{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_27821/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_27821","id":"gutenberg_27821","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27821","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Medieval/Middle Ages","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Philosophy, Jewish","Philosophy, Medieval"],"text":"Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Meredith Bach,\nand the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at\nhttps://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [Transcriber's Note:\n\n English transliterations have been provided for the Greek and Hebrew\n words.\n\n A few other substitutions have also been used in this version of the\n text. They are as follows:\n\n [= ] surrounding a vowel indicates that it is a long vowel with a macron\n (dash) above it.\n\n [h.] indicates that this is an h with a dot under it.\n\n The use of tildes (~) around a word signifies that the original was\n spaced out l i k e t h i s.\n\n ` indicates an inverted apostrophe, which in this book is used to\n represent the gutteral ayin found in Hebrew and Arabic.]\n\n\n\n\n A HISTORY OF\n MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY\n\n BY\n\n ISAAC HUSIK, A.M., PH.D.\n ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY\n OF PENNSYLVANIA\n\n\n New York\n THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n 1916\n\n _All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1916\n BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1916.\n\n\n\n\nThis book is issued by the Macmillan Company in conjunction with the\nJewish Publication Society of America.\n\n\n\n\n TO\n SOLOMON SOLIS COHEN, M.D.\n AS A TOKEN\n OF\n GRATITUDE AND ESTEEM\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nNo excuse is needed for presenting to the English reader a History of\nMedi\u00e6val Jewish Philosophy. The English language, poor enough in books\non Jewish history and literature, can boast of scarcely anything at all\nin the domain of Jewish Philosophy. The Jewish Encyclopedia has no\narticle on Jewish Philosophy, and neither has the eleventh edition of\nthe Encyclopedia Britannica. Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and\nEthics will have a brief article on the subject from the conscientious\nand able pen of Dr. Henry Malter, but of books there is none. But while\nthis is due to several causes, chief among them perhaps being that\nEnglish speaking people in general and Americans in particular are more\ninterested in positive facts than in tentative speculations, in concrete\nresearches than in abstract theorizing--there are ample signs that here\ntoo a change is coming, and in many spheres we are called upon to\nexamine our foundations with a view to making our superstructure deep\nand secure as well as broad and comprehensive. And this is nothing else\nthan philosophy. Philosophical studies are happily on the increase in\nthis country and more than one branch of literary endeavor is beginning\nto feel its influence. And with the increase of books and researches in\nthe history of the Jews is coming an awakening to the fact that the\nphilosophical and rationalistic movement among the Jews in the middle\nages is well worth study, influential as it was in forming Judaism as a\nreligion and as a theological and ethical system.\n\nBut it is not merely the English language that is still wanting in a\ngeneral history of Medi\u00e6val Jewish Philosophy, the German, French and\nItalian languages are no better off in this regard. For while it is true\nthat outside of the Hebrew and Arabic sources, German books and\nmonographs are the _sine qua non_ of the student who wishes to\ninvestigate the philosophical movement in medi\u00e6val Jewry, and the\npresent writer owes very much to the researches of such men as Joel,\nGuttmann, Kaufmann and others, it nevertheless remains true that there\nis as yet no complete history of the subject for the student or the\ngeneral reader. The German writers have done thorough and distinguished\nwork in expounding individual thinkers and problems, they have gathered\na complete and detailed bibliography of Jewish philosophical writings in\nprint and in manuscript, they have edited and translated and annotated\nthe most important philosophical texts. France has also had an important\nshare in these fundamental undertakings, but for some reason neither the\none nor the other has so far undertaken to present to the general\nstudent and non-technical reader the results of their researches.\n\nWhat was omitted by the German, French and English speaking writers was\naccomplished by a scholar who wrote in Hebrew. Dr. S. Bernfeld has\nwritten in Hebrew under the title \"Daat Elohim\" (The Knowledge of God) a\nreadable sketch of Jewish Religious philosophy from Biblical times down\nto \"Ahad Haam.\" A German scholar (now in America), Dr. David Neumark of\nCincinnati, has undertaken on a very large scale a History of Jewish\nPhilosophy in the Middle Ages, of which only a beginning has been made\nin the two volumes so far issued.\n\nThe present writer at the suggestion of the Publication Committee of the\nJewish Publication Society of America has undertaken to write a history\nof medi\u00e6val Jewish rationalistic philosophy in one volume--a history\nthat will appeal alike to the scholar and the intelligent non-technical\nreader. Treating only of the rationalistic school, I did not include\nanything that has to do with mysticism or Kabbala. In my attempt to\nplease the scholar and the layman, I fear I shall have succeeded in\nsatisfying neither. The professional student will miss learned notes and\nquotations of original passages in the language of their authors. The\ngeneral reader will often be wearied by the scholastic tone of the\nproblems as well as of the manner of the discussion and argument. And\nyet I cannot but feel that it will do both classes good--the one to get\nless, the other more than he wants. The latter will find oases in the\ndesert where he can refresh himself and take a rest, and the former will\nfind in the notes and bibliography references to sources and technical\narticles where more can be had after his own heart.\n\nThere is not much room for originality in a historical and expository\nwork of this kind, particularly as I believe in writing history\nobjectively. I have not attempted to read into the medi\u00e6val thinkers\nmodern ideas that were foreign to them. I endeavored to interpret their\nideas from their own point of view as determined by their history and\nenvironment and the literary sources, religious and philosophical, under\nthe influence of which they came. I based my book on a study of the\noriginal sources where they were available--and this applies to all the\nauthors treated with the exception of the two Karaites, Joseph al Basir\nand Jeshua ben Judah, where I had to content myself with secondary\nsources and a few fragments of the original texts. For the rest I tried\nto tell my story as simply as I knew how, and I hope the reader will\naccept the book in the spirit in which it is offered--as an objective\nand not too critical exposition of Jewish rationalistic thought in the\nmiddle ages.\n\nMy task would not be done were I not to express my obligations to the\nPublication Committee of the Jewish Publication Society of America to\nwhose encouragement I owe the impulse but for which the book would not\nhave been written, and whose material assistance enabled the publishers\nto bring out a book typographically so attractive.\n\n\n ISAAC HUSIK.\n\n PHILADELPHIA,\n _July, 1916._\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n\n PAGE\n\n PREFACE vii\n\n INTRODUCTION xiii\n\n CHAPTER\n\n I. ISAAC ISRAELI 1\n\n II. DAVID BEN MERWAN AL MUKAMMAS 17\n\n III. SAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI 23\n\n IV. JOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH 48\n\n V. SOLOMON IBN GABIROL 59\n\n VI. BAHYA IBN PAKUDA 80\n\n VII. PSEUDO-BAHYA 106\n\n VIII. ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA 114\n\n IX. JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK 125\n\n X. JUDAH HALEVI 150\n\n XI. MOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA 184\n\n XII. ABRAHAM IBN DAUD 197\n\n XIII. MOSES MAIMONIDES 236\n\n XIV. HILLEL BEN SAMUEL 312\n\n XV. LEVI BEN GERSON 328\n\n XVI. AARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA 362\n\n XVII. HASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS 388\n\n XVIII. JOSEPH ALBO 406\n\n CONCLUSION 428\n\n BIBLIOGRAPHY 433\n\n NOTES 439\n\n LIST OF BIBLICAL AND RABBINIC PASSAGES 449\n\n INDEX 451\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe philosophical movement in medi\u00e6val Jewry was the result of the\ndesire and the necessity, felt by the leaders of Jewish thought, of\nreconciling two apparently independent sources of truth. In the middle\nages, among Jews as well as among Christians and Mohammedans, the two\nsources of knowledge or truth which were clearly present to the minds of\nthinking people, each claiming recognition, were religious opinions as\nembodied in revealed documents on the one hand, and philosophical and\nscientific judgments and arguments, the results of independent rational\nreflection, on the other. Revelation and reason, religion and\nphilosophy, faith and knowledge, authority and independent reflection\nare the various expressions for the dualism in medi\u00e6val thought, which\nthe philosophers and theologians of the time endeavored to reduce to a\nmonism or a unity.\n\nLet us examine more intimately the character and content of the two\nelements in the intellectual horizon of medi\u00e6val Jewry. On the side of\nrevelation, religion, authority, we have the Bible, the Mishna, the\nTalmud. The Bible was the written law, and represented literally the\nword of God as revealed to lawgiver and prophet; the Talmud (including\nthe Mishna) was the oral law, embodying the unwritten commentary on the\nwords of the Law, equally authentic with the latter, contemporaneous\nwith it in revelation, though not committed to writing until many ages\nsubsequently and until then handed down by word of mouth; hence\ndepending upon tradition and faith in tradition for its validity and\nacceptance. Authority therefore for the Rabbanites was two-fold, the\nauthority of the direct word of God which was written down as soon as\ncommunicated, and about which there could therefore be no manner of\ndoubt; and the authority of the indirect word of God as transmitted\norally for many generations before it was written down, requiring belief\nin tradition. By the Karaites tradition was rejected, and there remained\nonly belief in the words of the Bible.\n\nOn the side of reason was urged first the claim of the testimony of the\nsenses, and second the validity of logical inference as determined by\ndemonstration and syllogistic proof. This does not mean that the Jewish\nthinkers of the middle ages developed unaided from without a system of\nthought and a _Weltanschauung_, based solely upon their own observation\nand ratiocination, and then found that the view of the world thus\nacquired stood in opposition to the religion of the Bible and the\nTalmud, the two thus requiring adjustment and reconciliation. No! The\nso-called demands of the reason were not of their own making, and on the\nother hand the relation between philosophy and religion was not\naltogether one of opposition. To discuss the latter point first, the\nteachings of the Bible and the Talmud were not altogether clear on a\ngreat many questions. Passages could be cited from the religious\ndocuments of Judaism in reference to a given problem both _pro_ and\n_con_. Thus in the matter of freedom of the will one could argue on the\none hand that man must be free to determine his conduct since if he were\nnot there would have been no use in giving him commandments and\nprohibitions. And one could quote besides in favor of freedom the direct\nstatement in Deuteronomy 30, 19, \"I call heaven and earth to witness\nagainst you this day, that I have set before thee life and death, the\nblessing and the curse: therefore choose life, that thou mayest live,\nthou and thy seed.\" But on the other hand it was just as possible to\nfind Biblical statements indicating clearly that God preordains how a\nperson shall behave in a given case. Thus Pharaoh's heart was hardened\nthat he should not let the children of Israel go out of Egypt, as we\nread in Exodus 7, 3: \"And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my\nsigns and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh will not hearken\nunto you, and I will lay my hand upon Egypt, and bring forth my hosts,\nmy people, the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt by great\njudgments.\" Similarly in the case of Sihon king of Heshbon we read in\nDeuteronomy 2, 30: \"But Sihon king of Heshbon would not let us pass by\nhim: for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart\nobstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand, as at this day.\" And\nthis is true not merely of heathen kings, Ahab king of Israel was\nsimilarly enticed by a divine instigation according to I Kings 22, 20:\n\"And the Lord said, Who shall entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at\nRamoth-Gilead?\"\n\nThe fact of the matter is the Bible is not a systematic book, and\nprinciples and problems are not clearly and strictly formulated even in\nthe domain of ethics which is its strong point. It was not therefore a\nquestion here of opposition between the Bible and philosophy, or\nauthority and reason. What was required was rather a rational analysis\nof the problem on its own merits and then an endeavor to show that the\nconflicting passages in the Scriptures are capable of interpretation so\nas to harmonize with each other and with the results of rational\nspeculation. To be sure, it was felt that the doctrine of freedom is\nfundamental to the spirit of Judaism, and the philosophic analyses led\nto the same result though in differing form, sometimes dangerously\napproaching a thorough determinism, as in Hasdai Crescas.[1]\n\nIf such doubt was possible in an ethical problem where one would suppose\nthe Bible would be outspoken, the uncertainty was still greater in\npurely metaphysical questions which as such were really foreign to its\npurpose as a book of religion and ethics. While it was clear that the\nBible teaches the existence of God as the creator of the universe, and\nof man as endowed with a soul, it is manifestly difficult to extract\nfrom it a rigid and detailed theory as to the nature of God, the manner\nin which the world was created, the nature of the soul and its relation\nto man and to God. As long as the Jews were self-centered and did not\ncome in close contact with an alien civilization of a philosophic mould,\nthe need for a carefully thought out and consistent theory on all the\nquestions suggested was not felt. And thus we have in the Talmudic\nliterature quite a good deal of speculation concerning God and man. But\nit can scarcely lay claim to being rationalistic or philosophic, much\nless to being consistent. Nay, we have in the Bible itself at least two\nbooks which attempt an anti-dogmatic treatment of ethical problems. In\nJob is raised the question whether a man's fortunes on earth bear any\nrelation to his conduct moral and spiritual. Ecclesiastes cannot make up\nhis mind whether life is worth living, and how to make the best of it\nonce one finds himself alive, whether by seeking wisdom or by pursuing\npleasure. But here too Job is a long poem, and the argument does not\nprogress very rapidly or very far. Ecclesiastes is rambling rather than\nanalytic, and on the whole mostly negative. The Talmudists were visibly\npuzzled in their attitude to both books, wondered whether Job really\nexisted or was only a fancy, and seriously thought of excluding\nEcclesiastes from the canon. But these attempts at questioning the\nmeaning of life had no further results. They did not lead, as in the\ncase of the Greek Sophists, to a Socrates, a Plato or an Aristotle.\nPhilo in Alexandria and Maimonides in Fostat were the products not of\nthe Bible and the Talmud alone, but of a combination of Hebraism and\nHellenism, pure in the case of Philo, mixed with the spirit of Islam in\nMaimonides.\n\nAnd this leads us to consider the second point mentioned above, the\nnature and content of what was attributed in the middle ages to the\ncredit of reason. It was in reality once more a set of documents. The\nBible and Talmud were the documents of revelation, Aristotle was the\ndocument of reason. Each was supreme in its sphere, and all efforts must\nbe bent to make them agree, for as revelation cannot be doubted, so\nneither can the assured results of reason. But not all which pretends to\nbe the conclusion of reason is necessarily so in truth, as on the other\nhand the documents of faith are subject to interpretation and may mean\nsomething other than appears on the surface.\n\nThat the Bible has an esoteric meaning besides the literal has its\nsource in the Talmud itself. Reference is found there to a mystic\ndoctrine of creation known as \"Maase Bereshit\" and a doctrine of the\ndivine chariot called \"Maase Merkaba.\"[2] The exact nature of these\nteachings is not known since the Talmud itself prohibits the imparting\nof this mystic lore to any but the initiated, i. e., to those showing\nthemselves worthy; and never to more than one or two at a time.[3] But\nit is clear from the names of these doctrines that they centered about\nthe creation story in Genesis and the account of the divine chariot in\nEzekiel, chapters one and ten. Besides the Halaka and Agada are full of\ninterpretations of Biblical texts which are very far from the literal\nand have little to do with the context. Moreover, the beliefs current\namong the Jews in Alexandria in the first century B.C. found their way\ninto medi\u00e6val Jewry, that the philosophic literature of the Greeks was\noriginally borrowed or stolen from the Hebrews, who lost it in times of\nstorm and stress.[4] This being the case, it was believed that the Bible\nitself cannot be without some allusions to philosophic doctrines. That\nthe Bible does not clearly teach philosophy is due to the fact that it\nwas intended for the salvation of all men, the simple as well as the\nwise, women and children as well as male adults. For these it is\nsufficient that they know certain religious truths within their grasp\nand conduct themselves according to the laws of goodness and\nrighteousness. A strictly philosophic book would have been beyond their\nken and they would have been left without a guide in life. But the more\nintellectual and the more ambitious are not merely permitted, nay they\nare obligated to search the Scriptures for the deeper truths found\ntherein, truths akin to the philosophic doctrines found in Greek\nliterature; and the latter will help them in understanding the Bible\naright. It thus became a duty to study philosophy and the sciences\npreparatory thereto, logic, mathematics and physics; and thus equipped\nto approach the Scriptures and interpret them in a philosophical manner.\nThe study of medi\u00e6val Jewish rationalism has therefore two sides to it,\nthe analysis of metaphysical, ethical and psychological problems, and\nthe application of these studies to an interpretation of Scripture.\n\nNow let us take a closer glance at the rationalistic or philosophic\nliterature to which the Jews in the middle ages fell heirs. In 529 A.D.\nthe Greek schools of philosophy in Athens were closed by order of\nEmperor Justinian. This did not, however, lead to the extinction of\nGreek thought as an influence in the world. For though the West was\ngradually declining intellectually on account of the fall of Rome and\nthe barbarian invasions which followed in its train, there were signs of\nprogress in the East which, feeble at first, was destined in the course\nof several centuries to illumine the whole of Europe with its\nenlightening rays.\n\nLong before 529, the date of the closing of the Greek schools, Greek\ninfluence was introduced in the East in Asia and Africa.[5] The whole\nmovement goes back to the days of Alexander the Great and the victories\nhe gained in the Orient. From that time on Greeks settled in Asia and\nAfrica and brought along with them Greek manners, the Greek language,\nand the Greek arts and sciences. Alexandria, the capital of the\nPtolemies in Egypt after the death of Alexander, and Antioch, the\ncapital of Syria under the empire of the Seleucid\u00e6, were well-known\ncentres of Greek learning.\n\nWhen Syria changed masters in 64 B.C. and became a Roman province, its\nform of civilization did not change, and the introduction of\nChristianity had the effect of spreading the influence of the Greeks and\ntheir language into Mesopotamia beyond the Euphrates. The Christians in\nSyria had to study Greek in order to understand the Scriptures of the\nOld and the New Testaments, the decrees and canons of the ecclesiastical\ncouncils, and the writings of the Church Fathers. Besides religion and\nthe Church, the liberal arts and sciences, for which the Greeks were so\nfamous, attracted the interests of the Syrian Christians, and schools\nwere established in the ecclesiastical centres where philosophy,\nmathematics and medicine were studied. These branches of knowledge were\nrepresented in Greek literature, and hence the works treating of these\nsubjects had to be translated into Syriac for the benefit of those who\ndid not know Greek. Aristotle was the authority in philosophy,\nHippocrates and Galen in medicine.\n\nThe oldest of these schools was in Edessa in Mesopotamia, founded in the\nyear 363 by St. Ephrem of Nisibis. It was closed in 489 and the teachers\nmigrated to Persia where two other schools became famous, one at Nisibis\nand the other at Gandisapora. A third school of philosophy among the\nJacobite or Monophysite Christians was that connected with the convent\nof Kinnesrin on the left bank of the Euphrates, which became famous as a\nseat of Greek learning in the beginning of the seventh century.\n\nChristianity was succeeded in the Orient by Mohammedanism, and this\nchange led to even greater cultivation of Greek studies on the part of\nthe Syrians. The Mohammedan Caliphs employed the Syrians as physicians.\nThis was especially true of the Abbasid dynasty, who came into power in\n750. When they succeeded to the Caliphate they raised Nestorian Syrians\nto offices of importance, and the latter under the patronage of their\nmasters continued their studies of Greek science and philosophy and\ntranslated those writings into Syriac and Arabic. Among the authors\ntranslated were, Hippocrates and Galen in medicine, Euclid, Archimedes\nand Ptolemy in mathematics and astronomy, and Aristotle, Theophrastus\nand Alexander of Aphrodisias in philosophy. In many cases the Greek\nwritings were not turned directly into Arabic but as the translators\nwere Syrians, the versions were made first into Syriac, and then from\nthe Syriac into Arabic. The Syrian Christians were thus the mediators\nbetween the Greeks and the Arabs. The latter, however, in the course of\ntime far surpassed their Syrian teachers, developed important schools\nof philosophy, became the teachers of the Jews, and with the help of the\nlatter introduced Greek philosophy as well as their own development\nthereof into Christian Europe in the beginning of the thirteenth\ncentury.\n\nWe see now that the impulse to philosophizing came from the Greeks,--and\nnot merely the impulse but the material, the matter as well as the\nmethod and the terminology. In the Aristotelian writings we find\ndeveloped an entire system of thought. There is not a branch of\nknowledge dealing with fundamental principles which is not there\nrepresented. First of all Aristotle stands alone as the discoverer of\nthe organon of thought, the tool which we all employ in our reasoning\nand reflection; he is the first formulator of the science and art of\nlogic. He treats besides of the principles of nature and natural\nphenomena in the Physics and the treatise on the Heavens. He discusses\nthe nature of the soul, the senses and the intellect in his\n\"Psychology.\" In the \"History of Animals\" and other minor works we have\na treatment of biology. In the Nikomachean and Eudemian Ethics he\nanalyzes the meaning of virtue, gives a list and classification of the\nvirtues and discusses the _summum bonum_ or the aim of human life.\nFinally in the Metaphysics we have an analysis of the fundamental\nnotions of being, of the nature of reality and of God.\n\nThe Jews did not get all this in its purity for various reasons. In the\nfirst place it was only gradually that the Jews became acquainted with\nthe wealth of Aristotelian material. We are sure that Abraham Ibn Daud,\nthe forerunner of Maimonides, had a thorough familiarity with the ideas\nof Aristotle; and those who came after him, for example Maimonides,\nGersonides, Hasdai Crescas, show clearly that they were deep students of\nthe ideas represented in the writings of the Stagirite. But there is not\nthe same evidence in the earlier writings of Isaac Israeli, Saadia,\nJoseph Ibn Zaddik, Gabirol, Bahya Ibn Pakuda, Judah Halevi. They had\npicked up Aristotelian ideas and principles, but they had also absorbed\nideas and concepts from other schools, Greek as well as Arabian, and\nunconsciously combined the two.\n\nAnother explanation for the rarity of the complete and unadulterated\nAristotle among the Jewish thinkers of the middle ages is that people in\nthose days were very uncritical in the matter of historical facts and\nrelations. Historical and literary criticism was altogether unknown, and\na number of works were ascribed to Aristotle which did not belong to\nhim, and which were foreign in spirit to his mode of thinking. They\nemanated from a different school of thought with different\npresuppositions. I am referring to the treatise called the \"Theology of\nAristotle,\"[6] and that known as the \"Liber de Causis.\"[7] Both were\nattributed to Aristotle in the middle ages by Jews and Arabs alike, but\nit has been shown recently[8] that the former represents extracts from\nthe works of Plotinus, the head of the Neo-Platonic school of\nphilosophy, while the latter is derived from a treatise of Proclus, a\nNeo-Platonist of later date.\n\nFinally a third reason for the phenomenon in question is that the Jews\nwere the pupils of the Arabs and followed their lead in adapting Greek\nthought to their own intellectual and spiritual needs. It so happens\ntherefore that even in the case of Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides and\nGersonides, who were without doubt well versed in Aristotelian thought\nand entertained not merely admiration but reverence for the philosopher\nof Stagira, we notice that instead of reading the works of Aristotle\nhimself, they preferred, or were obliged as the case may be, to go to\nthe writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes for their information on\nthe views of the philosopher. In the case of Gersonides this is easily\nexplained. It seems he could read neither Latin nor Arabic[9] and there\nwas no Hebrew translation of the text of Aristotle. Averroes had taken\nin the fourteenth century the place of the Greek philosopher and instead\nof reading Aristotle all students read the works of the Commentator, as\nAverroes was called. Of course the very absence of a Hebrew translation\nof Aristotle's text proves that even among those who read Arabic the\ndemand for the text of Aristotle was not great, and preference was shown\nfor the works of the interpreters, compendists and commentators, like\nAlfarabi and Avicenna. And this helps us to understand why it is that\nIbn Daud and Maimonides who not only read Arabic but wrote their\nphilosophical works in Arabic showed the same preference for the\nsecondhand Aristotle. One reason may have been the lack of historical\nand literary criticism spoken of above, and the other the difficulty of\nthe Arabic translations of Aristotle. Aristotle is hard to translate\ninto any language by reason of his peculiar technical terminology; and\nthe difficulty was considerably enhanced by the fact that the Syriac in\nmany cases stood between the original Greek and the Arabic, and in the\nsecond place by the great dissimilarity between the Semitic language and\nits Indo-European original. This may have made the copies of Aristotle's\ntext rare, and gradually led to their disuse. The great authority which\nnames like Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes acquired still further served\nto stamp them as the approved expositors of the Aristotelian doctrine.\n\nAmong the Arabs the earliest division based upon a theoretical question\nwas that of the parties known as the \"Kadariya\" and the \"Jabariya.\"[10]\nThe problem which was the cause of the difference was that of free will\nand determinism. Orthodox Islam favored the idea that man is completely\ndependent upon the divine will, and that not only his destiny but also\nhis conduct is determined, and his own will does not count. This was the\npopular feeling, though as far as the Koran is concerned the question\ncannot be decided one way or the other, as it is not consistent in its\nstand, and arguments can be drawn in plenty in favor of either opinion.\nThe idea of determinism, however, seemed repugnant to many minds, who\ncould not reconcile this with their idea of reward and punishment and\nthe justice of God. How is it possible that a righteous God would force\na man to act in a certain manner and then punish him for it? Hence the\nsect of the \"Kadariya,\" who were in favor of freedom of the will. The\nJabariya were the determinists.\n\nThis division goes back to a very early period before the introduction\nof the Aristotelian philosophy among the Arabs, and hence owes its\ninception not to reason as opposed to religious dogma, but to a pious\nendeavor to understand clearly the religious view upon so important a\nquestion.\n\nFrom the Kadariya, and in opposition to the Aristotelian movement which\nhad in the meantime gained ground, developed the school of theologians\nknown as the \"Mutakallimun.\" They were the first among the Arabs who\ndeliberately laid down the reason as a source of knowledge in addition\nto the authority of the Koran and the \"Sunna\" or tradition. They were\nnot freethinkers, and their object was not to oppose orthodoxy as such.\nOn the contrary, their purpose was to purify the faith by freeing it\nfrom such elements as obscured in their minds the purity of the\nmonotheistic tenet and the justice of God. They started where the\nKadariya left off and went further. As a school of opposition their\nefforts were directed to prove the creation of the world, individual\nprovidence, the reality of miracles, as against the \"philosophers,\" _i.\ne._, the Aristotelians, who held to the eternity of motion, denied God's\nknowledge of particulars, and insisted on the unchanging character of\nnatural law.\n\nFor this purpose they placed at the basis of their speculations not the\nAristotelian concepts of matter and form, the former uncreated and\ncontinuous, but adopted the atomistic theory of Democritus, denied the\nnecessity of cause and effect and the validity of natural law, and made\nGod directly responsible for everything that happened every moment in\nlife. God, they said, creates continually, and he is not hampered by any\nsuch thing as natural law, which is merely our name for that which we\nare accustomed to see. Whenever it rains we are accustomed to see the\nground wet, and we conclude that there is a necessary connection of\ncause and effect between the rain and the wetness of the ground. Nothing\nof the kind, say the Mutakallimun, or the Mu`tazila, the oldest sect of\nthe school. It rains because God willed that it should rain, and the\nground is wet because God wills it shall be wet. If God willed that the\nground should be dry following a rain, it would be dry; and the one is\nno more and no less natural than the other. Miracles cease to be\nmiracles on this conception of natural processes. Similarly the dogma of\ncreation is easily vindicated on this theory as against the Aristotelian\ndoctrine of eternity of the world, which follows from his doctrine of\nmatter and form, as we shall have occasion to see later.\n\nThe Mu`tazila were, however, chiefly known not for their principles of\nphysics but for their doctrines of the unity of God and his justice. It\nwas this which gave them their name of the \"Men of Unity and Justice,\"\n_i. e._, the men who vindicate against the unenlightened views of\npopular orthodoxy the unity of God and his justice.\n\nThe discussion of the unity centered about the proper interpretation of\nthe anthropomorphic passages in the Koran and the doctrine of the divine\nattributes. When the Koran speaks of God's eyes, ears, hands, feet; of\nhis seeing, hearing, sitting, standing, walking, being angry, smiling,\nand so on, must those phrases be understood literally? If so God is\nsimilar to man, corporeal like him, and swayed by passions. This seemed\nto the Mu`tazila an unworthy conception of God. To vindicate his\nspirituality the anthropomorphic passages in the Koran must be\nunderstood metaphorically.\n\nThe other more difficult question was in what sense can attributes be\nascribed to God at all? It is not here a question of anthropomorphism.\nIf I say that God is omniscient, omnipotent and a living God, I\nattribute to God life, power, knowledge. Are these attributes the same\nwith God's essence or are they different? If different (and they must be\neternal since God was never without them), then we have more than one\neternal being, and God is dependent upon others. If they are not\ndifferent from God's essence, then his essence is not a strict unity,\nsince it is composed of life, power, knowledge; for life is not power,\nand power is not knowledge. The only way to defend the unity of God in\nits absolute purity is to say that God has no attributes, _i. e._, God\nis omniscient but not through knowledge as his attribute; God is\nomnipotent but not through power as his attribute, and so on. God is\nabsolutely one, and there is no distinction between knowledge, power,\nand life in him. They are all one, and are his essence.\n\nThis seemed in opposition to the words of the Koran, which frequently\nspeaks of God's knowledge, power, and so on, and was accordingly\ncondemned as heretical by the orthodox.\n\nIn the tenth century a new sect arose named the \"Ashariya\" after\nAl-Ashari, its founder. This was a party of moderation, and tended to\nconciliate orthodoxy by not going too far in the direction of\nrationalistic thinking. They solved the problem by saying, \"God knows\nthrough a knowledge which is not different from his essence.\"\n\nThe other problem to which the Mu`tazila devoted their attention was\nthat of the justice of God. This was in line with the efforts of the\nKadariya before them. It concerned itself with the doctrine of free\nwill. They defended man's absolute freedom of action, and insisted on\njustice as the only motive of God's dealings with men. God must be just\nand cannot act otherwise than in accordance with justice.\n\nIn reference to the question of the nature of good and evil, the\northodox position was that good is that which God commands, evil that\nwhich God forbids. In other words, nothing is in itself good or evil,\nthe ethical character of an act is purely relative to God's attitude to\nit. If God were to command cannibalism, it would be a good act. The\nMu`tazila were opposed to this. They believed in the absolute character\nof good and evil. What makes an act good or bad is reason, and it is\nbecause an act is good that God commands it, and not the reverse.\n\nThe foregoing account gives us an idea of the nature of the Mu`tazilite\ndiscussions of the two problems of God's unity and God's justice. Their\nworks were all arranged in the same way. They were divided into two\nparts, one dealing with the question of the unity, and the other with\nthat of justice. The proofs of the unity were preceded by the proofs of\nGod's existence, and the latter were based upon a demonstration that the\nworld is not eternal, but bears traces of having come to be in time.\nThese are the earmarks by which a Mu`tazilite book could be recognized,\nand the respect for them on the part of the philosophers, _i. e._, the\nAristotelians, was not great. The latter did not consider them worthy\ncombatants in a philosophical fight, claiming that they came with\npreconceived notions and arranged their conceptions of nature to suit\nthe religious beliefs which they desired to defend. Maimonides expresses\na similar judgment concerning their worthlessness as philosophical\nthinkers.[11]\n\nThis school of the Mutakallimun, or of the more important part of it\nknown as the Mu`tazila, is of great interest for the history of Jewish\nrationalism. In the first place their influence on the early Jewish\nphilosophers was great and unmistakable. It is no discovery of a late\nday but is well known to Maimonides who is himself, as has just been\nsaid and as will appear with greater detail later, a strong opponent of\nthese to him unphilosophical thinkers. In the seventy-first chapter of\nhis \"Guide of the Perplexed,\" he says, \"You will find that in the few\nworks composed by the Geonim and the Karaites on the unity of God and on\nsuch matter as is connected with this doctrine, they followed the lead\nof the Mohammedan Mutakallimun.... It also happened, that at the time\nwhen the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose among\nthem a certain sect, called Mu`tazila. In certain things our scholars\nfollowed the theory and the method of these Mu`tazila.\"\n\nThanks to the researches of modern Jewish and non-Jewish scholars we\nknow now that the Rabbanite thinker Saadia and the Karaite writers, like\nJoseph Al Basir and Jeshuah ben Judah, are indebted far more to the\nMohammedan Mu`tazilites than would appear from Maimonides's statement\njust quoted. The Rabbanites being staunch adherents of the Talmud, to\nthe influence of which they owed a national and religious\nself-consciousness much stronger than that of the Karaites, who rejected\nthe authority of tradition, did not allow themselves to be carried away\nso far by the ideas of the Mohammedan rationalists as to become their\nslavish followers. The Karaites are less scrupulous; and as they were\nthe first among the Jews to imitate the Mu`tazila in the endeavor to\nrationalize Jewish doctrine, they adopted their views in all details,\nand it is sometimes impossible to tell from the contents of a Karaite\nMu`tazilite work whether it was written by a Jew or a Mohammedan. The\narrangement of the work in the two divisions of \"Unity\" and \"Justice,\"\nthe discussion of substance and accident, of the creation of the world,\nof the existence, unity and incorporeality of God, of his attributes, of\nhis justice, and of human free will, are so similar in the two that it\nis external evidence alone to which we owe the knowledge of certain\nKaraite works as Jewish. There are no medi\u00e6val Jewish works treating of\nreligious and theological problems in which there is so much aloofness,\nsuch absence of theological prepossession and religious feeling as in\nsome Karaite writings of Mu`tazilite stamp. Cold and unredeemed logic\ngives the tone to the entire composition.\n\nAnother reason for the importance of the Mu`tazilite school for the\nhistory of Jewish thought is of recent discovery. Schreiner has\nsuggested[12] that the origin of the Mu`tazilite movement was due to the\ninfluence of learned Jews with whom the Mohammedans came in contact,\nparticularly in the city of Basra, an important centre of the school.\nThe reader will recall that the two main doctrines of the Mu`tazila were\nthe unity of God and his justice. The latter really signified the\nfreedom of the will. That these are good Jewish views would of course\nprove nothing for the origin of similar opinions among the Mohammedans.\nFor it is not here a question simply of the dogmatic belief in\nMonotheism as opposed to polytheism. Mohammedanism is as a religion\nMonotheistic and we know that Mohammed was indebted very much to Jews\nand Judaism. We are here concerned with the origin of a rationalistic\nmovement which endeavors to defend a spiritual conception of God against\na crude anthropomorphism, to vindicate a conception of his absolute\nunity against the threatened multiplication of his essence by the\nassumption of eternal attributes, and which puts stress upon God's\njustice rather than upon his omnipotence so as to save human freedom.\nAnother doctrine of the Mu`tazila was that the Koran was not eternal as\nthe orthodox believed, but that it was created. Now we can find\nparallels for most of these doctrines. Anthropomorphism was avoided in\nthe Aramaic translations of the Pentateuch, also in certain changes in\nthe Hebrew text which are recorded in Rabbinical literature, and known\nas \"Tikkune Soferim,\" or corrections of the Scribes.[13] Concern for\nmaintaining the unity of God in its absolute purity is seen in the care\nwith which the men of the Agada forbid any prayer which may have a\nsemblance, however remote, of dualism.[14] The freedom of the will is\nclearly stated in the Rabbinic expression, \"All is in the hands of God\nexcept the fear of Heaven.\"[15] And an apparently deterministic passage\nin Job 23, 13, \"But he is one and who can turn him, and what his soul\ndesireth, even that he doeth,\" is explained by Rabbi Akiba in the\nfollowing manner, \"It is not possible to answer the words of him who\nwith his word created the world, for he rules all things with truth and\nwith righteousness.\"[16] And we find a parallel also for the creation of\nthe Koran in the Midrashic statement that the Torah is one of the six or\nseven things created before the world.[17]\n\nThese parallels alone would not be of much weight, but they are\nstrengthened by other considerations. The Mu`tazilite movement seems to\nhave developed among the ascetic sects, with the leaders of whom its\nfounders were in close relation.[18] The ascetic literature bears\nunmistakable traces of having been influenced by the Halaka and the\nAgada.[19] Moreover, there is a Mohammedan tradition or two to the\neffect that the doctrine of the creation of the Koran and also of the\nrejection of anthropomorphism goes back to a Jew, Lebid-ibn\nAl-A`sam.[20]\n\nMore recently still[A] C. H. Becker proved from a study of certain\nPatristic writings that the polemical literature of the Christians\nplayed an important r\u00f4le in the formation of Mohammedan dogma, and he\nshows conclusively that the form in which the problem of freedom was\ndiscussed among the Mohammedans was taken from Christianity. The\nquestion of the creation or eternity of the Koran or word of Allah, is\nsimilarly related to the Christian idea of the eternal Logos, who is on\nthe one hand the Word and the Wisdom, and is on the other identified\nwith Jesus Christ. And the same thing holds of the doctrine of\nattributes. It played a greater r\u00f4le in Christian dogma than it ever did\nin Judaism prior to the philosophic era in the middle ages. To be sure,\nthe Patristic writers were much indebted to Philo, in whose writings the\ngerm of the medi\u00e6val doctrine of attributes is plainly evident. But the\nMohammedan schools did not read Philo. It would seem, therefore, that\nSchreiner's view must be considerably modified, if not entirely\nrejected, in view of the later evidence adduced by Becker.\n\n\n[A] Cf. Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Assyriologie, 1912, 175 ff.\n\n\nThe more extreme doctrines, however, of the more orthodox Ashariya, such\nas the denial of natural law and the necessity of cause and effect,\nlikewise the denial of man's ability to determine his actions, none of\nthe Jews accepted. Here we have again the testimony of Maimonides, who,\nhowever, is not inclined to credit this circumstance to the intelligence\nand judgment of his predecessors, but to chance. His words are,\n\"Although another sect, the Ashariya, with their own peculiar views, was\nsubsequently established among the Mohammedans, you will not find any of\nthese views in the writings of our authors; not because these authors\npreferred the opinions of the first named sect to those of the latter,\nbut because they chanced first to become acquainted with the theory of\nthe Mu`tazila, which they adopted and treated as demonstrated\ntruth.\"[21]\n\nThe influence of the Kalam is present in greater or less degree in the\nphilosophers up to Abraham Ibn Daud and Maimonides. The latter gave this\nsystem its death blow in his thoroughgoing criticism,[22] and\nthenceforth Aristotelianism was in possession of the field until that\ntoo was attacked by Hasdai Crescas.\n\nAnother sect of the Mohammedans which had considerable influence on some\nof the Jewish philosophical and ethical writers are the ascetics and the\nSufis who are related to them. The latter developed their mode of life\nand their doctrines under the influence of the Christian monks, and are\nlikewise indebted to Indian and Persian ideas.[23] In their mode of\nlife they belong to the class of ascetics and preach abstinence,\nindifference to human praise and blame, love of God and absolute trust\nin him even to the extent of refraining from all effort in one's own\nbehalf, and in extreme cases going so far as to court danger. In\ntheoretical teaching they adopted the emanatistic doctrine of the\nNeo-Platonic School. This has been called dynamic Pantheism. It is\nPantheism because in its last analysis it identifies God with the\nuniverse. At the same time it does not bring God directly in contact\nwith the world, but only indirectly through the powers or [Greek:\ndynameis], hence _dynamic_ Pantheism. These powers emanate successively\nfrom the highest one, forming a chain of intermediate powers mediating\nbetween God and the world of matter, the links of the chain growing\ndimmer and less pure as they are further removed from their origin,\nwhile the latter loses nothing in the process. This latter condition\nsaves the Neo-Platonic conception from being a pure system of emanation\nlike some Indian doctrines. In the latter the first cause actually gives\naway something of itself and loses thereby from its fulness. The process\nin both systems is explained by use of analogies, those of the radiation\nof light from a luminous body, and of the overflowing of a fountain\nbeing the most common.\n\nThe chief exponent of the ethics of the Sufis in medi\u00e6val Jewish\nliterature is Bahya Ibn Pakuda. In his ethical work \"The Duties of the\nHearts,\" he lays the same stress on intention and inwardness in\nreligious life and practice as against outward performance with the\nlimbs on the one hand and dry scholasticism on the other, as do the\nSufis. In matters of detail too he is very much indebted to this Arab\nsect from whose writings he quotes abundantly with as well as without\nacknowledgment of his sources except in a general way as the wise men.\nTo be sure, he does not follow them slavishly and rejects the extremes\nof asceticism and unworldly cynicism which a great many of the Sufis\npreached and practiced. He is also not in sympathy with their mysticism.\nHe adopts their teachings only where he can support them with analogous\nviews as expressed in the Rabbinical writings, which indeed played an\nimportant r\u00f4le in Mohammedan ascetic literature, being the source of\nmany of the sayings found in the latter.[24]\n\nThe systems of thought which had the greatest influence upon Jewish as\nwell as Mohammedan theology, were the great systems of Plato\n(especially as developed in Neo-Platonism) and Aristotle. These two\nphilosophies not merely affected the thinking of Jew and Mohammedan but\nreally transformed it from religious and ethical discussions into\nmetaphysical systems. In the Bible and similarly in the Koran we have a\npurely personal view of God and the world. God is a person, he creates\nthe world--out of nothing to be sure--but nevertheless he is thought of\ndoing it in the manner in which a person does such things with a will\nand a purpose in time and place. He puts a soul into man and\ncommunicates to him laws and prohibitions. Man must obey these laws\nbecause they are the will of God and are good, and he will be rewarded\nand punished according to his attitude in obedience and disobedience.\nThe character of the entire point of view is personal, human,\nteleological, ethical. There is no attempt made at an impersonal and\nobjective analysis of the common aspects of all existing things, the\nelements underlying all nature. Nor is there any conscious effort at a\ncritical classification of the various kinds of things existing in\nnature beyond the ordinary and evident classification found in\nGenesis--heaven and earth; in heaven, sun, moon and stars; on earth,\ngrass, fruit trees, insects, water animals, birds, quadrupeds, man. Then\nlight and darkness, the seasons of the year, dry land and water.\n\nIn Greek philosophy for the first time we find speculations concerning\nthe common element or elements out of which the world is made--the\nmaterial cause as Aristotle later called it. The Sophists and Socrates\ngave the first impulse to a logical analysis of what is involved in\ndescription or definition. The concept as denoting the essence of a\nthing is the important contribution Socrates made to knowledge. Plato\nobjectified the concept, or rather he posited an object as the basis of\nthe concept, and raised it out of this world of shadows to an\nintelligible world of realities on which the world of particulars\ndepends. But it was Aristotle who made a thoroughgoing analysis of thing\nas well as thought, and he was the master of knowledge through the\nmiddle ages alike for Jew, Christian and Mohammedan.\n\nFirst of all he classified all objects of our experience and found that\nthey can be grouped in ten classes or categories as he called them.\nThink of any thing you please and you will find that it is either an\nobject in the strict sense, _i. e._, some thing that exists\nindependently of anything else, and is the recipient of qualities, as\nfor example a man, a mountain, a chair. Or it is a quantity, like four,\nor cubit; or a quality, like good, black, straight; or a relation like\nlong, double, master, slave; and so on throughout the ten categories.\nThis classification applies to words and thoughts as well as to things.\nAs an analysis of the first two it led him to more important\ninvestigations of speech and thinking and arguing, and resulted in his\nsystem of logic, which is the most momentous discovery of a single mind\nrecorded in history. As applied to things it was followed by a more\nfundamental analysis of all real objects in our world into the two\nelements of matter and form. He argued as follows: nothing in the\nmaterial world is permanent as an individual thing. It changes its state\nfrom moment to moment and finally ceases to be the thing it was. An\nacorn passes a number of stages before it is ripe, and when it is placed\nin the ground it again changes its form continually and then comes out\nas an oak. In artificial products man in a measure imitates nature. He\ntakes a block of marble and makes a statue out of it. He forms a log\ninto a bed. So an ignorant man becomes civilized and learned. All these\nexamples illustrate change. What then is change? Is there any similarity\nin all the cases cited? Can we express the process of change in a\nformula which will apply to all instances of change? If so, we shall\nhave gained an insight into a process of nature which is all-embracing\nand universal in our experience. Yes, we can, says Aristotle. Change is\na play of two elements in the changing thing. When a thing affected with\none quality changes into a thing with the opposite quality, there must\nbe the thing itself without either of the opposite qualities, which is\nchanging. Thus when a white fence becomes black, the fence itself or\nthat which undergoes the change is something neither white nor black. It\nis the uncolored matter which first had the form of white and now lost\nthat and took on the form of black. This is typical of all change. There\nis in all change ultimately an unchanging substratum always the same,\nwhich takes on one quality after another, or as Aristotle would say, one\n_form_ after another. This substratum is _matter_, which in its purity\nis not affected with any quality or form, of which it is the seat and\nresidence. The forms on the other hand come and go. Form does not change\nany more than matter. The changing thing is the composite of matter and\nform, and change means separation of the actual components of which\none, the form, disappears and makes room for its opposite. In a given\ncase, say, when a statue is made out of a block of marble, the matter is\nthe marble which lost its original form and assumed the form of a\nstatue. In this case the marble, if you take away both the previous form\nand the present, will still have some form if it is still marble, for\nmarble must have certain qualities if it is to be marble. In that case\nthen the matter underlying the change in question is not pure matter, it\nis already endowed with some primitive form and is composite. But marble\nis ultimately reducible to the four elements, fire, air, water, earth,\nwhich are simpler; and theoretically, though not in practice, we can\nthink away all form, and we have left only that which takes forms but is\nitself not any form. This is matter.\n\nHere the reader will ask, what kind of thing is it that has no form\nwhatsoever, is it not nothing at all? How can anything exist without\nbeing a particular kind of thing, and the moment it is that it is no\nlonger pure matter. Aristotle's answer is that it is true that pure\nmatter is never found as an objective existence. Point to any real\nobject and it is composed of matter and form. And yet it is not true\nthat matter is a pure figment of the imagination; it has an existence of\nits own, a potential existence. And this leads us to another important\nconception in the Aristotelian philosophy.\n\nPotentiality and actuality are correlative terms corresponding to matter\nand form. Matter is the potential, form is the actual. Whatever\npotentialities an object has it owes to its matter. Its actual essence\nis due to its form. A thing free from matter would be all that it is at\nonce. It would not be liable to change of any kind, whether progress or\nretrogression. All the objects of our experience in the sublunar world\nare not of this kind. They realize themselves gradually, and are never\nat any given moment all that they are capable of becoming. This is due\nto their matter. On the other hand, pure matter is _actually_ nothing.\nIt is just capacity for being anything, and the moment it is anything it\nis affected with form.\n\nIt is clear from this account that matter and form are the bases of\nsublunar life and existence. No change, no motion without matter and\nform. For motion is presupposed in all kinds of change. If then all\nprocesses of life and death and change of all kinds presuppose matter\nand form, the latter cannot themselves be liable to genesis and decay\nand change, for that would mean that matter is composed of matter and\nform, which is absurd. We thus see how Aristotle is led to believe in\nthe eternity of matter and motion, in other words, the eternity of the\nworld processes as we know them.\n\nMotion is the realization of the potential _qua_ potential. This is an\nAristotelian definition and applies not merely to motion in the strict\nsense, _i. e._, movement in place, or motion of translation, but\nembraces all kinds of change. Take as an example the warming of the air\nin a cold room. The process of heating the room is a kind of motion; the\nair passes from a state of being cold to a state of being warm. In its\noriginal state as cold it is potentially warm, _i. e._, it is actually\nnot warm, but has the capacity of becoming warm. At the end of the\nprocess it is actually warm. Hence the process itself is the\nactualization of the potential. That which is potential cannot make\nitself actual, for to make itself actual it must be actual, which is\ncontrary to the hypothesis of its being potential. Potentiality and\nactuality are contradictory states and cannot exist side by side in the\nsame thing at the same time in the same relation. There must therefore\nbe an external agent, itself actual, to actualize a potential. Thus, in\nthe above illustration, a cold room cannot make itself warm. There must\nbe some agency itself actually warm to cause the air in the room to pass\nfrom cold to warm. This is true also of motion in place, that a thing\ncannot move itself and must be moved by something else. But that\nsomething else if itself in motion must again be moved by something\nelse. This process would lead us to infinity. In order that a given\nthing shall be in motion, it would be necessary for an infinite number\nof things to be in motion. This is impossible, because there cannot be\nan infinite number of things all here and now. It is a contradiction in\nterms. Hence if anything is to move at all, there must be at the end of\nthe finite chain a link which while causing the next link to move, is\nitself unmoved. Hence the motion existing in the world must be due\nultimately to the existence of an unmoved mover. If this being causes\nmotion without being itself in motion it does not act upon the bodies it\nmoves as one body acts upon another, for a body can move another body\nonly by being itself in motion. The manner in which the unmoved mover\nmoves the world is rather to be conceived on the analogy of a loved\nobject moving the loving object without itself being moved. The person\nin love strives to approach and unite with the object of his love\nwithout the latter necessarily being moved in turn. This is the way in\nwhich Aristotle conceives of the cause of the world's motion. There is\nno room here for the creation of the world. Matter is eternal, motion is\neternal, and there is an eternal mind for the love of which all motions\nhave been going on, eternally.\n\nThe unmoved mover, or God, is thus not body, for no body can move\nanother body without being itself in motion at the same time. Besides,\nall body is finite, _i. e._, it has a finite magnitude. A body of\ninfinite magnitude is an impossibility, as the very essence of body is\nthat it must be bounded by surfaces. A finite body cannot have an\ninfinite power, as Aristotle proves, though we need not at present go\ninto the details of his proof. But a being which causes eternal motion\nin the world must have an infinite power to do this. Hence another proof\nthat God is not corporeal.\n\nIf God is not subject to motion, he is not subject to change of any\nkind, for change involves motion. As matter is at the basis of all\nchange God is without matter, hence he is pure form, _i. e._, pure\nactuality without the least potentiality. This means that he is what he\nis wholly all the time; he has no capacities of being what he is at any\ntime not. But if he is not corporeal, the nature of his actuality or\nactivity must be Thought, pure thinking. And the content of his thought\ncannot vary from topic to topic, for this would be change, which is\nforeign to him. He must be eternally thinking the same thought; and the\nhighest thought it must be. But the highest thought is himself; hence\nGod is pure thought thinking himself, thought thinking thought.\n\nThe universe is in the shape of a sphere with the earth stationary in\nthe centre and the heavens revolving around it exactly as appears to us.\nThe element earth is the heaviest, hence its place is below or, which is\nthe same thing, in the centre. This is its natural place; and its\nnatural motion when away from the centre is in a straight line toward\nthe centre. Water is the next heaviest element and its natural place is\njust above earth; hence the water in the world occupies a position\nspherical in shape round about the earth, _i. e._, it forms a hollow\nsphere concentric with the earth. Next comes the hollow sphere of air\nconcentric with the other two. Its natural motion when away from its\nplace in the direction of the earth is in a straight line toward the\ncircumference of the world, not however going beyond the sphere of the\nlightest element of all, namely, fire. This has its natural place\noutside of the other elements, also in the form of a hollow sphere\nconcentric with the other three. Its natural motion is in a straight\nline away from the centre of the world and in the direction of the\ncircumference. Our earth, water, air and fire are not really the\nelements in their purity. Each one has in it also mixtures of the other\nthree elements, the one which gives it the name predominating.\n\nAll minerals, plants and animals are formed from these four elements by\nvarious combinations, all together forming the sublunar world, or the\nworld of generation and decay. No individual thing in this world is\npermanent. All are subject to change and to ultimate destruction, though\nthe destruction of one thing is the genesis of another. There is no\nannihilation.\n\nThe causes of the various combinations of the elements and the\ngeneration and destruction of mineral, plant and animal resulting\ntherefrom, are the motions of the heavenly bodies. These are made of a\npurer substance than that of the four elements, the ether. This is\nproven by the fact that the heavenly bodies are not subject to change or\ndestruction. They are all permanent and the only change visible in them\nis change of place. But even their motions are different from those of\nthe four elements. The latter are in a straight line toward the centre\nor away from it, whereas the heavenly bodies move in a circle eternally\naround the centre. This is another proof that they are not composed of\nthe same material as sublunar bodies.\n\nThe heavens consist of transparent spheres, and the stars as well as the\nplanets are set in them and remain fixed. The motions of the heavenly\nbodies are due to the revolutions of the spheres in which they are set.\nThese spheres are hollow and concentric. The outermost sphere forming\nthe outer limit of the universe (the world is finite according to\nAristotle) is studded with the fixed stars and moves from east to west,\nmaking a complete revolution in twenty-four hours. This motion is\ntransmitted to the other spheres which carry the planets. Since,\nhowever, we notice in the sun, moon and the other planetary bodies\nmotions in the contrary direction in addition to that from east to west,\nthere must be other spheres having the motions apparent to us in the\npositions of the planets borne by them. Thus a given body like the sun\nor moon is set in more than one sphere, each of which has its own proper\nmotion, and the star's apparent motion is the resultant of the several\nmotions of its spheres. Without entering into further details concerning\nthese motions, it will be sufficient for us to know that Aristotle\ncounted in all fifty-five spheres. First came the sphere of the fixed\nstars, then in order the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury,\nVenus, Sun, Moon.\n\nGod himself sets the outer sphere in motion, or rather is the eternal\ncause of its motion, as the object of its desire; and in the same way\neach of the other motions has also its proper mover, likewise a pure\nform or spirit, which moves its sphere in the same incorporeal and\nunmoved manner as God.\n\nThus we have in the supra-lunar world pure forms without matter in God\nand the spirits of the spheres, whereas in the sublunar world matter and\nform are inseparable. Neither is found separately without the other.\n\nIn man's soul, however, or rather in his intellect we find a form which\ncombines in itself the peculiarities of sublunar as well as celestial\nforms. When in contact with the human body it partakes of the nature of\nother sublunar forms exhibiting its activity through matter and being\ninseparable from it. But it is not destroyed with the death of the body.\nIt continues as a separate form after death.\n\nThe soul, Aristotle defines as the first entelechy of the body. The term\nentelechy which sounds outlandish to us may be replaced by the word\nrealization or actualization and is very close in meaning to the\nAristotelian use of the word form. The soul then, according to\nAristotle, is the realization or actualization or form of the body. The\nbody takes the place of matter in the human composite. It has the\ncomposition and the structure which give it the capacity for performing\nthe functions of a human being, as in any other composite, say an axe,\nthe steel is the matter which has the potentiality or capacity of being\nmade into a cutting instrument. Its cutting function is the form of the\naxe--we might almost say the soul of the axe, if it were not for the\ncircumstance that it cannot do its own cutting; it must be wielded by\nsomeone else.\n\nSo far then the human soul forms an inseparable unit with the body which\nit informs. As we do not think of the cutting function of an axe\nexisting apart from the axe, so neither can we conceive of sensation,\nemotion or memory as existing without a body. In so far as the soul is\nthis it is a material form like the rest, and ceases with the\ndissolution of the body. But the soul is more than this. It is also a\nthinking faculty. As such it is not in its essence dependent upon the\nbody or any corporeal organ. It comes from without, having existed\nbefore the body, and it will continue to exist after the body is no\nmore. That it is different from the sensitive soul is proven by the fact\nthat the latter is inherent in the physical organ through which it acts,\nbeing the form of the body, as we have seen. And hence when an unusually\nviolent stimulus, say a very bright light or a very loud sound, impinges\nupon the sense organ, the faculty of sight or hearing is injured to such\nan extent that it cannot thereafter perceive an ordinary sight or sound.\nBut in the rational faculty this is not the case. The more intense the\nthought occupying the thinking soul, the more capable it becomes of\nthinking lesser thoughts. To be sure, the reason seems to weaken in old\nage, but this is due to the weakening of the body with which the soul is\nconnected during life; the soul itself is just as active as ever.\n\nWe must, however, distinguish between two aspects of the rational soul,\nto one of which alone the above statements apply. Thought differs from\nsensation in that the latter perceives the particular form of the\nindividual thing, whereas the former apprehends the essential nature of\nthe object, that which constitutes it a member of a certain class. The\nsense of sight perceives a given individual man; thought or reason\nunderstands what it is to be a member of the human species. Reason\ntherefore deals with pure form. In man we observe the reason gradually\ndeveloping from a potential to an actual state. The objects of the sense\nwith the help of the faculties of sensation, memory and imagination act\nupon the potential intellect of the child, which without them would\nforever remain a mere capacity without ever being realized. This aspect\nof the reason then in man, namely, the passive aspect which receives\nideas, grows and dies with the body. But there is another aspect of the\nreason, the active reason which has nothing to do with the body, though\nit is in some manner resident in it during the life of the latter. This\nit is which enables the passive intellect to become realized. For the\nexternal objects as such are insufficient to endow the rational capacity\nof the individual with actual ideas, any more than a surface can endow\nthe sense of sight with the sensation of color when there is no light.\nIt is the active intellect which develops the human capacity for\nthinking and makes it active thought. This alone, the active intellect,\nis the immortal part of man.\n\nThis very imperfect sketch of Aristotle's mode of approach to the\never-living problems of God, the universe and man shows us the wide\ndiversity of his method from that with which the Jews of Biblical and\nRabbinic tradition were identified. Greek philosophy must have seemed a\nrevelation to them, and we do not wonder that they became such\nenthusiastic followers of the Stagirite, feeling as they must have done\nthat his method as well as his results were calculated to enrich their\nintellectual and spiritual life. Hence the current belief of an original\nJewish philosophy borrowed or stolen by the Greeks, and still betraying\nits traces in the Bible and Talmud was more than welcome to the\nenlightened spirits of the time. And they worked this unhistorical\nbelief to its breaking point in their Biblical exegesis.\n\nAristotle, however, was not their only master, though they did not know\nit. Plotinus in Aristotelian disguise contributed not a little to their\nconception of God and his relation to the universe. The so-called\n\"Theology of Aristotle\"[25] is a Plotinian work, and its Pantheistic\npoint of view is in reality foreign to Aristotle's dualism. But the\nmiddle ages were not aware of the origin of this treatise, and so they\nattributed it to the Stagirite philosopher and proceeded to harmonize it\nwith the rest of his system as they knew it.\n\nAristotle's system may be called theistic and dualistic; Plotinus's is\npantheistic and monistic. In Aristotle matter is not created by or\nderived from God, who is external to the universe. Plotinus derives\neverything from God, who through his powers or activities pervades all.\nThe different gradations of being are static in Aristotle, dynamic in\nPlotinus. Plotinus assumes an absolute cause, which he calls the One and\nthe Good. This is the highest and is at the top of the scale of\nexistence. It is superior to Being as well as to Thought, for the latter\nimply a duality whereas unity is prior to and above all plurality. Hence\nwe can know nothing as to the nature of the Highest. We can know only\n_that_ He is, not _what_ he is. From this highest Being proceeds by a\nphysical necessity, as light from a luminous body or water from an\noverflowing spring, a second _hypostasis_ or substance, the _nous_ or\nReason. This is a duality, constituting Being and Knowledge. Thus\nThought and Being hold a second place in the universe. In a similar way\nfrom Reason proceeds the third hypostasis or the _World-Soul_. This\nstands midway between the intelligible world, of which it is the last,\nand the phenomenal world, of which it is the first. The Soul has a dual\naspect, the one spiritual and pertaining to the intelligible world, the\nother, called _Nature_, residing in the lower world. This is the\nmaterial world of change and decay. Matter is responsible for all change\nand evil, and yet matter, too, is a product of the powers above it, and\nis ultimately a derivative of the Absolute Cause, though indirectly.\nMatter is two-fold, intelligible and sensible. The matter of the lower\nworld is the non-existent and the cause of evil. Matter in a more\ngeneral sense is the indeterminate, the indefinite and the potential.\nMatter of this nature is found also in the intelligible world. The\nReason as the second hypostasis, being an activity, passes from\npotentiality to actuality, its indeterminateness being made determinate\nby the One or the Good. This potentiality and indeterminateness is\nmatter, but it is not to be confused with the other matter of the\nphenomenal world.\n\nMan partakes of the intelligible, as well as of the sensible world. His\nbody is material, and in so far forth partakes of the evil of matter.\nBut his soul is derived from the universal soul, and if it conducts\nitself properly in this world, whither it came from without, and holds\nitself aloof from bodily contamination, it will return to the\nintelligible world where is its home.\n\nWe see here a number of ideas foreign to Aristotle, which are found\nfirst in Philo the Jew and appear later in medi\u00e6val philosophy. Thus God\nas a Being absolutely unknowable, of whom negations alone are true just\nbecause he is the acme of perfection and bears no analogy to the\nimperfect things of our world; matter in our world as the origin of\nevil, and the existence of matter in the intelligible world--all these\nideas will meet us again in Ibn Gabirol, in Ibn Daud, in Maimonides,\nsome in one, some in the other.\n\nAlike in respect to Aristotle as in reference to Plotinus, the Jewish\nphilosophers found their models in Islamic writers. The \"Theology of\nAristotle\" which, as we have seen, is really Plotinian rather than\nAristotelian, was translated into Arabic in the ninth century and\nexerted its influence on the _Brethren of Purity_, a Mohammedan secret\norder of the tenth century. These men composed an encyclop\u00e6dia of\nfifty-one treatises in which is combined Aristotelian logic and physics\nwith Neo-Platonic metaphysics and theology. In turn such Jewish writers\nas Ibn Gabirol, Bahya, Ibn Zaddik, Judah Halevi, Moses and Abraham Ibn\nEzra, were much indebted to the Brethren of Purity. This represents the\nNeo-Platonic influence in Jewish philosophy. The Arab Aristotelians, Al\nKindi, Al Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes, while in the main disciples of\nthe Stagirite, were none the less unable to steer clear of Neo-Platonic\ncoloring of their master's doctrine, and they were the teachers of the\nJewish Aristotelians, Abraham Ibn Daud, Moses ben Maimon, Levi ben\nGerson.\n\nOne other phase must be mentioned to complete the parallelism of Islamic\nand Jewish philosophy, and that is the anti-philosophic attitude adopted\nby Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas. It was not a dogmatic and unreasoned\nopposition based simply upon the un-Jewish source of the doctrines in\nquestion and their incompatibility with Jewish belief and tradition,\nsuch as exhibited itself in the controversies that raged around the\n\"Guide\" of Maimonides. Here we have rather a fighting of the\nphilosophers with their own weapons. Especially do we find this to be\nthe case in Crescas who opposes Aristotle on philosophic grounds. In\nJudah Halevi similarly, though with less rigor and little technical\ndiscussion, we have nevertheless a man trained in philosophic\nliterature, who found the philosophic attitude unsympathetic and\nunsatisfying because cold and impersonal, failing to do justice to the\nwarm yearning after God of the religious soul. He could not abide the\nphilosophic exclusion from their natural theology of all that was racial\nand national and historic in religion, which was to him its very heart\nand innermost essence.\n\nIn this attitude, too, we find an Arab prototype in the person of Al\nGazali, who similarly attacked the philosophers on their own ground and\nfound his consolation in the asceticism and mysticism of the Sufis.\n\nWe have now spoken in a general way of the principal motives of medi\u00e6val\nJewish philosophy, of the chief sources, philosophical and dogmatic, and\nhave classified the Jewish thinkers accordingly as Mutakallimun,\nNeo-Platonists and Aristotelians. We also sketched briefly the schools\nof philosophy which influenced the Jewish writers and determined their\npoint of view as Kalamistic, Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian. There still\nremains as the concluding part of the introductory chapter, and before\nwe take up the detailed exposition of the individual philosophers, to\ngive a brief and compendious characterization of the content of medi\u00e6val\nJewish philosophy. We shall start with the theory of knowledge.\n\nWe have already referred to the attitude generally adopted by the\nmedi\u00e6val Jewish thinkers on the relation between religion and\nphilosophy. With the exception of Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas the\ncommonly accepted view was that philosophy and religion were at bottom\nidentical in content, though their methods were different; philosophy\ntaught by means of rational demonstration, religion by dogmatic\nassertion based upon divine revelation. So far as the actual\nphilosophical views of an Aristotle were concerned, they might be\nerroneous in some of their details, as was indeed the case in respect to\nthe origin of the world and the question of Providence. But apart from\nhis errors he was an important guide, and philosophy generally is an\nindispensable adjunct to religious belief because it makes the latter\nintelligent. It explains the why's and the wherefore's of religious\ntraditions and dogmas. Into detailed discussions concerning the origin\nof our knowledge they did not as a rule go. These strictly scientific\nquestions did not concern, except in a very general way, the main object\nof their philosophizing, which was to gain true knowledge of God and his\nattributes and his relation to man. Accordingly we find for the most\npart a simple classification of the sources of knowledge or truth as\nconsisting of the senses and the reason. The latter contains some truths\nwhich may be called innate or immediate, such as require no experience\nfor their recognition, like the logical laws of thought, and truths\nwhich are the result of inference from a fact of sensation or an\nimmediate truth of the mind. To these human sources was added tradition\nor the testimony of the revealed word of God in the written and oral\nlaw.\n\nWhen Aristotle began to be studied in his larger treatises and the\ndetails of the psychology and the metaphysics became known especially\nthrough Averroes, we find among the Jews also an interest in the finer\npoints of the problem of knowledge. The motives of Plato's idealism and\nAristotle's conceptualism (if this inexact description may be allowed\nfor want of a more precise term) are discussed with fulness and detail\nby Levi ben Gerson. He realizes the difficulty involved in the problem.\nKnowledge must be of the real and the permanent. But the particular is\nnot permanent, and the universal, which is permanent, is not real. Hence\neither there is no knowledge or there is a reality corresponding to the\nuniversal concept. This latter was the view adopted by Plato. Gersonides\nfinds the reality in the thoughts of the Active Intellect, agreeing in\nthis with the views of Philo and Augustine, substituting only the Active\nIntellect for their Logos. Maimonides does not discuss the question, but\nit is clear from a casual statement that like Aristotle he does not\nbelieve in the independent reality of the universal (Guide III, 18).\n\nIn theoretical physics the Arabian Mutakallimun, we have seen (p. xxii),\nlaid great stress on the theory of atom and accident as opposed to the\nconcepts of matter and form by which Aristotle was led to believe in the\neternity of the world. Accordingly every Mutakallim laid down his\nphysical theory and based on it his proof of creation. This method was\nfollowed also by the early Jewish thinkers. The Karaites before\nMaimonides adopted the atomic theory without question. And Aaron ben\nElijah, who had Maimonides's \"Guide\" before him, was nevertheless\nsufficiently loyal to his Karaite predecessors to discuss their views\nside by side with those of the Aristotelians and to defend them against\nthe strictures of Maimonides. Saadia, the first Rabbanite philosopher,\ndiscusses no less than thirteen erroneous views concerning the origin\nand nature of the world, but he does not lay down any principles of\ntheoretical physics explicitly. He does not seem to favor the atomic\ntheory, but he devotes no special treatment to the subject, and in his\narguments for creation as opposed to eternity he makes use of the\nKalamistic concepts of substance and accident and composition and\ndivision. The same is true of Bahya Ibn Pakuda. Joseph Ibn Zaddik is\nthe first who finds it necessary to give an independent treatment of the\nsciences before proceeding to construct his religious philosophy, and in\nso doing he expounds the concepts of matter and form, substance and\naccident, genesis and destruction, the four elements and their natures\nand so on--all these Aristotelian concepts. Ibn Daud follows in the path\nof Ibn Zaddik and discusses the relevant concepts of potentiality and\nactuality and the nature of motion and infinity, upon which his proof is\nbased of the existence of God. Maimonides clears the ground first by a\nthorough criticism and refutation of the Kalamistic physics, but he does\nnot think it necessary to expound the Aristotelian views which he\nadopts. He refers the reader to the original sources in the Physics and\nMetaphysics of Aristotle, and contents himself with giving a list of\nprinciples which he regards as established. Aristotle is now the master\nof all those who know. And he reigns supreme for over a century until\nthe appearance of the \"Or Adonai\" of Hasdai Crescas, who ventured to\ndeny some of the propositions upon which Maimonides based his proof of\nthe existence of God--such, for example, as the impossibility of an\ninfinite magnitude, the non-existence of an infinite fulness or vacuum\noutside of the limits of our world, the finiteness of our world and its\nunity, and so on.\n\nThese discussions of the fundamental principles of physics were applied\nultimately to prove the existence of God. But there was a difference in\nthe manner of the application. During the earlier period before the\n\"Emunah Ramah\" of Abraham Ibn Daud was written, the method employed was\nthat of the Arabian Mutakallimun. That is, the principles of physics\nwere used to prove the creation of the world in time, and from creation\ninference was made to the existence of a Creator, since nothing can\ncreate itself. The creation itself in time as opposed to eternity was\nproved from the fact of the composite character of the world.\nComposition, it was said, implies the prior existence of the constituent\nelements, and the elements cannot be eternal, for an infinite past time\nis unthinkable. This method is common to Saadia, Bahya, Joseph Ibn\nZaddik, and others.\n\nWith the appearance of Ibn Daud's masterpiece, which exhibits a more\ndirect familiarity with the fundamental ideas of Aristotle, the method\nchanged. The existence of God is proved directly from physics without\nthe mediation of the doctrine of creation. Motion proves a mover, and to\navoid an infinite regress we must posit an unmoved mover, that is, a\nfirst mover who is not himself moved at the same time. An unmoved mover\ncannot be corporeal, hence he is the spiritual being whom we call God.\nIbn Daud does not make use of creation to prove the existence of God,\nbut neither does he posit eternal motion as Aristotle does. And the\nresult is that he has no valid proof that this unmoved mover is a pure\nspirit not in any way related to body. This defect was made good by\nMaimonides. Let us frankly adopt tentatively, he says, the Aristotelian\nidea of the eternity of the world, _i. e._, the eternity of matter and\nmotion. We can then prove the existence of an unmoved mover who is pure\nspirit, for none but a pure spirit can have an infinite force such as is\nmanifested in the eternal motion of the world. Creation cannot be\ndemonstrated with scientific rigor, hence it is not safe to build so\nimportant a structure as the existence of God upon an insecure\nfoundation. Show that eternity of the world leads to God, and you are\nsafe no matter what the ultimate truth turns out to be concerning the\norigin of the world. For if the world originated in time there is no\ndoubt that God made it.\n\nThus Maimonides accepted provisionally the eternity of matter and\nmotion, but provisionally only. No sooner did he prove his point, than\nhe takes up the question of the world's origin and argues that while\nstrict demonstration there is as yet none either for or against\ncreation, the better reasons are on the side of creation.\n\nGersonides, on the other hand, was a truer Aristotelian than Maimonides\nand he decided in favor of the eternity of matter, though not of this\nour world.\n\nThe Jewish Mutakallimun, as we have seen, proved the existence of God\nfrom the fact that a created world implies a creator. The next step was\nto show that there is only one God, and that this one God is simple and\nnot composite, and that he is incorporeal. The unity in the sense of\nuniqueness was shown by pointing out that dualism or pluralism is\nincompatible with omnipotence and perfection--attributes the possession\nof which by God was not considered to require proof. Maimonides, indeed,\npointed out, in his opposition to the Mutakallimun, that if there is a\nplurality of worlds, a plurality of Gods would not necessarily be in\nconflict with the omnipotence and perfection of each God in his own\nsphere (Guide I, 75), and he inferred the unity of God from his\nspirituality.\n\nThe simplicity of God was proved by arguing that if he is composite, his\nparts are prior to him, and he is neither the first, nor is he eternal,\nand hence not God; and the incorporeality followed from his simplicity,\nfor all body is composite. Maimonides proved with one stroke God's\nexistence, unity and incorporeality. For his argument from motion leads\nhim to conceive of the first mover as a \"separate\" form or intellect.\nThis clearly denotes incorporeality, for body is composed of matter and\nform. But it also denotes unity, for the immaterial is not subject to\nnumerical distinction unless the one be the cause and the other the\neffect. But in that case the cause alone is God.\n\nNext in importance to the proof of God's existence, unity and\nincorporeality, is the doctrine of attributes. We have seen (p. xxiii)\nhow much emphasis the Arabian Mutakallimun placed upon the problem of\nattributes. It was important to Jew, Christian and Mohammedan alike for\na number of reasons. The crude anthropomorphism of many expressions in\nthe Bible as well as the Koran offended the more sophisticated thinkers\never since Alexandrian days. Hence it was necessary to deal with this\nquestion, and the unanimous view was that the Biblical expressions in\nquestion are to be understood as figures of speech. The more difficult\nproblem was how any predicates at all can be applied to God without\nendangering his unity. If God is the possessor of many qualities, even\nthough they be purely spiritual, such as justice, wisdom, power, he is\ncomposite and not simple. The Christian theologians found indeed in this\nproblem of attributes a philosophical support for the doctrine of the\nTrinity. Since God cannot be devoid of power, reason and life, he is\ntrinitarian, though he is one. The difficulty was of course that the\nmoment you admit distinctions within the Godhead, there is no reason for\nstopping at three. And the Jewish critics were not slow to recognize\nthis weakness in the system of their opponents. At the same time they\nfound it necessary to take up a positive attitude toward the question of\nattributes so as to harmonize the latter with God's absolute unity. And\nthe essence of the solution of the problem was to explain away the\nattributes. Saadia says that the ascription of life, power and\nknowledge to God does not involve plurality in his essence. The\ndistinction of three attributes is due to our limited mind and\ninadequate powers of expression. In reality the essence of which we\npredicate these attributes is one and simple. This solution did not seem\nthoroughgoing enough to Saadia's successors, and every one of the Jewish\nphilosophers tried his hand at the problem. All agreed that the\nattributes cannot apply to God in the same signification as they have\nwhen we use them in our own experience. The meaning of the term\nattribute was investigated and the attributes were divided into classes,\nuntil finally in the system of Maimonides this question too received its\nclassical solution. God is conceived as absolutely transcendent and\nunknowable. No positive predicate can apply to him so as to indicate his\nessence. We can say only what he is not, we cannot say what he is. There\nis not the faintest resemblance between him and his creatures. And yet\nhe is the cause of the world and of all its happenings. Positive\nattributes signify only that God is the cause of the experiences denoted\nby the attributes in question. When we say God is just we mean that he\nis not unjust, and that he is the cause of all justice in the world.\nHence Maimonides says there are no essential attributes, meaning\nattributes expressive of God's essence, and the only predicates having\napplication are negative and such as designate effects of God's causal\nactivity in the world. Gersonides was opposed to Maimonides's radical\nagnosticism in respect of the nature of God, and defended a more human\nview. If God is pure thought, he is of the nature of our thought, though\nof course infinitely greater and perfect, but to deny any relation\nwhatsoever between God's thought and ours, as Maimonides does, is\nabsurd.\n\nFrom God we pass to man. And the important part of man is his soul. It\nis proved that man has a soul, that the soul is not material or\ncorporeal, that it is a substantial entity and not a mere quality or\naccident of the body. Both Plato and Aristotle are laid under\ncontribution in the various classifications of the soul that are found\nin Saadia, in Joseph Ibn Zaddik, in Judah Halevi, in Abraham Ibn Daud,\nin Maimonides. The commonest is the three-fold division into vegetative,\nanimal and rational. We also find the Platonic division into appetitive,\nspirited and rational. Further psychological details and descriptions of\nthe senses, external and internal, the latter embracing the common\nsense, memory, imagination and judgment, are ultimately based upon\nAristotle and are found in Judah Halevi, Abraham Ibn Daud and\nMaimonides, who derived them from Avicenna and Alfarabi. In the\nNeo-Platonic writers, such as Isaac Israeli, Solomon Ibn Gabirol, Joseph\nIbn Zaddik, Moses Ibn Ezra, Pseudo-Bahya, Abraham Bar Hiyya, and so on,\nwe also find reference to the World Soul and its emanation from\nIntelligence. In the conception of the human soul the Jewish\nphilosophers vary from the Platonic view, related to the Biblical, that\nthe soul is a distinct entity coming into the body from a spiritual\nworld, and acting in the body by using the latter as its instrument, to\nthe Aristotelian view that at least so far as the lower faculties of\nsense, memory and imagination are concerned, the soul is the form of the\nbody, and disappears with the death of the latter. The human unit,\naccording to this opinion, is body-and-mind, and the human activities\nare psycho-physical and not purely psychical as they are according to\nPlato. Some writers occupying intermediate positions combine unwittingly\nthe Platonic and Aristotelian views, or rather they use Aristotelian\nexpressions and interpret them Platonically (Saadia, Joseph Ibn Zaddik,\nHillel ben Samuel).\n\nAs the influence of the Arab Aristotelians, Alfarabi, Avicenna and\nespecially Averroes, began to make itself felt, the discussions about\nthe Active Intellect and its relation to the higher Intelligences on the\none hand and to the human intellect on the other found their way also\namong the Jews and had their effect on the conception of prophecy.\nAristotle's distinction of an active and a passive intellect in man, and\nhis ideas about the spheral spirits as pure Intelligences endowing the\nheavenly spheres with their motions, were combined by the Arabian\nAristotelians with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation. The result was\nthat they adopted as Aristotelian the view that from God emanated in\nsuccession ten Intelligences and their spheres. Thus the first emanation\nwas the first Intelligence. From this emanated the sphere of the fixed\nstars moved by it and the second Intelligence. From this emanated in\nturn the sphere of Saturn and the third Intelligence, and so on through\nthe seven planets to the moon. From the Intelligence of the lunar sphere\nemanated the Active Intellect and the sublunar spheres of the four\nelements. These Intelligences were identified with the angels of\nScripture. With some modifications this theory was adopted by the\nJewish Aristotelians, Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides, Levi ben Gerson.\n\nThe Active Intellect was thus placed among the universal Intelligences\nwhose function it is to control the motions of the sublunar world, and\nin particular to develop the human faculty of reason which is in the\ninfant a mere capacity--a material intellect. Sensation and experience\nalone are not sufficient to develop the theoretical reason in man, for\nthey present concrete, individual material objects, whereas the reason\nis concerned with universal truth. The conversion of sense experience\ninto immaterial concepts is accomplished through the aid of the Active\nIntellect. And at the end of the process a new intellect is produced in\nman, the Acquired Intellect. This alone is the immortal part of man and\ntheoretical study creates it. Averroes believed that this Acquired\nIntellect exists separately in every individual so long only as the\nindividual is alive. As soon as the individual man dies, his acquired\nintellect loses its individuality (there being no material body to\nindividuate it) and there is only one acquired intellect for the entire\nhuman species, which in turn is absorbed into the Active Intellect.\nThere is thus no individual immortality. Maimonides, it would seem,\nthough he does not discuss the question in his \"Guide,\" shared the same\nview. Gersonides devotes an entire book of his \"Milhamot Adonai\" to this\nproblem, but he defends individuation of the acquired intellect as such\nand thus saves personal immortality.\n\nThe practical part of philosophy, ethics, the Mutakallimun among the\nArabians discussed in connection with the justice of God. In opposition\nto the Jabariya and the Ashariya who advocated a fatalistic determinism\ndenying man's ability to determine his own actions, some going so far as\nto say that right and wrong, good and evil, are entirely relative to\nGod's will, the Mu`tazila insisted that man is free, that good and evil\nare absolute and that God is just because justice is inherently right,\ninjustice inherently wrong. Hence reward and punishment would be unjust\nif man had not the freedom to will and to act. The Karaites Joseph Al\nBasir and Jeshua ben Judah discuss the problem of the nature of good and\nevil and vindicate their absolute character. God desires the good\nbecause it is good, and it is not true that a thing is good because God\nhas commanded it. Freedom of man is a corollary of the goodness of God.\nThe Rabbanites take it for granted that good is good inherently, and\nGod desires and commands it because it is identical with his wisdom and\nhis will. Freedom of man does follow as a corollary from the justice of\nGod and it is also taught in the Bible and the Talmud. The very fact of\nthe existence of a divine law and commandments shows that man has\nfreedom. And those passages in Scripture which seem to suggest that God\nsometimes interferes with man's freedom are explained away by\ninterpretations _ad hoc_. Our own consciousness of power to determine\nour acts also is a strong argument in favor of freedom. Nevertheless the\nsubject is felt to have its difficulties and the arguments against free\nwill taken from the causal sequences of natural events and the influence\nof heredity, environment and motive on the individual will are not\nignored. Judah Halevi as well as Abraham Ibn Daud discuss these\narguments in detail. But freedom comes out triumphant. It is even sought\nto reconcile the antinomy of freedom vs. God's foreknowledge. God knows\nbeforehand from all eternity how a given man will act at a given moment,\nbut his knowledge is merely a mirror of man's actual decision and not\nthe determining cause thereof. This is Judah Halevi's view. Abraham Ibn\nDaud with better insight realizes that the contingent, which has no\ncause, and the free act, which is undetermined, are as such\nunpredictable. He therefore sacrifices God's knowledge of the contingent\nand the free so as to save man's freedom. It is no defect, he argues,\nnot to be able to predict what is in the nature of the case\nunpredictable. Maimonides cannot admit any ignorance in God, and takes\nrefuge in the transcendent character of God's knowledge. What is\nunpredictable for us is not necessarily so for God. As he is the cause\nof everything, he must know everything. Gersonides who, as we have seen,\nis unwilling to admit Maimonides's agnosticism and transcendentalism,\nsolves the problem in the same way as Ibn Daud. God knows events in so\nfar as they are determined, he does not know them in so far as they are\ncontingent. There is still another possibility and that is that God\nknows in advance every man's acts because no act is absolutely free. And\nthere is an advocate of this opinion also. Hasdai Crescas frankly adopts\nthe determinist position on the basis of God's knowledge, which cannot\nbe denied, as well as of reason and experience, which recognizes the\ndetermining character of temperament and motive. But reward and\npunishment are natural and necessary consequences, and are no more\nunjust than is the burning of the finger when put into the fire.\n\nIn respect to the details of ethical doctrine and the classification of\nthe virtues, we find at first the Platonic virtues and their relation to\nthe parts of the soul, in Saadia, Pseudo-Bahya, Joseph Ibn Zaddik and\neven Abraham Ibn Daud. In combination with this Platonic basis\nexpression is given also to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean.\nMaimonides, as in other things, so here also, adopts the Aristotelian\nviews almost in their entirety, both in the definition of virtue, in the\ndivision of practical and intellectual virtues, and the list of the\nvirtues and vices in connection with the doctrine of the mean. As is to\nbe expected, the ultimate sanction of ethics is theistic and Biblical,\nand the ceremonial laws also are brought into relation with ethical\nmotives. In this rationalization of the ceremonial prescriptions of\nScripture Maimonides, as in other things, surpasses all his predecessors\nin his boldness, scientific method and completeness. He goes so far as\nto suggest that the institution of sacrifice has no inherent value, but\nwas in the nature of a concession to the crude notions of the people\nwho, in agreement with their environment, imagined that God's favor is\nobtained by the slaughter of animals.\n\nAmong the peculiar phenomena of religion, and in particular of Judaism,\nthe one that occupies a fundamental position is the revelation of God's\nwill to man and his announcement of the future through prophetic\nvisions. Dreams and divination had already been investigated by\nAristotle and explained psychologically. The Arabs made use of this\nsuggestion and endeavored to bring the phenomenon of prophecy under the\nsame head. The Jewish philosophers, with the exception of Judah Halevi\nand Hasdai Crescas, followed suit. The suggestion that prophecy is a\npsychological phenomenon related to true dreams is found as early as\nIsaac Israeli. Judah Halevi mentions it with protest. Abraham Ibn Daud\nadopts it, and Maimonides gives it its final form in Jewish\nrationalistic philosophy. Levi ben Gerson discusses the finer details of\nthe process, origin and nature of prophetic visions. In short the\ngenerally accepted view is that the Active Intellect is the chief agent\nin communicating true visions of future events to those worthy of the\ngift. And to become worthy a combination of innate and acquired powers\nis necessary together with the grace of God. The faculties chiefly\nconcerned are reason and imagination. Moral excellence is also an\nindispensable prerequisite in aiding the development of the theoretical\npowers.\n\nProceeding to the more dogmatic elements of Judaism, Maimonides was the\nfirst to reduce the 613 commandments of Rabbinic Judaism to thirteen\narticles of faith. Hasdai Crescas criticised Maimonides's principle of\nselection as well as the list of dogmas, which he reduced to six. And\nJoseph Albo went still further and laid down three fundamental dogmas\nfrom which the rest are derived. They are the existence of God,\nrevelation of the Torah and future reward and punishment.\n\nThe law of Moses is unanimously accepted as divinely revealed. And in\nopposition to the claims of Christianity and Mohammedanism an endeavor\nis made to prove by reason as well as the explicit statement of\nScripture that a divine law once given is not subject to repeal. The\nlaws are divided into two classes, _rational_ and _traditional_; the\nformer comprising those that the reason approves on purely rational and\nethical grounds, while the latter consist of such ceremonial laws as\nwithout specific commandment would not be dictated by man's own reason.\nAnd in many of these commandments no reason is assigned. Nevertheless an\nendeavor is made to rationalize these also. Bahya introduced another\ndistinction, viz., the \"duties of the heart,\" as he calls them, in\ncontradistinction to the \"duties of the limbs.\" He lays stress on\nintention and motive as distinguished from the mere external observance\nof a duty or commandment.\n\nFinally, some consideration is given in the works of the majority of the\nwriters to eschatological matters, such as the destiny of the soul after\ndeath, the nature of future reward and punishment, the resurrection of\nthe body and the Messianic period, and its relation to the other world.\nThis brief sketch will suffice as an introduction to the detailed\ntreatment of the individual philosophers in the following chapters.\n\n\n\n\nA HISTORY OF MEDI\u00c6VAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nMEDI\u00c6VAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nISAAC ISRAELI\n\n\nWe know next to nothing about the condition of the Jews in Mohammedan\nEgypt in the ninth and tenth centuries. But the fact that the two first\nJewish writers who busied themselves with philosophical problems came\nfrom Egypt would indicate that the general level of intellectual culture\namong the Jews at that time was not so low as the absence of literary\nmonuments would lead us to believe. Every one knows of Saadia, the first\nHebrew grammarian, the first Hebrew lexicographer, the first Bible\ntranslator and exegete, the first Jewish philosopher of medi\u00e6val Jewry.\nHe was born in Egypt and from there was called to the Gaonate of Sura in\nBabylonia. But not so well known is his earlier contemporary, Isaac ben\nSolomon Israeli, who also was born in Egypt and from there went later to\nKairuan, where he was court physician to several of the Fatimide Califs.\nThe dates of his birth and death are not known with certainty, but he is\nsaid to have lived to the age of one hundred years, and to have survived\nthe third Fatimide Calif Al-Mansur, who died in 953. Accordingly we may\nassume the years of his birth and death as 855 and 955 respectively.\n\nHis fame rests on his work in theory and practice as a physician; and as\nsuch he is mentioned by the Arab annalists and historians of\nmedicine.[26] To the Christian scholastics of medi\u00e6val Europe he is\nknown as the Jewish physician and philosopher next in importance to\nMaimonides.[27] This is due to the accident of his works having been\ntranslated into Latin by Constantinus Afer,[28] and thus made accessible\nto men like Albertus Magnus, Vincent of Beauvais, Thomas Aquinas and\nothers. For his intrinsic merits as a philosopher, and particularly as a\nJewish philosopher, do not by any means entitle him to be coupled with\nMaimonides. The latter, indeed, in a letter which he wrote to Samuel\nIbn Tibbon, the translator of the \"Guide of the Perplexed,\" expresses\nhimself in terms little flattering concerning Israeli's worth as a\nphilosopher.[29] He is a mere physician, Maimonides says, and his\ntreatises on the _Elements_, and on _Definitions_ consist of windy\nimaginings and empty talk. We need not be quite as severe in our\njudgment, but the fact remains that Israeli is little more than a\ncompiler and, what is more to the purpose, he takes no attitude in his\nphilosophical writings to Judaism as a theological doctrine or to the\nBible as its source. The main problem, therefore, of Jewish philosophy\nis not touched upon in Israeli's works, and no wonder Maimonides had no\nuse for them. For the purely scientific questions treated by Israeli\ncould in Maimonides's day be studied to much better advantage in the\nworks of the great Arabian Aristotelians, Al Farabi and Avicenna,\ncompared to whom Israeli was mediocre. We are not to judge him, however,\nfrom Maimonides's point of view. In his own day and generation he was\nsurpassed by none as a physician; and Saadia alone far outstrips him as\na Jewish writer, and perhaps also David Al Mukammas, of whom we shall\nspeak later. Whatever may be said of the intrinsic value of the content\nof his philosophical work, none can take away from him the merit of\nhaving been the first Jew, so far as we know, to devote himself to\nphilosophical and scientific discussions, though not with the avowed aim\nof serving Judaism. The rest was bound to come later as a result of the\nimpulse first given by him.\n\nThe two works of Israeli which come in consideration for our purpose are\nthose mentioned by Maimonides in his letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon spoken\nof above, namely, the \"Book of the Elements,\"[30] and the \"Book of\nDefinitions.\"[31] Like all scientific and philosophic works by Jews\nbetween the ninth and thirteenth centuries with few exceptions, these\nwere written in Arabic. Unfortunately, with the exception of a fragment\nrecently discovered of the \"Book of Definitions,\" the originals are\nlost, and we owe our knowledge of their contents to Hebrew and Latin\ntranslations, which are extant and have been published.[32] We see from\nthese that Israeli was a compiler from various sources, and that he had\na special predilection for Galen and Hippocrates, with whose writings he\nshows great familiarity. He makes use besides of Aristotelian notions,\nand is influenced by the Neo-Platonic treatise, known as the \"Liber de\nCausis,\" and derived from a work of Proclus. It is for this reason\ndifficult to characterize his standpoint, but we shall not go far wrong\nif we call him a Neo-Platonist, for reasons which will appear in the\nsequel.\n\nIt would be useless for us here to reproduce the contents of Israeli's\ntwo treatises, which would be more appropriate for a history of medi\u00e6val\nscience. A brief _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ will show the correctness of this view. In his\n\"Book of the Elements\" Israeli is primarily concerned with a definite\nphysical problem, the definition of an element, and the number and\ncharacter of the elements out of which the sublunar world is made. He\nbegins with an Aristotelian definition of element, analyzes it into its\nparts and comes to the conclusion that the elements are the four\nwell-known ones, fire, air, water, earth. Incidentally he seizes\nopportunities now and then, sometimes by force, to discuss points in\nlogic, physics, physiology and psychology. Thus the composition of the\nhuman body, the various modes in which a thing may come into being, that\nthe yellow and black galls and the phlegm are resident in the blood, the\npurpose of phlebotomy, the substantial character of prime form, that the\nsoul is not an accident, the two kinds of blood in the body, the various\nkinds of \"accident,\" the nature of a \"property\" and the manner in which\nit is caused--all these topics are discussed in the course of proof that\nthe four elements are fire, air, water, earth, and not seed or the\nqualities of heat, cold, dryness and moisture. He then quotes the\ndefinitions of Galen and Hippocrates and insists that though the wording\nis different the meaning is the same as that of Aristotle, and hence\nthey all agree about the identity of the elements. Here again he takes\noccasion to combat the atomic theory of the _Mu`tazila_ and Democritus,\nand proves that a line is not composed of points. In the last part of\nthe treatise he refutes contrary opinions concerning the number and\nidentity of the elements, such as that there is only one element which\nis movable or immovable, finite or infinite, namely, the power of God,\nor species, or fire, or air, or water, or earth; or that the number is\ntwo, matter and God; or three, matter, form and motion; or six, viz.,\nthe four which he himself adopts, and composition and separation; or the\nnumber ten, which is the end and completion of number. In the course of\nthis discussion he takes occasion to define pain and pleasure, the\nnature of species, the difference between element and principle. And\nthus the book draws to a close. Not very promising material this, it\nwould seem, for the ideas of which we are in search.\n\nThe other book, that dealing with definitions of things, is more\npromising. For while there too we do not find any connected account of\nGod, of the world and of man, Israeli's general attitude can be gathered\nfrom the manner in which he explains some important concepts. The book,\nas its title indicates, consists of a series of definitions or\ndescriptions of certain terms and ideas made use of by philosophers in\ntheir construction of their scheme of the world--such ideas and terms as\nIntelligence, science, philosophy, soul, sphere, spirit, nature, and so\non. From these we may glean some information of the school to which\nIsraeli belongs. And in the \"Book of the Elements,\" too, some of the\nepisodic discussions are of value for our purpose.\n\nPhilosophy, Israeli tells us, is self-knowledge and keeping far from\nevil. When a man knows himself truly--his spiritual as well as his\ncorporeal aspects--he knows everything. For in man are combined the\ncorporeal and the spiritual. Spiritual is the soul and the reason,\ncorporeal is the body with its three dimensions. In his qualities and\nattributes--\"accidents\" in the terminology of Israeli--we similarly find\nthe spiritual as well as the corporeal. Humility, wisdom and other\nsimilar qualities borne by the soul are spiritual; complexion, stature,\nand so on are corporeal. Seeing that man thus forms an epitome, as it\nwere, of the universe (for spiritual and corporeal substance and\naccident exhausts the classes of existence in the world), a knowledge of\nself means a knowledge of everything, and a man who knows all this is\nworthy of being called a philosopher.\n\nBut philosophy is more than knowledge; it involves also action. The\nformula which reveals the nature and aim of philosophy is to become like\nunto God as far as is possible for man. This means to imitate the\nactivities of God in knowing the realities of things and doing what the\ntruth requires. To know the realities of things one must study science\nso as to know the various causes and purposes existing in the world. The\nmost important of these is the purpose of the union in man of body and\nsoul. This is in order that man may know reality and truth, and\ndistinguish between good and evil, so as to do what is true and just and\nupright, to sanctify and praise the Creator and to keep from impure\ndeeds of the animal nature. A man who does this will receive reward\nfrom the Creator, which consists in cleaving to the upper soul, in\nreceiving light from the light of knowledge, and the beauty of splendor\nand wisdom. When a man reaches this degree, he becomes spiritual by\ncleaving to the created light which comes directly from God, and\npraising the Creator. This is his paradise and his reward and\nperfection. Hence Plato said that philosophy is the strengthening and\nthe help of death. He meant by this that philosophy helps to deaden all\nanimal desires and pleasures. For by being thus delivered from them, a\nman will reach excellence and the higher splendor, and will enter the\nhouse of truth. But if he indulges his animal pleasures and desires and\nthey become strengthened, he will become subject to agencies which will\nlead him astray from the duties he owes to God, from fear of him and\nfrom prayer at the prescribed time.\n\nWe look in vain in Israeli's two treatises for a discussion of the\nexistence and nature of God. Concerning creation he tells us that when\nGod wanted to show his wisdom and bring everything from potentiality to\nactuality, he created the world out of nothing, not after a model (this\nin opposition to Plato and Philo), nor for the purpose of deriving any\nbenefit from it or to obviate harm, but solely on account of his\ngoodness.\n\nBut how did the creation proceed? A fragment from the treatise of\nIsraeli entitled \"The Book of Spirit and Soul\"[33] will give us in\nsummary fashion an idea of the manner in which Israeli conceived of the\norder and connection of things in the world.\n\nIn the name of the ancients he gives the following account. God created\na splendor. This having come to a standstill and real permanence, a\nspark of light proceeded from it, from which arose the power of the\nrational soul. This is less bright than the splendor of the Intelligence\nand is affected with shadow and darkness by reason of its greater\ndistance from its origin, and the intervening Intelligence. The rational\nsoul again becoming permanent and fixed, there issued from it likewise a\nspark, giving rise to the animal soul. This latter is endowed with a\ncogitative and imaginative faculty, but is not permanent in its\nexistence, because of the two intervening natures between it and the\npure light of God. From the animal soul there likewise issued a\nsplendor, which produced the vegetative soul. This soul, being so far\nremoved from the original light, and separated from it by the\nIntelligence and the other two souls, has its splendor dimmed and made\ncoarse, and is endowed only with the motions of growth and nourishment,\nbut is not capable of change of place. From the vegetative soul proceeds\nagain a splendor, from which is made the sphere (the heaven). This\nbecomes thickened and materialized so that it is accessible to the\nsight. Motion being the nature of the sphere, one part of it pushes the\nother, and from this motion results fire. From fire proceeds air; from\nair, water; from water, earth. And from these elements arise minerals,\nplants and animals.\n\nHere we recognize the Neo-Platonic scheme of emanation as we saw it in\nPlotinus, a gradual and successive emanation of the lower from the\nhigher in the manner of a ray of light radiating from a luminous body,\nthe successive radiations diminishing in brightness and spirituality\nuntil when we reach the Sphere the process of obscuration has gone so\nfar as to make the product material and visible to the physical sense.\nThe Intelligence and the three Souls proceeding from it in order are\nclearly not individual but cosmic, just as in Plotinus. The relation\nbetween these cosmic hypostases, to use a Neo-Platonic term, and the\nrational and psychic faculties in man Israeli nowhere explains, but we\nmust no doubt conceive of the latter as somehow contained in the former\nand temporarily individualized, returning again to their source after\nthe dissolution of the body.\n\nLet us follow Israeli further in his account of the nature of these\nsubstances. The Intelligence is that which proceeds immediately from the\ndivine light without any immediate agency. It represents the permanent\nideas and principles--species in Israeli's terminology--which are not\nsubject to change or dissolution. The Intelligence contains them all in\nherself eternally and immediately, and requires no searching or\nreflection to reach them. When the Intelligence wishes to know anything\nshe returns into herself and finds it there without requiring thought or\nreflection. We can illustrate this, he continues, in the case of a\nskilful artisan who, when he wishes to make anything, retires into\nhimself and finds it there. There is a difference, however, in the two\ncases, because Intelligence always knows its ideas without thought or\nreflection, for it exists always and its ideas are not subject to change\nor addition or diminution; whereas in the smith a difficulty may arise,\nand then his soul is divided and he requires searching and thinking and\ndiscrimination before he can realize what he desires.\n\nWhat has been said so far applies very well to the cosmic Intelligence,\nthe [Greek: nous] of the Neo-Platonists. It represents thought as\nembracing the highest and most fundamental principles of existence, upon\nwhich all mediate and discursive and inferential thinking depends. Its\ncontent corresponds to the Ideas of Plato. But the further account of\nthe Intelligence must at least in a part of it refer to the individual\nhuman faculty of that name, though Israeli gives us no indication where\nthe one stops and where the other begins.\n\nHe appeals to the authority of Aristotle for his division of\nIntelligence into three kinds. First, the Intelligence which is always\nactual. This is what has just been described. Second, the Intelligence\nwhich is in the soul potentially before it becomes actual, like the\nknowledge of the child which is at first potential, and when the child\ngrows up and learns and acquires knowledge, becomes actual. Third, that\nwhich is described as the second Intelligence. It represents that state\nof the soul in which it receives things from the senses. The senses\nimpress the forms of objects upon the imagination ([Greek: phantasia])\nwhich is in the front part of the head. The imagination, or phantasy,\ntakes them to the rational soul. When the latter knows them, she becomes\nidentical with them spiritually and not corporeally.\n\nWe have seen above the Aristotelian distinction between the active\nintellect and the passive. The account just given is evidently based\nupon it, though it modifies Aristotle's analysis, or rather it enlarges\nupon it. The first and second divisions in Israeli's account correspond\nto Aristotle's active and passive intellects respectively. The third\nclass in Israeli represents the process of realization of the potential\nor passive intellect through the sense stimuli on the one hand and the\ninfluence of the active intellect on the other. Aristotle seems to have\nleft this intermediate state between the potential and the eternally\nactual unnamed. We shall see, however, in our further study of this very\ndifficult and complicated subject how the classification of the various\nintellects becomes more and more involved from Aristotle through\nAlexander and Themistius down to Averroes and Levi ben Gerson. It is\nsufficient for us to see here how Israeli combines Aristotelian\npsychology, as later Aristotelian logic and physics, with Neo-Platonic\nmetaphysics and the theistic doctrine of creation. But more of this\nhereafter.\n\nFrom the Intelligence, as we have seen, proceeds the rational soul. In\nhis discussion of the general nature of the three-fold soul (rational,\nanimal and vegetative) Israeli makes the unhistoric but thoroughly\nmedi\u00e6val attempt to reconcile Aristotle's definition of the soul, which\nwe discussed above (p. xxxv), with that of Plato. The two conceptions\nare in reality diametrically opposed. Plato's is an anthropological\ndualism, Aristotle's, a monism. For Plato the soul is in its origin not\nof this world and not in essential unity with the body, which it\ncontrols as a sailor his boat. Aristotle conceives of the relation\nbetween soul and body as one of form and matter; and there is no union\nmore perfect than that of these two constituent elements of all natural\nsubstances. Decomposition is impossible. A given form may disappear, but\nanother form immediately takes its place. The combination of matter and\nform is the essential condition of sublunar existence, hence there can\nbe no question of the soul entering or leaving the body, or of its\nactivity apart from the body.\n\nBut Israeli does not seem to have grasped Aristotle's meaning, and\nascribes to him the notion that the soul is a separate substance\nperfecting the natural body, which has life potentially, meaning by this\nthat bodies have life potentially before the soul apprehends them; and\nwhen the soul does apprehend them, it makes them perfect and living\nactually. To be sure, he adds in the immediate sequel that he does not\nmean temporal before and after, for things are always just as they were\ncreated; and that his mode of expression is due to the impossibility of\nconveying spiritual ideas in corporeal terms in any other way. This\nmerely signifies that the human body and its soul come into being\nsimultaneously. But he still regards them as distinct substances forming\nonly a passing combination. And with this pretended Aristotelian notion\nhe seeks to harmonize that of Plato, which he understands to mean not\nthat the soul enters the body, being clothed with it as with a garment,\nand then leaves it, but that the soul apprehends bodies by clothing them\nwith its light and splendor, and thus makes them living and moving, as\nthe sun clothes the world with its light and illuminates it so that\nsight can perceive it. The difference is that the light of the sun is\ncorporeal, and sight perceives it in the air by which it is borne;\nwhereas the light of the soul is spiritual, and intelligence alone can\nperceive it, not the physical sense.\n\nAmong the conceptual terms in the Aristotelian logic few play a more\nimportant part than those of substance and accident. Substance is that\nwhich does not reside in anything else but is its own subject. It is an\nindependent existence and is the subject of accidents. The latter have\nno existence independent of the substance in which they inhere. Thus of\nthe ten categories, in which Aristotle embraces all existing things, the\nfirst includes all substances, as for example, man, city, stone. The\nother nine come under the genus accident. Quantity, quality, relation,\ntime, place, position, possession, action, passion--all these represent\nattributes which must have a substantial being to reside in. There is no\nlength or breadth, or color, or before or after, or here or there, and\nso on except in a real object or thing. This then is the meaning of\naccident as a logical or ontological term, and in this signification it\nhas nothing to do with the idea of chance. Clearly substance represents\nthe higher category, and accident is inferior, because dependent and\nvariable. Thus it becomes important to know in reference to any object\nof investigation what is its status in this respect, whether it is\nsubstance or accident.\n\nThe nature of the soul has been a puzzle to thinkers and philosophers\nfrom time immemorial. Some thought it was a material substance, some\nregarded it as spiritual. It was identified with the essence of number\nby the Pythagoreans. And there have not been wanting those who, arguing\nfrom its dependence upon body, said it was an accident and not a\nsubstance. Strange to say the Mutakallimun, defenders of religion and\nfaith, held to this very opinion. But it is really no stranger than the\nmaintenance of the soul's materiality equally defended by other\nreligionists, like Tertullian for example, and the opposition to\nMaimonides's spiritualism on the part of Abraham ben David of\nPosqui\u00e8res. The Mutakallimun were led to their idea by the atomic\ntheory, which they found it politic to adopt as more amenable to\ntheological treatment than Aristotle's Matter and Form. It followed then\naccording to some of them that the fundamental unit was the material\natom which is without quality, and any power or activity in any atom or\ngroup of atoms is a direct creation of God, which must be re-created\nevery moment in order to exist. This is the nature of accident, and it\nmakes more manifest the ever present activity of God in the world. Thus\nthe \"substantial\" or \"accidental\" character of the soul is one that is\ntouched on by most Jewish writers on the subject. And Israeli also\nrefers to the matter incidentally in the \"Book of the Elements.\"[34]\nLike the other Jewish philosophers he defends its substantiality.\n\nThe fact of its separability from the body, he says, is no proof of its\nbeing an accident. For it is not the separability of an accident from\nits substance that makes it an accident, but its destruction, when\nseparated. Thus when a white substance turns green, the white color is\nnot merely separated from its substance but ceases to exist. The soul is\nnot destroyed when it leaves the body.\n\nAnother argument to prove the soul a substance is this. If the soul were\nan accident it should be possible for it to pass from the animal body to\nsomething else, as blackness is found in the Ethiopian's skin, in ebony\nwood and in pitch. But the soul exists only in living beings.\n\nWe find, besides, that the activity of the soul extends far beyond the\nbody, and acts upon distant things without being destroyed. Hence it\nfollows that the soul itself, the agent of the activity, keeps on\nexisting without the body, and is a substance.\n\nHaving made clear the conception of soul generally and its relation to\nthe body, he next proceeds to treat of the three kinds of soul. The\nhighest of these is the rational soul, which is in the horizon of the\nIntelligence and arises from its shadow. It is in virtue of this soul\nthat man is a rational being, discriminating, receptive of wisdom,\ndistinguishing between good and evil, between things desirable and\nundesirable, approaching the meritorious and departing from wrong. For\nthis he receives reward and punishment, because he knows what he is\ndoing and that retribution follows upon his conduct.\n\nNext to the rational soul is the animal soul, which arises from the\nshadow of the former. Being far removed from the light of Intelligence,\nthe animal soul is dark and obscure. She has no knowledge or\ndiscrimination, but only a dim notion of truth, and judges by appearance\nonly and not according to reality. Of its properties are sense\nperception, motion and change in place. For this reason the animals are\nfierce and violent, endeavoring to rule, but without clear knowledge and\ndiscrimination, like the lion who wants to rule over the other beasts,\nwithout having a clear consciousness of what he is doing. A proof that\nthe animals have only dim notions of things is that a thirsty ass coming\nto the river will fly from his own shadow in the water, though he needs\nthe latter for preserving his life, whereas he will not hesitate to\napproach a lion, who will devour him. Therefore the animals receive no\nreward or punishment (this in opposition to the Mutakallimun) because\nthey do not know what to do so as to be rewarded, or what to avoid, in\norder not to be punished.\n\nThe vegetative soul proceeds from the shadow of the animal soul. She is\nstill further removed from the light of Intelligence, and still more\nweighed down with shadow. She has no sense perception or motion. She is\nnext to earth and is characterized by the powers of reproduction,\ngrowth, nutrition, and the production of buds and flowers, odors and\ntastes.\n\nNext to the soul comes the Sphere (the heaven), which arises in the\nhorizon and shadow of the vegetative soul. The Sphere is superior to\ncorporeal substances, being itself not body, but the matter of body.\nUnlike the material elements, which suffer change and diminution through\nthe things which arise out of them as well as through the return of the\nbodies of plants and animals back to them as their elements, the\nspiritual substances (and also the sphere) do not suffer any increase or\ndiminution through the production of things out of them. For plants and\nanimals are produced from the elements through a celestial power which\nGod placed in nature effecting generation and decay in order that this\nworld of genesis and dissolution should exist. But the splendor of the\nhigher substances, viz., the three souls, suffers no change on account\nof the things coming from them because that which is produced by them\nissues from the _shadow_ of their splendor and not from the essence of\nthe splendor itself. And it is clear that the splendor of a thing in its\nessence is brighter than the splendor of its shadow, viz., that which\ncomes from it. Hence the splendor of the vegetative soul is undoubtedly\nbrighter than that of the sphere, which comes from its shadow. The\nlatter becomes rigid and assumes a covering, thickness and corporeality\nso that it can be perceived by sight. But no other of the senses can\nperceive it because, although corporeal, it is near to the higher\nsubstances in form and nobility, and is moved by a perfect and complete\nmotion, motion in a circle, which is more perfect than other motions and\nnot subject to influence and change. Hence there is no increase or\ndiminution in it, no beginning or end, and this on account of the\nsimplicity, spirituality and permanence of that which moves it. The\nIntelligence pours of her splendor upon it, and of the light of her\nknowledge, and the sphere becomes intelligent and rational, and knows,\nwithout investigation or reflection, the lordship of its Creator, and\nthat he should be praised and glorified without intermission. For this\nreason the Creator assigned to the Sphere a high degree from which it\ncannot be removed, and gave it charge of the production of time and the\nfour seasons of the year, and the month and the day and the hour, and\nmade it ruler of the production of perishable things in this world of\ngeneration and dissolution, so that the upper souls may find bodies to\napprehend, to clothe with their light, and to make visible in them their\nactivities according to the determination of God.\n\nThe Sphere by its motion produces the four elements, fire, air, water,\nearth; and the combinations of these in various proportions give rise to\nthe minerals, plants and animals of this world, the highest of whom is\nman.\n\nThat the elements are those mentioned above and nothing else is proved\nby the definition of element and its distinction from \"principle.\" A\nprinciple is something which, while being the cause of change, and even\npossibly at the basis of change, is not itself subject to change. Thus\nGod is undoubtedly the cause of everything that happens in the world. He\nmay therefore be called a principle of the world, but he does not enter\nwith his essence the changing things. Hence it is absurd to speak of God\nas an element of the sublunar world. Matter, i. e., primary formless\nmatter, does enter all changing things and is at the basis of all\nchange; but it does not itself change. Hence matter also is a principle\nbut not an element. An element is something which is itself a composite\nof matter and form, and changes its form to become something else in\nwhich, however, it is contained potentially, not actually. The product\nultimately goes back to the element or elements from which it was made.\nWhen we follow this resolution of a given composite into its elements\nback as far as we can until we reach a first which is no longer\nproduced out of anything in the same way as things were produced from\nit, we have the element. Such is the nature of fire, air, water, earth.\nAll things are made from them in the manner above indicated. But there\nis nothing prior to them which changes its form to become fire,\ncontinues to reside potentially in fire and returns to its original\nstate by the resolution of fire. The same applies to the other three.\n\nThe matter is now clear. The elements stand at the head of physical\nchange and take part in it. Prior to the elements are indeed matter and\nform, but as logical principles, not as physical and independent\nentities. Hence it would seem, according to Israeli, that matter and\nform are side-tracked in the gradual evolution of the lower from the\nhigher. For the elements, he tells us, come from the motion of the\nSphere, the Sphere from the shadow of the Soul, the Soul from the shadow\nof the Intelligence, the Intelligence is created by God. To be sure he\ntells us that the Sphere is not body, but the matter of body. Yet the\nSphere cannot take the place of prime matter surely, for it is\nundoubtedly endowed with form, nay is rational and intelligent, as we\nhave seen.\n\nWhen Israeli says that prior to the four elements there is nothing but\nthe Omnipotence of God, he means that the sublunar process of change and\nbecoming stops with the elements as its upper limit. What is above the\nelements belongs to the intelligible world; and the manner of their\nproduction one from the other is a spiritual one, emanation. The Sphere\nstands on the border line between the corporeal and the intelligible,\nitself a product of emanation, though producing the elements by its\nmotion--a process apparently neither like emanation nor like sublunar\nbecoming and change.\n\nCreation in Israeli seems to be the same as emanation, for on the one\nhand he tells us that souls are created, that nothing precedes the four\nelements except the Omnipotence of God, and on the other that the\nelements come from the motion of the Sphere, and the souls issue from\nthe shadow of the Intelligence. For matter and form there seems to be no\nroom at all except as logical principles. This is evidently due to the\nfact that Israeli is unwittingly combining Aristotelian physics with\nNeo-Platonic emanationism. For Aristotle matter and form stand at the\nhead of sublunar change and are ultimate. There is no derivation of\nmatter or form from anything. The celestial world has a matter of its\nown, and is not the cause of the being of this one except as influencing\nits changes. God is the mover of the Spheres, but not their Creator,\nhence he stands outside of the world. This is Theism. In Israeli there\nis a continuity of God, the intelligible world and the corporeal, all\nbeing ultimately the same thing, though the processes in the two worlds\nare different. And yet he obviates Pantheism by declaring that God is a\nprinciple not an element.\n\nWe said before that Israeli takes no avowed attitude to Jewish dogma or\nthe Bible. He never quotes any Jewish works, and there is nothing in his\nwritings to indicate that he is a Jew and is making an effort to\nharmonize Judaism with philosophy and science. In words he refers to\ncreation _ex nihilo_, which is not necessarily Jewish, it might be just\nas well Mohammedan or Christian. But in reality, as we have seen, his\nideas of the cosmic process are far enough removed from the orthodox\ndoctrine of creation as it appears in Bible and Talmud.\n\nIncidentally we learn also something of Israeli's ideas of God's\nrelation to mankind, of his commandments, and of prophecy. God created\nthe world, he tells us, because of his goodness. He wanted to benefit\nhis creatures. This could not be without their knowing the will of God\nand performing it. The will of God could not be revealed directly to\neverybody because the divine wisdom can speak only to those in whom the\nrational soul is mistress and is enlightened by the Intelligence. But\npeople are not all of this kind; for some have the animal soul\npredominating in them, being on that account ignorant, confused,\nforward, bold, murderous, vengeful, unchaste like animals; others are\nmastered by the vegetative soul, i. e., the appetitive, and are thus\nstupid and dull, and given over to their appetites like plants. In\nothers again their souls are variously combined, giving to their life\nand conduct a composite character. On this account it was necessary for\nGod to select a person in whom the rational soul is separated, and\nillumined by the Intelligence--a man who is spiritual in his nature and\neager to imitate the angels as far as it is possible for a man to do\nthis. This man he made a messenger to mankind. He gave him his book\nwhich contains two kinds of teaching. One kind is spiritual in its\nnature, and needs no further commentary or interpretation. This is\nmeant for the intellectual and discriminating. The other kind is\ncorporeal, and requires spiritual interpretation. This is intended for\nthe various grades of those who cannot understand directly the spiritual\nmeaning, but who can grasp the corporeal teaching, by which they are\ngradually trained and prepared for the reception of higher truths. These\npeople therefore need instructors and guides because a book alone is not\nsufficient for the purposes of those who cannot understand.\n\nDreams and prophecy are closely related, hence an explanation of the\nformer will also throw light on the latter. A dream is caused by the\ninfluence of the Intelligence on the soul in sleep. The Intelligence\nreceives its knowledge directly from God, and serves as a mediator\nbetween him and the soul, like a prophet who mediates between God and\nhis creatures. In communicating to the soul the spiritual forms which it\nreceived from God, the Intelligence translates them into forms\nintermediate between corporeality and spirituality in order that they\nmay be quickly impressed upon the common sense, which is the first to\nreceive them. The common sense stands midway between the corporeal sense\nof sight and the imagination, which is in the anterior chamber of the\nbrain, and is known as phantasy (Aristotelian [Greek: phantasia]).\n\nThat the forms thus impressed on the common sense in sleep are\nintermediate between corporeal and spiritual is proved by the fact that\nthey are different from the corporeal forms of things seen in the waking\nstate. The latter are obscure and covered up, whereas those seen in\nsleep are finer, more spiritual and brighter. Proof of this is that a\nperson sees himself in sleep endowed with wings and flying between\nheaven and earth. He sees the heavens opening and someone speaking to\nhim out of the heaven, and so on. There would be no sense in all this if\nthese phenomena had no spiritual meaning, for they are contrary to\nnature. But we know that they have real significance if interpreted by a\nreally thoughtful person. The prophets also in wishing to separate\nthemselves from mankind and impress the latter with their qualities,\nshowed them spiritual forms of similar kind, which were preternatural.\nHence all who believe in prophecy admit that dreams are a part of\nprophecy.\n\nNow these intermediate forms which are impressed upon the common sense\nin sleep are turned over by it to the phantasy and by the latter to the\nmemory. When the person awakes, he recovers the forms from the memory\njust as they were deposited there by the phantasy. He then consults his\nthinking power; and if this is spiritual and pure, the Intelligence\nendows him with its light and splendor and reveals to him the spiritual\nforms signified by the visions seen in sleep. He is then able to\ninterpret the dream correctly. But if his powers of thought are not so\ngood and are obscured by coverings, he cannot properly remove the husk\nfrom the kernel in the forms seen in sleep, is not able to penetrate to\nthe true spirituality beneath, and his interpretation is erroneous.\n\nThis explanation does not really explain, but it is noteworthy as the\nfirst Jewish attempt to reduce prophecy to a psychological phenomenon,\nwhich was carried further by subsequent writers until it received its\ndefinitive form for the middle ages in Maimonides and Levi ben Gerson.\n\nTo sum up, Israeli is an eclectic. There is no system of Jewish\nphilosophy to be found in his writings. He had no such ambitions. He\ncombines Aristotelian logic, physics and psychology with Neo-Platonic\nmetaphysics, and puts on the surface a veneer of theistic creationism.\nHis merit is chiefly that of a pioneer in directing the attention of\nJews to the science and philosophy of the Greeks, albeit in Arab dress.\nThere is no trace yet of the Kalam in his writings except in his\nallusions to the atomic theory and the denial of reward and punishment\nof animals.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nDAVID BEN MERWAN AL MUKAMMAS\n\n\nNothing was known of Al Mukammas until recently when fragments of his\nphilosophical work were found in Judah ben Barzilai's commentary on the\nSefer Yezirah.[35] The latter tells us that David Al Mukammas is said to\nhave associated with Saadia, who learned a good deal from him, but the\nmatter is not certain. If this account be true we have a second Jewish\nphilosopher who preceded Saadia. His chief work is known by the title of\n\"Twenty Chapters,\" fifteen of which were discovered in the original\nArabic in 1898 by Abraham Harkavy of St. Petersburg.[36] Unfortunately\nthey have not yet been published, and hence our account will have to be\nincomplete, based as it is on the Hebrew fragments in the Yezirah\ncommentary above mentioned.\n\nThese fragments are sufficient to show us that unlike Israeli, who shows\nlittle knowledge of the Mu`tazilite discussions, Al Mukammas is a real\nMu`tazilite and moves in the path laid out by these Mohammedan\nrationalists. Whether this difference is due to their places of\nresidence (Israeli having lived in Egypt and Kairuan, while Al Mukammas\nwas in Babylon), or to their personal predilections for Neo-Platonism\nand the Kalam respectively, is not certain. Saadia knows the Kalam; but\nthough coming originally from Egypt, he spent his most fruitful years in\nBabylonia, in the city of Sura, where he was gaon. The centres of\nArabian rationalism were, as we know, the cities of Bagdad and Basra,\nnearer to Babylon and Mesopotamia than to Egypt or Kairuan.\n\nThe first quotation in Judah ben Barzilai has reference to science and\nphilosophy, their definition and classification. Science is the\nknowledge of the reality of existing things. It is divided into two\nparts, theoretical and practical. Theoretical science aims at knowledge\nfor its own sake; practical seeks an end beyond knowledge, viz., the\nproduction of something. We call it then art. Thus geometry is a science\nin so far as one desires to know the nature and relations to each other\nof solid, surface, line, point, square, triangle, circle. But if his\npurpose is to know how to build a square or circular house, or to\nconstruct a mill, or dig a well, or measure land, he becomes an artisan.\nTheoretical science is three-fold. First and foremost stands theology,\nwhich investigates the unity of God and his laws and commandments. This\nis the highest and most important of all the sciences. Next comes logic\nand ethics, which help men in forming opinions and guide them in the\npath of understanding. The last is physics, the knowledge of created\nthings.\n\nIn the ninth and tenth chapters of his book Al Mukammas discusses the\ndivine attributes. This was a very important problem in the Mu`tazilite\nschools, as we saw in the Introduction, and was treated in Mu`tazilite\nworks in the first division, which went by the title of \"Bab al Tauhid,\"\nthe chapter on the unity.\n\nGod is one--so Al Mukammas sums up the results of his previous\ndiscussions--not in the sense in which a genus is said to be one, nor in\nthat in which a species is one, nor as the number one is one, nor as an\nindividual creature is one, but as a simple unity in which there is no\ndistinction or composition. He is one and there is no second like him.\nHe is first without beginning, and last without end. He is the cause and\nground of everything caused and effected.\n\nThe question of God's essence is difficult. Some say it is not permitted\nto ask what God is. For to answer the question what a thing is is to\nlimit it, and the limited is the created. Others again say that it is\npermitted to make this inquiry, because we can use in our answer the\nexpressions to which God himself testifies in his revealed book. And\nthis would not be limiting or defining his glory because his being is\ndifferent from any other, and there is nothing that bears any\nresemblance to him. Accordingly we should answer the question what God\nis, by saying, he is the first and the last, and the visible and the\nhidden, without beginning or end. He is living, but not through life\nacquired from without. His life is not sustained and prolonged by food.\nHe is wise, but not through acquired wisdom. He hears without ears, sees\nwithout eyes, is understanding in all his works, and a true judge in all\nhis judgments. Such would be our answer in accordance with God's own\ntestimony of himself.\n\nWe must on no account suppose that the expressions living, wise,\nseeing, hearing, and so on, when applied to God mean the same thing as\nwhen we ascribe them to ourselves. When we say God is living we do not\nmean that there was a time when he was not living, or that there will be\na time when he will not be living. This is true of us but not of God.\nHis life has no beginning or end. The same thing applies to his wisdom.\nIt is not acquired like ours, it has no beginning or end, and is not\nsubject to error, forgetfulness, addition or diminution. It is not\nstrange that his attributes should be so unlike ours, for it is fitting\nthat the Creator should be different from the thing created, and the\nMaker from the thing made.\n\nWe must, however, analyze the matter of divine attributes more closely.\nWhen we say God is living, we may mean he is living with life as his\nattribute, i. e., that there is an attribute life which makes him\nliving, or we may deny that there is any such attribute in him as life,\nbut that he is living through himself and not through life as an\nattribute. To make this subtle distinction clear we will investigate\nfurther what is involved in the first statement that God is living with\nlife. It may mean that there was a time when God was not living and then\nhe acquired life and became living. This is clearly a wrong and unworthy\nconception. We must therefore adopt the other alternative, that the life\nwhich makes him living is eternal like him, and hence he was always\nliving from eternity and will continue to be living to eternity. But the\nmatter is not yet settled. The question still remains, Is this life\nthrough which he lives identical with his being, or is it distinct from\nhis being, or is it a part of it? If we say it is distinct from his\nbeing, we are guilty of introducing other eternal beings beside God,\nwhich destroys his unity. The Christians are guilty of this very thing\nwhen they say that God's eternal life is the Holy Ghost, and his eternal\nWisdom is the Son. If we say that his life is a part of his being, we do\ninjury to the other aspect of his unity, namely, his simplicity. For to\nhave parts in one's being implies composition. We are forced therefore\nto conclude that God's life is identical with his being. But this is\nreally tantamount to saying that there is no attribute life which makes\nhim living, or that he is living not through life. The difference is\nonly in expression.\n\nWe may make this conception clearer by illustrations from other spheres,\ninadequate though they be. The soul is the cause of life to the body,\ni. e., the body lives through the soul, and when the latter leaves it,\nthe body loses its life and dies. But the soul itself does not live\nthrough anything else, say through another soul. For if this were the\ncase this other soul would need again another soul to make it live and\nthis again another, and so on _ad infinitum_, which is absurd. The soul\nlives through itself. The same thing applies to angels. They live\nthrough their own being; and that is why souls and angels are called in\nthe Sacred Scriptures spirits. A spirit is something that is fine and\nlight and incomposite. Hence their life cannot be due to anything\ndistinct from their being, for this would make them composite.\n\nThis statement, however, that souls and angels are living through their\nown being must not be understood as meaning that they have no creator\nwho gave them being and life. The meaning merely is that the being which\nGod gave them is different from the being he gave to bodies. Bodies need\na soul to become living, the soul is itself living. So in material\nthings, also, the sun shines with its own light and not with light\nacquired. The odor of myrrh is fragrant through itself, not through\nanything else. The eye sees with its own power, whereas man sees with\nthe eye. The tongue does not speak with another tongue, man speaks with\na tongue, and so on. So we say of God, though in a manner a\nthousand-fold more sublime, that he is living, but not with a life which\nis distinct from his being; and so of the other attributes, hearing,\nseeing, and so on, that we find in the Scriptural praises of him.\n\nIt is necessary to add that as on the one hand we have seen that God's\nattributes are identical with his being, so it follows on the other that\nthe various attributes, such as wise, seeing, hearing, knowing, and so\non, are not different from each other in meaning, though distinct in\nexpression. Otherwise it would make God composite. The reason we employ\na number of distinct expressions is in order to remove from God the\nseveral opposites of the terms used. Thus when we say God is living we\nmean to indicate that he is not dead. The attribute wise excludes folly\nand ignorance; hearing and seeing remove deafness and blindness. The\nphilosopher Aristotle says that it is truer and more appropriate to\napply negative attributes to God than positive. Others have said that we\nmust not speak of the Creator in positive terms for there is danger of\nendowing him with form and resemblance to other things. Speaking of him\nnegatively we imply the positive without risking offence.\n\nIn the sequel Al Mukammas refutes the views of the dualists, of the\nChristians and those who maintain that God has form. We cannot afford to\nlinger over these arguments, interesting though they be, and must hurry\non to say a word about the sixteenth chapter, which deals with reward\nand punishment. This no doubt forms part of the second Mu`tazilite\ndivision, namely, the \"Bab al `Adl,\" or section concerning God's\njustice.\n\nHe defines reward as the soul's tranquillity and infinite joy in the\nworld to come in compensation for the sojourn in this world which she\nendured and the self-control she practiced in abstaining from the\npleasures of the world. Punishment, on the other hand, is the soul's\ndisquietude and sorrow to the end of days as retribution for indulging\nin the world's evil pleasures. Both are imposed by God with justice and\nfairness. It is fitting that the promises of reward and threats of\npunishment consequent upon obedience and disobedience should be\nspecified in connection with the commandments and prohibitions in the\nScriptures, because this is the only way to train the soul to practice\nself-control. A child who does not fear his teacher's punishment, or has\nno confidence in his good will will not be amenable to instruction. The\nsame is true of the majority of those who serve kings. It is fear alone\nwhich induces them to obey the will of their masters. So God in\ncommanding us to do what is worthy and prohibiting what is unworthy saw\nfit in his wisdom to specify the accompanying rewards and punishments\nthat he who observes may find pleasure and joy in his obedience, and the\nunobservant may be affected with sorrow and fear.\n\nAs the world to come has no end, so it is proper that the reward of the\nrighteous as well as the punishment of the wicked should be without end.