{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_28256/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_28256","id":"gutenberg_28256","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/28256","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Revelation"],"text":"Transcribed from the 1862 Wertheim, Macintosh and Hunt edition by David\nPrice, email ccx074@pglaf.org\n\n\n\n\n\n                                 THOUGHTS\n                                    ON\n                              A REVELATION.\n\n\n                                    BY\n                           S. J. JERRAM, M.A.,\n                        VICAR OF CHOBHAM, SURREY.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                                 LONDON:\n                      WERTHEIM, MACINTOSH AND HUNT,\n                           24, PATERNOSTER ROW,\n                 AND 23, HOLLES STREET, CAVENDISH SQUARE.\n\n                                  1862.\n\n\n\n\nABSTRACT OF CONTENTS.\n\n                                                                 PAGE.\n\nIntroductory: proposed mode of treating the subject                1-4\n1.--Knowledge of God needful                                         4\n   ,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained by direct perception of               5\n      God\n   ,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained, to a sufficient extent,              6\n      by exercise of natural faculties\n   ,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained by any implanted idea                 6\n   ,, ,, ,, therefore must be revealed                               8\n   Objection arising from non-universality of a                      8\n      Revelation answered\n2.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected              9\n      to be _given_\n   Revelation must have a distinctive character                      9\n   ,, ,, ,, must be authenticated to original recipients            10\n   ,, ,, ,, cannot convey a perfect knowledge of God                12\n   ,, ,, ,, must be limited by the object designed                  12\n   ,, ,, ,, must be limited also by the state of                    14\n      knowledge existing at the time when made\n   ,, ,, ,, must be, in some degree, phenomenal                     15\n   Such a Revelation appears to be the only one in                  16\n      accordance with man's position, and also adequate\n   Words as a medium of Revelation must be limited by               18\n      ideas already existing, which ideas are also limited by\n      experience\n   Anthropomorphic notions of God; the Infinite and                 19\n      Absolute\n   Ideas as a medium of Revelation; ideas and perceptions           20\n      distinguished, etc.\n   Perception as a medium of Revelation; not in itself              22\n      adequate\n3.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected             26\n      to be _recorded_, etc.\n   Exact verbal record considered; difference of                    26\n      languages, etc.\n   Distinction drawn as to meaning of \"exact verbal                 29\n      record\"\n   Divine and human elements in a Revelation; variety of            29\n      style, etc.\n   Considerations as to the precise manner of recording a           31\n      Revelation\n4.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected             32\n      to be _transmitted_\n5.--Some considerations as to the conditions under which            34\n      a professed Revelation may be properly _accepted_\n   Evidence to contemporaries: miracles, doctrines, etc.            34\n   Evidence to others                                               37\n   Observations as to believing: aid derived from others,           37\n      rapidity of mental processes, intuitions\n6.--Some considerations as to the Bible, as a professed             41\n      Revelation\n   Its pure morality, hold on public opinion, etc., mark            43\n      it out as _different_ from other books\n   Why a candid spirit is _especially_ needful for the              43\n      study of it\n   Its offer of supernatural aid considered                         45\n   Its offer of supernatural aid is in accordance with              46\n      the general beliefs as to Providence, and prayer\n\n\nTHOUGHTS ON A REVELATION.\n\n\nFew persons can have observed attentively the various phases of public\nopinion on religious subjects during the last twenty years or more,\nwithout noticing a growing tendency to the accumulation of difficulties\non the subject of Revelation.  Geology, ethnology, mythical\ninterpretation, critical investigation, and inquiries of other kinds,\nhave raised their several difficulties; and, in consequence, infidels\nhave rejoiced, candid inquirers have been perplexed, and even those who\nhave held with firmness decided views on the distinctive character of the\ninspiration of the Bible, have sometimes found it difficult to satisfy\ntheir minds entirely, and to see clearly the grounds of their\nconclusions.\n\nThe writer of these pages does not propose to attempt a detailed reply to\nthe various difficulties which have been raised.  Answers to objections\narising from the pursuit of particular sciences are most effectually\ngiven by those, who have made those sciences their study; nor can there\nbe any doubt that, if the book of nature and the Bible spring from the\nsame source, an increasing acquaintance with both will tend to show their\nharmony with each other, and to dispel the perplexities which have arisen\nfrom an imperfect acquaintance with either of them.  It may be observed,\ntoo, that, as it requires special knowledge on the part of a writer to\ncope with special difficulties; so also does it demand acquirements, but\nrarely found, on the part of the reader, to appreciate the real value,\nboth of the objections and answers which may be made on geological,\ncritical, or other special grounds.\n\nThe writer thinks that there is another method of reply--a method which\nconsists in giving as clear a view as can be had of the real character of\nthe subject against which the objections are made; and this is the kind\nof answer which he proposes to attempt.  The man who has a distinct and\nwell defined knowledge of chemical, mathematical, or any other science,\nwill not be greatly perplexed with difficulties which may be brought from\nother sciences, touching upon that with which he is acquainted.  The\nknowledge which he possesses of his own particular science will enable\nhim, in some instances, to perceive at once the weakness of the\nobjections which are alleged; and, even when this is not the case, he\nwill see such an harmonious proportion subsisting between the various\nparts of that branch of knowledge which he has been pursuing, and be so\nstrongly convinced of the certainty of it, that he will be justly\ndisposed to attribute to his own ignorance his inability to give\nsatisfactory replies to those difficulties which he cannot dispose of.\n_Real_ knowledge cannot of course be overthrown; and, although it is\noften difficult to decide what knowledge is of this description, the task\nof arriving at a tolerably correct conclusion with regard to such\nsubjects as fall within the range of our faculties, must not be regarded\nas an hopeless one.\n\nWhen clear definitions have been given, disputants have often found that\nthere is no further room for discussion; and, even when this is not the\ncase, the force of objections can, under such circumstances, be more\naccurately weighed, and the real points of attack and defence more\nclearly perceived.  If a man were to say, in a mixed company, that there\nwas no taste in an apple, many sensible men, unacquainted with his exact\nmeaning, might be inclined to dispute the assertion, and to say that the\nstatement was contrary to common experience; but, if he explained his\nmeaning to be, that taste is a quality of a sentient being, and that\nthere is nothing in the apple of this kind, or corresponding to it,\neverybody then would see the truth of his assertion, and all ground of\ndispute would be removed.  We will take another case.  Those who hold\nstrong Protestant views frequently say, that the \"religion of the Bible\nis the religion of Protestants.\" This, for most purposes, expresses their\nmeaning forcibly and well, and the mind, in practice, usually supplies\nthe necessary limitations.  It does not, however, always happen that\nthese limitations are consciously present to the mind, or that the person\nwho practically receives the right impression might not be greatly\npuzzled by the subtle reasonings of objectors.  The _dictum_, quoted\nabove, does not mean, as might at first sight appear, that we are to make\nuse of no other means than the Bible in the investigation of Divine\ntruth, and that the wisdom of the present and past ages is to go for\nnothing.  No one _could_ thus isolate himself from other influences; and,\nif he could, it would not be _desirable_.  What is really meant is, that\nall truth necessary for salvation is contained in the Bible, \"so that\nwhatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be\nrequired of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith,\"\netc.; in other words, that the Bible is the ultimate and sole standard of\nappeal.  This of course may be, and is disputed; but, when the statement\nis put in a clear and well defined shape, many apparent objections vanish\nat once, and the real points of attack and defence are made evident.  If,\nthen, we can obtain ideas, on the subject of revelation, which shall be,\nupon the whole, distinct, and worthy of being received as true, much will\nbe done to remove objections, and to satisfy a reasonable mind.\n\nThe proposed investigation will necessarily be, in some degree, of an _a\npriori_ character; not, however, as we trust, so much so as to render it\nvague and without practical value.  It will be _a priori_, inasmuch as it\nwill not assume the existence of a revelation, and then proceed to\nexamine its character.  This would be to beg the question at issue.  It\nwill not be _a priori_, so far as it consists in instituting an inquiry\ninto the faculties of the human mind, and their capacity to receive a\nrevelation; and into this it will be found that the investigation will\nmainly resolve itself.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n1.  We may commence our inquiry into the subject by noticing, _that a\nknowledge of God_, _to be obtained in some way or other_, _seems almost\nessential to the well-being of man_.  If it be granted, that there is\nsuch a Being--and few, it is presumed, would go so far as to deny\nthis--it must be of great importance for us to know the relationship in\nwhich that Being stands to us, and we to Him.  We can hardly suppose it\npossible that an Infinite Being, in some sense, as we suppose will be\ngenerally allowed, the Governor of the world, should not have an\nimportant relation to _all_ other existences; much less, that the\nrelation which He bears to _man_, the most noble existence of which we\nhave any actual experience, should be of an insignificant character.