{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_28312/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_28312","id":"gutenberg_28312","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/28312","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism -- History","Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Greece -- Religion","Rome -- Religion"],"text":"Atheism In Pagan Antiquity\n\n                                    By\n\n                             A. B. Drachmann\n\n     Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Copenhagen\n\n                                Gyldendal\n\n                      11 Hanover Square, London, W.1\n\n                                Copenhagen\n\n                               Christiania\n\n                                   1922\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface\nIntroduction\nChapter I\nChapter II\nChapter III\nChapter IV\nChapter V\nChapter VI\nChapter VII\nChapter VIII\nChapter IX\nNotes\nIndex\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe present treatise originally appeared in Danish as a University\npublication (_Kj\u0153benhavns Universitets Festskrift_, November 1919). In\nsubmitting it to the English public, I wish to acknowledge my profound\nindebtedness to Mr. G. F. Hill of the British Museum, who not only\nsuggested the English edition, but also with untiring kindness has\nsubjected the translation, as originally made by Miss Ingeborg Andersen,\nM.A. of Copenhagen, to a painstaking and most valuable revision.\n\nFor an account of the previous treatments of the subject, as well as of\nthe method employed in my investigation, the reader is referred to the\nintroductory remarks which precede the Notes.\n\nA. B. DRACHMANN.\nCHARLOTTENLUND,\n_July 1922_.\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe present inquiry is the outcome of a request to write an article on\n\u201cAtheism\u201d for a projected dictionary of the religious history of classical\nantiquity. On going through the sources I found that the subject might\nwell deserve a more comprehensive treatment than the scope of a dictionary\nwould allow. It is such a treatment that I have attempted in the following\npages.\n\nA difficulty that occurred at the very beginning of the inquiry was how to\ndefine the notion of atheism. Nowadays the term is taken to designate the\nattitude which denies every idea of God. Even antiquity sometimes referred\nto atheism in this sense; but an inquiry dealing with the history of\nreligion could not start from a definition of that kind. It would have to\nkeep in view, not the philosophical notion of God, but the conceptions of\nthe gods as they appear in the religion of antiquity. Hence I came to\ndefine atheism in Pagan antiquity as the point of view which _denies the\nexistence of the ancient gods_. It is in this sense that the word will be\nused in the following inquiry.\n\nEven though we disregard philosophical atheism, the definition is somewhat\nnarrow; for in antiquity mere denial of the existence of the gods of\npopular belief was not the only attitude which was designated as atheism.\nBut it has the advantage of starting from the conception of the ancient\ngods that may be said to have finally prevailed. In the sense in which the\nword is used here we are nowadays all of us atheists. We do not believe\nthat the gods whom the Greeks and the Romans worshipped and believed in\nexist or have ever existed; we hold them to be productions of the human\nimagination to which nothing real corresponds. This view has nowadays\nbecome so ingrained in us and appears so self-evident, that we find it\ndifficult to imagine that it has not been prevalent through long ages;\nnay, it is perhaps a widely diffused assumption that even in antiquity\neducated and unbiased persons held the same view of the religion of their\npeople as we do. In reality both assumptions are erroneous: our \u201catheism\u201d\nin regard to ancient paganism is of recent date, and in antiquity itself\ndownright denial of the existence of the gods was a comparatively rare\nphenomenon. The demonstration of this fact, rather than a consideration of\nthe various intermediate positions taken up by the thinkers of antiquity\nin their desire to avoid a complete rupture with the traditional ideas of\nthe gods, has been one of the chief purposes of this inquiry.\n\nThough the definition of atheism set down here might seem to be clear and\nunequivocal, and though I have tried to adhere strictly to it, cases have\nunavoidably occurred that were difficult to classify. The most\nembarrassing are those which involve a reinterpretation of the conception\nof the gods, _i.e._ which, while acknowledging that there is some reality\ncorresponding to the conception, yet define this reality as essentially\ndifferent from it. Moreover, the acknowledgment of a certain group of gods\n(the celestial bodies, for instance) combined with the rejection of\nothers, may create difficulties in defining the notion of atheism; in\npractice, however, this doctrine generally coincides with the former, by\nwhich the gods are explained away. On the whole it would hardly be just,\nin a field of inquiry like the present, to expect or require absolutely\nclearly defined boundary-lines; transition forms will always occur.\n\nThe persons of whom it is related that they denied the existence of the\nancient gods are in themselves few, and they all belong to the highest\nlevel of culture; by far the greater part of them are simply professional\nphilosophers. Hence the inquiry will almost exclusively have to deal with\nphilosophers and philosophical schools and their doctrines; of religion as\nexhibited in the masses, as a social factor, it will only treat by\nexception. But in its purpose it is concerned with the history of\nreligion, not with philosophy; therefore\u2014in accordance with the definition\nof its object\u2014it will deal as little as possible with the purely\nphilosophical notions of God that have nothing to do with popular\nreligion. What it aims at illustrating is a certain\u2014if you like, the\nnegative\u2014aspect of ancient religion. But its result, if it can be\nsufficiently established, will not be without importance for the\nunderstanding of the positive religious sense of antiquity. If you want to\nobtain some idea of the hold a certain religion had on its adherents, it\nis not amiss to know something about the extent to which it dominated even\nthe strata of society most exposed to influences that went against it.\n\nIt might seem more natural, in dealing with atheism in antiquity, to adopt\nthe definition current among the ancients themselves. That this method\nwould prove futile the following investigation will, I hope, make\nsufficiently evident; antiquity succeeded as little as we moderns in\nconnecting any clear and unequivocal idea with the words that signify\n\u201cdenial of God.\u201d On the other hand, it is, of course, impossible to begin\nat all except from the traditions of antiquity about denial and deniers.\nHence the course of the inquiry will be, first to make clear what\nantiquity understood by denial of the gods and what persons it designated\nas deniers, and then to examine in how far these persons were atheists in\nour sense of the word.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nAtheism and atheist are words formed from Greek roots and with Greek\nderivative endings. Nevertheless they are not Greek; their formation is\nnot consonant with Greek usage. In Greek they said _atheos_ and\n_atheotes_; to these the English words ungodly and ungodliness correspond\nrather closely. In exactly the same way as ungodly, _atheos_ was used as\nan expression of severe censure and moral condemnation; this use is an old\none, and the oldest that can be traced. Not till later do we find it\nemployed to denote a certain philosophical creed; we even meet with\nphilosophers bearing _atheos_ as a regular surname. We know very little of\nthe men in question; but it can hardly be doubted that _atheos_, as\napplied to them, implied not only a denial of the gods of popular belief,\nbut a denial of gods in the widest sense of the word, or Atheism as it is\nnowadays understood.\n\nIn this case the word is more particularly a philosophical term. But it\nwas used in a similar sense also in popular language, and corresponds then\nclosely to the English \u201cdenier of God,\u201d denoting a person who denies the\ngods of his people and State. From the popular point of view the interest,\nof course, centred in those only, not in the exponents of philosophical\ntheology. Thus we find the word employed both of theoretical denial of the\ngods (atheism in our sense) and of practical denial of the gods, as in the\ncase of the adherents of monotheism, Jews and Christians.\n\nAtheism, in the theoretical as well as the practical sense of the word,\nwas, according to the ancient conception of law, always a crime; but in\npractice it was treated in different ways, which varied both according to\nthe period in question and according to the more or less dangerous nature\nof the threat it offered to established religion. It is only as far as\nAthens and Imperial Rome are concerned that we have any definite knowledge\nof the law and the judicial procedure on this point; a somewhat detailed\naccount of the state of things in Athens and Rome cannot be dispensed with\nhere.\n\nIn the criminal law of Athens we meet with the term _asebeia_\u2014literally:\nimpiety or disrespect towards the gods. As an established formula of\naccusation of _asebeia_ existed, legislation must have dealt with the\nsubject; but how it was defined we do not know. The word itself conveys\nthe idea that the law particularly had offences against public worship in\nview; and this is confirmed by the fact that a number of such\noffences\u2014from the felling of sacred trees to the profanation of the\nEleusinian Mysteries\u2014were treated as _asebeia_. When, in the next place,\ntowards the close of the fifth century B.C., free-thinking began to assume\nforms which seemed dangerous to the religion of the State, theoretical\ndenial of the gods was also included under _asebeia_. From about the\nbeginning of the Peloponnesian War to the close of the fourth century\nB.C., there are on record a number of prosecutions of philosophers who\nwere tried and condemned for denial of the gods. The indictment seems in\nmost cases\u2014the trial of Socrates is the only one of which we know\ndetails\u2014to have been on the charge of _asebeia_, and the procedure proper\nthereto seems to have been employed, though there was no proof or\nassertion of the accused having offended against public worship; as to\nSocrates, we know the opposite to have been the case; he worshipped the\ngods like any other good citizen. This extension of the conception of\n_asebeia_ to include theoretical denial of the gods no doubt had no\nfoundation in law; this is amongst other things evident from the fact that\nit was necessary, in order to convict Anaxagoras, to pass a special public\nresolution in virtue of which his free-thinking theories became\nindictable. The law presumably dated from a time when theoretical denial\nof the gods lay beyond the horizon of legislation. Nevertheless, in the\ntrial of Socrates it is simply taken for granted that denial of the gods\nis a capital crime, and that not only on the side of the prosecution, but\nalso on the side of the defence: the trial only turns on a question of\nfact, the legal basis is taken for granted. So inveterate, then, at this\ntime was the conception of the unlawful nature of the denial of the gods\namong the people of Athens.\n\nIn the course of the fourth century B.C. several philosophers were accused\nof denial of the gods or blasphemy; but after the close of the century we\nhear no more of such trials. To be sure, our knowledge of the succeeding\ncenturies, when Athens was but a provincial town, is far less copious than\nof the days of its greatness; nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the\npractice in regard to theoretical denial of the gods was changed. A\nphilosopher like Carneades, for instance, might, in view of his sceptical\nstandpoint, just as well have been convicted of _asebeia_ as Protagoras,\nwho was convicted because he had declared that he did not know whether the\ngods existed or not; and as to such a process against Carneades, tradition\nwould not have remained silent. Instead, we learn that he was employed as\nthe trusted representative of the State on most important diplomatic\nmissions. It is evident that Athens had arrived at the point of view that\nthe theoretical denial of the gods might be tolerated, whereas the law, of\ncourse, continued to protect public worship.\n\nIn Rome they did not possess, as in Athens, a general statute against\nreligious offences; there were only special provisions, and they were,\nmoreover, few and insufficient. This defect, however, was remedied by the\nvigorous police authority with which the Roman magistrates were invested.\nIn Rome severe measures were often taken against movements which\nthreatened the Roman official worship, but it was done at the discretion\nof the administration and not according to hard-and-fast rules; hence the\npractice was somewhat varying, and a certain arbitrariness inevitable.\n\nNo example is known from Rome of action taken against theoretical denial\nof the gods corresponding to the trials of the philosophers in Athens. The\nmain cause of this was, no doubt, that free-thinking in the fifth century\nB.C. invaded Hellas, and specially Athens, like a flood which threatened\nto overthrow everything; in Rome, on the other hand, Greek philosophy made\nits way in slowly and gradually, and this took place at a time when in the\ncountry of its origin it had long ago found a _modus vivendi_ with popular\nreligion and was acknowledged as harmless to the established worship. The\nmore practical outlook of the Romans may perhaps also have had something\nto say in the matter: they were rather indifferent to theoretical\nspeculations, whereas they were not to be trifled with when their national\ninstitutions were concerned.\n\nIn consequence of this point of view the Roman government first came to\ndeal with denial of the gods as a breach of law when confronted with the\ntwo monotheistic religions which invaded the Empire from the East. That\nwhich distinguished Jews and Christians from Pagans was not that they\ndenied the existence of the Pagan gods\u2014the Christians, at any rate, did\nnot do this as a rule\u2014but that they denied that they were gods, and\ntherefore refused to worship them. They were practical, not theoretical\ndeniers. The tolerance which the Roman government showed towards all\nforeign creeds and the result of which in imperial times was, practically\nspeaking, freedom of religion over the whole Empire, could not be extended\nto the Jews and the Christians; for it was in the last resort based on\nreciprocity, on the fact that worship of the Egyptian or Persian gods did\nnot exclude worship of the Roman ones. Every convert, on the other hand,\nwon over to Judaism or Christianity was _eo ipso_ an apostate from the\nRoman religion, an _atheos_ according to the ancient conception. Hence, as\nsoon as such religions began to spread, they constituted a serious danger\nto the established religion, and the Roman government intervened. Judaism\nand Christianity were not treated quite alike; in this connexion details\nare of no interest, but certain principal features must be dwelt on as\nsignificant of the attitude of antiquity towards denial of the gods. To\nsimplify matters I confine myself to Christianity, where things are less\ncomplicated.\n\nThe Christians were generally designated as _atheoi_, as deniers of the\ngods, and the objection against them was precisely their denial of the\nPagan gods, not their religion as such. When the Christian, summoned\nbefore the Roman magistrates, agreed to sacrifice to the Pagan gods (among\nthem, the Emperor) he was acquitted; he was not punished for previously\nhaving attended Christian services, and it seems that he was not even\nrequired to undertake not to do so in future. Only if he refused to\nsacrifice, was he punished. We cannot ask for a clearer proof that it is\napostasy as such, denial of the gods, against which action is taken. It is\nin keeping with this that, at any rate under the earlier Empire, no\nattempt was made to seek out the Christians at their assemblies, to hinder\ntheir services or the like; it was considered sufficient to take steps\nwhen information was laid.\n\nThe punishments meted out were different, in that they were left solely to\nthe discretion of the magistrates. But they were generally severe: forced\nlabour in mines and capital punishment were quite common. No\ndiscrimination was made between Roman citizens and others belonging to the\nEmpire, but all were treated alike; that the Roman citizen could not\nundergo capital punishment without appeal to the Emperor does not affect\nthe principle. This procedure has really no expressly formulated basis in\nlaw; the Roman penal code did not, as mentioned above, take cognizance of\ndenial of the gods. Nevertheless, the sentences on the Christians were\nconsidered by the Pagans of the earlier time as a matter of course, the\njustice of which was not contested, and the procedure of the government\nwas in principle the same under humane and conscientious rulers like\nTrajan and Marcus Aurelius as under tyrants like Nero and Domitian. Here\nagain it is evident how firmly rooted in the mind of antiquity was the\nconviction that denial of the gods was a capital offence.\n\nTo resume what has here been set forth concerning the attitude of ancient\nsociety to atheism: it is, in the first place, evident that the frequently\nmentioned tolerance of polytheism was not extended to those who denied its\ngods; in fact, it was applied only to those who acknowledged them even if\nthey worshipped others besides. But the assertion of this principle of\nintolerance varied greatly in practice according to whether it was a\nquestion of theoretical denial of the gods\u2014atheism in our sense\u2014or\npractical refusal to worship the Pagan gods. Against atheism the community\ntook action only during a comparatively short period, and, as far as we\nknow, only in a single place. The latter limitation is probably explained\nnot only by the defectiveness of tradition, but also by the fact that in\nAthens free-thinking made its appearance about the year 400 as a general\nphenomenon and therefore attracted the attention of the community. Apart\nfrom this case, the philosophical denier of God was left in peace all\nthrough antiquity, in the same way as the individual citizen was not\ninterfered with, as a rule, when he, for one reason or another, refrained\nfrom taking part in the worship of the deities. On the other hand, as soon\nas practical refusal to believe in the gods, apostasy from the established\nreligion, assumed dangerous proportions, ruthless severity was exercised\nagainst it.\n\nThe discrimination, however, made in the treatment of the theoretical and\npractical denial of the gods is certainly not due merely to consideration\nof the more or less isolated occurrence of the phenomenon; it is rooted at\nthe same time in the very nature of ancient religion. The essence of\nancient polytheism is the worship of the gods, that is, cultus; of a\ndoctrine of divinity properly speaking, of theology, there were only\nslight rudiments, and there was no idea of any elaborate dogmatic system.\nQuite different attitudes were accordingly assumed towards the\nphilosopher, who held his own opinions of the gods, but took part in the\npublic worship like anybody else; and towards the monotheist, to whom the\nwhole of the Pagan worship was an abomination, which one should abstain\nfrom at any cost, and which one should prevail on others to give up for\nthe sake of their own good in this life or the next.\n\nIn the literature of antiquity we meet with sporadic statements to the\neffect that certain philosophers bore the epithet _atheos_ as a sort of\nsurname; and in a few of the later authors of antiquity we even find lists\nof men\u2014almost all of them philosophers\u2014who denied the existence of the\ngods. Furthermore, we possess information about certain persons\u2014these\nalso, if Jews and Christians are excluded, are nearly all of them\nphilosophers\u2014having been accused of, and eventually convicted of, denial\nof the gods; some of these are not in our lists. Information of this kind\nwill, as remarked above, be taken as the point of departure for an\ninvestigation of atheism in antiquity. For practical reasons, however, it\nis reasonable to include some philosophers whom antiquity did not\ndesignate as atheists, and who did not come into conflict with official\nreligion, but of whom it has been maintained in later times that they did\nnot believe in the existence of the gods of popular belief. Thus we arrive\nat the following list, in which those who were denoted as _atheoi_ are\nitalicised and those who were accused of impiety are marked with an\nasterisk:\n\n      Xenophanes.\n      *Anaxagoras.\n_      Diogenes of Apollonia._\n_      Hippo of Rhegium._\n      *_Protagoras._\n_      Prodicus._\n_      Critias._\n      *_Diagoras of Melos._\n      *Socrates.\n      Antisthenes.\n      Plato.\n      *Aristotle.\n      Theophrastus.\n      *Stilpo.\n      *_Theodorus._\n      *_Bion._\n_      Epicurus._\n_      Euhemerus._\n\nThe persons are put down in chronological order. This order will in some\nmeasure be preserved in the following survey; but regard for the\ncontinuity of the tradition of the doctrine will entail certain\ndeviations. It will, that is to say, be natural to divide the material\ninto four groups: the pre-Socratic philosophy; the Sophists; Socrates and\nthe Socratics; Hellenistic philosophy. Each of these groups has a\nphilosophical character of its own, and it will be seen that this\ncharacter also makes itself felt in the relation to the gods of the\npopular belief, even though we here meet with phenomena of more isolated\noccurrence. The four groups must be supplemented by a fifth, a survey of\nthe conditions in Imperial Rome. Atheists of this period are not found in\nour lists; but a good deal of old Pagan free-thinking survives in the\nfirst centuries of our era, and also the epithet _atheoi_ was bestowed\ngenerally on the Christians and sometimes on the Jews, and if only for\nthis reason they cannot be altogether passed by in this survey.