do we mean by an\nexplanation? Is it not a \"making plain\" to the understanding? It is, in\nshort, a complete answer to the questions _how_ is it so? and _why_ is\nit so? Now, if Comte denies to himself and to us all knowledge of\nefficient and final causation, if we are in utter ignorance of \"forces\"\noperating in nature, and of \"reasons\" for which things exist in nature,\nhe can not answer either question, and consequently nothing is\nexplained.\n\nPractically, however, Comte regards gravitation as a force. The order of\nthe solar system has been established and is still maintained by the\nmutual gravity of its several parts. We shall not stop here to note the\ninconsistency of his denying to us the knowledge of, even the existence\nof, force, and yet at the same time assuming to treat gravitation as a\nforce really adequate to the explanation of the _how_ and _why_ of the\nphenomena of the universe, without any reference to a supernatural will\nor an intelligent mind. The question with which we are immediately\nconcerned is whether gravitation _alone_ is adequate to the explanation\nof the phenomena of the heavens? A review _in extenso_ of Comte's answer\nto this question would lead us into all the inextricable mazes of the\nnebular hypothesis, and involve us in a more extended discussion than\nour space permits and our limited scientific knowledge justifies. For\nthe masses of the people the whole question of cosmical development\nresolves itself into \"a balancing of authorities;\" they are not in a\nposition to verify the reasonings for and against this theory by actual\nobservation of astral phenomena, and the application of mathematical\ncalculus; they are, therefore, guided by balancing in their own minds\nthe statements of the distinguished astronomers who, by the united\nsuffrages of the scientific world, are regarded as \"authorities.\" For\nus, at present, it is enough that the nebular hypothesis is rejected by\nsome of the greatest astronomers that have lived. We need only mention\nthe names of Sir William Herschel, Sir John Herschel, Prof. Nichol, Earl\nRosse, Sir David Brewster, and Prof. Whewell.\n\nBut if we grant that the nebular hypothesis is entitled to take rank as\nan established theory of the development of the solar system, it by no\nmeans proves that the solar system was formed without the intervention\nof intelligence and design. On this point we shall content ourselves\nwith quoting the words of one whose encyclop\u00e6dian knowledge was\nconfessedly equal to that of Comte, and who in candor and accuracy was\ncertainly his superior. Prof. Whewell, in his \"Astronomy and Physics,\"\nsays: \"This hypothesis by no means proves that the solar system was\nformed without the intervention of intelligence and design. It only\ntransfers our view of the skill exercised and the means employed to\nanother part of the work; for how came the sun and its atmosphere to\nhave such materials, such motions, such a constitution, and these\nconsequences followed from their primordial condition? How came the\nparent vapor thus to be capable of coherence, separation, contraction,\nsolidification? How came the laws of its motion, attraction, repulsion,\ncondensation, to be so fixed as to lead to a beautiful and harmonious\nsystem in the end? How came it to be neither too fluid nor too\ntenacious, to contract neither too quickly nor too slowly for the\nsuccessive formation of the several planetary bodies? How came that\nsubstance, which at one time was a luminous vapor, to be at a subsequent\nperiod solids and fluids of many various kinds? What but design and\nintelligence prepared and tempered this previously-existing element, so\nthat it should, by its natural changes, produce such an orderly\nsystem\"?[262] \"_The laws of motion alone will not produce the regularity\nwhich we admire in the motion of the heavenly bodies_. There must be an\noriginal adjustment of the system on which these laws are to act; a\nselection of the arbitrary quantities which they are to involve; a\nprimitive cause which shall dispose the elements in due relation to each\nother, in order that regular recurrence may accompany constant change,\nand that perpetual motion may be combined with perpetual\nstability.\"[263]\n\n[Footnote 262: \"Astronomy and Physics,\" p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 263: Chalmers's \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. p. 119.]\n\nThe harmony of the solar system in all its phenomena does not depend\nupon the operation of any _one_ law, but from the special adjustment of\nseveral laws. There are certain agents operating throughout the entire\nsystem which have different properties, and which require special\nadjustment to each other, in order to their beneficial operation. 1st.\nThere is _Gravitation,_ prevailing apparently through all space. But it\ndoes not prevail alone. It is a force whose function is to balance other\nforces of which we know little, except that these, again, are needed to\nbalance the force of gravitation. Each force, if left to itself, would\nbe the destruction of the universe. Were it not for the force of\ngravitation, the centrifugal forces which impel the planets would fling\nthem off into space. Were it not for these centrifugal forces, the force\nof gravitation would dash them against the sun. The ultimate fact of\nastronomical science, therefore, is not the law of gravitation, but the\n_adjustment_ between this law and other laws, so as to produce and\nmaintain the existing order.[264] 2d. There is _Light_, flowing from\nnumberless luminaries; and _Heat_, radiating everywhere from the warmer\nto the colder regions; and there are a number of adjustments needed in\norder to the beneficial operation of these agents. Suppose we grant that\nby merely mechanical causes the sun became the centre of our system, how\ndid it become also the _source of its vivifying influences_? \"How was\nthe fire deposited on this hearth? How was the candle placed on this\ncandlestick?\" 3d. There is an all-pervading _Ether_, through which light\nis transmitted, which offers resistance to the movement of the planetary\nand cometary bodies, and tends to a dissipation of mechanical energy,\nand which needs to be counter-balanced by well-adjusted arrangements to\nsecure the stability of the solar system. All this balancing of opposite\nproperties and forces carries our minds upward towards Him who holds the\nbalances in his hands, and to a Supreme Intelligence on whose\nadjustments and collocations the harmony and stability of the universe\ndepends.[265]\n\n[Footnote 264: Duke of Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" pp. 91, 92.]\n\n[Footnote 265: M'Cosh, \"Typical Forms and Special Ends,\" ch. xiii.]\n\nThe recognition of all teleology of organs in vegetable and animal\nphysiology is also persistently repudiated by this school. When Cuvier\nspeaks of the combination of organs in such order as to adapt the animal\nto the part which it has to play in nature, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire\nreplies, \"I know nothing of animals which have to play a part in\nnature.\" \"I have read, concerning fishes, that, because they live in a\nmedium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculated\nso as to give them the power of progression under these circumstances.\nBy this mode of reasoning, you would say of a man who makes use of\ncrutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having a\nleg paralyzed or amputated.[266] \"With a modesty which savors of\naffectation, he says, \"I ascribe no intentions to God, for I mistrust\nthe feeble powers of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go no\nfarther. I only pretend to the character of the historian of _what is_.\"\n\"I can not make Nature an intelligent being who does nothing in vain,\nwho acts by the shortest mode, who does all for the best.\"[267] All the\nsupposed consorting of means to ends which has hitherto been regarded as\nevidencing Intelligence is simply the result of \"the elective affinities\nof organic elements\" and \"the differentiation of organs\" consequent\nmainly upon exterior conditions. \"_Functions are a result, not an end_.\nThe animal undergoes the kind of life that his organs impose, and\nsubmits to the imperfections of his organization. The naturalist studies\nthe play of his apparatus, and if he has the right of admiring most of\nits parts, he has likewise that of showing the imperfection of other\nparts, and the practical uselessness of those which fulfill no\nfunctions.\"[268] And it is further claimed that there are a great many\nstructures which are clearly useless; that is, they fulfill no purpose\nat all. Thus there are monkeys, which have no thumbs for use, but only\nrudimental thumb-bones hid beneath the skin; the wingless bird of New\nZealand (Apteryx) has wing-bones similarly developed, which serve no\npurpose; young whalebone whales are born with teeth that never cut the\ngums, and are afterwards absorbed; and some sheep have horns turned\nabout their ears which fulfill no end. And inasmuch as there are some\norganisms in nature which serve no purpose of utility, it is argued\nthere is no design in nature; things are _used_ because there are\nantecedent conditions favorable for _use_, but that use is not the _end_\nfor which the organ exists. The true naturalist will never say, \"Birds\nhave wings given them _in order_ to fly;\" he will rather say, \"Birds fly\n_because_ they have wings.\" The doctrine of final causes must,\ntherefore, be abandoned.\n\n[Footnote 266: Whewell, \"History of Inductive Sciences,\" vol. ii. p.\n486.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Id., ib., vol. ii. p. 490.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Martin's \"Organic Unity in Animals and Vegetables,\" in M.\nQ. Review, January, 1863.]\n\nIt is hardly worth while to reply to the lame argument of Geoffroy,\nwhich needs a \"crutch\" for its support. The very illustration,\nundignified and irrelevant as it is, tells altogether against its\nauthor. For, first, the crutch is certainly a _contrivance_ designed for\nlocomotion; secondly, the length and strength and lightness of the\ncrutch are all matters of calculation and _adjustment_; and, thirdly,\nall the adaptations of the crutch are well-considered, in order to\nenable the lame man to walk; the function of the crutch is the final\ncause of its creation. This crutch is clearly out of place in Geoffroy's\nargument, and utterly breaks down. It is in its place in the\nteleological argument, and stands well, though it may not behave as well\nas the living limb. The understanding of a child can perceive that the\ndesign-argument does not assert that men were intended to have amputated\nlimbs, but that crutches are designed for those whose limbs are\nparalyzed or amputated.\n\nThe existence of useless members, of rudimentary and abortive limbs,\ndoes seem, at first sight, to be unfavorable to the idea of supremacy of\npurpose and all-pervading design. It should be remarked, however, that\nthis is an argument based upon our ignorance, and not upon our\nknowledge. It does not by any means follow that because we have\ndiscovered no reasons for their existence, therefore there are no\nreasons. Science, in enlarging its conquests of nature, is perpetually\ndiscovering the usefulness of arrangements of which our fathers were\nignorant, and the reasons of things which to their minds, were\nconcealed; and it ill becomes the men who so far \"mistrust their own\nfeeble powers\" as to be afraid of ascribing any intention to God or\nnature, to dogmatically affirm there is no purpose in the existence of\nany thing. And then we may ask, what right have these men to set up the\nidea of \"utility\" as the only standard to which the Creator must\nconform? How came they to know that God is a mere \"utilitarian;\" or, if\nthey do not believe in God, that nature is a miserable \"Benthamite?\" Why\nmay not the idea of beauty, of symmetry, of order, be a standard for the\nuniverse, as much as the idea of utility, or mere subordination to some\npractical end? May not conformity to one grand and comprehensive plan,\nsweeping over all nature, be perfectly compatible with the adaptation of\nindividual existences to the fulfillment of special ends? In civil\narchitecture we have conformity to a general plan; we have embellishment\nand ornament, and we have adaptation to a special purpose, all combined;\nwhy may not these all be combined in the architecture of the universe?\nThe presence of any one of these is sufficient to prove design, for mere\nornament or beauty is itself a purpose, an object, and an end. The\nconcurrence of all these is an overwhelming evidence of design. Wherever\nfound, they are universally recognized as the product of intelligence;\nthey address themselves at once to the intelligence of man, and they\nplace him in immediate relation to and in deepest sympathy with the\nIntelligence which gave them birth. He that formed the eye of man to\nsee, and the heart of man to admire beauty, shall He not delight in it?\nHe that gave the hand of man its cunning to create beauty, shall He not\nhimself work for it? And if man can and does combine both \"ornament\" and\n\"use\" in one and the same implement or machine, why should not the\nCreator of the world do the same? \"When the savage carves the handle of\nhis war-club, the immediate purpose of his carving is to give his own\nhand a firmer hold. But any shapeless scratches would be enough for\nthis. When he carves it in an elaborate pattern, he does so for the love\nof ornament, and to satisfy the sense of beauty.\" And so \"the harmonies,\non which all beauty depends, are so connected in nature that _use_ and\n_ornament_ may often both arise out of the same conditions.\"[269]\n\n[Footnote 269: Duke of Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" p. 203.]\n\nThe \"true naturalist,\" therefore, recognizes two great principles\npervading the universe--_a principle of order_--a unity of plan, and _a\nprinciple of special adaptation_, by which each object, though\nconstructed upon a general plan, is at the same time accommodated to the\nplace it has to occupy and the purpose it has to serve. In other words,\nthere is _homology of structure_ and _analogy of function_, conformity\nto _archetypal forms_ and _Teleology of organs_, in wonderful\ncombination. Now, in the Materialistic school, it has been the prevalent\npractice to set up the unity of plan in animal structures, in opposition\nto the principle of Final Causes: Morphology has been opposed to\nTeleology. But in nature there is no such opposition; on the contrary,\nthere is a beautiful co-ordination. The same bones, in different\nanimals, are made subservient to the widest possible diversity of\nfunctions. The same limbs are converted into fins, paddles, wings, legs,\nand arms. \"No comparative anatomist has the slightest hesitation in\nadmitting that the pectoral fin of a fish, the wing of a bird, the\npaddle of the dolphin, the fore-leg of a deer, the wing of a bat, and\nthe arm of a man, are the same organs, notwithstanding that their forms\nare so varied, and the uses to which they are applied so unlike each\nother.\"[270] All these are homologous in structure--they are formed\nafter an ideal archetype or model, but that model or type is variously\nmodified to adapt the animal to the sphere of life in which it is\ndestined to move, and the organ itself to the functions it has to\nperform, whether swimming, flying, walking, or burrowing, or that varied\nmanipulation of which the human hand is capable. These varied\nmodifications of the vertebrated type, for special purposes, are\nunmistakable examples of final causation. Whilst the silent members, the\nrudimental limbs instanced by Oken, Martins, and others--as fulfilling\nno purpose, and serving no end, exist in conformity to an ideal\narchetype on which the bony skeletons of all vertebrated animals are\nformed,[271] and which has never been departed from since time began.\nThis type, or model, or plan, is, however, itself an evidence of\n_design_ as much as the plan of a house. For to what standard are we\nreferring when we say that two limbs are morphologically the same? Is it\nnot an _ideal_ plan, a _mental_ pattern, a metaphysical conception? Now\nan _ideal_ implies a mind which preconceived the idea, and in which\nalone it really exists. It is only as \"an _order of Divine thought_\"\nthat the doctrine of animal homologies is at all intelligible; and\nHomology is, therefore, the science which traces the outward embodiment\nof a Divine Idea.[272] The principle of intentionality or final\ncausation, then, is not in any sense invalidated by the discovery of \"a\nunity of plan\" sweeping through the entire universe.\n\n[Footnote 270: Carpenter's \"Comparative Physiology,\" p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Agassiz, \"Essay on Classification,\" p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Whewell's \"History of Inductive Sciences,\" vol. i. p.\n644; \"The Reign of Law,\" p. 208; Agassiz, \"Essay on Classification,\" pp.\n9-11.]\n\nWe conclude that we are justly entitled to regard \"the principle of\nintentionality\" as a primary and necessary law of thought, under which\nwe can not avoid conceiving and describing the facts of the\nuniverse--_the special adaptation of means to ends necessarily implies\nmind_. Whenever and wherever we observe the adaptation of an organism to\nthe fulfillment of a special end, we can not avoid conceiving of that\n_end_ as foreseen and premeditated, the _means_ as selected and adjusted\nwith a view to that end, and creative energy put forth to secure the\nend--all which is the work of intelligence and will.[273] And we can not\ndescribe these facts of nature, so as to render that account\nintelligible to other minds, without using such terms as \"contrivance,\"\n\"purpose,\" \"adaptation,\" \"design.\" A striking illustration of this may\nbe found in Darwin's volume \"On the Fertilization of Orchids.\" We select\nfrom his volume with all the more pleasure because he is one of the\nwriters who enjoins \"caution in ascribing intentions to nature.\" In one\nsentence he says: \"The _Labellum_ is developed into a long nectary, _in\norder_ to attract _Lepidoptera_; and we shall presently give reasons for\nsuspecting the nectar is _purposely_ so lodged that it can be sucked\nonly slowly, _in order_ to give time for the curious chemical quality of\nthe viscid matter settling hard and dry\" (p. 29). Of one particular\nstructure he says: \"This _contrivance_ of the guiding ridges may be\ncompared to the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a thread\ninto the eye of a needle.\" The notion that every organism has a use or\npurpose seems to have guided him in his discoveries. \"The strange\nposition of the _Labellum_, perched on the summit of the column, ought\nto have shown me that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have\nscorned the notion that the _Labellum_ was thus placed _for no good\npurpose_. I neglected this plain guide, and for a long time completely\nfailed to understand the flower\" (p. 262).[274]\n\n[Footnote 273: Carpenter's \"Principles of Comparative Physiology,\" p.\n723.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Edinburgh Review, October, 1862; article, \"The\nSupernatural.\"]\n\nSo that the assumption of final causes has not, as Bacon affirms, \"led\nmen astray\" and \"prejudiced further discovery;\" on the contrary, it has\nhad a large share in every discovery in anatomy and physiology, zoology\nand botany. The use of every organ has been discovered by starting from\nthe assumption _that it must have some use_. The belief in a creative\npurpose led Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood. He says:\n\"When I took notice that the valves in the veins of so many parts of the\nbody were so placed that they gave a free passage to the blood towards\nthe heart, but opposed the passage of the venal blood the contrary way,\nI was incited to imagine that so provident a cause as Nature has not\nplaced so many valves _without design_, and no design seemed more\nprobable than the circulation of the blood.\"[275] The wonderful\ndiscoveries in Zoology which have immortalized the name of Cuvier were\nmade under the guidance of this principle. He proceeds on the\nsupposition not only that animal forms have _some_ plan, _some_ purpose,\nbut that they have an intelligible plan, a discoverable purpose. At the\noutset of his \"_R\u00e8gne Animal_\" he says: \"Zoology has a principle of\nreasoning which is peculiar to it, and which it employs to advantage on\nmany occasions; that is, the principle of the conditions of existence,\ncommonly called final causes.\"[276] The application of this principle\nenabled him to understand and arrange the structures of animals with\nastonishing clearness and completeness of order; and to restore the\nforms of extinct animals which are found in the rocks, in a manner which\nexcited universal admiration, and has commanded universal assent.\nIndeed, as Professor Whewell remarks, at the conclusion of his \"History\nof the Inductive Sciences,\" \"those who have been discoverers in science\nhave generally had minds, the disposition of which was to believe in an\n_intelligent Maker_ of the universe, and that the scientific\nspeculations which produced an opposite tendency were generally those\nwhich, though they might deal familiarly with known physical truths, and\nconjecture boldly with regard to unknown, do not add to the number of\nsolid generalizations.\"[277]\n\n[Footnote 275: \"History of Inductive Science,\" vol. ii. p. 449.]\n\n[Footnote 276: \"History of Inductive Science,\" vol. ii. p. 2, Eng. ed.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 491. A list of the \"great discoverers\"\nis given in his \"Astronomy and Physics,\" bk. iii. ch. v.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE UNKNOWN GOD (_continued_).\n\nIS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? (_continued_).\n\n\n      \"The faith which can not stand unless buttressed by\n      contradictions is built upon the sand. The profoundest faith\n      is faith in the unity of truth. If there is found any\n      conflict in the results of a right reason, no appeal to\n      practical interests, or traditionary authority, or\n      intuitional or theological faith, can stay the flood of\n      skepticism.\"--ABBOT.\n\nIn the previous chapter we have considered the answers to this question\nwhich are given by the Idealistic and Materialistic schools; it devolves\nupon us now to review (iii.) the position of the school of _Natural\nRealism_ or _Natural Dualism_, at the head of which stands Sir William\nHamilton.\n\nIt is admitted by this school that philosophic knowledge is \"the\nknowledge of effects as dependent on their causes,\"[278] and \"of\nqualities as inherent in substances.\"[279]\n\n[Footnote 278: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.]\n\n1. _As to Events and Causes_.--\"Events do not occur isolated, apart, by\nthemselves; they occur and are conceived by us only in connection. Our\nobservation affords us no example of a phenomenon which is not an\neffect; nay, our thought can not even realize to itself the possibility\nof a phenomenon without a cause. By the necessity we are under of\nthinking some cause for every phenomenon, and by our original ignorance\nof what particular causes belong to what particular effects, it is\nrendered impossible for us to acquiesce in the mere knowledge of the\nfact of the phenomenon; on the contrary, we are determined, we are\nnecessitated to regard each phenomenon as _only partially known until we\ndiscover the causes_ on which it depends for its existence.[280]\nPhilosophic knowledge is thus, in its widest acceptation, the knowledge\nof effects as dependent on causes. Now what does this imply? In the\nfirst place, as every cause to which we can ascend is only an effect, it\nfollows that it is the scope, that is, the aim, of philosophy to trace\nup the series of effects and causes until we arrive at _causes which are\nnot in themselves effects_,\"[281]--that is, to ultimate and final\ncauses. And then, finally, \"Philosophy, as the knowledge of effects in\ntheir causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of ultimate or\nfinal causes, but towards _one_ alone.\"[282]\n\n[Footnote 280: Ibid., vol. i. p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 281: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 282: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.]\n\n2. _As to Qualities and Substance, or Phenomena and Reality_.--As\nphenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled, by the\nconstitution of our nature, to think them conjoined in and by something;\nand as they are phenomena, we can not think them phenomena of nothing,\nbut must regard them as properties or qualities of something.[283] Now\nthat which manifests its qualities--in other words, that in which the\nappearing causes inhere, that to which they belong--is called their\n_subject_, or _substance_, or _substratum_.[284] The subject of one\ngrand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, extension, solidity, figure,\netc.) is called _matter_, or _material substance_. The subject of the\nother grand series of phenomena (as, _e.g._, thought, feeling, volition,\netc.) is termed _mind_, or _mental substance_. We may, therefore, lay it\ndown as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate\nfact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the _ego_ in relation and\ncontrast to the _non-ego_, and a knowledge of the _non-ego_ in relation\nand contrast to the _ego_[285] Natural Dualism thus establishes the\nexistence of two worlds of _mind_ and _matter_ on the immediate\nknowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the Cosmothetic\nIdealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediate\nknowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our _immediate\nknowledge of the existence of matter_.[286]\n\n[Footnote 283: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 285: Ibid., vol. i. p. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 286: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 292, 295.]\n\nThe obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that we have an\nimmediate knowledge of the \"_existence_ of matter\" as well as of \"the\n_phenomena_ of matter;\" that is, we know \"_substance_\" as immediately\nand directly as we know \"_qualities_.\" Phenomena are known only as\ninherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting its\nqualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we can\nnever know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in one\nconcrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality is\nknown no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate,\npresentative \"face to face\" knowledge of matter and mind in every act of\nconsciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his\n\"Philosophy of Perception.\"[287] In the course of the discussion he\nstarts the question, \"_Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally\nimmediate?_\" His answer to this question may be condensed in the\nfollowing sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of _mind_\nthere is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The\nproblem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the\nqualities of _matter_. Now, says Hamilton, \"if we interrogate\nconsciousness concerning the point in question, the response is\ncategorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am conscious\nof _myself_ as a perceiving _subject_, and of an external _reality_ as\nthe object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same\nindivisible amount of intuition.\"[288] Again he says, \"I have frequently\nasserted that in perception we are conscious of the external object,\nimmediately and _in itself_.\" \"If, then, the veracity of consciousness\nbe unconditionally admitted--_if the intuitive knowledge of matter and\nmind_, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken as\ntruths,\" the doctrine of Natural Realism is established, and, \"without\nany hypothesis or demonstration, the _reality of mind_ and the _reality\nof matter_.\"[289]\n\n[Footnote 287: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, part ii.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Ibid., p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Ibid., pp. 34, 182.]\n\nNow, after these explicit statements that we have an intuitive knowledge\nof matter and mind--a direct and immediate consciousness of self as a\nreal, \"self-subsisting entity,\" and a knowledge of \"an external reality,\nimmediately and _in itself_,\" it seems unaccountably strange that\nHamilton should assert \"_that all human knowledge, consequently all\nhuman philosophy, is only of the Relative or Phenomenal_;\"[290] and that\n\"_of existence absolutely and in itself we know nothing_.\"[291] Whilst\nteaching that the proper sphere and aim of philosophy is to trace\nsecondary causes up to ultimate or first causes, and that it\n_necessarily tends_ towards one First and Ultimate Cause, he at the same\ntime asserts that \"first causes do not lie within the reach of\nphilosophy,\"[292] and that it can never attain to the knowledge of the\nFirst Cause.[293] \"The Infinite God can not, by us, be comprehended,\nconceived, or thought.\"[294] God, as First Cause, as infinite, as\nunconditioned, as eternal, is to us absolutely \"_The Unknown_.\" The\nscience of Real Being--of Being _in se_--of self-subsisting entities, is\ndeclared to be impossible. All science is only of the phenomenal, the\nconditioned, the relative. Ontology is a delusive dream. Thus, after\npages of explanations and qualifications, of affirmations and denials,\nwe find Hamilton virtually assuming the same position as Comte and\nMill--_all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena_.\n\n[Footnote 290: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 136]\n\n[Footnote 291: Ibid., vol. i. p. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 292: Ibid., vol. i. p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Ibid., vol. i. p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 294: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 375.]\n\nIt has been supposed that the chief glory of Sir William Hamilton rested\nupon his able exposition and defense of the doctrine of Natural Realism.\nThere are, however, indications in his writings that he regarded \"the\nPhilosophy of the Conditioned\" as his grand achievement. The Law of the\nConditioned had \"not been generalized by any previous philosopher;\" and,\nin laying down that law, he felt that he had made a new and important\ncontribution to speculative thought.\n\nThe principles upon which this philosophy is based are:\n\n1. _The Relativity of all Human Knowledge._--Existence is not cognized\nabsolutely and in itself, but only under special modes which are related\nto our faculties, and, in fact, determined by these faculties\nthemselves. All knowledge, therefore, is _relative_--that is, it is of\nphenomena only, and of phenomena \"under modifications determined by our\nown faculties.\" Now, as the Absolute is that which exists out of all\nrelation either to phenomena or to our faculties of knowledge, it can\nnot possibly be _known_.\n\n2. _The Conditionality of all Thinking_.--Thought necessarily supposes\nconditions. \"To think is to condition; and conditional limitation is the\nfundamental law of the possibility of thought. As the eagle can not\nout-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is\nsupported, so the mind can not transcend the sphere of limitation within\nand through which the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is\nonly of the conditioned, because, as we have said, to think is to\ncondition.\"[295] Now the Infinite is the unlimited, the unconditioned,\nand as such can not possibly be _thought_.\n\n3. _The notion of the Infinite--the Absolute, as entertained by man, is\na mere \"negation of thought._\"--By this Hamilton does not mean that the\nidea of the Infinite is a negative idea. \"The Infinite and the Absolute\nare _only_ the names of two counter _imbecilities_ of the human\nmind\"[296]--that is, a mental inability to conceive an absolute\nlimitation, or an infinite illimitation; an absolute commencement, or an\ninfinite non-commencement. In other words, of the absolute and infinite\nwe have no conception at all, and, consequently, no knowledge.[297]\n\nThe grand law which Hamilton generalizes from the above is, \"_that the\nconceivable is in every relation bounded by the inconceivable_.\" Or,\nagain, \"The conditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or\npoles; and these extremes or poles are each of them unconditioned, each\nof them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or contradictory of the\nother.\"[298] This is the celebrated \"Law of the Conditioned.\"\n\n[Footnote 295: \"Discussions,\" p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 296: Ibid., p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 297: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. pp. 368, 373.]\n\n[Footnote 298: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 373.]\n\nIn attempting a brief criticism of \"the Philosophy of the Conditioned,\"\nwe may commence by inquiring:\n\nI. _What is the real import and significance of the doctrine \"that all\nhuman knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal_?\"\n\nHamilton calls this \"the great axiom\" of philosophy. That we may\ndistinctly comprehend its meaning, and understand its bearing on the\nsubject under discussion, we must ascertain the sense in which he uses\nthe words \"_phenomenal_\" and \"_relative._\" The importance of an exact\nterminology is fully appreciated by our author; and accordingly, in\nthree Lectures (VIII., IX., X.), he has given a full explication of the\nterms most commonly employed in philosophic discussions. Here the word\n\"_phenomenon_\" is set down as the necessary \"_correlative_\" of the word\n\"_subject_\" or \"_substance_.\" \"These terms can not be explained apart,\nfor each is correlative of the other, each can be comprehended only in\nand through its correlative. The term '_subject_' is used to denote the\nunknown (?) basis which lies under the various _phenomena_ or properties\nof which we become aware, whether in our external or internal\nexperience.\"[299] \"The term '_relative_' is _opposed_ to the term\n'_absolute_;' therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I\nvirtually assert that we know nothing absolutely, that is, _in and for\nitself, and without relation to us and our faculties_.\"[300] Now, in the\nphilosophy of Sir William Hamilton, \"the absolute\" is defined as \"that\nwhich is aloof from relation\"--\"that which is out of all relation.\"[301]\nThe _absolute_ can not, therefore, be \"_the correlative_\" of the\nconditioned--can not stand in any relation to the phenomenal. The\n_subject,_ however, is the necessary correlative of the phenomenal, and,\nconsequently, the subject and the absolute are not identical.\nFurthermore, Hamilton tells us the subject _may be comprehended_ in and\nthrough its correlative--the phenomenon; but the absolute, being aloof\nfrom all relation, can not be comprehended or conceived at all. \"The\nsubject\" and \"the absolute\" are, therefore, not synonymous terms; and,\nif they are not synonymous, then their antithetical terms, \"phenomenal\"\nand \"relative,\" can not be synonymous.\n\n[Footnote 299: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 300: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 301: \"Discussions,\" p. 21.]\n\nIt is manifest, however, that Hamilton does employ these terms as\nsynonymous, and this we apprehend is the first false step in his\nphilosophy of the conditioned. \"All our knowledge is of the relative\n_or_ phenomenal.\" Throughout the whole of Lectures VIII. and IX., in\nwhich he explains the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge,\nthese terms are used as precisely analogous. Now, in opposition to this,\nwe maintain that the relative is not always the phenomenal. A thing may\nbe \"in relation\" and yet not be a phenomenon. \"The subject or substance\"\nmay be, and really is, on the admission of Hamilton himself,\n_correlated_ to the phenomenon. The ego, \"the conscious _subject_\"[302]\nas a \"_self-subsisting entity_\" is necessarily related to the phenomena\nof thought, feeling, etc.; but no one would repudiate the idea that the\nconscious subject is a mere phenomenon, or \"series of phenomena,\" with\nmore indignation than Hamilton. Notwithstanding the contradictory\nassertion, \"that the _subject_ is unknown,\" he still teaches, with equal\npositiveness, \"that in every act of perception I am conscious of self,\nas a perceiving _subject.\"_ And still more explicitly he says: \"As\nclearly as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I conscious, at\nevery moment of my existence, that the conscious Ego is not itself a\nmere modification [a phenomenon], nor a series of modifications\n[phenomena], but that it is itself different from all its modifications,\nand a _self-subsisting entity_.\"[303] Again: \"Thought is possible only\nin and through the consciousness of Self. The Self, the I, is recognized\nin every act of intelligence as the _subject_ to which the act belongs.\nIt is I that perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, etc.; these\nspecial modes are all only the phenomena of the I.\"[304] We are,\ntherefore, conscious of the _subject_ in the most immediate, and direct,\nand intuitive manner, and the subject of which we are conscious can not\nbe \"_unknown_.\" We regret that so distinguished a philosophy should deal\nin such palpable contradictions; but it is the inevitable consequence of\nviolating that fundamental principle of philosophy on which Hamilton so\nfrequently and earnestly insists, viz., \"that the testimony of\nconsciousness must be accepted in all its integrity\".\n\n[Footnote 302: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton (edited by O.W.\nWight), p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 303: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Ibid., vol. i. p. 166.]\n\nIt is thus obvious that, with proper qualifications, we may admit _the\nrelativity of human knowledge_, and yet at the same time reject the\ndoctrine of Hamilton, _that all human knowledge is only of the\nphenomenal_.\n\n\"The relativity of human knowledge,\" like most other phrases into which\nthe word \"relative\" enters, is vague, and admits of a variety of\nmeanings. If by this phrase is meant \"that we can not know objects\nexcept as related to our faculties, or as our faculties are related to\nthem,\" we accept the statement, but regard it as a mere truism leading\nto no consequences, and hardly worth stating in words. It is simply\nanother way of saying that, in order to an object's being known, it must\ncome within the range of our intellectual vision, and that we can only\nknow as much as we are capable of knowing. Or, if by this phrase is\nmeant \"that we can only know things by and through the phenomena they\npresent,\" we admit this also, for we can no more know substances apart\nfrom their properties, than we can know qualities apart from the\nsubstances in which they inhere. Substances can be known only in and\nthrough their phenomena. Take away the properties, and the thing has no\nlonger any existence. Eliminate extension, form, density, etc., from\nmatter, and what have you left? \"The thing in itself,\" apart from its\nqualities, is nothing. Or, again, if by the relativity of knowledge is\nmeant \"that all consciousness, all thought are relative,\" we accept this\nstatement also. To conceive, to reflect, to know, is to deal with\ndifference and relation; the relation of subject and object; the\nrelation of objects among themselves; the relation of phenomena to\nreality, of becoming to being. The reason of man is unquestionably\ncorrelated to that which is beyond phenomena; it is able to apprehend\nthe necessary relation between phenomena and being, extension and space,\nsuccession and time, event and cause, the finite and the infinite. We\nmay thus admit the _relative character of human thought_, and at the\nsame time deny that it is an ontological disqualification.[305]\n\nIt is not, however, in any of these precise forms that Hamilton holds\nthe doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. He assumes a middle place\nbetween Reid and Kant, and endeavors to blend the subjective idealism of\nthe latter with the realism of the former. \"He identifies the\n_phenomenon_ of the German with the _quality_ of the British\nphilosophy,\"[306] and asserts, as a regulative law of thought, that the\nquality implies the substance, and the phenomenon the noumenon, but\nmakes the substratum or noumenon (the object in itself) unknown and\nunknowable. The \"phenomenon\" of Kant was, however, something essentially\ndifferent from the \"quality\" of Reid. In the philosophy of Kant,\n_phenomenon_ means an object as we envisage or represent it to\nourselves, in opposition to the _noumenon_, or a thing as it is in\nitself. The phenomenon is composed, in part, of subjective elements\nsupplied by the mind itself; as regards intuition, the forms of space\nand time; as regards thought, the categories of Quantity, Quality,\nRelation, and Modality. To perceive a thing in itself would be to\nperceive it neither in space nor in time. To think a thing in itself\nwould be not to think it under any of the categories. The phenomenal is\nthus the product of the inherent laws of our own constitution, and, as\nsuch, is the sum and limit of all our knowledge.[307]\n\n[Footnote 305: Martineau's \"Essays,\" p. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 306: M'Cosh's \"Defense of Fundamental Truth,\" p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 307: Mansel's \"Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant,\" pp. 21,\n22.]\n\nThis, in its main features, is evidently the doctrine propounded by\nHamilton. The special modes in which existence is cognizable\" are\npresented to, and known by, the mind _under modifications determined by\nthe faculties themselves_.\"[308] This doctrine he illustrates by the\nfollowing supposition: \"Suppose the total object of consciousness in\nperception is=12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6,\nthe material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some\nrude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception.\"[309] The\nconclusion at which Hamilton arrives, therefore, is that things are not\nknown to us as they exist, but simply as they appear, and as our minds\nare capable of perceiving them.\n\n[Footnote 308: Hamilton's \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 309: Hamilton's \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 129;\nand also vol. i. p. 147.]\n\nLet us test the validity of this majestic deliverance. No man is\njustified in making this assertion unless, 1. He knows things as they\nexist; 2. He knows things not only as they exist but as they appear; 3.\nHe is able to compare things as they exist with the same things as they\nappear. Now, inasmuch as Sir William Hamilton affirms we do not know\nthings as they exist, but only as they appear, how can he know that\nthere is any difference between things as they exist and as they appear?\nWhat is this \"_thing in itself_\" about which Hamilton has so much to\nsay, and yet about which he professes to know nothing? We readily\nunderstand what is meant by the _thing_; it is the object as existing--a\nsubstance manifesting certain characteristic qualities. But what is\nmeant by _in itself_? There can be no _in itself_ besides or beyond the\n_thing_. If Hamilton means that \"the thing itself\" is the thing apart\nfrom all relation, and devoid of all properties or qualities, we do not\nacknowledge any such thing. A thing apart from all relation, and devoid\nof all qualities, is simply pure nothing, if such a solecism may be\npermitted. With such a definition of Being _in se_, the logic of Hegel\nis invincible, \"Being and Nothing are identical.\"\n\nAnd now, if \"the thing in itself\" be, as Hamilton says it is, absolutely\n_unknown_, how can he affirm or deny any thing in regard to it? By what\nright does he prejudge a hidden reality, and give or refuse its\npredicates; as, for example, that it is conditioned or unconditioned, in\nrelation or aloof from relation, finite or infinite? Is it not plain\nthat, in declaring a thing in its inmost nature or essence to be\ninscrutable, it is assumed to be partially _known_? And it is obvious,\nnotwithstanding some unguarded expressions to the contrary, that\nHamilton does regard \"the thing in itself\" as partially known. \"The\nexternal reality\" is, at least, six elements out of twelve in the \"total\nobject of consciousness.\"[310] The primary qualities of matter are known\nas in the things themselves; \"they develop themselves with rigid\nnecessity out of the simple datum of _substance occupying space_.\"[311]\n\"The Primary Qualities are apprehended as they are in bodies\"--\"they are\nthe attributes of _body as body_,\" and as such \"are known immediately in\nthemselves,\"[312] as well as mediately by their effects upon us. So that\nwe not only know by direct consciousness certain properties of things as\nthey exist in things themselves, but we can also deduce them in an _\u00e0\npriori_ manner. \"The bare notion of matter being given, the Primary\nQualities may be deduced _\u00e0 priori_; they being, in fact, only\nevolutions of the conditions which that notion necessarily implies.\" If,\nthen, we know the qualities of things as \"in the things themselves,\"\n\"the things themselves\" must also be, at least, partially known; and\nHamilton can not consistently assert the relativity of _all_ knowledge.\nEven if it be granted that our cognitions of objects are only in part\ndependent on the objects themselves, and in part on elements superadded\nby our organism, or by our minds, it can not warrant the assertion that\nall our knowledge, but only the part so added, is relative. \"The\nadmixture of the relative element not only does not take away the\nabsolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our author is\nright) prevent us from recognizing it. The confusion, according to him,\nis not inextricable. It is for us 'to analyze and distinguish what\nelements,' in an 'act of knowledge,' are contributed by the object, and\nwhat by the organs or by the mind.\"[313]\n\n[Footnote 310: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 311: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, p. 357]\n\n[Footnote 312: Ibid., pp. 377, 378.]\n\n[Footnote 313: Mill's \"Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy,\" vol. i. p.\n44.]\n\nAdmitting the relative character of human thought as a psychological\nfact, Mr. Martineau has conclusively shown that this law, instead of\nvisiting us with disability to transcend phenomena, _operates as a\nrevelation of what exists beyond_. \"The finite body cut out before our\nvisual perception, or embraced by the hands, lies as an island in the\nemptiness around, and without comparative reference to this can not be\nrepresented: the same experience which gives us the definite object\ngives us also the infinite space; and both terms--the limited appearance\nand the unlimited ground--are apprehended with equal certitude and\nclearness, and furnished with names equally susceptible of distinct use\nin predication and reasoning. The transient successions, for instance,\nthe strokes of a clock, which we count, present themselves to us as\ndotted out upon a line of permanent duration; of which, without them, we\nshould have no apprehension, but which as their condition, is\nunreservedly known.\"[314]\n\n\"What we have said with regard to space and time applies equally to the\ncase of Causation. Here, too, the finite offered to perception\nintroduces to an Infinite supplied by thought. As a definite body\nreveals also the space around, and an interrupted succession exhibits\nthe uniform time beneath, so does the passing phenomenon demand for\nitself a power beneath. The space, and time, and power, not being part\nof the thing perceived, but its conditions, are guaranteed to us,\ntherefore, on the warrant, not of sense, but of intellect.\"[315]\n\n\"We conclude, then, on reviewing these examples of Space, and Time, and\nCausation, that ontological ideas introducing us to certain fixed\nentities belong no less to our knowledge than scientific ideas of\nphenomenal disposition and succession.\"[316] In these instances of\nrelation between a phenomenon given in perception and an entity as a\nlogical condition, the correlatives are on a perfect equality of\nintellectual validity, and the relative character of human thought is\nnot an ontological disqualification, but a cognitive power.\n\n[Footnote 314: \"Essays,\" pp. 193,194.]\n\n[Footnote 315: Ibid., p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Ibid., p. 195.]\n\nThere is a thread of fallacy running through the whole of Hamilton's\nreasonings, consequent upon a false definition of the Absolute at the\noutset. The Absolute is defined as _that which exists in and by itself,\naloof from and out of all relation_. An absolute, as thus defined, does\nnot and can not exist; it is a pure abstraction, and, in fact, a pure\nnon-entity. \"The Absolute expresses perfect independence both in being\nand in action, and is applicable to God as self-existent.\"[317] It may\nmean the absence of all _necessary_ relation, but it does not mean the\nabsence of _all_ relation. If God can not _voluntarily_ call a finite\nexistence into being, and thus stand in the relation of cause, He is\ncertainly under the severest limitation. But surely that is not a limit\nwhich substitutes choice for necessity. To be unable to know God out of\nall relation--that is, apart from his attributes, apart from his created\nuniverse, is not felt by us to be any privation at all. A God without\nattributes, and out of all relations, is for us no God at all. God as a\nbeing of unlimited perfection, as infinitely wise and good, as the\nunconditioned cause of all finite being, and, consequently, as\nvoluntarily related to nature and humanity, we can and do know; this is\nthe living and true God. The God of a false philosophy is not the true\nGod; the pure abstractions of Hegel and Hamilton are negations, and not\nrealities.\n\n2. We proceed to consider the second fundamental principle of Hamilton's\nphilosophy of the conditioned, viz., that \"conditional limitation is the\nfundamental law of the possibility of thought,\" and that thought\nnecessarily imposes conditions on its object.\n\n\"Thought,\" says Hamilton, \"can not transcend consciousness:\nconsciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an\nobject known only in correlation, and _mutually limiting each\nother_\"[318] Thought necessarily supposes conditions; \"to think is\nsimply to condition,\" that is, to predicate limits; and as the infinite\nis the unlimited, it can not be thought. The very attempt to think the\ninfinite renders it finite; therefore there can be no infinite _in\nthought_, and, consequently, the infinite can not be known.\n\n[Footnote 317: Calderwood's \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 318: \"Discussions,\" p. 21.]\n\nIf by \"the infinite in thought\" is here meant the infinite compassed or\ncontained in thought, we readily grant that the finite can not contain\nthe infinite; it is a simple truism which no one has ever been so\nfoolish as to deny. Even Cousin is not so unwise as to assert the\nabsolutely comprehensibility of God. \"In order absolutely to comprehend\nthe Infinite, it is necessary to have an infinite power of\ncomprehension, and this is not granted to us.\"[319] A finite mind can\nnot have \"an infinite thought.\" But it by no means follows that, because\nwe can not have infinite thought, we can have no clear and definite\nthought of or concerning the Infinite. We have a precise and definite\nidea of infinitude; we can define the idea; we can set it apart without\ndanger of being confounded with another, and we can reason concerning\nit. There is nothing we more certainly and intuitively know than that\nspace is infinite, and yet we can not comprehend or grasp within the\ncompass of our thought the infinite space. We can not form an _image_ of\ninfinite space, can not traverse it in perception, or represent it by\nany combination of numbers; but we can have the _thought_ of it as an\nidea of Reason, and can argue concerning it with precision and\naccuracy.[320] Hamilton has an idea of the Infinite; he defines it; he\nreasons concerning it; he says \"we must believe in the infinity of God.\"\nBut how can he define the Infinite unless he possesses some knowledge,\nhowever limited, of the infinite Being? How can he believe in the\ninfinity of God if he has no definite idea of infinitude? He can not\nreason about, can not affirm or deny any thing concerning, that of which\nhe knows absolutely nothing.\n\n[Footnote 319: \"Lectures on History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 320: \"To form an _image_ of any infinitude--be it of time or\nspace [or power]; to go mentally through it by successive steps of\nrepresentation--is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in\nour finite perception and experience. But to have the _thought_ of it as\nan idea of the reason, not of the phantasy, and assign that thought a\nconstituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasonings, appears to\nus as not only possible, but inevitable.\"--Martineau's \"Essays,\" p.\n205.]\n\nThe grand logical barrier which Hamilton perpetually interposes to all\npossible cognition of God _as infinite_ is, that to think is to\ncondition--to limit; and as the Infinite is the unconditioned, the\nunlimited, therefore \"the Infinite can not be _thought_.\" We grant at\nonce that all human thought is limited and finite, but, at the same\ntime, we emphatically deny that the limitation of our thought imposes\nany conditions or limits upon the object of thought. No such affirmation\ncan be consistently made, except on the Hegelian hypothesis that\n\"Thought and Being are identical;\" and this is a maxim which Hamilton\nhimself repudiates. Our thought does not create, neither does it impose\nconditions upon, any thing.\n\nThere is a lurking sophism in the whole phraseology of Hamilton in\nregard to this subject. He is perpetually talking about \"thinking a\nthing\"--\"thinking the Infinite.\" Now we do not think a thing, but we\nthink _of_ or _concerning_ a thing. We do not think a man, neither does\nour thought impose any conditions upon the man, so that he must be as\nour thought conceives or represents him; but our thought is of the man,\nconcerning or about the man, and is only so far true and valid as it\nconforms to the objective reality. And so we do not \"think the\nInfinite;\" that is, our thought neither contains nor conditions the\nInfinite Being, but our thoughts are _about_ the Infinite One; and if we\ndo not think of Him as a being of infinite perfection, our thought is\nneither worthy, nor just, nor true.[321]\n\n[Footnote 321: Calderwood's \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" pp. 255, 256.]\n\nBut we are told the law of all thought and of all being is\ndetermination; consequently, negation of some quality or some\npotentiality; whereas the Infinite is \"_the One and the All_\" (ti En kai\nPyn),[322] or, as Dr. Mansel, the disciple and annotator of Hamilton,\naffirms, \"the sum of all reality,\" and \"the sum of all possible modes of\nbeing.\"[323] The Infinite, as thus defined, must include in itself all\nbeing, and all modes of being, actual and possible, not even excepting\nevil. And this, let it be observed, Dr. Mansel has the hardihood to\naffirm. \"If the Absolute and the Infinite is an object of human\nconception at all, this, and none other, is the conception\nrequired.\"[324] \"The Infinite Whole,\" as thus defined, can not be\nthought, and therefore it is argued the Infinite God can not be known.\nSuch a doctrine shocks our moral sense, and we shrink from the thought\nof an Infinite which includes evil. There is certainly a moral\nimpropriety, if not a logical impossibility, in such a conception of\nGod.\n\n[Footnote 322: Hamilton's \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" Appendix, vol. ii.\np. 531.]\n\n[Footnote 323: \"Limits of Religious Thought,\" p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 324: Ibid.]\n\nThe fallacy of this reasoning consists in confounding a _supposed_\nQuantitative Infinite with _the_ Qualitative Infinite--the totality of\nexistence with the infinitely perfect One. \"Qualitative infinity is a\nsecondary predicate; that is, the attribute of an attribute, and is\nexpressed by the adverb _infinitely_ rather than the adjective\n_infinite_. For instance, it is a strict use of language to say, that\nspace is infinite, but it is an elliptical use of language to say, God\nis infinite. Precision of language would require us to say, God is\ninfinitely good, wise, and great; or God is good, and his goodness is\ninfinite. The distinction may seem trivial, but it is based upon an\nimportant difference between the infinity of space and time on the one\nhand, and the infinity of God on the other. Neither philosophy nor\ntheology can afford to disregard the difference. Quantitative Infinity\nis illimitation by _quantity_. Qualitative Infinity is illimitation by\n_degree_. Quantity and degree alike imply finitude, and are categories\nof the finite alone. The danger of arguing from the former kind of\ninfinitude to the latter can not be overstated. God alone possesses\nQualitative Infinity, which is strictly synonymous with _absolute\nperfection_; and the neglect of the distinction between this and\nQuantitative Infinity, leads irresistibly to pantheistic and\nmaterialistic notions. Spinozism is possible only by the elevation of\n'infinite extension' to the dignity of a divine attribute. Dr. Samuel\nClarke's identification of God's immensity with space has been shown by\nMartin to ultimate in Pantheism. From ratiocinations concerning the\nincomprehensibility of infinite space and time, Hamilton and Mansel pass\nat once to conclusions concerning the incomprehensibility of God. The\ninconsequence of all such arguments is absolute; and if philosophy\ntolerates the transference of spatial or temporal analogies to the\nnature of God, she must reconcile herself to the negation of his\npersonality and spirituality.\"[325] An Infinite Being, quite remote from\nthe notion of _quantity_, may and does exist; which, on the one hand,\ndoes not include finite existence, and, on the other hand, does not\nrender the finite impossible to thought. Without contradiction they may\ncoexist, and be correlated.\n\nThe thought will have already suggested itself to the mind of the reader\nthat for Hamilton to assert that the Infinite, as thus defined (the One\nand the All), is absolutely unknown, is certainly the greatest\nabsurdity, for in that case nothing can be known. This Infinite must be\nat least partially known, or all human knowledge is reduced to zero. To\nthe all-inclusive Infinite every thing affirmative belongs, not only to\nbe, but to be known. To claim it for being, yet deny it to thought, is\nthus impossible. The Infinite, which includes all real existence, is\ncertainly possible to cognition.\n\nThe whole argument as regards the conditionating nature of all thought\nis condensed into four words by Spinoza--\"_Omnis determinatio est\nnegatio_;\" all determination is negation. Nothing can be more arbitrary\nor more fallacious than this principle. It arises from the confusion of\ntwo things essentially different--_the limits of a being_, and _its\ndeterminate and distinguishing characteristics_. The limit of a being is\nits imperfection; the determination of a being is its perfection. The\nless a thing is determined, the more it sinks in the scale of being; the\nmost determinate being is the most perfect being. \"In this sense God is\nthe only being absolutely determined. For there must be something\nindetermined in all finite beings, since they have all imperfect powers\nwhich tend towards their development after an indefinite manner. God\nalone, the complete Being in whom all powers are actualized, escapes by\nHis own perfection from all progress, and development, and\nindetermination.\"[326]\n\n[Footnote 325: North American Review, October, 1864, article, \"The\nConditioned and the Unconditioned,\" pp. 422, 423. See also Young's\n\"Province of Reason,\" p. 72; and Calderwood's \"Philosophy of the\nInfinite,\" p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 326: Saisset, \"Modern Pantheism,\" vol. ii. p. 71.]\n\nAll real being must be determined; only pure Nothing can be\nundetermined. _Determination_ is, however, one thing; and _limitation_\nis essentially another thing. \"Even space and time, though cognized\nsolely by negative characteristics, are determined in so far as\ndifferentiated from the existences they contain; but this\ndifferentiation involves no limitation of their infinity.\" If all\ndistinction is determination, and if all determination is negation, that\nis (as here used), limitation, then the infinite, as distinguished from\nthe finite, loses its own infinity, and either becomes identical with\nthe finite, or else vanishes into pure nothing. If Hamilton will persist\nin affirming that all determination is limitation, he has no other\nalternatives but to accept the doctrine of Absolute Nihilism, or of\nAbsolute Identity. If the Absolute is the indeterminate--that is, no\nattributes, no consciousness, no relations--it is pure non-being. If the\nInfinite is \"the One and All,\" then there is but one substance, one\nabsolute entity.\n\nHerbert Spencer professes to be carrying out, a step farther, the\ndoctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel, viz., \"the philosophy of\nthe Unconditioned.\" In other words, he carries that doctrine forward to\nits rigidly logical consequences, and utters the last word which\nHamilton and Mansel dare not utter--\"Apprehensible by us there is no\nGod.\" The Ultimate Reality is absolutely unknown; it can not be\napprehended by the human intellect, and it can not present itself to the\nintellect at all. This Ultimate Reality can not be _intelligent_,\nbecause to think is to condition, and the Absolute is the unconditioned;\ncan not be _conscious_, because all consciousness is of plurality and\ndifference, and the Absolute is one; can not be _personal_, because\npersonality is determination or limitation, and the Infinite is the\nillimitable. It is \"audacious,\" \"irreverent,\" \"impious,\" to apply any of\nthese predicates to it; to regard it as Mind, or speak of it as\nRighteous.[327] The ultimate goal of the philosophy of the Unconditioned\nis a purely subjective Atheism.\n\n[Footnote 327: \"First Principles,\" pp. 111, 112.]\n\nAnd yet of this Primary Existence--inscrutable, and absolutely\nunknown--Spencer knows something; knows as much as he pleases to know.\nHe knows that this \"ultimate of ultimates is _Force_,\"[328] an\n\"_Omnipresent Power_,\"[329] is \"_One_\" and \"_Eternal_.\"[330] He knows\nalso that it can not be intelligent, self-conscious, and a\npersonality.[331] This is a great deal to affirm and deny of an\nexistence \"absolutely unknown.\" May we not be permitted to affirm of\nthis hidden and unknown something that it is _conscious Mind_,\nespecially as Mind is admitted to be the only analogon of Power; and\n\"the _force_ by which we produce change, and which serves to symbolize\nthe causes of changes in general, is the final disclosure of\nanalysis.\"[332]\n\n[Footnote 328: \"First Principles,\" p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 329: Ibid., p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 330: Ibid., p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 331: Ibid., pp. 108-112.]\n\n[Footnote 332: Ibid., p. 235.]\n\n3. We advance to the review of the third fundamental principle of\nHamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned, viz., that the terms\ninfinite and absolute are names for a \"mere negation of thought\"--a\n\"mental impotence\" to think, or, in other words, the absence of all the\nconditions under which thought is possible.\n\nThis principle is based upon a distinction between \"positive\" and\n\"negative\" thought, which is made with an air of wonderful precision and\naccuracy in \"the Alphabet of Human Thought.\"[333] \"Thinking is\n_positive_ when existence is predicated of an object.\" \"Thinking is\n_negative_ when existence is not attributed to an object.\" \"Negative\nthinking,\" therefore, is not the thinking of an object as devoid of this\nor that particular attribute, but as devoid of all attributes, and thus\nof all existence; that is, it is \"the negation of all\nthought\"--_nothing_. \"When we think a thing, that is done by conceiving\nit as possessed of certain modes of being or qualities, _and the sum of\nthese qualities constitutes its concept or notion_.\" \"When we perform an\nact of negative thought, this is done by thinking _something_ as _not_\nexisting in this or that determinate mode; and when we think it as\nexisting in no determinate mode, _we cease to think at all--it becomes a\nnothing_.\"[334] Now the Infinite, according to Hamilton, can not be\nthought in any determinate mode; therefore we do not think it at all,\nand therefore it is for us \"a logical Non-entity.\"\n\n[Footnote 333: \"Discussions,\" Appendix I. p. 567.]\n\n[Footnote 334: \"Logic,\" pp. 54, 55.]\n\nIt is barely conceivable that Hamilton might imagine himself possessed\nof this singular power of \"performing an act of negative thought\"--that\nis, of thinking and not thinking at once, or of \"thinking something\"\nthat \"becomes nothing;\" we are not conscious of any such power. To think\nwithout an object of thought, or to think of something without any\nqualities, or to think \"something\" which in the act of thought melts\naway into \"nothing,\" is an absurdity and a contradiction. We can not\nthink about nothing. All thought must have an object, and every object\nmust have some predicate. Even space has some predicates--as\nreceptivity, unity, and infinity. Thought can only be realized by\nthinking something existing, and existing in a determinate manner; and\nwhen we cease to think something having predicates, we cease to think at\nall. This is emphatically asserted by Hamilton himself.[335] \"Negative\nthinking\" is, therefore, a meaningless phrase, a contradiction in terms;\nit is no thought at all. We are cautioned, however, against regarding\n\"the negation of thought\" as \"a negation of all mental ability.\" It is,\nwe are told, \"an attempt to think, and a failure in the attempt.\" An\nattempt to think about _what_? Surely it must be about some object, and\nan object which is _known_ by some sign, else there can be no thought.\nLet any one make the attempt to think without something to think about,\nand he will find that both the process and the result are blank\nnothingness. All thought, therefore, as Calderwood has amply shown, is,\nmust be, _positive_. \"Thought is nothing else than the comparison of\nobjects known; and as knowledge is always positive, so must our thought\nbe. All knowledge implies an object _known_; and so all thought involves\nan object about which we think, and must, therefore, be positive--that\nis, it must embrace within itself the conception of certain qualities as\nbelonging to the object.\"[336]\n\n[Footnote 335: \"Logic,\" p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 336: \"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 272.]\n\nThe conclusion of Hamilton's reasoning in regard to \"negative thinking\"\nis, that we can form no notion of the Infinite Being. We have no\npositive idea of such a Being. We can think of him only by \"the thinking\naway of every characteristic\" which can be conceived, and thus \"ceasing\nto think at all.\" We can only form a \"negative concept,\" which, we are\ntold, \"is in fact no concept at all.\" We can form only a \"negative\nnotion,\" which, we are informed, \"is only the negation of a notion.\"\nThis is the impenetrable abyss of total gloom and emptiness into which\nthe philosophy of the conditions leads us at last.[337]\n\n[Footnote 337: Whilst Spencer accepts the general doctrine of Hamilton,\nthat the Ultimate Reality is inscrutable, he argues earnestly against\nhis assertion that the Absolute is a \"mere negation of thought.\"\n\n\"Every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is\ndemonstrated distinctly postulates the _positive existence_ of something\nbeyond the relative. To say we can not know the Absolute is, by\nimplication, to affirm there _is_ an Absolute. In the very denial of our\npower to learn _what_ the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption\n_that_ it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute\nhas been present to the mind, not as nothing, but as _something_. And so\nwith every step in the reasoning by which the doctrine is upheld, the\nNoumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is\nthroughout thought as actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive\nthat our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, without, at the\nsame time, conceiving a Reality of which these are appearances, for\nappearances without reality are unthinkable.\n\n\"Truly to represent or realize in thought any one of the propositions of\nwhich the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as\n_positive_, and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate\nconclusion from the argument that our consciousness of it is negative?\nAn argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a\ncertain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no\nmeaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very\ndemonstration that a definite consciousness [comprehension] of the\nAbsolute is impossible, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite\nconsciousness of it [an apprehension].\"--\"First Principles,\" p. 88.]\n\nStill we have the word _infinite_, and we have _the notion_ which the\nword expresses. This, at least, is spared to us by Sir William Hamilton.\nHe who says we have no such notion asks the question _how we have it?_\nHere it may be asked, how have we, then, the word infinite? How have we\nthe notion which this word expresses? The answer to this question is\ncontained in the distinction of positive and negative thought.\n\nWe have a positive concept of a thing when we think of it by the\nqualities of which it is the complement. But as the attribution of\nqualities is an affirmation, as affirmation and negation are relatives,\nand as relatives _are known only in and through each other_, we can not,\ntherefore, have a _consciousness_ of the affirmation of any quality\nwithout having, at the same time, the _correlative consciousness_ of its\nnegation. Now the one consciousness is a positive, the other\nconsciousness is a negative notion; and as all language is the reflex of\nthought, the positive and negative notions are expressed by positive and\nnegative names. Thus it is with the Infinite.[338] Now let us carefully\nscrutinize the above deliverance. We are told that \"relatives are known\nonly in and through each other;\" that is, such relatives as _finite_ and\n_infinite_ are known necessarily in the same act of thought. The\nknowledge of one is as necessary as the knowledge of the other. We can\nnot have a consciousness of the one without the correlative\nconsciousness of the other. \"For,\" says Hamilton, \"a relation is, in\ntruth, a thought, one and indivisible; and while the thinking a relation\n_necessarily involves the thought of its two terms,_, so it is, with\nequal necessity, itself involved in the thought of either.\" If, then, we\nare _conscious_ of the two terms of the relation in the same \"one and\nindivisible\" mental act--if we can not have \"the consciousness of the\none without the consciousness of the other\"--if space and position, time\nand succession, substance and quality, infinite and finite, are given to\nus in pairs, then 'the _knowledge of one is as necessary as the\nknowledge of the other,_' and they must stand or fall together. The\nfinite is known no more positively than the infinite; the infinite is\nknown as positively as the finite. The one can not be taken and the\nother left. The infinite, discharged from all relation to the finite,\ncould never come into apprehension; and the finite, discharged of all\nrelation to the infinite, is incognizable too. \"There can be no\nobjection to call the one 'positive' and the other 'negative,' provided\nit be understood that _each_ is so with regard to the other, and that\nthe relation is convertible; the finite, for instance, being the\nnegative of the infinite, not less than the infinite of the\nfinite.\"[339]\n\n[Footnote 338: _Logic,_ p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 339: Martineau's \"Essays,\" p. 237.]\n\nTo say that the finite is comprehensible in and by itself, and the\ninfinite is incomprehensible in and by itself, is to make an assertion\nutterly at variance both with psychology and logic. The finite is no\nmore comprehensible _in itself_ than the infinite. \"Relatives are known\nonly in and through each other.\"[340] \"The conception of one term of a\nrelation necessarily implies that of the other, it being the very nature\nof a relative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its\ncorrelative.\" We comprehend nothing more completely than the infinite;\n\"for the idea of illimitation is as clear, precise, and intelligible as\nthe idea of limitability, which is its basis. The propositions \"A is X\"\n\"A is not X,\" are equally comprehensible; the conceptions A and X are in\nboth cases positive data of experience, while the affirmation and\nnegation consist solely in the copulative or disjunctive nature of the\npredication. Consequently, if X is comprehensible, so is not--X; if the\nfinite is comprehensible, so is the infinite.\"[341]\n\nWhilst denying that the infinite can by us be _known_, Hamilton tells us\nhe is \"far from denying that it is, must, and ought to be\n_believed_.\"[342] \"We must believe in the infinity of God.\"\n\"Faith--belief--is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond\nknowledge.\"[343] We heartily assent to the doctrine that the Infinite\nBeing is the object of faith, but we earnestly deny that the Infinite\nBeing is not an object of knowledge. May not knowledge be grounded upon\nfaith, and does not faith imply knowledge? Can we not obtain knowledge\nthrough faith? Is not the belief in the Infinite Being implied in our\nknowledge of finite existence? If so, then God as the infinite and\nperfect, God as the unconditioned Cause, is not absolutely \"the\nunknown.\"\n\n[Footnote 340: Hamilton's \"Logic,\" p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 341: North American Review, October, 1864, article\n\"Conditioned and the Unconditioned,\" pp. 441, 442.]\n\n[Footnote 342: Letter to Calderwood, Appendix, vol. ii. p. 530.]\n\n[Footnote 343: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 374.]\n\nA full exposition of Sir William Hamilton's views of _Faith_ in its\nconnection with Philosophy would have been deeply interesting to us, and\nit would have filled up a gap in the interpretation of his system. The\nquestion naturally presents itself, how would he have discriminated\nbetween faith and knowledge, so as to assign to each its province? If\nour notion of the Infinite Being rests entirely upon faith, then upon\nwhat ultimate ground does faith itself rest? On the authority of\nScripture, of the Church, or of reason? The only explicit statement of\nhis view which has fallen in our way is a note in his edition of\nReid.[344] \"We _know_ what rests upon reason; we _believe_ what rests\nupon authority. But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for\nthe original data of reason do not rest upon reason, but are necessarily\naccepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data\nare, therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is that,\nin the last resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit that\nbelief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate\nground of belief.\"\n\n[Footnote 344: P. 760; also Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 61.]\n\nHere we have, first, an attempted distinction between faith and\nknowledge. \"We _know_ what rests upon reason;\" that is, whatever we\nobtain by deduction or induction, whatever is capable of explication and\nproof, is _knowledge_. \"We _believe_ what rests upon authority;\" that\nis, whatever we obtain by intellectual intuition or pure apperception,\nand is incapable of explication and of proof, is \"a _belief or trust_.\"\nThese instinctive beliefs, which are, as it were, the first principles\nupon which all knowledge rests, are, however, indiscriminately called by\nHamilton \"cognitions,\" \"beliefs,\" \"judgments.\" He declares most\nexplicitly \"that the principles of our knowledge must themselves be\n_knowledges_;\"[345] and these first principles, which are \"the primary\ncondition of reason,\" are elsewhere called \"_\u00e0 priori cognitions_;\" also\n\"native, pure, or transcendental _knowledge_,\" in contradistinction to\n\"_\u00e0 posteriori cognitions_,\" or that knowledge which is obtained in the\nexercise of reason.[346] All this confusion results from an attempt to\nput asunder what God has joined together. As Clemens of Alexandria has\nsaid, \"Neither is faith without knowledge, nor knowledge without faith.\"\nAll faith implies knowledge, and all knowledge implies faith. They are\nmingled in the one operation of the human mind, by which we apprehend\nfirst principles or ultimate truths. These have their light and dark\nside, as Hamilton has remarked. They afford enough light to show _that_\nthey are and must be, and thus communicate knowledge; they furnish no\nlight to show _how_ they are and _why_ they are, and under that aspect\ndemand the exercise of faith. There must, therefore, first be something\n_known_ before there can be any _faith_.[347]\n\n[Footnote 345: Ibid., p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 346: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 347: M'Cosh, \"Intuitions,\" pp. 197, 198; Calderwood,\n\"Philosophy of the Infinite,\" p. 24.]\n\nAnd now we seem to have penetrated to the centre of Hamilton's\nphilosophy, and the vital point may be touched by one crucial question,\n_Upon what ultimate ground does faith itself rest?_ Hamilton says, \"we\nbelieve what rests upon _authority_.\" But what is that authority? I. It\nis not the authority of Divine Revelation, because beliefs are called\n\"instinctive,\" \"native,\" \"innate,\" \"common,\" \"catholic,\"[348] all which\nterms seem to indicate that this \"authority\" lies within the sphere of\nthe human mind; at any rate, this faith does not rest on the authority\nof Scripture. Neither is it the authority of Reason. \"The original data\nof reason [the first principles of knowledge] do not rest upon the\nauthority of reason, but _on the authority of what is beyond itself_.\"\nThe question thus recurs, what is this ultimate ground beyond reason\nupon which faith rests? Does it rest upon any thing, or nothing?\n\n[Footnote 348: Philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton, pp. 68, 69.]\n\nThe answer to this question is given in the so-called \"Law of the\nConditioned,\" which is thus laid down: \"_All that is conceivable in\nthought lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each\nother, can not both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories,\none must_.\" For example, we conceive _space_, but we can not conceive it\nas absolutely bounded or infinitely unbounded. We can conceive _time_,\nbut we can not conceive it as having an absolute commencement or an\ninfinite non-commencement. We can conceive of _degree_, but we can not\nconceive it as absolutely limited or as infinitely unlimited. We can\nconceive of _existence_, but not as an absolute part or an infinite\nwhole. Therefore, \"the Conditioned is that which is alone conceivable or\ncogitable; the Unconditioned, that which is inconceivable or\nincogitable. The conditioned, or the thinkable, lies between two\nextremes or poles; and each of these extremes or poles are\nunconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of them exclusive or\ncontradictory of the other. Of these two repugnant opposites, the one is\nthat of Unconditional or Absolute Limitation; the other that of\nUnconditional or Infinite Illimitation, or, more simply, the Absolute\nand the Infinite; the term _absolute_ expressing that which is finished\nor complete, the term _infinite_ that which can not be terminated or\nconcluded.\"[349]\n\n\"The conditioned is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates,\nexclusive of each other, neither of which _can be conceived as\npossible_, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, and excluded\nmiddle, _one must be admitted as necessary_. We are thus warned from\nrecognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with\nthe horizon of our faith. And by a _wonderful revelation_, we are thus,\nin the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the\nrelative and the finite, _inspired with a belief in_ the existence of\nsomething unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible\nreality.\"[350] Here, then, we have found the ultimate ground of our\nfaith in the Infinite God. It is built upon a \"mental imbecility,\" and\nbuttressed up by \"contradictions!\"[351]\n\n[Footnote 349: \"Lectures on Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. pp. 368, 374. With\nHamilton, the Unconditioned is a genus, of which the Infinite and\nAbsolute are species.]\n\n[Footnote 350: \"Discussions on Philosophy,\" p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 351: The warmest admirers of Sir William Hamilton hesitate to\napply the doctrine of the unconditioned to Cause and Free-will. See\n\"Mansel's Prolegom.,\" Note C, p. 265.]\n\nSuch a faith, however, is built upon the clouds, and the whole structure\nof this philosophy is \"a castle in the air\"--an attempt to organize\nNescience into Science, and evoke something out of nothing. To pretend\nto believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is in reality\nnot to believe at all. The nature which compels me to believe in the\nInfinite must supply me some object upon which my belief can take hold.\nWe can not believe in contradictions. Our faith must be a rational\nbelief--a faith in the ultimate harmony and unity of all truth, in the\nveracity and integrity of human reason as the organ of truth; and, above\nall, a faith in the veracity of God, who is the author and illuminator\nof our mental constitution. \"We can not suppose that we are created\ncapable of intelligence in order to be made victims of delusion--that\nGod is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie.\"[352] We close our\nreview of Hamilton by remarking:\n\n[Footnote 352: Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, p. 21.]\n\n1. \"The Law of the Conditioned,\" as enounced by Hamilton, is\ncontradictory. It predicates contradiction of two extremes, which are\nasserted to be equally incomprehensible and incognizable. If they are\nutterly incognizable, how does Hamilton _know_ that they are\ncontradictory? The mutual _relation_ of two objects is said to be known,\nbut the objects themselves are absolutely unknown. But how can we know\nany relation except by an act of comparison, and how can we compare two\nobjects so as to affirm their relation, if the objects are absolutely\nunknown? \"The Infinite is defined as Unconditional Illimitation; the\nAbsolute as Conditional Limitation. Yet almost in the same breath we are\ntold that each is utterly inconceivable, each the mere negation of\nthought. On the one hand, we are told they _differ_; on the other, we\nare told they do _not differ_. Now which does Hamilton mean? If he\ninsist upon the definitions as yielding a ground of conceivable\ndifference, he must abandon the inconceivability; but if he insist upon\nthe inconceivability, he must abandon the definition as sheer verbiage,\ndevoid of all conceivable meaning. There is no possible escape from this\ndilemma. Further, two negations can never contradict; for contradiction\nis the asserting and the denying of the same proposition; two denials\ncan not conflict. If Illimitation is negative, Limitation, its\ncontradictory, is positive, whether conditional or unconditional. In\nbrief, if the Infinite and Absolute are wholly incomprehensible, they\nare not distinguishable; but if they are distinguishable, they are not\nwholly incomprehensible. If they are indistinguishable, they are to us\nidentical; and identity precludes contradiction. But if they are\ndistinguishable, distinction is made by difference, which involves\npositive cognition; hence one, at least, must be conceivable. It\nfollows, therefore, by inexorable logic, that either the contradiction\nor the inconceivability must be abandoned.\"[353]\n\n[Footnote 353: North American Review, October, 1864, pp. 407, 408.]\n\n2. \"The Law of the Conditioned,\" as a ground of faith in the Infinite\nBeing, is utterly void, meaningless, and ineffectual. Let us re-state it\nin Hamilton's own words: \"The conditioned is the _mean_ between two\nextremes, two inconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which\n_can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principle of\nContradiction and Excluded Middle, _one must be admitted as necessary_.\"\nIt is scarcely needful to explain to the intelligent reader the above\nlogical principles; that they may, however, be clearly before the mind\nin this connection, we state that the principle of Contradiction is\nthis: \"A thing can not at the same time be and not be; _A is_, _A is\nnot_, are propositions which can not both be true at once.\" The\nprinciple of Excluded Middle is this: \"A thing either is or is not--_A\neither is or is not B_; there is no _medium_.\"[354] Now, to mention the\nlaw of Excluded Middle and two contradictories with a _mean_ between\nthem, in the same sentence, is really astounding. \"If the two\ncontradictory extremes are equally incogitable, yet include a cogitable\nmean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either extreme? This\nnecessity of accepting one of the contradictories is wholly based upon\nthe supposed impossibility of a _mean_; if a mean exists, _that_ may be\ntrue, and both contradictories together false. But if a mean between two\ncontradictories be both impossible and absurd, Hamilton's 'conditioned'\nentirely vanishes.\"[355] If both contradictories are equally unknown and\nequally unthinkable, we can not discover _why_, on his principles, we\nare bound to believe _either_.\n\n[Footnote 354: Hamilton's \"Logic,\" pp. 58, 59; \"Metaphysics,\" vol. ii.\np. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 355: North British Review, October, 1864, pp. 415, 416.]\n\n3. The whole of this confusion in thought and expression results from\nthe habit of confounding the sensuous imagination with the non-sensuous\nreason, and the consequent co-ordination of an imageable conception with\nan abstract idea. The objects of sense and the sensuous imagination may\nbe characterized as extension, limitation, figure, position, etc.; the\nobjects of the non-sensuous reason may be characterized as universality,\neternity, infinity. I can form an _image_ of an extended and figured\nobject, but I can not form an _image_ of space, time, or God; neither,\nindeed, can I form an image of Goodness, Justice, or Truth. But I can\nhave a clear and precise idea of space, and time, and God, as I can of\nJustice, Goodness, and Truth. There are many things which I can most\nsurely _know_ that I can not possibly _comprehend_, if to comprehend is\nto form a mental image of a thing. There is nothing which I more\ncertainly know than that space is infinite, and eternity unbeginning and\nendless; but I can not comprehend the infinity of space or the\nillimitability of eternity. I know that God is, that he is a being of\ninfinite perfection, but I can not throw my thoughts around and\ncomprehend the infinity of God.\n\n(iv.) We come, lastly, to consider the position of the _Dogmatic\nTheologians_.[356] In their zeal to demonstrate the necessity of Divine\nRevelation, and to vindicate for it the honor of supplying to us all our\nknowledge of God, they assail every fundamental principle of reason,\noften by the very weapons which are supplied by an Atheistical\nphilosophy. As a succinct presentation of the views of this school, we\nselect the \"_Theological Institutes_\" of R. Watson.\n\n[Footnote 356: Ellis, Leland, Locke, and Horsley, whose writings are\nextensively quoted in Watson's \"Institutes of Theology\" (reprinted by\nCarlton & Lanahan, New York).]\n\n1st. The invalidity of \"_the principle of causality_\" is asserted by\nthis author. \"We allow that the argument which proves that the _effects_\nwith which we are surrounded have been _caused_, and thus leads us up\nthrough a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has a\nsimplicity, an obviousness, and a force which, when we are previously\nfurnished with the idea of God, makes it, at first sight, difficult to\nconceive that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate\nto it; yet if ever the human mind commenced such an inquiry at all, it\nis highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an _eternal\nsuccession of causes and effects_, rather than acquire the ideas of\ncreation, in the proper sense, and of a Supreme Creator.\"[357] \"We feel\nthat our reason rests with full satisfaction in the doctrine that all\nthings are created by one eternal and self-existent Being; but the Greek\nphilosophers held that matter was eternally co-existent with God. This\nwas the opinion of Plato, who has been called the Moses of\nphilosophy.\"[358]\n\nFor a defense of \"the principle of causality\" we must refer the reader\nto our remarks on the philosophy of Comte. We shall now only remark on\none or two peculiarities in the above statement which betray an utter\nmisapprehension of the nature of the argument. We need scarcely direct\nattention to the unfortunate and, indeed, absurd phrase, \"an eternal\nsuccession of causes and effects.\" An \"eternal succession\" is a\n_contradictio in adjecto_, and as such inconceivable and unthinkable. No\nhuman mind can \"rest\" in any such thing, because an eternal succession\nis no rest at all. All \"succession\" is finite and temporal, capable of\nnumeration, and therefore can not be eternal.[359] Again, in attaining\nthe conception of a First Cause the human mind does not pass up \"through\na chain of subordinate causes,\" either definite or indefinite, \"to one\nFirst Cause.\"\n\n[Footnote 357: Watson's \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 358: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 359: See _ante_, pp. 181, 182, ch. v.]\n\nLet us re-state the principle of causality as a universal and necessary\nlaw of thought. \"_All phenomena present themselves to us as the\nexpression of_ POWER, and refer us to a causal ground whence they\nissue.\" That \"power\" is intuitively and spontaneously apprehended by the\nhuman mind as Supreme and Ultimate--\"the causal ground\" is a personal\nGod. All the phenomena of nature present themselves to us as \"effects,\"\nand we know nothing of \"subordinate causes\" except as modes of the\nDivine Efficiency.[360] The principle of causality compels us to think\ncausation behind nature, and under causation to think of Volition.