{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_27869/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_27869","id":"gutenberg_27869","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27869","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Theodicy"],"text":"A THEODICY;\n\n OR\n\n VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GLORY,\n\n AS MANIFESTED IN THE\n\n CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MORAL WORLD.\n\n BY ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE,\n\n PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS AND ASTRONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI.\n\n NEW YORK:\n\n PUBLISHED BY CARLTON & PHILLIPS.\n\n 200 MULBERRY STREET.\n\n 1854.\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nIntroduction. Of The Possibility Of A Theodicy.\n Section I. The failure of Plato and other ancient philosophers to\n construct a Theodicy, not a ground of despair.\n Section II. The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair.\n Section III. The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in\n obscurity to teach us a lesson of humility.\n Section IV. The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope.\n Section V. The construction of a Theodicy, not an attempt to solve\n mysteries, but to dissipate absurdities.\n Section VI. The spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted,\n and the relation of the author to other systems.\nPart I. The Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Consistent With The Holiness\nOf God.\n Chapter I. The Scheme Of Necessity Denies That Man Is Responsible For\n The Existence Of Sin.\n Section I. The attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme\n of necessity with the responsibility of man.\n Section II. The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others,\n endeavour to reconcile necessity with free and accountable agency.\n Section III. The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche,\n concerning the relation between liberty and necessity.\n Section IV. The views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley,\n Helvetius, and Diderot, with respect to the relation between liberty\n and necessity.\n Section V. The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile\n liberty and necessity.\n Section VI. The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable\n agency on the basis of necessity\u2014The views of the younger Edwards,\n Day, Chalmers, Dick, D\u2019Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M\u2019Cosh, concerning\n the agreement of liberty and necessity.\n Section VII. The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in\n relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.\n Section VIII. The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation\n to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.\n Section IX. The notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the\n same subject.\n Section X. The conclusion of M\u0153hler, Tholuck, and others, that all\n speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless.\n Section XI. The true conclusion from the foregoing review of\n opinions and arguments.\n Chapter II. The Scheme Of Necessity Makes God The Author Of Sin.\n Section I. The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that\n the system of necessity does not make God the author of sin.\n Section II. The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of\n necessity does not make God the author of sin.\n Section III. The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that\n the scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin.\n Section IV. The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile\n the scheme of necessity with the purity of God.\n Chapter III. Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral\n Distinctions.\n Section I. The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral\n distinctions.\n Section II. The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of\n necessity with the reality of moral distinctions.\n Section III. Of the proposition that \"The essence of the virtue and\n vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in\n their cause, but in their nature.\"\n Section IV. The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with\n the reality of moral distinctions, not because we confound natural\n and moral necessity, but because it is really inconsistent\n therewith.\n Chapter IV. The Moral World Not Constituted According To The Scheme Of\n Necessity.\n Section I. The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.\n Section II. The scheme of necessity is directed against a false\n issue.\n Section III. The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.\n Section IV. The scheme of necessity is fortified by false\n conceptions.\n Section V. The scheme of necessity is recommended by false\n analogies.\n Section VI. The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false\n phraseology.\n Section VII. The scheme of necessity originates in a false method,\n and terminates in a false religion.\n Chapter V. The Relation Between The Human Will And The Divine Agency.\n Section I. General view of the relation between the divine and the\n human power.\n Section II. The Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between\n the divine and the human power.\n Section III. The Augustinian Platform, or view of the relation\n between the divine agency and the human.\n Section IV. The views of those who, in later times, have symbolized\n with Augustine.\n Section V. The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of\n the divine sovereignty.\n Chapter VI. The Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Reconciled With The\n Holiness Of God.\n Section I. The hypothesis of the soul\u2019s preexistence.\n Section II. The hypothesis of the Manicheans.\n Section III. The hypothesis of optimism.\n Section IV. The argument of the atheist\u2014The reply of Leibnitz and\n other theists\u2014The insufficiency of this reply.\n Section V. The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect\n agreement shown to subsist between the existence of sin and the\n holiness of God.\n Section VI. The true and only foundation of optimism.\n Section VII. The glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which\n he foresaw would fall under the dominion of sin.\n Section VIII. The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other\n atheizing minute philosophers.\n Chapter VII. Objections Considered.\n Section I. It may be objected that the foregoing scheme is \"new\n theology.\"\n Section II. It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit\n the omnipotence of God.\n Section III. The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy\n view of the universe.\n Section IV. It may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the\n volitions of men to the power and control of God, we undermine the\n sentiments of humility and submission.\n Section V. The foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with\n gratitude to God.\n Section VI. It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the\n preceding difficulties against the scheme of necessity; inasmuch as\n the same, or as great, difficulties attach to the system of those by\n whom they are urged.\nPart II. The Existence Of Natural Evil, Or Suffering, Consistent With The\nGoodness Of God.\n Chapter I. God Desires And Seeks The Salvation of All Men.\n Section I. The reason why theologians have concluded that God\n designs the salvation of only a part of mankind.\n Section II. The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a\n portion of mankind with the sincerity of God in his endeavours to\n save them.\n Section III. The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity\n of God in his endeavours to save those who will finally perish.\n Chapter II. Natural Evil, Or Suffering, And Especially The Suffering Of\n Infants Reconciled With The Goodness Of God.\n Section I. All suffering not a punishment for sin.\n Section II. The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness\n of God.\n Section III. The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much\n less with the divine goodness.\n Section IV. The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil.\n Section V. The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation.\n Chapter III. The Sufferings Of Christ Reconciled With The Goodness Of\n God.\n Section I. The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary.\n Section II. The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the\n goodness of God.\n Section III. The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians,\n against the doctrine of the atonement.\n Chapter IV. The Eternal Punishment Of The Wicked Reconciled With The\n Goodness Of God.\n Section I. The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity\n of future punishment has been placed.\n Section II. The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy\n of the eternity of future punishments may be clearly inferred.\n Section III. The eternity of future punishments an expression of the\n divine goodness.\n Chapter V. The Dispensation Of The Divine Favours Reconciled With The\n Goodness Of God.\n Section I. The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the\n economy of natural providence, consistent with the goodness of God.\n Section II. The Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the\n impartiality of the divine goodness.\n Section III. The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with\n the impartiality and glory of the divine goodness.\n Section IV. The true ground and reason of election to eternal life\n shows it to be consistent with the infinite goodness of God.\nConclusion. A Summary View Of The Principles And Advantages Of The\nForegoing System.\n Chapter I. Summary Of The First Part Of The Foregoing System.\n Section I. The scheme of necessity denies that man is the\n responsible author of sin.\n Section II. The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin.\n Section III. The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral\n distinctions.\n Section IV. The moral world not constituted according to the scheme\n of necessity.\n Section V. The relation between the human agency and the divine.\n Section VI. The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite\n purity of God.\n Chapter II. Summary Of The Second Part Of The Foregoing System.\n Section I. God desires the salvation of all men.\n Section II. The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of\n infants, consistent with the goodness of God.\n Section III. The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine\n goodness.\n Section IV. The eternity of future punishment consistent with the\n goodness of God.\n Section V. The true doctrine of election and predestination\n consistent with the goodness of God.\n Section VI. The question submitted.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\n Introduction.\n\n\nOF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY.\n\n\nHow, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, evil could have\nproceeded from a creature of his own, has ever been regarded as the great\ndifficulty pertaining to the intellectual system of the universe. It has\nnever ceased to puzzle and perplex the human mind. Indeed, so great and so\nobstinate has it seemed, that it is usually supposed to lie beyond the\nreach of the human faculties. We shall, however, examine the grounds of\nthis opinion, before we exchange the bright illusions of hope, if such\nindeed they be, for the gloomy forebodings of despair.\n\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe failure of Plato and other ancient philosophers to construct a\nTheodicy, not a ground of despair.\n\n\nThe supposed want of success attending the labours of the past, is, no\ndoubt, the principal reason which has induced so many to abandon the\nproblem of evil in despair, and even to accuse of presumption every\nspeculation designed to shed light upon so great a mystery. But this\nreason, however specious and imposing at first view, will lose much of its\napparent force upon a closer examination.\n\nIn every age the same reasoning has been employed to repress the efforts\nof the human mind to overcome the difficulties by which it has been\nsurrounded; yet, in spite of such discouragements, the most stupendous\ndifficulties have gradually yielded to the progressive developments and\nrevelations of time. It was the opinion of Socrates, for example, that the\nproblem of the natural world was unavoidably concealed from mortals, and\nthat it was a sort of presumptuous impiety, displeasing to the gods, for\nmen to pry into it. If Newton himself had lived in that age, it is\nprobable that he would have entertained the same opinion. It is certain\nthat the problem in question would then have been as far beyond the reach\nof his powers, as beyond those of the most ordinary individual. The\nignorance of the earth\u2019s dimensions, the manifold errors respecting the\nlaws of motion, and the defective state of the mathematical sciences,\nwhich then prevailed, would have rendered utterly impotent the efforts of\na thousand Newtons to grapple with such a problem. The time was neither\nripe for the solution of that problem, nor for the appearance of a Newton.\nIt was only after science had, during a period of two thousand years,\nmultiplied her resources and gathered up her energies, that she was\nprepared for a flight to the summit of the world, whence she might behold\nand reveal the wonderful art wherewith it hath been constructed by the\nAlmighty Architect. Because Socrates could not conceive of any possible\nmeans of solving the great problem of the material world, it did not\nfollow, as the event has shown, that it was forever beyond the reach and\ndominion of man. We should not then listen too implicitly to the teachers\nof despair, nor too rashly set limits to the triumphs of the human power.\nIf we may believe \u201cthe master of wisdom,\u201d they are not the true friends of\nscience, nor of the world\u2019s progress. \u201cBy far the greatest obstacle,\u201d says\nBacon, \u201cto the advancement of the sciences, _is to be found in men\u2019s\ndespair and idea of impossibility_.\u201d\n\nEven in the minds of those who cultivate a particular branch of knowledge,\nthere is often an internal secret despair of finding the truth, which so\nfar paralyzes their efforts as to prevent them from seeking it with that\ndeep earnestness, without which it is seldom found. The history of optics\nfurnishes a most impressive illustration of the justness of this remark.\nPrevious to the time of Newton, no one seemed to entertain a real hope\nthat this branch of knowledge would ever assume the form and clearness of\nscientific truth. The laws and properties of so ethereal a substance as\nlight, appeared to elude the grasp of the human intellect; and hence, no\none evinced the boldness to grapple directly with them. The whole region\nof optics was involved in mists, and those who gave their attention to\nthis department of knowledge, abandoned themselves, for the most part, to\nvague generalities and loose conjectures. In the conflict of manifold\nopinions, and the great variety of hypotheses which seemed to promise\nnothing but endless disputes, the highest idea of the science of optics\nthat prevailed, was that of something in relation to light which might be\nplausibly advanced and confidently maintained. It was reserved for Newton\nto produce a revolution in the mode of treating this branch of knowledge,\nas well as that of physical astronomy. Not despairing of the truth, he\nsternly put away \u201cinnumerable fancies flitting on all sides around him,\u201d\nand by searching observation and experiment, brought his mind directly\ninto contact with things themselves, and held it steadily to them, until\nthe clear light of truth dawned. The consequence was, that the dreams of\nphilosophy, falsely so called, gave place to the clear realities of\nnature. It was to the unconquerable hope, no less than to the profound\nhumility of Newton, that the world is indebted for his most splendid\ndiscoveries, as well as for that perfect model of the true spirit of\nphilosophy, which combined the infinite caution of a Butler with the\nunbounded boldness of a Leibnitz. The lowliest humility, free from the\nleast shadow of despair, united with the loftiest hope, without the least\nmixture of presumption, both proceeding from an invincible love of truth,\nare the elements which constituted the secret of that patient and\nall-enduring thought which conducted the mind of Newton from the\nobscurities and dreams enveloping the world below into the bright and\nshining region of eternal truths above. In our humble opinion, Newton has\ndone more for the great cause of knowledge, by the mighty impulse of hope\nhe has given to the powers of the human mind, than by all the sublime\ndiscoveries he has made. For, as Maclaurin says: \u201cThe variety of opinions\nand perpetual disputes among philosophers has induced not a few of late,\nas well as in former times, to think that it was vain labour to endeavour\nto acquire certainty in natural knowledge, and to ascribe this to some\nunavoidable defect in the principles of the science. But it has appeared\nsufficiently, from the discoveries of those who have consulted nature, and\nnot their own imaginations, and particularly from what we learn from Sir\nIsaac Newton, _that the fault has lain in philosophers themselves, and not\nin philosophy_.\u201d\n\nWe are persuaded the day will come, when it will be seen that the despair\nof scepticism has been misplaced, not only with regard to natural\nknowledge, but also in relation to the great problems of the intellectual\nand moral world. It is true, that Plato failed to solve these problems;\nbut his failure may be easily accounted for, without in the least degree\nshaking the foundations of our hope. The learned Ritter has said, that\nPlato felt the necessity imposed upon him, by his system, to reconcile the\nexistence of evil with the perfections of God; but yet, as often as he\napproached this dark subject, his views became vague, fluctuating, and\nunsatisfactory. How little insight he had into it on any scientific or\nclearly defined principle, is obvious from the fact, that he took shelter\nfrom its difficulties in the wild hypothesis of the pre\u00ebxistence of souls.\nBut the impotency of Plato\u2019s attempts to solve these difficulties, may be\nexplained without the least disparagement to his genius, or without\nleading us to hope for light only from the world\u2019s possession of better\nminds.\n\nIn the first place, such was the state of mental science when Plato lived,\nthat it would have been impossible for any one to reconcile the existence\nof evil with the perfections of God. It has been truly said, that \u201cAn\nattention to the internal operations of the human mind, _with a view to\nanalyze its principles_, is one of the distinctions of modern times. Among\nthe ancients scarcely anything of the sort was known.\u201d\u2014_Robert Hall_. Yet\nwithout a correct analysis of the powers of the human mind, and of the\nrelations they sustain to each other, as well as to external objects and\ninfluences, it is impossible to shed one ray of light on the relation\nsubsisting between the existence of moral evil and the divine glory. The\ntheory of motion is \u201cthe key to nature.\u201d It was with this key that Newton,\nthe great high-priest of nature, entered into her profoundest recesses,\nand laid open her most sublime secrets to the admiration of mankind. In\nlike manner, the true theory of action is the key to the intellectual\nworld, by which its difficulties are to be laid open and its enigmas\nsolved. Not possessing this key, it was as impossible for Plato, or for\nany other philosopher, to penetrate the mystery of sin\u2019s existence, as it\nwould have been, without a knowledge of the laws of motion, to comprehend\nthe stupendous problem of the material universe.\n\nSecondly, the ancient philosophers laboured under the insuperable\ndisadvantage, that the sublime disclosures of revelation had not been made\nknown to the world. Hence the materials were wanting out of which to\nconstruct a Theodicy, or vindication of the perfections of God. For if we\ncould see only so much of this world\u2019s drama as is made known by the light\nof nature, it would not be possible to reconcile it with the character of\nits great Author. No one was more sensible of this defect of knowledge\nthan Plato himself; and its continuance was, in his view, inconsistent\nwith the goodness of the divine Being. Hence his well-known prediction,\nthat a teacher would be sent from God to clear up the darkness of man\u2019s\npresent destiny, and to withdraw the veil from its future glory. The facts\nof revelation cannot, of course, be logically assumed as verities, in an\nargument with the atheist; but still, as we shall hereafter see, they may,\nin connexion with other truths, be made to serve a most important and\nlegitimate function in exploding his sophisms and objections.\n\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair.\n\n\nIt is alleged, that since Leibnitz exhausted the resources of his vast\nerudition, and exerted the powers of his mighty intellect without success,\nto solve the problem in question, it is in vain for any one else to\nattempt its solution. Leibnitz, himself, was too much of a philosopher to\napprove of such a judgment in relation to any human being. He could never\nhave wished, or expected to see \u201cthe empire of man, which is founded in\nthe sciences,\u201d permanently confined to the boundaries of a single mind,\nhowever exalted its powers, or comprehensive its attainments. He finely\nrebuked the false humility and the disguised arrogance of Descartes, in\naffirming that the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man could never\nbe reconciled. \u201cIf Descartes,\u201d says he, \u201chad confessed such an inability\nfor himself alone, this might have savoured of humility; but it is\notherwise, when, because he could not find the means of solving this\ndifficulty, he declares it an impossibility for all ages and for all\nminds.\u201d We have, at least, the authority and example of Leibnitz, in\nfavour of the propriety of cultivating this department of knowledge, with\na view to shed light on the great problem of the intellectual world.\n\nHis failure, if rightly considered, is not a ground for despondency. He\napproached the problem in question in a wrong spirit. The pride of\nconquering difficulties is the unfortunate disposition with which he\nundertook to solve it. His well-known boast, that with him all difficult\nthings are easy, and all easy things difficult, is a proof that his spirit\nwas not perfectly adapted to carry him forward in a contest with the dark\nenigmas of the universe. Indeed, if we consider what Leibnitz has actually\ndone, we shall perceive, that notwithstanding his wonderful powers, he has\nrendered many easy things difficult, as well as many difficult things\neasy. The best way to conquer difficulties is, if we may judge from his\nexample, not to attack them directly, and with the pride of a conqueror,\nbut simply to seek after the truth. If we make a conquest of all the\ntruth, this will make a conquest of all the difficulties within our reach.\nIt is wonderful with what ease a difficulty, which may have resisted the\ndirect siege of centuries, will sometimes fall before a single inquirer\nafter truth, who had not dreamed of aiming at its solution, until this\nseemed, as if by accident, to offer itself to his mind. If we pursue\ndifficulties, they will be apt to fly from us and elude our grasp;\nwhereas, if we give up our minds to an honest and earnest search after\ntruth, they will come in with their own solutions.\n\nThe truth is, that the difficulty in question has been increased rather\nthan diminished by the speculations of Leibnitz. This has resulted from a\npremature and extreme devotion to system\u2014a source of miscarriage and\nfailure common to Leibnitz, and to most others who have devoted their\nattention to the origin of evil. On the one hand, exaggerated views\nconcerning the divine agency, or equally extravagant notions on the other,\nrespecting the agency of man, have frequently converted a seeming into a\nreal contradiction. In general, the work of God has been conceived in such\na relation to the powers of man, as to make the latter entirely disappear;\nor else the power of man has been represented as occupying so exalted and\nindependent a position, as to exclude the Almighty from his rightful\ndominion over the moral world. Thus, the Supreme Being has generally been\nshut out from the affairs and government of the world by one side, and his\nenergy rendered so all-pervading by the other, as really to make him the\nauthor of evil. In this way, the difficulties concerning the origin and\nexistence of evil have been greatly augmented by the very speculations\ndesigned to solve them. For if God takes little or no concern in the\naffairs and destiny of the moral world, this clearly seems to render him\nresponsible for the evil which he might easily have prevented; and, on the\nother hand, if he pervades the moral world with his power in such a manner\nas to bring all things to pass, this as clearly seems to implicate him in\nthe turpitude of sin.\n\nAfter having converted the seeming discrepancy between the divine power\nand human agency into a real contradiction, it is too late to endeavour to\nreconcile them. Yet such has been the case with most of the giant\nintellects that have laboured to reconcile the sovereignty of God and the\nmoral agency of man. It will hereafter be clearly seen, we trust, that it\nis not possible for any one, holding the scheme of a Calvin, or a\nLeibnitz, or a Descartes, or an Edwards, to show an agreement between the\npower of God and the freedom of man; since according to these systems\nthere is an eternal opposition and conflict between them. It is no ground\nof despair, then, that the mighty minds of the past have failed to solve\nthe problem in question, if the cause of their failure may be traced to\nthe errors of their own systems, and not to the inherent difficulties of\nthe subject.\n\nThose who have endeavoured to solve the problem in question have, for the\nmost part, been necessitated to fail in consequence of having adopted a\nwrong method. Instead of beginning with observation, and carefully\ndissecting the world which God has made, so as to rise, by a clear\nanalysis of _things_, to the general principles on which they have been\nactually framed and put together, they have set out from the lofty region\nof universal abstractions, and proceeded to reconstruct the world for\nthemselves. Instead of beginning with the actual, as best befits the\nfeebleness of the human intellect, and working their way up into the great\nsystem of things, they have taken their position at once in the high and\nboundless realm of the ideal, and thence endeavoured to deduce the nature\nof the laws and phenomena of the real world. This is the course pursued by\nPlato, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Descartes, Edwards, and, indeed, most of those\ngreat thinkers who have endeavoured to shed light on the problem in\nquestion. Hence each has necessarily become \u201ca sublime architect of\nwords,\u201d whose grand and imposing system of shadows and abstractions has\nbut a slight foundation in the real constitution and laws of the spiritual\nworld. Their writings furnish the most striking illustration of the\nprofound aphorism of Bacon, that \u201cthe usual method of discovery and proof,\nby first establishing the most general propositions, then applying and\nproving the intermediate axioms according to these, is the _parent of\nerror and the calamity of every science_.\u201d He who would frame a real model\nof the world in the understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as\nman\u2019s reason has distorted, must pursue the opposite course. Surely it\ncannot be deemed unreasonable, that this course should be most diligently\napplied to the study of the intellectual world; especially as it has\nwrought such wonders in the province of natural knowledge, and that too,\nafter so many ages had, according to the former method, laboured upon it\ncomparatively in vain. Because the human mind has not been able to bridge\nover the impassable gulf between the ideal and the concrete, so as to\neffect a passage from the former to the latter, it certainly does not\nfollow, that it should forever despair of so far penetrating the apparent\nobscurity and confusion of real things, as to see that nothing which God\nhas created is inconsistent with the eternal, immutable glory of the\nideal: or, in other words, because the real world and the ideal cannot be\nshown to be connected by a logical dependency, it does not follow, that\nthe actual creation and providence of God, that all his works and ways\ncannot be made to appear consistent with the idea of an absolutely perfect\nbeing and of the eternal laws according to which his power acts: that is\nto say, because the high _a priori_ method, which so magisterially\nproceeds to pronounce what _must be_, has failed to solve the problem of\nthe moral world, it does not follow, that the inductive method, or that\nwhich cautiously begins with an examination of what _is_, may not finally\nrise to the sublime contemplation of what _ought to be_; and, in the light\nof God\u2019s own creation, behold the magnificent model of the actual universe\nperfectly conformed to the transcendent and unutterable glory of the\nideal.\n\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity to\nteach us a lesson of humility.\n\n\nBut the assertion is frequently made, that the moral government of the\nworld is purposely left in obscurity and apparent confusion, in order to\nteach man a lesson of humility and submission, by showing him how weak and\nnarrow is the human mind. We have not, however, been able to find any\nsufficient reason or foundation for such an opinion. As every atom in the\nuniverse presents mysteries which baffle the most subtle research and the\nmost profound investigation of the human intellect, we cannot see how any\nreflecting mind can possibly find an additional lesson of humility in the\nfact, that the system of the universe itself is involved in clouds and\ndarkness. Would it not be strange, indeed, if the mind, whose grasp is not\nsufficient for the mysteries of a single atom, should be really humbled by\nthe conviction that it is too weak and limited to fathom the wonders of\nthe universe? Does the insignificance of an egg-shell appear from the fact\nthat it cannot contain the ocean?\n\nThe truth is, that the more clearly the majesty and glory of the divine\nperfections are displayed in the constitution and government of the world,\nthe more clearly shall we see the greatness of God and the littleness of\nman. No true knowledge can ever impress the human mind with a conceit of\nits own greatness. The farther its light expands, the greater must become\nthe visible sphere of the surrounding darkness; and its highest attainment\nin real knowledge must inevitably terminate in a profound sense of the\nvast, unlimited extent of its own ignorance. Hence, we need entertain no\nfear, that man\u2019s humility will ever be endangered by too great attainments\nin science. Presumption is, indeed, the natural offspring of ignorance,\nand not of knowledge. Socrates, as we have already seen, endeavoured to\ninculcate a lesson of humility, by reminding his contemporaries how far\nthe theory of the material heavens was beyond the reach of their\nfaculties. And to enforce this lesson, he assured them that it was\ndispleasing to the gods for men to attempt to pry into the wonderful art\nwherewith they had constructed the universe. In like manner, the poet, at\na much later period, puts the following sentiment into the mouth of an\nangel:\u2014\n\n\n \u201cTo ask or search, I blame thee not; for heaven\n Is as the book of God before thee set,\n Wherein to read his wondrous works, and learn\n His seasons, hours, or days, or months, or years:\n This to attain, whether heaven move or earth,\n Imports not if thou reckon right; _the rest_\n _From man or angel the great Architect_\n _Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge_\n _His secrets, to be scann\u2019d by them who ought_\n _Rather admire_; or, if they list to try\n Conjecture, he his fabric of the heavens\n Hath left to their disputes, perhaps to move\n His laughter at their quaint opinions wide\n Hereafter.\u201d\n\n\nAll this may be very well, no doubt, for him by whom it was uttered, and\nfor those who may have received it as an everlasting oracle of truth. But\nthe true lesson of humility was taught by Newton, when he solved the\nproblem of the world, and revealed the wonderful art displayed therein by\nthe Supreme Architect. Never before, in the history of the human race, was\nso impressive a conviction made of the almost absolute nothingness of man,\nwhen measured on the inconceivably magnificent scale of the universe. No\none, it is well known, felt this conviction more deeply than Newton\nhimself. \u201cI have been but as a child,\u201d said he, \u201cplaying on the sea-shore;\nnow finding some pebble rather more polished, and now some shell rather\nmore agreeably variegated than another, while the immense _ocean of truth_\nextended itself _unexplored_ before me.\u201d\n\nIt is, indeed, strangely to forget our littleness, as well as the limits\nwhich this necessarily sets to the progress of the understanding, to\nimagine that the Almighty has to conceal anything with a view to remind us\nof the weakness of our powers. Indeed, everything around us, and\neverything within us, brings home the conviction of the littleness of man.\nThere is not a page of the history of human thought on which this lesson\nis not deeply engraved. Still we do not despair. We find a ground of hope\nin the very littleness as well as in the greatness of the human powers.\n\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe littleness of the human mind a ground of hope.\n\n\nWe would yield to no one in a profound veneration for the great intellects\nof the past. But let us not be dazzled and blinded by the splendour of\ntheir achievements. Let us look at it closely, and see how wonderful it\nis\u2014this thing called the human mind. The more I think of it, the more it\nfills me with amazement. I scarcely know which amazes me the more, its\nlittleness or its grandeur. Now I see it, with all its high powers and\nglorious faculties, labouring under the ambiguity of a word, apparently in\nhopeless eclipse for centuries. Shall I therefore despise it? Before I\nhave time to do so, the power and the light which is thus shut out from\nthe world by so pitiful a cause, is revealed in all its glory. I see this\nsame intelligence forcing its way through a thousand hostile appearances,\nresisting innumerable obstacles pressing on all sides around it,\novercoming deep illusions, and inveterate opinions, almost as firmly\nseated as the very laws of nature themselves. I see it rising above all\nthese, and planting itself in the radiant seat of truth. It embraces the\nplan, it surveys the work of the Supreme Architect of all things. It\nfollows the infinite reason, and recognises the almighty power, in their\nsublimest manifestations. I rejoice in the glory of its triumphs, and am\nready to pronounce its empire boundless. But, alas! I see it again baffled\nand confounded by the wonders and mysteries of a single atom!\n\nI see this same thing, or rather its mightiest representatives, with a\nNewton or a Leibnitz at their head, in full pursuit of a shadow, and\nwasting their wonderful energies in beating the air. They have measured\nthe world, and stretched their line upon the chambers of the great deep.\nThey have weighed the sun, moon, and stars, and marked out their orbits.\nThey have determined the laws according to which all worlds and all atoms\nmove\u2014according to which the very spheres sing together. And yet, when they\ncame to measure \u201cthe force of a moving body,\u201d they toil for a century at\nthe task, and finally rest in the amazing conclusion, that \u201cthe very same\nthing may have two measures widely different from each other!\u201d Alas! that\nthe same mind, that the same god-like intelligence, which has measured\nworlds and systems, should thus have wasted its stupendous energies in\nstriving to measure a metaphor!\n\nWhen I think of its grandeur and its triumphs, I bow with reverence before\nits power, and am ready to despair of ever seeing it go farther than it\nhas already gone; but when I think of its littleness and its failures, I\ntake courage again, and determine to toil on as a living atom among living\natoms. The glory of its triumphs does not discourage me, because I also\nsee its littleness; nor can its littleness extinguish in me the light of\nhope, because I also see the glory of its triumphs. And surely this is\nright; for the intellect of man, so conspicuously combining the attributes\nof the angel and of the worm, is not to be despised without infinite\ndanger, nor followed without infinite caution.\n\nSuch, indeed, is the weakness and fallibility of the human mind, even in\nits brightest forms, that we cannot for a moment imagine, that the\ninherent difficulties of the dark enigma of the world are insuperable,\nbecause they have not been clearly and fully solved by a Leibnitz or an\nEdwards. On the contrary, we are perfectly persuaded that in the end the\nwonder will be, not that such a question should have been attempted after\nso many illustrious failures, but that any such failure should have been\nmade. This will appear the more probable, if we consider the precise\nnature of the problem to be solved, and not lose ourselves in dark and\nunintelligible notions. It is not to do some great thing\u2014it is simply to\nrefute the sophism of the atheist. If God were both willing and able to\nprevent sin, which is the only supposition consistent with the idea of\nGod, says the atheist, he would certainly have prevented it, and sin would\nnever have made its appearance in the world. But sin has made its\nappearance in the world; and hence, God must have been either unable or\nunwilling to prevent it. Now, if we take either term of this alternative,\nwe must adopt a conclusion which is at war with the idea of a God.\n\nSuch is the argument of the atheist; and sad indeed must be the condition\nof the Christian world if it be forever unable to meet and refute such a\nsophism. Yet, it is the error involved in this sophism which obscures our\nintellectual vision, and causes so perplexing a darkness to spread itself\nover the moral order and beauty of the world. Hence, in grappling with the\nsupposed great difficulty in question, we do not undertake to remove a\nveil from the universe\u2014we simply undertake to remove a sophism from our\nown minds. Though we have so spoken in accommodation with the views of\nothers, the problem of the moral world is not, in reality, high and\ndifficult _in itself_, like the great problem of the material universe. We\nrepeat, it is simply to refute and explode the sophism of the atheist. Let\nthis be blown away, and the darkness which seems to overhang the moral\ngovernment of the world will disappear like the mists of the morning.\n\nIf such be the nature of the problem in question, and such it will be\nfound to be, it is certainly a mistake to suppose that \u201cit must be\nentangled with perplexities while we see but in part.\u201d(1) It is only while\nwe see amiss, and not while we see in part, that this problem must wear\nthe appearance of a dark enigma. It is clear, that our knowledge is, and\never must be, exceedingly limited on all sides; and if we must understand\nthe whole of the case, if we must comprehend the entire extent of the\ndivine government for the universe and for eternity, before we can remove\nthe difficulty in question, we must necessarily despair of success. But we\ncannot see any sufficient ground to support this oft-repeated assertion.\nBecause the field of our vision is so exceedingly limited, we do not see\nwhy it should be forever traversed by apparent inconsistencies and\ncontradictions. In relation to the material universe, our space is but a\npoint, and our time but a moment; and yet, as that inconceivably grand\nsystem is now understood by us, there is nothing in it which seems to\nconflict with the dictates of reason, or with the infinite perfections of\nGod. On the contrary, the revelations of modern science have given an\nemphasis and a sublimity to the language of inspiration, that \u201cthe heavens\ndeclare the glory of the Lord,\u201d which had, for ages, been concealed from\nthe loftiest conception of the astronomer.\n\nNor did it require a knowledge of the whole material universe to remove\nthe difficulties, or to blast the objections which atheists had, in all\npreceding ages, raised against the perfections of its divine Author. Such\nobjections, as is well known, were raised before astronomy, as a science,\nhad an existence. Lucretius, for example, though he deemed the sun, moon,\nand stars, no larger than they appear to the eye, and supposed them to\nrevolve around the earth, undertook to point out and declaim against the\nmiserable defects which he saw, or fancied he saw, in the system of the\nmaterial world. That is to say, he undertook to criticise and find fault\nwith the great volume of nature, before he had even learned its alphabet.\nThe objections of Lucretius, which appeared so formidable in his day, as\nwell as many others that have since been raised on equally plausible\ngrounds, have passed away before the progress of science, and now seem\nlike the silly prattle of children, or the insane babble of madmen. But\nalthough such difficulties have been swept away, and our field of vision\ncleared of all that is painful and perplexing, nay, brightened with all\nthat is grand and beautiful, we seem to be farther than ever from\ncomprehending the whole of the case\u2014from grasping the amazing extent and\nglory of the material globe. And why may not this ultimately be the case\nalso in relation to the moral universe? Why should every attempt to clear\nup its difficulties, and blow away the objections of atheism to its order\nand beauty, be supposed to originate in presumption and to terminate in\nimpiety? Are we so much the less interested in knowing the ways of God in\nregard to the constitution and government of the moral world than of the\nmaterial, that he should purposely conceal the former from us, while he\nhas permitted the latter to be laid open so as to ravish our minds? We can\nbelieve no such thing; and we are not willing to admit that there is any\npart of the creation of God in which omniscience alone can cope with the\natheist.\n\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe construction of a Theodicy, not an attempt to solve mysteries, but to\ndissipate absurdities.\n\n\nAs we have merely undertaken to refute the atheist, and vindicate the\nglory of the divine perfections, so it would be a grievous mistake to\nsuppose, that we are about to pry into the holy mysteries of religion. No\nsound mind is ever perplexed by the contemplation of mysteries. Indeed,\nthey are a source of positive satisfaction and delight. If nothing were\ndark,\u2014if all around us, and above us, were clearly seen,\u2014the truth itself\nwould soon appear stale and mean. Everything truly great must transcend\nthe powers of the human mind; and hence, if nothing were mysterious, there\nwould be nothing worthy of our veneration and worship. It is mystery,\nindeed, which lends such unspeakable grandeur and variety to the scenery\nof the moral world. Without it, all would be clear, it is true, but\nnothing grand. There would be lights, but no shadows. And around the very\nlights themselves, there would be nothing soothing and sublime, in which\nthe soul might rest and the imagination revel.\n\nHence it is no part of our object to pry into mystery, but to get rid of\nabsurdity. And in our humble opinion, this would long since have been\ndone, and the difficulty in question solved, had not the friends of truth\nincautiously given the most powerful protection to the sophism and\nabsurdity of the atheist, by throwing around it the sacred garb of\nmystery.\n\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted, and the\nrelation of the author to other systems.\n\n\nIn conclusion, we offer a few remarks in relation to the manner and spirit\nin which the following work has been undertaken and prosecuted. In the\nfirst place, the writer may truly say, that he did not enter on the\napparently dark problem of the moral world with the least hope that he\nshould be able to throw any light upon it, nor with any other set purpose\nand design. He simply revolved the subject in mind, because he was by\nnature prone to such meditations. So far from having aimed at things\nusually esteemed so high and difficult with a feeling of presumptuous\nconfidence, he has, indeed, suffered most from that spirit of despondency,\nthat despair of scepticism, against which, in the foregoing pages, he has\nappeared so anxious to caution others. It has been patient reflection, and\nthe reading of excellent authors, together with an earnest desire to know\nthe truth, which has delivered him from the power of that spirit, and\nconducted him to what now so clearly seems \u201cthe bright and shining light\nof truth.\u201d\n\nIt was, in fact, while engaged in meditation on the powers and\nsusceptibilities of the human mind, as well as on the relations they\nsustain to each and to other things, and not in any direct attempt to\nelucidate the origin of evil, that the first clear light appeared to dawn\non this great difficulty: and in no other way, he humbly conceives, can\nthe true philosophy of the spiritual world ever be comprehended. For, as\nthe laws of matter had first to be studied and traced out in relation to\nbodies on the earth, before they could be extended to the heavens, and\nmade to explain its wonderful mechanism; so must the laws and phenomena of\nthe human mind be correctly analyzed and clearly defined, in order to\nobtain an insight into the intellectual system of the universe. And just\nin proportion as the clouds and darkness hanging over the phenomena of our\nown minds are made to disappear, will the intellectual system of the world\nwhich God \u201chas set in our hearts,\u201d become more distinct and beautiful in\nits proportions. For it is the mass of real contradictions and\nobscurities, existing in the little world within, which distorts to our\nview the great world without, and causes the work and ways of God to\nappear so full of disorders. Hence, in proportion as these real\ncontradictions and obscurities are removed, will the mind become a truer\nmicrocosm, or more faithful mirror, in which the image of the universe\nwill unfold itself, free from the apparent disorders and confusion which\nseem to render it unworthy of its great Author and Ruler.\n\nSecondly, the relation which the writer sustains to other systems, has\nbeen, it appears to himself, most favourable to a successful prosecution\nof the following speculations. Whether at the outset of his inquiries, he\nwas the more of an Arminian or of a Calvinist, he is unable to say; but if\nhis crude and imperfectly developed sentiments had then been made known,\nit is probable he would have been ranked with the Arminians. Be this as it\nmay, it is certain that he was never so much of an Arminian, or of\nanything else, as to imagine that Calvinism admitted of nothing great and\ngood. On the contrary, he has ever believed that the Calvinists were at\nleast equal to any other body of men in piety, which is certainly the\nhighest and noblest of all qualities. And besides, it was a constant\ndelight to him to read the great master-pieces of reasoning which\nCalvinism had furnished for the instruction and admiration of mankind. By\nthis means he came to believe that the scheme of the Arminians could not\nbe maintained, and his faith in it was gradually undermined.\n\nBut although he thus submitted his mind to the dominion of Calvinism, as\nadvocated by Edwards, and earnestly espoused it with some exceptions; he\nnever felt that profound, internal satisfaction of the truth of the\nsystem, after which his rational nature continually longed, and which it\nstruggled to realize. He certainly expected to find this satisfaction in\nCalvinism, if anywhere. Long, therefore, did he pass over every portion of\nCalvinism, in order to discover, if possible, how its foundations might be\nrendered more clear and convincing, and all its parts harmonized among\nthemselves as well as with the great undeniable facts of man\u2019s nature and\ndestiny. While engaged in these inquiries, he has been more than once led\nto see what appeared to be a flaw in Calvinism itself; but without at\nfirst perceiving all its consequences. By reflection on these apparent\ndefects; nay, by protracted and earnest meditation on them, his suspicions\nhave been confirmed and his opinions changed. If what now so clearly\nappears to be the truth is so or not, it is certain that it has not been\nembraced out of a spirit of opposition to Calvinism, or to any other\nsystem of religious faith whatever. Its light, whether real or imaginary,\nhas dawned upon his mind while seeking after truth amid the foundations of\nCalvinism itself; and this light has been augmented more by reading the\nworks of Calvinists themselves, than those of their opponents.\n\nThese things are here set down, not because the writer thinks they should\nhave any weight or influence to bias the judgment of the reader, but\nbecause he wishes it to be understood that he entertains the most profound\nveneration for the great and good men whose works seem to stand in the way\nof the following design to vindicate the glory of God, and which,\ntherefore, he will not scruple to assail in so far as this may be\nnecessary to his purpose. It is, indeed, a matter of deep and\ninexpressible regret, that in our conflicts with the powers of darkness,\nwe should, however undesignedly, be weakened and opposed by Christian\ndivines and philosophers. But so it seems to be, and we dare not cease to\nresist them. And if, in the following attempt to vindicate the glory of\nGod, it shall become necessary to call in question the infallibility of\nthe great founders of human systems, this, it is to be hoped, will not be\ndeemed an unpardonable offence.\n\nThus has the writer endeavoured to work his way through the mingled lights\nand obscurity of human systems into a bright and beautiful vision of the\ngreat harmonious system of the world itself. It is certainly either a\nsublime truth, or else a glorious illusion, which thus enables him to rise\nabove the apparent disorders and perturbations of the world, as\nconstituted and governed by the Almighty, and behold the real order and\nharmony therein established. The ideal creations of the poet and the\nphilosopher sink into perfect insignificance beside the actual creation of\nGod. Where clouds and darkness once appeared the most impenetrable, there\nscenes of indescribable magnificence and beauty are now beheld with\ninexpressible delight; the stupendous cloud of evil no longer hangs\noverhead, but rolls beneath us, while the eternal Reason from above\npermeates its gloom, and irradiates its depths. We now behold the reason,\nand absolutely rejoice in the contemplation, of that which once seemed\nlike a dark blot on the world\u2019s design.\n\nIn using this language, we do not wish to be understood as laying claim to\nthe discovery of any great truth, or any new principle. Yet we do trust,\nthat we have attained to a clear and precise statement of old truths. And\nthese truths, thus clearly defined, we trust that we have seized with a\nfirm grasp, and carried as lights through the dark places of theology, so\nas to expel thence the errors and delusions by which its glory has been\nobscured. Moreover, if we have not succeeded, nor even attempted to\nsucceed, in solving any mysteries, properly so called, yet may we have\nremoved certain apparent contradictions, which have been usually deemed\ninsuperable to the human mind.\n\nBut even if the reader should be satisfied beforehand, that no additional\nlight will herein be thrown on the problem of the moral world, yet would\nwe remind him, that it does not necessarily follow that the ensuing\ndiscourse is wholly unworthy of his attention: for the materials, though\nold, may be presented in new combinations, and much may be omitted which\nhas disfigured and obscured the beauty of most other systems. Although no\nnew fountains of light may be opened, yet may the vision of the soul be so\npurged of certain films of error as to enable it to reflect the glory of\nthe spiritual universe, just as a single dew-drop is seen to mirror forth\nthe magnificent cope of heaven with all its multitude of stars.\n\nWe have sought the truth, and how far we have found it, no one should\nproceed to determine without having first read and examined. We have\nsought it, not in Calvinism alone, nor in Arminianism alone, nor in any\nother creed or system of man\u2019s devising. In every direction have we\ndiligently sought it, as our feeble abilities would permit; and yet, we\nhope, it will be found that the body of truth which we now have to offer\nis not a mere hasty patchwork of superficial eclecticism, but a living and\norganic whole. By this test we could wish to be tried; for, as Bacon hath\nwell said, \u201cIt is the harmony of any philosophy in itself that giveth it\nlight and credence.\u201d And in the application of this test, we could also\nwish, that the reader would so far forget his sectarian predilections, if\nhe have any, as to permit his mind to be inspired by the immortal words of\nMilton, which we shall here adopt as a fitting conclusion of these our\npresent remarks:\u2014\n\n\u201cTruth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine Master, and was a\nperfect shape most glorious to look on; but when he ascended, and his\napostles after him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of\ndeceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon, with his\nconspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin, Truth,\nhewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the\nfour winds. From that time ever since the sad friends of Truth, such as\ndurst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled\nbody of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they\ncould find them. We have not yet found them all, nor ever shall do, till\nher Master\u2019s second coming; he shall bring together every joint and\nmember, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and\nperfection. Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to stand at every\nplace of opportunity, forbidding and disturbing them that continue\nseeking, that continue to do our obsequies to the torn body of our\nmartyred saint. We boast our light; but if we look not wisely on the sun\nitself, it smites us into darkness. Who can discern those planets that are\noft combust, and those stars of brightest magnitude, that rise and set\nwith the sun, until the opposite motion of their orbs bring them to such a\nplace in the firmament, where they may be seen morning or evening? The\nlight which we have gained was given us, not to be ever staring on, but by\nit to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge. It is not the\nunfrocking of a priest, the unmitring of a bishop, and the removing him\nfrom off the Presbyterian shoulders, that will make us a happy nation; no,\nif other things as great in the Church, and in the rule of life, both\neconomical and political, be not looked into and reformed, we have looked\nso long upon the blaze that Zuinglius and Calvin have beaconed up to us,\nthat we are stark blind. There be who perpetually complain of schisms and\nsects, and make it such a calamity that any man dissents from their\nmaxims. It is their own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing,\nwho neither will hear with meekness, nor can convince, yet all must be\nsuppressed which is not found in their Syntagma. They are the troublers,\nthey are the dividers of unity, who neglect and permit not others to unite\nthose dissevered pieces which are yet wanting to the body of truth. To be\nstill searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth\nto truth as we find it, (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional,)\nthis is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic, and makes up\nthe best harmony in a Church; not the forced and outward union of cold,\nand neutral, and inwardly-divided minds.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n Part I.\n\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, CONSISTENT WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD.\n\n\n What Time this World\u2019s great Workmaister did cast,\n To make all things such as we now behold,\n It seems that he before his eyes had plast\n A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould\n He fashion\u2019d them as comely as he could,\n That now so fair and seemly they appear,\n As naught may be amended anywhere.\n\n That wondrous patterne, wheresoe\u2019er it be,\n Whether in earth laid up in secret store,\n Or else in heav\u2019n, that no man may it see\n With sinful eyes, for feare it to deflore,\n Is perfect Beautie.\u2014SPENSER.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter I.\n\n\nThe Scheme Of Necessity Denies That Man Is Responsible For The Existence\nOf Sin.\n\n\n Ye, who live,\n Do so each cause refer to Heaven above,\n E\u2019en as its motion, of necessity,\n Drew with it all that moves. If this were so,\n Free choice in you were none; nor justice would\n There should be joy for virtue, woe for ill.\u2014DANTE.\n\n\nThe doctrine of necessity has been, in all ages of the world, the great\nstronghold of atheism. It is the mighty instrument with which the\nunbeliever seeks to strip man of all accountability, and to destroy our\nfaith and confidence in God, by tracing up the existence of all moral evil\nto his agency. \u201cThe opinion of necessity,\u201d says Bishop Butler, \u201cseems to\nbe the very basis in which infidelity grounds itself.\u201d It will not be\ndenied that this opinion seems, at first view, to be inconsistent with the\nfree agency and accountability of man, and that it appears to impair our\nidea of God by staining it with impurity. Hence it has been used, by the\nprofligate and profane, to excuse men for their crimes. It is against this\nuse of the doctrine that we intend to direct the force of our argument.\n\nBut here the question arises: Can we refute the argument against the\naccountability of man, without attacking the doctrine on which it is\nfounded? If we can meet this argument at all, it must be either by showing\nthat no such consequence flows from the scheme of necessity, or by showing\nthat the scheme itself is false. We cannot meet the sceptic, who seeks to\nexcuse his sins, and to cast dishonour on God, and expose his sophistry,\nunless we can show that his premises are unsound, or that his conclusions\nare false. We must do the one or the other of these two things; or,\nwhatever we may think of his moral sensibility, we must acknowledge the\nsuperiority of his reason and logic. After long and patient meditation on\nthe subject, we have been forced to the conclusion, that the only way to\nrepel the argument of the sceptic, and cause the intrinsic lustre of man\u2019s\nfree-agency to appear, is to unravel and refute the doctrine of necessity.\n\nIf we could preserve the scheme of necessity, and at the same time avoid\nthe consequences in question, we may fairly conclude that the means of\ndoing so have been found by some of the illustrious advocates of that\nscheme. How, then, do they vindicate their own system? How do they repel\nthe frightful consequences which infidelity deduces from it? This is the\nfirst question to be considered; and the discussion of it will occupy the\nremainder of the present chapter.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity\nwith the responsibility of man.\n\n\nNothing can be more unjust than to bring, as has often been done, the\nunqualified charge of fatalism against the great Protestant reformers. The\nmanner in which this odious epithet is frequently used, applying it\nwithout discrimination to the brightest ornaments and to the darkest\nspecimens of humanity, is calculated to engender far more heat than light.\nIndeed, under this very ambiguous term, three distinct schemes of\ndoctrine, widely different from each other, are set forth; schemes which\nevery candid inquirer after truth should be careful to distinguish. The\nfirst is that scheme of fatalism which rests on the fundamental idea that\nthere is nothing in the universe besides matter and local motion. This\ndoctrine, of course, denies the spirituality of the Divine Being, as well\nas of all created souls, and strikes a fatal blow at the immutability of\nmoral distinctions. It is unnecessary to say, that in such a sense of the\nword, neither Calvin nor Luther can be justly accused of fatalism; as it\nis well known that both of them maintained the spirituality of God, as\nwell as the reality of moral distinctions prior to all human laws.\n\nThe second scheme of fatalism rises above the first in point of dignity\nand purity of character. It proceeds on the idea that all things in heaven\nand earth are bound together by \u201can implexed series and concatenation of\ncauses:\u201d it admits the existence of God, it is true, but yet it regards\nhim as merely the greatest and brightest link in the adamantine universal\nchain of necessity. According to this scheme, as well as to the former,\nthe very idea of moral liberty is inconceivable and impossible. This\nportentous scheme was perfectly understood and expressly repudiated by\nCalvin. In reference to this doctrine, which was maintained by the ancient\nStoics, he says: \u201cThat dogma is falsely and maliciously charged upon us.\nFor we do not, with the Stoics, imagine a necessity arising from a\nperpetual concatenation and intricate series of causes contained in\nnature; but we make God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in\nhis own wisdom, has, from all eternity, decreed what he would do, and now\nby his own power executes what he decreed.\u201d\n\nHere we behold the nature of the third scheme, which has been included\nunder the term _fatalism_. It recognises God as the great central and\nall-controlling power of the universe. It does not deny the possibility of\nliberty; for it recognises its actual existence in the Divine Being. \u201cIf\nthe divine will,\u201d says Calvin, \u201chas any cause, then there must be\nsomething antecedent, on which it depends; which it is impious to\nsuppose.\u201d According to Calvin, it is the uncaused divine will which makes\nthe \u201cnecessity of all things.\u201d He frequently sets forth the doctrine,\nthat, from all eternity, God decreed whatever should come to pass, not\nexcepting, but expressly including, the deliberations and \u201cvolitions of\nmen,\u201d and by his own power now executes his decree. As we do not wish to\nuse opprobrious names, we shall characterize these three several schemes\nof doctrine by the appellations given to them by their advocates. The\nfirst we shall call, \u201cmaterialistic fatalism;\u201d the second, \u201cStoical\nfatalism;\u201d and the third we shall designate by the term, \u201c_necessity_.\u201d\n\nWidely as these schemes may differ in other respects, they have one\nfeature in common: they all seem to bear with equal stringency on the\nhuman will, and deprive it of that freedom which is now conceded to be\nindispensable to render men accountable for their actions. If our\nvolitions be produced by a series of causes, according to the Stoical\nnotion of fate, or by the omnipotence of God, they would seem to be\nequally necessitated and devoid of freedom. Hence, in attacking one of\nthese schemes at this point, we really attack them all. We shall first\nconsider the question, then, How does Calvin attempt to reconcile his\ndoctrine with the accountability of man? How does he show, for example,\nthat the first man was guilty and justly punishable for a transgression in\nwhich he succumbed to the divine omnipotence?\n\nIf a man is really laid under a necessity of sinning, it would certainly\nseem impossible to conceive that he is responsible for his sins. Nay, it\nwould not only seem impossible to conceive this, but it would also appear\nvery easy to understand, that he could not be responsible for them. In\norder to remove this difficulty, and repel the attack of his opponents,\nCalvin makes a distinction between \u201cco-action and necessity.\u201d \u201cNow, when I\nassert,\u201d says he, \u201cthat the will, being deprived of its liberty, is\nnecessarily drawn or led into evil, I should wonder if any one considered\nit as a harsh expression, since it has nothing in it absurd, nor is it\nunsanctioned by the custom of good men. It offends those who know not how\nto distinguish between necessity and compulsion.\u201d(2) Let us see, then,\nwhat is this distinction between necessity and compulsion, or co-action,\n(as Calvin sometimes calls it,) which is to take off all appearance of\nharshness from his views. We are not to imagine that this is a distinction\nwithout a difference; for, in truth, there is no distinction in philosophy\nwhich may be more easily made, or more clearly apprehended. It is this:\nSuppose a man wills a particular thing, or external action, and it is\nprevented from happening by any outward restraint; or suppose he is\nunwilling to do a thing, and he is constrained to do it against his will;\nhe is said to labour under compulsion or co-action. Of course he is not\naccountable for the failure of the consequence of his will in the one\ncase, nor for the consequence of the force imposed on his body in the\nother. This kind of necessity is called co-action by Calvin and Luther; it\nis usually denominated \u201cnatural necessity\u201d by Edwards and his followers;\nthough it is also frequently termed compulsion, or co-action, by them.\n\nThis natural necessity, or co-action, it is admitted on all hands,\ndestroys accountability for external conduct, wherever it obtains. Indeed,\nif a man is compelled to do a thing against his will, this is not,\nproperly speaking, his act at all; nor is it an omission of his, if he\nwills to do a thing, and is necessarily prevented from doing it by\nexternal restraint. But it should be observed that natural necessity, or\nco-action, reaches no deeper than the external conduct; and can excuse for\nnothing else. As it does not influence the will itself, so it cannot\nexcuse for acts of the will. Indeed, it presupposes the existence of a\nvolition, or act of the will, whose natural consequences it counteracts\nand overcomes. Hence, if the question were\u2014Is a man accountable for his\nexternal actions, that is, for the motions of his body, we might speak of\nnatural necessity, or co-action, with propriety; but not so when the\nquestion relates to internal acts of the will. All reference to natural\nnecessity, or co-action, in relation to such a question, is wholly\nirrelevant. No one doubts, and no one denies, that the motions of the body\nare controlled by the volitions of the mind, or by some external force.\nThe advocates for the inherent activity and freedom of the mind, do not\nplace them in the external sphere of matter, in the passive and\nnecessitated movements of body: they seek not the living among the dead.\n\nBut to do justice to these illustrious men, they did not attempt, as many\nof their followers have done, to pass off this freedom from external\nco-action for the freedom of the will. Indeed, neither of them contended\nfor the freedom of the will at all, nor deemed such freedom requisite to\nrender men accountable for their actions. This is an element which has\nbeen wrought into their system by the subsequent progress of human\nknowledge. Luther, it is well known, so far from maintaining the freedom\nof the mind, wrote a work on the \u201cBondage of the Human Will,\u201d in reply to\nErasmus. \u201cI admit,\u201d says he, \u201cthat man\u2019s will is free in a certain sense;\nnot because it is now in the same state it was in paradise, _but because\nit was made free originally, and may, through God\u2019s grace, become so\nagain_.\u201d(3) And Calvin, in his Institutes, has written a chapter to show\nthat \u201cman, in his present state, is despoiled of freedom of will, and\nsubjected to a miserable slavery.\u201d He \u201cwas endowed with free will,\u201d says\nCalvin, \u201cby which, if he had chosen, he might have obtained eternal\nlife.\u201d(4) Thus, according to both Luther and Calvin, man was by the fall\ndespoiled of the freedom of the will.\n\nThough they allow a freedom from co-action, they repudiate the idea of\ncalling this a freedom of the will. \u201cLombard at length pronounces,\u201d says\nCalvin, \u201cthat we are not therefore possessed of free-will, because we have\nan equal power to do or to think either good or evil, _but only because we\nare free from constraint_. And this liberty is not diminished, although we\nare corrupt, and slaves of sin, _and capable of doing nothing but sin_.\nThen man will be said to possess free-will in this sense, not that he has\nan equally free election of good and evil, but because he does evil\nvoluntarily, _and not by constraint_. That indeed, is true; but what end\ncould it answer to deck out a thing so diminutive with a title so\nsuperb?\u201d(5) Truly, if Lombard merely meant by the freedom of the will, for\nwhich he contended, a freedom from external restraint, or co-action,\nCalvin might well contemptuously exclaim, \u201cEgregious liberty!\u201d(6) It was\nreserved for a later period in the history of the Church to deck out this\ndiminutive thing with the superb title of the freedom of the will, and to\npass it off for the highest and most glorious liberty of which the human\nmind can form any conception. Hobbes, it will be hereafter seen, was the\nfirst who, either designedly or undesignedly, palmed off this imposture\nupon the world.\n\nIt is a remarkable fact, in the history of the human mind, that the most\npowerful and imposing arguments used by the early reformers to disprove\nthe freedom of the will have been as confidently employed by their most\ncelebrated followers to establish that very freedom on a solid basis. It\nis well known, for example, that Edwards, and many other great men, have\nemployed the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God to prove philosophical\nnecessity, without which they conclude there can be no rational foundation\nfor the freedom of the will. Yet, in former times, this very doctrine was\nregarded as the most formidable instrument with which to overthrow and\ndemolish that very freedom. Thus Luther calls the foreknowledge of God a\nthunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms. And who can\nforbear to agree with Luther so far as to say, that if the foreknowledge\nof God proves anything in opposition to the freedom of the will, it proves\nthat it is under the most absolute and uncontrollable necessity? It\nclearly seems, that if it proves anything in favour of necessity, it\nproves everything for which the most absolute necessitarian can contend.\nAccordingly, a distinguished Calvinistic divine has said, that if our\nvolitions be foreseen, we can no more avoid them \u201cthan we can pluck the\nsun out of the heavens.\u201d(7)\n\nBut though the reformers were thus, in some respects, more true to their\nfundamental principle than their followers have been, we are not to\nsuppose that they are free from all inconsistencies and\nself-contradiction. Thus, if \u201cforeknowledge is a thunderbolt\u201d to dash the\ndoctrine of free-will into atoms, it destroyed free-will in man before the\nfall as well as after. Hence the thunderbolt of Luther falls upon his own\ndoctrine, that man possessed free-will in his primitive state, with as\nmuch force as it can upon the doctrine of his opponents. He is evidently\ncaught in the toils he so confidently prepared for his adversary. And how\nmany of the followers of the great reformer adopt his doctrine, and wield\nhis thunderbolts, without perceiving how destructively they recoil on\nthemselves! Though they ascribe free-will to man as one of the elements of\nhis pristine glory, yet they employ against it in his present condition\narguments which, if good for anything, would despoil, not only man, but\nthe whole universe of created intelligences\u2014nay, the great Uncreated\nIntelligence himself\u2014of every vestige and shadow of such a power.\n\nIt is a wonderful inconsistency in Luther, that he should so often and so\ndogmatically assert that the doctrine of free-will falls prostrate before\nthe prescience of God, and at the same time maintain the freedom of the\ndivine will. If foreknowledge is incompatible with the existence of\nfree-will, it is clear that the will of God is not free; since it is on\nall sides conceded that all his volitions are perfectly foreseen by him.\nYet in the face of this conclusion, which so clearly and so irresistibly\nfollows from Luther\u2019s position, he asserts the freedom of the divine will,\nas if he were perfectly unconscious of the self-contradiction in which he\nis involved. \u201cIt now then follows,\u201d says he, \u201cthat free-will is plainly a\ndivine term, and can be applicable to none but the Divine Majesty\nonly.\u201d(8) ... He even says, If free-will \u201cbe ascribed unto men, it is not\nmore properly ascribed, than the divinity of God himself would be ascribed\nunto them; which would be the greatest of all sacrilege. Wherefore, it\nbecomes theologians to refrain from the use of this term altogether,\nwhenever they wish to speak of human ability, and to leave it to be\napplied to God only.\u201d(9) And we may add, if they would apply it to God, it\nbecomes them to refrain from all such arguments as would show even such an\napplication of it to be absurd.\n\nIn like manner, Calvin admits that the human soul possessed a free-will in\nits primitive state, but has been despoiled of it by the fall, and is now\nin bondage to a \u201cmiserable slavery.\u201d But if the necessity which arises\nfrom the power of sin over the will be inconsistent with its freedom, how\nare we to reconcile the freedom of the first man with the power exercised\nby the Almighty over the wills of all created beings? So true it is, that\nthe most systematic thinker, who begins by denying the truth, will be sure\nto end by contradicting himself.\n\nIn one respect, as we have seen, Calvin differs from his followers at the\npresent day; the denial of free-will he regards as perfectly reconcilable\nwith the idea of accountability. Although our volitions are absolutely\nnecessary to us, although they may be produced in us by the most\nuncontrollable power in the universe, yet are we accountable for them,\nbecause they are our volitions. The bare fact that we will such and such a\nthing, without regard to how we come by the volition, is sufficient to\nrender us accountable for it. We must be free from an external\n_co-action_, he admits, to render us accountable for our external actions;\nbut not from an internal necessity, to render us accountable for our\ninternal volitions. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory reply to\nthe difficulty in question. We ask, How a man can be accountable for his\nacts, for his volitions, if they are caused in him by an infinite power?\nand we are told, Because they are _his_ acts. This eternal repetition of\nthe fact in which all sides are agreed, can throw no light on the point\nabout which we dispute. We still ask, How can a man be responsible for an\nact, or volition, which is necessitated to arise in his mind by\nOmnipotence? If any one should reply, with Dr. Dick, that we do not know\nhow he can be accountable for such an act, yet we should never deny a\nthing because we cannot see how it is; this would not be a satisfactory\nanswer. For, though it is certainly the last weakness of the human mind to\ndeny a thing, because we cannot see how it is; yet there is a great\ndifference between not being able to see _how a thing is_, and being\nclearly able to see that it _cannot be anyhow at all_,\u2014between being\nunable to see how two things agree together, and being able to see that\ntwo ideas are utterly repugnant to each other. Hence we mean to ask, that\nif a man\u2019s act be necessitated in him by an infinite, omnipotent power,\nover which he had, and could have, no possible control, can we not see\nthat he _cannot_ be accountable for it? We have no difficulty whatever in\nbelieving a mystery; but when we are required to embrace what so plainly\nseems to be an absurdity, we confess that our reason is either weak\nenough, or strong enough, to pause and reluctate.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others, endeavour to reconcile\nnecessity with free and accountable agency.\n\n\nThe celebrated philosopher of Malmsbury viewed all things as bound\ntogether in the relation of cause and effect; and he was, beyond doubt,\none of the most acute thinkers that ever advocated the doctrine of\nnecessity. From some of the sentiments expressed towards the conclusion of\n\u201cThe Leviathan,\u201d which have, not without reason, subjected him to the\ncharge of atheism, we may doubt his entire sincerity when he pretends to\nadvocate the doctrine of necessity out of a zeal for the Divine\nSovereignty and the dogma of Predestination. If he hoped by this avowal of\nhis design to propitiate any class of theologians, he must have been\ngreatly disappointed; for his speculations were universally condemned by\nthe Christian world as atheistical in their tendency. This charge has been\nfixed upon him, in spite of his solemn protestations against its\ninjustice, and his earnest endeavours to reconcile his scheme of necessity\nwith the free-agency and accountability of man.\n\n\u201cI conceive,\u201d says Hobbes, \u201cthat nothing taketh beginning from itself, but\nfrom the action of some other immediate agent without itself. And that\ntherefore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to\nwhich immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his\nwill is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing;\nso that it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is\nthe necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by\nother things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary\nactions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are\nnecessitated.\u201d This is clear and explicit. There is no controversy, he\ntruly says, that voluntary actions, that is, external actions proceeding\nfrom the will, are necessitated by the will. And as according to his\npostulate, the will or volition is also caused by other things of which it\nhas no disposal, so they are also necessitated. In other words, external\nvoluntary actions are necessarily caused by volitions, and volitions are\nnecessarily caused by something else other than the will; and consequently\nthe chain is complete between the cause of volition and its effects. How,\nthen, is man a free-agent? and how is he accountable for his actions?\nHobbes has not left these questions unanswered; and it is a mistake to\nsuppose, as is too often done, that his argument in favour of necessity\nevinces a design to sap the foundations of human responsibility.\n\nHe answers these questions precisely as they were answered by Luther and\nCalvin more than a hundred years before his time. In order to solve this\ngreat difficulty, and establish an agreement between necessity and\nliberty, he insists on the distinction between co-action and necessity.\nSir James Mackintosh says, that \u201cin his treatise _de Servo Arbitrio_\nagainst Erasmus, Luther states the distinction between co-action and\nnecessity as familiar a hundred and fifty years before it was proposed by\nHobbes, or condemned in the Jansenists.\u201d(10) According to his definition\nof liberty, it is merely a freedom from co-action, or external compulsion.\n\u201cI conceive liberty,\u201d says he, \u201cto be rightly defined in this manner:\nLiberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not\ncontained in the nature and intrinsical qualities of the agent: as for\nexample, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to\ndescend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that\nway; but not across, because the banks are impediments; and though the\nwater cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants liberty to ascend, but the\nfaculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and\nintrinsical.\u201d According to this definition, though a man\u2019s volitions were\nthrown out, not by himself, but by some irresistible power working within\nhis mind, say the power of the Almighty, yet he would be free, provided\nthere were no impediments to prevent the external effects of his\nvolitions. This is the liberty which water, impelled by the power of\ngravity, possesses in descending the channel of a river. It is the liberty\nof the winds and waves of the sea, which, by a sort of metaphor, is\nsupposed to reign over the dominions of a mechanical and materialistic\nfate. It is the most idle of all idle things to speak of such a liberty,\n_or rather, to use the word in such a sense_, when the controversy relates\nto the freedom of the mind itself. What has such a thing to do with the\norigin of human volitions, or the nature of moral agency? Is there no\ndifference between the motion of the body and the action of mind? Or is\nthere nothing in the universe of God but mere body and local motion? If\nthere is not, then, indeed, we neither have nor can conceive any higher\nliberty than that which the philosopher is pleased to allow us to possess;\nbut if there be mind, then there may be things in heaven and earth which\nare not dreamed of in his philosophy.\n\nThe definition which Collins, the disciple of Hobbes, has given of\nliberty, is the same as that of his master. \u201cI contend,\u201d says he, \u201cfor\nliberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills or pleases.\u201d The\ndoing here refers to the external action, which, properly speaking, is not\nan act at all, but merely a change of state in the body. The body merely\n_suffers_ a change of place and position, in obedience to the act of the\nwill; it does not act, nor can it act, because it is passive in its\nnature. To _do_ as one wills, in this sense, is a freedom of the body from\nco-action; it is not a freedom of the will from internal necessity.\nCollins says this is \u201ca valuable liberty,\u201d and he says truly; for if one\nwere thrown into prison, he could not go wherever he might please, or do\nas he might will. But the imprisonment of the body does not prevent a man\nfrom being a free-agent. He also tells us truly, that \u201cmany philosophers\nand theologians, both ancient and modern, have given definitions of\nliberty that are consistent with fate and necessity.\u201d But then, their\ndefinitions, like his own, had no reference to the acts of the mind, but\nto the motions of the body; and it is a grand irrelevancy, we repeat, to\nspeak of such a thing, when the question relates, not to the freedom of\nthe body, but the freedom of the mind. Calvin truly says, that to call\nthis external freedom from co-action or natural necessity a freedom of the\nwill, is to decorate a most diminutive thing with a superb title; but the\nphilosopher of Malmsbury, and his ingenious disciple, seem disposed to\nconfer the high-sounding title and empty name on us, in order to reconcile\nus to the servitude and chains in which they have been pleased to bind us.\n\nThis idea of liberty, common to Hobbes and Collins, which Mackintosh says\nwas familiar to Luther and Calvin at least a hundred and thirty years\nbefore, is in reality of much earlier origin. It was maintained by the\nancient Stoics, by whom it is as clearly set forth as by Hobbes himself.\nThe well-known illustration of the Stoic Chrysippus, so often mentioned by\nLeibnitz and others, is a proof of the correctness of this remark:\n\u201cSuppose I push against a heavy body,\u201d says he: \u201cif it be square, it will\nnot move; if it be cylindrical, it will. What the difference of form is to\nthe stone, the difference of disposition is to the mind.\u201d Thus his notion\nof freedom was derived from matter, and supposed to consist in the absence\nof friction! The idea of liberty thus deduced from that which is purely\nand perfectly passive, from an absolutely necessitated state of body, was\neasily reconciled by him with his doctrine of fate.\n\nIs it not strange that Mr. Hazlitt, after adopting this definition of\nliberty, should have supposed that he allowed a real freedom to the will?\n\u201cI prefer exceedingly,\u201d says he, \u201cto the modern instances of a couple of\nbilliard-balls, or a pair of scales, the illustration of Chrysippus.\u201d We\ncannot very well see, how the instance of a cylinder is so great an\nimprovement on that of a billiard-ball; especially as a sphere, and not a\ncylinder, is free to move in all directions.\n\nThe truth is, we must quit the region of dead, inert, passive matter, if\nwe would form an idea of the true meaning of the term liberty, as applied\nto the activity of living agents. Mr. Hazlitt evidently loses himself amid\nthe ambiguities of language, when he says, that \u201cI so far agree with\nHobbes and differ from Locke, in thinking that liberty, in the most\nextended and abstracted sense, is applicable to _material as well as\nvoluntary agents_.\u201d Still this very acute writer makes a few feeble and\nineffectual efforts to raise our notion of the liberty of moral agents\nabove that given by the illustration of Chrysippus in Cicero. \u201cMy notion\nof a free agent, I confess,\u201d says he, \u201cis not that represented by Mr.\nHobbes, namely, one that when all things necessary to produce the effect\nare present, can nevertheless not produce it; but I believe a free-agent\nof whatever kind is one which, where all things necessary to produce the\neffect are present, can produce it; its own operation not being hindered\nby anything else. The body is said to be free when it has the power to\nobey the direction of the will; so the will may be said to be free when it\nhas the power to obey the dictates of the understanding.\u201d(11) Thus the\nliberty of the will is made to consist not in the denial that its\nvolitions are produced, but in the absence of impediments which might\nhinder its operations from taking effect. This idea of liberty, it is\nevident, is perfectly consistent with the materialistic fatalism of\nHobbes, which is so much admired by Mr. Hazlitt.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche, concerning the\nrelation between liberty and necessity.\n\n\nNo one was ever more deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity than\nDescartes. \u201cMere philosophy,\u201d says he, \u201cis enough to make us know that\nthere cannot enter the least thought into the mind of man, but God must\nwill and have willed from all eternity that it should enter there.\u201d His\nargument in proof of this position is short and intelligible. \u201cGod,\u201d says\nhe, \u201ccould not be absolutely perfect if there could happen anything in\nthis world which did not spring entirely from him.\u201d Hence it follows, that\nit is inconsistent with the absolute perfections of God to suppose that a\nbeing created by him could put forth a volition which does not spring\nentirely from him, and not even in part from the creature.\n\nYet Descartes is a warm believer in the doctrine of free-will. On the\nground of reason, he believes in an absolute predestination of all things;\nand yet he concludes from experience that man is free. If we ask how these\nthings can hang together, he replies, that we cannot tell; that a solution\nof this difficulty lies beyond the reach of the human faculties. Now, it\nis evident, that reason cannot \u201cmake us know\u201d one thing, and experience\nteach another, quite contrary to it; for no two truths can ever contradict\neach other. Those who adopt this mode of viewing the subject, generally\nremind us of the feebleness of human reason, and of the necessary limits\nto all human speculation. Though, as disciples of Butler, we are deeply\nimpressed with these truths, yet, as disciples of Bacon, we do not intend\nto despair until we can discover some good and sufficient reason for so\ndoing. It seems to us, that the reply of Leibnitz to Descartes, already\nalluded to, is not without reason. \u201cIt might have been an evidence of\nhumility in Descartes,\u201d says he, \u201cif he had confessed his own inability to\nsolve the difficulty in question; but not satisfied with confessing for\nhimself, he does so for all intelligences and for all times.\u201d\n\nBut, after all, Descartes has really endeavoured to solve the problem\nwhich he declared insoluble; that is, to reconcile the infinite\nperfections of God with the free-agency of man. He struggles to break\nloose from this dark mystery; but, like the charmed bird, he struggles and\nflutters in vain, and finally yields to its magical influence. In his\nsolution, this great luminary of science, like others before him, seems to\nsuffer a sad eclipse. \u201cBefore God sent us into the world,\u201d says he, \u201che\nknew exactly what all the inclinations of our wills would be; _it is he\nthat has implanted them in us_; it is he also that has disposed all\nthings, so that such or such objects should present themselves to us at\nsuch or such times, by means of which he has known that our free-will\nwould determine us to such or such actions, _he has willed that it should\nbe so; but he has not willed to constrain us thereto_.\u201d This is found in a\nletter to the Princess Elizabeth, for whose benefit he endeavoured to\nreconcile the liberty of man with the perfections of God. It brings us\nback to the old distinction between necessity and co-action. God brings\nour volitions to pass; he wills them; they \u201cspring entirely from him;\u201d but\nwe are nevertheless free, because he constrains not our external actions,\nor compels us to do anything contrary to our wills! We cannot suppose,\nhowever, that this solution of the problem made a very clear or deep\nimpression on the mind of Descartes himself, or he would not, on other\noccasions, have pronounced every attempt at the solution of it vain and\nhopeless.\n\nIn his attempt to reconcile the free-agency of man with the divine\nperfections, Descartes deceives himself by a false analogy. Thus he\nsupposes that a monarch \u201c_who has forbidden_ duelling, and who, certainly\nknowing that two gentlemen will fight, if they should meet, _employs\ninfallible means to bring them together_. They meet, they fight each\nother: their disobedience of the laws is an effect of their free-will;\nthey are punishable.\u201d \u201cWhat a king can do in such a case,\u201d he adds, \u201cGod\nwho has an infinite power and prescience, infallibly does in relation to\nall the actions of men.\u201d But the king, in the supposed case, does not act\non the minds of the duellists; their disposition to disobey the laws does\nnot proceed from him; whereas, according to the theory of Descartes,\nnothing enters into the mind of man which does not spring entirely from\nGod. If we suppose a king, who has direct access to the mind of his\nsubject, like God, and who employs his power to excite therein a murderous\nintent or any other particular disposition to disobey the law, we shall\nhave a more apposite representation of the divine agency according to the\ntheory of Descartes. Has anything ever been ascribed to the agency of\nSatan himself which could more clearly render him an accomplice in the\nsins of men?\n\nFrom the bosom of Cartesianism two systems arose, one in principle, but\nwidely different in their developments and ultimate results. We allude to\nthe celebrated schemes of Spinoza and Malebranche. Both set out with the\nsame exaggerated view of the sublime truth that God is all in all; and\neach gave a diverse development to this fundamental position, to this\ncentral idea, according as the logical faculty predominated over the\nmoral, or the moral faculty over the logical. Father Malebranche, by a\nhappy inconsistency, preserved the great moral interests of the world\nagainst the invasion of a remorseless logic. Spinoza, on the contrary,\ncould follow out his first principle almost to its last consequence, even\nto the entire extinction of the moral light of the universe, and the\nenthronement of blind power, with as little concern, with as profound\ncomposure, as if he were merely discussing a theorem in the mathematics.\n\n\u201cAll things,\u201d says he, \u201cdetermined to such and such actions, are\ndetermined by God; and, if God determines not a thing to act, it cannot\ndetermine itself.\u201d(12) From this proposition he drew the inference, that\nthings which are produced by God, could not have existed in any other\nmanner, nor in any other order.(13) Thus, by the divine power, all things\nin heaven and earth are bound together in the iron circle of necessity. It\nrequired no great logical foresight to perceive that this doctrine shut\nall real liberty out of the created universe; but it did require no little\nmoral firmness, or very great moral insensibility, to declare such a\nconsequence with the unflinching audacity which marks its enunciation by\nSpinoza. He repeatedly declares, in various modes of expression, that \u201cthe\nsoul is a spiritual automaton,\u201d and possesses no such liberty as is\nusually ascribed to it. All is necessary, and the very notion of a\nfree-will is a vulgar prejudice. \u201cAll I have to say,\u201d he coolly remarks,\n\u201cto those who believe that they can speak or keep silence\u2014in one word, can\nact\u2014by virtue of a free decision of the soul, is, that they dream with\ntheir eyes open.\u201d(14) Though he thus boldly denies all free-will,\naccording to the common notion of mankind; yet, no less than Hobbes and\nCollins, he allows that the soul possesses \u201ca sort of liberty.\u201d \u201cIt is\nfree,\u201d says he, in the act of affirming that \u201ctwo and two are equal to\nfour;\u201d thus finding the freedom of the soul which he is pleased to allow\nthe world to possess in the most perfect type of necessity it is possible\nto conceive.\n\nBut Spinoza does not employ this idea of liberty, nor any other, to show\nthat man is a responsible being. This is not at all strange; the wonder\nis, that after having _demonstrated_ that \u201cthe prejudice of men concerning\n_good_ and _evil_, merit and demerit, praise and blame, order and\nconfusion, beauty and deformity,\u201d are nothing but dreams, he should have\nfelt bound to defend the position, that we may be justly punished for our\noffences by the Supreme Ruler of the world. His defence of this doctrine\nwe shall lay before the reader without a word of comment. \u201cWill you say,\u201d\nhe replies to Oldenburg, \u201cthat God cannot be angry with the wicked, or\nthat all men are worthy of beatitude? In regard to the first point, I\nperfectly agree that God cannot be angry at anything which happens\naccording to his decree, but I deny that it results that all men ought to\nbe happy; for men can be excusable, and at the same time be deprived of\nbeatification, and made to suffer a thousand ways. A horse is excusable\nfor being a horse, and not a man; but that prevents not that he ought to\nbe a horse, and not a man. He who is rendered mad by the bite of a dog, is\nsurely excusable, and yet we ought to constrain him. In like manner, the\nman who cannot govern his passions, nor restrain them by the fear of the\nlaws, though excusable on account of the infirmity of his nature, can\nnevertheless not enjoy peace, nor the knowledge and the love of God; and\nit is necessary that he should perish.\u201d(15)\n\nIt was as difficult for Father Malebranche to restrain his indignation at\nthe system of Spinoza, as it was for him to expose its fallacy, after\nhaving admitted its great fundamental principle. This is well illustrated\nby the facts stated by M. Saisset: \u201cWhen Mairan,\u201d says he, \u201cstill young,\nand having a strong passion for the study of the \u2018Ethique,\u2019 requested\nMalebranche to guide him in that perilous route; we know with what\nurgency, bordering on importunity, he pressed the illustrious father to\nshow him the weak point of Spinozism, the precise place where the rigour\nof the reasoning failed, the _paralogism_ contained in the demonstration.\nMalebranche eluded the question, and could not assign the _paralogism_,\nafter which Mairan so earnestly sought: \u2018It is not that the paralogism is\nin such or such places of the _Ethique_, it is everywhere.\u2019 \u201d(16) In this\nimpatient judgment, Father Malebranche uttered more truth than he could\nvery well perceive; the paralogism is truly everywhere, because this whole\nedifice of words, \u201cthis frightful chimera,\u201d is really assumed in the\narbitrary definition of the term substance. We might say with equal truth,\nthat the fallacy of Malebranche\u2019s scheme is also everywhere; for although\nit stops short of the consequences so sternly deduced by Spinoza, it sets\nout from the same distorted view of the sovereignty and dominion of God,\nfrom which those consequences necessarily flow.\n\nSpinoza, who had but few followers during his lifetime, has been almost\nidolized by the most celebrated savants of modern Germany. Whether this\nwill ultimately add to the glory of Spinoza, or detract from that of his\nadmirers, we shall leave the reader and posterity to determine. In the\nmean time, we shall content ourselves with a statement of the fact, in the\nlanguage of M. Saisset: \u201cEverything,\u201d says he, \u201cappears extraordinary in\nSpinoza; his person, his style, his philosophy; but that which is more\nstrange still, is the destiny of that philosophy among men. Badly known,\ndespised by the most illustrious of his contemporaries, Spinoza died in\nobscurity, and remained buried during a century. All at once his name\nreappeared with an extraordinary eclat; his works were read with passion;\na new world was discovered in them, with a horizon unknown to our fathers;\nand the god of Spinoza, which the seventeenth century had broken as an\nidol, became the god of Lessing, of Goethe, of Novalis.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe solitary thinker whom Malebranche called a wretch, Schleiermacher\nreveres and invokes as equal to a saint. That \u2018systematic atheist,\u2019 on\nwhom Bayle lavished outrage, has been for modern Germany the most\nreligious of men. \u2018God-intoxicated,\u2019 as Novalis said, \u2018he has seen the\nworld through a thick cloud, and man has been to his troubled eyes only a\nfugitive mode of Being in itself.\u2019 In that system, in fine, so shocking\nand so monstrous, that \u2018hideous chimera,\u2019 Jacobi sees the last word of\nphilosophy, Schelling the presentiment of the true philosophy.\u201d\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley, Helvetius, and Diderot,\nwith respect to the relation between liberty and necessity.\n\n\nLocke, it is well known, adopted the notions of free-agency given by\nHobbes. \u201cIn this,\u201d says he, \u201cconsists freedom, viz., in our being able to\nact or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.\u201d(17) And this\nnotion of liberty, consisting in a freedom from external co-action, has\nreceived an impetus and currency from the influence of Locke which it\nwould not otherwise have obtained. Neither Calvin nor Luther, as we have\nseen, pretended to hold it up as the freedom of the will. This was\nreserved for Hobbes and his immortal follower, John Locke, who has, in his\nturn, been copied by a host of illustrious disciples who would have\nrecoiled from the more articulate and consistent development of this\ndoctrine by the philosopher of Malmsbury. It is only because Locke has\nenveloped it in a cloud of inconsistencies that it has been able to secure\nthe veneration of the great and good.\n\nIt is remarkable, that although Locke adopted the definition of free-will\ngiven by Hobbes, and which the latter so easily reconciled with the\nomnipotence and omniscience of God; yet he expressly declares that he had\nfound it impossible to reconcile those attributes in the Divine Being with\nthe free-agency of man. Surely no such difficulty could have existed, if\nhis definition of free-agency, or free-will, be correct; for although\nomnipotence itself might produce our volitions, we might still be free to\nact, to move in accordance with our volitions. But the truth is, there was\nsomething more in Locke\u2019s thoughts and feelings, in the inmost working of\nhis nature, with respect to moral liberty, than there was in his\ndefinition. The inconsistency and fluctuation of his views on this\nall-important subject are fully reflected in his chapter on power.\n\nBoth in Great Britain and France, the most illustrious successors of Locke\nsoon delivered themselves from his inconsistencies and\nself-contradictions. Hartley was not in all respects a follower of Locke,\nit is true, though he admitted his definition of free-agency. \u201cIt appears\nto me,\u201d says Hartley, \u201cthat all the most complex ideas arise from\nsensation, and that _reflection is not a distinct source_, as Mr. Locke\nmakes it.\u201d By this mutilation of the philosophy of Locke, it was reduced\nback to that dead level of materialism in which Hobbes had left it, and\nfrom which the former had scarcely endeavoured to raise it. Hence arose\nthe rigid scheme of necessity, for which Hartley is so zealous an\nadvocate. In reading his treatise on the \u201cMechanism of the Human Mind,\u201d we\nare irresistibly compelled to feel the conviction that the only\ncircumstance which prevents the movements of the soul from being subjected\nto mathematical calculation, and made a branch of dynamics, is the want of\na measure of the force of motives. If this want were supplied, then the\nphilosophy of the mind might be, according to his view of its nature and\noperations, converted into a portion of mechanics. Yet this excellent man\ndid not imagine for a moment that he upheld a scheme which is at war with\nthe great moral interests of the world. He supposes it is no matter how we\ncome by our volitions, provided our bodies be left free to obey the\nimpulses of the will; this is amply sufficient to render us accountable\nfor our actions, and to vindicate the moral government of God. Thus did he\nfall asleep with a specious, but most superficial dream of liberty, which\nhas no more to do with the real question concerning the moral agency of\nman than if it related to the winds of heaven or to the waves of the sea.\nAccordingly this is the view of liberty which he repeatedly holds up as\nall-sufficient to secure the great moral interest of the human race.\n\nHis great disciple, Dr. Priestley, pursues precisely the same course. \u201cIf\na man,\u201d says he, \u201cbe wholly a material being, and the power of thinking\nthe result of a certain organization of the brain, does it not follow that\nall his functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism, and that of\nconsequence his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity?\u201d And\nagain, he observes, \u201cthe doctrine of necessity is the immediate result of\nthe materiality of man, for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of\nmaterialism.\u201d(18) Priestley, however, allows us to possess free-will as\ndefined by Hobbes, Locke, and Hartley.