\nLooking, too, upon man as a free and moral agent, accountable, as\nconscience declares, for his actions to his fellow-men, it seems almost\ncertain that he must be also responsible for his acts in relation to the\nDeity.  The general belief of mankind, in all ages and in all places,\ntends to the same conclusion; and, if it be admitted that there is an\neternal world into which the consequences of our actions follow us, a\nknowledge of the relationship in which we stand to God becomes of still\ngreater importance.  But if this knowledge probably may be, and, should\nthe general belief of the world have a foundation in fact, certainly is,\nof great importance, it can hardly be supposed that a God of love would\nallow us to remain in ignorance of it; and the question arises, _how it\nis to be obtained_.\n\nIt may be observed, first of all, that _the Deity does not_, _like other\nobjects_, _come within the direct cognizance of our perceptive\nfaculties_.  We have an organization, by means of which we are enabled to\nperceive various objects around us; and, by travelling to other lands, we\ncan obtain a knowledge of many things of which we had before been\nignorant.  We perceive also what is going on within us.  The telescope\nand the microscope reveal to us wonders which, without their\nintervention, we could never have discovered.  But we cannot through the\ninstrumentality of any of our faculties perceive God.  Travel where we\nwill we cannot find Him out.  No appliance of art has availed to disclose\nHim to us.  If any philosophers conceive that they can intuitively gaze\nupon God, other philosophers declare their ignorance of any intuition of\nthis kind, and assuredly the common people, who most stand in need of\nclear notions on the subject, and who would hardly be neglected by a\nbeneficent God, are altogether unconscious of it.  The knowledge of Him,\ntherefore, if obtained at all, must be had in some other way.\n\nBut may not an adequate knowledge of God be obtained _by the exercise of\nthe faculties of the human mind upon external nature_, _or in some other\nway_?  The Apostle St. Paul says something which rather favours this\nview, when he declares that \"the invisible things of Him from the\ncreation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things\nthat are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are\nwithout excuse\" (Rom. i. 20): and we believe that a considerable insight\ninto the nature of God, and the probable character of His dealings with\nus may be obtained in the manner to which we have referred.  Still we\nhave only to look at the ever varying and degrading notions which have,\nat all times, prevailed in many parts of the world respecting the Divine\nBeing, to perceive that a more clear method of obtaining knowledge about\nHim would, to say the least of it, be a most valuable boon.  The method\nunder consideration has not practically issued as we might have hoped\nthat it would; and therefore there is reason to expect, that God might\nmake use of some more direct way of communicating to us a knowledge of\nHimself.\n\nAnother possible mode of communicating a knowledge of God would be, _by\nimplanting in the mind of man_, _an idea corresponding_, _so far as might\nbe needful_, _to the nature of God_.  But a belief in the existence of\nanything of this kind is open to several objections.  If such an idea\nexisted, it must, to answer the required end, be sufficiently clear and\nwell defined to give at least a tolerably accurate notion of the Deity,\nand must also bring with it a well-grounded conviction of its\ncorrespondence to the reality.  But the variety of opinions which have\nbeen entertained on the subject forbid us to believe that any such idea\nas this exists.  Search as far as we can into our own minds, we are\nunable to discover anything approaching to such a notion of the Divinity.\nIt appears too, that, notwithstanding some speculations as to time and\nspace, which, in the opinion of some, bear a slightly exceptional\ncharacter, there is no good reason to believe that we acquire other kinds\nof knowledge in the manner under consideration; and, if this be so, there\nis a strong presumption against a knowledge of the Deity being obtained\nin this way.\n\nAs however some confusion of mind not uncommonly prevails on this\nsubject, we will endeavour to explain our meaning more fully.  We\npossess, as it appears to us, certain capacities for obtaining knowledge,\nand for retaining, and disposing our knowledge, when obtained, in\ndifferent ways; but we are not born with the actual possession of\nknowledge; nor, so far as we can see, is knowledge, at any subsequent\ntime, obtained by us, except by means of the capabilities to which we\nhave referred.  We have by nature powers of knowing objects, both\nexternal to our organization, and internal; but the objects themselves,\nand not the representations of them, are presented to us before we know\nthem.  We are conscious of seeing, and smelling, and tasting, and\nfeeling, etc.; but they are the things themselves which we see, and\nsmell, and taste, and feel, in the first instance, although afterwards we\nare able to contemplate the representations of them which are formed in\nthe mind.  There is within us, no doubt, a capability of apprehending, in\na sufficient degree, the perfections of God, when they are declared to\nus; but a knowledge of these perfections does not naturally exist within\nus.  We conclude, then, that, as the Deity is not directly perceived by\nus, has not in practice been adequately discerned by any process of the\nmind, and is not made known to us by any connate, or subsequently\nimplanted idea, we must be indebted to revelation, in the main, for any\nknowledge we may obtain respecting Him.  We do not consider it necessary\nto enter into a discussion of Pantheistic views, inasmuch as we have yet\nto learn that Pantheism has ever furnished any definite ideas respecting\nthe nature of God which will bear the test of a close examination as to\ntheir reality.  We think, too, that it is destructive of the personality\nof either God, or man, or both, and thus does away with all real relation\nbetween the two.\n\nBefore proceeding to the investigation of what we mean by a revelation,\nwe will endeavour to answer an objection which may be raised.  It may be\nalleged that, if a true knowledge of God is of such great consequence to\nman, it appears strange that such differing opinions should have been\nheld on the subject, and that God's revelation--on the supposition that\nthere is one--should not have been more extensively promulgated, and\ndeclared with more irresistible evidence.  There is no doubt a difficulty\nhere.  It does not however attach _especially_ to the subject of a\nrevelation; but meets us at all points, when we consider the unequal\ndistribution of the blessings of nature.  Why many persons should be\ndestitute of the advantages which others enjoy, and why some should pass\na life of suffering, while others are surrounded with every comfort, are\nquestions which naturally arise in the minds of reflecting men, but which\nhave hitherto remained without full and satisfactory answers.  He who\nwould give a complete reply must have clearer views, than have yet been\nobtained, with regard to the origin of evil.  It may be observed too\nthat, on the supposition that the Bible is a real revelation from God,\nand bearing in mind the vast number of the human race to whom it has\nalready been given, and its capability of future communication, it far\nmore nearly meets the difficulty, than abstruse speculations respecting\nthe Deity, which can scarcely be apprehended even by philosophers, and\nwhich are to the mass wholly unintelligible.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n2.  Let us now examine _the conditions under which a revelation may be\nexpected to be given to the original recipients_.\n\nIt may be observed in the first place that a revelation _must possess\nsome distinctive character_.  Even, if it should turn out that there is\nno such thing in reality at all, at least the notion which we form in our\nminds must possess such points of difference as to distinguish it from\nall other notions.  It appears needful to bear this in mind, obvious\nthough it is, because there are not a few, in the present day, who\ndeprive the word, revelation, of nearly all the distinguishing features\nwhich have commonly been supposed to attach to it, and so extend the\nmeaning of the word inspiration as \"sometimes to believe it in poets,\nlegislators, philosophers, and others gifted with high genius,\" (Essays\nand Reviews, p. 140).  What this means it is hard to say.  Shakespeare,\nMilton, Newton, and others certainly did not imagine that they had direct\ncommunication with God; that they revealed to us His nature, and the\nrelation in which He stands to us; predicted future events, etc., in the\nsame sense that Moses, David, Isaiah, and the other writers of the Bible\nare supposed to have done.  If they actually did anything of this kind,\nthey were assuredly wholly unconscious of their power; nor, we may add,\nhas common opinion held that they afforded information on the same\nsubjects as those which the writers of the Bible handled.  Admirers of\nour poets, and philosophers, have not considered it necessary to\npromulgate what they have found in their writings, as matters in which\nthe spiritual, and, possibly, eternal interests of man are vitally\nconcerned; although believers in the Bible, and even in Mahomet, have\ndone so.  The word inspiration, in fact, as used in the passage above\nquoted, involves a confusion of ideas which we should hardly have\nexpected to find in the writings of any one who professed to speak\naccurately, and appears scarcely pardonable, or even honest, in the case\nof so acute a thinker, as the late Mr. Baden Powell.  We are not now\nsaying that the Bible is a revelation from God, or even that there is\nsuch a thing as a distinctive revelation at all.  All we assert is, that\nthe idea of such a thing is a very common one, and that it is very\ndifferent from that which is usually held with regard to the works of\nNewton, Milton, and other gifted sages and philosophers.  We might add,\nin passing, that, unless the Bible be an imposture--in which case it\nought to be regarded as far inferior to the works of genuine and truthful\npoets and philosophers--it does correspond, as we trust will be seen, on\nan examination of its contents, to the idea referred to.\n\nStill further, revelation must not only have some distinctive character;\nbut, in order to be effectual for its purpose, _it should carry along\nwith it_, _to the original recipients_, _a reasonable conviction of its\nauthenticity_.  The Bible speaks of several professed modes of\ncommunication, and accepting them according to the ordinary meaning of\nwords, and not in any mythical, or ideological sense, they appear to be\nsuch as might answer for the purpose of authentication.  The Lord talked\nwith Abraham.  He appeared in a burning bush to Moses, spake to him and\nthe children of Israel on Mount Sinai, and conversed with him afterwards\non the top of that mountain, during a period of forty days.  