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nThe paganism of antiquity is based on a primitive religion, _i.e._ it is\noriginally in the main homogeneous with the religions nowadays met with in\nthe so-called primitive peoples. It underwent, however, a long process of\nevolution parallel with and conditioned by the development of Greek and\nlater Roman civilisation. This evolution carried ancient religion far away\nfrom its primitive starting-point; it produced numerous new formations,\nabove all a huge system of anthropomorphic gods, each with a definite\ncharacter and personality of his own. This development is the result of an\ninterplay of numerous factors: changing social and economical conditions\nevoked the desire for new religious ideas; the influence of other peoples\nmade itself felt; poetry and the fine arts contributed largely to the\nmoulding of these ideas; conscious reflection, too, arose early and\nmodified original simplicity. But what is characteristic of the whole\nprocess is the fact that it went on continuously without breaks or sudden\nbounds. Nowhere in ancient religion, as far as we can trace it, did a\npowerful religious personality strike in with a radical transformation,\nwith a direct rejection of old ideas and dogmatic accentuation of new\nones. The result of this quiet growth was an exceedingly heterogeneous\norganism, in which remains of ancient, highly primitive customs and ideas\nwere retained along with other elements of a far more advanced character.\n\nSuch a state of things need not in itself trouble the general\nconsciousness; it is a well-established fact that in religion the most\ndivergent elements are not incompatible. Nevertheless, among the Greeks,\nwith their strong proclivity to reflective thought, criticism early arose\nagainst the traditional conceptions of the gods. The typical method of\nthis criticism is that the higher conceptions of the gods are used against\nthe lower. From the earliest times the Greek religious sense favoured\nabsoluteness of definition where the gods are concerned; even in Homer\nthey are not only eternal and happy, but also all-powerful and\nall-knowing. Corresponding expressions of a moral character are hardly to\nbe found in Homer; but as early as Hesiod and Solon we find, at any rate,\nZeus as the representative of heavenly justice. With such definitions a\nlarge number of customs of public worship and, above all, a number of\nstories about the gods, were in violent contradiction; thus we find even\nso old and so pious a poet as Pindar occasionally rejecting mythical\nstories which he thinks at variance with the sublime nature of the gods.\nThis form of criticism of popular beliefs is continued through the whole\nof antiquity; it is found not only in philosophers and philosophically\neducated laymen, but appears spontaneously in everybody of a reflective\nmind; its best known representative in earlier times is Euripides. Typical\nof its popular form is in the first place its casualness; it is directed\nagainst details which at the moment attract attention, while it leaves\nother things alone which in principle are quite as offensive, but either\nnot very obviously so, or else not relevant to the matter in hand.\nSecondly, it is na\u00efve: it takes the gods of the popular belief for granted\nessentially as they are; it does not raise the crucial question whether\nthe popular belief is not quite justified in attributing to these higher\nbeings all kinds of imperfection, and wrong in attributing perfection to\nthem, and still less if such beings, whether they are defined as perfect\nor imperfect, exist at all. It follows that as a whole this form of\ncriticism is outside the scope of our inquiry.\n\nStill, there is one single personality in early Greek thought who seems to\nhave proceeded still further on the lines of this na\u00efve criticism, namely,\nXenophanes of Colophon. He is generally included amongst the philosophers,\nand rightly in so far as he initiated a philosophical speculation which\nwas of the highest importance in the development of Greek scientific\nthought. But in the present connexion it would, nevertheless, be\nmisleading to place Xenophanes among those philosophers who came into\nconflict with the popular belief because their conception of Existence was\nbased on science. The starting-point for his criticism of the popular\nbelief is in fact not philosophical, but religious; he ranks with\npersonalities like Pindar and Euripides\u2014he was also a verse-writer\nhimself, with considerable poetic gift\u2014and is only distinguished from them\nby the greater consistency of his thought. Hence, the correct course is to\ndeal with him in this place as the only eminent thinker in antiquity about\nwhom it is known that\u2014starting from popular belief and religious\nmotives\u2014he reached a standpoint which at any rate with some truth may be\ndesignated as atheism.\n\nXenophanes lived in the latter part of the sixth and the beginning of the\nfifth centuries B.C. (according to his own statement he reached an age of\nmore than ninety years). He was an itinerant singer who travelled about\nand recited poetry, presumably not merely his own but also that of others.\nIn his own poems he severely attacked the manner in which Homer and\nHesiod, the most famous poets of Greece, had represented the gods: they\nhad attributed to them everything which in man\u2019s eyes is outrageous and\nreprehensible\u2014theft, adultery and deception of one another. Their accounts\nof the fights of the gods against Titans and Giants he denounced as\n\u201cinventions of the ancients.\u201d But he did not stop at that: \u201cMen believe\nthat the gods are born, are clothed and shaped and speak like themselves\u201d;\n\u201cif oxen and horses and lions could draw and paint, they would delineate\ntheir gods in their own image\u201d; \u201cthe Negroes believe that their gods are\nflat-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs have blue eyes and red\nhair.\u201d Thus he attacked directly the popular belief that the gods are\nanthropomorphic, and his arguments testify that he clearly realised that\nmen create their gods in their own image. On another main point, too, he\nwas in direct opposition to the religious ideas of his time: he rejected\nDivination, the belief that the gods imparted the secrets of the future to\nmen\u2014which was deemed a mainstay of the belief in the existence of the\ngods. As a positive counterpart to the anthropomorphic gods, Xenophanes\nset up a philosophical conception of God: God must be One, Eternal,\nUnchangeable and identical with himself in every way (all sight, all\nhearing and all mind). This deity, according to the explicit statements of\nour earliest sources, he identified with the universe.\n\nIf we examine more closely the arguments put forth by Xenophanes in\nsupport of his remarkable conception of the deity, we realise that he\neverywhere starts from the definitions of the nature of the gods as given\nby popular religion; but, be it understood, solely from the absolute\ndefinitions. He takes the existence of the divine, with its absolute\nattributes, for granted; it is in fact the basis of all his speculation.\nHis criticism of the popular ideas of the gods is therefore closely\nconnected with his philosophical conception of God; the two are the\npositive and negative sides of the same thing. Altogether his connexion\nwith what I call the na\u00efve criticism of the popular religion is\nunmistakable.\n\nIt is undoubtedly a remarkable fact that we meet at this early date with\nsuch a consistent representative of this criticism. If we take Xenophanes\nat his word we must describe him as an atheist, and atheism in the sixth\ncentury B.C. is a very curious phenomenon indeed. Neither was it\nacknowledged in antiquity; no one placed Xenophanes amongst _atheoi_; and\nCicero even says somewhere (according to Greek authority) that Xenophanes\nwas the only one of those who believed in gods who rejected divination. In\nmore recent times, too, serious doubt has been expressed whether\nXenophanes actually denied the existence of the gods. Reference has\namongst other things been made to the fact that he speaks in several\nplaces about \u201cgods\u201d where he, according to his view, ought to say \u201cGod\u201d;\nnay, he has even formulated his fundamental idea in the words: \u201cOne God,\nthe greatest amongst gods and men, neither in shape nor mind like unto any\nmortal.\u201d To be sure, Xenophanes is not always consistent in his language;\nbut no weight whatever ought to be attached to this, least of all in the\ncase of a man who exclusively expressed himself in verse. Another theory\nrests on the tradition that Xenophanes regarded his deity and the universe\nas identical, consequently was a pantheist. In that case, it is said, he\nmay very well have considered, for instance, the heavenly bodies as\ndeities. Sound as this argument is in general, it does not apply to this\ncase. When a thinker arrives at pantheism, starting from a criticism of\npolytheism which is expressly based on the antithesis between the unity\nand plurality of the deity\u2014then very valid proofs, indeed, are needed in\norder to justify the assumption that he after all believed in a plurality\nof gods; and such proofs are wanting in the case of Xenophanes.\n\nJudging from the material in hand one can hardly arrive at any other\nconclusion than that the standpoint of Xenophanes comes under our\ndefinition of atheism. But we must not forget that only fragments of his\nwritings have been preserved, and that the more extensive of them do not\nassist us greatly to the understanding of his religious standpoint. It is\npossible that we might have arrived at a different conclusion had we but\npossessed his chief philosophical work in its entirety, or at least larger\nportions of it. And I must candidly confess that if I were asked whether,\nin my heart of hearts, I believed that a Greek of the sixth century B.C.\ndenied point-blank the existence of his gods, my answer would be in the\nnegative.\n\nThat Xenophanes was not considered an atheist by the ancients may possibly\nbe explained by the fact that they objected to fasten this designation on\na man whose reasoning took the deity as a starting-point and whose sole\naim was to define its nature. Perhaps they also had an inkling that he in\nreality stood on the ground of popular belief, even if he went beyond it.\nStill more curious is the fact that his religious view does not seem to\nhave influenced the immediately succeeding philosophy at all. His\nsuccessors, Parmenides and Zeno, developed his doctrine of unity, but in a\npantheistic direction, and on a logical, not religious line of argument;\nabout their attitude to popular belief we are told practically nothing.\nAnd Ionic speculation took a quite different direction. Not till a century\nlater, in Euripides, do we observe a distinct influence of his criticism\nof popular belief; but at that time other currents of opinion had\nintervened which are not dependent on Xenophanes, but might direct\nattention to him.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nAncient Greek naturalism is essentially calculated to collide with the\npopular belief. It seeks a natural explanation of the world, first and\nforemost of its origin, but in the next place of individual natural\nphenomena. As to the genesis of the world, speculations of a mythical kind\nhad already developed on the basis of the popular belief. They were not,\nhowever, binding on anybody, and, above all, the idea of the gods having\ncreated the world was altogether alien to Greek religion. Thus, without\noffence to them it might be maintained that everything originated from a\nprimary substance or from a mixture of several primary substances, as was\ngenerally maintained by the ancient naturalists. On the other hand, a\nconflict arose as soon as the heavenly phenomena, such as lightning and\nthunder, were ascribed to natural causes, or when the heavenly bodies were\nmade out to be natural objects; for to the Greeks it was an established\nfact that Zeus sent lightning and thunder, and that the sun and the moon\nwere gods. A refusal to believe in the latter was especially dangerous\nbecause they were _visible_ gods, and as to the person who did not believe\nin their divinity the obvious conclusion would be that he believed still\nless in the invisible gods.\n\nThat this inference was drawn will appear before long. But the epithet\n\u201catheist\u201d was very rarely attached to the ancient naturalists; only a few\nof the later (and those the least important) were given the nickname\n_atheos_. Altogether we hear very little of the relation of these\nphilosophers to the popular belief, and this very silence is surely\nsignificant. No doubt, most of them bestowed but a scant attention on this\naspect of the matter; they were engrossed in speculations which did not\nbring them into conflict with the popular belief, and even their\nscientific treatment of the \u201cdivine\u201d natural phenomena did not make them\ndoubt the _existence_ of the gods. This is connected with a peculiarity in\ntheir conception of existence. Tradition tells us of several of them, and\nit applies presumably also to those of whom it is not recorded, that they\ndesignated their primary substance or substances as gods; sometimes they\nalso applied this designation to the world or worlds originating in the\nprimary substance. This view is deeply rooted in the Greek popular belief\nand harmonises with its fundamental view of existence. To these ancient\nthinkers the primary substance is at once a living and a superhuman power;\nand any living power which transcended that of man was divine to the\nGreeks. Hylozoism (the theory that matter is alive) consequently, when it\nallies itself with popular belief, leads straight to pantheism, whereas it\nexcludes monotheism, which presupposes a distinction between god and\nmatter. Now it is a matter of experience that, while monotheism is the\nhereditary foe of polytheism, polytheism and pantheism go very well\ntogether. The universe being divine, there is no reason to doubt that\nbeings of a higher order than man exist, nor any reason to refuse to\nbestow on them the predicate \u201cdivine\u201d; and with this we find ourselves in\nprinciple on the standpoint of polytheistic popular belief. There is\nnothing surprising, then, in the tradition that Thales identified God with\nthe mind of the universe and believed the universe to be animated, and\nfilled with \u201cdemons.\u201d The first statement is in this form probably\ninfluenced by later ideas and hardly a correct expression of the view of\nThales; the rest bears the very stamp of genuineness, and similar ideas\nrecur, more or less completely and variously refracted, in the succeeding\nphilosophers.\n\nTo follow these variations in detail is outside the scope of this\ninvestigation; but it may be of interest to see the form they take in one\nof the latest and most advanced representatives of Ionian naturalism. In\nDemocritus\u2019s conception of the universe, personal gods would seem excluded\n_a priori_. He works with but three premises: the atoms, their movements,\nand empty space. From this everything is derived according to strict\ncausality. Such phenomena also as thunder and lightning, comets and\neclipses, which were generally ascribed to the gods, are according to his\nopinion due to natural causes, whereas people in the olden days were\nafraid of them because they believed they were due to the gods.\nNevertheless, he seems, in the first place, to have designated Fire, which\nhe at the same time recognised as a \u201csoul-substance,\u201d as divine, the\ncosmic fire being the soul of the world; and secondly, he thought that\nthere was something real underlying the popular conception of the gods. He\nwas led to this from a consideration of dreams, which he thought were\nimages of real objects which entered into the sleeper through the pores of\nthe body. Now, since gods might be seen in dreams, they must be real\nbeings. He did actually say that the gods had more senses than the\nordinary five. When he who of all the Greek philosophers went furthest in\na purely mechanical conception of nature took up such an attitude to the\nreligion of his people, one cannot expect the others, who were less\nadvanced, to discard it.\n\nNevertheless, there is a certain probability that some of the later Ionian\nnaturalists went further in their criticism of the gods of popular belief.\nOne of them actually came into conflict with popular religion; it will be\nnatural to begin with him.\n\nShortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Anaxagoras of\nClazomenae was accused of impiety and had to leave Athens, where he had\ntaken up his abode. The object of the accusation was in reality political;\nthe idea being to hit Pericles through his friend the naturalist. What\nAnaxagoras was charged with was that he had assumed that the heavenly\nbodies were natural objects; he had taught that the sun was a red-hot\nmass, and that the moon was earth and larger than Peloponnese. To base an\naccusation of impiety on this, it was necessary first to carry a public\nresolution, giving power to prosecute those who gave natural explanations\nof heavenly phenomena.\n\nAs to Anaxagoras\u2019s attitude to popular belief, we hear next to nothing\napart from this. There is a story of a ram\u2019s head being found with one\nhorn in the middle of the forehead; it was brought to Pericles, and the\nsoothsayer Lampon explained the portent to the effect that, of the two\nmen, Pericles and Thucydides, who contended for the leadership of Athens,\none should prove victorious. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, had the ram\u2019s\nhead cut open and showed that the brain did not fill up the cranium, but\nwas egg-shaped and lay gathered together at the point where the horn grew\nout. He evidently thought that abortions also, which otherwise were\ngenerally considered as signs from the gods, were due to natural causes.\nBeyond this, nothing is said of any attack on the popular belief on the\npart of Anaxagoras, and in his philosophy nothing occurred which logically\nentailed a denial of the existence of the gods. Add to this that it was\nnecessary to create a new judicial basis for the accusation against\nAnaxagoras, and it can be taken as certain that neither in his writings\nnor in any other way did he come forward in public as a denier of the\ngods.\n\nIt is somewhat different when we consider the purely personal point of\nview of Anaxagoras. The very fact that no expression of his opinion\nconcerning the gods has been transmitted affords food for thought.\nPresumably there was none; but this very fact is notable when we bear in\nmind that the earlier naturalists show no such reticence. Add to this\nthat, if there is any place and any time in which we might expect a\ncomplete emancipation from popular belief, combined with a decided\ndisinclination to give expression to it, it is Athens under Pericles. Men\nlike Pericles and his friends represent a high level, perhaps the zenith,\nin Hellenic culture. That they were critical of many of the religious\nconceptions of their time we may take for granted; as to Pericles himself,\nthis is actually stated as a fact, and the accusations of impiety directed\nagainst Aspasia and Pheidias prove that orthodox circles were very well\naware of it. But the accusations prove, moreover, that Pericles and those\nwho shared his views were so much in advance of their time that they could\nnot afford to let their free-thinking attitude become a matter of public\nknowledge without endangering their political position certainly, and\npossibly even more than that. To be sure, considerations of that kind did\nnot weigh with Anaxagoras; but he was\u2014and that we know on good authority\u2014a\nquiet scholar whose ideal of life was to devote himself to problems of\nnatural science, and he can hardly have wished to be disturbed in this\noccupation by affairs in which he took no sort of interest. The question\nis then only how far men like Pericles and himself may have ventured in\ntheir criticism. Though all direct tradition is wanting, we have at any\nrate circumstantial evidence possessing a certain degree of probability.\n\nTo begin with, the attempt to give a natural explanation of prodigies is\nnot in itself without interest. The mantic art, _i.e._ the ability to\npredict the future by signs from the gods or direct divine inspiration,\nwas throughout antiquity considered one of the surest proofs of the\nexistence of the gods. Now, it by no means follows that a person who was\nnot impressed by a deformed ram\u2019s head would deny, _e.g._, the ability of\nthe Delphic Oracle to predict the future, especially not so when the\nperson in question was a naturalist. But that there was at this time a\ngeneral tendency to reject the art of divination is evident from the fact\nthat Herodotus as well as Sophocles, both of them contemporaries of\nPericles and Anaxagoras, expressly contend against attempts in that\ndirection, and, be it remarked, as if the theory they attack was commonly\nheld. Sophocles is in this connexion so far the more interesting of the\ntwo, as, on one hand, he criticises private divination but defends the\nDelphic oracle vigorously, while he, on the other hand, identifies denial\nof the oracle with denial of the gods. And he does this in such a way as\nto make it evident that he has a definite object in mind. That in this\npolemic he may have been aiming precisely at Anaxagoras is indicated by\nthe fact that Diopeithes, who carried the resolution concerning the\naccusation of the philosopher, was a soothsayer by profession.