\n\nHelvetius himself could easily admit such a liberty into his unmitigated\nscheme of necessity, but he did not commit the blunder of Locke and\nHartley, in supposing that it bore on the great question concerning the\nfreedom of the mind. \u201cIt is true,\u201d he says, \u201cwe can form a tolerably\ndistinct idea of the word _liberty_, understood in its common sense. _A\nman is free who is neither loaded with irons nor confined in prison_, nor\nintimidated like the slave with the dread of chastisement: in this sense\nthe liberty of man consists in the free exercise of his power; I say, of\nhis power, because it would be ridiculous to mistake for a want of liberty\nthe incapacity we are under to pierce the clouds like the eagle, to live\nunder the water like the whale, or to become king, emperor, or pope. We\nhave so far a sufficiently clear idea of the word. But this is no longer\nthe case when we come to apply liberty to the will. What must this liberty\nthen mean? We can only understand by it a free power of willing or not\nwilling a thing: but this power would imply that there may be a will\nwithout motives, and consequently an effect without a cause. A\nphilosophical treatise on _the liberty of the will_ would be a treatise of\neffects without a cause.\u201d(19)\n\nIn like manner, Diderot had the sagacity to perceive that the idea of\nliberty, as defined by Locke, did not at all come into conflict with his\nportentous scheme of irreligion, which had grounded itself on the doctrine\nof necessity. Having pronounced the term liberty, as applied to the will,\nto be a word without meaning, he proceeds to justify the infliction of\npunishment on the same grounds on which it is vindicated by Hobbes and\nSpinoza. \u201cBut if there is no liberty,\u201d says he, \u201cthere is no action that\nmerits either praise or blame, neither vice nor virtue, nothing that ought\nto be either rewarded or punished. What then is the distinction among men?\nThe doing of good and the doing of evil! The doer of ill is one who must\nbe destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. But\nthough neither the doer of good nor of ill be free, man is, nevertheless,\na being to be modified; it is for this reason the doer of ill should be\ndestroyed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of education, of\npleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c.; from thence a philosophy\nfull of pity, strongly attached to the good, nor more angry with the\nwicked than with the whirlwind which fills one\u2019s eyes with dust.\u201d ...\n\u201cAdopt these principles if you think them good, or show me that they are\nbad. If you adopt them, they will reconcile you _too_ with others and with\nyourself: you will neither be pleased nor angry with yourself for being\nwhat you are. Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing, this is\nthe first step to wisdom. Besides this all is prejudice and false\nphilosophy.\u201d\n\nThough these consequences irresistibly flow from the doctrine of\nnecessity, yet the injury resulting from them would be far less if they\nwere maintained only by such men as Helvetius and Diderot. It is when such\nerrors receive the sanction of Christian philosophers, like Hartley and\nLeibnitz, and are recommended to the human mind by a pious zeal for the\nglory of God, that they are apt to obtain a frightful currency and become\nfar more desolating in their effects. \u201cThe doctrine of necessity,\u201d says\nHartley, \u201chas a tendency to abate all resentment against men: _since all\nthey do against us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against\nhim to be offended with them_.\u201d\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and\nnecessity.\n\n\nLeibnitz censures the language of Descartes, in which he ascribes all the\nthoughts and volitions of men to God, and complains that he thereby shuts\nout free-agency from the world. It becomes a very curious question, then,\nhow Leibnitz himself, who was so deeply implicated in the scheme of\nnecessity, has been able to save the great interests of morality. He does\nnot, for a moment, call in question \u201cthe great demonstration from cause\nand effect\u201d in favour of necessity. It is well known that he has more than\nonce compared the human mind to a balance, in which reasons and\ninclinations take the place of weights; he supposes it to be just as\nimpossible for the mind to depart from the direction given to it by \u201cthe\ndetermining cause,\u201d as it is for a balance to turn in opposition to the\ninfluence of the greatest weight.\n\nNor is he pleased with Descartes\u2019s appeal to consciousness to prove the\ndoctrine of liberty. In reply to this appeal, he says: \u201cThe chain of\ncauses connected one with another reaches very far. Wherefore the reason\nalleged by Descartes, in order to prove the independence of our free\nactions, by a pretended vigorous internal feeling, has no force.(20) We\ncannot, strictly speaking, feel our independence; and we do not always\nperceive the causes, frequently imperceptible, on which our resolution\ndepends. It is as if a needle touched with the loadstone were sensible of\nand pleased with its turning toward the north. For it would believe that\nit turned itself, independently of any other cause, not perceiving the\ninsensible motions of the magnetic matter.\u201d(21) Thus, he seems to\nrepresent the doctrine of liberty as a mere dream and delusion of the\nmind, and the iron scheme of necessity as a stern reality. Is it in the\npower of Leibnitz, then, any more than it was in that of Descartes, to\nreconcile such a scheme with the free-agency and accountability of man?\nLet us hear him and determine.\n\nLeibnitz repudiates the notion of liberty given by Hobbes and Locke. In\nhis \u201cNouveaux Essais sur L\u2019Entendement Humain,\u201d a work in which he combats\nmany of the doctrines of Locke, the insignificance of his idea of the\nfreedom of the will is most clearly and triumphantly exposed. Philalethe,\nor the representative of Locke, says: \u201cLiberty is the power that a man has\nto do or not to do an action _according to his will_.\u201d Theophile, or the\nrepresentative of Leibnitz, replies: \u201cIf men understood only that by\nliberty, when they ask whether the will is free, their question would be\ntruly absurd.\u201d And again: \u201cThe question ought not to be asked,\u201d says\nPhilalethe, \u201cif the will is free: that is to speak in a very improper\nmanner: but if man is free. This granted, I say that, when any one can, by\nthe direction or choice of his mind, prefer the existence of one action to\nthe non-existence of that action and to the contrary, that is to say, when\nhe can make it exist or not exist, _according to his will_, then he is\nfree. _And we can scarcely see how it could be possible to conceive a\nbeing more free than one who is capable of doing what he wills._\u201d\nTheophile rejoins: \u201cWhen we reason concerning the liberty of the will, we\ndo not demand if the man can do what he wills, but if he has a sufficient\nindependence in the will itself; we do not ask if he has free limbs or\nelbow-room, but if the mind is free, and in what that freedom\nconsists.\u201d(22)\n\nHaving thus exploded the delusive notion of liberty which Locke had\nborrowed from Hobbes, Leibnitz proceeds to take what seems to be higher\nground. He expressly declares, that in order to constitute man an\naccountable agent, he must be free, not only from constraint, but also\nfrom necessity. In the adoption of this language, Leibnitz seems to speak\nwith the advocates of free-agency; but does he think with them? The sound\nis pleasant to the ear; but what sense is it intended to convey to the\nmind? Leibnitz shall be his own interpreter. \u201cAll events have their\nnecessary causes,\u201d says Hobbes. \u201cBad,\u201d replies Leibnitz: \u201cthey have their\n_determining_ causes, by which we can assign a reason for them; but they\nhave not necessary causes.\u201d Now does this signify that an event, that a\nvolition, is not absolutely and indissolubly connected with its\n\u201cdetermining cause?\u201d Is this the grand idea from which the light of\nliberty is to beam on a darkened and enslaved world? By no means. We must\nindulge no fond hopes or idle dreams of the kind. Volition is free from\nnecessity, adds Leibnitz; because \u201c_the contrary could happen without\nimplying a contradiction_.\u201d This is the signification which he attaches to\nhis own language; and it is the only meaning of which it is susceptible in\naccordance with his system. Thus, Leibnitz saw and clearly exposed the\nfutility of speaking about a freedom from co-action or restraint, when the\nquestion is, not whether the body is untrammelled, but whether the mind\nitself is free in the act of willing. But he did not see, it seems, that\nit is equally irrelevant to speak of a freedom from a mathematical\nnecessity in such a connexion; although this, as plainly as the other\nsense of the word, has no conceivable bearing on the point in dispute. If\na volition were produced by the omnipotence of God, irresistibly acting on\nthe human mind, still it would not be necessary, in the sense of Leibnitz,\nsince it might and would have been different if God had so willed it; the\ncontrary volition implying no contradiction. Is it not evident, that to\nsuppose the mind may thus be bound to act, and yet be free because the\ncontrary act implies no contradiction, is merely to dream of liberty, and\nto mistake a shadow for a substance?\n\nAs the opposite of a volition implies no contradiction, says Leibnitz, so\nit is free from an absolute necessity; that is to say, it might have been\ndifferent, nay, it must have been different, from what it is, provided its\ndetermining cause had been different. The same thing may be said of the\nmotions of matter. We may say that they are also free, because the\nopposite motions imply no contradiction; and we only have to vary the\nforce in order to vary the motion. Hence, freedom in this sense of the\nword is perfectly consistent with the absolute and uncontrolled dominion\nof causes over the will; for what can be more completely necessitated than\nthe motions of the body?\n\nThe demand of his own nature, which so strongly impelled Leibnitz to seek\nand cling to the freedom of the mind, as the basis of moral and\naccountable agency, could not rest satisfied with so unsubstantial a\nshadow. After all, he has felt constrained to have recourse to the\nhypothesis of a pre\u00ebstablished harmony in order to restore, if possible,\nthe liberty which his scheme of necessity had banished from the universe.\nIt is no part of our intention to examine this obsolete fiction; we merely\nwish to show how essential Leibnitz regarded it to a solution of the\ndifficulty under consideration. \u201cI come now,\u201d says he, \u201cto show how the\naction of the will depends on causes; that there is nothing so agreeable\nto human nature as this dependence of our actions, and that otherwise we\nshould fall into an absurd and insupportable fatality; that is to say,\ninto the _Mohammedan fate_, which is the worst of all, because it does\naway with foresight and good counsel. However, it is well to explain how\nthis dependency of our voluntary actions does not prevent that there may\nbe at the bottom of things a marvellous spontaneity in us, which in a\ncertain sense renders the mind, in its resolutions, independent of the\nphysical influence of _all other creatures_. This spontaneity, _but little\nknown hitherto_, which raises our empire over our actions as much as it is\npossible, _is a consequence of the system of pre\u00ebstablished harmony_.\u201d\nThus, in order to satisfy himself that our actions are really free and\nindependent of the physical influence of _other creatures_, he has\nrecourse to a fiction in which few persons ever concurred with him, and\nwhich is now universally regarded as one of the vagaries and dreams of\nphilosophy. If we are to be saved from an insupportable fate only by such\nmeans, our condition must indeed be one of forlorn hopelessness.\n\nBefore we take leave of Leibnitz, there is one view of the difficulty in\nquestion which we wish to notice, not because it is peculiar to him, but\nbecause it is very clearly stated and confidently relied on by him. It is\ncommon to most of the advocates of necessity, and it is exceedingly\nimposing in its appearance and effect. \u201cMen of all times,\u201d says he, \u201chave\nbeen troubled by a sophism, which the ancients called the \u2018_raison\nparesseuse_,\u2019 because it induces them to do nothing, or at least to\nconcern themselves about nothing, and to follow only the present\ninclination to pleasure. For, say they, if the future is necessary, that\nwhich is to happen will happen whatever I may do. But the future, say\nthey, is necessary, either because the Divinity foresees all things, and\neven pre\u00ebstablishes them in governing the universe; or because all things\nnecessarily come to pass by a concatenation of causes.\u201d(23) Leibnitz\nillustrated the fallacy of this reasoning in the following manner: \u201cBy the\nsame reason (if it is valid) I could say\u2014If it is written in the archives\nof fate, that poison will kill me at present, or do me harm, this will\nhappen, though I should not take it; and if that is not written, it will\nnot happen, though I should take it; and, consequently, I can follow my\ninclination to take whatever is agreeable with impunity, however\npernicious it may be; which involves a manifest absurdity.... This\nobjection staggers them a little, but they always come back to their\nreasoning, turned in different points of view, until we cause them to\ncomprehend in what the defect of their sophism consists. It is this, that\nit is false that the event will happen whatever we may do; it will happen,\nbecause we do that which leads to it; and if the event is written, the\ncause which will make it happen is also written. Thus the connexion\n(_liaison_) of effects and their causes, so far from establishing the\ndoctrine of a necessity prejudicial to practice, serves to destroy\nit.\u201d(24) The same reply is found more than once in the course of the same\ngreat work; and it is employed by all necessitarians in defence of their\nsystem. But it is not a satisfactory answer. It overlooks the real\ndifficulty in the case, and seeks to remove an imaginary one. The question\nis, not whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and their\n_effects_ is a discouragement to practice, but whether a necessary\nconnexion between our volitions and their _causes_ is so. It is very true,\nthat no man would be accountable for his external actions or their\nconsequences, if there were no fixed relation between these and his\nvolitions. If, when a man willed one thing, another should happen to\nfollow which he did not will, of course he would not be responsible for\nit. And if there were no certain or fixed connexion between his external\nactions and their consequences, either as they affected himself or others,\nhe certainly would not be responsible for those consequences. This\nconnexion between causes and effects, this connexion between volitions and\ntheir consequences, is indispensable to our accountability for such\nconsequences. But for such a connexion, nothing could be more idle and\nridiculous than to endeavour to do anything; for we might will one thing,\nand another would take place.\n\nBut must the same necessary connexion exist between the causes of our\nvolitions and the volitions themselves, before we can be accountable for\nthese volitions, for these effects? This is the question. Leibnitz has\nlost sight of it, and deceived himself by a false application of his\ndoctrine. The doctrine of necessity, when applied to volitions and their\neffects, is indispensable to build up man\u2019s accountability for his\nexternal conduct and its consequences. But the same doctrine, when applied\nto establish a fixed and unalterable relation between the causes of\nvolition and volition itself, really demolishes all responsibility for\nvolition, and consequently for its external results. Leibnitz undertook to\nshow that a necessary connexion between volition and its causes does not\ndestroy man\u2019s accountability for his volitions; and he has shown, what no\none ever doubted, that a necessary connexion between volition and its\neffects does not destroy accountability for those effects! Strange as this\nconfusion of things is, it is made by the most celebrated advocates of the\ndoctrine of necessity; which shows, we think, that the doctrine hardly\nadmits of a solid defence. Thus Edwards, for example, insists that the\ndoctrine of necessity is so far from rendering our endeavours vain and\nuseless, that it is an indispensable condition or prerequisite to their\nsuccess. In illustration of this point, he says: \u201cLet us suppose a real\nand sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the clear\ndaylight, with good organs of sight, and seeing; so that seeing is\nconnected with opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his\neyes; and also the like connexion between such a man attempting to open\nhis eyes and his actually doing it: the supposed established connexion\nbetween these antecedents and consequents, let the connexion be never so\nsure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a man\nin such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing; his\naiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the effect of his\nwill, does not break the connexion, or hinder the success.\u201d\n\n\u201cSo that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of\nthe necessity of events by a certainty of connexion and consequence: on\nthe contrary, it is truly forcible against the _Arminian_ doctrine of\ncontingence and self-determination, which is inconsistent with such a\nconnexion. If there be no connexion between those events wherein virtue\nand vice consist, and anything antecedent; then there is no connexion\nbetween these events and any means or endeavours used in order to them:\nand if so, then those means must be in vain. The less there is of\nconnexion between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less\nthere is between means and end, endeavours and success; and in the same\nproportion are means and endeavours ineffectual and in vain.\u201d\n\nIn like manner, Dr. Chalmers, in his defence of the doctrine of necessity,\nhas in all his illustrations confounded the connexion between a volition\nand its antecedent, with the relation between a volition and its\nconsequent. To select one such illustration from many, it would be idle,\nsays he, for a man to labour and toil after wealth, if there were no fixed\nconnexion between such exertion and the accumulation of riches.\n\nWe reply to all such illustrations,\u2014It is true, there must be a fixed\nconnexion between our endeavours or voluntary exertions and their\nconsequences, in order to render such endeavours or exertions of any\navail, or to render us accountable for such consequences. But it should be\nforever borne in mind, that the question is not whether a fixed connexion\nobtains between our volitions and their _sequents_, but whether a\nnecessary connexion exists between our volitions and their antecedents.\nThe question is, not whether the will be a power which is often followed\nby necessitated effects; but whether there be a power behind the will by\nwhich its volitions are necessitated. And this being the question, what\ndoes it signify to tell us, that the will is a producing power? We deny\nthat volitions and their antecedents are necessarily connected; and our\nopponents refute us by showing that volitions and their sequents are thus\nconnected! We deny that A and B are necessarily connected; and this\nposition is overthrown and demolished by showing that B and C are thus\nconnected! Is it not truly wonderful that such men as a Leibnitz, an\nEdwards, and a Chalmers, should, in their zeal to maintain a favourite\ndogma, commit so great an oversight, and so grievously deceive themselves?\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the\nbasis of necessity\u2014The views of the younger Edwards, Day, Chalmers, Dick,\nD\u2019Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M\u2019Cosh, concerning the agreement of liberty and\nnecessity.\n\n\nThe great metaphysician of New-England insists, that his scheme, and his\nscheme alone, is consistent with the free-agency and accountability of\nman. But how does he show this? Does he endeavour to shake the stern\nargument by which all things seem bound together in the relation of cause\nand effect? Does he even intimate a doubt with respect to the perfect\ncoherency and validity of this argument? Does he once enter a protest\nagainst the doctrine of the Stoics, or of the materialistic fatalists,\naccording to which all things in heaven and earth are involved in an\n\u201cimplex series of causes?\u201d He does not. On the contrary, he has stated and\nenforced the great argument from cause and effect, in the strongest\npossible terms. He contends that volition is caused, not by the will nor\nthe mind, but by the strongest motive. This is the cause of volition, and\nit is impossible for the effect to be loose from its cause. It is an\ninherent contradiction, a glaring absurdity, to say that motive is the\ncause of volition, and yet admit that volition may, or may not, follow\nmotive. This is to say, indeed, that motive is the cause, and yet that it\nis not the cause, of volition; which is a contradiction in terms.(25) So\nfar from saying anything, then, to extricate the volitions of men from the\nadamantine circle of necessity, he has exerted his prodigious energies to\nfasten them therein.\n\nHence the question arises, Has he left any room for the introduction of\nthat _freedom of the mind_, which it is the great object of his inquiry to\nestablish upon its true foundations? The liberty for which he contends,\nis, after all his labours, precisely that advocated by Hobbes and Collins,\nand no other. It is a freedom from co-action, and not from necessity. But\nhe is entitled to speak for himself, and we shall permit him so to do:\n\u201cThe plain and obvious meaning of the word _freedom_ and liberty,\u201d says\nhe, \u201cin common speech, is the _power_, opportunity, _or advantage, that\nany one has, to do as he pleases_. Or, in other words, his being free from\nhinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect\n_as he wills_. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call it by,\nis a person being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being\nnecessitated to do otherwise.\u201d Here, it will be seen, that liberty,\naccording to this notion of it, has no relation to the manner in which the\nwill arises, or comes into existence; if one\u2019s external conduct can only\nfollow his will, he is free.\n\n\u201cThere are two things,\u201d says he, \u201ccontrary to what is called liberty in\ncommon speech. One is _constraint_, otherwise called _force_,\n_compulsion_, and _co-action_; which is a person being necessitated to do\na thing _contrary_ to his will. The other is _restraint_; which is, his\nbeing hindered, and not having power to do _according_ to his will. But\nthat which has no will cannot be the subject of these things.\u201d This\ndefinition, it is plain, presupposes the existence of a volition; and\nliberty consists in the absence of co-action. It has no relation to the\nquestion as to how we come by our volitions, whether they are put forth by\nthe mind itself without being necessitated, or whether they are\nnecessarily produced in us. It leaves this great fundamental question\nuntouched.\n\nOn this subject his language is perfectly explicit. There is nothing in\nKames, nor Collins, nor Crombie, nor Hobbes, nor any other writer, more\nperfectly unequivocal. \u201cBut one thing more,\u201d says he, \u201cI would observe\nconcerning what is vulgarly called liberty, namely, that power and\nopportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his\nchoice, is all that is meant by it, without taking into the meaning of the\nword anything of the cause of that choice, or at all considering how the\nperson came to have such a volition, or internal habit and bias; whether\nit was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it\nhappened without a cause; whether it were necessarily connected with\nsomething foregoing, or not connected. _Let the person come by his choice\nany how_, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder\nhis pursuing and executing his will, _the man is perfectly free according\nto the primary and common notion of freedom_.\u201d Now this is all the\ndefinition of liberty with which his \u201cInquiry\u201d furnishes us; and this, he\nsays, is \u201csufficient to show what is meant by liberty, according to the\ncommon notion of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the\nword.\u201d\n\nIt is easy to see, that there is no difficulty in reconciling liberty, in\nsuch a sense, with the most absolute scheme of necessity or fatalism the\nworld has ever seen. Let a man come by his volition ANY HOW; let it be\nproduced in him by the direct and almighty power of God himself; yet, \u201che\nis perfectly free,\u201d provided there is no external co-action to prevent his\nvolition from producing its natural effects!\n\nPresident Day is not pleased with the definition contained in the\n\u201cInquiry;\u201d and in this particular we think he has discovered a superior\nsagacity to Edwards. But his extreme anxiety to save the credit of his\nauthor has betrayed him, it seems to us, into an apology which will not\nbear a close examination. \u201cOn the subject of liberty or freedom,\u201d says he,\n\u201cwhich occupies a portion of the fifth section of Edwards\u2019s first book, he\nhas been less particular than was to be expected, considering that this is\nthe great object of inquiry in his work. His explanation of what he\nregards as the proper meaning of the term is applicable to the liberty of\noutward _action_, to what is called by philosophers _external_ liberty.\u201d\n\u201cThis is very well as far as it goes. But the professed object of his\nbook, according to the title-page, is an inquiry concerning the freedom of\nthe will, not the freedom of the external conduct. We naturally look for\nhis meaning of this internal liberty. What he has said, in this section,\nrespecting freedom of the will, has rather the appearance of evading such\na definition of it as might be considered his own.\u201d(26) Now, is it\npossible that President Edwards has instituted an inquiry into the freedom\nof the will, and written a great book in defence of it, and yet has evaded\ngiving his own definition of it? If so, then he may have demolished the\nviews of others on this subject, but he has certainly not established his\nown in their stead; and hence, for aught we know, he really did not\nbelieve in the freedom of the will at all; and, for all his work shows,\nthere may be no such freedom. For how is it possible for any man to\nestablish his views of the freedom of the will, if he is not at sufficient\npains to explain his meaning of the terms, and forbears even to give his\nown definition of them?\n\nBut the truth is, the author of the \u201cInquiry\u201d has placed it beyond all\ncontroversy, that he has been guilty of no such omission or evasion. He\nhas left no room to doubt that the definition of liberty, which he says is\nin conformity \u201cwith the common notion of mankind,\u201d is his own. He always\nuses this definition when he undertakes to repel objections against his\nscheme of necessity. \u201cIt is evident,\u201d he says, \u201cthat such a providential\ndisposing and determining of men\u2019s moral actions, though it infers a moral\nnecessity of those actions, _yet it does not in the least infringe the\nreal liberty of mankind, the only liberty that common sense teaches to be\nnecessary to moral agency, which_, AS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, is not\ninconsistent with such necessity.\u201d(27) He defines liberty in the very\nwords of Collins and Hobbes, to mean the power or opportunity any one has\n\u201cto do as he pleases;\u201d or, in other words, to do \u201cas he _wills_.\u201d(28) This\ndefinition, he says, is according to the primary and common notion of\nmankind; and now he declares, that \u201cthis is the only liberty common sense\nteaches is necessary to moral agency.\u201d It is very strange that any one\nshould have read the great work of President Edwards without perceiving\nthat this is the sense in which he always uses the term when he undertakes\nto repel the attacks of his adversaries. To select only one instance out\nof many, he says, \u201cIf the Stoics held such a fate as is repugnant to any\nliberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate.\nIf they held any such fate as is not consistent with the common and\nuniversal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency,\nvirtue, and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated\nthe scheme I maintain is no such scheme.\u201d(29) Thus he always has recourse\nto this definition of liberty, consisting in the power or opportunity any\none has \u201cto do as he pleases,\u201d or, in other words, \u201cas he wills,\u201d whenever\nhe attempts to reconcile his doctrine with the moral agency and\naccountability of man, or to vindicate it against the attacks of his\nopponents. We must suppose then, that Edwards has given his own definition\nof liberty in the Inquiry, or we must conclude that he defended his system\nby the use of an idea of liberty which he did not believe to be correct;\nthat when he alleged that he \u201chad demonstrated\u201d his doctrine to be\nconsistent with free-agency, he only meant with a false and atheistical\nnotion of free-agency.\n\nWe are not surprised that President Day does not like this definition of\nliberty; but we are somewhat surprised, we confess, that such an idea of\nliberty should be so unhesitatingly adopted from Edwards, and so\nconfidently set forth as the highest conceivable notion thereof, by Dr.\nChalmers. He does not seem to entertain the shadow of a doubt, either that\nthe definition of liberty contained in the Inquiry is that of Edwards\nhimself, or that which is fully founded in truth. He freely concedes, that\n\u201cwe can do as we please,\u201d and supposes that the reader may be startled to\nhear that this is \u201ccordially admitted by the necessitarians themselves!\u201d\n\nBut this concession he easily reconciles with the tenet of necessity. \u201cTo\nsay that you can do as you please,\u201d says he, \u201cis just to affirm one of\nthose sequences which take place in the phenomena of mind\u2014a sequence\nwhereof a volition is the antecedent, and the performance of that volition\nis the consequent. It is a sequence which no advocate of the philosophical\nnecessity is ever heard to deny. Let the volition ever be formed, and if\nit point to some execution which lies within the limits we have just\nadverted to, the execution of it will follow.\u201d(30) Thus, his notion of\nliberty makes it consist in the absence of external impediments, which\nmight break the connexion of a volition and its consequent, and not in the\nfreedom of the will itself from the absolute dominion of causes. Such an\nidea of free-will, it must be confessed, is very well adopted by one who\nintends to maintain \u201ca rigid and absolute predestination\u201d of all events.\n\nThe manner in which Edwards attempts to reconcile the free-agency and\naccountability of man with the great argument from the law of causation,\nor with his doctrine of necessity, is, as we have seen, precisely the same\nas that adopted by Hobbes. There is not a shade of difference between\nthem. It is, indeed, easy to demonstrate that liberty, according to this\ndefinition of it, is not inconsistent with necessity; and it is just as\neasy to demonstrate, that it is not inconsistent with any scheme of fate\nthat has ever been heard of among men. The will may be absolutely\nnecessitated in all its acts, and yet the body may be free from external\nco-action or natural necessity!\n\nBut though there is this close agreement between Hobbes and Edwards, there\nare some points of divergency between Edwards and Calvin. The former comes\nforward as the advocate of free-will, the latter expressly denies that we\nhave a free-will. Calvin admits that we may be free from co-action or\ncompulsion; but to call this freedom of the will, is, he considers, to\ndecorate a most \u201cdiminutive thing with a superb title.\u201d And though this is\nall the freedom Edwards allows us to possess, yet he does not hesitate to\ndeclare that his doctrine is perfectly consistent with \u201cthe highest degree\nof liberty that ever could be thought of, or that ever could possibly\nenter into the heart of man to conceive.\u201d\n\nThe only liberty we possess, according to all the authors referred to, is\na freedom of the body and not of the mind. Though the younger Edwards is a\nstrenuous advocate of his father\u2019s doctrine, he has sometimes, without\nintending to do so, let fall a heavy blow upon it. He finds, for instance,\nthe following language in the writings of Dr. West, \u201che might have omitted\ndoing the thing if he would,\u201d and he is perplexed to ascertain its\nmeaning. \u201cTo say that if a man had chosen not to go to a debauch, (for\nthat is the case put by Dr. West,) he would, indeed, have chosen not to go\nto it, is too great trifling to be ascribed to Dr. West.\u201d \u201cYet to say,\u201d he\ncontinues, \u201cthat the man could have avoided the _external action of\ngoing_, &c., if he would, would be equally trifling; for the question\nbefore us is concerning the liberty of the _will_ or _mind_, and _not_ the\nbody.\u201d The italics are his own. It seems, then, that in the opinion of the\nyounger Edwards it is very great trifling to speak of the power to do an\n_external action_ in the present controversy, _because it relates to the\nwill or mind, and not to the body_. We believe this remark to be perfectly\njust, and although it was aimed at the antagonist of President Edwards, it\nfalls with crushing weight on the doctrine of President Edwards himself.\nIs it not wonderful that so just a reflection did not occur to the younger\nEdwards, in relation to the definition of liberty contained in the great\nwork he had undertaken to defend?\n\nWe have now seen how some of the early reformers, and some of the great\nthinkers in after-times, have endeavoured to reconcile the scheme of\nnecessity with the free-agency and accountability of man. Before quitting\nthis subject, however, we wish to adduce a remarkable passage from one of\nthe most correct reasoners, as well as one of the most impressive writers\nthat in modern times have advocated the doctrines of Calvinism. \u201cHere we\ncome to a question,\u201d says he, \u201cwhich has engaged the attention, and\nexercised the ingenuity, and perplexed the wits of men in every age. If\nGod has foreordained whatever comes to pass, the whole series of events is\nnecessary, and human liberty is taken away. Men are passive instruments in\nthe hands of their Maker; they can do nothing but what they are secretly\nand irresistibly impelled to do; they are not, therefore, responsible for\ntheir actions; and God is the author of sin.\u201d After sweeping away some\nattempts to solve this difficulty, he adds: \u201cIt is a more intelligible\nmethod to explain the subject by the doctrine which makes liberty consist\nin the power of acting according to the prevailing inclination, or the\nmotive which appears strongest to the mind. Those actions are free which\nare the _effects of volition_. _In whatever manner the state of mind which\ngave rise to volition has been produced, the liberty of the agent is\nneither greater nor less. It is his will alone which is to be considered,\nand not the means by which it has been determined._ If God foreordained\ncertain actions, and placed men in such circumstances that the actions\nwould certainly take place agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are\nnevertheless moral agents, because they act voluntarily and are\nresponsible for the actions which consent has made their own. _Liberty\ndoes not consist in the power of acting or not acting, but in acting from\nchoice._ The choice is determined by something in the mind itself, or by\nsomething external influencing the mind; but _whatever is the cause_, the\nchoice makes the action free, _and the agent accountable_. _If this\ndefinition of liberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible\nto reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees; but we have\nnot got rid of every difficulty._\u201d Now this definition of liberty, it is\nobvious, is precisely the same as that given by President Edwards, and\nnothing could be more perfectly adapted to effect a reconciliation between\nthe freedom of the will and the doctrine of absolute decrees. How\nperfectly it shapes the freedom of man to fit the doctrine of\npredestination! It is a fine piece of workmanship, it is true; but as the\nlearned and candid author remarks, we must not imagine that we have \u201cgot\nrid of every difficulty.\u201d For, \u201c_by this theory_,\u201d he continues, \u201c_human\nactions appear to be as necessary as the motions of matter according to\nthe laws of gravitation and attraction; and man seems to be a machine,\nconscious of his movements, and consenting to them, but impelled by\nsomething different from himself_.\u201d(31) Such is the candid confession of\nthis devoted Calvinist.\n\nWe have now seen the nature of that freedom of the will which the immortal\nEdwards has exerted all his powers to recommend to the Christian world!\n\u201cEgregious liberty!\u201d exclaimed Calvin. \u201cIt merely allows us elbow-room,\u201d\nsays Leibnitz. \u201cIt seems, after all, to leave us mere machines,\u201d says\nDick. \u201cIt is trifling to speak of such a thing,\u201d says the younger Edwards,\nin relation to the will. \u201cWhy, surely, this cannot be what the great\nPresident Edwards meant by the freedom of the will,\u201d says Dr. Day. He\ncertainly must have evaded his own idea on that point. Is it not evident,\nthat the house of the necessitarian is divided against itself?\n\nNecessitarians not only refute each other, but in most cases each one\ncontradicts himself. Thus the younger Edwards says, it is absurd to speak\nof a power to act according to our choice, when the question relates, not\nto the freedom of the body, but to the freedom of the mind itself. He\nhappens to see the absurdity of this mode of speaking when he finds it in\nhis adversary, Dr. West; and yet it is precisely his own definition of\nfreedom. \u201cBut if by liberty,\u201d says he, \u201cbe meant a power of willing and\nchoosing, an exemption from co-action and natural necessity, and power,\nopportunity, and advantage, to _execute our own choice_; in this sense we\nhold liberty.\u201d(32) Thus he returns to the absurd idea of free-will as\nconsisting in \u201celbow-room,\u201d which merely allows our choice or volition to\npass into effect. Dr. Dick is guilty of the same inconsistency. Though he\nadmits, as we have seen, that this definition of liberty does not get rid\nof every difficulty, but seems to leave us mere \u201cmachines;\u201d yet he has\nrecourse to it, in order to reconcile the Calvinistic view of divine grace\nwith the free-agency of man. \u201cThe great objection,\u201d says he, \u201cagainst the\ninvincibility of divine grace, is, that it is subversive of the liberty of\nthe will.\u201d(33) But, he replies, \u201cTrue liberty consists in doing what we do\nwith knowledge and _from choice_.\u201d\n\nYet as if unconscious that their greatest champions were thus routed and\noverthrown by each other, we see hundreds of minor necessitarians still\nfighting on with the same weapons, perfectly unmindful of the disorder and\nconfusion which reigns around them in their own ranks. Thus, for example,\nD\u2019Aubign\u00e9 says, \u201cIt were _easy to demonstrate_ that the doctrine of the\nreformers did not take away from man the liberty of a moral agent, and\nreduce him to a passive machine.\u201d Now, how does the historian so easily\ndemonstrate that the doctrine of necessity, as held by the reformers, does\nnot deny the liberty of a moral agent? Why, by simply producing the old\neffete notion of the liberty of the will, as consisting in freedom from\nco-action; as if it had never been, and never could be, called in\nquestion. \u201cEvery action performed without external restraint,\u201d says he,\n\u201cand in pursuance of the determination of the soul itself, is a free\naction.\u201d(34) This demonstration, it is needless to repeat, would save any\nscheme of fatalism from reproach, as well as the doctrine of the\nreformers.\n\nThe scheme of the Calvinists is defended in the same manner in Hill\u2019s\nDivinity: \u201cThe liberty of a moral agent,\u201d says he, \u201cconsists in the power\nof acting according to his choice; and those actions are free, which are\nperformed without any external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of\nthe determination of his own mind.\u201d \u201cAccording to the Calvinists,\u201d says\nMr. Shaw, in his Exposition of the Confession of Faith, \u201cthe liberty of a\nmoral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice; and\nthose actions are free which are performed without any external compulsion\nor restraint, in consequence of the determination of his own mind.\u201d(35)\nSuch, if we may believe these learned Calvinists, is the idea of the\nfreedom of the will which belongs to their system. If this be so, then it\nmust be conceded that the Calvinistic definition of the freedom of the\nwill is perfectly consistent with the most absolute scheme of fatality\nwhich ever entered into the heart of man to conceive.\n\nThe views of M\u2019Cosh respecting the freedom of the will, seem, at first\nsight, widely different from those of other Calvinists and necessitarians.\nThe freedom and independence of the will is certainly pushed as far by him\nas it is carried by Cousin, Coleridge, Clarke, or any of its advocates in\nmodern times. \u201cTrue necessitarians,\u201d says he, \u201cshould learn in what way to\nhold and defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all\nthat doubtful argument, derived from man being supposed to be swayed by\nthe most powerful motive.\u201d(36) Again: \u201cThe truth is,\u201d says he, \u201cit is not\nmotive, properly speaking, that determines the working of the will; but it\nis the will that imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says,\n\u2018It is the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man.\u2019 \u201d(37)\nAccording to this Calvinistic divine, the will is not determined by the\nstrongest motive; on the contrary, it is self-active and self-determined.\n\u201cMind is a self-acting substance,\u201d says he; \u201cand hence its activity and\nindependence.\u201d In open defiance of all Calvinistic and necessitarian\nphilosophy, he even adopts the self-determining power of the will. \u201cNor\nhave necessitarians,\u201d says he, \u201ceven of the highest order, been\nsufficiently careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of\nmaking admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of them have\nfully developed the phenomena of human spontaneity. Even Edwards ridicules\nthe idea of the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the use of that\npower determining its own volitions. Now, we hold it to be an\nincontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true\ndetermining cause of every given volition is not any mere anterior\nincitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will.\u201d(38)\nSurely, the author of such a passage cannot be accused of being afraid to\nmake concessions to his opponents. But this is not all. If possible, he\nrises still higher in his views of the lofty, not to say god-like,\nindependence of the human will. \u201cWe rejoice,\u201d says he, \u201cto recognise such\na being in man. We trust that we are cherishing no presumptuous feeling,\nwhen we believe him to be free, as his Maker is free. We believe him,\nmorally speaking, to be as independent of external control as his Creator\nmust ever be\u2014as that Creator was when, in a past eternity, there was no\nexternal existence to control him.\u201d(39)\n\nYet, strange as it may seem, Mr. M\u2019Cosh trembles at the idea of \u201cremoving\nthe creature from under the control of God;\u201d and hence, he insists as\nstrenuously as any other necessitarian, that the mind, and all its\nvolitions, are subjected to the dominion of causes. \u201cWe are led by an\nintuition of our nature,\u201d says he, \u201cto a belief in the invariable\nconnexion between cause and effect; and we see numerous proofs of this law\nof cause and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the external\nworld, and reigning in the will as it does in every other department of\nthe mind.\u201d(40) Again: \u201cIt is by an intuition of our nature that we believe\nthis thought or feeling could not have been produced without a cause; and\nthat this same cause will again and forever produce the same effects. And\nthis intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation, not\nonly among the thoughts and feelings generally, but among the wishes and\nvolitions of the soul.\u201d(41)\n\nNow here is the question, How can the soul be self-active,\nself-determined, and yet all its thoughts, and feelings, and volitions,\nhave producing causes? How can it be free and independent in its acts, and\nyet under the dominion of efficient causes? How can the law of causation\nreign in all the states of the mind, as it reigns over all the movements\nof matter, and yet leave it as free as was the Creator when nothing beside\nhimself existed? In other words, How is such a scheme of necessity to be\nreconciled with such a scheme of liberty? The author replies, We are not\nbound to answer such a question(42)\u2014nor are we. As we understand it, the\nvery idea of liberty, as above set forth by the author, is a direct\nnegative of his doctrine of necessity.\n\nBut although he has taken so much pains to dissent from his necessitarian\nbrethren, and to advocate the Arminian notion of free-will, Mr. M\u2019Cosh,\nnevertheless, falls back upon the old Calvinistic definition of liberty,\nas consisting in a freedom from external co-action, in order to find a\nbasis for human responsibility. It may seem strange, that after all his\nlabour in laying the foundation, he should not build upon it; but it is\nstrictly true. \u201cIf any man asserts,\u201d says he, \u201cthat in order to\nresponsibility, the will must be free\u2014that is, free from physical\nrestraint; free to act as he pleases\u2014we at once and heartily agree with\nhim; and we maintain that in this sense the will is free, as free as it is\npossible for any man to conceive it to be.\u201d And again: \u201cIf actions do not\nproceed from the will, but from something else, from mere physical or\nexternal restraint, then the agent is not responsible for them. But if the\ndeeds proceed from the will, then it at once attaches a responsibility to\nthem. Place before the mind a murder committed by a party through pure\nphysical compulsion brought to bear on the arm that inflicts the blow, and\nthe conscience says, here no guilt is attachable. But let the same murder\nbe done with the thorough consent of the will, the conscience stops not to\ninquire whether _this consent has been caused or no_.\u201d(43) Thus, after all\nhis dissent from Edwards, he returns precisely to Edwards\u2019s definition of\nthe freedom of the will as the ground of human responsibility; after all\nhis strictures upon \u201cnecessitarians of the first order,\u201d he falls back\nupon precisely that notion of free-will which was so long ago condemned by\nCalvin, and exploded by Leibnitz, and which relates, as we have so often\nseen, not to acts of the will at all, but only to the external movements\nof the body.\n\n\n\n Section VII.\n\n\nThe sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the\nantagonism between liberty and necessity.\n\n\nMr. Hume has disposed of the question concerning liberty and necessity, by\nthe application of his celebrated theory of cause and effect. According to\nthis theory, the idea of power, of efficacy, is a mere chimera, which has\nno corresponding reality in nature, and should be ranked among the\nexploded prejudices of the human mind. \u201cOne event follows another,\u201d says\nhe; \u201cbut we never can observe any tie between them. They seem _conjoined_,\nbut never _connected_.\u201d(44)\n\nWe shall not stop to examine this hypothesis, which has been so often\nrefuted. We shall merely remark in passing, that it owes its existence to\na false method of philosophizing. Its author set out with the doctrine of\nLocke, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection; and\nbecause he could not trace the idea of power to either of these sources,\nhe denied its existence. Hence we may apply to him, with peculiar force,\nthe judicious and valuable criticism which M. Cousin has bestowed upon the\nmethod of Locke. Though Mr. Hume undertakes, as his title-page declares,\nto introduce the inductive method into the science of human nature, he\ndeparted from that method at the very first step. Instead of beginning, as\nhe should have done, by ascertaining the ideas actually in our minds, and\nnoting their characteristics, and proceeding to trace them up to their\nsources, he pursued the diametrically opposite course. He first determined\nand fixed the origin of all our ideas; and every idea which was not seen\nto arise from this pre\u00ebstablished origin, he declared to be a mere\nchimera. He thus caused nature to bend to hypotheses; instead of\nanatomizing and studying the world of mind according to the inductive\nmethod, he pursued the high _a priori_ road, and reconstructed it to suit\nhis pre\u00ebstablished origin of human knowledge. This was not to study and\ninterpret the work of God \u201cin the profound humiliation of the human\nsoul;\u201d(45) but to re-write the volume of nature, and omit those parts\nwhich did not accord with the views and wishes of the philosopher. In the\npithy language of Sir William Hamilton, he \u201cdid not anatomize, but\ntruncate.\u201d\n\nIf this doctrine be true, it is idle to talk about free-agency, for there\nis no such thing as agency in the world. It is true, there is a thing\nwhich we call volition, or an act of the mind; but this does not produce\nthe external change by which it is followed. The two events co-exist, but\nthere is no connecting tie between them. \u201cThey are _conjoined_, but not\nconnected.\u201d In short, according to this scheme, all things are equally\nfree, and all equally necessary. In other words, there is neither freedom\nnor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms; and the whole\ncontroversy concerning them, which has agitated the learned for so many\nages, dwindles down into a mere empty and noisy logomachy. Indeed, this is\nthe conclusion to which Mr. Hume himself comes; expressly maintaining that\nthe controversy in question has been a dispute about words. We are not to\nsuppose from this, however, that he forbears to give a definition of\nliberty. His idea of free-agency is precisely that of Hobbes, and so many\nothers before him. \u201cBy liberty,\u201d says he, \u201cwe can only mean a power of\n_acting or not acting according to the determination of the will_: that\nis, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also\nmay.\u201d(46) Such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term\n_liberty_; and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere dream.\nThe coolness of this assumption is admirable; but it is fully equalled by\nthe conclusion which follows. If we will observe these two circumstances,\nsays he, and thereby render our definition intelligible, Mr. Hume is\nperfectly persuaded \u201cthat all mankind will be found of one opinion with\nregard to it.\u201d If Mr. Hume had closely looked into the great productions\nof his own school, he would have seen the utter improbability, that\nnecessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of\nliberty.(47)\n\nIf Mr. Hume\u2019s scheme were correct, it would seem that nothing could be\nstable or fixed; mind would be destitute of energy to move within its own\nsphere, or to bind matter in its orbit. All things would seem to be in a\nloose, disconnected, and fluctuating state. But this is not the view which\nhe had of the matter. Though he denied that there is any connecting link\namong events, yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting among them is\nfixed and unalterable. \u201cLet any one define a cause,\u201d says he, \u201cwithout\ncomprehending, as part of the definition, a _necessary connexion_ with its\neffect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by\nthe definition, and I shall readily give up the whole controversy.\u201d(48)\nThis is the philosopher who has so often told us, that events are\n\u201cconjoined, not connected.\u201d\n\nThe motives of volition given, for example, and the volition invariably\nand inevitably follows. How then, may we ask, can a man be accountable for\nhis volitions, over which he has no power, and in which he exerts no\npower? This question has not escaped the attention of Mr. Hume. Let us see\nhis answer. He admits that liberty \u201cis essential to morality.\u201d(49) For \u201cas\nactions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are\nindications of the internal character, passions, and affections, it is\nimpossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, when they\nproceed, not from these principles, but are derived altogether from\nexternal violence.\u201d It is true, as we have seen, that if our external\nactions, the motions of the body, proceed not from our volitions, but from\nexternal violence, we are not responsible for them. This is conceded on\nall sides, and has nothing to do with the question. But suppose our\nexternal actions are inevitably connected with our volitions, and our\nvolitions as inevitably connected with their causes, how can we be\nresponsible for either the one or the other? This is the question which\nMr. Hume has evaded and not fairly met.\n\nMr. Hume\u2019s notion about cause and effect has been greatly extended by its\ndistinguished advocate, Dr. Thomas Brown; whose acuteness, eloquence, and\nelevation of character, have given it a circulation which it could never\nhave received from the influence of its author. Almost as often as divines\nhave occasion to use this notion, they call it the doctrine of Dr. Brown,\nand omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin.\n\nThe defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed, in regard to a\nfundamental point, to all other necessitarians. Though they deny the\nexistence of all power and efficacy, they still hold that human volitions\nare necessary; while other necessitarians ground their doctrine on the\nfact, that volitions are produced by the most powerful, the most\nefficacious motives. They are not only at war with other necessitarians,\nthey are also at war with themselves. Let us see if this may not be\nclearly shown.\n\nAccording to the scheme in question, the mind does not act upon the body,\nnor the body upon the mind; for there is no power, and consequently no\naction of power, in the universe. Now, it is known that it was the\ndoctrine of Leibnitz, that two substances so wholly unlike as mind and\nmatter could not act upon each other; and hence he concluded that the\nphenomena of the internal and external worlds were merely \u201c_conjoined_,\nnot _connected_.\u201d The soul and body run together\u2014to use his own\nillustration\u2014like two independent watches, without either exerting any\ninfluence upon the movements of the other. Thus arose his celebrated, but\nnow obsolete fiction, of a pre\u00ebstablished harmony. Now, if the doctrine of\nHume and Brown be true, this sort of harmony subsists, not only in\nrelation to mind and body, but in relation to all things in existence.\nMind never acts upon body, nor mind upon mind. Hence, this doctrine is but\na generalization of the pre\u00ebstablished harmony of Leibnitz, with the\nexception that Mr. Hume did not contend that this wonderful harmony was\nestablished by the Divine Being. Is it not wonderful that so acute a\nmetaphysician as Dr. Brown should not have perceived the inseparable\naffinity between his doctrine and that of Leibnitz? Is it not wonderful\nthat, instead of perceiving this affinity, he should have poured ridicule\nand contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a generalization?\nMr. Mill, another able and strenuous advocate of Mr. Hume\u2019s theory of\ncausation, has likewise ranked the pre\u00ebstablished harmony of Leibnitz, as\nwell as the system of occasional causes peculiar to Malebranche, among the\nfallacies of the human mind. Thus they are at war with themselves, as well\nas with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity.\n\nM. Comte, pre\u00ebminently distinguished in every branch of science, has taken\nthe same one-sided view of nature as that which is exhibited in the theory\nunder consideration; but he does not permit himself to be encumbered by\nthe inconsistencies observable in his great predecessors. On the contrary,\nhe boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences, denying\nthe existence of a God, the free-agency of man, and the reality of moral\ndistinctions.\n\nMr. Mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty\nentertained by Hobbes and Hume, in order to lay a foundation for human\nresponsibility. He sees that it really cannot be made to answer such a\npurpose. He also sees, that the doctrine of necessity, as usually\nmaintained, is liable to the objections urged against it, that \u201cit tends\nto degrade the moral nature of man, and to paralyze our desire of\nexcellence.\u201d(50) In making this concession to the advocates of liberty, he\nspeaks from his own \u201cpersonal experience.\u201d The only way to escape these\npernicious consequences, he says, is to keep constantly before the mind a\nclear and unclouded view of the true theory of causation, which will\nprevent us from supposing, as most necessitarians do, that there is a real\nconnecting link or influence between motives and volitions, or any other\nevents. So strong is the prejudice (as he calls it) in favour of such\nconnection, that even those who adopt Mr. Hume\u2019s theory, are not\nhabitually influenced by it, but frequently relapse into the old error\nwhich conflicts with the free-agency and accountability of man, and hence\nan advantage which their opponents have had over them.\n\nThese remarks are undoubtedly just. There is not a single writer, from Mr.\nHume himself, down to the present day, who has been able either to speak\nor to reason in conformity with his theory, however warmly he may have\nembraced it. Mr. Mill himself has not been more fortunate in this respect\nthan many of his distinguished predecessors. It is an exceedingly\ndifficult thing, by the force of speculation, to silence the voice of\nnature within us. If it were necessary we might easily show, that if we\nabstract \u201cthe common prejudice,\u201d in regard to causation, it will be as\nimpossible to read Mr. Mill\u2019s work on logic, as to read Mr. Hume\u2019s\nwritings themselves, without perceiving that many of its passages have\nbeen stripped of all logical coherency of thought. The defect which he so\nclearly sees in the writings of other advocates of necessity, not\nexcepting those who embrace his own paradox in relation to cause and\neffect, we can easily perceive in his own.\n\nThe doctrine of causation, under consideration, annihilates one of the\nclearest and most fundamental distinctions ever made in philosophy; the\ndistinction between _action_ and _passion_, between _mind_ and _matter_.\nMatter is passive, mind is active. The very first law of motion laid down\nin the Principia, a work so much admired by M. Comte and Mr. Mill, is\nbased on the idea that matter is wholly inert, and destitute of power\neither to move itself, or to check itself when moved by anything _ab\nextra_. This will not be denied. But is mind equally passive? Is there\nnothing in existence which rises above this passivity of the material\nworld? If there is not, and such is the evident conclusion of the doctrine\nin question, then all things flow on in one boundless ocean of passivity,\nwhile there is no First Mover, no Self-active Agent in the universe.\nIndeed, Mr. Mill has expressly declared, that the distinction between\nagent and patient is illusory.(51) If this be true, we are persuaded that\nM. Comte has been more successful in delivering the world from the being\nof a God, than Mr. Mill has been in relieving it from the difficulties\nattending the scheme of necessity.\n\n\n\n Section VIII.\n\n\nThe views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation to the antagonism\nbetween liberty and necessity.\n\n\n\u201cTo clear up this seeming antagonism between the mechanism of nature and\nfreedom in one and the self-same given action, we must refer,\u201d says Kant,\n\u201cto what was advanced in the critique of pure reason, or what, at least,\nis a corollary from it, viz., that the necessity of nature which may not\nconsort with the freedom of the subject, attaches simply to a thing\nstanding under the relations of time, i. e., to the modifications of the\nacting subject as phenomena, and that, therefore, so far (i. e., as\nphenomena) the determinators of each act lie in the foregoing elapsed\ntime, and are quite beyond his power, (part of which are the actions man\nhas already performed, and the phenomenal character he has given himself\nin his own eyes,) yet, _e contra_, the self-same subject, being\nself-conscious of itself as a thing in itself, considers its existence as\nsomewhat detached from the conditions of time, and itself, so far forth,\nas only determinable by laws given it by its own reason.\u201d(52)\n\nKant has said, that this \u201cintricate problem, at whose solution centuries\nhave laboured,\u201d is not to be solved by \u201ca jargon of words.\u201d If so, may we\nnot doubt whether he has taken the best method to solve it? His solution\nshows one thing at least, viz., that he was not satisfied with any of the\nsolutions of his predecessors, for his is wholly unlike them. Kant saw\nthat the question of liberty and necessity related to the will itself, and\nnot to the consequences of the will\u2019s volitions. Hence he was compelled to\nreject those weak evasions of the difficulty of reconciling them, and to\ngrapple directly with the difficulty itself. Let us see if this was not\ntoo much for him. Let us see if he has been able to maintain the doctrine\nof necessity, holding it as a \u201cdemonstrated truth,\u201d and at the same time\ngive the idea of liberty a tenable position in his system.\n\nIf we would clear up the seeming antagonism between the mechanism of\nnature and freedom in regard to the same volition, says he, we must\nremember, that the volition itself, as standing under the conditions of\ntime, is to be considered as subject to the law of mechanism: yet the mind\nwhich puts forth the volition, being conscious that it is a thing somewhat\ndetached from the conditions of time, is free from the law of mechanism,\nand determinable by the laws of its own reason. That is to say, the\nvolitions of mind falling under the law of cause and effect, like all\nother events which appear in time, are necessary; while the mind itself,\nwhich exists not exactly in time, is free. We shall state only two\nobjections to this view. In the first place, it seems to distinguish the\nmind from its act, not _modally_, i. e., as a thing from its mode, but\n_numerically_, i. e., as one thing from another thing. But who can do\nthis? Who regards an act of the mind, a volition, as anything but the mind\nitself as existing in a state of willing? In the second place, it requires\nus to conceive, that the act of the mind is necessitated, while the mind\nitself is free in the act thus necessitated. But who can do this? On the\ncontrary, who can fail to see in this precisely the same seeming\nantagonism which Kant undertook to remove? To tell us, that volition is\nnecessitated because it exists in time, but the mind is free because it\ndoes not exist in time, is, one would think, a very odd way to dispel the\ndarkness which hangs over the grand problem of life. It is to solve one\ndifficulty merely by adding other difficulties to it. Hence, the world\nwill never be much wiser, we are inclined to suspect, with respect to the\nseeming antagonism between liberty and necessity, in consequence of the\nspeculations of the philosopher of K\u00f6nigsberg, especially since his great\nadmirer, Mr. Coleridge, forgot to fulfil his promise to write the history\nof a man who existed in \u201cneither time nor space, but a-one side.\u201d\n\nThough Kant made the attempt in his Metaphysics of Ethics to overcome the\nspeculative difficulty in question, it is evident that he is not satisfied\nwith his own solution of it, since he has repeatedly declared, that the\npractical reason furnishes the only ground on which it can be surmounted.\n\u201cThis view of Kant,\u201d says Knapp, \u201cimplying that freedom, while it is a\npostulate of our _practical_ reason, (i. e., necessary to be assumed in\norder to moral action,) is yet _inconsistent with our theoretical reason_,\n(i. e., incapable of demonstration, _and contrary to the conclusions to\nwhich the reflecting mind arrives_,) is now very generally rejected.\u201d(53)\n\nIn regard to this point, there seems to be a perfect coincidence between\nthe philosophy of Kant and that of Sir William Hamilton. \u201cIn thought,\u201d\nsays the latter, \u201cwe never escape determination and necessity.\u201d(54) If the\nscheme of necessity never fails to force itself upon our thought, how are\nwe then to get rid of it, so as to lay a foundation for morality and\naccountability? This question, the author declares, is too much for the\nspeculative reason of man; and being utterly baffled in that direction, we\ncan only appeal to the fact of consciousness, in order to establish the\ndoctrine of liberty. \u201cThe philosophy which I profess,\u201d says he,\n\u201cannihilates the theoretical problem\u2014How is the scheme of liberty, or the\nscheme of necessity, to be rendered comprehensible?\u2014by showing that both\nschemes are equally inconceivable; but it establishes liberty practically\nas a fact, by showing that it is either itself an immediate datum, or is\ninvolved in an immediate datum of consciousness.\u201d(55) We shall hereafter\nsee, why the scheme of necessity always riveted the chain of conviction on\nthe thought of Sir William Hamilton, and compelled him to have recourse to\nan appeal to consciousness in order to escape its delusive power.\n\n\n\n Section IX.\n\n\nThe notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the same subject.\n\n\nLord Kames boldly cut the knot which philosophy had failed to unravel for\nhim. Supposing the doctrine of necessity to be settled on a clear and firm\nbasis, he resolved our feelings of liberty into \u201ca deceitful sense\u201d which\nhe imagined the Almighty had conferred on man for wise and good purposes.\nHe concluded that if men could see the truth, in regard to the scheme of\nnecessity, without any illusion or mistake, they would relax their\nexertions in all directions, and passively submit to the all-controlling\ninfluences by which they are surrounded. But God, he supposed, out of\ncompassion for us, concealed the truth from our eyes, in order that we\nmight be induced to take care of ourselves, by the pleasant dream that we\nreally have the power to do so.\n\nWe shall not stop to pull this scheme to pieces. We shall only remark,\nthat it is a pity the philosopher undertook to counteract the benevolent\ndesign of the Deity, and to expose the cheat and delusion by which he\nintended to govern the world for its benefit. But the author himself, it\nis but just to add, had the good sense and candour to renounce his own\nscheme; and hence we need dwell no longer upon it. It remains at the\npresent day only as a striking example of the frightful contortions of the\nhuman mind, in its herculean efforts to escape from the dark labyrinth of\nfate into the clear and open light of nature.\n\nSir James Mackintosh, though familiar with the speculations of preceding\nphilosophers, was satisfied with none of their solutions of the great\nproblem under consideration, and consequently he has invented one of his\nown. This solution is founded on his theory of the moral sentiments, which\nis peculiar to himself. This theory is employed to show how it is, that\nalthough we may come by our volitions according to the scheme of\nnecessity, yet we do not perceive the causes by which they are necessarily\nproduced, and consequently imagine that we are free. Thus, the \u201cfeeling of\nliberty,\u201d as he calls it, is resolved into an illusory judgment, and the\nscheme of necessity is exhibited in all its adamantine strength. \u201cIt seems\nimpossible,\u201d says he, \u201cfor reason to consider occurrences otherwise than\nas bound together by the connexion of cause and effect; and in this\ncircumstance consists the strength of the necessitarian system.\u201d(56)\n\nWe shall offer only one remark on this extraordinary hypothesis. If the\ntheory of Sir James were true, it could only show, that although our\nvolitions are necessarily caused, we do not perceive the causes by which\nthey are produced. But this fact has never been denied: it has always been\nconceded, that we ascertain the existence of efficient causes, excepting\nthe acts of our minds, only by means of the effects they produce. Both\nLeibnitz and Edwards long ago availed themselves of this undisputed fact,\nin order to account for the belief which men entertain in regard to their\ninternal freedom. \u201cThus,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cI find myself possessed of my\nvolitions before I can see the effectual power and efficacy of any cause\nto produce them, _for the power and efficacy of the cause are not seen but\nby the effect, and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine that\nvolition has no cause_.\u201d We shall see hereafter that this is a very false\naccount of the genesis of the common belief, that we possess an internal\nfreedom from necessity; but it is founded on the truth which no one\npretends to deny, that external efficient causes can only be seen by their\neffects, and not by any direct perception of the mind. It was altogether a\nwork of supererogation, then, for Sir James Mackintosh to bring forth his\ntheory of moral sentiments to establish the _possibility_ of a thing which\npreceding philosophers had admitted to be a _fact_. It requires no\nelaborate theory to convince us that a thing might exist without our\nperceiving it, when it is conceded on all sides, that even if it did\nexist, we have no power by which to perceive it. With this single remark,\nwe shall dismiss a scheme which resolves our conviction of internal\nliberty into a mere illusion, and which, however pure may have been the\nintentions of the author, really saps the foundation of moral obligation,\nand destroys the nature of virtue.\n\n\n\n Section X.\n\n\nThe conclusion of M\u0153hler, Tholuck, and others, that all speculation on\nsuch a subject must be vain and fruitless.\n\n\nConsidering the vast wilderness of speculation which exists on the subject\nunder consideration, it is not at all surprising that many should turn\naway from every speculative view of it with disgust, and endeavour to\ndissuade others from such pursuits. Accordingly M\u0153hler has declared, that\n\u201cso often as, without regard to revelation, _the relation of the human\nspirit to God hath been more deeply investigated_, men have found\n_themselves forced ... to the adoption of pantheism, and, with it, the\nmost arrogant deification of man_.\u201d(57) And Tholuck spreads out the\nreasoning from effect to cause, by which all things are referred to God,\nand God himself only made the greatest and brightest link in the chain;\nand assuming this to be an unanswerable argument, he holds it up as a\ndissuasive from all such speculations. He believes that reason necessarily\nconducts the mind to fatalism.\n\nWe cannot concur with these celebrated writers, and we would deduce a far\ndifferent conclusion from the speculations of necessitarians. This sort of\nscepticism or despair is more common in Germany than it is in this\ncountry; for there, speculation pursuing no certain or determinate\n_method_, has shown itself in all its wild and desolating excesses. But it\nis sophistry, and not reason, that leads the human mind astray; and we\nbelieve that reason, in all cases, is competent to detect and expose the\nimpositions of sophistry. We do not believe that one guide which the\nAlmighty has given us, can, by the legitimate exercise of it, lead us to a\ndifferent result from that of another guide. We are persuaded that if\nreason seems to force us into any system which is contradicted by the\ntestimony of our moral nature, or by the truths of revelation, this is\nunsound speculation: it is founded either on false premises, or else\nsprings from false conclusions, which reason itself may correct, either by\npointing out the fallacy of the premises, or the logical incoherency of\nthe argument. We do not then intend to abandon speculation, but to plant\nit, if we can, on a better foundation, and build it up according to a\nbetter method.\n\n\n\n Section XI.\n\n\nThe true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and arguments.\n\n\nAll the mighty logicians we have yet named have yielded to \u201cthe\ndemonstration\u201d in favour of necessity, but we do not know that one of them\nhas ever directed the energies of his mind to pry into its validity. They\nhave all pursued the method so emphatically condemned by Bacon, and the\nresult has verified his prediction. \u201cThe usual method,\u201d says he, \u201cof\ndiscovery and proof by first establishing the most general propositions,\nthen applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to these, is\nthe parent of error and the calamity of every science.\u201d(58) They have set\nout with the universal law of causality or the principle of the sufficient\nreason, and thence have proceeded to ascertain and determine the actual\nnature and processes of things. We may despair of ever being able to\ndetermine a single fact, or a single process of nature, by reasoning from\ntruisms; we must begin in the opposite direction and learn \u201cto dissect\nnature,\u201d if we would behold her secrets and comprehend her mysteries.\n\nBy pursuing this method it will be seen, and clearly seen, that \u201cthe great\ndemonstration\u201d which has led so many philosophers in chains, is, after\nall, a sophism. We have witnessed their attempts to reconcile the great\nfact of man\u2019s free-agency with this boasted demonstration of necessity.\nBut how interminable is the confusion among them? If a few of them concur\nin one solution, this is condemned by others, and not unfrequently by the\nvery authors of the solution itself. We entertain too great a respect for\ntheir abilities not to believe, that if there had been any means of\nreconciling these things together, they would long since have discovered\nthem, and come to an agreement among themselves, as well as made the truth\nknown to the satisfaction of mankind. But as it is, their speculations are\ndestitute of harmony\u2014are filled with discordant elements. Instead of the\nclear and steady light of truth, illuminating the great problem of\nexistence, we are bewildered by the glare of a thousand paradoxes; instead\nof the sweet voice of harmony, reaching and calling forth a response from\nthe depths of the human soul, the ear is stunned and confounded with a\nfrightful roar of confused sounds.\n\nWe shall not attempt to hold the scheme of necessity, and reconcile it\nwith the fact of man\u2019s free-agency. We shall not undertake a task, in the\nprosecution of which a Descartes, a Leibnitz, a Locke, and an Edwards, not\nto mention a hundred others, have laboured in vain. But we do not intend\nto abandon speculation. On the contrary, we intend to show, so clearly and\nso unequivocally that every eye may see it, that the great boasted\ndemonstration in favour of necessity is a prodigious sophism. We intend to\ndo this; because until the mental vision be purged of the film of this\ndark error, it can never clearly behold the intrinsic majesty and glory of\nGod\u2019s creation, nor the divine beauty of the plan according to which it is\ngoverned.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter II.\n\n\nThe Scheme Of Necessity Makes God The Author Of Sin.\n\n\n I told ye then he should prevail, and speed\n On his bad errand; man should be seduced,\n And flatter\u2019d out of all, believing lies\n Against his Maker; no decree of mine\n Concurring to necessitate his fall,\n Or touch\u2019d with slightest moment of impulse\n His free-will, to her own inclining left\n In even scale.\u2014MILTON.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity, as we have already said, presents two phases in\nrelation to the existence of moral evil; one relating to the agency of\nman, and the other to the agency of God. In the preceding chapter, we\nexamined the attempts of the most learned and skilful advocates of this\nscheme to reconcile it with the free-agency and accountability of man. We\nhave seen how ineffectual have been all their endeavours to show that\ntheir doctrine does not destroy the responsibility of man for his sins.\n\nIt is the design of the present chapter to consider the doctrine of\nnecessity under its other aspect, and to demonstrate that it makes God the\nauthor of sin. If this can be shown, it may justly lead us to suspect that\nthe scheme contains within its bosom some dark fallacy, which should be\ndragged from its hiding-place into the open light of day, and exposed to\nthe abhorrence and detestation of mankind.\n\nIn discussing this branch of our subject, we shall pursue the course\nadopted in relation to the first; for if the doctrine of necessity does\nnot make God the author of sin, we may conclude that this has been shown\nby some one of its most profound and enlightened advocates. If the\nattempts of a Calvin, and an Edwards, and a Leibnitz, to maintain such a\ndoctrine, and yet vindicate the purity of God may be shown to be signal\nfailures, we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between\nthese tenets as maintained by them. Nay, if in order to vindicate their\nsystem from so great a reproach, they have been compelled to adopt\npositions which are clearly inconsistent with the divine holiness, and\nthus to increase rather than to diminish the reproach; surely their system\nitself should be more than suspected of error. We shall proceed, then,\nwith this view, to examine their speculations in regard to the agency of\nGod in its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that the system of\nnecessity does not make God the author of sin.\n\n\nMost of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured to soften\ntheir views, so as to bring them into a conformity with the common\nsentiments of mankind, by supposing that God merely _permits_, without\n_producing_ the sinful volitions of men. But Calvin rejects this\ndistinction with the most positive disdain. \u201cA question of still greater\ndifficulty arises,\u201d says he, \u201cfrom other passages, where God is said to\nincline or draw Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal\nunderstanding scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means, and even\nin operations common to himself and them, is free from any fault, and yet\nrighteously condemns those whose ministry he uses. Hence was invented the\ndistinction between _doing_ and _permitting_; because to many persons this\nhas appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious\nare subject to the power and government of God, so that he directs their\nmalice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for the execution\nof his judgments. The modesty of those who are alarmed by absurdity, might\nperhaps be excusable, if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine\njustice from all accusation by _a pretence utterly destitute of any\nfoundation in truth_.\u201d(59) Here the distinction between God\u2019s _permitting_\nand _doing_ in relation to the sins of men, is declared by Calvin to be\nutterly without foundation in truth, and purely chimerical. So, in various\nother places, he treats this distinction as \u201ctoo weak to be supported.\u201d\n\u201cThe will of God,\u201d says he, \u201cis the supreme and first cause of things;\u201d\nand he quotes Augustine with approbation to the effect, that \u201cHe does not\nremain an idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an\nintervention of an actual volition, if I may be allowed the expression,\nwhich otherwise could never be considered a cause.\u201d(60) According to\nCalvin, then, nothing ever happens in the universe, not even the sinful\nvolitions of men, which is not caused by God, even by \u201cthe intervention of\nan actual volition\u201d of the supreme will.\n\nIt is evident that Calvin scorns to have any recourse to a permissive will\nin God, in order to soften down the stupendous difficulties under which\nhis system seems to labour. On the contrary, he sometimes betrays a little\nimpatience with those who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged\nfeatures of what he conceived to be the truth. \u201cThe fathers,\u201d says he,\n\u201care sometimes too scrupulous on this subject, and afraid of a simple\nconfession of the truth.\u201d(61) He entertains no such fears. He is even bold\nand rigid enough in his consistency to say, \u201cthat God often actuates the\nreprobate by the interposition of Satan, but in such a manner that Satan\nhimself acts his part by the divine impulse.\u201d(62) And again, he declares\nthat by means of Satan, \u201cGod excites the will and strengthens the efforts\u201d\nof the reprobate.(63) Indeed, his great work, whenever it touches upon\nthis awful subject, renders it perfectly clear that Calvin despises all\nweak evasions in the advocacy of his stern doctrine.\n\nIt has been truly said, that Calvin never thinks of \u201cdeducing the fall of\nman from the abuse of human freedom.\u201d So far is he from this, indeed, that\nhe seems to lose his patience with those who trace the origin of moral\nevil to such a source. \u201cThey say it is nowhere declared in express terms,\u201d\nsays Calvin, \u201cthat God decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as\nthough the same God, whom the Scriptures represent as doing whatever he\npleases, created the noblest of his creatures without any determinate end.\nThey maintain, that he was possessed of free choice, that he might be the\nauthor of his own fate, but that God decreed nothing more than to treat\nhim according to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what\nwill become of God\u2019s omnipotence, by which he governs all things according\nto his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing\nbesides.\u201d(64) The fall of man, says Calvin, was decreed from all eternity,\nand it was brought to pass by the omnipotence of God. To suppose that Adam\nwas the author of his own fate and fall, is to deny the omnipotence of\nGod, and to rob him of his sovereignty.\n\nNow, if to say that God created man, and then left his sin to proceed\nwholly from himself, be to rob God of his omnipotence, and to affirm that\nhe made man for no determinate end, the same consequences would follow\nfrom the position that God created Satan, and then left his sin and\nrebellion to proceed wholly from himself. But, strange as it may seem, the\nvery thing which Calvin so vehemently denies in regard to man, he asserts\nin relation to Satan; and he even feels called upon to make this assertion\nin order to vindicate the divine purity against the calumny of being\nimplicated in the sin of Satan! \u201cBut since the devil was created by God,\u201d\nsays he, \u201cwe must remark, that this wickedness which we attribute to his\nnature is not from creation, but from corruption. For whatever evil\nquality he has, he has acquired by his defection and fall. And of this\nScripture apprizes us; but, believing him to have come from God, just as\nhe now is, we shall ascribe to God himself that which is in direct\nopposition to him. For this reason, Christ declares, that Satan, \u2018when he\nspeaketh a lie, speaketh of his own;\u2019 and adds the reason, \u2018because he\nabode not in the truth.\u2019 When he says that he abode not in the truth, he\ncertainly implied that he had once been in it; and when he calls him the\nfather of a lie, _he precludes his imputing to God the depravity of his\nnature, which originated wholly from himself_. Though these things are\ndelivered in a brief and rather obscure manner, yet they are abundantly\nsufficient to vindicate the majesty of God from every calumny.\u201d(65) Thus,\nin order to show that God is not the author of sin, Calvin assumes the\nvery positions in regard to the rebellion of Satan which his opponents\nhave always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgression of\nman. What then, on Calvin\u2019s own principles, becomes of the omnipotence of\nGod? Does this extend merely to man and not to Satan? Is it not evident\nthat Calvin\u2019s scheme in regard to the sin of the first man, is here most\nemphatically condemned out of his own mouth? Does he not here endorse the\nvery consequence which his adversaries have been accustomed to deduce from\nhis scheme of predestination, namely, that it makes God the author of sin?\n\nThis scheme of doctrine, it must be confessed, is not without its\ndifficulties. It clothes man, as he came from the hand of his Maker, with\nthe glorious attributes of freedom; but to what end? Is this attribute\nemployed to account for the introduction of sin into the world? Is it\nemployed to show that man, and not God, is the author of moral evil? It is\nsad to reflect that it is not. The fall of man is referred to the direct\n\u201comnipotence of God.\u201d The feeble creature yields to the decree and power\nof the Almighty, who, because he does so, kindles into the most fearful\nwrath and dooms him and all his posterity to temporal, spiritual, and\neternal death. Such is the doctrine which is advanced, in order to secure\nthe omnipotence of God, and to exalt his sovereignty. But is it not a\ngreat leading feature of deism itself, that it exalts the power of God at\nthe expense of his infinite moral perfections? So we have understood the\nmatter; and hence, it seems to us, that Christian divines should be more\nguarded in handling the attribute of omnipotence. \u201cThe rigid theologians,\u201d\nsays Leibnitz, \u201chave held the greatness of God in higher estimation than\nhis goodness, the latitudinarians have done the contrary; _true orthodoxy\nhas these two perfections equally at heart_. The error which abases the\ngreatness of God should be called _anthropomorphism_, and _despotism_ that\nwhich divests him of his goodness.\u201d(66)\n\nIf Calvin\u2019s doctrine be true, God is not the author of sin, inasmuch as he\nmade man pure and upright; but yet, by the same power which created him,\nhas he plunged him into sin and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a\nsinful nature be inconsistent with the infinite purity of God, will it not\nbe difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in man,\nafter his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence?\n\nIf we ask, How can God be just in causing man to sin, and then punishing\nhim for it? Calvin replies, That all his dealings with us \u201care guided by\nequity.\u201d(67) We know, indeed, that all his ways are guided by the most\nabsolute and perfect justice; and this is the very circumstance which\ncreates the difficulty. The more clearly we perceive, and the more vividly\nwe realize, the perfection of the divine equity, the more heavily does the\ndifficulty press upon our minds. This assurance brings us no relief; we\nstill demand, if God be just, as in truth he is, how can he deal with us\nafter such a manner? The answer we obtain is, that God is just. And if\nthis does not satisfy us, we are reminded that \u201cit is impossible ever\nwholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety.\u201d(68) We seek for\nlight, and, instead of light, we are turned off with reproaches for the\nwant of piety. We have not that faith, we humbly confess, which \u201cfrom its\nexaltation looks down on these mists with contempt;\u201d(69) but we have a\nreason, it may be \u201ca carnal understanding,\u201d which longs to be enlarged and\nenlightened by faith. Hence, it cannot but murmur when, instead of being\nenlarged and enlightened by faith, it is utterly overwhelmed and\nconfounded by it. And these murmurings of reason, which we can no more\nprevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean from its\ndepths, are met and sought to be quelled with the rebuke, \u201cWho art thou, O\nman, that repliest against God?\u201d We reply not against God, but against\nman\u2019s interpretation of God\u2019s word; and who art thou, O man, that puttest\nthyself in the place of God? \u201cMen,\u201d saith Bacon, \u201care ever ready to usurp\nthe style, \u2018_Non ego, sed Dominus_;\u2019 and not only so, but to bind it with\nthe thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of\nthose who have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon, that the\n\u2018causeless curse shall not come.\u2019 \u201d\n\nIn relation to the subject under consideration, the amiable and\nphilosophic mind of Melanchthon seems to have been more consistent, at one\ntime, than that of most of the reformers. \u201cHe laid down,\u201d says D\u2019Aubign\u00e9,\n\u201ca sort of fatalism, which might lead his readers to think of God as the\nauthor of evil, and which consequently has no foundation in Scripture:\n\u2018since whatever happens,\u2019 said he, \u2018happens by necessity, agreeably to\ndivine foreknowledge, it is plain our will hath no liberty whatever.\u2019 \u201d It\nis certainly a very mild expression to say, that the doctrine of\nMelanchthon might lead his readers to think of God as the author of evil.\nThis is a consequence which the logical mind of Melanchthon did not fail\nto draw from his own scheme of necessity. In his commentary on the Epistle\nto the Romans, in the edition of 1525, he asserted \u201cthat God wrought all\nthings, evil as well as good; that he was the author of David\u2019s adultery,\nand the treason of Judas, as well as of Paul\u2019s conversion.\u201d\n\nThis doctrine was maintained by Melanchthon on practical as well as on\nspeculative grounds. It is useful, says he, in its tendency to subdue\nhuman arrogance; it represses the wisdom and cunning of human reason. We\nhave generally observed, that whenever a learned divine denounces the\narrogancy of reason, and insists on an humble submission to his own\ndoctrines, that he has some absurdity which he wishes us to embrace; he\nfeels a sort of internal consciousness that human reason is arrayed\nagainst him, and hence he abuses and vilifies it. But reason is not to be\nkept in due subordination by any such means. If sovereigns would maintain\na legitimate authority over their subjects, they should bind them with\nwise and wholesome laws, and not with arbitrary and despotic enactments,\nwhich are so well calculated to engender hatred and rebellion. In like\nmanner, the best possible way to tame the refractory reason of man, and\nhold it in subjection, is to bind it with the silken cords of divine\ntruth, and not fetter it with the harsh and galling absurdities of man\u2019s\ninvention. Melanchthon himself furnished a striking illustration of the\njustness of this remark; for although, like other reformers, he taught the\ndoctrine of a divine fatality of all events, in order to humble the pride\nof the human intellect, his own reason afterward rebelled against it. He\nnot only recanted the monstrous doctrine which made God the author of sin,\nbut he openly combatted it.\n\nIn the writings of Beza and Zwingle there are passages, in relation to the\norigin of evil, more offensive, if possible, than any we have adduced from\nCalvin and Melanchthon. The mode in which the reformers defended their\ncommon doctrine was, with some few exceptions, the same in substance. They\nhave said nothing which can serve to dispel, or even materially lessen,\nthe stupendous cloud of difficulties which their scheme spreads over the\nmoral government of God.\n\nConsidering the condition of the Church, the state of human knowledge,\nand, in short, all the circumstances of the times in which the reformers\nlived and acted, it is not very surprising that they should have fallen\ninto such errors. The corruptions of human nature, manifesting themselves\nin the Romish Church, had so extravagantly exalted the powers of man, and\nespecially of the priesthood, and so greatly depressed or obscured the\nsovereignty of God, that the reformers, in fighting against those abuses,\nwere naturally forced into the opposite extreme. It is not at all\nwonderful, we say, that a reaction, which shook the very foundations of\nthe earth, should have carried the authors of it beyond the bounds of\nmoderation and truth. They would have been more than human if they had not\nfallen into some such errors as these which we have ascribed to them. But\nthe great misfortune is, that these errors should have been stereotyped\nand fixed in the symbolical books of the Protestant Churches, and made to\ndescend from the reformers to their children\u2019s children, as though they\nwere of the very essence of the faith once delivered to the saints. This\nis the misfortune, the lamentable evil, which has furnished the Romish\nChurch with its most powerful weapons of attack;(70) which has fortified\nthe strongholds of atheism and infidelity; and which has, beyond all\nquestion, fearfully retarded the great and glorious cause of true\nreligion.\n\nIf we would examine the most elaborate efforts to defend these doctrines,\nor rather the great central dogma of necessity from which they all\nradiate, we must descend to later times; we must turn our attention to the\nimmortal writings of a Leibnitz and an Edwards.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make\nGod the author of sin.\n\n\nThis philosopher employed all the resources of a sublime genius, and all\nthe stores of a vast erudition, in order to maintain the scheme of\nnecessity, and at the same time vindicate the purity of the Divine Being.\nThat subtle and adroit sceptic, M. Bayle, had drawn out all the\nconsequences of the doctrine of necessity in opposition to the free-agency\nof man, and to the holiness of God. Leibnitz wrote his great \u201cEssais de\nTh\u00e9odic\u00e9e,\u201d for the purpose of refuting these conclusions of Bayle, as\nwell as those of all other sceptics, and of reconciling his system with\nthe divine attributes. In the preface to his work he says, \u201cWe show that\nevil has another source than the will of God; and that we have reason to\nsay of moral evil, that God only permits it, and that he does not will it.\nBut what is more important, we show that God can not only permit sin, but\neven concur therein, and contribute to it, without prejudice to his\nholiness; although, absolutely speaking, he might have prevented it.\u201d Such\nis the task which Leibnitz has undertaken to perform; let us see how he\nhas accomplished it.\n\n\u201cThe ancients,\u201d says he, \u201cattributed the cause of evil to matter; but\nwhere shall we, who derive all things from God, find the source of\nevil?\u201d(71) He has more than once answered this question, by saying that\nthe source of evil is to be found in the ideas of the divine mind.\n\u201cChrysippus,\u201d says he, \u201chas reason to allege that vice comes from the\noriginal constitution of some spirits. It is objected to him that God has\nformed them; and he can only reply, that the imperfection of matter does\nnot permit him to do better. This reply is good for nothing; for matter\nitself is indifferent to all forms, and besides God has made it. Evil\ncomes rather from forms themselves, but abstract; that is to say, from\nideas that God has not produced by an act of his will, no more than he has\nproduced number and figures; and no more, in one word, than all those\npossible essences which we regard as eternal and necessary; for they find\nthemselves in the ideal region of possibles; that is to say, in the divine\nunderstanding. God is then not the author of those essences, in so far as\nthey are only possibilities; but there is nothing actual, but what he\ndiscerned and called into existence; and he has permitted evil, because it\nis enveloped in the best plan which is found in the region of possibles;\nthat plan the supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. It is this notion\nwhich at once satisfies the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of God,\nand yet leaves room for the entrance of evil.\u201d(72)\n\nIn reading the lofty speculations of Leibnitz, we have been often led to\nwonder how one, whose genius was so great, could have permitted himself to\nrest in conceptions which appear so vague and indistinct. In the above\npassage we have both light and obscurity; and we find it difficult to\ndetermine which predominates over the other. We are clearly told that God\nis not the author of evil, because this proceeds from abstract forms which\nwere from all eternity enveloped in his understanding, and not from any\noperation of his will. But how does evil proceed from abstract forms; from\nthe ideal region of the possible? Leibnitz does not mean that evil\nproceeds from abstract ideas, before they are embodied in the creation of\nreal moral agents. Why then did God create beings which he knew from all\neternity would commit sin? and why, having created them, did he contribute\nto their sins by a divine concourse? This is coming down from the _ideal_\nregion of the possible, into the world of _real_ difficulties.\n\nAccording to the philosophy of Leibnitz, God created every intelligent\nbeing in the universe with a perfect knowledge of its whole destiny; and\nthere is, moreover, a concourse of the divine will with all their\nvolitions. Now, here we are in the very midst of the concrete world, and\nhere is a difficulty which cannot be avoided by a flight into the ideal\nregion of the possible. How can there be a concourse of the divine will\nwith the human will in one and the same sinful volition, without a stain\nupon the immaculate purity of God? How can the Father of Lights, by an\noperation of his will, contribute to our sinful volitions, without\nprejudice to his holiness? This is the problem which Leibnitz has promised\nto solve; and we shall, with all patience, listen to his solution.\n\nThe solution of this problem, says he, is effected by means of the\n\u201cprivative nature of evil.\u201d We shall state this part of his system in his\nown words: \u201cAs to the physical concourse,\u201d says he, \u201cit is here that it is\nnecessary to consider that truth which has made so much noise in the\nschools, since St. Augustine has shown its importance, that evil is a\nprivation, whereas the action of God produces only the positive. This\nreply passes for a defective one, and even for something chimerical in the\nminds of many men; but here is an example sufficiently analogous, which\nmay undeceive them.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe celebrated Kepler, and after him M. Descartes, have spoken of the\n_natural inertia_ of bodies, and that we can consider it as a perfect\nimage, and even as a pattern of the original limitation of creatures, in\norder to make us see that privation is the formal cause of the\nimperfections and inconveniences which are found in substance as well as\nin actions. Suppose that the current of a river carries along with it many\nvessels which have different cargoes, some of wood, and others of stone;\nsome more, and some less. It will happen that the vessels which are more\nheavily laden will move more slowly than the others, provided there is\nnothing to aid their progress.... Let us compare the force which the\ncurrent exercises over the vessels and what it communicates to them, with\nthe action of God, who produces and preserves whatever is positive in the\ncreature, and imparts to them perfection, being, and force; let us\ncompare, I say, the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection of\ncreatures, and the slowness of the more heavily laden vessel with the\ndefect which is found in the qualities and in the actions of the creature,\nand we shall perceive that there is nothing so just as this comparison.\nThe current is the cause of the movement of the vessel, but not of its\nretardation; God is the cause of the perfection in the nature and the\nactions of the creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the\ncreature is the cause of the defect in its actions. Thus the Platonists,\nSt. Augustine, and the schoolmen, have reason to say that God is the\nmaterial cause of evil, which consists in what is positive, and not the\nformal cause of it, which consists in privation, as we can say that the\ncurrent is the material cause of the retardation, without being its formal\ncause; that is to say, is the cause of the swiftness of the vessel,\nwithout being the cause of the bounds of that swiftness. God is as little\nthe cause of sin, as the current of the river is the cause of the\nretardation of the vessel.\u201d(73) Or as Leibnitz elsewhere says, God is the\nauthor of all that is positive in our volitions, and the pravity of them\narises from the necessary imperfection of the creature.\n\nWe have many objections to this mode of explaining the origin of moral\nevil, some few of which we shall proceed to state. 1. It is a hopeless\nattempt to illustrate the processes of the mind by the analogies of\nmatter. All such illustrations are better adapted to darken and confound\nthe subject, than to throw light upon it. If we would know anything about\nthe nature of moral evil, or its origin, we must study the subject in the\nlight of consciousness, and in the light of consciousness alone. Dugald\nStewart has conferred on Descartes the proud distinction of having been\nthe first philosopher to teach the true method according to which the\nscience of mind should be studied. \u201cHe laid it down as a first principle,\u201d\nsays Stewart, \u201cthat nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at\nall subservient to the knowledge of mind; and that the sensible images\ninvolved in all our common forms of speaking concerning its operations,\nare to be guarded against with the most anxious care, as tending to\nconfound in our apprehensions, two classes of phenomena, which it is of\nthe last importance to distinguish accurately from each other.\u201d(74) 2. The\nprivative nature of evil, as it is called, is purely a figment of the\nbrain; it is an invention of the schoolmen, which has no corresponding\nreality in nature. When Adam put forth his hand to pluck the forbidden\nfruit, and ate it, he committed a sinful act. But why was it sinful?\nBecause he knew it was wrong; because his act was a voluntary and known\ntransgression of the command of God. Now, if God had caused all that was\npositive in this sinful act, that is, if he had caused Adam to will to put\nforth his hand and eat the fruit, it is plain that he would have been the\ncause of his transgression. Nothing can be more chimerical, it seems to\nus, than this distinction between being the author of the substance of an\nact, and the author of its pravity. If Adam had obeyed, that is, if he had\nrefused to eat the forbidden fruit, such an act would not have been more\npositive than the actual series of volitions by which he transgressed. 3.\nIf what we call sin, arises from the necessary imperfection of the\ncreature, as the slowness of a vessel in descending a stream arises from\nits cargo, how can he be to blame for it; or, in other words, how can it\nbe moral evil at all? And, 4. Leibnitz has certainly committed a very\ngreat oversight in this attempt to account for the origin of evil. He\nexplains it, by saying that it arises from the necessary imperfection of\nthe creature which limits its receptivity; but does he mean that God\ncannot communicate holiness to the creature? Does he mean that God\nendeavours to communicate holiness, and fails in consequence of the\nnecessary imperfection of the creature? If so, what becomes of the\ndoctrine which he everywhere advances, that God can very easily cause\nvirtue or holiness to exist if he should choose to do so? If God can very\neasily cause this to exist, as Leibnitz contends he can, notwithstanding\nthe necessary imperfection of the creature, why has he not done so? Is it\nnot evident, that the philosophy of Leibnitz merely plays over the surface\nof this great difficulty, and decks it out with the ornaments of fancy,\ninstead of reaching down to the bottom of it, and casting the\nilluminations of his genius into its depths?