He spake in\nthe night to Samuel.  He appeared in a vision to Isaiah and others.  To\nsome He made Himself known in dreams.  Christ spake to His disciples.\nAll these are evidently ways in which God might communicate with man; and\nthere is no difficulty in supposing that the attendant circumstances,\nsuch for instance as some of those recorded in the Bible, might be of\nsuch a kind as to authenticate the communication.  It would be idle to\nargue that, because God does not make Himself known in any of these ways\nnow, He has never done so; for, to omit other considerations, we may\nobserve that, in accordance with the economy which prevails in the works\nof God, we have no reason to suppose that He would make special\nrevelations to more persons than might be necessary for the purpose He\nhad in view.  If He revealed Himself to them, the promulgation of the\nrevelation would be naturally and safely left to more ordinary\ninstrumentality.  At the present time, so far as Christians are\nconcerned, they do not expect a special revelation to themselves,\nbecause, as they believe, God has already communicated all that He\ndesires them to know.\n\nBut supposing a revelation to be sufficiently authenticated,--What may be\nreasonably expected as to the _extent_ of it?  It is, we think, clear in\nthe first place that _no perfect knowledge of God and His relation to us\ncould be communicated_.  Even if a direct presentation of the Infinite\nwere given, the capacity of man could not grasp it, and therefore the\nresult would be a finite conception; and, if the revelation were made by\nwords or other signs, it is plain that these can only express the finite\nideas of which they are the symbols.\n\nNor is there anything in this which need excite our surprise; for the\nlimited nature of our knowledge with regard to God would be analogous to\nthat which we have about other things.  There is nothing with regard to\nwhich our knowledge is not limited.  Some may be ready to affirm that we\ndo not know things in themselves at all, but only the effects produced\nupon us, or their relation to us.  We are not about to maintain this\nproposition; but it is at any rate plain that the most familiar objects,\nas science advances, often disclose to us new qualities, and that we have\nno reason to suppose that we are fully acquainted with all the qualities\nof even the simplest substances.  There is no reason to expect that the\nbook of revelation should be more explicit than that of nature.\n\nNot only, however, _must_ our knowledge, derived from revelation, be, in\nsome degree, limited; but it is not difficult to see, why _it would be\nprobably kept even within the range of what it is possible for us to\nknow_.  We can readily understand that the object of God in making a\nrevelation would be to inform us about those things only, a knowledge of\nwhich might be essential to our interests; and here again the analogy of\nthe natural world comes in to assist us.  God has given to each existence\nsuch qualities as are requisite for the position in which it is placed.\nAscending through the various classes of animals, we find, as we advance,\nthe capacities for knowledge increasing, and bearing a relation to their\nactual circumstances.  The mole is not endowed with the far-seeing vision\nwhich is essential to the well-being of the eagle: nor, on the other\nhand, has the eagle the power of threading its way through the earth,\nwithout which the mole could not exist.  Viewing man in relation to the\nnatural world, we find that he has the power of obtaining that kind of\nknowledge which is necessary to his welfare here, although, in many\nrespects, he is far surpassed by the keener perceptions of the inferior\nanimals.  God has in fact ordered and limited his knowledge with an\nexpress reference to the position which he is called upon to occupy.\nThis throws light upon the subject of revelation.  It is reasonable to\nexpect that God would limit the knowledge communicated in that way also,\nby a consideration of the state in which man is placed here, and of that\nwhich, upon the supposition of a future state, he is to occupy hereafter.\n\nSo far as we have yet gone, there does not appear to be any reason why\nthe knowledge, although limited, should not be accurate as far as it\ngoes.  Though we do not know all the properties of particular objects, we\nmay know some of them, and may also safely reason about those with which\nwe are acquainted, so long as we are careful not to introduce into the\nreasoning anything which does not result from our actual knowledge; and\nso, turning from nature to a revelation, we may learn much from it about\nGod, as for instance, that He is a God of love and holiness; that He will\nact towards us in a particular manner; that He will punish some actions\nand recompense others; and this knowledge also may be a true knowledge,\nso far as it goes, and one that we may safely act upon, although we may\nstill be in ignorance of His exact nature and many points of our\nrelationship to Him.\n\nThere is, however, a light in which revelation must be viewed, which\ninvolves considerations of a somewhat different character from those\nhitherto noticed, and to this we now turn.  A revelation must not only be\nlimited by the extent of the human capacity for receiving it, and by the\nproposed object of it, but also, in a considerable degree, by _the state\nof knowledge existing in the world at the time it is made_.  In fact,\nwithout some such limitation, it would be unintelligible, and,\nconsequently no revelation.  As this truth has frequently been\nmisapplied, we will endeavour to explain, as accurately as we can, our\nmeaning.  God could, perhaps, if He thought proper, give in an ignorant\nage a revelation, as full and explicit, as in a more enlightened\nperiod--a revelation we mean which should be understood--but it must be\nremembered that this could only be effected by altering the conditions\nunder which human knowledge is acquired.  For example, to have given a\ncorrect theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies, before the age of\nNewton, would have been impossible, without an entire change both in the\nexisting state of knowledge, and also in the method of acquiring it.\nDown to the present time all history and experience testify to the fact\nthat the acquisition of knowledge is _gradual_; but such a revelation, as\nthat to which we have referred, would require that it should be made _per\nsaltum_.  If knowledge were given in this way the usual course would be\ncompletely changed; and not only so, but the knowledge communicated would\nbe altogether out of proportion to that possessed on other points, and\nwould place those who had it in a false and unsatisfactory state with\nregard to the world in which they lived.  To see this we have only to\npicture to ourselves the condition of a man living in a savage, or only\npartially civilized state of society, with his mind preternaturally\nexpanded to that of a Newton, and put into possession of the knowledge\nwhich he had on some of those subjects which the Bible touches on.  How\nentirely out of harmony would he be with his fellow-men, and everything\naround him! and, how unable would he be even to pursue his studies for\nwant of those instruments, books, and appliances which a more advanced\nstate of society alone can produce!  A revelation of this kind would\nclearly not be a boon, but an injury to him.  It may be observed,\nmoreover, that a revelation, adapted to the knowledge even of a Newton,\nwould neither exactly correspond with facts, nor obviate all the\ndifficulties which a more enlightened age might discover.  We do not stop\nto dwell upon the obvious fact, that such a revelation, as that which we\nhave been noticing, would require not only a preternatural expansion of\nfaculties in the person to whom it was made, but also a similar\nexpansion, or, if not, a long educational process in the case of all\nthose who should receive it.  We conclude, then, that a revelation must\nbe adapted to, and in a great degree limited by, the state of knowledge\nexisting in the world at the time when such revelation is made.\n\nThis leads us to a consideration of the _necessarily phenomenal character\nof some portions of a revelation_, respecting which objections against\nthe Bible have been frequently raised.  We will, to explain our views,\ntake as an example, the familiar instance of the sun and earth.\nAccording to appearance the sun moves, and the earth is stationary: but\nscience has demonstrated that the opposite to this is the real state of\nthe case.  What line might it be expected that a revelation would take,\nwhen it had to deal with a case of this kind?  Should it speak according\nto appearances, or realities?  This, we believe, is the exact point to be\nconsidered, and we do not think, when fairly put, that it is one about\nwhich there is much difficulty.  If a revelation were given to an\nignorant people, in accordance with the reality, it is quite clear that\nthey would not be in a condition to receive it, and would therefore,\nprobably, reject it as absurd; but if the description were given\naccording to the appearance presented, then no difficulty would be felt.\nThe question, however, is pressed--whether such a mode of representation\nis consistent with the truthfulness which may be expected in a\nrevelation.\n\nIt might, we think, be a sufficient reply to say that, as, according to\nour former reasoning, it is, in many cases, the only possible mode of\nrevelation consistent with the established order of things, we may well\nbe content with it; but we will pursue the subject a little further, with\nthe view of making clear how the matter stands.  It may be observed that,\nif absolute truth on a particular subject cannot be communicated, the\nnearest approximation to it is, not only all that can be expected, but is\nin itself highly desirable.  If a man is unable to receive as full an\napprehension of a thing as we have ourselves, we must endeavour to give\nhim the most perfect information which he is capable of receiving.  We do\nnot injure him by doing this, but we should injure him if we omitted to\ndo it.  If a man, who had lived all his life in the Arctic regions, and\nhad never heard of any other country, were to be brought to England, it\nwould not be necessary to tell him, with a view to his comfort here, the\nmotion of the earth with regard to the sun, and the causes of the length\nof our days and nights, and of the variation of the seasons.  To enter\ninto these matters would confuse his mind, and the man, if he had to earn\nhis living, would starve while he was acquiring the knowledge of them.\nBy such a course of proceeding we should, in reality, do him a great\ninjustice.  Instead of attempting anything of the kind, we should\nnaturally give him such information as might be requisite for his\npractical guidance, in a popular manner, and leave to himself the\nacquisition of such scientific truth as he might be desirous of becoming\nacquainted with.  