\n\nThe strongest evidence as to the free-thinking of the Periclean age is,\nhowever, to be met with in the historical writing of Thucydides. In his\nwork on the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides completely eliminated the\nsupernatural element; not only did he throughout ignore omens and\ndivinations, except in so far as they played a part as a psychological\nfactor, but he also completely omitted any reference to the gods in his\nnarrative. Such a procedure was at this time unprecedented, and contrasts\nsharply with that of his immediate forerunner Herodotus, who constantly\nlays stress on the intervention of the gods. That is hardly conceivable\nexcept in a man who had altogether emancipated himself from the religious\nviews of his time. Now, Thucydides is not only a fellow-countryman and\nyounger contemporary of Pericles, but he also sees in Pericles his ideal\nnot only as a politician but evidently also as a man. Hence, when\neverything is considered, it is not improbable that Pericles and his\nfriends went to all lengths in their criticism of popular belief,\nalthough, of course, it remains impossible to state anything definite as\nto particular persons\u2019 individual views. Curiously enough, even in\nantiquity this connexion was observed; in a biography of Thucydides it is\nsaid that he was a disciple of Anaxagoras and _accordingly_ was also\nconsidered something of an atheist.\n\nWhile Anaxagoras, his trial notwithstanding, is not generally designated\nan atheist, probably because there was nothing in his writings to which he\nmight be pinned down, that fate befell two of his contemporaries, Hippo of\nRhegium and Diogenes of Apollonia. Very little, however, is known of them.\nHippo, who is said to have been a Pythagorean, taught that water and fire\nwere the origin of everything; as to the reason why he earned the nickname\n_atheos_, it is said that he taught that Water was the primal cause of\nall, as well as that he maintained that nothing existed but what could be\nperceived by the senses. There is also quoted a (fictitious) inscription,\nwhich he is said to have caused to be put on his tomb, to the effect that\nDeath has made him the equal of the immortal gods (in that he now exists\nno more than they). Otherwise we know nothing special of Hippo; Aristotle\nrefers to him as shallow. As to Diogenes, we learn that he was influenced\nby Anaximenes and Anaxagoras; in agreement with the former he regarded Air\nas the primary substance, and like Anaxagoras he attributed reason to his\nprimary substance. Of his doctrine we have extensive accounts, and also\nsome not inconsiderable fragments of his treatise _On Nature_; but they\nare almost all of them of purely scientific, mostly of an anatomical and\nphysiological character. In especial, as to his relation to popular\nbelief, it is recorded that he identified Zeus with the air. Indirectly,\nhowever, we are able to demonstrate, by the aid of an almost contemporary\nwitness, that there must have been some foundation for the accusation of\n\u201catheism.\u201d For in _The Clouds_, where Aristophanes wants to represent\nSocrates as an atheist, he puts in his mouth scraps of the naturalism of\nDiogenes; that he would hardly have done, if Diogenes had not already been\ndecried as an atheist.\n\nIt is of course impossible to base any statement of the relation of the\ntwo philosophers to popular belief on such a foundation. But it is,\nnevertheless, worth noticing that while not a single one of the earlier\nnaturalists acquired the designation atheist, it was applied to two of the\nlatest and otherwise little-known representatives of the school. Take this\nin combination with what has been said above of Anaxagoras, and we get at\nany rate a suspicion that Greek naturalism gradually led its adherents\nbeyond the na\u00efve stage where many individual phenomena were indeed\nascribed to natural causes, even if they had formerly been regarded as\ncaused by divine intervention, but where the foundations of the popular\nbelief were left untouched. Once this path has been entered on, a point\nwill be arrived at where the final conclusion is drawn and the existence\nof the supernatural completely denied. It is probable that this happened\ntowards the close of the naturalistic period. If so early a philosopher as\nAnaxagoras took this point of view, his personal contribution as a member\nof the Periclean circle may have been more significant in the religious\nfield than one would conjecture from the character of his work.\n\nBefore we proceed to mention the sophists, there is one person on our list\nwho must be examined though the result will be negative, namely, Diagoras\nof Melos. As he appears in our records, he falls outside the\nclassification adopted here; but as he must have lived, at any rate, about\nthe middle of the fifth century (he is said to have \u201cflourished\u201d in 464)\nhe may most fitly be placed on the boundary line between the Ionian\nphilosophy and Sophistic.\n\nFor later antiquity Diagoras is the typical atheist; he heads our lists of\natheists, and round his person a whole series of myths have been formed.\nHe is said to have been a poet and a pious man like others; but then a\ncolleague once stole an ode from him, escaped by taking an oath that he\nwas innocent, and afterwards made a hit with the stolen work. So Diagoras\nlost his faith in the gods and wrote a treatise under the title of\n_apopyrgizontes logoi_ (literally, destructive considerations) in which he\nattacked the belief in the gods.\n\nThis looks very plausible, and is interesting in so far as it, if correct,\naffords an instance of atheism arising in a layman from actual experience,\nnot in a philosopher from speculation. If we ask, however, what is known\nhistorically about Diagoras, we are told a different tale. There existed\nin Athens, engraved on a bronze tablet and set up on the Acropolis, a\ndecree of the people offering a reward of one talent to him who should\nkill Diagoras of Melos, and of two talents to him who should bring him\nalive to Athens. The reason given was that he had scoffed at the\nEleusinian Mysteries and divulged what took place at them. The date of\nthis decree is given by a historian as 415 B.C.; that this is correct is\nseen from a passage in Aristophanes\u2019s contemporary drama, _The Birds_.\nFurthermore, one of the disciples of Aristotle, the literary historian\nAristoxenus, states that no trace of impiety was to be found in the works\nof the dithyrambic poet Diagoras, and that, in fact, they contained\ndefinite opinions to the contrary. A remark to the effect that Diagoras\nwas instrumental in drawing up the laws of Mantinea is probably due to the\nsame source. The context shows that the reference is to the earlier\nconstitution of Mantinea, which was a mixture of aristocracy and\ndemocracy, and is praised for its excellence. It is inconceivable that, in\na Peloponnesian city during the course of, nay, presumably even before the\nmiddle of the fifth century, a notorious atheist should have been invited\nto advise on the revision of its constitution. It is more probable that\nAristoxenus adduced this fact as an additional disproof of Diagoras\u2019s\natheism, in which he evidently did not believe.\n\nThe above information explains the origin of the legend. Two fixed points\nwere in existence: the pious poet of _c._ 460 and the atheist who was\noutlawed in 415; a bridge was constructed between them by the story of the\nstolen ode. This disposes of the whole supposition of atheism growing out\nof a basis of experience. But, furthermore, it must be admitted that it is\ndoubtful whether the poet and the atheist are one and the same person. The\ninterval of time between them is itself suspicious, for the poet,\naccording to the ancient system of calculation, must have been about forty\nyears old in 464, consequently between eighty and ninety in 415. (There is\ngeneral agreement that the treatise, the title of which has been quoted,\nmust have been a later forgery.) If, in spite of all, I dare not\nabsolutely deny the identity of the two Diagorases of tradition, the\nreason is that Aristophanes, where he mentions the decree concerning\nDiagoras, seems to suggest that his attack on the Mysteries was an old\nstory which was raked up again in 415. But for our purpose, at any rate,\nnothing remains of the copious mass of legend but the fact that one\nDiagoras of Melos in 415 was outlawed in Athens on the ground of his\nattack on the Mysteries. Such an attack may have been the outcome of\natheism; there was no lack of impiety in Athens at the end of the fifth\ncentury. But whether this was the case or not we cannot possibly tell; and\nto throw light on free-thinking tendencies in Athens at this time, we have\nother and richer sources than the historical notice of Diagoras.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nWith the movement in Greek thought which is generally known as sophistic,\na new view of popular belief appears. The criticism of the sophists was\ndirected against the entire tradition on which Greek society was based,\nand principally against the moral conceptions which hitherto had been\nunquestioned: good and evil, right and wrong. The criticism was\nessentially negative; that which hitherto had been imagined as absolute\nwas demonstrated to be relative, and the relative was identified with the\ninvalid. Thus they could not help running up against the popular ideas of\nthe gods, and treating them in the same way. A leading part was here\nplayed by the sophistic distinction between _nomos_ and _physis_, Law and\nNature, _i.e._ that which is based on human convention, and that which is\nfounded on the nature of things. The sophists could not help seeing that\nthe whole public worship and the ideas associated with it belonged to the\nformer\u2014to the domain of \u201cthe law.\u201d Not only did the worship and the\nconceptions of the gods vary from place to place in the hundreds of small\nindependent communities into which Hellas was divided\u2014a fact which the\nsophists had special opportunity of observing when travelling from town to\ntown to teach; but it was even officially admitted that the whole\nritual\u2014which, popularly speaking, was almost identical with religion\u2014was\nbased on convention. If a Greek was asked why a god was to be worshipped\nin such and such a way, generally the only answer was: because it is the\nlaw of the State (or the convention; the word _nomos_ expresses both\nthings). Hence it followed in principle that religion came under the\ndomain of \u201cthe law,\u201d being consequently the work of man; and hence again\nthe obvious conclusion, according to sophistic reasoning, was that it was\nnothing but human imagination, and that there was no _physis_, no reality,\nbehind it at all. In the case of the naturalists, it was the positive\nfoundation of their system, their conception of nature as a whole, that\nled them to criticise the popular belief. Hence their criticism was in the\nmain only directed against those particular ideas in the popular belief\nwhich were at variance with the results of their investigations. To be\nsure, the sophists were not above making use of the results of natural\nscience in their criticism of the popular belief; it was their general aim\nto impart the highest education of their time, and of a liberal education\nnatural science formed a rather important part. But their starting-point\nwas quite different from that of the naturalists. Their whole interest was\nconcentrated on man as a member of the community, and it was from\nconsideration of this relation that they were brought into collision with\nthe established religion. Hence their attack was far more dangerous than\nthat of the naturalists; no longer was it directed against details, it\nlaid bare the psychological basis itself of popular belief and clearly\nrevealed its unstable character. Their criticism was fundamental and\ncentral, not casual and circumstantial.\n\nFrom a purely practical point of view also, the criticism of the sophists\nwas far more dangerous than that of the old philosophers. They were not\ntheorists themselves, but practitioners; their business was to impart the\nhigher education to the more mature youth. It was therefore part of their\nprofession to disseminate their views not by means of learned professional\nwritings, but by the persuasive eloquence of oral discourse. And in their\ncriticism of the existing state of things they did not start with special\nresults which only science could prove, and the correctness of which the\nlayman need not recognise; they operated with facts and principles known\nand acknowledged by everybody. It is not to be wondered at that such\nefforts evoked a vigorous reaction on the part of established society, the\nmore so as in any case the result of sophistic criticism\u2014though not\nconsciously its object\u2014was to liquefy the moral principles on which the\nsocial order was based.\n\nSuch, in principle, appeared to be the state of things. In practice, here\nas elsewhere, the devil proved not so black as he was painted. First, not\nall the sophists\u2014hardly even the majority of them\u2014drew the logical\nconclusions from their views in respect of either morals or religion. They\nwere teachers of rhetoric, and as such they taught, for instance, all the\ntricks by which a bad cause might be defended; that was part of the trade.\nBut it must be supposed that Gorgias, the most distinguished of them,\nexpressly insisted that rhetoric, just like any other art the aim of which\nwas to defeat an opponent, should only be used for good ends. Similarly\nmany of them may have stopped short in their criticism of popular belief\nat some arbitrary point, so that it was possible for them to respect at\nany rate something of the established religion, and so, of course, first\nand foremost the very belief in the existence of the gods. That they did\nnot as a rule interfere with public worship, we may be sure; that was\nbased firmly on \u201cthe Law.\u201d But, in addition, even sophists who personally\ntook an attitude radically contradictory to popular belief had the most\nimportant reasons for being careful in advancing such a view. They had to\nlive by being the teachers of youth; they had no fixed appointment, they\ntravelled about as lecturers and enlisted disciples by means of their\nlectures. For such men it would have been a very serious thing to attack\nthe established order in its tenderest place, religion, and above all they\nhad to beware of coming into conflict with the penal laws. This risk they\ndid not incur while confining themselves to theoretical discussions about\nright and wrong, nor by the practical application of them in their\nteaching of rhetoric; but they might very easily incur it if attacking\nreligion. This being the case, it is not to be wondered at that we do not\nfind many direct statements of undoubtedly atheistical character handed\ndown from the more eminent sophists, and that trials for impiety are rare\nin their case. But, nevertheless, a few such cases are met with, and from\nthese as our starting-point we will now proceed.\n\nAs to Protagoras of Abdera, one of the earliest and most famous of all the\nsophists, it is stated that he began a pamphlet treating of the gods with\nthe words: \u201cConcerning the gods I can say nothing, neither that they exist\nnor that they do not exist, nor of what form they are; because there are\nmany things which prevent one from knowing that, namely, both the\nuncertainty of the matter and the shortness of man\u2019s life.\u201d On this\naccount, it is said, he was charged with impiety at Athens and was\noutlawed, and his works were publicly burned. The date of this trial is\nnot known for certain; but it is reasonably supposed to have coincided\nwith that of Diagoras, namely, in 415. At any rate it must have taken\nplace after 423-421, as we know that Protagoras was at that time staying\nin Athens. As he must have been born about 485, the charge overtook him\nwhen old and famous; according to one account, his work on the gods seems\nto belong to his earlier writings.\n\nTo doubt the correctness of this tradition would require stronger reasons\nthan we possess, although it is rather strange that the condemnation of\nProtagoras is mentioned neither in our historical sources nor in\nAristophanes, and that Plato, who mentions Protagoras rather frequently as\ndead, never alludes to it. At any rate, the quotation from the work on the\ngods is certainly authentic, for Plato himself referred to it. Hence it is\ncertain that Protagoras directly stated the problem as to the existence of\nthe gods and regarded it as an open question. But beyond that nothing much\ncan be deduced from the short quotation; and as to the rest of the book on\nthe gods we know nothing. The meagre reasons for scepticism adduced\nprobably do not imply any more than that the difficulties are objective as\nwell as subjective. If, in the latter respect, the brevity of life is\nspecially mentioned it may be supposed that Protagoras had in mind a\ndefinite proof of the existence of the gods which was rendered difficult\nby the fact that life is so brief; prediction of the future may be guessed\nat, but nothing certain can be stated.\n\nProtagoras is the only one of the sophists of whom tradition says that he\nwas the object of persecution owing to his religious views. The trial of\nSocrates, however, really belongs to the same category when looked at from\nthe accusers\u2019 point of view; Socrates was accused as a sophist. But as his\nown attitude towards popular religion differed essentially from that of\nthe sophists, we cannot consider him in this connexion. Protagoras\u2019s trial\nitself is partly determined by special circumstances. In all probability\nit took place at a moment when a violent religious reaction had set in at\nAthens owing to some grave offences against the public worship and\nsanctuaries of the State (violation of the Mysteries and mutilation of the\nHermae). The work on the gods had presumably been in existence and known\nlong before this without causing scandal to anybody. But, nevertheless,\nthe trial, like those of Anaxagoras and Socrates, plainly bears witness to\nthe animosity with which the modern free-thought was regarded in Athens.\nThis animosity did not easily manifest itself publicly without special\nreasons; but it was always there and might always be used in case of\nprovocation.\n\nAs to Protagoras\u2019s personal attitude to the question of the existence of\nthe gods, much may be guessed and much has been guessed; but nothing can\nbe stated for certain. However, judging from the man\u2019s profession and his\ngeneral habit of life as it appears in tradition, we may take for granted\nthat he did not give offence in his outward behaviour by taking a hostile\nattitude to public worship or attacking its foundations; had that been so,\nhe would not for forty years have been the most distinguished teacher of\nHellas, but would simply not have been tolerated. An eminent modern\nscholar has therefore advanced the conjecture that Protagoras\ndistinguished between belief and knowledge, and that his work on the gods\nonly aimed at showing that the existence of the gods could not be\nscientifically demonstrated.  Now such a distinction probably, if\nconceived as a conscious principle, is alien to ancient thought, at any\nrate at the time of Protagoras; and yet it may contain a grain of truth.\nWhen it is borne in mind that the incriminated passage represents the very\nexordium of the work of Protagoras, the impression cannot be avoided that\nhe himself did not intend his work to disturb the established religion,\nbut that he quite na\u00efvely took up the existence of the gods as a subject,\nas good as any other, for dialectic discussion. All that he was concerned\nwith was theory and theorising; religion was practice and ritual; and he\nhad no more intention of interfering with that than the other earlier\nsophists of assailing the legal system of the community in their\nspeculation as to relativity of right and wrong.\n\nAll this, however, does not alter the fact that the work of Protagoras\nposed the very question of the existence of the gods as a problem which\nmight possibly be solved in the negative. He seems to have been the first\nto do this. That it could be done is significant of the age to which\nProtagoras belongs; that it was done was undoubtedly of great importance\nfor the development of thought in wide circles.\n\nProdicus of Ceos, also one of the most famous sophists, advanced the idea\nthat the conceptions of the gods were originally associated with those\nthings which were of use to humanity: sun and moon, rivers and springs,\nthe products of the earth and the elements; therefore bread was identified\nwith Demeter, wine with Dionysus, water with Poseidon, fire with\nHephaestus. As a special instance he mentioned the worship of the Nile by\nthe Egyptians.\n\nIn Democritus, who was a slightly elder contemporary of Prodicus, we have\nalready met with investigation into the origin of the conceptions of the\ngods. There is a close parallel between his handling of the subject and\nthat of Prodicus, but at the same time a characteristic difference.\nDemocritus was a naturalist, hence he took as his starting-point the\nnatural phenomena commonly ascribed to the influence of the gods.\nProdicus, on the other hand, started from the intellectual life of man. We\nlearn that he had commenced to study synonyms, and that he was interested\nin the interpretation of the poets. Now he found that Homer occasionally\nsimply substituted the name of Hephaestus for fire, and that other poets\nwent even further on the same lines. Furthermore, while it was common\nknowledge to every Greek that certain natural objects, such as the\nheavenly bodies and the rivers, were regarded as divine and had names in\ncommon with their gods, this to Prodicus would be a specially attractive\nsubject for speculation. It is plainly shown by his instances that it is\nlinguistic observations of this kind which were the starting-point of his\ntheory concerning the origin of the conceptions of the gods.