\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that the scheme of\nnecessity does not make God the author of sin.\n\n\n\u201cThis remarkable man,\u201d says Sir James Mackintosh, \u201cthe metaphysician of\nAmerica, was formed among the Calvinists of New-England, when their stern\ndoctrine retained its vigorous authority. His power of subtle argument,\nperhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in some\nof the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his piety to\nfervour.\u201d It is in his great work on the will, as well as in some of his\nmiscellaneous observations, that Edwards has put forth the powers of his\nmind, in order to show that the scheme of necessity does not obscure the\nlustre of the divine perfections. With the exception of the Essais de\nTh\u00e9odic\u00e9e of Leibnitz, it is perhaps the greatest effort the human mind\nhas ever made to get rid of the seeming antagonism between the scheme of\nnecessity and the holiness of God.\n\nAccording to the system of Edwards, as well as that of his opponents, sin\nwould not have been committed unless it were permitted by God. But in the\nscheme of Edwards, the agency of God bears a more intimate relation to the\norigin and existence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it.\n\u201cGod,\u201d says he, disposes \u201cthe state of events in such a manner, for wise,\nholy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted\nor not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow.\u201d(75) And this\noccurrence of sin, in consequence of his disposing and ordering events,\nenters into his design. For Edwards truly says, that \u201cIf God disposes all\nevents, so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his\nprovidence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things _knowingly_\nand on _design_. God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders,\naccidentally and unawares, either _without_ or _beside_ his intention.\u201d\nThus, we are told, that God so arranges and disposes the events of his\nprovidence as to bring sin to pass, and that he does so designedly. This\nbroad proposition is laid down, not merely with reference to sin in\ngeneral, but to certain great sins in particular. \u201cSo that,\u201d says Edwards,\n\u201cwhat these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to\npass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.\u201d According\nto Edwards, then, the events of God\u2019s providence are arranged with a view\nto bring all the sinful deeds of men \u201ccertainly and infallibly\u201d to pass,\nas well as their holy acts.\n\nNow, here the question arises, Is this doctrine consistent with the\ncharacter of God? Is it not repugnant to his infinite holiness? We affirm\nthat it is; Edwards declares that it is not. Let us see, then, if his\nposition does not involve him in insuperable difficulties, and in\nirreconcilable contradictions.\n\nEdwards supposes that some one may object: \u201cAll that these things amount\nto is, that _God may do evil that good may come_; which is justly esteemed\nimmoral and sinful in men, and therefore may be justly esteemed\ninconsistent with the perfections of God.\u201d This is a fair and honest\nstatement of the objection; now let us hear the reply. \u201cI answer,\u201d says\nEdwards, \u201cthat for God to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has\nbeen spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do\nevil at all.\u201d It is not to do evil at all, says he, for the Supreme Ruler\nof the world to arrange events around one of his creatures in such a\nmanner that they will certainly and infallibly induce him to commit sin.\nWhy is not this to do evil? At first view, it certainly looks very much\nlike doing evil; and it is not at once distinguishable from the\ntemptations ascribed to Satanic agency. Why is it not to do evil, then,\nwhen it is done by the Almighty? It is not to do evil, says Edwards,\nbecause when God brings sin certainly and infallibly to pass, he does so\n\u201cfor wise and holy purposes.\u201d This is his answer: \u201cIn order to a thing\u2019s\nbeing morally evil, there must be one of these two things belonging to it:\neither it must be a thing _unfit_ and _unsuitable_ in its own nature, or\nit must have a _bad tendency_, or it must be done for an evil end. But\nneither of these things can be attributed to God\u2019s ordering and permitting\nsuch events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends.\u201d(76) Let us\nexamine this logic.\n\nWe are gravely told, that God designedly brings the sinful acts of men to\npass by the use of most certain and infallible means; but this is not to\ndo evil, _because he has a good end in view_. His intention is right; he\nbrings sin to pass for \u201cwise and holy purposes.\u201d Let us come a little\ncloser to this doctrine, and see what it is. It will not be denied, that\nif any being should bring sin to pass without any end at all, except to\nsecure its existence, this would be a sinful agency. If any being should,\nknowingly and designedly, bring sin to pass in another, without any \u201cwise\nand holy purposes,\u201d all mankind will agree in pronouncing the deed to be\nmorally wrong. But precisely the same deed is not wrong in God, says\nEdwards, because in his case it proceeds from \u201ca wise and holy purpose,\u201d\nand he has \u201ca good end in view.\u201d That is to say, the means, in themselves\nconsidered, are morally wrong; but being employed for a wise and holy\npurpose, for the attainment of a good end, they are sanctified! This is\nprecisely the doctrine, that the end sanctifies the means. Is it not\nwonderful, that any system should be so dark and despotic in its power as\nto induce the mind of an Edwards, ordinarily so amazing for its acuteness\nand so exalted in its piety, to vindicate the character of God upon such\ngrounds?\n\nThe defence of Edwards is neither more nor less than a play on the term\n_evil_. When it is said, that \u201cwe may do evil that good may come;\u201d the\nmeaning of the maxim is, that the means in such a case and under such\ncircumstances ceases to be evil. The maxim teaches that \u201cwe may do evil,\u201d\nthat it is lawful to do evil, with a view to the grand and glorious end to\nbe attained by it. Or, in other words, that it is right to do what would\notherwise be morally evil, in order to accomplish a good end. If Edwards\nhad considered the other form of the same odious maxim, namely, that \u201cthe\nend sanctifies the means,\u201d he would have found it impossible to evade the\nforce of its application to his doctrine. He could not have escaped from\nthe difficulty of his position by a play upon the word _evil_. He would\nhave seen that he had undertaken to justify the conduct of the Father of\nLights, by supposing it to be governed by the most corrupt maxim of the\nmost corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen.\n\nWhat God does, says Edwards, is not evil at all; because his purpose is\nholy, because his object is good, his intention is right. In like manner,\nthe maxim says, that when the end is good and holy, \u201cit sanctifies the\nmeans.\u201d The means may be impure in themselves considered, but they are\nrendered pure by the cause in which they are employed. This doctrine has\nbeen immortalized by Pascal, in his \u201cProvincial Letters;\u201d and we cannot\nbetter dismiss the subject than with an extract from the \u201cProvincial\nLetters.\u201d \u201cI showed you,\u201d says the jesuitical father, \u201chow servants might,\nwith a safe conscience, manage certain troublesome messages; did you not\nobserve that it is simply taking off their intention from the _sin\nitself_, and fixing it on the advantage to be gained.\u201d(77) On this\nprinciple, stealing, and lying, and murder, may all be vindicated.\n\u201cCaramuel, our illustrious defender,\u201d says the Jesuit, \u201cin his Fundamental\nTheology,\u201d ... enters into the examination of many new questions resulting\nfrom this principle, (of directing the intention,) as, for example,\nwhether the Jesuits may kill the Jansenists? \u201cAlas, father!\u201d exclaimed\nPascal, \u201cthis is a most surprising point in theology! I hold the\nJansenists already no better than dead men by the doctrine of Father\nLauny.\u201d \u201cAha, sir, you are caught; for Caramuel deduces the very opposite\nconclusion from the same principles.\u201d \u201cHow so?\u201d said Pascal. \u201cObserve his\nwords, n. 1146 and 1147, p. 547 and 548. The Jansenists call the Jesuits\nPelagians; may they be _killed_ for so doing? No\u2014for this plain reason,\nthat the Jansenists are no more able to obscure the glory of our society,\nthan an owl can hide the sun; in fact, they promote it, though certainly\nagainst their intention\u2014_occidi non possunt, quia nocere non potuerunt_.\u201d\n\u201cAlas, father,\u201d says Pascal, \u201cand does the existence of the Jansenists\ndepend solely upon their capacity of injuring your reputation? If that be\nthe case, I am afraid they are not in a very good predicament; for if the\nslightest probability should arise of their doing you any hurt, they may\nbe despatched at once. You can perform the deed logically and in form; for\nit is only to _direct your intention_ right, and you insure a quiet\nconscience. What a blessedness for those who can endure injuries to know\nthis charming doctrine! But, on the other hand, how miserable is the\ncondition of the offending party! Really, father, it would be better to\nhave to do with people totally devoid of all religion, than with those who\nhave received instructions so far only as to this point, relative to\ndirecting the intention. I am afraid the _intention_ of the murderer is no\nconsolation to the wounded person. He can have no perception of this\nsecret _direction_\u2014poor man! he is conscious only of the _blow_ he\nreceives; and I am not certain whether he would not be less indignant to\nbe cruelly massacred by people in a violent transport of rage, than to be\ndevoutly killed for conscience\u2019 sake.\u201d Now, we submit it to the candid\nreader, whether the reasoning here ascribed to the Jesuit by Pascal, is\nnot exactly parallel with that on which Edwards justifies the procedure of\nthe Almighty? If God may choose sin and bring it to pass, without\ncontracting the least impurity, because his _intention is directed\naright_, to a wise and good end, may we not be permitted to imitate his\nexample? And again, if God thus employs the creature as an instrument to\naccomplish his wise and holy purposes, why should he pour out the vials of\nhis wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his almighty\npower? In order to save his doctrine from reproach, Edwards has invented a\ndistinction, which next demands our attention. \u201cThere is no\ninconsistence,\u201d says he, \u201cin supposing that God may hate a thing as it is\nin itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will\nit should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is\nno person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is certain\nthat it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and\nextent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events,\nthat there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so,\nit will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always\nchooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And\nif so, then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if\nso, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise\nand holy Providence. Men do _will_ sin as sin, and so are the authors and\nactors of it; they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God\ndoes not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be\nhis pleasure so to order things that, he permitting, sin will come to\npass, for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the\nconsequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass\nfor the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate\nevil as evil; and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably\nforbid evil as evil, and punish it as such.\u201d(78) Here we are plainly told,\nthat although God hates sin as sin, yet, all things considered, he prefers\nthat it should come to pass, and even helps it into existence. But man\nloves and commits evil _as such_, and is therefore justly punishable for\nit.\n\nThere are several serious objections to this extraordinary distinction. It\nis not true that men love and commit sin _as sin_. Sin is committed, not\nfor its own sake, but for the pleasure which attends it. If sin did not\ngratify the appetites, or the passions, or the desires of men, it would\nnot be committed at all; there would be no temptation to it, and it would\nbe seen as it is in its own loathsome nature. Indeed, to speak with\nphilosophical accuracy, sin is never a direct object of our affections or\nchoice; we simply desire certain things, as Adam did the forbidden fruit,\nand we seek our gratification in them contrary to the will of God. This\nconstitutes our sin. The direct object of our choice is, not disobedience,\nnot sin, but the forbidden thing, the prohibited gratification. We do not\nlove and choose the disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey.\nThis is so very plain and simple a matter, that we cannot but wonder that\nhonest men should have lost sight of it in a mist of words, and built up\ntheir theories in the dark.\n\nSecondly, the above position, into which Edwards has been forced by the\nexigencies of his doctrine concerning evil, is directly at war with the\ngreat fundamental principle on which his whole system rests, namely, that\nthe will is always determined by the greatest apparent good. For how is it\npossible that men should commit sin _as sin_, and for its own sake, if\nthey never do anything except what is the most agreeable to them? How is\nit possible that they pursue moral evil merely _as moral evil_, and yet\npursue it as the greatest apparent good? If it should be said that men\nlove sin merely _as sin_, and therefore it pleases them to choose it for\nits own sake, this reply would be without foundation. For, as we have\nalready seen, there is no such principle in human nature as the love of\nsin _as such_, or for its own sake; and consequently sin can never delight\nor please the human mind as it is in itself. And, besides, it is\nself-contradictory; for the question is, How can a man commit sin _for its\nown sake on account of the pleasure it affords him_? It would be an\nattempt to explain an hypothesis which denies the very fact to be\nexplained by it.\n\nIn the third place, if the philosophy of Edwards be true, no good reason\ncan be assigned why men should restrain themselves from the commission of\nsin: for, all things considered, God prefers the sin which actually\nexists, and infallibly brings it to pass. He _prefers_ it on account of\nthe great good he intends to educe from it. Why then should we not also\nprefer its existence? God is sovereign; he will permit no more sin than he\ncan and will render subservient to the highest good of the universe; and\nso much as is for the highest good he will bring into existence. Why,\nthen, should we give ourselves any concern about the matter? Why should we\nfear that there may be too much sin in the world, or why should we blame\nother men for their crimes and offences?\n\nThe inference which we have just mentioned as necessarily flowing from the\ndoctrine of Edwards, has actually been drawn by some of the most\nillustrious advocates of that doctrine. Thus says Hartley, as we have\nalready seen, \u201csince all men do against us is by the appointment of God,\nit is rebellion against him to be offended with them.\u201d This is so clearly\nthe logical inference from the doctrine in question, that it is truly\nwonderful how any one can possibly fail to perceive it.\n\nWe are told by Leibnitz and Edwards, that we should not presume to act on\nthe principle of permitting sin in others, or of bringing it to pass, on\naccount of the good that we may educe from it; because such an affair is\ntoo high for us. But, surely, we need have no weak fears on this ground;\nfor although it may be too high for us, they do not pretend that it is too\nhigh for God. He will allow no more sin to make its appearance in the\nworld, say they, than he will cause to redound to the good of the\nuniverse. He prefers it for that reason, and why should we not respond,\namen! to his preference? Why should we give ourselves any concern about\nsin? May we not follow our own inclinations, leaving sin to take its\ncourse, and rest quietly in Providence? To this question it will be\nreplied, as Calvin and Edwards repeatedly reply, that the revealed, and\nnot the secret, will of God is the rule of our duty. We do not object to\nthis doctrine; we acknowledge its perfect propriety and correctness: but\nit is no reply to the consequence we have deduced from the philosophy of\nEdwards. It only shows that his philosophy leads to a conclusion which is\nin direct opposition to revelation. So far from objecting that any should\nturn from the philosophy of Edwards to revelation, in order to find\nreasons why evil should not be committed by us, we sincerely regret that\nsuch a departure from a false philosophy, and return to a true religion,\nis not more permanent and universal.\n\nThe doctrine of Edwards on this subject destroys the harmony of the divine\nattributes. It represents God as having two wills; or, to speak more\ncorrectly, it represents him as having published a holy law for the\ngovernment of his creatures, which he does not, in all cases, wish them to\nobey. On the contrary, he prefers that some of them should violate his\nholy law; and not only so, but he adopts certain and infallible means to\nlead them to violate and trample it under foot. It is admitted by Edwards,\nthat in this sense God really possesses two wills; but he still denies\nthat this shows any inconsistency in the nature of God.\n\nEdwards says, that the will of God does not oppose sin in the same sense\nin which it prefers sin, and that, therefore, there is no inconsistency in\nthe case. But let us not deceive ourselves by words. Is it true, that sin\nis opposed by what is called the revealed will of God, by his command; and\nyet that it is, all things considered, chosen by his secret and working\nwill? He commands one thing, and yet works to bring another to pass! He\nprohibits all sin, under the awful penalty of eternal death, and yet\nsecretly arranges and plans things in such a manner as to secure the\ncommission of it!\n\nWe have already seen one of these defences. God \u201chates sin as it is in\nitself;\u201d and hence he prohibits it by his command. \u201cYet it may be his will\nit should come to pass, considering all its consequences;\u201d and hence his\nsecret will is bent on bringing it into existence. There is no\ninconsistency here, says Edwards, because the divine will relates to two\ndifferent objects; namely, to \u201csin considered simply as sin,\u201d and to \u201csin\nconsidered in all its consequences.\u201d We do not care whether the two\npropositions contradict each other or not; it is abundantly evident, as we\nhave seen, that it makes God choose that which he hates, even sin itself,\nas the means of good. It makes the end sanctify the means, even in the eye\nof the holy God. This doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor. We\nhad rather have \u201cour sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not\nbesides, disputed, and even torn away from us, than suffer ourselves to be\ndisputed into a belief,\u201d that the holy God can choose moral evil as a\nmeans of good. We had rather believe all the fables in the Talmud and the\nKoran, than that the ever-blessed God should, by his providence and his\npower, plunge his feeble creatures into sin, and then punish them with\neverlasting torments for their transgression. We know of nothing in the\nPantheism of Spinoza, or in the atheism of Hobbes, more revolting than\nthis hideous dogma.\n\nThe great metaphysician of New-England has made a still further attempt to\nvindicate the dogma in question. \u201cThe Arminians,\u201d says he, \u201cridicule the\ndistinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly\nexpressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we\nsay he may decree one thing and command another. And so, they argue, we\nhold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted another.\nHowever, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that\nthere is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute\nabout it. We and they know it was God\u2019s secret will, that Abraham should\nnot sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do\nit.\u201d(79) Such is the instance produced by this acute divine, to show that\nthe secret will of God may prefer the very thing which is condemned by his\nrevealed will or law; and on the strength of it, he is bold to say, \u201cWe\n_know_ it, so that _it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it_.\u201d\n\nWe have often seen this passage of Scripture produced by infidels, to show\nthat the Old Testament contains unworthy representations of God. If\nEdwards had undertaken to refute the infidel ground in relation to this\npassage, he might have done so with very great ease: but then he would at\nthe same time have refuted himself. The Scriptural account of God\u2019s\ncommanding Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, was long ago employed by the\nfamous infidel Hobbes to show that there are two wills in God. This\nargument of Hobbes has been refuted by Leibnitz. \u201cHobbes contends,\u201d says\nLeibnitz, \u201cthat God wills not always what he commands, as when he commands\nAbraham to sacrifice his son;\u201d and he replies, that \u201cGod, in commanding\nAbraham to sacrifice his son, _willed the obedience, and not the action_,\nwhich he prevented after having the obedience; for that was not an action\nwhich merited in itself to be willed: but such is not the case with those\nactions which he positively wills, and which are indeed worthy of being\nthe objects of his will; such as piety, charity, and every virtuous action\nwhich God commands, and such as the avoidance of sin, more repugnant to\nthe divine perfections than any other thing. It is incomparably better,\ntherefore, to explain the will of God, as we have done it in this\nwork.\u201d(80) It is evident that Leibnitz did not relish the idea of two\nwills in God; and perhaps few pious minds would do so, if it were\npresented to them by an atheist. But there was too close an affinity\nbetween the philosophy of Leibnitz and that of Hobbes, to permit the\nformer to furnish the most satisfactory refutation of the argument of the\nlatter.\n\nThis command to Abraham does not show that there ever was any such\ncontrariety between the revealed and the decretal wills of God, as is\ncontended for by Hobbes and Edwards. God intended, as we are told, to\nprove the faith of Abraham, in order that it might shine forth and become\na bright example to all succeeding ages. For this purpose he commanded him\nto take his only son, whom he loved, and go into the land of Moriah, and\nthere offer him up as a burnt-offering upon one of the mountains. Abraham\nobeyed without a murmur. After several days travelling and preparation,\nAbraham has reached the appointed place, and is ready for the sacrifice.\nHis son Isaac is bound, and laid upon the altar; the father stretches\nforth his hand to take the knife and slay him. But a voice is heard,\nsaying, \u201cLay not thine hand on the lad; neither do thou anything unto\nhim.\u201d Now, the conduct of Abraham on this memorable occasion, is one of\nthe most remarkable exhibitions of confidence in the wisdom and goodness\nof God, which the history of the world has furnished. It deserves to be\nheld up to the admiration of mankind, and to be celebrated in all ages of\nthe world. We sincerely pity the man, who is so taken up with superficial\nappearances, or who is so destitute of sympathy with the moral greatness\nand beauty of soul manifested in this simple narrative, that he can\napproach it in a little, captious, sneering spirit, rather than in an\nattitude of profound admiration. But our business, at present, is not so\nmuch with the laughing sceptic as with the grave divine.\n\nWhat evidence, then, does this story furnish that the secret will of God\nhad anything to do with the simple but sublime transaction which it\nrecords? God commanded Abraham to repair to the land of Moriah with his\nson Isaac; but are we informed that his secret will was opposed to the\npatriarch\u2019s going thither, or that it opposed any obstacle to his\nobedience? Are we told that God so arranged the events of his providence\nas to render the disobedience of Abraham, in any one particular, certain\nand infallible? We cannot find the shadow of any such information in the\nsacred story. And is there the least intimation, that when Abraham was\ncommanded to stay the uplifted knife, the secret will of God was in favour\nof its being plunged into the bosom of his son? Clearly there is not.\nWhere, then, is the discrepancy between the revealed and the secret wills\nof God in this case, which we are required to see? Where is this\ndiscrepancy so plainly manifested, that we absolutely _know_ its\nexistence, so that it is the height of absurdity to dispute against it?\n\nIf there is any contrariety at all in this case, it is between the\n_revealed will_ of God in commanding Abraham to offer up his son, and his\nsubsequently _revealed will_ to desist from the sacrifice. It does not\npresent even a seeming inconsistency between his secret will and his\ncommand, but between two portions of his revealed will. This seeming\ninconsistency between the command of God and his countermand, in relation\nto the same external action, has been fully removed by Leibnitz; and if it\nhad not been, it is just as incumbent on the abettors of Edwards\u2019s scheme\nto explain it, as it is upon his opponents. If God had commanded Abraham\nto do a thing, and yet exerted his secret will to make him violate the\ninjunction, this would have been a case in point: but there is no such\ncase to be found in the word of God.\n\nIt may not be improper, in this connexion, to quote the following\njudicious admonition of Howe: \u201cTake heed,\u201d says he, \u201cthat we do not oppose\nthe secret and revealed will of God to one another, or allow ourselves so\nmuch as to imagine an opposition or contrariety between them. And that\nground being once firmly laid and stuck to, as it is impossible that there\ncan be a will against a will in God, or that he can be divided from\nhimself, or against himself, or that he should reveal anything to us as\nhis will that is not his will, (it being a thing inconsistent with his\nnature, and impossible to him to lie,) that being, I say, firmly laid, (as\nnothing can be firmer or surer than that,) then measure all your\nconceptions of the secret will of God by his revealed will, about which\nyou may be sure. But never measure your conceptions of his revealed by his\nsecret will; that is, by what you may imagine concerning that. For you can\nbut imagine while it is secret, and so far as it is unrevealed.\u201d(81)\n\n\u201cIt properly belongs,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cto the supreme absolute Governor of\nthe universe, to order all important events within his dominions by\nwisdom; but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind,\nsuch as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and the consequences.\nThese events will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by\nwisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be disposed\nby blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be\ncalled a disposal. Is it not better that the good and evil which happen in\nGod\u2019s world should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the\ngood pleasure of an infinitely wise being, than to leave these things to\nfall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no\nunderstanding and aim?... It is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and\nnot chance, should order these things.\u201d(82)\n\nIn our opinion, if there be no other alternative, it is better that sin\nshould be left to chance, than ascribed to the high and holy One. But why\nmust sin be ordered and determined by the supreme Ruler of the world, or\nelse be left to chance? Has the great metaphysician forgotten, that there\nmay be such things as men and angels in the universe; or does he mean,\nwith Spinoza, to blot out all created agents, and all subordinate agency,\nfrom existence? If not, then certainly God may refuse to be the author of\nsin, without leaving it to blind chance, which is incapable of such a\nthing. He may leave it, as we conceive he has done, to the determination\nof finite created intelligences. If sin is to come into the world, as come\nit evidently does, it is infinitely better, we say, that it should be left\nto proceed from the creature, and not be made to emanate from God himself,\nthe fountain of light, and the great object of all adoration. It is\ninfinitely better that the high and holy One should do nothing either by\nhis wisdom or by his decree, by his providence or his power, to help this\nhideous thing to raise its head amid the inconceivable splendours of his\ndominion.\n\nSuch speculations as those of Edwards and Leibnitz, in our opinion, only\nreflect dishonour and disgrace upon the cause they are intended to\nsubserve. It is better, ten thousand times better, simply to plant\nourselves upon the moral nature of man, and the irreversible dictates of\ncommon sense, and annihilate the speculations of the atheist, than to\nendeavour to parry them off by such invented quibbles and sophisms. They\ngive point, and pungency, and power to the shafts of the sceptic. If we\nmeet him on the common ground of necessity, he will snap all such quibbles\nlike threads of tow, and overwhelm us with the floods of irony and scorn.\nFor, in the memorable words of Sir William Hamilton, \u201cIt can easily be\nproved by those who are able and not afraid to reason, that the doctrine\nof necessity is subversive of religion, natural and revealed.\u201d To perceive\nthis, it requires neither a Bayle, nor a Hobbes, nor a Hume; it only\nrequires a man who is neither unable nor afraid to reason.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme of\nnecessity with the purity of God.\n\n\nAs we have dwelt so long on the speculations of President Edwards\nconcerning the objections in question, we need add but a few remarks in\nrelation to the views of the above-mentioned authors on the same subject.\nThe sentiments of Dr. Emmons on the relation between the divine agency and\nthe sinful actions of men, are even more clearly defined and boldly\nexpressed than those of President Edwards. The disciple is more open and\ndecided than the master. \u201cSince mind cannot act,\u201d says he, \u201cany more than\nmatter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men\ncan be left to the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act,\nindependently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the\nexercise of a divine agency in every human action, without which it is\nimpossible to conceive that God should govern moral agents, and make\nmankind act in perfect conformity to his designs.\u201d(83) \u201cHe is now\nexercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every\none of the human race, and producing either holy or unholy exercises in\nit.\u201d(84) \u201cIt is often thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on\nGod\u2019s part, in order to fit Pharaoh for destruction, than barely to leave\nhim to himself. But God knew that no external means and motives would be\nsufficient of themselves to form his moral character. He determined\ntherefore to operate on his heart itself, and cause him to put forth\ncertain evil exercises in view of certain external motives. When Moses\ncalled upon him to let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to\nrefuse. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and\nmoved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what\nGod did on such particular occasions, he did at all times.\u201d(85) It is\nuseless to multiply extracts to the same effect. Could language be more\nexplicit, or more revolting to the moral sentiments of mankind?\n\nIf God is alike the author of all our volitions, sinful as well as holy,\none wonders by what sort of legerdemain the authors of the doctrine have\ncontrived to ascribe all the glory and all the praise of our holy actions\nto God, and at the same time all the shame and condemnation of our evil\nactions to ourselves. In relation to the holy actions of men, all the\npraise is due to God, say they, because they were produced by his power.\nWhy is not the moral turpitude of their evil actions, then, also ascribed\nto God, inasmuch as he is said to produce them by his irresistible and\nalmighty agency? We are accountable for our evil acts, say Dr. Emmons and\nCalvin, because they are _voluntary_. Are not our moral acts, our virtuous\nacts, also voluntary? Certainly they are; this is not denied; and yet we\nare not allowed to impute the moral quality of the acts to the agent in\nsuch cases. This whole school of metaphysicians, indeed, from Calvin down\nto Emmons, can make God the author of our evil acts, by an exertion of his\nomnipotence, and yet assert that because they are voluntary we are justly\nblameworthy and punishable for them; but though our virtuous acts are also\nvoluntary, they still insist the praiseworthiness of them is to be\nascribed exclusively to Him by whom they were produced. The plain truth\nis, that as the scheme originated in a particular set purpose and design,\nso it is one-sided in its views, arbitrary in its distinctions, and full\nof self-contradictions.\n\nThe simple fact seems to be, that if any effect be produced in our minds\nby the power of God, it is a passive impression, and is very absurdly\ncalled a voluntary state of the will. And even if such an impression could\nbe a voluntary state, or a volition, properly so called, we should not be\nresponsible for it, because it is produced by the omnipotence of God.\nThis, we doubt not, is in perfect accordance with the universal\nconsciousness and voice of mankind, and cannot be resisted by the\nsophistical evasions of particular men, how great soever may be their\ngenius, or exalted their piety.\n\nWe shall, in conclusion, add one more great name to the list of those who,\nfrom their zeal for the glory of the divine omnipotence, have really and\nclearly made God the author of sin. The denial of his scheme of \u201ca rigid\nand absolute predestination,\u201d as he calls it, Dr. Chalmers deems\nequivalent to the assertion, that \u201cthings grow up from the dark womb of\nnon-entity, which omnipotence did not summon into being, and which\nomniscience could not foretell.\u201d And again, \u201cAt this rate, events would\ncome forth uncaused from the womb of non-entity, to which omnipotence did\nnot give birth, and which omniscience could not foresee.\u201d(86) Now all this\nis spoken, be it remembered, in relation to the volitions or acts of men.\nBut if there are no such events, except such as omnipotence gives birth\nto, or summons into being, how clear and how irresistible is the\nconclusion that God is the author of the sinful acts of the creature? It\nwere better, we say, ten thousand times better, that sin, _that_ monstrous\nbirth of night and darkness, should grow up out of the womb of nonentity,\nif such were the only alternative, than that it should proceed from the\nbosom of God.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter III.\n\n\nScheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral Distinctions.\n\n\n Our voluntary service He requires,\n Not our necessitated; such with him\n Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how\n Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve\n Willing or no, who will but what they must\n By destiny, and can no other choose?\u2014MILTON.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that there is such\na thing as moral good and evil, and endeavoured to show, that if the\nscheme of necessity be true, man is absolved from guilt, and God is the\nauthor of sin. But, in point of fact, if the scheme of necessity be true,\nthere is no such thing as moral good or evil in this lower world; all\ndistinction between virtue and vice, moral good and evil, is a mere dream,\nand we really live in a non-moral world. This has been shown by many of\nthe advocates of necessity.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions.\n\n\nIt is shown by Spinoza, that all moral distinctions vanish before the iron\nscheme of necessity. They are swept away as the dreams of vulgar prejudice\nby the force of Spinoza\u2019s logic; yet little praise is due, we think, on\nthat account, to the superiority of his acumen. The wonder is, not that\nSpinoza should have drawn such an inference, but that any one should fail\nto draw it. For if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which we\nhave no control, it seems to follow, as clear as noonday, that they cannot\nbe the objects of praise or blame\u2014cannot be our virtue or vice. So far is\nit indeed from requiring any logical acuteness to perceive such an\ninference, that it demands, as we shall see, the very greatest ingenuity\nto keep from perceiving it. Hence, in our humble opinion, the praise which\nhas been lavished on the logic of Spinoza is not deserved.\n\nHis superior consistency only shows one of two things\u2014either that he\npossessed a stronger reasoning faculty than his great master, Descartes,\nor a weaker moral sense. In our opinion, it shows the latter. If his moral\nsentiments had been vigorous and active, they would have induced him, no\ndoubt, either to invent sophistical evasions of such an inference, or to\nreject the doctrine from which it flows. If a Descartes, a Leibnitz, or an\nEdwards, for example, had seen the consequences of the scheme of necessity\nas clearly as they were seen by Spinoza, his moral nature would have\nrecoiled from it with such force as to dash the premises to atoms. If any\npraise, then, be due to Spinoza for such triumphs of the reasoning power,\nit should be given, not to the superiority of his logic, but to the apathy\nof his moral sentiments. For our part, greatly as we admire sound\nreasoning and consistency in speculation, we had rather be guilty of ten\nthousand acts of logical inconsistency, such as those of Edwards, or\nLeibnitz, or Descartes, than to be capable of resting in the conclusion to\nwhich the logic of Spinoza conducted him\u2014that every moral distinction is a\nvulgar prejudice, and that the existence of moral goodness is a dream.(87)\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the\nreality of moral distinctions.\n\n\nIt would not be difficult to see, perhaps, that a necessary holiness, or a\nnecessary sin, is a contradiction in terms, if we would only allow reason\nto speak for itself, instead of extorting testimony from it by subjecting\nit to the torture of a false logic. For what proposition can more clearly\ncarry its own evidence along with it, than that whatever is necessary to\nus, that whatever we cannot possibly avoid, is neither our virtue nor our\nfault? What can be more unquestionable, than that we can be neither to\npraise nor to blame, neither justly rewardable nor punishable for anything\nover whose existence we have no power or control? Yet this question,\napparently so plain and simple in itself, has been enveloped in clouds of\nmetaphysical subtilty, and obscured by huge masses of scholastic jargon.\nIf, on this subject, we have wandered in the dim twilight of uncertain\nspeculation, instead of walking in the clear open day, this has been, it\nseems to us, because we have neglected the wise admonition of Barrow, that\nlogic, however admirable in its place, was not designed as an instrument\n\u201cto put out the sight of our eyes.\u201d\n\nIt shall be our first object, then, to pull down and destroy \u201cthe invented\nquibbles and sophisms\u201d which have so long darkened and confounded the\nlight of reason and conscience in relation to the nature of moral good and\nevil, to dispel the clouds which have been so industriously thrown around\nthis subject, in order that the bright and shining light of nature may,\nfree and unobstructed, find its way into our minds and hearts.\n\nWe say, then, that there never can be virtue or vice in the breast of a\nmoral agent, prior to his own actings and doings. On the contrary, it is\ninsisted by Edwards, that true virtue or holiness was planted in the bosom\nof the first man by the act of creation. \u201cIn a moral agent,\u201d says he,\n\u201csubject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly\ninnocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there\ncan no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or between being\nright and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium\nbetween straight and crooked in a natural.\u201d(88) This is applied to the\nfirst man as he came from the hand of the Creator, and is designed to show\nthat he was created with true holiness or virtue in his heart. According\nto this doctrine, man was made upright, not merely in the sense that he\nwas free from the least bias to evil, or that he possessed all the powers\nrequisite to moral agency, but in the sense that true virtue or moral\ngoodness was planted in his nature by the act of creation. If this be so,\nthe doctrine of a necessary holiness must be admitted; for surely nothing\ncan be more necessary to us, nothing can take place in which we have less\nto do, than the act by which we are created.\n\nThis then is the question which we intend to examine: whether that which\nis concreated with a moral agent, can be his virtue or his vice? Whether,\nin other words, the dispositions or qualities which Adam derived from the\nhand of God, partook of the nature of true virtue or otherwise? Edwards\nassumes the affirmative. To establish his position, he relies upon two\narguments, which we shall proceed to examine.\n\nThe first argument is designed to show, that unless true virtue, or moral\ngoodness, had been planted in the nature of man by the finger of God, it\ncould never have found its way into the world. To give this argument in\nhis own words, he says: \u201cIt is agreeable to the sense of men in all\nnations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is\nvirtuous, but that the good choice itself, from whence that effect\nproceeds, is so; yea, also, the antecedent good disposition, temper, or\naffection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous.\nThis is the general notion\u2014not that principles derive their goodness from\nactions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence\nthey proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good is no further\nvirtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition\nof mind; which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before\na virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there\nshould first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any\nvirtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a\ngood disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? There\ncan, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which\nproceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or\nsome animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before\na good act of choice, as a tree may be before its fruit, and the fountain\nbefore the stream which proceeds from it.\u201d(89) Thus, he argues, if there\nmust be choice before a good disposition, or virtue, according to our\ndoctrine, then virtue could not arise at all, or find its way into the\nworld. For all men concede, says he, that every virtuous choice, or act,\nmust proceed from a virtuous disposition; and if this must also proceed\nfrom a virtuous act, it is plain there could be no such thing as virtue or\nmoral goodness at all. The scheme which teaches that the act must precede\nthe principle, and the principle the act, reduces the very existence of\nvirtue to a plain impossibility. He shows virtue to be possible, and\nescapes the difficulty, by referring it to the creative energy of the\nDivine Being, by which the principle of virtue, he contends, was planted\nin the mind of the first man.\n\nThis argument is plausible; but it will not bear a close examination. It\nmight be made to give way, in various directions, before an analysis of\nthe principle on which it is constructed; but we intend to demolish it by\neasier and more striking arguments. If we had nothing better to oppose to\nit, we might indeed neutralize its effect by a counter-argument of Edwards\nhimself, which we find in his celebrated work on the will. He there says,\nthat the virtuousness of every virtuous act or choice depends upon its own\nnature, and not upon its origin or cause. If we must refer every virtuous\nact, says he, to something in us that is virtuous as its antecedent, we\nmust likewise refer that antecedent to some other virtuous origin or\ncause; and so on _ad infinitum_. Thus we should be compelled to trace\nvirtue back from step to step, until we had quite driven it out of the\nworld, and excluded it from the universality of things.(90)\n\nNow this argument seems just as plausible as that which we have produced\nfrom the same author, in his work on Original Sin. Let us lay them\ntogether, and contemplate the joint result. According to one, the\ncharacter of every virtuous act depends upon the virtuousness of the\nprinciple or disposition whence it proceeds; according to the other, it\ndepends upon its own nature, and not at all upon anything in its origin,\nor cause, or antecedent. According to one, we must trace every virtuous\nact to a virtuous principle, and the virtuous principle itself to the\nnecessitating act of God; according to the other, we must look no higher\nto determine the character of an act than its own nature; and if we\nproceed to its origin or cause to determine its character, we shall find\nno stopping-place. We shall not trace it up to God, as before, but we\nshall banish all virtue quite out of the world, and exclude it from the\nuniversality of things. According to one argument, there can be no virtue\nin the world, unless it be caused to exist, in the first place, by the\nnecessitating, creative act of the Almighty; and according to the other,\nthe virtuousness of every virtuous act depends upon its own nature, and is\nwholly independent of the question respecting its origin or cause. The\nsolution of these inconsistencies and contradictions, we shall leave to\nthe followers and admirers of President Edwards.(91)\n\nBut we have something better, we trust, to oppose to President Edwards\nthan his own arguments. If his logic be good for anything, it will prove\nthat God is the author of sin as well as of virtue. For it is as much the\ncommon notion of mankind that every sinful act must proceed from a sinful\ndisposition or principle, as it is that every virtuous act must proceed\nfrom a virtuous disposition or principle; and hence, according to the\nlogic of Edwards, a sinful disposition or principle must have preceded the\nfirst sinful act; that an antecedent sinful disposition or principle could\nnot have been introduced by the act of the creature, and consequently it\nmust have been planted in the bosom of the first man by the act of the\nCreator. This argument, we say, just as clearly shows that sin is\nimpossible, or that it must have been concreated with man, as it shows the\nsame thing in relation to virtue. If we maintain his argument, then, we\nmust either deny the possibility of moral evil or make God the author of\nit.\n\nAfter having laid down principles from which the impossibility of moral\nevil may be demonstrated, it was too late for Edwards to undertake to\naccount for the origin of sin. According to his philosophy, it can have no\nexistence; and hence we are not to look into that philosophy for any very\nclear account of how it took its rise in the world. Indeed, this point is\nhurried over by Edwards in a most hasty and superficial manner, in which\nhe seems conscious of no little embarrassment. In his great work on the\nwill he devotes one page and a half to this subject; and the greater part\nof this small space is filled up with the retort upon the Arminians, that\ntheir scheme is encumbered with as great difficulties as his own! He lets\nthe truth drop in one place, however, that \u201cthe abiding principle and\nhabit of sin\u201d was \u201cfirst introduced by an evil act of the creature.\u201d(92)\nIs it possible? How could there be an evil act which did not proceed from\nan antecedent evil principle or disposition? What becomes of the great\ncommon notion of mankind, on which his demonstration is erected? But we\nmust allow the author to contradict himself, since he has now come around\nto the truth, that an evil act of the creature may and must have preceded\nthe existence of moral evil in the world. If an intelligent creature,\nhowever, as it came from the hand of God, can introduce a \u201cprinciple of\nsin by a sinful act,\u201d why should it be thought impossible for such a\ncreature to introduce a principle of virtue by a virtuous act?\n\nThe truth is, that a virtuous act does not require an antecedent virtuous\ndisposition or principle to account for its existence; nor does a vicious\nact require an antecedent vicious principle to account for its existence.\nIn relation to the rise of good and evil in the world, the philosophy of\nEdwards is radically defective; and no one can discuss that subject on the\nprinciples of his philosophy without finding himself involved in\ncontradictions and absurdities. If his psychology had not been false, he\nmight have seen a clear and steady light where he has only beheld\ndifficulties and confusion. As we have already seen, and as we shall still\nmore fully see, Edwards confounds the power by which we _act_ with the\nsusceptibility through which we _feel_: the will with the emotive part of\nour nature. Every one knows that we may feel without acting; and yet\nfeeling and acting, suffering and doing, are expressly and repeatedly\nidentified in his writings. Having merged the will in sensibility, he\nregarded virtue and vice as phenomena of the latter, and as evolved from\nits bosom by the operation of necessitating causes. Hence his views in\nrelation to the nature of moral good and evil, as well as in relation to\ntheir origin, became unavoidably dark and confused.\n\nIf we only bear in mind the distinction between the will and the\nsensibility, we may easily see how either holiness or sin might have taken\nits rise in the bosom of the first man, without supposing that either a\nholy or a sinful principle was planted there by the hand of the Creator.\nIf we will only carry the light of this distinction along with us, it will\nbe no more difficult to account for the rise of the first sin in the bosom\nof a spotless creature of God, than to account for any other volition of\nthe human mind. The first man, by means of his intelligence, could\ncontemplate the perfection of his Creator, and, doing so, he could not but\nfeel an emotion of admiration and delight. But this _feeling_ was not his\nvirtue. It was the natural and the necessary result of the organization\nwhich God had given him. He was also so constituted, that certain earthly\nobjects were agreeable to him, and excited his natural appetites and\ndesires. These appetites and desires were not sinful, nor was the\nsensibility from whose bosom they were evolved: they were the spontaneous\nworkings of the nature which God had bestowed upon him. _But his will was\nfree._ He could turn his mind to God, or he could turn it to earth. He did\nthe latter, and there was no harm in this. But he listened to the voice of\nthe tempter; he fixed his mind on the forbidden fruit; he saw it was\npleasant to the eye; he imagined it was good for food, and greatly to be\ndesired to make one wise. Neither the possession of the intellect by which\nhe perceived the beauty of the fruit, nor of the sensibility in which it\nexcited so many pleasurable emotions, was the sin of Adam. They were given\nto him by the Author of every good and perfect gift. _His will was free._\nIt was not necessitated to act by his desires. But yet, in direct\nopposition to the known will of God, he put forth an act of his own free\nmind, his own unnecessitated will, and plucked the forbidden fruit to\ngratify his desires. This was his sin\u2014this voluntary transgression of the\nknown will of God. On the other hand, if he had resisted the temptation,\nand instead of voluntarily gratifying his appetite and desire, had\npreserved his allegiance to God by acting in conformity with his will,\nthis would have been his virtue. He would have acted in conformity with\nthe rule of duty, and thereby gratified a _feeling_ of love to God,\ninstead of the lower feelings of his nature.\n\nThus, by observing the distinction between the will and the sensitive part\nof our nature, we may easily see how either holiness or sin might have\narisen in the bosom of the first man, though he had neither a holy nor a\nsinful principle planted in his nature by the hand of the Creator. We may\neasily see that he had all the powers requisite to moral agency, and that\nhe was really capable of either a holy or a sinful act, without any\nantecedent principle of holiness or sin in his nature.\n\nWe have now said enough, we think, to show the fallacy of Edwards\u2019s first\ngreat argument in favour of a necessary holiness. We have seen, that we\nneed not suppose the existence of a virtuous principle in the first man,\nin order to account for his first virtuous act, or to render virtue\npossible. We might point out many other errors and inconsistencies in\nwhich that argument is involved; but to avoid, as far as possible,\nbecoming prolix and tiresome, we shall proceed to consider his second\nargument in favour of a necessary or concreated holiness.\n\nHis second argument is this: \u201cHuman nature must have been created with\nsome dispositions\u2014a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable,\nand to be averse to others as odious and disagreeable; otherwise it must\nbe without any such thing as inclination or will; perfectly indifferent,\nwithout preference, without choice, or aversion, towards anything as\nagreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at\nall, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable\nto the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of things\nexcellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest\ndelight in those things which were most worthy of it, then his\ndispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be excellent in\na higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that\nwere inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it\nis evident there can be no medium between these.\u201d\n\nIt is thus that Edwards seeks and finds virtue in the emotion, and not in\nthe voluntary element of man\u2019s nature. The natural concreated disposition\nof Adam, he supposes, was morally right in the highest sense of the word,\nbecause he was so made as to relish and delight in the glorious\nperfections of the divine nature. Our first answer to this is, that it is\ncontradicted by the reason and moral judgment of mankind in general, and,\nin particular, by the reason and moral judgment of Edwards himself.\n\nIt is agreeable to the voice of human reason, that nothing can be _our\nvirtue_, in the true sense of the word, which was planted in us by the act\nof creation, and in regard to the production of which we possessed no\nknowledge, exercised no agency, and gave no consent. And if we listen to\nthe language of Edwards, when the peculiarities of his system are out of\nthe question, we shall find that this moral judgment was as agreeable to\nhim as it is to the rest of mankind. For example: human nature is created\nwith a disposition to be grateful for favours; and this disposition,\naccording to Edwards, must either be agreeable or disagreeable to the\nnature of things, that is, it must be either morally right or wrong in the\nhighest sense of the word. There can be no medium between these two\u2014it\nmust partake of the nature of virtue or of vice. Now, which of the terms\nof this alternative does Edwards adopt? Does he pronounce this natural\ndisposition our virtue or our vice? We do not know what Edwards would have\nsaid, if this question had been propounded to him in connexion with the\nargument now under consideration; but we do know what he has said of it in\nother portions of his works. This natural concreated disposition is, says\nhe, neither our virtue nor our vice! \u201cThat ingratitude, or the want of\nnatural affection,\u201d says he, \u201cshows a high degree of depravity, does not\nprove that all gratitude and natural affection possesses the nature of\ntrue virtue or saving grace.\u201d(93) \u201cWe see, in innumerable instances, that\nmere nature is sufficient to excite gratitude in men, or to affect their\nhearts with thankfulness to others for favours received.\u201d(94) \u201cGratitude\nbeing thus a natural principle, ingratitude is so much the more vile and\nheinous; because it shows a dreadful prevalence of wickedness, which even\noverbears and suppresses the better principles of human nature. It is\nmentioned as a high degree of wickedness in many of the heathen, that they\nwere without natural affection. Rom. ii, 31. But that the want of\ngratitude, or natural affection, is evidence of a great degree of _vice_,\nis no argument that all gratitude and natural affection has the nature of\n_virtue_ or saving grace.\u201d\n\nHere, as well as in various other places, Edwards speaks of gratitude and\nother natural affections as the better principles of our nature; to be\ndestitute of which he considers a horrible deformity. But, however amiable\nand lovely, he denies to these natural affections, or dispositions, the\ncharacter of virtue; because they are merely natural or concreated\ndispositions. They are innocent; that is, they are neither our virtue nor\nour vice, but a medium between moral good and evil. Nothing can be more\nreasonable than this, and nothing more inconsistent with the logic of the\nauthor. Such is the testimony of Edwards himself, when he escapes from the\nshadows of a dark system, and the trammels of a false logic, and permits\nhis own individual mind, in the clear open light of nature, to work in\nfull unison with the universal mind of man.\n\nAccording to the author\u2019s own definition of \u201ctrue virtue,\u201d it \u201cis the\nbeauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature,\ni. e., such as are attended with desert of _praise_ or _blame_.\u201d Surely,\nAdam could have deserved no praise for the qualities bestowed on him by\nthe act of creation; and hence, according to the author\u2019s own definition,\nthey could not have been his virtue. In regard to the \u201cnew creation\u201d of\nthe soul, Edwards contends that all the praise is due to God, and no part\nof it to man; because the whole work is performed by divine grace, without\nhuman co\u00f6peration. Now, we admit that if the whole work of regeneration is\nperformed by God, then man is not to be praised for it; that is to say, it\nis not his virtue. Here again the author sets forth the true principle;\nbut how does it agree with his logic in relation to the first man? Was not\nhis creation wholly and exclusively the work of God? If so, then all the\npraise is due to God, and no part of it to man. But, according to the\nauthor\u2019s own definition, when there is no praiseworthiness there is no\nvirtue; and hence, as Adam deserved no praise on account of what he\nreceived at his creation, so such endowments partook not of the nature of\ntrue virtue.\n\nBut we have a still more fundamental objection to the argument in\nquestion. It proceeds on the supposition that _true virtue_ consists in\nmere _feeling_. This view of the nature of virtue is admirably adapted to\nmake it agree and harmonize with the scheme of necessity; but it is not a\nsound view. If an object is calculated to excite a certain feeling or\nemotion in the mind, that feeling or emotion will necessarily arise in\nview of such object. If the glorious perfections of the divine nature, for\nexample, had been presented to the mind of Adam, no doubt he would have\nbeen necessarily compelled to \u201clove, relish, and delight in them.\u201d But\nthis feeling of love and delight, thus necessarily evolved out of the\nbosom of his natural disposition, however exquisite and enrapturing, would\nnot have been his virtue or holiness. It would have been the spontaneous\nand irresistible development of the nature which God had given him. We may\nadmire it as the most beautiful unfolding of that nature, but we cannot\napplaud it as the virtue or moral goodness of Adam. We look upon it merely\nas the excellency and glory of the divine work of creation. We could\nregard the glory of the heavens, or the beauty of the earth, with a\nsentiment of moral approbation, as easily as we could ascribe the\ncharacter of moral goodness to the noble qualities with which the Almighty\nhad been pleased to adorn the nature of the first man.\n\nThe beautiful feeling or emotion of love is merely the blossom which\nprecedes the formation of true virtue in the heart. This consists, not in\nholy feelings, as they are called, but in holy exercises of the will. It\nis only when the will, in its workings, coalesces with a sense of right\nand a feeling of love to God, that the blossom gives place to the fruit of\nvirtue. A virtuous act is not a spontaneous and irresistible emotion of\nthe sensibility; it is a voluntary exercise and going forth of the will in\nobedience to God.\n\nIt is a strange error which makes virtue consist in \u201cthe spontaneous\naffections, emotions, and desires that arise in the mind in view of its\nappropriate objects.\u201d If these necessarily arise in us, \u201cand do not wait\nfor the bidding of the will,\u201d(95) how can they possibly be our virtue? how\ncan they form the objects of moral approbation in us? Yet is it\nconfidently asserted, that the denial of such a doctrine \u201cstands in direct\nand palpable opposition to the authority of God\u2019s word.\u201d(96) The word of\nGod, we admit, says that holiness consists in love; but does it assert\nthat it consists in the _feeling_ of love merely? or in any feeling which\nspontaneously and irresistibly arises in the mind? If the Scripture had\nbeen written expressly to refute such a moral heresy, it could not have\nbeen more pointed or explicit.\n\nHoliness consists in love. But what is the meaning of the term love, as\nset forth in Scripture? We answer, \u201cThis is the love of God,\u201d that we\n\u201c_keep_ his commandments.\u201d \u201cLet us not love in word, neither in tongue,\nbut in _deed_ and in truth.\u201d \u201cWhosoever heareth these sayings of mine and\n_doeth_ them, I will liken him unto a wise man who built his house upon a\nrock.\u201d \u201cHe that hath my commandments, and _keepeth_ them, he it is that\nloveth me.\u201d Here, as well as in innumerable other places, are we told that\ntrue love is not a mere evanescent feeling of the heart, but an inwrought\nand abiding habit of the will. It is not a _suffering_, it is a _doing_.\nThe most lively emotions, the most ecstatic feelings, if they lead not the\nwill to action, can avail us nothing; for the tree will be judged, not by\nits blossoms, but by its fruits.\n\nIf we see our brother in distress, we cannot but sympathize with him,\nunless our hearts have been hardened by crime. The feeling of compassion\nwill spontaneously arise in our minds, in view of his distress; but let us\nnot too hastily imagine therefore that we are virtuous, or even humane. We\nmay possess a tender feeling of compassion, and yet the feeling may have\nno corresponding act. The opening fountain of compassion may be shut up,\nor turned aside from its natural course, by a wrong habit of the will; and\nhence, with all our weeping tenderness of feeling, we may be destitute of\nany true humanity. We may be merely as sounding brass, or a tinkling\ncymbal. \u201cWhoso hath this world\u2019s goods, and seeth his brother have need,\nand shutteth up his bowels of _compassion_ from him, how dwelleth the love\nof God in him?\u201d It is this _loving in work_, and not in _feeling_ merely,\nwhich the word of God requires of us; and when, at the last day, all\nnations, and kindreds, and tongues, shall stand before the throne of\nheaven, we shall be judged, not according to the feelings we have\nexperienced, but according to the deeds done in the body. Hence, the\ndoctrine which makes true virtue or moral goodness consist in the\nspontaneous and irresistible feelings of the heart, \u201cstands in direct and\npalpable opposition to the authority of God\u2019s word.\u201d\n\nFeeling is one thing; obedience is another. This counterfeit virtue or\nmoral goodness, which begins and terminates in feeling, is far more common\nthan true virtue or holiness. Who can reflect, for instance, on the\ninfinite goodness of God, without an emotion or feeling of love? That man\nmust indeed be uncommonly hard-hearted and sullen, who can walk out on a\nfine day and behold the wonderful exhibitions of divine goodness on all\nsides around him, without being warmed into a feeling of admiration and\nlove. When all nature is music to the ear and beauty to the eye, it\nrequires nothing more than a freedom from the darker stains and clouds of\nguilt within, to lead a sympathizing heart to the sunshine of external\nnature, as it seems to rejoice in the smile of Infinite Beneficence. The\nheart may swell with rapture as it looks abroad on a happy universe,\nreplenished with so many evidences of the divine goodness; nay, the story\nof a Saviour\u2019s love, set forth in eloquent and touching language, may draw\ntears from our eyes, and the soul may rise in gratitude to the Author of\nsuch boundless compassion; and yet, after all, we may be mere\nsentimentalists in religion, whose wills and whose lives are in direct\nopposition to all laws, both human and divine. Infidelity itself, in such\nmoments of deep but transitory feeling, may exclaim with an emotion known\nbut to few Christian minds, \u201cSocrates died like a philosopher, but Jesus\nChrist like a God,\u201d and its iron nature still retain \u201cthe unconquerable\nwill.\u201d\n\nWe may now safely conclude, we think, that the mists raised by the\nphilosophy and logic of Edwards have not been able to obscure the lustre\nof the simple truth, that true virtue or holiness cannot be produced in us\nby external necessitating causes. Whatsoever is thus produced in us, we\nsay, cannot be our virtue, nor can we deserve any praise for its\nexistence. This seems to be a clear dictate of the reason of man; and it\nwould so seem, we have no doubt, to all men, but for certain devices which\nto some have obscured the light of nature. The principal of these devices\nwe shall now proceed to examine.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nOf the proposition that \u201cThe essence of the virtue and vice of\ndispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in their cause,\nbut in their nature.\u201d(97)\n\n\nFor the sake of greater distinctness, we shall confine our attention to a\nsingle branch of this complex proposition; namely, that the essence of\nvirtuous acts of the will lies not in their cause, but their nature. Our\nreasoning in relation to this point, may be easily applied to the other\nbranches of the proposition.\n\nWe admit, then, that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its nature. If\nthis means that the nature of a virtuous act lies in its nature, or its\nessence lies in its essence, it is certainly true; and even if the author\nattached different ideas to the terms _essence_ and _nature_, we do not\ncare to search out his meaning; as we may very safely admit his\nproposition, whatever may be its signification. We are told by the editor,\nthat the whole proposition is very important on account of \u201cthe negative\npart,\u201d namely, that \u201cthe essence of virtue and vice lies not in their\n_cause_.\u201d We are also willing to admit, that the essence of everything\nlies in its own nature, _and not in its cause_. But why is this\nproposition brought forward? What purpose is it designed to serve in the\nphilosophy of the author?\n\nThis question is easily answered. He contends that true virtue may be, and\nis, necessitated to exist by powers and causes over which we have no\ncontrol. If we raise our eyes to such a source of virtue, its intrinsic\nlustre and beauty seem to fade from our view. The author, indeed,\nendeavours to explain why it is, that the scheme of necessity seems to be\ninconsistent with the nature of true virtue. The main reason is, says he,\nbecause we imagine that the essence of virtue and vice consists, not in\ntheir nature, but in their origin and cause. Hence this persuasion not to\nbusy ourselves about the origin or cause of virtue and vice, but to\nestimate them according to their nature.\n\nWe are fully persuaded. If any can be found who will assert \u201cthat the\nvirtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the will, consists not in the\nnature of these dispositions or acts of the will, but wholly in the origin\nor cause of them,\u201d we must deliver them up to the tender mercies of\nPresident Edwards. Or if any shall talk so absurdly as to say, \u201cthat if\nthe dispositions of the mind, or acts of the will, _be never so good_, yet\nif the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing\nvirtuous or praiseworthy in it,\u201d we have not one word to say in his\ndefence; nor shall we ever raise our voice in favour of any one, who shall\nmaintain, that \u201cif the will, in its inclinations or acts, _be never so\nbad_, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault,\nthere is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it.\u201d For we are firmly\npersuaded, that if the acts of the will be good, then they are good; and\nif they be bad, then they are bad; whatever may have been their origin or\ncause. We shall have no dispute about such truisms as these.\n\nWe insist, indeed, that the first virtuous act of the first man was so,\nbecause it partook of the nature of virtue, and not because it had a\nvirtuous origin or cause in a preceding virtuous disposition of the mind.\nBut, in his work on Original Sin, Edwards contends otherwise. He there\ncontends, that no act of Adam could have been virtuous, unless it had\nproceeded from a virtuous origin or cause in the disposition of his heart;\nand that this could have had no existence in the world, unless it had\nproceeded from the power of the Creator. Thus he looked beyond the nature\nof the act itself, even to its origin and cause, in order to show upon\nwhat its moral nature depended; but now he insists that we should simply\nlook at its own nature, and not to its origin or cause, in order to\ndetermine this point. He ascends from acts of the will to their origin or\ncause, in order to show that virtue can only consist with the scheme of\nnecessity; and yet he denies to us the privilege of ascending with him, in\norder to show that the nature of virtue cannot at all consist with the\nscheme of necessity!\n\nWe admit that the virtuousness of every virtuous act lies, not in its\norigin or cause, but in itself. But still we insist that a virtuous act,\nas well as everything else, may be traced to a false origin or cause that\nis utterly inconsistent with its very nature. A horse is undoubtedly a\nhorse, come from whence it may; but yet if any one should tell us that\nhorses grow up out of the earth, or drop down out of the clouds, we should\ncertainly understand him to speak of mere phantoms, and no real horses, or\nwe should think him very greatly mistaken. In like manner, when we are\ntold that virtue may be, and is, necessitated to exist in us by causes\nover which we have no control; that we may be to praise for any gift\nbestowed upon us by the divine power; we are constrained to believe that\nhe has given a false genealogy of moral goodness, and one that is utterly\ninconsistent with its nature. Nor can we be made to blink this truth,\nwhich so perfectly accords, as we have seen, with the universal sentiment\nof mankind, by being reminded that moral goodness consists, not in its\norigin or cause, but in its own nature. Virtue is always virtue, we freely\nadmit, proceed from what quarter of the universe it may; yet do we insist\nthat it can no more be produced in us by an extraneous agency than it can\ngrow up out of the earth, or drop down out of the clouds of heaven. That\nwhich is produced in us by such an agency, be it what it may, is not our\nvirtue, nor is any praise therefor due to us. To mistake such effects or\npassive impressions for virtue, is to mistake phantoms for things, shadows\nfor substances, and dreams for realities.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral\ndistinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessity, but\nbecause it is really inconsistent therewith.\n\n\nLet us then look at this matter, and see if we are really so deplorably\nblinded by the ambiguity of a word, that we cannot contemplate the glory\nof the scheme of moral necessity as it is in itself. The distinction\nbetween these two things, _natural_ and _moral_ necessity, is certainly a\nclear and a broad one. Let us see, then, if we may not find our way along\nthe line of this distinction, without that darkness and confusion by which\nour judgment is supposed to be so sadly misled and perverted.\n\nIt is on all sides conceded, that natural necessity is inconsistent with\nthe good or ill desert of human actions. If a man were commanded, for\nexample, to leap over a mountain, or to lift the earth from its centre, he\nwould be justly excusable for the non-performance of such things, because\nthey lie beyond the range of his natural power. \u201cThere is here a limit to\nour power,\u201d as Dr. Chalmers says, \u201cbeyond which we cannot do that which we\nplease to do; and there are many thousand such limits.\u201d(98) This is\nnatural necessity, in one of its branches. It circumscribes and binds our\nnatural power. It limits the external sphere beyond which the effects or\nconsequences of our volitions cannot be projected. It reaches not to the\ninterior sphere of the will itself, and has no more to do with its freedom\nthan has the influence of the stars. We may please to do a thing, nay, we\nmay freely will it, and yet a natural necessity may cut off and prevent\nthe external consequence of the act.\n\nAgain, if by a superior force, a man\u2019s limbs or external bodily organs\nshould be used as instruments of good or evil, without his concurrence or\nconsent, he would be excusable for the consequences of such use. This is\nthe other branch of natural necessity. It is evident that it has no\nrelation to the freedom or to the acts of the will, but only to the\nexternal movements of the body. It interferes merely with that external\nfreedom of bodily motion, about which we heard so much in the first\nchapter of this work, and which the advocates of necessity have, for the\nmost part, so industriously laboured to pass off upon the world for the\nliberty of the will itself. As this natural necessity, then, trenches not\nupon the interior sphere of the will, so it merely excuses for the\nperformance or non-performance of external actions. It leaves the great\nquestion with respect to man\u2019s accountability for the acts of the will\nitself, from which his external actions proceed, wholly untouched and\nundetermined.\n\nFar different is the case with respect to moral necessity. This acts\ndirectly upon the will itself, and absolutely controls all its movements.\nWithin its own sphere it is conceded to be \u201cas absolute as natural\nnecessity,\u201d(99) and \u201cas sure as fatalism.\u201d(100) It absolutely and\nunconditionally determines the will at all times, and in all cases. Yet we\nare told that we are accountable for all the acts thus produced in us,\nbecause they are the acts of our own wills! Nothing is done against our\nwills, as in the case of natural necessity; (they should rather say,\nagainst the external effects of our wills;) but our wills always follow,\nand we are accountable therefor, though they cannot but follow. Moral\nnecessity is not irresistible, because this implies resistance, and our\nwills never resist that which makes us willing. It is only invincible; and\ninvincible it is indeed, since with the mighty, sovereign power of the\nAlmighty it controls all the thoughts, and feelings, and volitions of the\nhuman mind. Now we see this scheme as it is in itself, in all its\nnakedness, just as it is presented to us by its own most able and\nenlightened defenders. And seeing it thus removed from all contact with\nthe scheme of natural necessity, we ask, whether agents can be justly held\naccountable for acts thus determined and controlled by the power of God,\nor by those invincible causes which his omnipotence marshalleth?\n\nWe speak not of external acts; and hence we lay aside the whole scheme of\nnatural necessity. We speak of the acts of the will; and we ask, if these\nbe not free from the dominion of moral necessity, from necessitating\ncauses over which we have no control, can we be accountable for them? Can\nwe be to praise or to blame for them? Can they be our virtue or our vice?\nThese questions, we think, we may safely submit to the impartial decision\nof every unbiassed mind. And to such minds we shall leave it to determine,\nwhether the scheme of moral necessity has owed its hold upon the reason of\nman to a dark confusion of words and things, or whether its glory has been\nobscured by the misconception of its opponents?\n\nIn conclusion, we shall simply lay down, in a few brief propositions, what\nwe trust has now been seen in relation to the nature of virtue and\nvice:\u20141. No necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice. 2.\nIn order that any act of the will should partake of a moral nature, it\nmust be free from the dominion of causes over which it has no control, or\nfrom whose influence it cannot depart. 3. Virtue and vice lie not in the\npassive state of the sensibility, nor in any other necessitated states of\nthe mind, but in acts of the will, and in habits formed by a repetition of\nsuch free voluntary acts. Whatever else may be said in relation to the\nnature of virtue and of vice, and to the distinction between them, these\nthings appear to be clearly true; and if so, then the scheme of moral\nnecessity is utterly inconsistent with their existence, and saps the very\nfoundation of all moral distinctions.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter IV.\n\n\nThe Moral World Not Constituted According To The Scheme Of Necessity.\n\n\n I made him just and right;\n Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.\n Such I created all the ethereal powers\n And spirits, both them who stood and them who fail\u2019d;\n Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.\u2014MILTON.\n\n\nWe have already witnessed the strange inconsistencies into which the most\nlearned and ingenious men have fallen, in their attempts to reconcile the\ndoctrine of necessity with the accountability of man, and the glory of\nGod. Having involved themselves in that scheme, on what has appeared to\nthem conclusive evidence, they have seemed to struggle in vain to force\ntheir way out into the clear and open light of nature. They have seemed to\ntorment themselves, and to confound others, in their gigantic efforts to\nextricate themselves from a dark labyrinth, out of which there is\nabsolutely no escape. Let us see, then, if we may not refute the pretended\ndemonstration in favour of necessity, and thereby restore the mind to that\ninternal satisfaction which it so earnestly desires, and which it so\nconstantly seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.\n\n\nThere are three great leading faculties or attributes of the human mind;\nnamely, the _intelligence_, the _sensibility_, and the _will_. By means of\nthese we _think_, we _feel_, and we _act_. Now, the phenomena of thinking,\nfeeling, and acting, will be found, on examination, to possess different\ncharacteristics; of which we must form clear and fixed conceptions, if we\nwould extricate the philosophy of the will from the obscurity and\nconfusion in which it has been so long involved. Let us proceed then to\nexamine them, to interrogate our consciousness in relation to them.\n\nSuppose, for example, that an apple is placed before me. I fix my\nattention upon it, and consider its form: _it is round_. This judgment, or\ndecision of the mind, in relation to the form of the apple, is a state of\nthe intelligence. It does not depend on any effort of mine, whether it\nshall appear round to me or not: I could not possibly come to any other\nconclusion if I would: I could as soon think it as large as the globe as\nbelieve it to be square, or of any other form than round. Hence this\njudgment, this decision, this state of the intelligence, is necessitated.\nThe same thing is true of all the other perceptions or states of the\nintelligence. M. Cousin has truly said: \u201cUndoubtedly different intellects,\nor the same intellect at different periods of its existence, may sometimes\npass different judgments in regard to the same thing. Sometimes it may be\ndeceived; it will judge that which is false to be true, the good to be\nbad, the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse: but at the moment when it\njudges that a proposition is true or false, an action good or bad, a form\nbeautiful or ugly, at that moment it is not in the power of the intellect\nto pass any other judgment than that it passes. It obeys laws it did not\nmake. It yields to motives which determine it independent of the will. In\na word, the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, knowing,\nthinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the characteristic\nof necessity.\u201d(101)\n\nOnce more I fix my attention on the apple: an agreeable sensation arises\nin the mind; a desire to eat it is awakened. This desire or appetite is a\nstate of the sensibility. Whether I shall feel this appetite or desire,\ndoes not depend upon any effort or exertion of my will. The mind is\nclearly passive in relation to it; the desire, then, is as strongly marked\nwith the characteristic of necessity, as are the states of the\nintelligence. The same is true of all our feelings; they are necessarily\ndetermined by the objects in view of the mind. There is no controversy on\nthese points; it is universally agreed that every state of the\nintelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily determined by the\nevidence and the object in view of the mind. It is not, then, either in\nthe intelligence or in the sensibility that we are to look for liberty.\n\nBut once more I fix my attention on the apple: the desire is awakened, and\nI conclude to eat it. Hitherto I have done nothing except in fixing my\nattention on the apple. I have experienced the judgment that it is round,\nand felt the desire to eat it. But now I conclude to eat it, and I make an\neffort of the mind to put forth my hand to take the apple and eat it. It\nis done. Now here is an entirely new phenomenon; it is an _effort_, an\n_exertion_, an _act_, a _volition_ of the mind. The name is of no\nimportance; the circumstances under which the phenomenon arises have\ncalled attention to it, and the precise thing intended is seen in the\nlight of consciousness. Let us look at it closely, and mark its\ncharacteristic well, being careful to see neither more nor less than is\npresented by the phenomenon itself.\n\nWe are conscious, then, of the existence of an act, of a volition:\neverybody can see what this is. We must not say, as the advocates of\nfree-agency usually do, that when we put forth this act or volition we are\nconscious of a power to do the contrary; for this position may be refuted,\nand the foundation on which we intend to raise our superstructure\nundermined. We are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself,\nand not even of the power by means of which we act; the existence of the\npower is necessarily inferred from its exercise. This is the only way in\nwhich we know it, and not from the direct testimony of consciousness. Much\nless if we had refused to act, should we have been conscious of the power\nto withhold it; much less again are we conscious of the power to withhold\nthe act, as we do not in the case supposed exercise this power. But\ncertainly we are conscious of the act itself; all men will concede this,\nand this is all our argument really demands.\n\nHere then we are conscious of an act, of an effort, of the mind. Look at\nit closely. Is the mind passive in this act? No; we venture to answer for\nthe universal intelligence of man. If this act had been produced in us by\na necessitating cause, would not the mind have been passive in it? In\nother words, would it not have been a passive impression, and not an act,\nnot an effort of the mind at all? Yes; we again venture to answer for the\nunbiassed reason of man. But it is not, we have seen, a passive\nimpression; it is an act of the mind, and hence it is not necessitated. It\nis not necessitated, because it is not stamped with the characteristic of\nnecessity. The universal reason of man declares that the will has not\nnecessarily yielded like the intelligence and the sensibility, to motives\nover which it had no control. It does not bear upon its face the mark of\nany such subjection \u201cto the power and action\u201d of a cause. It is marked\nwith the characteristic, not of necessity, but of liberty.\n\nWe would not say, with Dr. Samuel Clarke, that \u201caction and liberty are\nidentical ideas;\u201d but we will say, that the idea of action necessarily\nimplies that of liberty; for if we duly reflect on the nature of an act we\ncannot conceive it as being necessitated. This consideration furnishes an\neasy and satisfactory solution of a problem, by which necessitarians are\nsadly perplexed. They endeavour in various ways to account for the fact\nthat we believe our volitions to be free, or not necessarily caused. Some\nresolve this belief and feeling of liberty into a deceitful sense; some\nimagine that we are deceived by the ambiguities of language; and some\nresort to other methods of explaining the phenomenon. \u201cIt is true,\u201d says\nPresident Edwards, \u201cI find myself possessed of my volitions before I can\nsee the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the power and\nefficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect; and this, for aught I\nknow, may make some imagine that volition has no cause, or that it\nproduces itself.\u201d But this is not a satisfactory account of the\n_imagination_, as he would term it. We also find ourselves possessed of\nour judgments and feelings before we perceive the effectual power of the\ncause which produces them. Why then do we refer these to the operation of\na necessary cause, and not our volitions? If the power and efficacy of the\ncause is seen only by the effect in the one case, it is only seen in the\nsame manner in the other. Why then do we differ in our conclusions with\nrespect to them? Why do we refer the judgment and the feeling to necessary\ncauses, and fail to do the same in relation to the volition? The reason is\nobvious. The mind is passive in judging and feeling, and hence these\nphenomena necessarily demand the operation of causes to account for them;\nbut the mind is active in its volitions, and this necessarily excludes the\nidea of causes to produce them. The mind clearly perceives, by due\nreflection, and at all times sees dimly, at least, that an act or volition\nis different in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect;\nand hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power and efficacy\nof a producing cause in its volitions. This fact of our consciousness it\nis not in the power of sophistry wholly to conceal, nor in the power of\nhuman nature to evade. Hence we carry about with us the irresistible\nconviction that we are free; that our wills are not absolutely subject to\nthe dominion of causes over which we have no control. Hence we see and\nknow that we are self-active.\n\n -------------------------------------\n\nHaving completed our analysis, in as far as our present purpose demands,\nwe may proceed to show that the system of necessity is founded on a false\npsychology,\u2014on a dark confusion of the facts of human nature. It is very\nremarkable that all the advocates of this system, from Hobbes down to\nEdwards, will allow the human mind to possess only two faculties, the\nunderstanding and the will. The will and the sensibility are expressly\nidentified by them. Locke distinguished between will and desire, between\nthe _faculty_ of willing and the _susceptibility_ to feeling; but Edwards\nhas endeavoured to show that there is no such distinction as that for\nwhich Locke contends. We shall not arrest the progress of our remarks in\norder to point out the manner in which Edwards has deceived himself by an\nappeal to logic rather than to consciousness, because the threefold\ndistinction for which we contend is now admitted by necessitarians\nthemselves. Indeed, after the clear and beautiful analysis by M. Cousin,\nthey could not well do otherwise than recognise this threefold\ndistinction; but they have done so, we think it will be found, without\nperceiving all the consequences of such an admission to their system. It\nis an admission which, in our opinion, will show the scheme of necessity\nto be insecure in its foundation, and disjointed in all its parts.\n\nWith the light of this distinction in our minds, it will be easy to follow\nand expose the sophistries of the necessitarian. He often declaims against\nthe idea of liberty for which we contend, on the ground that it would be,\nnot a perfection, but a very great imperfection of our nature to possess\nsuch a freedom. But in every such instance he confounds the will with one\nof the passive susceptibilities of the mind. Thus, for example, Collins\nargues that liberty would be a great imperfection, because \u201cnothing can be\nmore irrational and absurd than to be able to refuse our assent to what is\nevidently true to us, and to assent to what we see to be false.\u201d Now, all\nthis is true, but it is not to the purpose; for no one contends that the\nintelligence is free in assenting to, or in dissenting from, the evidence\nin view of the mind. No rational being, we admit, could desire such a\nfreedom; could desire to be free, for example, from the conviction that\ntwo and two make four. M. Lamartine, we are aware, expresses a very lively\nabhorrence of the mathematics, because they allow not a sufficient\n_freedom of thought_\u2014because they exercise so great a _despotism over the\nintellect_. But the circumstance which this flowery poet deems an\nimperfection in the mathematics, every enlightened friend of free-agency\nwill regard as their chief excellency and glory.\n\nThe same error is committed by Spinoza: \u201cWe can consider the soul under\ntwo points of view,\u201d says he, \u201cas thought and as desire.\u201d Here the will is\nmade to disappear, and we behold only the two susceptibilities of the\nsoul, which are stamped with the characteristic of necessity. Where, then,\nwill Spinoza find the freedom of the soul? Certainly not in the will, for\nthis has been blotted out from the map of his psychology. Accordingly he\nsays: \u201cThe free will is a chimera of the species, flattered by our pride,\nand founded upon our ignorance.\u201d He must find the freedom of the soul\nthen, if he find it at all, in one of its passive susceptibilities. This,\nas we have already seen, is exactly what he does; he says the soul is free\nin the affirmation that two and two are four! Thus he finds the liberty of\nthe soul, not in the exercises of its will, of its active power, but in\nthe bosom of the intelligence, which is absolutely necessitated in all its\ndeterminations.\n\nIn this particular, as well as in most others, Spinoza merely reproduces\nthe error of the ancient Stoics. It was a principle with them, says\nRitter, \u201cthat the will and the desire are one with thought, and may be\nresolved into it.\u201d(102) Thus, by the ancient Stoics, as well as by Hobbes,\nand Spinoza, and Collins, and Edwards, the will is merged in one of the\npassive elements of the mind, and its real characteristic lost sight of.\n\u201cBy the freedom of the soul,\u201d says Ritter, \u201cthe Stoics understood simply\nthat assent which it gives to certain ideas.\u201d(103) Thus the ancient Stoics\nendeavoured to find the freedom of the soul, where Spinoza and so many\nmodern necessitarians have sought to find it, in the passive, necessitated\nstates of the intelligence. This was indeed to impose upon themselves a\nmere shadow for a substance,\u2014a dream for a reality.\n\n\u201cBy whatever name we call the act of the will,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cchoosing,\nrefusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing,\nrejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or\nbeing averse, being pleased or displeased with\u2014all may be reduced to this\nof choosing.\u201d(104) Thus, in the vocabulary and according to the psychology\nof this great author, the phenomena of the sensibility and those of the\nwill are identified, as well as the faculties themselves. _Pleasing_ and\n_willing_, liking and acting, are all one with him. His psychology admits\nof no distinction, for example, between the pleasant impression made by an\napple on the sensibility, and the act of the will by which the hand is put\nforth to take it. \u201cThe will and the affections of the soul,\u201d says he, \u201care\nnot two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the\nwill, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and\ninclination, but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exercise.\u201d(105)\nAnd again, \u201cI humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are not\nproperly distinguished from the will, as though there were two\nfaculties.\u201d(106) And still more explicitly, \u201call acts of the will are\ntruly acts of the affections.\u201d(107) Is it not strange, that one who could\nexhibit such wonderful discrimination when the exigences of his system\ndemanded the exercise of such a power, should have confounded things so\nclearly distinct in their natures as an act of the will and an agreeable\nimpression made on the sensibility?\n\nIt is not possible for any mind, no matter how great its powers, to see\nthe nature of things clearly when it comes to the contemplation of them\nwith such a confusion of ideas. Even President Edwards is not exempt from\nthe common lot of humanity. His doctrine is necessarily enveloped in\nobscurity. We can turn it in no light without being struck with its\ninconsistencies or its futility. He repeatedly says, the will is always\ndetermined by the strongest affection, or appetite, or passion; that is,\nby the most agreeable state of the sensibility. But if the will and the\nsensibility are identical, as his language expressly makes them; or if the\nstates of the one are not distinguishable from the states of the other,\nthen to say that the will is always determined by the sensibility, or an\nact of the will by the strongest affection of the sensibility, is to say\nthat a thing is determined by itself. It is to say, in fact, that the will\nis always determined by itself; a doctrine against which he uniformly\nprotests. Nay, more, that an act of the will causes itself; a position\nwhich he has repeatedly ascribed to his opponents, and held up to the\nderision of mankind.\n\nIt is very remarkable, that Edwards seems to have been conscious, at\ntimes, that he laid himself open to the charge of such an absurdity, when\nhe said that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by\nwhat seems most agreeable to the mind. For he says, \u201cI have chosen rather\nto express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent\ngood, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say the will is\ndetermined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable;\n_because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind\u2019s\npreferring, seem scarcely distinct_.\u201d We have taken the liberty to\nemphasize his words. Now here he tells us that the \u201cmind\u2019s preferring,\u201d by\nwhich word he has explained himself to mean willing,(108) is scarcely\ndistinct from \u201can appearing most agreeable to the mind.\u201d Here he returns\nto his psychology, and identifies the most agreeable impression made on\nthe sensibility with an act of the will. He does not like to say, that the\nact of the will is caused by the most agreeable sensation, because this\nseems to make a thing the cause of itself.\n\nIn this he does wisely; but having shaped his doctrine to suit himself\nmore exactly, in what form is it presented to us? Let us look at it in its\nnew shape, and see what it is. The will is not determined by the greatest\napparent good, because a thing is not determined by itself; but the will\nis always as the greatest apparent good! Thus the absurdity of saying a\nthing is determined by itself is avoided; but surely, if an appearing most\nagreeable to the mind is not distinct from the mind\u2019s acting, then to say\nthat the mind\u2019s acting is always as that which appears most agreeable to\nit is merely to say, that the mind\u2019s acting is always as the mind\u2019s\nacting! or, in other words, that a thing is always as itself! Thus, his\ngreat fundamental proposition is, in one form, a glaring absurdity; and in\nthe other, it is an insignificant truism; and there is no escape from this\ndilemma except through a return to a better psychology, to a sounder\nanalysis of the great facts of human nature.\n\nWhen Edwards once reaches the truism that a thing is always as itself, he\nfeels perfectly secure, and defies with unbounded confidence the utmost\nefforts of his opponents to dislodge him. \u201cAs we observed before,\u201d says\nhe, \u201cnothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, and do\nwhat they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them; and to\nsay otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choose what\nappears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them; or that\nthey do not choose what they prefer\u2014_which brings the matter to a\ncontradiction_.\u201d True; this brings the matter to a contradiction, as he\nhas repeatedly told us; for choosing, and preferring, or willing, are all\none. But if any one denies that a man does what he pleases when he does\nwhat he pleases; or if he affirms that he pleases without pleasing, or\nchooses without choosing, or prefers without preferring, we shall leave\nhim to the logic of the necessitarian and the physician. We have no idea\nthat he will ever be able to refute the volumes that have been written to\nconfound him. President Edwards clearly has the better of him; for he puts\n\u201cthe soul in a state of choice,\u201d and yet affirms that it \u201chas no choice.\u201d\nHe might as well say, indeed, that \u201ca body may move while it is in a state\nof rest,\u201d as to say that \u201cthe mind may choose without choosing,\u201d or\nwithout having a choice. He is very clearly involved in an absurdity; and\nif he can read the three hundred pages of the Inquiry, without being\nconvinced of his error, his case must indeed be truly hopeless.\n\nEdwards is far from being the only necessitarian who has fallen into the\nerror of identifying the sensibility with the will; thus reducing his\ndoctrine to an unassailable truism. In his famous controversy with Clarke,\nLeibnitz has done the same thing. \u201cThus,\u201d says he, \u201cin truth, the motives\ncomprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act\nvoluntarily; for they include not only reasons, but also the inclinations\nand passions, or other preceding impressions. Wherefore if the mind should\nprefer a weak inclination to a strong one, _it would act against itself,\nand otherwise than it is disposed to act_.\u201d\n\nNow is it not wonderful, that so profound a thinker, and so acute a\nmetaphysician, as Leibnitz, should have supposed that he was engaged in a\ncontroversy to show that the mind never acts otherwise than it acts; that\nit never acts against itself? Having reduced his doctrine to this truism,\nhe says, this \u201cshows that the author\u2019s notions, contrary to mine, are\nsuperficial, and appear to have no solidity in them, when they are well\nconsidered.\u201d True, the notions of Clarke were superficial, and worse than\nsuperficial, if he supposed that the mind ever acts contrary to its act,\nor otherwise than it really acts. But Clarke distinguished between the\ndisposition and the will.\n\nIn like manner Thummig, the disciple of Leibnitz, has the following\nlanguage, as quoted by Sir William Hamilton: \u201cIt is to philosophize very\ncrudely concerning mind, and to image everything in a corporeal manner, to\nconceive that actuating reasons are something external, which make an\nimpression on the mind, and _to distinguish motives from the active\nprinciple itself_.\u201d Now this language, it seems, is found in Thummig\u2019s\ndefence of the last paper of Leibnitz (who died before the controversy was\nterminated) against the answer of Clarke. But, surely, if it is a great\nmistake, as the author insists it is, to distinguish motives from the\nactive principle itself; then to say that the active principle is\ndetermined by motives, is to say that the active principle is determined\nby itself. And having reached this point, the disciple of Leibnitz finds\nhimself planted precisely on the position he had undertaken to overthrow,\nnamely, that the will is determined by itself. And again, if it be wrong\nto distinguish the motive from the active principle itself, then to say\nthat the active principle never departs from the motive, is to affirm that\na thing is always as itself.\n\nThe great service which a false psychology has rendered to the cause of\nnecessity is easily seen. For having identified an act of the will with a\nstate of the sensibility, which is universally conceived to be\nnecessitated, the necessitarian is delivered from more than half his\nlabours. By merging a phenomenon or manifestation of the will in a state\nof the sensibility, it seems to lose its own characteristic, which is\nincompatible with the scheme of necessity, and to assume the\ncharacteristic of feeling, which is perfectly reconcilable with it; nay,\nwhich demands the scheme of necessity to account for its existence. Thus,\nthe system of necessity is based on a false psychology, on which it has\ntoo securely stood from the earliest times down to the present day. But\nthe stream of knowledge, ever deepening and widening in its course, has\nbeen gradually undermining the foundations of this dark system.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue.\n\n\nAs we have seen in the last section, the argument of the necessitarian is\nfrequently directed against a false issue; but the point is worthy of a\nstill more careful consideration.\n\nWe shall never cease to admire the logical dexterity with which the\nchampions of necessity assail and worry their adversaries. They have said,\nin all ages, that \u201cnothing taketh beginning from itself;\u201d but who ever\nimagined or dreamed of so wild an absurdity? It is conceded by all\nrational beings. Motion taketh not beginning from itself, but from action;\naction taketh not beginning from itself, but from mind; and mind taketh\nnot beginning from itself, but from God. It is false, however, to conclude\nthat because nothing taketh beginning from itself, it is brought to pass\n\u201cby the action of some immediate agent without itself.