\nArguments have been advanced to show that unlike reward which is\nproperly infinite as is becoming to God's goodness, punishment should\nhave a limit, for God is merciful. On the other hand, it is claimed on\nthe basis of the finiteness of human action that both reward and\npunishment should be finite. But in reality it can be shown in many ways\nthat reward and punishment should be infinite. Without naming all the\narguments--as many as ten have been advanced--in favor of this view, we\nmay urge some of the more important.\n\nIt was God's own goodness that prompted him to benefit mankind by giving\nthem laws for their guidance, and not any prior merits on their part\nwhich gave them a claim on God's protection. God himself is not in any\nway benefited by man's obedience or injured by his disobedience. Man\nknows that it is for his own good that he is thus admonished; and if he\nwere asked what reward he would like to have for his good deeds he would\nselect no less than infinite happiness. Justice demands that punishment\nbe commensurate with reward. The greater the reward and the punishment\nthe more effective are the laws likely to be. Besides in violating God's\nlaw a person virtually denies the eternity of him who gave it, and is\nguilty of contempt; for he hides himself from men, fearing their\ndispleasure, whereas the omnipresence of God has no deterring effect\nupon him. For such offence infinite punishment is the only fit\nretribution.\n\nThe question whether the soul alone is rewarded or the body alone or\nboth has been answered variously. In favor of the soul alone as the\nsubject of reward and punishment it has been urged that reward raises\nman to the grade of angels, who are pure spirits. How then can the body\ntake part? And punishment must be of the same nature as reward. On the\nother hand, it is claimed that the Bible says nothing of man being\nraised to the status of angels, and we know in this world of physical\nreward and punishment only. The Garden of Eden of which the Bible speaks\nis not peopled with angels, and that is where the righteous go after\ndeath.\n\nThe true solution is that as man is composed of body and soul, and both\nshare in his conduct, reward and punishment must attach to both. As we\ndo not understand the nature of spiritual retribution so the composite\nis equally inconceivable to us. But everyone who believes in the\nresurrection of the dead has no difficulty in holding that the body has\na share in future reward and punishment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nSAADIA BEN JOSEPH AL-FAYYUMI (892-942)\n\n\nSaadia was the first important Jewish philosopher. Philo of Alexandria\ndoes not come within our purview as he was not medi\u00e6val. Besides his\nwork is not systematic, being in the nature of a commentary on Holy\nWrit. Though Philo was a good and loyal Jew, he stood, so to speak,\napart from the real centre of Jewish intellectual and spiritual\ndevelopment. He was on the one hand too closely dependent on Greek\nthought and on the other had only a limited knowledge of Jewish thought\nand tradition. The Bible he knew only in the Greek translation, not in\nthe original Hebrew; and of the Halaka, which was still in the making in\nPalestine, he knew still less.\n\nIt was different with Saadia. In the tenth century the Mishna and the\nTalmud had been long completed and formed theoretically as well as\npractically the content of the Jew's life and thought. Sura in\nBabylonia, where Saadia was the head of the academy, was the chief\ncentre of Jewish learning, and Saadia was the heir in the main line of\nJewish development as it passed through the hands of lawgiver and\nprophet, scribe and Pharisee, Tanna and Amora, Saburai and Gaon. As the\nhead of the Sura academy he was the intellectual representative of the\nJewry and Judaism of his day. His time was a period of agitation and\nstrife, not only in Judaism but also in Islam, in whose lands the Jews\nlived and to whose temporal rulers they owed allegiance in the East as\nwell as in Spain.\n\nIn Islam we saw in the introduction how the various schools of the\nKadariya, the Mu`tazila and the Ashariya arose in obedience to the\ndemand of clarifying the chief problems of faith, science and life. In\nJudaism there was in addition to this more general demand the more local\nand internal conflict of Karaite and Rabbanite which centred about the\nproblem of tradition. Saadia found himself in the midst of all this and\nproved equal to the occasion.\n\nWe are not here concerned with the vicissitudes of Saadia's personal\nlife or of his literary career as opponent of the Karaite sect. Nor can\nwe afford more than merely to state that Jewish science in the larger\nsense begins with Saadia. Hebrew grammar and lexicography did not exist\nbefore him. The Bible had been translated into several languages before\nSaadia's day, but he was the first to translate it into Arabic, and the\nfirst to write a commentary on it. But the greatest work of Saadia, that\nwhich did the most important service to the theory of Judaism, and by\nwhich he will be best remembered, is his endeavor to work out a system\nof doctrine which should be in harmony with the traditions of Judaism on\nthe one hand and with the most authoritative scientific and philosophic\nopinion of the time on the other. Israeli, we have seen, was interested\nin science before Saadia. As a physician he was probably more at home in\npurely physical discussions than Saadia. But there is no evidence that\nhe had the larger interest of the Gaon of Sura, namely, to construct a\nsystem of Judaism upon the basis of scientific doctrine. Possibly the\nexample of Islam was lacking in Israeli's environment, as he does not\nseem to be acquainted with the theories and discussions of the\nMutakallimun, and draws his information from Aristotelian and\nNeo-Platonic sources. Saadia was in the very midst of Arab speculation\nas is evident from the composition of his _chef d'oeuvre_, \"Emunot\nve-Deot,\" Beliefs and Opinions.[37]\n\nThe work is arranged on the Mu`tazilite model. The two main divisions in\nworks of this character are _Unity_ and _Justice_. The first begins with\nsome preliminary considerations on the nature and sources of knowledge.\nIt proceeds then to prove the existence of God by showing that the world\ncannot have existed from eternity and must have been created in time.\nCreation implies a creator. This is followed by arguments showing that\nGod is one and incorporeal. The rest is devoted to a discussion of the\ndivine attributes with the purpose of showing that God's unity and\nsimplicity are not affected by them. The section on unity closes with a\nrefutation of opposing views, such as those of the dualists or\nTrinitarians or infidels. The section on Justice centres about the\ndoctrine of free will. Hence psychology and ethics are treated in this\npart of the work. To this may be added problems of a more dogmatic\nnature, eschatological and otherwise. We shall see in the sequel that\nSaadia's masterpiece is modeled on the same plan.\n\nBut not merely the plan and arrangement of his work give evidence of the\ninfluence upon Saadia of Islamic schools, many of his arguments, those\nfor example on the existence of God and the creation of the world, are\ntaken directly from them. Maimonides, who was a strong opponent of the\nMutakallimun, gives an outline of their fundamental principles and their\narguments for the existence, unity and incorporeality of God.[38] Some\nof these are identical with those of Saadia. Saadia, however, is not\ninterested in pure metaphysics as such. His purpose is decidedly\napologetic in the defence of Judaism and Jewish dogma. Hence we look in\nvain in his book for definite views on the constitution of existing\nsubstances, on the nature of motion, on the meaning of cause, and so on.\nWe get a glimpse of his attitude to some of these questions in an\nincidental way.\n\nThe Mutakallimun were opposed to the Aristotelian theory of matter and\nform, and substituted for it the atomic theory. God created atoms\nwithout magnitude or quality, and he likewise created qualities to\ninhere in groups of atoms. These qualities they called accidents, and\none of their important discussions was whether an accident can last more\nthan a moment of time. The opinions were various and the accidents were\nclassified according to their powers of duration. That is, there were\nsome accidents which once created continued to exist of their own accord\nsome length of time, and there were others which had to be re-created\nanew every moment in order to continue to exist. Saadia does not speak\nof matter and form as constituting the essence of existing things; he\ndoes speak of substance and accident,[39] which might lead us to believe\nthat he held to the atomic theory, since he speaks of the accidents as\ncoming and going one after the other, which suggests the constant\ncreation spoken of by the Mutakallimun. On the other hand, when he\nanswers an objection against motion, which is as old as Zeno, namely,\nhow can we traverse an infinitely divisible distance, since it is\nnecessary to pass an infinite number of parts, he tells us that it is\nnot necessary to have recourse to the atomic theory or other theories\nadopted by some Mu`tazilites to meet this objection. We may believe in\nthe continuity and infinite divisibility of matter, but as long as this\ndivisibility is only potentially infinite, actually always finite, our\nability to traverse the space offers no difficulty.[40] Finally, in\nrefuting the second theory of creation, which combines Platonism with\natomism, he argues against an atomic theory primarily because of its\nimplications of eternity of the atoms, but partly also on other grounds,\nwhich would also affect the Kalamistic conceptions of the atoms.[41]\nThese points are not treated by Saadia expressly but are only mentioned\nincidentally in the elucidation of other problems dealing with the\ncreation of the world and the existence of God.\n\nLike Israeli Saadia shows considerable familiarity with Aristotelian\nnotions as found in the Logic, the Physics and the Psychology. It is\ndoubtful, however, whether he really knew Aristotle's more important\ntreatises at first hand and in detail. The \"Categories,\" a small\ntreatise forming the first book of Aristotle's logic, he no doubt knew,\nbut the other Aristotelian concepts he probably derived from secondary\nsources. For while he passes in review all the ten categories showing\nthat none of them is applicable to God,[42] we scarcely find any mention\nof such important and fundamental Aristotelian conceptions as matter and\nform, potentiality and actuality, the four causes, formal, material,\nefficient and final--concepts which as soon as Aristotle began to be\nstudied by Al Farabi and Avicenna became familiar to all who wrote\nanything at all bearing on philosophy, theology, or Biblical exegesis.\nNay, the very concepts which he does employ seem to indicate in the way\nhe uses them that he was not familiar with the context in which they are\nfound in the Aristotelian treatises, or with the relation they bear to\nother views of Aristotle. Thus no one who knew Aristotle at first hand\ncould make the mistake of regarding his definition of the soul as making\nthe latter an accident.[43] When Saadia speaks of six kinds of motion\n[44] instead of _three_, he shows clearly that his knowledge of the\nAristotelian theory of motion was limited to the little of it that is\ncontained in the \"Categories.\"\n\nWe are thus justified in saying, that Saadia's sources are Jewish\nliterature and tradition, the works of the Mutakallimun, particularly\nthe Mu`tazilites, and Aristotle, whose book on the \"Categories\" he knew\nat first hand.\n\nSaadia tells us he was induced to write his book because he found that\nthe beliefs and opinions of men were in an unsatisfactory state. While\nthere are some persons who are fortunate enough to possess the truth and\nto know that they have it and rejoice thereat, this is not true of all.\nFor there are others who when they have the truth know it not, and hence\nlet it slip; others are still less fortunate and adopt false and\nerroneous opinions, which they regard as true; while still others\nvacillate continually, going from one opinion and belief to another.\nThis gave him pain and he thought it his duty to make use of his limited\nknowledge to help them. A conscientious study of his book will tend to\nremove doubt and will substitute belief through knowledge for belief\nthrough tradition. Another result of such study, not less important,\nwill be improvement of character and disposition, which will affect for\nthe better a man's life in every respect, in relation to God as well as\nto his fellowmen.[45]\n\nOne may ask why it is that one encounters so many doubts and\ndifficulties before arriving at true knowledge. The answer is, a human\nbeing is a creature, i. e., a being dependent upon another for its\nexistence, and it is in the nature of a creature as such that it must\nlabor for the truth with the sweat of its brow. For whatever a man does\nor has to do with is subject to time; each work must be accomplished\ngradually, step by step, part by part, in successive portions of time.\nAnd as the task before him is at the beginning complex, he has to\nanalyze and simplify it. This takes time; while certainty and knowledge\ncannot come until the task is accomplished. Before that point is reached\nhe is naturally in doubt.[46]\n\nThe sources of truth are three. First is that to which the senses\ntestify. If our normal sense perceives under normal conditions which are\nfree from illusion, we are certain of that perception.\n\nThe judgment is another source of truth. There are certain truths of\nwhich we are certain. This applies especially to such judgments of\nvalue, as that truth is good and falsehood is bad. In addition to these\ntwo sources of immediate knowledge, there is a third source based upon\nthese two. This is logical inference. We are led to believe what we have\nnot directly perceived or a matter concerning which we have no immediate\nknowledge of the second kind, because we infer it from something else\nwhich we have perceived or of which we have immediate certainty. Thus we\nbelieve man has a soul though we have never seen it because we infer its\npresence from its activity, which we do see.\n\nThese three sources are universal. They are not peculiar to a given race\nor religious denomination, though there are some persons who deny the\nvalidity of some or all of them. We Jews believe in them and in still\nanother source of truth, namely, authentic tradition.[47]\n\nSome think that a Jew is forbidden to speculate or philosophize about\nthe truths of religion. This is not so. Genuine and sincere reflection\nand speculation is not prohibited. What is forbidden is to leave the\nsacred writings aside and rely on any opinions that occur to one\nconcerning the beginnings of time and space. For one may find the truth\nor one may miss it. In any case until a person finds it, he is without a\nreligious guide; and if he does find what seems to him the truth and\nbases his belief and conduct upon it, he is never sure that he may not\nlater be assailed by doubts, which will lead him to drop his adopted\nbelief. But if we hold fast to the commandments of the Bible, our own\nratiocination on the truths of religion will be of great benefit to\nus.[48]\n\nOur investigation of the facts of our religion will give us a reasoned\nand scientific knowledge of those things which the Prophets taught us\ndogmatically, and will enable us to answer the arguments and criticisms\nof our opponents directed against our faith. Hence it is not merely our\nprivilege but our duty to confirm the truths of religion by reason.[49]\n\nHere a question presents itself. If the reason can discover by itself\nthe truths communicated to us by divine revelation, why was it necessary\nto have recourse to the latter? Why was it not left to the reason alone\nto guide us in our belief and in our conduct? The answer is, as was\nsuggested before, that human reason proceeds gradually and does not\nreach its aim until the end of the process. In the meantime one is left\nwithout a guide. Besides not everybody's reason is adequate to discover\ntruth. Some are altogether incapable of this difficult task, and many\nmore are exposed to harassing doubts and perplexities which hinder their\nprogress. Hence the necessity of revelation, because in the witness of\nthe senses all are equally at home, men and women, young and old.[50]\n\nThe most important fact of religion is the existence of God. We know it\nfrom the Bible, and we must now prove it by reason. The proof is\nnecessarily indirect because no one of us has seen God, nor have we an\nimmediate certainty of his existence. We must prove it then by the\nmethod of inference. We must start with something we do know with\ncertainty and proceed from it through as many steps of logical inference\nas may be necessary until we reach the object of our search.[51]\n\nThe world and the things in it are directly accessible to our senses and\nour judgment. How long has the world been in existence and how did it\ncome to be? The answers to these questions also we do not know through\nour senses, and we must prove them by a chain of reasoning. There are\nseveral possibilities. The world just as it is may have existed from\neternity. If so nobody made it; it just existed, and we have no proof of\nGod. The world in its present form might have proceeded from a primitive\nmatter. This hypothesis only removes the problem further back. For,\nleaving aside the question how did this prime matter develop into the\ncomplex world of our experience, we direct our attention to the prime\nmatter itself, and ask, Has it existed from eternity or did it come to\nbe? If it existed from eternity, then nobody made it, and we have no\nproof of a God, for by God we mean an intelligent being acting with\npurpose and design, and the cause of the existence of everything in\ncreation. The third alternative is that whether the world was developed\nout of a primitive matter or not, it at any rate, or the primitive\nmatter, as the case may be, was made in time, that is, it was created\nout of nothing. If so there must have been someone who created it, as\nnothing can create itself. Here we have proof of the existence of God.\nIt follows therefore that we must first show that the world is not\neternal, that it came to be in time, and this is what Saadia does.\n\nHere are some of his proofs. The world is finite in magnitude. For the\nworld consists of the earth, which is in the centre, and the heavens\nsurrounding it on all sides. This shows that the earth is finite, for an\ninfinite body cannot be surrounded. But the heavens are finite too, for\nthey make a complete revolution in twenty-four hours. If they were\ninfinite it would take an infinite time to complete a revolution. A\nfinite body cannot have an infinite power. This Saadia regards as\nself-evident, though Aristotle, from whom this statement is derived,\ngives the proof. Hence the force or power within the world which keeps\nit going is finite and must one day be exhausted. But this shows also\nthat it could not have gone on from eternity. Hence the world came to be\nin time.[52]\n\nAnother proof is based on the composite character of all things in\nheaven and earth. Minerals, plants and animals are made up of parts and\nelements. The heavens consist of spheres, one within the other. The\nspheres are studded with stars. But composition implies a time when the\ncomposition took place. In other words, the parts must have been there\nfirst and somebody put them together. Hence the world as we see it now\nis not eternal.[53]\n\nA special form of composition, which is universal, is that of substance\nand accident. Plants and animals are born (or sprout), grow and decay.\nThese manifestations are the accidents of the plant or animal's\nsubstance. The heavenly bodies have various motions, lights and colors\nas their accidents. But these accidents are not eternal, since they come\nand go. Hence the substances bearing the accidents, without which they\ncannot exist, are also temporal like them. Hence our world is not\neternal.[54]\n\nFinally, past time itself cannot be eternal. For this would mean that an\ninfinite time has actually elapsed down to our day. But this is a\ncontradiction in terms. What is already accomplished cannot be infinite.\nInfinity is possible only as a potentiality, for example, we may speak\nof a given length as infinitely divisible. This merely means that one\nmay mentally continue dividing it forever, but we can never say that one\nhas actually made an infinite number of divisions. Therefore not merely\nthe world, but even time must have begun to be.[55]\n\nIt will be seen that the first three arguments prove only that the world\nin the form which it has now is not eternal. The possibility is not yet\nexcluded of an eternal matter out of which the world proceeded or was\nmade. The fourth argument proves a great deal. It shows that nothing\nwhich is subject to time can be eternal, hence not even prime matter.\nGod can be eternal because he is not subject to time. Time, as we shall\nsee later, cannot exist without motion and moving things, hence before\nthe world there was no time, and the fourth argument does not apply to\npremundane existence.\n\nTo complete the first three arguments Saadia therefore proceeds to show\nthat the world, which we now know came to be in time, must have been\nmade by someone (since nothing can make itself), and that too out of\nnothing, and not out of a pre-existing eternal matter.\n\nIf an eternal matter existed before the world, the explanation of the\norigin of the world is open to two possibilities. One is that there is\nnothing outside of this matter and the world which came from it. This is\nabsurd, for it would mean that an unintelligent dead thing is the cause\nof intelligence and life in the universe. We must therefore have\nrecourse to the other alternative that someone, an intelligent being,\nmade the world out of the primitive, eternal matter. This is also\nimpossible. For if the matter is eternal like the maker of the world, it\nis independent of him, and would not be obedient to his will to adapt\nitself to his purpose. He could therefore not make the world out of it.\n\nThe only alternative left now is that the author of the universe is an\nintelligent being, and that nothing outside of him is eternal. He alone\nis responsible for the existence of the world, which was at one time\nnothing. Whether he first created a matter and then from it the\nuniverse, or whether he made the world outright, is of secondary\nimportance.[56]\n\nThere is still a possibility that instead of making the world out of\nnothing, God made it out of himself, _i. e._, that it emanated from him\nas light from the sun. This, as we know, is the opinion of the\nNeo-Platonists; and Israeli comes very close to it as we saw before (p.\n6). Saadia is strongly opposed to any such doctrine.\n\nIt is unlikely, he says, that an eternal substance having neither form,\ncondition, measure, place or time, should change into a body or bodies\nhaving those accidents; or that a wise being, not subject to change or\ninfluence, or comprehensibility should choose to make himself into a\nbody subject to all of these. What could have induced a just being who\ndoes no wrong to decree that some of his parts should be subject to such\nevils as matter and material beings are afflicted with? It is\nconceivable only in one of two ways. Either they deserved it for having\ndone wrong, or they did not deserve it, and it was an act of violence\nthat was committed against them. Both suppositions are absurd. The fact\nof the matter is that the authors of this opinion to avoid the theory of\ncreation _ex nihilo_ went from the frying pan into the fire. To be sure,\ncreation out of nothing is difficult to conceive, but this is the reason\nwhy we ascribe this power to God alone. To demand that we show how this\ncan be done is to demand that we ourselves become creators.[57]\n\nThe question what existed in place of the earth before it was created\nevinces ignorance of the idea of place. By place is meant simply the\ncontact of two bodies in which the one is the place of the other. When\nthere is no earth and no bodies there is no such thing as place.\n\nThe same thing applies to time. Time means the persistence of existing\nthings in heaven and earth under changing conditions. Where there is no\nworld, there is no time. This answers the objection raised by some,\nnamely, how is it possible that before all these bodies were made time\nexisted void of objects? Or the other difficulty which is closely\nrelated, viz., Why did not God create the world before he did? The\nanswer to both is, there was no before and there was no time, when the\nworld was not.\n\nThe following question is a legitimate one, Why did God create all\nthings? And our answer is, there was no cause which made him create\nthem, and yet they were not made in vain. God wished to exhibit his\nwisdom; and his goodness prompted him to benefit his creatures by\nenabling them to worship him.[58]\n\nWe have now proved the existence of God as the cause of the existence of\nall things. We must now try to arrive at some notion of what God is as\nfar as this is in our power. God cannot be corporeal or body, for in our\nproof of his existence we began with the world which is body and arrived\nat the notion of God as the cause of all corporeal existence. If God\nhimself is corporeal our search is not at an end, for we should still\nwant to know the cause of him. Being the cause of all body, he is not\nbody and hence is for our knowledge ultimate, we cannot go beyond him.\nBut if God is not corporeal, he is not subject to motion or rest or\nanger or favor, for to deny the corporeality of God and still look for\nthese accidents in him is to change the expression and retain the idea.\nBodily accidents involve body.[59]\n\nThe incorporeality of God proves also his unity. For what is not body\ncannot have the corporeal attributes of quantity or number, hence God\ncannot be more than one.[60] And there are many powerful arguments\nbesides against a dualistic theory.\n\nA unitary effect cannot be the result of two independent causes. For if\none is responsible for the whole, there is nothing left for the other,\nand the assumption of his existence is gratuitous. If the effect\nconsists of two parts of which each does one, we have really two\neffects. But the universe is one and its parts cannot be separated.[61]\nAgain, if one of them wishes to create a thing and cannot without the\nhelp of the other, neither is all-powerful, which is inconsistent with\nthe character of deity. If he can compel the other to help him, they are\nboth under necessity. And if they are free and independent, then if one\nshould desire to keep a body alive and the other to kill it, the body\nwould have to be at the same time alive and dead, which is absurd.\nAgain, if each one can conceal aught from the other, neither is\nall-knowing. If they cannot, they are not all-powerful.[62]\n\nHaving proved God's existence, unity and incorporeality, he proceeds to\ndiscuss his most essential attributes, which are, Life, Omnipotence, and\nOmniscience. These easily follow from what was said before. We cannot\nconceive a creator _ex nihilo_ unless he is all-powerful; power implies\nlife; and the thing made cannot be perfect unless its maker knows what\nit is going to be before he makes it.\n\nThese three concepts our reason discovers with one act of its thinking\neffort, for they are all involved in the concept, Maker. There is no\ngradual inference from one to the other. The reason we are forced to use\nthree expressions is because of the limitations of language. Hence it\nmust not be thought that they involve plurality in God. They are simply\nthe implications of the one expression, Maker, and as that does not\nsuggest plurality in God's essence, but signifies only that there is a\nthing made by the maker, so the three derivative terms, Living,\nOmnipotent, Omniscient, imply no more.\n\nThe Christians erred in this matter in making God a trinity. They say\none cannot create unless he is living and wise, hence they regard his\nlife and his wisdom as two other things outside of his essence. But this\nis a mistake. For in saying there are several attributes in him distinct\none from the other, they say in effect that he is corporeal--an error\nwhich we have already refuted. Besides they do not understand what\nconstitutes proof: In man we say that his life and his knowledge are not\nhis essence because we see that he sometimes has them and sometimes not.\nIn God this is not the case. Again, why only three? They say essence,\nlife, wisdom; why do they not add power, or hearing and seeing? If they\nthink that power is implied in life, and hearing and seeing in wisdom,\nso is life implied in wisdom.\n\nThey quote Scripture in their support, for example, the verse in II\nSamuel (23, 2), \"The _Spirit_ of the Lord spoke through me, and his\n_Word_ was upon my tongue.\" \"Word\" denotes, they say, his attribute of\nwisdom, and \"Spirit\" his life, as distinct persons. But they are\nmistaken. The expressions in question denote the words which God puts\ninto the mouth of his prophets. There are other similar instances which\nthey cite, and in their ignorance of Hebrew take metaphorical\nexpressions literally. If they are consistent, they should add many more\npersons in the Godhead, in accordance with the many phrases of the Bible\nconcerning the hand of God, the eye of God, the glory of God, the anger\nof God, the mercy of God, and so on.[63]\n\nThe above discussion, as also that of Al-Mukammas (p. 19), shows clearly\nthe origin of the doctrine of attributes as well as its motive. Both\nAl-Mukammas and Saadia and the later Jewish philosophers owed their\ninterest in this problem primarily to the Mohammedan schools in which we\nknow it played an important r\u00f4le (see Introduction, pp. xxiii, xxvi).\nBut there is no doubt that the problem originated in the Christian\nschools in the Orient, who made use of it to rationalize the dogma of\nthe Trinity.\n\nThere is extant a confession of faith attributed to Jacob Barad\u00e6us\n(sixth century), the founder of the Syrian Church of the Monophysites or\nJacobites, in which the phrase occurs that the Father is the Intellect,\nthe Son is the Word and the Holy Ghost is Life. In the works of Elias of\nNisibis of the Nestorian Church, who lived shortly after Saadia\n(975-1049), we also find a passage in which the three expressions\nessence, life and wisdom are applied to the three persons of the\nTrinity. The passage is worth quoting. It reads as follows: \"As the\nessence of God cannot receive accidents, his life and his wisdom cannot\nbe accidents. But whatever is not accident is either substance or\nperson. Hence as the essence of the Creator and his life and his wisdom\nare not three substances or three accidents, it is proved that they are\nthree persons.\"[64]\n\nMonotheism was a fundamental dogma of the Mohammedan faith. Hence it was\nnecessary for their rationalizing theologians to meet the Trinitarians\nwith their own weapons and show that the multiplicity of the divine\nattributes which they could not deny, since the Koran was authority for\nit, does in no way affect God's unity. The problem was quite as\nimportant for Judaism as it was for Islam, and for the same reason.\nHence Saadia's insistence that inadequacy of language is alone\nresponsible for our expressing God's essential attributes in the three\nwords, Living, Omnipotent, Omniscient; that in reality they are no more\nthan interpretations of the expression Maker.\n\nWe have now shown that God is one in the two important senses of the\nword. He is one in the sense that there is no second God beside him; and\nhe is one in his own essence, _i. e._, he is simple and not composed of\nparts. His Life and his Power and his Wisdom are not distinct one from\nthe other and from his essence. They are all one. We have also proved\nGod's incorporeality. Nevertheless Saadia is not satisfied until he has\nshown in detail that God cannot be compared to man in any sense, and\nthat the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible must not be taken\nliterally. In reference to Biblical interpretation Saadia makes the\ngeneral remark that whenever a verse of Scripture apparently contradicts\nthe truths of reason, there is no doubt that it is figurative, and a\nperson who successfully interprets it so as to reconcile it with the\ndata of sense or reason will be rewarded for it. For not the Bible alone\nis the source of Judaism, Reason is another source preceding the Bible,\nand Tradition is a third source coming after the Bible.[65]\n\nIn order to show that God is not to be compared to any other thing in\ncreation Saadia finds it convenient to use Aristotle's classification of\nall existing things under the ten categories.[66] Everything that exists\nis either a substance, or it is an accident, _i. e._, an attribute or\nquality of a substance. Substance is therefore the first and most\nimportant of the categories and is exemplified by such terms as man,\nhorse, city. Everything that is not substance is accident, but there are\nnine classes of accident, and with substance they make up the ten\ncategories. The order of the categories as Aristotle gives them in his\ntreatise of the same name is, substance, quantity, quality, relation,\nplace, time, position, possession, action, passion. If these categories\ninclude all existing things and we can prove that God is not any of\nthem, our object is accomplished. The one general argument is one with\nwhich we are already familiar. It is that God is the cause of all\nsubstance and accident, hence he is himself neither the one nor the\nother. Scripture supports our view, as in Deuteronomy 4, 15: \"Take ye\ntherefore good heed of yourselves; for ye saw no manner of form on the\nday that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire:\nlest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image in the form of\nany figure, the likeness of male or female, the likeness of any beast\nthat is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the\nheaven; the likeness of anything that creepeth on the ground, the\nlikeness of any fish that is in the water under the earth: and lest thou\nlift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun and the moon\nand the stars, even all the host of heaven, thou be drawn away,\" etc.\nAnd tradition is equally emphatic in this regard. Our sages, who were\nthe disciples of the prophets, render the anthropomorphic passages in\nthe Bible so as to avoid an objectionable understanding. This is\nparticularly true of the Aramaic translation of the Targum.\n\nSuch terms as head, eye, ear, mouth, lip, face, hand, heart, bowels,\nfoot, which are used in relation to God in the Bible, are figurative.\nFor it is the custom of language to apply such terms metaphorically to\ncertain ideas like elevation, providence, acceptance, declaration,\ncommand, favor, anger, power, wisdom, mercy, dominion. Language would be\na very inadequate instrument if it confined itself to the literal\nmeaning of the words it uses; and in the case of God we should be\nlimited to the statement that he is.\n\nWhat was said of the nouns above mentioned applies also to other parts\nof speech, such as verbs attributing human activity to God. Such phrases\nas \"incline thine ear,\" \"open thine eyes,\" \"he saw,\" \"he heard,\" \"he\nspoke\" are figurative. So the expression, \"the Lord smelled,\" which\nsounds especially objectionable, denotes acceptance.\n\nThe theophanies in the Bible, where God is represented under a certain\nform, as in Ezekiel, Isaiah and Kings, do not argue against our view,\nfor there are meant specially created forms for the benefit and honor of\nthe prophet. This is what is meant by the \"Glory of the Lord,\" and\n\"Shekinah.\" Sometimes it is simply a created light without an individual\nform. When Moses asked to see God, he meant the created light. God\ncannot be seen with the eye nor can he be grasped in thought or\nimagination. Hence Moses could not have meant to see God, but the\ncreated light. His face was covered so that he should not be dazzled by\nthe exceeding splendor of the beginning of the light, which is too much\nfor a mortal to endure; but later when the brightest part passed by,\nthe covering was taken off and Moses saw the last part of the light.\nThis is the meaning of the expression in Exodus 33, 23, \"And I will take\naway mine hand, and thou shalt see my back: but my face shall not be\nseen.\"\n\nHaving treated of God as the creator of the world and having learned\nsomething about his attributes, we must now proceed to the study of man,\nor which is the same thing, to an investigation of God's relations to\nthe rational part of his creation in the sublunar world. That man is\nendowed with a soul cannot be doubted, for the activities of man's soul\nare directly visible. The problem which is difficult is concerning the\nnature of the soul.[67] Here opinions differ, and some regard the soul\nas an accident of the body, some think it is a corporeal substance like\nair or fire, while others believe there is more than one soul in man. It\nwill be our task to vindicate our own view against these erroneous\nideas. The soul is too important in its functions to be an accident. It\nis neither air nor fire because it has not the properties of these\nbodies. And if the soul consisted of two or more distinct parts, the\nperceptions of sense would not reach the reason, and there would be no\nco-operation between these two powers. The true view is therefore that\nthe soul of man is a substance created by God at the time when the human\nbody is completed. The soul has no eternal existence before the body as\nPlato thought, for nothing is eternal outside of God, as we saw before.\nNor does it enter the soul from the outside, but is created with and in\nthe body. Its substance is as pure as that of the celestial spheres,\nreceiving its light like them, but is much finer than the substance of\nthe spheres, for the latter are not rational, whereas the soul is. The\nsoul is not dependent for its knowledge upon the body, which without the\nlatter has neither life nor knowledge, but it uses the body as an\ninstrument for its functions. When connected with the body the soul has\nthree faculties, reason, spirit and desire. But we must not think with\nPlato that these powers form so many divisions or parts of the soul,\nresiding in different parts of the body. All the three faculties belong\nto the one soul whose seat is in the heart; for from the heart issue the\narteries, which give the body sense and motion.\n\nThe soul was put in the body because from its nature it cannot act by\nitself; it must have the body as its instrument in order thereby to\nattain to perfect happiness, for the soul's functions either purify or\ndefile it. When the soul leaves the body she can no longer repent; all\nthis must be done while she is in the body. Being placed in the body is\ntherefore a good for the soul. If she were left alone, there would be no\nuse in her existence or in that of the body, and hence the entire\ncreation would be in vain, which was made for the sake of man. To ask\nwhy was not the soul made so as to be independent of the body is foolish\nand tantamount to saying why was not the soul made something else than\nsoul. The soul is not in any way harmed by being with the body, for the\ninjury of sin is due to her own free will and not to the body. Moreover,\nthe body is not unclean, nor are the fluids of the body unclean while in\nthe body; some of them are declared in the Bible to cause uncleanness\nwhen they leave the body, but this is one of those ordinances which, as\nwe shall see later, are not demanded by the reason for their own sake,\nbut are specially commanded for a different purpose. As for the\nsufferings which the soul undergoes by reason of her connection with the\nbody, some are due to her own negligence, such as cold, heat, and so on,\nothers are inflicted by God for the soul's own good so that she may be\nlater rewarded.\n\nWe see here, and we shall learn more definitely later, that Saadia is\nopposed to the view of the ascetics--a view Neo-Platonic in its\norigin--that matter and body as such are evil, and that the constant\neffort of man must be to free the soul from the taint of the body in\nwhich it is imprisoned, and by which it is dragged down from its\npristine nobility and purity. Saadia's opposition to the belief in the\npre-existence of the soul at once does away with the Neo-Platonic view\nthat the soul was placed in the body as a punishment for wrongdoing. The\nsoul was created at the same time with the body, and the two form a\nnatural unit. Hence complete life involves both body and soul.\n\nWe have seen that God's creation of the world is due to his goodness.\nHis first act of kindness was that he gave being to the things of the\nworld. He showed himself especially beneficent to man in enabling him to\nattain perfect happiness by means of the commandments and prohibitions\nwhich were imposed upon him. The reward consequent upon obedience was\nthe real purpose of the commandments.[68]\n\nThe laws which God gave us through the prophets consist of two groups.\nThe first embraces such acts as our reason recognizes to be right or\nwrong, good or bad, through a feeling of approval or disapproval which\nGod planted in our minds. Thus reason demands that a benefactor should\nreceive in return for his goodness either a kind reward if he needs it,\nor thanks if he needs no reward. As this is a general demand of the\nreason, God could not have neglected it in his own case, and hence the\ncommandments that we should serve him, that we should not offend or\nrevile him and the other laws bearing on the same subject.\n\nIt is likewise a demand of the reason that one should prevent the\ncreatures from sinning against one another in any way. Murder is\nprohibited because it would lead to the destruction of the race and the\nconsequent frustration of God's purpose in creating the world.\nPromiscuous association of the sexes is prohibited in order that man may\nbe different from the lower animals, and shall know his father and other\nrelatives that he may show them honor and kindness. Universal stealing\nwould lead to indolence, and in the end would destroy itself when there\nis nothing more to steal. In a similar way we can explain all laws\nrelating to social dealings among mankind.\n\nThe second group of laws has reference to acts which are inherently\nneither right nor wrong, but are made so by the act of God's commandment\nor prohibition. This class may be called _Traditional_ in contrast to\nthe first, which we shall name _Rational_.\n\nThe traditional laws are imposed upon us primarily so that we may be\nrewarded for obeying them. At the same time we shall find on careful\nexamination of these laws that they also have a rational signification,\nand are not purely arbitrary. Thus the purpose of sanctifying certain\ndays of the year, like Sabbaths and holy days, is that by resting from\nlabor we may devote ourselves to prayer, to the acquisition of wisdom,\nand to converse with our fellows in the interest of religion. Laws of\nceremonial purity have for their purpose to teach man humility, and to\nmake prayer and the visitation of holy places more precious in his eyes\nafter having been debarred from his privileges during the period of his\nuncleanness.\n\nIt is clear that we should not know how to perform the traditional\ncommandments without divine revelation since our own reason would not\nhave suggested them. But even in the case of the rational laws the\ngeneral principles alone are known to us from our own reason but not the\ndetails. We know in general that theft, unchastity, and so on, are\nwrong, but the details of these matters would lead to disagreement among\nmankind, and hence it was necessary that the rational laws also be\ndirectly communicated to us by divine messengers.\n\nThe divine messengers are the prophets.[69] They knew that their\nrevelations came from God through a sign which appeared at the beginning\nof the communication and lasted to the end. The sign was a pillar of\ncloud or of fire, or an extraordinary bright light, as we learn in the\ncase of Moses.\n\nThe genuineness of a prophet's message is tested first of all by the\nnature of the content, and then by his ability to perform miracles. The\nIsraelites would not have believed Moses, notwithstanding his miracles,\nif he had commanded them to commit murder or adultery. It is because his\nteaching was found acceptable to the reason that the miracles\naccompanying it were regarded as a confirmation of Moses's divine\nmission.\n\nThe Jewish Law[70] contains three elements, all of which are necessary\nfor effective teaching. First, the commandments and prohibitions, or the\nlaws proper; second, the reward and punishment consequent upon obedience\nand disobedience; and third, examples of historical characters in which\nthe laws and their consequences are illustrated.\n\nBut the written law would not accomplish its purpose without belief in\ntradition. This is fundamental, for without it no individual or society\ncan exist. No one can live by what he perceives with his own senses\nalone. He must depend upon the information he receives from others. And\nwhile this information is liable to error either by reason of the\ninformant being mistaken or his possible purpose to deceive, these two\npossibilities are eliminated in case the tradition is vouched for not by\nan individual, but by a whole nation, as in the case of the Jewish\nrevelation.\n\nAs Saadia's emphasis on tradition, apart from its intrinsic importance\nfor Judaism, has its additional motive in refuting Karaism, so the\nfollowing discussion against the possibility of the Law being abrogated\nis directed no doubt against the claims of the two sister religions,\nChristianity and Mohammedanism.[71]\n\nAbrogation of the law, Saadia says, is impossible. For in the first\nplace tradition has unanimously held to this view, and in the second\nplace the Law itself assures us of its permanent validity, \"Moses\ncommanded us a law, an inheritance for the assembly of Jacob\" (Deut. 33,\n4). The law constitutes the national existence of our people; hence as\nwe are assured by the Prophets that the Jewish nation is eternal, the\nLaw must be likewise. We must not even accept the evidence of miracles\nin favor of a new law abrogating the old. For as we saw before, it was\nnot primarily Moses's miracles that served to authenticate his teaching,\nbut the character of the teaching itself. Now that the law of Moses\nstood the test of internal acceptability and external confirmation by\nthe performance of miracles, its declaration of permanent validity\ncannot be upset by any new evidence even if it be miraculous.\n\nMan[72] alone of all created things was given commandments and\nprohibitions, because he is superior to all other creatures by reason of\nthe rational faculty which he possesses, and the world was created for\nhim. Man's body is small, but his mind is great and comprehensive. His\nlife is short, but it was given him to assist him to the eternal life\nafter death. The diseases and other dangers to which he is subject are\nintended to keep him humble and God-fearing. The appetites and passions\nhave their uses in the maintenance of the individual and the race.\n\nIf it is true that God gave man commandments and that he rewards and\npunishes him according to his conduct, it follows that unless we\nattribute injustice to God he must have given man the power to do and to\nrefrain in the matters which form the subject of the commandments. This\nis actually the case and can be proven in many ways. Everyone is\nconscious of freedom in his actions, and is not aware of any force\npreventing him in his voluntary acts. The Bible testifies to this when\nit says (Deut. 30, 19), \"I have set before you life and death ...\ntherefore choose thou life,\" or (Malachi 1, 9), \"From your hand has this\nthing come.\" Tradition is equally explicit in the statement of the\nRabbis (Berakot 33b), \"Everything is in the hands of God except the fear\nof God.\" To be sure God is omniscient and knows how a given individual\nwill act in a given case, but this does not take away from the freedom\nof the individual to determine his own conduct. For God's knowledge is\nnot the _cause_ of a man's act, or in general of a thing's being. If\nthat were so, all things would be eternal since God knows all things\nfrom eternity. God simply knows that man will choose of his own free\nwill to do certain things. Man as a matter of fact never acts contrary\nto God's knowledge, but this is not because God's knowledge determines\nhis act, but only because God knows the final outcome of a man's free\ndeliberation.\n\nSince it is now clear from every point of view that God does not\ninterfere with a man's freedom of action, any passages in the Bible\nwhich seem to indicate the contrary are not properly understood, and\nmust needs be interpreted in accordance with the evidence we have\nadduced from various sources including the Bible itself. Thus when God\nsays (Exod. 7, 3) \"I will harden the heart of Pharaoh,\" it does not\nmean, as many think, that God forced Pharaoh to refuse to let Israel go.\nThe meaning rather is that he gave Pharaoh strength to withstand the\nplagues without succumbing to them, as many of the Egyptians did. The\nsame method should be followed with all the other expressions in the\nBible which appear to teach determinism.\n\nA man's conduct has an influence upon the soul, making it pure or impure\nas the case may be.[73] Though man cannot see this effect, since the\nsoul is an intellectual substance, God knows it. He also keeps a record\nof our deeds, and deals out reward and punishment in the world to come.\nThis time will not come until he has created the number of souls which\nhis wisdom dictates. At the same time there are also rewards and\npunishments in this world as an earnest of what is to come in the\nhereafter.\n\nA man is called righteous or wicked according as his good or bad deeds\npredominate. And the recompense in the next world is given for this\npredominating element in his character. A righteous man is punished for\nhis few bad deeds in this world, and rewarded for his many good deeds in\nthe world to come. Similarly the wicked man is paid for his good deeds\nin this world, while the punishment for his wickedness is reserved. This\nanswers the old problem of the prosperity of the wicked and the misery\nof the righteous in this world.\n\nThere are also sufferings of the righteous which are not in the nature\nof punishment for past conduct, but in view of the future so as to\nincrease their reward in the world to come for the trials they endured\nwithout murmuring. The sufferings of little children come under this\nhead.\n\nOn the other hand, a sinner is sometimes well treated and his life\nprolonged for one of the following reasons: To give him time to repent,\nas in the case of Manasseh; that he may beget a righteous son, like\nAhaz, the father of Hezekiah; to use him as God's tool to punish others\nmore wicked than he--witness the r\u00f4le of Assyria as Isaiah describes it\nin chapter ten of his prophecies; for the sake of the righteous who is\nclosely related to him, as Lot was saved for the sake of Abraham; or in\norder to make the punishment more severe later, as in the case of\nPharaoh.\n\nThat there is another world after this one in which man is rewarded and\npunished can be proved from reason, from Scripture and from\ntradition.[74] It is not likely from what we know of God's wisdom and\ngoodness that the measure of happiness intended for the soul is what it\ngets in this world. For every good here is mixed with evil, the latter\neven predominating. No one is really content and at peace in this world\neven if he has reached the top of the ladder of prosperity and honor.\nThere must be a reason for this, which is that the soul has an\nintuitional longing for the other world which is destined for it. There\nare many things from which the soul is bidden to abstain, such as theft,\nadultery, and so on, which it desires, and abstention from which causes\nit pain. Surely there must be reward awaiting the soul for this\nsuffering. Often the soul suffers hatred, persecution and even death for\npursuing justice as she is bidden to do. Surely she will be rewarded.\nEven when a person is punished with death for a crime committed in this\nworld, the same death is inflicted for one crime as for ten crimes.\nHence there must be another world where all inequalities are adjusted.\n\nIt is also evident that the men of the Bible believed in a hereafter.\nElse why should Isaac have consented to be sacrificed, or why should God\nhave expected it? The same applies to Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah,\nwho preferred to be thrown into the fiery furnace rather than fall down\nin worship before the golden image of Nebuchadnezzar; and to Daniel who\nwas thrown into the den of lions for disobeying the order of the king\nand praying to God. They would not have done this if they did not\nbelieve in another world, where they would be rewarded for their\nsufferings in this one.\n\nTradition and the Rabbinical literature are filled with reference to a\nfuture world. We need mention only one or two. In the Ethics of the\nFathers (ch. 4) we read that this world is like the vestibule to the\nother world. Another statement in the Talmudic treatise Berakot (p. 17a)\nreads that \"in the world to come there is no eating and drinking, nor\ngiving in marriage, nor buying and selling, but the righteous sit with\ntheir crowns on their heads and enjoy the splendor of the Shekinah.\"\n\nWith regard to the condition of the soul after death and the nature of\nreward and punishment in the next world, there is a variety of opinions.\nThose who hold that the soul is corporeal or that it is an accident of\nthe body believe it is destroyed with the death of the body. We have\nalready refuted their opinion. Others, like the Platonists, the Dualists\nand the Pantheists, who believe in the pre-existence of the soul either\nas a separate entity or as a part of God, hold that after the death of\nthe body the soul returns to its original condition. Our belief as\nstated above (p. 37) is opposed to this. But there are some calling\nthemselves Jews who believe in metempsychosis, that the soul migrates\nfrom one person to another and even from man to beast, and that in this\nway it is punished for its sins and purged. They see a confirmation of\ntheir view in the fact that some persons exhibit qualities which are\ncharacteristic of lower animals. But this is absurd. The soul and the\nbody form a natural unit, the one being adapted to the other. A human\nbody cannot unite with the soul of an animal, nor an animal body with a\nhuman soul. They try to account by their theory for the suffering of\nlittle children, who could not have sinned in their own person. But we\nhave already explained that the suffering of children is not in the\nnature of punishment, but with a view to subsequent reward, and they\nmust admit that the first placing of the soul in the body and giving it\ncommandments is not in the nature of compensation for any past merit,\nbut with a view to later reward. Why not then explain the suffering of\nchildren in the same way?[75]\n\nAs the body and the soul form a natural unit during life and a man's\nconduct is the combined effort of the two constituent parts of his\nbeing, it stands to reason that future reward and punishment should be\nimposed upon body and soul in combination. Hence the doctrine of the\nresurrection of the body, which is alluded to in the Bible and made\ninto a religious dogma by the Rabbis, has support also in the\nreason.[76] Many objections have been advanced against it, but they can\nbe easily answered. The strongest objection might seem to be that which\nattempts to show that resurrection is a logical contradiction. The\nargument is that the elements making up a given body during life find\ntheir way after the death of the person into the body of another, to\nwhich they are assimilated and of which they form a part. Hence it is\nimpossible to resurrect two bodies out of the material common to both.\nBut this argument is untrue to fact. Every human body has its own\nmatter, which never enters into the composition of any other body. When\nthe person dies and the body decomposes, each element returns to its\nplace in nature, where it is kept until the resurrection.\n\nBut there is another event which will happen to Israel before the time\nof the resurrection. In accordance with the promises of the Prophets we\nbelieve that Israel will be delivered from exile by the Messiah.[77]\nReason also supports this belief, for God is righteous, and since he has\nplaced us in exile partly as a punishment for wrongdoing, partly for the\npurpose of trying us, there must be a limit to both.\n\nMessiah the son of David will come, will deliver Jerusalem from the\nenemy and settle there with his people. When all the believing\nIsraelites have been gathered from all the nations to the land of\nPalestine, then will come the resurrection. The Temple will be rebuilt,\nthe light of the Shekinah will rest upon it, and the spirit of prophecy\nwill be vouchsafed to all Israel, young and old, master and servant.\nThis blessed period will last until the end of time, _i. e._, until this\nworld will give place to the next, which is the place of reward and\npunishment.\n\nWe describe the future habitation and status of the soul as Garden of\nEden (Paradise) and Gehenna.[78] The former expression is intended to\nsuggest happiness, there being nothing pleasanter in the world than a\ngarden. The term Gehenna is associated in the Bible with Tofteh, which\nwas a place of impurity not far from the Temple. In reality, however,\nGod will create a substance which will combine light and heat in such a\nway that the righteous will enjoy the light only, while the wicked will\nbe tortured by the heat. All this Saadia infers from Biblical passages.\n\nThere will be no eating and drinking in the next world, and hence no\nneed of a heaven and an earth like ours, but there will be place and\ntime, since creatures cannot do without it. There will be no succession\nof day and night, for these are of use only for our present life and\noccupations, but will be unnecessary there. There will, however, be a\nspecial period for worship.\n\nReward and punishment in the next world will both be eternal. It stands\nto reason that God should _promise_ eternal reward and punishment so as\nto inspire mankind with the highest possible degree of hope and fear,\nthat they may have no excuse for not heeding the commandments so\nforcibly impressed upon them. Having made the promise, his justice\nprompts him to fulfil it, and those who suffer have themselves to blame.\n\nWe have now completed in outline Saadia's system of Judaism. There are\nmany details which we necessarily had to leave out, especially in the\nmore dogmatic part of his work, that dealing with specific Jewish\ndoctrines, which he constructs on the basis of Rabbinical literature and\nBiblical allusions interpreted so as to harmonize with the statements of\nthe Rabbis. Many questions specifically theological and eschatological\nassumed importance in his mind by reason of his surroundings. I mean the\nMohammedan schools and sects, and the Karaite discussions which were\nclosely modelled after them. The most important part of his system\nphilosophically is that which deals with creation and the attributes of\nGod. His discussions of the soul and of free will are less thorough, and\nthe details of his doctrines of resurrection, future reward and\npunishment, the redemption of Israel and the Messiah are almost purely\ndogmatic. For a scientific ethic there is no room at all in the body of\nhis work. A man's conduct is prescribed for him in the divine\ncommandments, though in a general way the reason sees the right and the\nwrong of the so-called rational group of laws. Still as an after thought\nSaadia added a chapter to the \"Emunot ve-Deot\" in which he attempts to\ngive a psychological basis for human conduct. Noting the various\ntendencies of individuals and sects in his environment to extremes in\nhuman behavior, some to asceticism, some to self-indulgence, be it the\nlust of love or of power, he lays emphasis on the inadequacy of any one\npursuit for the demands of man's complex nature, and recommends a\nharmonious blending of all things for which men strive.[79]\n\nGod alone, he says, is a real unity, everything else is by the very\nreason of its being a creature essentially not one and simple, but\ncomposite and complex. So man has a love and desire for many things, and\nalso aversion for many things. And as in other objects in nature it\ntakes a combination of several elements to constitute a given thing, so\nin man it is by a proper systematization of his likes and dislikes that\nhe can reach perfection of character and morals. It cannot be that God\nintended man to pursue one object all his life to the exclusion of all\nothers, for in that case he would have implanted only one desire in man\ninstead of many. You cannot build a house of stones alone neither can\nyou develop a perfect character by one pursuit and one interest.\n\nPursuit of one thing is likely to result in harm, for example,\nover-indulgence in eating brings on disease. Wisdom is therefore needed\nin regulating one's conduct. The principle here is control of one's\nlikes and dislikes. Of the three faculties of the soul, reason, spirit\nand desire, reason must be the master of the other two. If any matter\noccurs to a person's imagination, he must try it with his reason to see\nwhether it is likely to benefit or injure him, and pursue or avoid it\naccordingly. If, on the other hand, he allows the lower parts of his\nsoul to rule his reason, he is not a moral man.\n\nThe reader will recognize Plato in the last statement. The division of\nthe soul into the three faculties of reason, spirit and desire is\nPlatonic, as we have already seen, and the attempt to base an ethic on\nthe proper relation between the powers of the soul also goes back to\nPlato. But Saadia tries to show that the Bible too favors this\nconception.\n\nWhen Ecclesiastes tells us (1, 14), \"I have seen all the works that are\ndone under the sun; and, behold, all is vanity and a striving after\nwind,\" he does not mean that there is nothing worth striving after, for\nhe would then be condemning the objects of God's creation. His meaning\nis that it is vain to pursue any one thing to the exclusion of every\nother. He then proceeds to name three prominent objects of pursuit,\nwisdom, pleasure and worldly gain--all is vain when taken by itself. A\nproper combination of all is to be recommended as is delicately hinted\nin the same book (2, 3), \"I searched in mine heart how to cheer my flesh\nwith wine, mine heart yet guiding me with wisdom, and how to lay hold on\nfolly.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nJOSEPH AL-BASIR AND JESHUA BEN JUDAH\n\n\nI. _Joseph Al-Basir (11th century)_[80]\n\nJoseph ben Abraham, euphemistically surnamed on account of his\nblindness, al-Basir (the seer), was a Karaite and lived in Babylonia or\nPersia in the beginning of the eleventh century. His philosophical work\nis closely modelled on the writings of the Arabian Mutakallimun, the\nMu`tazilites. Unlike Saadia, who tacitly accepts some of their methods\nand views, al-Basir is an avowed follower of the Kalam and treats only\nof those questions which are common to Jew and Mohammedan, avoiding, for\nexample, so important an issue as whether it is possible that the law of\nGod may be abrogated--a question which meant so much to Saadia. The\ndivision of his investigation into the two parts, Unity and Justice, is\na serious matter with him; and he finds it necessary to tell us in\nseveral instances why he chose to treat a given topic under the one or\nthe other heading. In spirit and temperament he is a thoroughgoing\nrationalist. Brief and succinct to the point of obscurity, he betrays\nneither partiality nor emotion, but fearlessly pushes the argument to\nits last conclusion and reduces it to its lowest terms.\n\nSaadia (above p. 28) puts revelation as a fourth source of truth\nparallel to sense, judgment and logical inference. To be sure he, in one\ninstance (p. 35), speaks of the reason as preceding the Bible even as\ntradition follows it, but this is only a passing observation, and is\nproperly corrected by the view expressed elsewhere (p. 28) that while a\nJew is not forbidden to speculate, he must not set the Bible aside and\nadopt opinions as they occur to him. Al-Basir does not leave the matter\nin this unsettled condition. He definitely gives priority--logical\npriority, to reason. Knowledge, he says, must precede revelation. The\nprophet as the messenger of God cannot be believed on his word, for the\nopponent may have the same claim. Not only must the prophet\nauthenticate his mission by the performance of a miracle which cannot be\nexplained by natural means, but we must know besides that he who sent\nhim has our good at heart and would not deceive us. A knowledge of the\nexistence, power and wisdom of the creator must therefore precede our\nbelief in the prophet's mission. To take these truths from the words of\nthe prophet and then give him credence because God sent him would be\nreasoning in a circle. The minimum of knowledge therefore which is\nindispensable before we can make any appeal to the words of the prophet\nis rational proof of the existence, power and wisdom of God. Having this\nminimum the person who is not practiced in speculative investigation may\nrely for the rest of the creed, for example, the unity of God and his\nother attributes, upon the words of the Bible. For if we know\nindependently that God is Omnipotent and Omniscient, and the prophet can\nsubstantiate his claim to be a divine messenger by the performance of\ngenuine miracles, his reliability is established and we are safe in\naccepting all that he has to say without proof; but the fundamental\nthing to do is to establish the prophet's reliability, and for this an\nindependent source of evidence is necessary. This is the reason.\n\nOur problem therefore is to prove the power and wisdom of God, which\nwill imply his existence. We cannot do this directly, for we cannot see\nGod. Hence the only method is to prove the existence of a powerful and\nwise creator through his creation. We must prove his power in doing\nthings which we cannot do, such as the ability to create our bodies. But\nfor this it is necessary to show that our bodies--and the same will\napply to the other bodies of the world, and hence to the world as a\nwhole--were created, _i. e._, that there was a time when they were not.\nThis leads us to an analysis of the constituents of body. All bodies\nconsist of atoms and their \"accidents,\" or conditions and qualities. The\nprimary accidents, which are presupposed by all the rest, are the\nfollowing four, combination, separation, motion and rest. Without these\nno body can exist, for body is the result of a combination and\nseparation of atoms at rest or in motion. But combination and separation\nare the acts of a combiner and separater, as we can infer from the\nanalogy of our own acts. Our acts have ourselves as their creators,\nhence the acts visible in the combinations and separations of atoms to\nform bodies must also have their creator.\n\nThe attributes of the creator we infer from the nature of his work. So\nwe call God \"Powerful,\" meaning that he had the power to create the\nworld. As creation denotes power, so the success and harmony of the\nproduct argues wisdom; and this power and wisdom thus established are\nnot disproved by an occasional production or event which is not perfect,\na monstrosity for example, or disease and suffering. We say in reference\nto these that God must have a deeper object in view, to inspire mankind\nwith the fear of God, and in order to increase their reward in the next\nworld.\n\nThe attribute of Life follows from the other two, for life denotes the\npossession or capacity of power and knowledge.\n\nThus al-Basir has the same three essential attributes as Saadia. His\nproof of the existence of God is also identical with one of the proofs\nof Saadia. But he shows himself a more loyal follower of the Kalam by\nfrankly adopting the atomic theory, whereas Saadia opposes it (p. 25).\n\nOther predicates of God are perception, will, unity, incorporeality and\neternity.\n\nPerception is one of the most important expressions of life, but it must\nnot be confused with knowledge or wisdom. The latter embraces the\nnon-existent as well as the existent, the former the existent only. It\nis in virtue of the former attribute that we speak of God as \"hearing\"\nand \"seeing.\"\n\n\"Willing\" is another attribute of God, and those are wrong who identify\nGod's will with his knowledge, and define God's willing to mean that his\nworks take place in accordance with his knowledge. God's will must be a\nspecial attribute since we see in creation traces of free will. To be\nthe will of God it must not reside in anything different from God, and\nyet it cannot inhere in God as the subject, for only body is capable of\nbeing the subject of accidents. The only solution, therefore, is that\nGod exercises his voluntary activity through a will which he creates, a\nwill not residing in any subject.\n\nThis discussion of the nature of God's will seems a case of hair\nsplitting with a vengeance, and al-Basir is not the author of it. As in\nhis other doctrines so in this also he is a faithful follower of the\nMu`tazila, and we shall see more of this method in his discussion of the\nunity of God despite the plurality of his attributes.\n\nBut we shall first take up the attributes of incorporeality and\neternity, which can be dismissed in a few words.\n\nGod is eternal because the only other alternative is that he is created.\nBut if so there is a creator, and if the latter is again created, he\nmust likewise have a creator, and so we are led to infinity, which\ncannot be, the infinite regress being in all cases an impossibility\naccording to an axiom of the Kalam. We must, therefore, have an eternal\ncreator somewhere, and he is God.\n\nFrom God's eternity follows his incorporeality, for we have shown before\nthat all body is created, since it presupposes combination and\nseparation, and the latter a combiner and separater.\n\nWhen we speak of the unity of God we mean first that there is no second\nGod, and then that his own essence has no composition or plurality in\nit. Two Gods is an absurdity, for the one might desire what the other\ndoes not, and he whose will predominates is the real God. It is no\nobjection to say that in their wisdom they would never disagree, because\nthe _possibility_ is there, and this makes the above argument valid.\nAgain, if there were two Gods they would have to be completely alike in\ntheir essential attributes, and as space cannot hold them apart, since\nthey are not bodies, what is there to constitute them two?\n\nThe other problem, of God's simplicity, is more difficult. Does not the\nmultiplicity of attributes make God's essence multiple and composite?\nThe form which this question took was this. Shall we say that God is\nomnipotent through Power, omniscient through Knowledge, and so on? If\nso, this Power, Knowledge, etc., are created or eternal. If the Power,\nsay, is created, then God must have had power in order to create it,\nhence was powerful not through Power. If the Power is eternal, we have\nmore than one God, and \"Power\" as an eternal would also be Wise and\nLiving, etc.; Wisdom would also be powerful, living, etc., and so on\nwith the other attributes, a doctrine closely bordering on Christianity\nand reminding one of Augustine. The principle of monotheism could not\nallow such a conception as this. If Power is neither created nor\neternal, it follows that God is omnipotent not through Power as an\nexternal cause or a distinct entity, but through his own essence. The\nattributes Power, Wisdom, Life, are not anything distinguishable from\neach other and from God's essence. They are modes or conditions of\nGod's essence, and are known along with it.\n\nThe same considerations which prompted us to conceive God as one and\nsimple, make impossible the belief in the eternity of God's word. This\nwas a point much discussed in the Mohammedan schools, and was evidently\ndirected against Christianity, where the Word or Logos was identified\nwith the second person in the Trinity. Eternity, Al-Basir says, is\nincompatible with the idea and purpose of speech. God speaks with a word\nwhich he creates. This adds no new predicate to God, but is implied in\nhis Power. The attribute omnipotent implies that when he wills he can\nmake himself understood by us as we do through speech.\n\nWe notice that Al-Basir is more elaborate in his discussion of the\nattributes than Saadia, and like Al-Mukammas he makes use of the formul\u00e6\nof the Kalam, \"omnipotent not with Power, omniscient not with Wisdom.\"\nSaadia does not follow the Kalam so closely, but is just as emphatic in\nhis endeavor to show that the three essential attributes are only\nverbally three; conceptually and really they are one.\n\nThe doctrine of the attributes brings to a close the section on unity,\nand the second division of the investigation is entitled Justice and\nFairness. The main problems here are the nature of good and evil and the\nrelation of God to them, the question of free will and other subordinate\ntopics, theological and eschatological.\n\nWith regard to the first question two extreme positions are possible,\nwhich were actually held by Mohammedan schools of Al-Basir's day. One is\nthat nothing is good or bad in itself, our reason not recognizing it as\nsuch; that the divine command or prohibition makes the thing good or\nbad. Hence, the representatives of this opinion say, God, who stands\nabove his commands and prohibitions, is not bound by them. Good and bad\nhold for the subject, not for the author. The acts of God do not come\nwithin the classification, and hence it is possible that God may do what\nwe regard as injustice. Some, in their endeavor to be consistent and to\ncarry the argument to its last conclusion, did not even shrink from the\n_reductio ad absurdum_ that it is possible God may lie; for, said they,\nif I promise a boy sweetmeats and fail to keep my promise, it is no\nworse than if I beat him.\n\nFor this school there is no problem of evil, because ethical\ndistinctions do not apply to God's doings. Whatever God does is good.\nThe other school came under the influence of Greek thought and\nidentified the idea of God with the idea of the Good. They maintained\nthat from the nature of God's essence it was not only his duty to do the\ngood, but that it was impossible for him to do anything else. Doing good\nis a necessity of his nature, and our good and evil are also his good\nand evil. Ethical values are absolute and not relative.\n\nNeither of these radical views can be maintained. The first is refuted\nby its own consequences which only very few of its advocates were bold\nenough to adopt. The possibility of God telling a falsehood, which is\nimplied in the purely human validity of good and evil, is subversive of\nall religion. God would then cease to be trustworthy, and there would be\nno reason for giving him obedience. Besides, if revelation alone\ndetermines right and wrong, it would follow that if God chose to reverse\nhis orders, our moral judgments would be turned the other way around,\ngood would be evil, and evil good. Finally, if good and bad are\ndetermined by the will of God only, those who do not believe in\nrevelation would be without an idea of right and wrong, but this is\nmanifestly not true.\n\nBut the other opinion, that God is compelled by the necessity of his\nnature to do the good, is also erroneous. In the first place it detracts\nfrom God's omnipotence to say he cannot do wrong. Besides, if he is\ncompelled by an inner necessity to do the good, he must always have done\nthis, and the world would have existed from eternity. It is just as\nwrong to say that it is the duty of God to do what is good and useful\nfor man. For this is due to a confusion of the good or generous with the\nobligatory. Any deed to which no blame attaches may be called good. If\nno praise attaches to it either, it is indifferent. If it is deserving\nof praise and its omission does not call forth blame, it is a generous\nact. A duty is an act the omission of which deserves blame.\n\nNow the truth in the question under discussion is midway between the two\nextremes. God is able to do good as well as evil, and is under no\nnecessity. The notions of right and wrong are absolute and not merely\nrelative. God never does wrong because evil has no attractive power _per\nse_. Wrong is committed always as a means to an end, namely, to gain an\nadvantage or avoid an injury. God is not dependent upon anything; he\nneeds no advantages and fears no injuries. Hence there is nothing to\nprompt him to do wrong. The good on the other hand attracts us by its\ninherent goodness, not for an ulterior end. If the good were done only\nfor the sake of deriving some benefit external to the good itself, God,\nwho is self-sufficient, would not do anything either good or evil. God\ndoes the good always and not the bad, because in his wisdom he sees the\ndifference between them. It was a deed of generosity in God to have\ncreated the world and given life to his creatures, but it was not a\nduty.\n\nThis conception of the nature of good and evil leaves on our hands the\nproblem of evil. Why does a good God permit disease and suffering to\nexist in the world? In particular, how explain the suffering and death\nof innocent children and harmless animals?\n\nThe answer of Al-Basir is that infliction of pain may under certain\ncircumstances be a good instead of an evil. In human relations a person\nis permitted to inflict pain on another in self-defence, or to prevent\nthe pain from becoming worse, as, for example, when a finger is\namputated to save the hand. The infliction of pain is not only\npermitted, it becomes a duty in case of retribution, as in a court of\njustice; and finally it is permitted to inflict temporary pain if it\nwill result in a greater advantage in the future. The last two cases\napply also to God's treatment of his creatures. Disease and suffering\nare either punishment for offences committed, or are imposed with a view\nto later reward. In the case of children the last explanation alone is\napplicable. They will be rewarded in the next world. At the same time\nthe parents are admonished to repentance and good conduct.\n\nThe most difficult question of the section on justice is that of free\nwill and foreknowledge. Is man master of his actions? If so, how can we\nreconcile this with God's omniscience, who knows beforehand how the\nperson will act at a given moment? Is man free to decide at the last\nmoment in a manner contrary to God's knowledge? If so, we defend freedom\nat the expense of God's omniscience. If man is bound to act as God\nforeknew he would act, divine knowledge is saved, man's freedom lost.\nAl-Basir has no doubt man is free. Our own consciousness testifies to\nthis. When we cut off our finger bitten by a snake, we know that we\nourselves did it for a purpose, and distinguish it from a case of our\nfinger being cut off by order of an official, before whom we have been\naccused or maligned. One and the same act can have only one author and\nnot two, and we know that we are the authors of our acts. There is a\nmuch closer connection between an agent and his act than between a\nknower and his knowledge, which may be the common property of many, and\nno one doubts that a man's knowledge is his own.\n\nThe dilemma above mentioned with its two horns, of which one denies\nGod's knowledge, the other man's freedom, is puzzling enough, to be\nsure. But we are not bound to answer it since it is purely hypothetical.\nWe do not know of a real instance in which a man's decision tended to be\ncontrary to God's foreknowledge of its outcome. Just as we should refuse\nto answer the question whether an actual case of injustice on the part\nof God would prove his ignorance or dependence, because we know through\nirrefutable proofs that God is wise and without need; so here we say man\nhas freedom though God knows he will act thus and so, and refuse to say\nwhether in case the unbeliever turned believer it would prove God's\nignorance or change in his knowledge.\n\nGod's creation was a pure act of grace. But once having done this and\ncommunicated to us a knowledge of himself and his will, it is now his\nduty to guide us in the right path, by sending us his prophets. The\ncommandments and prohibitions must never be contrary to the knowledge of\nreason. We must see in the commandments means of guidance, in the\nprohibitions a protection against destructive influences. If they had\nnot this rational basis, we do not see why God should have imposed them\nupon us.\n\nHaving given us reason to know his being, and having announced his truth\nthrough the prophets, it is his duty to reward those who knew him and\nwere obedient, eternally in the next world, and to punish eternally the\nunbeliever. If one has merits and sins, they are balanced against each\nother. If the sinner repents of his evil deeds, it is the duty of God to\naccept his repentance and remit his punishment.\n\n\n2. _Jeshua ben Judah_[81]\n\nJeshua ben Judah or, as he is known by his Arabic name, Abu al-Faraj\nFurkan ibn Asad, was likewise a Karaite, a pupil of Joseph Al-Basir,\nand flourished in Palestine in the second half of the eleventh century.\nHis point of view is essentially the same as that of his teacher,\nAl-Basir. He is also a follower of the Mu`tazilite Kalam and as strong a\nrationalist as his master. He agrees with Al-Basir that we cannot get\ncertain knowledge of the creation of the world and the existence of God\nfrom the Bible. This information must come originally from rational\nspeculation. It should then be applied to the miracles of the prophets\nso as to prove the authenticity of their mission and the truth of their\nannouncements.\n\nHe adopts the atomic theory, though he is opposed to the view that atoms\nare created ever anew by God from moment to moment, and that there is no\nnatural and necessary sequence or continuity in the phenomena of the\nworld or qualities of bodies, all being due to habit, and custom induced\nin us by God's uninterrupted creations. As in his philosophical\ndiscussions he is a follower of the Kalam, so in his legalistic works he\nis indebted to the Mohammedan schools of religious law.\n\nLike Al-Basir, Jeshua ben Judah regards as the corner stone of his\nreligious philosophy the proof that the world was created, _i. e._, that\nit is not eternal. His arguments are in essence the same, though\ndifferently formulated. In their simplest form they are somewhat as\nfollows. The world and its bodies consist of atoms and their accidents.\nTaking a given atom for the sake of argument we know that it is\nimmaterial to it, so far as its own essence is concerned, whether it\noccupy one place or another. As a fact, however, it does occupy a\ndefinite place at a given moment. This must be due to a cause. And as\nthe atom in question in the course of time changes its place, this shows\nthat the cause which kept it in the former place has disappeared and\ngiven way to a new cause, and so on. In other words, the successive\ncauses which determine the positions and motions of the atoms are not\npermanent, hence not eternal but created. The necessary inference is\nthat the atoms or the bodies, which cannot exist without these created\ncauses (else they could not occupy one place rather than another), must\nalso be created.\n\nAnother form of the argument for creation is this. The eternal has no\ncause. It exists by virtue of its own essence, and is not dependent on\nanything else. If now the atoms were eternal, they would have to persist\nin the same condition all the time; for any change would imply a cause\nupon which the atom is dependent, and this is fatal to its eternity. But\nthe atoms do constantly change their condition and place. Hence they are\ncreated.\n\nIf the things of the world are created, someone must have created them.\nThis is clear. But there may be room for the supposition that this\ncreative agency is a \"_cause_,\" _i. e._, an impersonal entity, which by\nnecessity produces other things from itself. Hence we must hasten to say\nthat this conception of the Creator is impossible because incompatible\nwith our results so far. A necessarily producing cause cannot be without\ncreating, hence an eternal cause implies an eternal effect--which\ncontradicts our idea of a created world proved above. We say, therefore,\nthat the Creator is not a \"cause\" but an \"agent,\" _i. e._, one acting\nwith will and choice.\n\nGod is incorporeal because body consists of atoms, and atoms, we have\nshown, are created. Besides, if he were corporeal, he could not create\nbodies any more than we can. He would furthermore be limited to a\ndefinite place, and the same arguments cited above to prove that atoms\nare dependent on a cause would apply to him. Finally we as corporeal\nbeings cannot exert an influence on objects except by coming in contact\nwith them. God causes the seed to grow without being in contact with it.\nHence he is not body, and the scriptural passages apparently teaching\nthe contrary must be explained otherwise.\n\nJeshua ben Judah likewise agrees with Al-Basir in regarding the nature\nof good and evil as absolute, not relative. Like his master he opposes\nthose who make God's command and prohibition the sole creators of good\nand evil respectively, as on the other hand he refuses to agree with the\nview that God is bound by necessity to do the good. Our reason\ndistinguishes between good and evil as our senses between white and\nblack.\n\nAmong other arguments in favor of the absolute character of right and\nwrong, which we have already found in Al-Basir, appears the following.\nIf good and evil mean simply that which God commands and prohibits\nrespectively, and the distinction holds only for us but not for God, it\nfollows that God may do what we think is evil. If this be so, we have no\nground for believing in the good faith of the prophet--God might have\nsent him to deceive us--and the alleged basis of right and wrong is\nremoved.\n\nWe conclude therefore that good and evil are absolute and are binding\nupon God as well. God can do evil as well as good, but being omnipotent\nhe can accomplish his purpose just as easily by doing good as by doing\nevil, and hence surely prefers to do good. Besides, all evil doing is\nthe result of some need, but God has no needs, being self-sufficient,\nhence he does not do evil.\n\nIt follows from the above that God had a purpose in creating the world.\nFor an act without a purpose is vain and hence bad. This purpose cannot\nhave been egoistic, since God is without need, being above pleasure and\npain. The purpose must therefore have been the well-being of his\ncreatures.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nSOLOMON IBN GABIROL\n\n\nWith Gabirol the scene of Jewish intellectual activity changes from the\neast to the west. Prior to the middle of the tenth century the centre of\nJewish learning was in Babylonia. The succession of Geonim in the\nTalmudical schools of Sura and Pumbadita, and particularly the great\nfame of Saadia, made all the other Jewish communities of the world look\nto Babylonia as the spiritual centre. They considered it a privilege to\ncontribute to the support of the great eastern academies and appealed to\ntheir spiritual heads in cases of doubt in religious matters. Some of\nthis glory was reflected also upon the neighboring countries under\nMohammedan domination, Palestine, Egypt, and Kairuan or northern Africa\nto the west of Egypt. Thus all the men, Rabbanites as well as Karaites,\nwhom we treated so far lived and flourished in the east in one of the\nfour countries mentioned. Christian Europe was intellectually on a low\nlevel, and as far as scientific studies were concerned, the Jews under\nChristian rule were no better than their temporal rulers.\n\nBut a new era dawned for Jewish literature with the accession to power\nof the Umayyad caliph Abd al Rahman III, as head of Mohammedan Spain or\nAndalusia. He was a liberal man and a patron of learning. Hasdai ibn\nShaprut, a cultured and high-minded Jew, was his trusted adviser, and\nlike his royal patron he protected and encouraged Jewish learning,\nTalmudical as well as scientific. When Moses ben Enoch, a learned\nemissary from the Babylonian Academy, was ransomed by the Jewish\ncommunity of Cordova and made the head of a Talmudical school in that\ncity, the beginning of the end of Babylonian Jewish supremacy was at\nhand. Moses ben Enoch the Talmudist, Menahem ben Saruk, the grammarian\nand lexicographer, and Dunash ben Labrat, the poet--all three under the\ndistinguished patronage of Hasdai ibn Shaprut--inaugurated the long line\nof Spanish Jewish worthies, which continued almost five centuries,\nconstituting the golden era of Jewish literature and making of Spain\nthe intellectual centre of all Jewry.\n\nSolomon ibn Gabirol was not merely the first Jewish philosopher in\nSpain, he was the first Spanish philosopher, that is, he was the first\nphilosophical writer in Andalusia. Ibn Badja, the first Mohammedan\nphilosopher in Spain, was born at least a half century after Gabirol.\nThe birth of Gabirol is generally placed in 1021 and his death in 1058,\nthough some have put it as late as 1070.\n\nThe fate of Gabirol in the history of Jewish literature was a peculiar\none. Highly celebrated as a synagogal poet in the Sephardic as well as\nAshkenazic community, his fame as a great philosopher was early\novershadowed by his successors, and his chief work, the \"Fountain of\nLife,\" was in the course of time quite forgotten. The Arabic original\nwas lost and there was no Hebrew translation. The Tibbonides, Judah,\nSamuel and Moses, who translated everything worth while in Jewish\nphilology, science and philosophy from Arabic into Hebrew, either did\nnot know of Gabirol's masterpiece or did not think it important enough\nto translate. To judge from the extant fragments of the correspondence\nbetween Samuel ibn Tibbon and Maimonides, it would seem that both were\ntrue; that is that Samuel ibn Tibbon had no access to Gabirol's \"Fons\nVit\u00e6,\" and that if he had had such access, Maimonides would have\ndissuaded him from translating it. Maimonides actually tells his\ntranslator[82] that the only books worth studying are those of Aristotle\nand his true commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius,\nAverroes. Alfarabi and Avicenna are also important, but other writings,\nsuch as those of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Hermes, Porphyry, represent a\npre-Aristotelian philosophy which is obsolete, and are a waste of time.\nThe books of Isaac Israeli on the \"Elements\" and on \"Definitions,\" are\nno better, seeing that Israeli was only a physician and no philosopher.\nHe is not familiar with the \"Microcosmus\" of Joseph ibn Zaddik, but\ninfers from a knowledge of the man that his work is based upon the\nwritings of the \"Brothers of Purity\"; and hence, we may add, not\nstrictly Aristotelian, and not particularly important. Not a word is\nhere said about Gabirol, apparently because Samuel ibn Tibbon had not\ninquired about him. But from Maimonides's judgment concerning the works\nof \"Empedocles,\" we may legitimately infer that he would have been no\nmore favorable to Gabirol; for, as we shall see, Gabirol's system is\nalso based upon a point of view similar to that of the so-called\n\"Empedocles.\" What the Tibbonides left undone was, however, partially\naccomplished about a half century later by the commentator and critic\nShem Tob Falaquera (1225-1290). Apparently in agreement with Abraham ibn\nDaud that Gabirol's profuseness in his philosophic masterpiece made it\npossible to reduce it to a tenth part of its size, Falaquera did not\nfind it necessary to translate the whole of the \"Mekor Hayim\" into\nHebrew, giving us instead a translation of selected parts, which in his\nestimation contained the gist of Gabirol's teaching. The absence of a\ncomplete Hebrew translation of Gabirol's philosophical work meant of\ncourse that no one who did not know Arabic could have access to\nGabirol's \"Mekor Hayim,\" and this practically excluded the majority of\nlearned Jews after the first half of the thirteenth century. But the\nselections of Falaquera did not seem to find many readers either, as may\nbe inferred from the fact that so far only one single manuscript of this\ntranslation is known.\n\n_En revanche_, as the French would say, the Christian Scholastics of the\nthirteenth century made Gabirol their own and studied him diligently.\nHis fundamental thesis of a universal matter underlying all existence\noutside of God was made a bone of contention between the two dominant\nschools; the Dominicans, led by Thomas Aquinas, opposing this\nun-Aristotelian principle, the Franciscans with Duns Scotus at their\nhead, adopting it as their own. \"Ego autem redeo ad sententiam\nAvicembronis,\" is a formula in Duns Scotus's discussion of the principle\nof matter.[83]\n\nThe translation of Gabirol's philosophy into an accessible language,\nwhich was not considered desirable by Jews, was actually accomplished by\nChristians. About a century before Falaquera a complete translation into\nLatin was made in Toledo of Gabirol's \"Fountain of Life,\" under the\ntitle \"Fons Vit\u00e6.\" This translation was made at the instance of Raymond,\nArchbishop of Toledo in the middle of the twelfth century, by Dominicus\nGundissalinus, archdeacon of Segovia, with the assistance of a converted\nJewish physician, Ibn Daud (Avendehut, Avendeath), whose name after\nconversion became Johannes Hispanus or Hispalensis. Unlike the Hebrew\nepitome of Falaquera this translation was not neglected, as is clear\nfrom the r\u00f4le Gabirol's philosophy plays in the disputations of the\nschools, and from the fact that there are still extant four manuscripts\nof the complete translation, one of an epitome thereof, and there is\nevidence that a fifth manuscript existed in 1375 in the Papal\nlibrary.[84] As Ibn Sina was corrupted by the Latin writers into\nAvicenna, and Ibn Roshd into Averroes, so Ibn Gabirol became in turn,\nAvencebrol, Avicembron, Avicebron; and the Scholastics who fought about\nhis philosophy had no idea he was a Jew and celebrated as a writer of\nreligious hymns used in the synagogue. He was regarded now as a\nMohammedan, now as a Christian.\n\nThis peculiar circumstance will help us to get an inkling of the reason\nfor the neglect of Gabirol's philosophy in the Jewish community. It is\nclear that a work which, like the \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" made it possible for its\nauthor to be regarded as a Mohammedan or even a Christian, cannot have\nhad the Jewish imprint very deeply stamped upon its face. Nay more,\nwhile the knowledge of its having been translated from the Arabic may\nhave been sufficient in itself to stamp the author as a Mohammedan,\nthere must have been additional indications for his Scholastic admirers\nto make them regard him as a Christian. An examination of the work lends\nsome semblance of truth to these considerations.\n\nGabirol nowhere betrays his Jewishness in the \"Fons Vit\u00e6.\" He never\nquotes a Biblical verse or a Talmudic dictum. He does not make any overt\nattempt to reconcile his philosophical views with religious faith. The\ntreatise is purely speculative as if religious dogma nowhere existed to\nblock one's way or direct one's search. Abraham Ibn Daud, the author of\nthe philosophical treatise \"Emunah Ramah\" (The Exalted Faith), and the\npredecessor of Maimonides, criticises Gabirol very severely, and that\nnot merely because he disagrees with him in the conception of matter and\nfinds Gabirol's reasoning devoid of cogency and logical force--many bad\narguments, he says, seem in the mind of Gabirol to be equivalent to one\ngood one--but principally because Gabirol failed to take a Jewish\nattitude in his philosophizing, and actually, as Ibn Daud tells us,\nmaintains views dangerous to Judaism (below, p. 198).\n\nThis will easily account for the fact that Gabirol, celebrated as he was\nas a poet, was lost sight of generally as a philosopher. The matter is\nmade clearer still if we add that his style in the \"Mekor Hayim\" is\nagainst him. It is devoid of all merit whether of literary beauty or of\nlogical conciseness and brevity. It is diffuse to a degree and\nfrequently very wearisome and tedious. One has to wade through pages\nupon pages of bare syllogisms, one more flimsy than another.\n\nFinally, the point of view of Gabirol was that of a philosophy that was\nrapidly becoming obsolete, and Maimonides, the ground having been made\nready by Ibn Daud, gave this philosophy its death-blow by substituting\nfor it the philosophy of Aristotle.\n\nWe now understand why it is that, with few exceptions here and there,\nGabirol's philosophical work was in the course of time forgotten among\nthe Jews, though his name Avicebron as well as some of his chief\ndoctrines were well known to the Scholastic writers. To be sure, even\nstudents of Scholastic literature had no direct access to Gabirol's\ntreatise as it was never printed and no one knew whether there were\nstill any manuscripts of it extant or not. The only sources of\ninformation concerning Avicebron's philosophy were Aquinas's\nrefutations, and Duns Scotus's defence, and other second-hand references\nin the writings of the Scholastics. Who Avicebron was no one knew. It\nwas not until 1819 that Amable Jourdain,[85] in tracing the history of\nthe Latin translations of Aristotle, came to the conclusion that more\nmust be known about the philosophy of Avicebron's \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" if we\nintended to understand the Scholastics. In 1845 Solomon Munk discovered\nin the national library at Paris the epitome of Falaquera mentioned\nabove, and comparing it with the views of Avicebron as found in the\ndiscussions of the Scholastics, made the important discovery that the\nmysterious Avicebron was neither a Mohammedan nor a Christian but a Jew,\nand none other than the famous poet Solomon ibn Gabirol. Then began a\nsearch for copies of a Latin translation, which was rewarded amply. Both\nMunk and Seyerlen discovered manuscript copies of the \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" and\nnow both the Hebrew epitome of Falaquera and the Latin translation of\nGundissalinus are accessible in print.[86] So much for the interesting\nhistory of Gabirol. Now a word as to his views.\n\nShem Tob ibn Falaquera, in the brief introduction which he appends to\nhis epitome of the \"Mekor Hayim\" says, \"It seems to me that Solomon ibn\nGabirol follows in his book the views of the ancient philosophers as we\nfind them in a book composed by Empedocles concerning the 'Five\nSubstances.'[87] This book is based upon the principle that all\nspiritual substances have a spiritual matter; that the form comes from\nabove and the matter receives it from below, _i. e._, that the matter is\na substratum and bears the form upon it.\" He then adds that Aristotle\nattributes a similar view to his predecessors, but that this view is\ninconsistent with Aristotle's own thinking. For in his opinion what is\nmaterial is composite and possessed of potentiality. Hence only those\nthings have matter which are subject to generation and decay, and in\ngeneral change from one state to another.\n\nWithout going into detail as to the nature of this work of Empedocles\nnamed by Falaquera as the source of Gabirol's views--expositions of\nthese so-called Empedoclean views and fragments from Empedocles's book\nhave been found in Arabian and Hebrew writers[88]--it is sufficient for\nus to know that it has nothing to do with the real Empedocles, the\nancient Greek philosopher; that it was another of the many spurious\nwritings which circulated in the middle ages under famous names of\nantiquity; and that like the \"Theology of Aristotle,\" and the \"Liber de\nCausis,\" mentioned in the Introduction (p. xx), it was Neo-Platonic in\ncharacter.\n\nThus Gabirol was a Neo-Platonist. This does not mean that he did not\nadopt many important Aristotelian conceptions. Neo-Platonism itself\ncould not have arisen without Aristotle. The ideas of matter and form,\nand potentiality and actuality, and the categories, and so on, had\nbecome the fixed elements of philosophical thinking, and no new system\ncould do without them. In this sense Plotinus himself, the founder of\nNeo-Platonism, is an Aristotelian. When we speak of Gabirol as a\nNeo-Platonist, we mean that the essence of his system is Neo-Platonic.\nHe is not a dualist, but a monist. God and matter are not opposed as two\nultimate principles, as they are in Aristotle. Matter in Gabirol is\nultimately identified with God. In this he goes even beyond Plotinus.\nFor whereas in Plotinus matter occupies the lowest scale in the\ngradation of being as it flows from the One or the Good (_cf._\nIntroduction, p. xxxviii), and becomes equivalent to the non-existent,\nand is the cause of evil, in Gabirol matter is the underlying substance\nfor all being from the highest to the lowest, with the one exception of\nthe Creator himself.[89] It emanates from the essence of the Creator,\nforming the basis of all subsequent emanations.[90] Hence the spiritual\nsubstances of the celestial world, or, to use a more technical and more\nprecise term--since spirit is not located in heaven or anywhere\nspatially--the intelligible world, have matter underlying their\nform.[91] In fact, matter itself is intelligible or spiritual, not\ncorporeal.[92] Corporeality and materiality are two different things.\nThere are various gradations of matter, to be sure; for the prime matter\nas it emerges from the essence of the Creator pervades all existence\nfrom highest to lowest, and the further it extends from its origin the\nless spiritual and the more corporeal it becomes until in the sublunar\nworld we have in the matters of its particular objects, corporeal\nmatter, _i. e._, matter affected with quantity and magnitude and figure\nand color.[93] Like Plotinus, Gabirol conceives of the universe as a\nprocess of a gradually descending series of existences or worlds, as the\nKabbalistic writers term them; these cosmic existences radiating or\nflowing out of the superabundant light and goodness of the Creator. The\ntwo extremes of this graded universe are God at the one end, and the\ncorporeal world at the other. Intermediate between these are the\nspiritual substances, Intelligence, Soul and Nature.[94] Man as a\nmicrocosm, a universe in little, partakes of both the corporeal and\nintermediate worlds, and hence may serve as a model of the constitution\nof the macrocosm, or great universe. His body is typical of the\ncorporeal world, which consists of the lowest matter, viz., that which\nhas no other form except that of corporeality, or extension, and the\nforms of figure, color, and so on, borne on top of the extension.[95]\n\nBody as such is at rest and is not capable of action. To act it needs an\nagent. Hence it needs an agency to compose its parts and hold them\ntogether. We call this agency Nature. Man's body also grows, is\nnourished and propagates its kind as do plants. This likewise must have\nits non-corporeal cause. This we call vegetative soul. Man has also\nsense perception and local motion like the animals. The principle or\nsubstance causing this is the animal soul. Man also thinks and reasons\nand reflects. This is brought about by the rational soul. Finally, man\nhas a still higher function than discursive thought. The latter has to\nsearch and to pass from premise to conclusion, whereas the apprehension\nof the intelligence takes place \"without seeking, without effort, and\nwithout any other cause except its own essence, because it is full of\nperfection.\" In other words, it is immediate intellectual intuition of\nwhich Gabirol speaks here. The Intelligence is capable of this because\nit has in itself, constituting its essence, all the forms of existence,\nand knowledge means possession of the forms of the things known.\n\nAs man is typical of the universe, it follows that there are cosmic\nexistences corresponding to the principles or powers just enumerated in\nman, and the relation of the latter to the former is that of the\nparticular to the general. Hence there is a cosmic Intelligence, a\ncosmic soul embracing the rational, the animal and the vegetative parts,\nand a cosmic nature. Of these the more perfect is the cause of the less\nperfect; hence the order in which we named them represents the order of\ncausation or of emanation from the prime source.\n\nThe lowest of these emanations is the matter which sustains extension or\nmagnitude, and with it the process ceases. This matter is no longer the\nsource of an additional form of existence. The various qualities and\nattributes which inhere in this corporeal matter are caused by the\nspiritual substances above. For like the prototype of all generosity and\ngoodness the First Essence or God, every one of the spiritual substances\nproceeding from him has the same tendency of imparting its form or forms\nto the substance next below it. But the forms thus bestowed are no\nlonger the same as they are in the essence of the bestowing substance,\nas it depends upon the recipient what sort of form it will receive. An\ninferior receiving substance will receive a superior form in an inferior\nway. That is, the form which in the substance above the one in question\nis contained in a spiritual and unitary manner, will be transformed in\nthe substance below it into something less spiritual, less unified, and\nmore nearly corporeal, _i. e._, visible and tangible. Hence the visible\nand tangible, and in general the sensible qualities of particular things\nin the sublunar world, are in reality descended from a line of spiritual\nancestors in the forms of the simple substances, Intelligence, Soul and\nNature. But it is their distance from the prime source, which increases\nwith every transmission of influence, together with the cruder nature of\nthe receiving substance, that makes the resulting forms corporeal and\nsensible. The matter may be made clear if we use the analogy of light,\nwhich is invisible as long as it is in air because it penetrates it,\nbut becomes visible when it comes in contact with a gross body which it\ncannot penetrate. It then remains on the surface condensed, and becomes\nvisible to the senses.\n\nWe thus see that the higher substance acts upon the lower and contains\nall that is found in the latter, though in a more perfect and simple\nmanner. The lower substances flow from the higher and yet the latter are\nnot diminished in their essence and power.[96]\n\nThat ordinary material objects are composed of matter and form is\nadmitted and we need not now prove it, as we have already discussed the\nsubject in the Introduction, where we gave an outline of the\nAristotelian philosophy. The principle peculiar to Gabirol is that not\nmerely the material objects of the sublunar world, but that the\nintelligible or spiritual substances also are composed of matter and\nform.[97] Whenever two things have something in common and something in\nwhich they differ, that which they have in common is the matter, that in\nwhich they differ is the form. Two things absolutely simple must be\nprime to each other, _i. e._, they must have nothing in common, for if\nthey have anything in common they have everything in common, and they\nare no longer two things but one. Hence a spiritual substance must be\ncomposite, for it must have something by which it differs from a\ncorporeal substance, and something, viz., substantiality, which it has\nin common with it. In the same way the intelligible substances,\nIntelligence and Soul, have their substantiality in common, and they\ndiffer in form. Hence they are composed of matter and form, and the\nmatter must be the same in all the intelligible substances; for their\ndifferences are due to their forms, hence if their matters also\ndiffered, they would have to differ in form, but matter as such has no\nform. Hence matter in itself is everywhere the same.\n\nAs the Intelligence is the highest existence next to God, and is\ncomposed of matter and form, these are respectively the universal matter\nand universal form, embracing all subsequent matters and forms.[98]\nHence the Intelligence in knowing itself knows everything, as everything\nis contained in it. And as it is prior to everything and the cause of\neverything it has an immediate knowledge of all things without effort or\nsearching.\n\nBut what is the origin of universal matter and universal form which, in\nconstituting Intelligence, are the fundamental principles of all\nexistence?[99] The answer is they come from the First Essence, God.\nUnity comes before duality or plurality, and there is no true unity\nexcept in God. Whatever issues from him is _ipso facto_, as a product\nwhich is not God, affected with duality. Matter and Form is this\nduality. Their union is necessary and real, and it is only in thought\nthat we can keep them apart. In reality they form a unit, their union\nvarying in perfection according as they are nearer or further away from\ntheir origin. Hence the union is closest in Intelligence, the first\ndivine emanation, and least close in corporeal objects of the sublunar\nworld, where plurality is the order of the day.\n\nThis process by which universal matter and form issue from God may be\ncalled creation.[100] But we must conceive of it on the analogy of water\nflowing from a fountain in continued and uninterrupted succession. The\nonly difference is that the emanation from God takes place without\nmotion and without time.\n\nThe union of universal form and universal matter must be thought of as a\nstamping of the form upon the matter. Matter has in itself no actual or\ndefinable existence. It serves merely as a _tabula rasa_, as a potential\nbackground, as an empty receptacle, as a reflecting mirror for form to\nbe written, filled out, impressed or reflected therein or upon. Hence we\nmay view God as the spectator, universal matter as the mirror, and\nuniversal form as the reflection of the spectator in the glass. God\nhimself does not enter the glass, only his reflection is outlined\ntherein. And as matter and form are really the whole world, it would\nfollow that the universe is a reflection of God, though God remains in\nhimself and does not enter the world with his essence.\n\nWe may also picture to ourselves this impression of form upon matter on\nthe analogy of speech. The speaker's words impress ideas upon the soul\nof the listener. So God speaks and his Word or Will impresses form upon\nmatter. The world is created by the Word or the Will[101] of God.\n\nIn all these similes matter appears as something external to God, upon\nwhich he impresses form. But this is not strictly true, since matter has\nno real existence without form, and has never so existed. The existence\nof matter and form is simultaneous, and both come from God, matter from\nhis essence, form from his attribute, or his Wisdom, or his Word, or his\nWill. And yet in God, who is a perfect unity, essence and attribute are\none. It is the Will of God, not God himself, that must be regarded as\nthe spectator, whose outline is reflected in the mirror of matter in the\nabove simile. It is the Will of God that writes form upon the chart of\nmatter, and thereby produces a world. It is in virtue of the Will that\nGod is said to be in everything.\n\nBut what is this will of God as distinguished from God himself, since in\nGod there can be no duality of any kind? Gabirol's answer is not clear\nor satisfactory. The will, he says, is identical with God if we consider\nit apart from its activity; considered as active it is different from\nthe divine essence. Exactly to describe it is impossible, but the\nfollowing is an approximation. It is a divine power producing matter and\nform, binding them together, pervading them throughout their extent\nabove and below, as the soul pervades the body, and moving and ordering\neverything.\n\nGod himself, or the First Essence, can be known only through the Will as\npervading everything, _i. e._, through his effects in the world. And in\nthis way too only his existence can be known but not his essence as he\nis in himself, because God is above everything and infinite. The soul\nmay know Intelligence because though the latter is above the soul there\nis some similarity between them. But the First Essence has no similarity\nto Intelligence, therefore no intelligence can know it.\n\nThere is a kind of mystic knowledge by which man may come in touch with\nthe spiritual substances and rise even to universal matter, which is\nabove Intelligence. \"If you wish to form a picture of these substances,\"\nthe master says to the disciple in the \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" \"you must raise your\nintellect to the last intelligible, you must purify it from all sordid\nsensibility, free it from the captivity of nature and approach with the\nforce of your intelligence to the last limit of intelligible substance\nthat it is possible for you to comprehend, until you are entirely\ndivorced from sensible substance and lose all knowledge thereof. Then\nyou will embrace, so to speak, the whole corporeal world in your being,\nand will place it in one corner of your soul. When you have done this\nyou will understand the insignificance of the sensible in comparison\nwith the greatness of the intelligible. Then the spiritual substances\nwill be before your eyes, comprehending you and superior to you, and you\nwill see your own being as though you were those substances. Sometimes\nit will seem to you that you are a part of them by reason of your\nconnection with corporeal substance; and sometimes you will think you\nare all of them, and that there is no difference between you and them,\non account of the union of your being with their being, and the\nattachment of your form to their forms.\" The pupil assures the teacher\nthat he has followed this advice and seen the whole corporeal world\nfloating in the spiritual substances as a small boat in the sea, or a\nbird in the air. \"When you have raised yourself to the first universal\nmatter,\" replies the teacher, \"and illumined its shadow, you will see\nthere the wonder of wonders. Pursue this therefore diligently and with\nlove, because this is the purpose of the existence of the human soul,\nand in this is great delight and extreme happiness.\"[102]\n\nBut Gabirol does not promise a knowledge of the Most High even through\nthis royal road of ecstasy, unless we suppose that in the promise of\nseeing in universal matter the wonder of all wonders there may be a\ncovert allusion to a glimpse of the deepest secret of all, the essence\nof God.\n\nAll knowledge is according to Gabirol embraced in the following three\ntopics, (1) Matter and Form, (2) the Active Word or Will, (3) the First\nEssence or God. By far the larger part of the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" is devoted to\nthe first subject. Only brief hints are given of the second and third,\nand Gabirol refers us to a special work of his on the Will, which he\nsays he wrote. There is no trace of any such treatise. At any rate it is\nclear from the little that is contained on the Divine Will in the \"Fons\nVit\u00e6\" that the Will forms an important element in Gabirol's philosophy.\nThis is the more remarkable because it is not an essential element in\nNeo-Platonism, upon which Gabirol's system is based. Nay, the doctrine\nof a divine will scarcely has any place in the form of emanation taught\nby Plotinus. The cosmic process is conceived there as necessary and\nimpersonal. And but for the introduction of the Will in the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\"\nwe should be forced to understand Gabirol in the same way. The\ndifficulty in Neo-Platonism is that God is at the same time transcendent\nand, through his powers or emanations, immanent in the world. God is\nabove all being and at the same time is the cause of and pervades all\nexistence. Gabirol must have felt not merely this purely philosophical\ndifficulty, but as a Jew, Pantheism as well as impersonalism must have\nbeen objectionable to him. Hence he mitigates both by introducing the\ndivine will as mediating between God and the world. This brings God in\ncloser and more personal touch with his creation. The cosmic process is\nnot a necessary and impersonal flow or radiation but a voluntary\nactivity having a purpose. The solution is unsatisfactory, as all such\nsolutions are bound to be, because it introduces as many difficulties as\nit solves. The nature of this divine Will is ambiguous. If it is God's\nwill, and God is the One in whom there can be no distinctions, we have\nonly a new word, and nothing is solved. If on human analogy we are\ninclined to take the will seriously, we are endangering God's unity.\nThis dilemma Gabirol does not succeed in removing. His system still has\na strong flavor of Pantheism, and moreover his identification of the\nWill of God with the Wisdom and the Word of God, and his hypostatization\nof the latter as in a sense a being distinct from God, reminds us\nstrongly of Philo's Logos, which became the Logos of Christianity, the\nsecond person in the Trinity. This is the reason why William of\nAuvergne, bishop of Paris in the thirteenth century, regarded Avicebron\nas a Christian. And these same reasons were no doubt adequate to\nestrange Jewish readers, as Abraham ibn Daud expressly tells us about\nhimself, though his terms are general (see above, p. 62).\n\nGabirol is also the author of an ethical work which he composed in 1045.\nThough of little importance philosophically, or perhaps because of this,\nthe \"Tikkun Middot ha-Nefesh\" (Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul)\nfared much better than its more important companion, the \"Mekor Hayim.\"\nNot only did it have the privilege of a Hebrew translation at the hands\nof the father of translators, Judah ibn Tibbon, but the original Arabic\nitself is still extant and was recently published with an English\ntranslation by Stephen S. Wise (1901).[103] The Hebrew translation also\nhad the good fortune of being reprinted several times. This is due to\nthe fact that the \"Tikkun Middot ha-Nefesh\" is a popular work, dealing\nwith morals, and does not go into metaphysical questions. It is full of\nBiblical citations, which stamps it as Jewish; and there are also in it\nquotations from Arabic writers serving to illustrate the argument and\nlending variety and interest to the style.\n\nThe larger question of the aim of human life is touched on in the \"Fons\nVit\u00e6.\" We are told there that the ultimate aim of man's existence is\nthat the soul should unite with the upper world to which it\nbelongs.[104] The particular human soul is according to Gabirol a part,\nthough not in a physical sense, of the cosmic soul, which is one of the\nuniversal spiritual substances (see above, p. 66). Hence its own real\nexistence is spiritual and eternal, and independent of the body. Its\nentrance into the body obscures its spiritual vision, though it does not\nlose all touch with the higher world from which it came. The senses and\nthe data of sense perception are not an end in themselves; they are only\na means for the soul through them to recall the higher knowledge which\nwas its own in its spiritual existence, and thereby win its return to\nthe intelligible world. Man's duty therefore in this world is to strive\nto attain this higher life for his soul. This is brought about by means\nof _knowledge_ and _practice_. This knowledge has to do with knowing all\nthings as they really are, and particularly the intelligible substances\nand the Prime Essence. Practice signifies to keep away as far as\npossible from things of sense, which are foreign to the soul and might\ninjure it. What more particularly the things are which are beneficial to\nthe soul, and what are injurious, we learn from Gabirol's ethical\ntreatise. Man's soul has a higher and a lower nature. The higher power\nis the reason or rational soul, the lower is the animal or vegetative\nsoul; and man's business is to see that the reason rules over the lower\nnature.\n\nGabirol does not give us any test by which we can tell whether a given\nact or feeling belongs to the lower or higher nature except to say that\nthe appetites are diseases of the body which must be cured; that they do\nnot belong to the rational soul, and to satisfy them is not the\nattainment of a good. Gabirol's method of treating virtue and vice, or\nrather the virtues and the vices, is to relate them to the five senses\nand the four humors in man, which in turn correspond to the four\nelements, fire, air, water, earth, and the four primitive qualities,\nhot, cold, moist, dry. This division of the elements, the humors, the\nqualities and the senses was a commonplace of the physiological and\nmedical science of the time. We have met it in Isaac Israeli (see above,\np. 3), and it goes back to Aristotle and Galen and Hippocrates. The\noriginality, though a queer one to be sure, of Gabirol is to bring the\nethical qualities of man into relation with all these. The\napproximations are forced in every instance and often ludicrous. Instead\nof attempting to give a psychological analysis of the qualities in\nquestion, he lays stress on their physical basis in one of the five\nsenses, as we shall see presently.\n\nThe great world, we are told, was created out of the four elements, and\nsimilarly man, the microcosm, also consists of four natures\ncorresponding to the elements. Thus the four humors, upon the harmonious\ncombination of which the health of man's body depends, viz., blood,\nphlegm, black gall, and red gall, correspond respectively to air, water,\nearth, fire. Man is endowed besides with five senses. If he is wise he\nwill use his senses properly and in the right measure, like a skilful\nphysician who calculates carefully what proportion of each drug should\nbe prescribed.\n\nThe sense of sight is the noblest of the senses, and is related to the\nbody as the sun to the world. The philosophers have a wonderful saying\nconcerning the eye that there are spiritual tints in the soul which are\nvisible in the movements of the eyelids--pride and haughtiness, humility\nand meekness. Accordingly the ethical qualities due to the sense of\nsight are pride, meekness, modesty and impudence, besides the\nsubordinate qualities derived from these.\n\nPride is common in a person of a warm disposition in whom the red gall\npredominates. Many wise men exhibit this quality out of place, fools\nadopt it until they are mastered by it, and it is prevalent in youth. It\nmay be useful when it keeps a man away from vice and unworthy things,\ninspiring him to rise to nobility of character and the service of God.\nBut generally it is useless and leads to many evils, especially if it\ncauses one to be self-opinionated, refusing to seek the advice of\nanyone. When a man sees this quality gaining mastery over him, he should\nconsider the origin and end of existing things. When he sees that all\nthings are destined to pass away, and himself likewise, his pride will\nchange to humility.\n\nMeekness is closer to virtue than the quality mentioned before, because\nhe who possesses it withholds his desire from seeking gratification. It\nis a quality manifested by the prophets and leads to honor. \"The fruits\nof lowliness,\" a philosopher has said, \"are love and tranquillity.\"\nContentment is of a kind with meekness. The greatest riches are\ncontentment and patience. He who esteems his rank but lightly enhances\nman's estimation of his dignity. A wise man has said, \"Be humble without\ncringing, and manly without being arrogant. Arrogance is a wilderness\nand haughtiness a taking refuge therein, and altogether a going astray.\"\n\nModesty is connected with humility but is superior to it, for it is a\nsister of reason, and reason, as everybody knows, is the most important\nquality, which separates man from beast and brings him near to the\nangels. You never see a modest person without sense, or a person of good\nsense who is not modest. A man must be modest not only before others but\nalso to himself. Modesty and faithfulness, it is said, are closely\nrelated, and the one cannot be had truly without the other.\n\nThe impudent man is disliked by God and by man, even if he be wise and\nlearned. If one has this quality it is the duty of his friend and\nassociate to break him of it by reproving him. It is of value only when\nused in defence of the Torah and in behalf of God and the truth.\n\nSpace will not permit us to treat in detail of the other senses and the\nvirtues and vices depending upon them, but we shall indicate briefly\nGabirol's method of relating the ethical qualities to the physical\nsenses.\n\nThus the sense of hearing, which is next in importance to sight has as\nits qualities hate, love, mercy and cruelty. It takes some fine insight,\nhe says, to see the connection of these qualities with the sense of\nhearing, but the intelligent and discerning reader will find this hint\nsufficient. I hope he will not blame me, Gabirol continues, if I do not\nbring together all the reasons and the scriptural passages to prove\nthis, for human flesh is weak, especially in my case on account of my\nvexatious experiences and disappointments. We find in the Bible love\nassociated with hearing: \"_Hear_, O Israel ... and thou shalt _love_ the\nLord thy God\" (Deut. 6, 4). Hate follows hearing in the phrase: \"When\nEsau heard the words of his father ... and Esau hated Jacob\" (Gen. 27,\n34-41). Mercy is related to hearing in Exod. (22, 26), \"And I will hear\nfor I am merciful.\" Finally cruelty is to refuse to listen, as we find\nin the case of Pharaoh (Ex. 9, 12), \"And the Lord hardened the heart of\nPharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them.\"\n\nIn a similar manner Gabirol proves that the sense of smell has four\nqualities, anger, favor, envy, wide-awakeness; the sense of taste, the\nfour qualities, joy, sorrow, regret, calmness; while liberality,\nniggardliness, courage and cowardice are related to the sense of touch.\n\nThe relation of the ethical qualities to the senses, humors, elements\nand primitive physical qualities is exhibited in the following table, as\nit appears in the Arabic text of the \"Aslah al-Ahlak,\" the original\ntitle of Gabirol's ethical work.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nAmong Gabirol's religious poems there is one which interests us\nparticularly because it bears traces of the philosophy of the \"Fons\nVit\u00e6.\" It is the most important of his hymns and is found in the\nprayer-book of the Sephardic ritual for the Day of Atonement. \"The Royal\nCrown,\" as the poem is entitled, is an appeal to God for mercy and\nforgiveness, and is based upon the contrast between the greatness of God\nand the insignificance of man. The first part is therefore devoted to a\npoetical description of God's attributes and the wonders of the cosmic\nsystem, as conceived in the astronomical science of the day. A few\nquotations will give us an idea of the style and character of the hymn\nand its relation to the \"Fons Vit\u00e6.\"\n\n\"Thine are the mysteries, which neither fancy nor imagination can\ncomprehend; and the life, over which dissolution hath no power. Thine is\nthe _Throne_ exalted above all height; and the habitation concealed in\nthe eminence of its recess. Thine is the existence, from the shadow of\nwhose light sprung every existing thing; of which we said, under its\nprotecting shadow shall we live....\n\n\"Thou art One, the first of every number, and the foundation of all\nstructure. Thou art One, and in the mystery of the Unity all the wise in\nheart are astonished; for they cannot define it. Thou art One, and thy\nUnity can neither be lessened nor augmented; for nothing is there\nwanting or superfluous. Thou art One, but not such a one as is estimated\nor numbered; for neither plurality, nor change, form, nor physical\nattribute, nor name expressive of thy quality, can reach thee....\"\n\nIn the same way he treats God's other attributes, existent, living,\ngreat, mighty. Then he continues:\n\n\"Thou art light, and the eyes of every pure soul shall see thee; for the\nclouds of iniquity alone hide thee from her sight.... Thou art most\nhigh, and the eye of the intellect desireth and longeth for thee; but it\ncan only see a part, it cannot see the whole of thy greatness....\n\n\"Thou art God, who by thy Divinity supportest all things formed; and\nupholdest all creatures by thy Unity. Thou art God, and there is no\ndistinction between thy godhead, unity, eternity or existence; for all\nis one mystery; and although each of these attributes is variously\nnamed, yet the whole point to one end.\n\n\"Thou art wise, and wisdom, which is the _fountain of life_, floweth\nfrom thee; and compared with thy wisdom, the knowledge of all mankind is\nfolly. Thou art wise; and didst exist prior to all the most ancient\nthings; and wisdom was reared by thee. Thou art wise; and hast not\nlearned aught from another, nor acquired thy wisdom from anyone else.\nThou art wise; and from thy wisdom thou didst cause to emanate a ready\n_will_, an agent and artist as it were, to draw existence out of\nnon-existence, as light proceeds from the eye. Thou drawest from the\nsource of light without a vessel, and producest everything without a\ntool.\"\n\nThen follows a description of the constitution of the sublunar world,\nthe terrestrial sphere consisting of part earth, part water, and being\nsurrounded by the successive spheres of air and fire. Then follow in\norder the spheres of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter,\nSaturn, the spheres of the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere\nembracing all and giving to the entire heaven the diurnal motion from\neast to west. He then continues:\n\n\"Who can understand thy tremendous mysteries, when thou didst exalt\nabove the ninth orb, the sphere of the _Intelligence_; that is the inner\ntemple; for the tenth shall be holy to the Lord. This is the sphere\nwhich is exalted above all the highest, and which no imagination can\nreach; and there is the hiding-place, wherein is the canopy for thy\nglory....\n\n\"O Lord! who can come near thy understanding, when thou didst place on\nhigh above the sphere of the Intelligence the _Throne of thy glory_,\nwhere is the glorious dwelling of the hiding-place; there also is the\nmystery and the _foundation_ (matter); so far the intellect may reach\nand no further; for above this art thou greatly exalted upon thy mighty\nthrone, where no man may come up to thee....\n\n\"Who can comprehend thy power, when thou didst create from the splendor\nof thy glory a pure lustre? From the rock of rocks was it hewn, and dug\nfrom the hollow of the cave. Thou also didst bestow on it the spirit of\nwisdom, and didst call it soul. Thou didst form it hewn from the flames\nof intellectual fire, so that its spirit burneth as fire within it. Thou\ndidst send it forth to the body to serve and guard it; it is as fire in\nthe midst of it, and yet doth not consume it; for _from the fire of the\nsoul the body was created_, and called into existence from nothing,\nbecause the Lord descended thereto in fire.\"\n\nHere we see the Intelligence spoken of as standing above the heavenly\nspheres. This clearly represents the cosmic Intelligence as a creation\nof God, \"which is exalted above all the highest,\" hence the first\nproduct of God's light. And yet the _Throne of Glory_ is said to be\nplaced even above the sphere of the Intelligence. He speaks of it as the\nmystery and the foundation (Yesod), beyond which the intellect cannot\nreach. This is apparently a contradiction, but becomes clear when we\nlearn what is meant by the Throne of Glory, and by \"foundation.\" In the\n\"Fons Vit\u00e6\" Gabirol tells us that matter receives form from the First\nEssence through the medium of the Will, which latter therefore, as it\nbestows form upon matter, sits in it and rests upon it. And hence, he\nsays, matter is as it were the stool (cathedra) of the One. The word\n\"yesod\" (foundation) which Gabirol applies in the \"Keter Malkut\" (Royal\nCrown) to the Throne of Glory is the same that Falaquera uses for matter\nthroughout in his epitome of the \"Mekor Hayim.\" Hence it is clear that\nthe Throne of Glory which is above the Intelligence is nothing else than\nGabirol's matter. And we know from the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" that matter is really\nprior to Intelligence as it exists in the knowledge of God, but that in\nreality it never was, as a creation, without form; and that with form it\nconstitutes the Intelligence. Finally there is also a reference in the\npoem to the will as emanating from God's wisdom, and like an \"agent and\nartist drawing existence out of non-existence as light proceeds from the\neye.\" The process of creation is thus compared with the radiation of\nlight in the sentence just quoted, and likewise in the following: \"Thou\ndrawest from the source of light without a vessel, and producest\neverything without a tool.\"\n\nWe do not know whether Gabirol wrote any commentaries on the Bible--none\nare extant, nor are there any references to such works--but from his\nexegetical attempts in his ethical work discussed above (p. 71 ff.) and\nfrom citations by Abraham ibn Ezra of Gabirol's explanations of certain\npassages in Scripture, we gather that like Philo of Alexandria before\nhim and Maimonides and a host of philosophical commentators after him,\nhe used the allegorical method to reconcile his philosophical views with\nthe Bible, and read the former into the latter.[105]\n\nThus we are told that Eden represents the presence of God, the garden\nplanted in Eden stands for the angelic beings or, according to another\ninterpretation, for the world of sense. By the river which flows out of\nEden is meant prime matter which issues from the essence of God\naccording to the \"Fons Vit\u00e6.\" The four divisions of the river are the\nfour elements; Adam is the rational soul, Eve, as the Hebrew name\nindicates, the animal soul, and the serpent is the vegetative or\nappetitive soul. The serpent entices Adam to eat of the forbidden tree.\nThis means that when the lower soul succeeds in controlling the reason,\nthe result is evil and sin, and man is driven out of the Garden, _i. e._,\nis excluded from his angelic purity and becomes a corporeal being.\n\nIt is clear from all this that Gabirol's omission of all reference to\nJewish dogma in the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" was purely methodological. Philosophy,\nand religion or theology should be kept apart in a purely philosophical\nwork. Apologetics or harmonization has its rights, but it is a different\ndepartment of study, and should be treated by itself, or in connection\nwith exegesis of the Bible.\n\nWhile it is true that Gabirol's influence on subsequent Jewish\nphilosophy is slight--at most we find it in Moses and Abraham ibn Ezra,\nAbraham ibn Daud and Joseph ibn Zaddik--traces of his ideas are met with\nin the mysticism of the Kabbala. Gabirol's \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" is a peculiar\ncombination of logical formalism with mystic obscurity, or profundity,\naccording to one's point of view. The latter did not appeal to pure\nrationalists like Ibn Daud or Maimonides, and the former seemed\nunconvincing, as it was employed in a lost cause. For Neo-Platonism was\ngiving way to Aristotelianism, which was adopted by Maimonides and made\nthe authoritative and standard philosophy. It was different with the\nKabbala. Those who were responsible for its spread in the thirteenth\ncentury must have been attracted by the seemingly esoteric character of\na philosophy which sees the invisible in the visible, the spiritual in\nthe corporeal, and the reflection of the unknowable God in everything.\nThere are certain details also which are common to both, such as the\nanalogies of irradiation of light or flowing of water used to represent\nthe process of creation, the position of the Will, the existence of\nmatter in spiritual beings, and so on, though some of these ideas are\ncommon to all Neo-Platonic systems, and the Kabbala may have had access\nto the same sources as Gabirol.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nBAHYA IBN PAKUDA\n\n\nAll that is known of the life of Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakuda is that he\nlived in Spain and had the office of \"Dayyan,\" or judge of the Jewish\ncommunity. Not even the exact time in which he lived is yet determined,\nthough the most reliable recent investigations make it probable that he\nlived after Gabirol and was indebted to the latter for some of his views\nin philosophy as well as in Ethics.[106] So far as traditional data are\nconcerned we have equally reliable, or rather equally unreliable\nstatements for regarding Bahya as an older contemporary of Gabirol\n(eleventh century), or of Abraham ibn Ezra (1088-1167). Neither of these\ntwo data being vouched for by any but their respective authors, who\nlived a long time after Bahya, we are left to such indirect evidence as\nmay be gathered from the content of Bahya's ethical work, the \"Duties of\nthe Hearts.\" And here the recent investigations of Yahuda, the latest\nauthority on this subject and the editor of the Arabic text of Bahya's\nmasterpiece (1912), force upon us the conclusion that Bahya wrote after\nGabirol. Yahuda has shown that many passages in the \"Duties of the\nHearts\" are practically identical in content and expression with similar\nideas found in a work of the Arab philosopher Gazali (1059-1111). This\nleaves very little doubt that Bahya borrowed from Gazali and hence could\nnot have written before the twelfth century.\n\nTo be sure, there are arguments on the other side, which would give\nchronological priority to Bahya over Gabirol,[107] but without going\ninto the details of this minute and difficult discussion, it may be said\ngenerally that many of the similarities in thought and expression\nbetween the two ethical works of Gabirol and Bahya rather point in favor\nof the view here adopted, namely, that Bahya borrowed from Gabirol,\nwhile the rest prove nothing for either side. In so far as a reader of\nthe \"Duties of the Hearts\" recognizes here and there an idea met with in\nGabirol's \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" there can scarcely be any doubt that the latter\nis the more original of the two. Gabirol did not borrow his philosophy\nor any part thereof from Bahya. Despite its Neo-Platonic character the\n\"Fons Vit\u00e6\" of Gabirol is the most independent and original of Jewish\nmedi\u00e6val productions. The \"Duties of the Hearts\" owes what originality\nit has to its ethics, which is the chief aim of the work, and not at all\nto the introductory philosophical chapter. As we shall see later, the\nentire chapter on the existence and unity of God, which introduces the\nethical teachings of Bahya, moves in the familiar lines of Saadia, Al\nMukammas, Joseph al Basir and the other Jewish Mutakallimun. There is\nbesides a touch of Neo-Platonism in Bahya, which may be due to Gabirol\nas well as to Arabic sources. That Bahya did not borrow more from the\n\"Fons Vit\u00e6\" than he did is due no doubt to the difference in temperament\nbetween the two men. Bahya is not a mystic. Filled as he is with the\nspirit of piety and warmth of heart--an attitude reflected in his style,\nwhich helped to make his work the most popular moral-religious book in\nJewish literature--there is no trace of pantheism or metaphysical\nmysticism in his nature. His ideas are sane and rational, and their\nexpression clear and transparent. Gabirol's high flights in the \"Fons\nVit\u00e6\" have little in common with Bahya's modest and brief outline of the\nfamiliar doctrines of the existence, unity and attributes of God, for\nwhich he claims no originality, and which serve merely as the background\nfor his contribution to religious ethics. That Bahya should have taken a\nfew leading notions from the \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" such as did not antagonize his\ntemperament and mode of thinking, is quite possible, and we shall best\nexplain such resemblances in this manner.\n\nAs Abraham ibn Ezra in 1156 makes mention of Bahya and his views,[108]\nwe are safe in concluding that the \"Duties of the Hearts\" was written\nbetween 1100 and 1156.\n\nAs the title of the work indicates, Bahya saw the great significance of\na distinction made by Mohammedan theologians and familiar in their\nascetic literature, between outward ceremonial or observance, known as\n\"visible wisdom\" and \"duties of the limbs,\" and inward intention,\nattitude and feeling, called \"hidden wisdom\" and \"duties of the\nhearts.\"[109] The prophet Isaiah complains that the people are diligent\nin bringing sacrifices, celebrating the festivals and offering prayer\nwhile their hands are full of blood. He informs them that such conduct\nis an abomination to the Lord, and admonishes them to wash themselves,\nto make themselves clean, to put away the evil of their deeds from\nbefore God's eyes; to cease to do evil; to learn to do well, to seek for\njustice, to relieve the oppressed, to do justice to the fatherless, to\nplead for the widow (Isa. 1, 11-17). This is a distinction between\nduties to God and duties to one's fellow man, between religious ceremony\nand ethical practice. Saadia makes a further distinction--also found in\nArabic theology before him--between those commandments and prohibitions\nin the Bible which the reason itself approves as right or condemns as\nwrong--the rational commandments--and those which to the reason seem\nindifferent, and which revelation alone characterizes as obligatory,\npermitted or forbidden--the so-called \"traditional commandments.\"\n\nBahya's division is identical with neither the one nor the other.\nEthical practice may be purely external and a matter of the limbs, quite\nas much as sacrifice and ceremonial ritual. On the other hand, one may\nfeel profoundly moved with the spirit of true piety, love of God and\nloyalty to his commandments in the performance of a so-called\n\"traditional commandment,\" like the fastening of a \"mezuzah\" to the\ndoor-post. Bahya finds room for Saadia's classification but it is with\nhim of subordinate importance, and is applicable only to the \"duties of\nthe limbs.\" Among these alone are there some which the reason unaided by\nrevelation would not have prescribed. The \"duties of the heart\" are all\nrational. Like all precepts they are both positive and negative.\nExamples of positive duties of the heart are, belief in a creator who\nmade the world out of nothing; belief in his unity and incomparability;\nthe duty to serve him with all our heart, to trust in him, to submit to\nhim, to fear him, to feel that he is watching our open and secret\nactions, to long for his favor and direct our actions for his name's\nsake; to love those who love him so as to be near unto him, and to hate\nthose who hate him. Negative precepts of this class are the opposites of\nthose mentioned, and others besides, such as that we should not covet,\nor bear a grudge, or think of forbidden things, or desire them or\nconsent to do them. The common characteristic of all duties of the heart\nis that they are not visible to others. God alone can judge whether a\nperson's feeling and motives are pure or the reverse.\n\nThat these duties are incumbent upon us is clear from every point of\nview. Like Saadia Bahya finds the sources of knowledge, particularly of\nthe knowledge of God's law and religion, in sense, reason, written law\nand tradition. Leaving out the senses which are not competent in this\nparticular case, the obligatory character of the duties of the heart is\nvouched for by the other three, reason, law, tradition.\n\nFrom reason we know that man is composed of soul and body, and that both\nare due to God's goodness. One is visible, the other is not. Hence we\nare obliged to worship God in a two-fold manner; with visible worship\nand invisible. Visible worship represents the duties of the limbs, such\nas prayer, fasting, charity, and so on, which are carried out by the\nvisible organs. The hidden worship includes the duties of the heart, for\nexample, to think of God's unity, to believe in him and his Law, to\naccept his worship, etc., all of which are accomplished by the thought\nof the mind, without the assistance of the visible limbs.\n\nBesides, the duties of the limbs, the obligation of which no one doubts,\nare incomplete without the will of the heart to do them. Hence it\nfollows that there is a duty upon our souls to worship God to the extent\nof our powers.\n\nThe Bible is just as emphatic in teaching these duties as the reason.\nThe love of God and the fear of God are constantly inculcated; and in\nthe sphere of negative precepts we have such prohibitions as, \"Thou\nshalt not covet\" (Exod. 20, 17); \"Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor\nbear any grudge\" (Lev. 19, 18); \"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy\nheart\" (ib. 17); \"You shalt not go astray after your own heart\" (Num.\n15, 39); \"Thou shalt not harden thy heart nor shut thy hand from thy\nneedy brother\" (Deut. 15, 7), and many others.\n\nRabbinical literature is just as full of such precepts as the Bible, and\nis if possible even more emphatic in their inculcation. Witness such\nsayings as the following: \"Heaven regards the intention\" (Sanh. 106b):\n\"The heart and the eye are two procurers of sin\" (Jer. Berak. 1), and\nmany others, particularly in the treatise Abot.\n\nThe great importance of these duties is also made manifest by the fact\nthat the punishment in the Bible for unintentional misdeeds is more\nlenient than for intentional, proving that for punishment the mind must\nshare with the body in the performance of the deed. The same is true of\nreward, that none is received for performing a good deed if it is not\ndone \"in the name of heaven.\"\n\nThey are even more important than the duties of the limbs, for unlike\nthe latter the obligation of the duties of the heart is always in force,\nand is independent of periods or circumstances. Their number, too, is\ninfinite, and not limited, as are the duties of the limbs, to six\nhundred and thirteen.\n\nAnd yet, Bahya complains, despite the great importance of these duties,\nvery few are the men who observed them even in the generations preceding\nours, not to speak of our own days when even the external ceremonies are\nneglected, much more so the class of precepts under discussion. The\nmajority of students of the Torah are actuated by desire for fame and\nhonor, and devote their time to the intricacies of legalistic discussion\nin Rabbinic literature, and matters unessential, which are of no account\nin the improvement of the soul; but they neglect such important subjects\nof study as the unity of God, which we ought to understand and\ndistinguish from other unities, and not merely receive parrot fashion\nfrom tradition. We are expressly commanded (Deut. 4, 39), \"Know\ntherefore this day, and reflect in thy heart, that the Eternal is the\nGod in the heavens above, and upon the earth beneath: there is none\nelse.\" Only he is exempt from studying these matters whose powers are\nnot adequate to grasp them, such as women, children and simpletons.\n\nMoreover Bahya is the first, he tells us, among the post-Talmudical\nwriters, to treat systematically and _ex professo_ this branch of our\nreligious duties. When I looked, he says, into the works composed by the\nearly writers after the Talmud on the commandments, I found that their\nwritings can be classified under three heads. First, exposition of the\nTorah and the Prophets, like the grammatical and lexicographical\ntreatises of Ibn Janah, or the exegetical works of Saadia. Second, brief\ncompilations of precepts, like the works of Hefez ben Yazliah and the\nresponsa of some geonim. Third, works of a philosophico-apologetic\ncharacter, like those of Saadia, Al Mukammas and others, whose purpose\nit was to present in an acceptable manner the doctrines of the Torah, to\nprove them by logical demonstration, and to refute the criticisms and\nerroneous views of unbelievers. But I have not seen any book dealing\nwith the \"hidden wisdom.\"[110]\n\nHere we see clearly the purpose of Bahya. It is not the rationalization\nof Jewish dogma that he is interested in, nor the reconciliation of\nreligion and philosophy. It is the purification of religion itself from\nwithin which he seeks to accomplish. Sincerity and consistency in our\nwords and our thoughts, so far as the service of God is concerned, is\nthe fundamental requirement and essential value of the duties of the\nheart. To be sure this cannot be attained without intelligence. The\nknowledge of God and of his unity is a prerequisite for a proper\nunderstanding and an adequate appreciation of our religious duties.\nPhilosophy therefore becomes a necessity in the interest of a purer and\ntruer religion, without reference to the dangers threatening it from\nwithout.\n\nHaving found, he continues in the introduction to the \"Duties of the\nHearts,\" that all the three sources, reason, Bible and tradition,\ncommand this branch of our religious duties, I tried to think about them\nand to learn them, being led from one topic to another until the subject\nbecame so large that I feared I could not contain it all in my memory. I\nthen determined to write the subject down systematically in a book for\nmy own benefit as well as for the benefit of others. But I hesitated\nabout writing it on account of my limitations, the difficulty of the\nsubject and my limited knowledge of Arabic, the language in which I\nintended writing it because the majority of our people are best familiar\nwith it. But I thought better of it and realized that it was my duty to\ndo what I could even if it was not perfect; that I must not yield to the\nargument springing from a love of ease and disinclination to effort; for\nif everyone were to abstain from doing a small good because he cannot do\nas much as he would like, nothing would ever be done at all.\n\nHaving decided to compose the work, he continues, I divided the subject\ninto ten fundamental principles, and devoted a section of the book to\neach principle. I endeavored to write in a plain and easy style,\nomitting difficult expressions, technical terms and demonstrations in\nthe manner of the dialecticians. I had to make an exception in the first\nsection dealing with the existence and unity of God, where the sublet of\nthe subject required the employment of logical and mathematical proofs.