\n\nIn the accounts of Prodicus it is taken for granted that he denied the\nexistence of the gods, and in later times he is classed as _atheos_.\nNevertheless we have every reason to doubt the correctness of this\nopinion. The case of Democritus already shows that a philosopher might\nvery well derive the conceptions of the gods from an incorrect\ninterpretation of certain phenomena without throwing doubt on their\nexistence. As far as Prodicus is concerned it may be assumed that he did\nnot believe that Bread, Wine or Fire were gods, any more than Democritus\nimagined that Zeus sent thunder and lightning; nor, presumably, did he\never believe that rivers were gods. But he need not therefore have denied\nthe existence of Demeter, Dionysus and Hephaestus, much less the divinity\nof the sun and the moon. And if we consider his theory more closely it\npoints in quite a different direction from that of atheism. To Prodicus it\nwas evidently the conception of utility that mattered: if these objects\ncame to be regarded as gods it was because they \u201cbenefited humanity.\u201d This\ntoo is a genuinely sophistic view, characteristically deviating from that\nof the naturalist Democritus in its limitation to the human and social\naspect of the question. Such a point of view, if confronted with the\nquestion of the existence of the gods, may very well, according to\nsophistic methods of reasoning, lead to the conclusion that primitive man\nwas right in so far as the useful, _i.e._ that which \u201cbenefits humanity,\u201d\nreally is an essential feature of the gods, and wrong only in so far as he\nidentified the individual useful objects with the gods. Whether Prodicus\nadopted this point of view, we cannot possibly tell; but the general body\nof tradition concerning the man, which does not in any way suggest\nreligious radicalism, indicates as most probable that he did not connect\nthe question of the origin of the conceptions of the gods with that of the\nexistence of the gods, which to him was taken for granted, and that it was\nonly later philosophers who, in their researches into the ideas of earlier\nphilosophers about the gods, inferred his atheism from his speculations on\nthe history of religion.\n\nCritias, the well-known reactionary politician, the chief of the Thirty\nTyrants, is placed amongst the atheists on the strength of a passage in a\nsatyric drama, _Sisyphus_. The drama is lost, but our authority quotes the\nobjectionable passage _in extenso_; it is a piece of no less than forty\nlines. The passage argues that human life in its origins knew no social\norder, that might ruled supreme. Then men conceived the idea of making\nlaws in order that right might rule instead of might. The result of this\nwas, it is true, that wrong was not done openly; but it was done secretly\ninstead. Then a wise man bethought himself of making men believe that\nthere existed gods who saw and heard everything which men did, nay even\nknew their innermost thoughts. And, in order that men might stand in\nproper awe of the gods, he said that they lived in the sky, out of which\ncomes that which makes men afraid, such as lightning and thunder, but also\nthat which benefits them, sunshine and rain, and the stars, those fair\nornaments by whose course men measure time. Thus he succeeded in bringing\nlawlessness to an end. It is expressly stated that it was all a cunning\nfraud: \u201cby such talk he made his teaching most acceptable, veiling truth\nwith false words.\u201d\n\nIn antiquity it was disputed whether the drama _Sisyphus_ was by Critias\nor Euripides; nowadays all agree in attributing it to Critias; nor does\nthe style of the long fragment resemble that of Euripides. The question\nis, however, of no consequence in this connexion: whether the drama is by\nCritias or Euripides it is wrong to attribute to an author opinions which\nhe has put into the mouth of a character in a drama. Moreover, _Sisyphus_\nwas a satyric play, _i.e._ it belonged to a class of poetry the liberty of\nwhich was nearly as great as in comedy, and the speech was delivered by\nSisyphus himself, who, according to the legend, is a type of the crafty\ncriminal whose forte is to do evil and elude punishment. There is, in\nfact, nothing in that which we otherwise hear of Critias to suggest that\nhe cherished free-thinking views. He was\u2014or in his later years became\u2014a\nfanatical adversary of the Attic democracy, and he was, when he held\npower, unscrupulous in his choice of the means with which he opposed it\nand the men who stood in the path of his reactionary policy; but in our\nearlier sources he is never accused of impiety in the theoretical sense.\nAnd yet there had been an excellent opportunity of bringing forward such\nan accusation; for in his youth Critias had been a companion of Socrates,\nand his later conduct was used as a proof that Socrates corrupted his\nsurroundings. But it is always Critias\u2019s political crimes which are\nadduced in this connexion, not his irreligion. On the other hand,\nposterity looked upon him as the pure type of tyrant, and the label\natheist therefore suggested itself on the slightest provocation.\n\nBut, even if the _Sisyphus_ fragment cannot be used to characterise its\nauthor as an atheist, it is, nevertheless, of the greatest interest in\nthis connexion, and therefore demands closer analysis.\n\nThe introductory idea, that mankind has evolved from an animal state into\nhigher stages, is at variance with the earlier Greek conception, namely,\nthat history begins with a golden age from which there is a continual\ndecline. The theory of the fragment is expressed by a series of authors\nfrom the same and the immediately succeeding period. It occurs in\nEuripides; a later and otherwise little-known tragedian, Moschion,\ndeveloped it in detail in a still extant fragment; Plato accepted it and\nmade it the basis of his presentation of the origin of the State;\nAristotle takes it for granted. Its source, too, has been demonstrated: it\nwas presumably Democritus who first advanced it. Nevertheless the author\nof the fragment has hardly got it direct from Democritus, who at this time\nwas little known at Athens, but from an intermediary. This intermediary is\nprobably Protagoras, of whom it is said that he composed a treatise, _The\nOriginal State, i.e._ the primary state of mankind. Protagoras was a\nfellow-townsman of Democritus, and recorded by tradition as one of his\ndirect disciples.\n\nIn another point also the fragment seems to betray the influence of\nDemocritus. When it is said that the wise inventors of the gods made them\ndwell in the skies, because from the skies come those natural phenomena\nwhich frighten men, it is highly suggestive of Democritus\u2019s criticism of\nthe divine explanation of thunder and lightning and the like. In this case\nalso Protagoras may have been the intermediary. In his work on the gods he\nhad every opportunity of discussing the question in detail. But here we\nhave the theory of Democritus combined with that of Prodicus in that it is\nmaintained that from the skies come also those things that benefit men,\nand that they are on this account also a suitable dwelling-place for the\ngods. It is obvious that the author of the fragment (or his source) was\nversed in the most modern wisdom.\n\nAll this erudition, however, is made to serve a certain tendency: the\nwell-known tendency to represent religion as a political invention having\nas its object the policing of society. It is a theory which in\nantiquity\u2014to its honour be it said\u2014is but of rare occurrence. There is a\nvague indication of it in Euripides, a more definite one in Aristotle, and\nan elaborate application of it in Polybius; and that is in reality all.\n(That many people in more enlightened ages upheld religion as a means of\nkeeping the masses in check, is a different matter.) However, it is an\ninteresting fact that the Critias fragment is not only the first evidence\nof the existence of the theory known to us, but also presumably the\nearliest and probably the best known to later antiquity. Otherwise we\nshould not find reference for the theory made to a fragment of a farce,\nbut to a quotation from a philosopher.\n\nThis might lead us to conclude that the theory was Critias\u2019s own\ninvention, though, of course, it would not follow that he himself adhered\nto it. But it is more probable that it was a ready-made modern theory\nwhich Critias put into the mouth of Sisyphus. Not only does the whole\ncharacter of the fragment and its scene of action favour this supposition,\nbut there is also another factor which corroborates it.\n\nIn the _Gorgias_ Plato makes one of the characters, Callicles\u2014a man of\nwhom we otherwise know nothing\u2014profess a doctrine which up to a certain\npoint is almost identical with that of the fragment. According to\nCallicles, the natural state (and the right state; on this point he is at\nvariance with the fragment) is that right belongs to the strong. This\nstate has been corrupted by legislation; the laws are inventions of the\nweak, who are also the majority, and their aim is to hinder the\nencroachment of the strong. If this theory is carried to its conclusion,\nit is obvious that religion must be added to the laws; if the former is\nnot also regarded as an invention for the policing of society, the whole\ntheory is upset. Now in the _Gorgias_ the question as to the attitude of\nthe gods towards the problem of what is right and what is wrong is\ncarefully avoided in the discussion. Not till the close of the dialogue,\nwhere Plato substitutes myth for scientific research, does he draw the\nconclusion in respect of religion. He does this in a positive form, as a\nconsequence of _his_ point of view: after death the gods reward the just\nand punish the unjust; but he expressly assumes that Callicles will regard\nit all as an old wives\u2019 tale.\n\nIn Callicles an attempt has been made to see a pseudonym for Critias. That\nis certainly wrong. Critias was a kinsman of Plato, is introduced by name\nin several dialogues, nay, one dialogue even bears his name, and he is\neverywhere treated with respect and sympathy. Nowadays, therefore, it is\ngenerally acknowledged that Callicles is a real person, merely unknown to\nus as such. However that may be, Plato would never have let a leading\ncharacter in one of his longer dialogues advance (and Socrates refute) a\nview which had no better authority than a passage in a satyric drama. On\nthe other hand, there is, as shown above, difficulty in supposing that the\ndoctrine of the fragment was stated in the writings of an eminent sophist;\nso we come to the conclusion that it was developed and diffused in\nsophistic circles by oral teaching, and that it became known to Critias\nand Plato in this way. Its originator we do not know. We might think of\nthe sophist Thrasymachus, who in the first book of Plato\u2019s _Republic_\nmaintains a point of view corresponding to that of Callicles in _Gorgias_.\nBut what we otherwise learn of Thrasymachus is not suggestive of interest\nin religion, and the only statement of his as to that kind of thing which\nhas come down to us tends to the denial of a providence, not denial of the\ngods. Quite recently Diagoras of Melos has been guessed at; this is empty\ntalk, resulting at best in substituting _x_ (or _NN_) for _y_.\n\nIf I have dwelt in such detail on the _Sisyphus_ fragment, it is because\nit is our first direct and unmistakable evidence of ancient atheism. Here\nfor the first time we meet with the direct statement which we have\nsearched for in vain among all the preceding authors: that the gods of\npopular belief are fabrication pure and simple and without any\ncorresponding reality, however remote. The nature of our tradition\nprecludes our ascertaining whether such a statement might have been made\nearlier; but the probability is _a priori_ that it was not. The whole\ndevelopment of ancient reasoning on religious questions, as far as we are\nable to survey it, leads in reality to the conclusion that atheism as an\nexpressed (though perhaps not publicly expressed) confession of faith did\nnot appear till the age of the sophists.\n\nWith the Critias fragment we have also brought to an end the inquiry into\nthe direct statements of atheistic tendency which have come down to us\nfrom the age of the sophists. The result is, as we see, rather meagre. But\nit may be supplemented with indirect testimonies which prove that there\nwas more of the thing than the direct tradition would lead us to\nconjecture, and that the denial of the existence of the gods must have\npenetrated very wide circles.\n\nThe fullest expression of Attic free-thought at the end of the fifth\ncentury is to be found in the tragedies of Euripides. They are leavened\nwith reflections on all possible moral and religious problems, and\ncriticism of the traditional conceptions of the gods plays a leading part\nin them. We shall, however, have some difficulty in using Euripides as a\nsource of what people really thought at this period, partly because he is\na very pronounced personality and by no means a mere mouthpiece for the\nideas of his contemporaries\u2014during his lifetime he was an object of the\nmost violent animosity owing, among other things, to his free-thinking\nviews\u2014partly because he, as a dramatist, was obliged to put his ideas into\nthe mouths of his characters, so that in many cases it is difficult to\ndecide how much is due to dramatic considerations and how much to the\npersonal opinion of the poet. Even to this day the religious standpoint of\nEuripides is matter of dispute. In the most recent detailed treatment of\nthe question he is characterised as an atheist, whereas others regard him\nmerely as a dialectician who debates problems without having any real\nstandpoint of his own.\n\nI do not believe that Euripides personally denied the existence of the\ngods; there is too much that tells against that theory, and, in fact,\nnothing that tells directly in favour of it, though he did not quite\nescape the charge of atheism even in his own day. To prove the correctness\nof this view would, however, lead too far afield in this connexion. On the\nother hand, a short characterisation of Euripides\u2019s manner of reasoning\nabout religious problems is unavoidable as a background for the treatment\nof those\u2014very rare\u2014passages where he has put actually atheistic\nreflections into the mouths of his characters.\n\nAs a Greek dramatist Euripides had to derive his subjects from the heroic\nlegends, which at the same time were legends of the gods in so far as they\nwere interwoven with tales of the gods\u2019 direct intervention in affairs. It\nis precisely against this intervention that the criticism of Euripides is\nprimarily directed. Again and again he makes his characters protest\nagainst the manner in which they are treated by the gods or in which the\ngods generally behave. It is characteristic of Euripides that his\nstarting-point in this connexion is always the moral one. So far he is a\ntypical representative of that tendency which, in earlier times, was\nrepresented by Xenophanes and a little later by Pindar; in no other Greek\npoet has the method of using the higher conceptions of the gods against\nthe lower found more complete expression than in Euripides. And in so far,\ntoo, he is still entirely on the ground of popular belief. But at the same\ntime it is characteristic of him that he is familiar with and highly\ninfluenced by Greek science. He knows the most eminent representatives of\nIonian naturalism (with the exception of Democritus), and he is fond of\ndisplaying his knowledge. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that he uses it\nin a contentious spirit against popular belief; on the contrary, he is\ninclined in agreement with the old philosophers to identify the gods of\npopular belief with the elements. Towards sophistic he takes a similar,\nbut less sympathetic attitude. Sophistic was not in vogue till he was a\nman of mature age; he made acquaintance with it, and he made use of\nit\u2014there are reflections in his dramas which carry distinct evidence of\nsophistic influence; but in his treatment of religious problems he is not\na disciple of the sophists, and on this subject, as on others, he\noccasionally attacked them.\n\nIt is against this background that we must set the reflections with an\natheistic tone that we find in Euripides. They are, as already mentioned,\nrare; indeed, strictly speaking there is only one case in which a\ncharacter openly denies the existence of the gods. The passage is a\nfragment of the drama _Bellerophon_; it is, despite its isolation, so\ntypical of the manner of Euripides that it deserves to be quoted in full.\n\n\u201cAnd then to say that there are gods in the heavens! Nay, there are none\nthere; if you are not foolish enough to be seduced by the old talk. Think\nfor yourselves about the matter, and do not be influenced by my words. I\ncontend that the tyrants kill the people wholesale, take their money and\ndestroy cities in spite of their oaths; and although they do all this they\nare happier than people who, in peace and quietness, lead god-fearing\nlives. And I know small states which honour the gods, but must obey\ngreater states, which are less pious, because their spearmen are fewer in\nnumber. And I believe that you, if a slothful man just prayed to the gods\nand did not earn his bread by the work of his hands\u2014\u201d Here the sense is\ninterrupted; but there remains one more line: \u201cThat which builds the\ncastle of the gods is in part the unfortunate happenings ...\u201d The\ncontinuation is missing.\n\nThe argumentation here is characteristic of Euripides. From the injustice\nof life he infers the non-existence of the gods. The conclusion evidently\nonly holds good on the assumption that the gods must be just; and this is\nprecisely one of the postulates of popular belief. The reasoning is not\nsophistic; on the contrary, in their attacks the sophists took up a\nposition outside the foundation of popular belief and attacked the\nfoundation itself. This reasoning, on the other hand, is closely allied to\nthe earlier religious thinking of the Greeks; it only proceeds further\nthan the latter, where it results in rank denial.\n\nThe drama of _Bellerophon_ is lost, and reconstruction is out of the\nquestion; if only for that reason it is unwarrantable to draw any\nconclusions from the detached fragment as to the poet\u2019s personal attitude\ntowards the existence of the gods. But, nevertheless, the fragment is of\ninterest in this connexion. It would never have occurred to Sophocles or\nAeschylus to put such a speech in the mouth of one of his characters. When\nEuripides does that it is a proof that the question of the existence of\nthe gods has begun to present itself to the popular consciousness at this\ntime. Viewed in this light other statements of his which are not in\nthemselves atheistic become significant. When it is said: \u201cIf the gods act\nin a shameful way, they are not gods\u201d\u2014that indeed is not atheism in our\nsense, but it is very near to it. Interesting is also the introduction to\nthe drama _Melanippe_: \u201cZeus, whoever Zeus may be; for of that I only know\nwhat is told.\u201d Aeschylus begins a strophe in one of his most famous choral\nodes with almost the same words: \u201cZeus, whoe\u2019er he be; for if he desire so\nto be called, I will address him by this name.\u201d In him it is an expression\nof genuine antique piety, which excludes all human impertinence towards\nthe gods to such a degree that it even forgoes knowing their real names.\nIn Euripides the same idea becomes an expression of doubt; but in this\ncase also the doubt is raised on the foundation of popular belief.\n\nIt is not surprising that so prominent and sustained a criticism of\npopular belief as that of Euripides, produced, moreover, on the stage,\ncalled forth a reaction from the defenders of the established faith, and\nthat charges of impiety were not wanting. It is more to be wondered at\nthat these charges on the whole are so few and slight, and that Euripides\ndid not become the object of any actual prosecution. We know of a private\ntrial in which the accuser incidentally charged Euripides with impiety on\nthe strength of a quotation from one of his tragedies, Euripides\u2019s answer\nbeing a protest against dragging his poetry into the affair; the verdict\non that belonged to another court. Aristophanes, who is always severe on\nEuripides, has only one passage directly charging him with being a\npropagator of atheism; but the accusation is hardly meant to be taken\nseriously. In _The Frogs_, where he had every opportunity of emphasising\nthis view, there is hardly an indication of it. In _The Clouds_, where the\nmain attack is directed against modern free-thought, Euripides, to be\nsure, is sneered at as being the fashionable poet of the corrupted youth,\nbut he is not drawn into the charge of impiety. Even when Plato wrote his\n_Republic_, Euripides was generally considered the \u201cwisest of all\ntragedians.\u201d This would have been impossible if he had been considered an\natheist. In spite of all, the general feeling must undoubtedly have been\nthat Euripides ultimately took his stand on the ground of popular belief.\nIt was a similar instinctive judgment in regard to religion which\nprevented antiquity from placing Xenophanes amongst the atheists. Later\ntimes no doubt judged differently; the quotation from _Melanippe_ is in\nfact cited as a proof that Euripides was an atheist in his heart of\nhearts.\n\nIn Aristophanes we meet with the first observations concerning the change\nin the religious conditions of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. In one\nof his plays, _The Clouds_, he actually set himself the task of taking up\narms against modern unbelief, and he characterises it directly as atheism.\nIf only for that reason the play deserves somewhat fuller consideration.