{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_2801/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_2801","id":"gutenberg_2801","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2801","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - British","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Utopias -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"OCEANA\n\nBy James Harrington\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION TO OCEANA\n\nJAMES HARRINGTON, eldest son of Sir Sapcotes Harrington of Exton, in\nRutlandshire, was born in the reign of James I, in January, 1611, five\nyears before the death of Shakespeare. He was two or three years younger\nthan John Milton. His great-grandfather was Sir James Harrington, who\nmarried Lucy, daughter of Sir William Sidney, lived with her to their\ngolden wedding-day, and had eighteen children, through whom he counted\nhimself, before his death, patriarch in a family that in his own time\nproduced eight dukes, three marquises, seventy earls, twenty-seven\nviscounts, and thirty-six barons, sixteen of them all being Knights of\nthe Garter. James Harrington\u2019s ideal of a commonwealth was the design,\ntherefore, of a man in many ways connected with the chief nobility of\nEngland.\n\nSir Sapcotes Harrington married twice, and had by each of his wives two\nsons and two daughters. James Harrington was eldest son by the first\nmarriage, which was to Jane, daughter of Sir William Samuel of Upton, in\nNorthamptonshire. James Harrington\u2019s brother became a merchant; of his\nhalf-brothers, one went to sea, the other became a captain in the army.\n\nAs a child, James Harrington was studious, and so sedate that it was\nsaid playfully of him he rather kept his parents and teachers in awe\nthan needed correction; but in after-life his quick wit made him full of\nplayfulness in conversation. In 1629 he entered Trinity College, Oxford,\nas a gentleman commoner. There he had for tutor William Chillingworth,\na Fellow of the college, who after conversion to the Church of Rome had\nreasoned his way back into Protestant opinions. Chillingworth became a\nfamous champion of Protestantism in the question between the Churches,\nalthough many Protestants attacked him as unsound because he would not\naccept the Athanasian Creed and had some other reservations.\n\nHarrington prepared himself for foreign travel by study of modern\nlanguages, but before he went abroad, and while he was still under age,\nhis father died and he succeeded to his patrimony. The socage tenure of\nhis estate gave him free choice of his own guardian, and he chose his\nmother\u2019s mother, Lady Samuel.\n\nHe then began the season of travel which usually followed studies at the\nuniversity, a part of his training to which he had looked forward with\nespecial interest. He went first to Holland, which had been in Queen\nElizabeth\u2019s time the battle-ground of civil and religious liberty.\nBefore he left England he used to say he knew of monarchy, anarchy,\naristocracy, democracy, oligarchy, only as hard words to be looked for\nin a dictionary. But his interest in problems of government began to be\nawakened while he was among the Dutch. He served in the regiment of\nLord Craven, and afterward in that of Sir Robert Stone; was much at The\nHague; became familiar with the Court of the Prince of Orange, and with\nKing James\u2019s daughter, the Queen of Bohemia, who, with her husband the\nPrince Elector, was then a fugitive to Holland. Lord Harrington, who had\nonce acted as governor to the princess, and won her affection, was James\nHarrington\u2019s uncle, and she now cordially welcomed the young student of\nlife for his uncle\u2019s sake, and for his own pleasantness of outward wit\nand inward gravity of thought. Harrington was taken with him by the\nexiled and plundered Prince Elector, when he paid a visit to the Court\nof Denmark, and he was intrusted afterward with the chief care of the\nprince\u2019s affairs in England.\n\nFrom Holland, James Harrington passed through Flanders into France, and\nthence to Italy. When he came back to England, some courtiers who were\nwith him in Rome told Charles I that Harrington had been too squeamish\nat the Pope\u2019s consecration of wax lights, in refusing to obtain a light,\nas others did, by kissing his Holiness\u2019s toe. The King told Harrington\nthat he might have complied with a custom which only signified respect\nto a temporal prince. But his Majesty was satisfied with the reply, that\nhaving had the honor to kiss his Majesty\u2019s hand, he thought it beneath\nhim to kiss any other prince\u2019s foot.\n\nOf all places in Italy, Venice pleased Harrington best. He was deeply\ninterested in the Venetian form of government, and his observations\nbore fruit in many suggestions for the administration of the\nCommonwealth of Oceana.\n\nAfter his return to England, being of age, James Harrington cared\nactively for the interests of his younger brothers and sisters. It was\nhe who made his brother William a merchant. William Harrington throve,\nand for his ingenuity in matters of construction he was afterward made\none of the Fellows of the newly formed Royal Society. He took pains over\nthe training of his sisters, making no difference between sisters and\nhalf-sisters, and treating his step-mother as a mother. He filled\nhis home with loving-kindness, and was most liberal in giving help\nto friends. When he was told that he often threw away his bounty on\nungrateful persons, he playfully told his advisers they were mercenary\nand that he saw they sold their gifts, since they expected so great a\nreturn as gratitude.\n\nJames Harrington\u2019s bent was for the study of life, and he made no active\nsuit for court employment. But he went to court, where Charles I liked\nhim, and admitted him as one of his privy chamber extraordinary, in\nwhich character he went with the King in his first expedition against\nthe Scots.\n\nBecause Charles I knew him and liked him, and because he had shown\nhimself no partisan of either side in the civil war, though he was\nknown to be inclined, in the way of abstract opinion, toward a form of\ngovernment that was not monarchy, the commissioners appointed in 1646\nto bring Charles from Newcastle named Harrington as one of the King\u2019s\nattendants. The King was pleased, and Harrington was appointed a groom\nof the bedchamber at Holmby. He followed faithfully the fortunes of\nthe fallen King, never saying even to the King himself a word in\ncontradiction of his own principles of liberty, and finding nothing\nin his principles or in his temper that should prevent him from paying\nhonor to his sovereign, and seeking to secure for him a happy issue\nout of his afflictions. Antony \u00e0 Wood says that, \u201cHis Majesty loved\nHarrington\u2019s company, and, finding him to be an ingenious man, chose\nrather to converse with him than with others of his chamber: they had\noften discourses concerning government; but when they happened to talk\nof a commonwealth the King seemed not to endure it.\u201d\n\nHarrington used all the influence he had with those in whose power the\nKing was, to prevent the urging of avoidable questions that would stand\nin the way of such a treaty as they professed to seek during the King\u2019s\nimprisonment at Carisbrooke. Harrington\u2019s friendly interventions on the\nKing\u2019s behalf before the Parliament commissioners at Newport caused\nhim, indeed, to be suspected; and when the King was removed from\nCarisbrooke to Hurst Castle, Harrington was not allowed to remain in his\nservice. But afterward, when King Charles was being taken to Windsor,\nHarrington got leave to bid him farewell at the door of his carriage. As\nhe was about to kneel, the King took him by the hand and pulled him in.\nFor a few days he was left with the King, but an oath was required of\nhim that he would not assist in, or conceal knowledge of any attempt\nto procure, the King\u2019s escape. He would not take the oath; and was this\ntime not only dismissed from the King\u2019s service but himself imprisoned,\nuntil Ireton obtained his release. Before the King\u2019s death, Harrington\nfound his way to him again, and he was among those who were with Charles\nI upon the scaffold.\n\nAfter the King\u2019s execution, Harrington was for some time secluded in\nhis study. Monarchy was gone; some form of commonwealth was to be\nestablished; and he set to work upon the writing of \u201cOceana,\u201d calmly\nto show what form of government, since men were free to choose, to him\nseemed best.\n\nHe based his work on an opinion he had formed that the troubles of\nthe time were not due wholly to the intemperance of faction, the\nmisgovernment of a king, or the stubbornness of a people, but to\nchange in the balance of property; and he laid the foundations of his\ncommonwealth in the opinion that empire follows the balance of property.\nThen he showed the commonwealth of Oceana in action, with safeguards\nagainst future shiftings of that balance, and with a popular government\nin which all offices were filled by men chosen by ballot, who should\nhold office for a limited term. Thus there was to be a constant flow of\nnew blood through the political system, and the representative was to be\nkept true as a reflection of the public mind.\n\nThe Commonwealth of Oceana was England. Harrington called Scotland\nMarpesia; and Ireland, Panopea. London he called Emporium; the Thames,\nHalcionia; Westminster, Hiera; Westminster Hall, Pantheon. The Palace of\nSt. James was Alma; Hampton Court, Convallium; Windsor, Mount Celia. By\nHemisna, Harrington meant the river Trent. Past sovereigns of England\nhe renamed for Oceana: William the Conqueror became Turbo; King John,\nAdoxus; Richard II, Dicotome; Henry VII, Panurgus; Henry VIII, Coraunus;\nElizabeth, Parthenia; James I, Morpheus. He referred to Hobbes as\nLeviathan; and to Francis Bacon, as Verulamius. Oliver Cromwell he\nrenamed Olphaus Megaletor.\n\nHarrington\u2019s book was seized while printing, and carried to Whitehall.\nHarrington went to Cromwell\u2019s daughter, Lady Claypole, played with her\nthree-year-old child while waiting for her, and said to her, when she\ncame and found him with her little girl upon his lap, \u201cMadam, you have\ncome in the nick of time, for I was just about to steal this pretty\nlady.\u201d \u201cWhy should you?\u201d \u201cWhy shouldn\u2019t I, unless you cause your father\nto restore a child of mine that he has stolen?\u201d It was only, he said,\na kind of political romance; so far from any treason against her father\nthat he hoped she would let him know it was to be dedicated to him. So\nthe book was restored; and it was published in the time of Cromwell\u2019s\nCommonwealth, in the year 1656.\n\nThis treatise, which had its origin in the most direct pressure of the\nproblem of government upon the minds of men continues the course of\nthought on which Machiavelli\u2019s \u201cPrince\u201d had formed one famous station,\nand Hobbes\u2019s \u201cLeviathan,\u201d another.\n\n\u201cOceana,\u201d when published, was widely read and actively attacked. One\nopponent of its doctrines was Dr. Henry Ferne, afterward Bishop of\nChester. Another was Matthew Wren, eldest son to the Bishop of Ely.\nHe was one of those who met for scientific research at the house of Dr.\nWilkins, and had, said Harrington, \u201can excellent faculty of magnifying\na louse and diminishing a commonwealth.\u201d\n\nIn 1659, Harrington published an abridgment of his Oceana as \u201cThe Art of\nLawgiving,\u201d in three books. Other pieces followed, in which he\ndefended or developed his opinions. He again urged them when Cromwell\u2019s\nCommonwealth was in its death-throes. Then he fell back upon argument\nat nightly meetings of a Rota Club which met in the New Palace Yard,\nWestminster. Milton\u2019s old pupil, Cyriac Skinner, was one of its members;\nand its elections were by ballot, with rotation in the tenure of all\noffices. The club was put an end to at the Restoration, when Harrington\nretired to his study and amused himself by putting his \u201cSystem of\nPolitics\u201d into the form of \u201cAphorisms.\u201d\n\nOn December 28, 1661, James Harrington, then fifty years old, was\narrested and carried to the Tower as a traitor. His Aphorisms were on\nhis desk, and as they also were to be carried off, he asked only that\nthey might first be stitched together in their proper order. Why he was\narrested, he was not told. One of his sisters pleaded in vain to the\nKing. He was falsely accused of complicity in an imaginary plot, of\nwhich nothing could be made by its investigators. No heed was paid\nto the frank denials of a man of the sincerest nature, who never had\nconcealed his thoughts or actions. \u201cWhy,\u201d he was asked, at his first\nexamination by Lord Lauderdale, who was one of his kinsmen, \u201cwhy did\nhe, as a private man, meddle with politics? What had a private man to\ndo with government?\u201d His answer was: \u201cMy lord, there is not any public\nperson, nor any magistrate, that has written on politics, worth a\nbutton. All they that have been excellent in this way have been private\nmen, as private men, my lord, as myself. There is Plato, there is\nAristotle, there is Livy, there is Machiavel. My lord, I can sum up\nAristotle\u2019s \u2018Politics\u2019 in a very few words: he says, there is the\nBarbarous Monarchy--such a one where the people have no votes in making\nthe laws; he says, there is the Heroic Monarchy--such a one where the\npeople have their votes in making the laws; and then, he says, there is\nDemocracy, and affirms that a man cannot be said to have liberty but in\na democracy only.\u201d Lord Lauderdale here showing impatience, Harrington\nadded: \u201cI say Aristotle says so. I have not said so much. And under what\nprince was it? Was it not under Alexander, the greatest prince then in\nthe world? I beseech you, my lord, did Alexander hang up Aristotle? did\nhe molest him? Livy, for a commonwealth, is one of the fullest authors;\ndid not he write under Augustus Caesar? Did Caesar hang up Livy? did\nhe molest him? Machiavel, what a commonwealthsman was he! but he wrote\nunder the Medici when they were princes in Florence: did they hang up\nMachiavel, or did they molest him? I have done no otherwise than as the\ngreatest politicians: the King will do no otherwise than as the greatest\nprinces.\u201d\n\nThat was too much to hope, even in a dream, of the low-minded Charles\nII. Harrington could not obtain even the show of justice in a public\ntrial. He was kept five months an untried prisoner in the Tower, only\nsheltered from daily brutalities by bribe to the lieutenant. When his\nhabeas corpus had been moved for, it was at first flatly refused; and\nwhen it had been granted, Harrington was smuggled away from the Tower\nbetween one and two o\u2019clock in the morning, and carried on board a ship\nthat took him to closer imprisonment on St. Nicholas Island, opposite\nPlymouth. There his health suffered seriously, and his family obtained\nhis removal to imprisonment in Plymouth by giving a bond of \u00a35,000\nas sureties against his escape. In Plymouth, Harrington suffered from\nscurvy, and at last he became insane.\n\nWhen he had been made a complete wreck in body and in mind, his gracious\nMajesty restored Harrington to his family. He never recovered health,\nbut still occupied himself much with his pen, writing, among other\nthings, a serious argument to prove that they were themselves mad who\nthought him so.\n\nIn those last days of his shattered life James Harrington married an old\nfriend of the family, a witty lady, daughter of Sir Marmaduke Dorrell,\nof Buckinghamshire. Gout was added to his troubles; then he was\npalsied; and he died at Westminster, at the age of sixty-six, on\nSeptember 11, 1677. He was buried in St. Margaret\u2019s Church, by the grave\nof Sir Walter Raleigh, on the south side of the altar.\n\nH. M.\n\n\n\n\n\nOCEANA\n\n\n\n\nPART I. THE PRELIMINARIES\n\nShowing the Principles of Government\n\nJANOTTI, the most excellent describer of the Commonwealth of Venice,\ndivides the whole series of government into two times or periods: the\none ending with the liberty of Rome, which was the course or empire, as\nI may call it, of ancient prudence, first discovered to mankind by\nGod himself in the fabric of the commonwealth of Israel, and afterward\npicked out of his footsteps in nature, and unanimously followed by the\nGreeks and Romans; the other beginning with the arms of Caesar, which,\nextinguishing liberty, were the transition of ancient into modern\nprudence, introduced by those inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals,\nLombards, Saxons, which, breaking the Roman Empire, deformed the whole\nface of the world with those ill-features of government, which at this\ntime are become far worse in these western parts, except Venice, which,\nescaping the hands of the barbarians by virtue of its impregnable\nsituation, has had its eye fixed upon ancient prudence, and is attained\nto a perfection even beyond the copy.\n\nRelation being had to these two times, government (to define it de jure,\nor according to ancient prudence) is an art whereby a civil society of\nmen is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right or\ninterest; or, to follow Aristotle and Livy, it is the empire of laws,\nand not of men.\n\nAnd government (to define it de facto, or according to modern prudence)\nis an art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a city or a nation,\nand rule it according to his or their private interest; which, because\nthe laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or\nof some few families, may be said to be the empire of men, and not of\nlaws.\n\nThe former kind is that which Machiavel (whose books are neglected) is\nthe only politician that has gone about to retrieve; and that Leviathan\n(who would have his book imposed upon the universities) goes about to\ndestroy. For \u201cit is,\u201d says he, \u201canother error of Aristotle\u2019s politics\nthat in a well-ordered commonwealth, not men should govern, but the\nlaws. What man that has his natural senses, though he can neither write\nnor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes\ncan kill or hurt him when he obeys not? or, who believes that the law\ncan hurt him, which is but words and paper, without the hands and swords\nof men?\u201d I confess that the magistrate upon his bench is that to the\nlaw which a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon. Nevertheless, I\nshould not dare to argue with a man of any ingenuity after this manner.\nA whole army, though they can neither write nor read, are not afraid\nof a platform, which they know is but earth or stone; nor of a cannon,\nwhich, without a hand to give fire to it, is but cold iron; therefore a\nwhole army is afraid of one man. But of this kind is the ratiocination\nof Leviathan, as I shall show in divers places that come in my way,\nthroughout his whole politics, or worse; as where he says, \u201cof Aristotle\nand of Cicero, of the Greeks, and of the Romans, who lived under popular\nStates, that they derived those rights, not from the principles of\nnature, but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of\ntheir own commonwealths, as grammarians describe the rules of language\nout of poets.\u201d Which is as if a man should tell famous Harvey that he\ntranscribed his circulation of the blood, not out of the principles of\nnature, but out of the anatomy of this or that body.\n\nTo go on therefore with his preliminary discourse, I shall divide it,\naccording to the two definitions of government relating to Janotti\u2019s two\ntimes, in two parts: the first, treating of the principles of government\nin general, and according to the ancients; the second, treating of\nthe late governments of Oceana in particular, and in that of modern\nprudence.\n\nGovernment, according to the ancients, and their learned disciple\nMachiavel, the only politician of later ages, is of three kinds: the\ngovernment of one man, or of the better sort, or of the whole people;\nwhich, by their more learned names, are called monarchy, aristocracy,\nand democracy. These they hold, through their proneness to degenerate,\nto be all evil. For whereas they that govern should govern according\nto reason, if they govern according to passion they do that which they\nshould not do. Wherefore, as reason and passion are two things, so\ngovernment by reason is one thing, and the corruption of government by\npassion is another thing, but not always another government: as a body\nthat is alive is one thing, and a body that is dead is another thing,\nbut not always another creature, though the corruption of one comes at\nlength to be the generation of another. The corruption then of monarchy\nis called tyranny; that of aristocracy, oligarchy and that of democracy,\nanarchy. But legislators, having found these three governments at the\nbest to be naught, have invented another, consisting of a mixture of\nthem all, which only is good. This is the doctrine of the ancients.\n\nBut Leviathan is positive that they are all deceived, and that there is\nno other government in nature than one of the three; as also that the\nflesh of them cannot stink, the names of their corruptions being but the\nnames of men\u2019s fancies, which will be understood when we are shown which\nof them was Senatus Populusque Romanus.\n\nTo go my own way, and yet to follow the ancients, the principles\nof government are twofold: internal, or the goods of the mind; and\nexternal, or the goods of fortune. The goods of the mind are natural or\nacquired virtues, as wisdom, prudence, and courage, etc. The goods of\nfortune are riches. There be goods also of the body, as health, beauty,\nstrength; but these are not to be brought into account upon this score,\nbecause if a man or an army acquires victory or empire, it is more from\ntheir discipline, arms, and courage than from their natural health,\nbeauty, or strength, in regard that a people conquered may have more of\nnatural strength, beauty, and health, and yet find little remedy. The\nprinciples of government then are in the goods of the mind, or in the\ngoods of fortune. To the goods of the mind answers authority; to the\ngoods of fortune, power or empire. Wherefore Leviathan, though he be\nright where he says that \u201criches are power,\u201d is mistaken where he\nsays that \u201cprudence, or the reputation of prudence, is power;\u201d for the\nlearning or prudence of a man is no more power than the learning or\nprudence of a book or author, which is properly authority. A learned\nwriter may have authority though he has no power; and a foolish\nmagistrate may have power, though he has otherwise no esteem or\nauthority. The difference of these two is observed by Livy in Evander,\nof whom he says that he governed rather by the authority of others than\nby his own power.\n\nTo begin with riches, in regard that men are hung upon these, not of\nchoice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the teeth; forasmuch\nas he who wants bread is his servant that will feed him, if a man thus\nfeeds a whole people, they are under his empire.\n\nEmpire is of two kinds, domestic and national, or foreign and\nprovincial.\n\nDomestic empire is founded upon dominion. Dominion is property, real or\npersonal; that is to say, in lands, or in money and goods.\n\nLands, or the parts and parcels of a territory, are held by the\nproprietor or proprietors, lord or lords of it, in some proportion;\nand such (except it be in a city that has little or no land, and whose\nrevenue is in trade) as is the proportion or balance of dominion or\nproperty in land, such is the nature of the empire.\n\nIf one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the people,\nfor example, three parts in four, he is grand seignior; for so the Turk\nis called from his property, and his empire is absolute monarchy.\n\nIf the few or a nobility, or a nobility with the clergy, be landlords,\nor overbalance the people to the like proportion, it makes the Gothic\nbalance (to be shown at large in the second part of this discourse),\nand the empire is mixed monarchy, as that of Spain, Poland, and late of\nOceana.\n\nAnd if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so divided among\nthem that no one man, or number of men, within the compass of the few or\naristocracy, overbalance them, the empire (without the interposition of\nforce) is a commonwealth.\n\nIf force be interposed in any of these three cases, it must either frame\nthe government to the foundation, or the foundation to the government;\nor holding the government not according to the balance, it is not\nnatural, but violent; and therefore if it be at the devotion of a\nprince, it is tyranny; if at the devotion of the few, oligarchy; or\nif in the power of the people, anarchy: Each of which confusions, the\nbalance standing otherwise, is but of short continuance, because against\nthe nature of the balance, which, not destroyed, destroys that which\nopposes it.\n\nBut there be certain other confusions, which, being rooted in the\nbalance, are of longer continuance, and of worse consequence; as, first,\nwhere a nobility holds half the property, or about that proportion, and\nthe people the other half; in which case, without altering the balance\nthere is no remedy but the one must eat out the other, as the people did\nthe nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in Rome. Secondly,\nwhen a prince holds about half the dominion, and the people the other\nhalf (which was the case of the Roman emperors, planted partly upon\ntheir military colonies and partly upon the Senate and the people), the\ngovernment becomes a very shambles, both of the princes and the people.\nSomewhat of this nature are certain governments at this day, which are\nsaid to subsist by confusion. In this case, to fix the balance is to\nentail misery; but in the three former, not to fix it is to lose the\ngovernment. Wherefore it being unlawful in Turkey that any should\npossess land but the Grand Seignior, the balance is fixed by the law,\nand that empire firm. Nor, though the kings often sell was the throne\nof Oceana known to shake, until the statute of alienations broke the\npillars, by giving way to the nobility to sell their estates. While\nLacedaemon held to the division of land made by Lycurgus, it was\nimmovable; but, breaking that, could stand no longer. This kind of law\nfixing the balance in lands is called agrarian, and was first introduced\nby God himself, who divided the land of Canaan to his people by lots,\nand is of such virtue that wherever it has held, that government has\nnot altered, except by consent; as in that unparalleled example of the\npeople of Israel, when being in liberty they would needs choose a\nking. But without an agrarian law, government, whether monarchical,\naristocratical, or popular, has no long lease.\n\nAs for dominion, personal or in money, it may now and then stir up a\nMelius or a Manlius, which, if the Commonwealth be not provided with\nsome kind of dictatorian power, may be dangerous, though it has been\nseldom or never successful; because to property producing empire, it\nis required that it should have some certain root or foothold, which,\nexcept in land, it cannot have, being otherwise as it were upon the\nwing.\n\nNevertheless, in such cities as subsist mostly by trade, and have little\nor no land, as Holland and Genoa, the balance of treasure may be equal\nto that of land in the cases mentioned.\n\nBut Leviathan, though he seems to skew at antiquity, following his\nfurious master Carneades, has caught hold of the public sword, to which\nhe reduces all manner and matter of government; as, where he affirms\nthis opinion (that any monarch receives his power by covenant; that is\nto say, upon conditions) \u201cto proceed from the not understanding this\neasy truth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no power to\noblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what they have from\nthe public sword.\u201d But as he said of the law, that without this sword\nit is but paper, so he might have thought of this sword, that without a\nhand it is but cold iron. The hand which holds this sword is the militia\nof a nation; and the militia of a nation is either an army in the field,\nor ready for the field upon occasion. But an army is a beast that has a\ngreat belly, and must be fed: wherefore this will come to what pastures\nyou have, and what pastures you have will come to the balance of\nproperty, without which the public sword is but a name or mere spitfrog.\nWherefore, to set that which Leviathan says of arms and of contracts a\nlittle straighter, he that can graze this beast with the great belly,\nas the Turk does his Timariots, may well deride him that imagines he\nreceived his power by covenant, or is obliged to any such toy. It being\nin this case only that covenants are but words and breath. But if the\nproperty of the nobility, stocked with their tenants and retainers, be\nthe pasture of that beast, the ox knows his master\u2019s crib; and it is\nimpossible for a king in such a constitution to reign otherwise than by\ncovenant; or if he break it, it is words that come to blows.\n\n\u201cBut,\u201d says he, \u201cwhen an assembly of men is made sovereign, then no man\nimagines any such covenant to have part in the institution.\u201d But what\nwas that by Publicola of appeal to the people, or that whereby the\npeople had their tribunes? \u201cFie,\u201d says he, \u201cnobody is so dull as to say\nthat the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to hold the\nsovereignty on such or such conditions, which, not performed, the Romans\nmight depose the Roman people.\u201d In which there be several remarkable\nthings; for he holds the Commonwealth of Rome to have consisted of one\nassembly, whereas it consisted of the Senate and the people; that they\nwere not upon covenant, whereas every law enacted by them was a covenant\nbetween them; that the one assembly was made sovereign, whereas the\npeople, who only were sovereign, were such from the beginning, as\nappears by the ancient style of their covenants or laws--\u201cThe Senate has\nresolved, the people have decreed,\u201d that a council being made sovereign,\ncannot be made such upon conditions, whereas the Decemvirs being a\ncouncil that was made sovereign, was made such upon conditions; that all\nconditions or covenants making a sovereign being made, are void; whence\nit must follow that, the Decemviri being made, were ever after the\nlawful government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the Commonwealth\nof Rome to depose the Decemvirs; as also that Cicero, if he wrote\notherwise out of his commonwealth, did not write out of nature. But to\ncome to others that see more of this balance.\n\nYou have Aristotle full of it in divers places, especially where he\nsays, that \u201cimmoderate wealth, as where one man or the few have greater\npossessions than the equality or the frame of the commonwealth will\nbear, is an occasion of sedition, which ends for the greater part in\nmonarchy and that for this cause the ostracism has been received in\ndivers places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better to\nprevent the growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to seek\nthe remedy of such an evil.\u201d\n\nMachiavel has missed it very narrowly and more dangerously for not fully\nperceiving that if a commonwealth be galled by the gentry it is by their\noverbalance, he speaks of the gentry as hostile to popular governments,\nand of popular governments as hostile to the gentry; and makes us\nbelieve that the people in such are so enraged against them, that where\nthey meet a gentleman they kill him: which can never be proved by any\none example, unless in civil war, seeing that even in Switzerland the\ngentry are not only safe, but in honor. But the balance, as I have laid\nit down, though unseen by Machiavel, is that which interprets him, and\nthat which he confirms by his judgment in many others as well as in\nthis place, where he concludes, \u201cThat he who will go about to make a\ncommonwealth where there be many gentlemen, unless he first destroys\nthem, undertakes an impossibility. And that he who goes about to\nintroduce monarchy where the condition of the people is equal, shall\nnever bring it to pass, unless he cull out such of them as are the most\nturbulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemen or noblemen, not in\nname but in effect; that is, by enriching them with lands, castles, and\ntreasures, that may gain them power among the rest, and bring in the\nrest to dependence upon themselves, to the end that, they maintaining\ntheir ambition by the prince, the prince may maintain his power by\nthem.\u201d\n\nWherefore, as in this place I agree with Machiavel, that a nobility\nor gentry, overbalancing a popular government, is the utter bane and\ndestruction of it; so I shall show in another, that a nobility or\ngentry, in a popular government, not overbalancing it, is the very life\nand soul of it.\n\nBy what has been said, it should seem that we may lay aside further\ndisputes of the public sword, or of the right of the militia; which, be\nthe government what it will, or let it change how it can, is inseparable\nfrom the overbalance in dominion: nor, if otherwise stated by the law\nor custom (as in the Commonwealth of Rome, where the people having the\nsword, the nobility came to have the overbalance), avails it to\nany other end than destruction. For as a building swaying from the\nfoundation must fall, so it fares with the law swaying from reason, and\nthe militia from the balance of dominion. And thus much for the balance\nof national or domestic empire, which is in dominion.\n\nThe balance of foreign or provincial empire is of a contrary nature. A\nman may as well say that it is unlawful for him who has made a fair and\nhonest purchase to have tenants, as for a government that has made a\njust progress and enlargement of itself to have provinces. But how a\nprovince may be justly acquired appertains to another place. In this\nI am to show no more than how or upon what kind of balance it is to be\nheld; in order whereto I shall first show upon what kind of balance\nit is not to be held. It has been said, that national or independent\nempire, of what kind soever, is to be exercised by them that have\nthe proper balance of dominion in the nation; wherefore provincial or\ndependent empire is not to be exercised by them that have the balance of\ndominion in the province, because that would bring the government\nfrom provincial and dependent, to national and independent. Absolute\nmonarchy, as that of the Turks, neither plants its people at home nor\nabroad, otherwise than as tenants for life or at will; wherefore its\nnational and provincial government is all one. But in governments that\nadmit the citizen or subject to dominion in lands, the richest are they\nthat share most of the power at home; whereas the richest among\nthe provincials, though native subjects, or citizens that have been\ntransplanted, are least admitted to the government abroad; for men, like\nflowers or roots being transplanted, take after the soil wherein they\ngrow. Wherefore the Commonwealth of Rome, by planting colonies of its\ncitizens within the bounds of Italy, took the best way of propagating\nitself, and naturalizing the country; whereas if it had planted such\ncolonies without the bounds of Italy it would have alienated the\ncitizens, and given a root to liberty abroad, that might have sprung up\nforeign or savage, and hostile to her: wherefore it never made any such\ndispersion of itself and its strength, till it was under the yoke of\nthe Emperors, who, disburdening themselves of the people, as having less\napprehension of what they could do abroad than at home, took a contrary\ncourse.\n\nThe Mamelukes (which, till any man show me the contrary, I shall presume\nto have been a commonwealth consisting of an army, whereof the common\nsoldier was the people, the commissioned officer the Senate, and the\ngeneral the prince) were foreigners, and by nation Circassians, that\ngoverned Egypt; wherefore these never durst plant themselves upon\ndominion, which growing naturally up into the national interest, must\nhave dissolved the foreign yoke in that province.\n\nThe like in some sort may be said of Venice, the government whereof is\nusually mistaken; for Venice, though it does not take in the people,\nnever excluded them. This commonwealth, the orders whereof are the\nmost democratical or popular of all others, in regard of the exquisite\nrotation of the Senate, at the first institution took in the whole\npeople; they that now live under the government without participation of\nit, are such as have since either voluntarily chosen so to do, or\nwere subdued by arms. Wherefore the subject of Venice is governed by\nprovinces, and the balance of dominion not standing, as has been said,\nwith provincial government; as the Mamelukes durst not cast their\ngovernment upon this balance in their provinces, lest the national\ninterest should have rooted out the foreign, so neither dare the\nVenetians take in their subjects upon this balance, lest the foreign\ninterest should root out the national (which is that of the 3,000\nnow governing), and by diffusing the commonwealth throughout her\nterritories, lose the advantage of her situation, by which in great\npart it subsists. And such also is the government of the Spaniard in the\nIndies, to which he deputes natives of his own country, not admitting\nthe creoles to the government of those provinces, though descended from\nSpaniards.\n\nBut if a prince or a commonwealth may hold a territory that is foreign\nin this, it may be asked why he may not hold one that is native in\nthe like manner? To which I answer, because he can hold a foreign by a\nnative territory, but not a native by a foreign; and as hitherto I\nhave shown what is not the provincial balance, so by this answer it may\nappear what it is, namely, the overbalance of a native territory to\na foreign; for as one country balances itself by the distribution\nof property according to the proportion of the same, so one country\noverbalances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the\nCommonwealth of Rome overbalanced her provinces by the vigor of a\nmore excellent government opposed to a crazier. Or by a more exquisite\nmilitia opposed to one inferior in courage or discipline. The like was\nthat of the Mamelukes, being a hardy people, to the Egyptians, that were\na soft one. And the balance of situation is in this kind of wonderful\neffect; seeing the King of Denmark, being none of the most potent\nprinces, is able at the Sound to take toll of the greatest; and as\nthis King, by the advantage of the land, can make the sea tributary, so\nVenice, by the advantage of the sea, in whose arms she is impregnable,\ncan make the land to feed her gulf. For the colonies in the Indies,\nthey are yet babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their\nmother cities, but such as I mistake if when they come of age they do\nnot wean themselves; which causes me to wonder at princes that delight\nto be exhausted in that way. And so much for the principles of power,\nwhether national or provincial, domestic or foreign; being such as are\nexternal, and founded in the goods of fortune.\n\nI come to the principles of authority, which are internal, and founded\nupon the goods of the mind. These the legislator that can unite in his\ngovernment with those of fortune, comes nearest to the work of God,\nwhose government consists of heaven and earth; which was said by Plato,\nthough in different words, as, when princes should be philosophers, or\nphilosophers princes, the world would be happy. And says Solomon: \u201cThere\nis an evil which I have seen under the sun, which proceeds from the\nruler (enimvero neque nobilem, neque ingenuum, nec libertinum quidem\narmis praeponere, regia utilitas est). Folly is set in great dignity,\nand the rich (either in virtue and wisdom, in the goods of the mind,\nor those of fortune upon that balance which gives them a sense of the\nnational interest) sit in low places. I have seen servants upon horses,\nand princes walking as servants upon the earth.\u201d Sad complaints, that\nthe principles of power and of authority, the goods of the mind and\nof fortune, do not meet and twine in the wreath or crown of empire!\nWherefore, if we have anything of piety or of prudence, let us raise\nourselves out of the mire of private interest to the contemplation of\nvirtue, and put a hand to the removal of \u201cthis evil from under the sun;\u201d\n this evil against which no government that is not secured can be good;\nthis evil from which the government that is secure must be perfect.\nSolomon tells us that the cause of it is from the ruler, from those\nprinciples of power, which, balanced upon earthly trash, exclude the\nheavenly treasures of virtue, and that influence of it upon government\nwhich is authority. We have wandered the earth to find out the balance\nof power; but to find out that of authority we must ascend, as I said,\nnearer heaven, or to the image of God, which is the soul of man.\n\nThe soul of man (whose life or motion is perpetual contemplation or\nthought) is the mistress of two potent rivals, the one reason, the other\npassion, that are in continual suit; and, according as she gives up her\nwill to these or either of them, is the felicity or misery which man\npartakes in this mortal life.\n\nFor, as whatever was passion in the contemplation of a man, being\nbrought forth by his will into action, is vice and the bondage of sin;\nso whatever was reason in the contemplation of a man, being brought\nforth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of soul.\n\nAgain, as those actions of a man that were sin acquire to himself\nrepentance or shame, and affect others with scorn or pity, so those\nactions of a man that are virtue acquire to himself honor, and upon\nothers authority.\n\nNow government is no other than the soul of a nation or city: wherefore\nthat which was reason in the debate of a commonwealth being brought\nforth by the result, must be virtue; and forasmuch as the soul of a\ncity or nation is the sovereign power, her virtue must be law. But the\ngovernment whose law is virtue, and whose virtue is law, is the same\nwhose empire is authority, and whose authority is empire.\n\nAgain, if the liberty of a man consists in the empire of his reason, the\nabsence whereof would betray him to the bondage of his passions, then\nthe liberty of a commonwealth consists in the empire of her laws, the\nabsence whereof would betray her to the lust of tyrants. And these I\nconceive to be the principles upon which Aristotle and Livy (injuriously\naccused by Leviathan for not writing out of nature) have grounded their\nassertion, \u201cthat a commonwealth is an empire of laws and not of men.\u201d\n But they must not carry it so. \u201cFor,\u201d says he, \u201cthe liberty whereof\nthere is so frequent and honorable mention in the histories and\nphilosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and the writings and\ndiscourses of those that from them have received all their learning in\nthe politics, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty\nof the commonwealth.\u201d He might as well have said that the estates of\nparticular men in a commonwealth are not the riches of particular men,\nbut the riches of the commonwealth; for equality of estates causes\nequality of power, and equality of power is the liberty, not only of the\ncommonwealth, but of every man.\n\nBut sure a man would never be thus irreverent with the greatest authors,\nand positive against all antiquity without some certain demonstration of\ntruth--and what is it? Why, \u201cthere is written on the turrets of the city\nof Lucca in great characters at this day the word LIBERTAS; yet no man\ncan thence infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from\nthe service of the commonwealth there than in Constantinople. Whether\na commonwealth be monarchical or popular the freedom is the same.\u201d The\nmountain has brought forth, and we have a little equivocation! For to\nsay that a Lucchese has no more liberty or immunity from the laws of\nLucca than a Turk has from those of Constantinople; and to say that a\nLucchese has no more liberty or immunity by the laws of Lucca, than a\nTurk has by those of Constantinople, are pretty different speeches. The\nfirst may be said of all governments alike; the second scarce of any\ntwo; much less of these, seeing it is known that, whereas the greatest\nBashaw is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will\nof his lord, the meanest Lucchese that has land is a freeholder of\nboth, and not to be controlled but by the law, and that framed by every\nprivate man to no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to\nprotect the liberty of every private man, which by that means comes to\nbe the liberty of the commonwealth.\n\nBut seeing they that make the laws in commonwealths are but men, the\nmain question seems to be, how a commonwealth comes to be an empire of\nlaws, and not of men? or how the debate or result of a commonwealth is\nso sure to be according to reason; seeing they who debate, and they who\nresolve, be but men? \u201cAnd as often as reason is against a man, so often\nwill a man be against reason.\u201d\n\nThis is thought to be a shrewd saying, but will do no harm; for be it so\nthat reason is nothing but interest, there be divers interests, and so\ndivers reasons.\n\nAs first, there is private reason, which is the interest of a private\nman.\n\nSecondly, there is reason of state, which is the interest (or error,\nas was said by Solomon) of the ruler or rulers, that is to say, of the\nprince, of the nobility, or of the people.\n\nThirdly there is that reason, which is the interest of mankind, or of\nthe whole. \u201cNow if we see even in those natural agents that want sense,\nthat as in themselves they have a law which directs them in the means\nwhereby they tend to their own perfection, so likewise that another law\nthere is, which touches them as they are sociable parts united into one\nbody, a law which binds them each to serve to others\u2019 good, and all to\nprefer the good of the whole, before whatsoever their own particular; as\nwhen stones, or heavy things, forsake their ordinary wont or centre,\nand fly upward, as if they heard themselves commanded to let go the good\nthey privately wish, and to relieve the present distress of nature in\ncommon.\u201d There is a common right, law of nature, or interest of the\nwhole, which is more excellent, and so acknowledged to be by the agents\nthemselves, than the right or interest of the parts only. \u201cWherefore,\nthough it may be truly said that the creatures are naturally carried\nforth to their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken\nin too general a sense; seeing divers of them abstain from their own\nprofit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their\nyoung.\u201d\n\nMankind then must either be less just than the creature, or acknowledge\nalso his common interest to be common right. And if reason be nothing\nelse but interest, and the interest of mankind be the right interest,\nthen the reason of mankind must be right reason. Now compute well; for\nif the interest of popular government come the nearest to the interest\nof mankind, then the reason of popular government must come the nearest\nto right reason.\n\nBut it may be said that the difficulty remains yet; for be the interest\nof popular government right reason, a man does not look upon reason as\nit is right or wrong in itself, but as it makes for him or against him.\nWherefore, unless you can show such orders of a government as, like\nthose of God in nature, shall be able to constrain this or that creature\nto shake off that inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up\nthat which regards the common good or interest, all this is to no more\nend than to persuade every man in a popular government not to carve\nhimself of that which he desires most, but to be mannerly at the\npublic table, and give the best from himself to decency and the common\ninterest. But that such orders may be established as may, nay must, give\nthe upper hand in all cases to common right or interest, notwithstanding\nthe nearness of that which sticks to every man in private, and this in\na way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to girls, being no\nother than those that are of common practice with them in divers cases.\nFor example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given\nbetween them: that each of them therefore might have that which is due,\n\u201cDivide,\u201d says one to the other, \u201cand I will choose; or let me divide,\nand you shall choose.\u201d If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough;\nfor the divident, dividing unequally, loses, in regard that the other\ntakes the better half. Wherefore she divides equally, and so both have\nright. \u201cOh, the depth of the wisdom of God.\u201d And yet \u201cby the mouths of\nbabes and sucklings has He set forth His strength;\u201d that which great\nphilosophers are disputing upon in vain is brought to light by two\nharmless girls, even the whole mystery of a commonwealth, which lies\nonly in dividing and choosing. Nor has God (if his works in nature be\nunderstood) left so much to mankind to dispute upon as who shall divide\nand who choose, but distributed them forever into two orders, whereof\nthe one has the natural right of dividing, and the other of choosing.\n\nFor example: A commonwealth is but a civil society of men: let us take\nany number of men (as twenty) and immediately make a commonwealth.\nTwenty men (if they be not all idiots, perhaps if they be) can never\ncome so together but there will be such a difference in them that about\na third will be wiser, or at least less foolish than all the rest; these\nupon acquaintance, though it be but small, will be discovered, and, as\nstags that have the largest heads, lead the herd; for while the six,\ndiscoursing and arguing one with another, show the eminence of their\nparts, the fourteen discover things that they never thought on; or are\ncleared in divers truths which had formerly perplexed them. Wherefore,\nin matter of common concernment, difficulty, or danger, they hang upon\ntheir lips, as children upon their fathers; and the influence thus\nacquired by the six, the eminence of whose parts are found to be a stay\nand comfort to the fourteen, is the authority of the fathers. Wherefore\nthis can be no other than a natural aristocracy diffused by God\nthroughout the whole body of mankind to this end and purpose; and\ntherefore such as the people have not only a natural but a positive\nobligation to make use of as their guides; as where the people of Israel\nare commanded to \u201ctake wise men, and understanding, and known among\ntheir tribes, to be made rulers over them.\u201d The six then approved of,\nas in the present case, are the senate, not by hereditary right, or in\nregard of the greatness of their estates only, which would tend to\nsuch power as might force or draw the people, but by election for their\nexcellent parts, which tends to the advancement of the influence of\ntheir virtue or authority that leads the people. Wherefore the office of\nthe senate is not to be commanders, but counsellors, of the people; and\nthat which is proper to counsellors is first to debate, and afterward\nto give advice in the business whereupon they have debated, whence the\ndecrees of the senate are never laws, nor so called; and these being\nmaturely framed, it is their duty to propose in the case to the people.\nWherefore the senate is no more than the debate of the commonwealth. But\nto debate is to discern or put a difference between things that, being\nalike, are not the same; or it is separating and weighing this reason\nagainst that, and that reason against this, which is dividing.\n\nThe senate then having divided, who shall choose? Ask the girls: for if\nshe that divided must have chosen also, it had been little worse for\nthe other in case she had not divided at all, but kept the whole cake to\nherself, in regard that being to choose, too, she divided accordingly.\nWherefore if the senate have any further power than to divide, the\ncommonwealth can never be equal. But in a commonwealth consisting of\na single council, there is no other to choose than that which divided;\nwhence it is, that such a council fails not to scramble--that is, to\nbe factious, there being no other dividing of the cake in that case but\namong themselves.\n\nNor is there any remedy but to have another council to choose. The\nwisdom of the few may be the light of mankind; but the interest of\nthe few is not the profit of mankind nor of a commonwealth. Wherefore,\nseeing we have granted interest to be reason, they must not choose lest\nit put out their light. But as the council dividing consists of the\nwisdom of the commonwealth, so the assembly or council choosing should\nconsist of the interest of the commonwealth: as the wisdom of the\ncommonwealth is in the aristocracy, so the interest of the commonwealth\nis in the whole body of the people. And whereas this, in case the\ncommonwealth consist of a whole nation, is too unwieldy a body to be\nassembled, this council is to consist of such a representative as may be\nequal, and so constituted, as can never contract any other interest\nthan that of the whole people; the manner whereof, being such as is best\nshown by exemplification, I remit to the model. But in the present case,\nthe six dividing, and the fourteen choosing, must of necessity take in\nthe whole interest of the twenty.\n\nDividing and choosing, in the language of a commonwealth, is debating\nand resolving; and whatsoever, upon debate of the senate, is proposed\nto the people, and resolved by them, is enacted by the authority of the\nfathers, and by the power of the people, which concurring, make a law.\n\nBut the law being made, says Leviathan, \u201cis but words and paper without\nthe hands and swords of men;\u201d wherefore as these two orders of a\ncommonwealth, namely, the senate and the people, are legislative, so of\nnecessity there must be a third to be executive of the laws made, and\nthis is the magistracy. In which order, with the rest being wrought up\nby art, the commonwealth consists of \u201cthe senate proposing, the people\nresolving, and the magistracy executing,\u201d whereby partaking of the\naristocracy as in the senate, of the democracy as in the people, and of\nmonarchy as in the magistracy, it is complete. Now there being no other\ncommonwealth but this in art or nature, it is no wonder if Machiavel\nhas shown us that the ancients held this only to be good; but it seems\nstrange to me that they should hold that there could be any other, for\nif there be such a thing as pure monarchy, yet that there should be such\na one as pure aristocracy or pure democracy is not in my understanding.\nBut the magistracy, both in number and function, is different in\ndifferent commonwealths. Nevertheless there is one condition of it that\nmust be the same in every one, or it dissolves the commonwealth where it\nis wanting. And this is no less than that, as the hand of the magistrate\nis the executive power of the law, so the head of the magistrate is\nanswerable to the people, that his execution be according to the law; by\nwhich Leviathan may see that the hand or sword that executes the law is\nin it and not above it.\n\nNow whether I have rightly transcribed these principles of a\ncommonwealth out of nature, I shall appeal to God and to the world--to\nGod in the fabric of the Commonwealth of Israel, and to the world in\nthe universal series of ancient prudence. But in regard the same\ncommonwealths will be opened at large in the Council of legislators, I\nshall touch them for the present but slightly, beginning with that of\nIsrael.\n\nThe Commonwealth of Israel consisted of the Senate, the people, and the\nmagistracy.\n\nThe people by their first division, which was genealogical, were\ncontained under their thirteen tribes, houses, or families; whereof the\nfirst-born in each was prince of his tribe, and had the leading of it:\nthe tribe of Levi only, being set apart to serve at the altar, had no\nother prince but the high-priest. In their second division they were\ndivided locally by their agrarian, or the distribution of the land\nof Canaan to them by lot, the tithe of all remaining to Levi; whence,\naccording to their local division, the tribes are reckoned but twelve.\n\nThe assemblies of the people thus divided were methodically gathered by\ntrumpets to the congregation: which was, it should seem, of two sorts.\nFor if it were called with one trumpet only, the princes of the tribes\nand the elders only assembled; but if it were called with two, the whole\npeople gathered themselves to the congregation, for so it is rendered\nby the English; but in the Greek it is called Ecclesia, or the Church of\nGod, and by the Talmudist the great \u201cSynagogue.\u201d The word Ecclesia\nwas also anciently and properly used for the civil congregations, or\nassemblies of the people in Athens, Lacedaemon, and Ephesus, where it\nis so called in Scripture, though it be otherwise rendered by the\ntranslators, not much as I conceive to their commendation, seeing by\nthat means they have lost us a good lesson, the apostles borrowing that\nname for their spiritual congregations, to the end that we might\nsee they intended the government of the church to be democratical or\npopular, as is also plain in the rest of their constitutions.\n\nThe church or congregation of the people of Israel assembled in a\nmilitary manner, and had the result of the commonwealth, or the power of\nconfirming all their laws, though proposed even by God himself; as\nwhere they make him king, and where they reject or depose him as civil\nmagistrate, and elect Saul. It is manifest that he gives no such example\nto a legislator in a popular government as to deny or evade the power of\nthe people, which were a contradiction; but though he deservedly blames\nthe ingratitude of the people in that action, he commands Samuel, being\nnext under himself supreme magistrate, \u201cto hearken to their voice\u201d\n (for where the suffrage of the people goes for nothing, it is no\ncommonwealth), and comforts him, saying, \u201cThey have not rejected thee,\nbut they have rejected me that I should not reign over them.\u201d But to\nreject him that he should not reign over them, was as civil magistrate\nto depose him. The power therefore which the people had to depose even\nGod himself as he was civil magistrate, leaves little doubt but that\nthey had power to have rejected any of those laws confirmed by them\nthroughout the Scripture, which, to omit the several parcels, are\ngenerally contained under two heads: those that were made by covenant\nwith the people in the land of Moab, and those which were made by\ncovenant with the people in Horeb; which two, I think, amount to the\nwhole body of the Israelitish laws.\n\nBut if all and every one of the laws of Israel being proposed by God,\nwere no otherwise enacted than by covenant with the people, then that\nonly which was resolved by the people of Israel was their law; and so\nthe result of that commonwealth was in the people. Nor had the people\nthe result only in matter of law, but the power in some cases of\njudicature; as also the right of levying war, cognizance in matter\nof religion, and the election of their magistrates, as the judge or\ndictator, the king, the prince: which functions were exercised by the\nSynagoga magna, or Congregation of Israel, not always in one manner, for\nsometimes they were performed by the suffrage of the people, viva voce,\nsometimes by the lot only, and at others by the ballot, or by a mixture\nof the lot with the suffrage, as in the case of Eldad and Medad, which I\nshall open with the Senate.\n\nThe Senate of Israel, called in the old Testament the Seventy Elders,\nand in the New the Sanhedrim (which word is usually translated \u201cthe\nCouncil\u201d), was appointed by God, and consisted of seventy elders besides\nMoses, which were at first elected by the people, but in what manner is\nrather intimated than shown. Nevertheless, because I cannot otherwise\nunderstand the passage concerning Eldad and Medad, of whom it is said\n\u201cthat they were of them that were written, but went not up to the\ntabernacle,\u201d then with the Talmudists I conceive that Eldad and Medad\nhad the suffrage of the tribes, and so were written as competitors for\nmagistracy; but coming afterward to the lot, failed of it, and therefore\nwent not up to the tabernacle, or place of confirmation by God, or to\nthe session-house of the Senate, with the Seventy upon whom the lot fell\nto be senators; for the session-house of the Sanhedrim was first in the\ncourt of the tabernacle, and afterward in that of the Temple, where it\ncame to be called the stone chamber or pavement. If this were the ballot\nof Israel, that of Venice is the same transposed; for in Venice the\ncompetitor is chosen as it were by the lot, in regard that the electors\nare so made, and the magistrate is chosen by the \u201csuffrage of the great\nCouncil or assembly of the people.\u201d But the Sanhedrim of Israel being\nthus constituted, Moses, for his time, and after him his successor sat\nin the midst of it as prince or archon, and at his left hand the orator\nor father of the Senate; the rest, or the bench, coming round with\neither horn like a crescent, had a scribe attending upon the tip of it.\n\nThis Senate, in regard the legislator of Israel was infallible, and the\nlaws given by God such as were not fit to be altered by men, is much\ndifferent in the exercise of their power from all other senates, except\nthat of the Areopagus in Athens, which also was little more than a\nsupreme judicatory, for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that\nthe Sanhedrim proposed to the people till the return of the children of\nIsrael out of captivity under Esdras, at which time there was a new law\nmade--namely, for a kind of excommunication, or rather banishment, which\nhad never been before in Israel. Nevertheless it is not to be thought\nthat the Sanhedrim had not always that right, which from the time of\nEsdras is more frequently exercised, of proposing to the people, but\nthat they forebore it in regard of the fulness and infallibility of the\nlaw already made, whereby it was needless. Wherefore the function\nof this Council, which is very rare in a senate, was executive, and\nconsisted in the administration of the law made; and whereas the Council\nitself is often understood in Scripture by the priest and the Levite,\nthere is no more in that save only that the priests and the Levites,\nwho otherwise had no power at all, being in the younger years of this\ncommonwealth, those that were best studied in the laws were the most\nfrequently elected into the Sanhedrim. For the courts, consisting of\nthree-and-twenty elders sitting in the gates of every city, and the\ntriumvirates of judges constituted almost in every village, which were\nparts of the executive magistracy subordinate to the Sanhedrim, I shall\ntake them at better leisure, and in the larger discourse; but these\nbeing that part of this commonwealth which was instituted by Moses upon\nthe advice of Jethro the priest of Midian (as I conceive a heathen), are\nto me a sufficient warrant even from God himself, who confirmed them,\nto make further use of human prudence, wherever I find it bearing a\ntestimony to itself, whether in heathen commonwealths or others; and the\nrather, because so it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in\nthem the original of a commonwealth, made by the same hand that made\nthe world, are either altogether blind or negligent of it; while the\nheathens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other copy; as,\nto be more brief in the present account of that which you shall have\nmore at large hereafter:\n\nAthens consisted of the Senate of the Bean proposing, of the Church or\nAssembly of the people resolving, and too often debating, which was the\nruin of it; as also of the Senate of the Areopagus, the nine archons,\nwith divers other magistrates, executing.\n\nLacedaemon consisted of the Senate proposing, of the Church or\ncongregation of the people resolving only, and never debating, which was\nthe long life of it; and of the two kings, the court of the ephors, with\ndivers other magistrates, executing.\n\nCarthage consisted of the Senate proposing and sometimes resolving too,\nof the people resolving and sometimes debating too, for which fault she\nwas reprehended by Aristotle; and she had her suffetes, and her hundred\nmen, with other magistrates, executing.\n\nRome consisted of the Senate proposing, the concio or people resolving,\nand too often debating, which caused her storms; as also of the consuls,\ncensors, aediles, tribunes, praetors, quaestors, and other magistrates,\nexecuting.\n\nVenice consists of the Senate, or pregati, proposing, and sometimes\nresolving too, of the great Council or Assembly of the people, in whom\nthe result is constitutively; as also of the doge, the signory, the\ncensors, the dieci, the quazancies, and other magistrates, executing.\n\nThe proceeding of the Commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a\nlike nature, though after a more obscure manner; for the sovereignties,\nwhether cantons, provinces, or cities, which are the people, send\ntheir deputies, commissioned and instructed by themselves (wherein they\nreserve the result in their own power), to the provincial or general\nconvention, or Senate, where the deputies debate, but have no other\npower of result than what was conferred upon them by the people, or\nis further conferred by the same upon further occasion. And for\nthe executive part they have magistrates or judges in every canton,\nprovince, or city, besides those which are more public, and relate to\nthe league, as for adjusting controversies between one canton, province,\nor city and another, or the like between such persons as are not of the\nsame canton, province, or city.\n\nBut that we may observe a little further how the heathen politicians\nhave written, not only out of nature, but as it were out of Scripture:\nas in the Commonwealth of Israel, God is said to have been king, so\nthe commonwealth where the law is king, is said by Aristotle to be \u201cthe\nkingdom of God.\u201d And where by the lusts or passions of men a power is\nset above that of the law deriving from reason, which is the dictate of\nGod, God in that sense is rejected or deposed that he should not reign\nover them, as he was in Israel. And yet Leviathan will have it that \u201cby\nreading of these Greek and Latin [he might as well in this sense have\nsaid Hebrew] authors, young men, and all others that are unprovided\nof the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful\nimpression of the great exploits of war achieved by the conductors\nof their armies, receive withal a pleasing idea of all they have done\nbesides, and imagine their great prosperity not to have proceeded from\nthe emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular\nform of government, not considering the frequent seditions and civil\nwars produced by the imperfection of their polity.\u201d Where, first,\nthe blame he lays to the heathen authors, is in his sense laid to the\nScripture; and whereas he holds them to be young men, or men of no\nantidote that are of like opinions, it should seem that Machiavel,\nthe sole retriever of this ancient prudence, is to his solid reason a\nbeardless boy that has newly read Livy. And how solid his reason is, may\nappear where he grants the great prosperity of ancient commonwealths,\nwhich is to give up the controversy. For such an effect must have some\nadequate cause, which to evade he insinuates that it was nothing else\nbut the emulation of particular men, as if so great an emulation could\nhave been generated without as great virtue, so great virtue without\nthe best education, and best education without the best law, or the best\nlaws any otherwise than by the excellency of their polity.\n\nBut if some of these commonwealths, as being less perfect in their\npolity than others, have been more seditious, it is not more an argument\nof the infirmity of this or that commonwealth in particular, than of the\nexcellency of that kind of polity in general, which if they, that have\nnot altogether reached, have nevertheless had greater prosperity, what\nwould befall them that should reach?\n\nIn answer to which question let me invite Leviathan, who of all other\ngovernments gives the advantage to monarchy for perfection, to a better\ndisquisition of it by these three assertions.\n\nThe first, that the perfection of government lies upon such a libration\nin the frame of it, that no man or men in or under it can have the\ninterest, or, having the interest, can have the power to disturb it with\nsedition.\n\nThe second, that monarchy, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches\nnot to the perfection of government, but must have some dangerous flaw\nin it.\n\nThe third, that popular government, reaching the perfection of the kind,\nreaches the perfection of government, and has no flaw in it.\n\nThe first assertion requires no proof.\n\nFor the proof of the second, monarchy, as has been shown, is of two\nkinds: the one by arms, the other by a nobility and there is no\nother kind in art or nature; for if there have \u2018been anciently some\ngovernments called kingdoms, as one of the Goths in Spain, and another\nof the Vandals in Africa, where the King ruled without a nobility and\nby a council of the people only it is expressly said by the authors that\nmention them that the, kings were but the captains, and that the people\nnot only gave them laws, but deposed them as often as they pleased.\nNor is it possible in reason that it should be otherwise in like cases;\nwherefore these were either no monarchies, or had greater flaws in them\nthan any other.\n\nBut for a monarchy by arms, as that of the Turk (which, of all models\nthat ever were, comes up to the perfection of the kind), it is not in\nthe wit or power of man to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the\nJanizaries have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise sedition,\nand to tear the magistrate, even the prince himself, in pieces.\nTherefore the monarchy of Turkey is no perfect government.\n\nAnd for a monarchy by nobility, as of late in Oceana (which of all other\nmodels, before the declination of it, came up to the perfection in\nthat kind), it was not in the power or wit of man to cure it of that\ndangerous flaw; that the nobility had frequent interest and perpetual\npower by their retainers and tenants to raise sedition; and (whereas the\nJanizaries occasion this kind of calamity no sooner than they make an\nend of it) to levy a lasting war, to the vast effusion of blood, and\nthat even upon occasions wherein the people, but for their dependence\nupon their lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of the Red and\nWhite. The like has been frequent in Spain, France, Germany, and other\nmonarchies of this kind; wherefore monarchy by a nobility is no perfect\ngovernment.\n\nFor the proof of the third assertion: Leviathan yields it to me, that\nthere is no other commonwealth but monarchical or popular; wherefore\nif no monarchy be a perfect government, then either there is no perfect\ngovernment, or it must be popular, for which kind of constitution I have\nsomething more to say than Leviathan has said or ever will be able to\nsay for monarchy. As,\n\nFirst, that it is the government that was never conquered by any\nmonarch, from the beginning of the world to this day, for if the\ncommonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon,\nthey were first broken by themselves.\n\nSecondly, that it is the government that has frequently led mighty\nmonarchs in triumph.\n\nThirdly, that it is the government, which, if it has been seditious, it\nhas not been so from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular\nconstitution; which, wherever the like has happened, must have been\nunequal.\n\nFourthly, that it is the government, which, if it has been anything\nnear equal, was never seditious; or let him show me what sedition has\nhappened in Lacedaemon or Venice.\n\nFifthly, that it is the government, which, attaining to perfect\nequality, has such a libration in the frame of it, that no man living\ncan show which way any man or men, in or under it, can contract any such\ninterest or power as should be able to disturb the commonwealth with\nsedition, wherefore an equal commonwealth is that only which is without\nflaw and contains in it the full perfection of government. But to\nreturn.\n\nBy what has been shown in reason and experience, it may appear, that\nthough commonwealths in general be governments of the senate proposing,\nthe people resolving, and the magistracy executing, yet some are not so\ngood at these orders as others, through some impediment or defect in\nthe frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which they are of\ndivers kinds.\n\nThe first division of them is into such as are single, as Israel,\nAthens, Lacedaemon, etc.; and such as are by leagues, as those of the\nAchaeans, AEtolians, Lycians, Switz, and Hollanders.\n\nThe second (being Machiavel\u2019s) is into such as are for preservation, as\nLacedaemon and Venice, and such as are for increase, as Athens and\nRome; in which I can see no more than that the former takes in no more\ncitizens than are necessary for defence, and the latter so many as are\ncapable of increase.\n\nThe third division (unseen hitherto) is into equal and Unequal, and this\nis the main point, especially as to domestic peace and tranquillity; for\nto make a commonwealth unequal, is to divide it into parties, which sets\nthem at perpetual variance, the one party endeavoring to preserve their\neminence and inequality and the other to attain to equality; whence\nthe people of Rome derived their perpetual strife with the nobility and\nSenate. But in an equal commonwealth there can be no more strife than\nthere can be overbalance in equal weights; wherefore the Commonwealth\nof Venice, being that which of all others is the most equal in the\nconstitution, is that wherein there never happened any strife between\nthe Senate and the people.\n\nAn equal commonwealth is such a one as is equal both in the balance or\nfoundation, and in the superstructure; that is to say, in her agrarian\nlaw and in her rotation.\n\nAn equal agrarian is a perpetual law, establishing and preserving the\nbalance of dominion by such a distribution, that no one man or number of\nmen, within the compass of the few or aristocracy, can come to overpower\nthe whole people by their possessions in lands.\n\nAs the agrarian answers to the foundation, so does rotation to the\nsuperstructures.\n\nEqual rotation is equal vicissitude in government, or succession\nto magistracy conferred for such convenient terms, enjoying equal\nvacations, as take in the whole body by parts, succeeding others,\nthrough the free election or suffrage of the people.\n\nThe contrary, whereunto is prolongation of magistracy, which, trashing\nthe wheel of rotation, destroys the life or natural motion of a\ncommonwealth.\n\nThe election or suffrage of the people is most free, where it is made or\ngiven in such a manner that it can neither oblige nor disoblige another,\nnor through fear of an enemy, or bashfulness toward a friend, impair a\nman\u2019s liberty.\n\nWherefore, says Cicero, the tablet or ballot of the people of Rome (who\ngave their votes by throwing tablets or little pieces of wood secretly\ninto urns marked for the negative or affirmative) was a welcome\nconstitution to the people, as that which, not impairing the assurance\nof their brows, increased the freedom of their judgment. I have not\nstood upon a more particular description of this ballot, because that of\nVenice exemplified in the model is of all others the most perfect.\n\nAn equal commonwealth (by that which has been said) is a government\nestablished upon an equal agrarian, arising into the superstructures or\nthree orders, the Senate debating and proposing, the people resolving,\nand the magistracy executing, by an equal rotation through the suffrage\nof the people given by the ballot. For though rotation may be without\nthe ballot, and the ballot without rotation, yet the ballot not only as\nto the ensuing model includes both, but is by far the most equal\nway; for which cause under the name of the ballot I shall hereafter\nunderstand both that and rotation too.\n\nNow having reasoned the principles of an equal commonwealth, I should\ncome to give an instance of such a one in experience, if I could find\nit; but if this work be of any value, it lies in that it is the first\nexample of a commonwealth that is perfectly equal. For Venice, though\nit comes the nearest, yet is a commonwealth for preservation; and such\na one, considering the paucity of citizens taken in, and the number\nnot taken in, is externally unequal; and though every commonwealth that\nholds provinces must in that regard be such, yet not to that degree.\nNevertheless, Venice internally, and for her capacity, is by far the\nmost equal, though it has not, in my judgment, arrived at the full\nperfection of equality; both because her laws supplying the defect of\nan agrarian are not so clear nor effectual at the foundation, nor\nher superstructures, by the virtue of her ballot or rotation, exactly\nlibrated; in regard that through the paucity of her citizens her\ngreater magistracies are continually wheeled through a few hands, as is\nconfessed by Janotti, where he says, that if a gentleman comes once\nto be Savio di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he fails from\nthenceforward to be adorned with some one of the greater magistracies,\nas Savi di mare, Savi di terra ferma, Savi Grandi, counsellors, those\nof the decemvirate or dictatorian council, the aurogatori, or censors,\nwhich require no vacation or interval. Wherefore if this in Venice, or\nthat in Lacedaemon, where the kings were hereditary, and the Senators\n(though elected by the people) for life, cause no inequality (which is\nhard to be conceived) in a commonwealth for preservation, or such a one\nas consists of a few citizens; yet is it manifest that it would cause\na very great one in a commonwealth for increase, or consisting of the\nmany, which, by engrossing the magistracies in a few hands, would be\nobstructed in their rotation.\n\nBut there be who say (and think it a strong objection) that, let a\ncommonwealth be as equal as you can imagine, two or three men when all\nis done will govern it; and there is that in it which, notwithstanding\nthe pretended sufficiency of a popular State, amounts to a plain\nconfession of the imbecility of that policy, and of the prerogative of\nmonarchy; forasmuch as popular governments in difficult cases have had\nrecourse to dictatorian power, as in Rome.\n\nTo which I answer, that as truth is a spark to which objections are like\nbellows, so in this respect our commonwealth shines; for the eminence\nacquired by suffrage of the people in a commonwealth, especially if\nit be popular and equal, can be ascended by no other steps than the\nuniversal acknowledgment of virtue: and where men excel in virtue, the\ncommonwealth is stupid and unjust, if accordingly they do not excel in\nauthority. Wherefore this is both the advantage of virtue, which has her\ndue encouragement, and of the commonwealth, which has her due services.\nThese are the philosophers which Plato would have to be princes, the\nprinces which Solomon would have to be mounted, and their steeds are\nthose of authority, not empire; or, if they be buckled to the chariot of\nempire, as that of the dictatorian power, like the chariot of the\nsun, it is glorious for terms and vacations or intervals. And as a\ncommonwealth is a government of laws and not of men, so is this the\nprincipality of virtue, and not of man; if that fail or set in one, it\nrises in another who is created his immediate successor. And this takes\naway that vanity from under the sun, which is an error proceeding more\nor less from all other rulers under heaven but an equal commonwealth.\n\nThese things considered, it will be convenient in this place to speak a\nword to such as go about to insinuate to the nobility or gentry a fear\nof the people, or to the people a fear of the nobility or gentry; as if\ntheir interests were destructive to each other. When indeed an army may\nas well consist of soldiers without officers, or of officers without\nsoldiers, as a commonwealth, especially such a one as is capable of\ngreatness, of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry without a\npeople. Wherefore this, though not always so intended, as may appear\nby Machiavel, who else would be guilty, is a pernicious error. There is\nsomething first in the making of a commonwealth, then in the governing\nof it, and last of all in the leading of its armies, which, though there\nbe great divines, great lawyers, great men in all professions, seems to\nbe peculiar only to the genius of a gentleman.