\n\"Other forces we have no sort of ground for believing; or, except by\nartifices of abstraction, even power of conceiving. The dynamic idea is\neither this or nothing; and the logical alternative assuredly is that\nnature is either a mere Time-march of phenomena or an expression of\nMind.\"[361] The true doctrine of philosophy, of science, and of\nrevelation is not simply that God did create \"in the beginning,\" but\nthat he still creates. All the operations of Nature are the operations\nof the Divine Mind. \"Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return\nto their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou\nrenewest the face of the earth.\"[362]\n\n[Footnote 360: The modern doctrine of the Correlation and Homogenity of\nall Forces clearly proves that they are not many, but _one_--\"a dynamic\nself-identity masked by transmigration.\"--Martineau's \"Essays,\" pp.\n134-144.]\n\n[Footnote 361: Martineau's \"Essays,\" pp. 140, 141.]\n\n[Footnote 362: Psalm civ.]\n\nThe assertion that Plato taught \"the eternity of matter,\" and that\nconsequently he did not arrive at the idea of a Supreme and Ultimate\nCause, is incapable of proof. The term yl\u00ea=matter does not occur in the\nwritings of Plato, or, indeed, of any of his predecessors, and is\npeculiarly Aristotelian. The ground of the world of sense is called by\nPlato \"the receptacle\" (ypodoch\u00ea), \"the nurse\" (tith\u00ean\u00ea) of all that is\nproduced, and was apparently identified, in his mind, with _pure\nspace_--a logical rather than a physical entity--the mere negative\ncondition and medium of Divine manifestation. He never regards it as a\n\"cause,\" or ascribes to it any efficiency. We grant that he places this\nvery indefinite something (opoionoun ti) out of the sphere of temporal\norigination; but it must be borne in mind that he speaks of \"creation in\neternity\" as well as of \"creation in time;\" and of time itself, though\ncreated, as \"an eternal image of the generating Father.\"[363] This one\nthing, at any rate, can not be denied, that Plato recognizes creation in\nits fullest sense as the act of God.\n\nThe admission that something has always existed besides the Deity, as a\nmere logical condition of the exercise of divine power (_e.g._, space),\nwould not invalidate the argument for the existence of God. The proof of\nthe Divine Existence, as Chalmers has shown, does not rest on the\nexistence of matter, but on the orderly arrangement of matter; and the\ngrand question of Theism is not whether the _matter of the world_, but\nwhether the _present order of the world_ had a commencement.[364]\n\n2d. Doubt is cast by our author upon the validity of \"_the principle of\nthe Unconditioned or the Infinite_.\" \"Supposing it were conceded that\nsome faint glimmering of this great truth [the existence of a First\nCause] might, by induction, have been discovered by contemplative minds,\nby what means could they have _demonstrated_ to themselves that he is\neternal, self-existent, immortal, and independent?\"[365] \"Between things\nvisible and invisible, time and eternity, beings finite and beings\ninfinite, objects of sense and objects of faith, _the connection is not\nperceptible_ to human observation. Though we push our researches,\ntherefore, to the extreme point whither the light of nature can carry\nus, they will in the end be abruptly terminated, and we must stop short\nat an immeasurable distance between the creature and the Creator.\"[366]\n\n[Footnote 363: Plato, \"Tim\u00e6us,\" \u00a7 xiv.]\n\n[Footnote 364: Chalmers's \"Natural Theology,\" bk. i. ch. v.; also\nMahan's \"Natural Theology,\" pp. 21-23.]\n\n[Footnote 365: Watson's \"Institutes of Theol.,\" vol. i. p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 366: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 273.]\n\nTo this assertion that the connection of things visible and things\ninvisible, finite and infinite, objects of sense and objects of faith,\nis utterly imperceptible to human thought, we might reply by quoting the\nwords of that Sacred Book whose supreme authority our author is seeking,\nby this argument, to establish. \"The _invisible_ things of God, even his\neternal power and god-head, from the creation, are clearly _seen_, being\n_understood by the things which are made_.\" We may also point to the\nfact that in every age and in every land the human mind has\nspontaneously and instinctively recognized the existence of an invisible\nPower and Presence pervading nature and controlling the destinies of\nman, and that religious worship--prayer, and praise, and\nsacrifice--offered to that unseen yet omnipresent Power is an universal\nfact of human nature. The recognition of an _immediate_ and a\n_necessary_ \"connection\" between the visible and the invisible, the\nobjects of sense and the objects of faith, is one of the most obvious\nfacts of consciousness--of universal consciousness as revealed in\nhistory, and of individual consciousness as developed in every rational\nmind.\n\nThat this connection is \"not perceptible to human observation,\" if by\nthis our author means \"not perceptible to sense,\" we readily admit. No\none ever asserted it was perceptible to human observation. We say that\nthis connection is perceptible to human _reason_, and is revealed in\nevery attempt to think about, and seek an explanation of, the phenomenal\nworld. The Phenomenal and the Real, Genesis and Being, Space and\nExtension, Succession and Duration, Time and Eternity, the Finite and\nthe Infinite, are correlatives which are given in one and the same\nindivisible act of thought. \"The conception of one term of a relation\nnecessarily implies that of the other; it being the very nature of a\ncorrelative to be thinkable only through the conjunct thought of its\ncorrelative; for a relation is, in truth, a thought one and indivisible;\nand whilst the thinking of one relation necessarily involves the thought\nof its two terms, so it is, with equal necessity, itself involved in the\nthought of either.\"[367] Finite, dependent, contingent, temporal\nexistence, therefore, necessarily supposes infinite, self-existent,\nindependent, eternal Being; the Conditioned and Relative implies the\nUnconditioned and Absolute--one is known only in and through the other.\nBut inasmuch as the unconditioned is cognized solely _\u00e0 priori_, and the\nconditioned solely _\u00e0 posteriori_, the recognition by the human mind of\ntheir necessary correlation becomes the bridge whereby the chasm between\nthe subjective and the objective may be spanned, and whereby Thought may\nbe brought face to face with Existence.\n\n[Footnote 367: Hamilton's \"Metaphysics,\" vol. ii. pp. 536, 537.]\n\nThe reverence which, from boyhood, we have entertained for the\ndistinguished author of the \"Institutes\" restrains us from speaking in\nadequate terms of reprobation of the statement that \"the _First Cause_\"\nmay be known, and yet not conceived \"as eternal, self-existent,\nimmortal, and independent\". Surely that which is the ground and reason\nof all existence must have the ground and reason of its own existence in\nitself. That which is _first_ in the order of existence, and in the\nlogical order of thought, can have nothing prior to itself. If the\nsupposed First Cause is not necessarily self-existent and independent,\nit is not the _first_; if it has a dependent existence, there must be a\nprior being on which it depends. If the First Cause is not eternal, then\nprior to this Ultimate Cause there was nothingness and vacuity, and pure\nnothing, by its own act, became something. But \"_Ex nihilo nihil_\" is a\nuniversal law of thought. To ask the question whether the First Cause be\nself-existent and eternal, is, in effect, to ask the question \"who made\nGod?\" and this is not the question of an adult theologian, but of a\nlittle child. Surely Mr. Watson must have penned the above passage\nwithout any reflection on its real import[368].\n\n[Footnote 368: In an article on \"the Impending Revolution in Anglo-Saxon\nTheology\" Methodist Quarterly Review, (July, 1863), Dr. Warren seems to\ntake it for granted that the \"aiteological\" and \"teleological\" arguments\nfor the existence of God are utterly invalidated by the Dynamical theory\nof matter. \"Once admit that _real power_ can and does reside in matter,\nand all these reasonings fail. If inherent forces of matter are\ncompetent to the production of all the innumerable miracles of movement\nin the natural world, what is there in the natural world which they can\nnot produce. If all _the exertions of power_ in the universe can be\naccounted for without resort to something back of, and superior to,\nnature, what is there which can force the mind to such a resort?\" (p.\n463). \"Having granted that _power_, or _self-activity_, is a natural\nattribute of all matter, what right have we to deny it _intelligence_?\"\n(p. 465). \"_Self-moving matter must have thought and design_\" (p. 469).\n\nIt is not our intention to offer an extended criticism of the above\npositions in this note. We shall discuss \"the Dynamical theory\" more\nfully in a subsequent work. If the theory apparently accepted by Dr.\nWarren be true, that \"_the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly\nefficient as minds_, and that we have the same ground to regard the\nforce exerted by the one _innate_ and _natural_ as that exerted by the\nother\" (p. 464), then we grant that the conclusions of Dr. Warren, as\nabove stated, are unavoidable. We proceed one step farther, and boldly\nassert that the existence of God is, on this hypothesis, incapable of\nproof, and the only logical position Dr. Warren can occupy is that of\nspiritualistic Pantheism.\n\nDr. Warren asserts that \"the Dynamical theory of matter\" is now\ngenerally accepted by \"Anglo-Saxon _naturalists_.\" \"One can scarcely\nopen a scientific treatise without observing the altered stand-point\"\n(p. 160). We confess that we are disappointed with Dr. Warren's\ntreatment of this simple question of fact. On so fundamental an issue,\nthe Doctor ought to have given the name of at least _one_ \"naturalist\"\nwho asserts that \"the ultimate atoms of matter are as uniformly\nefficient as minds.\" Leibnitz, Morrell, Ulrici, Hickok, the authorities\nquoted by him, are metaphysicians and idealists of the extremest school.\nAt present we shall, therefore, content ourselves with a general denial\nof this wholesale statement of Dr. Warren; and we shall sustain that\ndenial by a selection from the many authorities we shall hereafter\npresent. \"No particle of matter possesses within itself the power of\nchanging its existing state of motion or of rest. Matter has no\nspontaneous power either of rest or motion, but is equally susceptible\nto each as it may be acted on by _external_ causes\" (Silliman's\n\"Principles of Physics,\" p. 13). The above proposition is \"a truth on\nwhich the whole science of mechanical philosophy ultimately depends\"\n(Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, art. \"Dynamics,\" vol. viii. p. 326). \"A\nmaterial substance existing alone in the universe could not produce any\neffects. There is not, so far as we know, a self-acting material\nsubstance in the universe\" (M'Cosh, \"Divine Government, Physical and\nMoral,\" p. 78). \"Perhaps the only true indication of matter is\n_inertia_.\" \"The cause of gravitation is _not resident_ in the particles\nof matter merely,\" but also \"_in all space_\" (Dr. Faraday on\n\"Conservation of Force,\" in \"Correlation and Conservation of Force.\" (p.\n368). He also quotes with approbation the words of Newton, \"That gravity\nshould be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, is so great an\nabsurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophic matters a\ncompetent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it\" p. 368). \"The\n'force of gravity' is an improper expression\" (p. 340). \"Forces are\ntransformable, indestructible, and, _in contradistinction from matter_,\nimponderable\" (p. 346). \"The first cause of things is Deity\" (Dr. Mayer,\nin \"Correlation and Conservation of Force,\" p. 341). \"Although the word\n_cause_ may be used in a secondary and subordinate sense, as meaning\nantecedent forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable;\nwe can not predicate of any physical agent that it is abstractedly the\ncause of another\" (p. 15). \"Causation is the _will_,\" \"creation is the\nact, of God\" Grove on \"Correlation of Physical Forces,\" (p. 199).\n\"Between gravity and motion it is impossible to establish the equation\nrequired for a rightly-conceived _causal_ relation\" (\"Correlation and\nConservation of Force,\" p. 253). See also Herschel's \"Outlines of\nAstronomy,\" p. 234.\n\nIt certainly must have required a wonderful effort of imagination on the\npart of Dr. Warren to transform \"weight\" and \"density,\" mere passive\naffections of matter, into self-activity, intelligence, thought, and\ndesign. Weight or density are merely relative terms. Supposing one\nparticle or mass of matter to exist alone, and there can be no\nattractive or gravitating force. There must be a cause of gravity which\nis distinct from matter.]\n\n3d. The validity of \"_the principle of unity_\" is also discredited by\nWatson. \"If, however, it were conceded that some glimmerings of this\ngreat truth, the existence of a First Cause, might, by induction, have\nbeen discovered, by what means could they have demonstrated to\nthemselves that the great collection of bodies which we call the world\nhad but _one_ Creator.\"[369]\n\n[Footnote 369: \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. p. 275.]\n\nWe might answer directly, and at once, that the oneness or unity of God\nis necessarily contained in \"the very notion of a First Cause\"--a\n_first_ cause is not many causes, but _one_. By a First Cause we do not,\nhowever, understand the first of a numerical series, but an arch\u00ea--a\nprinciple, itself unbeginning, which is the source of all beginning. Our\ncategorical answer, therefore, must be that the unity of God is a\nsublime deliverance of reason--God is one God. It is a first principle\nof reason that all differentiation and plurality supposes an incomposite\nunity, all diversity implies an indivisible identity. The sensuous\nperception of a plurality of parts supposes the rational idea of an\nabsolute unity, which has no parts, as its necessary correlative. For\nexample, extension is a congeries of indefinitesimal parts; the\ncontinuity of matter, as _empirically_ known by us, is never absolute.\nSpace is absolutely continuous, incapable of division into integral\nparts, illimitable, and, as _rationally_ known by us, an absolute unity.\nThe cognition of limited extension, which is the subject of quantitative\nmeasurement, involves the conception of unlimited space, which is the\nnegation of all plurality and complexity of parts. And so the cognition\nof a phenomenal universe in which we see only difference, plurality, and\nchange, implies the existence of a Being who is absolutely unchangeable,\nidentical, and one.\n\nThis law of thought lies at the basis of that universal desire of unity,\nand that universal effort to reduce all our knowledge to unity, which\nhas revealed itself in the history of philosophy, and also of inductive\nscience. \"Reason, intellect, nous, concatenating thoughts and objects\ninto system, and tending upward from particular facts to general laws,\nfrom general laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its\nascent till it comprehends all laws in a single formula, and consummates\nall conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional existence.\" \"The\nhistory of philosophy is only the history of this tendency, and\nphilosophers have borne ample testimony to its reality. 'The mind,' says\nAnaxagoras, 'only knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces the\nmany to the one.' 'The end of philosophy,' says Plato, 'is the intuition\nof unity.' 'All knowledge,' say the Platonists, 'is the gathering up\ninto one, and the indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowing\nmind.'\"[370]\n\n[Footnote 370: Hamilton's \"Metaphysics,\" vol. i. pp. 68, 69.]\n\nThis law has been the guiding principle of the Inductive Sciences, and\nhas led to some of its most important discoveries. The unity which has\nbeen attained in physical science is not, however, the absolute unity of\na material substratum, but a unity of _Will_ and of _Thought_. The late\ndiscovery of the monogenesis, reciprocal convertibility, and\nindestructibility of all Forces in nature, leads us upward towards the\nrecognition of one Omnipresent and Omnipotent Will, which, like a mighty\ntide, sweeps through the universe and effects all its changes. The\nuniversal prevalence of the same physical laws and numerical relations\nthroughout all space, and of the same archetypal forms and teleology of\norgans throughout all past time, reveals to us a Unity of Thought which\ngrasps the entire details of the universe in one comprehensive\nplan.[371] The positive _\u00e0 priori_ intuitions of reason and the _\u00e0\nposteriori_ inductions of science equally attest _that God is one_.\n\n[Footnote 371: We refer with pleasure to the articles of Dr. Winchell,\nin the North-western Christian Advocate, in which the _\u00e0 posteriori_\nproof of \"the Unity of God\" is forcibly exhibited, and take occasion to\nexpress the hope they will soon be presented to the public in a more\npermanent form.]\n\n4th. By denying that man has any intuitive cognitions of right and\nwrong, or any native and original feeling of obligation, Mr. Watson\ninvalidates \"the moral argument\" for the existence of a Righteous God.\n\n\"As far as man's reason has applied itself to the discovery of truth or\n_duty_ it has generally gone astray.\"[372] \"Questions of morals do not,\nfor the most part, lie level to the minds of the populace.\"[373] \"Their\nconclusions have no _authority_, and place them under no\n_obligation_.\"[374] And, indeed, man without a revelation \"is without\n_moral control_, without _principles of justice_, except such as may be\nslowly elaborated from those relations which concern the grosser\ninterests of life, without _conscience_, without hope or fear in another\nlife.\"[375]\n\n[Footnote 372: \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. ii. p. 470.]\n\n[Footnote 373: Ibid., vol. i. p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 374: Ibid., vol. i. p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 375: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 271.]\n\nNow we shall not occupy our space in the elaboration of the proposition\nthat the universal consciousness of our race, as revealed in human\nhistory, languages, legislations, and sentiments, bears testimony to the\nfact that the ideas of right, duty, and responsibility are native to the\nhuman mind; we shall simply make our appeal to those Sacred Writings\nwhose verdict must be final with all theologians. That the fundamental\nprinciples of the moral law do exist, subjectively, in all human minds\nis distinctly affirmed by Paul, in a passage which deserves to be\nregarded as the chief corner-stone of moral science. \"The Gentiles\n(ephn\u00ea, heathen), which have not the written law, do by the guidance of\nnature (reason or conscience) the works enjoined by the revealed law;\nthese, having no written law, are a law unto themselves; who show\nplainly the works of the law written on their hearts, their conscience\nbearing witness, and also their reasonings one with another, when they\naccuse, or else excuse, each other.\"[376] To deny this is to relegate\nthe heathen from all responsibility. For Mr. Watson admits \"that the\nwill of a superior is not in justice binding unless it be in some mode\nsufficiently declared.\" Now in the righteous adjudgments of revelation\nthe heathen are \"without excuse.\" The will of God must, therefore, be\n\"sufficiently declared\" to constitute them accountable. Who will presume\nto say that the shadowy, uncertain, variable, easily and unavoidably\ncorrupted medium of tradition running through forty muddy centuries is a\n\"sufficient declaration of the will of God?\" The law is \"written on the\nheart\" of every man, or all men are not accountable.\n\n[Footnote 376: Romans, ch. ii. ver. 14-15.]\n\nNow this \"law written within the heart\" immediately and naturally\nsuggests the idea of a Lawgiver who is over us. This felt presence of\nConscience, approving or condemning our conduct, suggests, as with the\nspeed of the lightning-flash, the notion of a Judge who will finally\ncall us to account. This \"accusing or excusing of each other,\" this\nrecognition of good or ill desert, points us to, and constrains us to\nrecognize, a future Retribution; so that some hope or fear of another\nlife has been in all ages a universal phenomenon of humanity.\n\nIt is affirmed, however, that whilst this capacity to know God may have\nbeen an original endowment of human nature, yet, in consequence of the\nfall, \"the understanding and reason are weakened by the deterioration of\nhis whole intellectual nature.\"[377] \"Without some degree of education,\nman is _wholly_ the creature of appetite. Labor, feasting, and sleeping\ndivide his time, and wholly occupy his thoughts.\"[378]\n\n[Footnote 377: \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 378: Ibid., vol. i. p. 271.]\n\nWe reverently and believingly accept the teaching of Scripture as to the\ndepravity of man. We acknowledge that \"the understanding is darkened\" by\nsin. At the same time, we earnestly maintain that the Scriptures do not\nteach that the fundamental laws of mind, the first principles of reason,\nare utterly traversed and obliterated by sin, so that man is not able to\nrecognize the existence of God, and feel his obligation to Him. \"_Though\nthey_(the heathen) _knew God_ (dioti gnontes), they did not glorify him\nas God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagination, and\ntheir foolish hearts were darkened. They changed the truth of God into a\nlie, and worshipped and served the creature _more_ than the Creator.\"\n\"And as they did not _approve of holding God with acknowledgment_, God\ndelivered them over to an unapproving mind, to work those things which\nare not suitable.\" After drawing a fearful picture of the darkness and\ndepravity of the heathen, the Apostle adds, \"Who, _though they_ KNOW\n_the law of God_, that they who practise such things are worthy of\ndeath, not only do them, but even are well pleased with those who\npractise them.\"[379] The obvious and direct teaching of this passage is\nthat the heathen, in the midst of their depravity and idolatry, are not\nutterly ignorant of God; \"they _know_ God\"--\"they _know_ the law of God\n\"--\"they worship Him,\" though they worship the creature _more than_ Him.\nThey know God, and are unwilling to \"acknowledge God.\" \"They know the\nrighteousness of God,\" and are \"haters of God\" on account of his purity;\nand their worshipping of idols does not proceed from ignorance of God,\nfrom an intellectual inability to know God, but from \"corruption of\nheart,\" and a voluntary choice of, and a \"pleasure\" in, the sinful\npractices accompanying idol worship. Therefore, argues the Apostle, they\nare \"without excuse.\" The whole drift and aim of the argument of Paul\nis, not to show that the heathen were, by their depravity, incapacitated\nto know God, but that because they knew God and knew his righteous law,\ntherefore their depravity and licentiousness was \"inexcusable.\"\n\n[Footnote 379: Romans, ch. i. ver. 23-32.]\n\nWe conclude our review of opposing schools by the re-affirmation of our\nposition, _that God is cognizable by human reason._ The human mind,\nunder the guidance of necessary laws of thought, is able, from the facts\nof the universe, to affirm the existence of God, and to attain some\nvalid knowledge of his character and will. Every attempt to solve the\ngreat problem of existence, to offer an explanation of the phenomenal\nworld, or to explore the fundamental idea of reason, when fairly and\nfully conducted, has resulted in the recognition of a Supreme\n_Intelligence_, a personal _Mind_ and _Will_, as the ground, and reason,\nand cause of all existence. A survey of the history of Greek Philosophy\nwill abundantly sustain this position, and to this we shall, in\nsubsequent chapters, invite the reader's attention.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS.\n\nPRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n\nSENSATIONAL:\nTHALES--ANAXIMENES--HERACLITUS--ANAXIMANDER--LEUCIPPUS--DEMOCRITUS.\n\n\n      \"Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the\n      Stoics encountered Paul.\"--Acts xvii. 18.\n\n      \"Plato affirms that this is the most just cause of the\n      creation of the world, that works which are good should be\n      wrought by the God who is good; whether he had read these\n      things in the Bible, or whether by his penetrating genius he\n      beheld _the invisible things of God as understood by the\n      things which are made_\"--ST. AUGUSTINE, \"De Civ. Dei,\" lib.\n      xi. ch. 21.\n\nOf all the monuments of the greatness of Athens which have survived the\nchanges and the wastes of time, the most perfect and the most enduring\nis her philosophy. The Propyl\u00e6a, the Parthenon, and the Erechtheum,\nthose peerless gems of Grecian architecture, are now in ruins. The\nmagnificent sculpture of Phidias, which adorned the pediment, and outer\ncornice, and inner frieze of these temples, and the unrivalled statuary\nof gods and heroes which crowded the platform of the Acropolis, making\nit an earthly Olympus, are now no more, save a few broken fragments\nwhich have been carried to other lands, and, in their exile, tell the\nmournful story of the departed grandeur of their ancient home. The\nbrazen statue of Minerva, cast from the spoils of Marathon, which rose\nin giant grandeur above the buildings of the Acropolis, and the flashing\nof whose helmet plumes was seen by the mariner as soon as he had rounded\nthe Sunian promontory; and that other brazen Pallas, called, by\npre-eminence, \"the Beautiful;\" and the enormous Colossus of ivory and of\ngold, \"the Immortal Maid\"--the protecting goddess of the\nParthenon--these have perished. But whilst the fingers of time have\ncrumbled the Pentelic marble, and the glorious statuary has been broken\nto pieces by vandal hands, and the gold and brass have been melted in\nthe crucibles of needy monarchs and converted into vulgar money, the\nphilosophic _thought_ of Athens, which culminated in the dialectic of\nPlato, still survives. Not one of all the vessels, freighted with\nimmortal thought, which Plato launched upon the stream of time, has\nfoundered. And after the vast critical movement of European thought\nduring the past two centuries, in which all philosophic systems have\nbeen subjected to the severest scrutiny, the _method_ of Plato still\npreserves, if not its exclusive authority unquestioned, at least its\nintellectual pre-eminence unshaken. \"Platonism is immortal, because its\nprinciples are immortal in the human intellect and heart.\"[380]\n\n[Footnote 380: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n9.]\n\nPhilosophy is, then, the world-enduring monument of the greatness and\nthe glory of Athens. Whilst Greece will be forever memorable as \"the\ncountry of wisdom and of wise men,\" Athens will always be pre-eminently\nmemorable as the University of Greece. This was the home of Socrates,\nand Plato, and Aristotle--the three imperial names which, for twenty\ncenturies, reigned supreme in the world of philosophic thought. Here\nschools of philosophy were founded to which students were attracted from\nevery part of the civilized world, and by which an impulse and a\ndirection was given to human thought in every land and in every age.\nStanding on the Acropolis at Athens, and looking over the city and the\nopen country, the Apostle would see these _places_ which are inseparably\nassociated with the names of the men who have always been recognized as\nthe great teachers of the pagan world, and who have also exerted a\npowerful influence upon Christian minds of every age. \"In opposite\ndirections he would see the suburbs where Plato and Aristotle, the two\npupils of Socrates, held their illustrious schools. The streamless bed\nof the Ilissus passes between the Acropolis and Hymettus in a\nsouth-westerly direction, until it vanishes in the low ground which\nseparates the city from the Pir\u00e6us.\" Looking towards the upper part of\nthis channel, Paul would see gardens of plane-trees and thickets of\nangus-castus, \"with other torrent-loving shrubs of Greece.\" Near the\nbase of Lycabettus was a sacred inclosure which Pericles had ornamented\nwith fountains. Here stood a statue of Apollo Lycius, which gave the\nname to the _Lyceum_. Here, among the plane-trees, Aristotle _walked_,\nand, as he walked, taught his disciples. Hence the name Peripatetics\n(the Walkers), which has always designated the disciples of the\nStagirite philosopher.\n\nOn the opposite side of the city, the most beautiful of the Athenian\nsuburbs, we have the scene of Plato's teaching. Beyond the outer\nCeramicus, which was crowded with the sepulchres of those Athenians who\nhad fallen in battle, and were buried at the public expense, the eye of\nPaul would rest on the favored stream of the Cephisus, flowing towards\nthe west. On the banks of this stream the _Academy_ was situated. A\nwall, built at great expense by Hipparchus, surrounded it, and Cimon\nplanted long avenues of trees and erected fountains. Beneath the\nplane-trees which shaded the numerous walks there assembled the\nmaster-spirits of the age. This was the favorite resort of poets and\nphilosophers. Here the divine spirit of Plato poured forth its sublimest\nspeculations in streams of matchless eloquence; and here he founded a\nschool which was destined to exert a powerful and perennial influence on\nhuman minds and hearts in all coming time.\n\nLooking down from the Acropolis upon the Agora, Paul would distinguish a\ncloister or colonnade. This is the Stoa Poecile, or \"Painted Porch,\" so\ncalled because its walls were decorated with fresco paintings of the\nlegendary wars of Greece, and the more glorious struggle at Marathon. It\nwas here that Zeno first opened that celebrated school which thence\nreceived the name of _Stoic_. The site of the _garden_ where Epicurus\ntaught is now unknown. It was no doubt within the city walls, and not\nfar distant from the Agora. It was well known in the time of Cicero, who\nvisited Athens as a student little more than a century before the\nApostle. It could not have been forgotten in the time of Paul. In this\n\"tranquil garden,\" in the society of his friends, Epicurus passed a life\nof speculation and of pleasure. His disciples were called, after him,\nthe Epicureans.[381]\n\n[Footnote 381: See Conybeare and Howson's \"Life and Epistles of St.\nPaul,\" vol. i., Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy;\" and\nEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article, \"Athens,\" from whence our materials\nfor the description of these \"places\" are mainly derived.]\n\nHere, then, in Athens the Apostle was brought into immediate contact\nwith all the phases of philosophic thought which had appeared in the\nancient world. \"Amongst those who sauntered beneath the cool shadows of\nthe plane-trees in the Agora, and gathered in knots under the porticoes,\neagerly discussing the questions of the day, were the philosophers, in\nthe garb of their several sects, ready for any new question on which\nthey might exercise their subtlety or display their rhetoric.\" If there\nwere any in that motley group who cherished the principles and retained\nthe spirit of the true Platonic school, we may presume they felt an\ninward intellectual sympathy with the doctrine enounced by Paul. With\nPlato, \"philosophy was only another name for _religion_: philosophy is\nthe love of perfect Wisdom; perfect Wisdom and perfect Goodness are\nidentical: the perfect Good is God himself; philosophy is the love of\nGod.\"[382] He confessed the need of divine assistance to attain \"the\ngood,\" and of divine interposition to deliver men from moral ruin.[383]\nLike Socrates, he longed for a supernatural--a divine light to guide\nhim, and he acknowledged his need thereof continually.[384] He was one\nof those who, in heathen lands, waited for \"the desire of nations;\" and,\nhad he lived in Christian times, no doubt his \"spirit of faith\" would\nhave joyfully \"embraced the Saviour in all the completeness of his\nrevelation and advent.\"[385] And in so far as the spirit of Plato\nsurvived among his disciples, we may be sure they were not among the\nnumber who \"mocked,\" and ridiculed, and opposed the \"new doctrine\"\nproclaimed by Paul. It was \"the philosophers of the Epicureans and of\nthe Stoics who _encountered_ Paul.\" The leading tenets of both these\nsects were diametrically opposed to the doctrines of Christianity. The\nruling spirit of each was alien from the spirit of Christ. The haughty\n_pride_ of the Stoic, the Epicurean abandonment to _pleasure_, placed\nthem in direct antagonism to him who proclaimed the crucified and risen\nChrist to be \"_the wisdom_ of God.\"\n\n[Footnote 382: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n61.]\n\n[Footnote 383: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. vi. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 384: Butler's \"Lectures,\" vol. i. p. 362.]\n\n[Footnote 385: Wheedon on \"The Will,\" p. 352; also Butler's \"Lectures,\"\nvol. ii. p. 252]\n\nIf, however, we would justly appreciate the relation of pagan philosophy\nto Christian truth, we must note that, when Paul arrived in Athens, the\nage of Athenian glory had passed away. Not only had her national\ngreatness waned, and her national spirit degenerated, but her\nintellectual power exhibited unmistakable signs of exhaustion, and\nweakness, and decay. If philosophy had borne any fruit, of course that\nfruit remained. If, in the palmy days of Athenian greatness, any field\nof human inquiry had been successfully explored; if human reason had\nachieved any conquests; if any thing true and good had been obtained,\nthat must endure as an heir-loom for all coming time; and if those\ncenturies of agonizing wrestlings with nature, and of ceaseless\nquestioning of the human heart, had yielded no results, then, at least,\nthe _lesson_ of their failure and defeat remained for the instruction of\nfuture generations. Either the problems they sought to solve were proved\nto be insoluble, or their methods of solution were found to be\ninadequate; for here the mightiest minds had grappled with the great\nproblems of being and of destiny. Here vigorous intellects had struggled\nto pierce the darkness which hangs alike over the beginning and the end\nof human existence. Here profoundly earnest men had questioned nature,\nreason, antiquity, oracles, in the hope they might learn something of\nthat invisible world of _real_ being which they instinctively felt must\nlie beneath the world of fleeting forms and ever-changing appearances.\nHere philosophy had directed her course towards every point in the\ncompass of thought, and touched every _accessible_ point. The sun of\nhuman reason had reached its zenith, and illuminated every field that\nlay within the reach of human ken. And this sublime era of Greek\nphilosophy is of inestimable value to us who live in Christian times,\nbecause _it is an exhaustive effort of human reason to solve the problem\nof being_, and in its history we have a record of the power and weakness\nof the human mind, at once on the grandest scale and in the fairest\ncharacters.[386]\n\n[Footnote 386: See article \"Philosophy,\" in Smith's \"Dictionary of the\nBible.\"]\n\nThese preliminary considerations will have prepared the way for, and\nawakened in our minds a profound interest in, the inquiry--1st. What\npermanent _results_ has Greek philosophy bequeathed to the world? 2d. In\nwhat manner did Greek philosophy fulfill for Christianity a\n_propoedeutic_ office?\n\nIt will at once be obvious, even to those who are least conversant with\nour theme, that it would be fruitless to attempt the answer to these\nimportant questions before we have made a careful survey of the entire\nhistory of philosophic thought in Greece. We must have a clear and\ndefinite conception of the problems they sought to solve, and we must\ncomprehend their methods of inquiry, before we can hope to appreciate\nthe results they reached, or determine whether they did arrive at any\ndefinite and valuable conclusions. It will, therefore, devolve upon us\nto present a brief and yet comprehensive epitome of the history of\nGrecian speculative thought.\n\n\"_Philosophy_,\" says Cousin, \"_is reflection_, and nothing else than\nreflection, in a vast form\"--\"Reflection elevated to the rank and\nauthority of a _method_.\" It is the mind looking back upon its own\nsensations, perceptions, cognitions, ideas, and from thence to the\n_causes_ of these sensations, cognitions, and ideas. It is thought\npassing beyond the simple perceptions of things, beyond the mere\nspontaneous operations of the mind in the cognition of things to seek\nthe _ground_, and _reason_, and _law_ of things. It is the effort of\nreason to solve the great problem of \"Being and Becoming,\" of appearance\nand reality, of the changeful and the permanent. Beneath the endless\ndiversity of the universe, of existence and action, there must be a\nprinciple of unity; below all fleeting appearances there must be a\npermanent substance; beyond this everlasting flow and change, this\nbeginning and ending of finite existence, there must be an _eternal\nbeing_, the source and cause of all we see and know, _What is that\nprinciple of unity, that permanent substance_, or principle, or being?\n\nThis fundamental question has assumed three separate forms or aspects in\nthe history of philosophy. These forms have been determined by the\nobjective phenomena which most immediately arrested and engaged the\nattention of men. If external nature has been the chief object of\nattention, then the problem of philosophy has been, _What is the\narch\u00ea--_the beginning; what are the first principles_--the elements from\nwhich, the ideas or laws according to which, the efficient cause or\nenergy by which, and the reason or end for which the universe exists?_\nDuring this period reflective thought was a PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. If the\nphenomena of mind--the opinions, beliefs, judgments of men--are the\nchief object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been,\n_What are the fundamental Ideas which are unchangeable and permanent\namid all the diversities of human opinions, connecting appearance with\nreality, and constituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute\ntruth?_ Reflective thought is now a PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS. Then, lastly,\nif the practical activities of life and the means of well-being be the\ngrand object of attention, then the problem of philosophy has been,\n_What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of\nhuman conduct, we may determine what is right and good in individual,\nsocial, and political life?_ And now reflective thought is a PHILOSOPHY\nOF LIFE. These are the grand problems with which philosophy has grappled\never since the dawn of reflection. They all appear in Greek philosophy,\nand have a marked chronology. As systems they succeed each other, just\nas rigorously as the phenomena of Greek civilization.\n\nThe Greek schools of philosophy have been classified from various points\nof view. In view of their geographical relations, they have been divided\ninto the _Ionian_, the _Italian_, the _Eleatic_, the _Athenian_, and the\n_Alexandrian_. In view of their prevailing spirit and tendency, they\nhave been classified by Cousin as the Sensational, the Idealistic, the\nSkeptical, and the Mystical. The most natural and obvious method is that\nwhich (regarding Socrates as the father of Greek philosophy in the\ntruest sense) arranges all schools from the Socratic stand point, and\ntherefore in the chronological order of development:\n\n     I. THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.\n     II. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.\n     III. THE POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.\n\nThe history of philosophy is thus divided into three grand epochs. The\nfirst reaching from Thales to the time of Socrates (B.C. 639-469): the\nsecond from the birth of Socrates to the death of Aristotle (B.C.\n469-322); the third from the death of Aristotle to the Christian era\n(B.C. 322, A.D. 1). Greek philosophy during the first period was almost\nexclusively a philosophy of nature; during the second period, a\nphilosophy of mind; during the last period, a philosophy of life.\nNature, man, and society complete the circle of thought. Successive\nsystems, of course, overlap each other, both in the order of time and as\nsubjects of human speculation; and the results of one epoch of thought\nare transmitted to and appropriated by another; but, in a general sense,\nthe order of succession has been very much as here indicated. Setting\naside minor schools and merely incidental discussions, and fixing our\nattention on the general aspects of each historic period, we shall\ndiscover that the first period was eminently _Physical_, the second\n_Psychological_, the last _Ethical_. Every stage of progress which\nreason, on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds, would suggest as the natural order of\nthought, or of which the development of an individual mind would furnish\nan analogy, had a corresponding realization in the development of\nGrecian thought from the time of Thales to the Christian era. \"Thought,\"\nsays Cousin, \"in the first trial of its strength is drawn without.\" The\nfirst object which engages the attention of the child is the outer\nworld. He asks the \"_how_\" and \"_why_\" of all he sees. His reason urges\nhim to seek an explanation of the universe. So it was in the _childhood_\nof philosophy. The first essays of human thought were, almost without\nexception, discourses peri physe\u00f4s (De rerum natura), of the nature of\nthings. Then the rebound of baffled reason from the impenetrable\nbulwarks of the universe drove the mind back upon itself. If the youth\ncan not interpret nature, he can at least \"know himself,\" and find\nwithin himself the ground and reason of all existence. There are\n\"_ideas_\" in the human mind which are copies of those \"_archetypal\nideas_\" which dwell in the Creative Mind, and after which the universe\nwas built. If by \"analysis\" and \"definition\" these universal notions can\nbe distinguished from that which is particular and contingent in the\naggregate of human knowledge, then so much of eternal truth has been\nattained. The achievements of philosophic thought in this direction,\nduring the Socratic age, have marked it as the most brilliant period in\nthe history of philosophy--the period of its _youthful_ vigor. Deeply\nimmersed in the practical concerns and conflicts of public life,\n_manhood_ is mainly occupied with questions of personal duty, and\nindividual and social well-being. And so, during the hopeless turmoil of\ncivil disturbance which marked the decline of national greatness in\nGrecian history, philosophy was chiefly occupied with questions of\npersonal interest and personal happiness. The poetic enthusiasm with\nwhich a nobler age had longed for _truth_, and sought it as the highest\ngood, has all disappeared, and now one sect seeks refuge from the storms\nand agitations of the age in Stoical indifference, the other in\nEpicurean effeminacy.\n\nIf now we have succeeded in presenting the real problem of philosophy,\nit will at once be obvious that the inquiry was not, in any proper\nsense, _theological_. Speculative thought, during the period we have\nmarked as the era of Greek philosophy, was not an inquiry concerning the\nexistence or nature of God, or concerning the relations of man to God,\nor the duties which man owes to God. These questions were all remitted\nto the _theologian_. There was a clear line of demarkation separating\nthe domains of religion and philosophy. Religion rested solely on\nauthority, and appealed to the instinctive faith of the human heart. She\npermitted no encroachment upon her settled usages, and no questioning of\nher ancient beliefs. Philosophy rested on reason alone. It was an\nindependent effort of thought to interpret nature, and attain the\nfundamental grounds of human knowledge--to find an arch\u00ea--a first\nprinciple, which, being assumed, should furnish a rational explanation\nof all existence. If philosophy reach the conclusion that the arch\u00eb was\nwater, or air, or fire, or a chaotic mixture of all the elements or\natoms, extended and self-moved, or monads, or to pan, or uncreated mind,\nand that conclusion harmonized with the ancient standards of religious\nfaith--well; if not, philosophy must present some method of\nconciliation. The conflicts of faith and reason; the stragglings of\ntraditional authority to maintain supremacy; the accommodations and\nconciliations attempted in those primitive times, would furnish a\nchapter of peculiar interest, could it now be written.\n\nThe poets who appeared in the dim twilight of Grecian\ncivilization--Orpheus, Mus\u00e6us, Homer, Hesiod--seem to have occupied the\nsame relation to the popular mind in Greece which the Bible now sustains\nto Christian communities.[387] Not that we regard them as standing on\nequal ground of authority, or in any sense a revelation. But, in the eye\nof the wondering Greek, they were invested with the highest sacredness\nand the supremest authority. The high poetic inspiration which pervaded\nthem was a supernatural gift. Their sublime utterances were accepted as\nproceeding from a divine afflatus. They were the product of an age in\nwhich it was believed by all that the gods assumed a human form,[388]\nand held a real intercourse with gifted men. This universal faith is\nregarded by some as being a relic of still more distant times, a faint\nremembrance of the glory of patriarchal days. The more natural opinion\nis, that it was begotten of that universal longing of the human heart\nfor some knowledge of that unseen world of real being, which man\ninstinctively felt must lie beyond the world of fleeting change and\ndelusive appearances. It was a prolepsis of the soul, reaching upward\ntowards its source and goal. The poet felt within him some native\naffinities therewith, and longed for some stirring breath of heaven to\nsweep the harp-strings of the soul. He invoked the inspiration of the\nGoddess of Song, and waited for, no doubt believed in, some \"deific\nimpulse\" descending on him. And the people eagerly accepted his\nutterance as the teaching of the gods. They were too eager for some\nknowledge from that unseen world to question their credentials. Orpheus,\nHesiod, Homer, were the theologoi--the theologians of that age.[389]\n\n[Footnote 387: \"Homer was, in a certain sense, the Bible of the\nGreeks.\"--Whewell, \"Platonic Dialogues,\" p. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 388: The universality of this belief is asserted by Cicero:\n\"Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et\npopuli Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandem inter\nhomines divinationem.\"--Cicero, \"De Divin.\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 389: Cicero.]\n\nThese ancient poems, then, were the public documents of the religion of\nGreece--the repositories of the national faith. And it is deserving of\nespecial note that the philosopher was just as anxious to sustain his\nspeculations by quoting the high traditional authority of the ancient\ntheologian, as the propounder of modern novelties is to sustain his\nnotions by the authority of the Sacred Scriptures. Numerous examples of\nthis solicitude will recur at once to the remembrance of the student of\nPlato. All encroachments of philosophy upon the domains of religion were\nwatched as jealously in Athens in the sixth century before Christ, as\nthe encroachments of science upon the fields of theology were watched in\nRome in the seventeenth century after Christ. The court of the Areopagus\nwas as earnest, though not as fanatical and cruel, in the defense of the\nancient faith, as the court of the Inquisition was in the defense of the\ndogmas of the Romish Church. The people, also, as \"the sacred wars\" of\nGreece attest, were ready quickly to repel every assault upon the\nmajesty of their religion. And so philosophy even had its martyrs. The\ntears of Pericles were needed to save Aspasia, because she was suspected\nof philosophy. But neither his eloquence nor his tears could save his\nfriend Anaxagoras, and he was ostracized. Aristotle had the greatest\ndifficulty to save his life. And Plato was twice imprisoned, and once\nsold into slavery.[390]\n\n[Footnote 390: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 305.]\n\nIt is unnecessary that we should, in this place, again attempt the\ndelineation of the theological opinions of the earlier periods of\nGrecian civilization. That the ancient Greeks believed in _one Supreme\nGod_ has been conclusively proved by Cudworth. The argument of his\nfourth chapter is incontrovertible.[391] However great the number of\n\"generated gods\" who crowded the Olympus, and composed the ghostly array\nof Greek mythology, they were all subordinate agents, \"demiurges,\"\nemployed in the framing of the world and all material things, or else\nthe ministers of the moral and providential government of the eis Theos\nagentos--the one uncreated God. Beneath, or beyond the whole system of\npagan polytheism, we recognize a faith in an _Uncreated Mind_, the\nSource of all the intelligence, and order, and harmony which pervades\nthe universe the Fountain of law and justice; the Ruler of the world;\nthe Avenger of injured innocence; and the final Judge of men. The\nimmortality of the soul and a state of future retribution were necessary\ncorollaries of this sublime faith. This primitive theology was\nunquestionably the people's faith; the faith, also, of the philosopher,\nin his inmost heart, however far he might wander in speculative thought.\nThe instinctive feeling of the human heart, the spontaneous intuitions\nof the human reason, have led man, in every age, to recognize a God. It\nis within the fields of speculative thought that skepticism has had its\nbirth. Any thing like atheism has only made its appearance amid the\nefforts of human reason to explain the universe. The native sentiments\nof the heart and the spontaneous movements of the reason have always\nbeen towards faith, that is, towards \"a religious movement of the\nsoul.\"[392] Unbridled speculative thought, which turns towards the outer\nworld alone, and disregards \"the voices of the soul,\" tends towards\n_doubt_ and irreligion. But, as Cousin has said, \"a complete\nextravagance, a total delusion (except in case of real derangement), is\nimpossible.\" \"Beneath reflection there is still spontaneity, when the\nscholar has denied the existence of a God; listen to the man,\ninterrogate him unawares, and you will see that all his words betray the\nidea of a God, and that faith in a God is, without his recognition, at\nthe bottom of his heart.\"[393]\n\n[Footnote 391: \"Intellectual System of the Universe;\" see also ch. iii.,\n\"On the Religion of the Athenians.\"]\n\n[Footnote 392: Cousin's \"Hist. of Philos.,\" vol. i. p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 393: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 137.]\n\nLet us not, therefore, be too hasty in representing the early\nphilosophers as destitute of the idea of a God, because in the imperfect\nand fragmentary representations which are given us of the philosophical\nopinions of Thales, and Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, and Diogenes of\nApollonia, we find no explicit allusions to the _Uncreated Mind_ as the\nfirst principle and cause of all. A few sentences will comprehend the\nwhole of what remains of the opinions of the earliest philosophers, and\nthese were transmitted for ages by _oral_ tradition. To Plato and\nAristotle we are chiefly indebted for a stereotype of those scattered,\nfragmentary sentences which came to their hands through the dim and\ndistorting medium of more than two centuries. Surely no one imagines\nthese few sentences contain and sum up the results of a lifetime of\nearnest thought, or represent all the opinions and beliefs of the\nearliest philosophers! And should we find therein no recognition of a\npersonal God, would it not be most unfair and illogical to assert that\nthey were utterly ignorant of a God, or wickedly denied his being? If\nthey say \"there is no God,\" then they are foolish Atheists; if they are\nsilent on that subject, we have a right to assume they were Theists, for\nit is most natural to believe in God. And yet it has been quite\ncustomary for Christian teachers, after the manner of some Patristic\nwriters, to deny to those early sages the smallest glimpse of underived\nand independent knowledge of a Divine Being, in their zeal to assert for\nthe Sacred Scriptures the exclusive prerogative of revealing Him.\n\nNow in regard to the theological opinions of the Greek philosophers, we\nshall venture this general _lemma_--_the majority of them recognized an\n\"incorporeal substance\"_[394]_ an uncreated Intelligence, an ordering,\ngoverning Mind_. Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, who were\nMaterialists, are perhaps the only exceptions. Many of them were\nPantheists, in the higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associates\nthe universe with its framer and mover, still makes \"the moving\nprinciple\" superior to that which is moved. The world was a living\norganism,\n\n     \"Whose body nature is, and God the soul.\"\n\nUnquestionably most on them recognized the existence of _two_ first\nprinciples, substances essentially distinct, which had co-existed from\neternity--an incorporeal Deity and matter.[395] We grant that the free\nproduction of a universe by a creative fiat--the calling of matter into\nbeing by a simple act of omnipotence--is not elementary to human reason.\nThe famous physical axiom of antiquity, \"_De nihilo nihil, in nihilum\nposse reverti\"_ under one aspect, may be regarded as the expression of\nthe universal consciousness of a mental inability to conceive a creation\nout of nothing, or an annihilation.[396] \"We can not conceive, either,\non the one hand, nothing becoming something, or something becoming\nnothing, on the other hand. When God is said to create the universe out\nof nothing, we think this by supposing that he evolves the universe out\nof himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation only by\nconceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into\npower.\"[397] \"It is by _faith_ we understand the worlds were framed by\nthe _word of God_, so that things which are were not made from things\nwhich do appear\"--that is, from pre-existent matter.\n\n[Footnote 394: \"Ousian as\u00f4maton.\"--Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 395: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 396: Mansell's \"Limits of Religious Thought,\" p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 397: Sir William Hamilton's \"Discussions on Philosophy,\" p.\n575.]\n\nThose writers[398] are, therefore, clearly in error who assert that the\nearliest question of Greek philosophy was, What is God? and that various\nand discordant answers were given, Thales saying, water is God,\nAnaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire; Pythagoras, numbers; and so on. The\nidea of God is a native intuition of the mind. It springs up\nspontaneously from the depths of the human soul. The human mind\nnaturally recognizes God as an uncreated Mind, and recognizes itself as\n\"the offspring of God.\" And, therefore, it is simply impossible for it\nto acknowledge water, or air, or fire, or any material thing to be its\nGod. Now they who reject this fundamental principle evidently\nmisapprehend the real problem of early Grecian philosophic thought. The\nexternal world, the material universe, was the first object of their\ninquiry, and the method of their inquiry was, at the first stage, purely\nphysical. Every object of sense had a beginning and an end; it rose out\nof something, and it fell back into something. Beneath this ceaseless\nflow and change there must be some permanent principle. What is that\nstoicheon--that first element? The changes in the universe seem to obey\nsome principle of law--they have an orderly succession. What is that\nmorph\u00ea--that form, or ideal, or archetype, proper to each thing, and\naccording to which all things are produced? These changes must be\nproduced by some efficient cause, some power or being which is itself\nimmobile, and permanent, and eternal, and adequate to their production.\nWhat is that arch\u00ea t\u00eas kin\u00ease\u00f4s--that first principle of movement Then,\nlastly, there must be an end for which all things exist--a good reason\nwhy things are as they are, and not otherwise. What is that to ou eneken\nkai to agathon--that reason and good of all things? Now these are all\narchai or first principles of the universe. \"Common to all first\nprinciples,\" says Aristotle, \"is the being, the original, from which a\nthing is, or is produced, or is known.\"[399] First principles,\ntherefore, include both elements and causes, and, under certain aspects,\nelements are also causes, in so far as they are that without which a\nthing can not be produced. Hence that highest generalization by\nAristotle of all first principles; as--1. The Material Cause; 2. The\nFormal Cause; 3. The Efficient Cause; 4. The Final Cause. The grand\nsubject of inquiry in ancient philosophy was not alone what is the final\n_element_ from which all things have been produced? nor yet what is the\n_efficient cause_ of the movement and the order of the universe? _but\nwhat are those First Principles which, being assumed, shall furnish a\nrational explanation of all phenomena, of all becoming?_\n\n[Footnote 398: As the writer of the article \"Attica,\" in the\nEncyclop\u00e6dia Britannica.]\n\n[Footnote 399: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. iv. ch. i. p. 112 (Bohn's edition).]\n\nSo much being premised, we proceed to consider the efforts and the\nresults of philosophic thought in\n\n\n\nTHE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.\n\n\"The first act in the drama of Grecian speculation was performed on the\nvaried theatre of the Grecian colonies--Asiatic, insular, and Italian,\nverging at length (in Anaxagoras) towards Athens.\" During the progress\nof this drama two distinct schools of philosophy were developed, having\ndistinct geographical provinces, one on the east, the other on the west,\nof the peninsula of Greece, and deriving their names from the localities\nin which they flourished. The earliest was the _Ionian;_ the latter was\nthe _Italian_ school.\n\nIt would be extremely difficult, at this remote period, to estimate the\ninfluence which geographical conditions and ethnical relations exerted\nin determining the course of philosophic thought in these schools.\nUnquestionably those conditions contributed somewhat towards fixing\ntheir individuality. At the same time, it must be granted that the\ndistinction in these two schools of philosophy is of a deeper character\nthan can be represented or explained by geographical surroundings; it is\na distinction reaching to the very foundation of their habits of\nthought. These schools represent two distinct aspects of philosophic\nthought, two distinct methods in which the human mind has essayed to\nsolve the problem of the universe.\n\nThe ante-Socratic schools were chiefly occupied with the study of\nexternal nature. \"Greek philosophy was, at its first appearance, a\nphilosophy of nature.\" It was an effort of the reason to reach a \"first\nprinciple\" which should explain the universe. This early attempt was\npurely speculative. It sought to interpret all phenomena by\n_hypotheses_, that is, by suppositions, more or less plausible,\nsuggested by physical analogies or by _\u00e0 priori_ rational conceptions.\n\nNow there are two distinct aspects under which nature presents itself to\nthe observant mind. The first and most obvious is the _simple phenomena_\nas perceived by the senses. The second is the _relations_ of\n_phenomena_, cognized by the reason alone. Let phenomena, which are\nindeed the first objects of perception, continue to be the chief and\nalmost exclusive object of thought, and philosophy is on the highway of\npure physics. On the other hand, instead of stopping at phenomena, let\ntheir relations become the sole object of thought, and philosophy is now\non the road of purely mathematical or metaphysical abstraction. Thus two\nschools of philosophy are developed, the one SENSATIONAL, the other\nIDEALIST. Now these, it will be found, are the leading and\ncharacteristic tendencies of the two grand divisions of the pre-Socratic\nschools; the Ionian is _sensational_, the Italian is _idealist_.\n\nThese two schools have again been the subject of a further subdivision\nbased upon diverse habits of thought. The Ionian school sought to\nexplain the universe by _physical analogies._ Of these there are two\nclear and obvious divisions--analogies suggested by living organisms,\nand analogies suggested by mechanical arrangements. One class of\nphilosophers in the Ionian school laid hold on the first analogy. They\nregarded the world as a living being, spontaneously evolving itself--a\nvital organism whose successive developments and transformations\nconstitute all visible phenomena. A second class laid hold on the\nanalogy suggested by mechanical arrangements. For them the universe was\na grand superstructure, built up from elemental particles, arranged and\nunited by some ab-extra power or force, or else aggregated by some\ninherent mutual affinity. Thus we have two sects of the Ionian school;\nthe first, _Dynamical_ or vital; the second, _Mechanical_.[400]\n\n[Footnote 400: Ritter's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp. 191, 192.]\n\nThe Italian school sought to explain the universe by rational\nconceptions and _\u00e0 priori_ ideas. Now to those who seek, by simple\nreflection, to investigate the relations of the external world this\nmarked distinction will present itself: some are relations _between_\nsensible phenomena--relations of time, of place, of number, of\nproportion, and of harmony; others are relations _of_ phenomena to\nessential being--relations of qualities to substance, of becoming to\nbeing, of the finite to the infinite. The former constituted the field\nof Pythagorean the latter of Eleatic contemplation. The Pythagoreans\nsought to explain the universe by numbers, forms, and harmonies; the\nEleatics by the _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of unity, substance, Being _in se_, the\nInfinite. Thus were constituted a _Mathematical_ and a _Metaphysical_\nsect in the Italian school. The pre-Socratic schools may, therefore, be\ntabulated in the following order:\n\n     I. IONIAN (Sensational), (1.) PHYSICAL {Dynamical or Vital.\n                                            {Mechanical.\n\n     II. Italian (Idealist), {(2.) MATHEMATICAL Pythagoreans.\n                             {(3.) METAPHYSICAL Eleatics.\n\nI. _The Ionian or Physical School._--We have premised that the\nphilosophers of this school attempted the explanation of the universe by\nphysical analogies.\n\nOne class of these early speculators, the _Dynamical_, or vital\ntheorists, proceeded on the supposition of a living energy infolded in\nnature, which in its spontaneous development continuously undergoes\nalteration both of quality and form. This imperfect analogy is the first\nhypothesis of childhood. The child personifies the stone that hurts him,\nand his first impulse is to resent the injury as though he imagined it\nto be endowed with consciousness, and to be acting with design. The\nchildhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifies\neach individual existence--a rude Fetichism, which imagines a\nsupernatural power and presence enshrined in every object of nature, in\nevery plant, and stock, and stone. The childhood of philosophy (whose\ngenius is unity) personifies the universe. It regards the earth as one\nvast organism, animated by one soul, and this soul of the world as a\n\"created god.\"[401] The first efforts of philosophy were, therefore,\nsimply an attempt to explain the universe in harmony with the popular\ntheological beliefs. The cosmogonies of the early speculators in the\nIonian school were an elaboration of the ancient theogonies, but still\nan elaboration conducted under the guidance of that law of thought which\nconstrains man to seek for _unity_, and reduce the many to the one.\n\nTherefore, in attempting to construct a theory of the universe they\ncommenced by postulating an arch\u00ea--a first principle or element out of\nwhich, by a _vital_ process, all else should be produced. \"Accordingly,\nwhatever seemed the most subtle or pliable, as well as _universal_\nelement in the mass of the visible world, was marked as the seminal\nprinciple whose successive developments and transformations produced all\nthe rest.\"[402] With this seminal principle the living, _animating_\nprinciple seems to have been associated--in some instances perhaps\nconfounded, and in most instances called by the same name. And having\npursued this analogy so far, we shall find the _most decided and\nconclusive_ evidence of a tendency to regard the soul of man as similar,\nin its nature, to the soul which animates the world.\n\n[Footnote 401: Plato's \"Laws,\" bk. x. ch. i.; \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 402: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. 1. p.\n292.]\n\n_Thales of Miletus_(B.C. 636-542) was the first to lead the way in the\nperilous inquiry after an arch\u00ea, or first principle, which should\nfurnish a rational explanation of the universe. Following, as it would\nseem, the genealogy of Hesiod, he supposed _water_ to be the primal\nelement out of which all material things were produced. Aristotle\nsupposes he was impressed with this idea from observing that all things\nare nourished by moisture; warmth itself, he declared, proceeded from\nmoisture; the seeds of all things are moist; water, when condensed,\nbecomes earth.\n\nThus convinced of the universal presence of water, he declared it to be\nthe first principle of things.[403]\n\nAnd now, from this brief statement of the Thalean physics, are we to\nconclude that he recognized only a _material_ cause of the universe?\nSuch is the impression we receive from the reading of the First Book of\nAristotle's Metaphysics. His evident purpose is to prove that the first\nphilosophers of the Ionian school did not recognize an _efficient_\ncause. In his opinion, they were decidedly materialistic. Now to\nquestion the authority of Aristotle may appear to many an act of\npresumption. But Aristotle was not infallible; and nothing is more\ncertain than that in more than one instance he does great injustice to\nhis predecessors.[404] To him, unquestionably, belongs the honor of\nhaving made a complete and exhaustive classification of causes, but\nthere certainly does appear something more than vanity in the assumption\nthat he, of all the Greek philosophers, was the only one who recognized\nthem all. His sagacious classification was simply a resum\u00e8 of the labors\nof his predecessors. His \"principles\" or \"causes\" were incipient in the\nthought of the first speculators in philosophy. Their accurate\ndefinition and clearer presentation was the work of ages of analytic\nthought. The phrases \"efficient,\" \"formal,\" \"final\" cause, are, we\ngrant, peculiar to Aristotle; the ideas were equally the possession of\nhis predecessors.\n\n[Footnote 403: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 404: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 77;\nCousin's \"The True, the Beautiful, and the Good,\" p. 77.]\n\nThe evidence, we think, is conclusive that, with this primal element\n(water), Thales associated a formative principle of motion; to the\n\"material\" he added the \"efficient\" cause. A strong presumption in favor\nof this opinion is grounded on the psychological views of Thales. The\nauthor of \"De Placitis Philosophorum\" associates him with Pythagoras and\nPlato, in teaching that the soul is incorporeal, making it naturally\nself-active, and an intelligent substance.[405] And it is admitted by\nAristotle (rather unwillingly, we grant, but his testimony is all the\nmore valuable on that account) that, in his time, the opinion that the\nsoul is a principle, aeikin\u00eaton--ever moving, or essentially\nself-active, was currently ascribed to Thales. \"If we may rely on the\nnotices of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a\n_moving principle_.\"[406] Extending this idea, that the soul is a moving\nprinciple, he held that all motion in the universe was due to the\npresence of a living soul. \"He is reported to have said that the\nloadstone possessed a soul because it could move iron.\"[407] And he\ntaught that \"the world itself is _animated_, and full of gods.\"[408]\n\"Some think that _soul_ and _life_ is mingled with the whole universe;\nand thence, perhaps, was that [opinion] of Thales that all things are\nfull of gods,\"[409] portions, as Aristotle said, of the universal soul.\nThese views are quite in harmony with the theology which makes the Deity\nthe moving energy of the universe--the energy which wrought the\nsuccessive transformations of the primitive aqueous element. They also\nfurnish a strong corroboration of the positive statement of\nCicero--\"Aquam, dixit Thales, esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem\nqu\u00e6 ex aqua cuncta fingeret.\" Thales said that water is the first\nprinciple of things, but God was that mind which formed all things out\nof water;[410] as also that still more remarkable saying of Thales,\nrecorded by Diogenes Laertius; \"God is the most ancient of all things,\nfor he had no birth; the world is the most beautiful of all things, for\nit is the workmanship of God.\"[411] We are aware that some historians of\nphilosophy reject the statement of Cicero, because, say they, \"it does\nviolence to the chronology of speculation.\"[412] Following Hegel, they\nassert that Thales could have no conception of God as Intelligence,\nsince that is a conception of a more advanced philosophy. Such an\nopinion may be naturally expected from the philosopher who places God,\nnot at the commencement, but at the _end_ of things, God becoming\nconscious and intelligent in humanity. If, then, Hegel teaches that God\nhimself has had a progressive development, it is no wonder he should\nassert that the idea of God has also had an historic development, the\n_last_ term of which is an _intelligent God_. But he who believes that\nthe idea of God as the infinite and the perfect is native to the human\nmind, and that God stands at the beginning of the entire system of\nthings, will feel there is a strong _\u00e0 priori_ ground for the belief\nthat Thales recognized the existence of an _intelligent God who\nfashioned the universe_.\n\n[Footnote 405: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 406: Aristotle, \"De Anima,\" i. 2, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 407: Id., ib., i. 2, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 408: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" p. 18\n(Bohn's ed.).]\n\n[Footnote 409: Aristotle, \"De Anima,\" i. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 410: \"De Natura Deor.,\" bk. i. ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 411: \"Lives,\" etc., p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 412: Lewes's \"Hist. Philos.,\" p. 4.]\n\n_Anaximenes of Miletus_ (B.C. 529-480) we place next to Thales in the\nconsecutive history of thought. It has been usual to rank Anaximander\nnext to the founder of the Ionian School. The entire complexion of his\nsystem is, however, unlike that of a pupil of Thales. And we think a\ncareful consideration of his views will justify our placing him at the\nhead of the Mechanical or Atomic division of the Ionian school.\nAnaximenes is the historical successor of Thales; he was unquestionably\na vitalist. He took up the speculation where Thales had left it, and he\ncarried it a step forward in its development.[413]\n\nPursuing the same method as Thales, he was not, however, satisfied with\nthe conclusion he had reached. Water was not to Anaximenes the most\nsignificant, neither was it the most universal element. But air seemed\nuniversally present. \"The earth was a broad leaf resting upon it. All\nthings were produced from it; all things were resolved into it. When he\nbreathed he drew in a part of this universal life. All things are\nnourished by air.\"[414] Was not, therefore, _air_ the arch\u00ea, or primal\nelement of things?\n\n[Footnote 413: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p.\n203.]\n\n[Footnote 414: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 7.]\n\nThis brief notice of the physical speculations of Anaximenes is all that\nhas survived of his opinions. We search in vain for some intimations of\nhis theological views. On this merely negative ground, some writers have\nunjustly charged him with Atheism. Were we to venture a conjecture, we\nwould rather say that there are indications of a tendency to Pantheism\nin that form of it which associates God necessarily with the universe,\nbut does not utterly confound them. His fixing upon \"_air_\" as the\nprimal element, seems an effort to reconcile, in some apparently\nintermediate substance, the opposite qualities of corporeal and\nspiritual natures. Air is invisible, impalpable, all-penetrating, and\nyet in some manner appreciable to sense. May not the vital\ntransformations of this element have produced all the rest? The writer\nof the Article on Anaximenes in the Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica tells us (on\nwhat ancient authorities he saith not) that \"he asserted this air was\nGod, since the divine power resides in it and agitates it.\"\n\nSome indications of the views of Anaximenes may perhaps be gathered from\nthe teachings of Diogenes of Apollonia (B.C. 520-490,) who was the\ndisciple, and is generally regarded as the commentator and expounder of\nthe views of Anaximenes. The air of Diogenes was a soul; therefore it\nwas _living_, and not only living, but conscious and _intelligent_. \"It\nknows much,\" says he; \"for without _reason_ it would be impossible for\nall to be arranged duly and proportionately; and whatever objects we\nconsider will be found to be so arranged and ordered in the best and\nmost beautiful manner.\"[415] Here we have a distinct recognition of the\nfundamental axiom that _mind is the only valid explanation of the order\nand harmony which pervades the universe_. With Diogenes the first\nprinciple is a \"divine air,\" which is vital, conscious, and intelligent,\nwhich spontaneously evolves itself, and which, by its ceaseless\ntransformations, produces all phenomena. The soul of man is a detached\nportion of this divine element; his body is developed or evolved\ntherefrom. The theology of Diogenes, and, as we believe, of his master,\nAnaximenes also, was a species of Materialistic Pantheism.\n\n[Footnote 415: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 8;\nRitter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 214.]\n\n_Heraclitus of Ephesus_(B.C. 503-420) comes next in the order of\nspeculative thought. In his philosophy, _fire_ is the arch\u00ea, or first\nprinciple; but not fire in the usual acceptation of that term. The\nHeraclitean \"fire\" is not flame, which is only an intensity of fire, but\na warm, dry vapor--an _ether_, which may be illustrated, perhaps, by the\n\"caloric\" of modern chemistry. This \"_ether_\" was the primal element out\nof which the universe was formed; it was also a vital power or principle\nwhich animated the universe, and, in fact, the _cause_ of all its\nsuccessive phenomenal changes. \"The world,\" he said, \"was neither made\nby the gods nor men, and it was, and is, and ever shall be, an\n_ever-living fire_, in due proportion self-enkindled, and in due measure\nself-extinguished.\"[416] The universe is thus reduced to \"an eternal\nfire,\" whose ceaseless energy is manifested openly in the work of\ndissolution, and yet secretly, but universally, in the work of\nrenovation. The phenomena of the universe are explained by Heraclitus as\n\"the concurrence of opposite tendencies and efforts in the motions of\nthis ever-living fire, out of which results the most beautiful harmony.\nThis harmony of the world is one of conflicting impulses, like the lyre\nand the bow. The strife between opposite tendencies is the parent of all\nthings. All life is change, and change is strife.\"[417]\n\n[Footnote 416: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p.\n235.]\n\n[Footnote 417: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 70;\nRitter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 244.]\n\nHeraclitus was the first to proclaim the doctrine of the perpetual\nfluxion of the universe (to reon, to gignomenon--Unrest and\nDevelopment), the endless changes of matter, and the mutability and\nperishability of all individual things. This restless, changing flow of\nthings, which never _are_, but always are _becoming_, he pronounced to\nbe the _One_ and the _All_.\n\nFrom this statement of the physical theory of Heraclitus we might\nnaturally infer that he was a Hylopathean Atheist. Such an hypothesis\nwould not, however, be truthful or legitimate. On a more careful\nexamination, his system will be found to stand half-way between the\nmaterialistic and the spiritual conception of the Author of the\nuniverse, and marks, indeed, a transition from the one to the other.\nHeraclitus unquestionably held that all substance is material, for a\nphilosopher who proclaims, as he did, that the senses are the only\nsource of knowledge, must necessarily attach himself to a material\nelement as the primary one. And yet he seems to have _spiritualized_\nmatter. \"The moving unit of Heraclitus--the Becoming--is as immaterial\nas the resting unit of the Eleatics--the Being.\"[418] The Heraclitean\n\"_fire_\" is endowed with _spiritual_ attributes. \"Aristotle calls it\npsych\u00ea--soul, and says that it is as\u00f4mat\u00f4taton, or absolutely\nincorporeal (\"De Anima,\" i. 2. 16). It is, in effect, the common ground\nof the phenomena both of mind and matter it is not only the animating,\nbut also the intelligent and regulating principle of the universe; the\nZynos Logos, or universal Word or Reason, which it behooves all men to\nfollow.\"[419] The psychology of Heraclitus throws additional light upon\nhis theological opinions. With him human intelligence is a detached\nportion of the Universal Reason. \"Inhaling,\" said he, \"through the\nbreath the Universal Ether, which is Divine Reason, we become\nconscious.\" The errors and imperfections of humanity are consequently to\nbe ascribed to a deficiency of the Divine Reason in man. Whilst,\ntherefore, the theory of Heraclitus seems to materialize mind, it may,\nwith equal fairness, be said to spiritualize matter.\n\n[Footnote 418: Zeller's \"History of Greek Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 419: Butler's \"Lectures,\" vol. i. p. 297, note.]\n\nThe general inference, therefore, from all that remains of the doctrine\nof Heraclitus is that he was a Materialistic Pantheist. His God was a\nliving, rational, intelligent Ether--a soul pervading the universe. The\nform of the universe, its ever-changing phenomena, were a necessary\nemanation from, or a perpetual transformation of, this universal soul.\n\nWith Heraclitus we close our survey of that sect of the physical school\nwhich regarded the world as a living organism.\n\nThe second subdivision of the physical school, _the Mechanical_ or\n_Atomist theorists_, attempted the explanation of the universe by\nanalogies derived from mechanical collocations, arrangements, and\nmovements. The universe was regarded by them as a vast superstructure\nbuilt up from elemental particles, aggregated by some inherent force or\nmutual affinity.\n\n_Anaximander of Miletus_ (born B.C. 610) we place at the head of the\nMechanical sect of the Ionian school; first, on the authority of\nAristotle, who intimates that the philosophic dogmata of Anaximander\n\"resemble those of Democritus,\" who was certainly an Atomist; and,\nsecondly, because we can clearly trace a genetic connection between the\nopinions of Democritus and Leucippus and those of Anaximander.\n\nThe arch\u00ea, or first principle of Anaximander, was to apeiron, _the\nboundless, the illimitable, the infinite_. Some historians of philosophy\nhave imagined that the infinite of Anaximander was the \"unlimited all,\"\nand have therefore placed him at the head of the Italian or \"idealistic\nschool.\" These writers are manifestly in error. Anaximander was\nunquestionably a sensationalist. Whatever his \"infinite\" may be found to\nbe, one thing is clear, it was not a \"metaphysical infinite\"--it did not\ninclude infinite power, much less infinite mind.\n\nThe testimony of Aristotle is conclusive that by \"the infinite\"\nAnaximander understood the multitude of primary, material particles. He\ncalls it \"a migma, or mixture of elements.\"[420] It was, in fact, a\n_chaos_--an original state in which the primary elements existed in a\nchaotic combination without _limitation_ or division. He assumed a\ncertain \"_prima materia_,\" which was neither air, nor water, nor fire,\nbut a \"mixture\" of all, to be the first principle of the universe. The\naccount of the opinions of Anaximander which is given by Plutarch (\"De\nPlacita,\" etc.) is a further confirmation of our interpretation of his\ninfinite. \"Anaximander, the Milesian, affirmed the infinite to be the\nfirst principle, and that all things are generated out of it, and\ncorrupted again into it. _His infinite is nothing else but matter._\"\n\"Whence,\" says Cudworth, \"we conclude that Anaximander's infinite was\nnothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were actually or\npotentially contained all manner of qualities, by the fortuitous\nsecretion and segregation of which he supposed infinite worlds to be\nsuccessively generated and corrupted. So that we may easily guess whence\nLeucippus and Democritus had their infinite worlds, and perceive how\nnear akin these two Atheistic hypotheses were.\"[421] The reader, whose\ncuriosity may lead him to consult the authorities collected by Cudworth\n(pp. 185-188), will find in the doctrine of Anaximander a rude\nanticipation of the modern theories of \"spontaneous generation\" and \"the\ntransmutation of species.\" In the fragments of Anaximander that remain\nwe find no recognition of an ordering Mind, and his philosophy is the\ndawn of a Materialistic school.\n\n[Footnote 420: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 421: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. pp. 186, 187.]\n\n_Leucippus of Miletus_ (B.C. 500-400) appears, in the order of\nspeculation, as the successor of Anaximander. _Atoms_ and _space_ are,\nin his philosophy, the archai, or first principles of all things.\n\"Leucippus (and his companion, Democritus) assert that the plenum and\nthe vacuum [_i.e._, body and space] are the first principles, whereof\none is the Ens, the other Non-ens; the differences of the body, which\nare only figure, order, and position, are the causes of all\nothers.\"[422]\n\n[Footnote 422: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" p. 21 (Bohn's edition).]\n\nHe also taught that the elements, and the worlds derived from them, are\n_infinite_. He describes the manner in which the worlds are produced as\nfollows: \"Many bodies of various kinds and shapes are borne by\namputation from the infinite [_i.e._, the chaotic migma of Anaximander]\ninto a vast vacuum, and then they, being collected together, produce a\nvortex; according to which, they, dashing against each other, and\nwhirling about in every direction, are separated in such a way that like\nattaches itself to like; bodies are thus, without ceasing, united\naccording to the impulse given by the vortex, and in this way the earth\nwas produced.\"[423] Thus, through a boundless void, atoms infinite in\nnumber and endlessly diversified in form are eternally wandering; and,\nby their aggregation, infinite worlds are successively produced. These\natoms are governed in their movements by a dark negation of\nintelligence, designated \"Fate,\" and all traces of a Supreme Mind\ndisappear in his philosophy. It is a system of pure materialism, which,\nin fact, is Atheism.\n\n[Footnote 423: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives,\" p. 389.]\n\n_Democritus of Abdera_ (B.C. 460-357), the companion of Leucippus, also\ntaught \"that _atoms_ and the _vacuum_ were the beginning of the\nuniverse.\"[424] These atoms, he taught, were infinite in number,\nhomogeneous, extended, and possessed of those primary qualities of\nmatter which are necessarily involved in extension in space--as size,\nfigure, situation, divisibility, and mobility. From the combination of\nthese atoms all other existences are produced; fire, air, earth, and\nwater; sun, moon, and stars; plants, animals, and men; the soul itself\nis an aggregation of round, moving atoms. And \"motion, which is the\ncause of the production of every thing, he calls _necessity_.\"[425]\nAtoms are thus the only real existences; these, without any pre-existent\nmind, or intelligence, were the original of all things.\n\n[Footnote 424: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives,\" p. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 425: Id, ib., p. 394.]\n\nThe psychological opinions of Democritus were as decidedly materialistic\nas his physical theories. All knowledge is derived from sensation. It is\nonly by material impact that we can know the external world, and every\nsense is, in reality, a kind of touch. Material images are being\ncontinually thrown off from the surface of external objects which come\ninto actual contact with the organs of sense. The primary qualities of\nmatter, that is, those which are involved in extension in space, are the\nonly objects of real knowledge; the secondary qualities of matter, as\nsoftness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, and the like, are but\nmodifications of the human sensibilities. \"The sweet exists only in\nform--the bitter in form, hot in form, color in form; but in causal\nreality only atoms and space exist. The sensible things which are\nsupposed by opinion to exist have no real existence, but atoms and space\nalone exist.\"[426]\n\n[Footnote 426: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 96. The\nwords of Democritus, as reported by Sextus Empiricus.]\n\nThus by Democritus was laid the basis of a system of absolute\nmaterialism, which was elaborated and completed by Epicurus, and has\nbeen transmitted to our times. It has undergone some slight\nmodifications, adapting it to the progress of physical science; but it\nis to-day substantially the theory of Democritus. In Democritus we have\nthe culmination of the mechanical theory of the Ionian or Physical\nschool. In physics and psychology it terminated in pure materialism. In\ntheology it ends in positive Atheism.\n\nThe fundamental error of all the philosophers of the physical school was\nthe assumption, tacitly or avowedly, that sense-perception is the only\nsource of knowledge. This was the fruitful source of all their erroneous\nconclusions, the parent of all their materialistic tendencies. This led\nthem continually to seek an arch\u00ea, or first principle of the universe,\nwhich should, under some form, be appreciable to _sense_; and\nconsequently the course of thought tended naturally towards materialism.\n\nThales was unquestionably a dualist. Instructed by traditional\nintimations, or more probably guided by the spontaneous apperceptions of\nreason, he recognized, with more or less distinctness, an incorporeal\nDeity as the moving, animating, and organizing cause of the universe.\nThe idea of God is a truth so self-evident as to need no demonstration.\nThe human mind does not attain to the idea of a God as the last\nconsequence of a series of antecedent principles. It comes at once, by\nan inherent and necessary movement of thought, to the recognition of God\nas the First Principle of all principles. But when, instead of\nhearkening to the simple and spontaneous intuitions of the mind, man\nturns to the world of sense, and loses himself in discursive thought,\nthe conviction of a personal God becomes obscured. Then, amid the\nendlessly diversified phenomena of the universe, he seeks for a cause or\norigin which in some form shall be appreciable to sense. The mere study\nof material phenomena, scientifically or unscientifically conducted,\nwill never yield the sense of the living God. Nature must be\ninterpreted, can only be interpreted in the light of certain _\u00e0 priori_\nprinciples of reason, or we can never \"ascend from nature up to nature's\nGod.\" Within the circle of mere sense-perception, the dim and\nundeveloped consciousness of God will be confounded with the universe.\nThus, in Anaximenes, God is partially confounded with \"air,\" which\nbecomes a symbol; then a vehicle of the informing mind; and the result\nis a semi-pantheism. In Heraclitus, the \"ether\" is, at first, a\nsemi-symbol of the Deity; at length, God is utterly confounded with this\nether, or \"rational fire,\" and the result is a definite _materialistic\npantheism_. And, finally, when this feeling or dim consciousness of God,\nwhich dwells in all human souls, is not only disregarded, but pronounced\nto be an illusion--a phantasy; when all the analogies which intelligence\nsuggests are disregarded, and a purely mechanical theory of the universe\nis adopted, the result is the utter negation of an Intelligent Cause,\nthat is, _absolute Atheism_, as in Leucippus and Democritus.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued_).\n\nPRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOL _(continued_).\n\nIDEALIST: PYTHAGORAS--XENOPHANES--PARMENIDES--ZENO. NATURAL REALIST:\nANAXAGORAS.\n\n\nSOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n\nSOCRATES.\n\n\nIn the previous chapter we commenced our inquiry with the assumption\nthat, in the absence of the true inductive method of philosophy which\nobserves, and classifies, and generalizes facts, and thence attains a\ngeneral principle or law, two only methods were possible to the early\nspeculators who sought an explanation of the universe--1st, That of\nreasoning from physical analogies; or, 2d, That of deduction from\nrational conceptions, or _\u00e0 priori_ ideas.\n\nAccordingly we found that one class of speculators fixed their attention\nsolely on the mere phenomena of nature, and endeavored, amid sensible\nthings, to find a _single_ element which, being more subtile, and\npliable, and universally diffused, could be regarded as the ground and\noriginal of all the rest, and from which, by a vital transformation, or\nby a mechanical combination and arrangement of parts, all the rest\nshould be evolved. The other class passed beyond the simple phenomena,\nand considered only the abstract _relations_ of phenomena among\nthemselves, or the relations of phenomena to the necessary and universal\nideas of the reason, and supposed that, in these relations, they had\nfound an explanation of the universe. The former was the Ionian or\nSensation school; the latter was the Italian or Idealist school.