\nFor the rest I made use of comparisons or similes, adduced support from\nthe Bible and tradition, and also quoted the sages of other\nnations.[111]\n\nWe have already seen in the introduction that Bahya was indebted for his\nideas to the ascetic and Sufic literature of the Arabs, and Yahuda, who\nis the authority in this matter of Bahya's sources, has shown recently\nthat among the quotations of the wise men of other nations in Bahya's\nwork are such as are attributed by the Arabs to Jesus and the gospels,\nto Mohammed and his companions, to the early caliphs, in particular the\ncaliph Ali, to Mohammedan ascetics and Sufis.[112]\n\nIn selecting the ten general and inclusive principles, Bahya lays down\nas the first and most fundamental the doctrine of the deity, or as it is\ncalled in the works of the Kalam, the Unity. As God is a true unity,\nbeing neither substance nor accident, and our thought cannot grasp\nanything except substance or accident, it follows that we cannot know\nGod as he is in himself, and that we can get a conception of him and of\nhis existence from his creatures only. The second section is therefore\ndevoted to an examination of creation. Then follow in order sections\ntreating of the service of God, trust in God, action for the sake of God\nalone, submission to God, repentance, self-examination, separation from\nthe pleasures of the world, love of God.\n\nIn his discussion of the unity of God, Bahya follows the same method as\nSaadia, and the Kalam generally, _i. e._, he first proves that the world\nmust have been created; hence there must be a creator, and this is\nfollowed by a demonstration of God's unity. The particular arguments,\ntoo, are for the most part the same, as we shall see, though differently\nexpressed and in a different order. The important addition in Bahya is\nhis distinction between God's unity and other unities, which is not\nfound so strictly formulated in any of his predecessors, and goes back\nto Pseudo-Pythagorean sources in Arabian literature of Neo-Platonic\norigin.\n\nIn order to prove that there is a creator who created the world out of\nnothing we assume three principles. First, nothing can make itself.\nSecond, principles are finite in number, hence there must be a first\nbefore which there is no other. Third, every composite is \"new,\" _i. e._,\ncame to be in time, and did not exist from eternity.\n\nMaking use of these principles, which will be proved later, we proceed\nas follows: The world is composite in all its parts. Sky, earth, stars\nand man form a sort of house which the latter manages. Plants and\nanimals are composed of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. The\nelements again are composed of matter and form, or substance and\naccident. Their matter is the primitive \"hyle,\" and their form is the\nprimitive form, which is the root of all forms, essential as well as\naccidental. It is clear therefore that the world is composite, and\nhence, according to the third principle, had its origin in time. As,\naccording to the first principle, a thing cannot make itself, it must\nhave been made by some one. But as, in accordance with the second\nprinciple, the number of causes cannot be infinite, we must finally\nreach a first cause of the world before which there is no other, and\nthis first made the world out of nothing.\n\nBefore criticising this proof, from which Bahya infers more than is\nlegitimate, we must prove the three original assumptions.\n\nThe proof of the first principle that a thing cannot make itself is\nidentical in Bahya with the second of the three demonstrations employed\nby Saadia for the same purpose. It is that the thing must either have\nmade itself before it existed or after it existed. But both are\nimpossible. Before it existed it was not there to make itself; after it\nexisted there was no longer anything to make. Hence the first\nproposition is proved that a thing cannot make itself.\n\nThe proof of the second proposition that the number of causes cannot be\ninfinite is also based upon the same principle as the fourth proof in\nSaadia for the creation of the world. The principle is this. Whatever\nhas no limit in the direction of the past, _i. e._, had no beginning,\nbut is eternal a _parte ante_, cannot have any stopping point anywhere\nelse. In other words, we as the spectators could not point to any\ndefinite spot or link in this eternally infinite chain, because the\nchain must have traversed infinite time to reach us, but the infinite\ncan never be traversed. Since, however, as a matter of fact we can and\ndo direct our attention to parts of the changing world, this shows that\nthe world must have had a beginning.\n\nA second proof of the same principle is not found in Saadia. It is as\nfollows: If we imagine an actual infinite and take away a part, the\nremainder is less than before. Now if this remainder is still infinite,\nwe have one infinite larger than another, which is impossible. If we say\nthe remainder is finite, then by adding to it the finite part which was\ntaken away, the result must be finite; but this is contrary to\nhypothesis, for we assumed it infinite at the start. Hence it follows\nthat the infinite cannot have a part. But we can separate in thought out\nof all the generations of men from the beginning those that lived\nbetween the time of Noah and that of Moses. This will be a finite number\nand a part of all the men in the world. Hence, as the infinite can have\nno part, this shows that the whole number of men is finite, and hence\nthat the world had a beginning.\n\nThis proof is not in Saadia, but we learn from Maimonides (\"Guide of the\nPerplexed,\" I, ch. 75) that it was one of the proofs used by the\nMutakallimun to prove the absurdity of the belief in the eternity of the\nworld.\n\nThe third principle is that the composite is \"new.\" This is proved\nsimply by pointing out that the elements forming the composite are prior\nto it by nature, and hence the latter cannot be eternal, for nothing is\nprior to the eternal. This principle also is found in Saadia as the\nsecond of the four proofs in favor of creation.[113]\n\nWe have now justified our assumptions and hence have proved--what?\nClearly we have only proved that this _composite_ world cannot have\nexisted _as such_ from eternity; but that it must have been composed of\nits elements at some point in time past, and that hence there must be a\ncause or agency which did the composing. But there is nothing in the\nprinciples or in the demonstration based upon them which gives us a\nright to go back of the composite world and say of the elements, the\nsimple elements at the basis of all composition, viz., matter and form,\nthat they too must have come to be in time, and hence were created out\nof nothing. It is only the composite that argues an act of composition\nand elements preceding in time and by nature the object composed of\nthem. The simple needs not to be made, hence the question of its having\nmade itself does not arise. It was not made at all, we may say, it just\nexisted from eternity.\n\nThe only way to solve this difficulty from Bahya's premises is by saying\nthat if we suppose matter (or matter and form as separate entities) to\nhave existed from eternity, we are liable to the difficulty involved in\nthe idea of anything having traversed infinite time and reached us;\nthough it is doubtful whether unformed matter would lend itself to the\nexperiment of abstracting a part as in generations of men.\n\nBe this as it may, it is interesting to know that Saadia having arrived\nas far as Bahya in his argument was not yet satisfied that he proved\ncreation _ex nihilo_, and added special arguments for this purpose.\n\nBefore proceeding to prove the unity of God, Bahya takes occasion to\ndismiss briefly a notion which scarcely deserves consideration in his\neyes. That the world could have come by accident, he says, is too absurd\nto speak of, in view of the evidence of harmony and plan and wisdom\nwhich we see in nature. As well imagine ink spilled by accident forming\nitself into a written book.[114] Saadia also discusses this view as the\nninth of the twelve theories of creation treated by him, and refutes it\nmore elaborately than Bahya, whose one argument is the last of Saadia's\neight.\n\nIn the treatment of creation Saadia is decidedly richer and more\ncomprehensive in discussion, review and argumentation. This was to be\nexpected since such problems are the prime purpose of the \"Emunot\nve-Deot,\" whereas they are only preparatory, though none the less\nfundamental, in the \"Hobot ha-Lebabot,\" and Bahya must have felt that\nthe subject had been adequately treated by his distinguished\npredecessor. It is the more surprising therefore to find that in the\ntreatment of the unity of God Bahya is more elaborate, and offers a\ngreater variety of arguments for unity as such. Moreover, as has already\nbeen said before, he takes greater care than anyone before him to guard\nagainst the identification of God's unity with any of the unities,\ntheoretical or actual, in our experience. There is no doubt that this\nemphasis is due to Neo-Platonic influence, some of which may have come\nto Bahya from Gabirol, the rest probably from their common sources.\n\nWe see, Bahya begins his discussion of the unity of God, that the causes\nare fewer than their effects, the causes of the causes still fewer, and\nso on, until when we reach the top there is only one. Thus, the number\nof individuals is infinite, the number of species is finite; the number\nof genera is less than the number of species, until we get to the\nhighest genera, which according to Aristotle are ten (the ten\ncategories). Again, the causes of the individuals under the categories\nare five, motion and the four elements. The causes of the elements are\ntwo, matter and form. The cause of these must therefore be one, the will\nof God. (The will of God as immediately preceding universal matter and\nform sounds like a reminiscence of the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\".)\n\nGod's unity is moreover seen in the unity of plan and wisdom that is\nevident in the world. Everything is related to, connected with and\ndependent upon everything else, showing that there is a unitary\nprinciple at the basis.\n\nIf anyone maintains that there is more than one God, the burden of proof\nlies upon him. Our observation of the world has shown us that there is a\nGod who made it; hence one, since we cannot conceive of less than one;\nbut why more than one, unless there are special reasons to prove it?\n\nEuclid defines unity as that in virtue of which we call a thing one.\nThis means to signify that unity precedes the unitary thing by nature,\njust as heat precedes the hot object. Plurality is the sum of ones,\nhence plurality cannot be prior to unity, from which it proceeds. Hence\nwhatever plurality we find in our minds we know that unity precedes it;\nand even if it occurs to anyone that there is more than one creator,\nunity must after all precede them all. Hence God is one.\n\nThis argument is strictly Neo-Platonic and is based upon the idealism of\nPlato, the notion that whatever reality or attributes particular things\nin our world of sense possess they owe to the real and eternal types of\nthese realities and attributes in a higher and intelligible (using the\nterm in contradistinction to sensible) world in which they participate.\nIn so far as this conception is applied to the essences of things, it\nleads to the hypostatization of the class concepts or universals. Not\nthe particular individual whom we perceive is the real man, but the\ntypical man, the ideal man as the mind conceives him. He is not a\nconcept but a real existent in the intelligible world. If we apply it\nalso to qualities of things, we hypostatize the abstract quality. Heat\nbecomes really distinct from the hot object, existence from the existent\nthing, goodness from the good person, unity from the one object. And a\nthing is existent and one and good, because it participates in\nExistence, Unity and Goodness. These are real entities, intelligible\nand not sensible, and they give to our world what reality it possesses.\n\nPlotinus improved upon Plato, and instead of leaving these Ideas as\ndistinct and ultimate entities, he adopted the suggestion of Philo and\ngathered up all these intelligible existences in the lap of the\nuniversal Reason, as his ideas or thoughts. This universal Reason is in\nPhilo the _Logos_, whose mode of existence is still ambiguous, and is\nrather to be understood as the divine mind. In Plotinus it is the first\nstage in the unfoldment of the Godhead, and is a distinct _hypostasis_,\nthough not a person. In Christianity it is the second person in the\nTrinity, incarnated in Jesus. In Israeli, Gabirol and the other Jewish\nNeo-Platonists, it occupies the same place as the _Nous_ in Plotinus. In\nBahya, whose taint of Neo-Platonism is not even skin deep, there is no\nuniversal Reason spoken of. But we do not really know what his ideas may\nhave been on the subject, as he does not develop them in this direction.\n\nTo return to Bahya's arguments in favor of the unity of God, we proceed\nto show that dualism would lead to absurd conclusions. Thus if there is\nmore than one creator, they are either of the same substance or they are\nnot. If they are, then the common substance is the real creator, and we\nhave unity once more. If their substances are different, they are\ndistinct, hence limited, finite, composite, and hence not eternal, which\nis absurd.\n\nBesides, plurality is an attribute of substance, and belongs to the\ncategory of quantity. But the creator is neither substance nor accident\n(attribute), hence plurality cannot pertain to him. But if he cannot be\ndescribed as multiple, he must be one.\n\nIf the creator is more than one, it follows that either each one of them\ncould create the world alone, or he could not except with the help of\nthe other. If we adopt the first alternative, there is no need of more\nthan one creator. If we adopt the second, it follows that the creator is\nlimited in his power, hence, as above, composite, and not eternal, which\nis impossible. Besides, if there were more than one creator, it is\npossible that a dispute might arise between them in reference to the\ncreation. But all this time no such thing has happened, nature being\nalways the same. Hence God is one. Aristotle also agrees with us, for he\napplies in this connection the Homeric expression, \"It is not good to\nhave many rulers, let the ruler be one\" (Iliad, II, 204; Arist.,\nMetaphysics, XII, ch. 10, p. 1076a 4).[115]\n\nSo far as Bahya proves the unity of God he does not go beyond Saadia,\nsome of whose arguments are reproduced by him, and one or two of a\nNeo-Platonic character added besides. But there is a decided advance in\nthe analysis which follows, in which Bahya shows that there are various\nkinds of unity in our experience, and that the unity of God is unique.\n\nWe apply the term one to a class, a genus, a species, or an individual.\nIn all of these the multiplicity of parts is visible. The genus animal\ncontains many animals; the species man embraces a great many individual\nmen; and the individual man consists of many parts and organs and\nfaculties. Things of this sort are one in a sense and many in a sense.\n\nWe also apply the term one to an object in which the multiplicity of\nparts is not as readily visible as in the previous case. Take for\nexample a body of water which is homogeneous throughout and one part is\nlike another. This too is in reality composed of parts, matter and form,\nsubstance and accident. It is in virtue of this composition that it is\nsubject to genesis and decay, composition and division, union and\nseparation, motion and change. But all this implies plurality. Hence in\nboth the above cases the unity is not essential but accidental. It is\nbecause of a certain appearance or similarity that we call a thing or a\nclass one, which is in reality many.\n\nAnother application of the term one is when we designate by it the basis\nof number, the numerical one. This is a true one, essential as\ndistinguished from the accidental referred to above. But it is mental\nand not actual. It is a symbol of a beginning which has no other before\nit.\n\nFinally there is the real and actual one. This is something that does\nnot change or multiply; that cannot be described by any material\nattribute, that is not subject to generation and decay; that does not\nmove and is not similar to anything. It is one in all respects and the\ncause of multiplicity. It has no beginning or end, for that which has is\nsubject to change, and change is opposed to unity, the thing being\ndifferent before and after the change. For the same reason the real one\ndoes not resemble anything, for resemblance is an accident in the\nresembling thing, and to be possessed of accidents is to be multiple.\nHence the true one resembles nothing. Its oneness is no accident in it,\nfor it is a purely negative term in this application. It means not\nmultiple.[116]\n\nWe have now shown that there is a creator who is one, and on the other\nhand we have analyzed the various meanings of the term one, the last of\nwhich is the most real and the purest. It remains now to show that this\npure one is identical with the one creator. This can be proved in the\nfollowing way. The world being everywhere composite contains the one as\nwell as the many--unity of composition, plurality of the parts composed.\nAs unity is prior by nature to plurality, and causes do not run on to\ninfinity (see above, p. 87), the causes of the world's unity and\nmultiplicity cannot be again unity and multiplicity of the same kind\nforever. Hence as multiplicity cannot be the first, it must be\nunity--the absolute and true unity before which there is no other, and\nin which there is no manner of multiplicity. But God is the one cause of\nthe universe, as we have shown, hence God and this true unity are the\nsame.\n\nWe can show this also in another way. Whatever is an accidental\nattribute in one thing is an essential element in some other thing. Thus\nheat is an accidental attribute in hot water. For water may lose its\nheat and remain water as before. It is different with fire. Fire cannot\nlose its heat without ceasing to be fire. Hence heat in fire is an\nessential element; and it is from fire that hot water and all other hot\nthings receive their heat. The same thing applies to the attribute of\nunity. It is accidental in all creatures. They are called one because\nthey combine a number of elements in one group or concept. But they are\nreally multiple since they are liable to change and division and motion,\nand so on. Hence there must be something in which unity is essential,\nand which is the cause of whatsoever unity all other things possess. But\nGod is the cause of the universe, hence he is this true and absolute\nunity, and all change and accident and multiplicity are foreign to\nhim.[117]\n\nThis unity of God is not in any way derogated from by the ascription to\nhim of attributes. For the latter are of two kinds, \"essential\" and\n\"active.\" We call the first essential because they are permanent\nattributes of God, which he had before creation and will continue to\nhave when the world has ceased to be. These attributes are three in\nnumber, Existing, One, Eternal. We have already proved every one of\nthem.\n\nNow these attributes do not imply change in the essence of God. They are\nto be understood in the sense of denying their opposites, _i. e._, that\nhe is not multiple, non-existent or newly come into being. They also\nimply each other as can easily be shown, _i. e._, every one of the three\nimplies the other two. We must understand therefore that they are really\n_one_ in idea, and if we could find one term to express the thought\nfully, we should not use three. But the three do not imply multiplicity\nin God.\n\nThe \"active\" are those attributes which are ascribed to God by reason of\nhis actions or effects on us. We are permitted to apply them to him\nbecause of the necessity which compels us to get to know of his\nexistence so that we may worship him. The Biblical writers use them very\nfrequently. We may divide these into two kinds: First, those which\nascribe to God a corporeal form, such as (Gen. 1, 27), \"And God created\nman in his image,\" and others of the same character. Second, those\nattributes which refer to corporeal movements and actions. These have\nbeen so interpreted by our ancient sages as to remove the corporeality\nfrom God by substituting the \"Glory of God\" for God as the subject of\nthe movement or act in question. Thus, (Gen. 28, 13) \"And behold the\nLord stood above it,\" is rendered by the Aramaic translator, \"and behold\nthe _glory of God was present_ above it.\" Saadia deals with this matter\nat length in his \"Emunot ve-Deot,\" in his commentary on Genesis, and on\nthe book \"Yezirah.\" So there is no need of going into detail here. We\nare all agreed that necessity compels us to speak of God in corporeal\nterms so that all may be made to know of God's existence. This they\ncould not do if the prophets had spoken in metaphysical terms, for not\neveryone can follow such profound matters. But having come to the\nknowledge of God in this simpler though imperfect way, we can then\nadvance to a more perfect knowledge of him. The intelligent and\nphilosophical reader will lose nothing by the anthropomorphic form of\nthe Bible, for he can remove the husk and penetrate to the kernel. But\nthe simple reader would miss a very great deal indeed if the Bible were\nwritten in the language of philosophy, as he would not understand it and\nwould remain without a knowledge of God.\n\nDespite its predominant anthropomorphism, however, the Bible does give\nus hints of God's spirituality so that the thoughtful reader may also\nhave food for _his_ thought. For example, such expressions as (Deut. 4,\n15), \"Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner\nof form on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the\nmidst of the fire,\" and many others are meant to spur on the\ndiscriminating reader to further thought. The same applies to all those\npassages in which the word \"name\" is inserted before the word God as the\nobject of praise to indicate that we do not know God in his essence. An\nexample of this is, \"And they shall bless the name of thy glory\" (Neh.\n9, 5). For the same reason the name of God is joined in the Bible to\nheaven, earth, the Patriarchs, in such phrases as the God of the\nheavens, the God of Abraham, and so on, to show that we do not know\nGod's essence but only his revelation in nature and in history. This is\nthe reason why after saying to Moses, \"I am sent me unto you\" (Ex. 3,\n14), he adds (ib. 15), tell them, \"the God of your fathers, the God of\nAbraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob sent me unto you.\" The\nmeaning is, if they cannot understand God with their reason, let them\nknow me from history and tradition.[118]\n\nIn Bahya's treatment of the divine attributes we already have in brief\nthe main elements which Maimonides almost a century later made classic,\nnamely, the distinction between essential and active attributes, and the\nidea that the former are to be understood as denying their opposites,\n_i. e._, as being in their nature not positive but negative. The outcome\ntherefore is that only two kinds of attributes are applicable to God,\nnegative and those which are transferred or projected from the effects\nof God's activity as they are visible in nature. Saadia had already made\nthe distinction between essential and active attributes, but it was\nquite incidental with him, and not laid down at the basis of his\ndiscussion, but casually referred to in a different connection. Al\nMukammas speaks of negative attributes as being more applicable to God\nthan positive, as Philo had already said long before. But the\ncombination of these two, negative and active, as the only kinds of\ndivine attributes is not found in Jewish literature before Bahya.\n\nIt is worth noting also that Bahya does not lay down the three\nattributes, Power, Wisdom and Life as fundamental or essential in the\nmanner of the Christians, the Arab Mutakallimun, and the Jewish Saadia.\nBahya, as we have seen, regards as God's essential attributes,\nexistence, unity, eternity. Herein, too, he seems to anticipate\nMaimonides who insists against the believers in essential attributes\nthat the attributes, living, omnipotent, omniscient, having a will, are\nno more essential than any other, but like the rest of the qualities\nascribed to God have reference to his activity in nature.[119]\n\nWe have now gone through Bahya's philosophical chapter giving us the\nmetaphysical basis of his ethico-religious views. That his purpose is\npractical and not theoretical is clear from his definition of what he\ncalls the \"acknowledgment of the unity of God with full heart,\" not to\nspeak of the title of the book itself, the meaning of which we explained\nat the beginning of this section, and the nine chapters in Bahya's work\nfollowing upon the first, which constitute its real essence and purpose.\nTo acknowledge the unity of God with full heart means, he tells us, that\none must first know how to prove the existence and unity of God, to\ndistinguish God's unity from every other, and then to make his heart and\nhis tongue unite in this conception.[120] It is not a matter of the\nintellect merely, but of the heart as affecting one's practical conduct.\nThe adequacy of the conception is destroyed not merely by thinking of\nGod as multiple, or by worshiping images, sun, moon and stars; it is\nmade null and void likewise by hypocrisy and pretence, as when one\naffects piety before others to gain their favor or acquire a reputation.\nThe same disastrous result is brought about by indulging the low\nphysical appetites. Here the worship of the appetites is brought into\ncompetition and rivalry with devotion to the one God.[121]\n\nOur object being to trace the philosophical conceptions in medi\u00e6val\nJewish literature, we cannot linger long in the study of the rest of\nBahya's masterpiece, which is homiletical and practical rather than\ntheoretic, and must content ourselves with a very brief r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of its\nprincipal contents.\n\nIn studying the nature and attributes of God we reached the conclusion\nthat while a knowledge of him is absolutely necessary for a proper mode\nof life, we cannot form an idea of him as he is in himself, and are left\nto such evidence as we can gather from the world of which he is the\nauthor. It becomes our duty, therefore, to study nature, as a whole and\nin its parts, conscientiously and minutely, in order to realize clearly\nthe goodness and wisdom of God as exhibited therein. For various reasons\nwe are apt to neglect this study and miss the insight and benefits\narising therefrom. Chief among these hindering circumstances are our\nexcessive occupations with the pleasures of this world, and the\naccidents and misfortunes to which mortal is heir, which blind him to\nhis real good, and prevent him from seeing the blessing in disguise\nlurking in these very misfortunes.\n\nBut it is clear that man has a duty to study the divine goodness and\nwisdom as exhibited in nature, else of what use is his faculty of reason\nand intelligence, which raises him above the beast. If he neglects it,\nhe places himself below the latter, which realizes all the functions of\nwhich it is capable. Bible and Talmud are equally emphatic in urging us\nto study the wonders of nature.\n\nThe variety of natural phenomena and the laws they exhibit give evidence\nof the personality of God and the existence of his will. A being without\nwill, acting by necessity of nature, acts with unswerving uniformity.\n\nHeaven and earth, plant and animal, all creatures great and small, bear\nwitness, in their structure and relations, in their functions and mutual\nservice and helpfulness, to the wisdom and goodness of God. Above all is\nthis visible in man, the highest of earthly beings, the microcosm, the\nrational creature, the discoverer and inventor of arts and sciences. In\nthe laws and statutes which were given to him for the service of God,\nand in the customs of other nations which take the place of our divine\nlaw, we see God's kindness to man in securing his comfort in this world\nand reward in the next.\n\nPride is the great enemy of man, because it prevents him from\nappreciating what he owes to God's goodness. Pride makes him feel that\nhe deserves more than he gets, and blinds him to the truth.[122]\n\nWe all recognize the duty of gratitude to a fellow man who has done us a\nfavor, although all such cases of benefit and service between man and\nman, not excepting even the kindness of a father to his child, will be\nfound on examination to be of a selfish nature. The benefit to self may\nnot in all cases be conscious, but it is always there. It is a father's\nnature to love his child as part of himself. Moreover, these human\nfavors are not constant, and the person benefited stands comparatively\non the same level of existence and worth as his benefactor. How much\ngreater then is the duty incumbent upon us to appreciate God's favors\nwhich are not selfish, which are constant, and which are bestowed by the\ngreatest of all beings upon the smallest of all in respect of physical\nstrength.\n\nThe only way in which man can repay God for his kindness, and show an\nappreciation thereof is by submitting to him and doing those things\nwhich will bring him nearer to God. In order to realize this it is\nnecessary to abandon the bad qualities, which are in principle two, love\nof pleasure and love of power. The means enabling one to obtain this\nfreedom are to abstain from too much eating, drinking, idling, and so\non, for the first, and from too much gossip, social intercourse, and\nlove of glory for the second. It may be difficult to do this, but one\nmust make up one's mind to it, like the invalid who is ready to lose a\nlimb in order to save his life.\n\nThe problem of free will is perplexing indeed and interferes with the\nproper attitude toward God and his worship. The best way out of the\ndifficulty is to act as if we were free, and on the other hand to have\nconfidence in God as the author of everything.\n\nWe have seen that the reason bids us recognize our duty to God in return\nfor his goodness to us. At the same time we are not left to the\nsuggestions and promptings of the reason alone. We have a positive law\nprescribing our conduct and the manner and measure of expressing our\ngratitude to God. This is made necessary by the constitution of man's\nnature. He is a composite of body and spirit. The former is at home in\nthis lower world and is endowed with powers and qualities which tend to\nstrengthen it at the expense of the spirit, a stranger in this world.\nHence the necessity of a positive law to cure the spirit from the ills\nof the body by forbidding certain kinds of food, clothing, sexual\nindulgence, and so on, which strengthen the appetites, and commanding\nsuch actions as prayer, fasting, charity, benevolence, which have the\nopposite tendency of strengthening the reason.\n\nThe positive law is necessary and useful besides because it prescribes\nthe middle way, discouraging equally the extremes of asceticism and of\nself-indulgence. It regulates and defines conduct, and makes it uniform\nfor old and young, intelligent and unintelligent. It institutes new\noccasions of worship and thanksgiving as history reveals new\nbenefactions of God to his people in various generations. The law also\ncontains matters which the reason alone would not dictate, and of which\nit does not understand the meaning. Such are the \"traditional\ncommandments.\" The reason why the law prescribes also some of the\nprinciples of the \"rational commandments\" is because at that time the\npeople were so sunk in their animal desires that their minds were\nweakened, and there was need of putting both classes of commandments on\nthe same level of positive prescription. But now the intelligent person\nobserves them in accordance with their distinct origin, whereas the\nmasses simply follow the law in both.\n\nThe admonition of the positive law serves as an introduction to the\nsuggestions of our own reason and prepares the way for the latter. The\nfirst is absolutely necessary for the young, the women and those of weak\nintellectual power. To worship God not merely because the law prescribes\nit, but because reason itself demands it denotes a spiritual advance,\nand puts one in the grade of prophets and pious men chosen of God. In\nthis world their reward is the joy they feel in the sweetness of divine\nservice; in the next world they attain to the spiritual light which we\ncannot declare or imagine.[123]\n\nOne of the duties of the heart is to trust in God. Apart from the Bible\nwhich commands us to have trust in God, we can come to the same\nconclusion as a result of our own reflection. For in God alone are\ncombined all the conditions necessary to confidence. He has the power to\nprotect and help us, and the knowledge of our needs. He is kind and\ngenerous and has a love for us and an interest in our welfare, as we\nhave shown in a previous discussion. Trust in God is of advantage\nreligiously in giving a person peace of mind, independence and freedom\nto devote himself to the service of God without being worried by the\ncares of the world. He is like the alchemist who changes lead into\nsilver, and silver into gold. If he has money he can make good use of it\nin fulfilling his duties to God and man. If he has not, he is grateful\nfor the freedom from care which this gives him. He is secure against\nmaterial worries. He does not have to go to distant lands to look for\nsupport, or to engage in hard and fatiguing labor, or to exploit other\npeople. He chooses the work that is in consonance with his mode of\nlife, and gives him leisure and strength to do his duty to God and man.\n\nThe suffering of the good and the prosperity of the bad, which\napparently contradicts our conclusion, is a problem as old as the world,\nand is discussed in the Bible. There is no one explanation to cover all\ncases, hence no solution is given in the Bible. But several reasons may\nbe brought forward for this anomaly. The righteous man may suffer by way\nof punishment for a sin he has committed. He may suffer in this world in\norder that he may be rewarded in the next. His suffering may be an\nexample of patience and goodness to other people; especially in a bad\ngeneration, to show off their wickedness by contrast with his goodness.\nOr finally the good man may be punished for not rebuking his generation\nof evil doers. In a similar way we may explain the prosperity of the\nwicked.\n\nTrust in God does not signify that one should neglect one's work, be\ncareless of one's life, health and well-being, or abandon one's effort\nto provide for one's family and dependents. No, one must do all these\nthings conscientiously, at the same time feeling that if not for the\nhelp of God all effort would be in vain. In the matter of doing one's\nduty and observing the commandments, whether of the limbs or the heart,\ntrust in God can apply only to the last step in the process, namely, the\nrealization in practice. He must trust that God will put out of the way\nall obstacles and hindrances which may prevent him from carrying out his\nresolutions. The choice and consent must come from a man's own will,\nwhich is free. The most he may do is to trust that God may remove\ntemptations.\n\nWhile it is true that good deeds are rewarded in this world as well as\nin the next, a man must not trust in his deeds, but in God. It may seem\nstrange that there is no reference in the Bible to reward in the\nhereafter. The reasons may be the following. Not knowing what the state\nof the soul is without the body, we could not understand the nature of\nfuture reward, and the statement of it in the Bible would not have been\na sufficient inducement for the people of that time to follow the\ncommandments. Or it is possible that the people knew by tradition of\nreward after death, hence it was not necessary to specify it.\n\nAs knowledge of nature and of God leads to trust in him, so ignorance\nleads away from it. It is as with a child, who develops in his manner of\ntrusting in things; beginning with his mother's breast and rising\ngradually as he grows older and knows more, until he embraces other\npersons and attains to trust in God.[124]\n\nWe said before (p. 83) that the duties of the limbs are imperfect unless\naccompanied by the intention of the heart. A man's motive must be\nsincere. It must not be his aim to gain the favor of his fellowmen or to\nacquire honor and fame. The observance of the prescribed laws must be\nmotived by the sole regard for God and his service. This we call the\n\"unity of conduct.\" The meaning is that a man's act and intention must\ncoincide in aiming at the fulfilment of God's will. In order to realize\nthis properly one must have an adequate and sincere conception of God's\nunity as shown above; he must have an appreciation of God's goodness as\nexhibited in nature; he must submit to God's service; he must have trust\nin God alone as the sole author of good and evil; and correspondingly he\nmust abstain from flattering mankind, and must be indifferent to their\npraise and blame; he must fear God, and have respect and awe for him.\nWhen he is in the act of fulfilling his spiritual obligations, he must\nnot be preoccupied with the affairs of this world; and finally he must\nalways consult his reason, and make it control his desires and\ninclinations.[125]\n\nHumility and lowliness is an important element conducive to \"unity of\nconduct.\" By this is not meant that general helplessness in the face of\nconditions, dangers and injuries because of ignorance of the methods of\naverting them. This is not humility but weakness. Nor do we mean that\ntimidity and loss of countenance which one suffers before a superior in\nphysical power or wealth. The true humility with which we are here\nconcerned is that which one feels constantly before God, though it shows\nitself also in such a person's conduct in the presence of others, in\nsoft speech, low voice, and modest behavior generally, in prosperity as\nwell as adversity. The truly humble man practices patience and\nforgiveness; he does good to mankind and judges them favorably; he is\ncontented with little in respect to food and drink and the needs of the\nbody generally; he endures misfortune with resignation; is not spoiled\nby praise, nor irritated by blame, but realizes how far he is from\nperfection in the one case, and appreciates the truth of the criticism\nin the other. He is not spoiled by prosperity and success, and always\nholds himself under strict account. God knows it, even if his fellowmen\ndo not.\n\nHumility, as we have described it, is not, however, incompatible with a\ncertain kind of pride; not that form of it which boasts of physical\nexcellence, nor that arrogance which leads a man to look down upon\nothers and belittle their achievements. These forms of pride are bad and\ndiametrically opposed to true humility. Legitimate mental pride is that\nwhich leads a person blessed with intellectual gifts to feel grateful to\nGod for his favor, and to strive to improve his talents and share their\nbenefits with others.[126]\n\nHumility is a necessary forerunner of repentance and we must treat of\nthis duty of the heart next. It is clear from reason as well as from the\nLaw that man does not do all that is incumbent upon him in the service\nof God. For man is composed of opposite principles warring with each\nother, and is subject to change on account of the change of his mental\nqualities. For this reason he needs a law and traditional custom to keep\nhim from going astray. The Bible also tells us that \"the imagination of\nthe heart of man is evil from his youth\" (Gen. 8, 21). Therefore God was\ngracious and gave man the ability and opportunity to correct his\nmistakes. This is repentance.\n\nTrue repentance means return to God's service after having succeeded in\nmaking the reason the master of the desires. The elements in repentance\nare, (1) regret; (2) discontinuance of the wrong act; (3) confession and\nrequest for pardon; (4) promise not to repeat the offence.\n\nIn respect to gravity of offence, sins may be divided into three\nclasses: (1) Violation of a positive commandment in the Bible which is\nnot punished by \"cutting off from the community.\" For example, dwelling\nin booths, wearing fringes, and shaking the palm branch. (2) Violation\nof a negative commandment not so punished. (3) Violation of a negative\ncommandment the penalty for which is death at the hands of the court,\nand being \"cut off\" by divine agency; for example, profanation of the\ndivine name or false oath. In cases of the first class a penitent is as\ngood as one who never sinned. In the second class he is even superior,\nbecause the latter has not the same prophylactic against pride. In the\nthird class the penitent is inferior to the one who never sinned.\n\nAnother classification of offences is in two divisions according to the\nsubject against whom the offence is committed. This may be a human\nbeing, and the crime is social; or it may be God, and we have sin in the\nproper sense of the term. Penitence is sufficient for forgiveness in the\nlatter class, but not in the former. When one robs another or insults\nhim, he must make restoration or secure the pardon of the offended party\nbefore his repentance can be accepted. And if the person cannot be\nfound, or if he died, or is alive but refuses to forgive his offender,\nor if the sinner lost the money which he took, or if he does not know\nwhom he robbed, or how much, it may be impossible for him to atone for\nthe evil he has done. Still if he is really sincere in his repentance,\nGod will help him to make reparation to the person wronged.[127]\n\nSelf-examination is conducive to repentance. By this term is meant\ntaking stock of one's spiritual condition so as to know the merits one\nhas as well the duties one owes. In order to do this conscientiously a\nman must reflect on the unity of God, on his wisdom and goodness, on the\nobedience which all nature pays to the laws imposed upon it, disregard\nof which would result in the annihilation of all things, including\nhimself. A man should review his past conduct, and provide for his\nfuture life, as one provides for a long journey, bearing in mind that\nlife is short, and that he is a stranger in this world with no one to\nhelp him except the goodness and grace of his maker. He should cultivate\nthe habit of being alone and not seek the society of idlers, for that\nleads to gossip and slander, to sin and wrong, to vanity and neglect of\nGod. This does not apply to the company of the pious and the learned,\nwhich should be sought. He should be honest and helpful to his friends,\nand he will get along well in this world. All the evils and complaints\nof life are due to the fact that people are not considerate of one\nanother, and everyone grabs for himself all that he can, more than he\nneeds. One should examine anew the ideas one has from childhood to be\nsure that he understands them in the light of his riper intellect. He\nshould also study again the books of the Bible and the prayers which he\nlearned as a child, for he would see them now in a different light. He\nmust try to make his soul control his body, strengthening it with\nintellectual and spiritual food for the world to come. These efforts and\nreflections and many others of a similar kind tend to perfect the soul\nand prepare it to attain to the highest degree of purity, where the evil\ndesire can have no power over her.[128]\n\nIn self-examination temperance or abstemiousness plays an important\nr\u00f4le. Let us examine this concept more closely. By abstemiousness in the\nspecial sense in which we use it here we do not mean that general\ntemperance or moderation which we practice to keep our body in good\norder, or such as physicians prescribe for the healthy and the sick,\nbidding them abstain from certain articles of food, drink, and so on. We\nmean rather a more stringent abstemiousness, which may be called\nseparation from the world, or asceticism. We may define this to mean\nabstention from all corporeal satisfactions except such as are\nindispensable for the maintenance of life.\n\nNot everyone is required to practice this special form of temperance,\nnor is it desirable that he should, for it would lead to extinction of\nthe human race. At the same time it is proper that there shall be a few\nselect individuals, ascetic in their habits of life, and completely\nseparated from the world, to serve as an example for the generality of\nmankind, in order that temperance of the more general kind shall be the\nhabit of the many.\n\nThe object of God in creating man was to try the soul in order to purify\nit and make it like the angels. It is tried by being put in an earthy\nbody, which grows and becomes larger by means of food. Hence God put\ninto the soul the desire for food, and the desire for sexual union to\nperpetuate the species; and he made the reward for the satisfaction of\nthese desires the pleasure which they give. He also appointed the \"evil\ninclination\" to incite to all these bodily pleasures. Now if this \"evil\ninclination\" gets the upper hand of the reason, the result is excess and\nruin. Hence the need of general abstemiousness. And the ascetic class\nserve the purpose of reinforcing general temperance by their example.\n\nBut in the asceticism of the few there is also a limit beyond which one\nshould not go. Here too the middle way is the best. Those extremists who\nleave the world entirely and live the life of a recluse in the desert,\nsubsisting on grass and herbs, are farthest from the middle way, and the\nBible does not approve of their mode of life, as we read in Isaiah (45,\n18) \"The God that formed the earth and made it; he that hath\nestablished it,--not in vain did he create it, he formed it to be\ninhabited.\" Those are much better who without leaving for the desert\npass solitary lives in their homes, not associating with other people,\nand abstaining from superfluities of all kinds. But the best of all are\nthose who adopt the mildest form of asceticism, who separate from the\nworld inwardly while taking part in it outwardly, and assisting in the\nordinary occupations of mankind. These are commended in the Bible.\nWitness the prayer of Jacob (Gen. 28, 20), the fasting of Moses forty\ndays and forty nights on the mount, the fasting of Elijah, the laws of\nthe Nazirite, Jonadab ben Rechab, Elisha, prescriptions of fasting on\nvarious occasions, and so on.[129]\n\nThe highest stage a man can reach spiritually is the love of God, and\nall that preceded has this as its aim. True love of God is that felt\ntoward him for his own sake because of his greatness and exaltation, and\nnot for any ulterior purpose.\n\nThe soul is a simple spiritual substance which inclines to that which is\nlike it, and departs from what is material and corporeal. But when God\nput the soul into the body, he implanted in it the desire to maintain\nit, and it was thus affected by the feelings and desires which concern\nthe health and growth of the body, thus becoming estranged from the\nspiritual.\n\nIn order that the soul shall attain to the true love of God, the reason\nmust get the upper hand of the desires, all the topics treated in the\npreceding sections must be taken to heart and sincerely and\nconscientiously acted upon. Then the eyes of the soul will be opened,\nand it will be filled with the fear and the love of God.[130]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nPSEUDO-BAHYA\n\n\nIt had been known for a number of years that there was a manuscript\ntreatise in Arabic on the soul, which was attributed on the title page\nto Bahya. In 1896 Isaac Broyd\u00e9 published a Hebrew translation of this\nwork under the title \"Torot ha-Nefesh,\" (\"Reflections on the\nSoul\").[131] The original Arabic was edited by Goldziher in 1907.[132]\nThe Arabic title is \"Ma`ani al-Nafs,\" and should be translated \"Concepts\nof the soul,\" or \"Attributes of the soul.\"\n\nThere seems little doubt now that despite the ascription on the title\npage of the manuscript, the treatise is not a work of Bahya. It is very\nunlikely that anything written by so distinguished an author as Bahya,\nwhose \"Duties of the Hearts\" was the most popular book in the middle\nages, should have been so thoroughly forgotten as to have left no trace\nin Jewish literature. Bahya as well as the anonymous author refer, in\nthe introductions to their respective works, to their sources or to\ntheir own previous writings. But there is no reference either in the\n\"Duties of the Hearts\" to the \"Attributes of the Soul,\" or in the latter\nto the former. A still stronger argument against Bahya as the author of\nour treatise is that derived from the content of the work, which moves\nin a different circle of ideas from the \"Duties of the Hearts.\" Our\nanonymous author is an outspoken Neo-Platonist. He believes in the\ndoctrine of emanation, and arranges the created universe, spiritual and\nmaterial, in a descending series of such emanations, ten in number. The\nMutakallimun he opposes as being followers of the \"Naturalists,\" who\ndisagree with the philosophers as well as the Bible. Bahya, on the other\nhand, is a strict follower of the Kalam in his chapter on the \"Unity,\"\nas we have seen (p. 86), and the Neo-Platonic influence is very slight.\nThere is no trace of a graded series of emanations in the \"Duties of the\nHearts.\"[133]\n\nThe sources of the \"Attributes of the Soul\" are no doubt the various\nNeo-Platonic writings current among the Arabs in the tenth and eleventh\ncenturies, of which we spoke in the Introduction (p. xx) and in the\nchapter on Gabirol (p. 63 f.). Gabirol himself can scarcely have had\nmuch influence on our author, as the distinctive doctrine of the \"Fons\nVit\u00e6\" is absent in our treatise. The reader will remember that matter\nand form, according to Gabirol, are at the basis not merely of the\ncorporeal world, but that they constitute the essence of the spiritual\nworld as well, the very first emanation, the Universal Intelligence,\nbeing composed of universal matter and universal form. As we shall see\nthis is not the view of the \"Attributes of the Soul.\" Matter here\noccupies the position which it has in Plotinus and in the encyclop\u00e6dia\nof the Brethren of Purity. It is the fourth in order of emanations, and\nthe composition of matter and form begins with the celestial sphere,\nwhich is the fifth in order. Everything that precedes matter is\nabsolutely simple. At the same time it seems clear that he was familiar\nwith Gabirol's doctrine of the will. For in at least two passages in the\n\"Attributes of the Soul\" (chs. 11 and 13)[134] we have the series,\nvegetative soul, spheral impression, [psychic power--omitted in ch. 13],\nuniversal soul, intellect, will.\n\nThe \"Categories\" of Aristotle is also clearly evident in the \"Attributes\nof the Soul.\" It is the ultimate source of the definition of accident as\nthat which resides in substance without being a part of it, but yet in\nsuch a way that without substance it cannot exist.[135] The number of\nthe species of motion as six[136] points in the same direction. This,\nhowever, does not prove that the author read the \"Categories.\" He might\nhave derived these notions, as well as the list of the ten categories,\nfrom the writings of the Brethren of Purity. The same thing applies to\nthe statement that a spiritual substance is distinguished from a\ncorporeal in its capacity of receiving its qualities or accidents\nwithout limits.[137] This probably goes back to the De Anima of\nAristotle where a similar contrast between the senses and the reason is\nused as an argument for the \"separate\" character of the latter. The\ndoctrine of the mean in conduct[138] comes from the ethics of Aristotle.\nThe doctrine of the four virtues and the manner of their derivation is\nPlatonic,[139] and so is the doctrine of reminiscence, viz., that the\nsoul recalls the knowledge it had in its previous life.[140]\n\nIbn Sina is one of the latest authors mentioned in our work; hence it\ncould not have been written much before 1037, the date of Ibn Sina's\ndeath. The _terminus ad quem_ cannot be determined.\n\nAs the title indicates, the anonymous treatise is concerned primarily\nwith the nature of the soul. Whatever other topics are found therein are\nintroduced for the bearing they have on the central problem. A study of\nthe soul means psychology as well as ethics, for a complete\ndetermination of the nature of the soul necessarily must throw light not\nonly upon the origin and activity of the soul, but also upon its purpose\nand destiny.\n\nThe first error, we are told, that we must remove concerning the soul,\nis the doctrine of the \"naturalists,\" with whom the Mu`tazilites among\nthe Arabs and the Karaites among the Jews are in agreement, that the\nsoul is not an independent and self-subsistent entity, but only an\n\"accident\" of the body. Their view is that as the soul is a corporeal\nquality it is dependent for its existence upon the body and disappears\nwith the latter. Those of the Mu`tazilites who believe in \"Mahad\"\n(return of the soul to its origin), hold that at the time of the\nresurrection God will bring the parts of the body together with its\naccident, the soul, and will reward and punish them. But the\nresurrection is a distinct problem, and has nothing to do with the\nnature of the soul and its qualities.\n\nThe true opinion, which is that of the Bible and the true philosophers,\nis that the soul is a spiritual substance independent of the body; that\nit existed before the body and will continue to exist after the\ndissolution of the latter. The existence of a spiritual substance is\nproved from the presence of such qualities as knowledge and ignorance.\nThese are opposed to each other, and cannot be the qualities of body as\nsuch, for body cannot contain two opposite forms at the same time.\nMoreover, the substance, whatever it be, which bears the attributes of\nknowledge and ignorance, can receive them without limit. The more\nknowledge a person has, the more capable he is of acquiring more. No\ncorporeal substance behaves in this way. There is always a limit to a\nbody's power of receiving a given accident. We legitimately conclude,\ntherefore, that the substance which bears the attributes of knowledge\nand ignorance is not corporeal but spiritual.[141]\n\nTo understand the position of the soul and its relation to the body, we\nmust have an idea of the structure and origin of the universe. The\nentire world, upper as well as lower, is divided into two parts, simple\nand composite. The simple essences, which are pure and bright, are\nnearer to their Creator than the less simple substances which come\nafter. There are ten such creations with varying simplicity, following\neach other in order according to the arrangement dictated by God's\nwisdom. As numbers are simple up to ten, and then they begin to be\ncompound, so in the universe the ten simple substances are followed by\ncomposite.\n\nThe first of these simple creations, which is nearest to God, is called\nin Hebrew \"Shekinah.\" The Torah and the Prophets call it \"Name\" (Exod.\n23, 21), also \"Kabod,\" Glory (Is. 59, 19). God gave his name to the\nnearest and first of his creations, which is the first light, and\ninterpreter and servant nearest to him. Solomon calls it \"Wisdom\" (Prov.\n8, 22); the Greeks, Active Intellect. The second creation is called by\nthe Prophets, \"the Glory of the God of Israel\" (Ezek. 8, 9); by the\nGreeks, Universal Soul, for it moves the spheres through a natural power\nas the individual soul moves the body. The soul partakes of the\nIntelligence or Intellect on the side which is near to it; it partakes\nof Nature on the side adjoining the latter. Nature is the third\ncreation. It also is an angel, being the first of the powers of the\nuniversal soul, and constituting the life of this world and its motion.\n\nThese three are simple essences in the highest sense of the word. They\nare obedient to their Creator, and transmit in order his emanation and\nthe will, and the laws of his wisdom to all the worlds. The fourth\ncreation is an essence which has no activity or life or motion\noriginally, but only a power of receiving whatever is formed and created\nout of it. This is the _Matter_ of the world. From it come the bodies\nwhich possess accidents. In being formed some of its non-existence is\ndiminished, and its matter moves. It is called \"hyle,\" and is the same\nas the darkness of the first chapter in Genesis. For it is a mistake to\nsuppose that by darkness in the second verse of the first chapter is\nmeant the absence of the light of the sun. This is accidental darkness,\nwhereas in the creation story the word darkness signifies something\nelemental at the basis of corporeal things. This is what is known as\nmatter, which on account of its darkness, _i. e._, its imperfection and\nmotionlessness, is the cause of all the blemishes and evils in the\nworld. In receiving forms, however, it acquires motion; its darkness is\nsomewhat diminished, and it appears to the eye through the forms which\nit receives.\n\nThe fifth creation is the celestial Sphere, where for the first time we\nhave motion in its revolutions. Here too we have the first composition\nof matter and form; and the beginning of time as the measure of the\nSphere's motion; and place. The sixth creation is represented by the\nbodies of the _stars_, which are moved by the spheres in which they are\nset. They are bright and luminous because they are near the first simple\nbodies, which were produced before time and place. The last four of the\nten creations are the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. The\nelement earth is the end of \"creation.\" What follows thereafter is\n\"formation\" and \"composition.\" By creation is meant that which results\nthrough the will of God from his emanation alone, and not out of\nanything, or in time or place. It applies in the strictest sense to the\nfirst three only. The fifth, namely the Sphere, already comes from\nmatter and form, and is in time and place. The fourth, too, enters into\nthe fifth and all subsequent creations and formations. Still, the term\ncreation is applicable to the first ten, though in varying degrees,\nuntil when we reach the element earth, creation proper is at an end.\nThis is why in the first verse in Genesis, which speaks of heaven and\nearth, the term used is \"bara\" (created), and not any of the other\nterms, such as \"yazar,\" \"`asah,\" \"kanah,\" \"pa`al,\" and so on, which\ndenote formation.\n\nFrom earth and the other elements were formed all kinds of minerals,\nlike rocks, mountains, stones, and so on. Then plants and animals, and\nfinally man.\n\nMan who was formed last bears traces of all that preceded him. He is\nformed of the four elements, of the motions of the spheres, of the\nmixtures of the stars and their rays, of Nature, of the Universal Soul,\nthe mother of all, of the Intellect, the father of all, and finally of\nthe will of God. But the order in man is reversed. The first two\ncreations, Intellect and Soul, appear in man last.\n\nThe soul of man, embracing reason and intellect, is thus seen to be a\ndivine emanation, being related to the universal soul and Intellect. On\nits way from God to man it passes through all spheres, and every one\nleaves an impression upon her, and covers her with a wrapper, so to\nspeak. The brightness of the star determines the ornament or \"wrapper\"\nwhich the soul gets from it. This is known to the Creator, who\ndetermines the measure of influence and the accidents attaching to the\nsoul until she reaches the body destined for her by his will. The longer\nthe stay in a given sphere the stronger the influence of the sphere in\nquestion; and hence the various temperaments we observe in persons,\nwhich determine their character and conduct. For at bottom the soul is\nthe same in essence and unchangeable in all men, because she is an\nemanation from the Unchangeable. All individual differences are due to\nthe spheral impressions. These impressions, however, do not take away\nfrom the soul its freedom of will.[142]\n\nIn the rest of his psychology and ethics the anonymous author follows\nPlatonic theories, modified now and then in the manner of Aristotle.\nThus we are told that the soul consists of three powers, or three souls,\nthe vegetative, the animal and the rational. We learn of the existence\nof the vegetative soul from the nourishment, growth and reproduction\nevidenced by the individual. The animal soul shows its presence in the\nmotions of the body. The existence of the rational soul we have already\nshown from the attributes of knowledge and ignorance.\n\nThe vegetative soul comes from certain spheral influences, themselves\ndue to the universal soul, and ultimately to the will of God. It is the\nfirst of the three to make its appearance in the body. It is already\nfound in the embryo, to which it gives the power of motion in its own\nplace like the motion of a plant or tree. Its seat is in the liver,\nwhere the growth of the embryo begins. Its function ceases about the\ntwentieth year, when the growth of the body reaches its limit.\n\nThe animal soul springs from the heart. Its functioning appears after\nbirth when the child begins to crawl, and continues until the person\nloses the power of locomotion in old age. The rational soul resides in\nthe middle of the brain. She knows all things before joining the body,\nbut her knowledge is obscured on account of the material coverings which\nshe receives on her way down from her divine source.[143]\n\nThe virtue of the vegetative soul is temperance; of the animal soul,\ncourage; of the rational soul, wisdom. When these are harmoniously\ncombined in the individual, and the two lower souls are controlled by\nthe higher, there results the fourth virtue, which is justice, and which\ngives its possessor the privilege of being a teacher and a leader of his\npeople. In Moses all these qualities were exemplified, and Isaiah (11,\n1-4) in describing the qualities of the Messianic King also enumerates\nthese four cardinal virtues. \"The spirit of wisdom and understanding\"\nrepresents wisdom, \"the spirit of counsel and strength\" stands for\ncourage; \"the spirit of knowledge and fear of the Lord\" denotes\ntemperance; and justice is represented in the phrase, \"and he will judge\nthe poor with righteousness.\"[144]\n\nVirtue is a mean between the two extremes of excess and defect, each of\nwhich is a vice. Thus an excess of wisdom becomes shrewdness and cunning\nand deceit; while a defect means ignorance. The true wisdom consists in\nthe middle way between the two extremes. Similarly courage is a mean\nbetween foolhardiness and rashness on the side of excess, and cowardice\non the side of defect. Temperance is a mean between excessive indulgence\nof the appetites on one side and utter insensibility on the other. The\nmean of justice is the result of the harmonious combination of the means\nof the last three. If the rational soul has wisdom and the two other\nsouls are obedient to it through modesty and courage, their substance\nchanges into the substance of the rational soul, _i. e._, their bad\nqualities are transformed into the four virtues just mentioned. Then the\ntwo lower souls unite with the rational soul and enjoy eternal happiness\nwith it. On the other hand, if the rational soul follows the senses, its\nwisdom changes into their folly, its virtues into their vices, and it\nperishes with them.[145]\n\nThe immortality of the soul is proved as follows. Things composed of\nelements return back to their elements, hence the soul also returns to\nits own origin. The soul is independent of the body, for its qualities,\nthought and knowledge, are not bodily qualities, hence they become\nclearer and more certain after the soul is separated from the body than\nbefore, when the body obscured its vision like a curtain. The fact that\na person's mind is affected when his body is ill does not show that the\nsoul is dependent in its nature upon the body; but that acting as it\ndoes in the body by means of corporeal organs, it cannot perform its\nfunctions properly when these organs are injured.\n\nSince death is a decree of God, it is clear that he has a purpose in\nchanging the relations of body and soul. But if the soul comes to an\nend, this change would be a vain piece of work of which he cannot be\nguilty. Hence it follows that the destruction of the body is in order\nthat we may exist in another similar form, similar to the angels.[146]\n\nThe purpose of the soul's coming into this world is in order that she\nmay purify the two lower souls; also that she may know the value of her\nown world in comparison with this one, and in grieving for having left\nit may observe God's commandments, and thus achieve her return to her\nown world.\n\nIn the matter of returning to their own world after separation from the\nbody, souls are graded according to the measure of their knowledge and\nthe value of their conduct. These two conditions, ethical and spiritual\nor intellectual, are requisite of fulfilment before the soul can regain\nits original home. The soul on leaving this world is like a clean, white\ngarment soaked in water. If the water is clean, it is easy to dry the\ngarment, and it becomes even cleaner than it was before. But if the\nwater is dirty, no amount of drying will make the garment clean.\n\nThose souls which instead of elevating the two lower souls, vegetative\nand animal, were misled by them, will perish with the latter. Between\nthe two extremes of perfection and wickedness there are intermediate\nstages, and the souls are treated accordingly. Those of the proud will\nrise in the air and flying hither and thither will not find a resting\nplace. Those which have knowledge, but no good deeds, will rise to the\nsphere of the ether, but will be prevented from rising higher by the\nweight of their evil deeds, and the pure angels will rain down upon them\narrows of fire, thus causing them to return below in shame and disgrace.\nThe souls of the dishonest will be driven from place to place without\nfinding any rest. Other bad souls will be punished in various ways.\nThose souls which have good deeds but no knowledge will be placed in the\nterrestrial paradise until their souls recall the knowledge they had in\ntheir original state, and they will then return to the Garden of Eden\namong the angels.[147]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nABRAHAM BAR HIYYA\n\n\nAbraham bar Hiyya, the Prince, as he is called, lived in Spain in the\nfirst half of the twelfth century. He also seems to have stayed some\ntime in southern France, though we do not know when or how long. His\ngreatest merit lies not in his philosophical achievement which, if we\nmay judge from the only work of a philosophical character that has come\ndown to us, is not very great. He is best known as a writer on\nmathematics, astronomy and the calendar; though there, too, his most\nimportant service lay not so much in the original ideas he propounded,\nas in the fact that he was among the first, if not the first, to\nintroduce the scientific thought current in the Orient and in Moorish\nSpain into Christian Europe, and especially among the Jews of France and\nGermany, who devoted all their energies to the Rabbinical literature,\nand to whom the Arabic works of their Spanish brethren were a sealed\nbook.\n\nSo we find Abraham bar Hiyya, or Abraham Savasorda (a corruption of the\nArabic title Sahib al-Shorta), associated with Plato of Tivoli in the\ntranslation into Latin of Arabic scientific works. And he himself wrote\na number of books on mathematics and astronomy in Hebrew at the request\nof his friends in France who could not read Arabic. Abraham bar Hiyya is\nthe first of the writers we have treated so far who composed a\nscientific work in the Hebrew language. All the others, with the\nexception of Abraham ibn Ezra, wrote in Arabic, as they continued to do\nuntil and including Maimonides.\n\nThe only one of his extant works which is philosophical in content is\nthe small treatise \"Hegyon ha-Nefesh,\" Meditation of the Soul.[148] It\nis a popular work, written with a practical purpose, ethical and\nhomiletic in tone and style. The idea of repentance plays an important\nr\u00f4le in the book, and what theoretical philosophy finds place therein is\nintroduced merely as a background and basis for the ethical and\nreligious considerations which follow. It may be called a miniature\n\"Duties of the Hearts.\" As in all homiletical compositions in Jewish\nliterature, exegesis of Biblical passages takes up a good deal of the\ndiscussions, and for the history of the philosophic movement in medi\u00e6val\nJudaism the methods of reading metaphysical and ethical ideas into the\nBible are quite as important as these ideas themselves.\n\nThe general philosophical standpoint of Abraham bar Hiyya may be\ncharacterized as an uncertain Neo-Platonism, or a combination of\nfundamental Aristotelian ideas with a Neo-Platonic coloring. Thus matter\nand form are the fundamental principles of the world. They existed\npotentially apart in the wisdom of God before they were combined and\nthus realized in actuality.[149] Time being a measure of motion, came\ninto being together with the motion which followed upon this\ncombination. Hence neither the world nor time is eternal. This is\nPlatonic, not Aristotelian, who believes in the eternity of motion as\nwell as of time. Abraham bar Hiyya also speaks of the purest form as\nlight and as looking at and illuminating the form inferior to it and\nthus giving rise to the heavens, minerals and plants.[150] This is all\nNeo-Platonic. And yet the most distinctive doctrine of Plotinus and the\nlater Neo-Platonists among the Arabs, the series of emanating\nhypostases, Intellect, Universal Soul, Nature, Matter, and so on, is\nwanting in the \"Hegyon ha-Nefesh.\"[151] Form is the highest thing he\nknows outside of God; and the purest form, which is too exalted to\ncombine with matter, embraces angels, seraphim, souls, and all forms\nrelated to the upper world.[152] With the exception of the names angel,\nseraphim, souls, this is good Aristotelian doctrine, who also believes\nin the movers of the spheres and the active intellect in man as being\npure forms.\n\nTo proceed now to give a brief account of Abraham bar Hiyya's teaching,\nhe thinks it is the duty of rational man to know how it is that man who\nis so insignificant was given control of the other animals, and endowed\nwith the power of wisdom and knowledge. In order to gain this knowledge\nwe must investigate the origins and principles of existing things, so\nthat we may arrive at an understanding of things as they are. This the\nwise men of other nations have realized, though they were not privileged\nto receive a divine Torah, and have busied themselves with philosophical\ninvestigations. Our Bible recommends to us the same method in the words\nof Deuteronomy (4, 39), \"Know therefore this day, and reflect in thy\nheart, that the Lord is God in the heavens above, and upon the earth\nbeneath: there is none else.\" This means that if you understand\nthoroughly the order of things in heaven above and the earth beneath,\nyou will at once see that God made it in his wisdom, and that he is the\nonly one and there is no one beside him. The book of Job teaches the\nsame thing, when it says (19, 26) \"And from my flesh I shall behold\nGod.\" This signifies that from the structure of the body and the form of\nits members we can understand the wisdom of the Creator. We need not\nhesitate therefore to study the works of the ancients and the wise men\nof other nations in order to learn from them the nature of existence. We\nhave the permission and recommendation of Scripture.[153]\n\nStarting from a consideration of man we see that he is the last of\ncreated things because we find in him additional composition over and\nabove that found in other creatures. Man is a \"_rational animal_.\"\n\"Animal\" means a body that grows and moves and at last is dissolved.\n\"Rational\" refers to the power of knowledge, of inferring one thing from\nanother, and discriminating between good and evil. In this man differs\nfrom other animals. Descending in the scale of existence we find that\nthe plant also grows and dies like the animal, but it does not move.\nStones, metals and other inanimate bodies on the earth, change their\nforms and shapes, but unlike plants they have no power of growing or\nincreasing. They are the simplest of the things on the earth. They\ndiffer from the heavenly bodies in that the latter never change their\nforms. Proceeding further in our analysis, we find that body, the\nsimplest thing so far, means length, breadth and depth attached to\nsomething capable of being measured. This definition shows that body is\nalso composed of two elements, which are theoretically distinct until\nGod's will joins them together. These are \"hyle\" (matter)--what has no\nlikeness or form, but has the capacity of receiving form--and form,\nwhich is defined as that which has power to clothe the hyle with any\nform. Matter alone is too weak to sustain itself, unless form comes to\nits aid. Form, on the other hand, is not perceptible to sense unless it\nclothes matter, which bears it. One needs the other. Matter cannot\n_exist_ without form; form cannot _be seen_ without matter. Form is\nsuperior to matter, because it needs the latter only to be seen but can\nexist by itself though not seen; whereas matter cannot _exist_ without\nform. These two, matter and form, were hidden in God, where they existed\npotentially until the time came to produce them and realize them _in\nactu_.\n\nMatter is further divided into two kinds. There is pure matter, which\nenters into the composition of the heavens, and impure matter, forming\nthe substance of terrestrial bodies. Similarly form may be divided at\nfirst into two kinds; closed and sealed form, too pure and holy to be\ncombined with matter; and open and penetrable form, which is fit to\nunite with matter. The pure, self-subsistent form gazes at and\nilluminates the penetrable form, and helps it to clothe matter with all\nthe forms of which the latter is capable.\n\nNow when God determined to realize matter and form _in actu_, he caused\nthe pure form to be clothed with its splendor, which no hyle can touch.\nThis gave rise to angels, seraphim, souls, and all other forms of the\nupper world. Not all men can see these forms or conceive them in the\nmind, because they do not unite with anything which the eye can\nperceive, and the majority of people cannot understand what they cannot\nperceive with their corporeal senses. Only those who are given to\nprofound scientific investigations can understand the essence of these\nforms.\n\nThe light of this pure form then emanated upon the second form, and by\nthe word of God the latter united with the pure matter firmly and\npermanently, so that there is never a change as long as they are united.\nThis union gave rise to the bodies of the heavens (spheres and fixed\nstars) which never change their forms. Then the form united with the\nimpure matter, and this gave rise to all the bodies in the sublunar\nworld, which change their forms. These are the four elements, and the\nproducts of their composition, including plants.[154]\n\nSo far we have bodies which do not change their places. Then a light\nemanated from the self-subsisting form by the order of God, the splendor\nof which spread upon the heaven, moving from point to point, and caused\nthe material form (_i. e._, the inferior, so-called penetrable form) to\nchange its place. This produced the stars which change their position\nbut not their forms (planets). From this light extending over the heaven\nemanated another splendor which reached the body with changing form,\ngiving rise to the three species of living beings, aquatic, aerial and\nterrestial animals, corresponding to the three elements, water, air,\nearth; as there is no animal life in fire.\n\nWe have so far therefore three kinds of forms. (1) The pure\nself-subsistent form which never combines with matter. This embraces all\nthe forms of the spiritual world. (2) Form which unites with body firmly\nand inseparably. These are the forms of the heavens and the stars. (3)\nForm which unites with body temporarily. Such are the forms of the\nbodies on the earth. The forms of the second and third classes cannot\nexist without bodies. The form of class number one cannot exist with\nbody. To make the scheme complete, there ought to be a fourth kind of\nform which can exist with as well as without body. In other words, a\nform which unites with body for a time and then returns to its original\nstate and continues to exist without body. Reason demands that the\nclassification should be complete, hence there must be such a form, and\nthe only one worthy of this condition is the soul of man. We thus have a\nproof of the immortality of the soul.[155]\n\nThese are the ideas of the ancient sages, and we shall find that they\nare drawn from the Torah. Thus matter and form are indicated in the\nsecond verse of Genesis, \"And the earth was _without form_ (Heb. Tohu)\nand _void_ (Heb. Bohu).\" \"Tohu\" is matter; \"Bohu\" [Hebrew: Bohu = Bo hu]\nsignifies that through which matter gains existence, hence form. \"Water\"\n(Heb. Mayim) is also a general word for any of the various forms,\nwhereas \"light\" (Heb. Or) stands for the pure subsistent form. By\n\"firmament\" (Heb. Rakia`) is meant the second kind of form which unites\nwith the pure matter in a permanent and unchangeable manner. \"Let there\nbe a _firmanent_ in the midst of the _waters_\" (Gen. 1, 6) indicates\nthat the \"firmament\" is embraced by the bright light of the first day,\nthat is the universal form, from which all the other forms come. \"And\nlet it divide between _water_ and _water_\" (_ib._) signifies that the\n\"firmament\" stands between the self-subsistent form and the third kind\nof form above mentioned, namely, that which unites with body and gives\nrise to substances changing their forms, like minerals and plants. The\n\"luminaries\" (Heb. Meorot) correspond to the second light mentioned\nabove. We shall find also that the order of creation as given in Genesis\ncoincides with the account given above in the name of the ancient\nsages.[156]\n\nIt would seem as if the self-subsisting form and the two lights\nemanating from it are meant to represent the Intellect, Soul and Nature\nof the Neo-Platonic trinity respectively, and that Abraham bar Hiyya\npurposely changed the names and partly their functions in order to make\nthe philosophical account agree with the story of creation in Genesis.\n\nWith regard to the intellectual and ethical condition of the soul and\nits destiny, the speculative thinkers of other nations, arguing from\nreason alone and having no divine revelation to guide or confirm their\nspeculations, are agreed that the only way in which the soul, which\nbelongs to a higher world, can be freed from this world of body and\nchange is through _intellectual excellence_ and _right conduct_.\nAccordingly they classify souls into four kinds. The soul, they say, may\nhave health, sickness, life, death. Health signifies _wisdom_ or\n_knowledge_; sickness denotes _ignorance_. Life means the _fear of God_\nand _right conduct_; death is _neglect of God_ and _evil practice_.\nEvery person combines in himself one of the two intellectual qualities\nwith one of the two ethical qualities. Thus we have four classes of\npersons. A man may be wise and pious, wise and wicked, ignorant and\npious, ignorant and wicked. And his destiny after death is determined by\nthe class to which he belongs. Thus when a man who is wise and pious\ndeparts this world, his soul by reason of its wisdom separates from the\nbody and exists in its own form as before. Owing to its piety it will\nrise to the upper world until it reaches the pure, eternal form, with\nwhich it will unite for ever. If the man is wise and wicked, the wisdom\nof the soul will enable it to exist without body; but on account of its\nwickedness and indulgence in the desires of this world, it cannot become\ncompletely free from the creatures of this world, and the best it can do\nis to rise above the sublunar world of change to the world of the\nplanets where the forms do not change, and move about beneath the light\nof the sun, the heat of which will seem to it like a fire burning it\ncontinually, and preventing it from rising to the upper light.\n\nIf the man is ignorant and pious, his soul will be saved from body in\norder that it may exist by itself, but his ignorance will prevent his\nsoul from leaving the atmosphere of the lower world. Hence the soul will\nhave to be united with body a second, and a third time, if necessary,\nuntil it finally acquires knowledge and wisdom, which will enable it to\nrise above the lower world, its degree and station depending upon the\nmeasure of intellect and virtue it possesses at the time of the last\nseparation from the body. The soul of the man who is both ignorant and\nwicked cannot be saved from the body entirely, and dies like a beast.\n\nThese are the views of speculative thinkers which we may adopt, but they\ncannot tell us what is the content of the terms _wisdom_ and _right\nconduct_. Not having been privileged to receive the sacred Law, which is\nthe source of all wisdom and the origin of rectitude, they cannot tell\nus in concrete fashion just what a man must know and what he must do in\norder to raise his soul to the highest degree possible for it to attain.\nAnd if they were to tell us what they understand by wisdom and right\nconduct, we should not listen to them. Our authority is the Bible, and\nwe must test the views of the philosophers by the teaching of the Bible.\n\nIf we do this we find authority in Scripture also for belief in the\nimmortality of the soul. Thus if we study carefully the expressions used\nof the various creations in the first chapter of Genesis, we notice that\nin some cases the divine command is expressed by the phrase, \"Let there\nbe...,\" followed by the name of the thing to be created; and the\nexecution of the command is expressed by the words, \"And there was...,\"\nthe name of the created object being repeated; or the phrase may be\nsimply, \"And it was so,\" without naming the object. In other cases the\nexpression \"Let there be\" is not used, nor the corresponding \"And there\nwas.\"\n\nThis variation in expression is not accidental. It is deliberate and\nmust be understood. Upon a careful examination we cannot fail to see\nthat where the expression \"Let there be\" is used, the object so created\nexists in this world permanently and without change. Thus, \"Let there be\nlight\" (Gen. i, 3). If in addition we have the corresponding expression,\n\"And there was,\" in connection with the same object and followed by its\nname, it means that the object will continue its everlasting existence\nin the next world also. Hence, \"And there was light\" (_ib._). In the\ncreation of the firmament and the luminaries we have the expression,\n\"Let there be\"; the corresponding expression at the end is in each case\nnot, \"And there was...,\" but, \"And it was so.\" This signifies that in\nthis world, as long as it lasts, the firmament and luminaries are\npermanent and without change; but they will have no continuance in the\nnext world. In the creation of the sublunar world we do not find the\nphrase, \"Let there be,\" at all, but such expressions as, \"Let the waters\nbe gathered together\" (_ib._ 9), \"Let the earth produce grass\" (_ib._\n11), and so on. This means that these things change their forms and have\nno permanent existence in this world. The phrase, \"And it was so,\"\nrecording the realization of the divine command, signifies that they do\nnot exist at all in the next world.\n\nThe case is different in man. We do not find the expression, \"Let there\nbe,\" in the command introducing his formation; hence he has no\npermanence in this world. But we do find the expression, \"And the man\nbecame (lit. _was_) a living soul\" (_ib._ 2, 7), which means that he\nwill have permanent existence in the next world. The article before the\nword man in the verse just quoted indicates that not every man lives\nforever in the next world, but only the good. What manner of man he must\nbe in order to have this privilege, _i. e._, of what nation he must be a\nmember, we shall see later. This phase of the question the speculative\nthinkers cannot understand, hence they did not investigate it. Reason\nalone cannot decide this question; it needs the guidance of the Torah,\nwhich is divine.\n\nConsulting the Torah on this problem, we notice that man is\ndistinguished above other animals in the manner of his creation in three\nrespects. (1) All other living beings were created by means of something\nelse. The water or the earth was ordered to produce them. Man alone was\nmade directly by God. (2) There are three expressions used for the\ncreation of living things, \"create\" (Heb. bara), \"form\" (Heb. yazar),\nand \"make\" (Heb. `asah). The water animals have only the first (_ib._ 1,\n21), as being the lowest in the scale of animal life. Land animals have\nthe second and the third, \"formed\" and \"made\" (_ib._ 1, 25; 2, 19). Man,\nwho is superior to all the others, has all the three expressions (_ib._\n26, 27; 2, 7). (3) Man was given dominion over the other animals (_ib._\n1, 28).\n\nAs man is distinguished above the other animals, so is one nation\ndistinguished above other men. In Isaiah (43, 7) we read: \"Every one\nthat is called by my name, and whom I have _created_ for my glory; I\nhave _formed_ him; yea, I have _made_ him.\" The three terms, created,\nformed, made, signify that the reference is to man; and we learn from\nthis verse that those men were created for his glory who are called by\nhis name. But if we inquire in the Bible we find that the nation called\nby God's name is Israel, as we read (_ib._ 1), \"Thus said the Lord that\ncreated thee, O Israel, Fear not; for I have redeemed thee, I have\ncalled thee by thy name; thou art mine,\" and in many other passages\nbesides. The reason for this is their belief in the unity of God and\ntheir reception of the Law. At the same time others who are not\nIsraelites are not excluded from reaching the same degree through\nrepentance.[157]\n\nThere is no system of ethics in Abraham bar Hiyya, and we shall in the\nsequel select some of his remarks bearing on ethics and pick out the\nethical kernel from its homiletical and exegetical husk.\n\nMan alone, he tells us, of all animal creation receives reward and\npunishment. The other animals have neither merit nor guilt. To be sure,\ntheir fortune in life depends upon the manner in which they respond to\ntheir environment, but this is not in the way of reward and punishment,\nbut a natural consequence of their natural constitution. With man it is\ndifferent, and this is because of the responsible position man occupies,\nhaving been given the privilege and the ability to control all animal\ncreation.[158]\n\nThe psychological basis of virtue in Abraham bar Hiyya is Platonic in\norigin, as it is in Pseudo-Bahya, though we do not find the four\ncardinal virtues and the derivation of justice from a harmonious\ncombination of the other three as in the Republic of Plato, to which\nPseudo-Bahya is ultimately indebted.\n\nMan has three powers, we are told, which some call three souls. One is\nthe power by which he grows and multiplies like the plants of the field.\nThe second is that by which he moves from place to place. These two\npowers he has in common with the animal. The third is that by which he\ndistinguishes between good and evil, between truth and falsehood,\nbetween a thing and its opposite, and by which he acquires wisdom and\nknowledge. This is the soul which distinguishes him from the other\nanimals. If this soul prevails over the lower two powers, the man is\ncalled meritorious and perfect. If on the other hand the latter prevail\nover the soul, the man is accounted like a beast, and is called wicked\nand an evil doer. God gives merit to the animal soul for the sake of\nthe rational soul if the former is obedient to the latter; and on the\nother hand imputes guilt to the rational soul and punishes her for the\nguilt of the animal soul because she did not succeed in overcoming the\nlatter.[159]\n\nThe question of the relative superiority of the naturally good who feels\nno temptation to do wrong, and the temperamental person who has to\nsustain a constant struggle with his passions and desires in order to\novercome them is decided by Abraham bar Hiyya in favor of the former on\nthe ground that the latter is never free from evil thought, whereas the\nformer is. And he quotes the Rabbis of the Talmud, according to whom the\nreward in the future world is not the same for the two types of men. He\nwho must overcome temptation before he can subject his lower nature to\nhis reason is rewarded in the next world in a manner bearing resemblance\nto the goods and pleasures of this world, and described as precious\nstones and tables of gold laden with good things to eat. On the other\nhand, the reward of the naturally perfect who is free from temptation is\npurely spiritual, and bears no earthly traces. These men are represented\nas \"sitting under the Throne of Glory with their crowns on their heads\nand delighting in the splendor of the Shekinah.\"[160]\n\nHis theodicy offers nothing remarkable. He cites and opposes a solution\nfrequently given in the middle ages of the problem of evil. This is\nbased on the assumption that God cannot be the cause of evil. How then\nexplain the presence of evil in the world? There is no analysis or\nclassification or definition of what is meant by evil. Apparently it is\nphysical evil which Abraham bar Hiyya has in mind. Why do some people\nsuffer who do not seem to deserve it? is the aspect of the problem which\ninterests him. One solution that is offered, he tells us, is that evil\nis not anything positive or substantial. It is something negative,\nabsence of the good, as blindness is absence of vision; deafness,\nabsence of hearing; nakedness, absence of clothing. Hence it has no\ncause. God produces the positive forms which are good, and determines\nthem to stay a definite length of time. When this time comes to an end,\nthe forms disappear and their negatives take their place automatically\nwithout the necessity of any cause.\n\nAbraham bar Hiyya is opposed to this solution of the problem, though he\ngives us no philosophic reason for it. His arguments are Biblical. God\nis the cause of evil as well as good, and this is the meaning of the\nword \"judgment\" (Heb. Mishpat) that occurs so often in the Bible in\nconnection with God's attributes. The same idea is expressed in Jeremiah\n(9, 23) \"I am the Lord which exercise loving kindness, judgment and\nrighteousness in the earth.\" Loving kindness refers to the creation of\nthe world, which was an act of pure grace on the part of God. It was not\na necessity. His purpose was purely to do kindness to his creatures and\nto show them his wisdom and power. Righteousness refers to the kindness\nof God, his charity so to speak, which every one needs when he dies and\nwishes to be admitted to the next world. For the majority of men have\nmore guilt than merit. Judgment denotes the good and evil distributed in\nthe world according to the law of justice. Thus he rewards the righteous\nin the next world, and makes them suffer sometimes in this world in\norder to try them and to double their ultimate reward. He punishes the\nwicked in this world for their evil deeds, and sometimes he gives them\nwealth and prosperity that they may have no claim or defence in the next\nworld. Thus evil in this world is not always the result of misconduct\nwhich it punishes; it may be inflicted as a trial, as in the case of\nJob. Abraham bar Hiyya's solution is therefore that there is no reason\nwhy God should not be the author of physical evil, since everything is\ndone in accordance with the law of justice.[161]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nJOSEPH IBN ZADDIK\n\n\nLittle is known of the life of Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddik. He lived in\nCordova; he was appointed _Dayyan_, or Judge of the Jewish community of\nthat city in 1138; and he died in 1149. He is praised as a Talmudic\nscholar by his countryman Moses ibn Ezra, and as a poet by Abraham ibn\nDaud and Harizi, though we have no Talmudic composition from his pen,\nand but few poems, whether liturgical or otherwise.[162] His fame rests\non his philosophical work, and it is this phase of his career in which\nwe are interested here. \"Olam Katon\" or \"Microcosm\" is the Hebrew name\nof the philosophical treatise which he wrote in Arabic, but which we no\nlonger possess in the original, being indebted for our knowledge of it\nto a Hebrew translation of unknown authorship.[163] Maimonides knew\nJoseph ibn Zaddik favorably, but he was not familiar with the\n\"Microcosm.\" In a letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of his\n\"Guide of the Perplexed,\" Maimonides tells us that though he has not\nseen the \"Olam Katon\" of Ibn Zaddik, he knows that its tendency is the\nsame as that of the Brothers of Purity (_cf._ above, p. 60).[164] This\nsignifies that its trend of thought is Neo-Platonic, which combines\nAristotelian physics with Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics, ethics and\npsychology.\n\nAn examination of the book itself confirms Maimonides's judgment. In\naccordance with the trend of the times there is noticeable in Ibn Zaddik\nan increase of Aristotelian influence, though of a turbid kind; a\ndecided decrease, if not a complete abandonment, of the ideas of the\nKalam, and a strong saturation of Neo-Platonic doctrine and point of\nview. It was the fashion to set the Kalam over against the philosophers\nto the disadvantage of the former, as being deficient in logical\nknowledge and prejudiced by theological prepossessions. This is attested\nby the attitude towards the Mutakallimun of Judah Halevi, Maimonides,\nAverroes. And Ibn Zaddik forms no exception to the rule. The\ncircumstance that it was most likely from Karaite writings, which found\ntheir way into Spain, that Ibn Zaddik gained his knowledge of Kalamistic\nideas, was not exactly calculated to prepossess him, a Rabbanite, in\ntheir favor. And thus while we see him in the manner of Saadia and Bahya\nfollow the good old method, credited by Maimonides to the Mutakallimun,\nof starting his metaphysics with proofs of the world's creation, and\nbasing the existence of God, his unity, incorporeality and other\nattributes on the creation of the world as a foundation, he turns into\nan uncompromising opponent of these much despised apologetes when he\ncomes to discuss the nature of God's attributes, of the divine will, and\nof the nature of evil. And in all these cases the target of his attack\nseems to be their Karaite representative Joseph al-Basir, whose\nacquaintance we made before (p. 48 ff.).\n\nHe laid under contribution his predecessors and contemporaries, Saadia,\nBahya, Pseudo-Bahya, Gabirol; and his sympathies clearly lay with the\ngeneral point of view represented by the last, and his Mohammedan\nsources; though he was enough of an eclectic to refuse to follow\nGabirol, or the Brethren of Purity and the other Neo-Platonic writings,\nin all the details of their doctrine; and there is evidence of an\nattempt on his part to tone down the extremes of Neo-Platonic tendency\nand create a kind of level in which Aristotelianism and Platonism meet\nby compromising. Thus he believes with Gabirol that all things corporeal\nas well as spiritual are composed of matter and form;[165] but when it\ncomes to defining what the matter of spiritual things may be, he tells\nus that we may speak of the genus as the matter of the species--a\ndoctrine which is not so Neo-Platonic after all. For we do not have to\ngo beyond Aristotle to hear that in the definition of an object, which\nrepresents its _intelligible_ (opposed to sensible) essence, the genus\nis like the matter, the difference like the form. Of the universal and\nprime matter underlying all created things outside of God, of which\nGabirol says that it is the immediate emanation of God's essence and\nconstitutes with universal form the Universal Intelligence, Ibn Zaddik\nknows nothing. Nor do we find any outspoken scheme of emanation, such as\nwe see in Plotinus or with a slight modification in the cyclopoedia of\nthe Brethren of Purity, or as it is presupposed in the \"Fons Vit\u00e6\" of\nGabirol. Ibn Zaddik does refer to the doctrine of the divine Will, which\nplays such an important r\u00f4le in the philosophy of Gabirol and of the\nPseudo-Empedoclean writings, which are supposed to have been Gabirol's\nsource.[166] But here, too, the negative side of Ibn Zaddik's doctrine\nis developed at length, while the positive side is barely alluded to in\na hint. He takes pains to show the absurdity of the view that the divine\nwill is a momentary entity created from time to time to make possible\nthe coming into being of the things and processes of our world--a view\nheld by the Mutakallimun as represented by their spokesman al-Basir, but\nwhen it comes to explaining his own view of the nature of the divine\nwill, and whether it is identical with God or not, he suddenly becomes\nreticent, refers us to the writings of Empedocles, and intimates that\nthe matter is involved in mystery, and it is not safe to talk about it\ntoo plainly and openly. Evidently Ibn Zaddik was not ready to go all the\nlength of Gabirol's emanationism and Neo-Platonic mysticism.\n\nThe Aristotelian ideas, of which there are many in the \"Microcosm,\" are\nprobably not derived from a study of Aristotle's works, but from\nsecondary sources. This we may safely infer from the way in which he\nuses or interprets them. An Aristotelian definition is a highly\ntechnical proposition in which every word counts, and requires a\ndefinition in turn to be understood. In the Aristotelian context the\nreader sees the methodical derivation of the concept; and the several\ntechnical terms making up the definition are made clear by illustrative\nexamples. Aside from the context the proposition is obscure even in the\noriginal Greek. Now conceive an Arabic translation of an Aristotelian\ndefinition taken out of its context, and you do not wonder that it is\nmisunderstood; particularly when the interpreter's point of view is\ntaken from a school of thought at variance with that of Aristotle. This\nis exactly what happens to Ibn Zaddik. He quotes approvingly Aristotle's\ndefinition of the soul, and proceeds to interpret it in a manner not\nintended by the author of the \"De Anima.\"[167] If he had read the\ncontext he could not have misunderstood the definition as he did.\n\nUnlike his predecessors, Ibn Zaddik did not confine himself to a special\ntopic in philosophy or to the metaphysical aspects of Judaism. Isaac\nIsraeli and Gabirol discuss special questions in Physics and Metaphysics\nwithout bringing them into relation with Judaism or the text of the\nBible. Saadia takes cognizance of philosophical doctrine solely with a\nview to establishing and rationalizing Jewish dogma, and only in so far\nas it may thus be utilized. Bahya and Abraham bar Hiyya confine their\nphilosophical outlook within still narrower limits, having Jewish ethics\nas their primary concern. All of the latter make a feature of Biblical\ninterpretation, which lends to their work the Jewish stamp and to their\nstyle the element of homeliness and variety. To this they owe in a\nmeasure their popularity, which, however, cannot be said for Abraham bar\nHiyya, whose \"Hegyon ha-Nefesh\" was not printed until the second half of\nlast century. The \"Microcosm\" of Ibn Zaddik is the first compendium of\nscience, philosophy and theology in Jewish literature. And yet it is a\nsmall book; for Ibn Zaddik does not enter into lengthy discussions, nor\ndoes he adorn his style with rhetorical flourishes or copious quotations\nfrom Bible and Talmud. The \"Olam Katon\" is clearly meant for beginners,\nwho require a summary and compendious view of so much of physics,\npsychology, metaphysics and ethics as will give them an idea of the\nposition of man in the world, and his duties, theoretical and practical,\nin this life, that he may fulfil his destiny for which he was created.\nIt is very possible that Ibn Zaddik modelled his work on the\nEncyclop\u00e6dia of the Brethren of Purity, leaving out all that he regarded\nas unessential or objectional and abridging the rest.\n\nAccordingly, the \"Microcosm\" is divided into four parts. The first part\ntreats of what is called in the Aristotelian classification of the\nsciences Physics, _i. e._, the principles and constitution of the\ncorporeal world and its processes. The second treats of man, including\nanthropology and psychology. The third is devoted to a discussion of the\nexistence, unity, incorporeality and other attributes of God, based upon\nthe doctrine of the creation of the world. This bears the stamp of the\nKalam, and is indebted to the writings of Saadia, Bahya and Joseph\nal-Basir. It covers the topics usually treated by the Mutakallimun in\nthe division of their works, known by the name of \"Bab al Tauhid,\"\ntreatise on Unity. The fourth part corresponds to the \"Bab al Adi\" of\nthe Kalam, _i. e._, the second division of Kalamistic works devoted to\ntheodicy, or vindication of God's justice in his dealings with mankind.\nHence it includes theological questions of an ethical nature, like\nfreedom of the will, reasons for divine worship, the nature of reward\nand punishment, and so on.\n\nThe book was written, Ibn Zaddik tells us, in answer to the question of\na pupil concerning the meaning of such terms as \"perfection\" and\n\"permanent good,\" used by philosophers. They are not of this world these\nmen say, and yet every man of intelligence should seek them. This is a\nvery difficult subject, made more so by the small number of persons\nengaged in its study. Particularly in our own generation is this true,\nthat the value of knowledge and investigation is not recognized. People\nare Jews in name only, and men only in outward appearance. Former ages\nwere much superior in this regard.\n\nTwo fundamental requisites are necessary for the knowledge of our\nsubject. They are the knowledge of God, and performance of his will. For\nthis purpose we must understand the works of the philosophers. But these\nin turn require a knowledge of the preliminary sciences of arithmetic,\ngeometry, music, astronomy, and logic. This takes a long time and is\nlikely to weary the student, especially the beginner. I have therefore\nmade it my purpose to show how a man can know himself, for from a\nknowledge of self he will come to a knowledge of all. Man is called\n\"Microcosm,\" a world in miniature, because he has in him represented all\nthe elements of the universe. His body resembles the corporeal world;\nhis rational soul the spiritual world. Hence the importance of knowing\nhimself, and hence the definition of philosophy as a man's _knowledge of\nhimself_. Philosophy is the science of sciences and the end thereof,\nbecause it is the path to a knowledge of the Creator.[168]\n\nHere we see at the outset Ibn Zaddik's Neo-Platonic tendency to make a\nshort cut to knowledge through the study of man instead of the painful\nand laborious mastery of the preliminary sciences. And so it was that\nthe Neo-Platonists added little to Aristotle's study of nature,\nconcentrating their attention upon the intelligible or spiritual world.\n\nThe first thing we must do then is to show that the human body is\nsimilar to the corporeal world. This will require an analysis of the\nstructure of the latter. But before examining the _objects_ of\nknowledge, we must say a word about the process of knowing. Man\nperceives things in two ways--through sense and through intellect. His\nsenses give him the accidents of things, the shell or husk, so to speak.\nHe perceives color through sight, sound through hearing, odor through\nsmell, and so on. It takes reason to penetrate to the essence of an\nobject. Take as an example a book. The sense of sight perceives its\ncolor, and through the color its form. This is then apprehended by the\npower of imagination or representation. The latter in turn hands it over\nto the cogitative power of the rational soul, from the reflection of\nwhich results the spiritual reality of the object, which is its\nknowledge. So we see that the reason knows the essence and reality of a\nthing, whereas the senses know only its husk and its accidents. This\nsame thing is stated by the philosopher in another form. The senses, he\nsays, know only the particular, the universal can be known by the\nintellect only. This is because the soul is fine and penetrating, while\nthe body is gross, and can reach the surface only.\n\nWe may also classify knowledge from another point of view as necessary\n(or immediate), and demonstrated (or mediate). Necessary knowledge is\nthat which no sane man can deny. Such knowledge may be of the senses, as\nthe sight of the sun or the sound of thunder; or it may be of the\nreason, such as that the whole is greater than its parts. We may then\nenumerate four kinds of things known directly without the help of other\nknowledge, (1) The percepts of the senses. (2) Truths generally admitted\nby reason of their self-evidence. (3) Traditional truths, _i. e._,\ntruths handed down by a reliable and wise man, or by a community worthy\nof credence. (4) First principles or axioms. These four can be easily\nreduced to two; for traditional truths ultimately go back to the\ntestimony of the senses; while first principles or axioms are included\nin self-evident propositions. We thus have two kinds of necessary or\nimmediate knowledge, the data of sense, and self-evident propositions.\nThe latter kind is superior to the former, because man shares sense\nknowledge with the lower animals; whereas rational propositions are\npeculiar to him alone.\n\nDemonstrated knowledge is built upon necessary knowledge, and is derived\nfrom it by means of logical inference.[169]\n\nWe may now proceed to discuss the principles of the corporeal world.\nMatter is the foundation and principle of a thing. All things, natural\nas well as artificial, are composed of matter and form. Wood is the\ncommon matter of chair and bed. Their forms are different. So the common\nmatter of the four elements is the prime matter endowed with the form of\ncorporeality, _i. e._, with the capacity of filling place. This form of\ncorporeality makes the prime matter corporeal substance. Matter is\nrelative to form, form is relative to matter.\n\nSpiritual things also have matter and form. In corporeal artificial\nthings like ring or bracelet, the matter is gold, the form is the form\nof ring or bracelet, the efficient cause is the art of the goldsmith,\nthe final cause or purpose is the adornment. In spiritual things we may\ncompare genus to matter, species to form, specific difference to\nefficient cause, the individual to the final cause.\n\nEverything exists either by itself (_per se_) or in something else.\nMatter exists by itself, form exists in something else, in matter.\nMatter is potentially substance; after it assumes a form it becomes\nactual substance. In reality there is no matter without form, but in\nthought we can remove the form and leave the matter.\n\nSubstance may be described as that which bears opposite and changing\nqualities. No substance can be the opposite of another substance through\nits substantiality, but through its accidents; for opposition resides in\nquality. Matter receiving form is substance. Absolute substance is\nsimple and spiritual, for it cannot be perceived through the five\nsenses. When the philosophers say that all body is substance, and that\nthe individual is a substance, they use substance in contradistinction\nto accident, meaning that the individual exists by itself, and needs not\nanother for its existence, unlike accidents, which must have something\nto exist in.\n\nThis absolute substance, which is simple and spiritual, seems to be\nidentical with Gabirol's \"substantia qu\u00e6 sustinet decem pr\u00e6dicamenta,\"\nthe substance which supports the ten categories. Gabirol means by it\nthat which remains of a corporeal substance when we take away from it\neverything that qualifies it as being here or there, of a particular\nnature or size, in a given relation, and so on.\n\nThe expression corporeal world includes the celestial spheres and all\nwhich is under them. To be sure, the body of the sphere is different\nfrom the other bodies in matter and form and qualities. It consists of a\nfifth nature, different from the four elements. It is not cold, or it\nwould move downward like earth and water. It is not warm, or it would\nmove upward like air and fire. It is not wet, for it would then roll\nlike the waves of the sea. Nor is it dry, for it would condense and not\nmove at all. Not being any one of these qualities, which constitute our\nfour elements, the sphere is not a composite of them either; for the\nsimple is prior to the composite, and we cannot regard the elements of\nthe sublunar world as prior and superior to the spheres.\n\nThe sphere is neither light nor heavy. For light and heavy are relative\nterms. An object is heavy when out of its natural place, light when in\nits natural place. Thus a stone is heavy when it is away from the earth,\nwhich is its natural place, but is light when it comes to rest where it\nbelongs. The sphere is never out of its place or in its place, as it\nmoves constantly in a circle. Hence it is neither light nor heavy.\n\nIbn Zaddik's definition of light and heavy as being relative, and\ndependent on the relation of the object to its natural place is\npeculiar, and would lead him to say that fire and air are also heavy\nwhen out of their natural place, which is outside of, and above earth\nand water. But this does not seem in consonance with the Aristotelian\nuse of these terms. According to Aristotle an object is heavy if its\ntendency is to move to the centre of the world; it is light if it moves\naway from the centre to the circumference. Hence earth and water are\nheavy, fire and air are light. The natural place of a body or element is\nthat to which it has a tendency to move, or in which it has a tendency\nto rest, when left to itself. Hence a body will always move to its\nnatural place when away from it and under no restriction; and its\nheaviness or lightness does not change with its position.\n\nTo continue, the sphere moves in a circle, the most perfect of all\nmotions, having neither beginning nor end. It is more perfect than all\nbodies, and the knowledge of God is not hidden from it as it is hidden\nfrom us. Whatever moves in a circle must move around a body at rest; for\nif it moves around another moving body, this second body must have\nanother body around which it moves, and this third body another, and so\non _ad infinitum_, which is impossible. Hence the sphere moves around a\nbody at rest. This is the earth.\n\nThe four elements of the sublunar world are, fire, air, water, earth. In\ntheir purity these elements have neither color nor taste, nor odor nor\nany other sensible property. For the elements are simple bodies, whereas\nthe sensible qualities are the result of the composition of the\nelements. If air had color, we should see it as we see all colored\nthings; and all other things would appear to us in the color of air, as\nis the case when we look through a colored glass. The same argument\napplies to water.\n\nThe elements change into each other. We see water changing under the\neffect of heat into vapor, and the vapor condenses again under the\ninfluence of cold and changes back to water, namely, rain. Air changes\ninto fire when flint strikes iron. Fire cannot exist here unless it has\nsomething to take hold of; otherwise it changes into air. Earth and\nwater change into each other very slowly, because earth is hard to\nchange.\n\nThe basis of the four elements is a substance filling place as a result\nof its assuming the form of corporeality, _i. e._, extension in three\ndirections. Filling place, it moves; moving, it becomes warm. When its\nmotion is completed, it necessarily comes to rest and becomes cold. Heat\nand cold are the active powers, wet and dry are the passive qualities,\nwet being associated with heat, dry with cold. The mixture of these\nqualities with the corporeal basis results in the four elements.\n\nThe three natures, mineral, plant, animal are composed of the four\nelements. When a seed is put in the ground it cannot grow without water,\nand sunshine and air. These form its food, and food is assimilated to\nthe thing fed. Our bodies are composed of the four elements, because\nthey are nourished by plants. The general process of the sublunar world\nis that of genesis and dissolution. The genesis of one thing is the\ndissolution of another. The dissolution of the egg is the genesis of the\nchicken; the dissolution of the chicken is the genesis of the four\nelements; for in the living being the elements are potential, and they\nbecome actual when the animal dies. This continuous process of genesis\nand dissolution proves that this world is not permanent, for the basis\nof its processes is change.[170]\n\nThe human body corresponds to the corporeal world, and is similar to it\nin its nature and matter. Man's body is subject to genesis and decay\nlike other objects. It is composed of the elements and returns to them.\nIt has in it the nature of minerals, plants and animals. It has the\npower of growth, sustenance and reproduction like plants. Man is like\nanimal in having motion and sensation. He has the spirited power and the\nappetitive like other animals. His body is perfect because it has\nresemblances to all kinds of plants and animals. His body as a whole\nresembles great trees, his hair is like grass and shrubs. Animals have\nvarious qualities according to the relation of the animal soul to the\nbody. Thus the lion has strength, the lamb meekness, the fox shrewdness,\nand so on. Mankind includes all of these qualities. In the same way\nvarious animals have various instincts resembling arts, such as the\nweaving of the spider, the building of the bird and the bee, and so on.\nThey also subsist on various foods. Man alone combines all arts and all\nkinds of food.\n\nThe human body has three dimensions like inanimate bodies. It is also\nsimilar to the bodies of plants and animals, and at the same time is\ndistinguished alone among animals by its erect position. This is due to\nthe fact that man's nature is proportionate, and his body is purer and\nfiner than other bodies. Thus we see when oil is pure, its flame rises\nin a straight line; when the oil is impure the flame is not straight.\nAnother thing proving that man's nature is superior to that of other\nanimals is that the latter live in that element which is akin to their\nconstitution--fish in water, birds in air, quadrupeds on land. Man alone\ncan inhabit all three. Another reason for man's erect position is that\nhe is a plant originating in heaven. Hence his head, which is the root,\nfaces heaven.[171]\n\nMan has three souls, a plant soul, an animal soul and a rational soul.\nHe must have a plant soul to account for the fact that man grows like\nother plants and dies like them. For if he can grow without a plant\nsoul, plants can do the same. And if this too is granted, then there is\nno reason why mountains and stones should not grow also. Again, if man\ncan grow without a plant soul, he can live without an animal soul, and\nknow without a rational soul, which is absurd.\n\nThe faculty of the vegetative soul is the appetitive power, whose seat\nis in the liver. Its subordinate powers are those of nutrition and\ngrowth. Through it man feels the need of food and other natural desires.\nHe has this in common with the lower animals. It is the first power that\nappears in man while he is still in his mother's womb. First comes the\npower which forms the combined seed of the male and the female into a\nhuman being in its proper form and nature. In doing this it requires the\nassistance of the \"growing\" power, which begins its activity as soon as\nthe first member is formed, and continues until the period of youth is\ncompleted. This power in turn needs the assistance of the nourishing\npower, which accompanies the other two from the beginning of their\nactivity to the end of the person's life. All this constitutes the plant\nsoul, and it must not be supposed that these powers are separated from\none another, and that one is in one place and another in another place.\n_They are all spiritual powers derived from the universal powers in the\nupper world._\n\nWhen the form of the being is complete, the animal soul makes its\nappearance. This soul is carried in the spirit of the animal or man,\nwhich is found in the pure blood of the arteries. There are two\nmembranes in every artery, making two passages, one for blood and the\nother for the spirit or wind. The seat of the animal soul is in the\nheart, and it is borne in the pure red blood. This is why we see in the\nheart two receptacles; in one is spirit, in the other, blood. Hence\nafter death we find congealed blood in the one, while the other is\nempty. Death happens on account of the defective \"mixture\" of the heart.\nThis means that the four humors of which the body is composed, namely,\nblood, yellow and black gall and phlegm, lose the proper proportionality\nin their composition, and one or other of them predominates. An animal\ndoes not die unless the mixture of the heart is injured, or the heart is\nwounded seriously. Death is also caused by disease or injury of the\nbrain. For the brain is the origin of the nerves which control the\nvoluntary activities by means of contraction and expansion. If the chest\ndoes not contract, the warm air does not come out; if it does not\nexpand, the cold air does not come in; and if the air does not come in\nor out, the heart loses its proportionality, and the animal dies. The\nfunctions of the animal soul are sensation and motion. This motion may\nbe active as well as passive. The active motions are those of the\narteries, and the expansion and contraction of the chest which results\nin respiration. The passive motions give rise to the emotions of anger,\nfear, shame, joy, sorrow.\n\nAnger is the motion of the spirit within the body toward the outside,\ntogether with the blood and the humors. This is found in animals also.\nFear is the entrance of the soul within, leaving the surface of the\nbody, and causing the extremities to become cold. Shame is a motion\ninward, and forthwith again outward. Sorrow is caused in the same way as\nfear, except that fear is sudden, while sorrow is gradual. This is why\nfear sometimes kills when the body is weak. Joy is motion outward. Joy\nmay kill too, when it is very great, and the person is weak and without\ncontrol. Joy is of the nature of pleasure, except that pleasure is\ngradual, while joy is sudden.\n\nPain is that feeling we have when we are taken out of our natural state\nand put into an unnatural. Pleasure is felt when we are restored to the\nnatural. Take, for example, the heat of the sun. When a person is\nexposed to it, the sun takes him out of his natural state. Heat is then\npainful, and pleasure is produced by the thing which restores him to his\nnatural state; in this case a cold spring and a drink of cold water.\nSimilarly a person walking in the snow and cold air feels pain by reason\nof the cold taking him out of his natural state. Heat then gives him\npleasure by restoring him. The same thing applies to hunger and thirst,\nsleeping and waking, and other things which give us pleasure and pain.\nWithout pain there is no pleasure, and the pleasure varies in accordance\nwith the antecedent pain.\n\nLife is the effect of the animal soul. The disappearance of the effect\ndoes not necessarily involve the disappearance of the cause, as the\ndisappearance of the smoke does not require the cessation of the fire.\nDeath means simply the separation of the soul, not the destruction\nthereof. It does not follow because the human soul remains after the\ndeath of the body, that the soul of the ox and the ass continues\nlikewise, for the two souls are different. Animals were created for the\nsake of man, whereas man exists for his own sake. Moreover, man's life\nis ultimately derived from his rational soul. For if the animal soul of\nman were the ultimate source of life, the rational soul too would be\ndependent for its life upon the former, and hence would be inferior to\nit, which is absurd. It remains then that the _rational soul gives\nexistence to the animal soul in man_.\n\nSleep is the rest of the senses, as death is their entire cessation. The\npurpose of sleep is to give the brain rest so that the \"spirit\" of the\nsoul should not be dissolved and the \"mixture\" of the body injured\nsuddenly and cause death. The heart rests continually between\ncontraction and expansion, hence it needs no special rest at night.\nWaking is the activity of the senses and the exercise of their functions\nto satisfy the desires of the body. The motions of the soul in the\nwaking state are in the interest of the needs of the body. During sleep\nthe soul looks out for itself, for its better world, being then free\nfrom the business of the body. If it is pure and bright, and the body\nis free from the remnant of food, and the thought is not depressed by\nsorrow and grief--then the soul is aroused in its desire for the future,\nand beholds wonderful things.[172]\n\nNo one can deny that man has a rational soul because speech is an\nattribute which man has above all other animals. The soul is not a\ncorporeal thing, for if it were it would have to occupy place like body,\nand would have color and form and other qualities like body. Moreover,\nit would require something else to give it life like body. In other\nwords, the soul would require another soul, and that soul another soul,\nand so on _ad infinitum_, which is impossible. Hence the soul is not a\ncorporeal thing.\n\nNor can we say that the soul is _in_ the body. For if it were, it would\nitself be body; since only body can fill the empty place in another\nbody, as water fills a jar.\n\nThe soul is a substance and not an accident. An accident is a quality\nwhich makes its appearance in something else, and has no permanence. If\nthen the rational soul is an accident of the body, it has no permanence,\nand man is sometimes rational and sometimes not. This is absurd, for in\nthat case there could be no purpose in giving him commandments and\nstatutes.\n\nThere are inseparable accidents to be sure, like the color of the\nEthiopian's skin. But in that case we know the color is an accident\ndespite its inseparability, from the fact that in other things color is\nan accident and may be removed. This will not apply to the reason. For\nwe do not find anything in which reason is a removable accident. The\nmoment you remove reason, you remove man, for reason is essential to\nman. The fact that as a result of an injury a man may lose his reason is\nno argument against us, for this happens only when an injury is\ninflicted on the brain, which is the reason's instrument. This accounts\nfor the fact, too, that men in good health if given henbane to drink\nlose their reason, because the drink affects the brain. On the other\nhand, we see that those afflicted with a certain disease of the\nintestines, which causes their death, are more rational and brighter at\nthe time of death than ever before, showing that the soul cannot be an\naccident depending upon the \"mixture\" of the body.\n\nTo regard the soul as an accident, while the body is a substance, would\nmake the soul inferior to the body. This is absurd. For we have the\nbody in common with the beasts; whereas it is in virtue of the reason\nthat we are given commandments, and reward and punishment in the world\nto come.\n\nIf the soul is neither a corporeal thing nor an accident of body, it\nmust be a spiritual substance. And the best definition of the soul is\nthat of Aristotle, who says it is _a substance giving perfection to a\nnatural organic body, which has life potentially_. Every phrase in this\ndefinition tells. \"Substance\" excludes the view that the soul is an\naccident. \"Giving perfection\" signifies that the soul is that which\nmakes man perfect, bringing him to the next world, and being the purpose\nnot merely of his creation and the composition of his body, but of the\ncreation of matter as well. \"Natural organic body\" indicates that the\nbody is an organon, or instrument in the function of the soul, the\nlatter using the body to carry out its own purposes. The rational soul\nis like a king; the animal soul is like an official before the king,\nrebuking the appetitive soul.\n\nIn the discussion of the last paragraph we have a good example of the\nuncritical attitude of Ibn Zaddik toward the various schools of\nphilosophical thought, particularly those represented by Plato and\nAristotle. This attitude is typical of the middle ages, which appealed\nto authority in philosophy as well as in theology, and hence developed a\nharmonistic attitude in the presence of conflicting authorities. Aided\nby their defective knowledge of the complete systems of the ancient\nGreek philosophers, by the difficulties and obscurities incident to\ntranslations from an alien tongue, and by the spurious writings\ncirculating in the name of an ancient Greek philosopher, the precise\ndemarcation of schools and tendencies became more and more confused, and\nit was possible to prove that Plato and Aristotle were in entire\nagreement. Thus Ibn Zaddik has no scruple in combining (unconsciously,\nto be sure) Platonic and Neo-Platonic psychology with the Aristotelian\ndefinition representing quite a different point of view. The one is\nanthropological dualism, regarding the soul as a distinct entity which\ncomes to the body from without. The other is a biological monism, in\nwhich the soul is the reality of the body, the essence of its\nfunctioning, which makes the potentially living body an actually living\nbody. We cannot enter here into a criticism of the elements of the\nAristotelian definition of the soul as rendered and interpreted by Ibn\nZaddik, but will merely say that it misses completely the meaning of\nAristotle, and shows that Ibn Zaddik did not take it from the \"De Anima\"\nof Aristotle, but found it without its context in some Arabic work.\n\nTo return from our digression, the three souls, Ibn Zaddik tells us, are\nspiritual powers; every one of them is a substance by itself of benefit\nto the body. The rational soul gets the name soul primarily, and the\nothers get it from the rational soul. The _Intellect_ is called soul\nbecause the rational soul and the Intellect have a common matter. And\nhence when the soul is perfected it becomes intellect. This is why the\nrational soul is called potential intellect. The only difference between\nthem is one of degree and excellence. The world of Intellect is\nsuperior, and its matter is the pure light, Intellect in which there is\nno ignorance, because it comes from God without any intermediate agency.\n\nHere we see just a touch of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, of\nwhich the Universal Intellect is the first. But it is considerably toned\ndown and not continued down the series as in Plotinus or the Brethren of\nPurity.\n\nThe accidents of the soul are spiritual like the soul itself. They are,\nknowledge, kindness, goodness, justice, and other similar qualities.\nIgnorance, wrong, evil, and so on, are not the opposites of those\nmentioned above, and were not created with the soul like the others.\nThey are merely the absence of the positive qualities mentioned before,\nas darkness is the absence of light. God did not create any defect, nor\ndid he desire it. Evil is simply the result of the incapacity of a given\nthing to receive a particular good. If all things were capable of\nreceiving goods equally, all things would be one thing, and the Creator\nand his creatures would be likewise one. This was not God's purpose.\n\nThere is a tacit opposition to the Mutakallimun in Ibn Zaddik's\narguments against the view that the soul is an accident, as well as in\nhis statement in the preceding paragraph that the bad qualities and evil\ngenerally are not opposites of the good qualities and good respectively,\nbut that they are merely privations, absences, and hence not created by\nGod. This is a Neo-Platonic doctrine. Pseudo-Bahya, we have seen (p. 108\nf.), and Abraham bar Hiyya (p. 123 f.) adopt the Kalamistic view in the\nlatter point, and solve the problem of evil differently.\n\nThe function of the rational soul is knowledge. The rational soul\ninvestigates the unknown and comprehends it. It derives general rules,\nmakes premises and infers one thing from another. Man alone has this\nprivilege. It is in virtue of the rational soul that we have been given\ncommandments and prohibitions, and become liable to reward and\npunishment. Brute animals have no commandments, because they have no\nreason. The soul has reason only potentially, and man makes it actual by\nstudy. If the reason were actual originally in the soul, there would be\nno difference between the soul's condition in its own world and in this\none; and the purpose of man, which is that he may learn in order to\nchoose the right way and win salvation, would have no meaning.\n\nThe existence of many individual souls, all of which have the soul\ncharacter in common, shows that there is a universal soul by virtue of\nwhich all the particular souls exist. This division of the universal\nsoul into many individual souls is not really a division of the former\nin its essence, which remains one and indivisible. It is the bodies\nwhich receive the influence of the universal soul, as vessels in the sun\nreceive its light according to their purity. Hence the existence of\njustice and evil, righteousness and wrong. This does not, however, mean\nto say that the reception of these qualities is independent of a man's\nchoice. Man is free to choose, and hence he deserves praise and blame,\nreward and punishment.\n\nThe rational soul is destined for the spiritual world, which is a pure\nand perfect world, made by God directly without an intermediate agency.\nIt is not subject to change or defect or need. God alone created this\nspiritual world to show his goodness and power, and not because he\nneeded it. The world is not like God, though God is its cause. It is not\neternal _a parte ante_, having been made out of nothing by God; but it\nwill continue to exist forever, for it cannot be more perfect than it\nis. It is simple and spiritual. This applies also to the heavenly\nspheres and their stars.\n\nMan is obliged to reason and investigate, as all nations do according to\nthe measure of their capacities. No animal reasons because it has not\nthe requisite faculty. But if man should neglect to exercise the power\ngiven him, he would lose the benefit coming therefrom and the purpose of\nhis existence. There would then be no difference between him and the\nbeast.\n\nThe first requisite for study and investigation is to deaden the animal\ndesires. Then with the reason as a guide and his body as a model, man\nacquires the knowledge of the corporeal world. From his rational soul he\ncomes to the knowledge of the existence of a spiritual world. Finally he\nwill learn to know the Creator, who is the only real existent, for\nnothing can be said truly to exist, which at one time did not exist, or\nwhich at some time will cease to exist. When a man neglects this\nprivilege which is his of using his reason, he forfeits the name man,\nand descends below the station of the beast, for the latter never falls\nbelow its animal nature.\n\nIt is very important to study the knowledge of God, for it is the\nhighest knowledge and the cause of human perfection. The prophets are\nfull of recommendations in this regard. Jeremiah says (31, 33), \"They\nshall all know me, from the least of them even unto their greatest.\"\nAmos (5, 6) bids us \"Seek for the Lord and you shall live.\" Hosea\nlikewise (6, 3) recommends that \"We may feel it, and strive to know the\nLord.\"[173]\n\nThe first loss a man suffers who does not study and investigate is that\nhe does not understand the real existence of God, and imagines he is\nworshipping a body. Some think God is light. But this is as bad as to\nregard him body. For light is an accident in a shining body, as is\nproved by the fact that the air receives the light of the sun, and later\nit receives the shadow and becomes dark. And yet these people are not\nthe worst by any means, for there are others who do not trouble to\nconcentrate their minds on God, and occupy their thoughts solely with\nthe business and the pleasures of this world. These people we do not\ndiscuss at all. We are arguing against those who imagine they are wise\nmen and students of the Kalam. In fact they are ignorant persons, and do\nnot know what logic is and how it is to be used.\n\nBefore giving our own views of the nature and existence of God, we must\nrefute the objectionable doctrines of these people. Joseph al-Basir in a\nwork of his called \"Mansuri\" casts it up to the Rabbanites that in\nbelieving that God descends and ascends they are not true worshippers of\nGod. But he forgets that his own doctrines are no better. Anyone who\nbelieves that God created with a newly created will and rejects by means\nof a newly created rejection has never truly served God or known him.\nJust as objectionable is their view that God is living but not with life\nresiding in a subject, powerful but not with power, and so on. We shall\ntake up each of these in turn.\n\nThe Mutakallimun refuse to believe that God's will is eternal, for fear\nof having a second eternal beside God. And so they say that whenever God\nwills, he creates a will for the purpose, and whenever he rejects\nanything he creates a \"rejection\" with which the objectionable thing is\nrejected. But this leads them to a worse predicament than the one from\nwhich they wish to escape, as we shall see. If God cannot create\nanything without having a will as the instrument in creating, and for\nthis reason must first create a will for the purpose--how did he create\nthis will? He must have had another will to create this will, and a\nthird will to create the second, and so on _ad infinitum_, which is\nabsurd. If he created the first will without the help of another will,\nwhy not create the things he wanted outright without any will? Besides,\nin making God will at a given time after a state of not willing, they\nintroduce change in God.\n\nAs for the other dictum, that God is \"living but not with life,\"\n\"powerful but not with power,\" \"knowing but not with knowledge,\" and so\non; what do they mean by this circumlocution? If they say \"living\" to\nindicate that he is not dead, and add \"but not with life,\" so as to\nprevent a comparison of him with other living things, why not say also,\n\"He is body, but not like other bodies\"? If the objection to calling him\nbody is that body is composite, and what is composite must have been\ncomposed by someone and is not eternal, the same objection applies to\n\"living.\" For \"living\" implies \"breathing\" and \"possessed of sensation,\"\nhence also composite and created. If they reply, we mean life peculiar\nto him, we say why not also body peculiar to him? You see these people\nentangle themselves in their own sophisms, because they do not know what\ndemonstration means.[174]\n\nHaving disposed of the errors of the Mutakallimun, we must now present\nour own method of investigation into the nature of God. To know a thing,\nwe investigate its four causes--material, formal, efficient and final.\nWhat has no cause but is the cause of all things, cannot be known in\nthis way. Still it is not altogether unknowable for this reason. Its\nessence cannot be known, but it may be known through its activities, or\nrather effects, which suggest attributes. We cannot therefore know\nconcerning God _what_ he is, nor _how_ he is, nor _on account of what_,\nnor _of what kind_, nor _where_, nor _when_. For these can apply only to\na created thing having a cause. But we can ask concerning him, _whether_\nhe is; and this can best be known from his deeds.\n\nWe observe the things of the world and find that they are all composed\nof substance and accident, as we saw before (p. 131). These are\ncorrelative, and one cannot exist without the other. Hence neither\nprecedes the other. But accident is \"new\" (_i. e._, not eternal), hence\nso is substance. That accident is new is proved from the fact that rest\nsucceeds motion and motion succeeds rest, hence accidents constantly\ncome and go and are newly created.\n\nNow if substance and accident are both new there must be something that\nbrought them into being unless they bring themselves into being. But the\nlatter is impossible, for the agent must either exist when it brings\nitself into being, or not. If it exists it is already there; if it does\nnot exist, it is nothing, and nothing cannot do anything. Hence there\nmust be a being that brought the world into existence. This is God.\n\nGod is one, for the cause of the many must be the one. If the cause of\nthe many is the many, then the cause of the second many is a third many,\nand so on _ad infinitum_; hence we must stop with the one. God is to the\nworld as unity is to number. Unity is the basis of number without being\nincluded in number, and it embraces number on all sides. It is the\nfoundation of number; for if you remove unity, you remove number; but\nthe removal of number does not remove unity. The one surrounds number on\nall sides; for the beginning of number is the one, and it is also the\nmiddle of number and the end thereof. For number is nothing but an\naggregate of ones. Besides, number is composed of odds and evens, and\none is the cause of odd as well as even.\n\nIf there were two eternal beings, they would either coincide in all\nrespects, and they would be one and not two. Or they would differ. In\nthe latter case, the world is either the work of both or of one only.\nIf of both, they are not omnipotent, and hence not eternal. If of one\nonly, then the other does not count, since he is not eternal, and there\nis only one.\n\nBy saying God is one we do not mean that he comes under the category of\nquantity, for quantity is an accident residing in a substance, and all\nsubstance is \"new.\" What we mean is that the essence of God is true\nunity, not numerical unity. For numerical unity is also in a sense\nmultiplicity, and is capable of multiplication and division. God's unity\nis alone separate and one in all respects.\n\nGod is not like any of his creatures. For if he were, he would be\npossessed of quality, since it is in virtue of quality that a thing is\nsaid to be like another, and quality is an accident contained in a\nsubstance.\n\nGod is self-sufficient and not in need of anything. For if he needed\nanything at all, it would be first of all the one who created him and\nmade him an existent thing. But this is absurd, since God is eternal. We\nmight suppose that he needs the world, which he created for some\npurpose, as we sometimes make things to assist us. But this, too, is\nimpossible. For if he were dependent upon the world for anything, he\ncould not create it. It is different with us. We do not create things;\nwe only modify matter already existing.\n\nAgain, if God created the world for his own benefit, then either he was\nalways in need of the world, or the need arose at the time of creating.\nIf he was always in need of the world, it would have existed with him\nfrom eternity, but we have already proved that the world is not eternal.\nIf the need arose in him at the time of creation, as heat arises in a\nbody after cold, or motion after rest, then he is like created things,\nand is himself \"new\" and not eternal. To say the need was always there,\nand yet he did not create it until the time he did would be to ascribe\ninability to God of creating the world before he did, which is absurd.\nFor one who is unable at any given time, cannot create at all. It\nremains then that he does not need anything, and that he created the\nworld by reason of his goodness and generosity and nothing else.\n\nThe question of God's will is difficult. The problem is this. If God's\nwill is eternal and unchanging, and he created the world with his will,\nthe world is eternal. If we say, as we must, that he created the world\nafter a condition of non-creation, we introduce a change in God, a\nsomething newly created in him, namely, the will to create, which did\nnot exist before. This is a dilemma. My own view is that since God's\ncreating activity is his essence, and his essence is infinite and\neternal, we cannot say he created _after_ a condition of non-creation,\nor that he willed _after_ a condition of non-willing, or that he was\nformerly not able. And yet we do not mean that the world is eternal. It\nwas created a definite length of time before our time. The solution of\nthe problem is that time itself was created with the world; for time is\nthe measure of motion of the celestial sphere, and if there are no\nspheres there is no time, and no before and after. Hence it does not\nfollow because the world is not eternal that _before_ its creation God\ndid not create. There is no _before_ when the world is not.\n\nWe objected to the view of the Mutakallimun (p. 142), who speak of God\ncreating a will on the ground that if he can create a will directly he\ncan create the world instead. Our opinion is therefore that God's will\nis eternal and not newly created, for the latter view introduces\ncreation in God. There is still the difficulty of the precise relation\nof the will to God. If it is different from God we have two eternals,\nand if it is the same as God in all respects, he changes when he\ncreates. My answer is, it is not different from God in any sense, and\nthere is no changing attribute in God. But there is a subtle mystery in\nthis matter, which it is not proper to reveal, and this is not the place\nto explain it. The interested reader is referred to the book of\nEmpedocles and other works of the wise men treating of this subject\n(_cf._ above, p. 64).\n\nGod created the world out of nothing, and not out of a pre-existent\nmatter. For if the matter of the world is eternal like God, there is no\nmore reason for supposing that God formed a world out of it than that it\nformed a world out of God.\n\nThe world is perfect. For we have repeatedly shown that its creation is\ndue entirely to God's goodness. If then it were not perfect, this would\nargue in God either ignorance or niggardliness or weakness.[175]\n\nMost of the ancients avoided giving God attributes for fear of making\nhim the bearer of qualities, which would introduce plurality and\ncomposition in his essence. The proper view, however, is this. As God's\nessence is different from all other essences, so are his attributes\ndifferent from all other attributes. His attributes are not different\nfrom him; his knowledge and his truth and his power are his essence. The\nway man arrives at the divine attributes is this. Men have examined his\nworks and learned from them God's existence. They then reflected on this\nexistent and found that he was not weak; so they called him strong. They\nfound his works perfect, and they called him wise. They perceived that\nhe was self-sufficient, without need of anything, and hence without any\nmotives for doing wrong. Hence they called him righteous. And so on with\nthe other attributes. All this they did in order that people may learn\nfrom him and imitate his ways. But we must not forget that all these\nexpressions of God's attributes are figurative. No one must suppose that\nif we do not say he has life, it means he is dead. What we mean is that\nwe cannot apply the term living to God literally, in the sense in which\nwe apply it to other living things. When the Bible does speak of God as\nalive and living, the meaning is that he exists forever. The philosopher\nis right when he says that it is more proper to apply negative\nattributes to God than positive.[176]\n\nTaking a glance at Ibn Zaddik's theology just discussed in its essential\noutlines, we notice that while he opposes vigorously certain aspects of\nKalamistic thought, as he found them in al-Basir, the Karaite, his own\nmethod and doctrine are not far removed from the Kalam. His proof of the\ncreation of the world from its composite character (substance and\naccident) is the same as one of Saadia, which Maimonides cites as a\nKalamistic proof. We have already spoken of the fact that the method of\nbasing one's theology upon the creation of the world is one that is\ndistinctive of the Kalam, as Maimonides himself tells us. And this\nmethod is common to Saadia, Bahya and Ibn Zaddik. In his discussion of\nthe attributes Ibn Zaddik offers little if anything that is new. His\nattitude is that in the literal and positive sense no attribute can be\napplied to God. We can speak of God negatively without running the risk\nof misunderstanding. But the moment we say anything positive we do\nbecome thus liable to comparing God with other things; and such\ncircumlocutions as the Kalamistic \"Living without life,\" and so on, do\nnot help matters, for they are contradictory, and take away with one\nhand what they give with the other. The Biblical expressions must be\ntaken figuratively; and the most important point to remember is that\nGod's essence cannot be known at all. The manner in which we arrive at\nthe divine attributes is by transferring them from God's effects in\nnature to his own essence. All this we have already found in Bahya much\nbetter expressed, and Bahya is also without doubt the source of Ibn\nZaddik's discussion of God's unity.\n\nWe must now review briefly the practical part of Ibn Zaddik's philosophy\nas it is found in the fourth part of the \"Microcosm.\" In the manner of\nBahya he points out the importance of divine service and obedience to\nthe commandments of God, viewing man's duties to his maker as an\nexpression of gratitude, which everyone owes to his benefactor. Like\nBahya he compares God's benefactions with those of one man to another to\nshow the infinite superiority of the former, and the greater duty which\nfollows therefrom.\n\nThe commandments which God gave us like the act of our creation are for\nour own good, that we may enjoy true happiness in the world to come. As\nit would not be proper to reward a person for what he has not done, God\ngave man commandments. The righteous as well as the wicked are free to\ndetermine their own conduct, hence reward and punishment are just.\n\nLike Saadia and Bahya before him, Ibn Zaddik makes use of the\ndistinction (or rather takes it for granted) between rational and\ntraditional commandments; pointing out that the latter also have a cause\nand explanation in the mind of God even though we may not know it. In\nsome cases we can see the explanation ourselves. Take for instance the\nobservance of the Sabbath. Its rational signification is two-fold. It\nteaches us that the world was created, and hence has a Creator whom we\nworship. And in the second place the Sabbath symbolizes the future\nworld. As one has nothing to eat on the Sabbath day unless he has\nprepared food the day before, so the enjoyment of the future world\ndepends upon spiritual preparation in this world.\n\nIn his conduct a man must imitate God's actions by doing good and mercy\nand kindness. Without the knowledge of God a person's good deeds are of\nno account and no better than the work of idolaters. In fact it is not\npossible to do good deeds without a knowledge of God, for he is the\nsource of all good, and there is no true good without him. When a fool\nis seen with good qualities such as mercy and benevolence, they are due\nto the weakness of his animal soul, the spirited part of his nature.\nSimilarly if this fool abstains from pleasures, it is because of the\nweakness of his appetitive soul.\n\nThus we see that knowledge comes first in importance; for knowledge\nleads to practice, and practice brings reward in the world to come. As\nthe purpose of man's creation is that he may enjoy the future life,\nwisdom or knowledge is the first requisite to this great end.\n\nThe four principal qualities constituting goodness or virtue are (1)\nknowledge of God's attributes; (2) righteousness or justice; (3) hope;\n(4) humility. All other good qualities are derived from these. Jeremiah\nnames some of them when he says (9, 23), \"I am the Lord who exercise\nkindness, justice and righteousness on the earth; for in these things I\ndelight, saith the Lord.\" Similarly Zephaniah (2, 3) bids us, \"Seek ye\nthe Lord, all ye meek of the earth, who have fulfilled his ordinances;\nseek righteousness, seek meekness.\"\n\nThe four qualities of wisdom or knowledge, righteousness, hope and\nhumility are without doubt modified descendants of the four Platonic\nvirtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, which we still find in\ntheir original form and in their Platonic derivation and psychological\norigin in Pseudo-Bahya (_cf._ above p. 111).\n\nReward and punishment of the real kind, Ibn Zaddik thinks, are not in\nthis world but in the next. In this way he accounts for the fact of the\nprosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous. Another\nproof that this world cannot be the place of final reward and punishment\nis that pleasure in this world is not a real good, but only a temporary\nrespite from disease. Pain and pleasure are correlative, as we saw\nbefore (p. 136). In fact pleasure is not a good at all; for if it were,\nthen the greater the pleasure, the greater the good, which is not true.\nReward in the next world is not a corporeal pleasure at all.\n\nThe evil which happens to the righteous in this world is often a natural\noccurrence without reference to reward and punishment, and may be\ncompared to the natural pleasures which men derive from the sense of\nsight and the other senses, and which have nothing to do with reward and\npunishment. Sometimes, too, this evil is inflicted upon the good man to\nforgive his sins. Real reward and punishment are in the future life,\nand as that life is spiritual, the reward as well as the punishment is\ntimeless.