\n\nFor so it is in the universal series of story, that if any man has\nfounded a commonwealth, he was first a gentleman. Moses had his\neducation by the daughter of Pharaoh; Theseus and Solon, of noble birth,\nwere held by the Athenians worthy to be kings; Lycurgus was of the royal\nblood; Romulus and Numa princes; Brutus and Publicola patricians;\nthe Gracchi, that lost their lives for the people of Rome and the\nrestitution of that commonwealth, were the sons of a father adored with\ntwo triumphs, and of Cornelia the daughter of Scipio, who being demanded\nin marriage by King Ptolemy, disdained to become the Queen of Egypt. And\nthe most renowned Olphaus Megaletor, sole legislator, as you will see\nanon, of the Commonwealth of Oceana, was derived from a noble family;\nnor will it be any occasion of scruple in this case, that Leviathan\naffirms the politics to be no ancienter than his book \u201cDe Cive.\u201d Such\nalso as have got any fame in the civil government of a commonwealth, or\nby the leading of its armies, have been gentlemen; for so in all other\nrespects were those plebeian magistrates elected by the people of Rome,\nbeing of known descents and of equal virtues, except only that they were\nexcluded from the name by the usurpation of the patricians. Holland,\nthrough this defect at home, has borrowed princes for generals, and\ngentlemen of divers nations for commanders: and the Switzers, if they\nhave any defect in this kind, rather lend their people to the colors\nof other princes, than make that noble use of them at home which should\nassert the liberty of mankind. For where there is not a nobility to\nhearten the people, they are slothful, regardless of the world, and of\nthe public interest of liberty, as even those of Rome had been without\ntheir gentry: wherefore let the people embrace the gentry in peace, as\nthe light of their eyes; and in war, as the trophy of their arms; and if\nCornelia disdained to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman consul looked down\nfrom his tribunal upon the greatest king, let the nobility love and\ncherish the people that afford them a throne so much higher in a\ncommonwealth, in the acknowledgment of their virtue, than the crowns of\nmonarchs.\n\nBut if the equality of a commonwealth consist in the equality first\nof the agrarian, and next of the rotation, then the inequality of a\ncommonwealth must consist in the absence or inequality of the agrarian,\nor of the rotation, or of both.\n\nIsrael and Lacedaemon, which commonwealths (as the people of this, in\nJosephus, claims kindred of that) have great resemblance, were each of\nthem equal in their agrarian, and unequal in their rotation, especially\nIsrael, where the Sanhedrim, or Senate, first elected by the people, as\nappears by the words of Moses, took upon them ever after, without any\nprecept of God, to substitute their successors by ordination; which\nhaving been there of civil use, as excommunication, community of goods,\nand other customs of the Essenes, who were many of them converted, came\nafterward to be introduced into the Christian Church. And the election\nof the judge, suffes, or dictator, was irregular, both for the occasion,\nthe term, and the vacation of that magistracy. As you find in the book\nof Judges, where it is often repeated, that in those days there was no\nking in Israel--that is, no judge; and in the first of Samuel, where Eli\njudged Israel forty years, and Samuel, all his life. In Lacedaemon the\nelection of the Senate being by suffrage of the people, though for life,\nwas not altogether so unequal, yet the hereditary right of kings, were\nit not for the agrarian, had ruined her.\n\nAthens and Rome were unequal as to their agrarian, that of Athens being\ninfirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more anciently\ncarried it was never observed. Whence, by the time of Tiberius Gracchus,\nthe nobility had almost eaten the people quite out of their lands,\nwhich they held in the occupation of tenants and servants, whereupon the\nremedy being too late, and too vehemently applied, that commonwealth was\nruined.\n\nThese also were unequal in their rotation, but in a contrary manner.\nAthens, in regard that the Senate (chosen at once by lot, not by\nsuffrage, and changed every year, not in part, but in the whole)\nconsisted not of the natural aristocracy, nor sitting long enough to\nunderstand or to be perfect in their office, had no sufficient authority\nto restrain the people from that perpetual turbulence in the end, which\nwas their ruin, notwithstanding the efforts of Nicias, who did all a man\ncould do to help it. But as Athens, by the headiness of the people, so\nRome fell by the ambition of the nobility, through the want of an equal\nrotation; which, if the people had got into the Senate, and timely\ninto the magistracies (whereof the former was always usurped by the\npatricians, and the latter for the most part) they had both carried and\nheld their agrarian, and that had rendered that commonwealth immovable.\n\nBut let a commonwealth be equal or unequal, it must consist, as has been\nshown by reason and all experience, of the three general orders; that is\nto say, of the Senate debating and proposing, of the people resolving,\nand of the magistracy executing. Wherefore I can never wonder enough\nat Leviathan, who, without any reason or example, will have it that a\ncommonwealth consists of a single person, or of a single assembly; nor\ncan I sufficiently pity those \u201cthousand gentlemen, whose minds, which\notherwise would have wavered, he has framed (as is affirmed by himself)\nin to a conscientious obedience (for so he is pleased to call it) of\nsuch a government.\u201d\n\nBut to finish this part of the discourse, which I intend for as\ncomplete an epitome of ancient prudence, and in that of the whole art of\npolitics, as I am able to frame in so short a time:\n\nThe two first orders, that is to say, the Senate and the people, are\nlegislative, whereunto answers that part of this science which by\npoliticians is entitled \u201cof laws;\u201d and the third order is executive,\nto which answers that part of the same science which is styled \u201cof the\nframe and course of courts or judicatories.\u201d A word to each of these\nwill be necessary.\n\nAnd first for laws: they are either ecclesiastical or civil, such as\nconcern religion or government.\n\nLaws, ecclesiastical, or such as concern religion, according to\nthe universal course of ancient prudence, are in the power of the\nmagistrate; but, according to the common practice of modern prudence,\nsince the papacy, torn out of his hands.\n\nBut, as a government pretending to liberty, and yet suppressing\nliberty of conscience (which, because religion not according to a\nman\u2019s conscience can to him be none at all, is the main) must be a\ncontradiction, so a man that, pleading for the liberty of private\nconscience, refuses liberty to the national conscience, must be absurd.\n\nA commonwealth is nothing else but the national conscience. And if the\nconviction of a man\u2019s private conscience produces his private religion,\nthe conviction of the national conscience must produce a national\nreligion. Whether this be well reasoned, as also whether these two\nmay stand together, will best be shown by the examples of the ancient\ncommonwealths taken in their order.\n\nIn that of Israel the government of the national religion appertained\nnot to the priests and Levites, otherwise than as they happened to be\nof the Sanhedrim, or Senate, to which they had no right at all but\nby election. It is in this capacity therefore that the people are\ncommanded, under pain of death, \u201cto hearken to them, and to do according\nto the sentence of the law which they should teach;\u201d but in Israel the\nlaw ecclesiastical and civil was the same, therefore the Sanhedrim,\nhaving the power of one, had the power of both. But as the national\nreligion appertained to the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrim, so the\nliberty of conscience appertained, from the same date, and by the same\nright, to the prophets and their disciples; as where it is said, \u201cI will\nraise up a prophet; and whoever will not hearken to my words which he\nshall speak in my name, I will require it of him.\u201d The words relate to\nprophetic right, which was above all the orders of this commonwealth;\nwhence Elijah not only refused to obey the King, but destroyed his\nmessengers with fire. And whereas it was not lawful by the national\nreligion to sacrifice in any other place than the Temple, a prophet was\nhis own temple, and might sacrifice where he would, as Elijah did in\nMount Carmel. By this right John the Baptist and our Saviour, to whom it\nmore particularly related, had their disciples, and taught the people,\nwhence is derived our present right of gathered congregations;\nwherefore the Christian religion grew up according to the orders of\nthe Commonwealth of Israel, and not against them. Nor was liberty of\nconscience infringed by this government, till the civil liberty of\nthe same was lost, as under Herod, Pilate, and Tiberius, a three-piled\ntyranny.\n\nTo proceed, Athens preserved her religion, by the testimony of Paul,\nwith great superstition: if Alcibiades, that atheistical fellow had not\nshowed them a pair of heels, they had shaven off his head for shaving\ntheir Mercuries, and making their gods look ridiculously upon them\nwithout beards. Nevertheless, if Paul reasoned with them, they loved\nnews, for which he was the more welcome; and if he converted Dionysius\nthe Areopagite, that is, one of the senators, there followed neither any\nhurt to him, nor loss of honor to Dionysius. And for Rome, if Cicero,\nin his most excellent book \u201cDe Natura Deorum,\u201d overthrew the national\nreligion of that commonwealth, he was never the further from being\nconsul. But there is a meanness and poorness in modern prudence, not\nonly to the damage of civil government, but of religion itself; for\nto make a man in matter of religion, which admits not of sensible\ndemonstration (jurare in verba magistri), engage to believe no otherwise\nthan is believed by my lord bishop, or Goodman Presbyter is a pedantism\nthat has made the sword to be a rod in the hands of schoolmasters; by\nwhich means, whereas the Christian religion is the furthest of any\nfrom countenancing war, there never was a war of religion but since\nChristianity, for which we are beholden to the Pope; for the Pope not\ngiving liberty of conscience to princes and commonwealths, they cannot\ngive that to their subjects which they have not themselves, whence\nboth princes and subjects, either through his instigation or their own\ndisputes, have introduced that execrable custom, never known in the\nworld before, of fighting for religion, and denying the magistrate to\nhave any jurisdiction concerning it, whereas the magistrate\u2019s losing the\npower of religion loses the liberty of conscience, which in that case\nhas nothing to protect it. But if the people be otherwise taught,\nit concerns them to look about them, and to distinguish between the\nshrieking of the lapwing and the voice of the turtle.\n\nTo come to civil laws. If they stand one way and the balance another,\nit is the case of a government which of necessity must be new modelled;\nwherefore your lawyers, advising you upon the like occasions to fit your\ngovernment to their laws, are no more to be regarded than your tailor\nif he should desire you to fit your body to his doublet. There is\nalso danger in the plausible pretence of reforming the law, except the\ngovernment be first good, in which case it is a good tree, and (trouble\nnot yourselves overmuch) brings not forth evil fruit; otherwise, if\nthe tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit, or if a root that is\nnaught bring forth fruit of this kind that seems to be good, take the\nmore heed, for it is the ranker poison. It was nowise probable, if\nAugustus had not made excellent laws, that the bowels of Rome could have\ncome to be so miserably eaten out by the tyranny of Tiberius and his\nsuccessors. The best rule as to your laws in general is that they be\nfew. Rome, by the testimony of Cicero, Was best governed under those of\nthe twelve tables; and by that of Tacitus, Plurimoe leges, corruptissima\nrespublica. You will be told that where the laws be few they leave much\nto arbitrary power; but where they be many, they leave more, the laws\nin this case, according to Justinian and the best lawyers, being as\nlitigious as the suitors. Solon made few, Lycurgus fewer, laws; and\ncommonwealths have the fewest at this day of all other governments.\n\nNow to conclude this part with a word de judiciis, or of the\nconstitution or course of courts; it is a discourse not otherwise\ncapable of being well managed but by particular examples, both the\nconstitution and course of courts being divers in different governments,\nbut best beyond compare in Venice, where they regard not so much the\narbitrary power of their courts as the constitution of them, whereby\nthat arbitrary power being altogether unable to retard or do hurt to\nbusiness, produces and must produce the quickest despatch, and the most\nrighteous dictates of justice that are perhaps in human nature. The\nmanner I shall not stand in this place to describe, because it is\nexemplified at large in the judicature of the people of Oceana. And\nthus much of ancient prudence, and the first branch of this preliminary\ndiscourse.\n\nTHE SECOND PART OF THE PRELIMINARIES\n\nIn the second part I shall endeavor to show the rise, progress, and\ndeclination of modern prudence.\n\nThe date of this kind of policy is to be computed, as was shown, from\nthose inundations of Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Lombards that overwhelmed\nthe Roman Empire. But as there is no appearance in the bulk or\nconstitution of modern prudence, that it should ever have been able to\ncome up and grapple with the ancient, so something of necessity must\nhave interposed whereby this came to be enervated, and that to receive\nstrength and encouragement. And this was the execrable reign of the\nRoman emperors taking rise from (that felix scelus) the arms of\nCaesar, in which storm the ship of the Roman Commonwealth was forced\nto disburden itself of that precious freight, which never since could\nemerge or raise its head but in the Gulf of Venice.\n\nIt is said in Scripture, \u201cThy evil is of thyself, O Israel!\u201d to which\nanswers that of the moralists, \u201cNone is hurt but by himself,\u201d as also\nthe whole matter of the politics; at present this example of the Romans,\nwho, through a negligence committed in their agrarian laws, let in the\nsink of luxury, and forfeited the inestimable treasure of liberty for\nthemselves and their posterity.\n\nTheir agrarian laws were such whereby their lands ought to have been\ndivided among the people, either without mention of a colony, in which\ncase they were not obliged to change their abode; or with mention and\nupon condition of a colony, in which case they were to change their\nabode, and leaving the city, to plant themselves upon the lands so\nassigned. The lands assigned, or that ought to have been assigned, in\neither of these ways, were of three kinds: such as were taken from the\nenemy and distributed to the people; or such as were taken from the\nenemy, and, under color of being reserved to the public use, were\nthrough stealth possessed by the nobility; or such as were bought with\nthe public money to be distributed. Of the laws offered in these cases,\nthose which divided the lands taken from the enemy, or purchased with\nthe public money, never occasioned any dispute; but such as drove at\ndispossessing the nobility of their usurpations, and dividing the common\npurchase of the sword among the people, were never touched but they\ncaused earthquakes, nor could they ever be obtained by the people; or\nbeing obtained, be observed by the nobility, who not only preserved\ntheir prey, but growing vastly rich upon it, bought the people by\ndegrees quite out of those shares that had been conferred upon them.\nThis the Gracchi coming too late to perceive found the balance of the\ncommonwealth to be lost; but putting the people (when they had least\nforce) by forcible means upon the recovery of it, did ill, seeing\nit neither could nor did tend to any more than to show them by worse\neffects that what the wisdom of their leaders had discovered was true.\nFor quite contrary to what has happened in Oceana, where, the balance\nfalling to the people, they have overthrown the nobility, that nobility\nof Rome, under the conduct of Sylla, overthrew the people and the\ncommonwealth; seeing Sylla first introduced that new balance which was\nthe foundation of the succeeding monarchy, in the plantation of military\ncolonies, instituted by his distribution of the conquered lands, not now\nof enemies, but of citizens, to forty-seven legions of his soldiers;\nso that how he came to be perpetual dictator, or other magistrates to\nsucceed him in like power, is no miracle.\n\nThese military colonies (in which manner succeeding emperors continued,\nas Augustus by the distribution of the veterans, whereby he had overcome\nBrutus and Cassius to plant their soldiery) consisted of such as I\nconceive were they that are called milites beneficiarii; in regard that\nthe tenure of their lands was by way of benefices, that is, for life,\nand upon condition of duty or service in the war upon their own\ncharge. These benefices Alexander Severus granted to the heirs of the\nincumbents, but upon the same conditions. And such was the dominion by\nwhich the Roman emperors gave their balance. But to the beneficiaries,\nas was no less than necessary for the safety of the prince, a matter of\n8,000 by the example of Augustus were added, which departed not from\nhis sides, but were his perpetual guard, called Pretorian bands; though\nthese, according to the incurable flaw already observed in this kind of\ngovernment, became the most frequent butchers of their lords that are\nto be found in story. Thus far the Roman monarchy is much the same with\nthat at this day in Turkey, consisting of a camp and a horse-quarter; a\ncamp in regard of the Spahis and Janizaries, the perpetual guard of the\nprince, except they also chance to be liquorish after his blood; and a\nhorse-quarter in regard of the distribution of his whole land to tenants\nfor life, upon condition of continual service, or as often as they shall\nbe commanded at their own charge by timars, being a word which they\nsay signifies benefices, that it shall save me a labor of opening the\ngovernment.\n\nBut the fame of Mahomet and his prudence is especially founded in this,\nthat whereas the Roman monarchy, except that of Israel, was the most\nimperfect, the Turkish is the most perfect that ever was. Which\nhappened in that the Roman (as the Israelitish of the Sanhedrim and\nthe congregation) had a mixture of the Senate and the people; and the\nTurkish is pure. And that this was pure, and the other mixed, happened\nnot through the wisdom of the legislators, but the different genius of\nthe nations; the people of the Eastern parts, except the Israelites,\nwhich is to be attributed to their agrarian, having been such as scarce\never knew any other condition than that of slavery; and these of the\nWester having ever had such a relish of liberty, as through what despair\nsoever could never be brought to stand still while the yoke was putting\non their necks, but by being fed with some hopes of reserving to\nthemselves some part of their freedom.\n\nWherefore Julius Caesar (saith Suetonius) contented himself in naming\nhalf the magistrates, to leave the rest to the suffrage of the people.\nAnd Maecenas, though he would not have Augustus to give the people their\nliberty, would not have him take it quite away. Whence this empire,\nbeing neither hawk nor buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and the\nprince being perpetually tossed (having the avarice of the soldiery on\nthis hand to satisfy upon the people, and the Senate and the people on\nthe other to be defended from the soldiery), seldom died any other\ndeath than by one horn of this dilemma, as is noted more at large by\nMachiavel.\n\nBut the Pretorian bands, those bestial executioners of their captain\u2019s\ntyranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued from\nthe time of Augustus, were by Constantine the Great (incensed against\nthem for taking part with his adversary Maxentius) removed from their\nstrong garrison which they held in Rome, and distributed into divers\nprovinces. The benefices of the soldiers that were hitherto held for\nlife and upon duty, were by this prince made hereditary, so that\nthe whole foundation whereupon this empire was first built being now\nremoved, shows plainly that the emperors must long before this have\nfound out some other way of support; and this was by stipendiating the\nGoths, a people that, deriving their roots from the northern parts of\nGermany, or out of Sweden, had, through their victories obtained against\nDomitian, long since spread their branches to so near a neighborhood\nwith the Roman territories that they began to overshadow them. For the\nemperors making use of them in their armies, as the French do at this\nday of the Switz, gave them that under the notion of a stipend, which\nthey received as tribute, coming, if there were any default in the\npayment, so often to distrain for it, that in the time of Honorius\nthey sacked Rome, and possessed themselves of Italy. And such was the\ntransition of ancient into modern prudence, or that breach, which being\nfollowed in every part of the Roman Empire with inundations of Vandals,\nHuns, Lombards, Franks, Saxons, overwhelmed ancient languages, learning,\nprudence, manners, cities, changing the names of rivers, countries,\nseas, mountains, and men; Camillus, Caesar, and Pompey, being come to\nEdmund, Richard, and Geoffrey.\n\nTo open the groundwork or balance of these new politicians: \u201cFeudum,\u201d\n says Calvin the lawyer, \u201cis a Gothic word of divers significations;\nfor it is taken either for war, or for a possession of conquered lands,\ndistributed by the victor to such of his captains and soldiers as had\nmerited in his wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their\nperpetual lord, and themselves to be his subjects.\u201d\n\nOf these there were three kinds or orders: the first of nobility\ndistinguished by the titles of dukes, marquises, earls, and these\nbeing gratified with the cities, castles, and villages of the conquered\nItalians, their feuds participated of royal dignity, and were called\nregalia, by which they had right to coin money, create magistrates, take\ntoll, customs, confiscations, and the like.\n\nFeuds of the second order were such as, with the consent of the King,\nwere bestowed by these feudatory princes upon men of inferior quality,\ncalled their barons, on condition that next to the King they should\ndefend the dignities and fortunes of their lords in arms.\n\nThe lowest order of feuds were such, as being conferred by those of the\nsecond order upon private men, whether noble not noble, obliged them in\nthe like duty to their superiors; the were called vavasors. And this is\nthe Gothic balance, by which all the kingdoms this day in Christendom\nwere at first erected; for which cause, if I had time, I should open in\nthis place the Empire of Germany, and the Kingdoms of France, Spain, and\nPoland; but so much as has been said being sufficient for the discovery\nof the principles of modern prudence in general, I shall divide the\nremainder of my discourse, which is more particular, into three parts:\n\nThe first, showing the constitution of the late monarchy of Oceana;\n\nThe second, the dissolution of the same; and\n\nThe third, the generation of the present commonwealth.\n\nThe constitution of the late monarchy of Oceana is to be considered\nin relation to the different nations by whom it has been successively\nsubdued and governed. The first of these were the Romans, the second the\nTeutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth the Neustrians.\n\nThe government of the Romans, who held it as a province, I shall omit,\nbecause I am to speak of their provincial government in another place,\nonly it is to be remembered here, that if we have given over running up\nand down naked, and with dappled hides, learned to write and read, and\nto be instructed with good arts, for all these we are beholden to the\nRomans, either immediately or mediately by the Teutons; for that\nthe Teutons had the arts from no other hand is plain enough by their\nlanguage, which has yet no word to signify either writing or reading,\nbut what is derived from the Latin. Furthermore, by the help of these\narts so learned, we have been capable of that religion which we have\nlong since received; wherefore it seems to me that we ought not to\ndetract from the memory of the Romans, by whose means we are, as it\nwere, of beasts become men, and by whose means we might yet of obscure\nand ignorant men (if we thought not too well of ourselves) become a wise\nand a great people.\n\nThe Romans having governed Oceana provincially, the Teutons were the\nfirst that introduced the form of the late monarchy. To these succeeded\nthe Scandians, of whom (because their reign was short, as also because\nthey made little alteration in the government as to the form) I shall\ntake no notice. But the Teutons going to work upon the Gothic balance,\ndivided the whole nation into three sorts of feuds, that of ealdorman,\nthat of king\u2019s thane, and that of middle thane.\n\nWhen the kingdom was first divided into precincts will be as hard to\nshow as when it began first to be governed. It being impossible that\nthere should be any government without some division. The division that\nwas in use with the Teutons was by counties, and every county had either\nits ealdorman or high reeve. The title of ealdorman came in time to\neorl, or erl, and that of high reeve to high sheriff.\n\nEarl of the shire or county denoted the king\u2019s thane, or tenant by grand\nsergeantry or knight\u2019s service, in chief or in capite; his possessions\nwere sometimes the whole territory from whence he had his denomination,\nthat is, the whole county; sometimes more than one county, and sometimes\nless, the remaining part being in the crown. He had also sometimes a\nthird, or some other customary part of the profits of certain cities,\nboroughs, or other places within his earldom. For an example of the\npossessions of earls in ancient times, Ethelred had to him and his heirs\nthe whole Kingdom of Mercia, containing three or four counties; and\nthere were others that had little less.\n\nKing\u2019s thane was also an honorary title, to which he was qualified\nthat had five hides of land held immediately of the King by service of\npersonal attendance; insomuch that if a churl or countryman had thriven\nto this proportion, having a church, a kitchen, a bell-house (that is,\na hall with a bell in it to call his family to dinner), a borough-gate\nwith a seat (that is, a porch) of his own, and any distinct office in\nthe King\u2019s court, then was he the King\u2019s thane. But the proportion of a\nhide-land, otherwise called caruca, or a plough-land, is difficult to\nbe understood, because it was not certain; nevertheless it is generally\nconceived to be so much as may be managed with one plough, and would\nyield the maintenance of the same, with the appurtenances in all kinds.\n\nThe middle thane was feudal, but not honorary; he was also called a\nvavasor, and his lands a vavasory, which held of some mesne lord, and\nnot immediately of the King.\n\nPossessions and their tenures, being of this nature, show the balance\nof the Teuton monarchy, wherein the riches of earls were so vast that to\narise from the balance of their dominion to their power, they were\nnot only called reguli, or little kings, but were such indeed; their\njurisdiction being of two sorts, either that which was exercised by them\nin the court of their countries, or in the high court of the kingdom.\n\nIn the territory denominating an earl, if it were all his own, the\ncourts held, and the profits of that jurisdiction were to his own\nuse and benefit. But if he had but some part of his county, then his\njurisdiction and courts, saving perhaps in those possessions that were\nhis own, were held by him to the King\u2019s use and benefit; that is, he\ncommonly supplied the office which the sheriffs regularly executed in\ncounties that had no earls, and whence they came to be called viscounts.\nThe court of the county that had an earl was held by the earl and the\nbishop of the diocese, after the manner of the sheriffs\u2019 turns to this\nday; by which means both the ecclesiastical and temporal laws were given\nin charge together to the country. The causes of vavasors or vavasories\nappertained to the cognizance of this court, where wills were proved,\njudgment and execution given, cases criminal and civil determined.\n\nThe King\u2019s thanes had the like jurisdiction in their thane lands as\nlords in their manors, where they also kept courts.\n\nBesides these in particular, both the earls and King\u2019s thanes, together\nwith the bishops, abbots, and vavasors, or middle thanes, had in the\nhigh court or parliament in the kingdom a more public jurisdiction,\nconsisting first of deliberative power for advising upon and assenting\nto new laws; secondly, giving counsel in matters of state and thirdly,\nof judicature upon suits and complaints. I shall not omit to enlighten\nthe obscurity of these times, in which there is little to be found of\na methodical constitution of this high court, by the addition of an\nargument, which I conceive to bear a strong testimony to itself, though\ntaken out of a late writing that conceals the author. \u201cIt is well\nknown,\u201d says he, \u201cthat in every quarter of the realm a great many\nboroughs do yet send burgesses to the parliament which nevertheless be\nso anciently and so long since decayed and gone to naught, that they\ncannot be showed to have been of any reputation since the Conquest, much\nless to have obtained any such privilege by the grant of any succeeding\nking: wherefore these must have had this right by more ancient usage,\nand before the Conquest, they being unable now to show whence they\nderived it.\u201d\n\nThis argument, though there be more, I shall pitch upon as sufficient to\nprove: First, that the lower sort of the people had right to session\nin Parliament during the time of the Teutons. Secondly, that they were\nqualified to the same by election in their boroughs, and if knights of\nthe shire, as no doubt they are, be as ancient in the counties. Thirdly\nif it be a good argument to say that the commons during the reign of the\nTeutons were elected into Parliament because they are so now, and no man\ncan show when this custom began, I see not which way it should be an ill\none to say that the commons during the reign of the Teutons constituted\nalso a distinct house because they do so now, unless any man can show\nthat they did ever sit in the same house with the lords. Wherefore\nto conclude this part, I conceive for these, and other reasons to be\nmentioned hereafter, that the Parliament of the Teutons consisted of the\nKing, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons of the nation,\nnotwithstanding the style of divers acts of Parliament, which runs,\nas that of Magna Charta, in the King\u2019s name only, seeing the same was\nnevertheless enacted by the King, peers, and commons of the land, as is\ntestified in those words by a subsequent act.\n\nThe monarchy of the Teutons had stood in this posture about 220 years;\nwhen Turbo, Duke of Neustria, making his claim to the crown of one of\ntheir kings that died childless, followed it with successful arms, and,\nbeing possessed of the kingdom, used it as conquered, distributing the\nearldoms, thane-lands, bishoprics, and prelacies of the whole realm\namong his Neustrians. From this time the earl came to be called comes,\nconsul, and dux, though consul and dux grew afterward out of use; the\nKing\u2019s thanes came to be called barons, and their lands baronies;\nthe middle thane holding still of a mesne lord, retained the name of\nvavasor.\n\nThe earl or comes continued to have the third part of the pleas of the\ncounty paid to him by the sheriff or vice--comes, now a distinct officer\nin every county depending upon the King; saving that such earls as had\ntheir counties to their own use were now counts-palatine, and had under\nthe King regal jurisdiction; insomuch that they constituted their own\nsheriffs, granted pardons, and issued writs in their own names; nor did\nthe King\u2019s writ of ordinary justice run in their dominions till a late\nstatute, whereby much of this privilege was taken away.\n\nFor barons they came from henceforth to be in different times of three\nkinds: barons by their estates and tenures, barons by writ, and barons\ncreated by letters-patent. From Turbo the first to Adoxus the seventh\nking from the Conquest, barons had their denomination from their\npossessions and tenures. And these were either spiritual or temporal;\nfor not only the thanelands, but the possessions of bishops, as also of\nsome twenty six abbots, and two priors, were now erected into baronies,\nwhence the lords spiritual that had suffrage in the Teuton Parliament as\nspiritual lords came to have it in the Neustrian Parliament as barons,\nand were made subject, which they had not formerly been, to knights\u2019\nservice in chief. Barony coming henceforth to signify all honorary\npossessions as well of earls as barons, and baronage to denote all\nkinds of lords as well spiritual as temporal having right to sit\nin Parliament, the baronies in this sense were sometimes more, and\nsometimes fewer, but commonly about 200 or 250, containing in them a\nmatter of 60,000 feuda militum, or knights\u2019 fees, whereof some 28,000\nwere in the clergy.\n\nIt is ill-luck that no man can tell what the land of a knight\u2019s\nfee, reckoned in some writs at \u00a340 a year, and in others at \u00a310, was\ncertainly worth, for by such a help we might have exactly demonstrated\nthe balance of this government. But, says Coke, it contained twelve\nplough-lands, and that was thought to be the most certain account. But\nthis again is extremely uncertain; for one plough out of some land that\nwas fruitful might work more than ten out of some other that was\nbarren. Nevertheless, seeing it appears by Bracton, that of earldoms and\nbaronies it was wont to be said that the whole kingdom was composed, as\nalso that these, consisting of 60,000 knights\u2019 fees, furnished 60,000\nmen for the King\u2019s service, being the whole militia of this monarchy,\nit cannot be imagined that the vavasories or freeholds in the people\namounted to any considerable proportion. Wherefore the balance and\nfoundation of this government were in the 60,000 knights\u2019 fees, and\nthese being possessed by the 250 lords, it was a government of the few,\nor of the nobility, wherein the people might also assemble, but could\nhave no more than a mere name. And the clergy, holding a third of the\nwhole nation, as is plain by the Parliament-roll, it is an absurdity\n(seeing the clergy of France came first through their riches to be a\nstate of that kingdom) to acknowledge the people to have been a state\nof this realm, and not to allow it to the clergy, who were so much more\nweighty in the balance, which is that of all other whence a state or\norder in a government is denominated. Wherefore this monarchy consisted\nof the King, and of the three ordines regni, or estates, the lords\nspiritual and temporal, and the commons; it consisted of these, I say,\nas to the balance, though, during the reign of some of these kings, not\nas to the administration.\n\nFor the ambition of Turbo, and some of those that more immediately\nsucceeded him, to be absolute princes, strove against the nature of\ntheir foundation, and, inasmuch as he had divided almost the whole\nrealm among his Neustrians, with some encouragement for a while. But\nthe Neustrians, while they were but foreign plants, having no security\nagainst the natives, but in growing up by their princes\u2019 sides, were no\nsooner well rooted in their vast dominions than they came up according\nto the infallible consequence of the balance domestic, and, contracting\nthe national interest of the baronage, grew as fierce in the vindication\nof the ancient rights and liberties of the same, as if they had been\nalways natives: whence, the kings being as obstinate on the one side for\ntheir absolute power, as these on the other for their immunities, grew\ncertain wars, which took their denomination from the barons.\n\nThis fire about the middle of the reign of Adoxus began to break out.\nAnd whereas the predecessors of this King had divers times been forced\nto summon councils resembling those of the Teutons, to which the lords\nonly that were barons by dominion and tenure had hitherto repaired,\nAdoxus, seeing the effects of such dominion, began first not to call\nsuch as were barons by writ (for that was according to the practice of\nancient times), but to call such by writs as were otherwise no barons;\nby which means, striving to avoid the consequence of the balance, in\ncoming unwillingly to set the government straight, he was the first that\nset it awry. For the barons in his reign, and his successors, having\nvindicated their ancient authority, restored the Parliament with all\nthe rights and privileges of the same, saving that from thenceforth the\nkings had found out a way whereby to help themselves against the mighty\nby creatures of their own, and such as had no other support but by their\nfavor.. By which means this government, being indeed the masterpiece of\nmodern prudence, has been cried up to the skies, as the only invention\nwhereby at once to maintain the sovereignty of a prince and the\nliberty of the people. Whereas, indeed, it has been no other than a\nwrestling-match, wherein the nobility, as they have been stronger, have\nthrown the King, or the King, if he has been stronger, has thrown the\nnobility; or the King, where he has had a nobility, and could bring\nthem to his party has thrown the people, as in France and Spain; or\nthe people, where they have had no nobility, or could get them to be of\ntheir party, have thrown the King, as in Holland, and of later times in\nOceana.\n\nBut they came not to this strength, but by such approaches and degrees\nas remain to be further opened. For whereas the barons by writ, as the\nsixty-four abbots and thirty-six priors that were so called, were but\npro temp ore, Dicotome, being the twelfth king from the Conquest, began\nto make barons by letters-patent, with the addition of honorary pensions\nfor the maintenance of their dignities to them and their heirs; so that\nthey were hands in the King\u2019s purse and had no shoulders for his throne.\nOf these, when the house of peers came once to be full, as will be seen\nhereafter, there was nothing more empty. But for the present, the throne\nhaving other supports, they did not hurt that so much as they did\nthe King; for the old barons, taking Dicotome\u2019s prodigality to such\ncreatures so ill that they deposed him, got the trick of it, and never\ngave over setting up and pulling down their kings according to their\nvarious interests, and that faction of the White and Red, into which\nthey have been thenceforth divided, till Panurgus, the eighteenth king\nfrom the Conquest, was more by their favor than his right advanced to\nthe crown. This King, through his natural subtlety, reflecting at once\nupon the greatness of their power, and the inconstancy of their favor,\nbegan to find another flaw in this kind of government, which is also\nnoted by Machiavel namely, that a throne supported by a nobility is not\nso hard to be ascended as kept warm. Wherefore his secret jealousy, lest\nthe dissension of the nobility, as it brought him in might throw him\nout, made him travel in ways undiscovered by them, to ends as little\nforeseen by himself, while to establish his own safety, he, by mixing\nwater with their wine, first began to open those sluices that have since\noverwhelmed not the King only, but the throne. For whereas a nobility\nstrikes not at the throne, without which they cannot subsist, but at\nsome king that they do not like, popular power strikes through the King\nat the throne, as that which is incompatible with it. Now that Panurgus,\nin abating the power of the nobility, was the cause whence it came to\nfall into the hands of the people, appears by those several statutes\nthat were made in his reign, as that for population, those against\nretainers, and that for alienations.\n\nBy the statute of population, all houses of husbandry that were used\nwith twenty acres of ground and upward, were to be maintained and kept\nup forever with a competent proportion of land laid to them, and in no\nwise, as appears by a subsequent statute, to be severed. By which means\nthe houses being kept up, did of necessity enforce dwellers; and the\nproportion of land to be tilled being kept up, did of necessity enforce\nthe dweller not to be a beggar or cottager, but a man of some substance,\nthat might keep hinds and servants and set the plough a-going. This\ndid mightily concern, says the historian of that prince, the might and\nmanhood of the kingdom, and in effect amortize a great part of the lands\nto the hold and possession of the yeomanry or middle people, who living\nnot in a servile or indigent fashion, were much unlinked from dependence\nupon their lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became\na more excellent infantry, but such a one upon which the lords had so\nlittle power, that from henceforth they may be computed to have been\ndisarmed.\n\nAnd as they had lost their infantry after this manner, so their cavalry\nand commanders were cut off by the statute of retainers; for whereas it\nwas the custom of the nobility to have younger brothers of good houses,\nmettled fellows, and such as were knowing in the feats of arms about\nthem, they who were longer followed with so dangerous a train, escaped\nnot such punishments as made them take up.\n\nHenceforth the country lives and great tables of the nobility, which\nno longer nourished veins that would bleed for them, were fruitless and\nloathsome till they changed the air, and of princes became courtiers;\nwhere their revenues, never to have been exhausted by beef and mutton,\nwere found narrow, whence followed racking of rents, and at length sale\nof lands, the riddance through the statute of alienations being rendered\nfar more quick and facile than formerly it had been through the new\ninvention of entails.\n\nTo this it happened that Coraunus, the successor of that King,\ndissolving the abbeys, brought, with the declining state of the\nnobility, so vast a prey to the industry of the people, that the balance\nof the commonwealth was too apparently in the popular party to be\nunseen by the wise Council of Queen Parthenia, who, converting her reign\nthrough the perpetual love tricks that passed between her and her people\ninto a kind of romance, wholly neglected the nobility. And by these\ndegrees came the House of Commons to raise that head, which since has\nbeen so high and formidable to their princes that they have looked\npale upon those assemblies. Nor was there anything now wanting to the\ndestruction of the throne, but that the people, not apt to see their own\nstrength, should be put to feel it; when a prince, as stiff in disputes\nas the nerve of monarchy was grown slack, received that unhappy\nencouragement from his clergy which became his utter ruin, while\ntrusting more to their logic than the rough philosophy of his\nParliament, it came to an irreparable breach; for the house of peers,\nwhich alone had stood in this gap, now sinking down between the King and\nthe commons, showed that Crassus was dead and the isthmus broken. But\na monarchy, divested of its nobility, has no refuge under heaven but an\narmy. Wherefore the dissolution of this government caused the war, not\nthe war the dissolution of this government.\n\nOf the King\u2019s success with his arms it is not necessary to give any\nfurther account than that they proved as ineffectual as his nobility;\nbut without a nobility or an army (as has been shown) there can be no\nmonarchy. Wherefore what is there in nature that can arise out of these\nashes but a popular government, or a new monarchy to be erected by the\nvictorious army?\n\nTo erect a monarchy, be it never so new, unless like Leviathan you can\nhang it, as the country-fellow speaks, by geometry (for what else is it\nto say, that every other man must give up his will to the will of\nthis one man without any other foundation?), it must stand upon old\nprinciples--that is, upon a nobility or an army planted on a due balance\nof dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an adage of Caesar, and\nthere is no standing for a monarchy unless it finds this balance, or\nmakes it. If it finds it, the work is done to its hand; for, where there\nis inequality of estates, there must be inequality of power; and where\nthere is inequality of power, there can be no commonwealth. To make it,\nthe sword must extirpate out of dominion all other roots of power, and\nplant an army upon that ground. An army may be planted nationally or\nprovincially. To plant it nationally, it must be in one of the four\nways mentioned, that is, either monarchically in part, as the Roman\nbeneficiarii; or monarchically, in the whole, as the Turkish Timariots;\naristocratically that is, by earls and barons, as the Neustrians were\nplanted by Turbo; or democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the\nIsraelitish army in the land of Canaan by Joshua. In every one of these\nways there must not only be confiscations, but confiscations to such a\nproportion as may answer to the work intended.\n\nConfiscation of a people that never fought against you, but whose arms\nyou have borne, and in which you have been victorious, and this upon\npremeditation and in cold blood, I should have thought to be against\nany example in human nature, but for those alleged by Machiavel\nof Agathocles, and Oliveretto di Fermo, the former whereof being\ncaptain-general of the Syracusans, upon a day assembled the Senate and\nthe people, as if he had something to communicate with them, when at a\nsign given he cut the senators in pieces to a man, and all the richest\nof the people, by which means he came to be king. The proceedings of\nOliveretto, in making himself Prince of Fermo, were somewhat different\nin circumstances, but of the same nature. Nevertheless Catiline, who\nhad a spirit equal to any of these in his intended mischief, could never\nbring the like to pass in Rome. The head of a small commonwealth, such\na one as was that of Syracuse or Fermo, is easily brought to the block;\nbut that a populous nation, such as Rome, had not such a one, was the\ngrief of Nero. If Sylvia or Caesar attained to be princes, it was by\ncivil war, and such civil war as yielded rich spoils, there being a vast\nnobility to be confiscated; which also was the case in Oceana, when\nit yielded earth by earldoms, and baronies to the Neustrian for the\nplantation of his new potentates. Where a conqueror finds the riches of\na land in the hands of the few, the forfeitures are easy, and amount to\nvast advantage; but where the people have equal shares, the confiscation\nof many comes to little, and is not only dangerous but fruitless.\n\nThe Romans, in one of their defeats of the Volsci, found among the\ncaptives certain Tusculans, who, upon examination, confessed that the\narms they bore were by command of their State; whereupon information\nbeing given to the Senate by the general Camillus, he was forthwith\ncommanded to march against Tusculum which doing accordingly, he found\nthe Tusculan fields full of husbandmen, that stirred not otherwise from\nthe plough than to furnish his army with all kinds of accommodations\nand victuals. Drawing near to the city, he saw the gates wide open, the\nmagistrates coming out in their gowns to salute and bid him welcome;\nentering, the shops were all at work, and open, the streets sounded\nwith the noise of schoolboys at their books; there was no face of war.\nWhereupon Camillus, causing the Senate to assemble, told them, that\nthough the art was understood, yet had they at length found out the true\narms whereby the Romans were most undoubtedly to be conquered, for\nwhich cause he would not anticipate the Senate, to which he desired them\nforthwith to send, which they did accordingly; and their dictator with\nthe rest of their ambassadors being found by the Roman senators as\nthey went into the house standing sadly at the door were sent for in as\nfriends, and not as enemies; where the dictator having said, \u201cIf we\nhave offended, the fault was not so great as is our penitence and your\nvirtue,\u201d the Senate gave them peace forthwith, and soon after made the\nTusculans citizens of Rome.\n\nBut putting the case, of which the world is not able to show an example,\nthat the forfeiture of a populous nation, not conquered, but friends,\nand in cool blood, might be taken, your army must be planted in one of\nthe ways mentioned. To plant it in the way of absolute monarchy, that\nis, upon feuds for life, such as the Timars, a country as large and\nfruitful as that of Greece, would afford you but 16,000 Timariots, for\nthat is the most the Turk (being the best husband that ever was of\nthis kind) makes of it at this day: and if Oceana, which is less in\nfruitfulness by one-half, and in extent by three parts, should have no\ngreater a force, whoever breaks her in one battle, may be sure she shall\nnever rise; for such (as was noted by Machiavel) is the nature of the\nTurkish monarchy, if you break it in two battles, you have destroyed its\nwhole militia, and the rest being all slaves, you hold it without any\nfurther resistance. Wherefore the erection of an absolute monarchy in\nOceana, or in any other country that is no larger, without making it a\ncertain prey to the first invader is altogether impossible.\n\nTo plant by halves, as the Roman emperors did their beneficiaries,\nor military colonies, it must be either for life; and this an army of\nOceaners in their own country, especially having estates of inheritance,\nwill never bear because such an army so planted is as well confiscated\nas the people; nor had the Mamelukes been contented with such usage in\nEgypt, but that they were foreigners, and daring not to mix with the\nnatives, it was of absolute necessity to their being.\n\nOr planting them upon inheritance, whether aristocratically as the\nNeustrians, or democratically as the Israelites, they grow up by certain\nconsequences into the national interest, and this, if they be planted\npopularly, comes to a commonwealth; if by way of nobility, to a mixed\nmonarchy, which of all other will be found to be the only kind of\nmonarchy whereof this nation, or any other that is of no greater\nextent, has been or can be capable; for if the Israelites, though their\ndemocratical balance, being fixed by their agrarian, stood firm, be yet\nfound to have elected kings, it was because, their territory lying open,\nthey were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded, turned\nthemselves to anything which, through the want of experience, they\nthought might be a remedy; whence their mistake in election of their\nkings, under whom they gained nothing, but, on the contrary, lost all\nthey had acquired by their commonwealth, both estates and liberties, is\nnot only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have been, as\nwas shown, a kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the Vandals in Asia,\nconsisting of a single person and a Parliament (taking a parliament to\nbe a council of the people only, without a nobility), it is expressly\nsaid of those councils that they deposed their kings as often as they\npleased; nor can there be any other consequence of such a government,\nseeing where there is a council of the people they do never receive\nlaws, but give them; and a council giving laws to a single person, he\nhas no means in the world whereby to be any more than a subordinate\nmagistrate but force: in which case he is not a single person and a\nparliament, but a single person and an army, which army again must be\nplanted as has been shown, or can be of no long continuance.\n\nIt is true, that the provincial balance bring in nature quite contrary\nto the national, you are no way to plant a provincial army upon\ndominion. But then you must have a native territory in strength,\nsituation, or government, able to overbalance the foreign, or you can\nnever hold it. That an army should in any other case be long supported\nby a mere tax, is a mere fancy as void of all reason and experience as\nif a man should think to maintain such a one by robbing of orchards; for\na mere tax is but pulling of plum-trees, the roots whereof are in other\nmen\u2019s grounds, who, suffering perpetual violence, come to hate the\nauthor of it; and it is a maxim, that no prince that is hated by his\npeople can be safe. Arms planted upon dominion extirpate enemies and\nmake friends; but maintained by a mere tax, have enemies that have\nroots, and friends that have none.\n\nTo conclude, Oceana, or any other nation of no greater extent, must have\na competent nobility, or is altogether incapable of monarchy; for where\nthere is equality of estates, there must be equality of power, and where\nthere is equality of power, there can be no monarchy.\n\nTo come then to the generation of the commonwealth. It has been shown\nhow, through the ways and means used by Panurgus to abase the nobility,\nand so to mend that flaw which we have asserted to be incurable in this\nkind of constitution, he suffered the balance to fall into the power of\nthe people, and so broke the government; but the balance being in the\npeople, the commonwealth (though they do not see it) is already in the\nnature of them. There wants nothing else but time, which is slow\nand dangerous, or art, which would be more quick and secure, for the\nbringing those native arms, wherewithal they are found already, to\nresist, they know not how, everything that opposes them, to such\nmaturity as may fix them upon their own strength and bottom.\n\nBut whereas this art is prudence, and that part of prudence which\nregards the present work is nothing else but the skill of raising such\nsuperstructures of government as are natural to the known foundations,\nthey never mind the foundation, but through certain animosities,\nwherewith by striving one against another they are infected, or through\nfreaks, by which, not regarding the course of things, nor how they\nconduce to their purpose, they are given to building in the air, come to\nbe divided and subdivided into endless parties and factions, both civil\nand ecclesiastical, which, briefly to open, I shall first speak of the\npeople in general, and then of their divisions.\n\nA people, says Machiavel, that is corrupt, is not capable of a\ncommonwealth. But in showing what a corrupt people is, he has either\ninvolved himself, or me; nor can I otherwise come out of the labyrinth,\nthan by saying, the balance altering a people, as to the foregoing\ngovernment, must of necessity be corrupt; but corruption in this sense\nsignifies no more than that the corruption of one government, as in\nnatural bodies, is the generation of another. Wherefore if the balance\nalters from monarchy, the corruption of the people in this case is\nthat which makes them capable of a commonwealth. But whereas I am not\nignorant that the corruption which he means is in manners, this also is\nfrom the balance. For the balance leading from monarchical into popular\nabates the luxury of the nobility, and, enriching the people, brings the\ngovernment from a more private to a more public interest which coming\nnearer, as has been shown, to justice and right reason, the people upon\na like alteration is so far from such a corruption of manners as should\nrender them incapable of a commonwealth, that of necessity they must\nthereby contract such a reformation of manners as will bear no other\nkind of government. On the other side, where the balance changes from\npopular to oligarchical or monarchical, the public interest, with the\nreason and justice included in the sane, becomes more private; luxury is\nintroduced in the room of temperance, and servitude in that of freedom,\nwhich causes such a corruption of manners both in the nobility and\npeople, as, by the example of Rome in the time of the Triumvirs, is more\nat large discovered by the author to have been altogether incapable of a\ncommonwealth.\n\nBut the balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of Rome, the\nmanners of the people were not thereby corrupted, but, on the contrary,\nadapted to a commonwealth. For differences of opinion in a people not\nrightly informed of their balance, or a division into parties (while\nthere is not any common ligament of power sufficient to reconcile or\nhold them) is no sufficient proof of corruption. Nevertheless, seeing\nthis must needs be matter of scandal and danger, it will not be amiss,\nin showing what were the parties, to show what were their errors.\n\nThe parties into which this nation was divided, were temporal or\nspiritual; and the temporal parties were especially two, the one\nroyalists, the other republicans, each of which asserted their different\ncauses, either out of prudence or ignorance, out of interest or\nconscience.\n\nFor prudence, either that of the ancients is inferior to the modern,\nwhich we have hitherto been setting face to face, that anyone may judge,\nor that of the royalist must be inferior to that of the commonwealths\nman. And for interest, taking the commonwealths man to have really\nintended the public, for otherwise he is a hypocrite and the worst of\nmen, that of the royalist must of necessity have been more private.\nWherefore, the whole dispute will come upon matter of conscience, and\nthis, whether it be urged by the right of kings, the obligation of\nformer laws, or of the oath of allegiance, is absolved by the balance.\n\nFor if the right of kings were as immediately derived from the breath\nof God as the life of man, yet this excludes not death and dissolution.\nBut, that the dissolution of the late monarchy was as natural as the\ndeath of man, has been already shown. Wherefore it remains with the\nroyalists to discover by what reason or experience it is possible for a\nmonarchy to stand upon a popular balance; or, the balance being popular,\nas well the oath of allegiance, as all other monarchical laws, imply an\nimpossibility, and are therefore void.\n\nTo the commonwealths man I have no more to say, but that if he excludes\nany party, he is not truly such, nor shall ever found a commonwealth\nupon the natural principle of the same, which is justice. And the\nroyalist for having not opposed a commonwealth in Oceana, where the\nlaws were so ambiguous that they might be eternally disputed and never\nreconciled, can neither be justly for that cause excluded from his full\nand equal share in the government; nor prudently for this reason, that\na commonwealth consisting of a party will be in perpetual labor for her\nown destruction: whence it was that the Romans, having conquered the\nAlbans, incorporated them with equal right into the commonwealth. And\nif the royalists be \u201cflesh of your flesh,\u201d and nearer of blood than were\nthe Albans to the Romans, you being also both Christians, the argument\nis the stronger. Nevertheless there is no reason that a commonwealth\nshould any more favor a party remaining in fixed opposition against it,\nthan Brutus did his own sons. But if it fixes them upon that opposition,\nit is its own fault, not theirs; and this is done by excluding them. Men\nthat have equal possessions and the same security for their estates and\ntheir liberties that you have, have the same cause with you to defend\nboth; but if you will liberty, though for monarchy; and be trampling,\nthey fight for you for tyranny, though under the name of a commonwealth:\nthe nature of orders in a government rightly instituted being void of\nall jealousy, because, let the parties which it embraces be what they\nwill, its orders are such as they neither would resist if they could,\nnor could if they would, as has been partly already shown, and will\nappear more at large by the following model.\n\nThe parties that are spiritual are of more kinds than I need mention;\nsome for a national religion, and others for liberty of conscience,\nwith such animosity on both sides, as if these two could not consist\ntogether, and of which I have already sufficiently spoken, to show that\nindeed the one cannot well subsist without the other But they of all the\nrest are the most dangerous, who, holding that the saints must govern,\ngo about to reduce the commonwealth to a party, as well for the reasons\nalready shown, as that their pretences are against Scripture, where the\nsaints are commanded to submit to the higher powers, and to be subject\nto the ordinance of man. And that men, pretending under the notion\nof saints or religion to civil power, have hitherto never failed to\ndishonor that profession, the world is full of examples, whereof I shall\nconfine myself at present only to a couple, the one of old, the other of\nnew Rome.\n\nIn old Rome, the patricians or nobility pretending to be the godly\nparty, were questioned by the people for engrossing all the magistracies\nof that commonwealth, and had nothing to say why they did so, but that\nmagistracy required a kind of holiness which was not in the people;\nat which the people were filled with such indignation as had come to\ncutting of throats, if the nobility had not immediately laid by the\ninsolency of that plea; which nevertheless when they had done, the\npeople for a long time after continued to elect no other but patrician\nmagistrates.\n\nThe example of new Rome in the rise and practice of the hierarchy (too\nwell known to require any further illustration) is far more immodest.\n\nThis has been the course of nature; and when it has pleased or shall\nplease God to introduce anything that is above the course of nature,\nhe will, as he has always done, confirm it by miracle; for so in his\nprophecy of the reign of Christ upon earth he expressly promises, seeing\nthat \u201cthe souls of them that were beheaded for Jesus, shall be seen to\nlive and reign with him;\u201d which will be an object of sense, the rather,\nbecause the rest of the dead are not to live again till the thousand\nyears be finished. And it is not lawful for men to persuade us that a\nthing already is, though there be no such object of our sense, which God\nhas told us shall not be till it be an object of our sense.\n\nThe saintship of a people as to government, consists in the election\nof magistrates fearing God, and hating covetousness, and not in their\nconfining themselves, or being confined, to men of this or that party or\nprofession. It consists in making the most prudent and religious choice\nthey can; yet not in trusting to men, but, next God, to their own\norders. \u201cGive us good men, and they will make us good laws,\u201d is the\nmaxim of a demagogue, and is (through the alteration which is commonly\nperceivable in men, when they have power to work their own wills)\nexceeding fallible. But \u201cgive us good orders, and they will make us\ngood men,\u201d is the maxim of a legislator, and the most infallible in the\npolitics.\n\nBut these divisions (however there be some good men that look sadly on\nthem) are trivial things; first as to the civil concern, because the\ngovernment, whereof this nation is capable, being once seen, takes\nin all interests. And, secondly, as to the spiritual; because as the\npretence of religion has always been turbulent in broken governments, so\nwhere the government has been sound and steady, religion has never\nshown itself with any other face than that of its natural sweetness\nand tranquillity, nor is there any reason why it should, wherefore\nthe errors of the people are occasioned by their governors. If they\nbe doubtful of the way, or wander from it, it is because their guides\nmisled them; and the guides of the people are never so well qualified\nfor leading by any virtue of their own, as by that of the government.\n\nThe government of Oceana (as it stood at the time whereof we discourse,\nconsisting of one single Council of the people, exclusively of the King\nand the Lords) was called a Parliament: nevertheless the parliaments of\nthe Teutons and of the Neustrians consisted, as has been shown, of the\nKing, lords, and commons; wherefore this, under an old name, was a\nnew thing a parliament consisting of a single assembly elected by the\npeople, and invested with the whole power of the government, without\nany covenants, conditions, or orders whatsoever. So new a thing, that\nneither ancient nor modern prudence can show any avowed example of the\nlike. And there is scarce anything that seems to me so strange as that\n(whereas there was nothing more familiar with these councillors than to\nbring the Scripture to the house) there should not be a man of them that\nso much as offered to bring the house to the Scripture, wherein, as\nhas been shown, is contained that original, whereof all the rest of the\ncommonwealths seem to be copies. Certainly if Leviathan (who is surer\nof nothing than that a popular commonwealth consists but of one council)\ntranscribed his doctrine out of this assembly, for him to except against\nAristotle and Cicero for writing out of their own commonwealths was not\nso fair play; or if the Parliament transcribed out of him, it had been\nan honor better due to Moses. But where one of them should have an\nexample but from the other, I cannot imagine, there being nothing of\nthis kind that I can find in story, but the oligarchy of Athens, the\nThirty Tyrants of the same, and the Roman Decemvirs.\n\nFor the oligarchy, Thucydides tells us, that it was a Senate or council\nof 400, pretending to a balancing council of the people consisting of\n5,000, but not producing them; wherein you have the definition of\nan oligarchy, which is a single council both debating and resolving,\ndividing and choosing, and what that must come to was shown by the\nexample of the girls, and is apparent by the experience of all times;\nwherefore the thirty set up by the Lacedaemonians (when they had\nconquered Athens) are called tyrants by all authors, Leviathan only\nexcepted, who will have them against all the world to have been an\naristocracy, but for what reason I cannot imagine; these also, as void\nof any balance, having been void of that which is essential to every\ncommonwealth, whether aristocratical or popular, except he be pleased\nwith them, because that, according to the testimony of Xenophon, they\nkilled more men in eight months than the Lacedaemonians had done in ten\nyears; \u201coppressing the people (to use Sir Walter Raleigh\u2019s words) with\nall base and intolerable slavery.\u201d\n\nThe usurped government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the same kind.\nWherefore in the fear of God let Christian legislators (setting the\npattern given in the Mount on the one side, and these execrable examples\non the other) know the right hand from the left; and so much the rather,\nbecause those things which do not conduce to the good of the governed\nare fallacious, if they appear to be good for the governors. God, in\nchastising a people, is accustomed to burn his rod. The empire of these\noligarchies was not so violent as short, nor did they fall upon the\npeople, but in their own immediate ruin. A council without a balance is\nnot a commonwealth, but an oligarchy; and every oligarchy, except it\nbe put to the defence of its wickedness or power against some outward\ndanger, is factious. Wherefore the errors of the people being from their\ngovernors (which maxim in the politics bearing a sufficient testimony to\nitself, is also proved by Machiavel), if the people of Oceana have been\nfactious, the cause is apparent, but what remedy?\n\nIn answer to this question, I come now to the army, of which the most\nvictorious captain and incomparable patriot, Olphaus Megaletor, was now\ngeneral, who being a much greater master of that art whereof I have made\na rough draught in these preliminaries, had such sad reflections upon\nthe ways and proceedings of the Parliament as cast him upon books and\nall other means of diversion, among which he happened on this place of\nMachiavel: \u201cThrice happy is that people which chances to have a man able\nto give them such a government at once, as without alteration may secure\nthem of their liberties; seeing it was certain that Lacedaemon, in\nobserving the laws of Lycurgus, continued about 800 years without any\ndangerous tumult or corruption.\u201d My lord general (as it is said\nof Themistocles, that he could not sleep for the glory obtained by\nMiltiades at the battle of Marathon) took so new and deep an impression\nat these words of the much greater glory of Lycurgus, that, being on\nthis side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious object, and on\nthe other with the misery of the nation, which seemed (as it were\nruined by his victory) to cast itself at his feet, he was almost wholly\ndeprived of his natural rest, till the debate he had within himself came\nto a firm resolution, that the greatest advantages of a commonwealth\nare, first, that the legislator should be one man; and, secondly, that\nthe government should be made all together, or at once. For the first,\nit is certain, says Machiavel, that a commonwealth is seldom or never\nwell turned or constituted, except it has been the work of one man; for\nwhich cause a wise legislator, and one whose mind is firmly set, not\nupon private but the public interest, not upon his posterity but upon\nhis country, may justly endeavor to get the sovereign power into his\nown hands, nor shall any man that is master of reason blame such\nextraordinary means as in that case will be necessary, the end proving\nno other than the constitution of a well-ordered commonwealth.\n\nThe reason of this is demonstrable; for the ordinary means not failing,\nthe commonwealth has no need of a legislator, but the ordinary\nmeans failing, there is no recourse to be had but to such as are\nextraordinary. And, whereas a book or a building has not been known to\nattain to its perfection if it has not had a sole author or architect, a\ncommonwealth, as to the fabric of it, is of the like nature. And thus\nit may be made at once; in which there be great advantages; for a\ncommonwealth made at once, takes security at the same time it lends\nmoney; and trusts not itself to the faith of men, but launches\nimmediately forth into the empire of laws, and, being set straight,\nbrings the manners of its citizens to its rule, whence followed that\nuprightness which was in Lacedaemon. But manners that are rooted in men,\nbow the tenderness of a commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent,\nwhence followed the obliquity that was in Rome, and those perpetual\nrepairs by the consuls\u2019 axes, and tribunes\u2019 hammers, which could never\nfinish that commonwealth but in destruction.\n\nMy lord general being clear in these points, and of the necessity\nof some other course than would be thought upon by the Parliament,\nappointed a meeting of the army, where he spoke his sense agreeable\nto these preliminaries with such success to the soldiery, that the\nParliament was soon after deposed; had he himself, in the great hall\nof the Pantheon or palace of justice, situated in Emporium, the capital\ncity, was created by the universal suffrage of the army, Lord Archon, or\nsole legislator of Oceana, upon which theatre you have, to conclude this\npiece, a person introduced, whose fame shall never draw its curtain.\n\nThe Lord Archon being created, fifty select persons to assist him,\nby laboring in the mines of ancient prudence, and bringing its hidden\ntreasures to new light, were added, with the style also of legislators,\nand sat as a council, whereof he was the sole director and president.\n\n\n\n\nPART II. THE COUNCIL OF LEGISLATORS\n\nOF this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I shall be able\nat this time to give no further account, than very briefly to show at\nwhat it aims.\n\nMy Lord Archon, in opening the Council of legislators, made it\nappear how unsafe a thing it is to follow fancy in the fabric of a\ncommonwealth; and how necessary that the archives of ancient prudence\nshould be ransacked before any councillor should presume to offer any\nother matter in order to the work in hand, or toward the consideration\nto be had by the Council upon a model of government. Wherefore he caused\nan urn to be brought, and every one of the councillors to draw a lot. By\nthe lots as they were drawn,\n\n     The Commonwealth of                        Fell to\n\n     Israel......                            Phosphorus de Auge\n     Athens.....                             Navarchus de Paralo\n     Lacedaemon.....                         Laco de Scytale\n     Carthage..                              Mago de Syrtibus\n     The Achaeans, AEtolians, and Lycians....Aratus de Isthmo\n     The Switz Alpester                      de Fulmine\n     Holland and the United Provinces        Glaucus de Ulna\n     Rome......                              Dolabella de Enyo\n     Venice.....                             Lynceus de Stella\n\nThese contained in them all those excellencies whereof a commonwealth\nis capable; so that to have added more had been to no purpose. Upon\ntime given to the councillors, by their own studies and those of their\nfriends, to prepare themselves, they were opened in the order, and by\nthe persons mentioned at the Council of legislators, and afterward by\norder of the same were repeated at the council of the prytans to the\npeople; for in drawing of the lots, there were about a dozen of them\ninscribed with the letter P, whereby the councillors that drew them\nbecame prytans.\n\nThe prytans were a committee or council sitting in the great hall of\nPantheon, to whom it was lawful for any man to offer anything in order\nto the fabric of the commonwealth; for which cause, that they might not\nbe oppressed by the throng, there was a rail about the table where they\nsat, and on each side of the same a pulpit; that on the right hand for\nany man that would propose anything, and that on the left for any\nother that would oppose him. And all parties (being indemnified by\nproclamation of the Archon) were invited to dispute their own interests,\nor propose whatever they thought fit (in order to the future government)\nto the council of the prytans, who, having a guard of about two or three\nhundred men, lest the heat of dispute might break the peace, had\nthe right of moderators, and were to report from time to time such\npropositions or occurrences as they thought fit, to the Council of\nlegislators sitting more privately in the palace called Alma.\n\nThis was that which made the people (who were neither safely to\nbe admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the\ncommonwealth) verily believe, when it came forth, that it was no other\nthan that whereof they themselves had been the makers.\n\nMoreover, this Council sat divers months after the publishing and during\nthe promulgation of the model to the people; by which means there is\nscarce anything was said or written for or against the said model but\nyou shall have it with the next impression of this work, by way of\noration addressed to and moderated by the prytans.\n\nBy this means the Council of legislators had their necessary solitude\nand due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to time\nwith the pulse of the people, and yet without any manner of interruption\nor disturbance.\n\nWherefore every commonwealth in its place having been opened by due\nmethod--that is, first, by the people; secondly, by the Senate; and,\nthirdly, by the magistracy-the Council upon mature debate took such\nresults or orders out of each, and out of every part of each of them,\nas upon opening the same they thought fit; which being put from time to\ntime in writing by the clerk or secretary, there remained no more in\nthe conclusion, than putting the orders so taken together, to view and\nexamine them with a diligent eye, that it might be clearly discovered\nwhether they did interfere, or could anywise come to interfere or jostle\none with the other. For as such orders jostling or coming to jostle one\nanother are the certain dissolution of the commonwealth, so, taken upon\nthe proof of like experience, and neither jostling nor showing which way\nthey can possibly come to jostle one another, they make a perfect\nand (for aught that in human prudence can be foreseen) an immortal\ncommonwealth.\n\nAnd such was the art whereby my Lord Archon (taking council of\nthe Commonwealth of Israel, as of Moses; and of the rest of the\ncommonwealths, as of Jethro) framed the model of the Commonwealth of\nOceana.\n\n\n\n\nPART III. THE MODEL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA\n\nWHEREAS my Lord Archon, being from Moses and Lycurgus the first\nlegislator that hitherto is found in history to have introduced or\nerected an entire commonwealth at once, happened, like them also, to be\nmore intent upon putting the same into execution or action, than into\nwriting; by which means the model came to be promulgated or published\nwith more brevity and less illustration than are necessary for their\nunderstanding who have not been acquainted with the whole proceedings\nof the Council of legislators, and of the prytans, where it was asserted\nand cleared from all objections and doubts: to the end that I may supply\nwhat was wanting in the promulgated epitome to a more full and\nperfect narrative of the whole, I shall rather take the commonwealth\npractically; and as it has now given an account of itself in some years\u2019\nrevolutions (as Dicearchus is said to have done that of Lacedaemon,\nfirst transcribed by his hand some three or four hundred years after\nthe institution), yet not omitting to add for proof to every order such\ndebates and speeches of the legislators in their Council, or at least\nsuch parts of them as may best discover the reason of the government;\nnor such ways and means as were used in the institution or rise of the\nbuilding, not to be so well conceived, without some knowledge given of\nthe engines wherewithal the mighty weight was moved. But through the\nentire omission of the Council of legislators or workmen that squared\nevery stone to this structure in the quarries of ancient prudence, the\nproof of the first part of this discourse will be lame, except I\ninsert, as well for illustration as to avoid frequent repetition, three\nremarkable testimonies in this place.\n\nThe first is taken out of the Commonwealth of Israel: \u201cSo Moses\nhearkened to the voice of Jethro, his father-in-law, and did all that\nhe had said. And Moses chose able men out of all Israel, and made them\nheads over the people;\u201d tribunes, as it is in the vulgar Latin; or\nphylarchs, that is, princes of the tribes, sitting upon twelve thrones,\nand judging the twelve tribes of Israel; and next to these he chose\nrulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers\nof tens, which were the steps and rise of this commonwealth from its\nfoundation or root to its proper elevation or accomplishment in the\nSanhedrim, and the congregation, already opened in the preliminaries.\n\nThe second is taken out of Lacedaemon, as Lycurgus (for the greater\nimpression of his institutions upon the minds of his citizens) pretended\nto have received the model of that commonwealth from the oracle of\nApollo at Delphos, the words whereof are thus recorded by Plutarch in\nthe life of that famous legislator: \u201cWhen thou shalt have divided the\npeople into tribes (which were six) and oboe (which were five in every\ntribe), thou shalt constitute the Senate, consisting, with the two\nKings, of thirty councillors, who, according as occasion requires, shall\ncause the congregation to be assembled between the bridge and the river\nGnacion, where the Senate shall propose to the people, and dismiss them\nwithout suffering them to debate.\u201d The oboe were lineages into which\nevery tribe was divided, and in each tribe there was another division\ncontaining all those of the same that were of military age, which being\ncalled the mora, was subdivided into troops and companies that were kept\nin perpetual discipline under the command of a magistrate called the\npolemarch.