In a word, we should describe to him things as they\nappear to be, and in this respect our description would be, in a certain\nsense, true; we should not describe them as they really are, and so far\nour description would not be in strict accordance with the facts of the\ncase.  We were about to say that it is a choice of difficulties; but, is\nthere any real difficulty in the case?  Does not the common sense of\nmankind declare that the mode of proceeding which we have described is\nthe only proper one, and that there is no real untruthfulness in it?  It\nmay be noticed too that even scientific men continually make use of it\namongst themselves, and in their intercourse with others, and this\nwithout any charge of untruthfulness being brought against them.  What\nobjection then can possibly lie against the adoption of the same method\nin a revelation? {17}  The supposed object of a revelation is to save the\nsoul, or, at least, to advance in a material degree our spiritual\ninterests.  Is that to be put aside till the world has learnt scientific\ntruth, and is able to converse in scientific language?  We feel no\ndifficulty in leaving the answer to this question to the common sense of\nmankind in general.  We conclude, then, that as phenomenal truth is in\nmany cases the only truth which can possibly be afforded, and the\nimparting of it is a boon, and not an injury, there is no reason why the\nDeity should not, when He sees fit, make use of this mode of\ncommunication in revelation.\n\nWe will now notice, distinctly, _words as a medium of revelation_.  It is\nplain, that in communicating knowledge, they are only effectual by\ncalling up in the mind of the hearer ideas _already_ existing.  To speak\nto a man who has been blind from his birth, of colours would be useless,\nbecause he has had no experience of them, and consequently no ideas\ncorresponding to them.  Words may bring up ideas in a different\n_combination_ from any which had previously existed in the mind of the\nperson spoken to; but they cannot _create_ ideas.  They may make the\nhearer acquainted with something which he has never actually perceived;\nmay cause him to reason in a new manner; to see a familiar object in a\nfresh light, or, in some other way, bring the faculties of the mind into\nplay; but still the mind, so far as instruction by words is concerned,\ncan only act upon its previous stores, and analyze or combine them into\nnew forms.  This being the case, it is clear that a revelation, so far as\nit is made by words, must be limited by the ideas previously existing in\nthe mind of the person to whom it is made.  These ideas, too, however\nnumerous and refined they may be, are limited by the experience which a\nman has had of the external world, and of himself.  He cannot get beyond\nthese.  If, then, God should think fit to reveal, in words, a knowledge\nof Himself, or any other object which does not come within the direct\ncognizance of our perceptive faculties, this can only be effected by\ncalling up in the mind, through the words, some new combination of ideas\nalready possessed.  This may not correspond precisely with the object,\nrespecting which the revelation is made; but, as it is the only way in\nwhich a revelation by words can be effected, we have no just reason to\nfind fault with it.  All we have a right to expect, is that the words\nshould call up in the mind those ideas which best represent the object\ndesigned to be revealed.\n\nThis may tend to throw some light upon what are called anthropomorphic\nideas of God.  These have sometimes been spoken of as inadequate, and\ndegrading.  Inadequate they certainly are, as every notion which we can\nhave of the Deity must be; but we are unable to see in what way they are\ndegrading.  Almost every nation, following apparently the necessity of\nour nature, has clothed its gods in the objective form of some familiar\nanimal, or other existence, and endowed them with qualities of which they\nhad experience.  What wonder then if God, seeing that He must, unless the\nconditions of our nature were altered, make use of ideas with which we\nare already familiar, should adopt an anthropomorphic representation of\nHimself, purified, exalted, and adapted, as far as possible, to His own\ninfinite perfections?  In fact, we know not how God could declare Himself\nas just, righteous, pure, and loving, or reveal our responsibility to\nHimself, without a reference to man, inasmuch as he is the only being, of\nwhich we have any actual experience, who possesses, even in a limited\ndegree, qualities of such a description.  Assuredly then it cannot be a\ndegrading notion of the Deity to regard Him as invested with the highest\nattributes of which we have a conception.  We are aware that some\nphilosophers talk much of the Infinite, and the Absolute, as conveying\nmore exalted notions of the Divine Being.  What the exact meaning of\nthose terms is philosophers find it difficult to declare, and the common\npeople are almost wholly unable to understand.  Certainly such highly\nabstract terms convey little distinct meaning.  It will be found upon\nexamination, that the word \"Infinite,\" to stir in any degree the depths\nof our nature, must be combined with some quality with which we are\nfamiliar.  Infinite love, infinite justice, infinite purity, are things\nwhich we can in some degree understand and appreciate; but the point\nwhich we understand best is not the \"Infinite,\" but the finite,--the\nlove,--the justice,--the purity; and these are ideas taken from what we\nfind in some imperfect degree in ourselves.  To those who believe that\nman was made \"in the image of God,\" and that the Word, being God, became\nalso man, the train of thought here indicated will come home with\nadditional force.\n\nWhat has been said with regard to a revelation, made by words, applies,\nin its main points, to a revelation made directly to the mind through\n_ideas_, without the intervention of words.  To see this clearly, let us\nbear in mind the distinction between a perception and an idea.  An idea\nis the result of a perception.  We perceive a rose when it is presented\nto our senses, and we see, smell, or touch it.  We have an idea of it,\nwhen, not being any longer presented, we think of it, and call to mind\nits qualities.  We are said to have a perception of anger, or love, or\nany other emotion, when those feelings are present to the mind.  We have\nideas of them, when we think about them.  It is not our object to enter\nupon any abstruse discussion as to the origin of ideas.  What has been\njust advanced will be generally admitted by metaphysicians, and readily\nunderstood by others.  Hoping, then, that the distinction between an idea\nand a perception will be carried in the mind, we will proceed with our\nargument.  There is no difficulty in supposing--and this, we believe,\ncorresponds very closely to an opinion commonly entertained respecting\ninspiration--that God could, without the intervention of words, call up\nin the mind such ideas as He might think fit.  For instance, instead of\nspeaking the words, \"Thou shalt do no murder,\" He might, in a\npreternatural manner, excite in the mind the ideas corresponding to them.\nStill, however, unless we suppose the conditions of human thought to be\naltered in a manner for which we have no analogy, the ideas of a man,\nkilling, etc., must previously exist in the mind, or the revelation would\nbe unintelligible.  Whether, then, the ideas are called up, through the\ninstrumentality of words, or in some other way, is immaterial to our\npresent argument.  The point we insist on is that, except in the case of\nactual perception, the communication of knowledge, by revelation, or\notherwise, _must be limited by the ideas previously existing in the mind\nof the person to whom the communication is made_.  These ideas may be\ncombined into new forms, and new relations may be discovered between\nthem, or they may be analyzed into their constituent parts, but we cannot\ntranscend the ideas themselves, except by new perceptions.\n\nLet it not, however, be imagined that a revelation, conveyed through the\ninstrumentality of ideas previously existing, must be so narrow as to\nconvey little or no new information, or instruction.  We have only to\nlook at the works of Milton, Newton, Shakespeare, and other great men, to\nsee the almost endless variety with which ideas, and the relations in\nwhich they stand to each other, may be so combined and disposed, as to\nminister to the imagination, or enrich the mind with fresh stores of\nknowledge.  All the information which we derive from books, or\nconversation, is obtained in this way, and to it we must probably\nattribute by far the largest portion of our mental acquisitions, after\nthe period of childhood.  So far, indeed, as the promulgation of a\nrevelation by its original recipients is concerned, it appears plain that\nit must be made, almost necessarily, through the instrumentality of\nwords, inasmuch as they are the best signs which can be made use of in\nthe communication of knowledge.\n\nBefore, however, proceeding to this portion of the subject, it appears\ndesirable to make a few additional observations with regard to a\nrevelation by _perception_.  We have already had occasion to notice that\n\"the Deity does not, like other objects, come within the direct\ncognizance of our perceptive faculties\" (p. 5), and that, \"even if a\ndirect presentation of the Infinite were given . . . the result would be\na finite conception\" (p. 12).  It may, however, be imagined that a direct\npresentation, even though issuing in a finite conception, or a\nrepresentation either addressed _ab extra_ to our perceptive faculties,\nor brought before us in a vision, or a dream, or otherwise, would convey\nto the mind a more correct apprehension of God's nature than could be\nobtained in any other way.  These cases, though differing in some\nparticulars, may, for our present purpose, be regarded as identical, and\ntreated as perceptions.  Now there can be no doubt that a perception\nconveys a more vivid impression to the mind than a description; and we\nmay, therefore, reasonably suppose that, in a revelation, God might use\nthis method of communicating knowledge in those cases to which it might\nbe specially adapted.  Thus, for instance, if God designed to give an\nidea of some place or being which we had never seen, He might effect\nthis, in a very perfect manner, by bringing such a place or being, either\nin reality, or by representation, within the range of our perceptive\nfaculties.  The appearance vouchsafed by God to Moses (Exod. xxxiii.\n19-23), the vision of Ezekiel (Ezek. xxxvii. 1-10), and the description\ngiven by St. Paul (2 Cor. xii. 1-4), will serve as illustrations of our\nmeaning.\n\nIt must not, however, be taken for granted that such a mode of revelation\nwould, in every case, be possible; or that, if possible, it would always\nbe the best method of communication.  So far as we can see, no mere\npresentation, or representation of the Deity, could, in itself, give any\ndeep insight into His moral character, or the relation in which He stands\nto us.  Even if the Deity were constantly present, we know not how we\ncould obtain any accurate knowledge of His attributes, except by\nobservation of His words and acts.  