\n\nThe Mutakallimun think that animals and little children are also\nrewarded in the next world for ill treatment, suffering and death which\nare inflicted upon them in this world. So we find in Joseph al Basir's\nMansuri. But this is absurd. If the killing of animals is a wrong, God\nwould not have commanded us to do it, any more than he ordered us to\nkill human beings in order that he may reward them later. Moreover, we\nshould then deserve punishment for killing animals if that is wrong, and\nthere would follow the absurdity that God commanded us to do that for\nwhich we deserve punishment. Besides, if the animals deserve reward and\npunishment, they should have been given commandments and laws like\nourselves. If this was not done because animals are not rational, reward\nand punishment are equally out of place for the same reason.\n\nWhen the soul leaves the body in death, if she exercised her reason in\nthe pursuit of knowledge, she will continue her existence forever in the\nupper world. This is her happiness, her reward and her paradise, namely,\nto cleave to her own world, and to shine with the true light emanating\nfrom God directly. This is the end of the human soul. But if she did not\nexercise her reason and did not pursue right conduct, she will not be\nable to return to the spiritual world, for she will have lost her own\nspirituality. She will be similar to the body, desiring this world and\nits pleasures. Her fate will be to revolve forever with the sphere in\nthe world of fire, without being able to return to her world. Thus she\nwill be forever in pain, and homeless.\n\nWhen the Messiah comes, the pious men of our nation, the Prophets, the\nPatriarchs and those who died for the sanctification of the name, _i. e._,\nthe martyrs, will be brought back to life in the body, and will\nnever die again. There will be no eating and drinking, but they will\nlive like Moses on the mountain basking in the divine light. The wicked\nwill also be joined to their bodies and burned with fire.[177]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nJUDAH HALEVI\n\n\nIn Judah Halevi the poet got the better of the rationalist. Not that\nJudah Halevi was not familiar with philosophical thinking and did not\nabsorb the current philosophical terminology as well as the ideas\ncontained therein. Quite the contrary. He shows a better knowledge of\nAristotelian ideas than his predecessors, and is well versed in\nNeo-Platonism. While he attacks all those views of philosophers which\nare inconsistent to his mind with the religion of Judaism, he speaks in\nother respects the philosophic language, and even makes concessions to\nthe philosophers. If the reason should really demand it, he tells us,\none might adopt the doctrine of the eternity of matter without doing any\nharm to the essence of Judaism.[178] As for the claims of reason to rule\nour beliefs, he similarly admits that that which is really proved in the\nsame absolute manner as the propositions in mathematics and logic cannot\nbe controverted. But this opinion need cause one no difficulty as there\nis nothing in the Bible which opposes the unequivocal demands of the\nreason.[179] He cannot consistently oppose all philosophy and science,\nfor he maintains that the sciences were originally in the hands of the\nJews, and that it was from them that the Chaldeans borrowed them and\nhanded them over to the Persians, who in turn transferred them to Greece\nand Rome, their origin being forgotten.[180] At the same time he insists\nthat philosophy and reason are not adequate means for the solution of\nall problems, and that the actual solutions as found in the writings of\nthe Aristotelians of his day are in many cases devoid of all\ndemonstrative value. Then there are certain matters in theory as well as\nin practice which do not at all come within the domain of reason, and\nthe philosophers are bound to be wrong because they apply the wrong\nmethod. Revelation alone can make us wise as to certain aspects of God's\nnature and as to certain details in human conduct; and in these\nphilosophy must fail because as philosophy it has no revelation. With\nall due respect therefore to the philosophers, who are the most reliable\nguides in matters not conflicting with revelation, we must leave them if\nwe wish to learn the truth concerning those matters in which they are\nincompetent to judge.\n\nThis characterization of Judah Halevi's attitude is brief and\ninadequate. But before proceeding to elaborate it with more detail and\ngreater concreteness, it will be well to sketch very briefly the little\nwe know of his life.[181]\n\nJudah Halevi was born in Toledo in the last quarter of the eleventh\ncentury. This is about the time when the city was taken from the\nMohammedans by the emperor Alphonso VI, king of Leon, Castile, Galicia\nand Navarre. At the same time Toledo remained Arabic in culture and\nlanguage for a long while after this, and even exerted a great influence\nupon the civilization of Christendom. The Jews were equally well treated\nin Toledo by Mohammedan emir and Christian king. The youth of Halevi was\ntherefore not embittered or saddened by Jewish persecutions. It seems\nthat he was sent to Lucena, a Jewish centre, where he studied the Talmud\nwith the famous Alfasi, and made friends with Joseph ibn Migash,\nAlfasi's successor, and Baruh Albalia, the philosopher. A poet by\nnature, he began to write Hebrew verses early, and soon became famous as\na poet of the first order in no manner inferior to Gabirol. His living\nhe made not from his verses, but like many others of his day by\npracticing the art of medicine. Later in life he visited Cordova,\nalready in its decline through the illiberal government of the Almoravid\ndynasty. The rulers were strict religionists, implicit followers of the\n\"fukaha,\" the men devoted to the study of Mohammedan religion and law;\nand scientific learning and philosophy were proscribed in their domains.\nMen of another faith were not in favor, and the Jews who, unlike the\nChristians, had no powerful emperor anywhere to take their part, had to\nbuy their lives and comparative freedom with their hard earned wealth.\nHere Halevi spent some time as a physician. He was admitted in court\ncircles, but his personal good fortune could not reconcile him to the\nsufferings of his brethren, and his letters give expression to his\ndissatisfaction. He wrote a variety of poems on subjects secular and\nreligious; but what made him famous above all else was his strong\nnationalism, and those of his poems will live longest which give\nexpression to his intense love for his people and the land which was\nonce their own. That it was not mere sentiment with Judah Halevi he\nproved late in life when he decided to leave his many friends and his\nbirthplace and go to Palestine to end his life on the soil of his\nancestors. It was after 1140 that he left Spain for the East.\nUnfavorable winds drove him out of course to Egypt, and he landed at\nAlexandria. From there he went to Cairo at the invitation of his\nadmirers and friends. Everywhere he was received with great honor, his\nfame preceding him, and he was urged to remain in Egypt. But no\ndissuasion could keep him from his pious resolve. We find him later in\nDamietta; we follow him to Tyre and Damascus, but beyond the last city\nall trace of him is lost. We know not whether he reached Jerusalem or\nnot. Legend picks up the thread where history drops it, and tells of\nJudah Halevi meeting his death at the gates of the holy city as with\ntears he was singing his famous ode to Zion. An Arab horseman, the story\ngoes, pierced him through with his spear.\n\nThis sketch of Halevi's life and character, brief and inadequate as it\nis, will prepare us to understand better his attitude to philosophy and\nto Judaism. His was not a critical intellect whose curiosity is not\nsatisfied until the matter in dispute is proved in logical form. Reason\nis good enough in mathematics and physics where the objects of our\ninvestigation are accessible to us and the knowledge of their nature\nexhausts their significance. It is not so with the truths of Judaism and\nthe nature of God. These cannot be known adequately by the reason alone,\nand mere knowledge is not enough. God and the Jewish religion are not\nsimply facts to be known and understood like the laws of science. They\nare living entities to be acquainted with, to be devoted to, to love.\nHence quite a different way of approach is necessary. And not everyone\nhas access to this way. The method of acquaintance is open only to those\nwho by birth and tradition belong to the family of the prophets, who had\na personal knowledge of God, and to the land of Palestine where God\nrevealed himself.[182]\n\nWe see here the nationalist speaking, the lover of his people and of\ntheir land and language and institutions. David Kaufmann has shown that\nJudah Halevi's anti-philosophical attitude has much in common with that\nof the great Arab writer Al Gazali, from whom there is no doubt that he\nborrowed his inspiration.[183] Gazali began as a philosopher, then lost\nconfidence in the logical method of proof, pointed to the contradictions\nof the philosophers, to their disagreements among themselves, and went\nover to the Sufis, the pietists and mystics of the Mohammedan faith.\nThere are a number of resemblances between Gazali and Halevi as Kaufmann\nhas shown, and there is no doubt that skepticism in respect of the\npowers of the human reason on the one hand, and a deep religious sense\non the other are responsible for the point of view of Gazali as well as\nHalevi. But there is this additional motive in Halevi that he was\ndefending a persecuted race and a despised faith against not merely the\nphilosophers but against the more powerful and more fortunate professors\nof other religions. He is the loyal son of his race and his religion,\nand he will show that they are above all criticism, that they are the\nbest and the truest there are. Maimonides, too, found it necessary to\ndefend Judaism against the attacks of philosophy. But in his case it was\nthe Jew in him who had to be defended against the philosopher in him. It\nwas no external enemy but an internal who must be made harmless, and the\nmethod was one of reconciliation and harmonization. It is still truer to\nsay that with Maimonides both Judaism and philosophy were his friends,\nneither was an enemy. He was attached to one quite as much as to the\nother. And it was his privilege to reconcile their differences, to the\ngreat gain, as he thought, of both. Judah Halevi takes the stand of one\nwho fights for his hearth and home against the attacks of foreign foes.\nHe will not yield an inch to the adversary. He will maintain his own.\nThe enemy cannot approach.\n\nThus Halevi begins his famous work \"Kusari\": \"I was asked what I have to\nsay in answer to the arguments of philosophers, unbelievers and\nprofessors of other religions against our own.\" Instead of working out\nhis ideas systematically, he wanted to give his subject dramatic\ninterest by clothing it in dialogue form. And he was fortunate in\nfinding a historical event which suited his purpose admirably.\n\nSome three or four centuries before his time, the king of the Chazars, a\npeople of Turkish origin living in the Caucasus, together with his\ncourtiers and many of his subjects embraced Judaism. Hasdai ibn Shaprut,\nthe Jewish minister and patron of learning of Cordova, in the tenth\ncentury corresponded with the then king of the Chazars, and received an\naccount of the circumstances of the conversion. In brief it was that the\nking wishing to know which was the true religion invited representatives\nof the three dominant creeds, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism,\nand questioned them concerning the tenets of their respective faiths.\nSeeing that the Christian as well as the Mohammedan appealed in their\narguments to the truth of the Hebrew Bible, the king concluded that\nJudaism must be the true religion, which he accordingly adopted. This\nstory gave Halevi the background and framework for his composition. He\nworks out his own ideas in the form of a dialogue between the Jewish\nRabbi and the king of the Chazars, in which the former explains to the\nking the essentials of the Jewish religion, and answers the king's\nquestions and criticisms, taking occasion to discuss a variety of\ntopics, religious, philosophical and scientific, all tending to show the\ntruth of Judaism and its superiority to other religions, to philosophy,\nKalam, and also to Karaism.\n\nThe story is, Halevi tells us, in the introduction to his book, that the\nking of the Chazars had repeated dreams in which an angel said to him,\n\"Your intentions are acceptable to God, but not your practice.\" His\nendeavors to be faithful to his religion, and to take part in the\nservices and perform the sacrifices in the temple in person only led to\nthe repetition of the dream. He therefore consulted a philosopher about\nhis belief, and the latter said to him, \"In God there is neither favor\nnor hatred, for he is above all desire and purpose. Purpose and\nintention argue defect and want, which the fulfilment of the intention\nsatisfies. But God is free from want. Hence there is no purpose or\nintention in his nature.\n\n\"God does not know the particular or individual, for the individual\nconstantly changes, whereas God's knowledge never changes. Hence God\ndoes not know the individual man and, needless to say, he does not hear\nhis prayer. When the philosophers say God created man, they use the word\ncreated metaphorically, in the sense that God is the cause of all\ncauses, but not that he made man with purpose and intention.\n\n\"The world is eternal, and so is the existence of man. The character and\nability of a person depend upon the causes antecedent to him. If these\nare of the right sort, we have a person who has the potentialities of a\nphilosopher. To realize them he must develop his intellect by study, and\nhis character through moral discipline. Then he will receive the\ninfluence of the 'Active Intellect,' with which he becomes identified so\nthat his limbs and faculties do only what is right, and are wholly in\nthe service of the active Intellect.\n\n\"This union with the active Intellect is the highest goal of man; and he\nbecomes like one of the angels, and joins the ranks of Hermes,\n\u00c6sculapius, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. This is the meaning of the\nexpression 'favor of God.' The important thing is to study the sciences\nin order to know the truth, and to practice the ethical virtues. If one\ndoes this, it matters not what religion he professes, or whether he\nprofesses any religion at all. He can make his own religion in order to\ndiscipline himself in humility, and to govern his relations to society\nand country. Or he can choose one of the philosophical religions. Purity\nof heart is the important thing, and knowledge of the sciences. Then the\ndesired result will come, namely, union with the active intellect, which\nmay also result in the power of prophecy through true dreams and\nvisions.\"\n\nThe king was not satisfied with the statement of the philosopher, which\nseemed to him inadequate because he felt that he himself had the\nnecessary purity of heart, and yet he was told that his practice was not\nsatisfactory, proving that there is something in practice as such apart\nfrom intention. Besides, the great conflict between Christianity and\nIslam, who kill one another, is due to the difference in religious\npractice, and not in purity of heart. Moreover, if the view of the\nphilosophers were true, there should be prophecy among them, whereas in\nreality prophecy is found among those who did not study the sciences\nrather than among those who did.\n\nThe king then said, I will ask the Christians and the Mohammedans. I\nneed not inquire of the Jews, for their low condition is sufficient\nproof that the truth cannot be with them. So he sent for a Christian\nsage, who explained to him the essentials of his belief, saying among\nother things, We believe in the creation of the world in six days, in\nthe descent of all men from Adam, in revelation and Providence, in\nshort, in all that is found in the law of Moses and in the other\nIsraelitish Scriptures, which cannot be doubted because of the publicity\nwhich was given to the events recorded therein. He also quoted the\nwords of the gospel, I did not come to destroy any of the commandments\nof Israel and of Moses their teacher; I came to confirm them.\n\nThe king was not convinced by the Christian belief, and called a\nMohammedan doctor, who in describing the specific tenets of\nMohammedanism also mentioned the fact that in the Koran are quoted the\nPentateuch and Moses and the other leaders, and the wonderful things\nthey did. These, he said, cannot be denied; for they are well known.\n\nSeeing that both Christian and Mohammedan referred to the law of Moses\nas true, and as evidence that God spoke to man, the king determined to\ncall a Jewish sage also, and hear what he had to say.\n\nThe Jewish \"Haber,\" as Judah Halevi calls him, began his discourse by\nsaying, We Jews believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who took\nthe children of Israel out of Egypt, supported them in the wilderness,\ngave them the land of Canaan, and so on.\n\nThe king was disappointed and said, I had determined not to consult the\nJews in this matter at all, because their abject condition in the world\ndid not leave them any good quality. You should have said, he told the\nJew, that you believe in him who created the world and governs it; who\nmade man and provides for him. Every religionist defends his belief in\nthis way.\n\nThe Jew replied, The religion to which you refer is a rational religion,\nestablished by speculation and argument, which are full of doubt, and\nabout which there is no agreement among philosophers, because not all\nthe arguments are valid or even plausible. This pleased the king, and he\nexpressed a wish to continue the discourse. The Rabbi then said, The\nproper way to define one's religion is by reference to that which is\nmore certain, namely, actual experience. Jews have this actual\nexperience. The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob spoke to Moses and\ndelivered the Israelites out of Egypt. This is well known. God gave\nIsrael the Torah. To be sure, all others not of Israel who accept the\nLaw will be rewarded, but they cannot be equal to Israel. There is a\npeculiar relation between God and Israel in which the other peoples do\nnot share. As the plant is distinguished from the mineral, the animal\nfrom the plant, and man from the irrational animal, so is the prophetic\nindividual distinguished above other men. He constitutes a higher\nspecies. It is through him that the masses became aware of God's\nexistence and care for them. It was he who told them things unknown to\nthem; who gave them an account of the world's creation and its history.\nWe count now forty-five hundred years from the creation. This was handed\ndown from Adam through Seth and Enos to Noah, to Shem and Eber, to\nAbraham, Isaac and Jacob, to Moses, and finally to us. Moses came only\nfour hundred years after Abraham in a world which was full of knowledge\nof heavenly and earthly things. It is impossible that he should have\ngiven them a false account of the division of languages and the\nrelations of nations without being found out and exposed.\n\nThe philosophers, it is true, oppose us by maintaining that the world is\neternal. But the philosophers are Greeks, descended from Japheth, who\ndid not inherit either wisdom or Torah. Divine wisdom is found only in\nthe family of Shem. The Greeks had philosophy among them only during the\nshort time of their power. They borrowed it from the Persians, who had\nit in turn from the Chaldeans. But neither before nor after did they\nhave any philosophers among them.\n\nAristotle, not having any inherited tradition concerning the origin of\nthe world, endeavored to reason it all out of his own head. Eternity was\njust as hard to believe in as creation. But as he had no true and\nreliable tradition, his arguments in favor of eternity seemed to him to\nbe the stronger. Had he lived among a people who had reliable traditions\non the other side, he would have found arguments in favor of creation,\nwhich is more plausible than eternity. Real demonstration cannot be\ncontroverted; and there is nothing in the Bible which opposes what the\nreason unequivocally demands. But the matter of eternity or creation is\nvery difficult. The arguments on one side are as good as those on the\nother. And tradition from Adam to Noah and Moses, which is better than\nargument, lends its additional weight to the doctrine of creation. If\nthe believer in the Torah were obliged to hold that there is a primitive\neternal matter from which the world was made, and that there were many\nworlds before this one, there would be no great harm, as long as he\nbelieves that this world is of recent origin and Adam was the first\nman.[184]\n\nWe see now the standpoint of Judah Halevi, for the \"Haber\" is of course\nhis spokesman. Philosophy and independent reasoning on such difficult\nmatters as God and creation are after all more or less guess work, and\ncannot be made the bases of religion except for those who have nothing\nbetter. The Jews fortunately have a surer foundation all their own. They\nhave a genuine and indisputable tradition. History is the only true\nscience and the source of truth; not speculation, which is subjective,\nand can be employed with equal plausibility in favor of opposite\ndoctrines. True history and tradition in the case of the Jews goes back\nultimately to first hand knowledge from the very source of all truth.\nThe prophets of Israel constitute a higher species, as much superior to\nthe ordinary man as the ordinary man is to the lower animal, and these\nprophets received their knowledge direct from God. In principle Judah\nHalevi agrees with the other Jewish philosophers that true reason cannot\nbe controverted. He differs with them in the concrete application of\nthis abstract principle. He has not the same respect as Maimonides for\nthe actual achievements of the unaided human reason, and an infinitely\ngreater respect for the traditional beliefs of Judaism and the Biblical\nexpressions taken in their obvious meaning. Hence he does not feel the\nsame necessity as Maimonides to twist the meaning of Scriptural passages\nto make them agree with philosophical theories.\n\nAccording to this view Judah Halevi does not find it necessary with the\nphilosophers and the Mutakallimun painfully to prove the existence of\nGod. The existence of the Jewish people and the facts of their wonderful\nhistory are more eloquent demonstrations than any that logic or\nmetaphysics can muster. But more than this. The philosophical view of\nGod is inadequate in more ways than one. It is inaccurate in content and\nincorrect in motive. In the first place, they lay a great deal of stress\non nature as the principle by which objects move. If a stone naturally\nmoves to the centre of the world, they say this is due to a cause called\nnature. And the tendency is to attribute intelligence and creative power\nto this new entity as an associate of God. This is misleading. The real\nIntelligence is God alone. It is true that the elements, and the sun and\nmoon, and the stars exert certain influences, producing heat and cold,\nand various other effects in things material, by virtue of which these\nlatter are prepared for the reception of higher forms. And there is no\nharm in calling these agencies Nature. But we must regard these as\ndevoid of intelligence, and as mere effects of God's wisdom and\npurpose.[185]\n\nThe philosopher denies will in God on the ground that this would argue\ndefect and want. This reduces God to an impersonal force. We Jews\nbelieve God has will. The word we use does not matter. I ask the\nphilosopher what is it that makes the heavens revolve continually, and\nthe outer sphere carry everything in uniform motion, the earth standing\nimmovable in the centre? Call it what you please, will or command; it is\nthe same thing that made the air shape itself to produce the sounds of\nthe ten commandments which were heard, and that caused the characters to\nform on the Tables of Stone.[186]\n\nThe motive of the philosopher is also different from that of the\nbeliever. The philosopher seeks knowledge only. He desires to know God\nas he desires to know the exact position and form of the earth.\nIgnorance in respect to God is no more harmful in his mind than\nignorance respecting a fact in nature. His main object is to have true\nknowledge in order to become like unto the Active Intellect and to be\nidentified with it. As long as he is a philosopher it makes no\ndifference to him what he believes in other respects and whether he\nobserves the practices of religion or not.[187]\n\nThe true belief in God is different in scope and aim. What God is must\nbe understood not by means of rational proofs, but by prophetic and\nspiritual insight. Rational proofs are misleading, and the heretics and\nunbelievers also use rational proofs--those for example who believe in\ntwo original causes, in the eternity of the world, or in the divinity of\nthe sun and fire. The most subtle proofs are those used by the\nphilosophers, and they maintain that God is not concerned about us, and\npays no attention to our prayers and sacrifices; that the world is\neternal. It is different with us, who heard his words, his commands and\nprohibitions, and felt his reward and his punishment. We have a proper\nname of God, Jhvh, representative of the communications he made to us,\nand we have a conviction that he created the world. The first was Adam,\nwho knew God through actual communication and the creation of Eve from\none of his ribs. Cain and Abel came next, then Noah and Abraham, Isaac\nand Jacob, and so on to Moses and the Prophets, who came after him. All\nthese called him Jhvh by reason of their insight. The people who\nreceived the teaching of the Prophets, in whom they believed, also\ncalled him Jhvh, because he was in communication with men; and the\nselect among them saw him through an intermediate agency, called\nvariously, Form, Image, Cloud, Fire, Kingdom, Shekinah, Glory, Rainbow,\nand so on, proving that he spoke to them.[188]\n\nAs the sun's light penetrates different objects in varying degrees, for\nexample, ruby and crystal receive the sun's light in the highest degree;\nclear air and water come next, then bright stones and polished surfaces,\nand last of all opaque substances like wood and earth, which the light\ndoes not penetrate at all; so we may conceive of different minds varying\nin the degree to which they attain a knowledge of God. Some arrive only\nas far as the knowledge of \"Elohim,\" while others attain to a knowledge\nof Jhvh, which may be compared to the reception of the sun's light in\nruby and crystal. These are the prophets in the land of Israel. The\nconception involved in the name \"Elohim\" no intelligent man denies;\nwhereas many deny the conception of Jhvh, because prophecy is an unusual\noccurrence even among individuals, not to speak of a nation. That is why\nPharaoh said (Exod. 5, 2), \"I know not Jhvh.\" He knew \"Elohim,\" but not\nJhvh, that is a God who reveals himself to man. \"Elohim\" may be arrived\nat by reasoning; for the reason tells us that the world has a ruler;\nthough the various classes of men differ as to details, the most\nplausible view being that of the philosophers. But the conception of\nJhvh cannot be arrived at by reason. It requires that prophetic vision\nby which a person almost becomes a member of a new species, akin to\nangels. Then the doubts he formerly had about \"Elohim\" fall away, and he\nlaughs at the arguments which led him to the conception of God and of\nunity. Now he becomes a devotee, who loves the object of his devotion,\nand is ready to give his life in his love for him, because of the great\nhappiness he feels in being near to him, and the misery of being away\nfrom him. This is different from the philosopher, who sees in the\nworship of God only good ethics and truth, because he is greater than\nall other existing things; and in unbelief nothing more than the fault\nof choosing the untrue.[189]\n\nHere there is clearly a touch of religious poetry and mysticism, which\nreveals to us Halevi's real attitude, and we have no difficulty in\nunderstanding his lack of sympathy with what seemed to him the shallow\nrationalism of the contemporaneous Aristotelian, who fancied in his\nconceit that with a few logical formul\u00e6 he could penetrate the\nmysteries of the divine, when in reality he was barely enabled to skim\nthe surface; into the sanctuary he could never enter.\n\nThough, as we have just seen, Halevi has a conception of God as a\npersonal being, acting with purpose and will and, as we shall see more\nclearly later, standing in close personal relation to Israel and the\nland of Palestine, still he is very far from thinking of him\nanthropomorphically. In his discussion of the divine attributes he\nyields to none in removing from God any positive quality of those\nascribed to him in the Bible. The various names or appellatives applied\nto God in Scripture, except the tetragrammaton, he divides, according to\ntheir signification, into three classes, _actional_, _relative_,\n_negative_. Such expressions as \"making high,\" \"making low,\" \"making\npoor,\" almighty, strong, jealous, revengeful, gracious, merciful, and so\non, do not denote, he says, feeling or emotion in God. They are ascribed\nto him because of his visible acts or effects in the world, which we\njudge on the analogy of our own acts. As a human being is prompted to\nremove the misery of a fellowman because he feels pity, we ascribe all\ninstances of divine removal of misery from mankind to a similar feeling\nin God, and call him merciful. But this is only a figure of speech. God\ndoes remove misery, but the feeling of pity is foreign to him. We call\ntherefore the attribute merciful and others like it actional, meaning\nthat it is God's acts which suggest to us these appellations.\n\nAnother class of attributes found in the Bible embraces such expressions\nas blessed, exalted, holy, praised, and so on. These are called\nrelative, because they are derived from the attitude of man to God. God\nis blessed because men bless him, and so with the rest. They do not\ndenote any essential quality in God. And hence their number does not\nnecessitate plurality in God. Finally we have such terms as living, one,\nfirst, last, and so on. These too do not denote God's positive essence,\nfor in reality God cannot be said to be either living or dead. Life as\nwe understand it denotes sensation and motion, which are not in God. If\nwe do apply to God the term living, we do so in order to exclude its\nnegative, dead. Living means not dead; one means not many; first means\nnot having any cause antecedent to him; last means never ceasing to be.\nHence we call these attributes negative.[190]\n\nWe see that Judah Halevi is at one with Bahya and Joseph ibn Zaddik in\nhis understanding of the divine attributes. The slight difference in the\nmode of classification is not essential.\n\nThis God chose Israel and gave them the ten commandments in order to\nconvince them that the Law originated from God and not from Moses. For\nthey might have had a doubt in their minds, seeing that speech is a\nmaterial thing, and believe that the origin of a law or religion is in\nthe mind of a human being, which afterwards comes to be believed in as\ndivine. For this reason God commanded the people to purify themselves\nand be ready for the third day, when they _all_ heard the word of God,\nand were convinced that prophecy is not what the philosophers say it\nis--a natural result of man's reason identifying itself with the Active\nIntellect through the help of the imagination, which presents true\nvisions in a dream--but a real communication from God. Not only did they\nhear the word of God, but they saw the writing of God on the Tables of\nStone.\n\nThis does not mean that we believe in the corporeality of God; Heaven\nforbid, we do not even think of the soul of man as corporeal. But we\ncannot deny the things recorded, which are well known. Just as God\ncreated heaven and earth, not by means of material tools as a man does,\nbut by his will, so he might have willed that the air should convey\narticulate sounds to the ear of Moses, and that letters should be formed\non the Tables of Stone to convey to the people the ideas which he wanted\nthem to know. They might have happened in a still more wonderful way\nthan I have been able to conceive.\n\nThis may seem like an unwarranted magnifying of the virtues of our\npeople. But in reality it is true that the chain of individuals from\nAdam to Moses and thereafter was a remarkable one of godly men. Adam was\nsurely a godlike man since he was made by the hand of God and was not\ndependent on the inherited constitution of his parents, and on the food\nand climate he enjoyed in the years of his growth. He was made perfect\nas in the time of mature youth when a person is at his best, and was\nendowed with the best possible soul for man. Abel was his successor in\nexcellence, also a godly man, and so down the line through Seth and\nNoah, and so on. There were many who were unworthy and they were\nexcluded. But there was always one in every generation who inherited the\ndistinguished qualities of the Adam line. And even when, as in the case\nof Terah, the individual was unworthy in himself, he was important as\nbeing destined to give birth to a worthy son, who would carry on the\ntradition, like Abraham. Among Noah's sons, Shem was the select one, and\nhe occupied the temperate regions of Palestine, whereas Japheth went\nnorth and Ham went south--regions not so favorable to the development of\nwisdom.[191]\n\nThe laws were all given directly to Moses with all their details so that\nthere is no doubt about any of them. This was absolutely necessary, for\nhad there been any detail left out, a doubt might arise respecting it\nwhich would destroy the whole spiritual structure of Judaism. This is\nnot a matter which philosophical reasoning can think out for itself. As\nin the natural generation of plant and animal the complexity of elements\nand conditions is so great that a slight tilting of the balance in the\nwrong direction produces disease and death, so in the spiritual creation\nof Israel the ceremonies and the laws are all absolutely essential to\nthe whole, whether we understand it or not, and none could be left to\nspeculation. All were given to Moses.\n\nMoses addressed himself to his own people only. You say it would have\nbeen better to call all mankind to the true religion. It would be better\nalso perhaps that all animals should be rational. You have forgotten\nwhat I said about the select few that worthily succeeded Adam as the\nheart of the family to the exclusion of the other members, who are as\nthe peel, until in the sons of Jacob all twelve were worthy, and from\nthem Israel is descended. These remarkable men had divine qualities\nwhich made them a different species from ordinary men. They were aiming\nat the degree of the prophet, and many of them reached it by reason of\ntheir purity, holiness and proximity to the Prophets. For a prophet has\na great influence on the one who associates with him. He converts the\nlatter by awakening in him spirituality and a desire to attain that high\ndegree which brings visible greatness and reward in the world to come,\nwhen the soul is separated from the senses and enjoys the heavenly\nlight. We do not exclude anyone from the reward due him for his good\nworks, but we give preference to those who are near to God, and we\nmeasure their reward in the next world by this standard. Our religion\nconsists not merely in saying certain words, but in difficult practices\nand a line of conduct which bring us near to God. Outsiders too may\nattain to the grade of wise and pious men, but they cannot become equal\nto us and be prophets.[192]\n\nNot only is Israel a select nation to whom alone prophecy is given as a\ngift, but Palestine is the most suitable place in the world for\ncommunion with God, as a certain spot may be best for planting certain\nthings and for producing people of a particular character and\ntemperament. All those who prophesied outside of Palestine did so with\nreference to Palestine. Abraham was not worthy of the divine covenant\nuntil he was in this land. Palestine was intended to be a guide for the\nwhole world. The reason the second Temple did not last longer than it\ndid is because the Babylonian exiles did not sufficiently love their\nfatherland and did not all return when the decree of Cyrus permitted\nthem to do so.[193]\n\nIsrael is the heart among the nations. The heart is more sensitive than\nthe rest of the body in disease as in health. It feels both more\nintensely. It is more liable to disease than the other organs, and on\nthe other hand it becomes aware sooner of agencies dangerous to its\nhealth and endeavors to reject them or ward them off. So Israel is among\nthe nations. Their responsibility is greater than that of other nations\nand they are sooner punished. \"Only you have I loved out of all the\nfamilies of the earth,\" says Amos (3, 2), \"therefore will I visit upon\nyou all your iniquities.\" On the other hand, God does not allow our sins\nto accumulate as he does with the other nations until they deserve\ndestruction. \"He pardons the iniquities of his people by causing them to\npass away in due order.\" As the heart is affected by the other organs,\nso Israel suffers on account of their assimilation to the other nations.\nIsrael suffers while the other nations are in peace. As the elements are\nfor the sake of the minerals, the minerals for the sake of the plants,\nthe plants for the sake of the animals, the animals for the sake of man,\nso is man for the sake of Israel, and Israel for the sake of the\nProphets and the pious men. With the purification of Israel the world\nwill be improved and brought nearer to God.[194]\n\nAssociated with Israel and Palestine as a third privilege and\ndistinction is the Hebrew language. This is the original language which\nGod spoke to Adam. The etymologies of Biblical names prove it. It was\nricher formerly, and has become impoverished in the course of time like\nthe people using it. Nevertheless it still shows evidence of\nsuperiority to other languages in its system of accents which shows the\nproper expression in reading, and in its wonderful system of vowel\nchanges producing euphony in expression and variation in meaning.[195]\n\nThe highest type of man, we have seen, is the Prophet, for whose sake\nIsrael and the whole of humanity exists. He is the highest type because\nhe alone has an immediate knowledge of Jhvh as distinguished from\n\"Elohim,\" the concept of universal cause and power, which the\nphilosopher also is able to attain. Jhvh signifies, as we have seen, the\npersonal God who performs miracles and reveals himself to mankind\nthrough the prophet. We wish to know therefore how Judah Halevi\nconceives of the essence and process of prophetic inspiration. We are\nalready aware that he is opposed to the philosophers who regard the\npower of prophecy as a natural gift possessed by the man of pure\nintellect and perfect power of imagination. To these Aristotelians, as\nwe shall have occasion to see more clearly later, the human intellect is\nnothing more than an individualized reflection, if we may so term it, of\nthe one universal intellect, which is--not God, but an intellectual\nsubstance wholly immaterial, some nine or ten degrees removed from the\nGodhead. It is called the Active Intellect, and its business is to\ngovern the sublunar world of generation and decay. As pure thought the\nActive Intellect embraces as its content the entire sublunar world in\nessence. In fact it bestows the forms (in the Aristotelian sense) upon\nthe things of this world, and hence has a timeless knowledge of all the\nworld and its happenings. The individualized reflection of it in the\nhuman soul is held there so long as the person is alive, somewhat as a\ndrop of water may hold the moon until it evaporates, and the reflection\nis reabsorbed in the one real moon. So it is the Active Intellect which\nis the cause of all conceptual knowledge in man through its\nindividualizations, and into it every human intellect is reabsorbed when\nthe individual dies. Some men share more, some less in the Active\nIntellect; and it is in everyone's power, within limits, to increase and\npurify his participation in the influence of the Active Intellect by\nstudy and rigorous ethical discipline. The prophet differs from the\nordinary man and the philosopher in degree only, not in kind. His\nknowledge comes from the influence of the Active Intellect as does the\nknowledge of the philosopher. The difference is that in the prophet's\ncase the imagination plays an important r\u00f4le and presents concrete\nvisions instead of universal propositions, and the identification with\nthe Active Intellect is much closer.\n\nThis conception of prophecy, which in its essentials, we shall see, was\nadopted by Abraham ibn Daud, Maimonides and Gersonides, naturally would\nnot appeal to Judah Halevi. Prophecy is the prerogative of Israel and of\nPalestine. The philosophers have nothing to do with it. A mere\nphilosopher has no more chance of entering the kingdom of prophecy than\na camel of passing through the eye of a needle.[B] Have the philosophers\never produced prophets? And yet, if their explanation is correct, their\nranks should abound in them. Prophecy is a supernatural power, and the\ninfluence comes from God. The prophet is a higher species of mortal. He\nis endowed with an internal eye, a hidden sense, which sees certain\nimmaterial objects, as the external sense sees the physical objects. No\none else sees those forms, but they are none the less real, for the\nwhole species of prophetic persons testify to their existence. In\nordinary perception we tell a real object from an illusion by appealing\nto the testimony of others. What appears to a single individual only may\nbe an illusion. If all persons agree that the object is there, we\nconclude it is real. The same test holds of the prophetic visions. All\nprophets see them. Then the intellect of the prophet interprets the\nvision, as our intellect interprets the data of our senses. The latter\ngive us not the essence of the sensible object, but the superficial\naccidents, such as color, shape, and so on. It is the work of the reason\nto refer these qualities to the essence of the object, as king, sun. The\nsame holds true of the prophet. He sees a figure in the form of a king\nor a judge in the act of giving orders; and he knows that he has before\nhim a being that is served and obeyed. Or he sees the form in the act of\ncarrying baggage or girded for work; and he infers that he is dealing\nwith a being that is meant for a servant. What these visions really were\nit is not in all cases possible to know with certainty. There is no\ndoubt that the Prophets actually saw the hosts of heaven, the spirits of\nthe spheres, in the form of man. The word angel in the Bible (Heb.\nMal`ak) means messenger. What these messengers or angels were we cannot\ntell with certainty. They may have been specially created from the fine\nelementary bodies, or they belonged to the eternal angels, who may be\nthe same as the spiritual beings of whom the philosophers speak. We can\nneither reject their view nor definitely accept it. Similarly the\nexpression, \"The Glory of Jhvh,\" may denote a fine body following the\nwill of God and formed every time it has to appear to a prophet, or it\nmay denote all the angels and spiritual beings, Throne and Chariot and\nFirmament, and Ofannim and Galgalim, and other eternal beings\nconstituting, so to speak, the suite of God.\n\n\n[B] This simile represents Halevi's thought. He does not use this\nexpression.\n\n\nEven such phrases as, \"They saw the God of Israel\" (Exod. 24, 10), \"He\nsaw the form of Jhvh\" (Num. 12, 8), the Rabbinic expression \"Maase\nMerkaba\" (work of the divine chariot, _cf._ above, p. xvi), and the\nlater discussions concerning the \"Measure of the divine stature\" (Shi`ur\nKomah), must not be rejected. These visual images representative of God\nare calculated to inspire fear in the human soul, which the bare\nconception of the One, Omnipotent, and so on, cannot produce.[196]\n\nAs Judah Halevi is unwilling to yield to the philosophers and explain\naway the supernaturalism of prophecy, maintaining rather on the contrary\nthat the supernatural character of the prophetic vision is an evidence\nof the superior nature of Israel as well as of their land and their\nlanguage, so he insists on the inherent value of the ceremonial law,\nincluding sacrifices. To Saadia, and especially to Bahya and Maimonides,\nthe test of value is rationality. The important laws of the Bible are\nthose known as the rational commandments. The other class, the so-called\ntraditional commandments, would also turn out to be rational if we knew\nthe reason why they were commanded. And in default of exact knowledge it\nis the business of the philosopher to suggest reasons. Bahya lays the\ngreatest stress upon the commandments of the heart, _i. e._, upon the\npurity of motive and intention, upon those laws which concern feeling\nand belief rather than outward practice. Judah Halevi's attitude is\ndifferent. If the only thing of importance in religion were intention\nand motive and moral sense, why should Christianity and Islam fight to\nthe death, shedding untold human blood in defence of their religion. As\nfar as ethical theory and practice are concerned there is no difference\nbetween them. Ceremonial practice is the only thing that separates them.\nAnd the king of the Chazars was told repeatedly in his dreams that his\nintentions were good but not his practice, his religious practice. To be\nsure the ethical law is important in any religion, but it is not\npeculiar to religion as such. It is a necessary condition of social\nlife, without which no association is possible, not even that of a\nrobber band. There is honesty even among thieves. Religion has its\npeculiar practices, and it is not sufficient for an Israelite to observe\nthe rational commandments alone. When the Prophets inveigh against\nsacrifices; when Micah says (6, 8), \"He hath shewed thee, O man, what is\ngood; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to\nlove mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God,\" they mean that the\nceremonies alone are not sufficient; but surely a man is not fully an\nIsraelite if he neglects the ceremonial laws and observes only the\nrational commandments. We may not understand the value of the ceremonial\nlaws, the meaning of the institution of sacrifices. But neither do we\nunderstand why the rational soul does not attach itself to a body except\nwhen the parts are arranged in a certain manner and the elements are\nmixed in a certain proportion, though the reason needs not food and\ndrink for itself. God has arranged it so, that only under certain\nconditions shall a body receive the light of reason. So in the matter of\nsacrifices God has ordained that only when the details of the\nsacrificial and other ceremonies are minutely observed shall the nation\nenjoy his presence and care. In some cases the significance of certain\nobservances is clearer than in others. Thus the various festivals are\nalso symbolic of certain truths of history and the divine government of\nthe world. The Sabbath leads to the belief in the exodus from Egypt and\nthe creation of the world; and hence inculcates belief in God.[197]\n\nIn his views of ethics Judah Halevi is more human than Bahya, being\nopposed to all manner of asceticism. The law, he says, does not demand\nexcess in any direction. Every power and faculty must be given its due.\nOur law commends fear, love and joy as means of worshipping God; so that\nfasting on a fast day does not bring a man nearer to God than eating and\ndrinking and rejoicing on a feast day, provided all is done with a view\nto honoring God. A Jewish devotee is not one who separates himself from\nthe world. On the contrary, he loves the world and a long life because\nthereby he wins a share in the world to come. Still his desire is to\nattain the degree of Enoch or Elijah, and to be fit for the association\nof angels. A man like this feels more at home when alone than in\ncompany of other people; for the higher beings are his company, and he\nmisses them when people are around him. Philosophers also enjoy solitude\nin order to clarify their thoughts, and they are eager to meet disciples\nto discuss their problems with them. In our days it is difficult to\nreach the position of these rare men. In former times when the Shekinah\nrested in the Holy Land, and the nation was fit for prophecy, there were\npeople who separated themselves from their neighbors and studied the law\nin purity and holiness in the company of men like them. These were the\nSons of the Prophets. Nowadays when there is neither prophecy nor\nwisdom, a person who attempted to do this, though he be a pious man,\nwould come to grief; for he would find neither prophets nor philosophers\nto keep him company; nor enough to keep his mind in that high state of\nexaltation needed for communion with God. Prayer alone is not\nsufficient, and soon becomes a habit without any influence on the soul.\nHe would soon find that the natural powers and desires of the soul begin\nto assert themselves and he will regret his separation from mankind,\nthus getting farther away from God instead of coming nearer to him.\n\nThe right practice of the pious man at the present day is to give all\nthe parts of the body their due and no more, without neglecting any of\nthem; and to bring the lower powers and desires under the dominion of\nthe higher; feeding the soul with things spiritual as the body with\nthings material. He must keep himself constantly under guard and\ncontrol, making special use of the times of prayer for self-examination,\nand striving to retain the influence of one prayer until the time comes\nfor the next. He must also utilize the Sabbaths and the festivals and\nthe Great Fast to keep himself in good spiritual trim. In addition he\nmust observe all the commandments, traditional, rational, and those of\nthe heart, and reflect on their meaning and on God's goodness and\ncare.[198]\n\nJudah Halevi has no doubt of the immortality of the soul and of reward\nand punishment after death, though the Bible does not dwell upon these\nmatters with any degree of emphasis. Other religions, he admits, make\ngreater promises of reward after death, whereas Judaism offers divine\nnearness through miracles and prophecy. Instead of saying, If you do\nthus and so, I will put you in gardens after death and give you\npleasures, our Law says, I will be your God and you will be my people.\nSome of you will stand before me and will go up to heaven, walking among\nthe angels; and my angels will walk among you, protecting you in your\nland, which is the holy land, not like the other nations, which are\ngoverned by nature. Surely, he exclaims, we who can boast of such things\nduring life are more certain of the future world than those whose sole\nreliance is on promises of the hereafter. It would not be correct, the\nRabbi says to the king of the Chazars, who was tempted to despise the\nJews as well as their religion because of their material and political\nweakness, to judge of our destiny after death by our condition during\nlife, in which we are inferior to all other people. For these very\npeople, like the Christians and Mohammedans, glory in their founders,\nwho were persecuted and despised, and not in the present power and\nluxury of the great kings. The Christians in particular worship the man\nwho said, \"Whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the\nother also. And if a man ... take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak\nalso\" (Matth. 5, 39). Accordingly our worth is greater in the sight of\nGod than if we were prosperous. It is true that not all of us accept our\nmiserable condition with becoming humility. If we did, God would not\nkeep us so long in misery. But after all there is reward awaiting our\npeople for bearing the yoke of the exile voluntarily, when it would be\nan easy matter for any one of us to become a brother to our oppressors\nby the saying of one word.\n\nOur wise men, too, have said a great deal about the pleasures and\nsufferings awaiting us in the next world, and in this also they surpass\nthe wise men of other religions. The Bible, it is true, does not lay\nstress on this aspect of our belief; but so much is clear from the Bible\nalso, that the spirit returns to God. There are also allusions to the\nimmortality of the soul in the disappearance of Elijah, who did not die,\nand in the belief of his second coming. This appears also from the\nprayer of Balaam, \"Let me die the death of the righteous, and may my\nlast end be like his\" (Num. 23, 10), and from the calling of Samuel from\nthe dead. The idea of paradise (Gan Eden) is taken from the Torah, and\nGehenna is a Hebrew word, the name of a valley near Jerusalem, where\nfire always burned, consuming unclean bones, carcases, and so on. There\nis nothing new in the later religions which is not already found in\nours.[199]\n\nAn important ethical problem which Judah Halevi discusses more\nthoroughly than any of his predecessors is that of free will, which he\ndefends against fatalistic determinism, and endeavors to reconcile with\ndivine causality and foreknowledge. We have already seen (p. xxi) that\nthis was one of the important theses of the Mu`tazilite Kalam. And there\nis no doubt that fatalism is opposed to Judaism. A fatalistic\ndeterminist denies the category of the contingent or possible. He says\nnot merely that an event is determined by its proximate cause, he goes\nfurther and maintains that it is determined long in advance of any of\nits secondary causes by the will of God. It would follow then that there\nis no way of preventing an event thus predetermined. If we take pains to\navoid a misfortune fated to come upon us, our very efforts may carry us\ntoward it and land us in its clutches. Literature is full of stories\nillustrating this belief, as for example the story of OEdipus. Against\nthis form of belief Judah Halevi vindicates the reality of the\ncontingent or possible as opposed to the necessary. No one except the\nobstinate and perverse denies the possible or contingent. His\npreparations to meet and avoid that which he hopes and fears prove that\nhe believes the thing amenable to pains and precautions. If he had not\nthis belief, he would fold his hands in resignation, never taking the\ntrouble to supply himself with arms to meet his enemy, or with water to\nquench his thirst. To be sure, we may argue that whether one prepare\nhimself or omit to do so, the preparation or neglect is itself\ndetermined. But this is no longer the same position as that maintained\nat the outset. For we now admit that secondary causes do play a part in\ndetermining the result, whereas we denied it at first. The will is one\nof these secondary causes. Accordingly Judah Halevi divides all acts or\nevents into four classes, divine, natural, accidental and voluntary.\nStrictly divine events are the direct results of the divine will without\nany intermediate cause. There is no way of preparing for or avoiding\nthese; not, that is, physically; but it is possible to prepare oneself\nmentally and morally, namely, through the secrets of the Torah to him\nwho knows them.\n\nNatural events are produced by secondary causes, which bring the objects\nof nature to their perfection. These produce their effects regularly and\nuniformly, provided there is no hindrance on the part of the other\nthree causes. An example of natural events would be the growth of a\nplant or animal under favorable conditions. Accidental events are also\nproduced by secondary causes, but they happen by chance, not regularly\nand not as a result of purpose. Their causes are not intended for the\npurpose of bringing perfection to their chance effects. These too may be\nhindered by any one of the other three causes. An example of a chance\nevent might be death in war. The secondary cause is the battle, but its\npurpose was not that this given person might meet his death there, and\nnot all men die in war.\n\nFinally, voluntary acts are those caused by the will of man. It is these\nthat concern us most. We have already intimated that the human will is\nitself a secondary cause and has a r\u00f4le in determining its effect. It is\ntrue that the will itself is caused by other higher causes until we get\nto the first cause, but this does not form a _necessary_ chain of\ncausation. Despite the continuous chain of causes antecedent to a given\nvolition the soul finding itself in front of a given plan is free to\nchoose either of the two alternatives. To say that a man's speech is as\nnecessary as the beating of his pulse contradicts experience. We feel\nthat we are masters of our speech and our silence. The fact that we\npraise and blame and love and hate a person according to his deliberate\nconduct is another proof of freedom. We do not blame a natural or\naccidental cause. We do not blame a child or a person asleep when they\ncause damage, because they did not do the damage deliberately and with\nintention. If those who deny freedom are consistent, they must either\nrefrain from being angry with a person who injures them deliberately, or\nthey must say that anger and praise and blame and love and hate are\ndelusive powers put in our souls in vain. Besides there would be no\ndifference between the pious and the disobedient, because both are doing\nthat which they are by necessity bound to do.\n\nBut there are certain strong objections to the doctrine of freedom. If\nman is absolutely free to do or forbear, it follows that the effects of\nhis conduct are removed from God's control. The answer to this is that\nthey are not absolutely removed from his control. They are still related\nto him by a chain of causes.\n\nAnother argument against free will is that it is irreconcilable with\nGod's knowledge. If man alone is the master of his choice, God cannot\nknow beforehand what he will choose. And if God does know, the man\ncannot but choose as God foreknew he would choose, and what becomes of\nhis freedom? This may be answered by saying that the knowledge of a\nthing is not the cause of its being. We do not determine a past event by\nthe fact that we know it. Knowledge is simply evidence that the thing\nis. So man chooses by his own determination, and yet God knows\nbeforehand which way he is going to choose, simply because he sees into\nthe future as we remember the past.[200]\n\nJudah Halevi's discussion of the problem of freedom is fuller than any\nwe have met so far in our investigation. But it is not satisfactory.\nApart from his fourfold classification of events which is open to\ncriticism, there is a weak spot in the very centre of his argument,\nwhich scarcely could have escaped him. He admits that the will is caused\nby higher causes ending ultimately in the will of God, and yet maintains\nin the same breath that the will is not determined. As free the will is\nremoved from God's control, and yet it is not completely removed, being\nrelated to him by a chain of causes. This is a plain contradiction,\nunless we are told how far it is determined and how far it is not.\nSurely the aspect in which it is not determined is absolutely removed\nfrom God's control and altogether uncaused. But Judah Halevi is\nunwilling to grant this. He just leaves us with the juxtaposition of two\nincompatibles. We shall see that Hasdai Crescas was more consistent, and\nadmitted determinism.\n\nWe have now considered Judah Halevi's teachings, and have seen that he\nhas no sympathy with the point of view of those people who were called\nin his day philosophers, _i. e._, those who adopted the teachings\nascribed to Aristotle. At the same time he was interested in maintaining\nthat all science really came originally from the Jews; and in order to\nprove this he undertakes a brief interpretation of the \"Sefer Yezirah\"\n(Book of Creation), an early mystic work of unknown authorship and date,\nwhich Judah Halevi in common with the uncritical opinion of his day\nattributed to Abraham.[201] Not to lay himself open to the charge of\ninconsistency, he throws out the suggestion that the Sefer Yezirah\nrepresented Abraham's own speculations before he had the privilege of a\nprophetic communication from God. When that came he was ready to abandon\nall his former rationalistic lucubrations and abide by the certainty of\nrevealed truth.[202] We may therefore legitimately infer that Judah\nHalevi's idea was that the Jews were the originators of philosophy, but\nthat they had long discarded it in favor of something much more valid\nand certain; whereas the Greeks and their descendants, having nothing\nbetter, caught it up and are now parading it as their own discovery and\neven setting it up as superior to direct revelation.\n\nNatural science in so far as it had to do with more or less verifiable\ndata could not be considered harmful, and so we find Judah Halevi taking\npains to show that the sages of Rabbinical literature cultivated the\nsciences, astronomy in connection with the Jewish calendar; anatomy,\nbiology and physiology in relation to the laws of slaughter and the\nexamination of animal meat (laws of \"Terefa\").[203]\n\nBut so great was the fascination philosophy exerted upon the men of his\ngeneration that even Judah Halevi, despite his efforts to shake its\nauthority and point out its inadequacy and evident inferiority to\nrevelation, was not able wholly to escape it. And we find accordingly\nthat he deems it necessary to devote a large part of the fifth book of\nthe Kusari to the presentation of a bird's eye view of the current\nphilosophy of the day. To be sure, he does not give all of it the stamp\nof his approval; he repeatedly attacks its foundations and lays bare\ntheir weakness. At the same time he admits that not every man has faith\nby nature and is proof against the erroneous arguments of heretics,\nastrologers, philosophers and others. The ordinary mortal is affected by\nthem, and may even be misled for a time until he comes to see the truth.\nIt is therefore well to know the principles of religion according to\nthose who defend it by reason, and this involves a knowledge of science\nand theology. But we must not, he says, in the manner of the Karaites,\nadvance all at once to the higher study of theology. One must first\nunderstand the fundamental principles of physics, psychology, and so on,\nsuch as matter and form, the elements, nature, Soul, Intellect, Divine\nWisdom. Then we can proceed to the more properly theological matters,\nlike the future world, Providence, and so on.\n\nAccordingly Judah Halevi gives us in the sequel a brief account such as\nhe has just outlined. It will not be worth our while to reproduce it all\nhere, as in the first place Judah Halevi does not give it as the result\nof his own investigation and conviction, and secondly a good deal of it\nis not new; and we have already met it in more or less similar form\nbefore in Joseph ibn Zaddik, Abraham bar Hiyyah, and others. We must\npoint out, however, the new features which we did not meet before,\nexplain their origin and in particular indicate Judah Halevi's\ncriticisms.\n\nIn general we may say that Judah Halevi has a better knowledge of\nAristotelian doctrines than any of his predecessors. Thus to take one\nexample, which we used before (p. 138), Aristotle's famous definition of\nthe soul is quoted by Isaac Israeli, Saadia, Joseph ibn Zaddik as well\nas by Judah Halevi. Israeli does not discuss the definition in\ndetail.[204] Saadia and Ibn Zaddik show clearly that they did not\nunderstand the precise meaning of the definition. Judah Halevi is the\nfirst who understands correctly all the elements of the definition. And\nyet it would be decidedly mistaken to infer from this that Judah Halevi\nstudied the Aristotelian works directly. By a fortunate discovery of S.\nLandauer[205] we are enabled to follow Judah Halevi's source with the\ncertainty of eyewitnesses. The sketch which he gives of the Aristotelian\npsychology is taken bodily not from Aristotle's De Anima, but from a\nyouthful work of Ibn Sina. Judah Halevi did not even take the trouble to\npresent the subject in his own words. He simply took his model and\nabridged it, by throwing out all argumentative, illustrative and\namplificatory material. Apart from this abridgment he follows his\nauthority almost word for word, not to speak of reproducing the ideas in\nthe original form and order. This is a typical and extremely instructive\ninstance; and it shows how careful we must be before we decide that a\nmedi\u00e6val writer read a certain author with whose ideas he is familiar\nand whom he quotes.\n\nIn the sketch of philosophical theory Judah Halevi first speaks of the\nhyle ([Greek: hyl\u00ea]) or formless matter, which according to the\nphilosophers was in the beginning of things contained within the lunar\nsphere. The \"water\" in the second verse of Genesis (\"and the spirit of\nGod moved upon the face of the water\") is supposed by them to denote\nthis primitive matter, as the \"darkness\" in the same verse and the\n\"chaos\" (\"Tohu\") in the first verse signify the absence of form and\ncomposition in the matter (the Aristotelian [Greek: ster\u00easis]). God then\nwilled the revolution of the outermost sphere, known as the diurnal\nsphere, which caused all the other spheres to revolve with it, thereby\nproducing changes in the hyle in accordance with the motions of the\nsphere. The first change was the heating of that which was next to the\nlunar sphere and making it into pure fire, known among the philosophers\nas \"natural fire,\" a pure, fine and light substance, without color or\nburning quality. This became the sphere of fire. The part that was\nfurther away changed as a result of the same revolution into the sphere\nof air, then came the sphere of water, and finally the terrestrial globe\nin the centre, heavy and thick by reason of its distance from the place\nof motion. From these four elements come the physical objects by\ncomposition. The forms (in the Aristotelian sense) of things are imposed\nupon their matters by a divine power, the \"Intellect, and Giver of\nForms\"; whereas the matters come from the hyle, and the accidental\nproximity of different parts to the revolving lunar sphere explains why\nsome parts became fire, some air, and so on.\n\nTo this mechanical explanation of the formation of the elements Judah\nHalevi objects. As long as the original motion of the diurnal sphere is\nadmittedly due not to chance but to the will of God, what is gained by\nreferring the formation of the elements to their accidental proximity to\nthe moving sphere, and accounting for the production of mineral, plant\nand animal in the same mechanical way by the accidental composition of\nthe four elements in proportions varying according to the different\nrevolutions and positions of the heavenly bodies? Besides if the latter\nexplanation were true, the number of species of plants and animals\nshould be infinite like the various positions and formations of the\nheavenly bodies, whereas they are finite and constant. The argument from\nthe design and purpose that is clearly visible in the majority of plants\nand animals further refutes such mechanical explanation as is attempted\nby the philosophers. Design is also visible in the violation of the\nnatural law by which water should always be above and around earth;\nwhereas in reality we see a great part of the earth's surface above\nwater. This is clearly a beneficent provision in order that animal life\nmay sustain itself, and this is the significance of the words of the\nPsalmist (136, 6), \"To him that stretched out the earth above the\nwaters.\"\n\nThe entire theory of the four elements and the alleged composition of\nall things out of them is a pure assumption. Take the idea of the world\nof fire, the upper fire as they call it, which is colorless, so as not\nto obstruct the color of the heavens and the stars. Whoever saw such a\nfire? The only fire we know is an extremely hot object in the shape of\ncoal, or as a flame in the air, or as boiling water. And whoever saw a\nfiery or a\u00ebry body enter the matter of plant and animal so as to warrant\nus in saying that the latter are composed of the four elements? True, we\nknow that water and earth do enter the matter of plants, and that they\nare assisted by the air and the heat of the sun in causing the plant to\ngrow and develop, but we never see a fiery or a\u00ebry body. Or whoever saw\nplants resolved into the four elements? If a part changes into earth, it\nis not real earth, but ashes; and the part changed to water is not real\nwater, but a kind of moisture, poisonous or nutritious, but not water\nfit for drinking. Similarly no part of the plant changes to real air fit\nfor breathing, but to vapor or mist. Granted that we have to admit the\nwarm and the cold, and the moist and the dry as the primary qualities\nwithout which no body can exist; and that the reason resolves the\ncomposite objects into these primary qualities, and posits substances as\nbearers of these qualities, which it calls fire, air, water and\nearth--this is true conceptually and theoretically only. It cannot be\nthat the primary qualities really existed in the simple state _extra\nanimam_, and then all existing things were made out of them. How can the\nphilosophers maintain such a thing, since they believe in the eternity\nof the world, that it always existed as it does now?\n\nThese are the criticisms of their theory of the elements. According to\nthe Torah God created the world just as it is, with its animals and\nplants already formed. There is no need of assuming intermediate powers\nor compositions. The moment we admit that the world was created out of\nnothing by the will of God in the manner in which he desired, all\ndifficulties vanish about the origin of bodies and their association\nwith souls. And there is no reason why we should not accept the\nfirmament, and the waters above the heaven, and the demons mentioned by\nthe Rabbis, and the account of the days of the Messiah and the\nresurrection and the world to come.[206]\n\nAnother theory he criticizes is that developed by Alfarabi and Avicenna,\nthe chief Aristotelians of the Arabs before Averroes. It is a\ncombination of Aristotelianism with the Neo-Platonic doctrine of\nemanation, though it was credited as a whole to Aristotle in the middle\nages. We have already seen in the Introduction (p. xxxiv) that Aristotle\nconceived the world as a series of concentric spheres with the earth in\nthe centre. The principal spheres are eight in number, and they carry in\norder, beginning with the external sphere, (1) the fixed stars, (2)\nSaturn, (3) Jupiter, (4) Mars, (5) Mercury, (6) Venus, (7) Sun, (8)\nMoon. To account for the various motions of the sun and the planets\nadditional spheres had to be introduced amounting in all to fifty-six.\nBut the principal spheres remained those mentioned. Each sphere or group\nof spheres with the star it carries is moved by an incorporeal mover, a\nspirit or Intelligence, and over them all is the first unmoved mover,\nGod. He sets in motion the outer sphere of the fixed stars, and so the\nwhole world moves. There is nothing said in this of the origin of these\nspheres and their intelligible movers. On the other hand, in the\nNeo-Platonic system of Plotinus all existence and particularly that of\nthe intelligible or spiritual world issues or emanates from the One or\nthe Good. Intellect is the first emanation, Soul the second, Nature the\nthird and Matter the last.\n\nOn account of the confusion which arose in the middle ages, as a result\nof which Neo-Platonic writings and doctrines were attributed to\nAristotle, Alfarabi and Avicenna worked out a scheme which combined the\nmotion theory of Aristotle with the doctrine of emanation of Plotinus.\nThe theory is based upon a principle alleged to be Aristotle's that from\na unitary cause nothing but a unitary effect can follow. Hence, said\nAvicenna, God cannot have produced directly all the world we see in its\ncomplexity. He is the direct cause of the first Intelligence only, or\nfirst angel as Judah Halevi calls him. This Intelligence contemplates\nitself and it contemplates its cause. The effect of the latter act is\nthe emanation of a second intelligence or angel; the effect of the\nformer is a sphere--that of the fixed stars, of which the first\nIntelligence is the mover. The second Intelligence again produces a\nthird Intelligence by its contemplation of the First Cause, and by its\nself-contemplation it creates the second sphere, the sphere of Saturn,\nwhich is moved by it. So the process continues until we reach the sphere\nof the moon, which is the last of the celestial spheres, and the Active\nIntellect, the last of the Intelligences, having in charge the sublunar\nworld.\n\nThis fanciful and purely mythological scheme arouses the antagonism of\nJudah Halevi. It is all pure conjecture, he says, and there is not an\niota of proof in it. People believe it and think it is convincing,\nsimply because it bears the name of a Greek philosopher. As a matter of\nfact this theory is less plausible than those of the \"Sefer Yezirah\";\nand there is no agreement even among the philosophers themselves except\nfor those who are the followers of the same Greek authority, Empedocles,\nor Pythagoras, or Aristotle, or Plato. These agree not because the\nproofs are convincing, but simply because they are members of a given\nsect or school. The objections to the theory just outlined are manifold.\nIn the first place why should the series of emanations stop with the\nmoon? Is it because the power of the First Cause has given out? Besides\nwhy should self-contemplation result in a sphere and contemplation of\nthe First Cause in an Intelligence or angel? It should follow that when\nAristotle contemplates himself he produces a sphere, and when he\ncontemplates the First Cause he gives rise to an angel. Granting the\ntruth of the process, one does not see why the mover of Saturn should\nnot produce two more emanations, one by contemplating the Intelligence\nimmediately above it, and the other by contemplating the first\nIntelligence, thus making four emanations instead of two.[207]\n\nIn his outline of the philosophers' psychology, which as we have seen\n(p. 175) is borrowed verbally from Avicenna, what is new to us is the\nexposition of the inner senses and the account of the rational faculty.\nWe must therefore reproduce it here in outline together with Judah\nHalevi's criticism.\n\nThe three kinds of soul, vegetative, animal and rational, we have\nalready met before. We have also referred to the fact that Judah Halevi\nanalyzes correctly the well-known Aristotelian definition of the soul.\nWe must now give a brief account of the inner senses as Judah Halevi\ntook it from Avicenna. The five external senses, seeing, hearing,\ntouching, smelling and tasting, give us merely colors, sounds, touch\nsensations, odors and tastes. These are combined into an object by the\n_common sense_, known also as the _forming power_. Thus when we see\nhoney we associate with its yellow color a sweet taste. This could not\nbe done unless we had a power which combines in it all the five senses.\nFor the sense of sight cannot perceive taste, nor can color be\napprehended by the gustatory sense. There is need therefore of a common\nsense which comprehends all the five external senses. This is the first\ninternal sense. This retains the forms of sensible objects just as the\nexternal senses present them. Then comes the _composing power_ or power\nof imagination. This composes and divides the material of the common\nsense. It may be true or false, whereas the common sense is always true.\nBoth of these give us merely forms; they do not exercise any judgment.\nThe latter function belongs to the third internal sense, the _power of\njudgment_. Through this an animal is enabled to decide that a given\nobject is to be sought or avoided. It also serves to rectify the errors\nof reproduction that may be found in the preceding faculty of\nimagination. Love, injury, belief, denial, belong likewise to the\njudging faculty together with such judgments as that the wolf is an\nenemy, the child a friend. The last of the internal senses is that of\n_factual memory_, the power which retains the judgments made by the\nfaculty preceding.\n\nIn addition to these sensory powers the animal possesses motor\nfaculties. These are two, the _power of desire_, which moves the animal\nto seek the agreeable; and the _power of anger_, which causes it to\nreject or avoid the disagreeable. All these powers are dependent upon\nthe corporeal organs and disappear with the destruction of the latter.\n\nThe highest power of the soul and the exclusive possession of man (the\nfaculties mentioned before are found also in animals) is the rational\nsoul. This is at first simply a potentiality. Actually it is a _tabula\nrasa_, an empty slate, a blank paper. But it has the power (or is the\npower) of acquiring general ideas. Hence it is called hylic or material\nintellect, because it is like matter which in itself is nothing actual\nbut is potentially everything, being capable of receiving any form and\nbecoming any real object. As matter receives sensible forms, so the\nmaterial intellect acquires intelligible forms, _i. e._, thoughts,\nideas, concepts. When it has these ideas it is an _actual intellect_. It\nis then identical with the ideas it has, _i. e._, thinker and thought\nare the same, and hence the statement that the actual intellect is\n\"intelligent\" and \"intelligible\" at the same time. As matter is the\nprinciple of generation and destruction the rational soul, which is thus\nshown to be an immaterial substance, is indestructible, hence immortal.\nAnd it is the ideas it acquires which make it so. When the rational soul\nis concerned with pure knowledge it is called the _speculative_ or\n_theoretical intellect_. When it is engaged in controlling the animal\npowers, its function is conduct, and is called the _practical\nintellect_. The rational soul, _i. e._, the speculative intellect, is\nseparable from the body and needs it not, though it uses it at first to\nacquire some of its knowledge. This is proved by the fact that whereas\nthe corporeal powers, like the senses, are weakened by strong stimuli,\nthe reason is strengthened by hard subjects of thought. Old age weakens\nthe body, but strengthens the mind. The activities of the body are\nfinite; of the mind, infinite.\n\nWe must also show that while the rational soul makes use of the data of\nsense perception, which are corporeal, as the occasions for the\nformation of its general ideas, it is not wholly dependent upon them,\nand the sense data alone are inadequate to give the soul its\nintellectual truths. Empirical knowledge is inductive, and no induction\ncan be more general and more certain than the particular facts from\nwhich it is derived. As all experience, however rich, is necessarily\nfinite, empirical knowledge is never universally certain. But the soul\ndoes possess universally certain knowledge, as for example the truths of\nmathematics and logic; hence the origin of these truths can not be\nempirical. How does the soul come to have such knowledge? We must assume\nthat there is a divine emanation cleaving to the soul, which stands to\nit in the relation of light to the sense of sight. It is to the\nillumination of this intellectual substance and not to the data of sense\nperception that the soul owes the universal certainty of its knowledge.\nThis divine substance is the _Active Intellect_. As long as the soul is\nunited with the body, perfect union with the Active Intellect is\nimpossible. But as the soul becomes more and more perfect through the\nacquisition of knowledge, it cleaves more and more to the Active\nIntellect, and this union becomes complete after death. Thus the\nimmortality of the soul is proved by reason. It is based upon the\nconviction that the soul is an immaterial substance and that its\nperfection lies in its acquisition of intellectual ideas.[208]\n\nJudah Halevi cannot help admitting the fascination such speculation\nexercises upon the mind of the student. But he must warn him against\nbeing misled by the fame of such names as Plato and Aristotle, and\nsupposing that because in logic and mathematics the philosophers give us\nreal proofs, they are equally trustworthy in metaphysical speculation.\nIf the soul is, as they say, an intellectual substance not limited in\nplace and for this reason not subject to genesis and decay, there is no\nway to distinguish one soul from another, since it is matter which\nconstitutes individual existence. How then can my soul be distinguished\nfrom yours, or from the Active Intellect and the other Intelligences, or\nfrom the First Cause itself? The souls of Plato and Aristotle should\nbecome one so that the one should know the secret thoughts of the other.\nIf the soul gets its ideas through divine illumination from the Active\nIntellect, how is it that philosophers do not intuit their ideas at once\nlike God and the Active Intellect, and how is it they forget?\n\nThen as to their ideas about immortality. If immortality is a necessary\nphenomenon due to the intellectual nature of the soul and dependent upon\nthe degree of intellectual knowledge it possesses, how much knowledge\nmust a man have to be immortal? If any amount is sufficient, then every\nrational soul is immortal, for everybody knows at least the axioms of\nlogic and mathematics, such as that things equal to the same thing are\nequal to each other, that a thing cannot both be and not be, and so on.\nIf a knowledge of the ten categories is necessary, and of the other\nuniversal principles which embrace existence conceptually, though not\npractically, this knowledge can be gotten in a day, and it is not likely\nthat a man can become an angel in a day. If on the other hand one must\nknow everything not merely conceptually but in detail, no one can ever\nacquire universal knowledge and no one is immortal The philosophers may\nbe excused because this is the best they can do with the help of pure\nreason. We may commend them for their mode of life in accordance with\nthe moral law and in freedom from the world, since they were not bound\nto accept our traditions. But it is different with us. Why should we\nseek peculiar proofs and explanations for the immortality of the soul,\nsince we have promises to that effect whether the soul be corporeal or\nspiritual? If we depend upon logical proof, our life will pass away\nwithout our coming to any conclusion.[209]\n\nJudah Halevi takes issue also with the Mutakallimun. These, as we know,\nwere Mohammedan theologians who, unlike the philosophers, were not\nindifferent to religion. On the contrary their sole motive in\nphilosophizing was to prove the dogmas of their faith. They had no\ninterest in pure speculation as such. Judah Halevi has no more sympathy\nwith them than with the philosophers. Owing to the fact that the\nKaraites were implicit followers of the Kalam and for other reasons, no\ndoubt, more objective, he thinks less of them than he does of the\nphilosophers. The only possible use, he tells us, of their methods is to\nafford exercise in dialectics so as to be able to answer the arguments\nof unbelievers. To the superficial observer the Mutakallim may seem to\nbe superior to the prophet, because he argues, whereas the latter\naffirms without proving. In reality, however, this is not so. The aim of\nthe Mutakallim is to acquire the belief which the prophet has by nature.\nBut his Kalam may injure his belief instead of confirming it, by reason\nof the many difficulties and doubts it introduces. The prophet, who has\nnatural belief, teaches not by means of dialectic discussion. If one has\na spark of the true belief in his nature, the prophet by his personality\nwill benefit him by a slight hint. Only he who has nothing of true\nbelief in his nature must have recourse to Kalam, which may benefit him\nor injure.\n\nJudah Halevi follows up this general comment by a brief sketch of the\nsystem of the Kalam, but we need not enter into this matter as there is\nlittle there that we do not already know, and there is no detailed\ncriticism on the part of Judah Halevi.[210]\n\nThe Rabbi concludes his discourse with the king of the Chazars by\ndeclaring his intention to leave the land in order to go to Jerusalem.\nAlthough the visible Shekinah is no longer in Palestine, the invisible\nand spiritual presence is with every born Israelite of pure heart and\ndeed; and Palestine is the fittest land for this communion, being\nconducive to purity of heart and mind.[211]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nMOSES AND ABRAHAM IBN EZRA\n\n\n_1. Moses ibn Ezra_\n\nAmong the Jewish Neo-Platonists must be included the two Ibn Ezras,\nMoses and Abraham. They were contemporary and came from Spain. Moses,\nthe older of the two, was born at Granada about 1070 and died after\n1138. Abraham, who travelled all over the world, was born at Toledo in\n1092 and died in 1167. Neither is particularly famous as a philosopher.\nMoses's celebrity rests on his poetic productions, secular as well as\nreligious, which are highly praised by Harizi, above even those of\nHalevi. Abraham is best known as a grammarian and Biblical commentator,\nparticularly the latter, though his versatility is remarkable. Besides\ngrammar and exegesis he wrote on mathematics, astronomy and astrology,\non religious philosophy, and was a poet of no mean order; though, as\nZunz says,[212] \"flashes of thought spring from his words, but not\npictures of the imagination.\"\n\nAll that is accessible in print of Moses Ibn Ezra's philosophical\ntreatise is a Hebrew translation of extracts under the title \"Arugat\nha-Bosem\" (Bed of Spices).[213] If we may judge of the rest of the work\nby these Hebrew fragments, we should say that philosophy was not Ibn\nEzra's forte. He dabbled in it as any poet of that age did, but what\ncaught his fancy was more the mysteriously sounding phrases of\ncelebrated authorities like Pythagoras, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato,\nAristotle, Hermes (whom he identifies with Enoch), than a strictly\nreasoned out argument. Accordingly the Hebrew selections consist of\nlittle more than a string of quotations on the transcendence and\nunknowableness of God, on the meaning of philosophy, on the position of\nman in the universe, on motion, on nature and on intellect. It is of\nhistorical interest to us to know that Moses ibn Ezra, so famous as a\npoet, was interested in philosophy, and that the views which appealed to\nhim were those of Ibn Gabirol, whose \"Fountain of Life\" he knew, and\nfrom which he quotes a celebrated mystical passage. A few details will\nsuffice to make this clear.\n\nMan is a microcosm, a world in miniature, and there is nothing above or\nbelow, the counterpart of which is not found in man. There is no sphere,\nor star, or animal, or plant, or mineral, or power, or nature, but\nsomething similar, _mutatis mutandis_, is found in man. The ten\ncategories, which according to the philosophers embrace all existence,\nare also found, all of them, in man. The perfection of man's creation\npoints to a wise Creator. Man comes after multiplicity, God is before\nmultiplicity. Man is like the great universe, and in both the spiritual\ncannot come in direct contact with the corporeal, but needs\nintermediating powers to bring the extremes together. In man soul and\nspirit stand between intellect and body.\n\nHence a man must know himself before he can know the universe, else he\nis like a person who feeds other people while he is himself hungry. To\nknow the Creator, the soul must first know herself, and this is one of\nthe definitions of philosophy, to know one's own soul. He who can strip\nhis soul of his corporeal senses and worldly desires, and rise to the\nsphere will find there his reward. Other similarly ascetic and mystical\nexpressions are quoted from Aristotle(!), Pythagoras, and \"one of the\nmodern philosophers.\" The last is none other than Ibn Gabirol, and the\npassage quoted is the same as that cited above, (p. 69).\n\nUnity precedes the unitary object as heat comes before the hot object.\nUnity alone is self-subsistent. Numerical unity is prior to two, and is\nthe very root and essence of number. God's unity is above all other\nunities, hence it cannot be described, because it has no cause, being\nthe cause of everything else. As our eye cannot see the sun by reason of\nits very brilliance, so our intellect cannot comprehend God because of\nthe extreme perfection of his existence. The finite and imperfect cannot\nknow the infinite and perfect. Hence no names can apply to God except\nmetaphorically. When we say that God knows, we mean that he is knowledge\nitself, not that knowledge is an attribute which he possesses. Socrates(!)\nsaid in his prayers, \"Thou art not far from me so that I should\nraise my voice to thee, nor art Thou near unto me that I should content\nmyself with a low whisper and the meditation of the heart; nor art Thou\non any side of me so that I may turn toward Thee; for nearness and\ndistance have measure, but there is no measure between me and Thee. Thou\nart united with me and embracest me more closely than my intellect and\nsoul.\"\n\nHe who knows most of the secret of the Creator, knows least; and he who\nknows least, knows most. As the limbs of the body and the senses cannot\nknow the intelligible ideas because the latter are superior to them, so\nthe intellect cannot know the essence of the Creator because he is above\nthe sphere of the intellect. Although the intellect is spiritual, it\ncannot comprehend the Creator because he is above all intellectual\npowers, and is infinite. What is infinite has no division or\nmultiplication, or part or whole.\n\nThe Gentiles make use of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible to\nannoy us, charging us with believing in a corporeal God. Would that we\nhad strength to silence their impudence by a crushing reply. But alas!\ntheir tyranny prevents us from raising our voice. But it is still more\naggravating to hear men of our own people, heretics, repeating the same\ncharge against the Bible and Talmud, when they ought to know better,\nsince the expressions in question are metaphorical. Saadia has made this\nsufficiently clear.\n\nThe Active Intellect is the first of God's creations. It is a power\nemanating from the Will. It is a simple, pure and transparent substance,\nbearing in itself the forms of all existing things. The human intellect\nis known as the passive intellect. The rational soul is a pure substance\ngiving perfection to a natural body, etc. It is inferior to the\nintellect, and the animal soul is inferior to the rational. The soul is\nthe horseman, the body represents the soldiers and the arms. As the\nhorseman must take care of his arms that he may not be put to death, so\nthe soul must take care of the body that she may not perish. And the\nsenses must be taken into account, for the powers of the soul are\ndependent upon the powers of the body. If the food of the body is in\nproper proportion, the activity of the soul is proper and right.\nSimilarly if one neglects moderation in food, he is bound to suffer\nmorally and spiritually.\n\nThe above selections, which are representative of the accessible portion\nof Moses ibn Ezra's philosophical treatise, except that such recurring\nphrases have been omitted as \"And the philosopher said,\" \"And they say,\"\netc., show that the work is nothing but a compilation of sayings on\nvarious philosophical topics, without any attempt on the author's part\nto think out the subject or any part thereof, for himself.\n\n\n_2. Abraham ibn Ezra_\n\nAbraham Ibn Ezra did not write any special work on philosophy, and his\nimportance lies chiefly in his Biblical commentary, which unlike that of\nRashi, is based upon a scientific and philological foundation. Ibn Ezra\nwas thoroughly familiar with Arabic and well versed in the philological,\nscientific and philosophical studies cultivated by Arabs and Jews in his\nnative land. For reasons not known to us--poverty was very likely one of\nthem--he left his native Spain and wandered as far as Rome in the east,\nEgypt and Morocco in the south, and London in the north. Everywhere he\nwas busy with literary activity, and as he wrote in Hebrew his purpose\nmust have been, as the result certainly proved to be, the enlightenment\nof the non-Arabic speaking Jews of England, France and Italy, by\nbringing before them in a language that they knew the grammar of Hayyuj,\nthe mathematics and astronomy of the Greeks and the Arabs, the\nphilosophy of Neo-Platonism, and the scientific and rationalistic spirit\ngenerally, as enlightened Spain had developed it in Jew and Arab alike.\n\nWe are interested here more particularly in Ibn Ezra's philosophical\nviews. These are scattered through his Biblical commentaries and in a\nfew other small works devoted to an investigation of the laws of the\nPentateuch and the meaning of the names of God.[214] For though Ibn Ezra\nfavors the philological method as the best way to arrive at the true\nmeaning of Scripture, and decries allegory as well as Midrash when\npushed too far, and though his commentary is for the most part based\nupon the philological method of interpretation, he was too much a child\nof his age to be able to refrain from finding in the Bible views akin to\nthose he learned from Gabirol, the Brethren of Purity and what other\nphilosophical literature of the Arabs he read and was influenced by. And\nso he, too, the grammarian and philologist, succumbed to the allegorical\nand symbolical method he condemned. Without denying the historical\nreality of the Garden of Eden, the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of\nLife, he also sees in these expressions symbols of cosmological,\npsychological and ethical ideas. In the fashion of Philo he sees in Eden\na representation of the higher world of the divinity, in the Garden the\nintermediate world of the spheres and Intelligences, in the river\nissuing from the Garden the substance of the sublunar world, in the four\nheads into which the river divides the four elements, and so on. He\nspeaks of these symbolic meanings as the \"secrets,\" and so we have the\nsecret of the Garden, of the rivers, of the coats. And in the same way\nhe speaks of the secret of the Cherubim, of the ark and the Tabernacle.\nThese objects also symbolize metaphysical and cosmological truths. He\nwas a believer in astrology, and laid this pseudo-science also under\ncontribution in the interpretation of Holy Writ. Here the various\nnumbers found in the Bible in connection with ritual prescriptions, the\nconstruction of the Tabernacle, and so on, were of great service to Ibn\nEzra in his symbolizations. Like Philo and the Neo-Pythagoreans he\nanalyzes the virtues and significances of the different numbers, and\nthus finds a symbol in every number found in the Bible. Writing as he\ndid for the Jews of central Europe, who were not trained in secular\nscience and philosophy, Ibn Ezra was not prepared to shock the\nsensibilities of his readers by his novel and, to them, heretical views;\nand hence he expressed himself in cryptic phrases and allusions, which\noften make his meaning difficult if not impossible to decipher. This,\ntaken together with the fact that his views are not laid down anywhere\nsystematically and in connected fashion, but are thrown out briefly,\noften enigmatically, in connection with the explanation of Biblical\nverses and phrases, accounts for the difference among critics concerning\nthe precise doctrines of Abraham Ibn Ezra.\n\nOf his predecessors among the Jewish philosophers Ibn Ezra shows closest\nrelation to Solomon ibn Gabirol. He does not quote the \"Fountain of\nLife,\" but he names its author as a great thinker and writer of poems,\nand shows familiarity with Gabirol's doctrines. Like Gabirol he says\nthat all except God consists of substance (matter) and form. Not only\nthe sublunar things, subject to generation and decay, but the higher\nincorporeal things, also, are in essence two, _i. e._, are composed of\ntwo elements, subject and predicate. God alone is One; he is subject\nonly and not predicate. And Ibn Ezra also has some allusion to the\ndivine Will as taught by Gabirol.\n\nIn giving a connected sketch of Ibn Ezra's philosophical ideas, the most\none can do is to collect all the sayings bearing upon our subject which\nare found scattered through Ibn Ezra's writings, and classify them and\ncombine them into a connected whole. This has been done before by Nahman\nKrochmal[215] and by David Rosin,[216] and we shall follow the latter in\nour exposition here.\n\nGod is the One. He gives forms to all things, and is himself all things.\nGod alone is the real existent, all else is an existent by virtue of\nhim. Unity is the symbol of God because in number also the unit is the\nfoundation of all number, and yet is not itself number. It exists by\nvirtue of itself and needs not the numbers that come after. At the same\ntime the unit is also all number, because all number is made up of the\nunit. God alone is one, because he alone is not composed of matter and\nform, as everything else is. God has neither likeness nor form, for he\nis the creator of all things, _i. e._, of all likeness and form. He is\ntherefore incorporeal. In God the subject knowing and the object of his\nknowledge are one and the same thing. Else he would not be one. In\nknowing himself, therefore, he knows the universe. God as the cause and\ncreator of all things must know all things, the universal as well as the\nparticular, the world soul as well as the various species, and even\nevery single creature, but he knows the particular in a general way. For\nGod knows only what is permanent, whereas the particular is constantly\nchanging, hence he does not know the particular as such, but only as\ninvolved in the general and permanent.\n\nAs God is incorporeal he is not subject to corporeal accidents or human\nfeelings. Hence the many expressions in the Bible which ascribe such\naccidents and feelings to God must be understood as metaphors. It is a\npsychological necessity for man wishing to communicate his ideas to\nother men to speak in human terms, whether he speak of beings and things\ninferior or superior to him. The result is that the metaphor he finds it\nnecessary to employ either raises or lowers the object to which it\nrefers. It elevates the sub-human and lowers the superhuman to the\nhuman. This is the explanation of such phrases as \"the mouth of the\nearth\" the \"hand of the Jordan,\" the \"head of the dust of the world,\"\nand so on, in which the figure is that of personification. And the\nfundamental explanation is the same in such phrases as \"The Lord\nrepented,\" \"The Lord rested,\" \"The Lord remembered,\" \"He that dwelleth\nin heaven laughs,\" and so on, where the process is the reverse of\npersonification. The motive common to both is to convey some idea to the\nreader.\n\nThe Hebrew word \"bara,\" ordinarily translated \"created,\" which implies\nto most people the idea of _creatio ex nihilo_, Ibn Ezra renders, in\naccordance with its etymology, to limit, to define, by drawing or\nincising a line or boundary. Having said this, Ibn Ezra, in his wonted\nmysterious manner, stops short, refusing to say more and preferring to\nmystify the reader by adding the tantalizing phrase, \"The intelligent\nwill understand.\" He means apparently to indicate that an eternal matter\nwas endowed with form. In fact he seems to favor the idea of eternal\ncreation and maintenance of the universe, the relation of which to God\nis as the relation of speech to the speaker, which exists only so long\nas the speaker speaks. The moment he ceases speaking the sounds cease to\nexist.\n\nThe two ideas of eternal emanation of the world from God after the\nmanner of the Neo-Platonists and of an eternal matter which God endows\nwith forms, are not really quite consistent, for the latter implies that\nmatter is independent of God, whereas according to the former everything\nowes its existence and continuance to God, from whom it emanates. But it\nis difficult from the fragmentary and laconic sayings of Ibn Ezra to\nextract a consistent and certain system.\n\nThe world consists of three parts, three worlds Ibn Ezra calls them. The\nhighest world consists of the separate Intelligences or angels,\nincluding the world-soul of which the human soul is a part. The\nintermediate world consists of the spheres, planets and fixed stars.\nFinally the lower world contains the four elements and the product of\ntheir various mixtures, minerals, plants, animals, man. These three\nworlds, Ibn Ezra appears to intimate in his oracular manner, are\nsymbolized by the three divisions of the Tabernacle, the holy of holies\ntypifying the world of spirits, the holy pointing to the spheres, while\nthe outer court represents the sublunar world.\n\nThe highest world, the world of Intelligences and angels, is eternal,\nthough it too is dependent upon God for its existence. The angels, too,\nare composed of matter and form, and their function is to move the\nbodies of the intermediate world, the spheres and their stars. Through\nthe instrumentality of the heavenly bodies, the angels form the lower\nworld. This amounts to saying that the corporeal world is the last stage\nin the descending series of emanations from the One, and is preceded by\nthe heavenly bodies and the Intelligences. The angels are also the\nimmediate agents in prophetic inspiration.\n\nNot all mention of angels in the Bible, however, must be identified with\na separate Intelligence or a spheral soul (for the latter too is called\nangel by Ibn Ezra). There are instances of the expression angel which\nrefer to a momentary, special creation of a light or air for the special\nbenefit of the people. This explains a number of theophanies in the\nBible, such as the burning bush, \"the glory of the Lord,\" the cloud in\nthe wilderness, and so on.\n\nThe intermediate world of spheres is also eternal and consists of nine\nspheres, that of the Intelligences making up the perfect number ten. The\nnine spheres are arranged as follows, the spheres of the seven planets,\nthe sphere of the fixed stars, and the diurnal sphere without stars,\nwhich gives the motion from east to west to the whole heaven.\n\nThe lower world, the sublunar and corporeal world of generation and\ndecay, was created in time. This, however, does not mean that there was\ntime before this creation, for time exists only with motion and change.\nCreation here signifies the formation of the chaotic matter. As God\ncannot come in contact with the material and changeable (we have already\nseen that he cannot know it as such), it follows that this lower world\nwas not made directly by him, but by the angels, hence the word \"Elohim\"\nis used in the first chapter of Genesis, which means primarily the\nangels, and secondarily God as acting through the angels.\n\nIn this lower world man is the noblest creature. By means of his soul he\nmay attain eternal life as an individual like God and the angels (_i. e._,\nthe Intelligences), whereas all other creatures of the lower world\nare permanent in species only but not as individuals. This is the\nmeaning of the expression in Genesis, \"Let us make man in our image,\" in\nthe image, that is, of God and the angels. Man is a microcosm, a\nuniverse in little, for like the great universe he consists of a body\nanimated by a soul.\n\nAs the noblest part of man is his soul, it becomes his duty to know it.\nHe must know whether it is substance or accident, whether it will die\nwhen it is separated from the body, and for what purpose it was brought\ninto union with the body. In order to learn all this one must first\nstudy the preparatory branches, grammar, logic, mathematics and physics.\nIn the study of psychology we learn that man has three souls,\nvegetative, animal and rational, and the latter alone is immortal. It is\na part of the world soul, having existed before it came into the body,\nand under favorable conditions will return again to the world soul when\nseparated from the body. The condition which must be fulfilled by the\nsoul before it can return to the world soul is the acquisition of\nwisdom, for this is the purpose for which it was put into the body,\nnamely, in order that it may learn the work of its master and observe\nhis commandments. There are many sciences, but they are related to each\nother, all leading up to the one highest science, the knowledge of God\nand his goodness. A person must advance gradually in studying the work\nof God from the knowledge of minerals, plants, animals, the human body,\nto the knowledge of the spheres and heavenly bodies, the causes of\neclipses, etc., and from this he will gradually come to know God. The\ncommandments of the Bible are also of importance for this purpose. To\nunderstand the secret of the commandments is to gain eternal life. For\nwisdom is the form of the soul, and hence the soul does not die like a\nbody.\n\nThe reward of the soul is re-absorption in the world soul of which it is\na part, and the punishment of the unworthy soul that neglected to\nacquire knowledge is destruction. What Ibn Ezra means by the Hebrew word\n\"abad\" (ordinarily rendered to perish, to be destroyed) is not clear. It\nis hard to see how a pre-existing soul can perish utterly. Rosin\nsuggests that Ibn Ezra is alluding to transmigration,[217] but it is not\nclear.\n\nWe have seen that Ibn Ezra holds that the events of the sublunar world\nand the destinies of men are governed by the positions and motions of\nthe heavenly bodies, which in turn are determined by the Intelligences\nor angels. The heavenly bodies, he tells us, follow necessary laws\nimposed upon them, and are not responsible for any good or evil which\nresults to mankind from them, since the effects are not of their\nintention, and they cannot change them if they would. Accordingly it is\nfoolish to pray to the heavenly bodies in order to appease them and\nprevent evil, as some of the heathen are accustomed to do. The motions\nof the heavenly bodies are determined and invariable, and no prayer will\nchange them. This, however, does not mean to say that no one can escape\nthe evil which is destined for him in the stars. Ordinarily, it is true,\nGod does not know the particular individual as such. He knows him only\nas implied in the whole, and his destiny is determined accordingly. But\nthere are exceptions when a person by developing his soul and intellect,\nas we saw above, succeeds in his lifetime in separating his soul from\nthe corporeal and particular, and brings it into contact with the\nspiritual and universal. In that case he attracts to himself the special\nprovidence of God, which enables him to evade the evil threatened by his\nstar, without in any way changing the star's natural course or ordinary\neffects. How this is done, Ibn Ezra illustrates by an example.[218]\nSuppose, he says, that it is fated according to the stars that a given\ncity shall be flooded by a river and its inhabitants drowned. A prophet\ncomes and warns them, urging them to repent of their evil ways before\ntheir fate is sealed. They obey him, return to God with all their heart\nand leave the city to offer prayer to God. The river rises in their\nabsence, as often happens, and floods the city. The wolf is satisfied\nand the lamb is whole. The decree of the stars is not interfered with,\nand the good man is delivered from evil. In this way Ibn Ezra endeavors\nto reconcile natural law (or astrological fatalism) with the ethical\npurpose of divine providence. And he also vindicates free will and\nresponsibility. The rational soul of man has power, he says, to\ncounteract in part the indications of the stars, though it cannot annul\nthem entirely. The punishment of the wicked is that they are left\nentirely to the fates determined for them by their constellations.\n\nThe highest good of man, we have seen, is the knowledge of God and his\nwork. There are two ways of knowing God. One is through a study of\nnature, the work of God. This is described in the first part of the\nnineteenth Psalm, \"The Heavens declare the glory of God; and the\nfirmament showeth his handiwork.\" But there is a second and, in a sense,\na better way of knowing God. This is derived from his revelation in the\nLaw. As we are told in the second part of the above Psalm (_v._ 7), \"The\nlaw of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul.\" The law of the Lord\nrestores the soul, Ibn Ezra says, by removing doubt from it. For the\nfirst method of knowing God, with all its importance for the man of\nwisdom and reason, is not fit for all persons; and not everything can be\nproved by reason. Revelation in the Law is necessary for the simple\nminded. \"I am the Lord thy God\" (Exod. 20, 2) is a hint to the\nphilosopher, who need not depend on hearsay, for real knowledge is\nproved knowledge. But as not everyone is in a position to have such\nknowledge, the Bible adds, \"which brought thee out of the land of\nEgypt.\" This all can understand, the simple minded as well as the\nphilosopher. The Law has also a practical purpose, to strengthen the\nrational soul so as to prevent the body from gaining the upper hand.\n\nGod's messenger, through whom his will is made known, is the prophet. He\nseeks retirement so as to get in communion with God, and receives such\ninfluence as he is capable of getting. Moses was the greatest of the\nprophets. He was able to communicate with God whenever he chose, whereas\nthe others had to wait until the inspiration came. The revelation of God\nto Moses was without an intermediary, and without visions and\nlikenesses. Moses saw the things presented to him in their true form.\n\nThe laws may be divided into 1. Innate or rational laws, _i. e._, laws\nplanted by God in the mind of every rational being. There are many such\nin the Torah. All the laws of the Ten Commandments belong to this class,\nwith the exception of the Sabbath. Hence all mankind believe in them,\nand Abraham observed them all before ever the Law was given on Sinai. 2.\nHidden laws, _i. e._, laws, the reason of which is not given. We must\nnot suppose for a moment that there is any law which is against reason,\nHeaven forbid! We must observe them all, whether we understand the\nreason or not. If we find a law that apparently is unreasonable, we must\nassume that it has some hidden meaning and is not to be taken in its\nliteral sense. It is our duty, then, to look for this hidden meaning,\nand if we cannot find it, we must admit that we do not understand it.\n\nThe laws may also be classified as 1. Commandments of the heart, 2.\nCommandments of the tongue, and 3. Commandments of action. An example of\ncommandments of the heart is, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,\" \"Thou\nshalt not hate thy brother in thy heart,\" and so on. To the commandments\nof the tongue belong the reading of the _Shema_, grace after meals, the\npriestly benediction, and so on. The laws of the third class are so\nnumerous that there is no need of mentioning them. The laws of the heart\nare the most important of all. The reader will recognize in this\ntwo-fold classification Saadia's division of the laws into rational and\ntraditional, and Bahya's classification of duties of the heart and\nduties of the limbs. This second class includes Ibn Ezra's second and\nthird classes, tongue and action.[219]\n\nThe problem of evil Ibn Ezra solves by saying that from God comes good\nonly. The world as a whole is good; evil is due to the defect of the\nobject receiving higher influence. To argue that because of the small\npart of evil the whole world, which is good, should not have been\ncreated, is foolish.\n\nThe highest good of man is to develop his reason. As the traveller and\nthe captive long to return to the land of their birth and be with their\nfamily, so the rational soul is eager to rise to the upper world which\nis not made of clay. This it can do only if it purifies itself from the\nuncleanness of corporeal desire which drags it down, and takes pains to\nknow its own nature and origin, with the help of Wisdom whose eyes are\nundimmed. Then she will know the truth, which will remain indelibly\nimpressed upon her when she separates from the body, where she was put\nfor her own good. The suffering she underwent here for a time will give\nplace to everlasting rest and joy. All man's work is vain, for man can\nneither create nor annihilate a substance. All his corporeal activity\nconsists in combination and separation of accidents. The only thing of\nvalue is the fear of God. But no man can rise to this stage until he has\nascended the ladder of wisdom, and has acquired understanding.[220]\n\nMore concretely the way to purify the soul from the body is by uniting\nthe rational and spirited soul, as Plato has it, against the appetitive,\nand giving the reason the mastery over the spirited soul as well. A\nmoderate degree of asceticism is to be recommended as favoring the\nemancipation of the soul from the tyranny of the body. This is the\nmeaning of the institution of the Nazirite; and the offering he must\nbring after the expiration of his period is to atone for the sin of\nreturning to a life of indulgence. But one should not go to extremes.\nToo much praying and fasting results in stupefaction. It is a mistake to\ndevelop one side of one's nature at the expense of another. Every one\nof the three souls (the rational, the spirited and the appetitive) must\nbe given its due.\n\nBut the most important activity of man, which leads to eternal life and\nhappiness, is the knowledge of God. This knowledge cannot be attained at\nonce. It must be preceded by a study of one's own soul and of the\nnatural sciences. Through a knowledge of oneself and nature, one arrives\nfinally at a knowledge of God. The soul, originally a _tabula rasa_, is\ngradually perfected by the ideas which theoretical speculation acquires.\nThese ideas are identified with the rational soul, and there results the\nacquired Intellect, which, as absolutely immaterial, is immortal and\nbecomes one with the world soul of which it is a part. During life\ncomplete union with the spiritual world is impossible. Even Moses could\nonly see the \"rear part\" of God. But when one has during life kept as\nfar as possible away from the sensuous and corporeal, then at the time\nof death, when the soul is separated from the body, he will be\ncompletely absorbed in the world soul and possess the knowledge of God.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nABRAHAM IBN DAUD\n\n\nWhat was poison to Judah Halevi is meat to Abraham Ibn Daud. We must, he\nsays, investigate the principles of the Jewish religion and seek to\nharmonize them with true philosophy. And in order to do these things\nproperly a preliminary study of science is necessary. Nowadays all this\nis neglected and the result is confusion in fundamental principles, for\na superficial and literal reading of the Bible leads to contradictory\nviews, not to speak of anthropomorphic conceptions of God which cannot\nbe the truth. Many of our day think that the study of philosophy is\ninjurious. This is because it frequently happens in our time that a\nperson who takes up the study of philosophy neglects religion. In\nancient times also this happened in the person of Elisha ben Abuya,\nknown by the name of Aher. Nevertheless science was diligently studied\nin Rabbinic times. Witness what was said concerning Rabbi Yohanan ben\nZakkai, Samuel and the Synhedrin.[221] It cannot be that God meant us to\nabstain from philosophical study, for many statements in the Bible, such\nas those relating to freedom of the will, to the nature of God and the\ndivine attributes, to the creation of the world, and so on, are a direct\nstimulus to such investigation. Surely mental confusion cannot be the\npurpose God had in mind for us. If he preferred our ignorance he would\nnot have called our attention to these matters at all.[222]\n\nThis, as we see, is decidedly a different point of view from that of\nJudah Halevi. The difference between them is not due to a difference in\ntheir age and environment, but solely to personal taste and temperament.\nToledo was the birthplace of Ibn Daud as it was of Halevi. And the\nperiod in which they lived was practically the same. Judah Halevi's\nbirth took place in the last quarter of the eleventh century, whereas\nIbn Daud is supposed to have been born about 1110, a difference of some\ntwenty-five or thirty years. The philosopher whom Judah Halevi presents\nto us as the typical representative of his time is an Aristotelian of\nthe type of Alfarabi and Avicenna. And it is the same type of philosophy\nthat we meet in the pages of the \"Emunah Ramah\" (Exalted Faith), Ibn\nDaud's philosophical work.[223] Whereas, however, Judah Halevi was a\npoet by the grace of God, glowing with love for his people, their\nreligion, their language and their historic land, Ibn Daud leaves upon\nus the impression of a precise thinker, cold and analytical. He exhibits\nno graces of style, eloquence of diction or depths of enthusiasm and\nemotion. He passes systematically from one point to the next, uses few\nwords and technical, and moves wholly in the Peripatetic philosophy of\nthe day. In 1161, the same year in which the Emunah Ramah was composed,\nhe also wrote a historical work, \"Sefer Hakabala\" (Book of Tradition),\nwhich we have; and in 1180, regarded by some as the year of his death,\nhe published an astronomical work, which is lost. This gives an index of\nhis interests which were scientific and philosophic. Mysticism, whether\nof the poetic or the philosophic kind, was far from his nature; and this\ntoo may account for the intense opposition he shows to Solomon Ibn\nGabirol. On more than one occasion he gives vent to his impatience with\nthat poetic philosopher, and he blames him principally for two faults.\nChoosing to devote a whole book to one purely metaphysical topic, in\nitself not related to Judaism, Gabirol, we are told by Ibn Daud, gave\nexpression to doctrines extremely dangerous to the Jewish religion. And\napart from his heterodoxy, he is philosophically incompetent and his\nmethod is abominable. His style is profuse to the point of weariness,\nand his logic carries no conviction.[224]\n\nWhile Abraham Ibn Daud is thus expressly unsympathetic to Gabirol and\ntacitly in disagreement with Halevi (he does not mention him), he shows\nthe closest relation to Maimonides, whose forerunner he is. We feel\ntempted to say that if not for Ibn Daud there would have been no\nMaimonides. And yet the irony of history has willed that the fame of\nbeing the greatest Jewish philosopher shall be Maimonides's own, while\nhis nearest predecessor, to whose influence he owed most, should be all\nbut completely forgotten. The Arabic original of Ibn Daud's treatise is\nlost, and the Hebrew translations (there are two) lay buried in\nmanuscript in the European libraries until one of them was published by\nSimson Weil in 1852.[225]\n\nAbraham Ibn Daud is the first Jewish philosopher who shows an intimate\nknowledge of the works of Aristotle and makes a deliberate effort to\nharmonize the Aristotelian system with Judaism. To be sure, he too owes\nhis Aristotelian knowledge to the Arabian exponents of the Stagirite,\nAlfarabi and Avicenna, rather than to the works of Aristotle himself.\nBut this peculiarity was rooted in the intellectual conditions of his\ntime, and must not be charged to his personal neglect of the sources.\nAnd Maimonides does nothing more than repeat the effort of Ibn Daud in a\nmore brilliant and masterly fashion.\n\nThe development of the three religious philosophies in the middle ages,\nJewish, Christian and Mohammedan, followed a similar line of\nprogression. In all of them it was not so much a development from\nwithin, the unfolding of what was implicit and potential in the original\ngerm of the three respective religions, as a stimulus from without,\nwhich then combined, as an integral factor, with the original mass, and\nthe final outcome was a resultant of the two originally disparate\nelements. We know by this time what these two elements were in each\ncase, Hellenic speculation, and Semitic religion in the shape of sacred\nand revealed documents. The second factor was in every case complete\nwhen the process of fusion began. Not so the first. What I mean is that\nnot all of the writings of Greek antiquity were known to Jew, Christian\nand Mohammedan at the beginning of their philosophizing career. And the\nprogress in their philosophical development kept equal step with the\nsuccessive accretion of Greek philosophical literature, in particular\nAristotle's physical, psychological and metaphysical treatises, and\ntheir gradual purgation of Neo-Platonic adhesions.\n\nThe Syrian Christians, who were the first to adopt Greek teachings, seem\nnever to have gone beyond the mathematical and medical works of the\nGreeks and the logic of Aristotle. The Arabs began where their Syrian\nteachers ended, and went beyond them. The Mutakallimun were indebted to\nthe Stoics,[226] the Pure Brethren to the Neo-Platonists; and it was\nonly gradually that Aristotle became the sole master not merely in\nlogic, which he always had been, but also in physics, metaphysics and\npsychology. Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes represent so many steps in\nthe Aristotelization of Arabic philosophy.\n\nChristian medi\u00e6val thought, which was really a continuation of the\nPatristic period, likewise began with Eriugena in the ninth century\nunder Platonic and Neo-Platonic influences. Of Aristotle the logic alone\nwas known, and that too only in small part. Here also progress was due\nto the increase of Aristotelian knowledge; though in this case it was\nnot gradual as with the Arabs before them, but sudden. In the latter\npart of the twelfth and the early part of the thirteenth century,\nthrough the Crusades, through the Moorish civilization in Spain, through\nthe Saracens in Sicily, through the Jews as translators and mediators,\nAristotle invaded Christian Europe and transformed Christian philosophy.\nAlbertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Occam are the\nresults of this transformation.\n\nThe same thing holds true of the Jews. Their philosophizing career\nstands chronologically between that of their Arab teachers and their\nChristian disciples. And the line of their development was similar. It\nwas parallel to that of the Arabs. First came Kalam in Saadia, Mukammas,\nthe Karaites Al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah. Then Neo-Platonism and Kalam\ncombined, or pure Neo-Platonism, in Bahya, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik and the\ntwo Ibn Ezras, Abraham and Moses. In Judah Halevi, so far as philosophy\nis represented, we have Neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism. Finally in\nIbn Daud and Maimonides, Neo-Platonism is reduced to the vanishing\npoint, and Aristotelianism is in full view and in possession of the\nfield. After Maimonides the only philosopher who deviates from the\nprescribed path and endeavors to uproot Aristotelian authority in\nJudaism is Crescas. All the rest stand by Aristotle and his major domo,\nMaimonides.\n\nThis may seem like a purely formal and external mode of characterizing\nthe development of philosophical thought. But the character of medi\u00e6val\nphilosophy is responsible for this. Their ideal of truth as well as\ngoodness was in the past. Knowledge was thought to have been discovered\nor revealed in the past,[227] and the task of the philosopher was to\nacquire what was already there and to harmonize contradictory\nauthorities. Thus the more of the past literature that came to them, the\ngreater the transformation in their own philosophy.\n\nThe above digression will make clear to us the position of Ibn Daud and\nhis relation to Maimonides. Ibn Daud began what Maimonides finished--the\nlast stage in the Aristotelization of Jewish thought. Why is it then\nthat so little was known about him, and that his important treatise was\nneglected and practically forgotten? The answer is to be found partly in\nthe nature of the work itself and partly in historical circumstances.\n\nThe greatest and most abiding interest in intellectual Jewry was after\nall the Bible and the Talmud. This interest never flagged through\nadversity or through success. The devotion paid to these Jewish classics\nand sacred books may have been fruitful in original research and\nintelligent application at one time and place and relatively barren at\nanother. Great men devoted to their study abounded in one country and\nwere relatively few in another. The nature of the study applied to these\nbooks was affected variously by historical conditions, political and\neconomic; and the cultivation or neglect of the sciences and philosophy\nwas reflected in the style of Biblical and Talmudical interpretation.\nBut at all times and in all countries, under conditions of comparative\nfreedom as well as in the midst of persecution, the sacred heritage of\nIsrael was studied and its precepts observed and practiced. In this\nfield alone fame was sure and permanent. All other study was honored\naccording to the greater or less proximity to this paramount interest.\nIn times of freedom and of great philosophic and scientific interest\nlike that of the golden era in Spain, philosophical studies almost\nacquired independent value. But this independence, never quite absolute,\nwaned and waxed with external conditions, and at last disappeared\nentirely. If Ibn Daud had made himself famous by a Biblical commentary\nor a halakic work, or if his philosophic treatise had the distinction of\nbeing written in popular and attractive style, like Bahya's \"Duties of\nthe Hearts,\" or Halevi's \"Cusari,\" it might have fared better. As it is,\nit suffers from its conciseness and technical terminology. Add to this\nthat it was superseded by the \"Guide of the Perplexed\" of Maimonides,\npublished not many years after the \"Emunah Ramah,\" and the neglect of\nthe latter is completely explained.\n\nAbraham ibn Daud tells us in the introduction to his book that it was\nwritten in response to the question of a friend concerning the problem\nof free will. The dilemma is this. If human action is determined by God,\nwhy does he punish, why does he admonish, and why does he send prophets?\nIf man is free, then there is something in the world over which God has\nno control. The problem is made more difficult by the fact that Biblical\nstatements are inconsistent, and passages may be cited in favor of\neither of the theories in question. This inconsistency is to be\nexplained, however, by the circumstance that not all Biblical phrases\nare to be taken literally--their very contradiction is a proof of this.\nNow the passages which require exegetic manipulation are in general\nthose which seem opposed to reason. Many statements in the Bible are in\nfact intended for the common people, and are expressed with a view to\ntheir comprehension, and without reference to philosophic truth. In the\npresent instance the objections to determinism are much greater and more\nserious than those to freedom. In order to realize this, however, it is\nnecessary to investigate the principles of the Jewish religion and seek\nto harmonize them with true philosophy. This in turn cannot be done\nwithout a preliminary study of science. A question like that of\ndeterminism and freedom cannot be decided without a knowledge of the\ndivine attributes and the consequences flowing from them. But to\nunderstand these we must have a knowledge of the principles of physics\nand metaphysics.[228] Accordingly Abraham Ibn Daud devotes the entire\nfirst part of the \"Emunah Ramah\" to general physics and metaphysics in\nthe Aristotelian conception of these terms.\n\nConcerning the kind of persons for whom he wrote his book, he says, I\nadvise everyone who is perfectly innocent, who is not interested in\nphilosophical and ethical questions like that of determinism and freedom\non the ground that man cannot grasp them; and is entirely unconcerned\nabout his ignorance--I advise such a person to refrain from opening this\nbook or any other of a similar nature. His ignorance is his bliss, for\nafter all the purpose of philosophy is conduct. On the other hand, those\nwho are learned in the principles of religion and are also familiar with\nphilosophy need not my book, for they know more than I can teach them\nhere. It is the beginner in speculation who can benefit from this work,\nthe man who has not yet been able to see the rational necessity of\nbeliefs and practices which he knows from tradition.\n\nThat the principles of the Jewish religion are based upon philosophic\nfoundations is shown in Deuteronomy 4, 6: \"Keep therefore and do them;\nfor this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the\npeoples, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, surely this great\nnation is a wise and understanding people.\" This cannot refer to the\nceremonial precepts, the so-called \"traditional\" commandments; for there\nis nothing in them to excite the admiration of a non-Jew. Nor can it\nrefer to the political and moral regulations, for one need not profess\nthe Jewish or any other religion in order to practice them; they are a\nmatter of reason pure and simple. The verse quoted can only mean that\nthe other nations will be seized with admiration and wonder when they\nfind that the fundamental principles of the Jewish religion, which we\nreceived by tradition and without effort, are identical with those\nphilosophical principles at which they arrived after a great deal of\nlabor extending over thousands of years.[229]\n\nIbn Daud is not consistent in his idea of the highest aim of man. We\nhave just heard him say that the purpose of philosophy is conduct. This\nis true to the spirit of Judaism which, despite all the efforts of the\nJewish philosophers to the contrary, is not a speculative theology but a\npractical religion, in which works stand above faith. But as an\nAristotelian, Ibn Daud could not consistently stand by the above\nstandpoint as the last word in this question. Accordingly we find him\nelsewhere in true Aristotelian fashion give priority to theoretical\nknowledge.\n\nJudging from the position of man among the other creatures of the\nsublunar world, we come to the conclusion, he tells us, that that which\ndistinguishes him above his surroundings, namely, his rational soul, is\nthe aim of all the rest; and they are means and preparations for it. The\nrational soul has two forms of activity. It may face upward and receive\nwisdom from the angels (theoretical knowledge). Or it may direct its\nattention downwards and judge the other corporeal powers (practical\nreason). But it must not devote itself unduly or without system to any\none occupation. The aim of man is wisdom, science. Of the sciences the\nhighest and the aim of all the rest is the knowledge of God. The body of\nman is his animal, which leads him to God. Some spend all their time in\nfeeding the animal, some in clothing it, and some in curing it of its\nills. The latter is not a bad occupation, as it saves the body from\ndisease and death, and so helps it to attain the higher life. But to\nthink of the study of medicine as the aim of life and devote all one's\ntime to it is doing injury to one's soul. Some spend their time in\nmatters even less significant than this, _viz._, in studying grammar and\nlanguage; others again in mathematics and in solving curious problems\nwhich are never likely to happen. The only valuable part here is that\nwhich has relation to astronomy. Some are exclusively occupied in\n\"twisting threads.\" This is an expression used by an Arabian\nphilosopher,[230] who compares man's condition in the world to that of a\nslave who was promised freedom and royalty besides if he made the\npilgrimage to Mecca and celebrated there. If he made the journey and was\nprevented from reaching the holy city, he would get freedom only; but if\nhe did not undertake the trip he would get nothing. The three steps in\nthe realization of the purpose are thus: making the preparations for the\njourney, getting on the road and passing from station to station, and\nfinally wandering about in the place of destination. One small element\nin the preparation for the journey is twisting the threads for the water\nbottle. Medicine and law as means of gaining a livelihood and a\nreputation represent the stage of preparing for the journey. They are\nboth intended to improve the ills of life, whether in the relations of\nman to man as in law; or in the treatment of the internal humors as in\nmedicine. Medicine seems more important, for on the assumption of\nmankind being just, there would be no need of law, whereas the need for\nmedicine would remain. To spend one's whole life in legal casuistry and\nthe working out of hypothetical cases on the pretext of sharpening one's\nwits, is like being engaged in twisting threads continually--a little is\nnecessary, but a great deal is a waste of time. It would be best if the\nreligious man would first learn how to prove the existence of God, the\nmeaning of prophecy, the nature of reward and punishment and the future\nworld, and how to defend these matters before an unbeliever. Then if he\nhas time left, he may devote it to legalistic discussions, and there\nwould be no harm.\n\nSelf-examination, in order to purify oneself from vices great and small,\nrepresents the second stage of getting on the road and travelling from\nstation to station. The final stage, arriving in the holy city and\ncelebrating there, is to have a perfect knowledge of God. He who attains\nthis is the best of wise men, having the best of knowledge, which deals\nwith the noblest subject. The reader must not expect to find it all in\nthis book. If he reads this and does not study the subject for himself,\nhe is like a man who spent his time in reading about medicine and cannot\ncure the simplest ailment. The knowledge of God is a form that is\nbestowed from on high upon the rational soul when she is prepared by\nmeans of moral perfection and scientific study. The prophet puts all\nthree functions of the soul on the same level, and gives preference to\nknowledge of God. \"Thus saith the Lord,\" says Jeremiah (9, 22), \"Let not\nthe wise man glory in his wisdom [rational soul], neither let the mighty\nman glory in his might [spirited soul], let not the rich man glory in\nhis riches [nutritive soul]: but let him that glorieth glory in this,\nthat he understandeth, and knoweth me....\" Jeremiah also recommends\n(_ib._) knowing God through his deeds--\"That I am the Lord which\nexercise loving-kindness\"--in order that man may imitate him.[231]\n\nWe have now a general idea of Ibn Daud's attitude and point of view; and\nin passing to the details of his system it will not be necessary to\nrehearse all the particulars of his thought, much of it being common to\nall medi\u00e6val writers on Jewish philosophy. We shall confine ourselves to\nthose matters in which Ibn Daud contributed something new, not contained\nin the writings of his predecessors.\n\nFollowing the Aristotelian system, he begins by describing substance and\naccident and gives a list and characterization of the ten categories.\nThis he follows up by showing that the classification of the ten\ncategories lies at the basis of the 139th Psalm. It needs not our saying\nthat it must be an extraordinary mode of exegesis that can find such\nthings in such unusual places. But the very strangeness of the\nphenomenon bears witness to the remarkable influence exerted by the\nAristotelian philosophy upon the thinking of the Spanish Jews at that\ntime.[232]\n\nFrom the categories he passes to a discussion of the most fundamental\nconcepts in the Aristotelian philosophy, matter and form. And here his\nmethod of proving the existence of matter is Aristotelian and new. It is\nbased upon the discussion in Aristotle's Physics, though not necessarily\nderived from there directly. Primary matter, he says, is free from all\nform. There must be such, for in the change of one thing to another, of\nwater to air for example, it cannot be the _form_ of water that receives\nthe form of air; for the form of water disappears, whereas that which\nreceives the new form must be there. Reason therefore leads us to assume\na common substrate of all things that are subject to change. This is\nprimary matter, free from all form. This matter being at the basis of\nall change and becoming, could not itself have come to be through a\nsimilar process, or we should require another matter prior to it, and it\nwould not be the prime matter we supposed it to be. This last argument\nled Aristotle to the concept of an eternal matter, the basis of becoming\nfor all else besides, itself not subject to any such process. It is an\nultimate, to ask for the origin of which would signify to misunderstand\nthe meaning of origin. All things of the sublunar world originate in\nmatter, hence matter itself is the unoriginated, the eternal.\n\nIbn Daud as a Jew could not accept this solution, and so he cut the knot\nby saying that while it is true that matter cannot originate in the way\nin which the composite objects of the sublunar world come to be, it does\nnot yet follow that it is absolutely ultimate and eternal. God alone is\nthe ultimate and eternal; nothing else is. Matter is a relative\nultimate; relative, that is, to the composite and changeable objects of\nour world; but it is itself an effect of God as the universal cause. God\ncreated it outright.\n\nPrime matter, therefore, represents the first stage in creation. The\nnext stage is the endowment of this formless matter with corporeality in\nthe abstract, _i. e._, with extension. Then come the specific forms of\nthe four elements, then their compounds through mineral, plant and\nanimal to man. This is not new; we have already met with it in Gabirol\nand Ibn Zaddik. Nor is the following significant statement altogether\nnew, though no one before Ibn Daud expressed it so clearly and so\ndefinitely. It is that the above analysis of natural objects into\nmatter, universal body, the elements, and so on, is not a physical\ndivision but a logical. It does not mean that there was a time when\nprime matter actually existed as such before it received the form of\ncorporeality, and then there existed actually an absolute body of pure\nextension until it received the four elements. No, nothing has existence\n_in actu_ which has not individuality, including not only form, but also\naccidents. The above analysis is theoretical, and the order of priority\nis logical not real. In reality only the complete compound of matter and\nform (the individual) exists.\n\nAllusion to matter and form is also found in the Bible in Jeremiah (18,\n1ff.), \"Arise and go down to the potter's house.... Then I went down to\nthe potter's house, and, behold, he wrought his work on the wheels....\nBehold as the clay in the potter's hand....\"[233]\n\nThe next important topic analyzed by Ibn Daud is that of motion. This is\nof especial importance to Ibn Daud because upon it he bases a new proof\nof the existence of God, not heretofore found in the works of any of his\npredecessors. It is taken from Aristotle's Physics, probably from\nAvicenna's treatises on the subject, is then adopted by Maimonides, and\nthrough his example no doubt is made use of by Thomas Aquinas, the great\nChristian Scholastic of the thirteenth century, who gives it the most\nprominent place in his \"Summa Contra Gentiles.\"\n\nIbn Daud does not give Aristotle's general definition of motion as the\n\"actualization of the potential qua potential\" (_cf._ above, p. xxxii),\nbut his other remarks concerning it imply it. Motion, he says, is\napplied first to movement in place, and is then transferred to any\nchange which is gradual, such as quantitative or qualitative change.\nSudden change is not called motion. As the four elements have all the\nsame matter and yet possess different motions--earth and water moving\ndownward, fire and air upward--it cannot be the matter which is the\ncause of their motions. It must therefore be the forms, which are\ndifferent in different things.\n\nNothing can move itself. While it is true that the form of a thing\ndetermines the kind of motion it shall have, it cannot in itself produce\nthat motion, which can be caused only by an efficient cause from\nwithout. The case of animal motions may seem like a refutation of this\nview, but it is not really so. The soul and the body are two distinct\nprinciples in the animal; and it is the soul that moves the body. The\nreason why a thing cannot move itself is because the thing which is\nmoved is potential with reference to that which the motion is intended\nto realize, whereas the thing causing the motion is actual with respect\nto the relation in question. If then a thing moved itself, it would be\nactual and potential at the same time and in the same relation, which is\na contradiction. The Bible, too, hints at the idea that every motion\nmust have a mover by the recurring questions concerning the origin of\nprophetic visions, of the existence of the earth, and so on. Such are\nthe expressions in Job (38, 36, 37): \"Who hath put wisdom in the inward\nparts?\" \"Who can number the clouds by wisdom?\" In Proverbs (30, 4): \"Who\nhath established all the ends of the earth?\" and in many passages\nbesides.[234]\n\nThe question of infinity is another topic of importance for proving\nthe existence of God. We proceed as follows: An infinite line is an\nimpossibility. For let the lines _a_------------_b_ be infinite in the\n _c_------|-----_d_\n _e_\ndirections _b_, _d_. Take away from _cd_ a finite length = _ce_, and pull\nup the line _ed_ so that _e_ coincides with _c_. Now if _ed_ is equal to\n_ab_, and _cd_ was also equal to _ab_ by hypothesis, it follows that\n_ed_ = _cd_, which is impossible, for _ed_ is a part of _cd_. If it is\nshorter than _cd_ and yet is infinite, one infinite is shorter than\nanother infinite, which is also impossible. The only alternative left is\nthen that _ed_ is finite. If then we add to it the finite part _ce_, the\nsum, _ce_ + _ed_ = _cd_, will be finite, and _cd_ being equal to _ab_ by\nhypothesis, _ab_ is also finite. Hence there is no infinite line. If\nthere is no infinite line, there is no infinite surface or infinite\nsolid, for we could in that case draw in them infinite lines. Besides we\ncan prove directly the impossibility of infinite surface and solid by\nthe same methods we employed in line.\n\nWe can prove similarly that an infinite series of objects is also an\nimpossibility. In other words, infinite number as an actuality is\nimpossible because it is a contradiction in terms. A number of things\nmeans a known number; infinite means having no known number. A series is\nsomething that has beginning, middle and end. Infinite means being all\nmiddle. We have thus proved that an actual infinite is impossible,\nwhether as extension or number. And the Bible also alludes to the\nfiniteness of the universe in the words of Isaiah (40, 12): \"Who hath\nmeasured the waters in the hollow of his hand...,\" intimating that the\nuniverse is capable of being measured.\n\nWe must prove next that no finite body can have an infinite power.\nFor let the line _ae_ ------------- be a finite line having an infinite\n _a_ _b_ _c_ _d_ _e_\npower. Divide into the several parts _ab_, _be_, _cd_, _de_, etc. If\nevery one of the parts has an infinite power, _ab_ has an infinite\npower, _ac_ a greater infinite power, _ad_ a still greater, _ae_ a still\ngreater, and so on. But this is absurd, for there cannot be anything\ngreater than the infinite. It follows then that each of the parts has a\nfinite power; and as the sum of finites is finite, the line _ae_ also\nhas a finite power. All these principles we must keep in mind, for we\nshall by means of them prove later the existence and incorporeality of\nGod.[235]\n\nAs the concepts of physics are essential for proving the existence of\nGod, so are the principles of psychology of importance in showing that\nthere are intermediate beings between God and the corporeal substances\nof the world. These are called in the Bible angels. The philosophers\ncall them secondary causes.\n\nAccordingly Ibn Daud follows his physical doctrines with a discussion of\nthe soul. There is nothing new in his proof that such a thing as soul\nexists. It is identical with the deduction of Joseph Ibn Zaddik\n(_supra_, p. 134). Stone and tree and horse and man are all bodies and\nyet the last three have powers and functions which the stone has not,\n_viz._, nutrition, growth and reproduction. Horse and man have in\naddition to the three powers above mentioned, which they have in common\nwith tree, the powers of sensation and motion and imagination, which\nplants have not. Finally man is distinguished above all the rest of\nanimal creation in possessing the faculty of intelligence, and the\nknowledge of art and of ethical discrimination. All these functions\ncannot be body or the result of body, for in that case all corporeal\nobjects should have all of them, as they are all bodies. We must\ntherefore attribute them to an extra-corporeal principle; and this we\ncall soul. As an incorporeal thing the soul cannot be strictly defined,\nnot being composed of genus and species; but we can describe it in a\nroundabout way in its relation to the body. He then gives the\nAristotelian definition of the soul as \"the [first] entelechy of a\nnatural body having life potentially\" (_cf._ above, p. xxxv).\n\nLike many of his predecessors who treated of the soul, Ibn Daud also\nfinds it necessary to guard against the materialistic theory of the soul\nwhich would make it the product of the elemental mixture in the body, if\nnot itself body. This would reduce the soul to a phenomenon of the body,\nor in Aristotelian terminology, an accident of the body, and would\ndeprive it of all substantiality and independence, not to speak of\nimmortality. How can that which is purely a resultant of a combination\nof elements remain when its basis is gone? Accordingly Ibn Daud takes\npains to refute the most important of these phenomenalistic theories,\nthat of Hippocrates and Galen. Their theory in brief is that the\nfunctions which we attribute to the soul are in reality the results of\nthe various combinations of the four elementary qualities, hot, cold,\nmoist, dry. The more harmonious and equable the proportion of their\nunion, the higher is the function resulting therefrom. The difference\nbetween man and beast, and between animal and plant is then the\ndifference in the proportionality of the elemental mixture. They prove\nthis theory of theirs by the observation that as long as the mixture is\nperfect the activities above mentioned proceed properly; whereas as soon\nas there is a disturbance in the mixture, the animal becomes sick and\ncannot perform his activities, or dies altogether if the disturbance is\nvery great. The idea is very plausible and a great many believe it, but\nit is mistaken as we shall prove.\n\nHis refutation of the \"accident\" or \"mixture\" theory of the soul, as\nwell as the subsequent discussion of the various functions, sensuous and\nrational, of the tripartite soul, are based upon Ibn Sina's treatment of\nthe same topic, and we have already reproduced some of it in our\nexposition of Judah Halevi. We shall therefore be brief here and refer\nonly to such aspects as are new in Ibn Daud, or such as we found it\nadvisable to omit in our previous expositions.\n\nHis main argument against the materialistic or mechanistic theory of the\nsoul is that while a number of phenomena of the growing animal body can\nbe explained by reference to the form of the mixture in the elementary\nqualities, not all aspects can be thus explained. Its growth and general\nformation may be the result of material and mechanical causes, but not\nso the design and purpose evident in the similarity, to the smallest\ndetail, of the individuals of a species, even when the mixture is not\nidentical. There is no doubt that there is wisdom here working with a\npurpose. This is soul. There is another argument based upon the visible\nresults of other mixtures which exhibit properties that cannot be\nremotely compared with the functions we attribute to the soul. The\nanimal and the plant exhibit activities far beyond anything present in\nthe simple elements of the mixture. There must therefore be in animals\nand plants something additional to the elements of the mixture. This\nextra thing resides in the composite of which it forms a part, for\nwithout it the animal or plant is no longer what it is. Hence as the\nlatter is substance, that which forms a part of it is also substance;\nfor accident, as Aristotle says, is that which resides _in_ a thing but\nnot as forming a part of it.\n\nWe have now shown that the soul is substance and not accident. We must\nstill make clear in which of the four senses of the Aristotelian\nsubstance the soul is to be regarded. By the theory of exclusion Ibn\nDaud decides that the soul is substance in the sense in which we apply\nthat term to \"form.\" The form appears upon the common matter and\n\"specifies\" it, and makes it what it is, bringing it from potentiality\nto actuality. It is also the efficient and final cause of the body. The\nbody exists for the sake of the soul, in order that the soul may attain\nits perfection through the body. As the most perfect body in the lower\nworld is the human body, and it is for the sake of the soul, it follows\nthat the existence of the sublunar world is for the sake of the human\nsoul, that it may be purified and made perfect by science and moral\nconduct.\n\nWhile we have proved that soul is not mixture nor anything like it, it\nis nevertheless true that the kind of soul bestowed upon a given body\ndepends upon the state of the mixture in the elementary qualities of\nthat body. Thus we have the three kinds of soul, vegetative, animal and\nhuman or rational. We need not follow Ibn Daud in his detailed\ndescriptions of the functions of the several kinds of soul, as there is\nlittle that is new and that we have not already met in Joseph Ibn Zaddik\nand Judah Halevi. Avicenna (Ibn Sina) is the common source for Halevi\nand Ibn Daud, and the description of the inner senses is practically\nidentical in the two, with the slight difference that Halevi attributes\nto the \"common sense\" the two functions which are divided in Ibn Daud\nbetween the common sense and the power of representation.\n\nThe soul is not eternal. It was created and bestowed upon body. When a\nbody comes into being, the character of its mixture determines that a\nsoul of a certain kind shall be connected with it. The other\nalternatives are (1) that the soul existed independently before the\nbody, is then connected with the body and dies with the death of the\nlatter; or (2) it remains after the death of the body. The first\nalternative is impossible; because if the soul is connected with the\nbody in order to die with it, its union is an injury to the soul, for in\nits separate existence it was free from the defects of matter. The\nsecond alternative is equally impossible; for if the soul was able to\nexist without the body before the appearance of the latter and after its\nextinction, of what use is its connection with the body? Far from being\nof any benefit, its union with the body is harmful to the soul, for it\nis obliged to share in the corporeal accidents. Divine wisdom never does\nanything without a purpose.