\n\nIt is well known that Aristophanes chose Socrates as a representative of\nthe modern movement. In him he embodies all the faults with which he\nwished to pick a quarrel in the fashionable philosophy of the day. On the\nother hand, the essence of Socratic teaching is entirely absent from\nAristophanes\u2019s representation; of that he had hardly any understanding,\nand even if he had he would at any rate not have been able to make use of\nit in his drama. We need not then in this connexion consider Socrates\nhimself at all; on the other hand, the play gives a good idea of the\npopular idea of sophistic. Here we find all the features of the school,\ngrotesquely mixed up and distorted by the farce, it is true, but\nnevertheless easily recognisable: rhetoric as an end in itself, of course,\nwith emphasis on its immoral aspect; empty and hair-splitting dialectics;\nlinguistic researches; Ionic naturalism; and first and last, as the focus\nof all, denial of the gods. That Aristophanes was well informed on certain\npoints, at any rate, is clear from the fact that the majority of the\nscientific explanations which he puts into the mouth of Socrates actually\nrepresent the latest results of science at that time\u2014which in all\nprobability did not prevent his Athenians from considering them as\nexceedingly absurd and ridiculous.\n\nWhat matters here, however, is only the accusation of atheism which he\nmade against Socrates. It is a little difficult to handle, in so far as\nAristophanes, for dramatic reasons, has equipped Socrates with a whole set\nof deities. There are the clouds themselves, which are of Aristophanes\u2019s\nown invention; there is also the air, which he has got from Diogenes of\nApollonia, and finally a \u201cvortex\u201d which is supposed to be derived from the\nsame source, and which at any rate has cast Zeus down from his throne. All\nthis we must ignore, as it is only conditioned partly by technical\nreasons\u2014Aristophanes had to have a chorus and chose the clouds for the\npurpose\u2014and partially by the desire to ridicule Ionic naturalism. But\nenough is left over. In the beginning of the play Socrates expressly\ndeclares that no gods exist. Similar statements are repeated in several\nplaces. Zeus is sometimes substituted for the gods, but it comes to the\nsame thing. And at the end of the play, where the honest Athenian, who has\nventured on the ticklish ground of sophistic, admits his delusion, it is\nexpressly said:\n\n\u201cOh, what a fool I am! Nay, I must have been mad indeed when I thought of\nthrowing the gods away for Socrates\u2019s sake!\u201d\n\nEven in the verses with which the chorus conclude the play it is insisted\nthat the worst crime of the sophists is their insult to the gods.\n\nThe inference to be drawn from all this is simply that the popular\nAthenian opinion\u2014for we may rest assured that this and the view of\nAristophanes are identical\u2014was that the sophists were atheists. That says\nbut little. For popular opinion always works with broad categories, and\nthe probability is that in this case, as demonstrated above, it was in the\nwrong, for, as a rule, the sophists were hardly conscious deniers of the\ngods. But, at the same time, at the back of the onslaught of Aristophanes\nthere lies the idea that the teaching of the sophists led to denial of the\ngods; that atheism was the natural outcome of their doctrine and way of\nreasoning. And that there was some truth therein is proved by other\nevidence which can hardly be rejected.\n\nIn the indictment of Socrates it is said that he \u201coffended by not\nbelieving in the gods in which the State believed.\u201d In the two apologies\nfor Socrates which have come down to us under Xenophon\u2019s name, the author\ntreats this accusation entirely under the aspect of atheism, and tries to\nrefute it by positive proofs of the piety of Socrates. But not one word is\nsaid about there being, in and for itself, anything remarkable or\nimprobable in the charge. In Plato\u2019s _Apology_, Plato makes Socrates ask\nthe accuser point-blank whether he is of the opinion that he, Socrates,\ndoes not believe in the gods at all and accordingly is a downright denier\nof the gods, or whether he merely means to say that he believes in other\ngods than those of the State. He makes the accuser answer that the\nassertion is that Socrates does not believe in any gods at all. In Plato\nSocrates refutes the accusation indirectly, using a line of argument\nentirely differing from that of Xenophon. But in Plato, too, the\naccusation is treated as being in no way extraordinary. In my opinion,\nPlato\u2019s _Apology_ cannot be used as historical evidence for details unless\nspecial reasons can be given proving their historical value beyond the\nfact that they occur in the _Apology_. But in this connexion the question\nis not what was said or not said at Socrates\u2019s trial. The decisive point\nis that we possess two quite independent and unambiguous depositions by\ntwo fully competent witnesses of the beginning of the fourth century which\nboth treat of the charge of atheism as something which is neither strange\nnor surprising at their time. It is therefore permissible to conclude that\nin Athens at this time there really existed circles or at any rate not a\nfew individuals who had given up the belief in the popular gods.\n\nA dialogue between Socrates and a young man by name Aristodemus, given in\nXenophon\u2019s _Memorabilia_, makes the same impression. Of Aristodemus it is\nsaid that he does not sacrifice to the gods, does not consult the Oracle\nand ridicules those who do so. When he is called to account for this\nbehaviour he maintains that he does not despise \u201cthe divine,\u201d but is of\nthe opinion that it is too exalted to need his worship. Moreover, he\ncontends that the gods do not trouble themselves about mankind. This is,\nof course, not atheism in our sense; but Aristodemus\u2019s attitude is,\nnevertheless, extremely eccentric in a community like that of Athens in\nthe fifth century. And yet it is not mentioned as anything isolated and\nextraordinary, but as if it were something which, to be sure, was out of\nthe common, but not unheard of.\n\nIt is further to be observed that at the end of the fifth century we often\nhear of active sacrilegious outrages. An example is the historic trial of\nAlcibiades for profanation of the Mysteries. But this was not an isolated\noccurrence; there were more of the same kind at the time. Of the\ndithyrambic poet Cinesias it is said that he profaned holy things in an\nobscene manner. But the greatest stress of all must be laid on the\nwell-known mutilation of the Hermae at Athens in 415, just before the\nexpedition to Sicily. All the tales about the outrages of the Mysteries\n_may_ have been fictitious, but it is a fact that the Hermae were\nmutilated. The motive was probably political: the members of a secret\nsociety intended to pledge themselves to each other by all committing a\ncapital crime. But that they chose just this form of crime shows quite\nclearly that respect for the State religion had greatly declined in these\ncircles.\n\nWhat has so far been adduced as proof that the belief in the gods had\nbegun to waver in Athens at the end of the fifth century is, in my\nopinion, conclusive in itself to anybody who is familiar with the more\nancient Greek modes of thought and expression on this point, and can not\nonly hear what is said, but also understand how it is said and what is\npassed over in silence. Of course it can always be objected that the\nproofs are partly the assertions of a comic poet who certainly was not\nparticular about accusations of impiety, partly deductions _ex silentio_,\npartly actions the motives for which are uncertain. Fortunately, however,\nwe have\u2014from a slightly later period, it is true\u2014a positive utterance\nwhich confirms our conclusion and which comes from a man who was not in\nthe habit of talking idly and who had the best opportunities of knowing\nthe circumstances.\n\nIn the tenth book of his _Laws_, written shortly before his death, _i.e._\nabout the middle of the fourth century, Plato gives a detailed account of\nthe question of irreligion seen from the point of view of penal\nlegislation. He distinguishes here between three forms, namely, denial of\nthe existence of the gods, denial of the divine providence (whereas the\nexistence of the gods is admitted), and finally the assumption that the\ngods exist and exercise providence, but that they allow themselves to be\ninfluenced by sacrifices and prayers. Of these three categories the last\nis evidently directed against ancient popular belief itself; it does not\ntherefore interest us in this connexion. The second view, the denial of a\nprovidence, we have already met with in Xenophon in the character of\nAristodemus, and in the sophist Thrasymachus; Euripides, too, sometimes\nalludes to it, though it was far from being his own opinion. Whether it\namounted to denial of the gods or not was, in ancient times, the cause of\nmuch dispute; it is, of course, not atheism in our sense, but it is\ncertainly evidence that belief in the gods is shaken. The first view, on\nthe other hand, is sheer atheism. Plato consequently reckons with this as\na serious danger to the community; he mentions it as a widespread view\namong the youth of his time, and in his legislation he sentences to death\nthose who fail to be converted. It would seem certain, therefore, that\nthere was, in reality, something in it after all.\n\nPlato does not confine himself to defining atheism and laying down the\npenalty for it; he at the same time, in accordance with a principle which\nhe generally follows in the _Laws_, discusses it and tries to disprove it.\nIn this way he happens to give us information\u2014which is of special interest\nto us\u2014of the proofs which were adduced by its followers.\n\nThe argument is a twofold one. First comes the naturalistic proof; the\nheavenly bodies, according to the general (and Plato\u2019s own) view the most\ncertain deities, are inanimate natural objects. It is interesting to note\nthat in speaking of this doctrine in detail reference is clearly made to\nAnaxagoras; this confirms our afore-mentioned conjectures as to the\ncharacter of his work. Plato was quite in a position to deal with\nAnaxagoras on the strength not only of what he said, but of what he passed\nover in silence. The second argument is the well-known sophistic one, that\nthe gods are _nom\u00f4i_, not _physei_, they depend upon convention, which has\nnothing to do with reality. In this connexion the argument adds that what\napplies to the gods, applies also to right and wrong; _i.e._ we find here\nin the _Laws_ the view with which we are familiar from Callicles in the\n_Gorgias_, but with the missing link supplied. And Plato\u2019s development of\nthis theme shows clearly just what a general historical consideration\nmight lead us to expect, namely, that it was naturalism and sophistic that\njointly undermined the belief in the old gods.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nWith Socrates and his successors the whole question of the relation of\nGreek thought to popular belief enters upon a new phase. The Socratic\nphilosophy is in many ways a continuation of sophistic. This is involved\nalready in the fact that the same questions form the central interest in\nthe two schools of thought, so that the problems stated by the sophists\nbecame the decisive factor in the content of Socratic and Platonic\nthought. The Socratic schools at the same time took over the actual\nprogramme of the sophists, namely, the education of adolescence in the\nhighest culture. But, on the other hand, the Socratic philosophy was in\nthe opposite camp to sophistic; on many points it represents a reaction\nagainst it, a recollection of the valuable elements contained in earlier\nGreek thought on life, especially human life, values which sophistic\nregarded with indifference or even hostility, and which were threatened\nwith destruction if it should carry the day. This reactionary tendency in\nSocratic philosophy appears nowhere more plainly than in the field of\nreligion.\n\nUnder these circumstances it is a peculiar irony of fate that the very\noriginator of the new trend in Greek thought was charged with and\nsentenced for impiety. We have already mentioned the singular prelude to\nthe indictment afforded by the comedy of Aristophanes. We have also\nremarked upon the futility of looking therein for any actual enlightenment\non the Socratic point of view. And Plato makes Socrates state this with\nall necessary sharpness in the _Apology_. Hence what we may infer from the\nattack of Aristophanes is merely this, that the general public lumped\nSocrates together with the sophists and more especially regarded him as a\ngodless fellow. Unless this had been so, Aristophanes could not have\nintroduced him as the chief character in his travesty. And without doubt\nit was this popular point of view which his accusers relied on when they\nactually included atheism as a count in their bill of indictment. It will,\nnevertheless, be necessary to dwell for a moment on this bill of\nindictment and the defence.\n\nThe charge of impiety was a twofold one, partly for not believing in the\ngods the State believed in, partly for introducing new \u201cdemonic things.\u201d\nThis latter act was directly punishable according to Attic law. What his\naccusers alluded to was the _daimonion_ of Socrates. That they should have\nhad any idea of what that was must be regarded as utterly out of the\nquestion, and whatever it may have been\u2014and of this we shall have a word\nto say later\u2014it had at any rate nothing whatever to do with atheism. As to\nthe charge of not believing in the gods of the State, Plato makes the\naccuser prefer it in the form that Socrates did not believe in any gods at\nall, after which it becomes an easy matter for Socrates to show that it is\ndirectly incompatible with the charge of introducing new deities. As\nground for his accusation the accuser states\u2014in Plato, as before\u2014that\nSocrates taught the same doctrine about the sun and moon as Anaxagoras.\nThe whole of the passage in the _Apology_ in which the question of the\ndenial of gods is dealt with\u2014a short dialogue between Socrates and the\naccuser, quite in the Socratic manner\u2014historically speaking, carries\nlittle conviction, and we therefore dare not take it for granted that the\ncharge either of atheism or of false doctrine about the sun and moon was\nput forward in that form. But that something about this latter point was\nmentioned during the trial must be regarded as probable, when we consider\nthat Xenophon, too, defends Socrates at some length against the charge of\nconcerning himself with speculations on Nature. That he did not do so must\nbe taken for certain, not only from the express evidence of Xenophon and\nPlato, but from the whole nature of the case. The accusation on this point\nwas assuredly pure fabrication. There remains only what was no doubt also\nthe main point, namely, the assertion of the pernicious influence of\nSocrates on the young, and the inference of irreligion to be drawn from\nit\u2014an argument which it would be absurd to waste any words upon.\n\nThe attack, then, affords no information about Socrates\u2019s personal point\nof view as regards belief in the gods, and the defence only very little.\nBoth Xenophon and Plato give an account of Socrates\u2019s _daimonion_, but\nthis point has so little relation to the charge of atheism that it is not\nworth examination. For the rest Plato\u2019s defence is indirect. He makes\nSocrates refute his opponent, but does not let him say a word about his\nown point of view. Xenophon is more positive, in so far as in the first\nplace he asserts that Socrates worshipped the gods like any other good\ncitizen, and more especially that he advised his friends to use the\nOracle; in the second place, that, though he lived in full publicity, no\none ever saw him do or heard him say anything of an impious nature. All\nthese assertions are assuredly correct, and they render it highly\nimprobable that Socrates should have secretly abandoned the popular faith,\nbut they tell us little that is positive about his views. Fortunately we\npossess other means of getting to closer grips with the question; the way\nmust be through a consideration of Socrates\u2019s whole conduct and his mode\nof thought.\n\nHere we at once come to the interesting negative fact that there is\nnothing in tradition to indicate that Socrates ever occupied himself with\ntheological questions. To be sure, Xenophon has twice put into his mouth a\nwhole theodicy expressing an elaborate teleological view of nature. But\nthat we dare not base anything upon this is now, I think, universally\nacknowledged. Plato, in the dialogue _Euthyphron_, makes him subject the\npopular notion of piety to a devastating criticism; but this, again, will\nnot nowadays be regarded as historical by anybody. Everything we are told\nabout Socrates which bears the stamp of historical truth indicates that he\nrestricted himself to ethics and left theology alone. But this very fact\nis not without significance. It indicates that Socrates\u2019s aim was not to\nalter the religious views of his contemporaries. Since he did not do so we\nmay reasonably believe it was because they did not inconvenience him in\nwhat was most important to him, _i.e._ ethics.\n\nWe may, however, perhaps go even a step farther. We may venture, I think,\nto maintain that so far from contemporary religion being a hindrance to\nSocrates in his occupation as a teacher of ethics, it was, on the\ncontrary, an indispensable support to him, nay, an integral component of\nhis fundamental ethical view. The object of Socrates in his relations with\nhis fellow-men was, on his own showing\u2014for on this important point I think\nwe can confidently rely upon Plato\u2019s _Apology_\u2014to make clear to them that\nthey knew nothing. And when he was asked to say in what he himself\ndiffered from other people, he could mention only one thing, namely, that\nhe was aware of his own ignorance. But his ignorance is not an ignorance\nof this thing or that, it is a radical ignorance, something involved in\nthe essence of man as man. That is, in other words, it is determined by\nreligion. In order to be at all intelligible and ethically applicable, it\npresupposes the conception of beings of whom the essence is knowledge. For\nSocrates and his contemporaries the popular belief supplied such beings in\nthe gods. The institution of the Oracle itself is an expression of the\nrecognition of the superiority of the gods to man in knowledge. But the\ndogma had long been stated even in its absolute form when Homer said: \u201cThe\ngods know everything.\u201d To Socrates, who always took his starting-point\nquite popularly from notions that were universally accepted, this basis\nwas simply indispensable. And so far from inconveniencing Socrates, the\nmultiplicity and anthropomorphism of the gods seemed an advantage to\nhim\u2014the more they were like man in all but the essential qualification,\nthe better.\n\nThe Socratic ignorance has an ethical bearing. Its complement is his\nassertion that virtue is knowledge. Here again the gods are the necessary\npresupposition and determination. That the gods were good, or, as it was\npreferred to express it, \u201cjust\u201d (the Greek word comprises more than the\nEnglish word), was no less a popular dogma than the notion that they\npossessed knowledge. Now all Socrates\u2019s efforts were directed towards\ngoodness as an end in view, towards the ethical development of mankind.\nHere again popular belief was his best ally. To the people to whom he\ntalked, virtue (the Greek word is at once both wider and narrower in sense\nthan the English term) was no mere abstract notion; it was a living\nreality to them, embodied in beings that were like themselves, human\nbeings, but perfect human beings.\n\nIf we correlate this with the negative circumstance that Socrates was no\ntheologian but a teacher of ethics, we can easily understand a point of\nview which accepted popular belief as it was and employed it for working\npurposes in the service of moral teaching. Such a point of view, moreover,\ngained extraordinary strength by the fact that it preserved continuity\nwith earlier Greek religious thought. This latter, too, had been ethical\nin its bearing; it, too, had employed the gods in the service of its\nethical aim. But its central idea was felicity, not virtue; its\nstarting-point was the popular dogma of the felicity of the gods, not\ntheir justice. In this way it had come to lay stress on a virtue which\nmight be termed modesty, but in a religious sense, _i.e._ man must\nrecognise his difference from the gods as a limited being, subject to the\nvicissitudes of an existence above which the gods are raised. Socrates\nsays just the same, only that he puts knowledge or virtue, which to him\nwas the same thing, in the place of felicity. From a religious point of\nview the result is exactly the same, namely, the doctrine of the gods as\nthe terminus and ideal, and the insistence on the gulf separating man from\nthem. We are tempted to say that, had Socrates turned with hostile intent\nagainst a religion which thus played into his hands, the more fool he. But\nthis is putting the problem the wrong way up\u2014Socrates never stood\ncritically outside popular belief and traditional religious thought\nspeculating as to whether he should use it or reject it. No, his thought\ngrew out of it as from the bosom of the earth. Hence its mighty religious\npower, its inevitable victory over a school of thought which had severed\nall connexion with tradition.