If we had been introduced to the\nphilanthropist, Howard, we could not have become acquainted with his\nexcellence by merely gazing at his countenance.  We must have listened to\nhis words, and followed him to those scenes of misery which he was in the\nhabit of visiting, if we would obtain a clear understanding of his\nbenevolence.  So too, the holiness, love, and other moral perfections of\nthe Deity, are not matters which can be apprehended from any mere\nintuition of the Divine nature.  A glorious exhibition of the Divine\npresence, such, for instance, as that described in Exodus, as having\noccurred on Mount Sinai, might inspire feelings of awe, and enable those\nwho witnessed it to apprehend more clearly, perhaps, than could have been\neffected in any other way, the dignity and majesty of God; but, for a\nrevelation of His moral nature, and the relation in which He stands to\nman, we must look more to words--such words, for instance, as He is said\nto have spoken to the children of Israel at that time, and afterwards,\nduring forty days, to Moses.  While, then, we think that a revelation by\nperception, with regard to some things, might be expected, we do not\nconsider that it would convey a large amount of information, unless it\nwere combined with a revelation through words.  Words are, in fact, the\nmost natural and effectual mode of imparting most kinds of knowledge, and\nwe may, therefore, reasonably expect that, in any revelation which the\nDivine Being might think fit to make to man, they would form a chief\nmethod of communication.  When we thus speak of words in connection with\na revelation, we do not mean only words addressed actually to the ear,\nbut also such, as in a dream or vision, may appear to be spoken.  We\ndesire also that it should be remembered that, for the main purpose of\nour argument, it is not so much words as _ideas_ which we wish to keep in\nview.  What we chiefly wish to leave on the mind is, that a revelation,\nexcept so far as a new perception may be given, _must be limited by the\nideas previously existing in the mind of the person to whom it is made_.\nIt may be reasonably expected that God would make use of those ideas\nwhich were best adapted to His purpose, but not that He should transcend\nthe ideas themselves.  If, too, we suppose that a new perception is\ngiven, that perception could not be explained to others, except through\nthe instrumentality of such ideas as those to which we have referred.\n\nOur object hitherto has been to explain the conditions under which a\ndirect revelation from God may be expected to be _given_.  If we have\nbeen able to remove from the minds of our readers vague and indefinite\nnotions on the subject, and to put, in their place, something clearer and\nmore distinct, our object thus far will have been answered.\n\nIt is, perhaps, hardly necessary to state that, by what has been said\nabove, we do not intend to intimate that the recipient of a direct\nrevelation must, necessarily, always understand the exact meaning of such\na revelation.  It may contain a hidden meaning, to be evident at some\nfuture time.  Thus, for instance, on the supposition that the first\nchapter of Ezekiel is a revelation from God, it is probable that the\nmeaning of it was as unintelligible to Ezekiel, as it is generally\nconsidered to be at the present time.  But the meaning of the words\nthemselves, and their connection with each other are clear.  It is in the\napplication that the difficulty arises.  So, too, as advances are made in\nknowledge, words, and the ideas belonging to them, acquire a more\nextended and fuller meaning.  The ideas involved in the word, _sun_, are\nvery different to the philosopher and the peasant; and some ideas\ncontained in a revelation may be of such a kind as not to be fully\nunderstood till more knowledge has been acquired, than existed at the\ntime when the revelation was made.  But to suppose that the words convey\nno meaning to the original recipient of the revelation, is to say that no\nrevelation is made to him at all, and it certainly hardly appears\nprobable that the Divine Being should make a communication which could\nanswer no end to the person to whom it was addressed.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n3.  We now proceed to an examination of the conditions under which _a\nrevelation may be recorded_, _or otherwise made known by the person who\nhas received it_.  Here we see at once that, for all practical purposes,\nthe method of communication must be _words_; for it is not necessary to\ntake into account such visual representations as might be made to the eye\nby painting or otherwise.  Words may be oral, or written.  As the latter\nare more likely to be well weighed and definite than the former, and are,\nmoreover, better calculated to hand down a truth from age to age, we\nshall confine our attention to them, although what we have to say is, in\na great degree, applicable to spoken words also.  We start with the\nsupposition that God has already made known to some particular person, as\nperfectly as He has thought fit, and, it may be, as perfectly as the\nnature of the subject admitted, or the capability of the person to whom\nthe communication has been made would allow, some truth which is to be\nrecorded for the benefit of the present, and future generations.  The\nquestion we have to answer is,--how this may be most effectually\naccomplished.\n\nIt is obvious that, in the case of a revelation, made by words, _the\nwords might be recorded exactly as they were delivered_.  The words which\nGod is said to have spoken on Mount Sinai, and to have written\nafterwards, on two tables of stone, may serve as an exemplification of\nour meaning.  In this case God is described as writing them with His own\nhand: but they might have been written, with equal truthfulness, by any\nof those who had heard them.  If future generations had convincing\nevidence that they possessed a faithful record of what God said, and the\nmeaning of the words had not changed during the lapse of time, the\nrevelation would be as perfect to them as it was to the original\nrecipients.  So, too, if God, instead of speaking the words of the ten\ncommandments, had, in some way which should authenticate the reality of\nthe revelation, called up in the mind of Moses the ideas corresponding to\nthe words, and he had faithfully written them down; those words would\nconvey as full a revelation to those who read them, as that which Moses\nhimself had experienced.  Both these would be verbal revelations in the\nstrict sense of the word.  They would be, in fact, the very words of God\nHimself.  If any book, professing to be a revelation from God, could be\nproved to be entirely of this description, there would be little or no\nroom for discussion about it.  The only things which could give rise to\ndispute would be such as attach to the interpretation of all records.\nQuestions might be asked as to the exact meaning of the words, and\ninquiries might be raised as to whether they retained the same meaning\nwhich they had when they were originally written down: but any dispute\nwhich might arise on these points would be confined within very narrow\nlimits, and would moreover be of such a character, as could not be\navoided, unless God were to make a revelation afresh in every age, and we\nmay add, perhaps, to every individual,--a supposition which would be\ncontrary to analogy, and in the highest degree improbable.  Thus far\nthere is no practical difficulty.\n\nIs it, however, necessary to the idea of a recorded revelation that the\nexact words, neither _more nor less_, as spoken by God, or as expressing\nideas which He has called up in the mind of the person to whom He has\nrevealed Himself, should be written down?  A recorded revelation, we must\nremember, is designed chiefly for the benefit of future generations, and\nit may therefore very properly leave out much which was only of passing\ninterest.  God might have revealed many things to Abraham, which were\nhighly important for him to know, but in which we may have no interest.\nWe can easily see then that, in any record which God might authorize,\nsuch things would very probably be omitted.  Thus far again there is no\npractical difficulty.\n\nTo proceed a step further.  Is there any reason to expect that, in a\nrecord of a revelation, the original words, either as spoken by God, or\nas expressive of the ideas which He had called up in the mind of the\nrecipient, might be in any decree _altered_?--and, would every alteration\nnecessarily make the record less a revelation from God than it was\nbefore?  These are questions which we shall endeavour to answer.\n\nIt may be observed, in the first place, that the same train of thought\nwhich applies to an original revelation from God, applies also, in its\nmain points, to the record of it.  Both in the one case, and the other,\nit appears reasonable to expect that God would not, to a greater extent\nthan was absolutely necessary, transcend or interfere with those natural\npowers in man which He had Himself implanted.  As the giving of a\nrevelation would, as already shewn, be conformed in a great degree to the\nusual conditions under which knowledge is imparted, so also, it seems\nreasonable to expect that the record of a revelation would as far as\npossible be conformed to the usual conditions under which knowledge is\nrecorded.\n\nIn looking at the conditions under which a revelation must be recorded,\nit is obvious that the difference of languages, which prevails in this\nworld, presents an insuperable obstacle to an exact record of words being\ncontinued.  It may indeed be alleged that God could cause a revelation to\nbe recorded, in its exact words, in each distinct language.  We hardly\nthink however that such a view as this will be seriously entertained by\nany one.  Not to mention how completely contrary this would be to what\nanalogy would lead us to expect, we may observe that, as languages are\ncontinually undergoing changes, such a method of recording must be\ncontinually renewed; and, moreover, as language does not convey precisely\nthe same ideas to any two individuals, it would be almost needful that a\nseparate record, or rather a separate revelation, should be made for each\nperson.  Such views as these require only to be stated to shew that they\nare untenable; but, if they are untenable, it is plain that the\n_continuance_ of an exact record of words cannot be expected.\n\nBut may it not be expected that, at least, _one_ exact record would be\nmade of any revelation which God might think fit to give, and that this\nwould afford the best guarantee which could be had for future\ntruthfulness?  In answering this question it is very important to draw a\ndistinction.  _The words of the record may be exactly such words as God\napproves of_, _although they may not be the precise words in which the\noriginal revelation was made_.  In some particular instances God might\ndetermine that the precise words of the revelation should be used, while\nin others He might think fit that it should be otherwise.  