\n\nThe third is taken out of the Commonwealth of Rome, or those parts of\nit which are comprised in the first and second books of Livy, where the\npeople, according to the institution by Romulus, are first divided into\nthirty curias or parishes, whereof he elected, by three out of each\ncuria, the Senate, which, from his reign to that or Servius Tullius,\nproposed to the parishes or parochial congregations; and these\nbeing called the Comitia curiata, had the election of the kings,\nthe confirmation of their laws, and the last appeal in matters of\njudicature, as appears in the case of Horatius that killed his sister;\ntill, in the reign of Servius (for the other kings kept not to the\ninstitution of Romulus), the people being grown somewhat, the power\nof the Curiata was for the greater part translated to the Centuriata\ncomitia instituted by this King, which distributed the people, according\nto the sense of valuation of their estates, into six classes, every one\ncontaining about forty centuries, divided into youth and elders; the\nyouth for field-service, the elders for the defence of their territory,\nall armed and under continual discipline, in which they assembled both\nupon military and civil occasions. But when the Senate proposed to the\npeople, the horse only, whereof there were twelve centuries, consisting\nof the richest sort over and above those of the foot enumerated, were\ncalled with the first classes of the foot to the suffrage; or if these\naccorded not, then the second classes were called to them, but seldom or\nnever any of the rest. Wherefore the people, after the expulsion of the\nkings, growing impatient of this inequality, rested not till they had\nreduced the suffrage as it had been in the Comitia curiato to the\nwhole people again; but in another way, that is to say, by the Comitia\ntributa, which thereupon were instituted, being a council where the\npeople in exigencies made laws without the Senate, which laws were\ncalled plebiscita. This Council is that in regard whereof Cicero and\nother great wits so frequently inveigh against the people, and sometimes\neven Livy as at the first institution of it. To say the truth, it was a\nkind of anarchy, whereof the people could not be excusable, if there had\nnot, through the courses taken by the Senate, been otherwise a necessity\nthat they must have seen the commonwealth run into oligarchy.\n\nThe manner how the Comitia curiata, centuriata or tributa were called,\nduring the time of the commonwealth, to the suffrage, was by lot: the\ncuria, century, or tribe, whereon the first lot fell, being styled\nprincipium, or the prerogative; and the other curioe, centuries or\ntribes, whereon the second, third, and fourth lots, etc., fell, the\njure vocatoe. From henceforth not the first classes, as in the times\nof Servius, but the prerogative, whether curia, century, or tribe, came\nfirst to the suffrage, whose vote was called omen proerogativum, and\nseldom failed to be leading to the rest of the tribes. The jure vocatoe,\nin the order of their lots, came next: the manner of giving suffrage\nwas, by casting wooden tablets, marked for the affirmative or the\nnegative, into certain urns standing upon a scaffold, as they marched\nover it in files, which for the resemblance it bore was called the\nbridge. The candidate, or competitor, who had most suffrages in a curia,\ncentury, or tribe, was said to have that curia, century, or tribe;\nand he who had most of the curioe, centuries, or tribes, carried the\nmagistracy.\n\nThese three places being premised, as such upon which there will be\nfrequent reflection, I come to the narrative, divided into two parts,\nthe first containing the institution, the second the constitution of the\ncommonwealth, in each whereof I shall distinguish the orders, as those\nwhich contain the whole model, from the rest of the discourse, which\ntends only to the explanation or proof of them.\n\nIn the institution or building of a commonwealth, the first work, as\nthat of builders, can be no other than fitting and distributing the\nmaterials.\n\nThe materials of a commonwealth are the people, and the people of Oceana\nwere distributed by casting them into certain divisions, regarding their\nquality, their age, their wealth, and the places of their residence or\nhabitation, which was done by the ensuing orders.\n\nThe first order \u201cdistributes the people into freemen or citizens and\nservants, while such; for if they attain to liberty, that is, to live of\nthemselves, they are freemen or citizens.\u201d\n\nThis order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of servitude, which\nis inconsistent with freedom, or participation of government in a\ncommonwealth.\n\nThe second order \u201cdistributes citizens into youth and elders (such as\nare from eighteen years of age to thirty, being accounted youth; and\nsuch as are of thirty and upward, elders), and establishes that\nthe youth shall be the marching armies, and the elders the standing\ngarrisons of this nation.\u201d\n\n  A commonwealth, whose arms are in the hands of her\nservants, had need be situated, as is elegantly said of Venice by\nContarini, out of the reach of their clutches; witness the danger run\nby that of Carthage in the rebellion of Spendius and Matho. But though\na city, if one swallow makes a summer, may thus chance to be safe, yet\nshall it never be great; for if Carthage or Venice acquired any fame\nin their arms, it is known to have happened through the mere virtue of\ntheir captains, and not of their orders; wherefore Israel, Lacedaemon,\nand Rome entailed their arms upon the prime of their citizens, divided,\nat least in Lacedaemon and Rome, into youth and elders: the youth for\nthe field, and the elders for defence of the territory.\n\nThe third order \u201cdistributes the citizens into horse and foot, by the\nsense or valuation of their estates; they who have above \u00a3100 a year in\nlands, goods, or moneys, being obliged to be of the horse, and they\nwho have under that sum to be of the foot. But if a man has prodigally\nwasted and spent his patrimony, he is neither capable of magistracy,\noffice, or suffrage in the commonwealth.\u201d\n\nCitizens are not only to defend the commonwealth, but according to their\nabilities, as the Romans under Servius Tullius (regard had to their\nestates), were some enrolled in the horse centuries, and others of the\nfoot, with arms enjoined accordingly, nor could it be otherwise in the\nrest of the commonwealths, though out of historical remains, that are\nso much darker, it be not so clearly probable. And the necessary\nprerogative to be given by a commonwealth to estates, is in some measure\nin the nature of industry, and the use of it to the public. \u201cThe Roman\npeople,\u201d says Julius Exuperantius, \u201cwere divided into classes, and taxed\naccording to the value of their estates. All that were worth the sums\nappointed were employed in the wars; for they most eagerly contend\nfor the victory; who fight for liberty in defence of their country and\npossessions. But the poorer sort were polled only for their heads (which\nwas all they had) and kept in garrison at home in time of war; for these\nmight betray the armies for bread, by reason of their poverty, which is\nthe reason that Marius, to whom the care of the government ought not to\nhave been committed, was the first that led them into the field;\u201d and\nhis success was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as exorbitant\nriches overthrow the balance of a commonwealth, so extreme poverty\ncannot hold it, nor is by any means to be trusted with it. The clause in\nthe order concerning the prodigal is Athenian, and a very laudable one;\nfor he that could not live upon his patrimony, if he comes to touch the\npublic money, makes a commonwealth bankrupt.\n\nThe fourth order \u201cdistributes the people according to the places of\ntheir habitation, into parishes, hundreds, and tribes.\u201d\n\nFor except the people be methodically distributed, they cannot be\nmethodically collected; but the being of a commonwealth consists in the\nmethodical collection of the people: wherefore you have the Israelitish\ndivisions into rulers of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, and of\ntens; and of the whole commonwealth into tribes: the Laconic into oboe,\nmoras, and tribes; the Roman into tribes, centuries, and classes; and\nsomething there must of necessity be in every government of the like\nnature, as that in the late monarchy--by counties. But this being the\nonly institution in Oceana, except that of the agrarian, which required\nany charge or included any difficulty, engages me to a more particular\ndescription of the manner how it was performed, as follows:\n\nA thousand surveyors, commissioned and instructed by the Lord Archon\nand the Council, being divided into two equal numbers, each under the\ninspection of two surveyors-general, were distributed into the northern\nand southern parts of the territory, divided by the river Hemisua, the\nwhole whereof contains about 10,000 parishes, some ten of those being\nassigned to each surveyor; for as to this matter there needed no great\nexactness, it tending only by showing whither everyone was to, begin, to\nthe more orderly carrying repair and whereabout to on of the work; the\nnature of their instructions otherwise regarding rather the number of\nthe inhabitants than of the parishes. The surveyors, therefore, being\nevery one furnished with a convenient proportion of urns, balls,\nand balloting-boxes--in the use whereof they had been formerly\nexercised--and now arriving each at his respective parish, being with\nthe people by teaching them their first lesson, which was the ballot;\nand though they found them in the beginning somewhat froward, as at\ntoys, with which, while they were in expectation of greater matters from\na Council of legislators, they conceived themselves to be abused, they\ncame within a little while to think them pretty sport, and at length\nsuch as might very soberly be used in good earnest; whereupon the\nsurveyors began the institution included in--\n\nThe first order, requiring \u201cThat upon the first Monday next ensuing the\nlast of December the bigger bell in every parish throughout the nation\nbe rung at eight of the clock in the morning, and continue ringing\nfor the space of one hour; and that all the elders of the parish\nrespectively repair to the church before the bell has done ringing,\nwhere, dividing themselves into two equal numbers, or as near equal as\nmay be, they shall take their places according to their dignities, if\nthey be of divers qualities, and according to their seniority, if they\nbe of the same, the one half on the one side, and the other half on the\nother, in the body of the church, which done, they shall make oath to\nthe overseers of the parish for the time being (instead of these the\nsurveyors were to officiate at the institution, or first assembly) by\nholding up their hands, to make a fair election according to the laws of\nthe ballot, as they are hereafter explained, of such persons, amounting\nto a fifth part of their whole number, to be their deputies, and to\nexercise their power in manner hereafter explained, as they shall think\nin their consciences to be fittest for that trust, and will acquit\nthemselves of it to the best advantage of the commonwealth. And oath\nbeing thus made, they shall proceed to election, if the elders of the\nparish amount to 1,000 by the ballot of the tribe, as it is in due place\nexplained, and if the elders of the parish amount to fifty or upward,\nbut within the number of 1,000, by the ballot of the hundred, as it is\nin due place explained. But, if the elders amount not to fifty, then\nthey shall proceed to the ballot of the parish, as it is in this place\nand after this manner explained.\n\n\u201cThe two overseers for the time being shall seat themselves at the upper\nend of the middle alley, with a table before them, their faces being\ntoward the congregation, and the constable for the time being shall set\nan urn before the table, into which he shall put so many balls as there\nbe elders present, whereof there shall be one that is gilded, the rest\nbeing white; and when the constable has shaken the urn, sufficiently to\nmix the balls, the overseers shall call the elders to the urn, who from\neach side of the church shall come up the middle alley in two files,\nevery man passing by the urn, and drawing out one ball; which, if it be\nsilver, he shall cast into a bowl standing at the foot of the urn, and\nreturn by the outward alley on his side to his place. But he who\ndraws the golden ball is the proposer, and shall be seated between the\noverseers, where he shall begin in what order he pleases, and name such\nas, upon his oath already taken, he conceives fittest to be chosen,\none by one, to the elders; and the party named shall withdraw while the\ncongregation is balloting his name by the double box or boxes appointed\nand marked on the outward part, to show which side is affirmative\nand which negative, being carried by a boy or boys appointed by the\noverseers, to every one of the elders, who shall hold up a pellet made\nof linen rags between his finger and his thumb, and put it after such\na manner into the box, as though no man can see into which side he puts\nit, yet any man may see that he puts in but one pellet or suffrage. And\nthe suffrage of the congregation being thus, given, shall be returned\nwith the box or boxes to the overseers, who opening the same, shall pour\nthe affirmative balls into a white bowl standing upon the table on the\nright hand, to be numbered by the first overseer; and the negative into\na green bowl standing on the left hand, to be numbered by the second\noverseer; and the suffrages being numbered, he who has the major part in\nthe affirmative is one of the deputies of the parish, and when so many\ndeputies are chosen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole number\nof the elders, the ballot for that time shall cease. The deputies being\nchosen are to be listed by the overseers in order as they were chosen,\nexcept only that such as are horse must be listed in the first place\nwith the rest, proportionable to the number of the congregation, after\nthis manner.\u201d\n\nAnno Domini\n\n\n     THE LIST OF THE FIRST MOVER\n\n     A.A. Equestrian Order, First Deputy\n     B.B. Second Deputy,\n     C.C. Third Deputy,\n     D.D. Fourth Deputy,\n     E.E. Fifty Deputy,\n\n     Of the parish of  in the hundred of  and the tribe\n     of, which parish at the present election contains twenty\n     elders, whereof one is of the horse or equestrian order.\n\n\u201cThe first and second in the list are overseers by consequence; the\nthird is the constable, and the fourth and fifth are churchwardens; the\npersons so chosen are deputies of the parish for the space of one year\nfrom their election, and no longer, nor may they be elected two years\ntogether. This list, being the primum mobile, or first mover of\nthe commonwealth, is to be registered in a book diligently kept and\npreserved by the overseers, who are responsible in their places, for\nthese and other duties to be hereafter mentioned, to the censors of the\ntribe; and the congregation is to observe the present order, as they\nwill answer the contrary to the phylarch, or prerogative troop of the\ntribe, which, in case of failure in the whole or any part of it, have\npower to fine them or any of them at discretion, but under an appeal to\nthe Parliament.\u201d\n\nFor proof of this order, first, in reason, it is with all politicians\npast dispute that paternal power is in the right of nature; and this is\nno other than the derivation of power from fathers of families as the\nnatural root of a commonwealth. And for experience, if it be otherwise\nin that of Holland, I know no other example of the like kind. In Israel,\nthe sovereign power came clearly from the natural root, the elders of\nthe whole people; and Rome was born, Comitiis curiatis, in her parochial\ncongregations, out of which Romulus first raised her Senate, then all\nthe rest of the orders of that commonwealth, which rose so high: for the\ndepth of a commonwealth is the just height of it--\n\n     \u201cShe raises up her head unto the skies,\n     Near as her root unto the centre lies.\u201d\n\nAnd if the Commonwealth of Rome was born of thirty parishes, this of\nOceana was born of 10,000. But whereas mention in the birth of this\nis made of an equestrian order, it may startle such as know that the\ndivision of the people of Rome, at the institution of that commonwealth\ninto orders, was the occasion of its ruin. The distinction of the\npatrician as a hereditary order from the very institution, engrossing\nall the magistracies, was indeed the destruction of Rome; but to a\nknight or one of the equestrian order, says Horace,\n\n     \u201cSi quadringentis sex septem millia desunt,\n     Plebs eris.\u201d\n\nBy which it should seem that this order was not otherwise hereditary\nthan a man\u2019s estate, nor did it give any claim to magistracy; wherefore\nyou shall never find that it disquieted the commonwealth, nor does the\nname denote any more in Oceana than the duty of such a man\u2019s estate to\nthe public.\n\nBut the surveyors, both in this place and in others, forasmuch as they\ncould not observe all the circumstances of this order, especially that\nof the time of election, did for the first as well as they could; and,\nthe elections being made and registered, took each of them copies\nof those lists which were within their allotments, which done they\nproduced--\n\nThe sixth order, directing \u201cin case a parson or vicar of a parish comes\nto be removed by death or by the censors, that the congregation of the\nparish assemble and depute one or two elders by the ballot, who upon\nthe charge of the parish shall repair to one of the universities of this\nnation with a certificate signed by the overseers, and addressed to\nthe vice-chancellor, which certificate, giving notice of the death\nor removal of the parson or vicar, of the value of the parsonage or\nvicarage, and of the desire of the congregation to receive a probationer\nfrom that university, the vice-chancellor, upon the receipt thereof,\nshall call a convocation, and having made choice of a fit person, shall\nreturn him in due time to the parish, where the person so returned shall\nreturn the full fruits of the benefice or vicarage, and do the duty of\nthe parson or vicar, for the space of one year, as probationer; and\nthat being expired, the congregation of the elders shall put their\nprobationer to the ballot, and if he attains not to two parts in three\nof the suffrage affirmative, he shall take his leave of the parish, and\nthey shall send in like manner as before for another probationer; but\nif their probationer obtains two parts in three of the suffrage\naffirmative, he is then pastor of that parish. And the pastor of the\nparish shall pray with the congregation, preach the Word, and administer\nthe sacraments to the same, according to the directory to be hereafter\nappointed by the Parliament. Nevertheless such as are of gathered\ncongregations, or from time to time shall join with any of them, are in\nno wise obliged to this way of electing their teachers, or to give\ntheir votes in this case, but wholly left to the liberty of their own\nconsciences, and to that way of worship which they shall choose, being\nnot popish, Jewish, or idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better\nprotected by the State in the exercise of the same, they are desired to\nmake choice, and such manner as they best like, of certain magistrates\nin every one of their congregations, which we could wish might be four\nin each of them, to be auditors in cases of differences or distaste, if\nany through variety of opinions, that may be grievous or injurious to\nthem, shall fall out. And such auditors or magistrates shall have power\nto examine the matter, and inform themselves, to the end that if they\nthink it of sufficient weight, they may acquaint the phylarch with it,\nor introduce it into the Council of Religion; where all such causes\nas those magistrates introduce shall from time to time be heard and\ndetermined according to such laws as are or shall hereafter be provided\nby the Parliament for the just defence of the liberty of conscience.\u201d\n\nThis order consists of three parts, the first restoring the power of\nordination to the people, which, that it originally belongs to them,\nis clear, though not in English yet in Scripture, where the apostles\nordained elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation, that\nis, by the suffrage of the people, which was also given in some of\nthose cities by the ballot. And though it may be shown that the apostles\nordained some by the laying on of hands, it will not be shown that they\ndid so in every congregation.\n\nExcommunication, as not clearly provable out of the Scripture, being\nomitted, the second part of the order implies and establishes a national\nreligion; for there be degrees of knowledge in divine things; true\nreligion is not to be learned without searching the Scripture; the\nScriptures cannot be searched by us unless we have them to search; and\nif we have nothing else, or (which is all one) understand nothing else\nbut a translation, we may be (as in the place alleged we have been)\nbeguiled or misled by the translation, while we should be searching the\ntrue sense of the Scripture, which cannot be attained in a natural way\n(and a commonwealth is not to presume upon that which is supernatural)\nbut by the knowledge of the original and of antiquity, acquired by our\nown studies, or those of some others, for even faith comes by hearing.\nWherefore a commonwealth not making provision of men from time to time,\nknowing in the original languages wherein the Scriptures were written,\nand versed in those antiquities to which they so frequently relate, that\nthe true sense of them depends in great part upon that knowledge,\ncan never be secure that she shall not lose the Scripture, and by\nconsequence her religion; which to preserve she must institute some\nmethod of this knowledge, and some use of such as have acquired it,\nwhich amounts to a national religion.\n\nThe commonwealth having thus performed her duty toward God, as a\nrational creature, by the best application of her reason to Scripture,\nand for the preservation of religion in the purity of the same, yet\npretends not to infallibility, but comes in the third part of the order,\nestablishing liberty of conscience according to the instructions given\nto her Council of Religion, to raise up her hands to heaven for further\nlight; in which proceeding she follows that (as was shown in the\npreliminaries) of Israel, who, though her national religion was always\na part of her civil law, gave to her prophets the upper hand of all her\norders.\n\nBut the surveyors having now done with the parishes, took their leave;\nso a parish is the first division of land occasioned by the first\ncollection of the people of Oceana, whose function proper to that place\nis comprised in the six preceding orders.\n\nThe next step in the progress of the surveyors was to a meeting of the\nnearest of them, as their work lay, by twenties; where conferring their\nlists, and computing the deputies contained therein, as the number of\nthem in parishes, being nearest neighbors, amounted to 100, or as even\nas might conveniently be brought with that account, they cast them and\nthose parishes into the precinct which (be the deputies ever since\nmore or fewer) is still called the hundred; and to every one of these\nprecincts they appointed a certain place, being the most convenient town\nwithin the same, for the annual rendezvous; which done, each surveyor,\nreturning to his hundred, and summoning the deputies contained in his\nlists to the rendezvous, they appeared and received--\n\nThe seventh order, requiring, \u201cThat upon the first Monday next ensuing\nthe last of January, the deputies of every parish annually assemble\nin arms at the rendezvous of the hundred, and there elect out of their\nnumber one justice of the peace, one juryman, one captain, one ensign of\ntheir troop or century, each of these out of the horse; and one juryman,\none coroner, one high constable, out of the foot. The election to be\nmade by the ballot in this manner. The jurymen for the time being are\nto be overseers of the ballot (instead of these, the surveyors are to\nofficiate at the first assembly), and to look to the performance of\nthe same according to what was directed in the ballot of the parishes,\nsaving that the high constable setting forth the urn shall have five\nseveral suits of gold balls, and one dozen of every suit; whereof the\nfirst shall be marked with the letter A, the second with the letter B,\nthe third with C, the fourth with D, and the fifth with E: and of each\nof these suits he shall cast one ball into his hat, or into a little\nurn, and shaking the balls together, present them to the first overseer,\nwho shall draw one, and the suit which is so drawn by the overseer shall\nbe of use for that day, and no other; for example, if the overseer drew\nan A, the high constable shall put seven gold balls marked with the\nletter A into the urn, with so many silver ones as shall bring them\neven with the number of the deputies, who being sworn, as before, at\nthe ballot of the parish to make a fair election, shall be called to the\nurn; and every man coming in manner as was there shown, shall draw one\nball, which, if it be silver, he shall cast it into a bowl standing at\nthe foot of the urn, and return to his place: but the first that draws a\ngold ball (showing it to the overseers, who if it has not the letter of\nthe present ballot, have power to apprehend and punish him) is the first\nelector, the second the second elector, and so to the seventh; which\norder they are to observe in their function. \u201cThe electors as they are\ndrawn shall be placed upon the bench by the overseers, till the whole\nnumber be complete, and then be conducted, with the list of the officers\nto be chosen, into a place apart, where, being private, the first\nelector shall name a person to the first office in the list; and if the\nperson so named, being balloted by the rest of the electors, attains\nnot to the better half of the suffrages in the affirmative, the first\nelector shall continue nominating others, till one of them so nominated\nby him attains to the plurality of the suffrages in the affirmative, and\nbe written first competitor to the first office. This done, the second\nelector shall observe in his turn the like order; and so the rest of the\nelectors, naming competitors each to his respective office in the list,\ntill one competitor be chosen to every office: and when one competitor\nis chosen to every office, the first elector shall begin again to name\na second competitor to the first office, and the rest successively shall\nname to the rest of the offices till two competitors be chosen to every\noffice; the like shall be repeated till three competitors be chosen to\nevery office. And when three competitors are chosen to every office, the\nlist shall be returned to the overseers, or such as the overseers, in\ncase they or either of them happened to be electors, have substituted\nin his or their place or places; and the overseers or substitutes\nhaving caused the list to be read to the congregation, shall put\nthe competitors, in order as they are written, to the ballot of the\ncongregation; and the rest of the proceedings being carried on in\nthe manner directed in the fifth order, that competitor, of the three\nwritten to each office, who has most of the suffrages above half in the\naffirmative, is the officer. The list being after this manner completed,\nshall be entered into a register, to be kept at the rendezvous of the\nhundred, under inspection of the magistrates of the same, after the\nmanner following:\n\nAnno Domini\n\n\n     THE LIST OF THE NEBULOSA\n\n     A.A. Equestrian Order, Justice of the Peace,\n     B.B. Equestrian Order, First Juryman,\n     C.C. Equestrian Order, Captain of the Hundred,\n     D.D. Equestrian Order, Ensign,\n     E.E. Second Juryman,\n     F.F. High Constable,\n     G.G. Coroner,\n\n     Of the hundred of  in the tribe of, which hundred\n     consists at this election of 105 deputies.\n\n\u201cThe list being entered, the high constable shall take three copies of\nthe same, whereof he shall presently return one to the lord high sheriff\nof the tribe, a second to the lord custos rotulorum, and a third to the\ncensors; or these, through the want of such magistrates at the first\nmuster, may be returned to the orator, to be appointed for that tribe.\nTo the observation of all and every part of this order, the officers and\ndeputies of the hundred are all and every of them obliged, as they will\nanswer it to the phylarch, who has power, in case of failure in the\nwhole or any part, to fine all or any of them so failing at discretion,\nor according to such laws as shall hereafter be provided in that case,\nbut under an appeal to the Parliament.\u201d There is little in this order\nworthy of any further account, but that it answers to the rulers\nof hundreds in Israel, to the mora or military part of the tribe in\nLacedaemon, and to the century in Rome. The jurymen, being two in a\nhundred, and so forty in a tribe, give the latitude allowed by the law\nfor exceptions. And whereas the golden balls at this ballot begin to be\nmarked with letters, whereof one is to be drawn immediately before it\nbegins, this is to the end that the letter being unknown, men may be\nfrustrated of tricks or foul play, whereas otherwise a man may bring a\ngolden ball with him, and make as if he had drawn it out of the urn. The\nsurveyors, when they had taken copies of these lists, had accomplished\ntheir work in the hundreds.\n\nSo a hundred is the second division of land occasioned by the second\ncollection of the people, whose civil and military functions proper to\nthis place are comprised in the foregoing order.\n\nHaving stated the hundreds, they met once again by twenties, where there\nwas nothing more easy than to cast every twenty hundreds, as they lay\nmost conveniently together, into one tribe; so the whole territory of\nOceana, consisting of about 10,000 parishes, came to be cast into 1,000\nhundreds, and into fifty tribes. In every tribe at the place appointed\nfor the annual rendezvous of the same, were then, or soon after begun\nthose buildings which are now called pavilions; each of them standing\nwith one open side upon fair columns, like the porch of some ancient\ntemple, and looking into a field capable of the muster of some 4,000\nmen; before each pavilion stand three pillars sustaining urns for\nthe ballot, that on the right hand equal in height to the brow of\na horseman, being called the horse urn, that on the left hand, with\nbridges on either side to bring it equal in height with the brow of a\nfootman, being called the foot urn, and the middle urn, with a bridge\non the side toward the foot urn, the other side, as left for the horse,\nbeing without one; and here ended the whole work of the surveyors, who\nreturned to the Lord Archon with this--\n\n\nACCOUNT OF THE CHARGE\n\n   Imprimis: Urns, balls, and balloting-boxes for 10,000 parishes,\n   the same being wooden-ware,                     \u00a320,000\n   Item: Provision of the like kind for a thousand hundreds\n\n                                        3,000\n   Item: Urns and balls of metal, with balloting-boxes for fifty\n   tribes,\n\n                                        2,000\n   Item: For erecting of fifty pavilions,\n\n                                       60,000\n   Item: Wages for four surveyors-general at \u00a31,000 a man\n\n                                        4,000\n   Item: Wages for the rest of the surveyors, being 1,000 at \u00a3250 a\n   man\n\n                                      250,000\n\n               Sum Total             \u00a3339,000\n\nThis is no great matter of charge for the building of a commonwealth, in\nregard that it has cost (which was pleaded by the surveyors) as much\nto rig a few ships. Nevertheless that proves not them to be honest,\nnor their account to be just; but they had their money for once, though\ntheir reckoning be plainly guilty of a crime, to cost him his neck that\ncommits it another time, it being impossible for a commonwealth (without\nan exact provision that it be not abused in this kind) to subsist; for\nif no regard should be had of the charge (though that may go deep), yet\nthe debauchery and corruption whereto, by negligence in accounts, it\ninfallibly exposes its citizens, and thereby lessens the public faith,\nwhich is the nerve and ligament of government, ought to be prevented.\nBut the surveyors being despatched, the Lord Archon was very curious in\ngiving names to his tribes, which having caused to be written in scrolls\ncast into an urn, and presented to the councillors, each of them drew\none, and was accordingly sent to the tribe in his lot, as orators of\nthe same, a magistracy no otherwise instituted, than for once and pro\ntempore, to the end that the council upon so great an occasion might\nboth congratulate with the tribes, and assist at the first muster in\nsome things of necessity to be differently carried from the established\nadministration and future course of the commonwealth.\n\nThe orators being arrived, every one as soon as might be, at the\nrendezvous of his tribe, gave notice to the hundreds, and summoned the\nmuster which appeared for the most part upon good horses, and already\nindifferently well armed; as to instance in one for all, the tribe of\nNubia, where Hermes de Caduceo, lord orator of the same, after a short\nsalutation and a hearty welcome, applied himself to his business, which\nbegan with--\n\nThe eighth order requiring \u201cThat the lord high sheriff as\ncommander-in-chief, and the lord custos rotulorum as muster-master of\nthe tribe (or the orator for the first muster), upon reception of the\nlists of their hundreds, returned to them by the high constables of the\nsame, presently cause them to be cast up, dividing the horse from\nthe foot, and listing the horse by their names in troops, each troop\ncontaining about 100 in number, to be inscribed First, Second, or Third\ntroop, etc., according to the order agreed upon by the said magistrates;\nwhich done, they shall list the foot in like manner, and inscribe the\ncompanies in like order. These lists upon the eve of the muster shall\nbe delivered to certain trumpeters and drummers, whereof there shall\nbe fifteen of each sort (as well for the present as otherwise to be\nhereafter mentioned) stipendiated by the tribe. And the trumpeters and\ndrummers shall be in the field before the pavilion, upon the day of the\nmuster, so soon as it is light, where they shall stand every one with\nhis list in his hand, at a due distance, placed according to the order\nof the list, the trumpeters with the lists of the horse on the right\nhand, and the drummers with the lists of the foot on the left hand;\nwhere having sounded awhile, each of them shall begin to call and\ncontinue calling the names of the deputies, as they come into the field,\ntill both the horse and foot be gathered by that means into their due\norder. The horse and foot being in order, the lord lieutenant of the\ntribe shall cast so many gold balls marked with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4,\netc., as there be troops of horse in the field, together with so many\nsilver balls as there be companies, marked in the same manner, into\na little urn, to which he shall call the captains; and the captains\ndrawing the gold balls shall command the horse, and those that draw the\nsilver the foot, each in the order of his lot. The like shall be done by\nthe conductor at the same time for the ensigns at another urn; and they\nthat draw the gold balls shall be cornets, the left ensigns.\u201d\n\nThis order may puzzle the reader, but tends to a wonderful speed of the\nmuster, to which it would be a great matter to lose a day in ranging\nand marshalling, whereas by virtue of this the tribe is no sooner in the\nfield than in battalia, nor sooner in battalia than called to the urns\nor the ballot by virtue of--\n\nThe ninth order, \u201cWhereby the censors (or the orator for the first\nmuster) upon reception of the lists of the hundreds from the high\nconstables, according as is directed by the seventh order are to make\ntheir notes for the urns beforehand, with regard had to the lists of the\nmagistrates, to be elected by the ensuing orders, that is to say, by the\nfirst list called the prime magnitude, six; and by the second called the\ngalaxy, nine. Wherefore the censors are to put into the middle urn for\nthe election of the first list twenty-four gold balls, with twenty-six\nblanks or silver balls, in all sixty; and into the side urns sixty gold\nballs, divided into each according to the different number of the horse\nand foot; that is to say, if the horse and the foot be equal, equally,\nand if the horse and the foot be unequal, unequally, by an arithmetical\nproportion. The like shall be done the second day of the muster for\nthe second list, except that the censors shall put into the middle urn\nthirty-six gold balls with twenty-four blanks, in all sixty; and sixty\ngold balls into the side urns, divided respectively into the number of\nthe horse and the foot; and the gold balls in the side urns at either\nballot are by the addition of blanks to be brought even with the\nnumber of the ballotants at either urn respectively. The censors having\nprepared their notes, as has been shown, and being come at the day\nappointed into the field, shall present a little urn to the lord high\nsheriff, who is to draw twice for the letters to be used that day,\nthe one at the side urns, and the other at the middle. And the censors\nhaving fitted the urns accordingly, shall place themselves in certain\nmovable seats or pulpits (to be kept for that use in the pavilion) the\nfirst censor before the horse urn, the second before the foot urn, the\nlord lieutenant doing the office of censor pro tempore at the middle\nurn; where all and every one of them shall cause the laws of the ballot\nto be diligently observed, taking a special care that no man be suffered\nto come above once to the urn (whereof it more particularly concerns\nthe sub-censors, that is to say, the overseers of every parish, to be\ncareful, they being each in this regard responsible for their respective\nparishes) or to draw above one ball, which if it be gold, he is to\npresent to the censor, who shall look upon the letter; and if it be not\nthat of the day, and of the respective urn, apprehend the party, who for\nthis or any other like disorder is obnoxious to the phylarch.\u201d\n\nThis order being observed by the censors, it is not possible for the\npeople, if they can but draw the balls, though they understand nothing\nat all of the ballot, to be out. To philosophize further upon this art,\nthough there be nothing more rational, were not worth the while, because\nin writing it will be perplexed, and the first practice of it gives\nthe demonstration; whence it came to pass that the orator, after some\nneedless pains in the explanation of the two foregoing orders, betaking\nhimself to exemplify the same, found the work done to his hand, for the\ntribe, as eager upon a business of this nature, had retained one of\nthe surveyors, out of whom (before the orator arrived) they had got the\nwhole mystery by a stolen muster, at which in order to the ballot they\nhad made certain magistrates pro tempore. Wherefore he found not only\nthe pavilion (for this time a tent) erected with three posts, supplying\nthe place of pillars to the urns, but the urns being prepared with a\njust number of balls for the first ballot, to become the field, and the\noccasion very gallantly with their covers made in the manner of helmets,\nopen at either ear to give passage to the hands of the ballotants, and\nslanting with noble plumes to direct the march of the people.\n\nWherefore he proceeded to--\n\nThe tenth order, \u201cRequiring of the deputies of the parishes, that upon\nevery Monday next ensuing the last of February, they make their personal\nappearance, horse and foot in arms accordingly, at the rendezvous of\nthe tribe, where, being in discipline, the horse upon the right, and the\nfoot upon the left, before the pavilion, and having made oath by holding\nup their hands, upon the tender of it by the lord high sheriff, to make\nelection without favor, and of such only as they shall judge fittest\nfor the commonwealth, the conductor shill take three balls, the one\ninscribed with these words (outward files), another with these words\n(inward files), and the third with these (middle files), which balls he\nshall cast into a little urn, and present it to the lord high sheriff,\nwho, drawing one, shall give the words of command, as they are thereupon\ninscribed, and the ballot shall begin accordingly. For example, if the\nball be inscribed \u2018Middle files,\u2019 the ballot shall begin by the middle;\nthat is, the two files that are middle to the horse shall draw out first\nto the horse urn, and the two files that are middle to the foot shall\ndraw out first to the foot urn, and be followed by all the rest of the\nfiles as they are next to them in order. The like shall be done by the\ninward, or by the outward files in case they be first called. And the\nfiles, as every man has drawn his ball, if it be silver, shall behind\nat the urn to countermarch to their places, but he that has drawn a gold\nball at a side urn shall proceed to the middle urn, where if the balls\nhe draws be silver he shall also countermarch, but if it be gold he\nshall take his place upon a form set across the pavilion, with his face\ntoward the lord high sheriff, who shall be seated in the middle of the\npavilion, with certain clerks by him, one of which shall write down the\nnames of every elector, that is, of every one that drew a gold ball at\nthe middle urn, and in the order his ball was drawn, till the electors\namount to six in number. And the first six electors, horse and foot\npromiscuously, are the first order of electors; the second six (still\naccounting them as they are drawn) the second order, the third six the\nthird order, and the fourth six the fourth order of electors; every\nelector having place in his order, according to the order wherein he was\ndrawn. But so soon as the first order of electors is complete, the lord\nhigh sheriff shall send them with a copy of the following list, and a\nclerk that understands the ballot, immediately to a little tent standing\nbefore the pavilion in his eye, to which no other person but themselves,\nduring the election, shall approach. The list shall be written in this\nmanner:\u201d\n\nAnno Domini\n\n\n     THE LIST OF THE PRIME MAGNITUDE, OR FIRST DAY\u2019S ELECTION OF\n     MAGISTRATES\n\n     1. The Lord High Sheriff, Commander-in-Chief,\n     2. Lord Lieutenant,\n     3. Lord Custos Rotulorum, Muster-Master-General,\n     4. The Conductor, being Quarter-master General,\n     5. The First Censor,\n     6. The Second Censor,\n\n     Of the tribe of Nubia, containing at the present muster 700 horse\n     and 1,500 foot, in all 22,000 deputies.\n\n\u201cAnd the electors of the first band or order, being six, shall each\nof them name to his respective magistracy in the left such as are not\nalready elected in the hundreds, till one competitor be chosen to every\nmagistracy in the list by the ballot of the electors of the first order,\nwhich done, the list with the competitors thereunto annexed shall be\nreturned to the lord high sheriff by the clerk attending that order, but\nthe electors shall keep their places; for they have already given their\nsuffrage, and may not enter into the ballot of the tribe. If there\narises any dispute in an order of electors, one of the censors or\nsub-censors appointed by them in case they be electors, shall enter into\nthe tent of that order, and that order shall stand to his judgment in\nthe decision of the controversy. The like shall be done exactly by each\nother order of electors, being sent as they are drawn, each with another\ncopy of the same list, into a distinct tent, till there be returned to\nthe lord high sheriff four competitors to every magistracy in the list;\nthat is to say, one competitor elected to every office in every one of\nthe four orders, which competitors the lord high sheriff shall cause\nto be pronounced or read by a crier to the congregation, and the\ncongregation having heard the whole lists repeated, the names shall be\nput by the lord high sheriff to the tribe, one by one, beginning with\nthe first competitor in the first order, thence proceeding to the first\ncompetitor in the second order, and so to the first in the third and\nfourth orders. And the suffrages being taken in boxes by boys (as has\nbeen already shown) shall be poured into the bowls standing before the\ncensors, who shall be seated at each end of the table in the pavilion,\nthe one numbering the affirmatives and the other the negatives, and he\nof the four competitors to the first magistracy that has most above half\nthe suffrages of the tribe in the affirmative, is the first magistrate.\nThe like is to be done successively by the rest of the competitors in\ntheir order. But because soon after the boxes are sent out for the first\nname, there be others sent out for the second, and so for the third,\netc., by which means divers names are successively at one and the same\ntime in balloting; the boy that carries a box shall sing or repeat\ncontinually the name of the competitor for whom that box is carrying,\nwith that also of the magistracy to which he is proposed. A magistrate\nof the tribe happening to be an elector, may substitute any one of his\nown order to execute his other function. The magistrates of the prime\nmagnitude being thus elected, shall receive the present charge of the\ntribe.\u201d\n\nIf it be objected against this order that the magistrates to be elected\nby it will be men of more inferior rank than those of the hundreds, in\nregard that those are chosen first, it may be remembered that so were\nthe burgesses in the former government, nevertheless the knights of the\nshire were men of greater quality; and the election at the hundred is\nmade by a council of electors, of whom less cannot be expected than the\ndiscretion of naming persons fittest for those capacities, with an eye\nupon these to be elected at the tribe. As for what may be objected in\npoint of difficulty, it is demonstrable by the foregoing orders, that a\nman might bring 10,000 men, if there were occasion, with as much ease,\nand as suddenly to perform the ballot, as he can make 5,000 men, drawing\nthem out by double files, to march a quarter of a mile. But because at\nthis ballot, to go up and down the field, distributing the linen pellets\nto every man, with which he is to ballot or give suffrage, would lose\na great deal of time, therefore a man\u2019s wife, his daughters, or others,\nmake him his provision of pellets before the ballot, and he comes into\nthe field with a matter of a score of them in his pocket. And now I have\nas good as done with the sport. The next is--\n\nThe eleventh order, \u201cExplaining the duties and functions of the\nmagistrates contained in the list of the prime magnitude, and those of\nthe hundreds, beginning with the lord high sheriff, who, over and above\nhis more ancient offices, and those added by the former order, is\nthe first magistrate of the phylarch, or prerogative troop. The lord\nlieutenant, over and above his duty mentioned, is commander-in-chief\nof the musters of the youth, and second magistrate of the phylarch. The\ncustos rotulorum is to return the yearly muster-rolls of the tribe, as\nwell that of the youth as of the elders, to the rolls in emporium, and\nis the third magistrate of the phylarch. The censors by themselves and\ntheir sub-censors, that is, the overseers of the parishes, are to see\nthat the respective laws of the ballot be observed in all the popular\nassemblies of the tribe. They have power also to put such national\nministers, as in preaching shall intermeddle with matters of government,\nout of their livings, except the party appeals to the phylarch, or to\nthe Council of Religion, where in that case the censors shall prosecute.\nAll and every one of these magistrates, together with the justices of\npeace, and the jurymen of the hundreds, amounting in the whole number to\nthreescore and six, are the prerogative troop or phylarch of the tribe.\n\n\u201cThe function of the phylarch or prerogative troop is fivefold:\n\n\u201cFirst, they are the council of the tribe, and as such to govern the\nmusters of the same according to the foregoing orders, having cognizance\nof what has passed in the congregation or elections made in the parishes\nor the hundreds, with power to punish any undue practices, or variation\nfrom their respective rules and orders, under an appeal to the\nParliament. A marriage legitimately is to be pronounced by the parochial\ncongregation, the muster of the hundred, or the phylarch. And if a\ntribe have a desire (which they are to express at the muster by their\ncaptains, every troop by his own) to petition the Parliament the\nphylarch, as the council, shall frame the petition in the pavilion, and\npropose it by clauses to the ballot of the whole tribe; and the clauses\nthat shall be affirmed by the ballot of the tribe, and signed by the\nhands of the six magistrates of the prime magnitude, shall be received\nand esteemed by the Parliament as the petition of the tribe, and no\nother.\n\n\u201cSecondly, the phylarch has power to call to their assistance what\nother troops of the tribe they please (he they elders or youth, whose\ndiscipline will be hereafter directed), and with these to receive the\njudges itinerant in their circuits, whom the magistrates of the phylarch\nshall assist upon the bench, and the juries elsewhere in their proper\nfunctions according to the more ancient laws and customs of this nation.\n\n\u201cThirdly, the phylarch shall hold the court called the quartersessions\naccording to the ancient custom, and therein shall also hear causes in\norder to the protection of liberty of conscience, by such rules as are\nor shall hereafter be appointed by the Parliament.\n\n\u201cFourthly, all commissions issued into the tribes by the Parliament,\nor by the chancery, are to be directed to the phylarch, or some of that\ntroop, and executed by the same respectively.\n\n\u201cFifthly, in the case of levies of money the Parliament shall tax\nthe phylarchs, the phylarchs shall tax the hundreds, the hundreds the\nparishes, and the parishes shall levy it upon themselves. The parishes\nhaving levied the tax-money accordingly, shall return it to the officers\nof the hundreds, the hundred to the phylarchs, and the phylarchs to the\nExchequer. But if a man has ten children living, he shall pay no taxes;\nif he has five living, he shall pay but half taxes; if he has been\nmarried three years, or be above twenty-five years of age, and has no\nchild or children lawfully begotten, he shall pay double taxes. And\nif there happen to grow any dispute upon these or such other orders as\nshall or may hereto be added hereafter, the phylarchs shall judge the\ntribes, and the Parliament shall judge the phylarchs. For the rest, if\nany man shall go about to introduce the right or power of debate into\nany popular council or congregation of this nation, the phylarch or any\nmagistrate of the hundred, or of the tribe, shall cause him presently to\nbe sent in custody to the Council of War.\u201d\n\nThe part of the order relating to the rolls in Emporium being of\nsingular use, is not unworthy to be somewhat better opened. In what\nmanner the lists of the parishes, hundreds, and tribes are made, has\nbeen shown in their respective orders, where, after the parties are\nelected, they give an account of the whole number of the elders or\ndeputies in their respective assemblies or musters; the like for this\npart exactly is done by the youth in their discipline (to be hereafter\nshown) wherefore the lists of the parishes, youth and elders, being\nsummed up, give the whole number of the people able to bear arms, and\nthe lists of the tribes, youth and elders, being summed up, give the\nwhole number of the people bearing arms. This account, being annually\nrecorded by the master of the rolls, is called the \u201cPillar of Nilus,\u201d\n because the people, being the riches of the commonwealth, as they are\nfound to rise or fall by the degrees of this pillar, like that river,\ngive an account of the public harvest.\n\nThus much for the description of the first day\u2019s work at the muster,\nwhich happened (as has been shown) to be done as soon as said; for as in\npractice it is of small difficulty, so requires it not much time, seeing\nthe great Council of Venice, consisting of a like number, begins at\ntwelve of the clock, and elects nine magistrates in one afternoon. But\nthe tribe being dismissed for this night, repaired to their quarters,\nunder the conduct of their new magistrates. The next morning returning\nto the field very early, the orator proceeded to--\n\nThe twelfth order, \u201cDirecting the muster of the tribe in the second\nday\u2019s election, being that of the list called the galaxy; in which the\ncensors shall prepare the urns according to the directions given in the\nninth order for the second ballot; that is to say, with thirty-six gold\nballs in the middle urn, making four orders, and nine electors in every\norder, according to the number of the magistrates in the list of the\ngalaxy, which is as follows:\n\n1. Knight 2. Knight\n\nTo be chosen out of the horse. 3. Deputy 4. Deputy 5. Deputy\n\nTo be chosen out of the horse. 6. Deputy 7. Deputy 8. Deputy 9. Deputy\n\nTo be chosen out of the foot.\n\n\u201cThe rest of the ballot shall proceed exactly according to that of the\nfirst day. But, forasmuch as the commonwealth demands as well the fruits\nof a man\u2019s body as of his mind, he that has not been married shall not\nbe capable of these magistracies till he be married. If a deputy already\nchosen to be an officer in the parish, in the hundred, or in the\ntribe, be afterward chosen of the galaxy, it shall be lawful for him to\ndelegate his office in the parish, in the hundred, or in the tribe,\nto any one of his own order being not already chosen into office. The\nknights and deputies being chosen, shall be brought to the head of the\ntribe by the lord high sheriff, who shall administer to them this oath:\n\u2018Ye shall well and truly observe and keep the orders and customs of this\ncommonwealth which the people have chosen.\u2019 And if any of them shall\nrefuse the oath, he shall be rejected, and that competitor which had\nthe most voices next shall be called in his place, who, if he takes the\noath, shall be entered in the list; but if he also refuses the oath, he\nwho had most voices next shall be called, and so till the number of\nnine out of those competitors which had most voices be sworn knights and\ndeputies of the galaxy. (This clause, in regard to the late divisions,\nand to the end that no violence be offered to any man\u2019s conscience,\nto be of force but for the first three years only.) The knights of\nthe galaxy being elected and sworn, are to repair, by the Monday next\nensuing to the last of March, to the Pantheon or palace of justice,\nsituated in the metropolis of this commonwealth (except the Parliament,\nby reason of a contagious sickness, or some other occasion, has\nadjourned to another part of the nation), where they are to take their\nplaces in the Senate, and continue in full power and commission as\nsenators for the full term of three years next ensuing the date of\ntheir election. The deputies of the galaxy are to repair by the same day\n(except as before excepted) to the halo situated in Emporium, where they\nare to be listed of the prerogative tribe, or equal representative\nof the people; and to continue in full power and commission as their\ndeputies for the full term of three years next ensuing their election.\nBut, forasmuch as the term of every magistracy or office in this\ncommonwealth requires an equal vacation, a knight or deputy of\nthe galaxy, having fulfilled his term of three years, shall not be\nre-elected into the same galaxy or any other, till he has also fulfilled\nhis three years\u2019 vacation.\u201d\n\nWhoever shall rightly consider the foregoing orders, will be as little\nable to find how it is possible that a worshipful knight should declare\nhimself in ale and beef worthy to serve his country, as how my lord high\nsheriff\u2019s honor, in case he were protected from the law, could play\nthe knave. But though the foregoing orders, so far as they regard the\nconstitution of the Senate and the people, requiring no more as to an\nordinary election than is therein explained, that is but one-third part\nof their knights and deputies, are perfect; yet must we in this place,\nand as to the institution, of necessity erect a scaffold. For the\ncommonwealth to the first creation of her councils in full number,\nrequired thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing orders.\nWherefore the orator whose aid in this place was most necessary, rightly\ninforming the people of the reason, stayed them two days longer at the\nmuster, and took this course. One list, containing two knights and seven\ndeputies, he caused to be chosen upon the second day; which list being\ncalled the first galaxy, qualified the parties elected of it with power\nfor the term of one year, and no longer: another list, containing two\nknights and seven deputies more, he caused to be chosen the third day,\nwhich list being called the second galaxy, qualified the parties elected\nof it with power for the term of two years, and no longer. And upon the\nfourth day he chose the third galaxy, according as it is directed by the\norder, empowered for three years; which lists successively falling (like\nthe signs or constellations of one hemisphere, which setting, cause\nthose of the other to rise) cast the great orbs of this commonwealth\ninto an annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.\n\nThe business of the muster being thus happily finished, Hermes de\nCaduceo, lord orator of the tribe of Nubia, being now put into her first\nrapture, caused one of the censor\u2019s pulpits to be planted in front of\nthe squadron, and ascending into the same, spake after this manner:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS, THE MAGISTRATES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE TRIBE OF NUBIA:\n\n\u201cWe have this day solemnized the happy nuptials of the two greatest\nprinces that are upon the earth or in nature, arms and councils, in the\nmutual embraces whereof consists your whole commonwealth; whose councils\nupon their perpetual wheelings, marches, and countermarches, create her\narmies, and whose armies with the golden volleys of the ballot at once\ncreate and salute her councils. There be those (such is the world at\npresent) that think it ridiculous to see a nation exercising its civil\nfunctions in military discipline; while they, committing their buff to\ntheir servants, come themselves to hold trenchards. For what avails it\nsuch as are unarmed, or (which is all one) whose education acquaints\nthem not with the proper use of their swords, to be called citizens?\nWhat were 2,000 or 3,000 of you, though never so well affected to your\ncountry, but naked, to one troop of mercenary soldiers? If they should\ncome upon the field and say, \u2018Gentlemen, it is thought fit that such\nand such men should be chosen by you,\u2019 where were your liberty? or,\n\u2018Gentlemen, parliaments are exceeding good, but you are to have a\nlittle patience; these times are not so fit for them,\u2019 where were your\ncommonwealth? What causes the monarchy of the Turks but servants in\narms? What was it that begot the glorious Commonwealth of Rome but the\nsword in the hands of her citizens? Wherefore my glad eyes salute the\nserenity and brightness of this day with a shower that shall not cloud\nit.\n\n\u201cBehold the army of Israel become a commonwealth, and the Commonwealth\nof Israel remaining an army, with her rulers of tens and of fifties, her\nrulers of hundreds and thousands, drawing near (as this day throughout\nour happy fields) to the lot by her tribes, increased above threefold,\nand led up by her phylarchs or princes, to sit upon fifty thrones,\njudging the fifty tribes of Oceana! Or, is it Athens, breaking from\nher iron sepulchre, where she has been so long trampled by hosts of\nJanizaries? For certainly that is the voice of Theseus, having gathered\nhis scattered Athenians into one city. This freeborn nation lives\nnot upon the dole or bounty of one man, but distributing her annual\nmagistracies and honors with her own hand, is herself King People--(At\nwhich the orator was awhile interrupted with shouts, but at length\nproceeded.) is it grave Lacedaemon in her armed tribe, divided by her\noboe and her mora, which appears to chide me that I teach the people to\ntalk, or conceive such language as is dressed like a woman, to be a fit\nusher of the joys of liberty into the hearts of men? is it Rome in\nher victorious arms (for so she held her concio or congregation) that\ncongratulates with us, for finding out that which she could not hit\non, and binding up her Comitia curiata, centuriata, and tributa, in one\ninviolable league of union? Or is it the great council of incomparable\nVenice, bowling forth by the selfsame ballot her immortal commonwealth?\nFor, neither by reason nor by experience is it impossible that a\ncommonwealth should be immortal; seeing the people being the materials,\nnever die; and the form, which is motion, must, without opposition, be\nendless. The bowl which is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no\nimpediment, shall never cease: for which cause the glorious luminaries\nthat are the bowls of God, were once thrown forever; and next these,\nthose of Venice. But certainly, my lords, whatever these great examples\nmay have shown us, we are the first that have shown to the world a\ncommonwealth established in her rise upon fifty such towers, and so\ngarrisoned as are the tribes of Oceana, containing 100,000 elders upon\nthe annual list, and yet but an outguard; besides her marching armies to\nbe equal in the discipline, and in the number of her youth.\n\n\u201cAnd forasmuch as sovereign power is a necessary but a formidable\ncreature, not unlike the powder which (as you are soldiers) is at once\nyour safety and your danger, being subject to take fire against you\nas well as for you, how well and securely is she, by your galaxies so\ncollected as to be in full force and vigor and yet so distributed that\nit is impossible you should be blown up by your own magazine? Let them\nwho will have it, that power if it be confined cannot be sovereign, tell\nus, whether our rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitful reign\nwithin their proper banks, than if it were lawful for them, in ravaging\nour harvests, to spill themselves? whether souls, not confined to their\npeculiar bodies, do govern them any more than those of witches in their\ntrances? whether power, not confined to the bounds of reason and virtue,\nhas any other bounds than those of vice and passion? or if vice and\npassion be boundless, and reason and virtue have certain limits, on\nwhich of these thrones holy men should anoint their sovereign? But to\nblow away this dust, the sovereign power of a commonwealth is no more\nbounded, that is to say straitened, than that of a monarch; but is\nbalanced. The eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if she be bounded,\nnor is free if she be not balanced. And lest a monarch should think he\ncan reach further with his sceptre, the Roman eagle upon such a balance\nspread her wings from the ocean to Euphrates. Receive the sovereign\npower; you have received it, hold it fast, embrace it forever in your\nshining arms. The virtue of the loadstone is not impaired or limited,\nbut receives strength and nourishment, by being bound in iron. And so\ngiving your lordships much joy, I take my leave of this tribe.\u201d\n\nThe orator descending, had the period of his speech made with a vast\napplause and exultation of the whole tribe, attending him for that night\nto his quarter, as the phylarch with some commanded troops did the next\nday to the frontiers of the tribe, where leave was taken on both sides\nwith more tears than grief.\n\nSo a tribe is the third division of land occasioned by the third\ncollection of the people, whose functions proper to that place are\ncontained in the five foregoing orders.\n\nThe institution of the commonwealth was such as needed those props and\nscaffolds which may have troubled the reader; but I shall here take them\naway, and come to the constitution which stands by itself, and yields a\nclearer prospect.\n\nThe motions, by what has been already shown, are spherical; and\nspherical motions have their proper centre, for which cause (ere I\nproceed further) it will be necessary, for the better understanding\nof the whole, that I discover the centre whereupon the motions of this\ncommonwealth are formed.\n\nThe centre, or basis of every government, is no other than the\nfundamental laws of the same.\n\nFundamental laws are such as state what it is that a man, and what the\nmeans may call his own, that is to say, property; be whereby a man may\nenjoy his own, that is to say, protection. The first is also called\ndominion, and the second empire or sovereign power, whereof this (as\nhas been shown) is the natural product of the former, for such as is the\nbalance of dominion in a nation, such is the nature of its empire.\n\nWherefore the fundamental laws of Oceana, or the centre of this\ncommonwealth, are the agrarian and the ballot: the agrarian by the\nbalance of dominion preserving equality in the root; and the ballot by\nan equal rotation conveying it into the branch, or exercise of sovereign\npower, as, to begin with the former, appears by--\n\nThe thirteenth order, \u201cConstituting the agrarian laws of Oceana,\nMarpesia, and Panopea, whereby it is ordained, first, for all such lands\nas are lying and being within the proper territories of Oceana, that\nevery man who is at present possessed, or shall hereafter be possessed,\nof an estate in land exceeding the revenue of \u00a32,000 a year, and having\nmore than one son, shall leave his lands either equally divided among\nthem, in case the lands amount to above \u00a32,000 a year to each, or so\nnear equally, in case they come under, that the greater part or portion\nof the same remaining to the eldest exceed not the value of \u00a32,000\nrevenue. And no man, not in present possession of lands above the\nvalue of \u00a32,000 by the year, shall receive, enjoy (except by lawful\ninheritance) acquire, or, purchase to himself lands within the said\nterritories, amounting, with those already in his possession, above the\nsaid revenue. And if a man has a daughter or daughters, except she be an\nheiress or they be heiresses, he shall not leave or give to any. One\nof them in marriage, or otherwise, for her portion, above the value of\n\u00a31,500 in lands, goods, and moneys. Nor shall any friend, kinsman, or\nkinswoman add to her or their portion or portions that are so provided\nfor, to make any one of them greater. Nor shall any man demand or have\nmore in marriage with any woman. Nevertheless an heiress shall enjoy her\nlawful inheritance, and a widow, whatsoever the bounty or affection\nof her husband shall bequeath to her, to be divided in the first\ngeneration, wherein it is divisible according as has been shown.\n\n\u201cSecondly, for lands lying and being within the territories of Marpesia,\nthe agrarian shall hold in all parts as it is established in Oceana,\nexcept only in the standard or proportion of estates in land, which\nshall be set for Marpesia, at \u00a3500. And,\n\n\u201cThirdly, for Panopea, the agrarian shall hold in all parts, as in\nOceana. And whosoever possessing above the proportion allowed by\nthese laws, shall be lawfully convicted of the same, shall forfeit the\noverplus to the use of the State.\u201d\n\nAgrarian laws of all others have ever been the greatest bugbears, and\nso in the institution were these, at which time it was ridiculous to see\nhow strange a fear appeared in everybody of that which, being good for\nall, could hurt nobody. But instead of the proof of this order, I shall\nout of those many debates that happened ere it could be passed, insert\ntwo speeches that were made at the Council of legislators, the first by\nthe Right Honorable Philautus de Garbo, a young man, being heir-apparent\nto a very noble family, and one of the councillors, who expressed\nhimself as follows:\n\n\u201cMay it please your Highness, my Lord Archon of Oceana.\n\n\u201cIf I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a councillor I\ndissent, it would certainly be no hard task to make it as light as the\nday. First, that an agrarian is altogether unnecessary; secondly, that\nit is dangerous to a commonwealth; thirdly, that it is insufficient to\nkeep out monarchy; fourthly, that it ruins families; fifthly, that it\ndestroys industry; and last of all, that though it were indeed of any\ngood use, it will be a matter of such difficulty to introduce in this\nnation, and so to settle that it may be lasting, as is altogether\ninvincible.\n\n\u201cFirst, that an agrarian is unnecessary to a commonwealth, what clearer\ntestimony can there be than that the commonwealths which are our\ncontemporaries (Venice, to which your Highness gives the upper hand of\nall antiquity, being one) have no such thing? And there can be no reason\nwhy they have it not, seeing it is in the sovereign power at any time to\nestablish such an order, but that they need it not; wherefore no wonder\nif Aristotle, who pretends to be a good commonwealths man, has long\nsince derided Phaleas, to whom it was attributed by the Greeks, for his\ninvention.\n\n\u201cSecondly, that an agrarian is dangerous to a commonwealth is affirmed\nupon no slight authority seeing Machiavel is positive that it was the\ndissension which happened about the agrarian that caused the destruction\nof Rome; nor do I think that it did much better in Lacedaemon, as I\nshall show anon.\n\n\u201cThirdly, that it is insufficient to keep out monarchy cannot without\nimpiety be denied, the holy Scriptures bearing witness that the\nCommonwealth of Israel, notwithstanding her agrarian, submitted her neck\nto the arbitrary yoke of her princes.\n\n\u201cFourthly, therefore, to come to my next assertion, that it is\ndestructive to families: this also is so apparent, that it needs pity\nrather than proof. Why alas, do you bind a nobility (which no generation\nshall deny to have been the first that freely sacrificed their blood to\nthe ancient liberties of this people) on an unholy altar? Why are the\npeople taught that their liberty, which, except our noble ancestors had\nbeen born, must have long since been buried, cannot now be born except\nwe be buried? A commonwealth should have the innocence of the dove. Let\nus leave this purchase of her birth to the serpent, which eats itself\nout of the womb of its mother.\n\n\u201cFifthly but it may be said, perhaps, that we are fallen from our first\nlove, become proud and idle. It is certain, my lords, that the hand\nof God is not upon us for nothing. But take heed how you admit of such\nassaults and sallies upon men\u2019s estates, as may slacken the nerve of\nlabor, and give others also reason to believe that their sweat is vain;\nor else, whatsoever be pretended, your agrarian (which is my fifth\nassertion) must indeed destroy industry. For, that so it did in\nLacedaemon is most apparent, as also that it could do no otherwise,\nwhere every man having his forty quarters of barley, with wine\nproportionable, supplied him out of his own lot by his laborer or helot;\nand being confined in that to the scantling above which he might not\nlive, there was not any such thing as a trade, or other art, except that\nof war, in exercise. Wherefore a Spartan, if he were not in arms, must\nsit and play with his Angers, whence ensued perpetual war, and, the\nestate of the city being as little capable of increase as that of the\ncitizens, her inevitable ruin. Now what better ends you can propose to\nyourselves in the like ways, I do not so well see as I perceive that\nthere may be worse; for Lacedaemon yet was free from civil war: but if\nyou employ your citizens no better than she did, I cannot promise you\nthat you shall fare so well, because they are still desirous of war that\nhope that it may be profitable to them; and the strongest security you\ncan give of peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwise men will rather\nchoose that whereby they may break your laws, than that whereby your\nlaws may break them. Which I speak not so much in relation to the\nnobility or such as would be holding, as to the people or them that\nwould be getting; the passion in these being so much the stronger, as\na man\u2019s felicity is weaker in the fruition of things, than in their\nprosecution and increase.\n\n\u201cTruly, my lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more hands, and the\nbest from industry, you will farther endamage it, than can be repaired\nby laying on a few, and the worst; while the nobility must be forced to\nsend their sons to the plough, and, as if this were not enough, to marry\ntheir daughters also to farmers.\n\n\u201cSixthly, but I do not see (to come to the last point) how it is\npossible that this thing should be brought about, to your good I mean,\nthough it may to the destruction of many. For that the agrarian of\nIsrael, or that of Lacedaemon, might stand, is no such miracle; the\nlands, without any consideration of the former proprietor, being\nsurveyed and cast into equal lots, which could neither be bought, nor\nsold, nor multiplied: so that they knew whereabout to have a man. But in\nthis nation no such division can be introduced, the lands being already\nin the hands of proprietors, and such whose estates lie very rarely\ntogether, but mixed one with another being also of tenures in nature\nso different, that as there is no experience that an agrarian was ever\nintroduced in such a case, so there is no appearance how or reason\nwhy it should: but that which is against reason and experience is\nimpossible.\u201d\n\nThe case of my Lord Philautus was the most concerned in the whole\nnation; for he had four younger brothers, his father being yet living,\nto whom he was heir of \u00a310,000 a year. Wherefore being a man both of\ngood parts and esteem, his words wrought both upon men\u2019s reason and\npassions, and had borne a stroke at the head of the business, if my Lord\nArchon had not interposed the buckler in this oration:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS, THE LEGISLATORS OF OCEANA:\n\n\u201cMy Lord Philautus has made a thing which is easy to seem hard; if the\nthanks were due to his eloquence, it would be worthy of less praise\nthan that he owes it to his merit, and the love he has most deservedly\npurchased of all men: nor is it rationally to be feared that he who is\nso much beforehand in his private, should be in arrear in his public,\ncapacity. Wherefore, my lord\u2019s tenderness throughout his speech arising\nfrom no other principle than his solicitude lest the agrarian should\nbe hurtful to his country, it is no less than my duty to give the best\nsatisfaction I am able to so good a patriot, taking every one of his\ndoubts in the order proposed. And,\n\n\u201cFirst, whereas my lord, upon observation of the modern commonwealths,\nis of opinion that an agrarian is not necessary: it must be confessed\nthat at the first sight of them there is some appearance favoring\nhis assertion, but upon accidents of no precedent to us. For the\ncommonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I mean of those leagues, being\nsituated in countries not alluring the inhabitants to wantonness, but\nobliging them to universal industry, have an implicit agrarian in the\nnature of them: and being not obnoxious to a growing nobility (which,\nas long as their former monarchies had spread the wing over them, could\neither not at all be hatched, or was soon broken) are of no example to\nus, whose experience in this point has been to the contrary. But what if\neven in these governments there be indeed an explicit agrarian? For when\nthe law commands an equal or near equal distribution of a man\u2019s estate\nin land among his children, as it is done in those countries, a nobility\ncannot grow; and so there needs no agrarian, or rather there is one.\nAnd for the growth of the nobility in Venice (if so it be, for Machiavel\nobserves in that republic, as a cause of it, a great mediocrity of\nestates) it is not a point that she is to fear, but might study, seeing\nshe consists of nothing else but nobility, by which, whatever their\nestates suck from the people, especially if it comes equally, is\ndigested into the better blood of that commonwealth, which is all, or\nthe greatest, benefit they can have by accumulation. For how unequal\nsoever you will have them to be in their incomes, they have officers\nof the pomp, to bring them equal in expenses, or at least in the\nostentation or show of them. And so unless the advantage of an estate\nconsists more in the measure than in the use of it, the authority of\nVenice does but enforce our agrarian; nor shall a man evade or elude the\nprudence of it, by the authority of any other commonwealth.\n\n\u201cFor if a commonwealth has been introduced at once, as those of Israel\nand Lacedaemon, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the\nmain foundation; nor, if she is obliged more to fortune than prudence,\nhas she raised her head without musing upon this matter, as appears by\nthat of Athens, which through her defect in this point, says Aristotle,\nintroduced her ostracism, as most of the democracies of Greece. But,\nnot to restrain a fundamental of such latitude to any one kind of\ngovernment, do we not yet see that if there be a sole landlord of a\nvast territory, he is the Turk? that if a few landlords overbalance a\npopulous country, they have store of servants? that if a people be in an\nequal balance, they can have no lords? that no government can otherwise\nbe erected, than upon some one of these foundations? that no one of\nthese foundations (each being else apt to change into some other) can\ngive any security to the government, unless it be fixed? that through\nthe want of this fixation, potent monarchy and commonwealths have fallen\nupon the heads of the people, and accompanied their own sad ruins with\nvast effusions of innocent blood? Let the fame, as was the merit of\nthe ancient nobility of this nation, be equal to or above what has been\nalready said, or can be spoken, yet have we seen not only their glory\nbut that of a throne, the most indulgent to and least invasive for so\nmany ages upon the liberty of a people that the world has known, through\nthe mere want of fixing her foot by a proportionable agrarian upon\nher proper foundation, to have fallen with such horror as has been a\nspectacle of astonishment to the whole earth. And were it well argued\nfrom one calamity, that we ought not to prevent another? Nor is\nAristotle so good a commonwealths man for deriding the invention of\nPhaleas as in recollecting himself, where he says that democracies, when\na less part of their citizens overtop the rest in wealth, degenerate\ninto oligarchies and principalities; and, which comes nearer to the\npresent purpose, that the greater part of the nobility of Tarentum\ncoming accidentally to be ruined, the government of the few came by\nconsequence to be changed into that of the many.\n\n\u201cThese things considered, I cannot see how an agrarian, as to the\nfixation or security of a government, can be less than necessary. And\nif a cure be necessary, it excuses not the patient, his disease being\notherwise desperate, that it is dangerous; which was the case of Rome,\nnot so stated by Machiavel, where he says, that the strife about the\nagrarian caused the destruction of that commonwealth. As if when a\nsenator was not rich (as Crassus held) except he could pay an army, that\ncommonwealth could expect nothing but ruin whether in strife about the\nagrarian, or without it. \u2018Of late,\u2019 says Livy, \u2018riches have introduced\navarice, and voluptuous pleasures abounding have through lust and\nluxury begot a desire of lasting and destroying all good orders.\u2019 if the\ngreatest security of a commonwealth consists in being provided with the\nproper antidote against this poison, her greatest danger, must be\nfrom the absence of an agrarian, which is the whole truth of the Roman\nexample. For the Laconic, I shall reserve the further explication of it,\nas my lord also did, to another place; and first see whether an agrarian\nproportioned to a popular government be sufficient to keep out monarchy.\nMy lord is for the negative, and fortified by the people of Israel\nelecting a king. To which I say that the action of the people therein\nexpressed is a full answer to the objection of that example; for the\nmonarchy neither grew upon them, nor could; by reason of the agrarian,\npossibly have invaded them, if they had not pulled it upon themselves by\nthe election of a king. Which being an accident, the like whereof is not\nto be found in any other people so planted, nor in this till, as it\nis manifest, they were given up by God to infatuation (for says he to\nSamuel, \u2018They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I\nshould not reign over them,), has something in it which is apparent, by\nwhat went before, to have been besides the course of nature, and by what\nfollowed.