\u201d The motion of\nbody, as we have seen, is produced by the action of some immediate agent\nwithout itself; but the action of mind is produced, or brought to pass, by\nno action at all. It taketh beginning from an agent, and not from the\naction of an agent. This distinction, though so clearly founded in the\nnature of things, is always overlooked by the logic of the necessitarian.\nThey might well adopt the language of Bacon, that the subtilty of nature\nfar surpasseth that of our logic.\n\nHobbes was content to rest on a simple statement of the fact, that nothing\ncan produce itself; but it is not every logician who is willing to rely on\nthe inherent strength of such a position. Ask a child, Did you make\nyourself? and the child will answer, No. Propound the same question to the\nroving savage, or to the man of mere common sense, and he will also\nanswer, No. Appeal to the universal reason of man, and the same emphatic\nNo, will come up from its profoundest depths. But your redoubtable\nlogicians are not satisfied to rely on such testimony alone: they dare not\nbuild on such a foundation unless it be first secured and rendered firm by\nthe aid of the syllogistic process. I know \u201cI did not make myself,\u201d says\nDescartes, \u201cfor if I had made myself, I should have given myself every\nperfection.\u201d Now this argument in true syllogistic form stands thus: If I\nhad made myself, I should have endowed myself with every perfection; I am\nnot endowed with every perfection; therefore I did not make myself.\nSurely, after so clear a process of reasoning, no one can possibly doubt\nthe proposition that Descartes did not make himself! In the same way we\nmight prove that he did not make his own logic: for if he had made his\nlogic, he would have endowed it with every possible perfection; but it is\nnot endowed with every possible perfection, and therefore he did not make\nit.\n\nBut President Edwards has excelled Descartes, and every other adept in the\nsyllogistic art, except Aristotle in his physics, in his ability to render\nthe light of perfect day clearer by a few masterly strokes of logic. He\nhas furnished the reason why some persons imagine that volition has no\ncause of its existence, or \u201cthat it produces itself.\u201d Now, by the way,\nwould it not have been as well if he had first made sure of the fact,\nbefore he undertook to explain it? But to proceed: let us see how he has\nproved that volition does not produce itself; that it does not arise out\nof nothing and bring itself into existence.\n\nHe does this in true logical form, and according to the most approved\nmethods of demonstration. He first establishes the general position, that\nno existence or event whatever can give rise to its own being,(109) and he\nthen shows that this is true of volition in particular.(110) And having\nreached the position, that volition does not arise out of nothing, but\nmust \u201chave some antecedent\u201d to introduce it into being; he next proceeds\nto prove that there is a necessary connexion between volition and the\nantecedents on which it depends for existence. This completes the chain of\nlogic, and the process is held up by his followers to the admiration of\nthe world as a perfect demonstration. Let us look at it a little more\nclosely, and examine the nature and mechanism of its parts.\n\nIf the huge frame of the earth, with all its teeming population and\nproductions, could rise up out of nothing, he argues, and bring itself\ninto being without any cause of its existence, then we could not prove the\nbeing of a God. All this is very true. For, as he truly alleges, if one\nworld could thus make itself, so also might another and another, even unto\nmillions of millions. The universe might make itself, or come into\nexistence without any cause thereof, and hence we could never know that\nthere is a God. But surely, if any man imagined that even one world could\ncreate itself, it is scarcely worth while to reason with him. It is not at\nall likely that he would be frightened from his position by such a\n_reductio ad absurdum_. We should almost as soon suspect a sane man of\ndenying the existence of God himself, as of doubting the proposition that\n\u201cnothing taketh beginning from itself.\u201d\n\nHaving settled it to his entire satisfaction, by this and other arguments,\nthat no effect whatever can produce itself, he then proceeds to show that\nthis proposition is true of volitions as well as of all other events or\noccurrences. \u201cIf any should imagine,\u201d says he, \u201cthere is something in the\nsort of event that renders it possible to come into existence without a\ncause, and should say that the free acts of the will are existences of an\n_exceeding different nature_ from other things, by reason of which they\nmay come into existence without _previous ground or reason of it_, though\nother things cannot; if they make this objection in good earnest, it would\nbe an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves; for it would be\ngiving some account of the existence of a thing, when, at the same time,\nthey would maintain there is no ground of its existence.\u201d(111) True, if\nany man should suppose that a volition rises up in the world \u201cwithout any\nground or reason of its existence,\u201d and afterward endeavour to assign a\nground or reason of it, he would certainly be strangely inconsistent with\nhimself; but we should deem his last position, that there must be a ground\nor reason of its existence, to be some evidence of _his coming to\nhimself_, rather than of his having forgotten himself. But to proceed with\nthe argument. \u201cTherefore I would observe,\u201d says he, \u201cthat the particular\nnature of existence, be it never so diverse from others, can lay no\nfoundation for that thing coming into existence without a cause; because,\nto suppose this, would be to suppose the _particular nature_ of existence\nto be a thing prior to existence, without a cause or reason of existence.\nBut that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or\nfor any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to\nexistence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is something\nbelonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward to act before it\nis. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can\nhave no influence, while it is not. And afterward it is too late for its\ninfluence; for then the thing has made sure of its existence already\nwithout its help.\u201d(112) After all this reasoning, and more to the same\neffect, we are perfectly satisfied that volition, no matter what its\nnature may be, cannot produce itself; and that it must have some ground or\nreason of its existence, some antecedent without which it could not come\ninto being.\n\nWe shall not do justice to this branch of our subject, if we leave it\nwithout laying before the reader one or two more specimens of logic from\nthe celebrated Inquiry of President Edwards. He is opposing \u201cthe\nhypothesis,\u201d he tells us, \u201cof acts of the will coming to pass without a\ncause.\u201d Now, according to his definition of the term _cause_, as laid down\nat the beginning of the section under consideration, it signifies any\nantecedent on which a thing depends, in whole or in part, for its\nexistence, or which constitutes the reason why it is, rather than\nnot.(113) His doctrine is, then, that nothing ever comes to pass without\nsome \u201cground or reason of its existence,\u201d without some antecedent which is\nnecessary to account for its coming into being. And those who deny it are\nbound to maintain the strange thesis, that something may come into\nexistence without any antecedent to account for it; that it may rise from\nnothing and bring itself into existence. It is against this thesis that\nhis logic is directed.\n\n\u201cIf it were so,\u201d says he, \u201cthat things only of one kind, viz., acts of the\nwill, seemed to come to pass of themselves; and it were an event that was\ncontinual, and that happened in a course whenever were found subjects\ncapable of such events; this very thing would demonstrate there was some\ncause of them, which made such a difference between this event and others.\nFor contingency is blind, and does not pick and choose a particular sort\nof events. Nothing has no choice. This no-cause, which causes no\nexistence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass to be of one\nparticular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only one\nsort of matter drops out of heaven, even water; and that this comes so\noften, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages,\nshows that there is some cause or reason of the falling of water out of\nthe heavens, and that something besides mere contingence had a hand in the\nmatter.\u201d(114) We do not intend to comment on this passage; we merely wish\nto advert to the fact, that it is a laboured and logical effort to\ndemolish the hypothesis that acts of the will do not bring themselves into\nexistence, and to show that there must be some antecedent to account for\ntheir coming into being. We shall only add, \u201cit is true that nothing has\nno choice;\u201d but who ever pretended to believe that _nothing_ puts forth\nvolitions? that there is no mind, no motive, no ground or reason of\nvolition? Is it not wonderful that the great metaphysician of New-England\nshould thus worry himself and exhaust his powers in grappling with shadows\nand combatting dreams, which no sane man ever seriously entertained for a\nmoment?\n\n\u201cIf we should suppose non-entity to be about to bring forth,\u201d he\ncontinues, \u201cand things were coming into existence without any cause or\n_antecedent_ on which the existence, or kind or manner of existence\ndepends, or which could at all determine whether the things should be\nstones or stems, or beasts or angels, or human bodies or souls, or only\nsome new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensation in\nanimals, or new idea in the human understanding, or new volition in the\nwill, or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles,\u2014then it\ncertainly would not be expected, although many millions of millions of\nthings were coming into existence in this manner all over the face of the\nearth, that they should all be only of one particular kind, and that it\nshould be thus in all ages, and that this sort of existences should never\nfail to come to pass when there is room for them, or a subject capable of\nthem, and that constantly whenever there is occasion.\u201d(115) Now all these\nwords are put together to prove that non-entity cannot bring forth\neffects, at least such effects as we see in the world; for if non-entity\nbrought them forth, that is, to come to the point in dispute, if\nnon-entity brought forth our volitions, they would not be always of one\nparticular sort of effects. But they are of one particular sort, and hence\nthere must be some antecedent to account for this uniformity in their\nnature, and they could not have been brought forth by nonentity! Surely if\nanything can equal the fatuity of the hypothesis that nonentity can bring\nforth, or that a thing can produce itself, it is a serious attempt to\nrefute it. How often, while poring over the works of necessitarians, are\nwe lost in amazement at the logical mania which seems to have seized them,\nand which, in its impetuous efforts to settle and determine everything by\nreasoning, leaves reason itself neither time nor opportunity to\ncontemplate the nature of things themselves, or listen to its own most\nauthoritative and irreversible mandates.\n\nBut lest we should be suspected of doing this great metaphysician\ninjustice, we must point out the means by which he has so grossly deceived\nhimself. According to his definition of motive, as the younger Edwards\ntruly says, it includes every cause and condition of volition. If anything\nis merely a condition, without which a volition could not come to pass,\nthough it exerts no influence, it is called a cause of that volition, and\nplaced in the definition of motive. And if anything exerts a positive\ninfluence to produce volition, this is also a cause of it, and is included\nin the same definition. In short, this definition embraces every\nconceivable antecedent on which volition in any manner, either in whole or\nin part, either negatively or positively, depends. Thus the most\nheterogeneous materials are crowded together under one and the same\nterm,\u2014the most different ideas under one and the same definition. Is it\npossible to conceive of a better method of obscuring a subject than such a\ncourse? When Edwards merely means a condition, why does he not say so? and\nwhen he means a producing cause, why does he not use the right word to\nexpress his meaning? If he had carried on the various processes of his\nreasoning with some one clear and distinct idea before his mind, we might\nhave expected great things from him; but he has not chosen to do so. It is\nwith the term _cause_ that he operates, against the ambiguities of which\nhe has not guarded himself or his reader.\n\n\u201cHaving thus explained what I mean by cause,\u201d says he, \u201cI assert that\nnothing ever comes to pass without a cause.\u201d We have seen his reasoning on\nthis point. He labours through page after page to establish his very\nambiguous proposition, in a sense in which nobody ever denied it; unless\nsome one has affirmed that a thing may come into being without any ground\nor reason of its existence,\u2014may arise out of nothing and help itself into\nexistence. Having sufficiently established his fundamental proposition in\nthis sense, he proceeds to show that every effect and volition in\nparticular, is necessarily connected with its cause. \u201cIt must be\nremembered,\u201d says he, \u201cthat it has been already shown, that nothing can\never come to pass without a cause or a reason;\u201d(116) and he then proceeds\nto show, that \u201cthe acts of the will must be connected with their cause.\u201d\nIn this part of his argument, he employs his ambiguous proposition in a\ndifferent sense from that in which he established it. In the establishment\nof it he only insists that there must be some antecedent sufficient to\naccount for every event; and in the application of it he contends, that\nthe antecedent or cause must produce the event. These ideas are perfectly\ndistinct. There could be no act of the mind unless there were a mind to\nact, and unless there were a motive in view of which it acts; but it does\nnot follow that the mind is compelled to act by motive. But let us see how\nhe comes to this conclusion.\n\n\u201cFor an event,\u201d says he, \u201cto have a cause and ground of its existence, and\nyet not be connected with its cause, is an inconsistency. For if the event\nbe not connected with its cause, it is not dependent on the cause: _its\nexistence is, as it were, loose from its influence, and may attend it or\nmay not_.\u201d(117) \u201cDependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion\nof an effect.\u201d(118) Again, \u201cto suppose there are some events which have a\ncause and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily\nconnected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is\nnot their cause. Thus, if the effect be not necessarily connected with the\ncause, with its influence and influential circumstances, then, as I\nobserved before, _it is a thing possible and supposable that the cause may\nsometimes exert the same influence under the same circumstances, and yet\nthe effect not follow_.\u201d(119) He has much other similar reasoning to show\nthat it is absurd and contradictory to say that motive is the cause of\nvolition, and yet admit that volition may be loose from the influence of\nmotive, or that \u201cthe cause is not sufficient to produce the effect.\u201d(120)\nIn all this he uses the term in its most narrow and restricted sense. It\nis no longer a mere antecedent or antecedents, which are sufficient to\naccount for the existence of the phenomena of volition; it is an efficient\ncause which produces volitions. Thus he establishes his ambiguous\nproposition in one sense, and builds on it in another. He explains the\nterm _cause_ to signify any antecedent, in order, he tells us, to prevent\nobjection to his doctrine, when he alleges that nothing ever comes to pass\nwithout some cause of its existence; and yet, when he applies this\nfundamental proposition to the construction of his scheme, he returns to\nthe restricted sense of the word, in which it signifies, \u201cthat which has a\npositive efficacy or influence to produce a thing.\u201d It is thus that the\ngreat scheme of President Edwards is made up of mere words, having no\nintrinsic coherency of parts, and appearing consistent throughout, only\nbecause its disjointed fragments seem to be united, and its huge chasms\nconcealed by means of the ambiguities of language.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.\n\n\nOne reason why the advocates of necessity deceive themselves, as well as\nothers, is, that there is great want of precision and distinctness in\ntheir views and definitions. We are told by them that the will is always\ndetermined by the strongest motive; that this is invariably the cause of\nvolition. But what is meant by the term _cause_? We have final causes,\ninstrumental causes, occasional causes, predisposing causes, efficient\ncauses, and many others. Now, in which of these senses is the word used,\nwhen we are informed that motive is the cause of volition? On this point\nwe are not enlightened. Neither Leibnitz nor Edwards is sufficiently\nexplicit. The proposition, as left by them, is vague and obscure.\n\nLeibnitz inclined to the use of the word _reason_, because he carried on a\ncontroversy with Bayle and Hobbes, who were atheists; though he frequently\nspeaks of a chain of causes which embrace human volitions.(121) While\nEdwards, who opposed the Arminians, generally employs the more rigid term\n_cause_; though he, too, frequently represents motive as \u201cthe ground and\nreason\u201d of volition. The one softens his language, in places, as he\ncontends with those who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the Christian\nworld by an advocacy of the doctrine of necessity in connexion with\natheistical sentiments. The other appears to prefer the stronger\nexpression, as he puts forth his power against antagonists whose views of\nliberty were deemed subversive of the tenets of Calvinism. But the law of\ncausality, as stated by Edwards, and the principle of the sufficient\nreason, as defined and employed by Leibnitz, are perfectly identical.\n\nWhen we are told that motive is the cause of volition, it is evident we\ncannot determine whether to deny or to assent to the proposition, unless\nwe know in what sense the term _cause_ is used. We might discuss this\nperplexed question forever, by the use of such vague and indefinite\npropositions, without progressing a single step toward the end of the\ncontroversy. We must bring a more searching analysis to the subject, if we\nhope to accomplish anything. We must take the word cause or _reason_, in\neach of its significations, in order to discover in what particulars the\ncontending parties agree, and in what particulars they disagree, in order\nto see how far each party is right, and how far it is wrong. This is the\nonly course that promises the least prospect of a satisfactory result.\n\nIf we mean by the cause of volition, that which wills or exerts the\nvolition, there is no controversy; for in this sense the advocates of\nnecessity admit that the mind is the cause of volition. Thus says Edwards:\n\u201cThe acts of my will are my own; i. e., they are acts of my will.\u201d(122) It\nis universally conceded that it is the mind which wills, and nothing else\nin the place of it; and hence, in this sense of the word, there is no\nquestion but that the mind is the cause of volition. But the advocates of\nnecessity cannot be understood in this sense; for they deny that the mind\nis the cause of volition, and insist that it is caused by motive.\n\nThe term _cause_ is very often used to designate the condition of a thing,\nor that without which it could not happen or come to pass. Thus we are\ntold by Edwards, that he sometimes uses \u201cthe word cause to signify any\n_antecedent_\u201d of an event, \u201cwhether it has any influence or not,\u201d in the\nproduction of such event.(123) If this be the meaning, when it is said\nthat motive is the cause of volition, the truth of the proposition is\nconceded by the advocates of free-agency. In speaking of arguments and\nmotives, Dr. Samuel Clarke says: \u201cOccasions indeed there may be, and are,\nupon which that substance in man, wherever the self-moving principle\nresides, freely exerts its active power.\u201d(124) Herein, then, there is a\nperfect agreement between the contending parties. The fact that the mind\nrequires certain conditions or occasions, on which to exercise its active\npower, does not at all interfere with its freedom; and hence the advocates\nof free-agency have readily admitted that motives are the occasional\ncauses of volition. We must look out for some other meaning of the term,\nthen, if we would clearly and distinctly fix our minds on the point in\ncontroversy.\n\nWe say that an antecedent is the cause of its consequent, when the latter\nis produced by the action of the former. For example, a motion of the body\nis said to be caused by the mind; because it is produced by an act of the\nmind. This seems to be what is meant by an \u201c_efficient cause_.\u201d It is, no\ndoubt, the most proper sense of the word; and around this it is that the\ncontroversy still rages, and has for centuries raged.\n\nThe advocates of necessity contend, not only that volition is the effect\nof motive, but also that \u201cto be an effect implies _passiveness_, or the\nbeing subject to the power and action of its cause.\u201d(125) Such precisely\nis the doctrine of Edwards, and Collins, and Hobbes. In this sense of the\nword it is denied that motive is the cause of volition, and it is affirmed\nthat mind is the cause thereof. Thus, says Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his reply\nto Collins, \u201c\u2019Tis the self-moving principle, and not at all the reason or\nmotive, which is the _physical_ or _efficient_ cause of action;\u201d by which\nwe understand him to mean volition, as that is the thing in dispute. Now,\nwhen the advocates of free-agency insist that motive is not the efficient\ncause of volition, and that mind is the efficient cause thereof, we\nsuppose them to employ the expression, _efficient cause_, in one and the\nsame sense in both branches of the proposition. This is the only fair way\nof viewing their language; and if they wished to be understood in any\nother manner, they should have taken the pains to explain themselves, and\nnot permit us to be misled by an ambiguity. Here the precise point in\ndispute is clearly presented; and let us hear the contending parties,\nbefore we proceed to decide between them.\n\nYou are in error, says the necessitarian to his opponents, in denying that\nmotive, and in affirming that mind, is the efficient cause of volition.\nFor if an act of the mind, or a volition, is caused by the mind, it must\nbe produced by a preceding act of the mind, and this act must be produced\nby another preceding act of the mind, and so on _ad infinitum_; which\nreduces the matter to a plain impossibility. Now, if the necessitarian has\nnot been deceived by an unwarrantable ambiguity on the part of his\nadversary, he has clearly reduced his doctrine to the absurdity of an\ninfinite series of acts: that is to say, if the advocate of free-agency\ndoes not depart from the ordinary meaning of words, when he affirms that\nmind is the _efficient cause_ of volition; and if he does not use these\nterms \u201c_efficient cause_,\u201d in different senses in the same sentence, then\nwe feel bound to say that he is fairly caught in the toils of his\nadversary. But we are not yet in condition to pass a final judgment\nbetween the parties.\n\nThe necessitarian contends that \u201cvolition, or an act of the mind, is the\neffect of motive, and that it is subject to the power and action of its\ncause.\u201d(126) The advocate of free-will replies, If we must suppose an\naction of motive on the mind to account for its act, we must likewise\nsuppose another action to account for the action of motive; and so on _ad\ninfinitum_. Thus the necessitarian seems to be fairly caught in his own\ntoils, and entrapped by his own definition and arguments.\n\nOur decision (for the correctness of which we appeal to the calm and\nimpartial judgment of the reader) is as follows: If the term _cause_ be\nunderstood in the first or the second sense above mentioned, there is no\ndisagreement between the contending parties; and if it be understood in\nthe third sense, then both parties are in error. If, in order to account\nfor an act of the mind, we suppose it is caused by an action of motive, we\nare involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of actions; and on the\nother hand, if we suppose it is caused by a preceding act of the mind\nitself, we are forced into the same absurdity. Hence, we conclude, that an\nact of the mind, or a volition, is not produced by the action of either\nmind or motive, but takes its rise in the world without any such efficient\ncause of its existence.\n\nEach party has refuted his adversary, and in the enjoyment of his triumph\nhe seems not to have duly reflected on the destruction of his own\nposition. Both are in the right, and both are in the wrong; but, as we\nshall hereafter see, not equally so. If we adopt the argument of both\nsides, in so far as it is true, we shall come to the conclusion that\naction must take its rise somewhere in the universe without being caused\nby preceding action. And if so, where shall we look for its origin? in\nthat which by nature is endowed with active power, or in that which is\npurely and altogether passive?\n\nWe lay it down, then, as an established and fundamental position, that the\nmind acts or puts forth its volitions without being efficiently caused to\ndo so\u2014without being impelled by its own prior action, or by the prior\naction of anything else. The conditions or occasions of volition being\nsupplied, the mind itself acts in view thereof, without being subject to\nthe power or action of any cause whatever. All rational beings must, as we\nhave seen, either admit this exemption of the mind in willing from the\npower and action of any cause, or else lose themselves in the labyrinth of\nan infinite series of causes. It is this exemption which constitutes the\nfreedom of the human soul.\n\nWe are now prepared to see, in a clear light, the sophistical nature of\nthe pretended demonstration of the scheme of necessity. \u201cIt is impossible\nto consider occurrences,\u201d says Sir James Mackintosh, otherwise than as\nbound together in \u201c_the relation of cause and effect_.\u201d Now this relation,\nif we interpret it according to the nature of things, and not according to\nthe sound of words, is not one, but two.\n\nThe motions of the body are caused by the mind, that is, they are produced\nby the action of the mind; this constitutes one relation: but acts of the\nmind are caused, that is, they are produced by the action of nothing; and\nthis is a quite different relation. In other words, the motions of body\nare produced by preceding action, and the acts of the mind are not\nproduced by preceding action. Hence, the first are necessitated, and the\nlast are free: the first come under \u201cthe relation of cause and effect,\u201d\nand the last come under a very different relation. The relation of cause\nand effect connects the most remote consequences of volition with volition\nitself; but when we reach volition there a new relation arises: it is the\nrelation which subsists between an agent and its act. We may trace changes\nin the external world up to the volitions or acts of mind, and perceive no\ndiversity in the chain of dependencies; but precisely at this point the\nchain of cause and effect ceases, and agency begins. The surrounding\ncircumstances may be conditions, may be occasional causes, may be\npredisposing causes, but they are not, and cannot be, producing or\nefficient causes. Here, then, the iron chain terminates, and freedom\ncommences. In the ambiguity which fails to distinguish between \u201cthe\nrelation of cause and effect,\u201d and the relation which volition bears to\nits antecedents, \u201cconsists the strength of the necessitarian system.\u201d Let\nthis distinction be clearly made and firmly borne in mind, and the great\nboasted adamantine scheme of necessity will resolve itself into an empty,\nineffectual sound.\n\nHence, if we would place the doctrine of liberty upon solid grounds, it\nbecomes necessary to modify the categories of M. Cousin. All things, says\nhe, fall under the one or the other of the two following relations: the\nrelation between subject and attribute, or the relation between cause and\neffect. This last category, we think, should be subdivided, so as to give\ntwo relations; one between cause and effect, properly so called, and the\nother between agent and action. Until this be done, it will be impossible\nto extricate the phenomena of the will from the mechanism of cause and\neffect.\n\nWe think we might here leave the stupendous sophism of the necessitarian;\nbut as it has exerted so wonderful an influence over the human mind, and\nobscured, for ages, the glory of the moral government of God, we may well\nbe permitted to pursue it further, and to continue the pursuit so long as\na fragment or a shadow of it remains to be demolished.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions.\n\n\nOne of the notions to which the cause of necessity owes much of its\nstrength, is a false conception of liberty, as consisting in \u201ca power over\nthe determinations of the will.\u201d Hence it is said that this power over the\nwill can do nothing, can cause no determination except by acting to\nproduce it. But according to this notion of liberty, this causative act\ncannot be free unless it be also caused by a preceding act; and so on _ad\ninfinitum_. Such is one of the favourite arguments of the necessitarian.\nBut in truth the freedom of the mind does not consist in its possessing a\npower over the determinations of its own will, for the true notion of\nfreedom is a negative idea, and consists in the absence of every power\nover the determinations of the will. The mind is free because it possesses\na power of acting, over which there is no controlling power, either within\nor without itself.\n\nIt must be admitted, it seems to us, that the advocates of free-agency\nhave too often sanctioned this false conception of liberty, and thereby\nstrengthened the cause of their opponents. Cudworth, Clark, Stuart,\nColeridge, and Reid, all speak of this supposed power of the mind over the\ndeterminations of the will, as that which constitutes its freedom. Thus\nsays Reid, for example: \u201cBy the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a\npower over the determinations of his own will.\u201d Now, it is not at all\nstrange that this language should be conceived by necessitarians in such a\nmanner as to involve the doctrine of liberty in the absurd consequence of\nan infinite series of acts, since it is so understood by some of the most\nenlightened advocates of free-agency themselves. \u201cA power over the\ndeterminations of our will,\u201d says Sir William Hamilton, \u201csupposes an act\nof the will that our will should determine so and so; for we can only\nexert power through a rational determination or volition. _This definition\nof liberty is right._ But the question upon question remains, (and this\n_ad infinitum_)\u2014have we a power (a will) over such anterior will? and\nuntil this question be definitively answered, which it never can, we must\nbe _unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty_. But,\nthough inconceivable, this fact is not therefore false.\u201d True, we are\nunable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty, if this must be\nconceived as consisting in a power over the determinations of the will;\nbut, in our humble opinion, this definition of liberty is not right. It\nseems more correct to say, that the freedom of the will consists in the\nabsence of a power over its determinations, than in the presence of such a\npower.\n\nThere is another false conception which has given great apparent force to\nthe cause of necessity. It is supposed that the states of the will, the\nvolitions, are often necessitated by the necessitated states of the\nsensibility. In other words, it is supposed that the appetites, passions,\nand desires, often act upon the will, and produce its volitions. But this\nseems to be a very great mistake, which has arisen from viewing the subtle\noperations of the mind through the medium of those mechanical forms of\nthought that have been derived from the contemplation of the phenomena of\nthe material world. In truth, the feelings do not act at all, and\nconsequently they cannot act upon the will. It is absurd, as Locke and\nEdwards well say, to ascribe power, which belongs to the agent himself, to\nthe properties of an agent. Hence, it is absurd to suppose that our\nfeelings, appetites, desires, and passions, are endowed with power, and\ncan act. They are not agents\u2014they are merely the properties of an agent.\nIt is the mind itself which acts, and not its passions. These are but\npassive impressions made upon the sensibility; and hence, \u201cit is to\nphilosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image everything in a\ncorporeal manner,\u201d to conceive that they act upon the will and control its\ndeterminations, just as the motions of body are caused and controlled by\nthe action of mind.(127)\n\nThis conception, however, is not peculiar to the necessitarian. It has\nbeen most unfortunately sanctioned by the greatest advocates of\nfree-agency. Thus says Dr. Reid, in relation to the appetites and\npassions: \u201cSuch motives are not addressed to the rational powers. Their\ninfluence is _immediately_ upon the will.\u201d \u201cWhen a man is acted upon by\ncontrary motives of this kind, he finds it easy to yield to the strongest.\n_They are like two forces pushing him in contrary directions. To yield to\nthe strongest he needs only be passive._\u201d If this be so, how can Dr. Reid\nmaintain, as he does, that \u201cthe determination was made by the _man_, and\nnot by the motive?\u201d To this assertion Sir William Hamilton replies: \u201cBut\nwas the _man_ determined by no motive to that determination? Was his\nspecific volition to this or to that without a cause? On the supposition\nthat the sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to\nvolition A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter volition B, equal to\n8\u2014can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be\nnecessary? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by\nsupposing that the man _creates_ (calls from nonexistence into existence)\na certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or in\nitself, is inconceivable; and even to conceive the possibility of this\ninconceivable act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is\ndetermined to exert it. We thus _in thought_, never escape determination\nand necessity. It will be observed that I do not consider this inability\nto notion any disproof of the fact of free-will.\u201d\n\nIt is true, that if we suppose, according to the doctrine of Sir William\nand Dr. Reid, that two counter influences act upon the will, the one being\nas 12 and the other as 8, then the first must necessarily prevail. But if\nthis supposition be correct, we are not only unable to conceive the fact\nof liberty, we are also able to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all.\nThere is a great difference, we have been accustomed to believe, between\nbeing unable to conceive how a thing is, and being able to conceive that\nit cannot be anyhow at all: the first would leave it a mere mystery,\u2014the\nlast would show it to be an absurdity. In the one case, the thing would be\nabove reason, and in the other, contrary to reason. Now, to which of these\ncategories does the fact of liberty, as left by Sir William Hamilton,\nbelong? Is it a mystery, or is it an absurdity? Is it an inconceivable\nfact, or is it a conceived impossibility? It seems to us that it is the\nlatter; and that if we will only take the pains to view the phenomena of\nmind as they exist in consciousness, and not through the medium of\nmaterial analogies, we shall be able to untie the knot which Sir William\nHamilton has found it necessary to cut.\n\nThe doctrine of liberty, if properly viewed, is perfectly conceivable. We\ncan certainly conceive that the omnipotence of God can put forth an act\nwithout being impelled thereto by a power back of his own; and to suppose\notherwise, is to suppose a power greater than God\u2019s, and upon which the\nexercise of his omnipotence depends. By parity of reason, we should be\ncompelled to suppose another power still back of that, and so on _ad\ninfinitum_. This is not only absurd, but, as Calvin truly says, it is\nimpious. Here, then, we have upon the throne of the universe a clear and\nunequivocal instance of a self-active power,\u2014a power whose goings forth\nare not impelled by any power without itself. It goes forth, it is true,\nin the light of the Eternal Reason, and in pursuit of the ends of the\nEternal Goodness; but yet in itself it possesses an infinite fulness,\nbeing self-sustained, self-active, and wholly independent of all other\npowers and influences whatsoever.\n\nNow, if such a Being should create at all, it is not difficult to conceive\nthat he would create subordinate agents, bearing his own image in this,\nnamely, the possession of a self-active power. It is not difficult to\nconceive that he should produce spiritual beings like himself, who can act\nwithout being necessitated to act, like the inanimate portions of\ncreation, as well as those of an inferior nature. Nor is it more difficult\nto conceive that man, in point of fact, possesses such a limited\nself-active power, than it is to conceive that God possesses an infinite\nself-active power. Indeed we must and do conceive this, or else we should\nhave no type or representative in this lower part of the world, by and\nthrough which to rise to a contemplation of its universal Lord and\nSovereign. We should have a temple without a symbol, and a universe\nwithout a God. But God has not thus left himself without witness; for he\nhas raised man above the dust of the earth in this, that he is endowed\nwith a self-active power, from whence, as from an humble platform, he may\nrise to the sublime contemplation of the Universal Mover of the heavens\nand the earth. But for this ray of light, shed abroad in our hearts by the\ncreative energy of God, the nature of the divine power itself would be\nunknown to us, and its eternal, immutable glories shrouded in impenetrable\ndarkness. The idea of an omnipotent power, moving in and of itself in\nobedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness, would be\nforever merged and lost in the dark scheme of an implexed series and\nconcatenation of causes, binding all things fast, God himself not\nexcepted, in the iron bonds of fate.\n\nIf liberty be a _fact_, as Sir William Hamilton contends it is, then no\nsuch objections can be urged against it as those in which he supposes it\nto be involved. We are aware of what may be said in favour of such a mode\nof viewing subjects of this kind, as well as of the nature of the\nprinciples from which it takes its rise. But we cannot consider those\nprinciples altogether sound. They appear to be too sceptical, with respect\nto the powers of the human mind, and the destiny of human knowledge. The\nsentiment of Leibnitz seems to rest upon a more solid foundation. \u201cIt is\nnecessary to come,\u201d says he, \u201cto the grand question which M. Bayle has\nrecently brought upon the carpet, to wit, whether a truth, and especially\na truth of faith, can be subject to unanswerable objections. That\nexcellent author seems boldly to maintain the affirmative of this\nquestion: he cites grave theologians on his side, and even those of Rome,\nwho appear to say what he pretends; and he adduces philosophers who have\nbelieved _that there are even philosophical truths, the defenders of which\ncannot reply to objections made against them_.\u201d \u201cFor my part,\u201d says\nLeibnitz, \u201cI avow that I cannot be of the sentiment of those who maintain\nthat a truth can be liable to invincible objections; for what is an\n_objection_ but an argument of which the conclusion contradicts our\nthesis? and is not an invincible argument a demonstration?\u201d \u201cIt is always\nnecessary to yield to demonstrations, whether they are proposed for our\nadoption, or advanced in the form of objections. And it is unjust and\nuseless to wish to weaken the proofs of adversaries, under the pretext\nthat they are only objections; since the adversary has the same right, and\ncan reverse the denominations, by honouring his arguments with the name of\n_proofs_, and lowering yours by the disparaging name of objections.\u201d(128)\n\nThere is another false conception, by which the necessitarian fortifies\nhimself in his opposition to the freedom of the will. As he identifies the\nsensibility and the will, so when the indifference of the latter is spoken\nof, the language is understood to mean that the mind is indifferent, and\ndestitute of all feeling or emotion. But this is to view the doctrine of\nliberty, not as it is held by its advocates, but as it is seen through the\nmedium of a false psychology. We might adduce a hundred examples of the\ntruth of this remark, but one or two must suffice. Thus, Collins supposes\nthat the doctrine of liberty implies, that the mind is \u201cindifferent to\ngood and evil;\u201d \u201cindifferent to what causes _pleasure_ or _pain_;\u201d\n\u201cindifferent to all objects, and swayed by no motives.\u201d Gross as this\nmisrepresentation of the doctrine of free-agency is, it is frequently made\nby its opponents. It occurs repeatedly in the writings of President\nEdwards and President Day.(129) The freedom of the _will_, indeed, no more\nimplies an indifference of the _sensibility_ than the power of a bird to\nfly implies the existence of a vacuum.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies.\n\n\nIt is insisted that there is no difficulty in conceiving of a caused\naction or volition; but this position is illustrated by false and\ndeceptive analogies. Thus says an advocate of necessity: \u201cThe term passive\nis sometimes employed to express the relation of an effect to its cause.\nIn this sense, it is so far from being inconsistent with activity, that\nactivity may be the very effect which is produced. A cannonshot is said to\nbe passive, with respect to the charge of powder which impels it. But is\nthere no activity given to the ball? Is not the whirlwind active when it\ntears up the forest?\u201d(130) Not at all, in any sense pertaining to the\npresent controversy. The tremendous power, whatever it may be, which sets\nthe whirlwind in motion, is active; the wind itself is perfectly passive.\nThe air is acted on, and it merely _suffers_ a change of place. If it\ntears up the forest, this is not because it exercises an active power, but\nbecause it is body coming into contact with body, and both cannot occupy\nthe same space at one and the same time. It tears up the forest, not as an\nagent, but as an instrument.\n\nThe same is true of the cannonball. This does not _act_; it merely\n_moves_. It does not put forth a volition, or an exercise of power; it\nmerely suffers a change of place. In one word, there is no sort of\nresemblance between an act of mind and the motion of body. This has no\nactive power, and cannot be made to act: it is passive, however, and may\nbe made to move. If the question were, Can a body be made to move? these\nillustrations would be in point; but as it relates to the possibility of\ncausing the mind to put forth a volition, they are clearly irrelevant. And\nif they were really apposite, they would only show that the mind may be\ncaused to act like a cannonball, a whirlwind, a clock, or any other piece\nof machinery. This is the only kind of _action_ they serve to prove may be\ncaused; and such action, as it is called, has far more to do with\nmachinery than with human agency.\n\nPresident Edwards also has recourse to false analogies. To select only one\ninstance: \u201cIt is no more a contradiction,\u201d says he, \u201cto suppose that\naction may be the effect of some other cause besides the agent, or being\nthat acts, than to suppose that life may be the effect of some other cause\nbesides the being that lives.\u201d(131) Now, as we are wholly passive in the\nreception of life, so it may be wholly conferred upon us by the power and\nagency of God. The very reason why we suppose an act cannot be caused is,\nthat it is a voluntary exercise of our own minds; whereas, if it were\ncaused, it would be a necessitated passive impression. How can it show the\nfallacy of this position, to refer to the case of a caused life, in regard\nto which, by universal consent, we do not and cannot act at all?\n\nThe younger Edwards asserts, that \u201cto say that an agent that is acted upon\ncannot act, is as groundless as to say that a body acted upon cannot\nmove.\u201d Again: \u201cMy actions are _mine_; but in what sense can they be\nproperly called mine, if I be not the efficient cause of them?\u2014Answer: my\nthoughts and all my perceptions and feelings are _mine_; yet it will not\nbe pretended that I am the efficient cause of them.\u201d(132) But in regard to\nall our thoughts and feelings, we are, as we have seen, altogether\npassive; and these are ours, because they are necessarily produced _in\nus_. Is it only in this sense that our acts are ours? Are they ours only\nbecause they are necessarily caused to exist in our minds? If so, then\nindeed we understand these writers; but if they are not merely passive\nimpressions, why resort to states of the intelligence and the sensibility,\nwhich are conceded to be passive, in order to illustrate the\nreasonableness of their scheme, and to expose the unreasonableness of the\nopposite doctrine? We admit that every passive impression is caused; but\nthe question is, Can the mind be caused to act? As we lay all the stress\non the _nature of an act_, as seen in the light of consciousness, what\ndoes it signify to tell us that another thing, which possesses no such\nnature, may be efficiently caused? All such illustrations overlook the\nessential difference between action and passion, between _doing_ and\n_suffering_.\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology.\n\n\nThe false psychology, of which we have spoken, has been greatly\nstrengthened and confirmed in its influences by the phraseology connected\nwith it. As Mr. Locke distinguished between will and desire, partially at\nleast, so he likewise distinguished a preference of the mind from a\nvolition. But President Edwards is not satisfied with this distinction.\n\u201c_The instance he mentions_,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cdoes not prove there is\nanything else in _willing_ but merely preferring.\u201d(133) This may be very\ntrue; but is there nothing in willing, in _acting_, but merely\n_preferring_? This last term, however it may be applied, seems better\nadapted to express a state of the intelligence, than an act of the will.\nTwo objects are placed before the mind: one affects the sensibility in a\nmore agreeable manner than the other, and therefore the intelligence\npronounces that one is more to be desired than the other. This seems to be\nprecisely what is meant by the use of the term preference. One prefers an\norange to an apple, for instance, because the orange affects his\nsensibility more agreeably than the apple; and the intelligence perceiving\nthis state of the sensibility, declares in favour of the orange. This\ndecision of the judgment is what is usually meant by the use of the term\npreference, or choice. To prefer, is merely to judge, in view of desire,\nwhich of two objects is more agreeable. But judging and desiring are, as\nwe have seen, both necessitated states of the mind. Why, then, apply the\nterm preference, or choice, to acts of the will? Why apply a term, which\nseems to express merely a state of the intelligence, which all concede is\nnecessitated, to an act of the will? Is it not evident, that by such a use\nof language the cause of necessity gains great apparent strength?\n\nThere is another way in which the language of the necessitarian deceives.\nThe language he employs often represents the facts of nature, but not\nfacts as they would be, if his system were true. Hence, when this system\nis attacked, its advocates repel the attack by the use of words which\ntruly represent nature, but not their errors. This gives great\nplausibility to their apologies. Thus, when it is objected that the scheme\nof necessity \u201cmakes men no more than mere machines,\u201d they are always ready\nto reply, \u201cthat notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly,\nand unspeakably different from a machine.\u201d But how? Is it because his\nvolitions, as they are called, are not necessarily determined by causes?\nNo. Is it because his will may be loose from the influence of motives? No.\nIs it because he may follow the strongest motive, or may not follow it?\nNo. Nothing of the kind is hinted. How does the man, then, differ so\nentirely from a machine? Why, \u201cin that he has reason and understanding,\nwith a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition and choice.\u201d True, a\nmachine has no reason or understanding; but suppose it had, would it be a\nperson? By no means. We have seen that the understanding, or the\nintelligence, is necessarily determined; all its states are necessitated\nas completely as the movements of a machine. This constitutes an essential\nlikeness, and it is what is always meant, when it is said that necessity\nmakes men mere machines. But it seems that man also has \u201ca faculty of\nwill, and so is capable of volition or choice.\u201d(134) Yes, he can _act_.\nNow this language means something according to the system of nature; but\nwhat does it mean according to the system of necessity? It merely means\nthat the human mind is susceptible of being necessitated to undergo a\nchange by the \u201cpower and action of a cause,\u201d which the advocates of that\nsystem are pleased to call an act. They never hint that we are not\nmachines, because we have any power by which we are exempt from the most\nabsolute dominion of causes. They never hint that we are not machines,\nbecause our volitions, or acts, are not as necessarily produced in us, as\nthe motions of a clock are produced in it. Now, if this scheme were true,\nthere would be no such things as acts or volitions in us: all the\nphenomena of our minds would be passive impressions, like our judgments\nand feelings. When they speak of the will, then, which is capable of\nvolitions, or acts, they deceive by using the language of nature, and not\nof their false scheme.\n\n\n\n Section VII.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity originates in a false method, and terminates in a\nfalse religion.\n\n\nThis system, as we have seen, has been built up, not by an analysis of the\nphenomena of the human mind, but by means of universal abstractions and\ntruisms. It takes its rise, not from the facts of nature, but from the\nconceptions of the intellect. In other words, instead of anatomizing the\nworld which God has made so as to exhibit the actual plan according to\nwhich it has been constituted, it sets out from certain identical\npropositions, such as that every effect must have a cause, and proceeds to\ninform us how the world _must_ have been constituted. This \u201cusual method\nof discovery and proof,\u201d as Bacon says, \u201cby first establishing the most\ngeneral propositions, then applying and proving the intermediate axioms\naccording to these, is the parent of error and the calamity of every\nscience.\u201d Nowhere, it is believed, can a more striking illustration of the\ntruth of these pregnant words be found, than in the method adopted by\nnecessitarians. They begin with the universal proposition, that every\neffect must have a cause, as a self-evident truth, and then proceed, not\nto examine and discover how the world is made, but to demonstrate how it\n_must_ have been constructed. This is not to \u201cinterpret,\u201d it is to\n\u201canticipate\u201d nature.\n\nBy this high _a priori_ method the freedom of the human mind is\ndemonstrated, as we have seen, to be an impossibility, and the\naccountability of man a dream. Man is not responsible for sin, or rather,\nthere is no such thing as moral good and evil in the lower world; since\nGod, the only efficient fountain of all things and events, is the sole\nresponsible author of all evil as well as of all good. Such, as we have\nseen, are the inevitable logical consequences of this boasted scheme of\nnecessity.\n\nBut we have clearly shown, we trust, that the grand demonstration of the\nnecessitarian is a sophism, whose apparent force is owing to a variety of\ncauses:\u2014First, it seeks out, and lays its foundation in, a false\npsychology; identifying the feelings, or affections, and the will.\nSecondly, by viewing the opposite scheme through the medium of this false\npsychology, it reduces its main position to the pitiful absurdity that a\nthing may produce itself, or arise out of nothing, and bring itself into\nexistence; and then demolishes this absurdity by logic! Thirdly, it\nreduces itself to the truism, that a thing is always as it is; and being\nentrenched in this stronghold, it gathers around itself all the common\nsense and all the reason of mankind, as well it may, and looks down with\nsovereign contempt on the feeble attacks of its adversaries. Fourthly, it\nfortifies itself by a multitude of false conceptions, arising from a hasty\napplication of its universal truism, and not from a severe inspection and\nanalysis of things. Fifthly, it decorates itself in false analogies, and\nthereby assumes the imposing appearance of truth. Sixthly, it clothes\nitself in deceptive and ambiguous phraseology, by which it speaks the\nlanguage of truth to the ear, but not to the sense. And, seventhly, it\ntakes its rise in a false method, and terminates in a false religion.\n\nThese are some of the hidden mysteries of the scheme of necessity; which\nhaving been detected and exposed, we do not hesitate to pronounce it a\ngrand imposition on the reason of mankind. As such, we set aside this\nstupendous sophism, whose dark shadow has so long rested on the beauty of\nthe world, obscuring the intrinsic majesty and glory of the infinite\ngoodness therein displayed. We put away and repudiate this vast assemblage\nof errors, which has so sadly perplexed our mental vision, and so\nfrightfully distorted the real proportions of the world, as to lead\nphilosophers, such as Kant and others, to pronounce a Theodicy impossible.\nWe put them aside utterly, in order that we may proceed to vindicate the\nglory of God, as manifested in the constitution and government of the\nmoral world.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter V.\n\n\nThe Relation Between The Human Will And The Divine Agency.\n\n\n Thou art the source and centre of all minds,\n Their only point of rest, eternal Word!\n From Thee departing, they are lost and rove\n At random, without honour, hope, or peace.\n From Thee is all that soothes the life of man,\u2014\n His high endeavour and his glad success,\n His strength to suffer and his will to serve.\u2014COWPER.\n\n And God proclaim\u2019d from heaven, and by an oath\n Confirm\u2019d, that each should answer for himself;\n And as his own peculiar work should be\n Done by his proper self, should live or die.\u2014POLLOK.\n\n\nThe evils of haste and precipitancy in the formation of opinions are,\nperhaps, nowhere more deplorably exhibited, than in regard to the relation\nbetween human and divine agency. Indeed, so many rash judgments have been\nput forth on this important subject, that the very act of approaching it\nhas come to be invested, in the minds of many persons, with the character\nof rashness and presumption. Hence the frequent warnings to turn our\nattention from it, as a subject lying beyond the range of all sober\nspeculation, and as unsuited to the investigation of our finite minds. If\nthis be a wise conclusion, it would be well to leave it to support itself,\ninstead of attempting to bolster it up with the reasons frequently given\nfor it.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nGeneral view of the relation between the divine and the human power.\n\n\nIt is frequently said, for example, that it is impossible to reconcile the\nagency of God with that of man; because we do not know how the divine\npower operates upon the human mind. But, if we examine the subject\nclosely, we shall find that the manner in which the Spirit of God\noperates, is not what we want to know, in order to remove the great\ndifficulty in question. If such knowledge were possessed in the greatest\npossible perfection, we have no reason to believe that our insight into\nthe relation between the human and the divine power would be at all\nimproved. For aught we can see, our notions on this point would remain as\ndim and feeble as if we possessed no such knowledge. If we could\nascertain, however, precisely what is done by the power of man, then we\nshould see whether there be any real inconsistency or conflict between\nthem or not. This is the point on which we need to be enlightened, in\norder to clear up the difficulty in question; and on this point the most\nsatisfactory light may be attained. If we must wait to understand the\n_modus operandi_ of the divine Spirit, before we can dispel the clouds and\ndarkness which his influence casts over the free-agency of man, then must\nwe indeed defer this great mystery to another state of being, and perhaps\nforever. Those who have looked in this direction for light, may well\ndeplore our inability to see it. But let us look in the right direction:\nlet us consider, not the _modus operandi_ of the divine power, but the\neffects produced by it, and then, perhaps, we may behold the beautiful\nharmony subsisting between the agency of God and the freedom of man.\n\nThe reason why the views of most persons concerning this relation are so\nvague and indistinct is, that they do not possess a sufficiently clear and\nperfect analysis of the human mind. The powers and susceptibilities of the\nmind, as well as the laws which govern its phenomena, seem blended\ntogether in their minds in one confused mass; and hence the relations they\nbear to each other, and to the divine agency, are as dim and fluctuating\nas an ill-remembered dream. In this confusion of laws and phenomena, of\npowers and susceptibilities, of facts and fancies, it is no wonder that so\nmany crude conceptions and vague hypotheses have sprung up and prevailed\nconcerning the great difficulty under consideration. In the dim twilight\nof mental science, which has shown all things distorted and nothing in its\ntrue proportions, it is no wonder that the beautiful order and perspective\nof the moral world should have been concealed from our eyes. It was to\nhave been expected, that every attempt to delineate this order, would,\nunder such circumstances, prove premature, and aggravate rather than\nlessen the apparent disorders prevailing in the spiritual world.\nAccordingly, such attempts generally terminate, either in the denial of\nthe free-agency of man, or of the sovereignty of God; and those who have\nmaintained both of these tenets in reality, as well as in name, have\nusually refused to allow themselves to be troubled by the apparent\ncontradictions in which they are involved. While they recognise the two\nspheres of the human and of the divine agency, they have left them so\nshadowy and indistinct, and so distorted from their real proportions, that\nthey have inevitably seemed to clash with each other. Hence, to describe\nthese two spheres with clearness and precision, and to determine the\nprecise point at which they come into contact without intersecting each\nother, is still a desideratum in the science of theology. We shall\nendeavour to define the human power and the divine sovereignty, and to\nexhibit the harmony subsisting between them, in such a manner as to\nsupply, in some small degree at least, this great _desideratum_ which has\nso long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences.\n\nBut this is not to be done by planting ourselves upon any one particular\nplatform, and dogmatizing from thence, as if that particular point of view\nnecessarily presented us with every possible phase of the truth. There has\nbeen, indeed, so much of this one-sided, exclusive, and dogmatizing spirit\nmanifested in relation to the subject in question, as to give a great\nappearance of truth to the assertion of an ingenious writer, that inasmuch\nas different minds contemplate the divine and human agency from different\npoints of view, the predominant or leading idea presented to them can\nnever be the same; and hence they can never agree in the same\nrepresentation of the complex whole. The one, says he, \u201cnecessarily gives\na greater prominence to the divine agency, and the other to the scope and\ninfluence of the human will, and consequently they pronounce different\njudgments; just as a man who views a spherical surface from the inside\nwill forever affirm it to be concave, while he who contemplates it from\nthe outside will as obstinately assert that it is convex.\u201d But although\nthis has been the usual method of treating the subject in question, such\nweakness and dogmatizing is self-imposed, and not an inevitable condition\nof the human mind. We may learn wisdom from the errors of the past, no\nless than from its most triumphant and glorious discoveries.\n\nIn the discussion of this subject, it is true that opposite parties have\nconfined themselves to first appearances too much, and rested on one-sided\nviews. But are we necessarily tied down to such inadequate conceptions?\nThe causes which separate men in opinion, and the obstacles which keep\nthem asunder, are indeed powerful; but we hope they do not form an eternal\nbarrier between the wise and good. In regard to doctrines so fundamental\nand so vital as the divine sovereignty and human freedom, it is to be\nhoped that all good men will some day unite, and perfectly harmonize with\neach other.\n\nAs we are rational beings, so we are not tied down to that appearance of\nthings which is presented to one particular point of view. If this were\nthe case, the science of astronomy would never have had an existence. Even\nthe phenomena of that noble science are almost inconceivably different\nfrom those presented to the mind of man at his particular point of view.\nFrom the small shining objects which are brought to our knowledge by the\nsense of sight, the reason rises to the true dimensions of those\ntremendous worlds. And after the human mind has thus furnished itself with\nthe facts of the solar system, it has proceeded but a small way toward a\nknowledge of the system itself. It has also to deduce the laws of the\nmaterial world from its first appearances, and, armed with these, it must\ntransport itself from the earth to the true centre of the system, from\nwhich its wonderful order and beauty may be contemplated, and revealed to\nthe world. Then these innumerable twinkling points of light, which sparkle\nin the heavens like so many atoms, become to the eye of reason the\nstupendous suns and centres of other worlds and systems.\n\nIf we should judge from first appearances, indeed, if we could not\nemancipate ourselves from phenomena as they are exhibited to us from one\nparticular point of view, then should we never escape the conclusion, that\nthe earth is the fixed centre of the universe, around which its countless\nmyriads of worlds perform their eternal revolutions. But, fortunately, we\nare subject to no such miserable bondage. The mind of man has already\nraised itself from the planet to which his body is confined, and, planting\nitself on the true centre of the system, has beheld the sublime scheme\nplanned by the infinite reason, and executed by the almighty power of the\nDivine Architect. Surely the mind which can do, and has done, all this,\nhas the capacity to understand, place it where you will, that although the\ninside of a sphere is concave, the outside may be convex; as well as some\nother things which may perhaps have been placed beyond its power, without\ndue consideration. But in every attempt to emancipate ourselves from first\nappearances, and to reach a knowledge of the truth, \u201cnot as reflected\nunder a single angle,\u201d but as seen in all its fulness and beauty, it is\nindispensable to contemplate it on all sides, and to mark the precise\nboundaries of all its phases.\n\nHence we shall not plant ourselves on the fact of man\u2019s power alone, and,\nviewing the subject exclusively from thence, enlarge the sphere of human\nagency to such an extent as to shut the divine agency quite out of the\nintellectual and moral world. Nor, on the other hand, shall we permit\nourselves to become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the\nmajesty of God, to dwell so warmly on his infinite sovereignty and the\nlittleness of man, as to cause the sphere of human power to dwindle down\nto a mere point, and entirely disappear. We shall endeavour to find the\ntrue medium between these two extreme opinions. That such a medium exists\n_somewhere_, will not be denied by many persons. The only question will\nbe, as to where and how the line should be drawn to strike out this\nmedium. In most systems of theology, this line is not drawn at all, but\nleft completely in the dark. We are shown some things on both sides of\nthis line, but we are not shown the line itself. We are made to see, for\nexample, the fact of human existence as something distinct from God, that\nwe may not err with Spinoza, in reducing man to a mere fugitive mode of\nthe Divine Being, to a mere shadow and a dream. And on the other side, we\nare made to contemplate the omnipotence of God, that we may not call in\nquestion his sovereignty and dominion over the moral world. But between\nthese two positions, on which the light of truth has thus been made to\nfall, there is a tract of dark and unexplored territory, a _terra\nincognita_, which remains to be completely surveyed and delineated, before\nwe can see the beauty of the whole scene. In the attempt to map out this\nregion, to define the precise boundary of that _imperium in imperio_, of\nwhich Spinoza and others entertained so great a horror, we should\nendeavour to follow the wise maxim of Bacon, \u201cto despise nothing, and to\nadmire nothing.\u201d\n\nIn other words, we should endeavour to \u201cprove all things, and to hold fast\nthat which is good,\u201d without yielding a blind veneration to received\ndogmas, or a blind admiration to the seductive charms of novelty. Hence,\nwe shall first stand on the same platform with Pelagius, and endeavour to\nview the subject with his eyes; to see all that he saw, as well as to\ncorrect the errors of his observation. And having done this, we shall then\ntransport ourselves to the platform of Augustine, and contemplate the\nsubject from his point of view, so as to possess ourselves of his great\ntruths, and also to correct the errors of his observation. Having finished\nthese processes, it will not be found difficult to combine the truths of\nthese two conflicting schemes in a complete and harmonious system, which\nshall exhibit both the human and the divine elements of religion in their\ntrue proportions and just relations to each other.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between the divine and the\nhuman power.\n\n\nThe doctrine of Pelagius was developed from his own personal experience,\nand moulded, in a great measure, by his opposition to the scheme of\nAugustine. According to the historian, Neander, as well as to the\ntestimony of Augustine himself, the life of Pelagius was, from beginning\nto end, one \u201cearnest moral effort.\u201d As his character was gradually formed\nby his own continued and unremitted exertions, without any sudden or\nviolent revolution in his views or feelings, so the great fact of human\nagency presented itself to his individual consciousness with unclouded\nlustre. This fact was the great central position from which his whole\nscheme developed itself. And, as the history of his opinion shows, he was\nled to give a still greater predominance to this fact, in consequence of\nhis opposition to the system of Augustine, by which it seemed to him to be\nsubverted, and the interests of morality threatened.\n\nThe great fact of free-will, of whose existence he was so well assured by\nhis own consciousness, was so imperfectly interpreted by him, that he was\nled to exclude other great facts from his system, which might have been\nperfectly harmonized with his central position. Thus, as Neander well\nsays, he denied the operation of the divine power in the renovation of the\nsoul,(135) because he could not reconcile its influence with the\nfree-agency of man. This was the weak point in the philosophy of Pelagius,\nas it has been in the system of thousands who have lived since his time.\nTo reject the one of two facts, both of which rest upon clear and\nunequivocal evidence, is an error which has been condemned by Butler and\nBurlamaqui, as well as by many other celebrated philosophers. But this\nerror, so far as we know, has been by no one more finely reproved than by\nProfessor Hodge, of Princeton. \u201cIf the evidence of the constant revolution\nof the earth round its axis,\u201d says he, \u201cwere presented to a man, it would\ncertainly be unreasonable in him to deny the fact, merely because he could\nnot reconcile it with the stability of everything on the earth\u2019s surface.\nOr if he saw two rays of light made to produce darkness, must he resist\nthe evidence of his senses, because he knows that two candles give more\nlight than one? Men do not act thus irrationally in physical\ninvestigations. They let each fact stand upon its own evidence. They\nstrive to reconcile them, and are happy when they succeed. But they do not\nget rid of difficulties by denying facts.\n\n\u201cIf in the department of physical knowledge we are obliged to act upon the\nprinciple of receiving every fact upon its own evidence, even when unable\nto reconcile one with another, it is not wonderful that this necessity\nshould be imposed upon us in those departments of knowledge which are less\nwithin the limits of our powers. It is certainly irrational for a man to\nreject all the evidence of the spirituality of the soul, because he cannot\nreconcile this doctrine with the fact that a disease of the body disorders\nthe mind. Must I do violence to my nature in denying the proof of design\nafforded by the human body, because I cannot account for the occasional\noccurrence of deformities of structure? Must I harden my heart against all\nthe evidence of the benevolence of God, which streams upon me in a flood\nof light from all his works, because I may not know how to reconcile that\nbenevolence with the existence of evil? Must I deny my free-agency, the\nmost intimate of all convictions, because I cannot see the consistency\nbetween the freeness of an act and the frequency of its occurrence? May I\ndeny that I am a moral being, the very glory of my nature, because I\ncannot change my character at will?\u201d(136)\n\nIf this judicious sentiment had been observed by speculatists, it had been\nwell for philosophy, and still better for religion. The heresy of\nPelagius, and the countless forms of kindred errors, would not have\ninfested human thought. But this sentiment, however just in itself, or\nhowever elegantly expressed, should not be permitted to inspire our minds\nwith a feeling of despair. It should teach us caution, but not\ndespondency; it should extinguish presumption, but not hope. For if \u201cwe\nstrive to reconcile the facts\u201d of the natural world, \u201cand are happy when\nwe succeed,\u201d how much more solicitous should we be to succeed in such an\nattempt to shut up and seal the very fountains of religious error?\n\nNothing is more wonderful to my mind, than that Pelagius should have such\nfollowers as Reimarus and Lessing, not to mention hundreds of others, who\ndeny the _possibility_ of a divine influence, because it seems to them to\nconflict with the intellectual and moral nature of man.(137) To assert, as\nthese philosophers do, that the power of God cannot act upon the human\nmind without infringing upon its freedom, betrays, as we venture to\naffirm, a profound and astonishing ignorance of the whole doctrine of\nfree-agency. It proceeds on the amazing supposition that the will is the\nonly power of the human mind, and that volitions are the only phenomena\never manifested therein; so that God cannot act upon it at all, unless it\nbe to produce volitions. But is it true, that God must do all things\nwithin us, or he can do nothing? that if he produce a change in our mental\nstate, then he must produce all conceivable changes therein? In order to\nrefute so rash a conclusion, and explode the wild supposition on which it\nis based, it will be necessary to recur to the threefold distinction of\nthe intelligence, the sensibility, and the will, already referred to.\n\nIn the perception of truth, as we have seen, the intelligence is perfectly\npassive. Every state of the intelligence is as completely necessitated as\nis the affirmation that two and two are equal to four. The decisions of\nthe intelligence, then, are not free acts; indeed, they are not acts at\nall, in the proper sense of the word. They are passive states of the\nintellect. They are usually called acts, it is true; and this use of\nlanguage is, no doubt, one of the causes which has given rise to so many\nerrors and delusions in regard to moral and accountable agency. With every\ndecision or state of the intelligence, with every perception of truth by\nit, there is intimately associated, it is true, an act of the mind, a\nstate of the will, a volition, by which the attention is directed to the\nsubject under consideration; and it is this intimate association in which\nthe two states or mental phenomena seem blended into one, which has led so\nmany to regard the passive susceptibility, called the intelligence, as an\nactive power, and its states as free acts of the mind. A more correct\nanalysis, a finer discrimination of the real facts of consciousness, must\nprevail on this subject, before light can be let in upon the philosophy of\nfree and accountable agency. The dividing knife must be struck between the\ntwo _phenomena_ in question, between an active state of the will and the\npassive states of the intelligence, and the obstinate association be\nsevered in our imagination, before the truth can be seen otherwise than\nthrough distorting films of error.\n\nAs every state of the intelligence is necessitated, so God may act upon\nthis department of our mental frame without infringing upon the nature of\nman in the slightest possible degree. As the law of necessity is the law\nof the intelligence, so God may absolutely necessitate its states, by the\npresentation of truth, or by his direct and irresistible agency in\nconnexion with the truth, without doing violence to the laws of our\nintellectual and moral nature. Nay, in so acting, he proceeds in perfect\nconformity with those laws. Hence, no matter how deep a human soul may be\nsunk in ignorance and stupidity, God may flash the light of truth into it,\nin perfect accordance with the laws of its nature. And, as has been well\nsaid, \u201cThe first effect of the divine power in the new, as in the old\ncreation, is light.\u201d\n\nThis is not all. Every state of the sensibility is a passive impression, a\nnecessitated phenomenon of the human mind. No matter what fact, or what\ntruth, may be present to the mind, either by its own voluntary attention\nor by the agency of God, or by the co\u00f6peration of both, the impression it\nmakes upon the sensibility is beyond the control of the will, except by\nrefusing to give the attention of the mind to it. Hence, although truth\nmay be vividly impressed upon the intelligence, although the glories of\nheaven and the terrors of hell may be made to shine into it, yet the\nsensibility may remain unaffected by them. It may be dead. Hence, God may\nact upon this, may cause it to melt with sorrow or to glow with love,\nwithout doing violence to any law of our moral nature. There is no\ndifficulty, then, in conceiving that the second effect of the divine power\nin the new creation is \u201ca new heart.\u201d\n\nHaving done all this, he may well call on us to \u201cwork out our salvation\nwith fear and trembling, for God worketh in us to will and to do of his\nown good pleasure.\u201d We have seen that the state of the will, that a\nvolition is not necessitated by the intelligence or by the sensibility;\nand, hence, it may \u201cobey the heavenly vision,\u201d or it may \u201cresist and do\ndespite to the Spirit of grace.\u201d If it obey, then the vivifying light and\ngenial shower have not fallen upon the soul in vain. The free-will\ncoalesces with the renovated intelligence and sensibility, and the man\n\u201chas root in himself.\u201d The blossom gradually yields to the fruit, and the\ngerm of true holiness is formed in the soul. This consists in the\nvoluntary exercise of the mind, in obedience to the knowledge and the love\nof God, and in the permanent habit formed by the repetition of such\nexercises. Hence, in the great theandric work of regeneration, we see the\npart which is performed by God, and the part which proceeds from man.\n\nThis shows an absolute dependence of the soul upon the agency of God. For\nwithout knowledge the mind can no more perform its duty than the eye can\nsee without light; and without a feeling of love to God, it is as\nimpossible for it to render a spiritual obedience, as it would be for a\nbird to fly in a vacuum. Yet this dependence, absolute as it is, does not\nimpair the free-agency of man. For divine grace supplies, and must supply,\nthe indispensable conditions of holiness; but it does not produce holiness\nitself. It does not produce holiness itself, because, as we have seen, a\nnecessary holiness is a contradiction in terms.\n\nIs it not evident, then, that those who assert the impossibility of a\ndivine influence, on the ground that it would destroy the free-agency of\nman, have proceeded on a wonderful confusion of the phenomena of the human\nmind? Is it not evident that they have confounded those states of the\nintelligence and the sensibility, which are marked over with the\ncharacteristics of necessity, with those states of the will which\ninevitably suggest the ideas of freedom and accountability? But, strange\nas it may seem, the philosophers who thus shut the influence of the Divine\nBeing out of the spiritual world, because they cannot reconcile it with\nthe moral agency of man, do not always deny the influence of created\nbeings over the mind. On the contrary, it is no uncommon thing to see\nphilosophers and theologians, who begin by denying the influence of the\nDivine Spirit upon the human mind, in order to save the freedom of the\nlatter, end by subjecting it to the most absolute dominion of facts; and\ncircumstances, and motives.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe Augustinian Platform, or view of the relation between the divine\nagency and the human.\n\n\nThe doctrine of Augustine, like that of Pelagius, was developed from the\nindividual experience and consciousness of its author. The difference\nbetween them was, that the sensible experience of the one furnished him\nwith only the human element of religion, which was unduly magnified by\nhim; while the divine element was the great prominent fact in the\nconsciousness of the other, who accordingly rendered it too exclusive in\nthe formation of his views. The one elevated the human element of religion\nat the expense of the divine; the other permitted the majesty of the\ndivine to overshadow the human, and cause it to disappear.\n\nThe causes which induced Augustine to take this sublime but one-sided view\nof religion may be easily understood. In the early part of his life, he\nabandoned himself to vicious excesses; being hurried away, to use a\nmetaphor, by the violence of his appetites and passions. His conscience,\nno doubt, often reproved him for such a course of life, and gave rise to\nmany resolutions of amendment. But experience taught him that he could not\ntransform and mould his own character at pleasure. He lacked those views\nof truth, and those feelings of reverence and love to God, without which\ntrue obedience is impossible. Hence he struggled in vain. He felt his own\nimpotency. He still yielded to the importunities of appetite and passion.\nOf a sudden, however, he finds his views of divine things changed, and his\nreligious sensibilities awakened. He knows this marvellous transformation\nis not effected by himself. He ascribes it, and he truly ascribes it, to\nthe power of God; by which he has been brought from a region of darkness\nto light. Old things had passed away, and all things become new.\n\nBut now observe the precise manner in which the error of Augustine takes\nits rise in his mind. He, too, as well as Pelagius, confounds the passive\nsusceptibility of the heart with a voluntary state of the will. The\nintelligence and the sensibility are the only elements in his psychology;\nthe states of them, which are necessitated, constitute all the phenomena\nof the human mind. Holiness, according to him, consists in a feeling of\nlove to God. He knows this is derived from the divine agency; and hence he\nconcludes, that the whole work of conversion is due to God, and no part of\nit is performed by himself. I know, says he, that I did not make myself\nlove God, by which he means a feeling of love; and this he takes to be\ntrue holiness, which has been wrought in his heart by the power of God.\n\u201cLove is the fulfilling of the law; but love to God is not shed abroad in\nour hearts by the law, but by the Holy Ghost.\u201d He is sure the whole work\nis from God, because he is sure that the intelligence and the sensibility\nare the whole of man. How many excellent persons are there, who, taking\ntheir stand upon the same platform of a false psychology, proceed to\ndogmatize with Augustine as confidently as if the only possible ground of\ndifference from them was a want of the religious experience of the\nChristian consciousness, by which they have been so eminently blessed. We\ndeny not the reality of their Christian experience; but we do doubt the\naccuracy of their interpretation of it.\n\nThus, the complex fact of consciousness, consisting in a state of the\nsensibility and a state of the will, was viewed from opposite points by\nPelagius and Augustine. The voluntary phase of it was seen by Pelagius,\nand hence he became an exclusive and one-sided advocate of free-agency;\nthe passive side was beheld by Augustine, and hence he became a one-sided\nand exclusive advocate of divine grace. If we would possess the truth, and\nthe whole truth, we must view it on all sides, and give a better\ninterpretation of the natural consciousness of the one, as well as the\nsupernatural consciousness of the other, than they themselves were enabled\nto give. Then shall we not instinctively turn to one-sided views of\nrevelation. Then shall we not always repeat with Pelagius, \u201cWork out your\nown salvation with fear and trembling,\u201d nor always exclaim with Augustine,\nthat \u201cGod worketh in us to will and to do of his good pleasure;\u201d but we\nshall with equal freedom and readiness approach and appropriate both\nbranches of the truth.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe views of those who, in later times, have symbolized with Augustine.\n\n\nThose divines who have adopted, in the main, the same leading views with\nAugustine, have generally admitted the fact of free-agency; but, because\nthey could not reconcile it with their leading tenet, they have, as we\nhave seen, explained it away. The only freedom which they allow to man,\npertains, as we have shown, not to the will at all, but only to the\nexternal sphere of the body. They have maintained the great fact in words,\nbut rejected it in substance. Though they have seen the absurdity of\nrejecting one fact because they could not reconcile it with another, yet\ntheir internal struggle after a unity and harmony of principle has induced\nthem to deny, in reality, what they have seemed to themselves to preserve\nand maintain. We have seen, in the first chapter of this work, in what\nmanner this has been done by them; it now remains to take a view of the\nsubject, in connexion with the point under consideration.\n\nThe man who confounds the sensibility with the will should, indeed, have\nno difficulty in reconciling the divine agency with the human. If the\nstate of the mind in willing is purely passive, like a state of the mind\nin feeling; then to say that it is produced by the power of God, would\ncreate no difficulty whatever. Hence, the great difficulty of reconciling\nthe human with the divine agency, which has puzzled and perplexed so many,\nshould not exist for one who identifies the will with the sensibility; and\nit would exist for no one holding this psychology, if there were not more\nin the operations of his nature than in the developments of his system.\nPerhaps no one ever more completely lost sight of the true characteristic\nof the manifestations of the will, by thrusting them behind the phenomena\nof the sensibility, than President Edwards; and hence the difficulty in\nquestion seemed to have no existence for him. So far from troubling\nhimself about the line which separates the human agency from the divine,\nhe calmly and quietly speaks as if such a line had no existence. According\nto his view, the divine agency encircles all, and man is merely the\nsubject of its influence. It is true, he uses the terms active and\nactions, as applicable to man and his exertions; but yet he regards his\nvery acts, his volitions, as being produced by God. \u201cIn efficacious\ngrace,\u201d says he, \u201cGod does all, and we do all. God produces all, and we\nact all. For that is what he produces; namely, our own acts.\u201d Now I think\nEdwards could not have used such language, if he had attached any other\nidea to the term act, than what really belongs to it when it is applied,\nas it often is, to the passive states of the intelligence and the\nsensibility. An _act_ of the intellect, or an _act_ of the affections, may\nbe produced by the power of God; but not an act of the will. For, as the\nPrinceton Review well says, \u201ca necessary volition is an absurdity, a thing\ninconceivable.\u201d\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to add, that in causing all real human agency to\ndisappear before the divine sovereignty, Edwards merely reproduced the\nopinion of Calvin; which he endeavoured to establish, not by a fierce,\nunreasoning dogmatism, but upon the principles of reason and philosophy.\n\u201cThe apostle,\u201d says Calvin, \u201cascribes everything to the Lord\u2019s mercy, _and\nleaves nothing to our wills or exertions_.\u201d(138) He even contends, that to\n\u201csuppose man to be a co\u00f6perator with God, so that the validity of election\ndepends on his consent,\u201d is to make the \u201cwill of man superior to the\ncounsel of God;\u201d(139) as if there were no possible medium between nothing\nand omnipotence.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine\nsovereignty.\n\n\nThere is no danger, it is true, that we shall ever form too exalted\nconceptions of the divine majesty. All notions must fall infinitely below\nthe sublime reality. But we may proceed in the wrong direction, by making\nit our immediate aim and object to exalt the sovereignty of God. An object\nso vast and overwhelming as the divine omnipotence, cannot fail to\ntransport the imagination, and to fill the soul with wonder. Hence, in our\npassionate, but always feeble, endeavours to grasp so wonderful an object,\nour vision may be disturbed by our emotions, and the glory of God badly\nreflected in our minds. Our utmost exertions may thus end, not in exalted,\nbut in distorted views of the divine sovereignty. Is it not better, then,\nfor feeble creatures like ourselves, to aim simply to acquire a knowledge\nof the truth, which, we may depend upon it, will not fail to exhibit the\ndivine sovereignty in its most beautiful lights?\n\nIf such be our object, we shall find, we think, that God is the author of\nour spiritual views in religion, as well as those genuine feelings of\nreverence and love, without which obedience is impossible; and that man\nhimself is the author of the volitions by which his obedience is\nconsummated. This shows the precise point at which the divine agency\nceases, and human agency begins; the precise point at which the sphere of\nhuman power comes into contact with the sphere of omnipotence, without\nintersecting it and without being annihilated by it. It shows at once the\nabsolute dependence of man upon God, without a denial of his free and\naccountable agency; and it asserts the latter, without excluding the\nDivine Being from the affairs of the moral world. It renders unto C\u00e6sar\nthe things which are C\u00e6sar\u2019s, and unto God the things which are God\u2019s. At\nthe same time that it combines and harmonizes these truths, it shows the\nerrors of the opposite extremes, and places the doctrines of human and\ndivine agency upon a solid and enduring basis, by preventing each from\nexcluding the other.\n\nIn all our inquiries, truth, and truth alone, should be our grand object.\nAll by-ends and contracted purposes, all party schemes and sectarian zeal,\nwill be almost sure to defeat their own objects, by seeking them with _too\ndirect and exclusive an aim_. These, even when noble and praiseworthy,\nmust be sought and reached, if reached at all, by seeking and finding the\ntruth. Thus, for instance, would we exalt the sovereignty of God, then\nmust we not directly seek to exalt that sovereignty, but put away from us\nall the forced contrivances and factitious lights which have been invented\nfor that purpose. It is the light of truth alone, sought for its own sake,\nand therefore clearly seen, that can reveal the sublime proportions, and\nthe intrinsic moral loveliness, of this awful attribute of the Divine\nBeing. On the other hand, would we vindicate the freedom of man, and break\ninto atoms the iron law of necessity, which is supposed to bind him to the\ndust, then again must we seek the truth without reference to this\nparticular aim or object. We must study the great advocates of that law\nwith as great earnestness and fairness as its adversaries. For it is by\nthe light of truth alone, that the real position man occupies in the moral\nworld, or the orbit his power moves in, can be clearly seen, free from the\nmanifold illusions of error; and until it be thus seen, the liberty of the\nhuman mind can never be successfully and triumphantly vindicated. If we\nwould understand these things, then, we must struggle to rise above the\nfoggy atmosphere and the refracted lights of prejudice, into the bright\nregion of eternal truth.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter VI.\n\n\nThe Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Reconciled With The Holiness Of God.\n\n\n One doubt remains,\n That wrings me sorely, if I solve it not.\n\n The world, indeed, is even so forlorn\n Of all good, as thou speakest it, and so swarms\n With every evil. Yet, beseech thee, point\n The cause out to me, that myself may see\n And unto others show it: for in heaven\n One places it, and one on earth below.\u2014DANTE.\n\n\nTheology teaches that God is a being of infinite perfections. Hence, it is\nconcluded, that if he had so chosen, he might have secured the world\nagainst the possibility of evil; and this naturally gives rise to the\ninquiry, why he did not thus secure it? Why he did not preserve the moral\nuniverse, as he had created it, free from the least impress or\novershadowing of evil? Why he permitted the beauty of the world to become\ndisfigured, as it has been, by the dark invasion and ravages of sin? This\ngreat question has, in all ages, agitated and disturbed the human mind,\nand been a prolific source of atheistic doubts and scepticism. It has\nbeen, indeed, a dark and perplexing enigma to the eye of faith itself.\n\nTo solve this great difficulty, or at least to mitigate the stupendous\ndarkness in which it seems enveloped, various theories have been employed.\nThe most celebrated of these are the following: 1. The hypothesis of the\nsoul\u2019s pre\u00ebxistence; 2. The hypothesis of the Manicheans; and, 3. The\nhypothesis of optimism. It may not be improper to bestow a few brief\nremarks on these different schemes.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe hypothesis of the soul\u2019s pre\u00ebxistence.\n\n\nThis was a favourite opinion with many of the ancient philosophers. In the\nPh\u00e6don of Plato, Socrates is introduced as maintaining it; and he ascribes\nit to Orpheus as its original author. Leibnitz supposes that it was\ninvented for the purpose of explaining the origin of evil;(140) but the\ntruth seems to be, that it arose from the difficulty of conceiving how the\nsoul could be created out of nothing, or out of a substance so different\nfrom itself as matter. The hypothesis in question was also maintained by\nmany great philosophers, because they imagined that if the past eternity\nof the soul were denied, this would shake the philosophical proof of its\nfuture eternity.(141) There can be no doubt, however, that after the idea\nof the soul\u2019s pre\u00ebxistence had been conceived and entertained, it was very\ngenerally employed to account for the origin of evil.\n\nBut it must be conceded that this hypothesis merely draws a veil over the\ngreat difficulty it was designed to solve. The difficulty arises, not from\nthe circumstance that evil exists in the present state of our being, but\nfrom the fact that it is found to exist anywhere, or in any state, under\nthe moral administration of a perfect God. It is as difficult to conceive\nwhy such a being should have permitted the soul to sin in a former state\nof existence, even if such a state were an established reality, as it is\nto account for its rise in the present world. To remove the difficulty out\nof sight, by transferring the origin of evil beyond the sphere of visible\nthings, is a poor substitute for a solid and satisfactory solution of it.\nThe great problem of the moral world is not to be illuminated by any such\nfictions of the imagination; and we had better let it alone altogether, if\nwe have nothing more rational and solid to advance.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe hypothesis of the Manicheans.\n\n\nThough this doctrine is ascribed to Manes, after whom it is called, it is\nof a far more early origin. It was taught, says Plutarch, by the Persian\nMagi, whose views are exhibited by him in his celebrated treatise of Isis\nand Osiris. \u201cZoroaster,\u201d says he, \u201cthought that there are two gods,\ncontrary to each other in their operations\u2014a good and an evil principle.\nTo the former he gave the name of Oromazes, and to the latter that of\nArimanius. The one resembles light and truth, the other darkness and\nignorance.\u201d We do not allude to this theory for the purpose of combatting\nit; we suppose it would scarcely find a respectable advocate at the\npresent day. This, like many other inventions of the great intellects of\nantiquity, has entirely disappeared before the simple but sublime\ndoctrines of the religion of Jesus.\n\nM. Bayle, it is true, has exhausted the resources of his genius, as well\nas the rich stores of his learning, in order to adorn the doctrine of\nManes, and to render it more plausible, if possible, than any other which\nhas been employed to explain the origin and existence of evil. But this\nwas not because he sincerely believed it to be founded in truth. He merely\nwished to show its superiority to other schemes, in order that by\ndemolishing it he might the more effectually inspire the minds of men with\na dark feeling of universal scepticism. It was decorated by him, not as a\nsystem of truth, but as a sacrifice to be offered up on the altar of\natheism. True to the instincts of his philosophy, he sought on this\nsubject, as well as on all others, to extinguish the light of science, and\nmanifest the wonders of his power, by hanging round the wretched\nhabitation of man the gloom of eternal despair.\n\nThough this doctrine is now obsolete in the civilized world, it was\nemployed by a large portion of the ancient philosophers to account for the\norigin of evil. This theory does not, it is true, relieve the difficulty\nit was designed to solve; but it shows that there was a difficulty to be\nsolved, which would not have been the case if evil could have been\nascribed to the Supreme God as its author. If those philosophers could\nhave regarded him as a Being of partial goodness, they would have found no\ndifficulty in explaining the origin and existence of evil; they would\nsimply have attributed the good and the evil in the world to the good and\nthe evil supposed to pertain to his nature. But they could not do this,\ninasmuch as the human mind no sooner forms an idea of God, than it regards\nhim as a being of unlimited and unmixed goodness. It has shown a\ndisposition, in all ages, to adopt the most wild and untenable hypotheses,\nrather than entertain the imagination that evil could proceed from the\nFather of Lights. The doctrine of Manes, then, as well as the other\nhypotheses employed to explain the origin of evil, demonstrates how deep\nis the conviction of the human mind that God is light, and in him there is\nno darkness at all. In searching after the fountain of evil, it turns from\nthe great source of life and light, and embraces the wildest\nextravagancies, rather than indulge a dark suspicion respecting the\ngoodness of its Maker.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe hypothesis of optimism.\n\n\n\u201cThe fundamental principle of the optimist is,\u201d says Dugald Stewart, \u201cthat\nall events are ordered for the best; and that evils which we suffer are\nparts of a great system conducted by almighty power under the direction of\ninfinite wisdom and goodness.\u201d Leibnitz, who is unquestionably one of the\ngreatest philosophers the world has produced, has exerted all his powers\nto adorn and recommend the scheme of optimism. We have, in a former\nchapter, considered the system of Leibnitz; but we have not denied its\nfundamental principle, which is so well expressed in the above language of\nMr. Stewart. If he had confined himself to that principle, without\nundertaking to explain _how_ it is that God orders all things for the\nbest, his doctrine would have been free from objections, except for a want\nof clearness and precision.\n\nDr. Chalmers has said that the scheme of optimism, as left by Leibnitz, is\nmerely an hypothesis. He insists, however, that even as an hypothesis, it\nmay be made to serve a highly important purpose in theology. \u201cIf it be not\nan offensive weapon,\u201d says he, \u201cwith which we may beat down and demolish\nthe strongholds of the sceptic, it is, at least, an armour of defence,\nwith which we may cause all his shafts to fall harmless at our feet.\u201d This\nremark of Dr. Chalmers seems to be well founded. The objection of the\nsceptic, as we have seen, proceeds on the supposition that if a Being of\ninfinite perfections had so chosen, he might have made a better universe\nthan that which actually exists. But we have as good reasons to make\nsuppositions as the sceptic. Let us suppose, then, that notwithstanding\nthe evil which reigns in the world, the universe is the best possible\nuniverse that even infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness, could have\ncalled into existence. Let us suppose that this would be clearly seen by\nus, if we only knew the whole of the case; if we could only view the\npresent condition of man in all its connexions and relations to God\u2019s\ninfinite plans for the universe and for eternity. In other words, let us\nsuppose, that if we were only omniscient, our difficulty would vanish, and\nwhere we now see a cloud over the divine perfections, we should behold\nbright manifestations of them. This is a mere supposition, it is true, but\nit should be remembered that the objection in question is based on a mere\nsupposition. When it is asked, why God permitted evil if he had both the\npower and the will to prevent it? it is assumed that the prevention of\nevil is better, on the whole, than the permission of it, and consequently\nmore worthy of the infinite wisdom and goodness ascribed to God. But as\nthis is a mere supposition, which has never been proved by the sceptic, we\ndo not see why it may not be sufficiently answered by a mere supposition.\n\nThis is an important idea. In many a good old writer, it exists in the\ndark germ; in Dr. Chalmers it appears in the expanded blossom. Its value\nmay be shown, and its beauty illustrated, by a reference to the affairs of\nhuman life; for many of the most important concerns of society are settled\nand determined by the application of this principle. If a man were on\ntrial for his life, for example, and certain facts tending to establish\nhis guilt were in evidence against him, no enlightened tribunal would\npronounce him guilty, provided any hypothesis could be framed, or any\nsupposition made, by which the facts in evidence could be reconciled with\nhis innocence. \u201cEvidence,\u201d says a distinguished legal writer, \u201cis always\ninsufficient, where, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to\nprove, some other hypothesis may still be true; for it is the actual\nexclusion of any other hypothesis which invests mere circumstances with\nthe force of proof.\u201d(142) This is a settled principle of law. If any\nsupposition can be made, then, which would reconcile the facts in evidence\nwith a man\u2019s innocence, the law directs that he shall be acquitted. Any\nother rule of decision would be manifestly unjust, and inconsistent with\nthe dictates of a sound policy.\n\nThis principle is applicable, whether the accused bear a good or a bad\nmoral character. As, according to the hypothesis, he might be innocent; so\nno tribunal on earth could fairly determine that he was guilty. The\nhardship of such a conclusion would be still more apparent in regard to\nthe conduct of a man whose general character is well known to be good. In\nsuch a case, especially, should the facts be of such a nature as to\nexclude every favourable hypothesis, before either truth or justice would\nlisten to an unfavourable decision and judgment.\n\nSuch is the rule which human wisdom has established, in order to arrive at\ntruth, or at least to avoid error, in relation to the acts and intentions\nof men. Hence, is it not reasonable, we ask, that we should keep within\nthe same sacred bounds, when we come to form an estimate of the ways of\nGod? No one can fairly doubt that the world is replete with the evidences\nof his goodness. If he had so chosen, he might have made every breath a\nsigh, every sensation a pang, and every utterance of man\u2019s spirit a groan;\nbut how differently has he constituted the world within us, and the\nglorious world around us! Instead of swelling every sound with discord,\nand clothing every object with deformity, he has made all nature music to\nthe ear and beauty to the eye. The full tide of his universal goodness\nflows within us, and around us on all sides. In its eternal rounds, it\ntouches and blesses all things living with its power. We live, and move,\nand have our very being in the goodness of God. Surely, then, we should\nmost joyfully cling to an hypothesis which is favourable to the character\nof such a Being. Hence, we infinitely prefer the warm and generous theory\nof the optimist, which regards the actual universe as the best possible,\nto the dark and cold hypothesis of the sceptic, which calls in question\nthe boundless perfections of God.