In either case\nthe record would be a true one, and each method of recording might have\nits own peculiar advantages.  Under some circumstances it might be\ndesirable that not the slightest deviation from the precise mode of\nexpression which God had communicated should be made; while under others,\nthe human view--by which we here mean the view of the particular person\nto whom the revelation is made--might be recorded, and add to it a force\nwhich could hardly be had in any other way.  So long as the record is\nsuch as God approves of, every requisite to a true record is complied\nwith.  If a minister of state were commissioned to make a communication\nto a foreign court, he might write down the whole or a part of it in his\nown words, and, if his own court approved of the words, contained in the\nwriting, the object in view would be answered.  We can even understand\nthat, in some respects, the communication might gain force by this mode\nof proceeding.  The [Greek text] of the writer would be manifested, and\ncarry with it a certain degree of weight.  There would be the weight\nwhich attached to the document as emanating from the government, and\nthere might be an additional weight from the character of the person who\nhad been entrusted to write, and, perhaps, carry out, in some degree, the\nrequirements of, the dispatch.  In the case of a recorded revelation, it\nappears then probable that God would permit those feelings and powers\nwhich He has implanted in man, and which exert such a strong influence on\nothers, to do their work, subject, however, to His own control and\nguidance.  In this way there would be a Divine and a human aspect of the\nrecord; a Divine and a human power in it.  All of it would be the truth\nof God, and it would be presented to us in a manner peculiarly adapted to\nour condition, and likely to ensure our acceptance of it.  At the very\nleast such a method of recording would be exactly consistent with\ntruthfulness.\n\nWe may go a step further, and say that it would be difficult, if not\nimpossible, to conceive any circumstances under which the record should\nnot bear a human aspect.  If the views propounded in the former part of\nthese \"Thoughts,\" with regard to the conditions under which a revelation\nmust be made, and especially with respect to anthropomorphic views of\nGod, be correct, a revelation _must_ assume, in some measure, a human\naspect.  But if the human aspect must exist in the presentation, it must\nalso in the record.  The only question which is really open to discussion\nis, whether there should be the _same_ human aspect in the record, as in\nthe original revelation; in other words, whether it may be expected that\nGod would always present that particular human aspect in the original\nrevelation which He considered best adapted for the record.  For the\nreasons already assigned it does not seem probable that this would be the\ncase.\n\nIt must be remembered, moreover, that in the case of a revelation, made\nat different times, and to different persons, either the character of\neach individual writer must be manifested in the record, or some other\ncharacter, alien perhaps to that of the writer, and certainly not equally\nadapted to that of all the readers, must be adopted.  Which method of\nrecord appears the most probable, and the most calculated to promote the\nobject of a revelation--namely, to instruct and influence mankind--it\ndoes not appear very difficult to determine.  It seems, then, that a\nvariety of style may be expected in the records written by different\npersons of the revelations which they have received.  As has been before\nobserved, all that is essential to the truthfulness of the record is that\nGod should approve of it.\n\nA question may possibly arise here as to the precise _manner_ in which\nthe words may be so recorded, as to convey a true account of God's\nrevelation.  In endeavouring to supply an answer, it should be\nremembered, in the first place, that in the ordinary affairs of life no\ngreat difficulty occurs with regard to the transmission of a message.  If\nthe person who has been selected to convey it, has sufficient\nintelligence to understand it, and is, moreover, desirous to deliver it\nfaithfully, he is, in most cases, able either to speak, or write it, in\nhis own words, in such a manner as to convey the right meaning to others.\nSo, too, with regard to a revelation; if the person to whom it has been\nmade rightly apprehends it, and endeavours to record it honestly, the\nprobability is great that the record which he makes will be a true one.\nIf, too, we are prepared, in accordance with the common belief in all\nages, to admit that God can, and at times does, exercise a control over\nthe minds of men, it is reasonable to believe that He would do this, when\nthe object was to furnish a correct record for the benefit of future\nages.  This control might be exercised either consciously, or\nunconsciously to the writer.  All that would be needful for the\ntruthfulness of the record is, that it should be exercised in some way.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n4.  We will now proceed to offer some remarks as to the conditions under\nwhich _a revelation may be expected to be transmitted_.  Much of what has\nbeen said, with regard to the recording of a revelation, by the person to\nwhom it was originally made, applies to the transmission of such a record\nto future generations, and its translation into other languages.  If a\nbelief (in what way originated we do not now stop to enquire) in the\nreality of the recorded revelation existed, the greatest care would\nnaturally be taken in making copies from it, and also in translating it.\nWell-known examples of this are to be found in the care which the Jews of\nold used in making new copies of their sacred books, and also in the fact\nthat, in our own country, no printers, but those appointed by the Queen,\nare permitted to publish the authorized version of the Bible.  It can\nhardly be considered possible that those who believed in the reality of a\nrecorded revelation, and valued it, would not take care to hand it down\nin a correct form to others; and, although incorrect, mutilated, and\ninterpolated copies, might, in some instances, be made by other persons,\nit does not seem likely that these would prevail to such an extent, as to\nprevent the true record from maintaining its ground.  Such dishonest\ncopies would hardly be made at all, till considerable interest had been\nmanifested in the revelation; and _then_ any variations from the correct\ncopies would scarcely pass without challenge, and correction.\n\nIt appears then, that, as the ordinary mode of recording, copying, and\ntranslating important communications are usually found sufficiently\nadequate for their several purposes, such methods might be employed with\nsuccess in regard to a revelation: and it also seems probable that God\nwould not interfere with such methods more than was absolutely necessary\nfor the purpose He had in view.  If we suppose that God exercised,\nthroughout the whole process of transmission, that controlling power to\nwhich reference has been made; then there would be a correct record in\neach age.  That God should exercise that power to such an extent as to\nprevent every possibility of error, in the transmission of the record, or\nof mistake as to its meaning in the minds of those who read it, would be\ncontrary to the analogy of His dealings with us in other things.  We\npossess faculties, by the due exercise of which we are enabled to arrive\nat a sufficiently accurate knowledge of those things which are essential\nto our wellbeing, but we are not, by infallible guidance, preserved from\nerror.  If we were, our responsibility would to a great extent cease.\nAll that can be reasonably expected, in the case under consideration, is\nthat the record should be transmitted with such exactness, as that an\nhonest inquirer should be able to ascertain its authenticity, and\nunderstand its meaning, so far as God designed that he should know it.\nWe say--so far as God designed that he should know it,--because it is\nquite conceivable that there might be mysteries in a revelation, the\nmeaning of which would not be made clear till the time determined\nbeforehand by God should arrive.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n5.  To enter into a full examination, as to what would constitute\nsufficient grounds for _accepting_ a professed revelation, would open too\nwide a field of enquiry for our present purpose, and would necessitate a\ndiscussion of that very difficult branch of metaphysics which relates to\nthe laws which regulate our belief.  Without, however, attempting to\ndiscuss the subject fully, a few points may be indicated for\nconsideration.\n\nIt is clear that the evidence, with regard to the record of a professed\nrevelation, _will vary in its character at different times_.  The\nevidence will be more direct, and, in this respect, more clear, at an\nearlier period of the record, than at a later: while, on the other hand,\na record which has been translated into different languages, and has\nexercised a widely spread influence, will possess a peculiar force of its\nown.  On the supposition that God made a revelation to Moses, it is not\ndifficult to suppose that convincing evidence, as to the truthfulness of\nwhat he might say, or write about it, might readily be afforded to those\nwho lived in his times.  If such miracles, as those recorded in the\nPentateuch really occurred--and certainly if God so far transcended the\nusual course of nature as to give a revelation, it does not seem hard to\nbelieve that He might also so far transcend it, as to authenticate it in\nsome special manner--the evidence would be of a very strong kind.  To\nsay, however, that no reasonable conviction of the reality of a\nrevelation could be afforded, without the aid of miracles, is an\nassertion which we are not prepared to hazard; though we certainly think\nthat, as calculated to excite attention, and implying a power superior to\nthat of man, they would serve as excellent credentials.  To human view,\nin fact, a miracle does not necessarily imply the agency of the one God.\nIt might, for anything that can be proved to the contrary, be the work of\nsome power, inferior to that God whom we are bound to obey, and yet\nsuperior to man.  The various circumstances therefore, connected with the\nmiracle, would be properly taken into account by the person who was\ninvestigating a professed revelation.  He would not only examine with\ncare the evidence as to the reality of the miracle itself, but also the\ncircumstances under which it was worked, and its aspect.  The character\nof the person who professed to have received the revelation would very\nfairly come under consideration.  Inquiries would be made as to whether\nhe was one whose word could be safely trusted, and whether he possessed\nsufficient intelligence, to render it probable that he would arrive at a\nright conclusion.  A man of known truthfulness and intelligence would\njustly meet with more ready credence, than a person of an opposite\ncharacter.