\n\n\u201cFor the King having no other foundation than the calamities of the\npeople, so often beaten by their enemies, that despairing of themselves\nthey were contented with any change, if he had peace as in the days of\nSolomon, left but a slippery throne to his successor, as appeared\nby Rehoboam. And the agrarian, notwithstanding the monarchy thus\nintroduced, so faithfully preserved the root of that commonwealth, that\nit shot forth oftener and by intervals continued longer than any other\ngovernment, as may be computed from the institution of the same by\nJoshua, 1,465 years before Christ, to the total dissolution of it,\nwhich happened in the reign of the emperor Adrian, 135 years after the\nincarnation. A people planted upon an equal agrarian, and holding to it,\nif they part with their liberty, must do it upon good-will, and make but\na bad title of their bounty. As to instance yet further in that which is\nproposed by the present order to this nation, the standard whereof is\nat \u00a32,000 a year; the whole territory of Oceana being divided by this\nproportion, amounts to 5,000 lots. So the lands of Oceana being thus\ndistributed, and bound to this distribution, can never fall to fewer\nthan 5,000 proprietors. But 5,000 proprietors so seized will not agree\nto break the agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one another; nor to\nbring in a king, because they must maintain him, and can have no benefit\nby him; nor to exclude the people, because they can have as little by\nthat, and must spoil their militia. So the commonwealth continuing upon\nthe balance proposed, though it should come into 5,000 hands, can never\nalter, and that it should ever come into 5,000 hands is as improbable as\nanything in the world that is not altogether impossible.\n\n\u201cMy lord\u2019s other considerations are more private, as that, this order\ndestroys families; which is as if one should lay the ruin of some\nancient castle to the herbs which usually grow out of them, the\ndestruction of those families being that indeed which naturally produced\nthis order. For we do not now argue for that which we would have, but\nfor that which we are already possessed of, as would appear if a note\nwere but taken of all such as have at this day above \u00a32,000 a year in\nOceana. If my lord should grant (and I will put it with the most) that\nthey who are proprietors in land, exceeding this proportion, exceed not\n300, with what brow can the interest of so few be balanced with that of\nthe whole nation? or rather, what interest have they to put in such a\nbalance? they would live as they had been accustomed to do; who hinders\nthem? they would enjoy their estates; who touches them? they would\ndispose of what they have according to the interest of their families;\nit is that which we desire. A man has one son, let him be called; would\nhe enjoy his father\u2019s estate? it is his, his son\u2019s, and his son\u2019s son\u2019s\nafter him. A man has five sons, let them be called; would they enjoy\ntheir father\u2019s estate? It is divided among them; for we have four votes\nfor one in the same family, and therefore this must be the interest of\nthe family, or the family knows not its own interest. If a man shall\ndispute otherwise, he must draw his arguments from custom and from\ngreatness, which was the interest of the monarchy, not of the family;\nand we are now a commonwealth. If the monarchy could not bear with\nsuch divisions because they tendered to a commonwealth, neither can\na commonwealth connive at such accumulations because they tend to a\nmonarchy. If the monarchy might make bold with so many for the good of\none, we may make bold with one for the good of so many, nay, for the\ngood of all.\n\n\u201cMy lords, it comes into my mind, that which upon occasion of the\nvariety of parties enumerated in our late civil wars, was said by a\nfriend of mine coming home from his travels, about the latter end\nof these troubles; that he admired how it came to pass, that younger\nbrothers, especially being so many more in number than their elder did\nnot unite as one man against a tyranny, the like whereof has not been\nexercised in any other nation. And truly, when I consider that our\ncountrymen are none of the worst-natured, I must confess I marvel\nmuch how it comes to pass that we should use our children as we do our\npuppies--take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and\ndrown five; nay, yet worse, forasmuch as the puppies are once drowned,\nwhereas the children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my lords,\nit is a flinty custom! and all this for his cruel ambition, that would\nraise himself a pillar a golden pillar for his monument, though he has\nchildren, his own reviving flesh, and a kind of immortality. And this is\nthat interest of a family, for which we are to think ill of a government\nthat will not endure it. But quiet ourselves; the land through which the\nriver Nilus wanders in one stream, is barren; but where it parts into\nseven, it multiplies its fertile shores by distributing, yet keeping and\nimproving, such a propriety and nutrition, as is a prudent agrarian to a\nwell-ordered commonwealth.\n\n\u201cNor (to come to the fifth assertion) is a political body rendered any\nfitter for industry by having one gouty and another withered leg, than\na natural. It tends not to the improvement of merchandise that there be\nsome who have no need of their trading, and others that are not able to\nfollow it. If confinement discourages industry, an estate in money is\nnot confined, and lest industry should want whereupon to work, land is\nnot engrossed or entailed upon any man, but remains at its devotion.\nI wonder whence the computation can arise, that this should discourage\nindustry. Two thousand pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as\nmuch in Panopea, \u00a3500 in Marpesia; there be other plantations, and the\ncommonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the arms of our agrarian\nmay extend themselves? and whether he that might have left a pillar, may\nnot leave a temple of many pillars to his more pious memory? Where there\nis some measure in riches, a man may be rich, but if you will have them\nto be infinite, there will be no end of starving himself, and wanting\nwhat he has: and what pains does such a one take to be poor Furthermore,\nif a man shall think that there may be an industry less greasy or more\nnoble, and so cast his thoughts upon the commonwealth, he will have\nleisure for her and she riches and honors for him; his sweat shall smell\nlike Alexander\u2019s. My Lord Philautus is a young man who, enjoying his\n\u00a310,000 a year, may keep a noble house in the old way, and have homely\nguests; and having but two, by the means proposed, may take the upper\nhand of his great ancestors; with reverence to whom, I may say, there\nhas not been one of them would have disputed his place with a Roman\nconsul.\n\n\u201cMy lord, do not break my heart; the nobility shall go to no other\nploughs than those which we call our consuls. But, says he, it having\nbeen so with Lacedaemon, that neither the city nor the citizens were\ncapable of increase, a blow was given by that agrarian, which ruined\nboth. And what are we concerned with that agrarian, or that blow while\nour citizens and our city (and that by our agrarian) are both capable\nof increase? The Spartan, if he made a conquest, had no citizens to hold\nit; the Oceaner will have enow. The Spartan could have no trade; the\nOceaner may have all. The agrarian in Laconia, that it might bind on\nknapsacks, forbidding all other arts but that of war, could not make\nan army of above 30,000 citizens. The agrarian in Oceana, without\ninterruption of traffic, provides us in the fifth part of the youth\nan annual source or fresh spring of 100,000, besides our provincial\nauxiliaries, out of which to draw marching armies; and as many elders,\nnot feeble, but men most of them in the flower of their age, and in arms\nfor the defence of our territories. The agrarian in Laconia banished\nmoney, this multiplies it; that allowed a matter of twenty or thirty\nacres to a man, this 2,000 or 3,000; there is no comparison between\nthem. And yet I differ so much from my lord, or his opinion that\nthe agrarian was the ruin of Lacedaemon, that I hold it no less than\ndemonstrable to have been her main support. For if, banishing all other\ndiversions, it could not make an army of above 30,000, then, letting in\nall other diversions, it must have broken that army. Wherefore Lysander,\nbringing in the golden spoils of Athens, irrevocably ruined that\ncommonwealth; and is a warning to us, that in giving encouragement to\nindustry, we also remember that covetousness is the root of all evil.\nAnd our agrarian can never be the cause of those seditions threatened\nby my lord, but is the proper cure of them, as Lucan notes well in the\nstate of Rome before the civil wars, which happened through the want of\nsuch an antidote.\n\n\u201cWhy then are we mistaken, as if we intended not equal advantages in our\ncommonwealth to either sex, because we would not have women\u2019s fortunes\nconsist in that metal which exposes them to cutpurses? If a man cuts my\npurse I may have him by the heels or by the neck for it; whereas a man\nmay cut a woman\u2019s purse, and have her for his pains in fetters. How\nbrutish, and much more than brutish, is that commonwealth which prefers\nthe earth before the fruits of the womb? If the people be her treasure,\nthe staff by which she is sustained and comforted, with what justice can\nshe suffer them, by whom she is most enriched, to be for that cause the\nmost impoverished? And yet we see the gifts of God, and the bounties of\nheaven in fruitful families, through this wretched custom of marrying\nfor money, become their insupportable grief and poverty. Nor falls this\nso heavy upon the lower sort, being better able to shift for themselves,\nas upon the nobility or gentry. For what avails it in this case, from\nwhence their veins have derived their blood; while they shall see the\ntallow of a chandler sooner converted into that beauty which is required\nin a bride? I appeal, whether my Lord Philautus or myself be the\nadvocate of nobility; against which, in the case proposed by me, there\nwould be nothing to hold the balance. And why is a woman, if she may\nhave but \u00a31,500, undone? If she be unmarried, what nobleman allows his\ndaughter in that case a greater revenue than so much money may command?\nAnd if she marry, no nobleman can give his daughter a greater portion\nthan she has. Who is hurt in this case?--nay, who is not benefited? If\nthe agrarian gives us the sweat of our brows without diminution; if it\nprepares our table; if it makes our cup to overflow, and above all this,\nin providing for our children, anoints our heads with that oil which\ntakes away the greatest of worldly cares; what man, that is not besotted\nwith a covetousness as vain as endless, can imagine such a constitution\nto be his poverty? Seeing where no woman can be considerable for her\nportion, no portion will be considerable with a woman; and so his\nchildren will not only find better preferments without his brokage, but\nmore freedom of their own affections. \u201cWe are wonderful severe in laws,\nthat they shall not marry without our consent, as if it were care and\ntenderness over them; but is it not lest we should not have the other\n\u00a31,000 with this son, or the other \u00a3100 a year more in jointure for that\ndaughter? These, when we are crossed in them, are the sins for which we\nwater our couch with tears, but not of penitence. Seeing whereas it is\na mischief beyond any that we can do to our enemies, we persist to make\nnothing of breaking the affection of our children. But there is in this\nagrarian a homage to pure and spotless love, the consequence whereof I\nwill not give for all your romances. An alderman makes not his daughter\na countess till he has given her \u00a320,000, nor a romance a considerable\nmistress till she be a princess; these are characters of bastard love.\nBut if our agrarian excludes ambition and covetousness, we shall at\nlength have the care of our own breed, in which we have been curious as\nto our dogs and horses. The marriage-bed will be truly legitimate, and\nthe race of the commonwealth not spurious. But (impar magnanimis\nausis, imparque dolori) I am hurled from all my hopes by my lord\u2019s last\nassertion of impossibility, that the root from whence we imagine these\nfruits should be planted or thrive in this soil. And why? Because of the\nmixture of estates and variety of tenures. Nevertheless, there is yet\nextant in the Exchequer an old survey of the whole nation; wherefore\nsuch a thing is not impossible. Now if a new survey were taken at the\npresent rates, and the law made that no man should hold hereafter above\nso much land as is valued therein at \u00a32,000 a year, it would amount to\na good and sufficient agrarian. It is true that there would remain\nsome difficulty in the different kind of rents, and that it is a matter\nrequiring not only more leisure than we have, but an authority which\nmay be better able to bow men to a more general consent than is to be\nwrought out of them by such as are in our capacity. Wherefore as to the\nmanner, it is necessary that we refer it to the Parliament; but as to\nthe matter, they cannot otherwise fix their government upon the right\nbalance.\n\n\u201cI shall conclude with a few words to some parts of the order, which\nmy lord has omitted. As first to the consequences of the agrarian to be\nsettled in Marpesia, which irreparably breaks the aristocracy of that\nnation; being of such a nature, as standing, it is not possible that you\nshould govern. For while the people of that country are little better\nthan the cattle of the nobility, you must not wonder if, according as\nthese can make their markets with foreign princes, you find those to be\ndriven upon your grounds. And if you be so tender, now you have it\nin your power, as not to hold a hand upon them that may prevent the\nslaughter which must otherwise ensue in like cases, the blood will lie\nat your door. But in holding such a hand upon them, you may settle the\nagrarian; and in settling the agrarian, you give that people not only\nliberty, but lands; which makes your protection necessary to their\nsecurity; and their contribution due to your protection, as to their own\nsafety.\n\n\u201cFor the agrarian of Panopea, it allowing such proportions of so good\nland, men that conceive themselves straitened by this in Oceana, will\nbegin there to let themselves forth, where every citizen will in time\nhave his villa. And there is no question, but the improvement of that\ncountry by this means must be far greater than it has been in the best\nof former times. I have no more to say, but that in those ancient and\nheroic ages (when men thought that to be necessary which was virtuous)\nthe nobility of Athens, having the people so much engaged in their debt\nthat there remained no other question among these than which of those\nshould be king, no sooner heard Solon speak than they quitted their\ndebts, and restored the commonwealth; which ever after held a solemn\nand annual feast called the Sisacthia, or Recision, in memory of that\naction. Nor is this example the phoenix; for at the institution by\nLycurgus, the nobility having estates (as ours here) in the lands of\nLaconia, upon no other valuable consideration than the commonwealth\nproposed by him, threw them up to be parcelled by his agrarian. But\nnow when no man is desired to throw up a farthing of his money, or a\nshovelful of his earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue\nof necessity, we are disputing whether we should have peace or war.\nFor peace you cannot have without some government, nor any government\nwithout the proper balance. Wherefore if you will not fix this which you\nhave, the rest is blood, for without blood you can bring in no other.\u201d\n\nBy these speeches made at the institution of the agrarian you may\nperceive what were the grounds of it. The next is--\n\nThe fourteenth order, \u201cConstituting the ballot of Venice, as it is\nfitted by several alterations, and appointed to every assembly, to\nbe the constant and only way of giving suffrage in this commonwealth,\naccording to the following scheme.\u201d\n\nI shall endeavor by the following figure to demonstrate the manner of\nthe Venetian ballot (a thing as difficult in discourse or writing, as\nfacile in practice) according to the use of it in Oceana. The whole\nfigure represents the Senate, containing, as to the house or form\nof sitting, a square and a half; the tribunal at the upper end being\nascended by four steps. On the uppermost of these sit the magistrates\nthat constitute the signory of the commonwealth, that is to say, A the\nstrategus; B the orator; C the three commissioners of the great seal; D\nthe three commissioners of the Treasury, whereof one, E, exercises for\nthe present the office of a censor at the middle urn, F To the two upper\nsteps of the tribunal answer G, G-G, G, the two long benches next the\nwall on each side of the house; the outwardmost of which are equal in\nheight to the uppermost step, and the innermost equal in height to the\nnext. Of these four benches consists the first seal; as the second seat\nconsists in like manner of those four benches H, H-H, H, which being\nnext the floor, are equal in height to the two nethermost steps of\nthe throne. So the whole house is distributed into two seats, each\nconsisting of four benches.\n\nThis distribution causes not only the greater conveniency; as will be\nshown, to the senators in the exercise of their function at the ballot,\nbut a greater grace to the aspect of the Senate. In the middle of the\noutward benches stand I, 12 the chairs of the censors, those being their\nordinary places, though upon occasion of the ballot they descend, and\nsit where they are shown by K, K at each of the outward urns L, L. Those\nM, M that sit with their tables, and the bowls N, N before them, upon\nthe halfspace or second step of the tribunal from the floor, are the\nclerks or secretaries of the house. Upon the short seats O, O on the\nfloor (which should have been represented by woolsacks) sit: P, the two\ntribunes of the horse. Q, the two tribunes of the foot; and R, R-R, R\nthe judges, all which magistrates are assistants, but have no suffrage.\nThis posture of the Senate considered, the ballot is performed as\nfollows:\n\nFirst, whereas the gold balls are of several suits, and accordingly\nmarked with several letters of the alphabet, a secretary presents a\nlittle urn (wherein there is one ball of every suit or mark) to the\nstrategus and the orator; and look what letter the strategus draws, the\nsame and no other is to be used for that time in the middle urn F; the\nlike for the letter drawn by the orator is to be observed for the side\nurns L, L, that is to say if the strategus drew a ball with an A, all\nthe gold balls in the middle urn for that day are marked with the letter\nA; and if the orator drew a B, all the gold balls in the side urn for\nthat day are marked with the letter B, which done immediately before\nthe ballot, and so the letter unknown to the ballotants, they can use no\nfraud or juggling; otherwise a man might carry a gold ball in his hand,\nand seem to have drawn it out of an urn. He that draws a gold ball at\nany urn, delivers it to the censor or assessor of that urn, who views\nthe character, and allows accordingly of his lot.\n\nThe strategus and the orator having drawn for the letters, the urns are\nprepared accordingly by one of the commissioners and the two censors.\nThe preparation of the urns is After this manner. If the Senate be to\nelect, for example, the list called the tropic of magistrates, which is\nthis:\n\n1. The Lord Strategus;\n\n2. The Lord Orator;\n\n3. The Third Commissioner of the Great Seal;\n\n4. The Third Commissioner of the Treasury;\n\n5. The First Censor;\n\n6. The Second Censor;\n\nthis list or schedule consists of six magistracies, and to every\nmagistracy there are to be four competitors; that is, in all\nfour-and-twenty competitors proposed to the house. They that are to\npropose the competitors are called electors, and no elector can propose\nabove one competitor: wherefore for the proposing of four-and-twenty\ncompetitors you must have four-and-twenty electors; and whereas the\nballot consists of a lot and of a suffrage, the lot is for no other use\nthan for the designation of electors; and he that draws a gold ball\nat the middle urn is an elector. Now, as to have four-and-twenty\ncompetitors proposed, you must have four-and-twenty electors made, so to\nhave four-and-twenty electors made by lot, you must have four-and-twenty\ngold balls in the middle urn; and these (because otherwise it would\nbe no lot) mixed with a competent number of blanks, or silver balls.\nWherefore to the four-and-twenty gold balls cast six-and-twenty silver\nones, and those (reckoning the blanks with the prizes) make fifty balls\nin the middle urn. This done (because no man can come to the middle urn\nthat has not first drawn a gold ball at one of the side urns) and to be\nsure that the prizes or gold balls in this urn be all drawn, there must\ncome to it fifty persons; therefore there must be in each of the side\nurns five-and-twenty gold balls, which in both come to fifty; and to the\nend that every senator may have his lot, the gold balls in the side urns\nare to be made up with blanks equal to the number of the ballotants at\neither urn; for example, the house consisting of 300 senators, there\nmust be in each of the side urns 125 blanks and twenty-five prizes,\nwhich come in both the side urns to 300 balls. This is the whole mystery\nof preparing the urns, which the censors having skill to do accordingly,\nthe rest of the ballot, whether the parties balloting understand it or\nnot must of necessary consequence come right; and they can neither be\nout, nor fall into any confusion in the exercise of this art.\n\nBut the ballot, as I said, is of two parts, lot and suffrage, or\nthe proposition and result. The lot determines who shall propose the\ncompetitors; and the result of the Senate, which of the competitors\nshall be the magistrates. The whole, to begin with the lot, proceeds in\nthis manner:\n\nThe first secretary with an audible voice reads first the list of the\nmagistrates to be chosen for the day, then the oath for fair election,\nat which the senators hold up their hands; which done, another secretary\npresents a little urn to the strategus, in which are four balls, each\nof them having one of these four inscriptions: \u201cFirst seat at the upper\nend,\u201d \u201cFirst seat at the lower end,\u201d \u201cSecond seat at the upper end,\u201d\n \u201cSecond seat at the lower end.\u201d And look which of them the strategus\ndraws, the secretary pronouncing the inscription with a loud voice, the\nseat so called comes accordingly to the urns: this in the figure is the\nsecond seat at the upper end. The manner of their coming to the side\nurns is in double files, that being two holes in the cover of each side\nurn, by which means two may draw at once. The senators therefore S, S-S,\nS are coming from the upper end of their seats H, H-H, H to the side\nurns L, L. The senators T T-T are drawing. The senator V has drawn a\ngold ball at his side urn, and is going to the middle urn F, where\nthe senator W, having done the like at the other side urn, is already\ndrawing. But the senators X, X-X, X having drawn blanks at their side\nurns, and thrown them into the bowls Y Y standing at the feet of the\nurns, are marching by the lower end into their seats again; the senator\na having done the like at the middle urn, is also throwing his blank\ninto the bowl b and marching to his seat again: for a man by a prize at\na side urn gains no more than right to come to the middle urn, where, if\nhe draws a blank, his fortune at the side urn comes to nothing at all;\nwherefore he also returns to his place. But the senator C has had a\nprize at the middle urn, where the commissioner, having viewed his ball,\nand found the mark to be right, he marches up the steps to the seat\nof the electors, which is the form d set across the tribunal, where he\nplaces himself, according as he was drawn, with the other electors e, e,\ne drawn before him. These are not to look back, but sit with their faces\ntoward the signory or state, till their number amount to that of the\nmagistrates to be that day chosen, which for the present, as was shown,\nare six: wherefore six electors being made, they are reckoned according\nas they were drawn: first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, in\ntheir order, and the first six that are chosen are the first order of\nelectors.\n\nThe first order of electors being made, are conducted by a secretary,\nwith a copy of the list to be chosen, out of the Senate, and into a\ncommittee or council-chamber, being neither suffered by the way, nor in\ntheir room (till the ballot be ended), to have conference with any but\nthemselves; wherefore the secretary, having given them their oath that\nthey shall make election according to the law and their conscience,\ndelivers them the list, and seats himself at the lower end of the table\nwith his pen and paper, while another secretary keeps the door.\n\nBy such time as the first order of electors are thus seated, the second\norder of electors is drawn, who, with a second copy of the same list,\nare conducted into another committee-chamber, by other secretaries\nperforming the same office with the former.\n\nThe like exactly is done by the third and by the fourth orders (or\nhands, as the Venetians call them) of electors, by which means you have\nthe four-and-twenty electors divided according to the four copies of\nthe same list, by six, into four hands or orders; and every one of these\norders names one competitor to every magistracy in the list; that is to\nsay, the first elector names to the first magistracy, the second elector\nto the second magistracy, and so forth. But though the electors, as has\nbeen shown, are chosen by mere lot, yet the competitors by them named\nare not chosen by any lot, but by the suffrage of the whole order for\nexample, the first elector in the first order proposes a name to\nbe strategus, which name is balloted by himself and the other five\nelectors, and if the name so balloted attain not to above half the\nsuffrages, it is laid aside, and the first elector names another to the\nsame magistracy and so in case this also fails, another, till one he has\nnamed, whether it be himself, or some other, has attained to above half\nthe suffrages in the affirmative; and the name so attaining to above\nhalf the suffrages in the affirmative is written to the first magistracy\nin the list by the secretary which being done, the second elector of the\nfirst order, names to \u2018the second magistracy till one of his nomination\nbe chosen to the same. The like is done by the rest of the electors of\nthe first order, till one competitor be chosen, and written to every\nmagistracy in their list. Now the second, third, and fourth orders of\nelectors doing exactly after the same manner, it comes to pass that one\ncompetitor to every magistracy being chosen in each order, there be in\nall four competitors chosen to every magistracy.\n\nIf any controversy arises in an order of electors, one of the censors\n(these being at this game the groom-porters) is advertised by the\nsecretary who brings him in, and the electors disputing are bound to\nacquiesce in his sentence. For which cause it is that the censors do not\nballot at the urns; the signory also abstains, lest it should deform the\nhouse: wherefore the blanks in the side urns are by so many the\nfewer. And so much for the lot, which is of the greater art but less\nconsequence, because it concerns proposition only: but all (except the\ntribunes and the judges, which being but assistants have no suffrage)\nare to ballot at the result, to which I now come.\n\nThe four orders of electors having perfected their lists, the face of\nthe house is changed: for the urns are taken away, and every senator\nand magistrate is seated in his proper place, saving the electors, who,\nhaving given their suffrages already, may not stir out of their\nchambers till the house have given theirs, and the rest of the ballot be\nperformed; which follows in this manner:\n\nThe four lists being presented by the secretaries of each council of\nelectors to the signory, are first read, according to their order, to\nthe house, with an audible voice; and then the competitors are put to\nthe ballot or suffrage of the whole Senate in this manner: A, A named\nto be strategus in the first order, whereupon eight ballotins, or pages,\nsuch as are expressed by the figures f, f, take eight of the boxes\nrepresented, though rudely, by the figures g, g, and go four on the one\nand four on the other side of the house, that is, one to every bench,\nsignifying \u201cA, A named to be the strategus in the first order..\u201d and\nevery magistrate or senator (beginning by the strategus and the orator\nfirst) holds up a little pellet of linen, as the box passes, between his\nfinger and his thumb, that men may see he has but one, and then puts it\ninto the same. The box consisting in the inner part of two boxes, being\npainted on the outside white and green, to distinguish the affirmative\nfrom the negative side, is so made that when your hand is in it, no man\ncan see to which of the sides you put the suffrage, nor hear to which it\nfalls, because the pellet being linen, makes no noise. The strategus and\nthe orator having begun, all the rest do the like.\n\nThe ballotins having thus gathered the suffrages, bring them before the\nsignory, in whose presence the outward boxes being opened, they take\nout the inner boxes, whereof the affirmative is white, and the negative\ngreen, and pour the white in the bowl N on the right hand, which is\nwhite also, and the green into the bowl N on the left, which is also\ngreen. These bowls or basins (better represented at the lower end of the\nfigure by h, i) being upon this occasion set before the tables of the\nsecretaries at the upper end N, N, the white on the right hand, and the\ngreen on the left, the secretaries on each side number the balls, by\nwhich, if they find that the affirmatives amount not to above one-half,\nthey write not the name that was balloted, but if they amount to above\none-half, they write it, adding the number of above half the suffrages\nto which it attained. The first name being written, or laid aside, the\nnext that is put is BB named to be strategus in the second order; the\nthird CC, named to be strategus in the third order; the fourth DD, named\nto be strategus in the fourth order and he of these four competitors\nthat has most above half in the affirmative, is the magistrate; or if\nnone of them attain to above half, the nomination for that magistracy\nis to be repeated by such new electors as shall be chosen at the next\nballot. And so, as is exemplified in the first magistracy, proceeds the\nballot of the rest; first in the first, then in the second, and so in\nthe third and fourth orders.\n\nNow whereas it may happen that AA, for example, being named strategus in\nthe first order, may also be named to the same or some one or more\nother magistracies in one or more of the other orders; his name is\nfirst balloted where it is first written, that is to the more worthy\nmagistracy, whereof if he misses, he is balloted as it comes in course\nfor the next, and so for the rest, if he misses of that, as often as he\nis named.\n\nAnd because to be named twice, or oftener, whether to the same or some\nother magistracy, is the stronger recommendation, the note must not fail\nto be given upon the name, at the proposition in this manner: AA named\nto be strategus in the first, and in the second order, or AA named to be\nstrategus in the first and the third, in the first and the fourth, etc.\nBut if he be named to the same magistracy in the first, second, third,\nand fourth orders, he can have no competitor; wherefore attaining to\nabove half the suffrages, he is the magistrate. Or thus: AA named to be\nstrategus in the first, to be censor in the second, to be orator in the\nthird, and to be commissioner of the seal in the fourth order, or the\nlike in more or fewer orders, in which cases if he misses of the first\nmagistracy, he is balloted to the second; if he misses of the second, to\nthe third; and if he misses of the third, to the fourth.\n\nThe ballot not finished before sunset, though the election of the\nmagistrates already chosen be good, voids the election of such\ncompetitors as being chosen are not yet furnished with magistracies, as\nif they had never been named (for this is no juggling-box, but an art\nthat must see the sun), and the ballot for the remaining magistracies\nis to be repeated the next day by new orders of electors, and such\ncompetitors as by them shall be elected. And so in the like manner, if\nof all the names proposed to the same magistracy, no one of them attains\nto above half the suffrages in the affirmative.\n\nThe senatorian ballot of Oceana being thus described, those of the\nparish, of the hundred, and of the tribe, being so little different,\nthat in this they are all contained, and by this may be easily\nunderstood, are yet fully described, and made plain enough before in the\nfifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth orders.\n\nThis, therefore, is the general order, whence those branches of the\nballot, some whereof you have already seen, are derived; which, with\nthose that follow, were all read and debated in this place at the\ninstitution. When my Lord Epimonus de Garrula, being one of the\ncouncillors, and having no further patience (though the rulers were\ncomposed by the agent of this commonwealth, residing for that purpose at\nVenice) than to hear the direction for the parishes, stood up and made\nway for himself in this manner:\n\n\u201cMAY IT PLEASE YOUR HIGHNESS, MY LORD ARCHON:\n\n\u201cUnder correction of Mr. Peregrin, Spy, our very learned agent and\nintelligencer, I have seen the world a little, Venice, and (as gentlemen\nare permitted to do) the great Council balloting. And truly I must needs\nsay, that it is for a dumb show the goodliest that I ever beheld with my\neyes. You should have some would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians\nthought themselves too good to speak to strangers, but they observed\nthem not so narrowly. The truth is, they have nothing to say to their\nacquaintance; or men that are in council sure would have tongues: for a\ncouncil, and not a word spoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is\nsuch a pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, though never\na one of them draw a sword, you would think they were training; which\ntill I found that they did it only to entertain strangers, I came from\namong them as wise as I went thither But in the Parliament of Oceana you\nhad no balls nor dancing, but sober conversation; a man might know and\nbe known, show his parts, and improve them. And now if you take the\nadvice of this same fellow, you will spoil all with his whimsies. Mr.\nSpeaker--cry you mercy, my Lord Archon, I mean--set the wisest man of\nyour house in the great Council of Venice, and you will not know him\nfrom a fool. Whereas nothing is more certain than that flat and dull\nfellows in the judgment of all such as used to keep company with them\nbefore, upon election into our house, have immediately chitted like\nbarley in the vat, where it acquires a new spirit, and flowed forth into\nlanguage, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not such\nas delight to abuse us, is far better than Tully\u2019s; or, let anybody but\ntranslate one of his orations, and speak it in the house, and see if\neverybody do not laugh at him.\n\n\u201cThis is a great matter, Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your\nbook-learning, your orbs, your centres, your prime magnitudes, and your\nnebulones, things I profess that would make a sober man run stark mad to\nhear them; while we, who should be considering the honor of our country\nand that it goes now or never upon our hand, whether it shall be\nridiculous to all the world, are going to nine-holes or trow madam for\nour business, like your dumb Venetian, whom this same Sir Politic your\nresident, that never saw him do anything but make faces, would insinuate\nto you, at this distance, to have the only knack of state. Whereas if\nyou should take the pains, as I have done, to look a little nearer,\nyou would find these same wonderful things to be nothing else but mere\nnatural fopperies, or capriccios as they call them in Italian, even\nof the meanest, of that nation. For, put the case you be travelling in\nItaly, ask your contadino, that is, the next country-fellow you meet,\nsome question, and presently he ballots you an answer with a nod, which\nis affirmative; or a shake with his head, which is the negative box; or\na shrug with his shoulder, which is the bossolo di non sinceri. Good!\nYou will admire Sandys for telling you, that grotta di cane is a\nmiracle: and I shall be laughed at, for assuring you, that it is nothing\nelse but such a damp (continued by the neighborhood of certain sulphur\nmines) as through accidental heat does sometimes happen in our coalpits.\nBut ingratitude must not discourage an honest man from doing good.\nThere is not, I say, such a tongue-tied generation under heaven as your\nItalian, that you should not wonder if he makes signs. But our people\nmust have something in their diurnals; we must ever and anon be telling\nthem our minds; or if we be at it when we raise taxes, like those\ngentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they will swear that we are\ncutpurses. Come, I know what I have heard them say, when some men had\nmoney that wrought hard enough for it; and do you conceive they will be\nbetter pleased when they shall be told that upon like occasions you are\nat mumchance or stool-ball?\n\n\u201cI do not speak for myself; for though I shall always acknowledge that\nI got more by one year\u2019s sitting in the house than by my three years\u2019\ntravels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this same Spy, for\npretending to have played at billiards with the most serene Commonwealth\nof Venice, should make such fools of us here, when I know that he must\nhave had his intelligence from some corn-cutter upon the Rialto; for a\nnoble Venetian would be hanged if he should keep such a fellow company.\nAnd yet if I do not think he has made you all dote, never trust me, my\nLord Archon is sometimes in such strange raptures. Well, good my lord,\nlet me be heard as well as your apple squire. Venice has fresh blood\nin her cheeks, I must confess, yet she is but an old lady. N or has he\npicked her cabinet; these he sends you are none of her receipts, I can\nassure you; he bought them for a Julio at St. Mark\u2019s of a mountebank.\nShe has no other wash, upon my knowledge, for that same envied\ncomplexion of hers but her marshes, being a little better scented,\nsaving your presence, than a chamber-pot. My lords, I know what I say,\nbut you will never have done with it, that neither the great Turk, nor\nany of those little Turks her neighbors, have been able to spoil her!\nWhy you may as well wonder that weasels do not suck eggs in swans\u2019\nnests. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her beads; which\nyou that have puked so much at popery, are now at length resolved shall\nconsecrate M. Parson, and be dropped by every one of his congregation,\nwhile those same whimsical intelligences your surveyors (you will break\nmy heart) give the turn to your primum mobile! And so I think they will;\n(for you will find that money is the primum mobile) and they will turn\nyou thus out of some \u00a3300,000 or \u00a3400,000: a pretty sum for urns\nand balls, for boxes and pills, which these same quacksalvers are to\nadminister to the parishes; and for what disease I marvel! Or how does\nit work? Out comes a constable, an overseer, and a churchwarden! Mr.\nSpeaker, I am amazed!\u201d\n\nNever was there goose so stuck with lard as my Lord Epimonus\u2019s speech\nwith laughter, the Archon having much ado to recover himself in such a\nmanner as might enable him to return these thanks:\n\n\u201cIn your whole lives, my lords, were you never entertained with so much\ningenuity, my Lord Epimonus having at once mended all the faults of\ntravellers. For, first, whereas they are abominable liars, he has not\ntold you (except some malicious body has misinformed him concerning poor\nSpy) one syllable of falsehood. And, secondly, whereas they never fail\nto give the upper hand in all their discourses to foreign nations, still\njostling their own into the kennel, he bears an honor to his country\nthat will not dissolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with figs and\nmelons, which I can assure you is an ordinary obligation; and therefore\nhold it a matter of public concern that we be to no occasion of\nquenching my lord\u2019s affections, nor is there any such great matter\nbetween us, but, in my opinion, might be easily reconciled, for though\nthat which my lord gained by sitting in the house, I steadfastly\nbelieve, as he can affirm, was got fairly yet dare I not, nor do I\nthink, that upon consideration he will promise for other gamesters,\nespecially when they were at it so high, as he intimates not only to\nhave been in use, but to be like enough to come about again. Wherefore\nsay I, let them throw with boxes, for unless we will be below the\npolitics of an ordinary, there is no such bar to cogging, it is known\nto his lordship that our game is most at a throw, and that every cast\nof our dice is in our suffrages, nor will he deny that partiality in a\nsuffrage is downright cogging.\n\n\u201cIf the Venetian boxes be the most sovereign of all remedies against this\nsame cogging, is it not a strange thing that they should be thrown first\ninto the fire by a fair gamester? Men are naturally subject to all kinds\nof passions; some you have that are not able to withstand the brow of an\nenemy, and others that make nothing of this, are less proof against that\nof a friend. So that if your suffrage be barefaced, I dare say you shall\nnot have one fair cast in twenty. But whatever a man\u2019s fortune be at the\nbox, he neither knows whom to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherefore\n(that my lord may have a charitable opinion of the choice affection\nwhich I confess to have, above all other beauties, for that of\nincomparable Venice) there is in this way of suffrage no less than a\ndemonstration that it is the most pure, and the purity of the suffrage\nin a popular government is the health, if not the life of it, seeing\nthe soul is not otherwise breathed into the sovereign power than by the\nsuffrage of the people. Wherefore no wonder if Postellus be of opinion\nthat this use of the ball is the very same with that of the bean in\nAthens, or that others, by the text concerning Eldad and Medad, derive\nit from the Commonwealth of Israel. There is another thing, though not\nso material to us, that my lord will excuse me if I be not willing to\nyield, which is, that Venice subsists only by her situation. It is true\nthat a man in time of war may be more secure from his enemies by being\nin a citadel, but not from his diseases; wherefore the first cause, if\nhe lives long, is his good constitution, without which his citadel were\nto little purpose, and it is not otherwise with Venice.\u201d\n\nWith this speech of the Archon I conclude the proof of the agrarian and\nthe ballot, being the fundamental laws of this commonwealth, and come\nnow from the centre to the circumferences or orbs, whereof some have\nbeen already shown; as how the parishes annually pour themselves into\nthe hundreds, the hundreds into the tribes, and the tribes into the\ngalaxies; the annual galaxy of every tribe consisting of two knights and\nseven deputies, whereof the knights constitute the Senate; the deputies,\nthe prerogative tribe, commonly called the people; and the Senate and\npeople constitute the sovereign power or Parliament of Oceana. Whereof\nto show what the Parliament is, I must first open the Senate, and then\nthe prerogative tribe.\n\nTo begin with the Senate, of which (as a man is differently represented\nby a picture drawer and by an anatomist) I shall first discover the\nface or aspect, and then the parts, with the use of them. Every Monday\nmorning in the summer at seven, and in the winter at eight, the great\nbell in the clock-house at the Pantheon begins, and continues ringing\nfor the space of one hour; in which time the magistrates of the Senate,\nbeing attended according to their quality, with a respective number of\nthe ballotins, doorkeepers, and messengers, and having the ensigns of\ntheir magistracies borne before them, as the sword before the\nstrategus, the mace before the orator, a mace with the seal before\nthe commissioners of the chancery, the like with the purse before the\ncommissioners of the treasury, and a silver wand, like those in use with\nthe universities, before each of the censors, being chancellors of the\nsame. These, with the knights, in all 300, assemble in the house or hall\nof the Senate.\n\nThe house or hall of the Senate being situated in the Pantheon or palace\nof justice, is a room consisting of a square and a half. In the middle\nof the lower end is the door, at the upper end hangs a rich state\novershadowing the greater part of a large throne, or half-pace of two\nstages; the first ascended by two steps from the floor, and the second\nabout the middle rising two steps higher. Upon this stand two chairs,\nin that on the right hand sits the strategus, in the other the orator\nadorned with scarlet robes, after the fashion that was used by the dukes\nin the aristocracy. At the right end of the upper stage stand three\nchairs, in which the three commissioners of the seal are placed; and at\nthe other end sit the three commissioners of the treasury, every one\nin a robe or habit like that of the earls. Of these magistrates of\nthis upper stage consists the signory. At either end of the lower stage\nstands a little table, to which the secretaries of the Senate are set\nwith their tufted sleeves in the habit of civil lawyers. To the four\nsteps, whereby the two stages of the throne are ascended, answer four\nlong benches, which successively deriving from every one of the steps,\ncontinue their respective height, and extend themselves by the side\nwalls toward the lower end of the house, every bench being divided by\nnumeral characters into the thirty-seven parts or places. Upon the upper\nbenches sit the censors in the robes of barons; the first in the middle\nof the right hand bench, and the second directly opposite to him on the\nother side. Upon the rest of the benches sit the knights, who, if they\nbe called to the urns, distributing themselves by the figures, come in\nequal files, either by the first seat, which consists of the two upper\nbenches on either side; or by the second seat, consisting of the two\nlower benches on either side, beginning also at the upper or at the\nlower ends of the same, according to the lot whereby they are called;\nfor which end the benches are open, and ascended at either end with easy\nstairs and large passages.\n\nThe rest of the ballot is conformable to that of the tribe; the censors\nof the house sitting at the side urn, and the youngest magistrate of\nthe signory at the middle, the urns being placed before the throne, and\nprepared according to the number of the magistrates to be at that time\nchosen by the rules already given to the censors of the tribes. But\nbefore the benches of the knights on either side stands one being\nshorter, and at the upper end of this sit the two tribunes of the horse.\nAt the upper end of the other the two tribunes of the foot in their\narms, the rest of the benches being covered by the judges of the land in\ntheir robes. But these magistrates have no suffrage, nor the tribunes,\nthough they derive their presence in the Senate from the Romans, nor\nthe judges, though they derive theirs from the ancient Senate of Oceana.\nEvery Monday this assembly sits of course; at other times, if there be\noccasion, any magistrate of the house, by giving order for the bell, or\nby his lictor or ensign-bearer, calls a senate. And every magistrate\nor knight during his session has the title, place, and honor of a duke,\nearl, baron, or knight respectively And every one that has borne the\nsame magistracy by his third session, has his respective place and title\nduring the term of his life, which is all the honor conferred by this\ncommonwealth, except upon the master of the ceremonies, the master of\nthe horse, and the king of the heralds, who are knights by their places.\nAnd thus you have the face of the Senate, in which there is scarce any\nfeature that is not Roman or Venetian; nor do the horns of the crescent\nextend themselves much unlike those of the Sanhedrim, on either hand of\nthe prince, and of the father of that Senate. But upon beauty, in which\nevery man has his fancy, we will not otherwise philosophize than to\nremember that there is something more than decency in the robe of\na judge, that would not be well spared from the bench; and that the\ngravest magistrate to whom you can commit the sword of justice, will\nfind a quickness in the spurs of honor, which, if they be not laid to\nvirtue, will lay themselves to that which may rout a commonwealth.\n\nTo come from the face of the Senate to the constitution and use of the\nparts: it is contained in the peculiar orders. And the orders which are\npeculiar to the Senate, are either of election or instruction.\n\nElections in the Senate are of three sorts: annual, biennial, and\nextraordinary.\n\nAnnual elections are performed by the schedule called the tropic; and\nthe tropic consists of two parts: the one containing the magistrates,\nand the other the councils to be yearly elected. The schedule or tropic\nof the magistrates is as follows in--\n\nThe fifteenth order requiring, \u201cThat upon every Monday next ensuing the\nlast of March, the knights of the annual galaxies taking their places in\nthe Senate, be called the third region of the same; and that the house\nhaving dismissed the first region, and received the third, proceed to\nelection of the magistrates contained in the first part of the tropic,\nby the ensuing schedule:\n\n     The lord strategus,\n     The lord orator,\n     the first censor,\n     The second censor,\n\n     Annual magistrates,\n\n     The third commissioner of the seal,\n     The third commissioner of the Treasury,\n\n     Triennal magistrates.\n\n\u201cThe annual magistrates (provided that no one man bears above one of\nthose honors during the term of one session) may be elected out of any\nregion. But the triennial magistrates may not be elected out of any\nother than the third region only, lest the term of their session expire\nbefore that of their honor; and (it being unlawful for a man to bear\nmagistracy any longer than he is thereto qualified by the election of\nthe people) cause a fraction in the rotation of this commonwealth.\n\n\u201cThe strategus is first president of the Senate, and general of the\narmy, if it be commanded to march; in which case there shall be a second\nstrategus elected to be first president of the Senate, and general\nof the second army, and if this also be commanded to march, a third\nstrategus shill be chosen, and so on, as long as the commonwealth sends\nforth armies.\n\n\u201cThe lord orator is the second and more peculiar president of the Senate\nto whom it appertains to keep the house to orders.\n\n\u201cThe censors, whereof the first, by consequence of his election,\nis chancellor of the University of Clio, and the second of that of\nCalliope, are presidents of the Council for Religion and magistrates, to\nwhom it belongs to keep the house to the order of the ballot. They are\nalso inquisitors into the ways and means of acquiring magistracy, and\nhave power to punish indirect proceedings in the same, by removing a\nknight or magistrate out of the house, under appeal to the Senate.\n\n\u201cThe commissioners of the seal being three, whereof the third is\nannually chosen out of the third region, are judges in chancery.\n\n\u201cThe commissioners of the Treasury being three, whereof the third is\nannually chosen out of the third region, are judges in the exchequer,\nand every magistrate of this schedule has right to propose to the\nSenate.\n\n\u201cBut the strategus with the six commissioners is the signory of this\ncommonwealth, having right of session and suffrage in every council of\nthe Senate, and power either jointly or severally to propose in all or\nany of them.\u201d\n\nI have little in this order to observe and prove but that the strategus\nis the same honor both in name and thing that was borne, among others,\nby Philopemen and Aratus in the Commonwealth of the Achaeans; the like\nhaving been in use also with the AEtolians. The orator, called otherwise\nthe speaker, is, with small alteration, the same that had been of former\nuse in this nation. These two, if you will, may be compared to the\nconsuls in Rome, or the suffetes in Carthage, for their magistracy is\nscarce different.\n\nThe censors derive their power of removing a senator from those of\nRome, the government of the ballot from those of Venice, and that of\nanimadversion upon the ambitious, or canvass for magistracy, from both.\n\nThe signory, with the whole right and use of that magistracy to be\nhereafter more fully explained, is almost purely Venetian.\n\nThe second part of the tropic is directed by--\n\nThe sixteenth order\u201d Whereby the constitution of the councils being\nfour; that is to say, the Council of State, the Council of War, the\nCouncil of Religion, and the Council of Trade, is rendered conformable\nin their revolutions to that of the Senate. As: First, by the annual\nelection of five knights out of the first region of the Senate into the\nCouncil of State, consisting of fifteen knights, five in every region.\nSecondly, by the annual election of three knights out of the third\nregion of the Council of State, to be proposed by the provosts, and\nelected by that council, into the Council of War, consisting of nine\nknights, three in every region, not excluded by this election from\nremaining members also of the Council of State. The four tribunes of\nthe people have right of session and suffrage in the Council of War.\nThirdly, by the annual election of four knights out of the third\nregion of the Senate into the Council of Religion, consisting of\ntwelve knights, four in every region; of this council the censors are\npresidents. Fourthly, by the annual election of four knights out of\nthe third region of the Senate into the Council of Trade, consisting of\ntwelve knights, four in every region. And each region, in every one of\nthese councils thus constituted, shall weekly and interchangeably elect\none provost whose magistracy shall continue for one week; nor shall he\nbe re-elected into the same till every knight of that region in the same\ncouncil has once borne the same magistracy. And the provosts being one\nin every region, three in every council, and twelve in all, beside their\nother capacities, shall assemble and be a council, or rather an Academy\napart, to certain ends and purposes to be hereafter further explained\nwith those of the rest of the councils.\u201d\n\nThis order is of no other use than the frame and turn of the councils,\nand yet of no small one; for in motion consists life, and the motion of\na commonwealth will never be current unless it be circular. Men that,\nlike my Lord Epimonus, not enduring the resemblance of this kind of\ngovernment to orbs and spheres, fall on physicking and purging it, do no\nmore than is necessary; for if it be not in rotation both as to persons\nand things, it will be very sick. The people of Rome, as to persons, if\nthey had not been taken up by the wheel of magistracy, had overturned\nthe chariot of the Senate. And those of Lacedaemon, as to things, had\nnot been so quiet when the Senate trashed their business, by encroaching\nupon the result, if by the institution of the ephors they had not\nbrought it about again. So that if you allow not a commonwealth her\nrotation, in which consists her equality, you reduce her to a party, and\nthen it is necessary that you be physicians indeed, or rather farriers;\nfor you will have strong patients, and such as must be haltered and\ncast, or yourselves may need bone-setters. Wherefore the councils of\nthis commonwealth, both in regard of their elections, and, as will\nbe shown, of their affairs, are uniform with the Senate in their\nrevolutions; not as whirlpits to swallow, but to bite, and with the\nscrews of their rotation to hold and turn a business (like the vice of a\nsmith) to the hand of the workman. Without engines of which nature it\nis not possible for the Senate, much less for the people, to be perfect\nartificers in a political capacity. But I shall not hold you longer\nfrom--\n\nThe seventeenth order, \u201cDirecting biennial elections, or the\nconstitution of the orb of ambassador-in-ordinary, consisting of four\nresidences, the revolution whereof is performed in eight years, and\npreserved through the election of one ambassador in two years by the\nballot of the Senate to repair to the Court of France, and reside there\nfor the term of two years; and the term of two years being expired,\nto remove from thence to the Court of Spain, there to continue for the\nspace of two years, and thence to remove to the State of Venice, and\nafter two years\u2019 residence in that city to conclude with his residence\nat Constantinople for a like term of time, and so to return. A knight\nof the Senate, or a deputy of the prerogative, may not be elected\nambassador-in-ordinary, because a knight or deputy so chosen must either\nlose his session, which would cause an unevenness in the motion of this\ncommonwealth, or accumulate magistracy, which agrees not with equality\nof the same. Nor may any man be elected into this capacity that is above\nfive-and-thirty years of age, lest the commonwealth lose the charge of\nhis education, by being deprived at his return of the fruit of it, or\nelse enjoy it not long through the defects of nature.\u201d\n\nThis order is the perspective of the commonwealth, whereby she foresees\ndanger; or the traffic, whereby she receives every two years the return\nof a statesman enriched with eight years\u2019 experience from the prime\nmarts of negotiation in Europe. And so much for the elections in the\nSenate that are ordinary; such as are extraordinary follow in--\n\nThe eighteenth order, \u201cAppointing all elections upon emergent occasions,\nexcept that of the dictator, to be made by the scrutiny, or that kind\nof election whereby a council comes to be a fifth order of electors.\nFor example, if there be occasion of an ambassador-extraordinary, the\nprovosts of the Council of State, or any two of them, shall propose to\nthe same, till one competitor be chosen by that council; and the council\nhaving chosen a competitor, shall bring his name into the Senate,\nwhich in the usual way shall choose four more competitors to the same\nmagistracy; and put them, with the competitor of the council, to the\nballot of the house, by which he of the five that is chosen is said to\nbe elected by the scrutiny of the Council of State. A vice-admiral, a\npolemarch, or field officer, shall be elected after the same manner, by\nthe scrutiny of the Council of War. A judge or sergeant-at-law, by the\nscrutiny of the commissioners of the seal. A baron, or considerable\nofficer of the Exchequer, by the scrutiny of the commissioners of\nthe Treasury: Men in magistracy, or out of it, are equally capable of\nelection by the scrutiny; but a magistrate or officer elected by the\nscrutiny to a military employment, if he be neither a knight of the\nSenate nor a deputy of the prerogative, ought to have his office\nconfirmed by the prerogative, because the militia in a commonwealth,\nwhere the people are sovereign, is not lawful to be touched injussu\npopuli.\n\nThe Romans were so curious that, though their consuls were elected in\nthe centuriate assemblies, they might not touch the militia, except\nthey were confirmed in the parochial assemblies; for a magistrate not\nreceiving his power from the people, takes it from them, and to take\naway their power is to take away their liberty. As to the election by\nthe scrutiny, it is easily perceived to be Venetian, there being no such\nway to take in the knowledge; which in all reason must be best in every\ncouncil of such men as are most fit for their turns, and yet to keep\nthem from the bias of particular affection or interest under that\npretence; for the cause why the great Council in Venice scarce ever\nelects any other than the name that is brought in by the scrutiny, is\nvery probable to be, that they may... This election is the last of those\nappertaining to the Senate. The councils being chosen by the orders\nalready shown, it remains that we come to those whereby they are\ninstructed and the orders of instruction to the councils are two: the\nfirst for the matter whereupon they are to proceed, and the second\nfor the manner of their proceeding. The matter of the councils is\ndistributed to them by--\n\nThe nineteenth order \u201cDistributing to every council such businesses\nas are properly to belong to their cognizance, whereof some they shall\nreceive and determine, and others they shall receive, prepare, and\nintroduce into the house: as, first,\n\n\u201cThe Council of State is to receive all addresses, intelligences, and\nletters of negotiation; to give audience to ambassadors sent to, and to\ndraw up instructions for such as shall be sent by, this commonwealth;\nto receive propositions from, and hold intelligence with, the provincial\ncouncils; to consider upon all laws to be enacted, amended, or\nrepealed, and upon all levies of men or money, war or peace, leagues\nor associations to be made by this commonwealth, so far forth as is\nconducible to the orderly preparation of the same to be introduced by\nthem into the Senate; provided, that all such affairs, as otherwise\nappertaining to the Council of State, are, for the good of the\ncommonwealth, to be carried with greater secrecy, be managed by the\nCouncil of War, with power to receive and send forth agents, spies,\nemissaries, intelligencers, frigots, and to manage affairs of that\nnature, if it be necessary without communication to the Senate, till\nsuch time as it may be had without detriment to the business. But they\nshall have no power to engage the commonwealth in a war without the\nconsent of the Senate and the people. It appertains also to this\ncouncil to take charge of the fleet as admiral, and of all storehouses,\narmories, arsenals, and magazines appertaining to this commonwealth.\nThey shall keep a diligent record of the military expeditions from time\nto time reported by him that was strategus or general, or one of the\npolemarchs in that action; or at least so far as the experience of such\ncommanders may tend to the improvement of the military discipline, which\nthey shall digest and introduce into the Senate; and if the Senate shall\nthereupon frame any article, they shall see that it be observed, in the\nmusters or education of the youth. And whereas the Council of War is the\nsentinel or scout of this commonwealth, if any person or persons shall\ngo about to introduce debate into any popular assembly of the same, or\notherwise to alter the present government, or strike at the root of it,\nthey shall apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, seized, imprisoned,\nand examine, arraign, acquit, or condemn, and cause to be executed any\nsuch person or persons, by their proper power and authority and without\nappeal.\n\n\u201cThe Council of Religion, as the arbiter of this commonwealth in cases of\nconscience more peculiarly appertaining to religion, Christian charity,\nand a pious life, shall have the care of the national religion, and\nthe protection of the liberty of conscience with the cognizance of\nall causes relating to either of them. And first as to the national\nreligion: they shall cause all places or preferments of the best revenue\nin either of the universities to be conferred upon no other than such of\nthe most learned and pious men as have dedicated themselves to the\nstudy of theology. They shall also take a special care that, by such\naugmentations as be or shall hereafter be appointed by the Senate, every\nbenefice in this nation be improved at least to the value of \u00a3100 a\nyear. And to the end that there be no interest at all, whereby the\ndivines or teachers of the national religion may be corrupted, or\ncorrupt religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of employment\nor preferment in this commonwealth. And whereas a directory for the\nadministration of the national religion is to be prepared by this\ncouncil, they shall in this and other debates of this nature proceed in\nmanner following: a question arising in matter of religion shall be put\nand stated by the council in writing, which writing the censors shall\nsend by their beadles (being proctors chosen to attend them) each to the\nuniversity whereof he is chancellor, and the vice-chancellor of the same\nreceiving the writing, shall call a convocation of all the divines of\nthat university being above forty years of age. And the universities,\nupon a point so proposed, shall have no manner of intelligence or\ncorrespondence one with another, till their debates be ended, and they\nhave made return of their answers to the Council of Religion by two\nor three of their own members, that they may clear their sense, if any\ndoubt should arise, to the council, which done, they shall return, and\nthe council, having received such information, shall proceed according\nto their own judgments, in the preparation of the whole matter for the\nSenate: that so the interest of the learned being removed, there may be\na right application of reason to Scripture, which is the foundation of\nthe national religion.\n\n\u201cSecondly, this council, as to the protection of the liberty of\nconscience, shall suffer no coercive power in the matter of religion to\nbe exercised in this nation; the teachers of the natural religion being\nno other than such as voluntarily undertake that calling, and their\nauditors or hearers no other than are also voluntary. Nor shall any\ngathered congregation be molested or interrupted in their way of worship\n(being neither Jewish nor idolatrous), but vigilantly and vigorously\nprotected and defended in the enjoyment, practice, and profession of\nthe same. And if there be officers or auditors appointed by any\nsuch congregation for the introduction of causes into the Council of\nReligion, all such causes so introduced shall be received, heard, and\ndetermined by the same, with recourse had, if need be, to the Senate.\n\n\u201cThirdly, every petition addressed to the Senate, except that of a\ntribe, shall be received, examined, and debated by this council; and\nsuch only as they, upon such examination and debate had, shall think\nfit, may be introduced into the Senate.\n\n\u201cThe Council of Trade being the vena porta of this nation, shall\nhereafter receive instructions more at large. For the present, their\nexperience, attaining to a right understanding of those trades\nand mysteries that feed the veins of this commonwealth, and a true\ndistinction of them from those that suck or exhaust the same, they shall\nacquaint the Senate with the conveniences and inconveniences, to the end\nthat encouragement may be applied to the one, and remedy to the other.\n\n\u201cThe Academy of the provosts, being the affability of the commonwealth,\nshall assemble every day toward the evening in a fair room, having\ncertain withdrawing-rooms thereto belonging; and all sorts of company\nthat will repair thither for conversation or discourse, so it be upon\nmatters of government, news, or intelligence, or to propose anything to\nthe councils, shall be freely and affably received in the outer chamber,\nand heard in the way of civil conversation, which is to be managed\nwithout any other awe or ceremony than is thereto usually appertaining,\nto the end that every man may be free, and that what is proposed by\none, may be argued or discoursed by the rest, except the matter be of\nsecrecy; in which case the provosts, or some of them, shall take such as\ndesire audience into one of the withdrawing-rooms. And the provosts\nare to give their minds that this academy be so governed, adorned, and\npreserved, as may be most attractive to men of parts and good affections\nto the commonwealth, for the excellency of the conversation.\n\n\u201cFurthermore, if any man, not being able or willing to come in person,\nhas any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the\ncommonwealth, he may write his mind to the Academy of the provosts, in\na letter signed or not signed, which letter shall be left with the\ndoorkeeper of the Academy. Nor shall any person delivering such a letter\nbe seized, molested, or detained, though it should prove to be a libel.\nBut the letters so delivered shall be presented to the provosts; and in\ncase they be so many that they cannot well be perused by the provosts\nthemselves, they shall distribute them as they please to be read by the\ngentlemen of the Academy, who, finding anything in them material,\nwill find matter of discourse; or if they happen upon a business that\nrequires privacy, return it with a note upon it to a provost. And the\nprovosts by the secretaries attending shall cause such notes out of\ndiscourses or letters to be taken as they please, to the end that they\nmay propose, as occasion serves, what any two of them shall think fit\nout of their notes so taken to their respective councils; to the end\nthat not only the ear of the commonwealth be open to all, but that men\nof such education being in her eve, she may upon emergent elections or\noccasions be always provided of her choice of fit persons.\n\n\u201cEvery council being adorned with a state for the signory, shall\nbe attended by two secretaries, two doorkeepers, and two\nmessengers-in-ordinary, and have power to command more upon emergencies,\nas occasion requires. And the Academy shall be attended with two\nsecretaries, two messengers, and two doorkeepers; this with the other\ncouncils being provided with their further conveniences at the charge of\nthe State.\n\n\u201cBut whereas it is incident to commonwealths, upon emergencies requiring\nextraordinary speed or secrecy, either through their natural delays or\nunnatural haste, to incur equal danger, while holding to the slow pace\nof their orders, they come not in time to defend themselves from some\nsudden blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they but haste to\ntheir own destruction; if the Senate shall at any time make election\nof nine knights-extraordinary, to be added to the Council of War, as a\njuncta for the term of three months, the Council of War with the juncta\nso added, is for the term of the same Dictator of Oceana, having power\nto levy men and money, to make war and peace, as also to enact laws,\nwhich shall be good for the space of one year (if they be not sooner\nrepealed by the Senate and the people) and for no longer time,\nexcept they be confirmed by the Senate and the people. And the whole\nadministration of the commonwealth for the term of the said three months\nshall be in the Dictator, provided that the Dictator shall have no power\nto do anything that tends not to his proper end and institution, but all\nto the preservation of the commonwealth as it is established, and for\nthe sudden restitution of the same to the natural channel and common\ncourse of government. And all acts, orders, decrees, or laws of the\nCouncil of War with the junota being thus created, shall be signed,\n\n                                \u201cDICTATOR OCEANAE.\u201d\n\nThis order of instructions to the councils being (as in a matter of that\nnature is requisite) very large, I have used my best skill to abbreviate\nit in such manner as might show no more of it than is necessary to the\nunderstanding of the whole, though as to the parts, or further duties\nof the councils, I have omitted many things of singular use in a\ncommonwealth. But it was discoursed at the council by the Archon in this\nmanner:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS, THE LEGISLATORS:\n\n\u201cYour councils, except the Dictator only, are proper and native springs\nand sources, you see, which (hanging a few sticks and straws, that, as\nless considerable, would otherwise be more troublesome, upon the banks\nof their peculiar channels) derive the full stream of business into the\nSenate, so pure, and so far from the possibility of being troubled\nor stained (as will Undeniably appear by the course contained in the\nensuing order) with any kind of private interest or partiality, that\nit shall never be possible for any assembly hearkening to the advice or\ninformation of this or that worthy member (either instructed upon his\npillow, or while he was making himself ready, or by the petition or\nticket which he received at the door) to have half the security in\nhis faith, or advantage by his wisdom; such a Senate or council being,\nthrough the uncertainty of the winds, like a wave of the sea. Nor\nshall it otherwise mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, or\nreferring businesses to be better examined by committees, than to go\nfurther about with it to less purpose; if it does not ebb back again\nwith the more mud in it. For in a case referred to an occasional\ncommittee, of which any member that is desirous may get himself named,\nand to which nobody will come but either for the sake of his friend or\nhis own interest; it fares little better as to the information of the\nSenate, than if it had been referred to the parties. Wherefore the\nAthenians being distributed into four tribes, out of which by equal\nnumbers they annually chose 400 men, called the Senate of the Bean,\nbecause the ballot at their election was performed by the use of beans,\ndivided them by fifties into eight parts. And every fifty in their turn,\nfor one-eighth part of the year, was a council apart called the Prytans.\n\n\u201cThe Prytans in their distinct council receiving all comers, and\ngiving ear to every man that had anything to propose concerning the\ncommonwealth, had power to debate and prepare all the businesses that\nwere to be introduced into the Senate. The Achaeans had ten selected\nmagistrates called the demiurgs, constituting a council apart called the\nsynarchy, which, with the strategus, prepared all the business that was\nintroduced into their Senate. But both the Senate of the Athenians, and\nthat of the Achaeans, would have wondered if a man had told them that\nthey were to receive all comers and discourses, to the end that they\nmight refer them afterward to the Prytans or the synarchy, much less\nto an occasional committee, exposed to the catch that catch may of the\nparties interested. And yet Venice in this, as in most of her orders,\nexcels them all by the constitution of her councils, that of the\nCollege, and the other of the Dieci, or Council of Ten. The course of\nthe College is exactly described in the ensuing order: and for that\nof the Dieci, it so little differs from what it has bestowed upon Our\nDictator, that I need not make any particular description of it. But to\ndictatorian power in general, and the use of it (because it must needs\nbe of difficult digestion to such as, puking still at ancient prudence,\nshow themselves to be in the nursery of mother-wit); it is no less than\nnecessary to say something. And, first, in a commonwealth that is not\nwrought up, or perfected, this power will be of very frequent, if not\ncontinual, use; wherefore it is said more than once, upon defects of the\ngovernment, in the book of Judges, \u2018that in those days there was no king\nin Israel.\u2019 Nor has the translator, though for \u2018no king, he should have\nsaid \u2018no judge,\u2019 abused you so much; seeing that the Dictator (and such\nwas the Judge of Israel) or the dictatorian power being in a single\nperson, so little differs from monarchy, which followed in that, that\nfrom the same cause there has been no other effect in any commonwealth:\nas in Rome was manifest by Sylla and Caesar, who to make themselves\nabsolute or sovereign, had no more to do than to prolong their\nmagistracy, for the dictatorian power was reputed divine, and therefore\nirresistible.\n\n\u201cNevertheless, so it is, that without this power, which is so dangerous,\nand subject to introduce monarchy, a commonwealth cannot be safe from\nfalling into the like dissolution; unless you have an expedient in\nthis case of your own, and bound up by your providence from recoiling.\nExpedients in some cases you must not only have, but be beholden for\nthem to such whom you must trust at a pinch, when you have not leisure\nto stand with them for security; which will be a thousand times more\ndangerous. And there can never be a commonwealth otherwise than by the\norder in debate wrought up to that perfection; but this necessity must\nsometimes happen in regard of her natural slowness and openness, and the\nsuddenness of assaults that may be made upon her, as also the secrecy\nwhich in some cases may be of absolute necessity to her affairs. Whence\nMachiavel concludes it positively, that a commonwealth unprovided of\nsuch a refuge, must fall to ruin; for her course is either broken by the\nblow in one of those cases, or by herself, while it startles her out of\nher orders. And indeed a commonwealth is like a greyhound, which, having\nonce coasted, will never after run fair, but grow slothful; and when it\ncomes to make a common practice of taking nearer ways than its orders,\nit is dissolved: for the being of a commonwealth consists in its orders.\nWherefore at this list you will be exposed to danger, if you have not\nprovided beforehand for the safety of your resort in the like cases: nor\nis it sufficient that your resort be safe, unless it be as secret and\nquick; for if it be slow or open, your former inconveniences are not\nremedied.\n\n\u201cNow for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in experience like\nthat of the Council of Ten in Venice; the benefit whereof would be too\nlong to be shown in the whole piece, and therefore I shall take but a\npattern out of Janotti. In the war, says he, which the Venetians had\nwith Florence in Casentin, the Florentines, finding a necessity in their\naffairs far from any other inclination in themselves to ask their peace,\nsent ambassadors about it to Venice, where they were no sooner heard,\nthan the bargain was struck up by the Council of Ten: and everybody\nadmiring (seeing this commonwealth stood upon the higher ground) what\nshould be the reason of such haste, the council upon the return of the\nambassadors imparted letters to the Senate, whereby it appeared that the\nTurks had newly launched a formidable fleet against their State, which,\nhad it been understood by the Florentines, it was well enough known they\nwould have made no peace. Wherefore the service of the Ten was highly\napplauded by the Senate, and celebrated by the Venetians. Whereby may\nappear not only in part what use there is of dictatorian power in that\ngovernment, but that it is assumed at the discretion of that Council;\nwhereas in this of Oceana it is not otherwise intrusted than when the\nSenate, in the election of nine knights-extraordinary, gives at once\nthe commission, and takes security in a balance, added to the Council\nof War, though securer before by the tribunes of the people than that of\nVenice, which yet never incurred jealousy; for if the younger nobility\nhave been often girding at it, that happened not so much through the\napprehension of danger in it to the commonwealth, as through the awe of\nit upon themselves. Wherefore the graver have doubtlessly shown their\nprudence in the law whereby the magistracy of these councillors being to\nlast till\u2019 their successors be created, the council is established.\u201d\n\nThe instructions of the councils for their matter being shown, it\nremains that I show the instructions for the manner of their proceeding,\nas they follow in--\n\nThe twentieth order, \u201cContaining the method of debates to be observed\nby the magistrates and the councils successively in order to a decree of\nthe Senate.