\n\nWe have traced the method according to which the Ionian school\nproceeded, and estimated the results attained. We now come to consider\nthe method and results of\n\nTHE ITALIAN OR IDEALIST SCHOOL.\n\nThis school we have found to be naturally subdivided into--1st, The\n_Mathematical_ sect, which attempted the explanation of the universe by\nthe abstract conceptions of number, proportion, order, and harmony; and,\n2d, The _Metaphysical_ school, which attempted the interpretation of the\nuniverse according to the _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of unity, of Being _in se_,\nof the Infinite, and the Absolute.\n\n_Pythagoras of Samos_(born B.C. 605) was the founder of the Mathematical\nschool.\n\nWe are conscious of the difficulties which are to be encountered by the\nstudent who seeks to attain a definite comprehension of the real\nopinions of Pythagoras. The genuineness of many of those writings which\nwere once supposed to represent his views, is now questioned. \"Modern\ncriticism has clearly shown that the works ascribed to Tim\u00e6us and\nArchytas are spurious; and the treatise of Ocellus Lucanus on 'The\nNature of the All' can not have been written by a Pythagorean.\"[427] The\nonly writers who can be regarded as at all reliable are Plato and\nAristotle; and the opinions they represent are not so much those of\nPythagoras as \"the Pythagoreans.\" This is at once accounted for by the\nfact that Pythagoras taught in secret, and did not commit his opinions\nto writing. His disciples, therefore, represent the _tendency_ rather\nthan the actual tenets of his system; these were no doubt modified by\nthe mental habits and tastes of his successors.\n\n[Footnote 427: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 24.]\n\nWe may safely assume that the proposition from which Pythagoras started\nwas the fundamental idea of all Greek speculation--_that beneath the\nfleeting forms and successive changes of the universe there is some\npermanent principle of unity_[428] The Ionian school sought that\nprinciple in some common physical element; Pythagoras sought, not for\n\"elements,\" but for \"relations,\" and through these relations for\nultimate laws indicating primal forces.\n\n[Footnote 428: See Plato, \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix. p. 331 (Bohn's edition);\nAristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. v. ch. iii.]\n\nAristotle affirms that Pythagoras taught \"that _numbers_ are the first\nprinciples of all entities,\" and, \"as it were, a _material_ cause of\nthings,\"[429] or, in other words, \"that numbers are substances that\ninvolve a separate subsistence, and are primary causes of\nentities.\"[430]\n\n[Footnote 429: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. v.]\n\n[Footnote 430: Id., ib., bk. xii. ch. vi.]\n\nAre we then required to accept the dictum of Aristotle as final and\ndecisive? Did Pythagoras really teach that numbers are real\nentities--the _substance_ and cause of all other existences? The reader\nmay be aware that this is a point upon which the historians of\nphilosophy are not agreed. Ritter is decidedly of opinion that the\nPythagorean formula \"can only be taken symbolically.\"[431] Lewes insists\nit must be understood literally.[432] On a careful review of all the\narguments, we are constrained to regard the conclusion of Ritter as most\nreasonable. The hypothesis \"that numbers are real entities\" does\nviolence to every principle of common sense. This alone constitutes a\nstrong _\u00e0 priori_ presumption that Pythagoras did not entertain so\nglaring an absurdity. The man who contributed so much towards perfecting\nthe mathematical sciences, who played so conspicuous a part in the\ndevelopment of ancient philosophy, and who exerted so powerful a\ndetermining influence on the entire current of speculative thought, did\nnot obtain his ascendency over the intellectual manhood of Greece by the\nutterance of such enigmas. And further, in interpreting the philosophic\nopinions of the ancients, we must be guided by this fundamental\ncanon--\"The human mind has, under the necessary operation of its own\nlaws, been compelled to entertain the same fundamental ideas, and the\nhuman heart to cherish the same feelings in all ages.\" Now if a careful\nphilosophic criticism can not render the _reported_ opinions of an\nancient teacher into the universal language of the reason and heart of\nhumanity, we must conclude either that his opinions were misunderstood\nand misrepresented by some of his successors, or else that he stands in\nutter isolation, both from the present and the past. His doctrine has,\nthen, no relation to the successions of thought, and no place in the\nhistory of philosophy. Nay, more, such a doctrine has in it no element\nof vitality, no germ of eternal truth, and must speedily perish. Now it\nis well known that the teaching of Pythagoras awakened the deepest\nintellectual sympathy of his age; that his doctrine exerted a powerful\ninfluence on the mind of Plato, and, through him, upon succeeding ages;\nand that, in some of its aspects, it now survives, and is more\ninfluential to-day than in any previous age; but this element of\nimmutable and eternal truth was certainly not contained in the inane and\nempty formula, \"that numbers are real existences, the causes of all\nother existences!\" If the fame of Pythagoras had rested on such \"airy\nnothings,\" it would have melted away before the time of Plato.\n\n[Footnote 431: \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 432: \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 38.]\n\nWe grant there is considerable force in the argument of Lewes. He urges,\nwith some pertinence, the unquestionable fact that Aristotle asserts,\nagain and again, that the Pythagoreans taught \"that numbers are the\nprinciples and substance of things as well as the causes of their\nmodifications;\" and he argues that we are not justified in rejecting the\nauthority of Aristotle, unless better evidence can be produced.\n\nSo far, however, as the authority of Aristotle is concerned, even Lewes\nhimself charges him, in more than one instance, with strangely\nmisrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors.[433] Aristotle is\nevidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize the\nhistorian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to question\nhis integrity. Indeed, throughout his \"Metaphysics\" he exhibits the\negotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has\nthe full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly\nassociates the \"_numbers_\" of Pythagoras with the \"_forms_\" and\n\"_ideas_\" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies \"forms\" and\n\"numbers,\" and regards them as real entities--substances, and causes of\nall other things. \"_Forms are numbers_[434]... so Plato affirmed,\nsimilar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes to\nother things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, asserted with\nthem_.\"[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments in\nrefuting the doctrines of both.\n\n[Footnote 433: \"Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras\"\n(Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy\"). He represents him as\nemploying mind (nous) simply as \"a _machine_\" for the production of the\nworld;--\"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of its\nbeing necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by force\nto his assistance\" \"Metaphysics,\" (bk. i. ch. iv.). But he is evidently\ninconsistent with himself, for in \"De Anima\" (bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells\nus that \"Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ in\nthe whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_.\" We may further ask,\nis not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final\ncause, even according to Aristotle?\n\nHe also totally misrepresents Plato's doctrine of \"Ideas.\" \"Plato's\nIdeas,\" he says, \"are substantial existences--real beings\"\n(\"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. ix.). Whereas, as we shall subsequently show,\n\"they are objects of pure conception for human reason, and they are\nattributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially exist.\"\n(Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 415). It is also pertinent\nto inquire, what is the difference between the \"formal cause\" of\nAristotle and the archetypal ideas of Plato? and is not Plato's to\nagathon the \"final cause?\" Yet Aristotle is forever congratulating\nhimself that he alone has properly treated the \"formal\" and the \"final\ncause!\"]\n\n[Footnote 434: This, however, was not the doctrine of Plato. He does not\nsay \"forms are numbers.\" He says: \"God formed things as they first arose\naccording to forms _and_ numbers.\" See \"Timaeus,\" ch. xiv. and xxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 435: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\nNow the writings of Plato are all extant to-day, and accessible in an\nexcellent English translation to any of our readers. Cousin has\nshown,[436] most conclusively (and we can verify his conclusions for\nourselves), that Aristotle has totally misrepresented Plato. And if, in\nthe same connection, and in the course of the same argument, and in\nregard to the same subjects, he misrepresents Plato, it is most probable\nhe also misrepresents Pythagoras.\n\n[Footnote 436: \"The True, the Beautiful, and the Good,\" pp. 77-81.]\n\nIt is, however, a matter of the deepest interest for us to find the\nevidence gleaming out here and there, on the pages of Aristotle, that he\nhad some knowledge of the fact that the Pythagorean numbers were\nregarded as _symbols_. The \"numbers\" of Pythagoras are, in the mind of\nAristotle, clearly identified with the \"forms\" of Plato. Now, in Chapter\nVI. of the First Book he says that Plato taught that these \"forms\" were\nparadeigmata--models, patterns, exemplars after which created things\nwere framed. The numbers of Pythagoras, then, are also models and\nexemplars. This also is admitted by Aristotle. The Pythagoreans indeed\naffirm that entities subsist by an _imitation_ (mim\u00easis) of\nnumbers.[437] Now if ideas, forms, numbers, were the models or paradigms\nafter which \"the Operator\" formed all things, surely it can not be\nlogical to say they were the \"material\" out of which all things were\nframed, much less the \"efficient cause\" of things. The most legitimate\nconclusion we can draw, even from the statements of Aristotle, is that\nthe Pythagoreans regarded numbers as the best expression or\nrepresentation of those laws of proportion, and order, and harmony,\nwhich seemed, to their eyes, to pervade the universe. Their doctrine was\na faint glimpse of that grand discovery of modern science--that all the\nhigher laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitative\nstatement.\n\n[Footnote 437: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\nThe fact seems to be this, the Pythagoreans busied themselves chiefly\nwith what Aristotle designates \"the _formal_ cause,\" and gave little\nattention to the inquiry concerning \"the _material_ cause.\" This is\nadmitted by Aristotle. Concerning fire, or earth, or the other bodies of\nsuch kind, they have declared nothing whatsoever, inasmuch as affirming,\nin my opinion, nothing that is peculiar concerning _sensible_\nnatures.[438] They looked, as we have previously remarked, to the\nrelations of phenomena, and having discovered certain \"numerical\nsimilitudes,\" they imagined they had attained an universal principle, or\nlaw. \"If all the essential properties and attributes of things were\nfully represented by the relations of numbers, the philosophy which\nsupplied such an explanation of the universe might well be excused from\nexplaining, also, that existence of objects, which is distinct from the\nexistence of all their qualities and properties. The Pythagorean\ndoctrine of numbers might have been combined with the doctrine of atoms,\nand the combination might have led to results worthy of notice. But, so\nfar as we are aware, no such combination was attempted, and perhaps we\nof the present day are only just beginning to perceive, through the\ndisclosures of chemistry and crystallography, the importance of such an\ninquiry.\"[439]\n\n[Footnote 4398: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 439: Whewell's \"History of Inductive Sciences,\" vol. i. p.\n78.]\n\nThese preliminary considerations will have cleared and prepared the way\nfor a fuller presentation of the philosophic system of Pythagoras. The\nmost comprehensive and satisfactory exposition of his \"method\" is that\ngiven by Wm Archer Butler in his \"_Lectures on Ancient Philosophy_,\" and\nwe feel we can not do better than condense his pages.[440]\n\n[Footnote 440: Lecture VI. vol. i.]\n\nPythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty idea\nof _order_, which seemed to reveal itself to his mind, as the presiding\ngenius of the serene and silent world. He had, from his youth, dwelt\nwith delight upon the eternal relations of space, and determinate form,\nand number, in which the very idea of _proportion_ seems to find its\nfirst and immediate development, and without the latter of which\n(number), all proportion is absolutely inconceivable. To this ardent\ngenius, whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprising\ncontributions to the sum of discoverable relations, it at length began\nto appear as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in these\nmysterious correspondences.\n\nIn making this extensive generalization, Pythagoras may, on his known\nprinciples, be supposed to have reasoned as follows: The mind of man\nperceives the relations of an eternal _order_ in the proportions of\nspace, and form, and number. That mind is, no doubt, a portion of the\nsoul which animates and governs the universe; for on what other\nsupposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity--the\nvery principle which characterizes the prime mover, and can scarce be\nascribed to an inferior nature? And on what other supposition are we to\nexplain the identity which subsists between the principles of order,\nauthenticated by the reason and the facts of order which are found to\nexist in the forms and multiplicities around us, and independent of us?\nCan this sameness be other than the sameness of the internal and\nexternal principles of a common nature? The proportions of the universe\ninhere in its divine soul; they are indeed its very essence, or at\nleast, its attributes. The ideas or principles of Order which are\nimplanted in the human reason, must inhere in the Divine Reason, and\nmust be reflected in the visible world, which is its product. Man, then,\ncan boldly affirm the necessary harmony of the world, because he has in\nhis own mind a revelation which declares that the world, in its real\nstructure, must be the image and copy of that divine _proportion_ which\nhe inwardly adores.[441]\n\n[Footnote 441: It is an opinion which goes as far back as the time of\nPlato, and even Pythagoras, and has ever since been widely entertained,\nthat beauty of _form_ consists in some sort of _proportion_ or _harmony_\nwhich may admit of a mathematical expression; and later and more\nscientific research is altogether in its favor. It is now established\nthat complementary colors, that is, colors which when combined make up\nthe full beam, are felt to be beautiful when seen simultaneously; that\nis, the mind is made to delight in the unities of nature. At the basis\nof music there are certain fixed ratios; and in poetry, of every\ndescription, there are measures, and correspondencies. Pythagoras has\noften been ridiculed for his doctrine of \"the music of the spheres;\" and\nprobably his doctrine was somewhat fanciful, but later science shows\nthat there is a harmony in all nature--in its forms, in its forces, and\nin its motions. The highest unorganized and all organized objects take\ndefinite forms which are regulated by mathematical laws. The forces of\nnature can be estimated in numbers, and light and heat go in\nundulations, whilst the movements of the great bodies in nature admit of\na precise quantitative expression. The harmonies of nature in respect of\ncolor, of number, of form, and of time are forcibly exhibited in\n\"Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation,\" by M'Cosh.]\n\nAgain, the world is assuredly _perfect_, as being the sensible image and\ncopy of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of the\nEternal Unity. It must, therefore, when thoroughly known and properly\ninterpreted, answer to all which we can conceive as perfect; that is, it\nmust be regulated by laws, of which we have the highest principles in\nthose first and elementary properties of numbers which stand next to\n_unity_. \"The world is then, through all its departments, _a living\narithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose_.\" It\nis a kosmos (for the word is purely Pythagorean)--the expression of\n_harmony_, the manifestation, to sense, of everlasting _order_.\n\nThough Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting initiative for abstract\nspeculation, it is remarkable that he himself preferred to constitute\nthe science of Numbers as the true representative of the laws of the\nuniverse. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks\nindeed of eternal truths, yet when the notion of symmetry and proportion\nis introduced, it is often necessary to insist, in preference, upon the\nproperties of numbers. Hence, though the universe displays the geometry\nof its Constructor or Animator, yet nature was eminently defined as the\nmim\u00easis t\u00f4n arithm\u00f4n--the imitation of numbers.\n\nThe key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the general\nformula of _unity in multiplicity_:--unity either evolving itself into\nmultiplicity, or unity discovered as pervading multiplicity. The\nprinciple of all things, the same principle which in this philosophy, as\nin others, was customarily called _Deity_, is the primitive unit from\nwhich all proceeds in the accordant relations of the universal scheme.\nInto the sensible world of multitude, the all-pervading Unity has\ninfused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his own image upon\nthat world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man.\nWhat, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and\ndiversified--which we perceive as the combination of a thousand\nelements, yet as the expression of a single spirit--which is a chaos to\nthe sense, a cosmos to the reason? What is it but\nharmony--proportion--the one governing the many, the many lost in the\none? The world is therefore a _harmony_ in innumerable degrees, from the\nmost complicated to the most simple: it is now a Triad, combining the\nMonad and the Duad, and partaking of the nature of both; now a Tetrad,\nthe form of perfection; now a Decad, which, in combining the four\nformer, involves, in its mystic nature, all the possible accordances of\nthe universe.[442]\n\nThe psychology of the Pythagoreans was greatly modified by their\nphysical, and still more, by their moral tenets. The soul was arithmos\neauton kin\u00f4n--a self-moving number or Monad, the copy (as we have seen)\nof that Infinite Monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensible\nessence all the relations of the universe. This soul has three elements,\nReason (nous), Intelligence (phr\u00ean), and Passion (Thymos). The two last,\nman has in common with brutes, the first is his grand and peculiar\ncharacteristic. It has, hence, been argued that Pythagoras could not\nhave held the doctrine of \"transmigration.\" This clear separation of man\nfrom the brute, by this signal endowment of reason, which is\nsempiternal, seems a refutation of those who charge him with the\ndoctrine.\n\nIn the department of morals, the legislator of Crotona found his\nappropriate sphere. In his use of numerical notation, moral good was\nessential unity--evil, essential plurality and division. In the fixed\ntruths of mathematical abstractions he found the exemplars of social and\npersonal virtue. The rule or law of all morality is resemblance to God;\nthat is, the return of number to its root, to unity,[443] and virtue is\nthus a harmony.\n\n[Footnote 442: That is, 1+2+3+4=10. There are intimations that the\nPythagoreans regarded the Monad as God, the Duad as matter, the Triad as\nthe complex phenomena of the world, the Tetrad as the completeness of\nall its relations, the Decad as the cosmos, or harmonious whole.]\n\n[Footnote 443: Aristotle, \"Nichomachian Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\nThus have we, in Pythagoras, the dawn of an _Idealist_ school; for\nmathematics are founded upon abstractions, and there is consequently an\nintimate connection between mathematics and idealism. The relations of\nspace, and number, and determinate form, are, like the relations of\ncause and effect, of phenomena and substance, perceptible _only in\nthought_; and the mind which has been disciplined to abstract thought by\nthe study of mathematics, is prepared and disposed for purely\nmetaphysical studies. \"The looking into mathematical learning is a kind\nof prelude to the contemplation of real being.\"[444] Therefore Plato\ninscribed over the door of his academy, \"Let none but Geometricians\nenter here.\" To the mind thus disciplined in abstract thinking, the\nconceptions and ideas of reason have equal authority, sometimes even\nsuperior authority, to the perceptions of sense.\n\n[Footnote 444: Alcinous, \"Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato,\" ch.\nvii.]\n\nNow if the testimony of both reason and sense, as given in\nconsciousness, is accepted as of equal authority, and each faculty is\nregarded as, within its own sphere, a source of real, valid knowledge,\nthen a consistent and harmonious system of _Natural Realism_ or _Natural\nDualism_ will be the result. If the testimony of sense is questioned and\ndistrusted, and the mind is denied any immediate knowledge of the\nsensible world, and yet the existence of an external world is maintained\nby various hypotheses and reasonings, the consequence will be a species\nof _Hypothetical Dualism_ or _Cosmothetic Idealism_. But if the\naffirmations of reason, as to the unity of the cosmos, are alone\naccepted, and the evidence of the senses, as to the variety and\nmultiplicity of the world, is entirely disregarded, then we have a\nsystem of _Absolute Idealism_. Pythagoras regarded the harmony which\npervades the diversified phenomena of the outer world as a manifestation\nof the unity of its eternal principle, or as the perpetual evolution of\nthat unity, and the consequent _tendency_ of his system was to\ndepreciate the _sensible_. Following out this tendency, the Eleatics\nfirst neglected, and finally denied the variety of the universe--denied\nthe real existence of the external world, and asserted an absolute\n_metaphysical_ unity.\n\n_Xenophanes of Colophon_, in Ionia (B.C. 616-516), was the founder of\nthis celebrated school of Elea. He left Ionia, and arrived in Italy\nabout the same time as Pythagoras, bringing with him to Italy his Ionian\ntendencies; he there amalgamated them with Pythagorean speculations.\n\nPythagoras had succeeded in fixing the attention of his countrymen on\nthe harmony which pervades the material world, and had taught them to\nregard that harmony as the manifestation of the intelligence, and unity,\nand perfection of its eternal principle. Struck with this idea of\nharmony and of unity, Xenophanes, who was a poet, a rhapsodist, and\ntherefore by native tendency, rather than by intellectual discipline, an\nIdealist, begins already to attach more importance to _unity_ than\nmultiplicity in his philosophy of nature. He regards the testimony of\nreason as of more authority than the testimony of sense; \"and he holds\nbadly enough the balance between the unity of the Pythagoreans and the\nvariety which Heraclitus and the Ionians had alone considered.\"[445]\n\nWe are not, however, to suppose that Xenophanes denied entirely the\nexistence of _plurality_. \"The great Rhapsodist of Truth\" was guided by\nthe spontaneous intuitions of his mind (which seemed to partake of the\ncharacter of an inspiration), to a clearer vision of the truth than were\nhis successors of the same school by their discursive reasonings. \"The\nOne\" of Xenophanes was clearly distinguished from the outward universe\n(ta polla) on the one hand, and from the \"_non-ens_\" on the other. It\nwas his disciple, Parmenides, who imagined the logical necessity of\nidentifying plurality with the \"_non-ens_\" and thus denying all\nimmediate cognition of the phenomenal world. The compactness and logical\ncoherence of the system of Parmenides seems to have had a peculiar charm\nfor the Grecian mind, and to have diverted the eyes of antiquity from\nthe views of the more earnest and devout Xenophanes, whose opinions were\ntoo often confounded with those of his successors of the Eleatic school.\n\"Accordingly we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much that\nis, exclusively, the property of Parmenides and Zeno, in particular for\ndenying plurality, and for identifying God with the universe.\"[446]\n\n[Footnote 445: Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 446: See note by editor, W.H. Thompson, M.A., on pages 331,\n332 of Butler's \"Lectures,\" vol. i. His authorities are \"Fragments of\nXenophanes\" and the treatise \"De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia,\" by\nAristotle.]\n\nIn theology, Xenophanes was unquestionably a _Theist_. He had a profound\nand earnest conviction of the existence of a God, and he ridiculed with\nsarcastic force, the anthropomorphic absurdities of the popular\nreligion. This one God, he taught, was self-existent, eternal, and\ninfinite; supreme in power, in goodness, and intelligence.[447] These\ncharacteristics are ascribed to the Deity in the sublime words with\nwhich he opens his philosophic poem--\n\n     \"There is one God, of all beings, divine and human, the greatest:\n     Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in mind.\"\n\nHe has no parts, no organs, as men have, being\n\n     \"All sight, all ear, all intelligence;\n     Wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by _thought_ and\n                                                           _will_.\"[448]\n\nXenophanes also taught that God is \"uncreated\" or \"uncaused,\" and that\nhe is \"excellent\" as well as \"all-powerful.\"[449] And yet, regardless of\nthese explicit utterances, Lewes cautions his readers against supposing\nthat, by the \"one God,\" Xenophanes meant a Personal God; and he asserts\nthat his Monotheism was Pantheism. A doctrine, however, which ascribes\nto the Divine Being moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which\nacknowledges an outward world distinct from Him, and which represents\nHim as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of an\nintelligent volition, can only by a strange perversion of language be\ncalled pantheism.\n\n[Footnote 447: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 38;\nRitter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp. 428, 429.]\n\n[Footnote 448: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n432, 434.]\n\n[Footnote 449: Butler's \"Lectures,\" vol. i. p. 331, note; Ritter's\n\"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 428.]\n\n_Parmenides of Elea_ (born B.C. 536) was the philosopher who framed the\npsychological opinions of the Idealist school into a precise and\ncomprehensive system. He was the first carefully to distinguish between\n_Truth_ (al\u00eatheian) and _Opinion_ (doxan)--between ideas obtained\nthrough the reason and the simple perceptions of sense. Assuming that\nreason and sense are the only sources of knowledge, he held that they\nfurnish the mind with two distinct classes of cognitions--one variable,\nfleeting, and uncertain; the other immutable, necessary, and eternal.\nSense is dependent on the variable organization of the individual, and\ntherefore its evidence is changeable, uncertain, and nothing but a mere\n\"_seeming_.\" Reason is the same in all individuals, and therefore its\nevidence is constant, real, and true. Philosophy is, therefore, divided\ninto two branches--_Physics_ and _Metaphysics_; one, a science of\nabsolute knowledge; the other, a science of mere appearances. The first\nscience, Physics, is pronounced illusory and uncertain; the latter,\nMetaphysics, is infallible and immutable.[450]\n\nProceeding on these principles, he rejects the dualistic system of the\nuniverse, and boldly declared that all essences are fundamentally\n_one_--that, in fact, there is no real plurality, and that all the\ndiversity which \"appears\" is merely presented under a peculiar aesthetic\nor sensible law. The senses, it is true, teach us that there are \"many\nthings,\" but reason affirms that, at bottom, there exists only \"the\none.\" Whatever, therefore, manifests itself in the field of sense is\nmerely illusory--the mental representation of a phenomenal world, which\nto experience seems diversified, but which reason can not possibly admit\nto be other than \"immovable\" and \"one.\" There is but one Being in the\nuniverse, eternal, immovable, absolute; and of this unconditioned being\nall phenomenal existences, whether material or mental, are but the\nattributes and modes. Hence the two great maxims of the Eleatic school,\nderived from Parmenides--ta panta en, \"_The All is One_\" and to auto\nnoein te kai einai (Idem est cogitare atque esse), \"_Thought and Being\nare identical._\" The last remarkable dictum is the fundamental principle\nof the modern pantheistic doctrine of \"absolute identity\" as taught by\nSchelling and Hegel.[451]\n\n[Footnote 450: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n447, 451.]\n\n[Footnote 451: Id., ib., vol. i. pp. 450, 455.]\n\nLewes asserts that \"Parmenides did not, with Xenophanes, call 'the One'\nGod; he called it Being.[452] In support of this statement he, however,\ncites no ancient authorities. We are therefore justified in rejecting\nhis opinion, and receiving the testimony of Simplicius, \"the only\nauthority for the fragments of the Eleatics,\"[453] and who had a copy of\nthe philosophic poems of Parmenides. He assures us that Parmenides and\nXenophanes \"affirmed that '_the One,_' or unity, was the first Principle\nof all,....they meaning by this One _that highest or supreme God_, as\nbeing the cause of unity to all things.... It remaineth, therefore, that\nthat _Intelligence_ which is the cause of all things, and therefore of\nmind and understanding also, in which all things are comprehended in\nunity, was Parmenides' one Ens or Being.[454] Parmenides was, therefore,\na spiritualistic or idealistic Pantheist.\n\n_Zeno of Elea_ (born B.C. 500) was the logician of the Eleatic school.\nHe was, says Diogenes Laertius, \"the inventor of Dialectics.\"[455] Logic\nhenceforth becomes the organon[456]--organon of the Eleatics.\n\n[Footnote 452: \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 453: Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article \"Simplicius.\"]\n\n[Footnote 454: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 455: \"Lives,\" p. 387 (Bohn's edition).]\n\n[Footnote 456: Plato in \"Parmen.\"]\n\nThis organon, however, Zeno used very imperfectly. In his hands it was\nsimply the \"reductio ad absurdum\" of opposing opinions as the means of\nsustaining the tenets of his own sect. Parmenides had asserted, on _\u00e0\npriori_ grounds, the existence of \"the One.\" Zeno would prove by his\ndialectic the non-existence of \"the many.\" His grand position was that\nall phenomena, all that appears to sense, is but a _modification_ of the\nabsolute One. And he displays a vast amount of dialectic subtilty in the\neffort to prove that all \"appearances\" are unreal, and that all movement\nand change is a mere \"seeming\"--not a reality. What men call motion is\nonly a name given to a series of conditions, each of which, considered\nseparately, is rest. \"Rest is force resistant; motion is force\ntriumphant.\"[457] The famous puzzle of \"Achilles and the Tortoise,\" by\nwhich he endeavored to prove the unreality of motion, has been rendered\nfamiliar to the English reader.[458]\n\n[Footnote 457: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 458: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n475, 476.]\n\nAristotle assures us that Zeno, \"by his one Ens, which neither was moved\nnor movable, meaneth God.\" And he also informs us that \"Zeno endeavored\nto demonstrate that there is but one God, from the idea which all men\nhave of him, as that which is the best, supremest, most powerful of all,\nor an absolutely perfect being\" (\"De Xenophane, Zenone, et\nGorgia\").[459]\n\nWith Zeno we close our survey of the second grand line of independent\ninquiry by which philosophy sought to solve the problem of the universe.\nThe reader will be struck with the resemblance which subsists between\nthe history of its development and that of the modern Idealist school.\nPythagoras was the Descartes, Parmenides the Spinoza, and Zeno the Hegel\nof the Italian school.\n\nIn this survey of the speculations of the pre-Socratic schools of\nphilosophy, we have followed the course of two opposite streams of\nthought which had their common origin in one fundamental principle or\nlaw of the human mind--the _intuition of unity_--\"or the desire to\ncomprehend all the facts of the universe in a single formula, and\nconsummate all conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditioned\nexistence.\" The history of this tendency is, in fact, the history of all\nphilosophy. \"The end of all philosophy,\" says Plato, \"is the intuition\nof unity.\" \"All knowledge,\" said the Platonists, \"is the gathering up\ninto one.\"[460]\n\n[Footnote 459: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. i. p. 518.]\n\n[Footnote 460: Hamilton's \"Metaphysics,\" vol. i. pp. 67-70 (English\nedition).]\n\nStarting from this fundamental idea, _that, beneath the endless flux and\nchange of the visible universe, there must be a permanent principle of\nunity_, we have seen developed two opposite schools of speculative\nthought. As the traveller, standing on the ridges of the Andes, may see\nthe head-waters of the great South American rivers mingling in one, so\nthe student of philosophy, standing on the elevated plane of analytic\nthought, may discover, in this fundamental principle, the common source\nof the two great systems of speculative thought which divided the\nancient world. Here are the head-waters of the sensational and the\nidealist schools. The Ionian school started its course of inquiry in the\ndirection of _sense_; it occupied itself solely with the phenomena of\nthe external world, and it sought this principle of unity in a\n_physical_ element. The Italian school started its course of inquiry in\nthe direction of _reason_; it occupied itself chiefly with rational\nconceptions or _\u00e0 priori_ ideas, and it sought this principle of unity\nin purely _metaphysical_ being. And just as the Amazon and La Plata\nsweep on, in opposite directions, until they reach the extremities of\nthe continent, so these two opposite streams of thought rush onward, by\nthe force of a logical necessity, until they terminate in the two\nUnitarian systems of _Absolute Materialism_ and _Absolute Idealism_,\nand, in their theological aspects, in a pantheism which, on the one\nhand, identifies God with matter, or, on the other hand, swallows up the\nuniverse in God.\n\nThe radical error of both these systems is at once apparent. The\ntestimony of the primary faculties of the mind was not regarded as each,\nwithin its sphere, final and decisive. The duality of consciousness was\nnot accepted in all its integrity; one school rejected the testimony of\nreason, the other denied the veracity of the senses, and both prepared\nthe way for the _skepticism_ of the Sophists.\n\nWe must not, however, lose sight of the fact that there were some\nphilosophers of the pre-Socratic school, as Anaxagoras and Empedocles,\nwho recognized the partial and exclusive character of both these\nsystems, and sought, by a method which Cousin would designate as\nEclecticism, to combine the element of truth contained in each.\n\n_Anaxagoras of Clazomencoe_ (B.C. 500-428) added to the Ionian\nphilosophy of a material element or elements the Italian idea of a\n_spirit_ distinct from, and independent of the world, which has within\nitself the principle of a spontaneous activity--Nous autocrat\u00eas, and\nwhich is the first cause of motion in the universe--arch\u00ea t\u00eas\nkin\u00ease\u00f4s.[461]\n\n[Footnote 461: Cousin, \"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 411.]\n\nIn his physical theory, Anaxagoras was an Atomist. Instead of one\nelement, he declared that the elements or first principles were\nnumerous, or even infinite. No point in space is unoccupied by these\natoms, which are infinitely divisible. He imagined that, in nature,\nthere are as many kinds of principles as there are species of compound\nbodies, and that the peculiar form of the primary particles of which any\nbody is composed is the same with the qualities of the compound body\nitself. This was the celebrated doctrine of _Homoeomeria_, of which\nLucretius furnishes a luminous account in his philosophic poem \"De\nNatura Rerum\"--\n\n                        \"That bone from bones\n     Minute, and embryon; nerve from nerves arise;\n     And blood from blood, by countless drops increased.\n     Gold, too, from golden atoms, earths concrete,\n     From earths extreme; from fiery matters, fire;\n     And lymph from limpen dews. And thus throughout\n     From primal kinds that kinds perpetual spring.\"[462]\n\nThese primary particles were regarded by Anaxagoras as eternal; because\nhe held the dogma, peculiar to all the Ionians, that nothing can be\nreally created or annihilated (de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse\nreverti). But he saw, nevertheless, that the simple existence of\n\"_inert_\" matter, even from eternity, could not explain the motion and\nthe harmony of the material world. Hence he saw the necessity of another\npower--_the power of Intelligence_. \"All things were in chaos; then came\nIntelligence and introduced Order.\"[463]\n\nAnaxagoras, unlike the pantheistic speculators of the Ionian school,\nrigidly separated the Supreme Intelligence from the material universe.\nThe Nous of Anaxagoras is a principle, infinite, independent\n(autocrat\u00eas), omnipresent (en panti pantos moioa enon), the subtilest\nand purest of things (lepitotaton pani\u00f4n chr\u00eamat\u00f4n kaikai kathar\u00f4taton);\nand incapable of mixture with aught besides; it is also omniscient\n(panta egn\u00f4), and unchangeable (pas omoios esti).--Simplicius, in\n\"Arist. Phys.\" i. 33.[464]\n\n[Footnote 462: Good's translation, bk. i. p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 463: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives,\" p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 464: Butler's \"Lectures on Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 305, note.]\n\nThus did Anaxagoras bridge the chasm between the Ionian and the Italian\nschools. He accepted both doctrines with some modifications. He believed\nin the real existence of the phenomenal world, and he also believed in\nthe real existence of \"The Infinite Mind,\" whose Intelligence and\nOmnipotence were manifested in the laws and relations which pervade the\nworld. He proclaimed the existence of the Infinite Intelligence (\"the\nONE\"), who was the Architect and Governor of the Infinite Matter (\"the\nMANY\").\n\nOn the question as to the origin and certainty of human knowledge,\nAnaxagoras differed both from the Ionians and the Eleatics. Neither the\nsense alone, nor the reason alone, were for him a ground of certitude.\nHe held that reason (logos) was the regulative faculty of the mind, as\nthe Nous, or Supreme Intelligence, was the regulative power of the\nuniverse. And he admitted that the senses were veracious in their\nreports; but they reported only in regard to phenomena. The senses,\nthen, perceive _phenomena_, but it is the reason alone which recognizes\n_noumena_, that is, the reason perceives being in and through phenomena,\nsubstance in and through qualities; an anticipation of the fundamental\nprinciple of modern psychology--\"_that every power or substance in\nexistence is knowable to us, so far only, as we know its phenomena_.\"\nThus, again, does he bridge the chasm that separates between the\nSensationalist and the Idealist. The Ionians relied solely on the\nintuitions of sense; the Eleatics accepted only the apperceptions of\npure reason; he accepted the testimony of both, and in the synthesis of\nsubject and object--the union of an element supplied by sensation, and\nan element supplied by reason, he found real, certain knowledge.\n\nThe harmony which the doctrine of Anaxagoras introduced into the\nphilosophy of Athens, soon attracted attention and multiplied disciples.\nHe was teaching when Socrates arrived in Athens, and the latter attended\nhis school. The influence which the doctrine of Anaxagoras exerted upon\nthe mind of Socrates (leading him to recognize Intelligence as the cause\nof order and special adaptation in the universe),[465] and also upon the\ncourse of philosophy in the Socratic schools, is the most enduring\nmemorial of his name.[466]\n\n[Footnote 465: \"Phaedo,\" \u00a7 105.]\n\n[Footnote 466: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. iii.]\n\nWe have devoted a much larger space than we originally designed to the\nante-Socratic schools--quite out of proportion, indeed, with that we\nshall be able to appropriate to their successors. But inasmuch as all\nthe great primary problems of thought, which are subsequently discussed\nby Plato and Aristotle, were started, and received, at least, typical\nanswers in those schools, we can not hope to understand Plato, or\nAristotle, or even Epicurus, or Zeno of Cittium, unless we have first\nmastered the doctrines of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, and\nAnaxagoras.[467] The attention we have bestowed on these early thinkers\nwill, therefore, have been a valuable preparatory discipline for the\nstudy of\n\nII. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n\nThe first cycle of philosophy was now complete. That form of Grecian\nspeculative thought which, during the first period of its development,\nwas a philosophy of nature, had reached its maturity; it had sought \"the\nfirst principles of all things\" in the study of external nature, and had\nsignally failed. In this pursuit of first principles as the basis of a\ntrue and certain knowledge of the system of the universe, the two\nleading schools had been carried to opposite poles of thought. One had\nasserted that _experience_ alone, the other, that _reason_ alone was the\nsole criterion of truth. As the last consequence of this imperfect\nmethod, Leucippus had denied the existence of \"the one,\" and Zeno had\ndenied the existence of \"the many.\" The Ionian school, in Democritus,\nhad landed in Materialism; the Italian, in Parmenides, had ended in\nPantheism; and, as the necessary result of this partial and defective\nmethod of inquiry, which ended in doubt and contradiction, a spirit of\ngeneral skepticism was generated in the Athenian mind. If doubt be cast\nupon the veracity of the primary cognitive faculties of the mind, the\nflood-gates of universal skepticism are opened. If the senses are\npronounced to be mendacious and illusory in their reports regarding\nexternal phenomena, and if the intuitions of the reason, in regard to\nthe ground and cause of phenomena, are delusive, then we have no ground\nof certitude. If one faculty is unveracious and unreliable, how can we\ndetermine that the other is not equally so? There is, then, no such\nthing as universal and necessary truth. Truth is variable and uncertain,\nas the variable opinion of each individual.\n\n[Footnote 467: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 114; Butler's\n\"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. pp. 87, 88.]\n\nThe Sophists, who belonged to no particular school, laid hold on the\nelements of skepticism contained in both the pre-Socratic schools of\nphilosophy, and they declared that \"the sophia\" was not only\nunattainable, but that no relative degree of it was possible for the\nhuman faculties.[468] Protagoras of Abdera accepted the doctrine of\nHeraclitus, that thought is identical with sensation, and limited by it;\nhe therefore declared that there is no criterion of truth, and _Man is\nthe measure of all things_.[469] Sextus Empiricus gives the\npsychological opinions of Protagoras with remarkable explicitness.\n\"Matter is in a perpetual flux, whilst it undergoes augmentations and\nlosses; the senses also are modified according to the age and\ndisposition of the body. He said, also, that the reason of all phenomena\nresides in matter as substrata, so that matter, in itself, might be\nwhatever it appeared to each. But men have different perceptions at\ndifferent periods, according to the changes in the things perceived....\nMan is, therefore, the criterion of that which exists; all that is\nperceived by him exists; _that which is perceived by no man does not\nexist_.\"[470] These conclusions were rigidly and fearlessly applied to\nethics and political science. If there is no Eternal Truth, there can be\nno Immutable Right. The distinction of right and wrong is solely a\nmatter of human opinion and conventional usage.[471] \"That which\n_appears_ just and honorable to each city, is so for _that city_, so\nlong as the opinion prevails.\"[472]\n\n[Footnote 468: Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article \"Sophist.\"]\n\n[Footnote 469: Plato's \"The\u00e6tetus\" (anthropos--\"the individual is the\nmeasure of all things\"), vol. i. p. 381 (Bohn's edition).]\n\n[Footnote 470: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 471: \"Gorgias,\" \u00a7 85-89.]\n\n[Footnote 472: Plato's \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 65-75.]\n\nThere were others who laid hold on the weapons which Zeno had prepared\nto their hands. He had asserted that all the objects of sense were mere\nphantoms--delusive and transitory. By the subtilties of dialectic\nquibbling, he had attempted to prove that \"change\" meant \"permanence,\"\nand \"motion\" meant \"rest.\"[473] Words may, therefore, have the most\nopposite and contradictory meanings; and all language and all opinion\nmay, by such a process, be rendered uncertain. One opinion is,\nconsequently, for the individual, just as good as another; and all\nopinions are equally true and untrue. It was nevertheless desirable, for\nthe good of society, that there should be some agreement, and that, for\na time at least, certain opinions should prevail; and if philosophy had\nfailed to secure this agreement, rhetoric, at least, was effectual; and,\nwith the Sophist, rhetoric was \"the art of making the worst appear the\nbetter reason.\" All wisdom was now confined to a species of \"word\njugglery,\" which in Athens was dignified as \"the art of disputation.\"\n\n[Footnote 473: \"And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno)\nspoke by art in such a manner that the same things appeared to be\nsimilar and dissimilar, one and many, at rest and in\nmotion?\"--\"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 97.]\n\nSOCRATES (B.C. 469-399), the grand central figure in the group of\nancient philosophers, arrived in Athens in the midst of this general\nskepticism. He had an invincible faith in truth. \"He made her the\nmistress of his soul, and with patient labor, and unwearied energy, did\nhis great and noble soul toil after perfect communion with her.\" He was\ndisappointed and dissatisfied with the results that had been reached by\nthe methods of his predecessors, and he was convinced that by these\nmethods the problem of the universe could not be solved. He therefore\nturned away from physical inquiries, and devoted his whole attention to\nthe study of the human mind, its fundamental beliefs, ideas, and laws.\nIf he can not penetrate the mysteries of the outer world, he will turn\nhis attention to the world within. He will \"know himself,\" and find\nwithin himself the reason, and ground, and law of all existence. There\nhe discovered certain truths which can not possibly be questioned. He\nfelt he had within his own heart a faithful monitor--a _conscience_,\nwhich he regarded as the voice of God.[474] He believed \"he had a divine\nteacher with him at all times. Though he did not possess wisdom, this\nteacher could put him on the road to seek it, could preserve him from\ndelusions which might turn him out of the way, could keep his mind fixed\nupon the end for which he ought to act and live.\"[475] In himself,\ntherefore, he sought that ground of certitude which should save him from\nthe prevailing skepticism of his times. The Delphic inscription, Gn\u00f4ti\nseauton, \"_know thyself_\" becomes henceforth the fundamental maxim of\nphilosophy.\n\n[Footnote 474: The D\u00e6mon of Socrates has been the subject of much\ndiscussion among learned men. The notion, once generally received, that\nhis _daim\u00f4n_ was \"a familiar genius,\" is now regarded as an exploded\nerror. \"Nowhere does Socrates, in Plato or Xenophon, speak of _a_ genius\nor demon, but always of a _doemoniac something (to daimonion_, or\n_daimonin ti_), or of a _sign_, a _voice_, a _divine sign_, a _divine\nvoice_\" (Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 166).\n\"Socrates always speaks of a _divine or supernatural somewhat_ ('divinum\nquiddam,' as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to\ndivine, and to which he never attributes personality\" (Butler's\n\"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 357). The scholar need not\nto be informed that _to daimonion_, in classic literature, means the\ndivine Essence (Lat. _numen_), to which are attributed events beyond\nman's power, yet not to be assigned to any special god.]\n\n[Footnote 475: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 124.]\n\nTruth has a rational, _\u00e0 priori_ foundation in the constitution of the\nhuman mind. There are _ideas_ connatural to the human reason which are\nthe copies of those archetypal ideas which belong to the Eternal Reason.\nThe grand problem of philosophy, therefore, now is--_What are these\nfundamental_ IDEAS _which are unchangeable and permanent, amid all the\ndiversifies of human opinion, connecting appearance with reality, and\nconstituting a ground of certain knowledge or absolute truth_? Socrates\nmay not have held the doctrine of ideas as exhibited by Plato, but he\ncertainly believed that there were germs of truth latent in the human\nmind--principles which governed, unconsciously, the processes of\nthought, and that these could be developed by reflection and by\nquestioning. These were embryonate in the womb of reason, coming to the\nbirth, but needing the \"maieutic\" or \"obstetric\" art, that they might be\nbrought forth.[476] He would, therefore, become the accoucheur of ideas,\nand deliver minds of that secret truth which lay in their mental\nconstitution. And thus _Psychology_ becomes the basis of all legitimate\nmetaphysics.\n\n[Footnote 476: Plato's \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 22.]\n\nBy the general consent of antiquity, as well as by the concurrent\njudgment of all modern historians of philosophy, Socrates is regarded as\nhaving effected a complete revolution in philosophic thought, and, by\nuniversal consent, he is placed at the commencement of a new era in\nphilosophy. Schleiermacher has said, \"the service which Socrates\nrendered to philosophy consisted not so much in the truths arrived at\n_as in the_ METHOD _by which truth is sought_.\" As Bacon inaugurated a\nnew method in physical inquiry, so Socrates inaugurated a new method in\nmetaphysical inquiry.\n\nWhat, then, was this _new method_? It was no other than the _inductive_\nmethod applied to the facts of consciousness. This method is thus\ndefined by Aristotle: \"Induction is the process from particulars to\ngenerals;\" that is, it is the process of discovering laws from facts,\ncauses from effects, being from phenomena. But how is this process of\ninduction conducted? By observing and enumerating the real facts which\nare presented in consciousness, by noting their relations of resemblance\nor difference, and by classifying these facts by the aid of these\nrelations. In other words, it is _analysis_ applied to the phenomena of\nmind.[477] Now Socrates gave this method of psychological analysis to\nGreek philosophy. There are two things of which Socrates must justly be\nregarded as the author,--the _inductive reasoning_ and _abstract\ndefinition_.[478] We readily grant that Socrates employed this method\nimperfectly, for methods are the last things perfected in science; but\nstill, the Socratic movement was a vast movement in the right direction.\n\n[Footnote 477: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 478: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" vol. xii. ch. iv. p. 359\n(Bohn's edition).]\n\nIn what are usually regarded as the purely Socratic dialogues,[479]\nPlato evidently designs to exhibit this method of Socrates. They proceed\ncontinually on the firm conviction that there is a standard or criterion\nof truth in the reason of man, and that, by _reflection_, man can\napprehend and recognize the truth. To awaken this power of reflection;\nto compel men to analyze their language and their thoughts; to lead them\nfrom the particular and the contingent, to the universal and the\nnecessary; and to teach them to test their opinions by the inward\nstandard of truth, was the aim of Socrates. These dialogues are a\npicture of the conversations of Socrates. They are literally an\neducation of the thinking faculty. Their purpose is to discipline men to\nthink for themselves, rather than to furnish opinions for them. In many\nof these dialogues Socrates affirms nothing. After producing many\narguments, and examining a question on all sides, he leaves it\nundetermined. At the close of the dialogue he is as far from a\ndeclaration of opinions as at the commencement. His grand effort, like\nthat of Bacon's, is to furnish men a correct method of inquiry, rather\nthan to apply that method and give them results.\n\n[Footnote 479: \"Laches,\" \"Charmides,\" \"Lysis,\" \"The Rivals,\" \"First and\nSecond Alcibiades,\" \"Theages,\" \"Clitophon.\" See Whewell's translation,\nvol. i.]\n\nWe must not, however, from thence conclude that Socrates did not himself\nattain any definite conclusions, or reach any specific and valuable\nresults. When, in reply to his friends who reported the answer of the\noracle of Delphi, that \"Socrates was the wisest of men,\" he said, \"he\nsupposed the oracle declared him wise _because he knew nothing_,\" he did\nnot mean that true knowledge was unattainable, for his whole life had\nbeen spent in efforts to attain it. He simply indicates the disposition\nof mind which is most befitting and most helpful to the seeker after\ntruth. He must be conscious of his own ignorance. He must not exalt\nhimself. He must not put his own conceits in the way of the thing he\nwould know. He must have an open eye, a single purpose, an honest mind,\nto prepare him to receive light when it comes. And that there is light,\nthat there is a source whence light comes, he avowed in every word and\nact.\n\nSocrates unquestionably believed in one Supreme God, the immaterial,\ninfinite Governor of all. He cherished that instinctive, spontaneous\nfaith in God and his Providence which is the universal faith of the\nhuman heart. He saw this faith revealed in the religious sentiments of\nall nations, and in the tendency to worship so universally\ncharacteristic of humanity.[480] He appealed to the consciousness of\nabsolute dependence--the persuasion, wrought by God in the minds of all\nmen, that \"He is able to make men happy or miserable,\" and the\nconsequent sense of obligation which teaches man he ought to obey God.\nAnd he regarded with some degree of affectionate tenderness the common\nsentiment of his countrymen, that the Divine Government was conducted\nthrough the ministry of subordinate deities or generated gods. But he\nsought earnestly to prevent the presence of these subordinate agents\nfrom intercepting the clear view of the Supreme God.\n\nThe faith of Socrates was not, however, grounded on mere feeling and\nsentiment. He endeavored to place the knowledge of God on a rational\nbasis. We can not read the arguments he employed without being convinced\nthat he anticipated all the subsequent writers on Natural Theology in\nhis treatment of the argument from _special ends_ or _final causes_. We\nventure to abridge the account which is given by Xenophon of the\nconversation with Aristodemus:[481]\n\n[Footnote 480: \"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. iv. \u00a7 16.]\n\n[Footnote 481: Ibid., bk. i. ch. iv.]\n\n\"I will now relate the manner in which I once heard Socrates discoursing\nwith Aristodemus concerning the Deity; for, observing that he never\nprayed nor sacrificed to the gods, but, on the contrary, ridiculed those\nwho did, he said to him:\n\n\"'Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man you admire on account of his\nmerits? Aristodemus having answered, 'Many,--'Name some of them, I pray\nyou,' said Socrates. 'I admire,' said Aristodemus, 'Homer for his Epic\npoetry, Melanippides for his dithyrambics, Sophocles for his tragedy,\nPolycletus for statuary, and Zeuxis for painting.'\n\n\"'But which seemed to you most worthy of admiration, Aristodemus--the\nartist who forms images void of motion and intelligence, or one who has\nskill to produce animals that are endued, not only with activity, but\nunderstanding?'\n\n\"'The latter, there can be no doubt,' replied Aristodemus, 'provided the\nproduction was not the effect of chance, but of wisdom and contrivance.'\n\n\"'But since there are many things, some of which we can easily see the\nuse of, while we can not say of others to what purpose they are\nproduced, which of these, Aristodemus, do you suppose the work of\nwisdom?'\n\n\"'It would seem the most reasonable to affirm it of those whose fitness\nand utility are so evidently apparent,' answered Aristodemus.\n\n\"'But it is evidently apparent that He who, at the beginning, made man,\nendued him with senses because they were good for him; eyes wherewith to\nbehold what is visible, and ears to hear whatever was heard; for, say,\nAristodemus, to what purpose should odor be prepared, if the sense of\nsmelling had been denied or why the distinction of bitter or sweet, of\nsavory or unsavory, unless a palate had been likewise given,\nconveniently placed to arbitrate between them and proclaim the\ndifference? Is not that Providence, Aristodemus, in a most eminent\nmanner conspicuous, which, because the eye of a man is so delicate in\nits contexture, hath therefore prepared eyelids like doors whereby to\nsecure it, which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again\nclose when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were,\nwith a fence on the edge of them to keep off the wind and guard the eye?\nEven the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse,\nis prepared to turn off the sweat, which falling from the forehead might\nenter and annoy that no less tender than astonishing part of us. Is it\nnot to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and\nyet are not too much filled with them? That the fore teeth of the animal\nshould be formed in such a manner as is evidently best for cutting, and\nthose on the side for grinding it to pieces? That the mouth, through\nwhich this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and eyes\nas to prevent the passing unnoticed whatever is unfit for\nnourishment?... And canst thou still doubt, Aristodemus, whether a\n_disposition of parts like this should be a work of chance, or of wisdom\nand contrivance_?'\n\n\"'I have no longer any doubt,' replied Aristodemus; 'and, indeed, the\nmore I consider it, the more evident it appears to me that man must be\nthe masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with it infinite\nmarks of the love and favor of Him who hath thus formed it.'\n\n\"'But, further (unless thou desirest to ask me questions), seeing,\nAristodemus, thou thyself art conscious of reason and intelligence,\nsupposest thou there is no intelligence elsewhere? Thou knowest thy body\nto be a small part of that wide-extended earth thou everywhere\nbeholdest; the moisture contained in it thou also knowest to be a\nportion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a\npart, while the rest of the elements contribute out of their abundance\nto thy formation. It is the _soul_, then, alone, that intellectual part\nof us, which is come to thee by some lucky chance, from I know not\nwhere. If so, there is no intelligence elsewhere; and we must be forced\nto confess that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodies\ncontained therein--equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitude\nor number, whatever their use, whatever their order--all have been\nproduced by chance, not by intelligence!'\n\n\"'It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise,' returned\nAristodemus; 'for I behold none of those gods whom you speak of as\nframing and governing the world; whereas I see the artists when at their\nwork here among us.'\n\n\"'Neither yet seest thou thy soul, Aristodemus, which, however, most\nassuredly governs thy body; although it may well seem, by thy manner of\ntalking, that it is chance and not reason which governs thee.'\n\n\"'I do not despise the gods,' said Aristodemus; 'on the contrary, I\nconceive so highly of their excellency, as to suppose they stand in no\nneed of me or of my services.'\n\n\"'Thou mistakest the matter,' Aristodemus, 'the great magnificence they\nhave shown in their care of thee, so much the more honor and service\nthou owest them.'\n\n\"'Be assured,' said Aristodemus, 'if I once could persuade myself the\ngods take care of man, I should want no monitor to remind me of my\nduty.'\n\n\"'And canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, if the gods take care of man? Hath\nnot the glorious privilege of walking upright been alone bestowed on\nhim, whereby he may with the better advantage survey what is around him,\ncontemplate with more ease those splendid objects which are above, and\navoid the numerous ills and inconveniences which would otherwise befall\nhim? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet; but to man\nthey have also given hands, with which he can form many things for use,\nand make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hath\nbeen bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, hath\nthe power of forming words with it whereby to explain his thoughts and\nmake them intelligible to others? But it is not with respect to the body\nalone that the gods have shown themselves bountiful to man. Their most\nexcellent gift is that of a soul they have infused into him, which so\nfar surpasses what is elsewhere to be found; for by what animal except\nman is even the existence of the gods discovered, who have produced and\nstill uphold in such regular order this beautiful and stupendous frame\nof the universe? What other creature is to be found that can serve and\nadore them?... In thee, Aristodemus, has been joined to a wonderful soul\na body no less wonderful; and sayest thou, after this, the gods take no\nthought for me? What wouldst thou, then, more to convince thee of their\ncare?'\n\n\"'I would they should send and inform me,' said Aristodemus, 'what\nthings I ought or ought not to do, in like manner as thou sayest they\nfrequently do to thee.'\"\n\nIn reply, Socrates shows that the revelations of God which are made in\nnature, in history, in consciousness, and by oracles, are made _for_ all\nmen and _to_ all men. He then concludes with these remarkable words:\n\"As, therefore, amongst men we make best trial of the affection and\ngratitude of our neighbor by showing him kindness, and make discovery of\nhis wisdom by consulting him in our distress, do thou, in like manner,\nbehave towards the gods; and if thou wouldst experience what their\nwisdom and their love, render thyself deserving of some of those divine\nsecrets which may not be penetrated by man, and are imparted to those\nalone who consult, who adore, and who obey the Deity. Then shalt thou,\nmy Aristodemus, understand _there is a Being whose eye passes through\nall nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; extended to all\nplaces, extending through all time; and whose bounty and care can know\nno other bounds than those fixed by his own creation_\".[482]\n\n[Footnote 482: Lewes's translation, in \"Biog. History of Philosophy,\"\npp. 160-165.]\n\nSocrates was no less earnest in his belief in the immortality of the\nsoul, and a state of future retribution. He had reverently listened to\nthe intuitions of his own soul--the instinctive longings and aspirations\nof his own heart, as a revelation from God. He felt that all the powers\nand susceptibilities of his inward nature were in conscious adaptation\nto the idea of immortality, and that its realization was the appropriate\ndestiny of man. He was convinced that a future life was needed to avenge\nthe wrongs and reverse the unjust judgments of the present life;[483]\nneeded that virtue may receive its meet reward, and the course of\nProvidence may have its amplest vindication. He saw this faith reflected\nin the universal convictions of mankind, and the \"common traditions\" of\nall ages.[484] No one refers more frequently than Socrates to the grand\nold mythologic stories which express this faith; to Minos, and\nRhadamanthus, and \u00c6acus, and Triptolemus, who are \"real judges,\" and\nwho, in \"the Place of Departed Spirits, administer _justice_.\"[485] He\nbelieved that in that future state the pursuit of wisdom would be his\nchief employment, and he anticipated the pleasure of mingling in the\nsociety of the wise, and good, and great of every age.\n\n[Footnote 483: \"Apology,\" \u00a7 32, p. 329 (Whewell's edition).]\n\n[Footnote 484: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 485: \"Apology,\" p. 330.]\n\nWhilst, then, Socrates was not the first to teach the doctrine of\nimmortality, because no one could be said to have first _discovered_ it\nany more than to have first discovered the existence of a God, he was\ncertainly the first to place it upon a philosophic basis. The Ph\u00e6do\npresents the doctrine and the _reasoning_ by which Socrates had elevated\nhis mind above the fear of death. Some of the arguments may be purely\nPlatonic, the argument especially grounded on \"ideas;\" still, as a\nwhole, it must be regarded as a tolerably correct presentation of the\nmanner in which Socrates would prove the immortality of the soul.\n\nIn _Ethics_, Socrates was pre-eminently himself. The systematic\nresolution of the whole theory of society into the elementary principle\nof natural law, was peculiar to him. _Justice_ was the cardinal\nprinciple which must lie at the foundation of all good government. The\nword sophia--_wisdom_--included all excellency in personal morals,\nwhether as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or\n(socially) towards others. And _Happiness_, in its purity and\nperfection, can only be found in virtuous action.[486]\n\n[Footnote 486: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n360, 361.]\n\nSocrates left nothing behind him that could with propriety be called a\n_school_. His chief glory is that he inaugurated a new _method_ of\ninquiry, which, in Plato and Aristotle, we shall see applied. He gave a\nnew and vital impulse to human thought, which endured for ages; \"and he\nleft, as an inheritance for humanity, the example of a heroic life\ndevoted wholly to the pursuit of truth, and crowned with martyrdom.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n\nTHE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n\nPLATO.\n\n\nWe have seen that the advent of Socrates marks a new era in the history\nof speculative thought. Greek philosophy, which at first was a\nphilosophy of nature, now changes its direction, its character, and its\nmethod, and becomes a philosophy of mind. This, of course, does not mean\nthat now it had mind alone for its object; on the contrary, it tended,\nas indeed philosophy must always tend, to the conception of a rational\nideal or _intellectual system of the universe_. It started from the\nphenomena of mind, began with the study of human thought, and it made\nthe knowledge of mind, of its ideas and laws, the basis of a higher\nphilosophy, which should interpret all nature. In other words, it\nproceeded from psychology, through dialectics, to ontology.[487]\n\n[Footnote 487: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 413.]\n\nThis new movement we have designated in general terms as the _Socratic\nSchool_. Not that we are to suppose that, in any technical sense,\nSocrates founded _a_ school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and the\nGarden, were each the chosen resort of distinct philosophic sects, the\nlocality of separate schools; but Athens itself, the whole city, was the\nscene of the studies, the conversations, and the labors of Socrates. He\nwandered through the streets absorbed in thought. Sometimes he stood\nstill for hours lost in profoundest meditation; at other times he might\nbe seen in the market-place, surrounded by a crowd of Athenians, eagerly\ndiscussing the great questions of the day.\n\nSocrates, then, was not, in the usual sense of the word, a teacher. He\nis not to be found in the Stoa or the Grove, with official aspect,\nexpounding a system of doctrine. He is \"the garrulous oddity\" of the\nstreets, putting the most searching and perplexing questions to every\nbystander, and making every man conscious of his ignorance. He delivered\nno lectures; he simply talked. He wrote no books; he only argued: and\nwhat is usually styled his school must be understood as embracing those\nwho attended him in public as listeners and admirers, and who caught his\nspirit, adopted his philosophic _method_, and, in after life, elaborated\nand systematized the ideas they had gathered from him.\n\nAmong the regular or the occasional hearers of Socrates were many who\nwere little addicted to philosophic speculation. Some were warriors, as\nNicias and Laches; some statesmen, as Critias and Critobulus; some were\npoliticians, in the worst sense of that word, as Glaucon; and some were\nyoung men of fashion, as Euthydemus and Alcibiades. These were all alike\ndelighted with his inimitable irony, his versatility of genius, his\ncharming modes of conversation, his adroitness of reply; and they were\ncompelled to confess the wisdom and justness of his opinions, and to\nadmire the purity and goodness of his life. The magic power which he\nwielded, even over men of dissolute character, is strikingly depicted by\nAlcibiades in his speech at \"the Banquet.\"[488] Of these listeners,\nhowever, we can not now speak. Our business is with those only who\nimbibed his philosophic spirit, and became the future teachers of\nphilosophy. And even of those who, as Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes\nthe Cynic, and Aristippus of Cyrenaica, borrowed somewhat from the\ndialectic of Socrates, we shall say nothing. They left no lasting\nimpression upon the current of philosophic thought, because their\nsystems were too partial, and narrow, and fragmentary. It is in Plato\nand Aristotle that the true development of the Socratic philosophy is to\nbe sought, and in Plato chiefly, as the disciple and friend of Socrates.\n\n[Footnote 488: \"Banquet,\" \u00a7\u00a7 39, 40.]\n\nPlato (B.C. 430-347) was pre-eminently the pupil of Socrates. He came to\nSocrates when he was but twenty years of age, and remained with him to\nthe day of his death.\n\nDiogenes Laertius reports the story of Socrates having dreamed he found\nan unfledged cygnet on his knee. In a few moments it became winged and\nflew away, uttering a sweet sound. The next day a young man came to him\nwho was said to reckon Solon among his near ancestors, and who looked,\nthrough him, to Codrus and the god Poseidon. That young man was Plato,\nand Socrates pronounced him to be the bird he had seen in his\ndream.[489]\n\n[Footnote 489: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. iii.\nch. vii.]\n\nSome have supposed that this old tradition intimates that Plato departed\nfrom the method of his master--he became fledged and flew away into the\nair. But we know that Plato did not desert his master whilst he was\nliving, and there is no evidence that he abandoned his method after he\nwas dead. He was the best expounder and the most rigid observer of the\nSocratic \"organon.\" The influence of Socrates upon the philosophy of\nPlato is everywhere discernible. Plato had been taught by Socrates, that\nbeyond the world of sense there is a world of eternal truth, seen by the\neye of reason alone. He had also learned from him that the eye of reason\nis purified and strengthened by _reflection_, and that to reflect is to\nobserve, and analyze, and define, and classify the facts of\nconsciousness. Self-reflection, then, he had been taught to regard as\nthe key of real knowledge. By a completer induction, a more careful and\nexact analysis, and a more accurate definition, he carried this\nphilosophic method forward towards maturity. He sought to solve the\nproblem of _being_ by the principles revealed in his own consciousness,\nand in the _ultimate ideas of the reason_ to find the foundation of all\nreal knowledge, of all truth, and of all certitude.\n\nPlato was admirably fitted for these sublime investigations by the\npossession of those moral qualities which were so prominent in the\ncharacter of his master. He had that same deep seriousness of spirit,\nthat earnestness and rectitude of purpose, that longing after truth,\nthat inward sympathy with, and reverence for justice, and purity, and\ngoodness, which dwelt in the heart of Socrates, and which constrained\nhim to believe in their reality and permanence. He could not endure the\nthought that all ideas of right were arbitrary and factitious, that all\nknowledge was unreal, that truth was a delusion, and certainty a dream.\nThe world of sense might be fleeting and delusive, but the voice of\nreason and conscience would not mislead the upright man. The opinions of\nindividual men might vary, but the universal consciousness of the race\ncould not prevaricate. However conflicting the opinions of men\nconcerning beautiful things, right actions, and good sentiments, Plato\nwas persuaded there are ideas of Order, and Right, and Good, which are\nuniversal, unchangeable, and eternal. Untruth, injustice, and wrong may\nendure for a day or two, perhaps for a century or two, but they can not\nalways last; they must perish. The _just_ thing and the _true_ thing are\nthe only enduring things; these are eternal. Plato had a sublime\nconviction that his mission was to draw the Athenian mind away from the\nfleeting, the transitory, and the uncertain, and lead them to the\ncontemplation of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Justice, an Eternal\nBeauty, all proceeding from and united in an Eternal Being--the ultimate\nagathon--_the Supremely Good_. The knowledge of this \"Supreme Good\" he\nregarded as the highest science.[490]\n\n[Footnote 490: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xvi. p. 193.]\n\nAdded to these moral qualifications, Plato had the further qualification\nof a comprehensive knowledge of all that had been achieved by his\npredecessors. In this regard he had enjoyed advantages superior to those\nof Socrates. Socrates was deficient in erudition, properly so called. He\nhad studied men rather than books. His wisdom consisted in an extensive\n_observation_, the results of which he had generalized with more or less\naccuracy. A complete philosophic method demands not only a knowledge of\ncontemporaneous opinions and modes of thought, but also a knowledge of\nthe succession and development of thought in past ages. Its instrument\nis not simply psychological analysis, but also historical analysis as a\ncounterproof.[491] And this erudition Plato supplied. He studied\ncarefully the doctrines of the Ionian, Italian, and Eleatic schools.\nCratylus gave him special instruction in the theories of\nHeraclitus.[492] He secured an intimate acquaintance with the lofty\nspeculations of Pythagoras, under Archytas of Tarentum, and in the\nwritings of Philolaus, whose books he is said to have purchased. He\nstudied the principles of Parmenides under Hermogenes,[493] and he more\nthan once speaks of Parmenides in terms of admiration, as one whom he\nhad early learned to reverence.[494] He studied mathematics under\nTheodoras, the most eminent geometrician of his day. He travelled in\nSouthern Italy, in Sicily, and, in search of a deeper wisdom, he pursued\nhis course to Egypt.[495] Enriched by the fruits of all previous\nspeculations, he returned to Athens, and devoted the remainder of his\nlife to the development of a comprehensive system \"which was to combine,\nto conciliate, and to supersede them all.\"[496] The knowledge he had\nderived from travel, from books, from oral instruction, he fused and\nblended with his own speculations, whilst the Socratic spirit mellowed\nthe whole, and gave to it a unity and scientific completeness which has\nexcited the admiration and wonder of succeeding ages.[497]\n\n[Footnote 491: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 492: Aristotle's \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 493: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. iii.\nch. viii. p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 494: See especially \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 101.]\n\n[Footnote 495: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n147.]\n\n[Footnote 496: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n22.]\n\n[Footnote 497: Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article \"Plato.\"]\n\nThe question as to _the nature, the sources, and the validity of human\nknowledge_ had attracted general attention previous to the time of\nSocrates and Plato. As the results of this protracted controversy, the\nopinions of philosophers had finally crystallized in two well-defined\nand opposite theories of knowledge.\n\n1. That which reduced all knowledge to the accidental and passively\nreceptive quality of the organs of sense and which asserted, as its\nfundamental maxim, that \"_Science consists in_\naisth\u00easis--_sensation_.\"[498]\n\nThis doctrine had its foundation in the physical philosophy of\nHeraclitus. He had taught that all things are in a perpetual flux and\nchange. \"Motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation.\"\n\"Nothing _is_, but is always a _becoming\"_[499] Material substances are\nperpetually losing their identity, and there is no permanent essence or\nbeing to be found. Hence Protagoras inferred that truth must vary with\nthe ever-varying sensations of the individual. \"Man (the individual) is\nthe measure of all things.\" Knowledge is a purely relative thing, and\nevery man's opinion is truth for him.[500] The law of right, as\nexemplified in the dominion of a party, is the law of the strongest;\nfluctuating with the accidents of power, and never attaining a permanent\nbeing. \"Whatever a city enacts as appearing just to itself, this also is\njust to the city that enacts it, so long as it continues in force.\"[501]\n\"The just, then, is nothing else but that which is expedient for the\nstrongest.\"[502]\n\n[Footnote 498: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 23.]\n\n[Footnote 499: Ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 25, 26.]\n\n[Footnote 500: Ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 39, 87.]\n\n[Footnote 501: Ibid., \u00a7 87.]\n\n[Footnote 502: \"Republic,\" bk. i. ch. xii.]\n\n2. The second theory is that which denies the existence (except as\nphantasms, images, or mere illusions of the mind) of the whole of\nsensible phenomena, and refers all knowledge to the _rational\napperception of unity_ (to en) _or the One_.\n\nThis was the doctrine of the later Eleatics. The world of sense was, to\nParmenides and Zeno, a blank negation, the _non ens_. The identity of\nthought and existence was the fundamental principle of their philosophy.\n\n      \"Thought is the same thing as the cause of thought; For\n      without the thing in which it is announced, You can not find\n      the thought; for there is nothing, nor shall be, Except the\n      existing.\"[503]\n\n[Footnote 503: Parmenides, quoted in Lewes's \"Biog. History of\nPhilosophy,\" p. 54.]\n\nThis theory, therefore, denied to man any valid knowledge of the\nexternal world.\n\nIt will at once be apparent to the intelligent reader that the direct\nand natural result of both these theories[504] of knowledge was a\ntendency to universal skepticism. A spirit of utter indifference to\ntruth and righteousness was the prevailing spirit of Athenian society.\nThat spirit is strikingly exhibited in the speech of Callicles, \"the\nshrewd man of the world,\" in \"Gorgias\" (\u00a785, 86). Is this new to our\nears?\" My dear Socrates, you talk of _law_. Now the laws, in my\njudgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous; in framing\nthem they never thought but of themselves and their own interests; they\nnever approve or censure except in reference to _this._ Hence it is that\nthe cant arises that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for\neminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to\npreach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the\nstronger.... We surround our children from their infancy with\npreposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense\ntramples on such impositions, and shows what Nature's justice is.... I\nconfess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study--in moderation,\nand for boys. But protracted too long, it becomes a perfect plague. Your\nphilosopher is a complete novice in the life _comme il faut_.... I like\nvery well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about\nit when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the\nchild, is absurd. Just so with your philosophy.\" The consequence of this\nprevalent spirit of universal skepticism was a general laxity of morals.\nThe Aleibiades, of the \"_Symposium_,\" is the ideal representative of the\nyoung aristocracy of Athens. Such was the condition of society\ngenerally, and such the degeneracy of even the Government itself, that\nPlato impressively declares \"that God alone could save the young men of\nhis age from ruin.\"[505]\n\n[Footnote 504: Between these two extreme theories there were offered\ntwo, apparently less extravagant, accounts of the nature and limits of\nhuman knowledge--one declaring that \"_Science_(real knowledge) _consists\nin right opinion_\" (doxa al\u00eath\u00eas), but having no further basis in the\nreason of man (\"The\u00e6stetus,\" \u00a7 108); and the other affirming that\n\"_Science is right opinion with logical explication or definition_\"\n(meta loxou, \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 139). A close examination will, however,\nconvince us that these are but modifications of the sensational theory.\nThe latter forcibly remind us of the system of Locke, who adds\n\"reflection\" to \"sensation,\" but still maintains that all on \"simple\nideas\" are obtained from without, and that these are the only material\nupon which reflection can be exercised. Thus the human mind has no\ncriterion of truth within itself, no elements of knowledge which are\nconnatural and inborn.]\n\n[Footnote 505: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. vii.]\n\nTherefore the grand, the vital, the most urgent question for his times,\nas indeed for all times, was, _What is Truth? What is Right_? In the\nmidst of all this variableness and uncertainty of human opinion, is\nthere no ground of certainty? Amid all the fluctuations and changes\naround us and within us, is there nothing that is immutable and\npermanent? Have we no ultimate standard of Right? Is there no criterion\nof Truth? Plato believed most confidently there was such a criterion and\nstandard. He had learned from Socrates, his master, to cherish an\nunwavering faith in the existence of an Eternal Truth, an Eternal Order,\nan Eternal Good, the knowledge of which is essential to the perfection\nand happiness of man, and which knowledge must therefore be presumed to\nbe attainable by man. Henceforth, therefore, the ceaseless effort of\nPlato's life is to attain a standard (krit\u00earion)[506]--a CRITERION OF\nTRUTH.\n\n[Footnote 506: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 89.]\n\nAt the outset of his philosophic studies, Plato had derived from\nSocrates an important principle, which became the guide of all his\nsubsequent inquiries. He had learned from him that the criterion of\ntruth must be no longer sought amid the ever-changing phenomena of the\n\"sensible world.\" This had been attempted by the philosophers of the\nIonian school, and ended in failure and defeat. It must therefore be\nsought in the metaphenomenal--the \"intelligible world;\" that is, it must\nbe sought in the apperceptions of the reason, and not in opinions\nfounded on sensation. In other words, he must look _within_. Here, by\nreflection, he could recognize, dimly and imperfectly at first, but\nincreasing gradually in clearness and distinctness, two classes of\ncognitions, having essentially distinct and opposite characteristics. He\nfound one class that was complex (synkegumenon), changeable (thateron),\ncontingent and relative (ta pros ti schesin echonta); the other, simple\n(kex\u00f4rismenon), unchangeable (akin\u00eaton), constant (tauton), permanent\n(to on aei), and absolute (anypotheton = aploun). One class that may be\nquestioned, the other admitting of no question, because self-evident and\nnecessary, and therefore compelling belief. One class grounded on\nsense-perception, the other conceived by reason alone. But whilst the\nreason recognizes, it does not create them. They are not particular and\nindividual, but universal. They belong not to the man, but to the race.\n\nHe found, then, that there are in all minds certain \"principles\" which\nare fundamental--principles which lie at the basis of all our cognitions\nof the objective world, and which, as \"mental laws,\" determine all our\nforms of thought; and principles, too, which have this marvellous and\nundeniable character, that they are encountered in the most common\nexperiences, and, at the same time, instead of being circumscribed\nwithin the limits of experience, transcend and govern it--principles\nwhich are _universal_ in the midst of particular phenomena--_necessary,_\nthough mingled with things contingent--to our eyes _infinite_ and\n_absolute_, even when appearing in us the relative and finite beings\nthat we are.[507] These first or fundamental principles Plato called\nIDEAS (ideai).\n\n[Footnote 507: Cousin's \"The True, the Beautiful, and the Good,\" p. 40.]\n\nIn attempting to present to the reader an adequate representation of the\nPlatonic Ideas, we shall be under the necessity of anticipating some of\nthe results of his Dialectical method before we have expounded that\nmethod. And, further, in order that it may be properly appreciated by\nthe modern student, we shall avail ourselves of the lights which modern\npsychology, faithful to the method of Plato, has thrown upon the\nsubject. Whilst, however, we admit that modern psychology has succeeded\nin giving more definiteness and precision to the \"doctrine of Ideas,\" we\nshall find that all that is fundamentally valuable and true was present\nto the mind of Plato. Whatever superiority the \"Spiritual\" philosophy of\nto-day may have over the philosophy of past ages, it has attained that\nsuperiority by its adherence to the principles and method of Plato.\n\nIn order to the completeness of our preliminary exposition of the\nPlatonic doctrine of Ideas, we shall conditionally assume, as a natural\nand legitimate hypothesis, the doctrine so earnestly asserted by Plato,\nthat the visible universe, at least in its present form, is an _effect_\nwhich must have had a _cause_,[508] and that the Order, and Beauty, and\nExcellence of the universe are the result of the presence and operation\nof a \"regulating Intelligence\"--a _Supreme Mind_.[509] Now that,\nanterior to the creation of the universe, there must have existed in the\nEternal Mind certain fundamental principles of Order, Right, and Good,\nwill not be denied. Every conceivable _form_, every possible _relation_,\nevery principle of _right_, must have been eternally present to the\nDivine thought. As pure intelligence, the Deity must have always been\nself-conscious--must have known himself as substance and cause, as the\nInfinite and Perfect. If then the Divine Energy is put forth in creative\nacts, that energy must obey those eternal principles of Order, Right,\nand Good. If the Deity operate at all, he must operate rightly, wisely,\nand well. The created universe must be an _image_, in the sphere of\nsense, of the ideas which inhere in the reason of the great First Cause.\n\n[Footnote 508: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 509: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 105.]\n\n\"Let us declare,\" says Plato, \"with what _motive_ the Creator hath\nformed nature and the universe. He was _good_, and in the good no manner\nof envy can, on any subject, possibly subsist. Exempt from envy, he had\nwished that all things should, as far as possible, _resemble\nhimself_.... It was not, and is not to be allowed for the Supremely Good\nto do any thing except what is most _excellent_ (kalliston)--most\n_fair_, most _beautiful_.\"[510] Therefore, argues Plato, \"inasmuch as\nthe world is the most beautiful of things, and its artificer the best of\ncauses, it is evident that the Creator and Father of the universe looked\nto the _Eternal Model_(paradeigma), pattern, or plan,\"[511] which lay in\nhis own mind. And thus this one, only-generated universe, is the _image_\n(eik\u00f4n) of that God who is the object of the intellect, the greatest,\nthe best, and the most perfect Being.[512]\n\n[Footnote 510: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 511: Ibid., ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 512: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. lxxiii.]\n\nAnd then, furthermore, if this Supreme Intelligence, this Eternal Mind,\nshall create another _mind_, it must, in a still higher degree, resemble\nhim. Inasmuch as it is a rational nature, it must, in a peculiar sense,\npartake of the Divine characteristics. \"The soul,\" says Plato, \"is that\nwhich most partakes of the _Divine_\"[513] The soul must, therefore, have\nnative _ideas_ and sentiments which correlate it with the Divine\noriginal. The ideas of substance and cause, of unity and identity, of\nthe infinite and perfect, must be mirrored there. As it is the\n\"offspring of God,\"[514] it must bear some traces and lineaments of its\nDivine parentage. That soul must be configured and correlated to those\nprinciples of Order, Right, and Good which dwell in the Eternal Mind.