\n\nThat such a point of view should be so badly misunderstood as it was in\nAthens seems incomprehensible. The explanation is no doubt that the whole\nstory of Socrates\u2019s denial of the gods was only included by his accusers\nfor the sake of completeness, and did not play any great part in the final\nissue. This seems confirmed by the fact that they found it convenient to\nsupport their charge of atheism by one of introducing foreign gods, this\nbeing punishable by Attic law. They thus obtained some slight hold for\ntheir accusation. But both charges must be presumed to have been so\nsignally refuted during the trial that it is hardly possible that any\ngreat number of the judges were influenced by them. It was quite different\nand far weightier matters which brought about the conviction of Socrates,\nquestions on which there was really a deep and vital difference of opinion\nbetween him and his contemporaries. That Socrates\u2019s attitude towards\npopular belief was at any rate fully understood elsewhere is testified by\nthe answer of the Delphic Oracle, that declared Socrates to be the wisest\nof all men. However remarkable such a pronouncement from such a place may\nappear, it seems impossible to reject the accounts of it as unhistorical;\non the other hand, it does not seem impossible to explain how the Oracle\ncame to declare itself as reported. Earlier Greek thought, which insisted\nupon the gulf separating gods and men, was from olden times intimately\nconnected with the Delphic Oracle. It hardly sprang from there; more\nprobably it arose spontaneously in various parts of Hellas. But it would\nnaturally feel attracted toward the Oracle, which was one of the religious\ncentres of Hellas, and it was recognised as legitimate by the Oracle.\nAbove all, the honour shown by the Oracle to Pindar, one of the chief\nrepresentatives of the earlier thought, testifies to this. Hence there is\nnothing incredible in the assumption that Socrates attracted notice at\nDelphi as a defender of the old-fashioned religious views approved by the\nOracle, precisely in virtue of his opposition to the ideas then in vogue.\n\nIf we accept this explanation we are, however, excluded from taking\nliterally Plato\u2019s account of the answer of the Delphic Oracle and\nSocrates\u2019s attitude towards it. Plato presents the case as if the Oracle\nwere the starting-point of Socrates\u2019s philosophy and of the peculiar mode\nof life which was indissolubly bound up with it. This presentation cannot\nbe correct if we are to regard the Oracle as historical and understand it\nas we have understood it. The Oracle presupposes the Socrates we know: a\nman with a religious message and a mode of life which was bound to attract\nnotice to him as an exception from the general rule. It cannot, therefore,\nhave been the cause of Socrates\u2019s finding himself. On the other hand, it\nis difficult to imagine a man choosing a mode of life like that of\nSocrates without a definite inducement, without some fact or other that\nwould lead him to conceive himself as an exception from the rule. If we\nlook for such a fact in the life of Socrates, we shall look in vain as\nregards externals. Apart from his activities as a religious and ethical\npersonality, his life was that of any other Attic citizen. But in his\nspiritual life there was certainly one point, but only one, on which he\ndeviated from the normal, namely, his _daimonion_. If we examine the\naccounts of this more closely the only thing we can make of them is\u2014or so\nat least it seems to me\u2014that we are here in the presence of a\nform\u2014peculiar, no doubt, and highly developed\u2014of the phenomena which are\nnowadays classed under the concept of clairvoyance. Now Plato makes\nSocrates himself say that the power of avoiding what would harm him, in\ngreat things and little, by virtue of a direct perception (a \u201cvoice\u201d),\nwhich is what constituted his _daimonion_, was given him from childhood.\nThat it was regarded as something singular both by himself and others is\nevident, and likewise that he himself regarded it as something\nsupernatural; the designation _daimonion_ itself seems to be his own. I\nthink that we must seek for the origin of Socrates\u2019s peculiar mode of life\nin this direction, strange as it may be that a purely mystic element\nshould have given the impulse to the most rationalistic philosophy the\nworld has ever produced. It is impossible to enter more deeply into this\nproblem here; but, if my conjecture is correct, we have an additional\nexplanation of the fact that Socrates was disposed to anything rather than\nan attack on the established religion.\n\nA view of popular religion such as I have here sketched bore in itself the\ngerm of a further development which must lead in other directions. A\npersonality like Socrates might perhaps manage throughout a lifetime to\nkeep that balance on a razor\u2019s edge which is involved in utilising to the\nutmost in the service of ethics the popular dogmas of the perfection of\nthe gods, while disregarding all irrelevant tales, all myths and all\nnotions of too human a tenor about them. This demanded concentration on\nthe one thing needful, in conjunction with deep piety of the most genuine\nantique kind, with the most profound religious modesty, a combination\nwhich it was assuredly given to but one man to attain. Socrates\u2019s\nsuccessors had it not. Starting precisely from a Socratic foundation they\nentered upon theological speculations which carried them away from the\nSocratic point of view.\n\nFor the Cynics, who set up virtue as the only good, the popular notions of\nthe gods would seem to have been just as convenient as for Socrates. And\nwe know that Antisthenes, the founder of the school, made ample use of\nthem in his ethical teaching. He represented Heracles as the Cynical ideal\nand occupied himself largely with allegorical interpretation of the myths.\nOn the other hand, there is a tradition that he maintained that \u201caccording\nto nature\u201d there was only one god, but \u201caccording to the law\u201d several\u2014a\npurely sophistic view. He inveighed against the worship of images, too,\nand maintained that god \u201cdid not resemble any thing,\u201d and we know that his\nschool rejected all worship of the gods because the gods \u201cwere in need of\nnothing.\u201d This conception, too, is presumably traceable to Antisthenes. In\nall this the theological interest is evident. As soon as this interest\nsets in, the harmonious relation to the popular faith is upset, the\ndiscord between its higher and lower ideas becomes manifest, and criticism\nbegins to assert itself. In the case of Antisthenes, if we may believe\ntradition, it seems to have led to monotheism, in itself a most remarkable\nphenomenon in the history of Greek religion, but the material is too\nslight for us to make anything of it. The later Cynics afford interesting\nfeatures in illustration of atheism in antiquity, but this is best left to\na later chapter.\n\nAbout the relations of the Megarians to the popular faith we know next to\nnothing. One of them, Stilpo, was charged with impiety on account of a bad\njoke about Athene, and convicted, although he tried to save himself by\nanother bad joke. As his point of view was that of a downright sceptic, he\nwas no doubt an atheist according to the notions of antiquity; in our day\nhe would be called an agnostic, but the information that we have about his\nreligious standpoint is too slight to repay dwelling on him.\n\nAs to the relation of the Cyrenaic school to the popular faith, the\ngeneral proposition has been handed down to us that the wise man could not\nbe \u201cdeisidaimon,\u201d _i.e._ superstitious or god-fearing; the Greek word can\nhave both senses. This does not speak for piety at any rate, but then the\nrelationship of the Cyrenaics to the gods of popular belief was different\nfrom that of the other followers of Socrates. As they set up pleasure\u2014the\nmomentary, isolated feeling of pleasure\u2014as the supreme good, they had no\nuse for the popular conceptions of the gods in their ethics, nay, these\nconceptions were even a hindrance to them in so far as the fear of the\ngods might prove a restriction where it ought not to. In these\ncircumstances we cannot wonder at finding a member of the school in the\nlist of _atheoi_. This is Theodorus of Cyrene, who lived about the year\n300. He really seems to have been a downright denier of the gods; he wrote\na work _On the Gods_ containing a searching criticism of theology, which\nis said to have exposed him to unpleasantness during a stay at Athens, but\nthe then ruler of the city, Demetrius of Phalerum, protected him. There is\nnothing strange in a manifestation of downright atheism at this time and\nfrom this quarter. More remarkable is that interest in theology which we\nmust assume Theodorus to have had, since he wrote at length upon the\nsubject. Unfortunately it is not evident from the account whether his\ncriticism was directed mostly against popular religion or against the\ntheology of the philosophers. As it was asserted in antiquity that\nEpicurus used his book largely, the latter is more probable.\n\nWhereas in the case of the \u201cimperfect Socratics\u201d as well as of all the\nearlier philosophers we must content ourselves with more or less casual\nnotes, and at the best with fragments, and for Socrates with second-hand\ninformation, when we come to Plato we find ourselves for the first time in\nthe presence of full and authentic information. Plato belongs to those few\namong the ancient authors of whom everything that their contemporaries\npossessed has been preserved to our own day. There would, however, be no\ncause to speak about Plato in an investigation of atheism in antiquity,\nhad not so eminent a scholar as Zeller roundly asserted that Plato did not\nbelieve in the Greek gods\u2014with the exception of the heavenly bodies, in\nthe case of which the facts are obvious. On the other hand, it is\nimpossible here to enter upon a close discussion of so large a question; I\nmust content myself with giving my views in their main lines, with a brief\nstatement of my reasons for holding them.\n\nIn the mythical portions of his dialogues Plato uses the gods as a given\npoetic motive and treats them with poetic licence. Otherwise they play a\nvery inferior part in the greater portion of his works. In the\n_Euthyphron_ he gives a sharp criticism of the popular conception of\npiety, and in reality at the same time very seriously questions the\nimportance and value of the existing form of worship. In his chief ethical\nwork, the _Gorgias_, he subjects the fundamental problems of individual\nethics to a close discussion without saying one word of their relation to\nreligion; if we except the mythic part at the end the gods scarcely appear\nin the dialogue. Finally, in his _Republic_ he no doubt gives a detailed\ncriticism of popular mythology as an element of education, and in the\ncourse of this also some positive definitions of the idea of God, but\nthroughout the construction of his ideal community he entirely disregards\nreligion and worship, even if he occasionally takes it for granted that a\ncult of some sort exists, and in one place quite casually refers to the\nOracle at Delphi as authority for its organisation in details. To this may\nfurther be added the negative point that he never in any of his works made\nSocrates define his position in regard to the sophistic treatment of the\npopular religion.\n\nIn Plato\u2019s later works the case is different. In the construction of the\nuniverse described in the _Timaeus_ the gods have a definite and\nsignificant place, and in the _Laws_, Plato\u2019s last work, they play a\nleading part. Here he not only gives elaborate rules for the organisation\nof the worship which permeate the whole life of the community, but even in\nthe argument of the dialogue the gods are everywhere in evidence in a way\nwhich strongly suggests bigotry. Finally, Plato gives the above-mentioned\ndefinitions of impiety and fixes the severest punishment for it\u2014for\ndownright denial of the gods, when all attempts at conversion have failed,\nthe penalty of death.\n\nOn this evidence we are tempted to take the view that Plato in his earlier\nyears took up a critical attitude in regard to the gods of popular belief,\nperhaps even denied them altogether, that he gradually grew more\nconservative, and ended by being a confirmed bigot. And we might look for\na corroboration of this in a peculiar observation in the _Laws_. Plato\nopens his admonition to the young against atheism by reminding them that\nthey are young, and that false opinion concerning the gods is a common\ndisease among the young, but that utter denial of their existence is not\nwont to endure to old age. In this we might see an expression of personal\nreligious experience.\n\nNevertheless I do not think such a construction of Plato\u2019s religious\ndevelopment feasible. A decisive objection is his exposition of the\nSocratic point of view in so early a work as the _Apology_. I at any rate\nregard it as psychologically impossible that a downright atheist, be he\never so great a poet, should be able to draw such a picture of a deeply\nreligious personality, and draw it with so much sympathy and such\nconvincing force. Add to this other facts of secondary moment. Even the\nclose criticism to which Plato subjects the popular notions of the gods in\nhis _Republic_ does not indicate denial of the gods as such; moreover, it\nis built on a positive foundation, on the idea of the goodness of the gods\nand their truth (which for Plato manifests itself in immutability).\nFinally, Plato at all times vigorously advocated the belief in providence.\nIn the _Laws_ he stamps unbelief in divine providence as impiety; in the\n_Republic_ he insists in a prominent passage that the gods love the just\nman and order everything for him in the best way. And he puts the same\nthought into Socrates\u2019s mouth in the _Apology_, though it is hardly\nSocratic in the strict sense of the word, _i.e._ as a main point in\nSocrates\u2019s conception of existence. All this should warn us not to\nexaggerate the significance of the difference which may be pointed out\nbetween the religious standpoints of the younger and the older Plato. But\nthe difference itself cannot, I think, be denied; there can hardly be any\ndoubt that Plato was much more critical of popular belief in his youth and\nprime than towards the close of his life.\n\nEven in Plato\u2019s later works there is, in spite of their conservative\nattitude, a very peculiar reservation in regard to the anthropomorphic\ngods of popular belief. It shows itself in the _Laws_ in the fact that\nwhere he sets out to _prove_ the existence of the gods he contents himself\nwith proving the divinity of the heavenly bodies and quite disregards the\nother gods. It appears still more plainly in the _Timaeus_, where he gives\na philosophical explanation of how the divine heavenly bodies came into\nexistence, but says expressly of the other gods that such an explanation\nis impossible, and that we must abide by what the old theologians said on\nthis subject; they being partly the children of gods would know best where\ntheir parents came from. It is observations of this kind that induced\nZeller to believe that Plato altogether denied the gods of popular belief;\nhe also contends that the gods have no place in Plato\u2019s system. This\nlatter contention is perfectly correct; Plato never identified the gods\nwith the ideas (although he comes very near to it in the _Republic_, where\nhe attributes to them immutability, the quality which determines the\nessence of the ideas), and in the _Timaeus_ he distinguishes sharply\nbetween them. No doubt his doctrine of ideas led up to a kind of divinity,\nthe idea of the good, as the crown of the system, but the direct inference\nfrom this conception would be pure monotheism and so exclude polytheism.\nThis inference Plato did not draw, though his treatment of the gods in the\n_Laws_ and _Timaeus_ certainly shows that he was quite clear that the gods\nof the popular faith were an irrational element in his conception of the\nuniverse. The two passages do not entitle us to go further and conclude\nthat he utterly rejected them, and in the _Timaeus_, where Plato makes\nboth classes of gods, both the heavenly bodies and the others, take part\nin the creation of man, this is plainly precluded. The playful turn with\nwhich he evades inquiry into the origin of the gods thus receives its\nproper limitation; it is entirely confined to their origin.\n\nSuch, according to my view, is the state of the case. It is of fundamental\nimportance to emphasise the fact that we cannot conclude, because the gods\nof popular belief do not fit into the system of a philosopher, that he\ndenies their existence. In what follows we shall have occasion to point\nout a case in which, as all are now agreed, a philosophical school has\nadopted and stubbornly held to the belief in the existence of gods though\nthis assumption was directly opposed to a fundamental proposition in its\nsystem of doctrine. The case of Plato is particularly interesting because\nhe himself was aware and has pointed out that here was a point on which\nthe consistent scientific application of his conception of the universe\nmust fail. It is the outcome\u2014one of many\u2014of what is perhaps his finest\nquality as a philosopher, namely, his intellectual honesty.\n\nAn indirect testimony to the correctness of the view here stated will be\nfound in the way in which Plato\u2019s faithful disciple Xenocrates developed\nhis theology, for it shows that Xenocrates presupposed the existence of\nthe gods of popular belief as given by Plato. Xenocrates made it his\ngeneral task to systematise Plato\u2019s philosophy (which had never been set\nforth publicly by himself as a whole), and to secure it against attack. In\nthe course of this work he was bound to discover that the conception of\nthe gods of popular belief was a particularly weak point in Plato\u2019s\nsystem, and he attempted to mend matters by a peculiar theory which became\nof the greatest importance for later times. Xenocrates set up as gods, in\nthe first place, the heavenly bodies. Next he gave his highest principles\n(pure abstracts such as oneness and twoness) and the elements of his\nuniverse (air, water and earth) the names of some of the highest\ndivinities in popular belief (Zeus, Hades, Poseidon, Demeter). These gods,\nhowever, did not enter into direct communication with men, but only\nthrough some intermediate agent. The intermediate agents were the\n\u201cdemons,\u201d a class of beings who were higher than man yet not perfect like\nthe gods. They were, it seems, immortal; they were invisible and far more\npowerful than human beings; but they were subject to human passions and\nwere of highly differing grades of moral perfection. These are the beings\nthat are the objects of the greater part of the existing cult, especially\nsuch usages as rest on the assumption that the gods can do harm and are\ndirected towards averting it, or which are in other ways objectionable;\nand with them are connected the myths which Plato subjected to so severe a\ncriticism. Xenocrates found a basis for this system in Plato, who in the\n_Symposium_ sets up the demons as a class of beings between gods and men,\nand makes them carriers of the prayers and wishes of men to the gods. But\nwhat was a passing thought with Plato serving only a poetical purpose was\ntaken seriously and systematised by Xenocrates.\n\nIt can hardly be said that Xenocrates has gained much recognition among\nmodern writers on the history of philosophy for his theory of demons. And\nyet I cannot see that there was any other possible solution of the problem\nwhich ancient popular belief set ancient philosophy, if, be it understood,\nwe hold fast by two hypotheses: the first, that the popular belief and\nworship of the ancients was based throughout on a foundation of reality;\nand second, that moral perfection is an essential factor in the conception\nof God. The only inconsistency which we may perhaps bring home to\nXenocrates is that he retained certain of the popular names of the gods as\ndesignations for gods in his sense; but this inconsistency was, as we\nshall see, subsequently removed. In favour of this estimate of\nXenocrates\u2019s doctrine of demons may further be adduced that it actually\nwas the last word of ancient philosophy on the matter. The doctrine was\nadopted by the Stoics, the Neo-Pythagoreans, and the Neo-Platonists. Only\nthe Epicureans went another way, but their doctrine died out before the\nclose of antiquity. And so the doctrine of demons became the ground on\nwhich Jewish-Christian monotheism managed to come to terms with ancient\npaganism, to conquer it in theory, as it were.\n\nThis implies, however, that the doctrine of demons, though it arose out of\nan honest attempt to save popular belief philosophically, in reality\nbrings out its incompatibility with philosophy. The religion and worship\nof the ancients could dispense with neither the higher nor the lower\nconceptions of its gods. If the former were done away with, recognition,\nhowever full, of the existence of the gods was no good; in the long run\nthe inference could not be avoided that they were immoral powers and so\nought not to be worshipped. This was the inference drawn by Christianity\nin theory and enforced in practice, ultimately by main force.\n\nAristotle is among the philosophers who were prosecuted for impiety. When\nthe anti-Macedonian party came into power in Athens after the death of\nAlexander, there broke out a persecution against his adherents, and this\nwas also directed against Aristotle. The basis of the charge against him\nwas that he had shown divine honour after his death to the tyrant Hermias,\nwhose guest he had been during a prolonged stay in Asia Minor. This seems\nto have been a fabrication, and at any rate has nothing to do with\natheism. In the writings of Aristotle, as they were then generally known,\nit would assuredly have been impossible to find any ground for a charge of\natheism.