\n\n\u201cThe magistrates of the signory, as councillors of this commonwealth,\nshall take into their consideration all matters of state or of\ngovernment; and, having right to propose in any council, may, any one or\nmore of them, propose what business he or they please in that council\nto which it most properly belongs. And, that the councils may be held to\ntheir duty, the said magistrates are superintendents and inspectors of\nthe same, with right to propose to the Senate.\n\n\u201cThe censors have equal power with these magistrates, but in relation to\nthe Council of Religion only.\n\n\u201cAny two of the three provosts in every council may propose to, and are\nthe more peculiar proposers of, the same council; to the end that there\nbe not only an inspection and superintendency of business in general,\nbut that every work be also committed to a peculiar hand.\n\n\u201cAny one or more of the magistrates, or any two of the provosts\nrespectively having proposed, the council shall debate the business so\nproposed, to which they of the third region that are willing shall speak\nfirst in their order; they of the second, next; and they of the first,\nlast; and the opinions of those that proposed or spoke, as they shall\nbe thought the most considerable by the council, shall be taken by the\nsecretary of the same in writing, and each of them signed with the name\nof the author.\n\n\u201cThe opinions being thus prepared, any magistrate of the signory, the\ncensors, or any two of the provosts of that council, upon this occasion\nmay assemble the Senate.\n\n\u201cThe Senate being assembled, the opinions (for example, if they be four)\nshall be read in their order, that is, according to the order or dignity\nof the magistrates or councillors by which they were signed. And being\nread, if any of the council introducing them will speak, they, as best\nacquainted with the business, shall have precedence; and after them the\nsenators shall speak according to their regions, beginning by the third\nfirst, and so continuing till every man that will has spoken; and when\nthe opinions have been sufficiently debated, they shall be put all\ntogether to the ballot after this manner:\n\n\u201cFour secretaries, carrying each of them one of the opinions in one\nhand, with a white box in the other, and each following the other,\naccording to the order of the opinions, shall present his box, naming\nthe author of his opinion to every senator; and one secretary or\nballotin with a green box shall follow the four white ones; and one\nsecretary or ballotin with a red box shall follow the green one; and\nevery senator shall put one ball into some one of these six boxes. The\nsuffrage being gathered and opened before the signory, if the red box or\nnon-sincere had above half the suffrages, the opinions shall be all cast\nout, for the major part of the house is not clear in the business. If\nno one of the four opinions had above half the suffrages in the\naffirmative, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other\nthree shall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half,\nthat which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other two shall ballot\nagain. If neither of the two had above half, that which had fewest shall\nbe cast out, and the remaining opinion shall be balloted again. And if\nthe remaining opinion has not above half, it shall also be cast out.\nBut the first of the opinions that arrives at most above half in the\naffirmative, is the decree of the Senate. The opinions being all of them\ncast out by the non-sincere, may be reviewed, if occasion permits, by\nthe council, and brought in again. If they be cast out by the negative,\nthe case being of advice only; the house approves not, and there is an\nend of it: the case being necessary, and admitting delay, the council is\nto think again upon the business, and to bring in new opinions; but the\ncase being necessary, and not admitting delay, the Senate immediately\nelecting the juncta shall create the Dictator. \u2018And let the Dictator,\u2019\nas the Roman saying is, \u2018take care that the commonwealth receives no\nharm.\u2019\u201d\n\nThis in case the debate concludes not in a decree. But if a decree be\npassed, it is either in matter of state or government according to law\nenacted already, and then it is good without going any further, or it\nis in matter of law to be enacted, repealed, or amended; and then the\ndecree of the Senate, especially if it be for a war, or for a levy of\nmen or money, is invalid, without the result of the commonwealth, which\nis in the prerogative tribe, or representative of the people.\n\n\u201cThe Senate having prepared a decree to be proposed to the people, shall\nappoint their proposers; and no other may propose for the Senate to\nthe people but the magistrates of the house; that is to say, the\nthree commissioners of the seal, or any two of them; the three of the\nTreasury, or any two of them; or the two censors.\n\n\u201cThe Senate having appointed their proposers, shall require of the\ntribunes a muster of the people at a set time and place: and the\ntribunes or any two of them having mustered the people accordingly, the\nproposers shall propose the sense or decree of the Senate by clauses to\nthe people. And that which is proposed by the authority of the Senate,\nand resolved by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.\u201d To\nthis order, implicitly containing the sum very near of the whole civil\npart of the commonwealth, my Lord Archon spoke thus in council:\n\n \u201cMY DEAR LORDS:\n\n\u201cThere is a saying, that a man must cut his coat according to his cloth.\nWhen I consider what God has allowed or furnished to our present work, I\nam amazed. You would have a popular government; he has weighed it to you\nin the present balance, as I may say, to a drachm; you have no more\nto do but to fix it. For the superstructures of such a government they\nrequire a good aristocracy: and you have, or have had a nobility or\ngentry the best studied, and the best writers, at least next that\nof Italy, in the whole world; nor have they been inferior, when so\nexercised, in the leading of armies. But the people are the main body\nof a commonwealth; show me from the treasuries of the snow (as it is in\nJob) to the burning zone a people whose shoulder so universally and so\nexactly fits the corselet. Nevertheless, it were convenient to be well\nprovided with auxiliaries. There is Marpesia, through her fruitfulness,\ninexhaustible of men, and men through her barrenness not only enured to\nhardship, but in your arms. It may be said that Venice, excepting only\nthat she takes not in the people, is the most incomparable situation\nof a commonwealth. You are Venice, taking in your people and your\nauxiliaries too. My lords, the children of Israel were makers of brick\nbefore they were builders of a commonwealth; but our brick is made,\nour mortar tempered, the cedars of Lebanon are hewed and squared to our\nhands. Has this been the work of man? Or is it in man to withstand this\nwork? \u2018Shall he that contends with the Almighty instruct him? He that\nreproves God, let him answer it.\u2019 For our parts, everything is so laid\nthat when we come to have use of it, it is the next at hand; and unless\nwe can conceive that God and nature do anything in vain, there is no\nmore for us to do but to despatch. The piece which we have reached to us\nin the foregoing orders, is the aristocracy. Athens, as has been shown,\nwas plainly lost through the want of a good aristocracy.\n\n\u201cBut the sufficiency of an aristocracy goes demonstrably upon the hand\nof the nobility or gentry; for that the politics can be mastered\nwithout study, or that the people can have leisure to study, is a vain\nimagination; and what kind of aristocracy divines and lawyers would\nmake, let their incurable running upon their own narrow bias and their\nperpetual invectives against Machiavel (though in some places justly\nreprovable, yet the only politician, and incomparable patron of the\npeople) serve for instruction. I will stand no more to the judgment\nof lawyers and divines in this work, than to that of so many other\ntradesmen; but if this model chances to wander abroad, I recommend it\nto the Roman speculativi (the most complete gentlemen of this age)\nfor their censure; or with my Lord Epimonus his leave, send 300 or 400\ncopies to your agent at Venice to be presented to the magistrates there;\nand when they have considered them, to be proposed to the debate of the\nSenate, the most competent judges under heaven, who, though they have\ngreat affairs, will not refuse to return you the oracle of their ballot.\nThe councillors of princes I will not trust; they are but journeymen.\nThe wisdom of these later times in princes\u2019 affairs (says Verulamius) is\nrather fine deliveries and shiftings of dangers when they be near, than\nsolid and grounded courses to keep them off. Their councillors do not\nderive their proceedings from any sound root of government that may\ncontain the demonstration, and assure the success of them, but are\nexpedient-mongers, givers of themselves to help a lame dog over a stile;\nelse how comes it to pass that the fame of Cardinal Richelieu has been\nlike thunder, whereof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration\nof the reason? But to return: if neither the people, nor divines and\nlawyers, can be the aristocracy of a nation, there remains only\nthe nobility; in which style, to avoid further repetition, I shall\nunderstand the gentry also, as the French do by the word noblesse.\n\n\u201cNow to treat of the nobility in such sort as may be less obnoxious to\nmistake, it will be convenient, and answerable to the present occasion,\nthat I divide my discourse into four parts:\n\n\u201cThe first, treating of nobility, and the kinds of it;\n\n\u201cThe second, of their capacity of the Senate;\n\n\u201cThe third, of the divers kinds of senates;\n\n\u201cThe fourth, of the Senate, according to the foregoing orders.\n\n\u201cNobility may be defined divers ways; for it is either ancient riches,\nor ancient virtue, or a title conferred by a prince or a commonwealth.\n\n\u201cNobility of the first kind may be subdivided into two others, such as\nhold an overbalance in dominion or property to the whole people, or such\nas hold not an overbalance, in the former case, a nobility (such was\nthe Gothic, of which sufficient has been spoken) is incompatible with\npopular government; for to popular government it is essential that power\nshould be in the people, but the overbalance of a nobility in dominion\ndraws the power to themselves. Wherefore in this sense it is that\nMachiavel is to be understood, where he says, that these are pernicious\nin a commonwealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are\nnations which for this cause are the corruption of the world: for\notherwise nobility may, according to his definition (which is, \u2018that\nthey are such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without\nengagement either to the tilling of their lands, or other work for their\nlivelihood \u2018), hold an underbalance to the people; in which case\nthey are not only safe, but necessary to the natural mixture of a\nwell-ordered commonwealth.\n\n\u201cFor how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether\nmechanic? or what comparison is there of such commonwealths as are, or\ncome nearest to mechanic--for example, Athens, Switzerland, Holland,\nto Lacedaemon, Rome, and Venice, plumed with their aristocracies? Your\nmechanics, till they have first feathered their nests, like the fowls of\nthe air whose whole employment is to seek their food, are so busied in\ntheir private concernments that they have neither leisure to study\nthe public, nor are safely to be trusted with it, because a man is not\nfaithfully embarked in this kind of ship, if he has no share in the\nfreight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his private\nadvantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there\nfor this sort of men, being a leur aise, but (as Machiavel you see calls\nthem) nobility? Especially when their families come to be such as are\nnoted for their services done to the commonwealth, and so take into\ntheir ancient riches ancient virtue, which is the second definition of\nnobility, but such a one as is scarce possible in nature without the\nformer. \u2018For as the baggage,\u2019 says Verulamius, \u2018is to an army, so are\nriches to virtue; they cannot be spared nor left behind, though they be\nimpediments, such as not only hinder the march, but sometimes through\nthe care of them lose or disturb the victory.\u2019 Of this latter sort is\nthe nobility of Oceana; the best of all others because they, having no\nstamp whence to derive their price, can have it no otherwise than by\ntheir intrinsic value. The third definition of nobility, is a title,\nhonor, or distinction from the people, conferred or allowed by the\nprince or the commonwealth. And this may be two ways, either without\nany stamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with such privileges as are\ninconsiderable, as in Athens after the battle of Plataea, whence the\nnobility had no right, as such, but to religious offices, or inspection\nof the public games, to which they were also to be elected by the\npeople; or with privileges, and those considerable ones, as the nobility\nin Athens before the battle of Plataea, and the patricians in Rome\neach of which had right, or claimed it, to the Senate and all the\nmagistracies; wherein for some time they only by their stamp were\ncurrent.\n\n\u201cBut to begin higher, and to speak more at large of nobility in their\nseveral capacities of the Senate. The phylarchs, or princes of the\ntribes of Israel, were the most renowned, or, as the Latin, the most\nnoble of the congregation, whereof by hereditary right they had the\nleading and judging. The patriarchs, or princes of families, according\nas they declared their pedigrees, had the like right as to their\nfamilies; but neither in these nor the former was there any hereditary\nright to the Sanhedrim: though there be little question but the wise men\nand understanding, and known among their tribes, which the people took\nor elected into those or other magistracies, and whom Moses made rulers\nover them, must have been of these, seeing they could not choose but be\nthe most known among the tribes, and were likeliest by the advantages of\neducation to be the most wise and understanding.\n\n\u201cSolon having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealogically,\nbut by their different ways of life, divided into four tribes--that\nis, into the soldiery, the tradesmen, the husbandmen, and the\ngoatherds--instituted a new distribution of them, according to the sense\nor valuation of their estates, into four classes: the first, second, and\nthird consisting of such as were proprietors in land, distinguished by\nthe rate of their freeholds, with that stamp upon them, which making\nthem capable of adding honor to their riches, that is to say, of the\nSenate, and all the magistracies, excluded the fourth, being the body\nof the people, and far greater in number than the former three, from all\nother right, as to those capacities, except the election of these, who\nby this means became an hereditary aristocracy or senatorian order\nof nobility. This was that course which came afterward to be the\ndestruction of Rome, and had now ruined Athens. The nobility, according\nto the inevitable nature of such a one, having laid the plot how to\ndivest the people of the result, and so to draw the whole power of the\ncommonwealth to themselves; which in all likelihood they had done, if\nthe people, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the battle of\nPlataea, and famous for defending Greece against the Persians, had not\nreturned with such courage as irresistibly broke the classes, to which\nof old they had borne a white tooth, brought the nobility to equal\nterms, and the Senate with the magistracies to be common to both; the\nmagistracies by suffrage, and the Senate (which was the mischief of\nit, as I shall show anon in that constitution) by lot only.\u201d The\nLacedaemonians were in the manner, and for the same cause with the\nVenetians at this day, no other than a nobility even according to the\ndefinition given of nobility by Machiavel; for they neither exercised\nany trade, nor labored their lands or lots, which was done by their\nhelots: wherefore some nobility may be far from pernicious in a\ncommonwealth by Machiavel\u2019s own testimony, who is an admirer of this,\nthough the servants thereof were more in number than the citizens. To\nthese servants I hold the answer of Lycurgus--when he bade him who asked\nwhy he did not admit the people to the government of his commonwealth,\nto go home and admit his servants to the government of his family-to\nrelate: for neither were the Lacedaemonians servants, nor, further,\ncapable of the government, unless, whereas the congregation had the\nresult, he should have given them the debate also; every one of\nthese that attained to sixty years of age, and the major vote of the\ncongregation, being equally capable of the Senate.\n\n\u201cThe nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the Senate, I have already\ndescribed by that of Athens before the battle of Plataea, saving\nonly that the Athenian was never eligible into the Senate without the\nsuffrage of the people till the introduction of the lot, but the Roman\nnobility ever: for the patricians were elected into the Senate by the\nkings; by the consuls, or the censors, or if a plebeian happened to\nbe conscribed, he and his posterity became patricians. Nor, though\nthe people had many disputes with the nobility, did this ever come in\ncontroversy, which, if there had been nothing else, might in my judgment\nhave been enough to overturn that commonwealth.\n\n\u201cThe Venetian nobility, but that they are richer, and not military,\nresemble at all other points the Lacedaemonian, as I have already shown.\nThese Machiavel excepts from his rule, by saying that their estates are\nrather personal than real, or of any great revenue in land, which comes\nto our account, and shows that a nobility or party of the nobility, not\noverbalancing in dominion, is not dangerous, but of necessary use in\nevery commonwealth, provided it be rightly ordered; for if it be so\nordered as was that of Rome, though they do not overbalance at the\nbeginning, as they did not there, it will not be long ere they do, as\nis clear both in reason and experience toward the latter end. That the\nnobility only be capable of the Senate is there only not dangerous,\nwhere there be no other citizens, as in this government and that of\nLacedaemon.\n\n\u201cThe nobility of Holland and Switzerland, though but few, have\nprivileges not only distinct from the people, but so great that in some\nsovereignties they have a negative voice; an example which I am far from\ncommending, being such as (if those governments were not cantonized,\ndivided, and subdivided into many petty sovereignties that balance one\nanother, and in which the nobility, except they had a prince at the head\nof them, can never join to make work) would be the most dangerous\nthat ever was, but the Gothic, of which it favors. For in ancient\ncommonwealths you shall never find a nobility to have had a negative\nbut by the poll, which, the people being far more in number, came to\nnothing; whereas these have it, be they never so few by their stamp or\norder.\n\n\u201cOurs of Oceana have nothing else but their education and their leisure\nfor the public, furnished by their ease and competent riches: and their\nintrinsic value, which, according as it comes to hold weight in the\njudgment or suffrage of the people, is their only way to honor and\npreferment. Wherefore I would have your lordships to look upon your\nchildren as such, who, if they come to shake off some part of their\nbaggage, shall make the more quick and glorious march; for it was\nnothing else but the baggage, sordidly plundered by the nobility of\nRome, that lost the victory of the whole world in the midst of her\ntriumph.\n\n\u201cHaving followed the nobility thus close, they bring us, according to\ntheir natural course and divers kinds, to the divers constitutions of\nthe Senate.\n\n\u201cThat of Israel (as was shown by my right noble Lord Phosphorus de Auge,\nin the opening of the commonwealth) consisted of seventy elders, elected\nat first by the people. But whereas they were for life, they ever after\n(though without any divine precept for it) substituted their successors\nby ordination, which ceremony was most usually performed by imposition\nof hands; and by this means a commonwealth of as popular institution\nas can be found became, as it is accounted by Josephus, aristocratical.\nFrom this ordination derives that which was introduced by the Apostles\ninto the Christian Church; for which cause I think it is that\nthe Presbyterians would have the government of the Church to be\naristocratical, though the Apostles, to the end, as I conceive, that\nthey might give no occasion to such a mistake, but show that they\nintended the government of the Church to be popular, ordained elders,\nas has been shown, by the holding up of hands (or free suffrage of the\npeople) in every congregation or ecclesia: for that is the word in the\noriginal, being borrowed from the civil congregations of the people in\nAthens and Lacedaemon, which were so called; and the word for holding up\nof hands in the text is also the very same, which signified the suffrage\nof the people in Athens, chirotonante; for the suffrage of the\nAthenians was given per chirotonian, says Emmius.\n\n\u201cThe Council of the Bean (as was shown by my Lord Navarchus de Paralo in\nhis full discourse), being the proposing Senate of Athens (for that\nof the Areopagites was a judicatory), consisted of 400, some say 500\nsenators, elected annually, all at once, and by a mere lot without\nsuffrage. Wherefore though the Senate, to correct the temerity of the\nlot, had power to cast out such as they should judge unworthy of that\nhonor, this related to manners only, and was not sufficient to repair\nthe commonwealth, which by such means became impotent; and forasmuch\nas her Senate consisted not of the natural aristocracy, which in a\ncommonwealth is the only spur and rein of the people, it was cast\nheadlong by the rashness of her demagogues or grandees into ruin; while\nher Senate, like the Roman tribunes (who almost always, instead of\ngoverning, were rather governed by the multitude), proposed not to the\nresult only, but to the debate also of the people, who were therefore\ncalled to the pulpits, where some vomited, and others drank, poison.\n\n\u201cThe Senate of Lacedaemon, most truly discovered by my Lord Laco de\nScytale, consisted but of thirty for life, whereof the two kings, having\nbut single votes, were hereditary, the rest elected by the free suffrage\nof the people, but out of such as were sixty years of age. These had\nthe whole debate of the commonwealth in themselves, and proposed to the\nresult only of the people. And now the riddle which I have heretofore\nfound troublesome to unfold, is out; that is to say, why Athens and\nLacedaemon, consisting each of the Senate and the people, the one\nshould be held a democracy, and the other an aristocracy, or laudable\noligarchy, as it is termed by Isocrates; for that word is not, wherever\nyou meet it, to be branded, Seeing it is used also by Aristotle,\nPlutarch, and others, sometimes in a good sense. The main difference was\nthat the people in this had the result only, and in that the debate and\nresult, too. But for my part, where the people have the election of\nthe Senate, not bound to a distinct order, and the result, which is the\nsovereign power, I hold them to have that share in the government (the\nSenate being not for life) whereof, with the safety of the commonwealth,\nthey are capable in nature, and such a government, for that cause, to\nbe democracy; though I do not deny but in Lacedaemon, the paucity of\nthe senators considered, it might be called oligarchy, in comparison of\nAthens; or, if we look on their continuance for life, though they had\nbeen more, aristocracy.\n\n\u201cThe Senate of Rome (whose fame has been heard to thunder in the\neloquence of my Lord Dolabella d\u2019Enyo) consisting of 300, was, in regard\nof the number, less oligarchical than that of Lacedaemon; but more in\nregard of the patricians, who, having an hereditary capacity of\nthe same, were not elected to that honor by the people; but, being\nconscribed by the censors, enjoyed it for life. Wherefore these, if they\nhad their wills, would have resolved as well as debated; which set the\npeople at such variance with them as dissolved the commonwealth; whereas\nif the people had enjoyed the result, that about the agrarian, as well\nas all other strife, must of necessity have ceased.\n\n\u201cThe Senates of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learnt of my Lords\nAlpester and Glaucus), being bound up (like the sheaf of arrows which\nthe latter gives) by leagues, lie like those in their quivers; but\narrows, when they come to be drawn, fly from this way and from that; and\nI am contented that these concerned us not.\n\n\u201cThat of Venice (by the faithful testimony of my most excellent Lord\nLinceus de Stella) has obliged a world, sufficiently punished by its\nown blindness and ingratitude, to repent and be wiser: for whereas\na commonwealth in which there is no senate, or where the senate is\ncorrupt, cannot stand, the great Council of Venice, like the statue of\nNilus, leans upon an urn or waterpot, which pours forth the Senate in\nso pure and perpetual a stream, as being unable to stagnate, is forever\nincapable of corruption. The fuller description of this Senate is\ncontained in that of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing orders.\nTo every one of which, because something has been already said, I shall\nnot speak in particular. But in general, your Senate, and the other\nassembly, or the prerogative, as I shall show in due place, are\nperpetual, not as lakes or puddles, but as the rivers of Eden; and are\nbeds made, as you have seen, to receive the whole people, by a due and\nfaithful vicissitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late\nway, alternate. Alternate life in government is the alternate death of\nit.\n\n\u201cThis was the Gothic work, whereby the former government (which was not\nonly a ship, but a gust, too) could never open her sails, but in danger\nto overset herself, neither could make any voyage nor lie safe in her\nown harbor. The wars of later ages, says Verulamius, seem to be made in\nthe dark, in respect of the glory and honor which reflected on men from\nthe wars in ancient times. Their shipping of this sort Was for voyages;\nours dare not launch, nor lies it safe at home. Your Gothic politicians\nseem to me rather to have invented some new ammunition or gunpowder, in\ntheir King and Parliament, than government. For what is become of the\nprinces (a kind of people) in Germany?--blown up. Where are the estates,\nor the power of the people in France?--blown up. Where is that of the\npeople in Arragon, and the rest of the Spanish kingdoms?--blown up. On\nthe other side, where is the King of Spain\u2019s power in Holland?--blown\nup. Where is that of the Austrian princes in Switzerland?--blown up.\nThis perpetual peevishness and jealousy, under the alternate empire of\nthe prince and of the people, are obnoxious to every spark. Nor shall\nany man show a reason that will be holding in prudence, why the people\nof Oceana have blown up their King, but that their kings did not\nfirst blow up them. The rest is discourse for ladies. Wherefore your\nparliaments are not henceforth to come out of the bag of AEolus, but by\nyour galaxies, to be the perpetual food of the fire of Vesta.\n\n\u201cYour galaxies, which divide the house into so many regions, are three;\none of which constituting the third region is annually chosen, but\nfor the term of three years; which causes the house (having at once\nblossoms, fruit half ripe, and others dropping off in full maturity)\nto resemble an orange tree, such as is at the same time an education or\nspring, and a harvest, too; for the people have made a very ill-choice\nin the man, who is not easily capable of the perfect knowledge in one\nyear of the senatorian orders; which knowledge, allowing him for the\nfirst to have been a novice, brings him the second year to practise, and\ntime enough. For at this rate you must always have 200 knowing men\nin the government. And thus the vicissitude of your senators is not\nperceivable in the steadiness and perpetuity of your Senate; which, like\nthat of Venice, being always changing, is forever the same. And though\nother politicians have not so well imitated their patter, there is\nnothing more obvious in nature, seeing a man who wears the same flesh\nbut a short time, is nevertheless the same man, and of the same genius;\nand whence is this but from the constancy of nature, in holding a man\nto her orders? Wherefore keep also to your orders. But this is a mean\nrequest; your orders will be worth little if they do not hold you to\nthem, wherefore embark. They are like a ship, if you be once aboard,\nyou do not carry them, but they you; and see how Venice stands to her\ntackling: you will no more forsake them than you will leap into the sea.\n\n\u201cBut they are very many and difficult. O my Lords, what seaman casts\naway his card because it has four-and-twenty points of the compass? and\nyet those are very near as many and as difficult as the orders in the\nwhole circumference of your commonwealth. Consider, how have we been\ntossed with every wind of doctrine, lost by the glib tongues of your\ndemagogues and grandees in our own havens? A company of fiddlers that\nhave disturbed your rest for your groat; \u00a32,000 to one, \u00a33,000 a year to\nanother, has been nothing. And for what? Is there one of them that\nyet knows what a commonwealth is? And are you yet afraid of such a\ngovernment in which these shall not dare to scrape for fear of the\nstatute? Themistocles could not fiddle, but could make of a small city\na great commonwealth: these have fiddled, and for your money, till they\nhave brought a great commonwealth to a small city.\n\n\u201cIt grieves me, while I consider how, and from what causes, imaginary\ndifficulties will be aggravated, that the foregoing orders are not\ncapable of any greater clearness in discourse or writing; but if a man\nshould make a book, describing every trick and passage, it would fare no\notherwise with a game at cards; and this is no more, if a man plays upon\nthe square. \u2018There is a great difference,\u2019 says Verulamius, \u2018between a\ncunning man and a wise man (between a demagogue and a legislator), not\nonly in point of honesty, but in point of ability as there be that can\npack the cards, and yet cannot play well; so there be some that are good\nin canvasses and fractions, that are otherwise weak men.\u2019 Allow me but\nthese orders, and let them come with their cards in their sleeves,\nor pack if they can. \u2018Again,\u2019 says he, \u2018it is one thing to understand\npersons, and another to understand matters; for many are perfect in\nmen\u2019s humors that are not greatly capable of the real part of business,\nwhich is the constitution of one that has studied men more than books.\nBut there is nothing more hurtful in a State than that cunning men\nshould pass for wise.\u2019 His words are an oracle. As Dionysius, when he\ncould no longer exercise his tyranny among men, turned schoolmaster,\nthat he might exercise it among boys. Allow me but these orders, and\nyour grandees, so well skilled in the baits and palates of men, shall\nturn rat-catchers.\n\n\u201cAnd whereas \u2018councils (as is discreetly observed by the same author\nin his time) are at this day, in most places, but familiar meetings\n(somewhat like the Academy of our provosts), where matters are rather\ntalked on than debated, and run too swift to order an act of council,\u2019\ngive me my orders, and see if I have not puzzled your demagogues.\n\n\u201cIt is not so much my desire to return upon haunts, as theirs that\nwill not be satisfied; wherefore if, notwithstanding what was said of\ndividing and choosing in our preliminary discourses, men will yet\nbe returning to the question, Why the Senate must be a council apart\n(though even in Athens, where it was of no other constitution than the\npopular assembly, the distinction of it from the other was never held\nless than necessary) this may be added to the former reasons, that if\nthe aristocracy be not for the debate, it is for nothing; but if it be\nfor debate, it must have convenience for it; and what convenience\nis there for debate in a crowd, where there is nothing but jostling,\ntreading upon one another, and stirring of blood, than which in this\ncase there is nothing more dangerous? Truly, it was not ill said of my\nLord Epimonus, that Venice plays her game, as it were, at billiards or\nnine-holes; and so may your lordships, unless your ribs be so strong\nthat you think better of football: for such sport is debate in a popular\nassembly as, notwithstanding the distinction of the Senate, was the\ndestruction of Athens.\u201d\n\nThis speech concluded the debate which happened at the institution\nof the Senate. The next assembly is that of the people or prerogative\ntribe.\n\nThe face, or mien, of the prerogative tribe for the arms, the horses,\nand the discipline, but more especially for the select men, is that of\na very noble regiment, or rather of two; the one of horse, divided\ninto three troops (besides that of the provinces, which will be shown\nhereafter), with their captains, cornets, and two tribunes of the horse\nat the head of them; the other of foot in three companies (beside that\nof the provinces), with their captains, ensigns, and two tribunes of\nthe foot at the head of them. The first troop is called the Phoenix,\nthe second the Pelican, and the third the Swallow. The first company the\nCypress, the second the Myrtle, and the third the Spray. Of these again\n(not without a near resemblance of the Roman division of a tribe) the\nPhoenix and the Cypress constitute the first class, the Pelican and the\nMyrtle the second, and the Swallow with the Spray the third, renewed\nevery spring by--\n\nThe one-and-twentieth order, \u201cDirecting, that upon every Monday next\nensuing the last of March, the deputies of the annual galaxy arriving at\nthe pavilion in the halo, and electing one captain and one cornet of the\nSwallow (triennial officers) by and out of the cavalry at the horse urn,\naccording to the rules contained in the ballot of the hundred; and one\ncaptain with one ensign of the Spray (triennial officers) by and out\nof the infantry at the foot urn, after the same way of balloting,\nconstitute and become the third classes of the prerogative tribe.\u201d\n\nSeven deputies are annually returned by every tribe, whereof three are\nhorse and four are foot; and there be fifty tribes: so the Swallow must\nconsist of 150 horse, the Spray of 200 foot. And the rest of the classes\nbeing two, each of them in number equal, the whole prerogative (beside\nthe provinces, that is, the knights and deputies of Marpesia and\nPanopea) must consist of 1,050 deputies. And these troops and companies\nmay as well be called centuries as those of the Romans; for the Romans\nrelated not, in so naming theirs, to the number. And whereas they were\ndistributed according to the valuation of their estates, so are these;\nwhich, by virtue of the last order, are now accommodated with their\ntriennial officers. But there be others appertaining to this tribe whose\nelection, being of far greater importance, is annual, as follows in\n\nThe twenty-second order, \u201cWhereby the first class having elected their\ntriennial officers, and made oath to the old tribunes, that they\nwill neither introduce, cause, nor to their power suffer debate to be\nintroduced into any popular assembly of this government, but to their\nutmost be aiding and assisting to seize and deliver any person or\npersons in that way offending, and striking at the root of this\ncommonwealth, to the Council of War, are to proceed with the other two\nclasses of the prerogative tribe to election of the new tribunes,\nbeing four annual magistrates, whereof two are to be elected out of the\ncavalry at the horse urn, and two out of the infantry at the foot\nurn, according to the common ballot of the tribes. And they may be\npromiscuously chosen out of any classes, provided that the same person\nshall not be capable of bearing the tribunitian honor twice in the term\nof one galaxy. The tribunes thus chosen shall receive the tribe (in\nreference to the power of mustering and disciplining the same) as\ncommanders-in-chief, and for the rest as magistrates, whose proper\nfunction is prescribed by the next order. The tribunes may give leave\nto any number of the prerogative, not exceeding 100 at a time, to be\nabsent, so they be not magistrates nor officers, and return within three\nmonths. If a magistrate or officer has a necessary occasion, he may also\nbe absent for the space of one month, provided that there be not above\nthree cornets or ensigns, two captains, or one tribune so absent at one\ntime.\u201d\n\nTo this the Archon spoke at the institution after this manner:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS:\n\n\u201cIt is affirmed by Cicero, in his oration for Flaccus, that the\ncommonwealths of Greece were all shaken or ruined by the intemperance of\ntheir Comitia, or assemblies of the people. The truth is, if good heed\nin this point be not taken, a commonwealth will have bad legs. But all\nthe world knows he should have excepted Lacedaemon, where the people, as\nhas been shown by the oracle, had no power at all of debate, nor (till\nafter Lysander, whose avarice opened a gulf that was not long ere it\nswallowed up his country) came it ever to be exercised by them. Whence\nthat commonwealth stood longest and firmest of any other but this,\nin our days, of Venice; which, having underlaid herself with the like\ninstitution, owes a great, if not the greater, part of her steadiness to\nthe same principle; the great Council, which is with her the people, by\nthe authority of my Lord Epimonus, never speaking a word. Nor shall any\ncommonwealth, where the people in their political capacity is talkative,\never see half the days of one of these, but, being carried away by\nvainglorious men (that, as Overbury says, void more than they drink),\nswim down the stream, as did Athens, the most prating of these dames,\nwhen that same ranting fellow Alcibiades fell a-demagoguing for the\nSilician War.\n\n\u201cBut whereas debate, by the authority and experience of Lacedaemon\nand Venice, is not to be committed to the people in a well-ordered\ngovernment, it may be said that the order specified is but a slight\nbar in a matter of like danger; for so much as an oath, if there be no\nrecourse upon the breach of it, is a weak tie for such hands as have\nthe sword in them, wherefore what should hinder the people of Oceana,\nif they happen not to regard an oath from assuming debate, and making\nthemselves as much an anarchy as those of Athens? To which I answer,\nTake the common sort in a private capacity, and, except they be injured,\nyou shall find them to have a bashfulness in the presence of the better\nsort, or wiser men, acknowledging their abilities by attention, and\naccounting it no mean honor to receive respect from them; but if they be\ninjured by them, they hate them, and the more for being wise or great,\nbecause that makes it the greater injury. Nor refrain they in this\ncase from any kind of intemperance of speech, if of action. It is no\notherwise with a people in their political capacity; you shall never\nfind that they have assumed debate for itself, but for something else.\nWherefore in Lacedaemon where there was, and in Venice where there is,\nnothing else for which they should assume it, they have never shown so\nmuch as an inclination to it.\n\n\u201cNor was there any appearance of such a desire in the people of Rome\n(who from the time of Romulus had been very well contented with the\npower of result either in the parochial assemblies, as it was settled\nupon them by him, or in the meetings of the hundreds, as it was altered\nin their regard for the worse by Servius Tullius) till news was brought,\nsome fifteen years after the exile of Tarquin, their late King (during\nwhich time the Senate had governed pretty well), that he was dead at the\nCourt of Aristodemus the tyrant of Cumae. Whereupon the patricians,\nor nobility, began to let out the hitherto dissembled venom which is\ninherent in the root of oligarchy and fell immediately upon injuring\nthe people beyond all moderation. For whereas the people had served both\ngallantly and contentedly in arms upon their own charges, and, though\njoint purchasers by their swords of the conquered lands, had not\nparticipated in the same to above two acres a man (the rest being\nsecretly usurped by the patricians), they, through the meanness of their\nsupport and the greatness of their expense, being generally indebted, no\nsooner returned home with victory to lay down their arms, than they were\nsnatched up by their creditors, the nobility, to cram jails. Whereupon,\nbut with the greatest modesty that was ever known in the like case,\nthey first fell upon debate, affirming \u2018That they were oppressed and\ncaptivated at home, while abroad they fought for liberty and empire,\nand that the freedom of the common people was safer in time of war than\npeace, among their enemies than their fellow-citizens.\u2019 It is true that\nwhen they could not get the Senate, through fear, as was pretended\nby the patricians, to assemble and take their grievances into\nconsideration, they grew so much the warmer, that it was glad to meet;\nwhere Appius Claudius, a fierce spirit, was of opinion that recourse\nshould be had to consular power, whereby some of the brands of sedition\nbeing taken off, the flame might be extinguished. Servilius, being of\nanother temper, thought it better and safer to try if the people might\nbe bowed than broken.\n\n\u201cBut this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near approach\nof the Volsci, a case in which the Senate had no recourse but to the\npeople, who, contrary to their former custom upon the like occasions,\nwould not stir a foot, but fell a-laughing, and saying, \u2018Let them fight\nthat have something to fight for.\u2019 The Senate that had purses, and could\nnot sing so well before the thief, being in a great perplexity, found\nno possible way out of it but to beseech Servilius, one of a genius well\nknown to be popular, that he would accept of the consulship, and make\nsome such use of it as might be helpful to the patrician interest.\nServilius, accepting of the offer, and making use of his interest with\nthe people, persuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the\nfathers, whom it would little beseem to be forced to those things which\nwould lose their grace, and that in view of the enemy, if they came not\nfreely; and withal published an edict, that no man should withhold a\ncitizen of Rome by imprisonment from giving his name (for that was\nthe way, as I shall have opportunity hereafter to show more at large,\nwhereby they drew out their armies), nor to seize or sell any man\u2019s\ngoods or children that were in the camp. Whereupon the people with a\nmighty concourse immediately took arms, marched forth, and (which to\nthem was as easy as to be put into the humor, and that, as appears in\nthis place, was not hard) totally defeated the Volsci first, then the\nSabines (for the neighboring nations, hoping to have had a good bargain\nof the discord in Rome, were up in arms on all sides), and after the\nSabines the Aurunci. Whence returning, victorious in three battles they\nexpected no less than that the Senate would have made good their words,\nwhen Appius Claudius, the other Consul, of his innate pride, and that\nhe might frustrate the faith of his colleague, caused the soldiers (who\nbeing set at liberty, had behaved themselves with such valor) to be\nrestored at their return to their creditors and their jails.\n\n\u201cGreat resort upon this was made by the people to Servilius, showing him\ntheir wounds, calling him to witness how they had behaved themselves,\nand minding him of his promise. Poor Servilius was sorry, but so\noverawed with the headiness of his colleague, and the obstinacy of the\nwhole faction of the nobility, that, not daring to do anything either\nway, he lost both parties, the fathers conceiving that he was ambitious,\nand the people that he was false; while the Consul Claudius, continuing\nto countenance such as daily seized and imprisoned some of the indebted\npeople, had still new and dangerous controversies with them, insomuch\nthat the commonwealth was torn with horrid division, and the people\n(because they found it not so safe or so effectual in public) minded\nnothing but laying their heads together in private conventicles. For\nthis Aulus Virginius and Titus Vetusius, the new Consuls, were reproved\nby the Senate as slothful, and upbraided with the virtue of Appius\nClaudius. Whereupon the Consuls having desired the Senate that they\nmight know their pleasure, showed afterward their readiness to obey\nit, by summoning the people according to command, and requiring names\nwhereby to draw forth an army for diversion, but no man would answer.\nReport hereof being made to the Senate, the younger sort of the fathers\ngrew so hot with the Consuls that they desired them to abdicate the\nmagistracy, which they had not the courage to defend.\n\n\u201cThe Consuls, though they conceived themselves to be roughly handled,\nmade this soft answer. \u2018Fathers conscript, that you may please to take\nnotice it was foretold some horrid sedition is at hand, we shall only\ndesire that they whose valor in this place is so great, may stand by us\nto see how we behave ourselves, and then be as resolute in your\ncommands as you will; your fatherhoods may know if we be wanting in the\nperformance.\u2019\n\n\u201cAt this some of the hot young noblemen returned with the Consuls to\nthe tribunal, before which the people were yet standing; and the\nConsuls having generally required names in vain, to put it to something,\nrequired the name of one that was in their eye particularly; on whom,\nwhen he moved not, they commanded a lictor to lay hands, but the people,\nthronging about the party summoned, forbade the lictor, who durst not\ntouch him; at which the hotspurs that came with the consuls, enraged by\nthe affront, descended from the throne to the aid of the lictor;\nfrom whom in so doing they turned the indignation of the people upon\nthemselves with such heat that the Consuls interposing, thought fit, by\nremitting the assembly, to appease the tumult; in which, nevertheless,\nthere had been nothing but noise. Nor was there less in the Senate,\nbeing suddenly rallied upon this occasion, where they that received the\nrepulse, with others whose heads were as addled as their own, fell\nupon the business as if it had been to be determined by clamor till\nthe Consuls, upbraiding the Senate that it differed not from the\nmarket-place, reduced the house to orders.\n\n\u201cAnd the fathers, having been consulted accordingly, there were three\nopinions: Publius Virginius conceived that the consideration to be\nhad upon the matter in question, or aid of the indebted and imprisoned\npeople, was not to be further extended than to such as had engaged upon\nthe promise made by Servilius; Titus Largius, that it was no time to\nthink it enough, if men\u2019s merits were acknowledged, while the whole\npeople, sunk under the weight of their debts, could not emerge without\nsome common aid, which to restrain, by putting some into a better\ncondition than others, would rather more inflame the discord than\nextinguish it; Appius Claudius (still upon the old haunt) would have it\nthat the people were rather wanton than fierce; it was not oppression\nthat necessitated, but their power that invited them to these freaks;\nthe empire of the Consuls since the appeal to the people (whereby a\nplebeian might ask his fellows if he were a thief) being but a mere\nscarecrow. \u2018Go to,\u2019 says he, \u2018let us create the dictator, from whom\nthere is no appeal, and then let me see more of this work, or him that\nshall forbid my lictor.\u2019\n\n\u201cThe advice of Appius was abhorred by many; and to introduce a general\nrecision of debts with Largius, was to violate all faith; that of\nVirginius, as the most moderate, would have passed best, but that\nthere were private interests, that constant bane of the public, which\nwithstood it. So they concluded with Appius, who also had been dictator,\nif the Consuls and some of the graver sort had not thought it altogether\nunseasonable, at a time when the Volsci and the Sabines were up again,\nto venture so far upon alienation of the people: for which cause\nValerius, being descended from the Publicolas, the most popular family,\nas also in his own person of a mild nature, was rather trusted with so\nrigid a magistracy. Whence it happened that the people, though they knew\nwell enough against whom the Dictator was created, feared nothing from\nValerius; but upon a new promise made to the same effect with that of\nServilius, hoped better another time, and throwing away all disputes,\ngave their names roundly, went out, and, to be brief, came home again\nas victorious as in the former action, the Dictator entering the city in\ntriumph. Nevertheless, when he came to press the Senate to make good his\npromise, and do something for the ease of the people, they regarded him\nno more as to that point than they had done Servilius. Whereupon the\nDictator, in disdain to be made a stale, abdicated his magistracy, and\nwent home. Here, then, was a victorious army without a captain, and a\nSenate pulling it by the beard in their gowns. What is it (if you have\nread the story, for there is not such another) that must follow? Can\nany man imagine that such only should be the opportunity upon which this\npeople could run away?\n\n\u201cAlas, poor men, the AEqui and the Volsci and the Sabines were nothing,\nbut the fathers invincible! There they sat, some 300 of them armed all\nin robes, and thundering with their tongues, without any hopes in\nthe earth to reduce them to any tolerable conditions. Wherefore, not\nthinking it convenient to abide long so near them, away marches the\narmy, and encamps in the fields. This retreat of the people is called\nthe secession of Mount Aventin, where they lodged, very sad at their\ncondition, but not letting fall so much as a word of murmur against the\nfathers. The Senate by this time were great lords, had the whole city to\nthemselves; but certain neighbors were upon the way that might come to\nspeak with them, not asking leave of the porter. Wherefore their minds\nbecame troubled, and an orator was posted to the people to make as good\nconditions with them as he could; but, whatever the terms were, to bring\nthem home, and with all speed. And here it was covenanted between the\nSenate and the people, that these should have magistrates of their own\nelection, called the tribunes, upon which they returned.\n\n\u201cTo hold you no longer, the Senate having done this upon necessity, made\nfrequent attempts to retract it again, while the tribunes, on the other\nside, to defend what they had got, instituted their Tributa Comitia,\nor council of the people; where they came in time, and, as disputes\nincreased, to make laws without the authority of the Senate, called\nplebiscita. Now to conclude in the point at which I drive: such were the\nsteps whereby the people of Rome came to assume debate, nor is it in art\nor nature to debar a people of the like effect, where there is the like\ncause. For Romulus, having in the election of his Senate squared out a\nnobility for the support of a throne, by making that of the patricians\na distinct and hereditary order, planted the commonwealth upon two\ncontrary interests or roots, which, shooting forth, in time produced two\ncommonwealths, the one oligarchical in the nobility, the other a mere\nanarchy of the people, and ever after caused a perpetual feud and enmity\nbetween the Senate and the people, even to death.\n\n\u201cThere is not a more noble or useful question in the politics than that\nwhich is started by Machiavel, whether means were to be found whereby\nthe enmity that was between the Senate and the people of Rome could\nhave been removed? Nor is there any other in which we, on the present\noccasion, are so much concerned, particularly in relation to this\nauthor; forasmuch as his judgment in the determination of the question\nstanding, our commonwealth falls. And he that will erect a commonwealth\nagainst the judgment of Machiavel, is obliged to give such reasons\nfor his enterprise as must not go a-begging. Wherefore to repeat the\npolitician very honestly, but somewhat more briefly, he disputes thus:\n\n\u201c\u2018There be two sorts of commonwealths, the one for preservation, as\nLacedaemon and Venice; the other for increase, as Rome.\n\n\u201c\u2018Lacedaemon, being governed by a King and a small Senate, could\nmaintain itself a long time in that condition, because the inhabitants,\nbeing few, having put a bar upon the reception of strangers, and living\nin a strict observation of the laws of Lycurgus, which now had got\nreputation, and taken away all occasion of tumults, might well continue\nlong in tranquillity. For the laws of Lycurgus introduced a greater\nequality in estates, and a less equality in honors, whence there was\nequal poverty; and the plebeians were less ambitious, because the honors\nor magistracies of the city could extend but to a few and were not\ncommunicable to the people, nor did the nobility by using them ill ever\ngive them a desire to participate of the same. This proceeded from the\nkings, whose principality, being placed in the midst of the nobility,\nhad no greater means whereby to support itself than to shield the people\nfrom all injury; whence the people, not fearing empire, desired it not;\nand so all occasion of enmity between the Senate and the people was\ntaken away. But this union happened especially from two causes: the one\nthat the inhabitants of Lacedaemon being few, could be governed by the\nfew; the other, that, not receiving strangers into their commonwealth,\nthey did not corrupt it, nor increase it to such a proportion as was not\ngovernable by the few.\n\n\u201c\u2018Venice has not divided with her plebeians, but all are called\ngentlemen that be in administration of the government; for which\ngovernment she is more beholden to chance than the wisdom of her\nlaw-makers; for many retiring to those islands, where that city is now\nbuilt, from the inundations of barbarians that overwhelmed the Roman\nEmpire, when they were increased to such a number that to live together\nit was necessary to have laws, they ordained a form of government,\nwhereby assembling often in council upon affairs, and finding their\nnumber sufficient for government, they put a bar upon all such as\nrepairing afterward to their city should become inhabitants, excluding\nthem from participation of power. Whence they that were included in the\nadministration had right, and they that were excluded, coming afterward,\nand being received upon no other conditions to be inhabitants, had no\nwrong, and therefore had no occasion, nor (being never trusted with\narms) any means to be tumultuous. Wherefore this commonwealth might very\nwell maintain itself in tranquillity.\n\n\u201c\u2018These things considered, it is plain that the Roman legislators, to\nhave introduced a quiet state, must have done one of these two things:\neither shut out strangers, as the Lacedemonians; or, as the Venetians,\nnot allowed the people to bear arms. But they did neither. By which\nmeans the people, having power and increase, were in perpetual tumult.\nNor is this to be helped in a commonwealth for increase, seeing if Rome\nhad cut off the occasion of her tumults, she must have cut off the means\nof her increase, and by consequence of her greatness.\n\n\u201c\u2018Wherefore let a legislator consider with himself whether he would make\nhis commonwealth for preservation, in which case she may be free from\ntumults; or for increase, in which case she must be infested with them.\n\n\u201c\u2018If he makes her for preservation, she may be quiet at home, but will\nbe in danger abroad. First, because her foundation must be narrow,\nand therefore weak, as that of Lacedaemon, which lay but upon 30,000\ncitizens; or that of Venice, which lies but upon 3,000. Secondly, such\na commonwealth must either be in peace, or war; if she be in peace,\nthe few are soonest effeminated and corrupted and so obnoxious also to\nfaction. If in war, succeeding ill, she is an easy prey; or succeeding\nwell, ruined by increase: a weight which her foundation is not able to\nbear. For Lacedaemon, when she had made herself mistress upon the matter\nof all Greece, through a slight accident, the rebellion of Thebes,\noccasioned by the conspiracy of Pelopidas discovering this infirmity of\nher nature, the rest of her conquered cities immediately fell off, and\nin the turn as it were of a hand reduced her from the fullest tide to\nthe lowest ebb of her fortune. And Venice having possessed herself of a\ngreat part of Italy by her purse, was no sooner in defence of it put to\nthe trial of arms than she lost all in one battle.\n\n\u201c\u2018Whence I conclude that in the ordination of a commonwealth a\nlegislator is to think upon that which is most honorable, and, laying\naside models for preservation, to follow the example of Rome conniving\nat, and temporizing with, the enmity between the Senate and the people,\nas a necessary step to the Roman greatness. For that any man should\nfind out a balance that may take in the conveniences and shut out the\ninconveniences of both, I do not think it possible.\u2019 These are the words\nof the author, though the method be somewhat altered, to the end that I\nmay the better turn them to my purpose.\n\n\u201cMy lords, I do not know how you hearken to this sound; but to hear\nthe greatest artist in the modern world giving sentence against our\ncommonwealth is that with which I am nearly concerned. Wherefore, with\nall honor due to the prince of politicians, let us examine his reasoning\nwith the same liberty which he has asserted to be the right of a free\npeople. But we shall never come up to him, except by taking the business\na little lower, we descend from effects to their causes. The causes of\ncommotion in a commonwealth are either external or internal. External\nare from enemies, from subjects, or from servants. To dispute then what\nwas the cause why Rome was infested by the Italian, or by the servile\nwars; why the slaves took the capitol; why the Lacedaemonians were near\nas frequently troubled with their helots as Rome with all those; or why\nVenice, whose situation is not trusted to the faith of men, has as good\nor better quarter with them whom she governs, than Rome had with the\nLatins; were to dispute upon external causes. The question put by\nMachiavel is of internal causes; whether the enmity that Was between the\nSenate and the people of Rome might have been removed. And to determine\notherwise of this question than he does, I must lay down other\nprinciples than he has done. To which end I affirm that a commonwealth,\ninternally considered, is either equal or unequal. A commonwealth that\nis internally equal, has no internal cause of commotion, and therefore\ncan have no such effect but from without. A commonwealth internally\nunequal has no internal cause of quiet, and therefore can have no such\neffect but by diversion.\n\n\u201cTo prove my assertions, I shall at this time make use of no other\nthan his examples. Lacedaemon was externally unquiet, because she was\nexternally unequal, that is as to her helots; and she was internally at\nrest, because she was equal in herself, both in root and branch; in the\nroot by her agrarian, and in branch by the Senate, inasmuch as no man\nwas thereto qualified but by election of the people. Which institution\nof Lycurgus is mentioned by Aristotle, where he says that rendering his\ncitizens emulous (not careless) of that honor, he assigned to the people\nthe election of the Senate. Wherefore Machiavel in this, as in other\nplaces, having his eye upon the division of patrician and plebeian\nfamilies as they were in Rome, has quite mistaken the orders of this\ncommonwealth, where there was no such thing. Nor did the quiet of it\nderive from the power of the kings, who were so far from shielding the\npeople from the injury of the nobility, of which there was none in\nhis sense but the Senate, that one declared end of the Senate at the\ninstitution was to shield the people from the kings, who from that time\nhad but single votes. Neither did it proceed from the straitness of the\nSenate, or their keeping the people excluded from the government, that\nthey were quiet, but from the equality of their administration, seeing\nthe Senate (as is plain by the oracle, their fundamental law) had no\nmore than the debate, and the result of the commonwealth belonged to the\npeople.\n\n\u201cWherefore when Theopompus and Polydorus, Kings of Lacedaemon, would\nhave kept the people excluded from the government by adding to the\nancient law this clause, \u2018If the determination of the people be faulty,\nit shall be lawful for the Senate to resume the debate,\u2019 the people\nimmediately became unquiet, and resumed that debate, which ended not\ntill they had set up their ephors, and caused that magistracy to be\nconfirmed by their kings.\u201d For when Theopompus first ordained that\nthe ephori or overseers should be created at Lacedaemon, to be such a\nrestraint upon the kings there as the tribunes were upon the consuls at\nRome, the Queen complained to him, that by this means he transmitted\nthe royal authority greatly diminished to his children: \u201cI leave indeed\nless,\u201d answered he, \u201cbut more lasting.\u201d And this was excellently said;\nfor that power only is safe which is limited from doing hurt. Theopompus\ntherefore, by confining the kingly power within the bounds of the laws,\ndid recommend it by so much to the people\u2019s affection as he removed it\nfrom being arbitrary.\u2019 By which it may appear that a commonwealth for\npreservation, if she comes to be unequal, is as obnoxious to enmity\nbetween the Senate and the people as a commonwealth for increase; and\nthat the tranquillity of Lacedaemon was derived from no other cause than\nher equality.\n\n\u201cFor Venice, to say that she is quiet because she disarms her subjects,\nis to forget that Lacedaemon disarmed her helots, and yet could not in\ntheir regard be quiet; wherefore if Venice be defended from external\ncauses of commotion, it is first through her situation, in which respect\nher subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be attributed to her\nfortune); and, secondly, through her exquisite justice, whence they have\nno will to invade her. But this can be attributed to no other cause than\nher prudence, which will appear to be greater, as we look nearer; for\nthe effects that proceed from fortune, if there be any such thing, are\nlike their cause, inconstant. But there never happened to any other\ncommonwealth so undisturbed and constant a tranquillity and peace in\nherself as are in that of Venice; wherefore this must proceed from some\nother cause than chance. And we see that as she is of all others the\nmost quiet, so the most equal commonwealth. Her body consists of one\norder, and her Senate is like a rolling stone, as was said, which never\ndid, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never shall gather the\nmoss of a divided or ambitious interest, much less such a one as that\nwhich grasped the people of Rome in the talons of their own eagles. And\nif Machiavel, averse from doing this commonwealth right, had considered\nher orders, as his reader shall easily perceive he never did, he must\nhave been so far from attributing the prudence of them to chance, that\nhe would have touched up his admirable work to that perfection which,\nas to the civil part, has no pattern in the universal world but this of\nVenice.\n\n\u201cRome, secure by her potent and victorious arms from all external causes\nof commotion, was either beholden for her peace at home to her enemies\nabroad, or could never rest her head. My lords, you that are parents\nof a commonwealth, and so freer agents than such as are merely natural,\nhave a care. For, as no man shall show me a commonwealth born straight\nthat ever became crooked, so no man shall show me a commonwealth born\ncrooked that ever became straight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or\nrather prodigious. Her twins, the patrician and plebeian orders, came,\nas was shown by the foregoing story, into the world, one body but two\nheads, or rather two bellies; for, notwithstanding the fable out of\nAEsop, whereby Menenius Agrippa, the orator that was sent from the\nSenate to the people at Mount Aventin, showed the fathers to be the\nbelly, and the people to be the arms and the legs (which except that,\nhow slothful soever it might seem, they were nourished, not these only,\nbut the whole body must languish and be dissolved), it is plain that the\nfathers were a distinct belly, such a one as took the meat indeed out of\nthe people\u2019s mouths, but abhorring the agrarian, returned it not in\nthe due and necessary nutrition of a commonwealth. Nevertheless, as the\npeople that live about the cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the\nnoise, so neither the Roman writers, nor Machiavel the most conversant\nwith them, seem among so many of the tribunitian storms to hear their\nnatural voice; for though they could not miss of it so far as to\nattribute them to the strife of the people for participation in\nmagistracy, or, in which Machiavel more particularly joins, to that\nabout the agrarian, this was to take the business short, and the remedy\nfor the disease.\n\n\u201cA people, when they are reduced to misery and despair, become their\nown politicians, as certain beasts, when they are sick, become their own\nphysicians, and are carried by a natural instinct to the desire of such\nherbs as are their proper cure; but the people, for the greater part,\nare beneath the beasts in the use of them. Thus the people of Rome,\nthough in their misery they had recourse by instinct, as it were, to the\ntwo main fundamentals of a commonwealth, participation of magistracy and\nthe agrarian, did but taste and spit at them, not (which is necessary in\nphysic) drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they\nhad obtained participation of magistracy it was but lamely, not to a\nfull and equal rotation in all elections; nor did they greatly regard it\nin what they had got. And when they had attained to the agrarian, they\nneglected it so far as to suffer the law to grow obsolete; but if you do\nnot take the due dose of your medicines (as there be slight tastes which\na man may have of philosophy that incline to atheism) it may chance to\nbe poison, there being a like taste of the politics that inclines to\nconfusion, as appears in the institution of the Roman tribunes, by which\nmagistracy and no more the people were so far from attaining to peace,\nthat they in getting but so much, got but heads for an eternal feud;\nwhereas if they had attained in perfection either to the agrarian, they\nhad introduced the equality and calm of Lacedaemon, or to rotation, and\nthey had introduced that of Venice: and so there could have been no more\nenmity between the Senate and the people of Rome than there was between\nthose orders in Lacedaemon, or is now in Venice. Wherefore Machiavel\nseems to me, in attributing the peace of Venice more to her luck than\nher prudence, of the whole stable to have saddled the wrong horse;\nfor though Rome in her military part could beat it better, beyond\nall comparison, upon the sounding hoof, Venice for the civil part has\nplainly had the wings of Pegasus.\n\n\u201cThe whole question then will come upon this point, whether the people\nof Rome could have obtained these orders? And first, to say that they\ncould not have obtained them without altering the commonwealth, is no\nargument; seeing neither could they, without altering the commonwealth,\nhave obtained their tribunes, which nevertheless were obtained. And if\na man considers the posture that the people were in when they obtained\ntheir tribunes, they might as well, and with as great ease (forasmuch\nas the reason why the nobility yielded to the tribunes was no other\nthan that there was no remedy) have obtained anything else. And for\nexperience, it was in the like case that the Lacedaemonians did set up\ntheir ephors, and the Athenians, after the battle of Plataea, bowed the\nSenate (so hard a thing it is for a commonwealth that was born crooked\nto become straight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected\nthat this must have ruined the nobility (and in that deprived the\ncommonwealth of the greatness which she acquired by them), is this\nopinion holding, but confuted by the sequel of the story, showing\nplainly that the nobility, through the defect of such orders (that is\nto say, of rotation and the agrarian), came to eat up the people; and\nbattening themselves in luxury, to be, as Sallust speaks of them, \u2018a\nmost sluggish and lazy nobility, in whom, besides the name, there was no\nmore than in a statue;\u2019 and to bring so mighty a commonwealth, and of so\nhuge a glory, to so deplorable an end. Wherefore means might have been\nfound to remove the enmity that was between the Senate and the people of\nRome.\n\n\u201cMy lords, if I have argued well, I have given you the comfort and\nassurance that, notwithstanding the judgment of Machiavel, your\ncommonwealth is both safe and sound; but if I have not argued well, then\ntake the comfort and assurance which he gives you while he is firm, that\na legislator is to lay aside all other examples, and follow that of Rome\nonly, conniving and temporizing with the enmity between the Senate and\nthe people as a necessary step to the Roman greatness. Whence it follows\nthat your commonwealth, at the worst, is that which he has given you his\nword is the best.\n\n\u201cI have held your lordships long, but upon an account of no small\nimportance, which I can now sum up in these few words: where there is a\nliquorishness in a popular assembly to debate, it proceeds not from\nthe constitution of the people, but of the commonwealth. Now that your\ncommonwealth is of such a constitution as is naturally free from this\nkind of intemperance, is that which, to make good, I must divide the\nremainder of my discourse into two parts:\n\n\u201cThe first, showing the several constitutions of the assemblies of the\npeople in other commonwealths;\n\n\u201cThe second, comparing our assembly of the people with theirs; and\nshowing how it excludes the inconveniences and embraces the conveniences\nof them all.\n\n\u201cIn the beginning of the first part I must take notice, that among\nthe popular errors of our days it is no small one that men imagine the\nancient governments of this kind to have consisted for the most part\nof one city that is, of one town; whereas by what we have learned of my\n\u2018lords that owned them, it appears that there was not any considerable\none of such a Constitution but Carthage, till this in our days of\nVenice.\n\n\u201cFor to begin with Israel, it consisted of the twelve tribes, locally\nspread or quartered throughout the whole territory, and these being\ncalled together by trumpets, constituted the Church or assembly of\nthe people. The vastness of this weight, as also the slowness thence\nunavoidable, became a great cause (as has been shown at large by my Lord\nPhosphorus) of the breaking that commonwealth; notwithstanding that\nthe Temple, and those religious ceremonies for which the people were at\nleast annually obliged to repair thither, were no small ligament of the\ntribes, otherwise but slightly tacked together.\n\n\u201cAthens consisted of four tribes, taking in the whole people, both of\nthe city and of the territory; not so gathered by Theseus into one\ntown, as to exclude the country, but to the end that there might be some\ncapital of the commonwealth: though true it be, that the congregation,\nconsisting of the inhabitants within the walls, was sufficient to all\nintents and purposes, without those of the country. These also being\nexceeding numerous, became burdensome to themselves and dangerous to\nthe commonwealth; the more for their ill-education, as is observed by\nXenophon and Polybius, who compare them to mariners that in a calm are\nperpetually disputing and swaggering one with another, and never lay\ntheir hands to the common tackling or safety till they be all endangered\nby some storm. Which caused Thucydides, when he saw this people through\nthe purchase of their misery become so much wiser as to reduce their\nComitia or assemblies to 5,000, to say in his eighth book: \u2018And now, at\nleast in my time, the Athenians seem to have ordered their State aright,\nconsisting of a moderate tempor both of the few (by which he means the\nSenate of the Bean) and of the many,\u2019 or the 5,000. And he does not only\ngive you his judgment, but the best proof of it; for \u2018this,\u2019 says he,\n\u2018was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes past, made the city\nagain to raise her head.\u2019 The place I would desire your lordships to\nnote, as the first example that I find, or think is to be found, of a\npopular assembly by way of representative.\n\n\u201cLacedaemon consisted of 30,000 citizens dispersed throughout Laconia,\none of the greatest provinces in all Greece, and divided, as by some\nauthors is probable, into six tribes. Of the whole body of these,\nbeing gathered, consisted the great Church or assembly, which had the\nlegislative power; the little church, gathered sometimes for matters of\nconcern within the city, consisted of the Spartans only. These happened,\nlike that of Venice, to be good constitutions of a congregation, but\nfrom an ill-cause the infirmity of a commonwealth, which through her\npaucity was oligarchical.\n\n\u201cWherefore, go which way you will, it should seem that without a\nrepresentative of the people, your commonwealth, consisting of a whole\nnation, can never avoid falling either into oligarchy or confusion.\n\n\u201cThis was seen by the Romans, whose rustic tribes, extending themselves\nfrom the river Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fesulae or Florence\nto Capua, invented a way of representative by lots: the tribe upon which\nthe first fell being the prerogative, and some two or three more\nthat had the rest, the jure vocatoe. These gave the suffrage of the\ncommonwealth in two meetings; the prerogative at the first assembly, and\nthe jure vocatoe at a second.\n\n\u201cNow to make the parallel: all the inconveniences that you have observed\nin these assemblies are shut out, and all the conveniences taken into\nyour prerogative. For first, it is that for which Athens, shaking\noff the blame of Xenophon and Polybius, came to deserve the praise of\nThucydides, a representative. And, secondly, not, as I suspect in\nthat of Athens, and is past suspicion in this of Rome, by lot, but by\nsuffrage, as was also the late House of Commons, by which means in your\nprerogatives all the tribes of Oceana are jure vocatoe; and if a man\nshall except against the paucity of the standing number, it is a wheel,\nwhich in the revolution of a few years turns every hand that is fit,\nor fits every hand that it turns to the public work. Moreover, I am\ndeceived if, upon due consideration, it does not fetch your tribes, with\ngreater equality and ease to themselves and to the government, from the\nfrontiers of Marpesia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her\npomoeria, or the nearest parts of her adjoining territories. To this you\nmay add, that whereas a commonwealth, which in regard of the people is\nnot of facility in execution, were sure enough in this nation to be\ncast off through impatience; your musters and galaxies are given to the\npeople, as milk to babes, whereby when they are brought up through four\ndays\u2019 election in a whole year (one at the parish, one at the hundred,\nand two at the tribe) to their strongest meat, it is of no harder\ndigestion than to give their negative or affirmative as they see cause.\nThere be gallant men among us that laugh at such an appeal or umpire;\nbut I refer it whether you be more inclining to pardon them or me, who I\nconfess have been this day laughing at a sober man, but without meaning\nhim any harm, and that is Petrus Cunaeus, where speaking of the nature\nof the people, he says, \u2018that taking them apart, they are very simple,\nbut yet in their assemblies they see and know something, and so runs\naway without troubling himself with what that something is. Whereas the\npeople, taken apart, are but so many private interests; but if you take\nthem together, they are the public interest.\n\n\u201cThe public interest of a commonwealth, as has been shown, is nearest\nthat of mankind, and that of mankind is right reason; but with\naristocracy (whose reason or interest, when they are all together,\nas appeared by the patricians, is but that of a party) it is quite\ncontrary: for as, taken apart, they are far wiser than the people\nconsidered in that manner, so, being put together, they are such fools,\nwho by deposing the people, as did those of Rome, will saw off the\nbranch whereupon they sit, or rather destroy the root of their own\ngreatness. Wherefore Machiavel, following Aristotle, and yet going\nbefore him, may well assert, \u2018that the people are wiser and more\nconstant in their resolutions than a prince:\u2019 which is the prerogative\nof popular government for wisdom. And hence it is that the prerogative\nof your commonwealth, as for wisdom so for power, is in the people,\nwhich (though I am not ignorant that the Roman prerogative was so\ncalled a proerogando, because their suffrage was first asked) gives the\ndenomination to your prerogative tribe.\u201d\n\nThe elections, whether annual or triennial, being shown by the\ntwenty-second, that which comes in the next place to be considered is--\n\nThe twenty-third order, \u201cShowing the power, function, and manner of\nproceeding of the prerogative tribe.\n\n\u201cThe power or function of the prerogative is of two parts: the one of\nresult, in which it is the legislative, power, the other of judicature,\nin which regard it is the highest court, and the last appeal in this\ncommonwealth.\n\n\u201cFor the former part (the people by this constitution being not obliged\nby any law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the\nresult of the prerogative, their equal representative) it shall not be\nlawful for the Senate to require obedience from the people, nor for the\npeople to give obedience to the Senate in or by any law that has not\nbeen promulgated, or printed and published for the space of six weeks,\nand afterward proposed by the authority of the Senate to the prerogative\ntribe, and resolved by the major vote of the same in the affirmative.\nNor shall the Senate have any power to levy war, men, or money,\notherwise than by the consent of the people so given, or by a law so\nenacted, except in cases of exigence, in which it is agreed that the\npower, both of the Senate and the people, shall be in the dictator\nso qualified, and for such a term of time, as is according to that\nconstitution already prescribed. While a law is in promulgation, the\ncensors shall animadvert upon the Senate, and the tribunes upon the\npeople, that there be no laying of heads together, no conventicles or\ncanvassing to carry on or oppose anything; but that all may be done in a\nfree and open way.\n\n\u201cFor the latter part of the power of the prerogative, or that whereby\nthey are the supreme judicatory of this nation, and of the provinces of\nthe same, the cognizances of crimes against the majesty of the people,\nsuch as high treason, as also of peculation, that is, robbery of the\ntreasury, or defraudation of the commonwealth, appertains to this tribe.\nAnd if any person or persons, provincials or citizens, shall appeal to\nthe people, it belongs to the prerogative to judge and determine the\ncase; provided that if the appeal be from any court of justice in this\nnation or the provinces, the appellant shall first deposit \u00a3100 in the\ncourt from which he appeals, to be forfeited to the same if he be cast\nin his suit by the people. But the power of the Council of War being the\nexpedition of this commonwealth, and the martial law of the strategus\nin the field, are those only from which there shall lie no appeal to the\npeople.