\n\nThe truth is that the soul does not exist before the body. It arises at\nthe same time as, and in connection with body, realizing and actualizing\nthe latter. Seed and sperm have in them the possibility of becoming\nplant and animal respectively. But they need an agent to bring to\nactuality what is in them potentially. This agent--an angel or a sphere,\nor an angel using a sphere as its instrument--bestows forms upon bodies,\nwhich take the places of the previous forms the bodies had. The sphere\nor star produces these forms (or souls) by means of its motions, which\nmotions ultimately go back to the first incorporeal mover, by whose\nwisdom forms are connected with bodies in order to perfect the former by\nmeans of the latter.\n\nNow the human soul has the most important power of all other animals,\nthat of grasping intelligibles or universals. It is also able to\ndiscriminate between good and evil in conduct, moral, political and\neconomic. The human soul, therefore, has, it seems, two powers,\n_theoretical_ and _practical_. With the former it understands the simple\nsubstances, known as angels in the Bible and as \"secondary causes\" and\n\"separate intelligences\" among the philosophers. By this means the soul\nrises gradually to its perfection. With the practical reason it attends\nto noble and worthy conduct. All the other powers of the soul must be\nobedient to the behests of the practical reason. This in turn is\nsubservient to the theoretical, putting its good qualities at the\ndisposition of the speculative reason, and thus helping it to come into\ncloser communion with the simple substances, the angels and God. This is\nthe highest power there is in the _world of nature_.\n\nWe must now show that the rational power in man is neither itself body\nnor is it a power residing in a corporeal subject. That it is not itself\nbody is quite evident, for we have proved that the lower souls too,\nthose of animals and plants, are not corporeal. But we must show\nconcerning the rational power that it is independent of body in its\nactivity. This we can prove in various ways. One is by considering the\nobject and content of the reason. Man has general ideas or universal\npropositions. These are not divisible. An idea cannot be divided into\ntwo halves or into parts. Reason in action consists of ideas. Now if\nreason is a power residing in a corporeal subject, it would be divisible\nlike the latter. Take heat as an example. Heat is a corporeal power,\n_i. e._, a power residing in a body. It extends through the dimensions of\nthe body, and as the latter is divided so is the former. But this is\nevidently not true of general ideas, such as that a thing cannot both be\nand not be, that the whole is greater than its part, and so on. Hence\nthe rational power is independent of body.\n\nIbn Daud gives several other proofs, taken from Aristotle and Avicenna,\nto show that reason is independent, but we cannot reproduce them all\nhere. We shall, however, name one more which is found in the \"De Anima\"\nof Aristotle and is based on experience. If the reason performed its\nthinking by means of a corporeal organ like the external senses, the\npower of knowing would be weakened when confronted with a difficult\nsubject, and would thereby be incapacitated from exercising its powers\nas before. This is the case with the eye, which is dazzled by a bright\nlight and cannot see at all, or the ear, which cannot hear at all when\ndeafened by a loud noise. But the case of knowledge is clearly\ndifferent. The more difficult the subject the more is the power of the\nreason developed in exercising itself therein. And in old age, when the\ncorporeal organs are weakened, the power of reason is strongest.\n\nAlthough it is thus true that the rational soul is independent of the\nbody, nevertheless it did not exist before the body any more than the\nlower souls. For if it did, it was either one soul for all men, or there\nwere as many souls as there are individual men. The first is impossible;\nfor the same soul would then be wise and ignorant, good and bad, which\nis impossible. Nor could the separate souls be different, for being all\nhuman souls they cannot differ in essence, which is their common\nhumanity. But neither can they differ in accidental qualities, for\nsimple substances have no accidents. They cannot therefore be either one\nor many, _i. e._, they cannot be at all before body.\n\nNor must we suppose because the reason exercises its thought functions\nwithout the use of a corporeal organ that it appears full fledged in\nactual perfection in the person of the infant. Experience teaches\notherwise. The perfections of the human soul are in the child potential.\nLater on by divine assistance he acquires the first principles of\nknowledge about which there is no dispute, such as that two things equal\nto the same thing are equal to each other, that two contrary predicates\ncannot apply to the same subject at the same time in the same relation,\nand so on. Some of these are the fundamental principles of mathematics,\nothers of other sciences. Then he progresses further and learns to make\npremises and construct syllogisms and argue from the known to the\nunknown. We have thus three stages in the development of the reason. The\nfirst potential stage is known as the _hylic_ or _potential intellect_.\nThe second is known as the _actual intellect_, and the third is the\n_acquired intellect_. If not for the body the person could not make this\nprogress. For without body there are no senses, and without senses he\nwould not see how the wine in the barrel ferments and increases in\nvolume, which suggests that quantity is accident and body is substance.\nNor would he learn the distinction between quality and substance if he\ndid not observe a white garment turning black, or a hot body becoming\ncold. There is need therefore of the body with its senses to lead to a\nknowledge of the universals. But this knowledge once acquired, the soul\nneeds not the body for its subsequent existence; and as the soul is not\na corporeal power, the death of the body does not cause the extinction\nof the soul.\n\nSome think that because the soul is the form of the body it is dependent\nupon it and cannot survive it, as no other form survives its substance.\nBut this inference is not valid. For if the human soul is included in\nthe statement that no form survives its matter, we assume what we want\nto prove, and there is no need of the argument. If it is not as a matter\nof fact included, because it is the question at issue, its comparison\nwith the other observed cases is simply a matter of opinion and not\ndecisive.\n\nThe reader will see that the problem of the rational soul gave Ibn Daud\nmuch concern and trouble. The pre-existence of the soul as Plato teaches\nit did not appeal to him for many reasons, not the least among them\nbeing the statement in Genesis (2, 7), \"And God breathed into his\nnostrils the breath of life,\" which seems to favor the idea of the soul\noriginating with the body; though, to be sure, a harmless verse of this\nkind would not have stood in his way, had he had reason to favor the\ndoctrine of pre-existence. Immortality was also a dogma which he dared\nnot deny. The arguments against it seemed rather strong. From the\ndoctrine of the soul's origin with the body and its being fitted to the\nmaterial composition of the latter, would seem to follow the soul's\nextinction with the death of the body. The same result was apparently\ndemanded by the observation that the intellect develops as the body\nmatures, and that without the senses and their data there would be no\nintellect at all. The fluctuation of intellectual strength with the\nstate of bodily health would seem to tend to the same end, against the\ndoctrine of immortality. Moreover, the Aristotelian definition of the\nsoul as the entelechy or form of the body, if it applies to the rational\nfaculty as well as to the lower powers, implies necessarily that it is a\nform like other forms and disappears with the dissolution of its\nsubstance. To avoid all these pitfalls Ibn Daud insists upon the\nincorporeal character of the reason's activity, _i. e._, its independence\nof any corporeal organ, and its increasing power in old age despite the\ngradual weakening of the body. He admits that its development is\ndependent on the data of sense perception, but insists that this is not\nincompatible with its freedom from the body when fully developed and\nperfected. As for its being a form of body, not all forms are alike; and\nit is not so certain that the rational power is a form of body. Neither\nthe difficulties nor the solution are of Ibn Daud's making. They are as\nold as Aristotle, and his successors grappled with them as best they\ncould.\n\nThere is still the question of the manner of the soul's survival. The\nsame reasons which Ibn Daud brings forward against the possibility of\nthe existence of many souls before the body, apply with equal cogency to\ntheir survival after death. If simple substances having a common essence\ncannot differ either in essence or in accident, the human souls after\nthe death of the body must exist as one soul, and what becomes of\n_individual_ immortality, which religion promises? Ibn Daud has not a\nword to say about this, and it is one of the weak points religiously in\nhis system as well as in that of Maimonides, which the critics and\nopponents of the latter did not fail to observe.\n\nBefore leaving the problem of the soul Ibn Daud devotes a word to\nshowing that metempsychosis is impossible. The soul of man is suited to\nthe character of his elemental mixture, which constitutes the\nindividuality of his body. Hence every individual's body has its own\npeculiar soul. A living person cannot therefore have in him a soul\nwhich formerly resided in a different body unless the two bodies are\nidentical in all respects. But in that case it is not transmigration but\nthe re-appearance of the same person after he has ceased to be. But this\nhas never yet happened.\n\nFinally Ibn Daud finds it necessary to defend the Bible against those\nwho criticize the Jews on the ground that there is no mention of the\nfuture world and the existence of the soul after death in the Biblical\nwritings. All the rewards and punishments spoken of in the Bible, they\nsay, refer to this world. His answer offers nothing new. Judah Halevi\nhad already tried to account for this phenomenon, besides insisting that\naltogether devoid of allusion to the future world the Bible is not. Ibn\nDaud follows in Halevi's footsteps (_cf._ above, p. 170).[236]\n\nAbraham Ibn Daud closes the first, the purely scientific part of his\ntreatise, by a discussion of the heavenly spheres and their motions. In\naccordance with the view of Aristotle, which was shared by the majority\nof writers throughout the middle ages, he regards the spheres with their\nstars as living beings, and their motions as voluntary, the result of\nwill and purpose, and not simply \"natural,\" _i. e._, due to an\nunconscious force within them called nature. One of his arguments to\nprove this is derived from the superiority of the heavenly bodies to our\nown. Their size, their brightness and their continued duration are all\nevidence of corporeal superiority. And it stands to reason that as the\nhuman body, which is the highest in the sublunar world, has a soul that\nis nobler than that of plant or animal, so the heavenly bodies must be\nendowed with souls as much superior to the human intellect as their\nbodies are to the human body. The Bible alludes to this truth in the\nnineteenth Psalm, \"The heavens declare the glory of God.... There is no\nspeech nor language....\" The last expression signifies that they praise\nGod with the intellect. There are other passages in the Bible besides,\nand particularly the first chapter of Ezekiel, which make it clear that\nthe heavenly bodies are living and intelligent beings; not, to be sure,\nin the sense of taking nourishment and growing and reproducing their\nkind and making use of five senses, but in the sense of performing\nvoluntary motions and being endowed with intellect.[237]\n\nWe have now concluded our preliminary discussion of the scientific\nprinciples lying at the basis of Judaism. And our next task is to study\nthe fundamental doctrines of Jewish theology which form the highest\nobject of knowledge, dealing as they do with God and his attributes and\nhis revelation. The first thing to prove then is the existence of God,\nsince we cannot define him. For definition means the designation of the\ngenus or class to which the thing defined belongs, whereas God cannot be\nput in a class. As the essence of a thing is revealed by its definition,\nwe cannot know God's essence and are limited to a knowledge of his\nexistence.\n\nThe principles for this proof we have already given. They are that a\nthing cannot move itself, and that an actual infinite series is\nimpossible. The argument then proceeds as follows: Nothing can move\nitself, hence everything that moves is moved by something other than\nitself. If this is also moving, it must be moved by a third, and so on\n_ad infinitum_. But an actual infinite series of things moving and being\nmoved is impossible, and unless we ultimately arrive at a first link in\nthis chain, all motion is impossible. Hence there must be a first to\naccount for the motion we observe in the world. This first must not\nitself be subject to motion, for it would then have to have another\nbefore it to make it move, and it would not be the first we supposed it\nto be. We have thus proved, therefore, the existence of a _primum movens\nimmobile_, a first unmoved mover.\n\nWe must now show that this unmoved mover is incorporeal. This we can\nprove by means of another principle of physics, made clear in the first\npart. We showed there that a finite body cannot have an infinite power.\nBut God is infinite. For, being immovable, his power is not affected by\ntime. Hence God cannot be body.\n\nThis proof, as we said before, is new in Jewish philosophy. In Bahya we\nfound a proof which bears a close resemblance to this one (_cf._ above,\np. 87); but the difference is that Bahya argues from being, Ibn Daud\nfrom motion. Bahya says if a thing is, some cause must have made it to\nbe, for a thing cannot make itself. As we cannot proceed _ad infinitum_,\nthere must be a first which is the cause of the existence of everything\nelse. The objection here, of course, is that if a thing cannot make\nitself, how did the first come to be.\n\nThe Aristotelian proof of Ibn Daud knows nothing about the origin of\nbeing. As far as Aristotle's own view is concerned there is no\n_temporal_ beginning either of being or of motion. Both are eternal, and\nso is matter, the basis of all genesis and change. God is the eternal\ncause of the eternal motion of the world, and hence of the eternal\ngenesis and dissolution, which constitutes the life of the sublunar\nworld. How to reconcile the idea of eternal time and eternal motion with\nthe doctrine that an actual infinite is impossible we shall see when we\ntreat Maimondes (p. 251). Ibn Daud does not adopt eternity of motion\neven hypothetically, as Maimonides does. But this merely removes the\ndifficulty one step. For the infinity which is regarded impossible in\nphenomena is placed in God. But another more serious objection is the\nadoption of an Aristotelian argument where it does not suit. For the\nargument from motion does not give us a creator but a first mover. For\nAristotle there is no creator, and his proof is adequate. But for Ibn\nDaud it is decidedly inadequate. We are so far minus a proof that God is\na creator _ex nihilo_. Ibn Daud simply asserts that God created matter,\nbut this argument does not prove it. As to the incorporeality of God\nAristotle can prove it adequately from the eternity of motion. If a\nfinite body (and there is no such thing as an infinite body) cannot have\nan infinite power, God, whose causing eternal motion argues infinite\npower, is not a body. Ibn Daud's attempt to prove God's infinity without\nthe theory of infinite motion on the ground that time cannot affect what\nis immovable, is decidedly less satisfactory. On the whole then this\nadoption of Aristotle's argument from motion is not helpful, as it leads\nto eternity of matter, and God as the mover rather than the Creator.\nGersonides was frank enough and bold enough to recognize this\nconsequence and to adopt it. We shall see Maimonides's attitude when we\ncome to treat of his philosophy.\n\nIbn Daud may have been aware of the inadequacy of his argument from\nmotion, and therefore he adds another, based upon the distinction\nbetween the \"possible existent\" and the \"necessary existent\"--a\ndistinction and an argument due to Alfarabi and Avicenna. A possible\nexistent is a thing whose existence depends upon another, and was\npreceded by non-existence. It may exist or not, depending upon its\ncause; hence the name _possible_ existent. A necessary existent is one\nwhose existence is in itself and not derived from elsewhere. It is a\nnecessary existent because its own essence cannot be thought without\ninvolving existence. Now the question is, Is there such a thing as a\nnecessary existent, or are all existents merely possible? If all\nexistents are possible, we have an infinite series, every link of which\nis dependent for its existence upon the link preceding it; and so long\nas there is no first there is nothing to explain the existence of any\nlink in the chain. We must therefore assume a first, which is itself not\nagain dependent upon a cause prior to it. This is by definition a\nnecessary existent, which is the cause of the existence of everything\nelse. This proof is compatible with God as a Creator.\n\nHaving shown the existence and incorporeality of God we must now prove\nhis unity. We shall base this proof upon the idea of the necessary\nexistent. Such an existent cannot have in it any multiplicity; for if it\nhas, its own essence would not be able to keep the elements together,\nand there would be need of an external agent to do this. But in this\ncase the object would be dependent upon something else, which is\nincompatible with the idea of a necessary existent.\n\nNor is it possible there should be two necessary existents; for the\nnecessary existent, we have just shown, must be of the utmost\nsimplicity, and hence cannot have any attribute added to its essence.\nNow if there is a second, there must be something by which the first\ndiffers from the second, or they are identical. Either the first or the\nsecond therefore would not be completely simple, and hence not a\nnecessary existent.\n\nWe have thus shown that God is one both in the sense of simple and in\nthe sense of unique. To have a clear insight into the nature of his\nunity, we must now show that nothing else outside of God is really one,\nthough we apply the term one to many things. No one will claim that a\ncollective is one; but neither is an individual really one, for an\nindividual man, for example, consists of many organs. You might think\nthat a homogeneous and continuous elementary mass like air or water is\none. But this is not true either, for everything that is corporeal is\ncomposed of matter and form. If then we set aside corporeal objects and\naim to find real unity in mathematical entities like line and surface,\nwhich are not corporeal, we are met with the difficulty that line and\nsurface are divisible, and hence potentially multiple. But neither are\nthe simple intellectual substances, like the angels, true ones; for they\nare composed of their own possible existence and the necessary\nexistence they acquire from another. The only being therefore that may\nbe a true one is that which is not corporeal and not dependent upon\nanother for its existence.\n\nConsidering the question of unity from a different aspect, in its\nrelation, namely, to the thing designated as one, we find that unity\nnever forms the essence of anything called by that name; but is in every\ncase an accident. Thus if it were the essence of man as man that he is\none, there could not on the one hand be many men, and on the other there\ncould not also at the same time be one horse, one tree, one stone. In\nGod his unity cannot be an accident, since as simple he has no\naccidents. Hence his unity is his essence. And if we examine the matter\ncarefully we find that it is a negative concept. It involves two things.\nFirst, that every other unity involves plurality in some form or\nanother. And second that being unlike anything else, he cannot bear\nhaving other things associated with him to make the result many, as we\ncan in the case of man. A, for example, is one; and with B, C, and D he\nbecomes many. This is not applicable to God.[238]\n\nThe divine attributes form the next topic we must consider. Here Ibn\nDaud offers little or nothing that is essentially new. He admits neither\nessential nor accidental attributes, for either would bring plurality\nand composition in the nature of God. The only attributes he admits are\nnegative and relative. When we speak of God as cause we do not place any\nspecial entity in his essence, but merely indicate the dependence of\nthings upon him. The truest attributes are the negative, such as that he\nis not body, that his existence is not dependent upon another, and so\non; the only difficulty being that negative attributes, though removing\nmany doubts, do not give us any positive information. All the\nanthropomorphic attributes in the Bible endowing God with human\nfunctions like sleeping and waking, or ascribing to him human limbs,\neyes, ears, hands, feet, etc., must be understood metaphorically. For\nthe Bible itself warns us against corporealizing God, \"Take ye therefore\ngood heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of form on the day that\nthe Lord spake unto you in Horeb\" (Deut. 4, 15). When the Bible speaks\nof God's anger and favor, the meaning is that good deeds bring man near\nto God and cause happiness which is known as paradise (\"Gan Eden\"), and\nbad deeds remove far away from God and lead to misfortune, called\nGehenna. It is like the apparent motion of the trees and the mountains\nto the traveller, when in reality it is he that is moving. So here God\nis said to approach and depart, to be angry with and favor, when in\nreality it is man who by his deeds comes near to God or departs far from\nhim. When we assign many attributes to God we do not mean that there is\nany multiplicity in his nature. This cannot be. It is like the case of a\nman whose eyes are not properly co-ordinated. He sees double when there\nis only one. So we too suffer from intellectual squinting, when we seem\nto see many attributes in the one God.\n\nThe most common and most important attributes are the following eight:\nOne, existent, true, eternal, living, knowing, willing, able. It can be\neasily shown (and Ibn Daud does proceed to show, though we shall not\nfollow him in his details) that all these are at bottom negative. Unity\nmeans that there is nothing like him and that he is indivisible. Eternal\nmeans he is not subject to change or motion. True means he will never\ncease existing and that his existence does not come from another, and so\non with the rest.\n\nHe closes his discussion of the attributes by intimating that he has\nmore to say on this topic, but had better be content with what has been\nsaid so far, for a more thorough discussion of these matters in a book\nmight do harm to those who do not understand and interpret the author's\nwords incorrectly. This reminds us of Maimonides's adjuration of the\nreader to keep what he finds in the \"Guide of the Perplexed\" to himself\nand not to spread it abroad. Philosophy clearly was a delicate subject\nand not meant for intellectual babes, whose intellectual digestion might\nbe seriously disturbed.[239]\n\nWe have now concluded our theory of God and his attributes; and in doing\nso we made use of principles of physics, such as matter and form,\npotentiality and actuality, motion and infinity. The next step is to\nprove the existence and nature of intermediate spiritual beings between\nGod and the corporeal objects of the superlunar and sublunar worlds,\ncalled angels in the Bible, and secondary causes by the philosophers.\nFor this purpose we shall have to apply the principles we have proved\nconcerning the soul and the motions of the heavenly bodies. We have\nproved above that the human soul is at first in the child intelligent\npotentially and then becomes intelligent actually. This requires an\nagent, in whom the end to which the potential is proceeding is always\nactual. As the rational soul is neither body nor a corporeal power, this\nactual agent cannot be either of these, hence it is neither a sphere nor\nthe soul of a sphere, but it must be a simple substance called _Active\nIntellect_. The prophets call it \"Holy Spirit\" (\"Ruah Ha-Kodesh\"). We\nthus have a proof of the existence of at least one such simple\nintellectual substance, or angel, the relation of which to the human\nsoul is as that of light to vision. Without light vision is potential,\nlight makes it actual. So the active intellect makes the potential soul\nactual and gives it first the axioms, which are universally certain, and\nhence could not have originated by induction from experience.\n\nSimilarly we can prove the existence of other simple substances from the\nmotions of the heavenly spheres. We have already shown that the spheres\nare living beings and endowed with souls. But souls, while causing\nmotion in their bodies are at the same time themselves in a sort of\npsychic motion. This must be caused by unmoved movers, or intellects,\nwho are also the causes of the souls. To make this difficult matter\nsomewhat clearer and more plausible, we may instance an analogy from\nfamiliar experience. A ship is made by the shipbuilder, who is its\ncorporeal cause. But there is also an incorporeal cause, likewise a\nship, _viz._, the ship in the mind of the shipbuilder. The analogy is\nimperfect, because the incorporeal ship in the mind of the builder\ncannot produce an actual corporeal ship without the builder employing\nmaterial, such as wood, iron, etc., and in addition to that expending\ntime and physical exertion on the material. But if he had the power to\ngive the form of a ship to the material as soon as the latter was\nprepared for it without time and physical manipulation, we should have\nan instance of what we want to prove, namely, the existence of simple\nimmaterial substances causing forms to emanate upon corporeal\nexistences. This is the nature of the active intellect in its relation\nto the soul of man, and it is in the same way that the philosophers\nconceive of the motions of the heavenly spheres. God is the first\nunmoved mover. The angels or simple substances stand next to him; and\nthey, too, are always actual intelligences, and move the heavenly bodies\nas the object of love and desire moves the object loving it without\nitself being moved. The heavenly bodies move therefore because of a\ndesire to perfect themselves, or to become like unto their movers.\n\nSo far Ibn Daud agrees with the philosophers, because the doctrines so\nfar expounded are not incompatible with the Bible. But when the\nphilosophers raise the question, How can the many originate from the\nOne, the manifold universe from the one God, and attempt to answer it by\ntheir theory of successive emanations, Ibn Daud calls a halt. The human\nmind is not really so all-competent as to be able to answer all\nquestions of the most difficult nature. The doctrine of successive\nemanations is that elaborated by Alfarabi and Avicenna, which we have\nalready seen quoted and criticized by Judah Halevi (_cf._ above, p. 178\nf.). It is slightly more complicated in Ibn Daud, who speaks of the\ntreble nature of the emanations after the first Intelligence--an\nintelligence, a soul and a sphere--whereas in Halevi's account there\nwere only two elements, the soul not being mentioned.[240]\n\nWe have so far dealt with the more theoretical part of theology and\nreligion, so much of it as may be and is accepted by nations and\nreligions other than Jews. It remains now to approach the more practical\nand the more specifically Jewish phases of religion; though in the\npurely ethical discussions and those relating to Providence we have once\nmore a subject of general application, and not exclusively Jewish.\n\nAs the introduction to this second part of the subject, Abraham Ibn Daud\ndevotes a few words to the theoretical defence of tradition, or rather\nof mediate knowledge. He does so by analyzing the various kinds of\nknowledge. Knowledge, he says, is either intelligible or sensible.\nSensible knowledge is either directly perceived by the subject or\nreceived by him from another who perceived it directly, and whom he\nbelieves or not as the case may be. That is why some things believed by\nsome people are not believed by others. The ignorant may think that this\nweakness is inherent in matters received from others. As a matter of\nfact such indirect knowledge is at the basis of civilization and makes\nit possible. If every man were to judge only by what he sees with his\nown eyes, society could never get along; there would be no way of\nobtaining justice in court, for the judge would not put credence in\nwitnesses, and the parties would have to fight out their differences,\nwhich would lead to bloodshed and the disruption of social life. The\ndifferent attitude of different persons to a given matter of belief is\ndue not necessarily to the uncertainty of the thing itself, but to the\nmanner in which the object of the belief came down to us. If a thing\nrests upon the testimony of one man, its warrant is not very strong. But\nif a whole nation witnessed an event, it is no longer doubtful, unless\nwe suppose that the account itself is due to one writer, and the event\nnever happened. We shall discuss these matters in the sequel.[241]\n\nHaving justified in a general way the knowledge derived from the\ntestimony of others by showing that society could not exist without\ndepending upon such knowledge; though admitting at the same time that\ncaution should be exercised and criticism in determining what\ntraditional testimony is valid or not, we now take up one of these\ntraditional phenomena which plays perhaps the most important r\u00f4le in\nJewish theology, namely, the phenomenon of prophecy. Before discussing\nthe traditional aspect of this institution and its purpose in the\nhistory of religion we must consider it from its natural and\npsychological aspect.\n\nThe explanation of Ibn Daud--it was not original with him, as we have\nalready seen the non-religious philosopher in Halevi's Cusari giving\nutterance to the same idea, and in Jewish philosophy Israeli touches on\nit--the explanation of Ibn Daud is grounded in his psychology, the\nAristotelian psychology of Avicenna. The first degree of prophecy, he\nsays, is found in true dreams, which happen to many people. Just as\nwaking is a state of the body in which it uses the external as well as\nthe internal senses, so sleeping is a state of the body in which the\nsoul suppresses the external senses by putting them to sleep, and\nexercises its \"natural\" powers only, such as the beating of the heart\npulse, respiration, and so on. The internal senses are also at work\nduring sleep, or at least some of them. In particular the power of\nimagination is active when the external senses are at rest. It then\nmakes various combinations and separations and brings them to the common\nsense. The result is a dream, true or false. When the senses are weak\nfor one reason or another this power becomes active and, when not\ncontrolled by the reason, produces a great many erroneous visions and\nideas, as in the delusions of the sick.\n\nThe Deity and the angels and the Active Intellect have a knowledge of\nthe past, present and future, and we already know that the soul, _i. e._,\nthe rational soul, receives influence from the Active Intellect as\na natural thing in every person. Now just as it gets from it science and\ngeneral ideas, so it may receive a knowledge of hidden things if the\nsoul is adequately prepared. The reason it cannot receive information of\nhidden things from the Active Intellect in its waking state, is because\nthe soul is then busy in acquiring knowledge through the senses. In\nsleep, too, it may be prevented by the thick vapors rising from the food\nconsumed during the day, or by anxiety due to want of food or drink. The\nimagination also sometimes hinders this process by the constant\npresentation of its foolish combinations to the common sense. But\nsometimes this power comes under the control of the reason, and then the\nrational soul is prepared to receive hidden things from the Active\nIntellect. In those cases the imagination transforms these facts into\nimages, which are true dreams. If they concern an individual or a\nparticular event, we do not call them prophecy, or at least the share of\nprophecy they may have is very small. We call them prophetic dreams when\nthey concern important matters and have reference to a whole nation or\nnations, and come to pass in the distant future. An example of such a\ndream is that recorded in Daniel 7, 1.\n\nSometimes the information comes to the prophet without the aid of an\nimage, when the reason prevails over the imagination, like the dream of\nAbraham at the \"covenant of the pieces\" (Gen. 15, 12ff.). Sometimes,\nalso, the activity of the senses does not prevent the prophet from\nseeing the hidden things of the future, and he receives prophetic\ninspirations while awake. The prophet sometimes faints as he is overcome\nby the unusual phenomenon, at other times he succeeds in enduring it\nwithout swooning. All these cases can be illustrated from the Bible, and\nexamples will readily occur to the reader who is familiar with the\nvarious instances and descriptions of prophetic visions and activities\nin Scripture.\n\nThe purpose of prophecy is to guide the people in the right way. With\nthis end in view God inspires a proper man as a prophet and gives him\nsuperior powers to perform miracles. Not every man is capable of\nprophecy, only one who has a pure soul. For the most part the prophetic\ngift is innate, at the same time study and good associations help to\ndevelop this power in him who has it. Witness the \"company of prophets,\"\nwhose example inspired Saul (1 Sam. 19, 20), and Elisha as the disciple\nof Elijah.\n\nWhile we thus see Ibn Daud, unlike Halevi, adopting the philosophical\nexplanation of prophecy, which tries to bring it within the class of\nnatural psychological phenomena and relates it to dreams, he could not\nhelp recognizing that one cannot ignore the supernatural character of\nBiblical prophecy without being untrue to the Bible. He accordingly adds\nto the above naturalistic explanation a number of conditions which\npractically have the effect of taking the bottom out of the\npsychological theory. If Judah Halevi insists that only Israelites in\nthe land of Palestine and at the time of their political independence\nhad the privilege of the prophetic gift, we realize that such a belief\nis of the warp and woof of Halevi's innermost sentiment and thinking,\nwhich is radically opposed to the shallow rationalism and superficial\ncosmopolitanism of the \"philosophers\" of his day. But when the champion\nof Peripateticism, Abraham Ibn Daud, after explaining that prophecy is\nof the nature of true dreams, and though in most cases innate, may be\ncultivated by a pure soul through study and proper associations--repeats\nwith Judah Halevi that the time and the place are essential conditions\nand that Israelites alone are privileged in this respect, he is giving\nup, it seems to us, all that he previously attempted to explain. This is\nonly one of the many indications which point to the essential\nartificiality of all the medi\u00e6val attempts to harmonize a given system\nof philosophy with a supernaturalistic standpoint, such as is that of\nthe Bible. It is not in this way that the Bible is to be saved if it\nneeds saving.[242]\n\nThe next practical question Ibn Daud felt called upon to discuss was\nthat of the possibility of the Law being repealed, abrogated or altered.\nThis he found it necessary to do in order to defend the Jewish\nstandpoint against that of Christianity in particular. How he will\nanswer this question is of course a foregone conclusion. We are only\ninterested in his manner of argument. He adopts a classification of long\nstanding of the Biblical laws into rational and traditional. The first,\nhe says, are accepted by all nations and can never be changed. Even a\nband of thieves, who disregard all laws of right and wrong as they\nrelate to outsiders, must observe them in their own midst or they\ncannot exist. These laws bring people of different nationalities and\nbeliefs together, and hence there can be no change in these. Nor can\nthere be any alteration in that part of the Law which is historical in\ncontent. An event of the past cannot be repealed.\n\nIt only remains therefore to see whether abrogation may possibly be\ncompatible with the nature of the traditional or ceremonial laws.\nWithout arguing like the philosophers that change of a divine law is\nincompatible with the nature of God, which is unchangeable, our sages\nnevertheless have a method of explaining such phrases as, \"And it\nrepented the Lord that he had made man\" (Gen. 6, 6), so as to reconcile\nthe demands of reason with those of tradition. Now if there were laws of\nthe traditional kind stated in the Bible without any indication of time\nand without the statement that they are eternal, and afterwards other\nlaws came to change them, we should say that the Lord has a certain\npurpose in his laws which we do not know, but which is revealed in the\nnew law taking the place of the old. But as a matter of fact the Bible\nstates explicitly in many cases that the laws are not to be changed, \"A\nstatute for ever throughout your generations\" (Num. 10, 8, and\n_passim_). Arguments from phrases like, \"Your new moons and your\nappointed feasts my soul hateth, etc.\" (Is. 1, 14), have no validity,\nfor there is no indication here that sacrifices are abolished. The\nmeaning of Isaiah is that sacrifices in conjunction with wrong living\nare undesirable.\n\nOur opponents also argue that Biblical expressions to the effect that\nthe laws are eternal prove nothing, for we know of similar instances in\nwhich promises have been withdrawn as in the priesthood of Eli's family\nand the royalty of the house of David, where likewise eternity is\nmentioned. We answer these by saying, first, that in David's case the\npromise was withdrawn only temporarily, and will return again, as the\nProphets tell us. Besides the promise was made only conditionally, as\nwas that made to Eli. But there is no statement anywhere that the Law is\ngiven to Israel conditionally and that it will ever be taken away from\nthem.\n\nThe claim of those who say that the laws of the Old Testament were true,\nbut that they were repealed and the New Testament took its place, we\nmeet by pointing to a continuous tradition against their view. We have\nan uninterrupted tradition during two thousand four hundred and\nseventy-two years that there was a man Moses who gave a Law accepted by\nhis people and held without any break for two thousand four hundred and\nseventy-two years. We do not have to prove he was a genuine prophet\nsince they do not deny it.\n\nSome of them say that in the captivity in Babylon the old Law was\nforgotten and Ezra made a new law, the one we have now. This is absurd.\nThe law could not have been forgotten, for the people did not all go\ninto captivity at one time. They were not all put to death; they were\nled into exile in a quiet fashion, and there were great men among them\nlike Hananiah, Mishael, Azariah, Daniel and others who surely could not\nhave forgotten the Law. Besides Ezra could never have had the consent of\nall the people scattered everywhere if he had made a law of his own. As\na matter of fact the Law as we have it is the same in all details\nthroughout the world.[243]\n\nThe next problem we must consider is the perennial one--the problem of\nevil and of freedom. It is the purpose of the entire book, as Ibn Daud\ntells us in his introduction.\n\nThe further a thing is removed from matter the more perfect is its\nknowledge. For, as we have already said, it is matter that hinders\nknowledge. All defect and evil is the result of the potential. Hence the\nfarther a thing is removed from potentiality the more perfect it is and\nthe freer it is from defect. God's essence is the most perfect thing\nthere is; and as he knows his essence, his is the most perfect\nknowledge. God knows, too, that his perfection is not stationary in him,\nbut that it extends and communicates itself to all other things in\norder. And the further a thing is from him the less is its perfection\nand the greater is its imperfection. We have thus a graduated series, at\none end the most perfect being, at the other the least perfect, _viz._,\nmatter.\n\nNow it is impossible from any point of view, either according to reason\nor Bible or tradition, that evil or defect should come from God. Not by\nreason, for two contradictories in the same subject are impossible. Now\nif good and evil both came from God, he would have to be composite just\nlike man, who can be the cause of good and evil, the one coming from his\nrational power, the other from the spirited or appetitive. But God is\nsimple and if evil comes from him, good cannot do so, which is absurd.\nBesides, the majority of defects are privational in character and not\npositive, like for example darkness, poverty, ignorance, and so on,\nwhich are not things, but the negations of light, wealth, wisdom,\nrespectively. Being negative, not positive, they are not _made_ by any\nbody.\n\nOne may argue that it is in the nature of man that he should have\nunderstanding and perfection; and if God deprives him of it, he does\nevil. The answer is that the evil in the world is very small in\ncomparison with the good. For evil and defect are found only in things\ncomposed of the elements, which have a common matter, receiving forms in\naccordance with the mixture of the elementary qualities in the matter.\nHere an external cause sometimes prevents the form from coming to the\nmatter in its perfection. The seed, for example, depends upon the\ncharacter of the soil which it finds for its growth. Now it does not\nfollow that God was bound to give things the highest perfection\npossible. For in that case all minerals would be plants, all plants\nanimals, all animals men, all men angels; and there would be no world,\nbut only God and a few of the highest angels. In order that there shall\nbe a world, it was necessary to make a graduated series as we actually\nhave it. And as a matter of fact the very defects in the material\ncomposites are a good when we have in view not the particular thing but\nthe whole. Thus if all men were of a highly intellectual type, there\nwould be no agriculture or manual labor.\n\nNow there are men whose temperament is such that they cannot distinguish\nbetween right and wrong, and they follow their inclinations. To\ncounteract these bad qualities God gave his commandments and warnings.\nThis shows that it is not impossible to oppose these evil tendencies,\nfor in that case the commandments would be useless. The acts of man come\nneither under the category of the _necessary_, nor under that of the\n_impossible_, but under the category of the _possible_.\n\nThere are two senses in which we may understand the term possible. A\nthing may be possible subjectively, _i. e._, in relation to our\nignorance, though objectively it may be necessary and determined. Thus\nwe in Spain do not know whether the king of Babylon died to-day or not;\nand so far as we are concerned, it is possible that he is dead or that\nhe is alive. In reality it is not a question of possibility but of\nnecessity. God knows which is true. The same thing applies to the\noccurrence of an eclipse in the future for the man who is ignorant of\nastronomy. Such possibility due to ignorance does not exist in God.\n\nBut there is another sense of the word possible; the sense in which an\nevent is objectively undetermined. An event is possible if there is\nnothing in the previous chain of causation to determine the thing's\nhappening in one way rather than another. The result is then a matter of\npure chance or of absolute free will. Now God may make a thing possible\nin this objective sense, and then it is possible for him also. If you\nask, but is God then ignorant of the result? We say, this is not\nignorance. For to assume that it is, and that everything should be\ndetermined like eclipses, and that God cannot create things _possible_,\nmeans to destroy the order of the world, of this world as well as the\nnext. For why shall man engage in various occupations or pursue definite\nlines of conduct since his destiny is already fixed?\n\nThe truth of the matter is that there are several orders of causes. Some\nare directly determined by God, and there is no way of evading them;\nothers are entrusted to nature, and man is able to enjoy its benefits\nand avoid its injuries by proper management. A third class contains the\nthings of chance, and one may guard against these also. So we are bidden\nin the Bible to make a parapet on the roofs of our houses to guard\nagainst the possibility of falling down. Finally there is the fourth\nclass, those things which depend upon the free choice of the individual.\nRight and wrong conduct are matters of choice, else there would be no\nuse in prophets, and no reward and punishment. When a person makes an\neffort to be good, his desire increases, and he obtains assistance from\nthe angels.\n\nSince freedom is supported by reason, Scripture and tradition, the\npassages in the Bible which are in favor of it should be taken\nliterally, and those against it should be interpreted figuratively. When\nthe Bible says that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, it means simply that\nPharaoh was allowed to proceed as he began. All the ancient sages of our\nnation were in favor of freedom.[244]\n\nIf we compare the above discussion of the problem of freedom with that\nof Judah Halevi (above, p. 171), we see that Ibn Daud is more\nconsistent, whatever we may think of his success in solving the\ninsoluble problem. He frankly insists on the absolute freedom of the\nwill and on the reality of the objectively contingent, not shrinking\nbefore the unavoidable conclusion that the events which are the results\nof such freedom or chance are no more known beforehand to God than they\nare to man. And he tries to avoid the criticism of attributing\nimperfection to God by insisting that not to be able to foretell the\ncontingent is not ignorance, and hence not an imperfection. The reader\nmay think what he pleases of this defence, but there seems to be a more\nserious difficulty in what this idea implies than in what it explicitly\nsays.\n\nIf the contingent exists for God also, it follows that he is not the\ncomplete master of nature and the world. To say as Ibn Daud does that\nGod made the contingent, _i. e._, made it to be contingent, sounds like\na contradiction, and reminds one of the question whether God can make a\nstone so big that he cannot lift it himself.\n\nHis proofs in favor of freedom and the contingent are partially\nidentical with those of Judah Halevi, but in so far as he does not\nexplicitly admit that the will may itself be influenced by prior causes\nhe evades, to be sure, the strongest argument against him, but he does\nso at the expense of completeness in his analysis. Halevi is less\nconsistent and more thorough, Ibn Daud is more consistent, because he\nfails to take account of real difficulties.\n\nIn the final outcome of their respective analyses, Halevi maintains\nGod's foreknowledge at the expense of absolute freedom, or rather he\ndoes not see that his admissions are fatal to the cause he endeavors to\ndefend. Ibn Daud maintains absolute freedom and frankly sacrifices\nforeknowledge; though his defence of freedom is secured by blinding\nhimself to the argument most dangerous to that doctrine.\n\nAbraham Ibn Daud concludes his \"Emunah Ramah\" by a discussion of ethics\nand the application of the principles thus discovered to the laws of the\nBible. He entitles this final division of his treatise, \"Medicine of the\nSoul,\" on the ground that virtue is the health of the soul as vice is\nits disease. In his fundamental ethical distinctions, definitions and\nclassifications he combines Plato's psychology and the virtues based\nthereon with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, which he also\napplies in detail. He omits wisdom as one of the Platonic virtues and,\nunlike Plato for whom justice consists in a harmony of the other three\nvirtues and has no psychological seat peculiar to it, Ibn Daud makes\njustice the virtue of the rational soul.\n\nThe end of practical philosophy is, he says, happiness. This is\nattained, first, by good morals; second, by proper family life; and\nthird, by means of correct social and political conduct.\n\nThe human soul consists of three principal faculties, vegetative,\nanimal, rational. Corresponding to these the principal virtues and vices\nare also three. The vegetative power, whose functions are nourishment,\ngrowth and reproduction, is related to appetite, and is called the\nappetitive soul. The animal power as being the cause of sensation,\nvoluntary motion, cruelty, revenge, mercy and kindness, is called the\nspirited soul, because these qualities are dependent upon the energy or\nweakness of the spirit. The rational power has two aspects. One is\ndirected upwards and is the means of our learning the sciences and the\narts. The other aspect is directed downwards, and endeavors to control\n(successfully or not as the case may be), the two lower powers of the\nsoul, guarding them against excess and defect. This function we call\nconduct, and virtue is the mean between the two extremes of too much and\ntoo little. The mean of the appetitive power is temperance; of the\nspirited power, bravery and gentleness; of the rational soul,\njustice.[245]\n\nJustice consists in giving everything its due without excess or defect.\nJustice is therefore the highest of all qualities, and is of value not\nmerely in a person's relations to his family and country, but also in\nthe relations of his powers one to another. The rational power must see\nto it that the two lower faculties of the soul get what is their due, no\nmore and no less. This quality has an important application also in the\nrelations of a man to his maker. It is just that a person should requite\nhis benefactor as much as he received from him, if possible. If he\ncannot do this, he should at least thank him. Hence the reason for\ndivine worship, the first of commandments. This quality, the greatest of\nmen possessed in the highest degree. Moses \"said to him that did the\nwrong, wherefore smitest thou thy fellow?\" (Ex. 2, 13). And when the\nshepherds came and drove away the daughters of the priest of Midian,\n\"Moses stood up and helped them, and watered their flock\" (_ib._ 17).\nThis is the reason why God sent him to deliver Israel.\n\nGod showed the care he had of his nation by revealing himself to them,\nand thus showing them the error of those who think that God gave over\nthe rule of this world to the stars, and that he and the angels have no\nfurther interest in it. Hence the first commandment is \"I am the Lord\nthy God,\" which is followed by \"You shall have no other gods,\" \"Thou\nshalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain\" (Ex. 20, 2ff.).\n\"Remember the Sabbath day\" is for the purpose of condemning the belief\nin the eternity of the world, as is evident from the conclusion, \"For in\nsix days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them\nis....\" (_ib._ 11). \"Honor thy father and thy mother\" (_ib._ 12) is\nintended to inculcate the duty of honoring the cause of one's being,\nincluding God. Thus the first five commandments all aim to teach the\nrevelation and Providence of God. The rest deal with social and\npolitical conduct, especially the last one, \"Thou shalt not covet,\"\nwhich is important in the preservation of society.\n\nThe commandment to love God involves the knowledge of God, for one\ncannot love what one does not know. A man must know therefore God's\nattributes and actions. He must be convinced likewise that no evil comes\nfrom God, or he cannot love him as he should. He may fear him but not\nwith the proper fear. For there are two kinds of fear, and the one that\nis commanded is fear of majesty and awe, not fear of punishment.\n\nDivine service means not merely prayer three times a day, but constant\nthought of God. To develop and train this thought of God in us we are\ncommanded to put on phylacteries and fringes, and to fasten the\n\"mezuzah\" to our door posts. For the same reason we celebrate the\nfestivals of Passover, Tabernacles, Hanukkah and Purim, as a remembrance\nof God's benefits to our people. All these observances are ultimately\nbased upon the duty of thanking our benefactor, which is part of\njustice, the highest of the virtues.\n\nAmong moral virtues we are also commanded to practice suppression of\nanger, and its inculcation is emphasized by making it a divine\nattribute, \"The Lord, the Lord, a God full of compassion and\ngracious....\" (Ex. 34, 6). Other virtues of the same kind are, not to\nrepay evil for evil, not to be jealous, to practice humility like Moses,\nand so on. In fact all the virtues laid down by ethical philosophers are\nfound better expressed in the Bible.\n\nIn respect to family virtues, we are bidden to care for and protect the\nmembers of our family, wife, children and slaves. Of social virtues we\nhave love of our neighbor, honesty in dealing, just weights and\nmeasures, prohibition of interest and of taking a pledge from the poor,\nreturning a find to the loser, and a host of other teachings.\n\nThere are, however, some of the traditional laws, the purpose of which\nis not known, especially the details of sacrifices and the like. In\nexplanation of these we must say that the law consists of a rule of life\ncomposed of several parts. First is belief; second, moral qualities;\nthird, family life; fourth, social and political life; fifth, the\ncommandments above referred to, which we shall characterize as dictated\nby divine wisdom, though we do not understand them. Not all the parts of\nthe Law are of the same order of value. The fundamental portion and the\nmost important is that dealing with belief. Next in importance are the\nlaws governing social and moral conduct, without which society is\nimpossible. That is why all nations agree about these; and there is\nhonesty even among thieves. The last class of commandments, whose\npurpose is not known, are the least in importance, as is clear also from\nstatements in the Bible, such as, \"I spake not unto your fathers, nor\ncommanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt,\nconcerning burnt offerings or sacrifices....\" (Jer. 7, 22). At the same\ntime we cannot deny that there are some reasons for their observance.\nThus sacrifice leads to repentance as a result of reflection, even if\nthe person does not confess his sin, as he is bidden to do in certain\ncases.\n\nIn fact there is one aspect which gives this class of commandments even\ngreater importance than the social duties. It is the principle of\nimplicit obedience even when we do not see the value of the commandment.\nI do not mean that a man should not study science, particularly what\nconcerns the knowledge of God. This is not to be recommended. But when a\nman is convinced that there is such a thing as genuine prophecy, showing\nGod's providence, as we see in the case of Moses who delivered his\nnation, performed wonders for them and was always honored and\nbelieved--he should not balk at the acceptance of some laws given by\nsuch a divine man simply because he does not understand them. Abraham is\na good example. For when God promised him that Isaac would become a\ngreat nation, and then commanded him to sacrifice his only child, he did\nnot ask any questions and was ready to do God's behest. His example is\nmeant to be followed by all. This is the purpose of these subtle\ncommandments, which are made with wisdom. Through them we may see the\ndifference between belief and unbelief.[246]\n\nThe above discussion is extremely typical of the rationalistic attitude\nof Ibn Daud and his school, which includes such men as Maimonides,\nGersonides and others. Reason, theory, science, explanation--these are\nthe important considerations in things philosophical, as well as things\nreligious. Theory is more important than practice, and belief stands\nhigher than mere conduct. No wonder that Maimonides was not satisfied\nuntil he elaborated a creed with a definite number of dogmas. Dogmas and\nfaith in reason go together. It is the mystic who is impatient of\nprescribed generalities, for he is constantly refreshed by the living\nand ever flowing stream of individual experience. The rationalist has a\nfixed unchangeable Idea or reason or method, whose reality and value\nconsists in its unity, permanence and immutability. In favor of this\nhypostatised reason, the rationalist Ibn Daud is ready to sacrifice so\nfundamental an institution as sacrifice in the face of the entire book\nof Leviticus, pretending that a single verse of Jeremiah entitles him to\ndo so. But the Jew Ibn Daud in the end asserted himself, and he finds it\nnecessary to admit that in a sense these non-rational laws may be of\neven greater importance than the rational; not, however, as a simple\nbeliever might say, because we must not search the wisdom of God, but\nfor the reason that unreasoned obedience is itself a virtue.\n\nIn conclusion we remind the reader that Ibn Daud was the precursor of\nMaimonides, touching upon, and for the most part answering every\nquestion treated by his more famous successor. Ibn Daud was the first to\nadopt Aristotelianism for the purpose of welding it with Judaism. He\nshowed the way to follow. Maimonides took his cue from Ibn Daud and\nsucceeded in putting the latter in the shade. Historic justice demands\nthat Ibn Daud be brought forward into the light and given the credit\nwhich is deservedly his due.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nMOSES MAIMONIDES\n\n\nWith Maimonides we reach the high water mark of medi\u00e6val Jewish\nphilosophy. He was by far the most comprehensive mind of medi\u00e6val Jewry,\nand his philosophy was the coping stone of a complete system of Judaism.\nIn his training and education he embraced all Jewish literature,\nBiblical and Rabbinic, as well as all the science and philosophy of his\nday. And his literary activity was fruitful in every important branch of\nstudy. He was well known as a practicing physician, having been in the\nemploy of the Caliph's visier at Cairo (Fostat), and he wrote on medical\ntheory and practice. He was versed in mathematics and astronomy, and his\nknowledge of these subjects served him in good stead not merely as an\nintroduction to theology and metaphysics, but was of direct service in\nhis studies and writings on the Jewish calendar. It goes without saying\nthat he knew logic, for this was the basis of all learning in medi\u00e6val\ntimes; but in this branch, too, Maimonides has left us a youthful\ntreatise,[247] which bears witness to his early interest in science and\nhis efforts to recommend its study as helpful to a better understanding\nof Jewish literature.\n\nBut all these activities and productions were more or less side issues,\nor preparations for a _magnum opus_, or rather _magna opera_. From his\nyouth we can trace the evident purpose, not finally completed until\ntoward the end of his brilliant and useful career,--the purpose to\nharmonize Judaism with philosophy, to reconcile the Bible and Talmud\nwith Aristotle. He was ambitious to do this for the good of Judaism, and\nin the interest of a rational and enlightened faith. Thus in his\ncommentary on the Mishna,[248] the earliest of his larger works, he had\nalready conceived the idea of writing a composition of a harmonizing\nnature, _viz._, to gather all the homiletical disquisitions of the\nTalmud (the \"derashot\") and explain them in a rationalistic manner so as\nto remove what appears on the surface to be offensive to sound reason.\nBut instead of proceeding at once to the performance of this cherished\nobject of his philosophic ambition, he kept it in his bosom, brooding\nover it during a life of intense literary and practical activity, until\nit was in the end matured and brought to fruition in a manner quite\ndifferent from that at first intended. The book explanatory of the\nRabbinic legends was given up for reasons which will appear later. But\nthe object that work was to realize was carried out in a much more\neffective manner because it was delayed, and was published toward the\nend of his life as the systematic and authoritative pronouncement of the\ngreatest Jew of his time. The \"Guide of the Perplexed\" would not have\nattracted the attention it did, it would not have raised the storm which\ndivided Jewry into two opposed camps, if it had not come as the mature\nwork of the man whom all Jewry recognized as the greatest Rabbinic\nauthority of his time. Others had written on philosophy before\nMaimonides. We have in these pages followed their ideas--Saadia,\nGabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abraham Ibn Daud. The latter in particular\nanticipated Maimonides in almost all his ideas. None had the effect of\nupsetting the theological equilibrium of Jewry. Everyone had his\nadmirers, no doubt, as well as his opponents. Gabirol was forgotten, Ibn\nZaddik and Ibn Daud were neglected, and Jewish learning continued the\neven tenor of its course. Maimonides was the first to make a profound\nimpression, the first who succeeded in stirring to their depths the\nsmooth, though here and there somewhat turbid, Rabbinic waters, as they\nflowed not merely in scientific Spain and Provence, or in the Orient,\nbut also in the strictly Talmudic communities of northern France. It was\nthe Commentary on the Mishna and the Talmudic code known as the \"Yad\nha-Hazaka\" that was responsible for the tremendous effect of the \"More\nNebukim\" (\"Guide of the Perplexed\").\n\nIn these two Rabbinical treatises, and particularly in the \"Yad\nha-Hazaka,\" the Rabbinic Code, Maimonides showed himself the master of\nRabbinic literature. And all recognized in him the master mind. Having\nbeen written in Hebrew the Code soon penetrated all Jewish communities\neverywhere, and Maimonides's fame spread wherever there were Jews\nengaged in the study of the Talmud. His fame as a court physician in\nEgypt and as the official head of Oriental Jewry enhanced the influence\nof his name and his work. Jealousy no doubt had its share in starting\nopposition to the Code itself even before the publication of the\n\"Guide,\" and during the lifetime of its author. When the \"More Nebukim\"\nwas translated from the original Arabic into Hebrew, so that all could\nread it, and Maimonides was no longer among the living, the zealots\nbecame emboldened and the storm broke, the details of which, however, it\nis not our province to relate.\n\nFor completeness' sake let us set down the facts of his life. Moses ben\nMaimon was born in the city of Cordova on the fourteenth of Nissan (30th\nof March) at one o'clock in the afternoon, on a Sabbath which was the\nday before Passover, in the year 1135. It is not often that the birth of\na medi\u00e6val Jewish writer is handed down with such minute detail. Usually\nwe do not even know the year, to say nothing of the day and the hour.\nCordova had long fallen from its high estate. It was no longer the\nglorious city of the days before the Almoravid conquest. And it was\ndestined to descend lower still when the fanatical hordes of the\nAlmohades renewed the ancient motto of the early Mohammedan conquerors,\n\"The Koran or the Sword.\"\n\nMaimonides was barely thirteen when his native city fell into the hands\nof the zealots from Morocco, and henceforth neither Jew nor Christian\ndared avow his faith openly in Cordova. Adoption of Islam, emigration or\ndeath were the choices held out to the infidel. Many Jews adopted the\ndominant faith outwardly--that was all that was demanded of them--while\nin the secret of their homes they observed Judaism. Some emigrated, and\namong them was the family of Moses' father. For a time they wandered\nabout from city to city in Spain, and then crossed over to Fez in\nMorocco. This seems to us like going from the frying pan into the fire,\nfor Fez was the lion's den itself. The conquerors of Cordova came from\nMorocco. And there seems to be some evidence too that the Maimon family\nhad to appear outwardly as Mohammedans. Be that as it may, Maimonides\ndid not stay long in Fez. On the 18th of April, 1165, the family set\nsail for Palestine, and after a month's stormy voyage they arrived in\nAcco. He visited Jerusalem and Hebron, but did not find Palestine a\npromising place for permanent residence and decided to go to Egypt. He\nsettled in Old Cairo (Fostat), and with his brother David engaged in the\njewel trade. His father died soon after, and later his brother met an\nuntimely death when the ship on which he was a passenger on one of his\nbusiness trips was wrecked in the Indian Ocean. Thereafter Maimonides\ngave up the jewel business and began to practice medicine, which at\nfirst did not offer him more than the barest necessities. But in the\ncourse of time his fame spread and he was appointed physician to\nSaladin's grand visier Alfadhil. He was also made spiritual head[C] of\nthe Jews of Egypt, and what with his official duties as court physician,\nleader of the Jewish community, practicing physician among the people,\nand his literary activities, Jewish and secular, Rabbinical and\nscientific, he was a busy man indeed; so much so that he dissuades\nSamuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of the \"Guide,\" from paying him a\nvisit on the ground that he would scarcely have time to spare to see\nhim, much less to enter into scientific discussions with him.[249]\nMaimonides died on Monday, December 13 (20 Tebeth), 1204.\n\n\n[C] Not a paid post.\n\n\nThe philosophy of Maimonides is contained in the \"Guide of the\nPerplexed,\" his last great work, which was published in Arabic in\n1190.[250] Some philosophic and ethical material is also found in the\nintroductory chapters of his commentary on the Mishnaic treatise \"Abot\"\n(the so-called \"Eight Chapters\"--\"Shemonah Perakim\"),[251] in the\nintroduction to the eleventh chapter (Helek) of the Talmudic treatise\n\"Sanhedrin,\" and in the introductory sections of the Code (\"Hilkot\nYesode ha-Torah\" and \"Hilkot Deot\"). Here, however, the treatment is\npopular and elementary, and is intended for popular consumption. He lays\ndown results in their simplest form without discussing their origin or\nthe arguments _pro_ and _con_. The \"Guide of the Perplexed,\" on the\nother hand, is intended for a special class of persons, for the\nsophisticated; for those who are well trained in science and philosophy,\nnot to speak of Bible and Talmud, and are as a result made uneasy by the\napparent disagreement of philosophical teaching with the ideas expressed\nin the Biblical and Rabbinic writings. His purpose is deliberately\napologetic and concordistic. The work is not a treatise of science or\nphilosophy. The latter are presupposed. He introduces philosophic\nprinciples, Aristotelian or Kalamistic, only with a view to their\nrelation to Jewish theology. And he either accepts them, provisionally\nor absolutely, if he regards them as proven, as true and useful; or he\nrefutes and rejects them if untenable. In the former case he shows by\nproper interpretation that similar principles are taught in Bible and\nTalmud; in the latter he contents himself by proving that Aristotle or\nthe Mutakallimun, as the case may be, did not prove their point.\n\nHis method, in general, of quieting the doubts of the \"perplexed\" is the\nold one--as old as Philo and beyond--of regarding Biblical phrases as\nmetaphors and allegories, containing an esoteric meaning beside or\nopposed to the literal. Accordingly he lays the greatest stress on the\nexplanation of Scriptural \"homonyms,\" as he calls them, borrowing an\nAristotelian term. A homonym is a word which has more than one meaning;\na word which denotes several things having nothing in common. Thus when\nI apply the word dog to the domestic animal we know by that name, as\nwell as to Sirius, known as the dog-star, I use dog as a homonym. The\nstar and the animal have nothing in common. So the word \"merciful,\" one\nof the attributes of God in the Bible, is a homonym. That is, we denote\nby the same word also a quality in a human being; but this quality and\nthat which is denoted by the same word when applied to God have nothing\nin common. They are not merely different in degree but in kind. In fact,\nas Maimonides insists, there is really nothing _in_ God corresponding to\nthe word merciful.\n\nThere are besides certain passages in the Bible which while having an\nacceptable meaning when taken literally, contain besides a deeper\nsignification which the practiced eye can detect. Thus in the\ndescription of the harlot in the seventh chapter of Proverbs there is\nbeside the plain meaning of the text, the doctrine of matter as the\ncause of corporeal desires. The harlot, never faithful to one man,\nleaving one and taking up with another, represents matter which, as\nAristotle conceives it, never is without form and constantly changes one\nform for another.\n\nThere is really nothing new in this, and Philo apart, whom Maimonides\ndid not know, Ibn Daud anticipated Maimonides here also in making use of\nthe term \"homonym\" as the basis of this method of interpretation.[252]\nBut whereas Ibn Daud relegates the chapter treating of this principle to\na subordinate place, his interest being as he tells us primarily\nethical--to solve the problem of free will; Maimonides places it in the\nvery centre of his system. The doctrine of attributes as leading to a\ntrue conception of God,--of God as absolutely incorporeal and without\nany resemblance or relation whatsoever to anything else--is the very\nkeystone of Maimonides's philosophical structure. His purpose is to\nteach a spiritual conception of God. Anything short of this is worse\nthan idolatry. He cannot reconcile the Bible to such a view without this\n\"homonymic\" tool. Hence the great importance of this in his system; and\nhe actually devotes the greater part of the first book of the \"Guide\" to\na systematic and exhaustive survey of all terms in the Bible used as\nhomonyms.[253] All this is preparatory to his discussion of the divine\nattributes.\n\nThis consideration will account also for the fact that, systematic and\nlogical thinker as he was, he perpetrates what might appear at first\nsight as a logical blunder. Instead of first proving the existence of\nGod and then discussing his nature and attributes, as Saadia, Bahya, Ibn\nDaud and others did before him, he treats exhaustively of the divine\nattributes in the first book, whereas the proof of the existence of God\ndoes not appear until the second book. This inversion of the logical\norder is deliberate. Maimonides's method is directed _ad hominem_. The\nJews for whom he wrote his \"Guide\" did not doubt the existence of God.\nBut a great many of them had an inadequate idea of his spiritual nature.\nAnd apparently the Bible countenanced their anthropomorphism. Hence\nMaimonides cast logical considerations to the wind, and dealt first with\nthat which was nearest to his heart. The rest could wait, this could\nnot.\n\nI promised in my commentary on the Mishna, he tells us in the\nintroduction to the \"Guide,\" to explain the allegories and \"Midrashim\"\nin two works to be entitled \"The Book of Reconciliation\" and \"The Book\nof Prophecy.\" But after reflecting on the matter a number of years I\ndecided to desist from the attempt. The reasons are these. If I\nexpressed my explanations obscurely, I should have accomplished nothing\nby substituting one unintelligible statement for another. If, on the\nother hand, I were really to make clear the matters that require\nexplanation, the result would not be suitable for the masses, for whom\nthose treatises were intended. Besides, those Midrashim when read by an\nignorant man are harmless because to such a person nothing is\nimpossible. And if they are read by a person who is learned and worthy,\none of two things is likely to happen. Either he will take them\nliterally and suspect the author of ignorance, which is not a serious\noffence; or he will regard the legendary statements as containing an\nesoteric meaning and think well of the author--which is a good thing,\nwhether he catch the meaning intended or not. Accordingly I gave up the\nidea of writing the books mentioned. In this work I am addressing myself\nto those who have been philosophizing; who are believers in the Bible\nand at the same time know science; and are perplexed in their ideas on\naccount of the homonymous terms.\n\nHaving made clear Maimonides's chief interest and purpose in his\nmasterpiece we need not follow his own method of treatment, which often\ngives the impression of a studied attempt to conceal his innermost ideas\nfrom all but the initiated. At least he is not willing that anyone who\nhas not taken the trouble carefully to study and scrutinize every\nchapter and compare it with what precedes and follows, should by a\nsuperficial browsing here and there arrive at an understanding of the\nprofound problems treated in the work. He believes that the mysterious\ndoctrines passing by the name of \"Maase Bereshit\" and \"Maase Merkaba\" in\nthe Talmud (_cf._ Introduction, p. xvi) denote respectively Physics and\nMetaphysics--the very sciences of which he treats in the \"Guide.\"\nAccordingly he tells us that following the instructions of the Rabbis he\nmust not be expected to give more than bare allusions. And even these\nare not arranged in order in the book, but scattered and mixed up with\nother subjects which he desires to explain. For, as he says, \"I do not\nwant to oppose the divine intention, which concealed the truths of his\nbeing from the masses.\"\n\n\"You must not suppose,\" he continues, \"that these mysteries are known to\nanybody completely. By no means. But sometimes the truth flashes upon us\nand it is day; and then again our natural constitution and habits shut\nthem out, and we are again in darkness. The relative proportion of light\nand darkness which a person enjoys in these matters, makes the\ndifference in the grade of perfection of great men and prophets. The\ngreatest of the prophets had comparatively little if any darkness. With\nthose who never see light at all, namely the masses of the people, we\nhave nothing to do in this book.\"\n\nFinally he adjures the reader not to explain to anyone else the novel\nideas found in his work, which are not contained in the writings of his\npredecessors. Heaven knows, he exclaims, I hesitated long before writing\nthis book, because it contains unknown matters, never before treated by\nany Jewish writer in the \"Galut.\" But I relied on two Rabbinic\nprinciples. One is that when it is a question of doing something for a\ngreat cause in a critical time, it is permitted to transgress a law. The\nother is the consciousness that my motives are pure and unselfish. In\nshort, he concludes, I am the man who, when he finds himself in a\ncritical position and cannot teach truth except by suiting one worthy\nperson and scandalizing ten thousand fools, chooses to say the truth for\nthe benefit of the one without regard for the abuse of the great\nmajority.\n\nAs we are not bound by Maimonides's principle of esoterism and mystery,\nnor are we in fear of being an offence and a stumbling block to the\nfools, we shall proceed more directly in our exposition of his\nphilosophy; and shall begin with Maimonides's general ideas on the need\nof science for intelligent faith and the relation thereto of Jewish\nhistory and literature.\n\nThe highest subject of study is metaphysics or theology, the knowledge\nof God (_cf._ below, p. 285). This is not merely not forbidden in the\nBible, but it is directly commanded. When Moses says, \"That I may know\nthee, to the end that I may find grace in thy sight\" (Exod. 33, 13), he\nintimates that only he finds favor with God who knows him, and not\nmerely who fasts and prays.[254] Besides, the commandment, \"Thou shalt\nlove the Lord thy God,\" cannot be fulfilled without a study and\nunderstanding of the whole of nature.[255] Thus, as we shall see, it is\nonly by a study of physics that we come to understand that affection is\na defect and must therefore be removed from the conception of God. The\nsame thing applies to the ideas of potentiality and actuality. We should\nnot know what they signify without a study of physics, nor should we\nunderstand that potentiality is a defect and hence not to be found in\nGod. It is therefore a duty to study both physics and metaphysics for a\ntrue knowledge of God.[256] At the same time we must recognize that\nhuman reason has a limit and that there are matters which are beyond its\nken. Not to realize this and to deny what has not been proved impossible\nis dangerous, and may lead a man astray after the imagination and the\nevil desires which quench the light of the intellect. And it is this the\nBible and the Rabbis had in mind in such passages as, \"Hast thou found\nhoney? eat so much as is sufficient for thee; lest thou be filled\ntherewith, and vomit it\" (Prov. 25, 16); or in the following from the\nMishna, \"Whoever pries into four things, had better not come into the\nworld, _viz._, what is above and what is below, what was before and what\nwill be after\" (Hagigah, ch. 2). The meaning is not, as some fools\nthink, that the Rabbis forbid the use of the reason entirely to reach\nwhat is in its power. It is _abuse_ of the reason that they prohibit,\nand neglect of the truth that the human reason has a limit.[257]\n\nAccordingly while the study of metaphysics and the explanation of the\nallegories of Scripture are thus shown to be a necessity of intelligent\nbelief, it is not proper to begin with these difficult subjects. One\nmust first be mature intellectually and possessed of the preliminary\nsciences. Otherwise the study of metaphysics is likely not merely to\nconfuse the mind in its belief, but to destroy belief entirely. It is\nlike feeding an infant on wheat bread and meat and wine. These are not\nbad in themselves, but the infant is not prepared to digest them. That\nis why these matters are given in the Bible in the form of allegories,\nbecause the Bible is intended for all--men, women and children--not\nbecause metaphysical ideas are injurious in themselves, as some fools\nimagine, who believe they are wise men. For beginners it is sufficient\nthat they have the right view by tradition and know the existence of\ncertain beings, without being able to prove the opinions they hold, or\nto understand the essence of the being in the existence of which they\nbelieve. This they will acquire gradually if they are capable.[258]\n\nThere are five causes preventing the study of metaphysics on the part of\nthe general masses. First, the difficulty of the subject itself. Second,\nthe limitations of all people's minds at the beginning. Third, the great\namount of preparatory training that is necessary, and which everybody is\nnot ready to undertake, however eager he may be to know the results. And\nto study metaphysics without preliminary training is worse than not to\nstudy it at all. For there is nothing in existence except God and his\ncreation. To know God's existence and what is and is not proper to\nascribe to him we must examine his creation; and thus arithmetic, the\nnature of number, and the properties of geometrical figures help us a\ngreat deal in determining what attributes are inapplicable to God. Even\nmuch more important for metaphysics is the study of spherical astronomy\nand physics, which throw light on the relation of God to the world. Then\nthere are some theoretical topics which, while not directly of help in\nmetaphysics, are useful in training the mind and enabling it to know\nwhat is true demonstration. One who wishes therefore to undertake the\nstudy of metaphysics, must first study logic, then the mathematical\nsciences in order, then physics, and not until he has mastered all these\nintroductory branches should he take up metaphysics. This is too much\nfor most people, who would die in the midst of their preparatory\nstudies, and if not for tradition would never know whether there is a\nGod or not, not to speak of knowing what attributes are applicable to\nhim and what are not.\n\nThe fourth cause which keeps people away from the study of metaphysics\nis their natural disposition. For it has been shown that intellectual\nqualities are dependent upon moral; and the former cannot be perfect\nunless the latter are. Now some persons are temperamentally incapable of\nright thinking by reason of their passionate nature; and it is foolish\nto attempt to teach them, for it is not medicine or geometry, and not\neverybody is prepared for it. This is the reason, too, why young men\ncannot study it, because of the passions which are still strong in them.\nFinally as a fifth reason, the necessities of the body and its luxuries,\ntoo, stand in the way of a person's devoting enough time and attention\nto this subject.[259]\n\nLike many others before him, Christians as well as Jews, Maimonides also\nbelieved that in ancient times the Jews diligently cultivated the\nsciences, which were gradually forgotten on account of foreign\ndomination. Maimonides adds another reason for their disappearance,\nnamely, that they were not disseminated abroad. They were confined to a\nselect few and were not put down in writing but handed down by word of\nmouth. As a result only a few hints are found in the Talmud and\nMidrashim, where the kernel is small and the husk large, so that people\nmistake the husk for the kernel.[260]\n\nHe then traces the history of philosophical thinking in Jewish medi\u00e6val\nliterature from the time of the Geonim, and tells us that the little\nthat is found of the Kalam concerning the Unity of God and related\ntopics in the works of some of the Geonim and the Karaites in the East\nis borrowed from the Mutakallimun of the Mohammedans and constitutes a\nsmall fraction of the writings of the latter on this subject. The first\nattempt in this direction among the Moslems was that of the party known\nas the Mu`tazila, whom our people followed. Later came the party of the\nAshariya with different opinions which, however, were not adopted by any\nof our people. This was not due, he tells us, to a deliberate decision\nin favor of the Mu`tazila, but solely to the historical accident of\ntheir chronological priority. On the other hand, the Spanish Jews of\nAndalusia adopted the views of the philosophers, _i. e._, the\nAristotelians, so far as they are not in conflict with our religion.\nThey do not follow the Mutakallimun, and hence what little of the\nsubject is found in the works of the later writers of this class\nresembles our own method and views.[261]\n\nThere seems no doubt that whatever other Spanish writers Maimonides had\nin mind, whose works are not extant, his characterization fits admirably\nthe \"Emunah Ramah\" of Abraham Ibn Daud (_cf._ above, p. 217), and in a\nless degree it is also true of Ibn Gabirol, Bahya, Judah Halevi, Moses\nand Abraham Ibn Ezra. Bahya as we saw above (p. 86) still retains a good\ndeal of Kalamistic material and so does Ibn Zaddik (p. 126). As for\nMukammas, Saadia and the two Karaites Al Basir and Jeshua ben Judah, we\nhave seen (pp. 17, 24, 48, 56) that they move wholly in the ideas of the\nMutakallimun. It becomes of great interest for us therefore to see what\nMaimonides thinks of these Islamic theologians, of their origins, of\ntheir methods and of their philosophical value. Maimonides's exposition\nand criticism of the principles of the Mutakallimun is of especial\ninterest, too, because up to recent times his sketch of the tenets of\nthis school was the only extensive account known; and it has not lost\nits value even yet. We shall, however, be obliged to abridge his\ndetailed exposition in order not to enlarge our volume beyond due\nlimits. Besides, there is no occasion for repeating what we have already\nsaid of the Kalam in our Introduction (p. xxi ff.); though the account\nthere given was not taken from Maimonides and does not follow his order.\n\nMaimonides is aware that the Arabs are indebted to the Christians,\nGreeks as well as Syrians. The Mu`tazila and Ashariya, he says, base\ntheir opinions upon premises and principles borrowed from Greek and\nSyrian Christians, who endeavored to refute the opinions of the\nphilosophers as dangerous to the Christian religion. There was thus a\nChristian Kalam prior to the Mohammedan.[262] Their method was to lay\ndown premises favorable to their religion, and by means of these to\nrefute the opinions opposed to them. When the Mohammedans came upon the\nscene and translated the works of the philosophers, they included in\ntheir work of translation the refutations composed by the Christians. In\nthis way they found the works of Philoponus, Yahya ben Adi and others;\nand adopted also the opinions of the pre-Socratic philosophers, which\nthey thought would be of help to them, though these had already been\nrefuted by Aristotle, who came after. Such are the atomic theory of\nmatter and the belief in the existence of a vacuum. These opinions they\ncarried to consequences not at all contemplated by their authorities,\nwho were closer to the philosophers.\n\nTo characterize briefly the methods of the Mutakallimun, Maimonides\ncontinues, I would say that the first among them, the Greeks and the\nMohammedans, did not follow reality, but adopted principles which were\ncalculated to help them in defending their religious theses, and then\ninterpreted reality to suit their preconceived notions. The later\nmembers of the school no longer saw through the motives of their\npredecessors and imagined their principles and arguments were _bona\nfide_ refutations of philosophical opinions.\n\nOn examination of their works I found, he continues, that with slight\ndifferences they are all alike. They do not put any trust in reality and\nnature. For, they say, the so-called laws of nature are nothing more\nthan the order of events to which we are accustomed. There is no kind of\nnecessity in them, and it is conceivable they might be different. In\nmany cases the Mutakallimun follow the imagination and call it reason.\nTheir method of procedure is as follows. They first state their\npreliminary principles, then they prove that the world is \"new,\" _i. e._,\ncreated in time. Then they argue that the world must have had an\noriginator, and that he is one and incorporeal. All the Mutakallimun\nfollow this method, and they are imitated by those of our own people who\nfollow in their footsteps.\n\nTo this method I have serious objections, continues Maimonides, for\ntheir arguments in favor of the creation of the world are not convincing\nunless one does not know a real demonstration from a dialectical or\nsophistic. The most one can do in this line is to invalidate the\narguments for eternity. But the decision of the question is by no means\neasy, as is shown by the fact that the controversy is three thousand\nyears old and not yet settled. Hence it is a risky policy to build the\nargument for the existence of God on so shaky a foundation as the\n\"newness\" of the world. The best way then, it seems to me, is to prove\nGod's existence, unity and incorporeality by the methods of the\nphilosophers, which are based upon the eternity of the world. Not that I\nbelieve in eternity or that I accept it, but because on this hypothesis\nthe three fundamental doctrines are validly demonstrated. Having proved\nthese doctrines we will then return to the problem of the origin of the\nworld and say what can be said in favor of creation.[263]\n\nThis is a new contribution of Maimonides. All the Jewish writers before\nHalevi followed in their proofs of the existence of God the method\ndesignated by Maimonides as that of the Kalam. Judah Halevi criticised\nthe Mutakallimun as well as the philosophers in the interest of a point\nof view all his own (pp. 176 ff., 182). Ibn Daud tacitly ignored the\nKalam and based his proof of the existence of God upon the principles of\nmotion as exhibited in the Aristotelian Physics, without, however,\nfinding it necessary to assume even provisionally the eternity of motion\nand the world (p. 217 ff.). His proof of the incorporeality of God is,\nas we have seen (_ibid._), weak, just because he does not admit the\neternity of motion, which alone implies infinity of power in God and\nhence incorporeality. Maimonides is the first who takes deliberate\naccount of the Mutakallimun, gives an adequate outline of the essentials\nof their teaching and administers a crushing blow to their principles as\nwell as their method. He then follows up his destructive criticism with\na constructive method, in which he frankly admits that in order to\nestablish the existence, unity and incorporeality of God--the three\nfundamental dogmas of Judaism--beyond the possibility of cavil, we must\nmake common cause with the philosophers even though it be only for a\nmoment, until they have done our work for us, and then we may fairly\nturn on our benefactors and taking advantage of their weakness, strike\nthem down, and upon their lifeless arguments for the eternity of the\nworld establish our own more plausible theory of creation. The attitude\nof Maimonides is in brief this. If we were certain of creation, we\nshould not have to bother with the philosophers. Creation implies the\nexistence of God. But the question cannot be strictly demonstrated\neither way. Hence let us prove the existence of God on the least\npromising hypothesis, namely, that of eternity, and we are quite secure\nagainst all possible criticism.\n\nOf the twelve propositions of the Mutakallimun enumerated by Maimonides\nas the basis of their doctrine of God, we shall select a few of the most\nimportant.[264]\n\n1. _The Theory of Atoms._ The entire universe is made up of indivisible\nbodies having no magnitude. Their combination produces magnitude and\ncorporeality. They are all alike. Genesis and dissolution means simply\nthe combination or rather aggregation of atoms and their separation.\nThese atoms are not eternal, as Epicurus believed them to be, but\ncreated.\n\n2. This atomic theory they extend from magnitude to time. Time also\naccording to them is composed of moments or atomic units of time.\nNeither magnitude, nor matter, nor time is continuous or infinitely\ndivisible.\n\n3. Applying these ideas to motion they say that motion is the passage of\nan atom of matter from one atom of place to the next in an atom of time.\nIt follows from this that one motion is as fast as another; and they\nexplain the apparent variation in speed of different motions, as for\nexample when two bodies cover unequal distances in the same time, by\nsaying that the body covering the smaller distance had more rests in the\nintervals between the motions. The same thing is true in the flight of\nan arrow, that there are rests even though the senses do not reveal\nthem. For the senses cannot be trusted. We must follow the reason.\n\nMaimonides's criticism of the atomic theory of matter and motion just\ndescribed is that it undermines the bases of geometry. The diagonal of a\nsquare would be the same length as its side. The properties of\ncommensurability and incommensurability in lines and surfaces, of\nrational and irrational lines would cease to have any meaning. In fact\nall that is contained in the tenth book of Euclid would lose its\nfoundation.\n\n4. The atom is made complete by the accidents, without which it cannot\nbe. Every atom created by God, they say, must have accidents, such as\ncolor, odor, motion, and so on, except quantity or magnitude, which\naccording to them is not accident. If a substance has an accident, the\nlatter is not attributed to the body as a whole, but is ascribed to\nevery atom of which the body is composed. Thus in a white body every\natom is white, in a moving body every atom is in motion, in a living\nbody every atom is alive, and every atom is possessed of sense\nperception; for life and sense and reason and wisdom are accidents in\ntheir opinion like whiteness and blackness.\n\n6. Accident does not last more than one moment of time. When God creates\nan atom he creates at the same time an accident with it. Atom without\naccident is impossible. The accident disappears at the end of the moment\nunless God creates another of the same kind, and then another, and so\non, as long as he wants the accident of that kind to continue. If he\nceases to create another accident, the substance too disappears.\n\nTheir motive in laying down this theory of accidents is in order to\ndestroy the conception that everything has a peculiar nature, of which\nits qualities and functions are the results. They attribute everything\ndirectly to God. God created a particular accident at this moment, and\nthis is the explanation of its being. If God ceases to create it anew\nthe next moment, it will cease to be.\n\n7. All that is not atom is accident, and there is no difference between\none kind of accident and another in reference to essentiality. All\nbodies are composed of similar atoms, which differ only in accidents;\nand animality and humanity and sensation and reason are all accidents.\nHence the difference between the individuals of the same species is the\nsame as that between individuals of different species. The philosophers\ndistinguish between essential forms of things and accidental properties.\nIn this way they would explain, for example, why iron is hard and black,\nwhile butter is soft and white. The Mutakallimun deny any such\ndistinction. All forms are accidents. Hence it would follow that there\nis no intrinsic reason why man rather than the bat should be a rational\ncreature. Everything that is conceivable is possible, except what\ninvolves a logical contradiction; and God alone determines at every\ninstant what accident shall combine with a given atom or group of atoms.\n\n8. It follows from the above also that man has no power of agency at\nall. When we think we are dyeing a garment red, it is not we who are\ndoing it at all. God creates the red color in the garment at the time\nwhen we apply the red dye to it. The red dye does not enter the garment,\nas we think, for an accident is only momentary, and cannot pass beyond\nthe substance in which it is.\n\nWhat appears to us as the constancy and regularity of nature is nothing\nmore than the will of God. Nor is our knowledge of to-day the same as\nthat of yesterday. Yesterday's is gone and to-day's is created anew. So\nwhen a man moves a pen, it is not he who moves it. God creates motion in\nthe hand, and at the same time in the pen. The hand is not the cause of\nthe motion of the pen. In short they deny causation. God is the sole\ncause.\n\nIn respect to human conduct they are divided. The majority, and the\nAshariya among them, say that when a person moves a pen, God creates\nfour accidents, no one of which is the cause of the other. They merely\nexist in succession, but no more. The first accident is the man's will\nto move the pen; the second, his ability to move it; the third, the\nmotion of the hand; the fourth, the motion of the pen. It follows from\nthis that when a person does anything, God creates in him a will, the\nability and the act itself, but the act is not the effect of the\nability. The Mu`tazila hold that the ability is the cause of the effect.\n\n9. _Impossibility of the Infinite._ They hold that the infinite is\nimpossible in any sense, whether actual or potential or accidental. That\nan actual infinite is impossible is a matter of proof. So it can be and\nhas been proved that the potential infinite is possible. For example\nextension is infinitely divisible, _i. e._, potentially. As to the\naccidental infinite, _i. e._, an infinity of parts of which each ceases\nto be as soon as the next appears, this is doubtful. Those who boast of\nhaving proved the eternity of the world say that time is infinite, and\ndefend their view against criticism by the claim that the successive\nparts of time disappear. In the same way these people regard it as\npossible that an infinite number of accidents have succeeded each other\non the universal matter, because here too they are not all present now,\nthe previous having disappeared before the succeeding ones came. The\nMutakallimun do not admit of any kind of infinite. They prove it in this\nway. If past time and the world are infinite, then the number of men who\ndied up to a given point in the past is infinite. The number of men who\ndied up to a point one thousand years before the former is also\ninfinite. But this number is less than the other by the number of men\nwho died during the thousand years between the two starting points.\nHence the infinite is larger than the infinite, which is absurd. If the\naccidental infinite were really impossible the theory of the eternity of\nthe world would be refuted at once. But Alfarabi has shown that the\narguments against accidental infinity are invalid.\n\n10. _Distrust of the Senses._ The senses, they say, cannot be regarded\nas criteria of truth and falsehood; for many things the senses cannot\nsee at all, either because the objects are so fine, or because they are\nfar away. In other cases the senses are deceptive, as when the large\nappears small at a distance, the small appears great in the water, and\nthe straight appears broken when partly in water and partly without. So\na man with the jaundice sees everything yellow, and one with red bile on\nhis tongue tastes everything bitter. There is method in their madness.\nThe motive for this sceptical principle is to evade criticism. If the\nsenses testify in opposition to their theories, they reply that the\nsenses cannot be trusted, as they did in their explanation of motion and\nin their theory of the succession of created accidents. These are all\nancient theories of the Sophists, as is clear from Galen.[265]\n\nHaving given an outline of the fundamental principles of the\nMutakallimun and criticised them, Maimonides next gives their arguments\nbased upon these principles in favor of creation in time and against\neternity. It will not be worth our while to reproduce them here as they\nare not adopted by Maimonides, and we have already met some of them\nthough in a somewhat modified form before (_cf._ above, pp. 29 ff.).[266]\n\nThe Kalamistic proofs for the unity of God are similarly identical for\nthe most part with those found in Saadia, Bahya and others, and we need\nonly mention Maimonides's criticism that they are inadequate unless we\nassume with the Mutakallimun that all atoms in the universe are of the\nsame kind. If, however, we adopt Aristotle's theory, which is more\nplausible, that the matter of the heavenly bodies is different from that\nof the sublunar world, we may defend dualism by supposing that one God\ncontrols the heavens and the other the earth. The inability of the one\nto govern the domain of the other would not necessarily argue\nimperfection, any more than we who believe in the unity of God regard it\nas a defect in God that he cannot make a thing both be and not be. This\nbelongs to the category of the impossible; and we should likewise class\nin the same category the control of a sphere that is independent of one\nand belongs to another. This is purely an _argumentum ad hominem_, for\nMaimonides does not regard the sublunar and superlunar worlds as\nindependent of each other. He recognizes the unity of the universe.[267]\n\nMaimonides closes his discussion of the Kalamistic system by citing\ntheir arguments for incorporeality, which he likewise finds inadequate,\nboth because they are based upon God's unity, which they did not succeed\nin proving (Saadia, in so far as he relates the two, bases unity upon\nincorporeality), and because of inherent weakness.[268]\n\nHaving disposed of the arguments of the Mutakallimun, Maimonides\nproceeds to prove the existence, unity and incorporeality of God by the\nmethods of the philosophers, _i. e._, those who, like Alfarabi and\nAvicenna, take their arguments from Aristotle. The chief proof[269] is\nbased upon the Aristotelian principles of motion and is found in the\neighth book of Aristotle's Physics. We have already met this proof in\nIbn Daud (_cf._ above, p. 217), and the method in Maimonides differs\nonly in form and completeness, but not in essence. There is, however,\nthis very important difference that Ibn Daud fights shy of Aristotle's\ntheory of the eternity of motion and time, thus losing his strongest\nargument for God's infinite power and incorporeality (_cf._ p. 218);\nwhereas Maimonides frankly bases his entire argument from motion\n(provisionally to be sure) upon the Aristotelian theory, including\neternity of motion. With this important deviation there is not much in\nthis part of the Maimonidean discussion which is not already contained,\nthough less completely, in the \"Emunah Ramah\" of Abraham Ibn Daud. We\nshould be tempted to omit these technical arguments entirely if it were\nnot for the fact that it is in the form which Maimonides gave them that\nthey became classic in Jewish philosophy, and not in that of Ibn Daud.\n\nThe second proof of God's existence, unity and incorporeality, that\nbased upon the distinction between \"possible\" and \"necessary\"\nexistent,[270] which has its origin in Alfarabi and Avicenna, is also\nfound in Ibn Daud.[271] The other two proofs[272] are Maimonides's own,\n_i. e._, they are not found in the works of his Jewish predecessors.\n\nAs in the exposition of the theory of the Mutakallimun Maimonides began\nwith their fundamental principles, so here he lays down twenty-six\npropositions culled from the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle and\nhis Arabian commentators, and applies them later to prove his points. He\ndoes not attempt to demonstrate them, expecting the reader to take them\nfor granted, or to be familiar with them from a study of the\nphilosophical sources. Ibn Daud presupposed less from his readers,\nhaving written as he said, for beginners; hence he proves many of the\npropositions which Maimonides lays down dogmatically. Possibly\nMaimonides expected his readers to be familiar with the work of his\nimmediate Jewish predecessor.\n\nThe twenty-six propositions of the philosophers are as follows:\n\n1. There can be no infinite object possessing magnitude.\n\n2. There cannot be an infinite number of bodies possessing magnitude,\nall at the same time.\n\n3. There cannot be an infinite chain of cause and effect, even if these\nlinks are not possessed of magnitude, for example, intellects.\n\n4. Change is found in four categories. In substance--genesis and decay.\nIn quantity--growth and diminution. In quality--qualitative change. In\nplace--motion of translation.\n\n5. All motion is change, and is the realization of the potential.\n\n6. Motion may be _per se_, _per accidens_, forcible, partial, the latter\ncoming under _per accidens_. An example of motion _per se_ is the motion\nof a body from one place to the next; of motion _per accidens_, when the\nblackness of an object is said to move from one place to another.\nForcible motion is that of the stone when it is forced upward. Partial\nmotion is that of a nail of a ship when the ship moves.\n\n7. Every changeable thing is divisible; hence every movable thing is\ndivisible, _i. e._, every body is divisible. What is not divisible is\nnot movable, and hence cannot be body.\n\n8. That which is moved _per accidens_ is necessarily at rest because its\nmotion is not in itself. Hence it cannot have that accidental motion\nforever.\n\n9. A body moving another must itself be in motion at the same time.\n\n10. Being in a body means one of two things: being in it as an accident,\nor as constituting the essence of the body, like a natural form. Both\nare corporeal powers.\n\n11. Some things which are in a body are divided with the division of the\nbody. They are then divided _per accidens_, like colors and other powers\nextending throughout the body. Some of the things which constitute the\nbody are not divisible at all, like soul and intellect.\n\n12. Every power which extends throughout a body is finite, because all\nbody is finite.\n\n13. None of the kinds of change mentioned in 4 is continuous except\nmotion of translation; and of this only circular motion.\n\n14. Motion of translation is the first by nature of the motions. For\ngenesis and decay presuppose qualitative change; and qualitative change\npresupposes the approach of the agent causing the change to the thing\nundergoing the change. And there is no growth or diminution without\nantecedent genesis and decay.\n\n15. Time is an accident following motion and connected with it. The one\ncannot exist without the other. No motion except in time, and time\ncannot be conceived except with motion. Whatever has no motion does not\ncome under time.\n\n16. Whatever is incorporeal cannot be subject to number, unless it is a\ncorporeal power; in which case the individual powers are numbered with\ntheir matters or bearers. Hence the separate forms or Intelligences,\nwhich are neither bodies nor corporeal powers, cannot have the\nconception of number connected with them, except when they are related\nto one another as cause and effect.\n\n17. Everything that moves, necessarily has a mover, either outside, like\nthe hand moving the stone, or inside like the animal body, which\nconsists of a mover, the soul, and a moved, the body proper. Every\n_mobile_ of the last kind is called a self-moving thing. This means that\nthe motor element in the thing is part of the whole thing in motion.\n\n18. If anything passes from potentiality to actuality, the agent that\ncaused this must be outside the thing. For if it were inside and there\nwas no obstruction, the thing would never be potential, but always\nactual; and if there was an obstruction, which was removed, the agency\nwhich removed the obstruction is the cause which caused the thing to\npass from potentiality to actuality.\n\n19. Whatever has a cause for its existence is a \"possible\" existent in\nso far as itself is concerned. If the cause is there, the thing exists;\nif not, it does not. Possible here means not necessary.\n\n20. Whatever is a necessary existent in itself, has no cause for its\nexistence.\n\n21. Every composite has the cause of its existence in the composition.\nHence it is not in itself a necessary existent; for its existence is\ndependent upon the existence of its constituent parts and upon their\ncomposition.\n\n22. All body is composed necessarily of two things, matter and form; and\nit necessarily has accidents, _viz._, quantity, figure, situation.\n\n23. Whatever is potential and has in it a possibility may at some time\nnot exist as an actuality.\n\n24. Whatever is potential is necessarily possessed of matter, for\npossibility is always in matter.\n\n25. The principles of an individual compound substance are matter and\nform; and there must be an agent, _i. e._, a mover which moves the\nobject or the underlying matter until it prepares it to receive the\nform. This need not be the ultimate mover, but a proximate one having a\nparticular function. The idea of Aristotle is that matter cannot move\nitself. This is the great principle which leads us to investigate into\nthe existence of the first mover.\n\nOf these twenty-five propositions, Maimonides continues, some are clear\nafter a little reflection, some again require many premises and proofs,\nbut they are all proved in the Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle and\nhis commentators. My purpose here is, as I said, not to reproduce the\nwritings of the philosophers. I will simply mention those principles\nwhich we must have for our purpose. I must add, however, one more\nproposition, which Aristotle thinks is true and more deserving of belief\nthan anything else. We will grant him this by way of hypothesis until we\nexplain what we intend to prove. The proposition is:\n\n26. Time and motion are eternal and actual. Hence there must be a body\nmoving eternally and existing actually. This is the matter constituting\nthe substance of the heavenly bodies. Hence the heavens are not subject\nto genesis and decay, for their motion is eternal. This presupposes the\npossibility of accidental infinity (_cf._ above, p. 251). Aristotle\nregards this as true, though it does not seem to me that he claims he\nhas proved it. His followers and commentators maintain that it is a\nnecessary proposition and demonstrated. The Mutakallimun, on the other\nhand, think it is impossible that there should be an infinite number of\nstates in succession (_cf._ _ibid._). It seems to me it is neither\nnecessary nor impossible, but possible. This is, however, not the place\nto discuss it.[273]\n\nNow follows the classical proof of the existence of God from motion. It\nis in essence the same as that given by Ibn Daud, but much more\nelaborate. We shall try to simplify it as much as possible. The numbers\nin parentheses in the sequel refer to the preliminary propositions above\ngiven.\n\nWe start with something that is known, namely, the motion we see in the\nsublunar world, the motion which is involved in all the processes of\ngenesis and decay and change generally. This motion must have a mover\n(25). This mover must have another mover to move it, and this would lead\nus to infinity, which is impossible (3). We find, however, that all\nmotion here below ends with the motion of the heaven. Let us take an\nexample. The wind is blowing through an opening in the wall. I take a\nstone and stop up the hole. Here the stone is moved by the hand, the\nhand by the tendons, the tendons by the nerves, the nerves by the veins,\nthe veins by the natural heat, the natural heat by the animal soul, the\nanimal soul by a purpose, namely, to stop the hole from which the wind\ncomes, the purpose by the wind, the wind by the motion of the heavenly\nsphere. But this is not the end. The sphere must also have a mover (17).\nThis mover is either outside the sphere it moves or within it. If it is\nsomething outside, it is either again a body like the sphere, or an\nincorporeal thing, a \"Separate Intelligence.\" If the mover of the sphere\nis something within the sphere, two alternatives are again possible. The\ninternal moving power of the sphere may be a corporeal force extended\nthroughout the body of the sphere and divisible with it like heat, or an\nindivisible power like soul or intellect (10, 11). We thus have four\npossibilities in all. The mover of the heavenly sphere may be (a) a body\nexternal to the sphere; (b) a separate incorporeal substance; (c) an\ninternal corporeal power divisible with the division of the sphere; (d)\nan internal indivisible power. Of these four, (a) is impossible. For if\nthe mover of the sphere is another body, it is likewise in motion (9)\nand must have another to move it, which, if a body, must have another,\nand so on _ad infinitum_, which is impossible (2). The third hypothesis,\n(c), is likewise impossible. For as the sphere is a body it is finite\n(1), and its power is also finite (12), since it is divisible with the\nbody of the sphere (11). Hence it cannot move infinitely (26). Nor can\nwe adopt the last alternative, (d). For a soul residing within the\nsphere could not alone be the cause of continuous motion. For a soul\nthat moves its body is itself in motion _per accidens_ (6); and whatever\nmoves _per accidens_ must necessarily sometime stop (8), and with it the\nthing set in motion by it will stop also. There is thus only one\nalternative left, (b), _viz._, that the cause of the motion of the\nsphere is a \"separate\" (_i. e._, incorporeal) power, which is itself not\nsubject to motion either _per se_ or _per accidens_; hence it is\nindivisible and unchangeable (7, 5). This is God. He cannot be two or\nmore, for \"separate\" essences which are not body are not subject to\nnumber unless one is cause and the other effect (16). It follows, too,\nthat he is not subject to time, for there is no time without motion\n(15).\n\nWe have thus proved with one stroke God's existence as well as his unity\nand incorporeality. But, it will be observed, if not for the\ntwenty-sixth proposition concerning the eternity of motion, which\nimplies an infinite power, we should not have been forced to the\nalternative (b), and could have adopted (c) as well as (d). That is, we\nmight have concluded that God is the soul of the heavenly sphere\nresident within it, or even that he is a corporeal force pervading the\nextension of the sphere as heat pervades an ordinary body. But we must\nadmit that in this way we prove only the existence of a God who is the\ncause of the heavenly motions, and through these of the processes of\ngenesis and decay, hence of all the life of our sublunar world. This is\nnot the God of Jewish tradition, who creates out of nothing, who is the\ncause of the being of the universe as well as of its life processes.\nMaimonides was aware of this defect in the Aristotelian view, and he\nlater repudiates the Stagirite's theory of eternal motion on\nphilosophical as well as religious grounds. Before, however, we speak of\nMaimonides's attitude in this matter, we must for completeness' sake\nbriefly mention three other proofs for the existence of God as given by\nMaimonides. They are not strictly Aristotelian, though they are based\nupon Peripatetic principles cited above and due to the Arabian\ncommentators of Aristotle.\n\nThe second proof is as follows. If we find a thing composed of two\nelements, and one of these elements is also found separately, it follows\nthat the other element is found separately also. Now we frequently find\nthe two elements of _causing motion_ and _being moved_ combined in the\nsame object. And we also find things which are moved only, but do not\ncause motion, as for example matter, or the stone in the last proof. It\nstands to reason therefore that there is something that causes motion\nwithout being itself subject to motion. Not being subject to motion, it\nis indivisible, incorporeal and not subject to time, as above.\n\nThe third proof is based upon the idea of necessary existence. There is\nno doubt that there are existing things, for example the things we\nperceive with our senses. Now either all things are incapable of decay,\nor all are subject to genesis and decay, or some are and some are not.\nThe first is evidently untrue for we see things coming into, and passing\nout, of being. The second hypothesis is likewise untrue. For if all\nthings are subject to genesis and decay, there is a possibility that at\nsome time all things might cease to be and nothing should exist at all.\nBut as the coming and going of individuals in the various species in the\nworld has been going on from eternity, the possibility just spoken of\nmust have been realized--a possibility that is never realized is not a\npossibility--and nothing existed at all at that moment. But in that case\nhow could they ever have come into being, since there was nothing to\nbring them into being? And yet they do exist, as ourselves for example\nand everything else. There is only one alternative left, therefore, and\nthat is that beside the great majority of things subject to genesis and\ndecay, there is a being not subject to change, a necessary existent, and\nultimately one that exists by virtue of its own necessity (19).\n\nWhatever is necessary _per se_ can have no cause for its existence (20)\nand can have no multiplicity in itself (21); hence it is neither a body\nnor a corporeal power (12).\n\nWe can also prove easily that there cannot be two necessary existents\n_per se_. For in that case the element of necessary existence would be\nsomething added to the essence of each, and neither would then be\nnecessary _per se_, but _per_ that element of necessary existence which\nis common to both.\n\nThe last argument against dualism may also be formulated as follows. If\nthere are two Gods, they must have something in common--that in virtue\nof which they are Gods--and something in which they differ, which makes\nthem two and not one. If each of them has in addition to divinity a\ndifferential element, they are both composite, and neither is the first\ncause or the necessary existent (19). If one of them only has this\ndifferentia, then this one is composite and is not the first cause.\n\nThe fourth proof is very much like the first, but is based upon the\nideas of potentiality and actuality instead of motion. But when we\nconsider that Aristotle defines motion in terms of potentiality and\nactuality, the fourth proof is identical with the first. It reads in\nMaimonides as follows: We see constantly things existing potentially and\ncoming into actuality. Every such thing must have an agent outside (18).\nIt is clear, too, that this agent was first an agent potentially and\nthen became one actually. This potentiality was due either to an\nobstacle in the agent himself or to the absence of a certain relation\nbetween the agent and its effect. In order that the potential agent may\nbecome an actual agent, there is need of another agent to remove the\nobstacle or to bring about the needed relation between the agent and the\nthing to be acted upon. This agent requires another agent, and so it\ngoes _ad infinitum_. As this is impossible, we must stop somewhere with\nan agent that is always actual and in one condition. This agent cannot\nbe material, but must be a \"separate\" (24). But the _separate_ in which\nthere is no kind of potentiality and which exists _per se_, is God. As\nwe have already proved him incorporeal, he is one (16).[274]\n\nWe must now analyze the expressions _incorporeal_ and _one_, and see\nwhat in strictness they imply, and how our logical deductions agree with\nScripture. Many persons, misled by the metaphorical expressions in the\nBible, think of God as having a body with organs and senses on the\nanalogy of ours. Others are not so crude as to think of God in\nanthropomorphic terms, nor are they polytheists, and yet for the same\nreason, namely, misunderstanding of Scriptural expressions, ascribe a\nplurality of essential attributes to God. We must therefore insist on\nthe absolute incorporeality of God and explain the purpose of Scripture\nin expressing itself in anthropomorphic terms, and on the other hand\nemphasize the absolute unity of God against the believers in essential\nattributes.\n\nBelief in God as body or as liable to suffer affection is worse than\nidolatry. For the idolater does not deny the existence of God; he merely\nmakes the mistake of supposing that the image of his own construction\nresembles a being which mediates between him and God. And yet because\nthis leads to erroneous belief on the part of the people, who are\ninclined to worship the image itself instead of God (for the people\ncannot discriminate between the outward act and its idea), the Bible\npunishes idolatry with death, and calls the idolater a man who angers\nGod. How much more serious is the error of him who thinks God is body!\nHe entertains an error regarding the nature of God directly, and surely\ncauses the anger of God to burn. Habit and custom and the evidence of\nthe literal understanding of the Biblical text are no more an excuse for\nthis erroneous belief than they are for idolatry; for the idolater, too,\nhas been brought up in his wrong ideas and is confirmed in them by some\nfalse notions. If a man is not himself able to reason out the truth,\nthere is no excuse for his refusing to listen to one who has reasoned it\nout. A person is not an unbeliever for not being able to _prove_ the\nincorporeality of God. He _is_ an unbeliever if he thinks God is\ncorporeal.[275]\n\nThe expressions in the Bible which have led many to err so grievously in\ntheir conceptions of God are due to a desire on the part of their\nauthors to show all people, the masses including women and children,\nthat God exists and is possessed of all perfection, that he is existent,\nliving, wise, powerful, and active. Hence it was necessary to speak of\nhim as body, for this is the only thing that suggests real existence to\nthe masses. It was necessary to endow him with motion, as this alone\ndenotes life; to ascribe to him seeing, hearing, and so on, in order to\nindicate that he understands; to represent him as speaking, in order to\nshow that he communicates with prophets, because to the minds of common\npeople this is the only way in which ideas are communicated from one\nperson to another. As we are active by our sense of touch, God, too, is\ndescribed as doing. He is given a soul, to denote that he is alive. Then\nas all these activities are among us done by means of organs, these also\nare ascribed to God, as feet, hands, ear, eye, nose, mouth, tongue,\nvoice, fingers, palm, arm. In other words, to show that God has all\nperfections, certain senses are ascribed to him; and to indicate these\nsenses the respective organs are related to them, organs of motion to\ndenote life, of sensation to denote understanding, of touch to denote\nactivity, of speech to denote revelation. As a matter of fact, however,\nsince all these organs and perceptions and powers in man and animals are\ndue to imperfection and are for the purpose of satisfying various wants\nfor the preservation of the individual or the species, and God has no\nwants of any kind, he has no such powers or organs.[276]\n\nHaving disposed of crude anthropomorphism we must now take up the\nproblem of attributes, which endangers the unity. It is a self-evident\ntruth that an attribute is something different from the essence of a\nthing. It is an accident added to the essence. Otherwise it is the thing\nover again, or it is the definition of the thing and the explanation of\nthe name, and signifies that the thing is composed of these elements. If\nwe say God has many attributes, it will follow that there are many\neternals. The only belief in true unity is to think that God is one\nsimple substance without composition or multiplicity of elements, but\none in all respects and aspects. Some go so far as to say that the\ndivine attributes are neither God's essence nor anything outside of his\nessence. This is absurd. It is saying words which have nothing\ncorresponding to them in fact. A thing is either the same as another, or\nit is not the same. There is no other alternative. The imagination is\nresponsible for this error. Because bodies as we know them always have\nattributes, they thought that God, too, is made up of many essential\nelements or attributes.\n\nAttributes may be of five kinds:\n\n1. The attributes of a thing may be its definition, which denotes its\nessence as determined by its causes. This everyone will admit cannot be\nin God, for God has no cause, hence cannot be defined.\n\n2. An attribute may consist of a part of a definition, as when we say,\n\"man is rational,\" where the attribute rational is part of the\ndefinition of man, \"rational animal\" being the whole definition. This\ncan apply to God no more than the first; for if there is a part in God's\nessence, he is composite.\n\n3. An attribute may be an expression which characterizes not the essence\nof the thing but its quality. Quality is one of the nine categories of\naccident, and God has no accidents.\n\n4. An attribute may indicate relation, such as father, master, son,\nslave. At first sight it might seem as if this kind of attribute may be\napplicable to God; but after reflection we find that it is not. There\ncan be no relation of time between God and anything else; because time\nis the measure of motion, and motion is an accident of body. God is not\ncorporeal. In the same way it is clear that there cannot be a relation\nof place between God and other things. But neither can there be any\nother kind of relation between God and his creation. For God is a\nnecessary existent, while everything else is a possible existent. A\nrelation exists only between things of the same proximate species, as\nbetween white and black. If the things have only a common genus, and\nstill more so if they belong to two different genera, there is no\nrelation between them. If there were a relation between God and other\nthings, he would have the accident of relation, though relation is the\nleast serious of attributes, since it does not necessitate a\nmultiplicity of eternals, nor change in God's essence owing to change in\nthe related things.\n\n5. An attribute may characterize a thing by reference to its effects or\nworks, not in the sense that the thing or author of the effect has\nacquired a character by reason of the product, like carpenter, painter,\nblacksmith, but merely in the sense that he is the one who made a\nparticular thing. An attribute of this kind is far removed from the\nessence of the thing so characterized by it; and hence we may apply it\nto God, provided we remember that the varied effects need not be\nproduced by different elements in the agent, but are all done by the one\nessence.\n\nThose who believe in attributes divide them into two classes, and number\nthe following four as _essential_ attributes, not derived from God's\neffects like \"creator,\" which denotes God's relation to his work, since\nGod did not create himself. The four essential attributes about which\nall agree are, living, powerful, wise, possessed of will. Now if by wise\nis meant God's knowledge of himself, there might be some reason for\ncalling it an essential attribute; though in that case it implies\n\"living,\" and there is no need of two. But they refer the attribute wise\nto God's knowledge of the world, and then there is no reason for calling\nit an essential attribute any more than the word \"creator,\" for example.\nIn the same way \"powerful\" and \"having will\" cannot refer to himself,\nbut to his actions. We therefore hold that just as we do not say that\nthere is something additional in his essence by which he created the\nheavens, something else with which he created the elements, and a third\nwith which he created the Intelligences, so we do not say that he has\none attribute with which he exercises power, another with which he\nwills, a third with which he knows, and so on, but his essence is simple\nand one.[277]\n\nFour things must be removed from God: (1) corporeality, (2) affection,\n(3) potentiality, (4) resemblance to his creatures. The first we have\nalready proved. The second implies change, and the author of the change\ncannot be the same as he who suffers the change and feels the affection.\nIf then God were subject to affection, there would be another who would\ncause the change in him. So all want must be removed from him; for he\nwho is in want of something is potential, and in order to pass into\nactuality requires an agent having that quality _in actu_. The fourth is\nalso evident; for resemblance involves relation. As there is no relation\nbetween God and ourselves, there is no resemblance. Resemblance can\nexist only between things of the same species. All the expressions\nincluding \"existent\" are applied to God and to ourselves in a homonymous\nsense (_cf._ above, p. 240). The use is not even analogical; for in\nanalogy there must be some resemblance between the things having the\nsame name, but not so here. Existence in things which are determined by\ncauses (and this includes all that is not God), is not identical with\nthe essence of those things. The essence is that which is expressed in\nthe definition, whereas the existence or non-existence of the thing so\ndefined is not part of the definition. It is an accident added to the\nessence. In God the case is different. His existence has no cause, since\nhe is a necessary existent; hence his existence is identical with his\nessence. So we say God exists, but not with existence, as we do.\nSimilarly he is living, but not with life; knowing, but not with\nknowledge; powerful, but not with power; wise, but not with wisdom.\nUnity and plurality are also accidents of things which are one or many\nas the case may be. They are accidents of the category of quantity. God,\nwho is a necessary existent and simple cannot be one any more than many.\nHe is one, but not with unity. Language is inadequate to express our\nideas of God. Wishing to say he is not many, we have to say he is one;\nthough one as well as many pertains to the accidents of quantity. To\ncorrect the inexactness of the expression, we add, \"but not with unity.\"\nSo we say \"eternal\" to indicate that he is not \"new,\" though in reality\neternal is an accident of time, which in turn is an accident of motion,\nthe latter being dependent upon body. In reality neither \"eternal\" nor\n\"new\" is applicable to God. When we say one, we mean merely that there\nis none other like him; and when Scripture speaks of him as the first\nand the last, the meaning is that he does not change.\n\nThe only true attributes of God are the negative ones. Negative\nattributes, too, by excluding the part of the field in which the thing\nto be designated is not contained, bring us nearer to the thing itself;\nthough unlike positive attributes they do not designate any part of the\nthing itself. God cannot have positive attributes because he has no\nessence different from his existence for the attributes to designate,\nand surely no accidents. Negative attributes are of value in leading us\nto a knowledge of God, because in negation no plurality is involved. So\nwhen we have proved that there is a being beside these sensible and\nintelligible things, and we say he is existent, we mean that his\nnon-existence is unthinkable. In the same way living means not dead;\nincorporeal is negative; eternal signifies not caused; powerful means\nnot weak; wise--not ignorant; willing denotes that creation proceeds\nfrom him not by natural necessity like heat from fire or light from the\nsun, but with purpose and design and method. All attributes therefore\nare either derived from God's effects or, if they have reference to\nhimself, are meant to exclude their opposites, _i. e._, are really\nnegatives. This does not mean, however, that God is devoid of a quality\nwhich he might have, but in the sense in which we say a stone does not\nsee, meaning that it does not pertain to the nature of the stone to\nsee.[278]\n\nAll the names of God except the tetragrammaton designate his activities\nin the world. Jhvh alone is the real name of God, which belongs to him\nalone and is not derived from anything else. Its meaning is unknown. It\ndenotes perhaps the idea of necessary existence. All the other so-called\ndivine names used by the writers of talismans and charms are quite\nmeaningless and absurd. The wonderful claims these people bespeak for\nthem are not to be believed by any intelligent man.[279]\n\nThe above account of Maimonides's doctrine of attributes shows us that\nhe followed the same line of thought as his predecessors. His treatment\nis more thorough and elaborate, and his requirements of the religionist\nmore stringent. He does not even allow attributes of relation, which\nwere admitted by Ibn Daud. Negative attributes and those taken from\nGod's effects are the only expressions that may be applied to God. This\nis decidedly not a Jewish mode of conceiving of God, but it is not even\nAristotelian. Aristotle has very little to say about God's attributes,\nit is true, but there seems no warrant in the little he does say for\nsuch an absolutely transcendental and agnostic conception as we find in\nMaimonides. To Aristotle God is pure form, thought thinking itself. In\nso far as he is thought we may suppose him to be similar in kind, though\nnot in degree, to human thought. The only source of Maimonides's ideas\nis to be sought in Neo-Platonism, in the so-called Theology of Aristotle\nwhich, however, Maimonides never quotes. He need not have used it\nhimself. He was a descendant of a long line of thinkers, Christian,\nMohammedan and Jewish, in which this problem was looked at from a\nNeo-Platonic point of view; and the Theology of Aristotle had its share\nin forming the views of his predecessors. The idea of making God\ntranscendent appealed to Maimonides, and he carried it to the limit. How\nhe could combine such transcendence with Jewish prayer and ceremony it\nis hard to tell; but it would be a mistake to suppose that his\nphilosophical deductions represented his last word on the subject. As in\nPhilo so in Maimonides, his negative theology was only a means to a\npositive. Its purpose was to emphasize God's perfection. And in the\nadmission, nay maintenance, of man's inability to understand God lies\nthe solution of the problem we raised above. Prayer _is_ answered, man\n_is_ protected by divine Providence; and if we cannot understand how, it\nis because the matter is beyond our limited intellect.\n\nHaving discussed the existence and nature of God, our next problem is\nthe existence of angels and their relation to the \"Separate\nIntelligences\" of the philosophers. In this matter, too, Ibn Daud\nanticipated Maimonides, though the latter is more elaborate in his\nexposition as well as criticism of the extreme philosophic view. He\nadopts as much of Aristotelian (or what he thought was Aristotelian)\ndoctrine as is compatible in his mind with the Bible and subject to\nrigorous demonstration, and rejects the rest on philosophic as well as\nreligious grounds.\n\nThe existence of separate intelligences he proves in the same way as Ibn\nDaud from the motions of the celestial spheres. These motions cannot be\npurely \"natural,\" _i. e._, unconscious and involuntary like the\nrectilinear motions of the elements, fire, air, water and earth, because\nin that case they would stop as soon as they came to their natural\nplace, as is true of the elements (_cf._ above, p. xxxiii); whereas the\nspheres actually move in a circle and never stop. We must therefore\nassume that they are endowed with a soul, and their motions are\nconscious and voluntary. But it is not sufficient to regard them as\nirrational creatures, for on this hypothesis also their motions would\nhave to cease as soon as they attained the object of their desire, or\nescaped the thing they wish to avoid. Neither object can be accomplished\nby circular motion, for one approaches in this way the thing from which\none flees, and flees the object which one approaches. The only way to\naccount for continuous circular motion is by supposing that the sphere\nis endowed with reason or intellect, and that its motion is due to a\ndesire on its part to attain a certain conception. God is the object of\nthe conception of the sphere, and it is the love of God, to whom the\nsphere desires to become similar, that is the cause of the sphere's\nmotion. So far as the sphere is a body, it can accomplish this only by\ncircular motion; for this is the only continuous act possible for a\nbody, and it is the simplest of bodily motions.\n\nSeeing, however, that there are many spheres having different kinds of\nmotions, varying in speed and direction, Aristotle thought that this\ndifference must be due to the difference in the objects of their\nconceptions. Hence he posited as many separate Intelligences as there\nare spheres. That is, he thought that intermediate between God and the\nrational spheres there are pure incorporeal intelligences, each one\nmoving its own sphere as a loved object moves the thing that loves it.\nAs the number of spheres were in his day thought to be fifty, he assumed\nthere were fifty separate Intelligences. The mathematical sciences in\nAristotle's day were imperfect, and the astronomers thought that for\nevery motion visible in the sky there must be a sphere, not knowing that\nthe inclination of one sphere may be the cause of a number of apparent\nmotions. Later writers making use of the more advanced state of\nastronomical science, reduced the number of Intelligences to ten,\ncorresponding to the ten spheres as follows: the seven planetary\nspheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, the diurnal sphere embracing\nthem all and giving all of them the motion from east to west, and the\nsphere of the elements surrounding the earth. Each one of these is in\ncharge of an Intelligence. The last separate Intelligence is the Active\nIntellect, which is the cause of our mind's passing from potentiality to\nactuality, and of the various processes of sublunar life generally.\n\nThese are the views of Aristotle and his followers concerning the\nseparate Intelligences. And in a general way his views, says Maimonides,\nare not incompatible with the Bible. What he calls Intelligences the\nScriptures call angels. Both are pure forms and incorporeal. Their\nrationality is indicated in the nineteenth Psalm, \"The heavens declare\nthe glory of God.\" That God rules the world through them is evident from\na number of passages in Bible and Talmud. The plural number in \"Let _us_\nmake man in our image\" (Gen. 1, 26), \"Come, let _us_ go down and confuse\ntheir speech\" (_ib._ 11, 7) is explained by the Rabbis in the statement\nthat \"God never does anything without first looking at the celestial\n'familia.'\" (Bab. Talm. Sanhedrin 38b.) The word \"looking\" (\"Mistakkel\")\nis striking;[280] for it is the very expression Plato uses when he says\nthat God looks into the world of Ideas and produces the universe.[281]\n\nFor once Maimonides in the last Rabbinic quotation actually hit upon a\npassage which owes its content to Alexandrian and possibly Philonian\ninfluence. Having no idea of the Alexandrian School and of the works of\nPhilo and his relation to some theosophic passages in the Haggadah, he\nmade no distinction between Midrash and Bible, and read Plato and\nAristotle in both alike, as we shall see more particularly later.\n\nMaimonides's detailed criticism of Aristotle we shall see later. For the\npresent he agrees that the philosophic conception of separate\nIntelligences is the same as the Biblical idea of angels with this\nexception that according to Aristotle these Intelligences and powers are\nall eternal and proceed from God by natural necessity, whereas the\nJewish view is that they are created. God created the separate\nIntelligences; he likewise created the spheres as rational beings and\nimplanted in them a desire for the Intelligences which accounts for\ntheir various motions.\n\nNow Maimonides has prepared the ground and is ready to take up the\nquestion of the origin of the world, which was left open above. He\nenumerates three views concerning this important matter.\n\n1. _The Biblical View._ God created everything out of nothing. Time\nitself is a creation, which did not exist when there was no world. For\ntime is a measure of motion, and motion cannot be without a moving\nthing. Hence no motion and no time without a world.\n\n2. _The Platonic View._ The world as we see it now is subject to genesis\nand decay; hence it originated in time. But God did not make it out of\nnothing. That a composite of matter and form should be made out of\nnothing or should be reduced to nothing is to the Platonists an\nimpossibility like that of a thing being and not being at the same time,\nor the diagonal of a square being equal to its side. Therefore to say\nthat God cannot do it argues no defect in him. They believe therefore\nthat there is an eternal matter, the effect of God to be sure, but\nco-eternal with him, which he uses as the potter does the clay.\n\n3. _The Aristotelian View._ Time and motion are eternal. The heavens and\nthe spheres are not subject to genesis and decay, hence they were always\nas they are now. And the processes of change in the lower world existed\nfrom eternity as they exist now. Matter is not subject to genesis and\ndecay; it simply takes on forms one after the other, and this has been\ngoing on from eternity. It results also from his statements, though he\ndoes not say it in so many words, that it is impossible there should be\na change in God's will. He is the cause of the universe, which he\nbrought into being by his will, and as his will does not change, the\nuniverse has existed this way from eternity.\n\nThe arguments of Aristotle and his followers by which they defend their\nview of the eternity of the world are based partly upon the nature of\nthe world, and partly upon the nature of God. Some of these arguments\nare as follows:\n\nMotion is not subject to beginning and end. For everything that comes\ninto being after a state of non-existence requires motion to precede it,\nnamely, the actualization from non-being. Hence if motion came into\nbeing, there was motion before motion, which is a contradiction. As\nmotion and time go together, time also is eternal.\n\nAgain, the prime matter common to the four elements is not subject to\ngenesis and decay. For all genesis is the combination of a pre-existing\nmatter with a new form, namely, the form of the generated thing. If\ntherefore the prime matter itself came into being, there must be a\nprevious matter from which it came, and the thing that resulted must be\nendowed with form. But this is impossible, since the prime matter has no\nmatter before it and is not endowed with form.\n\nAmong the proofs derived from the nature of God are the following:\n\nIf God brought forth the world from non-existence, then before he\ncreated it he was a creator potentially and then became a creator\nactually. There is then potentiality in the creator, and there must be a\ncause which changed him from a potential to an actual creator.\n\nAgain, an agent acts at a particular time and not at another because of\nreasons and circumstances preventing or inducing action. In God there\nare no accidents or hindrances. Hence he acts always.\n\nAgain, how is it possible that God was idle an eternity and only\nyesterday made the world? For thousands of years and thousands of worlds\nbefore this one are after all as yesterday in comparison with God's\neternity.\n\nThese arguments Maimonides answers first by maintaining that Aristotle\nhimself, as can be inferred from his manner, does not regard his\ndiscussions favoring the eternity of the world as scientific\ndemonstrations. Besides, there is a fundamental flaw in Aristotle's\nentire attitude to the question of the ultimate principles and\nbeginnings of things. All his arguments in favor of eternity of motion\nand of the world are based upon the erroneous assumption that the world\nas a whole must have come into being in the same way as its parts appear\nnow after the world is here. According to this supposition it is easy to\nprove that motion must be eternal, that matter is not subject to\ngenesis, and so on. Our contention is that at the beginning, when God\ncreated the world, there were not these laws; that he created matter\n_out of nothing_, and then made it the basis of all generation and\ndestruction.\n\nWe can also answer the arguments in favor of eternity taken from the\nnature of God. The first is that God would be passing from potentiality\nto actuality if he made the world at a particular time and not before,\nand there would be need of a cause producing this passage. Our answer\nis that this applies only to material things but not to immaterial,\nwhich are always active whether they produce visible results or not. The\nterm action is a homonym (_cf._ above, p. 240), and the conditions\napplying to it in the ordinary usage do not hold when we speak of God.\n\nNor is the second argument conclusive. An agent whose will is determined\nby a purpose external to himself is subject to influences positive and\nnegative, which now induce, now hinder his activity. A person desires to\nhave a house and does not build it by reason of obstacles of various\nsorts. When these are removed, he builds the house. In the case of an\nagent whose will has no object external to itself this does not hold. If\nhe does not act always, it is because it is the nature of will sometimes\nto will and sometimes not. Hence this does not argue change.[282]\n\nSo far our results have been negative. We have not proved that God did\ncreate the world in time; we have only taken the edge off the\nAristotelian arguments and thereby shown that the doctrine of creation\nis not impossible. We must now proceed to show that there are positive\nreasons which make creation a more plausible theory than eternity.\n\nThe gist of Maimonides's arguments here is that the difference between\neternity and creation resolves itself into a more fundamental difference\nbetween an impersonal mechanical law as the explanation of the universe\nand an intelligent personality acting with will, purpose and design.\nAristotle endeavors to explain all motions in the world above the moon\nas well as below in terms of mechanics. He succeeds pretty well as far\nas the sublunar world is concerned, and no one who is free from\nprejudice can fail to see the cogency of his reasoning. If he were just\nas convincing in his explanation of celestial phenomena on the\nmechanical principle as he is in his interpretation of sublunar events,\neternity of the world would be a necessary consequence. Uniformity and\nabsolute necessity of natural law are more compatible with an eternal\nworld than with a created one. But Aristotle's method breaks down the\nmoment he leaves the sublunar sphere. There are too many phenomena\nunaccounted for in his system.\n\nAristotle tries to find a reason why the heavens move from east to west\nand not in the opposite direction; and his explanation for the\ndifference in speed of the motions of the various spheres is that it is\ndue to their relative proximity to the outer sphere, which is the cause\nof this motion and which it communicates to all the other spheres under\nit. But his reasons are inadequate, for some of the swift moving spheres\nare below the slow moving and some are above. When he says that the\nreason the sphere of the fixed stars moves so slowly from west to east\nis because it is so near to the diurnal sphere (the outer sphere), which\nmoves from east to west, his explanation is wonderfully clever.[283] But\nwhen he infers from this that the farther a sphere is from the fixed\nstars the more rapid is its motion from west to east, his conclusion is\nnot true to fact. Or let us consider the existence of the stars in the\nspheres. The matter of the stars must be different from that of the\nspheres, for the latter move, whereas the stars are always stationary.\nNow what has put these two different matters together? Stranger still is\nthe existence and distribution of the fixed stars in the eighth sphere.\nSome parts are thickly studded with stars, others are very thin. In the\nplanetary spheres what is the reason (since the sphere is simple and\nuniform throughout) that the star occupies the particular place that it\ndoes? This can scarcely be a matter of necessity. It will not do to say\nthat the differences in the motions of the spheres are due to the\nseparate Intelligences for which the respective spheres have a desire.\nFor the Intelligences are not bodies, and hence do not occupy any\nposition relative to the spheres. There must therefore be a being who\ndetermines their various motions.\n\nFurther, it is argued on the philosophical side that from a simple cause\nonly a simple effect can follow; and that if the cause is composite, as\nmany effects will follow as there are simple elements in the cause.\nHence from God directly can come only one simple Intelligence. This\nfirst Intelligence produces the second, the second produces the third,\nand so on (_cf._ above, p. 178). Now according to this idea, no matter\nhow many Intelligences are produced in this successive manner, the last,\neven if he be the thousandth, would have to be simple. Where then does\ncomposition arise? Even if we grant that the farther the Intelligences\nare removed from the first cause the more composite they become by\nreason of the composite nature of their ideas or thoughts, how can we\nexplain the emanation of a sphere from an Intelligence, seeing that the\none is body, the other Intellect? Granting again this also on the ground\nthat the Intelligence producing the sphere is composite (since it thinks\nitself and another), and hence one of its parts produces the next lower\nIntelligence and the other the sphere, there is still this difficulty\nthat the part of the Intelligence producing the sphere is simple,\nwhereas the sphere has four elements--the matter and the form of the\nsphere, and the matter and the form of the star fixed in the sphere.\n\nAll these are difficulties arising from the Aristotelian theory of\nmechanical causation, necessity of natural law and eternity of the\nworld. And they are all removed at a stroke when we substitute\nintelligent cause working with purpose, will and design. To be sure, by\nfinding difficulties attaching to a theory we do not disprove it, much\nless do we prove our own. But we should follow the view of Alexander,\nwho says that where a theory is not proved one should adopt the view\nwhich has the least number of objections. This, we shall show, is the\ncase in the doctrine of creation. We have already pointed out a number\nof difficulties attaching to the Aristotelian view, which are solved if\nwe adopt creation. And there are others besides. It is impossible to\nexplain the heavenly motions as a necessary mechanical system. The\nhypotheses made by Ptolemy to account for the apparent motions conflict\nwith the principles of the Aristotelian Physics. According to these\nprinciples there is no motion of translation, _i. e._, there is no\nchange of place, in the heavenly spheres. Also there are three kinds of\nmotion in the world, toward the centre (water, earth), away from the\ncentre (air, fire) and around the centre (the celestial spheres). Also\nmotion in a circle must be around a fixed centre. All these principles\nare violated in the theories of the epicycle and eccentric, especially\nthe first. For the epicycle is a sphere which changes place in the\ncircumference of the large sphere.\n\nFinally, an important objection to the doctrine of eternity as taught by\nAristotle, involving as it does necessity and absolute changelessness of\nnatural phenomena, is that it subverts the foundations of religion, and\ndoes away with miracles and signs. The Platonic view (_cf._ above, p.