\n\nNevertheless, Aristotle is one of the philosophers about whose faith in\nthe gods of popular religion well-founded doubts may be raised. Like\nPlato, he acknowledged the divinity of the heavenly bodies on the ground\nthat they must have a soul since they had independent motion. Further, he\nhas a kind of supreme god who, himself unmoved, is the cause of all\nmovement, and whose constituent quality is reason. As regards the gods of\npopular belief, in his _Ethics_ and his _Politics_ he assumes public\nworship to be a necessary constituent of the life of the individual and\nthe community. He gave no grounds for this assumption\u2014on the contrary, he\nexpressly declared that it was a question which ought not to be discussed\nat all: he who stirs up doubts whether honour should be paid to the gods\nis in need not of teaching but of punishment. (That he himself took part\nin worship is evident from his will.) Further, in his ethical works he\nused the conceptions of the gods almost in the same way as we have assumed\nthat Socrates did, _i.e._ as the ethical ideal and determining the limits\nof the human. He never entered upon any elaborate criticism of the lower\nelements of popular religion such as Plato gave. So far everything is in\nadmirable order. But if we look more closely at things there is\nnevertheless nearly always a little \u201cbut\u201d in Aristotle\u2019s utterances about\nthe gods. Where he operates with popular notions he prefers to speak\nhypothetically or to refer to what is generally assumed; or he is content\nto use only definitions which will also agree with his own philosophical\nconception of God. But he goes further; in a few places in his writings\nthere are utterances which it seems can only be interpreted as a radical\ndenial of the popular religion. The most important of them deserves to be\nquoted _in extenso_:\n\n\n    \u201cA tradition has been handed down from the ancients and from the\n    most primitive times, and left to later ages in the form of myth,\n    that these substances (_i.e._ sky and heavenly bodies) are gods\n    and that the divine embraces all nature. The rest consists in\n    legendary additions intended to impress the multitude and serve\n    the purposes of legislation and the common weal; for these gods\n    are said to have human shape or resemble certain other beings\n    (animals), and they say other things which follow from this and\n    are of a similar kind to those already mentioned. But if we\n    disregard all this and restrict ourselves to the first point, that\n    they thought that the first substances were gods, we must\n    acknowledge that it is a divinely inspired saying. And as, in all\n    probability, every art and science has been discovered many times,\n    as far as it is possible, and has perished again, so these\n    notions, too, may have been preserved till now as relics of those\n    times. To this extent only can we have any idea of the opinion\n    which was held by our fathers and has come down from the beginning\n    of things.\u201d\n\n\nThe last sentences, expressing Aristotle\u2019s idea of a life-cycle and\nperiods of civilisation which repeat themselves, have only been included\nin the quotation for the sake of completeness. If we disregard them, the\npassage plainly enough states the view that the only element of truth in\nthe traditional notions about the gods was the divinity of the sky and the\nheavenly bodies; the rest is myth. Aristotle has nowhere else expressed\nhimself with such distinctness and in such length, but then the passage in\nquestion has a place of its own. It comes in his _Metaphysics_ directly\nafter the exposition of his philosophical conception of God\u2014a position\nmarked by profound earnestness and as it were irradiated by a quiet inner\nfervour. We feel that we are here approaching the _sanctum sanctorum_ of\nthe thinker. In this connexion, and only here, he wished for once to state\nhis opinion about the religion of his time without reserve. What he says\nhere is a precise formulation of the result arrived at by the best Greek\nthinkers as regards the religion of the Greek people. It was not, they\nthought, pure fabrication. It contained an element of truth of the\ngreatest value. But most of it consisted of human inventions without any\nreality behind them.\n\nA point of view like that of Aristotle would, I suppose, hardly have been\ncalled atheism among the ancients, if only because the heavenly bodies\nwere acknowledged as divine. But according to our definition it is\natheism. The \u201csky\u201d-gods of Aristotle have nothing in common with the gods\nof popular belief, not even their names, for Aristotle never names them.\nAnd the rest, the whole crowd of Greek anthropomorphic gods, exist only in\nthe human imagination.\n\nAristotle\u2019s successors offer little of interest to our inquiry.\nTheophrastus was charged with impiety, but the charge broke down\ncompletely. His theological standpoint was certainly the same as\nAristotle\u2019s. Of Strato, the most independent of the Peripatetics, we know\nthat in his view of nature he laid greater stress on the material causes\nthan Aristotle did, and so arrived at a different conception of the\nsupreme deity. Aristotle had severed the deity from Nature and placed it\noutside the latter as an incorporeal being whose chief determining factor\nwas reason. In Strato\u2019s view the deity was identical with Nature and, like\nthe latter, was without consciousness; consciousness was only found in\norganic nature. Consequently we cannot suppose him to have believed in the\ndivinity of the heavenly bodies in Aristotle\u2019s sense, though no direct\nstatement on this subject has come down to us. About his attitude towards\npopular belief we hear nothing. A denial of the popular gods is not\nnecessarily implied in Strato\u2019s theory, but seems reasonable in itself and\nis further rendered probable by the fact that all writers seem to take it\nfor granted that Strato knew no god other than the whole of Nature.\n\nWe designated Socratic philosophy, in its relation to popular belief, as a\nreaction against the radical free-thought of the sophistic movement. It\nmay seem peculiar that with Aristotle it develops into a view which we can\nonly describe as atheism. There is, however, an important difference\nbetween the standpoints of the sophists and of Aristotle. Radical as the\nlatter is at bottom, it is not, however, openly opposed to popular\nbelief\u2014on the contrary, to any one who did not examine it more closely it\nmust have had the appearance of accepting popular belief. The very\nassumption that the heavenly bodies were divine would contribute to that\neffect; this, as we have seen, was a point on which the popular view laid\ngreat stress. If we add to this that Aristotle never made the existence of\nthe popular gods matter of debate; that he expressly acknowledged the\nestablished worship; and that he consistently made use of certain\nfundamental notions of popular belief in his philosophy\u2014we can hardly\navoid the conclusion that, notwithstanding his personal emancipation from\nthe existing religion, he is a true representative of the Socratic\nreaction against sophistic. But we see, too, that there is a reservation\nin this reaction. In continuity with earlier Greek thought on religion, it\nproceeded from the absolute definitions of the divine offered by popular\nbelief, but when criticising anthropomorphism on this basis it did not\nafter all avoid falling out with popular belief. How far each philosopher\nwent in his antagonism was a matter of discretion, as also was the means\nchosen to reconcile the philosophical with the popular view. The theology\nof the Socratic schools thus suffered from a certain half-heartedness; in\nthe main it has the character of a compromise. It would not give up the\npopular notions of the gods, and yet they were continually getting in the\nway. This dualism governs the whole of the succeeding Greek philosophy.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nDuring the three or four centuries which passed between the downfall of\nfree Hellas and the beginning of the Roman Empire, great social and\npolitical changes took place in the ancient world, involving also vital\nchanges in religion. The chief phenomenon in this field, the invasion of\nforeign, especially oriental, religions into Hellas, does not come within\nthe scope of this investigation. On the one hand, it is an expression of\ndissatisfaction with the old gods; on the other, the intrusion of new gods\nwould contribute to the ousting of the old ones. There is no question of\natheism here; it is only a change within polytheism. But apart from this\nchange there is evidence that the old faith had lost its hold on men\u2019s\nminds to no inconsiderable extent. Here, too, there is hardly any question\nof atheism properly speaking, but as a background to the\u2014not very\nnumerous\u2014evidences of such atheism in our period, we cannot well ignore\nthe decline of the popular faith. Our investigation is rendered difficult\non this point, and generally within this period, by the lack of direct\nevidence. Of the rich Hellenistic literature almost everything has been\nlost, and we are restricted to reports and fragments.\n\nIn order to gain a concrete starting-point we will begin with a quotation\nfrom the historian Polybius\u2014so to speak the only Greek prose author of the\nearlier Hellenistic period of whose works considerable and connected\nportions are preserved. Polybius wrote in the latter half of the second\ncentury a history of the world in which Rome took the dominant place. Here\nhe gave, among other things, a detailed description of the Roman\nconstitution and thus came to touch upon the state of religion in Rome as\ncompared with that in Greece. He says on this subject:\n\n\u201cThe greatest advantage of the Roman constitution seems to me to lie in\nits conception of the gods, and I believe that what among other peoples is\ndespised is what holds together the Roman power\u2014I mean superstition. For\nthis feature has by them been developed so far in the direction of the\n\u2018horrible,\u2019 and has so permeated both private and public life, that it is\nquite unique. Many will perhaps find this strange, but I think they have\nacted so with an eye to the mass of the people. For if it were possible to\ncompose a state of reasonable people such a procedure would no doubt be\nunnecessary, but as every people regarded as a mass is easily impressed\nand full of criminal instincts, unreasonable violence, and fierce passion,\nthere is nothing to be done but to keep the masses under by vague fears\nand such-like hocus-pocus. Therefore it is my opinion that it was not\nwithout good reason or by mere chance that the ancients imparted to the\nmasses the notions of the gods and the underworld, but rather is it\nthoughtless and irrational when nowadays we seek to destroy them.\u201d\n\nAs a proof of this last statement follows a comparison between the state\nof public morals in Greece and in Rome. In Greece you cannot trust a man\nwith a few hundred pounds without ten notaries and as many seals and\ndouble the number of witnesses; in Rome great public treasure is\nadministered with honesty merely under the safeguard of an oath.\n\nAs we see, this passage contains direct evidence that in the second\ncentury in Hellas\u2014in contradistinction to Rome\u2014there was an attempt to\nbreak down the belief in the gods. By his \u201cwe\u201d Polybius evidently referred\nespecially to the leading political circles. He knew these circles from\npersonal experience, and his testimony has all the more weight because he\ndoes not come forward in the r\u00f4le of the orthodox man complaining in the\nusual way of the impiety of his contemporaries; on the contrary, he speaks\nas the educated and enlightened man to whom it is a matter of course that\nall this talk about the gods and the underworld is a myth which nobody\namong the better classes takes seriously. This is a tone we have not heard\nbefore, and it is a strong indirect testimony to the fact that Polybius is\nnot wrong when he speaks of disbelief among the upper classes of Greece.\n\nIn this connexion the work of Polybius has a certain interest on another\npoint. Where earlier\u2014and later\u2014authors would speak of the intervention of\nthe gods in the march of history, he operates as a rule with an idea which\nhe calls Tyche. The word is untranslatable when used in this way. It is\nsomething between chance, fortune and fate. It is more comprehensive and\nmore personal than chance; it has not the immutable, the \u201clawbound\u201d\ncharacter of fate; rather it denotes the incalculability, the\ncapriciousness associated, especially in earlier usage, with the word\nfortune, but without the tendency of this word to be used in a good sense.\n\nThis Tyche-religion\u2014if we may use this expression\u2014was not new in Hellas.\nQuite early we find Tyche worshipped as a goddess among the other deities,\nand it is an old notion that the gods send good fortune, a notion which\nset its mark on a series of established phrases in private and public\nlife. But what is of interest here is that shifting of religious ideas in\nthe course of which Tyche drives the gods into the background. We find\nindications of it as early as Thucydides. In his view of history he lays\nthe main stress, certainly, on human initiative, and not least on rational\ncalculation, as the cause of events. But where he is obliged to reckon\nwith an element independent of human efforts, he calls it Tyche and not\n\u201cthe immortal gods.\u201d A somewhat similar view we find in another great\npolitical author of the stage of transition to our period, namely,\nDemosthenes. Demosthenes of course employs the official apparatus of gods:\nhe invokes them on solemn occasions; he quotes their authority in support\nof his assertions (once he even reported a revelation which he had in a\ndream); he calls his opponents enemies of the gods, etc. But in his\npolitical considerations the gods play a negligible part. The factors with\nwhich he reckons as a rule are merely political forces. Where he is\ncompelled to bring forward elements which man cannot control, he shows a\npreference for Tyche. He certainly occasionally identifies her with the\nfavour of the gods, but in such a way as to give the impression that it is\nonly a _fa\u00e7on de parler_. Direct pronouncements of a free-thinking kind\none would not expect from an orator and statesman, and yet Demosthenes was\nonce bold enough to say that Pythia, the mouthpiece of the Delphic Oracle,\nwas a partisan of Macedonia, an utterance which his opponent Aeschines,\nwho liked to parade his orthodoxy, did not omit to cast in his teeth. On\nthe whole, Aeschines liked to represent Demosthenes as a godless fellow,\nand it is not perhaps without significance that the latter never directly\nreplied to such attacks, or indirectly did anything to impair their force.\n\nDuring the violent revolutions that took place in Hellas under Alexander\nthe Great and his successors, and the instability of social and political\nconditions consequent thereon, the Tyche-religion received a fresh\nimpetus. With one stroke Hellas was flung into world politics. Everything\ngrew to colossal proportions in comparison with earlier conditions. The\nsmall Hellenic city-states that had hitherto been each for itself a world\nshrank into nothing. It is as if the old gods could not keep pace with\nthis violent process of expansion. Men felt a craving for a wider and more\ncomprehensive religious concept to answer to the changed conditions, and\nsuch an idea was found in the idea of Tyche. Thoughtful men, such as\nDemetrius of Phalerum, wrote whole books about it; states built temples to\nTyche; in private religion also it played a great part. No one reflected\nmuch on the relation of Tyche to the old gods. It must be remembered that\nTyche is a real layman\u2019s notion, and that Hellenistic philosophy regarded\nit as its task precisely to render man independent of the whims of fate.\nSometimes, however, we find a positive statement of the view that Tyche\nruled over the gods also. It is characteristic of the state of affairs;\nmen did not want to relinquish the old gods, but could not any longer\nallow them the leading place.\n\nIf we return for a moment to Polybius, we shall find that his conception\nof Tyche strikingly illustrates the distance between him and Thucydides.\nIn the introduction to his work, on its first page, he points out that the\nuniversally acknowledged task of historical writing is partly to educate\npeople for political activities, partly to teach them to bear the\nvicissitudes of fortune with fortitude by reminding them of the lot of\nothers. And subsequently, when he passes on to his main theme, the\nfoundation of the Roman world-empire, after having explained the plan of\nhis work, he says: \u201cSo far then our plan. But the _co-operation of\nfortune_ is still needed if my life is to be long enough for me to\naccomplish my purpose.\u201d An earlier\u2014or a later\u2014author would here either\nhave left the higher powers out of the game altogether or would have used\nan expression showing more submission to the gods of the popular faith.\n\nIn a later author, Pliny the Elder, we again find a characteristic\nutterance throwing light upon the significance of the Tyche-religion.\nAfter a very free-thinking survey of the popular notions regarding the\ngods, Pliny says: \u201cAs an intermediate position between these two views\n(that there is a divine providence and that there is none) men have\nthemselves invented another divine power, in order that speculation about\nthe deity might become still more uncertain. Throughout the world, in\nevery place, at every hour of the day, Fortune alone is invoked and named\nby every mouth; she alone is accused, she bears the guilt of everything;\nof her only do we think, to her is all praise, to her all blame. And she\nis worshipped with railing words\u2014she is deemed inconstant, by many even\nblind; she is fickle, unstable, uncertain, changeable; giving her favours\nto the unworthy. To her is imputed every loss, every gain; in all the\naccounts of life she alone fills up both the debit and the credit side,\nand we are so subject to chance that Chance itself becomes our god, and\nagain proves the incertitude of the deity.\u201d Even if a great deal of this\nmay be put down to rhetoric, by which Pliny was easily carried away, the\nsolid fact itself remains that he felt justified in speaking as if Dame\nFortune had dethroned all the old gods.\n\nThat this view of life must have persisted very tenaciously even down to a\ntime when a strong reaction in the direction of positive religious feeling\nhad set in, is proved by the romances of the time. The novels of the\nancients were in general poor productions. Most of them are made after the\nrecipe of a little misfortune in each chapter and great happiness in the\nlast. The two lovers meet, fall in love, part, and suffer a series of\ntroubles individually until they are finally united. The power that\ngoverns their fates and shapes everything according to this pattern is\nregularly Tyche, never the gods. The testimony of the novels is of special\nsignificance because they were read by the general mass of the educated\nclasses, not by the select who had philosophy to guide them.\n\nAnother testimony to the weakening of popular faith in the Hellenistic age\nis the decay of the institution of the Oracle. This, also, is of early\ndate; as early as the fifth and fourth century we hear much less of the\ninterference of the oracles in political matters than in earlier times.\nThe most important of them all, the Delphic Oracle, was dealt a terrible\nblow in the Holy War (356-346 B.C.), when the Phocians seized it and used\nthe treasures which had been accumulated in it during centuries to hire\nmercenaries and carry on war. Such proceedings would assuredly have been\nimpossible a century earlier; no soldiers could have been hired with money\nacquired in such a way, or, if they could have been procured, all Hellas\nwould have risen in arms against the robbers of the Temple, whereas in the\nHoly War most of the states were indifferent, and several even sided with\nthe Phocians. In the succeeding years, after Philip of Macedonia had put\nan end to the Phocian scandal, the Oracle was in reality in his hands\u2014it\nwas during this period that Demosthenes stigmatised it as the mouthpiece\nof Philip. In the succeeding centuries, too, it was dependent on the\nvarious rulers of Hellas and undoubtedly lost all public authority. During\nthis period we hear very little of the oracles of Hellas until the time\nbefore and after the birth of Christ provides us with definite evidence of\ntheir complete decay.\n\nThus Strabo, who wrote during the reign of Augustus, says that the\nancients attached more importance to divination generally and oracles more\nparticularly, whereas people in his day were quite indifferent to these\nthings. He gives as the reason that the Romans were content to use the\nSibylline books and their own system of divination. His remark is made _a\npropos_ of the Oracle in Libya, which was formerly in great repute, but\nwas almost extinct in his time. He is undoubtedly correct as to the fact,\nbut the decline of the oracular system cannot be explained by the\nindifference of the Romans. Plutarch, in a monograph on the discontinuance\nof the oracles, furnishes us with more detailed information. From this it\nappears that not only the Oracle of Ammon but also the numerous oracles of\nBoeotia had ceased to exist, with one exception, while even for the Oracle\nat Delphi, which had formerly employed three priestesses, a single one\namply sufficed. We also note the remark that the questions submitted to\nthe Oracle were mostly unworthy or of no importance.\n\nThe want of consideration sometimes shown to sacred places and things\nduring the wars of the Hellenistic period may no doubt also be regarded as\nthe result of a weakening of interest in the old gods. We have detailed\ninformation on this point from the war between Philip of Macedonia and the\nAetolians in 220-217 B.C. The Aetolians began by destroying the temples at\nDium and Dodona, whereupon Philip retaliated by totally wrecking the\nfederal sanctuary of the Aetolians at Thermon. Of Philip\u2019s admiral\nDicaearchus we are told by Polybius that wherever he landed he erected\naltars to \u201cgodlessness and lawlessness\u201d and offered up sacrifice on them.