\nAnd because it has within itself the same ideas and laws, according to\nwhich the great Architect built the universe, therefore it is capable of\nknowing, and, in some degree, of comprehending, the intellectual system\nof the universe. It apprehends the external world by a light which the\nreason supplies. It interprets nature according to principles and laws\nwhich God has inwrought within the very essence of the soul. \"That which\nimparts truth to knowable things, and gives the knower his power of\nknowing truth, is the _idea of the good_, and you are to conceive of\nthis as the source of knowledge and of truth.\"[515]\n\n[Footnote 513: \"Laws,\" bk. v. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 514: Ibid., bk. x.]\n\n[Footnote 515: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xviii.]\n\nAnd now we are prepared to form a clear conception of the Platonic\ndoctrine of Ideas. Viewed in their relation to the Eternal Reason, as\ngiving the primordial thought and law of all being, these principles are\nsimply eid\u00ea auta kath auta--_ideas in themselves_--the essential\nqualities or attributes of Him who is the supreme and ultimate Cause of\nall existence. When regarded as before the Divine imagination, giving\ndefinite forms and relations, they are the tupoi, the paradeigmata--_the\ntypes_, _models, patterns, ideals_ according to which the universe was\nfashioned. Contemplated in their actual embodiment in the laws, and\ntypical forms of the material world, they are eikones--_images_ of the\neternal perfections of God. The world of sense pictures the world of\nreason by a participation (methexis) of the ideas. And viewed as\ninterwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul, they are\nomoi\u00f4mata--copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws of\nknowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the nexus of relation\nbetween God and the visible universe, and between the human and the\nDivine reason.[516] There is something divine in the world, and in the\nhuman soul, namely, _the eternal laws and reasons of things_, mingled\nwith the endless diversity and change of sensible phenomena. These ideas\nare \"the light of the intelligible world;\" they render the invisible\nworld of real Being perceptible to the reason of man. \"Light is the\noffspring of the Good, which the Good has produced in his own likeness.\nLight in the visible world is what the _idea of the Good_ is in the\nintelligible world. And this offspring of the Good--light--has the same\nrelation to vision and visible things which the Good has to intellect\nand intelligible things.\"[517]\n\n[Footnote 516: \"Now, Idea is, as regards God, a mental operation by him\n(the notions of God, eternal and perfect in themselves); as regards us,\nthe first things perceptible by mind; as regards Matter, a standard; but\nas regards the world, perceptible by sense, a pattern; but as considered\nwith reference to itself, an existence.\"--Alcinous, \"Introduction to the\nDoctrines of Plato,\" p. 261.\n\n\"What general notions are to our minds, he (Plato) held, ideas are to\nthe Supreme Reason (nous basileus); they are the eternal thoughts of the\nDivine Intellect, and we attain truth when our thoughts conform with\nHis--when our general notions are in conformity with the\nideas.\"--Thompson, \"Laws of Thought,\" p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 517: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xix.]\n\n_Science_ is, then, according to Plato, _the knowledge of universal,\nnecessary, unchangeable, and eternal ideas_. The simple cognition of the\nconcrete phenomena of the universe is not regarded by him as _real_\nknowledge. \"Science, or real knowledge, belongs to _Being_, and\nignorance to _non_-Being.\" Whilst that which is conversant only \"with\nthat which partakes of both--of being and non-being--and which can not\nbe said either to be or not to be\"--that which is perpetually\n\"becoming,\" but never \"really is,\" is \"simply _opinion_, and not real\nknowledge.\"[518] And those only are \"philosophers\" who have a knowledge\nof the _really-existing_, in opposition to the mere seeming; of the\n_always-existing_, in opposition to the transitory; and of that which\nexists _permanently_, in opposition to that which waxes and wanes--is\ndeveloped and destroyed alternately. \"Those who recognize many beautiful\nthings, but who can not see the Beautiful itself, and can not even\nfollow those who would lead them to it, they _opine_, but do not _know_.\nAnd the same may be said of those who recognize right actions, but do\nnot recognize an absolute righteousness. And so of other ideas. But they\nwho look at these ideas--permanent and unchangeable ideas--these men\n_really know_.\"[519] Those are the true philosophers alone who love the\nsight of truth, and who have attained to the vision of the eternal\norder, and righteousness, and beauty, and goodness in the Eternal Being.\nAnd the means by which the soul is raised to this vision of real Being\n(to ont\u00f4s on) is THE SCIENCE OF REAL KNOWLEDGE.\n\nPlato, in the \"The\u00e6tetus,\" puts this question by the interlocutor\nSocrates, \"What is Science (Epist\u00eam\u00ea) or positive knowledge?\"[520]\nThe\u00e6tetus essays a variety of answers, such as, \"Science is sensation,\"\n\"Science is right judgment or opinion,\" \"Science is right opinion with\nlogical definition.\" These, in the estimation of the Platonic Socrates,\nare all unsatisfactory and inadequate. But after you have toiled to the\nend of this remarkable discussion, in which Socrates demolishes all the\nthen received theories of knowledge, he gives you no answer of his own.\nHe abruptly closes the discussion by na\u00efvely remarking that, at any\nrate, The\u00e6tetus will learn that he does not understand the subject; and\nthe ground is now cleared for an original investigation.\n\n[Footnote 518: \"Republic,\" bk. v. ch. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 519: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.]\n\n[Footnote 520: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 10.]\n\nThis investigation is resumed in the \"Republic.\" This greatest work of\nPlato's was designed not only to exhibit a scheme of Polity, and present\na system of Ethics, but also, at least in its digressions, to propound a\nsystem of Metaphysics more complete and solid than had yet appeared. The\ndiscussion as to the _powers_ or _faculties_ by which we obtain\nknowledge, the _method_ or _process_ by which real knowledge is\nattained, and the ultimate _objects_ or _ontological grounds_ of all\nreal knowledge, commences at \u00a7 18, book v., and extends to the end of\nbook vii.\n\nThat we may reach a comprehensive view of this \"sublimest of sciences,\"\nwe shall find it necessary to consider--\n\n1st. _What are the powers or faculties by which we obtain knowledge, and\nwhat are the limits and degrees of human knowledge?_\n\n2d. _What is the method in which, or the processes and laws according to\nwhich, the mind operates in obtaining knowledge?_\n\n3d. _What are the ultimate results attained by this method? what are the\nobjective and ontological grounds of all real knowledge?_\n\nThe answer to the first question will give the PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY; the\nanswer to the second will exhibit the PLATONIC DIALECTIC; the answer to\nthe last will reveal the PLATONIC ONTOLOGY.\n\nI. PLATONIC PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nEvery successful inquiry as to the reality and validity of human\nknowledge must commence by clearly determining, by rigid analysis, what\nare the actual phenomena presented in consciousness, what are the powers\nor faculties supposed by these phenomena, and what reliance are we to\nplace upon the testimony of these faculties? And, especially, if it be\nasserted that there is a science of absolute Reality, of ultimate and\nessential Being, then the most important and vital question is, By what\npower do we cognize real Being? through what faculty do we obtain the\nknowledge of that which absolutely _is_? If by sensation we only obtain\nthe knowledge of the fleeting and the transitory, \"_the becoming_\" how\ndo we attain to the knowledge of the unchangeable and permanent, \"the\n_Being_?\" Have we a faculty of universal, necessary, and eternal\nprinciples? Have we a faculty, an interior eye which beholds \"_the\nintelligible_,\" ideal, spiritual world, as the eye of sense beholds the\nvisible or \"_sensible world_?\"[521]\n\nPlato commences this inquiry by first defining his understanding of the\nword dynamis--_power_ or _faculty_. \"We will say _faculties_ (dynameis)\nare a certain kind of real existences by which we can do whatever we are\nable (_e.g._, to know), as there are powers by which every thing does\nwhat it does: the eye has a _power_ of seeing; the ear has a _power_ of\nhearing. But these powers (of which I now speak) have no color or figure\nto which I can so refer that I can distinguish one power from another.\n_In order to make such distinction, I must look at the power itself, and\nsee what it is, and what it does. In that way I discern the power of\neach thing, and that is the same power which produces the same effect,\nand that is a different power which produces a different effect_.\"[522]\nThat which is employed about, and accomplishes one and the same purpose,\nthis Plato calls a _faculty_.\n\n[Footnote 521: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xviii.]\n\n[Footnote 522: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi.]\n\nWe have seen that our first conceptions (_i.e._, first in the order of\ntime) are of the mingled, the concrete (to synkechymenon), \"the\nmultiplicity of things to which the multitude ascribe beauty, etc.[523]\nThe mind \"contemplates what is great and small, not as distinct from\neach other, but as confused.[524] Prior to the discipline of\n_reflection_, men are curious about mere sights and sounds, love\nbeautiful voices, beautiful colors, beautiful forms, but their\nintelligence can not see, can not embrace, the essential nature of the\nBeautiful itself.[525] Man's condition previous to the education of\nphilosophy is vividly presented in Plato's simile of the cave.[526] He\nbeholds only the images and shadows of the ectypal world, which are but\ndim and distant adumbrations of the real and archetypal world.\n\nPrimarily nothing is given in the abstract (to keg\u00f4rismenon), but every\nthing in the concrete. The primary faculties of the mind enter into\naction spontaneously and simultaneously; all our primary notions are\nconsequently synthetic. When reflection is applied to this primary\ntotality of consciousness, that is, when we analyze our notions, we find\nthem composed of diverse and opposite elements, some of which are\nvariable, contingent, individual, and relative, others are permanent,\nunchangeable, universal, necessary, and absolute. Now these elements, so\ndiverse, so opposite, can not have been obtained from the same source;\nthey must be supplied by separate powers. \"Can any man with common sense\nreduce under one what _is infallible_, and what is _not\ninfallible?_\"[527] Can that which is \"_perpetually becoming_\" be\napprehended by the same faculty as that which \"_always is?_\"[528] Most\nassuredly not.\n\n[Footnote 523: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.]\n\n[Footnote 524: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 525: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 526: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. i., ii.]\n\n[Footnote 527: \"Republic,\" bk. v. ch. xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 528: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxii.; also \"Tim\u00e6us,\" \u00a7 9.]\n\nThese primitive intuitions--the simple perceptions of sense, and the _\u00e0\npriori_ intuitions of the reason, which constitute the elements of all\nour complex notions, have essentially _diverse objects_--the sensible or\nectypal world, seen by the eye and touched by the hand, which Plato\ncalls doxast\u00ean--_the subject of opinion_; and the noetic or archetypal\nworld, perceived by reason, and which he calls dianontik\u00ean--_the subject\nof rational intuition or science_. \"It is plain,\" therefore, argues\nPlato, \"that _opinion_ is a different thing from _science_. They must,\ntherefore, have a different _faculty_ in reference to a different\nobject--science as regards that which _is_, so as to know the nature of\nreal _being_--opinion as regards that which can not be said absolutely\nto be, or not to be. That which is known and that which is opined can\nnot possibly be the same,... since they are naturally faculties of\ndifferent things, and both of them are faculties--_opinion_ and\n_science_, and each of them different from the other.\"[529] Here then\nare two grand divisions of the mental powers--a faculty of apprehending\nuniversal and necessary Truth, of intuitively beholding absolute\nReality, and a faculty of perceiving sensible objects, and of judging\naccording to appearance.\n\n[Footnote 529: Ibid., bk. v. ch. xxi., xxii.]\n\nAccording to the scheme of Plato, these two general divisions of the\nmental powers are capable of a further subdivision. He says: Consider\nthat there are two kinds of things, the _intelligible_ and the\n_visible_; two different regions, the intelligible world and the\nsensible world. Now take a line divided into two equal segments to\nrepresent these two regions, and again divide each segment in the same\nratio--both that of the visible and that of the intelligible species.\nThe parts of each segment are to represent differences of clearness and\nindistinctness. In the visible world the parts are _things_ and\n_images_. By _images_ I mean shadows,[530] reflections in water and in\npolished bodies, and all such like representations; and by _things_ I\nmean that of which images are resemblances, as animals, plants, and\nthings made by man.\n\nYou allow that this difference corresponds to the difference of\n_knowledge_ and _opinion_; and the _opinionable_ is to the _knowable_ as\nthe _image_ to the _reality_.[531]\n\n[Footnote 530: As in the simile of the cave (\"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. i.\nand ii.).]\n\n[Footnote 531: The analogy between the \"images produced by reflections\nin water and on polished surfaces\" and \"the images of external objects\nproduced in the mind by sensation\" is more fully presented in the\n\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. 19.\n\nThe eye is a light-bearer, \"made of that part of elemental fire which\ndoes not burn, but sheds a mild light, like the light of day.... When\nthe light of the day meets the light which beams from the eye, then\nlight meets like, and make a homogeneous body; the external light\nmeeting the internal light, in the direction in which the eye looks. And\nby this homogeneity like feels like; and if this beam touches any\nobject, or any object touches it, it transmits the motions through the\nbody to the soul, and produces that sensation which we call _seeing_....\nAnd if (in sleep) some of the strong motions remain in some part of the\nframe, they produce within us likenesses of external objects,... and\nthus give rise to dreams.... As to the images produced by mirrors and by\nsmooth surfaces, they are now easily explained, for all such phenomena\nresult from the mutual affinity of the external and internal fires. The\nlight that proceeds from the face (as an object of vision), and the\nlight that proceeds from the eye, become one continuous ray on the\nsmooth surface.\"]\n\nNow we have to divide the segment which represents intelligible things\nin this way: The one part represents the knowledge which the mind gets\nby using things as images--the other; that which it has by dealing with\nthe ideas themselves; the one part that which it gets by reasoning\ndownward from principles--the other, the principles themselves; the one\npart, truth which depends on hypotheses--the other, unhypothetical or\nabsolute truth.\n\nThus, to explain a problem in geometry, the geometers make certain\nhypotheses (namely, definitions and postulates) about numbers and\nangles, and the like, and reason from them--giving no reason for their\nassumptions, but taking them as evident to all; and, reasoning from\nthem, they prove the propositions which they have in view. And in such\nreasonings, they use visible figures or diagrams--to reason about a\nsquare, for instance, with its diagonals; but these reasonings are not\nreally about these visible figures, but about the mental figures, and\nwhich they conceive in thought.\n\nThe diagrams which they draw, being visible, are the images of thoughts\nwhich the geometer has in his mind, and these images he uses in his\nreasoning. There may be images of these images--shadows and reflections\nin water, as of other visible things; but still these diagrams are only\nimages of conceptions.\n\nThis, then, is _one_ kind of intelligible things: _conceptions_--for\ninstance, geometrical conceptions of figures. But in dealing with these\nthe mind depends upon assumptions, and does not ascend to first\nprinciples. It does not ascend above these assumptions, but uses images\nborrowed from a lower region (the visible world), these images being\nchosen so as to be as distinct as may be.\n\nNow the _other_ kind of intelligible things is this: that which the\n_Reason_ includes, in virtue of its power of reasoning, when it regards\nthe assumptions of the sciences as (what they are) assumptions only, and\nuses them as occasions and starting-points, that from these it may\nascend to the _Absolute_, which does not depend upon assumption, the\norigin of scientific truth.\n\n_The reason takes hold of this first principle of truth_, and availing\nitself of all the connections and relations of this principle, it\nproceeds to the conclusion--using no sensible image in doing this, but\ncontemplates the _idea alone_; and with these ideas the process begins,\ngoes on, and terminates.\n\n\"I apprehend,\" said Glaucon, \"but not very clearly, for the matter is\nsomewhat abstruse. _You wish to prove that the knowledge which by the\nreason, in an intuitive manner, we may acquire of real existence and\nintelligible things is of a higher degree of certainty than the\nknowledge which belongs to what are commonly called the Sciences_. Such\nsciences, you say, have certain assumptions for their basis; and these\nassumptions are by the student of such sciences apprehended not by\nsense, but by a mental operation--by conception.\n\n\"But inasmuch as such students ascend no higher than assumptions, and do\nnot go to the first principles of truth, they do not seem to have true\nknowledge, intellectual insight, intuitive reason, on the subjects of\ntheir reasonings, though the subjects are intelligible things. And you\ncall this habit and practice of the geometers and others by the name of\nJUDGMENT (dianoia), not reason, or insight, or intuition--taking\njudgment to be something between opinion, on the one side, and intuitive\nreason, on the other.\n\n\"You have explained it well,\" said I. \"And now consider these four kinds\nof things we have spoken of, as corresponding to four affections (or\nfaculties) of the mind. INTUITIVE REASON (no\u00easis), the highest; JUDGMENT\n(dianoia)(or _discursive reason_), the next; the third, BELIEF (pistis);\nand the fourth, CONJECTURE, or _guess_ (eikasia); and arrange them in\norder, so that they may be held to have more or less certainty, as their\nobjects have more or less truth.\"[532] The completeness, and even\naccuracy of this classification of all the objects of human cognition,\nand of the corresponding mental powers, will be seen at once by studying\nthe diagram proposed by Plato, as figured on the opposite page.\n\n[Footnote 532: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.]\n\nPLATONIC SCHEME OF THE OBJECTS OF COGNITION, AND THE RELATIVE MENTAL POWERS\n___________________________________________________________________________\n            |                                 |\n            | VISIBLE WORLD                   | INTELLIGIBLE WORLD\n            | (the object of Opinion--doxa).  |(the object of Knowledge or\n            |                                 | Science--ipytt\u00eam\u00ea).\n            |_________________________________|____________________________\n            |                |                |              |\n            | Things.        | Images.        | Intuitions.  | Conceptions.\n____________|________________|________________|______________|_____________\n\nAnd may be thus further expanded:\n___________________________________________________________________________\n            |                                 |\n            | VISIBLE WORLD.                  |   INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n____________|_________________________________|____________________________\n            |                |                |             |\n            | Things         | Images         | Ideas       | Conceptions\nOBJECT      |                |                |             |\n            | zoa. k. t. l.  | icones.        | ideai.      | dueno\u00eamata.\n____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________\n            |                |                |             |\n            | Belief.        | Conjecture.    | Intuition.  |Demonstration.\nPROCESS     |                |                |             |\n            | piotis.        | eikasia.       | no\u00easis.     | ipisi\u00eai\u00ea.\n____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________\n            |                |                |             |\n            | SENSATION.     | PHANTASY.      | INTUITIVE   | DISCURSIVE\nFACULTY     |                |                |   REASON.   |    REASON.\n            | aisth\u00easis.     | phantasia.     | nous.       | logos.\n____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________\n            |                |                |             |\nMODERN      | SENSE.         | IMAGINATION.   | REASON.     | JUDGMENT.\nNOMENCLATURE|Presentative    |Representative  |Regulative   | Logical\n            | Faculty.       | Faculty        | Faculty.    |    Faculty.\n____________|________________|________________|_____________|______________\n            |                                 |\n            | MEMORY.                         | REMINISCENCE\n            | mn\u00eam\u00ea.                          |   anam\u00easis.\n            | The Conservative Faculty--      | The Reproductive Faculty--\n            | \"the preserver of sensation\"    |\"the recollection of the\n            | (sot\u00earia aisin, se\u00f4s.) [533]    | things which the soul\n            |                                 | saw (in Eternity) when\n            |                                 | journeying in the train of\n            |                                 | the Deity.\"[534]\n            |[Footnote 533: \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 67] | [Footnote 534: Ph\u00e6drus,\n            |                                 |                     \u00a7 62.]\n____________|_________________________________|____________________________\n\n\nThe foregoing diagram, borrowed from Whewell, with some modifications\nand additions we have ventured to make, exhibits a perfect view of the\nPlatonic scheme of the _cognitive powers_--the faculties by which the\nmind attains to different degrees of knowledge, \"having more or less\ncertainty, as their objects have more or less truth.\"[535]\n\n1st. SENSATION (aisth\u00easis).--This term is employed by Plato to denote\nthe passive mental states or affections which are produced within us by\nexternal objects through the medium of the vital organization, and also\nthe cognition or vital perception or consciousness[536] which the mind\nhas of these mental states.\n\n2d. PHANTASY (phantasia).--This term is employed to describe the power\nwhich the mind possesses of imagining or representing whatever has once\nbeen the object of sensation. This may be done involuntarily as \"in\ndreams, disease, and hallucination,\"[537] or voluntarily, as in\nreminiscence. Phantasmata are the images, the life-pictures (zograph\u00eana)\nof sensible things which are present to the mind, even when no external\nobject is present to the sense.\n\n[Footnote 535: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 536: \"In Greek philosophy there was no term for\n'consciousness' until the decline of philosophy, and in the latter ages\nof the language. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other\nphilosophers, had no special term to express the knowledge which the\nmind has of the operation of its own faculties, though this, of course,\nwas necessarily a frequent matter of consideration. Intellect was\nsupposed by them to be cognizant of its own operations.... In his\n'The\u00e6tetus' Plato accords to sense the power of perceiving that it\nperceives.\"--Hamilton's \"Metaphysics,\" vol. i. p. 198 (Eng. ed.).]\n\n[Footnote 537: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 39.]\n\nThe conjoint action of these two powers results in what Plato calls\n_opinion_ (doxa). \"Opinion is the complication of memory and sensation.\nFor when we meet for the first time with a thing perceptible by a sense,\nand a sensation is produced by it, and from this sensation a memory, and\nwe subsequently meet again with the same thing perceived by a sense, we\ncombine the memory previously brought into action with the sensation\nproduced a second time, and we say within ourselves [this is] Socrates,\nor a horse, or fire, or whatever thing there may be of such a kind. Now\nthis is called _opinion_, through our combining the recollection brought\npreviously into action with the sensation recently produced. And when\nthese, placed along each other, agree, a true opinion is produced; but\nwhen they swerve from each other, a false one.\"[538] The dixa of Plato,\ntherefore answers to the experience, or the _empirical knowledge_ of\nmodern philosophy, which is concerned only with appearances (phenomena),\nand not with absolute realities, and can not be elevated to the dignity\nof _science_ or real knowledge.\n\nWe are not from hence to infer that Plato intended to deny all reality\nwhatever to the objects of sensible experience. These transitory\nphenomena were not real existences, but they were _images_ of real\nexistences. The world itself is but the image, in the sphere of sense,\nof those ideas of Order, and Proportion, and Harmony, which dwell in the\nDivine Intellect, and are mirrored in the soul of man. \"Time itself is a\nmoving image of Eternity.\"[539] But inasmuch as the immediate object of\nsense-perception is a representative image generated in the vital\norganism, and all empirical cognitions are mere \"conjectures\" (eikasiai)\nfounded on representative images, they need to be certified by a higher\nfaculty, which immediately apprehends real Being (to on). Of things, as\nthey are in themselves, the senses give us no knowledge; all that in\nsensation we are conscious of is certain affections of the mind\n(pathos); the existence of self, or the perceiving subject, and a\nsomething external to self, a perceived object, are revealed to us, not\nby the senses, but by the reason.\n\n[Footnote 538: Alcinous, \"Introduction to the Doctrine of Plato,\" p.\n247.]\n\n[Footnote 539: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" \u00a7 14.]\n\n3d. JUDGMENT (dianoia, logos), _the Discursive Faculty, or the Faculty\nof Relations_.--According to Plato, this faculty proceeds on the\nassumption of certain principles as true, without inquiring into their\nvalidity, and reasons, by deduction, to the conclusions which\nnecessarily flow from these principles. These assumptions Plato calls\nhypotheses (ypotheseis). But by hypotheses he does not mean baseless\nassumptions--\"mere theories--\"but things self-evident and \"obvious to\nall;\"[540] as for example, the postulates and definitions of Geometry.\n\"After laying down hypotheses of the odd and even, and three kinds of\nangles [right, acute, and obtuse], and figures [as the triangle, square,\ncircle, and the like], he _proceeds on them as known, and gives no\nfurther reason about them_, and reasons downward from these\nprinciples,\"[541] affirming certain judgments as consequences deducible\ntherefrom.\n\n[Footnote 540: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 541: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xx.]\n\nAll judgments are therefore founded on _relations_. To judge is to\ncompare two terms. \"Every judgment has three parts: the subject, or\nnotion about which the judgment is; the predicate, or notion with which\nthe subject is compared; and the copula, or nexus, which expresses the\nconnection or relation between them.[542] Every act of affirmative\njudgment asserts the agreement of the predicate and subject; every act\nof negative judgment asserts the predicate and subject do not agree. All\njudgment is thus an attempt to reduce to unity two cognitions, and\nreasoning (logizesthai) is simply the extension of this process. When we\nlook at two straight lines of equal length, we do not merely think of\nthem separately as _this_ straight line, and _that_ straight line, but\nthey are immediately connected together by a comparison which takes\nplace in the mind. We perceive that these two lines are alike; they are\nof equal length, and they are both straight; and the connection which is\nperceived as existing between them is a _relation of sameness or\nidentity._[543] When we observe any change occurring in nature, as, for\nexample, the melting of wax in the presence of heat, the mind recognizes\na causal efficiency in the fire to produce that change, and the relation\nnow apprehended is a _relation of cause and effect_[544] But the\nfundamental principles, the necessary ideas which lie at the basis of\nall the judgments (as the ideas of space and time, of unity and\nidentity, of substance and cause, of the infinite and perfect) are not\ngiven by the judgment, but by the \"highest faculty\"--\"the _Intuitive\nReason_,[545] which is, for us, the source of all unhypothetical and\nabsolute knowledge.\n\n[Footnote 542: Thompson's \"Laws of Thought,\" p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 543: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 50-57, 62.]\n\n[Footnote 544: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.; \"Sophocles,\" \u00a7 109.]\n\n[Footnote 545: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xxi.]\n\nThe knowledge, therefore, which is furnished by the Discursive Reason,\nPlato does not regard as \"real Science.\" \"It is something between\nOpinion on the one hand, and Intuition on the other.\"[546]\n\n[Footnote 546: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xxi.]\n\n4th. REASON (nous)--_Intuitive Reason_, is the organ of self-evident,\nnecessary, and universal Truth. In an immediate, direct, and intuitive\nmanner, it takes hold on truth with absolute certainty. The reason,\nthrough the medium of _ideas_, holds communion with the world of real\nBeing. These ideas are the _light_ which reveals the world of unseen\nrealities, as the sun reveals the world of sensible forms. \"_The idea of\nthe good_ is the _sun_ of the Intelligible World; it sheds on objects\nthe light of truth, and gives to the soul that knows, the power of\nknowing.\"[547] Under this light, the eye of reason apprehends the\neternal world of being as truly, yes more truly, than the eye of sense\napprehends the world of phenomena. This power the rational soul\npossesses by virtue of its having a nature kindred, or even homogeneous\nwith the Divinity. It was \"generated by the Divine Father,\" and, like\nhim, it is in a certain sense \"_eternal_.\"[548] Not that we are to\nunderstand Plato as teaching that the rational soul had an independent\nand underived existence; it was created or \"generated\" in eternity,[549]\nand even now, in its incorporate state, is not amenable to the\nconditions of time and space, but, in a peculiar sense, dwells in\neternity; and therefore is capable of beholding eternal realities, and\ncoming into communion with absolute beauty, and goodness, and\ntruth--that is, with God, the _Absolute Being_.\n\n[Footnote 547: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xix.; see also ch. xviii.]\n\n[Footnote 548: The reader must familiarize himself with the Platonic\nnotion of _\"eternity\" as a fixed state out of time existing\ncontemporaneous with one in time_, to appreciate the doctrine of Plato\nas stated above. If we regard his idea of eternity as merely an\nindefinite extension of time, with a past, a present, and a future, we\ncan offer no rational interpretation of his doctrine of the eternal\nnature of the rational essence of the soul. An eternal nature\n\"generated\" in a \"past\" or \"present\" time is a contradiction. But that\nwas not Plato's conception of \"eternity,\" as the reader will discover on\nperusing the \"Tim\u00e6us\" (ch. xiv.). \"God resolved to create a moving image\nof eternity, and out of that eternity which reposes in its own\n_unchangeable unity_ he framed an eternal image moving according to\nnumerical succession, which we call _Time_. Nothing can be more\ninaccurate than to apply the terms, _past, present, future_, to real\nBeing, which is immovable. Past and future are expressions only suitable\nto generation which proceeds through time.\" Time reposes on the bosom of\neternity, as all bodies are in space.]\n\n[Footnote 549: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xvi., and \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" where the soul is\npronounced arch\u00ea de agen\u00eaton.]\n\nThus the soul (psych\u00ea) as a composite nature is on one side linked to\nthe eternal world, its essence being generated of that ineffable element\nwhich constitutes the real, the immutable, and the permanent. It is a\nbeam of the eternal Sun, a spark of the Divinity, an emanation from God.\nOn the other side it is linked to the phenomenal or sensible world, its\nemotive part[550] being formed of that which is relative and phenomenal.\nThe soul of man thus stands midway between the eternal and the\ncontingent, the real and the phenomenal, and as such, it is the mediator\nbetween, and the interpreter of, both.\n\n[Footnote 550: thymeides, the seat of the nobler--epithym\u00eatikon, the\nseat of the baser passions.]\n\nIn the allegory of the \"Chariot and Winged Steeds\"[551] Plato represents\nthe lower or inferior part of man's nature as dragging the soul down to\nthe earth, and subjecting it to the slavery and debasement of corporeal\nconditions. Out of these conditions there arise numerous evils that\ndisorder the mind and becloud the reason, for evil is inherent to the\ncondition of finite and multiform being into which we have \"fallen by\nour own fault.\" The present earthly life is a fall and a punishment. The\nsoul is now dwelling in \"the grave we call the body.\" In its incorporate\nstate, and previous to the discipline of education, the rational element\nis \"asleep.\" \"Life is more of a dream than a reality.\" Men are utterly\nthe slaves of sense, the sport of phantoms and illusions. We now\nresemble those \"captives chained in a subterraneous cave,\" so poetically\ndescribed in the seventh book of the \"Republic;\" their backs are turned\nto the light, and consequently they see but the shadows of the objects\nwhich pass behind them, and they \"attribute to these shadows a perfect\nreality.\" Their sojourn upon earth is thus a dark imprisonment in the\nbody, a dreamy exile from their proper home. \"Nevertheless these pale\nfugitive shadows suffice to revive in us the reminiscence of that higher\nworld we once inhabited, if we have not absolutely given the reins to\nthe impetuous untamed horse which in Platonic symbolism represents the\nemotive sensuous nature of man.\" The soul has some dim and shadowy\nrecollection of its ante-natal state of bliss, and some instinctive and\nproleptic yearnings for its return.\n\n[Footnote 551: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 54-62.]\n\n     \"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;\n     The soul that rises with us, our life's star,\n       Has had elsewhere its setting,\n       And cometh from afar,\n       Not in entire forgetfulness,\n       And not in utter nakedness,\n     But trailing clouds of glory, do we come\n     From God, who is our home.\"[552]\n\n[Footnote 552: Wordsworth, \"Ode on the Intimations of Immortality,\" vol.\nv.]\n\nExiled from the true home of the spirit, imprisoned in the body,\ndisordered by passion, and beclouded by sense, the soul has yet longings\nafter that state of perfect knowledge, and purity, and bliss, in which\nit was first created. Its affinities are still on high. It yearns for a\nhigher and nobler form of life. It essays to rise, but its eye is\ndarkened by sense, its wings are besmeared by passion and lust; it is\n\"borne downward, until at length it falls upon and attaches itself to\nthat which is material and sensual,\" and it flounders and grovels still\namid the objects of sense.\n\nAnd now, with all that seriousness and earnestness of spirit which is\npeculiarly Christian, Plato asks how the soul may be delivered from the\nillusions of sense, the distempering influence of the body, and the\ndisturbances of passion, which becloud its vision of the real, the good,\nand the true?\n\nPlato believed and hoped this could be accomplished by _philosophy_.\nThis he regarded as a grand intellectual discipline for the purification\nof the soul. By this it was to be disenthralled from the bondage of\nsense[553] and raised into the empyrean of pure thought \"where truth and\nreality shine forth.\" All souls have the faculty of knowing, but it is\nonly by reflection, and self-knowledge, and intellectual discipline,\nthat the soul can be raised to the vision of eternal truth, goodness,\nand beauty--that is, to the vision of God. And this intellectual\ndiscipline was the _Platonic Dialectic_.\n\n[Footnote 553: Not, however, fully in this life. The consummation of the\nintellectual struggle into \"the intelligible world\" is death. The\nintellectual discipline was therefore melet\u00ea thanatou, _a preparation\nfor death_.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_.)\n\nTHE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n\nPLATO.\n\n\nII. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC.\n\nThe Platonic Dialectic is the Science of Eternal and Immutable\nPrinciples, and the _method_ (organon) by which these first principles\nare brought forward into the clear light of consciousness. The student\nof Plato will have discovered that he makes no distinction between logic\nand metaphysics. These are closely united in the one science to which he\ngives the name of \"_Dialectic_\" and which was at once the science of the\nideas and laws of the Reason, and of the mental process by which the\nknowledge of Real Being is attained, and a ground of absolute certainty\nis found. This science has, in modern times, been called _Primordial_ or\n_Transcendental Logic_.\n\nWe have seen that Plato taught that the human reason is originally in\npossession of fundamental and necessary ideas--the copies of the\narchetypal ideas which dwell in the eternal Reason; and that these ideas\nare the primordial laws of thought--that is, they are the laws under\nwhich we conceive of all objective things, and reason concerning all\nexistence. These ideas, he held, are not derived from sensation, neither\nare they generalizations from experience, but they are inborn and\nconnatural. And, further, he entertained the belief, more, however, as a\nreasonable hypothesis[554] than as a demonstrable truth, that these\nstandard principles were acquired by the soul in a pre-existent state in\nwhich it stood face to face with ideas of eternal order, beauty,\ngoodness, and truth.[555] \"Journeying with the Deity,\" the soul\ncontemplated justice, wisdom, science--not that science which is\nconcerned with change, and which appears under a different manifestation\nin different objects, which we choose to call beings; but such science\nas is in that which alone is indeed _being_.[556] Ideas, therefore,\nbelong to, and inhere in, that portion of the soul which is properly\nousia--_essence_ or _being_; which had an existence anterior to time,\nand even now has no relation to time, because it is now in\neternity--that is, in a sphere of being to which past, present, and\nfuture can have no relation.[557]\n\n[Footnote 554: Within \"the eikot\u00f4n myth\u00f4n idea--the category of\nprobability.\"--\"Ph\u00e6do.\"]\n\n[Footnote 555: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 50-56.]\n\n[Footnote 556: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 58.]\n\n[Footnote 557: See note on p. 349.]\n\nAll knowledge of truth and reality is, therefore, according to Plato, a\nREMINISCENCE (anamn\u00easis)--a recovery of partially forgotten ideas which\nthe soul possessed in another state of existence; and the _dialectic_ of\nPlato is simply the effort, by apt _interrogation_, to lead the mind to\n\"_recollect_\"[558] the truth which has been formerly perceived by it,\nand is even now in the memory though not in consciousness. An\nillustration of this method is attempted in the \"_Meno_\" where Plato\nintroduces Socrates as making an experiment on the mind of an uneducated\nperson. Socrates puts a series of questions to a slave of Meno, and at\nlength elicits from the youth a right enunciation of a geometrical\ntruth. Socrates then points triumphantly to this instance, and bids Meno\nobserve that he had not taught the youth any thing, but simply\ninterrogated him as to his opinions, whilst the youth had recalled the\nknowledge previously existing in his own mind.[559]\n\n[Footnote 558: \"To learn is to recover our own previous knowledge, and\nthis is properly to _recollect._\"--\"Ph\u00e6do\" \u00a7 55.]\n\n[Footnote 559: \"Meno,\" \u00a7 16-20. \"Now for a person to recover knowledge\nhimself through himself, is not this to _recollect_.\"]\n\nNow whilst we readily grant that the instance given in the \"_Meno_\" does\nnot sustain the inference of Plato that \"the boy\" had learnt these\ngeometrical truths \"in eternity,\" and that they had simply been brought\nforward into the view of his consciousness by the \"questioning\" of\nSocrates, yet it certainly does prove that _there are ideas or\nprinciples in the human reason which are not derived from without--which\nare anterior to all experience, and for the development of which,\nexperience furnishes the occasion, but is not the origin and source_. By\na kind of lofty inspiration, he caught sight of that most important\ndoctrine of modern philosophy, so clearly and logically presented by\nKant, _that the Reason is the source of a pure_ \u00e0 priori _knowledge_--a\nknowledge native to, and potentially in the mind, antecedent to all\nexperience, and which is simply brought out into the field of\nconsciousness by experience conditions. Around this greatest of all\nmetaphysical truths Plato threw a gorgeous mythic dress, and presented\nit under the most picturesque imagery.[560] But, when divested of the\nrich coloring which the glowing imagination of Plato threw over it, it\nis but a vivid presentation of the cardinal truth that _there are ideas\nin the mind which have not been derived from without_, and which,\ntherefore, the mind brought with it into the present sphere of being.\nThe validity and value of this fundamental doctrine, even as presented\nby Plato, is unaffected by any speculations in which he may have\nindulged, as to the pre-existence of the soul. He simply regarded this\ndoctrine of pre-existence as highly probable--a plausible explanation of\nthe facts. That there are ideas, innate and connatural to the human\nmind, he clung to as the most vital, most precious, most certain of all\ntruths; and to lead man to the recognitions of these ideas, to bring\nthem within the field of consciousness, was, in his judgment, the great\nbusiness of philosophy.\n\nAnd this was the grand aim of his _Dialectic_--to elicit, to bring to\nlight the truths which are already in the mind--\"a maieusis\" a kind of\nintellectual midwifery[561]--a delivering of the mind of the ideas with\nwhich it was pregnant.\n\n[Footnote 560: As in the \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 48-57; \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 52-64;\n\"Republic,\" bk. x.]\n\n[Footnote 561: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 17-20.]\n\nIt is thus, at first sight, obvious that it was a higher and more\ncomprehensive science than the art of deduction. For it was directed to\nthe discovery and establishment of First Principles. Its sole object was\nthe discovery of truth. His dialectic was an _analytical_ and _inductive\nmethod_. \"In Dialectic Science,\" says _Alcinous_, \"there is a dividing\nand a defining, and an analyzing, and, moreover, that which is inductive\nand syllogistic.\"[562] Even _Bacon_, who is usually styled \"the Father\nof the Inductive method,\" and who, too often, speaks disparagingly of\nPlato, is constrained to admit that he followed the inductive method.\n\"An induction such as will be of advantage for the invention and\ndemonstration of Arts and Sciences must distinguish the essential nature\nof things (naturam) by proper rejections and exclusions, and then after\nas many of these negatives as are sufficient, by comprising, above all\n(super), the positives. Up to this time this had not been done, nor even\nattempted, _except by Plato alone, who, in order to attain his\ndefinitions and ideas, has used, to a certain extent, the method of\nInduction_.\"[563]\n\n[Footnote 562: \"Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato,\" vol. vi. p.\n249. \"The Platonic Method was the method of induction.\"--Cousin's\n\"History of Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 563: \"Novum Organum,\" vol. i. p. 105.]\n\nThe process of investigation adopted by Plato thus corresponds with the\ninductive method of modern times, with this simple difference, that\nBacon conducted science into the world of _matter_, whilst Plato\ndirected it to the world of _mind_. The dialectic of Plato aimed at the\ndiscovery of the \"laws of thought;\" the modern inductive philosophy aims\nat the discovery of the \"laws of nature.\" The latter concerns itself\nchiefly with the inquiry after the \"causes\" of material phenomena; the\nformer concerned itself with the inquiry after the \"first principles\" of\nall knowledge and of all existence. Both processes are, therefore,\ncarried on by _interrogation_. The analysis which seeks for a law of\nnature proceeds by the interrogation of nature. The analysis of Plato\nproceeds by the interrogation of mind, in order to discover the\nfundamental _ideas_ which lie at the basis of all cognition, which\ndetermine all our processes of thought, and which, in their final\nanalysis, reveal the REAL BEING, which is the ground and explanation of\nall existence.\n\nNow the fact that such an inquiry has originated in the human mind, and\nthat it can not rest satisfied without some solution, is conclusive\nevidence that the mind has an instinctive belief, a proleptic\nanticipation, that such knowledge can be attained. There must\nunquestionably be some mental initiative which is the _motive_ and\n_guide_ to all philosophical inquiry. We must have some well-grounded\nconviction, some _\u00e0 priori_ belief, some pre-cognition \"ad intentionem\nejus quod qu\u00e6ritur,\"[564] which determines the direction of our\nthinking. The mind does not go to work aimlessly; it asks a specific\nquestion; it demands the \"_whence_\" and the \"_why_\" of that which is.\nNeither does it go to work unfurnished with any guiding principles. That\nwhich impels the mind to a determinate act of thinking is the possession\nof a _knowledge_ which is different from, and independent of, the\nprocess of thinking itself. \"A rational anticipation is, then, the\nground of the _prudens qu\u00e6stio_--\"the forethought query, which, in\nfact, is the prior half of the knowledge sought.\"[565] If the mind\ninquire after \"laws,\" and \"causes,\" and \"reasons,\" and \"grounds,\"--the\nfirst principles of all knowledge and of all existence,--\"it must have\nthe _\u00e0 priori_ ideas of \"law,\" and \"cause,\" and \"reason,\" and \"being _in\nse\"_ which, though dimly revealed to the mind previous to the discipline\nof reflection, are yet unconsciously governing its spontaneous modes of\nthought. The whole process of induction has, then, some rational ground\nto proceed upon--some principles deeper than science, and more certain\nthan demonstration, which reason contains within itself, and which\ninduction \"draws out\" into clearer light.\n\n[Footnote 564: Bacon.]\n\n[Footnote 565: Coleridge, vol. ii. p. 413.]\n\nNow this mental initiative of every process of induction is the\nintuitive and necessary conviction _that there must be a sufficient\nreason why every thing exists, and why it is as it is, and not\notherwise_;[566] or in other words, if any thing begins to be, some\nthing else must be supposed[567] as the ground, and reason, and cause,\nand law of its existence. This \"_law of sufficient_ (or _determinant)\nreason_\"[568] is the fundamental principle of all metaphysical inquiry.\nIt is contained, at least in a negative form, in that famous maxim of\nancient philosophy, \"_De nihilo nihil_\"--\"Adynaton ginestai ti ek\nm\u00eadenos prouparxontos.\" \"It is impossible for a real entity to be made\nor generated from nothing pre-existing;\" or in other words, \"nothing can\nbe made or produced without an efficient cause.\"[569] This principle is\nalso distinctly announced by Plato: \"Whatever is generated, is\nnecessarily generated from a certain aitian\"--_ground, reason_, or\n_cause_; \"for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be generated\nwithout a cause.\"[570]\n\n[Footnote 566: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 103.]\n\n[Footnote 567: _Suppono_, to place under as a support, to take as a\nground.]\n\n[Footnote 568: This generic principle, viewed under different relations,\ngives--\n\n     1st. _The principle of Substance_--every quality supposes a subject\n       or real being.\n\n     2d. _The principle of Causality_--every thing which begins to be\n       must have a cause.\n\n     3d. _The principle of Law_--every phenomenon must obey some uniform\n       law.\n\n     4th. _The principle of Final Cause_--every means supposes an end,\n       every existence has a purpose or reason why.\n\n     5th. _The principle of Unity_--all plurality supposes a unity as\n       its basis and ground.]\n\n[Footnote 569: Cudworth's \"Intellectual System,\" vol. ii. p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 570: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\nThe first business of Plato's dialectic is to demonstrate that the\nground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objects\nof sense, nor in any opinions or judgments founded upon sensation.\nPrinciples are only so far \"first principles\" as they are permanent and\nunchangeable, depending on neither time, nor place, nor circumstances.\nBut the objects of sense are in ceaseless flux and change; they are\n\"_always becoming_;\" they can not be said to have any \"_real being_.\"\nThey are not to-day what they were yesterday, and they will never again\nbe what they are now; consequently all opinions founded on mere\nphenomena are equally fluctuating and uncertain. Setting out, therefore,\nfrom the assumption of the fallaciousness of \"_opinion_\" it examined the\nvarious hypotheses which had been bequeathed by previous schools of\nphilosophy, or were now offered by contemporaneous speculators, and\nshowed they were utterly inadequate to the solution of the problem. This\nscrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of \"contradiction\"[571]\nwith regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing that\nopposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground these\nopinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and it\nshowed that the grounds upon which \"opinion\" was founded, and the\nconclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, and\nconsequently untrue.[572] \"They,\" the Dialecticians, \"examined the\nopinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by a\nreasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side of\neach other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at one\nand the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with\nreference to the same circumstances, and according to the same\npremises_.\"[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the same\ntime, be affirmed and denied of the same subject,[574] therefore a thing\ncan not be at once \"changeable\" and \"unchangeable,\" \"movable\" and\n\"immovable,\" \"generated\" and \"eternal.\"[575] The objects of sense,\nhowever generalized and classified, can only give the contingent, the\nrelative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficient\nreason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions and\njudgments founded upon sensation.\n\n[Footnote 571: \"The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers the\ncontradictions implied in popular opinions.\"--Aristotle, \"Sophist,\" \u00a7\u00a7\n1, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 572: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 573: \"Sophist,\" \u00a7 33; \"Republic,\" bk. iv. ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 574: See the \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 119, and \"Republic,\" bk. iv. ch.\nxiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.]\n\n[Footnote 575 \"Parmenides,\" \u00a7 3.]\n\nThe dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of\n_refutation_,[576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_\n(elenchos)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given\nproposition is inferred. \"When refutation had done its utmost, and all\nthe points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the\ndialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation which\nremained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the\ntruth of the question under consideration;\"[577] or in other words,\n_when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictory\nopposite principle, with its logical developments, must be accepted as\nan established truth_.\n\n[Footnote 576: Confutation is the greatest and chiefest of\npurification.--\"Sophist,\" \u00a7 34.]\n\n[Footnote 577: Article \"Plato,\" Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica.]\n\nBy the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed the\ninsufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere\n_\u00e0 posteriori_ generalization of the simple facts of experience, but he\ndemonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of some\nelements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; that\nthere are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, which\nhave been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that these\nnotions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, and\nreveal the knowledge of _real being_--to ont\u00f4s on--_Being in se_.\n\nTo determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresses\nhimself to the _analysis of thought_. \"It is the glory of Plato to have\nborne the light of analysis into the most obscure and inmost region; he\nsearched out what, in this totality which forms consciousness, is the\nprovince of reason; what comes from it, and not from the imagination and\nthe senses--from within, and not from without.\"[578] Now to analyze is\nto decompose, that is, to divide, and to define, in order to see better\nthat which really is. The chief logical instruments of the dialectic\nmethod are, therefore, _Division_ and _Definition_. \"The being able to\n_divide_ according to genera, and not to consider the same species as\ndifferent, nor a different as the same,\"[579] and \"to see under one\naspect, and bring together under one general idea, many things scattered\nin various places, that, by _defining_ each, a person may make it clear\nwhat the subject is,\" is, according to Plato, \"dialectical.\"[580]\n\n[Footnote 578: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 579: \"Sophist,\" \u00a7 83.]\n\n[Footnote 580: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 109, 111.]\n\nWe have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflection\nto the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized two\ndistinct classes of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentially\nopposite;--one of \"_sensible_\" objects having a definite outline, limit,\nand figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in a\ndeterminate form--the other of \"_intelligible_\" objects, which can not\nbe outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by any\nfigures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rational\nconception. He found, also, that we arrive at one class of cognitions\n\"_mediately_\" through images generated in the vital organism, or by some\ntestimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at the\nother class \"_immediately_\" by simple intuition, or rational\napperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazes\ndirectly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its own\nlight, and we find it impossible to refuse our assent--that is, it is\n_self-evident_. One class consisted of _contingent_ ideas--that is,\ntheir objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, without\nany contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the other\nconsisted of _necessary_ ideas--their objects are conceived as existing\nwith the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence.\nThus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as not\nexisting, but we can not conceive the non-existence of space. We can\nconceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, in\nthought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particular\nthing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction of\nBeing in itself. He further observed, that one class of our cognitions\nare _conditional_ ideas; the existence of their objects is conceived\nonly on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example,\nthe idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other class of\ncognitions are _unconditional_ and _absolute_--we can conceive of their\nobjects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whether\nany thing else does or does not exist, as space, duration, the infinite,\nBeing _in se_. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as\n_particular_ and _individual_, determined and modified by our own\npersonality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullest\nsense, _universal_. They are not the creations of our own minds, and\nthey can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neither\ntimes, nor places, nor circumstances; they are common to all minds, in\nall times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in our\ninmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyond\nand above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneath\nall changes there is a _permanent_ being. Beyond all finite and\nconditional existance there is something _unconditional_ and _absolute_.\nHaving determined that there are truths which are independent of our own\nminds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths which\nwould be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are led\nonward to a _super-sensual_ and super-natural ground, on which they\nrest.\n\nTo reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, is\nthe grand effort of Plato's dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid analysis,\nclearly to _separate_, and accurately to _define_ the _\u00e0 priori_\nconceptions of reason. And it was only when he had eliminated every\nelement which is particular, contingent, and relative, and had defined\nthe results in precise and accurate language, that he regarded the\nprocess as complete. The ideas which are self-evident, universal, and\nnecessary, were then clearly disengaged, and raised to their pure and\nabsolute form. \"You call the man dialectical who requires a reason of\nthe essence or being of each thing. As the dialectical man can define\nthe essence of every thing, so can he of the good. He can _define_ the\nidea of the good, _separating_ it from all others--follow it through all\nwindings, as in a battle, resolved to mark it, not according to opinion,\nbut according to science.\"[581]\n\n[Footnote 581: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. xiv.]\n\n_Abstraction_ is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonic\ndialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between\nthe method of _comparative_ abstraction, as employed in physical\ninquiry, and that _immediate_ abstraction, which is the special\ninstrument of philosophy. The former proceeds by comparison and\ngeneralization, the latter by simple separation. The one yields a\ncontingent general principle as the result of the comparison of a number\nof individual cases, the other gives an universal and necessary\nprinciple by the analysis of a single concrete fact. As an illustration\nwe may instance \"the principle of causality.\" To enable us to affirm\n\"that every event must have a cause,\" we do not need to compare and\ngeneralize a great number of events. \"The principle which compels us to\npronounce the judgment is already complete in the first as in the last\nevent; it can change in regard to its object, it can not change in\nitself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less\nnumber of applications.\"[582] In the presence of a single event, the\nuniversality and necessity of this principle of causality is recognized\nwith just as much clearness and certainty as in the presence of a\nmillion events, however carefully generalized.\n\n[Footnote 582: Cousin's \"The True, the Beautiful, and the Good,\" pp. 57,\n58.]\n\nAbstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it add\nany new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed by\nall human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and more\ndefinite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as part\nof its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has always\nunconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process of\nrational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible and\nconscious communion with the world of _Ideas_. These ideas are partially\nrevealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Plato\nbelieved, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensible\nobjects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in the\nconstitution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred nature\nwith the original essence or being, must know them intuitively and\nimmediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process,\nwhich disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, and\nsets them forth in their pure and absolute form.\n\nBut whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method of\ninvestigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from all\nconcrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempted\na complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such an\nenumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can not\nfail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize the\ngrand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has so\nfully exhibited, viz., the _True_, the _Beautiful_, and the _Good_.\n\nPLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS\n\nI. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (to al\u00eathes--to on)--the\nground and efficient cause of all existence, and by participating in\nwhich all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensible\nthings being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea is\ndeveloped in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenal\nworld; as,\n\n1. _The idea of_ SUBSTANCE (ousia)--the ground of all phenomena, \"the\nbeing or essence of all things,\" the permanent reality.--\"Tim\u00e6eus,\" ch.\nix. and xii.; \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. xiv.; \"Ph\u00e6do,\"\u00a7\u00a7 63-67, 73.\n\n2. _The idea of_ CAUSE (aitia)--the power or efficiency by which things\nthat \"become,\" or begin to be, are generated or produced.--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch.\nix.; \"Sophist,\" \u00a7 109; \"Philebus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 45, 46.\n\n3. _The idea of_ IDENTITY (auto to ison)--that which \"does not change,\"\n\"is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite and\nindissoluble,\"--that which constitutes personality or\nself-hood.--\"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 61-75; \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.; \"Republic,\" bk. ii.\nch. xix. and xx.\n\n4. _The idea of_ UNITY (to en)--one _mind_ or intelligence pervading the\nuniverse, the comprehensive conscious _thought_ or _plan_ which binds\nall parts of the universe in one great whole (to pan)--the principle of\n_order_.--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xi. and xv.; \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xiii.;\n\"Philebus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 50-51.\n\n5. _The idea of the_ INFINITE (to apeiron)--that which is unlimited and\nunconditioned, \"has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, nor\nend.\"--\"Parmenides,\" \u00a7\u00a7 22, 23.\n\nII. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (to kalon)--the formal cause of the\nuniverse, and by participation in which all created things have only so\nfar a real beauty.--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xi, \"Greater Hippias,\" \u00a7\u00a7 17, 18;\n\"Republic,\" bk. v. ch. 22.\n\nThis idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the\norganic world; as,\n\n      1. _The Idea of_ PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (symmetria)--the\n      proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a\n      harmony (cosmos), and which relation admits of mathematical\n      expression.--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. lxix.; \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 155\n      (\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xi. and xii., where the relation of numerical\n      proportions to material elements is expounded).\n\n      2. _The idea of_ DETERMINATE FORM (paradeigma\n      archetypos)--the eternal models or archetypes according to\n      which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical\n      representation.--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.; \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7112 (\"Tim\u00e6us,\"\n      ch. xxviii.-xxxi., where the relation of geometrical forms\n      to material elements is exhibited).\n\n      3. _The idea of_ RHYTHM (rythmos)--measured movement in time\n      and space, resulting in melody and grace.--\"Republic,\" bk.\n      iii. ch. xi. and xii.; \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 21.\n\n      4. _The idea of_ FITNESS or ADAPTATION\n      (chr\u00easimon)--effectiveness to some purpose or end.--\"Greater\n      Hippias,\" \u00a7 35.\n\n      5. _The idea of_ PERFECTION (teleiot\u00eas)--that which is\n      complete, \"a structure which is whole and finished--of whole\n      and perfect parts.\"--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xi., xii., and xliii.\n\n\nIII. _The idea of_ ABSOLUTE GOOD (to agathon)--the final _cause_ or\n_reason_ of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that pours\nupon all things the revealing light of truth.\n\nThe first Good[583] (_summum bonum_) is God the highest, and Mind or\nIntelligence (nous), which renders man capable of knowing and resembling\nGod. The second flows from the first, and are virtues of mind. They are\ngood by a participation of the chief good, and constitute in man a\nlikeness or _resemblance_ to God.--\"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7110-114; \"Laws,\" bk. i.\nch. vi., bk. iv. ch. viii.; \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 84, 85; \"Republic,\" bk. vi.\nch. xix., bk. vii. ch. iii., bk. x. ch. xii.[584]\n\n[Footnote 583: \"Let us declare, then, on what account the framing\nArtificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;\" and being\ngood, \"he desired that all things should as much as possible resemble\nhimself.\"--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 584: \"At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the\n_idea of the Good_, perceived with difficulty, but which, once seen,\nmakes itself known as the cause of all that is beautiful and good; which\nin the visible world produces light, and the orb that gives it; and\nwhich in the invisible world directly produces Truth and\nIntelligence.\"--\"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. iii.]\n\nThis idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the\nworld of moral order; as,\n\n1. _The idea of_ WISDOM or PRUDENCE (phron\u00easis)--thoughtfulness,\nrightness of intention, following the guidance of reason, the right\ndirection of the energy or will.--\"Republic,\" bk. iv. ch. vii., bk. vi.\nch. ii.\n\n2. _The idea of_ COURAGE or FORTITUDE (andria)--zeal, energy, firmness\nin the maintenance of honor and right, virtuous indignation against\nwrong.--\"Republic,\" bk. iv. ch. viii.; \"Laches;\" \"Meno,\" \u00a7 24.\n\n3. _The idea of_ SELF-CONTROL or TEMPERANCE\n(sophrosyn\u00ea)--sound-mindedness, moderation, dignity.--\"Republic,\" bk.\niv. ch. ix.; \"Meno,\" \u00a7 24; \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 35.\n\n4. _The idea of_ JUSTICE (dikalosyn\u00ea)--the harmony or perfect\nproportional action of all the powers of the soul.--\"Republic,\" bk. i.\nch. vi., bk. iv. ch. x.-xii., bk. vi. ch. ii. and xvi.; \"Philebus,\" \u00a7\n155; \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 54; \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 84, 85.\n\nPlato's idea of Justice comprehends--\n\n(1) EQUITY (isot\u00eas)--the rendering to every man his due.--\"Republic,\"\nbk. i. ch. vi.\n\n(2.) VERACITY (al\u00eapheia)--the utterance of what is true.--\"Republic,\"\nbk. i. ch. v., bk. ii. ch. xx., bk. vi. ch. ii.\n\n(3.) FAITHFULNESS (pistot\u00eas)--the strict performance of a\ntrust.--\"Republic,\" bk. i. ch. v., bk. vi. ch. ii.\n\n(4.) USEFULNESS (\u00f4pheltmon)--the answering of some valuable\nend.--\"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xviii., bk. iv. ch. xviii.; \"Meno,\" \u00a7 22.\n\n(5.) BENEVOLENCE (eunoia)--seeking the well-being of\nothers.--\"Republic,\" bk. i. ch. xvii., bk. ii. ch. xviii.\n\n(6.) HOLINESS (osiot\u00eas)--purity of mind, piety.--\"Protagoras,\" \u00a7\u00a7 52-54;\n\"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 32; \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 84.\n\nThe final effort of Plato's Dialectic was to ascend from these ideas of\nAbsolute Truth, and Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Goodness to the\n_Absolute Being_, in whom they are all united, and from whom they all\nproceed. \"He who possesses the true love of science is naturally carried\nin his aspirations to the _real Being_; and his love, so far from\nsuffering itself to be retarded by the multitude of things whose reality\nis only apparent, knows no repose until it have arrived at union with\nthe _essence_ of each object, by the part of the soul which is akin to\nthe permanent and essential; so that this divine conjunction having\nproduced intelligence and truth, the knowledge of _being_ is won.\"[585]\n\n[Footnote 585: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. v.]\n\nTo the mind of Plato, there was in every thing, even the smallest and\nmost insignificant of sensible objects, a _reality_ just in so far as it\nparticipates in some archetypal form or idea. These archetypal forms or\nideas are the \"_thoughts of God_\"[586]--they are the plan according to\nwhich he framed the universe. \"The Creator and Father of the universe\nlooked to an _eternal model_.... Being thus generated, the universe is\nframed according to principles that can be comprehended by reason and\nreflection.\"[587] Plato, also, regarded all individual conceptions of\nthe mind as hypothetical notions which have in them an _\u00e0 priori_\nelement--an idea which is unchangeable, universal, and necessary. These\nunchangeable, universal, and necessary ideas are copies of the Divine\nIdeas, which are, for man, the primordial laws of all cognition, and all\nreasoning. They are possessed by the soul \"in virtue of its kindred\nnature to that which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal.\" He also\nbelieved that every archetypal form, and every _\u00e0 priori_ idea, has its\nground and root in a higher idea, which is _unhypothetical_ and\n_absolute_--an idea which needs no other supposition for its\nexplanation, and which is, itself, needful to the explanation of all\nexistence--even the idea of an _absolute_ and _perfect Being_, in whose\nmind the ideas of absolute truth, and beauty, and goodness inhere, and\nin whose eternity they can only be regarded as eternal.[588] Thus do the\n\"ideas of reason\" not only cast a bridge across the abyss that separates\nthe sensible and the ideal world, but they also carry us beyond the\nlimits of our personal consciousness, and discover to us a realm of real\nBeing, which is the foundation, and cause, and explanation of the\nphenomenal world that appears around us and within us.\n\n[Footnote 586: Alcinous, \"Doctrines of Plato,\" p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 587: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 588: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 149.]\n\nThis passage from psychology to ontology is not achieved _per saltum_,\nor effected by any arbitrary or unwarrantable assumption. There are\nprinciples revealed in the centre of our consciousness, whose regular\ndevelopment carry us beyond the limits of consciousness, and attain to\nthe knowledge of actual being. The absolute principles of _causality_\nand _substance_, of _intentionality_ and _unity_, unquestionably give us\nthe absolute Being. Indeed the absolute truth _that every idea supposes\na being in which it resides_, and which is but another form of the law\nor principle of substance, viz., _that every quality supposes a\nsubstance or being in which it inheres_, is adequate to carry us from\nIdea to Being. \"There is not a single cognition which does not suggest\nto us the notion of existence, and there is not an unconditional and\nabsolute truth which does not necessarily imply an absolute and\nunconditional Being.\"[589]\n\n[Footnote 589: Cousin's \"Elements of Psychology,\" p. 506.]\n\nThis, then, is the dialectic of Plato. Instead of losing himself amid\nthe endless variety of particular phenomena, he would search for\nprinciples and laws, and from thence ascend to the great Legislator, the\n_First Principle of all Principles_. Instead of stopping at the\nrelations of sensible objects to the general ideas with which they are\ncommingled, he will pass to their _eternal Paradigms_--from the just\nthing to the idea of absolute justice, from the particular good to the\nabsolute good, from beautiful things to the absolute beauty, and thence\nto the ultimate reality--_the absolute Being_. By the realization of the\nlower idea, embodied in the forms of the visible universe and in the\nnecessary laws of thought, he sought to rise to the higher idea, in its\npure and abstract form--the _Supreme Idea_, containing in itself all\nother ideas--the _One Intelligence_ which unites the universe in a\nharmonious whole. \"The Dialectic faculty proceeds from hypothesis to an\nunhypothetical principle.... It uses hypotheses as steps, and\nstarting-points, in order to proceed from thence to the _absolute_. The\nIntuitive Reason takes hold of the First Principle of the Universe, and\navails itself of all the connections and relations of that principle. It\nascends from idea to idea, until it has reached the Supreme Idea\"--the\n_Absolute Good_--that is, _God_.[590]\n\n[Footnote 590: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.]\n\nWe are thus brought, in the course of our examination of the Platonic\nmethod, to the _results_ obtained by this method--or, in other words, to\n\nIII. THE PLATONIC ONTOLOGY.\n\nThe grand object of all philosophic inquiry in ancient Greece was to\nattain to the knowledge of real Being--that Being which is permanent,\nunchangeable, and eternal. It had proceeded on the intuitive conviction,\nthat beneath all the endless diversity of the universe there must be a\nprinciple of _unity_--below all fleeting appearances there must be a\npermanent _substance_--beyond all this everlasting flow and change, this\nbeginning and end of finite existence, there must be an eternal Being,\nwhich is the _cause_, and which contains, in itself, the _reason_ of the\norder, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency which pervades the\nuniverse. And it had perpetually asked what is this permanent,\nunchangeable, and eternal substance or being?\n\nPlato had assiduously labored at the solution of this problem. The\nobject of his dialectic was \"to lead upward the soul to the knowledge of\nreal being,\"[591] and the conclusions to which he attained may be summed\nup as follows:\n\n1st. _Beneath all_ SENSIBLE _phenomena there is an unchangeable\nsubject-matter, the mysterious substratum of the world of sense, which\nhe calls the receptacle (ipodoch\u00ea) the nurse (tith\u00ean\u00ea) of all that is\nproduced_.[592]\n\nIt is this \"substratum or physical groundwork\" which gives a reality and\ndefiniteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for, in their\nceaseless change, _they_ can not justify any title whatever. It alone\ncan be styled \"_this_\" or \"_that_\" (tode or touto); they rise no higher\nthan \"_of such kind_\" or \"_of what kind or quality\" (toiouton or\nopoionoun ti).[593] It is not earth, or air, or fire, or water, but \"an\ninvisible _species_ and formless universal receiver, which, in the most\nobscure way, receives the immanence of the intelligible.\"[594] And in\nrelation to the other two principles (_i.e._, ideas and objects of\nsense), \"it is _the mother_\" to the father and the offspring.[595] But\nperhaps the most remarkable passage is that in which he seems to\nidentify it with _pure space_, which, \"itself imperishable, furnishes a\n_seat_ (edran) to all that is produced, not apprehensible by direct\nperception, but caught by a certain spurious reasoning, scarcely\nadmissible, but which we see as in a dream; gaining it by that judgment\nwhich pronounces it necessary that all which is, be _somewhere_, and\noccupy a _certain space_.\"[596] This, it will be seen, approaches the\nCartesian doctrine, which resolves matter into _simple extension.[597]\n\n[Footnote 591: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. xii. and xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 592: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xxii.]\n\n[Footnote 593: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xxiii.]\n\n[Footnote 594: Ibid., ch. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 595: Ibid., ch. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 596: Ibid., ch. xxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 597: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n171.]\n\nIt should, however, be distinctly noted that Plato does not use the word\nyl\u00ea--matter. This term is first employed by Aristotle to express \"the\nsubstance which is the subject of all changes.\"[598] The subject or\nsubstratum of which Plato speaks, would seem to be rather a logical than\na material entity. It is the _condition or supposition_ necessary for\nthe production of a world of phenomena. It is thus the\n_transition-element_ between the real and the apparent, the eternal and\nthe contingent; and, lying thus on the border of both territories, we\nmust not be surprised that it can hardly be characterized by any\ndefinite attribute.[599] Still, this unknown recipient of forms or ideas\nhas a _reality_; it has \"an abiding nature,\" \"a constancy of existence;\"\nand we are forbidden to call it by any name denoting quality, but\npermitted to style it \"_this_\" and \"_that_\" (tode kai touto).[600]\nBeneath the perpetual changes of sensible phenomena there is, then, an\nunchangeable subject, which yet is neither the Deity, nor ideas, nor the\nsoul of man, which exists as the means and occasion of the manifestation\nof Divine Intelligence in the organization of the world.[601]\n\n[Footnote 598: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. vii. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 599: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n178.]\n\n[Footnote 600: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xxiii.]\n\n[Footnote 601: Ibid., ch. xiiii]\n\nThere has been much discussion as to whether Plato held that this\n\"_Receptacle_\" and \"_Nurse_\" of forms and ideas was eternal, or\ngenerated in time. Perhaps no one has more carefully studied the\nwritings of Plato than William Archer Butler, and his conclusions in\nregard to this subject are presented in the following words: \"As, on the\none hand, he maintained a strict system of dualism, and avoided, without\na single deviation, that seduction of pantheism to which so many\nabstract speculators of his own school have fallen victims; so, on the\nother hand, it appears to me that he did not scruple to place this\nprinciple, the opposite of the Divine intelligence, in a sphere\nindependent of temporal origination.... But we can scarcely enter into\nhis views, unless we ascertain his notions of the nature of _Time_\nitself. This was considered to have been created with the rest of the\nsensible world, to finish with it, if it ever finished--to be altogether\nrelated to this phenomenal scene.[602] 'The generating Father determined\nto create a moving image of eternity (ai\u00f4nos); and in disposing the\nheavens, he framed of this eternity, reposing in its own unchangeable\nunity, an eternal _image_, moving according to numerical succession,\nwhich he called _Time_. With the world arose days, nights, months,\nyears, which all had no previous existence. The past and future are but\nforms of time, which we most erroneously transfer to the eternal\nsubstance (aidion ousian); we say it was, and is, and will be, whereas\nwe can only fitly say _it is_. Past and future are appropriate to the\nsuccessive nature of generated beings, for they bespeak motion; but the\nBeing eternally and immovably the same is subject neither to youth nor\nage, nor to any accident of time; it neither was, nor hath been, nor\nwill be, which are the attributes of fleeting sense--the circumstances\nof time, imitating eternity in the shape of number and motion. Nor can\nany thing be more inaccurate than to apply the term _real being_ to\npast, or present, or future, or even to non-existence. Of this, however,\nwe can not now speak fully. _Time_, then, was formed with the heavens,\nthat, together created, they may together end, _if indeed an end be in\nthe purpose of the Creator_; and it is designed as closely as possible\nto resemble the eternal nature, its exemplar. The model exists through\nall eternity; the world has been, is, and will be through all\n_time_.'[603] In this ineffable eternity Plato places the Supreme Being,\nand the archetypal ideas of which the sensible world of time partakes.\nWhether he also includes under the same mode of existence the\n_subject-matter_ of the sensible world, it is not easy to pronounce; and\nit appears to me evident that he did not himself undertake to speak with\nassurance on this obscure problem.\"[604] The creation of matter \"out of\nnothing\" is an idea which, in all probability, did not occur to the mind\nof Plato. But that he regarded it as, in some sense, a _dependent_\nexistence--as existing, like time, by \"the purpose or will of the\nCreator\"--perhaps as an eternal \"generation\" from the \"eternal\nsubstance,\" is also highly probable; for in the last analysis he\nevidently desires to embrace all things in some ultimate _unity_--a\ntendency which it seems impossible for human reason to avoid.\n\n[Footnote 602: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 603: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xiv.]\n\n[Footnote 604: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n171-175.]\n\n2d. _Beneath all mental phenomena there is a permanent subject or\nsubstratum which he designates_ THE IDENTICAL (to auto)--_the rational\nelement of the soul--\"the principle of self-activity\" or\nself-determination_.[605]\n\nThere are three principles into which Plato analyzes the soul--the\nprinciple of the _Identical_, the _Diverse_, and the _Intermediate\nEssence_.[606] The first is indivisible and eternal, always existing in\n_sameness_, the very substance of _Intelligence_ itself, and of the same\nnature with the Divine.[607] The second is divisible and corporeal,\nanswering to our notion of the passive _sensibilities_, and placing the\nsoul in relation with the visible world. The third is an intermediate\nessence, partaking of the natures of both, and constituting a medium\nbetween the eternal and the mutable--the conscious _energy_ of the soul\ndeveloped in the contingent world of time. Thus the soul is, on one\nside, linked to the unchangeable and the eternal, being formed of that\nineffable element which constitutes the _real_ or _immutable Being_, and\non the other side, linked to the sensible and the contingent, being\nformed of that element which is purely _relative_ and _contingent_. This\nlast element of the soul is regarded by Plato as \"mortal\" and\n\"corruptible,\" the former element as \"immortal\" and \"indestructible,\"\nhaving its foundations laid in eternity.\n\n[Footnote 605: \"Laws,\" bk. x. ch. vi. and vii.; \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 51; \"arch\u00ea\nkin\u00ease\u00f4s.\"]\n\n[Footnote 606: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xii.; tauton, thateron, and ousia or to\nsymmisgomenon.]\n\n[Footnote 607: \"Laws,\" bk. v. ch. i.]\n\nThis doctrine of the eternity of the free and rational element of the\nsoul must, of course, appear strange and even repulsive to those who are\nunacquainted with the Platonic notion of eternity as a fixed state out\nof time, which has no past, present, or future, and is simply that which\n\"always _is_\"--an everlasting _now_. The soul, in its elements of\nrationality and freedom, has existed anterior to time, because it now\nexists in eternity.[608] In its actual manifestations and personal\nhistory it is to be contemplated as a \"generated being,\" having a\ncommencement in time.\n\nNow, that the human soul, like the uncreated Deity, has always had a\ndistinct, conscious, personal, independent being, does not appear to be\nthe doctrine of Plato. He teaches, most distinctly, that the \"divine,\"\nthe immortal part, was created, or rather \"generated,\" in eternity. \"The\nDeity himself _formed the divine_, and he delivered over to his\ncelestial offspring [the subordinate and generated gods] the task of\n_forming the mortal_. These subordinate deities, copying the example of\ntheir parent, and receiving from his hands the _immortal principle_ of\nthe human soul, fashioned subsequently to this the mortal body, which\nthey consigned to the soul as a vehicle, and in which they placed\nanother kind of soul, mortal, the seat of violent and fatal\naffections.\"[609] He also regarded the soul as having a derived and\ndependent existence. He draws a marked distinction between the divine\nand human forms of the \"self-moving principle,\" and makes its\ncontinuance dependent upon the will and wisdom of the Almighty Disposer\nand Parent, of whom it is \"the first-born offspring.\"[610]\n\n[Footnote 608: See _ante_, note 4, p. 349, as to the Platonic notions of\n\"Time\" and \"Eternity.\"]\n\n[Footnote 609: \"Timaeus,\" ch. xliv.]\n\n[Footnote 610: See the elaborate exposition in \"Laws,\" bk. x. ch. xii.\nand xiii.]\n\nThat portion of the soul which Plato regarded as \"immortal\" and \"to be\nentitled divine,\" is thus the \"_offspring of God_\"--a ray of the\nDivinity \"generated\" by, or emanating from, the Deity. He seems to have\nconceived it as co-eternal with its ideal objects, in some mysterious\nultimate _unity_. \"The true foundation of the Platonic theory of the\nconstitution of the soul is this fundamental principle of his\nphilosophy--the _oneness of truth and knowledge_.[611] This led him\nnaturally to derive the _rational_ element of the soul (that element\nthat _knows_), that possesses the power of no\u00easis from the _real_\nelement in things (the element that _is_)--the nooumenon; and in the\noriginal, the final, and, though imperfectly, the present state of that\nrational element, he, doubtless, conceived it united with its object in\nan eternal conjunction, or even identity. But though intelligence and\nits correlative intelligibles were and are thus combined, the soul is\n_more_ than pure intelligence; it possesses an element of personality\nand consciousness distinct to each individual, of which we have no\nreason to suppose, from any thing his writings contain, Plato ever meant\nto deprive it.\"[612] On the contrary, he not only regarded it as having\nnow, under temporal conditions, a distinct personal existence, but he\nalso claimed for it a conscious, personal existence after death. He is\nmost earnest, and unequivocal, and consistent in his assertion of the\ndoctrine of the immortality of the soul. The arguments which human\nreason can supply are exhibited with peculiar force and beauty in the\n\"Ph\u00e6do,\" the \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" and the tenth book of the \"Republic.\" The most\nimportant of these arguments may be presented in a few words.\n\n[Footnote 611: See Grant's \"Aristotle,\" vol. i. pp. 150, 151.]\n\n[Footnote 612: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n209, note.]\n\n1. _The soul is immortal, because it is incorporeal_. There are two\nkinds of existences, one compounded, the other simple; the former\nsubject to change, the latter unchangeable; one perceptible to sense,\nthe other comprehended by mind alone. The one is visible, the other is\ninvisible. When the soul employs the bodily senses, it wanders and is\nconfused; but when it abstracts itself from the body, it attains to\nknowledge which is stable, unchangeable, and immortal. The soul,\ntherefore, being uncompounded, incorporeal, invisible, must be\nindissoluble--that is to say, immortal.[613]\n\n[Footnote 613: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 61-75.]\n\n2. _The soul is immortal, because it has an independent power of\nself-motion_--that is, it has self-activity and self-determination. No\narrangement of matter, no configuration of body, can be conceived as the\noriginator of free and voluntary movement.\n\nNow that which can not move itself, but derives its motion from\nsomething else, may cease to move, and perish. \"But that which is\nself-moved, never ceases to be active, and is also the cause of motion\nto all other things that are moved.\" And \"whatever is continually active\nis immortal.\" This \"self-activity is,\" says Plato, \"the very essence and\ntrue notion of the soul.\"[614] Being thus essentially _causative_, it\ntherefore partakes of the nature of a \"principle,\" and it is the nature\nof a principle to exclude its _contrary_. That which is essentially\nself-active can never cease to be active; that which is the cause of\nmotion and of change, can not be extinguished by the change called\ndeath.