\n269) is not so bad and does not necessitate the denial of miracles; but\nthere is no need of forcing the Biblical texts to that opinion so long\nas it has not been proved. As long as we believe in creation all\npossible questions concerning the reasons for various phenomena such as\nprophecy, the various laws, the selection of Israel, and so on, can be\nanswered by reference to the will of God, which we do not understand.\nIf, however, the world is a mechanical necessity, all these questions\narise and demand an answer.[284]\n\nIt will be seen that Maimonides's objections to eternity and mechanical\nnecessity (for these two are necessarily connected in his mind), are\ntwofold, philosophic and religious. The latter objection we may conceive\nMaimonides to insist upon if he were living to-day. Mechanical necessity\nas a universal explanation of phenomena would exclude free will and the\nefficacy of prayer as ordinarily understood, though not necessarily\nmiracles, if we mean by miracle simply an extraordinary phenomenon not\nexplicable by the laws of nature as we know them, and happening only on\nrare occasions. But in reality this is not what we mean by miracle. A\nmiracle is a discontinuity in the laws of nature brought to pass on a\nspecial occasion by a personal being in response to a prayer or in order\nto realize a given purpose. In this sense miracles are incompatible with\nthe doctrine of necessity, and Maimonides's objections hold to-day,\nexcept for those to whom religion is independent of the Bible, tradition\nor any external authority.\n\nAs concerns the scientific objections, the case is different. We may\nallow Maimonides's negative criticism of the Aristotelian arguments,\nnamely, that they are not convincing. His positive criticism that\nAristotle's interpretation of phenomena on the mechanical principle does\nnot explain all the facts is not valid. Aristotle may be wrong in his\nactual explanations of particular phenomena and yet be correct in his\nmethod. Modern science, in fact, has adopted the mechanical method of\ninterpreting phenomena, assuming that this is the only way in which\nscience can exist at all. And if there is any domain in which mechanical\ncausation is still denied, it is not the celestial regions about which\nMaimonides was so much concerned--the motions of the heavenly bodies\nhave been reduced to uniformity in accordance with natural law quite as\ndefinitely as, and in some cases more definitely than, some terrestrial\nphenomena--but the regions of life, mind and will. In these domains the\ndiscussion within the scientific and philosophic folds is still going\non. But in inanimate nature modern science has succeeded in justifying\nits method by the ever increasing number of phenomena that yield to its\ntreatment. Maimonides fought an obsolete philosophy and obsolete\nscientific principles. It is possible that he might have found much to\nobject to in modern science as well, on the ground that much is yet\nunexplained. But an objection of this sort is captious, particularly if\nwe consider what Maimonides desires to place in science's stead. Science\nis doing its best to classify all natural phenomena and to discover the\nuniformities underlying their behavior. It has succeeded admirably and\nis continually widening its sphere of activity. It has been able to\npredict as a result of its method. The principle of uniformity and\nmechanical necessity is becoming more and more generally verified with\nevery new scientific discovery and invention.\n\nAnd what does Maimonides offer us in its stead? The principle of\nintelligent purpose and design. This, he says, is not open to the\nobjections which apply to the Aristotelian principles and methods. It is\nas if one said the coward is a better man than the brave warrior,\nbecause the latter is open to the danger of being captured, wounded or\nkilled, whereas the former is not so liable. The answer obviously would\nbe that the only way the coward escapes the dangers mentioned is by\nrunning away, by refusing to fight. Maimonides's substitution is\ntantamount to a refusal to fight, it is equivalent to flight from the\nfield of battle.\n\nAristotle tries to explain the variation in speed of the different\ncelestial motions, and succeeds indifferently. Another man coming after\nAristotle and following the same method may succeed better. This has\nactually been the case. Leverrier without ever looking into a telescope\ndiscovered Neptune, and told the observers in what part of the heavens\nthey should look for the new planet. Substitute Maimonides's principle,\nand death to science! Why do the heavenly bodies move as they do?\nMaimonides replies in effect, because so God's wisdom has determined and\nhis wisdom is transcendent. There is no further impulse to investigation\nin such an answer. It is the reply of the obscurantist, and it is very\nsurprising that Maimonides the rationalist should so far have forgotten\nhis own ideal of reason and enlightenment. He is here playing into the\nhands of those very Mutakallimun whom he so severely criticises. They\nwere more consistent. Distrustful of the irreligious consequences of the\nphilosophical theories of Aristotle and his Arabian followers, they\ndeliberately denied causation and natural law, and substituted the will\nof God as interfering continuously in the phenomena of nature. A red\nobject continues red because and as long as God creates the \"accident\"\nred and attaches it to the atoms of which the object is composed. Fire\ntaking hold of wood burns it and reduces it to ashes because God wills\nat the particular moment that this shall be the result. The next moment\nGod may will otherwise and the fire and the wood will lie down in peace\ntogether and no harm done. This makes miracles possible and easy.\nMaimonides would not think of going so far; he has no names harsh enough\nto describe this unscientific, unphilosophic, illogical, irrational,\npurely imaginary procedure. But we find that he is himself guilty of the\nsame lack of scientific insight when he rejects a method because it is\nnot completely successful, and substitutes something else which will\nalways be successful because it will never tell us anything at all and\nwill stifle all investigation. Were Maimonides living in our day, we may\nsuppose he would be more favorably inclined to the mechanical principle\nas a scientific method.\n\nHaving laid the philosophical foundations of religion in proving the\nexistence, unity and incorporeality of God, and purposeful creation in\ntime, Maimonides proceeds to the more properly religious doctrines of\nJudaism, and begins with the phenomenon of prophecy. Here also he\nfollows Aristotelian ideas as expressed in the writings of the Arabs\nAlfarabi and Avicenna, and was anticipated among the Jews by Ibn Daud.\nHis distinction here as elsewhere is that he went further than his model\nin the manner of his elaboration of the doctrine.\n\nHe cites three opinions concerning prophecy:\n\n1. _The Opinion of the Masses._ God chooses any person he desires, be he\nyoung or old, wise or ignorant, and inspires him with the prophetic\nspirit.\n\n2. _The Opinion of the Philosophers._ Prophecy is a human gift and\nrequires natural aptitude and hard preparation and study. But given\nthese qualifications, and prophecy is sure to come.\n\n3. _The Opinion of Judaism._ This is very much like that of the\nphilosophers, the only difference being that a man may have all the\nqualifications and yet be prevented from prophesying if God, by way of\npunishment, does not desire that he should.\n\nProphecy is an inspiration from God, which passes through the mediation\nof the Active Intellect to the rational power first and then to the\nfaculty of the imagination. It is the highest stage a man can attain and\nis not open to everyone. It requires perfection in theoretical wisdom\nand in morals, and perfect development of the imaginative power. This\nlatter does its work when the senses are at rest, giving rise to true\ndreams, and producing also prophetic visions. Dream and prophecy differ\nin degree, not in kind. What a man thinks hard in his waking state, that\nthe imagination works over in sleep. Now if a person has a perfect\nbrain; develops his mind as far as a man can; is pure morally; is eager\nto know the mysteries of existence, its causes and the First Cause; is\nnot susceptible to the purely animal desires, or to those of the\nspirited soul ambitious for dominion and honor--if a man has all these\nqualifications, he without doubt receives through his imagination from\nthe Active Intellect divine ideas. The difference in the grade of\nprophets is due to the difference in these three requirements--perfection\nof the reason, perfection of the imagination and perfection of moral\ncharacter.\n\nAccording to the character and development of their reasons and\nimaginations men may be divided into three classes.\n\n1. Those whose rational faculties are highly developed and receive\ninfluences from the Active Intellect, but whose imagination is defective\nconstitutionally, or is not under the influence of the Active Intellect.\nThese are wise men and philosophers.\n\n2. When the imagination also is perfect in constitution and well\ndeveloped under the influence of the Active Intellect, we have the class\nof prophets.\n\n3. When the imagination alone is in good condition, but the intellect is\ndefective, we have statesmen, lawgivers, magicians, dreamers of true\ndreams and occult artists. These men are so confused sometimes by\nvisions and reveries that they think they have the gift of prophecy.\n\nEach of the first two classes may be further divided into two according\nas the influence from above is just sufficient for the perfection of the\nindividual himself, or is so abundant as to cause the recipient to seek\nto impart it to others. We have then authors and teachers in the first\nclass, and preaching prophets in the second.\n\nAmong the powers we have in varying degrees are those of courage and\ndivination. These are innate and can be perfected if one has them in any\ndegree. By means of the power of divination we sometimes guess what a\nperson said or did under certain conditions, and guess truly. The result\nreally follows from a number of premises, but the mind passes over these\nso rapidly that it seems the guess was made instantaneously. The prophet\nmust have these two faculties in a high degree. Witness Moses braving\nthe wrath of a great king. Some prophets also have their rational powers\nmore highly developed than those of an ordinary person who perfects his\nreason by theoretical study. The same inspiration which renders the\nactivity of the imagination so vivid that it seems to it its perceptions\nare real and due to the external senses--this same inspiration acts also\nupon the rational power, and makes its ideas as certain as if they were\nderived by intellectual effort.\n\nThe prophetic vision (Heb. Mar`ah) is a state of agitation coming upon\nthe prophet in his waking state, as is clear from the words of Daniel,\n\"And I saw this great vision, and there remained no strength in me: for\nmy comeliness was turned in me into corruption, and I retained no\nstrength\" (Dan. 10, 8). In vision also the senses cease their functions,\nand the process is the same as in sleep.\n\nWhenever the Bible speaks of prophecy coming to anyone, it is always\nthrough an angel and in a dream or vision, whether this is specifically\nstated or not. The expression, \"And God came to ... in a dream of the\nnight,\" does not denote prophecy at all. It is merely a dream that comes\nto a person warning him of danger. Laban and Abimelech had such dreams,\nbut no one would credit these heathens with the prophetic power.\n\nWhenever an angel is met in Scripture speaking or communicating with a\nperson, it is always in a dream or vision. Examples are, Abraham and the\nthree men, Jacob wrestling with the angel, Balaam and the ass, Joshua\nand the angel at Jericho;--all these were in a dream or vision.\nSometimes there is no angel at all, but merely a voice that is heard by\nsuch as are not deserving of prophecy, for example Hagar, and Manoah and\nhis wife.\n\nThe prophets see images in their visions. These images are sometimes\ninterpreted in the vision itself; sometimes the interpretation does not\nappear until the prophet wakes up. Sometimes the prophet sees a\nlikeness, sometimes he sees God speaking to him, or an angel; or he\nhears an angel speaking to him, or sees a man speaking to him, or sees\nnothing at all but only hears a voice.\n\nIn this way we distinguish eleven grades of prophecy. The first two are\nonly preparatory, not yet constituting one who has them a prophet.\n\n1. When one is endowed by God with a great desire to save a community or\na famous individual, and he undertakes to bring it about, we have the\nfirst grade known as the \"Spirit of God.\" This was the position of the\nJudges. Moses always had this desire from the moment he could be called\na man, hence he killed the Egyptian and chided the two quarreling men,\nand delivered the daughters of Jethro from the shepherds, and so on. The\nsame is true of David. Not everyone, however, who has this desire is a\nprophet until he succeeds in doing a very great thing.\n\n2. When a person feels something come upon him and begins to\nspeak--words of wisdom and praise or of warning, or relating to social\nor religious conduct--all this while in a waking state and with full\nconsciousness, we have the second stage called the \"Holy Spirit.\" This\nis the inspiration which dictated the Psalms, the Proverbs,\nEcclesiastes, Song of Songs, Daniel, Job, Chronicles and the other\nsacred writings (Hagiographa). Balaam's discourses also belong to this\nclass. David, Solomon and Daniel belong here, and are not in the same\nclass with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Nathan, Ahiah, and so on. God spoke to\nSolomon through Ahiah the Shilonite; at other times he spoke to him in a\ndream, and when Solomon woke up, he knew it was a dream and not a\nprophecy. Daniel's visions were also in dreams. This is why his book is\nclassed in the third division of the Biblical writings (Hagiographa),\nand not in the second (Prophets).\n\n3. This is the first grade of real prophecy, _i. e._, when a prophet\nsees a picture in a dream under the proper conditions, and the picture\nis explained to him in the dream itself. Most of the dreams of Zechariah\nare of this nature.\n\n4. When he hears speech in a prophetic dream, but does not see the\nspeaker, as happened to Samuel in the beginning of his career.\n\n5. When a man speaks to him in a dream, as we find in some of the\nprophecies of Ezekiel, \"And the man said unto me, son of man....\"\n\n6. When an angel speaks to him in a dream. This is the condition of most\nprophets, as is indicated in the expression, \"And an angel of God said\nto me in a dream.\"\n\n7. When it seems to him in a prophetic dream as if God is speaking to\nhim; as we find in Isaiah, \"I saw the Lord ... and he said, whom shall I\nsend and who will go for us\" (Isa. 6, 1, 8).\n\n8. When a _vision_ appears to him and he sees pictures, like Abraham at\nthe covenant of the pieces (Gen. 15).\n\n9. When he hears words in a vision, as in the case of Abraham, \"And,\nbehold, the word of the Lord came unto him saying, This man shall not be\nthine heir\" (Gen. 15, 4).\n\n10. When he sees a man speaking to him in a prophetic vision. Examples,\nAbraham in the plain of Mamre, Joshua in Jericho.\n\n11. When he sees an angel speaking to him in a vision, like Abraham in\nthe sacrifice of Isaac. This is the highest degree of prophecy,\nexcepting Moses. The next higher stage would be that a prophet should\nsee God speaking to him in a vision. But this seems impossible, as it is\ntoo much for the imaginative faculty. In fact it is possible that in a\nvision speech is never heard at all, but only likenesses are seen. In\nthat case the eleven grades are reduced to eight.\n\nAll the details of actions and travels that are described in prophetic\nvisions must not be understood as having actually taken place, as for\nexample Hosea's marrying a harlot. They appear only in the prophet's\nvision or dream. Many expressions in the prophets are hyperbolical or\nmetaphorical, and must not be taken literally.\n\nMoses was the greatest of the prophets. He alone received his\ncommunications direct from God. All the others got their divine messages\nthrough an angel. Moses performed his miracles before the whole people\nas no one else did. The standing still of the sun produced by Joshua was\nnot in the presence of _all_ the people. Besides it may be the meaning\nis that that day seemed to the people the longest of any they\nexperienced in those regions. Moses alone, by reason of his superiority\nto all other prophets before or after, called the people to the Law. No\none before him did this, though there were many prophets before Moses.\nAbraham taught a few people, and so did others. But no one like Moses\nsaid to the people, \"The Lord sent me to you that you may do thus and\nso.\" After Moses all the prophets urge upon the people obedience to the\nlaw of Moses. This shows that the law of Moses will never change. For it\nis perfect, and any change in any direction would be for the worse.[285]\n\nFrom the theoretical part of philosophy we pass to the practical. This\nincludes ethics and other topics related thereto, theodicy, providence,\nfree will and its compatibility with God's omniscience. To give his\nethical doctrine a scientific character, Maimonides bases it upon a\nmetaphysical and psychological foundation. The doctrine of matter and\nform gives him a convenient formula underlying his ethical discussion.\nSin and vice are due to matter, virtue and goodness to form. For\nsensuous desires, which are due to matter, are at the basis of vice;\nwhereas intellectual pursuits, which constitute the noblest activity of\nthe soul, the form of the living body, lead to virtue. We may therefore\nstate man's ethical duty in broad philosophical terms as follows:\nDespise matter, and have to do with it only so far as is absolutely\nnecessary.[286] This is too general to be enlightening, and it is\nnecessary to have recourse to psychology. Ethics has for its\nsubject-matter the improvement and perfection of character. Making use\nof a medical analogy we may say that as it is the business of the\nphysician to cure the body, so it is the aim of the moral teacher to\ncure the soul. We may carry this figure further and conclude that as the\nphysician must know the anatomy and physiology of the body before he can\nundertake to cure it of its ills, so the moralist must know the nature\nof the soul and its powers or faculties.\n\nIn the details of his psychology Maimonides follows Alfarabi instead of\nAvicenna who was the model of Judah Halevi and Ibn Daud (pp. 175, 211).\n\nThe soul consists of five parts or faculties: the nutritive, the\nsensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive and the rational. The further\ndescription of the nutritive soul pertains to medicine and does not\nconcern us here. The sensitive soul contains the well known five senses.\nThe imaginative faculty is the power which retains the forms of sensible\nobjects when they are no longer present to the external senses. It also\nhas the function of original combination of sense elements into\ncomposite objects having no real existence in the outside world. This\nmakes the imagination an unreliable guide in matters intellectual.\n\nThe appetitive faculty is the power of the soul by which a person\ndesires a thing or rejects it. Acts resulting from it are the pursuit of\nan object and its avoidance; also the feelings of anger, favor, fear,\ncourage, cruelty, pity, love, hate, and so on. The organs of these\npowers, feelings and activities are the members of the body, like the\nhand, which takes hold of an object; the foot, which goes toward a thing\nor away from it; the eye, which looks; the heart, which takes courage or\nis stricken with fear; and so with the rest.\n\nThe rational faculty is the power of the soul by which a person\nreflects, acquires knowledge, discriminates between a praiseworthy act\nand a blameworthy. The functions of the rational soul are practical and\ntheoretical. The practical activity of the reason has to do with the\narts directly, as in learning carpentry, agriculture, medicine,\nseamanship; or it is concerned with reflecting upon the methods and\nprinciples of a given art. The theoretical reason has for its\nsubject-matter the permanent and unchangeable, what is known as science\nin the true sense of the term.[287]\n\nNow as far as the commandments, mandatory and prohibitive, of the Bible\nare concerned, the only parts of the soul which are involved are the\nsensitive and the appetitive. For these are the only powers subject to\ncontrol. The nutritive and the imaginative powers function in sleep as\nwell in waking, hence a person cannot be held responsible for their\nactivities, which are involuntary. There is some doubt about the\nrational faculty, but it seems that here too a person is responsible for\nthe opinions he holds, though no practical acts are involved.\n\nVirtues are divided into ethical and intellectual (dianoetic); and so\nare the contrary vices. The intellectual virtues are the excellencies of\nthe reason. Such are _science_, which consists in the knowledge of\nproximate and remote causes of things; _pure reason_, having to do with\nsuch innate principles as the axioms; _the acquired reason_, which we\ncannot discuss here; _clearness of perception_ and _quick insight_. The\nintellectual vices are the opposites or the contraries of these.\n\nThe ethical virtues are resident in the appetitive faculty. The\nsensitive soul is auxiliary to the appetitive. The number of these\nvirtues is large. Examples are; temperance, generosity, justice,\nmodesty, humility, contentment, courage, and so on. The vices of this\nclass are the above qualities carried to excess, or not practiced to the\nrequired extent. The faculties of nutrition and imagination have neither\nvirtues nor vices. We say a person's digestion is good or it is poor;\nhis imagination is correct or it is defective, but we do not attach the\nidea of virtue or vice to these conditions.\n\nVirtue is a permanent and enduring quality of the soul occupying an\nintermediate position between the two opposite extremes each of which is\na vice, sinning by exceeding the proper measure of the golden mean or by\nfalling short of it. A good act is that form of conduct which follows\nfrom a virtuous disposition as just defined. A bad act is the result of\na tendency of the soul to either of the two extremes, of excess or\ndefect. Thus temperance or moderation is a virtue. It is the mean\nbetween over-indulgence in the direction of excess, and insensibility or\nindifference in the direction of defect. The last two are vices.\nSimilarly generosity is a mean between niggardliness and extravagance;\ncourage is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice; dignity is a mean\nbetween haughtiness and loutishness; humility is a mean between\narrogance and self-abasement; contentment is a mean between avarice and\nslothful indifference; kindness is a mean between baseness and excessive\nself-denial; gentleness is a mean between irascibility and insensibility\nto insult; modesty is a mean between impudence and shamefacedness.\nPeople are often mistaken and regard one of the extremes as a virtue.\nThus the reckless and the foolhardy is often praised as the brave; the\nman of no backbone is called gentle; the indolent is mistaken for the\ncontented; the insensible for the temperate, the extravagant for the\ngenerous. This is an error. The mean alone is worthy of commendation.\n\nThe ethical virtues and vices are acquired as a result of repeated\npractice during a long time of the corresponding acts until they become\na confirmed habit and a second nature. A person is not born virtuous or\nvicious. What he will turn out to be depends upon the way he is trained\nfrom childhood. If his training has been wrong and he has acquired a\nvicious disposition in a particular tendency, he may be cured. And here\nwe may borrow a leaf from the book of medicine. As in bodily disease the\nphysician's endeavor is to restore the disturbed equilibrium in the\nmixture of the humors by increasing the element that is deficient, so in\ndiseases of the soul, if a person has a decided tendency to one of the\nvicious extremes, he must as a curative measure, for a certain length of\ntime, be directed to practice the opposite extreme until he has been\ncured. Then he may go back to the virtuous mean. Thus if a person has\nthe vice of niggardliness, the practice of liberality is not sufficient\nto cure him. As a heroic measure he must practice extravagance until the\nformer tendency has left him. Then he may return to the liberal mean.\nThe same thing applies to the other virtues, except that it is necessary\nto use proper judgment in the amount of practice of a vicious extreme\nnecessary to bring about a satisfactory result. Too great deviation and\ntoo long continued from the mean would in some cases be dangerous, as\nlikely to develop the opposite vice. Thus it is comparatively safe to\nindulge in extravagance as a cure for niggardliness; the reverse process\nmust be used with caution. Care should likewise be taken in trying to\nwean a person away from a habit of insensibility to pleasure by means of\na r\u00e9gime of indulgence. If it is not discontinued in time, he may become\na pleasure seeker, which is even worse than total indifference.\n\nIt is in this way that we must explain the conduct of certain pious men\nand saints who were not content with following the middle way, and\ninclined to one extreme, the extreme of asceticism and self-abasement.\nThey did this as a measure of cure, or because of the wickedness of\ntheir generation, whose example they feared would contaminate them by\nits contagion. Hence they lived a retired and solitary life, the life of\na recluse. It was not meant as the normal mode of conduct, which would\nbe as unwholesome to the soul as an invalid's drugs would be dangerous\nif taken regularly by a person of sound health.\n\nThe will of God is that we should follow the middle way and eat and\ndrink and enjoy ourselves in moderation. To be sure, we must be always\non our guard against slipping into the forbidden extreme, but it is not\nnecessary for this purpose to inflict additional burdens upon ourselves\nor to practice mortification of the flesh and abstention from food and\ndrink beyond what is prescribed in the Law. For many of the regulations\nin the Pentateuch have been laid down for this very purpose. The dietary\nlaws, the laws of forbidden marriages, the laws of tithes, the laws\nprescribing that the corner of the field, the dropped and forgotten\nears and the gleanings of the vintage should be left to the poor, the\nlaws of the sabbatical year, the Jubilee, and the regulations governing\ncharity--all these are intended to guard us against avarice and\nselfishness. Other laws and precepts are for the purpose of moderating\nour tendency to anger and rage, and so with all the other virtues and\nvices. Hence it is folly and overscrupulousness to add restrictions of\none's own accord except in critical instances, as indicated above.\n\nThe purpose of all human life and activity is to know God as far as it\nis possible for man. Hence all his activities should be directed to that\none end. His eating and drinking and sleeping and waking and motion and\nrest and pleasure should have for their object the maintenance of good\nhealth and cheerful spirits, not as an end in themselves, but as a means\nto intellectual peace and freedom from worry and care in order that he\nmay have leisure and ability to study and reflect upon the highest\ntruths of God. Good music, beautiful scenery, works of art, splendid\narchitecture and fine clothing should not be pursued for their own sake,\nbut only so far as they may be necessary to relieve the tedium and\nmonotony of toil and labor, or as a curative measure to dispel gloom and\nlow spirits or a tendency to melancholy. The same thing applies to the\narts and sciences. Medicine is of assistance in maintaining bodily\nhealth and curing it of its ills. The logical, mathematical and physical\nsciences are either directly helpful to speculative theology, and their\nvalue is evident; or they serve to train the mind in deduction and\nanalysis, and are thus indirectly of benefit for the knowledge of\nGod.[288]\n\nThe ethical qualities similarly conduce to intellectual perfection, and\nthe difference between one prophet and another is in large measure\ndependent upon relative ethical superiority. Thus when the Rabbis say\nthat Moses saw God through a luminous mirror, and the other prophets\nthrough a non-luminous, the meaning is that Moses had intellectual and\nmoral perfection, so far as a human being is capable of having them, and\nthe only partition separating him from a complete vision of God was his\nhumanity. The other prophets had other defects besides, constituting so\nmany additional partitions obscuring the divine view.[289]\n\nSome foolish astrologers are of the opinion that a man's character is\ndetermined in advance by the position of the stars at the time of his\nbirth. This is a grave error, as can be shown from reason as well as\ntradition. The Bible as well as the Greek philosophers are agreed that a\nman's acts are under his own control, and that he himself and no one\nelse is responsible for his virtues as well as his vices. It is true\nthat a person's temperament, which is constitutional and over which he\nhas no control, plays an important r\u00f4le in his conduct. There is no\ndenying that men are born with certain tendencies. Some are born\nphlegmatic, some are passionate and hot-blooded. One man has a tendency\nto fearlessness and bravery, another is timid and backward. But while it\nis true that it is more difficult for the hot-blooded to develop the\nvirtue of temperance and moderation than it is for the phlegmatic, that\nit is easier for the warm-tempered to learn courage than it is for the\ncold-tempered--these are not impossible. Virtue, we have seen before, is\nnot a natural state, but an acquired possession due to long continued\ndiscipline and practice. One man may require longer and more assiduous\npractice than another to acquire a certain virtue, but no matter what\nhis inherited temperament, he can acquire it if he undertakes to do so,\nor if properly trained. If man's character and conduct were determined,\nall the commandments and prohibitions in the Bible would be in vain, for\nwithout freedom command has no effect. Similarly there would be no use\nin a person's endeavoring to learn any trade or profession; for if it is\ndetermined beforehand that a given individual shall be a physician or a\ncarpenter, he is bound to be one whether he studies or not. This would\nmake all reward and punishment wrong and unjust whether administered by\nman or by God. For the person so rewarded or punished could not help\ndoing what he did, and is therefore not responsible. All our plans and\npreparations would on this supposition be useless and without meaning,\nsuch as building houses, acquiring food, avoiding danger, and so on. All\nthis is absurd and opposed to reason as well as to sense. It undermines\nthe foundation of religion and imputes wrong to God. The Bible says\ndistinctly, \"See, I have set before thee this day life and the good,\ndeath and the evil ... therefore choose thou life....\" (Deut. 30, 15,\n19.)\n\nThere are some passages in the Bible which apparently lend color to the\nidea that a person's acts are determined from on high. Such are the\nexpressions used in relation to Pharaoh's conduct toward the Israelites\nin refusing to let them go out of Egypt. We are told there that God\nhardened the heart of Pharaoh that he should not let the Israelites go.\nAnd he did this in order to punish the Egyptians. The criticism here is\ntwofold. First, these expressions indicate that a person is not always\nfree; and second, it seems scarcely just to force a man to act in a\ncertain way and then to punish him for it.\n\nThe explanation Maimonides gives to this passage is as follows: He\nadmits that in Pharaoh's case there was a restriction of Pharaoh's\nfreedom. But this was a penal measure and exceptional. Normally a man is\nfree, but he may forfeit this freedom if he abuses it. So Pharaoh's\nprimary offence was not that he would not let the children of Israel go\nout of Egypt. His sin consisted in his tyrannical treatment of Israel in\nthe past, which he did of his own accord and as a result of free choice.\nHis loss of freedom in complying with Moses's request to let the\nIsraelites go was already in the nature of a punishment, and its object\nwas to let all the world know that a person may forfeit his freedom of\naction as a punishment for abusing his human privilege. To be sure God\ndoes not always punish sin so severely, but it is not for us to search\nhis motives and ask why he punishes one man in one way and another in\nanother. We must leave this to his wisdom.\n\nAnother argument against free will is that it is incompatible with the\nknowledge of God. If God is omniscient and knows the future as well as\nthe past and the present, he knows how a given person will act at a\ngiven moment. But since God's knowledge is certain and not liable to\nerror, the person in question cannot help acting as God long foreknew he\nwould act, and hence his act is not the result of his free will.\nMaimonides's answer to this objection is virtually an admission of\nignorance. He takes refuge in the transcendence of God's knowledge, upon\nwhich he dwelt so insistently in the earlier part of his work (p. 260\nff.). God is not qualified by attributes as we his creatures are. As he\ndoes not live by means of life, so he does not know by means of\nknowledge. He knows through his own essence. He and his existence and\nhis knowledge are identical. Hence as we cannot know his essence, we\ncannot have any conception of his knowledge. It is mistaken therefore to\nargue that because we cannot know a future event unless it is already\ndetermined in the present, God cannot do so. His knowledge is of a\ndifferent kind from ours, and he can do what we cannot. [290]\n\nThe next problem Maimonides takes up is the doctrine of evil. The\npresence of evil in the world, physical as well as moral, was a\nstumbling block to all religious thinkers in the middle ages. The\ndifficulty seems to find its origin in Neo-Platonism, or, farther back\nstill, in Philo of Alexandria, who identified God with the Good. If he\nis the Good, evil cannot come from him. How then account for the evil in\nthe world? The answer that was given was extremely unsatisfactory. It\nwas founded on a metaphysical distinction which is as old as Plato,\nnamely, of matter as the non-existent. Matter was considered a principle\nwithout any definite nature or actual being, and this was made the basis\nof all imperfection, death, sin. Evil partakes of the non-existence of\nmatter, it is nothing positive, but only a negation or privation of good\nas darkness is the absence of light; hence it needs no creator, it has\nno efficient cause, but only a deficient cause. In this way physical\nevil was accounted for. Moral evil as the result of man's inhumanity to\nman could easily be explained by laying it to the charge of man's free\nwill or even to the free will of the fallen angels as Origen conceives\nit. This removes from God all responsibility for evil. We shall find\nthat Maimonides has nothing essentially new to contribute to the\nsolution of the problem.\n\nStrictly speaking, he says, only a positive thing can be made, negation\nor privation cannot. We may speak loosely of the negative being produced\nwhen one removes the positive. So if a man puts out a light, we say he\nmade darkness, though darkness is a negation.\n\nEvil is nothing but the negation of the positive, which is good. All\npositive things are good. Hence God cannot be said to produce evil. The\npositive thing which he produces is good; the evil is due to defect in\nthe thing. Matter also is good so far as it is positive, _i. e._, so far\nas it causes continued existence of one thing after another. The evil in\nmatter is due to its negative or privative aspect as the formless, which\nmakes it the cause of defect and evil. All evil that men do to each\nother is also due to negation, namely, absence of wisdom and knowledge.\n\nMany people think there is more evil in the world than good. Their\nmistake is due to the fact that they make the experience of the\nindividual man the arbiter in this question, thinking that the universe\nwas made for his sake. They forget that man is only a small fraction of\nthe world, which is made by the will of God. Even so man should be\ngrateful for the great amount of good he receives from God, for many of\nthe evils of man are self-inflicted. In fact the evils befalling man\ncome under three categories.\n\n1. The evil that is incident to man's nature as subject to genesis and\ndecay, _i. e._, as composed of matter. Hence arise the various accidents\nto which man is liable on account of bad air and other natural causes.\nThese are inevitable, and inseparable from matter, and from the\ngeneration of individuals in a species. To demand that a person of flesh\nand blood shall not be subject to impressions is a contradiction in\nterms. And with all this the evils of this class are comparatively few.\n\n2. They are the evils inflicted by one man upon the other. These are\nmore frequent than the preceding. Their causes are various. And yet\nthese too are not very frequent.\n\n3. These are the most common. They are the evils man brings upon himself\nby self-indulgence and the formation of bad habits. He injures the body\nby excess, and he injures the mind through the body by perverting and\nweakening it, and by enslaving it to luxuries to which there is no end.\nIf a person is satisfied with that which is necessary, he will easily\nhave what he needs; for the necessaries are not hard to get. God's\njustice is evident in affording the necessaries to all his creatures and\nin making all the individuals of the same species similar in power and\nability.[291]\n\nThe next problem Maimonides discusses is really theoretical and should\nhave its place in the discussion of the divine attributes, for it deals\nwith the character of God's knowledge. The reason for taking it up here\nis because, according to Maimonides, it was an ethical question that was\nthe motive for the formulation of the view of the opponents. Accordingly\nthe problem is semi-ethical, semi-metaphysical, and is closely related\nto the question of Providence.\n\nObserving that the good are often wretched and the bad prosperous, the\nphilosophers came to the conclusion that God does not know individual\nthings. For if he knows and does not order them as is proper, this must\nbe due either to inability or to jealousy, both of which are impossible\nin God. Having come to this conclusion in the way indicated, they then\nbolstered it up with arguments to justify it positively. Such are that\nthe individual is known through sense and God has no sensation; that the\nnumber of individual things is infinite, and the infinite cannot be\ncomprehended, hence cannot be known; that knowledge of the particular is\nsubject to change as the object changes, whereas God's knowledge is\nunchangeable. Against us Jews they argue that to suppose God knows\nthings before they are connects knowledge with the non-existent; and\nbesides there would be two kinds of knowledge in God, one knowledge of\npotential things, and another of actual things. So they came to the\nconclusion that God knows only species but not individuals. Others say\nthat God knows nothing except his own essence, else there would be\nmultiplicity in his nature. As the entire difficulty, according to\nMaimonides, arose from the supposed impropriety in the government of\nindividual destinies, he first discusses the question of Providence and\ncomes back later to the problem of God's knowledge.[292]\n\nHe enumerates five opinions concerning Providence.\n\n1. _The Opinion of Epicurus._ There is no Providence at all; everything\nis the result of accident and concurrence of atoms. Aristotle has\nrefuted this idea.\n\n2. _The Opinion of Aristotle._ Some things are subject to Providence,\nothers are governed by accident. God provides for the celestial spheres,\nhence they are permanent individually; but, as Alexander says in his\nname, Providence ceases with the sphere of the moon. Aristotle's\ndoctrine concerning Providence is related to his belief in the eternity\nof the world. Providence corresponds to the nature of the object in\nquestion. As the individual spheres are permanent, it shows that there\nis special Providence which preserves the spheres individually. As,\nagain, there proceed from them other beings which are not permanent\nindividually but only as species, namely, the species of our world, it\nis clear that with reference to the sublunar world there is so much\nProvidential influence as to bring about the permanence of the species,\nbut not of the individual. To be sure, the individuals too are not\ncompletely neglected. There are various powers given to them in\naccordance with the quality of their matters; which powers determine the\nlength of their duration, their motion, perception, purposive existence.\nBut the other incidents and motions in individual human as well as\nanimal life are pure accident. When a storm scatters the leaves of\ntrees, casts down some trunks and drowns a ship with its passengers, the\nincident is as accidental with the men drowned as with the scattered\nleaves. That which follows invariable laws Aristotle regards as\nProvidential, what happens rarely and without rule is accidental.\n\n3. _The View of the Ashariya._ This is the very opposite of the\npreceding opinion. The Ashariya deny all accident. Everything is done by\nthe will of God, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the death of a man.\nEverything is determined, and a person cannot of himself do or forbear.\nIt follows from this view that the category of the possible is ruled\nout. Everything is either necessary or impossible. It follows also that\nall laws are useless, for man is helpless, and reward and punishment are\ndetermined solely by the will of God, to whom the concepts of right and\nwrong do not apply.\n\n4. _The Opinion of the Mu`tazila._ They vindicate man's power to do and\nforbear, thus justifying the commands and prohibitions, and the rewards\nand punishments of the laws. God does not do wrong. They also believe\nthat God knows of the fall of a leaf, and provides for all things. This\nopinion, too, is open to criticism. If a person is born with a defect,\nthey say this is due to God's wisdom, and it is better for the man to be\nthus. If a pious man is put to death, it is to increase his reward in\nthe next world. They extend this to lower animals also, and say that the\nmouse killed by the cat will be rewarded in the next world.\n\nThe last three opinions all have their motives. Aristotle followed the\ndata of nature. The Ashariya refused to impute ignorance to God. The\nMu`tazila object to imputing to him wrong, or to denying reason, which\nholds that to cause a person pain for no offence is wrong. Their opinion\nleads to a contradiction, for they say God knows everything and at the\nsame time man is free.\n\n5. _The Opinion of our Law._ A fundamental principle of the law of Moses\nis that man has absolute freedom in his conduct, and so has an\nirrational animal. No one of our religion disputes this. Another\nfundamental principle is that God does no wrong, and hence all reward\nand punishment is justly given. There is only one exception mentioned by\nthe Rabbis, what they call \"suffering for love,\" _i. e._, misfortunes\nwhich are not in the nature of punishment for sins committed, but in\norder to increase reward. There is no support, however, for this view in\nthe Bible. All this applies only to man. Nothing is said in the Bible or\nin the Talmud of reward and punishment of animals. It was adopted by\nsome of the later Geonim from the Mu`tazila.\n\nAfter citing these five opinions on the nature of Providence, Maimonides\nformulates his own to the following effect:\n\nMy own belief in the matter, not as a result of demonstration, but based\nupon what seems to me to be the meaning of Scripture is that in the\nsublunar world man alone enjoys individual Providence. All other\nindividual things besides are ruled by chance, as Aristotle says. Divine\nProvidence corresponds to divine influence or emanation. The more one\nhas of divine influence, the more one has of Providence. Thus in plants\nand animals divine Providence extends only to the species. When the\nRabbis tell us that cruelty to animals is forbidden in the Torah, the\nmeaning is that we must not be cruel to animals for our own good, in\norder not to develop habits of cruelty. To ask why God does not provide\nfor the lower animals in the same way as he does for man, is the same as\nto ask why he did not endow the animals with reason. The answer would\nbe, so he willed, so his wisdom decreed. My opinion is not that God is\nignorant of anything or is incapable of doing certain things, but that\nProvidence is closely related to reason. One has as much of Providence\nas he has of the influence of the divine reason. It follows from this\nthat Providence is not the same for all individuals of the human\nspecies, but varies with the person's character and achievements. The\nprophets enjoy a special Providence; the pious and wise men come next;\nwhereas a person who is ignorant and disobedient is neglected and\ntreated like a lower animal, being left to the government of\nchance.[293]\n\nHaving disposed of the question of Providence, we may now resume the\ndiscussion undertaken above (p. 289) of the nature of God's knowledge.\nThe idea that God does not know the particular things in our world below\nis an old one and is referred to in the Bible often. Thus, to quote one\ninstance from the Psalms, the idea is clearly enunciated in the\nfollowing passage, \"And they say [sc. the wicked], How doth God know?\nAnd is there knowledge in the most High? Behold, these are the wicked;\nand, being alway at ease, they increase in riches. Surely in vain have I\ncleansed my heart, and washed my hands in innocency....\" (73, 11-13).\nThe origin of this notion is in human experience, which sees the\nadversity of the good and the prosperity of the wicked, though many of\nthe troubles are of a man's own doing, who is a free agent. But this\nview is wrong. For ignorance of any kind is a defect, and God is\nperfect. David pointed out this when he said, \"He that planted the ear\nshall he not hear? He that formed the eye shall he not see?\" (94, 9).\nThis means that unless God knows what the senses are, he could not have\nmade the sense organs to perceive.\n\nWe must now answer the other metaphysical arguments against God's\nknowledge of particulars. It is agreed that no new knowledge can come to\nGod which he did not have before, nor can he have many knowledges. We\nsay therefore (we who are believers in the Torah) that with one\nknowledge God knows many things, and his knowledge does not change as\nthe objects change. We say also that he knows all things before they\ncome into being, and knows them always; hence his knowledge never\nchanges as the objects appear and disappear. It follows from this that\nhis knowledge relates to the non-existent and embraces the infinite. We\nbelieve this and say that only the absolutely non-existent cannot be\nknown; but the non-existent whose existence is in God's knowledge and\nwhich he can bring into reality can be known. As to comprehending the\ninfinite, we say with some thinkers that knowledge relates primarily to\nthe species and extends indirectly to the individuals included in the\nspecies. And the species are finite. The philosophers, however, decide\nthat there cannot be knowledge of the non-existent, and the infinite\ncannot be comprehended. God, therefore, as he cannot have new and\nchanging knowledge knows only the permanent things, the species, and not\nthe changing and temporary individuals. Others go still further and\nmaintain that God cannot even know the permanent things, because\nknowledge of many things involves many knowledges, hence multiplicity in\nGod's essence. They insist therefore that God knows only himself. My\nview is, says Maimonides, that the error of all these people is that\nthey assume there is a relation of resemblance between our knowledge and\nGod's knowledge. And it is surprising that the philosophers should be\nguilty of such an error, the very men who proved that God's knowledge is\nidentical with his essence, and that our reason cannot know God's\nessence.\n\nThe difference between our knowledge and God's knowledge is that we get\nour knowledge from the data of experience, upon which it depends. Each\nnew datum adds to our knowledge, which cannot run ahead of that which\nproduces it. It is different in the case of God. He is the cause of the\ndata of experience. The latter follow his knowledge, and not _vice\nversa_. Hence by knowing himself he knows everything else before it\ncomes into being. We cannot conceive of his knowledge, for to do this\nwould be to have it ourselves.[294]\n\nThe last topic Maimonides considers in his philosophical work is the\nreason and purpose of the commandments of the Bible, particularly the\nceremonial precepts which apparently have no rational meaning. In fact\nthere are those who maintain that it is vain to search for reasons of\nthe laws where none are given in the Bible itself; that the sole reason\nin those cases is the will of God. These people labor under the absurd\nimpression that to discover a rational purpose in the ceremonial laws\nwould diminish their value and reduce them to human institutions. Their\ndivine character and origin is attested in the minds of these people by\ntheir irrationality, by the fact that they have no human meaning. This\nis clearly absurd, says Maimonides the rationalist. It is tantamount to\nsaying that man is superior to God; and that whereas a man will command\nonly that which is of benefit, God gives orders which have no earthly\nuse. The truth is quite the reverse, and all the laws are for our\nbenefit.[295]\n\nAccordingly Maimonides undertakes to account for all the laws of the\nBible. The Law, he says, has two purposes, the improvement of the body\nand the improvement of the soul or the mind. The improvement of the soul\nis brought about by study and reflection, and the result of this is\ntheoretical knowledge. But in order to be able to realize this perfectly\na necessary prerequisite is the improvement of the body. This is\ninferior in value to perfection of the soul, but comes naturally and\nchronologically first as a means to an end. For bodily perfection one\nmust have health and strength as far as one's constitution permits, and\nfor this purpose a person must have his needs at all times. Social life\nis necessary for the supply of the individuals' needs, and to make\nsocial life possible there must be rules of right and wrong to be\nobserved.[296]\n\nApplying what has just been said to the Law, we may divide its contents\nbroadly into four classes, (1) Precepts inculcating true beliefs and\nideas, such as the existence of God, his unity, knowledge, power, will,\neternity. (2) Legal and moral precepts, such as the inculcation of\njustice and a benevolent disposition for the good of society. (3) The\nnarratives and genealogies of the Law. (4) The ceremonial prescriptions.\n\nOf these the purpose of the first two divisions is perfectly clear and\nadmitted by all. True beliefs and ideas regarding God and his government\nof the world are directly conducive to the highest end of man, knowledge\nand perfection of the soul. Honorable and virtuous conduct is a\npreliminary requisite to intellectual perfection. The genealogies and\nnarratives of the Bible are also not without a purpose. They are\nintended to inculcate a theoretical doctrine or a moral, and to\nemphasize the one or the other, which cannot be done so well by a bare\nstatement or commandment. Thus, to take a few examples, the creation of\nthe world is impressed upon the reader beyond the possibility of a doubt\nby a circumstantial narrative of the various steps in the process, the\ngradual peopling of the earth by the multiplication of the human race\ndescended from the first pair, and so on. The story of the flood and of\nthe destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah has for its purpose to emphasize\nthe truth that God is a just judge, who rewards the pious and punishes\nthe wicked. The genealogy of the kings of Edom in Genesis (36, 31) is\nintended as a warning to Israel in the appointment of kings. These kings\nof the Edomites were all of them foreigners not of Edom, and it is\nprobable that the history of their tyrannical rule and oppression of\ntheir Edomite subjects was well known to the people in Moses's time.\nHence the point of the enumeration of the list of kings and their origin\nis to serve as a deterring example to the Israelites never to appoint as\nking of Israel a man who came from another nation, in accordance with\nthe precept in Deuteronomy (17,15), \"Thou mayest not put a foreigner\nover thee, which is not thy brother.\"[297]\n\nThere remains the division of the ceremonial laws, which are the subject\nof dispute. The purpose in these precepts is not evident, and opinions\nare divided as to whether they have any purpose. I will endeavor to\nshow, says Maimonides, that these also have one or more of the following\nobjects: to teach true beliefs and opinions, to remove injustice and to\ninculcate good qualities.\n\nAbraham grew up among the Sabeans, who were star worshippers and\nbelievers in the eternity of the world. The object of the law is to keep\nmen away from the erroneous views of the Sabeans, which were prevalent\nin those days. The Sabeans believed that the worship of the stars helps\nin the cultivation of the ground to make it fruitful. For this reason\nthey think highly of the husbandmen and laborers on the land. They also\nrespect cattle and prohibit slaughtering them because they are of\nbenefit in the cultivation of the land. In the interest of agriculture\nthey instituted the worship of the stars, which they believed would\ncause the rain to fall and the earth to yield its fertility. On this\naccount we find the reverse of this in the Bible, telling us that\nworship of the stars will result in lack of rain and infertility.\n\nIn the life of nature we see how one thing serves another, and certain\nobjects are not brought about except through certain others, and\ndevelopment is gradual. So, for example, a young infant cannot be fed on\nmeat and solid food, and nature provides milk in the mother's breast.\nSimilarly in governing the people of Israel, who were living in a\ncertain environment, God could not at once tear them away from the\nhabits of thought to which they were accustomed, but he led them\ngradually. Hence as they were accustomed to sacrificing to the stars,\nGod ordered them to sacrifice to him, the object being to wean them away\nfrom the idols in the easiest way possible. This is why the prophets do\nnot lay stress on the sacrifices. To be sure, it was not impossible for\nGod to form their minds so that they would not require this form of\ntraining, and would see at once that God does not need sacrifices, but\nthis would have been a miracle. And while God does perform miracles\nsometimes for certain purposes, he does not change the nature of man;\nnot because he cannot, but because he desires man to be free and\nresponsible. Otherwise there would be no sense in laws and prophets.\n\nAmong the purposes of the law are abstention from self-indulgence in the\nphysical appetites, like eating and drinking and sensuous pleasure,\nbecause these things prevent the ultimate perfection of man, and are\nlikewise injurious to civil and social life, multiplying as they do\nsorrow and trouble and strife and jealousy and hate and warfare.\n\nAnother purpose is to inculcate gentleness and politeness and docility.\nAnother is purity and holiness. External cleanliness is also\nrecommended, but not as a substitute for internal. The important thing\nis internal purity, external takes a secondary place.\n\nMaimonides ends the discussion of the Pentateuchal laws by dividing them\ninto fourteen classes (following in this the divisions in his great\nlegal code, the \"Yad Ha-Hazakah\") and explaining the purposes of each\nclass. It will be useful briefly to reproduce the division here.\n\n1. Those laws that concern fundamental ideas of religion and theology,\nincluding the duty of learning and teaching, and the institutions of\nrepentance and fasting. The purpose here is clear. Intellectual\nperfection is the greatest good of man, and this cannot be attained\nwithout learning and teaching; and without wisdom there is neither good\npractice nor true opinion. Similarly honoring the wise, swearing by\nGod's name, and not to swear falsely--all these lead to a firm belief in\nGod's greatness. Repentance is useful to guard against despair and\ncontinuance in evil doing on the part of the sinner.\n\n2. The precepts and prohibitions relating to idolatry. Here are included\nalso the prohibition to mix divers kinds of seeds in planting, the\nprohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three\nyears of its growth, and against wearing a garment made of a mixture of\nwool and flax. The prohibition of idolatry is evident in its purpose,\nwhich is to teach true ideas about God. The other matters above\nmentioned are connected with idolatry. Magic is a species of idolatry\nbecause it is based on a belief in the direct influence of the stars.\nAll practices done to produce a certain effect, which are not justified\nby a reason or at least are not verified by experience, are forbidden as\nbeing superstitious and a species of magic. Cutting the beard and the\nearlocks is forbidden on a similar ground because it was a custom of the\nidolatrous priests. The same thing applies to mixing of cotton and flax,\nto men wearing women's garments and _vice versa_, though here there is\nthe additional reason, to prevent, namely, laxness in sexual morality.\n\n3. The precepts relating to ethical and moral conduct. Here the purpose\nis clear, namely, to improve social life.\n\n4. The rules relating to charity, loans, gifts, and so on. The purpose\nis to teach kindness to the poor, and the benefit is mutual, for the\nrich man to-day may be poor to-morrow.\n\n5. Laws relating to injury and damages. The purpose is to remove wrong\nand injustice.\n\n6. Laws relating to theft, robbery, false witnesses. The purpose is to\nprevent injury by punishing the offender.\n\n7. The regulation of business intercourse, like loan, hire, deposits,\nbuying and selling, inheritance, and so on. The purpose here is social\njustice to make life in society possible.\n\n8. Laws relating to special periods, such as the Sabbath and the\nfestivals. The purpose is stated in each case in the Law itself, and it\nis either to inculcate a true idea like the creation in the case of the\nSabbath, or to enable mankind to rest from their labors, or for both\ncombined.\n\n9. The other practical observances like prayer, the reading of \"Shema,\"\nand so on. These are all modes of serving God, which lead to true\nopinions concerning him, and to fear and love.\n\n10. The regulations bearing upon the temple and its service. The purpose\nof these was explained above in connection with the institution of\nsacrifice, namely that it was a concession to the primitive ideas and\ncustoms of the people of those times for the purpose of gradually\nweaning them away from idolatry.\n\n11. Laws relating to sacrifices. The purpose was stated above and under\n10.\n\n12. Laws of cleanness and uncleanness. The purpose is to guard against\ntoo great familiarity with the Temple in order to maintain respect for\nit. Hence the regulations prescribing the times when one may, and the\noccasions when one may not, approach or enter the Temple.\n\n13. The dietary laws. Unwholesome food is forbidden, also unclean\nanimals. The purpose in some cases is to guard against excess and\nself-indulgence. Some regulations like the laws of slaughter and others\nare humanitarian in their nature.\n\n14. Forbidden marriages, and circumcision. The purpose is to guard\nagainst excess in sexual indulgence, and against making it an end in\nitself.[298]\n\nTo sum up, there are four kinds of human accomplishments or\nexcellencies, (1) Acquisition of wealth, (2) Physical perfection,\nstrength, beauty, etc., (3) Moral perfection, (4) Intellectual and\nspiritual perfection. The last is the most important. The first is\npurely external; the second is common to the lower animals; the third is\nfor the sake of one's fellowmen, in the interest of society, and would\nnot exist for a solitary person. The last alone concerns the individual\nhimself. Jeremiah expresses this truth in his statement, \"Thus saith the\nLord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty\nman glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches: but\nlet him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth\nme, that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindness, judgment and\nrighteousness in the earth\" (Jer. 9, 22). \"Wise man\" in the above\nquotation means the man of good morals. The important thing, Jeremiah\nsays, is to know God through his actions and to imitate him.[299]\n\nMaimonides's ethics as well as his interpretation of the Pentateuchal\nlaws is intellectualistic, as the foregoing account shows. And it is\nnatural that it should be. The prevailing trend of thought in the middle\nages, alike among the Arabs, Jews and Christians, was of this character.\nAristotle was the master of science, and to him intellectual\ncontemplation is the highest good of man. The distinction of man is his\nrational faculty, hence the excellence and perfection of this faculty is\nthe proper function of man and the realization of his being. This alone\nleads to that \"eudaimonia\" or happiness for which man strives. To be\nsure complete happiness is impossible without the complete development\nof all one's powers, but this is because the reason in man is not\nisolated from the rest of his individual and social life; and perfection\nof mind requires as its auxiliaries and preparation complete living in\nfreedom and comfort. But the aim is after all the life of the intellect,\nand the \"dianoetic\" virtues are superior to the practical. Theoretic\ncontemplation stands far higher than practical activity. Add to this\nthat Aristotle's God is pure thought thinking eternally itself, the\nuniversal mover, himself eternally unmoved, and attracting the celestial\nspheres as the object of love attracts the lover, without itself\nnecessarily being affected, and the intellectualism of Aristotle stands\nout clearly.\n\nMaimonides is an Aristotelian, and he endeavors to harmonize the\nintellectualism and theorism of the Stagirite with the diametrically\nopposed ethics and religion of the Hebrew Bible. And he is apparently\nunaware of the yawning gulf extending between them. The ethics of the\nBible is nothing if not practical. No stress is laid upon knowledge and\ntheoretical speculation as such. The wisdom and the wise man of the book\nof Proverbs no more mean the theoretical philosopher than the fool and\nthe scorner in the same book denote the one ignorant in theoretical\nspeculation. \"The beginning of wisdom is the fear of the Lord.\" This is\nthe keynote of the book of Proverbs, and its precepts and exhortations\nare practical and nothing else. That the Pentateuchal law is solely\nconcerned with practical conduct, religious, ceremonial and moral, needs\nnot saying. It is so absolutely clear and evident that one wonders how\nso clear-sighted a thinker like Maimonides could have been misled by the\nauthority of Aristotle and the intellectual atmosphere of the day to\nimagine otherwise. The very passage from Jeremiah which he quotes as\nsumming up his idea of the _summum bonum_, speaks against him, and he\nonly succeeds in manipulating it in his favor by misinterpreting the\nword \"wise.\" Whatever the wise man may denote in the book of Proverbs,\nhere in Jeremiah he is clearly contrasted with the person who in\nimitation of God practices kindness, judgment and righteousness. The\nword does not denote the theoretical philosopher, to be sure, but it\napproximates it more closely than the expression describing the ideal\nman of Jeremiah's commendation.\n\nIt is in line with Maimonides's general rationalistic and\nintellectualistic point of view when he undertakes to find a reason for\nevery commandment, where no reason is given in the Law. He shows himself\nin this an opponent of all mysticism, sentimentality and arbitrariness.\nReason is paramount. The intellect determines the will, and not even\nGod's will may be arbitrary. His will is identical with his reason,\nhence there is a reason in everything that he wills. We may not in every\ncase succeed in finding the reason where he himself did not choose to\ntell us, but a reason there always is, and the endeavor on our part to\ndiscover it should be commended rather than condemned.\n\nThe details of his motivation of the ceremonial laws are very\ninteresting, and in many cases they anticipated, though in a cruder\nform, the more scientific theories of modern critics. Take his\ninterpretation of the institution of sacrifices. Take away the personal\nmanner of expression, which might seem to imply that God spoke to Moses\nin some such fashion as this: You and I know that sacrifices have no\ninherent meaning or value. They rather smack of superstition and\nidolatry. But what can we do? We cannot, _i. e._, we must not, change\nthe nature of these people. We must train them gradually to see the\ntruth for themselves. They are now on the level of their environment,\nand believe in the efficacy of killing sheep and oxen to the stars and\nthe gods. We will use a true pedagogical method if we humor them in this\ntheir crudity for the purpose of transferring their allegiance from the\nfalse gods to the one true God. Let us then institute a system of\nsacrifices with all the details and minutiae of the sacrificial systems\nof the heathens and star worshippers. We shall impose this system upon\nour people for the time being, and in the end as they grow wiser they\nwill outgrow it--take away this mode of expression in Maimonides's\ninterpretation, which is not essential, and the essence may be rendered\nin more modern terms thus. Man's religion is subject to change and\ndevelopment and progress like all his other institutions. The forms they\nsuccessively take in the course of their development are determined by\nthe state of general intelligence and positive knowledge that the given\nrace or nation possesses. The same thing holds of religious development.\nThe institution of sacrifices is prevalent in all religious communities\nat a certain stage in their career. It starts with human sacrifice,\nwhich is later discarded and replaced by sacrifices of animals. And this\nis again in the course of time discontinued, leaving its traces only in\nthe prayer book, which in Judaism has officially taken the place of the\nTemple service.\n\nWhile the merit of Maimonides in foreshadowing this modern understanding\nof ancient religion cannot be overestimated, it is clear that in some of\nhis other interpretations of Jewish ceremonial, he is wide of the mark.\nHis rationalism could not take the place of a knowledge of history. His\nmotivation of the dietary laws on the score of hygiene or of moderation\nand self-restraint is probably not true. Nor is the prohibition against\nmixing divers seeds, or wearing garments of wool and flax mixed, or\nshaving the corner of the beard, and so on, due to the fact that these\nwere the customs of the idolaters and their priests. If Maimonides was\nbold enough to pull the sacrificial system down from its glorious\npedestal in Jewish tradition and admit that being inherently nothing but\na superstition, it was nevertheless instituted with such great pomp and\nceremony, with a priestly family, a levitical tribe and a host of\nprescriptions and regulations, merely as a concession to the habits and\nprejudices of the people, why could he not apply the same method of\nexplanation to the few prohibitions mentioned above? Why not say the\nancient Hebrews were forbidden to mix divers seeds because they had been\nfrom time immemorial taught to believe that there was something sinful\nin joining together what God has kept asunder; and in order not to shock\ntheir sensibilities too rudely the new religion let them have these\nharmless notions in order by means of these to inculcate real truths?\n\nBefore concluding our sketch of Maimonides we must say a word about his\nBible exegesis. Though the tendency to read philosophy into the Bible is\nas old as Philo, from whom it was borrowed by Clement of Alexandria and\nOrigen and by them handed down to the other Patristic writers, and\nthough in the Jewish middle ages too, from Saadia down, the verses of\nthe Bible were employed to confirm views adopted from other\nconsiderations; though finally Abraham Ibn Daud in the matter of\nexegesis, too, anticipated Maimonides in finding the Aristotelian\nmetaphysic in the sacred scriptures, still Maimonides as in everything\nelse pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, so in the interpretation\nof the Bible also obtained the position of a leader, of the founder of a\nschool and the most brilliant and most authoritative exponent thereof,\nputting in the shade everyone who preceded him and every endeavor in the\nsame direction to which Maimonides himself owed his inspiration.\nMaimonides's treatment of the Bible texts and their application to his\nphilosophical disquisitions is so much more comprehensive and masterly\nthan anything in the same line done before him, that it made everything\nelse superfluous and set the pace for manifold imitation by the\nsuccessors of Maimonides, small and great. Reading the Bible through\nAristotelian spectacles became the fashion of the day after Maimonides.\nJoseph Ibn Aknin, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Jacob Anatoli, Joseph Ibn Caspi,\nLevi Ben Gerson and a host of others tried their hand at Biblical\nexegesis, and the Maimonidean stamp is upon their work.\n\nWe have already spoken of Maimonides's general attitude toward the\nanthropomorphisms in the Bible and the manner in which he accounts for\nthe style and mode of expression of the Biblical writers. He wrote no\nspecial exegetical work, he composed no commentaries on the Bible. But\nhis \"Guide of the Perplexed\" is full of quotations from the Biblical\nbooks, and certain sections in it are devoted to a systematic\ninterpretation of those Biblical chapters and books which lend\nthemselves most easily and, as Maimonides thought, imperatively to\nmetaphysical interpretation. It is impossible here to enter into\ndetails, but it is proper briefly to point out his general method of\ntreating the Biblical passages in question, and to state what these\npassages are.\n\nWe have already referred more than once to the Talmudic expressions\n\"Maase Bereshit\" (Work of Creation) and \"Maase Merkaba\" (Work of the\nChariot). Maimonides says definitely that the former denotes the science\nof physics, _i. e._, the fundamental notions of nature as treated in\nAristotle's Physics, and the latter signifies metaphysics or theology,\nas represented in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The creation chapters in\nGenesis contain beneath their simple exterior of a generally\nintelligible narrative, appealing to young and old alike, women as well\nas children, a treatment of philosophical physics. And similarly in the\nobscure phraseology of the vision of Ezekiel in the first and tenth\nchapters of that prophet's book, are contained allusions to the most\nprofound ideas of metaphysics and theology, concerning God and the\nseparate Intelligences and the celestial spheres. As the Rabbis forbid\nteaching these profound doctrines except to one or two worthy persons at\na time, and as the authors of those chapters in the Bible clearly\nintended to conceal the esoteric contents from the gaze of the vulgar,\nMaimonides with all his eagerness to spread abroad the light of reason\nand knowledge hesitates to violate the spirit of Bible and Talmud. His\ninterpretations of these mystic passages are therefore expressed in\nallusions and half-concealed revelations. The diligent student of the\n\"Guide,\" who is familiar with the philosophy of Aristotle as taught by\nthe Arabs Alfarabi and Avicenna will be able without much difficulty to\nsolve Maimonides's allusions, the casual reader will not. Without going\ninto details it will suffice for our purpose to say that in the creation\nstory Maimonides finds the Aristotelian doctrines of matter and form,\nof the four elements, of potentiality and actuality, of the different\npowers of the soul, of logical and ethical distinctions (the true and\nthe false on one hand, the good and the bad on the other), and so\non.[300] In the Vision of Ezekiel he sees the Peripatetic ideas of the\ncelestial spheres, of their various motions, of their souls, their\nintellects and the separate Intelligences, of the Active Intellect, of\nthe influence of the heavenly bodies on the changes in the sublunar\nworld, of the fifth element (the ether) and so on.[301] Don Isaac\nAbarbanel has already criticized this attempt of Maimonides by justly\narguing that if the meaning of the mysterious vision of Ezekiel is what\nMaimonides thinks it is, there was no occasion to wrap it in such\nobscurity, since the matter is plainly taught in all schools of\nphilosophy.[302] We might, however, reply that no less a man than Plato\nexpresses himself in the Tim\u00e6us in similarly obscure terms concerning\nthe origin and formation of the world. Be this as it may, Munk is\ncertainly right when he says that if, as is not improbable, Ezekiel's\nvision does contain cosmological speculations, they have nothing to do\nwith the Aristotelian cosmology, but must be related to Babylonian\ntheories.[303]\n\nAnother favorite book of the Bible for the exegesis of philosophers was\nthe book of Job. In this Maimonides sees reflected the several views\nconcerning Providence, divine knowledge and human freedom, which he\nenumerates (p. 290 ff.).[304]\n\nThe influence of Maimonides upon his contemporaries and immediate\nsuccessors was indeed very great, and it was not confined to Judaism.\nChristian Scholastics and Mohammedan theologians studied and used the\nGuide of the Perplexed. Maimonides himself, it seems, though he wrote\nhis \"Guide\" in the Arabic language, did not desire to make it accessible\nto the Mohammedans, fearing possibly that some of his doctrines\nconcerning prophecy might be offensive to them. Hence he is said to have\ninstructed his friends and disciples not to transliterate the Hebrew\ncharacters, which he in accordance with general Jewish usage employed in\nwriting Arabic, into Arabic characters. But he was powerless to enforce\nhis desire and there is no doubt that such transcriptions were in use.\nSamuel Tibbon himself, the Hebrew translator of the \"Guide,\" made use of\nmanuscript copies written in Arabic letters. We are told that in the\nMohammedan schools in the city of Fez in Morocco, Jews were appointed\nto teach Maimonides's philosophy, and there is extant in Hebrew\ntranslation a commentary by a Mohammedan theologian on the twenty-five\nphilosophical propositions laid down by Maimonides as the basis of his\nproof of the existence of God (p. 254).[305]\n\nThe influence of Maimonides on Christian scholasticism is still greater.\nWe have already said (p. 199 f.) that the philosophical renaissance in\nLatin Europe during the thirteenth century was due to the introduction\nof the complete works of Aristotle in Latin translation. These\ntranslations were made partly from the Arabic versions of the\nMohammedans, partly from the Greek originals, which became accessible\nafter the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1207.[306]\nBefore this time the scope of philosophical research and investigation\nin Christian Europe was limited, and its basis was the Platonism of St.\nAugustine and fragments of Aristotle's logic. In general Platonism was\nfavorable to Christian dogma. Plato according to Augustine came nearest\nto Christianity of all the ancient Greek philosophers.[307] And the\ndangers to Church doctrine which lurked in philosophical discussion\nbefore the thirteenth century were a tendency to Pantheism on the part\nof thinkers imbued with the Neo-Platonic mode of thought, and an undue\nemphasis either on the unity of God as opposed to the Trinity (Ab\u00e9lard),\nor on the Trinity at the expense of the unity (Roscellinus of\nCompi\u00e8gne)--conclusions resulting from the attitudes of the thinkers in\nquestion on the nature of universals.\n\nIn the early part of the thirteenth century for the first time, the\nhorizon of the Latin schoolmen was suddenly enlarged and brilliantly\nillumined by the advent of the complete Aristotle in his severe,\nexacting and rigorous panoply. All science and philosophy opened before\nthe impoverished schoolmen, famished for want of new ideas. And they\nthrew themselves with zeal and enthusiasm into the study of the new\nphilosophy. The Church took alarm because the new Aristotle constituted\na danger to accepted dogma. He taught the eternity of the world, the\nuniformity of natural law, the unity of the human intellect, denying by\nimplication Providence and freedom and individual immortality. Some of\nthese doctrines were not precisely those of Aristotle but they could be\nderived from Aristotelian principles if interpreted in a certain way;\nand the Arab intermediators between Aristotle and his Christian students\nhad so interpreted him. Averroes in particular, who gained the\ndistinction of being the commentator _par excellence_ of Aristotle, was\nresponsible for this mode of interpretation; and he had his followers\namong the Masters of Arts in the University of Paris. These and similar\ntendencies the Church was striving to prevent, and it attempted to do\nthis at first crudely by prohibiting the study and teaching of the\nPhysical and Metaphysical works of Aristotle. Failing in this the Papacy\ncommissioned three representatives of the Dominican order to expurgate\nAristotle in order to render him harmless. You might as well think of\nexpurgating a book on geometry! The task was never carried out. But\ninstead something more valuable for the welfare of the Church was\naccomplished in a different way. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas\nundertook the study of Aristotle and the interpretation of his works\nwith a view to harmonizing his teachings with the dogmas of\nChristianity. Albertus Magnus began the task, Thomas Aquinas, his\ngreater disciple, the Maimonides of Christian philosophy, completed it.\nAnd in this undertaking Maimonides was Thomas Aquinas's model.[308]\n\nThe Guide of the Perplexed was translated into Latin not long after its\ncomposition.[309] Before Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales, the\nFranciscan leader, and William of Auvergne, the Bishop of Paris, had\nread and made use of Maimonides's philosophical masterpiece. Albertus\nMagnus was still more diligent in his adoption of Maimonidean views, or\nin taking account of them, where he is opposed to their adoption. But it\nremained for Thomas Aquinas, who made the most systematic attempt in the\nmedi\u00e6val schools to harmonize the philosophy of Aristotle with the\ndoctrine of the Church, to use Maimonides as his guide and model. Like\nMaimonides he employs Aristotelian proofs for the existence of God,\nproofs based on the eternity of motion; and like him Aquinas argues that\nif motion is not eternal and the world was made in time, the existence\nof God is still more readily evident. In his discussion of the divine\nattributes, of angels, of Providence, of Prophecy, of free will, of the\nceremonial laws in the Pentateuch, Thomas Aquinas constantly takes\naccount of Maimonides's views, whether he agrees with them or not. It is\nno doubt an exaggeration to say that there would have been no Aquinas if\nMaimonides had not preceded him. For Aquinas had access to the works of\nAristotle and his Arabian commentators, the former of whom he studied\nmore diligently than Maimonides himself. But there is no doubt that the\nmethod of harmonizing Aristotelian doctrine with traditional teaching so\nfar as the common elements of Judaism and Christianity were concerned\nwas suggested to Aquinas by his Jewish predecessor. It is not our\nprovince here to go into details of the system of Aquinas to show\nwherein he agrees or disagrees with Maimonides, nor is it possible to do\nmore than mention the fact that after Aquinas also, Duns Scotus, the\nhead of the Franciscan school, had the \"Guide\" before him, and in\ncomparatively modern times, such celebrities as Scaliger and Leibnitz\nspeak of the Jewish philosopher with admiration and respect.[310]\n\nThat Maimonides's influence upon Jewish theology and thought was deep\nand lasting is a truism. The attitude of the prominent theologians and\nphilosophers who succeeded him will appear in the sequel in connection\nwith our treatment of the post-Maimonidean writers. Here a word must be\nsaid of the general effect of Maimonides's teaching upon Jews and\nJudaism throughout the dispersion. His fame as the greatest Jew of his\ntime--great as a Talmudical authority, which appealed to all classes of\nJewish students, great as a physician with the added glory of being a\nfavorite at court, great as the head of the Jewish community in the\nEast, and finally great as a philosopher and scientist--all these\nqualifications, never before or after united in the same way in any\nother man, served to make him the cynosure of all eyes and to make his\nword an object of notice and attention throughout the Jewish diaspora.\nWhat he said or wrote could not be ignored whether people liked it or\nnot. They could afford to ignore a Gabirol even, or an Ibn Daud. But\nMaimonides must be reckoned with. The greater the man, the greater the\nalertness of lesser, though not less independent, spirits, to guard\nagainst the enslavement of all Judaism to one authority, no matter how\ngreat. And in particular where this authority erred in boldly adopting\nviews in disagreement with Jewish tradition, as it seemed to many, and\nin setting up a new source of truth alongside of, or even above, the\nrevelation of the Torah and the authority of tradition, to which these\nlatter must be bent whether they will or no--his errors must be\nstrenuously opposed and condemned without fear or favor. This was the\nview of the traditionalists, whose sole authorities in all matters of\ntheology and related topics were the words of Scripture and Rabbinic\nliterature as tradition had interpreted them. On the other hand, the\nrationalistic development during the past three centuries, which we have\ntraced thus far, and the climax of that progress as capped by Maimonides\nwas not without its influence on another class of the Jewish community,\nparticularly in Spain and southern France; and these regarded Maimonides\nas the greatest teacher that ever lived. Their admiration was unbounded\nfor his personality as well as his method and his conclusions. His\nopponents were regarded as obscurantists, who, rather than the object of\ntheir attack, were endangering Judaism. All Jewry was divided into two\ncamps, the Maimunists and the anti-Maimunists; and the polemic and the\nstruggle between them was long and bitter. Anathema and counter\nanathema, excommunication and counter excommunication was the least of\nthe matter. The arm of the Church Inquisition was invoked, and the altar\nof a Parisian Church furnished the torch which set on flame the pages of\nMaimonides's \"Guide\" in the French capital. More tragic even was the\npunishment meted out to the Jewish informers who betrayed their people\nto the enemy. The men responsible had their tongues cut out.\n\nThe details of the Maimunist controversy belong to the general\nhistorian.[311] Our purpose here is to indicate in brief outline the\ngeneral effect which the teaching of Maimonides had upon his and\nsubsequent ages. The thirteenth century produced no great men in\nphilosophy at all comparable to Moses Ben Maimon or his famous\npredecessors. The persecutions of the Jews in Spain led many of them to\nemigrate to neighboring countries, which put an end to the glorious era\ninaugurated three centuries before by Hasdai Ibn Shaprut. The centre of\nJewish liberal studies was transferred to south France, but the literary\nactivities there were a pale shadow compared with those which made\nJewish Spain famous. Philosophical thought had reached its perigee in\nMaimonides, and what followed after was an attempt on the part of his\nlesser disciples and successors to follow in the steps of their master,\nto extend his teachings, to make them more widespread and more popular.\nWith the transference of the literary centre from Spain to Provence went\nthe gradual disuse of Arabic as the medium of philosophic and scientific\nculture, and the age of translation made its appearance. Prior to, and\nincluding, Maimonides all the Jewish thinkers whom we have considered,\nwith the exception of Abraham Bar Hiyya and Abraham Ibn Ezra, wrote\ntheir works in Arabic. After Maimonides Hebrew takes the place of\nArabic, and in addition to the new works composed, the commentaries\non the \"Guide\" which were now written in plenty and the\nphilosophico-exegetical works on the Bible in the Maimonidean spirit,\nthe ancient classics of Saadia, Bahya, Gabirol, Halevi, Ibn Zaddik, Ibn\nDaud and Maimonides himself had to be translated from Arabic into\nHebrew. In addition to these religio-philosophical works, it was\nnecessary to translate those writings which contained the purely\nscientific and philosophical branches that were preliminary to the study\nof religious philosophy. This included logic, the various branches of\nmathematics and astronomy, medical treatises and some of the books of\nthe Aristotelian corpus with the Arabic compendia and commentaries\nthereon. The grammatical and lexical treatises of Hayyuj and Ibn Janah\nwere also translated. The most famous of the host of translators, which\nthe need of the times brought forth, were the three Tibbonides, Judah\n(1120-1190), Samuel (1150-1230) and Moses (fl. 1240-1283), Jacob Anatoli\n(fl. 1194-1256), Shemtob Falaquera (1225-1290), Jacob Ben Machir\n(1236-1304), Moses of Narbonne (d. after 1362), and others. Some of\nthese wrote original works besides. Samuel Ibn Tibbon wrote a\nphilosophical treatise, \"Ma`amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim,\"[312] and\ncommentaries in the Maimonidean vein on Ecclesiastes and the Song of\nSongs. His greater fame rests on his translation of the \"Guide of the\nPerplexed.\" He translated besides Maimonides's \"Letter on Resurrection,\"\nthe \"Eight Chapters,\" and other Arabic writings on science and\nphilosophy. Moses Ibn Tibbon was prolific as an original writer as well\nas a translator. Joseph Ibn Aknin (1160-1226), the favorite pupil of\nMaimonides, for whom the latter wrote his \"Guide,\" is the author of\ntreatises on philosophical topics, and of exegetical works on certain\nbooks of the Bible and on the Mishnic treatise, the \"Ethics of the\nFathers.\"[312a] Jacob Anatoli, in addition to translating Ptolemy's\nAlmagest and Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle's logic, wrote a work,\n\"Malmad ha-Talmidim,\" on philosophical homiletics in the form of a\ncommentary on the Pentateuch.[313] Shemtob Falaquera, the translator of\nportions of Gabirol's \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\"[314] is the author of a commentary\non the \"Guide,\" entitled \"Moreh ha-Moreh,\"[315] and of a number of\nethical and psychological works.[316] Jacob Ben Machir translated a\nnumber of scientific and philosophical works, particularly on astronomy,\nand is likewise the author of two original works on astronomy. Joseph\nIbn Caspi (1297-1340) was a very prolific writer, having twenty-nine\nworks to his credit, most of them exegetical, and among them a\ncommentary on the \"Guide.\"[317] Moses of Narbonne wrote an important\ncommentary on the \"Guide,\"[318] and is likewise the author of a number\nof works on the philosophy of Averroes, of whom he was a great admirer.\nThe translations of Judah Ibn Tibbon, the father of translators as he\nhas been called, go back indeed to the latter half of the twelfth\ncentury, and Abraham Ibn Ezra translated an astronomical work as early\nas 1160. But the bulk of the work of translation is the product of the\nthirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The result of these translations\nwas that scientific and philosophical works became accessible to all\nthose who knew Hebrew instead of being confined to the lands of Arabian\nculture. Another effect was the enlargement of the Hebrew language and\nthe development of a new Hebrew dialect with a philosophical and\nscientific terminology. These translations so far as they relate to pure\nscience and philosophy were neglected in the closing centuries of the\nmiddle ages, when conditions among the Jews were such as precluded them\nfrom taking an interest in any but purely religious studies. Continuous\npersecutions, the establishment of the Ghettoes, the rise of the Kabbala\nand the opposition of the pietists and mystics to the rationalism of the\nphilosophers all tended to the neglect of scientific study and to the\nconcentration of all attention upon the Biblical, Rabbinic and mystical\nliterature. The Jews at the close of the middle ages and the beginning\nof modern times withdrew into their shell, and the science and learning\nof the outside had little effect on them. Hence, and also for the reason\nthat with the beginning of modern times all that was medi\u00e6val was, in\nthe secular world, relegated, figuratively speaking, to the ash-heap, or\nliterally speaking to the mouldering dust of the library shelves--for\nboth of these reasons the very large number of the translations above\nmentioned were never printed, and they are still buried on the shelves\nof the great European libraries, notably of the British Museum, the\nnational library of Paris, the Bodleian of Oxford, the royal library of\nMunich, and others. The reader who wishes to have an idea of the\ntranslating and commenting activity of the Jews in the thirteenth and\nfollowing centuries in the domains of logic, philosophy, mathematics,\nastronomy, medicine and folklore is referred to the monumental work of\nthe late Moritz Steinschneider, the prince of Hebrew Bibliographers,\n\"Die Hebr\u00e4ischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als\nDolmetscher,\" (The Hebrew translations of the middle ages, and the Jews\nas dragomen) Berlin, 1893, containing 1077 pages of lexicon octavo size\ndevoted to brief enumerations and descriptions of extant editions and\nmanuscripts of the translations referred to.[319]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nHILLEL BEN SAMUEL\n\n\nIn the post-Maimonidean age all philosophical thinking is in the nature\nof a commentary on Maimonides whether avowedly or not. The circle of\nspeculation and reflection is complete. It is fixed by the \"Guide of the\nPerplexed,\" and the efforts of those who followed Maimonides are to\nelaborate in his spirit certain special topics which are treated in his\nmasterpiece in a summary way. In the case of the more independent\nthinkers like Levi ben Gerson we find the further attempt to carry out\nmore boldly the implications of the philosophical point of view, which,\nas the latter thought, Maimonides left implicit by reason of his\npredisposition in favor of tradition. Hasdai Crescas went still farther\nand entirely repudiated the authority of Aristotle, substituting will\nand emotion for rationalism and logical inference. Not knowledge of God\nas logically demonstrated is the highest aim of man, but love of God.\nBut even in his opposition Crescas leans on Maimonides's principles,\nwhich he takes up one by one and refutes. Maimonides was thus the point\nof departure for his more rigorous followers as well as for his\nopponents. In the matter of external sources philosophical reflection\nafter Maimonides was enriched in respect to details by the works of\nAverroes on the Arabic side and those of the chief Christian scholastics\namong the Latin writers. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas furnished\nsome material to men like Hillel of Verona in the thirteenth century and\nDon Isaac Abarbanel in the fifteenth. Maimonides was limited to the\nAristotelian expositions of Alfarabi and Avicenna. The works of\nAverroes, his contemporary, he did not read until toward the end of his\nlife. After his death Averroes gained in prestige and influence until he\nsucceeded in putting into the shade his Arabian predecessors and was\nregarded by Jew and Christian alike as the Commentator of Aristotle _par\nexcellence_. His works were rapidly translated into Hebrew and Latin,\nand the Jewish writers learned their Aristotle from Averroes. The\nknowledge of the Arabic language was gradually disappearing among the\nJews of Europe, and they were indebted for their knowledge of science\nand philosophy to the works translated. Philosophy was declining among\nthe Arabs themselves owing to the disfavor of the powers that be, and\nmany of the scientific writings of the Arabs owe their survival to the\nHebrew translations or transcriptions in Hebrew characters which escaped\nthe proscription of the Mohammedan authorities.\n\nThe one problem that came to the front as a result of Averroes's\nteaching, and which by the solution he gave it formed an important\nsubject of debate in the Parisian schools of the thirteenth century, was\nthat of the intellect in man, whether every individual had his own\nimmortal mind which would continue as an individual entity after the\ndeath of the body, or whether a person's individuality lasted only as\nlong as he was alive, and with his death the one human intellect alone\nsurvived. This was discussed in connection with the general theory of\nthe intellect and the three kinds of intellect that were distinguished\nby the Arabian Aristotelians, the material, the acquired and the active.\nThe problem goes back to Aristotle's psychology, who distinguishes two\nintellects in man, passive and active (above, p. xxxvi). But the\ntreatment there is so fragmentary and vague that it gave rise to widely\nvarying interpretations by the Greek commentators of Aristotle,\nAlexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, as well as among the Arabs,\nAlfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes. The latter insisted on the unity of the\nintellect for the human race, thereby destroying individual immortality,\nand this Averroistic doctrine, adopted by some Masters of Arts at the\nUniversity of Paris, was condemned among other heresies, and refuted in\nthe writings of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Maimonides does not\ndiscuss these problems in detail in his \"Guide.\" He drops a remark\nincidentally here and there, and it would appear that for him too, as\nfor Averroes, the intellect when in separation from the body is not\nsubject to individual distinction, that there cannot be several human\nintellects, since matter is the principle of individuation and the\nimmaterial cannot embrace a number of individuals of the same\nspecies.[320] The problem of immortality he does not treat _ex professo_\nin the \"Guide.\" Hence this was a matter taken up by his successors.\nHillel ben Samuel as well as Levi ben Gerson discuss this question in\ndetail.\n\nHillel ben Samuel does not tower as a giant in medi\u00e6val Jewish\nliterature. His importance is local, as being the first devotee of\nJewish learning and philosophy in Italy in the middle of the thirteenth\ncentury, at the close of a period of comparative ignorance. The Italian\nJews before his time contributed little to knowledge and learning\ndespite their external circumstances, which were more favorable than in\nsome other countries. Hillel ben Samuel (1220-1295) was a strong admirer\nof Maimonides and undertook to comment on the \"Guide of the Perplexed.\"\nHe defended Maimonides against the aspersions of his opponents, and was\nso confident in the truth of his master's teachings that he proposed a\nconference of the learned men of Jewry to judge the works and doctrines\nof Maimonides and to decide whether the \"Guide\" should be allowed to\nlive or should be destroyed. Another interest attaching to Hillel ben\nSamuel is that he was among the first, if not the first Jew who by his\nknowledge of Latin had access to the writings of the scholastics, to\nwhom he refers in his \"Tagmule ha-Nefesh\" (The Rewards of the Soul) as\nthe \"wise men of the nations.\" He was also active as a translator from\nthe Latin.\n\nHis chief work, which entitles him to brief notice here, is the \"Tagmule\nha-Nefesh\" just mentioned.[321] He does not offer us a system of\nphilosophy, but only a treatment of certain questions relating to the\nnature of the soul, its immortality and the manner of its existence\nafter the death of the body, questions which Maimonides passes over\nlightly. With the exception of the discussion relating to the three\nkinds of intellect and the question of the unity of the acquired\nintellect for all mankind, there is not much that is new or remarkable\nin the discussion, and we can afford to pass it by with a brief notice.\n\nMen of science know, he tells us in the introduction, that the valuable\npossession of man is the soul, and the happiness thereof is the final\npurpose of man's existence. And yet the number of those who take pains\nto investigate the nature of the soul is very small, not even one in a\nhundred. And even the few who do undertake to examine this subject are\nhindered by various circumstances from arriving at the truth. The matter\nitself is difficult and requires long preparation and preliminary\nknowledge. Then the vicissitudes of life and the shortness of its\nduration, coupled with the natural indolence of man when it comes to\nstudy, completely account for the lack of true knowledge on this most\nimportant topic.\n\nInduced by these considerations Hillel ben Samuel undertook to collect\nthe scattered notices in the extensive works of the philosophers and\narranged and expounded them briefly so as not to discourage those who\nare in search of wisdom. His purpose is the knowledge of truth, which is\nan end in itself. He desires to explain the existence of the soul, its\nnature and reward. The soul is that which makes man man, hence we should\nknow the nature of that which makes us intelligent creatures, else we do\nnot deserve the name.\n\nAnother reason for the importance of knowing the nature of the soul is\nthat error in this matter may lead to more serious mistakes in other\ndepartments of knowledge and belief. Thus if a man who calls himself\npious assumes that the soul after parting from the body is subject to\ncorporeal reward and punishment, as appears from a literal rendering of\npassages in Bible and Talmud, he will be led to think that the soul\nitself is corporeal. And since the soul, it is believed, comes from on\nhigh, the upper world must have bodies and definite places, and hence\nthe angels too are bodies. But since the angels are emanations from the\ndivine splendor, God too is body! Thus you see how serious are the\nconsequences of a belief, in itself perhaps not so dangerous, as that of\nthe corporeality of the soul.[322]\n\nWe must first prove the existence of the soul. This can be shown in\nvarious ways. We see that of natural bodies some take food, grow,\npropagate their like, while others, like stones, do not do these things.\nThis shows that the powers and functions mentioned cannot be due to the\ncorporeal part of the objects performing them, else stones, too, would\nhave those powers, as they are also corporeal like the rest. There must\ntherefore be a different principle, not body, which is responsible for\nthose activities. We call it soul.\n\nAs all existents are divided into substance and accident, the soul must\nbe either the one or the other. Now an accident, according to Aristotle,\nis that which may be or not be without causing the being or destruction\nof the object in which it is. But the body cannot be a living body\nwithout the soul. Hence the soul is not an accident; it is therefore a\nsubstance. Substance may be corporeal or incorporeal. The soul cannot be\na corporeal substance, for all body is divisible, and subject to motion\nand change, whereas the soul, as will be shown later, is not movable,\nnot changeable and not divisible. It might seem that the soul is subject\nto motion, since it descends into the body and rises again when it\nleaves the body. But this is not so. Descent and ascent when thus\napplied to the soul are metaphorical. The union of soul and body is not\na spatial relation. The upper world from which the soul comes is not\ncorporeal, hence there is no such thing as place there, nor anything\nlimited by space. Hence the coming of the soul from the spiritual world\nand its return thither are not motions at all. The relation of the soul\nto the body is as that of form to matter, as Aristotle says.\n\nGranted that the soul's union with and separation from the body are not\nmotions, is not the soul subject to motion while in the body? Hillel's\nanswer is that it is not, and he proves his point in the prescribed\nfashion by making use of Aristotle's classification of motion into (1)\ngenesis and (2) decay, (3) increase and (4) diminution, (5) qualitative\nchange and (6) motion proper, or motion of translation. He then\nundertakes to show that the soul can have none of the kinds of motion\nhere enumerated. The arguments offer nothing striking or interesting,\nand we can afford to omit them. It is worth while, however, to refer to\nhis interpretation of emotion. The passage of the soul from joy to\ngrief, from anger to favor, might seem to be a kind of motion. Hillel\nanswers this objection by saying that these emotions do not pertain to\nthe soul as such. Their primary cause is the state of mixture of the\nhumors in the body, which affects certain corporeal powers in certain\nways; and the soul shares in these affections only so far as it is\nunited with the body. In its own nature the soul has no emotions.\n\nWe can also prove that the soul is not divisible. For a divisible thing\nmust have parts. Now if the soul is divided or divisible, this means\neither that every part of the soul, no matter how small, has the same\npowers as the whole, or that the powers of the soul are the resultant of\nthe union of the parts. The first alternative is impossible, for it\nleads us to the absurd conclusion that instead of one soul every person\nhas an infinite number of souls, or at least a great number of souls.\nThe second alternative implies that while the soul is not actually\ndivided, since its powers are the summation of the parts, which form a\nunit, it is potentially divisible. But this signifies that at some time\nthis potential divisibility will be realized (or potentiality would be\nvain and meaningless) and we are brought back to the absurdity of a\nmultiplicity of souls in the human body.\n\nHaving shown that the soul is not movable, changeable or divisible, we\nare certain of its incorporeality, and we are ready to give a definition\nof the soul. Hillel accordingly defines the soul as \"a stage of\nemanation, consisting of a formal substance, which subsists through its\nown perfection, and occupies the fourth place in the emanatory process,\nnext to the Active Intellect. Its ultimate source is God himself, who is\nthe ultimate perfection and the Good, and it emanates from him\nindirectly through the mediation of the separate Powers standing above\nit in the scale of emanation. The soul constitutes the first entelechy\nof a natural body.\"[323]\n\nThe above definition is interesting. It shows that Hillel did not\nclearly distinguish the Aristotelian standpoint from the Neo-Platonic,\nfor in the definition just quoted, the two points of view are combined.\nThat all medi\u00e6val Aristotelianism was tinged with Neo-Platonism,\nespecially in the doctrine of the Active Intellect, is well known. But\nin Hillel's definition of the soul we have an extreme form of this\npeculiar combination, and it represents a step backward to the\nstandpoint of Pseudo-Bahya and Ibn Zaddik. The work of Ibn Daud and\nMaimonides in the interest of a purer Aristotelianism seems not to have\nenlightened Hillel. The Neo-Platonic emanation theory is clearly\nenunciated in Hillel's definition. The soul stands fourth in the series.\nThe order he has in mind is probably (1) God, (2) Separate\nIntelligences, (3) Active Intellect, (4) Soul. We know that Hillel was a\nstudent of the Neo-Platonic \"Liber de Causis\" (_cf._ above, p. xx),\nhaving translated some of it into Hebrew, and he might have imbibed his\nNeo-Platonism from that Proclean book.\n\nContinuing the description of the soul in man, he says that the noblest\npart of matter, _viz._, the human body, is endowed with the rational\nsoul, and becomes the subject of the powers of the latter. Thereby it\nbecomes a man, _i. e._, a rational animal, distinguished from all other\nanimals, and similar to the nature of the angels.\n\nThe Active Intellect causes its light to emanate upon the rational soul,\nthus bringing its powers out into actuality. The Active Intellect,\nwhich is one of the ten degrees of angels, is related to the rational\npower in man as the sun to the power of sight. The sun gives light,\nwhich changes the _potentially_ seeing power into _actually_ seeing, and\nthe potentially visible object into the actually visible. Moreover, this\nsame light enables the sight to see the sun itself, which is the cause\nof the actualization in the sight. So the Active Intellect gives\nsomething to the rational power which is related to it as light to the\nsight; and by means of this something the rational soul can see or\nunderstand the Active Intellect itself. Also the potentially\nintelligible objects become through this influence actually\nintelligible, and the man who was potentially intelligent becomes\nthereby actually intelligent.\n\n_Intellect_ (\"sekel\") in man is distinguished from _wisdom_ (\"hokmah\").\nBy the former power is meant an immediate understanding of abstract\nprinciples. The latter is _mediate_ understanding. Wisdom denotes\nspeculation about universals through inference from particulars.\nIntellect applies directly to the universals and to their influence upon\nthe particulars.[324]\n\nHillel next discusses the live topic of the day, made popular by\nAverroes, namely, whether there are in essence as many individual souls\nas there are human bodies, or, as Averroes thought, there is only one\nuniversal soul, and that its individualizations in different men are\nonly passing incidents, due to the association of the universal soul\nwith the human body, and disappear when the body dies. The \"sages of the\nGentiles,\" Hillel tells us, regard Averroes's notion as heretical, and\nleading besides to the absurd conclusion that the same soul is both\nrewarded and punished; a view which upsets all religion. Averroes\nemploys a number of arguments to prove his point, among them being the\nfollowing. If there are many souls, they are either all existing from\neternity or they are created with the body. The first is impossible, for\nsince the soul is a form of the body, we should have actually an\ninfinite number of forms, and this would necessitate the actual\nexistence of an infinite number of bodies also; else the existence of\nthese souls for the purpose of joining the bodies would be in vain. But\nit is absurd to suppose that there has been from eternity an infinite\nnumber of bodies created like the number of souls, and yet they have not\nbecome real bodies with souls until now.\n\nThe second alternative is also impossible. For if there are many souls\nwhich came into being with the bodies, they either came from nothing or\nfrom something. From nothing is impossible, for nothing comes from\nnothing except by way of creation, which is a miracle; and we do not\nbelieve in miracles unless we have to. That they came from something is\nalso impossible; for this something can be neither matter nor form. It\ncannot be matter, for form, the actual and superior, cannot come from\nthe potential and inferior. It cannot be form, for then form would\nproceed from form by way of genesis and dissolution, which is not true.\nMatter is the cause of generation and dissolution, not form. We are thus\nforced to the conclusion that the soul is one and eternal, one in\nsubstance and number; and that it becomes many only _per accidens_, by\nvirtue of the multiplicity of its receiving subjects, comparable to the\nlight of the one sun, which divides into many rays.\n\nThe Bible cannot help us to decide this question, for its expressions\ncan be interpreted either way. Hillel then undertakes to adjudicate\nbetween the contending views by striking a compromise. He feels that he\nis contributing to the solution of an important problem by an original\nsuggestion, which he says is to be found nowhere else expressed with\nsuch clearness and brevity.\n\nHere again Hillel's Neo-Platonic tendencies are in evidence. For he\nassumes both a universal soul and a great number of individual souls\nemanating from it in a descending series. The objection that forms\ncannot come from other forms by way of generation and dissolution,\nHillel says, is not valid, for no such process is here involved.\nGeneration and dissolution is peculiar to the action of body upon body,\nwhich is by contact. A _spiritual_ form acts upon other forms not\nthrough contact, because it is not limited by time or place. We know\nconcerning the Intelligences that each comes from the one previous to it\nby way of emanation, and the same thing applies to the issue of many\nhuman souls from the one universal soul. After death the rational part\nof every soul remains; that part which every soul receives from the\nActive Intellect through the help of the _possible_ or _material\nintellect_, and which becomes identified with the Active and separate\nIntellect. This is the part which receives reward and punishment,\nwhereas the one universal soul from which they all emanate is a divine\nemanation, and is not rewarded or punished.[325]\n\nWe must now discuss further the nature of the three grades of intellect.\nFor this it will be necessary to lay down three preliminary\npropositions.\n\n1. There must be an intellect whose relation to the material intellect\nis the same as that of the object of sense perception is to the sense.\nThis means that just as there must be a real and actual object to arouse\nthe sense faculty to perceive, so there must be an actual intelligible\nobject to stir the rational power to comprehend.\n\n2. It follows from 1 that as the material sense has the power of\nperceiving the sensible object, so the material intellect has the power\nof perceiving this other intellect.\n\n3. If it has this power, this must at some time be realized _in actu_.\nTherefore at some time the material intellect is identified with the\nother intellect, which is the Active Intellect.\n\nWe must now prove 1. This is done as follows: We all know that we are\npotentially intelligent, and it takes effort and pains and study to\nbecome actually intelligent. In fact the process of intellection has to\npass several stages from sense perception through imagination. Now our\nintellect cannot make itself pass from potentiality to actuality. Hence\nthere must be something else as agent producing this change; and this\nagent must be actually what it induces in us. Hence it is an active\nintellect.\n\nThe material intellect has certain aspects in common with the sense\nfaculty, and in certain aspects it differs. It is similar to it in being\nreceptive and not active. But the mode of receptivity is different in\nthe two. As the intellect understands all forms, it cannot be a power\nresiding in a body in the sense of extending through it and being\ndivided with the division of the body, as we see in some of the powers\nof sense. This we can prove as follows:\n\n1. If the intellect were receptive in the same manner as the senses, it\nwould receive only a definite kind of form, as for example the sense of\nsight does not receive taste.\n\n2. If the intellect were a power in body and had a special form, it\ncould not receive that form, just as for example if the eye were\ncolored, it could not perceive colors.\n\n3. If the intellect were a corporeal power, it would be affected by its\nobject and injured by a powerful stimulus, as is the case in the senses\nof sight and hearing. A dazzling light injures the eye, a deafening\nnoise injures the ear, so that thereafter neither sense can perform its\nnormal function properly. This is not true with the intellect. An\nunusually difficult subject of thought does not injure the intellect.\n\n4. If the intellect were similar in its activity to sense perception, it\nwould not be self-conscious, as the sense faculties cannot perceive\nthemselves.\n\n5. The intellect, if it were like sense, would not be able to comprehend\na thing and its opposite at the same time, or it would do so in a\nconfused manner, as is the case in the powers of sense.\n\n6. The intellect perceives universals; the sense, particulars.\n\nThis being the case, there is a difference of opinion as to the nature\nof the material intellect. Some say that it has no definite nature in\nitself except that of possibility and capacity, though it is different\nfrom other possibilities in this respect that it is not resident in, and\ndependent upon a material subject like the others. That is why Aristotle\nsays that the material intellect is not anything before it intellects;\nthat it is in its essence potential with reference to the\n_intelligibilia_, and becomes actual when it understands them actually.\n\nThemistius says it is not any of the existents actually, but a potential\nessence receiving material forms. Its nature is analogous to that of\nprime matter; hence it is called _material_ intellect. It is best to\ncall it possible intellect. Being a potential existent it is not subject\nto generation and dissolution any more than prime matter.\n\nAlexander of Aphrodisias thinks the material intellect is only a\ncapacity, _i. e._, a power in the soul, and appears when the soul enters\nthe body, hence is not eternal _a parte ante_.\n\nAverroes holds that the possible intellect is a separate substance, and\nthat the capacity is something it has by virtue of its being connected\nwith the body as its subject. Hence this capacity is neither entirely\ndistinct from it nor is it identical with it. According to him the\npossible intellect is not a part of the soul.\n\nWhich of these views is correct, says Hillel, requires discussion, but\nit is clear that whichever of these we adopt there is no reason opposing\nthe conjunction of the possible intellect with the Active. For if it is\nan eternal substance, potential in its nature, like primary matter,\nthen it becomes actual when it understands the intelligible objects. The\nsame is true if it is a capacity residing in the soul.\n\nHillel is thus of the opinion in this other question debated in those\ndays, whether the intellect of man is capable of conjunction during life\nwith the angelic Active Intellect, that it is. The Active Intellect, he\nsays, in actualizing the material intellect influences it not in the\nmanner of one body acting upon another, _i. e._, in the manner of an\nefficient or material cause, but rather as its formal or final cause,\nleading it to perfection. It is like the influence which the separate\nIntelligences receive from one another, the influence of emanation, and\nnot a material influence comparable to generation. This reception of\ninfluence from the Active Intellect on the part of the potential is\nitself conjunction. It means that the agent and the thing acted upon\nbecome one, and the same substance and species. The material intellect\nbecomes a separate substance when it can understand itself.[326]\n\nBefore taking up the more theological problem of reward and punishment,\nhe devotes the last section of the theoretical part of his book to a\ndiscussion of the relation of the possible or material intellect to the\nrest of the human soul. This problem also arose from Averroes's\ninterpretation of the Aristotelian psychology, and is closely related to\nthe other one of the unity of the human intellect. It is needless for us\nto enter into the technical details which are a weariness to the flesh\nof the modern student, but it is worth while to state briefly the\nmotives underlying the opposing views. Averroes, who had no theological\nscruples, interpreted Aristotle to mean that the part of the soul which\nwas intimately associated with the body as its form, constituting an\nindissoluble organism in conjunction with it, embraced its lower\nfaculties of sense, imagination and the more concrete types of judgment.\nThese are so intimately bound up with the life of the body that they die\nwith its death. The reason on the other hand, which has to do with\nimmaterial ideas, or intelligibles as they called them, is eternal and\nis not the form of the body. It is a unitary immaterial substance and is\nnot affected by the life or death of the body. To be sure it comes in\ncontact with the human soul during the life of the body, thus bringing\ninto existence an individualized human reason as a passing episode. But\nthis individualized phase of the intellect's life is dependent upon the\nbody and ceases when the body dies, or is reabsorbed in the universal\nintellect.\n\nThe theological implications of this view were that if there is any\nreward and punishment after death, it would either have to be\nadministered to the lower faculties of the soul, which would have to be\nmade immortal for the purpose, or if the rational soul is the subject of\nretribution, this cannot affect the individual, as there is no\nindividual rational soul. Hence the Christian opponents of Averroes,\nlike Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas (Hillel speaks of them here as\nthe \"Religionists,\" or the \"Sages who believe in religion\"), endeavored\nto vindicate for the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of\nthe body, also the rational part, thus maintaining the view that the\nreason too has an individual existence both during life and after death.\nThomas Aquinas, as a truer interpreter of Aristotle, goes so far as to\nmaintain that the Active Intellect itself is also a part of the human\nsoul, and not one of the angelic separate Intelligences. Neither\nMaimonides nor Hillel ben Samuel, nor any other Jewish philosopher was\nable to depart so widely from their Arabian masters or to undertake an\nindependent study of Aristotle's text, as to come to a similar\nconclusion. Hence the Active Intellect in Jewish Philosophy is\nunanimously held to be the last of the Angelic substances, and the\nproximate inspirer of the prophet. The discussion therefore in Hillel's\nwork concerns the possible intellect, and here he ventures to disagree\nwith Averroes and decides in favor of the possible intellect as a part\nof the soul and the subject of reward and punishment.[327]\n\nConcerning the nature of reward and punishment after death opinions are\ndivided. Some think that both reward and punishment are corporeal. Some\nsay reward is spiritual, punishment is corporeal; while a small number\nare of the opinion that both are spiritual. Hillel naturally agrees with\nthe latter and gives reasons for his opinion. If the soul, as was shown\nbefore, is incorporeal, immaterial and a _formal_ substance, it cannot\nbe influenced by corporeal treatment. For corporeal influence implies\nmotion on the part of agent and patient, and the pervasion of the\ninfluence of the former through the parts of the latter; whereas a\nspiritual substance has no parts. Besides, if reward and punishment are\ncorporeal, and Paradise is to be taken literally, then why separate the\nsoul from the body, why not reward the living person with eternal life\nand give him the enjoyment of paradise while on earth? The effect would\nbe much greater upon the rest of mankind, who would see how the\nrighteous fare and the wicked. The objection that this would make people\nmercenary does not hold, for they are mercenary in any case, since they\nexpect reward; whether in this life or in the next makes no difference.\nReward must therefore be spiritual, and so must punishment, since the\ntwo go together.[328]\n\nWhen God in his kindness favored the human race by giving them a soul,\nwhich he united with the body, he also gave them the possibility of\nattaining eternal happiness. For this purpose he arranged three grades\nof ascent, _viz._, the three intellects spoken of above, the material or\npossible intellect, the acquired intellect (this is the actual\nfunctioning of the possible intellect and the result thereof) and the\nactive intellect. The second intellect is partly speculative or\ntheoretical and partly practical. The theoretical intellect studies and\ncontemplates all intelligible existents which are separate from matter.\nThere is nothing practical in this contemplation, it is just the\nknowledge of existents and their causes. This is called the science of\ntruth, and is the most important part of philosophy.\n\nThe practical intellect is again divided into the _cogitative_ and the\n_technological_. The former decides whether a thing should be done or\nnot, and discriminates between the proper and the improper in human\nactions and qualities. It is important as a guide to the happiness of\nthe soul because it instructs the appetitive power in reference to those\nthings which are subject to the will, and directs it to aim at the good\nand to reject the evil.\n\nThe technological intellect is that by which man learns arts and trades.\nThe practical intellect is also theoretical in the sense that it has to\nthink in order to discriminate between the proper and the improper, and\nbetween the beneficial and injurious in all things pertaining to\npractice. The difference between the speculative and practical\nintellects is in the respective objects of their comprehension, and\nhence is accidental and not essential. The objects of the theoretical\nintellect are the true and the false; of the practical, the good and the\nbad. The acquired intellect gives these intelligibles to the soul\nthrough the possible intellect, and is intermediate between the latter\nand the Active Intellect, which is one of the separate Intelligences\nabove soul. The Active Intellect watches over the rational animal that\nhe may attain to the happiness which his nature permits.\n\nMen differ according to their temperamental composition and their human\nconduct. This leads to differences in the power of understanding and in\nthe amount of influence received from the Active Intellect. Hillel\nquotes Maimonides in support of his view that the prophetic stage is an\nemanation of glory from God through the medium of the Active Intellect,\nwhich exerts its influence upon the rational power and upon the\nimagination, so that the prophet sees his vision objectified _extra\nanimam_. The three conditions requisite for prophecy are perfection in\ntheory, perfection in imagination and perfection in morals. The first\nwithout the second and third produces a philosopher; the second without\nthe first and third gives rise to a statesman or magician.\n\nIt is important to know, he tells us, that the cultivation of the reason\nand imagination alone is not sufficient. Practice of the commandments is\nvery important. Hence a man must guide properly the two powers of sense\nperception and desire, which are instruments of the rational power. For,\nas Maimonides says in his commentary on Aboth (_cf._ p. 282), all\nobservance and violation of the commandments, good and bad qualities\ndepend upon those two powers. Without a proper training of these the\ninfluence of the active intellect upon the reason and imagination may\nlead to evil.\n\nBeginning with sense perception a man must train all his five senses to\nattend only to what is good and to turn away from evil. When he\nsatisfies his sensuous desires, he must do this in order to preserve his\nbody that he may be enabled to serve God in the best possible way.\n\nThe same applies to the power of desire. This is the power which directs\none to pursue the agreeable and shun the disagreeable. From it proceed\nalso courage, confidence, anger, good will, joy, sorrow, humility,\npride. All these qualities must be used in the service of God. If a man\ndo this, he will attain the grade of an angelic being even during life,\nand will be able to perform miracles like the prophets and the sages of\nthe Talmud.\n\nAfter death the souls of such men reach even a higher degree than they\nhad before entering the body, as a reward for not allowing themselves\nto be degraded by their corporeal desires, but on the contrary directing\nthese to higher aims.[329]\n\nAs for the nature of reward and punishment more particularly, we may say\nthat the soul of the wicked loses all the glory promised to her and\ndescends to a position lower than was hers originally. She is expelled\nfrom the land of life and remains in darkness forever, without returning\nto her original station. Knowing what she has lost, she will feel\ncontinuous distress, sorrow and fear, for the power of imagination\nremains with the soul after death. But there is no physical burning with\nfire. On the other hand, the soul of the righteous will return to God.\n\nThe doctrine of the resurrection and the explanation for it are a\nfurther proof that the soul after death is not punished corporeally. The\nmotive of the resurrection is that the soul and body may receive their\ncompensation together as in life. If then the retribution of the soul is\ncorporeal, there is no need of resurrection.[330]\n\nHillel then proceeds to show that the words of the Rabbis which seem to\nspeak for corporeal retribution are not to be taken literally. In this\nconnection it is worth while to reproduce his classification of the\ncontents of the Talmud and his attitude toward them. He enumerates six\nclasses.\n\n1. Passages in the Talmudic and Midrashic literature which must be taken\nliterally. These are the discussions of the _Halaka_ (the legal and\nceremonial portions). To pervert these from their literal meaning, or to\nmaintain that the _intention_ of the law is the important thing and not\nthe practice of the ceremony, is heresy and infidelity; though it is\nmeritorious to seek for an explanation of every law, as the Rabbis\nthemselves do in many instances.\n\n2. Passages which should be understood as parables and allegories with a\ndeeper meaning. These are the peculiar _Haggadahs_, or the strange\ninterpretations of Biblical verses where no ceremonial precept is\ninvolved.\n\n3. Statements similar to those of the Prophetical books of the Bible,\nwhich were the result of the influence of the Active Intellect and came\nto the sages in a dream or in the waking state, speaking of the future\nin an allegorical manner. These are the extraordinary tales found in the\nTalmud, which cannot be understood literally, as they involve a\nviolation of the order of nature; and no miracle must be believed unless\nfor a very important reason.\n\n4. The homilies addressed to the people on the occasion of holidays for\nthe purpose of exhorting them to divine worship and observance of the\nLaw. Many of these are hyperbolical in their expression, especially in\nthe promises concerning the future blessings in store for the people.\nThese were in the nature of encouragement to the people to make their\nburdens easier to bear. Here belong also unusual interpretations of\nBiblical verses, explanations which do not give the original meaning of\nthe verse in question, but are suggested in order to interest the\npeople. We must add, too, stories of the good things that came to pious\npeople in return for their piety. These must be taken for the most part\nliterally, unless they are clearly improbable.\n\n5. Jokes and jests by way of relief from the strain of study. Hyperboles\nbelong here.\n\n6. Narratives of miracles done for pious people, such as reviving the\ndead, punishing with death by means of a word, bringing down rain, and\nso on. All these must be taken literally. To disbelieve is heresy. This\nis true only where the alleged miracles were done for a high purpose,\notherwise we need not believe them.\n\nThe reason the Bible and the Talmud express themselves in corporeal\nterms concerning reward and punishment is in order to frighten the\npeople and to impress them with the terrible punishment consequent upon\nwrongdoing. The people do not understand any reward and punishment\nunless it is physical and corporeal. In reality spiritual existence is\nmore real than physical.[331]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nLEVI BEN GERSON\n\n\nAmong the men who devoted themselves to philosophical investigation in\nthe century and a half after Maimonides's death, the greatest and most\nindependent was without doubt Levi ben Gerson or Gersonides, as he is\nalso called. There were others who were active as commentators,\ntranslators and original writers, and who achieved a certain fame, but\ntheir work was too little original to merit more than very brief notice\nin these pages. Isaac Albalag[331a] (second half of thirteenth century)\nowes what reputation he enjoys to the boldness with which he enunciated\ncertain doctrines, such as the eternity of the world and particularly\nthe notion, well enough known among the Averroists of the University of\nParis at that time and condemned by the Church, but never before\nannounced or defended in Jewish philosophy--the so-called doctrine of\nthe twofold truth. This was an attitude assumed in self-defence,\nsincerely or not as the case may be, by a number of scholastic writers,\nwho advanced philosophic views at variance with the dogma of the Church.\nThey maintained that a given thesis might be true and false at the same\ntime, true for philosophy and false for theology, or vice versa.[332]\nShem Tob Falaquera (1225-1290) is a more important man than Albalag. He\nwas a thorough student of the Aristotelian and other philosophy that was\naccessible to him through his knowledge of Arabic. Munk's success in\nidentifying Avicebron with Gabirol (p. 63) was made possible by\nFalaquera's translation into Hebrew of extracts from the \"Fons Vit\u00e6.\" Of\ngreat importance also is Falaquera's commentary of Maimonides's \"Guide,\"\nwhich, with that of Moses of Narbonne (d. after 1362), is based upon a\nknowledge of Arabic and a thorough familiarity with the Aristotelian\nphilosophy of the Arabs, and is superior to the better known\ncommentaries of Shemtob, Ephodi, and Abarbanel. Falaquera also wrote\noriginal works of an ethical and philosophical character.\n\nJoseph Ibn Caspi (1297-1340) is likewise a meritorious figure as a\ncommentator of Maimonides and as a philosophical exegete of Scripture.\nBut none of these men stands out as an independent thinker with a strong\nindividuality, carrying forward in any important and authoritative\ndegree the work of the great Maimonides. Great Talmudic knowledge, which\nwas a necessary qualification for national recognition, these men seem\nnot to have had; and on the other hand none of them felt called upon or\nable to make a systematic synthesis of philosophy and Judaism in a large\nway.\n\nLevi ben Gerson (1288-1344) was the first after Maimonides who can at\nall be compared with the great sage of Fostat. He was a great\nmathematician and astronomer; he wrote supercommentaries on the\nAristotelian commentaries of Averroes, who in his day had become the\nsource of philosophical knowledge for the Hebrew student; he was\nthoroughly versed in the Talmud as his commentary on the Pentateuch\nshows; and he is one of the recognized Biblical exegetes of the middle\nages. Finally in his philosophical masterpiece \"Milhamot Adonai\" (The\nWars of the Lord),[333] he undertakes to solve in a thoroughly\nscholastic manner those problems in philosophy and theology which\nMaimonides had either not treated adequately or had not solved to\nGersonides's satisfaction. That despite the technical character and\nstyle of the \"Milhamot,\" Gersonides achieved such great reputation shows\nin what esteem his learning and critical power were held by his\ncontemporaries. His works were all written in Hebrew, and if he had any\nknowledge of Arabic and Latin it was very limited, too limited to enable\nhim to make use of the important works written in those languages.[334]\nHis fame extended beyond the limits of Jewish thought, as is shown by\nthe fact that his scientific treatise dealing with the astronomical\ninstrument he had discovered was translated into Latin in 1377 by order\nof Pope Clement VI, and his supercommentaries on the early books of the\nAristotelian logic were incorporated, in Latin translation, in the Latin\neditions of Aristotle and Averroes of the 16th century.[335]\n\nLevi ben Gerson's general attitude to philosophical study and its\nrelation to the content of Scripture is the same as had become common\nproperty through Maimonides and his predecessors. The happiness and\nperfection of man are the purpose of religion and knowledge. This\nperfection of man, or which is the same thing, the perfection of the\nhuman soul, is brought about through perfection in morals and in\ntheoretical speculation, as will appear more clearly when we discuss the\nnature of the human intellect and its immortality. Hence the purpose of\nthe Bible is to lead man to perfect himself in these two\nelements--morals and science. For this reason the Law consists of three\nparts. The first is the legal portion of the Law containing the 613\ncommandments, mandatory and prohibitive, concerning belief and practice.\nThis is preparatory to the second and third divisions of the Pentateuch,\nwhich deal respectively with social and ethical conduct, and the science\nof existence. As far as ethics is concerned it was not practicable to\nlay down definite commandments and prohibitions because it is so\nextremely difficult to reach perfection in this aspect of life. Thus if\nthe Torah gave definite prescriptions for exercising and controlling our\nanger, our joy, our courage, and so on, the results would be very\ndiscouraging, for the majority of men would be constantly disobeying\nthem. And this would lead to the neglect of the other commandments\nlikewise. Hence the principles of social and ethical conduct are\ninculcated indirectly by means of narratives exemplifying certain types\nof character in action and the consequences flowing from their conduct.\nThe third division, as was said before, contains certain teachings of a\nmetaphysical character respecting the nature of existence. This is the\nmost important of all, and hence forms the beginning of the Pentateuch.\nThe account of creation is a study in the principles of philosophical\nphysics.[336]\n\nAs to the relations of reason and belief or authority, Levi ben Gerson\nshares in the optimism of the Maimonidean school and the philosophic\nmiddle age generally, that there is no opposition between them. The\npriority should be given to reason where its demands are unequivocal,\nfor the meaning of the Scriptures is not always clear and is subject to\ninterpretation.[337] On the other hand, after having devoted an entire\nbook of his \"Milhamot\" to a minute investigation of the nature of the\nhuman intellect and the conditions of its immortality, he disarms in\nadvance all possible criticism of his position from the religious point\nof view by saying that he is ready to abandon his doctrine if it is\nshown that it is in disagreement with religious dogma. He developed his\nviews, he tells us, because he believes that they are in agreement with\nthe words of the Torah.[338] This apparent contradiction is to be\nexplained by making a distinction between the abstract statement of the\nprinciple and the concrete application thereof. In general Levi ben\nGerson is so convinced of man's prerogative as a rational being that he\ncannot believe the Bible meant to force upon him the belief in things\nwhich are opposed to reason. Hence, since the Bible is subject to\ninterpretation, the demands of the reason are paramount where they do\nnot admit of doubt. On the other hand, where the traditional dogma of\nJudaism is clear and outspoken, it is incumbent upon man to be modest\nand not to claim the infallibility of direct revelation for the limited\npowers of logical inference and deduction.\n\nWe must now give a brief account of the questions discussed in the\n\"Milhamot Adonai.\" And first a word about Gersonides's style and method.\nOne is reminded, in reading the Milhamot, of Aristotle as well as Thomas\nAquinas. There is no rhetoric and there are no superfluous words. All is\nprecise and technical, and the vocabulary is small. One is surprised to\nsee how in a brief century or so the Hebrew language has become so\nflexible an instrument in the expression of Aristotelian ideas. Levi ben\nGerson does not labor in the expression of his thought. His linguistic\ninstrument is quite adequate and yields naturally to the manipulation of\nthe author. Gersonides, the minute logician and analyst, has no use for\nrhetorical flourishes and figures of speech. The subject, he says, is\ndifficult enough as it is, without being made more so by rhetorical\nobscuration, unless one intends to hide the confusion of one's thought\nunder the mask of fine writing.[339] Like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas,\nhe gives a history of the opinions of others in the topic under\ndiscussion, and enumerates long lists of arguments _pro_ and _con_ with\nrigorous logical precision. The effect upon the reader is monotonous and\nwearisome. Aristotle escapes this by the fact that he is groping his way\nbefore us. He has not all his ideas formulated in proper order and form\nready to deliver. He is primarily the investigator, not the pedagogue,\nand the brevity and obscurity of his style pique the ambitious reader\nand spur him on to puzzle out the meaning. Not so Thomas Aquinas and the\nscholastics generally. As the term scholastic indicates, they developed\ntheir method in the schools. They were expositors of what was ready\nmade, rather than searchers for the new. Hence the question of form was\nan important one and was determined by the purpose of presenting one's\nideas as clearly as may be to the student. Add to this that the logic of\nAristotle and the syllogism was the universal method of presentation and\nthe monotony and wearisomeness becomes evident. Levi ben Gerson is in\nthis respect like Aquinas rather than like Aristotle. And he is the\nfirst of his kind in Jewish literature. Since the larger views and\nproblems were already common property, the efforts of Gersonides were\ndirected to a more minute discussion of the more technical details of\nsuch problems as the human intellect, prophecy, Providence, creation,\nand so on. For this reason, too, it will not be necessary for us to do\nmore than give a brief r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the results of Gersonides's\nlucubrations without entering into the really bewildering and\nhair-splitting arguments and distinctions which make the book so hard on\nthe reader.\n\nWe have already had occasion in the Introduction (p. xxxvi) to refer\nbriefly to Aristotle's theory of the intellect and the distinction\nbetween the passive and the active intellects in man. The ideas of the\nArabs were also referred to in our treatment of Judah Halevi, Ibn Daud\nand Maimonides (pp. 180 f., 213 f., 282). Hillel ben Samuel, as we saw\n(p. 317 ff.), was the first among the Jews who undertook to discuss in\ngreater detail the essence of the three kinds of intellect, material,\nacquired and active, as taught by the Mohammedan and Christian\nScholastics, and devoted some space to the question of the unity of the\nmaterial intellect. Levi ben Gerson takes up the same question of the\nnature of the material intellect and discusses the various views with\nmore rigor and minuteness than any of his Jewish predecessors. His chief\nsource was Averroes. The principal views concerning the nature of the\npossible or material intellect in man were those attributed to Alexander\nof Aphrodisias, the most important Greek commentator of Aristotle (lived\nabout 200 of the Christian Era), Themistius, another Aristotelian Greek\ncommentator who lived in the time of Emperor Julian, and Averroes, the\nfamous Arabian philosopher and contemporary of Maimonides. All these\nthree writers pretended to expound Aristotle's views of the passive\nintellect rather than propound their own. And Levi ben Gerson discusses\ntheir ideas before giving his own.\n\nAlexander's idea of the passive intellect in man is that it is simply a\ncapacity residing in the soul for receiving the universal forms of\nmaterial things. It has no substantiality of its own, and hence does not\nsurvive the lower functions of the soul, namely, sensation and\nimagination, which die with the body. This passive intellect is\nactualized through the Active Intellect, which is not a part of man at\nall, but is identified by Alexander with God. The Active Intellect is\nthus pure form and actuality, and enables the material or possible\nintellect in man, originally a mere potentiality, to acquire general\nideas, and thus to become an intellect with a content. This is called\nthe actual or acquired intellect, which though at first dependent on the\ndata of sense, may succeed later in continuing its activity unaided by\nsense perception. And in so far as the acquired intellect thinks of the\npurely immaterial ideas and things which make up the content of the\ndivine intellect (the Active Intellect), it becomes identified with the\nlatter and is immortal. The reason for supposing that the material\nintellect in man is a mere capacity residing in the soul and not an\nindependent substance is because as having the capacity to receive all\nkinds of forms it must itself not be of any form. Thus in order that the\nsense of sight may receive all colors as they are, it must itself be\nfree from color. If the sight had a color of its own, this would prevent\nit from receiving other colors. Applying this principle to the intellect\nwe make the same inference that it must in itself be neutral, not\nidentified with any one idea or form, else this would color all else\nknocking for admission, and the mind would not know things as they are.\nNow a faculty which has no form of its own, but is a mere mirror so to\nspeak of all that may be reflected in it, cannot be a substance, and\nmust be simply a power inherent in a substance and subject to the same\nfate as that in which it inheres. This explains the motive of\nAlexander's view and is at the same time a criticism of the doctrine of\nThemistius.\n\nThis commentator is of the opinion that the passive intellect of which\nAristotle speaks is not a mere capacity inherent in something else, but\na real spiritual entity or substance independent of the lower parts of\nthe soul, though associated with them during the life of the body, and\nhence is not subject to generation and destruction, but is eternal. In\nsupport of this view may be urged that if the passive intellect were\nmerely a capacity of the lower parts of the soul, we should expect it to\ngrow weaker as the person grows older and his sensitive and imaginative\npowers are beginning to decline; whereas the contrary is the case. The\nolder the person the keener is his intellect. The difficulty, however,\nremains that if the human intellect is a real substance independent of\nthe rest of the soul, why is it that at its first appearance in the\nhuman being it is extremely poor in content, being all but empty, and\ngrows as the rest of the body and the soul is developed?\n\nTo obviate these difficulties, Averroes in his commentary on the _De\nAnima_ of Aristotle practically identifies (according to Levi ben\nGerson's view of Averroes) the material intellect with the Active\nIntellect. The Active Intellect according to him is neither identical\nwith the divine, as Alexander maintains, nor is it a part of man, as\nThemistius and others think, but is the last of the separate\nIntelligences, next to the spiritual mover of the lunar sphere. It is a\npure actuality, absolutely free from matter, and hence eternal. This\nActive Intellect in some mysterious manner becomes associated with man,\nand this association results in a temporary phase represented by the\nmaterial intellect. As a result of the sense perceptions, images of the\nexternal objects remain in the imagination, and the Active Intellect\ntakes hold of these images, which are potentially universal ideas, and\nby its illumination produces out of them actual ideas and an intellect\nin which they reside, the material intellect. The material intellect is\ntherefore the result of the combination of the Active Intellect with the\nmemory images, known as _phantasmata_ ([Greek: phantasmata]), in the\nhuman faculty of imagination. So long as this association exists, the\nmaterial intellect receives the intelligible forms as derived from the\n_phantasmata_, and these forms are represented by such ideas as \"all\nanimal is sensitive,\" \"all man is rational,\" _i. e._, ideas concerning\nthe objects of this world. This phase of man's mind ceases when the body\ndies, and the Active Intellect alone remains, whose content is free from\nmaterial forms. The Active Intellect contemplates itself, a pure\nintelligence. At the same time it is possible for man to identify\nhimself with the Active Intellect as he acquires knowledge in the\nmaterial intellect, for the Active Intellect is like light which makes\nthe eye see. In seeing, the eye not merely perceives the form of the\nexternal object, but indirectly also receives the light which made the\nobject visible. In the same way the human soul in acquiring knowledge as\nimplicit in its _phantasmata_, at the same time gets a glimpse of the\nspiritual light which converted the _phantasma_ into an explicit idea\n(_cf._ above, p. 320). When the soul in man perfects itself with all the\nknowledge of this world it becomes identified with the Active Intellect,\nwhich may be likened to the intellect or soul of the corporeal world.\n\nIn this combination of the views of Alexander and Themistius Averroes\nsucceeds in obviating the criticisms levelled at the two former. That\nthe power of the material intellect grows keener with age though the\ncorporeal organs are weaker, supports Averroes's doctrine as against\nAlexander, to whom it is a mere capacity dependent upon the mixture of\nthe elements in the human body. But neither is he subject to the\nobjection applying to Themistius's view, that a real independent entity\ncould scarcely be void of all forms and a mere receptacle. For the\nmaterial intellect as it really is in itself when not in combination\nwith the human body is not a mere receptacle or empty potentiality. It\nis the Active Intellect, which combines in itself all immaterial forms\nand thinks them as it thinks itself. It is only in its individualized\naspect that it becomes a potential intellect ready to receive all\nmaterial forms.\n\nBut what Averroes gains here he loses elsewhere. There are certain\nconsiderations which are fatal to his doctrine. Thus it would follow\nthat theoretical studies which have no practical aim are useless. But\nthis is impossible. Nature has put in us the ability as well as the\ndesire to speculate without reference to practical results. The pleasure\nwe derive from theoretical studies is much greater than that afforded by\nthe practical arts and trades. And nature does nothing in vain.\nTheoretical studies must therefore have some value. But in Averroes's\ntheory of the material intellect they have none. For all values may be\ndivided into those which promote the life of the body and those which\nlead to the final happiness of man. The former is clearly not served by\nthose theoretical speculations which have no practical aim. On the\ncontrary, they hinder it. Deep students of the theoretical sciences\nforego all bodily pleasures, and often do without necessities. But\nneither can there be any advantage in theoretical speculation for\nultimate human happiness. For human happiness according to Averroes (and\nhe is in a sense right, as we shall see later) consists in union with\nthe Active Intellect. But this union takes place as a matter of course\naccording to his theory at the time of death, whether a man be wise or a\nfool. For the Active Intellect then absorbs the material.\n\nAnother objection to Averroes's theory is the following. If the material\nintellect is in essence the same as the Active Intellect, it is a\nseparate, immaterial substance, and hence is, like the Active Intellect,\none. For only that which has matter as its substratum can be\n_quantitatively_ differentiated. Thus A is numerically different from B,\nthough A and B are both men (_i. e._, _qualitatively_ the same), because\nthey are corporeal beings. Forms as such can be differentiated\nqualitatively only. Horse is different from ass in quality. Horse as\nsuch and horse as such are the same. It follows from this that the\nmaterial intellect, being like the Active Intellect an immaterial form,\ncannot be numerically multiplied, and therefore is one only. But if so,\nno end of absurdities follows. For it means that all men have the same\nintellect, hence the latter is wise and ignorant at the same time in\nreference to the same thing, in so far as A knows a given thing and B\ndoes not know it. It would also follow that A can make use of B's sense\nexperience and build his knowledge upon it. All these inferences are\nabsurd, and they all follow from the assumption that the material\nintellect is in essence the same as the Active Intellect. Hence\nAverroes's position is untenable.[340]\n\nGersonides then gives his own view of the material intellect, which is\nsimilar to that of Alexander. The material intellect is a capacity, and\nthe prime matter is the ultimate subject in which it inheres. But there\nare other powers or forms inhering in matter prior to the material\nintellect. Prime matter as such is not endowed with intellect, or all\nthings would have human reason. Prime matter when it reaches the stage\nof development of the imaginative faculty is then ready to receive the\nmaterial intellect. We may say then that the sensitive soul, of which\nthe imaginative faculty is a part, is the subject in which the material\nintellect inheres. The criticism directed against Alexander, which\napplies here also, may be answered as follows. The material intellect is\ndependent upon its subject, the sensitive soul, for its existence only,\nnot for the manner of receiving its knowledge. Hence the weakening or\nstrengthening of its subject cannot affect it directly at all.