\n\n\u201cThe proceeding of the prerogative in case of a proposition is to be\nthus ordered: The magistrates, proposing by authority of the Senate,\nshall rehearse the whole matter, and expound it to the people; which\ndone, they shall put the whole together to the suffrage, with three\nboxes, the negative, the affirmative, and the non-sincere; and the\nsuffrage being returned to the tribunes, and numbered in the presence\nof the proposers. If the major vote be in the non-sincere, the proposer\nshall desist, and the Senate shall resume the debate. If the major vote\nbe in the negative, the proposers shall desist, and the Senate, too. But\nif the major vote be in the affirmative, then the tribe is clear and the\nproposers shall begin and put the whole matter, with the negative\nand the affirmative (leaving out the non-sincere) by clauses; and the\nsuffrages being taken and numbered by the tribunes in the presence of\nthe proposers, shall be written and reported by the tribunes of the\nSenate. And that which is proposed by the authority of the Senate, and\nconfirmed by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.\n\n\u201cThe proceeding of the prerogative in a case of judicature is to be thus\nordered: The tribunes being auditors of all causes appertaining to\nthe cognizance of the people, shall have notice of the suit or trial,\nwhether of appeal or otherwise, that is to be commenced; and if any one\nof them shall accept of the same, it appertains to him to introduce it.\nA cause being introduced, and the people mustered or assembled for the\ndecision of the same, the tribunes are presidents of the court, having\npower to keep it to orders, and shall be seated upon a scaffold erected\nin the middle of the tribe. Upon the right hand shall stand a seat or\nlarge pulpit assigned to the plaintiff or the accuser; and, upon the\nleft, another for the defendant, each if they please with his counsel.\nAnd the tribunes (being attended upon such occasions with so many\nballotins, secretaries, doorkeepers, and messengers of the Senate as\nshall be requisite) one of them shall turn up a glass of the nature\nof an hour-glass, but such a one as is to be of an hour and a half\u2019s\nrunning; which being turned up, the party or counsel on the right hand\nmay begin to speak to the people. If there be papers to be read, or\nwitnesses to be examined, the officer shall lay the glass sideways\ntill the papers be read and the witnesses examined, and then turn it up\nagain; and so long as the glass is running, the party on the right hand\nhas liberty to speak, and no longer. The party on the right hand having\nhad his time, the like shall be done in every respect for the party on\nthe left. And the cause being thus heard, the tribunes shall put\nthe question to the tribe with a white, a black, and a red box (or\nnon-sincere), whether guilty or not guilty. And if the suffrage being\ntaken, the major vote be in the non-sincere, the cause shall be reheard\nupon the next juridicial day following, and put to the question in the\nsame manner. If the major vote comes the second time in the non-sincere,\nthe cause shall be heard again upon the third day; but at the third\nhearing the question shall be put without the non-sincere. Upon the\nfirst of the three days in which the major vote comes in the white box,\nthe party accused is absolved; and upon the first of them in which\nit comes in the black box, the party accused is condemned. The party\naccused being condemned, the tribunes (if the case be criminal) shall\nput with the white and the black box these questions, or such of them\nas, regard had to the case, they shall conceive most proper:\n\n 1. Whether he shall have a writ of ease;\n 2. Whether he shall be fined so much or so much;\n 3. Whether he shall be confiscated;\n 4. Whether he shall be rendered incapable of magistracy;\n 5. Whether he shall be banished;\n 6. Whether he shall be put to death.\n\n\u201cThese, or any three of these questions, whether simple or such as shall\nbe thought fitly mixed, being put by the tribunes, that which has most\nabove half the votes in the black box is the sentence of the people,\nwhich the troop of the third class is to see executed accordingly.\n\n\u201cBut whereas by the constitution of this commonwealth it may appear that\nneither the propositions of the Senate nor the judicature of the people\nwill be so frequent as to hold the prerogative in continual employment,\nthe Senate, a main part of whose office it is to teach and instruct\nthe people, shall duly (if they have no greater affairs to divert\nthem) cause an oration to be made to the prerogative by some knight or\nmagistrate of the Senate, to be chosen out of the ablest men, and from\ntime to time appointed by the orator of the house, in the great hall of\nthe Pantheon, while the Parliament resides in the town, or in some grove\nor sweet place in the field, while the Parliament for the heat of\nthe year shall reside in the country, upon every Tuesday, morning or\nafternoon.\n\n\u201cAnd the orator appointed for the time to this office shall first repeat\nthe orders of the commonwealth with all possible brevity; and then,\nmaking choice of one or some part of it, discourse thereof to the\npeople. An oration or discourse of this nature, being afterward\nperused by the Council of State, may as they see cause be printed and\npublished.\u201d\n\nThe Archon\u2019s comment upon the order I find to have been of this sense:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS:\n\n\u201cTo crave pardon for a word or two in further explanation of what\nwas read, I shall briefly show how the constitution of this tribe or\nassembly answers to their function; and how their function, which is of\ntwo parts, the former in the result or legislative power, the latter\nin the supreme judicature of the commonwealth, answers to their\nconstitution. Machiavel has a discourse, where he puts the question,\n\u2018Whether the guard of liberty may with more security be committed to the\nnobility or to the people?\u2019 Which doubt of his arises through the want\nof explaining his terms; for the guard of liberty can signify nothing\nelse but the result of the commonwealth; so that to say that the guard\nof liberty may be committed to the nobility, is to say that the result\nmay be committed to the Senate, in which case the people signify\nnothing.\n\n\u201cNow to show it was a mistake to affirm it to have been thus in\nLacedaemon, sufficient has been spoken; and whereas he will have it\nto be so in Venice also: \u2018They,\u2019 says Contarini, \u2018in whom resides the\nsupreme power of the whole commonwealth, and of the laws, and upon whose\norders depends the authority as well of the Senate as of all the other\nmagistrates, is the Great Council.\u2019 It is institutively in the Great\nCouncil, by the judgment of all that know that commonwealth; though, for\nthe reasons shown, it be sometimes exercised by the Senate. Nor need\nI run over the commonwealths in this place for the proof of a thing so\ndoubtless, and such as has been already made so apparent, as that the\nresult of each was in the popular part of it. The popular part of yours,\nor the prerogative tribe, consists of seven deputies (whereof three are\nof the horse) annually elected out of every tribe of Oceana; which being\nfifty, amounts to 150 horse and 200 foot. And the prerogative consisting\nof three of these lists, consists of 450 horse and 600 foot, besides\nthose of the provinces to be hereafter mentioned; by which means the\noverbalance in the suffrage remaining to the foot by 150 votes, you have\nto the support of a true and natural aristocracy the deepest root of a\ndemocracy that has been ever planted.\n\n\u201cWherefore there is nothing in art or nature better qualified for the\nresult than this assembly it is noted out of Cicero by Machiavel, \u2018That\nthe people, though they are not so prone to find out truth of themselves\nas to follow custom or run into error yet if they be shown truth, they\nnot only acknowledge and embrace it very suddenly, but are the most\nconstant and faithful guardians and conservators of it.\u2019 it is your\nduty and office, whereto you are also qualified by the orders of this\ncommonwealth, to have the people as you have your hawks and greyhounds,\nin leashes and slips, to range the fields and beat the bushes for them,\nfor they are of a nature that is never good at this sport, but when you\nspring or start their proper quarry. Think not that they will stand to\nask you what it is, or less know it than your hawks and greyhounds do\ntheirs; but presently make such a flight or course, that a huntsman may\nas well undertake to run with his dogs, or a falconer to fly with his\nhawk, as an aristocracy at this game to compare with the people. The\npeople of Rome were possessed of no less a prey than the empire of the\nworld, when the nobility turned tails, and perched among daws upon the\ntower of monarchy. For though they did not all of them intend the thing,\nthey would none of them endure the remedy, which was the agrarian.\n\n\u201cBut the prerogative tribe has not only the result, but is the supreme\njudicature, and the ultimate appeal in this commonwealth. For the\npopular government that makes account to be of any standing, must make\nsure in the first place of the appeal to the people. As an estate in\ntrust becomes a man\u2019s own if he be not answerable for it, so the\npower of a magistracy not accountable to the people, from whom it was\nreceived, becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty\nWherefore the right of supreme judicature in the people (Without which\nthere can be no such thing as popular government) is confirmed by the\nconstant practice of all commonwealths; as that of Israel in the cases\nof Achan, and of the tribe of Benjamin, adjudged by the congregation.\n\n\u201cThe dicasterian, or court called the heliaia in Athens, which (the\ncomitia of that commonwealth consisting of the whole people, and so\nbeing too numerous to be a judicatory) was constituted sometimes of\n500, at others of 1,000, or, according to the greatness of the cause, of\n1,500, elected by the lot out of the whole body of the people, had, with\nthe nine Archons that were presidents, the cognizance of such causes as\nwere of highest importance in that State. The five ephors in Lacedaemon,\nwhich were popular magistrates, might question their kings, as appears\nby the cases of Pausanias, and of Agis, who being upon his trial in this\ncourt, was cried to by his mother to appeal to the people, as Plutarch\nhas it in his life. The tribunes of the people of Rome (like, in the\nnature of their magistracy, and for some time in number, to the ephors,\nas being, according to Halicarnassus and Plutarch, instituted in\nimitation of them) had power to summon any man, his magistracy at least\nbeing expired (for from the Dictator there lay no appeal) to answer for\nhimself to the people. As in the case of Coriolanus, who was going\nabout to force the people, by withholding corn from them in a famine,\nto relinquish the magistracy of the tribunes, in that of Spurius Cassius\nfor affecting tyranny, of Marcus Sergius for running away at Veii, of\nCaius Lucretius for spoiling his province, of Junius Silanus for making\nwar without a command from the people against the Cimbri, with divers\nothers. And the crimes of this nature were called loesoe majestatis,\nor high treason. Examples of such as were arraigned or tried for\npeculation, or defraudation of the commonwealth, were Marcus Curius\nfor intercepting the money of the Samnites, Salinator for the unequal\ndivision of spoils to his soldiers, Marcus Posthumius for cheating the\ncommonwealth by a feigned shipwreck. Causes of these two kinds were of\na more public nature; but the like power upon appeals was also exercised\nby the people in private matters, even during the time of the kings, as\nin the case of Horatius. Nor is it otherwise with Venice, where the\nDoge Loredano was sentenced by the great Council, and Antonio Grimani,\nafterward doge, questioned, for that he, being admiral, had suffered the\nTurk to take Lepanto in view of his fleet.\n\n\u201cNevertheless, there lay no appeal from the Roman dictator to the\npeople; which, if there had, might have cost the commonwealth dear,\nwhen Spurius Melius, affecting empire, circumvented and debauched the\ntribunes: whereupon Titus Quintus Cincinnatus was created Dictator, who\nhaving chosen Servilius Ahala to be his lieutenant, or magister equitum,\nsent him to apprehend Melius, whom, while he disputed the commands of\nthe Dictator and implored the aid of the people, Ahala cut off upon\nthe place. By which example you may see in what cases the dictator may\nprevent the blow which is ready sometimes to fall ere the people be\naware of the danger. Wherefore there lies no appeal from the Dieci,\nor the Council of Ten, in Venice, to the Great Council, nor from our\nCouncil of War to the people. For the way of proceeding of this tribe,\nor the ballot, it is, as was once said for all, Venetian.\n\n\u201cThis discourse of judicatories whereupon we are fallen, brings us\nrather naturally than of design from the two general orders of every\ncommonwealth, that is to say, from the debating part, or the Senate, and\nthe resolving part, or the people, to the third, which is the executive\npart or the magistracy, whereupon I shall have no need to dwell, for the\nexecutive magistrates of this commonwealth are the strategus in arms;\nthe signory in their several courts, as the chancery, the exchequer; as\nalso the councils in divers cases within their instructions; the censors\nas well in their proper magistracy, as in the Council of Religion; the\ntribunes in the government of the prerogative, and that judicatory; and\nthe judges with their courts; of all which so much is already said or\nknown as may suffice.\n\n\u201cThe Tuesday lectures or orations to the people will be of great benefit\nto the Senate, the prerogative, and the whole nation. To the Senate,\nbecause they will not only teach your Senators elocution, but keep the\nsystem of the government in their memories. Elocution is of great use to\nyour Senators, for if they do not understand rhetoric (giving it at this\ntime for granted that the art were not otherwise good) and come to treat\nwith, or vindicate the cause of the commonwealth against some other\nnation that is good at it, the advantage will be subject to remain upon\nthe merit of the art, and not upon the merit of the cause. Furthermore,\nthe genius or soul of this government being in the whole and in\nevery part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any\nparticular, unless at the same time they have an idea of the whole.\nThat this therefore must be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the\nprerogative, is plain; though these have a greater concernment in it.\nFor this commonwealth is the estate of the people; and a man, you know,\nthough he be virtuous, yet if he does not understand his estate, may run\nout or be cheated of it. Last of all, the treasures of the politics will\nby this means be so opened, rifled, and dispersed, that this nation\nwill as soon dote, like the Indians, upon glass beads, as disturb your\ngovernment with whimsies and freaks of mother-wit, or suffer themselves\nto be stuttered out of their liberties. There is not any reason why\nyour grandees, your wise men of this age, that laugh out and openly at\na commonwealth as the most ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in\nthis regard they are, mere idiots, but that the people have not eyes.\u201d\n\nThere remains no more relating to the Senate and the people than--\n\nThe twenty-fourth order, \u201cWhereby it is lawful for the province of\nMarpesia to have thirty knights of their own election continually\npresent in the Senate of Oceana, together with sixty deputies of horse,\nand 120 of foot in the prerogative tribe, endued with equal power\n(respect had to their quality and number) in the debate and result of\nthis commonwealth, provided that they observe the course or rotation\nof the same by the annual return of ten knights, twenty deputies of the\nhorse, and forty of the foot. The like in all respects is lawful for\nPanopea; and the horse of both the provinces amounting to one troop, and\nthe foot to one company, one captain and one cornet of the horse shall\nbe annually chosen by Marpesia, and one captain and one ensign of the\nfoot shall be annually chosen by Panopea.\u201d\n\nThe orb of the prerogative being thus complete, is not unnaturally\ncompared to that of the moon, either in consideration of the light\nborrowed from the Senate, as from the sun; or of the ebbs and floods\nof the people, which are marked by the negative or affirmative of this\ntribe. And the constitution of the Senate and the people being shown,\nyou have that of the Parliament of Oceana, consisting of the Senate\nproposing, and of the people resolving, which amounts to an act of\nParliament. So the Parliament is the heart, which, consisting of two\nventricles, the one greater and replenished with a grosser matter, the\nother less and full of a purer, sucks in and spouts forth the vital\nblood of Oceana by a perpetual circulation. Wherefore the life of\nthis government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this score to\ndissolution than that of a man; nor to giddiness than the world; seeing\nthe earth, whether it be itself or the heavens that are in rotation, is\nso far from being giddy, that it could not subsist without motion. But\nwhy should not this government be much rather capable of duration\nand steadiness by motion? Than which God has ordained no other to the\nuniversal commonwealth of mankind: seeing one generation comes and\nanother goes, but the earth remains firm forever, that is, in her proper\nsituation or place, whether she be moved or not moved upon her proper\ncentre. The Senate, the people, and the magistracy, or the Parliament so\nconstituted, as you have seen, is the guardian of this commonwealth, and\nthe husband of such a wife as is elegantly described by Solomon: \u201cShe is\nlike the merchant\u2019s ships; she brings her food from far. She considers\na field, and buys it: with the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard.\nShe perceives that her merchandise is good. She stretches forth her\nhands to the poor. She is not afraid of the snow for her household; for\nall her household are clothed with scarlet. She makes herself coverings\nof tapestry, her clothing is silk and purple. Her husband is known (by\nhis robes) in the gates, when he sits among the senators of the land.\u201d\n The gates, or inferior courts, were branches, as it were, of the\nSanhedrim, or Senate, of Israel. Nor is our commonwealth a worse\nhousewife, nor has she less regard to her magistrates; as may pear by--\n\nThe twenty-fifth order, \u201cThat, whereas the public revenue is through the\nlate civil wars dilapidated, the excise, being improved or improvable to\nthe revenue of \u00a31,000,000, be applied, for the space of eleven years to\ncome, to the reparation of the same, and for the present maintenance of\nthe magistrates, knights, deputies, and other officers, who, according\nto their several dignities and functions, shall annually receive toward\nthe support of the same, as follows:\n\n\u201cThe lord strategus marching, is, upon another account, to have\nfield-pay as general.\n\n                                          Per Annum\n     The lord strategus sitting......            \u00a32,000\n     The lord orator......                        2,000\n     The three commissioners of the seal...       4,500\n     The three commissioners of the treasury...   4,500\n     The two censors....                          3,000\n     The 290 knights, at \u00a3500 a man.....        145,000\n     The four ambassadors-in-ordinary....        12,000\n     The Council of War for intelligence....      3,000\n     The master of the ceremonies.....              500\n     The master of the horse......                  500\n     His substitute.....                            150\n     The twelve ballotins for their winter liveries 240\n\n     For summer liveries...                     120\n\n     For their board-wages......                480\n     For the keeping of three coaches of state,\n\n     twenty-four coach-horses, with coachmen\n\n     and postilions..........                1,500\n     For the grooms, and keeping of sixteen\n\n     great horses for the master of the\n\n     horse, and for the ballotins whom he\n\n     is to govern and instruct in the art\n\n     of riding..........                        480\n     The twenty secretaries of the Parliament...  2,000\n     The twenty doorkeepers, who are to attend\n\n     with pole-axes,\n\n     For their coats.......                     200\n\n     For their board-wages....                1,000\n     The twenty messengers, which are trumpeters,\n\n     For their coats....                        200\n\n     For their board-wages.....               1,000\n     For ornament of the masters of the youth...  5,000\n\n         Sum                               \u00a3189,370\n\n\u201cOut of the personal estates of every man, who at his death bequeaths\nnot above forty shillings to the muster of that hundred wherein it lies,\nshall be levied one per cent. till the solid revenue of the muster of\nthe hundred amounts to \u00a350 per annum for the prizes of the youth.\n\n\u201cThe twelve ballotins are to be divided into three regions, according to\nthe course of the Senate; the four of the first region to be elected at\nthe tropic out of such children as the knights of the same shall offer,\nnot being under eleven years of age, nor above thirteen. And their\nelection shall be made by the lot at an urn set by the sergeant of the\nhouse for that purpose in the hall of the Pantheon. The livery of the\ncommonwealth for the fashion or the color may be changed at the election\nof the strategus according to his fancy. But every knight during his\nsession shall be bound to give to his footman, or some one of his\nfootmen, the livery of the commonwealth.\n\n\u201cThe prerogative tribe shall receive as follows:\n\n                                            By the week\n     The two tribunes of the horse.....              \u00a314  0\n     The two tribunes of the foot.....                12  0\n     The three captains of the horse.....             15  0\n     The three cornets.....                            9  0\n     The three captains of the foot....               12  0\n     The three ensigns........                         7  0\n     The 442 horse, at \u00a32 a man.....                 884  0\n     The 592 foot, at \u00a31 10s a man....               888  0\n     The six trumpeters.....                           7 10\n     The three drummers...........                     2  5\n\n     Sum by the week................          \u00a31,850 15\n\n     Sum by the year.............            \u00a396,239  0\n\n     The total of the Senate, the people,\n\n     and the magistracy....................  \u00a3287,459 15\n\n\u201cThe dignity of the commonwealth, and aids of the several magistracies\nand offices thereto belonging, bring provided for as aforesaid, the\noverplus of the excise, with the product of the sum rising, shall be\ncarefully managed by the Senate and the people through the diligence of\nthe officers of the Exchequer, till it amount to \u00a38,000,000, or to the\npurchase of about \u00a3400,000 solid revenue. At which time, the term of\neleven years being expired, the excise, except it be otherwise ordered\nby the Senate and the people, shall be totally remitted and abolished\nforever.\u201d\n\nAt this institution the taxes, as will better appear in the Corollary,\nwere abated about one-half, which made the order, when it came to be\ntasted, to be of good relish with the people in the very beginning;\nthough the advantages then were no ways comparable to the consequences\nto be hereafter shown. Nevertheless, my Lord Epimonus, who with much ado\nhad been held till now, found it midsummer moon, and broke out of bedlam\nin this manner.\n\n\u201cMY LORD ARCHON:\n\n\u201cI have a singing in my head like that of a cart-wheel, my brains are\nupon a rotation; and some are so merry, that a man cannot speak his\ngriefs, but if your high-shod prerogative, and those same slouching\nfellows your tribunes, do not take my lord strategus\u2019s and my lord\norator\u2019s heads, and jolt them together under the canopy, then let me be\nridiculous to all posterity. For here is a commonwealth, to which if a\nman should take that of the \u2018prentices in their ancient administration\nof justice at Shrovetide, it were an aristocracy. You have set the very\nrabble with truncheons in their hands, and the gentry of this nation,\nlike cocks with scarlet gills, and the golden combs of their salaries to\nboot, lest they should not be thrown at.\n\n\u201cNot a night can I sleep for some horrid apparition or other; one while\nthese myrmidons are measuring silks by their quarterstaves, another\nstuffing their greasy pouches with my lord high treasurer\u2019s jacobuses.\nFor they are above 1,000 in arms to 300, which, their gowns being pulled\nover their ears, are but in their doublets and hose. But what do I speak\nof 1,000? There be 2,000 in every tribe, that is, 100,000 in the whole\nnation, not only in the posture of an army, but in a civil capacity\nsufficient to give us what laws they please. Now everybody knows that\nthe lower sort of people regard nothing but money; and you say it is\nthe duty of a legislator to presume all men to be wicked: wherefore they\nmust fall upon the richer, as they are an army; or, lest their minds\nshould misgive them in such a villany, you have given them encouragement\nthat they have a nearer way, seeing it may be done every whit as well as\nby the overbalancing power which they have in elections. There is a fair\nwhich is annually kept in the centre of these territories at Kiberton,\na town famous for ale, and frequented by good fellows; where there is a\nsolemnity of the pipers and fiddlers of this nation (I know not whether\nLacedaemon, where the Senate kept account of the stops of the flutes and\nof the fiddle-strings of that commonwealth, bad any such custom) called\nthe bull-running, and he that catches and holds the bull, is the annual\nand supreme magistrate of that comitia or congregation, called king\npiper, without whose license it is not lawful for any of those citizens\nto enjoy the liberty of his calling; nor is he otherwise legitimately\nqualified (or civitate donatus) to lead apes or bears in any\nperambulation of the same. Mine host of the Bear, in Kiberton, the\nfather of ale, and patron of good football and cudgel players, has any\ntime since I can remember been grand-chancellor of this order.\n\n\u201cNow, say I, seeing great things arise from small beginnings, what\nshould hinder the people, prone to their own advantage and loving money,\nfrom having intelligence conveyed to them by this same king piper and\nhis chancellor, with their loyal subjects the minstrels and bear-wards,\nmasters of ceremonies, to which there is great recourse in their\nrespective perambulations, and which they will commission and instruct,\nwith directions to all the tribes, willing and commanding them, that\nas they wish their own good, they choose no other into the next primum\nmobile but of the ablest cudgel and football players? Which done as\nsoon as said, your primum mobile, consisting of no other stuff, must of\nnecessity be drawn forth into your nebulones and your galimofries; and\nso the silken purses of your Senate and prerogative being made of sows\u2019\nears, most of them blacksmiths, they will strike while the iron is\nhot, and beat your estates into hob-nails, mine host of the Bear being\nstrategus, and king piper lord orator. Well, my lords, it might have\nbeen otherwise expressed, but this is well enough a-conscience. In your\nway, the wit of man shall not prevent this or the like inconvenience;\nbut if this (for I have conferred with artists) be a mathematical\ndemonstration, I could kneel to you, that ere it be too late we might\nreturn to some kind of sobriety. If we empty our purses with these\npomps, salaries, coaches, lackeys, and pages, what can the people say\nless than that we have dressed a Senate and a prerogative for nothing\nbut to go to the park with the ladies?\u201d\n\nMy Lord Archon, whose meekness resembled that of Moses, vouchsafed this\nanswer:\n\n\u201cMy LORDS:\n\n\u201cFor all this, I can see my Lord Epimonus every night in the park, and\nwith ladies; nor do I blame this in a young man, or the respect which is\nand ought to be given to a sex that is one-half of the commonwealth of\nmankind, and without which the other would be none: but our magistrates,\nI doubt, may be somewhat of the oldest to perform this part with much\nacceptation; and, as the Italian proverb says, \u2018Servire e non gradire\ne cosa da far morire.\u2019 Wherefore we will lay no certain obligation upon\nthem in this point, but leave them, if it please you, to their own fate\nor discretion. But this (for I know my Lord Epimonus loves me, though\nI can never get his esteem) I will say, if he had a mistress should use\nhim so, he would find it a sad life; or I appeal to your lordships, how\nI can resent it from such a friend, that he puts king piper\u2019s politics\nin the balance with mine. King piper, I deny not, may teach his bears to\ndance, but they have the worst ear of all creatures. Now how he\nshould make them keep time in fifty several tribes, and that two years\ntogether, for else it will be to no purpose, may be a small matter with\nmy lord to promise; but it seems to me of impossible performance. First,\nthrough the nature of the bean; and, secondly, through that of the\nballot; or how what he has hitherto thought so hard, is now come to be\neasy; but he may think that for expedition they will eat up these balls\nlike apples.\n\n\u201cHowever, there is so much more in their way by the constitution of\nthis, than is to be found in that of any other commonwealth, that I am\nreconciled, it now appearing plainly that the points of my lord\u2019s\narrows are directed at no other white than to show the excellency of our\ngovernment above others; which, as he proceeds further, is yet plainer;\nwhile he makes it appear that there can be no other elected by the\npeople but smiths:\n\n\u201c\u2018Brontesque Steropesque et nudus membra Pyracmon:\u2019\n\n\u201cOthoniel, Aod, Gideon, Jephtha, Samson, as in Israel; Miltiades,\nAristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, as in Athens; Papyrius,\nCincinnatus, Camillus, Fabius Scipio, as in Rome: smiths of the fortune\nof the commonwealth; not such as forged hob-nails, but thunderbolts.\nPopular elections are of that kind, that all of the rest of the world\nis not able, either in number or glory, to equal those of these three\ncommonwealths. These indeed were the ablest cudgel and football players;\nbright arms were their cudgels, and the world was the ball that lay\nat their feet. Wherefore we are not so to understand the maxim of\nlegislators, which holds all men to be wicked, as if it related to\nmankind or a commonwealth, the interests whereof are the only straight\nlines they have whereby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to\nevery man or party, under what color soever he or they pretend to be\ntrusted apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is derived, which is\nmade good in all experience, that the aristocracy is ravenous, and not\nthe people. Your highwaymen are not such as have trades, or have been\nbrought up to industry; but such commonly whose education has pretended\nto that of gentlemen. My lord is so honest, he does not know the maxims\nthat are of absolute necessity to the arts of wickedness; for it is\nmost certain, if there be not more purses than thieves, that the thieves\nthemselves must be forced to turn honest, because they cannot thrive\nby their trade; but now if the people should turn thieves, who sees not\nthat there would be more thieves than purses? wherefore that a whole\npeople should turn robbers or levellers, is as impossible in the end as\nin the means.\n\n\u201cBut that I do not think your artist which you mentioned, whether\nastronomer or arithmetician, can tell me how many barley-corns would\nreach to the sun, I could be content he were called to the account, with\nwhich I shall conclude this point: when by the way I have chid my lords\nthe legislators, who, as if they doubted my tackling could not hold,\nwould leave me to flag in a perpetual calm, but for my Lord Epimonus,\nwho breathes now and then into my sails and stirs the waters. A ship\nmakes not her way so briskly as when she is handsomely brushed by the\nwaves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her; in which\ncase I have perceived in the dark that light has been struck even out of\nthe sea, as in this place, where my Lord Epimonus feigning to give us\na demonstration of one thing, has given it of another, and of a better.\nFor the people of this nation, if they amount in each tribe to 2,000\nelders and 2,000 youths upon the annual roll, holding a fifth to\nthe whole tribe, then the whole of a tribe, not accounting women and\nchildren, must amount to 20,000; and so the whole of all the tribes,\nbeing fifty, to 1,000,000.\n\n\u201cNow you have 10,000 parishes, and reckoning these one with another,\neach at \u00a31,000 a year dry-rent, the rent or revenue of the nation, as it\nis or might be let to farm, amounts to \u00a310,000,000; and \u00a310,000,000 in\nrevenue divided equally to 1,000,000 of men, comes but to \u00a310 a year to\neach wherewith to maintain himself, his wife and children. But he that\nhas a cow upon the common, and earns his shilling by the day at his\nlabor, has twice as much already as this would come to for his share;\nbecause if the land were thus divided, there would be nobody to set him\non work. So my Lord Epimonus\u2019s footman, who costs him thrice as much as\none of these could thus get, would certainly lose by his bargain. What\nshould we speak of those innumerable trades whereupon men live, not only\nbetter than others upon good shares of lands, but become also purchasers\nof greater estates? Is not this the demonstration which my lord meant,\nthat the revenue of industry in a nation, at least in this, is three\nor four-fold greater than that of the mere rent? If the people then\nobstruct industry, they obstruct their own livelihood; but if they\nmake a war, they obstruct industry. Take the bread out of the people\u2019s\nmouths, as did the Roman patricians, and you are sure enough of a war,\nin which case they may be levellers; but our agrarian causes their\nindustry to flow with milk and honey. It will be owned that this is\ntrue, if the people were given to understand their own happiness; but\nwhere is it they do that? Let me reply with the like question, where\ndo they not? They do not know their happiness it should seem in France,\nSpain, and Italy; but teach them what it is, and try whose sense is the\ntruer.\n\n\u201cAs to the late wars in Germany, it has been affirmed to me there, that\nthe princes could never make the people to take arms while they had\nbread, and have therefore suffered countries now and then to be wasted\nthat they might get soldiers. This you will find to be the certain pulse\nand temper of the people; and if they have been already proved to be the\nmost wise and constant order of a government, why should we think\n(when no man can produce one example of the common soldiery in an army\nmutinying because they had not captains\u2019 pay) that the prerogative\nshould jolt the heads of the Senate together because these have the\nbetter salaries, when it must be as evident to the people in a nation,\nas to the soldiery in an army, that it is no more possible their\nemoluments of this kind should be afforded by any commonwealth in the\nworld to be made equal with those of the Senate, than that the common\nsoldiers should be equal with the captains? It is enough for the common\nsoldier that his virtue may bring him to be a captain, and more to the\nprerogative, that each of them is nearer to be a senator.\n\n\u201cIf my lord thinks our salaries too great, and that the commonwealth is\nnot housewife enough, whether is it better housewifery that she should\nkeep her family from the snow, or suffer them to burn her house that\nthey may warm themselves? for one of these must be. Do you think that\nshe came off at a cheaper rate when men had their rewards by \u00a31,000 or\n\u00a32,000 a year in land if inheritance? if you say that they will be\nmore godly than they have been, it may be ill taken; and if you cannot\npromise that, it is time we find out some way of stinting at least, if\nnot curing them of that same sacra fames. On the other side, if a poor\nman (as such a one may save a city) gives his sweat to the public, with\nwhat conscience can you suffer his family in the meantime to starve?\nbut he that lays his hand to this plough shall not lose by taking it\noff from his own, and a commonwealth that will mend this shall be\npenny-wise. The Sanhedrim of Israel, being the supreme, and a constant\ncourt of judicature, could not choose but be exceeding gainful. The\nSenate of the Bean in Athens, because it was but annual, was moderately\nsalaried; but that of the Areopagites, being for life, bountifully; and\nwhat advantages the senators of Lacedaemon had, where there was little\nmoney or use of it, were in honors for life. The patricians having no\nprofit, took all. Venice being a situation where a man goes but to the\ndoor for his employment, the honor is great and the reward very little;\nbut in Holland a councillor of state has \u00a31,500 Flemish a year,\nbesides other accommodations. The States-General have more. And that\ncommonwealth looks nearer her penny than ours needs to do.\n\n\u201cFor the revenue of this nation, besides that of her industry,\nit--amounts, as has been shown, to \u00a310,000,000; and the salaries in\nthe whole come not to \u00a3300,000 a year. The beauty they will add to the\ncommonwealth will be exceeding great, and the people will delight in\nthis beauty of their commonwealth; the encouragement they will give to\nthe study of the public being very progitable, the accommodation they\nwill afford to your magistrates very honorable and easy. And the sum,\nwhen it or twice as much was spent in bunting and housekeeping, was\nnever any grievance to the people. I am ashamed to stand huckling upon\nthis point; it is sordid. Your magistrates are rather to be provided\nwith further accommodations. For what if there should be sickness?\nwhither will you have them to remove? And this city in the soundest\ntimes, for the heat of the year, is no wholesome abode: have a care of\ntheir healths to whom you commit your own. I would have the Senate and\nthe people, except they see cause to the contrary, every first of June\nto remove into the country air for the space of three months. You are\nbetter fitted with summer-houses for them than if you had built them to\nthat purpose.\n\n\u201cThere is some twelve miles distant the convallium upon the river\nHalcionia, for the tribunes and the prerogative, a palace capable of\n1,000 men; and twenty miles distant you have Mount Celia, reverend as\nwell for the antiquity as state of a castle completely capable of\nthe Senate, the proposers having lodgings in the convallium, and the\ntribunes in Celia, it holds the correspondency between the Senate and\nthe people exactly And it is a small matter for the proposers,\nbeing attended with the coaches and officers of state, besides other\nconveniences of their own, to go a matter of five or ten miles (those\nseats are not much farther distant) to meet the people upon any heath or\nfield that shall be appointed: where, having despatched their business,\nthey may hunt their own venison (for I would have the great walled\npark upon the Halcionia to belong to the signory, and those about the\nconvallium to the tribunes) and so go to supper. Pray, my lords, see\nthat they do not pull down these houses to sell the lead of them; for\nwhen--you have considered on it, they cannot be spared. The founders of\nthe school in Hiera provided that the boys should have a summer seat.\nYou should have as much care of these magistrates. But there is such a\nselling, such a Jewish humor in our republicans, that I cannot tell\nwhat to say to it; only this, any man that knows what belongs to a\ncommonwealth, or how diligent every nation in that case has been to\npreserve her ornaments, and shall see the waste lately made (the woods\nadjoining to this city, which served for the delight and health of it,\nbeing cut down to be sold for threepence), will you tell that they who\ndid such things would never have made a commonwealth. The like may be\nsaid of the ruin or damage done upon our cathedrals, ornaments in which\nthis nation excels all others. Nor shall this ever be excused upon the\nscore of religion; for though it be true that God dwells not in houses\nmade with hands, yet you cannot hold your assemblies but in such houses,\nand these are of the best that have been made with hands. Nor is it well\nargued that they are pompous, and therefore profane, or less proper for\ndivine service, seeing the Christians in the primitive Church chose\nto meet with one accord in the Temple, so far were they from any\ninclination to pull it down.\u201d\n\nThe orders of this commonwealth, so far, or near so far as they concern\nthe elders, together with the several speeches at the institution, which\nmay serve for the better understanding of them as so many commentaries,\nbeing shown, I should now come from the elders to the youth, or from the\ncivil constitution of this government to the military, but that I judge\nthis the fittest place whereinto, by the way, to insert the government\nof the city though for the present but perfunctorily.\n\n\u201c\u2018The metropolis or capital city of Oceana is commonly called Emporium,\nthough it consists of two cities distinct, as well in name as in\ngovernment, whereof the other is called Hiera, for which cause I shall\ntreat of each apart, beginning with Emporium.\n\n\u201cEmporium, with the liberties, is under a twofold division, the one\nregarding the national, and the other the urban or city government. It\nis divided, in regard of the national government, into three tribes, and\nin respect of the urban into twenty six, which for distinction\u2019s sake\nare called wards, being contained under three tribes but unequally;\nwherefore the first tribe containing ten wards is called scazon, the\nsecond containing eight metoche, and the third containing as many\ntelicouta, the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better\nunderstanding of the government.\n\n\u201cEvery ward has her wardmote, court, or inquest, consisting of all that\nare of the clothing or liveries of companies residing within the same.\n\n\u201cSuch are of the livery or clothing as have attained to the dignity to\nwear gowns and parti-colored hoods or tippets, according to the rules\nand ancient customs of their respective companies.\n\n\u201cA company is a brotherhood of tradesmen professing the same art,\ngoverned according to their charter by a master and wardens. Of these\nthere be about sixty, whereof twelve are of greater dignity than the\nrest, that is to say, the mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers,\ngoldsmiths, skinners, merchant-tailors, haberdashers, salters,\nironmongers, vintners, clothworkers, which, with most of the rest, have\ncommon halls, divers of them being of ancient and magnificent structure,\nwherein they have frequent meetings, at the summons of their master or\nwardens, for the managing and regulation of their respective trades and\nmysteries. These companies, as I shall show, are the roots of the whole\ngovernment of the city. For the liveries that reside in the same ward,\nmeeting at the wardmote inquest (to which it belongs to take cognizance\nof all sorts of nuisances and violations of the customs and orders of\nthe city, and to present them to the court of aldermen), have also power\nto make election of two sorts of magistrates or officers; the first\nof elders or aldermen of the ward, the second of deputies of the same,\notherwise called common councilmen.\n\n\u201cThe wards in these elections, because they do not elect all at once,\nbut some one year and some another, observe the distinction of the three\ntribes; for example, the scazon, consisting of ten wards, makes election\nthe first year of ten aldermen, one in each ward, and of 150 deputies,\nfifteen in each ward, all which are triennial magistrates or officers,\nthat is to say, are to bear their dignity for the space of three years.\n\n\u201cThe second year the metoche, consisting of eight wards, elects eight\naldermen, one in each ward, and 120 deputies, fifteen in each ward,\nbeing also triennial magistrates.\n\n\u201cThe third year telicouta, consisting of a like number of wards, elects\nan equal number of like magistrates for a like term. So that the whole\nnumber of the aldermen, according to that of the wards, amounts to\ntwenty-six; and the whole number of the deputies, to 390.\n\n\u201cThe aldermen thus elected have divers capacities; for, first, they\nare justices of the peace for the term, and in consequence of their\nelection. Secondly, they are presidents of the wardmote and governors\neach of that ward whereby he was elected. And last of all, these\nmagistrates being assembled together, constitute the Senate of the city,\notherwise called the court of aldermen; but no man is capable of this\nelection that is not worth \u00a310,000. This court upon every new election\nmakes choice of nine censors out of their own number.\n\n\u201cThe deputies in like manner being assembled together, constitute the\nprerogative tribe of the city, otherwise called the common council, by\nwhich means the Senate and the people of the city were comprehended, as\nit were, by the motion of the national government, into the same wheel\nof annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.\n\n\u201cBut the liveries, over and above the right of these elections by their\ndivisions mentioned, being assembled all together at the guild of the\ncity, constitute another assembly called the common hall.\n\n\u201cThe common hall has the right of two other elections; the one of the\nlord mayor, and the other of the two sheriffs, being annual magistrates.\nThe lord mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the twelve\ncompanies of the first ranks; and the common hall agrees by the\nplurality of suffrages upon two names, which, being presented to the\nlord mayor for the time being, and the court of the aldermen, they elect\none by their scrutiny. For so they call it, though it differs from\nthat of the commonwealth. The orator or assistant to the lord mayor\nin holding of his courts, is some able lawyer elected by the court of\naldermen, and called the recorder of Emporium.\n\n\u201cThe lord mayor being thus elected, has two capacities: one regarding\nthe nation, and the other the city. In that which regards the city,\nhe is president of the court of aldermen, having power to assemble the\nsame, or any other council of the city, as the common council or common\nhall, at his will and pleasure; and in that which regards the nation, he\nis commander-in-chief of the three tribes whereinto the city is divided;\none of which he is to bring up in person at the national muster to the\nballot, as his vice-comites, or high sheriffs, are to do by the other\ntwo, each at their distinct pavilion, where the nine aldermen, elected\ncensors, are to officiate by three in each tribe, according to the rules\nand orders already given to the censors of the rustic tribes. And the\ntribes of the city have no other than one common phylarch, which is the\ncourt of aldermen and the common council, for which cause they elect not\nat their muster the first list called the prime magnitude.\n\n\u201cThe conveniences of this alteration of the city government, besides the\nbent of it to a conformity with that of the nation, were many, whereof\nI shall mention but a few: as first, whereas men under the former\nadministration, when the burden of some of these magistracies lay\nfor life, were oftentimes chosen not for their fitness, but rather\nunfitness, or at least unwillingness to undergo such a weight, whereby\nthey were put at great rates to fine for their ease; a man might now\ntake his share in magistracy with that equity which is due to the\npublic, and without any inconvenience to his private affairs. Secondly,\nwhereas the city (inasmuch as the acts of the aristocracy, or court of\naldermen, in their former way of proceeding, were rather impositions\nthan propositions) was frequently disquieted with the inevitable\nconsequence of disorder in the power of debate exercised by the\npopular part, or common council; the right of debate being henceforth\nestablished in the court of aldermen, and that of result in the common\ncouncil, killed the branches of division in the root. Which for the\npresent may suffice to have been said of the city of Emporium.\n\n\u201cThat of Hiera consists as to the national government of two tribes, the\nfirst called agoroea, the second propola; but as to the peculiar policy\nof twelve manipuls, or wards divided into three cohorts, each cohort\ncontaining four wards, whereof the wards of the first cohort elect for\nthe first year four burgesses, one in each ward, the wards of the second\ncohort for the second year four burgesses, one in each ward, and the\nwards of the third cohort for the third year four burgesses, one in each\nward, all triennial magistrates; by which the twelve burgesses,\nmaking one court for the government of this city according to their\ninstructions by act of Parliament, fall likewise into an annual,\ntriennial, and perpetual revolution.\n\n\u201cThis court being thus constituted, makes election of divers\nmagistrates; as first, of a high steward, who is commonly some person of\nquality, and this magistracy is elected in the Senate by the scrutiny of\nthis court; with him they choose some able lawyer to be his deputy, and\nto hold the court; and last of all they elect out of their own number\nsix censors.\n\n\u201cThe high steward is commander-in-chief of the two tribes, whereof he in\nperson brings up the one at the national muster to the ballot, and his\ndeputy the other at a distinct pavilion; the six censors chosen by the\ncourt officiating by three in each tribe at the urns; and these tribes\nhave no other phylarch but this court.\n\n\u201cAs for the manner of elections and suffrage, both in Emporium and\nHiera, it may be said, once for all, that they are performed by ballot,\nand according to the respective rules already given.\n\n\u201cThere be other cities and corporations throughout the territory, whose\npolicy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labor\nto insert, nor dare I stay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.\u201d\n\nI return, according to the method of the commonwealth, to the remaining\nparts of her orbs, which are military and provincial; the military,\nexcept the strategus, and the polemarchs or field-officers, consisting\nof the youth only, and the provincial consisting of a mixture both of\nelders and of the youth.\n\nTo begin with the youth, or the military orbs, they are circles to\nwhich the commonwealth must have a care to keep close. A man is a spirit\nraised by the magic of nature; if she does not stand safe, and so that\nshe may set him to some good and useful work, he spits fire, and blows\nup castles; for where there is life, there must be motion or work; and\nthe work of idleness is mischief, but the work of industry is health.\nTo set men to this, the commonwealth must begin betimes with them, or\nit will be too late; and the means whereby she sets them to it is\neducation, the plastic art of government. But it is as frequent as sad\nin experience (whether through negligence, or, which in the consequence\nis all one or worse, over-fondness in the domestic performance of this\nduty) that innumerable children come to owe their utter perdition to\ntheir own parents, in each of which the commonwealth loses a citizen.\n\nWherefore the laws of a government, how wholesome soever in themselves,\nare such as, if men by a congruity in their education be not bred to\nfind a relish in them, they will be sure to loathe and detest. The\neducation therefore of a man\u2019s own children is not wholly to be\ncommitted or trusted to himself. You find in Livy the children of\nBrutus, having been bred under monarchy, and used to a court life,\nmaking faces at the Commonwealth of Rome: \u201cA king (say they) is a man\nwith whom you may prevail when you have need there should be law, or\nwhen you have need there should be no law; he has favors in the right,\nand he frowns not in the wrong place; he knows his friends from\nhis enemies. But laws are deaf, inexorable things, such as make no\ndifference between a gentleman and an ordinary fellow; a man can never\nbe merry for them, for to trust altogether to his own innocence is a sad\nlife.\u201d Unhappy wantons! Scipio, on the other side, when he was but a boy\n(about two or three and twenty), being informed that certain patricians\nof Roman gentlemen, through a qualm upon the defeat which Hannibal had\ngiven them at Cannae, were laying their heads together and contriving\ntheir flight with the transportation of their goods out of Rome, drew\nhis sword, and setting himself at the door of the chamber where they\nwere at council, protested \u201cthat who did not immediately swear not to\ndesert the commonwealth, he would make his soul to desert his body.\u201d Let\nmen argue as they please for monarchy, or against a commonwealth, the\nworld shall never see any man so sottish or wicked as in cool blood to\nprefer the education of the sons of Brutus before that of Scipio; and\nof this mould, except a Melius or a Manlius, was the whole youth of that\ncommonwealth, though not ordinarily so well cast.\n\nNow the health of a government and the education of the youth being\nof the same pulse, no wonder if it has been the constant practice of\nwell-ordered commonwealths to commit the care and feeling of it to\npublic magistrates. A duty that was performed in such a manner by the\nAreopagites, as is elegantly praised by Isocrates, \u201cthe Athenians (says\nhe) write not their laws upon dead walls, nor content themselves with\nhaving ordained punishments for crimes, but provide in such a way, by\nthe education of their youth, that there be no crimes for punishment.\u201d\n He speaks of those laws which regarded manners, not of those orders\nwhich concerned the administration of the commonwealth, lest you should\nthink he contradicts Xenophon and Polybius. The children of Lacedaemon,\nat the seventh year of their age, were delivered to the poedonomi, or\nschoolmasters, not mercenary, but magistrates of the commonwealth, to\nwhich they were accountable for their charge; and by these at the age of\nfourteen they were presented to other magistrates called the beidioei,\nhaving the inspection of the games and exercises, among which that of\nthe platanista was famous, a kind of fight in squadrons, but somewhat\ntoo fierce. When they came to be of military age they were listed of\nthe mora, and so continued in readiness for public service under the\ndiscipline of the polemarchs. But the Roman education and discipline by\nthe centuries and classes is that to which the Commonwealth of Oceana\nhas had a more particular regard in her three essays, being certain\ndegrees by which the youth commence as it were in arms for magistracy,\nas appears by--\n\nThe twenty-sixth order, instituting, \u201cThat if a parent has but one son,\nthe education of that one son shall be wholly at the disposition of that\nparent. But whereas there be free schools erected and endowed, or to\nbe erected and endowed in every tribe of this nation, to a sufficient\nproportion for the education of the children of the same (which schools,\nto the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the scholars upon case\nof removing from one to another, are every of them to be governed by\nthe strict inspection of the censors of the tribes, both upon the\nschoolmaster\u2019s manner of life and teaching, and the proficiency of the\nchildren, after the rules and method of that in Hiera) if a parent has\nmore sons than one, the censors of the tribes shall animadvert upon and\npunish him that sends not his sons within the ninth year of their age to\nsome one of the schools of a tribe, there to be kept and taught, if he\nbe able, at his own charges; and if he be not able, gratis, till they\narrive at the age of fifteen years. And a parent may expect of his sons\nat the fifteenth year of their age, according to his choice or ability,\nwhether it be to service in the way of apprentices to some trade or\notherwise, or to further study, as by sending them to the inns of court,\nof chancery, or to one of the universities of this nation. But he\nthat takes not upon him one of the professions proper to some of those\nplaces, shall not continue longer in any of them than till he has\nattained to the age of eighteen years; and every man having not at\nthe age of eighteen years taken upon him, or addicted himself to the\nprofession of the law, theology, or physic, and being no servant, shall\nbe capable of the essays of the youth, and no other person whatsoever,\nexcept a man, having taken upon him such a profession, happens to lay\nit by ere he arrives at three or four and twenty years of age, and be\nadmitted to this capacity by the respective. Phylarchs being satisfied\nthat he kept not out so long with any design to evade the service of the\ncommonwealth; but, that being no sooner at his own disposal, it was no\nsooner in his choice to come in. And if any youth or other person of\nthis nation have a desire to travel into foreign countries upon occasion\nof business, delight, or further improvement of his education, the\nsame shall be lawful for him upon a pass obtained from the censors in\nParliament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recommending him\nto the ambassadors by whom he shall be assisted, and to whom he shall\nyield honor and obedience in their respective residences. Every youth at\nhis return from his travel is to present the censors with a paper of his\nown writing, containing the interest of state or form of government of\nthe countries, or some one of the countries, where he has been; and\nif it be good, the censors shall cause it to be printed and published,\nprefixing a line in commendation of the author.\n\n\u201cEvery Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the whole youth of\nevery parish, that is to say, every man (not excepted by the foregoing\npart of the order), being from eighteen years of age to thirty, shall\nrepair at the sound of the bell to their respective church, and being\nthere assembled in presence of the overseers, who are to govern the\nballot, and the constable who is to officiate at the urn, shall, after\nthe manner of the elders, elect every fifth man of their whole number\n(provided that they choose not above one of two brothers at one\nelection, nor above half if they be four or upward) to be a stratiot\nor deputy of the youth; and the list of the stratiots so elected\nbeing taken by the overseers, shall be entered in the parish book, and\ndiligently preserved as a record, called the first essay. They whose\nestates by the law are able, or whose friends are willing, to mount\nthem, shall be of the horse, the rest are of the foot. And he who has\nbeen one year of this list, is not capable of being re-elected till\nafter another year\u2019s interval.\n\n\u201cEvery Wednesday next ensuing the last of January, the stratiots being\nmustered at the rendezvous of their respective hundreds, shall, in the\npresence of the jurymen, who are overseers of that ballot, and of the\nhigh constable who is to officiate at the urn, elect out of the horse\nof their troop or company one captain, and one ensign or cornet, to\nthe command of the same. And the jurymen having entered the list of the\nhundred into a record to be diligently kept at the rendezvous of the\nsame, the first public game of this commonwealth shall begin and be\nperformed in this manner. Whereas there is to be at every rendezvous of\na hundred, one cannon, culverin, or saker, the prize arms being forged\nby sworn armorers of this commonwealth, and for their proof, besides\ntheir beauty, viewed and tried at the tower of Emporium, shall be\nexposed by the justice of peace appertaining to that hundred (the said\njustice with the jurymen being judges of the game), and the judges shall\ndeliver to the horseman that gains the prize at the career, one suit\nof arms being of the value \u00a320, to the pikeman that gains the prize\nat throwing the bullet, one suit of arms of the value of \u00a310, to the\nmusketeer that gains the prize at the mark with his musket, one suit of\narms of the value of \u00a310, and to the cannoneer that gains the prize at\nthe mark with the cannon, culverin, or saker, a chain of silver being\nthe value of \u00a310, provided that no one man at the same muster plays\nabove one of the prizes. Whosoever gains a prize is bound to wear it\n(if it be his lot) upon service; and no man shall sell or give away any\narmor thus won, except he has lawfully attained to two or more of them\nat the games.\n\n\u201cThe games being ended, and the muster dismissed, the captain of the\ntroop or company shall repair with a copy of the list to the lord\nlieutenant of the tribe, and the high constable with a duplicate of\nthe same to the custos rotulorum, or muster-master general, to be also\ncommunicated to the censors; in each of which the jurymen, giving a\nnote upon every name of an only son, shall certify the list is without\nsubterfuge or evasion; or, if it be not, an account of those upon whom\nthe evasion or subterfuge lies, to the end that the phylarch or the\ncensors may animadvert accordingly.\n\n\u201cAnd every Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the lord\nlieutenant, custos rotulorum, the censors, and the conductor, shall\nreceive the whole muster of the youth of that tribe at the rendezvous of\nthe same, distributing the horse and foot with their officers, according\nto the directions given in the like case for the distribution of the\nelders; and the whole squadron being put by that means in battalia,\nthe second game of this commonwealth shall begin by the exercise of the\nyouth in all the parts of their military discipline according to the\norders of Parliament, or direction of the Council of War in that case.\nAnd the \u00a3100 allowed by the Parliament for the ornament of the muster\nin every tribe, shall be expended by the phylarch upon such artificial\ncastles, citadels, or the like devices, as may make the best and most\nprofitable sport for the youth and their spectators.\n\n\u201cWhich being ended, the censors having prepared the urns by putting\ninto the horse-urn 220 gold balls, whereof ten are to be marked with\nthe letter M and other ten with the letter P; into the foot-urn 700 gold\nballs, whereof fifty are to be marked, with the letter M and fifty with\nthe letter P; and after they have made the gold balls in each urn, by\nthe addition of silver balls to the same, in number equal with the horse\nand foot of the stratiots, the lord lieutenant shall call the stratiots\nto the urns, where they that draw the silver balls shall return to\ntheir places, and they that draw the gold balls shall fall off to the\npavilion, where, for the space of one hour, they may chop and change\ntheir balls according as one can agree with another, whose lot he likes\nbetter.\n\n\u201cBut the hour being out, the conductor separating them whose gold balls\nhave no letter from those whose balls are marked, shall cause the crier\nto call the alphabet, as first A; whereupon all they whose gold balls\nare not marked, and whose surnames begin with the letter A, shall repair\nto a clerk appertaining to the custos rotulorum, who shall first take\nthe names of that letter; then those of B, and so on, till all the names\nbe alphabetically enrolled. And the youth of this list being 600 foot\nin a tribe, that is, 30,000 foot in all the tribes; and 200 horse in a\ntribe, that is, 10,000 horse in all the tribes, are the second essay of\nthe stratiots, and the standing army of this commonwealth to be always\nready upon command to march. They whose balls are marked with M,\namounting, by twenty horse and fifty foot in a tribe, to 2,500 foot and\n500 horse in all the tribes, and they whose balls are marked with P, in\nevery point correspondent, are parts of the third essay; they in M being\nstraight to march for Marpesia, and they of P for Panopea, to the ends\nand according to the further directions following in the order for the\nprovincial orbs.\n\n\u201cIf the polemarchs or field officers be elected by the scrutiny of the\nCouncil of War, and the strategus commanded by the Parliament or the\nDictator to march, the lord lieutenants (who have power to muster and\ndiscipline the youth so often as they receive orders for the same from\nthe Council of War) are to deliver the second essay, or so many of them\nas shall be commanded, to the conductors, who shall present them to the\nlord strategus at the time and place appointed by his Excellency to be\nthe general rendezvous of Oceana, where the Council of War shall have\nthe accommodation of horses and arms for his men in readiness; and the\nlord strategus having armed, mounted, and distributed them, whether\naccording to the recommendation of their prize arms, or otherwise,\nshall lead them away to his shipping, being also ready and provided with\nvictuals, ammunition, artillery, and all other necessaries; commanding\nthem, and disposing of the whole conduct of the war by his sole power\nand authority. And this is the third essay of the stratiots, which being\nshipped, or marched out of their tribes, the lord lieutenants shall\nre-elect the second essay out of the remaining part of the first, and\nthe Senate another strategus.\n\n\u201cIf any veteran or veterans of this nation, the term of whose youth or\nmilitia is expired, having a desire to be entertained in the further\nservice of the commonwealth, shall present him or themselves at the\nrendezvous of Oceana to the strategus, it is in his power to take on\nsuch and so many of them as shall be agreed by the polemarchs, and to\nsend back an equal number of the stratiots.\n\n\u201cAnd for the better managing of the proper forces of this nation, the\nlord strategus, by appointment of the Council of War, and out of such\nlevies as they shall have made in either or both of the provinces to\nthat end, shall receive auxiliaries by sea or elsewhere at some certain\nplace, not exceeding his proper arms in number.\n\n\u201cAnd whosoever shall refuse any one of his three essays, except upon\ncause shown, he be dispensed withal by the phylarch, or, if the phylarch\nbe not assembled, by the censors of his tribe, shall be deemed a helot\nor public servant, shall pay a fifth part of his yearly revenue,\nbesides all other taxes, to the commonwealth for his protection, and be\nincapable of bearing any magistracy except such as is proper to the law.\nNevertheless if a man has but two sons, the lord lieutenant shall not\nsuffer above one of them to come to the Urn at one election of the\nsecond essay, and though he has above two sons, there shall not come\nabove half the brothers at one election; and if a man has but one son,\nhe shall not come to the urn at all without the consent of his parents,\nor his guardians, nor shall it be any reproach to him or impediment to\nhis bearing of magistracy.\u201d\n\nThis order, with relation to foreign expeditions, will be proved and\nexplained together with--\n\nThe twenty-seventh order, \u201cProviding, in case of invasion apprehended,\nthat the lords high sheriffs of the tribes, upon commands received from\nthe Parliament or the Dictator, distribute the bands of the elders into\ndivisions, after the nature of the essays of the youth; and that the\nsecond division or essay of the elders, being made and consisting of\n30,000 foot and 10,000 horse, be ready to march with the second essay of\nthe youth, and be brought also by the conductors to the strategus.\n\n\u201cThe second essay of the elders and youth being marched out of their\ntribes, the lords high sheriffs and lieutenants shall have the remaining\npart of the annual bands both of elders and youth in readiness, which,\nif the beacons be fired, shall march to the rendezvous to be in that\ncase appointed by the Parliament or the Dictator: And the beacons being\nfired, the curiata comitia, or parochial congregations, shall elect a\nfourth both of elders and youth to be immediately upon the guard of the\ntribes, and dividing themselves as aforesaid, to march also in their\ndivisions according to orders, which method in case of extremity shall\nproceed to the election of a third, or the levy of a second, or of the\nlast man in the nation, by the power of the lords high sheriffs, to the\nend that the commonwealth in her utmost pressure may show her trust that\nGod in his justice will remember mercy, by humbling herself, and yet\npreserving her courage, discipline, and constancy, even to the last drop\nof her blood and the utmost farthing.\n\n\u201cThe services performed by the youth, or by the elders, in case of\ninvasion, and according to this order, shall be at their proper cost and\ncharges that are any ways able to endure it; but if there be such as are\nknown in their parishes to be so indigent that they cannot march out of\ntheir tribes, nor undergo the burden in this case incumbent, then the\ncongregations of their parishes shall furnish them with sufficient sums\nof money to be repaid upon the certificate of the same by the Parliament\nwhen the action shall be over. And of that which is respectively\nenjoined by this order, any tribe, parish, magistrate, or person that\nshall fail, is to answer for it, at the Council of War, as a deserter of\nhis country.\u201d\n\nThe Archon, being the greatest captain of his own, if not of any age,\nadded much to the glory of this commonwealth, by interweaving the\nmilitia with more art and lustre than any legislator from or before the\ntime of Servius Tullius, who constituted the Roman militia. But as the\nbones or skeleton of a man, though the greatest part of his beauty be\ncontained in their proportion or symmetry, yet shown without flesh are a\nspectacle that is rather horrid than entertaining, so without discourses\nare the orders of a commonwealth; which, if she goes forth in that\nmanner, may complain of her friends that they stand mute and staring\nupon her. Wherefore this order was thus fleshed by the Lord Archon:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS:\n\n\u201cDiogenes seeing a young fellow drunk, told him that his father was\ndrunk when he begot him. For this, in natural generation, I must confess\nI see no reason; but in the political it is right. The vices of the\npeople are from their governors; those of their governors from\ntheir laws or orders; and those of their laws or orders from their\nlegislators. Whatever was in the womb imperfect, as to her proper work,\ncomes very rarely or never at all to perfection afterward; and the\nformation of a citizen in the womb of the commonwealth is his education.\n\n\u201cEducation by the first of the foregoing orders is of six kinds: at the\nschool, in the mechanics, at the universities, at the inns of court or\nchancery, in travels, and in military discipline, some of which I shall\nbut touch, and some I shall handle more at large.\n\n\u201cThat which is proposed for the erecting and endowing of schools\nthroughout the tribes, capable of all the children of the same, and able\nto give to the poor the education of theirs gratis, is only matter of\ndirection in case of very great charity, as easing the needy of the\ncharge of their children from the ninth to the fifteenth year of their\nage, during which time their work cannot be profitable; and restoring\nthem when they may be of use, furnished with tools whereof there are\nadvantages to be made in every work, seeing he that can read and use his\npen has some convenience by it in the meanest vocation. And it cannot\nbe conceived but that which comes, though in small parcels, to the\nadvantage of every man in his vocation, must amount to the advantage of\nevery vocation, and so to that of the whole commonwealth. Wherefore this\nis commended to the charity of every wise-hearted and well-minded man,\nto be done in time, and as God shall stir him up or enable him; there\nbeing such provision already in the case as may give us leave to proceed\nwithout obstruction.\n\n\u201cParents, under animadversion of the censors, are to dispose of their\nchildren at the fifteenth year of their age to something; but what, is\nleft, according to their abilities or inclination, at their own choice.\nThis, with the multitude, must be to the mechanics, that is to say to\nagriculture or husbandry, to manufactures, or to merchandise.\n\n\u201cAgriculture is the bread of the nation; we are hung upon it by the\nteeth; it is a mighty nursery of strength, the best army, and the most\nassured knapsack; it is managed with the least turbulent or ambitious,\nand the most innocent hands of all other arts. Wherefore I am of\nAristotle\u2019s opinion, that a commonwealth of husbandmen--and such is\nours--must be the best of all others. Certainly my lords, you have no\nmeasure of what ought to be, but what can be, done for the encouragement\nof this profession. I could wish I were husband good enough to direct\nsomething to this end; but racking of rents is a vile thing in the\nricher sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of\nslavery, and nips your commonwealth in the fairest blossom. On the other\nside, if there should be too much ease given in this kind, it would\noccasion sloth, and so destroy industry, the principal nerve of a\ncommonwealth. But if aught might be done to hold the balance even\nbetween these two, it would be a work in this nation equal to that for\nwhich Fabius was surnamed Maximus by the Romans.\n\n\u201cIn manufactures and merchandise the Hollander has gotten the start of\nus; but at the long run it will be found that a people working upon a\nforeign commodity does but farm the manufacture, and that it is really\nentailed upon them only where the growth of it is native; as also that\nit is one thing to have the carriage of other men\u2019s goods, and another\nfor a man to bring his own to the best market. Wherefore (nature having\nprovided encouragement for these arts in this nation above all others,\nwhere, the people growing, they of necessity must also increase) it\ncannot but establish them upon a far more sure and effectual foundation\nthan that of the Hollanders. But these educations are in order to\nthe first things or necessities of nature; as husbandry to the food,\nmanufacture to the clothing, and merchandise to the purse of the\ncommonwealth.\n\n\u201cThere be other things in nature, which being second as to their order,\nfor their dignity and value are first; and such to which the other\nare but accommodations; of this sort are especially these: religion,\njustice, courage, and wisdom.\n\n\u201cThe education that answers to religion in our government is that of the\nuniversities. Moses, the divine legislator, was not only skilful in\nall the learning of the Egyptians, but took also into the fabric of his\ncommonwealth the learning of the Midianites in the advice of Jethro; and\nhis foundation of a university laid in the tabernacle, and finished in\nthe Temple, became that pinnacle from whence (according to many Jewish\nand Christian authors) all the learning in the world has taken wing; as\nthe philosophy of the Stoics from the Pharisees; that of the Epicureans\nfrom the Sadducees; and from the learning of the Jews, so often quoted\nby our Saviour, and fulfilled in him, the Christian religion. Athens\nwas the most famous university in her days; and her senators, that is to\nsay, the Areopagites, were all philosophers. Lacedaemon, to speak truth,\nthough she could write and read, was not very bookish. But he that\ndisputes hence against universities, disputes by the same argument\nagainst agriculture, manufacture, and merchandise; every one of these\nhaving been equally forbid by Lycurgus, not for itself (for if he had\nnot been learned in all the learning of Crete, and well travelled in the\nknowledge of other governments, he had never made his commonwealth),\nbut for the diversion which they must have given his citizens from their\narms, who, being but few, if they had minded anything else, must have\ndeserted the commonwealth. For Rome, she had ingenium par ingenio, was\nas learned as great, and held our College of Augurs in much reverence.\nVenice has taken her religion upon trust. Holland cannot attend it to\nbe very studious. Nor does Switzerland mind it much; yet are they all\naddicted to their universities. We cut down trees to build houses; but\nI would have somebody show me, by what reason or experience the cutting\ndown of a university should tend to the setting up of a commonwealth.\nOf this I am sure, that the perfection of a commonwealth is not to be\nattained without the knowledge of ancient prudence, nor the knowledge of\nancient prudence without learning, nor learning without schools of good\nliterature, and these are such as we call universities.\n\n\u201cNow though mere university learning of itself be that which (to speak\nthe words of Verulamius) \u2018crafty men contemn, and simple men only\nadmire, yet is it such as wise men have use of; for studies do not\nteach their own use, but that is a wisdom without and above them, won by\nobservation. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge, of particulars\none by one; but the general councils and the plots, and the marshalling\nof affairs, come best from those that are learned.\u2019 Wherefore if you\nwould have your children to be statesmen, let them drink by all means of\nthese fountains, where perhaps there were never any. But what though the\nwater a man drinks be not nourishment, it is the vehicle without which\nhe cannot be nourished.\n\n\u201cNor is religion less concerned in this point than government: for\ntake away your universities, and in a few years you lose it. \u201cThe holy\nScriptures are written in Hebrew and Greek; they that have neither of\nthese languages may think light of both; but find me a man that has one\nin perfection, the study of whose whole life it has not been. Again,\nthis is apparent to us in daily conversation, that if four or five\npersons that have lived together be talking, another speaking the same\nlanguage may come in, and yet understand very little of their discourse,\nin that it relates to circumstances, persons, things, times and places\nwhich he knows not. It is no otherwise with a man, having no insight\nof the times in which they were written, and the circumstances to which\nthey relate, in the reading of ancient books, whether they be divine or\nhuman. For example, when we fall upon the discourse about baptism and\nregeneration that was between our Saviour and Nicodemus, where Christ\nreproaches him with his ignorance in this matter. \u2018Art thou a doctor in\nIsrael, and understandest not these things?\u2019 What shall we think of it?\nor wherefore should a doctor in Israel have understood these things more\nthan another, but that both baptism and regeneration, as was showed at\nlarge by my Lord Phosphorus, were doctrines held in Israel? I instance\nin one place of a hundred, which he, that has not mastered the\ncircumstances to which they relate, cannot understand. Wherefore to\nthe understanding of the Scripture, it is necessary to have ancient\nlanguages, and the knowledge of ancient times, or the aid of them who\nhave such knowledge; and to have such as may be always able and ready to\ngive such aid (unless you would borrow it of another nation, which would\nnot only be base, but deceitful) it is necessary to a commonwealth that\nshe have schools of good literature, or universities of her own.\n\n\u201cWe are commanded, as has been said more than once, to search the\nScriptures; and which of them search the Scriptures, they that take\nthis pains in ancient languages and learning, or they that will not,\nbut trust to translations only, and to words as they sound to present\ncircumstances? than which nothing is more fallible, or certain to lose\nthe true sense of Scriptures, pretended to be above human understanding,\nfor no other cause than that they are below it. But in searching\nthe Scriptures by the proper use of our universities, we have been\nheretofore blest with greater victories and trophies against the purple\nhosts and golden standards of the Romish hierarchy than any nation; and\ntherefore why we should relinquish this upon the presumption of some,\nthat because there is a greater light which they have, I do not know.\nThere is a greater light than the sun, but it does not extinguish the\nsun, nor does any light of God\u2019s giving extinguish that of nature,\nbut increase and sanctify it. Wherefore, neither the honor bore by the\nIsraelitish, Roman, or any other commonwealth that I have shown,\nto their ecclesiastics, consisted in being governed by them, but in\nconsulting them in matters of religion, upon whose responses or oracles\nthey did afterward as they thought fit.