\n\nIn the foregoing remarks, we have concurred with Dr. Chalmers in viewing\nthe doctrine of Bayle as a mere unsupported hypothesis; but have we any\nright to do so? It has not been proved, it is true; but there are some\nthings which require no proof. Is not the doctrine of Bayle a thing of\nthis kind? It certainly seems evident that if God hates sin above all\nthings, and could easily prevent it, he would not permit it to appear in\nhis dominions. This view of the subject recommends itself powerfully to\nthe human mind, which has, in all ages, been worried and perplexed by it.\nIt seems to carry its own evidence along with it; to shake the mind with\ndoubt, and over-spread it with darkness. Hence, we should either expose\nits fallacy or else fairly acknowledge its power.\n\nOn the other hand, the theory of Leibnitz, or rather the great fundamental\nidea of his theory, is more than a mere hypothesis. It rests on the\nconviction of the human mind that God is infinitely perfect, and seems to\nflow from it as a necessary consequence. For how natural, how irresistible\nthe conclusion, that if God be absolutely perfect, then the world made by\nhim must be perfect also! But while these two hypotheses seem to be sound,\nit is clear that both cannot be so: there is a real conflict between them,\nand the one or the other must be made to give way before our knowledge can\nassume a clearly harmonious and satisfactory form.\n\nThe effects of the hypothesis of the sceptic may be neutralized by\nopposing to it the hypothesis of the theist. But we are not satisfied to\nstop at this point. We intend, not merely to neutralize, but to explode,\nthe theory of the sceptic. We intend to wrest from it the element of its\nstrength, and grind it to atoms. We intend to lay our finger precisely\nupon the fallacy which lies so deeply concealed in its bosom, and from\nwhich it derives all its apparent force and conclusiveness. We shall drag\nthis false principle from its place of concealment into the open light of\nday, and thereby expose the utter futility, the inherent absurdity, of the\nwhole atheistical hypothesis, to which it has so long imparted its\ndeceptive power. If Leibnitz did not detect this false principle, and\nthereby overthrow the theory of Bayle, it was because he held this\nprinciple in common with him. We must eliminate this error, common to the\nscheme of the atheist and to that of the theist, if we would organize the\ntruths which both contain, and present them together in one harmonious and\nsymmetrical system; into a system which will enable us, not merely to\nstand upon the defensive, and parry off the attacks of the sceptic, but to\nenter upon his own territory, and demolish his strongholds; not merely to\noppose his argument by a counter-argument, but to explode his sophism, and\nexhibit the cause of God in cloudless splendour.\n\nThis false principle, this concealed fallacy, of which the atheist has\nbeen so long allowed to avail himself, has been the source of many\nunsuspected errors, and many lamentable evils. It has not only given power\nand efficacy to the weapons of the sceptic, but to the eye of faith itself\nhas it cast clouds and darkness over the transcendent glory of the moral\ngovernment of God. It has prevented a Leibnitz from refuting the sophism\nof a Bayle, and induced a Kant to declare a theodicy impossible. It has,\nindeed, as we shall see, crept into and corrupted the whole mass of\nreligious knowledge; converting the radiant and clearly-defined body of\ntruth into a dark, heterogeneous compound of conflicting elements. Hence\nwe shall utterly demolish it, that neither a fragment nor a shadow of it\nmay remain to darken and delude the minds of men.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe argument of the atheist\u2014The reply of Leibnitz and other theists\u2014The\ninsufficiency of this reply.\n\n\nSin exists. This is the astounding fact of which the atheist avails\nhimself. He has never ceased to contend, that as God has permitted sin to\nexist, he was either unable or unwilling to prevent it. God might easily\nhave prevented sin, says he, if he had chosen to do so; but he has not\nchosen to do so, and therefore his love of virtue is not infinite, his\nholiness is not unlimited. Now, we deny this conclusion, and assert the\ninfinite holiness of God.\n\nThis assertion may be true, says Voltaire, and hence God would have\nprevented all sin, if his power had not been limited. The only conceivable\nway, says he, to reconcile the existence of sin with the purity of God, is\n\u201cto deny his omnipotence.\u201d We insist, on the contrary, that the power of\nGod is absolutely without bounds or limits. Though sin exists, we still\nmaintain, in opposition to every form of atheism, that this fact implies\nno limitation of any of the perfections of God.\n\nBefore proceeding to establish this position, we shall consider the usual\nreply of the theist to the great argument of the atheist. \u201cThe greatest\nlove which a ruler can show for virtue,\u201d says Bayle, \u201cis to cause it, if\nhe can, to be always practised without any mixture of vice. If it is easy\nfor him to procure this advantage to his subjects, and he nevertheless\npermits vice to raise its head in his dominions, intending to punish it\nafter having tolerated it for a long time, his affection for virtue is not\nthe greatest of which we can conceive; _it is then not infinite_.\u201d This\nhas been the great standing argument of atheism in all ages of the world.\nThis argument, as held by the atheists of antiquity, is presented by\nCudworth in the following words: \u201cThe supposed Deity and Maker of the\nworld was either willing to abolish all evils, but not able; or he was\nable but not willing; or else, lastly, he was both able and willing. This\nlatter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now\nthat the supposed Creator of all things was not thus both able and willing\nto abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would have been no\nevils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a deluge of evils\noverflowing all, it must needs be that either he was willing, and not able\nto remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not\nwilling, and then he was envious; or, lastly, he was neither able nor\nwilling, and then he was both impotent and envious.\u201d This argument is, in\nsubstance, the same as that presented by Bayle, and relied upon by\natheists in all subsequent times.\n\nTo the argument of Bayle, the following reply is given by Leibnitz: \u201cWhen\nwe detach things that are connected together,\u2014the parts from the whole,\nthe human race from the universe, the attributes of God from each other,\nhis power from his wisdom,\u2014we are permitted to say that _God can cause\nvirtue to be in the world without any mixture of vice, and even that he\nmany easily cause it to be so_.\u201d(143) But he does not cause virtue to\nexist without any mixture of vice, says Leibnitz, because the good of the\nwhole universe requires the permission of moral evil. How the good of the\nuniverse requires the permission of evil, he has not shown us; but he\nrepeatedly asserts this to be the fact, and insists that if God were to\nprevent all evil, this would work a greater harm to the whole than the\npermission of some evil. Now, is this a sufficient and satisfactory reply\nto the argument of the atheist?\n\nIt certainly seems to possess weight, and is entitled to serious\nconsideration. Bayle contends, that as evil exists, the Creator and\nGovernor of the world cannot be absolutely perfect. He should have\nconcluded with me, Leibnitz truly says, that as God is absolutely perfect,\nthe existence of evil is necessary to the perfection of the universe, or\nis an unavoidable part of the best world that could have been created. It\nis thus that he neutralizes, without demolishing, the argument of the\natheist, and each person is left to be more deeply affected by the\nargument of Leibnitz, or by that of Bayle, as his faith in the unlimited\ngoodness of God is strong or weak. If the theist, by such means, should\ngain a complete victory, this would be due to the faith of the vanquished,\nrather than to the superiority of the logic by which he is subdued.\n\nTo this argument of Leibnitz we may then well apply his own remarks upon\nanother celebrated philosopher. Descartes met the argument of the\nnecessitarian, not by exposing its fallacy, but by repelling the\nconclusion of it on extraneous grounds. \u201cThis was to cut the Gordian\nknot,\u201d says Leibnitz, who was himself a necessitarian, \u201cand to reply to\nthe conclusion of one argument, not by resolving it, but by opposing to it\na contrary argument; which is not conformed to the laws of philosophical\ncontroversy.\u201d The reply of Leibnitz to Bayle is clearly open to the same\nobjection. It does not analyze the sophism of the sceptic, or resolve it\ninto its elements, and point out its error; it merely opposes its\nconclusion by the presentation of a contrary argument. Hence it is not\nlikely to produce very great effect; for, as Leibnitz himself says, in\nrelation to this mode of attacking sceptics, \u201cIt may arrest them a little,\nbut they will always return to their reasoning, presented in different\nforms, until we cause them to comprehend wherein the defect of their\nsophism consists.\u201d Leibnitz has, then, according to his own canons of\ncriticism, merely cut the Gordian knot of atheism, which he should have\nunravelled. He has merely arrested the champions of scepticism \u201ca little,\u201d\nwhom he should have overthrown and demolished.\n\nHis reply is not only incomplete, in that it does not expose the sophistry\nof the atheist; it is also unsound. It carries in its bosom the elements\nof its own destruction. It is self-contradictory, and consequently\nuntenable. It admits that it is easy for God to cause virtue to exist, and\nyet contends that, in certain cases, he fails to do so, because the\nhighest good of the universe requires the existence of moral evil. But how\nis this possible? It will be conceded that the good of the individual\nwould be promoted, if God should cause him to be perfectly holy and happy.\nThis would be for the good of each and every individual moral agent in the\nuniverse. How, then, is it possible for such an exercise of the divine\npower to be for the good of all the parts, and yet not for the good of the\nwhole? So far from being able to see how these things can hang together,\nit seems evident that they are utterly repugnant to each other.\n\nThe highest good of the universe, we are told, requires the permission of\nevil. What good? Is it the holiness of moral agents? This, it is said, can\nbe produced by the agency of God, without the introduction of evil, and\nproduced, too, in the greatest conceivable degree of perfection. Why\nshould evil be permitted, then, in order to attain an end, which it is\nconceded can be perfectly attained without it? Is there any higher end\nthan the perfect moral purity of the universe, which God seeks to\naccomplish by the permission of sin? It certainly is not the happiness of\nthe moral universe; for this can also be secured, in the highest possible\ndegree, by the agency of the Divine Being, without the permission of moral\nevil. What good is there, then, beside the perfect holiness and happiness\nof the universe, to the production of which the existence of moral evil is\nnecessary? There seems to be no such good in reality. It appears to be a\ndream of the imagination, a splendid fiction, which has been recommended\nto the human mind by its horror of the cheerless gloom of scepticism.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to\nsubsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of God.\n\n\nSupposing God to possess perfect holiness, he would certainly prevent all\nmoral evil, says the atheist, unless his power were limited. This\ninference is drawn from a false premiss; namely, that if God is\nomnipotent, he could easily prevent moral evil, and cause virtue to exist\nwithout any mixture of vice. This assumption has been incautiously\nconceded to the atheist by his opponent, and hence his argument has not\nbeen clearly and fully refuted. To refute this argument with perfect\nclearness, it is necessary to show two things: first, that it is no\nlimitation of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work\ncontradictions; and secondly, that if God should cause virtue to exist in\nthe heart of a moral agent, he would work a contradiction. We shall\nendeavour to evince these two things, in order to refute the grand sophism\nof the sceptic, and lay a solid foundation for a genuine scheme of\noptimism, against which no valid objection can be urged.\n\nIn the first place, then, it is not a limitation of the divine omnipotence\nto say, that it cannot work contradictions. There will be little\ndifficulty in establishing this point. Indeed, it will be readily\nconceded; and if we offer a few remarks upon it, it is only that we may\nleave nothing dark and obscure behind us, even to those whose minds are\nnot accustomed to such speculations.\n\nAs contradictions are impossible in themselves, so to say that God could\nperform them, would not be to magnify his power, but to expose our own\nabsurdity. When we affirm, that omnipotence cannot cause a thing to be and\nnot to be at one and the same time, or cannot make two and two equal to\nfive, we do not set limits to it; we simply declare that _such things are\nnot the objects of power_. A circle cannot be made to possess the\nproperties of a square, nor a square the properties of a circle. Infinite\npower cannot confer the properties of the one of these figures upon the\nother, not because it is less than infinite power, but because it is not\nwithin the nature, or province, or dominion of power, to perform such\nthings, to embody such inherent and immutable absurdities in an actual\nexistence. In regard to the doing of such things, or rather of such absurd\nand inconceivable nothings, omnipotence itself possesses no advantage over\nweakness. Power, from its very nature and essence, is confined to the\naccomplishment of such things as are possible, or imply no contradiction.\nHence it is beyond the reach of almighty power itself to break up and\nconfound the immutable foundations of reason and truth. God possesses no\nsuch miserable power, no such horribly distorted attribute, no such\ninconceivably monstrous imperfection and deformity of nature, as would\nenable him to embody absurdities and contradictions in actual existence.\nIt is one of the chief excellencies and glories of the divine nature, that\nits infinite power works within a sphere of light and love, without the\nleast tendency to break over the sacred bounds of eternal truth, into the\nouter darkness of chaotic night!\n\nThe truth of this remark, as a general proposition, will be readily\nadmitted. In general terms, it is universally acknowledged; and its\napplication is easy where the impossibility is plain, or the contradiction\nglaring. But there are things which really imply a contradiction, without\nbeing suspected to do so. We may well ask, in relation to such things, why\nGod does not produce them, without being sensible of the absurdity of the\ninquiry. The production of virtue, or true holiness, in the breast of a\nmoral agent, is a thing of this kind.(144)\n\nThis conducts us to our second position; namely, that if God should cause\nvirtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent, he would work a\ncontradiction. In other words, the production of virtue by any extraneous\nagency, is one of those impossible conceits, those inherent absurdities,\nwhich lie quite beyond the sphere of light in which the divine omnipotence\nmoves, and has no existence except in the outer darkness of a lawless\nimagination, or in the dim regions of error, in which the true nature of\nmoral goodness has never been seen. It is absurd, we say, to suppose that\nmoral agents can be governed and controlled in any other way than by moral\nmeans. All physical power is here out of the question. By physical power,\nin connexion with wisdom and goodness, a moral agent may be created, and\nendowed with the noblest attributes. By physical power, a moral agent may\nbe caused to glow with a _feeling_ of love, and armed with an uncommon\nenergy of will; but such effects, though produced by the power of God, are\nnot the virtue of the moral agent in whom they are produced. This\nconsists, not in the possession of moral powers, but in the proper and\nobedient exercise of those powers.(145) If infinite wisdom, and goodness,\nand power, should muster all the means and appliances in the universe, and\ncause them to bear with united energy on a single mind, the effect\nproduced, however grand and beautiful, would not be the virtue of the\nagent in whom it is produced. Nothing can be his virtue which is produced\nby an extraneous agency. This is a dictate of the universal reason and\nconsciousness of mankind. It needs no metaphysical refinement for its\nsupport, and no scholastic jargon for its illustration. On this broad\nprinciple, then, which is so clearly deduced, not from the confined\ndarkness of the schools, but the open light of nature, we intend to take\nour stand in opposition to the embattled ranks of atheism.\n\nThe argument of the atheist assumes, as we have seen, that a Being of\ninfinite power could easily prevent sin, and cause holiness to exist. It\nassumes that it is possible, that it implies no contradiction, to create\nan intelligent moral agent, and place it beyond all liability to sin. But\nthis is a mistake. Almighty power itself, we may say with the most\nprofound reverence, cannot create such a being, and place it beyond the\npossibility of sinning. If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no\nvirtue, in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent at\nall, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as well as to do right,\nis included in the very idea of a moral and accountable agent, and no such\nagent can possibly exist without being invested with such a power. To\nsuppose such an agent to be created, and placed beyond all liability to\nsin, is to suppose it to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the\nsame time; it is to suppose a creature to be endowed with a power to do\nwrong, and yet destitute of such a power, which is a plain contradiction.\nHence, Omnipotence cannot create such a being, and deny to it a power to\ndo evil, or secure it against the possibility of sinning.\n\nWe may, with the atheist, conceive of a universe of such beings, if we\nplease, and we may suppose them to be at all times prevented from sinning\nby the omnipotent and irresistible energy of the Divine Being; and having\nimagined all this, we may be infinitely better pleased with this ideal\ncreation of our own than with that which God has called into actual\nexistence around us. But then we should only prefer the absurd and\ncontradictory model of a universe engendered in our own weak brains, to\nthat which infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness have actually\nprojected into being. Such a universe, if freed from contradictions, might\nbe also free from evil, nay, from the very possibility of evil; but only\non condition that it should at the same time be free from the very\npossibility of good. It admits into its dominions moral and accountable\ncreatures, capable of knowing and serving God, and of drinking at the\npurest fountain of untreated bliss, only by being involved in\nirreconcilable contradiction. It may appear more delightful to the\nimagination, before it comes to be narrowly inspected, than the universe\nof God; and the latter, being compared with it, may seem less worthy of\nthe infinite perfections of its Author; but, after all, it is but a weak\nand crazy thing, a contradictious and impossible conceit. We may admire\nit, and make it the standard by which to try the work of God; but, after\nall, it is but an \u201cidol of the human mind,\u201d and not \u201can idea of the Divine\nMind.\u201d It is a little, distorted image of human weakness, and not a\nharmonious manifestation of divine power. Among all the possible models of\na universe, which lay open to the infinite mind and choice of God, a thing\nso deformed had no place; and when the sceptic concludes that the\nperfections of the Supreme Architect are limited, because he did work\nafter such a model, he only displays the impotency of his own wisdom, and\nthe blindness of his own presumption.\n\nHence, the error of the atheist is obvious. He does not consider that the\nonly way to place all creatures beyond a liability to sin, is to place\nthem below the rank of intelligent and accountable beings. He does not\nconsider that the only way to prevent \u201csin from raising its head\u201d is to\nprevent holiness from the possibility of appearing in the universe. He\ndoes not consider that among all the ideal worlds present to the Divine\nMind, there was not one which, if called into existence, would have been\ncapable of serving and glorifying its Maker, and yet incapable of throwing\noff his authority. Hence, he really finds fault with the work of the\nAlmighty, because he has not framed the world according to a model which\nis involved in the most irreconcilable contradictions. In other words, he\nfancies that God is not perfect, because he has not embodied an absurdity\nin the creature. If God, he asks, is perfect, why did he not render virtue\npossible, and vice impossible? Why did he not create moral agents, and yet\ndeny to them the attributes of moral agents? Why did he not give his\ncreatures the power to do evil, and yet withhold this power from them? He\nmight just as well have demanded, why he did not create matter without\ndimensions, and circles without the properties of a circle. Poor man! he\ncannot see the wisdom and power of God manifested in the world, because it\nis not filled with moral agents which are not moral agents, and with\nglorious realities that are mere empty shadows!\n\nIf the above remarks be just, then the great question, why has God\npermitted sin, which has exercised the ingenuity of man in all ages, is a\nmost idle and insignificant inquiry. The only real question is, why he\ncreated such beings as men at all; and not why he created them, and then\npermitted them to sin. The first question is easily answered. The second,\nthough often propounded, seems to be a most unmeaning question. It is\nunmeaning, because it seeks to ascertain the _reason why_ God has\npermitted a thing, which, in reality, he has not permitted at all. Having\ncreated a world of moral agents, that is, a world endowed with a power to\nsin, it was impossible for him to prevent sin, so long as they retained\nthis power, or, in other words, so long as they continued to exist as\nmoral agents. A universe of such agents given, its liability to sin is not\na matter for the will of God to permit; this is a necessary consequence\nfrom the nature of moral agents. He could no more deny peccability to such\ncreatures than he could deny the properties of the circle to a circle; and\nif he could not prevent such a thing, it is surely very absurd to ask why\nhe permitted it.\n\nOn the supposition of such a world, God did not permit sin at all; it\ncould not have been prevented. It would be considered a very absurd\ninquiry, if we should ask, why God permitted two and two to be equal to\nfour, or why he permitted the three angles of a triangle to be equal to\ntwo right angles. But all such questions, however idle and absurd, are not\nmore so than the great inquiry respecting the permission of moral evil. If\nthis does not so appear to our minds, it is because we have not\nsufficiently reflected on the great truth, that a necessary virtue is a\ncontradiction in terms, an inherent and utter impossibility. The full\npossession of this truth will show us, that the cause of theism has been\nencumbered with great difficulties, because its advocates have endeavoured\nto explain the reason _why_ God has permitted a thing, which, in point of\nfact, he has not permitted. Having attempted to explain a fact which has\nno existence, it is no wonder that they should have involved themselves in\nclouds and darkness. Let us cease then, to seek the reason of that which\nis _not_, in order that we may behold the glory of that which _is_.\n\nWe have seen that it is impossible for Omnipotence to create moral agents,\nand yet prevent them from possessing an ability to sin or transgress the\nlaw of God. In other words, that the Almighty cannot give agents a power\nto sin, and at the same time deny this power to them. To expect such\nthings of him, is to expect him to work contradictions; to expect him to\ncause a thing to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the same\ntime. Thus, although sin exists, we vindicate the character of God, on the\nground that it is an inherent impossibility to exclude all evil from a\nmoral universe. This is the high, impregnable ground of the true Christian\ntheist.\n\nWe have already said, that the only real question is, not why God\npermitted evil, but why he created beings capable of sinning. Such\ncreatures are, beyond all question, the most noble specimens of his\nworkmanship. St. Augustine has beautifully said, that the horse which has\ngone astray is a more noble creature than a stone which has no power to go\nastray. In like manner, we may say, a moral agent that is capable of\nknowing, and loving, and serving God, though its very nature implies an\nability to do otherwise, is a more glorious creature than any being\ndestitute of such a capacity. If God had created no such beings, his work\nmight have represented him \u201cas a house doth the builder,\u201d but not \u201cas a\nson doth his father.\u201d If he had created no such beings, there would have\nbeen no eye in the universe, except his own, to admire and to love his\nworks. Traces of his wisdom and goodness might have been seen here and\nthere, scattered over his works, provided any eye had been lighted up with\nintelligence to see them; but nowhere would his living and immortal image\nhave been seen in the magnificent temple of the world. It will be\nconceded, then, that there is no difficulty in conceiving why God should\nhave preferred a universe of creatures, beaming with the glories of his\nown image, to one wholly destitute of the beauty of holiness and the light\nof intelligence. But having preferred the noblest order of beings, its\ninseparable incident, a liability to moral evil, could not have been\nexcluded.\n\nHence God is the author of all good, and of good alone; and evil proceeds,\nnot from him nor from his permission, but from an abuse of those exalted\nand unshackled powers, whose nature and whose freedom constitute the glory\nof the moral universe.\n\nThis, then, is the sublime purpose of God, to give and continue existence\nto free moral agents, and to govern them for their good as well as for his\nown glory. This is the decree of the Almighty, to call forth from nothing\ninto actual existence, the universe which now shines around us, and spread\nover it the dominion of his perfect moral law. He does not cause sin. He\ndoes not permit sin. He sees that it will raise its hideous head, but he\ndoes not say\u2014_so let it be_. No! sin is the thing which God hates, and\nwhich he is determined, by all the means within the reach of his\nomnipotence, utterly to root out and destroy. The word has gone forth,\n\u201cOffences must needs come, but woe unto the man by whom they come!\u201d His\nomnipotence is pledged to wipe out the stain and efface the shadow of\nevil, in as far as possible, from the glory of his creation. But yet, so\nlong as the light and glory of the moral universe is permitted to shine,\nmay the dark shadow of evil, which moral agents cast upon its brightness\nand its beauty, continue to exist and partially obscure its divine\nperfections. And would it not be unworthy of the divine wisdom and\ngoodness to remove this partial shadow, by an utter extinction of the\nuniversal light?\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe true and only foundation of optimism.\n\n\nThough few have been satisfied with the details of the system of optimism,\nyet has the great fundamental conception of that system been received by\nthe wise and good in all ages. \u201cThe atheist takes it for granted,\u201d says\nCudworth, \u201cthat whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the\noriginal of all things, does therefore _ipso facto_ suppose all things to\nbe well made, and as they should be. And this, doubtless, was the sense of\nall the ancient theologers,\u201d &c.(146) This distinguished philosopher\nhimself maintains, as well as Leibnitz, that the intellectual world could\nnot have been made better than it is, even by a being of infinite power\nand goodness. \u201cTo believe a God,\u201d says he, \u201cis to believe the existence of\nall _possible_ good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe that\nthings are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and\ngoverned, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been\nbetter.\u201d(147)\n\nBut while this fundamental principle has been held by philosophers, both\nancient and modern, it has been, as we have seen, connected with other\ndoctrines, by which it is contradicted, and its influence impaired. The\nconcession which is universally made to the sceptic, that if God is\nomnipotent, he can easily cause virtue to exist without any mixture of\nvice, is fatal to the great principle that lies at the foundation of\noptimism. It resolves the whole scheme, which regards the world as the\nbest that could possibly be made, into a loose, vague, and untenable\nhypothesis. It is true, the good man would infinitely prefer this\nhypothesis to the intolerable gloom of atheism; but yet our rational\nnature demands something more solid and clear on which to repose. Indeed,\nthe warmest supporters of optimism have supplied us with the lofty\nsentiments of a pure faith, rather than with substantial and satisfactory\nviews. The writings of Plato, Leibnitz, Cudworth, and Edwards, all furnish\nillustrations of the justness of this remark. But nowhere is its truth\nmore clearly seen than in the following passage from Plotinus: \u201cGod made\nthe _whole_ most beautiful, entire, complete, and sufficient,\u201d says he;\n\u201call agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler and the\nmeaner of them being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from\nthe parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer.\nFor we ought to consider the parts not alone by themselves, but in\nreference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the\nsame; otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts\ntaken by themselves.\u201d(148)\n\nThe theist, however, who maintains this beautiful sentiment, is accustomed\nto make concessions by which its beauty is marred, and its foundation\nsubverted. For if God could easily cause virtue to exist without any\nmixture of vice, it is demonstrable that the universe might be rendered\nmore holy and happy than it is, in each _and every one of its parts, and\nconsequently in the whole_. But if we assume the position, as in truth we\nmay, that a necessary virtue is a contradiction in terms, then we can\nvindicate the infinite perfections of God, by showing that sin may enter\ninto the best possible world. This great truth, then, that \u201ca necessary\nholiness is a contradiction in terms,\u201d which has been so often uttered and\nso seldom followed out to its consequences, is the precise point from\nwhich we should contemplate the world, if we would behold the power and\ngoodness of God therein manifested. This is the secret of the world by\nwhich the dark enigma of evil is to be solved. This is the clew, by which\nwe are to be conducted from the dark labyrinth of atheistical doubt and\nscepticism, into the clear and open light of divine providence. This is\nthe great central light which has been wanting to the scheme of optimism,\nto convert it from a mere but magnificent hypothesis, into a clearly\nmanifested and glorious reality.\n\nGod governs everything according to the nature which he has given it.\nIndeed, it would be as impossible to necessitate true and genuine\nobedience by the application of power, as it would be to convert a stone\ninto a moral agent by the application of motives and persuasion. As sin is\npossible, then, though omnipotence be pledged to prevent its existence, it\nis clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine power.\nThis cuts off the objection of Voltaire, and explodes the grand sophism on\nwhich it is based. God hates sin above all things, and is more than\nwilling to prevent it; and he actually does so, in so far as this is\npossible to infinite wisdom and power. This refutes the objection of\nBayle, and leaves his argument without the shadow of a foundation. God\ndoes not choose sin, or permit it as a means of the highest good, as if\nthere could be any higher good than absolute and universal holiness; but\nit comes to pass, because God has created a world of moral agents, and\nthey have transgressed his law. This removes the high and holy God\ninfinitely above the contamination of all evil, above all contact with the\nsin of the world, and shows an impassable gulf between the purity of the\nCreator and the pravity of the creature. By revealing the true connexion\nof sin with the moral universe, and its relation to God, it clearly shows\nthat its existence should not raise the slightest cloud of suspicion\nrespecting his infinite goodness and power, and thus reconciles the fact\nof sin\u2019s existence with the adorable perfections of the Governor of the\nworld.\n\nIt may be said, that although God could not cause holiness to prevail\nuniversally, by the exercise of his power, yet he might employ means and\ninfluences sufficient to prevent the occurrence of sin. To this there are\ntwo satisfactory answers. First, it is a contradiction to admit that God\ncannot necessitate virtue, because such a thing is impossible; and yet\nsuppose that he could, in all cases, secure the existence of it, without\nany chance of failure. It both asserts and denies at the same time, the\nidea of a necessary holiness. Secondly, the objection in question proceeds\non the supposition, that there are resources in the stores of infinite\nwisdom and goodness, which might have been successfully employed for the\ngood of the universe, and which God has failed to employ. But this is a\nmere gratuitous assumption. It never has been, and it never can be proved.\nIt has not even the appearance of reason in its favour. Let the objector\nshow wherein the Almighty could have done more than he has actually done\nto prevent sin, and secure holiness, without attempting violence to the\nnature of man, and then his objection may have some force, and be entitled\nto some consideration. But if he cannot do this, his objection rests upon\na mere unsupported hypothesis. It is very easy to conceive that more light\nmight have been imparted to men, and greater influences brought to bear on\ntheir feelings; but it will not follow that such additional inducements to\nvirtue would have been good for them. For aught we know, it might only\nhave added to their awful responsibilities, without at all conducing to\ntheir good. For aught we know, the means employed by God for the salvation\nof man from sin and misery have, both in kind and degree, been precisely\nsuch as to secure the _maximum_ of good and the _minimum_ of evil.\n\nLet the sceptic frame a more perfect moral law for the government of the\nworld than that which God has established; let him show where more\ntremendous sanctions might be found to enforce that law; let him show how\nthe Almighty might have made a more efficacious display of his majesty,\nand power, and goodness, than he has actually exhibited to us; let him\nrefer to more powerful influences, consistent with the free-agency and\naccountability of man, than those exerted by the Spirit of God; let him do\nall this, we say, and then he may have some right to object and find\nfault. In one word, let him meet the demand of the Most High, \u201cwhat more\ncould have been done to my vineyard, that I have not done in it,\u201d and show\nit to be without foundation, and then there will be some appearance of\nreason in his objection.\n\n\n\n Section VII.\n\n\nThe glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which he foresaw would\nfall under the dominion of sin.\n\n\nIt may be said that we have not yet gone to the bottom of the difficulty;\nthat although omnipotence could not deny the capacity to commit sin to a\nmoral agent, yet God could prevent moral evil, by refusing to create any\nbeing who he foreknew would transgress his law. As God might have\nprevented the rise of evil in our world, by refusing to create man, why,\nit may be asked, did he not do so? Why did he not, in this way, spare the\nuniverse that spectacle of crime and suffering which has been presented in\nthe history of our fallen race? To this we answer, that God did not choose\nto prevent sin in this way, but to create the world exactly as he did,\nthough he foresaw the fall and all its consequences; _because the highest\ngood of the universe required the creation of such a world_. We are now\nprepared to see this great truth in its true light.\n\nThe highest good of the universe may, no doubt, be promoted in various\nways by the redemption of our fallen race, of which we have no conception\nin our present state of darkness and ignorance. But we are furnished with\nsome faint glimpses of the true source of that admiration and wonder with\nwhich the angels of God are inspired, as they contemplate the\nmanifestation of his glory in reconciling the world to himself. The\nfelicity of the angels, and no doubt of all created intelligences, must be\nfound in the enjoyment of God. No other object is sufficiently vast to\nfill and satisfy the unlimited desires of the mind. And as the character\nof God must necessarily constitute the chief happiness of his creatures,\nso every new manifestation of the glory of that character must add to\ntheir supreme felicity.\n\nNow, if there had been no such thing as sin, the compassion of God would\nhave been forever concealed from the eyes of his intelligent creatures.\nThey might have adored his purity; but of that tender compassion which\ncalls up the deepest and most pleasurable emotions in the soul, they could\nhave known absolutely nothing. They might have witnessed his love to\nsinless beings; but they could never have seen that love in its omnipotent\nyearnings over the ruined and the lost. The attribute of mercy or\ncompassion would have been forever locked up and concealed in the deep\nrecesses of the Divine Mind; and the blessing, and honour, and glory, and\ndominion, which shall be ascribed by the redeemed unto Him that sitteth\nupon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever, would not have been\nheard in the universe of God. The chord which now sends forth the sweetest\nmusic in the harmony of heaven, filling its inhabitants with deep and\nrapturous emotions of sympathy and delight, would never have been touched\nby the finger of God.\n\nHow far such a display of the divine character is necessary to the ends of\nthe moral government of God can be known only to himself. We are informed\nin his word, that it is by the redemption of the world, through Christ,\nthat the ends of his moral government are secured. It pleased the Father,\nsaith St. Paul, that in Christ all fulness should dwell; and having made\npeace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto\nhimself, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven. Thus we are\ntold that all things in heaven are reconciled unto God, by the blood of\nthe cross. But it may be asked, How was it possible to reconcile those\nbeings unto God who had never sinned against him, nor been estranged from\nhim? According to the original, God is not exactly said to reconcile, but\n_to keep together_, all things, by the mediation and work of Christ. The\nangels fell from heaven, and man sinned in paradise; but the creatures of\nGod are secured from any further defection from him, by the\nall-controlling display of his character, and by the stupendous system of\nmoral agencies and means which have been called forth in the great work of\nredemption.\n\nIn this view of the passage in question we are happy to find that we are\nconfirmed by so enlightened a critic as Dr. Macknight. In relation to\nthese words, \u201cAnd by him to reconcile all things,\u201d he says, \u201cThough I have\ntranslated the \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03b6\u03b1, to reconcile, which is its ordinary meaning,\n_I am clearly of opinion_ that it signifies here to _unite_ simply;\nbecause the good angels are said, in the latter part of the verse, to be\nreconciled with Christ, who never were at enmity with him. I therefore\ntake the apostle\u2019s meaning to be this: \u2018It pleased the Father, by Christ,\nto unite all things to Christ, namely, as their Head and Governor.\u2019 \u201d\n(Col. i, 20.) The same sublime truth is revealed in other portions of\nScripture, as in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, where it is\nsaid, that it is the design of God to subject all things to Christ, and\nexception is made only of Him by whom this universal subjection and\ndominion is established.\n\nThe accomplishment of such an object, it will be admitted, is one of\nunspeakable importance. For no government, however perfect and beautiful\nin other respects, can be of much value unless it be so constructed as to\nsecure its own permanency. This grand object, revelation informs us, has\nbeen attained by the redemption of the world through Christ. But for his\nwork, those blessed spirits now bound together in everlasting society with\nGod, by the sacred ties of confidence and love, might have fallen from him\ninto the outer darkness, as angels and archangels had fallen before them.\nThe ministers of light, though having drunk deeply of the goodness of God,\nand rejoiced in his smile, were not satisfied with their condition, and,\nstriving to better it, plucked down ruin on their heads. So, man in\nparadise, not content with his happy lot, but vainly striving to raise\nhimself to a god, forsook his allegiance to his Maker, and yielded himself\na willing servant to the powers of darkness. But an apostle, though born\nin sin, having tasted the bitter fruits of evil, and the sweet mercies of\nredeeming love, felt such confidence in God, that in whatsoever state he\nwas, he could therewith be content. Not only in heaven\u2014not only in\nparadise\u2014but in a dungeon, loaded with irons, and beaten with stripes, he\ncould rejoice and give glory to God. This firm and unshaken allegiance in\na weak and erring mortal to the throne of the Most High God, presents a\nspectacle of moral grandeur and sublimity to which the annals of eternity,\nbut for the existence of sin, had presented no parallel.\n\nIt is by the scheme of Christianity alone that the confidence of the\ncreature in his God has been rendered too strong for the gates of hell to\nprevail against him. But for this scheme, the moral government of God\nmight have presented scenes of mutability and change, infinitely more\nappalling than the partial evil which we behold in our present state. Or\nif God had chosen to prevent this, to render it absolutely impossible, by\nthe creation of no beings who he foreknew would rebel against him, this\nmight have contracted his moral empire into the most insignificant limits.\nThus, by the creation of the world, God has prepared the way to extend the\nboundaries of his empire, and to secure its foundations. Christ is the\ncorner-stone of the spiritual universe, by which all things in heaven and\nearth are kept from falling away from God, its great centre of light and\nlife. No wonder, then, that when this crowning event in the moral\ngovernment of the universe was about to be accomplished, the heavenly host\nshould have shouted, \u201cGlory to God in the highest!\u201d\n\nThis view of the subject of moral evil, derived from revelation,\nharmonizes all the phenomena of the moral world with the perfections of\nGod, as well as warms and expands the noblest feelings of the human heart.\nSt. Paul ascribes the stability of all things in heaven to the\nmanifestation of the divine character in the redemption of our fallen\nrace. If this be the case, then those who so confidently assert that God\nmight have preserved the world in holiness, without impairing the\nfree-agency of man, as easily as he keeps the angels from falling, are\nvery much mistaken. This assertion is frequently made; but, as we\nconceive, without authority either from reason or revelation. It is said\nby a learned divine, \u201cThat God has actually preserved some of the angels\nfrom falling; and that he has promised to preserve, and will, therefore,\ncertainly preserve the spirits of just men made perfect; and that this has\nbeen, and will be, done without infringing at all on their moral agency.\nOf course, he could just as easily have preserved Adam from falling,\nwithout infringing on his moral agency.\u201d(149) This argument is pronounced\nby its author to be conclusive and \u201cunanswerable.\u201d But if God preserves\none portion of his creatures from falling, by the manner in which he has\ndealt with those who have fallen, it does not follow that he could just as\neasily have kept each and every portion of them from a defection. If a\nruler should prevent a part of his subjects from rebellion, by the way in\nwhich he has dealt with those who have rebelled, does it follow that he\nmight just as easily have secured obedience in the rebels? It clearly does\nnot; and hence there is a radical defect in the argument of these learned\ndivines and the school to which they belong. Let them show that all things\nin heaven are not secured in their eternal allegiance to God by the work\nof Christ, and then they may safely conclude, that man might have been as\ncertainly and infallibly secured against a defection as angels and just\nmen made perfect. If God binds the spiritual universe to himself, by the\ndisplay of his unbounded mercy to a fallen race, it does not follow that\nhe could, by the same means, have preserved that race itself, and every\nother order of beings, from a defection. For, on this supposition, there\nwould have been no fallen race to call forth his infinite compassion, and\nsend its binding influences over angels and the spirits of just men made\nperfect.\n\nAccording to the sublime idea of revelation, it is the transcendent glory\nof the cross that it exerts moral influences, which have bound the whole\nintelligent creation together in one harmonious society with God, its\nsovereign and all-glorious head. For aught we know, the stability of the\nspiritual universe could not possibly have been secured in any other way;\nand hence, if there had been no fall, and no redemption, the grand\nintellectual system which is now so full of confidence and joy, might have\nbeen without a secure foundation. We have seen that its foundation could\nnot, from the very nature of things, have been established and fixed by\nmere power; for this could not have kept a single moral agent from the\npossibility of sinning much less a boundless universe of such beings.\n\nThe Christian believer, then, labours under no difficulty in regard to the\nexistence of evil, which should in the least oppress his mind. If he\nshould confine his attention too narrowly to the nature of evil as it is\nin itself, he may, indeed, perplex his brain almost to distraction; but he\nshould take a freer and wider range, viewing it in all its relations,\ndependencies, and ultimate results. If he should consider the origin of\nevil exclusively, he may only meet with impenetrable obscurity and\nconfusion, as he endeavours to pry into the dark enigma of the world; but\nall that is painful in it will soon vanish, if he will only view it in\nconnexion with God\u2019s infinite plans for the good of the universe. He will\nthen see, that this world, with all its wickedness and woe, is but a dim\nspeck of vitality in a boundless dominion of light, that is necessary to\nthe glory and perfection of the whole.\n\nThe believer should not, for one moment, entertain the low view, that the\natonement confers its benefits on man alone. The plan of redemption was\nnot an after-thought, designed to remedy an evil which the eye of\nomniscience had not foreseen; it was formed in the counsels of infinite\nwisdom long before the foundations of the world were laid. The atonement\nwas made for man, it is true; but, in a still higher sense, man was made\nfor the atonement. All things were made _for_ Christ. God, whose\nprerogative it is to bring good out of evil, will turn the short-lived\ntriumph of the powers of darkness into a glorious victory, and cause it to\nbe a universal song of rejoicing to his great name throughout the endless\nages of eternity.\n\nWho would complain, then, that he is subject to the evils of this life,\nsince he has been subjected in hope? Everything around us is a type and\nsymbol of our high destiny. All things shadow forth the glory to be\nrevealed in us. The insignificant seed that rots in the earth does not\ndie. It lives, it germinates, it grows, it springs up into the stately\nplant, and is crowned with beauty. The worm beneath our feet, though\nseemingly so dead, is, by the secret all-working power of God, undergoing\nchanges to fit it for a higher life. In due time it puts off its form of\ndeath, and rises, \u201clike a winged flower,\u201d from the cold earth into a warm\nregion of life and light. In like manner, the bodies we inhabit,\nwonderfully and fearfully as they are made, are destined to moulder in the\ngrave, and become the food of worms, before they are raised like unto\nChrist\u2019s glorified body, clothed with power and immortality. Nature\nitself, with all its teeming forms of beauty, must decay, till \u201cpale\nconcluding winter comes at last, and shuts the scene.\u201d But the scene is\nclosed, and all its magnificence shut in, only that it may open out again,\nas it were, into all the wonders of a new creation. Even so the human\nsoul, although it be subjected to the powers of darkness for a season, may\nemerge into the light and blessedness of eternity. Such is the destiny of\nman; and upon himself, under God, it depends whether this high destiny be\nfulfilled, or his bright hopes blasted. \u201cI call heaven and earth this day\nto witness,\u201d saith the Lord, \u201cthat I have set before you life and death,\nblessing and cursing; therefore choose life.\u201d\n\n\n\n Section VIII.\n\n\nThe little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other atheizing minute\nphilosophers.\n\n\nIt will be objected, no doubt, that in the foregoing vindication of the\ndivine holiness, we have taken for granted the Christian scheme of\nredemption; but it should be remembered, that we do not propose \u201cto\njustify the ways of God to man\u201d on deistical principles. We are fully\npersuaded, that if God had merely created the world, and remained\nsatisfied to look down as an idle spectator upon the evils it had brought\nupon itself, his character and glory would not admit of vindication; and\nwe should not have entered upon so chimerical an enterprise. We have\nattempted to reconcile the government of the world, as set forth in the\nsystem we maintain, and in no other, with the perfections of God; and\nwhoever objects that this cannot be done, is bound, we insist, to take the\nsystem as it is in itself, and not as it is mangled and distorted by its\nadversaries. We freely admit, that if the Christian religion does not\nfurnish the means of such a reconciliation, then we do not possess them,\nand are necessarily devoted to despair.\n\nHere we must notice a very great inconsistency of atheists. They insist\nthat if the world had been created by an infinitely perfect Being, he\nwould not have permitted the least sin or disorder to arise in his\ndominions; yet, when they hear of any interposition on his part for the\ngood of the world, they pour ridicule upon the idea of such intervention\nas wholly unworthy of the majesty of so august a Being. So weak and\nwavering are their notions, that it agrees equally well with their creed,\nthat it becomes an infinitely perfect Being to do all things, and that it\nbecomes him to do nothing! Can you believe that an omnipotent God reigns,\nsays M. Voltaire, since he beholds the frightful evils of the world\nwithout putting forth his arm to redress them? Can you believe, asks the\nsame philosopher, that so great a being, even if he existed, would trouble\nhimself about the affairs of so insignificant a creature as man?\n\nSuch inconsistencies are hardly worthy of a philosopher, who possesses a\nwisdom so sublime, and a penetration so profound, as to authorize him to\nsit in judgment on the order and harmony of the universe. They are\nperfectly worthy, however, of the author of Candidus. The poison of this\nwork consists, not in its argument, but in its ridicule. Indeed, it is not\neven an attempt at argument or rational criticism. The sole aim of the\nauthor seems to be to show the brilliancy of his wit, at the expense of\n\u201cthe best of all possible worlds;\u201d and it must be confessed that he has\nshown it, though it be in the worst of all possible causes.\n\nInstead of attempting to view the existence of evil in the light of any\nprinciple whatever, he merely accumulates evil upon evil; and when the\nmass has become sufficiently terrific, with the jeering mockery of a small\nfiend, he delights in the contemplation of the awful spectacle as a\nconclusive demonstration that the Ruler of the world is unequal to the\ngovernment of his creatures. His book is merely an appeal to the ignorance\nand feelings of the reader, and can do no mischief, except when it may\nhappen to find a weak head in union with a corrupt heart. For what does it\nsignify that the castle of the Baron Thunder-ten-trock was not the most\nperfect of all possible castles; does this disprove the skill of the great\nArchitect of the universe? Or what does it signify that Dr. Pangloss lost\nan eye; does this extinguish a single ray of the divine omniscience, or\ndepose either of the great lights which God ordained to rule the world?\nLastly, what does it signify that M. Voltaire, by a horrible abuse of his\npowers, should have extinguished the light of reason in his soul; does\nthis disprove the goodness of that Being by whom those powers were given\nfor a higher and a nobler purpose? A fracture in the dome of St. Paul\u2019s\nwould, no doubt, present as great difficulties to an insect lost in its\ndepths, as the disorders of this little world presented to the captious\nand fault-finding spirit of M. Voltaire; and would as completely shut out\nthe order and design of the whole structure from its field of vision, as\nthe order and design of the magnificent temple of the world was excluded\nfrom the mind of this very minute philosopher.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter VII.\n\n\nObjections Considered.\n\n\n Heaven seeth all, and therefore knows the sense\n Of the whole beauteous frame of Providence.\n His judgment of God\u2019s kingdom needs must fail,\n Who knows no more of it than this dark jail.\u2014BAXTER.\n\n One part, one little part, we dimly scan,\n Through the dark medium of life\u2019s feverish dream;\n Yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan,\n If but that little part incongruous seem.\u2014BEATTIE.\n\n\nThough we have taken great pains to obviate objections by the manner in\nwhich we have unfolded and presented our views, yet we cannot but foresee\nthat they will have to run the gauntlet of adverse criticism. Indeed, we\ncould desire nothing more sincerely than such a thing, provided they be\nsubjected to the test of principle, and not of prejudice. But how can such\na thing be hoped for? Is all theological prejudice and bigotry extinct,\nthat an author may hope to have a perfectly fair hearing, and impartial\ndecision? Experience has taught us that we must expect to be assailed by a\ngreat variety of cavils, and that the weakest will often produce as great\nan effect as the strongest upon the minds of sectarians. Hence, we shall\nendeavour to meet all such objections as may occur to us, provided they\ncan be supposed to exert any influence over the mind.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nIt may be objected that the foregoing scheme is \u201cnew theology.\u201d\n\n\nIf nothing more were intended by such an objection, than to put the reader\non his guard against the prejudice in favour of novelty, we could not\ncomplain of it. For surely every new opinion which comes into collision\nwith received doctrines, should be held suspected, until it is made to\nundergo the scrutiny to which its importance and appearance of truth may\nentitle it. No reasonable man should complain of such a precaution.\nCertainly, the present writer should not complain of such treatment, for\nit is precisely the treatment which he has received from himself. He well\nremembers, that when the great truths, as he now conceives them to be,\nfirst dawned upon his own mind, how sadly they disturbed and perplexed his\nblind veneration for the past. As he was himself, then, so ready to shrink\nfrom his own views as \u201cnew theology,\u201d he surely cannot censure any one\nelse for so doing, provided he will but give them a fair and impartial\nhearing before he proceeds to scout them from his presence.\n\nIt is true, after the writer had once fairly made the discovery that \u201cold\ntheology\u201d is not necessarily true theology, he could proceed with the\ngreater freedom in his inquiries. He did not very particularly inquire\nwhether _this_ or _that_ was old or new, but whether it was true. He felt\nassured, that if he could only be so fortunate as to find the truth, the\ndefect of novelty would be cured by lapse of time, and he need give\nhimself no very great concern about it.\n\nNot many centuries ago, as everybody knows, Galileo was condemned and\nimprisoned for teaching \u201cnew theology.\u201d He had the unbounded audacity to\nput forth the insufferable heresy, \u201cdirectly against the very word of God\nitself,\u201d that the sun does not revolve around the earth. The Vatican\nthundered, and crushed Galileo; but it did not shake the solar system.\nThis stood as firm in its centre, and rolled on as calmly and as\nmajestically in its course, as if the Vatican had not uttered its\nanathema. Its thunders are all hushed now. Nay, it has even reversed its\nformer decree, and concluded to permit the orbs of light to roll on in the\npaths appointed for them by the mighty hand that reared this beautiful\nfabric of the heavens and the earth. Even so will it be, in relation to\nall sound views pertaining to the constitution and government of the moral\nworld; and those who may deem them unsound, will have to give some more\nsolid reason than an odious epithet, before they can resist their\nprogress.\n\nWe do not pretend that they have not, or that they cannot give, more solid\nreasons for this opposition to what is called \u201cnew theology.\u201d We only\nmean, that an _objection_, which, entirely overlooking the truth or the\nfalsehood of an opinion, appeals to prejudice by the use of an odious\nname, is unworthy of a serious and candid inquirer after truth, and\ntherefore should be laid aside by all who aspire to such a character.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nIt may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence\nof God.\n\n\nThis objection has already been sufficiently answered; but it may be well\nto notice it more distinctly and by itself, as it is one upon which great\nreliance will be placed. It is not denying the omnipotence of God, as all\nagree, to say that he cannot work contradictions; but, as we have seen, a\nnecessitated volition is a contradiction in terms. Hence, it does not deny\nor limit the divine omnipotence, to say, it cannot produce or necessitate\nour volitions. It is absurd to say, that that is a voluntary exercise of\npower, which is produced in us by the power of God. Both of these\nprinciples are conceded by those who will be among the foremost, in all\nprobability, to deny the conclusion which necessarily flows from them.\nThus, the Princeton Review, for example, admits that God cannot work\ncontradictions; and also that \u201ca necessary volition is an absurdity, a\nthing inconceivable.\u201d But will it say, that God cannot work a volition in\nthe human mind? that omnipotence cannot work this particular absurdity? If\nthat journal should speak on this subject at all, we venture to predict it\nwill be seen that it has enounced a great truth, without perceiving its\nbearing upon the Princeton school of theology.\n\nIf this objection has any solidity, it lies with equal force against the\nscheme of Leibnitz, Edwards, and other philosophers and divines, as well\nas against the doctrine of the foregoing treatise. For they affirm, that\nGod chooses sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; and that he\ncould not exclude sin from the universe, without causing a greater evil\nthan its permission. This sentiment is repeatedly set forth in the Essais\nde Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e of Leibnitz; and it is also repeatedly avowed by Edwards.\nNow, here is an inherent impossibility; namely, the prevention of sin\nwithout producing a greater evil than its permission, which it is assumed\nGod cannot work. In other words, when it is asserted, that he chooses sin\nas the necessary means of the greatest good, it is clearly intended that\nhe _cannot_ secure the greatest good without choosing that sin should\nexist. Hence if the doctrine of this discourse limits the omnipotence of\nGod, no less can be said of that to which it is opposed.\n\nBut both schemes may be objected to on this ground, and both be set aside\nas limiting the perfections of God. Indeed, it has been objected against\nthe scheme of Leibnitz, \u201cthat it seems to make something which I do not\nknow how to express otherwise than by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent\nand superior even to God himself. I would therefore think it best to say,\nwith the current of orthodox divines, that God was perfectly free in his\npurpose and providence, and that there is no reason to be sought for the\none or the other beyond himself.\u201d(150) We do not know what reply Leibnitz\nwould have made to such an objection; but we should be at no loss for an\nanswer, were it urged against the fundamental principle of the preceding\ndiscourse. We should say, in the first place, that it was a very great\npity the author could not find a better way of expressing his objection,\n\u201cthan by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent and superior even to God\nhimself.\u201d To say that God cannot work contradictions, is not to place a\nstoical fate, nor any other kind of fate, above him. And if it is, this\nimpiety is certainly practised by \u201cthe current of orthodox divines,\u201d even\nin the author\u2019s own sense of the term; for they all affirm that God cannot\nwork contradictions.\n\nIf such an objection has any force against the present treatise, it might\nbe much better expressed than by an allusion to \u201cthe ancient stoical\nfate.\u201d Indeed, it is much better expressed by Luther, in his vindication\nof the doctrine of consubstantiation. When it was urged against that\ndoctrine, that it is a mathematical impossibility for the same corporeal\nsubstance to be in a thousand different places at one and the same time,\nthe great reformer resisted the objection as an infringement of the divine\nsovereignty: \u201cGod is above mathematics,\u201d he exclaimed: \u201cI reject reason,\ncommon-sense, carnal arguments, and mathematical proofs.\u201d(151) There is no\ndoubt but the orthodox divines of the present day will be disposed to\nsmile at this specimen of Luther\u2019s pious zeal for the sovereignty of God;\nand although they may not be willing to admit that God is above all reason\nand common-sense, yet will they be inclined to think that, in some\nrespects, Luther was a little below them. But while they smile at Luther,\nmight it not be well to take care, lest they should display a zeal of the\nsame kind, and equally pleasant in the estimation of posterity?\n\nIn affirming that omnipotence cannot work contradictions, we are certainly\nvery far from being sensible that we place a \u201cstoical fate\u201d above God, or\nany other kind of fate. We would not place mathematics above God; much\nless would we place him below mathematics. Nor would we say anything which\nwould seem to render him otherwise than \u201cperfectly free in his purpose, or\nin his providence.\u201d To say that he cannot make two and two equal to five,\nis not, we trust, inconsistent with the perfection of his freedom. If it\nwould be a great imperfection in mortals, as all orthodox divines will\nadmit, to be able to affirm and believe that two and two are equal to\nfive; then it would be a still greater imperfection in God, not only to be\nable to affirm such a thing, but to embody it in an actual creation. In\nlike manner, if it would be an imperfection in us to be able to affirm so\ngreat \u201can absurdity,\u201d a thing so \u201cinconceivable\u201d as a \u201cnecessary\nvolition;\u201d then it could not add much to the glory of the Divine Being, to\nsuppose him capable of producing such a monstrosity in the constitution\nand government of the world.\n\nThere is a class of theologians who reject every explication of the origin\nof evil, on the ground that they limit the divine sovereignty; and to the\nquestion why evil is permitted to exist, they reply, \u201cWe cannot tell.\u201d If\nGod can, as they insist he can, easily cause holiness to shine forth with\nunclouded, universal splendour, no wonder they cannot tell why he does not\ndo so. If, by a single glance of his eye, he can make hell itself clear up\nand shine out into a heaven, and fix the eternal glories of the moral\nuniverse upon an immovable foundation, no wonder they can see no reason\nwhy he refuses to do so. The only wonder is that they cannot see that, on\nthis principle, there is no reason at all for such refusal, and the\npermission of moral evil. For if God can do all this, and yet permits sin\n\u201cto raise its hideous head in his dominions,\u201d then there is, and must be,\nsomething which he loves more than holiness, or abhors more than sin. And\nhence, the reason why they cannot tell is, in our humble opinion, because\nthey have already _told too much_,\u2014more than they know. To doubt in the\nright place, is often the best cure for doubt; and to dogmatize in the\nwrong place, is often the most certain road to scepticism.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy view of the\nuniverse.\n\n\nIf we say that God cannot necessitate our volitions, or necessarily\nexclude all evil from a moral system, it will be objected, that, on these\nprinciples, \u201cwe have no certainty of the continued obedience of holy,\nangelic, and redeemed spirits.\u201d(152) This is true, if the scheme of\nnecessity affords the only ground of certainty in the universe. But we\ncannot see the justness of this assumption. It is agreed on all sides,\nthat a fixed habit of acting, formed by repeated and long-continued acts,\nis a pretty sure foundation for the certainty of action. Hence, there may\nbe some little certainty, some little stability in the moral world,\nwithout supposing all things therein to be necessitated. Perhaps there may\nbe, on this hypothesis, as great certainty therein, as is actually found\nto exist. In the assertion so often made, that if all our volitions are\nnot controlled by the divine power, but left to ourselves, then the moral\nworld will not be so well governed as the natural, and disorders will be\nfound therein; the _fact_ seems to be overlooked, that there is actually\ndisorder and confusion in the moral world. If it were our object to find\nan hypothesis to overturn and refute the _facts_ of the moral world, we\nknow of none better adapted to this purpose than the doctrine of\nnecessity; but if it be our aim, not to deny, but to explain the phenomena\nof the moral world, then must we adopt some other scheme.\n\nBut it has been eloquently said, that \u201cif God could not have prevented sin\nin the universe, he cannot prevent believers from falling; he cannot\nprevent Gabriel and Paul from sinking at once into devils, and heaven from\nturning into a hell. And were he to create new races to fill the vacant\nseats, they might turn to devils as fast as he created them, in spite of\nanything that he could do short of destroying their moral agency. He is\nliable to be defeated in all his designs, and to be as miserable as he is\nbenevolent. This is infinitely the gloomiest idea that was ever thrown\nupon the world. It is gloomier than hell itself.\u201d True, there might be a\ngloomier spectacle in the universe than hell itself; and for this very\nreason it is, as we have seen, that God has ordained hell itself, that\nsuch gloomier spectacle may never appear in the universe to darken its\ntranscendent and eternal glories. It is on this principle that we\nreconcile the infinite goodness of God with the awful spectacle of a world\nlying in ruins, and the still more awful spectacle of an eternal hell\nbeyond the grave.\n\nIt is true, there might be a gloomier _idea_ than hell itself; there might\nbe two such _ideas_. Nay, there _might_ be two such things; but yet, so\nfar as we know, there is only one. We beg such objectors to consider,\nthere are some things which, even according to our scheme, will not take\nplace quite so fast as they may be pleased to imagine them. It is true,\nfor example, that a man, that a rational being, _might_ take a copper\ninstead of a guinea, if both were presented for his selection; but\nalthough we may conceive this, it does not follow that he will actually\ntake the copper and leave the guinea. It is also true, that a man _might_\nthrow himself down from the brink of a precipice into a yawning gulf; yet\nhe may, perhaps, refuse to do so. This may be merely a gloomy _idea_, and\nmay never become a gloomy fact. In like manner, as one world fell away\nfrom God, so _might_ another, and another. But yet this imagination may\nnever be realized. Indeed, the Supreme Ruler of all things has assured us\nthat it will not be the case; and in forming our views of the universe, we\nfeel more disposed to look at facts than at fancies.\n\nWe need not frighten ourselves at \u201cgloomy ideas.\u201d There are gloomy facts\nenough in the universe to call forth all our fears. Indeed, if we should\npermit our minds to be directed, not by the reality of things, but by the\nrelative gloominess of ideas, we should altogether deny the eternity of\nfuture torments, and rejoice in the contemplation of the bright prospects\nof the universal holiness and happiness of created beings. We believe,\nhowever, that when the truth is once found, it will present the universe\nof God in a more glorious point of view, than it can be made to display by\nany system of error whatever. Whether the foregoing scheme possesses this\ncharacteristic of truth or not, the reader can now determine for himself.\nHe can determine whether it does not present a brighter and more lovely\nspectacle to contemplate God, the great fountain of all being and all\nlight, as doing all that is possible, in the very nature of things, for\nthe holiness and happiness of the universe, and actually succeeding,\nthrough and by the co\u00f6peration of his creation, in regard to all worlds\nbut this; than to view him as possessing the power to shut out all evil\nfrom the universe, for time and for eternity, and yet absolutely refusing\nto do so.\n\nBut let me insist upon it, that the first and the all-important inquiry\nis, \u201cWhat is truth?\u201d This is the only wise course; and it is the only safe\ncourse for the necessitarian. For no system, when presented in its true\ncolours, is more gloomy and appalling than his own. It represents the\ngreat God, who is seated upon the throne of the universe, as controlling\nall the volitions of his rational creatures by the omnipotence of his\nwill. The first man succumbs to his power. At this unavoidable\ntransgression, God kindles into the most fearful wrath, and dooms both\nhimself and his posterity to temporal and eternal misery. If this be so,\nthen let me ask the reader, if the _fact_ be not infinitely \u201cgloomier than\nhell itself?\u201d\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nIt may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the\npower and control of God, we undermine the sentiments of humility and\nsubmission.\n\n\nThis objection is often made: it is, indeed, the great practical ground on\nwhich the scheme of necessity plants itself. The object is, no doubt, a\nmost laudable one; but every laudable object is not always promoted by\nwise means. Let us see, then, if it be wise thus to assert the doctrine of\na necessitated agency, in order to abase the pride of man, and teach him a\nlesson of humility.\n\nIf we set out from this point of view, it will be found exceedingly\ndifficult, if not impossible, to tell when and where to stop. In fact,\nthose who rely upon this kind of argument, often carry it much too far;\nand if we look around us, we shall find that the only means of escaping\nthe charge of pride, is to swallow all the doctrines which the teachers of\nhumility may be pleased to present to us. Thus, for example, Spinoza would\nhave us to believe that man is not a person at all, but a mere fugitive\nmode of the Divine Being. Nothing is more ridiculous, in his eyes, than\nthat so insignificant a thing as a man should aspire to the rank of a\ndistinct, personal existence, and assume to himself the attribute of\nfree-will. \u201cThe free-will,\u201d says he, \u201cis a chimera of the same kind,\nflattered by our pride, and in reality founded upon our ignorance.\u201d Now it\nmay not be very humble in us, but still we beg leave to protest against\nthis entire annihilation of our being.\n\nEven M. Comte, who in his extreme modesty, denies the existence of a God,\ninsists that it is nothing but the fumes of pride and self-conceit, the\nintoxication of vanity, which induces us to imagine that we are free and\naccountable beings. No doubt he would consider us sufficiently humble and\nsubmissive, provided we would only forswear all the light which shines\nwithin us and around us, and swallow his atheistical dogmas. But there is\nsomething more valuable in the universe, if we mistake not, than even a\nreputation for humility.\n\nBut no one will expect us to go so far in self-abasement and humility, as\nto submit our intellects to all sorts of dogmas. It will be amply\nsufficient, if we only go just far enough to receive the dogmas of his\nparticular creed. Thus, for example, if you assail the doctrine of\nnecessity, on which, as we have seen, Calvinism erects itself, the\nPuseyite will clasp his hands, and cry out, \u201cWell done!\u201d But if you turn\naround and oppose any of his dogmas, then what pride and presumption to\nset up your individual opinion against \u201cthe decisions of the mother\nChurch!\u201d(153) And he will be sure to wind up his lesson of humility with\nthat of St. Vincentius: \u201c_Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus._\u201d\nSeeing, then, that a reputation for humility is not the greatest good in\nthe universe, and that the only possibility of obtaining it, even from one\nparty, is by a submission of the intellect to its creed; would it not be\nas well to leave such a reputation to take care of itself, and use all\nexertions to search out and find the truth?\n\nTell a carnal, unregenerate man, it is said, that though God had physical\npower to create him, he has not moral power to govern him, and you could\nnot furnish his mind with better aliment for pride and rebellion. Should\nyou, after giving this lesson, press upon him the claims of Jehovah, you\nmight expect to be answered, as Moses was by the proud oppressor of\nIsrael: \u201cWho is the Lord, that I should obey his voice?\u201d(154) He must,\nindeed, be an exceedingly _carnal man_, who should draw such an inference\nfrom the doctrine in question. But we should not tell him that \u201cGod had no\nmoral power to govern him.\u201d We should tell him, that God could not control\nall his volitions; that he could not govern him as a machine is governed,\nwithout destroying his free-agency; but we should still insist that he\npossessed the most absolute and uncontrollable power to govern him; that\nGod can give him a perfect moral law, and power to obey it, with the most\nstupendous motives for obedience; and then, if he persist in his\ndisobedience, God can, and will, shut him up in torments forever, that\nothers, seeing the awful consequences of rebellion, may keep their\nallegiance to him. Is this to deny the power of God to govern his\ncreatures?\n\nBut is it not wonderful that a Calvinist should undertake to test a\ndoctrine by the consequences which a \u201cproud oppressor,\u201d or \u201ca carnal man,\u201d\nmight draw from it? If we should tell such a man, that God possesses the\nabsolute power to control his volitions, and that nothing ever happens on\nearth but in perfect accordance with his good will and pleasure, might we\nnot expect him to conclude, that he would then leave the matter with God,\nand give himself no trouble about it?\n\nIf we may judge from the practical effect of doctrines, then the authors\nof the objection in question do not take the best method to inculcate the\nlesson of humility. They take the precise course pursued by Melanchthon,\nand often with the same success. This great reformer, it is well known,\nundertook to frame his doctrine so as to teach humility and submission:\nwith this view he went so far as to insist, that man was so insignificant\na thing, that he could not act at all, except in so far as he was acted\nupon by the Divine Being. Having reached this position, he not only saw,\nbut expressly adopted the conclusion, that God is the author of all the\nvolitions of men; that he was the author of David\u2019s adultery as well as of\nSaul\u2019s conversion.\n\nNow, it is true, if the human mind could abase itself so low as to embrace\nsuch a doctrine, it would give a most complete, if not a most pleasing\nexample of its submissiveness. But it cannot very well do so. For even\namid the ruins of our fallen nature, there are some fragments left, which\nraise the intellect and moral nature of man above so blind and so abject a\nsubmission to the dominion of error. Hence it was, that Melanchthon\nhimself could not long submit to his own doctrine; and he who had\nundertaken to teach others humility, became one of the most illustrious of\nrebels. This suggests the profound aphorism of Pascal: \u201cIt is dangerous to\nmake us see too much how near man is to the brutes, without showing him\nhis greatness. It is also dangerous to make him see his greatness without\nhis baseness. It is still more dangerous to leave him ignorant of both.\nBut it is very advantageous to represent to him both the one and the\nother.\u201d(155)\n\nThe fact is, that nothing can teach the human intellect a genuine\nsubmission but the light of evidence: this, and this alone, can rivet upon\nour speculative faculty the chains of inevitable conviction, and bind it\nto the truth. Those who teach error, then, may preach humility with\nsuccess to the blind and the unthinking; but wherever men may be disposed\nto think for themselves, they must expect to find rebels. How many at the\npresent day have begun, like Melanchthon, by the preaching of submission,\nand ended by the practice of rebellion against their own doctrines. It is\nwonderful to observe the style of criticism usually adopted by the\nfaithful, as one illustrious rebel after another is seen to depart from\ntheir ranks. The moment he is known to doubt a single dogma of the\nestablished faith, the awful suspicion is set afloat, \u201cthere is no telling\nwhere he will end.\u201d Alas! this is but too true; for when a man has once\ndiscovered that what he has been taught all his life to regard and\nreverence as a great mystery, is in reality an absurdity and an imposition\non his reason, there is no telling where he will end. The reaction may be\nso great, indeed, as to produce an entire shipwreck of his faith. But in\nthis case, let us not chide our poor lost brother with pride and\npresumption, as if we ourselves were unstained with the same sin. Let us\nremember, that the fault may be partly our own, as well as his. Let us\nremember, that the sin of not even every unwarrantable innovation, is\nexclusively imputable to the innovator himself. For, as Lord Bacon says,\n\u201cA froward retention of customs is a great innovator.\u201d\n\nIf those who, some centuries ago, formed the various creeds of the\nChristian world, were fallible men, and if they permitted serious errors\nto creep into the great mass of religious truth contained in those creeds,\nthen the best way to prevent innovation is, not to preach humility and\nsubmission, but to bring those formularies into a conformity with the\ntruth. For, if the \u201cOld Theology\u201d be unsound, the \u201cNew Theology\u201d will have\nthe audacity to show itself. And who, among the children of men, will set\nbounds to the progress of the human mind, either in the direction of God\u2019s\nword or his work, and say, Hitherto shalt thou come, and here shall thy\nproud waves be stayed? Who will lash the winds into submission, or bind\nthe raging ocean at his feet?\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with gratitude to God.\n\n\n\u201cSuch reflections,\u201d it has been urged, \u201cafford as little ground for\ngratitude as for submission. Why do we feel grateful to God for those\nfavours which are conferred on us by the agency of our fellow-men, except\non the principle that they are instruments in _his_ hand, who, without\n\u2018offering the least violence to their wills, or taking away the liberty or\ncontingency of second causes,\u2019 hath most sovereign dominion over them, to\ndo by them, and upon them, whatsoever himself pleaseth? On any other\nground, _they_ would be worthy of the principal, and He of the secondary\npraise.\u201d(156) True, if men are \u201c_only instruments in his hand_,\u201d we should\ngive him all the praise; but we should never feel grateful to our earthly\nfriends and benefactors. As we should not, on this hypothesis, be grateful\nfor the greatest benefits conferred on us by our fellow-men; so, in the\nlanguage of Hartley, and Belsham, and Diderot, we should never resent, nor\ncensure, the greatest injuries committed by the greatest criminals. But on\nour principles, while we have infinite ground for gratitude to God, we\nalso have some little room for gratitude to our fellow-men.\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nIt may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties\nagainst the scheme of necessity; inasmuch as the same, or as great,\ndifficulties attach to the system of those by whom they are urged.\n\n\nThis is the great standing objection with all the advocates of necessity.\nIndeed, we sometimes find it conceded by the advocates of free-agency; of\nwhich concessions the opposite party are ever ready and eager to avail\nthemselves. In the statement of this fact, I do not mean to complain of a\nzeal which all candid minds must acknowledge to be commendable on the part\nof the advocates of necessity. It is a fact, however, that the following\nlanguage of Archbishop Whately, in relation to the difficulty of\naccounting for the origin of evil, is often quoted by them: \u201cLet it be\nremembered, that it is not peculiar to any one theological system: let not\ntherefore the Calvinist or the Arminian urge it as an objection against\ntheir respective adversaries; much less an objection clothed in offensive\nlanguage, which will be found to recoil on their own religious tenets, as\nsoon as it shall be perceived that both parties are alike unable to\nexplain the difficulty; let them not, to destroy an opponent\u2019s system,\nrashly kindle a fire which will soon extend to the no less combustible\nstructure of their own.\u201d\n\nNo one can doubt the justice or wisdom of such a maxim; and it would be\nwell if it were observed by all who may be disposed to assail an\nadversary\u2019s scheme with objections. Every such person should first ask\nhimself whether his objection might not be retorted, or the shaft be\nhurled back with destructive force at the assailant. But although the\nremark of Archbishop Whately is both wise and just, it is not altogether\nso in its application to Archbishop King, or to other Arminians. For\nexample, it is conceded by Dr. Reid, that he had not found the means of\nreconciling the existence of moral evil with the perfections of God; but\nis this any reason why he should not shrink with abhorrence from the\ndoctrine of necessity which so clearly appeared to him to make God the\ndirect and proper cause of moral evil? \u201cWe acknowledge,\u201d says he, \u201cthat\nnothing can happen under the administration of the Deity which he does not\npermit. The permission of natural and moral evil is a phenomenon which\ncannot be disputed. To account for this phenomenon under the government of\na Being of infinite goodness, has, in all ages, been considered as\ndifficult to human reason, whether we embrace the system of liberty or\nthat of necessity.\u201d But because he could not solve this difficulty, must\nhe therefore embrace, or at least cease to object against every absurdity\nwhich may be propounded to him? Because he cannot comprehend why an\ninfinitely good Being should permit sin, does it follow that he should\ncease to protest against making God the proper cause and agent of all\nmoral evil as well as good? In his opinion, the scheme of necessity does\nthis; and hence he very properly remarks: \u201cThis view of the divine nature,\nthe only one consistent with the scheme of necessity, appears to me much\nmore shocking than the permission of evil upon the scheme of liberty. It\nis said, that it requires only _strength of mind_ to embrace it: to me it\nseems to require much strength of countenance to profess it.\u201d In this\nsentiment of Dr. Reid the moral sense and reason of mankind will, I have\nno doubt, perfectly concur. For although we may not be able to clear up\nthe stupendous difficulties pertaining to the spiritual universe, this is\nno reason why we may be permitted to deepen them into absurdities, and\ncause them to bear, in the harshest and most revolting form, upon the\nmoral sentiments of mankind.\n\nThe reason why Dr. Reid and others could not remove the great difficulty\nconcerning the origin of evil is, as we have seen, because they proceeded\non the supposition that God could create a moral system, and yet\nnecessarily exclude all sin from it. This mistake, it seems to me, has\nalready been sufficiently refuted, and the existence of moral evil brought\ninto perfect accordance and harmony with the infinite holiness of God.\n\nBut it is strenuously insisted, in particular, that the divine\nforeknowledge of all future events establishes their necessity; and thus\ninvolves the advocates of that sublime attribute in all the difficulties\nagainst which they so loudly declaim. As I have examined this argument in\nanother place,(157) I shall not dwell upon it here, but content myself\nwith a few additional remarks. The whole strength of this argument in\nfavour of necessity arises from the assumption, that if God foresees the\nfuture volitions of men, they must be bound together with other things\naccording to the mechanism of cause and effect; that is to say that God\ncould not foresee the voluntary acts of men, unless they should be\nnecessitated by causes ultimately connected with his own will.\nAccordingly, this bold position is usually assumed by the advocates of\nnecessity. But to say that God could not foreknow future events, unless\nthey are indissolubly connected together, seems to be a tremendous flight\nfor any finite mind; and especially for those who are always reminding us\nof the melancholy fact of human blindness and presumption. Who shall set\nlimits to the modes of knowledge possessed by an infinite,\nall-comprehending mind? Who shall tell _how_ God foresees future events?\nWho shall say it must be in this or that particular way, or it cannot be\nat all?\n\nLet the necessitarian prove his assumption, let him make it clear that God\ncould not foreknow future events unless they are necessitated, and he will\nplace in the hands of the sceptic the means of demonstrating, with\nabsolute and uncontrollable certainty, that God does not foreknow all\nfuture events at all, that he does not foresee the free voluntary acts of\nthe human mind. For we do know, as clearly as we can possibly know\nanything, not even excepting our own existence, or the existence of a God,\nthat we are free in our volitions, that they are not necessitated; and\nhence, according to the assumption in question, God could not foresee\nthem. If the sceptic could see what the necessitarian affirms, he might\nproceed from what he _knows_, by a direct and irresistible process, to a\ndenial of the foreknowledge of God, in relation to human volitions.\n\nBut fortunately the assumption of the necessitarian is not true. By the\nfundamental laws of human belief, we know that our acts are not\nnecessitated; and hence, we infer that as God foresees them all, he may do\nso without proceeding from cause to effect, according to the method of\nfinite minds. We thus reason from the _known_ to the _unknown_; from the\nclear light of facts around us up to the dark question concerning the\npossibility of the modes in relation to the divine prescience. We would\nnot first settle this question of possibility, we would not say that God\ncannot foreknow except in one particular way, and then proceed to reason\nfrom such a postulate against the clearest facts in the universe. No\nlogic, and especially no logic based upon so obscure a foundation, shall\never be permitted to extinguish for us the light of facts, or convert the\nuniversal intelligence of man into a falsehood.\n\nThose who argue from foreknowledge in favour of necessity, usually admit\nthat there is neither _before_ nor _after_ with God. This is emphatically\nthe case with the Edwardses. Hence, foreknowledge infers necessity in no\nother sense than it is inferred by present or concomitant knowledge. This\nis also freely conceded by President Edwards. In what sense, then, does\npresent knowledge infer necessity? Let us see. I know a man is now walking\nbefore me; does this prove that he could not help walking? that he is\nnecessitated to walk? It is plain that it infers no such thing. It infers\nthe necessary connexion, not between the act of the man in walking and the\ncauses impelling him thereto, but between my knowledge of the fact and the\nexistence of the fact itself. This is a necessary connexion between two\nideas, or propositions, and not between two events. This confusion is\nperpetually made in the \u201cgreat demonstration\u201d from foreknowledge in favour\nof necessity. It proves nothing, except that the greatest minds may be\ndeceived and misled by the ambiguities of language.\n\nThis argument, we say, only shows a necessary connexion between two ideas\nor propositions. This is perfectly evident from the very words in which it\nis often stated by the advocates of necessity. \u201cI freely allow,\u201d says\nPresident Edwards, \u201cthat foreknowledge does not prove a thing necessary\nany more than after-knowledge; but the after-knowledge, which is certain\nand infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the\nproposition known should be true.\u201d Now, here we have a necessary connexion\nbetween the certain and infallible knowledge of a thing, and the\ninfallible certainty of its existence! What has this to do with the\nquestion about the will? If any man has ever undertaken to assert its\nfreedom, by denying the necessary connexion between two or more ideas,\npropositions, or truths, this argument may be applied to him; we have\nnothing to do with it.\n\nAgain: \u201cTo suppose the future volitions of moral agents,\u201d says President\nEdwards, \u201cnot to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events\nwhich are not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to\nsuppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to\nsuppose God\u2019s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that\nGod certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will\ninfallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so _contingent_ that\nit may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with\nitself; or that one thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another\nthing he knows. It is the same thing as to say, he now knows a proposition\nto be of certain infallible truth which he knows to be of contingent\nuncertain truth.\u201d Now all this is true. If we affirm God\u2019s foreknowledge\nto be certain and at the same time to be uncertain, we contradict\nourselves. But what has this necessary connexion between the elements of\nthe divine foreknowledge, or between our propositions concerning them, to\ndo with the necessary connexion among _events_?\n\nThe question is not whether all future events will certainly come to pass;\nor, in other words, whether all future events are future events; for this\nis a truism, which no man in his right mind can possibly deny. But the\nquestion is, whether all future events will be determined by necessitating\ncauses, or whether they may not be, in part, the free unnecessitated acts\nof the human mind. This is the question, and let it not be lost sight of\nin a cloud of logomachy. If all future events are necessitated, then all\npast events are necessitated. But if we know anything, we know that all\npresent events are not necessitated, and hence, all future events will not\nbe necessitated. We deem it always safer to reason thus _from the known to\nthe unknown_, than to invert the process.\n\nBut suppose that foreknowledge proves that all human volitions are under\nthe influence of causes, in what sense does it leave them free? Does it\nleave them free to depart from the influence of motives? By no means. It\nwould be a contradiction in terms, according to this argument, to say that\nthey are certainly and infallibly foreknown, and yet that they may\npossibly not come to pass. Hence, if the argument proves anything, it\nproves the absolute fatality of all human volitions. It leaves not a\nfragment nor a shadow of moral liberty on earth.\n\nIf this argument prove anything to the purpose, then Luther was right in\ndeclaring that \u201cthe foreknowledge of God is a thunderbolt to dash the\ndoctrine of free-will into atoms;\u201d and Dr. Dick is right in affirming,\n\u201cthat it is as impossible to avoid them\u201d (our volitions) \u201cas it is to\npluck the sun out of the firmament.\u201d(158) It either proves all the most\nabsolute necessitarian could desire, or it proves nothing. In our humble\nopinion it proves the latter.\n\nOn this point the testimony of Dr. Dick himself is explicit: \u201cWhatever is\nthe foundation of his foreknowledge,\u201d says he, \u201cwhat he does foreknow will\nundoubtedly take place. Hence, then, _the actions of men are as\nunalterably fixed from eternity, as if they had been the subject of an\nimmutable decree_.\u201d(159) But to dispel this grand illusion, it should be\nremembered, that the actions of men will not come to pass because they are\nforeknown; but they are foreknown because they will come to pass. The free\nactions of men are clearly reflected back in the mirror of the divine\nomniscience\u2014they are not projected forward from the engine of the divine\nomnipotence.\n\nSince the argument in question proves so much, if it proves anything, we\nneed not wonder that it was employed by Cicero and other ancient Stoics to\nestablish the doctrine of an absolute and unconditional fate. \u201cIf the will\nis free,\u201d says he, \u201cthen fate does not rule everything, then the order of\nall causes is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in\nthe prescience of God; if the order of things is not certain in the\nprescience of God, then things will not take place as he foresees them;\nand if things do not take place as he foresees, there is no foreknowledge\nin God.\u201d Thus, by a _reductio ad absurdum_, he establishes the position\nthat the will is not free, but fate rules all things. Edwards and Dick,\nhowever, would only apply this argument to human volitions. But are not\nthe volitions of the divine mind also foreknown? Certainly they are; this\nwill not be denied. Hence, the very men who set out to exalt the power of\nGod and abase the glory of man, have, by this argument, raised a dominion,\nnot only over the power of man, but also over the power of God himself. In\nother words, if this argument proves that we cannot act unless we be first\nacted upon, and impelled to act, it proves no less in relation to God; and\nhence, if it show the weakness and dependence of men, it also shows the\nweakness and dependence of God. So apt are men to adopt arguments which\ndefeat their own object, whenever they have any other object than the\ndiscovery of truth.\n\nIt is frequently said, as we have seen, that it is a contradiction to\naffirm that a thing is foreknown, or will certainly come to pass, and that\nit may possibly not come to pass. This position is at least as old as\nAristotle. But let it be borne in mind, that if this be a contradiction,\nthen future events are placed, not only beyond the power of man, but also\nbeyond the power of God itself; for it is conceded on all hands, that God\ncannot work contradictions. This famous argument entirely overlooks the\nquestion of power. It simply declares the thing to be a contradiction, and\nas such, placed above all power. In other words, if it be absurd or\nself-contradictory to say, that a future event is foreknown, and, at the\nsame time, _might_ not come to pass, this proposition is true of the\nvolitions of the divine no less than of the human mind; for they are all\nalike foreknown. That is to say, if the argument from foreknowledge proves\nthat the volitions of man _might_ not have been otherwise than they are,\nit proves precisely the same thing in regard to the volitions of God.\nThus, if this argument proves anything to the purpose, it reaches the\nappalling position of Spinoza, that nothing in the universe could possibly\nbe otherwise than it is. And if this be so, then let the Calvinist decide\nwhether he will join with the Pantheist and fatalist, or give some little\nquarter to the Arminian. Let him decide whether he will continue to employ\nan argument which, if it proves anything, demonstrates the dependency of\nthe divine will as well as of the human; and instead of exalting the\nadorable sovereignty of God, subjects him to the dominion of fate.\n\n\n\n\n\n Part II.\n\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, CONSISTENT WITH THE GOODNESS\nOF GOD.\n\n\n The path of sorrow, and that path alone,\n Leads to the land where sorrow is unknown.\n\n But He, who knew what human hearts would prove,\n How slow to learn the dictates of his love,\n That, hard by nature and of stubborn will,\n A life of ease would make them harder still,\n In pity to the souls his grace design\u2019d\n For rescue from the ruin of mankind,\n Call\u2019d forth a cloud to darken all their years,\n And said, \u201cGo, spend them in the vale of tears.\u201d\u2014COWPER.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter I.\n\n\nGod Desires And Seeks The Salvation of All Men.\n\n\n Love is the root of creation,\u2014God\u2019s essence.\n Worlds without number\n Lie in his bosom, like children: he made them for this purpose\n only,\u2014\n Only to love, and be loved again. He breathed forth his Spirit\n Into the slumbering dust, and, upright standing, it laid its\n Hand on its heart, and felt it was warm with a flame out of\n heaven.\u2014TEGNER.\n\n\nThe attentive reader has perceived before this time, that one of the\nfundamental ideas, one of the great leading truths, of the present\ndiscourse is, that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms,\u2014an\ninherent and utter impossibility. This truth has shown us why a Being of\ninfinite purity does not cause virtue to prevail everywhere, and at all\ntimes. If virtue could be necessitated to exist, there seems to be no\ndoubt that such a Being would cause it to shine out in all parts of his\ndominion, and the blot of sin would not be seen upon the beauty of the\nworld. But although moral goodness cannot be necessitated to exist, yet\nGod has attested his abhorrence of vice and his approbation of virtue, by\nthe dispensation of natural good and evil, of pleasure and pain. Having\nmarked out the path of duty for us, he has made such a distribution of\nnatural good and evil as is adapted to keep us therein. The evident design\nof this arrangement is, as theologians and philosophers agree, to prevent\nthe commission of evil, and secure the practice of virtue. The Supreme\nRuler of the world adopts this method to promote that moral goodness which\ncannot be produced by the direct omnipotency of his power.\n\nHence, it must be evident, that although God desires the happiness of his\nrational and accountable creatures, he does not bestow happiness upon them\nwithout regard to their moral character. The great dispensation of his\nnatural providence, as well as the express declaration of his word,\nforbids the inference that he desires the happiness of those who\nobstinately persist in their evil courses. If we may rely upon such\ntestimony, he desires _first_ the _holiness_ of his intelligent creatures,\nand _next_ their _happiness_. Hence, it is well said by Bishop Butler,\nthat the \u201cdivine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free\nin our speculations, _may not be a bare, single disposition to produce\nhappiness_, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest\nman happy.\u201d(160)\n\nHe desires the holiness of all, that all may have life. This great truth\nis so clearly and so emphatically set forth in revelation, and it so\nperfectly harmonizes with the most pleasing conceptions of the divine\ncharacter, that one is filled with amazement to reflect how many crude\nundigested notions there are in the minds of professing Christians, which\nare utterly inconsistent with it. \u201cAs I live, saith the Lord God, I have\nno pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his\nway, and live. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die?\u201d This solemn\nasseveration that God desires not the death of the sinner, but that he\nshould turn from his wickedness and live, one would suppose should satisfy\nevery mind which reposes confidence in the divine origin of revelation.\nAnd yet, until the minds of men are purged from the films of a false\nphilosophy and sectarian prejudice, they seem afraid to look at the plain,\nobvious meaning of this and other similar passages of Scripture. They will\nhave it, that God desires the ultimate holiness and happiness of only a\nportion of mankind, and the destruction of all the rest; that upon some he\nbestows his grace, causing them to become holy and happy, and appear\nforever as the monuments of his mercy; while from some he withholds his\nsaving grace, that they may become the fearful objects of his indignation\nand wrath. Such a display of the divine character seems to be equally\nunknown to reason and to revelation.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe reason why theologians have concluded that God designs the salvation\nof only a part of mankind.\n\n\nThe reason why so many theologians come to so frightful a conclusion is,\nthat they imagine God could very easily cause virtue in the breast of\nevery moral agent, if he would. Hence arises in their minds the stupendous\ndifficulty, \u201cHow can God really desire the holiness and happiness of all,\nsince he refuses to make all holy and happy? Is he really in earnest, in\npleading with sinners to turn from their wickedness, since he might so\neasily turn them, and yet will not do it? Is the great God really sincere\nin the offer of salvation to all, and in the grand preparations he hath\nmade to secure their salvation, since he will not put forth his mighty,\nirresistible hand to save them?