\nIndirectly there is a relation between the two, and it works in the\nreverse direction. When the sensitive powers are weakened and their\nactivities diminish, there is more opportunity for the intellect to\nmonopolize the one soul for itself and increase its own activity, which\nthe other powers have a tendency to hinder, since the soul is one for\nall these contending powers. It follows of course that the material\nintellect in man is not immortal. As a capacity of the sensitive soul,\nit dies with the latter. What part of the human soul it is that enjoys\nimmortality and on what conditions we shall see later. But before we do\nthis, we must try to understand the nature of the Active Intellect.[341]\n\nWe know now that the function of the Active Intellect is to actualize\nthe material intellect, _i. e._, to develop the capacity which the\nlatter has of extracting general ideas from the particular memory images\n(phantasmata) in the faculty of imagination, so that this capacity,\noriginally empty of any content, receives the ideas thus produced, and\nis thus constituted into an _actual_ intellect. From this it follows\nthat the Active Intellect, which enables the material intellect to form\nideas, must itself have the ideas it induces in the latter, though not\nnecessarily in the same form. Thus an artisan, who imposes the form of\nchair upon a piece of wood, must have the form of chair in his mind,\nthough not the same sort as he realizes in the wood. Now as all the\nideas acquired by the material intellect constitute one single activity\nso far as the end and purpose is concerned (for it all leads to the\nperfection of the person), the agent which is the cause of it all must\nalso be one. Hence there are not many Active Intellects, each\nresponsible for certain ideas, but one Intellect is the cause of all the\nideas realized in the material intellect. Moreover, as this Active\nIntellect gives the material intellect not merely a knowledge of\nseparate ideas, but also an understanding of their relations to each\nother, in other words of the systematic unity connecting all ideas into\none whole, it follows that the Active Intellect has a knowledge of the\nideas from their unitary aspect. In other words, the unity of purpose\nand aim which is evident in the development of nature from the prime\nmatter through the forms of the elements, the plant soul, the animal\nsoul and up to the human reason, where the lower is for the sake of the\nhigher, must reside as a unitary conception in the Active Intellect.\n\nFor the Active Intellect has another function besides developing the\nrational capacity in man. We can arrive at this insight by a\nconsideration undertaken from a different point of view. If we consider\nthe wonderful and mysterious development of a seed, which is only a\npiece of matter, in a purposive manner, passing through various stages\nand producing a highly complicated organism with psychic powers, we must\ncome to the conclusion, as Aristotle does, that there is an intellect\noperating in this development. As all sublunar nature shows a unity of\npurpose, this intellect must be one. And as it cannot be like one of its\nproducts, it must be eternal and not subject to generation and decay.\nBut these are the attributes which, on grounds taken from the\nconsideration of the intellectual activity in man, we ascribed to the\nActive Intellect. Hence it _is_ the Active Intellect. And we have thus\nshown that it has two functions. One is to endow sublunar nature with\nthe intelligence and purpose visible in its processes and evolutions;\nthe other is to enable the rational power in man to rise from a _tabula\nrasa_ to an actual intellect with a content. From both these activities\nit is evident that the Active Intellect has a knowledge of sublunar\ncreation as a systematic unity.\n\nThis conception of the Active Intellect, Levi ben Gerson says, will also\nanswer all the difficulties by which other philosophers are troubled\nconcerning the possibility of knowledge and the nature of definition.\nThe problems are briefly these. Knowledge concerns itself with the\npermanent and universal. There can be no real knowledge of the\nparticular, for the particular is never the same, it is constantly\nchanging and in the end disappears altogether. On the other hand, the\nuniversal has no real existence outside of the mind, for the objectively\nreal is the particular thing. The only really existing man is A or B or\nC; man in general, man that is not a particular individual man, has no\nobjective extra-mental existence. Here is a dilemma. The only thing we\ncan really know is the thing that is not real, and the only real thing\nis that which we cannot know. The Platonists solve this difficulty by\nboldly declaring that the universal ideas or forms are the real\nexistents and the models of the things of sense. This is absurd.\nAristotle's solution in the Metaphysics is likewise unsatisfactory. Our\nconception, however, of the Active Intellect enables us to solve this\nproblem satisfactorily. The object of knowledge is not the particular\nthing which is constantly changing; nor yet the logical abstraction\nwhich is only in the mind. It is the real unity of sublunar nature as it\nexists in the Active Intellect.\n\nThe problem of the definition is closely related to that of knowledge.\nThe definition denotes the essence of every individual of a given\nspecies. As the individuals of a given species have all the same\ndefinition, and hence the same essence, they are all one. For what is\nnot in the definition is not real. Our answer is that the definition\nrepresents that unitary aspect of the sublunar individuals which is in\nthe Active Intellect. This aspect is also in a certain sense present in\nevery one of the individual objects of nature, but not in the same\nmanner as in the Active Intellect.[342]\n\nWe are now ready to take up the question of human immortality. The\nmaterial intellect as a capacity for acquiring knowledge is not\nimmortal. Being inherent in the sensitive soul and dependent for its\nacquisition of knowledge upon the memory images (phantasmata) which\nappear in the imagination, the power to acquire knowledge ceases with\nthe cessation of sense and imagination. But the knowledge already\nacquired, which, we have shown above, is identical with the conceptions\nof sublunar nature in the Active Intellect, is indestructible. For these\nconceptions are absolutely immaterial; they are really the Active\nIntellect in a sense, and only the material is subject to destruction.\nThe sum of acquisition of immaterial ideas constitutes the _acquired_ or\n_actual intellect_, and this is the immortal part of man.\n\nFurther than this man cannot go. The idea adopted by some that the human\nintellect may become identified completely with the Active Intellect,\nLevi ben Gerson rejects. In order to accomplish this, he says, it would\nbe necessary to have a complete and perfect knowledge of all nature, and\nthat too a completely unified and wholly immaterial knowledge just as it\nis in the Active Intellect. This is clearly impossible. But it is true\nthat a man's happiness after death is dependent upon the amount and\nperfection of his knowledge. For even in this life the pleasure we\nderive from intellectual contemplation is greater the more nearly we\nsucceed in completely concentrating our mind on the subject of study.\nNow after death there will be no disturbing factors such as are supplied\nin this world by the sensitive and emotional powers. To be sure this\nlack will also prevent the acquisition of new knowledge, as was said\nbefore, but the amount acquired will be there in the soul's power all\nat once and all the time. The more knowledge one has succeeded in\nobtaining during life, the more nearly he will resemble the Active\nIntellect and the greater will be his happiness.[343]\n\nThe next topic Levi ben Gerson takes up is that of prognostication.\nThere are three ways in which certain persons come to know the future,\n_dreams_, _divination_ and _prophecy_. What we wish to do is to\ndetermine the kind of future events that may be thus known beforehand,\nthe agency which produces in us this power, and the bearing this\nphenomenon has on the nature of events generally, and particularly as\nconcerns the question of chance and free will.\n\nThat there is such knowledge of future events is a fact and not a\ntheory. Experience testifies to the fact that there are certain people\nwho are able to foretell the future, not as a matter of accident or\nthrough a chance coincidence, but as a regular thing. Diviners these are\ncalled, or fortune tellers. This power is even better authenticated in\nprophecy, which no one denies. We can also cite many instances of\ndreams, in which a person sees a future event with all its particulars,\nand the dream comes true. All these cases are too common to be credited\nto chance. Now what does this show as to the nature of the events thus\nforeseen? Clearly it indicates that they cannot be chance happenings,\nfor what is by chance cannot be foreseen. The only conclusion then to be\ndrawn is that these events are determined by the order of nature. But\nthere is another implication in man's ability to foretell the future,\nnamely, that what is thus known to man is first known to a higher\nintellect which communicates it to us.\n\nThe first of these two consequences leads us into difficulties. For if\nwe examine the data of prognostication, whether it be of dream,\ndivination or prophecy, we find that they concern almost exclusively\nsuch particular human events as would be classed in the category of the\ncontingent rather than in that of the necessary. Fortune tellers\nregularly tell people about the kind of children they will have, the\nsort of things they will do, and so on. In prophecy similarly Sarah was\ntold she would have a son (Gen. 18, 10). We also have examples of\nprognostication respecting the outcome of a battle, announcement of\ncoming rain,--events due to definite causes--as well as the prediction\nof events which are the result of free choice or pure accident, as when\nSamuel tells Elisha that he will meet three men on the way, who will\ngive him two loaves of bread, which he will accept; or when the prophet\nin Samariah tells the prophet in Bethel that he will be killed by a\nlion. The question now is, if these contingent things can be known in\nadvance, they are not contingent; and if these are not, none are. For\nthe uniform events in nature are surely not contingent. If then those\nevents usually classed as contingent and voluntary are not such, there\nis no such thing as chance and free will at all, which is impossible.\n\nOur answer is that as a matter of fact those contingent happenings we\ncall luck and ill luck do often come frequently to certain persons, whom\nwe call lucky or unlucky, which shows that they are not the result of\npure chance, and that there is some sort of order determining them.\nMoreover, we know that the higher in the scale of being a thing is, the\nmore nature takes care to guard it. Hence as man is the highest being\nhere below, it stands to reason that the heavenly bodies order his\nexistence and his fortune. And so the science of astrology, with all its\nmistakes on account of the imperfect state of our knowledge, does say a\ngreat many things which are true. This, however, does not destroy\nfreedom and chance. For the horoscope represents only one side of the\nquestion. Man was also endowed with reason and purpose, which enable him\nwhenever he chooses to counteract the order of the heavenly bodies. In\nthe main the heavenly bodies by their positions and motions and the\nconsequent predominance of certain elemental qualities in the sublunar\nworld over others affect the temperaments of man in a manner tending to\nhis welfare. The social order with its differentiation of labor and\noccupation is worked out wonderfully well--better than the system of\nPlato's Republic--by the positions and motions of the heavenly bodies.\nIf not for this, all men would choose the more honorable trades and\nprofessions, there would be no one to do the menial work, and society\nwould be impossible. At the same time there are certain incidental evils\ninherent in the rigid system which would tend to destroy certain\nindividuals. To counteract these unintended defects, God endowed man\nwith reason and choice enabling him to avoid the dangers threatening him\nin the world of nature.\n\nThe solution of our problem then is this. These human events have a\ntwofold aspect. They are determined so far as they follow from the order\nof the heavenly bodies; and in so far they can be foretold. They are\nundetermined so far as they are the result of individual choice, and in\nso far they cannot be known beforehand. There are also pure chance\nevents in inanimate nature, bearing no relation to human fortune. These\ncannot be foretold.[344]\n\nWe said above that there must be an intellect which knows these\ncontingent events predicted in dreams, divination and prophecy and\nimparts a knowledge of them to these men. This can be no other than the\nActive Intellect, whose nature we discussed above. For the Active\nIntellect knows the order of sublunar things, and gives us a knowledge\nof them in the ideas of the material intellect. Moreover, he is the\nagent producing them through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies.\nHence the heavenly bodies are also his instrument in ordering those\ncontingent events which are predicted in dreams and prophetic visions.\n\nThe purpose of this information is to protect man against the evil\ndestined for him in the order of the heavenly bodies, or in order that\nhe may avail himself of the good in store for him if he knows of it.\n\nThere is a difference in kind between prophecy on the one hand and\ndivination and dream on the other. Prophecy comes from the Active\nIntellect directly acting on the material intellect. Hence only\nintelligent men can be prophets. Divination and dream come from the\nActive Intellect indirectly. They are caused by the heavenly bodies, and\nthe action is on the imagination. The imagination is more easily\nisolated from the other parts of the soul in young people and\nsimpletons. Hence we find examples of dreams and divination among\nthem.[345]\n\nIn discussing the problem of God's knowledge, Gersonides takes direct\nissue with Maimonides. The reader will recall that the question turns\nupon the knowledge of particulars. Some philosophers go so far as to\ndeny to God any knowledge of things other than his own essence; for the\nknown is in a sense identified with the knower, and to bring in a\nmultiplicity of ideas in God's knowledge would endanger his unity.\nOthers, however, fell short of this extreme opinion and admitted God's\nknowledge of things other than himself, but maintained that God cannot\nknow particulars for various reasons. The particular is perceived by\nsense, a material faculty, whereas God is immaterial. Particulars are\ninfinite and cannot be measured or embraced, whereas knowledge is a kind\nof measuring or embracing. The particulars are not always existing, and\nare subject to change. Hence God's knowledge would be subject to change\nand disappearance, which is impossible. If God knows particulars how is\nit that there is often a violation of right and justice in the destinies\nof individual men? This would argue in God either inability or\nindifference, both of which are impossible.\n\nMaimonides insists on God's knowledge of all things of which he is the\ncreator, including particulars. And he answers the arguments of the\nphilosophers by saying that their objections are valid only if we assume\nthat God's knowledge is similar to ours, and since with us it is\nimpossible to know the material except through a material organ, it is\nnot possible in God. As we cannot comprehend the infinite; as we cannot\nknow the non-existent, nor the changing without a change in our\nknowledge, God cannot do so. But it is wrong to assume this. God's\nknowledge is identical with his essence, which these same philosophers\ninsist is unlike anything else, and unknowable. Surely it follows that\nhis knowledge is also without the least resemblance to our knowledge and\nthe name alone is what they have in common. Hence all the objections of\nthe philosophers fall away at one stroke. _We_ cannot in one act of\nknowing embrace a number of things differing in species; God can,\nbecause his knowledge is one. _We_ cannot know the non-existent, for our\nknowledge depends upon the thing known. God can. _We_ cannot know the\ninfinite, for the infinite cannot be embraced; God can. _We_ cannot know\nthe outcome of a future event unless the event is necessary and\ndetermined. If the event is contingent and undetermined we can only have\nopinion concerning it, which may or may not be true; we are uncertain\nand may be mistaken. God can know the outcome of a contingent event, and\nyet the event is not determined, and may happen one way or the other.\nOur knowledge of a given thing changes as the thing itself undergoes a\nchange, for if our knowledge should remain the same while the object\nchanges, it would not be knowledge but error. In God the two are\ncompatible. He knows in advance how a given thing will change, and his\nknowledge never changes, even though that which was at one moment\npotential and implicit becomes later actual and explicit.\n\nAt this point Gersonides steps in in defence of human logic and sanity.\nHe accuses Maimonides of not being quite honest with himself.\nMaimonides, he intimates, did not choose this position of his own free\nwill--a position scientifically quite untenable--he was forced to it by\ntheological exigencies.[346] He felt that he must vindicate, by fair\nmeans or foul, God's knowledge of particulars. And so Gersonides\nproceeds to demolish Maimonides's position by reducing it _ad absurdum_.\n\nWhat does Maimonides mean by saying that God knows the contingent? If he\nmeans that God knows that the contingent may as contingent happen\notherwise than as he knows it will happen, we do not call this in us\nknowledge, but opinion. If he means that God knows it will happen in a\ncertain way, and yet it may turn out that the reverse will actually take\nplace, then we call this in our case error, not knowledge. And if he\nmeans that God merely knows that it may happen one way or the other\nwithout knowing definitely which will happen, then we call this in our\nexperience uncertainty and perplexity, not knowledge. By insisting that\nall this is in God knowledge because, forsooth, God's knowledge is not\nlike our knowledge, is tantamount to saying that what is in us opinion,\nuncertainty, error, is in God knowledge--a solution far from\ncomplimentary to God's knowledge.\n\nBesides, the entire principle of Maimonides that there is no relation of\nresemblance between God's attributes and ours, that the terms wise,\njust, and so on, are pure homonyms, is fundamentally wrong. We attribute\nknowledge to God because we know in our own case that an intellect is\nperfected by knowledge. And since we have come to the conclusion on\nother grounds that God is a perfect intellect, we say he must have\nknowledge. Now if this knowledge that we ascribe to God has no\nresemblance whatsoever to what we understand by knowledge in our own\ncase, the ground is removed from our feet. We might as well argue that\nman is rational because solid is continuous. If the word knowledge means\na totally different thing in God from what it means in us, how do we\nknow that it is to be found in God? If we have absolutely no idea what\nthe term means when applied to God, what reason have we for preferring\nknowledge as a divine attribute to its opposite or negative? If\nknowledge does not mean knowledge, ignorance does not mean ignorance,\nand it is just the same whether we ascribe to God the one or the other.\n\nThe truth is that the attributes we ascribe to God do have a resemblance\nto the same attributes in ourselves; only they are primary in God,\nsecondary in ourselves, _i. e._, they exist in God in a more perfect\nmanner than in us. Hence it is absurd to say that what would be in us\nerror or uncertainty is in God knowledge. Our problem must be solved\nmore candidly and differently. There are arguments in favor of God's\nknowing particulars (Maimonides gives some), and there are the arguments\nof the philosophers against the thesis. The truth must be between the\ntwo, that God knows them from one aspect and does not know them from\nanother. Having shown above that human events are in part ordered and\ndetermined by the heavenly bodies, and in part undetermined and\ndependent upon the individual's choice, we can now make use of this\ndistinction for the solution of our problem. God knows particulars in so\nfar as they are ordered, he does not know them in so far as they are\ncontingent. He knows that they are contingent, and hence it follows that\nhe does not know which of the two possibilities will happen, else they\nwould not be contingent. This is no defect in God's nature, for to know\na thing as it is is no imperfection. In general God does not know\nparticulars as particulars but as ordered by the universal laws of\nnature. He knows the universal order, and he knows the particulars in so\nfar as they are united in the universal order.\n\nThis theory meets all objections, and moreover it is in agreement with\nthe views of the Bible. It is the only one by which we can harmonize the\napparent contradictions in the Scriptures. Thus on the one hand we are\ntold that God sends Prophets and commands people to do and forbear. This\nimplies that a person has freedom to choose, and that the contingent is\na real category. On the other hand, we find that God foretells the\ncoming of future events respecting human destiny, which signifies\ndetermination. And yet again we find that God repents, and that he does\nnot repent. All these apparent contradictions can be harmonized on our\ntheory. God foretells the coming of events in so far as they are\ndetermined in the universal order of nature. But man's freedom may\nsucceed in counteracting this order, and the events predicted may not\ncome. This is signified by the expression that God repents.[347]\n\nLevi ben Gerson's solution, whatever we may think of its scientific or\nphilosophic value, is surely very bold as theology, we might almost say\nit is a theological monstrosity. It practically removes from God the\ndefinite knowledge of the outcome of a given event so far as that\noutcome is contingent. Gersonides will not give up the contingent, for\nthat would destroy freedom. He therefore accepts free will with its\nconsequences, at the risk of limiting God's knowledge to events which\nare determined by the laws of nature. Maimonides was less consistent,\nbut had the truer theological sense, namely, he kept to both horns of\nthe dilemma. God is omniscient and man is free. He gave up the solution\nby seeking refuge in the mysteriousness of God's knowledge. This is the\ntrue religious attitude.\n\nThe question of Providence is closely related to that of God's\nknowledge. For it is clear that one cannot provide for those things of\nwhich he does not know. Gersonides's view in this problem is very\nsimilar to that of Maimonides, and like him he sees in the discussions\nbetween Job and his friends the representative opinions held by\nphilosophers in this important problem.\n\nThere are three views, he says, concerning the nature of Providence. One\nis that God's providence extends only to species and not to individuals.\nThe second opinion is that God provides for every individual of the\nhuman race. The third view is that some individuals are specially\nprovided for, but not all. Job held the first view, which is that of\nAristotle. The arguments in favor of this opinion are that God does not\nknow particulars, hence cannot provide for them. Besides, there would be\nmore justice in the distribution of goods and evils in the world if God\nconcerned himself about every individual. Then again man is too\ninsignificant for God's special care.\n\nThe second view is that of the majority of our people. They argue that\nas God is the author of all, he surely provides for them. And as a\nmatter of fact experience shows it; else there would be much more\nviolence and bloodshed than there is. The wicked are actually punished\nand the good rewarded. This class is divided into two parts. Some think\nthat while God provides for all men, not all that happens to a man is\ndue to God; there are also other causes. The others think that every\nhappening is due to God. This second class may again be divided\naccording to the manner in which they account for those facts in\nexperience which seem to militate against their view. Maintaining that\nevery incident is due to God, they have to explain the apparent\ndeviation from justice in the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity\nof the righteous. One party explains the phenomenon by saying that the\nprosperity and the adversity in these cases are only seeming and not\nreal; that they in fact are the opposite of what they seem, or at least\nlead to the opposite. The second party answers the objection on the\nground that those we think good may not really be such, and similarly\nthose we think bad may not really be bad. For the way to judge a\nperson's character is not merely by his deeds alone, but by his deeds as\nrelated to his temperament and disposition, which God alone knows.\nEliphaz the Temanite belonged to those who think that not all which\nhappens is due to God; that folly is responsible for a man's misfortune.\nBildad the Shuchite believed that all things are from God, but not all\nthat seems good and evil is really so. Zophar the Naamathite thought we\ndo not always judge character correctly; that temperament and\ndisposition must be taken into account.\n\nOf these various opinions the first one, that of Aristotle, cannot be\ntrue. Dreams, divination, and especially prophecy contradict it flatly.\nAll these are given to the individual for his protection (_cf._ above,\np. 342). The second opinion, namely, that God's providence extends to\nevery individual, is likewise disproved by reason, by experience and by\nthe Bible. We have already proved (p. 345) that God's knowledge does not\nextend to particulars as such. He only knows things as ordered by the\nheavenly bodies; and knows at the same time that they may fail to happen\nbecause of man's free will. Now if God punishes and rewards every man\naccording to his deeds, one of two things necessarily follows. Either he\nrewards and punishes according to those deeds which the individual is\ndetermined to do by the order of the heavenly bodies, or according to\nthe deeds the individual actually does. In the first case there would be\noften injustice, for the person might not have acted as the order of the\nheavenly bodies indicated he would act, for he is free to act as he\nwill. The second case is impossible, for it would mean that God knows\nparticulars as particulars--a thesis we have already disproved. Besides,\nevil does not come from God directly, since he is pure form and evil\ncomes only from matter. Hence it cannot be said that he punishes the\nevil doer for his sin.\n\nExperience also testifies against this view, for we see the just suffer\nand the wicked prosper. The manner in which Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar\nwish to defend God's justice will not hold water. Man's own folly will\naccount perhaps for some evils befalling the righteous and some good\ncoming to the wicked. But it will not account for the failure of the\ngood man to get the reward he deserves, and of the wicked to receive the\npunishment which is his due. The righteous man often has troubles all\nhis life no matter how careful he is to avoid them, and correspondingly\nthe same is true of the wicked, that he is prosperous, despite his lack\nof caution and good sense. To avoid these objections as Eliphaz does by\nsaying that if the wicked man himself is not punished, his children will\nbe, is to go from the frying pan into the fire. For it is not just\neither to omit to punish the one deserving it, or to punish another\ninnocent man for him. Nor is Zophar's defence any better. For the same\nman, with the same temperament and disposition, often suffers more when\nhe is inclined to do good, and is prosperous when he is not so\nscrupulous. Bildad is no more successful than the other two. The evils\ncoming to the righteous are often real and permanent. But neither does\nthe Bible compel us to believe that God looks out for all individuals.\nThis is especially true in reference to punishment, as can be gathered\nfrom such expressions as \"I will hide my face from them, and they shall\nbe given to be devoured\" (Deut. 31, 17), or \"As thou hast forgotten the\nlaw of thy God, so will I myself also forget thy children\" (Hosea 4, 6).\nThese expressions indicate that God does not punish the individuals\ndirectly, but that he leaves them to the fate that is destined for them\nby the order of the heavenly bodies. True there are other passages in\nScripture speaking of direct punishment, but they may be interpreted so\nas not to conflict with our conclusions.\n\nHaving seen that neither of the two extreme views is correct, it remains\nto adopt the middle course, namely, that some individuals are provided\nfor specially, and others not. The nearer a person is to the Active\nIntellect, the more he receives divine providence and care. Those people\nwho do not improve their capabilities, which they possess as members of\nthe species, are provided for only as members of the species. The\nmatter may be put in another way also. God knows all ideas. Man is\npotentially capable of receiving them in a certain manner. God, who is\nactual, leads man from his potentiality to actuality. When a man's\npotentialities are thus realized, he becomes similar to God, because\nwhen ideas are actualized the agent and the thing acted upon are one.\nHence the person enjoys divine providence at that time. The way in which\nGod provides for such men is by giving them knowledge through dream,\ndivination or prophecy or intuition or in some other unconscious manner\non the individual's part, which knowledge protects him from harm. This\nview is not in conflict with the truth that God does not know\nparticulars as such. For it is not to the individual person as such that\nprovidence extends as a conscious act of God. The individualization is\ndue to the recipient and not to the dispenser. One may object that after\nall since it is possible that bad men may have goods as ordered by the\nheavenly bodies, and good men may have misfortune as thus ordered, when\ntheir attachment to God is loosened somewhat, there is _injustice_ in\nGod if he could have arranged the heavenly spheres differently and did\nnot, or _incapacity_ if he could not. The answer is briefly that the\norder of the spheres does a great deal of good in maintaining the\nexistence of things. And if some little evil comes also incidentally,\nthis does not condemn the whole arrangement. In fact the evils come from\nthe very agencies which are the authors of good. The view of providence\nhere adopted is that of Elihu the son of Barachel the Buzite in the book\nof Job (ch. 32), and it agrees also with the opinion of Maimonides in\nthe \"Guide of the Perplexed\" (_cf._ above, p. 292).[348]\n\nInstead of placing his cosmology at the beginning of his system and\nproceeding from that as a basis to the other parts of his work, the\npsychology and the ethics, Levi ben Gerson, whose \"Milhamot Hashem\" is\nnot so much a systematic work as an aggregation of discussions, reversed\nthe process. He begins as we have seen with a purely psychological\nanalysis concerning the nature of the human reason and its relation to\nthe Active Intellect. He follows up this discussion with a treatment of\nprognostication as exhibiting some of the effects of the Active\nIntellect upon the reason and imagination of man. This is again followed\nby a discussion of God's knowledge and providence. And not until all\nthese psychological (and in part ethical) questions have been decided,\ndoes Levi ben Gerson undertake to give us his views of the constitution\nof the universe and the nature and attributes of God. In this discussion\nhe takes occasion to express his dissatisfaction with Aristotle's proofs\nof the existence of the spheral movers and of the unmoved mover or God,\nas inadequate to bear the structure which it is intended to erect upon\nthem. It will be remembered that the innovation of Abraham Ibn Daud and\nMaimonides in making Jewish philosophy more strictly Aristotelian than\nit had been consisted in a great measure in just this introduction of\nthe Aristotelian proof of the existence of God as derived from the\nmotions of the heavenly bodies. Levi ben Gerson's proofs are\nteleological rather than mechanical. Aristotle said a moving body must\nhave a mover outside of it, which if it is again a body is itself in\nmotion and must have a mover in turn. And as this process cannot go on\n_ad infinitum_, there must be at the end of the series an unmoved mover.\nAs unmoved this mover cannot be body; and as producing motion eternally,\nit cannot be a power residing in a body, a physical or material power,\nfor no such power can be infinite. Gersonides is not satisfied with this\nproof. He argues that so far as the motions of the heavenly bodies are\nconcerned there is no reason why a physical power cannot keep on moving\nthem eternally. The reason that motions caused by finite forces in our\nworld come to a stop is because the thing moved is subject to change,\nwhich alters its relation to its mover; and secondly because the force\nendeavors to move the object in opposition to its own tendency, in\nopposition to gravity. In the case of the heavenly bodies neither of\nthese conditions is present. The relation of the mover to the moved is\nalways the same, since the heavenly bodies are not subject to change;\nand as they are not made of the four terrestrial elements they have no\ninherent tendency to move in any direction, hence they offer no\nopposition to the force exerted upon them by the mover. A finite power\nmight therefore quite conceivably cause eternal motion. Similarly an\nunmoved mover cannot be body, to be sure, but it may be a physical power\nlike a soul, which in moving the body is not itself moved by that\nmotion. Aristotle's proofs therefore are not sufficient to produce the\nconviction that the movers of the spheres and God himself are separate\nIntelligences.[349]\n\nGersonides accordingly follows a different method. He argues that if a\nsystem of things and events exhibits perfection not here and there and\nat rare intervals but regularly, the inference is justified that there\nis an intelligent agent who had a definite purpose and design in\nestablishing the system. The world below is such a system. Hence it has\nan intelligent agent as its author. This agent may be a separate and\nimmaterial intelligence, or a corporeal power like a soul. He then shows\nthat it cannot be a corporeal power, for it would have to reside in the\nanimal sperm which exhibits such wonderful and purposive development, or\nin the parent animal from which the sperm came, both of which, he\nargues, are impossible. It remains then that the cause of the\nteleological life of the sublunar world is an immaterial power, a\nseparate intellect. This intellect, he argues further, acts upon matter\nand endows it with forms, the only mediating power being the natural\nheat which is found in the seed and sperm of plants and animals.\nMoreover, it is aware of the order of what it produces. It is the Active\nIntellect of which we spoke above (p. 337). The forms of terrestrial\nthings come from it directly, the heat residing in the seed comes from\nthe motions of the spheres. This shows that the permanent motions of the\nheavenly bodies are also intelligent motions, for they tend to produce\nperfection in the terrestrial world and never come to a standstill,\nwhich would be the case if the motions were \"natural\" like those of the\nelements, or induced against their nature like that of a stone moving\nupward. We are justified in saying then that the heavenly bodies are\nendowed with intellects and have no material soul. Hence their movers\nare pure Intelligences, and there are as many of them as there are\nspheres, _i. e._, forty-eight, or fifty-eight or sixty-four according to\none's opinion on the astronomical question of the number of spheres.\n\nNow as the Active Intellect knows the order of sublunar existence in its\nunity, and the movers of the respective spheres know the order of their\neffects through the motions of the heavenly bodies, it follows that as\nall things in heaven above and on the earth beneath are related in a\nunitary system, there is a highest agent who is the cause of all\nexistence absolutely and has a knowledge of all existence as a unitary\nsystem.[350]\n\nThe divine attributes are derived by us from his actions, and hence they\nare not pure homonyms (_cf._, p. 240). God has a knowledge of the\ncomplete order of sublunar things, of which the several movers have only\na part. He _knows_ it as _one_, and knows it eternally without change.\nHis _joy_ and _gladness_ are beyond conception, for our joy also is very\ngreat in understanding. His is also the perfect _Life_, for\nunderstanding is life. He is the most real _Substance_ and _Existent_,\nand he is _One_. God is also the most real _Agent_, as making the other\nmovers do their work, and producing a complete and perfect whole out of\ntheir parts. He is also properly called _Bestower_, _Beneficent_,\n_Gracious_, _Strong_, _Mighty_, _Upright_, _Just_, _Eternal_,\n_Permanent_. All these attributes, however, do not denote\nmultiplicity.[351]\n\nFrom God we now pass again to his creation, and take up the problem\nwhich caused Maimonides so much trouble, namely, the question of the\norigin of the world. It will be remembered that dissatisfied with the\nproofs for the existence of God advanced by the Mutakallimun,\nMaimonides, in order to have a firm foundation for the central idea of\nreligion, tentatively adopted the Aristotelian notion of the eternity of\nmotion and the world. But no sooner does Maimonides establish his proof\nof the existence, unity and incorporeality of God than he returns to the\nattack of the Aristotelian view and points out that the problem is\ninsoluble in a strictly scientific manner; that Aristotle himself never\nintended his arguments in favor of eternity to be regarded as\nphilosophically demonstrated, and that they all labor under the fatal\nfallacy that because certain laws hold of the world's phenomena once it\nis in existence, these same laws must have governed the establishment of\nthe world itself in its origin. Besides, the assumption of the world's\neternity with its corollary of the necessity and immutability of its\nphenomena saps the foundation of all religion, makes miracles\nimpossible, and reduces the world to a machine. Gersonides is on the\nwhole agreed with Maimonides. He admits that Aristotle's arguments are\nthe best yet advanced in the problem, but that they are not convincing.\nHe also agrees with Maimonides in his general stricture on Aristotle's\nmethod, only modifying and restricting its generality and sweeping\nnature. With all this, however, he finds it necessary to take up the\nentire question anew and treats it in his characteristic manner, with\ndetail and rigor, and finally comes to a conclusion different from that\nof Maimonides, namely, that the world had an origin in time, to be sure,\nbut that it came not _ex nihilo_ in the absolute sense of the word\n_nihil_, but developed from an eternal formless matter, which God\nendowed with form. This is the so-called Platonic view.\n\nWe cannot enter into all his details which are technical and fatiguing\nin the extreme, but we must give a general idea of his procedure in the\ninvestigation of this important topic.\n\nThe problem of the origin of the world, he says, is very difficult.\nFirst, because in order to learn from the nature of existing things\nwhether they were created out of a state of non-existence or not, we\nmust know the essence of existing things, which is not easy. Secondly,\nwe must know the nature of God in order to determine whether he could\nhave existed first without the world and then have created it, or\nwhether he had to have the world with him from eternity. The fact of the\ngreat difference of opinion on this question among thinkers, and the\ntestimony of Maimonides that Aristotle himself had no valid proof in\nthis matter are additional indications of the great difficulty of the\nsubject.\n\nSome think the world was made and destroyed an infinite number of times.\nOthers say it was made once. Of these some maintain it was made out of\nsomething (Plato); others, that it was made out of absolute nothing\n(Philoponus, the Mutakallimun, Maimonides and many of our Jewish\nwriters). Some on the other hand, namely, Aristotle and his followers,\nhold the world to be eternal. They all have their defenders, and there\nis no need to refute the others since Aristotle has already done this.\nHis arguments are the best so far, and deserve investigation. The\nfundamental fallacy in all his proofs is that he argues from the laws of\ngenesis and decay in the parts of the world to the laws of these\nprocesses in the world as a whole. This might seem to be the same\ncriticism which Maimonides advances, but it is not really quite the\nsame, Maimonides's assertion being more general and sweeping. Maimonides\nsays that the origin of the world as a whole need not be in any respect\nlike the processes going on within its parts; whereas Gersonides bases\nhis argument on the observed difference in the world between wholes and\nparts, admitting that the two may be alike in many respects.\n\nIn order to determine whether the world is created or not, it is best to\ninvestigate first those things in the world which have the appearance\nof being eternal, such as the heavenly bodies, time, motion, the form of\nthe earth, and so on. If these are proven to be eternal, the world is\neternal; if not, it is not. A general principle to help us distinguish a\nthing having an origin from one that has not is the following: A thing\nwhich came into being in time has a purpose. An eternal thing has no\npurpose. Applying this principle to the heavens we find that all about\nthem is with a purpose to ordering the sublunar world in the best way\npossible. Their motions, their distances, their positions, their\nnumbers, and so on are all for this purpose. Hence they had a beginning.\nAristotle's attempts to explain these conditions from the nature of the\nheavens themselves are not successful, and he knew it. Again, as the\nheavenly bodies are all made of the same fifth element (the Aristotelian\nether), the many varieties in their forms and motions require special\nexplanation. The only satisfactory explanation is that the origin of the\nheavenly bodies is not due to nature and necessity, which would favor\neternity, but to will and freedom, and the many varieties are for a\ndefinite purpose. Hence they are not eternal.[352]\n\nGersonides then analyzes time and motion and proves that Aristotle to\nthe contrary notwithstanding, they are both finite and not infinite.\nTime belongs to the category of quantity, and there is no infinite\nquantity. As time is dependent on motion, motion too is finite, hence\nneither is eternal. Another argument for creation in time is that if the\nworld is eternal and governed altogether by necessity, the earth should\nbe surrounded on all sides by water according to the nature of the\nlighter element to be above the heavier. Hence the appearance of parts\nof the earth's surface above the water is an indication of a break of\nnatural law for a special purpose, namely, in order to produce the\nvarious mineral, plant and animal species. Hence once more purpose\nargues design and origin in time.\n\nFinally if the world were eternal, the state of the sciences would be\nmore advanced than it is. A similar argument may be drawn from language.\nLanguage is conventional; which means that the people existed before the\nlanguage they agreed to speak. But man being a social animal they could\nnot have existed an infinite time without language. Hence mankind is not\neternal.[353]\n\nWe have just proved that the world came into being, but it does not\nnecessarily follow that it will be destroyed. Nay, there are reasons to\nshow that it will not be destroyed. For there is no destruction except\nthrough matter and the predominance of the passive powers over the\nactive. Hence the being that is subject to destruction must consist of\nopposites. But the heavenly bodies have no opposites, not being\ncomposite; hence they cannot be destroyed. And if so, neither can the\nsublunar order be destroyed, which is the work of the heavenly bodies.\nThere is of course the abstract possibility of their being destroyed by\ntheir maker, not naturally, but by his will, as they were made; but we\ncan find no reason in God for wishing to destroy them, all reasons\nexisting in man for destroying things being inapplicable to God.[354]\n\nThat the world began in time is now established. The question still\nremains, was the world made out of something or out of nothing? Both are\nimpossible. The first is impossible, for that something out of which the\nworld was made must have had some form, for matter never is without\nform, and if so, it must have had some motion, and we have a kind of\nworld already, albeit an imperfect one. The second supposition is also\nimpossible; for while form may come out of nothing, body cannot come\nfrom not-body. We never see the matter of any object arise out of\nnothing, though the form may. Nature as well as art produces one\ncorporeal thing out of another. Hence the generally accepted principle,\n\"_ex nihilo nihil fit_.\" Besides it would follow on this supposition\nthat before the world came into existence there was a vacuum in its\nplace, whereas it is proved in the Physics that a vacuum is impossible.\nThe only thing remaining therefore is to say that the world was made\npartly out of something, partly out of nothing, _i. e._, out of an\nabsolutely formless matter.\n\nIt may be objected that to assume the existence of a second eternal\nthing beside God is equivalent to a belief in dualism, in two gods. But\nthis objection may be easily answered. Eternity as such does not\nconstitute divinity. If all the world were eternal, God would still be\nGod because he controls everything and is the author of the order\nobtaining in the world. In general it is the qualitative essence that\nmakes the divine character of God, his wisdom and power as the source of\ngoodness and right order in nature. The eternal matter of which we are\nspeaking is the opposite of all this. As God is the extreme of\nperfection so is matter the extreme of imperfection and defect. As God\nis the source of good, so is matter the source of evil. How then can\nanyone suppose for a moment that an eternal formless matter can in any\nway be identified with a divine being?\n\nAnother objection that may be offered to our theory is that it is an\nestablished fact that matter cannot exist at all without any form,\nwhereas our view assumes that an absolutely formless matter existed an\ninfinite length of time before the world was made from it. This may be\nanswered by saying that the impossibility of matter existing without\nform applies only to the actual objects of nature. God put in sublunar\nmatter the nature and capacity of receiving all forms in a certain\norder. The primary qualities, the hot and the cold and the wet and the\ndry, as the forms of the elements, enable this matter to receive other\nhigher forms. The very capacity of receiving a given form argues a\ncertain form on the part of the matter having this capacity; for if it\nhad no form there would be no reason why it should receive one form\nrather than another; whereas we find that the reception of forms is not\nat random, but that a given form comes from a definite other form. Man\ncomes only from man. But this does not apply to the prime matter of\nwhich we are speaking. It may have been without form. Nay, it is\nreasonable to suppose that as we find matter and form combined, and we\nalso find pure forms without matter, _viz._, in the separate\nIntelligences,--it is reasonable to suppose that there is also matter\nwithout form.\n\nFinally one may ask if the world has not existed from eternity, what\ndetermined the author to will its existence at the time he did and not\nat another? We cannot say that he acquired new knowledge which he had\nnot before, or that he needed the world then and not before, or that\nthere was some obstacle which was removed. The answer to this would be\nthat the sole cause of the creation was the will of God to benefit his\ncreatures. Their existence is therefore due to the divine causality,\nwhich never changes. Their origin in time is due to the nature of a\nmaterial object as such. A material object as being caused by an\nexternal agent is incompatible with eternity. It must have a beginning,\nand there is no sense in asking why at this time and not before or\nafter, for the same question would apply to any other time. Gersonides\ncites other objections which he answers, and then he takes up one by\none the Aristotelian arguments in favor of eternity and refutes them in\ndetail. We cannot afford to reproduce them here as the discussions are\ntechnical, lengthy and intricate.[355]\n\nHaving given his philosophical cosmology, Gersonides then undertakes to\nshow in detail that the Biblical story of creation teaches the same\ndoctrine. Nay, he goes so far as to say that it was the Biblical account\nthat suggested to him his philosophical theory. It would be truer to say\nthat having approached the Bible with Aristotelian spectacles, and\nhaving no suspicion that the two attitudes are as far apart as the\npoles, he did not scruple to twist the expressions in Genesis out of all\nsemblance to their natural meaning. The Biblical text had been twisted\nand turned ever since the days of Philo, and of the Mishna and Talmud\nand Midrash, in the interest of various schools and sects. Motives\nspeculative, religious, theological, legal and ethical were at the basis\nof Biblical interpretation throughout its long history of two millennia\nand more--the end is not yet--and Gersonides was swimming with the\ncurrent. The Bible is not a law, he says, which forces us to believe\nabsurdities and to practice useless things, as some people think. On the\ncontrary it is a law which leads us to our perfection. Hence what is\nproved by reason must be found in the Law, by interpretation if\nnecessary. This is why Maimonides took pains to interpret all Biblical\npassages in which God is spoken of as if he were corporeal. Hence also\nhis statement that if the eternity of the world were strictly\ndemonstrated, it would not be difficult to interpret the Bible so as to\nagree. But in the matter of the origin of the world, Gersonides\ncontinues, it was not necessary for me to force the Biblical account.\nQuite the contrary, the expressions in the Bible guided me to my\nview.[356]\n\nAccordingly he finds support for his doctrine that the world was not\ncreated _ex nihilo_, in the fact that there is not one miracle in the\nBible in which anything comes out of nothing. They are all instances of\nsomething out of a pre-existent something. The miracle of the oil in the\ncase of Elisha is no exception. The air changed into oil as it entered\nthe partly depleted vessel. The six days of creation must not be taken\nliterally. God's creation is timeless, and the six days indicate the\nnatural order and rank in existing things proceeding from the cause to\nthe effect and from the lower to the higher. Thus the movers of the\nheavenly bodies come before the spheres which they move as their causes.\nThe spheres come before the terrestrial elements for the same reason.\nThe elements are followed by the things composed of them. And among\nthese too there is a certain order. Plants come before animals, aquatic\nanimals before aerial, aerial before terrestrial, and the last of all is\nman, as the most perfect of sublunar creatures. All this he reads into\nthe account of creation in Genesis. Thus the _light_ spoken of in the\nfirst day represents the angels or separate Intelligences or movers of\nthe spheres, and they are distinguished from the _darkness_ there, which\nstands for the heavenly bodies as the matters of their movers, though at\nthe same time they are grouped together as one day, because the form and\nits matter constitute a unit. The _water_, which was divided by the\nfirmament, denotes the prime formless matter, part of which was changed\ninto the matter of the heavenly bodies, and part into the four\nterrestrial elements. Form and matter are also designated by the terms\n\"Tohu\" and \"Bohu\" in the second verse in Genesis, rendered in the\nRevised Version by \"without form\" and \"void.\" And so Gersonides\ncontinues throughout the story of creation, into the details of which we\nneed not follow him.[357]\n\nThe concluding discussion in the Milhamot is devoted to the problem of\nmiracles and its relation to prophecy. Maimonides had said that one\nreason for opposing the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world\nis that miracles would be an impossibility on that assumption. Hence\nMaimonides insists on creation _ex nihilo_, though he admits that the\nPlatonic view of a pre-existent matter may be reconciled with the Torah.\nGersonides, who adopted the doctrine of an eternal matter, finds it\nnecessary to say by way of introduction to his treatment of miracles\nthat they do not prove creation _ex nihilo_. For as was said before all\nmiracles exhibit a production of something out of something and not out\nof nothing.\n\nTo explain the nature of miracles, he says, and their authors, it is\nnecessary to know what miracles are. For this we must take the Biblical\nrecords as our data, just as we take the data of our senses in\ndetermining other matters. On examining the miracles of the Bible we\nfind that they may be classified into those which involve a change of\nsubstance and those in which the substance remains the same and the\nchange is one of quality or quantity. An example of the former is the\nchange of Moses's rod into a serpent and of the water of Egypt into\nblood; of the latter, Moses's hand becoming leprous, and the withering\nof the hand of Jeroboam. We may further divide the miracles into those\nin which the prophet was told in advance, as Moses was of the ten\nplagues, and those in which he was not, as for example the reviving of\nthe dead by Elijah and many other cases. Our examination also shows us\nthat all miracles are performed by prophets or in relation to them. Also\nthat they are done with some good and useful purpose, namely, to\ninculcate belief or to save from evil.\n\nThese data will help us to decide who is the author of miracles.\nMiracles cannot be accidental, as they are performed with a purpose; and\nas they involve a knowledge of the sublunar order, they must have as\ntheir author one who has this knowledge, hence either God or the Active\nIntellect or man, _i. e._, the prophet himself. Now it is not reasonable\nto suppose that God is the author of miracles, for miracles come only\nrarely and are of no value in themselves but only as a means to a\nspecial end, as we said before. The laws of nature, however, which\ncontrol all regular events all the time, are essentially good and\npermanent. Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that the Active\nIntellect who, as we know, orders the sublunar world, has more important\nwork to do than God. Besides if God were the author of miracles, the\nprophet would not know about them, for prophetic inspiration, as we know\n(p. 342), is due to the Active Intellect and not directly to God.\n\nNor do we need waste words in proving that man cannot be the author of\nmiracles, for in that case the knowledge of them would not come to him\nthrough prophetic inspiration, since they are due to his own will.\nBesides man, as we have seen, cannot have a complete knowledge of the\nsublunar order, and hence it is not likely that he can control its laws\nto the extent of changing them.\n\nThere is therefore only one alternative left, namely, that the author of\nmiracles is the same as the inspirer of the prophets, the controlling\nspirit of the sublunar world, whose intellect has as its content the\nunified system of sublunar creation as an immaterial idea, namely, the\nActive Intellect, of whom we have spoken so often. The prophet knows of\nthe miracles because the Active Intellect, who is the author of them, is\nalso the cause of the prophetic inspiration. This will account too for\nthe fact that all miracles have to do with events in the sublunar world\nand are not found in the relations and motions of the heavenly bodies.\nThe case of Joshua causing the sun and moon to stand still is no\nexception. There was no standing still of the sun and moon in that case.\nWhat is meant by the expressions in Joshua 10 is that the Israelites\nconquered the enemy in the short time that the sun occupied the zenith,\nwhile its motion was not noticeable for about an hour, as is usually the\ncase about noon. In the case of Isaiah moving the sun ten degrees back\nfor Hezekiah (Isai. 38, 8), there was likewise no change in the motion\nof the sun, but only in that of the cloud causing the shadow.\n\nMiracles cannot be of regular occurrence, for if natural phenomena and\nlaws were changed by miracle as a regular thing, it would signify a\ndefect in the original order. Miracles cannot take place to violate the\nprinciple of contradiction, hence there can be no miracles in reference\nto mathematical truths, nor in matters relating to the past. Thus a\nmiracle cannot make a thing black and white at the same time; nor a\nplane triangle whose angles are less than two right angles; nor is it\npossible by miracle now to make it not to have rained in Jerusalem\nyesterday, when as a matter of fact it did rain. For all these involve a\ndenial of the logical law of contradiction that a thing cannot be and\nnot be at the same time.[358]\n\nA prophet is tested (1) by being able to foretell miracles before they\ncome, and (2) by the realization of his prophetic messages. The question\nis raised concerning the statement of Jeremiah that one may be a true\nprophet and yet an evil prophecy may remain unfulfilled if the people\nrepent. Does this mean that a good prophecy must always come true? In\nthat case a good deal of what comes within the category of the possible\nand contingent becomes determined and necessary! The answer is that a\ngood prophecy too sometimes fails of realization, as is illustrated in\nJacob's fear of Esau after he was promised protection by God. But this\nhappens more rarely on account of the fact that a man endeavors\nnaturally to see a good prophecy realized, whereas he does his best to\ncounteract an evil prophecy.[359]\n\nGersonides's entire discussion of miracles shows a deep seated motive to\nminimize their extent and influence. The study of science and philosophy\nhad the effect of planting in the minds of the medi\u00e6val philosophers a\ngreat respect for reason on the one hand and natural law on the other. A\nstudy of history, arch\u00e6ology and literary criticism has developed in\nmodern times a spirit of scepticism regarding written records of\nantiquity. This was foreign to medi\u00e6val theologians generally. No one\ndoubted for a moment the accuracy of the Biblical records as well as\ntheir inspiration in every detail. Hence prophecy and miracles had to be\nexplained or explained away. Interpretation held the place of\ncriticism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\nAARON BEN ELIJAH OF NICOMEDIA\n\n\nThe chronological treatment of Jewish philosophy which we have followed\nmakes it necessary at this point to take up a Karaite work of the\nfourteenth century that is closely modelled upon the \"Guide of the\nPerplexed.\" In doing this we necessarily take a step backward as far as\nthe philosophical development is concerned. For while it is true that\nthe early Rabbanite thinkers like Saadia, Bahya, Ibn Zaddik and others\nmoved in the circle of ideas of the Mohammedan Mutakallimun, that period\nhad long since been passed. Judah Halevi criticized the Kalam, Ibn Daud\nis a thorough Aristotelian, and Maimonides gave the Kalam in Jewish\nliterature its deathblow. No Rabbanite after Maimonides would think of\ngoing back to the old arguments made popular by the Mutakallimun--the\ntheory of atoms, of substance and accident in the Kalamistic sense of\naccident as a quality which needs continuous creation to exist any\nlength of time, the denial of law and natural causation, the arguments\nin favor of creation and the existence of God based upon creation, the\ndoctrine of the divine will as eternal or created, residing in a subject\nor existing without a subject, the world as due to God's will or to his\nwisdom, the nature of right and wrong as determined by the character and\npurpose of the act or solely by the arbitrary will of God--these and\nother topics, which formed the main ground of discussion between the\nMu`tazilites and the Ashariya, and were taken over by the Karaites and\nto a less extent by the early Rabbanites in the tenth and eleventh\ncenturies, had long lost their significance and their interest among the\nRabbanite followers of Maimonides. Aristotelianism, introduced by\nAlfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes among the Arabs, and Ibn Daud and\nMaimonides among the Jews, dominated all speculative thought, and the\nold Kalam was obsolete and forgotten. Gersonides no longer regards the\nKalamistic point of view as a living issue. He ignores it entirely. His\nproblems as we have seen are those raised by the Averroistic system. In\nthis respect then a reading of Aaron ben Elijah's \"Ez Hayim\" (Tree of\nLife)[360] affects us like a breath from a foreign clime, like the odor\nof a thing long buried. And yet Aaron ben Elijah was a contemporary of\nLevi ben Gerson. He was born about 1300, and died in 1369. He lived in\nNicomedia, Cairo, Constantinople. The reason for the antiquated\nappearance of his work lies in the fact that he was a Karaite, and the\nKaraites never got beyond the Mu`tazilite point of view. Karaism was\nonly a sect and never showed after the days of Saadia anything like the\nlife and enthusiastic activity of the great body of Rabbanite Judaism,\nwhich formed the great majority of the Jewish people. The Karaites had\ntheir important men in Halaka as well as in religious philosophy and\nBiblical exegesis. Solomon ben Yeroham, Joseph Ha-Maor (Al-Kirkisani),\nJoseph Al Basir (p. 48 ff.), Jeshua ben Judah (p. 55 ff.), Yefet\nHa-Levi, Judah Hadassi, Aaron ben Joseph--all these were prominent in\nKaraitic literature. But they cannot be compared to the great men among\nthe Rabbanites. There was no Maimonides among them. And Aaron ben Elijah\ncherished the ambition of being to the Karaites what Maimonides was to\nthe Rabbanites. Accordingly he undertook to compose three works\nrepresenting the three great divisions of Karaitic Judaism--a book of\nLaws, a work on Biblical exegesis and a treatise on religious\nphilosophy. The last was written first, having been composed in 1346.\nThe \"Sefer Ha-Mizvot,\" on the religious commandments, was written in\n1354, and his exegetical work, known as \"Keter Torah\" (The Crown of the\nLaw) was published in 1362. It is the first that interests us, the \"Ez\nHayim.\" As was said before, this book is closely modelled upon the \"More\nNebukim,\" though the arrangement is different, being more logical than\nthat of the \"Guide.\" Instead of beginning, as Maimonides does, with\ninterpreting the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible, which is\nfollowed by a treatment of the divine attributes, long before the\nexistence of God has been proved or even the fundamental principles laid\ndown upon which are based the proofs of the existence of God, Aaron ben\nElijah more naturally begins with the basal doctrines of physics and\nmetaphysics, which he then utilizes in discussing the existence of God.\nAs Maimonides brought to a focus all the speculation on philosophy and\nreligion as it was handed down to him by Arab and Jew, and gave it a\nharmonious and systematic form in his masterpiece; so did Aaron ben\nElijah endeavor to sum up all Karaitic discussion in his work, and in\naddition declare his attitude to Maimonides. The success with which he\ncarried out this plan is not equal. As a source of information on\nschools and opinions of Arabs and Karaites, the \"Ez Hayim\" is of great\nimportance and interest. But it cannot in the least compare with the\n\"Guide\" as a constructive work of religious philosophy. It has not the\nsame originality or any degree remotely approaching it. The greater part\nof the Aristotelian material seems bodily taken from Maimonides, and so\nis the part dealing with the anthropomorphic expressions in the Bible.\nThere is a different point of view in his exposition of the Mu`tazilite\nphysics, which he presents in a more systematic and favorable light than\nMaimonides, defending it against the strictures of the latter. But\neverywhere Aaron ben Elijah lacks the positiveness and commanding\nmastery of Maimonides. He is not clear what side of a question to\nespouse. For the most part he places side by side the opposed points of\nview and only barely intimates his own attitude or preference. Under\nthese circumstances it will not be necessary for us to reproduce his\nideas _in extenso_. It will be sufficient if we indicate his relation to\nMaimonides in the problems common to both, adding a brief statement of\nthose topics which Aaron ben Elijah owes to his Karaite predecessors,\nand which Maimonides omits.\n\nHis general attitude on the relation of religion or revelation to reason\nand philosophy is somewhat inconsistent. For while he endeavors to\nrationalize Jewish dogma and Scriptural teaching like Maimonides, and in\ndoing so utilizes Aristotelian terminology in matters physical,\nmetaphysical, psychological, ethical and logical, he nevertheless in the\nbeginning of his work condemns philosophy as well as philosophers,\nmeaning of course the Aristotelians.[361] He nowhere expressly indicates\nthe manner of reconciling this apparent contradiction. But it would seem\nas if he intended to distinguish between the philosophical method and\nthe actual teachings of the Aristotelians. Their method he approves,\ntheir results he condemns. The Aristotelians taught the eternity of the\nworld, the immutability of natural law, God's ignorance of particulars\nand the absence of special Providence. These doctrines must be\ncondemned. Maimonides too rejects these extreme teachings while\npraising Aristotle and maintaining that philosophy was originally a\npossession of the Israelitish people, which they lost in the exile.\nAaron ben Elijah is not willing to follow the philosophers as far as\nMaimonides. He admits positive attributes in God, which Maimonides\nrejects; he admits an absolute will in God and not merely a relative\nlike Maimonides; he extends God's providence to all individuals\nincluding irrational creatures, whereas Maimonides limits special\nprovidence to the individuals of the human species, and so on. And so he\ncondemns the philosophers, though he cannot help using their method and\neven their fundamental doctrines, so far as they are purely theoretical\nand scientific. He is willing to go the full length of the Aristotelians\nonly in the unity and incorporeality of God, though here too he\nvindicates sense perception to God, _i. e._, the knowledge of that which\nwe get through our sense organs. He too like the philosophers insists on\nthe importance of the reason as the instrument of truth and knowledge.\nAbraham was the first, he tells us, who proved the existence of God with\nhis intellect. Then came the law of Moses, which strengthened the same\nidea. The Gentiles hated and envied Israel for their superiority and\ntheir true opinions; hence they endeavored to refute their ideas and\nestablish others in their stead. This was the work of the ancient Greek\nphilosophers, who are called enemies in the Bible (Psalms 139, 21). At\nthe time of the second Temple, seeing that the Jewish religion and its\nteachings were true, they took advantage of the advent of Jesus to adopt\nhis false teachings, thus showing their hatred and envy of Israel. At\nthe same time, however, they were obliged to borrow some views and\nmethods of proof from Israel, for religion as such is opposed to\nphilosophy. Still the true nature of God was unknown to them. Then came\nthe Arabs, who imitated the Christians in adopting a belief different\nfrom Judaism, at the same time borrowing views from the Bible. These are\nthe _Mu`tazila_ and the _Ashariya_. Later when on account of the exile\ndifferences arose among the Jews, there were formed the two parties of\nthe Karaites and the Rabbanites. The Karaites followed the Mu`tazila,\nand so did some of the Rabbanites, because their views coincided with\nthose of the Bible, from which they were borrowed. The views of the\nphilosophers as being opposed to the Bible they naturally rejected.\nNevertheless some Rabbanites adopted the views of the philosophers,\nthough believing in the Bible. This is a mistake, for even the\nChristians rejected the views of the philosophers.[362]\n\nHere we see clearly the difference in general attitude between Aaron ben\nElijah and Maimonides. The latter has no use whatsoever for the\nMu`tazila. He realizes the immeasurable superiority of the Aristotelians\n(this is the meaning of the word philosophers in medi\u00e6val Jewish and\nArabic literature). His task is therefore to harmonize the Bible with\nAristotelian doctrine wherever possible. Aaron ben Elijah is still, in\nthe fourteenth century, a follower of the Kalam, and believes the\nMu`tazila are closer to Scripture than Aristotle. He is two centuries\nbehind Maimonides philosophically, and yet he has the truer insight\nbecause less debauched by Aristotelian learning.\n\nAs was said before, Aaron ben Elijah follows a more logical arrangement\nin the disposition of his work than Maimonides. In reality it is the old\narrangement of the Kalamistic works (_cf._ p. 24). The purpose of all\nJewish investigators, he says, is the same, namely, to prove the\nexistence and nature of God, but there is a difference among them in the\nmethod of proving God's existence. Some base their proofs on the\nassumption of the creation of the world, others on that of the world's\neternity. The Mutakallimun follow the former method, the philosophers,\nthe latter. Their respective views of the origin of the world are\ndetermined by their opinions concerning the principles of existence and\nthe existent, that is, the fundamental principles of physics and\nmetaphysics. Accordingly Aaron ben Elijah finds it necessary to give a\npreliminary account of the Kalamistic as well as the philosophic\ntheories, as Maimonides did before him (p. 249 ff.). It is not necessary\nfor us to reproduce here his sketch of the philosophical views, as we\nknow them sufficiently from our studies of Ibn Daud and Maimonides. But\nit will be of value to refer to his account of the Kalamistic\nprinciples, though we have already discussed them in the introduction\n(p. xxi) and in our study of Maimonides (p. 249 ff.). This is due\nprincipally to the fact that Aaron ben Elijah endeavors to defend the\nMutakallimun against Maimonides's charge that they were influenced by\npreconceived notions and allowed their religious views to dictate to\nthem their interpretation of nature, instead of letting the latter speak\nfor itself. Thus Maimonides specifically accuses them of having adopted\nthe atomic theory of the pre-Aristotelian philosophers not because they\nwere really and independently convinced of its scientific truth--how\ncould that be since Aristotle proved it impossible?--but because on this\ntheory they could prove the creation of the world, which they must at\nall hazards maintain as a religious dogma fundamental in its nature,\nsince upon it is based the proof of the existence of God.\n\nAaron ben Elijah denies this charge, maintaining the philosophical\nhonesty of the Mutakallimun. Epicurus too, he says, believed in the\natomic theory, though he regarded the world as eternal. Hence there is\nno necessary connection between atoms and creation.[363] The atomic\ntheory is defensible on its own merits, and the motives of the\nMutakallimun in adopting it are purely scientific, as follows: According\nto the Mutakallimun there are only body or substance and its accidents\nor qualities. This is the constitution of material objects. There are,\nhowever, two kinds of qualities or attributes, _viz._, \"characters,\" and\naccidents. Characters are such attributes as are essential to body and\nwithout which it cannot exist. Accidents may disappear, while body\ncontinues. Since, then, body may exist with or without accidents, there\nmust be a cause which is responsible for the attachment of accidents to\nbody when they are so attached. This cause we call \"union.\" When a body\nis \"united\" with accidents it owes this to the existence of a certain\nsomething, a certain property, let us say, in it which we have called\n\"union.\" Hence when the body is \"separated\" from accidents, when it is\nwithout accidents, it is because there is no \"union.\" Further, every\nbody possessed of magnitude or extension is divisible, hence it must\nhave \"union\" to hold its parts together. But this \"union\" is not\nessential to all existents; for we have seen that its function is to\nunite accidents with body. And as accidents are separable while body may\ncontinue to exist without them, \"union\" disappears together with the\naccidents. Bodies without \"union\" are therefore possible and real. But\nwe have just seen that all bodies possessing magnitude have \"union.\" It\nfollows therefore that if there are \"union\"-less bodies, they are\nwithout magnitude, and hence atoms. This is the proof of the atomic\ntheory and it has nothing to do with the matter of the origin of the\nworld.[364] As a matter of fact the Mutakallimun believe that the atoms\nwere created _ex nihilo_. But the creation of the world can be proved\nwhichever view we adopt concerning the nature of the existent, whether\nit be the atomic theory of the Mutakallimun or the principles of matter\nand form of the Aristotelians. The important principle at the basis of\nthis proof is the well-known Kalamistic one that if an object cannot do\nwithout an attribute originating in time, the object itself has its\norigin in time. Now on either view of the constitution of the existent,\nbody must have form or accidents respectively, and as the latter are\nconstantly changing, body or matter has its origin in time, hence the\nworld is not eternal.\n\nBesides, not to speak of the inconclusive character of the philosophical\narguments in favor of eternity and the positive arguments for creation\n(all or most of which we have already met in our previous studies, and\nneed not therefore reproduce Aaron ben Elijah's version of them), the\nphilosophers themselves without knowing it are led to contradict\nthemselves in their very arguments from the assumption of eternity. The\ndoctrine of creation follows as a consequence from their own\npresuppositions. Thus on the basis of eternity of motion they prove that\nthe heavenly spheres are endowed with soul and intellect, and their\nmotions are voluntary and due to conceptions which they endeavor to\nrealize (_cf._ p. 267). This makes the sphere a composite object,\ncontaining the elements, _sphericity_, _soul_, _intellect_. Everything\ncomposite is a _possible_ existent, because its existence depends upon\nthe existence of its parts. What is a possible existent may also not\nexist. Moreover, that which is possible must at some time become actual.\nHence the sphere must at some time have been non-existent, and it\nrequired an agent to bring it into being. We are thus led to contradict\nour hypothesis of eternity from which we started.[365]\n\nCreation is thus established, and this is the best way to prove the\nexistence, unity and incorporeality of God. Maimonides attempts to prove\ncreation from the peculiarities of the heavenly motions, which cannot be\nwell accounted for on the theory of natural causes. Adopting the latter\nin the main, he makes an exception in the case of the spherical motions\nbecause the philosophers cannot adequately explain them, and jumps to\nthe conclusion that here the philosophical appeal to mechanical\ncausation breaks down and we are dealing with teleology, with\nintelligent design and purpose on the part of an intelligent agent.\nThis leads to belief in creation. But this argument of Maimonides is\nvery weak and inconclusive. Ignorance of causes in a special case, due\nto the limitations of our reason, proves nothing. Mechanical causes may\nbe the sole determinants of the heavenly motions even though the\nphilosophers have not yet discovered what they are (_cf._ above, p. 270\nff.).[366]\n\nNor is Maimonides to be imitated, who bases his proof of the existence\nof God on the theory of eternity. The Bible is opposed to it. The Bible\nbegins with creation as an indication that this is the basis of our\nknowledge of God's existence, revelation and providence. This is the\nmethod Abraham followed and this is what he meant when he swore by the\n\"most high God, the creator of heaven and earth\" (Gen. 14, 22). Abraham\narrived at this belief through ratiocination and endeavored to convince\nothers. The same thing is evident in the words of Isaiah (40, 26), \"Lift\nup your eyes on high and see who created these.\" He was arguing with the\npeople who believed in eternity, and proved to them the existence of God\nby showing that the world is created. All these indications in the Bible\nshow that the doctrine of creation is capable of apodeictic proof.[367]\n\nThe reader will see that all this is directed against Maimonides, though\nhe is not mentioned by name. Maimonides claimed against the Mutakallimun\nthat it is not safe to base the existence of God upon the theory of\ncreation, because the latter cannot be strictly demonstrated. And while\nhe believed in it himself and gave reasons to show why it is more\nplausible than eternity, he admitted that others might think\ndifferently; and hence based his proofs of God's existence on the\nAristotelian theory of eternity in order to be on the safe side. It is\nnever too late to prove God's existence if the world is created. We must\nbe sure of his existence, no matter what the fate of our cosmological\ntheories might be. This did not appeal to the Karaite and Mutakallim,\nAaron ben Elijah. His idea is that we must never for a moment doubt the\ncreation of the world. To follow the procedure of Maimonides would have\nthe tendency of making people believe that the world may be eternal\nafter all, as happened in fact in the case of Gersonides. Aaron ben\nElijah will not leave a way open to such a heresy.\n\nIn the doctrine of attributes Aaron ben Elijah likewise maintains the\nviews of the Mu`tazilite Karaites against the philosophers, and\nespecially against Maimonides. The general problem is sufficiently\nfamiliar to us by this time, and we need only present the salient points\nin the controversy. The question is whether there are any positive\nattributes which may be applied to God as actually denoting his\nessence--hence _positive essential_ attributes. Maimonides denied it,\nthe Karaites affirmed it. The arguments for Maimonides's denial we saw\nbefore (p. 262 f.). And his conclusion is that the only attributes that\nmay be applied to God are the negative, and those positive ones which do\nnot denote any definite thing corresponding to them in God's essence,\nbut are derived from the effects of God's unitary and simple being on\nthe life of man and nature. He is the author of these effects, and we\ncharacterize him in the way in which we would characterize a human being\nwho would do similar things; but this must not be done.\n\nAaron ben Elijah insists that there are positive essential attributes,\nwhich are the following five: Omnipotent, Omniscient, Acting with Will,\nLiving, Existent. He agrees with Maimonides that these essential\nattributes must be understood in a manner not to interfere with God's\nsimplicity and unity, but is satisfied that this can be done. For we\nmust not conceive of them as additions to God's essence, nor as so many\ndistinct elements composing God's essence, but as representing the\nmultiplicity of powers issuing from him without detriment to his unity.\nWe call them essential attributes, meaning that they are the essence of\nGod, but not that they are different from each other and each makes up\npart of God's essence. We do not know God's essence, and these terms are\nsimply transferred from our human experience, and do not indicate that\nGod's activity can be compared to ours in any sense.\n\nThe five attributes above named are all identical with God's simple\nessence. \"Living\" denotes ability to perceive, hence is identical with\n\"Omniscient.\" \"Acting with will\" likewise denotes just and proper\naction, which in turn involves true insight. Hence identity of will and\nknowledge. \"Omnipotent\" also in the case of an intellectual being\ndenotes the act of the intellect _par excellence_, which is knowledge.\nAnd surely God's existence is not distinct from his essence, else his\nexistence would be caused, and he would not be the necessary existent\nall agree him to be. It follows then that God is one, and his essence is\nnevertheless all these five attributes.\n\nThere are all the reasons in the world why we should apply attributes to\nGod. The same reason as we have for applying names to anything else\nexists for giving names to God. In fact it would be correct to say that\nwe should have more names for God than for anything else, since in other\nthings we can avoid naming them by pointing to them, as they can be\nperceived by the senses. Not so God. We are forced to use words in\ntalking about him. God has given himself names in the Bible, hence we\nmay do the same.\n\nMaimonides and his school endeavor to obviate the criticisms of the\nphilosophers, who are opposed to all attributes, by excluding all but\nnegative terms. But this does not help the matter in the least. A\nnegative attribute is in reality no different from a positive, and in\nthe end leads to a positive. Thus if we say \"not mineral,\" \"not plant,\"\nwe clearly say \"animal.\" The advocates of negative attributes answer\nthis criticism by saying that they understand pure negation without any\npositive implications, just as when we say a stone is \"not seeing,\" we\ndo not imply that it is blind. But this cannot be, for when they say God\nis \"not ignorant,\" they do not mean that he is not \"knowing\" either, for\nthey insist that he is power and knowledge and life, and so on. This\nbeing the case, it is much more proper to use positive attributes,\nseeing that the Prophets do so. When they say that the Prophets meant\nonly to exclude the negative; that by saying, \"Able,\" \"Knowing,\" they\nmeant to exclude \"weak\" \"ignorant,\" they _ipso facto_ admit that by\nexcluding the latter we posit the former.\n\nThe arguments against positive essential attributes we can easily\nanswer. By saying that certain attributes are essential we do not claim\nto know God's essence. All we know is God's existence, which we learn\nfrom his effects, and according to these same effects we characterize\nGod's existence by means of attributes of which also we know only the\nexistence, not the essence. For we do not mean to indicate that these\nterms denote the same thing in God as they denote in us. They are\nhomonyms, since in God they denote essence, whereas in us they are\naccidents. The plurality of attributes does not argue plurality in God,\nfor one essence may perform a great many acts, and hence we may\ncharacterize the essence in accordance with those acts. The error of\ncomposition arises only if we suppose that the various acts point to\nvarious elements in their author. Of the various kinds of terms those\nonly are applicable to God which denote pure essence or substance like\nknowledge, power; and those denoting activity like creating, doing, and\nso on.[368]\n\nIn reference to the will of God Aaron ben Elijah refuses to agree with\nthe peculiar view of the Mutakallimun; but unlike Maimonides, who can\nafford to ignore their discussions entirely and dismiss their fanciful\nnotion with a word (\"Guide,\" I. 75, proof 3), Aaron ben Elijah takes up\nthe discussion seriously. The Mutakallimun (or the Ashariya, according\nto Aaron ben Elijah) were in dread of anything that might lend some\nsemblance to eternity of the world. Hence they argued, If the will of\nGod is identical with his essence like the other essential attributes,\nit follows that as his essence is eternal and unchangeable so is his\nwill. And if we grant this, then the objects of his will too must be\neternal and unchangeable, and we have the much abhorred doctrine of the\neternity of the world. To avoid this objectionable conclusion they\nconceived of God's voluntary acts as due to an external will. But this\nexternal will also offered difficulties. It cannot be a power or quality\nresiding in God as its subject, for God is not a material substance\nbearing accidents. It cannot be a quality inherent in another subject,\nfor then it would not be God's will at all; it would be the will of this\nother being, and God's acts would be determined by someone else. They\nwere thus forced to assume a subject-less will newly created with every\nact of God. This notion Aaron ben Elijah rejects on the ground that a\nsubject-less will is an impossibility. An accident must have a subject,\nand will implies life as its subject. Besides, the relation between God\nand this subject-less accident, will, would be the cause of much logical\ndifficulty. Aaron ben Elijah therefore accepts the ordinary sane view\nthat the will of God is identical with his essence; that God wills\nthrough his own essence. And he does not fear that this will lead to\neternity of the world. He identifies God's will with his wisdom, and\nGod's wisdom with right action. As we do not know the essence of God's\nwisdom, so we do not know how it is that it prompts him to realize his\nwill at one time and not at another, though his will is always the\nsame.[369]\n\nAaron ben Elijah also follows his party in attributing to God sense\nperception, not, to be sure, the same kind of perception as we have,\nacquired by means of corporeal organs; for this is impossible in God for\nmany reasons. God is not corporeal, and he cannot be affected or changed\nby a corporeal stimulus. But it is clear beyond a doubt that nothing can\nbe more absurd than to suppose that the creator of the sense organs does\nnot understand the purpose which they serve and the objects which they\nperceive. What we mean then is that the objects which we perceive with\nour senses God also perceives, though in an incorporeal manner. Hence it\ndoes not follow that there is any change in God due to the external\nobject he perceives, nor that the multiplicity of objects involves\nplurality in God; for even our power of perception is one, though it\nperceives many things and opposite. We conclude then that God has\nperception as well as intelligence, but they are not two distinct powers\nin him. It is the object perceived that determines the power percipient.\nHence one and the same power may be called perception when we are\ndealing with a sensible object, and intelligence when it has an\nintelligible as its object.[370]\n\nIn his discussion of the nature of evil we once more are brought in\ncontact with Kalamistic views recalling the old Karaite works of the\neleventh century (_cf._ pp. 52, 57). Thus the notion that good and bad\nare adjectives applied to acts not in view of their inherent character,\nwhich is _per se_ neither good nor bad, but solely to indicate that they\nhave been commanded or forbidden; the idea that only the dependent\nsubject can do wrong, but not the master, since his will is the source\nof all right and wrong--these views are frequently discussed in the\nMu`tazilite works of Arabs and Karaites. The Rabbanites scarcely ever\nmention them. Aaron ben Elijah enumerates six views on the nature of\nevil, with all of which except the last he disagrees. The opinion named\nabove that an act is made good or bad by being commanded or prohibited,\nhe refutes as follows: Such a view removes the very foundation of good\nand bad. For if the person in authority chooses to reverse his order,\nthe good becomes bad, and the bad good, and the same thing is then good\nand bad, which is absurd. Besides, if there are two authorities giving\nopposite orders, the same act is good and bad at the same time. To say\nthat God's command alone determines the character of an act is\nincorrect, because as long as commanding and prohibiting as such\ndetermine the goodness or badness of an act, the person issuing the\ncommand is immaterial. We do say quite generally that an act which God\ncommands is good, and one which he prohibits is bad; but we mean by this\nmerely that the command or prohibition is an indication to us, who are\nignorant of the true nature of acts.\n\nAgain, on this theory of the value of acts, what will you do with such\nan act as the investigation of the existence and nature of God? Surely\nsuch an important matter cannot be indifferent. It must be good or bad.\nAnd yet we cannot apply to it the above test of command and prohibition,\nfor this test implies the existence of God, which the act endeavors to\nprove. It follows therefore that the value of an act is inherent in it\nand not determined and created by command and prohibition.\n\nAaron ben Elijah is similarly dissatisfied with another view, which\nregards evil as a negation. We have heard this opinion before and we\nknow that Maimonides adopted it (p. 288). Its motive as we know is to\nremove from God the responsibility for evil. If evil is nothing positive\nit is not caused by the activity of an agent. All essential activity is\ngood, and all the acts of God are good. Evil consists in the absence of\ngood; it is due to matter, and does not come from God. Aaron ben Elijah\nobjects properly that as good is a positive act, a doing of something\npositive, so is evil, even on the theory of its negative character, a\nremoval of something positive, hence a positive act. Besides, granting\nall that the opponent claims, the argument should work both ways, and if\nGod is not held responsible for the evil in the world because it is mere\nprivation, why should man be held responsible for doing evil, _i. e._,\nfor removing the positive? He clinches his argument by quoting Isaiah\n(5, 20), \"Woe unto those who say of evil it is good, and of good it is\nevil ... that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter.\" Good and evil\nare placed parallel with sweet and bitter, which are both positive.\nHence the Bible is opposed to the negative conception of evil.\n\nHis own view is that good and evil are qualities pertaining to an act by\nreason of its own nature, but these are not absolute conceptions like\ntrue and false. The good and the bad are conventional constructs, and\nthe value of an act is relative to the end or purpose it serves. The\npurpose of human convention in regarding certain acts as good and\nothers as bad is the protection of the human race. An act which conduces\nto human welfare is good, one that militates against it is bad. Still\nthere are instances in which an act generally regarded as bad may assume\na different character when in the given instance it serves a good\npurpose, as for example when pain is inflicted to obviate more serious\ndanger. The surgeon, who amputates a leg to save the patient's life,\ndoes good, not evil. The judge, who punishes the criminal with\nimprisonment or death for the protection of society and to realize\njustice, does good, not evil. In this way we must explain the evil which\nGod brings upon man. God cannot be the cause of evil. For evil in man is\ndue to want or ignorance. Neither is found in God, hence he has no\nmotive to do wrong. All the evil of which we complain is only apparent.\nIn reality it is good, because it is either brought upon us to prevent\nstill greater evils, or it is in the nature of just punishment for\nwrongdoing. In either case it is a good.[371]\n\nAaron ben Elijah's discussion of Providence follows closely the plan of\nthe corresponding arguments in Maimonides. The problem is treated by\nboth in connection with God's knowledge, and both maintain that the real\nmotive of those who denied God's knowledge of particulars is their\nobservation of apparent injustice in the happenings of this world (_cf._\nabove, p. 289). Both again preface their own views of the question of\nProvidence by a preliminary statement of the various opinions held by\nother sects. Here too the two accounts are in the main similar, except\nthat Aaron ben Elijah is somewhat more detailed and names a few sects\nnot mentioned by Maimonides, among them being the Manicheans and the\nfollowers of the Syrian Gnostic Bardesanes. In their own views, however,\nAaron ben Elijah and Maimonides differ; the latter approaching the view\nof Aristotle, the former that of the Mu`tazila.\n\nMaimonides as we know (p. 292) denies special providence for the\nindividuals of the sublunar world with the exception of man. In the case\nof the lower animals, the species alone are protected by divine\nprovidence, hence they will continue forever, whereas the individual\nanimals are subject to chance. Man, as a rational animal, is an\nexception. He is a free and responsible agent, hence he is under divine\nguidance and is rewarded and punished for his conduct. The extent of\nthe divine care depends upon the degree to which the individual develops\nhis reason, actualizing his potential intellect.\n\nAaron ben Elijah argues that this view is erroneous, for it is not\nproper to make a distinction between God's knowledge and his providence.\nIf it would argue imperfection in God not to _know_ certain things, the\nsame objection applies to limiting his providence, and the two should be\ncoextensive. To say that God's providence extends to superior and\nimportant things and ignores the inferior is to make God guilty of\ninjustice. Aaron ben Elijah believes therefore that Providence extends\nto all individuals, including animals. And he quotes the Bible in his\nsupport, \"The Lord is good to all, and his mercies are over all his\nworks,\" (Ps. 145, 9), and, \"Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass\ntogether\" (Deut. 22, 10). Maimonides, he says, was led to his opinion by\nhis idea that death and suffering always involve sin; and not being able\nto apply this dictum to the suffering of animals that are slaughtered,\nhe removed Providence from their individuals entirely. When the Bible\norders us to consider the feelings of the animal, he says the object is\nto train our own faculties in mercy, and prevent the formation of habits\nof cruelty, not for the sake of the animal. But he cannot remove all\ndifficulties in this way. What will he do with the case of a person born\ncrippled, and the sufferings of little children? The idea that death and\nsuffering in all cases involve sin must be given up. Maimonides is also\nwrong when he says that reward is purely intellectual and is dependent\nupon the development of the \"acquired intellect.\" It would follow from\nthis that right conduct as such is not rewarded; that it serves merely\nas a help to realizing the acquired intellect. All this is opposed to\nBiblical teaching.[372]\n\nThe prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous Aaron\nben Elijah endeavors to explain as follows. The prosperity of the wicked\nmay be due to former good deeds; or by way of punishment, that he may\ncontinue in his evil deeds and be punished more severely. It may be in\norder that he may use the good fortune he has in whatever way he\npleases, for good or ill. Finally his good fortune may be given him as a\nmatter of grace, like his creation. Correspondingly we may explain the\nadversity of the righteous in a similar manner. It may be due to former\nsins. If he has no sins, his sufferings may be intended to test him in\norder to add to his reward. If he dies without having enjoyed life, he\nwill be rewarded in the next world. The pleasures of this world must not\nbe considered. For since they are given as a matter of grace, they may\ncome or not without involving any injustice. When a man has both good\ndeeds and sins, he may be rewarded for his good deeds and punished for\nhis bad, or he may be paid according to the element which predominates.\nThose who are born crippled and the sufferings of children will be\nrewarded later. In reference to the slaughter of animals, Aaron ben\nElijah does not agree with the Mu`tazila that the animals will be\nrecompensed for their undeserved sufferings. There is no immortal part\nin animals, hence no reward after death. He can assign no reason for\ntheir sufferings except that men need them for food, but he sees nothing\nwrong in taking an animal's life for food, for as the life of animals\nwas given to them as a matter of grace, there is no wrong in taking it\naway. However, to inflict pain in a way different from the manner\npermitted by God is wrong.[373]\n\nAaron ben Elijah lays great stress upon what he considers an important\ndifference of opinion between the Rabbanites and the Karaites concerning\nthe nature and purpose of divine punishment. The Rabbanites according to\nhim insist that \"there is no death without sin, nor suffering without\nguilt,\" whereas the Karaites admit that some of the sufferings of the\nrighteous are not in the nature of punishment at all, but are what are\nknown as \"chastisements of love.\" Their purpose is to increase the man's\nreward later in the future world, and at the same time they have a\npedagogical value in themselves in strengthening the person spiritually.\nAccordingly Aaron ben Elijah, who in the main follows the opinions of\nthe Karaites, differs with the Rabbanites and particularly Maimonides in\nthe interpretation of the \"trials\" of Adam, Abraham, Job.\n\nSo far as Job is concerned, we know the opinions of Maimonides on the\nsubject. In his \"Guide of the Perplexed\" he interprets the book of Job\nin connection with his discussion of Providence (_cf._ above, p. 304).\nIn the general nature of suffering the idea of \"chastisement of love\" is\nquite familiar to the Rabbis, though Maimonides does not care to insist\non it, claiming that there is no support for it in the Bible. The idea\nof \"trial\" according to him is neither that God may know what he did not\nknow before; nor is it to make a man suffer that he may be rewarded\nlater. The purpose of trial is that mankind may know whatever it is\ndesired to teach them in a given case. In the trial of Abraham when he\nwas told to sacrifice Isaac, there was a two-fold reason; first, that\nall may know to what extent the love of God may go in a pious man; and\nsecond to show that a prophet is convinced of the reality of his visions\nas an ordinary person is of the data of his senses.[374]\n\nThe book of Job is to Maimonides a treatise on Providence, and the five\ncharacters in the drama represent the various opinions on the nature of\nProvidence as they were held by different schools of philosophy and\ntheology in Maimonides's day. Job has the Aristotelian view that God\ncares nothing for man. Eliphaz represents the correct Jewish view that\neverything is reward or punishment for merit and demerit. Bildad\nmaintains the Mu`tazilite opinion that many misfortunes are for the\npurpose of increasing reward in the world to come. Zophar stands for the\nview of the Ashariya that all is to be explained by reference to the\nwill of God, and no questions should be asked. Elihu finally insists\nthat the individual man is the object of the divine care, but that we\nmust not compare God's providence with our own interest in, and care for\nthings; that there is no relation at all between them except in name\n(_cf._ above, p. 304). The Rabbis, who do not make of Job a philosopher,\nnaturally do not understand the matter as Maimonides does, but they\nnevertheless agree with him that Job deserved the punishment he\nreceived. The Karaites on the other hand classed Job's sufferings with\n\"chastisements of love,\" which would mean that Job was a perfect man and\ndid not deserve any punishment. The sole motive for inflicting pain and\ntribulation upon him was to reward him the more later.\n\nAaron ben Elijah agrees in the main with his Karaite predecessors that\nJob was not punished for any fault he had committed. He does not see in\nthe arguments of Job's friends any difference of opinion on the general\nquestion of Providence, and Job was not an Aristotelian. Unlike\nAristotle, he did believe in God's care for man, as is evident from such\nstatements as (Job 10, 10), \"Behold like milk didst thou pour me out,\nand like cheese didst thou curdle me.\" The Karaites, he holds, are\ncorrect in their main contention that Job's sufferings were not in the\nnature of punishment for previous guilt and wrongdoing, but they are\nmistaken in supposing that Job was altogether right in his conception of\nthe meaning and reason of his sufferings; that they had no other purpose\nexcept to increase his reward in the future. Aaron ben Elijah then\nexplains his own view of \"trial.\"\n\nMan, he says, is composed of body and soul, and must therefore endeavor\nto gain this world and the next. If he is punished for guilt or offence,\nthe punishment corresponds to the offence. Corporeal guilt is followed\nby corporeal punishment, spiritual guilt by spiritual punishment. Adam\noffended spiritually and was punished spiritually by being driven from\nthe Garden of Eden as will be explained later. Abraham endeavored to do\njustice to both the constituent parts of his being; and hence God in his\nkindness, wishing to strengthen Abraham spiritually, gave him the\nopportunity in the trial of Isaac. At the same time the physical\nsuffering was compensated by the promise to Abraham of the continuity of\nIsaac's descendants. Job's sufferings were of the same kind, except that\nthey came to him without his knowledge and without his being told their\npurpose. And at first he thought they were in order to give him future\nreward, but without any use in themselves. Later he discovered that they\nbenefited him directly by increasing his spiritual strength.[375]\n\nAaron ben Elijah differs also from Maimonides in reference to the\npurpose of the world. Maimonides maintains that while there is sense in\ninquiring for the purpose of the parts of the world, the question of the\nultimate purpose of the world as a whole is meaningless. The purpose of\na given event or law of nature lies in its relation to the other events\nand laws, hence there is a relative purpose in particular things; thus,\ngiven the existence of animals they must have food, sense perception,\nand so on. But if we ask why the universe as a whole, the only answer\nthat can be given is God's wisdom, which we do not understand. In\nparticular Maimonides will not admit that the world is for the sake of\nman, as this view clashes with experience and makes it impossible to\nexplain a great many phenomena in nature, which are distinctly of no\nbenefit to man and take no cognizance of his interests.[376] Aaron ben\nElijah agrees with Maimonides that God's wisdom rather than his\narbitrary will, as the Ashariya maintain, must be appealed to in\nanswering the question of the purpose of the world. But he is inclined\nto regard man as the purpose of the lower world, admitting that we\ncannot know the purpose of the higher worlds of the spheres and\nIntelligences, as they transcend the powers of our comprehension.[377]\n\nWe can pass over Aaron ben Elijah's discussion of prophecy very briefly\nbecause there is no new attitude or contribution in his views. Without\nsaying it, he reluctantly perhaps, leans upon Maimonides, and with\napparent variations in form really adopts the classification of the\n\"Guide\" (p. 277). He gives no psychological explanation of prophecy\nbecause he disagrees with the philosophers, to whom prophecy is a purely\nnatural gift which cannot fail to manifest itself when the requisite\nconditions are there, namely, perfection in intellect and imagination.\nIn fact when he gives the different views on the nature of prophecy, he\nrefuses to identify what seems to stand in his book for the view of\nMaimonides (the fourth view) with that of the followers of the Mosaic\nlaw. Whereas Maimonides following the philosophers insists on the two\nimportant elements in prophecy, namely, intellect and imagination,\nadding thereto also moral perfection, Aaron ben Elijah in giving the\nopinion of those who follow the law of Moses, says nothing of the\nimagination. He insists only on perfection in intellect and in ethical\ncharacter. This difference is, however, only apparent; and further on he\nrefers to the imagination as an important element, which determines, in\nits relation to the reason, the character of a man as a prophet or a\nmere statesman or philosopher--all in the manner of Maimonides.\n\nHis idea of the purpose of prophecy he develops, as it seems, with an\neye to the criticism of the Brahmins of India, whom he quotes as denying\nprophecy, though admitting Providence, on the ground that it can serve\nno purpose. The reason alone, they say, is sufficient to decide what is\nright and what is wrong. Accordingly Aaron ben Elijah meets their\nobjection as follows: It is true that man might have gotten along\nwithout prophecy through the laws which his own reason established for\nright and wrong, good and evil. Those who followed these rational laws\nwould have attained long life, and the others would have perished. But a\ngood man living in a bad environment would have been involved in the\ndownfall of the majority, which would not be just. Hence it was\nnecessary that God should warn the man, that he might save himself. This\nis the first beginning of prophecy. Witness Noah and Lot. Abraham was a\ngreat advance on his predecessors. He endeavored to follow God's will in\nrespect to both body and soul. Hence God saved him from the danger to\nwhich he was exposed in Ur of the Chaldees, and wanted to benefit his\ndescendants also that they should perfect their bodies and their souls.\nThis is impossible for a whole nation without special laws to guide\nthem. This is particularly true of the \"traditional\" laws (ceremonial),\nwhich are not in themselves good or bad, but are disciplinary in their\nnature.\n\nA prophet must have both intellectual and ethical perfection. For he\nmust understand the nature of God in order to communicate his will; and\nthis cannot be had without previous ethical perfection. Hence the\ntwofold requirement. This is the reason, he says, why we do not believe\nin the religions of Jesus and Mohammed, because they were not possessed\nof intellectual perfection. And besides they tend to the extinction of\nthe human species by reason of their monastic and celibate ideal. They\nwere misled by the asceticism of the prophets, who meant it merely as a\nprotest against the material self-indulgence of the time, and called\nattention to the higher life. But those people in their endeavor to\nimitate the prophets mistook the means for the end, with the result that\nthey missed both, perfection of soul as well as of body, and merely\nmortified the flesh, thinking it the will of God. Hence, Aaron ben\nElijah continues, we shall never accept a religion which does not preach\nthe maintenance of this world as well as of the next. Not even miracles\ncan authenticate a religion which preaches monasticism and celibacy.\n\nMoses was superior to the other prophets. All the others received their\nmessages in a vision or a dream, Moses had his inspiration while awake.\nThe others were inspired through the medium of an angel, _i. e._,\nthrough the imagination, hence their language abounds in allegories and\nparables. Moses did not use the imagination, hence the plain character\nof his speech. The others were overcome by the vision and physically\nexhausted, as we read in Daniel (10, 17), \"There remained no strength in\nme, and no breath was left in me.\" Moses was free from this\nweakness--\"And the Lord spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh\nunto his neighbor\" (Exod. 33, 11). The others required preparation,\nMoses did not. Moses's testimony, too, was stronger than that of all the\nrest. His authority in the end was made plain to all the people\ndirectly and openly, so that there remained not a shred of a doubt. This\nis why we accept his law and no other, because none is so well\nauthenticated. The Law cannot change without implying that the standard\nof perfection has changed, or the world has changed, or God's knowledge\nhas changed. All this is impossible. The Law says besides, \"Thou shalt\nnot add thereto, and thou shalt not diminish therefrom\" (Deut. 13, 1).\nTherefore, concludes Aaron ben Elijah the Karaite, we do not believe in\nthe oral or traditional law because of the additions to, and\nsubtractions from, the written law which it contains.[378]\n\nAaron ben Elijah agrees with Maimonides that all the commandments of the\nBible, including the ceremonial laws, have a purpose and are not due to\nthe arbitrary will of God. The ceremonial laws are for the sake of the\nrational, serving a pedagogical and disciplinary purpose, and the Law as\na whole is for the purpose of teaching the truth and inculcating the\ngood. He goes further than Maimonides in vindicating the rational and\nethical purpose of all the details of the various laws, and not merely\nof the several commandments as a whole (_cf._ above, p. 294).[379]\n\nA problem that occupied the minds of the Mutakallimun, Arabs as well as\nKaraites, but which Maimonides does not discuss, is the purpose of God's\ngiving commandments to those who he knew would remain unbelievers, and\nrefuse to obey. That God's knowledge and man's freedom co-exist and\nneither destroys the other, has already been shown.[380] If then God\nknows, as we must assume, that a given person will refuse to obey the\ncommandments, what is the use of giving them to him? And granting that\nfor some reason unknown to us they have been given, is it just to punish\nhim for disobedience when the latter might have been spared by not\ngiving the man in question any commandments?\n\nAaron ben Elijah answers these questions by citing the following\nparallel. A man prepares a meal for two guests and one does not come.\nThe absence of the guest does not make the preparation improper, for the\ncharacter of the act does not depend upon the choice of the guest to do\nor not to do the desire of the host. The invitation was proper because\nthe host meant the guest's benefit. To be sure, the case is not quite\nparallel, and to make it so we must assume that the host expects that\nthe guest will not come. His intention being good, the invitation is\nproper. In our problem knowledge takes the place of expectation. God\ndoes not merely expect, he knows that the man will not obey. But as\nGod's desire is to benefit mankind and arouse them to higher things, the\ncommand is proper, no matter what the person chooses to do.\n\nTo punish the man for disobedience is not unjust because God intended to\nbenefit him by the command. If he disobeyed, that is his lookout. If the\nbenefit could have been had without the command, then the punishment\nwould be unjust, but not otherwise.\n\nIf only good men were commanded and the rest ignored, the danger would\nbe that the former being thereby assured of reward, might be tempted to\ndo wrong; and the others in despair might be worse than they would be\nunder ordinary circumstances. God saw that man has evil tendencies, and\nneeds warning and guidance from without. And just as he gave men\nunderstanding and ability to believe though he knew that a given person\nwould not avail himself thereof, so he gave all men commandments, though\nhe knew that some would not obey.[381]\n\nThe rest of the book is devoted to such questions as reward and\npunishment after death, immortality of the soul, the problem of the\nsoul's pre-existence, the nature of the future life, repentance--questions\nwhich Maimonides left untouched in the \"Guide\" on the ground that\nwhatever religion and tradition may say about them, they are not strictly\nspeaking scientific questions, and are not susceptible to philosophical\ndemonstration.\n\nAaron ben Elijah proves that there must be reward and punishment after\ndeath. For as man is composed of body and soul, there must be reward for\neach according as man endeavors to maintain and perfect them. Thus if a\nman cares for his body alone, he will be rewarded in his body, _i. e._,\nin this world. The other man who looks out for both body and soul must\nhave the same reward in this world as the other, since their physical\nefforts were similar. At the same time he must have something over and\nabove the other in the nature of compensation for his soul, and this\nmust be in the next world.\n\nThe prosperity of the wicked and the misery of the righteous are also to\nbe explained in part, as we have seen (p. 376), by reference to their\nrespective destinies in the next world, where the inequalities of this\nworld will be adjusted.\n\nFinally, material reward cannot be the consequence of intellectual and\nspiritual merit; it would mean doing the greater for the sake of the\nsmaller. And besides the soul is not benefited by physical goods and\npleasures, and would remain without reward. Hence there must be another\nkind of reward after death. In order to deserve such reward the soul\nmust become wise. At the same time the common people, who observe the\nceremonial commandments, are not excluded from a share in the world to\ncome, because the purpose of these laws is also intellectual and\nspiritual, as we said before (p. 382), and hence their observance makes\nthe soul wise, and gives it immortality. This last comment is clearly\ndirected against the extreme intellectualism of Maimonides and\nGersonides, according to whom rational activity alone confers\nimmortality (p. 339).[382]\n\nThe considerations just adduced imply the immortality of the soul, to\nwhich they lend indirect proof. But Aaron ben Elijah endeavors besides\nto furnish direct proof of the soul's continuance after the death of the\nbody. And the first thing he does is to disarm the criticism of the\nphilosophers, who deny immortality on the ground that the soul being the\nform of the body, it must like other material forms cease with the\ndissolution of the things of which they are the forms. He answers\nthis by showing that the soul as the cause of knowledge and\nwisdom--immaterial faculties--is itself immaterial. Being also the cause\nof the body's motion, it is not itself subject to motion, hence not to\ntime, and therefore not destructible like a natural form. Besides the\ncomposition of body and soul is different from that of matter and form\nin the ordinary sense. For in the former case each of the constituent\nparts is already a composite of matter and form. The body has both\nmatter and form, and the soul has likewise. For the acquired intellect\nis the form of the soul, which is the matter. Other proofs are as\nfollows: The rational soul performs its functions without help from the\nbody, hence it is independent in its existence. The proof of the last\nstatement is that the power of the rational soul is not limited, and\ndoes not become weary, as a corporeal power does. Hence it can exist\nwithout the body. Again, as the corporeal powers grow stronger, the\nintellectual powers grow weaker, and _vice versa_ as the corporeal\npowers grow weaker in old age, the intellect grows stronger. Hence the\nsoul is independent of the body, and when the physical powers cease\nentirely in death, the intellect is at its height.[383]\n\nThe question of the soul's pre-existence before coming in contact with\nthe body, Aaron ben Elijah answers in the affirmative, though his\narguments in favor of the opposite view are stronger. His sole argument\nin favor of its pre-existence is that the soul, being a self-subsisting\nsubstance and not an accident, is not dependent upon the body, and must\nhave existed before the body. The consequence which some have drawn from\nthis supposition combined with the soul's immortality, namely, that the\nsoul is eternal, he refuses to adopt. The soul existed before the body,\nbut like all things which are not God it was created in time.\n\nThough we have thus seen that the soul existed before the body, it is\nmistaken to suppose that it was completely developed. For though the\ngradual progress in knowledge and understanding as the individual\nmatures proves nothing for the soul's original imperfection, as we may\naccount for this progress by the gradual adaptation of the physical\nelements to the functions of the soul, there is a more valid objection.\nIf the soul was perfectly developed before entering the body, all souls\nshould be alike when they leave it, which is not the case. We come to\nthe conclusion therefore that the soul does acquire knowledge while in\ncontact with the body. The human soul is a unit, and from its connection\nwith the body arise the various powers, such as growth, life, reason.\nWhen the soul is separated from the body, those powers which functioned\nwith the aid of the body perish; the others remain.[384]\n\nIn the matter of eschatology Aaron ben Elijah gives a number of views\nwithout declaring himself definitely for any of them. The main\ndifference among the three points of view quoted concerns the\npossibility of the resurrection of the body, and the meaning of the\nterms \"revival of the dead\" (\"Tehiyat ha-metim\") and \"the world to come\"\n(\"Olam ha-ba\"). Aaron ben Elijah seems to incline to the first, in favor\nof resurrection.\n\nWe must endeavor, he says, to get some notion of final reward and\npunishment. For without any idea of its nature a man's hope or fear is\ntaken away from him, and he has no motive for right conduct. To be sure\nit is not possible to get a clear understanding of the matter, but some\nidea we must have. The first view which he seems to favor is that\n_revival of the dead_ and _world to come_ are the same thing; that the\nend of man is the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the\nsoul. This is the future life, and this is meant by reward and\npunishment. There is Biblical support for this view in such expressions\nas, \"Thy dead shall live, thy dead bodies shall arise\" (Isa. 26, 19).\n\"The Lord killeth, and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave and\nbringeth up\" (1 Sam. 2, 6). There is nothing to object in this, he says,\nfor the same God who made man of the dust can revive him after death.\nBesides, there seems to be a logical propriety in bringing soul and body\ntogether for reward and punishment just as they were during conduct in\nlife. When the soul is once reunited with the body in the resurrection,\nit is never separated again. The expression \"_garden_ of Eden\" for\nparadise is a figure of speech for eternal life free from pain.\n\nThe second opinion is expressed by those who do not believe in bodily\nresurrection. The end of man according to these is the return of the\nsoul to the world of souls. This is the meaning of \"world to come\"; and\n\"revival of the dead\" means the same thing. For it is not possible that\nthe soul should be reunited with the body, which is temporary in its\nnature and subject to dissolution. Besides, the body has organs, such as\nthose of food and reproduction, which would be useless in the future\nlife. The advocates of this theory also believe in transmigration of\nsouls as a punishment. Aaron ben Elijah rejects metempsychosis on the\nground that there is some relation between a soul and its body, and not\nevery body can receive every soul.\n\nAaron ben Elijah also quotes without comment the classification, already\nfamiliar to us (p. 119), of human souls into (1) dead, (2) alive, (3)\nhealthy, and (4) sick. Death denotes evil deeds; life, good deeds;\nhealth, intellectual knowledge; disease, ignorance. This classification\nis applied in determining the destiny of the soul after death. If one is\nalive and healthy, _i. e._, has knowledge and good deeds, he has a share\nin the world to come. If he is healthy and dead (knowledge + evil\ndeeds), the soul is kept in an intermediate world forever. If he is\nalive and sick (good deeds + ignorance), the soul rises to the upper\nair, whence it returns again and again to the body until it acquires\nwisdom to be able to rise to the world of angels. If he is dead and sick\n(evil deeds + ignorance), the soul dies like an animal.\n\nFinally, the third opinion is a combination of resurrection and \"future\nworld.\" Seeing that some of the functions of the soul are performed with\nthe help of the body, while others are not, the advocates of this view\nmaintain that the soul will be rewarded in both conditions--with the\nbody, in resurrection, without the body, in the world to come.\n\nIf a man has merits and demerits, his good and evil deeds are balanced\nagainst each other, and the surplus determines his reward or punishment\naccording to its nature.[385]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\nHASDAI BEN ABRAHAM CRESCAS (1340-1410)\n\n\nThe influence of Aristotle on Jewish thought, which began as early as\nSaadia and grew in intensity as the Aristotelian writings became better\nknown, reached its high water mark in Ibn Daud, Maimonides and\nGersonides. To Maimonides Aristotle was the indisputable authority for\nall matters pertaining to sublunar existence, but he reserved the right\nto differ with the Stagirite when the question concerned the heavenly\nspheres and the influences derived from them. Hence he denied the\neternity of motion and the fundamental principle at the basis of this\nAristotelian idea, that necessity rules all natural phenomena. In his\ndoctrine of creation in time, Maimonides endeavored to defend God's\npersonality and voluntary and purposeful activity. For the same reason\nhe defended the institution of miracles. Gersonides went further in his\nrationalistic attitude, carried the Aristotelian principles to their\ninevitable conclusions, and did not shrink from adopting to all intents\nand purposes the eternity of the world (strictly speaking the eternity\nof matter), and the limitation of God's knowledge to universals.\nAristotle's authority was now supreme, and the Bible had to yield to\nAristotelian interpretations, as we have seen abundantly. Maimonides and\nGersonides were the great peaks that stood out above the rest; but there\nwas any number of lesser lights, some who wrote books and still more who\ndid not write, taking the great men as their models and looking at\nJewish literature and belief through Aristotelian spectacles.\nIntellectualism is the term that best describes this attitude. It had\nits basis in psychology, and from there succeeded in establishing itself\nas the ruling principle in ethics and metaphysics. As reason and\nintellect is the distinguishing trait of man--the part of man which\nraises him above the beast--and as the soul is the form of the living\nbody, its essence and actuating principle, it was argued that the most\nimportant part of man is his rational soul or intellect, and immortality\nwas made dependent upon theoretical ideas. Speculative study made the\nsoul; and an intellect thus constituted was immortal, for it was\nimmaterial. The heavenly world, consisting of the separate Intelligences\nand culminating in God, was also in its essence reason and intellect.\nHence thought and knowledge formed the essence of the universe. By\nthought is man saved, and through thought is he united with the Most\nHigh. All else that is not pure thought acquires what value it has from\nthe relation it bears to thought. In this way were judged those\ndivisions of Judaism that concerned ceremony and ethical practice. Their\nvalue consisted in their function of promoting the ends of the reason.\n\nJudah Halevi, influenced by Al Gazali, had already before Maimonides\nprotested against this intellectualistic attitude in the name of a truer\nthough more naive understanding of the Bible and Jewish history. But\nJudah Halevi's nationalism and the expression of his poetical and\nreligious feelings and ideas could not vie with the dominating\npersonality of Maimonides, whose rationalistic and intellectualistic\nattitude swept everything before it and became the dominant mode of\nthinking for his own and succeeding ages. It remained for Hasdai Crescas\n(born in Barcelona, in 1340), who flourished in Christian Spain two\ncenturies after Maimonides and over a half century after Gersonides, to\ntake up the cudgels again in behalf of a truer Judaism, a Judaism\nindependent of Aristotle, and one that is based more upon the spiritual\nand emotional sides of man and less upon the purely intellectual,\ntheoretical and speculative. Himself devoid of the literary power and\npoetic feeling of Judah Halevi, Crescas had this in common with the\nmedi\u00e6val national poet that he resented the domination of Jewish belief\nand thought by the alien Greek speculation. In a style free from\nrhetoric, and characterized rather by a severe brevity and precision, he\nundertakes to undermine the Aristotelian position by using the\nStagirite's own weapons, logical analysis and proof. His chief work is\nthe \"Or Adonai,\" Light of the Lord.[386]\n\nAgreeing with all other Jewish writers that the existence of God is the\nbasis of Judaism, he sees in this very fact a reason why this principle\ncannot be regarded as one of the six hundred and thirteen commandments.\nFor a commandment implies the existence of one who commands. Hence to\nregard the belief in the existence of God as a commandment implies the\nvery thing which the commandment expresses. The existence of God\ntherefore as the basis of all commandments cannot itself be a\ncommandment. Besides only those things can form the objects of a command\nwhich can be controlled by the will. But a matter of belief like the\nexistence of God is not subject to will, it is a matter of fact and of\nproof.[387]\n\nMaimonides, as we know, based his proofs of the existence, unity and\nincorporeality of God upon twenty-six philosophical propositions taken\nfrom the works of Aristotle and his Arabian interpreters. As he was not\nwriting a book on general philosophy, Maimonides simply enumerates\ntwenty-five propositions, which he accepts as proved by Aristotle and\nhis followers. To these he adds provisionally another proposition,\nnumber twenty-six, concerning the eternity of motion, upon which he\nbases his proof of the existence of God in order to be safe from all\ncriticism. In the sequel he discusses this last proposition and shows\nthat unlike the other twenty-five, it is not susceptible of rigid\ndemonstration, and the arguments in favor of the origin of motion and\nthe world in time are more plausible.\n\nCrescas goes further than Maimonides, and controverts most of the other\npropositions as well, maintaining in particular against Aristotle and\nMaimonides that an infinite magnitude _is_ possible and exists actually;\nthat there _is_ an infinite fulness or void outside of this world, and\nhence there _may_ be many worlds, and it need not follow that the\nelements would pour in from one world into the next, so that all earth\nshould be together in the centre, all fire together in the outer\ncircumference, and the intermediate elements, air and water, between\nthese two. The elements may stay in their respective worlds in the\nplaces assigned to them. It will not be worth our while to wade through\nall the technical and hair-splitting discussions of these points. The\nresults will be sufficient for our purpose.\n\nThe proof of the existence of an unmoved mover in Aristotle and\nMaimonides is based upon the impossibility of a regress to infinity. If\nHasdai Crescas admits the infinite, the Aristotelian proof fails.\nSimilarly God's unity in Maimonides is among other things based upon the\nfiniteness of the world and its unity. If infinite space is possible\noutside of this world, and there may be many worlds, this proof fails\nfor God's unity. So Crescas takes up in detail all the Maimonidean\nproofs of the existence, unity and incorporeality of God and points out\nthat they are not valid because in the first place they are based upon\npremises which Crescas has refuted, and secondly were the premises\ngranted Maimonides's results do not follow from them.[388] It remains\nthen for Crescas to give his own views on this problem which, he says,\nthe philosophers are unable to solve satisfactorily, and the Bible alone\nis to be relied upon. At the same time he does give a logical proof\nwhich in reality is not different from one of the proofs given by\nMaimonides himself. It is based upon the distinction insisted upon by\nAlfarabi and Avicenna between the \"possible existent\" and the \"necessary\nexistent.\" Whatever is an effect of a cause is in itself merely\npossible, and owes the necessity of its existence to its cause. Now,\nargues Crescas, whether the number of causes and effects is finite or\ninfinite, there must be one cause of all of them which is not itself an\neffect. For if all things are effects they are \"possible existents\" as\nregards their own nature, and require a cause which will make them exist\nrather than not. This self-subsisting cause is God.[389]\n\nHe then endeavors to prove the unity of God in the two senses of the\nterm; unity in the sense of simplicity, and unity in the sense of\nuniqueness. Unity as opposed to composition--the former sense of the\nterm--is neither the same as the essence of a thing, nor is it an\naccident added to the essence. It cannot be essence, for in that case\nall things called one would have the same essence. Nor is it accident,\nfor that which defines and separates the existing thing is truly called\nsubstance rather than accident; and this is what unity does. Accordingly\nCrescas defines unity as something essential to everything actually\nexisting, denoting the absence of plurality. This being true, that\nexistent which is before all others is most truly called one. Also that\nbeing which is most separated from other things is best called one.[390]\n\nCrescas disagrees with Maimonides's opinion that no positive attributes\ncan be applied to God, such as indicate relation to his creatures, and\nso on. His arguments are that we cannot avoid relation to creatures even\nin the term \"cause,\" which Maimonides admits; and in the attributes of\naction--the only kind of positive attributes allowed by Maimonides--it\nis implied that before a given time God did not do a particular thing,\nwhich he did later, a condition in God which Maimonides will not admit.\nBesides, if there are no positive attributes, what could be the meaning\nof the tetragrammaton, about which Maimonides has so much to say? If it\nexpressed a negative attribute, why was its meaning kept so secret?\nCrescas's own view is that there are positive attributes, and that there\nis a relation between God and his creatures, though not a similarity, as\nthey are far apart, the one being a necessary existent, the other a\npossible existent; one being infinite, the other finite.[391]\n\nWe must now try to show that God is one in the sense that there are no\nother Gods besides. We may proceed as follows: If there are two Gods,\none of them controls only part of the world or he does not control it at\nall. The first is impossible because the unitary world must be due to\none agent. But there may be more than one world and hence more than one\nagent. This is, however, answered by the thought that being infinite in\npower one could control them all. There is still another alternative,\n_viz._, that one agent controls the whole world and the other does\nnothing. Here speculation can go no further, and we must have recourse\nto Scripture, which says, \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is\nOne.\"[392] We see here that Crescas is interested in discrediting the\nlogic chopping of the philosophers. No merely logical argument, is his\nidea, can give us absolute certainty even in so fundamental a doctrine\nas the unity of God. Like Judah Halevi, Crescas took his inspiration\nfrom Algazali, whose point of view appealed to him more than that of\nMaimonides and Gersonides, who may be classed with Alfarabi, Avicenna\nand Averroes.\n\nHaving discussed the fundamental principles of all religion and\nphilosophy, namely, the existence and nature of God, Crescas next takes\nup the following six fundamental dogmas of Judaism, God's knowledge of\nexisting things, Providence, Power, Prophecy, Freedom, Purpose.\n\nThere are three things to be remembered in the matter of God's\nknowledge. He knows the infinite, for he knows particulars. He knows the\nnon-existent, as he knows the future; and his knowledge of the\ncontingent does not remove its contingent character. Maimonides and\nGersonides had difficulty with this problem and we know their respective\nsolutions. Gersonides, for reasons metaphysical as well as ethical, does\nnot scruple to limit God's knowledge to universals. Maimonides endeavors\nto reconcile the dilemma by throwing the blame upon our limited\nunderstanding. In God's knowledge which is _toto coelo_ different from\nours, and of which we have no conception, all oppositions and\ncontradictions find their ultimate harmony. Crescas, as we might\nnaturally expect, agrees with Maimonides in this matter rather than with\nGersonides. To limit God's knowledge is opposed to the Bible, and would\ninvolve us in greater difficulties than those we endeavor to\nescape.[393]\n\nRelated to the question of God's knowledge is the problem of Providence.\nFor God must know the individual or thing for which he provides, and if\nGod has no knowledge of particulars, there can be no such thing as\nspecial providence. This latter as we know is virtually the opinion of\nGersonides (_cf._ p. 345). Crescas, we have seen, defends God's\nknowledge of particulars, hence he sees no difficulty in special\nprovidence on this score. He takes, however, the term in a broad sense.\nAll evidence of design in nature, all powers in plant and animal which\nguide their growth, reproduction and conservation are due to God's\nprovidence. Providence, he says, is sometimes exercised by God directly,\nwithout an intermediate voluntary agent, sometimes with such mediation.\nGod's relations to Moses and to the Israelites in Egypt at the time of\nthe tenth plague were without intermediate agency. In all other cases\nthere is mediation of angels, or prophets, or wise men, or, according to\nsome, the heavenly bodies, which are living and intelligent beings.\n\nProvidence itself is of different kinds. There is the most general and\nnatural exhibited in the equipment of the various species of plant and\nanimal life for their protection and growth and conservation. There are\nthe more special powers found in the human race. These forms of\nprovidence have little to do with the person's deserts. They are purely\ndependent upon the constitution and influence of the stars. Then there\nis the more special providence of the Jewish nation, then of the male\nmembers of this nation, and of the priests and the levites. Finally\ncomes the special providence of the individual, who is rewarded and\npunished according to his conduct. The reward and punishment of this\nworld are not strictly controlled by conduct, the reward and punishment\nof the next world are. In this last remark Crescas cuts the knot which\nhas been the cause of so much discussion in religious philosophy. If the\nreal reward and punishment are in the next world, the prosperity of the\nwicked and the adversity of the righteous in this world do not form so\ngreat a problem. At the same time an explanation of this peculiar\nphenomenon is still wanting. For surely the righteous man does not\ndeserve to _suffer_ for his righteousness, even though his good deeds\nwill not go unrewarded in the next world. In this discussion also\nCrescas takes issue with the intellectualistic point of view of\nMaimonides and particularly Gersonides. The solution of these men that\nevil does not come from God directly but by accident and by reason of\nmatter, and the corollary drawn therefrom that God does not punish the\nwicked directly, that he merely neglects them, leaving them to the\naccidents of nature and chance, Crescas does not approve. Nor is he more\nfavorably inclined to the theory that the good man is provided for\nbecause the more he cultivates his mind, the more closely he comes in\ncontact with God, in whom are contained actually all the ideas of which\nman has some potentially. His main criticism is that the theory is\nopposed to clear statements in the Bible, which imply special and\nindividual reward and punishment in a miraculous and supernatural\nmanner, which cannot be due to intellectual perfection, nor to the order\nof the heavenly bodies. Besides, if a man who is highly intellectual did\nmuch wrong, he should be punished in his soul, but on the\nintellectualist theory such a soul is immortal and cannot be destroyed.\n\nAccordingly Crescas goes back to the religious doctrine of reward and\npunishment as ordinarily understood. God rewards and punishes because\nman obeys or disobeys his will and command. The complaint raised on\naccount of the misery of the good and the prosperity of the wicked he\nanswers by saying that real reward and punishment are in the next world.\nThe goods and evils of this world are also to be considered, and he\ngives the ordinary excuses for the apparent deviation from what ought to\nbe, such as that evil is sometimes a good in disguise and _vice versa_;\nthat one sometimes inherits evil and good from one's parents; that the\nindividual is sometimes involved in the destinies of the majority, and\nso on, and so on. Evil in the sense of moral evil, _i. e._, wrong, does\nnot come from God, it is true, but punishment does come from God, and as\nits aim is justice, it is a good, not an evil. The providence extended\nto Israel is greatest. There is more Providence in Palestine than\nelsewhere, not because there is any difference in the relation on God's\nside, but there is on the side of the man enjoying this providence. His\ncharacter and disposition change with the place, and similarly with the\ntime and the season. Hence certain seasons of the year, like that about\nthe time of the Day of Atonement, are more propitious for receiving\nGod's providence.[394]\n\nAnother fundamental doctrine of Judaism is God's omnipotence. Weakness\nwould be a defect. Hence God can do everything except the contradictory.\nHis power is infinite not merely in duration, but also in intensity.\nFrom Aristotle's proof of the necessity of an immovable mover as based\nupon the eternity of motion (p. 256 f.), we gather only that God's power\nis infinite in duration; whereas our doctrine of creation _ex nihilo_\nshows that there is no relation at all between God's power and the work\nhe does; hence his power is infinite. This is shown also in the\nmiracles, some of which took place instantaneously, as the destruction\nof the first born in Egypt at midnight precisely. Crescas insists that\nthe ass of Balaam did speak, and refers with disapproval to those who\ndoubt it and say it was in a vision (Gersonides).[395]\n\nIn his discussion of Prophecy the interest lies once more in his\nanti-intellectualistic attitude. Maimonides agrees with the philosophers\nthat the prophetic power is a psychological process attainable by the\nman who in addition to moral perfection possesses a highly developed\nintellect and power of imagination. To anticipate the objection that if\nthis be so, why are there no prophets among the philosophers, Maimonides\nadds that divine grace is necessary besides, and that if this is\nlacking, one may have all the qualifications and yet not be a prophet.\nCrescas sees the forced nature of this explanation, and once more\nfrankly returns to the plain intent of Scripture and Jewish tradition\nthat the prophet is the man chosen by God because he is a student of the\nTorah and follows its commandments, and because he cleaves to God and\nloves him. The prophet receives his inspiration from God directly or\nthrough an intermediate agent, and the information received may concern\nany topic whatsoever. It is not to be limited to certain topics to the\nexclusion of others, as Gersonides tries to make out; and its purpose is\nto give guidance to the prophet himself or to others through him.[396]\n\nThe most original contribution of Crescas to philosophical theory is\nhis treatment of the ever living problem of freedom. So fundamental has\nit seemed for Judaism to maintain the freedom of the will that no one\nhitherto had ventured to doubt it. Maimonides no less than Judah Halevi,\nand with equal emphasis Gersonides, insist that the individual is not\ndetermined in his conduct. This seemed to be the only way to vindicate\nGod's justice in reward and punishment. But the idea of man's freedom\nclashed with the doctrine of God's omniscience. If nothing in the past\ndetermines a man's will in a given case, then up to the moment of the\nact it is undetermined, and no one can know whether a given act will\ntake place or its opposite. On the other hand, if God does know\neverything in the future as well as in the past, man is no longer free\nto act in a manner contrary to God's foreknowledge. This difficulty was\nrecognized by Maimonides as well as by Gersonides, and they solved it in\ndifferent ways. Maimonides gives up neither God's omniscience nor man's\nabsolute freedom, and escapes the dilemma by taking refuge in his idea\nof God's transcendence. Human knowledge is incompatible with human\nfreedom; God's knowledge is not like human knowledge, and we have no\nconception what it is. But it is consistent with human freedom.\nGersonides, who objects to Maimonides's treatment of the divine\nattributes, and insists that they must resemble in kind though not in\ndegree the corresponding human attributes, can avoid the difficulty only\nby a partial blunting of the sharp points of either horn of the dilemma.\nAccordingly he maintains freedom in all its rigor, and mitigates the\nconception of omniscience. God's omniscience extends only to the\nuniversal and its consequences; the contingent particular is by\ndefinition not subject to foreknowledge, and hence it argues no defect\nin God's knowledge if it does not extend to the undetermined decisions\nof the will.\n\nCrescas embraces the other horn of the dilemma. God's omniscience must\nbe maintained in all its rigor. It is absurd to suppose that the first\nuniversal and absolute cause should be ignorant of anything pertaining\nto its effects. Is man then not free? Has he no choice at all, no\nfreedom in the determination of his conduct? If so how justify God's\nreward and punishment, if reward and punishment are relative to conduct\nand imply responsibility? Crescas's answer is a compromise. Determinism\nis not fatalism. It does not mean that a given person is preordained\nfrom eternity to act in a given way, no matter what the circumstances\nare. It does not mean that command and advice and warning and education\nand effort and endeavor are useless and without effect. This is\ncontradicted by experience as well as by the testimony of Scripture. But\nneither is it true on the other hand that a person's will and its\nconduct are causeless and undetermined until the moment of action. This\nidea is equally untrue to reason and experience. We know that every\neffect has a cause and the cause has a cause, and this second cause has\nagain a cause, until we reach the first necessary cause. Two individuals\nsimilar in every respect would have the same will unless there is a\ncause which makes them different. We have already intimated that God's\nforeknowledge, which we cannot deny, is incompatible with absolute\nfreedom, and in the Bible we have instances of God's knowing future\nevents which are the results of individual choice, as in the case of\nPharaoh. The only solution then is that the act of will is in a sense\ncontingent, in a sense determined. It is contingent in respect to\nitself, it is determined by its cause, _i. e._, the act is not fated to\ntake place, cause or no cause. If it were possible to remove the cause,\nthe act would not be; but given the cause, the effect is necessary.\nEffort is not in vain, for effort is itself a cause and determines an\neffect. Commandments and prohibitions are not useless, for the same\nreason. Reward and punishment are not unjust, even though antecedent\ncauses over which man has no control determine his acts, any more than\nit is unjust that fire burns the one who comes near it, though he did so\nwithout intention. Reward and punishment are a necessary consequence of\nobedience and disobedience.\n\nThis is a bold statement on the part of Crescas, and the analogy between\na man's voluntary act in ethical and religious conduct and the tendency\nof fire to burn irrespective of the person's responsibility in the\nmatter can be valid only if we reduce the ethical and religious world to\nan impersonal force on a plane with the mechanism of the physical world\norder. This seems a risky thing to do for a religionist. And Crescas\nfeels it, saying that to make this view public would be dangerous, as\nthe people would find in it an apology for evil doers, not understanding\nthat punishment is a natural consequence of evil. This latter statement\nCrescas does not wish to be taken in its literal strictness, nor should\nthe analogy with the burning fire be pressed too far. For it would then\nfollow even if a person is physically compelled to do evil that he would\nbe punished, just as the fire would not refrain from burning a person\nwho was thrown into it by force. The determination of the will, he says,\nmust not be felt by the agent as a constraint and compulsion, else the\nact is not free and no punishment should follow; for command and\nprohibition can have no effect on a will constrained. Reward and\npunishment have a pedagogical value generally, even if in a given case\nthey are not deserved. Even though in reality every act is determined,\nstill where there is no external compulsion the person is so identified\nwith the deed that it is in a real sense the product of his own soul,\nbringing about a union with, or separation from God; and hence reward\nand punishment are necessarily connected with it. Where there is\nexternal compulsion, on the other hand, the act is not in reality his\nown and hence no reward or punishment.\n\nThe question arises, however, why should there be punishment for\nerroneous belief and opinion? These have nothing to do with the will,\nand are determined if anything is, _i. e._, the person having them is\nconstrained to believe as he does by the arguments, over which he has no\ncontrol. This matter offers no difficulty to those who, like Maimonides\nand Gersonides, regard intelligence as the essence of the soul, and make\nimmortality dependent upon intellectual ideas. A soul acquiring true\nideas, they say, becomes _ipso facto_ immortal. It is not a question of\nright and wrong or of reward and punishment. But this is not the\nBiblical view, and if it were true, there would be no need of the many\nceremonial regulations. Geometry would play a greater r\u00f4le in\nimmortality than the Torah. Crescas's answer is that reward and\npunishment in this case are not for the belief itself, but rather for\nthe pleasure one finds in it and the pains one takes to examine it\ncarefully. Even in conduct one is not rewarded or punished for deeds\ndirectly, but for the intention and desire. Deed without intention is\nnot punished. Intention without deed is; though the two together call\nfor the greatest punishment or reward. \"A burnt offering,\" say the\nRabbis, \"atones for sinful thoughts; sin committed through compulsion is\nnot punished.\"[397]\n\nIt is of interest here to know that Spinoza, as has been shown by\nJoel,[398] owed his idea of man's freedom to Crescas. He also like\nCrescas denies the absolute indeterminism of a person's conduct that is\ninsisted upon by the majority of the medi\u00e6val Jewish philosophers. And\nJoel shows moreover that Spinoza's final attitude to this question as\nfound in his Ethics was the outcome of a gradual development, and the\nresult of reading Crescas. In some of his earlier writings he insists\nthat anything short of absolute omniscience in God is unthinkable. He\nsees the difficulty of reconciling this with man's freedom, but is not\nready to sacrifice either, and like Maimonides decides that we must not\ndeny it simply because we cannot understand it. Later, however, he\nmaintains that God's omniscience and man's freedom are absolutely\nincompatible, and solves the difficulty in a manner similar to that of\nCrescas by curtailing freedom as formerly understood.\n\nThe next topic of which it is necessary to have a clear idea for a\ncomplete understanding of Judaism, is the purpose of the Law, and in\ngeneral the purpose of man. Here also appears clearly the\nanti-intellectualism of Crescas and his disagreement with Maimonides and\nGersonides. The final purpose of the Law is of course, he says, a good.\nThe Bible teaches us to perfect our morals; it inculcates true beliefs\nand opinions; and it promises by means of these happiness of body and\nhappiness of soul. Which of these four is the ultimate end? Clearly it\nmust be the best and most worthy. And it seems as if this quality\npertains to the eternal happiness of the soul, to which as an end the\nother three tend. Corporeal happiness is a means to the perfection of\nthe soul since the latter acts through the means of bodily organs.\nSimilarly moral perfection assists in purifying the soul. As for\nperfection in ideas, some think that it alone makes the soul immortal by\ncreating the acquired intellect, which is immaterial and separate, and\nenjoys happiness in the next world incomparably greater than the joy we\nfeel here below in the acquisition of knowledge. There is a difference\nof opinion as to the subject-matter which bestows immortality. According\nto some it is all knowledge, whether of sublunar things or of the\nseparate substances. According to others it is only the knowledge of God\nand the angels that confers immortality. All these views are wrong from\nthe Scriptural as well as the philosophical point of view.\n\nThe Bible makes it clear repeatedly that eternal life is obtained by\nperformance of the commandments; whereas according to the others\npractical observance is only a means and a preparation to theory,\nwithout which practice alone is inadequate. According to Scripture and\ntradition certain offences are punished with exclusion from eternal\nlife, and certain observances confer immortality, which have nothing to\ndo with theoretical truths.