\n\n\u201cNor would I be here mistaken, as if, by affirming the universities to\nbe, in order both to religion and government, of absolute necessity, I\ndeclared them or the ministry in any wise fit to be trusted, so far\nas to exercise any power not derived from the civil magistrate in the\nadministration of either, if the Jewish religion were directed and\nestablished by Moses, it was directed and established by the civil\nmagistrate; or if Moses exercised this administration as a prophet, the\nsame prophet did invest with the same administration the Sanhedrim, and\nnot the priests; and so does our commonwealth the Senate, and not the\nclergy. They who had the supreme administration or government of\nthe national religion in Athens, were the first Archon, the rex\nsacrificulus, or high-priest, and a polemarch, which magistrates\nwere ordained or elected by the holding up of hands in the church,\ncongregation, or comitia of the people. The religion of Lacedaemon was\ngoverned by the kings, who were also high-priests, and officiated at the\nsacrifice; these had power to substitute their pythii, ambassadors,\nor nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the Senate, they\nheld intelligence with the oracle of Apollo at Delphos. And the\necclesiastical part of the Commonwealth of Rome was governed by the\npontifex maximus, the rex sacrificulus, and the Flamens, all ordained\nor elected by the people, the pontifex by the tribes, the King by the\ncenturies, and the Flamens by the parishes.\n\n\u201cI do not mind you of these things, as if, for the matter, there were\nany parallel to be drawn out of their superstitions to our religion,\nbut to show that for the manner, ancient prudence is as well a rule in\ndivine as human things; nay, and such a one as the apostles themselves,\nordaining elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation, have\nexactly followed; for some of the congregations where they thus ordained\nelders were those of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, the countries of\nLycaona, Pisidia, Pamphilia, Perga, with Attalia. Now that these cities\nand countries, when the Romans propagated their empire into Asia, were\nfound most of them commonwealths, and that many of the rest were endued\nwith like power, so that the people living under the protection of the\nRoman emperors continued to elect their own magistrates, is so known\na thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the\nuniversal proof of these examples, will have ecclesiastical government\nto be necessarily distinct from civil power, when the right of the\nelders ordained by the holding up of hands in every congregation to\nteach the people, was plainly derived from the same civil power by which\nthey ordained the rest of their magistrates. And it is not otherwise in\nour commonwealth, where the parochial congregation elects or ordains its\npastor. To object the Commonwealth of Venice in this place, were to show\nus that it has been no otherwise but where the civil power has lost the\nliberty of her conscience by embracing popery; as also that to take away\nthe liberty of conscience in this administration from the civil power,\nwere a proceeding which has no other precedent than such as is popish.\n\n\u201cWherefore your religion is settled after the following manner: the\nuniversities are the seminaries of that part which is national, by which\nmeans others with all safety may be permitted to follow the liberty of\ntheir own consciences, in regard that, however they behave themselves,\nthe ignorance of the unlearned in this case cannot lose your religion\nnor disturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do;\nand the universities with their emoluments, as also the benefices of\nthe whole nation, are to be improved by such augmentations as may make\na very decent and comfortable subsistence for the ministry, which is\nneither to be allowed synods nor assemblies, except upon the occasion\nshown in the universities, when they are consulted by the Council\nof State, and suffered to meddle with affairs of religion, nor to be\ncapable of any other public preferment whatsoever; by which means the\ninterest of the learned can never come to corrupt your religion, nor\ndisturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do.\nVenice, though she does not see, or cannot help the corruption of her\nreligion, is yet so circumspect to avoid disturbance of her government\nin this kind, that her Council proceeds not to election of magistrates\ntill it be proclaimed fora papalini, by which words such as have\nconsanguinity with red hats, or relation to the Court of Rome, are\nwarned to withdraw.\n\n\u201cIf a minister in Holland meddles with matter of state, the magistrate\nsends him a pair of shoes; whereupon, if he does not go, he is driven\naway from his charge. I wonder why ministers, of all men, should be\nperpetually tampering with government; first because they, as well as\nothers, have it in express charge to submit themselves to the ordinances\nof men; and secondly because these ordinances of men must go upon such\npolitical principles as they of all others, by anything that can be\nfound in their writings or actions, least understand: whence you have\nthe suffrage of all nations to this sense, that an ounce of wisdom is\nworth a pound of clergy. Your greatest clerks are not your wisest men:\nand when some foul absurdity in state is committed, it is common\nwith the French, and even the Italians, to call it \u2018pas de clerc,\u2019\nor \u2018governo de prete.\u2019 They may bear with men that will be preaching\nwithout study, while they will be governing without prudence. My lords,\nif you know not how to rule your clergy, you will most certainly, like\na man that cannot rule his wife, have neither quiet at home nor honor\nabroad. Their honest vocation is to teach your children at the schools\nand the universities, and the people in the parishes, and yours is\nconcerned to see that they do not play the shrews, of which parts\ndoes consist the education of your commonwealth, so far as it regards\nreligion.\n\n\u201cTo justice, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the\neducation of the inns of court and chancery. Upon which to philosophize,\nrequires a public kind of learning that I have not. But they who take\nupon them any profession proper to the educations mentioned--that is,\ntheology, physic, or law--are not at leisure for the essays.\nWherefore the essays, being degrees whereby the youth commence for all\nmagistracies, offices, and honors in the parish, hundred, tribe, Senate,\nor prerogative; divines, physicians, and lawyers not taking these\ndegrees, exclude themselves from all such magistracies, offices, and\nhonors. And whereas lawyers are likest to exact further reason for\nthis, they (growing up from the most gainful art at the bar to those\nmagistracies upon the bench which are continually appropriated to\nthemselves, and not only endowed with the greatest revenues, but also\nheld for life) have the least reason of all the rest to pretend to\nany other, especially in an equal commonwealth, where accumulation of\nmagistracy or to take a person engaged by his profit to the laws, as\nthey stand, into the power, which is legislative, and which should keep\nthem to what they were, or ought to he, were a solecism in prudence.\nIt is true that the legislative power may have need of advice and\nassistance from the executive magistracy, or such as are learned in\nthe law; for which cause the judges are, as they have heretofore been,\nassistants in the Senate. Nor, however it came about, can I see any\nreason why a judge, being but an assistant or lawyer, should be member\nof a legislative council.\n\n\u201cI deny not that the Roman patricians were all patrons, and that the\nwhole people were clients, some to one family and some to another,\nby which means they had their causes pleaded and defended in some\nappearance gratis; for the patron took no money, though if he had a\ndaughter to marry, his clients were to pay her portion, nor was this so\ngreat a grievance. But if the client accused his patron, gave testimony\nor suffrage against him, it was a crime of such a nature that any man\nmight lawfully kill him as a traitor; and this, as being the nerve of\nthe optimacy, was a great cause of ruin to that commonwealth; for\nwhen the people would carry anything that pleased not the Senate, the\nsenators were ill provided if they could not intercede-that is, oppose\nit by their clients; with whom, to vote otherwise than they pleased,\nwas the highest crime. The observation of this bond till the time of the\nGracchi--that is to say, till it was too late, or to no purpose to break\nit--was the cause why, in all the former heats and disputes that had\nhappened between the Senate and the people, it never came to blows,\nwhich indeed was good; but withal, the people could have no remedy,\nwhich was certainly evil. Wherefore I am of opinion that a senator\nought not to be a patron or advocate, nor a patron or advocate to be a\nsenator; for if his practice be gratis it debauches the people, and if\nit be mercenary it debauches himself: take it which way you will, when\nhe should be making of laws, he will be knitting of nets.\n\n\u201cLycurgus, as I said, by being a traveller became a legislator, but in\ntimes when prudence was another thing. Nevertheless we may not shut\nout this part of education in a commonwealth, which will be herself\na traveller; for those of this make have seen the world, especially\nbecause this is certain (though it be not regarded in our times, when\nthings being left to take their chance, it fares with us accordingly)\nthat no man can be a politician except he be first a historian or a\ntraveller; for except he can see what must be, or what may be, he is no\npolitician. Now if he has no knowledge in history he cannot tell what\nhas been, and if he has not been a traveller, he cannot tell what is;\nbut he that neither knows what has been, nor what is, can never tell\nwhat must be, or what may be. Furthermore, the embassies-in-ordinary by\nour constitution are the prizes of young men, more especially such as\nhave been travellers. Wherefore they of these inclinations, having leave\nof the censors, owe them an account of their time, and cannot choose but\nlay it out with some ambition of praise or reward, where both are open,\nwhence you will have eyes abroad, and better choice of public ministers,\nyour gallants showing themselves not more to the ladies at their balls\nthan to your commonwealth at her Academy when they return from their\ntravels.\n\n\u201cBut this commonwealth being constituted more especially of two\nelements, arms and councils, drives by a natural instinct at courage and\nwisdom; which he who has attained is arrived at the perfection of human\nnature. It is true that these virtues must have some natural root in him\nthat is capable of them; but this amounts not to so great a matter\nas some will have it. For if poverty makes an industrious, a moderate\nestate a temperate, and a lavish fortune a wanton man, and this be\nthe common course of things, wisdom then is rather of necessity than\ninclination. And that an army which was meditating upon flight, has been\nbrought by despair to win the field, is so far from being strange,\nthat like causes will evermore produce like effects. Wherefore this\ncommonwealth drives her citizens like wedges; there is no way with them\nbut thorough, nor end but that glory whereof man is capable by art or\nnature. That the genius of the Roman families commonly preserved itself\nthroughout the line (as to instance in some, the Manlii were still\nsevere, the Publicolae lovers, and the Appii haters of the people) is\nattributed by Machiavel to their education; nor, if interest might add\nto the reason why the genius of a patrician was one thing, and that of\na plebeian another, is the like so apparent between different nations,\nwho, according to their different educations, have yet as different\nmanners. It was anciently noted, and long confirmed by the actions of\nthe French, that in their first assaults their courage was more\nthan that of men, and for the rest less than that of women, which\nnevertheless, through the amendment of their discipline, we see now to\nbe otherwise. I will not say but that some man or nation upon an equal\nimprovement of this kind may be lighter than some other; but certainly\neducation is the scale without which no man or nation can truly know\nhis or her own weight or value. By our histories we can tell when one\nMarpesian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Oceaner would\nhave beaten ten Marpesians. Marc Antony was a Roman, but how did that\nappear in the embraces of Cleopatra? You must have some other education\nfor your youth, or they, like that passage, will show better in romance\nthan true story.\n\n\u201cThe custom of the Commonwealth of Rome in distributing her magistracies\nwithout respect of age, happened to do well in Corvinus and Scipio; for\nwhich cause Machiavel (with whom that which was done by Rome, and that\nwhich is well done, are for the most part all one) commends this course.\nYet how much it did worse at other times, is obvious in Pompey and\nCaesar, examples by which Boccalini illustrates the prudence of Venice\nin her contrary practice, affirming it to have been no small step to the\nruin of the Roman liberty, that these (having tasted in their youth\nof the supreme honors) had no greater in their age to hope for, but by\nperpetuating of the same in themselves; which came to blood and ended in\ntyranny. The opinion of Verulamius is safe: \u2018The errors,\u2019 says he, \u2018of\nyoung men are the ruin of business; whereas the errors of old men amount\nbut to this, that more might have been done, or sooner.\u2019 But though\ntheir wisdom be little, their courage is great; wherefore (to come to\nthe main education of this commonwealth) the militia of Oceana is the\nprovince of youth.\n\n\u201cThe distribution of this province by the essays is so fully described\nin the order, that I need repeat nothing; the order itself being but a\nrepetition or copy of that original, which in ancient prudence is of all\nothers the fairest, as that from whence the Commonwealth of Rome more\nparticularly derived the empire of the world. And there is much more\nreason in this age, when governments are universally broken, or swerved\nfrom their foundations, and the people groan under tyranny, that the\nsame causes (which could not be withstood when the world was full of\npopular governments) should have the like effects.\n\n\u201cThe causes in the Commonwealth of Rome, whereof the empire of the\nworld was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay, I may safely say a\nnecessary) consequence, are contained in that part of her discipline\nwhich was domestic, and in that which she exercises in her provinces or\nconquest. Of the latter I shall have better occasion to speak when we\ncome to our provincial orbs; the former divided the whole people by\ntribes, amounting, as Livy and Cicero show, at their full growth to\nthirty-five, and every tribe by the sense or valuation of estates into\nfive classes: for the sixth being proletary, that is the nursery, or\nsuch as through their poverty contributed nothing to the commonwealth\nbut children, was not reckoned nor used in arms. And this is the first\npoint of the militia, in which modern prudence is quite contrary to the\nancient; for whereas we, excusing the rich and arming the poor, become\nthe vassals of our servants, they, by excusing the poor and arming\nsuch as were rich enough to be freemen, became lords of the earth. The\nnobility and gentry of this nation, who understand so little what it is\nto be the lords of the earth that they have not been able to keep their\nown lands, will think it a strange education for their children to be\ncommon soldiers, and obliged to all the duties of arms; nevertheless it\nis not for four shillings a week, but to be capable of being the best\nman in the field or in the city the latter part of which consideration\nmakes the common soldier herein a better man than the general of any\nmonarchical army.\n\n\u201cAnd whereas it may be thought that this would drink deep of noble\nblood, I dare boldly say, take the Roman nobility in the heat of their\nfiercest wars, and you shall not find such a shambles of them as has\nbeen made of ours by mere luxury and slothfulness; which, killing the\nbody, kill the soul also: Animasque in vulnere ponunt. Whereas common\nright is that which he who stands in the vindication of, has used that\nsword of justice for which he receives the purple of magistracy. The\nglory of a man on earth can go no higher, and if he falls he rises\nagain, and comes sooner to that reward which is so much higher as heaven\nis above the earth. To return to the Roman example: every class was\ndivided, as has been more than once shown, into centuries, and every\ncentury was equally divided into youth and elders; the youth for foreign\nservice, and the elders for the guard of the territory. In the first\nclass were about eighteen centuries of horse, being those which, by\nthe institution of Servius, were first called to the suffrage in the\ncenturial assemblies. But the delectus, or levy of an army, which is the\npresent business, proceeded, according to Polybius, in this manner:\n\n\u201cUpon a war decreed, the Consuls elected four-and-twenty military\ntribunes or colonels, whereof ten, being such as had merited their tenth\nstipend, were younger officers. The tribunes being chosen, the Consuls\nappointed a day to the tribes, when those in them of military age were\nto appear at the capitol. The day being come, and the youth assembled\naccordingly, the Consuls ascended their tribunal, and the younger\ntribunes were straight divided into four parts after this manner: four\nwere assigned to the first legion (a legion at the most consisted of\n6,000 foot and 300 horse), three to the second, four to the third, and\nthree to the fourth. The younger tribunes being thus distributed, two of\nthe elder were assigned to the first legion, three to the second, two to\nthe third, and three to the fourth; and the officers of each legion thus\nassigned, having drawn the tribes by lot, and being seated according to\ntheir divisions at a convenient distance from each other, the tribe of\nthe first lot was called, whereupon they that were of it knowing the\nbusiness, and being prepared, presently bolted out four of their number,\nin the choice whereof such care was taken that they offered none that\nwas not a citizen, no citizen that was not of the youth, no youth that\nwas not of some one of the five classes, nor any one of the five classes\nthat was not expert at his exercises. Moreover, they used such diligence\nin matching them for age and stature, that the officers of the legion,\nexcept they happened to be acquainted with the youth so bolted, were\nforced to put themselves upon fortune, while they of the first legion\nchose one, they of the second the next, they of the third another and\nthe fourth youth fell to the last legion; and thus was the election (the\nlegions and the tribes varying according to their lots) carried on till\nthe foot were complete.\n\n\u201cThe like course with little alteration was taken by the horse officers\ntill the horse also were complete. This was called giving of names,\nwhich the children of Israel did also by lot; and if any man refused to\ngive his name, he was sold for a slave, or his estate confiscated to the\ncommonwealth. \u2018When Marcus Curius the Consul was forced to make a sudden\nlevy, and none of the youth would give in their names, all the tribes\nbeing put to the lot, he commanded the first name drawn out of the urn\nof the Pollian tribe (which happened to come first) to be called; but\nthe youth not answering, he ordered his goods to be sold; which was\nconformable to the law in Israel, according to which Saul took a yoke\nof oxen, and hewed them in pieces, and sent them throughout the tribes,\nsaying, \u2018Whosoever comes not forth to battle after Saul and Samuel, so\nshall it be done to his oxen.\u2019 By which you may observe also that they\nwho had no cattle were not of the militia in Israel. But the age of\nthe Roman youth by the Tullian law determined at thirty; and by the law\n(though it should seem by Machiavel and others that this was not\nwell observed) a man could not stand for magistracy till he was miles\nemeritus, or had fulfilled the full term of his militia, which was\ncomplete in his tenth stipend or service, nor was he afterward obliged\nunder any penalty to give his name, except the commonwealth were\ninvaded, in which case the elders were as well obliged as the youth. The\nConsul might also levy milites evocatos, or soldiers, commanded men\nout of such as had served their turn, and this at his discretion. The\nlegions being thus complete, were divided by two to each consul, and\nin these no man had right to serve but a Roman citizen; now because two\nlegions made but a small army, the Romans added to every one of their\narms an equal number of foot, and a double number of horse levied among\ntheir Latin or Italian associates; so a consular army, with the legions\nand auxiliaries, amounted to about 30,000, and whereas they commonly\nlevied two such armies together, these being joined made about 60,000.\n\n\u201cThe steps whereby our militia follows the greatest captain, are the\nthree essays; the first, elected by a fifth man in the parishes,\nand amounting in the whole to 100,000, choose their officers at the\nhundreds, where they fall also to their games or exercises, invited by\nhandsome prizes, such as for themselves and the honor of them will be\ncoveted, such as will render the hundred a place of sports, and exercise\nof arms all the year long, such as in the space of ten years will equip\n30,000 men horse and foot, with such arms for their forge, proof, and\nbeauty, as (notwithstanding the argyraspides, or silver shields of\nAlexander\u2019s guards) were never worn by so many, such as will present\nmarks of virtue and direction to your general or strategus in the\ndistribution of his army, which doubles the value of them to the\nproprietors, who are bound to wear them, and eases the commonwealth of\nso much charge, so many being armed already.\n\n\u201cBut here will be the objection now. How shall such a revenue be\ncompassed? Fifty pounds a year in every hundred is a great deal, not so\neasily raised; men will not part with their money, nor would the sum,\nas it is proposed by the order of Pompey, rise in many years. These\nare difficulties that fit our genius exactly, and yet \u00a31,000 in each\nhundred, once levied, establishes the revenue forever. Now the hundreds\none with another are worth \u00a310,000 a year dry-rent, over and above\npersonal estates, which bring it to twice the value, so that a twentieth\npart of one year\u2019s revenue of the hundred does it, if you cannot afford\nthis while you pay taxes, though from henceforth they will be but small\nones, do it when you pay none, if it be then too much for one year, do\nit in two; if it be too much for two years, do it in four. What husbands\nhave we hitherto been? what is become of greater sums? My lords, if you\nshould thus cast your bread upon the waters, after many days you shall\nfind it; stand not huckling when you are offered corn and your money\nagain in the mouth of the sack.\n\n\u201cBut to proceed: the first essay being officered at the hundreds, and\nmustered at the tribes (where they are entertained with other sports,\nwhich will be very fine ones), proceeds to the election of the second\nessay, or standing army of this nation, consisting of 30,000 foot and\n10,000 horse; and these, upon a war decreed, being delivered at the\nrendezvous of Oceana to the strategus, are the third essay, which\nanswers to the Roman legions. But you may observe, that whereas the\nconsuls elected the military tribunes, and raised commanded men out of\nthe veterans at their own discretion, our polemarchs, or field officers,\nare elected by the scrutiny of the Council of War, and our veterans\nnot otherwise taken on than as volunteers, and with the consent of the\npolemarchs, which may serve for the removal of certain scruples which\nmight otherwise be incident in this place, though without encouragement\nby the Roman way of proceeding, much less by that which is proposed.\nBut whereas the Roman legions in all amounted not in one army to above\n30,000 men, or little more, you have here 40,000; and whereas they\nadded auxiliaries, it is in this regard that Marpesia will be a greater\nrevenue to you than if you had the Indies; for whereas heretofore she\nhas yielded you nothing but her native thistles, in ploughing out the\nrankness of her aristocracy by your agrarian, you will find her an\ninexhaustible magazine of men, and to her own advantage, who will make a\nfar better account by the arms than by the pins of Poland. Wherefore as\na consular army consisted of about an equal number of auxiliaries added\nto their legions by their Latin or Italian associates, you may add to a\nparliamentary army an equal number of Marpesians or Panopeans, as\nthat colony shall hereafter be able to supply you, by which means the\ncommonwealth will be able to go forth to battle with 80,000 men.\n\n\u201cTo make wars with small forces is no husbandry, but a waste, a disease,\na lingering and painful consumption of men and money the Romans making\ntheirs thick, made them short, and had little regard to money, as that\nwhich they who have men enough can command where it is fittest that it\nshould be levied. All the ancient monarchies by this means got on wing,\nand attained to vast riches. Whereas your modern princes being dear\npurchasers of small parcels, have but empty pockets. But it may be some\nwill accuse the order of rashness, in that it commits the sole conduct\nof the war to the general; and the custom of Venice by her proveditori,\nor checks upon her commanders-in-chief, may seem to be of greater\nprudence; but in this part of our government neither Venice nor any\nnation that makes use of mercenary forces is for our instruction. A\nmercenary army, with a standing general, is like the fatal sister that\nspins; but proper forces, with an annual magistrate, are like her that\ncuts the thread. Their interests are quite contrary, and yet you have a\nbetter proveditor than the Venetian, another strategus sitting with an\narmy standing by him; whereupon that which is marching, if there were\nany probability it should, would find as little possibility that it\ncould recoil, as a foreign enemy to invade you. These things considered,\na war will appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other\nreckonings, inasmuch as of this you must never look to have a good\naccount if you be strict in imposing checks. Let a council of huntsmen,\nassembled beforehand, tell you which way the stag shall run, where you\nshall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the\nchase all the day; but these may as well do that, as a council of war\ndirect a general. The hours that have painted wings, and of different\ncolors, are his council; he must be like the eye that makes not the\nscene, but has it so soon as it changes. That in many counsellors there\nis strength, is spoken of civil administrations; as to those that are\nmilitary, there is nothing more certain than that in many counsellors\nthere is weakness. Joint commissions in military affairs, are like\nhunting your hounds in their couples. In the Attic War Cleomenes and\nDemaratus, Kings of Lacedaemon, being thus coupled, tugged one against\nanother; and while they should have joined against the Persian, were the\ncause of the common calamity, whereupon that commonwealth took better\ncounsel, and made a law whereby from henceforth there went at once but\none of her kings to battle.\n\n\u201c\u2018The Fidenati being in rebellion, and having slain the colony of the\nRomans, four tribunes with consular power were created by the people of\nRome, whereof one being left for the guard of the city, the other three\nwere sent against the Fidenati, who, through the division that happened\namong them, brought nothing home but dishonor, whereupon the Romans\ncreated the Dictator, and Livy gives his judgment in these words: \u201cThe\nthree tribunes with consular power were a lesson how useless in war\nis the joint command of several generals; for each following his own\ncounsels, while they all differed in their opinions, gave by this\nopportunity an advantage to the enemy.\u201d When the consuls Quintus and\nAgrippa were sent against the AEqui, Agrippa for this reason refused\nto go with his colleague, saying: \u201cThat in the administration of great\nactions it was most safe that the chief command should be lodged in one\nperson.\u201d And if the ruin of modern armies were well considered, most of\nit would be found to have fallen upon this point, it being in this case\nfar safer to trust to any one man of common prudence, than to any two or\nmore together of the greatest parts.\u2019 The consuls indeed, being equal in\npower, while one was present with the Senate, and the other in the field\nwith the army, made a good balance; and this with us is exactly followed\nby the election of a new strategus upon the march of the old one.\n\n\u201cThe seven-and-twentieth order, whereby the elders in case of invasion\nare obliged to equal duty with the youth, and each upon their own\ncharge, is suitable to reason (for every man defends his own estate) and\nto our copy, as in the war with the Samnites and Tuscans. \u2018The Senate\nordered a vacation to be proclaimed, and a levy to be made of all sorts\nof persons, and not only the freemen and youths were listed, but cohorts\nof the old men were likewise formed.\u2019 This nation of all others is the\nleast obnoxious to invasion. Oceana, says a French politician, is\na beast that cannot be devoured but by herself. Nevertheless, that\ngovernment is not perfect which is not provided at all points; and in\nthis (ad triarios res rediit) the elders being such as in a martial\nstate must be veterans, the commonwealth invaded gathers strength like\nAntaeus by her fall, while the whole number of the elders, consisting\nof 500,000, and the youth of as many, being brought up according to the\norder, give twelve successive battles, each battle consisting of\n80,000 men, half elders and half youth. And the commonwealth, whose\nconstitution can be no stranger to any of those virtues which are to be\nacquired in human life, grows familiar with death ere she dies. If the\nhand of God be upon her for her transgressions, she shall mourn for\nher sins, and lie in the dust for her iniquities, without losing her\nmanhood.\n\n     \u201c\u2018Si fractus illabatur orbis,\n     Impavidam ferient ruinoe.\u2019\u201d\n\nThe remaining part, being the constitution of the provincial orb, is\npartly civil, or consisting of the elders; and partly military, or\nconsisting of the youth. The civil part of the provincial orb is\ndirected by--\n\nThe twenty-eighth order, \u201cWhereby the council of a province being\nconstituted of twelve knights, divided by four into three regions (for\ntheir term and revolution conformable to the Parliament), is perpetuated\nby the annual election at the tropic of four knights (being triennial\nmagistrates) out of the region of the Senate whose term expires; and\nof one knight out of the same region to be strategus or general of the\nprovince, which magistracy is annual. The strategus or magistrate thus\nchosen shall be as well president of the provincial council with power\nto propose to the same, as general of the army. The council for the\nrest shall elect weekly provosts, having any two of them also right\nto propose after the manner of the senatorian councils of Oceana. And\nwhereas all provincial councils are members of the Council of State,\nthey may and ought to keep diligent correspondence with the same, which\nis to be done after this manner: Any opinion or opinions legitimately\nproposed and debated at a provincial council, being thereupon signed\nby the strategus or any two of the provosts, may be transmitted to the\nCouncil of State in Oceana; and the Council of State proceeding upon\nthe same in their natural course (whether by their own power, if it be\na matter within their instructions; or by authority of the Senate\nthereupon consulted, if it be a matter of state which is not in their\ninstructions; or by authority of the Senate and command of the people,\nif it be a matter of law, as for the levies of men or money upon common\nuse and safety) shall return such answers, advice, or orders as in any\nof the ways mentioned shall be determined upon the case.\n\n\u201cThe provincial councils of Marpesia and Panopea respectively shall take\nspecial care that the agrarian laws, as also all other laws that be\nor shall from time to time be enacted by the Parliament of Oceana, for\neither of them, be duly put in execution; they shall manage and receive\nthe customs of either nation for the shipping of Oceana, being the\ncommon guard; they shall have a care that moderate and sufficient\npay upon the respective province be duly raised for the support and\nmaintenance of the officers and soldiers, or army of the same, in the\nmost effectual, constant, and convenient way; they shall receive\nthe regalia, or public revenues of those nations, out of which every\ncouncillor shall have for his term, and to his proper use, the sum of\n\u00a3500 per annum, and the strategus \u00a3500 as president, beside his pay as\ngeneral, which shall be \u00a31,000, the reminder to go to the use of the\nknights and deputies of the respective provinces, to be paid, if it\nwill reach, according to the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equal\ndistribution, respectively, or the overplus, if there be any, to be\nreturned to the Treasury of Oceana. They shall manage the lands (if\nthere be any such held in either of the provinces by the commonwealth\nof Oceana, in dominion) and return the rents into the Exchequer. If the\ncommonwealth comes to be possessed of richer provinces, the pay of\nthe general or strategus, and of the councils, may be respectively\nincreased. The people for the rest shall elect their own magistrates,\nand be governed by their own laws, having power also to appeal from\ntheir native or provincial magistrates, if they please, to the people of\nOceana. And whereas there may be such as receiving injury, are not\nable to prosecute their appeals at so great a distance, eight\nsergeants-at-law, being sworn by the commissioners of the seal, shall\nbe sent by four into each province once in two years; who, dividing\nthe same by circuits, shall hear such causes, and having gathered and\nintroduced them, shall return to the several appellants, gratis, the\ndeterminations and decrees of the people in their several cases.\n\n\u201cThe term of a knight in a provincial orb, as to domestic magistracies,\nshall be esteemed a vacation, and no bar to present election to any\nother honor, his provincial magistracy being expired.\n\n\u201cThe quorum of a provincial council, as also of every other council\nor assembly in Oceana, shall in time of health consist of two parts in\nthree of the whole number proper to that council or assembly; and in a\ntime of sickness, of one part in three; but of the Senate there can be\nno quorum without three of the signory, nor of a council without two of\nthe provosts.\u201d\n\nThe civil part of the provincial orb being declared by the foregoing\norder, the military part of the same is constituted by--\n\nThe twenty-ninth order, \u201cWhereby the stratiots of the third essay having\ndrawn the gold balls marked with the letter M, and being ten horse and\nfifty foot in a tribe, that is to say, 500 horse and 2,500 foot in\nall, the tribes shall be delivered by the respective conductors to\nthe provincial strategus or general, at such a time and place, or\nrendezvous, as he shall appoint by order and certificate of his\nelection, and the strategus having received the horse and foot\nmentioned, which are the third classes of his provincial guard or army,\nshall forthwith lead them away to Marpesia, where the army consists of\nthree classes, each class containing 3,000 men, whereof 500 are horse;\nand receiving the new strategus with the third class, the old strategus\nwith the first class shall be dismissed by the provincial council. The\nsame method with the stratiots of the letter P, is to be observed for\nthe provincial orb of Panopea; and the commonwealth coming to acquire\nnew provinces, the Senate and the people may erect new orbs in like\nmanner, consisting of greater or less numbers, according as is required\nby the respective occasion. If a stratiot has once served his term in a\nprovincial orb, and happens afterward to draw the letter of a province\nat the election of the second essay, he may refuse his lot; and if he\nrefuses it, the censor of that urn shall cause the files balloting at\nthe same to make a halt; and if the stratiot produces the certificate of\nhis strategus or general, that he has served his time accordingly, the\ncensor throwing the ball that he drew into the urn again, and taking out\na blank, shall dismiss the youth, and cause the ballot to proceed.\u201d\n\nTo perfect the whole structure of this commonwealth, some directions are\ngiven to the third essay, or army marching, in--\n\nThe thirtieth order. \u201c\u2018When thou goest to battle against thy enemies,\nand seest horses and chariots, and a people more than thou, be not\nafraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that goes with thee to fight\nfor thee against thy enemies. And when thou dividest the spoil, it shall\nbe as a statute and an ordinance to thee, that as his part is that goes\ndown to the battle, so shall his part be that tarries by the stuff;\nthat is (as to the commonwealth of Oceana) the spoil takin of the enemy\n(except clothes, arms, horses, ammunition, and victuals, to be divided\nto the soldiery by the strategus and the polemarchs upon the place\naccording to their discretion) shall be delivered to four commissaries\nof the spoils elected and sworn by the Council of War, which\ncommissaries shall be allowed shipping by the State, and convoys\naccording as occasion shall require by the strategus, to the end that\nhaving a bill of lading signed by three or more of the polemarchs,\nthey may ship and bring, or cause such spoils to be brought to the\nprize-office in Oceana, where they shall be sold, and the profit arising\nby such spoils shall be divided into three parts, whereof one shall go\nto the Treasury, another shall be paid to the soldiery of this nation,\nand a third to the auxiliaries at their return from their service,\nprovided that the said auxiliaries be equal in number to the proper\nforces of this nation, otherwise their share shall be so much less as\nthey themselves are fewer in number; the rest of the two-thirds to go\nto the officers and soldiers of the proper forces. And the spoils so\ndivided to the proper forces, shall be subdivided into three equal\nparts, whereof one shall go to the officers, and two to the common\nsoldiers, the like for the auxiliaries. And the share allotted the\nofficers shall be divided into four equal parts, whereof one shall go to\nthe strategus, another to the polemarchs, a third to the colonels, and a\nfourth to the captains, cornets, ensigns, and under-officers,\nreceiving their share of the spoil as common soldiers, the like for the\nauxiliaries. And this upon pain, in the case of failure, of what the\npeople of Oceana (to whom the cognizance of peculation or crimes of this\nnature is properly appertaining) shall adjudge or decree.\u201d\n\nUpon these three last orders the Archon seemed to be haranguing at the\nhead of his army in this manner:\n\n\u201cMY DEAR LORDS AND EXCELLENT PATRIOTS:\n\n\u201cA government of this make is a commonwealth for increase. Of those for\npreservation, the inconveniences and frailties have been shown: their\nroots are narrow, such as do not run, have no fibres; their tops weak\nand dangerously exposed to the weather, except you chance to find\none, as Venice, planted in a flower-pot, and if she grows, she grows\ntopheavy, and falls, too. But you cannot plant an oak in a flowerpot;\nshe must have earth for her root, and heaven for her branches.\n\n\u201c\u2018Imperium Oceano, famam quoe terminet astris.\u2019\n\n\u201cRome was said to be broken by her own weight, but poetically; for that\nweight by which she was pretended to be ruined was supported in her\nemperors by a far slighter foundation. And in the common experience of\ngood architecture, there is nothing more known than that buildings stand\nthe firmer and the longer for their own weight, nor ever swerve through\nany other internal cause than that their materials are corruptible; but\nthe people never die, nor, as a political body, are subject to any other\ncorruption than that which derives from their government. Unless a man\nwill deny the chain of causes, in which he denies God, he must also\nacknowledge the chain of effects; wherefore there can be no effect in\nnature that is not from the first cause, and those successive links of\nthe chain without which it could not have been. Now except a man can\nshow the contrary in a commonwealth, if there be no cause of corruption\nin the first make of it, there can never be any such effect. Let no\nman\u2019s superstition impose profaneness upon this assertion; for as man is\nsinful, but yet the universe is perfect, so may the citizen be sinful,\nand yet the commonwealth be perfect. And as man, seeing the world is\nperfect, can never commit any such sin as shall render it imperfect,\nor bring it to a natural dissolution, so the citizen, where the\ncommonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such crime as will render\nit imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution.\n\n\u201cTo come to experience: Venice, notwithstanding we have found some flaws\nin it, is the only commonwealth in the make whereof no man can find\na cause of dissolution; for which reason we behold her (though she\nconsists of men that are not without sin) at this day with 1,000 years\nupon her back, yet for any internal cause, as young, as fresh, and free\nfrom decay, or any appearance of it, as she was born; but whatever in\nnature is not sensible of decay by the course of 1,000 years, is capable\nof the whole age of nature; by which calculation, for any check that\nI am able to give myself, a commonwealth, rightly ordered, may for any\ninternal causes be as immortal or long-lived as the world. But if\nthis be true, those commonwealths that are naturally fallen, must have\nderived their ruin from the rise of them. Israel and Athens died, not\nnatural, but violent deaths, in which manner the world itself is to\ndie. We are speaking of those causes of dissolution which are natural to\ngovernment; and they are but two, either contradiction or inequality. If\na commonwealth be a contradiction, she must needs destroy herself; and\nif she be unequal, it tends to strife, and strife to ruin. By the former\nof these fell Lacedaemon, by the latter Rome. Lacedaemon being made\naltogether for war, and yet not for increase, her natural progress\nbecame her natural dissolution, and the building of her own victorious\nhand too heavy for her foundation, so that she fell, indeed, by her own\nweight. But Rome perished through her native inequality, which how it\ninveterated the bosoms of the Senate and the people each against other,\nand even to death, has been shown at large.\n\n\u201cLook well to it, my lords, for if there be a contradiction or\ninequality in your commonwealth, it must fall; but if it has neither of\nthese, it has no principle of mortality. Do not think me impudent; if\nthis be truth, I shall commit a gross indiscretion in concealing it.\nSure I am that Machiavel is for the immortality of a commonwealth upon\nfar weaker principles. \u2018If a commonwealth,\u2019 says he, \u2018were so happy\nas to be provided often with men, that, when she is swerving from\nher principles, should reduce her to her institution, she would be\nimmortal.\u2019 But a commonwealth, as we have demonstrated, swerves not from\nher principles, but by and through her institution; if she brought no\nbias into the world with her, her course for any internal cause must\nbe straightforward, as we see is that of Venice. She cannot turn to the\nright hand nor to the left, but by some rub, which is not an internal,\nbut external, cause: against such she can be no way fortified but\nthrough her situation, as is Venice, or through her militia, as was\nRome, by which examples a commonwealth may be secure of those also.\nThink me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a commonwealth\nthat is rightly instituted can never swerve, nor one that is not\nrightly instituted be secured from swerving by reduction to her\nfirst principles; wherefore it is no less apparent in this place that\nMachiavel understood not a commonwealth as to the whole piece, than\nwhere having told you that a tribune, or any other citizen of Rome,\nmight propose a law to the people, and debate it with them, he adds,\n\u2018this order was good while the people were good; but when the people\nbecame evil, it became most pernicious.\u2019 As if this order (through\nwhich, with the like, the people most apparently became evil) could ever\nhave been good, or that the people or the commonwealth could ever have\nbecome good, by being reduced to such principles as were the original of\ntheir evil.\n\n\u201cThe disease of Rome was, as has been shown, from the native inequality\nof her balance, and no otherwise from the empire of the world, than as,\nthis falling into one scale, that of the nobility (an evil in such a\nfabric inevitable) kicked out the people. Wherefore a man that could\nhave made her to throw away the empire of the world, might in that have\nreduced her to her principles, and yet have been so far from rendering\nher immortal that, going no further, he should never have cured her. But\nyour commonwealth is founded upon an equal agrarian; and if the earth be\ngiven to the sons of men, this balance is the balance of justice, such a\none as in having due regard to the different industry of different men,\nyet faithfully judges the poor\u2019 And the king that faithfully judges\nthe poor, his throne shall be established forever;, much more the\ncommonwealth, seeing that equality, which is the necessary dissolution\nof monarchy, is the generation, the very life and soul, of a\ncommonwealth. And now, if ever, I may be excusable, seeing my assertion,\nthat the throne of a commonwealth may be established forever, is\nconsonant to the holy Scriptures.\n\n\u201cThe balance of a commonwealth that is equal is of such a nature that\nwhatever falls into her empire must fall equally; and if the whole\nearth falls into your scales, it must fall equally, and so you may be\na greater people and yet not swerve from your principles one hair. Nay,\nyou will be so far from that that you must bring the world in such a\ncase to your balance, even to the balance of justice. But hearken, my\nlords; are we on earth, do we see the sun, or are we visiting those\nshady places which are feigned by the poets?\n\n\u201c\u2018Continuo auditoe voces, vagitus et ingens.\u2019\n\n\u201cThese Gothic empires that are yet in the world, were at the first,\nthough they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unwieldy burden; but\ntheir foundations being now broken, the iron of them enters even into\nthe souls of the oppressed; and hear the voice of their comforters:\n\u2018My father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with\nscorpions.\u2019 Hearken, I say, if thy brother cries to thee in affliction,\nwilt thou not hear him? This is a commonwealth of the fabric that has\nan open ear and a public concern; she is not made for herself only, but\ngiven as a magistrate of God to mankind, for the vindication of common\nright and the law of nature. Wherefore says Cicero of the like, that of\nthe Romans, \u2018We have rather undertaken the patronage than the empire of\nthe world.\u2019 If you, not regarding this example, like some other nations\nthat are upon the point to smart for it, shall, having attained to your\nown liberty, bear the sword of your common magistracy in vain, sit still\nand fold your arms, or, which is worse, let out the blood of your people\nto tyrants, to be shed in the defence of their yokes like water, and\nso not only turn the grace of God into wantonness, but his justice into\nwormwood: I say if you do thus, you are not now making a commonwealth,\nbut heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A commonwealth of this\nmake is a minister of God upon earth, to the end that the world may be\ngoverned with righteousness. For which cause (that I may come at length\nto our present business) the orders last rehearsed are buds of\nempire, such as with the blessing of God may spread the arms of your\ncommonwealth, like a holy asylum, to the distressed world, and give the\nearth her sabbath of years, or rest from her labors, under the shadow\nof your wings. It is upon this point where the writings of Machiavel,\nhaving for the rest excelled all other authors, come as far to excel\nthemselves.\n\n\u201cCommonwealths, says he, have had three ways of propagating themselves:\nOne after the manner of monarchies, by imposing the yoke, which was the\nway of Athens, and, toward the latter times, of Lacedaemon; another by\nequal leagues, which is the way of Switzerland (I shall add of Holland,\nthough since his time); a third by unequal leagues, which, to the shame\nof the world, was never practised, nay, nor so much as seen or minded,\nby any other commonwealth but that only of Rome. They will each of them,\neither for caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weighed, which\nis the proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedaemon have been the\noccasion of great scandal to the world, in two, or at least one of two\nregards: the first, their emulation, which involved Greece in perpetual\nwars; the second, their way of propagation, which by imposing yokes upon\nothers, was plainly contradictory to their own principles.\n\n\u201cFor the first: governments, be they of what kind soever, if they be\nplanted too close, are like trees, that impatient in their growth to\nhave it hindered, eat out one another. It was not unknown to these in\nspeculation, or, if you read the story of Agesilaus, in action, that\neither of them with 30,000 men might have mastered the East; and\ncertainly, if the one had not stood in the other\u2019s light, Alexander had\ncome too late to that end, which was the means (and would be if they\nwere to live again) of ruin, at least to one of them; wherefore with any\nman that understands the nature of government this is excusable. So\nit was between Oceana and Marpesia; so it is between France and Spain,\nthough less excusable; and so it ever will be in the like cases. But to\ncome to the second occasion of scandal by them given, which was in the\nway of their propagation, it is not excusable; for they brought their\nconfederates under bondage, by which means Athens gave occasion of\nthe Peloponnesian War, the wound of which she died stinking, when\nLacedaemon, taking the same infection from her carcass, soon followed.\n\n\u201cWherefore, my lords, let these be warnings to you not to make that\nliberty which God has given you a snare to others in practising this\nkind of enlargement to yourselves.\n\n\u201cThe second way of propagation or enlargement used by commonwealths is\nthat of Switzerland and Holland, equal leagues; this, though it be\nnot otherwise mischievous, is useless to the world, and dangerous to\nthemselves: useless to the world, for as the former governments were\nstorks, these are blocks, have no sense of honor, or concern in the\nsufferings of others. But as the AEtolians, a state of the like fabric,\nwere reproached by Philip of Macedon to prostitute themselves; by\nletting out their arms to the lusts of others, while they leave their\nown liberty barren and without legitimate issue; so I do not defame\nthese people; the Switzer for valor has no superior, the Hollander for\nindustry no equal; but themselves in the meantime shall so much the less\nexcuse their governments, seeing that to the Switz it is well enough\nknown that the ensigns of his commonwealth have no other motto than in\nte converte manus; and that of the Hollander, though he sweats more gold\nthan the Spaniard digs, lets him languish in debt; for she herself lives\nupon charity. These are dangerous to themselves, precarious governments,\nsuch as do not command, but beg their bread from province to province,\nin coats that being patched up of all colors are in effect of none. That\ntheir cantons and provinces are so many arrows, is good; but they are so\nmany bows too, which is naught.\n\n\u201cLike to these was the commonwealth of the ancient Tuscans, hung\ntogether like bobbins, without a hand to weave with them; therefore\neasily overcome by the Romans, though at that time, for number, a far\nless considerable people. If your liberty be not a root that grows,\nit will be a branch that withers, which consideration brings me to the\nparagon, the Commonwealth of Rome.\n\n\u201cThe ways and means whereby the Romans acquired the patronage, and in\nthat the empire, of the world were different, according to the different\ncondition of their commonwealth in her rise and in her growth: in her\nrise she proceeded rather by colonies, in her growth by unequal leagues.\nColonies without the bounds of Italy she planted none (such dispersion\nof the Roman citizen as to plant him in foreign parts, till the contrary\ninterest of the emperors brought in that practice, was unlawful), nor\ndid she ever demolish any city within that compass, or divest it of\nliberty; but whereas the most of them were commonwealths, stirred \u2018up by\nemulation of her great felicity to war against her, if she overcame\nany, she confiscated some part of their lands that were the greatest\nincendiaries, or causes of the trouble, upon which she planted colonies\nof her own people, preserving the rest of their lands and liberties for\nthe natives or inhabitants. By this way of proceeding, that I may be as\nbrief as possible, she did many and great things. For in confirming\nof liberty, she propagated her empire; in holding the inhabitants from\nrebellion, she put a curb upon the incursion of enemies; in exonerating\nherself of the poorer sort, she multiplied her citizens; in rewarding\nher veterans, she rendered the rest less seditious; and in acquiring to\nherself the reverence of a common parent, she from time to time became\nthe mother of new-born cities.\n\n\u201cIn her further growth the way of her propagation went more upon\nleagues, which for the first division were of two kinds, social and\nprovincial.\n\n\u201cAgain, social leagues, or leagues of society, were of two kinds:\n\n\u201cThe first called Latinity or Latin, the second Italian right.\u201d The\nleague between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin right, approached\nnearest to jus quiritium, or the right of a native Roman. The man or\nthe city that was honored with this right, was civitate donatus cum\nsuffragio, adopted a citizen of Rome, with the right of giving suffrage\nwith the people in some cases, as those of conformation of law, or\ndetermination in judicature, if both the Consuls were agreed, not\notherwise; wherefore that coming to little, the greatest and most\npeculiar part of this privilege was, that who had borne magistracy (at\nleast that of oedile or quoestor) in any Latin city, was by consequence\nof the same a citizen of Rome at all points.\n\n\u201cItalian right was also a donation of the city, but without suffrage:\nthey who were in either of these leagues, were governed by their own\nlaws and magistrates, having all the rights, as to liberty, of citizens\nof Rome, yielding and praying to the commonwealth as head of the league,\nand having in the conduct of all affairs appertaining to the common\ncause, such aid of men and money as was particularly agreed to upon the\nmerit of the cause, and specified in their respective leagues, whence\nsuch leagues came to be called equal or unequal accordingly.\n\n\u201cProvincial leagues were of different extension, according to the merit\nand capacity of a conquered people; but they were all of one kind, for\nevery province was governed by Roman magistrates, as a praetor or a\nproconsul, according to the dignity of the province, for the civil\nadministration and conduct of the provincial army, and a quaestor for\nthe gathering of the public revenue, from which magistrates a province\nmight appeal to Rome.\n\n\u201cFor the better understanding of these particulars, I shall exemplify in\nas many of them as is needful, and first in Macedon:\n\n\u201cThe Macedonians were thrice conquered by the Romans, first under the\nconduct of Titus Quintus Flaminius; secondly, under that of Lucius\nAEmilius Paulus; and, thirdly under that of Quintus Caecilius Metellus,\nthence called Macedonicus.\n\n\u201cFor the first time Philip of Macedon, who (possessed of Acrocorinthus)\nboasted no less than was true, that he had Greece in fetters, being\novercome by Flaminius, had his kingdom restored to him, upon condition\nthat he should immediately set all the cities which he held in Greece\nand in Asia at liberty, and that he should not make war out of Macedon\nbut by leave of the Senate of Rome; which Philip (having no other way to\nsave anything) agreed should be done accordingly.\n\n\u201cThe Grecians being at this time assembled at the isthmian games, where\nthe concourse was mighty great, a crier, appointed to the office by\nFlaminius, was heard among them proclaiming all Greece to be free;\nto which the people being amazed at so hopeless a thing, gave little\ncredit, till they received such testimony of the truth as put it past\nall doubt, whereupon they fell immediately on running to the proconsul\nwith flowers and garlands, and such violent expressions of their\nadmiration and joy, as, if Flaminius, a young man, about thirty-three,\nhad not also been very strong, he must have died of no other death than\ntheir kindness, while everyone striving to touch his hand, they bore him\nup and down the field with an unruly throng, full of such ejaculations\nas these: How is there a people in the world, that at their own charge,\nat their own peril, will fight for the liberty of another? Did they\nlive at the next door to the fire? Or what kind of men are these, whose\nbusiness it is to pass the seas, that the world may be governed with\nrighteousness? The cities of Greece and of Asia shake off their iron\nfetters at the voice of a crier was it madness to imagine such a thing,\nand is it done? O virtue! O felicity! O fame!\n\n\u201cIn this example your lordships have a donation of liberty or of Italian\nright to a people, by restitution to what they had formerly enjoyed; and\nsome particular men, families or cities, according to their merit of the\nRomans, if not upon this, yet upon the like occasions, were gratified\nwith Latinity.\u201d But Philip\u2019s share by this means did not please him,\nwherefore the league was broken by his son Perseus; and the Macedonians\nthereupon for the second time conquered by AEmilius Paulus, their King\ntaken, and they some time after the victory summoned to the tribunal of\nthe general; where, remembering how little hope they ought to have of\npardon, they expected some dreadful sentence: when AEmilius, in the\nfirst place, declared the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession\nof their lands, goods, and laws, with right to elect annual magistrates,\nyielding and paying to the people of Rome one-half of the tribute which\nthey were accustomed to pay to their own kings. This done he went on,\nmaking so skilful a division of the country in order to the methodizing\nof the people, and casting them into the form of popular government,\nthat the Macedonians, being first surprised with the virtue of the\nRomans, began now to alter the scene of their admiration, that a\nstranger should do such things for them in their own country, and with\nsuch facility as they had never so much as once imagined to be possible.\nNor was this all; for AEmilius, as if not dictating to conquered\nenemies, but to some well-deserving friends, gave them in the last place\nlaws so suitable, and contrived with such care and prudence, that long\nuse and experience (the only correctness of works of this nature) could\nnever find a fault in them.\n\n\u201cIn this example you have a donation of liberty, or of Italian right,\nto a people that had not tasted of it before, but were now taught how to\nuse it.\n\n\u201cMy lords, the royalists should compare what we are doing, and we what\nhitherto we have done for them, with this example. It is a shame that\nwhile we are boasting up ourselves above all others, we should yet be\nso far from imitating such examples as these, that we do not so much as\nunderstand that if government be the parent of manners, where there are\nno heroic virtues, there is no heroic government.\n\n\u201cBut the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a false Philip, the third\ntime against the Romans, were by them judged incapable of liberty, and\nreduced by Metellus to a province.\n\n\u201cNow whereas it remains that I explain the nature of a province, I shall\nrather choose that of Sicily, because, having been the first which the\nRomans made, the descriptions of the rest relate to it.\n\n\u201c\u2018We have so received the Sicilian cities into amity,\u2019 says Cicero,\n\u2018that they enjoy their ancient laws; and upon no other condition than of\nthe same obedience to the people of Rome, which they formerly yielded to\ntheir own princes or superiors.\u2019 So the Sicilians, whereas they had been\nparcelled out to divers princes, and into divers states (the cause of\nperpetual wars, whereby, hewing one another down, they became sacrifices\nto the ambition of their neighbors, or of some invader), were now\nreceived at the old rate into a new protection which could hold them,\nand in which no enemy durst touch them; nor was it possible, as the\ncase then stood, for the Sicilians to receive, or for the Romans to give\nmore.\n\n\u201cA Roman province is defined by Sigonius as a region having provincial\nright. Provincial right in general was to be governed by a Roman\npraetor, or consul, in matters at least of state, and of the militia;\nand by a quaeStor, whose office it was to receive the public revenue.\nProvincial right in particular was different, according to the different\nleagues or agreements between the commonwealth, and the people reduced\ninto a province. \u2018Siculi hoc jure sunt, ut quod civis cum cive agat,\ndomi certet suis legibus; quod siculus cum siculo non ejusdem civitatis,\nut de eo proetor judices, ex P. Rupilii decreto, sortiatur. Quod\nprivatus a populo petit, aut populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua\ncivitate, qui judicet, datur, cui alternoe civitates rejectoe sunt. Quod\nvivis Romanus a siculo petit, siculus judex datur quod siculus a cive\nRomano, civis Romanus datur. Coeterarum rerum selecti judices ex civium\nRomanorum conventu proponi solent. Inter aratores et decumanos lege\nfrumentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia fiunt.\u2019 Because the\nrest would oblige me to a discourse too large for this place, it shall\nsuffice that I have showed you how it was in Sicily.\n\n\u201cMy lords, upon the fabric of your provincial orb I shall not hold you;\nbecause it is sufficiently described in the order, and I cannot believe\nthat you think it inferior to the way of a praetor and a quaestor. But\nwhereas the provincial way of the Roman Commonwealth was that whereby it\nheld the empire of the world, and your orbs are intended to be capable\nat least of the like use, there may arise many controversies, as whether\nsuch a course be lawful, whether it be feasible; and, seeing that the\nRomans were ruined upon that point, whether it would not be to the\ndestruction of the commonwealth.\n\n\u201cFor the first: if the empire of a commonwealth be an occasion to ask\nwhether it be lawful for a commonwealth to aspire to the empire of the\nworld, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to do its duty, or to\nput the world into a better condition than it was before.\n\n\u201cAnd to ask whether this be feasible, is to ask why the Oceaner, being\nunder the like administration of government, may not do as much with\n200 men as the Roman did with 100; for comparing their commonwealths in\ntheir rise, the difference is yet greater: now that Rome (seris avaritia\nluxuriaque), through the natural thirst of her constitution, came at\nlength with the fulness of her provinces to burst herself, this is no\notherwise to be understood than as when a man that from his own evil\nconstitution had contracted the dropsy, dies with drinking, it being\napparent that in case her agrarian had held, she could never have been\nthus ruined, and I have already demonstrated that your agrarian being\nonce poised, can never break or swerve.\n\n\u201cWherefore to draw toward some conclusion of this discourse, let me\ninculcate the use, by selecting a few considerations out of many. The\nregard had in this place to the empire of the world appertains to a\nwell-ordered commonwealth, more especially for two reasons:\n\n\u201c1. The facility of this great enterprise, by a government of the model\nproposed;\n\n\u201c2. The danger that you would run in the omission of such a government.\n\n\u201cThe facility of this enterprise, upon the grounds already laid, must\nneeds be great, forasmuch as the empire of the world has been, both in\nreason and experience, the necessary consequence of a commonwealth of\nthis nature only; for though it has been given to all kinds to drive at\nit, since that of Athens or Lacedaemon, if the one had not hung in the\nother\u2019s light, might have gained it, yet could neither of them have held\nit; not Athens, through the manner of her propagation, which, being\nby downright tyranny, could not preserve what she had, nor Lacedaemon,\nbecause she was overthrown by the weight of a less conquest. The\nfacility then of this great enterprise being peculiar to popular\ngovernment, I shall consider it, first, in gaining, and secondly, in\nholding.\n\n\u201cFor the former, volenti non fit injuria. It is said of the people under\nEumenes, that they would not have changed them no their subjection for\nliberty; wherefore the Romans gave disturbance. If a people be contented\nwith their government, it is a certain sign that it is good, and much\ngood do them with it. The sword of your magistracy is for a terror to\nthem that do evil. Eumenes had the fear of God, or of the Romans, before\nhis eyes; concerning such he has given you no commission.\n\n\u201cBut till we can say, here are the Romans, where is Eumenes? do not\nthink that the late appearances of God to you have been altogether for\nyourselves; \u2018He has surely seen the affliction of your brethren,\nand heard their cry by reason of their task masters.\u2019 For to believe\notherwise is not only to be mindless of his ways, but altogether deaf.\nIf you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you will certainly be\ncalled upon; for if, while there is no stock of liberty no sanctuary\nof the afflicted, it be a common object to behold a people casting\nthemselves out of the pan of one prince into the fire of another, what\ncan you think, but if the world should see the Roman \u2018eagle again, she\nwould renew her age and her flight? Nor did ever she spread her wings\nwith better omen than will be read in your ensigns; which if, called in\nby an oppressed people they interpose between them and their yoke, the\npeople themselves must either do nothing in the meantime or have no more\npains to take for their wished fruit than to gather it, if that be not\nlikewise done for them. Wherefore this must needs be easy, and yet you\nhave a greater facility than is in the arm of flesh; for if the cause of\nmankind be the cause of God, the Lord of Hosts will be your captain, and\nyou shall be a praise to the whole earth.\n\n\u201cThe facility of holding is in the way of your propagation; if you take\nthat of Athens and Lacedemon, you shall rain snares, but either catch or\nhold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: if setting up\nfor liberty you impose yokes, he will infallibly destroy you. On the\nother side, to go about a work of this nature by a league without a\nhead, is to abdicate that magistracy wherewith he has not only endued\nyou, but whereof he will require an account of you; for, \u2018cursed is he\nthat does the work of the Lord negligently.\u2019 Wherefore you are to take\nthe course of Rome: if you have subdued a nation that is capable of\nliberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did Flaminius to\nGreece, and AEmilius to Macedon, reserving to yourselves some part of\nthat revenue which was legally paid to the former government, together\nwith the right of being head of the league, which includes such levies\nof men and money as shall be necessary for the carrying on of the public\nwork.\n\n\u201cFor if a people have by your means attained to freedom, they owe both\nto the cause and you such aid as may propagate the like fruit to the\nrest of the world. But whereas every nation is not capable of her\nliberty to this degree, lest you be put to doing and undoing of things,\nas the Romans were in Macedon, you shall diligently observe what nation\nis fit for her liberty to this degree, and what not; which is to be done\nby two marks, the first if she be willing to \u2018help the Lord against the\nmighty;\u2019 for if she has no care of the liberty of mankind she deserves\nnot her own. But because in this you may be deceived by pretences,\nwhich, continuing for a while specious, may afterward vanish; the other\nis more certain, and that is if she be capable of an equal agrarian;\nwhich that it was not observed by excellent AEmilius in his donation of\nliberty, and introduction of a popular state among the Macedonians, I\nam more than moved to believe for two reasons; the first, because at the\nsame time the agrarian was odious to the Roman patricians; the second,\nthat the pseudo-Philip could afterward so easily recover Macedon, which\ncould not have happened but by the nobility, and their impatience,\nhaving great estates, to be equalled with the people; for that the\npeople should otherwise, at the mere sound of a name, have thrown away\ntheir liberty, is incredible. Wherefore be assured that the nation where\nyou cannot establish an equal agrarian, is incapable of its liberty\nas to this kind of donation. For example, except the aristocracy in\nMarpesia be dissolved, neither can that people have their liberty there,\nnor you govern at home; for they continuing still liable to be sold\nby their lords to foreign princes, there will never (especially in a\ncountry of which there is no other profit to be made) be want of such\nmerchants and drovers, while you must be the market where they are to\nreceive their second payment.\n\n\u201cNor can the aristocracy there be dissolved but by your means, in\nrelation whereto you are provided with your provincial orb; which, being\nproportioned to the measure of the nation that you have vindicated or\nconquered, will easily hold it: for there is not a people in the\nworld more difficult to be held than the Marpesians, which, though by\nthemselves it be ascribed to their own nature, is truly to be attributed\nto that of their country. Nevertheless, you having 9,000 men upon the\ncontinual guard of it, that, threatened by any sudden insurrection, have\nplaces of retreat, and an army of 40,000 men upon a day\u2019s warning ready\nto march to their rescue, it is not to be rationally shown which way\nthey can possibly slip out of your hands. And if a man should think that\nupon a province more remote and divided by the sea, you have not the\nlike hold, he has not so well considered your wings as your talons,\nyour shipping being of such a nature as makes the descent of your armies\nalmost of equal facility in any country, so that what you take you hold,\nboth because your militia, being already populous, will be of great\ngrowth in itself, and also through your confederates, by whom in taking\nand holding you are still more enabled to do both.\n\n\u201cNor shall you easier hold than the people under your empire or\npatronage may be held. My lords, I would not go to the door to see\nwhether it be close shut; this is no underhand dealing, nor a game at\nwhich he shall have any advantage against you who sees your cards, but,\non the contrary the advantage shall be your own: for with 18,000 men\n(which number I put, because it circulates your orb by the annual change\nof 6,000) having established your matters in the order shown, you will,\nbe able to hold the greatest province; and 18,000 men, allowing them\ngreater pay than any prince ever gave, will not stand the province in\n\u00a31,000,000 revenue; in consideration whereof, they shall have their\nown estates free to themselves, and be governed by their own laws and\nmagistrates; which, if the revenue of the province be in dry-rent (as\nthere may be some that are four times as big as Oceana) \u00a340,000,000,\nwill bring it with that of industry, to speak with the least, to twice\nthe value: so that the people there, who at this day are so oppressed\nthat they have nothing at all whereon to live, shall for \u00a31,000,000 paid\nto you, receive at least \u00a379,000,000 to their proper use: in which place\nI appeal to any man, whether the empire described can be other than the\npatronage of the world.\n\n\u201cNow if you add to the propagation of civil liberty (so natural to this\ncommonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propagation of the liberty\nof conscience, this empire, this patronage of the world, is the kingdom\nof Christ: for as the kingdom of God the Father was a commonwealth, so\nshall the kingdom of God the Son; \u2018the people shall be willing in the\nday of his power.\u2019\n\n\u201cHaving showed you in this and other places some of those inestimable\nbenefits of this kind of government, together with the natural and\nfacile emanation of them from their fountain, I come (lest God who\nhas appeared to you, for he is the God of nature, in the glorious\nconstellation of these subordinate causes, whereof we have hitherto been\ntaking the true elevation, should shake off the dust of his feet against\nyou) to warn you of the dangers which you, not taking the opportunity,\nwill incur by omission.\n\n\u201cMachiavel, speaking of the defect of Venice, through her want of proper\narms, cries out, \u2018This cut her wings, and spoiled her mount to heaven.\u2019\nIf you lay your commonwealth upon any other foundation than the people,\nyou frustrate yourself of proper arms, and so lose the empire of the\nworld; nor is this all, but some other nation will have it.\n\n\u201cColumbus offered gold to one of your kings, through whose happy\nincredulity another prince has drunk the poison, even to the consumption\nof his people; but I do not offer you a nerve of war that is made\nof purse-strings, such a one as has drawn the face of the earth into\nconvulsions, but such as is natural to her health and beauty. Look you\nto it, where there is tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it\nmust end in death or recovery. Though the people of the world, in the\ndregs of the Gothic empire, be yet tumbling and tossing upon the bed of\nsickness, they cannot die; nor is there any means of recovery for them\nbut by ancient prudence, whence of necessity it must come to pass that\nthis drug be better known, if France, Italy, and Spain were not all\nsick, all corrupted together, there would be none of them so; for the\nsick would not be able to withstand the sound, nor the sound to preserve\ntheir health, without curing of the sick. The first of these nations\n(which if you stay her leisure, will in my mind be France) that recovers\nthe health of ancient prudence, shall certainly govern the world; for\nwhat did Italy when she had it? and as you were in that, so shall you in\nthe like case be reduced to a province; I do not speak at random. Italy,\nin the consulship of Lucius AEmilius Papus and Caius Attilius Regulus,\narmed, upon the Gallic tumult that then happened of herself, and without\nthe aid of foreign auxiliaries, 70,000 horse and 700,000 foot; but as\nItaly is the least of those three countries in extent, so is France now\nthe most populous.\n\n\u201c\u2018I, decus, I, nostrum, melioribus utere fatis.\u2019\n\n\u201cMy dear lords, Oceana is as the rose of Sharon, and the lily of the\nvalley. As the lily among thorns, such is my love among the daughters.\nShe is comely as the tents of Kedar, and terrible as an army with\nbanners. Her neck is as the tower of David, builded for an armory,\nwhereon there hang 1,000 bucklers and shields of mighty men. Let me hear\nthy voice in the morning, whom my soul loves. The south has dropped,\nand the west is breathing upon thy garden of spices. Arise, queen of the\nearth, arise, holy spouse of Jesus; for lo, the winter is past, the\nrain is over and gone; the flowers appear on the earth, the time for the\nsinging of birds is come, and the voice of the turtle is heard in our\nland. Arise, I say, come forth, and do not tarry: ah! wherefore should\nmy eyes behold thee by the rivers of Babylon, hanging thy harps upon the\nwillows, thou fairest among women?\n\n\u201cExcellent patriots, if the people be sovereign, here is that which\nestablishes their prerogative; if we be sincere, here is that which\ndisburdens our souls, and makes good all our engagements; if we be\ncharitable, here is that which embraces all parties; if we would be\nsettled, here is that which will stand, and last forever.\n\n\u201cIf our religion be anything else but a vain boast, scratching and\ndefacing human nature or reason, which, being the image of God, makes\nit a kind of murder, here is that empire whence \u2018justice shall run down\nlike a river, and judgment like a mighty stream.\u2019 Who is it then that\ncalls us? or, what is in our way? A lion! Is it not the dragon, that old\nserpent? For what wretched shifts are these? Here is a great deal; might\nwe not have some of this at one time, and some at another?\n\n\u201cMy lords, permit me to give you the sum, or brief:\n\nEPITOME OF THE WHOLE COMMONWEALTH\n\n\u201cThe centre or fundamental laws are, first, the agrarian, proportioned\nat \u00a32,000 a year in land, lying and being within the proper territory of\nOceana, and stating property in land at such a balance, that the power\ncan never swerve out of the hands of the many.\n\n\u201cSecondly, the ballot conveying this equal sap from the root, by an\nequal election or rotation, into the branches of magistracy or sovereign\npower.\n\n\u201cThe orbs of this commonwealth being civil, military, or provincial,\nare, as it were, cast upon this mould or centre by the divisions of\nthe people; first, into citizens and servants; secondly, into youth\nand elders; thirdly, into such as have \u00a3100 a year in lands, goods, or\nmoneys, who are of the horse; and such as have under, who are of the\nfoot; fourthly, they are divided by their usual residence into parishes,\nhundreds, and tribes.\n\n\u201cThe civil orbs consist of the elders, and are thus created: every\nMonday next ensuing the last of December, the elders in every parish\nelect the fifth man to be a deputy, which is but half a day\u2019s work;\nevery Monday next ensuing the last of January, the deputies meet at\ntheir respective hundred, and elect out of their number one justice of\nthe peace, one juryman, one coroner, and one high constable of the foot,\none day\u2019s work.\n\n\u201cEvery Monday next ensuing the last of February, the hundreds meet\nat their respective tribe, and there elect the lords high sheriff,\nlieutenant, custos rotulorum, the conductor, the two censors out of\nthe horse, the magistrates of the tribe and of the hundreds, with the\njurymen constituting the phylarch, and who assist in their respective\noffices at the assizes, hold the quarter-sessions, etc. The day\nfollowing the tribe elects the annual galaxy, consisting of two knights\nand three deputies out of the horse, with four deputies out of the foot,\nthereby endued with power, as magistrates of the whole nation, for the\nterm of three years. An officer chosen at the hundred may not be elected\na magistrate of the tribe; but a magistrate or officer either of the\nhundred or of the tribe, being elected into the galaxy, may substitute\nany one of his office in the hundred or in own order to his magistracy\nor office in the hundred or in the tribe. This of the muster is two\ndays\u2019 work. So the body of the people is annually, at the charge of\nthree days\u2019 work and a half, in their own tribes, for the perpetuation\nof their power, receiving over and above the magistracies so divided\namong them.