[615]\n\n3. _The soul is immortal, because it possesses universal, necessary, and\nabsolute ideas_, which transcend all material conditions, and bespeak an\norigin immeasurably above the body. No modifications of matter, however\nrefined, however elaborated, can give the Absolute, the Necessary, the\nEternal. But the soul has the ideas of absolute beauty, goodness,\nperfection, identity, and duration, and it possesses these ideas in\nvirtue of its having a nature which is one, simple, identical, and in\nsome sense, eternal.[616] If the soul can conceive an immortality, it\ncan not be less than immortal. If, by its very nature, \"it has hopes\nthat will not be bounded by the grave, and desires and longings that\ngrasp eternity,\" its nature and its destiny must correspond.\n\nIn the concluding sections of the \"Ph\u00e6do\" he urges the doctrine with\nearnestness and feeling as the grand motive to a virtuous life, for \"the\nreward is noble and the hope is great.\"[617] And in the \"Laws\" he\ninsists upon the doctrine of a future state, in which men are to be\nrewarded or punished as the most conclusive evidence that we are under\nthe moral government of God.[618]\n\n[Footnote 614: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 51-53.]\n\n[Footnote 615: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 112-128.]\n\n[Footnote 616: Ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 48-57, 110-115.]\n\n[Footnote 617: Ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129-145.]\n\n[Footnote 618: The doctrine of Metempsychosis, or transmigration of\nsouls, can scarcely be regarded as part of the philosophic system of\nPlato. He seems to have accepted it as a venerable tradition, coming\nwithin the range of probability, rather than as a philosophic truth, and\nit is always presented by him in a highly mythical dress. Now of these\nmythical representations he remarks in the \"Ph\u00e6do\" (\u00a7 145) that \"no man\nin his senses would dream of insisting _that they correspond to the\nreality_, but that, the soul having been shown to be immortal, this, or\nsomething like this, is true of individual souls or their habitations.\"\nIf, as in the opinions of the ablest critics, \"the Laws\" is to be placed\namongst the last and maturest of Plato's writings, the evidence is\nconclusive that whatever may have been his earlier opinions, he did not\nentertain the doctrine of \"Metempsychosis\" in his riper years. But when,\non the one hand, the soul shall remain having an intercourse with divine\nvirtue, it becomes divine pre-eminently; and pre-eminently, after having\nbeen conveyed to a _place_ entirely holy, it is changed for the better;\nbut when it acts in a contrary manner, it has, under contrary\ncircumstances, placed its existence in some _unholy spot_.\n\n     _This is the judgment of the gods, who hold Olympus._\n\n\"O thou young man,\" [know] \"that the person who has become more wicked,\n_departs to the more wicked souls;_ but he who has become better, to the\nbetter both in life and in all deaths, to do and suffer what is fitting\nfor the like.\"--\"Laws,\" bk. x. ch. xii. and xiii.]\n\n4. _Beyond all finite existences and secondary causes, all laws, ideas,\nand principles, there is an_ INTELLIGENCE _or_ MIND, _the First\nPrinciple of all Principles, the Supreme Idea on which all other ideas\nare grounded; the Monarch and Lawgiver of the universe, the ultimate\nSubstance from which all other things derive their being and essence,\nthe First and efficient Cause of all the order, and harmony, and beauty,\nand excellency, and goodness, which pervades the universe, who is called\nby way of pre-eminence and excellence the Supreme Good_, THE GOD (o\nTheos), \"_the God over all_,\" (o epi pasi Theos).\n\n_This_ SUPREME MIND,[619] Plato taught, is incorporeal,[620]\nunchangeable,[621] infinite,[622] absolutely perfect,[623] essentially\ngood,[624] unoriginated,[625] and eternal.[626] He is \"the Father, and\nArchitect, and Maker of the Universe,\"[627] \"the efficient Cause of all\nthings.\"[628] \"the Monarch and Ruler of the world,\"[629] \"the sovereign\nMind that orders all things, and pervades all things,\"[630] \"the sole\nPrinciple of all things,\"[631] and \"the Measure of all things,\"[632] He\nis \"the Beginning of all truth,\"[633] \"the Fountain of all law and\njustice,\"[634] \"the Source of all order and beauty,\"[635] \"the Cause of\nall good;\"[636] in short, \"he is the Beginning, the Middle, and End of\nall things.\"[637]\n\n[Footnote 619: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 105-107.]\n\n[Footnote 620: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives,\" bk. iii. ch. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 621: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xix.; \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 622: \"Apeleius,\" bk. i. ch. v.]\n\n[Footnote 623: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 624: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. x.; \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xviii.]\n\n[Footnote 625: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.-x.]\n\n[Footnote 626: Ibid., ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 627: Ibid., ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 628: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7 105.]\n\n[Footnote 629: \"Laws,\" bk. x. ch. xii.; \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. iii.;\n\"Philebus,\" \u00a7 50.]\n\n[Footnote 630: \"Philebus,\" \u00a751.]\n\n[Footnote 631: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 632: \"Laws,\" bk. iv. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 633: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 634: \"Laws,\" bk. iv. ch. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 635: \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 51; \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 636: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xviii.; \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 637: \"Laws,\" bk. iv, ch. vii.]\n\nBeyond the sensible world, Plato conceived another world of\nintelligibles or _ideas_. These ideas are not, however, distinct and\nindependent existences. \"What general notions are to our own minds,\nideas are to the Supreme Reason (nous basileus); they are the _eternal\nthoughts_ of the Divine Intellect.\"[638] Ideas are not substances, they\nare qualities, and there must, therefore, be some ultimate substance or\nbeing to whom, as attributes, they belong. \"It must not be believed, as\nhas been taught, that Plato gave to ideas a substantial existence. When\nthey are not objects of pure conception for human reason, they are\nattributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially\nexist.\"[639] These eternal laws and reasons of things indicate to us the\ncharacter of that Supreme Essence of essences, the Being of beings. He\nis not the simple aggregate of all laws, but he is the Author, and\nSustainer, and Substance of all laws. At the utmost summit of the\nintellectual world of Ideas blazes, with an eternal splendor, the idea\nof the _Supreme Good_ from which all others emanate.[640] This Supreme\nGood is \"far beyond all existence in dignity and power, and it is that\nfrom which all things else derive their being and essence.\"[641] The\nSupreme Good is not the truth, nor the intelligence; \"it is the Father\nof it.\" In the same manner as the sun, which is the visible image of the\ngood, reigns over the world, in that it illumes and vivifies it; so the\nSupreme Good, of which the sun is only the work, reigns over the\nintelligible world, in that it gives birth to it by virtue of its\ninexhaustible fruitfulness.[642] _The Supreme Good is_ GOD _himself_,\nand he is designated \"the good\" because this term seems most fittingly\nto express his essential character and essence.[643] It is towards this\nsuperlative perfection that the reason lifts itself; it is towards this\ninfinite beauty the heart aspires. \"Marvellous Beauty!\" exclaims Plato;\n\"eternal, uncreated, imperishable beauty, free from increase and\ndiminution... beauty which has nothing sensible, nothing corporeal, as\nhands or face: which does not reside in any being different from itself,\nin the earth, or the heavens, or in any other thing, but which exists\n_eternally and absolutely in itself, and by itself;_ beauty of which\nevery other beauty partakes, without their birth or destruction bringing\nto it the least increase or diminution.\"[644] The absolute being--God,\nis the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the complete ideal of all\nbeauty. God is, _par excellent_, the Beautiful.\n\n[Footnote 638: Thompson's \"Laws of Thought,\" p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 639: Cousin, \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 415. \"There is no quintessential metaphysics which can prevail\nagainst common sense, and if such be the Platonic theory of ideas,\nAristotle was right in opposing it. But such a theory is only a chimera\nwhich Aristotle created for the purpose of combating it.\"--\"The True,\nthe Beautiful, and the Good,\" p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 640: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 641: \"Ibid.,\" bk. vi. ch. xviii. and xix.]\n\n[Footnote 642: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 642: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n275.]\n\n[Footnote 644: \"Banquet,\" \u00a7 35. See Cousin, \"The True, the Beautiful,\nand the Good,\" Lecture IV., also Lecture VII. pp. 150-153; Denis,\n\"Histoire des Th\u00e9ories et Ide\u00e9s Morales dans l'Antiquit\u00e9,\" vol. i. p.\n149.]\n\nGod is therefore, with Plato, _the First Principle of all Principles;_\nthe Divine energy or power is the _efficient cause_, the Divine beauty\nthe _formal cause_, and the Divine goodness the _final cause_ of all\nexistence.\n\n_The eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and Truth, in\nan ultimate reality--the_ ETERNAL MIND, is thus the fundamental\nprinciple which pervades the whole of the Platonic philosophy. And now,\nhaving attained this sublime elevation, he looks down from thence upon\nthe _sensible, the phenomenal world_, and upon _the temporal life of\nman;_ and in the light of this great principle he attempts to explain\ntheir meaning and purpose. The results he attained in the former case\nconstitute the Platonic _Physics_, in the latter, the Platonic _Ethics_.\n\nI. PLATONIC PHYSICS.\n\nFirmly believing in the absolute excellence of the Deity, and regarding\nthe Divine Goodness as the Final Cause of the universe, he pronounces\nthe physical world to be an _image_ of the perfection of God.\nAnaxagoras, no doubt, prepared the way for this theory. Every one who\nhas read the \"Ph\u00e6do,\" will remember the remarkable passage in which\nSocrates gives utterance to the disappointment which he had experienced\nwhen expecting from physical science an explanation of the universe.\n\"When I was young,\" he said--\"it is not to be told how eager I was about\nphysical inquiries, and curious to know _how the universe came to be as\nit is_; and when I heard that Anaxagoras was teaching that all was\narranged by _mind_, I was delighted with the prospect of hearing such a\ndoctrine unfolded; I thought to myself, if he teaches that mind made\nevery thing to be as it is, he will explain _how it is_ BEST _for it to\nbe_, and show that so it is.\" But Anaxagoras, it appears, lost sight of\nthis principle, and descended to the explanation of the universe by\nmaterial causes. \"Great was my hope,\" says Socrates, \"and equally great\nmy disappointment.\"[645]\n\n[Footnote 645: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 105, 106.]\n\nPlato accepted this suggestion of Anaxagoras with all his peculiar\nearnestness, and devoted himself to its fuller development. It were a\nvain and profitless theory, which, whilst it assumed the existence of a\nSupreme Mind, did not represent that mind as operating in the universe\nby _design_, and as exhibiting his intelligence, and justice, and\ngoodness, as well as his power, in every thing. If it be granted that\nthere is a Supreme Mind, then, argued Plato, he must be regarded as \"the\nmeasure of all things,\" and all things must have been framed according\nto a plan or \"model\" which that mind supplied. Intelligence must be\nregarded as having a _purpose_, and as working towards an _end_, for it\nis this alone which distinguishes reason from unreason, and mind from\nmere unintelligent force. The only proper model which could be presented\nto the Supreme Intelligence is \"the eternal and unchangeable model\"[646]\nwhich his own perfection supplies, \"for he is the most excellent of\ncauses.\"[647] Thus God is not simply the maker of the universe, but the\nmodel of the universe, because he designed that it should be an IMAGE,\nin the sphere of sense, of his own perfections--a revelation of his\neternal beauty, and wisdom, and goodness, and truth. \"God was _good_,\nand being good, he desired that the universe should, as far as possible,\n_resemble_ himself.... Desiring that all things should be _good_, and,\nas far as might be, nothing evil, he took the fluctuating mass of things\nvisible, which had been in orderless confusion, and reduced it to\n_order_, considering this to be the _better_ state. Now it was and is\nutterly impossible for the supremely good to form any thing except that\nwhich is _most excellent_ (kalliston--most fair, most beautiful\").[648]\nThe object at which the supreme mind aimed being that which is \"_best_,\"\nwe must, in tracing his operations in the universe, always look for\n\"_the best_\" in every thing.[649] Starting out thus, upon the assumption\nthat the goodness of God is the final cause of the universe, Plato\nevolved a system of _optimism_.\n\nThe physical system of Plato being thus intended to illustrate a\nprinciple of optimism, the following results may be expected:\n\n1. That it will mainly concern itself with _final causes_. The universe\nbeing regarded chiefly, as indeed it is, an indication of the Divine\nIntelligence--every phenomenon will be contemplated in that light.\nNature is the volume in which the Deity reveals his own perfections; it\nis therefore to be studied solely with this motive, that we may learn\nfrom thence the perfection of God. The _Tim\u00e6us_ is a series of ingenious\nhypotheses designed to deepen and vivify our sense of the harmony, and\nsymmetry, and beauty of the universe, and, as a consequence, of the\nwisdom, and excellence, and goodness, of its Author.[650]\n\n[Footnote 646: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 647: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 648: Ibid., ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 649: Ibid., ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 650: \"Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to the\nContingent) as Truth is to Belief; consequently we must not marvel\nshould we find it impossible to arrive at any certain and conclusive\nresults in our speculations upon the creation of the visible universe\nand its authors; it should be enough for us if the account we have to\ngive be as probable as any other, remembering that we are but men, and\ntherefore bound to acquiesce in merely probable results, without looking\nfor a higher degree of certainty than the subject admits of\"--\"Tim\u00e6us,\"\nch. ix.]\n\nWhatever physical truths were within the author's reach, took their\nplace in the general array: the vacancies were filled up with the best\nsuppositions admitted by the limited science of the time.[651] And it is\nworthy of remark that, whilst proceeding by this \"high _\u00e0 priori_ road,\"\nhe made some startling guesses at the truth, and anticipated some of the\ndiscoveries of the modern inductive method, which proceeds simply by the\nobservation, comparison, and generalization of facts. Of these prophetic\nanticipations we may instance that of the definite proportions of\nchemistry,[652] the geometrical forms of crystallography,[653] the\ndoctrine of complementary colors,[654] and that grand principle that all\nthe highest laws of nature assume the form of a precise quantitative\nstatement.[655]\n\n2. It may be expected that a system of physics raised on optimistic\nprinciples will be _mathematical_ rather than experimental. \"Intended to\nembody conceptions of proportion and harmony, it will have recourse to\nthat department of science which deals with the proportions in space and\nnumber. Such applications of mathematical truths, not being raised on\nascertained facts, can only accidentally represent the real laws of the\nphysical system; they will, however, vivify the student's apprehension\nof harmony in the same manner as a happy parable, though not founded in\nreal history, will enliven his perceptions of moral truth.\"[656]\n\n[Footnote 651: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n157.]\n\n[Footnote 652: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 653: Ibid., ch. xxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 654: Ibid., ch. xlii.]\n\n[Footnote 655: \"It is Plato's merit to have discovered that the laws of\nthe physical universe are resolvable into numerical relations, and\ntherefore capable of being represented by mathematical\nformul\u00e6.\"--Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 656: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n163.]\n\n3. Another peculiarity of such a system will be an impatience of every\nmerely _mechanical_ theory of the operations of nature.\n\n\"The psychology of Plato led him to recognize mind wherever there was\nmotion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of the\nuniverse, but also to conceive the propriety of separate and subordinate\nagents attached to each of its parts, as principles of motion, no less\nthan intelligent directors. These agents were entitled '_gods_' by an\neasy figure, discernible even in the sacred language,[657] and which\nserved, besides, to accommodate philosophical hypotheses to the popular\nreligion. Plato, however, carefully distinguished between the sole,\nEternal Author of the Universe, on the one hand, and that 'soul,' vital\nand intelligent, which he attaches to the world, as well as the spheral\nintelligences, on the other. These 'subordinate deities,' though\nintrusted with a sort of deputed creation, were still only the deputies\nof the Supreme Framer and Director of all.\"[658] The \"gods\" of the\nPlatonic system are \"subordinate divinities,\" \"generated gods,\" brought\ninto existence by the will and wisdom of the Eternal Father and Maker of\nthe universe.[659] Even Jupiter, the governing divinity of the popular\nmythology, is a descendant from powers which are included in the\ncreation.[660] The offices they fulfill, and the relations they sustain\nto the Supreme Being, correspond to those of the \"angels\" of Christian\ntheology. They are the ministers of his providential government of the\nworld.[661]\n\n[Footnote 657: Psalm lxxxii. I; John x. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 658: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n164.]\n\n[Footnote 659: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xv.]\n\n[Footnote 660: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 661: \"Laws,\" bk. x.]\n\nThe application of this fundamental conception of the Platonic\nsystem--_the eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and\nTruth in an ultimate reality, the Eternal Mind_--to the elucidation of\nthe _temporal life_ of man, yields, as a result--\n\nII. THE PLATONIC ETHICS.\n\nBelieving firmly that there are unchangeable, necessary, and absolute\nprinciples, which are the perfections of the Eternal Mind, Plato must,\nof course, have been a believer in an _immutable morality_. He held that\nthere is a rightness, a justice, an equity, not arbitrarily constituted\nby the Divine will or legislation, but founded in the nature of God, and\ntherefore eternal. The independence of the principles of morality upon\nthe mere will of the Supreme Governor is proclaimed in all his\nwritings.[662] The Divine will is the fountain of efficiency, the Divine\nreason, the fountain of law. God is no more the creator of _virtue_ than\nhe is the creator of _truth_.\n\nAnd inasmuch as man is a partaker of the Divine essence, and as the\nideas which dwell in the human reason are \"copies\" of those which dwell\nin the Divine reason, man may rise to the apprehension and recognition\nof the immutable and eternal principles of righteousness, and \"by\ncommunion with that which is Divine, and subject to the law of order,\nmay become himself a subject of order, and divine, so far as it is\npossible for man.\"[663]\n\n[Footnote 662: In \"Euthyphron\" especially.]\n\n[Footnote 663: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xiii.]\n\nThe attainment of this consummation is the grand purpose of the Platonic\nphilosophy. Its ultimate object is \"_the purification of the soul_,\" and\nits pervading spirit is the aspiration after perfection. The whole\nsystem of Plato has therefore an eminently _ethical_ character. It is a\nspeculative philosophy directed to a practical purpose.\n\nPhilosophy is the _love of wisdom_. Now wisdom (sophia) is expressly\ndeclared by Plato to belong alone to the Supreme Divinity,[664] who\nalone can contemplate reality in a direct and immediate manner, and in\nwhom, as Plato seems often to intimate, knowledge and being coincide.\nPhilosophy is the aspiration of the soul after this wisdom, this perfect\nand immutable truth, and in its realization it is a union with the\nPerfect Wisdom through the medium of a divine affection, the _love_ of\nwhich Plato so often speaks. The eternal and unchangeable Essence which\nis the proper object of philosophy is also endowed with _moral_\nattributes. He is not only \"the Being,\" but \"the Good\" (to agathon), and\nall in the system of the universe which can be the object of rational\ncontemplation, is an emanation from that goodness. The love of truth is\ntherefore the love of God, and the love of Good is the love of truth.\nPhilosophy and morality are thus coincident. Philosophy is the love of\nPerfect Wisdom; Perfect Wisdom and Perfect Goodness are identical; the\nPerfect Good is God; philosophy is the \"_Love of God_.\"[665] Ethically\nviewed, it is this one motive of _love_ for the Supreme Wisdom and\nGoodness, predominating over and purifying and assimilating every desire\nof the soul, and governing every movement of the man, raising man to a\nparticipation of and communion with Divinity, and restoring him to \"the\n_likeness_ of God.\" \"This flight,\" says Plato, \"consists in resembling\nGod (omoi\u00f4sis Theo), and this resemblance is the becoming just and holy\nwith wisdom.\"[666] \"This assimilation to God is the enfranchisement of\nthe divine element of the soul. To approach to God as the substance of\ntruth is _Science_; as the substance of goodness in truth is _Wisdom_,\nand as the substance of Beauty in goodness and truth is _Love_.\"[667]\n\nThe two great principles which can be clearly traced as pervading the\nethical system of Plato are--\n\n1. _That no man is willingly evil_.[668]\n\n2. _That every man is endued with the power of producing changes in his\nmoral character_[669]\n\n[Footnote 664: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 145.]\n\n[Footnote 665: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n61.]\n\n[Footnote 666: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 84.]\n\n[Footnote 667: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n277.]\n\n[Footnote 668: \"Tim\u00e6sus,\" ch. xlviii.]\n\n[Footnote 669: \"Laws,\" bk. v. ch. i., bk. ix. ch. vi., bk. x. ch. xii.]\n\nThe first of these principles is the counterpart ethical expression of\nhis theory of _immutable Being_. The second is the counterpart of his\ntheory of phenomenal change, or _mere Becoming_.\n\nThe soul of man is framed after the pattern of the immutable ideas of\nthe _just_, and the _true_, and the _good_, which dwell in the Eternal\nMind--that is, it is made in the image of God. The soul in its ultimate\nessence is formed of \"the immutable\" and \"the permanent.\" The presence\nof the ideas of the just, and the true, and the good in the reason of\nman, constitute him a moral nature; and it is impossible that he can\ncease to be a moral being, for these ideas, having a permanent and\nimmutable being, can not be changed. All the passions and affections of\nthe soul are merely phenomenal. They belong to the mortal, the\ntransitory life of man; they are in endless flow and change, and they\nhave no permanent reality. As phenomena, they must, however, have some\nground; and Plato found that ground in the mysterious, instinctive\nlonging for the _good_ and the _true_ which dwells in the very essence\nof the soul. These are the realities after which it strives, even when\npursuing pleasure, and honor, and wealth, and fame. All the restlessness\nof human life is prompted by a longing for the _good_. But man does not\nclearly perceive what the _good_ really is. The rational element of the\nsoul has become clouded by passion and ignorance, and suffered an\neclipse of its powers. Still, man longs for the good, and bears witness,\nby his restlessness and disquietude, that he instinctively desires it,\nand that he can find no rest and no satisfaction in any thing apart from\nthe knowledge and the participation of the Supreme, the Absolute Good.\n\nThis, then, is the meaning of the oft-repeated assertion of Plato \"_that\nno man is willingly evil_;\" viz., that no man deliberately chooses evil\nas evil. And Plato is, at the same time, careful to guard the doctrine\nfrom misconception. He readily grants that acts of wrong are\ndistinguished as voluntary and involuntary, without which there could be\nneither merit nor demerit, reward nor punishment.[670] But still he\ninsists that no man chooses evil in and by itself. He may choose it\nvoluntarily as a means, but he does not choose it as an end. Every\nvolition, by its essential nature, pursues, at least, an _apparent_\ngood; because the end of volition is not the immediate act, but the\nobject for the sake of which the act is undertaken.[671]\n\n[Footnote 670: \"Laws,\" bk. ix. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 671: \"Gorgias,\" \u00a7\u00a7 52, 53.]\n\nHow is it, then, it may be asked, that men become evil? The answer of\nPlato is, that the soul has in it a principle of change, in the power of\nregulating the desires--in indulging them to excess, or moderating them\naccording to the demands of reason. The circumstances in which the soul\nis placed, as connected with the sensible world by means of the body,\npresent an occasion for the exercise of that power, the end of this\ntemporal connection being to establish a state of moral discipline and\nprobation. The humors and distempers of the body likewise deprave,\ndisorder, and discompose the soul.[672] \"Pleasures and pains are unduly\nmagnified; the democracy of the passions prevails; and the ascendency of\nreason is cast down.\" Bad forms of civil government corrupt social\nmanners, evil education effects the ruin of the soul. Thus the soul is\nchanged--is fallen from what it was when first it came from the\nCreator's hand. But the eternal Ideas are not utterly effaced, the image\nof God is not entirely lost. The soul may yet be restored by remedial\nmeasures. It may be purified by knowledge, by truth, by expiations, by\nsufferings, and by prayers. The utmost, however, that man can hope to do\nin this life is insufficient to fully restore the image of God, and\ndeath must complete the final emancipation of the rational element from\nthe bondage of the flesh. Life is thus a discipline and a preparation\nfor another state of being, and death the final entrance there.[673]\n\n[Footnote 672: \"Gorgias,\" \u00a7\u00a7 74-76.]\n\n[Footnote 673: \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\u00a7 130, 131.]\n\nIndependent of all other considerations, virtue is, therefore, to be\npursued as the true good of the soul. Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance,\nJustice, the four cardinal virtues of the Platonic system, are to be\ncultivated as the means of securing the purification and perfection of\nthe inner man. And the ordinary pleasures, \"the lesser goods\" of life,\nare only to be so far pursued as they are subservient to, and compatible\nwith, the higher and holier duty of striving after \"the resemblance to\nGod.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).\n\nTHE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).\n\nARISTOTLE.\n\n\nAristotle was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, B.C. 384. His\nfather, Nicomachus, was a physician in the Court of Amyntas II., King of\nMacedonia, and is reported to have written several works on Medicine and\nNatural History. From his father, Aristotle seems to have inherited a\nlove for the natural sciences, which was fostered by the circumstances\nwhich surrounded him in early life, and which exerted a determining\ninfluence upon the studies of his riper years.\n\nImpelled by an insatiate desire for knowledge, he, at seventeen years of\nage, repaired to Athens, the city of Plato and the university of the\nworld. Plato was then absent in Sicily; on his return Aristotle entered\nhis school, became an ardent student of philosophy, and remained until\nthe death of Plato, B.C. 348. He therefore listened to the instructions\nof Plato for twenty years.\n\nThe mental characteristics of the pupil and the teacher were strikingly\ndissimilar. Plato was poetic, ideal, and in some degree mystical.\nAristotle was prosaic, systematic, and practical. Plato was intuitive\nand synthetical. Aristotle was logical and analytical. It was therefore\nbut natural that, to the mind of Aristotle, there should appear\nsomething confused, irregular, and incomplete in the discourses of his\nmaster. There was a strange commingling of questions concerning the\ngrounds of morality, and statements concerning the nature of science; of\ninquiries concerning \"real being,\" and speculations on the ordering of a\nmodel Republic, in the same discourse. Ethics, politics, ontology, and\ntheology, are all comprised in his Dialectic, which is, in fact, the one\ngrand \"science of the idea of the good.\" Now to the mind of Aristotle it\nseemed better, and much more systematic, that these questions should be\nseparated, and referred to particular heads; and, above all, that they\nshould be thoroughly discussed in an exact and settled terminology. To\narrange and classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss them\nsystematically and, as far as possible, exhaustively, was evidently the\nambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He would\nsurvey the entire field of human knowledge; he would study nature as\nwell as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought;\nhe would define the proper limits of each department of study, and\npresent a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science.\nAnd, in fact, he was the first who really separated the different\nsciences and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon its\nown proper principles. He distributed philosophy into three\nbranches:--(i.) _Theoretic_; (ii.) _Efficient_; (iii.) _Practical_. The\nTheoretic he divided into--1. _Physics_; _2. Mathematics_; 3.\n_Theology_, or the Prime Philosophy--the science known in modern times\nas Metaphysics. The Efficient embraces what we now term the arts,--1.\n_Logic; 2. Rhetoric_; 3. _Poetics_. The Practical comprises--_1.\nEthics_; 2. _Politics_. On all these subjects he wrote separate\ntreatises. Thus, whilst Plato is the genius of abstraction, Aristotle is\neminently the genius of classification.\n\nSuch being the mental characteristics of the two men--their type of mind\nso opposite--we are prepared to expect that, in pursuing his inquiries,\nAristotle would develop a different _Organon_ from that of Plato, and\nthat the teachings of Aristotle will give a new direction to philosophic\nthought.\n\nARISTOTELIAN ORGANON.\n\nPlato made use of psychological and logical analysis in order to draw\nfrom the depth of consciousness certain fundamental ideas which are\ninherent in the mind--born with it, and not derived from sense or\nexperience. These ideas he designates \"the intelligible species\" (ta\nnooumena gen\u00ea) as opposed to \"the visible species\"--the objects of\nsense. Such ideas or principles being found, he uses them as\n\"starting-points\" from which he may pass beyond the sensible world and\nascend to \"the absolute,\" that is, to God.[674] Having thus, by\nimmediate abstraction, attained to universal and necessary ideas, he\ndescends to the outer world, and attempts by these ideas to construct an\nintellectual theory of the universe.[675]\n\nAristotle will reverse this process. He will commence with _sensation_,\nand proceed, by induction, from the known to the unknown.\n\nThe repetition of sensations produces _recollection_, recollection\n_experience_, and experience produces _science_.[676] \"Science and art\nresult unto men by means of experience....\" \"Art comes into being when,\nfrom a number of experiences, one universal opinion is evolved, which\nwill embrace all similar cases. For example, if you know that a certain\nremedy has cured Callias of a certain disease, and that the same remedy\nhas produced the same effect on Socrates and on several other persons,\nthat is _Experience_; but to know that a certain remedy will cure all\npersons attacked with that disease, is _Art_. Experience is a knowledge\nof individual things (t\u00f4n kathekasta); art is that of universals (t\u00f4n\nkatholou).\"[677]\n\n[Footnote 674: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 675: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 676: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 677: Ibid.]\n\nDisregarding the Platonic notion of the unity of all Being in the\nabsolute idea, he fixed his immediate attention on the manifoldness of\nthe phenomenal, and by a classification of all the objects of experience\nhe sought to attain to \"general notions.\" Concentrating all his\nattention on the individual, the contingent, the particular, he ascends,\nby induction, from the particular to the _general_; and then, by a\nstrange paralogism, \"the _universal_\" is confounded with \"the _general_\"\nor, by a species of logical sleight-of-hand, the general is transmuted\ninto the universal. Thus \"induction is the pathway from particulars to\nuniversals.\"[678] But how universal and necessary principles can be\nobtained by a generalization of limited experiences is not explained by\nAristotle. The experiences of a lifetime, the experiences of the whole\nrace, are finite and limited, and a generalization of these can only\ngive the finite, the limited, and at most, the general, but not the\nuniversal.\n\n[Footnote 679: \"Topics,\" bk. i. ch. xii.; \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. iii.]\n\nAristotle admits, however, that there are ideas or principles in the\nmind which can not be explained by experience, and we are therefore\nentitled to an answer to the question--how are these obtained? \"Sensible\nexperience gives us what is _here_, _there_, _now_, in such and such a\nmanner, but it is impossible for it to give what is _everywhere_ and _at\nall times_.\"[680] He tells us further, that \"science is a conception of\nthe mind engaged in universals, and in those things which exist of\nnecessity, and since there are _principles of things demonstrable and of\nevery science_ (for science is joined with reason), it will be neither\nscience, nor art, nor prudence, which discovers the principles of\nscience;... it must therefore be (nous) pure intellect,\" or the\nintuitive reason.[681] He also characterizes these principles as\n_self-evident_. \"First truths are those which obtain belief, not through\nothers, but through themselves, as there is no necessity to investigate\nthe '_why_' in scientific principles, but each principle ought to be\ncredible by itself.\"[682] They are also _necessary_ and _eternal_.\n\"Demonstrative science is from necessary principles, and those which are\n_per se_ inherent, are necessarily so in things.\"[683] \"We have all a\nconception of that which can not subsist otherwise than it does.... The\nobject of science has a necessary existence, therefore it is _eternal_.\nFor those things which exist in themselves, by necessity, are all\neternal.\"[684] But whilst Aristotle admits that there are \"immutable and\nfirst principles,\"[685] which are not derived from sense and\nexperience--\"principles which are the foundation of all science and\ndemonstration, but which are themselves indemonstrable,\"[686] because\nself-evident, necessary, and eternal; yet he furnishes no proper account\nof their genesis and development in the human mind, neither does he\nattempt their enumeration. At one time he makes the intellect itself\ntheir source, at another he derives them from sense, experience, and\ninduction. This is the defect, if not the inconsistency, of his\nmethod.[687]\n\n[Footnote 680: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 681: \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 682: \"Topics,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 683: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 684: \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 685: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 686: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 687: Hamilton attempts the following mode of reconciling the\ncontradictory positions of Aristotle:\n\n\"On the supposition of the mind virtually containing, antecedent to all\nexperience, certain universal principles of knowledge, in the form of\ncertain necessities of thinking; still it is only by repeated and\ncomparative experiments that we compass the certainty; on the one hand,\nthat such and such cognitions can not but be thought as necessary,\nnative generalities; and, on the other, that such and such cognitions\nmay or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitious\ngeneralizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, and\nclassification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of\nprinciples, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improperly, applies\nthe term _Induction_.\"--\"Philosophy,\" p. 88.]\n\nThe human mind, he tells us, has two kinds of intelligence--the\n_passive_ intelligence (nous path\u00eatikos), which is the receptacle of\nforms (dectikon tou eidous); and the _active_ intelligence (nous\npoi\u00eatikos), which impresses the seal of thought upon the data furnished\nby experience, and combines them into the unity of a single judgment,\nthus attaining \"general notions.\"[688] The passive intelligence (the\n\"external perception\" of modern psychology) perceives the individual\nforms which appear in the external world, and the active intelligence\n(the intellect proper) classifies and generalizes according to fixed\nlaws or principles inherent in itself; but of these fixed laws--pr\u00f4ta\nno\u00eamata--first thoughts, or _\u00e0 priori_ ideas, he offers no proper\naccount; they are, at most, purely subjective. This, it would seem, was,\nin effect, a return to the doctrine of Protagoras and his school, \"that\nman--the individual--is the measure of all things.\" The aspects under\nwhich objects present themselves in consciousness, constitute our only\nground of knowledge; we have no direct, intuitive knowledge of Being _in\nse_. The noetic faculty is simply a _regulative_ faculty; it furnishes\nthe laws under which we compare and judge, but it does not supply any\noriginal elements of knowledge. Individual things are the only real\nentities,[689] and \"universals\" have no separate existence apart from\nindividuals in which they inhere as attributes or properties. They are\nconsequently pure mental conceptions, which are fixed and recalled by\ngeneral names. He thus substitutes a species of conceptual-nominalism in\nplace of the realism of Plato. It is true that \"real being\" (to on) is\nwith Aristotle a subject of metaphysical inquiry, but the proper, if not\nthe only subsistence, or ouaia, is the form or abstract nature of\nthings. \"The essence or very nature of a thing is inherent in the _form_\nand _energy_\"[690] The science of Metaphysics is strictly conversant\nabout these abstract intellectual forms just as Natural Philosophy is\nconversant about external objects, of which the senses give us\ninformation. Our knowledge of these intellectual forms is, however,\nfounded upon \"beliefs\" rather than upon immediate intuition, and the\nobjective certainty of science, upon the subjective necessity of\nbelieving, and not upon direct apperception.\n\n[Footnote 688: \"On the Soul,\" ch. vi.; \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 689: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. vi. ch. xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 690: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. iii.]\n\nThe points of contrast between the two methods may now be presented in a\nfew sentences. Plato held that all our cognitions are reducible to two\nelements--one derived from _sense_, the other from _pure reason_; one\nelement particular, contingent, and relative, the other universal,\nnecessary, and absolute. By an act of _immediate abstraction_ Plato will\neliminate the particular, contingent, and relative phenomena, and\ndisengage the universal, necessary, and absolute _ideas_ which underlie\nand determine all phenomena. These ideas are the thoughts of the Divine\nMind, according to which all particular and individual existences are\ngenerated, and, as divine thoughts, they are real and permanent\nexistences. Thus by a process of immediate abstraction, he will rise\nfrom particular and contingent phenomena to universal and necessary\nprinciples, and from these to the First Principle of all principles, the\nFirst Cause of all causes--that is, to _God_.\n\nAristotle, on the contrary, held that all of our knowledge begins with\n\"the singular,\" that is, with the particular and the relative, and is\nderived from sensation and experience. The \"sensible object,\" taken as\nit is without any sifting and probing, is the basis of science, and\nreason is simply the architect constructing science according to certain\n\"forms\" or laws inherent in mind. The object, then, of metaphysical\nscience is to investigate those \"universal notions\" under which the mind\nconceives of and represents to itself external objects, and speculates\nconcerning them. Aristotle, therefore, agrees with Plato in teaching\n\"that science can only be a science of universals,\"[691] and \"that\nsensation alone can not furnish us with scientific knowledge.\"[692] How,\nthen, does he propose to attain the knowledge of universal principles?\nHow will he perform that feat which he calls \"passing from the known to\nthe unknown?\" The answer is, by _comparative abstraction_. The universal\nbeing constituted by a relation of the object to the thinking subject,\nthat is, by a property recognized by the intelligence alone, in virtue\nof which it can be retained as an object of thought, and compared with\nother objects, he proposes to _compare, analyze, define,_ and _classify_\nthe primary cognitions, and thus evoke into energy, and clearly present\nthose principles or forms of the intelligence which he denominate\n\"universals.\" As yet, however, he has only attained to \"general\nnotions,\" which are purely subjective, that is, to logical definitions,\nand these logical definitions are subsequently elevated to the dignity\nof \"universal principles and causes\" by a species of philosophic\nlegerdemain. Philosophy is thus stripped of its metaphysical character,\nand assumes a strictly _logical_ aspect. The key of the Aristotelian\nmethod is therefore the\n\nARISTOTELIAN LOGIC.\n\nPure Logic is the science of the formal laws of thought. Its office is\nto ascertain the rules or conditions under which the mind, by its own\nconstitution, reasons and discourses. The office of Applied Logic--of\nlogic as an art--is \"to form and judge of conclusions, and, through\nconclusions, to establish proof. The conclusions, however, arise from\npropositions, and the propositions from conceptions.\" It is chiefly\nunder the latter aspect that logic is treated by Aristotle. According to\nthis natural point of view he has divided the contents of the logical\nand dialectic teaching in the different treatises of the _Organon_.\n\n[Footnote 691: \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 692: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. xxxi.]\n\nThe first treatise is the \"_Categories_\" or \"Predicaments\"--a work which\ntreats of the universal determinations of Being. It is a classification\nof all our mental conceptions. As a matter of fact, the mind forms\nnotions or conceptions about those natures and essences of things which\npresent an outward image to the senses, or those, equally real, which\nutter themselves to the mind. These may be defined and classified; there\nmay be general conceptions to which all particular conceptions are\nreferable. This classification has been attempted by Aristotle, and as\nthe result we have the ten \"Categories\" of _Substance, Quantity,\nQuality, Relation, Time, Place, Position, Possession, Action, Passion_.\nHe does not pretend that this classification is complete, but he held\nthese \"Predicaments\" to be the most universal expressions for the\nvarious relations of things, under some one of which every thing might\nbe reduced.\n\nThe second treatise, \"_On Interpretation_,\" investigates language as the\nexpression of thought; and inasmuch as a true or false thought must be\nexpressed by the union or separation of a subject and a predicate, he\ndeems it necessary to discuss the parts of speech--the general term and\nthe verb--and the modes of affirmation and denial. In this treatise he\ndevelops the nature and limitations of propositions, the meaning of\ncontraries and contradictions, and the force of affirmations and denials\nin _possible, contingent_, and _necessary_ matter.\n\nThe third are the \"_Analytics_,\" which show how conclusions are to be\nreferred back to their principles, and arranged in the order of their\nprecedence.\n\nThe First or Prior Analytic presents the universal doctrine of the\nSyllogism, its principles and forms, and teaches how must reason, if we\nwould not violate the laws of our own mind. The theory of reasoning,\ngenerally, with a view to accurate demonstration, depends upon the\nconstruction of a perfect syllogism, which is defined as \"a discourse in\nwhich, certain things being laid down, something else different from the\npremises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence.\"[693]\nConclusions are, according to their own contents and end, either\n_Apodeictic_, which deal with necessary and demonstrable matter, or\n_Dialectic_, which deal with probable matter, or _Sophistical_, which\nare imperfect in matter or form, and announced, deceptively, as correct\nconclusions, when they are not. The doctrine of Apodeictic conclusions\nis given in the \"_Posterior Analytic_,\" that of Dialectic conclusions in\nthe \"_Topics_,\" and that of the Sophistical in the \"_Sophistical\nElenchi_.\"\n\nNow, if Logic is of any value as an instrument for the discovery of\ntruth, the attainment of certitude, it must teach us not only how to\ndeduce conclusions from premises, but it must certify to us the validity\nof the principles from whence we reason and this is attempted by\nAristotle in the Posterior Analytic. This treatise opens with the\nfollowing statement: All doctrine, and all intellectual discipline,\narises from a prior or pre-existent knowledge. This is evident, if we\nsurvey them all; for both mathematical sciences, and also each of the\narts, are obtained in this manner. The same holds true in the case of\nreasonings, whether through [deductive] _Syllogism_ or through\n_Induction_, for both accomplish the instruction they afford from\ninformation previously known--the former (syllogistic reasoning)\nreceiving it, as it were, from the traditions of the intelligent, the\nlatter (inductive reasoning) manifesting the universal through the light\nof the singular.[694] Induction and Syllogism are thus the grand\ninstruments of logic.[695]\n\n[Footnote 693: \"Prior Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. i.; \"Topics,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 694: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 695: \"We believe all things through syllogism, or from\ninduction.\"--\"Prior Analytic,\" bk. ii. ch. xxiii.]\n\nBoth these processes are based upon an _anterior_ knowledge.\nDemonstrative science must be from things true, first, immediate, more\nknown than, prior to, and the causes of, the conclusion, for thus there\nwill be the appropriate first principles of whatever is\ndemonstrated.[696] The first principles of demonstration, the material\nof thought, must, consequently, be supplied by some power or faculty of\nthe mind other than that which is engaged in generalization and\ndeductive reasoning. Whence, then, is this \"anterior knowledge\" derived,\nand what tests or criteria have we of its validity?\n\n1. In regard to deductive or syllogistic reasoning, the views of\nAristotle are very distinctly expressed.\n\nSyllogistic reasoning \"proceeds from generals to particulars.\"[697] The\ngeneral must therefore be supplied as the foundation of the deductive\nreasoning. Whence, then, is this knowledge of \"the general\" derived? The\nanswer of Aristotle is that the universal major proposition, out of\nwhich the conclusion of the syllogism is drawn, _is itself necessarily\nthe conclusion of a previous induction, and mediately or immediately an\ninference_--a collection from individual objects of sensation or of\nself-consciousness. \"Now,\" says he, \"demonstration is from universals,\nbut induction from particulars. It is impossible, however, to\ninvestigate universals except through induction, since things which are\nsaid to be from abstraction will be known only by induction.\"[698] It is\nthus clear that Aristotle makes _deduction necessarily dependent upon\ninduction_. He maintains that the highest or most universal principles\nwhich constitute the primary and immediate propositions of the former\nare furnished by the latter.\n\n[Footnote 696: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 697: Ibid., bk. i. ch. xviii.; \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 698: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. xviii.]\n\n2. General principles being thus furnished by induction, we may now\ninquire whence, according to Aristotle, are the materials for induction\nderived? What is the character of that \"anterior knowledge\" which is the\nbasis of the inductive process?\n\nInduction, says Aristotle, is \"the progression from singulars to\nuniversals.\"[699] It is an illation of the universal from the singular\nas legitimated by the laws of thought. All knowledge, therefore, begins\nwith singulars--that is, with individual objects. And inasmuch as all\nknowledge begins with \"individual objects,\" and as the individual is\nconstantly regarded by Aristotle as the \"object of sense,\" it is claimed\nthat his doctrine is that all knowledge is derived from _sensation_, and\nthat science and art result to man (_solely_) by means of _experience._\nHe is thus placed at the head of the empirical school of philosophy, as\nPlato is placed at the head of the ideal school.\n\n[Footnote 699: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. xviii.]\n\nThis classification, however, is based upon a very superficial\nacquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle as a whole. The practice,\nso commonly resorted to, of determining the character of the\nAristotelian philosophy by the light of one or two passages quoted from\nhis \"Metaphysics,\" is unjust both to Aristotle and to the history of\nphilosophic thought. We can not expect to attain a correct understanding\nof the views of Aristotle concerning the sources and grounds of all\nknowledge without some attention to his psychology. A careful study of\nhis writings will show that the terms \"sensation\" (aisth\u00easis) and\n\"experience\" (empeira) are employed in a much more comprehensive sense\nthan is usual in modern philosophic writings.\n\n\"Sensation,\" in its lowest form, is defined by Aristotle as \"an\nexcitation of the soul through the body,\"[700] and, in its higher form,\nas the excitation of the soul by any object of knowledge. In this latter\nform it is used by him as synonymous with \"intuition,\" and embraces all\nimmediate intuitive perceptions, whether of sense, consciousness, or\nreason. \"The universe is derived from particulars, therefore we ought to\nhave a sensible perception (aisth\u00easis) of these; and this is intellect\n(nous).\"[701] Intelligence proper, the faculty of first principles, is,\nin certain respects, a sense, because it is the source of a class of\ntruths which, like the perceptions of the senses, are immediately\nrevealed as facts to be received upon their own evidence. It thus\nanswers to the \"sensus communis\" of Cicero, and the \"Common Sense\" of\nthe Scottish school. Under this aspect, \"Sense is equal to or has the\nforce of Science.\"[702] The term \"Experience\" is also used to denote,\nnot merely the perception and remembrance of the impressions which\nexternal objects make upon the mind, but as co-extensive with the whole\ncontents of consciousness--all that the mind _does_ of its own native\nenergy, as well as all that it _suffers_ from without. It is evidently\nused in the Posterior Analytic (bk. ii. ch. xix.) to describe the whole\nprocess by which the knowledge of universals is obtained. \"From\nexperience, or from every universal remaining in the soul, the\nprinciples of art and science arise.\" The office of experience is \"to\nfurnish the principles of every science\"[703]--that is, to evoke them\ninto energy in the mind. 'Experience thus seems to be a thing almost\nsimilar to science and art.[704] In the most general sense, \"sensation\"\nwould thus appear to be the immediate perception or intuition of facts\nand principles, and \"experience\" the operation of the mind upon these\nfacts and principles, elaborating them into scientific form according to\nits own inherent laws. The \"experience\" of Aristotle is analogous to the\n\"reflection\" of Locke.\n\n[Footnote 700: \"De Somn.,\" bk. i.]\n\n[Footnote 701: \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. xi.; see also ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 702: \"De Cen. Anim.\"]\n\n[Footnote 703: \"Prior Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 704: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. i.]\n\nSo much being premised, we proceed to remark that there is a distinction\nperpetually recurring in the writings of Aristotle between the elements\nor first principles of knowledge which are \"clearest in their own\nnature\" and those which \"are clearest to our perception.\"[705] The\ncauses or principles of knowledge \"are _prior_ and _more known_ to us in\ntwo ways, for what is prior in nature is not the same as that which is\nprior to us, nor that which is more known (simply in itself) the same as\nthat which is more known to us. Now I call things prior and more known\nto us, those which are _nearer to sense_; and things prior and more\nknown simply in themselves, those which are _remote from sense_; and\nthose things are most remote which are especially _universal_, and those\nnearest which are _singular_; and these are mutually opposed.\"[706] Here\nwe have a distribution of the first or prior elements of knowledge into\ntwo fundamentally opposite classes.\n\n(i.) _The immediate or intuitive perceptions of sense,_\n\n(ii.) _The immediate or intuitive apperceptions of pure reason,_\n\n[Footnote 705: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. iv.; \"Metaphysics,\" bk. ii. ch. i.;\n\"Rhetoric,\" bk. i. ch. ii.; \"Prior Analytic,\" bk. ii. ch. xxiii.]\n\n[Footnote 706: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. i. ch. ii.]\n\nThe objects of sense-perception are external, individual, \"nearest to\nsense,\" and occasionally or contingently present to sense. The objects\nof the intellect are inward, universal, and the essential property of\nthe soul. They are \"remote from sense,\" \"prior by nature;\" they are\n\"forms\" essentially inherent in the soul previous to experience; and it\nis the office of experience to bring them forward into the light of\nconsciousness, or, in the language of Aristotle, \"to evoke them from\npotentiality into actuality.\" And further, from the \"prior\" and\nimmediate intuitions of sense and intellect, all our secondary, our\nscientific and practical knowledge is drawn by logical processes.\n\nThe Aristotelian distribution of the intellectual faculties corresponds\nfully to this division of the objects of knowledge. The human intellect\nis divided by Aristotle into,\n\n1. The Passive or Receptive Intellect (nous paph\u00eatikos).--Its office is\nthe reception of sensible impressions or images (Phantasmata) and their\nretention in the mind (my\u00eam\u00ea). These sensible forms or images are\nessentially immaterial. \"Each sensoriurn (aisth\u00eat\u00ear\u00f4n) is receptive of\nthe sensible quality _without the matter_, and hence when the sensibles\nthemselves are absent, sensations and phantasikos remain.\"[707]\n\n[Footnote 707: \"De Anima,\" bk. iii. ch. ii.]\n\n2. The Active or Creative Intellect (nous pointikos).--This is the power\nor faculty which, by its own inherent power, impresses \"form\" upon the\nmaterial of thought supplied by sense-perception, exactly as the First\nCause combines it, in the universe, with the recipient matter.\n\n\"It is necessary,\" says Aristotle, \"that these two modes should be\nopposed to each other, as matter is opposed to form, and to all that\ngives form. The receptive reason, which is as matter, becomes all things\nby receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all\nthings, as light calls color into being. The creative reason transcends\nthe body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it\nis an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or\naffected by it; prior, and subsequent to the individual mind. The\nreceptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is\nperishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is\nlost to the higher and immortal reason.\"[708]\n\nThis \"Active or Creative Intellect\" is again further subdivided, by\nAristotle--\n\n1. The _Scientific_ (epist\u00eamonikon) part--the \"virtue,\" faculty, or\n\"habit of principles.\" He also designates it as the \"place of\nprinciples,\" and further defines it as the power \"which apprehends those\nexistences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are\"--that\nis, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitive\nreason_.\n\n2. The _Reasoning_ (logistikon) part--the power by which we draw\nconclusions from premises, and \"contemplate contingent matter\"[710]--the\n_discursive reason_.\n\nThe correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would afford\nthe best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledge\nattained by the former is an \"intuitive principle\"--a truth at first\nhand; that obtained by the latter is a \"demonstrative proposition\"--a\ntruth at second hand.\n\nThe preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid us\nmaterially in interpreting his remarks \"_Upon the Method and Habits\nnecessary to the ascertainment of Principles_.\"[711]\n\n[Footnote 708: \"De Anima,\" bk. iii. ch. v.]\n\n[Footnote 709: \"Ethics,\" bk. vi. ch. i.]\n\n[Footnote 710: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 711: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. ii, ch. xix., the concluding\nchapter of the Organon.]\n\n\"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge through\ndemonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, has\nbeen elucidated before.\" This being established, he proceeds to explain\nhow that \"knowledge of first, immediate principles\" is developed in the\nmind.\n\n1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of\nsense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_\nor _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind.\n\n\"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called\n_sensible perception_ (aisth\u00easis); but sense being inherent, in some\nanimals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others\nit is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object does\nnot remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others,\nwhen they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul,... with some,\n_reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression),\n[as in man], but in others it is not [as in the brute]. From sense,\ntherefore, as we say, memory is produced, and from the repeated\nremembrance of the same thing we get experience.... From experience, or\n_from every universal remaining in the soul_--the one besides the many\nwhich in all of them is _one_ and the _same_--the principles of art and\nscience arise. If experience is conversant with generation, the\nprinciples of art; if with being, the principles of science.... Let us\nagain explain: When one thing without difference abides, there is then\nthe first universal (notion) [developed] in the soul; for the singular\nindeed is perceived by sense, _but sense is [also] of the\nuniversal_\"--that is, the universal is immanent in the sensible object\nas a property giving it \"form.\" \"It is manifest, then, that primary\nthings become necessarily known by induction, for thus sensible\nperception produces [develops or evokes] the _universal_.\" 2. The\nknowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of pure\nintellect_ (nous)--that is, \"_intellect itself is the principle of\nscience_\" or, in other words, intellect is the _efficient, essential\ncause_ of the knowledge of first principles.\n\n\"Of those habits which are about intellect by which we ascertain truth,\n_some[712] are always true_, but others[713] admit the false, as opinion\nand reasoning. But science and (pure) intellect are always true, and no\nother kind of knowledge, except intellect [intellectual intuition], is\nmore accurate than science. And since the principles of demonstration\nare more known, and all science is connected with reason, there could\nnot be a science of principles. But since nothing can be more true than\nscience, except intellect, intellect will belong to principles. From\nthese [considerations] it is evident that, as demonstration is not the\nprinciple of demonstration, so neither is science the principle of\nscience. If, then, we have no other true genus (of habit) besides\nscience, _intellect will be the principle of science_; it will also be\nthe principle (or cause of the knowledge) of the principle.\"\n\n[Footnote 712: The \"noetic.\"]\n\n[Footnote 713: The \"dian\u00e6tic.\"]\n\nThe doctrine of Aristotle regarding \"first principles\" may perhaps be\nsummed up as follows: All demonstrative science is based upon\n_universals_ \"prior in nature\"--that is, upon _\u00e0 priori_, self-evident,\nnecessary, and immutable principles. Our knowledge of these \"first and\nimmediate principles\" is dependent primarily on _intellect_ (nous) or\nintuitive reason, and secondarily on sense, experience, and induction.\nPrior to experience, the intellect contains these principles in itself\npotentially, as \"forms,\" \"laws,\" \"habitudes,\" or \"predicaments\" of\nthought; but they can not be \"evoked into energy,\" can not be revealed\nin consciousness, except on condition of experience, and they can only\nbe scientifically developed by logical abstraction and definition. The\nultimate ground of all truth and certainty is thus a mode of our own\nmind, a subjective necessity of thinking, and truth is not in things,\nbut in our own minds.[714] \"Ultimate knowledge, as well as primary\nknowledge, the most perfect knowledge which the philosopher can attain,\nas well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. All\nknowledge seems to be included under two forms--knowledge _that_ it is\nso; knowledge _why_ it is so. Neither of these can, of course, include\nthe knowledge at which Plato is aiming--knowledge which is correlated\nwith Being--a knowledge, not _about_ things or persons, but _of_\nthem.\"[715]\n\n[Footnote 714: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. v. ch. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 715: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 190.]\n\nARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY\n\nTheoretical philosophy, \"the science which has truth for its end,\" is\ndivided by Aristotle into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, or the\nFirst Philosophy, now commonly known as \"Metaphysics,\" because it is\nbeyond or above physics, and is concerned with the primitive ground and\ncause of all things.[716]\n\nIn the former two we have now no immediate interest, but with Theology,\nas \"the science of the Divine,\"[717] the _First Moving Cause_, which is\nthe source of all other causes, and the original ground of all other\nthings, we are specially concerned, inasmuch as our object is to\ndetermine, if possible, whether Greek philosophy exerted any influence\nupon Christian thought, and has bequeathed any valuable results to the\nTheology of modern times.\n\n\"The Metaphysics\" of Aristotle opens by an enumeration of \"the\nprinciples or causes\"[718] into which all existences can be resolved by\nphilosophical analysis. This enumeration is at present to be regarded as\nprovisional, and in part hypothetical--a verbal generalization of the\ndifferent principles which seem to be demanded to explain the existence\nof a thing, or constitute it what it is. These he sets down as--\n\n[Footnote 716: \"Physics are concerned with things which have a principle\nof motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not\ntranscendental and self-existent things; and there is another science\nseparate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and\ntranscendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall\nendeavor to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent\nsubstance, if it exist at all, must surely be the sphere of the\n_divine_--it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows\nthat there are three kinds of speculative science--Physics, Mathematics,\nand Theology.\"--\"Metaphysics,\" bk. x. ch. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 717: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 718: Aition--cause--is here used by Aristotle in the sense of\n\"account of\" or \"reason why.\"]\n\n1. The Material Cause (t\u00ean yl\u00ean kai to ypokeimenon)--the matter and\nsubject--that _out of_ which a given thing has been originated. \"From\nthe analogy which this principle has to wood or stone, or any actual\nmatter out of which a work of nature or of art is produced, the name\n'material' is assigned to this class.\" It does not always necessarily\nmean \"matter\" in the now common use of the term, but \"antecedents--that\nis, principles whose inherence and priority is implied in any existing\nthing, as, for example, the premises of a syllogism, which are the\nmaterial cause of the conclusion.\"[719] With Aristotle there is,\ntherefore, \"matter as an object of sense,\" and \"matter as an object of\nthought.\"\n\n2. The Formal Cause (T\u00ean ausian kai to ti einai)--the being or abstract\nessence of a thing--that primary nature on which all its properties\ndepend. To this Aristotle gave the name of eidos--the form or exemplar\n_according to_ which a thing is produced.\n\n3. The Moving or Efficient Cause (othen \u00ea arch\u00ea t\u00eas kin\u00ease\u00f4s)--the\norigin and principle of motion--that _by which_ a thing is produced.\n\n4. The Final Cause (to ou eneken kai to agathon)--the good end answered\nby the existence of any thing--that for the sake of which_ any thing is\nproduced--the eneka tou, or reason for it.[720] Thus, for instance, in a\nhouse, the wood out of which it is produced is the _matter (yl\u00ea), the\nidea or conception according to which it is produced is _the form_\n(eidos morph\u00ea), the builder who erects the house is the _efficient_\ncause, and the reason for its production, or the end of its existence is\nthe _final_ cause.\n\n[Footnote 719: Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article \"Aristotle;\" \"Post.\nAnalytic,\" bk. ii. ch. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 720: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i. ch. iii.]\n\nCauses are, therefore, the elements into which the mind resolves its\nfirst rough conception of an object. That object is what it is, by\nreason of the matter out of which it sprang, the moving cause which gave\nit birth, the idea or form which it realizes, and the end or object\nwhich it attains. The knowledge of a thing implies knowing it from these\nfour points of view--that is, knowing its four causes or principles.\n\nThese four determinations of being are, on a further and closer\nanalysis, resolved into the fundamental antithesis of MATTER and FORM.\n\n\"All things that are produced,\" says Aristotle,[721] \"are produced from\nsomething (that is, from _matter_), by something (that is, _form_), and\nbecome something (the totality--to synolon);\" as, for example, a statue,\na plant, a man. To every subject there belongs, therefore, first,\n_matter_ (yl\u00ea); secondly, _form_ (morph\u00ea). The synthesis of these two\nproduces and constitutes _substance_, or ousia. Matter and form are thus\nthe two grand causes or principles whence proceed all things. The\nformative cause is, at the same time, the moving cause and the final\ncause; for it is evidently the element of determination which impresses\nmovement upon matter whilst determining it; and it is also the end of\nbeing, since being only really exists when it has passed from an\nindeterminate to a determinate state.\n\n[Footnote 721: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. vi. ch. vii.]\n\nIn proof that the eidos or form is an _efficient_ principle operating in\nevery object, which makes it, to our conception, what it is, Aristotle\nbrings forward the subject of generation or production.[722] There are\nthree modes of production--natural, artificial, and automatic. In\nnatural production we discern at once a matter; indeed Nature, in the\nlargest sense, may be defined as \"that out of which things are\nproduced.\" Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is a given\nsubstance--a vegetable, a beast, or a man. But what is the _producing_\ncause in each case? Clearly something akin to the result. A man\ngenerates a man, a plant produces another plant like to itself. There\nis, therefore, implied in the resulting thing a _productive force_\ndistinct from matter, upon which it works. And this is the eidos, or\nform. Let us now consider artificial production. Here again the form is\nthe producing power. And this is in the soul. The art of the physician\nis the eidos, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect is\nthe conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, a\ndistinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed a\nno\u00easis and a poi\u00easis. The no\u00easis is the previous conception which the\narchitect forms in his own mind; the poi\u00easis is the actual creation of\nthe house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is the\nmoving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind of\nthe artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue is\nproduced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before it\ncan become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which is\ntrue of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneous\nproduction. For example, a cure may take place by the application of\nwarmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. This\nwarmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is\nconsequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health.\nEvidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an\nartificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generating\ninfluence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be a\nproductive power, and there must be something out of which it is\nproduced. In this case, then, there will be a yl\u00ea and an eidos.[723]\n\n[Footnote 722: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 723: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" pp. 205, 206.]\n\nFrom the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded by\nAristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_\ncause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly be\nseparated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from its\nconception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse of\nmotion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with the\ngood of that thing. \"The moving cause of the house is the builder, but\nthe moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, the\nhouse.\" From such examples as these it would seem that the\ndeterminations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in so\nfar as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regarded\nthe end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfect\nrealization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations,\ntherefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matter\nand form_.[724]\n\n[Footnote 724: Schwegler's \"History of Philosophy,\" pp. 120, 123.]\n\nThe opposition of matter and form, with Aristotle, corresponds to the\nopposition between the element of _generality_ and the element of\n_particularity_. Matter is indeterminate; form is determinate. Matter,\nabstracted from form, in thought, is entirely without predicate and\ndistinction; form is that which enters into the definition of every\nsubject, and without which it could not be defined. Matter is capable of\nthe widest diversity of forms, but is itself without form. Pure form is,\nin fact, that which is without matter, or, in other words, it is the\npure conception of being. Matter is the necessary condition of the\nexistence of a thing; form is the essence of each thing, that in virtue\nof which substance is possible, and without which it is inconceivable.\nOn the one side is passivity, possibility of existence, capacity of\naction; on the other side is activity, actuality, thought. The unity of\nthese two in the realm of determined being constitutes every individual\nsubstance. The relation of matter and form, logically apprehended, is\nthus the relation of POTENTIALITY and ACTUALITY.\n\nThis is a further and indeed a most important step in the Aristotelian\ntheology. Matter, as we have seen, after all, amounts to merely capacity\nfor action, and if we can not discover some productive power to develop\npotentiality into actuality, we look in vain for some explanation of the\nphenomena around us. The discovery, however, of energy (energeia), as a\nprinciple of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a\nmomentary glance at the actual phenomena will show its perfect identity\nwith the eidos, or form.[725] \"For instance, what is a calm? It is\nevenness in the surface of the sea. Here the sea is the subject, that\nis, the matter in _capacity_, but the evenness is the _energy_ or\nactuality;... energy is thus as form.\"[726] The form (or idea) is thus\nan energy or actuality (energeia); the matter is a capacity or\npotentiality (dynamis), requiring the co-operation of the energy to\nproduce a result.\n\nThese terms, which are first employed by Aristotle in their\nphilosophical signification, are characteristic of his whole system. It\nis, therefore, important we should grasp their precise philosophical\nimport; and this can only be done by considering them in the strictest\nrelation to each other. It is in this relation they are defined by\nAristotle. \"Now energeia is the existence of a thing not in the sense of\nits potentially existing. The term _potentially_ we use, for instance,\nof the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it may\nbe subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not\nthinking of it, but might be so; whereas energeia is the opposite. By\napplying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must\nnot seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of\nthe analogy as a whole,--that it is as that which builds to that which\nhas a capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that\nwhich sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the\ndefinite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the\nunaccomplished. In this contrast, let the energeia be set off as forming\nthe one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said\nto be in energeia not always in like manner (except so far as there is\nan analogy, that as this thing is in this, and related to this, so is\nthat in that, or related to that); for sometimes it implies _motion_ as\nopposed to the _capacity of motion_, and sometimes _complete existence_\nopposed to _undeveloped matter_\".[727] As the term dynamis has the\ndouble meaning of \"_possibility of existence_\" as well as \"_capacity of\naction_\" so there is the double contrast of \"_action_\" as opposed to the\ncapacity of action; and \"_actual existence_\" opposed to possible\nexistence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter antithesis,\nAristotle introduced the term entelecheia[728]--entelechy, of which the\nmost natural account is that it is a compound of en telei echein--\"being\nin a state of perfection.\"[729] This term, however, rarely occurs in the\n\"Metaphysics,\" whilst energeia is everywhere employed, not only to\nexpress activity as opposed to passivity, but complete existence as\nopposed to undeveloped matter.\n\n[Footnote 725: \"That which Aristotle calls 'form' is not to be\nconfounded with what we may perhaps call shape [or figure]; a hand\nsevered from the arm, for instance, has still the outward shape of a\nhand, but, according to Aristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand now\nas to matter, and not as to form; an actual hand, a hand as to form, is\nonly that which can do the proper work of a hand.\"--Schwegler's \"History\nof Philosophy,\" p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 726: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. vii. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 727: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. viii. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 728: \"Entelechy indicates the perfected act, the completely\nactual.\"--Schw.]\n\n[Footnote 729: Grant's Aristotle's \"Ethics,\" vol. i. p. 184.]\n\n\"In Physics dynamis answers to the necessary conditions for the\nexistence of any thing before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to\nyl\u00ea, both to the prot\u00ea yl\u00ea--the first matter, or matter devoid of all\nqualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for\nexample, marble; and also to the eschat\u00ea yl\u00ea--or matter capable of\nreceiving form, as marble the form of the statue.\" Marble then exists\npotentially in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue\nexists potentially in the marble before it is carved. All objects of\nthought exist, either purely in potentiality, or purely in actuality, or\nboth in potentiality and in actuality. This division makes an entire\nchain of all existence. At the one end is matter, the prot\u00ea yl\u00ea which\nhas a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but\nwhich having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of being\nrealized by the mind. At the other end of the chain is pure form, which\nis not at all matter, the absolute and the unconditioned, the eternal\nsubstance and energy without matter (ousia aldios kai energeia aneu\ndyname\u00f4s), who can not be thought as non-existing--the self-existent\nGod. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out\nof potentiality evermore spring into actual being.[730]\n\n[Footnote 730: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 185.]\n\nThe relation of actuality to potentiality is the subject of an extended\nand elaborate discussion in book viii., the general results of which may\nbe summed up in the following propositions:\n\n1. _The relation of Actuality to Potentiality is as the Perfect to the\nImperfect_.--The progress from potentiality to actuality is motion or\nproduction (kin\u00easis or genesis). But this motion is transitional, and in\nitself imperfect--it tends towards an end, but does not include the end\nin itself. But actuality, if it implies motion, has an end in itself and\nfor itself; it is a motion desirable for its own sake.[731] The relation\nof the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the\nunfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed builder to the one at\nwork upon his building, of the seed-corn to the tree, of the man who has\nthe capacity to think, to the man actually engaged in thought.[732]\nPotentially the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is the\nactuality; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment in\na philosophic condition; indeed, every thing is potential which\npossesses a principle of development, or of change. Actuality or\nentelechy, on the other hand, indicates the _perfect act_, the end\ngained, the completed actual; that activity in which the act and the\ncompleteness of the act fall together--as, for example, to see, to\nthink, where the acting and the completed act are one and the same.\n\n2. _The Relation of Actuality to Potentiality is a causal Relation_.--A\nthing which is endued with a simple capacity of being may nevertheless\nnot actually exist, and a thing may have a capacity of being and really\nexist. Since this is the case, there must ensue between non-being and\nreal being some such principle as _energy_, in order to account for the\ntransition or change.[733] Energy has here some analogy to motion,\nthough it must not be confounded with motion. Now you can not predicate\neither motion or energy of things which are not. The moment energy is\nadded to them they are. This transition from potentiality to actuality\nmust be through the medium of such principles as propension or _free\nwill_, because propension or free will possess in themselves the power\nof originating motion in other things.[734]\n\n[Footnote 731: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. viii. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 732: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 733: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 734: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. v.]\n\n3. _The Relation of Actuality and Potentiality is a Relation of\nPriority_.--Actuality, says Aristotle, is prior to potentiality in the\norder of reason, in the order of substance, and also (though not\ninvariably) in the order of time. The first of all capacities is a\ncapacity of energizing or assuming a state of activity; for example, a\nman who has the capacity of building is one who is skilled in building,\nand thus able to use his energy in the art of building.[735] The primary\nenergizing power must precede that which receives the impression of it,\nForm being older than Matter. But if you take the case of any particular\nperson or thing, we say that its capacity of being that particular\nperson or thing precedes its being so actually. Yet, though this is the\ncase in each particular thing, there is always a foregone energy\npresumed in some other thing (as a prior seed, plant, man) to which it\nowes its existence. One pregnant thought presents itself in the course\nof the discussion which has a direct bearing upon our subject. [Dynamis]\nhas been previously defined as \"a principle of motion or change in\nanother thing in so far forth as it is another thing\"[736]--that is, it\nis fitted by nature to have motion imparted to it, and to communicate\nmotion to something else. But this motion wants a resting-place. There\ncan be no infinite regression of causes. There is some primary [dynamis]\npresupposed in all others, which is the beginning of change. This is\n[Greek: physis], or nature. But the first and original cause of all\nmotion and change still precedes and surpasses nature. The final cause\nof all potentiality is energy or _actuality_. The one proposed is prior\nto the means through which the end is accomplished. A process of\nactualization, a tendency towards completeness or perfection ([Greek:\ntelos]) presupposes an absolute actuality which is at once its beginning\nand end. \"One energy is invariably antecedent to another in time, up to\nthat which is primarily and eternally the Moving Cause.\"[737]\n\n[Footnote 735: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. viii. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 736: Ibid., bk. iv. ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 737: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. viii.]\n\nAnd now having laid down these fundamental principles of metaphysical\nscience, as preparatory to Theology, Aristotle proceeds to establish the\nconception of the Absolute or Divine Spirit _as the eternal, immutable\nSubstance, the immaterial Energy, the unchangeable Form of Forms, the\nfirst moving Cause_.\n\nI. _The Ontological Form of Proof_.--It is necessary to conceive an\neternal and immutable substance--an actuality which is absolute and\nprior, both logically and chronologically, to all potentiality; for that\nwhich is potential is simply contingent, it may just as easily not be as\nbe; that which exists only in capacity is temporal and corruptible, and\nmay cease to be. Matter we know subsists merely in capacity and\npassivity, and without the operation of Energy,(energeia), or the\nformative cause, would be to us as non-entity. The phenomena of the\nworld exhibits to us the presence of Energy, and energy presupposes the\nexistence of an eternal substance. Furthermore, matter and potentiality\nare convertible terms, therefore the primal Energy or Actuality must be\n_immaterial_.[738]\n\n2. _The Cosmological Form of Proof_.--It is impossible that there should\nbe _motion_, genesis, or a chain of causes, except on the assumption of\na first Moving Cause, since that which exists only in capacity can not,\nof itself energize, and consequently without a principle of motion which\nis essentially active, we have only a principle of immobility. The\nprinciple \"ex nihilo nihil\" forbids us to assume that motion can arise\nout of immobility, being out of non-being. \"How can matter be put in\nmotion if nothing that subsists in energy exist, and is its cause?\" All\nbecoming, therefore, necessarily supposes that which has not become,\nthat which is eternally self-active as the principle and cause of all\nmotion. There is no refuge from the notion that all things are \"born of\nnight and nothingness\" except in this belief.[739]\n\n[Footnote 738: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 739: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii., viii.]\n\nThe existence of an eternal principle subsisting in energy is also\ndemanded to explain the _order_ of the world. \"For how, let me ask, will\nthere prevail _order_ on the supposition that there is no subsistence of\nthat which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and is\npermanent.\"[740] \"All things in nature are constituted in the best\npossible manner.\"[741] All things strive after \"the good.\" \"The\nappearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design.\"[742] Now\nan end or final cause presupposes intelligence,--implies a _mind_ to see\nand desire it. That which is \"fair,\" \"beautiful,\" \"good,\" an \"object of\ndesire,\" can only be perceived by Mind. The \"final cause\" must therefore\nsubsist in that which is prior and immovable and eternal; and _Mind_ is\n\"that substance which subsists absolutely, and according to\nenergy.\"[743] \"The First Mover of all things, moves all things without\nbeing moved, being an eternal substance and energy; and he moves all\nthings as the object of reason and of desire, or love.\"[744]\n\n[Footnote 740: Ibid., bk. x. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 741: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 742: \"Nat. Ausc.,\" bk. ii. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 743: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 744: Ibid.]\n\n3. _The Moral Form of Proof_.--So far as the relation of potentiality\nand actuality is identical with the relation of matter and form, the\nargument for the existence of God may be thus presented: The conception\nof an absolute matter without form, involves the supposition of an\nabsolute form without matter. And since the conception of form resolves\nitself into _motion_, _conception_, _purpose_ or _end_, so the Eternal\nOne is the absolute principle of motion (the pr\u00f4ton kinoun), the\nabsolute conception or pure intelligence (the pure ti \u00ean einai), and the\nabsolute ground, reason, or end of all being. All the other predicates\nof the First Cause follow from the above principles with logical\nnecessity.\n\n(i.) _He is, of course, pure intellect_, because he is absolutely\nimmaterial and free from nature. He is active intelligence, because his\nessence is pure actuality. He is self-contemplating and self-conscious\nintelligence, because the divine thought can not attain its actuality in\nany thing extrinsic; it would depend on something else than self--some\npotential existence for its actualization. Hence the famous definition\nof the absolute as \"the thought of thought\" (no\u00easis no\u00ease\u00f4s).[745] \"And\ntherefore the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself, doth\nsubsist in this way throughout all eternity.\"[746]\n\n[Footnote 745: Schwegler's \"History of Philosophy,\" p. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 746: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. ix.]\n\n(ii.) _He is also essential life_. \"The principle of life is inherent in\nthe Deity, for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life,\nand God constitutes this energy; and essential energy belongs to God as\nhis best and everlasting life. Now our statement is this--that the Deity\nis a living being that is everlasting and most excellent in nature, so\nthat with the Deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal; for\nthis constitutes the essence of God.\"[747]\n\n(iii.) _Unity belongs to him_, since multiplicity implies matter; and\nthe highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely\nimmaterial.[748] The Divine nature is \"devoid of parts and indivisible,\nfor magnitude can not in any way involve this Divine nature; for God\nimparts motion through infinite duration, and nothing finite--as\nmagnitude is--can be possessed of an infinite capacity.\"[749]\n\n(iv.) _He is immovable and ever abideth the same_; since otherwise he\ncould not be the absolute mover, and the cause of all becoming, if he\nwere subject to change.[750] God is impassive and unalterable ([Greek:\napath\u00eas kai analloi\u00f4ton]); for all such notions as are involved in\npassion or alteration are outside the sphere of the Divine\nexistence.[751]\n\n[Footnote 747: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 748: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 749: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 750: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 751: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii.]\n\n(v.) _He is the ever-blessed God_.