\n\nBut philosophically too their views are untenable. For it would follow\nfrom their opinions that the purpose of the Law is for something other\nthan man, for the acquired intellect is \"separate,\" and hence cannot be\nthe form of man. It is different in kind from man, for unlike him it is\neternal as an individual. Besides it is not true that the acquired\nintellect is made as a substance by its ideas, while being separate from\nthe material intellect; for as immaterial it has no matter as its\nsubject from which it could come into being. It must therefore come into\nbeing _ex nihilo_, which is absurd.\n\nAnd there are other reasons against their view. For if all knowledge\nconfers immortality, one may acquire it by studying geometry, which is\nabsurd. And if this privilege can be gained only by a knowledge of God\nand the separate substances, the objection is still greater; for, as\nMaimonides has shown, the only knowledge that may be had of these is\nnegative; and it is not likely that such imperfect knowledge should make\nan eternal intellect.\n\nIf then theoretical knowledge does not lead to immortality as they\nthought, and the other perfections are preparatory to theoretical, it\nfollows that the ultimate purpose of the Law and of man is attained\nprimarily neither by theory alone nor by practice alone, but by\nsomething else, which is neither quite the one nor the other. It is the\nlove and fear of God. This is demanded alike by Scripture, tradition and\nphilosophy. That it is the view of religion is clear enough from the\nmany passages in the Bible urging love of God. But it is also demanded\nby philosophy. For the soul is a spiritual substance, hence it is\ncapable of separation from the body and of existing by itself forever,\nwhether it has theoretical knowledge or not; since it is not subject to\ndecay, not being material. Further, the perfect loves the good and the\nperfect; and the greater the good and the perfection the greater the\nlove and the desire in the perfect being. Hence the perfect soul loves\nGod with the greatest love of which it is capable. Similarly God's love\nfor the perfect soul, though the object as compared with him is low\nindeed, is great, because his essence and perfection are great. Now as\nlove is the cause of unity even in natural things, the love of God in\nthe soul brings about a unity between them; and unity with God surely\nleads to happiness and immortality. As love is different from\nintellectual apprehension, the essence of the soul is love rather than\nintelligence.\n\nThere are many Talmudical passages confirming this view logically\nderived. We are told that the souls of the righteous enjoy the splendor\nof the Shekinah, and the wicked suffer correspondingly. This agrees with\nour conception of immortality and not with theirs. For enjoyment is\nimpossible on their showing, though they try to make it plausible.\nPleasure is different from apprehension; and as the essence of the\nacquired intellect is apprehension, there is no room for the pleasure,\nthe intellect being simple. According to our view love is rewarded with\npleasure. The pleasure we feel here below in intellectual work\n(Gersonides, p. 339) proves nothing, for it is due to the effort and the\npassing from potential knowledge to actual knowledge, _i. e._, to the\nprocess of learning. Proof of this is that we find no pleasure in axioms\nand first principles, which we know without effort. But the acquired\nintellect after the death of the body does not learn any new truths,\nhence can have no pleasure.\n\nThe Rabbis also speak of definite places of reward and punishment, which\ncannot apply to the acquired intellect, since it is a \"separate\"\nsubstance and can have no place. The soul as we understand it can have a\nplace, just as it is connected with the body during life.\n\nThe Rabbis often speak of the great reward destined for school children.\nBut surely the acquired intellect cannot amount to much in children. The\ntruth is that the soul becomes mature and complete as soon as it\nacquires the rational faculty in the shape of the first principles or\naxioms. Then it is prepared for immortality as a natural thing without\nregard to reward.\n\nThe purpose of the soul as we showed is to love God. This object the\nBible attains by the commandments, which may be classified with\nreference to their significance in seven groups. They exalt God; they\nshow his great kindness to us; they give us true ideas concerning the\nnature of God; they call our attention to his providence; they give us\npromises of corporeal and spiritual reward; they call our attention to\nGod's miracles in order to keep our attention from flagging; and finally\nthey command love of God and union with him as the final aim of\nman.[399]\n\nIn addition to the six fundamental doctrines of Judaism mentioned above\n(p. 392), there are true beliefs which are essential to Judaism, and the\ndenial of which constitutes heresy; though they are not as fundamental\nas the other six, in the sense that the Law would continue to exist\nwithout them. They are (1) Creation, (2) Immortality, (3) Reward and\nPunishment, (4) Resurrection, (5) Eternity of the Law, (6) The\nsuperiority of Moses to the other prophets, (7) The priest's learning\nthe future through the Urim and Tumim, (8) Belief in the Messiah. The\nlist of thirteen articles of the creed given by Maimonides (_cf._ below,\np. 409) is open to criticism. If he meant fundamental dogmas, there are\nnot as many as thirteen; there are no more than seven or eight--the six\nmentioned before (p. 392), and, if one chooses, the existence of God,\nmaking seven, and revelation as the eighth. On the other hand, if\nMaimonides meant to include \"true beliefs,\" there are more than fifteen,\nthe six enumerated above (p. 392), existence of God and revelation, and\nthe eight \"true beliefs\" named at the head of this section, not counting\na great many specific commandments.[400]\n\nHaving made this criticism of Maimonides's thirteen articles, Crescas\nproceeds to discuss every one of the eight true beliefs named at the\nbeginning of the last paragraph. For our purpose it will not be\nnecessary to reproduce the minute arguments here. We will select a few\nof the more important topics and state briefly Crescas's attitude.\n\nThe doctrine of creation formed the central theme in Maimonides and\nGersonides. It was here, as we have seen, that Maimonides stopped short\nin his devotion to Aristotle and took pains to show that the arguments\nof the latter in favor of eternity are not valid, and that Aristotle\nknew it. He endeavored to show, moreover, that the doctrine of creation\ncan be made more plausible than its opposite, and hence since creation\nis essential to Judaism, it must be regarded as a fundamental dogma.\nGersonides could not see his way clear to accepting creation _ex\nnihilo_, among other things because as matter cannot come from form, the\nmaterial world cannot come from God. Accordingly he compromised by\nsaying that while the present world as it is is not eternal, it came\nfrom a primitive \"hyle\" or matter, which was eternal. Thus our world is\ndependent for its forms upon God, for its matter upon the prime and\neternal \"hyle.\"\n\nHere Crescas takes up the problem and points out that whether we accept\nor not an eternal \"hyle,\" everything that exists must be dependent upon\nGod as the only necessary existent. Everything outside of him, be it\neternal matter or not, is only a possible existent and owes its\nexistence to God. Creation _ex nihilo_ means no more. To be sure, if we\nassume that the existence of the world and its emanation from God is\neternal, because his relation to his product is the same at all times,\nit will follow that the emanation of the world from God is a necessary\nprocess. But necessity in this case does not exclude will, nay it\nimplies it. For the only way in which anything can come from a rational\ncause is by way of conception. The rational cause forms a conception of\nthe world order and of himself as giving existence to this world order\nas a whole and in its parts. Will means no more than this. This will\nalso solve the old philosophic difficulty, how can the many come from\nthe One. Our answer is that the good God created a good world. The\ngoodness of the world is its unity, _i. e._, the parts contribute to\nmaking a whole which is good. On the other hand, an agent is perfectly\ngood when he acts with will. God's will also makes miracles possible.\nMoreover, eternal creation is not inconsistent with continued creation,\nand we have creation _ex nihilo_ every moment. Maimonides is wrong\ntherefore when he thinks that eternity would upset Judaism and make\nmiracles impossible. Creation in time is therefore not a fundamental\ndogma with which Judaism stands and falls. At the same time it is a true\nbelief as taught in the first verse of Genesis.[401]\n\nAnother of the true beliefs is reward and punishment. This consists of\ntwo kinds, corporeal and spiritual. Corporeal is spoken of in the Bible\nand is not opposed to reason. For as the purpose of creation is to do\nman good and enable him to achieve perfection, it stands to reason that\nGod would remove any obstacles in the way of man's perfecting himself,\nand this is the kind of reward mentioned first, \"All the diseases which\nI put upon the Egyptians I shall not put upon thee, for I the Lord am\nthy healer\" (Exod. 15, 26). Punishment is primarily for the same\npurpose.\n\nAs for spiritual reward and punishment, they are not mentioned\nspecifically in the Bible, but the Talmud is full of it. Rationally they\ncan be explained as follows. As the soul is spiritual and intellectual,\nit enjoys great pleasure from being in contact with the world of spirit\nand apprehending of the nature of God what it could not apprehend while\nin the body. On the other hand, being restrained from the world of\nspirit and kept in darkness gives it pain; and this may lead to its\nultimate destruction. The essence of the soul, as was said above, is not\nintellectuality, but love and desire; hence pain may destroy it.\n\nThe reason spiritual reward and punishment, which is the more important\nof the two, is not mentioned in the Bible, is because it was taken as a\nmatter of fact. Corporeal reward and punishment was not so regarded,\nhence the need of specifying it.\n\nA difficulty that presents itself is, How is it consistent with justice\nto punish the soul by itself, when it was the composite of body and soul\nthat sinned? This may be answered by saying that the soul is the form of\nthe body and does not change when separated. Hence, being the more\nimportant of the two elements composing man, it receives the more\nimportant punishment, namely, spiritual.\n\nBesides, it is true that the composite also receives compensation. And\nthis is the purpose of resurrection.[402]\n\nResurrection of the body is not universal, but is reserved only for\nsome, as is clear from the passage in Daniel (12, 2), \"And many of those\nthat sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting\nlife, and some to disgrace and everlasting abhorrence.\" At the same time\nit is difficult to know who these some are. It cannot be the perfect and\nthe good only, since some of those rising will go \"to disgrace and\neverlasting abhorrence.\" We can decide this better later, when we have\nlearned more of resurrection.\n\nThe variety of opinions concerning the time of the resurrection Crescas\nendeavors to reconcile by supposing that all agreed it would take place\nas soon as the Temple was built, but that the Messiah would precede the\nbuilding of the Temple by some length of time.\n\nThe purpose of the resurrection is to strengthen belief in those who\nhave it and to impress it upon those who have it not. At the time of the\nresurrection those who come back to life will tell the living how they\nfared when their souls left their bodies. Another purpose of\nresurrection is, as mentioned above, in order to reward and punish the\ncomposite of body and soul which acted during life.\n\nThe dogma of resurrection is regarded so seriously by the Rabbis, who\nexclude the unbeliever in it from a portion in the world to come,\nbecause in this act is completed the form of man; and because thereby is\nrealized the justice of God, and the faith is strengthened in the minds\nof the believers.\n\nIt seems at first sight impossible that the elements of the body, which\nwere dispersed at the time of the body's death and formed part of other\nsubstances, can be gathered together again. But it is not really so\nstrange, for in the first place God may so arrange matters that these\nelements may be in a position to return. Besides, this is not really\nnecessary. It is quite sufficient that God create a body exactly like\nthe first in temperament and form, and endow it with the old soul, which\nwill then behave like the old person; and being endowed with memory\nbesides, the identity of personality will be complete.\n\nFor the purpose of showing God's justice and strengthening man's faith\nit is sufficient to resurrect the perfectly good and the completely bad.\nThe intermediate classes do not deserve this extraordinary miracle, and\ntheir spiritual reward will be sufficient.[403]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\nJOSEPH ALBO (1380-1444)\n\n\nOf the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who contributes\noriginal views of philosophical value. Joseph Albo, of Monreal in\nAragon, is of little importance as a philosopher. He rehashes the\nproblems which occupied a Maimonides, a Gersonides and a Crescas, and\nsides now with one, now with the other. He benefited by the writings of\nhis predecessors, particularly Maimonides, Crescas, and Simon\nDuran;[403a] and the philosophical discussions in the last three\nsections of his \"Book of Roots\" (\"Sefer Ikkarim\") give the impression of\nan eclectic compilation in the interest of a moderate conservatism. The\nstyle is that of the popularizer and the homilist; and to this he owes\nhis popularity, which was denied his more original teacher, Crescas.\n\nBut philosophy as such was not Albo's forte, nor was it his chief\ninterest. While it is true that all the Jewish thinkers of the middle\nages were for a great part apologetes, this did not prevent a Maimonides\nor a Gersonides from making a really thorough and disinterested study of\nscience and philosophy; and often their scientific and philosophic\nconviction was so strong that the _apologia_ was _pro philosophia sua_\nrather than _pro Judaismo_. The central theme therefore in the majority\nof Albo's philosophical predecessors was the equally metaphysical and\ntheological, of God and his attributes. These were proved by reason and\nconfirmed by Scripture and tradition. Judaism had to be formulated and\ndefended with a view not so much to the dangers threatening from\nChristianity and Mohammedanism as to those endangering all religions\nalike, namely, the opinions of science and philosophy as taught\nespecially by the Aristotelians. Hence Maimonides treated for the most\npart of the same problems as the Mohammedan Mutakallimun before him, and\nThomas Aquinas the Christian had no scruple in making the Jewish\nphilosopher's method his own when he undertook to defend the Catholic\nfaith \"contra Gentiles.\"\n\nDifferent were the circumstances as well as the attitude of Joseph Albo.\nThe purely philosophic interest was not strong in his day. He was not\nconfronted by the necessity of proving the existence and incorporeality\nof God by reason. No one doubted these things and they had been\nabundantly written about in times gone by. In the interest of\ncompleteness and for the benefit of those who were not trained in\ntechnical philosophy, Albo found it desirable to restate the results of\nprevious discussions of these topics in a style more accessible to the\nreaders of his day. But the central interest in his age was shifted. It\nwas a time of religious disputations and forced conversions. Albo\nhimself had taken part in such a disputation held at Tortosa in 1413-14,\nand he had to defend Judaism against Christianity. He had to show his\nown people that Judaism was the true religion and Christianity spurious.\nHence it was religion as such he had to investigate, in order to find\nwhat marks distinguished a divine law from a human, and a genuine divine\nlaw from one that pretended to be such. To make this investigation\nlogically complete he had to show that there must be such a thing as a\ndivine law, and that no such law can be conceived without assuming\ncertain basal beliefs or dogmas. A discussion of religious dogma was\nessential, for upon the nature of these fundamental beliefs depended\none's judgment of a given law and its character as divine or human,\ngenuine or spurious. Hence the title of Albo's treatise, \"Book of\n[religious] Roots [dogmas].\" And while it is true that Maimonides, the\nsystematizer and codifier, could not fail to put down in his commentary\non the Mishna a list of articles of the Jewish creed, nothing is said of\nthis in his philosophical work, the \"Guide of the Perplexed.\" With Albo\nthe establishment of the fundamental dogmas is the central theme.\n\nAt the same time Albo was anticipated even in this, his more original\ncontribution. Crescas, his teacher, had written, beside the \"Or Adonai,\"\na work against Christianity.[404] And in the \"Or Adonai\" itself he\ndevotes considerable space to the question of the fundamental dogmas of\nJudaism, and takes occasion to criticize Maimonides for his faulty\nmethod in the selection of the thirteen articles, on the ground that he\ndid not distinguish between what was fundamental and what was\nderivative. This suggestion gave Albo his cue, which he developed in his\nown way.[404a]\n\nHuman happiness, Albo tells us, depends upon theory and practice, as\nAristotle says. But the human mind is inadequate to know by itself the\ntruth touching these two. Hence there is need of something superior to\nthe human mind which will define right practice and the true ideas. This\ncan be only by divine guidance. Hence everyone must be able to tell the\ndivine legislation from those which are not divine. For this it is\nnecessary to know what are the principles without which a divine law\ncannot exist. This is the purpose of the book, to explain the essential\nprinciples of a divine law.[405]\n\nA knowledge of the principles of religion would seem easy, for all\npeople profess some religion or other, and hence are presumed to know\nupon what their religions are based. But this question has not been\ntreated adequately before, and there is no agreement among previous\nwriters about the number of the principles or their identity. Some say\nthere are thirteen (Maimonides), some say twenty-six, some six\n(Crescas), without investigating what are the principles of divine\nreligion generally. For we must distinguish between the general\nprinciples which pertain to divine legislation as such and hence are\ncommon to all religions, and special principles which are peculiar to a\nparticular religion.\n\nSeeing the importance of this subject, Albo continues, I undertook this\ninvestigation. I came to the conclusion that there are three general\nprinciples of divine religion, existence of God, Revelation, and Reward\nand Punishment after death. Then there are special principles peculiar\nto a particular religion. From the general principles (\"Ikkarim\") follow\nparticular or derivative principles (\"Shorashim.\")[406]\n\nThe investigation of the principles of religion is a delicate matter\nbecause one is in danger of being reckoned an infidel if he denies what\nis considered by others a fundamental dogma. Thus according to\nMaimonides the belief in the Messiah is fundamental, and he who denies\nit is a heretic and has no share in the world to come. And yet Rabbi\nHillel in the Talmud (Sanhedrin, 99a) said, \"Israel need expect no\nMessiah, for they had the benefit of one in the days of Hezekiah, King\nof Judah.\" On the other hand, Maimonides does not regard creation _ex\nnihilo_ as fundamental, whereas others do; and to their mind Maimonides\nis open to the charge of unbelief.\n\nThe truth is that only he is an unbeliever who deliberately and\nknowingly contradicts the Bible. A person who believes in the Bible but\nis led mistakenly to misinterpret it, and denies real principles because\nhe thinks the Bible does not require us to believe them as principles,\nor does not require us to believe them at all, is guilty of error and in\nneed of forgiveness, but is not a heretic.[407]\n\nHaving thus defined his attitude and purpose, Albo proceeds to criticize\nthe list of dogmas laid down by Maimonides and modified by Crescas, and\nthen defends his own view. A fundamental principle (\"Ikkar,\" lit. root)\nis one upon which something else depends and without which this latter\ncannot exist. Maimonides counts thirteen principles of Judaism as\nfollows: (1) Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) Incorporeality, (4)\nEternity, (5) He alone must be worshipped, (6) Prophecy, (7) Superiority\nof the prophecy of Moses, (8) Revelation, (9) Immutability of the Law,\n(10) God's Omniscience, (11) Reward and Punishment, (12) Messiah, (13)\nResurrection.[408] This list is open to criticism. If Maimonides\nintended to admit strict principles only without which Judaism cannot\nexist, we understand why he named (1), (6), (8), (10), (11), which are\ngeneral principles of any divine religion, and (7) and (9) as special\nprinciples of Judaism. But we cannot see why he included (2) and (3).\nFor while they are true, and every Jew should believe them, Judaism can\nbe conceived as existing without them. It is still more strange that (5)\nshould be counted as a principle. To be sure, it is one of the ten\ncommandments, \"Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.... Thou shalt\nnot bow thyself down to them, nor serve them\" ... (Exod. 20, 35), but\nJudaism can be conceived to exist even with the belief in a mediator.\nSimilarly it is not clear why (13) should be considered as a fundamental\ndogma. On the other hand, he omitted Tradition and Free Will as beliefs\nessential to any divine religion.\n\nIf, in defence of Maimonides, we say that he intended to name not only\nfundamental principles, but also true beliefs, whether fundamental or\nderivative, then there are many others he might have mentioned, such as\ncreation _ex nihilo_, belief in miracles, that God rests in Israel\nthrough the Torah, and so on.\n\nAnother writer counts twenty-six principles, including everything that\noccurred to his mind, such as the attributes of eternity, wisdom, life,\npower, will and others, counting paradise and hell as two, and other\nabsurd ideas. Others again,[409] criticizing Maimonides's principles,\nreduce them to six, viz. (1) God's knowledge, (2) Providence, (3) Power,\n(4) Prophecy, (5) Free Will, (6) Purpose, adding thereto the three\nproved by Maimonides, God's existence, unity and incorporeality. The\nobjection to this list is that it does not contain the special dogmas of\nJudaism, and does not give us a principle by which we can distinguish\nbetween the genuine and spurious divine religion. For the dogmas named\nin the above list give us the _necessary_ requirements for a divine law,\nbut not the _sufficient_. We may have all these principles and yet not\nhave a divine religion. As to Free Will and Purpose, they are essential\nto divine legislation to be sure, but not _qua_ divine; they are also\nessential to a conventional human law. Divine religion has a special\npurpose peculiar to it.[410]\n\nHaving laid bare the defects in the attempts at a list of fundamental\ndogmas of Judaism made by his predecessors, Albo categorically lays down\nthe following three principles as fundamental to divine religion: (1)\nExistence of God, (2) Providence, and reward and punishment, (3)\nRevelation.\n\nTo justify this statement Albo finds it necessary to make clear what is\nmeant by divine law or religion, and what relation it bears to other\nlaws, not divine. This necessitates an explanation of existing laws and\ntheir motives and causes.\n\nAnimal life, we are told, may be divided into three classes according to\nthe mode of living adopted by each. Beasts of prey live separately and\nnot in groups. Mankind must live in communities, as one individual is\ndependent upon the work of another, and social life is essential to\ntheir existence. Intermediate between beast of prey and man are the\ngregarious animals, which keep together not as a matter of necessity, as\nis the case in man, but for convenience, for the sake of being together.\nMan is social by nature; and in order to make communal life possible,\nthere must be some order in the community which prohibits violence,\nrobbery, and so on. This is known as \"natural law.\" In addition to this\nthere are in many places \"conventional laws,\" made by kings and\nemperors, regulating more carefully and with greater detail than the\nnatural law the affairs of the members of the community.\n\nBut this is not all. There is still another kind of law due directly to\nGod's providence. The providence of God is seen even in the lower\nanimals, in the constitution of their bodies, not merely in matters\nessential to the preservation of the animal, but also in the interest of\ncomfort and convenience, as for example the duplication of the sense\norgans. It stands to reason therefore that there is a divine influence\nwhich provides for man even to a greater degree. This providence may\nextend only to one individual, but this person brings about the\nperfection of the race; just as in the individual man the heart is\ninstrumental in giving life to all the other limbs. The law which is\npromulgated through this person is a \"divine law.\"\n\nThe term \"law\" (\"Dat\") applies to any system of directions embracing a\nlarge aggregate of men, whether it contains many commands or one. There\nare thus three kinds of law, natural, conventional and divine. Natural\nlaw is the same for all persons, times and places. Conventional law is\nordered by a wise man or men in conformity with the necessity of the\npersons, times and places, as the reason dictates, without special\ndivine suggestion. Divine law is ordered by God through a prophet. The\npurpose of natural law is to remove wrong and promote right, keeping men\nfrom robbery and theft so that society may be able to exist.\nConventional law goes further and tends to remove the unseemly and to\npromote the becoming. Divine law has for its purpose to guide men to\ntrue happiness, which is the happiness of the soul and its eternal life.\nIt points out the way to follow to reach this end, showing what is the\ntrue good for man to pursue, and what is the real evil which one must\nshun; though it also lays down the law of right and wrong like the other\ntwo.[411]\n\nThe conventional law is inferior to the divine in a number of ways.\n\nThe conventional law only orders human conduct for the purpose of\nimproving social life, but does not concern itself with perfection in\ntheoretical speculation and knowledge, which leads the soul to eternal\nlife. The divine law embraces both the parts upon which human perfection\ndepends, conduct and theory. It embraces the becoming and unbecoming\n(practice), and the true and untrue (theory). As the Psalmist has it,\n\"The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul\" (Psal. 19, 8).\n\nThe conventional law, being human, cannot always decide with certainty\nwhat is becoming and what unbecoming. It is liable to error. This is\nparticularly the case in matters of theory, such as the creation or\neternity of the world. The divine law gives us certainty in all things,\n\"The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple\" (_ib._).\n\nThe person guided by the conventional law is not sure that he is always\nguided aright; hence he cannot feel the satisfaction and the joy of the\nman whose guide is the divine law, making him certain of being\nright--\"The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart\"\n(_ib._ 9).\n\nThe conventional law can give general rules only, but is unable to\nadvise in a particular case. So Aristotle in the Ethics points out that\nvirtue is a mean, but he cannot determine exactly the proper measure at\na given time. This is the function of the divine law--\"The commandment\nof the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes\" (_ib._).\n\nThe conventional law is subject to change in the course of time. Witness\nthe marriage of sisters in the early period of Adam and Abel. The divine\nlaw alone does not change--\"The fear of the Lord is pure, enduring for\never\" (_ib._ 10).\n\nThe conventional law cannot estimate exactly the merited amount and kind\nof reward and punishment; whereas, \"The ordinances of the Lord are the\ntruth; they are just altogether\" (_ib._).[412]\n\nFreedom and Purpose are principles of conventional law. Without freedom\nthere is no sense in giving orders. For this reason Freedom and Purpose\nare not correctly given as fundamental dogmas of divine law, for while\nthe latter cannot get along without them, they are not peculiar to\ndivine law as such, but are common also to conventional law. This is why\nMaimonides omitted Freedom in his creed. The same is true of Purpose in\ngeneral. The divine law, however, has a special purpose, perfection and\neternal life, hence Maimonides did include it in his list.[413]\n\nThe fundamental dogmas of divine law are, as we said before, Existence\nof God, Revelation, Reward and Punishment. It is evident that there\ncannot be a divine law without the first two. The third is also\nnecessary; for the purpose of divine law must be a perfection greater\nthan the conventional law can accomplish. This is eternal life, and is\nsignified by Reward and Punishment.\n\nAs all agree that the Law of Moses is divine, it is proper to use it as\na standard in order to discover what a divine law must have. Accordingly\nif we examine the first four chapters of Genesis, we find the principle\nof the existence of God in chapter one, describing creation. The second\nand third chapters give evidence of revelation, or communication of God\nwith man for the purpose of directing his conduct. Finally in the Cain\nincident in chapter four is illustrated the third dogma of Reward and\nPunishment.[414]\n\nCreation _ex nihilo_ is a true belief but not a fundamental principle.\nFor though the Aristotelian view of eternity is heretical, as it takes\naway the possibility of miracles, nay even the possibility of Moses and\nthe Messiah (for these could exist only after the lapse of an infinite\nnumber of individuals), one who believes like Plato in a primitive\nmatter is not necessarily in contradiction with the Biblical miracles,\nfor they were not _ex nihilo_[415] (_cf._ above, p. 358).\n\nIt is not sufficient to believe in the three principles mentioned to be\nconsidered a believer and to be entitled to a share in the world to\ncome. One must believe also in the derivative principles following from\nthem. Thus from the existence of God follow his unity and\nincorporeality. And if a man does not believe in incorporeality, he\ndisbelieves in the real nature of God, and it is as if he denied the\noriginal principle.\n\nThe derivative principles (\"Shorashim\" = roots) are as follows. From\nexistence of God are derived four: (1) Unity, (2) Incorporeality, (3)\nIndependence of time, (4) Freedom from defects. From Revelation are\nderived three: (1) God's knowledge, (2) Prophecy, (3) Authenticity of\nGod's messenger. From Reward and Punishment is derived one--Providence\nin the sense of special Providence. In all there are eleven dogmas.[416]\n\nA particular commandment of the Law is not reckoned either as a\nfundamental principle or as a derivative. He who trangresses it is a\nsinner and is punished for his misdeed, but is not a heretic who loses\nhis share in the world to come, unless he denies that the commandment in\nquestion is from God. In that case he comes in the category of those who\ndeny revelation. Similarly the belief in tradition is not a principle\nbecause it is a particular commandment. Unity of God is a principle\nthough it is apparently a special commandment, because the term unity\ncontains two concepts; first, that God is one and there is not another\nlike him; second, that being one and free from any multiplicity or\ncomposition, he is the cause of all the multiplicity in the world. The\nlatter is not a particular commandment, but a principle derived from the\nexistence of God. The former is a particular commandment. If particular\ncommandments were regarded as principles, we should have as many\nprinciples as there are commandments in the Bible.[417]\n\nThe above distinction between the two senses of the term unity, one of\nwhich is rationally derived from the existence of God, whereas the other\nnot being so derivable is not a principle, and is given in the Bible as\na special commandment, is clearly due to Crescas, who after a few\nattempts at proving the unity of God in the sense of excluding dualism,\ngives it up as incapable of proof logically, and falls back upon the\ntestimony of Scripture, \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is\nOne.\" The other sense of the word unity Crescas proves by reason. Hence\nAlbo counts it among the derivative principles (_cf._ above, p. 392).\n\nIf a particular commandment is not a principle, which means that a\nfundamental or derivative dogma cannot itself be a commandment, but must\nlie at the basis of all commandments, the question arises whence come\nthese principles, and who is to warrant their truth. In the sciences we\nknow that the basal principles of a given science are not proved in that\nscience itself, but are borrowed from another science in which they are\nproved. Thus physics takes the concepts of substance and accident from\nmetaphysics. In turn the latter takes the idea of a first mover from\nphysics. Among the laws, too, the conventional law takes its principles,\nfreedom and purpose, from political philosophy. Whence does divine law\ntake its principles? The existence of God can be demonstrated\nphilosophically from premises going back to axioms and first principles.\nBut this is not true of Prophecy and Providence.\n\nThe answer Albo gives to this question is that of Judah Halevi and\nCrescas. The principles of the divine law are known empirically, _i. e._,\nby experience. Adam knew of the existence of God, of prophecy and\nreward and punishment from personal experience. Similarly Noah and\nAbraham. Nowadays we know the law by tradition, but the majority of the\nprinciples thus known are so certain that there is neither difference of\nopinion nor doubt entertained by anyone concerning them. Such is the\nstatus for example of the principle of Revelation. Other principles\nagain, like the existence of God, are, as was said before, known by\ntheoretical speculation.[418]\n\nTo find out whether a religion professing to be of divine origin is\nreally so or not, it must be examined first with reference to the three\nfundamental, and the other derivative principles. If it opposes them, it\nis spurious and not genuine. If it is not opposed to the principles in\nquestion, it must be further examined with a view to determining whether\nthe promulgator is a genuine messenger of God or not. And the test here\nmust be a direct one. Miracles and signs are no conclusive proof of\nprophecy, and still less do they prove that the person performing them\nis a messenger sent by God to announce a law. They merely show that the\nperson is considered worthy of having miracles performed through him,\nprovided the miracles are genuine and not performed through magic. The\ntest of the prophet and the messenger of God must be as direct as it was\nin the case of Moses, where the people actually saw that he was\naddressed by God and commissioned with a message for them.[419]\n\nThis opinion of Albo is clearly intended as a defence of Judaism against\nChristianity's claim that Jesus performed miracles, a claim which the\nRabbis of the middle ages were inclined to recognize.\n\nIn addition to the three fundamental and eight derivative principles of\ndivine legislation, there are six dogmas, which every follower of the\nMosaic law must believe. They are (1) Creation _ex nihilo_, (2)\nSuperiority of Moses to other prophets, (3) Immutability of the Law, (4)\nThat human perfection can be attained by any one of the commandments of\nthe Law, (5) Resurrection, (6) Messiah.\n\nCreation _ex nihilo_ is neither a fundamental nor a derivative principle\nof religion generally or of Judaism specially because, as we saw before\n(p. 413), they can exist without this dogma. At the same time it is a\ntruth which it behooves every religionist and particularly every Jew to\nbelieve. It follows from the principle of the existence of God. If God\ncannot create _ex nihilo_, there is a defect in him. For creation _ex\nnihilo_ is admitted in a certain sense even by those who hold that the\nworld is eternal. They admit that God is the cause of everything else;\nhence matter is his effect through the mediation of the separate\nIntellect. But how can a separate Intellect be the cause of matter if\nthere is no creation _ex nihilo_. This is _ex nihilo_ as much as\nanything can be. To say that we can find no reason why he should create\nat a particular time rather than at another, and hence the world must be\neternal, is no argument; for this reasoning can apply only to action\nfrom necessity. Voluntary action is just of this kind, that it takes\nplace at a particular time.\n\nIn the above argument for creation the reader will not fail to see\nreminiscences of Maimonides as well as Crescas (_cf._ pp. 271 and 403).\n\nThe superiority of Moses to other prophets is not essential to Judaism,\nnevertheless it behooves every Jew to believe it, as it is included in\nthe principle of Revelation, and the Bible tells us, \"And there arose\nnot a prophet since then in Israel like unto Moses\" (Deut. 34, 10).\n\nThe Immutability of the Law will be treated in detail later. Here it\nwill suffice to say that while it is not a _sine qua non_ of Judaism,\nevery Jew should believe it, as it is included in the derivative\nprinciple of the Authenticity of God's messenger.\n\nIt stands to reason that human perfection can be attained by the\nperformance of any one of the commandments of the Law. For if it\nrequires the performance of all the commandments for this purpose, then\nthe Law of Moses makes it more difficult to reach perfection than the\nprevious laws, which is not in consonance with the statement of the\nRabbis that \"God gave Israel so many laws and commandments because he\nwished to make them meritorious\" (Tal. Bab. Makkot, 23 b).\n\nResurrection will be treated more at length later. It must be believed\nbecause it has been accepted by Israel and has come down to us by\ntradition. The same thing applies to the belief in the Messiah. This is\nalso a traditional belief and is related to the principle of Reward and\nPunishment, though it is not like the latter indispensable either to\nreligion in general or to Judaism in particular.[420]\n\nThe difference, it will be seen, between Albo and Maimonides in the\nquestion of Jewish dogmas is simply one of classification and grading.\nAlbo includes in his enumeration all the thirteen dogmas of Maimonides\nwith the exception of the fifth, namely, that God alone be worshipped,\nbut instead of placing them all on the same level of importance as\nequally essential to the structure of Judaism, as Maimonides apparently\nintended, Albo divides them into three categories of descending rank as\nfollows: fundamental principles, derived principles, true beliefs. Of\nMaimonides's list the last two, Messiah and Resurrection, belong to the\nlast category. None the less Albo believed strictly in both and held it\nincumbent upon every Jew to believe in them. It was only a question of\nthe status of a person who mistakenly denies these true beliefs.\nAccording to Maimonides, it would seem, he would be called a heretic and\nbe excluded from a share in the world to come equally with one who\ndenied the existence of God; whereas according to Albo a person so\nguilty is a sinner and needs forgiveness, but is not a heretic. Of the\nother eleven dogmas of Maimonides, (1), (8) and (11) are placed by Albo\nin his first class, (2), (3), (4), (6) and (10) belong to the second\nclass, while (7) and (9) come under true beliefs along with Messiah and\nResurrection. The difference between the first and the second class is\npurely logical and not practical. As we saw before (p. 413), one who\ndenies incorporeality (a principle of the second class) disbelieves in\nthe true nature of God, which is tantamount to denying the principle of\nthe existence of God.\n\nBefore concluding this general discussion of the fundamental dogmas of\nreligion and Judaism, Albo undertakes to answer two questions which must\nhave been near his heart, and which were on the tongues no doubt of a\ngreat many honest people in those days of religious challenge and\ndebate. The first question is, Is it proper, or perhaps obligatory, to\nanalyze the fundamental principles of one's religion, to see if they are\ntrue; and if one finds another religion which seems to him better, is\none permitted to adopt it in place of his own? Albo sees arguments\nagainst both sides of the dilemma. If a man is allowed to analyze his\nreligion and to choose the one that seems best to him, it will follow\nthat a person is never stable in his belief, since he is doubting it, as\nis shown by his examination. And if so, he does not deserve reward for\nbelief, since belief, as Albo defines it elsewhere (Pt. I, ch. 19),\nmeans that one cannot conceive of the opposite being true. Again, if he\nfinds another religion which he thinks better and is allowed to exchange\nhis own religion for the new one, he will never be sure of any religion;\nfor he may find a third still better, and a fourth, and so on, and as he\ncannot examine all the possible religions, he will remain without any\nreligious convictions.\n\nOn the other hand, if he is not allowed to investigate the foundations\nof his belief, it follows either that all religions alike bring their\nbeliever happiness, no matter how contradictory they are, which is\nabsurd; or God would seem unfair if only one religion leads its devotees\nto happiness and no one is allowed to change his religion for one that\nseems to him the true one.\n\nThe answer of Albo to this interesting question is characteristic. It\nshows that he armored himself in advance, before he risked such a\ndelicate question. He makes it clear that it really does not expose to\nany danger the religion of Judaism, the mother of the other two, which\nthey came to supersede. If all religions in the world, Albo tells us,\nwere opposed to one another, and regarded each other as untrue, the\nabove difficulty would be real. But it is not so. All religions agree in\nrespect to one of them that it is divine; but they say that it is\nsuperseded. Hence every religionist who is not a Jew must investigate\nhis religion to see if it is justified in opposing the religion which is\nacknowledged to be divine. Similarly the professor of the admittedly\ndivine religion should investigate to see if his religion is temporary\nor eternal. In this investigation he must first see if the religion\nconforms to the principles of divine religion above mentioned. If it\ndoes this and in addition endeavors to order human affairs in accordance\nwith justice, and leads its devotees to human perfection, it is divine.\nIt is still, however, possible that it is the work of a wise man of good\ncharacter. It is therefore necessary to investigate the character of the\npromulgator, to find out whether he is a genuine divine messenger or\nnot. This test, as was said above (p. 415), must be a direct test and\nnot an indirect.[421]\n\nThe other question is whether there can be more than one divine\nreligion. Apparently there can be only one, since the giver is one, and\nthe recipients are of one species. But in reality the receivers vary in\ntemperament according to difference in inheritance and environment.\nHence there may be a difference in the law according to the character of\nthe people for whom it is intended. Since, however, the difference is\ndue to the receiver and not to the giver, it must reside in those\nelements which are dependent upon the receiver, _i. e._, in particulars\nand details, not in the principles, fundamental or derived. So the\nNoachite and the Mosaic laws differ only in details, not in fundamental\nprinciples.[422]\n\nWe have now completed the exposition of the part of Albo's teaching that\nmay be called distinctly his own. And it seems he was aware that he had\nnothing further to teach that was new, and would have been content to\nend his book with the first part, of which we have just given an\naccount. But his friends, he tells us in the concluding remarks to the\nfirst part of the \"Ikkarim,\"[423] urged him to proceed further and\ndiscuss in detail the principles, fundamental and derived, the true\nbeliefs and the so-called \"branches,\" which he barely enumerated in the\nfirst part. He was persuaded by their advice and added the other three\nsections, each devoted to one of the three fundamental dogmas and the\ncorollaries following from it. Here Albo has nothing new to teach. He\nfollows the beaten track, reviews the classic views of Maimonides, takes\nadvantage of the criticisms of Gersonides and Crescas, and settles the\nproblems sometimes one way sometimes another, without ever suggesting\nanything new. Accordingly it will not be worth our while to reproduce\nhis discussions here. It will suffice briefly to indicate his position\non the more important problems.\n\nThe second section deals with the existence of God and the derived\nprinciples and branches growing out from this root. In proving the\nexistence of God he refers to Maimonides's four proofs (_cf._ p. 257 ff.),\nand selects the third and fourth as really valid and beyond\ndispute. The first and second are not conclusive; the one because it is\nbased upon the eternity of motion, which no Jew accepts; the other\nbecause the major premise is not true. It does not follow if one of the\ntwo elements _a_, _b_, of a composite _a + b_ is found separately, that\nthe other must be found existing separately likewise.[424]\n\nWe have seen that from the principle of the existence of God follow four\nderivative dogmas, unity, incorporeality, independence of time, freedom\nfrom defects. We are now told that from these secondary roots issue a\nnumber of branches. From Unity it follows that no attributes either\nessential or accidental can be applied to God, such as wisdom, strength,\ngenerosity, and so on, for they would cause multiplicity. From\nincorporeality we infer that God is not subject to corporeal affections\nlike fear, sorrow, joy, grudge, and so on. Independence of time implies\ninfinite power and want of resemblance to other things. Freedom from\ndefect implies absence of such qualities as ignorance, weakness, and so\non.[425]\n\nIn the discussion of the divine attributes Albo has nothing new to\noffer, but instead he argues forward and backward, now with Maimonides,\nnow against him, reproducing a good deal of Maimonides's classification,\nembodying some material of Bahya on unity, and after this rambling and\nnot very consistent discussion, he comes to the conclusion that none but\nactive and negative attributes are applicable to God; and yet some\nessential attributes too must be his, but these must be understood as\nimplying only the aspect of perfection, and not that other aspect of\nattribute which is responsible for multiplicity.[426]\n\nHe asks the question so often asked before, How can multiplicity come\nfrom unity? And after giving Ibn Sina's scheme of the emanation of the\nIntelligences one after the other, and criticizing it in the manner of\nGazali and Maimonides, he gives his own solution that the variety and\nmultiplicity of the world tends to one end, which is the order of the\nworld. And thus are reconciled plurality and unity. (_cf._ Gersonides\nabove, p. 351).[427]\n\nHe discusses the question of angels or Intellects, gives the views of\nthe philosophers concerning their nature and number, each being the\neffect of the superior and the cause of the inferior, and objects to\ntheir idea on the ground that these cannot be the same as the Biblical\nangels, who are messengers of God to mankind. He then gives his own view\nthat the number of angels is infinite, not as the philosophers say ten\nor fifty, and that they are not related to each other as cause and\neffect, but that though they are immaterial Intellects they are\nindividuated and differentiated according to the degree of understanding\nthey have of God.[428]\n\nIn discussing the second fundamental principle, Revelation, Albo argues\nin the good old fashion that man is the noblest creature of the sublunar\nworld, and the most distinctive and noblest part of man--his form and\nessence--is the theoretical reason. Hence the purpose of man must be the\nrealization of the theoretical intellect. At the same time, and with\nlittle consistency, Albo takes the part of Judah Halevi and Crescas,\nemploying their arguments, without naming them, that the philosophers\nand the philosophizing theologians are wrong who make human immortality,\nperfection and happiness depend solely upon intellectual activity. He\ncomes to the conclusion, therefore, that spiritual understanding, which\ngives perfection of soul when in combination with practice, is not\nacquisition of ideas but the intention of doing the will of God in the\nperformance of good deeds, and not that of pleasure or reward.[429]\n\nThis being so, it becomes an important question what are the practices\nwhich tend to human perfection, and what are those which tend the other\nway. In general we may conclude, as like desires and rejoices in like,\nthat those deeds which give the soul pleasure before and after\nperformance are good and helpful, while those which cause subsequent\npain, regret and sorrow are bad, and tend away from the soul's\nperfection.\n\nBut the criterion of pleasure and pain just suggested is not sufficient\nas a guide in conduct, for a great deal depends upon a man's\ntemperament. What a hot-blooded man may commend and find pleasure in,\nthe phlegmatic temperament will object to, and will feel discomfort in\ndoing. Besides, as the good deed is always a mean between two extremes,\nwhich it is hard to measure precisely; and as the good deed is that\nwhich pleases God, and beyond generalities we cannot tell what does, and\nwhat does not please God, since we do not know his essence, it was\nnecessary for man's sake that God should reveal his will to mankind\nthrough a prophet. Thus Revelation is proved by reason.[430]\n\nThis leads to the problem of prophecy, one of the derivative principles\nof Revelation. The divine influence from which man gets a knowledge of\nthe things pleasing and displeasing to God, he cannot obtain without the\ndivine will. Instead of magic, divination, and communication with evil\nspirits and the dead, which the ancient heathen employed in order to\nlearn the future, God sent prophets to Israel, to tell the people of the\nwill of God. Foretelling the future was only secondary with them.\nProphecy is a supernatural gift, whether it takes place with the help of\nthe imagination or not. If it were a natural phenomenon dependent upon\nthe intellectual power of the individual and his faculty of imagination,\nas the philosophers and some Jewish theologians think, there should have\nbeen prophets among the philosophers.\n\nHere again we see Albo adopt the view of Halevi and Crescas against the\nintellectualism of Maimonides and Gersonides. His further classification\nof the grades of prophecy is based upon Maimonides, though Albo\nsimplifies it. Instead of eleven Albo recognizes four grades in all,\nincluding that of Moses. The great majority of mankind, he says, stop\nwith the ability to analyze, such as is exhibited in the analysis of\nthings into matter and form, and so on, though not all of them go so\nfar. But there are some few who go farther and are enabled to speak\nwords of wisdom and to sing praises to God without being able to account\nfor the power. This is the holy spirit (\"Ruah ha-Kodesh\"). Some go still\nfarther, and through the strength of their reason and imagination they\ndream true dreams and receive prophecies; though, the imagination having\nthe upper hand, they struggle very hard and tremble and faint, almost\nlosing their soul. This is the first stage of prophecy. The second stage\nis when the imagination and reason are equal. In that case there is no\nstruggle or fainting. Visions come to the prophet at night in dreams, or\nin a revery at daytime. The forms that appear are not real, but the\nmeanings they convey are. Such are the figures of women, horses, basket\nof summer fruit, and so on, in the visions of Zechariah and Amos. The\nthird stage is when the reason gets the better of the imagination and\nthere are no forms or images, but real essences and ideas, like the\nvisions of Ezekiel, which represent real things in the secrets of nature\nand divinity. The prophet in this stage also hears an angel speaking to\nhim and giving him information of importance to himself or others. In\nall these cases the will of God is essential. No preparation can replace\nit. Finally the fourth stage is reached when the imagination does not\ncome into play at all. In this stage there is no angel or form, and the\nmessage comes to the prophet at daytime while he is awake. He hears a\nvoice telling him what he desires to know; and whenever he chooses he\ncan summon this power. Moses alone attained to this final stage. Outside\nof the prophets, the righteous and the pious have various degrees of\npower according to the degree of their union with God. Some can in this\nway influence the powers of nature to obey them, as a person can, by\nthinking of food, make his mouth water. So they can by taking thought\ncause rain and storm. Others can bring down fire from above and revive\nthe dead.\n\nThrough the influence of a prophet the gift of prophecy may sometimes\nrest upon individuals who are themselves unprepared and unworthy.\nWitness the revelation on Sinai where the entire people, six hundred\nthousand in number, were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and that\ntoo of the highest degree, like Moses himself. The prophetic medium\nreflects the spirit of prophecy on others as a smooth surface reflects\nthe light of the sun upon dark bodies. This is why prophecy is found\nonly in Israel and in Palestine, because the ark and the Tables of\nStone, upon which the Shekinah rests, reflect the divine spirit upon\nthose who are worthy and have in them something resembling the contents\nof the ark, namely, the Torah and the commandments.[431]\n\nAmong the true beliefs we have seen (p. 416) that Immutability of the\nLaw is related to the principle of Revelation. Hence this is the place\nto discuss this question. Can a divine religion change with time or not?\nIt would seem at first sight that it cannot. For the giver expresses his\nwill in the Law, and his will never changes. The receivers are the same,\n_i. e._, the same nation, and a nation does not change. Finally the\npurpose of the Law or religion is to give people true opinions, and\nthese never change.\n\nAnd yet on further reflection there seems no reason why religion should\nnot change with the change of the recipient, as the physician changes\nhis prescription with the progress of the patient, and as a matter of\nfact we find that the commandments given to Adam were different from\nthose given to Noah and to Abraham and to Moses. Adam was not allowed to\neat meat, Noah was. Abraham was commanded circumcision. High places were\nat first permitted and later forbidden. Maimonides makes the\nimmutability of the Law a fundamental dogma, relying upon the\ncommandment, \"Thou shalt not add thereto, and thou shalt not diminish\ntherefrom\" (Deut. 13, 1). But in the first place the verse refers to\nchanges in the mode of observing the laws; and besides, it says nothing\nabout God himself changing the Law.\n\nThe phrases \"an eternal statute,\" \"throughout your generations,\" \"it is\na sign for ever,\" are no proof of the eternity of the Law; for not all\ncommandments have these expressions attached, and this shows rather that\nthe others are subject to change. Besides, the expressions, \"for\neternity,\" and so on, are not to be taken absolutely. They are often\nused to express finite periods of time.\n\nAfter the Babylonian Exile two changes were made. They changed the\ncharacters in which the Bible was written, and the order and names of\nthe months, beginning with Tishri instead of Nisan. There is no reason,\ntherefore, why other laws might not change, too. We need not, then,\nregard Immutability of the Law as a fundamental dogma with Maimonides.\nHasdai Crescas also classes it with true beliefs and not with\nfundamental principles.\n\nAlbo resolves the problem as follows: A matter that is revealed by God\nhimself cannot be changed by a prophet unless it is changed by God\nhimself. The first two commandments, \"I am the Lord thy God, &c.,\" and\n\"Thou shalt not have other gods, &c.,\" were heard by the people directly\nfrom God without the intervention of Moses, hence they cannot be changed\nby any prophet. It follows therefore that the three fundamental dogmas,\nexistence of God, Revelation and Reward and Punishment can never be\nchanged by a prophet, for they are implied in the first two\ncommandments, which were heard from God himself. The rest of the\ncommandments, as they were heard from God through the interpretation of\nMoses, can be changed by a prophet as a temporary measure. The other\nlaws which were given by Moses may be changed by a later prophet even\npermanently. But the prophet must be greater than Moses, and he must\nshow this by the greatness, number, publicity and permanence of his\nmiracles, which must excel those of Moses. He must likewise show that he\nwas sent by God to change the Law, as clearly as Moses proved that he\nwas sent to give it. But it is unlikely that any such prophet will come,\nfor the Torah says that there never was or will be any prophet like\nMoses.[432]\n\nBefore discussing the third fundamental dogma, Albo finds it desirable\nto dispose first of a few other problems implied by this dogma, one of\nwhich, God's knowledge, was postponed to this place, though it is\nconnected with Revelation, because it cannot well be separated in\ndiscussion from the problem of Freedom. Providence is the other related\nproblem, which is derived from the dogma of Reward and Punishment.\n\nThere is nothing that is new in Albo's treatment of knowledge and\nFreedom. He insists like Maimonides that God must be omniscient, and on\nthe other hand the contingent cannot be denied, and neither can freedom.\nHe gives the stock arguments, which it is not necessary to reproduce at\nthis late hour. And his solution is that of Maimonides that in God human\nfreedom and divine Omniscience are reconcilable because God's knowledge\nis not our knowledge.[433]\n\nNor is there anything original in Albo's discussion of the problem of\nProvidence. He recognizes with Maimonides and others that a strong\nargument against special Providence is the observed inequality between\nthe destinies of men and their apparent merits. And he endeavors in the\nwell worn method to give reasons and explanations for this inequality\nwhich will not touch unfavorably God's justice or his special\nProvidence. The reasons are such as we met before and we shall not\nrepeat them. Albo also gives a few positive arguments to prove the\nreality of special Providence for man. He sees in various natural and\nhuman phenomena evidence of deviation from the merely \"natural\" as\ndemanded by the principles of Aristotle's Physics or the laws of\nuniformity. This shows special Providence. Thus the existence of dry\nearth, the heaviest element, above water, cannot be accounted for by the\nlaws of Physics. The phenomenon of rain cannot be reduced to law, hence\nit argues will and purpose and Providence. Admonition in dreams is\ndirect evidence of special Providence, and it is scarcely likely that\nman, who has special equipment above the other animals in his reason,\nshould not also receive special care above that which the lower animals\nhave. Now they are protected in the species, hence man is provided for\nas an individual.[434]\n\nHaving disposed of the auxiliary dogmas, Albo takes up the fundamental\nprinciple of Reward and Punishment. He cites various opinions on the\nsubject, which are dependent upon the idea one entertains concerning the\nnature of the soul. Thus if one holds that the human soul is not\ndifferent in kind from the animal soul, it follows that as there is no\nreward and punishment for the animal, there is none for man. And if one\nregards the human soul as merely a capacity or possibility of\nintelligence he must necessarily conclude that the soul perishes with\nthe body and there is no spiritual reward and punishment after death.\nThe only reward there is must therefore be corporeal, during life. On\nthe other hand, our general experience, which brings before us many\ncases of good men suffering and bad men enjoying prosperity, would seem\nto argue against corporeal reward and punishment in this world. This\ntaken together with the philosophical opinion that the soul is an\nimmaterial and indestructible substance gives rise to the third view\nthat the only recompense is spiritual after death. None of these views\nis satisfactory to Albo. The first two because they are based upon an\nerroneous notion of the soul. All agree, philosophers as well as\ntheologians, that the human soul is different in kind from the soul of\nthe animal; and it is likewise admitted that the human soul is immortal.\nHis criticism of the third view so far as it is based upon the\nintellectualist idea that the thing of highest value is intellectual\neffort, and the only reward is immortality which intellectual activity\nengenders, is similar to that of Halevi and Crescas in its endeavor to\nrefute this notion and to substitute for it the religious view that the\nsoul is an independent substance having a capacity for intelligence _in\nGod's service_. The degree in which a person realizes this service\ndetermines his reward and punishment. The argument from experience Albo\ndoes not answer here, but we may suppose he regards it as answered by\nwhat he said in his discussion of Providence, where he tries to account\nfor the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous.\n\nAlbo's own view accordingly is that which he also attributes to the\nBible that there is a twofold reward, in this world and in the next.\nThere is still a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the true\nand ultimate reward, whether it is given to the soul alone, or to body\nand soul combined in resurrection. He quotes Maimonides's opinion, with\nwhom he agrees, that the real reward is purely spiritual enjoyed by the\nsoul alone. To be sure, after the coming of the Messiah the bodies of\nthe righteous will be resurrected to make known abroad God's wonders, or\nto give these people bodily pleasure for the pain they suffered during\nlife, or to give them additional opportunity to acquire perfection so\nthat they may have a greater reward later. But this state of resurrected\nlife will last only for a time, and then all will die again, and the\nsouls will enjoy spiritual life forever.\n\nThe other opinion, held by Nachmanides, is that the real and ultimate\nreward is that of body and soul united to everlasting life. Albo is not\nsatisfied with this view, his objections being among others that if only\nthe perfect are resurrected, the rest will remain without any reward at\nall, not to mention the difficulty that it is not likely that the human\nbody--a perishable thing--will change into a matter that will last\nforever.\n\nAs to the nature of reward and punishment after death, Albo tells us\nthat reward will consist in the soul's realization that its endeavors\nin this world were correct, and in the next world it will be prepared to\njoin the spiritual beings, which will give it great joy. The erring soul\nwill find itself in a position where it will still desire the corporeal\npleasures of this world, but will not be able to have them for want of\ncorporeal organs. At the same time it will also entertain the other more\nnatural desire of a spiritual substance to join the other spiritual\nbeings in the other world. This feeling too it will not be able to\nsatisfy because of its want of perfection. This division of desires\nunsatisfied will cause the soul excruciating torture, and this is its\npunishment.[435]\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nOur task is done. We have now reached the limit we have assigned\nourselves. We have traced objectively and with greater or less detail\nthe rationalistic movement in medi\u00e6val Jewry from its beginnings in the\nninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites\nto its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century. We\nhave followed its ascending curve from Saadia through Gabirol, Bahya and\nIbn Daud to its highest point in Maimonides, and we likewise traced its\ndescent through Gersonides, Crescas and Albo. We took account of its\nessential nature as being a serious and conscientious attempt to define\na Jewish _Weltanschauung_ in the midst of conflicting claims of\nreligions and philosophies. The Jewish sacred writings had to be studied\nand made consistent with themselves in regard to certain ethical and\nmetaphysical questions which forced themselves upon the minds of\nthinking men. In this endeavor it was necessary to have regard to the\nsystem of doctrine that was growing up among their Mohammedan neighbors\nand masters--itself inherited from Greece--and adjust its teachings to\nthose of Judaism. The adjustment took various forms according to the\ntemperament of the adjuster. It embraced the extremes of all but\nsacrificing one of the two systems of doctrine to the other, and it\ncounted among its votaries those who honestly endeavored to give each\nclaim its due. The system of Judaism was the same for all throughout the\nperiod of our investigation, excepting only the difference between\nKaraites and Rabbanites. This was not the case with the system of\nphilosophic doctrine. There we can see a development from Kalam through\nNeo-Platonism to Aristotelianism, and we accordingly classified the\nJewish thinkers as Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists or Aristotelians, or\ncombinations in varying proportions of any two of the three systems\nmentioned.\n\nIt was not our province to treat of the mystic movement in medi\u00e6val\nJewry as it developed in the Kabbalistic works and gained the ground\nyielded in the course of time by the healthier rationalism. To complete\nthe picture it will suffice to say that as the political and economic\nconditions of the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries\ndeteriorated, and freedom and toleration were succeeded by persecution\nand expulsion, the Jews became more zealous for their own spiritual\nheritage as distinguished from foreign importations; philosophy and\nrationalism began to be regarded askance, particularly as experience\nshowed that scientific training was not favorable to Jewish\nsteadfastness and loyalty. In suffering and persecution those who stuck\nto their posts were as a rule not the so-called enlightened who played\nwith foreign learning, but the simple folk who believed in Torah and\ntradition in the good old style. The philosophical and the scientific\ndevotees were the first to yield, and many of them abandoned\nJudaism.[436] Thus it was that mysticism and obscurantism took the place\nof enlightenment as a measure of self-defence. The material walls of the\nGhetto and the spiritual walls of the Talmud and the Kabbala kept the\nremnant from being overwhelmed and absorbed by the hostile environment\nof Christian and Mohammedan. The second half of the fourteenth, and the\nfifteenth century were not favorable to philosophical studies among the\nJews, and the few here and there who still show an interest in science\nand philosophy combine with it a belief in Kabbala and are not of any\ngreat influence on the development of Judaism.\n\nShemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob (ab. 1440) author of a work entitled\n\"Emunot,\"[437] is a strong opponent of Greek science and philosophy. He\nis not content with attacking the lesser lights and extremists like\nAlbalag or Gersonides or Abraham ibn Ezra. He goes to the very\nfountain-head of Jewish Aristotelianism and holds Maimonides responsible\nfor the heresies which invaded the Jewish camp. He takes up one doctrine\nafter another of the great Jewish philosopher and points out how\ndangerous it is to the true Jewish faith. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides\nrepresent to him the true Jewish attitude. The mysteries of the Jewish\nfaith are revealed not in philosophy but in the Kabbala, which\nMaimonides did not study, and which he would not have understood if he\nhad studied it, for he had no Kabbalistic tradition.\n\nUnlike Shemtob, his son Joseph ben Shemtob (d. 1480)[438] shows great\nadmiration for Aristotle and Maimonides. But he is enabled to do so by\nlending credence to a legend that Aristotle in his old age recanted his\nheretical doctrines, in particular that of the eternity of the world.\nJoseph ben Shemtob made a special study of Aristotle's Ethics, to which\nhe wrote a commentary, and endeavored to show that the Stagirite's\nethical doctrines had been misunderstood; that the highest good of man\nand his ultimate happiness are to be sought according to Aristotle not\nin this world but in the next. It was likewise a misunderstanding, he\nthinks, when Maimonides and others make Aristotle deny special\nProvidence. True science is not really opposed to Judaism. At the same\ntime he too like his father realizes the danger of too much scientific\nstudy, and hence agrees with Solomon ben Adret that the study of\nphilosophy should be postponed to the age of maturity when the student\nis already imbued with Jewish learning and religious faith.\n\nThe son of Joseph, bearing the name of his grandfather, Shemtob ben\nJoseph (fl. ab. 1461-89), followed in his father's footsteps,[439] and\nwrote a commentary on the \"Guide of the Perplexed\" of Maimonides, whom\nhe defends against the attacks of Crescas.\n\nIsaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494)[440] is the author of a\nphilosophico-homiletical commentary on the Pentateuch entitled, \"Akedat\nYizhak,\" and a small treatise on the relations of philosophy and\ntheology. He was also interested in Kabbala and placed Jewish revelation\nabove philosophy.\n\nDon Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508),[441] the distinguished Jewish statesman\nwho went with his brethren into exile at the time of the expulsion of\nthe Jews from Spain in 1492, was a prolific writer on Biblical exegesis\nand religious philosophy. Though a great admirer of Maimonides, on whose\n\"Guide\" he wrote a commentary, and whose thirteen articles of the creed\nhe defended against the strictures of Crescas and Albo, he was\nnevertheless an outspoken opponent of the rationalistic attitude and has\nno phrases strong enough for such men as Albalag, Gersonides, Moses of\nNarbonne and others, whom he denounces as heretics and teachers of\ndangerous doctrines. He does not even spare Maimonides himself when the\nlatter attempts to identify the traditional \"Maase Bereshit\" and \"Maase\nMerkaba\" with the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics (_cf._ above, p.\n303 f.), and adopts Kabbalistic views along with philosophic doctrines.\nHe is neither original nor thoroughly consistent.\n\nHis son Judah Leo Abarbanel (1470-1530)[442] is the author of a\nphilosophical work in Italian, \"Dialoghi di Amore,\" (Dialogues of Love),\nwhich breathes the spirit of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and\nsixteenth centuries in Italy. It is under the influence of Plato and\nPlotinus and identifies God with love, which is regarded as the\nessential principle of all life and activity in the world, including\neven the inorganic natural processes. There is no attempt made to\nconstruct a Jewish philosophy, and though all evidence is against it,\nsome have made it out that Judah Abarbanel was a convert to\nChristianity.\n\nIn the same country, in Italy, Judah ben Yechiel Messer Leon of\nMantua[443] (1450-1490) made a name for himself as a student of Cicero\nand of medi\u00e6val Latin scholasticism. He wrote a rhetoric in Hebrew based\nupon Cicero and Lactantius, and composed logical works based upon\nAristotle's Latin text and Averroes. As an original student of\nphilosophy he is of no importance.\n\nTwo members of the Delmedigo family of Crete, Elijah (1460-1498) and\nJoseph Solomon,[444] are well known as students of philosophy and\nwriters on philosophical and scientific subjects.\n\nThus the stream of philosophical thought which rose among the Jews in\nBabylonia and flowed on through the ages, ever widening and deepening\nits channel, passing into Spain and reaching its high water mark in the\nlatter half of the twelfth century in Maimonides, began to narrow and\nthin out while spreading into France and Italy, until at last it dried\nup entirely in that very land which opened up a new world of thought,\nbeauty and feeling in the fifteenth century, the land of the\nRenaissance. Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic stage,\nand the freedom and light which came to the rest of the world in the\nrevival of ancient learning and the inventions and discoveries of the\nmodern era found the Jews incapable of benefiting by the blessings they\nafforded. Oppression and gloom caused the Jews to retire within their\nshell and they sought consolation for the freedom denied them without in\nconcentrating their interests, ideals and hopes upon the Rabbinic\nwritings, legal as well as mystical. There have appeared philosophers\namong the Jews in succeeding centuries, but they either philosophized\nwithout regard to Judaism and in opposition to its fundamental dogmas,\nthus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the synagogue, or they sought\nto dissociate Judaism from theoretical speculation on the ground that\nthe Jewish religion is not a philosophy but a rule of conduct. In more\nrecent times Jewry has divided itself into sects and under the influence\nof modern individualism has lost its central authority making every\ngroup the arbiter of its own belief and practice and narrowing the\nreligious influence to matters of ceremony and communal activity of a\npractical character. There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but\nthere are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY[D]\n\nGENERAL WORKS\n\n\nSOLOMON MUNK, M\u00e9langes de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris 1859, pp.\n461-511. A brief historical r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of philosophical authors and books.\nGerman translation by Beer, Philosophie und philosophische\nSchriftsteller der Juden, Leipzig, 1852. English translation by Isidor\nKalisch, Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews, Cincinnati,\n1881.\n\nA. SCHMIEDL, Studien \u00fcber j\u00fcdische, insonders j\u00fcdisch-arabische\nReligionsphilosophie, Wien, 1869.\n\nMORITZ EISLER, Vorlesungen \u00fcber die j\u00fcdischen Philosophen des\nMittelalters (3 parts), Wien, 1870-84.\n\nDAVID KAUFMANN, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der j\u00fcdischen\nReligionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadia bis Maimuni, Gotha,\n1877.\n\nSIMEON BERNFELD, [Hebrew: Da'at Elohim, Toldot Hafilosofiya Hadatit\nB'yisrael], Warsaw, 1897.\n\nS. HOROVITZ, Die Psychologie bei den j\u00fcdischen Religions-Philosophen des\nMittelalters, von Saadia bis Maimuni, Breslau, 1898-1912 (includes so\nfar Saadia, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abraham ibn Daud).\n\nJ. POLLAK, \"Entwicklung der arabischen und j\u00fcdischen Philosophie im\nMittelalter\" in _Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XVII\n(1904), pp. 196-236, 433-459.\n\nUEBERWEG-BAUMGARTNER, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. II,\n10th ed., Berlin, 1915, pp. 385-403.\n\nDAVID NEUMARK, Geschichte der j\u00fcdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters,\nnach Problemen dargestellt, vol. I, Berlin, 1907, vol. II, part I,\nBerlin, 1910.\n\nIGNAZ GOLDZIHER, Die j\u00fcdische Philosophie in _Allgemeine Geschichte der\nPhilosophie_, von W. Wundt, etc. (Die Kultur der Gegenwart I, 5), pp.\n70-77 (2nd ed., pp. 301-337).\n\n\nKALAM IN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY\n\nMARTIN SCHREINER, Der Kalam in der j\u00fcdischen Literatur, Berlin, 1895.\n\n\nISAAC ISRAELI\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon\nIsraeli, M\u00fcnster i. W. 1911.\n\n\nAL MUKAMMAS\n\nABRAHAM HARKAVY, in Russian periodical _Woskhod_, Sept. 1898.\n\n\nSAADIA\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, G\u00f6ttingen, 1882.\n\nD.J. ENGELKEMPER, Saadja Gaon's religionsphilosophische Lehre \u00fcber die\nheilige Schrift, \u00fcbersetzt und erkl\u00e4rt, M\u00fcnster, 1903.\n\n\nJOSEPH AL BASIR\n\nP. F. FRANKL, Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10. Jahrhundert, Wien,\n1872.\n\nMIKSA KLEIN, J\u00faszuf Al-Basz\u00eer, Al-Kit\u00e2b Al-Mu[h.]tav\u00ee, Budapest, 1913.\n\nERN\u00d6 MORGENSTERN, J\u00faszuf Al-Basz\u00eer, Al Kit\u00e2b Al Mu[h.]tav\u00ee, Budapest,\n1913.\n\n\nJESHUA BEN JUDAH\n\nMARTIN SCHREINER, Studien \u00fcber Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.\n\n\nSOLOMON IBN GABIROL\n\nS. MUNK, M\u00e9langes, etc., Paris, 1859, pp. 151-306.\n\nSEYERLEN, in Zeller's Theologische Jahrb\u00fccher, vols. XV and XVI.\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol, G\u00f6ttingen,\n1889.\n\nDAVID KAUFMANN, Studien \u00fcber Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.\n\n\nBAHYA IBN PAKUDA\n\nDAVID KAUFMANN, \"Die Theologie des Bachja Ibn Pakuda,\" in \"Gesammelte\nSchriften von David Kaufmann\" (ed. Brann), vol. II, Frankfurt a. M.,\n1910, pp. 1-98.\n\nJ. H. HERTZ, Bachya, The Jewish Thomas \u00e0 Kempis, New York, 1898 (in\nSixth Biennial Report of the Jewish Theological Seminary Association).\n\n\nPSEUDO-BAHYA\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, \"Eine bisher unbekannte, dem Bachja ibn Pakuda\nzugeignete Schrift,\" _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, vol. XLI (1897),\np. 241 ff.\n\n\nABRAHAM BAR HIYYA\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, in _Monatschrift f. G. u, W. d. J_., 1900.\n\n\nJOSEPH IBN ZADDIK\n\nMAX DOCTOR, Die Philosophie des Joseph Ibn Zaddik, nach ihren Quellen,\ninsbesondere nach ihren Beziehungen zu den Lauteren Br\u00fcdern und zu\nGabirol untersucht, M\u00fcnster, 1895.\n\nLEOPOLD WEINSBERG, Der Mikrokosmos, ein angeblich im 12. Jahrhundert von\ndem Cordubenser Joseph ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches System,\nnach seiner Echtheit untersucht, Breslau, 1888.\n\n\nJUDAH HALEVI\n\nAD. FRANKL-GR\u00dcN, Die Ethik des Juda Halevi, Bilin, s. a.\n\nDAVID KAUFMANN, Jehuda Halewi, Versuch einer Charakteristik, Breslau,\n1877; reprinted in \"Gesammelte Schriften\" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M.,\n1910, vol. II, pp. 99-151.\n\nDAVID NEUMARK, Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles,\nCincinnati, 1908.\n\nJULIUS GUTTMANN, Das Verh\u00e4ltniss von Religion und Philosophie bei Jehuda\nHalewi, in Israel Lewy's Festschrift (ed. Brann and Elbogen), Breslau,\n1911, pp. 327-358.\n\n\nABRAHAM IBN EZRA\n\nNACHMAN KROCHMAL, [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, p. 266 ff.\n\nDAVID ROSIN, Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham ibn Esras, in\n_Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._ vols. XLII (1898) and XLIII (1899).\n\nG. ORSCHANSKY, Abraham ibn Esra als Philosoph, Breslau, 1900.\n\n\nABRAHAM IBN DAUD\n\nGUGENHEIMER, Die Religionsphilosophie des R. Abraham ben David ha-Levi\nnach dessen noch ungedruckter Schrift Emuna Rama in ihrem inneren und\nhistorischen Zusammenhange entwickelt, Augsburg, 1850.\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud aus\nToledo, G\u00f6ttingen, 1879.\n\n\nMAIMONIDES\n\nM. JOEL, Die Religionsphilosophie des Mose ben Maimon, Breslau, 1876.\n\nSIMON B. SCHEYER, Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, Frankfurt\na. M., 1845.\n\nDAVID ROSIN, Die Ethik des Maimonides, Breslau, 1876.\n\nMOSES BEN MAIMON, sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss,\nheraus-gegeben von der Gesellschaft zur F\u00f6rderung der Wissenschaft des\nJudenthums, Band I, Leipzig, 1908.\n\nLOUIS-GERMAIN LEVY, Ma\u00efmonide, Paris, 1911 (Les Grands Philosophes).\n\nJ. M\u00dcNZ, Moses ben Maimon, sein Leben und seine Werke, Frankfurt a. M.,\n1912.\n\nM. JOEL, Verh\u00e4ltniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides, Breslau,\n1876.\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das\nchristliche Abendland, in _Moses ben Maimon_ (see above), pp. 135-230.\n\nDAVID KAUFMANN, Der \"F\u00fchrer\" Maim\u00fbni's in der Weltliteratur, _Archiv f\u00fcr\nGeschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XI (1898), pp. 335-376; reprinted in\n\"Gesammelte Schriften\" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. II, pp.\n152-189.\n\nJ. P. WICKERSHAM CRAWFORD, The _Vision Delectable_ of Alfonso de la\nTorre and Maimonides' _Guide of the Perplexed_, Publications of the\nModern Language Association of America, XXVIII, 2 (1913), pp. 188-212.\n\nISAAC HUSIK, An Anonymous Medieval Christian Critic of Maimonides,\nJewish Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. II, 1911, pp. 159-190.\n\n\nGERSONIDES\n\nM. JOEL, Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862.\n\n_Isidore Weil_, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson, Paris, 1868.\n\nBENZION KELLERMANN, Die K\u00e4mpfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson, Uebersetzung\nund Erkl\u00e4rung des handschriftlich revidierten Textes, Erster Teil,\nBerlin, 1914. Contains the German translation of the first book of the\n\"Milhamot Adonai.\" The translation is faulty in many places, as the\npresent writer has shown in an article entitled, \"Studies in\nGersonides,\" which will appear in the _Jewish Quarterly Review_, New\nSeries, in the course of the year 1917.\n\n\nHASDAI CRESCAS\n\n_M. Joel_, Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren in ihrem\ngeschichtlichen Einflusse dargestellt, Breslau, 1866.\n\nPHILIPP BLOCH, Die Willensfreiheit von Chasdai Kreskas, M\u00fcnchen, 1879.\n\nJULIUS WOLFSOHN, Der Einfluss Gaz\u00e2l\u00ee's auf Chisdai Crescas, Frankfurt\na. M., 1905.\n\nDAVID NEUMARK, \"Crescas and Spinoza,\" in Commemoration of the Fifth\nCentenary of the Publication of the \"Or Adonai\"; in Year Book of the\nCentral Conference of American Rabbis, XVIII, 1908, pp. 277-318.\n\n\nJOSEPH ALBO\n\nSAMUEL BACK, Joseph Albo's Bedeutung in der Geschichte der j\u00fcdischen\nReligionsphilosophie, Breslau, 1869.\n\nJAULUS, in _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, 1874, p. 462 ff.\n\nA. T\u00c4NZER, Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's nach seinem Werke\n\"Ikkarim\" systematisch dargestellt und erl\u00e4utert, Frankfurt a. M., 1896.\n\n\nBIBLICAL EXEGESIS\n\nW. BACKER, Die Bibelexegese der j\u00fcdischen Religionsphilosophen des\nMittelalters vor Maim\u00fbni, Budapest, 1892.\n\nID., Die J\u00fcdische Bibelexegese vom Anfange des zehnten his zum Ende des\nf\u00fcnfzehnten Jahrhunderts, Treves, 1892, reprinted from Winter und\nW\u00fcnsche, Die J\u00fcdische Literatur seit Abschluss des Kanons, II, 239-339,\nwhere a full bibliography is given.\n\nID., Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Bible Exegesis, \u00a7\u00a7 14-16.\n\n\nINFLUENCE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY ON SCHOLASTICISM\n\nThe works of Joel, Guttmann, Kaufmann, Crawford and Husik mentioned\nabove under Maimonides; and besides\n\nJACOB GUTTMANN, Das Verh\u00e4ltniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum und\nzur j\u00fcdischen Litteratur, G\u00f6ttingen, 1891.\n\nID., Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen\nzum Judenthum und zur j\u00fcdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902.\n\nFor further references see the notes.\n\n\n[D] This bibliography contains a selection of the more important works\nof exposition. For original sources see the notes.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n[Black figures denote the page, the light figures the notes]\n\n\n=xv=, 1. See below, p. 395 ff.\n\n=xvi=, 2. Talm. Bab. Hagiga 11b.\n\n3. Ibid.\n\n4. See Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2, 3d ed. p. 347;\nMaimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71, beginning.\n\n=xvii=, 5. See Wenrich, De Auctorum Graecorum Versionibus et\nCommentariis Syriacis, Arabicis, Armeniacis Persicisque, Leipzig, 1842,\np. 4 ff; De Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam, Stuttgart, 1901,\np. 17 ff (English translation by Jones, London, 1903, pp. 11-30). Duval,\nLa Litt\u00e9rature Syriaque 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, ch. XIV, \u00a7 2, p. 253 ff.\n\n=xx=, 6. See Dieterici, Die Theologie des Aristotles (Arabic text),\nLeipzig, 1882; German translation by the same, Leipzig, 1883.\n\n7. See Bardenhewer, Die Pseudoaristotelische Schrift \u00fcber das reine\nGute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis, Freiburg i. Br., 1882.\n\n8. See Valentinus Rose, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1883, p. 843.\n\n9. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary upon the \"Vetus Logica,\"\nLeyden, 1906, p. 11, 97 note.\n\n=xxi=, 10. For the following sketch of the Kalam see Goldziher,\nVorlesungen \u00fcber den Islam, Heidelberg, 1910, 100 ff, 127 f.\n\n=xxiv=, 11. See below, p. 247.\n\n=xxv=, 12. See Schreiner, Der Kalam in der j\u00fcdischen Literatur, Berlin,\n1895, p. 3; ibid., Studien \u00fcber Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900, p. 12\nff.\n\n=xxvi=, 13. See L. Ginzberg, in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v.\n\"Anthropomorphism.\"\n\n14. See Talm. Bab. Berakot, 33b. [Hebrew: Modim Modim Mashtikin Oto]\n\n15. See Talm. Bab. Megillah, 25b. [Hebrew: Hakol Beyidei Shamayim Chutz\nMeyeriat Shamaim]\n\n16. Schreiner, Studien \u00fcber Jeschu`a ben Jehudah, p. 15 note 2.\n\n17. See Bab. Talm. Pesakim, 54a, [Hebrew: Shiv'a Dvarim Nivreu Kodem\nShenivra Ha'olam Ve'eylu Hen Torah.... Torah Dechtiv (Mishley Khet) Hashem\nKanani Reyshit Darko.]\n\n18. Schreiner 1. c. p. 12.\n\n19. Ibid.\n\n20. Schreiner, Der Kalam in der j\u00fcdischen Literatur, p. 3, 4.\n\n=xxvii=, 21. Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71.\n\n22. See below, p. 246 ff.\n\n23. See Goldziher, Vorlesungen \u00fcber den Islam, p. 155 ff.\n\n=xxviii=, 24. See Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b\ndes Bachja ibn Joseph Ibn Paquda, Leyden, 1912, p. 53 ff.\n\n=xxxvii=, 25. Cf. above, note 6.\n\n=1=, 26. See Steinschneider, Die Hebr\u00e4ischen Uebersetzungen des\nMittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher, Berlin, 1893, \u00a7 479 and\nnotes.\n\n=1=, 27. See Guttmann, Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in\nihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur j\u00fcdischen Literatur, Breslau,\n1902, P. 55 ff.\n\n28. Omnia Opera Ysaac, Lugduni, (Lyons), 1515.\n\n=2=, 29. See [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam], ed. Amsterdam, p. 14b.\n\n30. S. Fried, Das Buch \u00fcber die Elemente ([Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot]),\nDrohobycz, 1900.\n\n31. Published by Hirschfeld in \"Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstag\nMoritz Steinschneiders,\" Leipzig, 1896, PP. 131-141; cf. also pp. 233-4.\n\n32. See note 28 and the two preceding notes.\n\n=5=, 33. [Hebrew: Sefer Haruach V'hanefesh] published by Steinschneider in\nthe Hebrew periodical [Hebrew: Hakarmel] I, pp. 401-405. cf. Guttmann, Die\nphilosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, M\u00fcnster i. W.,\n1911, p. 31, note 1.\n\n=10=, 34. Fried, [Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot], p. 12f.\n\n=17=, 35. Berlin, 1885, pp. 65, 77-83, 151-154.\n\n36. See the Russian paper Woskhod, September, 1898.\n\n=24=, 37. Arabic text edited by S. Landauer, Kit[=a]b al-Am[=a]n[=a]t\nwa`l-I`tiq[=a]d[=a]t, Leyden 1880. The Hebrew translation of Judah ibn\nTibbon has been published in many editions. The references in the\nfollowing notes are to the Yozefov edition.\n\n=25=, 38. Cf. below, p. 249 ff.\n\n39. Pt. I, ch. 1, third argument, p. 58 of Yozefov edition.\n\n40. Ibid., fourth argument, p. 59.\n\n=26=, 41. Ibid., ch. 3, p. 63 ff.; cf. Guttmann, Die\nReligionsphilosophie des Saadia, G\u00f6ttingen, 1882, p. 45 f.\n\n42. Pt. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-101.\n\n43. Pt. VI, ch. 1, p. 149.\n\n44. Pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 88-9.\n\n=27=, 45. Introduction, pp. 38-39.\n\n46. Ibid., p. 40.\n\n=28=, 47. Ibid., pp. 43-48.\n\n48. Ibid., p. 48.\n\n49. p. 49\n\n50. p. 51.\n\n=29=, 51. Pt. I. Introduction, p. 54 f.\n\n52. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 56.\n\n=30=, 53. Ibid., p. 57.\n\n54. Ibid., p. 58.\n\n55. Ibid., p. 59.\n\n=31=, 56. Ch. 2, p. 60 ff.\n\n57. Ch. 3, third opinion, p. 66 ff.\n\n=32=, 58. Ch. 4, pp. 80-82.\n\n59. Pt. II, Introduction, p. 86.\n\n60. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 88.\n\n=33=, 61. Pt. I, ch. 3, fifth opinion, p. 68.\n\n62. Pt. II, ch. 2, p. 89.\n\n=34=, 63. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 91-93.\n\n64. See Graf, Die Philosophie und Gotteslehre des Jahj[=a] ibn `Ad[=i]\nund sp\u00e4teren Autoren, M\u00fcnster, 1910, p. 32, note, p. 52.\n\n=35=, 65. III, ch. 10, p. 122; V, ch. 8, p. 147; VII, ch. 2, p. 165.\n\n66. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-102.\n\n=37=, 67. VI, chs. 1-4, pp. 148-156.\n\n=38=, 68. III chs. 1-3, pp. 104-110.\n\n=40=, 69. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 110-113.\n\n70. Ch. 6, pp. 113-114.\n\n71. Chs. 7-9, pp. 114-121.\n\n=41=, 72. IV, pp. 124-136.\n\n=42=, 73. V, chs. 1-3, pp. 136-140.\n\n=43=, 74. IX, chs. 1-4, pp. 185-190.\n\n=44=, 75. VI, ch. 8, pp. 160-162.\n\n=45=, 76. VII, chs. 1-9, pp. 162-174.\n\n77. VIII, pp. 175-185.\n\n78. IX, chs. 5-11, pp. 190-197.\n\n=46=, 79. X, pp. 197-215.\n\n=48=, 80. The following sketch is based upon Frankl, Ein\nMu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10ten Jahrhundert, Wien, 1872.\n\n=55=, 81. The following sketch is based upon Schreiner, Studien \u00fcber\nJeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.\n\n=60=, 82. [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam] (Letters of Maimonides), ed. Amsterdam,\np. 14b.\n\n=61=, 83. See Munk, M\u00e9langes de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris, 1859,\np. 291 ff; Guttmann, Die Scholastik des Dreizehnten Jahrhunderts,\nBreslau, 1902, pp. 60-85. _Id._, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn\nGabirol, G\u00f6ttingen, 1889, p. 54 ff. This last work and that of Munk\nrepresent the best exposition and criticism of Gabirol's philosophy and\nof his sources and influences.\n\n=62=, 84. Cf. Baeumker, Avencebrolis Fons Vit\u00e6, M\u00fcnister, 1892-95,\nProlegomena.\n\n=63=, 85. Jourdain, A., Recherches Critiques sur l'\u00e2ge et l'origine des\ntraductions Latines d' Aristote, 2 ed. Paris, 1843, p. 197 note.\n\n86. Munk, M\u00e9langes, etc. (see note 83), contains the Hebrew extracts of\nFalaquera. The Latin translation was published by Clemens Baeumker in\nthe Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. I,\npts. 2-4 (cf. above note 84). See also Seyerlen in Theologische\nJahrb\u00fccher, edited by Zeller, XV and XVI.\n\n=64=, 87. Cf. Munk, Le Guide des \u00c9gar\u00e9s, II, p. 25, note 1, end.\n\n88. See Kaufmann, Studien \u00fcber Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.\n\n89. Baeumker, Fons Vit\u00e6, V, p. 313, 6.\n\n=65=, 90. F. V. V, 333-335, Falaquera in Munk's M\u00e9langes, V, \u00a7\u00a7 67-69.\n\n91. F. V. IV, 8 ff., Falaquera IV, \u00a7 1.\n\n92. F. V. V, 296, 10.\n\n93. F. V. IV, 243, 10.\n\n94. F. V. III, p. 196, 5 ff., Falaq. III, \u00a7 10.\n\n95. F. V. III, 208, 15; Falaq. III, \u00a7 44.\n\n=67=, 96. F. V. III, 175, 10 ff.; Falaq. III \u00a7 27 ff.\n\n97. F. V. IV, 211, 9 ff., 213, 17 ff., 217, II ff., 218, 18; Falaq. IV,\n\u00a7\u00a7 1-4 and ff.\n\n98. F. V. V, 258, 19; 259, 1; 268, 8, 14, 15; 322, 12; Falaq. V, \u00a7 55.\n\n=68=, 99. F. V. V, 306, 7 ff.; Falaq. V, \u00a7 34 ff.\n\n100. F. V. V, 330, 15 ff.; Falaq. V, \u00a7 64 ff.\n\n101. F. V. V, 326, 3 ff.; Falaq. V, \u00a7 60 ff.\n\n=70=, 102. F. V. III, 204, 13 ff.; Falaq. III, \u00a7 37.\n\n=71=, 103. S. Wise, \"Improvement of the Moral Qualities,\" New York,\n1901. (Columbia University Oriental Studies, vol. 1.)\n\n=72=, 104. F. V. I, 4, 24 ff.; Falaq. I, \u00a7 2.\n\n=78=, 105. See Munk, M\u00e9langes, 166 ff.\n\n=80=, 106. Yahuda, Prolegomena zu einer erstmaligen Herausgabe des\nKit[=a]b Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b, Frankfurt a. M.,\n1904, 12 ff.; _id._, Al-Hidaja `Il[=a] Faraid Al-Qul[=u]b des Bachja ibn\nJoseph ibn Paq[=u]da, Leyden, 1912, 63 f.\n\n107. Neumark, Geschichte der j\u00fcdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, I,\nBerlin, 1907, 485-493.\n\n=81=, 108. In his commentary on Deut. 32, 39. Cf. Yahuda, Prolegomena,\np. 12, note 2, where 35 should be corrected to 39.\n\n109. Yahuda, Al-Hidaja, etc., p. 97.\n\n=85=, 110. [Hebrew: Chovat Halevavot] (Duties of the Hearts) ed. Warsaw,\n1875, Introduction, pp. 9-28.\n\n=86=, 111. Ibid., Introduction, 28-37.\n\n112. Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja, pp. 53-112.\n\n=88=, 113. Duties of the Hearts, I, chs. 1-6, pp. 41-58.\n\n=89=, 114. Duties, I, ch. 6, pp. 57-8.\n\n=92=, 115. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 58-69.\n\n=93=, 116. Ch. 8, pp. 69-72.\n\n117. Ch. 9, pp. 72-76.\n\n=95=, 118. Ch. 10, pp. 76-84.\n\n=96=, 119. Guide of the Perplexed I, ch. 53.\n\n120. Duties, ch. 1, p. 44.\n\n121. Ibid., ch. 10, end, p. 92 f.\n\n=97=, 122. Duties, II, pp. 95-137.\n\n=99=, 123. III, pp. 138-197.\n\n=101=, 124. IV, pp. 198-256.\n\n125. Duties, 2nd volume, part V, pp. 3-35.\n\n=102=, 126. VI, pp. 36-58.\n\n=103=, 127. VII, pp. 58-82.\n\n=104=, 128. VIII, pp. 82-126.\n\n=105=, 129. IX, pp. 126-150.\n\n130. X, pp. 151-168.\n\n=106=, 131. Broyd\u00e9, Les Reflexions sur l'\u00e2me par Bahya ben Joseph ibn\nPakouda, Paris, 1896; Hebrew title, [Hebrew: Sefer Torot Hanefesh].\n\n132. Goldziher, Kit[=a]b Ma`[=a]n[=i] al-Nafs, Berlin, 1907.\n\n133. See Guttmann in \"Monatschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Wissenschaft des\nJudenthums,\" XLI (1897), 241 ff.\n\n=107=, 134. Arabic text, p. 41, 12 and 46, 2; Hebrew, p. 55, 1 and 61, 5.\n\n135. Ch. 2, p. 4, 29 (Heb. p. 5, last line).\n\n136. Ibid., p. 6, 1 (Heb. p. 7, 3).\n\n137. Ibid., p. 5, 16 f. (Heb. 6, 16 f.).\n\n138. Ibid., ch. 9, p. 34, 13 ff. (Heb. p. 44, 10).\n\n139. Ch. 2, p. 6, 6 ff. (Heb. p. 7, 8 f.).\n\n140. Ch. 12, p. 42, 23 (Heb. p. 56, 23).\n\n=108=, 141. Chs. 1-2.\n\n=111=, 142. Chs. 16-17.\n\n143. Chs. 6 and 11-12.\n\n=112=, 144. Ch. 2.\n\n145. Ch. 9.\n\n=113=, 146. Ch. 7.\n\n147. Chs. 19 and 21.\n\n=114=, 148. [Hebrew: Sefer Higayon Hanefesh], edited by Freimann,\nLeipzig, 1860. German title, Sefer Hegjon ha-Nefesch.\n\n=115=, 149. p. 2a.\n\n150. Ibid., also 4b.\n\n151. See, however, below, p. 119.\n\n152. p. 2b.\n\n=116=, 153. p. 1.\n\n=117=, 154. pp. 1-2.\n\n=118=, 155. pp. 4b-5a.\n\n156. pp. 2b-4a.\n\n=122=, 157. pp. 5b-8a.\n\n158. p. 8b ff.\n\n=123= 159. p. 11a.\n\n160. pp. 10-12.\n\n=124=, 161. p. 30b ff.\n\n=125=,162. See Doctor, Die Philosophie des Joseph ibn Zaddik, M\u00fcnster,\n1895, pp. 1-3; Horovitz, Der Mikrokosmos des Joseph Ibn Saddik, Breslau,\n1903, I-II.\n\n163. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, XIII, ff.\n\n164. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, 14b.\n\n=126=, 165. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, 7, 24-8, 2.\n\n=127=, 166. Ibid., 44-46; 53-54; cf. below, p. 145.\n\n167. Ibid., p. 37, 2 ff.; cf. below, p. 138.\n\n=129=, 168. pp. 1-2.\n\n=130=, 169. pp. 3-6.\n\n=133=, 170. pp. 7-19.\n\n=134=, 171. pp. 19-25.\n\n=137=, 172. pp. 25-33.\n\n=141=, 173. pp. 33-43.\n\n=142=, 174. pp. 43-47.\n\n=145=, 175. pp. 47-57\n\n=146=, 176. pp. 57-58.\n\n=149=, 177. pp. 59-79.\n\n=150=, 178. Al-Chazari, I, 67, ed. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1887, p. 29, 24.\n\n179. Ibid., p. 29, 19-20.\n\n180. I, 63; II, 66; pp. 29 and 125.\n\n=151=, 181. See Kaufmann, Jehuda Halewi in \"Gesammelte Schriften,\"\nFrankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. 2, pp. 99-151.\n\n=152=, 182. Al-Chazari IV, 13, 15; p. 253, 18 ff., 257, 6 ff.\n\n=153=, 183. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der j\u00fcdischen\nReligionsphilosophie des Mittelalters, Gotha, 1877, pp. 119-140.\n\n=157=, 184. Al-Chazari I, 1-67, pp. 1-29.\n\n=158=, 185. Ibid., 70 ff., p. 31 ff.\n\n=159=, 186. II, 6; p. 75, 22 ff.\n\n187. IX, 13; p. 253, 18 ff.\n\n=160=, 188. IV, 3; p. 229, 10 ff.\n\n189, Ibid., 15 ff.; p. 257, 6 ff.\n\n=161=, 190. II, 2-4; pp. 71-75.\n\n=163=, 191. I, 87 ff.; p. 39 ff.\n\n=164=, 192. I, 99 ff.; p. 53 ff.\n\n193. II, 10 ff.; p. 77 ff.\n\n194. Ibid., 36 ff.; p. 103 ff.\n\n=165=, 195. Ibid., 68 f.; p. 125 f.\n\n=167=, 196. IV, 3 ff.; p. 237, 9 ff.\n\n=168=, 197. II, 26, p. 95; 48, p. 107 f.\n\n=169=, 198. Ibid., 50, p. 109, 24 f.; III, 1 ff., p. 141 ff.\n\n=170=, 199. I, 109 ff.; p. 59 ff.\n\n=173=, 200. V, 20 ff., p. 337 ff.\n\n201. IV, 25, p. 267 ff.\n\n202. Ibid., 27, p. 283 f.\n\n=174=, 203. Ibid., 29 ff., p. 285 ff.\n\n=175=, 204. See above, p. 8.\n\n205. Zeitschrift der ~deutschen~ morgenl\u00e4ndischen Gesellschaft, XXIX\n(1875), pp. 335-418.\n\n=177=, 206. V, 1 ff., p. 295 ff.\n\n=179=, 207. IV, 25, p. 281, 24 ff.\n\n=181=, 208. V, 12, p. 311 ff.\n\n=182=, 209. Ibid., 14, p. 323 ff.\n\n=183=, 210. Ibid., 16 ff., p. 331 ff.\n\n211. Ibid., 22 ff., p. 357 ff.\n\n=184=, 212. Quoted by Bacher in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Ibn Ezra,\nAbraham.\n\n213. Published by Dukes in \"Zion,\" II, Frankfurt a. M., 1842, pp.\n117-123, 134-137, 157-159, 175. Cf. also Literaturblatt des Orients, X,\n748, where Dukes publishes a brief passage from the \"Arugat Habosem,\"\nnot found in \"Zion.\" He derived it from a different manuscript.\n\n=187=, 214. Jesod Mora, published with German translation by M.\nCreizenach, Frankfurt a. M., and Leipzig, 1840. Hebrew title [Hebrew:\nYisod Mora]. Sefer Ha-Schem, ed. Lippmann, 1834. Cf., Bacher, Jewish\nEncyclopedia, s. v.\n\n=189=, 215. [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, ch. 17\n([Hebrew: Chochmat Hamisken]), pp. 266 ff.\n\n216. Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Esra's, in \"Monatschrift f\u00fcr\nGeschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums,\" 42 and 43 (1898 and 1899).\n\n=192=, 217. Ibid., 42 (1898), pp. 454-455.\n\n=193=, 218. Commentary on Exod. 33, 21, towards the end of the long\nexcursus.\n\n=195=, 219. Commentary on Exod. 20, 2.\n\n220. Introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes.\n\n=197=, 221. Emunah Ramah (Heb. title [Hebrew: Emunah Ramah]), published\nwith German translation by Simson Weil, Frankfurt a. M., 1852, p. 2\n(Heb.).\n\n222. Em. Ram., p. 83.\n\n=198=, 223. See note 221.\n\n224. Em. Ram., 2-3.\n\n225. See note 221.\n\n=199=, 226. See Horovitz, Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen\nPhilosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam, Breslau, 1909.\n\n=200=, 227. But see below, p. 354, l. 31.\n\n=202=, 228. Em. Ram., p. 1 ff.\n\n=203=, 229. Ibid., 4.\n\n=204=, 230. Al Gazali. Cf. Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des\nAbraham ibn Daud aus Toledo, G\u00f6ttingen, 1879, p. 117, note.\n\n=205=, 231. Em. Ram., 44-46.\n\n232. Ibid., 4-8.\n\n=207=, 233. Ibid., 9-13.\n\n=208=, 234. Ibid., 13-15.\n\n=209=, 235. Ibid., 15-20.\n\n=216=, 236. Em. Ram., 20-41.\n\n237. Ibid., 41-43.\n\n=220=, 238. Em. Ram., 44-51.\n\n=221=, 239. Ibid., 51-57.\n\n=223=, 240. Ibid., 57-69.\n\n=224=, 241. Ibid., 69-70.\n\n=226=, 242. Ibid., 70-75.\n\n=228=, 243. Ibid., 75-81.\n\n=230=, 244. Ibid., 93-98.\n\n=232=, 245. See Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham Ibn Daud,\np. 220, note 2.\n\n=235=, 246. Ibid., 98-104.\n\n=236=, 247. [Hebrew: Be'oor Milot Ha'higayon], Breslau, 1828. For other\neditions and interesting information concerning this treatise see\nSteinschneider, Die Hebr\u00e4ischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, Berlin,\n1893, \u00a7 251, and Die Arabische Literatur der Juden, Frankfurt a. M.,\n1902, p. 208, 5.\n\n248. Introduction to the eleventh chapter (ch. Helek) of the treatise\nSanhedrin.\n\n=239=, 249. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, pp. 13b-14.\n\n250. The Arabic text was published with a French translation and\nextremely valuable notes by Solomon Munk, under the title, Le Guide des\n\u00c9gar\u00e9s, 3 volumes, Paris, 1856-66. English translation by M. Friedl\u00e4nder\nin 3 vols., London, 1881-1885, re-issued in one volume, with omission of\nnotes, London, 1910. For other translations, editions and commentaries\nsee Kaufmann, \"Der 'F\u00fchrer' Maim\u00fbnis in der Weltliteratur,\" Archiv f\u00fcr\nGeschichte der Philosophie, XI (1898), pp. 335-376, republished in\nKaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften ed. Brann, vol. 2, Frankfurt a. M.,\n1910, pp. 152-189. See also Friedl\u00e4nder's translation, London, 1910, p.\nXXVII ff.\n\n251. The Arabic text was published with a German translation by M. Wolff\nunder the title, M\u00fbs\u00e2 Maim\u00fbni's Acht Kapitel, 2nd edition, Leyden, 1903.\nHebrew text with English translation by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, The Eight\nChapters of Maimonides on Ethics, New York, 1912 (Columbia University\nOriental Studies, vol. VII).\n\n=240=, 252. Emunah Ramah, p. 81 ff.\n\n=241=, 253. Guide, I, chs. 1, 3-16, 18-30, 37-45, 64-67, 70.\n\n=243=, 254. Ibid., ch. 54.\n\n255. III, 28.\n\n256. I, 55.\n\n=244=, 257. I, 32.\n\n258. Ibid., ch. 33.\n\n=245=, 259. Ch. 34.\n\n260. Ch. 71.\n\n=246=, 261. Ibid.\n\n=247=, 262. Cf., however, above, p. xxv f. (the view that Kalam\noriginated in Judaism).\n\n=248=, 263. Ch. 71.\n\n=249=, 264. The following numbers do not correspond to those of\nMaimonides.\n\n=252=, 265. Guide, I, 73.\n\n266. Ibid., 74.\n\n=253=, 267. Ibid., 75.\n\n268. Ibid., 76.\n\n269. See below, p. 257.\n\n270. Below, p. 259.\n\n271. Above, p. 218.\n\n272. Below, p. 258, last line, and 260.\n\n=257=, 273. Guide II, Introduction.\n\n=260=, 274. Ibid., ch. 1.\n\n=261=, 275. Ch. 36.\n\n=262=, 276. Ch. 46.\n\n=264=, 277. Ibid., chs. 51-53.\n\n=265=, 278. Chs. 55-58.\n\n279. Ch. 61.\n\n=268=, 280. See Munk, Guide des \u00c9gar\u00e9s II, p. 69, note 1.\n\n281. Guide II, chs. 3-6.\n\n=271=, 282. Chs. 13-18.\n\n=272=, 283. Munk understands the preceding sentence differently. See his\nedition, vol. II, p. 157, note 2.\n\n=274=, 284. Guide II, chs. 19-25.\n\n=281=, 285. Ibid., chs. 32-48.\n\n286. III, ch. 8.\n\n=282=, 287. \"Eight Chapters,\" ch. 1.\n\n=285=, 288. Ibid., chs. 2-5.\n\n289. Ch. 7.\n\n=288=, 290. Ch. 8.\n\n=289=, 291. Guide III, chs. 10-12.\n\n=290=, 292. Ibid., ch. 16.\n\n=292=, 293. Ibid., chs. 17-18.\n\n=294=, 294. Ibid., chs. 19-21.\n\n295. Ibid., chs. 26 and 31.\n\n=295=, 296. Ibid., ch. 27.\n\n297, Ibid., ch. 50.\n\n=298=, 298. Ibid., chs. 29-50.\n\n=299=, 299. Ibid., ch. 54.\n\n=304=, 300. Ibid., II, ch. 30.\n\n301. Ibid., III, chs. 1-7.\n\n302. See Munk, Le Guide des \u00c9gar\u00e9s, III, p. 8, note.\n\n303. Ibid.\n\n304. Guide III, chs. 22-23.\n\n=305=, 305. See Kaufmann, Der F\u00fchrer Maim\u00fbnis in der Weltliteratur in\nArchiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie XI (1898) p. 314 f.; reprinted in\nKaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Brann, Frankfurt a. M., 1910, p.\n158 f.\n\n306. See Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'\u00e2ge et l'origine des\ntraductions Latines d'Aristote, 2nd ed., Paris, 1843. German transl. by\nStahr, Halle, 1831.\n\n=305=, 307. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Book VIII, ch. 5, \"Nulli nobis\nquam isti [sc., Platonici] propius accesserunt\"; ch. 9, \"Platonem de Deo\nista sensisse, quae multum congruere veritati nostrae religionis\nagnoscunt.\"\n\n=306=, 308. See Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averro\u00efsme Latin au\nXIII^me Si\u00e8cle, Louvain, 1911, chs. 1-2; Isaac Husik, An Anonymous\nMedieval Christian Critic of Maimonides, Jewish Quarterly Review, New\nSeries, vol. II, Phila. 1911, p. 159 ff.\n\n309. See J. Perles, \"Die in einer M\u00fcnchener Handschrift aufgefundene\nerste lateinische Uebersetzung des Maimonidischen F\u00fchrers\", in\nMonatschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, XXIV\n(1875), p. 9 ff.\n\n=307=, 310. See M. Joel, Verh\u00e4ltniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses\nMaimonides, Breslau, 1876, in M. Joel, Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, Breslau, 1876. J. Guttmann, Das Verh\u00e4ltniss des Thomas von\nAquino zum Judenthum und zur j\u00fcdischen Literatur, G\u00f6ttingen, 1891; id.,\nDie Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen zum\nJudenthum und zur j\u00fcdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902; id., Der Einfluss\nder Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das christliche Abendland, in \"Moses\nben Maimon,\" vol. I, Leipzig, 1908.\n\n=308=, 311. See Graetz, History of the Jews, index volume, s. v.,\n\"Maimunist Controversy.\"\n\n=309=, 312. Published by M. L. Bisliches, Pressburg, 1837.\n\n312a. Edited by W. Bacher under the title \"Sefer Musar,\" Berlin, 1910.\n\n313. Published by the \"Mekize Nirdamim\" Society, Lyck, 1866.\n\n=310=, 314. Published by Munk in M\u00e9langes de Philosophie Juive et Arabe,\nParis, 1859.\n\n315. Published by Bisliches, Pressburg, 1837.\n\n316. See Munk, M\u00e9langes, p. 494, note 1; H. Malter, Shem Tob Palquera,\nin Jewish Quarterly Review, new series, vol. I, pp. 151-181, 451-501.\n\n317. Published by Werbluner, Josephi Kaspi ... Commentaria hebraica in\nR. Mosis Maimonides Tractatum Dalalat al Haiirin, Frankfurt a. M., 1848.\n\n318. Edited by Goldenthal, Wien, 1852.\n\n=311=, 319. The English reader will also find a good deal of material in\nthe pages of the Jewish Encyclopedia under the names of the translators\nand writers above mentioned.\n\n=313=, 320. Guide I, ch. 74, 7th proof, end.\n\n=314=, 321. Published by the \"Mekize Nirdamim,\" Lyck, 1874.\n\n=315=, 322. Tagm. Hanef. 1.\n\n=317=, 323. Ibid., 1b-7b. The definition occurs, p. 7b, ll. 28 ff.\n\n=318=, 324. Ibid., 8a.\n\n=319=, 325. Ibid., 8a-10a.\n\n=322=, 326. Ibid., 10a-13b.\n\n=323=, 327. Ibid., 13b-19b.\n\n=324=, 328. Ibid., 20a-21b.\n\n=326=, 329. Ibid., 21b-24b.\n\n330. Ibid., 24.\n\n=327=, 331. Ibid., 25a-32.\n\n=328=, 331a. See Heimann Auerbach, Albalag und seine Uebersetzung des\nMak\u00e2sid al-Gazzalis, Breslau, 1906, p. vii f.; Guttmann, Die Stellung\ndes Simon ben Zemach Duran in der Geschichte der j\u00fcdischen\nReligionsphilosophie in Monatschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Wissenschaft des\nJudenthums, vol. LVII (1913), p. 184 f.\n\n=328=, 332. See Maywald, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit, Berlin,\n1871; Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averro\u00efsme Latin au XIII^me\nSi\u00e8cle, Louvain, 1911, vol. 1, p. 148 ff.\n\n=329=, 333. First edition, Riva di Trento, 1560; modern edition,\nLeipzig, 1866. The references in the sequel are to the Leipzig edition.\n\n334. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the \"Vetus Logica,\"\nLeyden, 1906, p. 11.\n\n335. See Joel, Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862, p.\n9f. (in M. Joel, Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Breslau,\n1876).\n\n=330=, 336. Introduction to Gersonides' commentary on the Pentateuch.\n\n337. Introduction to \"Milhamot Adonai,\" pp. 6-7.\n\n=331=, 338. Milhamot I, ch. 14, p. 91.\n\n339. Ibid., Introduction, p. 8.\n\n=336=, 340. I, chs. 1-4, pp. 12-35.\n\n=337=, 341. Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 35-36.\n\n=339=, 342. Ch. 6, pp. 36-48.\n\n=340=, 343. Ibid., chs. 10-12, pp. 61-88.\n\n=342=, 344. Milhamot II, chs. 1-2, pp. 92-98.\n\n345. Ibid., chs. 3, 5 and 6, pp. 98 f., 104, 111 f.\n\n=344=, 346. Milhamot III, ch. 3, p. 132.\n\n=345=, 347. III, chs. 1-6, pp. 120-150.\n\n=349=, 348. IV, chs. 1-7, pp. 151-187.\n\n=350=, 349. V, 3, ch. 6, p. 264 f.\n\n=351=, 350. Ibid., chs. 4-6, pp. 247-264.\n\n=352=, 351. Ch. 12, pp. 278-285.\n\n=354=, 352. VI, 1, chs. 1-9, pp. 293-328.\n\n353, Ibid., chs. 10-13, pp. 328-353; ch. 15, p. 356 f.\n\n=355=, 354. Ch. 16, pp. 359-361.\n\n=357=, 355. Chs. 17-28, pp. 362-416.\n\n356, VI, 2, ch. 1, p. 419.\n\n=358=, 357. VI, 2, chs. 1-8, pp. 418-441.\n\n=360=, 358. Ibid., chs. 9-12, pp. 441-460.\n\n359. Chs. 13-14, pp. 460-463.\n\n=363=, 360. Published by Delitzsch and Steinschneider, Leipzig, 1841.\n\n=364=, 361. Ez Hayim, p. 4.\n\n=366=, 362. E. H., pp. 3-5.\n\n=367=, 363. p. 15, l. 6 f., also p. 18, l. 10 f.\n\n364. Ch. 4, pp. 12-13, l. 24.\n\n=368=, 365. Ch. 9, pp. 26-27.\n\n=369=, 366. p. 17, l. 16.\n\n367. p. 33.\n\n=372=, 368. Chs. 66-72, pp. 80-89.\n\n369. Ch. 75, pp. 93-96.\n\n=373=, 370. Chs. 76-78, pp. 96-99.\n\n=375=, 371. Chs. 79-81, pp. 100-107.\n\n=376=, 372. Chs. 82-89, pp 107-133.\n\n=377=, 373. Ch. 89, pp. 133-136.\n\n=378=, 374. \"Guide\" III, 24.\n\n=379=, 375. Ez Hayim, ch. 90, pp. 136-144.\n\n376. \"Guide\" III, chs. 12, 13, 25 end.\n\n=380=, 377. Ez Hayim, ch. 94, pp. 149-154.\n\n=382=, 378. Chs. 96-100, pp. 160-176.\n\n379. Chs. 101-102, pp. 177-181.\n\n380. Ez Hayim, pp. 116-117.\n\n=383=, 381. Ch. 103, pp. 181-185.\n\n=384=, 382. Chs. 104-105, pp. 185-187.\n\n=385=, 383. Ch. 106, p. 187 ff.; ch. 109, p. 194 ff.\n\n384. Chs. 107-108.\n\n=387=, 385. Chs. 110-112.\n\n=389=, 386. Ed. Ferara, 1556 (no pagination).\n\n=390=, 387. \"Or Adonai,\" Introduction, pp. 6-7 (not numbered).\n\n=391=, 388. Book I, sections 1-2.\n\n389. Ibid., section 3, ch. 2.\n\n390. Ibid., ch. 3.\n\n=392=, 391. Ibid.\n\n392. Ibid., ch. 4.\n\n=393=, 393. Book II, section I.\n\n=395=, 394. Ibid., section 2.\n\n395. Section 3.\n\n396. Section 4.\n\n=398=, 397. Section 5.\n\n398. See M. Joel, \"Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische\nLehren,\" Breslau, 1866 (in M. Joel, Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte der\nPhilosophie, Breslau, 1876), p. 54 f.\n\n=402=, 399. Or Adonai, II, section 6.\n\n400. Ibid., III, introduction.\n\n=403=, 401. Ibid., section 1.\n\n=404=, 402. Section 3.\n\n=405=, 403. Section 4.\n\n=406=, 403a. Simon ben Zemach Duran (1361-1444). He was a relative of\nGersonides, a Rabbinical authority, and the author of a scientific and\nphilosophical work, entitled \"Magen Abot.\" Unlike his more distinguished\nrelative, Simon Duran was opposed to the extreme views adopted by such\nmen as Albalag, Moses of Narbonne or Gersonides himself, and favored a\nreturn to the more moderate standpoint of Maimonides. Without laying any\nclaim to originality his work shows wide reading and familiarity with\nthe scientific and philosophic literature of the time. See Guttmann,\n\"Die Stellung des Simon ben Zemach Duran in der Geschichte der j\u00fcdischen\nReligionsphilosophie,\" in Monatschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Wissenschaft\ndes Judenthums, vol. 52 (1908), pp. 641-672, vol. 53 (1909), pp. 46-97,\n199-228. From Guttmann's investigations it appears that Albo cannot\nclaim any originality even for the reduction of the fundamental dogmas\nof Judaism to three. The first part of the \"Ikkarim\" turns out to be a\ncompilation from Crescas and Duran, and is no more original than the\nrest of the book. When we consider that though he owes the central point\nof his contribution to Duran, Albo never mentions him, the charge of\nplagiarism brought against him is not far from justified. See below, p.\n407.\n\n=407=, 404. [Hebrew: Bitul Ikarei Hanotzrim], published by Ephraim Deinard,\nCarney, N. J., 1904. The work was originally composed in Spanish, and\nwas translated into Hebrew by Joseph Ibn Shemtob.\n\n404a. See also note 403a.\n\n=408=, 405. [Hebrew: Sefer Ha'ikarim], ed. Warsaw, 1877, pp. 13-14.\n\n406. Ibid., pp. 14-17.\n\n=409=, 407. pp. 21-25.\n\n408. In the introduction to his commentary on the eleventh chapter of\nthe Mishnic treatise Sanhedrin (chapter Helek).\n\n=410=, 409. Crescas; cf. above, p. 392.\n\n410. Ikkarim, I, ch. 3, pp. 25-31.\n\n=411=, 411. Chs. 4-7, pp. 31-39.\n\n=412=, 412. Ch. 8, pp. 39-46.\n\n413. Ch. 9, pp. 46-48.\n\n=413=, 414. Chs. 10-11, pp. 48-58.\n\n415. Ch. 12, pp. 58-60.\n\n416. Chs. 13 and 15, pp. 60-61 and 64-68.\n\n=414=, 417. Ch. 14, pp. 61-64.\n\n=415=, 418. Ch. 17, pp. 7-76.\n\n419. Ch. 18, pp. 76-78.\n\n=416=, 420. Ch. 23, pp. 84-86.\n\n=418=, 421. Ch. 24, pp. 87-90.\n\n422, Ch. 25, pp. 90-92.\n\n=419=, 423. Ch. 26, p. 93.\n\n424. Book II, chs. 4-5, pp. 107-114.\n\n425. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 117-118.\n\n=420=, 426. Chs. 8-10, pp. 118-125.\n\n427. Chs. 11-13, pp. 125-140.\n\n428. Ch. 12, pp. 129-133.\n\n=421=, 429. Book III, chs. 1-5, pp. 197-214.\n\n430. Chs. 6-7, pp. 214-218.\n\n=423=, 431. Chs. 8-11, pp. 218-228.\n\n=424=, 432. Chs. 13-20, pp. 229-246.\n\n433. Book IV, chs. 1-6, pp. 279-294.\n\n=425=, 434. Chs. 7-15, pp. 294-313.\n\n=427=, 435. Chs. 29-35, pp. 338-356.\n\n=429=, 436. See Guttmann \"Die Familie Schemtob in ihren Beziehungen zur\nPhilosophie,\" Monatschrift f\u00fcr Geschichte und Wissenschaft des\nJudenthums, vol. 57 (1913), p. 177 ff.\n\n437. See Guttmann as in preceding note.\n\n438. See preceding note.\n\n=430=, 439. See note 436.\n\n440. See Jewish Encyclopedia s. v.\n\n441. J. E. s. v.\n\n=431=, 442. See Zimmels, \"Leo Hebraeus, ein j\u00fcdischer Philosoph der\nRenaissance,\" Leipzig, 1886; Appel, \"Leone Medigos Lehre vom Weltall und\nihr Verh\u00e4ltniss zu griechischen und zeitgen\u00f6ssischen Anschauungen,\" in\nArchiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. XX, pp. 387-400, 496-520;\nMunk, M\u00e9langes, pp. 522-528.\n\n443. Husik, \"Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the Vetus Logica,\"\nLeyden, 1906.\n\n444. Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v.\n\n\n\n\nLIST OF BIBLICAL AND RABBINIC QUOTATIONS\n\n\nBIBLE\n\n GENESIS: 1, 1, p. 110;\n 1, 2, p. 118;\n 1, 3, p. 120;\n 1, 6, p. 118;\n 1, 9, p. 121;\n 1, 11, p. 121;\n 1, 21, p. 121;\n 1, 25, p. 121;\n 1, 26, pp. 121, 268;\n 1, 27, pp. 94, 121;\n 1, 28, p. 121;\n 2, 7, p. 121, 214;\n 2, 19, p. 121;\n 6, 6, p. 227;\n 8, 21, p. 102;\n 11, 7, p. 268;\n 14, 22, p. 369;\n ch. 15, p. 280;\n 15, 4, p. 280;\n 15, 12 ff., p. 225;\n 18, 10, p. 340;\n 27, 34-41, p. 74;\n 28, 13, p. 94;\n 28, 20, p. 105;\n 36, 31, p. 295.\n\n EXODUS: 2, 13, p. 232;\n 2, 17, p. 232;\n 3, 14, p. 95;\n 5, 2, p. 160;\n 7, 3, pp. xiv, 42;\n 9, 12, p. 74;\n 15, 26, p. 403;\n 20, 2, pp. 194, 233;\n 20, 11-12, p. 233;\n 20, 17, p. 83;\n 20, 35, p. 409;\n 22, 26, p. 74;\n 23, 21, p. 109;\n 24, 10, p. 167;\n 33, 11, p. 381;\n 33, 13, p. 243;\n 33, 23, p. 37;\n 34, 6, p. 233.\n\n LEVITICUS: 19, 17, p. 83;\n 19, 18, p. 83.\n\n NUMBERS: 10, 8, p. 227;\n 12, 8, p. 167;\n 15, 39, p. 83;\n 23, 10, p. 170.\n\n DEUTERONOMY: 2, 30, p. xiv;\n 4, 15, pp. 35, 95;\n 4, 39, pp. 84, 115, 220;\n 6, 4, p. 74;\n 13, 1, pp. 382, 423;\n 15, 7, p. 83;\n 17, 15, p. 295;\n 30, 15, p. 286;\n 30, 19, pp. xiv, 41, 286;\n 31, 17, p. 348;\n 33, 4, p. 41;\n 34, 10, p. 416.\n\n JOSHUA: ch. 10, p. 360.\n\n I. SAMUEL: 2, 6, p. 386;\n 19, 20, p. 226.\n\n II. SAMUEL: 23, 2, p. 34.\n\n I. KINGS: 22, 20, p. xiv.\n\n ISAIAH: 1, 14, p. 227;\n 1, 11-17, p. 82;\n 5, 20, p. 374;\n 6, 1, 8, p. 280;\n 11, 1-4, p. 112;\n 26, 19, p. 386;\n 40, 12, p. 208;\n 40, 26, p. 369;\n 43, 1, p. 122;\n 43, 7, p. 121;\n 45, 18, p. 104;\n 59, 19, p. 109.\n\n JEREMIAH: 7, 22, p. 234;\n 9, 22-23, pp. 124, 148, 205, 299;\n 18, 1 ff., p. 207;\n 31, 33, p. 141.\n\n EZEKIEL: 8, 9, p. 109.\n\n HOSEA: 4, 6, p. 348;\n 6, 3, p. 141.\n\n AMOS: 3, 2, p. 164;\n 5, 6, p. 141.\n\n MICAH: 6, 8, p. 168.\n\n ZEPHANIAH: 2, 3, p. 148.\n\n MALACHI: 1, 9, p. 41.\n\n PSALMS: 19, p. 216;\n 19, 2, p. 193;\n 19, 7, p. 193;\n 19, 8, p. 411;\n 19, 9-10, p. 412;\n 73, 11-13, p. 293;\n 94, 9, p. 293;\n 136, 6, p. 176;\n 139, p. 205;\n 145, 9, p. 376.\n\n PROVERBS: 8, 22, p. 109;\n 25, 16, p. 244;\n 30, 4, p. 208.\n\n JOB: 10, 10, p. 378;\n 19, 26, p. 116;\n 23, 13, p. xxvi;\n ch. 32, p. 349;\n 38, 36-37, p. 208.\n\n ECCLESIASTES: 1, 14, p. 47;\n 2, 3, p. 47.\n\n DANIEL: 7, 1, p. 225;\n 10, 8, p. 278;\n 10, 17, p. 381;\n 12, 2, p. 404.\n\n NEHEMIAH: 9, 5, p. 95.\n\n\n MISHNA AND TALMUD\n\n BERAKOT (Bab. Tal.): 17 a, p. 44;\n 33 b, p. xxvi, note 14, p. 41.\n\n BERAKOT (Jer. Tal.): I, p. 83.\n\n PESAKIM: 54 a, p. xxvi, note 17.\n\n MEGILLAH: 25 b, p. xxvi, note 15.\n\n HAGIGAH: ch. 2, p. 244;\n 11 b, p. xvi, notes 2 and 3.\n\n SANHEDRIN: 38 b, p. 268;\n 99 a, p. 408;\n 106 b, p. 83.\n\n MAKKOT: 23 b, p. 416.\n\n ABOT: ch. 4, p. 44.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 362-387;\n relation to Maimonides, 363 f.;\n to the Mu`tazila, 364;\n reason and faith, 364 f.;\n physics, 366 ff.;\n defends atomic theory, 367 f.;\n creation, ibid.;\n existence of God, 368 f.;\n unity, ibid.;\n incorporeality, ibid.;\n attributes, 369 f.;\n will of God, 372;\n problem of evil, 373 f., 376 f.;\n Providence, 375 f.;\n reward and punishment, 379, 383;\n purpose of the world and of man, 379 f.;\n prophecy, 380 f.;\n immutability of the Law, 382;\n reason of the commandments, ibid.;\n immortality, 384;\n resurrection, 385 f.\n\n Aaron ben Joseph, 363\n\n Abarbanel, Don Isaac, 304, 312, 328, 430\n\n Abarbanel, Judah Leo, 431\n\n Abd Al Rahman III, 59\n\n Ab\u00e9lard, 305\n\n Abraham bar Hiyya, xlvi, 114-124;\n standpoint, 115;\n physics, 116 f.;\n matter, ibid.;\n form, 117 ff.;\n intellect, soul and nature, 119;\n ethics, 119, 122 f.;\n reward and punishment, 119, 122 ff.;\n immortality, 120 f.;\n problem of evil, 123 f., 128, 139, 175, 309, 435\n\n \u00c6sculapius, 155\n\n Afer, Constantinus, 1\n\n Aher, 197\n\n Akiba, Rabbi, xxvi\n\n Al-Ashari, xxiii\n\n Albalag, Isaac, 328, 429, 430, 447, note 403a\n\n Albalia, Baruh, 151\n\n Al Basir, Joseph, xxv, xlvii, 48-55;\n priority of reason, 48;\n atomic theory, 49;\n existence of God, 49 f.;\n creation, ibid.;\n attributes, 50;\n divine will, ibid.;\n eternity, 51;\n incorporeality, unity, simplicity, ibid, f.;\n God's word, 52;\n ethics, ibid, f.;\n problem of evil, 54;\n freedom, 54 f.;\n and foreknowledge, ibid.;\n reward and punishment, 55, 56, 57, 81, 126, 127, 128, 141, 146, 200,\n 246, 363, 434\n\n Albertus Magnus, 1, 200, 306, 312, 313, 323\n\n Albo, Joseph, I, 406-427;\n standpoint, 406 ff.;\n purpose of his work, 408;\n principles of religion, ibid.;\n criticism of Maimonides's 13 articles, 409 ff.;\n Albo's own view, 410 f.;\n divine law distinguished from natural and conventional, 408 ff.;\n freedom, a principle, 412;\n creation, 413, 415;\n existence of God, 419 f.;\n attributes, 420;\n angels, ibid.;\n revelation, 420 f.;\n prophecy, 421;\n immutability of the Law, 423;\n God's knowledge, 424;\n and human freedom, ibid.;\n Providence, 425;\n reward and punishment, 425 f.; 428, 430, 436, 447, note 403a\n\n Alexander of Aphrodisias, xviii, 7, 60, 290, 313, 321, 332, 334, 335, 336\n\n Alexander the Great, xvii\n\n Alexander of Hales, 306\n\n Alfadhil, 239\n\n Alfarabi, xx, xxi, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 26, 60, 177, 178, 198, 199, 218, 223,\n 252, 253, 276, 281, 302, 312, 313, 362, 391, 392\n\n Alfasi, 151\n\n Algazali, xxxix, 80, 152, 153, 389, 392, 420, 443, note 230\n\n Ali, 86\n\n Al-Kirkisani, Joseph Ha-Maor, 363\n\n Almohades, 238\n\n Alphonso VI, 151\n\n Al-Mansur, 1\n\n Almoravid, 151\n\n Anatoli, Jacob, 302, 309\n\n Angels, xlvi;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190 f.;\n in Ibn Daud, 221 f.;\n in Maimonides, 266 f.;\n in Albo, 420\n\n Anthropomorphism, xxii, xxvi, xlv, 35, 95, 186, 260 f.\n\n Appel, 448, note 442\n\n Aquinas, Thomas, 1, 61, 63, 200, 207, 306, 307, 312, 313, 323, 331, 332,\n 406\n\n Arama, Isaac, 430\n\n Archimedes, xviii\n\n Aristotelians, xl, 150, 165, 246, 364, 365, 366, 368, 428\n\n Aristotle, xvi, xviii, xix, xx, xxi, xxix ff., xxxvii, xxxix, xl, xli,\n xlii, xlv, xlvi, 7, 8, 9, 13, 20, 26, 60, 62, 64, 72, 89, 92, 107, 111,\n 126, 132, 138, 139, 155, 157, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184,\n 185, 199, 200, 206, 207, 210, 213, 216, 217, 218, 236, 240, 247, 252,\n 253, 254, 256, 258, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276,\n 290, 291, 299, 300, 303, 305, 306, 307, 309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 321,\n 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 338, 346, 347, 350, 352, 353, 354, 366, 367,\n 375, 378, 388, 389, 390, 395, 402, 408, 412, 425, 429, 430, 431\n\n \"Arugat Habosem,\" 184\n\n Ashariya, xxiii, xxvii, xlvii, 23, 246, 251, 291, 362, 365, 372, 378, 379\n\n Atomic theory, in the Kalam, xxii, 249 f.;\n in Saadia, 25;\n in Al Basir, 49;\n in Jeshua ben Judah, 56;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 367 f.\n\n Attributes, doctrine of, in the Kalam, xxiii, xxvii, xl, xliv;\n in Saadia, xliv, 33 f.;\n in Mukammas, 18 ff.;\n in Al Basir, 50;\n in Bahya, 93 f.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 145 f.;\n in Judah Halevi, 161 ff.;\n in Ibn Daud, 220 f.;\n in Maimonides, xlv, 262 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, xlv, 344 f., 351 f.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 369 f.;\n in Crescas, 391 f.;\n in Albo, 420\n\n Auerbach, Heimann, 445, note 331a\n\n Augustine, xli, 51, 305, 445, note 307\n\n Averroes (Ibn Roshd), xx, xxi, xxxix, xli, xlvi, xlvii, 7, 60, 62, 125,\n 177, 199, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313, 318, 321, 322, 323, 329, 332, 334,\n 335, 336, 362, 392, 431\n\n Avicebron, see Gabirol, Solomon Ibn\n\n Avicenna (Ibn Sina), xx, xxi, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 26, 60, 62, 107, 108, 175,\n 177, 178, 179, 198, 199, 207, 210, 211, 213, 218, 223, 224, 253, 276,\n 281, 302, 312, 313, 362, 391, 392, 420\n\n\n Bacher, W., 437, 443, notes 212 and 214; 445, note 312a\n\n Back, Samuel, 436\n\n Baeumker, Clemens, 440, note 84; 441, notes 86 and 89\n\n Bahya, Ibn Pakuda, xix, xxviii, xxxix, xlii, 1, 80-105;\n duties of the limbs and duties of the heart, 82 f.;\n sources of knowledge, 83;\n creation, 86 ff.;\n unity, 89 f.;\n attributes, 93 f.;\n study of nature, 96 f.;\n gratitude to God, 97 f.;\n submission to God, 98;\n freedom, ibid.;\n the laws, 98 f.;\n trust in God, 99 f.;\n \"unity of conduct,\" 101 f.;\n humility, ibid.;\n repentance, 102;\n self-examination, 103;\n temperance, 104;\n asceticism, ibid.;\n love of God, 105; 106, 126, 128, 146, 147, 162, 167, 168, 195, 200, 201,\n 217, 241, 246, 252, 309, 362, 428, 434\n\n Barad\u00e6us, Jacob, 34\n\n Bardenhewer, 439, note 7\n\n Bardesanes, 375\n\n Becker, C. H., xxvi, xxvii\n\n Beer, 433\n\n Bernfeld, Simon, viii, 433\n\n Bisliches, M. L., 445, notes 312 and 315\n\n Bloch, Philipp, 436\n\n Brahmins, 380\n\n Brethren of Purity, xxxix, 60, 107, 125, 126, 128, 139, 187, 199\n\n Broyd\u00e9, Isaac, 106, 441, note 131\n\n\n Cicero, 431\n\n Clement VI, Pope, 329\n\n Clement of Alexandria, 302\n\n Chazars, 153\n\n Crawford, J. P. W., 436\n\n Creation, in Kalam, xxii, xlii, 24, 247, 252;\n in Saadia, xlii, 24;\n in Israeli, 5 ff.;\n in Al Basir, 49 f.;\n in Jeshua ben Judah, 56;\n in Gabirol, 68;\n in Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.;\n in Pseudo Bahya, 110;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 116 ff.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 143;\n in Judah Halevi, 157;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190;\n in Maimonides, 269 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 352 f.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 367 f.;\n in Albo, 413, 415\n\n Creed, articles of, l;\n in Maimonides, 409 f.;\n in Crescas, 392 ff.;\n in Albo, 410 f.\n\n Creizenach, M., 443, note 214\n\n Crescas, Hasdai, xv, xix, xxvii, xxxix, xl, xlii, xlix, l, 173, 200, 312,\n 388-405;\n standpoint, 389;\n existence of God, 389 f.;\n unity, 391 f.;\n attributes, ibid.;\n fundamental dogmas of Judaism, 392 ff.;\n God's knowledge, 392 f.;\n Providence, 393 f.;\n problem of evil, 394;\n prophecy, 395;\n freedom, 396 f.;\n influence on Spinoza, 398 f.;\n purpose of the Law, 399 f.;\n immortality, 400;\n creation, 402;\n criticism of Maimonides's 13 articles of the creed, 402, 404;\n reward and punishment, 403 f.;\n resurrection, 404 f., 406, 407, 408, 409, 414, 416, 419, 420, 421, 424,\n 426, 428, 430, 436, 447, notes 403a and 409\n\n \"Cusari,\" see \"Kusari\"\n\n\n Daud, Abraham Ibn, xix, xx, xxvii, xxxix, xlii, xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii,\n xlviii, xlix, 61, 62, 63, 71, 79, 125, 166, 197-235;\n standpoint, 197 f.;\n Ibn Daud neglected, 201;\n purpose of his book, 201 f.;\n duty to study philosophy, 202;\n relative value of the sciences, 203 f.;\n categories, 205;\n physics, 205 ff.;\n matter and form, ibid.;\n motion, 207;\n infinity, 208;\n psychology, 209 ff.;\n rational soul, 212 ff.;\n the three kinds of intellect, 214;\n immortality, 215;\n metempsychosis, 215 f.;\n the heavenly spheres, 216;\n existence of God, 217 ff.;\n incorporeality, 217;\n unity, 219 f.;\n attributes, 220 f.;\n angels, 221 f.;\n active intellect, 222;\n emanation of Intelligences, 223;\n tradition, 223 f.;\n prophecy, 224 f.;\n abrogation of the Law, 226 f.;\n freedom, 201 f., 229 ff.;\n problem of evil, 228 f.;\n and foreknowledge, 229 f.;\n ethics, 231 ff.;\n virtues, 232;\n reason of commandments, 233 f., 237, 240, 241, 246, 248, 253, 254, 257,\n 266, 267, 276, 281, 302, 307, 309, 317, 332, 350, 362, 366, 388, 428,\n 435\n\n De Boer, 439, note 5\n\n \"Definitions, Book of,\" 2, 4, 60\n\n Deinard, E., 447, note 404\n\n Delitzsch, 446, note 360\n\n Delmedigo, Elijah, 431\n\n Delmedigo, Joseph Solomon, 431\n\n Democritus, xxii, 3\n\n Dieterici, 439, note 6\n\n Doctor, Max, 435, 442, note 162\n\n Dominicus Gundissalinus, 61, 63\n\n Dukes, 443, note 213\n\n Dunash ben Labrat, 59\n\n Duns Scotus, 61, 63, 200, 307\n\n Duran, Simon, 406, 447, note 403a\n\n \"Duties of the Hearts,\" 80, 81\n\n Duval, 439, note 5\n\n\n \"Eight Chapters,\" 239\n\n Eisler, Moritz, 433\n\n \"Elements, Book of,\" 2, 3, 4, 10, 60\n\n Elias of Nisibis, 34\n\n Elisha ben Abuya, 197\n\n Empedocles, 60, 61, 64, 126, 127, 145, 179, 184\n\n \"Emunah Ramah,\" 198\n\n \"Emunot ve-Deot,\" 24\n\n Engelkemper, D. J., 434\n\n Entelechy, xxxv, 209\n\n Ephodi, 328\n\n Epicurus, 290, 367\n\n Eriugena, 200\n\n Ethics, in Jewish Philosophy, xlvii f.;\n in Saadia, 46 f.;\n in Al Basir, 52 f.;\n in Jeshua ben Judah, 57;\n in Gabirol, 71 ff.;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119 ff.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 148;\n in Judah Halevi, 168;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 195;\n in Ibn Daud, 228 ff., 231 ff.;\n in Maimonides, 281 ff.;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 325.\n See also \"Virtue.\"\n\n Euclid, xviii, 90\n\n Evil, Problem of, in Al Basir, 54;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 123 f.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 148;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 195;\n in Ibn Daud, 228 f.;\n in Maimonides, 288 f.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 373 f.;\n in Crescas, 394\n\n Exegesis, Biblical, xvi, xxxvii;\n in Saadia, 35;\n in Gabirol, 78 f.;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 187 f.;\n in Maimonides, 302 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 357 f., 437\n\n \"Ez Hayim,\" 363\n\n Ezekiel, Vision of divine chariot, xvii, 303\n\n\n Falaquera, Shem Tob, 61, 63, 64, 309, 328, 441, note 86\n\n \"Fons Vit\u00e6,\" 60, 61, 72, 80, etc.\n\n \"Fountain of Life,\" see \"Fons Vit\u00e6\"\n\n Frankl, P. F., 434, 440, note 80\n\n Frankl-Gr\u00fcn, Ad., 435\n\n Freedom of the Will, xiv, xlvii;\n in Saadia, 41 f.;\n in Al Basir, 54 f.;\n in Bahya, 98;\n in Judah Halevi, xlviii, 171 ff.;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 193;\n in Ibn Daud, xlviii, 229 f.;\n in Maimonides, xlviii, 285 ff.;\n in Crescas, xlviii, 396 ff.;\n in Albo, 412, 424\n\n Freimann, 442, note 148\n\n Fried, S., 439, note 30; 440, note 34\n\n Friedl\u00e4nder, M., 444, note 250\n\n\n Gabirol, Solomon Ibn, xix, xxxix, xlvi, 59-79;\n fate of G. in Jewish Literature, 60 f.;\n tendency of his work, 63 f.;\n G. a Neo-Platonist, 64;\n his doctrine, 64 ff.;\n emanation, 65;\n matter in spiritual substances, 65, 67;\n man typical of the universe, 65;\n Intelligence, Soul, Nature, 66;\n matter, 66 f.;\n creation, 68;\n will, 68 f., 70;\n mystic knowledge, 69 f.;\n ethics, 71 ff.;\n the virtues, 72 f.;\n the \"Royal Crown\" (Keter Malkut), 75 f.;\n Biblical exegesis, 78 f.;\n influence on Jewish Philosophy, 79;\n on Kabbala, ibid., 80, 81, 89, 91, 107, 126, 127, 131, 151, 184, 185,\n 187, 188, 198, 200, 206, 237, 246, 307, 309, 328, 428, 434\n\n Galen, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209, 252\n\n Genesis, creation story, xvii, xxix, 303\n\n Gersonides, see Levi ben Gerson\n\n Ginzberg, L., 439, note 13\n\n God, in Aristotle, xxxiii;\n existence of G. in Kalam, xlii, 24, 247;\n in Saadia, xlii, 28 ff.;\n in Al Basir, 49 f.;\n in Jeshua ben Judah, 57;\n in Bahya, xlii, 86 ff.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 143;\n in Ibn Daud, xlii f., 217 ff.;\n in Maimonides, xliii, 248, 257 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 350 f.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.;\n in Crescas, 389 ff.;\n in Albo, 419 f.\n\n Goldenthal, 445, note 318\n\n Goldziher, Ignaz, 106, 433, 439, notes 10 and 23; 442, note 132\n\n Gorfinkle, Joseph I., 444, note 251\n\n Graetz, H., 445, note 311\n\n Graf, 440, note 64\n\n Gugenheimer, 435\n\n \"Guide of the Perplexed,\" 239\n\n Guttmann, Jacob, 434, 435, 436, 439, note 27; 440, notes 33, 41 and 83;\n 442, note 133; 443, notes 230 and 245; 445, notes 310 and 331a; 447,\n notes 403a, 436 and 437\n\n Guttmann, Julius, 435\n\n\n Halevi, Judah, xix, xxxix, xl, xlv, xlvi, xlviii, xlix, 125, 150-183;\n his standpoint, 150, 152, 157 f.;\n his life, 151 f.;\n philosophy and religion, 152;\n influence of Algazali, 152 f.;\n the \"Kusari,\" 153 ff.;\n the \"philosopher's\" creed, 154 f.;\n the Christian's, 155 f.;\n the Mohammedan's, 156;\n the Jew's, 156 ff.;\n creation, 157;\n existence of God, 158;\n will, 159;\n motives of philosopher and believer, 159 f.;\n meaning of the name of \"Jhvh,\" 159 f., 165;\n of \"Elohim,\" 160, 165;\n mysticism in H., 160;\n attributes, 161 ff.;\n incorporeality, 162;\n superiority of Israel, 162 f.;\n need of revelation, 163;\n superiority of Palestine, 164;\n Israel the heart among the nations, 164;\n superiority of the Hebrew language, 164 f.;\n prophecy, 165 f.;\n the active Intellect, 165 f.;\n the ceremonial law, 167 f.;\n ethics, 168 f.;\n immortality, 169 f., 181 f.;\n future world and reward and punishment, 170;\n freedom, 171 ff.;\n and foreknowledge, 172 f.;\n interpretation of \"Sefer Yezirah,\" 173 f.;\n the Rabbis knew the sciences, 174;\n exposition of the current philosophy, 174 ff.;\n H. understands Aristotle's definition of the soul, 175;\n physics, 175 ff.;\n matter, 175;\n criticism, 176 f.;\n emanation of Intelligences, 178;\n criticism, 178 f.;\n psychology, 179 f.;\n criticism, 181 f., 197, 198, 200, 201, 210, 211, 216, 223, 224, 226,\n 230, 231, 246, 248, 281, 309, 332, 362, 389, 392, 396, 414, 420, 421,\n 426, 429, 435\n\n Harizi, Judah, 125, 184\n\n Harkavy, Abraham, 17, 433\n\n Hasdai Ibn Shaprut, 59, 153, 308\n\n Hayyuj, 187, 309\n\n Hefez ben Yazliah, 84\n\n \"Hegyon ha-Nefesh,\" 114\n\n Hermes, 60, 155, 184\n\n Hertz, J. H., 434\n\n Hillel ben Samuel, xlvi, 312-327;\n standpoint, 314;\n the soul, 314 ff.;\n definition of soul, 317;\n active intellect, 317 ff.;\n reward and punishment, 323 ff.;\n prophecy, 325;\n ethics, ibid.;\n resurrection, 326;\n interpretation of Rabbinic writings, 326 f., 332\n\n Hippocrates, xviii, 2, 3, 72, 209\n\n Hirschfeld, 440, note 31; 442, note 178\n\n \"Hobot ha-Lebabot,\" see \"Duties of the Hearts\"\n\n Homonym, 240, 351, 371\n\n Horovitz, S., 433, 442, notes 162, 163 and 165; 443, note 226\n\n Husik, Isaac, 436, 439, note 9; 445, note 308; 446, note 334; 448, note\n 443\n\n Hypostasis, xxxviii, 6, 91, 115\n\n\n Ibn Aknin, Joseph, 302\n\n Ibn Badja, 60\n\n Ibn Caspi, Joseph, 302, 310, 329\n\n Ibn Daud (Aven Death), 61\n\n Ibn Daud, Abraham, see Daud, Abraham Ibn\n\n Ibn Ezra, Abraham, xxxix, 79, 80, 81, 114, 184, 187-196;\n Biblical exegesis, 187 f.;\n unity of God, 189;\n incorporeality, ibid.;\n creation, 190;\n matter, ibid.;\n the universe, 190 f.;\n Intelligences, ibid.;\n angels, ibid.;\n soul, 191 f.;\n reward and punishment, 192;\n transmigration, 192;\n freedom, 193;\n and foreknowledge, ibid.;\n knowledge of God, 193 f.;\n prophecy, 194;\n classification of the laws, 194;\n problem of evil, 195;\n ethics, ibid., 200, 246, 309, 310, 429, 435\n\n Ibn Ezra, Moses, xxxix, xlvi, 79, 125, 184-187;\n man a microcosm, 185;\n definition of philosophy, 185;\n unity of God, ibid.;\n active intellect, 186, 200, 246\n\n Ibn Migash, Joseph, 151\n\n Ibn Janah, 84, 309\n\n Ibn Roshd, see Averroes\n\n Ibn Sina, see Avicenna\n\n Ibn Zaddik, Joseph, xix, xxxix, xlii, xlv, xlvi, xlix, 60, 79, 125-149;\n standpoint, 125 f.;\n division of his book, 128;\n purpose, 129;\n definition of philosophy, 129;\n process and sources of knowledge, 129 f.;\n physics, 130 ff.;\n matter and form, ibid.;\n substance, 131;\n the sphere, 131 f.;\n the four elements, 132 f.;\n the human body, 133 f.;\n the soul, 134 f.;\n the three souls, ibid.;\n the emotions, ibid.;\n life, 136;\n death, ibid.;\n sleep and waking, ibid.;\n the rational soul, 137;\n definition of soul, 138;\n intellect, 139;\n world soul, 140;\n duty to use the reason, ibid.;\n criticism of the Kalam, 141 f.;\n creation, 143;\n existence of God, ibid.;\n unity, ibid.;\n self-sufficiency, 144;\n will of God, ibid.;\n attributes, 145 f.;\n commandments, 147;\n rational and traditional, ibid.;\n the virtues, 148;\n reward and punishment, 148;\n evil, 148 f.;\n Messiah, 149, 162, 175, 184, 200, 206, 209; 211, 237, 246, 309, 317,\n 362, 435\n\n \"Ikkarim,\" 406\n\n Immortality, in Pseudo-Bahya, 112 f.;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 120 f.;\n in Judah Halevi, 169 f., 181 f,;\n in Ibn Daud, 215;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 339 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 384;\n in Crescas, 400\n\n Incorporeality, in Kalam, xliv, 253;\n in Saadia, 32;\n in Al Basir, 51;\n in Jeshua ben Judah, 57;\n in Judah Halevi, 162;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 189 f.;\n in Ibn Daud, 217;\n in Maimonides, xliv, 257 ff., 260 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.\n\n Infinity, in Kalam, 251 f.;\n in Saadia, 25, 30;\n in Bahya, 86, 87;\n in Ibn Daud, 208;\n in Maimonides, 251 f., 254, 256 f.;\n in Crescas, 390\n\n Intellect, active, xli;\n in Jewish Philosophy, xlvi f.;\n acquired i., xlvii;\n active i. in prophecy, xlix, 109;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 139;\n in Judah Halevi, 155, 162, 165, 181;\n in Moses ibn Ezra, 186;\n in Ibn Daud, 222;\n in Maimonides, 268, 277;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 317 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 337 ff.\n See also \"Intelligence,\" \"Soul\"\n\n Intelligence, xlvi;\n in Israeli, 6 f.;\n in Gabirol, 65, 66;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 109;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190 f.;\n in Maimonides, 266 f.\n\n Israeli, Isaac, xix, xlvi, xlix, 1-16;\n Maimonides on I., 1 f.;\n his works, 2;\n his sources, ibid.;\n theory of the elements, 3, 12;\n definition of philosophy, 4;\n creation, 5 ff.;\n Intelligence, 6 f.;\n Soul, 8 ff.;\n three kinds of soul, 10 ff.;\n element and principle, 12 f.;\n prophecy, 15, 17, 24, 31, 60, 72, 91, 127, 175, 224, 434\n\n\n Jabariya, xxi, xlvii\n\n Jacob ben Machir, 309, 310\n\n Jacobites, xviii, 34\n\n Jaulus, 437\n\n Jeshua ben Judah, xxv, xlvii, 55-58;\n priority of reason, 56;\n atomic theory, ibid.;\n creation, ibid.;\n existence of God, 57;\n incorporeality, ibid.;\n good and evil, ibid.; 200, 246, 363, 434\n\n Jesus, xxvii, 86, 91\n\n Job, xv, xxvi, 304, 346, 377 f.\n\n Joel, M., 398, 435, 436, 445, note 310; 446, notes 335 and 398; 447,\n note 398 end\n\n Johannes Hispanus, 61\n\n Joseph ben Shemtob, 429, 430, 447, note 404\n\n Joseph ibn Zaddik, see Ibn Zaddik, Joseph\n\n Jourdain, A., 63, 441, note 85; 445, note 306\n\n Judah ben Barzilai, 17\n\n Judah Hadassi, 363\n\n Judah Halevi, see Halevi, Judah\n\n Judah Messer Leon, 431\n\n Justinian, xvii\n\n\n Kabbala, 79, 429, 430\n\n Kadariya, xxi, xxii, xxiii, 23\n\n Kalam, xxiv, xxvii, 16, 17, 48, 50, 52, 55, 86, 106, 125, 128, 141 f.,\n 146, 154, 171, 183, 200, 245, 246 ff., 362, 366, 428, 433, 439, note 10\n\n Kalisch, Isidor, 433\n\n Karaites, xiii, xxiv, xxv, xli, xlvii, 23, 24, 48, 55, 59, 108, 125,\n 126, 146, 154, 174, 183, 200, 245, 246, 362, 363, 364, 365, 370, 373,\n 377, 378, 428\n\n Kaufmann, David, 152, 153, 433, 434, 435, 436, 441, note 88; 442, note\n 181; 444, notes 250 and 305\n\n Kellermann, Benzion, 436\n\n \"Keter Malkut,\" see \"Royal Crown\"\n\n Kindi, Al, xxxix\n\n Klein, Miksa, 434\n\n Knowledge, sources of, xl;\n in Saadia, 27 f.;\n in Bahya, 83;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 129 f.\n\n Koran, xxi, xxii, xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, xxix, xliv, 34, 156\n\n Krochmal, Nahman, 189, 435\n\n \"Kusari,\" 153\n\n\n Lactantius, 431\n\n Landauer, S., 175, 440, note 37\n\n Laws, rational and traditional, 1;\n in Saadia, 38 f.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 147;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 194;\n in Ibn Daud, 233 f.;\n in Maimonides, 294 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 382\n\n Lebid-ibn Al-A`sam, xxvi\n\n Leibnitz, 307\n\n Leverrier, 275\n\n Levi ben Gerson, xix, xx, xxxix, xli, xliii, xlvii, xlix, 7, 16, 166, 217,\n 235, 302, 312, 313, 328-361;\n standpoint, 329 f.;\n reason and authority, 330 f.;\n his style and method, 331;\n the passive intellect, 332 ff.;\n active intellect, 337 ff.;\n problem of knowledge, 338;\n of definition, 339;\n immortality, 339 f.;\n prognostication and prophecy, 340 ff.;\n and the contingent, ibid.;\n God's knowledge, 342 ff.;\n attributes, 344 f., 351 f.;\n Providence, 346 ff.;\n existence of God, 350 f.;\n origin of the world, 352 f.;\n eternal matter, 355 f.;\n interpretation of creation story in Genesis, 357;\n miracles, 358 f., 362, 363, 369, 384, 388, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398,\n 399, 401, 402, 406, 419, 420, 421, 428, 429, 430, 436, 447, note 403a\n\n Levy, Louis-Germain, 436\n\n \"Liber de Causis,\" xx, 2, 64, 317\n\n Lippmann, 443, note 214\n\n Logos, xxvii, xli, 52, 71, 91\n\n\n \"Ma`amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim,\" 309\n\n \"Maase Bereshit,\" xvi, 242, 303, 430\n\n \"Maase Merkaba,\" xvi, 242, 303, 430\n\n Maimonides, Moses, xvi, xix, xx, xxiv, xxv, xxvii, xxxix, xli, xlii,\n xliii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlix, l, 1, 2, 16, 25, 60, 62, 63, 79, 88, 95,\n 96, 114, 125, 126, 146, 153, 158, 166, 167, 198, 199, 200, 201, 207,\n 218, 221, 235, 236-311;\n his life, 238 f.;\n his _chef d'oeuvre_, 239 f.;\n his method, 240;\n his standpoint, 240 ff.;\n importance of science, 243 f.;\n difficulty of metaphysics, 244 f.;\n sketch of Jewish Philosophy, 245 f.;\n exposition of the Kalam, 246 ff.;\n propositions of the \"philosophers,\" 254 ff.;\n existence of God, 257 ff.;\n unity, ibid.;\n incorporeality, ibid., 260 ff.;\n attributes, 262 ff.;\n meaning of \"Jhvh,\" 265;\n angels, 266 f.;\n origin of the world, 269 ff.;\n emanation of Intelligences, 272 f.;\n criticism of Aristotle, 271 ff.;\n psychology, 281 ff.;\n virtue, 282 ff.;\n freedom, 285 ff.;\n and foreknowledge, 287 f.;\n problem of evil, 288 ff.;\n God's knowledge, 289 ff.;\n reason of the commandments, 294 ff.;\n Bible exegesis, 302 ff.;\n influence of M., 305 ff.;\n on Scholasticism, 305-307;\n on Judaism, 307-311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 323, 325, 329, 332, 342, 343,\n 344, 345, 346, 350, 352, 353, 357, 358, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368,\n 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384,\n 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398, 399, 400, 402, 403,\n 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 423, 424, 425,\n 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 435, 447, note 403a\n\n \"Malmad Hatalmidim,\" 309\n\n Malter, H., vii, 445, note 316\n\n Mandonnet, P., 445, note 308; 446, note 332\n\n Manicheans, 375\n\n Matter, rejected by Mutakallimun, xxii;\n doctrine of, in Aristotle, xxix ff.;\n in Plotinus, xxxviii;\n as source of evil, 38;\n in Gabirol, 66 f.;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 109;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 117;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 130 ff.;\n in Judah Halevi, 175;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 190;\n in Ibn Daud, 205 f.;\n in Maimonides, 256, 270;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 355 f.\n\n Maywald, 446, note 332\n\n \"Mekize Nirdamim,\" 445, notes 313 and 321\n\n \"Mekor Hayim,\" see \"Fons Vit\u00e6\"\n\n Menahem ben Saruk, 59\n\n Messiah, in Saadia, 45;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 149;\n in Crescas, 402, 404;\n in Albo, 408\n\n Metempsychosis, see Transmigration\n\n \"Microcosmus,\" 60, 125\n\n \"Milhamot Adonai,\" 329\n\n Miracles, in Levi ben Gerson, 358 f.\n\n Mohammed, xxv, 86\n\n Monophysites, xviii, 34\n\n \"More Ha-moreh,\" 310\n\n \"More Nebukim,\" 238\n\n Morgenstern, Ern\u00f6, 434\n\n Moses ben Enoch, 59\n\n Moses ben Maimon, see Maimonides\n\n Moses of Narbonne, 309, 310, 328, 430, 447, note 403a\n\n Motion, in Aristotle, xxvi;\n in Ibn Daud, 207;\n in Maimonides, 254, 269\n\n Mukammas, David Al, 2, 17-22;\n definition of science and philosophy, 17 f.;\n attributes, 18 ff.;\n unity, 18;\n reward and punishment, 21 f., 34, 52, 81, 84, 95, 200, 246, 434\n\n Munk, Solomon, 63, 304, 328, 433, 434, 440, note 83; 441, notes 86, 87\n and 105; 444, notes 250, 280 and 302; 445, notes 314 and 316; 448, note\n 442\n\n M\u00fcnz, J., 436\n\n Mutakallimun, xxi f., xl, xli, xlvii, 9, 11, 24, 25, 26, 48, 81, 88, 96,\n 106, 125, 126, 127, 128, 139, 142, 145, 149, 158, 182, 183, 199, 240,\n 246-253, 256, 275, 352, 353, 362, 366 f., 369, 372, 382, 406, 428\n\n Mu`tazila, xxii ff., xxvii, xlvii, 3, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26, 48, 108, 171,\n 246, 251, 291, 292, 362, 365, 366, 375, 377\n\n\n Nachmanides, 426, 429\n\n Nature, in Plotinus, xxxviii;\n in Gabirol, 65, 66;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 109;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119\n\n Neo-Platonic, xx, xxviii, xxxix, xlvi, 2, 6, 13, 24, 38, 64, 79, 81, 86,\n 89, 90, 92, 106, 107, 114, 115, 125, 126, 127, 129, 138, 139, 177, 178,\n 199, 200, 266, 305, 317, 319\n\n Neo-Platonism, xxix, 17, 64, 70, 79, 91, 114, 150, 187, 200, 266, 288,\n 317, 428\n\n Neo-Platonists, xl, 31, 64, 91, 106, 184, 199\n\n Neo-Pythagoreans, 188\n\n Nestorians, xviii, 34\n\n Neumark, David, viii, 433, 435, 436, 441, note 107\n\n \"Nous,\" xxxviii, 7, 91\n\n\n \"Olam Katon,\" see \"Microcosmus\"\n\n \"Or Adonai,\" 389\n\n Origen, 288, 302\n\n Orschansky, G., 435\n\n\n Perles, J., 445, note 309\n\n Philo, xvi, xxvii, xxxviii, xli, 23, 91, 95, 188, 240, 266, 268, 288, 302\n\n Philoponus, 247, 353\n\n Philosophy, and religion, xiii;\n content of Jewish P., xl-l;\n defined by Israeli, 4;\n by Ibn Zaddik, 129;\n by Moses Ibn Ezra, 185\n\n Physics, in Kalam, xxii, xli;\n in Aristotle, xxx;\n in Israeli, 3, 5, 12;\n in Saadia, xli;\n in Ibn Zaddik, xlii, 130 ff.;\n in Judah Halevi, 175 ff.;\n in Ibn Daud, xlii, 205 ff.;\n in Maimonides, xlii, 254 ff., 269 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 352 f., 355 f.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, xli, 366 ff.;\n in Crescas, xlii, 389\n\n Plato, xxix, xli, xlv, 5, 7, 8, 37, 47, 90, 91, 122, 138, 155, 179, 181,\n 182, 184, 195, 231, 268, 269, 288, 304, 305, 353, 413, 431\n\n Plato of Tivoli, 114\n\n Plotinus, xx, xxxvii f., xxxix, 6, 64, 65, 91, 107, 115, 126, 139, 178,\n 431\n\n Pollak, J., 433\n\n Porphyry, 60\n\n Proclus, xx, 3\n\n Prophecy, xlvi, xlix f.;\n in Israeli, xlix, 15;\n in Saadia, 40;\n in Judah Halevi, xlix, 165;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 194;\n in Ibn Daud, xlix, 224 ff.;\n in Maimonides, xlix, 276 ff.;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 325;\n in Levi ben Gerson, xlix, 340 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 380 f.;\n in Crescas, 395;\n in Albo, 421\n\n Providence, xl;\n in Maimonides, 290 ff.;\n in Levi ben Gerson, 346 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 375 f.;\n in Crescas, 393 f.;\n in Albo, 425\n\n Pseudo-Bahya, xlvi, xlix, 106-113;\n standpoint, 106 f.;\n the soul, 108 ff., 111 ff.;\n Intelligence, Soul, Nature, 108 f., 110;\n matter, 109;\n creation, 110;\n virtue, 112;\n immortality, 112 f.;\n reward and punishment, 113, 122, 126, 139, 148, 317, 434\n\n Ptolemy, xviii, 273, 309\n\n Pythagoras, 60, 179, 184, 185\n\n Pythagoreans, 9\n\n\n Rashi, 187\n\n Raymond, Bishop of Toledo, 61\n\n Reason, and authority, xiii;\n r. in Aristotle, xxxvi;\n active and passive, xxxvi f.;\n in Plotinus, xxxviii;\n r. as a source of knowledge, xl;\n r. and authority in Levi ben Gerson, 330 f.\n See also \"Intellect,\" \"Soul\"\n\n Resurrection, l;\n in Saadia, 44 f.;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 326;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 385 f.;\n in Crescas, 404\n\n Reward and Punishment, xlvii, xlviii, l;\n in Mukammas, 21 f.;\n in Saadia, 42 f.;\n in Al Basir, 55;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 113;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119 ff.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 148;\n in Judah Halevi, 170;\n in Abraham Ibn Ezra, 192;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 323 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 379, 383;\n in Crescas, 403 f.;\n in Albo, 425 f.\n\n Roscellinus of Compi\u00e8gne, 305\n\n Rose, Valentinus, 439, note 8\n\n Rosin, David, 189, 192, 435\n\n \"Royal Crown,\" the, 75 f.\n\n\n Saadia, xix, xxv, xli, xlii, xlv, xlvi, xlix, 1, 17, 23-47;\n his \"Emunot ve-Deot,\" 24 f.;\n modelled on the Kalam, ibid.;\n atomic theory, 25;\n reason for writing, 26 f.;\n sources of truth, 27 f.;\n speculation not forbidden, 28;\n necessity of revelation, ibid.;\n existence of God, 28 ff.;\n incorporeality, 32;\n unity, 32 f.;\n attributes, 33 f.;\n categories inapplicable to God, 35 f.;\n theophanies, 36;\n soul, 37 f.;\n laws and commandments, 38 f.;\n rational and traditional, ibid.;\n prophecy, 40;\n written and oral law, 40;\n abrogation of Law, 40 f.;\n freedom, 41 f.;\n and foreknowledge, ibid.;\n reward and punishment, 42 f., 46;\n future world, 43 f.;\n resurrection, 44 f.;\n ethics, 46 f., 48, 50, 52, 59, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95,\n 96, 126, 127, 128, 146, 147, 167, 175, 186, 195, 200, 237, 241, 246,\n 252, 253, 302, 309, 362, 363, 388, 428, 434\n\n Sabeans, 296\n\n Saladin, 239\n\n Samuel, 197\n\n Scaliger, 307\n\n Scheyer, Simon B., 435\n\n Schmiedl, A., 433\n\n Schreiner, M., xxv, xxvii, 433, 434, 439, notes 12, 16, 18 and 20; 440,\n note 81\n\n \"Sefer Ha-Kabbala,\" 198\n\n Seyerlen, 63, 434, 441, note 86\n\n Shemtob ben Joseph, 430\n\n Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob, 429\n\n Socrates, xxix, 155, 184, 185\n\n Solomon ben Adret, 430\n\n Solomon ben Yeroham, 363\n\n Sophists, xxix\n\n Soul, in Aristotle, xxxv;\n world soul in Plotinus, xxxviii;\n s. in Jewish philosophy, xlv f.;\n world-soul in Jewish Neo-Platonists, xlvi;\n s. in Israeli, 5, 8 ff.;\n in Saadia, 37 f.;\n in Gabirol, 65, 66;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 108 ff.;\n in Abraham bar Hiyya, 119;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 134 f., 137 f.;\n world-soul in Ibn Zaddik, 140;\n s. in Judah Halevi, 179 ff.;\n in Abraham Ibn Ezra, 191 f.;\n in Ibn Daud, 209 ff.;\n in Maimonides, 281 ff.;\n in Hillel ben Samuel, 314 ff.;\n in Crescas, 400.\n See also \"Intellect,\" \"Reason\"\n\n Spinoza, 398 f.\n\n \"Spirit and Soul, Book of,\" 5\n\n Steinschneider, Moritz, 311, 439, note 26; 440, notes 31 and 33; 443,\n note 247; 446, note 360\n\n St. Ephrem of Nisibis, xviii\n\n Sufis, xxvii f., 86, 153\n\n Syrians, xvii ff., 199, 246\n\n\n \"Tagmule ha-Nefesh,\" 314\n\n T\u00e4nzer, A., 437\n\n Themistius, 7, 60, 313, 321, 332, 333, 334, 335\n\n \"Theology of Aristotle,\" xx, xxxix, 64, 266\n\n Theophrastus, xviii\n\n Tibbon, Judah Ibn, 71, 309, 310\n\n Tibbon, Moses Ibn, 309, 440, note 37\n\n Tibbon, Samuel Ibn, 2, 60, 125, 239, 302, 309\n\n \"Tikkun Midot ha-Nefesh,\" 71\n\n \"Torot ha-Nefesh,\" 106\n\n Tradition, xiii, xli, 28, 223 f.\n\n Transmigration, in Saadia, 44;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 192;\n in Ibn Daud, 215 f.\n\n Trinity, xliv, 33, 34, 71, 91\n\n Truth, twofold, 328\n\n \"Twenty Chapters,\" 17\n\n\n Ueberweg-Baumgartner, 433\n\n Unity of God, in Kalam, xxii, xliii f., 252;\n in Mukammas, 18;\n in Saadia, 32 f.;\n in Al Basir, 51;\n in Bahya, 89 f.;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 143;\n in Moses ibn Ezra, 185;\n in Abraham ibn Ezra, 189;\n in Ibn Daud, 219 f.;\n in Maimonides, xliv, 257 ff.;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 368 f.;\n in Crescas, 391 f.\n\n\n Vincent of Beauvais, 1\n\n Virtue, xlix; in Gabirol, 72 f.;\n in Pseudo-Bahya, 112;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 148;\n in Ibn Daud, 232;\n in Maimonides, 282 ff.\n\n\n Weil, Isidore, 436\n\n Weil, Simson, 198, 443, note 221\n\n Weinsberg, Leopold, 435\n\n Wenrich, 439, note 5\n\n Werbluner, 445, note 317\n\n Will of God, in Al Basir, 50;\n in Gabirol, 68 f.;\n in Bahya, 90;\n in Ibn Zaddik, 144;\n in Aaron ben Elijah, 372\n\n William of Auvergne, 71, 306\n\n William of Occam, 200\n\n Wise, Stephen S., 71, 441, note 103\n\n Wolff, M., 444, note 251\n\n Wolfsohn, Julius, 436\n\n\n Yahuda, 80, 86, 439, note 24; 441, notes 106, 108, 109 and 112\n\n Yahya ben Adi, 247\n\n Yefet Ha-Levi, 363\n\n \"Yezirah, Sefer\" 17, 94, 173, 179\n\n Yohanan ben Zakkai, 197\n\n\n Zeller, 439, note 4; 441, note 86\n\n Zeno, 25\n\n Zimmels, 448, note 442\n\n Zunz, Leopold, 184\n\n\nPrinted in the United States of America.","title":"A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":206478}