\u201d Such is the great difficulty which has\narisen from the imagination in question, and confounded theology for ages,\nas well as cast a dark shadow upon the Christian world. It is only by\ngetting rid of this unfounded imagination, this false supposition, that\nthis stupendous difficulty can be solved, and the glory of the divine\ngovernment clearly vindicated.\n\nWe have before us Mr. Symington\u2019s able and plausible defence of a limited\natonement, in which he says, that \u201c_the event is the best interpreter of\nthe divine intention_.\u201d Hence he infers, that as all are not actually\nsaved, it was not the design of God that all should be saved, and no\nprovision is really made for their salvation. This argument is plausible.\nIt is often employed by the school of theologians to which the author\nbelongs, and employed with great effect. But is it sound? No doubt it has\noften been shown to be unsound _indirectly_; that is, by showing that the\nconclusion at which it arrives comes into conflict with the express\ndeclarations of Scripture, as well as with our notions of the perfections\nof God. But this is not to analyze the argument itself, and show it to be\na sophism. Nor can this be done, so long as the principle from which the\nconclusion necessarily follows be admitted. If we admit, then, that God\ncould very easily cause virtue or moral goodness to exist everywhere, we\nmust conclude that \u201c_the event is the best interpreter_ of the divine\nintention;\u201d and that the atonement and all other provisions for the\nsalvation of men are limited in extent by the design of God. That is to\nsay, if we admit the premiss assumed by Mr. Symington and his school, we\ncannot consistently deny their conclusion.\n\nNor could we resist a great many other conclusions which are frightful in\nthe extreme. For if God could easily make all men holy, as it is contended\nhe can, then the event is the best evidence of his real intention and\ndesign. Hence he really did not design the salvation of all men. When he\ngave man a holy law, he really did not intend that he should obey and\nlive, but that he should transgress and die. When he created the world, he\nreally did not intend that all should reach the abodes of eternal bliss,\nbut that some should be ruined and lost forever. Such are some of the\nconsequences which necessarily flow from the principle, that holiness may\nbe caused to exist in the breast of every moral agent. This is not all. We\nhave before us another book, which insists that since the world was\ncreated, the law of God has never been violated, because his will cannot\nbe resisted. Hence, it is seriously urged, that if theft, or adultery, or\nmurder, be perpetrated, it must be in accordance with the will of God, and\nconsequently no sin in his sight. \u201cThe whole notion of sinning against\nGod,\u201d this book says, \u201cis perfectly puerile.\u201d Now all this vile stuff\nproceeds on the supposition, that \u201cthe event is the best interpreter of\nthe divine intention;\u201d and it rests upon that supposition with just as\ngreat security, as does the argument in favour of a limited atonement.\nThough we may well give such stuff to the winds, or trample it under foot\nwith infinite scorn, as an outrage against the moral sentiments of\nmankind; yet we cannot meet it on the arena of logic, if we concede that\nholiness may be everywhere caused to exist, and universal obedience to the\ndivine will secured.\n\nThe only principle, it clearly seems to us, on which we can reconcile such\nglaring discrepancies between the express will of God and the event, is,\nthat the event is of such a nature that it is not an object of power, or\ncannot be caused to exist by the Divine Omnipotence. For his \u201csecret\nwill,\u201d or rather his executive will, is always in perfect harmony with his\nrevealed will. It is from an inattention to the foregoing principle, that\ntheologians have not been able to see and vindicate the sincerity of God,\nin the offer of salvation to all men. We have examined their efforts to\nremove this difficulty, and been constrained to agree with Dr. Dick, that\n\u201cwe may pronounce these attempts to reconcile the universal call of the\ngospel with the sincerity of God, to be a faint struggle to extricate\nourselves from the profundities of theology.\u201d But on looking into those\nsolutions again, in which for some years we found a sort of rest, we could\nclearly perceive why theology had struggled in vain to deliver itself from\nits profound embarrassments on this subject, as well as on many others.\nThese solutions admit the very principle which necessarily creates the\ndifficulty, and renders a satisfactory answer impossible. Discard this\nfalse principle, substitute the truth in its stead, and the sincerity of\nGod will come out from every obscurity, and shine with unclouded\nsplendour.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of mankind\nwith the sincerity of God in his endeavours to save them.\n\n\nTo illustrate the justness of the remark just made, we shall select that\nsolution of the difficulty in question which has been deemed the most\nprofound and satisfactory. We mean the solution of \u201cthe wonderful\nHowe.\u201d(161) This celebrated divine clearly saw the impossibility of\nreconciling the sincerity of God with the offer of salvation to all, on\nthe supposition that he does anything to prevent the salvation, or promote\nthe ruin of those who are finally lost. He rejects the scheme of\nnecessity, or a concurrence of the divine will, in relation to the sinful\nvolitions of men, as aggravating the difficulty which he had undertaken to\nsolve. This was one great step towards a solution. But it still remained\nto \u201creconcile God\u2019s prescience of the sins of men with the wisdom and\nsincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and whatsoever means he uses to\nprevent them.\u201d Let us see how he has succeeded in his attempt to\naccomplish this great object.\n\nHe admits in this very attempt, \u201cthat the universal, continued rectitude\nof all intelligent creatures had, we may be sure, been willed with a\nperemptory, efficacious will, if it had been best.\u201d He expressly says,\nthat God might have prevented sin from raising its head in his dominions,\nif he had chosen to do so. \u201cNor was it less easy,\u201d says he, \u201cby a mighty,\nirresistible hand, universally to expel sin, than to prevent it.\u201d Now,\nhaving made this concession, was it possible for him to vindicate the\nsincerity and wisdom of God in the use of means to prevent sin, which he\nforesaw must fail to a very great extent?\n\nAfter having made such an admission, or rather after having assumed such a\nposition, we think it may be clearly shown that the author was doomed to\nfail; and that he has deceived himself by false analogies in his gigantic\nefforts to vindicate the character of God. He says, for example: \u201cWe will,\nfor discourse\u2019s sake, suppose a prince endowed with the gift or spirit of\nprophecy. This most will acknowledge a great perfection, added to\nwhatsoever other of his accomplishments. And suppose this his prophetic\nability to be so large as to extend to most events which fall out in his\ndominions. Is it hereby become unfit for him to govern his subjects by\nlaws, or any way admonish them of their duty? Hath this perfection so much\ndiminished him as to depose him from his government? It is not, indeed, to\nbe dissembled, that it were a difficulty to determine, whether such\nforesight were, for himself, better or worse. Boundless knowledge seems\nonly in a fit conjunction with an unbounded power. But it is altogether\nunimaginable that it should destroy his relation to his subjects; as what\nof it were left, if it should despoil him of his legislative power and\ncapacity of governing according to laws made by it? And to bring back the\nmatter to the Supreme Ruler: let it for the present be supposed only, that\nthe blessed God hath, belonging to his nature, the universal prescience\nwhereof we are discoursing; we will surely, upon that supposition,\nacknowledge it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to\naffirm, that by a perfection he is disabled from government? or were it a\ngood consequence, \u2018He foreknows all things\u2014he is therefore unfit to govern\nthe world?\u2019 \u201d\n\nThis way of representing the matter, it must be confessed, is exceedingly\nplausible and taking at first view; but yet, if we examine it closely, we\nshall find that it does not touch the real knot of the difficulty. The\ncases are not parallel. The prince is endowed with a foreknowledge of\noffences, which it is not in his power wholly to prevent. Hence it may be\nperfectly consistent with his wisdom and sincerity, to use all the means\nin his power to prevent them, though he may see they will fail in some\ncases, while they will succeed in others. But God, according to the\nauthor, might prevent all sin, or exclude it all from his dominions by\n\u201chis mighty, irresistible hand.\u201d Hence it may not be consistent with his\nwisdom and sincerity to use means which he foresees will have only partial\nsuccess, when he might so easily obtain universal and perfect success. It\nseems evident, then, that this is a deceptive analogy. It overlooks the\nroot, and grapples with the branches of the difficulty. Let it be seen,\nthat no power can cause the universal, continued moral rectitude of\nintelligent creatures, and then the two cases will be parallel; and God\nmay well use all possible means to prevent sin and cause holiness, though\nsome of his subjects may resist and perish. Let this principle, which we\nhave laboured to establish, be seen, and then may we entirely dispel the\ncloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom and sincerity of\nthe Supreme Ruler of the world. We might offer strictures upon other\npassages of the solution under consideration; but as the same error runs\nthrough all of them, the reader may easily unravel its remaining\nobscurities and embarrassments for himself.\n\nIf holiness cannot be caused by a _direct_ application of power, it\nfollows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of _indirect_ means, or\nof sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means the nature of the\ncase will admit: but if universal holiness may be caused to exist by a\nmere word, then indeed it seems to be clearly inconsistent with wisdom to\nresort to means which must fail to secure it, and with sincerity to utter\nthe most solemn and vehement asseverations that it is the will of God to\nsecure it; for how obvious is the inquiry, If he so earnestly desire it,\nand can so easily secure it, why does he not do it?\n\nIn rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid the usual\npenalty of denying the truth; that is, he has contradicted himself. \u201cIt\nwere very unreasonable to imagine,\u201d says he, \u201cthat God cannot, in any\ncase, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of\nsuch a creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we\nparticularly know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to\ninquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in many cases\nhe doth.\u201d Here he affirms, that our wills may be overruled and determined\nin perfect _conformity to our natures_, in some way or other, though we\nknow not how. Why, then, does not God so overrule our wills in all cases,\nand secure the existence of universal holiness? Because, says he, \u201cit is\nmanifest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this should be\nthe ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the same persons at all\ntimes; that is, that the whole order of intelligent creatures should be\nmoved only by inward impulses; _that God\u2019s precepts, promises, and\ncomminations, whereof their nature is capable, should be all made\nimpertinences_, through his constant overpowering those that should\nneglect them; that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral\ngovernment, should be rendered to this purpose, _useless and vain_; and\nthat they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed _as mere\nmachines that know not their own use_.\u201d\n\nWhat strange confusion and self-contradiction! The wills of men may be,\nand often are, swayed by the mighty, irresistible hand of God, and in a\nway _agreeable to their nature_; and yet this is not done in all cases,\nlest men should be governed as _mere machines_! The laws, promises, and\nthreatenings of God, are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases,\nbut only in some cases! Indeed, if we would escape such inconsistencies\nand self-contradictions, we must return to the position that a necessary\nholiness is a contradiction in terms,\u2014that no power can cause it. From\nthis position we may clearly see, that the laws, promises, and\ncomminations; the counsels, exhortations, and influences of God, which are\nemployed to prevent sin, are not a system of grand impertinences,\u2014are not\na vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be more\nperfectly, easily, and directly accomplished without them. We may see,\nthat God really desires the holiness and happiness of all men, although\nsome may be finally lost; that he is in earnest in the great work of\nsalvation; and when he so solemnly declares that he has no pleasure in the\ndeath of the sinner, but would rather he should turn and live, he means\nprecisely what he says, without the least equivocation or mental\nreservation. This position it is, then, which shows the goodness of God in\nunclouded glory, and reconciles his sincerity with the final result of his\nlabours.\n\nBut we have not yet got rid of every shade of difficulty. For it may still\nbe asked, why God uses means to save those who he foresees will be lost?\nwhy he should labour when he foresees his labour will be in vain? To this\nwe answer, that it does not follow his labour will be in vain, because\nsome may be pleased to rebel and perish. This would be the case in regard\nto such persons, provided his only object in what he does be to save them;\nbut although this is one great end and aim of his agency, it does not\nfollow that it is his only object. For if any perish, it is certainly\ndesirable that it be from their own fault, and not from the neglect of God\nto provide them with the means of salvation. It is his object, as he tells\nus, to vindicate his own character, and to stop every mouth in regard to\nthe lost, as well as to save the greatest possible number. But this object\ncould not be accomplished, if some should be permitted to perish without\neven a possibility of salvation. Hence he gives to all the means, power,\nand opportunity to turn and live; and this fact is nearly always alluded\nto in relation to the finally impenitent and lost. Thus says our Saviour,\nwith tears of commiseration and pity: \u201cO Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often\nwould I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her\nchickens under her wings, and ye would not! Behold, your house is left\nunto you desolate.\u201d Now the tears of the Redeemer thus wept over lost\nsouls, and this eloquent vindication of his own and his Father\u2019s goodness\nand compassion, would be a perfect mockery, if salvation had never been\nplaced within their reach, or if their obedience, their real spiritual\nobedience and submission, might have been secured. But as it is, there is\nnot even the shadow of a ground for suspecting the sincerity of the\nRedeemer, or his being in earnest in the great work of saving souls.\n\nAgain the impenitent are addressed in the following awful language: \u201cTurn\nye at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make\nknown my words unto you. Because I have called, and ye refused; I have\nstretched out my hand and no man regarded; but ye have set at naught all\nmy counsel and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your\ncalamity: I will mock when your fear cometh.\u201d Thus the proceeding of the\nAlmighty, in the final rejection of the impenitent, is placed on the\nground, that they had obstinately resisted the means employed for their\nsalvation. This seems to remove every shade of difficulty. But how dark\nand enigmatical, nay, how self-contradictory, would all such language\nappear, if they might have been very easily rendered holy and happy! Thus,\nby bearing in mind that a necessary holiness is a contradiction, an absurd\nand impossible conceit, the goodness of God is vindicated in regard to the\nlost, and his sincerity is evinced in the offer of salvation to all.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of God in his\nendeavours to save those who will finally perish.\n\n\nOn any other principle, we must forever struggle in vain to accomplish so\ndesirable and so glorious an object. If we proceed on the assumption that\nholiness may be very easily caused by an omnipotent, extraneous agency, we\nshall never be able to vindicate the sincerity of the Almighty, in the\nmany solemn declarations put forth by him that he desires the salvation of\nall men. The only sound, logical inference for such premises, is that\ndrawn by Luther, namely, that when God exhorts the sinner, who he foresees\nwill remain impenitent, to turn from his wickedness and live, he does so\nmerely in the way of mockery and derision; just \u201cas if a father were to\nsay to his child, \u2018Come,\u2019 while he knows that he cannot come.\u201d(162)\n\nThe representation which Calvin, starting from the same point of view,\ngives of the divine character, is not more amiable or attractive than that\nof Luther. He maintains that \u201cthe most perfect harmony\u201d exists between\nthese two things: \u201cGod\u2019s having appointed from eternity on whom he will\nbestow his favour and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation\nindiscriminately to all.\u201d(163) But how does he maintain this position? How\ndoes he show this agreement? \u201cThere is more apparent plausibility,\u201d says\nhe, \u201cto the objection [against predestination] from the declaration of\nPeter, that \u2018the Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all\nshould come to repentance.\u2019 But the second clause furnishes an immediate\nsolution of the difficulty; for the willingness to come to repentance must\nbe understood in consistence with the general tenor of Scripture.\u201d(164)\nNow what is the general tenor of Scripture, which is to overrule this\nexplicit declaration that \u201cGod is not willing that any should perish?\u201d The\nreader will be surprised, perhaps, that it is not Scripture at all, but\nthe notion that God might easily convert the sinner if he would.\n\u201cConversion is certainly in the power of God;\u201d he adds, \u201clet him be asked,\nwhether he wills the conversion of all, when he promises a few individuals\nto give them \u2018a heart of flesh,\u2019 while he leaves them with \u2018a heart of\nstone.\u2019 \u201d Thus the very clearest light of the divine word is extinguished\nby the application of a false metaphysics. God tells us that he \u201cis not\nwilling that any should perish:\u201d Calvin tells us, that this declaration\nmust, in conformity with the general tenor of Scripture, be so understood\nas to allow us to believe that he is not only willing that many should\nperish, but also that their destruction is pre\u00f6rdained and forever fixed\nby an eternal and immutable decree of God. Nay, that they are, and were,\ncreated for the express purpose of being devoted to death, spiritual and\neternal. Is this to interpret, or to refute the divine word?\n\nThe view which Calvin, from this position, finds himself bound to take of\nthe divine character, is truly horrible, and makes one\u2019s blood run cold.\nThe call of the gospel, he admits, is universal\u2014is directed to the\nreprobate as well as to the elect; but to what end, or with what design,\nis it directed to the former? \u201cHe directs his voice to them,\u201d if we may\nbelieve Calvin, \u201cbut it is that they may become more deaf; he kindles a\nlight, but it is that they may be made more blind; he publishes his\ndoctrine, but it is that they may be more besotted; he applies a remedy,\nbut it is that they may not be healed. John, citing this prophecy,\ndeclares that the Jews could not believe, because the curse of God was\nupon them. Nor can it be disputed, that to such persons as God determines\nnot to enlighten, he delivers his doctrine involved in enigmatical\nobscurity, that its only effect may be to increase their stupidity.\u201d(165)\n\nIn conclusion, we would add that it is this idea of a necessitated\nholiness which gives apparent solidity to the arguments of the Calvinist,\nand which neutralizes the attacks of their opponents. To select only one\ninstance out of a thousand: the Calvinist insists that if God had really\nintended the salvation of all men, then all would have been saved; since\nnothing lies beyond the reach of his omnipotence. To this the Arminian\ncries out with horror, that if God does not desire the salvation of all,\nbut is willing that a portion should sin and be eternally lost, then his\ngoodness is limited, and his glory obscured. In perfect conformity with\nthese views, the one contends for a limited atonement, insisting that it\nis confined either in its original design, or in its application, to a\ncertain, fixed, definite number of mankind; while the other maintains,\nwith equal earnestness, that such is the goodness of God that he has sent\nforth his Son to make an atonement for the sins of the whole world. To\ndesign and prepare it for all, says the Calvinist, and then apply it only\nto a few, is not consistent with either the wisdom or goodness of God; and\nthat he does savingly apply it only to a small number of the human race is\nevident from the fact that only a small number are actually saved. However\nthe doctrine of a limited atonement, or, what is the same thing in effect,\nthe limited application of the atonement, may be exclaimed against and\ndenounced as dishonourable to God, all must and do admit the fact, that it\nis efficaciously applied to only a select portion of mankind; which is to\ndeny and to admit one and the same thing in one and the same breath.\n\nNow, in this contest of arms, it is our humble opinion that each party\ngets the better of the other. Each overthrows the other; but neither\nperceives that he is himself overthrown. Hence, though each demolishes the\nother, neither is convinced, and the controversy still rages. Nor can\nthere ever be an end of this wrangling and jangling while the arguments of\nthe opposite parties have their roots in a common error. Let the work of\nMr. Symington, or any other which advocates a limited atonement, be taken\nup, its argument dissected, and let the false principle, that God could\neasily make all men holy if he would, be eliminated from them, and we\nventure to predict that they will lose all appearance of solidity, and\nresolve themselves into thin air.(166)\n\n\n\n\n Chapter II.\n\n\nNatural Evil, Or Suffering, And Especially The Suffering Of Infants\nReconciled With The Goodness Of God.\n\n\n Sweet Eden was the arbour of delight;\n Yet in his lovely flowers our poison blew:\n Sad Gethsemane, the bower of baleful night,\n Where Christ a health of poison for us drew;\n Yet all our honey in that poison grew:\n So we from sweetest flowers could suck our bane,\n And Christ, from bitter venom, could again\n Extract life out of death, and pleasure out of pain.\u2014GILES\n FLETCHER.\n\n\nIf, as we have endeavoured to show, a necessary holiness is a\ncontradiction in terms, then the existence of natural evil may be easily\nreconciled with the divine goodness, in so far as it may be necessary to\npunish and prevent moral evil. Indeed, the divine goodness itself demands\nthe punishment of moral evil, in order to restrain its prevalence, and\nshut out the disorders it tends to introduce into the moral universe. Nor\nis it any impeachment of the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, if the\nevils inflicted upon the commission of sin be sufficiently great to answer\nthe purpose for which they are intended\u2014that is, to stay the frightful\nprogress and ravages of moral evil. Hence it was that the sin of one man\nbrought \u201cdeath into the world, and all our woe.\u201d Thus the good providence\nof God, no less than his word, speaks this tremendous lesson to his\nintelligent creatures: \u201cBehold the awful spectacle of a world lying in\nruins, and tremble at the very thought of sin! A thousand deaths are not\nso terrible as one sin!\u201d\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nAll suffering not a punishment for sin.\n\n\nWe should not conclude from this, however, that all suffering or natural\nevil bears the characteristic of a punishment for moral evil. This seems\nto be a great mistake of certain theologians, who pay more attention to\nthe coherency of their system than to the light of nature or of\nrevelation. Thus, says Dr. Dick: \u201cIf our antagonists will change the\nmeaning of words, they cannot alter the nature of things. Pain and death\nare evils, and when inflicted by the hand of a just God, _must be\npunishments_: for although the innocent may be harassed and destroyed by\nthe arbitrary exercise of human power, none but the guilty suffer under\nhis administration. To pretend that, although death and other temporal\nevils have come upon us through the sin of Adam, yet these are not to be\nregarded as a punishment, is neither more nor less than to say,\u2014they must\nnot be called a punishment, because this would not agree with our system.\nIf we should concede that they are a punishment, we should be compelled to\nadmit that the sin of the first man is imputed to his posterity, and that\nhe was their federal head. We deny, therefore, that the labours and\nsorrows of the present life, the loss of such joys as are left to us at\nits close, and the dreadful agonies and terrors with which death is often\nattended, have the nature of a penalty. In like manner, a man may call\nblack white, and bitter sweet, because it will serve his purpose; but he\nwould be the veriest simpleton who should believe him.\u201d\n\nNow, we do not deny that the agonies and terrors of death are sometimes a\npunishment for sin: this is the case in regard to all those who actually\ncommit sin, and sink into the grave amid the horrors of a guilty\nconscience. But the question is, Do suffering and death never fall upon\nthe innocent under the administration of God? We affirm that they do; and\nalso that they may fall upon the innocent, in perfect accordance with the\ninfinite goodness of God. In the first place, we reply to the confident\nassertions of Dr. Dick, and of the whole school to which he belongs, as\nfollows: To pretend that death and other temporal evils are _always\npunishments_, is neither more nor less than to say, \u201cthey _must_ be called\npunishments, because this would agree with our system. If we should\nconcede that they are _not_ a punishment, we should be compelled to admit\nthat the sin of the first man is not imputed to his posterity, and that he\nwas _not_ their federal head. If our antagonists,\u201d &c. Surely it is not\nvery wise to use language which may be so easily retorted.\n\nSecondly, it is true, the change of a word cannot alter the nature of\nthings; but it may alter, and very materially too, our view of the nature\nof things. Besides, if to refuse to call suffering in certain cases a\n_punishment_, be merely to change a word, why should so great an outcry be\nmade about it? Why may we not use that word which sounds the most\npleasantly to the ear, and sits the most easily upon the heart?\n\nThirdly, we do not arbitrarily and blindly reject the term _punishment_,\n\u201cbecause it does not agree with our system.\u201d We not only reject the term,\nbut also the very idea and the thing for which it stands. We mean to\naffirm, that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the administration of\nGod; and that all suffering is not a punishment for sin. The very idea of\npunishment, according to Dr. Dick himself, is, that it is suffering\ninflicted on account of sin in the person upon whom it is inflicted; and\nhence, wherever pain or death falls under the administration of God, we\nmust there find, says he, either actual or imputed sin. Now, in regard to\ncertain cases, we deny both the name and the thing. And we make this\ndenial, as it will be seen, not because it agrees with our system merely,\nbut because it agrees with the universal voice and reason of mankind,\nexcept where that voice has been silenced, and that reason perverted, by\ndark and blindly-dogmatizing schemes of theology.\n\nFourthly, there is a vast difference, in reality, between regarding some\nsufferings as mere calamities, and all suffering as _punishment_. If we\nregard all suffering as punishment, then we need look no higher and no\nfurther in order to vindicate the character of God in the infliction of\nthem. For, according to this view, they are the infliction of his\nretributive justice, merited by the person upon whom they fall, and\nadapted to prevent sin; and consequently here our inquiries may terminate;\njust as when we see the criminal receive the penalty due to his crimes. On\nthe other hand, if we may not view all suffering as punishment, then must\nwe seek for other grounds and principles on which to vindicate the\ngoodness of God; then must we look for other ends, or final causes, of\nsuffering under the wise economy of divine providence. And this search, as\nwe shall see, will lead us to behold the moral government of the world,\nnot as it is darkly distorted in certain systems of theology, but as it is\nin itself, replete with light and ineffable beauty.\n\nBut before we undertake to show this by direct arguments, let us pause and\nconsider the predicament to which the greatest divines have reduced\nthemselves, by their advocacy of such an imputation of the sin of one man.\nDr. Dick affirms, as we have seen, that every evil brought upon man under\nthe good providence of God, must be a punishment for sin; and hence, as\ninfants do not actually sin, they are exposed to divine wrath on account\nof the sin of Adam, which is imputed to them. But is not this imputation,\nwhich draws after itself pain and death, also an evil? How has it\nhappened, then, that in the good providence of God, this tremendous evil,\nthis frightful source of so many evils, has been permitted to fall on the\ninfant world? Must there not be some other sin imputed to justify the\ninfliction of such an evil, and so on _ad infinitum_? Will Dr. Dick carry\nout his principle to this consequence? Will he require, as in consistency\nhe is bound to require, that the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin\nshall not fall upon any part of God\u2019s creation, except as a punishment for\nsome antecedent guilt? No, indeed: at the very second step his great\nprinciple, so confidently and so dogmatically asserted, completely breaks\ndown under him. The imposition of this evil is justified, not by any\nantecedent guilt, but by the divine constitution, according to which Adam\nis the federal head and representative of the human race. Thus, after all,\nDr. Dick has found some principle or ground on which to justify the\ninfliction of evil, beside the principle of guilt or ill-desert. Might\nthere not possibly be, then, such a divine constitution of things, as to\nbring suffering upon the offspring of Adam in consequence of his sin,\nwithout resorting to the dark and enigmatical fiction of the imputation of\nhis transgression? If there be a divine constitution, as Dr. Dick contends\nthere is, which justifies the imputation of moral evil, with all its\nfrightful consequences, both temporal and eternal death, may it not be\npossible, in the nature of things, to suppose a divine constitution to\njustify suffering without the imputation of sin? How can the one of these\nthings be so utterly repugnant to the divine character, and the other so\nperfectly agreeable to it? Until this question be answered, we may suspect\nthe author himself of having assumed positions and made confident\nassertions, \u201cbecause they agree with his system.\u201d\n\n\u201cWe say, then,\u201d says Dr. Dick, \u201cthat by his sin his posterity became\nliable to the punishment denounced against himself. They became guilty\nthrough his guilt, which is imputed to them, or placed to their account;\nso that they are treated as if they had personally broken the covenant.\u201d\nThus all the posterity of Adam, not excepting infants, became justly\nobnoxious to the \u201cpenalty of the covenant of works,\u2014death, temporal,\nspiritual, and eternal.\u201d Now, we would suppose that this scheme of\nimputation is attended with at least as great a difficulty as the doctrine\nthat the innocent do sometimes suffer under the good providence of God.\nIndeed, the author does not deny that it is attended with difficulties,\nwhich have never been answered. In regard to the imputation of sin, he\nsays: \u201cCandour requires me to add, that we are not competent fully to\nassign the reasons of this dispensation. After the most mature\nconsideration of the subject, it appears _mysterious_ that God should have\nplaced our first parent in such circumstances, that while he might insure,\nhe might forfeit, his own happiness and that of millions of beings who\nwere to spring from his loins. We cannot tell why he adopted this plan\nwith us and not with angels, each of whom was left to stand or fall for\nhimself.\u201d(167) Now, when it is affirmed that the innocent may suffer for\nwise and good purposes, why is all this candour and modesty forgotten? Why\nis it not admitted, \u201cIt may be so;\u201d \u201cWe cannot tell?\u201d Why is the fact, of\nwhich these writers so often and so eloquently remind us, that the human\nintellect is a poor, blind, weak thing, quite unfit to pry into mysteries,\nthen sunk in utter oblivion, and a tone of confident dogmatism assumed?\nWhy not act consistently with the character of the sceptic or the\ndogmatist, and not put on the one or the other by turns, according to the\nexigencies of a system?\n\nIf we ask, why infants are exposed to death, we are told, that it is a\npunishment for Adam\u2019s sin imputed to them. We are told that this _must_ be\nso; since \u201cnone but the guilty ever suffer under the administration of\nGod,\u201d who is not an arbitrary and cruel tyrant to cause the innocent to\nsuffer. Why then, we ask, does he impute sin to them? To this it is\nreplied, \u201cWe cannot tell.\u201d No wonder; for if there must always be\nantecedent guilt to justify God in imposing evil upon his subjects, then\nthere can be no reason for such a dispensation for imposing the tremendous\nevil of the imputation of sin. The advocates of it themselves have laid\ndown a principle, which shows it to be without a reason. Hence they may\nwell say, \u201cWe cannot tell.\u201d Thus suffering is justified by the imputation\nof guilt; the imputation of guilt by the divine constitution; and the\ndivine constitution, by nothing! If this is all that can be done, would it\nnot have been just as well to have begun, as well as ended, in the divine\nconstitution of things? But, no! even the most humble of men must have\nsome explanation, some little mitigation of their difficulties, if it be\nonly to place the world upon the back of an elephant, the elephant upon\nthe back of a tortoise, and the tortoise upon nothing.\n\nIt seems to be inconceivably horrible to Dr. Dick, and others of his\nschool, that the innocent should ever be made to suffer under the\nprovidence of God; but yet they earnestly insist that the same good\nprovidence plunges the whole human race\u2014infants and all\u2014into unavoidable\nguilt, and then punishes them for it! To say that the innocent may be made\nto suffer is monstrous injustice\u2014is horrible; but to say that they are\nmade sinners, and then punished, is all right and proper! To say that the\ninnocent can suffer under the administration of God, is to shock our sense\nof justice, and put out the light of the divine goodness; but it is all\nwell if we only say that the punishment due to Adam\u2019s sin is made, by the\nsame good administration, to fall upon all his posterity _in the form of\nmoral evil, and that then they are justly punished for this punishment_!\nAlas, that the minds of the great and the good, born to reflect the light\nof the glorious gospel of God upon a darkened world, should be so sadly\nwarped, so awfully distorted, by the inexorable necessities of a despotic\nsystem!\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of God.\n\n\nThis point has been already indirectly considered, but it is worthy of a\nmore direct and complete examination. It is very remarkable that although\nDr. Dick admits he cannot reconcile the scheme of imputation with the\ncharacter of God, or remove its seeming hardships, not to say cruelty, he\nyet positively affirms that \u201cit is a proof of the goodness of God.\u201d(168)\nSurely, if the covenant of works, involving the imputation of sin, as\nexplained by Dr. Dick, be a \u201c_proof_ of the divine goodness,\u201d it cannot\nbut appear to be too severe. But as this point, on which he scarcely\ndwells at all, is more elaborately and fully discussed by President\nEdwards, we shall direct our attention to him.\n\n\u201cIt is objected,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cthat appointing Adam to stand in this\ngreat affair as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating them as\n_one_ with him, is injurious to them.\u201d \u201cTo which,\u201d says he, \u201cI answer, it\nis demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being\n_injurious_ to Adam\u2019s posterity any more than if every one had been\nappointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself\nconsidered, attended with a more eligible _probability_ of a _happy_ issue\nthan the latter would have been; and so is a constitution that truly\nexpresses the goodness of its Author.\u201d Now, let us see how this is\n_demonstrated_.\n\n\u201cThere is a _greater tendency_ to a happy issue in such an appointment,\u201d\nsays he, \u201cthan if every one had been appointed to stand for himself;\nespecially on these accounts: (1.) That Adam had _stronger motives to\nwatchfulness_ than his posterity would have had; in that, not only his own\neternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.)\nAdam was in a state of complete _manhood_ when his trial began.\u201d(169) In\nthe first place, then, the constitution for which Edwards contends is \u201can\nexpression of the divine goodness,\u201d because it presented stronger motives\nto obedience than if it had merely suspended the eternal destiny of Adam\nalone upon his conduct. The eternal welfare of his posterity was staked\nupon his obedience; and, having this stupendous motive before him, he\nwould be more likely to preserve his allegiance than if the motive had\nbeen less powerful. The magnitude of the motive, says Edwards, is the\ngrand circumstance which evinces the goodness of God in the appointment of\nsuch a constitution. If this be true, it is very easy to see how the\nAlmighty might have made a vast improvement in his own constitution for\nthe government of the world. He might have made the motive still stronger,\nand thereby made the appointment or covenant still better: instead of\nsuspending merely the eternal destiny of the human race upon the conduct\nof Adam, he might have staked the eternal fate of the universe upon it.\nAccording to the argument of Edwards, what a vast, what a wonderful\nimprovement would this have been in the divine constitution for the\ngovernment of the world, and how much more conspicuously would it have\ndisplayed the goodness of its Divine Author!\n\nAgain, the scheme of Edwards is condemned out of his own mouth. If this\nscheme be better than another, because its motives are _stronger_, why did\nnot God render it still more worthy of his goodness, by rendering its\nmotives still more powerful and efficacious? Edwards admits, nay, he\ninsists, that God might easily have rendered the motives of his moral\ngovernment perfectly efficacious and successful. He repeatedly declares\nthat God could have prevented all sin, \u201cby giving such influences of his\nSpirit as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it.\u201d If the\ngoodness of a constitution, then, is to be determined by the strength of\nits motives, as the argument of Edwards supposes, then we are bound,\naccording to his principles, to pronounce that for which he contends\nunworthy of the goodness of God, as being radically unsound and defective.\nThis is emphatically the case, as the Governor of the world might have\nstrengthened the motives to obedience _indefinitely_, not by augmenting\nthe danger, but by increasing the security of his subjects; that is to\nsay, not by making the penalty more terrific, but by giving a greater\ndisposition to obedience.\n\nThe same thing may be clearly seen from another point of view. Let us\nsuppose, for instance, that God had established the constitution or\ncovenant, that if Adam had persevered in obedience, then all his posterity\nshould be confirmed in holiness and happiness; and that if he fell, he\nshould fall for himself alone. Would not such an appointment, we ask, have\nbeen more likely to have been attended with a happy issue than that for\nwhich Edwards contends? Let us suppose again, that after such a\nconstitution had been established, its Divine Author had really secured\nthe obedience of Adam; would not this have made a \u201chappy issue\u201d perfectly\ncertain? Why then was not such a constitution established? It would most\nassuredly have been an infinitely clearer and more beautiful expression of\nthe divine goodness than that of Edwards. Hence, the philosophy of Edwards\neasily furnishes an unspeakably better constitution for the government of\nthe world, than that which has been established by the wisdom of God! Is\nit not evident, that the advocates of such a scheme should never venture\nbefore the tribunal of reason at all? Is it not evident, that their only\nsafe policy is to insist, as they sometimes do, that we do not know what\nis consistent, or _inconsistent_, with the attributes of God, in his\narrangements for the government of the world? Is it not evident, that\ntheir truest wisdom is to be found in habitually dwelling on the\nlittleness, weakness, misery, and darkness of the human mind, and in\nrebuking its arrogance for presuming to pry into the _mysteries_ of their\nsystem?\n\nThe vindication of the divine goodness by Edwards, is, we think it must be\nconceded, exceedingly weak. All it amounts to is this,\u2014that this scheme is\nan expression of the goodness of God, because, in certain respects, it is\nbetter than a scheme which might have been established. So far from\nshowing it to be the best possible scheme, his philosophy shows it might\nbe greatly improved in the _very respects_ in which its excellency is\nsupposed to consist. In other words, he contends that God has displayed\nhis goodness in the appointment of such a constitution, on the ground that\nhe might have made a worse; though, according to his own principles, it is\nperfectly evident that he might have made a better! Is this to express, or\nto deny, the absolute, infinite goodness of God? Is it to manifest the\nglory of that goodness to the eye of man, or to shroud it in clouds and\ndarkness?\n\nEdwards also says, that \u201cthe goodness of God in such a constitution with\nAdam appears in this: that if there had been no _sovereign, gracious_\nestablishment at all, but God had proceeded on the basis of mere\n_justice_, and had gone no farther than this required, he might have\ndemanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should have performed\n_perfect, perpetual obedience_.\u201d The italics are all his own. On this\npassage, we have to remark, that it is built upon unfounded assumptions.\nIt is frequently said, we are aware, that if it had not been for the\nredemption of the world by a \u201csovereign, gracious\u201d dispensation, the whole\nrace of man might have been justly exposed to the torments of hell\nforever. But where is the proof? Is it found in the word of God? This\ntells us what _is_, what _has been_, and what _will be_; but it is not\ngiven to speculate upon what _might_ be. For aught we know, if there had\nbeen no salvation through Christ, as a part of the actual constitution and\nsystem of the world, then there would have been no other part of that\nsystem whatever. We are not told, and we do not know, what it would have\nbeen consistent with the justice of God to do in relation to the world, if\nthere had been no remedy provided for its restoration. Perhaps it might\nnever have been created at all. The work of Christ is the great sun and\ncentre of the system as _it is_; and if this had never been a part of the\noriginal grand design, we do not know that the planets would have been\ncreated to wander in eternal darkness. We do not know that even the\njustice of God would have created man, and permitted him to fall,\nwandering everlastingly amid the horrors of death, without hope and\nwithout remedy. We find nothing of the kind in the word of God; and in our\nnature it meets with no response, except a wail of unutterable horror. We\nlike not, we confess, those vindications of God\u2019s goodness, which consist\nin drawing hideous, black pictures of his justice, and then telling us\nthat it is not so dark as these. We want not to know whether there might\nnot be darker things in the universe than God\u2019s love; we only want to know\nif there could be anything brighter, or better, or more beautiful.\n\nThe most astounding feature of this vindication of the divine goodness\nstill remains to be noticed. We are told that the constitution in question\nis good, because it was so likely to have had a \u201chappy issue.\u201d And when\nthis constitution was established by the sovereign will and pleasure of\nGod, the conduct of Adam, it is conceded, was perfectly foreseen by him.\nAt the very time this constitution was established, its Divine Author\nforesaw with perfect absolute certainty what would be the issue. He knew\nthat the great federal head, so appointed by him, would transgress the\ncovenant, and bring down the curse of \u201cdeath, temporal, spiritual, and\neternal,\u201d upon all his posterity. O, wonderful goodness! to promise\neternal life to the human race on a condition which he certainly foreknew\nwould not be performed! Amazing grace! to threaten eternal death to all\nmankind, on a condition which he certainly foreknew would be fulfilled!\n\nThis cannot be evaded, by asserting that the same difficulty attaches to\nthe fact, that God created Adam foreseeing he would fall. His\nforeknowledge did not necessitate the fall of Adam. It left him free as\nGod had created him. Life and death were set before him, and he had the\npower to stand, as well as the power to fall. He had no right to complain\nof God, then, if, under such circumstances, he chose to rebel, and incur\nthe penalty. But if the scheme of Edwards be true, the descendants of Adam\ndid not have their fate in their own hands. It did not depend on their own\nchoice. It was necessitated, even prior to their existence, by the divine\nconstitution which had indissolubly connected their awful destiny, their\ntemporal and eternal ruin, with an event already foreseen. And the\nconstitution binding such awful consequences to an event already foreseen,\nis called an expression of the goodness of God!\n\nSuppose, for example, that a great prince should promise his subjects that\non the happening of a certain event, over which they had no control, he\nwould confer unspeakable favours upon them. Suppose also, that at the same\ntime he should declare to them, that if the event should not happen, he\nwould load them with irons, cast them into prison, and inflict the\ngreatest imaginable punishments upon them during the remainder of their\nlives. Suppose again, that at the very time he thus made known his\n_gracious intentions_ to them, he knew perfectly well that the event on\nwhich his favour was suspended would not happen. Then, according to his\ncertain foreknowledge, the event fails, and the penalty of the covenant or\nappointment is inflicted upon his subjects:\u2014they are cast into prison;\nthey are bound in chains, and perpetually tormented with the greatest of\nall imaginable evils:\u2014not because they had transgressed the appointment or\nsovereign constitution, but because an event had taken place over which\nthey had no control. Now, who would call such a ruler a good prince? Who\ncould conceive, indeed, of a more cruel or deceitful tyrant? But we submit\nit to the candid reader, if he be not more like the prince of\npredestination, than the great God of heaven and earth?\n\nThis scheme of imputation, so far from being an expression of infinite\ngoodness, were indeed an exhibition of the most frightful cruelty and\ninjustice. It would be a useful, as well as a most curious inquiry, to\nexamine the various contrivances of ingenious men, in order to bring the\ndoctrine of imputation into harmony with the justice of God. We shall\nbriefly allude to only two of these wonderful inventions,\u2014those of\nAugustine and Edwards. Neither of these celebrated divines supposed that a\nforeign sin, properly so called, is ever imputed to any one; but that the\nsin of Adam, which is imputed to his descendants, is their own sin, as\nwell as his.(170) But here the question arises, How could they make Adam\u2019s\nsin to be the sin of his descendants, many of whom were born thousands of\nyears after it was committed?\n\nAugustine, as is well known, maintained the startling paradox, that all\nmankind were present in Adam, and sinned in him. In this way, he supposed\nthat all men became partakers in the guilt of Adam\u2019s sin, and consequently\njustly liable to the penalty due to his transgression. Augustine was quite\ntoo good a logician not to perceive, that if all men are responsible for\nAdam\u2019s sin, because they were in him when he transgressed, then, it\nfollows, that we are also responsible for the sins of all our ancestors,\nfrom whom we are more immediately descended. This follows from that maxim\nof jurisprudence, from that dictate of common-sense, that a rule of law is\nco\u00ebxtensive with the reason upon which it is based. Hence, as Wiggers\nremarks: \u201cAugustine thought it not improbable that the sins of ancestors\n_universally_ are imputed to their descendants.\u201d(171) This conclusion is\nclearly set forth in the extracts made by the translator of Wiggers.(172)\nIf this scheme be true, we know indeed that we are all guilty of Adam\u2019s\nsin; but who, or how many of the human race, were the perpetrators of\nCain\u2019s murder beside himself, we cannot determine. Indeed, if this\nfrightful hypothesis be well founded, if it form a part of the moral\nconstitution of the world, no man can possibly tell how many thefts,\nmurders, or treasons, he may have committed in his ancestors. One thing is\ncertain, however, and that is, that the man who is born later in the\ncourse of time, will have the more sins to answer for, and the more\nfearful will be the accumulation of his guilt; as all the transgressions\nof all his ancestors, from Adam down to his immediate parents, will be\nlaid upon his head.\n\nClearly as this consequence is involved in the fundamental principle of\nAugustine\u2019s theory, the good father could not but reel and stagger under\nit. \u201cRespecting the sins of the other parents,\u201d says he, \u201cthe progenitors\nfrom Adam down to one\u2019s own immediate father, _it may not improperly be\ndebated_, whether the child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied\noriginal faults of _all_, so that each one is the worse in proportion as\nhe is later; or that, in respect to the sins of their parents, God\nthreatens posterity to the third and fourth generation, because, _by the\nmoderation of his compassion_, he does not further extend his anger in\nrespect to the faults of progenitors, lest those on whom the grace of\nregeneration is not conferred, _should be pressed with too heavy a burden\nin their own eternal damnation_, if they were compelled to contract by way\nof origin (_originaliter_) the _sins_ of _all_ their preceding parents\nfrom the commencement of the human race, and _to suffer the punishment due\nto them_.(173) Whether, on so great a subject, anything else can or cannot\nbe found, by a more diligent reading and scrutiny of the Scriptures, I\ndare not hastily affirm.\u201d(174)\n\nThus does the sturdy logician, notwithstanding his almost indomitable\nhardihood, seem to stand appalled before the consequences to which his\nprinciples would inevitably conduct him. Having followed those principles\nbut a little way, the scene becomes so dark with his representations of\nthe divine justice, that he feels constrained to retrace his steps, and\narbitrarily introduce the divine mercy, in order to mitigate the\nindescribable horrors which continually thicken around him. Such\nhesitation, such wavering and inconsistency, is the natural result of\nevery scheme which places the decisions of the head in violent conflict\nwith the indestructible feelings of the heart.\n\nIn his attempt to reconcile the scheme of imputation with the justice of\nGod, Edwards has met with as little success as Augustine. For this\npurpose, he supposed that God had constituted an identity between Adam and\nall his posterity, whereby the latter became partakers of his rebellion.\n\u201cI think it would go far toward directing us to the more clear conception\nand right statement of this affair,\u201d says he, in reference to imputation,\n\u201cwere we steadily to bear this in mind, that God, in every step of his\nproceedings with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution\nestablished with him, looked on his posterity as being _one with him_. And\nthough he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the _head_ of\nthe whole body, and the _root_ of the whole tree; and in his proceedings\nwith him, he dealt with all the branches as if they had been then existing\nin their root. From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness\nto punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam\u2019s posterity\njust as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all co\u00ebxisted,\nlike a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference\nnecessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in as head or root of the\nwhole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every\nalteration in the root had been attended at the same instant with the same\nalteration throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think\nthis will naturally follow on the supposition of their being a constituted\n_oneness_ or _identity_ of Adam and his posterity in this affair.\u201d(175) As\nthe sap of a tree, Edwards has said, spreads from the root of a tree to\nall its branches, so the original sin of Adam descends from him through\nthe generations of men.\n\nIn the serious promulgation of such sentiments, it is only forgotten that\nsin is not the sap of a tree, and that the whole human race is not really\none and the same person. Such an idea of personal identity is as utterly\nunintelligible as the nature of the sin and the responsibility with which\nit is so intimately associated. Surely these are the dark dreams of men,\nnot the bright and shining lights of eternal truth.\n\nBefore we take leave of President Edwards, we would remark, that he\nproceeds on the same supposition with Calvin,(176) Bates,(177)\nDwight,(178) Dick, and a host of others, that suffering is always a\npunishment of sin, and of \u201csin in them who suffer.\u201d(179) \u201cThe light of\nnature,\u201d says Edwards, \u201cor tradition from ancient revelation, led the\nheathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine\nvengeance. Thus we have an account, that when the barbarians saw the\nvenomous beast hang on Paul\u2019s hand, they said among themselves, \u2018No doubt,\nthis man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the seas, yet\nvengeance suffereth not to live.\u2019 \u201d(180) We think that the barbarians\nconcluded rashly: it is certain that St. Paul was neither a murderer nor a\ngod. Nor, indeed, if the venomous beast had taken his life, would this\nhave proved him to be a murderer, any more than its falling off into the\nfire proved him to be a god, according to the rash judgment of the\nbarbarians. There is a better source of philosophy, if we mistake not,\nthan the rash, hasty, foolish judgments of barbarians.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the divine\ngoodness.\n\n\nThere are few persons whose feelings will allow them to be consistent\nadvocates of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam\u2019s sin. \u201cTo many other\ndivines,\u201d says Bishop Burnet, \u201cthis seems a harsh and inconceivable\nopinion: it seems repugnant to the justice and goodness of God to reckon\nmen guilty of sin which they never committed, and to punish them in their\nsouls eternally for that which is no act of theirs.\u201d(181) It certainly\n\u201cseems very hard,\u201d as the author says, \u201cto apprehend how persons who have\nnever sinned, but are only unhappily descended, should be, in consequence\nof that, under so great a misery.\u201d But how to escape the pressure of this\nstupendous difficulty is the question. There are many who cannot endure\nit; or rather, there are very few who can endure it; but, as Bishop Burnet\nsays, they find no difficulty in the idea of temporal punishment on\naccount of Adam\u2019s sin. \u201cThis, they think, is easily enough reconcilable\nwith the notions of justice and goodness, since this is only a temporary\n_punishment_ relating to men\u2019s persons.\u201d(182) But do they not sacrifice\ntheir logic to their feelings? Let us see.\n\nThis view of a limited imputation, and a limited _punishment_, is not\nconfined to the Church of England. It prevails to a greater or less extent\nin all denominations. But President Edwards has, we think, unanswerably\nexposed the inconsistency of its advocates. \u201cOne of them supposes,\u201d says\nhe, \u201cthat this sin, though truly imputed to INFANTS, so that thereby they\nare exposed to a proper _punishment_, yet is not imputed to them in such a\n_degree_, as that upon this account they should be liable to _eternal_\npunishment, as Adam himself was, but only to _temporal death_, or\n_annihilation_; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely\nmore guilty of it than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to\nsuppose God imputes, not _all_ the guilt of Adam, but only _some little\npart_ of it, relieves nothing but his _imagination_. To think of poor\nlittle infants bearing such torments for Adam\u2019s sin, as they sometimes do\nin this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may\nsit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal\nmisery for it; but it does not at all relieve one\u2019s _reason_. There is no\nrule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the\n_whole_ of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not\npersonally commit it, but will also lie against its being so imputed and\npunished in _part_; for all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the\n_imputation_, not the _quality_ or _degree_ of what is imputed. If there\nbe any rule of reason that is strong and good, lying against a proper\nderivation or communication of guilt from one that acted to another that\ndid not act, then it lies against all that is of that nature.... If these\nreasons are good, all the difference is this: that to bring a _great_\npunishment on infants for Adam\u2019s sin, is a _great_ act of injustice, and\nto bring a comparatively _smaller_ punishment is a smaller act of\ninjustice; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of\ninjustice as the other.\u201d(183)\n\nWe hold this to be a solid and unanswerable argument; and we hold also,\nthat God can no more commit a small act of injustice than a great one.\nHence, in the eye of _reason_, there is no medium between rejecting the\nwhole of the imputation of Adam\u2019s sin, and ceasing to object against the\nimputation of the whole of it, as inconsistent with the justice and\ngoodness of God. We may arbitrarily wipe out a portion of it in order to\nrelieve our _imagination_; but this brings no relief to the calm and\npassionless reason. It may still the wild tumults of emotion, but it\ncannot silence the voice of the intellect. Why not relieve both the\n_imagination_ and the _reason_? Why not wipe out the whole dark film of\nimputation, and permit the glad eye to open on the bright glory of God\u2019s\ninfinite goodness?\n\nThe wonder is, that when Edwards had carried out his logic to such a\nconclusion, he did not regard his argument as a perfect _reductio ad\nabsurdum_. The wonder is, that when he had carried out his logic to the\nposition, that it might well consist with the justice of God to impute the\nwhole of Adam\u2019s sin to \u201cpoor little infants,\u201d as he calls them, and then\ncause them to endure \u201ceternal torments for it,\u201d his whole nature did not\nrecoil from such a conclusion with indescribable horror. For our part,\nhighly as we value logical consistency, we should prefer a little\nincoherency in our reasoning, a little flexibility in our logic, rather\nthan bear even one \u201cpoor little infant\u201d on the hard, unyielding point of\nit into the torments of hell forever.\n\nSt. Augustine was the great founder of the doctrine of the imputation of\nsin. But although he did more than any other person to give this doctrine\na hold upon the mind of the Christian world, it never had a perfect hold\nupon his own mind. So far from being able to reconcile it with the divine\ngoodness, he could not reconcile it with his own goodness. For this\npurpose, he employed the theory that all the posterity of Adam were, in\nthe most literal sense, already _in him_, and sinned in him\u2014in his person;\nand that Adam\u2019s sin is therefore justly imputed to all his posterity.(184)\nHe also appeals to revelation. \u201cSt. Augustine,\u201d as Father Almeyda truly\nsays, \u201cand the fathers who follow him, take the fundamental principle of\ntheir doctrine (which affirms that infants without baptism will endure\neternal pain) from the sentence which the Supreme Judge is to pronounce at\nthe last day. We know that the Lord, dividing the human race into two\nportions, will put the elect on the right hand, and the reprobate on the\nleft; and he will say to those on the left, Depart into eternal fire. St.\nAugustine then argues, that infants will not be on the right, because\nJesus Christ has positively excluded all those who shall not _be born\nagain of water_ and of the Holy Spirit: then they will be on the left; and\nthus they will be comprehended in the damnation of eternal fire, which the\nLord will pronounce against those who shall be on the left side: for\nhaving no more than two hands, and only two places and two sentences,\nsince, then, there are infants which God does not favour, it follows that\nthey will be comprehended in the sentence of the reprobate, which is not\nonly a privation of the sight of God, but also the pain of fire.\u201d(185)\nSuch is the ground, and such the logic, on which St. Augustine and his\nfollowers erected that portentous scheme, that awful speculation, which\nhas so long cast a dark cloud over the glory of the Christian world, and\nprevented it from reflecting the bright, cheering beams of the divine\ngoodness.\n\nBut, what! could St. Augustine find rest in his own views,\u2014in his own\nlogic? Did he really banish all non-elect infants into the region of penal\nfire and everlasting woe? If he adhered to the literal meaning of the\nwords of revelation, as he understood them, he was certainly bound to do\nso; but did he really and consistently do it? Did he really bind the \u201cpoor\nlittle\u201d reprobate, because it had sinned in Adam, in chains of adamant,\nand leave it to writhe beneath the fierce inquisitorial fury of the\neverlasting flames? Did he really extract the vials of such exquisite and\nunprovoked wrath from the essence of infinite goodness itself? No: this\nwas reserved for the superior logic and the sterner consistency of an iron\nage. But since it has been extracted, we may devoutly thank Almighty God,\nthat it is now excluded from the hearts of men calling themselves\nChristians, and kept safely bottled up in their creeds and confessions.\n\nSt. Augustine could not endure the insufferable consequences of his own\ndoctrine. Hence, in writing to his great friend, St. Jerome, he said, \u201cin\nall sincerity: when I come to treat of the punishment of infants, believe\n_that I find myself in great embarrassment, and I absolutely know not what\nto reply_.\u201d Writing against Julian, he adds: \u201c_I do not say that those who\ndie without baptism will be punished with a torment such that it would be\nbetter for them if they had never been born._\u201d And again: \u201cThose who,\nbesides original sin which they have contracted, have not committed any\nother, will be subjected to a pain the most mild of all.\u201d(186) Thus by\nadopting a wrong interpretation, the principles of which were but little\nunderstood in his time, St. Augustine banished all unbaptized infants from\nthe kingdom of light; but yet he could hardly find it in his heart to\ncondemn them to the outer darkness. He had too great a regard for the word\nof God, as he understood it, to permit non-elect infants to reign with\nChrist in heaven; and, on the other hand, he was too severely pressed by\nthe generous impulses of his nature, nay, by the eternal dictates of truth\nand goodness, to permit him to consign them really to the \u201cfire prepared\nfor the devil and his angels.\u201d Hence, although Christ knew of \u201cbut two\nplaces,\u201d he fitted up a third, to see them in which, was, as Edwards would\nsay, \u201cmore agreeable to his imagination.\u201d\n\nIt was the sublime but unsteady genius of St. Augustine that caused this\ndoctrine of the damnation of infants to be received into the Christian\nworld, and find its way into the council of Trent. That celebrated council\nnot only adopted the views of St. Augustine on this subject, but also most\nperfectly reflected all his hesitation and inconsistency. Widely as its\nmembers differed on other points, they all agreed that unbaptized infants\nshould be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. There was but little\nunanimity however, as to the best method of disposing of them. The\nDominicans fitted up a dark, subterraneous cavern for them, in which there\nis no fire, at least none such as that of the infernal regions, and in\nwhich they might be at least as happy as monks. This place was called\n_Limbo_\u2014which, we suppose, is to Purgatory, about what the varioloid is to\nthe smallpox. The Franciscans, more humane in their doctrine, determined\nthat \u201cdear little infants,\u201d though they had never felt the sanctifying\ninfluences of holy water, should yet reside, not in dark caverns and holes\nof the earth, but in the sweet light and pure air of the upper world. Well\ndone, noble Franciscan! we honour thee for thy sweet fancy! Surely thou\nwert not, like other monks, made so altogether fierce by dark keeping,\nthat thou couldest not delight to see in God\u2019s blessed, beautiful world, a\nsmiling infant!\n\nOthers insisted, that unbaptized infants would be condemned to become\nphilosophers, and turn out the authors of great discoveries. This may seem\na terrible damnation to some persons; but, for our part, if we had been of\nthat famous council, it is likely we should have been in favour of this\ndecree. As the most agreeable punishment we could imagine, we should have\nbeen for condemning them, like the fallen angels of Paradise Lost, to\ntorment themselves with reasonings high,\u2014\n\n\n \u201cOf providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,\n Fix\u2019d fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute.\u201d\n\n\nAnd if any of them had been found to possess no very great aptitude for\nsuch speculations, then, rather than they should find \u201cno end in wandering\nmazes lost,\u201d we should have condemned them to turn poets and \u201cbuild the\nlofty rhyme.\u201d\n\nSo completely did the spirit of a blind exegesis triumph over the light of\nreason in the time of Augustine, that even Pelagius and his followers\nexcluded unbaptized infants from the kingdom of heaven, because our\nSaviour had declared that a man could not enter therein, except he be born\nof water and of the Spirit. It is true, they did not banish them into \u201cthe\nfire prepared for the devil and his angels,\u201d nor into Limbo, nor into dark\nholes of the earth; on the contrary, they admitted them to the joys of\neternal life, but not into the kingdom of heaven.(187) Thus, the Pelagians\nbrought \u201cpoor little infants\u201d as near to the kingdom of heaven as\npossible, without doing too great violence to the universal orthodoxy of\ntheir time.\n\nBut as we cannot, like the Church of Rome, determine the fate of infants\nby a decree, we must take some little pains to ascertain how it has been\ndetermined by the Supreme Ruler of the world. For this purpose we shall\nfirst show, that there is suffering in the world which is not a punishment\nfor sin, and then declare the great ends, or final causes, of all natural\nevil.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe true ends, or final causes, of natural evil.\n\n\nWe have often wondered that grave divines should declare that there could\nbe no natural evil, or suffering, under the administration of God, except\nsuch as is a punishment for sin _in the person upon whom it is inflicted_.\nWe have wondered, that in declaring none but a tyrant could ever permit\nthe innocent to suffer, they have entertained no fears lest they might\nstrengthen the cause of atheism. For if it be impossible to justify the\ncharacter of God, except on the principle that all suffering is merited on\naccount of sin in the object of it, then it is easy to see, that the\natheistical argument against the goodness of God is unanswerable. The\natheist might well say: \u201cDo we not see and know that the whole animal\ncreation suffers? Now for what sin are they punished? The inferior\nanimals, you will admit, are not capable of committing actual sin, any\nmore than infants are; and Adam was not their federal head and\nrepresentative. Hence, unless you can show for what sin they are\n_punished_, you must admit that, according to your own principles, God is\na tyrant.\u201d How Dr. Dick, or Dr. Dwight, or President Edwards, or Calvin,\nwould have answered such an argument, we cannot determine. For although\nthey all assume that there can be no suffering under the good providence\nof God, except it be a punishment for sin in the object of it, yet, so far\nas we know, they have not made the most distant allusion to the suffering\nof the inferior animals. Indeed, they seem to be so intently bent on\nmaintaining the doctrine of the imputation of sin to infants, that they\npay no attention, in the assumption of the above position, either to the\nword of God, or to the great volume of nature spread out before them.\n\nBut we find the difficulty noticed in a prize essay of three hundred\npages, on the subject of native depravity, by Dr. Woods. The author\nassumes the same ground with Edwards, that all suffering must be justified\non the ground of justice; and hence he finds a real and proper sin in\ninfants, in order to reconcile their sufferings with the character of God.\nThis is the only ground, according to Dr. Woods, on which suffering can be\nvindicated under the administration of a perfect God. Where, then, is the\nreal and proper sin in the inferior animals to justify their sufferings?\nThis difficulty occurs to the distinguished author, and he endeavours to\nmeet it. Let us see his reply. It is a reply which we have long been\nsolicitous to see, and we now have it from one of the most celebrated\ntheologians of the present day.\n\n\u201cSome suppose,\u201d says he, \u201cthat infants suffer as irrational animals do,\nwithout reference to a moral law or the principles of a moral government.\nA strange supposition indeed, that _human beings_ should for a time be\nranked with beings which are not human, that is, mere animals.\u201d He is\nevidently shocked at such an insult offered to poor little infants. He\nwill not allow us, for one moment, to take the whole race of man, \u201cduring\nthe interesting period of infancy, cut them off from their relation to\nAdam, degrade them from the dignity of human beings, and put them in the\nrank of brute animals,\u2014and then say, they _suffer as the brutes do_....\nThis would be the worst of all theories,\u2014the farthest off from Scripture\nand reason, and the most revolting to all the noble sensibilities of man.\u201d\n\nNow, it is really refreshing to find these allusions to \u201cthe dignity of\nhuman beings\u201d in a writer of this school; and especially in Dr. Woods, who\nhas so often rebuked others for their pride, when they have imagined that\nthey were only engaged in the laudable enterprise of asserting this very\ndignity, by raising men from the rank of mere machines. It is so\nrefreshing, indeed, to find such allusions in Dr. Woods, that we could\nalmost forgive a little special pleading and bad logic in his attempt to\nvindicate the \u201cdignity of human beings,\u201d which should have been an attempt\nto vindicate the goodness of God.\n\nWe do not place human beings and brutes in the same rank, except in so far\nas both are sensitive creatures, and consequently susceptible of pleasure\nand pain. In this particular, the Creator himself has, to a certain\nextent, placed them in the same rank, and it is useless to cry out against\nhis appointment. He will not listen to our talk about \u201cthe dignity of\nhuman beings.\u201d He will still leave us, in so far as bodily pain and death\nare concerned, in the same rank with mere animals. This single point of\nresemblance between animals and human beings is all that our argument\nrequires; and the _fact_ that animals do suffer pain and death cannot be\ndenied, or swept away by declamation. Let this fact be fairly and openly\nmet, and not merely evaded. Let it be shown how the suffering of mere\nanimals may be reconciled with the infinite goodness of God, and we will\nundertake to show how the suffering of guiltless \u201chuman beings\u201d may be\nreconciled with it. Nay, we will undertake to show that the suffering of\ninfants may be reconciled with the divine goodness, on the same, and also\non still higher, grounds. We will place their sufferings on a more solid\nand a more definite foundation, than upon such vague and misty assertions\nas that they \u201csuffer with reference to a moral law.\u201d\n\nWe do not cut off infants from their relation to Adam; nor could we, if we\ndesired to do so, cut them off from their relation to the animal nature\nwhich God has given them. It may be a very humiliating thought, it is\ntrue, that _human beings_ should ever eat like mere animals, or sleep like\nmere animals, or suffer like mere animals; but yet we cannot see how any\nrebellion against so humiliating a thought can possibly alter the fact. We\ndo not deny, indeed, that a theologian may eat, and sleep, and suffer on\nhigher principles than mere animals do; but we seriously doubt if infants\never eat, or sleep, or suffer on any higher principles. It may shock the\n\u201cnoble sensibilities\u201d of man that dear little infants should suffer as\n_brutes_ do, especially when the term _brutes_ is so strongly emphasized;\nbut how it can relieve the case to have the poor little creatures\narraigned at the bar of divine justice, and condemned to suffer as\nmalefactors and criminals do, is more than we can possibly comprehend. To\nhave them thus arraigned, condemned, and punished as criminals, may\ndignify their sufferings, and render them more worthy of the rank of human\nbeings; but this is a dignity to which, we trust, they will never aspire.\n\nIf we are not mistaken, then, the theory for which we contend is \u201cnot the\nworst of all theories,\u201d nor \u201cthe most revolting to the noblest\nsensibilities of man.\u201d It is a worse theory to suppose, with Edwards, that\nthey may be arraigned and banished into \u201ceternal misery\u201d for a sin they\nhave not committed, or the possession of a nature they could not possibly\nhave avoided possessing. It is better, we say, to rank the human race \u201cfor\na time,\u201d \u201cduring the interesting period of infancy,\u201d even with mere\nanimals, than to rank them with the devil and his angels. But, in truth,\nwe rank them with neither; we simply leave them where God hath placed\nthem, as a connecting link between the animal and the angelic natures.\n\nBut we may produce many instances of suffering among human beings, which\nare not a punishment for sin. We might refer to the feeling of compassion,\nwhich is always painful, and sometimes wrings the heart with the most\nexquisite agony; and yet this was not planted in our bosom as a punishment\nfor sin, but, as Bishop Butler has shown,(188) it was ordained by a God of\nmercy, to teach us a lesson of mercy, and lead us to mitigate the manifold\nmiseries of man\u2019s estate. We might also refer to an indignation against\ncrime, which, as the same profound thinker has shown in his sermon on\nresentment, was planted in our natures, not to punish the subject of it,\nbut to insure the punishment of others, that is, of criminals; and thereby\nto preserve the good order and well-being of the world. This sense of\nwrong, of injustice, of outrage, by which the soul is so often tortured,\nis not designed to punish the subject of it, but to promote the happiness\nand virtue of mankind. We might refer to these, and many other things of\nthe same kind, but it is not necessary to dwell upon particular instances;\nfor the principle against which we contend may be more directly refuted by\nan appeal to reason, and to the very authors by whom it is advocated; for,\nalthough it is adopted by them, and seems plausible at first view, it is\noften lost sight of when they lose sight of their system, and they give\nutterance to another principle more in accordance with the voice of\nnature.\n\nIt is evident, that if the government of God requires that no suffering\nshould be inflicted, except as a punishment for sin, then his perfect\nmoral government requires that the punishment should, in all cases, be\nexactly proportioned to the demerit of those upon whom it falls.\n\nFor, as Butler truly says, \u201cMoral government consists in rewarding the\nrighteous and punishing the wicked; in rendering to men according to their\nactions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral\ngovernment consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent\ncreatures, in exact proportion to their personal merits and\ndemerits.\u201d(189) This will not be denied. Hence, if suffering is\ndistributed by God as a punishment for sin in all cases, as Calvin and his\nfollowers assert, then it must, on the same principle, be distributed\naccording to the demerit of men. But is this the case? Does this necessary\nconsequence of this principle agree with fact? If so, then every vile\ndeed, every wicked outrage, committed by man, should be regarded as an\ninstrument of divine justice, and deserved by those upon whom they fall.\nThe inquisition itself, with all its unuttered and unutterable horrors,\nshould be regarded, not merely as an exhibition of human wickedness and\nwrath, but also as an engine of divine justice, to crush the martyr on its\nwheels, because he refuses to lie to his own soul and to his God? Nature\nitself recoils from such a conclusion. Not one of the writers in question\nwould adopt it. Hence, they should not advocate a principle from which it\nnecessarily flows.\n\nIndeed, they all argue the necessity of a future state of retribution,\nfrom the unequal distribution of natural good and evil in this life. But\nLord Bolingbroke has refuted this argument by reasoning from their own\nprinciples. He insists that such is the justice of God, that there can be\nno suffering or natural evil in this life, except such as is proportioned\nto the demerits of men; and hence he rejects the argument from the\napparent unequal distribution of pleasure and pain in this world in favour\nof the reality of a future judgment. He resents the imputation that God\ncould ever permit any suffering which is not deserved, as warmly as it is\nresented by Dr. Dick himself, and proclaims it to be dishonourable to God.\nAll rewards and punishments, says he, are equal and just in this life; and\nto say otherwise, is to take an atheistical view of the divine character.\nLearned divines proceed on the same principle, as we have seen, when they\ncontend for the imputation of sin; but they forget and overlook it, when\nthey come to prove the future judgment to the infidel. Thus, in their zeal\nto establish their own peculiar dogmas, they place themselves and their\ncause in the power of the infidel.\n\nBut if suffering be not always inflicted, under the administration of God,\nas a punishment for sin, for what other end is it inflicted? We answer, it\nis inflicted for these ends: 1. Even when it is inflicted as a punishment\nfor sin, this is not the only end, or final cause of its infliction. It is\nalso intended to deter others from the commission of evil, and preserve\nthe order of the world. 2. In some instances, nay, in very many instances,\nit is intended to discipline and form the mind to virtue. As Bishop Butler\nwell says, even while vindicating the moral government of the world: \u201cIt\nis not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, happiness and\nmisery appear to be distributed by other rules, than only the personal\nmerit and demerit of character. They may sometimes be distributed by way\nof mere discipline.\u201d And in his profound chapter on a \u201cState of probation,\nas intended for moral discipline and improvement,\u201d he shows that they are\nactually distributed for this purpose. 3. The unavoidable evils of this\nlife, which are not brought upon us by our faults, are intended to serve\nas a foil to set off the blessedness of eternity. Our present light\nafflictions are intended, not merely to work out for us an exceeding and\neternal weight of glory, but also to heighten our sense and enjoyment of\nit by a recollection of the miseries experienced in this life. They are\nintended to form but a short and discordant prelude to an everlasting\nharmony. If they should not prove so in fact, the fault will be our own,\nwithout the least impeachment of the beneficent design of the great Author\nand Ruler of the universe.\n\nOn these grounds, especially on the first two, we must justify all the\nnatural evil in the world. In regard to the second, Bishop Butler says:\n\u201cAllurements to what is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our\nduties; our not being able to act a uniform right part without some\nthought and care; and the opportunities we have, or imagine we have, of\navoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means,\nwhen we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful\nones; these things, that is, _the snares and temptations of vice, are what\nrender the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline to\nthose who will preserve their integrity_; because they render being upon\nour guard, resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary to that\nend.\u201d Thus, the temptations by which we are surrounded, the allurements of\nthose passions by which vice is rendered so bewitching, are the appointed\nmeans of moral discipline and improvement in virtue.\n\nThe habit of virtue thus formed, he truly observes, will be firm and fixed\nin proportion to the amount of temptation we have gradually overcome in\nits formation. \u201cThough actions materially virtuous,\u201d says he, \u201cwhich have\nno sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to our particular\ninclinations, may possibly be done only from those particular\ninclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue,\ni. e., not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be\nan exercise of that principle, and, when they are, they have a tendency to\nform and fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous\nprinciple is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense, as it\nmust be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty of any\nkind, and in any degree, this tendency is increased proportionably, and a\nmore confirmed habit is the consequence.\u201d(190) The greater the temptation,\nthen, the more fixed will be the habit of virtue, by which it is gradually\novercome and subdued.\n\nThis habit may become so fixed, by a struggle with temptations and\ndifficulties, as to raise the soul above the dangers to which moral agents\nare exposed. \u201cVirtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but\nalso improves the inward constitution or character; and may improve it to\nsuch a degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular\naffections to be absolutely co-incident with the moral principle, and\nconsequently should allow, that _such creatures as have been above\nsupposed would forever remain defectible; yet their danger of actually\ndeviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully\nfortified against what remains of it; if that may be called danger,\nagainst which there is an adequate effectual security_.\u201d(191)\n\n\u201cThese several observations,\u201d says he, \u201cconcerning the active principle of\nvirtue and obedience to God\u2019s commands are applicable to passive\nsubmission or resignation to his will, which is another essential part of\na right character, connected with the former, and very much in our power\nto form ourselves to.\u201d This, then, is the view which we think should be\nentertained with respect to the natural evils of this life: they are\nintended by the infinitely wise and good Ruler of the world to detach us\nfrom the fleeting things of time and sense, by the gradual formation of a\nhabit of moral goodness, arising from a resistance against the influence\nof such things and firm adherence to the will of God, and to form our\ncharacter for a state of fixed eternal blessedness. Such is the beneficent\ndesign of God in relation to the human race itself. His design in relation\nto the more magnificent scheme of the moral universe, in thus planting the\nhuman race and striving to train it up to virtue and happiness, we have\nalready considered.(192)\n\nWe say, then, that it is a principle of the divine government of the world\nto impose natural evil or suffering as a means of good. It is objected\nagainst this principle, that it is to do evil that good may come. \u201cTo say\nthat Christ was subjected to _sufferings_,\u201d says Dr. Dick, \u201cfor the\nbenevolent purpose of conferring important benefits upon mankind, is to\ngive the highest sanction to the principle which is so strongly reprobated\nin the Scriptures, that evil may be done that good may come.\u201d The theology\nof Dr. Dick, and of his school, does not sufficiently distinguish between\nnatural and moral evil. We are nowhere told in Scripture, that it is wrong\nto do natural evil, or inflict suffering, that good may come. Every good\nman acts upon this principle every day of his life. Every act of\nself-denial, and every infliction of parental discipline, are proofs of\nthe justness of this remark. The surgeon who amputates a limb, in order to\nsave the life of his patient, acts upon the same principle. But who ever\nthought of condemning such conduct? Who ever reminded him that he should\nnot do evil that good may come? It is plain, that neither \u201cthe sufferings\u201d\nof Christ, nor any other sufferings imposed for the real good of the\nworld, are liable to any such objection, or come under the condemnation of\nany such maxim. This objection lies, as we have seen,(193) against the\ndoctrine of Edwards and his followers, that _moral evil_, that _sin_, may\nbe chosen as the means of good. The high and holy God never commits, or\ncauses others to commit, moral evil that good may come; but he not only\nmay, but actually does, inflict natural evil in order to promote the good\nof his creatures. Thus, by applying the language of Scripture to natural\nevil instead of to moral, Dr. Dick has just exactly inverted the order of\nthings as they actually exist in the constitution and government of the\nmoral world.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe importance of harmonizing reason and revelation.\n\n\nFor these reasons, we refuse to justify the sufferings of infants, on the\nground that the sin of Adam was imputed to them. A sentiment so dark and\nappalling but ill accords with the sublime and beautiful spirit of the\ngospel. It partakes more of the weakness and infirmity of human nature\nthan of the divine nature of Him who \u201cspake as never man spake.\u201d The best\naccount which Plato could give of the sufferings of infants was that they\nhad sinned in some former state of existence, for which they are punished\nin this. St. Augustine and his followers, rejecting such a view, and\nrelying on the literal sense of the words of revelation, advanced the\nhypothesis that infants sinned, not in a pre\u00ebxistent state, but in Adam;\nfor which they are justly exposed to pain and death. Others again, not\nbeing able to conceive how infants could be really and personally in Adam\nmany thousand years before they were born, so as to sin with him, adopted\nthe hypothesis, that _if they had been in his place they would have\nsinned_, and are therefore justly exposed to the penalty due to his\ntransgression; according to which theory each soul might be made liable to\nthe guilt of infinitely more sin than any finite being could possibly\ncommit. Another age, rising above such dark notions respecting the nature\nof sin and the justice of God, maintained the hypothesis that Adam\u2019s sin\nwas imputed to all his posterity, by which the fearful penalty due to his\nsin might be justly inflicted upon them. According to a fifth theory, it\nis clear that \u201cnothing under the empire of Jehovah\u201d can be sin, except a\nknown transgression of the law; and infants are punished, because, as soon\nas they come into the world, they knowingly transgress the law of God.\nThey cannot _knowingly_ sin, says a sixth theory; but still they really\ntransgress the law of God by those little bubbling emotions of anger, and\nso forth, as soon as they come into existence; and hence, the penalty of\nsin is inflicted upon them. Such are some of the hypotheses which have\nbeen adopted by Christian theologians to reconcile the suffering of\ninfants with the justice and goodness of God. The more we look into them,\nthe more we are amazed that the great lights of the world should have\nindulged in reveries so wild and so wonderful; and the more are we\nconvinced, that the speculations of men on these subjects, and the whole\ntheological literature of the world in relation to it, form one of the\ndarkest chapters in the history of the human mind.\n\nHow unlike are such views respecting the origin and existence of natural\nevil to the divine simplicity and beauty of the gospel! \u201cWho did sin, this\nman or his parents,\u201d said the disciples to our Saviour, \u201cthat he was born\nblind?\u201d They made no doubt but that the great evil of natural blindness\nmust have been the punishment of some sin; and merely wished to know\nwhether it were his own sin, committed in some former state of existence,\nor the sin of his parents. Their minds seem to have hung in a state of\nvacillation between the theory of Plato and that of imputation. But our\nSaviour replied: \u201cNeither did this man sin, nor his parents,\u201d that he was\nborn blind; but \u201cthat the work of God might be made manifest in him.\u201d We\nthank thee, O blessed Master, for that sweet word! How delightful is it,\nafter passing through the dark labyrinths of human folly to sit at thy\nfeet and drink in the lessons of heavenly wisdom! How pleasant to the\nsoul\u2014how inexpressibly cheering is it\u2014to turn from the harsh and revolting\nsystems of men, and listen to the sweet accents of mercy as they fall from\nthy lips!\n\nThe great law of suffering, then, is that it is intended for the benefit\nof intelligent creatures. This is the case, even when it assumes the\ncharacter of punishment; for then it is designed to prevent moral evil.\nSuch a view of natural evil, or suffering, does not give that horrid\npicture of the world which arises from the sentiment that all pain and\ndeath must be a punishment for sin. This causes us to see the black\nscourge of retributive justice everywhere, and the hand of fatherly\ncorrection nowhere. It places us, not in a school or state of probation,\nto train us up for a better and brighter world, but in the midst of\ninquisitorial fires and penal woe. It teaches that all mankind became\nguilty by the act of one man; and that for one deed, millions upon\nmillions of human beings are justly obnoxious, not only to temporal and\nspiritual, but also to eternal death.\n\nWe are perfectly aware of all the arguments which have been drawn from\nScripture in support of such a doctrine; and we are also perfectly\nsatisfied that they may be most easily and triumphantly refuted. But at\npresent we do not mean to touch this argument; we shall reserve it for\nanother work. In the mean time, we must be permitted to express the\nsentiment, that a system of theology, so profoundly unphilosophical, so\nutterly repugnant to the moral sentiments of mankind, can never fulfil the\nsublime mission of true religion on earth. It may possess the principle of\nlife within, but it is destitute of the form of life without. It may\nconvert the individual soul, and lead it up to heaven; but it has not the\nradiant form and power of truth, to command the admiration and conquer the\nintellect of the world. It may elevate and purify the affections, even\nwhile it depresses and confounds the understanding; but it cannot\ntransfigure the whole mind, and change it into its own divine image.\nNothing but the most fixed and rooted faith, or the most blind and\nunquestioning submission, can withstand the fearful blasts and dark\nimpulses of such a system.\n\nNo wonder, then, that under a system so deplorably deficient in some of\nthe most sublime features of Christianity, infidelity and Pelagianism\nshould so often have sprung up. If we write libels on the divine\ngovernment, we must expect rebellions and insurrections. This is the\nnatural consequence of the great fundamental heresy which places reason\nand revelation in opposition to each other. Orthodoxy, as she proudly\nstyles herself, may denounce such rebellions; but she herself is partly\nresponsible for the fatal consequences of them. Reason and revelation can\nnever be dissevered, can never be placed in violent conflict, without a\nfrightful injury to both, and to the best interests of mankind. Reason\nmust find its own internal power and life in revelation, and revelation\nmust find its own external form and beauty in reason. The perfection and\nglory of each consists in the living union and consentaneous development\nof both.\n\nIf we teach absurdity, it is worse than idle to enforce submission by\narrogant and lordly denunciations of human pride, or of \u201ccarnal reason.\u201d\nAnd we shall always find, indeed, that when a theologian or a philosopher\nbegins by abusing and vilifying human reason, he either has some absurdity\nwhich he wishes us to swallow, or he wishes to be excused from believing\nanything in particular. Thus, the dogmatism of the one and the scepticism\nof the other unite in trampling human reason under foot; the one, to erect\nan empire of absurdity, and the other, to erect an empire of darkness upon\nits ruins. It should be the great object of all our labours to effect a\nreunion and harmony between revelation and reason, whose \u201cinauspicious\nrepudiations and divorces\u201d have so long \u201cdisturbed everything in the great\nfamily of mankind.\u201d(194)\n\n\n\n\n Chapter III.\n\n\nThe Sufferings Of Christ Reconciled With The Goodness Of God.\n\n\n O blessed Well of Love! O Flower of Grace!\n O glorious Morning Starre! O Lampe of Light!\n Most lively Image of thy Father\u2019s face,\n Eternal King of Glorie, Lord of Might,\n Meeke Lambe of God, before all worlds behight,\n How can we thee requite for all this good?\n Or who can prize that thy most precious blood?\u2014SPENSER.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that natural evil or\nsuffering is not inconsistent with the goodness of God. We were there led\nto see that God, although he never chooses moral evil, often imposes\nnatural evil, or suffering, in order to secure the well-being of the\nworld. Of this general principle, the sufferings and death of Christ are a\nparticular instance; they are not anomalous, but a striking manifestation\nof a great principle which pervades the whole economy of divine\nprovidence. These sufferings, so far from being inconsistent with the\ngoodness of God, are a stupendous display of that sublime mercy which is\nover all his works. To illustrate this position, and clear it of sceptical\ncavils and objections, is the main object of the present chapter.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe sufferings of Christ not unnecessary.\n\n\nBecause the necessity of Christ\u2019s death and sufferings is not manifest at\nfirst view, or because the utility of them is not seen, it is concluded by\nsome that they were wholly useless, and consequently inconsistent with the\ninfinite goodness ascribed to the Ruler of the world. We shall content\nourselves with disposing of this objection in the words of Bishop Butler.\n\u201cTo object against the expediency or usefulness of particular things\nrevealed to have been done or suffered by him,\u201d says he, \u201cbecause we do\nnot see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet\nnothing is more common to be met with than this absurdity. But if it be\nacknowledged beforehand, that we are not judges in this case, it is\nevident that no objection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against\nany particular part of Christ\u2019s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture,\ntill it can be shown positively, not to be requisite, or conducive, to the\nends proposed to be accomplished; or that it is in itself\nunreasonable.\u201d(195)\n\nAgain: \u201cIt is indeed,\u201d says he, \u201ca matter of great patience to reasonable\nmen to find people arguing in this manner; objecting against the\ncredibility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do\nnot see the necessity or expediency of them. For, though it is highly\nright, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with\ndue reverence into the ends and reasons of God\u2019s dispensations; yet, when\nthose reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such\ndispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of\nthis kind of objection seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the\nfolly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are,\nagainst things in Christianity analogous, or like to those natural\ndispensations of Providence which are matters of experience. Let reason be\nkept to, and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the\nworld by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the\nScripture, in the name of God, be given up: but let not such poor\ncreatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not\nsee the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning;\nand what heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are\nnot actively concerned in.\u201d(196)\n\nThis reply is amply sufficient for such an objection. But although the\nconcession is made, for the sake of argument, it is not true, that we do\nnot see the necessity or usefulness of the sufferings of Christ. For, as\nthe author well says: \u201cWhat has been often alleged in justification of\nthis doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of\nour redemption\u2014its tendency to vindicate the authority of God\u2019s laws, and\ndeter his creatures from sin: _this has never been answered_, and _is, I\nthink, plainly unanswerable_; though I am far from thinking it an account\nof the whole of the case.\u201d(197)\n\nIt is true, we believe, that the position that the great work of Christ\nwas necessary to maintain the authority of God\u2019s law, and to deter his\ncreatures from sin, never has been, and never can be refuted. Yet nearly\nall of the commonly received systems of theology furnish a principle, a\nfalse principle, on which this position may be overthrown, and the\nsufferings of Christ shown to be unnecessary. For if a necessary holiness\nbe not a contradiction in terms, if God can, as is usually asserted, cause\nholiness universally to prevail by the mere word of his power, then the\nwork and sufferings of Christ are not necessary to maintain the authority\nof his law, and deter his creatures from sin. In other words, the\nsufferings of Christ were \u201cnot requisite to the ends proposed to be\naccomplished,\u201d because, on such a supposition, they might have been far\nmore easily and completely accomplished without them.\n\nThose who maintain, then, as most theologians do, that God could easily\ncause virtue to exist everywhere if he would, really set forth a principle\nwhich, if true, would demonstrate the sufferings of Christ to be\nunnecessary, and consequently inconsistent with the goodness of God. We\nmust strike at this false principle, and restore the truth that a\nnecessary holiness is a contradiction in terms, an inherent and impossible\nconceit, if we would behold the sublime significancy and beauty of the\nstupendous sacrifice of the cross. We shall then behold the necessity of\nthat sacrifice, and see the omnipotent yearnings of the divine love in its\nefforts to overcome an obstacle, which could not be otherwise surmounted.\n\nIt is often said, we are well aware, that God might have saved us by a\nmere word; but he chose not to do so, preferring to give up his Son to\ndeath in order to show his love. But how can such a position be\nmaintained? If God could save us by a word, how can it display his love to\nrequire such immense sufferings in order to save us? If he could\naccomplish the salvation of all men by a mere word, how does it show his\nlove to make such wonderful preparations for their salvation; and, after\nall, permit so large a portion of them to be eternally lost? If we could\nsave the life of a fellow-being by merely putting forth a hand, would it\ndisplay our love for him if we should choose to travel all around the\nearth, and incur incredible hardships and sufferings in order to save him?\nWould this display our love, we ask, or our folly? Is it not evident,\nthen, that the principle that virtue or holiness might be easily caused to\nexist everywhere, is utterly repugnant to the glory of revelation? Is it\nnot evident that it causes the transcendent glory of the cross to\ndisappear, and reduces the whole complicated system of means and\nappliances for the salvation of the world to a mere idle mockery of the\nmiseries of man\u2019s estate? Does it not show the whole plan of salvation, as\nconceived and executed by the infinite wisdom of God, to be an awkward and\nbungling attempt to accomplish an end, which might have been far more\neasily and perfectly accomplished? And if so, does it not become all\nChristian theologians to expunge this false principle from their systems,\nand eradicate it from their thoughts?\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of God.