--\"The life of God is of a kind with\nthose highest moods which, with us, last a brief space, it being\nimpossible they should be permanent; whereas, with Him they are\npermanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And\nit is because they are vivid states of consciousness, that waking, and\nperception, and thought, are the sweetest of all things. Now essential\nperception is the perception of that which is most excellent,... and the\nmind perceives itself by participating of its own object of perception;\nbut it is a sort of coalescence of both that, in the Divine Mind,\ncreates a regular identity between the two, so that with God both (the\nthinker and the thought, the subject and object) are the same. In\npossession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy;\nand the contemplation of his own perfections is what, to God, must be\nmost agreeable and excellent. This condition of existence, after so\nexcellent a manner, is what is \"so astonishing to us when we examine\nGod's nature, and the more we do so the more wonderful that nature\nappears to us. The mood of the Divine existence is essential energy,\nand, as such, it is a life that is most excellent, blessed, and\neverlasting.[752]\n\n[Footnote 752: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. vii.]\n\nThe theology of Aristotle may be summed up in the following sentences\nselected from book xi. of his \"Metaphysics:\"\n\n\"This motionless cause of motion is a necessary being; and, by virtue of\nsuch necessity, is the all-perfect being. This all-pervading principle\npenetrates heaven and all nature. It eternally possesses perfect\nhappiness; and its happiness is in action. This primal mover is\nimmaterial; for its essence is in energy. It is pure thought--thought\nthinking itself--the thought of thought. The activity of pure\nintelligence--such is the perfect, eternal life of God. This primal\ncause of change, this absolute perfection, moves the world by the\nuniversal desire for the absolute good, by the attraction exercised upon\nit by the Eternal Mind--the serene energy of Divine Intelligence.\"\n\nIt can not be denied that, so far as it goes, this conception of the\nDeity is admirable, worthy, and just. Viewed from a Christian\nstand-point, we at once concede that it is essentially defective. There\nis no clear and distinct recognition of God as Creator and Governor of\nthe universe; he is chiefly regarded as the Life of the universe--the\nIntellect, the Energy--that which gives excellence, and perfection, and\ngladness to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, in\nfact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate the\nDeity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of \"being made like God\nthrough becoming just and holy,\" Aristotle asserts that \"all moral\nvirtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God.\"[753] He is not\nthe God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human\ncares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individual\nmen, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not a\nbeing that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, however\nwell it may meet the demands of the reason.\n\n[Footnote 753: \"Ethics,\" bk. x. ch. viii.]\n\nMorality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in the\nperfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above.\nThe theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the\n\nARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.\n\nWe do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and\nimmutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the\nnature of God. Plato had taught that there was \"an absolute Good, above\nand beyond all existence in dignity and power;\" which is, in fact, \"the\ncause of all existence and all knowledge,\" and which is God; that all\nother things are good in proportion as they \"partake of this absolute\nGood;\" and that all men are so far good as they \"resemble God.\" But with\nthis position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato\nin the following words--\"Some have thought that, besides all these\nmanifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is the\ncause to all these of their being good\"--he proceeds to criticise that\nidea, and concludes his argument by saying--\"we must dismiss the idea at\npresent, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or\ntranscendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor\npossessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are\ninquiring after.\" He follows up these remarks by saying that \"Perhaps\nthe knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a\npattern (paradeigma) by which to judge of relative good.\" Against this\nhe argues that \"There is no trace of the arts making use of any such\nconception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general,\nall pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, nor\nis it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it.\"[754]\nThe good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relative\ngood_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be\nrealized.\n\n[Footnote 754: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. vi.]\n\nInstead, therefore, of seeking to attain to \"a transcendental and\nabsolute good \"--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a\nparadigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself\nsolely to the question, \"what is good for man\"--what is the good\nattainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the\nfinal and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_\nis, \"_What is the end of human action?_\" (ti esti to t\u00f4n prakt\u00f4n\nteloa).[755]\n\n[Footnote 755: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. xiii.]\n\nNow an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to\nperceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The\nquestion, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a\nhigher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an\nideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then\nconsciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim\nat fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered\nthat Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government of\nthe world. \"Moral government,\" in the now common acceptation of the\nterm, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of \"duty\" is\nscarcely recognized. He considers \"the good\" chiefly in relation to the\nconstitution and natural condition of man. \"_It is_\" says he, \"_the end\ntowards which nature tends_.\" As physical things strive unconsciously\nafter the end of their existence, so man strives after the good\nattainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had\ntaught that \"virtue is a Science.\" Aristotle contended that virtue is an\nart, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It\nis not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has\nbecome ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its\norganization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar\nperfection, so there is an instinctive desire (orexis) in the soul which\nat first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good\nis sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that the\ndesires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of\nthis end (telos).[756] And he asserts that man can only realize it in\nthe sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws\nof his own proper nature and its harmonious development.[757] It is not,\nthen, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that\nman is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ephos). By\npractice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of\nbuilding and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the\nhabit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of\noft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature,\nhabit, reason--that men become good.\n\n[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 757: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. vii.]\n\nAristotle's question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man as\nman_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being?\nor what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God?\nAnd the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolute\nsatisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling\n_happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The\nbrute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitute\nthe happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of\nrational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity,\nas the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness of\nman can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore,\nconsist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially in\ncontemplative thought,[758] or as Aristotle defines it--\"_It is a\nperfect practical activity in a perfect life_.\"[759] His conception of\nthe chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in\nand for the consciousness--a \"complete and perfect life,\" the other\nexternal and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former.\nThat complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction and\nperfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the\ncrown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and\nconstitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.[760] A good\naction is thus an End-in-itself (teleion telos) inasmuch as it secures\nthe _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which our\nmoral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and\nsatisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fully\nacquiesce; something which can be pronounced beautiful, fitting,\nhonorable, and perfect.\n\n[Footnote 758: \"If it be true to say that happiness consists in doing\nwell, a life of action must be best both for the state and the\nindividual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action\nimplies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which\nare concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must\nconsider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their _end\nin themselves_, and which are for their own sake.\"--\"Politics,\" bk. vii.\nch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 759: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 760: \"Ethics,\" bk. x. ch. viii.]\n\nFrom what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelian\nconception of _Virtue_ is not conformity to an absolute and immutable\nstandard of right. It is defined by him as _the observation of the right\nmean (mesot\u00eas) in action_--that is, the right mean relatively to\nourselves. \"Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean\n(meson) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudent\nman would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the one\nconsisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, in\nthat one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is right\nboth in passions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses the\nmean.\"[761] The perfection of an action thus consists in its containing\nthe right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. The\nlaw of the mesot\u00eas is illustrated by the following examples: Man has a\nfixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true mean\nis found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this is _fortitude_.\nIn relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness and\nindifference; this is _temperance_. The true mean between prodigality\nand narrowness is _liberality_; between simplicity and cunning is\n_prudence_; between suffering wrong and doing wrong is _justice_.\nExtending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and\nmanners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtue\nis thus _proportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action_.\n\n[Footnote 761: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. vi.]\n\nIt will at once be seen that this classification has no stable\nfoundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. The _mean_ is a\nwavering line. It differs under different circumstances and relations,\nand in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for one\nindividual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave,\nand of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues as\nthere are circumstances in life; and as men are ever entering into new\nrelations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method of\naction, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number.\n\nImperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who live\nin Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound with\njust and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is a _discipline of\nhuman character in order to human happiness_. And whilst it must be\nadmitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in the\npresent life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and noble\nprinciples, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of which\nhe could conceive. \"And no greater praise can be given to a work of\nheathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings of\nAristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense\nwith, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character;\nand that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects\nwhich it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal.\"[762]\n\n[Footnote 762: Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article \"Aristotle.\"]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued)_\n\nPOST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.\n\nEPICURUS AND ZENO.\n\n\nPhilosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In the\npre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature;\nin the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; and\nnow in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--a\nmoral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--of\nthe permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie all\nphenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness.\nThe primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is,\nWhat is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of\nhuman conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good in\nindividual and social life?\n\nThis remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainly\ndue--\n\n1st. _To the altered circumstances of the times_. An age of civil\ndisturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. The\ndifferent states of Greece lost their independence, and became gradually\nsubject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another,\nin the struggles of Alexander's lieutenants, they endeavored to\nreconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations,\nbut were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Ach\u00e6an\nand Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was in\nvain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties.\n\nDivided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid of\ndangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt.\nIn this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which was\ndestined to be extinguished by Rome.[763]\n\n[Footnote 763: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" pp. 136-140.]\n\nDuring this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all lofty\npursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. The\nphilosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and men\nbecame chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. The\nwars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, and\nphilosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; it\nbecame, in fact, \"the art of making one's self happy.\" The sad reverses\nto which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling of\nexhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in the\nphilosophy of the age.\n\n2d. In connection with the altered circumstances of the age, we must\nalso take account of _the apparent failure of the Socratic method to\nsolve the problem of Being_.\n\nThe teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialectic\nmethod was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return to\nsensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence,\nand that the \"essence\" of things is not to be sought in the elements of\nunity and generality, or in the _idea_, as Plato taught, but in the\nelements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition to\nPlato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, as\nthe source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching,\nwe find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberately\nsetting aside \"the god of philosophy,\" affirming \"that a _divinity_ was\nunnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of the\nuniverse.\" Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, the\ncharacteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. As\nthe skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period of\nphilosophy, so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of the\nsecond. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as the\nearlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics.\nThey naturally said: \"We have been seeking a long time; what have we\ngained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato says\nwe have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be as\ngood as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented during\nthe past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they may\nbe all alike untrue!\" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, it\nmight be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we should\ncease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain an _absolute calm_, which\nthey dignified with the name of _ataraxie_. Beholding the overthrow and\ndisgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity and\ncorruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, they\nwrote this maxim: \"Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; laws\nand customs alone constitute what is justice and what is iniquity.\"\nHaving reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap the\nclimax by saying, \"We assert nothing; no, not even that we assert\nnothing!\"\n\nAnd yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the \"wise man\"\n(sophos).\n\nReason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. And\ninasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be to\ndetermine practical questions. May it not teach men to _act_ rather than\nto _think_? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive the\ndarkening flood of skepticism.\n\nThree centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools are\nsucceeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, and\nwhich, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputes\nof the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics.\nWith Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature,\nhumanity, and God; but now, in the systems of Epicurus and \"Zeno\", moral\nphilosophy is placed in the foreground, and assumes the chief, the\novershadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now the\ngrand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse.\n\nIn dealing with _morals_ two opposite methods of inquiry were possible:\n\n1. _To judge of the quality of actions by their_ RESULTS.\n\n2. _To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves_.\n\nUtility, which in its last analysis is _Pleasure_, is the test of right,\nin the first method; an assumed or discovered _Law of Nature_, in the\nsecond. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the human\nfaculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would give\nidentical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side,\nwhich is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans and\nStoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the mass of educated\nmen until the coming of Christ.\n\nEPICUREANS.\n\nEpicurus was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 270. He purchased a Garden\nwithin the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teach\nphilosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelians\nwalked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans had\ntheir Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had a\ncommunity of goods.\n\nThere is not one of all the various founders of the ancient\nphilosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much veneration\nby his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after his\ndeath, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacred\nrelic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung up\nin their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their private\nchambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and other\nreligious observances, and a special festival in his honor was held\nevery month.\n\nSo much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturally\nexpect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. He\nwas one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenes\ncalls him \"a most voluminous writer,\" and estimates the number of works\ncomposed by him at no less than three hundred, the principal of which he\nenumerates.[764] But out of all this prodigious collection, not a single\nbook has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form.\nThree letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, are\npreserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his \"Fundamental\nMaxims\"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethical\nsystem. These, with part of his work \"On Nature,\" found during the last\ncentury among the Greek MSS. recovered at Herculaneum, constitute all\nthat has survived the general wreck.\n\n[Footnote 764: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xvi., xvii.]\n\nWe are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors for\nany general account of his system. And of the earliest and most\nimmediate of these the writings have perished.[765] Our sole original\nauthority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. The\nsketch of Epicurus which is given in his \"Lives\" is evidently a \"labor\nof love.\" Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him,\nthere is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and so\nelaborate an analysis. And even as regards the particulars of the\nsystem, nothing could be more complete than Laertius's account of his\nphysical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by the\nphilosophic poem of Lucretius \"On the Nature of Things,\" which was\nwritten to advocate the physical theory of Epicurus. These are the chief\nsources of our information.\n\n[Footnote 765: Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Ph\u00e6drus,\nPolystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the Herculanean\nPapyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additional\nlight on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on \"Herculanean Papyri,\"\nin Edinburgh Review, October, 1862.]\n\nIt is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of the\nindifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, he\naspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic;\non the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showed\nso little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so much\nconfidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his own\nphilosophy--_he_ was a \"self-taught\" man! Now \"Epicurus might be\nperfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked out\nthe conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; few\nmen more entirely so.\"[766] His psychology was certainly borrowed from\nthe Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim,\nthat \"sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of all\ntruth.\" His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, \"atoms are\nthe first principle of all things.\" And in Ethics he had learned from\nAristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life,\n_happiness_ must be its end.[767] All that is fundamental in the system\nof Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little that\ncan be called new in his teaching.\n\n[Footnote 766: Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 767: \"Ethics,\" bk. i. ch. vi]\n\nThe grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus, _is the\nattainment of a happy life_. \"Philosophy,\" says he, \"is the power by\nwhich reason conducts men to happiness.\" Truth is a merely relative\nthing, a variable quantity; and therefore the pursuit of truth for its\nown sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute,\nunchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. \"We\nchoose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake of\npleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of\nhealth.\"[768] That which is nominally right in morals, that which is\nrelatively good in human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by the\neffects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right;\nthat which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. \"The virtues are connate\nwith living pleasantly.\"[769] Pleasure (\u00eadon\u00ea), then, is the great end\nto be sought in human action. \"Pleasure is the chief good, the beginning\nand end of living happily.\"[770]\n\n[Footnote 768: \"Fundamental Maxims,\" preserved in Diogenes Laertius,\n\"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x. ch. xxx.]\n\n[Footnote 769: \"Epicurus to Men\u00e6ceus,\" in Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of\nthe Philosophers,\" bk. x. ch. xxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 770: Id., ib.]\n\nThe proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, \"that\npleasure is the chief good,\" is truly characteristic. \"All animals from\nthe moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended with\npain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason.\nTherefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain.\"[771] \"All\nmen like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter and\npursue the former.\" \"If happiness is present, we have every thing, and\nwhen it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it.\"[772]\nVirtue thus consists in man's doing deliberately what the animals do\ninstinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain.\n\n[Footnote 771: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxix.]\n\n[Footnote 772: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxvii.]\n\n\"Every kind of pleasure\" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, \"alike\ngood,\" and alike proper. \"If those things which make the pleasures of\ndebauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which\narise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and\npain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote\nthemselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is\nthe chief evil) from any quarter.\"[773] Whilst, however, all pleasures\nof the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good,\nthey differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their\nconsequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and in\nthis, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his\nphilosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are:\n\n1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (\u00eadon\u00ea en\nkin\u00easei).[774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the\ngreatest development of physical and mental power. \"Joy and cheerfulness\nare beheld in motion and energy.\" But it is not the most enduring\npleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by\nuneasiness; it \"brings with it many perturbations,\" and it yields some\nbitter fruits.\n\n[Footnote 773: \"Fundamental Maxims,\" No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives\nof the Philosophers,\" bk. x. ch. xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxviii.]\n\n2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity,\nimpassibility_ (\u00eadon\u00ea katast\u00eamatik\u00ea). This is a state, a \"condition,\"\nrather than a motion. It is \"the freedom of the body from pain, and the\nsoul from confusion.\"[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the\nhappiness of God; and he who attains it \"will be like a god among men.\"\n\"The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected.\"\n\nNow, whilst \"no pleasure is intrinsically bad,\"[776] prudence\n(phron\u00easis), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest\nand most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of\nreason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of\nreason is to \"determine our choices\"--to take account of the duration of\npleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness\nof a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without\nwisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow\nafter agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will\nconsequently lose \"tranquillity of mind.\" \"It is not possible,\" says\nEpicurus, \"to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and\njustly.\"[777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and the\nordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows\nhow to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation\nhereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment.\nEpicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a\nmeans to an end, namely, the securing of happiness.[778]\n\n[Footnote 775: Id., ib.]\n\n[Footnote 776: \"Fundamental Maxims,\" No. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 777: Ibid., No. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 778: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" p. 141.]\n\nSocial morality is, like private morality, founded upon _utility._ As\nnothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing is\nintrinsically just or unjust in social life. \"Justice has no independent\nexistence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself\nwherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or\nsustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this\ncharacter only because there is joined with it the fear of not escaping\nthose who are appointed to punish actions marked with this\ncharacter.\"[779] Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promote\neach other's happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individual\ndepends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of his\nethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating\n\"the greatest happiness of the greatest number.\"\n\nIf you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediate\ninterest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if your\ngeneral interest is secured by always observing it, you must make\nmomentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But \"when, in\nconsequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just\ndoes not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was\njust... ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful.\"[780] So\nthat self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by the\nperformance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especially\nto death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and all\ncontracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus.\n\nWith coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would\ninevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose\ntemperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would\ndevelop a refined selfishness--a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has\nadorned with the name \"tranquillity of mind--impassibility,\"\n(ataraxia).[781]\n\n[Footnote 779: \"Fundamental Maxims,\" Nos. 35, 36.]\n\n[Footnote 780: Ibid., No. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 781: It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether,\nby making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encourage\nwhat is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against any\nsuch unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--\"When we say that\npleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the\ndebauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think\nwho are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else\ninterpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from\npain, and the soul from confusion\" (\"Epicurus to Men\u00e6ceus,\" in Diogenes\nLaertius, \"Lives,\" bk. x. ch. xxvii.). The most obvious tendency of this\ndoctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--a\nselfishness which prefers one's own comfort and case to every other\nconsideration.\n\nAs to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided\nboth in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a\n\"sty.\" Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name\n\"Epicurean\" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of\nsensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast\nupon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to\nthe malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. \"The most modern criticism\nseems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him,\nrejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some\nFrench and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are\ninclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal\nman, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and\neven habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual\ngratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally\npreferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the\nmore violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us,\nwould be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make\nthe stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of\nhis philosophy.\"--Maurice's \"Ancient Philosophy,\" p. 236.]\n\nTo secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impassivity, it was\nnecessary to get rid of all superstitious fears of death, of\nsupernatural beings, and of a future retribution.[782] The chief causes\nof man's misery are his illusions, his superstitions, and his\nprejudices. \"That which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of\nmen, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings\nimperishable and happy (_i.e.,_ that they are gods), and that then our\nthoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings;\nthey also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of\nevils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affect\nthem....\" \"The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being\nemancipated from all these things.\"[783] And this emancipation is to be\nsecured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy which\nexplains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes all\nsupernatural powers.\n\n[Footnote 782: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. 1. 100-118.]\n\n[Footnote 783: Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of\nthe Philosophers,\" p. 453 (Bohn's edition).]\n\nThat ignorance which occasions man's misery is two-fold, (i.) _Ignorance\nof the external world, which leads to superstition._ All unexplained\nphenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often to\nmalignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to a\nSupreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for their\ngood or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly the\nphysics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from false\nhopes and false fears.[784] (ii.) _Ignorance of the nature of man, of\nhis faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge_,\nfrom whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need of\nPsychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explain\nthe origin of man's illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of his\nfears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of his\nexistence.\n\n[Footnote 784: \"The study of physics contributes more than any thing\nelse to the tranquillity and happiness of life.\"--Diogenes Laertius,\n\"Lives,\" bk. x. ch. xxiv. \"For thus it is that _fear_ restrains all men,\nbecause they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, of\nwhich effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore think\nthat they are wrought by a _divine_ power. For which reasons, when we\nhave clearly seen that _nothing can be produced from nothing_, we shall\nhave a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, and\nshall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how all\nthings are done without the agency of the gods.\"--Lucretius, \"On the\nNature of Things,\" bk. i. l. 145-150.]\n\nPhysics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus would\ntolerate as \"conducive to the happiness of man.\" The pursuit of truth\nfor its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the true\nfrom the false, the good from the bad, on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds, must be\nbanished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theology\nmust be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superstitious fears. The\nidea of God's taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishing\nthe evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics and\nPsychology are the most useful, because the most \"agreeable,\" the most\n\"comfortable\" sciences.\n\nEPICUREAN PHYSICS.\n\nIn his physical theories Epicurus followed Leucippus and Democritus. He\nexpounds these theories in his letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, which\nare preserved in Diogenes Laertius.[785] We shall be guided mainly by\nhis own statements, and when his meaning is obscure, or his exposition\nis incomplete, we shall avail ourselves of the more elaborate statements\nof Lucretius,[786] who is uniformly faithful to the doctrine of\nEpicurus, and universally regarded as its best expounder.\n\nThe fundamental principle of his philosophy is the ancient maxim--\"_de\nnihilo nihil, in nihilum nil fosse reverti_;\" but instead of employing\nthis maxim in the sense in which it is used by Parmenides, Anaxagoras,\nEmpedocles, and others, to prove there must be something self-existent\nand eternal, or in other words, \"that nothing which once was not can\never of itself come into being,\" he uses it to disprove a divine\ncreation, and even presents the maxim in an altered form--viz., \"nothing\nis ever _divinely_ generated from nothing;\"[787] and he thence concludes\nthat the world was by no means made for us by _divine_ power.[788]\nNature is eternal. \"The universal whole always was such as it now is,\nand always will be such.\" \"The universe also is infinite, for that which\nis finite has a limit, but the universe has no limit.\"[789]\n\n[Footnote 785: \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.]\n\n[Footnote 786: \"De Natura Rerum.\"]\n\n[Footnote 787: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i.]\n\n[Footnote 788: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 789: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxiv.]\n\nThe two great principles of nature are a _vacuum_, and a _plenum._ The\nplenum is _body_, or tangible nature; the vacuum is _space_, or\nintangible nature. \"We know by the evidences of the senses (which are\nour only rule of reasoning) that _bodies_ have a real existence, and we\ninfer from the evidence of the senses that the vacuum has a real\nexistence; for if space have no real existence, there would be nothing\nin which bodies can move, as we see they really do move. Let us add to\nthis reflection that one can not conceive, either in virtue of\nperception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality\npeculiar to all beings, which is not either an attribute, or an\naccident, of the body or of the vacuum.\"[790]\n\nOf bodies some are \"combinations\"--concrete bodies--and some are\nprimordial \"elements,\" out of which combinations are formed. These\nprimordial elements, out of which the universe is generated, are\n\"_atoms_\" (atomoi). These atoms are \"the first principles\" and \"seeds\"\nof all things.[791] They are \"_infinite_ in number,\" and, as their name\nimplies, they are \"_infrangible\" \"unchangeable_\" and\n\"_indestructible.\"_[792] Matter is, therefore, not infinitely divisible;\nthere must be a point at which division ends.[793]\n\nThe only qualities of atoms are _form_, _magnitude_, and _density._ All\nthe other sensible qualities of matter--the secondary qualities--as\ncolor, odor, sweetness, bitterness, etc.--are necessarily inherent in\nform. All secondary qualities are changeable, but the primary atoms are\nunchangeable; \"for in the dissolution of combined bodies there must be\nsomething _solid_ and _indestructible,_ of such a kind that it will not\nchange, either into what does not exist, or out of what does not exist,\nbut the change results from a simple displacement of parts, which is the\nmost usual case, or from an addition or subtraction of particles.\"[794]\n\n[Footnote 790: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 791: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxv.]\n\n[Footnote 792: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 793: Id., ib.; Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. l.\n616-620.]\n\n[Footnote 794: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxiv.]\n\nThe atoms are not all of one _form_, but of different forms suited to\nthe production of different substances by combination; some are square,\nsome triangular, some smooth and spherical, some are hooked with points.\nThey are also diversified in _magnitude_ and _density_. The number of\noriginal forms is \"incalculably varied,\" but not infinite. \"Every\nvariety of forms contains an infinitude of atoms, but there is not, for\nthat reason, an infinitude of forms; it is only the number of them which\nis beyond computation.\"[795] To assert that atoms are of every kind of\nform, magnitude, and density, would be \"to contradict the phenomena;\n\"for experience teaches us that objects have a finite magnitude, and\nform necessarily supposes limitation.\n\n[Footnote 795: Id., ib.]\n\nA variety of these primordial forms enter into the composition of all\nsensible objects, because sensible objects possess different qualities,\nand these diversified qualities can only result from the combination of\ndifferent original forms. \"The earth has, in itself, primary atoms from\nwhich springs, rolling forth cool _water_, incessantly recruit the\nimmense sea; it has also atoms from which _fire_ arises.... Moreover,\nthe earth contains atoms from which it can raise up rich _corn_ and\ncheerful _groves_ for the tribes of men....\" So that \"no object in\nnature is constituted of one kind of elements, and whatever possesses in\nitself must numerous powers and energies, thus demonstrates that it\ncontains more numerous kinds of primary particles,\"[796] or primordial\n\"seeds of things.\"\n\n\"The atoms are in a continual state of _motion_\" and \"have moved with\n_equal rapidity_ from all eternity, since it is evident the vacuum can\noffer no resistance to the heaviest, any more than the lightest.\" The\nprimary and original movement of all atoms is _in straight lines, by\nvirtue of their own weight_. The vacuum separates all atoms one from\nanother, at greater or less distances, and they preserve their own\npeculiar motion in the densest substances.[797]\n\n[Footnote 796: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. l. 582-600.]\n\n[Footnote 797: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxiv.; Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. l. 80-92.]\n\nAnd now the grand crucial question arises--_How do atoms combine so as\nto form concrete bodies?_ If they move in straight lines, and with equal\nrapidity from all eternity, then they can never unite so as to form\nconcrete substances. They can only coalesce by deviating from a straight\nline.[798] How are they made to deviate from a straight line? This\ndeviation must be introduced _arbitrarily_, or by some _external cause_.\nAnd inasmuch as Epicurus admits of no causes \"but space and matter,\" and\nrejects all divine or supernatural interposition, the _new_ movement\nmust be purely arbitrary. They deviate _spontaneously,_ and of their own\naccord. \"The system of nature immediately appears _as a free agent_,\nreleased from tyrant masters, to do every thing of itself spontaneously,\nwithout the help of the gods.\"[799] The manner in which Lucretius proves\nthis doctrine is a good example of the petitio principii. He assumes, in\nopposition to the whole spirit and tendency of the Epicurean philosophy,\nthat man has \"a free will,\" and then argues that if man who is nothing\nbut an aggregation of atoms, can \"turn aside and alter his own\nmovements,\" the primary elements, of which his soul is composed, must\nhave some original spontaneity. \"If all motion is connected and\ndependent, and a new movement perpetually arises from a former one in a\ncertain order, and if the primary elements do not produce any\ncommencement of motion by deviating from the straight line to break the\nlaws of fate, so that cause may not follow cause in infinite succession,\n_whence comes this freedom of will_ to all animals in the world? whence,\nI say, is this liberty of action wrested from the fates, by means of\nwhich we go wheresoever inclination leads each of us? whence is it that\nwe ourselves turn aside, and alter our motions, not at any fixed time,\nnor in any fixed part of space, but just as our own minds prompt?....\nWherefore we must necessarily confess that the same is the case with the\nseeds of matter, and there is some other cause besides strokes and\nweight [resistance and density] from which this power [of free movement]\nis innate in them, since we see that _nothing is produced from\nnothing_.\"[800] Besides form, extension, and density, Epicurus has found\nanother inherent or essential quality of matter or atoms, namely,\n\"_spontaneous\" motion._\n\n[Footnote 798: \"At some time, though at no fixed and determinate time,\nand at some point, though at no fixed and determinate point, they turn\naside from the right line, but only so far as you can call the least\npossible deviation.\"--Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. ii. l.\n216-222.]\n\n[Footnote 799: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things\" bk. ii. 1.\n1092-1096.]\n\n[Footnote 800: Id., ib., bk. ii. l. 250-290.]\n\nBy a slight \"voluntary\" deflection from the straight line, atoms are now\nbrought into contact with each other; \"they strike against each other,\nand by the percussion new movements and new complications\narise\"--\"movements from high to low, from low to high, and horizontal\nmovements to and fro, in virtue of this reciprocal percussion.\" The\natoms \"jostling about, _of their own accord_, in infinite modes, were\noften brought together confusedly, irregularly, and to no purpose, but\nat length they _successfully coalesced_; at least, such of them as were\nthrown together suddenly became, in succession, the beginnings of great\nthings--as earth, and air, and sea, and heaven.\"[801]\n\n[Footnote 801: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. ii. l.\n1051-1065.]\n\nAnd now Lucretius shall describe the formation of the different parts of\nthe world according to the cosmogony of Epicurus. We quote from Good's\ntranslation:\n\n     But from this boundless mass of matter first\n     How heaven, and earth, and ocean, sun, and moon,\n     Rose in nice order, now the muse shall tell.\n     For never, doubtless, from result of thought,\n     Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds\n     First harmonize, or move with powers precise.\n     But countless crowds in countless manners urged,\n     From time eternal, by intrinsic weight\n     And ceaseless repercussion, to combine\n     In all the possibilities of forms,\n     Of actions, and connections, and exert\n     In every change some effort to create--\n     Reared the rude frame at length, abruptly reared,\n     Which, when once gendered, must the basis prove\n     Of things sublime; and whence eventual rose\n     Heaven, earth, and ocean, and the tribes of sense.\n\n     Yet now nor sun on fiery wheel was seen\n     Riding sublime, nor stars adorned the pole,\n     Nor heaven, nor earth, nor air, nor ocean lived,\n     Nor aught of prospect mortal sight surveyed;\n     But one vast chaos, boisterous and confused.\n     Yet order hence began; congenial parts\n     Parts joined congenial; and the rising world\n     Gradual evolved: its mighty members each\n     From each divided, and matured complete\n     From seeds appropriate; whose wild discortderst,\n     Reared by their strange diversities of form,\n     With ruthless war so broke their proper paths,\n     Their motions, intervals, conjunctions, weights,\n     And repercussions, nought of genial act\n     Till now could follow, nor the seeds themselves\n     E'en though conjoined in mutual bonds, co\n     Thus air, secreted, rose o'er laboring earth;\n     Secreted ocean flowed; and the pure fire,\n     Secreted too, toward ether sprang sublime.\n\n     But first the seeds terrene, since ponderous most\n     And most perplext, in close embraces clung,\n     And towards the centre conglobating sunk.\n     And as the bond grew firmer, ampler forth\n     Pressed they the fluid essences that reared\n     Sun, moon, and stars, and main, and heaven's high wall.\n     For those of atoms lighter far consist,\n     Subtiler, and more rotund than those of earth.\n     Whence, from the pores terrene, with foremost haste\n     Rushed the bright ether, towering high, and swift\n     Streams of fire attracting as it flowed.\n\n     Then mounted, next, the base of sun and moon,\n     'Twixt earth and ether, in the midway air\n     Rolling their orbs; for into neither these\n     Could blend harmonious, since too light with earth\n     To sink deprest, while yet too ponderous far\n     To fly with ether toward the realms extreme:\n     So 'twixt the two they hovered; _vital_ there\n     Moving forever, parts of the vast whole;\n     As move forever in the frame of man\n     Some active organs, while some oft repose.[802]\n\n[Footnote 802: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" b. v. l. 431-498]\n\nAfter explaining the origin and causes of the varied celestial\nphenomena, he proceeds to give an account of the production of plants,\nanimals, and man:\n\n     Once more return we to the world's pure prime,\n     Her fields yet liquid, and the tribes survey\n     First she put forth, and trusted to the winds.\n\n     And first the race she reared of verdant herbs,\n     Glistening o'er every hill; the fields at large\n     Shone with the verdant tincture, and the trees\n     Felt the deep impulse, and with outstretched arms\n     Broke from their bonds rejoicing. As the down\n     Shoots from the winged nations, or from beasts\n     Bristles or hair, so poured the new-born earth\n     Plants, fruits, and herbage. Then, in order next,\n     Raised she the sentient tribes, in various modes,\n     By various powers distinguished: for not heaven\n     Down dropped them, nor from ocean's briny waves\n     Sprang they, terrestrial sole; whence, justly _Earth_\n     Claims the dear name of mother, since alone\n     Flowed from herself whate'er the sight surveys.\n\n     E'en now oft rears she many a sentient tribe\n     By showers and sunshine ushered into day.[803]\n     Whence less stupendous tribes should then have risen\n     More, and of ampler make, herself new-formed,\n     In flower of youth, and _Ether_ all mature.[804]\n\n     Of these birds first, of wing and plume diverse,\n     Broke their light shells in spring-time: as in spring\n     Still breaks the grasshopper his curious web,\n     And seeks, spontaneous, foods and vital air.\n\n     Then rushed the ranks of mortals; for the soil,\n     Exuberant then, with warmth and moisture teemed.\n     So, o'er each scene appropriate, myriad wombs\n     Shot, and expanded, to the genial sward\n     By fibres fixt; and as, in ripened hour,\n     Their liquid orbs the daring foetus broke\n     Of breath impatient, nature here transformed\n     Th' assenting earth, and taught her opening veins\n     With juice to flow lacteal; as the fair\n     Now with sweet milk o'erflows, whose raptured breast\n     First hails the stranger-babe, since all absorbed\n     Of nurture, to the genial tide converts.\n     Earth fed the nursling, the warm ether clothed,\n     And the soft downy grass his couch compressed.[805]\n\n[Footnote 803: The doctrine of \"spontaneous generations\" is still more\nexplicitly announced in book ii. \"Manifest appearances compel us to\nbelieve that animals, though possessed of sense, are generated from\nsenseless atoms. For you may observe living worms proceed from foul\ndung, when the earth, moistened with immoderate showers, has contracted\na kind of putrescence; and you may see all other things change\nthemselves, similarly, into other things.\"--Lucretius, \"On the Nature of\nThings,\" bk. i. l. 867-880.]\n\n[Footnote 804: Ether is the father, earth the mother of all organized\nbeing.--Id., ib., bk. i. l. 250-255.]\n\n[Footnote 805: Id., ib., bk. v. l. 795-836.]\n\nA state of pure savagism, or rather of mere animalism, was the primitive\ncondition of man. He wandered naked in the woods, feeding on acorns and\nwild fruits, and quenched his thirst at the \"echoing waterfalls,\" in\ncompany with the wild beast.\n\nThrough the remaining part of book v. Lucretius describes how speech was\ninvented; how society originated, and governments were instituted; how\ncivilization commenced; and how religion arose out of ignorance of\nnatural causes; how the arts of life were discovered, and how science\nsprang up. And all this, as he is careful to tell us, without any divine\ninstruction, or any assistance from the gods.\n\nSuch are the physical theories of the Epicureans. The primordial\nelements of matter are infinite, eternal, and self-moved. After ages\nupon ages of chaotic strife, the universe at length arose out of an\n_infinite_ number of atoms, and a _finite_ number of forms, by a\nfortuitous combination. Plants, animals, and man were spontaneously\ngenerated from ether and earth. Languages, society, governments, arts\nwere gradually developed. And all was achieved simply by blind,\nunconscious nature-forces, without any designing, presiding, and\ngoverning Intelligence--that is, without a God.\n\nThe evil genius which presided over the method of Epicurus, and\nperverted all his processes of thought, is clearly apparent. The end of\nhis philosophy was not the discovery of truth. He does not commence his\ninquiry into the principles or causes which are adequate to the\nexplanation of the universe, with an unprejudiced mind. He everywhere\ndevelops a malignant hostility to religion, and the avowed object of his\nphysical theories is to rid the human mind of all fear of supernatural\npowers--that is, of all fear of God.[806] \"The phenomena which men\nobserve to occur in the earth and the heavens, when, as often happens,\nthey are perplexed with fearful thoughts, overawe their minds with a\ndread of the gods, and humble and depress them to the earth. For\nignorance of natural causes obliges them to refer all things to the\npower of the divinities, and to resign the dominion of the world to\nthem; because of those effects they can by no means see the origin, and\naccordingly suppose that they are produced by divine influence.\"[807]\n\n[Footnote 806: \"Let us trample religion underfoot, that the victory\ngained over it may place us on an equality with heaven\" (book i.). See\nDiogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x. ch. xxiv. pp.\n453,454 (Bohn's edition); Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i.\nl. 54-120.]\n\n[Footnote 807: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. vi. l. 51-60.]\n\nTo \"expel these fancies from the mind\" as \"inconsistent with its\ntranquillity and opposed to human happiness,\" is the end, and, as\nLucretius believes, the glory of the Epicurean philosophy. To accomplish\nthis, God must be placed at an infinite distance from the universe, and\nmust be represented as indifferent to every thing that transpires within\nit. We \"must beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that Being\nwe ought to suppose _exempt from all occupation_, and perfectly\nhappy,\"[808]--that is, absolutely impassible. God did not make the\nworld, and he does not govern the world. There is no evidence of design\nor intelligence in its structure, and \"such is the faultiness with which\nit stands affected, that it can not be the work of a Divine power.\"[809]\n\nEpicurus is, then, an unmistakable Atheist. He did not admit a God in\nany rational sense. True, he _professed_ to believe in gods, but\nevidently in a very equivocal manner, and solely to escape the popular\ncondemnation. \"They are not pure spirits, for there is no spirit in the\natomic theory; they are not bodies, for where are the bodies that we may\ncall gods? In this embarrassment, Epicurus, compelled to acknowledge\nthat the human race believes in the existence of gods, addresses himself\nto an old theory of Democritus--that is, he appeals to dreams. As in\ndreams there are images that act upon and determine in us agreeable or\npainful sensations, without proceeding from exterior bodies, so the gods\nare images similar to those of dreams, but greater, having the human\nform; images which are not precisely bodies, and yet not deprived of\nmateriality which are whatever you please, but which, in short, must be\nadmitted, since the human race believes in gods, and since the\nuniversality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a\ncause.\"[810]\n\n[Footnote 808: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. x.\nch. xxv.; Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. l. 55-60.]\n\n[Footnote 809: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. v. l. 195-200.]\n\n[Footnote 810: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 431.]\n\nIt is needless to offer any criticism on the reasoning of Epicurus. One\nfact will have obviously presented itself to the mind of the reflecting\nreader. He starts with atoms having form, magnitude, and density, and\nessays to construct a universe; but he is obliged to be continually\nintroducing, in addition, a \"_nameless something_\" which \"remains in\nsecret,\" to help him out in the explanation of the phenomena.[811] He\nmakes life to arise out of dead matter, sense out of senseless atoms,\nconsciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, without an\nadequate cause, and thus violates the fundamental principle from which\nhe starts, \"_that nothing can arise from nothing_.\"\n\nEPICUREAN PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nIn the system of Epicurus, the soul is regarded as corporeal or\nmaterial, like the body; they form, together, one nature or substance.\nThe soul is composed of atoms exceedingly diminutive, smooth, and round,\nand connected with or diffused through the veins, viscera, and nerves.\nThe substance of the soul is not to be regarded as simple and\nuncompounded; its constituent parts are _aura_, heat, and air. These are\nnot sufficient, however, even in the judgment of Epicurus, to account\nfor _sensation_; they are not adequate to generate sensible motives such\nas revolve any thoughts in the mind. \"A certain fourth nature, or\nsubstance, must, therefore, necessarily be added to these, _that is\nwholly without a name_; it is a substance, however, than which nothing\nexists more active or more subtile, nor is any thing more essentially\ncomposed of small and smooth elementary particles; and it is this\nsubstance which first distributes sensible motions through the\nmembers.\"[812]\n\n[Footnote 811: As, _e.g._, Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk.\niii. l. 260-290.]\n\n[Footnote 812: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 237-250.]\n\nEpicurus is at great pains to prove that the soul is material; and it\ncan not be denied that he marshals his arguments with great skill.\nModern materialism may have added additional illustrations, but it has\ncontributed no new lines of proof. The weapons are borrowed from the old\narsenal, and they are not wielded with any greater skill than they were\nby Epicurus himself, I. The soul and the body act and react upon each\nother; and mutual reaction can only take place between substances of\nsimilar nature. \"Such effects can only be produced by _touch_, and touch\ncan not take place without _body_.\"[813] 2. The mind is produced\ntogether with the body, it grows up along with it, and waxes old at the\nsame time with it.[814] 3. The mind is diseased along with the body, \"it\nloses its faculties by material causes, as intoxication, or by severe\nblows; and is sometimes, by a heavy lethargy, borne down into a deep\neternal sleep.\"[815] 4. The mind, like the body, is healed by medicines,\nwhich proves that it exists only as a mortal substance.[816] 5. The mind\ndoes not always, and at the same time, continue _entire_ and\n_unimpaired_, some faculties decay before the others, \"the substance of\nthe soul is therefore divided.\" On all these grounds the soul must be\ndeemed mortal; it is dissolved along with the body, and has no conscious\nexistence after death.\n\n[Footnote 813: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. iii. l.\n138-168.]\n\n[Footnote 814: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 444-460.]\n\n[Footnote 815: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 438-490.]\n\n[Footnote 816: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 500-520.]\n\nSuch being the nature of the soul, inasmuch as it is material, all its\nknowledge must be derived from sensation. The famous doctrine of\nperception, as taught by Epicurus, is grounded upon this pre-supposition\nthat the soul is corporeal. \"The eid\u00f4la aporroiai--_imagines, simulacra\nrerum, etc_., are, like pellicles, continually flying off from objects;\nand these material 'likenesses,' diffusing themselves everywhere in the\nair, are propelled to the perceptive organs.\" These images of things\ncoming in contact with the senses produce _sensation_ (aisth\u00easis). A\nsensation may be considered either as regards its object, or as regards\nhim who experiences it. As regards him who experiences it, it is simply\na passive affection, an agreeable or disagreeable feeling, passion, or\nsentiment (to pathos). But along with sensation there is inseparably\nassociated some knowledge of the object which excites sensation; and it\nis for this reason that Epicurus marked the intimate relation of these\ntwo phenomena by giving them analogous names. Because the second\nphenomenon is joined to the first, he calls it\nepaisth\u00easis--_perception_. It is sensation viewed especially in regard\nto its object--_representative sensation_, or the \"sensible idea\" of\nmodern philosophy. It is from perception that we draw our general ideas\nby a kind of prolepsis (prol\u00eapsis) an anticipation or laying hold by\nreason of that which is implied in sensation. Now all sensations are\nalike true in so far as they are sensations, and error arises from false\nreasoning about the testimony of sense. All knowledge is purely relative\nand contingent, and there is no such thing as necessary and absolute\ntruth.\n\nThe system of Epicurus is thus a system of pure materialism, but not a\nsystem of materialism drawn, as a logical consequence, from a careful\nand unprejudiced study of the whole phenomena of mind. His openly avowed\ndesign is to deliver men from the fear of death, and rid them of all\napprehension of a future retribution. \"Did men but know that there was a\nfixed limit to their woes, they would be able, in some measure, to defy\nthe religious fictions and menaces of the poets; but now, since we must\nfear eternal punishment at death, there is no mode, no means of\nresisting them.\"[817] To emancipate men from \"these terrors of the\nmind,\" they must be taught \"that the soul is mortal, and dissolves with\nthe body\"--that \"death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is\ndevoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to\nus.\"[818] Starting with the fixed determination to prove that\n\n     \"Death is nothing, and naught after death,\"\n\nhe will not permit any mental phenomena to suggest to him the idea of an\nincorporeal spiritual substance. Matter, under any form known to\nEpicurus, is confessedly insufficient to explain sensation and thought;\na \"nameless something\" must be _supposed_. But may not \"that principle\nwhich _lies entirely hid, and remains in secret_\"[819]--and about which\neven Epicurus does not know any thing--be a spiritual, an _immaterial_\nprinciple? For aught that he knows it may as properly be called\n\"_spirit_\" as matter. May not _sensation_ and _cognition_ be the result\nof the union of matter and spirit; and if so, may not their mutual\naffections, their common sympathies, be the necessary conditions of\nsensation and cognition in the present life? A reciprocal relation\nbetween body and mind appears in all mental phenomena. A certain\nproportion in this relation is called mental health. A deviation from it\nis termed disease. This proportion is by no means an equilibrium, but\nthe perfect adaptation of the body, without injury to its integrity, to\nthe purposes of the mind. And if this be so, all the arguments of\nmaterialism fall to the ground.\n\n[Footnote 817: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. i. l. 100-118.]\n\n[Footnote 818: Diogenes Laertius, Maxim 2, in \"Lives of the\nPhilosophers,\" bk. x. ch. xxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 819: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. iii. l.\n275-280.]\n\nThe concluding portion of the third book, in which Lucretius discourses\non _death_, is a mournful picture of the condition of the heathen mind\nbefore Christianity \"brought life and immortality fully to light.\" It\ncomes to us, like a voice from the grave of two thousand years, to prove\nthey were \"without hope.\" To be delivered from the fear of future\nretribution, they would sacrifice the hope of an immortal life. To\nextintinguish guilt they would annihilate the soul. The only way in\nwhich Lucretius can console man in prospect of death is, by reminding\nhim that he will _escape the ills of life_.\n\n     \"'But thy dear home shall never greet thee more!\n     No more the best of wives!--thy babes beloved,\n     Whose haste half-met thee, emulous to snatch\n     The dulcet kiss that roused thy secret soul,\n     Again shall never hasten!--nor thine arm,\n     With deeds heroic, guard thy country's weal!--\n     Oh mournful, mournful fate!' thy friends exclaim!\n     'One envious hour of these invalued joys\n     Robs thee forever!--But they add not here,\n     '_It robs thee, too, of all desire of joy_'--\n     A truth, once uttered, that the mind would free\n     From every dread and trouble. 'Thou art safe\n     The sleep of death protects thee, _and secures\n     From all the unnumbered woes of mortal life!_\n     While we, alas! the sacred urn around\n     That holds thine ashes, shall insatiate weep,\n     Nor time destroy the eternal grief we feel!'\n     What, then, has death, if death be mere repose,\n     And quiet only in a peaceful grave,--\n     What has it thus to mar this life of man?\"[820]\n\n[Footnote 820: Lucretius, \"On the Nature of Things,\" bk. iii. l.\n906-926.]\n\nThis is all the comfort that Epicureanism can offer; and if \"the wretch\nstill laments the approach of death,\" she addresses him \"with voice\nsevere\"--\n\n     \"Vile coward! dry thine eyes--\n     Hence with thy snivelling sorrows, and depart!\"\n\nIt is evident that such a system of philosophy outrages the purest and\nnoblest sentiments of humanity, and, in fact, condemns itself. It was\nborn of selfishness and social degeneracy, and could perpetuate itself\nonly in an age of corruption, because it inculcated the lawfulness of\nsensuality and the impunity of injustice. Its existence at this precise\nperiod in Grecian history forcibly illustrates the truth, that Atheism\nis a disease of the heart rather than the head. It seeks to set man free\nto follow his own inclinations, by ridding him of all faith in a\nDivinity and in an immortal life, and thus exonerating him from all\naccountability and all future retribution. But it failed to perceive\nthat, in the most effectual manner, it annihilated all real liberty, all\ntrue nobleness, and made of man an abject slave.\n\nSTOICISM.\n\nThe Stoical school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who flourished B.C.\n290. He taught in the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch; and his disciples\nthence derived the name of Stoics. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes (B.C.\n260); and Cleanthes by Chrysippus (B.C. 240), whose vigorous intellect\ngave unity and completeness to the Stoical philosophy. He is reported to\nhave said to Cleanthes,--\"Give me your doctrines, and I will find the\ndemonstrations.\"[821]\n\n[Footnote 821: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. vii.]\n\nNone of the writings of the early Stoics, save a \"Hymn to Jupiter,\" by\nCleanthes, have survived. We are chiefly indebted to Diogenes\nLaertius[822] and Cicero[823] for an insight into their system. The Hymn\nof Cleanthes sheds some light on their Theology, and their moral\nprinciples are exhibited in \"The Fragments\" of Epictetus, and \"The Life\nand Meditations\" of Marcus Aurelius.\n\n[Footnote 822: \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 823: \"De Fm.,\" and \"De Natura Deorum.\"]\n\nThe philosophy of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was mainly a\nphilosophy of life--that is, a _moral_ philosophy. The manner in which\nthey approached the study of morals, and the principles upon which they\ngrounded morality, were, however, essentially different.\n\nThe grand object of Epicurus was to make the current of life flow on as\ncomfortably as possible, without any distracting thoughts of the past or\nany disturbing visions of the future. He therefore starts with this\nfundamental principle, that the true philosophy of life is to enjoy\none's self--the aim of existence is to be happy. Whatever in a man's\nbeliefs or conduct tends to secure happiness is _right_; whatever\nawakens uneasiness, apprehension, or fear, is _wrong_. And inasmuch as\nthe idea of a Divine Creator and Governor of the universe, and the\nbelief in a future life and retribution, are uncomfortable thoughts,\nexciting superstitious fears, they ought to be rejected. The Physics and\nthe Psychology of Epicurus are thus the natural outgrowth of his\nMorality.\n\nZeno was evidently a more earnest, serious, and thoughtful man. He\ncherished a nobler ideal of life than to suppose \"man must do\nvoluntarily, what the brute does instinctively--eschew pain, and seek\npleasure.\" He therefore seeks to ascertain whether there be not some\n\"principle of nature,\" or some law of nature, which determines what is\nright in human action--whether there be not some light under which, on\ncontemplating an action, we may at once pronounce upon its intrinsic\n_rightness_, or otherwise. This he believes he has found in the\n_universal reason_ which fashioned, and permeates, and vivifies the\nuniverse, and is the light and life of the human soul. The chief good\nis, confessedly, to live according to nature; which is to live according\nto virtue, for nature leads us to that point.... For our individual\nnatures are all part of the universal nature; on which account, the\nchief good is to live in a manner corresponding to one's own nature, and\nto universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of\nmankind (the universal conscience of our race) forbids. _That common law\nis identical with_ RIGHT REASON _which pervades every thing, being the\nsame with Jupiter_ (Zeus), _who is the regulator and chief manager of\nall existing things_.[824] The foundation of the ethical system of the\nStoics is thus laid in their philosophy of nature--their Physiology and\nPsychology. If, therefore, we would apprehend the logical connection and\nunity of Stoicism, we must follow their order of thought--that is, we\nmust commence with their\n\nPHYSIOLOGY.\n\nDiogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics held \"that there are two\ngeneral principles in the universe--the _passive_ principle (to\nnaschon), which is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality,\nand the _active_ principle (to poioun), which is the reason existing in\nthe passive, that is to say, God. For that He, being eternal, and\nexisting throughout all matter, makes every thing.\"[825] This Divine\nReason, acting upon matter, originates the necessary and unchangeable\nlaws which govern matter--laws which the Stoics called logoi\nspermatikoi--generating reasons or causes of things. The laws of the\nworld are, like eternal reason, necessary and immutable; hence the\neimarmen\u00ea--the _Destiny_ of the Stoics, which is also one of the names\nof the Deity.[826] But by Destiny the Stoics could not understand a\nblind unconscious necessity; it is rather the highest reason in the\nuniverse. \"Destiny (eimarmen\u00ea) is a connected (eiromen\u00ea) cause of\nthings, or the reason according to which the world is regulated.\"[827]\n\n[Footnote 824: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. liii.]\n\n[Footnote 825: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 826: \"They teach that God is unity, and that he is called\nMind, and _Fate_, and Jupiter.\"--Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 827: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. lxxiv.]\n\nThese two principles are not, however, regarded by the Stoics as having\na distinct, separate, and independent existence. One is substance\n(ousia); the other is quality (poios). The primordial matter is the\npassive ground of all existence--the original substratum for the Divine\nactivity. The Divine Reason is the active or formative energy which\ndwells within, and is essentially united to, the primary substance. The\nStoics, therefore, regarded all existence as reducible, in its last\nanalysis, to _one substance_, which on the side of its passivity and\ncapacity of change, they called _hyle_ (yl\u00ea);[828] and on the side of\nits changeless energy and immutable order, they called God. The\ncorporeal world--physical nature--is \"a peculiar manifestation\" of God,\ngenerated from his own substance, and, after certain periods, absorbed\nin himself. Thus God, considered in the evolution of His power, is\nnature. And nature, as attached to its immanent principle, is called\nGod.[829] The fundamental doctrine of the Stoics was a spiritual, ideal,\nintellectual pantheism, of which the proper formula is, _All things are\nGod, but God is not all things_.\n\n[Footnote 828: Or \"matter.\" A good deal of misapprehension has arisen\nfrom confounding the intellectual yl\u00ea of Aristotle and the Stoics with\nthe gross physical \"matter\" of the modern physicist. By \"matter\" we now\nunderstand that which is corporeal, tangible, sensible; whereas by yl\u00ea,\nAristotle and the Stoics (who borrowed the term from him) understood\nthat which is incorporeal, intangible, and inapprehensible to sense,--an\n\"unknown something\" which must necessarily be _supposed_ as the\ncondition of the existence of things. The _formal_ cause of Aristotle is\n\"the substance and essence\"--the primary nature of things, on which all\ntheir properties depend. The _material_ cause is \"the matter or subject\"\nthrough which the primary nature manifests itself. Unfortunately the\nterm \"material\" misleads the modern thinker. He is in danger of\nsupposing the _hyle_ of Aristotle to be something sensible and physical,\nwhereas it is an intellectual principle whose inherence is implied in\nany physical thing. It is something distinct from _body_, and has none\nof those properties we are now accustomed to ascribe to matter. Body,\ncorporeity, is the result of the union of \"hyle\" and \"form.\" Stobaeus\nthus expounds the doctrine of Aristotle: Form alone, separate from\nmatter (yl\u00ea) is _incorporeal_; so matter alone, separated from form, is\nnot _body_. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both\nthese--matter and form--to make the substance of body. Every individual\nsubstance is thus a totality of matter and form--a sinolon.\n\nThe Stoics taught that God is _oneliness_ (Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of\nthe Philosophers,\" bk. vii. ch. lxviii.); that he is _eternal_ and\n_immortal_ (bk. vii. ch. lxxii.); he could not, therefore, be corporeal,\nfor \"body _infinite, divisible,_ and _perishable_\" (bk. vii. ch.\nlxxvii.). \"All the parts of the world are perishable, for they change\none into another; therefore the world is perishable\" (bk. vii. ch.\nlxx.). The Deity is not, therefore, absolutely identified with the world\nby the Stoics. He permeates all things, creates and dissolves all\nthings, and is, therefore, _more_ than all things. The world is finite;\nGod is infinite.]\n\n[Footnote 829: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. lxx.]\n\nSchwegler affirms that, in physics, the Stoics, for the most part,\nfollowed Heraclitus, and especially \"carried out the proposition that\nnothing incorporeal exists; every thing is essentially _corporeal_.\" The\npantheism of Zeno is therefore \"_materialistic._\"[830] This is not a\njust representation of the views of the early Stoics, and can not be\nsustained by a fair interpretation of their teaching. They say that\nprinciples and elements differ from each other. Principles have no\ngeneration or beginning, and will have no end; but elements may be\ndestroyed. Also, that elements have bodies, and have forms, _but\nprinciples have no bodies, and no forms_.[831] Principles are,\ntherefore, _incorporeal._ Furthermore, Cicero tells us that they taught\nthat the universal harmony of the world resulted from all things being\n\"contained by one _Divine_ SPIRIT;\"[832] and also, that reason in man is\n\"nothing else but part of the _Divine_ SPIRIT merged into a human\nbody.\"[833] It thus seems evident that the Stoics made a distinction\nbetween corruptible _elements_ (fire, air, earth, water) and\nincorruptible _principles_, by which and out of which elements were\ngenerated, and also between corporeal and incorporeal substances.\n\n[Footnote 830: Schwegler's \"History of Philosophy,\" p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 831: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. lxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 832: \"De Natura Deorum,\" bk. ii. ch. xiii.]\n\n[Footnote 833: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. xxxi.]\n\nOn a careful collation of the fragmentary remains of the early Stoics,\nwe fancy we catch glimpses of the theory held by some modern pantheists,\nthat the material elements, \"having body and form,\" are a vital\ntransformation of the Divine substance; and that the forces of\nnature--\"the generating causes or reasons of things\" (logoi\nspermatikoi)--are a conscious transmutation of the Divine energy. This\ntheory is more than hinted in the following passages, which we slightly\ntranspose from the order in which they stand in Diogenes Laertius,\nwithout altering their meaning. \"They teach that the Deity was in the\nbeginning by _himself_\".... that \"first of all, he made the four\nelements, fire, water, air, and earth.\" \"The fire is the highest, and\nthat is called \u00e6ther, in which, first of all, the sphere was generated\nin which the fixed stars are set...; after that the air; then the water;\nand the sediment, as it were, of all, is the earth, which is placed in\nthe centre of the rest.\" \"He turned into water the whole substance which\npervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the product, so, too,\nHe, being the seminal principle of the world, remained still in\nmoisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production\nof things which were to come after.\"[834] The Deity thus draws the\nuniverse out of himself, transmuting the divine substance into body and\nform. \"God is a being of a certain quality, having for his peculiar\nmanifestation universal substance. He is a being imperishable, and who\nnever had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and order\nthat we see; and who at certain periods of time _absorbs all substance\nin himself and then reproduces it from himself_.\"[835] And now, in the\nlast analysis, it would seem as though every thing is resolved into\n_force_. God and the world are _power, and its manifestation_, and these\nare ultimately one. \"This identification of God and the world, according\nto which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the universe as but\na period in the development of God, renders their remaining doctrine\nconcerning the world very simple. Every thing in the world seemed to be\npermeated by the Divine life, and was regarded as the flowing out of\nthis most perfect life through certain channels, until it returns, in a\nnecessary circle, back to itself.\"[836]\n\n[Footnote 834: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. lxviii., lxix.]\n\n[Footnote 835: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxx.]\n\n[Footnote 836: Schwegler's \"History of Philosophy,\" p. 141.]\n\nThe God of the Stoics is not, however, a mere principle of life\nvitalizing nature, but an _intelligent_ principle directing nature; and,\nabove all, a _moral_ principle, governing the human race. \"God is a\nliving being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his\nhappiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil; having a foreknowledge of\nthe world, and of all that is in the world.\"[837] He is also the\ngracious Providence which cares for the individual as well as for the\nwhole; and he is the author of that natural law which commands the good\nand prohibits the bad. \"He made men to this end that they might be\nhappy; as becomes his fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil\nin those things which are in our own power.\"[838] The Providence and\nFatherhood of God are strikingly presented in the \"Hymn of Cleanthes\" to\nJupiter--\n\n[Footnote 837: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. lxxii.]\n\n[Footnote 838: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. ch. xxiv.]\n\n     Most glorious of the immortal Powers above!\n     O thou of many names! mysterious Jove:\n     For evermore almighty! Nature's source!\n     Thou governest all things in their order'd course!\n     All hail to thee! since, innocent of blame,\n     E'en mortal creatures may address thy name;\n     For all that breathe, and creep the lowly earth,\n     Echo thy being with reflected birth--\n     Thee will I sing, thy strength for aye resound:\n     The universe, that rolls this globe around,\n     Moves wheresoe'er thy plastic influence guides,\n     And, ductile, owns the god whose arm presides.\n     The lightnings are thy ministers of ire;\n     The double-forked and ever-living fire;\n     In thy unconquerable hands they glow,\n     And at the flash all nature quakes below.\n     Thus, thunder-armed, thou dost creation draw\n     To one immense, inevitable law:\n     And, with the various mass of breathing souls,\n     Thy power is mingled, and thy spirit rolls.\n     Dread genius of creation! all things bow\n     To thee: the universal monarch thou!\n\n     Nor aught is done without thy wise control,\n     On earth, or sea, or round the ethereal pole,\n     Save when the wicked, in their frenzy blind,\n     Act o'er the follies of a senseless mind,\n     Thou curb'st th' excess; confusion, to thy sight,\n     Moves regular; th' unlovely scene is bright.\n     Thy hand, educing good from evil, brings\n     To one apt harmony the strife of things.\n     One ever-during law still binds the whole,\n     Though shunned, resisted, by the sinner's soul.\n     Wretches! while still they course the glittering prize\n     The law of God eludes their ears and eyes.\n     Life, then, were virtue, did they thus obey;\n     But wide from life's chief good they headlong stray.\n     Now glory's arduous toils the breast inflame;\n     Now avarice thirsts, insensible of shame;\n     Now sloth unnerves them in voluptuous ease,\n     And the sweet pleasures of the body please.\n     With eager haste they rush the gulf within,\n     And their whole souls are centred in their sin.\n     But, oh, great Jove! by whom all good is given!\n     Dweller with lightnings and the clouds of heaven!\n     Save from their dreadful error lost mankind!\n     Father! disperse these shadows of the mind!\n     Give them thy pure and righteous law to know;\n     Wherewith thy justice governs all below.\n     Thus honored by the knowledge of thy way,\n     Shall men that honor to thyself repay;\n     And bid thy mighty works in praises ring,\n     As well befits a mortal's lips to sing:\n     More blest, nor men, nor heavenly powers can be,\n     Than when their songs are of thy law and thee.[839]\n\n[Footnote 839: Sir C. A. Elton's version, published in \"Specimens of\nAncient Poets,\" edited by William Peters, A. M., Christ Church, Oxford.]\n\nPSYCHOLOGY.\n\nAs in the world there are two principles, the passive and the active, so\nin the understanding there are two elements: a passive\nelement--_sensation_, and an active element--_reason_.\n\nAll knowledge commences with the phenomena of sensation (aisth\u00easis).\nThis produces in the soul an image (phantasia), which corresponds to the\nexterior object, and which Chrysippus regarded as a modification of the\nmind (alloi\u00f4sis).[840]\n\nAssociate with sensibility is thought--the faculty of general ideas--the\northos logos, or right reason, as the supreme power and the guiding\nlight of humanity. This active principle is of divine origin, \"a part or\nshred of the Divinity.\"\n\n[Footnote 840: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. xxxiv.]\n\nThis \"right reason,\" or \"common reason,\" is the source and criterion of\nall truth; \"for our individual natures are all parts of the universal\nnature,\" and, therefore, all the dictates of \"common reason\" are\n\"identical with that right reason which pervades every thing, being the\nsame with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all\nthings.\"\n\nThe fundamental canon of the logic of the Stoics, therefore, was that\n\"what appears to all, that is to be believed, for it is apprehended by\nthe reason, which is common and Divine.\"\n\nIt is needless to remark that the Stoics were compelled by their\nphysiological theory to deny the proper immortality of the soul. Some of\nthem seem to have supposed that it might, for a season, survive the\ndeath of the body, but its ultimate destination was absorption into the\nDivine essence. It must return to its original source.\n\nETHICS.\n\nIf reason be the great organizing and controlling law of the universe,\nthen, to live conformable to reason is the great practical law of life.\nAccordingly, the fundamental ethical maxim of the Stoics is, \"Live\nconformably with nature--that is, with reason, or the will of the\nuniversal governor and manager of all things.\"[841] Thus the chief good\n(eudaimonia) is the conformity of man's actions to reason--that is, to\nthe will of God, \"for nothing is well done without a reference to\nGod.\"[842]\n\n[Footnote 841: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. liii.]\n\n[Footnote 842: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. \u00a7 II.]\n\nIt is obvious that this doctrine must lead to a social morality and a\njurisprudence the very opposite of the Epicurean. If we must do that\nwhich is good--that is, that which is reasonable, regardless of all\nconsequences, then it is not for the pleasurable or useful results which\nflow from it that justice should be practised, but because of its\nintrinsic excellence. Justice is constituted good, not by the law of\nman, but by the law of God. The highest pleasure is to do right; \"this\nvery thing is the virtue of the happy man, and the perfect happiness of\nlife, when every thing is done according to a harmony of the genius of\neach individual to the will of the Universal Governor and Manager of all\nthings.\"[843] Every thing which interferes with a purely rational\nexistence is to be eschewed; the pleasures and pains of the body are to\nbe despised. To triumph over emotion, over suffering, over passion; to\ngive the fullest ascendency to reason; to attain courage, moral energy,\nmagnanimity, constancy, was to realize true manhood, nay, \"to be\ngodlike; for they have something in them which is, as it were, a\ngod\"[844]\n\nThe sublime heroism of the Stoic school is well expressed in the manly\nprecept, \"Anechou\"--_sustine_--endure. \"Endure the sorrows engendered by\nthe bitter struggle between the passions support all the evils which\nfortune shall send thee--calumny, betrayal, poverty, exile, irons, death\nitself.\" In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this spirit seems to rise\nalmost to the grandeur of Christian resignation. \"Dare to lift up thine\neyes to God and say, 'Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I\nagree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things.\nLead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of\na public or a private person, of a rich man or a beggar.'\"[845] \"Show\nthose qualities,\" says Marcus Aurelius, \"which God hath put in thy\npower--sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure,\ncontentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence,\nfrankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,\nmagnanimity.\"[846]\n\n[Footnote 843: Diogenes Laertius, \"Lives of the Philosophers,\" bk. vii.\nch. liii.]\n\n[Footnote 844: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. xliv.]\n\n[Footnote 845: Arrian, \"Diss. Epict.,\" bk. ii. ch. xviii.]\n\n[Footnote 846: \"I read to-day part of the 'Meditations of Marcus\nAntonius' [Aurelius]. What a strange emperor! And what a strange\nheathen! Giving thanks to God for all the good things he enjoyed! In\nparticular for his good inspirations, and for twice revealing to him, in\ndreams, things wherby he was cured of (otherwise) incurable distempers.\nI make no doubt but this is one of the 'many' who shall come from the\neast and the west, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,' while\nthe 'children of the kingdom'--nominal Christians--are 'shut\nout.'\"--Wesley's \"Journal,\" vol. i, p. 353.]\n\nAmid the fearful moral degeneracy of imperial Rome, Stoicism became the\nrefuge of all noble spirits. But, in spite of its severity, and its\napparent triumph over the feelings, it brought no real freedom and\npeace. \"Stoical morality, strictly speaking, is, at bottom, only a\nslavish morality, excellent in Epictetus; admirable still, but useless\nto the world, in Marcus Aurelius.