\n\nThe revelation itself, too, would be closely scrutinized.  In some cases\nit is conceivable that the revelation would go far to prove itself.  It\nmight make known things which, though not perhaps discoverable by man's\nreason, were nevertheless so agreeable to it, as to carry with them an\nalmost irresistible conviction.  As, too, a revelation would be given for\nthe practical guidance of man, it would probably be attended with\nthreatenings and promises, or other predictions; and when the things\nwhich had been foretold actually took place, the reality of the\nrevelation would be, to a great extent, established.  If, for instance,\nthe remarkable occurrences which Moses, on various occasions, foretold,\nas about to take place in the land of Egypt, really occurred, it would,\nwe think, be very difficult to avoid the conclusion that he had received\na revelation from God, and that what he said, or wrote, was to be\ndepended upon.  A candid inquirer would also examine, in a reverent\nspirit, whether the professed revelation was likely to promote a pure\nmorality, and to further the best interests of mankind.  He would not,\nindeed, enter upon such an examination, with the feeling that he was\ncompetent to decide, in _every_ respect, as to the justice and excellence\nof the statements which professed to be revealed; for his reason, if\nconsulted, would tell him that many circumstances might be hidden from\nhim, without which a correct judgment could not be formed, and that,\npossibly, his capacity might not be able to grasp them in all their\nrelations, even if they were put before him.  Still, such an examination\nas that which we have just referred to, would properly form an element in\nleading to a conclusion, and, when combined with others, would give as\nreasonable grounds for arriving at a decision with respect to a professed\nrevelation, as we should be willing to act on in the usual business of\nlife, and would, therefore, be suited to the conditions of our being.\nThe decision arrived at would commonly be the result, not of a single\nproof, but of many concurrent circumstances.\n\nWhat has been said in reference to an examination, instituted by persons\nliving at the time when a professed revelation was made, is obviously\napplicable, in many respects, to those who should live in later times,\nand also to the original recipients themselves.  With regard to evidence\nin later times, it may be added that the original believers in the\nrecord, and their followers in each succeeding age, would naturally be\nsubjected to an examination, as to their truthfulness and intelligence,\nand thus a chain of evidence would be continually kept up.  The larger,\ntoo, the number, and the more intelligent the character of those who\nbelieved in it, the greater would be the presumption in its favour.  If\nthe record were received generally by any nation, the _onus probandi_\nwould in that case lie with those who impugned it.  The record itself\nalso would, from time to time, be submitted to such fair rules of\ncriticism as apply to other documents, the fact however being remembered,\nthat it professed to be the word of God, and, therefore, that evidence of\nits authenticity, rather than of its exact coincidence with human reason,\nwas to be mainly looked for.\n\nWe have now indicated, although very briefly and imperfectly, a few\npoints for consideration, as to the transmission of a recorded\nrevelation, and what might constitute sufficient grounds for accepting it\nas true; and we trust that what has been said will suffice to show that\nthere would be no great difficulty in so handing it down, as that it\nshould convey to the candid inquirer, in each succeeding age, reasonable\nevidence of its reality.\n\nIt may, however, be argued, that, although such evidence, as has been\nindicated, might well convince those who had time and ability to\ninstitute a searching examination, the case is different with regard to\nothers; and that, as a revelation may be presumed to have a most\nimportant bearing upon the interests of all, there should be some more\neasy method by which it may be tested.  Now, we are quite prepared to\nadmit that every one should have sufficient grounds afforded him for\narriving at a decision; but, at the same time, we do not conceive that a\nthorough examination of the evidence, made by each person for himself, is\nthe only, or even principal, method by which a safe conclusion may be\nreached.  Each individual has commonly some peculiar talent, in the\nexercise of which he reaches an excellence, which others, whose abilities\nand pursuits are of a different character, do not attain to.  The\nastronomer works out conclusions, which, those, whose attention has been\ndirected to other subjects, could never have reached, but which they may\nnevertheless, with propriety, accept as true.  It is not every one who\nhas time or ability to sift evidence on theological subjects, or to\ncriticise manuscripts; but the labours of those who have given their\nattention to such things may, it is evident, justly be available for the\nbenefit of others.  Even the wisest person accepts as true much on the\ntestimony of others, and that often on subjects with which he is\nconversant.  When his judgment is most independent he will find, if he\nanalyzes it, that much is borrowed.  There is nothing contrary to sound\nreason in all this.  Without it, little progress could be made in\nanything.  Without it, each succeeding age, instead of standing on the\nplatform which had been raised by that which preceded it, would have the\nweary task of commencing afresh, and could thus make few accessions to\nknowledge.  Trustfulness is as much a part of man's constitution, as\nreasoning or any other intellectual process.  Should it be said that men\noften trust wrongly; it may be replied with equal force that they as\nfrequently reason wrongly.  Probably there is less difficulty in\nascertaining where we may safely trust, than in weighing evidence\nproperly, or carrying out correctly a train of reasoning.  Certainly\npeople have little difficulty, if they use their faculties aright, in\nselecting a fit adviser in law or medicine.  Why should there be a\ngreater difficulty with regard to religion?  We do not mean that anyone\nwould be justified in so placing himself under the guidance of another,\nas to _give up_ the exercise of his own judgment altogether; but, that he\nmay properly make use of the counsel of others, and that often to such an\nextent as to overrule his own views in _forming_ his judgment.\n\nThere is another consideration, connected with this portion of the\nsubject, which well deserves attention.  A conclusion may be a very\ncorrect one, and may have been reached by a very satisfactory process,\nalthough the person who has made it, may be unable to state the grounds\nupon which it rests, or meet the objections which may be made against it.\nThis applies not only to those cases, where the conclusion mainly rests\nupon trust, but also to others.  An eminent statesman recommended a\nperson going out in an official capacity, to give his decisions\nconfidently, but not to venture to declare the reasons.  The decisions\nwould probably be right, but the reasons, as _stated by him_, might not\nbe.  It need not be inferred from this that the reasons upon which he\nwould really act were wrong, but rather that from want of practice, or\npower of analysis, or some other cause, he would be unable to bring them\nout correctly.  The processes of thought pass so rapidly through the\nmind, that even the most practised thinkers often find it difficult to\narrest them in their progress, and state the various steps by which they\nhave arrived at their conclusions.  The simplest and most certain grounds\nof our conclusions are, in fact, not unfrequently those which it is most\ndifficult to bring out into distinct view.  They have so often passed\nthrough the mind that we have ceased to notice them, although, all the\nwhile, they contribute essentially to the judgment which is formed; or\nthey lie so far back, in the depths of our consciousness, that it is\nalmost impossible to recover them.  Necessarily, nothing can be so\nsimple, or so certain, in one sense, as intuitions, that is, those things\nwhich we know or believe without any intermediate process of thought, and\nyet, down to the present time, those who have most deeply studied the\nsubject hesitate to decide exactly as to what are intuitions, and what\nare not.  We conclude then that, while, on the one hand, we should not\ndiscredit the rational powers of men, as if they were unequal to perform\nthe task allotted to them; we must not, on the other, be easily shaken\nwith regard to conclusions which have been made with care and\nconsideration, because we may be unable to trace out accurately the\narguments by which they are supported, or answer the objections which are\nmade against them.\n\nWe have now considered revelation with regard to the conditions under\nwhich it may be expected to be _given_, _recorded_, and _transmitted_,\nwith a view to its being _accepted and believed_.  We do not for a moment\nsuppose that we have removed every difficulty; but if we have upon the\nwhole, made clear to our readers the nature of these conditions, or,\nwhere this has not been done, indicated the points at which difficulties\nexist, our chief purpose will have been answered.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n6.  Here we might leave the subject, but we cannot forbear adding some\nfurther observations in reference to that professed revelation of God's\nwill which is to be found in the Bible.  It is not our intention to\nattempt a summary of the various evidences which exist to show that it is\na real one; nor is it our design to reply at length to the objections\nwhich have been made to invalidate it.  There are however some obvious\nfacts which meet us on the threshold of the inquiry, and which can be\nestimated at their just value by any candid inquirer, to which we would\ndirect attention.\n\nWe find for instance that the Bible contains a purer system of morality,\nand conveys a clearer insight into the unity and nature of God, than is\nto be found in any other book; and that, although it is the composition\nof men, many of them ignorant and unlearned, who have lived at different\ntimes, and occupied very dissimilar positions in life, there is,\nnevertheless, a wonderful similarity in the main outlines of religious\ntruth, as delivered by all the writers.  We know, however, still further,\nthat the morality and precepts of the Bible, although confessedly of a\npure and holy character, are, nevertheless, not of such a kind as to fall\nin with the wishes and passions of mankind.  To believe that morality\nmust extend to thoughts as well as actions, and that an all-seeing God\nnotices, and will one day call all men to a strict account, is not a\nmatter which, if we may judge from what we see around us, is agreeable to\nthe feelings of most men.  Nor, if we look to the great remedy proposed\nfor the sin of man, such, we mean, as it is supposed to be, by the great\nmajority of professing Christians, namely, the atoning sacrifice made by\nthe Son of God, do we find here again a matter which either the reason or\nthe feelings of men generally are ready to lead them to adopt.  