\n\n\nThe reason why the love of God does not appear to all men in the sacrifice\nof his Son is, that it is often viewed, not as it is in itself, but\nthrough the distorting medium of false analogies, or of a vague and\nill-defined phraseology. Hence it is that the melancholy spectacle is\neverywhere presented of men, of rational and immortal beings, living and\ndying in a determined opposition to a doctrine which they have not taken\nthe pains to understand, and of whose intrinsic grandeur and glory they\nhave not enjoyed the most remote glimpse. So far from beholding the love\nof God, which shines forth so conspicuously in the cross of Christ, they\nsee in it only an act of injustice and cruelty on the part of God.\n\nOne source of this error, we have no doubt, is to be found in the use, or\nrather in the abuse, of the term _punishment_. In the strict sense of the\nword, it is not only unjust, but impossible, for God to punish the\ninnocent. The very idea of punishment, according to the strict sense of\nthe word, implies the notion of guilt or ill-desert in the person upon\nwhom it is inflicted. It is suffering inflicted on an offender, on account\nof his real or supposed personal guilt. Hence, as God regards all things\njust as they are in themselves, he cannot possibly look upon the innocent\nas guilty; and consequently he cannot, in the strict sense of the word,\ninflict punishment upon them. And when we speak of the punishment of\nChrist, we merely mean, or should merely mean, to convey the idea that he\n_suffered_, in order to release us from the _punishment_ due to our sins.\nIt would be well, perhaps, if this could always be borne in mind; for most\nmen are more under the influence and power of words than they are apt to\nsee, or willing to acknowledge. The mere expression, the _punishment_ of\nthe innocent, is apt to awaken associations in the mind which are\ninconsistent with the dictates of justice; but which the idea of the\natonement would never have suggested, if clearly and distinctly viewed in\nits own clear light, and not through the dark medium of an ill-defined\nphraseology.\n\nAnother source of the error in question is to be found in the ambiguity of\nthe term justice. It is frequently said that the atonement is a\nsatisfaction to divine justice; to which it is replied, that justice\nrequires the punishment of the very individual who offends, and not of\nanother person in his place. Let us consider this subject.\n\nThe term _justice_ has two distinct significations, which I shall\ndesignate by the epithets _retributive_ and _administrative_. By\nretributive justice, I mean that attribute which inclines Him to punish an\noffender merely on account of the intrinsic demerit and hatefulness of his\noffence; and which animadverts upon the evil conduct of a moral agent,\nconsidered as an individual, and not as a member of the great family of\nintelligent beings. This attribute seeks to punish sin merely because it\ndeserves punishment, and not because its punishment is necessary to secure\nthe ends of government; and, supposing sin to exist, it would have its\nobject, even if there were only one accountable creature in the universe.\n\nThe object of public or administrative justice is quite different. It\ninflicts punishment, not because it is deserved, but in order to prevent\ntransgression, and to secure the general good, by securing the ends of\nwise and good government. In the moral government of God, one of the\nhighest objects of this kind of justice, or, if you please, of this phase\nor manifestation of the divine justice, is to secure in the hearts of its\nsubjects a cordial approbation of the principles according to which they\nare governed. This is indispensable to the very existence of moral\ngovernment. The dominion of force, or of power, may be maintained, in many\ncases, notwithstanding the aversion of those who are subject to it; but it\nis impossible to govern the heart by love while it disapproves and hates\nthe principles to which it is required to submit, or the character of the\nruler by whom those principles are enforced.\n\nNow, it is very true, that Christ has made a satisfaction to divine\njustice. This is frequently asserted; but it is seldom considered, we\napprehend, with any very great degree of distinctness, in what sense the\nterm justice should always be understood in this proposition. It cannot\nproperly refer to the retributive justice of God. This requires the\npunishment of the offender, and of no one else. It accepts of no\nsubstitute. And hence, it is impossible to conceive that it can be\nsatisfied, except by the punishment of the offender himself. The object of\nthis sort of justice, as I have said, is personal guilt; and hence, as our\nSaviour did not become personally guilty, when he assumed our place and\nconsented to die for us, so it is impossible to conceive that he became\nliable to the infliction of the retributive justice of God. And we suppose\nit is this idea, at which the Socinian vaguely and obscurely aims, when he\nsays, that the justice of God requires the punishment of the transgressor\nalone; and that it is absurd to suppose it can be satisfied by the\nsubstitution of the innocent in his stead. He denies the whole doctrine of\nsatisfaction, because he sees and feels that it is not true according to\none meaning of the terms in which it is expressed.\n\nIn truth and in deed, the sinner is just as guilty after the atonement as\nhe was before; and he is just as obnoxious to the inflictions of the\nretributive justice of God. He may be most justly punished; for as the\nclaims of retributive justice have not been satisfied, so they may be\ndemanded of him without being a second time exacted. He really deserves\nthe wrath of God on account of his sins, although administrative justice\nhas been satisfied; and hence, when he truly repents and believes, all his\nsins are freely and graciously remitted. No satisfaction is made to\nretributive justice.\n\nIt is the administrative justice of God that has been satisfied by the\natonement. This merely enforces the punishment of the sinner, as I have\nsaid, in order to secure the ends of good government; and hence, it is\ncapable of yielding and giving place to any expedient by which those ends\nmay be secured. In other words, it is capable of being satisfied by\nwhatever method God may be pleased to adopt in order to secure the ends of\ngood government, and to accomplish his own glorious designs, without the\npunishment of the sinner. All this, as we shall see hereafter, has been\nmost gloriously accomplished by the death and sufferings of Christ. God\ncan now be just, and yet the justifier of him that believes. The great\nobstacles which the administrative justice of God interposes to the\nforgiveness of sin, having been taken out of the way and nailed to the\ncross, that unbounded mercy from which the provision of such a Saviour\nproceeded, can now flow down upon a lost and ruined world in all the\nfulness and plenitude of its pardoning and sanctifying power.\n\nAs a general thing, those who undertake to vindicate the sufferings of\nChrist against objections, rest their defence on the ground that they are\na satisfaction to the administrative justice of God. This is seen, not\nfrom their express declarations, but from the nature of their arguments\nand defence; as if they unconsciously turned to this position as to their\nstronghold. On the other hand, those who assail the sacrifice of Christ,\nalmost invariably treat it as if it were a satisfaction to the retributive\njustice of God. Both sides seem to be right, and both wrong. The whole\nidea of satisfaction to divine justice by a substitute is not absurd,\nbecause the idea of satisfaction to retributive justice is so; nor is the\nwhole justice of God, or the justice of God in every sense of the word, to\nbe conceived of as satisfied by the atonement, because his administrative\njustice is thus satisfied. When it is thus asserted, then, that the\njustice of God is satisfied by the atonement; we should be careful, we\nthink, to observe in what precise sense this proposition is true, and in\nwhat sense it is false; in order that we may pursue the clear and shining\nlight of truth, neither distracted by the clamour of words nor enveloped\nin clouds of logomachy.\n\nThere is a class of theologians, we are aware, and a very large class, who\nregard the sufferings of Christ as a satisfaction to the retributive\njustice of God. But this forms no part of the doctrine which we have\nundertaken to defend; and, indeed, we think the defence of such a view of\nthe atonement clearly impossible. It is placed on the ground, that the\nsins of the world, or of those for whom Christ died, have been imputed to\nhim; and hence he really suffers the inflictions of the retributive\njustice of God. The objections to this scheme, which seek to remove the\napparent hardships and injustice of the sufferings of the innocent, by the\nfiction of the imputation of the sins of the guilty, we shall not dwell\nupon here; as we so fully considered them in the preceding chapter. To our\nmind they are plainly unanswerable. We would vindicate the sufferings of\nChrist no more than those of infants, on the ground that sin was imputed\nto him, so as to render them just. On the contrary, we hold them to have\nbeen wholly undeserved; and instead of vindicating them on the ground of\nstern justice, we vindicate them on the ground of the infinite, unbounded,\nand overflowing goodness of God.\n\nIt is easy to see that such a view of the atonement does not in the least\ndegree conflict with the justice of God. It merely teaches, that God has\nprovided for the salvation of the world by the sufferings of Jesus Christ,\nwho was without spot or blemish. Surely we cannot find it in our hearts to\nobject, that the sufferings of Christ for such a purpose are not\nconsistent with the justice of God, if we will only read a single page in\nthe great volume of nature and of providence. It has been said by Bishop\nButler, that such an objection \u201cconcludes altogether as much against God\u2019s\nwhole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of\ndivine providence, in the government of the world, i. e., against the\nwhole scheme of theism and the whole notion of religion, as against\nChristianity. For the world is a constitution, or system, whose parts have\na mutual reference to each other; and there is a scheme of things\ngradually carrying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of\nwhich God has appointed us, in various ways, to contribute. And when, in\nthe daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that innocent\npeople should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the\nvery same objection as the instance we are considering. The infinitely\ngreater importance of that appointment of Christianity which is objected\nagainst, does not hinder but that it may be, as it plainly is, an\nappointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us daily\nexamples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it\nwould be stronger, in one respect, against natural providence, than\nagainst Christianity; because, under the former, we are in many cases\ncommanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the\nfaults of others, whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary.\u201d\n\nNow, how very unreasonable is it in the theist, to object against\nChristianity, that it represents God as having acted upon a particular\nprinciple, i. e., as having appointed the innocent to suffer for the good\nof the guilty, when we see that he has everywhere recognised and adopted\nthe very same principle in the government of the world? However remote\nthis principle may appear from the conceptions of man, it is not only\nfound in the volume of inspiration; it is deeply engraven by the finger of\nGod himself upon every page of the volume of natural providence. And to\nquestion the divine original of revelation, because it contains such a\nprinciple or appointment, while we admit that God created and governs the\nworld, is about as unreasonable as it would be to deny that a letter came\nfrom a particular person, because it was clearly written in his\nhand-writing, and bore evident traces of his peculiarities of style and\nthought.\n\nLet us view this general principle in a particular instance. This will set\nit in a clear and striking light, and seem to vindicate the constitution\nof the world, as well as the doctrine of the atonement. The principle of\ncompassion has been planted in our bosom by the finger of God. And thus\nthe necessity is laid upon us, by a law of our nature, to suffer on\naccount of the distresses which our fellow-men bring upon themselves by\ntheir own crimes and vices; and we are impelled in various ways to undergo\ninconvenience and loss, and self-denial and suffering, in order to avert\nfrom them the consequences of their own misconduct. But have we any reason\nto complain of this appointment of God? Certainly not: for if we obey the\nindications of his will, as seen in this part of the constitution of our\nnature, by doing all in our power to relieve the distresses of our\nfellow-men, we shall be infinitely more than repaid for all that we may\nundergo and suffer. However painful may be the feeling of compassion, we\nonly have to obey its dictates by relieving the distressed to the utmost\nof our ability, and we shall be more than repaid by the satisfaction and\ndelight which never fail to result from such a course of life; to say\nnothing of those infinite rewards which God has prepared for those who\nsincerely love and serve him.\n\nJust so it is in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He was led by his\nboundless compassion to avert from us the awful consequences of sin, by\nthe agony, and the sufferings, and the death, which he endured upon the\ncross. And, according to the doctrine of atonement, he is infinitely more\nthan repaid for all this. Though he suffered in the flesh, and was made a\nspectacle to men and angels, yet he despised the shame, seeing the joy\nthat was set before him. We do confess that we can see no insufferable\nhardship in all this, nor the least shadow of injustice. One thing is\ncertain, if injustice is exhibited here, it is exhibited everywhere in the\nprovidence of God; and if the doctrine of the atonement were stricken from\nthe scheme of Christianity, the injustice which is supposed to attend it\nwould still continue to overhang and cloud the moral government of God.\nAnd hence, if the deist or the Socinian would escape from this frightful\nspectre of his own imagination, he must bury himself in the most profound\ndepths and most cheerless gloom of atheism.\n\nThe doctrine in question is frequently misrepresented, and made to appear\ninconsistent with the justice of God, by means of false analogies. The\nSocinian frequently speaks of it, as if it were parallel with the\nproceeding of a human government that should doom the innocent to suffer\nin place of the guilty. Thus the feeling of indignation that is aroused in\nthe human bosom at the idea of a virtuous man\u2019s being sentenced to suffer\nthe punishment due to the criminal is sought to be directed against the\ndoctrine of the atonement. But in vain will such rhetoric be employed to\nexcite indignation and horror against the doctrine of the cross, in the\nmind of any person by whom it is at all understood.\n\nThe cases are not at all parallel. In the first place, no human government\nhas a right to doom a virtuous man to bear the punishment due to the\ncriminal; and if he were willing to suffer in the place of the culprit, no\ngovernment on earth has a right to accept of such a substitute. The life\nof the virtuous citizen is the gift of God, and no earthly power has the\nauthority to take it for any such purpose. It would be a violation of the\nwill of God for any human government to admit of such a substitution. On\nthe contrary, Christ had the power to lay down his life; and he did so, in\nperfect accordance with the appointment of God. In submitting to the death\nof the cross, he did not subvert, he fulfilled the end of his earthly\nexistence.\n\nSecondly, it would overthrow the ends of public justice for any human\ngovernment to permit a good man, the ornament and blessing of society, to\ndie in the room of the criminal, its scourge and plague. The sufferings of\nthe good citizen in such a case would be pure and unmitigated evil. While\nthey would deprive society of his services, they would throw back upon it\nthe burden of one who deserved to die. They would tend to render the\npunishment of crime uncertain; they would shock the moral sentiments of\nmankind, and cover with odium and disgrace the government that could\ntolerate such a proceeding. But not so in relation to the sufferings of\nChrist. He assumed his human nature for the express purpose of dying upon\nthe cross. He died, not to deliver an individual and turn him loose to\ncommit further depredations upon society, but to effect the salvation of\nthe world itself, and to deliver it from all the evils under which it\ngroans and travails in pain. He died for sinners, not that they might\ncontinue in their sins, but in order to redeem unto himself a peculiar\npeople zealous of good works.\n\nIn the third and last place, the death of a good man is the end of his\nexistence, the entire extinction of his being, in so far as all human\ngovernment is concerned; whereas the death of Christ, in relation to the\ngovernment of God, was but the beginning of his exaltation and glory. He\nendured the cross, despising the shame, in view of the unbounded joy that\nwas set before him. The temporal evils which he endured, unutterably great\nas they were, if viewed merely in relation to himself, were infinitely\nmore than counterbalanced by the eternal satisfaction and delight that\nresulted from them.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians, against the doctrine\nof the atonement.\n\n\nIt is likewise objected against the doctrine of the atonement, that it\nobscures the freeness and glory of the divine mercy. It is supposed to\ninterfere with the freeness of the favour of God, inasmuch as it requires\na sacrifice to procure the remission of sin. This point, no less than the\nformer, the Socinian endeavours to establish by means of analogies drawn\nfrom the ordinary transactions of life. \u201cI know it is said,\u201d says Dr.\nChanning, \u201cthat Trinitarianism magnifies God\u2019s mercy, because it teaches\nthat he himself provided the substitute for the guilty. But I reply, that\nthe work here ascribed to mercy is not the most appropriate, nor the most\nfitted to manifest it and impress it on the heart. This may be made\napparent by familiar illustration. Suppose that a creditor, through\ncompassion to certain debtors, should persuade a benevolent and opulent\nman to pay him in their stead; would not the debtors see a greater mercy,\nand feel a weightier obligation, if they were to receive a free,\ngratuitous release? And will not their chief gratitude stray beyond the\ncreditor to their benevolent substitute? Or suppose that a parent,\nunwilling to inflict a penalty on a disobedient but feeble child, should\npersuade a stronger child to bear it; would not the offender see a more\ntouching mercy in a free forgiveness, springing immediately from a\nparent\u2019s heart, than in this circuitous remission?\u201d\n\nIf there were any force in such analogies, they would conclude quite as\nmuch against the scheme of Dr. Channing as against ours. For he maintains\nthat the sinner can obtain forgiveness only by a sincere repentance of his\nsins. He teaches that God requires the sinner to humble himself, and take\nup his cross and follow Christ. Now to return to the case of the debtor.\nWould he not see a greater kindness, \u201cand feel a weightier obligation,\u201d if\nhe were to receive a free release, without any conditions being imposed\nupon him, than if it was accompanied by any terms or conditions?\n\nBut the analogy is false. However well it might serve some purposes, it is\nmisapplied by Dr. Channing. If a creditor is known to love money, as most\nmen are, and he should nevertheless release his debtors; this would\nundoubtedly be an exhibition of his kindness. And we might measure the\nextent of his kindness by the amount of the indebtedness which he had\nforgiven. But although the creditor, who is the most easily moved by the\nnecessities of his debtor, may be the most compassionate man, it does not\nfollow that the governor, who under all circumstances, makes the most free\nand unrestrained use of the pardoning power, is the best ruler. The\ncreditor has a perfect right to release his debtor; and in so doing, he\naffects the interest of no one but himself: whereas, by the pardon of\noffences against public law, the most sacred rights of the community may\nbe disregarded, the protection of law may be removed, and the general good\ninvaded. The penalty of the law does not belong to the supreme executive,\nas a debt belongs to the creditor to whom it is due; and hence it cannot\nalways be abandoned at his pleasure. It is ordained, not merely for the\nruler, but for the benefit and protection of all who are subject to its\ncontrol. And hence, although a creditor may show his mercy by releasing\nhis necessitous debtors; yet the ruler who undertakes to display his mercy\nby a free use of the pardoning power, may only betray a weak and yielding\ncompassion for the individual, instead of manifesting that calm and\nenlightened benevolence which labours to secure the foundations of wise\nand good government, and thereby to promote the order and happiness of the\ngoverned.\n\nThis leads me to remark, that the hope and the theology of the Socinian is\nbuilt upon the most inadequate conceptions of the divine mercy. This is\nnot a weak and yielding thing, as men are so fondly prone to imagine; it\nis a universal and inflexible law. The most perfect harmony exists among\nall the attributes of God; and as his justice demands the punishment of\nthe sinner, so also doth his mercy. The bosom of God is not, like that of\nfrail mortals, torn and distracted by conflicting principles. Even to the\nmaintenance of his law, that bright transcript of his eternal justice, his\nmercy is inviolably pledged. Heaven and earth shall sooner pass away, than\nhis mercy shall withdraw from the support of one jot or one tittle of it.\nIt is not only just and holy, and therefore will be maintained with\nalmighty power; but it is also good, and therefore its immutable\nfoundations are laid in the everlasting and unchanging mercy of God.\n\nFor the universal good, it will be inexorably enforced against the\nindividual transgressor. God is not slack concerning his promises. He is\nfree from all human weakness. His mind is not limited, like that of man,\nto be more affected by partial suffering than by that universal disorder\nand ruin which must inevitably result from the unrequited violation of his\nlaw. The mind of man is unduly affected by the present and the proximate;\nbut to God there is neither remote nor future. And when, in wisdom and in\ngoodness, he first established and ordained the law unto life, he saw the\nend from the beginning; and he can never sacrifice the universal good by\nsetting aside that law in order to avoid partial evil. His mercy to the\nwhole creation makes the same demand as his justice. The execution of\ndivine justice is, indeed, but a manifestation of that mercy which is over\nall his works; and which labours, with omnipotent energy, to secure the\ngood of all, by vindicating the majesty and glory of that law, upon the\npreservation of which inviolate the good of all depends. The fire that is\nnot quenched is kindled by the boundless love of God no less than by his\njustice; and the very fierceness of its burning is, that it is the \u201cwrath\nof the Lamb.\u201d Let us not be deceived by the vain fancies and the idle\ndreams which our fond wishes and narrow-minded infirmities are so apt to\nbeget in us. Let us remember that the mercy of God is united with\nomniscience; and that it is to be found only in the bosom of Him whose\nempire extends to the utmost bounds of the universe, as well as throughout\nthe endless ages of eternity.\n\nIn the genuine spirit of Socinian theology, Dr. Channing, in his\nillustration, has set before us the mercy of God alone; and that, too,\nmerely in relation to the sinner, and not in relation to his law and\ngovernment. He entirely overlooks the fact, that it is impossible to\nexhibit either the justice or the mercy of God in the most affecting\nmanner, except in union with each other. It is frequently said, we are\naware, that if God had pardoned the sinner without enforcing the demands\nof the law, he would have displayed his mercy alone, and not his justice;\nbut in fact this would have been a very equivocal display of mercy. It\nwould have shown only one of two things: either that God regarded the\nsinner with an eye of compassion, or that he did not regard his sin:\neither that he was merciful, or that he had no great abhorrence of sin:\neither that he loved the transgressor, or that he did not hate the\ntransgression.\n\nTo illustrate this point, let us take the case of Zaleucus, the king of\nthe Locrians. He passed a certain law, with the penalty that every\ntransgressor of it should lose both his eyes. It so happened that his own\nson was the first by whom it was violated. Now, any one can see, that\nalthough Zaleucus had been a hard-hearted and unfeeling tyrant, he might\nhave pardoned his son, just because he had no regard to the demands of\npublic justice; or, on the other hand, that he might have inflicted the\npenalty of the law upon his son to the uttermost, not out of a supreme\nregard to the law, but because he was destitute of mercy and natural\naffection. Neither by remitting the whole punishment, nor by inflicting it\nwith rigour, could he have made such a display of his justice and mercy as\nto make a deep moral impression upon his subjects. In other words, if\neither of these attributes had been left out in the manifestation, the\ndisplay of the other must have been exceedingly feeble and equivocal. Both\nmust be seen in union, or neither can be seen in the fulness of its glory.\n\nHow, then, could Zaleucus have displayed both of these attributes in the\nmost perfect and affecting manner? By doing precisely that which he is\nsaid to have done. He directed that one of his own eyes should be put out,\nand one of his son\u2019s. Whose heart is not touched by this most affecting\ndisplay of the tender pity of the father, in union with the stern justice\nof the law-giver? His pity would not allow him to inflict the whole\npenalty upon his beloved son; and his high regard for the demands of\npublic justice would not permit him to set at naught the authority of the\nlaw: and but for the possession and manifestation of this last trait of\ncharacter, the mighty strugglings and yearnings of the first could not\nhave burst forth and appeared with such overwhelming power and\ntranscendent lustre. Hence, every system of redemption which, like that of\nthe Socinian, leaves out of view the administrative justice of God, does\nnot admit of any very impressive display of his goodness and his mercy.\n\nAll such illustrations must be imperfect, in some respects; but the one\nabove given conveys a far more adequate view of the atonement than that\npresented by Dr. Channing. The application of it is easy. Such was the\nmercy of God, that he could not leave his poor fallen creatures to endure\nthe awful penalty of the law; and such was his regard for the purity and\nhappiness of the universe, that he could not permit his law to be violated\nwith impunity. If his administrative justice had not stood in the way, the\noffer of pardon to the sinner would have cost him merely a word. And hence\nthe length, the breadth, and the depth of his love could not have been\nmanifested. But he was the Ruler of the universe, and as such his law\nstood in the way. He owed it to himself not to permit this to be trampled\nunder foot with impunity, nor its violation to be forgiven, until he had\nprovided some way in order to secure the high and holy ends for which it\nhad been established. Hence, as it was not possible for God to deny\nhimself, he sent forth his beloved Son, who had been the companion of his\nbosom and his blessedness from all eternity, to take upon himself the form\nof a servant, and by his teaching, and obedience, and sufferings, and\ndeath, to vindicate the majesty of the law, and to render it honourable in\nthe sight of the universe. And it is this wonderful union of the goodness\nand the severity, of the mercy and the justice of God, which constitutes\nthe grand moral tendency and glory of the cross.\n\nThe course pursued by the king of the Locrians, in relation to the crime\nof his son, secured the ends of the law in a much greater degree than they\ncould have been secured by a rigorous execution of its penalty upon the\nperson of his son. It evinced a deep and settled abhorrence of crime, and\nan inflexible determination to punish it. It cut off all hope from his\nsubjects that crime would be permitted to escape with impunity. And hence,\nafter such a manifestation of his character as a king, he could permit his\nson to enjoy the unspeakable blessings of sight, without holding out the\nleast encouragement to the commission of crime.\n\nSo, likewise, in relation to the sufferings of Christ. These were not, in\nstrictness, the penalty of the law. This was eternal death; whereas the\nsufferings of Christ, inconceivably great as they were, were but temporal;\nand there can be no proportion between sufferings which know a period, and\nthose which are without end. Hence, as we have already said, he did not\nsatisfy the punitive justice of God. But the sacrifice of Christ answered\nall the purposes that could have been answered by the rigorous execution\nof the law; and it answered them in an infinitely greater degree, than if\nthe human race had been permitted to endure it without remedy.\n\nGod\u2019s love to his Son was inconceivably greater than that which any\ncreature ever bore to himself or to any other; and, consequently, by\noffering him up as a substitute for guilty mortals, in order that he might\nsave them without doing violence to his administrative justice, he\nmanifested the infinite energy of his determination to destroy sin. No\naccount of the indescribable odiousness and deformity of evil, nor of the\ninconceivable holiness of God, could have made so deep an impression of\nhis implacable abhorrence of sin, as is made by the cross upon which his\nSon was permitted to expire amid the scorn and contempt of his enemies.\nThe human imagination has no power to conceive of a more impressive and\nappalling enforcement of the great lesson, \u201cStand in awe, and sin not,\u201d\nthan that which is presented to an astonished universe in the cross and\npassion of the Son of God.\n\nAnd besides, it possesses this other unspeakable advantage, that while it\nmanifests an infinite abhorrence of sin, it displays the most\nheart-subduing love of the sinner. If Zaleucus had exhausted the penalty\nof the law upon his son, this would have had little or no tendency to\nreform his heart, or to induce him to acquiesce in the justness of the\nlaw. It would have been more apt to lead him to regard the king as an\nunfeeling father. But when he was made to see, by the manner in which the\nking had dispensed the law, that he cherished the warmest feelings of\naffection for him, there was no cause left for a murmur on the part of\nany, but for the highest admiration on the part of all.\n\nJust so in relation to the sufferings and death of Christ. If God had\nexhausted the fearful penalty of the law upon poor, suffering, and\ndegraded humanity, this would have been well calculated to inspire his\ncreatures with a servile and trembling awe of him. From their limited and\nimperfect views of the evil of sin, and of the reasons why it should be\npunished, they would not have been prepared to acquiesce in such\ntremendous severity. Thus, one of the great ends of God\u2019s moral government\nwould have been subverted: the affections of his creatures would have been\nestranged from him, through a distrust of his goodness and a dread of his\npower, instead of having been drawn to him by the sweet and sacred ties of\nconfidence and love. But how different is the case now! Having given for\nus his beloved Son, who is greater than all things, while we were yet\n_enemies_, now that we are _reconciled_ to him, we are most firmly\npersuaded that he will freely give us all things that can possibly conduce\nto our good. Surely, after such a display of his love, it were highly\ncriminal in us, to permit the least shadow of suspicion or distrust to\nintercept the sweet, and cheering, and purifying beams of his reconciled\ncountenance. Whatever may be his severity against sin, and whatever terror\nit may strike into the conscience of evil-doers, we can most cordially\nacquiesce in its justness: for we most clearly perceive, that the penalty\nof the law was not established to gratify any private appetite for\nrevenge, but to uphold and secure the highest happiness of the moral\nuniverse.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter IV.\n\n\nThe Eternal Punishment Of The Wicked Reconciled With The Goodness Of God.\n\n\n And thus,\n Transfigured, with a meek and dreadless awe,\n A solemn hush of spirit, he beholds\n All things of terrible seeming: yea, unmoved\n Views e\u2019en the immitigable ministers,\n That shower down vengeance on these latter days.\n For even these on wings of healing come,\n Yea, kindling with intenser Deity;\n From the celestial mercy-seat they speed,\n And at the renovating wells of love,\n Have fill\u2019d their vials with salutary wrath.\u2014COLERIDGE.\n\n\nHaving considered the sufferings of the innocent, it now becomes necessary\nto contemplate the punishment of the guilty, in connexion with the\ninfinite goodness of God. This conducts us to the consideration of the\nmost awful subject that ever engaged the attention of a rational\nbeing,\u2014the never-ending torments of the wicked in another world. Though\nplausible arguments and objections have been urged against this doctrine,\nwe are perfectly satisfied they will not bear the test of a close\nexamination. They have derived all their apparent force and\nconclusiveness, it seems to us, from two distinct sources, namely: from\nthe circumstance that this appalling doctrine has been too often placed,\nby its advocates, upon insecure and untenable grounds; and from the fact,\nthat the supporters of this doctrine have too often maintained principles\nfrom which its fallacy may be clearly inferred. In the defence of this\ndoctrine, then, we shall endeavour to point out, first, the false grounds\nupon which it has been placed; secondly, the unsound principles from which\nits fallacy may be inferred; and, thirdly, we shall endeavour to show the\nmeans by which it may be clearly and satisfactorily reconciled with the\ngoodness of the Supreme Ruler of the world.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future\npunishment has been placed.\n\n\nNothing could be more untenable, it seems to us, than the usual argument\nin favour of future punishments, which seeks to justify their eternity on\nthe ground that every sinful act, because it is committed against an\ninfinite being, is infinite, and therefore deserves to be visited with\nendless torments. This argument, which seems but little better than a play\non the term _infinite_, is perhaps calculated to make no impression upon\nany mind, which is not already fully persuaded of the truth of the\ndoctrine in question. On the other hand, it may be so easily refuted by a\nmultitude of considerations, that it exposes the doctrine, in one of its\ndefences, to the triumphant attacks of its adversaries. We shall not\nexhaust the patience of the reader by dwelling upon the refutation which\nmay be given of such an argument. We shall dismiss it with a single reply,\nand that we shall give in the language of John Foster.\n\n\u201cA common argument has been that sin is an _infinite evil_, that is, of\ninfinite demerit, as an offence against an infinite being; and that, since\na finite creature cannot suffer infinitely _in measure_, he must _in\nduration_. But, surely in all reason, the limited, and in the present\ninstance, _diminutive nature of the criminal_, must be an essential part\nof the case for judgment. Every act must, for one of its proportions, be\nmeasured by the nature and condition of the agent: and it would seem that\none principle in that rule of proportion should be, that the offending\nagent should be capable of being aware of the magnitude (the _amount_, if\nwe might use such a word,) of the offence he commits, by being capable of\nsomething like an adequate conception of the being against whom it is\ncommitted. A perverse child, committing an offence against a great\nmonarch, of whose dignity it _had some_, but a vastly inadequate\napprehension, would not be punished in the same manner as an offender of\nhigh endowments and responsibility, and fully aware of the dignity of the\npersonage offended. The one would justly be sharply chastised; the other\nmight as justly be condemned to death. In the present case, the offender\ndoes or may know that the Being offended against is of awful majesty, and\ntherefore the offence is one of great aggravation, and he will justly be\npunished with great severity; but by his extremely contracted and feeble\nfaculties, as the lowest in the scale of strictly rational and accountable\ncreatures in the whole creation, he is _infinitely incapable_ of any\nadequate conception of the greatness of the Being offended against. He is\nthen, according to the argument, obnoxious to a punishment not in any\nproportion to his own nature, but alone to that infinity of the supreme\nnature, which is to him infinitely inconceivable and unknown.\u201d(198)\n\nThis answer alone, though perhaps not the best which might be made, we\ndeem amply sufficient. Indeed, does not the position, that a man, a poor,\nweak, fallible creature, deserves an infinite punishment, an eternity of\ntorments, for each evil thought or word, carry its own refutation along\nwith it? And if not, what are we to think of that attribute of justice,\nwhich demands an eternity to inflict the infinite pangs due to a single\nsin? Is it a quality to inspire the soul with a rational worship, or to\nfill it with a horror which casteth out love?\n\nAnother argument to show the infinite ill-desert of some men, is drawn\nfrom the _scientia media Dei_. It is said, that if God foresaw that if\nthey had been placed in various other circumstances, and surrounded by\nother temptations, their dispositions and character would have induced\nthem to commit other sins; for which they are, therefore, as really\nresponsible as if they had actually committed them. If this be a correct\nprinciple, it is easy, we must admit, to render each individual of the\nhuman race responsible for a greater number of sins than have ever been\ncommitted, or than could ever have been committed by all the actual\ndwellers upon the face of the earth. Nay, by such a process of\nmultiplication, it would be easy to spread the guilt of a single soul over\nevery point of infinite space, and every moment of eternal duration. But\nsuch a principle is more than questionable. To say nothing of its\nintrinsic deformity, it is refuted by the consequences to which it leads.\nWe want arguments on this subject, that will give the mind, not horrid\ncaricatures of the divine justice, but such views of that sublime\nattribute as will inspire us with sentiments of admiration and love, as\nwell as with a godly fear and wholesome awe.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy of the eternity of\nfuture punishments may be clearly inferred.\n\n\nIt is a doctrine maintained by Augustine, Calvin, and Luther, as well as\nby many of their followers, that, in his fallen state, man \u201cis free to\nevil only.\u201d He can do nothing good without the aid of divine grace; and\nthis, in point of fact, is given to but a very small number of the human\nrace; at least, efficacious grace is given to but few, so that the greater\npart of mankind cannot acquire or possess that holiness without which no\nman shall see the Lord. Now, if we take our stand upon this platform of\ndoctrine, it will be found utterly impossible, we think, to defend the\neternity of future punishments.\n\nIt was upon this platform that John Foster erected his tremendous battery\nagainst the doctrine in question; and it is believed, that the more\nclosely the argument is examined, the more clearly it will be seen, that\nhe has either demolished the doctrine which was so obnoxious to his\nfeelings, or else the platform which constituted so essential a part of\nhis own creed. In our humble opinion, \u201cthe moral argument,\u201d as he calls\nit, \u201cpressed irresistibly upon his mind;\u201d because it was drawn from false\npremises, of whose correctness he seems not to have entertained the shadow\nof a doubt. He clung to the conclusion, when he should have abandoned the\npremises. But we shall give his own words, and permit the reader to judge\nfor himself.\n\nAfter having endeavoured to impress our feeble powers with \u201cthe stupendous\nidea of eternity,\u201d he adds: \u201cNow think of an infliction of misery\nprotracted through such a period, and at the end of it being only\n_commenced_,\u2014not one smallest step nearer a conclusion,\u2014the case just the\nsame if that sum of figures were multiplied by itself; and then think of\n_man_,\u2014his nature, his situation, the circumstances of his brief sojourn\nand trial on earth. Far be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin,\nand to remonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a severe chastisement,\nof whatever moral nature we may regard the infliction to be. But still,\nwhat is man? He comes into the world with a nature fatally corrupt, and\npowerfully tending to actual evil. He comes among a crowd of temptations\nadapted to his innate evil propensities. He grows up (incomparably the\ngreater portion of the race) in great ignorance, his judgment weak, and\nunder numberless beguilements into error; while his passions and appetites\nare strong, his conscience unequally matched against their power,\u2014in the\nmajority of men, but feebly and rudely constituted. The influence of\nwhatever good instructions he may receive, is counteracted by a\ncombination of opposite influences almost constantly acting on him. He is\nessentially and inevitably unapt to be powerfully acted on by what is\ninvisible and future. In addition to all which, there is the intervention\nand activity of the great tempter and destroyer. In short, his condition\nis such that there is no hope of him, but from a direct, special operation\non him, of what we denominate grace. _Is_ it not so? _Are_ we not\nconvinced? _Is_ it not the plain doctrine of Scripture? _Is_ there not\nirresistible evidence, from a view of the actual condition of the human\nworld, that no man can become _good_ in the Christian sense,\u2014can become\nfit for a holy and happy place hereafter,\u2014but by this operation _ab\nextra_? But this is arbitrary and discriminative on the part of the\nsovereign Agent, and independent of the will of man. And how awfully\nevident is it, that this indispensable operation takes place only on a\ncomparatively small proportion of the collective race!\n\n\u201cNow this creature, thus constituted and circumstanced, passes a few\nfleeting years on earth, a short, sinful course, in which he does often\nwhat, notwithstanding his ignorance and ill-disciplined judgment and\nconscience, he knows to be wrong, and neglects what he knows to be his\nduty; and, consequently, for a greater or less measure of guilt, widely\ndifferent in different offenders, deserves punishment. But ENDLESS\nPUNISHMENT! HOPELESS MISERY, _through a duration to which the enormous\nterms above imagined will be absolutely_ NOTHING! I acknowledge my\n_inability_ (I would say it reverently) _to admit this belief, together\nwith a belief in the divine goodness_,\u2014the belief that \u2018God is love,\u2019 that\nhis tender mercies are over all his works. Goodness, benevolence, charity,\nas ascribed in supreme perfection to him, cannot mean a quality foreign to\nall human conceptions of goodness: it must be something analogous in\nprinciple to what himself has defined and required as goodness in his\nmoral creatures; that, in adoring the divine goodness, we may not be\nworshipping an \u2018unknown God.\u2019 But, if so, how would all our ideas be\nconfounded, while contemplating him bringing, of his own sovereign will, a\nrace of creatures into existence, in such a condition that they certainly\nwill and _must_\u2014_must_ by their nature and circumstances\u2014go wrong, and be\nmiserable, unless prevented by especial grace, which is the privilege of\nonly a small proportion of them, and at the same time affixing on their\ndelinquency _a doom of which it is infinitely beyond the highest\narchangel\u2019s faculty to apprehend a thousandth part of the horror_!\u201d(199)\n\nNow, granting the premises, we hold this argument to be unanswerable and\nconclusive. But is it not wonderful that it did not occur to so acute a\nmind as Foster\u2019s, that the same premises would furnish a valid argument\nagainst the justice of all punishment, as well as against the justice of\neternal punishments? Surely, if the utter inability of man to do good\nwithout divine grace is any extenuation, when such grace is not given, it\nis an entire and perfect exoneration. It is either this, or it is nothing.\nSuch are the inevitable inconsistencies of the best thinkers, when the\nfeelings of the heart are at war with the notions of the head. Instead of\nanalyzing this awful subject, and tracing it down to its fundamental\nprinciples, upon which his reason might have reposed with a calm and\nimmovable satisfaction, Foster seems to have permitted his great mind to\ntake root in a creed of man\u2019s devising, and then to be swayed by the gusts\nand counter-blasts of passion. Believing that man \u201cmust go wrong,\u201d that\nnature and circumstances impose this dire necessity upon him, his\nbenevolence could not contemplate an eternity of torments as due to such\ninevitable sin. It was repelled by \u201cthe infinite horror of the tenet.\u201d On\nthe other hand, his abhorrence of evil, and sense of justice, shrank with\nequal violence from the idea that all punishment is unjust; and hence he\ncould say, \u201cFar be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin, and to\nremonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a _severe chastisement_.\u201d Thus\ndid his great mind, instead of resting upon truth, perpetually hang in a\nstate of suspense and vacillation between the noblest feelings of his\nheart and the darkest errors of his creed.\n\nOthers, who have adopted the same creed, have endeavoured to extricate\nthemselves from the dilemma in which Foster found himself, not by denying\nthe eternity of future punishments, but by inventing a very nice\ndistinction between the natural and moral inability of man. \u201cHe can obey\nthe law,\u201d say they, \u201c_if he will_;\u201d all that \u201che wants is the will.\u201d All\nhis natural faculties are complete; only let him will aright, and he is\nsafe. But, after all, the question still remains, How is he to get the\nwill,\u2014the good will,\u2014in order to render him acceptable to God? Does he get\nit from nature\u2014is it a part of his birth-right? No: from this he derives a\ndepraved will, \u201cfree to evil only.\u201d Is it vouchsafed to him from above? Is\nit a gift from God? Alas! to those who are lost, and perish eternally in\ntheir sins, the grace of God is never given! What does it signify thus to\ntell them, or to tell the world, that they have the natural ability to\nobey; that none of their natural faculties are lost; that they still have\nunderstandings, and affections, and wills? What can all these avail them?\nIs it not the merest mockery to assure them that they really have hearts,\nand wills, and feelings, if they \u201c_must_ go wrong,\u201d if they _must_ put\nforth the volitions for which they shall be tormented forever?\n\nUpon this distinction we shall not dwell, as we have fully considered it\nin our \u201cExamination of Edwards on the Will.\u201d We shall merely add, that it\nis not an invention of modern times.(200) It is at least as old as the age\nof Augustine. \u201cThe Pelagians think,\u201d says he, \u201cthey know some great thing,\nwhen they say, \u2018_God would not command what he knew could not be done by\nman_.\u2019 Who does not know this? But he commands what we cannot do, whereby\nwe know what we ought to ask of him. For it is faith which obtains by\nprayer what the law commands. For true it is that we keep the commandments\n_if we will_, (_si volumus_;) but as the will is prepared of the Lord, we\nmust seek of him that we may will as much as is sufficient, in order to\nour doing by volition, (_ut volendo faciamus_.)\u201d Truly, we can keep the\ncommandments _if we will_ to do so; for, as Augustine immediately says,\n\u201ccertain it is, that we will when we will.\u201d(201) But no man can put forth\na volition in conformity with the commandments, unless it be given him of\nGod, who \u201ccauses us to will good;\u201d(202) and this is never given to the\nreprobate. How, then, can they be justly consigned to eternal torments?\nHow can they be eternally punished for that which they could not possibly\navoid? It is no wonder that a Foster should have shrunk from \u201cthe infinite\nhorrors of such a tenet,\u201d as seen from this point of view; the only wonder\nis, that any one can be found who can possibly endure them.\n\nThe same distinction, as we have already said, is relied upon by Edwards\nin order to show that man has an ability to obey the law of God.(203)\n\nThus we are gravely taught that we are able to obey the law of God;\nbecause if we will to do so, the external act will follow; and because it\nis certain that _if_ we will we do really will. But _how to will_ is the\nquestion. Can we put forth the requisite volitions? No one doubts that if\nwe put forth the volition which the law of God requires, we then obey him,\nwhether the external act follow or not; nor that if we will, then we do\nreally will. But all this leaves the great question untouched, Can we put\nforth the requisite volitions without divine aid? And after this question\nhas been answered in the negative, and we have been told that such aid is\nnot given to the reprobate, all this talk about a natural ability, which\nmust forever prove unavailing, is the merest mockery that ever entered\ninto the imagination or the metaphysics of man. However the fact may be\ndisguised by verbal niceties, it as really places eternal life beyond the\nreach of the reprobate, as is the very sun in the firmament of heaven, and\nmakes eternal death as inevitable to them as is the rising and the setting\nthereof.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe eternity of future punishments an expression of the divine goodness.\n\n\nWe have seen in the first chapter of this part of the present work, that\nGod really and sincerely intended the salvation of all men; and that if\nany are lost, it is because it is impossible in the nature of things to\nnecessitate holiness; and that the impenitent, in spite of all the means\nemployed by infinite wisdom and goodness for their salvation, do\nobstinately work out their own ruin and destruction. Omnipotence cannot\nconfer holiness upon them; they do not choose to acquire it; and hence,\nthey are compelled to endure the awful wages of sin. To those who reject\nthis view of the nature of holiness, the world in which we live must\nforever remain an inexplicable enigma; and that to which we are hastening\nmust present still more terrific subjects of contemplation. To their minds\nthe eternal agonies of the lost can never be made to harmonize with the\ninfinite perfections of God, by whom the second death is appointed. \u201cHow\nself-evident the proposition,\u201d says Foster, \u201cthat if the Sovereign Arbiter\nhad _intended_ the salvation of the race, it must have been accomplished.\u201d\nHaving so summarily settled this position, that God did not intend the\nsalvation of the race, the question which admits of no answer, _Why did he\nnot intend it?_ might well spread a mysterious darkness over the whole\neconomy of divine providence. It was that darkness, that perplexing and\nconfounding darkness, by which the mighty soul of Foster was oppressed\nwith so many gloomy thoughts, and filled with so many frightful\nimaginations.\n\nFor our part, if we could believe that God could easily work holiness in\nthe heart of every creature, and that he does not do so simply because he\ndoes not intend their salvation, we should not have attempted to vindicate\nhis perfections. We should have believed in them, it is true; but we\nshould have been constrained to confess, that they are veiled in\nimpenetrable clouds and darkness. Hence, if we had not confessed ignorance\nand inability for all minds and all ages, as so many others have done, we\nshould, at least, have confessed these things for ourselves, and supinely\nwaited for the light of eternity to dispel the awful and perplexing\nenigmas of time. But we hold no such doctrine; we entertain no such\nsentiment. We believe that God, in his infinite, overflowing goodness\ndesires, and from all eternity has desired, the salvation of all men. We\nbelieve that salvation is impossible to some, because a necessary holiness\nis impossible, and they do not choose to work out for themselves what\ncannot be worked out for them, even by omnipotence. It was the bright and\ncheering light which this truth seemed to cast upon the dark places of the\nuniverse, that first inspired us with the thought and determination to\nproduce a theodicy. And it is in the light of this truth, if we mistake\nnot, that the infinite love of God may be seen beaming from the eye of\nhell, as well as from the bright regions of eternal blessedness. This\nconclusion we shall endeavour methodically to unfold, and to set in a\nclear light.\n\nIn the first place, then, to begin with our fundamental position, the\nCreator could not necessitate the holiness of the creature. Hence this\nholiness, after all the means and the ability were given to him, must be\nleft to the will of the creature himself. All that could be done in such a\ncase was, for God to set life and death before us, accompanied by the\ngreatest of all conceivable motives to pursue the one, and to fly from the\nother; and then say, \u201cchoose ye:\u201d and all this has God actually done for\nthe salvation of all men. Hence, though some should be finally lost, his\ninfinite goodness will be clear. Let us see what objections may be urged\nagainst this conclusion.\n\nSupposing it granted, that a necessitated virtue is a contradiction in\nterms, and that it is indispensably requisite to ordain rewards and\npunishments in order to prevent sin and secure holiness; it may still be\nsaid that the penalty of eternal death is too severe for that purpose, and\nis therefore inconsistent with the goodness of God. Indeed, after such a\nconcession, this is the only position which can be taken in opposition to\nthe doctrine in question. Let us then look at it, and examine the\nassumption upon which it rests for support.\n\nIf such punishments be too severe, it must be for one of these two\nreasons: either because no object can justify the infliction of them, or\nbecause the end proposed by the Supreme Ruler is not sufficiently great\nfor that purpose.\n\nLet us suppose, then, in the first place, the position to be assumed, that\nno object can possibly justify the infliction of such awful punishments.\nSuch would be the case, we admit, if such punishments were unjust\u2014were not\ndeserved by the person upon whom they are inflicted. Hence, it becomes\nindispensable, in order to vindicate the divine benevolence, to show that\neternal sufferings are deserved by those upon whom they fall. Otherwise\nthey would be unjust, and consequently unjustifiable; as the end could\nnever justify the means.\n\nWe say, then, that eternal sufferings are deserved by the finally\nimpenitent, not because every sinful act carries along with it an infinite\nguilt, nor because every sinner may be imagined to have committed an\ninfinite number of sins, but because they will continue to sin forever. It\nwill be conceded, that if punishment be admissible at all, it is right and\nproper that so long as acts of rebellion are persisted in, the rewards of\niniquity should attend them. It will be conceded, that if the finally\nimpenitent should continue to sin forever, then they forever deserve to\nreap the rewards of sin. But this is one part of the Scripture doctrine of\nfuture punishments, that those who endure them will never cease to sin and\nrebel against the authority of God\u2019s law.\n\nFoster has attempted a reply to this defence of the doctrine in question,\nbut without success. \u201cIt is usually alleged,\u201d says he, \u201cthat there will be\nan endless _continuance_ of sinning ... and therefore the punishment must\nbe endless.\u201d But \u201cthe allegation,\u201d he replies, \u201cis of no avail in\nvindication of the doctrine, because the first consignment to this\ndreadful state _necessitates a continuance of the criminality_; the\ndoctrine teaching that it is of the essence, and is an awful aggravation\nof the original consignment, that it dooms the condemned to maintain the\ncriminal spirit unchanged forever. The doom _to sin_ as well as to suffer,\nand, according to the argument, to sin _in order_ to suffer, is inflicted\nas the punishment of the sin committed in the mortal state. Virtually,\ntherefore, the eternal punishment is the punishment of the sins of\ntime.\u201d(204)\n\nEven according to the principles of Foster himself, the argument is wholly\nuntenable. For he admits, that such is the evil nature of man, such the\ncircumstances around him, and such the influences of the great tempter, he\nmust inevitably go wrong; and yet he holds that he may be justly punished\nfor such transgressions. Now, if every man who comes into the world be\ndoomed to sin, as this author insists he is, and may be justly punished\nfor sins committed in this life, why should he be excused for the sins\ncommitted in another state, because he is doomed to commit them? But this\n_argumentum ad hominem_ is merely by the way, and has more to do with the\nconsistency of the author, than with the validity of his position. We\nshall proceed to subject this to a more searching and a more, satisfactory\ntest.\n\nHis argument assumes, that \u201cit is of the essence of the original\nconsignment, that it dooms the condemned to maintain the criminal spirit\nunchanged forever.\u201d This is an unwarrantable assumption. We nowhere learn,\nand we are nowhere required to believe, that the guilty are doomed to sin\nforever, because they have voluntarily sinned in this life; much less that\nthey are necessitated to sin in order to suffer! The doctrine of the\neternity of future punishments is not necessarily encumbered with any such\nridiculous appendage; and if any one can be found to entertain so absurd a\nview of the doctrine, we must leave him to vindicate the creation of his\nown imagination.\n\nWe do not suppose that the soul of the guilty will continue to sin\nforever, because it will be consigned to the regions of the lost; but we\nsuppose it will be consigned to the regions of the lost, because, by its\nown repeated acts of transgression, it has made sure of its eternal\ncontinuance in sinning. God dooms no man to sin\u2014neither by his power nor\nby his providence. But it is a fact, against which there will be no\ndispute, that if a man commit a sin once, he will be still more apt to\ncommit the same sin again, under the same or similar circumstances. The\nsame thing will be true of each and every succeeding repetition of the\noffence; until the habit of sinning may be so completely wrought into the\nsoul, and so firmly fixed there, that nothing can check it in its career\nof guilt. Neither the glories of heaven, nor the terrors of hell, may be\nsufficient to change its course. No amount of influence brought to bear\nupon its feelings, may be sufficient to transform its will. \u201cThere is a\ncertain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour,\u201d says Butler, \u201cwhich being\ntransgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course\nof things.\u201d And may we not also add, nor in the supernatural course of\nthings either; and there only remains a certain fearful looking-for of\njudgment? As this may be the case, for aught we know, nay, as it seems so\nprobable that this is the case, no one is authorized to pronounce endless\nsufferings unjust, unless he can first show that the object of them has\nnot brought upon himself an eternal continuance in the practice of sin. In\nother words, unless he can first show that the sinner does not doom\nhimself to an eternity of sinning, he cannot reasonably complain that his\nCreator and Judge dooms him to an eternity of suffering.\n\nBut it may be said, that although the sinner may deserve to suffer\nforever, because he continues to sin forever; yet it were more worthy the\ninfinite goodness of God, to release him from so awful a calamity. If the\nsinner deserves such punishment, it is not only just to inflict it upon\nhim, it is a demand of infinite goodness itself that it should be\ninflicted upon him, provided a sufficiently great good may be attained by\nsuch a manifestation of justice. This brings us to the consideration of\nour second point, namely: Is the object proposed to be accomplished by the\ninfliction of eternal misery sufficiently great to justify the infliction\nof so severe a penalty? In other words, Is such a penalty disproportioned\nto the exigencies of the case?\n\nIn his attempt to show, that the infliction of eternal misery is too\nsevere to consist with the goodness of God, Mr. Foster does not at all\nconsider the great ends, or final causes, of penal enactments. He merely\ndwells upon the terrors of the punishment, and brings these into vivid\ncontrast with the weakness and impotency of man in his mortal state. This,\nit must be confessed, is a most one-sided and partial view of so profound\na subject; much better adapted to work upon the feelings than to enlighten\nthe judgment. All that he seems to have seen in the case, is a poor, weak\ncreature, utterly unable to do any good, subjected to eternal torments for\nthe sins of \u201ca few fleeting years on earth.\u201d Hence it was, that \u201cthe moral\nargument,\u201d which \u201cpressed so irresistibly on his mind,\u201d came in \u201cthe\nstupendous idea of eternity.\u201d\n\nIndeed, according to his theology, there could be no object sufficiently\nvast, no necessity sufficiently imperious, to justify eternal punishments.\nThe prevention of sin, and the promotion of universal holiness, could not\nform such an object or constitute such a necessity; for, according to his\ncreed, all this might have been most perfectly attained by a word. Hence,\nhe was puzzled and confounded in the contemplation of what appeared to him\nso much unnecessary evil. \u201cI acknowledge my _inability_,\u201d said he, \u201cto\nadmit the belief, (the belief in endless punishment,) together with the\nbelief in the divine goodness\u2014the belief that \u2018God is love,\u2019 that \u2018his\ntender mercies are over all his works.\u2019 \u201d\n\nAs we have already seen from another point of view, we must come out from\nhis theology if we would see the harmony and agreement between these\nbeliefs. We must take our stand on the position, that Omnipotence cannot\nnecessitate holiness, and must have recourse to rewards and punishments to\nsecure it. Otherwise all evil and all suffering will remain an\ninexplicable enigma; all rewards and punishments awkward and clumsy\ncontrivances to attain an end, which might be much better attained without\nthem.\n\nOn this high and impregnable ground the moral argument of Foster loses all\nits irresistible force, and \u201cthe stupendous idea of eternity\u201d presses with\nall its weight in favour of endless punishment. If temporal punishments\nare justified on the ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies\nand uphold the interests of temporal governments, surely eternal\npunishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an eternal\ngovernment. The \u201cstupendous idea of eternity\u201d attaches to the whole, as\nwell as to the part; and hence nothing can be gained to the cause of\nUniversalism by the introduction of this idea, except in the minds of\nthose who take only a one-sided and partial view of the subject.\n\nThe spectacle of punishment for a single day, it will be admitted, would\nbe justified on the ground that it was necessary to support for a single\nday a government; especially if that government were vast in extent and\ninvolved stupendous interests. But if suffering for a single day may be\njustified on such a ground, then the exigencies of such a government for\ntwo days would justify a punishment for two days; and so on _ad\ninfinitum_. Hence, the doctrine of eternal punishments in common with the\neternal moral government of God, is not a greater anomaly than temporal\npunishments in relation to temporal governments. If we reject the one, we\nmust also reject the other. Indeed, when we consider not only the eternal\nduration, _but also the universal extent_, of the divine government, the\nargument in question, if good for anything, presses with greater force\nagainst the little, insignificant governments of men, than against the\nmoral government of God. One reason why Foster was \u201crepelled into doubt by\nthe infinite horrors of the tenet\u201d is, that he merely contemplated the\nsufferings of the guilty, and saw not how those sufferings were connected\nwith the majesty and glory of God\u2019s universal and eternal empire. It is as\nif an insect should undertake to set bounds to the punishments which human\nbeings have found necessary to meet the exigencies and uphold the\ninterests of human society.\n\nWe are told by writers on jurisprudence, that penalties should be\nproportioned to offences; but, as has been truly said, how this proportion\nis to be ascertained, or on what principles it is to be adjusted, we are\nseldom informed. We are usually left to vague generalities, which convey\nno definite information, and furnish no satisfactory guidance to our\nminds. If we can ascertain the precise conditions according to which this\nprinciple should be adjusted, even by goodness itself, we shall then be\nthe better able to determine whether the eternal suffering of the guilty\nand impenitent is not a manifestation of the love of God,\u2014of that _tender\nmercy which is over all his works_.\n\nIt is a maxim that punishment should be sufficient to accomplish the great\nend for which it is imposed, namely, the prevention of offences.\nOtherwise, if it failed to accomplish this object, \u201cit would be so much\nsuffering in waste.\u201d(205) Now, who can say that the penalty of eternal\ndeath is not necessary to this end in the moral government of the\nuniverse, or that it is greater than is necessary for its accomplishment?\nWho can say that a punishment for a limited period would have answered\nthat end in a greater or more desirable degree? Who can say that there\nwould have been more holiness and happiness, with less sin and misery, in\nthe universe, if the punishment of those whom nothing could reclaim had\nnot been eternal? Who can say that it would be better for the universe, on\nthe whole, if the punishment of sin were limited than if it were eternal?\nUntil this question, which so evidently lies beyond the range of our\nnarrow faculties, be answered, it is presumption to object that eternal\npunishment is inconsistent with the goodness of God. For aught the\nobjector knows, this very penalty is demanded by infinite goodness itself,\nin order to stay the universal ravages of sin, and preserve the glory of\nthe moral empire of Jehovah. For aught he knows, the very sufferings of\nthe lost forever may be, not only a manifestation of the justice of God,\nbut also a profound expression of that tender mercy which is over all his\nworks. For aught he knows, this very appointment, at which he takes so\ngreat offence, may be one of the main pillars in the structure of the\nintellectual system of the universe; without which its internal\nconstitution would be radically defective, and its moral government\nimpossible. In short, for aught he knows, his objection may arise, not\nfrom any undue or unnecessary severity of the punishment in question, but\nfrom his own utter incapacity to decide such a point in relation to the\nuniversal and eternal government of God.\n\nIt may be said that this is an appeal to human ignorance, rather than a\nreply to the argument of the Universalist. Surely, it is good to be\nreminded of our ignorance, when we undertake to base objections against\nthe doctrines of religion upon assumptions about the truth of which we\nknow, and, from the nature of the case, must know, absolutely nothing. If\nthe doctrine in question involved any inherent contradictions, or were it\nclearly at war with the dictates of justice, or mercy, or truth, there\nmight be some reason in our opposition; but to oppose it because we cannot\nsee how it subserves the highest interests of the universe, seems to be an\nexceedingly rash and hasty decision; especially as we see that such a\npenalty must powerfully tend to restrain the wickedness of men, as well as\nto preserve unfallen creatures in their obedience.\n\nIt is not at all strange that beings with such faculties as we possess,\nlimited on all sides, and far more influenced by feeling than by reason,\nshould be oppressed by the stupendous idea of eternal torments. It\nabsolutely overwhelms the imagination of poor, short-sighted creatures\nlike ourselves. But God, in his plans for the universe and for eternity,\ntakes no counsel of human weakness; and that which seems so terrible to\nour feeble intellects may, to his all-seeing eye, appear no more than a\ndark speck in a boundless realm of light. Surely, if there ever was, or\never could be, a question which should be reduced to the simple inquiry,\n\u201cWhat saith the Scripture?\u201d it is that respecting the future condition of\nthe wicked.\n\nIt is truly amazing that a mind like Foster\u2019s should have put this inquiry\nso easily aside, and relied with so much confidence upon what he was\npleased to call \u201cthe moral argument.\u201d This argument, as we have seen, is\naltogether unsound and sophistical. It bases itself upon the prejudices of\na creed, and terminates in dark conjectures merely. He hopes, or rather he\n\u201cwould wish to indulge the hope, founded upon the divine attribute of\ninfinite benevolence, that there will be a period somewhere in the endless\nfuturity, when all God\u2019s sinning creatures will be restored by him to\nrectitude and happiness.\u201d Vain hope! delusive wish! How can they be made\nholy without their own consent and co\u00f6peration? And if they could be\nrestored to rectitude and happiness, how can we hope that God would\nrestore them, since he has not been pleased to preserve them in their\noriginal state of rectitude and happiness?\n\nBut perhaps, says he, there will be, not a restoration of all God\u2019s\nsinning creatures to rectitude and happiness, but an annihilation of their\nexistence. Even this conjecture, if true, \u201cwould be a prodigious relief;\u201d\nfor \u201cthe grand object of interest is a negation of the perpetuity of\nmisery.\u201d Suppose, then, that the universe had been planned according to\nthis benevolent wish of Mr. Foster, and that those who could not be\nreclaimed should, after a very protracted period of suffering, be forever\nannihilated; would this promote the order and well-being of the whole\ncreation? How did Mr. Foster know but that such a provision in the\ngovernment of the universe would oppose so feeble a barrier to the\nprogress of sin, that scenes of mutability, and change, and ruin, would be\nintroduced into the empire of God, from which his benevolence would shrink\nwith infinite abhorrence? How did Mr. Foster know but that the Divine\nBenevolence itself would prefer a hell in one part of his dominions, to\nthe universal disorder, confusion, and moral desolation which such a\nprovision might introduce into the government of God? Such a conjecture\nmight, it is true, bring a \u201cprodigious relief\u201d to our imagination; but the\ngovernment of God is intended for the relief of the universe, and not for\nthe relief of our imagination.\n\nOthers besides the author in question have sought relief for their minds\non this subject, by indulging in vague conjectures respecting the real\ndesign of the Supreme Ruler and Judge. Archbishop Tillotson, for example,\nsupposes that although God actually threatened to punish the wicked\neternally, he does not intend, and is not bound, to carry this threat into\nexecution. This penalty, he supposes, is merely set forth as a terror to\nevil-doers, in order to promote the good order and well-being of the\nworld; and after it has subserved this purpose, the Lawgiver will\ngraciously remit a portion of the threatened penalty, and restore all his\nsinning creatures to purity and bliss. In reply to this extraordinary\nposition, we shall only say that if the Almighty really undertook to\ndeceive the world for its own good, it is a pity he did not take the\nprecaution to prevent the archbishop from detecting the cheat. It is a\npity, we say, that he did not deceive the archbishop as well as the rest\nof men; and not suffer his secret to get into the possession of one who\nhas so indiscreetly published it to the whole world.\n\nNothing seems more amazing to us than the haste and precipitancy with\nwhich most men dispose of subjects so awful as that of the eternity of\nfuture punishments. One would suppose that if any subject in the whole\nrange of human thought should engage our most serious attention, and call\nforth the utmost exertion of our power of investigation, it would be the\nduration of punishment in a future life. If that punishment be eternal, it\nis certainly the most momentous question which ever engaged the attention\nof man, and is to be lightly disposed of only by madmen.(206)\n\n\n\n\n Chapter V.\n\n\nThe Dispensation Of The Divine Favours Reconciled With The Goodness Of\nGod.\n\n\n O God, whose thunder shakes the sky,\n Whose eye this atom globe surveys,\n To thee, my only rock, I fly;\n _Thy mercy in thy justice praise_.\n\n Then why, my soul, dost thou complain?\n Why drooping seek the dark recess?\n Shake off the melancholy chain,\n _For God created all to bless_.\u2014CHATTERTON.\n\n\nIn the preceding part, we considered the doctrine of predestination, under\nthe name of necessity, in its relation to the origin of evil. We there\nendeavoured to show that it denies the responsibility of man, and makes\nGod the author of sin. In the present part, it remains for us to examine\nthe same doctrine in relation to the equality of the divine goodness. If\nwe mistake not, the scheme of predestination, or rather the doctrine of\nelection, which lies at its foundation, is, when rightly understood,\nperfectly consistent with the impartiality and glory of the goodness of\nGod. On this subject we shall now proceed to unfold our views in as\norderly and perspicuous a manner as possible.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the economy of\nnatural providence, consistent with the goodness of God.\n\n\nIt has been thought that if the goodness of God were unlimited and\nimpartial, the light and blessings of revelation would be universal. But\nbefore we should attach any weight to such an objection, we should first\nconsider and determine two things.\n\nFirst, we should consider and determine how far the unequal diffusion of\nthe light of revelation has resulted from the agency of man, and how far\nfrom the agency of God. For, if this inequality in the spread of a divine\nblessing has sprung in any degree from the abuse which free, subordinate\nagents have made of their powers, either by active opposition, or passive\nneglect, it is in so far no more imputable to a want of goodness in the\nDivine Being than is any other evil or disorder which the creature has\nintroduced into the world. In so far, the glory of God is clear, and man\nalone is to blame. It is incumbent upon those, then, who urge this\nobjection against the goodness of God to show that the evil in question\nhas not resulted from the agency of man. This position, we imagine, the\nobjector will not find it very easy to establish; and yet, until he does\nso, his objection very clearly rests upon a mere unsupported hypothesis.\n\nSecondly, before we can fairly rely upon the objection in question, we\nshould be able to show, that the agency of God might have been so exerted\nas to spread the light of revelation further than it now extends, without\non the whole causing greater evil than good. Light or knowledge, it should\nbe remembered, is not in itself a blessing. It may be so, or it may not;\nand whether it be a blessing or a curse depends, not upon the beneficence\nof the giver, but upon the disposition and character of the recipient.\nBefore we should presume to indulge the least complaint, then, against the\ngoodness of divine providence, we should be able to produce the nation,\nwhose character for moral goodness and virtue would, on the whole, and in\nrelation to its circumstances, have been improved by the interposition of\nGod in causing the light of truth to shine in the midst of its\ncorruptions. But we are manifestly incompetent to deal with a question of\nsuch a nature. Its infinite complication, as well as its stupendous\nmagnitude, places it entirely beyond the reach of the human mind. So\nmanifold and so multiform are the hidden causes upon which its solution\ndepends, that general principles cannot be brought to bear upon it; and\nits infinite variety and complication of detail must forever baffle the\nintellect of man. Hence, an objection which proceeds on the supposition\nthat this question has been solved and determined, is worth nothing.\n\nBut, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the unequal diffusion\nof religious knowledge has proceeded directly from the agency of God.\nStill the objection against his goodness, in regard to the dispensation of\nlight, would be no greater than in relation to all the dispensations of\nhis favour. All the gifts of Heaven\u2014health, riches, honour, intelligence,\nand whatever else comes down from above\u2014are scattered among the children\nof men with the most promiscuous variety. Hence, the unequal distribution\nof the blessings of the gospel, or rather of its external advantages, is\nso far from being inconsistent with the character of God, that it is of a\npiece with all his other dispensations: it is so far from standing out as\nan anomaly in the proceedings of the Divine Being, that it falls in with\nthe whole analogy of nature and of providence. Hence, there is no\nresting-place between the abandonment of this objection, and downright\natheism.\n\nLet us see, then, what force there is in this objection, when urged, as it\nis by the atheist, against the whole constitution and management of the\nworld. It proceeds on the supposition, that if light and knowledge, or any\nother natural advantage, were bestowed upon one person, it would be\nbestowed upon all others, and upon all in precisely the same degree.\nAccording to his view, there should be no such thing as degrees in\nknowledge, and consequently no such thing as self-development and\nprogress. To select only one instance out of many: the atheist objects,\nthat it is not worthy of infinite wisdom and goodness to provide us with\nso complicated an instrument as the eye, as a means of obtaining light and\nknowledge. Why could not this end be attained by a more simple and direct\nmethod? Why leave us, for so great a portion of earthly existence, in\ncomparative ignorance, to grope out our way into regions of light?\n\nIn the eye of reason, there is no end to this kind of objecting; and it\nonly stops where the shallow conceit, or wayward fancy, of the objector is\npleased to terminate. It is very easy to ask, Why a Being of infinite\ngoodness did not confer light and knowledge upon us directly and at once,\nwithout leaving us to acquire them by the tedious use of the complicated\nmeans provided by his natural providence. But the inquiry does not stop\nhere. He might just as well ask, Why such a Being was pleased to confer so\nsmall an amount of light upon us, and leave us to acquire more for\nourselves? Why not confer it upon us without measure and without exertion\non our part? The same interrogation, it is evident, may be applied to\nevery other blessing, as well as to knowledge; and hence the objection of\nthe atheist, when carried out, terminates in the great difficulty, why God\ndid not make all creatures alike, and each equal to himself. On the\nprinciple of this objection, the insect should complain that it is not a\nman; the man that he is not an angel; and the angel that he is not a god.\nHence, such a principle would exclude from the system of the world\neverything like a diversity and subordination of parts; and would reduce\nthe whole universe, as a system, to as inconceivable a nonentity as would\nbe a watch, all of whose parts should be made of exactly the same\nmaterials, and possessing precisely the same force and properties.\n\nIn every system, whether of nature or of art, there must be a variety and\nsubordination of parts. Hence, to object that each part is not perfect in\nitself, without considering its relations and adaptation to the whole, is\nlittle short of madness. And what heightens the absurdity in the present\ncase is, that the parts which fall under observation may, for aught we\nknow, possess the greatest perfection which is consistent with the highest\ngood and beauty of the whole.\n\nIf God has endowed man with the attributes of reason and speech; if he has\nscattered around him, with a liberal hand, the multiplied blessings of\nlife; if, above all, he has made him capable of eternal blessedness, and\nof an endless progress in glory; this should warm his heart with the most\nglowing gratitude, and tune his tongue to the most exalted praise. And the\nman, the rational and immortal being, whose high endowments should lead\nhim to murmur and repine at the unequal dispensations of the divine\nbounty, because God has created beings of a higher order than himself, and\nplaced them in a world where no cloud is ever seen, and where no sigh is\never heard, would certainly, to say the very least, be guilty of the most\ncriminal ingratitude. Reason and conscience might well cry out, Shall the\nthing formed say to Him who formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? And God\nhimself might well demand, Is thine eye evil, because I am good?\n\nThe case is not altered, if we suppose that the divine favour is unequally\nbestowed upon different individuals of the same species, instead of the\ndifferent orders of created beings. The same principle of wisdom and\ngoodness, as Butler remarks, whatever it may be, which led God to make a\ndifference between men and angels, may be the same which induces him to\nmake a difference between one portion of the human family and another\u2014to\nleave one portion for a season to the dim twilight of nature, while upon\nanother he pours out the light of revelation. The same principle, it may\nalso be, which gives rise to the endless diversity of natural gifts among\nthe different individuals of the same community, as well as to the\ndifferent situations of the same individual, in regard to his temporal and\neternal interests, during the various stages of his earthly existence. And\nif this be so, we should either cease to object against the goodness of\nGod, because the same powers and advantages are not bestowed upon all, or\nwe should adopt the atheistical principle, in its fullest extent, which\nhas now been shown to be so full of absurdity.\n\nBut although we cannot see the particular reasons of such a diversity of\ngifts, or how each is subservient to the good of the whole; yet every\nshadow of injustice will disappear, if we consider that God deals with\nevery one, to use the language of Scripture, \u201caccording to what he hath,\nand not according to what he hath not.\u201d His bounty overflows, in various\ndegrees, upon his creatures; but his justice equalizes all, by requiring\nevery one to give an account of just exactly as many talents as have been\ncommitted to his charge, and no more.\n\nIn this respect, all the dispensations of divine providence are clearly\nand broadly distinguished from the Calvinistic scheme of election and\nreprobation. According to this scheme, the reprobate, or those who are not\nobjects of the divine mercy, have not, and never had, the ability to obey\nthe law of God; and yet they are condemned to eternal death for their\nfailure to obey it. This is to deal with them, not according to what they\nhave, but according to what they have not, and what they could not\npossibly have. Hence, to reason from one of these cases to the other, from\nthe inequality of gifts and talents ordained by God to a scheme of\nelection and reprobation, as Calvinists uniformly do, is to confound all\nour notions of just dealing, and to convert the rightful sovereignty of\nGod into frightful tyranny. The perfect justice of this remark will, we\ntrust, be made to appear the more clearly and fully in the course of the\nfollowing section of the present work.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of the\ndivine goodness.\n\n\nWe have seen that the election of a nation to the enjoyment of certain\nexternal advantages, or the bestowment of superior gifts upon some\nindividuals, is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine\ngoodness. Beyond the distinctions thus indicated, and which so clearly\nobtain in the natural providence of God, it is believed that the\nScriptural scheme of election does not go; and that the more rigid\nfeatures of the Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation can be\ndeduced from revelation only by a violent wresting and straining of the\nclear word of God. Let us see if this assertion may not be fully\nestablished.\n\nThe ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, it is well known, is the\nportion of Scripture upon which the advocates of that scheme have chiefly\nrelied, from Augustine down to Calvin, and from Calvin down to the present\nday. But, to any impartial mind, we believe, this chapter will not be\nfound to lend the least shadow of support to any such scheme of doctrine.\nWe assume this position advisedly, and shall proceed to give the reasons\non which it is based.\n\nNow, in the interpretation of any instrument of writing, it is a\nuniversally admitted rule, that it should be construed with reference to\nthe subject of which it treats. What, then, is the subject of which the\napostle treats in the ninth chapter of Romans? In regard to this point\nthere is no dispute; and, to avoid all appearance of controversy in\nrelation to it, we shall state the design of the apostle, in this part of\nhis discourse, in the words of one by whom the Calvinistic scheme of\nelection is maintained. \u201cWith the eighth chapter,\u201d says Professor Hodge,\nin his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, \u201cthe discussion of the\nplan of salvation, and its immediate consequences, was brought to a close.\nThe consideration of the calling of the Gentiles, and the rejection of the\nJews, commences with the ninth, and extends to the end of the eleventh.\u201d\nThus, according to the author, \u201cthe subject which the apostle had in\nview,\u201d in the ninth chapter, is \u201cthe rejection of the Jews, and the\ncalling of the Gentiles.\u201d Now, if this be his subject, and if the\ndiscussion of the plan of salvation was brought to a close in the eighth\nchapter, how can the doctrine of election and reprobation, which lies at\nthe very foundation of, and gives both shape and colouring to, the whole\nscheme of salvation, as maintained by Calvinists, be found in the ninth\nchapter? How has it happened that such important lights have been thrown\nupon the plan of salvation, and such fundamental positions established in\nrelation to it, after its discussion has been brought to a close? But this\nonly by the way; we shall hereafter see how these important lights have\nbeen extracted from the chapter in question.\n\nThe precise passage upon which the greatest stress is laid seems to be the\nfollowing: \u201cThe children being not yet born, neither having done any good\nor evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not\nof works, but of him that calleth; it was said unto her, The elder shall\nserve the younger. As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I\nhated.\u201d Now, the question is, Does this refer to the election of Jacob to\neternal life, and the eternal reprobation of Esau; or, Does it refer to\nthe selection of the descendants of the former to constitute the visible\npeople of God on earth? This is the question; and it is one which, we\nthink, is by no means difficult of solution.\n\nThe apostle was in the habit of quoting only a few words of a passage of\nthe Old Testament, to which he had occasion to refer; and in the present\ninstance he merely cites the words of the prophecy, \u201cThe elder shall serve\nthe younger.\u201d But, according to the prophecy to which he refers, it was\nsaid to Rebecca, \u201cTwo nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people\nshall be separated from thy bowels; and the one people shall be stronger\nthan the other people, and the elder shall serve the younger.\u201d Nothing can\nbe plainer, we think, than that this prophecy relates to the descendants\nof Jacob and Esau, and not to the individuals themselves.\n\nThis view of the above passage, if it needed further confirmation, is\ncorroborated by the fact that Esau did not serve Jacob, and that this part\nof the prophecy is true only in relation to his descendants. Thus the\nprophecy, when interpreted by its own express words, as well as by the\nevent, shows that it related to \u201ctwo nations,\u201d to \u201ctwo manner of people,\u201d\nand not to two individuals.\n\nThe argument of St. Paul demands this interpretation. He is not discussing\nthe plan of salvation. The question before him is not whether some are\nelected to eternal life on account of their works or not; and hence, if he\nhad quoted a _prophecy_(207) from the Old Testament to establish that\nposition, he would have been guilty of a gross solecism, a _non sequitur_,\nas plain as could well be conceived.\n\nFor these reasons, we think there can be but little doubt with respect to\nthe true meaning of the passage in question. And besides, this\nconstruction not only brings the language of the apostle into perfect\nconformity with the providence which God is actually seen to exercise over\nthe world, but also reconciles it with the glory of the divine character.\n\nIn regard to the meaning of the terms _loved_ and _hated_, used in the\nprophecy under consideration, there can be no doubt that the\ninterpretation of Professor Hodge is perfectly just. \u201cThe meaning is,\u201d\nsays he, \u201cthat God preferred one to the other, or chose one instead of the\nother. As this is the idea meant to be expressed, it is evident that in\nthis case the word _hate_ means to _love less, to regard and treat with\nless favour_. Thus in Gen. xxix, 33, Leah says, she was hated by her\nhusband; while, in the thirtieth verse, the same idea is expressed by\nsaying, Jacob \u2018loved Rachel more than Leah.\u2019 Matt. x, 37. Luke xiv, 26:\n\u2018If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother,\u2019 &c. John xii,\n25.\u201d\n\nNo one will object to this explanation. But how will the language, thus\nunderstood, apply to the case of individual election and reprobation, as\nmaintained by Calvinists? We can see, indeed, how it applies to the\ndescendants of Esau, who were in many respects placed in less advantageous\ncircumstances than the posterity of Jacob; but how can God be said to love\nthe elect more than the reprobate? Can he be said to love the reprobate at\nall? If, from all eternity, they have been eternally damned for not\nrendering an impossible obedience, should we call this a lesser degree of\nlove than that which is bestowed upon the elect, or should we call it\nhate? It seems, that the commentator feels some repugnance at the idea of\nsetting apart the individual, before he has \u201cdone either good or evil,\u201d as\nan object of hate; but not at all at the idea of setting him apart as an\nobject of eternal and remediless woe!\n\n\u201cIt is no doubt true,\u201d says Professor Hodge, \u201cthat the prediction\ncontained in this passage has reference not only to the relative standing\nof Jacob and Esau, as individuals, but also to that of their descendants.\nIt may even be allowed that the latter was principally intended in the\ncommunication to Rebecca. But it is clear: 1. That this distinction\nbetween the two races presupposed and included a distinction between the\nindividuals. Jacob, made the special heir to his father Isaac, obtained as\nan individual the birthright and the blessing; and Esau, as an individual,\nwas cut off.\u201d\n\nThis may all be perfectly true; it is certainly nothing to the purpose. It\nis true, that Jacob was made the special heir to his father; but did he\nthereby inherit eternal life? The distinction between him and Esau was\nundoubtedly a personal favour; the very fact that his descendants would be\nso highly blessed, must have been a source of personal satisfaction and\njoy, which his less favoured brother did not possess. But was this\nbirthright and this blessing the fixed and irreversible boon of eternal\nlife? There is not the least shadow of any such thing in the whole record.\nThe only blessings, of a personal or individual nature, of which the\naccount gives us the least intimation, either by express words or by\nimplication, are like those with which God, in his providence, still\ncontinues to distinguish some individuals from others. They are not the\ngift of eternal life, but of certain external and temporal advantages.\nHence they throw no light upon the Calvinistic scheme of election and\nreprobation. To make out this scheme, or anything in support of it,\nsomething more must be done than to show that God distinguishes one\nnation, or one individual, from another, in the distribution of his\nfavours. This is conceded on all sides; and has nothing to do with the\npoint in dispute. It must also be shown, that the particular favour which\nhe brings home to one by his infinite power, and which he withholds from\nanother, is neither more nor less than the salvation of the soul. It must\nbe shown, that the mere will and pleasure of God makes such a distinction\namong the souls of men, that while some are invincibly made the heirs of\nglory, others are stamped with the seal of eternal death. The inheritance\nof Jacob, and the casting off of Esau, were, so far as we can see, very\ndifferent from the awful proceeding which is ascribed to God according to\nthe Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation.\n\nThe same remark is applicable to other attempts to show, that God\u2019s favour\nwas bestowed upon Jacob, as an individual, in preference to Esau. \u201cAs to\nthe objection,\u201d says Professor Hodge, \u201cthat Esau never personally served\nJacob, it is founded on the mere literal sense of the words. Esau did\nacknowledge his inferiority to Jacob, and was postponed to him on various\noccasions. This is the real spirit of the passage. This prophecy, as is\nthe case with all similar predictions, has various stages of fulfilment.\nThe relation between the two brothers during life; the loss of the\nbirthright blessing and promises on the part of Esau; the temporary\nsubjugation of his descendants to the Hebrews under David; their final and\ncomplete subjugation under the Maccabees; and especially their exclusion\nfrom the peculiar privileges of the people of God, through all the periods\nof their history, are included.\u201d Suppose all this to be true, what\nrelation has it to the election of some individuals to eternal life, and\nthe reprobation of others?\n\nWe shall not dwell upon other portions of the chapter in question; for, if\nthe foregoing remarks be just, it will be easy to dispose of every text\nwhich may, at first view, appear to support the Calvinistic doctrine of\nelection. We shall dismiss the consideration of the ninth chapter of\nRomans with an extract from Dr. Macknight, who, although a firm believer\nin the Calvinistic view of election and reprobation, does not find any\nsupport for his doctrine in this portion of Scripture. \u201cAlthough some\npassages in this chapter,\u201d says he, \u201cwhich pious and learned men have\nunderstood of the election and reprobation of individuals, are in the\nforegoing illustration interpreted of the election of nations to be the\npeople of God, and to enjoy the advantage of an external revelation, and\nof their losing these honourable distinctions, the reader must not, on\nthat account, suppose the author rejects the doctrines of the decree and\nforeknowledge of God. These doctrines are taught in other passages of\nScripture: see Rom. viii, 29.\u201d Thus this enlightened critic candidly\nabandons the ninth chapter of Romans, and seeks support for his\nCalvinistic view of the divine decrees elsewhere.\n\nLet us, then, proceed to examine the eighth chapter of Romans, upon which\nhe relies. The words are as follow: \u201cFor whom he did foreknow, he also did\npredestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the\nfirst-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them\nhe also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he\njustified, them he also glorified.\u201d We need have no dispute with the\nCalvinists respecting the interpretation of these words. If we mistake\nnot, we may adopt their own construction of them, and yet clearly show\nthat they lend not the least support to their views of election and\nreprobation. \u201cAs to _know_,\u201d says Professor Hodge, \u201cis often to _approve_\nand _love_, it may express the idea of peculiar affection in the case; or\nit may mean to _select_ or _determine upon_.\u201d These two interpretations,\nas he truly says, \u201cdo not essentially differ. The one is but a\nmodification of the other.\u201d \u201cThe idea, therefore, obviously is, that those\nwhom God peculiarly loved, and by thus loving, distinguished or selected\nfrom the rest of mankind; or, to express both ideas in one word, those\nwhom he _elected_ he predestinated, &c.\u201d Thus, according to this\ncommentator, those whom God elected, he also predestinated, called,\njustified, and, finally, glorified.\n\nNow, suppose all this to be admitted, let us consider whether it gives any\nsupport to the Calvinistic creed of election. It teaches that all those\nwhom God elects shall be ultimately saved; but not one word or one\nsyllable does it say with respect to the principle or ground of his\nelection. It tells us that God, in his infinite wisdom, selects one\nportion of mankind as the objects of his saving mercy,\u2014the heirs of\neternal glory; but it does not say that this selection, this\n_approbation_, this _peculiar love_, is wholly without foundation in the\ncharacter or condition of the elect. It tells us that God has numbered the\nelect, and written their names in the book of life; but it does not tell\nus that, in any case, he has taken precisely such as he has left, or left\nprecisely such as he has taken. The bare fact of the election is all that\nis here disclosed. The reason, or the ground, or the principle, of that\nelection is not even alluded to; and we are left to gather it either from\nother portions of Scripture, or from the eternal dictates of justice and\nmercy. Hence, as this passage makes no allusion to the ground or reason of\nthe divine election, it does not begin to touch the controversy we have\nwith theologians of the Calvinistic school. Every link in the chain here\npresented is perfect, except that which connects its first link, the\nelection to eternal life, with the unconditional decree of God; and that\nlink, the only one in controversy, is absolutely wanting. We have no\noccasion to break the chain; for it is only to the imagination that it\nseems to be unconditionally bound to the throne of the Omnipotent.\n\nAs this passage, then, determines nothing with respect to the ground or\nreason of election, so we have as much right to affirm, even in the\npresence of such language, that God did really foresee a difference where\nhe has made so great a distinction, as the Calvinists have to suppose that\nso great a distinction has been made by a mere arbitrary and capricious\nexercise of power. That we have a better reason for this position than our\nopponents can produce for theirs, we shall endeavour to show in the\nensuing section.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality and\nglory of the divine goodness.\n\n\nHaving seen that the unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the\nwise economy of Providence, distinguishing nation from nation, as well as\nindividual from individual, is not inconsistent with the perfection of the\ndivine goodness; and having also seen that the Scripture doctrine of\nelection makes no other distinctions than those which take place in the\nprovidence of God, and is equally reconcilable with the glory of his\ncharacter, we come now to consider the Calvinistic scheme of election and\nreprobation. We have shown on what principles the providence of God, which\nmakes so many distinctions among men, may be vindicated; let us now see on\nwhat principles the Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation seeks\nto justify itself. If we mistake not, this scheme of predestination is as\nunlike the providence of God in its principles as it is in the appalling\ndistinctions which it makes among the subjects of the moral government of\nthe world.\n\n\u201cPredestination,\u201d says Calvin, \u201cwe call the eternal decree of God, by\nwhich he has determined in himself, what he would have to become of every\nindividual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar\ndestiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation\nfor others. Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of\nthese ends, we say, he is predestinated either to life or to death.\u201d(208)\nAgain: \u201cIn conformity, therefore, to the clear doctrine of Scripture, we\nassert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all\ndetermined, both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would\ncondemn to destruction.\u201d(209)\n\nThe doctrine of predestination is set forth in the Westminster Confession\nof Faith, in the following terms: \u201cBy the decree of God, for the\nmanifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto\neverlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese men and angels, thus predestinated and foreordained, are\nparticularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and\ndefinite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished.\u201d\n\n\u201cThose of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the\nfoundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable\npurpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen\nin Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love,\nwithout any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of\nthem, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving\nhim thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace.\u201d\n\n\u201cAs God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal\nand most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto.\nWherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by\nChrist, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working\nin due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power\nthrough faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ,\neffectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the\nelect only.