\" Pride takes the place of real\ndisinterestedness. It stands alone in haughty grandeur and solitary\nisolation, tainted with an incurable egoism. Disheartened by its\nmetaphysical impotence, which robs God of all personality, and man of\nall hope of immortality; defeated in its struggle to obtain purity of\nsoul, it sinks into despair, and often terminates, as in the case of its\ntwo first leaders, Zeno and Cleanthes, and the two Romans, Cato and\nSeneca, in self-murder. \"Thus philosophy is only an apprenticeship of\ndeath, and not of life; it tends to death by its image, _apathy_ and\n_ataraxy._\"[847]\n\n[Footnote 847: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 439.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nTHE PROP\u00c6DEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n\"Philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary to the Greeks\nfor righteousness, and it now proved useful for godliness, being in some\npart a preliminary discipline (propaideia tis ousa) for those who reap\nthe fruits of faith through demonstration. Perhaps we may say it was\ngiven to the Greeks with this special object; for philosophy was to the\nGreeks what the Law was to the Jews, 'a schoolmaster to bring them to\nChrist.'\"--CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.\n\nPhilosophy, says Cousin, is the effort of _reflection_--the attempt of\nthe human mind to develop in systematic and logical form that which has\ndimly revealed itself in the spontaneous thought of ages, and to account\nto itself in some manner for its native and instinctive beliefs. We may\nfurther add, it is the effort of the human mind to attain to truth and\ncertitude on purely rational grounds, uncontrolled by traditional\nauthorities. The sublime era of Greek philosophy was, in fact, an\nindependent effort of human reason to solve the great problems of\nexistence, of knowledge, and of duty. It was an attempt to explain the\nphenomenal history of the universe, to interpret the fundamental ideas\nand laws of human reason, to comprehend the utterances of conscience,\nand to ascertain what Ultimate and Supreme Reality underlies the world\nof phenomena, of thought, and of moral feeling.[848] And it is this\nwhich, for us, constitutes its especial value; that it was, as far as\npossible, a result of simple reason; or, if at any time Faith asserted\nits authority, the distinction is clearly marked: If this inquiry was\nfully, and honestly, and logically conducted, we are entitled to presume\nthat the results attain by this effort of speculative thought must\nharmonize with the positive utterances of the Divine Logos--the Eternal\nReason, whose revelations are embalmed and transmitted to us in the Word\nof God. If the great truth that man is \"the _offspring of God\"_ and as\nsuch \"_the image and glory of God_\" which is asserted, alike, by Paul\nand the poet-philosophers of Tarsus and Mysia, be admitted, then we may\nexpect that the reason of man shall have some correlation with the\nDivine reason. The mind of man is the _chef-d'oeuvre_ of Divine art. It\nis fashioned after the model which the Divine nature supplies. \"Let us\nmake man in _our_ image after _our_ likeness.\" That image consists in\nepign\u00f4sis--_knowledge;_ dikalosyn\u00ea--_justice_; and\nosiot\u00eas--_benevolence._ It is not merely the _capacity_ to know, to be\njust, and to be beneficent; it is _actual_ knowledge, justice, and\nbenevolence. It supposes, first, that the fundamental ideas of the true,\nthe just, and the good, are connate to the human mind; second, that the\nnative determination of the mind is towards the realization of these\nideas in every mental state and every form of human activity; third,\nthat there is a constitutional sympathy of reason with the ideas of\ntruth, and righteousness, and goodness, as they dwell in the reason of\nGod. And though man be now fallen, there is still within his heart some\nvestige of his primal nature. There is still a sense of the divine, a\nreligious aptitude, \"a feeling after God,\" and some longing to return to\nHim. There are still ideas in the reason, which, in their natural and\nlogical development compel him to recognize a God. There is within his\nconscience a sense of duty, of obligation, and accountability to a\nSuperior Power--\"a law of the mind,\" thought opposed and antagonized by\ndepraved passions and appetites--\"the law in the members.\" There is yet\na natural, constitutional sympathy of reason with the law of God--\"it\ndelights in that law,\" and consents \"that it is good,\" but it is\noverborne and obstructed by passion. Man, even as unregenerate, \"wills\nto do that which is good,\" but \"how to perform that which is good he\nfinds not,\" and in the agony of his soul he exclaims, \"Oh, wretched man\nthat I am, who shall deliver me!\"[849]\n\n[Footnote 848: Plato sought also to attain to the Ultimate Reality\nunderlying all \u00e6sthetic feeling--the Supreme Beauty as well as the\nSupreme Good.]\n\n[Footnote 849: Romans, ch. vii.]\n\nThe Author of nature is also the Author of revelation. The Eternal\nFather of the Eternal Son, who is the grand medium of all God's direct\ncommunications to our race--the revealer of God, is also \"the Father of\nthe spirits of all flesh.\" That divine inbreathing which first\nconstituted man \"a living soul\"--that \"inspiration of the Almighty\nwhich giveth man understanding,\" and still \"teacheth him knowledge,\"\nproceeds from the same Spirit as that which inspires the prophets and\nseers of the Old Testament Church, and the Apostles and teachers of the\nnew. That \"true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the\nworld\" shone on the mind of Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and Plato, as well\nas on the mind of Abraham and Rahab, Cornelius and the Syro-Phoenician\nwoman, and, in a higher form, and with a clearer and richer effulgence,\non the mind of Moses, Isaiah, Paul and John. It is not to be wondered\nat, then, if, in the teaching of Socrates and Plato, we should find a\nstriking _harmony_ of sentiment, and even form of expression, with some\nparts of the Christian revelation. No short-sighted jealousy ought to\nimpugn the honesty of our judgment, if, in the speculations of Plato, we\ncatch glimpses of a world of ideas not unlike that which Christianity\ndiscloses, and hear words not unfamiliar to those who spake as they were\nmoved by the Holy Ghost.\n\nIf, then, there exists some correlation between Divine and human reason,\nand if the light which illuminates all minds in Christian and in heathen\nlands is the _same_ \"true light,\" though differing in degrees of\nbrightness, it is most natural and reasonable to expect some connection\nand some correspondence between the discoveries of philosophy and the\nrevelations of the Sacred Oracles.\n\nAlthough Christianity is confessedly something which is above reason and\nnature--something communicated from above, and therefore in the fullest\nsense supernatural and superhuman, yet it must stand in _relation_ to\nreason and nature, and to their historic development; otherwise it could\nnot operate on man at all. \"We have no knowledge of a dynamic influence,\nspiritual or natural, without a dynamic reaction.\" Matter can only be\nmoved by forces, and according to laws, as it has properties which\ncorrelate it with these forces and laws. And mind can not be determined\nfrom without to any specific form of cognition, unless it have powers of\napprehension and conception which are governed by uniform laws. If man\nis to be instructed by a verbal revelation, he must, at least, be\ncapacitated for the reception of divine communication--must have a power\nof forming supersensuous conceptions, and there must be some original\ncommunity of thought and idea between the mind that teaches and the mind\nthat is taught. A revelation from an invisible God--a being \"whom no man\nhas ever seen or ever can see\" with the eye of sense--would have no\naffinity for, and no power to affect and enlighten, a being who had no\npresentiment of an invisible Power to which he is in some way related. A\nrevealed law promulgated from an unseen and utterly unknown Power would\nhave no constraining authority, if man had no idea of right, no sense of\nduty, no feeling of obligation to a Supreme Being. If, therefore,\nreligious instruction be not already preceded by an innate consciousness\nof God, and of obligation to God, as an operative predisposition, there\nwould be nothing for revelation to act upon. Some relation between the\nreason which planned the universe, and which has expressed its thoughts\nin the numerical relations and archetypal forms which are displayed\ntherein, and the reason of man, with its ideas of form and number,\nproportion and harmony, is necessarily supposed in the statement of Paul\nthat \"the invisible things of God from the creation are seen.\" Nature to\nus could be no symbol of the Divine Thought, if there were no\ncorrelation between the reason of man and the reason of God. All\nrevelation, indeed, supposes some community of nature, some affinities\nof thought, some correlation of ideas, between the mind communicating\nspiritual knowledge, and the mind to which the communication is made. In\napproaching man, it must traverse ground already occupied by man; it\nmust employ phrases already employed, and assume forms of thought\nalready familiar to man. It must address itself to some ideas,\nsentiments, and feelings already possessed by man. If religion is the\ngreat end and destination of man, then the nature of man must be\nconstituted for religion. Now religion, in its inmost nature, is a\ncommunion, a fellowship with God. But no creature can be brought into\nthis communion \"save one that is constitutionally related to God in\nterms that admit of correspondence.\" There must be intelligence offered\nto his intelligence, sentiment to his sentiment, reason to his reason,\nthought to his thought. There must be implanted in the human mind some\nfundamental ideas and determinations grounded upon this fact, that the\nreal end and destination of man is for religion, so that when that\nhigher sphere of life and action is presented to man, by an outward\nverbal revelation, there shall be a recognized harmony between the inner\nidea and determination, and the outer revelation. We can not doubt that\nsuch a relation between human nature and reason, and Christianity,\nexists. We see evidences of this in the perpetual strivings of humanity\nto attain to some fuller and clearer apprehension of that Supreme Power\nwhich is consciously near to human thought, and in the historic\ndevelopment of humanity towards those higher forms of thought and\nexistence which demand a revelation in order to their completion. This\noriginal capacity, and this historical development, have unquestionably\nprepared the way for the reception of Christianity.\n\nChristianity, then, must have some connection with the reason of man,\nand it must also have some relation to the progressive developments of\nhuman thought in the ages which preceded the advent of Christ.\nChristianity did not break suddenly upon the world as a new commencement\naltogether unconnected with the past, and wanting in all points of\nsympathy and contact with the then present. It proceeded along lines of\nthought which had been laid through ages of preparation; it clothed\nitself in forms of speech which had been moulded by centuries of\neducation, and it appropriated to itself a moral and intellectual\nculture which had been effected by long periods of severest discipline.\nIt was, in fact, the consummation of the whole moral and religious\nhistory of the world.\n\nA revelation of new truths, presented in entirely new forms of thought\nand speech, would have defeated its own ends, and, practically, would\nhave been no revelation at all. The divine light, in passing through\nsuch a medium, would have been darkened and obscured. The lens through\nwhich the heavenly rays are to be transmitted must first be prepared and\npolished. The intellectual eye itself must be gradually accustomed to\nthe light. Hence it is that all revelation has been _progressive_,\ncommencing, in the infancy of our race, with images and symbols\naddressed to sense, and advancing, with the education of the race, to\nabstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. The first communications to\nthe patriarchs were always accompanied by some external, sensible\nappearance; they were often made through some preternatural personage in\nhuman form. Subsequently, as human thought becomes assimilated to the\nDivine idea, God uses man as his organ, and communicates divine\nknowledge as an internal and spiritual gift. The theistic conception of\nthe earliest times was therefore more or less anthropomorphic, in the\nprophetic age it was unquestionably more spiritual. The education of\nHebraic, Mosaic, and prophetic ages had gradually developed a purer\ntheism, and prepared the Jewish mind for that sublime announcement of\nour Lord's--\"God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in\nspirit.\" For ages the Jews had worshipped in Samaria and Jerusalem, and\nthe inevitable tendency of thought was to localize the divine presence;\nbut the gradual withdrawment from these localities of all visible tokens\nof Jehovah's presence, prepared the way for the Saviour's explicit\ndeclaration that \"neither in this mountain of Samaria, nor yet at\nJerusalem, shall men worship the Father,\" to the exclusion of any other\nspot on earth; the real temple of the living God is now the heart of\nman. The _Holiness_ of God was an idea too lofty for human thought to\ngrasp at once. The light of God's ineffable purity was too bright and\ndazzling to burst at once on human eyes. Therefore it was gradually\ndisplayed. The election of a chosen seed in Abraham's race to a nearer\napproach to God than the rest of pagan humanity; the announcement of the\nDecalogue at Sinai amidst awe-inspiring wonders; the separation of a\nsingle tribe to the priestly office, who were dedicated to, and purified\nin an especial manner for the service of the tabernacle; the\nsanctification of the High-priest by sacrifice and lustration before he\ndared to enter \"the holiest place\"--the presence-chamber of Jehovah: and\nthen the direct and explicit teaching of the prophets--were all\nadvancing steps by which the Jewish mind was lifted up to the clearer\napprehension of the holiness of God, the impurity of man, the distance\nof man from God, and the need of Mediation.\n\nThe ideas of _Redemption_ and _Salvation_--of atonement, expiation,\npardon, adoption, and regeneration--are unique and _sui-generis_. Before\nthese conceptions could be presented in the fullness and maturity of the\nChristian system, there was needed the culture and education of the ages\nof Mosaic ritualism, with its sacrificial system, its rights of\npurification, its priestly absolution, and its family of God.[850]\nRedemption itself, as an economy, is a development, and has\nconsequently, a history--a history which had its commencement in the\nfirst Eden, and which shall have its consummation in the second Eden of\na regenerated world. It was germinally infolded in the first promise,\ngradually unfolded in successive types and prophecies, more fully\ndeveloped in the life, and sayings, and sufferings of the Son of God,\nand its ripened fruit is presented to the eye of faith in the closing\nscenic representations of the grand Apocalypse of John. \"Judaism was not\ngiven as a perfect religion. Whatever may have been its superiority over\nsurrounding forms of worship, it was, notwithstanding, a provisional\nform only. The consciousness that it was a preparatory, and not a\ndefinite dispensation, is evident throughout. It points to an end beyond\nitself, suggests a grander thought than any in itself; its glory\nprecisely consists in its constant looking forward to a glorious future\ndestined to surpass it.\"[851]\n\n[Footnote 850: Romans, IX 4-6.]\n\n[Footnote 851: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" p. 202.]\n\nThus the determinations which, through Redemption, fall to the lot of\nhistory, as Nitzsch justly remarks, obey the emancipating law of\n_gradual progress_.[852] Christianity was preceded by ages of\npreparation, in which we have a gradual development of religious phrases\nand ideas, of forms of social life and intellectual culture, and of\nnational and political institutions most favorable to its advent and its\npromulgation; and \"in the fullness of time\"--the maturity and fitness of\nthe age--\"God sent his own Son into the world.\"\n\n[Footnote 852: \"System of Doctrine,\" p. 73.]\n\nThis work of preparation was not confined alone to Judaism. The divine\nplan of redemption comprehended all the race; its provisions are made in\nview of the wants of all the race; and we must therefore believe that\nthe entire history of the race, previous to the coming of the Redeemer,\nwas under a divine supervision, and directed towards the grand centre of\nour world's history. Greek philosophy and Grecian civilization must\ntherefore have a place in the divine plan of history, and they must\nstand in an important relation to Christianity. He who \"determined the\ntime of each nation's existence, and fixed the geographical boundaries\nof their habitation in order that they may seek the Lord,\" can not have\nbeen unmindful of the Greek nation, and of its grandest age of\nphilosophy. \"The Father of the spirits of all flesh\" could not be\nunconcerned in the moral and spiritual welfare of any of his children.\nHe was as deeply interested in the Athenian as in the Hebrew. He is the\nGod of the Gentile as well as the Jew. His tender mercies are over all\nhis works. If the Hebrew race was selected to be the agent of his\nprovidence in one special field, and if the Jewish theocracy was one\ngrand instrument of preparatory discipline, it was simply because,\nthrough these, God designed to bless all the nations of the earth. And\nsurely no one will presume to say that a civilization and an\nintellectual culture which was second only to the Hebrew, and, in some\nof its aspects, even in advance of the Hebrew, was not determined and\nsupervised by Divine Providence, and made subservient to the education\nand development of the whole race. The grand results of Hebrew\ncivilization were appropriated and assimilated by Christianity, and\nremain to this day. And no one can deny that the same is true of Greek\ncivilization. Through a kind of historic preparation the heathen world\nwas made ready for Christ, as a soil is prepared to receive the seed,\nand some precious fruits of knowledge, of truth, and of righteousness,\neven, were largely matured, which have been reaped, and appropriated,\nand vitalized by the heaven-descended life of Christianity.\n\nThe chief points of excellence in the civilization of the Greeks are\nstrikingly obvious, and may be readily presented. High perfection of the\nintellect and the imagination displaying itself in the various forms of\nart, poetry, literature, and philosophy. A wonderful freedom and\nactivity of body and of mind, developed in trade, and colonization, in\nmilitary achievement, and in subtile dialectics. A striking love of the\nbeautiful, revealing itself in their sculpture and architecture, in the\nfree music of prosaic numbers, and the graceful movement and measure of\ntheir poetry. A quickness of perception, a dignity of demeanor, a\nrefinement of taste, a delicacy of moral sense, and a high degree of\nreverence for the divine in nature and humanity. And, in general, a ripe\nand all-pervading culture, which has made Athens a synonym for all that\nis greatest and best in the genius of man; so that literature, in its\nmost flourishing periods has rekindled its torch at her altars, and art\nhas looked back to the age of Pericles for her purest models.[853] All\nthese enter into the very idea of Greek civilization. We can not resist\nthe conviction that, by a Divine Providence, it was made subservient to\nthe purpose of Redemption; it prepared the way for, and contributed to,\nthe spread of the Gospel.\n\n[Footnote 853: In Lord Brougham's celebrated letter to the father of the\nhistorian Macaulay in regard to the education of the latter, we read:\n\"If he would be a great orator, he must go at once to the fountain-head,\nand be familiar with every one of the great orations of Demosthenes....\nI know from experience that nothing is half so successful in these times\n(bad though they be) as what has been formed on the Greek models. I use\npoor illustrations in giving my own experience, but I do assure you that\nboth in courts and Parliament, and even to mobs, I have never made so\nmuch play (to use a very modern phrase) as when I was almost translating\nfrom the Greek. I composed the peroration of my speech for the Queen, in\nthe Lords, after reading and repeating Demosthenes for three or four\nweeks.\"]\n\nIts subserviency to this grand purpose is seen in the Greek tendency to\ntrade and colonization. Their mental activity was accompanied by great\nphysical freedom of movement. They displayed an inherent disposition to\nextensive emigration. \"Without aiming at universal conquest, they\ndeveloped (if we may use the word) a remarkable catholicity of\ncharacter, and a singular power of adaptation to those whom they called\nBarbarians. In this respect they were strongly contrasted with the\nEgyptians, whose immemorial civilization was confined to the long valley\nwhich extended from the cataracts to the mouth of the Nile. The Hellenic\ntribes, on the other hand, though they despised the foreigners, were\nnever unwilling to visit them and to cultivate their acquaintance. At\nthe earliest period at which history enables us to discover them, we see\nthem moving about in their ships on the shores and among the islands of\ntheir native seas; and, three or four centuries before the Christian\nera, Asia Minor, beyond which the Persians had not been permitted to\nadvance, was bordered by a fringe of Greek colonies; and lower Italy,\nwhen the Roman Republic was just becoming conscious of its strength, had\nreceived the name of Greece itself. To all these places they carried\ntheir arts and literature, their philosophy, their mythology, and their\namusements.... They were gradually taking the place of the Phoenicians\nin the empire of the Mediterranean. They were, indeed, less exclusively\nmercantile than those old discoverers. Their voyages were not so long.\nBut their influence on general civilization was greater and more\npermanent. The earliest ideas of scientific navigation and geography are\ndue to the Greeks. The later Greek travellers, Pausanias and Strabo, are\nour best sources of information on the topography of St. Paul's\njourneys.\n\n\"With this view of the Hellenic character before us, we are prepared to\nappreciate the vast results of Alexander's conquests. He took the meshes\nof the net of Greek civilization which were lying in disorder on the\nedge of the Asiatic shore, and spread them over all the countries he\ntraversed in his wonderful campaigns. The East and the West were\nsuddenly brought together. Separate tribes were united under a common\ngovernment. New cities were built as the centres of political life. New\nlines of communication were opened as the channels of commercial\nactivity. The new culture penetrated the mountain ranges of Pisidia and\nLycaonia. The Tigris and Euphrates became Greek rivers. The language of\nAthens was heard among the Jewish colonies of Babylonia, and a Grecian\nBabylon was built by the conqueror in Egypt, and called by his name.\n\n\"The empire of Alexander was divided, but the effects of his campaigns\nand policy did not cease. The influence of these fresh elements of\nsocial life was rather increased by being brought into independent\naction within the sphere of distinct kingdoms. Our attention is\nparticularly directed to two of the monarchical lines which descended\nfrom Alexander's generals--the Ptolemies, or the Greek kings of Egypt,\nand the Seleucid\u00e6, or the Greek kings of Syria. Their respective\ncapitals, Alexandria and Antioch, became the metropolitan centres of\ncommercial and civilized life in the East.\"[854] Antioch was for ages\nthe home of science and philosophy. Here the religious opinions of the\nEast and the West were blended and mutually modified. Here it was\ndiscovered by the heathen mind that a new religion had appeared, and a\nnew revelation had been given.[855] In Alexandria all nations were\ninvited to exchange their commodities and, with equal freedom, their\nopinions. The representatives of all religions met here. \"Beside the\nTemple of Jupiter there rose the white marble Temple of Serapis, and\nclose at hand stood the synagogue of the Jews.\" The Alexandrian library\ncontained all the treasures of ancient culture, and even a copy of the\nHebrew Scriptures.\n\n[Footnote 854: Conybeare and Howson, \"Life and Epistles of St. Paul,\"\nvol. i. pp. 8-10.]\n\n[Footnote 855: Acts, xi. 26.]\n\nThe spread of the Greek _language_ was one of the most important\nservices which the cities of Antioch and Alexandria rendered to\nChristianity. The Greek tongue is intimately connected with the whole\nsystem of Christian doctrine.\n\nThis language, which, in symmetry of structure, in flexibility and\ncompass of expression, in exactness and precision, in grace and\nelegance, exceeds every other language, became the language of theology.\nNext in importance to the inspiration which communicates the superhuman\nthought, must be the gradual development of the language in which the\nthought can clothe itself. That development by which the Greek language\nbecame the adequate vehicle of Divine thought, the perfect medium of the\nmature revelation of truth contained in the Christian Scriptures, must\nbe regarded as the subject of a Divine providence. Christianity waited\nfor that development, and it awaited Christianity. \"The Greek tongue\nbecame to the Christian more than it had been to the Roman or the Jew.\nThe mother-tongue of Ignatius at Antioch was that in which Philo\ncomposed his treatises at Alexandria, and which Cicero spoke at Athens.\nIt is difficult to state in a few words the important relation which\nAlexandria, more especially, was destined to bear to the whole Christian\nChurch.\" In that city, the Old Testament was translated into Greek;\nthere the writings of Plato were diligently studied; there Philo, the\nPlatonizing Jew, had sought to blend into one system the teachings of\nthe Old Testament theology and the dialectic speculations of Plato.\nNumenius learns of Philo, and Plotinus of Numenius, and the ecstasy of\nPlotinus is the development of Philo's intuitions. A _theological\nlanguage_ by this means was developed, rich in the phrases of various\nschools, and suited to convey the spiritual revelation of Christian\nideas to all the world. \"It was not an accident that the New Testament\nwas written in Greek, the language which can best express the highest\nthoughts and worthiest feelings of the intellect and heart, and which is\nadapted to be the instrument of education for all nations; nor was it an\naccident that the composition of these books and the promulgation of the\nGospels were delayed till the instruction of our Lord, and the writings\nof his Apostles could be expressed in the dialect [of Athens and] of\nAlexandria.\"[856] This must be ascribed to the foreordination of Him\nwho, in the history of nations and of civilizations, \"worketh all things\naccording to the counsel of his own will.\"\n\n[Footnote 856: Conybeare and Howson, \"Life and Epistles of St. Paul,\"\nvol. i. p. 10.]\n\nNow it is the doctrine of the best philologists that language is a\n_growth_. Gradually, and by combined efforts of successive generations,\nit has been brought to the perfection which we so much admire in the\nidioms of the Bible, the poetry of Homer, Dante, and Shakspeare, and the\nprose compositions of Demosthenes, Cicero, Johnson, and Macaulay. The\nmaterial or root-element of language may have been the product of mental\ninstinct, or perhaps the immediate gift of God by revelation; but the\nformal element must have been the creation of thought, and the result of\nrational combination. Language is really the incarnation of thought;\nconsequently the growth of a language, its affluence, comprehension, and\nfullness must depend on the vigor and activity of thought, and the\nacquisition of general ideas. Language is thus the best index of\nintellectual progress, the best standard of the intellectual attainment\nof an age or nation. The language of barbaric tribes is exceedingly\nsimple and meagre; the paucity of general terms clearly indicating the\nabsence of all attempts at classification and all speculative thought.\nWhilst the language of educated peoples is characterized by great\nfullness and affluence of terms, especially such as are expressive of\ngeneral notions and abstract ideas. All grammar, all philology, all\nscientific nomenclature are thus, in fact, _psychological deposits_,\nwhich register the progressive advancement of human thought and\nknowledge in the world of mind, as the geological strata bear testimony\nto the progressive development of the material world. \"Language,\" says\nTrench, \"is fossil poetry, fossil history,\" and, we will add, fossil\nphilosophy. Many a single word is a concentrated poem. The record of\ngreat social and national revolutions is embalmed in a single term.[857]\nAnd the history of an age of philosophic thought is sometimes condensed\nand deposited in one imperishable word.[858]\n\n[Footnote 857: See Trench \"On the Study of Words,\" p. 20, where the word\n\"frank\" is given as an illustration.]\n\n[Footnote 858: For example, the cosmos of the Pythagoreans, the eid\u00ea of\nthe Platonists, and the ataraxia of the Stoics.]\n\nIf, then, language is the creation of thought, the sensible vesture with\nwhich it clothes itself, and becomes, as it were, incarnate--if the\nperfection and efficiency of language depends on the maturity and\nclearness of thought, we conclude that the wonderful adequacy and\nfitness of the Greek language to be the vehicle of the Divine thought,\nthe medium of the most perfect revelation of God to men, can only be\nexplained on the assumption that the ages of philosophic thought which,\nin Greece, preceded the advent of Christianity, were under the immediate\nsupervision of a providence, and, in some degree, illuminated by the\nSpirit of God.\n\nGreek philosophy must therefore have fulfilled a prop\u00e6deutic office for\nChristianity. \"As it had been intrusted to the Hebrews to preserve and\ntransmit the heaven-derived element of the Monotheistic religion, so it\nwas ordained that, among the Greeks, all seeds of human culture should\nunfold themselves in beautiful harmony, and then Christianity, taking up\nthe opposition between the divine and human, was to unite both in one,\nand show how it was necessary that both should co-operate to prepare for\nthe appearance of itself and the unfolding of what it contains.\"[859]\nDuring the period of Greek philosophy which preceded the coming of\nChrist, human reason, unfolding itself from beneath, had aspired after\nthat knowledge of divine things which is from above. It had felt within\nitself the deep-seated consciousness of God--the sporadic revelation of\nHim \"who is not far from any one of us\"--the immanent thought of that\nBeing \"in whom we live and move and are,\" and it had striven by analysis\nand definition to attain a more distinct and logical apprehension. The\nheart of man had been stirred with \"the feeling after God\"--the longing\nfor a clearer sense of the divine, and had struggled to attain, by\nabstraction or by ecstasy, a more immediate communion with God. Man had\nbeen conscious of an imperative obligation to conform to the will of the\ngreat Supreme, and he sought to interpret more clearly the utterances of\nconscience as to what duty was. He had felt the sense of sin and guilt,\nand had endeavored to appease his conscience by expiatory offerings, and\nto deliver himself from the power of sin by intellectual culture and\nmoral discipline. And surely no one, at all familiar with the history of\nthat interesting epoch in the development of humanity, will have the\nhardihood to assert that no steps were taken in the right direction, and\nno progress made towards the distant goal of human desire and hope. The\nlanguage, the philosophy, the ideals of moral beauty and excellence, the\nnoble lives and nobler utterances of the men who stand forth in history\nas the representatives of Greek civilization, all attest that their\nnoble aspiration and effort did not end in ignominious failure and utter\ndefeat. It is true they fell greatly beneath the realization of even\ntheir own moral ideals, and they became painfully conscious of their\nmoral weakness, as men do even in Christian times. They learned that,\nneither by intellectual abstraction, nor by ecstasy of feeling, could\nthey lift themselves to a living, conscious fellowship with God. The\nsense of guilt was unrelieved by expiations, penances, and prayers. And\nwhilst some cultivated a proud indifference, a Stoical apathy, and\nothers sank down to Epicurean ease and pleasure, there was a noble few\nwho longed and hoped with increasing ardor for a living Redeemer, a\npersonal Mediator, who should \"stand between God and man and lay his\nhand on both.\" Christ became in some dim consciousness \"the Desire of\nNations,\" and the Moral Law became even to the Greek as well as the Jew\n\"a school-master to lead them to Him.\"\n\n[Footnote 859: Neander's \"Church History,\" vol. i. p. 4.]\n\nThe arrival of Paul at Athens, in the close of this brilliant period of\nGreek philosophy, now assumes an aspect of deeper interest and\nprofounder significance. It was a grand climacteric in the life of\nhumanity--an epoch in the moral and religious history of the world. It\nmarked the consummation of a periodic dispensation, and it opened a new\nera in that wonderful progression through which an overruling Providence\nis carrying the human race. As the coming of the Son of God to Judea in\nthe ripeness of events--\"the fullness of time\"--was the consummation of\nthe Jewish dispensation, and the event for which the Jewish age had been\na preparatory discipline, so the coming of a Christian teacher to\nAthens, in the person of \"the Apostle of the Gentiles,\" was the\n_terminus ad quem_ towards which all the phases in the past history of\nphilosophic thought had looked, and for which they had prepared.\nChristianity was brought to Athens--brought into contact with Grecian\nphilosophy at the moment of its exhaustion--at the moment when, after\nages of unwearied effort, it had become conscious of its weakness, and\nits comparative failure, and had abandoned many questions in despair.\nGreek philosophy had therefore its place in the plan of Divine\nProvidence. It had a mission to the world; that mission was now\nfulfilled. If it had laid any foundation in the Athenian mind on which\nthe Christian system could plant its higher truths--if it had raised up\ninto the clearer light of consciousness any of those _ideas_ imbedded in\nthe human reason which are germane to Christian truth--if it had\nrevealed more fully the wants and instincts of the human heart, or if it\nhad attained the least knowledge of eternal truth and immutable right,\nupon this Christianity placed its _imprimatur_. And at those points\nwhere human reason had been made conscious of its own inefficiency, and\ncompelled to own its weakness and its failure, Christianity shed an\neffulgent and convincing light.\n\nTherefore the preparatory office of Greek religion and Greek philosophy\nis fully recognized by Paul in his address to the Athenians. He begins\nby saying that the observations he had made enabled him to bear witness\nthat the Athenians were indeed, in every respect, \"a God-fearing\npeople;\"--that the God whom they knew so imperfectly as to designate Him\n\"the Unknown,\" but whom \"they worshipped,\" was the God he worshipped,\nand would now more fully declare to them. He assures them that their\npast history, and their present geographical position, had been the\nobject of Divine foreknowledge and determination. \"He hath determined\nbeforehand the times of each nation's existence, and fixed the\ngeographical boundaries of their habitation,\" all with this specific\ndesign, that they might \"seek after,\" \"feel after,\" and \"find the Lord,\"\nwho had never been far from any one of them. He admits that their\npoet-philosophers had risen to a lofty apprehension of \"the Fatherhood\nof God,\" for they had taught that \"we are all his offspring;\" and he\nseems to have felt that in asserting the common brotherhood of our race,\nhe would strike a chord of sympathy in the loftiest school of Gentile\nphilosophy. He thus \"recognized the Spirit of God brooding over the face\nof heathenism, and fructifying the spiritual element in the heart even\nof the natural man. He feels that in these human principles there were\nsome faint adumbrations of the divine, and he looked for their firmer\ndelineation to the figure of that gracious Master, higher and holier\nthan man, whom he contemplated in his own imagination, and whom he was\nabout to present to them.\"[860]\n\n[Footnote 860: Merivale's \"Conversion of the Roman Empire,\" p. 78.]\n\nThis function of ancient philosophy is distinctly recognized by many of\nthe greatest of the Fathers, as Justin, Clement, Origen, Augustine, and\nTheodoret. Justin Martyr believed that a ray of the Divine Logos shone\non the mind of the heathen, and that the human soul instinctively turned\ntowards God as the plant turns towards the sun. \"Every race of men\nparticipated in the Word. And they who lived with the Word were\nChristians, even if they were held to be godless; as, for example, among\nthe Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and those like them.\"[861] Clement\ntaught that \"philosophy, before the coming of the Lord, was necessary to\nthe Greeks for righteousness; and now it proved useful for godliness,\nbeing a sort of preliminary discipline for those who reap the fruits of\nfaith through demonstration.... Perhaps we may say that it was given to\nthe Greeks with this special object, for it brought the Greek nation to\nChrist as the Law brought the Hebrews.\"[862] \"Philosophy was given as a\npeculiar testament to the Greeks, as forming the basis of the Christian\nphilosophy.\"[863] Referring to the words of Paul, Origen says, the\ntruths which philosophers taught were from God, for \"God manifested\nthese to them, and all things that have been nobly said.\"[864] And\nAugustine, whilst deprecating the extravagant claims made for the great\nGentile teachers, allows \"that some of them made great discoveries, so\nfar as they received help from heaven; whilst they erred as far as they\nwere hindered by human frailty.\"[865] They had, as he elsewhere\nobserves, \"a distant vision of the truth, and learnt, from the teaching\nof nature, what prophets learnt from the spirit.\"[866] In addressing the\nGreeks, Theodoret says, \"Obey your own philosophers; let them be your\ninitiators; for they announced beforehand our doctrines.\" He held that\n\"in the depths of human nature there are characters inscribed by the\nhand of God.\" And that \"if the race of Abraham received the divine law,\nand the gift of prophecy, the God of the universe led other nations to\npiety by natural revelation, and the spectacle of nature.\"[867]\n\n[Footnote 861: \"First Apology,\" ch. xlvi.]\n\n[Footnote 862: \"Stromata,\" bk. i. ch. v.]\n\n[Footnote 863: \"Stromata,\" bk. vi. ch. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 864: \"Contra Celsum,\" bk. vi. ch. iii.]\n\n[Footnote 865: \"De Civitate Dei,\" bk. ii. ch. vii.]\n\n[Footnote 866: Sermon lxviii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 867: See Smith's \"Bible Dictionary,\" article \"Philosophy;\"\nPressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" p. II; Butler's \"Lectures on\nAncient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. pp. 28-40.]\n\nIn attempting to account for this partial harmony between Philosophy and\nRevelation, we find the Patristic writers adopting different theories.\nThey are generally agreed in maintaining some original connection, but\nthey differ as to its immediate source. Some of them maintained that the\nancient philosophers derived their purest light from the fountain of\nDivine Revelation. The doctrines of the Old Testament Scriptures were\ntraditionally diffused throughout the West before the rise of\nphilosophic speculation. If the theistic conceptions of Plato are\nsuperior to those of Homer it is accounted for by his (hypothetical)\ntour of inquiry among the Hebrew nation, as well as his Egyptian\ninvestigations. Others maintained that the similarity of views on the\ncharacter of the Supreme Being and the ultimate destination of humanity\nwhich is found in the writings of Plato and the teachings of the Bible\nis the consequence of _immediate_ inspiration. Origen, Jerome, Eusebius,\nClement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his own\nhigh prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however,\nthe facts of the case compel them to make some abatements. In the\nmid-current of this divine revelation are found many acknowledged\nerrors, which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator.\nPlato, then, was _partially_ inspired, and clouded the heavenly beam\nwith the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense.[868] Whilst a\nthird, and more reasonable, hypothesis was maintained by others. They\nregarded man as \"the offspring and image of the Deity,\" and maintained\nthere must be a correlation of the human and divine reason, and,\nconsequently, of all discovered truth to God. Therefore they expected to\nfind some traces of connection and correspondence between Divine and\nhuman thought, and some kindred ideas in Philosophy and Revelation.\n\"Ideas,\" says St. Augustine, \"are the primordial forms, as it were, the\nimmutable reason of things; they are not created, they are eternal, and\nalways the same: they are contained in the Divine intelligence and\nwithout being subject to birth and death, they are _types_ according to\nwhich is formed every thing that is born and dies.\" The copies of these\narchetypes are seen in nature, and are participated in by the reason of\nman; and there may therefore be some community of idea between man and\nGod, and some relation between Philosophy and Christianity.\n\n[Footnote 868: Butler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n41.]\n\nThe various attempts which have been made to trace the elevated theism\nand morality of Socrates and Plato to Jewish sources have signally\nfailed. Justin Martyr and Tertullian claim that the ancient philosophers\n\"borrowed from the Jewish prophets.\" Pythagoras and Plato are supposed\nto have travelled in the East in quest of knowledge.[869] The latter is\nimagined to have had access to an existing Greek version of the Old\nTestament in Egypt, and a strange oversight in chronology brings him\ninto personal intercourse with the prophet Jeremiah. A sober and\nenlightened criticism is compelled to pronounce all these statements as\nmere exaggerations of later times.[870] They are obviously mere\nsuppositions by which over-zealous Christians sought to maintain the\nsupremacy and authority of Scripture. The travels of Pythagoras are\naltogether mythical, the mere invention of Alexandrian writers, who\nbelieved that all wisdom flowed from the East.[871] That Plato visited\nEgypt at all, rests on the single authority of Strabo, who lived at\nleast four centuries after Plato; there is no trace in his own works of\nEgyptian research. His pretended travels in Phoenicia, where he gained\nfrom the Jews a knowledge of the true God, are more unreliable still.\nPlato lived in the fourth century before Christ (born B.C. 430), and\nthere is no good evidence of the existence of a Greek version of the Old\nTestament before that of \"the Seventy\" (Septuagint), made by order of\nPtolemy Philadelphus, B.C. 270. Jeremiah, the prophet of Israel, lived\ntwo centuries before Plato; consequently any personal intercourse\nbetween the two was simply impossible. Greek philosophy was\nunquestionably a development of Reason alone.[872]\n\n[Footnote 869: Mr. Watson adopts this hypothesis to account for the\ntheistic opinions of the ancient philosophers of Greece. See \"Institutes\nof Theology,\" vol. i. pp. 26-34.]\n\n[Footnote 870: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p.\n147.]\n\n[Footnote 871: Max Muller, \"Science of Language,\" p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 872: See on this subject, Ritter's \"History of Ancient\nPhilosophy,\" vol. i. pp. 147, 148; Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica, article\n\"Plato,\" vol. xvii. p. 787; Smith's \"Bible Dictionary,\" article\n\"Philosophy;\" and Thompson's \"Laws of Thought,\" p. 326.]\n\nSome of the ablest Christian scholars and divines of modern times, as\nCudworth, Neander, Trench, Pressens\u00e9, Merivale, Schaff, after the most\ncareful and conscientious investigation, have come to this conclusion,\nthat Greek philosophy fulfilled a preparatory mission for Christianity.\nThe general conclusions they reached are forcibly presented in the words\nof Pressens\u00e9:\n\nIt would be difficult to overstate the importance of Greek philosophy\nwhen viewed as a preparation to Christianity. Disinterested pursuit of\ntruth is always a great and noble task. The imperishable want of the\nhuman mind to go back to first principles, suffices to prove that this\nprinciple is divine. We may abuse speculation; we may turn it into one\nof the most powerful dissolvents of moral truths; and the defenders of\npositive creeds, alarmed by the attitude too often assumed by\nspeculation in the presence of religion, have condemned it as\nmischievous in itself, confounding in their unjust prejudice its use and\nits abuse. But, for all serious thinkers, philosophy is one of the\nhighest titles of nobility that humanity possesses: and when we consider\nits mission previous to Christianity, we feel convinced that it had its\nplace in the Divine plan. It was not religion in itself that philosophy,\nthrough its noblest representatives, combated, but polytheism. It\ndethroned the false gods. Adopting what was best in paganism, philosophy\nemployed it as an instrument to destroy paganism, and thus clear the way\nfor definite religion. Above all, it effectually contributed to purify\nthe idea of Divinity, though this purification was but an approximation.\nIf at times it caught glimpses of the highest spiritualism, yet it was\nunable to protect itself against the return and reaction of Oriental\ndualism. In spite of this imperfection, which in its way served the\ncause of Christianity by demonstrating the necessity of revelation, men\nlike Socrates and Plato fulfilled amongst their people a really sublime\nmission.\n\nThey were to the heathen world the great prophets of the human\nconscience, which woke up at their call. And the awakening of the moral\nsense was at once the glory and ruin of philosophy; for conscience, once\naroused, could only be satisfied by One greater than they, and must\nnecessarily reject all systems which proved themselves insufficient to\nrealize the moral idea they had evoked.\n\n\"But to perish thus, and for such a cause, is a high honor to a\nphilosophy. It was this made the philosophy of Greece, like the Hebrew\nlaws, though in an inferior sense, a schoolmaster that led to Jesus\nChrist, according to the expression of Clement of Alexandria. Viewed in\nthis light, it was a true gift of God, and had, too, the shadow of good\nthings to come, awakening the presentiment and desire of them, though it\ncould not communicate them. Nor can we conceive a better way to prepare\nfor the advent of Him who was to be 'the Desire of Nations' before\nbecoming their Saviour.\"[873]\n\n[Footnote 873: \"Religions before Christ,\" pp. 101, 102.]\n\nIn previous chapters we have endeavored to sketch the history of the\ndevelopment of metaphysical thought, of moral feeling and idea, and of\nreligious sentiment and want, which characterized Grecian civilization.\nIn now offering a brief _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of the history of that development,\nwith the design of more fully exhibiting the preparatory office it\nfulfilled for Christianity, we shall assume that the mind of the reader\nhas already been furnished and disciplined by preparatory principles. He\ncan scarce have failed to recognize that this development obeyed a\n_general law_, however modified by exterior and geographical conditions;\nthe same law, in fact, which governs the development of all individual\nfinite minds, and which law may be formulated thus:--_All finite mind\ndevelops itself, first, in instinctive determinations and spontaneous\nfaiths; then in rising doubt, and earnest questioning, and ill-directed\ninquiry; and, finally, in systematic philosophic thought, and rational\nbelief_. These different stages succeed each other in the individual\nmind. There is, first, the simplicity and trust of childhood; secondly,\nthe undirected and unsettled force of youth; and, thirdly, the wisdom of\nmature age. And these different stages have also succeeded each other in\nthe universal mind of humanity. There has been, 1st. _The era of\nspontaneous beliefs_--of popular and semi-conscious theism, morality,\nand religion, 2d. _The transitional age_--the age of doubt, of inquiry,\nand of ill-directed mental effort, ending in fruitless sophism, or in\nskepticism. 3d. _The philosophic or conscious age_--the age of\nreflective consciousness, in which, by the analysis of thought, the\nfirst principles of knowledge are attained, the necessary laws of\nthought are discovered, and man arrives at positive convictions, and\nrational beliefs. In the history of Grecian civilization, the first is\nthe Homeric age; the second is the pre-Socratic age, ending with the\nSophists; and the third is the grand Socratic period. History is thus\nthe development of the fundamental elements of humanity, according to an\nestablished law, and under conditions which are ordained and supervised\nby the providence of God. \"The unity of civilization is in the unity of\nhuman nature; its varieties, in the variety of the elements of\nhumanity,\" which elements have been successively developed in the course\nof history. All that is fundamental in human nature passes into the\nmovement of civilization. \"I say all that is fundamental; for it is the\nexcellency of history to take out, and throw away all that is not\nnecessary and essential. That which is individual shines for a day, and\nis extinguished forever, or stops at biography.\" Nothing endures, except\nthat which is fundamental and true--that which is vital, and organizes\nitself, develops itself, and arrives at an historical existence.\n\"Therefore as human nature is the matter and basis of history, history\nis, so to speak, the judge of human nature, and historical analysis is\nthe counter-proof of psychological analysis.\"[874]\n\n[Footnote 874: Cousin's \"Lectures on the History of Philosophy,\" vol. i.\np. 31.] Nature, individual mind, and collective humanity, all obey the\nlaw of progressive development; otherwise there could be no history, for\nhistory is only of that which has movement and progress. Now, all\nprogress is from the indefinite to the definite, from the inorganic to\nthe organic and vital, from the instinctive to the rational, from a dim,\nnebulous self-feeling to a high reflective consciousness, from sensuous\nimages to abstract conceptions and spiritual ideas. This progressive\ndevelopment of nature and humanity has not been a series of creations\n_de novo_, without any relation, in matter or form, to that which\npreceded. All of the present was contained in embryonic infoldment in\nthe past, and the past has contributed its results to the present.[875]\nThe present, both in nature, and history, and civilization, is, so to\nspeak, the aggregate and sum-total of the past. As the natural history\nof the earth may now be read in the successive strata and deposits which\nform its crust, so the history of humanity may be read in the successive\ndeposits of thought and language, of philosophy and art, which register\nits gradual progression. As the paleontological remains imbedded in the\nrocks present a succession of organic types which gradually improve in\nform and function, from the first sea-weed to the palm-tree, and from\nthe protozoa to the highest vertebrate, so the history of ancient\nphilosophy presents a gradual progress in metaphysical, ethical, and\ntheistic conceptions, from the unreflective consciousness of the Homeric\nage, to the high reflective consciousness of the Platonic period. And as\nall the successive forms of life in pre-Adamic ages were a preparation\nfor and a prophecy of the coming of man, so the advancing forms of\nphilosophic thought, during the grand ages of Grecian civilization, were\na preparation and a prophecy of the coming of the Son of God.\n\n[Footnote 875: The writer would not be understood as favoring the idea\nthat this development is simply the result of \"natural law.\" The\nconnection between the past and the present is not a material, but a\n_mental_ connection. It is the bond of Creative Thought and Will giving\nto organic forces a foreseen direction towards the working out of a\ngrand plan. See Agassiz, \"Contributions to Natural History,\" vol. i. pp.\n9, 10; Duke of Argyll, \"Reign of Law,\" ch. v.]\n\nWe shall now endeavor to trace this process of gradual preparation for\nChristianity in the Greek mind--\n\n(i.) _In the field of_ THEISTIC _conceptions_.\n\n(ii.) _In the department of_ ETHICAL _ideas and principles_.\n\n(iii.) _In the region of_ RELIGIOUS _sentiment_.\n\nIn the field of theistic conception the prop\u00e6deutic office of Grecian\nphilosophy is seen--\n\nI. _In the release of the popular mind from Polytheistic notion, and the\npurifying and spiritualizing of the Theistic idea_.\n\nThe idea of a Supreme Power, a living Personality, energizing in nature,\nand presiding over the affairs of men, is not the product of philosophy.\nIt is the immanent, spontaneous thought of humanity. It has, therefore,\nexisted in all ages, and revealed itself in all minds, even when it has\nnot been presented to the understanding as a definite conception, and\nexpressed by human language in a logical form. It is the thought which\ninstinctively arises in the opening reason of childhood, as the dim and\nshadowy consciousness of a living mind behind all the movement and\nchange of the universe. Then comes the period of doubt, of anxious\nquestioning, and independent inquiry. The youth seeks to account to\nhimself for this peculiar sentiment. He turns his earnest gaze towards\nnature, and through this living vesture of the infinite he seeks to\ncatch some glimpses of the living Soul. In some fact appreciable to\nsense, in some phenomenon he can see, or hear, or touch, he would fain\ngrasp the cause and reason of all that is. But in this field of inquiry\nand by this method he finds only a \"receding God,\" who falls back as he\napproaches, and is ever still beyond; and he sinks down in exhaustion\nand feebleness, the victim of doubt, perhaps despair. Still the\nsentiment of the Divine remains, a living force, in the centre of his\nmoral being. He turns his scrutinizing gaze within, and by\nself-reflection seeks for some rational ground for his instinctive\nfaith. There he finds some convictions he can not doubt, some ideas he\ncan not call in question, some thoughts he is compelled to think, some\nnecessary and universal principles which in their natural and logical\ndevelopment ally him to an unseen world, and correlate and bind him fast\nto an invisible, but real God. The more his mind is disciplined by\nabstract thought, the clearer do these necessary and universal\nprinciples become, and the purer and more spiritual his ideas of God.\nGod is now for him the First Principle of all principles, the First\nTruth of all truths; the Eternal Reason, the Immutable Righteousness,\nthe Supreme Good. The normal and healthy development of reason, the\nmaturity of thought, conduct to the recognition of the true God.\n\nAnd so it has been in the universal consciousness of our race as\nrevealed in history. There was first a period of spontaneous and\nunreflective Theism, in which man felt the consciousness of God, but\ncould not or did not attempt a rational explanation of his instinctive\nfaith. He saw God in clouds and heard Him in the wind. His smile\nnourished the corn, and cheered the vine. The lightnings were the\nflashes of his vengeful ire, and the thunder was his angry voice. But\nthe unity of God was feebly grasped, the rays of the Divinity seemed\ndivided and scattered amidst the separate manifestations of power, and\nwisdom, and goodness, and retribution, which nature presented. Then\nplastic art, to aid and impress the imagination, created its symbols of\nthese separate powers and principles, chiefly in human form, and gods\nwere multiplied. But all this polytheism still rested on a dim\nmonotheistic background, and all the gods were subordinated to\nZeus--\"the Father of gods and men.\" Humanity had still the sense of the\ndependence of all finite being on one great fountain-head of\nIntelligence and Power, and all the \"generated gods\" were the subjects\nand ministers of that One Supreme. This was the childhood of humanity so\nvividly represented in Homeric poetry.\n\nThen came a period of incipient reflection, and speculative thought, in\nwhich the attention of man is drawn outward to the study of nature, of\nwhich he can yet only recognize himself as an integral part. He searches\nfor some arch\u00ea--some first principle, appreciable to sense, which in its\nevolution shall furnish an explanation of the problem of existence. He\ntries the hypothesis of \"_water_\" then of \"_air_\" then of \"_fire_\" as\nthe primal element, which either is itself, or in some way infolds\nwithin itself an informing Soul, and out of which, by vital\ntransformation, all things else are produced. But here he failed to find\nan adequate explanation; his reason was not satisfied. Then he sought\nhis first principle in \"_numbers_\" as symbols, and, in some sense, as\nthe embodiment of the rational conceptions of order, proportion, and\nharmony,--God is the original _monas_--unity--One;--or else he sought it\nin purely abstract \"_ideas_\" as unity, infinity, identity, and all\nthings are the evolution of an eternal thought, one and identical, which\nis God. And here again he fails. Then he supposes an unlimited\n_migma_--a chaotic mixture of elements existing from eternity, which was\nseparated, combined, and organized by the energy of a Supreme Mind, the\n_nous_ of Anaxagoras. But he holds not firmly to this great principle;\n\"he recurs again to air, and ether, and water, as _causes_ for the\nordering of all things.\"[876] And after repeated attempts and failures,\nhe is disappointed in his inquiry, and falls a prey to doubt and\nskepticism. This was the early youth of our humanity, the period that\nopens with Thales and ends with the Sophists.\n\n[Footnote 876: Thus Socrates complains of Anaxagoras. See \"Ph\u00e6do,\" \u00a7\n108.]\n\nThe problem of existence still waits for and demands a solution. The\nheart of man, also, still cries out for the living God. The Socratic\nmaxim, \"know thyself,\" introverts the mental gaze, and self-reflection\nnow becomes the method of philosophy. The Platonic analysis of thought\nreveals elements of knowledge which are not derived from the outer\nworld. There are universal and necessary principles revealed in\nconsciousness which, in their natural and logical development, transcend\nconsciousness, and furnish the cognition of a world of Real Being,\nbeyond the world of sense. There are absolute truths which bridge the\nchasm between the seen and the unseen, the fleeting and the permanent,\nthe finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. There are\nnecessary laws of thought which are also found to be laws of things, and\nwhich correlate man to a living, personal, righteous Lord and Lawgiver.\nFrom absolute ideas Plato ascends to an _absolute Being_, the author of\nall finite existence. From absolute truths to an _absolute Reason_, the\nfoundation and essence of all truth. From the principle of immutable\nright to an _absolutely righteous Being_. From the necessary idea of the\ngood to a being of _absolute Goodness_--that is, to _God_. This is the\nmaturity of humanity, the ripening manhood of our race which was\nattained in the Socratic age.\n\nThe inevitable tendency of this effort of speculative thought, spread\nover ages, and of the intellectual culture which necessarily resulted,\nwas to undermine the old polytheistic religion, and to purify and\nelevate the theistic conception. The school of Elea rejected the gross\nanthropomorphism of the Homeric theology. Xenophanes, the founder of the\nschool, was a believer in\n\n      \"_ One God_, of all beings divine and human the greatest,\n      Neither in body alike unto mortals, neither in ideas.\"\n\nAnd he repels with indignation the anthropomorphic representations of\nthe Deity.\n\n\"But men foolishly think that gods are born as men are,\nAnd have, too, a dress like their own, and their voice, and their figure:\nBut if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and fingers,\nThen would horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen,\nPaint and fashion their god-forms, and give to them bodies\nOf like shape to their own, as they themselves too are fashioned.\"[877]\n\nEmpedocles also wages uncompromising war against all representations of\nthe Deity in human form--\n\n      \"For neither with head adjusted to limbs, like the human,\n      Nor yet with two branches down from the shoulders outstretching,\n      Neither with feet, nor swift-moving limbs,....\n      He is, wholly and perfectly, _mind_, ineffable, holy,\n      With rapid and swift-glancing thought pervading the world.\"[878]\n\n[Footnote 877: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. pp.\n431, 432.]\n\n[Footnote 878: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 495, 496.]\n\nWhen speaking of the mythology of the older Greeks, Socrates maintains a\nbecoming prudence; he is evidently desirous to avoid every thing which\nwould tend to loosen the popular reverence for divine things.[879] But\nhe was opposed to all anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity. His\nfundamental position was that the Deity is the Supreme Reason, which is\nto be honored by men as the source of all existence and the end of all\nhuman endeavor. Notwithstanding his recognition of a number of\nsubordinate divinities, he held that the Divine is one, because Reason\nis one. He taught that the Supreme Being is the immaterial, infinite\nGovernor of all;[880] that the world bears the stamp of his\nintelligence, and attests it by irrefragable evidence;[881] and that he\nis the author and vindicator of all moral laws.[882] So that, in\nreality, he did more to overthrow polytheism than any of his\npredecessors, and on that account was doomed to death.\n\n[Footnote 879: Xenophon, \"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. iii. \u00a7 3.]\n\n[Footnote 880: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. iv. \u00a7\u00a7 17, 18.]\n\n[Footnote 881: Id., ib., bk. i. ch. i. \u00a7 19.]\n\n[Footnote 882: Ritter's \"History of Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. ii. p. 63;\nButler's \"Lectures on Ancient Philosophy,\" vol. i. p. 359.]\n\nIt was, however, the matured dialectic of Plato which gave the\ndeath-blow to polytheism. \"Plato, the poet-philosopher, sacrificed Homer\nhimself to monotheism. We may measure the energy of his conviction by\nthe greatness of the sacrifice. He could not pardon the syren whose\nsongs had fascinated Greece, the fresh brilliant poetry that had\ninspired its religion. He crowned it with flowers, but banished it,\nbecause it had lowered the religious ideal of conscience.\" He was\nsensible of the beauty of the Homeric fables, but he was also keenly\nalive to their religious falsehood, and therefore he excluded the poets\nfrom his ideal republic. In the education of youth, he would forbid\nparents and teachers repeating \"the stories which Hesiod and Homer and\nthe other poets told us.\" And after instancing a number of these stories\n\"which deserve the gravest condemnation,\" he enjoins that God must be\nrepresented as he is in reality. \"God,\" says he, \"is, beyond all else,\ngood in reality, and therefore so to be represented;\" \"he can not do\nevil, or be the cause of evil;\" \"he is of simple essence, and can not\nchange, or be the subject of change;\" \"there is no imperfection in the\nbeauty or goodness of God;\" \"he is a God of truth, and can not lie;\" \"he\nis a being of perfect simplicity and truth in deed and word.\"[883] The\nreader can not fail to recognize the close resemblance between the\nlanguage of Plato and the language of inspiration.\n\nThe theistic conception, in Plato, reaches the highest purity and\nspirituality. God is \"_the Supreme Mind_,\" \"incorporeal,\"\n\"unchangeable,\" \"infinite,\" \"absolutely perfect,\" \"essentially good,\"\n\"unoriginated and eternal.\" He is \"the Father and Maker of the world,\"\n\"the efficient Cause of all things,\" \"the Monarch and Ruler of the\nworld,\" \"the Sovereign Mind that orders all things,\" and \"pervades all\nthings.\" He is \"the sole principle of all things,\" \"the beginning of all\ntruth,\" \"the fountain of all law and justice,\" \"the source of all order\nand beauty;\" in short, He is \"the beginning, middle, and end of all\nthings.\"[884]\n\n[Footnote 883: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. \u00a7\u00a7 18-21.]\n\n[Footnote 884: See _ante_, ch. xi. pp. 377, 378, where the references to\nPlato's writings are given.]\n\nAristotle continued the work of undermining polytheism. He defines God\nas \"the Eternal Reason\"--the Supreme Mind. \"He is the immovable cause of\nall movement in the universe, the all-perfect principle. This principle\nor essence pervades all things. It eternally possesses perfect\nhappiness, and its happiness consists in energy. This primeval mover is\nimmaterial, for its essence is energy--it is pure thought, thought\nthinking itself--the thought of thought.\"[885] Polytheism is thus swept\naway from the higher regions of the intelligence. \"For several to\ncommand,\" says he, \"is not good, there should be but one chief. A\ntradition, handed down from the remotest antiguity, and transmitted\nunder the veil of fable, says that all the stars are gods, and that the\nDivinity embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea other\nmythical statements have been agglomerated, with a view to influencing\nthe vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as for instance,\nthey feigned that these gods have human shape, and are like certain of\nthe animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if any one\nwill separate from all this the first point alone, namely, that they\nthought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be Divine, he may\nconsider it a divine utterance.\"[886] The popular polytheism, then, was\nbut a perverted fragment of a deeper and purer \"Theology.\" This passage\nis a sort of obituary of polytheism. The ancient glory of paganism had\npassed away. Philosophy had exploded the old theology. Man had learned\nenough to make him renounce the ancient religion, but not enough to\nfound a new faith that could satisfy both the intellect and the heart.\n\"Wherefore we are not to be surprised that the grand philosophic period\nshould be followed by one of incredulity and moral collapse,\ninaugurating the long and universal _decadence_ which was, perhaps, as\nnecessary to the work of preparation, as was the period of religious and\nphilosophic development.\"\n\n[Footnote 885: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 886: \"Metaphysics,\" bk. xi. ch. viii. \u00a7 19.]\n\nThe preparatory office of Greek philosophy in the region of speculative\nthought is seen--\n\n2. _In the development of the Theistic argument in a logical\nform._--Every form of the theistic proof which is now employed by\nwriters on natural theology to demonstrate the being of God was\napprehended, and logically presented, by one or other of the ancient\nphilosophers, excepting, perhaps, the \"moral argument\" drawn from the\nfacts of conscience.\n\n(I.) _The_ \u00c6TIOLOGICAL _proof_, or the argument based upon the principle\nof causality, which may be presented in the following form:\n\n      All genesis or becoming supposes a permanent and uncaused\n      Being, adequate to the production of all phenomena.\n\n      The sensible universe is a perpetual genesis, a succession\n      of appearances: it is \"always becoming, and never really\n      is.\"\n\n      Therefore, it must have its cause and origin in a permanent\n      and unoriginated Being, adequate to its production.\n\nThe major premise of this syllogism is a fundamental principle of\nreason--a self-evident truth, an axiom of common sense, and as such has\nbeen recognized from the very dawn of philosophy. [Greek: Adounaton\nginesthai ti ek m\u00eadenos prouparxonios]--_Ex nihilo nihil_--_Nothing\nwhich once was not, could ever of itself come into being_. Nothing can\nbe made or produced without an efficient cause, is the oldest maxim of\nphilosophy. It is true that this maxim was abusively employed by\nDemocritus and Epicurus to disprove a Divine creation of any thing out\nof nothing, yet the great body of ancient philosophers, as Pythagoras,\nXenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and\nAristotle, regarded it as the announcement of an universal conviction,\nthat nothing can be produced without an efficient cause;--order can not\nbe generated out of chaos, life out of dead matter, consciousness out of\nunconsciousness, reason out of unreason. A first principle of life, of\norder, of reason, must have existed anterior to all manifestions of\norder, of life, of intelligence, in the visible universe. It was clearly\nin this sense that Cicero understood this great maxim of the ancient\nphilosophers of Greece. With him \"_De nihilo nihil fit\"_ is equivalent\nto \"_Nihil sine causa_\"--nothing exists without a cause. This is\nunquestionably the form in which that fundamental law of thought is\nstated by Plato: \"Whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a\ncertain cause, for it is wholly impossible that any thing should be\ngenerated without a cause.\"[887] And the efficient cause is defined as\n\"a power whereby that which did not previously exist was afterwards made\nto be.\"[888] It is scarcely needful to remark that Aristotle, the\nscholar of Plato, frequently lays it down as a postulate of reason,\n\"that we admit nothing without a cause.\"[889] By an irresistible law of\nthought, \"_all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of\npower_, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue.\"\n\n[Footnote 887: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.; also \"Philebus,\" \u00a7 45.]\n\n[Footnote 888: \"Sophist,\" \u00a7 109.]\n\n[Footnote 889: \"Post. Analytic,\" bk. ii. ch. xvi.; \"Metaphysics,\" bk. i.\nch. i. \u00a7 3.]\n\nThe major premise of this syllogism is a fact of observation.\n\nTo the eye of sense and sensible observation, to scientific induction\neven in its highest generalizations, the visible universe presents\nnothing but a history and aggregation of phenomena--a succession of\nappearances or effects having more or less resemblance. It is a\nceaseless flow and change, \"a generation and corruption,\" \"a becoming,\nbut never really _is_;\" it is never in two successive moments the\n_same_.[890] All our cognitions of sameness, uniformity, causal\nconnection, permanent Being, real Power, are purely rational conceptions\n_given in thought_, supplied by the spontaneous intuition of reason as\nthe correlative prefix to the phenomena observed.[891]\n\n[Footnote 890: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 891: Ibid.]\n\nTherefore the ancient philosophers concluded justly, there must be\nsomething [Greek: ag\u00eann\u00eaton]--something which was never generated,\nsomething [Greek: autophy\u00eas] and [Greek: authypostaton]--self-originated\nand self-existing, something [Greek: tauton] and [Greek:\nai\u00f4nion]--immutable and eternal, the object of rational\napperception--which is the real ground and efficient cause of all that\nappears.\n\n(2.) The COSMOLOGICAL proof, or the argument based upon the principle of\norder, and thus presented:\n\n      Order, proportion, harmony, are the product and expression\n      of Mind.\n\n      The created universe reveals order, proportion, and harmony.\n\n      Therefore, the created universe is the product of Mind.\n\nThe fundamental law of thought which underlies this mode of proof was\nclearly recognized by Pythagoras. All harmony and proportion and\nsymmetry is the result of _unity_ evolving itself in and pervading\n_multiplicity_. Mind or reason is unity and indivisibility; matter is\ndiverse and multiple. Mind is the determinating principle; matter is\nindeterminate and indefinite. Confused matter receives form, and\nproportion, and order, and symmetry, by the action and interpenetration\nof the spiritual and indivisible element. In presence of facts of order,\nthe human reason instinctively and necessarily affirms the presence and\naction of Mind.\n\n\"Pythagoras had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty\nidea of Order. To his mind it seemed as the presiding genius of the\nserene and silent world. He had from his youth dwelt with delight upon\nthe eternal relations of space and number, in which the very idea of\nproportion seems to find its first and immediate development, until at\nlength it seemed as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in\nthese mysterious correspondences. The world, in all its departments,\nmoral and material, is a living arithmetic in its development, a\nrealized geometry in its repose; it is a '_cosmos_' (for the word is\nPythagorean), the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense of\neverlasting order; and the science of _numbers_ is the truest\nrepresentation of its eternal laws.\" Therefore, argued Pythagoras and\nthe Pythagoreans, as the reason of man can perceive the relations of an\neternal order in the proportions of extension and number, the laws of\nproportion, and symmetry, and harmony must inhere in a Divine reason, an\nintelligent soul, which moves and animates the universe. The harmonies\nof the world which address themselves to the human mind must be the\nproduct of a Divine mind. The world, in its real structure, must be the\nimage and copy of that divine proportion which the mind of man adores.\nIt is the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multiple\ndevelopment of the Eternal Unity, the Eternal One--that is, God.\n\nThe same argument is elaborated by Plato in his philosophy of beauty.\nGod is with him the last reason, the ultimate foundation, the perfect\nideal of all beauty--of all the order, proportion, harmony, sublimity,\nand excellence which reigns in the physical, the intellectual, and the\nmoral world. He is the \"Eternal Beauty, unbegotten and imperishable,\nexempt from all decay as well as increase--the perfect--the Divine\nBeauty\"[892] which is beheld by the pure mind in the celestial world.\n\n[Footnote 892: \"Banquet,\" \u00a7 35.]\n\n(3.) The Teleological proof, or the argument based upon the principle of\nintentionality or Final Cause, and is presented in the following form:\n\n      The choice and adaptation of means to the accomplishment of\n      special ends supposes an intelligent purpose, a Designing\n      Mind.\n\n      In the universe we see such choice and adaptation of means\n      to ends.\n\n      Therefore, the universe is the product of an intelligent,\n      personal Cause.\n\nThis is peculiarly the Socratic proof. He recognized the necessity and\nthe irresistibility of the conviction that the choice and adaptation of\nmeans to ends is the effect of Purpose, the expression of Will.[893]\nThere is an obviousness and a directness in this mode of argument which\nis felt by every human mind. In the \"Memorabilia\" Xenophon has preserved\na conversation of Socrates with Aristodemus in which he develops this\nproof at great length. In reading the dialogue[894] in which Socrates\ninstances the adaptation of our organization to the external world, and\nthe examples of design in the human frame, we are forcibly reminded of\nthe chapters of Paley, Whewell, and M'Cosh. Well might Aristodemus\nexclaim: \"The more I consider it, the more it is evident to me that man\nmust be the masterpiece of some great Artificer, carrying along with it\ninfinite marks of the love and favor of Him who has thus formed it.\" The\nargument from Final Causes is pursued by Plato in the \"Tim\u00e6us;\" and in\nAristotle, God is the Final Cause of all things.[895]\n\n[Footnote 893: \"Canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, whether a disposition of\nparts like this (in the human body) should be the work of chance, or of\nwisdom and contrivance?\"--\"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 894: \"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 895: Aristotle clearly recognizes that an end or final cause\nimplies Intelligence. \"The appearance of ends and means is a proof of\nDesign.\"--\"Nat. Ausc.,\" bk. ii. ch. viii.]\n\n(4.) The Ontological or Ideological proof, or the argument grounded on\nnecessary and absolute ideas, which may be thrown into the following\nsyllogism:\n\n      Every attribute or quality implies a subject, and absolute\n      modes necessarily suppose an Absolute Being. Necessary and\n      absolute truths or ideas are revealed in human reason as\n      absolute modes.\n\n      Therefore universal, necessary, and absolute ideas are modes\n      of the absolute subject--that is, God, the foundation and\n      source of all truth.\n\nThis is the Platonic proof. Plato recognized the principle of substance\n([Greek: ousia ypokeimenon]), and therefore he proceeds in the \"Tim\u00e6us\"\nto inquire for the real ground of all existence; and in the \"Republic,\"\nfor the real ground of all truth and certitude.\n\nThe universe consists of two parts, permanent existences and transient\nphenomena--being and genesis; the one eternally constant, the other\nmutable and subject to change; the former apprehended by the reason, the\nlatter perceived by sense. For each of these there must be a principle,\nsubject, or substratum--a principle or subject-matter, which is the\nground or condition of the sensible world, and a principle or substance,\nwhich is the ground and reason of the intelligible world or world of\nideas. The subject-matter, or ground of the sensible world, is \"the\nreceptacle\" and \"nurse\" of forms, an \"invisible species and formless\nreceiver (which is not earth, or air, or fire, or water) which receives\nthe immanence of the intelligible.\"[896] The subject or ground of the\nintelligible world is that in which ideal forms, or eternal archetypes\ninhere, and which impresses form upon the transitional element, and\nfashions the world after its own eternal models. This eternal and\nimmutable substance is God, who created the universe as a copy of the\neternal archetypes--the everlasting thoughts which dwell in his infinite\nmind.\n\n[Footnote 896: \"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch. xxiv.]\n\nThese copies of the eternal archetypes or models are perceived by the\nreason of man in virtue of its participation in the Ultimate Reason. The\nreason of man is the organ of truth; by an innate and inalienable right,\nit grasps unseen and eternal realities. The essence of the soul is akin\nto that which is real, permanent, and eternal;--_It is the offspring and\nimage of God_; therefore it has a true communion with the realities of\nthings, by virtue of this kindred and homogeneous nature. It can,\ntherefore, ascend from the universal and necessary ideas, which are\napprehended by the reason, to the absolute and supreme Idea, which is\nthe attribute and perfection of God. When the human mind has\ncontemplated any object of beauty, any fact of order, proportion,\nharmony, and excellency, it may rise to the notion of a quality common\nto all objects of beauty--from a single beautiful body to two, from two\nto all others; from beautiful bodies to beautiful sentiments, from\nbeautiful sentiments to beautiful thoughts, until, from thought to\nthought, we arrive at the highest thought, which has no other object\nthan the perfect, absolute, _Divine Beauty_.[897] When a man has, from\nthe contemplation of instances of virtue, risen to the notion of a\nquality common to all these instances, this quality becomes the\nrepresentative of an ineffable something which, in the sphere of\nimmutable reality, answers to the conception in his soul. \"At the\nextreme limits of the intellectual world is the _Idea of the Good_,\nwhich is perceived with difficulty, but, in fine, can not be perceived\nwithout concluding that it is the source of all that is beautiful and\ngood; that in the visible world it produces light, and the star whence\nlight directly comes; that in the invisible world it directly produces\ntruth and intelligence.\"[898] This _absolute Good is God_.\n\n[Footnote 897: \"Banquet,\" \u00a7 34.]\n\n[Footnote 898: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. iii.]\n\nThe order in which these several methods of proof were developed, will\nat once present itself to the mind of the reader as the natural order of\nthought. The first and most obvious aspect which nature presents to the\nopening mind is that of movement and change--a succession of phenomena\nsuggesting the idea of _power_. Secondly, a closer attention reveals a\nresemblance of phenomena among themselves, a uniformity of nature--an\norder, proportion, and harmony pervading the _cosmos_, which suggest an\n_identity and unity of power and of reason_, pervading and controlling\nall things. Thirdly, a still closer inspection of nature reveals a\nwonderful adaptation of means to the fulfillment of special ends, of\norgans designed to fulfill specific functions, suggesting the idea of\n_purpose_, _contrivance_, and _choice_, and indicating that the power\nwhich moves and determines the universe is a _personal_, _thinking_, and\n_voluntary_ agent. And fourthly, a profounder study of the nature of\nthought, an analysis of personal consciousness, reveals that there are\nnecessary principles, ideas, and laws, which universally govern and\ndetermine thought to definite and immovable conceptions--as, for\nexample, the principles of causality, of substance, of identity or\nunity, of order, of intentionality; and that it is only under these laws\nthat we can conceive the universe. By the law of substance we are\ncompelled to regard these ideas, which are not only laws of thought but\nalso of things, as inherent in a subject, or Being, who made all things,\nand whose ideas are reflected in the reason of man. Thus from universal\nand necessary ideas we rise to the _absolute Idea_, from immutable\nprinciples to a _First Principle of all principles_, a _First Thought_\nof all thoughts--that is, to _God_. This is the history of the\ndevelopment of thought in the individual, and in the race--_cause_,\n_order_, _design_, _idea_, _being_, GOD.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nTHE PROP\u00c6DEUTIC OFFICE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY _(continued)_.\n\n\n      \"If we regard this sublime philosophy as a preparation for\n      Christianity instead of seeking in it a substitute for the\n      Gospel, we shall not need to overstate its grandeur in order\n      to estimate its real value.\"--Pressens\u00e9.\n\n      \"Plato made me to know the true God. Jesus Christ showed me\n      the way to Him.\"--St. Augustine.\n\nThe preparatory office of Grecian philosophy is also seen in _the\ndepartment of morals_.\n\nI. _In the awakening and enthronement of Conscience as a law of duty,\nand the elevation and purification of the Moral Idea_.\n\nThe same law of evolution, which we have seen governing the history of\nspeculative thought, may also be traced as determining the progress of\nethical inquiry. In this department there are successive stages marked,\nboth in the individual and the national mind. There is, first, the\nsimplicity and trust of childhood, submitting with unquestioning faith\nto prescribed and arbitrary laws; then the unsettled and ill-directed\nforce of youth, questioning the authority of laws, and asking reasons\nwhy this or that is obligatory; then the philosophic wisdom of riper\nyears, recognizing an inherent law of duty, which has an absolute\nrightness and an imperative obligation. There is first a dim and shadowy\napprehension of some lines of moral distinction, and some consciousness\nof obligation, but these rest mainly upon an outward law--the observed\npractice of others, or the command of the parent as, in some sense, the\ncommand of God. Then, to attain to personal convictions, man passes\nthrough a stage of doubt; he asks for a ground of obligation, for an\nauthority that shall approve itself to his own judgment and reason. At\nlast he arrives at some ultimate principles of right, some immutable\nstandard of duty; he recognizes an inward law of conscience, and it\nbecomes to him as the voice of God. He extends his analysis to history,\nand he finds that the universal conscience of the race has, in all ages,\nuttered the same behest. Should he live in Christian times, he discovers\na wondrous harmony between the voice of God within the heart, and the\nvoice of God within the pages of inspiration. And now the convention of\npublic opinion, and the laws of the state, are revered and upheld by\nhim, just so far as they bear the imprimatur of reason and of\nconscience--that is, of God.\n\nThis history of the normal development of the individual mind has its\ncounterpart in the history of humanity. There is (1.) _The age of\npopular and unconscious morality_; (2.) _The transitional, skeptical, or\nsophistical age_; and (3.) _The philosophic or conscious age of\nmorality_.[899] In the \"Republic\" of Plato, we have these three eras\nrepresented by different persons, through the course of the dialogue.\nThe question is started--what is Justice? and an answer is given from\nthe stand-point of popular morality, by Polemarchus, who quotes the\nwords of the poet Simonides,\n\n      \"To give to each his due is just;\"[900]\n\nthat is, justice is paying your debts. This doctrine being proved\ninadequate, an answer is given from the Sophistical point of view by\nThrasymachus, who defines justice as \"the advantage of the\nstrongest\"--that is, might is right, and right is might.[901] This\nanswer being sharply refuted, the way is opened for a more philosophic\naccount, which is gradually evolved in book iv., Glaucon and Adimantus\npersonifying the practical understanding, which is gradually brought\ninto harmony with philosophy, and Socrates the higher reason, as the\npurely philosophic conception. Justice is found to be the right\nproportion and harmonious development of all the elements of the soul,\nand the equal balance of all the interests of society, so as to secure a\nwell-regulated and harmonious whole.\n\n[Footnote 899: Grant's \"Aristotle's Ethics,\" vol. i. p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 900: \"Republic,\" bk. i. \u00a7 6.]\n\n[Footnote 901: Ibid., bk. i. \u00a7 12.]\n\nThe era of _popular and unconscious morality_ is represented by the\ntimes of Homer, Hesiod, the Gnomic poets, and \"the Seven Wise Men of\nGreece.\"\n\nThis was an age of instinctive action, rather than reflection--of poetry\nand feeling, rather than analytic thought. The rules of life were\npresented in maxims and proverbs, which do not rise above prudential\ncounsels or empirical deductions. Morality was immediately associated\nwith the religion of the state, and the will of the gods was the highest\nlaw for men. \"Homer and Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, constituted the\neducational course,\" to which may be added the saws and aphorisms of the\nSeven Wise Men, and we have before us the main sources of Greek views of\nduty. When the question was asked--\"What is right?\" the answer was given\nby a quotation from Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, and the like. The morality\nof Homer \"is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a\nheroic life, rather than a philosophic theory. It is mixed up with a\nreligion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of nature,\nand in a deification of the strong and brilliant qualities of human\nnature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard for a future life. It\nclings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the\nstate after death looms up in the distance as a cold and repugnant\nshadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The\ndistinction between a noble and ignoble life is strongly marked in\nHomer, and yet a sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems\nfluctuating\" and confused.[902] A sensuous conception of happiness is\nthe chief good, and mere temporal advantage the principal reward of\nvirtue. We hear nothing of the approving smile of conscience, of inward\nself-satisfaction, and peace, and harmony, resulting from the practice\nof virtue. Justice, energy, temperance, chastity, are enjoined, because\nthey secure temporal good. And yet, with all this imperfection, the\npoets present \"a remarkable picture of primitive simplicity, chastity,\njustice, and practical piety, under the three-fold influence of right\nmoral feeling, mutual and fear of the divine displeasure.\"[903]\n\n[Footnote 902: Grant's \"Aristotle's Ethics,\" vol. i. p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 903: Tyler, \"Theology of the Greek Poets,\" p. 167.]\n\nThe _transitional, skeptical_, or _sophistical era_ begins with\nProtagoras. Poetry and proverbs had ceased to satisfy the reason of man.\nThe awakening intellect had begun to call in question the old maxims and\n\"wise saws,\" to dispute the arbitrary authority of the poets, and even\nto arraign the institutions of society. It had already begun to seek for\nsome reasonable foundation of authority for the opinions, customs, laws,\nand institutions which had descended to them from the past, and to ask\nwhy men were obliged to do this or that? The question whether there is\nat bottom any real difference between truth and error, right and wrong,\nwas now fairly before the human mind. The ultimate standard of all truth\nand all right, was now the grand object of pursuit. These inquiries were\nnot, however, conducted by the Sophists with the best motives. They were\nnot always prompted by an earnest desire to know the truth, and an\nearnest purpose to embrace and do the right. They talked and argued for\nmere effect--to display their dialectic subtilty, or their rhetorical\npower. They taught virtue for mere emolument and pay. They delighted, as\nCicero tells us, to plead the opposite sides of a cause with equal\neffect. And they found exquisite pleasure in raising difficulties,\nmaintaining paradoxes, and passing off mere tricks of oratory for solid\nproofs. This is the uniform representation of the sophistical spirit\nwhich is given by all the best writers who lived nearest to their times,\nand who are, therefore, to be presumed to have known them best.