We see\ntoo, that in all ages unbelief has, more or less, existed, and objections\nhave been, from time to time, brought forward which appeared likely to\nhave considerable power in undermining the existing belief in the Bible.\nPersecution also has exercised its influence, and, it might frequently\nhave been supposed, according to human calculations, that it would have\navailed to destroy all credence in it.  And yet, notwithstanding all\nthese circumstances, to which we have referred, it is an incontrovertible\nfact that a professed belief in the Bible, as a revelation from God,\nexists most widely.  It is, we may add, not a little worthy of being\nremarked that the nomenclature of the Bible has obtained such a strong\nhold on the public mind, in our own day, that many who deny inspiration\nin any distinctive sense, still retain the use of this and other words,\nas if afraid to make it plain how far they differ from those opinions\nwhich are commonly received.\n\nThe present age is certainly more enlightened than any which has preceded\nit; but, hitherto at least, a professed belief in the orthodox doctrines\nof religion has increased rather than diminished.  We find moreover that\npersons of all ranks, and every kind of mental calibre, have declared\nthat they find something in the Bible which they do not find in any other\nbook; something, in fact, which, when duly received, comes home to their\nhearts as men, and seems admirably adapted to the deepest wants of human\nnature.  We see too that those who appear to have accepted the Bible most\nfully, and to hold it most firmly, have been so much impressed with a\nsense of its importance to the world at large, as to have endeavoured,\noften at considerable risk and expense, to communicate to others, both\nat-home and abroad, the knowledge of those things which they have\nreceived as truths--a method of proceeding which has not been adopted,\nand, in fact, could not have been, without a manifest absurdity, by those\nwho profess to believe in the inspiration of Plato, Milton, Shakespeare,\nand other great, but, according to common opinion, uninspired men.  All\nthese and various other considerations which might be adduced seem to\nmark out the Bible, as being a book at least _different_ from all other\nbooks, and to lead to the presumption that it may contain that knowledge\nof God which, as has been remarked in the earlier part of these\n\"Thoughts,\" it appears most important for men to be acquainted with, and\na revelation of which, in some way or other, has been very commonly\nbelieved in.  Assuredly there is a strong presumption in its favour, and\nthe _onus probandi_, in our own day, lies with those who deny its claims\nto acceptance.  Whether however the Bible actually is, or contains a\nrevelation from God is still a fair subject for reverent examination.\n\nWithout attempting to enter upon such an examination here, we may,\nwithout impropriety, offer a suggestion as to the _spirit_ in which it\nshould be conducted.  It must be remembered that the examination of a\ntheological, or any other subject which bears upon the interests of our\ndaily lives, involves principles of a very different character from those\nwhich are connected with an investigation of the science of number, or\nany other abstract science.  Mathematical and numerical investigations\nadvance from principles which are clearly defined, and almost universally\nacknowledged to be self-evident; the reasoning also is of such a kind as\nto preclude the admission of error.  In theology the case is different.\nThere, it is difficult to define with accuracy the points from which the\nreasoning commences, and also to exclude, with certainty, the possibility\nof error in the reasoning itself.  There is, too, another essential\ndifference between abstract sciences and other subjects of inquiry.  It\nis not only self-evident that two straight lines cannot enclose a space,\nbut the judgment which the mind gives on the subject is not in any danger\nof being disturbed by the feelings.  In theology, however, the matters\nwhich come under consideration are so mixed up with our nearest and\ndearest interests, that the feelings are called into play at every step\nof the investigation, and a just balance of the judgment cannot be\npreserved without the exercise of much care.  Hence the necessity of\nendeavouring to preserve a candid and unruffled spirit in all enquiries\nconnected with religion.  No doubt those feelings which a beneficent God\nhas implanted with a view to assist us in deciding, are to have their due\nweight; but certainly there is need of caution, lest they influence us\nunduly.  If the judge thinks it needful to charge the jury to dismiss\nfrom their minds everything which might tend to influence their judgments\nin an improper manner, and attend only to the evidence, even though the\nmatter about which they have to decide is usually one in which they have\nno personal interest; it certainly does not appear unnecessary to give a\nsimilar caution on a subject, with regard to which feeling has assumed so\nstrong a form as to give rise to the name, _odium theologicum_.  We\ndeceive ourselves, if we imagine that we approach the subject without any\ndanger of judging it unfairly.  This caution, undoubtedly applies to\n_all_ who discuss theological questions; but we think that we shall not\nbe making an unwarranted assertion, if we say that it applies in a\nspecial manner to those who _impugn_ the Bible revelation, when it is\nremembered that the doctrines contained in it, as they have generally\nbeen received by those who are called orthodox Christians, are of such a\nkind as very commonly to excite, in the first instance at least, a strong\nfeeling of opposition.  The Bible itself intimates this, and common\nexperience bears witness to it as being a fact.  We are not now saying\nthat the doctrines of the purity and holiness of God, the dreadful nature\nof sin, the need of an atonement, the inability of man to present himself\nbefore God in merits of his own, and others of a similar kind are true;\nbut we may properly say that, whether true or false, they are such as\nfrequently raise a strong feeling of opposition; and therefore that those\nwho examine them, with the view of ascertaining their character, stand in\n_special_ need of the caution to preserve a calm and candid spirit.\n\nIt will not be out of place to introduce here another consideration which\nhas a bearing upon this part of the subject, namely, the _supernatural\naid_ which the Bible offers towards the understanding and acceptance of\nits doctrines.  It is quite conceivable that a state of things might\nexist in which such aid would be wholly unnecessary.  We might suppose a\ncase in which the nature of man was so entirely in harmony with itself,\nand so exactly attuned to the truths of a Divine revelation, as readily\nto accept it, when it was presented; but the question we have to decide\nis, whether man's nature is actually in this state or not.  Observation\nleads us to believe that it is not.  Whether we accept the scripture\nstatement of the fall or not, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that\nit is difficult for virtue to force its way, while vice has many\nvotaries.  However convincing, abstractedly, the reasons may be to\nenforce the claims of virtue, it is evident that they possess but little\npower to lead the large majority of mankind.  History and experience\ntestify to this.  Scarce any deny the evidence in favour of virtue,\nalthough few are content to be governed by it.  Now it may be fairly\npresumed that any revelation which the Divine Being might make would be\nin the interests of virtue; it may be reasonably expected too that it\nwould be supported by strong evidence: but, if, as actual observation\nmakes it clear is the case, the feelings of mankind are more inclined to\nreject than accept the claims of virtue, the evidence, however strong,\nwill not produce the effect which it would, if the mind were more justly\nbalanced, and thus the revelation will be in danger of being rejected.\nSuch rejection, be it remembered, need not result from any deficiency of\nevidence, but may arise from an indisposition to receive it.  For our own\npart we believe that the evidence in favour of the orthodox views of\nscripture statements is far stronger than can be found in support of any\nother subject of a like kind: but, at the same time, taking into\nconsideration the actual tendencies of human nature, we are not surprised\nthat it does not produce the effect which it should do; and therefore it\nappears to us not unreasonable to suppose that God might exercise some\nsuch supernatural power upon the mind, as the Bible speaks of, with the\nview of disposing it to the reception of a revelation.\n\nThat God does at times interfere in a manner, out of the usual course of\nHis Providence, with regard to other matters, especially in answer to\nprayer, is believed almost universally.  We cannot enter here into a\ndiscussion as to the foundation of the belief; but, certainly so long as\nthe records of mankind go back, and so far as the experience of the\npresent day conducts us, the belief has been entertained, and prayer\nseems to be the natural expression of man's heart in all cases of\ndifficulty.  Men _will_ believe in, and appeal to, a supernatural power,\nand it is hard to suppose that a tendency so universal and deeply seated,\nshould have no solid foundation.  But if prayer, for aid and direction\nfrom above, is the natural outpouring of man's heart with regard to the\nmore ordinary affairs of life, there appears to be no reason why prayer\nshould not be offered up for counsel and guidance with regard to a\nprofessed revelation, and that an answer should be expected.  At least,\nit can hardly be said that those have fairly tested the claims of\nscripture to be received as a revelation from God, who have not complied\nwith the conditions which it has laid down as to the manner in which it\nshould be studied.\n\nWe now leave the subject, drawing the attention of our readers to the\nprayer of one of our greatest poets, and earnestly hoping that his prayer\nmay be theirs:--\n\n    . . . What in me is dark,\n    Illumine; what is low, raise and support;\n    That to the height of this great argument\n    I may assert Eternal Providence,\n    And justify the ways of God to man.\n\n                                                          _Paradise Lost_.\n\n                                * * * * *\n\n                  LONDON: WERTHEIM, MACINTOSH, AND HUNT.\n\n                          _By the same Author_,\n\n                          THOUGHTS ON MIRACLES.\n\n                             PRICE SIXPENCE.\n\n\n\n\nFootnotes:\n\n\n{17}  On the subject of the Mosaic cosmogony, see a very interesting\nLetter from Sir Isaac Newton to Dr. Thomas Burnet, in Sir David\nBrewster's \"Life of Newton,\" pp. 450-453.","title":"Thoughts on a Revelation","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":15087}