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable\ncounsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he\npleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass\nby, and to ordain to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of\nhis glorious justice.\u201d\n\nThe defenders of this system assume the position, that as \u201cby Adam\u2019s sin\nthe whole human race became a corrupt mass, and justly subject to eternal\ndamnation; so that no one can blame God\u2019s righteous decision, if none are\nsaved from perdition.\u201d(210) Augustine expressly says: \u201cBut why faith is\nnot given to all, need not move the faithful, who believe that by one all\ncame into condemnation, doubtless the most just; _so that there would be\nno just complaining of God, though no one should be freed_.\u201d And again:\n\u201cThe dominion of death has so far prevailed over men, that the deserved\npunishment would drive all headlong into a second death likewise, of which\nthere is no end, if the undeserved grace of God did not deliver them from\nit.\u201d(211) Such is the picture of the divine justice, which the advocates\nof predestination have presented, from the time of Augustine, the great\nfounder of the doctrine, down to the present day. It surely furnishes a\nsufficiently dark background on which to display the divine mercy to\nadvantage.\n\nWe are told, however, that we should not judge of the proceeding of God,\naccording to our notions of justice. This is certainly true, if the divine\njustice is fairly represented in the scheme of predestination; for that is\nclearly unlike all that is called justice among men. If God can create\ncountless myriads of beings, who, because they come into the world with a\ndepraved nature, and \u201ccan do nothing but sin,\u201d he regards with such\ndispleasure, as to leave them without hope and without remedy; and not\nonly so, but dooms them to eternal misery on account of an unavoidable\ncontinuance in sin; it must be confessed, that we should not presume to\napply our notions of justice to his dealings with the world. They would\nmore exactly accord with our notions of injustice, cruelty, and\noppression, than with any others of which we are capable of forming any\nconception.\n\nBut, if we are not to decide according to our notions of justice, how\nshall we judge, or form any opinion respecting the equity of the divine\nproceeding? Shall we judge according to some notion which we do not\npossess, or shall we not judge at all? This last would seem to be the\nwiser course; but it is one which the Calvinists themselves will not\npermit us to adopt. They tell us, that the predestination of the greater\npart of mankind to eternal death is \u201cto the praise of God\u2019s glorious\njustice.\u201d But how are we to behold this glorious manifestation of the\ndivine justice, if we may not view it through any medium known to us, or\ncontemplate it in any light which may have dawned upon our minds?\n\nIndeed, although the defenders of this doctrine often declare that the\npredestination of so many men and angels to eternal misery, displays the\njustice of God in all its glory; yet their own writings furnish the most\nabundant and conclusive evidence, that they themselves can see no\nappearance of justice in such a proceeding. On various occasions they do\nnot hesitate to tell us, that although they cannot recognise the justice\nof such a proceeding, yet they believe it to be just, because it is the\nproceeding of God. But how can that be a display of justice to us, which,\naccording to all our notions, wears the appearance of the most frightful\ninjustice? Calvin himself admits, that the justice of God, which is\nsupposed to be so brightly displayed in the predestination of so many\nimmortal beings to endless woe, is, in reality, therein involved in clouds\nand darkness. Yet he does not fail to deduce an argument in its favour\nfrom \u201cthe very obscurity which excites such dread.\u201d(212)\n\nIt seems clear, that if the divine justice is really displayed in the\npunishment of the reprobate, it would have been exhibited on a still more\nmagnificent scale by the condemnation of the whole human race. For,\naccording to Calvinism, all were equally deserving of the divine\ndispleasure, and the saved are distinguished from the lost only by the\nelection of God. Hence, this scheme shows the justice of God to be\nlimited, or not displayed on so grand and imposing a scale as it might\nhave been; that is to say, it shows the justice of God to be less than\ninfinite. But if such be the justice of God, we certainly should not\ncomplain that it has been limited by his mercy; we should rather rejoice,\nindeed, to believe that it had been thereby entirely extinguished.\n\nNotwithstanding the claims of divine justice, all were not reprobated and\ndoomed to eternal death. A certain portion of mankind are elected and\nsaved, \u201cto the praise of his glorious grace.\u201d Now, it is conceded by\nCalvinists, that \u201call the circumstances which distinguish the elect from\nothers are the fruit of their election.\u201d(213) This proposition is deduced\nby a Calvinistic divine from the \u201cWestminster Confession of Faith.\u201d It is\nalso conceded, that if the same grace which is given to the elect, should\nbe bestowed upon the reprobate, they also would be saved.(214) Why, then,\nis it not bestowed? Why this fearful limitation of the divine mercy? Can\nthe justice of God be manifested only at the expense of his mercy, and his\nmercy only at the expense of his justice? Or, is the everlasting mercy of\nGod, that sublime attribute which constitutes the excellency and glory of\nhis moral nature, so limited and straitened on all sides, that it merely\nselects here and there an object of its favour, while it leaves thousands\nand millions, equally within its reach, exposed to the eternal ravages of\nthe spoiler? If so, then are we bound to conclude, that the mercy of God\nis not infinite; that it is not only limited, but also partial and\narbitrary in its operation? But such is not the mercy of God. This is not\na capricious fondness, nor yet an arbitrary dictate of feeling; it is a\nuniform and universal rule of goodness.\n\nTo select one here and there out of the mass of mankind, while others,\nprecisely like them in all respects, are left to perish, is not mercy; it\nis favouritism. The tyrant may have his favourites as well as others. But\nGod is not a respecter of persons. If he selects one, as the object of his\nsaving mercy, he will select all who stand in the like condition;\notherwise, his mercy were no more mercy, but a certain capricious fondness\nof feeling, unworthy of an earthly monarch, and much more of the august\nHead and Ruler of the moral universe.\n\nThese views and feelings are not peculiar to the opponents of Calvinism.\nThey exist in the bosom of Calvinists themselves; only they are so crushed\nbeneath a system, that they cannot find that freedom of development, nor\nthat fulness of utterance, which so rightfully belongs to them, and which\nis so essential to their entire healthfulness and beauty.\n\nWe shall give only one illustration of the justness of this remark,\nalthough we might produce a hundred. After having endeavoured to vindicate\nthe mercy of God, as displayed in the scheme of predestination, Dr. Hill\ncandidly declares: \u201cStill, however, _a cloud hangs over the subject_; and\nthere is a difficulty in reconciling the mind to a system, which, after\nlaying this foundation, that special grace is necessary to the production\nof human virtue, adopts as its distinguishing tenet this position, that\nthat grace is denied to many.\u201d(215) Notwithstanding his most elaborate\ndefence of predestination, he may well say, that \u201ca cloud still hangs over\nthe subject,\u201d and darkens the mercy of God.\n\nSome of the stereotyped attempts of Calvinists to escape from the cloud\nwhich hangs over their doctrine are too weak to deserve a serious\nrefutation. We are often asked, for example, if God may not do what he\npleases with his own? Most assuredly he may; but does it please him,\naccording to the high supralapsarian notion of Calvin, to create myriads\nof men and angels, to the end that they may be eternally damned? Does it\nplease him, according even to the sublapsarian scheme, to leave the great\nmass of mankind in the helpless and forlorn condition in which they were\nborn, without assistance, and then subject them to eternal misery, because\nthey would not render an obedience beyond their power? Truly, the\nsovereign Creator and Ruler of the world may do what he pleases with his\nown; but yet we insist, that it is his supremest pleasure to deal with his\ncreatures according to the eternal principles of justice and mercy.\n\nHis power is infinite, we admit, nay, we joyfully believe; but yet it is\nnot a power which works according to the lawless pleasure of an\nunmitigated despot. It moves within a sphere of light and love. God\u2019s\ninfinite wisdom and goodness superintend and surround all its workings;\notherwise its omnipotent actings would soon carry the goodly frame of the\nworld, together with all the blessed inhabitants thereof, into a state of\nutter confusion and chaotic night; leaving occasion for none, save the\nblind idolaters of power, to exclaim, \u201cMay he not do what he pleases with\nhis own?\u201d\n\nWe are also told, that \u201cGod is under no obligation to his creatures.\u201d\nSupposing this to be true, (though true most certainly it is not,) yet\ndoes he not owe it to himself\u2014does he not owe it to the eternal principles\nof truth and goodness\u2014does he not owe it to the glory of his own empire\nover the world\u2014to deal with his rational and immortal creatures, otherwise\nthan according to the dark scheme of Calvinistic predestination? Nay, is\nit not due to the creature himself, that he should have some little chance\nor opportunity to embrace the life which God has set before him? Or, in\ndefault of such opportunity, is it not due to him that he should be exempt\nfrom the wages of the second death?\n\nConfessing the wisdom and justice of predestination, as maintained by\nthemselves, to be above our comprehension, the Calvinists are accustomed\nto remind us of the littleness, the weakness, and the blindness of the\nhuman mind, and how dangerous it is for beings like ourselves to pry into\nmysteries. We are aware, indeed, that our faculties are limited on all\nsides, and that we are exceedingly prone to assume more than belongs to\nus. We are not sure that the human mind, so little and so assuming,\nappears to any very great advantage in its advocacy of the Calvinistic\nscheme of predestination. This scheme is not only found in the ninth\nchapter of Romans, by a strange misapprehension of the whole scope and\ndesign of the apostle\u2019s argument, but, after having based it upon this\nmisinterpretation of the divine word, its advocates persist in regarding\nall opposition to it as an opposition against God. As often as we dispute\nthe doctrine, they cry out, \u201cNay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest\nagainst God?\u201d\n\nThis rebuke was well administered by St. Paul. He applied it to those who,\nunderstanding his doctrine, did not hesitate to arraign the equity of the\ndivine proceeding in the election of one nation in preference to another\nto constitute the visible Church on earth. This was not only to reply\nagainst God\u2019s word, but also against the manifest arrangements and\ndispensations of his providence. But it is not well applied by Calvinists,\nunless they possess an infallibility which authorizes them to identify\ntheir interpretation of the word of God with the word itself. It is not\nwell applied by them, unless they are authorized to put themselves in the\nplace of God. If they have no right to do this, we must insist upon it\nthat it is one thing to reply against God, and quite another to reply\nagainst Calvin and his followers.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to be\nconsistent with the infinite goodness of God.\n\n\nWe agree with both Calvinistic and Arminian writers in the position, that\nno man is elected to eternal life on account of his merits. Indeed, the\nidea that a human being can merit anything, much less eternal life, of\nGod, is preposterous in the extreme. All his gifts are of pure grace. The\ncreation of the soul with glorious and immortal powers was an act of pure,\nunmixed favour. The duty of loving and serving him, which we are permitted\nto enjoy, is an exalted privilege, and should inspire us with gratitude,\ninstead of begetting the miserable conceit that our service, even when\nmost perfect, could deserve anything further from God, or establish any\nclaims upon his justice. This view, which we take to be the true one, as\ncompletely shuts out all occasion of boasting as does the scheme of\nelection maintained by the Calvinists.\n\nIt is objected, that God did not elect individuals to eternal life,\nbecause he foresaw that they would repent and believe; since repentance\nand faith themselves are the fruits of election. If this objection have\nany force, we are persuaded that it arises from an improper wording, or\npresentation, of the truth against which it is directed. We cannot suppose\nthat God elected any one because he foresaw his good works, so as to make\nelection to depend upon them, instead of making them to depend upon\nelection. This does not prevent an individual, however, from having been\nelected, because God foresaw from all eternity that the influences\nattending upon his election would, by his own voluntary co\u00f6peration\ntherewith, be rendered effectual to his salvation. This is the ground on\nwhich we believe the election of individuals to eternal life to proceed.\nAccordingly, we suppose that God never selected, or determined to save,\nany one who he foresaw would not yield to the influences of his grace,\nprovided they should be given. And we also suppose that such is the\noverflowing goodness of God, that all were elected by him, and had their\nnames written in the book of life, who he foresaw would yield to the\ninfluences of his grace, and, by the co\u00f6peration therewith, \u201cmake their\ncalling and election sure.\u201d This scheme appears to possess the following\nvery great advantages:\u2014\n\n1. It does not give such a pervading energy to the operations of divine\ngrace as to exclude all subordinate moral agency from the world, and\ndestroy the very foundation of man\u2019s accountability.\n\n2. It does not weaken the motives to the practice of a virtuous and decent\nlife, by assuring the worst part of mankind that they are just as likely\nto be made the objects of the saving grace of God as any others. On the\ncontrary, it holds out this terrible warning, that by an obstinate\ncontinuance in evil-doing, the wicked may place themselves beyond the\neffectual influences of divine grace, and set the seal of eternal death to\ntheir own souls.\n\n3. It shows the mercy of God to be infinite. No one, except those who\nplace themselves beyond the possibility of salvation by their own evil\ndeeds, is ever lost. Hence, the mercy of God, which takes in all whose\nsalvation is within the range of possibility, appears in full-orbed and\nunclouded splendour. It could not possibly appear greater, or more\nbeautiful, than as it presents itself to our view in this scheme.\n\n4. It shows the justice of God to be infinite. This, according to the\nabove view, is neither limited by, nor does it limit, the mercy of God. It\nacts merely upon those who were not, and never could be made, the objects\nof mercy; and it acts upon these according to the full measure of their\nill-desert, as well as according to the exigencies of the moral empire of\nGod. It has no limits, except those which circumscribe and bound the\nobjects of infinite justice.\n\n5. It not only shows the mercy and justice of God to be as great as can\npossibly be conceived, but it also shows the perfect harmony and agreement\nwhich subsists between these sublime attributes of the Divine Being. It\nmarks out and defines the orbit, in which each revolves in all the\nperfection and plenitude of its glory, without the least clashing or\ninterference with the other.\n\nIn conclusion, we would simply ask the candid and impartial reader, Does\nany dark or perplexing \u201ccloud still hang over the subject?\u201d Is \u201cthere a\ndifficulty in reconciling the mind to a system,\u201d which exhibits the\ncharacter of God, and his government of the world, in so pleasing and so\nadvantageous a light? Does not a system, which gives so glad and joyous a\nresponse to the demand of God, \u201cAre not my ways equal?\u201d recommend itself\nto the affections of the pious mind?\n\nIt very clearly seems to us, that, strong as are the convictions of Dr.\nChalmers in favour of \u201ca rigid and absolute predestination,\u201d(216) his\naffections cannot always be restrained within the narrow confines of so\ndark a scheme. His language, in pleading for the universality of the\ngospel offer, contains, it seems to us, as direct, and pointed, and\npowerful condemnation of his own scheme as can well be found in the whole\nrange of theological literature. \u201cThere must be,\u201d says he, \u201ca sad\nmisunderstanding somewhere. The commission put into our hands is to go and\npreach the gospel to every creature under heaven; and the announcement\nsounded forth in the world from heaven\u2019s vault was, Peace on earth,\n_good-will to men_. There is no freezing limitation here, but a largeness\nand munificence of mercy boundless as space, free and open as the expanse\nof the firmament. We hope, therefore, the gospel, the real gospel, _is as\nunlike the views of some of its interpreters, as creation, in all its\nboundless extent and beauty, is unlike the paltry scheme of some wretched\nscholastic in the middle ages_. The middle age of science and civilization\nis now terminated; but Christianity also had its middle age, _and this,\nperhaps, is not yet fully terminated. There is still a remainder of the\nold spell_, even the spell of human authority, and by which a certain\ncramp or confinement has been laid on the genius of Christianity. We\ncannot doubt that the time of its complete emancipation is coming, when it\nshall break loose from the imprisonment in which it is held; but meanwhile\nthere is, as it were, a stricture upon it, not yet wholly removed, _and in\nvirtue of which the largeness and liberality of Heaven\u2019s own purposes have\nbeen made to descend in partial and scanty droppings through the strainers\nof an artificial theology, instead of falling, as they ought, in a\nuniversal shower upon the world_.\u201d(217)\n\nIs it possible, that this is the language of a man who believes that\nHeaven\u2019s purposes of mercy descend, not upon all men, but only upon the\nelect? It is even so. Boundless and beautiful as the goodness of God is in\nitself; yet, through the strainers of his theology, is it made to descend\nin partial and scanty droppings merely, and not in one universal shower.\nIt is good-will, not to _men_, but to the _elect_. Such is the \u201cchilling\nlimitation,\u201d and such the frightful \u201cstricture,\u201d on the genius of\nChristianity, from which, in the fervour of his imagination, the great\nheart of Chalmers burst into a higher and a more genial element of light\nand love.\n\nAlas! how sad and how sudden the descent, when in the very next paragraph\nhe says: \u201cThe names and number of the saved may have been in the view,\n_nay, even in the design and destination of God from all eternity_; and\nstill the distinction is carried into effect, not by means of a gospel\naddressed partially and exclusively to them, but by means of a gospel\naddressed generally to all. _A partial gospel, in fact, could not have\nachieved the conversion of the elect_:\u201d that is to say, though it was the\ndesign and destination of God from all eternity to save only a small\nportion of those whom he might have saved; yet he made the offer of\nsalvation to all, in order to save the chosen few! And if he had not\nproclaimed this universal offer, by which \u201cthe largeness and munificence\u201d\nof his mercy are made to _appear_ as \u201cboundless as space,\u201d the elect could\nnot have been saved! If so, is it the real goodness of God, then, or\nmerely the _appearance_ of universal goodness, that leadeth men to\nrepentance?\n\n\u201cAny charm,\u201d says he, \u201cwhich there is in Christianity to recall or to\nregenerate _some_, lies in those of its overtures which are so framed as\nto hold out the offered friendship of God to all:\u201d(218) that is, that\nalthough God intends and seeks to save only a few, he offers the same\nsalvation to all, to give an efficacious charm to the scheme of\nredemption! Indeed, if the Calvinistic scheme of an absolute\npredestination be true, then we admit that there is a charm and a glory in\nthe magnificent delusion, arising from God\u2019s offer of friendship to all,\nwhich is not to be found in the truth. But that scheme, as we have seen,\nis not true; and also, that the goodness of God is as boundless and\nbeautiful in reality, as it could possibly be in appearance.\n\nWe agree with Dr. Chalmers, that the goodness of God should be viewed, not\nthrough the medium of predestination, but as it shines forth in the light\nof the glorious gospel. We agree with him, that \u201cwe ought to proceed on\nthe obvious representations which Scripture gives of the Deity; and _these\nbeheld in their own immediate light, untinged by the dogma of\npredestination. God waiting to be gracious\u2014God not willing that any should\nperish, but that all should come to repentance\u2014God swearing by himself\nthat he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but rather that all\nshould come unto him and live\u2014God beseeching men to enter into\nreconciliation, and this not as elect, but simply and generally as men and\nsinners_;\u2014these are the attitudes in which the Father of the human family\nsets himself forth unto the world\u2014these the terms in which he speaks to us\nfrom heaven.\u201d It is precisely in this sublime attitude, and in this\ntransporting light, that we rejoice to contemplate the Father of mercies;\nand this view, it must be confessed, is wholly \u201cuntinged with the dogma of\npredestination.\u201d\n\n\n\n\n\n Conclusion.\n\n\nA SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.\n\n\n There is a lamp within the lofty dome\n Of the dim world, whose radiance clear doth show\n Its awful beauty; and, through the wide gloom,\n Make all its obscure mystic symbols glow\n With pleasing light,\u2014that we may see and know\n The glorious world, and all its wondrous scheme;\n Not as distorted in the mind below,\n Nor in philosopher\u2019s, nor poet\u2019s dream,\n But as it was, and is, high in the Mind Supreme.\u2014ANON.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter I.\n\n\nSummary Of The First Part Of The Foregoing System.\n\n\nThe commonly received systems of theology are, it is confessed by their\nadvocates, attended with manifold inconveniences and difficulties. The\nhabit of mind by which, notwithstanding such difficulties, it clings to\nthe great truths of those systems, is worthy of all admiration, and forms\none of the best guarantees of the stability and progress of human\nknowledge. For in every department of science the great truths which dawn\nupon the mind are usually attended with a cloud of difficulties, and, but\nfor the habit in question, they would soon be permitted to fade away, and\nbe lost in their original obscurity. Copernicus has, therefore, been\njustly applauded,(219) not only for conceiving, but for firmly grasping\nthe heliocentric theory of the world, notwithstanding the many formidable\nobjections which it had to encounter in his own mind. Even the sublime law\nof the material universe, before it finally established itself in the mind\nof Newton, more than once fell, in its struggles for acceptance, beneath\nthe apparently insuperable objections by which it was attended; and, after\nall, the overpowering evidence which caused it to be embraced, still left\nit surrounded by an immense penumbra of difficulties. These, together with\nthe sublime truth, he bequeathed to his successors. They have retained the\ntruth, and removed the difficulties. In like manner, admirable though the\nhabit of clinging to every sufficiently accredited truth may be, yet,\nwhether in the physical or in the moral sciences, the effort to\ndisencumber the truth of the difficulties by which its progress is\nembarrassed should never be remitted. The scientific impulse, by which a\ngreat truth is grasped, and established upon its own appropriate evidence,\nshould ever be followed by the subordinate movement, which strives to\nremove every obstacle out of the way, and cause it to secure a wider and a\nbrighter dominion in the human mind. And in proportion as any scheme,\nwhether in relation to natural or to divine things, shall, without a\nsacrifice or mutilation of the truth, divest itself of the darkness which\nmust ever accompany all one-sided and partial views, will it possess a\ndecided advantage and superiority over other systems. Since this general\nprinciple will not be denied, let us proceed, in conclusion, to take a\nbrief survey of the foregoing scheme of doctrine, and determine, if we\ncan, whether to any truth it has given any such advantage.\n\nIt clearly seems free from the stupendous cloud of difficulties that\noverhang that view of the moral universe which supposes its entire\nconstitution and government to be in accordance with the scheme of\nnecessity. These difficulties pertain, first, to the responsibility of\nman; secondly, to the purity of God; and, thirdly, to the reality of moral\ndistinctions. These three several branches of the difficulty in question\nhave been respectively considered in the first three chapters of the first\npart of the present work; and we shall now briefly recapitulate the views\ntherein presented, in the three following sections.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin.\n\n\nIf, according to this scheme, all things in heaven and earth, the\nvolitions of the human mind not excepted, be under the dominion of\nnecessitating causes, then may we well ask, How can man be a free and\nresponsible agent? To this inquiry the most illustrious advocates of the\nscheme in question have not been able to return a coherent or satisfactory\nreply. After the search of ages, and the joint labour of all their\ngigantic intellects, they have found no position in their system on which\nthe freedom of the human mind may be securely planted. The position set up\nfor this purpose by one is pulled down by another, who, in his turn,\nindicates some other position only to be demolished by some other advocate\nof his own scheme. The more we look into their writings on this subject,\nthe more irreconcilable seems the conflict of opinion in which they are\namong themselves involved. The more closely we contemplate the labour of\ntheir hands, the more clearly we perceive that all their attempts, in\nopposition to the voice of heaven and earth, to rear the great\nmetaphysical tower of necessity, have only ended in an utter confusion of\ntongues. So far, indeed, are they from having found and presented any such\nview of the freedom and responsibility of man, as shall, by the intrinsic\nand overpowering lustre of its evidence, stand some chance to disarm the\nenemies of God, that they have not even found one in which they themselves\ncan rest. The school of the necessitarian is, in reality, a house divided\nagainst itself; and that, too, in regard to the most vital and fundamental\npoint of its philosophy.\n\nThere seems to be one exception to the truth of this general remark: for\nthere is one scheme or definition of liberty, in which many, if not most,\nof the advocates of necessity have concurred; that is, the definition of\nHobbes. As the current of a river, says he, is free to flow down its\nchannel, provided there be no obstruction in the way; so the human will,\nthough compelled to act by causes over which it has no control, is free,\nprovided there be no external impediment to prevent its volition from\npassing into effect. This idea of the freedom of the will, though much\nolder than Hobbes, is primarily indebted to his influence for its\nprevalence in modern times; for it descended from Hobbes to Locke, from\nLocke to Edwards, and from Edwards to the modern school of Calvinistic\ndivines.\n\nNo matter how we come by our volitions, says Edwards, yet are we perfectly\nfree when there is no external impediment to hinder our volitions from\npassing into effect: that is to say, though our volitions be absolutely\nproduced by the divine omnipotence itself, or in any other way; yet is the\nwill free, provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition\nfrom moving the body. According to this definition of the liberty of the\nwill, it is not a _property_ of the soul at all, but only an _accidental_\ncircumstance or condition of the body. In the significant language of\nLeibnitz, it is not the freedom of the mind; it is merely \u201celbow-room.\u201d It\nconsists not in an attribute, or property, or power of the soul, but only\nin the external opportunity which its necessitated volitions may have to\nnecessitate an effect. We ask, How can the mind be free? and they tell us,\nWhen the body may be so! We inquire about an _attribute_ of the spiritual\nprinciple within, and they turn us off with an answer respecting an\n_accident_ of the material principle without! An _ignoratio elenchi_ more\nflagrant\u2014a mistaking of the question more palpable\u2014it is surely not\npossible to conceive. Yet this definition of the freedom of the will,\nthough so superficially false, is precisely that which has found the most\ngeneral acceptance among necessitarians. Though vehemently condemned by\nCalvin himself, unanswerably refuted by Leibnitz, sneered at by Edwards\nthe younger, and pronounced utterly inadequate by Dr. John Dick; yet, as\nwe have seen, is it now held up as \u201cthe Calvinistic idea of the freedom of\nthe will.\u201d\n\nWe do not wonder that such a definition of free-will should have been\nadopted by atheizing philosophers, such as Hume and Hobbes, for example;\nbecause we cannot suppose them to have been penetrated with any very\nprofound design to uphold the cause of human responsibility, or to\nvindicate the immaculate purity of the divine glory. But that it should\nhave been accepted with such unquestioning simplicity by a large body of\nChristian divines, having the great interests of the moral world at heart,\nis, we cannot but think, a sufficient ground for the most profound\nastonishment and regret; for, surely, to plant the great cause of human\nresponsibility on a foundation so slender, on a fallacy so palpable, on a\nposition so utterly untenable, is to expose it to the victorious assaults\nof its weakest enemy and invader.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin.\n\n\nThe necessitarian, in his attempts to vindicate the purity of God, has not\nbeen more successful than in his endeavours to establish the freedom and\naccountability of man. If, according to his scheme, the Supreme Ruler of\nthe world be the primal cause of all things, the volitions of men\nincluded; it certainly seems exceedingly difficult to conceive, that he is\nnot implicated in the sin of the world. And this difficulty, so appalling\nat first view, remains just as great after all that the most enlightened\nadvocates of that scheme have advanced as it was before.\n\nWe have witnessed the efforts of a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and a Chalmers,\nto repel this objection to the scheme of necessity; and if we mistake not,\nwe have seen how utterly ineffectual they have proved to break its force,\nor resist its influence. The sum and substance of that defence is, as we\nhave seen, that God may do evil that good may come; a defence which,\ninstead of vindicating the purity of the divine proceeding, represents it\nas having been governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most corrupt\nsystem of casuistry the world has ever seen. It darkens, rather than\nilluminates, that profound and portentous obscurity of the system of the\nworld, arising from the origin and existence of moral evil. So far from\nremoving the difficulty from their scheme, they have only illustrated its\nforce by the ineffable weakness of the means and methods which that scheme\nhas necessitated them to employ for its destruction.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions.\n\n\nFor, if all things in the world, the acts of the will not excepted, be\nproduced by an extraneous agency, it seems clear that it is absurd to\nattach praise or blame to men on account of their volitions. Nothing\nappears more self-evident than the position, that whatever is thus\nproduced in us can neither be our virtue nor our vice. The advocates of\nnecessity, at least those of them who do not admit the inference in\nquestion, invoke the aid of logic to extinguish the light of the principle\non which it is based. But where have they found, or where can they find, a\nprinciple more clear, more simple, or more unquestionable on which to\nground their arguments? Where, in the whole armory of logic, can be found\na principle more unquestionable than this, that no man can be to praise or\nto blame for that which is produced in him, by causes over which he had no\ncontrol?\n\nWe have examined those arguments in detail, and exhibited the principles\non which they proceed. Those principles, instead of being of such a nature\nas to subserve the purposes of valid argument, are either insignificant\ntruisms which prove nothing, or else they reach the point in dispute only\nby means of an ambiguity of words. Of the first description is the\ncelebrated maxim of Edwards, that _the essence of virtue and vice consists\nin their nature, and not in their cause_. By which he means, that no\nmatter how we come by our virtue and vice, though they be produced in us\naccording to the scheme of necessity, yet are they our virtue and vice. If\na horse should fall from the moon, it would be a horse: for no matter\nwhere it comes from, _a horse is a horse_; or, more scientifically\nexpressed, the essence of a horse consists in the nature of a horse, and\nnot in its origin or cause. All this is very true. But then, we no more\nbelieve that horses fall from the moon, than we do that virtue and vice\nare produced according to the scheme of necessity.\n\nOf the last description is that other maxim of Edwards, that men are\nadjudged virtuous or vicious on account of actions proceeding from the\nwill, without considering how they come by their volition. True, we may\njudge of _external_ actions according as their origin is in the will or\notherwise, without considering how its volitions come to pass; but then\nthis is because we proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free,\nand not under the dominion of necessitating causes. But the question\nrelates, not to external actions or movements of the body, but to the\nvolitions of the mind itself. And this being the case, it does make a vast\ndifference in our estimate, whether we consider those volitions as coming\nto pass freely; or whether, according to the scheme of necessity, we\nregard them as being produced by the operation of causes over which we\nhave no control. In this case, it is impossible for the human mind to\nattach praise or blame to them, or view them as constituting either virtue\nor vice. For nothing can be plainer than the position, that if anything in\nus be produced by the mighty and irresistible operation of an extraneous\nagency, it can neither be our virtue nor vice. This principle is so clear,\nthat logic can neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its\nevidence. And all the cloudy sophistications of an Edwards, ingenious as\nthey are, can obscure it only to the minds of those who have not\nsufficient penetration to see through the nature of his arguments.\n\nAt this point, then, as well as at others, the scheme of necessity,\ninstead of clearing up the old, has introduced new difficulties into the\nsystem of the world. Instead of diffusing light, it has actually extended\nthe empire of darkness, by investing in the clouds and mists of its own\nraising, some of the brightest elements which enter into its organization.\nBy scholastic refinements and sophistical devices, it has sought to\noverturn and destroy, not the elements of error and confusion, but some of\nthe clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of the human\nhead and heart.\n\nBut great as these difficulties are, we may still be asked to embrace the\nscheme from which they flow, on the ground that it is true. Indeed, this\nis the course pursued by some of the most enlightened Calvinistic\nnecessitarians of the present day. Freely admitting that all the attempts\nof Leibnitz, of Edwards, and others, to bring the scheme of necessity into\nan agreement with the dictates of reason, have left its stupendous\ndifficulties pretty much where they found them\u2014wrapped in impenetrable\ngloom; they nevertheless maintain this scheme, and propose it to our\nacceptance, on the sole and sufficient ground of its evidence. If we may\njudge from those of their writings which we have seen, this course of\nproceeding is getting to be very much the fashion among the Calvinists of\nthe present day; and they have a great deal to say in praise of simply\nadhering to the truth, without being over-solicitous about its\ndifficulties, or paying too much attention to them. That man, say they, is\nin imminent danger of heresy who, instead of receiving the truth with the\nsimplicity of a little child, goes about to worry himself with its\ndifficulties. He walks in dark and slippery places. We agree with them in\nthis, and commend their wisdom: for it presents the only chance which\ntheir system has of retaining its hold on the human mind. But before\naccepting this scheme on the ground of its evidence, we have deemed it\nprudent to look into the very interior of the scheme itself, and weigh the\nevidence on which it is so confidently recommended.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity.\n\n\nIn the prosecution of this inquiry, we have appeared to ourselves to find,\nthat this boasted scheme of necessity is neither more nor less than one\ngrand tissue of sophisms. We have found, we believe, that this huge\nimposition on the reason of man is a vile congregation of pestilential\nerrors, through which, if the glory of God and his marvellous ways be\ncontemplated, they must appear most horribly distorted. We have found that\nthis scheme is as weak and crazy in the mechanism of its internal\nstructure as it is frightful in its consequences. Instead of that closely\narticulated body of thought, which we were led to expect therein, we have\nfound little more than a jumble of incoherences, a semi-chaotic mass of\nplausible blunders. We have seen and shown, we trust, that this grand and\nimposing scheme of necessity is, in reality, based on a false\npsychology,\u2014directed against a false issue,\u2014supported by false\nlogic,\u2014fortified by false conceptions,\u2014recommended by false analogies,\u2014and\nrendered plausible by a false phraseology. And, besides, we have\nascertained that it originates in a false method, and terminates in a\nfalse religion. As such, we deem it far better adapted to represent the\nlittle, narrow, dark, crooked, and perverted world within, than the great\nand all-glorious world of God without. So have we not spared its\ndeformities.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe relation between the human agency and the divine.\n\n\nHaving got rid of the scheme of necessity, which opposed so many obstacles\nto the prosecution of our design, we were then prepared to investigate the\ngreat problem of evil: but, before entering on this subject, we paused to\nconsider the difficulty which, in all ages, the human mind has found in\nattempting to reconcile the influence of the Divine Spirit with the\nfreedom of the will. In regard to this difficulty, it has been made to\nappear, we trust, that we need not understand _how_ the Spirit of God\nacts, in order to reconcile his influence with the free-agency of man. We\nneed to know, not how the one Spirit acts on the other, but only what is\ndone by each, in order to see a perfect agreement and harmony in their\nco\u00f6peration. The inquiry relates, then, to the precise thing done by each,\nand not to the _modus operandi_. Having, in opposition to the commonly\nreceived notion, ascertained this to be the difficulty, we have found it\ncomparatively easy of solution.\n\nFor the improved psychology of the present day, which gives so clear and\nsteady a view of the simple facts of consciousness, has enabled us to see\nwhat may, and what may not, be produced by an extraneous agency. This\nagain has enabled us to make out and define the sphere of the divine\npower, as well as that of the human; and to determine the point at which\nthey come into contact, without interfering with or intersecting each\nother.\n\nThe same means have also shown us, that the opposite errors of Pelagianism\nand Augustinism have a common root in a false psychology. The psychology\nof the past, which identifies the passive states of the sensibility with\nthe active states of the will, is common to both of these schemes. From\nthis common root the two doctrines branch out in opposite directions; the\none on the side of the mind\u2019s activity, and the other on that of its\npassivity. Each perceives only one phase of the complex whole, and denies\nthe reality of the other. With one, the active phase is the whole; with\nthe other, the passive impression is the whole. Hence the one recognises\nthe human power alone; while the other causes this power entirely to\ndisappear beneath the overshadowing influence of the divine.\n\nNow the foregoing system, by availing itself of the psychology of the\npresent day, not only does not cause the one of these great facts to\nexclude the other, but, by showing their logical coherency and agreement,\nit removes the temptation that the speculative reason has ever felt to do\nsuch violence to the cause of truth. It embraces the half views of both\nschemes, and moulds them into one great and full-orbed truth. In the great\ntheandric work of regeneration, in particular, it neither causes the human\nelement to exclude the divine, nor the divine to swallow up the human; but\npreserves each in its integrity, and both in their harmonious union and\nco\u00f6peration. The mutual inter-dependency, and the undisturbed\ninter-working, of these all-important elements of the moral world, it aims\nto place on a firm basis, and exhibit in a clear light. If this object has\nbeen accomplished, though but in part, or by way of a first approximation\nonly, it will be conceded to be no small gain, or advantage, to the cause\nof truth.\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God.\n\n\nThe relation of the foregoing treatise to the great problem of the\nspiritual world, concerning the origin and existence of evil, may be\neasily indicated, and the solution it proposes distinguished from that of\nothers. This may be best done, perhaps, with the aid of logical forms.\n\nThe world, created by an infinitely perfect Being, says the sceptic, must\nneeds be the best of all possible worlds: but the actual world is not the\nbest of all possible worlds: therefore it was not created by an infinitely\nperfect Being. Now, in replying to this argument, no theist denies the\nmajor premiss. All have conceded, that the idea of an infinitely perfect\nBeing necessarily implies the existence and preservation of the greatest\npossible perfection in the created universe. In the two celebrated works\nof M. Leibnitz and Archbishop King, both put forth in reply to Bayle, this\nadmission is repeatedly and distinctly made. This seems to have been\nrightly done; for, in the language of Cudworth, \u201cTo believe a God, is to\nbelieve the existence of all possible good and perfection in the\nuniverse.\u201d(220)\n\nIn this, says Leibnitz, is embosomed all possible good. But how is this\npoint established? \u201cWe judge from the event itself,\u201d says he; \u201c_since God\nhas made it, it was not possible to have made a better_.\u201d(221) But this is\nthe language of faith, and not of reason. As an argument addressed to the\nsceptic, it is radically unsound; for as a medium of proof, it employs the\nvery thing in dispute, namely, that God is infinitely perfect. Hence this\nis a _petitio principii_, a begging of the question. If this were all that\nM. Leibnitz had to offer, he might as well have believed, and remained\nsilent.\n\nBut this was not all. He endeavours to show, that the world is absolutely\nperfect, without inferring its perfection from the assumed infinite\nperfection of its Author. At first view, this does not appear to be so;\nfor the sin and misery which overflow this lower part of the world seem to\ndetract from the perfection and beauty of the whole. Not so, says\nLeibnitz: \u201cthere are some disorders in the parts, which marvellously\nheighten the beauty of the whole; as certain discords, skilfully employed,\nrender the harmony more exquisite.\u201d(222) Considered as an argument, this\nis likewise quite unsatisfactory. It is, in fact, merely the light of the\nimagination, playing over the bosom of the cloud; not the concentrated\nblaze of the intelligence, dispelling its gloom. And besides, this analogy\nproceeds on a false principle; inasmuch as it supposes that God has\nhimself introduced sin into the world, with a view to its happy effects.\nWe could sooner believe, indeed, that the principle of evil had introduced\nharmony into the world in order to heighten the frightful effects of its\ndiscord, than that the principle of all good had produced the frightful\ndiscord of the world, in order to enhance the effects of its harmony. But\nwe shall let all such fine sayings pass. Perhaps they were intended as the\nornaments of faith, rather than as the radiant armour and the invincible\nweapons of reason.\n\nThough Leibnitz frequently insists, that \u201cthe permission of evil tends to\nthe good of the universe,\u201d(223) he does not always seem to mean that evil\nwould be better than holiness in its stead; but that the permission of sin\nis not so great an inconvenience as would be its universal prevention. \u201cWe\nought to say,\u201d says he, \u201cthat God permits sin, because otherwise he would\nhimself do a worse action (_une action pire_) than all the sin of his\ncreatures.\u201d(224) But what is this worse, this more unreasonable action of\nwhich God would be guilty, if he should prevent all sin? One bad feature\nthereof would be, according to Leibnitz, that it would interfere with the\nfreedom of the will. In his \u201cAbr\u00e9g\u00e9 de la Controverse,\u201d he says: \u201cWe have\nadded, after many good authors, that it is in conformity with the general\norder and good, for God to leave to certain creatures an occasion for the\nexercise of their liberty.\u201d This argument comes with a bad grace from one\nwho has already denied the liberty of the will; and, indeed, from the very\nform of his expression, Leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority,\nrather than from a perception of any support it derives from his own\nprinciples. He asserts the freedom of the will, it is true, but he does\nthis, as we have seen, only in opposition to the \u201cabsolute necessity\u201d of\nHobbes and Spinoza; according to whom nothing in the universe could\npossibly have been otherwise than it is. In his \u201cReflexions sur le Livre\nde Hobbes,\u201d he says, that although the will is determined in all cases by\nthe divine omnipotence, yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical\nnecessity, \u201cbecause _the contrary volition might happen without implying a\ncontradiction_.\u201d True, the contrary volition might happen without implying\na contradiction; for God himself might cause it to exist. And if, by his\nalmighty and irresistible power, he should cause it to exist, the will\nwould still be free in Leibnitz\u2019s sense of the word; since its contrary\nmight have happened. Hence, according to this definition of liberty, if\nGod should, in all cases, determine the will to good, it would\nnevertheless be free; since the contrary determination might have been\nproduced by his power. In other words, if such be the liberty of the will,\nno operation of the Almighty could possibly interfere therewith; as no\nvolition produced by him would have rendered it impossible for him to have\ncaused the opposite volition, if he had so chosen and exerted his\nomnipotence for that purpose. This defence of the divine procedure, then,\nhas no foundation in the scheme of Leibnitz; and the only thing he can say\nin its favour is, that after the authority \u201cof many good authors,\u201d we have\nadded it to our own views.\n\nArchbishop King, too, as is well known, assumes the ground that God\npermits sin, on account of the greater inconvenience that would result to\nthe world from an interference with the freedom of the will. But so\nextravagant are his views respecting this freedom, that the position in\nquestion is one of the weakest parts of his system. The mind chooses\nobjects, says he, not because they please it; but they are agreeable and\npleasant to the mind, because it chooses them. Surely, such a liberty as\nthis, consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious movement of the soul,\nthat owns not the guidance of reason, or wisdom, or anything apparently\ngood, cannot possess so great a value that the moral good of the universe\nshould be permitted to suffer, rather than that it should be interfered\nwith or restrained.\n\nBut these are merely _argumenta ad hominem_. There are \u201cmany good authors\u201d\nwho, although they maintain neither of the above views of liberty, insist\nthat it is better for God to permit sin, than to interfere with the\nfreedom of his creatures. But is it clear, that greater inconveniences\nwould have arisen from such an interference, than from the frightful reign\nof all the sin and misery that have afflicted the world? If God can so\neasily prevent all sin, and secure all holiness, by restraining the\nliberty of his creatures, is it clear, that in preferring their\nunrestrained freedom to the highest moral good of the universe, he makes a\nchoice worthy of his infinite wisdom? In other words, is it not more\ndesirable that moral evil should everywhere disappear, and the beauty of\nholiness everywhere shine forth, than that the creature should be left to\nabuse his liberty by the introduction of sin and death into the world?\nBesides, it is admitted by all the authors in question, that God sometimes\ninterposes the arm of his omnipotence, in order to the production of\nholiness. Now, in such an exertion of his power, he either interferes with\nthe freedom of the creature, or he does not. If he does not interfere with\nthat freedom, why may he not produce holiness in other cases also, without\nany such interference? And if, in some cases, he does interfere therewith,\nin order to secure the holiness of his creatures, why should he not, in\nall cases, prefer their highest moral good to so fatal an abuse of their\nprerogatives? Is his proceeding therein merely arbitrary and capricious,\nor is it governed by the best of reasons? Undoubtedly by the best of\nreasons, say all the authors in question: but then, when we come to this\npoint of the inquiry, they always tell us, that those reasons are\nprofoundly concealed in the unsearchable depths of the divine wisdom; that\nis to say, they believe them to be the best, not because they have seen\nand considered them, but because they are the reasons of an infinitely\nperfect mind. Now, all this is very well; but it is not to the purpose. It\nis to retire from the arena of logic, and fall back on the very point in\ndispute for support. It is not to argue; it is simply to drop the weapons\nof our warfare, and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of the\nadversary.\n\nIt is also contended by Leibnitz and King, as well as many other good\nauthors, that there is an established order, or system of laws, in the\ngovernment of the world; into which so great a confusion would be\nintroduced by the interposition of divine power to prevent all sin, that\nsome had better be permitted. This, which Leibnitz so positively asserts,\nis thrown out as a conjecture by Bishop Butler.(225) But in the present\ncontroversy, it is not to the point. For here the question is concerning\nthe order and government of the moral world itself. And this being the\nquestion, it is not admissible for one of the parties to say, that the\nproposed plan for the government of the world is not the best, because it\nwould interfere with and disturb the arrangements of that which is\nestablished. This is clearly to beg the question. It is to assume that the\nestablished method is the best, and therefore should not have been\nsuperseded by another; but this is the very point in dispute.\n\nThe truth is, that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his strong and\nimpregnable point, and left the vulnerable part of his system untouched.\nThis may be easily seen. The objection of the sceptic is thus stated by\nLeibnitz: Whoever can prevent the sin of another, and does not, but rather\ncontributes to it by his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to,\nthough he possesses a perfect knowledge, is an accomplice. God can prevent\nthe sin of his intelligent creatures: but he does it not, though his\nknowledge be perfect, and contributes to it by his concourse and the\noccasions to which he gives rise: therefore he is an accomplice. Now\nLeibnitz admits the minor, and denies the major, premiss of this argument.\nHe should have done the contrary. For, admitting that God might easily\nprevent sin, and cause holiness to reign universally, what had he left to\noppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the shield of faith? He might\nsay, indeed, as he often does, that God voluntarily permits sin, because\nit is a part and parcel of the best possible universe. But how easy for\nthe sceptic to demand, What good purpose does it answer? Can it add to the\nholiness or happiness of the universe? Cannot these high ends, these\nglorious purposes of the Divine Being, be as well attained by the\nuniversal rectitude and purity of his creatures, as by any other means?\nCannot the Supreme Ruler of the world, in the resources of his infinite\nmind, bring as much good out of holiness as can be brought out of sin? And\nif so, why permit sin in order to the good of the creation? Are not the\nperfect holiness and happiness of each and every part of the moral world\nbetter for each and every part thereof than are their contraries? And if\nso, are they not better for the whole? By this reply, the theist is, in\nour opinion, disarmed, and the sceptic victorious. Hence we say, that the\nformer should have conceded the major, and denied the minor, premiss of\nthe above argument; that is, he should have admitted, that whoever can\nprevent the sin of another, but, instead of so doing, contributes to it by\nhis concourse, is an accomplice: and he should have denied that God, being\nable to produce holiness in the place of sin, both permits and contributes\nto the reign of the latter in his dominions. The theist should have denied\nthis, we say, if he would have raised the ever-blessed God above all\ncontact with sin, and placed his cause upon high and impregnable ground,\nfar above the attacks of the sceptic. But as it is, he has placed that\ncause upon false grounds, and thereby exposed it to the successful shafts\nof the adversary.\n\nAnother reason assigned by Leibnitz(226) and King(227) for the permission\nof moral evil is, that if God should interpose to prevent it, this would\nbe to work a constant and universal miracle. But if such a thing were\npossible, why should he not work such a miracle? By these authors\nthemselves it is conceded, that the Almighty often works a miracle for the\nproduction of moral good; and, this being the case, why should he not\nexhibit this miracle on the most grand and magnificent scale of which it\nis possible to conceive? In other words, why should he not render it\nworthy of his infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness? Is it not by a\nlike miracle, by a like universal interposition of his power, that the\nmajestic fabric of the material globe is upheld, and the sublime movement\nof all its countless orbs continually carried on? And if so, are not the\norder and harmony of the moral universe as worthy such an exercise of his\nomnipotence as are the regularity and beauty of the material? We defend\nthe Divine Author and Preserver of all things on no such grounds. We say\nthat a universal holiness is not produced by the omnipresent energy of his\npower, not because this would be to work a miracle, but because it would\nbe to work a contradiction.\n\nBut we are becoming weary of such replies. The very question is, _Why_ is\nthere not a universal interposition of the divine power? and the reply,\nBecause this would be a universal interposition of the divine power! What\nis all this but a grand attempt to solve the awful mystery of the world,\nwhich ends in the assurance that God does not universally interpose to\nprevent sin, because he does not universally interpose to prevent it? Or,\nin fewer words, that he does not, because he does not?\n\nSince sin exists, says the sceptic, it follows that God is either unable\nor unwilling to prevent it. \u201cAble, but _unwilling_,\u201d replies the theist.\nSuch is the answer which has come down to us from the earliest times; from\na Lactantius to a Leibnitz, and from a Leibnitz to a M\u2019Cosh. No wonder\nthat in all this time they have not been able to find the reason why God\nis unwilling to prevent sin; since, in truth and reality, he is infinitely\nmore than willing to do so.\n\nBut, saying that he is willing, shall we concede that he is unable? By no\nmeans: for such language implies that the power of God is limited, and he\nis omnipotent. We choose to impale ourselves upon neither horn of the\ndilemma. We are content to leave M. Bayle upon the one, and M. Voltaire\nupon the other, while we bestow our company elsewhere. In plain English,\nwe neither reply unwilling nor unable.\n\nWe do say, however, that although God is infinitely willing to secure the\nexistence of universal holiness, to the exclusion of all sin, yet such a\nthing is not an object of power, and therefore cannot be produced by\nomnipotence itself. The production of holiness by the application of power\nis, as we have seen, an absurd and impossible conceit, which may exist in\nthe brain of man, but which can never be embodied in the fair and orderly\ncreation of God. It can no more be realized by the Divine Omnipotence than\na mathematical absurdity can be caused to be true.\n\nHence, we no longer ask why God permits sin. This were to seek a ground\nand reason of that which has no existence, except in the imagination of\nman. God does not permit sin. He chooses it not, and he permits it not, as\nan essential part of the best possible universe. Sin is that which his\nsoul abhors, and which all the perfections of his nature, his infinite\npower and wisdom, no less than his holiness, are pledged to wipe out from\nthe face of his creation. He does not cause, he does not tolerate sin, on\naccount of its happy effects, or on account of the uses to which it may be\nturned. The only word he has for such a thing is _woe_; and the only\nattitude he bears toward it is one of eternal and inexorable vengeance.\nAll the schemes of men make light of sin; but God is in earnest,\ninfinitely and immutably in earnest, in the purpose to root out and\ndestroy the odious thing, that it may have no place amid the glory of his\ndominions.\n\nAs sin did not originate by his permission, so it does not continue by his\nsufferance. He permits it, indeed, in that he permits the existence of\nbeings capable of sinning; and he permits the existence of such beings in\nthe very act of permitting the existence of those who are capable of\nknowing, and loving, and serving him. An infinitely good Being, says M.\nBayle, would not have conferred on his creature the fatal power to do\nevil. But he did not reflect that a power to do good is, _ex necessitate\nrei_, a power to do evil. Surely, a good Being would bestow on his\ncreature the power to do good\u2014the power to become like himself, and to\npartake of the incommunicable blessedness of a holy will. But if he would\nbestow this, he would certainly confer power to do evil; for the one is\nidentical with the other. And sin has arisen, not from any power conferred\nfor that purpose, but from that which constitutes the brightest element in\nthe sublime structure and glory of the moral world. It arises, not from\nany imperfection in the work of God, but from that without which it would\nhave been infinitely less than perfect.\n\n\u201cAll divines admit,\u201d says Bayle, \u201cthat God can infallibly produce a good\nact of the will in a human soul without depriving it of the use of\nliberty.\u201d(228) This is no longer admitted. We call it in question. We deny\nthat such an act can be produced, either with or without depriving the\nsoul of liberty. We deny that it can be produced at all: for whatever God\nmay produce in the human soul, this is not, this cannot be, the moral\ngoodness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced. In other words, it\nis not, and it cannot be, an object of praise or of moral approbation in\nhim in whom it is thus caused to exist. His virtue or moral goodness can\nexist only by reason, and in case of an exercise of his own will. It can\nno more be the effect of an extraneous force than two and two can be made\nequal to five.\n\nIn conclusion, the plain truth is, that the actual universe is not in the\nbest of all possible conditions; for we might conceive it to be better\nthan it is. If there were no sin and no suffering, but everywhere a purity\nand bliss as great as it is possible to conceive, this would be a vast\nimprovement in the actual state of the universe. Such is the magnificent\ndream of the sceptic; and, as we have seen, it is not without truth and\njustice that he thus dreams. But with this dream of his, magnificent as it\nis, there is connected another which is infinitely false: for he imagines\nthat the sublime spectacle of a world without sin, that the beatific\nvision of a universe robed in stainless splendour might have been realized\nby the Divine Omnipotence; whereas, this could have been realized only by\nthe universal and continued co\u00f6peration of the whole intelligent creation\nwith the grand design of God. On the other hand, the theist, by conceding\nthe error and contesting the truth of the sceptic, has inextricably\nentangled himself in the toils of the adversary.\n\nThe only remaining question which the sceptic has to ask is, that since\nGod might have prevented moral evil by the creation of no beings who he\nforesaw would sin, why did he create such beings? Why did he not leave all\nsuch uncreated, and call into existence only such as he foreknew would\nobey his law, and become like himself in purity and bliss? This question\nhas been fully answered both from reason and revelation. We have shown\nthat the highest good of the universe required the creation of such\nbeings. We have shown that it is by his dealings with the sinner that the\nfoundation of his spiritual empire is secured, and its boundaries\nenlarged. In particular, we have shown, from revelation, that it is by the\nredemption of a fallen world that all unfallen worlds are preserved in\ntheir allegiance to his throne, and kept warm in the bosom of his\nblessedness.\n\nIf the sceptic should complain that this is to meet him, not with weapons\ndrawn from the armory of reason, but from that of revelation, our reply is\nat hand: he has no longer anything left to be met. His argument, which\nassumes that a Being of infinite power could easily cause holiness to\nexist, has been shown to be false. This very assumption, this major\npremiss, which has been so long conceded to him, has been taken out of his\nhands, and demolished. Hence, we do not oppose the shield of faith to his\nargument; we hold it in triumph over his exploded sophism. We merely\nrecall our faith, and exult in the divine glory which it so magnificently\nbrings to view, and against which his once blind and blundering reason has\nnow no more to say.\n\n\n\n\n Chapter II.\n\n\nSummary Of The Second Part Of The Foregoing System.\n\n\nHaving reconciled the existence of sin with the purity of God, and refuted\nthe objections against the principles on which that reconciliation is\nbased, we next proceeded to the second part of the work, in which the\nnatural evil, or suffering, that afflicts humanity, is shown to be\nconsistent with his goodness. This part consists of five chapters, of\nwhose leading principles and position we shall now proceed to take a rapid\nsurvey in the remaining sections of the present chapter.\n\n\n\n Section I.\n\n\nGod desires the salvation of all men.\n\n\nThe fact that all men are not saved, at first view, seems inconsistent\nwith the goodness of the Divine Being, and the sincerity of his endeavours\nfor their conversion. We naturally ask, that if God could so easily cause\nall men to turn and live, why should he in vain call upon them to do so?\nIs he really sincere in the use of means for the salvation of all, since\nhe permits so many to hold out in their rebellion and perish? In other\nwords, if he really and sincerely seeks the salvation of all, why are not\nall saved? This is confessedly one of the most perplexing and confounding\ndifficulties which attach to the commonly received systems of theology. It\nconstitutes one of those profound obscurities from which, it is admitted,\ntheology has not been able to extricate itself, and come out into the\nclear light of the divine glory.\n\nBy many theologians this difficulty, instead of being solved, is most\nfearfully aggravated. Luther, for example, finds it so great, that he\ndenies the sincerity of God in calling upon sinners to forsake their evil\nways and live; and that, as addressed to the finally impenitent, his\nlanguage is that of mockery and scorn. And Calvin imagines that such\nexhortations, as well as the other means of grace offered to all, are\ndesigned, not for the real conversion of those who shall finally perish,\nbut to enhance their guilt, and overwhelm them in the more fearful\ncondemnation. If it were possible to go even one step beyond such\ndoctrines, that step is taken by President Edwards: for he is so far from\nsupposing that God really intends to lead all men into a conformity with\nhis revealed will, that he contends that God possesses another and a\nsecret will by which, for some good purpose, he chooses their sin, and\ninfallibly brings it to pass. If any mind be not appalled by such\ndoctrines, and chilled with horror, surely nothing can be too monstrous\nfor its credulity, provided only it relate to the divine sovereignty.\n\nThe Arminian with indignation rejects such views of the divine glory. But\ndoes he escape the great difficulty in question? If God forms the design,\nsays he, not to save all men, he is not infinitely good; but yet he admits\nthat God actually refuses to save some. Now, what difference can it make\nwhether God\u2019s intention not to save all be evidenced by a pre\u00ebxisting\ndesign, or by a present reality? Is not everything that is done by him, or\nleft undone, in pursuance of his eternal purpose and design? What, then,\nin reference to the point in question, is the difference between the\nArminian and the Calvinist? _Both admit that God could easily save all men\nif he would_; that is, render all men holy and happy. But the one says\nthat he did not design to save all, while the other affirms that he\nactually refuses to save some. Surely, if we may assume what is conceded\nby both parties, the infinite goodness of God is no more disproved by a\nscheme of salvation limited in its design, than by a scheme of salvation\nlimited in its execution. Hence, it is admitted by many Arminians\nthemselves, that their own scheme merely mitigates and softens down,\nwithout removing, the appalling difficulty in question.\n\nThere are many exceptions to this remark. One of the most memorable of\nthese is the judgment which Robert Hall(229) pronounces concerning the\nsolution of this difficulty by the \u201cWonderful Howe.\u201d This solution, as we\nhave seen, labours under the same defect with those of its predecessors,\nin that it rejects the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction\nin terms. Instead of following the guidance of this truth, he wanders amid\nthe obscurities of the subject, becomes involved in numerous\nself-contradictions, and is misled by the deceitful light of false\nanalogies.\n\nWe shall not here reproduce his inconsistencies and self-contradictions.\nWe shall simply add, that although he, too, attempts to show why it is for\nthe best that all should not be saved, he frequently betrays the feeble\nand unsatisfactory nature of the impression which his own reasons made\nupon his mind. For the light of these _reasons_ soon fades from his\nrecollection; and, like all who have gone before him, when he comes to\ncontemplate the subject from another point of view, he declares that the\nreasons of the thing he has endeavoured to explain, are hid from the human\nmind in the profound depths of the divine wisdom.\n\nIf we would realize, then, that God sincerely desires the salvation of all\nmen, we must plant ourselves on the truth, that holiness, which is of the\nvery essence of salvation, cannot be wrought in us by an extraneous force.\nIt is under the guidance of this principle, and of this principle alone,\nthat we can find our way out from the dark labyrinth of error and\nself-contradiction, in which others are involved, into the clear and\nbeautiful light of the gospel, that God \u201cwill have all men to be saved,\nand come unto a knowledge of the truth.\u201d It is with the aid of this\nprinciple, and of this alone, that we may hear the sublime teachings of\nthe divine wisdom, unmingled with the discordant sounds of human folly.\n\n\n\n Section II.\n\n\nThe sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with\nthe goodness of God.\n\n\nBy the Calvinistic school of divines it is most positively and\nperemptorily pronounced that the innocent can never suffer under the\nadministration of a Being of infinite goodness. They cannot possibly allow\nthat such a Being would permit one of his innocent creatures to suffer;\nbut they can very well believe that he can permit them both to sin and to\nsuffer. Is not this to strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel?\n\nHaving predetermined that the innocent never suffer, they have felt the\nnecessity of finding some sin in infants, by which their sufferings might\nbe shown to be deserved, and thereby reconciled with the divine goodness.\nThis has proved a hard task. From the time of Augustine down to the\npresent day, it has been diligently prosecuted; and with what success, we\nhave endeavoured to show. The series of hypotheses to which this effort\nhas given rise, are, perhaps, as wild and wonderful as any to be found in\nthe history of the human mind. We need not again recount those dark dreams\nand inventions in the past history of Calvinism. Perhaps the hypothesis of\nthe present day, by which it endeavours to vindicate the suffering of\ninfants, will seem scarcely less astonishing to posterity, than those\nexploded fictions of the past appear to this generation.\n\nAccording to this hypothesis, the infant world deserves to suffer, because\nthe sin of Adam, their federal head and representative, is imputed to\nthem. It is even contended that this constitution, by which the guilt or\ninnocence of the world was suspended on the conduct of the first man, is a\nbright display of the divine goodness, since it was so likely to be\nattended with a happy issue to the human race. Likely to be attended with\na happy issue! And did not the Almighty foresee and know, that if the\nguilt of the world were made to depend on the conduct of Adam, it would\ninfallibly be attended with a fatal result?\n\nWe have examined, at length, the arguments of an Edwards to show that such\na divine scheme and constitution of things is a display or manifestation\nof goodness. Those arguments are, perhaps, as ingenious and plausible as\nit is possible for the human intellect to invent in the defence of such a\ncause. When closely examined and searched to the bottom, they certainly\nappear as puerile and weak as it is possible for the human imagination to\nconceive.\n\nIndeed, no coherent hypothesis can be invented on this subject, so long as\nthe mind of the inventor fails to recognise the impossibility of excluding\nall sin from the moral system of the universe: for if all sin, then all\nsuffering, likewise, may be excluded; and we can never understand why\neither should be permitted; much less can we comprehend why the innocent\nshould be allowed to suffer. But having recognised this impossibility, we\nhave been conducted to three grounds, on which, it is believed, the\nsufferings of the innocent may be reconciled with the goodness of God.\n\nFirst, the sufferings of the innocent, in so far as they are the\nconsequences of sin, serve to show its terrific nature, and tend to\nprevent its introduction into the world. If this end could have been\naccomplished by the divine power, such a provision would have been\nunnecessary, and all the misery of the world only so much \u201csuffering in\nwaste.\u201d Secondly, the sufferings of the innocent serve as a foil to set\noff and enhance the blessedness of eternity. They are but a short and\ndiscordant prelude to an everlasting harmony. Thirdly, difficulties and\ntrials, temptations and wants, are indispensable to the rise of moral good\nin the soul of the innocent; for if there were no temptation to wrong,\nthere could be no merit in obedience, and no virtue in the world.\nSuffering is, then, essential to the moral discipline and improvement of\nmankind. On the one or the other of these grounds, it is believed that\nevery instance in which suffering falls upon the innocent, or falls not as\na punishment of sin, may be vindicated and reconciled with the goodness of\nGod.\n\n\n\n Section III.\n\n\nThe sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness.\n\n\nThe usual defences of the atonement are good, so far as they go, but not\ncomplete. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are well vindicated on the\nground, that they are necessary to cause the majesty and honour of the\ndivine law to be respected; but this defence, though sound, has been left\non an insecure foundation; for it has been admitted that God, by the word\nof his power, might easily have caused his laws to be universally\nrespected and obeyed. Hence, according to this admission, the sufferings\nof Christ might have been easily dispensed with, and were not necessary in\norder to maintain the honour and glory of the divine government. According\nto this admission, they were not necessary, and consequently not\nconsistent with the goodness of God.\n\nAgain: by distinguishing between the _administrative_ and the\n_retributive_ justice of God, and showing that the vicarious sufferings of\nChrist were a satisfaction to the first, and not to the last, we\nannihilate the objections of the Socinian. By means of this view of the\nsatisfaction rendered to the divine justice, we think we have placed the\ngreat doctrine of the atonement in a clearer and more satisfactory light\nthan usual. We have shown that the vicarious sufferings of the INNOCENT\nare so far from being inconsistent with the divine justice, that they are,\nin fact, free from the least shadow or appearance of hardship either to\nhim or to the world. Nay, that they are a bright manifestation of the\ndivine goodness both to himself and to those for whom he suffered; the\nbrightest manifestation thereof, indeed, which the universe has ever\nbeheld.\n\n\n\n Section IV.\n\n\nThe eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God.\n\n\nThe genuine Calvinist, if he reason consecutively from some of the\nprinciples of his system, can never escape the conclusion that all men\nwill be saved: for so long as he denies the ability of men to obey without\nthe efficacious grace of God, and affirms that this grace is not given to\nsuch as shall finally perish, it must follow that their punishment is\nunjust, and that their eternal punishment were an act of cruelty and\noppression greater than it is possible for the imagination of man to\nconceive.\n\nIt was precisely from such premises, as we have seen, that John Foster\ndenied the eternal duration of future punishment. His logic is good; but\neven an illogical escape from such a conclusion were better than the\nrejection of one of the great fundamental doctrines of revealed religion.\nBy having shown his premises to be false, we demolished the very\nfoundation of his arguments. But, not satisfied with this, we pursued\nthose arguments into all their branches and ramifications, and exposed\ntheir futility. By these means we have removed the objections and solved\nthe difficulties pertaining to this doctrine of revealed religion. In one\nword, we have shown that it is not inconsistent with the dictates of\nreason, or with the principle of the divine goodness.\n\nWe have shown that the eternal punishment of the wicked is deserved, and\ntherefore demanded by the divine justice; that they serve to promote the\nhighest moral interests of the universe, and are consequently imposed by\nthe divine goodness itself. We have shown, that in the administration of\nhis eternal government, the infliction of an endless punishment is even\nmore consistent with goodness than the use of temporal punishment in the\nmanagement of a temporal government; for the first, besides being eternal\nin duration, is unbounded in extent. Thus reason itself, when disenchanted\nof its strong Calvinistic prejudices and its weak Socinian\nsentimentalities, utters no other voice than that which proceeds from\nrevelation; and this it echoes rather than utters. In plainer words,\nthough reason does not prove or establish the eternity of future\npunishment, it has not one syllable to say against its wisdom, its\njustice, or its goodness.\n\n\n\n Section V.\n\n\nThe true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the\ngoodness of God.\n\n\nThe Calvinists endeavour to support their scheme of election and\npredestination by means of analogies drawn from the unequal distribution\nof the divine favours, which is observable in the natural economy and\ngovernment of the world. But the two cases are not parallel. According to\nthe one, though the divine favours are unequally distributed, no man is\never required to render an account of more than he receives. Whereas,\naccording to the other, countless millions of human-beings are doomed to\neternal misery for the non-observance of a law which they never had it in\ntheir power to obey. This is to judge them, not according to what they\nreceive, but according to what they receive not, and cannot obtain. It is\nto call them to give an account of talents never committed to their\ncharge. The difference between the two cases is, indeed, precisely that\nbetween the conduct of a munificent prince who bestows his favours\nunequally, but without making unreasonable demands, and the proceeding of\na capricious tyrant who, while he confers the most exalted privileges and\nhonours on one portion of his subjects, consigns all the rest, not more\nundeserving than they, to hopeless and remediless destruction; and that,\ntoo, for the non-performance of an impossible condition. Is it not\nwonderful that two cases so widely and so glaringly different, should have\nbeen so long and so obstinately confounded by serious inquirers after\ntruth?\n\nThe Calvinistic scheme of predestination, it is pretended, derives support\nfrom revelation. The ninth chapter of Romans which, from the time of\nAugustine down to the present day, has been so confidently appealed to in\nits support, has, as we have seen, no relation to the subject. It relates,\nnot to the election of individuals to eternal life, but of a nation to the\nenjoyment of external privileges and advantages. This is so plain, that\nDr. Macknight, though an advocate of the Calvinistic dogma of\npredestination, refuses to employ that portion of Scripture in support of\nhis doctrine.\n\nNor does the celebrated passage of the eighth chapter of the same epistle\ntouch the point in controversy. We might well call in question the\nCalvinistic interpretation of that passage, if this were necessary; but we\ntake it in their own sense, and show that it lends no support to their\nviews. The Calvinists themselves being the interpreters, that passage\nteaches that God, according to his eternal purpose, chose or selected a\ncertain portion out of the great mass of mankind as the heirs of eternal\nlife. Granted, then, that a certain portion of the human race were thus\nmade the objects of a peculiar favour, and prospectively endowed with the\ngreatest of all conceivable blessings. But _who_ were thus chosen, or\nselected? and on _what principle_ was the election made? In regard to this\npoint, it is not pretended by them that the passage in question utters a\nsingle syllable. They themselves being the judges, this Scripture merely\naffirms that a certain portion of mankind are chosen or elected to eternal\nlife; while in regard to the ground, or the reason, of their election, it\nis most perfectly and profoundly silent.\n\nHence it leaves us free to assume the position, that those persons were\nelected or chosen who God foresaw would, by a co\u00f6peration with his Spirit,\nmake their calling and election sure. And being thus left free, this is\nprecisely the position in which we choose to plant ourselves, in order to\nvindicate the divine glory against the awful misrepresentations of\nCalvinism: for, in the first place, this view harmonizes the passage in\nquestion with other portions of the divine record, and allows us, without\nthe least feeling of self-contradiction, to embrace the sublime word, that\nGod \u201cwill have all men to be saved;\u201d and that if any are not made the\nheirs of his great salvation, it is because his grace would have proved\nunavailing to them.\n\nSecondly, this view not only harmonizes two classes of seemingly opposed\ntexts of Scripture, but it also serves to vindicate the unbounded glory of\nthe divine goodness. It shows that the goodness of God is not partial in\nits operation; neither taking such as it leaves, nor leaving such as it\ntakes; but embracing all of the same class, and that class consisting of\nall who, by wicked works, do not place themselves beyond the possibility\nof being saved. Unlike Calvinism, it presents us, not with the spectacle\nof a mercy which might easily save all, but which, nevertheless,\ncontenting itself with a few only, abandons the rest to the ravages of the\nnever-dying worm.\n\nThirdly, at the same time that it vindicates the glory of the divine\nmercy, it rectifies the frightful distortion of the divine justice, which\nis exhibited in the scheme of Calvinism. According to this scheme, all\nthose who are not elected to eternal life are set apart as the objects on\nwhich the Almighty intends to manifest the glory of his justice. But how\nis this glory, or his justice, manifested? Displayed, we are told, by\ndooming its helpless objects to eternal misery for the non-performance of\nan impossible condition! A _display_ of justice this, which, to the human\nmind, bears every mark of the most appalling cruelty and oppression. _A\ndisplay of justice stamped with the most terrific features of its\nopposite_; so that no human mind can see the glory of the one, for the\ninevitable manifestation of the other! No wonder that Calvinists\nthemselves so often fly from the defence of such a display of the divine\njustice, and hide themselves in the unsearchable clouds and darkness of\nthe divine wisdom. This being of course a display for eternity, and not\nfor time, they may there await the light of another world to clear away\nthese clouds, and reveal to them the great mystery of such a manifestation\nof the divine justice. But whether that light will bring to view the great\nmystery of the divine wisdom therein displayed, or the great secret of\nhuman folly therein concealed, we can hardly say remains to be seen. The\nview we take presents a glorious display of the divine justice for _time_\nas well as for eternity.\n\nFourthly, this view not only shows the justice and the mercy of God,\nseparately considered, in the most advantageous light, but it exhibits the\nsublime harmony which subsists between them. It presents not, like\nCalvinism, a mercy limited by justice, and a justice limited by mercy; but\nit exhibits each in its absolute perfection, and in its agreement with the\nother: for, according to this view, the claim of mercy extends to all who\nmay be saved, and that of justice to those who may choose to remain\nincorrigibly wicked. Hence, the claim of the one does not interfere with\nthat of the other; nor can we conceive how either could be more gloriously\ndisplayed. We behold the infinite amplitude, as well as the ineffable,\nunclouded splendour of each divine perfection, without the least\ndisturbance or collision between them. In the very act of punishment, the\ntender mercy of God, which is over all his works, concurs, and inflicts\nthat suffering which is demanded by the good of the universe. The torment\nof the lost, is \u201cthe wrath of the Lamb.\u201d The glory of the redeemed, is the\npity of the Judge. Hence, instead of that frightful conflict which the\nscheme of Calvinism presents, we behold a reconciliation and agreement\namong the divine attributes, worthy the great principle of order, and\nharmony, and beauty in the universe.\n\n\n\n Section VI.\n\n\nThe question submitted.\n\n\nWe must now take leave of the reader. We have honestly endeavoured to\nconstruct a Theodicy, or to vindicate the divine glory as manifested in\nthe constitution and government of the moral world. We have endeavoured to\nreconcile the great fundamental doctrines of God and man with each other,\nas well as with the eternal principles of truth. It has likewise been our\nearnest aim, to evince the harmony of the divine attributes among\nthemselves, as well as their agreement with the condition of the universe.\nIn one word, we have aimed to repel the objections, and solve the\ndifficulties which have been permitted to obscure the glory of the Divine\nBeing; whether those difficulties and objections have seemed to proceed\nfrom the false philosophy of his enemies, or the mistaken views and\nmisguided zeal of his friends. How far we have succeeded in this attempt,\nno less arduous than laudable, it is not for us to determine. We shall,\ntherefore, respectfully submit the determination of this point to the calm\nand impartial judgment of those who may possess both the desire and the\ncapacity to think for themselves.\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n 1 Johnson\u2019s Works, vol. iv, p. 286.\n\n 2 Institutes, b. ii, c. iii.\n\n 3 Scott\u2019s Luther and Ref., vol. i, pp. 70, 71.\n\n 4 Institutes, b. i, c. xv.\n\n 5 Ibid., b. ii, c. ii.\n\n 6 Ibid.\n\n 7 Dick\u2019s Theology.\n\n 8 Bondage of the Will, sec. xxvi.\n\n 9 Ibid.\n\n 10 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, note O. Indeed, this distinction\n appears quite as clearly in the writings of Augustine, as it does in\n those of Luther, or Calvin, or Hobbes. He repeatedly places our\n liberty and ability in this, that we can \u201ckeep the commandments _if\n we will_,\u201d which is obviously a mere freedom from external\n co-action. See Part ii, ch. iv, sec. 2.\n\n 11 Literary Remains, p. 65.\n\n 12 Ethique, premiere partie, prop. xxvi.\n\n 13 Ibid., prop. xxxiv.\n\n 14 Ethique, Des Passions, prop. ii and Scholium.\n\n 15 \u0152uvres de Spinoza, tome ii, 350.\n\n 16 Introduction to the \u201c\u0152uvres de Spinoza,\u201d by M. Saisset.\n\n 17 Book ii, chapters 21, 27.\n\n 18 Disquisitions and Introduction, p. 5.\n\n 19 Helvetius on the Mind, p. 44.\n\n 20 Mr. Stewart says: \u201cDr. Hartley was, I believe, one of the first (if\n not the first) who denied that our consciousness is in favour of our\n free-agency.\u201d\u2014_Stewart\u2019s Works_, vol. v, Appendix. This is evidently\n a mistake. In the above passage, Leibnitz, with even more point than\n Hartley, denies that our consciousness is in favour of free-agency.\n\n 21 Essais de Theodicee, p. 99.\n\n 22 \u201cHobbes defines a free-agent,\u201d says Stewart, \u201cto be \u2018he that can do\n if he will, and forbear if he will.\u2019 The same definition has been\n adopted by Leibnitz, by Collins, by Gravezende, by Edwards, by\n Bonnet, and by all later necessitarians.\u201d The truth is, as we have\n seen, that instead of adopting, Leibnitz has very clearly refuted,\n the definition of Hobbes. Mr. Harris, in his work entitled \u201cThe\n Primeval Man,\u201d has also fallen into the error of ascribing this\n definition of liberty to Leibnitz. Surely, these very learned\n authors must have forgotten, that Leibnitz wrote a reply to Hobbes,\n in which he expressly combats his views of liberty.\n\n 23 Essais de Theodicee, pp. 5, 6.\n\n 24 Id., p. 8.\n\n 25 Inquiry, part ii, sec. viii.\n\n 26 Day\u2019s Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. v, pp. 80, 81.\n\n 27 Inquiry, part iv, sec. 9.\n\n 28 Ibid.\n\n 29 Ibid., sec. 7.\n\n 30 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, part iii, chap. i.\n\n 31 Lectures on Theology, by the late Rev. John Dick, D. D.\n\n 32 Dissertation, p. 41.\n\n 33 Dick\u2019s Lectures, vol. ii, p. 157.\n\n 34 History of the Reformation, b. v.\n\n 35 Hill\u2019s Divinity, ch. ix, sec. iii.\n\n 36 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. iii.\n\n 37 Id., b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.\n\n 38 Ibid.\n\n 39 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.\n\n 40 Ibid.\n\n 41 Ibid.\n\n 42 Ibid.\n\n 43 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.\n\n 44 Hume\u2019s Works, Liberty and Necessity.\n\n 45 Bacon.\n\n 46 Of Liberty and Necessity.\n\n 47 Although Mr. Hume gives precisely the same definition of liberty as\n that advanced by Hobbes, Locke, and Edwards, he had the sagacity to\n perceive that this related not to the freedom of the will, but only\n of the body. Hence he says, \u201cIn short, if motives are not under our\n power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can _at bottom\n have_ NO LIBERTY.\u201d We are not at all surprised, therefore, at the\n reception which Hume gave to the great work of President Edwards, as\n set forth in the following statement of Dr. Chalmers, concerning the\n appendix to the \u201cInquiry.\u201d \u201cThe history of this appendix,\u201d says he,\n \u201cis curious. It has only been subjoined to the later editions of his\n work, and did not accompany the first impression of it. Several\n copies of this impression found their way into this country, and\n created a prodigious sensation among the members of a school then in\n all its glory. I mean the metaphysical school of our northern\n metropolis, whereof Hume, and Smith, and Lord Kames, and several\n others among the more conspicuous infidels and semi-infidels of that\n day, were the most distinguished members. They triumphed in the book\n of Edwards, as that which set a conclusive seal on their\n principles,\u201d &c.\u2014_Institutes of Theology_, vol. ii, ch. ii.\n\n 48 Of Liberty and Necessity.\n\n 49 Ibid.\n\n 50 Mill\u2019s Logic, pp. 522, 523.\n\n 51 Mill\u2019s Logic, book ii, chap. v, sec. 4.\n\n 52 Metaphysics of Ethics.\n\n 53 Knapp\u2019s Theology, p. 520.\n\n 54 Reid\u2019s Works, note, p. 611.\n\n 55 Id., p. 599, note.\n\n 56 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 275.\n\n 57 M\u0153hler\u2019s Symbolism, p. 117\n\n 58 Novum Organum, book i, aph. 69.\n\n 59 Institutes, book i, chap. xviii.\n\n 60 Institutes, book i, chap. xvi.\n\n 61 Id., book ii, chap. iv.\n\n 62 Id., book i, chap. xviii.\n\n 63 Id., book iii, chap. xxiii.\n\n 64 Id., book iii, chap. xxiii, sec. 4, 7.\n\n 65 Institutes, book i, chap. xiv, sec. 16.\n\n 66 Theodice, p. 365.\n\n 67 Institutes, book i, chap. xiv.\n\n 68 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxiii.\n\n 69 Id., book i, ch. xviii.\n\n 70 See M\u0153hler\u2019s Symbolism.\n\n 71 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, p. 85.\n\n 72 Id., p. 264.\n\n 73 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, pp. 89, 90.\n\n 74 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 114.\n\n 75 Inquiry, p. 246\n\n 76 Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix.\n\n 77 Letter vii.\n\n 78 Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix.\n\n 79 Edwards\u2019s Works, vol. vii, p. 406.\n\n 80 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, p. 327.\n\n 81 Howe\u2019s Works, p. 1142.\n\n 82 On the Will, part iv, sec. ix.\n\n 83 Emmons\u2019s Works, vol. iv, p. 372.\n\n 84 Ibid., p. 388.\n\n 85 Ibid., p. 327.\n\n 86 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, chap. iii.\n\n 87 Emphatically as this conclusion is stated by Spinoza, and harshly as\n it is thrust by him against the moral sense of the reader, he could\n not himself find a perfect rest therein. Nothing can impart this to\n the reflective and inquiring mind but truth. Hence, even Spinoza\n finds himself constrained to speak of the duty of love to God, and\n so forth; all of which, according to his own conclusion, is\n irrelative nonsense.\n\n 88 Original Sin, part ii, chap. i, sec. i.\n\n 89 Original Sin, part ii, ch. i, sec. i.\n\n 90 Inquiry, part iv, sec. i.\n\n 91 They are accustomed to boast, that no man ever excelled Edwards in\n the _reductio ad absurdum_. But we believe no one has produced a\n more striking illustration of his ability in the use of this weapon,\n than that which we have just adduced. For if we contend, that every\n act is to be judged according to its own nature, whether it be good\n or evil, he will demonstrate, that we render virtue impossible, and\n exclude it entirely from the world. On the other hand, if we shift\n our position, and contend that no act is to be judged according to\n its own nature, but according to the goodness or badness of its\n origin or cause, he will also reduce this position, diametrically\n opposite though it be to the former, to precisely the same\n absurdity; namely, that it excludes all virtue out of the world, and\n banishes it from the universality of things! Surely, this _reductio\n ad absurdum_ is a most formidable weapon in his hands; since he\n wields it with such destructive fury against the most opposite\n principles, and seems himself scarcely less exposed than others to\n its force.\n\n 92 Inquiry, part iv, sec. x.\n\n 93 Religious Affections, part iii, sec. ii.\n\n 94 Ibid.\n\n 95 Dr. Woods.\n\n 96 Ibid.\n\n 97 Inquiry of President Edwards, part iv, sec. 1.\n\n 98 Institutes of Theology, part iii, chap. i.\n\n 99 President Edwards.\n\n 100 Dr. Chalmers.\n\n 101 Psychology, p. 247.\n\n 102 History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iii, p. 555.\n\n 103 Ibid.\n\n 104 President Edwards\u2019s Works, vol. ii, p. 16.\n\n 105 Id., vol. v, pp. 10, 11.\n\n 106 Id., vol. iv, p. 82.\n\n 107 Ibid.\n\n 108 Inquiry, p. 17.\n\n 109 Inquiry, part i, sec. iii.\n\n 110 Id., part i, sec. iv.\n\n 111 Inquiry, pp. 54, 55.\n\n 112 Inquiry, p. 55.\n\n 113 Id., p. 50.\n\n 114 Inquiry, p. 54.\n\n 115 Id., p. 55.\n\n 116 Inquiry, p. 77.\n\n 117 Ibid.\n\n 118 Ibid.\n\n 119 Id., p. 78.\n\n 120 Id., p. 79.\n\n 121 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e.\n\n 122 Inquiry, p. 277.\n\n 123 Id., pp. 50, 51.\n\n 124 Remarks upon Collins\u2019s Philosophical Inquiry.\n\n 125 Inquiry, p. 198.\n\n 126 Edwards\u2019s Inquiry, p. 178.\n\n 127 See Examination of Edwards on the Will.\n\n 128 Discours de la Conformit\u00e9 de la Foi avec la Raison.\n\n 129 See Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. ix.\n\n 130 President Day on the Will, p. 160.\n\n 131 Inquiry, p. 203.\n\n 132 Dissertation, p. 181.\n\n 133 Inquiry of Edwards, p. 222.\n\n 134 Edwards\u2019s Inquiry, p. 222.\n\n 135 A different view of the Pelagian doctrine on this point is given by\n Wiggers, and yet we suppose that both authors are in the right. The\n truth seems to me, that Pelagius, as usually happens to those who\n take one-sided views of the truth, has asserted contradictory\n positions.\n\n 136 The way of Life, chap. iii, sec. ii.\n\n 137 Knapp\u2019s Theology, vol. ii, p. 471. Note by the translator.\n\n 138 Institutes, b. iii, ch. xxiv.\n\n 139 Ibid.\n\n 140 Essais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e.\n\n 141 Cudworth\u2019s Intellectual System.\n\n 142 Starkie on Evidence.\n\n 143 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e.\n\n 144 See Chapter III.\n\n 145 Compare Chap. III.\n\n 146 Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 328.\n\n 147 Id., vol. ii, p. 149.\n\n 148 Cudworth\u2019s Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 338.\n\n 149 Dwight\u2019s Sermons, vol. i, pp. 254-412. Dick\u2019s Lec., p. 248.\n\n 150 Witherspoon, as quoted in \u201cNew and Old Theology,\u201d issued by the\n Presbyterian Board of Publication.\n\n 151 D\u2019Aubigne\u2019s History of the Reformation, book xiii.\n\n 152 Old and New Theology, p. 38.\n\n 153 The writer here speaks from personal experience.\n\n 154 Old and New Theology, p. 40.\n\n 155 Pens\u00e9es, I. Partie, art. iv, sec. vii.\n\n 156 Old and New Theology.\n\n 157 Examination of Edwards on the Will.\n\n 158 Theology, vol. i, p. 358.\n\n 159 Ibid.\n\n 160 Butler\u2019s Analogy, part i, chap. ii.\n\n 161 Robert Hall, a profound admirer of Howe, has pronounced his attempt\n to reconcile the sincerity of God with the universal offer of\n salvation, to be one of his great master-pieces of thought and\n reasoning.\n\n 162 Hagenbach\u2019s History of Doctrines, vol. ii, p. 259.\n\n 163 Institutes, book iii, chap. xxiv, sec. xvii.\n\n 164 Institutes, book iii, chap. xxiv, sec. xvi.\n\n 165 Id., sec. xiii.\n\n 166 We do not intend to investigate the subject of a limited atonement\n in the present work, because it is merely a metaphysical off-shoot\n from the doctrine of election and reprobation, and must stand or\n fall with the parent trunk. The strength of this we purpose to try\n in a subsequent chapter.\n\n 167 Lectures on Theology, vol. i, p. 458.\n\n 168 Lectures on Theology, p. 458.\n\n 169 Edwards\u2019s Works, vol. ii, p. 548.\n\n 170 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, chap. iii, p. 543.\n\n 171 Encheir., c. 46, 47. See also remarks by the American editor and\n translator.\n\n 172 See p. 284.\n\n 173 If God, out of the abundance of his compassion, imputes the sins of\n parents only to the third or fourth generation, how has it happened\n that Adam\u2019s transgression is imputed to all his posterity, and\n punished throughout all generations? Is there any consistency, or\n harmony, in such views respecting the government of the world?\n\n 174 Wiggers\u2019s Presentation, note by translator, p. 285.\n\n 175 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii.\n\n 176 Institutes, book ii, ch. i.\n\n 177 Divine Attributes.\n\n 178 Sermon on Original Sin.\n\n 179 Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.\n\n 180 Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.\n\n 181 Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, article ix.\n\n 182 Ibid.\n\n 183 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii.\n\n 184 See Knapp\u2019s Theology, vol. ii, art. ix, sec. 76; also Wiggers\u2019s\n Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap. xix, p. 268.\n\n 185 Harmonie de la Raison et de la Religion.\n\n 186 Ibid., Almeyda.\n\n 187 Wiggers\u2019s Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap. iv.\n\n 188 Sermon on Compassion.\n\n 189 Butler\u2019s Analogy, part i, chap. iii.\n\n 190 Analogy, chap. v.\n\n 191 Id., chap. v, p. 178.\n\n 192 Part i, chap. vi.\n\n 193 Part i, chap. ii.\n\n 194 This language of Bacon is applied by him to the empirical and\n rational faculties of the human mind.\n\n 195 Butler\u2019s Analogy, part ii, chap. v.\n\n 196 Analogy.\n\n 197 Ibid.\n\n 198 Letter on the Duration of Future Punishment, pp. 19, 20.\n\n 199 Letter, &c., pp. 15-18.\n\n 200 Robert Hall supposes that Edwards must have found it in Owen. He\n might have found it in a hundred earlier writers.\n\n 201 Wiggers\u2019s Presentation, p. 210\u2014Note by Translator.\n\n 202 Wiggers\u2019s Presentation, p. 210\u2014Note by Trans.\n\n 203 Freedom of the Will, p. 38.\n\n 204 Letter, pp. 21, 22.\n\n 205 Jeremy Bentham.\n\n 206 On one point we fully concur with Mr. Foster, (see Letter, p. 27:)\n \u201cAs to religious teachers, if this tremendous doctrine be true,\n surely it ought to be almost continually proclaimed as with the\n blast of a trumpet, inculcated and reiterated, with ardent passion,\n in every possible form of terrible illustration; no remission of the\n alarm to thoughtless spirits.\u201d\n\n But if it be so incumbent on religious teachers, who believe this\n awful tenet, thus to proclaim it to a perishing world, is it not\n equally incumbent on them not to speak on such a subject at all\n until they have taken the utmost pains to form a correct opinion\n concerning it? If the man who merely proclaims this doctrine in the\n usual quiet way of preachers, while he sees his fellow-men perishing\n around, is guilty of criminal neglect, what shall we say of the\n religious teacher who, without having devoted much time to the\n investigation of the subject, exerts his powers and his influence to\n persuade his fellow-men that it is all a delusion, and that the idea\n of endless misery is utterly inconsistent with the goodness of God?\n How many feeble outcries and warnings of those who are so terribly\n rebuked by Mr. Foster, may be silenced and forever laid to rest by\n his eloquent declamation against the doctrine in question, and how\n many souls may be thereby betrayed and led on to their own eternal\n ruin! Yet, wonderful as it may seem, Mr. Foster tells us that his\n opinion on this awful subject has not been the result of \u201ca\n protracted inquiry.\u201d In the very letter from which we have so\n frequently quoted, he says: \u201cI have perhaps been too content to let\n an opinion (or impression) admitted in early life dispense with\n protracted inquiry and various reading.\u201d Now, is this the way in\n which a question of this kind should be decided,\u2014a question which\n involves the eternal destiny of millions of human beings? Is it to\n be decided, not by protracted inquiry, but under the influence of an\n \u201cimpression admitted in early life?\u201d\n\n 207 Surely a very singular doctrine to be found in a prophecy.\n\n 208 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi.\n\n 209 Ibid.\n\n 210 Wiggers, ch. xvi.\n\n 211 Wiggers\u2019s Presentation, ch. xvi.\n\n 212 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi.\n\n 213 Hill\u2019s Divinity, p. 525.\n\n 214 Id., p. 526.\n\n 215 Hill\u2019s Divinity, p. 562.\n\n 216 Institutes of Theology.\n\n 217 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii.\n\n 218 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii.\n\n 219 Whewell\u2019s History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i.\n\n 220 Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 349.\n\n 221 Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 de la Controverse.\n\n 222 Ibid.\n\n 223 Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 de la Controverse.\n\n 224 Reflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes.\n\n 225 Analogy, part i, chap. vii.\n\n 226 Remarques sur Le Livre de M. King, sec. xvi.\n\n 227 Origin of Evil, vol. ii, ch. v, sec. v.\n\n 228 Dictionary, Article Paulicians.\n\n 229 It is not exactly just to rank Hall among the Arminians. His scheme\n of doctrine, if scheme it may be called, is, like that of so many\n others, a heterogeneous mixture of Calvinism and Arminianism\u2014a\n _mixture_, and not an _organic compound_, of the conflicting\n elements of the two systems.","title":"A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":143722}