\nGrote[904] has made an elaborate defense of the Sophists; he charges\nPlato with gross misrepresentation. His portraits of them are denounced\nas mere caricatures, prompted by a spirit of antagonism; all antiquity\nis presumed to have been misled by him. No one, however, can read\nGrant's \"Essay on the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece\"[905]\nwithout feeling that his vindication of Plato is complete and\nunanswerable: \"Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching a lax\nmorality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in\nholding wicked opinions; he represents them as only too orthodox in\ngeneral,[906] but capable of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for\nthe sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with the moral\nconvictions than directly attacks them.\" The Sophists were wanting in\ndeep conviction, in moral earnestness, in sincere love of truth, in\nreverence for goodness and purity, and therefore their trifling,\ninsincere, and paradoxical teaching was unfavorable to goodness of life.\nThe tendency of their method is forcibly depicted in the words of Plato:\n\"There are certain dogmas relating to what is _just_ and _good_ in which\nwe have been brought up from childhood--obeying and reverencing them.\nOther opinions recommending pleasure and license we resist, out of\nrespect for the old hereditary maxims. Well, then, a question comes up\nconcerning what is right? He gives some answer such as he has been\ntaught, and straightway is refuted. He tries again, and is again\nrefuted. And, when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the\nopinion that _nothing is either right or wrong_; and in the same way it\nhappens about the just and the good, and all that before we have held in\nreverence. On this, he naturally abandons his allegiance to the old\nprinciples and takes up with those he before resisted, and so, from\nbeing a good citizen, he becomes lawless.\"[907] And, in point of fact,\nthis was the theoretical landing-place of the Sophists. We do not say\nthey became practically \"lawless\" and antinomian, but they did arrive at\nthe settled opinion that right and wrong, truth and error, are solely\nmatter of private opinion and conventional usage. Man's own fluctuating\nopinion is the measure and standard of all things.[908] They who \"make\nthe laws, make them for their own advantage.\"[909] There is no such\nthing as Eternal Right. \"That which _appears_ just and honorable to each\ncity is so for that city, as long as the opinion prevails.\"[910]\n\n[Footnote 904: \"History of Greece.\"]\n\n[Footnote 905: Aristotle's \"Ethics,\" vol. i. ch. ii.]\n\n[Footnote 906: \"His teachings will be good counsels about a man's own\naffairs, how best to govern his family; and also about the affairs of\nthe state, how most ably to administer and speak of state\naffairs.\"--\"Protag.,\" \u00a7 26.]\n\n[Footnote 907: \"Republic,\" bk. vii. ch. xvii.]\n\n[Footnote 908: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7 23.]\n\n[Footnote 909: \"Gorgias,\" \u00a7\u00a7 85-89.]\n\n[Footnote 910: \"The\u00e6tetus,\" \u00a7\u00a7 65-75.]\n\nThe age of the Sophists was a transitional period--a necessary, though,\nin itself considered, an unhappy stage in the progress of the human\nmind; but it opened the way for, _The Socratic, philosophic_, or\n_conscious age of morals_. It has been said that \"before Socrates there\nwas no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct.\" If by this is\nmeant that prior to Socrates men simply followed the maxims of \"the\nTheologians,\"[911] and obeyed the laws of the state, without reflection\nand inquiry as to the intrinsic character of the acts, and without any\nanalysis and exact definition, so as to attain to principles of ultimate\nand absolute right, it must be accepted as true--there was no philosophy\nof morals. Socrates is therefore justly regarded as \"the father of moral\nphilosophy.\" Aristotle says that he confined himself chiefly to ethical\ninquiries. He sought a determinate conception and an exact definition of\nvirtue. As Xenophon has said of him, \"he never ceased asking, What is\npiety? what is impiety? what is noble? what is base? what is just? what\nis unjust? what is temperance? what is madness?\"[912] And these\nquestions were not asked in the Sophistic spirit, as a dialectic\nexercise, or from idle curiosity. He was a perfect contrast to the\nSophists. They had slighted Truth, he made her the mistress of his soul.\nThey had turned away from her, he longed for more perfect communion with\nher. They had deserted her for money and renown, he was faithful to her\nin poverty.[913] He wanted to know what piety was, that he might be\npious. He desired to know what justice, temperance, nobility, courage\nwere, that he might cultivate and practise them. He wrote no books,\ndelivered no lectures; he instituted no school; he simply conversed in\nthe shop, the market-place, the banquet-hall, and the prison. This\nphilosophy was not so much a _doctrine_ as a _life_. \"What is remarkable\nin him is not the _system_ but the _man_. The memory he left behind him\namongst his disciples, though idealized--the affection, blended with\nreverence, which they never ceased to feel for his person, bear\ntestimony to the elevation of his character and his moral purity. We\nrecognize in him a Greek of Athens--one who had imbibed many dangerous\nerrors, and on whom the yoke of pagan custom still weighed; but his life\nwas nevertheless a noble life; and it is to calumny we must have\nrecourse if we are to tarnish its beauty by odious insinuations, as\nLucian did, and as has been too frequently done, after him, by\nunskillful defenders of Christianity,[914] who imagine it is the gainer\nby all that degrades human nature. Born in a humble position, destitute\nof all the temporal advantages which the Greeks so passionately loved,\nSocrates exerted a kingship over minds. His dominion was the more real\nfor being less apparent.... His power consisted of three things: his\ndevoted affection for his disciples, his disinterested love of truth,\nand the perfect harmony of his life and doctrine.... If he recommended\ntemperance and sobriety, he also set the example; poorly clad, satisfied\nwith little, he disdained all the delicacies of life. He possessed every\nspecies of courage. On the field of battle he was intrepid, and still\nmore intrepid when he resisted the caprices of the multitude who\ndemanded of him, when he was a senator, to commit the injustice of\nsummoning ten generals before the tribunals. He also infringed the\niniquitous orders of the thirty tyrants of Athens. The satires of\nAristophanes neither moved nor irritated him. The same dauntless\nfirmness he displayed when brought before his judges, charged with\nimpiety. 'If it is your wish to absolve me on condition that I\nhenceforth be silent, I reply I love and honor you, but I ought rather\nto obey the gods than you. Neither in the presence of judges nor of the\nenemy is it permitted me, or any other man, to use every sort of means\nto escape death. It is not death but crime that it is difficult to\navoid; crime moves faster than death. So I, old and heavy as I am, have\nallowed myself to be overtaken by death, while my accusers, light and\nvigorous, have allowed themselves to be overtaken by the light-footed\ncrime. I go, then, to suffer death; they to suffer shame and iniquity. I\nabide by my punishment, as they by theirs. All is according to order.'\nIt was the same fidelity to duty that made Socrates refuse to escape\nfrom prison, in order not to violate the laws of his country, to which,\neven though irritated, more respect is due than to a father. 'Let us\nwalk in the path,' he says 'that God has traced for us.' These last\nwords show the profound religious sentiment which animated Socrates....\nIt is impossible not to feel that there was something divine in such a\nlife crowned with such a death.\"[914]\n\n[Footnote 911: Homer, Hesiod, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 912: \"Memorabilia,\" bk. i. ch. i. p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 913: Lewes's \"Biographical History of Philosophy,\" p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 914: Watson's \"Institutes of Theology,\" vol. i. p. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 915: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" pp. 109-111.]\n\nSocrates laid the foundation for conscious morality by placing the\nground of right and wrong in an eternal and unchangeable reason which\nilluminates the reason and conscience of every man. He often asserted\nthat morality is a science which can not be taught. It depends mainly\nupon principles which are discovered by an inward light. Accordingly he\nregarded it as the main business of education to \"draw out\" into the\nlight of consciousness the principles of right and justice which are\ninfolded within the conscience of man--to deliver the mind of the secret\ntruth which was striving towards the light of day. Therefore he called\nhis method the \"maieutic\" or \"obstetric\" art. He felt there was\nsomething divine in all men (answering to his _to daimonion_ or\n_daimonion ti_--a divine and supernatural something--a warning\n\"voice\"--a gnomic \"sign\"--a \"law of God written on the heart\"), which by\na system of skillful interrogations he sought to elicit, so that each\nmight hear for himself the voice of God, and, hearing, might obey. Thus\nwas he the \"great prophet of the human conscience,\" and a messenger of\nGod to the heathen world, to prepare the way of the Lord.\n\nThe morality of conscience was carried to its highest point by Plato.\nFrom the moment he became the disciple of Socrates he sympathized deeply\nwith the spirit and the method of his master. He had the same deep\nseriousness of spirit, that same earnestness of purpose, that same\ninward reverence for justice, and purity, and goodness, which dwelt in\nthe heart of Socrates. A naturally noble nature, he loved truth with all\nthe glow and fervor of his young heart. He felt that if any thing gave\nmeaning and value to life, it must be the contemplation of absolute\ntruth, absolute beauty, and absolute Good. This absolute Good is God,\nwho is the first principle of all ideas, the fountain of all the order\nand proportion and beauty of the universe, the source of all the good\nwhich exists in nature and in man. To practise goodness--to conform the\ncharacter to the eternal models of order, proportion, and excellence, is\nto resemble God. To aspire after perfection of moral being, to secure\nassimilation to God ([Greek: omoiosis The\u00f4]) is the noble aspiration of\nPlato's soul.\n\nWhen we read the \"Gorgias,\" the \"Philebus,\" and especially the\n\"Republic,\" with what noble joy are we filled on hearing the voice of\nconscience, like a harp swept by a seraph's hand, uttering such\ndeep-toned melodies! How does he drown the clamors of passion, the\ncalculations of mere expediency, the sophism of mere personal interest\nand utility. If he calls us to witness the triumph of the wicked in the\nfirst part of the \"Republic,\" it is in order that we may at the end of\nthe book see the deceitfulness of their triumph. \"As to the wicked,\" he\nsays, \"I maintain that even if they succeed at first in concealing what\nthey are, most of them betray themselves at the end of their career.\nThey are covered with opprobrium, and present evils are nothing compared\nwith those that _await them in the other life_. As to the just man,\nwhether in sickness or in poverty, these imaginary evils will turn to\nhis advantage in this life, _and after his death_; because the\nprovidence of the gods is necessarily attentive to the interests of him\nwho labors to become just, and to attain, by the practice of virtue, to\nthe most perfect resemblance to God which is possible to man.\"[916] He\nrises above all \"greatest happiness principles,\" and asserts distinctly\nin the \"Gorgias\" that it is better to suffer wrong than to do\nwrong.[917] \"I maintain,\" says he, \"that what is most shameful is not to\nbe struck unjustly on the cheek, or to be wounded in the body; but that\nto strike and wound me unjustly, to rob me, or reduce me to slavery--to\ncommit, in a word, any kind of injustice towards me, or what is mine--is\na thing far worse and more odious for him who commits the injustice,\nthan for me who suffer it.\"[918] It is a great combat, he says, greater\nthan we think, that wherein the issue is whether we shall be virtuous or\nwicked. Neither glory, nor riches, nor dignities, nor poetry, deserves\nthat we should neglect justice for them. The moral idea in Plato has\nsuch intense truth and force, that it has at times a striking analogy\nwith the language of the Holy Scriptures.[919]\n\n[Footnote 916: \"Republic,\" bk. x. ch. xii.]\n\n[Footnote 917: \"Gorgias,\" \u00a7\u00a7 59-80.]\n\n[Footnote 918: Ibid., \u00a7 137.]\n\n[Footnote 919: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ,\" p. 129.]\n\nThe obligation of moral rectitude is, by Plato, derived from the\nauthoritative utterances of conscience as the voice of God. We must do\nright because reason and conscience say it is right. In the \"Euthyphron\"\nhe maintains that the moral quality of actions is not dependent on the\narbitrary will of a Supreme Governor;--\"an act is not holy because the\ngods love it, but the gods love it because it is holy.\" The eternal law\nof right dwells in the Eternal Reason of God, the idea of right in all\nhuman minds is a ray of that Eternal Reason; and the requirement of the\ndivine law that we shall do right is, and must be, in harmony with both.\n\nThe present life is regarded by Plato as a state of probation and\ndiscipline, the future life as one of reward and punishment.[920]\n\n[Footnote 920: \"Republic,\" bk. x. ch. xv., xvi.; \"Laws,\" bk. x. ch.\nxiii.]\n\nPlato was thus to the heathen world \"the great apostle of the moral\nidea;\" he followed up and completed the work of Socrates. \"The voice of\nGod, that still found a profound echo in man's heart, possessed in him\nan organ to which all Greece gave ear; and the austere revelation of\nconscience this time embodied in language too harmonious not to entice\nby the beauty of form, a nation of artists, they received it. The tables\nof the eternal law, carved in purest marble and marvellously sculptured,\nwere read by them.\"\n\nIn Plato both the theistic conception and the moral idea seem to have\ntouched the zenith. The philosophy of Aristotle, considered as a whole,\nappears on one side to have passed the line of the great Hellenic\nperiod. If it did not inaugurate, it at least prepared the way for the\ndecline. It perfected logic, as the instrument of ratiocination, and\ngave it exactness and precision, Yet taken all in all, it was greatly\ninferior to its predecessor. From the moral point of view it is a\ndecided retrogression. The god of Aristotle is indifferent to virtue. He\nis pure thought rather than moral perfection. He takes no cognizance of\nman. Morality has no eternal basis, no divine type, and no future\nreward. Therefore Aristotle's philosophy had little power over the\nconscience and heart.\n\nDuring the grand Platonic period human reason made its loftiest flight,\nit rose aloft and soared towards heaven, but alas! its wings, like those\nof Icarus, melted in the sun and it fell to earth again. Instead of wax\nit needed the strong \"eagle pinions of faith\" which revelation only can\nsupply. The decadence is strongly marked both in the Epicurean and Stoic\nschools. They both express the feeling of exhaustion, disappointment,\nand despair. The popular theology had lost its hold upon the public\nmind. The gods no longer visited the earth. \"The mysterious voice which,\naccording to the poetic legend related by Plutarch, was heard out at\nsea--'Great Pan is dead'--rose up from every heart; the voice of an\nincredulous age proclaimed the coming end of paganism. The oracles were\ndumb.\" There was no vision in the land. All faith in a beneficent\noverruling Providence was lost, and the hope of immortality was\nwell-nigh gone. The doctrines of a resurrection and a judgment to come,\nwere objects of derisive mockery.[921] Philosophy directed her attention\nsolely to the problem of individual well-being on earth; it became\nsimply a philosophy of life, and not, as with Plato, \"a preparation for\ndeath.\" The grosser minds sought refuge in the doctrines of Epicurus.\nThey said, \"Pleasure is the chief good, the end of life is to enjoy\nyourself;\" to this end \"dismiss the fear of gods, and, above all, the\nfear of death.\" The nobler souls found an asylum with the Stoics. They\nsaid, \"Fata nos ducunt--The Fates lead us! Live conformable to reason.\nEndure and abstain!\" Notwithstanding numerous and serious errors, the\nethical system of the Stoics was wonderfully pure. This must be\nconfessed by any one who reads the \"Enchiridion\" of Epictetus, and the\n\"Meditations\" of Aurelius. \"The highest end of life is to contemplate\ntruth and to obey the Eternal Reason. God is to be reverenced above all\nthings, and universally submitted to. The noblest office of reason is to\nsubjugate passion and conduct to virtue. Virtue is the supreme good,\nwhich is to be pursued for its own sake, and not from fear or hope. That\nis sufficient for happiness which is seated only in the mind, and\ntherefore independent of external things. The consciousness of\nwell-doing is reward enough without the applause of others. And no fear\nof loss, or pain, or even death, must be suffered to turn us aside from\ntruth and virtue.\"[922]\n\n[Footnote 921: Acts xvii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 922: Marcus Aurelius.]\n\nThe preparatory office of Christianity in the field of ethics is further\nseen,\n\nII. _In the fact that, by an experiment conducted on the largest scale,\nit demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect ideal\nof moral excellence, and develop the moral forces necessary to secure\nits realization_.\n\nWe have seen that the moral idea in Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, Marcus\nAurelius, and Seneca rose to a sublime height, and that, under its\ninfluence, they developed a noble and heroic character. At the same time\nit must be conceded that their ethical system was marked by signal\nblemishes and radical defects. After all its excellence, it did not give\nroundness, completeness, and symmetry to moral life. The elements which\nreally purify and ennoble man, and lend grace and beauty to life, were\nutterly wanting. Their systems were rather a discipline of the reason\nthan a culture of the heart. The reason held in check the lower passions\nand propensities of the nature but it did not evoke the softer, gentler,\npurer emotions of the soul. The cardinal virtues of the ancient ethical\nsystems are Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Courage, all which are in\nthe last analysis reduced to Wisdom. Humility, Meekness, Forgiveness of\ninjuries, Love of even enemies, Universal Benevolence, Real\nPhilanthropy, the graces which give beauty to character and bless\nsociety, are scarcely known. It is true that in Epictetus and Seneca we\nhave some counsels to humility, to forbearance, and forgiveness; but it\nmust be borne in mind that Christianity was now in the air, exerting an\nindirect influence beyond the limits of the labors of the indefatigable\nmissionaries of the Cross.[923] By their predecessors, these qualities\nwere disparaged rather than upheld. Resentment of injuries was applauded\nas a virtue, and meekness was proclaimed a defect and a weakness. They\nknew nothing of a forgiving spirit, and were strangers to the charity\n\"which endureth all things, hopeth all things, and never fails.\" The\nenlarged philanthrophy which overleaps the bounds of kindred and\nnationality, and embraces a common humanity in its compassionate regards\nand benevolent efforts, was unknown. Socrates, the noblest of all the\nGrecians, was in no sense cosmopolitan in his feeling. His whole nature\nand character wore a Greek impress. He could scarce be tempted to go\nbeyond the gates of Athens, and his care was all for the Athenian\npeople. He could not conceive an universal philanthropy. Plato, in his\nsolicitude to reduce his ideal state to a harmonious whole, answering to\nhis idea of Justice, sacrificed the individual. He superseded private\nproperty, broke up the sacred relations of family and home, degraded\nwoman, and tolerated slavery. Selfishness was to be overcome, and\npolitical order maintained, by a rigid communism. To harmonize\nindividual rights and national interests, was the wisdom reserved for\nthe fishermen of Galilee. The whole method of Plato's \"Politeia,\"\nbreathes the spirit of legalism in all its severity, untempered by the\nspirit of Love. This was the living force which was wanting to give\nenergy to the ideals of the reason and conscience, to furnish high\nmotive to virtue, to prompt to deeds of heroic sacrifice and suffering\nfor the good of others; and this could not be inspired by philosophy,\nnor constrained by legislation. This love must descend from above. \"The\nPlatonic love\" was a mere intellectual appreciation of beauty, and\norder, and proportion, and excellence. It was not the love of man as the\noffspring and image of God, as the partaker of a common nature, and the\nheir of a common immortality. Such love was first revealed on earth by\nthe incarnate Son of God, and can only be attained by human hearts under\nthe inspiration of his teaching and life, and the renewing influence of\nthe Holy Spirit. \"Love is of God, and every one that loveth is born of\nGod and knoweth God.\" To \"love our neighbor as ourself\" is the golden\nprecept of the Son of God, who is incarnate Love. The equality of all\nmen as \"the offspring of God\" had been nominally recognized by the Stoic\nphilosophers; its realization had been rendered possible to the popular\nthought by Roman conquest, law, and jurisprudence; these had prepared\nthe way for its fullest announcement and practical recognition by the\nworld. At this providential juncture St. Paul appears on Mars' Hill, and\nin the presence of the assembled philosophers proclaims, \"_God hath made\nof one blood all nations of men_.\" A lofty ideal of moral excellence had\nbeen attained by Plato--the conception of a high and inflexible\nmorality, which contrasted most vividly with the depravity which\nprevailed in Athenian society. The education \"of the public assemblies,\nthe courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gathered\" was\nunfavorable to virtue. And the inadequacy of all mere human teaching to\nresist this current of evil, and save the young men of the age from\nruin, is touchingly and mournfully confessed by Plato. \"There is not,\nthere never was, there never will be a moral education possible that can\ncountervail the education of which these are the dispensers; that is,\n_human_ education: I except, with the proverb, that which is Divine.\nAnd, truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck,\ncan only escape _by the special favor of heaven.\"_[924] He affirms again\nand again that man can not by himself rise to purity and goodness.\n\"Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but it comes\nto us by a divine influence. Virtue is the gift of God in those who\npossess it.\"[925] That \"gift of God\" was about to be bestowed, in all\nits fullness of power and blessing, \"_through Jesus Christ our Lord_.\"\n\n[Footnote 923: Seneca lived in the second century; Epictetus, in the\nlatter part of the first century.]\n\n[Footnote 924: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.]\n\n[Footnote 925: \"Meno;\" see conclusion.]\n\nIn the department of _religious feeling_ and _sentiment_, the\nprop\u00e6deutic office of Greek philosophy is seen, in general, in the\nrevealing of the immediate spiritual wants of the soul, and the distinct\npresentation of the problem which Christianity alone can solve.\n\nI. _It awakened in man the sense of distance and estrangement from God,\nand the need of a Mediator--\"a daysman betwixt us, that might lay his\nhand upon us both_\"[926]\n\n[Footnote 926: Job ix. 33.]\n\nDuring the period of unconscious and unreflective theism, the sentiment\nof the Divine was one of objective nearness and personal intimacy. The\ngods interposed directly in the affairs of men, and held frequent and\nfamiliar intercourse with our race. They descend to the battle-field of\nTroy, and mingle in the bloody strife. They grace the wedding-feast by\ntheir presence, and heighten the gladness with celestial music. They\nvisit the poor and the stranger, and sometimes clothe the old and\nshrivelled beggar with celestial beauty. They inspire their favorites\nwith strength and courage, and fill their mouths with wisdom and\neloquence. They manifest their presence by signs and wonders, by visions\nand dreams, by auguries and prophetic voices. But more frequently than\nall, they are seen in the ordinary phenomena of nature, the sunshine and\nstorm, the winds and tempests, the hail and rain. The natural is, in\nfact, the supernatural, and all the changes of nature are the movement\nand action of the Divine. The feeling of dependence is immediate and\nuniversal, and worship is the natural and spontaneous act of man.\n\nBut the period of reflection is inevitable. Man turns his inquiring gaze\ntowards nature and desires, by an imperfect effort of physical\ninduction, to reach \"the first principle and cause of things.\" Soon he\ndiscovers the prevalence of uniformity in nature, the actions of\nphysical properties and agencies, and he catches some glimpses of the\nreign of universal law. The natural tendency of this discovery is\nobvious in the weakening of his sense of dependence on the immediate\nagency of God. The Egyptians told Herodotus that, as their fields were\nregularly irrigated by the waters of the Nile, they were less dependent\non God than the Greeks, whose lands were watered by rains, and who must\nperish if Jupiter did not send them showers.[927] As man advances in the\nfield of mere physical inquiry, God recedes; from the region of\nexplained phenomena, he retires into the region of unexplained\nphenomena--the border-land of mystery. The gods are driven from the\nwoods and streams, the winds and waves. Neptune does not absolutely\ncontrol the seas, nor \u00c6olus the winds. The Divine becomes, no more a\nphysical arch\u00ea--a nature-power, but a Supreme Mind, an ineffable Spirit,\nan invisible God, the Supreme Essence of Essences, the Supreme Idea of\nIdeas (eidos auto kath auto) apprehended by human reason alone, but\nhaving an independent, eternal, substantial, personal being. Through the\ninstrumentality of Platonism, the idea of God becomes clearer and purer.\nMan had learned that communion with the Divinity was something more than\nan apotheosis of humanity, or a pantheistic absorption. He caught\nglimpses of a higher and holier union. He had surrendered the ideal of a\nnational communion with God, and of personal protection through a\nfederal religion, and now was thrown back upon himself to find some\nchannel of personal approach to God. But alas! he could not find it. A\nGod so vastly elevated beyond human comprehension, who could only be\napprehended by the most painful effort of abstract thought; a God so\ninfinitely removed from man by the purity and rectitude of his\ncharacter; a God who was all pure reason, seemed alien to all the\nyearnings and sympathies of the human heart; and such a God, dwelling in\npure light, seemed inapproachable and inacessible to man.[928] The\npurifying of the religious idea had evoked a new ideal, and this ideal\nwas painfully remote. By the energy of abstract thought man had striven\nto pierce the veil, and press into \"the Holy of Holies,\" to come into\nthe presence of God, and he had failed. And he had sought by moral\ndiscipline, by self-mortification, by inward purification, to raise\nhimself to that lofty plane of purity, where he might catch some\nglimpses of the vision of a holy God, and still he failed. Nay, more, he\nhad tried the power of prayer. Socrates, and Plato, and Cleanthes had\nbowed the knee and moved the lips in prayer. The emperor Aurelius, and\nthe slave Epictetus had prayed, and prayer, no doubt, intensified their\nlonging, and sharpened and agonized their desire, but it did not raise\nthem to a satisfying and holy _koinonia_ in the divine life. \"It seems\nto me\"--said Plato--as Homer says of Minerva, that she removed the mist\nfrom before the eyes of Diomede,\n\n      'That he might clearly see 'twixt Gods and men.'\n\nso must he, in the first place, remove from your soul the mist that now\ndwells there, and then apply those things through which you will be able\nto know[929] and rightly pray to God.\n\n[Footnote 927: Herodotus, vol. ii. bk. ii. ch. xiii. p. 14 (Rawlinson's\nedition).]\n\n[Footnote 928: \"To discover the Maker and Father of the universe is a\nhard task;.... to make him known to all is impossible.\"--\"Tim\u00e6us,\" ch.\nix.]\n\n[Footnote 929: \"Second Alcibiades,\" \u00a7 23.]\n\nTo develop this innate desire and \"feeling after God\" was the grand\ndesign of providence in \"fixing the times\" of the Greek nation, and \"the\nboundaries of their habitation.\"[930] Man was brought, through a period\nof discipline, to feel his need of a personal relation to God. He was\nmade to long for a realizing sense of his presence--to desire above all\nthings a Father, a Counsellor, and a Friend--a living ear into which he\nmight groan his anguish, or hymn his joy; and a living heart that could\nbeat towards him in compassion, and prompt immediate succor and aid. The\nidea of a pure Spiritual Essence without form, and without emotion,\npervading all, and transcending all, is too vague and abstract to yield\nus comfort, and to exert over us any persuasive power. \"Our moral\nweakness shrinks from it in trembling awe. The heart can not feed on\nsublimities. We can not make a home of cold magnificence; we can not\ntake immensity by the hand.\"[931] Hence the need and the desire that God\nshall condescendingly approach to man, and by some manifestation of\nhimself in human form, and through the sensibilities of the human heart,\ncommend himself to the heart of man--in other words, the need of an\n_Incarnation_. Thus did the education of our race, by the dispensation\nof philosophy, prepare the way for him who was consciously or\nunconsciously \"_the Desire of Nations_,\" and the deepening earnestness\nand spiritual solicitude of the heathen world heralded the near approach\nof Him who was not only \"the Hope of Israel\" but \"the Saviour of the\nworld.\"\n\n[Footnote 930: Acts xvii. 26, 27.]\n\n[Footnote 931: Caird.]\n\nThe idea of an _Incarnation_ was not unfamiliar to human thought, it was\nno new or strange idea to the heathen mind. The numberless metamorphoses\nof Grecian mythology, the incarnations of Brahm, the avatars of Vishnu,\nand the human form of Krishna had naturalized the thought.[932] So that\nwhen the people of Lystra saw the apostles Paul and Barnabas exercising\nsupernatural powers of healing, they said, \"The gods have come down to\nus in the likeness of men!\" and they called Barnabas Jupiter, and Paul,\nMercurius. The idea in its more definite form may have been, and indeed\nwas, communicated to the world through the agency of the dispersed Jews.\nSo that Virgil, the Roman poet, who was contemporary with Christ, seems\nto re-echo the prophecy of Isaiah--\n\n     The last age decre\u00ebd by the Fates is come,\n     And a new frame of all things does begin;\n     A holy progeny from heaven descends\n     Auspicious in his birth, which puts an end\n     To the iron age, and from which shall arise\n     A golden age, most glorious to behold.\n\n[Footnote 932: Young's \"Christ of History,\" p. 248.]\n\nII. _Finally, Greek philosophy prepared the way for Christianity by\nawakening and deepening the consciousness of guilt, and the desire for\nRedemption_.\n\nThe consciousness of sin, and the consequent need of expiation for sin,\nwere gradually unfolded in the Greek mind. The idea of sin was at first\nrevealed in a confused and indefinite feeling of some external,\nsupernatural, and bewildering influence which man can not successfully\nresist; but yet so in harmony with the sinner's inclination, that he can\nnot divest himself of all responsibility. \"Homer has no word answering\nin comprehensiveness or depth of meaning to the word _sin_, as it is\nused in the Bible..... The noun _amartia_ which is appropriated to\nexpress this idea in the Greek of the New Testament, does not occur in\nthe Homeric poems..... The word which is most frequently employed to\nexpress wrong-doing of every kind is _at\u00ea_, with its corresponding\nverb..... The radical signification of the word seems to be a\nbefooling--a depriving one of his senses and his reason, as by\nunseasonable sleep, and excess of wine, joined with the influence of\nevil companions, and the power of destiny, or the deity. Hence, the\nGreek imagination, which impersonated every great power, very naturally\nconceived of At\u00ea as a person, a sort of omnipresent and universal cause\nof folly and sin, of mischief and misery, who, though the daughter of\nJupiter, yet once fooled or misled Jupiter himself, and thenceforth,\ncast down from heaven to earth, walks with light feet over the heads of\nmen, and makes all things go wrong. Hence, too, when men come to their\nsenses, and see what folly and wrong they have perpetrated, they cast\nthe blame on At\u00ea, and so, ultimately, on Jupiter and the gods.\"[933]\n\n[Footnote 933: Tyler, \"Theology of the Greek Poets,\" pp. 174, 175.]\n\n     \"Oft hath this matter been by Greeks discussed,\n      And I their frequent censure have incurred:\n      Yet was not I the cause; but Jove, and Fate,\n      And gloomy Erinnys, who combined to throw\n      A strong delusion o'er my mind, that day\n      I robb'd Achilles of his lawful prize.\n      What could I do? a Goddess all o'erruled,\n      Daughter of Jove, dread At\u00e9, baleful power\n      Misleading all; with light step she moves,\n      Not on the earth, but o'er the heads of men.\n      With blighting touch, and many hath caused to err.\"[934]\n\nAnd yet, though Agamemnon here attempts to shuffle off the guilt of his\ntransgression upon At\u00e9, Jove, and Fate, yet at other times he confesses\nhis folly and wrong, and makes no attempt to cast the responsibility on\nthe gods.[935] Though misled by a \"baleful power,\" he was not compelled.\nThough tempted by an evil goddess, he yet followed his own sinful\npassions, and therefore he owns himself responsible.\n\nTo satisfy the demands of divine justice, to show its hatred of sin, and\nto deter others from transgression, sin is punished. Punishment is the\npenalty due to sin; in the language of Homer, it is the payment of a\ndebt incurred by sin. When the transgressor is punished he is said to\n\"pay off,\" or \"pay back\" his crimes; in other words, to expatiate or\natone for them.\n\n                             \"If not at once,\n     Yet soon or late will Jove assert their claim,\n     And heavy penalty the perjured pay\n     With their own blood, their children's, and their wives'.\"[936]\n\nAt the same time the belief is expressed that the gods may be, and often\nare, propitiated by prayers and sacrifices, and thus the penalty is\nremitted.\n\n     \"The Gods themselves, in virtue, honor, strength,\n      Excelling thee, may yet be mollified;\n      For they when mortals have transgressed, or fail'd\n      To do aright, by sacrifice and pray'r,\n      Libations and burnt-off'rings, may be sooth'd.\"[937]\n\n[Footnote 934: \"Iliad,\" bk. xix. l. 91-101 (Lord Derby's translation).]\n\n[Footnote 935: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 132-136.]\n\n[Footnote 936: Ibid., bk. iv. l. 185-188.]\n\n[Footnote 937: Ibid., bk. ix. l. 581-585.]\n\nPolytheism, then, as Dr. Schaff has remarked, had the voice of\nconscience, and a sense, however obscure, of sin. It felt the need of\nreconciliation with deity, and sought that reconciliation by prayer,\npenance, and sacrifice.[938]\n\nThe sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the absolute need of\nexpiation, is determined with increasing clearness and definiteness in\nthe tragic poets.\n\nThe first great law which the Tragedians recognize, as a law written on\nthe heart, is \"that the sinner must suffer for his sins.\" The connection\nbetween sin and suffering is constantly recognized as a natural and\nnecessary connection, like that between sowing and reaping.\n\n     A haughty spirit, blossoming, bears a crop\n     Of woe, and reaps a harvest of despair.[939]\n\n\"Lust and violence beget lust and violence, and vengeance too, at the\nappointed time.\"[940] \"Impiety multiplies and perpetuates itself.\"[941]\n\"The sinner pays the debt he contracted, ends the career that he\nbegins,\"[942] \"and drinks to the dregs the cup of cursing which he\nhimself had filled.\"[943] Conscience is the instrument in the hands of\nJustice and Vengeance by which the Most High inflicts punishment. The\nretributions of sin are \"wrought out by God.\"\n\nThe consequences of great crimes, especially in high places, extend to\nevery person and every thing connected with them. \"The country and the\ncountry's gods are polluted.\"[944] \"The army and the people share in the\ncurse.\"[945] \"The earth itself is polluted with the shedding of\nblood,\"[946] \"and even the innocent and the virtuous who share the\nenterprises of the wicked may be involved in their ruin, as the pious\nman must sink with the ungodly when he embarks in the same ship.\"[947]\n\n[Footnote 938: Tyler, \"Theology of the Greek Poets,\" p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 938: \u00c6schylus, \"Pers\u00e6,\" l. 821.]\n\n[Footnote 940: \"Agamemnon,\" l. 763.]\n\n[Footnote 941: Ibid., l. 788.]\n\n[Footnote 942: Ibid., l. 1529.]\n\n[Footnote 943: Ibid., l. 1397.]\n\n[Footnote 944: Ibid., l. 1645.]\n\n[Footnote 945: \"Pers\u00e6,\" _passim._]\n\n[Footnote 946: \"Sup.,\" 265.]\n\n[Footnote 947: \"Theb.,\" p. 602.]\n\nThe pollution and curse of sin, when once contracted by an individual,\nor entailed upon a family, will rest upon them and pursue them till the\npolluted individual or the hated and accursed race is extinct, unless in\nsome way the sin can be expiated, or some god interpose to arrest the\npenalty. The criminal must die by the hand of justice, and even in Hades\nvengeance will still pursue him.[948] Others may in time be washed away\nby ablutions, worn away by exile and pilgrimage, and expiated by\nofferings of blood.[949] But great crimes can not be washed away; \"For\nwhat expiation is there for blood when once it has fallen on the\nground.\"[950] Thus the law (_[Greek: nomos]_)--for so it is expressly\ncalled--as from an Attic Sinai, rolls its reverberating thunders, and\npronounces its curses upon sin, from act to act and from chorus to\nchorus of that grand trilogy--the \"Agamemnon,\" the \"Choephoroe,\" and the\n\"Eumenides.\"\n\n[Footnote 948: \"Sup.,\" l. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 949: \"Eum.,\" l. 445 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 950: \"Choeph.,\" l. 47.]\n\nBut after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, then the\nreconciliation. A dim consciousness of sin and retribution as a fact,\nand of reconciliation as a _want_, seems to have revealed itself even in\nthe darkest periods of history. This consciousness underlies not a few\nof the Greek tragedies. \"The 'Prometheus Bound' was followed by the\n'Prometheus Unbound,' reconciled and restored through the intervention\nof Jove's son. The 'oedipus Tyrannus' of Sophocles was completed by the\n'oedipus Colonus,' where he dies in peace amid tokens of divine favor.\nAnd so the 'Agamemnon' and 'Choephoroe' reach their consummation only in\nthe 'Eumenides,' where the Erinyes themselves are appeased, and the\nFuries become the gracious ones. This is not, however, without a special\ndivine interposition, and then only after a severe struggle between the\npowers that cry for justice and those that plead for mercy.\"\n\nThe office and work which, in this trilogy, is assigned to Jove's son,\nApollo, must strike every reader as at least a remarkable resemblance,\nif not a foreshadowing of the Christian doctrine of _reconciliation_.\n\"This becomes yet more striking when we bring into view the relation in\nwhich this reconciling work stands to [Greek: Zeus S\u00f4t\u00ear], Jupiter\nSaviour--[Greek: Zeus tritos], Jupiter the third, who, in connection\nwith Apollo and Athena, consummates the reconciliation. Not only is\nApollo a [Greek: S\u00f4t\u00ear], a Saviour, who, having himself been exiled from\nheaven among men, will pity the poor and needy;[951] not only does\nAthena sympathize with the defendant at her tribunal, and, uniting the\noffice of advocate and judge, persuade the avenging deities to be\nappeased;[952] but Zeus is the beginning and end of the whole process.\nApollo appears as the advocate of Orestes only at her bidding;[953]\nAthena inclines to the side of the accused, as the offspring of the\nbrain of Zeus, and of like mind with him.\"[954] Orestes, after his\nacquittal, says that he obtained it\n\n     \"By means of Pallas and of Loxias\n      And the third Saviour who doth all things sway.\"[955]\n\nPlatonism reveals a still closer affinity with Christianity in its\ndoctrine of sin, and its sense of the need of salvation. Plato is\nsacredly jealous for the honor and purity of the divine character, and\nrejects with indignation every hypothesis which would make God the\nauthor of sin. \"God, inasmuch as he is good, can not be the cause of all\nthings, as the common doctrine represents him to be. On the contrary, he\nis the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part\nhe is not the author; for our evil things far outnumber our good things.\nThe good things we must ascribe to God, whilst we must seek elsewhere,\nand not in him, the causes of evil.\"[956] The doctrine of the poets,\nwhich would in some way charge on the gods the errors of men, he sternly\nresists. We must express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet,\nif guilty of such foolish blunders about the gods as to tell us[957]\n\n     'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed\n      Two casks, one stored with evil, one with good,'\n\nAnd that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both\n\n     'He leads a life checker'd with good and ill.'\n\n[Footnote 951: \"Sup.,\" l. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 952: \"Eum.,\" l. 970.]\n\n[Footnote 953: Ibid., l. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 954: Ibid., l. 664, 737.]\n\n[Footnote 955: Tyler's \"Theology of the Greek Poets,\" especially ch. v.,\nfrom which the above materials are drawn.]\n\n[Footnote 956: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch. xviii.]\n\n[Footnote 957: \"Iliad,\" xxiv., l. 660.]\n\nNor can we let our young people know that, in the words of \u00c6schylus--\n\n     \"'When to destruction God will plague a house\n       He plants among the members guilt and sin.'\"[958]\n\nWhatever in the writings of Homer and the tragic poets give countenance\nto the notion that God is, in the remotest sense the author of sin, must\nbe expunged. Here is clearly a great advance in ethical conceptions.\n\nThe great defect in the ethical system of Plato was the identification\nof evil with the inferior or corporeal nature of man--\"the irascible and\nconcupiscible elements,\" fashioned by the junior divinities. The\nrational and immortal part of man's nature, which is derived immediately\nfrom God--the Supreme Good, naturally chooses the good as its supreme\nend and destination. Hence he adopted the Socratic maxim \"that no man is\nwillingly evil,\" that is, no man deliberately chooses evil as evil, but\nonly as a _seeming_ good--he does not choose evil as an end, though he\nmay choose it voluntarily as a means. Plato manifests great solicitude\nto guard this maxim from misconception and abuse. Man has, in his\njudgment, the power to act in harmony with his higher reason, or\ncontrary to reason; to obey the voice of conscience or the clamors of\npassion, and consequently he is the object of praise or blame, reward or\npunishment. \"When a man does not consider himself, but others, as the\ncause of his own sins,.... and even seeks to excuse himself from blame,\nhe dishonors and injures his own soul; so, also, when contrary to\nreason.... he indulges in pleasure, he dishonors it by filling it with\nvice and remorse.\"[959] The work and effort of life, the end of this\nprobationary economy, is to make reason triumphant over passion, and\ndiscipline ourselves to a purer and nobler life.\n\n[Footnote 958: \"Republic,\" bk. ii. ch, xviii., xix.]\n\n[Footnote 959: \"Laws,\" bk. v. ch. i.]\n\nThe obstacles to a virtuous life are, however, confessedly numberless,\nand, humanly speaking, insurmountable. To raise one's self above the\nclamor of passion, the power of evil, the bondage of the flesh, is\nacknowledged, in mournful language, to be a hopeless task. A cloud of\nsadness shades the brow of Plato as he contemplates the fallen state of\nman. In the \"Ph\u00e6drus\" he describes, in gorgeous imagery, the purity, and\nbeauty, and felicity of the soul in its anterior and primeval state,\nwhen, charioteering through the highest arch of heaven in company with\nthe Deity, it contemplated the divine justice and beauty; but \"this\nhappy life,\" says he, \"we forfeited by our transgression.\" Allured by\nstrange affections, our souls forgot the sacred things that we were made\nto contemplate and love--we _fell_. And now, in our fallen state, the\nsoul has lost its pristine beauty and excellence. It has become more\ndisfigured than was Glaucus, the seaman \"whose primitive form was not\nrecognizable, so disfigured had he become by his long dwelling in the\nsea.\"[960] To restore this lost image of the good,--to regain \"this\nprimitive form,\" is not the work of man, but God. Man can not save\nhimself. \"Virtue is not natural to man, neither is it to be learned, but\nit comes by a divine influence. _Virtue, is the gift of God_.\"[961] He\nneeds a discipline, \"an education which is divine.\" If he is saved from\nthe common wreck, it must be \"by the special favor of Heaven.\"[962] He\nmust be delivered from sin, if ever delivered, by the interposition of\nGod.\n\n[Footnote 960: \"Republic,\" bk. x. ch. xi.]\n\n[Footnote 961: \"Meno.\"]\n\n[Footnote 962: \"Republic,\" bk. vi. ch. vi., vii.]\n\nPlato was, in some way, able to discover the need of a Saviour, to\ndesire a Saviour, but he could not predict his appearing. Hints are\nobscurely given of a Conqueror of sin, an Assuager of pain, an Averter\nof evil in this life, and of the impending retributions of the future\nlife; but they are exceedingly indefinite and shadowy. In all instances\nthey are rather the language of _desire_, than of hope. Platonism\nawakened in the heart of humanity a consciousness of sin and a profound\nfeeling of want--the want of a Redeemer from sin, a spiritual, a divine\nRemedy for its moral malady--and it strove after some remedial power.\nBut it was equally conscious of failure and defeat. It could enlighten\nthe reason, but it could only act imperfectly on the will. Platonic was\na striking counterpart to Pauline experience prior to the apostle's\ndeliverance by the power and grace of Christ. It discovered that \"the\nLaw is holy, and the commandment is holy, and just, and good.\" It\nrecognized that \"it is spiritual, but man is carnal, the slave of sin.\"\nIt could say, \"What I do I approve not; for I do not what I would, but\nwhat I hate. But if my will [my better judgment] is against what I do, I\nconsent unto the Law that it is good. And now it is no more I that do\nit, but sin, that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my\nflesh, good abideth not, for to will is present with me, but the power\nto do the right is absent: the good that I would, I do not; but the evil\nthat I would not, that I do. I consent gladly to the law of God in my\ninner man ['the rational and immortal nature'[963]]; but I behold a law\nin my members ['the irascible and concupiscible nature'[964]] warring\nagainst the law of my mind (or reason), and bringing me into captivity\nto the law of sin which is in my members. _Oh wretched man that I am!\nwho shall deliver me from the body of this death_?\"[965] Paul was able\nto say, \"I thank God (that he hath now delivered me), through Jesus\nChrist our Lord!\" Platonism could only desire, and hope, and wait for\nthe coming of a Deliverer.\n\n[Footnote 963: Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 964: Ibid.]\n\n[Footnote 965: Romans, vii.]\n\nThis consciousness of the need of supernatural light and help, and this\naspiration after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited\nfrom Socrates, constrained him to regard with toleration, and even\nreverence, every apparent approach, every pretension, even, to a divine\ninspiration and guidance in the age in which he lived. \"'The greatest\nblessings which men receive come through the operation of _phrensy_\n([Greek: mania]--inspired exaltation), when phrensy is the gift of God.\nThe prophetess of Delphi, and the priestess of Dodona, many are the\nbenefits which in their phrensies (moments of inspiration) they have\nbestowed upon Greece; but in their hours of self-possession, few or\nnone. And too long were it to speak of the Sibyl, and others, who,\ninspired and prophetic, have delivered utterances beneficial to the\nhearers. Indeed, this word phrenetic or maniac is no reproach; it is\nidentical with mantic--prophetic.[966] And often when diseases and\nplagues have fallen upon men for the sins of their forefathers, some\nphrensy too has broken forth, and in prophetic strain has pointed out a\nremedy, _showing how the sin might be expiated, and the gods appeased_\n(by prayers, and purifications, and atoning rites).... So many and yet\nmore great effects could I tell you of the phrensy which comes from the\ngods.\"[967] Some have discerned in all this merely the food for a feeble\nridicule. They regard these sentiments as simply an evidence of the\npower and prevalence of superstition clouding the loftiest intellects in\nancient times. By the more thoughtful and philosophic mind, however,\nthey will be accepted as an indication of the imperishable and universal\nfaith of humanity in a supernatural and supersensuous world, and in the\npossibility of some communication between heaven and earth.[968] And\nabove all, it is a conclusive proof that Plato believed that the\nknowledge of _salvation_--of a remedy for sin, a method of expiation for\nsin, a means of deliverance from the power and punishment of sin, must\nbe revealed from Heaven.\n\n[Footnote 966: [Greek: Mania], phrensy; _[Greek: pantis]_, a\nprophet--one who utters oracles in a state of divine phrensy; _[Greek:\npantik\u00ea]_, the prophetic art.]\n\n[Footnote 967: \"Ph\u00e6drus,\" \u00a7 47-50 (Whewell's translation).]\n\n[Footnote 968: \"_Vetus opinio est_, jam usque ab heroicis ducta\ntemporibus, eaque et populi Romani et _omnium gentium_ firmata consensu,\nversari quandem inter homines divinationem.\"--Cicero, \"De Divin.,\" i.\nI.]\n\nPaul, then, found, even in that focus of Paganism, the city of Athens,\nreligious aspirations tending towards Jesus Christ. A true philosophic\nmethod, notwithstanding its shortcomings and imperfections, concluded by\ndesiring and seeking \"the Unknown God,\" by demanding him from all forms\nof worship, from all schools of philosophy. The great work of\npreparation in the heathen world consisted in the developing of the\n_desire_ for salvation. It proved that God is the great want of every\nhuman soul; that there is a profound affinity between conscience and the\nliving God; and that Tertullian was right when he wrote the \"Testimonium\nAnim\u00e6 naturaliter Christian\u00e6.\"[969] And when it was sufficiently\ndemonstrated that \"the world by philosophy knew not God (as a Redeeming\nGod and Saviour), then it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to\nsave them that believe.\" This was all a dispensation of divine\nprovidence, which was determined by, or \"in, the wisdom of God.\"[970]\n\nThe history of the religions and philosophies of human origin thus\nbecomes to us a striking confirmation of the truth of Christianity. It\nshows there is a wondrous harmony between the instinctive wants and\nyearnings of the human heart, as well as the necessary ideas and laws of\nthe reason, and the fundamental principles of revealed religion. There\nis \"a law written on the heart\"--written by the finger of God, which\ncorresponds to the laws written by the same finger on \"tables of stone.\"\nThere are certain necessary and immutable principles and ideas infolded\nin the reason of man, which harmonize with the revelations of the\nEternal Logos in the written word.[971] There are instinctive longings,\nmysterious yearnings of the human heart, to which that unveiling of the\nheart of God which is made in the teaching and life of the incarnate God\nmost satisfyingly answers. Within the depths of the human spirit there\nis an \"oracle\" which responds to the voice of \"the living oracles of\nGod.\"\n\n[Footnote 969: Pressens\u00e9, \"Religions before Christ\" (Introduction);\nNeander, \"Church History,\" vol. i. (Introduction).]\n\n[Footnote 970: I Corinthians, i. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 971: \"The surmise of Plato, that the world of appearance\nsubsists in and by a higher world of Divine Thought, is confirmed by\nChristianity when it tells us of a Divine subsistence--that Eternal Word\nby whom and in whom all things consist.\"--Vaughan, \"Hours with the\nMystics,\" vol. i. p. 213.]\n\nHere, then, are two distinct and independent revelations--the unwritten\nrevelation which God has made to all men in the constitution of the\nhuman mind, and the external written revelation which he has made in the\nperson and teaching of his Son. And these two are perfectly harmonious.\nWe have here two great volumes--the volume of conscience, and the volume\nof the New Testament. We open them, and find they announce the _same_\ntruths--one in dim outline, the other in a full portraiture. There are\nthe same fundamental principles underlying both revelations. They both\nbear the impress of _divinity_. The history of philosophy may have been\nmarked by many errors of interpretation; so, also, has the history of\ndogmatic theology. Men may have often misunderstood and misinterpreted\nthe dictates of conscience; so have theologians misunderstood and\nmisinterpreted the dictates of revelation. The perversions of conscience\nand reason have been plead in defense of error and sin; and so, for\nages, have the perversions of Scripture been urged in defense of\nslavery, oppression, falsehood, and wrong. Sometimes the misunderstood\nutterances of conscience, of philosophy, and of science have been\narrayed against the incorrect interpretations of the Word of God. But\nwhen both are better understood, and more justly conceived, they are\nfound in wondrous harmony. When the New Testament speaks to man of God,\nof duty, of immortality, and of retribution, man feels that its\nteachings \"commend themselves to his conscience\" and reason. When it\nspeaks to him of redemption, of salvation, of eternal life and\nblessedness, he feels that it meets and answers all the wants and\nlongings of his heart. Thus does Christianity throw light upon the\noriginal revelations of God in the human conscience, and answers all the\nyearnings of the human soul. So it is found in individual experiences,\nso it has been found in the history of humanity. As Leverrier and Adams\nwere enabled to affirm, from purely mathematical reasoning, that another\nplanet must exist beyond _Uranus_ which had never yet been seen by human\neyes, and then, afterwards, that affirmation was gloriously verified in\nthe discovery of _Neptune_ by the telescope of Galle; so the reasonings\nof ancient philosophy, based on certain necessary laws of mind, enabled\nman to affirm the existence of a God, of the soul, of a future\nretribution, and an eternal life beyond the grave; and, then,\nsubsequently, these were brought fully into light, and verified by the\nGospel.\n\nWe conclude in the words of Pressens\u00e9: \"To isolate it from the past,\nwould be to refuse to comprehend the nature of Christianity itself, and\nthe extent of its triumphs. Although the Gospel is not, as has been\naffirmed, the product of anterior civilizations--a mere compound of\nGreek and Oriental elements--it is not the less certain that it brings\nto the human mind the satisfaction vainly sought by it in the East as in\nthe West. _Omnia subito_ is not its device, but that of the Gnostic\nheresy. Better to say, with Clement of Alexandria and Origen, that the\nnight of paganism had its stars to light it, but that they called to the\nMorning-star which stood over Bethlehem.\"\n\n\"If we regard philosophy as a preparation for Christianity, instead of\nseeking in it a substitute for the Gospel, we shall not need to\noverstate its grandeur in order to estimate its real value.\"\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nA.\n\n     Abstraction, comparative and immediate, 187-189; 362-364.\n\n     \u00c6schylus, his conception of the Supreme Divinity, 146;\n       his recognition of human guilt, and need of expiation, 515-517.\n\n     \u00c6tiological proof of the existence of God, 487-489.\n\n     Anaxagoras, an Eclectic, 311;\n       in his physical theory an Atomist, 312;\n       taught that the Order of the universe can only be explained by\n       Intelligence, 312;\n       his psychology, 313;\n       the teacher of Socrates, 313.\n\n     Anaximander, his first principle _the infinite_, 290;\n       his infinite a chaos of primary elements, 290.\n\n     Anaximenes, a vitalist, 286;\n       his first principle _air_, 287.\n\n     Aristotle, his opinion of the popular polytheism of Greece, 157;\n       his classification of causes, 280, 404, 405;\n       his misrepresentations of Pythagoras, 299;\n       his classification of the sciences, 389;\n       his Organon, 389-394;\n       his Logic, 394-403;\n       his Theology, 404-417;\n       his Ethics, 417-421;\n       his Categories, 395;\n       his logical treatises, 396;\n       on induction and deduction, 396-398;\n       his psychology, 398, 401;\n       on how the knowledge of first principles is attained, 394, 402,\n          403;\n       on Matter and Form, 405-408;\n       on Potentiality and Actuality, 408-412;\n       his proof of the Divine existence, 412-415;\n       on the chief good of man, 419, 420;\n       his doctrine of the Mean, 420, 421;\n       defect of his ethical system, 505.\n\n     [Archai], or first principles, the grand object of\n        investigation in Greek Philosophy, 271, 274, 279, 280.\n\n     Athenians, criticism on Plutarch's sketch of their character, 45;\n       their vivacity, 45;\n       love of freedom, 46--and of country, 46;\n       private life of, 47;\n       intellectual character of, 48;\n       inquisitive and analytic, 48;\n       rare combinations of imagination and reasoning powers, 49;\n       religion of, 98;\n       the Athenians a religious people, 102;\n       their faith in the being and providence of God, 107;\n       their consciousness of dependence on God, 110, 116;\n       their religious emotions, 117;\n       their deep consciousness of sin and guilt, 122-124;\n       their sense of the need of expiation, 124, 125;\n       their religion exerted some wholesome moral influence, 162, 163.\n\n     Athens, topography of 27;\n       the Agora, 28;\n       its porticoes, 29;\n       the Acropolis, 30;\n       its temples, 31;\n       the Areopagus, 33;\n       sacred objects in, 98, 99;\n       images of the gods, 99;\n       localities of schools of philosophy in, 266-268.\n\n     Attica, geographical boundaries of, 26;\n       a classic land, 34;\n       its geographical and cosmical conditions providentially ordained\n       for great moral   ends, 34, 35; soil of, not favorable to\n       agriculture, 40--necessitated industry and frugality, 41; the\n       climate of, 41--its influence on the mental character of the\n       people, 42.\n\n\nB.\n\n     Bacon, his assertion that the search after final causes had misled\n       scientific inquirers, 222.\n\n\nC.\n\n     Categories of Aristotle, 395.\n\n     Causality, principle of, 189;\n       assailed by the Materialists, 194--especially by Comte, 203-209;\n       the intuition of _power_ a fact of immediate consciousness, 204;\n       consciousness of _effort_ the type of all force, 211;\n       Aristotle on Causality, 413;\n       \u00e6tiological proof of existence of God, 487-489.\n\n     Cause, origin of the idea of, 204, 205.\n\n     Causes, Aristotle's classification of, 280, 404, 405.\n\n     Chief good of man, Aristotle on, 419, 420.\n\n     Cleanthes, his hymn to Jupiter, 452, 453.\n\n     Comte, his theory of the origin of religion, 57-65;\n       his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to material\n       phenomena, 203; denies all causation, both efficient and final,\n       203-214.\n\n     Conditioned, law of the, 227, 228;\n       is contradictory, 250;\n       as a ground of faith, meaningless and void, 251.\n\n     Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490.\n\n     Cousin, his theory that religion had its outbirth in the\n       spontaneous apperceptions\n       of reason, 78-84;\n       criticism thereon, 84-86.\n\n     Criterion of truth, Plato's search after, 333, 334.\n\n     Cudworth, his interpretation of Grecian mythology, 139, 143.\n\n     Cuvier, on final causes, 216, 222.\n\nD.\n\n     Darwin, his inability to explain the facts of nature without\n       recognizing design, 221, 222.\n\n     Democritus, taught that atoms and the vacuum are the beginning of\n       all things, 292; an absolute materialist, 293.\n\n     Dependence, consciousness of, the foundation of primary religious\n       emotions, 110-113.\n\n     Development, law of mental, 478; three successive stages clearly\n       marked, in the individual, 478--in the universal mind of\n       humanity, 479, 480;\n           (1) in the field of Theistic conceptions, 481-494;\n           (2) in the department of morals, 495-509;\n           (3) in the department of religious sentiment, 509-522.\n\n     Dialectic of Plato, 353-369.\n\n     Dogmatic Theologians, assert that all our knowledge of God is\n       derived from the teaching of the Scriptures, 86,167; cast doubt\n       upon the principle of causality, 253-255--upon the principle of\n       the unconditioned, 255-257--upon the principle of unity,\n       258-261--and upon the immutable principles of morality, 261-263.\n\n     Dynamical or Vital school of ancient philosophers, 282-289.\n\nE.\n\n     Eclecticism of Anaxagoras, 311.\n\n     Emotions, the religious, 117-122;\n       sentiment of the Divine exists in all minds, 119-121;\n       also instinctive yearning after the Invisible, 121, 122.\n\n     Empedocles, a believer in one Supreme God, 153.\n\n     Epicurus, his theory of the origin of religion, 56, 57;\n       his Ethics, 427-432;\n       his Physics, 433-438;\n       taught that pleasure is the chief end of life, 428--that\n       ignorance of nature is the sole cause of unhappiness, 432--that\n       Physics and Psychology are the only studies conducive to\n       happiness, 432--that the universe is eternal and infinite,\n       433--that concrete bodies are combinations of atoms, 434--that\n       atoms have spontaneity, 436, and some degree of freedom, 436,\n       437; the parts of the world self-formed, 437, 438; plants,\n       animals, and man are spontaneously generated, 438; a state of\n       savagism the primitive condition of man, 439; his Atheism, 441;\n       his Psychology, 442-444; the soul material and mortal, 445, 446.\n\n     Eternity, Platonic notion of, 349 (_note_), 372, 373.\n\n     Eternity of Matter, how taught by Plato, 371-373;\n       distinctly affirmed by Epicurus, 433.\n\n     Eternity of the Soul, Plato's doctrine of, 373-375.\n\n     Ethical ideas and principles, gradual development of, 495, 496;\n       (1) the age of popular and unconscious morals, 497, 498;\n       (2) the transitional or sophistical age, 498-500;\n       (3) the philosophic or conscious age, 500-506.\n\n     Ethics of Plato, 383-387, 502-505;\n       of Aristotle, 417-42l;\n       of Epicurus, 427-432;\n       of the Stoics, 454, 456.\n\n     Expiation for sin, the need of, 124;\n       universally acknowledged, 124--especially in Grecian mythology,\n       125--and in the language of Greece and Rome, 125.\n\nF.\n\n     Facts of the universe, classification of, 175-177.\n\n     Fathers, the early, recognized the prop\u00e6deutic office of Greek\n       philosophy, 473-475.\n\n     Feeling, theories which ground all religion on, 70-74;\n       its inadequacy, 74-78.\n\n     Final Causes, impossibility of interpreting nature without\n       recognizing, 221, 222;\n       the assumption of final causes a means of discovery, 222, 223;\n       Cuvier on, 216, 222;\n       argument of Socrates from, 320-324;\n       Plato on, 380-382;\n       Aristotle on, 405, 413, 414;\n       teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491.\n\n     Force, the idea of, rejected by Comte, 207.\n\n     Forces, all of one type, and that type mind, 211.\n\n     Freedom, human, 19;\n       exists under limitations, 20;\n       both admitted and denied by Comte, 208, 209;\n       of Will, as taught by Plato, 386, 387;\n       admitted by Epicurus, 486.\n\nG.\n\n     Geoffrey St. Hilaire, his pretense of not ascribing any intentions\n       to nature, 216, 217.\n\n     Geography and History, relations between, 14;\n       opposite theories concerning, 15;\n       theory of Buckle, 16--of Ritter, Guyot, and Coubin, 16;\n       the relation one of adjustment and harmony, 16.\n\n     God, universality of idea of, 89;\n       Athenians believed in one God, 107, 147, 148;\n       idea of God a common phenomenon of human intelligence, 168, 169;\n       the development of this idea dependent on experience conditions,\n       169-172; the phenomena of the universe demand a God for their\n       explanation, 172-175: there are principles revealed in\n       consciousness which necessitate the idea of God, 184-189; proofs\n       of the existence of God employed by Aristotle, 412-416--by\n       Socrates, 320-324; views of God entertained by the Stoics, 452,\n       453; logical proofs of the existence of God developed by Greek\n       philosophy, 487-494; gradual development of Theistic conception,\n       481-487.\n\n     Gods of Grecian Mythology, how regarded by the philosophers,\n       151-157; views of Plato regarding them, 383.\n\n     Great men, represent the spirit of their age, 20;\n       the creation of a providence interposing in history, 21.\n\n     Greece, its geographical relations favorable to free intercourse\n       with the great historic nations, 35--to commerce, 36--to the\n       diffusion of knowledge, 36--and to a high degree of civilization,\n       36; peculiar configuration of Greece conducive to activity and\n       freedom, 36-38--and independence, 38; natural scenery, 43--its\n       influence on imagination and taste, 44.\n\n     Greek Civilization, a preparation for Christianity, 465-468.\n\n     Greek Language, a providentially prepared vehicle for the perfect\n       revelation of Christianity, 468-470.\n\n     Greek Philosophy, first a philosophy of Nature, 271, 281, 282;\n       next a philosophy of Mind, 271, 316-318;\n       lastly a philosophy of Life, 271, 422;\n       prepared the way for Christianity, 457-522.\n\n     Greeks, the masses of the people believed in one Supreme God, 147,\n       148.\n\n     Guilt, consciousness of, a universal fact, 122, 123;\n       recognized in Grecian mythology, 123, 124;\n       awakened and deepened by philosophy, 513-518.\n\nH.\n\n     Hamilton, Sir W., teaches that philosophic knowledge is the\n       knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, 224, 225;\n       and of qualities as inherent in substances, 225, 226;\n       and yet asserts all human knowledge is necessarily confined to\n       phenomena, 227;\n       his doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge, 227, 229-236;\n       his philosophy of the conditioned, 228;\n       conditional limitation the law of all thought, 236-242;\n       the Infinite a mere negation of thought, 242-246;\n       asserts we must believe in the infinity of God, 246;\n       takes refuge in faith, 247;\n       faith grounded on the law of the conditioned, 243, 249--that is,\n       on contradiction, 249, 250.\n\n     Hegel, his philosophy of religion, 65-70.\n\n     Heraclitus, his first principle _ether_, 288;\n       change, the universal law of all existence, 288;\n       a Materialistic Pantheist, 289.\n\n     Hesiod, on the generation of the gods, 142.\n\n     Homer, his conception of Zeus, 144, 145.\n\n     Homeric doctrine of sin, 513,514.\n\n     Homeric theology, 143-145, 509, 510.\n\n     Humanity, fundamental ideas and laws of, 18;\n       developed and modified by exterior conditions, 19;\n       the most favorable conditions existed in Athens.\n\nI.\n\n     Idealism, furnishes no adequate explanation of the common belief\n       in an external world, 193,199--and of a personal self, 200-202;\n       Cosmothetic Idealism, 305;\n       absolute Idealism, 305.\n\n     Ideas, Platonic doctrine of, 334-337;\n       Platonic scheme of, 364-367.\n\n     Images of the gods, how regarded by Cicero, 129--by Plutarch, 129;\n       the heathens apologized for the use of images, 159.\n\n     Immortality of the soul, taught by Socrates, 324--and by Plato,\n       375, 376; denied by Epicurus, 444-446.\n\n     Incarnation, the idea of, not unfamiliar to heathen thought, 512.\n\n     Induction, the psychological method of Plato, 356, 357.\n\n     Induction and Deduction, Aristotle on, 397, 398.\n\n     Infinite, the, not a mere negation of thought, 242-244;\n       known as the necessary correlative of the finite, 245;\n       as comprehensible in itself, as the finite is comprehensible in\n       itself, 246;\n       in what sense known, 252.\n\n     Infinite Series, the phrase, when literally construed, a\n       contradiction, 181,182.\n\n     Infinity, qualitative and quantitative, 239;\n       qualitative infinity possessed by God alone, 184, 239.\n\n     Intentionality, principle of, 190;\n       denied by Materialists, 194;\n       a first law of thought, 221-223; recognized by Socrates, 320-324.\n\n     Ionian School of Philosophy, a physical and sensational school,\n       281; subdivided into Mechanical and Dynamical, 282, 283.\n\n     Italian School of Philosophy, an Idealist school, 281;\n       subdivided into the Mathematical and Metaphysical, 282, 296.\n\nJ.\n\n     Jacobi, his faith-philosophy, 71.\n\nK.\n\n     Knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of relativity of, 229-236;\n       opposite theories of knowledge among ancient philosophers, 330,\n       331; the tendency of these theories, 332;\n       Plato's theory of, 333, 334;\n       Plato's science of real knowledge, 337, 338.\n\n\n     L.\n\n     Language, inadequate to convey the idea of God, 92-94;\n       Greek language the best medium for the Christian revelation,\n       468-470.\n\n     Leucippus, his first principles _atoms_ and _space_, 291;\n       a pure Materialist, 292.\n\n     Logic of Aristotle, 394-403.\n\n     Logical Treatises of Aristotle, 395, 396.\n\n     Lucretius, the expounder of the doctrines of Epicurus, 426,427;\n       his account of the origin of worlds, 437, 438;\n       of plants, animals, and man, 438.\n\nM.\n\n     Mansel, bases religion on feeling of dependence, 72--and sense of\n       obligation, 73.\n\n     Materialists deny the principle of causality, 194, 203--and of\n       intentionality or final cause, 211-225;\n       Anaximander, Leucippus, and Democritus belong to the\n       materialistic school, 286-293:\n       Epicurus a materialist, 442-446.\n\n     Mathematical Infinite, not absolute, 179, 180;\n       capable of exact measurement, therefore limited, 180;\n       infinite sphere, radius, line, etc., self-contradictory, 180,\n       181.\n\n     Matter, did Plato teach the eternity of? 371-373;\n       the doctrine of the Stoics concerning matter, 449 (_note_).\n\n     Matter and Form, Aristotle on, 405-408.\n\n     Mean, Aristotle's doctrine of the, 420.\n\n     Mediator, consciousness of the need of a, awakened by Greek\n       philosophy, 509-513.\n\n     Metaphysical thought, law of its development, 478-480;\n       three different stages in the individual mind, 478, 479;\n       and in the universal consciousness of our race, 479.\n\n     Metempsychosis regarded by Plato as a mere hypothesis, 376\n       (_note_).\n\n     Mill, J. S., his doctrine that all knowledge is confined to mental\n       phenomena, 193;\n       his definition of matter, 196;\n       his views of personal identity, 196, 197;\n       his theological opinions, 197.\n\n     Miracles, not designed to prove the existence of God, 95.\n\n     Moral principles, universal and immutable, which lead to the\n       recognition of a God, 190;\n       the Dogmatic Theologians seek to invalidate the argument\n       therefrom, 261-263.\n\n     Mystics, base all religious knowledge on internal feeling, 70.\n\n     Mythology, philosophy of Greek, 134-139;\n       Cudworth's interpretation of, 139-143;\n       recognized the consciousness of guilt and need of expiation,\n       123-125.\n\n N.\n\n     National Character, a complex result, 17;\n       conjoint effect of moral and physical influences, 17;\n       human freedom not to be disregarded in the study of, 20;\n       influence of geographical surroundings, 23--of climate and\n       natural scenery, on the pursuits and mental character of nations,\n       23--on creative art, 24--and literature of nations, 25.\n\n     Nations, individuality of, 22;\n       determined mainly from without, 22.\n\n     Natural Realism, 305;\n       Anaxagoras a natural realist, 311-313.\n\n     Nature, interpreted by man according to fundamental laws of his\n      reason, 133.\n\nO.\n\n     Obligation, the sense of, lies at the foundation of religion, 115.\n\n     Ontological proof of the existence of God, 491-493.\n\n     Ontology, of Plato, 369-379;\n       the subject-matter of the world of sense, 370-373;\n       the permanent substratum of mental phenomena, 373-376;\n       the first Principle of all principles--God, 377-379, 491-493.\n\n     Optimism of Plato, 382.\n\n     Order of the Universe, had it a beginning, or is it eternal?\n       178-184.\n\n     Order, principle of, pervades the universe, 220, 221;\n       recognized by Pythagoras, 301;\n       Cosmological proof of the existence of God, 489, 490.\n\n P.\n\n     Parmenides, his theory of knowledge, 307-308;\n      a spiritualistic Pantheist, 308, 309.\n\n     Paul, St., at Athens, 14;\n       his emotion when he saw the city full of idols, 100;\n       the subject of his discourse, 101;\n       brought into contact with all the phases of philosophic thought,\n       268, 269;\n       his arrival at Athens an epoch in the moral history of the world,\n       472;\n       he recognized the preparatory office of Greek philosophy, 473.\n\n     Philosophers of Athens, 101;\n       believed in one supreme, uncreated, eternal God, 151-157;\n       their views of the mythological deities, 158, 159;\n       their apologies for images and image-worship, 159, 160.\n\n     Philosophic Schools, classification of, 271-273;\n       Pre-Socratic 280-314;\n       Socratic, 314-421;\n       Post-Socratic, 422-456.\n\n     Philosophy, the world-enduring monument of the glory of Athens,\n       265, 260;\n       defined, 270, 271;\n       an inquiry after first causes and principles, 271, 457;\n       not in any proper sense a theological inquiry, 273-277, 279;\n       the love of wisdom, 384, 385.\n\n     Philosophy in its relation to Christianity, 268-270;\n       sympathy of Platonism, 268;\n       antagonism of Epicureanism and Stoicism, 269;\n       the Prop\u00e6deutic office of philosophy, 457-524--recognized by St.\n       Paul, 473--and many of the early Fathers, 473-475;\n       philosophy undermined Polytheism, and purified the Theistic idea,\n       481-487;\n       developed the Theistic argument in a logical form, 487-494;\n       it awakened Conscience and purified the Ethical idea, 495-506;\n       demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elaborate a perfect\n       ideal of moral excellence, 506-509;\n       awakened in man the sense of distance from God, and the need of\n       a Mediator, 509-513;\n       deepened the consciousness of sin, and the desire for a Redeemer,\n       513-522;\n       the history of philosophy a confirmation of the truth of\n       Christianity, 522-524.\n\n     Philosophy of Religion, 53;\n       based on the correlation between Divine and human reason,\n       458-462.\n\n     Plato, condemns the poets for their unworthy representations of\n       the gods, 130-132;\n       his views of the gods of Grecian mythology, 154-157:\n       the sympathy of his philosophy with Christianity, 268:\n       followed the philosophic method of Socrates, 328;\n       his moral qualifications for the study of philosophy, 328, 329;\n       his literary qualifications, 329, 330;\n       his search after a criterion of truth, 333, 334;\n       his doctrine of Ideas, 334-337;\n       his science of real knowledge, 337, 338;\n       his answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339;\n       his Psychology 339-352;\n       his scheme of the intellectual powers, 345;\n       on the nature of the soul, 350;\n       his dialectic, 353-369;\n       his grand scheme of ideas, 364-367;\n       his Ontology, 369-379;\n       on the creation of time, 372;\n       did he teach that matter is eternal? 371, 372;\n       on the eternity of the rational element of the soul, 373-375;\n       on the immortality of the soul, 375, 376;\n       on God as the First Principle of all principles, 377-379;\n       his Physics, 380-383;\n       his Ethics, 383-387, 502-505;\n       defects of his\n       ethical system, 518;\n       his philosophy not derived from Jewish sources, 476;\n       felt the need of a superhuman deliverer from sin and guilt,\n       519-521.\n\n     Plutarch, his sketches of Athenian character, 44;\n       criticism on, 45;\n       on the universality of prayer and sacrifice, 115.\n\n     Poets, the Greek, believed in the existence of one uncreated Mind,\n       141;\n       their theogony was a cosmogony, 142;\n       the theologians of Greece, 274, 275.\n\n     Polytheism, Greek, a poetico-historical religion of myth and\n       symbol, 134;\n       its immoralities, 160, 161;\n       undermined by Philosophy, 484-487.\n\n     Post-Socratic Schools, classification of, 425;\n       a philosophy of life, 422-424.\n\n     Potentiality and Actuality, Aristotle on, 408-412.\n\n     Prayer, natural to man, 115.\n\n     Preparation for Christianity, not confined to Judaism alone,\n       464, 465;\n       Greek civilization also prepared the way for Christ, 465-468;\n       Greek language a providential development as the vehicle of a\n       more perfect revelation, 468-470;\n       Greek philosophy fulfilled a prop\u00e6deutic office, 470-472.\n\n     Pre-Socratic Schools, classification of, 280-282; 295, 296.\n\n     Principles, _universal and necessary_, how attained by the method\n       of Plato, 361-364, 390;\n       how, by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403.\n\n     Psychological analysis, logical demonstration of the existence of\n       God begins with, 170;\n       reveals principles which in their logical development attain to\n       the knowledge of God, 184-189.\n\n     Psychology of Heraclitus, 289;\n       of Pythagoras, 304;\n       of Parmenides, 307, 308;\n       of Anaxagoras, 313;\n       of Protagoras, 315;\n       of Socrates, 317, 318;\n       of Plato, 339-352;\n       of Aristotle, 392, 398-401;\n       of Epicurus, 442-444;\n       of the Stoics, 453, 454.\n\n     Pythagoras, his doctrine that numbers are the first principles of\n       things, 297;\n       how to be interpreted, 297-304;\n       misrepresented by Aristotle, 298-300;\n       psychology of, 304.\n\nR.\n\n     Reason, insufficiency of, to elaborate a perfect ideal of moral\n       excellence, 505-509.\n\n     Redemption, desire of, awakened and defined by Greek philosophy,\n       513-521.\n\n     Relativity of all knowledge, Hamilton's doctrine of, 229-236.\n\n     Religion, the philosophy of, 53;\n       defined 53, 106;\n       universality of religious phenomena, 54;\n       hypothesis offered in explanation of, 55;\n       hypothesis of Epicurus and Comte, 56-65--of Hegel, 65-70--of\n       Jacobi and Schleiermacher, 70-78--of Cousin, 78-86--of Dogmatic\n       Theologians, 86-96--author's theory, 96, 97;\n       religion of the Athenians, 98--its mythological and symbolic\n       aspects, 128--exerted some wholesome influences, 161-163.\n\n     Reminiscence, Plato on, 354, 355.\n\n     Revelation, progressive, 462-464;\n       harmony of the two revelations in the volume of conscience and\n       the volume of the New Testament, 522-524.\n\nS.\n\n     Sacrifice, universal prevalence of, 115, 124;\n       prompted by the universal consciousness of guilt, 126:\n       expiatory sacrifices grounded on a primitive revelation, 127.\n\n     Schleiermacher, his theory that all religion is grounded on the\n       feeling of absolute dependence, 71, 72.\n\n     Science, Plato's answer to the question, What is Science? 338, 339.\n\n     Self-determination, limited by idea of duty, 113;\n       implies accountability, 114;\n       recognizes a Lawgiver and Judge, 115.\n\n     Socrates, his desire for truth, 316;\n       his d\u00e6mon, 317 _(note_);\n       his philosophic method, 318, 319;\n       a believer in one Supreme God, 320;\n       his argument for the existence of God from final causes, 320-324;\n       his belief in immortality and a future retribution, 324, 325;\n       his Ethics, 325;\n       the great prophet of the human conscience, 500-502.\n\n     Socratic School, 314.\n\n     Sophists, 315, 316;\n       their skeptical tendency, 315;\n       their defective ethics, 498, 499.\n\n     Sophocles, believed in one Supreme God, 147.\n\n     Soul, Plato on the nature of the, 350, 373;\n       eternity of the rational element, 373-375.\n\n     Spencer, H., carries the law of the Conditioned forward to its\n       logical consequences, Atheism, 241, 242.\n\n     Stoical School, 446;\n       its philosophy a moral philosophy, 447.\n\n     Stoics, their Physiology, 448-453; their\n       Psychology, 453, 454;\n       their Ethics, 454-456;\n       their Theology, 452,453.\n\n     Substance, principle of, 189;\n       Idealism seeks to undermine it, 193;\n       Reason affirms a permanent substance as the ground of all mental\n       phenomena, 201--and of the phenomena of the sensible world,\n       202, 203.\n\n     Sufficient Reason, law of, recognized by Plato, 359.\n\n     Superstition, meaning of the term as used by Paul, 103.\n\n T.\n\n     Teleological proof of the existence of God, 490, 491.\n\n     Thales, a believer in one uncreated God, 152;\n       his first principles, 283;\n       he regards _water_ as the material cause, 284;\n       and God as the efficient cause, 285.\n\n     Theistic argument, in its logical form, 487-494.\n\n     Theistic conception, gradual development of, 481-484,\n\n     Theological opinions of the early periods of Greek civilization,\n       150, 151; 276-278.\n\n     Theology of Aristotle, 404-417;\n       identical with Metaphysics, 404, 416.\n\n     Theology of the Greek poets, 143-151;\n       proposed reform of Poetry by Plato, 131, 132.\n\n     Thinking, conditionality of, 228;\n       in what sense to be understood, 237;\n       thought imposes no limits upon the object of thought, 237, 238.\n\n     Thought, negative and positive, 242, 243;\n       negative thought an impossibility, 243;\n       all thought must be positive, 243.\n\n     Time, Platonic notion of, 371, 372.\n\n     Tragedians, the Greek, were the public religious teachers of the\n       Athenians, 145;\n       their theology, 146, 147;\n       influence of the religious dramas on the Athenian mind, 161-163;\n       guiltiness of man, and need of reconciliation confessed by,\n       515-517.\n\nU.\n\n     Unconditioned, principle of, 189;\n       assailed by Hamilton, 194.\n\n     Unity of God, 259;\n       an affirmation of reason, 259-261;\n       Xenophanes taught the unity of God, 307--also Parmenides,\n       309--and Plato, 377--and Aristotle, 415.\n\n     Unity, principle of, 189;\n       attempt of Dogmatic Theologians to prove its insufficiency, 194,\n       258-261;\n       recognized by Pythagoras, 296;\n       his effort to reduce all the phenomena of nature to a Unity, 303,\n       304.\n\n     Universal and necessary Principles, classification of, 189, 190;\n       these the foundation of our cognition of a God, 191;\n       how attained according to Plato, 360-364;\n       how by the method of Aristotle, 390-394, 402, 403.\n\n     Universe, the, is it finite or infinite? 178-184;\n       Epicurus teaches that it is infinite, 433.\n\n     Unknown God, the true God, 104;\n       God not absolutely unknown, 107-110;\n       classification of opponents to the doctrine that God can be\n       cognized by reason, 166-168;\n       Idealist School of Mill, 194-203;\n       Materialistic School of Comte, 203-223;\n       Hamiltonian School, 224-252;\n       School of Dogmatic Theologians, 252-263.\n\nW.\n\n     Watson, Richard, represents the views of Dogmatic Theologians 86;\n       asserts that all our religious knowledge is derived from oral\n       revelation, 86-88, 167;\n       incompleteness and inadequacy of this theory, 88-96;\n       in vindicating for the Scriptures the honor of revealing all our\n       knowledge of God, he casts doubt upon the principle of Causality,\n       253-255--on the principle of the Unconditioned, 255-257--on the\n       principle of Unity, 258-261--and on the immutable principles of\n       Morality, 261-263.\n\n     Wordsworth, on the Sentiment of the Divine, 118.\n\nX.\n\n     Xenophanes, his attack on Polytheism, 130;\n       his faith in one God, 153, 306, 307.\n\nZ.\n\n     Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoical School, 446;\n       a Spiritualistic Pantheist, 450, 451.\n\n     Zeno of Elea, maintained the doctrine of Absolute Identity, 309.\n\n     Zeus, originally the Supreme and only God of the Greeks, 143;\n       the Homeric Zeus, the Supreme God, 144, 145.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\nVALUABLE STANDARD WORKS\nFOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIBRARIES,\nPublished by HARPER & BROTHERS, New York.\n\n\n_For a full List of Books suitable for Libraries, see _Harper &\nBrother's Trade-List _and_ Catalogue, _which may be had gratuitously on\napplication to the Publishers personally, or by letter enclosing Five\nCents_.\n\n\nHARPER & BROTHERS _will send any of the following works by mail, postage\nprepaid, to any part of the United States, on receipt of the price_.\n\nMOTLEY'S DUTCH REPUBLIC. 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With Engravings. 10 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $15\n00.\n\nGIBBON'S ROME. History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. By\nEdward Gibbon. With Notes by Rev. H.H. Milman and M. Guizot. A new cheap\nEdition. To which is added a complete Index of the whole Work, and a\nPortrait of the Author. 6 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $9 00.\n\nHARPER'S PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE REBELLION. Harper's Pictorial History\nof the Great Rebellion in the United States. With nearly 1000\nIllustrations. In Two Vols., 4to. Price $6 00 per vol.\n\nHARPER'S NEW CLASSICAL LIBRARY. Literal Translations.\n\nThe following Volumes are now ready. Portraits. 12mo, Cloth, $1 50 each.\nC\u00e6sar.--Virgil.--Sallust.--Horace.--Cicero's Orations.--Cicero's\nOffices, &c.--Cicero on Oratory and Orators.--Tacitus (2\nvols.).--Terence.--Sophocles.--Juvenal.--Xenophon.--Homer's\nIliad.--Homer's\nOdyssey.--Herodotus.--Demosthenes.--Thucydides.--\u00c6schylus.--Euripides (2\nvols.).\n\nHELPS'S SPANISH CONQUEST. The Spanish Conquest in America, and its\nRelation to the History of Slavery and to the Government of Colonies. By\nArthur Helps. 4 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $6 00.\n\nHUME'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND. History of England, from the Invasion of\nJulius C\u00e6sar to the Abdication of James II., 1688. By David Hume. A new\nEdition, with the Author's last Corrections and Improvements. To which\nis Prefixed a short Account of his Life, written by Himself. With a\nPortrait of the Author. 6 vols., 12mo, Cloth, $9 00.\n\nGROTE'S HISTORY OF GREECE. 12 vols., 12mo, Cloth. $18 00.\n\nHALE'S (Mrs.) WOMAN'S RECORD. Woman's Record; or, Biographical Sketches\nof all Distinguished Women, from the Creation to the Present Time.\nArranged In Four Eras, with Selections from Female Writers of each Era.\nBy Mrs. Sarah Josepha Hale. Illustrated with more than 200 Portraits.\n8vo, Cloth, $5 00.\n\nHALL'S ARCTIC RESEARCHES. Arctic Researches and Life among the\nEsquimaux: being the Narrative of an Expedition in Search of Sir John\nFranklin, in the Years 1860, 1861, and 1862. By Charles Francis Hall.\nWith Maps and 100 Illustrations. The Illustrations are from Original\nDrawings by Charles Parsons, Henry L. Stephens, Solomon Eytinge, W.S.L.\nJewett, and Granville Perkins, after Sketches by Captain Hall. 8vo,\nCloth, $5 00.\n\nHALLAM'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, from the Accession of Henry\nVII. to the Death of George II. 8vo, Cloth, $2 00.\n\nHALLAM'S LITERATURE. Introduction to the Literature of Europe during the\nFifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries. By Henry Hallam. 2\nvols. 8vo, Cloth, $4 00.\n\nHALLAM'S MIDDLE AGES. State of Europe during the Middle Ages. By Henry\nHallam. 8vo, Cloth, $2 00.\n\nHILDRETH'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. First Series: From the First\nSettlement of the Country to the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.\nSecond Series: From the Adoption of the Federal Constitution to the End\nof the Sixteenth Congress. 6 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $18 00.\n\nJAY'S WORKS. Complete Works of Rev. William Jay: comprising his Sermons,\nFamily Discourses, Morning and Evening Exercises for every Day in the\nYear, Family Prayers, &c. Author's enlarged Edition, revised. 3 vols.,\n8vo, Cloth, $6 00.\n\nJOHNSON'S COMPLETE WORKS. The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. With an\nEssay on his Life and Genius, by Arthur Murphy, Esq. Portrait of Johnson\n2 vols., 8vo, Cloth, $4 00.\n\nKINGLAKE'S CRIMEAN WAR. The Invasion of the Crimea, and an Account of\nits Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan. By Alexander William\nKinglake. With Maps and Plans. Two Vols. ready. 12mo, Cloth, $2 00 per\nvol.\n\nKRUMMACHER'S DAVID, KING OF ISRAEL. David, the King of Israel: a\nPortrait drawn from Bible History and the Book of Psalms. By Frederick\nWilliam Krummacher, D.D., Author of \"Elijah the Tishbite,\" &c.\nTranslated under the express Sanction of the Author by the Rev. M.G.\nEaston, M.A. With a Letter from Dr. Krummacher to his American Readers,\nand a Portrait. 12mo, Cloth, $1 75.\n\nLAMB'S COMPLETE WORKS. The Works of Charles Lamb. Comprising his\nLetters, Poems, Essays of Elia. Essays upon Shakspeare, Hogarth, &c.,\nand a Sketch of his Life, with the Final Memorials, by T. Noon Talfourd.\nPortrait. 2 vols. 12mo, Cloth, $3 00.","title":"Christianity and Greek Philosophy: or, the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and His Apostles","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":187970}