\n\n\u201cEvery Monday next ensuing the last of March, the knights, being 100\nin all the tribes, take their places in the Senate. The knights, having\ntaken their places in the Senate, make the third region of the same, and\nthe house proceeds to the senatorian elections. Senatorian elections are\nannual, biennial, or emergent.\n\n\u201cThe annual are performed by the tropic.\n\n\u201cThe tropic is a schedule consisting of two parts; the first by which\nthe senatorian magistrates are elected; and the second, by which the\nsenatorian councils are perpetuated.\n\n\u201cThe first part is of this tenor:\n\n     The lord strategus,\n     The lord orator,\n     The first censor,\n     The second censor,\n\n\u201cAnnual magistrates and therefore such as may be elected out of any\nregion; the term of every region having at the tropic one year at the\nleast unexpired.\n\n     The third commissioner of the seal,\n     The third commissioner of the Treasury.\n\n\u201cTriennial magistrates, and therefore such as can be chosen out of the\nthird region only, as that alone which has the term of three years\nunexpired.\n\n\u201cThe strategus and the orator sitting, are consuls, or presidents of the\nSenate.\n\n\u201cThe strategus marching is general of the army, in which case a new\nstrategus is to be elected in his room.\n\n\u201cThe strategus sitting with six commissioners, being councillors of the\nnation, are the signory of the commonwealth.\u201d\n\nThe censors are magistrates of the ballot, presidents of the Council for\nReligion, and chancellors of the universities.\n\n\u201cThe second part of the tropic perpetuates the Council of State, by the\nelection of five knights out of the first region of the Senate, to be\nthe first region of that council consisting of fifteen knights, five in\nevery region.\n\n\u201cThe like is done by the election of four into the Council of Religion,\nand four into the Council of Trade, out of the same region in the\nSenate; each of these councils consisting of twelve knights, four in\nevery region.\n\n\u201cBut the Council of War, consisting of nine knights, three in every\nregion, is elected by and out of the Council of State, as the other\ncouncils are elected by and out of the Senate. And if the Senate add a\njuncta of nine knights more, elected out of their own number, for the\nterm of three months, the Council of War, by virtue of that addition, is\nDictator of Oceana for the said term.\n\n\u201cThe signory jointly or severally has right of session and suffrage in\nevery senatorial council, and to propose either to the Senate, or any of\nthem. And every region in a council electing one weekly provost, any\ntwo of those provosts have power also to propose to their respective\ncouncil, as the proper and peculiar proposers of the same, for which\ncause they hold an academy, where any man, either by word of mouth or\nwriting, may propose to the proposers.\n\n\u201cNext to the elections of the tropic is the biennial election of one\nambassador-in-ordinary, by the ballot of the house, to the residence\nof France; at which time the resident of France removes to Spain, he\nof Spain to Venice, he of Venice to Constantinople, and he of\nConstantinople returns. So the orb of the residents is wheeled about in\neight years, by the biennial election of one ambassador-in-ordinary.\n\n\u201cThe last kind of election is emergent. Emergent elections are made by\nthe scrutiny. Election by scrutiny is when a competitor, being made by\na council, and brought into the Senate, the Senate chooses four more\ncompetitors to him, and putting all five to the ballot, he who has most\nabove half the suffrages is the magistrate. The polemarchs or\nfield officers are chosen by the scrutiny of the Council of War; an\nambassador-extraordinary by the scrutiny of the Council of State; the\njudges and sergeants-at-law by the scrutiny of the seal; and the barons\nand prime officers of the Exchequer, by the scrutiny of the Treasury..\n\n\u201cThe opinion or opinions that are legitimately proposed to any council\nmust be debated by the same, and so many as are resolved upon the debate\nare introduced into the Senate, where they are debated and resolved, or\nrejected by the whole house; that which is resolved by the Senate is\na decree which is good in matters of state, but no law, except it be\nproposed to and resolved by the prerogative.\n\n\u201cThe deputies of the galaxy being three horse and four foot in a tribe,\namount in all the tribes to 150 horse and 200 foot; which, having\nentered the prerogative, and chosen their captains, cornet, and ensign\n(triennial officers), make the third class, consisting of one troop\nand one company; and so, joining with the whole prerogative, elect four\nannual magistrates, called tribunes, whereof two are of the horse and\ntwo of the foot. These have the command of the prerogative sessions,\nand suffrage in the Council of War, and sessions without suffrage in the\nSenate.\n\n\u201cThe Senate having passed a decree which they would propose to the\npeople, cause it to be printed and published, or promulgated for the\nspace of six weeks, which, being ordered, they choose their proposers.\nThe proposers must be magistrates, that is, the commissioners of the\nseal, those of the Treasury, or the censors. These being chosen, desire\nthe muster of the tribunes, and appoint the day. The people being\nassembled at the day appointed, and the decree proposed, that which is\nproposed by authority of the Senate, and commanded by the people, is the\nlaw of Oceana, or an act of Parliament.\n\n\u201cSo the Parliament of Oceana consists of the Senate proposing, and the\npeople resolving.\n\n\u201cThe people or prerogative are also the supreme judicatory of this\nnation, having power of hearing and determining all causes of appeal\nfrom all magistrates, or courts provincial or domestic, as also to\nquestion any magistrate, the term of his magistracy being expired, if\nthe case be introduced by the tribunes, or any one of them.\n\n\u201cThe military orbs consist of the youth, that is, such as are from\neighteen to thirty years of age; and are created in the following\nmanner:\n\n\u201cEvery Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the youth of\nevery parish, assembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their\ndeputies; the deputies of the youth are called stratiots, and this is\nthe first essay.\n\n\u201cEvery Wednesday next ensuing the last of January, the stratiots,\nassembling at the hundred, elect their captain and their ensign, and\nfall to their games and sports.\n\n\u201cEvery Wednesday next ensuing the last of February the stratiots are\nreceived by the lord lieutenant, their commander-in-chief, with the\nconductors and the censors; and, having been disciplined and entertained\nwith other games, are called to the urns, where they elect the second\nessay, consisting of 200 horse and 600 foot in a tribe; that is, of\n10,000 horse and 30,000 foot in all the tribes, which is the standing\narmy of this nation, to march at any warning. They also elect at the\nsame time a part of the third essay, by the mixture of balls marked with\nthe letter M and the letter P, for Marpesia and Panopea; they of either\nmark being ten horse and fifty foot in a tribe, that is, 500 horse and\n2,500 foot in all the tribes, which are forthwith to march to their\nrespective provinces.\n\n\u201cBut the third essay of this nation more properly so called, is when the\nstrategus with the polemarchs (the Senate and the people or the Dictator\nhaving decreed a war) receive in return of his warrants the second essay\nfrom the hands of the conductors at the rendezvous of Oceana; which\narmy, marching with all accommodations provided by the Council of War,\nthe Senate elects a new strategus, and the lords-lieutenant a new second\nessay.\n\n\u201cA youth, except he be an only son, refusing any one of his three\nessays, without sufficient cause shown to the phylarch or the censors,\nis incapable of magistracy, and is fined a fifth part of his yearly\nrent, or of his estate, for protection. In case of invasion the elders\nare obliged to like duty with the youth, and upon their own charge.\n\n\u201cThe provincial orb consisting in part of the elders, and in part of the\nyouth, is thus created:\n\n\u201cFour knights out of the first region falling, are elected in the Senate\nto be the first region of the provincial orb of Marpesia; these, being\ntriennial magistrates, take their places in the provincial council,\nconsisting of twelve knights, four in every region, each region choosing\ntheir weekly provosts of the council thus constituted. One knight more,\nchosen out of the same region in the Senate, being an annual magistrate,\nis president, with power to propose; and the opinions proposed by the\npresident, or any two of the provosts, are debated by the council, and,\nif there be occasion of further power or instruction than they yet have,\ntransmitted to the Council of State, with which the provincial is to\nhold intelligence.\n\n\u201cThe president of this council is also strategus or general of the\nprovincial army; wherefore the conductors, upon notice of his election,\nand appointment of his rendezvous, deliver to him the stratiots of his\nletter, which he takes with him into his province; and the provincial\narmy having received the new strategus with the third class, the council\ndismisses the old strategus with the first class. The like is done for\nPanopea, or any other province.\n\n\u201cBut whereas the term of every other magistracy or election in this\ncommonwealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal vacation,\nthe term of a provincial councillor or magistrate requires no vacation\nat all. The quorum of a provincial, as also that of every other council\nand assembly, requires two-thirds in a time of health, and one-third in\na time of sickness.\n\n\u201cI think I have omitted nothing but the props and scaffolds, which\nare not of use but in building. And how much is here? Show me another\ncommonwealth in this compass? how many things? Show me another entire\ngovernment consisting but of thirty orders. If you now go to law with\nanybody, there lie to some of our courts 200 original writs: if you stir\nyour hand, there go more nerves and bones to that motion; if you play,\nyou have more cards in the pack; nay, you could not sit with your ease\nin that chair, if it consisted not of more parts. Will you not then\nallow to your legislator, what you can afford your upholsterer, or to\nthe throne, what is necessary to a chair?\n\n\u201cMy lords, if you will have fewer orders in a commonwealth, you will\nhave more; for where she is not perfect at first, every day, every hour\nwill produce a new order, the end whereof is to have no order at all,\nbut to grind with the clack of some demagogue. Is he providing already\nfor his golden thumb? Lift up your heads; away with ambition, that\nfulsome complexion of a statesman, tempered, like Sylla\u2019s, with blood\nand muck. \u2018And the Lord give to his senators wisdom; and make our faces\nto shine, that we may be a light to them that sit in darkness and the\nshadow of death, to guide their feet in the way of peace.\u2019--In the name\nof God, what\u2019s the matter?\u201d\n\nPhiladelphus, the secretary of the council, having performed his task\nin reading the several orders as you have seen, upon the receipt of\na packet from his correspondent Boccalini, secretary of Parnassus, in\nreading one of the letters, burst forth into such a violent passion of\nweeping and downright howling, that the legislators, being startled with\nthe apprehension of some horrid news, one of them had no sooner snatched\nthe letter out of his hand, than the rest crying, \u201cRead, read,\u201d he\nobeyed in this manner:\n\n\u201cThe 3d instant his Phoebean majesty having taken the nature of free\nstates into his royal consideration, and being steadily persuaded that\nthe laws in such governments are incomparably better and more surely\ndirected to the good of mankind than in any other; that the courage of\nsuch a people is the aptest tinder to noble fire; that the genius of\nsuch a soil is that wherein the roots of good literature are least\nworm-eaten with pedantism, and where their fruits have ever come to the\ngreatest maturity and highest relish, conceived such a loathing of\ntheir ambition and tyranny, who, usurping the liberty of their native\ncountries, become slaves to themselves, inasmuch as (be it never so\ncontrary to their own nature or consciences) they have taken the earnest\nof sin, and are engaged to persecute all men that are good with the same\nor greater rigor than is ordained by laws for the wicked, for none ever\nadministered that power by good which he purchased by ill arts--Phoebus,\nI say, having considered this, assembled all the senators residing in\nthe learned court at the theatre of Melpomene, where he caused Caesar\nthe Dictator to come upon the stage, and his sister Actia, his nephew\nAugustus, Julia his daughter, with the children which she had by\nMarcus Agrippa, Lucius and Caius Caesars, Agrippa Posthumus, Julia,\nand Agrippina, with the numerous progeny which she bore to her renowned\nhusband Germanicus, to enter. A miserable scene in any, but most\ndeplorable in the eyes of Caesar, thus beholding what havoc his\nprodigious ambition, not satisfied with his own bloody ghost, had made\nupon his more innocent remains, even to the total extinction of his\nfamily. For it is (seeing where there is any humanity, there must\nbe some compassion) not to be spoken without tears, that of the full\nbranches deriving from Octavia the eldest sister, and Julia the daughter\nof Augustus, there should not be one fruit or blossom that was not cut\noff or blasted by the sword, famine, or poison.\n\n\u201cNow might the great soul of Caesar have been full; and yet that which\npoured in as much or more was to behold that execrable race of the\nClaudii, having hunted and sucked his blood, with the thirst of tigers,\nto be rewarded with the Roman Empire, and remain in full possession\nof that famous patrimony: a spectacle to pollute the light of heaven!\nNevertheless, as if Caesar had not yet enough, his Phoeban majesty\ncaused to be introduced on the other side of the theatre, the most\nillustrious and happy prince Andrea Doria, with his dear posterity,\nembraced by the soft and constant arms of the city of Genoa, into whose\nbosom, ever fruitful in her gratitude, he had dropped her fair liberty\nlike the dew of heaven, which, when the Roman tyrant beheld, and how\nmuch more fresh that laurel was worn with a firm root in the hearts of\nthe people than that which he had torn off, he fell into such a horrid\ndistortion of limbs and countenance, that the senators, who had thought\nthemselves steel and flint at such an object, having hitherto stood\nin their reverend snow-like thawing Alps, now covered their faces with\ntheir large sleeves.\u201d\n\n\u201cMy lords,\u201d said the Archon, rising, \u201cwitty Philadelphus has given us\ngrave admonition in dreadful tragedy. Discite justitiam moniti, et non\ntemnere divos. Great and glorious Caesar the highest character of flesh,\nyet could not rule but by that part of man which is the beast; but a\ncommonwealth is a monarchy; to her God is king, inasmuch as reason, his\ndictate, is her sovereign power.\u201d Which said, he adjourned the Council.\nAnd the model was soon after promulgated. Quod bonum, foelix, faustumque\nsit huic reipublicoe. Agite quirites, censuere patres, jubeat populus.\n(The sea roared, and the floods clapped their hands.)\n\n                LIBERTAS\n\nThe Proclamation of his Highness the Lord Archon of Oceana upon\nPromulgation of the Model,\n\n\u201cWhereas his Highness and the Council, in the framing of the model\npromulgated, have not had any private interest or ambition but the fear\nof God and the good of this people before their eyes; and it remains\ntheir desire that this great work may be carried on accordingly. This\npresent greeting is to inform the good people of this land, that as the\nCouncil of Prytans sat during the framing of the model, to receive from\ntime to time such propositions as should be offered by any wise-hearted\nor public-spirited man, toward the institution of a well-ordered\ncommonwealth, so the said Council is to sit as formerly in the great\nhall of the Pantheon during promulgation (which is to continue for\nthe space of three months) to receive, weigh, and, as there shall be\noccasion, transmit to the Council of Legislators, all such objections\nas shall be made against the said model, whether in the whole or in any\npart. Wherefore that nothing be done rashly or without the consent of\nthe people, such, of what party soever, with whom there may remain any\ndoubts or difficulties, are desired with all convenient speed to address\nthemselves to the said prytans; where, if such objections, doubts, or\ndifficulties receive solution to the satisfaction of the auditory,\nthey shall have public thanks, but if the said objections, doubts, or\ndifficulties receive no solution to the satisfaction of the auditory,\nthen the model promulgated shall be reviewed, and the party that was the\noccasion of the review, shall receive public thanks, together with\nthe best horse in his Highness\u2019s stable, and be one of the Council of\nLegislators. And so God have you in his keeping.\u201d\n\nI should now write the same Council of the Prytans, but for two reasons:\nthe one, that having had but a small time for that which is already\ndone, I am over-labored; the other, that there may be new objections.\nWherefore, if my reader has any such as to the model, I entreat him to\naddress himself by way of oration, as it were, to the prytans, that\nwhen this rough draught comes to be a work, his speech being faithfully\ninserted in this place, may give or receive correction to amendment; for\nwhat is written will be weighed. But conversation, in these days, is a\ngame at which they are best provided that have light gold; it is like\nthe sport of women that make flowers of straws, which must be stuck\nup but may not be touched. Nor, which is worse, is this the fault of\nconversation only: but to the examiner I say if to invent method and\nteach an art be all one, let him show that this method is not truly\ninvented, or this art is faithfully taught.\n\nI cannot conclude a circle (and such is this commonwealth) without\nturning the end into the beginning. The time of promulgation being\nexpired, the surveyors were sent down, who having in due season made\nreport that their work was perfect, the orators followed, under the\nadministration of which officers and magistrates the commonwealth was\nratified and established by the whole body of the people, in their\nparochial, hundred, and county assemblies. And the orators being, by\nvirtue of their scrolls or lots, members of their respective tribes,\nwere elected each the first knight of the third list, or galaxy;\nwherefore, having at their return assisted the Archon in putting the\nSenate and the people or prerogative into motion, they abdicated the\nmagistracy both of orators and legislators.\n\n\n\n\nPART IV. THE COROLLARY\n\nFOR the rest (says Plutarch, closing up the story of Lycurgus) when he\nsaw that his government had taken root, and was in the very plantation\nstrong enough to stand by itself, he conceived such a delight within\nhim, as God is described by Plato to have done when he had finished the\ncreation of the world, and saw his own orbs move below him: for in the\nart of man (being the imitation of nature, which is the art of God)\nthere is nothing so like the first call of beautiful order out of chaos\nand confusion, as the architecture of a well-ordered commonwealth.\nWherefore Lycurgus, seeing in effect that his orders were good, fell\ninto deep contemplation how he might render them, so far as could be\neffected by human providence, unalterable and immortal. To which end he\nassembled the people, and remonstrated to them: That for aught he could\nperceive, their policy was already such, and so well established, as was\nsufficient to entail upon them and theirs all that virtue and felicity\nwhereof human life is capable: nevertheless that there being another\nthing of greater concern than all the rest, whereof he was not yet\nprovided to give them a perfect account, nor could till he had consulted\nthe oracle of Apollo, he desired that they would observe his laws\nwithout any change or alteration whatsoever till his return from\nDelphos; to which all the people cheerfully and unanimously engaged\nthemselves by promise, desiring him that he would make as much haste\nas he could. But Lycurgus, before he went, began with the kings and the\nsenators, and thence taking the whole people in order, made them all\nswear to that which they had promised, and then took his journey. Being\narrived at Delphos, he sacrificed to Apollo, and afterward inquired\nif the policy which he had established was good and sufficient for a\nvirtuous and happy life?\n\nBy the way, it has been a maxim with legislators not to give checks to\nthe present superstition, but to make the best use of it, as that which\nis always the most powerful with the people; otherwise, though Plutarch,\nbeing a priest, was interested in the cause, there is nothing plainer\nthan Cicero, in his book \u201cDe Divinatione\u201d has made it, that there was\nnever any such thing as an oracle, except in the cunning of the priests.\nBut to be civil to the author, the god answered to Lycurgus that\nhis policy was exquisite, and that his city, holding to the strict\nobservation of his form of government, should attain to the height of\nfame and glory. Which oracle Lycurgus causing to be written, failed not\nof transmitting to his Lacedaemon. This done, that his citizens might\nbe forever inviolably bound by their oath, that they would alter nothing\ntill his return, he took so firm a resolution to die in the place, that\nfrom thenceforward, receiving no manner of food, he soon after performed\nit accordingly. Nor was he deceived in the consequence; for his city\nbecame the first in glory and excellency of government in the whole\nworld. And so much for Lycurgus, according to Plutarch.\n\nMy Lord Archon, when he beheld not only the rapture of motion, but\nof joy and harmony, into which his spheres (without any manner of\nobstruction or interfering, but as if it had been naturally) were\ncast, conceived not less of exultation in his spirit; but saw no more\nnecessity or reason why he should administer an oath to the Senate and\nthe people that they would observe his institutions, than to a man\nin perfect health and felicity of constitution that he would not kill\nhimself. Nevertheless whereas Christianity, though it forbids violent\nhands, consists no less in self-denial than any other religion, he\nresolved that all unreasonable desires should die upon the spot; to\nwhich end that no manner of food might be left to ambition, he entered\ninto the Senate with a unanimous applause, and having spoken of his\ngovernment as Lycurgus did when he assembled the people, he abdicated\nthe magistracy of Archon. The Senate, as struck with astonishment,\ncontinued silent, men upon so sudden an accident being altogether\nunprovided of what to say; till the Archon withdrawing, and being almost\nat the door, divers of the knights flew from their places, offering as\nit were to lay violent hands on him, while he escaping, left the Senate\nwith the tears in their eyes, of children that had lost their father and\nto rid himself of all further importunity, retired to a country house of\nhis, being remote, and very private, insomuch that no man could tell for\nsome time what was become of him.\n\nThus the law-maker happened to be the first object and reflection of the\nlaw made; for as liberty of all things is the most welcome to a people,\nso is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than ingratitude.\nWe, accusing the Roman people of this crime against some of their\ngreatest benefactors, as Camillus, heap mistake upon mistake; for being\nnot so competent judges of what belongs to liberty as they were, we take\nupon us to be more competent judges of virtue. And whereas virtue, for\nbeing a vulgar thing among them, was of no less rate than jewels are\nwith such as wear the most, we are selling this precious stone, which\nwe have ignorantly raked out of the Roman ruins, at such a rate as the\nSwitzers did that which they took in the baggage of Charles of Burgundy.\nFor that Camillus had stood more firm against the ruin of Rome than her\ncapitol, was acknowledged; but on the other side, that he stood as firm\nfor the patricians against the liberty of the people, was as plain;\nwherefore he never wanted those of the people that would die at his foot\nin the field, nor that would withstand him to his beard in the city.\nAn example in which they that think Camillus had wrong, neither do\nthemselves right, nor the people of Rome; who in this signify no less\nthan that they had a scorn of slavery beyond the fear of ruin, which is\nthe height of magnanimity.\n\nThe like might be shown by other examples objected against this and\nother popular governments, as in the banishment of Aristides the Just\nfrom Athens, by the ostracism, which, first, was no punishment, nor\never understood for so much as a disparagement; but tended only to the\nsecurity of the commonwealth, through the removal of a citizen (whose\nriches or power with a party was suspected) out of harm\u2019s way for the\nspace of ten years, neither to the diminution of his estate or\nhonor. And next, though the virtue of Aristides might in itself be\nunquestioned, yet for him under the name of the Just to become universal\numpire of the people in all cases, even to the neglect of the legal ways\nand orders of the commonwealth, approached so much to the prince, that\nthe Athenians, doing Aristides no wrong, did their government no more\nthan right in removing him; which therefore is not so probable to have\ncome to pass, as Plutarch presumes, through the envy of Themistocles,\nseeing Aristides was far more popular than Themistocles, who soon after\ntook the same walk upon a worse occasion. Wherefore as Machiavel,\nfor anything since alleged, has irrefragably proved that popular\ngovernments are of all others the least ungrateful, so the obscurity,\nI say, into which my Lord Archon had now withdrawn himself caused a\nuniversal sadness and clouds in the minds of men upon the glory of his\nrising commonwealth.\n\nMuch had been ventilated in private discourse, and the people (for\nthe nation was yet divided into parties that had not lost their\nanimosities), being troubled, bent their eyes upon the Senate,\nwhen after some time spent in devotion, and the solemn action of\nthanksgiving, his Excellency Navarchus de Paralo in the tribe of Dorean,\nlord strategus of Oceana (though in a new commonwealth a very prudent\nmagistrate) proposed his part or opinion in such a manner to the Council\nof State, that, passing the ballot of the same with great unanimity\nand applause, it was introduced into the Senate, where it passed with\ngreater. Wherefore the decree being forthwith printed and published,\ncopies were returned by the secretaries to the phylarchs (which is the\nmanner of promulgation) and the commissioners of the seal, that is\nto say, the Right Honorable Phosphorus de Auge in the tribe of Eudia,\nDolabella d\u2019Enyo in the tribe of Turmae, and Linceus de Stella in the\ntribe of Nubia, being elected proposers pro tempore, bespoke of the\ntribunes a muster of the people to be held that day six weeks, which was\nthe time allowed for promulgation at the halo.\n\nThe satisfaction which the people throughout the tribes received upon\npromulgation of the decree, loaded the carriers with weekly letters\nbetween friend and friend, whether magistrates or private persons. But\nthe day for proposition being come, and the prerogative upon the place\nappointed in discipline, Sanguine de Ringwood in the tribe of Saltum,\ncaptain of the Phoenix, marched by order of the tribunes with his troop\nto the piazza of the Pantheon, where his trumpets, entering into the\ngreat hall, by their blazon gave notice of his arrival; at which the\nsergeant of the house came down, and returning, in formed the proposers,\nwho descending, were received at the foot of the stairs by the captain,\nand attended to the coaches of state, with which Calcar de Gilvo in\nthe tribe of Phalera, master of the horse, and the ballotins upon their\ngreat horses, stood waiting at the gate.\n\nThe proposers being in their coaches, the train for the pomp, the same\nthat is used at the reception of ambassadors, proceeded in this order.\nIn the front marched the troop with the cornet in the van and the\ncaptain in the rear; next the troop came the twenty messengers or\ntrumpets, the ballotins upon the curvet with their usher in the van,\nand the master of the horse in the rear; next the ballotins, Bronchus de\nRauco, in the tribe of Bestia, king of the heralds, with his fraternity\nin their coats-of-arms, and next to Sir Bronchus, Boristhenes de\nHoliwater in the tribe of Ave, master of the ceremonies; the mace and\nthe seal of the chancery went immediately before the coaches, and\non either side, the doorkeepers or guard of the Senate, with their\npole-axes, accompanied with some 300 or 400 footmen belonging to the\nknights or senators, the trumpeters, ballotins, guards, postilions,\ncoachmen and footmen, being very gallant in the liveries of the\ncommonwealth, but all, except the ballotins, without hats, in lieu\nwhereof they wore black velvet calots, being pointed with a little peak\nat the forehead. After the proposers came a long file of coaches full of\nsuch gentlemen as use to grace the commonwealth upon the like occasions.\nIn this posture they moved slowly through the streets (affording, in the\ngravity of the pomp and the welcomeness of the end, a most reverend and\nacceptable prospect to the people all the way from the Pantheon,\nbeing about half a mile) and arrived at the halo, where they found the\nprerogative in a close body environed with scaffolds that were covered\nwith spectators. The tribunes received the proposers, and conducted them\ninto a seat placed in the front of the tribe, like a pulpit, but that it\nwas of some length, and well adorned by the heralds with all manner of\nbirds and beasts, except that they were ill-painted, and never a one of\nhis natural color. The tribunes were placed at a table that stood below\nthe long seat, those of the horse in the middle, and those of the foot\nat either end, with each of them a bowl or basin before him, that on the\nright hand being white, and the other green: in the middle of the table\nstood a third, which was red. And the housekeepers of the pavilion, who\nhad already delivered a proportion of linen balls or pellets to\nevery one of the tribe, now presented boxes to the ballotins. But the\nproposers as they entered the gallery, or long seat, having put off\ntheir hats by way of salutation, were answered by the people with a\nshout; whereupon the younger commissioners seated themselves at either\nend; and the first, standing in the middle, spoke after this manner:\n\n\u201cMY LORDS, THE PEOPLE OF OCEANA:\n\n\u201cWhile I find in myself what a felicity it is to salute you by this\nname, and in every face, anointed as it were with the oil of gladness,\na full and sufficient testimony of the like sense, to go about to feast\nyou with words, who are already filled with that food of the mind which,\nbeing of pleasing and wholesome digestion, takes in the definition of\ntrue joy, were a needless enterprise. I shall rather put you in mind\nof that thankfulness which is due, than puff you up with anything that\nmight seem vain. Is it from the arms of flesh that we derive these\nblessings? Behold the Commonwealth of Rome falling upon her own\nvictorious sword. Or is it from our own wisdom, whose counsels had\nbrought it even to that pass, that we began to repent ourselves of\nvictory? Far be it from us, my lords, to sacrifice to our own nets,\nwhich we ourselves have so narrowly escaped! Let us rather lay our\nmouths in the dust, and look up (as was taught the other day when we\nwere better instructed in this lesson) to the hills with our gratitude.\nNevertheless, seeing we read how God upon the neglect of his prophets\nhas been provoked to wrath, it must needs follow that he expects\nhonor should be given to them by whom he has chosen to work as his\ninstruments. For which cause, nothing doubting of my warrant, I shall\nproceed to that which more particularly concerns the present occasion,\nthe discovery of my Lord Archon\u2019s virtues and merit, to be ever placed\nby this nation in their true meridian.\n\n\u201cMy lords, I am not upon a subject which persuades me to balk, but\nnecessitates me to seek out the greatest examples. To begin with\nAlexander, erecting trophies common to his sword and the pestilence: to\nwhat good of mankind did he infect the air with his heap of carcasses?\nThe sword of war, if it be any otherwise used than as the sword of\nmagistracy, for the fear and punishment of those that do evil, is as\nguilty in the sight of God as the sword of a murderer; nay more, for if\nthe blood of Abel, of one innocent man, cried in the ears of the Lord\nfor vengeance, what shall the blood of an innocent nation? Of this kind\nof empire, the throne of ambition, and the quarry of a mighty hunter, it\nhas been truly said that it is but a great robbery. But if Alexander\nhad restored the liberty of Greece, and propagated it to mankind, he had\ndone like my Lord Archon, and might have been truly called the Great.\nAlexander cared not to steal a victory that would be given; but my Lord\nArchon has torn away a victory which had been stolen, while we went\ntamely yielding up obedience to a nation reaping in our fields,\nwhose fields he has subjected to our empire, and nailed them with his\nvictorious sword to their native Caucasus.\n\n\u201cMachiavel gives a handsome caution: \u2018Let no man,\u2019 says he, \u2018be\ncircumvented with the glory of Caesar, from the false reflection of\ntheir pens, who through the longer continuance of his empire in the name\nthan in the family, changed their freedom for flattery. But if a man\nwould know truly what the Romans thought of Caesar, let them observe\nwhat they said of Catiline.\u2019\u201d And yet by how much he who has perpetrated\nsome heinous crime is more execrable than he who did but attempt it, by\nso much is Caesar more execrable than Catiline. On the contrary, let\nhim that would know what ancient and heroic times, what the Greeks and\nRomans would both have thought and said of my Lord Archon, observe what\nthey thought and said of Solon, Lycurgus, Brutus, and Publicola. And yet\nby how much his virtue, that is crowned with the perfection of his work,\nis beyond theirs, who were either inferior in their aim, or in their\nperformance; by so much is my Lord Archon to be preferred before Solon,\nLycurgus, Brutus, and Publicola.\n\n\u201cNor will we shun the most illustrious example of Scipio: this\nhero, though never so little less, yet was he not the founder of a\ncommonwealth; and for the rest, allowing his virtue to have been of the\nmost untainted ray in what did it outshine this of my Lord Archon? But\nif dazzling the eyes of the magistrates it overawed liberty, Rome might\nbe allowed some excuse that she did not like it, and I, if I admit not\nof this comparison: for where is my Lord Archon? Is there a genius, how\nfree soever, which in his presence would not find itself to be under\npower? He is shrunk into clouds, he seeks obscurity in a nation that\nsees by his light. He is impatient of his own glory, lest it should\nstand between you and your liberty.\u201d\n\nLiberty! What is even that, if we may not be grateful? And if we may, we\nhave none: for who has anything that he does not owe? My lords, there be\nsome hard conditions of virtue: if this debt were exacted, it were not\ndue; whereas being cancelled, we are all entered into bonds. On the\nother side, if we make such a payment as will not stand with a free\npeople, we do not enrich my Lord Archon, but rob him of his whole estate\nimmense glory.\n\n\u201cThese particulars had in due deliberation and mature debate, according\nto the order of this commonwealth, it is proposed by authority of the\nSenate, to you my lords the people of Oceana:\n\n\u201cI. That the dignity and office of Archon, or protector of the\ncommonwealth of Oceana, be and are hereby conferred, by the Senate\nand the people of Oceana, upon the most illustrious Prince and sole\nlegislator of this commonwealth, Olphaus Megaletor, pater patrioe, whom\nGod preserve, for the term of his natural life, yet remaining of the\nancient.\n\n\u201cII. That \u00a3350,000 per annum revenue, be estated upon the said\nillustrious Prince, or Lord Archon, for the said term, and to the proper\nand peculiar use of his Highness.\n\n\u201cIII. That the Lord Archon have the reception of all foreign ambassadors,\nby and with the Council of State, according to the orders of this\ncommonwealth.\n\n\u201cIV. That the Lord Archon have a standing army of 12,000 defrayed upon a\nmonthly tax, during the term of three years, for the protection of this\ncommonwealth against dissenting parties, to be governed, directed, and\ncommanded by and with the advice of the Council of War, according to the\norders of this commonwealth.\n\n\u201cV. That this commonwealth make no distinction of persons or parties,\nbut every man being elected and sworn, according to the orders of the\nsame, be equally capable of magistracy, or not elected, be equally\ncapable of liberty, and the enjoyment of his estate free from all other\nthan common taxes.\n\n\u201cVI. That a man putting a distinction upon himself, refusing oath upon\nelection, or declaring himself of a party not conformable to the civil\ngovernment, may within any time of his the three years\u2019 standing of\nthe army transport himself and his estate, without molestation or\nimpediment, into any other nation.\n\n\u201cVII. That in case there remains any distinction of parties not\nconforming to the civil government of this commonwealth, after the\nthree years of the standing army being expired, and the commonwealth\nbe thereby forced to prolong the term of the said army, the pay from\nhenceforth of the said army be levied upon the estates of such parties\nso remaining unconformable to the civil government.\u201d\n\nThe proposer having ended his oration, the trumpets sounded; and the\ntribunes of the horse being mounted to view the ballot, caused the tribe\n(which thronging up to the speech, came almost round the gallery)\nto retreat about twenty paces, when Linceus de Stella, receiving the\npropositions, repaired with Bronchus de Rauco the herald, to a little\nscaffold erected in the middle of the tribe, where he seated himself,\nthe herald standing bare upon his right hand. The ballotins, having\ntheir boxes ready, stood before the gallery, and at the command of the\ntribunes marched, one to every troop on horseback, and one to every\ncompany on foot, each of them being followed by other children that bore\nred boxes: now this is putting the question whether the question should\nbe put. And the suffrage being very suddenly returned to the tribunes at\nthe table, and numbered in the view of the proposers, the votes were all\nin the affirmative, whereupon the red or doubtful boxes were laid aside,\nit appearing that the tribe, whether for the negative or affirmative,\nWas clear in the matter. Wherefore the herald began from the scaffold\nin the middle of the tribe, to pronounce the first proposition, and the\nballotins marching with the negative or affirmative only, Bronchus, with\nhis voice like thunder, continued to repeat the proposition over and\nover again, so long as it was in balloting. The like was done for every\nclause, till the ballot was finished, and the tribunes assembling, had\nsigned the points, that is to say, the number of every suffrage, as it\nwas taken by the secretary upon the tale of the tribunes, and in the\nsight of the proposers; for this may not be omitted: it is the pulse\nof the people. Now whereas it appertains to the tribunes to report the\nsuffrage of the people to the Senate, they cast the lot for this office\nwith three silver balls and one gold one; and it fell upon the Right\nWorshipful Argus de Crookhorn, in the tribe of Pascua, first tribune of\nthe foot. Argus, being a good sufficient man in his own country, was\nyet of the mind that he should make but a bad spokesman, and therefore\nbecame something blank at his luck, till his colleagues persuaded him\nthat it was no such great matter, if he could but read, having his paper\nbefore him. The proposers, taking coach, received a volley upon the\nfield, and returned in the same order, save that, being accompanied with\nthe tribunes, they were also attended by the whole prerogative to the\npiazza of the Pantheon, where, with another volley, they took their\nleaves. Argus, who had not thought upon his wife and children all the\nway, went very gravely up: and everyone being seated, the Senate by\ntheir silence seemed to call for the report, which Argus, standing up,\ndelivered in this wise:\n\n\u201cRIGHT HONORABLE LORDS AND FATHERS ASSEMBLED IN PARLIAMENT:\n\n\u201cSo it is, that it has fallen to my lot to report to your excellencies\nin the votes of the people, taken upon the 3d instant, in the first year\nof this commonwealth, at the halo; the Right Honorable Phosphorus de\nAuge in the tribe of Eudia, Dolabella d\u2019Enyo in the tribe of Turmae,\nand Linceus de Stella in the tribe of Nubia, lords commissioners of the\ngreat seal of Oceana, and proposers pro temporibus, together with my\nbrethren the tribunes, and myself being present. Wherefore these are to\ncertify to your fatherhoods, that the said votes of the people were as\nfollows, that is to say:\n\nTo the first proposition, nemine contradicente;\n\nTo the second, nemine contradicente;\n\nTo the third, the like;\n\nTo the fourth, 211, above half;\n\nTo the fifth, 201, above half;\n\nTo the sixth, 150, above half, in the affirmative;\n\nTo the seventh, nemine contradicente again, and so forth.\n\n\u201cMy Lords, it is a language that is out of my prayers, and if I be out\nat it, no harm--\n\n\u201cBut as concerning my Lord Archon (as I was saying) these are to signify\nto you the true-heartedness and goodwill which are in the people, seeing\nby joining with you, as one man, they confess that all they have to give\nis too little for his highness. For truly fathers, if he who is able to\ndo harm, and does none, may well be called honest; what shall we say to\nmy Lord Archon\u2019s highness, who having had it in his power to have done\nus the greatest mischief that ever befell a poor nation, so willing\nto trust such as they thought well of, has done us so much good, as\nwe should never have known how to do ourselves? Which was so sweetly\ndelivered by my Lord Chancellor Phosphorus to the people, that I dare\nsay there was never a one of them could forbear to do as I do-and, it\nplease your fatherhoods, they be tears of joy. Aye, my Lord Archon shall\nwalk the streets (if it be for his ease I mean) with a switch, while the\npeople run after him and pray for him; he shall not wet his foot; they\nwill strew flowers in his way; he shall sit higher in their hearts,\nand in the judgment of all good men, than the kings that go upstairs\nto their seats; and one of these had as good pull two or three of his\nfellows out of their great chairs as wrong him or meddle with him; he\nhas two or three hundred thousand men, that when you say the word, shall\nsell themselves to their shirts for him, and die at his foot. His pillow\nis of down, and his grave shall be as soft, over which they that are\nalive shall wring their hands. And to come to your fatherhoods, most\ntruly so called, as being the loving parents of the people, truly you\ndo not know what a feeling they have of your kindness, seeing you are so\nbound up, that if there comes any harm, they may thank themselves. And,\nalas! poor souls, they see that they are given to be of so many minds,\nthat though they always mean well, yet if there comes any good, they\nmay thank them that teach them better. Wherefore there was never such a\nthing as this invented, they do verily believe that it is no other than\nthe same which they always had in their very heads, if they could\nhave but told how to bring it out. As now for a sample: my lords the\nproposers had no sooner said your minds, than they found it to be that\nwhich heart could wish. And your fatherhoods may comfort yourselves,\nthat there is not a people in the world more willing to learn what is\nfor their own good, nor more apt to see it, when you have showed it\nthem. Wherefore they do love you as they do their own selves; honor you\nas fathers; resolve to give you as it were obedience forever, and so\nthanking you for your most good and excellent laws, they do pray for\nyou as the very worthies of the land, right honorable lords and fathers\nassembled in Parliament.\u201d\n\nArgus came off beyond his own expectation; for thinking right, and\nspeaking as he thought, it was apparent by the house and the thanks they\ngave him, that they esteemed him to be absolutely of the best sort of\norators; upon which having a mind that till then misgave him, he became\nvery crounse, and much delighted with that which might go down the next\nweek in print to his wife and neighbors. Livy makes the Roman tribunes\nto speak in the same style with the consuls, which could not be, and\ntherefore for aught in him to the contrary, Volero and Canuleius might\nhave spoken in no better style than Argus. However, they were not\ncreated the first year of the commonwealth; and the tribunes of Oceana\nare since become better orators than were needful. But the laws being\nenacted, had the preamble annexed, and were delivered to Bronchus, who\nloved nothing in the earth so much as to go staring and bellowing up\nand down the town, like a stag in a forest, as he now did, with his\nfraternity in their coats-of-arms, and I know not how many trumpets,\nproclaiming the act of parliament; when, meeting my Lord Archon, whom\nfrom a retreat that was without affectation, as being for devotion only\nand to implore a blessing by prayer and fasting upon his labors, now\nnewly arrived in town, the herald of the tribe of Bestia set up his\nthroat, and having chanted out his lesson, passed as haughtily by him as\nif his own had been the better office, which in this place was very well\ntaken, though Bronchus for his high mind happened afterward upon some\ndisasters, too long to tell, that spoiled much of his embroidery.\n\nMy Lord Archon\u2019s arrival being known, the signory, accompanied by the\ntribunes, repaired to him, with the news he had already heard by the\nherald, to which my lord strategus added that his highness could not\ndoubt upon the demonstrations given, but the minds of men were firm in\nthe opinion that he could be no seeker of himself in the way of earthly\npomp and glory, and that the gratitude of the Senate and the people\ncould not therefore be understood to have any such reflection upon him.\nBut so it was, that in regard of dangers abroad, and parties at home,\nthey durst not trust themselves without a standing army, nor a standing\narmy in any man\u2019s hands but those of his highness.\n\nThe Archon made answer, that he ever expected this would be the sense\nof the Senate and the people; and this being their sense, he should have\nbeen sorry they had made choice of any other than himself for a standing\ngeneral; first, because it could not have been more to their own safety,\nand secondly because so long as they should have need of a standing\narmy, \u2018his work was, not done, that he would not dispute against\nthe judgment of the Senate and the people, nor ought that to be.\nNevertheless, he made little doubt but experience would show every party\ntheir own interest in this government, and that better improved\nthan they could expect from any other; that men\u2019s animosities should\noverbalance their interest for any time was impossible, that humor could\nnever be lasting, nor through the constitution of the government of any\neffect at the first charge. For supposing the worst, and that the people\nhad chosen no other into the Senate and the prerogative than royalists,\na matter of 1,400 men must have taken their oaths at their election,\nwith an intention to go quite contrary not only to their oaths so taken,\nbut to their own interest; for being estated in the sovereign power,\nthey must have decreed it from themselves (such an example for which\nthere was never any experience, nor can there be any reason), or holding\nit, it must have done in their hands as well every wit as in any other.\nFurthermore, they must have removed the government from a foundation\nthat apparently would hold, to set it upon another which apparently\nwould not hold; which things if they could not come to pass, the Senate\nand the people consisting wholly of royalists, much less by a parcel of\nthem elected. But if the fear of the Senate and of the people derived\nfrom a party without, such a one as would not be elected, nor engage\nthemselves to the commonwealth by an oath; this again must be so large,\nas would go quite contrary to their own interest, they being as free and\nas fully estated in their liberty as any other, or so narrow that they\ncould do no hurt, while the people being in arms, and at the beck of the\nstrategus, every tribe would at any time make a better army than such\na party; and there being no parties at home, fears from abroad would\nvanish. But seeing it was otherwise determined by the Senate and the\npeople, the best course was to take that which they held the safest, in\nwhich, with his humble thanks for their great bounty, he was resolved to\nserve them with all duty and obedience.\n\nA very short time after the royalists, now equal citizens, made good\nthe Archon\u2019s judgment, there being no other that found anything near so\ngreat a sweet in the government. For he who has not been acquainted with\naffliction, says Seneca, knows but half the things of this world.\n\nMoreover they saw plainly, that to restore the ancient government they\nmust cast up their estates into the hands of 300 men; wherefore in case\nthe Senate and the prerogative, consisting of 1,300 men, had been all\nroyalists, there must of necessity have been, and be forever, 1,000\nagainst this or any such vote. But the Senate, being informed by the\nsignory that the Archon had accepted of his dignity and office, caused\na third chair to be set for his Highness, between those of the strategus\nand the orator in the house, the like at every council; to which he\nrepaired, not of necessity, but at his pleasure, being the best, and as\nArgus not vainly said, the greatest prince in the world; for in the\npomp of his court he was not inferior to any, and in the field he was\nfollowed with a force that was formidable to all. Nor was there a cause\nin the nature of this constitution to put him to the charge of guards,\nto spoil his stomach or his sleep: insomuch, as being handsomely\ndisputed by the wits of the academy, whether my Lord Archon, if he had\nbeen ambitious, could have made himself so great, it was carried\nclear in the negative; not only for the reasons drawn from the present\nbalance, which was popular, but putting the case the balance had been\nmonarchical. For there be some nations, whereof this is one, that will\nbear a prince in a commonwealth far higher than it is possible for them\nto bear a monarch. Spain looked upon the Prince of Orange as her most\nformidable enemy; but if ever there be a monarch in Holland, he will\nbe the Spaniard\u2019s best friend. For whereas a prince in a commonwealth\nderives his greatness from the root of the people, a monarch derives his\nfrom one of those balances which nip them in the root; by which means\nthe Low Countries under a monarch were poor and inconsiderable, but in\nbearing a prince could grow to a miraculous height, and give the\nglory of his actions by far the upper hand of the greatest king in\nChristendom. There are kings in Europe, to whom a king of Oceana would\nbe put a petit companion. But the Prince of this commonwealth is the\nterror and judge of them all.\n\nThat which my Lord Archon now minded most was the agrarian, upon which\ndebate he incessantly thrust the Senate and the Council of State, to the\nend it might be planted upon some firm root, as the main point and basis\nof perpetuity to the commonwealth.\n\nAnd these are some of the most remarkable passages that happened in the\nfirst year of this government. About the latter end of the second, the\narmy was disbanded, but the taxes continued at \u00a330,000 a month, for\nthree years and a half. By which means a piece of artillery was planted,\nand a portion of land to the value of \u00a350 a year purchased for the\nmaintenance of the games, and of the prize arms forever, in each\nhundred.\n\nWith the eleventh year of the commonwealth, the term of the excise,\nallotted for the maintenance of the Senate and the people and for the\nraising of a public revenue, expired. By which time the Exchequer, over\nand above the annual salaries, amounting to \u00a3300,000 accumulating every\nyear out of \u00a31,000,000 income, \u00a3700,000 in banco, brought it with a\nproduct of the sum, rising to about \u00a38,000,000 in the whole: whereby at\nseveral times they had purchased to the Senate and the people \u00a3400,000\nper annum solid revenue; which, besides the lands held in Panopea,\ntogether with the perquisites of either province, was held sufficient\nfor a public revenue. Nevertheless, taxes being now wholly taken off,\nthe excise, of no great burden (and many specious advantages not vainly\nproposed in the heightening of the public revenue), was very cheerfully\nestablished by the Senate and the people, for the term of ten years\nlonger, and the same course being taken, the public revenue was found in\nthe one-and-twentieth year of the commonwealth to be worth \u00a31,000,000\nin good land. Whereupon the excise was so abolished for the present,\nas withal resolved to be the best, the most fruitful and easy way of\nraising taxes, according to future exigencies.\n\nBut the revenue being now such as was able to be a yearly purchaser,\ngave a jealousy that by this means the balance of the commonwealth,\nconsisting in private fortunes, might be eaten out, whence this year is\nfamous for that law whereby the Senate and the people, forbidding any\nfurther purchase of lands to the public within the dominions of Oceana\nand the adjacent provinces, put the agrarian upon the commonwealth\nherself. These increases are things which men addicted to monarchy\nderide as impossible, whereby they unwarily urge a strong argument\nagainst that which they would defend. For having their eyes fixed upon\nthe pomp and expense, by which not only every child of a king, being\na prince, exhausts his father\u2019s coffers, but favorites and servile\nspirits, devoted to the flattery of those princes, grow insolent and\nprofuse, returning a fit gratitude to their masters, whom, while they\nhold it honorable to deceive, they suck and keep eternally poor:\nit follows that they do not see how it should be possible for a\ncommonwealth to clothe herself in purple, and thrive so strangely upon\nthat which would make a prince\u2019s hair grow through his hood, and not\nafford him bread. As if it were a miracle that a careless and prodigal\nman should bring \u00a310,000 a year to nothing, or that an industrious and\nfrugal man brings a little to \u00a310,000 a year. But the fruit of one man\u2019s\nindustry and frugality can never be like that of a commonwealth; first,\nbecause the greatness of the increase follows the greatness of the stock\nor principal; and, secondly, because a frugal father is for the most\npart succeeded by a lavish son; whereas a commonwealth is her own heir.\n\nThis year a part was proposed by the Right Honorable Aureus de Woolsack\nin the tribe of Pecus, first commissioner of the Treasury, to the\nCouncil of State, which soon after passed the ballot of the Senate\nand the people, by which the lands of the public revenue, amounting\nto \u00a31,000,000, were equally divided into \u00a35,000 lots, entered by their\nnames and parcels into a lot-book preserved in the Exchequer. And if\nany orphan, being a maid, should cast her estate into the Exchequer for\n\u00a31,400, the Treasury was bound by the law to pay her quarterly \u00a3200 a\nyear, free from taxes, for her life, and to assign her a lot for her\nsecurity; if she married, her husband was neither to take out the\nprincipal without her consent (acknowledged by herself to one of the\ncommissioners of the Treasury, who, according as he found it to be free,\nor forced, was to allow or disallow of it), nor any other way engage\nit than to her proper use. But if the principal were taken out, the\nTreasury was not bound to repay any more of it than \u00a31,000, nor might\nthat be repaid at any time, save within the first year of her marriage:\nthe like was to be done by a half or quarter lot respectively.\n\nThis was found to be a great charity to the weaker sex, and as some say,\nwho are more skilful in the like affairs than myself, of good profit to\nthe commonwealth.\n\nNow began the native spleen of Oceana to be much purged, and men not to\naffect sullenness and pedantism. The elders could remember that they had\nbeen youths. Wit and gallantry were so far from being thought crimes in\nthemselves, that care was taken to preserve their innocence. For which\ncause it was proposed to the Council for Religion by the Right Honorable\nCadiscus de Clero, in the tribe of Stamnum, first censor, that such\nwomen as, living in gallantry and view about the town, were of evil\nfame, and could not show that they were maintained by their own estates\nor industry, or such as, having estates of their own, were yet wasteful\nin \u2018their way of life, and of ill-example to others, should be obnoxious\nto the animadversion of the Council of Religion, or of the censors: in\nwhich the proceeding should be after this manner. Notice should be first\ngiven of the scandal to the party offending, in private: if there were\nno amendment within the space of six months, she should be summoned\nand rebuked before the said Council or censors; and, if after other six\nmonths it were found that neither this availed, she should be censored\nnot to appear at any public meetings, games, or recreations, upon\npenalty of being taken up by the doorkeepers or guards of the Senate,\nand by them to be detained, till for every such offence \u00a35 were duly\npaid for her enlargement.\n\nFurthermore, if any common strumpet should be found or any scurrility\nor profaneness represented at either of the theatres, the prelates for\nevery such offence should be fined \u00a320 by the said Council, and the\npoet, for every such offence on his part, should be whipped. This law\nrelates to another, which was also enacted the same year upon this\noccasion.\n\nThe youth and wits of the Academy having put the business so home in the\ndefence of comedies that the provosts had nothing but the consequences\nprovided against by the foregoing law to object, prevailed so far that\ntwo of the provosts of the Council of State joined in a proposition,\nwhich after much ado came to a law, whereby \u00a3100,000 was allotted for\nthe building of two theatres on each side of the piazza of the halo: and\ntwo annual magistrates called prelates, chosen out of the knights,\nwere added to the tropic, the one called the prelate of the buskin,\nfor inspection of the tragic scene called Melpomene; and the other the\nprelate of the sock, for the comic called Thalia, which magistrates had\neach \u00a3500 a year allowed out of the profits of the theatres; the rest,\nexcept \u00a3800 a year to four poets, payable into the Exchequer. A poet\nlaureate created in one of these theatres by the strategus, receives\na wreath of \u00a3500 in gold, paid out of the said profits. But no man\nis capable of this creation that had not two parts in three of the\nsuffrages at the Academy, assembled after six weeks\u2019 warning and upon\nthat occasion.\n\nThese things among us are sure enough to be censured, but not know the\nnature of a commonwealth; that they are free, and yet to curb the genius\nin a lawful recreation to which they are naturally is to tell a tale of\na tub. I have heard the Protestant ministers in France, by men that\nwere wise and of their own profession, much blamed in that they forbade\ndancing, a recreation to which the genius of that air is so inclining\nthat they lost many who would not lose that: nor do they less than blame\nthe former determination of rashness, who now gently connive at that\nwhich they had so roughly forbidden. These sports in Oceana are so\ngoverned, that they are pleasing for private diversion, and profitable\nto the public: for the theatres soon defrayed their own charge, and\nnow bring in a good revenue. All this is so far from the detriment\nof virtue, that it is to the improvement of it, seeing women that\nheretofore made havoc of their honor that they might have their\npleasures are now incapable of their pleasures if they lose their honor.\n\nAbout the one-and-fortieth year of the commonwealth, the censors,\naccording to their annual custom, reported the pillar of Nilus, by\nwhich it was found that the people were increased very near one-third.\nWhereupon the Council of War was appointed by the Senate to bring in a\nstate of war, and the treasurers the state of the Treasury. The state of\nwar, or the pay and charge of an army, was soon after exhibited by the\nCouncil in this account:\n\n     THE FIELD PAY OF A PARLIAMENTARY ARMY\n\n     The lord strategus, marching                \u00a310,000\n     Polemarches--\n\n     General of the horse...                   2,000\n\n     Lieutenant-general...                     2,000\n\n     General of the artillery....              1,000\n\n     Commissary-general...                     1,000\n\n     Major-general....                         1,000\n\n     Quartermaster-general...                  1,000\n     Two adjutants to the major-general...         1,000\n     Forty colonels.....                          40,000\n     100 captains of horse, at \u00a3500 a man...      50,000\n     300 captains of foot, at \u00a3300 a man...       90,000\n     100 cornets, at \u00a3100 a man....               10,000\n     300 ensigns, at \u00a350 a man....                15,000\n     800 Quartermasters, Sergeants, Trumpeters,\n\n     Drummers,                                20,000\n     10,000 horse, at 2s 6d per day each...      470,000\n     30,000 foot, at 1s per day each....         500,000\n     Chirurgeons...                                  400\n     40,000 auxiliaries, amounting to within a\n\n     little as much...                     1,100,000\n     The charge of mounting 20,000 horse..       300,000\n     The train of artillery, holding a 3d to\n\n     the whole                               900,000\n\n         Sum total                        \u00a33,514,400\n\n     Arms and ammunition are not reckoned, as those which are\n     furnished out of the store or arsenal of Emporium: nor wastage,\n     as that which goes upon the account of the fleet, maintained by\n     the customs; which customs, through the care of the Council for\n     Trade and growth of traffic, were long since improved to about\n     \u00a31,000,000 revenue. The house being thus informed of a state of\n     war, the commissioners brought in--\n\n     THE STATE OF THE TREASURY THIS PRESENT YEAR, BEING THE\n     ONE-AND-FORTIETH OF THE COMMONWEALTH\n\n     Received from the one-and-twentieth of the commonwealth:\n\n     By \u00a3700,000 a year in bank, with the product of the sum\n\n         rising..............\n     \u00a316,000,000\n\n     Expended from the one-and-twentieth of this commonwealth:\n\n      Imprimis, for the addition of arms for 100,000 men to\n\n     the arsenal, or tower of Emporium.........\n     \u00a31,000,000\n      For the storing of the same with artillery...\n     300,000\n      For the storing of the same with ammunition...\n     200,000\n      For beautifying the cities, parks, gardens, public walks,\n\n     and places for recreation of Emporium and Hiera, with\n\n     public buildings, aqueducts, statues,\n\n     and fountains, etc......\n     1,500,000\n      Extraordinary embassies...\n     150,000\n\n     Sum........\n     \u00a33,150,000\n\n      Remaining in the Treasury, the salaries of the\n\n     Exchequer being defalked.......\n     \u00a312,000,000\n\nBy comparison of which accounts if a war with an army of 80,000 men were\nto be made by the penny, yet was the commonwealth able to maintain such\na one above three years without levying a tax. But it is against all\nexperience, sense, and reason that such an army should not be soon\nbroken, or make a great progress; in either of which cases, the charge\nceases; or rather if a right course be taken in the latter, profit comes\nin: for the Romans had no other considerable way but victory whereby to\nfill their treasury, which nevertheless was seldom empty. Alexander\ndid not consult his purse upon his design for Persia: it is observed by\nMachiavel, that Livy, arguing what the event in reason must have been\nhad that King invaded Rome, and diligently measuring what on each\nside was necessary to such a war, never speaks a word of money. No\nman imagines that the Gauls, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Lombards, Saxons,\nNormans, made their inroads or conquests by the strength of the purse;\nand if it be thought enough, according to the dialect of our age, to say\nin answer to these things that those times are past and gone: what money\ndid the late Gustavus, the most victorious of modern princes, bring out\nof Sweden with him into Germany? An army that goes upon a golden leg\nwill be as lame as if it were a wooden one; but proper forces have\nnerves and muscles in them, such for which, having \u00a34,000,000 or\n\u00a35,000,000, a sum easy enough, with a revenue like this of Oceana, to be\nhad at any time in readiness, you need never, or very rarely, charge the\npeople with taxes. What influence the commonwealth by such arms has had\nupon the world, I leave to historians, whose custom it has been of old\nto be as diligent observers of foreign actions as careless of those\ndomestic revolutions which (less pleasant it may be, as not partaking\nso much of the romance) are to statesmen of far greater profit; and this\nfault, if it be not mine, is so much more frequent with modern writers,\nas has caused me to undertake this work; on which to give my own\njudgment, it is performed as much above the time I have been about it,\nas below the dignity of the matter.\n\nBut I cannot depart out of this country till I have taken leave of my\nLord Archon, a prince of immense felicity who having built as high with\nhis counsels as he digged deep with his sword, had now seen fifty years\nmeasured with his own unerring orbs.\n\nTimoleon (such a hater of tyrants that, not able to persuade his brother\nTimophanes to relinquish the tyranny of Corinth, he slew him) was\nafterward elected by the people (the Sicilians groaning to them from\nunder the like burden) to be sent to their relief: whereupon Teleclides,\nthe man at that time of most authority in the Commonwealth of Corinth,\nstood up, and giving an exhortation to Timoleon, how he should behave\nhimself in this expedition, told him that if he restored the Sicilians\nto liberty, it would be acknowledged that he destroyed a tyrant; if\notherwise, he must expect to hear he had murdered a king. Timoleon,\ntaking his leave with a very small provision for so great a design,\npursued it with a courage not inferior to, and a felicity beyond, any\nthat had been known to that day in mortal flesh, having in the space\nof eight years utterly rooted out of all Sicily those weeds of tyranny,\nthrough the detestation whereof men fled in such abundance from their\nnative country that whole cities were left desolate, and brought it\nto such a pass that others, through the fame of his virtues and the\nexcellency of the soil, flocked as fast from all quarters to it as to\nthe garden of the world: while he, being presented by the people of\nSyracuse with his town-house and his country retreat, the sweetest\nplaces in either, lived with his wife and children a most quiet, happy,\nand holy life; for he attributed no part of his success to himself, but\nall to the blessing and providence of the gods. As he passed his time\nin this manner, admired and honored by mankind, Laphistius, an envious\ndemagogue, going to summon him upon some pretence or other to answer for\nhimself before the assembly, the people fell into such a mutiny as could\nnot be appeased but by Timoleon, who, understanding the matter, reproved\nthem, by repeating the pains and travel which he had gone through, to\nno other end than that every man might have the free use of the laws.\nWherefore when Daemenetus, another demagogue, had brought the same\ndesign about again, and blamed him impertinently to the people for\nthings which he did when he was general, Timoleon answered nothing,\nbut raising up his hands, gave the gods thanks for their return to his\nfrequent prayers, that he might but live to see the Syracusans so free,\nthat they could question whom they pleased.\n\nNot long after, being old, through some natural imperfection, he fell\nblind; but the Syracusans by their perpetual visits held him, though he\ncould not see, their greatest object: if there arrived strangers, they\nbrought him to see this sight. Whatever came in debate at the assembly,\nif it were of small consequence, they determined it themselves; but if\nof importance, they always sent for Timoleon, who, being brought by his\nservants in a chair, and set in the middle of the theatre, there ever\nfollowed a great shout, after which some time was allowed for the\nbenedictions of the people; and then the matter proposed, when Timoleon\nhad spoken to it, was put to the suffrage; which given, his servants\nbore him back in his chair, accompanied by the people clapping their\nhands, and making all expressions of joy and applause, till, leaving him\nat his house, they returned to the despatch of their business. And this\nwas the life of Timoleon, till he died of age, and dropped like a mature\nfruit, while the eyes of the people were as the showers of autumn.\n\nThe life and death of my Lord Archon (but that he had his senses to the\nlast, and that his character, as not the restorer, but the founder of a\ncommonwealth, was greater) are so exactly the same, that (seeing by men\nwholly ignorant of antiquity I am accused of writing romance) I shall\nrepeat nothing: but tell you that this year the whole nation of Oceana,\neven to the women and children, were in mourning, where so great or\nsad a funeral pomp had never been seen or known. Some time after the\nperformance of the obsequies a Colossus, mounted on a brazen horse of\nexcellent fabric, was erected in the piazza of the Pantheon, engraved\nwith this inscription on the eastern side of the pedestal:\n\n             HIS NAME\n\n               IS AS\n\n          PRECIOUS OINTMENT\n\n     And on the wester with the following:\n\n             GRATA PATRIA\n\n     Piae et Perpetuae Memorie\n\n                  D.D.\n\n         OLPHAUS MEGALETOR\n\n     LORD ARCHON, AND SOLE LEGISLATOR\n\n      OF\n\n      OCEANA\n\n      PATER PATRIAE\n\n      Invincible in the Field     The Greatest of Captains\n      Inviolable in his Faith     The Best of Princes\n      Unfeigned in his Zeal       The Happiest of Legislators\n      Immortal in his Fame        The Most Sincere of Christians\n\n      Who setting the Kingdoms of Earth at Liberty,\n      Took the Kingdom of the Heavens by Violence.\n\n      Anno AEtat. suoe 116\n\n       Hujus Reipub. 50\n\n\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF OCEANA\n\nOCEANA is saluted by the panegyrist after this manner: \u201cO the most\nblessed and fortunate of all countries, Oceana! how deservedly has\nnature with the bounties of heaven and earth endued thee! Thy ever\nfruitful womb not closed with ice nor dissolved by the raging star;\nwhere Ceres and Bacchus are perpetual twins: thy woods are not the\nharbor of devouring beasts, nor thy continual verdure the ambush of\nserpents, but the food of innumerable herds and flocks presenting thee,\ntheir shepherdess, with distended dugs or golden fleeces. The wings of\nthy night involve thee not in the horror of darkness, but have still\nsome white feather; and thy day is (that for which we esteem life) the\nlongest.\u201d But this ecstasy of Pliny, as is observed by Bertius, seems\nto allude as well to Marpesia and Panopea, now provinces of this\ncommonwealth, as to Oceana itself.\n\nTo speak of the people in each of these countries. This of Oceana, for\nso soft a one, is the most martial in the whole world. \u201cLet States that\naim at greatness,\u201d says Verulamius, \u201ctake heed how their nobility and\ngentlemen multiply too fast, for that makes the common subject grow to\nbe a peasant and base swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a\ngentleman\u2019s laborer; just as you may see in coppice woods, if you leave\nthe staddels too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs\nand bushes; so in countries, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons\nwill be base; and you will bring it to that at last, that not the\nhundreth poll will be fit for a helmet, specially as to the infantry,\nwhich is the nerve of an army, and so there will be great population and\nlittle strength. This of which I speak has been nowhere better seen than\nby comparing of Oceana and France, whereof Oceana, though far less in\nterritory and population, has been nevertheless an overmatch, in regard\nthe middle people of Oceana make good solders, which the peasants in\nFrance do not.\u201d In which words Verulamius, as Machiavel has done before\nhim, harps much upon a string which he has not perfectly tuned, and that\nis, the balance of dominion or property, as it follows more plainly, in\nhis praise \u201cof the profound and admirable device of Panurgus, King of\nOceana, in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is,\nmaintained with such a proportion of land to them as may breed a subject\nto live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition, and to keep the\nplough in the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus,\nindeed,\u201d says he, \u201cyou shall attain to Virgil\u2019s character which he gives\nof ancient Italy.\u201d But the tillage, bringing up a good soldiery, brings\nup a good commonwealth; which the author in the praise of Panurgus did\nnot mind, nor Panurgus in deserving that praise; for where the owner of\nthe plough comes to have the sword, too, he will use it in defence of\nhis own; whence it has happened that the people of Oceana, in proportion\nto their property, have been always free. And the genius of this nation\nhas ever had some resemblance with that of ancient Italy, which was\nwholly addicted to commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the\ngreatest account of her rustic tribes, and to call her consuls from the\nplough; for in the way of parliaments, which was the government of this\nrealm, men of country lives have been still intrusted with the greatest\naffairs, and the people have constantly had an aversion to the ways of\nthe court. Ambition, loving to be gay and to fawn, has been a gallantry\nlooked upon as having something in it of the livery; and husbandry, or\nthe country way of life, though of a grosser spinning, as the best stuff\nof a commonwealth, according to Aristotle, such a one being the most\nobstinate assertress of her liberty and the least subject to innovation\nor turbulency. Wherefore till the foundations, as will be hereafter\nshown, were removed, this people was observed to be the least subject\nto shakings and turbulency of any; whereas commonwealths, upon which\nthe city life has had the stronger influence, as Athens, have seldom or\nnever been quiet, but at the best are found to have injured their own\nbusiness by overdoing it. Whence the urban tribes of Rome, consisting\nof the Turba forensis, and libertines that had received their freedom by\nmanumission, were of no reputation in comparison of the rustics. It\nis true that with Venice it may seem to be otherwise, in regard\nthe gentlemen (for so are all such called as have a right to that\ngovernment) are wholly addicted to the city life; but then the Turba\nforensis, the secretaries, Cittadini, with the rest of the populace,\nare wholly excluded. Otherwise a commonwealth consisting but of one city\nwould doubtless be stormy, in regard that ambition would be every man\u2019s\ntrade; but where it consists of a country, the plough in the hands of\nthe owner finds him a better calling, and produces the most innocent and\nsteady genius of a commonwealth, such as is that of Oceana.\n\nMarpesia, being the northern part of the same island, is the dry-nurse\nof a populous and hardy nation, but where the staddels have been\nformerly too thick, whence their courage answered not their hardiness,\nexcept in the nobility, who govern much after the manner of Poland, but\nthat the King was not elective till the people received their liberty;\nthe yoke of the nobility being broken by the commonwealth of Oceana,\nwhich in grateful return is thereby provided with an inexhaustible\nmagazine of auxiliaries.\n\nPanopea, the soft mother of a slothful and pusillanimous people, is a\nneighbor island, anciently subjected by the arms of Oceana; since almost\ndepopulated for shaking the yoke, and at length replanted with a new\nrace. But, through what virtues of the soil or vice of the air soever it\nbe, they come still to degenerate. Wherefore seeing it is neither likely\nto yield men fit for arms, nor necessary it should, it had been the\ninterest of Oceana so to have disposed of this province, being both rich\nin the nature of the soil, and full of commodious ports for trade, that\nit might have been ordered for the best in relation to her purse, which\nin my opinion, if it had been thought upon in time, might have been best\ndone by planting it with Jews, allowing them their own rites and laws;\nfor that would have brought them suddenly from all parts of the world,\nand in sufficient numbers. And though the Jews be now altogether for\nmerchandise, yet in the land of Canaan (except since their exile\nfrom whence they have not been landlords) they were altogether for\nagriculture; and there is no cause why a man should doubt, but having a\nfruitful country and excellent ports, too, they would be good at both.\nPanopea, well peopled, would be worth a matter of \u00a34,000,000 dry-rents;\nthat is, besides the advantage of the agriculture and trade, which,\nwith a nation of that industry, come at least to as much more. Wherefore\nPanopea, being farmed out to the Jews and their heirs forever, for the\npay of a provincial army to protect them during the term of seven years,\nand for \u00a32,000,000 annual revenue from that time forward, besides the\ncustoms, which would pay the provincial army, would have been a bargain\nof such advantage, both to them and this commonwealth, as is not to be\nfound otherwise by either. To receive the Jews after any other manner\ninto a commonwealth were to maim it; for they of all nations never\nincorporate, but taking up the room of a limb, are of no use office to\nthe body, while they suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural\nand useful member.\n\nIf Panopea had been so disposed of, that knapsack, with the Marpesian\nauxiliary, had been an inestimable treasure; the situation of these\ncountries being islands (as appears by Venice how advantageous such a\none is to the like government) seems to have been designed by God for\na commonwealth. And yet that, through the straitness of the place\nand defect of proper arms, can be no more than a commonwealth for\npreservation; whereas this, reduced to the like government, is a\ncommonwealth for increase, and upon the mightiest foundation that any\nhas been laid from the beginning of the world to this day.\n\n     \u201cIllam arcta capiens Neptunus compede stringit:\n      Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.\u201d\n\nThe sea gives law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana\ngives law to the sea.\n\nThese countries, having been anciently distinct and hostile kingdoms,\ncame by Morpheus the Marpesian, who succeeded by hereditary right to the\ncrown of Oceana, not only to be joined under one head, but to be cast,\nas it were by a charm, into that profound sleep, which, broken at length\nby the trumpet of civil war, has produced those effects that have given\noccasion to the preceding discourse, divided into four parts.\n\n\n\n\n\nEnd of Project Gutenberg\u2019s The Commonwealth of Oceana, by James Harrington","title":"The Commonwealth of Oceana","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":113329}