\nJudging by the way he was hated, his practice must have answered to his\ntheory.\n\nOne more phenomenon must be mentioned in this context, though it falls\noutside the limits within which we have hitherto moved, and though its\nconnexion with free-thought and religious enlightenment will no doubt, on\ncloser examination, prove disputable. This is the decay of the established\nworship of the Roman State in the later years of the Republic.\n\nIn the preceding pages there has been no occasion to include conditions in\nRome in our investigation, simply because nothing has come down to us\nabout atheism in the earlier days of Rome, and we may presume that it did\nnot exist. Of any religious thought at Rome corresponding to that of the\nGreeks we hear nothing, nor did the Romans produce any philosophy.\nWhatever knowledge of philosophy there was at Rome was simply borrowed\nfrom the Greeks. The Greek influence was not seriously felt until the\nsecond century B.C., even though as early as about the middle of the third\ncentury the Romans, through the performance of plays translated from the\nGreek, made acquaintance with Greek dramatic poetry and the religious\nthought contained therein. Neither the latter, nor the heresies of the\nphilosophers, seem to have made any deep impression upon them. Ennius,\ntheir most important poet of the second century, was no doubt strongly\ninfluenced by Greek free-thinking, but this was evidently an isolated\nphenomenon. Also, by birth Ennius was not a native of Rome but half a\nGreek. The testimony of Polybius (from the close of the second century) to\nRoman religious conservatism is emphatic enough. Its causes are doubtless\nof a complex nature, but as one of them the peculiar character of the\nRoman religion itself stands out prominently. However much it resembled\nGreek religion in externals\u2014a resemblance which was strengthened by\nnumerous loans both of religious rites and of deities\u2014it is decidedly\ndistinct from it in being restricted still more to cultus and, above all,\nin being entirely devoid of mythology. The Roman gods were powers about\nthe rites of whose worship the most accurate details were known or could\nbe ascertained if need were, but they had little personality, and about\ntheir personal relations people knew little and cared less. This was,\naesthetically, a great defect. The Roman gods afforded no good theme for\npoetry and art, and when they were to be used as such they were invariably\nreplaced by loans from the Greeks. But, as in the face of Greek\nfree-thought and Greek criticism of religion, they had the advantage that\nthe vital point for attack was lacking. All the objectionable tales of the\nexploits of the gods and the associated ideas about their nature which had\nprompted the Greek attack on the popular faith simply did not exist in\nRoman religion. On the other hand, its rites were in many points more\nprimitive than the Greek ones, but Greek philosophy had been very reserved\nin its criticism of ritual. We may thus no doubt take it for granted,\nthough we have no direct evidence to that effect, that even Romans with a\nGreek education long regarded the Greek criticism of religion as something\nforeign which was none of their concern.\n\nThat a time came when all this was changed; that towards the end of the\nRepublic great scepticism concerning the established religion of Rome was\nfound among the upper classes, is beyond doubt, and we shall subsequently\nfind occasion to consider this more closely. In this connexion another\ncircumstance demands attention, one which, moreover, has by some been\nassociated with Greek influence among the upper classes, namely, the decay\nof the established worship of the Roman State during the last years of the\nRepublic. Of the actual facts there can hardly be any doubt, though we\nknow very little about them. The decisive symptoms are: that Augustus,\nafter having taken over the government, had to repair some eighty\ndilapidated temples in Rome and reinstitute a series of religious rites\nand priesthoods which had ceased to function. Among them was one of the\nmost important, that of the priest of Jupiter, an office which had been\nvacant for more than seventy-five years (87-11 B.C.), because it excluded\nthe holder from a political career. Further, that complaints were made of\nprivate persons encroaching on places that were reserved for religious\nworship; and that Varro, when writing his great work on the Roman\nreligion, in many cases was unable to discover what god was the object of\nan existing cult; and generally, according to his own statement he wrote\nhis work, among other things, in order to save great portions of the old\nRoman religion from falling into utter oblivion on account of the\nindifference of the Romans themselves. It is obvious that such a state of\naffairs would have been impossible in a community where the traditional\nreligion was a living power, not only formally acknowledged by everybody,\nbut felt to be a necessary of life, the spiritual daily bread, as it were,\nof the nation.\n\nTo hold, however, that the main cause of the decay of the established\nreligion of Rome was the invasion of Greek culture, together with the fact\nthat the members of the Roman aristocracy, from whom the priests were\nrecruited and who superintended the cult, had become indifferent to the\ntraditional religion through this influence, this, I think, is to go\naltogether astray. We may take it for granted that the governing classes\nin Rome would not have ventured to let the cult decay if there had been\nany serious interest in it among the masses of the population; and it is\nequally certain that Greek philosophy and religious criticism did not\npenetrate to these masses. When they became indifferent to the national\nreligion, this was due to causes that had nothing to do with free-thought.\nThe old Roman religion was adapted for a small, narrow and homogeneous\ncommunity whose main constituent and real core consisted of the farmers,\nlarge and small, and minor artisans. In the last centuries of the Republic\nthe social development had occasioned the complete decay of the Roman\npeasantry, and the free artisans had fared little better. In the place of\nthe old Rome had arisen the capital of an empire, inhabited by a\npopulation of a million and of extraordinarily mixed composition. Not only\ndid this population comprise a number of immigrant foreigners, but, in\nconsequence of the peculiar Roman rule that every slave on being set free\nattained citizenship, a large percentage of the citizens must of necessity\nhave been of foreign origin. Only certain portions of the Roman religion,\nmore especially the cult of the great central deities of the State\nreligion, can have kept pace with these changed conditions; the remainder\nhad in reality lost all hold on Roman society as it had developed in\nprocess of time, and was only kept alive by force of habit. To this must\nbe added the peculiar Roman mixture of mobility and conservatism in\nreligious matters. The Roman superstition and uncertainty in regard to the\ngods led on the one hand to a continual setting up of new cults and new\nsanctuaries, and on the other hand to a fear of letting any of the old\ncults die out. In consequence thereof a great deal of dead and worthless\nritual material must have accumulated in Rome in the course of centuries,\nand was of course in the way during the rapid development of the city in\nthe last century of the Republic. Things must gradually have come to such\na pass that a thorough reform, above all a reduction, of the whole cult\nhad become a necessity. To introduce such a reform the republican\ngovernment was just as unsuited as it was to carry out all the other tasks\nimposed by the development of the empire and the capital at that time. On\nthis point, however, it must not be forgotten that the governing class not\nonly lacked ability, for political reasons, to carry out serious reforms,\nbut also the will to do so, on account of religious indifference, and so\nlet things go altogether to the bad. The consequence was anarchy, in this\nas in all other spheres at that time; but at the same time the tendency\ntowards the only sensible issue, a restriction of the old Roman\nState-cult, is plainly evident. The simultaneous strong infusion of\nforeign religions was unavoidable in the mixed population of the capital.\nThat these influences also affected the lower classes of the citizens is\nat any rate a proof that they were not indifferent to religion.\n\nIn its main outlines this is all the information that I have been able to\nglean about the general decline of the belief in the gods during the\nHellenistic period. Judging from such information we should expect to find\nstrong tendencies to atheism in the philosophy of the period. These\nanticipations are, however, doomed to disappointment. The ruling\nphilosophical schools on the whole preserved a friendly attitude towards\nthe gods of the popular faith and especially towards their worship,\nalthough they only accepted the existing religion with strict reservation.\n\nMost characteristic but least consistent and original was the attitude of\nthe Stoic school. The Stoics were pantheists. Their deity was a substance\nwhich they designated as fire, but which, it must be admitted, differed\ngreatly from fire as an element. It permeated the entire world. It had\nproduced the world out of itself, and it absorbed it again, and this\nprocess was repeated to eternity. The divine fire was also reason, and as\nsuch the cause of the harmony of the world-order. What of conscious reason\nwas found in the world was part of the divine reason.\n\nThough in this scheme of things there was in the abstract plenty of room\nfor the gods of popular belief, nevertheless the Stoics did not in reality\nacknowledge them. In principle their standpoint was the same as\nAristotle\u2019s. They supposed the heavenly bodies to be divine, but all the\nrest, namely, the anthropomorphic gods, were nothing to them.\n\nIn their explanation of the origin of the gods they went beyond Aristotle,\nbut their doctrine was not always the same on this point. The earlier\nStoics regarded mythology and all theology as human inventions, but not\narbitrary inventions. Mythology, they thought, should be understood\nallegorically; it was the na\u00efve expression partly of a correct conception\nof Nature, partly of ethical and metaphysical truths. Strictly speaking,\nmen had always been Stoics, though in an imperfect way. This point of view\nwas elaborated in detail by the first Stoics, who took their stand partly\non the earlier naturalism which had already broken the ground in this\ndirection, and partly on sophistic, so that they even brought into vogue\nagain the theory of Prodicus, that the gods were a hypostasis of the\nbenefits of civilisation. Such a standpoint could not of course be\nmaintained without arbitrariness and absurdities which exposed it to\nembarrassing criticism. This seems to have been the reason why the later\nStoics, and especially Poseidonius, took another road. They adopted the\ndoctrine of Xenocrates with regard to demons and developed it in fantastic\nforms. The earlier method was not, however, given up, and at the time of\nCicero we find both views represented in the doctrine of the school.\n\nSuch is the appearance of the theory. In both its forms it is evidently an\nattempt to meet popular belief half-way from a standpoint which is really\nbeyond it. This tendency is seen even more plainly in the practice of the\nStoics. They recognised public worship and insisted on its advantages; in\ntheir moral reflections they employed the gods as ideals in the Socratic\nmanner, regardless of the fact that in their theory they did not really\nallow for gods who were ideal men; nay, they even went the length of\ngiving to their philosophical deity, the \u201cuniversal reason,\u201d the name of\nZeus by preference, though it had nothing but the name in common with the\nOlympian ruler of gods and men. This pervading ambiguity brought much\nwell-deserved reproof on the Stoics even in ancient times; but, however\nunattractive it may seem to us, it is of significance as a manifestation\nof the great hold popular belief continued to have even on the minds of\nthe upper classes, for it was to these that the Stoics appealed.\n\nFar more original and consistent is the Epicurean attitude towards the\npopular faith. Epicurus unreservedly acknowledged its foundation, _i.e._\nthe existence of anthropomorphic beings of a higher order than man. His\ngods had human shape but they were eternal and blessed. In the latter\ndefinition was included, according to the ethical ideal of Epicurus, the\nidea that the gods were free from every care, including taking an interest\nin nature or in human affairs. They were entirely outside the world, a\nfact to which Epicurus gave expression by placing them in the empty spaces\nbetween the infinite number of spherical worlds which he assumed. There\nhis gods lived in bliss like ideal Epicureans. Lucretius, the only poet of\nthis school, extolled them in splendid verse whose motif he borrowed from\nHomer\u2019s description of Olympus. In this way Epicurus also managed to\nuphold public worship itself. It could not, of course, have any practical\naim, but it was justified as an expression of the respect man owed to\nbeings whose existence expressed the human ideal.\n\nThe reasons why Epicurus assumed this attitude towards popular belief are\nsimple enough. He maintained that the evidence of sensual perception was\nthe basis of all knowledge, and he thought that the senses (through\ndreams) gave evidence of the existence of the gods. And in the popular\nideas of the bliss of the gods he found his ethical ideal directly\nconfirmed. As regards their eternity the case was more difficult. The\nbasis of his system was the theory that everything was made of atoms and\nthat only the atoms as such, not the bodies composed of the atoms, were\neternal. He conceived the gods, too, as made of atoms, nevertheless he\nheld that they were eternal. Any rational explanation of this postulate is\nnot possible on Epicurus\u2019s hypotheses, and the criticism of his theology\nwas therefore especially directed against this point.\n\nEpicurus was the Greek philosopher who most consistently took the course\nof emphasising the popular dogma of the perfection of the gods in order to\npreserve the popular notions about them. And he was the philosopher to\nwhom this would seem the most obvious course, because his ethical\nideal\u2014quietism\u2014agreed with the oldest popular ideal of divine existence.\nIn this way Epicureanism became the most orthodox of all Greek\nphilosophical schools. If nevertheless Epicurus did not escape the charge\nof atheism the sole reason is that his whole theology was denounced\noff-hand as hypocrisy. It was assumed to be set up by him only to shield\nhimself against a charge of impiety, not to be his actual belief. This\naccusation is now universally acknowledged to be unjustified, and the\nEpicureans had no difficulty in rebutting it with interest. They took\nspecial delight in pointing out that the theology of the other schools was\nmuch more remote from popular belief than theirs, nay, in spite of\nrecognition of the existing religion, was in truth fundamentally at\nvariance with it. But in reality their own was in no better case: gods who\ndid not trouble in the least about human affairs were beings for whom\npopular belief had no use. It made no difference that Epicurus\u2019s\ndefinition of the nature of the gods was the direct outcome of a\nfundamental doctrine of popular belief. Popular religion will not tolerate\npedantry.\n\nIn this connexion we cannot well pass over a third philosophical school\nwhich played no inconspicuous r\u00f4le in the latter half of our period,\nnamely, Scepticism. The Sceptic philosophy as such dates from Socrates,\nfrom whom the so-called Megarian school took its origin, but it did not\nreach its greatest importance until the second century, when the Academic\nschool became Sceptic. It was especially the famous philosopher Carneades,\na brilliant master of logic and dialectic, who made a success by his\nsearching negative criticism of the doctrines of the other philosophical\nschools (the Dogmatics). For such criticism the theology of the\nphilosophers was a grateful subject, and Carneades did not spare it. Here\nas in all the investigations of the Sceptics the theoretical result was\nthat no scientific certainty could be attained: it was equally wrong to\nassert or to deny the existence of the gods. But in practice the attitude\nof the Sceptics was quite different. Just as they behaved like other\npeople, acting upon their immediate impressions and experience, though\nthey did not believe that anything could be scientifically proved, _e.g._\nnot even the reality of the world of the senses, so also did they\nacknowledge the existing cult and lived generally like good heathens.\nCharacteristic though Scepticism be of a period of Greek spiritual life in\nwhich Greek thought lost its belief in itself, it was, however, very far\nfrom supporting atheism. On the contrary, according to the correct Sceptic\ndoctrine atheism was a dogmatic contention which theoretically was as\nobjectionable as its antithesis, and in practice was to be utterly\ndiscountenanced.\n\nA more radical standpoint than this as regards the gods of the popular\nfaith is not found during the Hellenistic period except among the less\nnoted schools, and in the beginning of the period. We have already\nmentioned such thinkers as Strato, Theodorus, and Stilpo; chronologically\nthey belong to the Hellenistic Age, but in virtue of their connexion with\nthe Socratic philosophy they were dealt with in the last chapter. A\ndefinite polemical attitude towards the popular faith is also a\ncharacteristic of the Cynic school, hence, though our information is very\nmeagre, we must speak of it a little more fully.\n\nThe Cynics continued the tendency of Antisthenes, but the school\ncomparatively soon lost its importance. After the third century we hear no\nmore about the Cynics until they crop up again about the year A.D. 100.\nBut in the fourth and third centuries the school had important\nrepresentatives. The most famous is Diogenes; his life, to be sure, is\nentangled in such a web of legend that it is difficult to arrive at a true\npicture of his personality. Of his attitude towards popular belief we know\none thing, that he did not take part in the worship of the gods. This was\na general principle of the Cynics; their argument was that the gods were\n\u201cin need of nothing\u201d (cf. above, pp. 60 and 41). If we find him accused of\natheism, in an anecdote of very doubtful value, it may, if there is\nanything in it, be due to his rejection of worship. Of one of his\nsuccessors, however, Bion of Borysthenes, we have authentic information\nthat he denied the existence of the gods, with the edifying legend\nattached that he was converted before his death. But we also hear of Bion\nthat he was a disciple of the atheist Theodorus, and other facts go to\nsuggest that Bion united Cynic and Hedonistic principles in his mode of\nlife\u2014a compromise that was not so unlikely as might be supposed. Bion\u2019s\nattitude cannot therefore be taken as typical of Cynicism. Another Cynic\nof about the same period (the beginning of the third century) was Menippus\nof Gadara (in northern Palestine). He wrote tales and dialogues in a\nmixture of prose and verse. The contents were satirical, the satire being\ndirected against the contemporary philosophers and their doctrines, and\nagainst the popular notions of the gods. Menippus availed himself partly\nof the old criticism of mythology and partly of the philosophical attacks\non the popular conception of the gods. The only novelty was the facetious\nform in which he concealed the sting of serious criticism. It is\nimpossible to decide whether he positively denied the existence of the\ngods, but his satire on the popular notions and its success among his\ncontemporaries at least testifies to the weakening of the popular faith\namong the educated classes. In Hellas itself he seems to have gone out of\nfashion very early; but the Romans took him up again; Varro and Seneca\nimitated him, and Lucian made his name famous again in the Greek world in\nthe second century after Christ. It is chiefly due to Lucian that we can\nform an idea of Menippus\u2019s literary work, hence we shall return to Cynic\nsatire in our chapter on the age of the Roman Empire.\n\nDuring our survey of Greek philosophical thought in the Hellenistic period\nwe have only met with a few cases of atheism in the strict sense, and they\nall occur about and immediately after 300, though there does not seem to\nbe any internal connexion between them. About the same time there appeared\na writer, outside the circle of philosophers, who is regularly listed\namong the _atheoi_, and who has given a name to a peculiar theory about\nthe origin of the idea of the gods, namely, Euhemerus. He is said to have\ntravelled extensively in the service of King Cassander of Macedonia. At\nany rate he published his theological views in the shape of a book of\ntravel which was, however, wholly fiction. He relates how he came to an\nisland, Panchaia, in the Indian Ocean, and in a temple there found a\nlengthy inscription in which Uranos, Kronos, Zeus and other gods recorded\ntheir exploits. The substance of the tale was that these gods had once\nbeen men, great kings and rulers, who had bestowed on their peoples all\nsorts of improvements in civilisation and had thus got themselves\nworshipped as gods. It appears from the accounts that Euhemerus supposed\nthe heavenly bodies to be real and eternal gods\u2014he thought that Uranos had\nfirst taught men to worship them; further, as his theory is generally\nunderstood, it must be assumed that in his opinion the other gods had\nceased to exist as such after their death. This accords with the fact that\nEuhemerus was generally characterised as an atheist.\n\nThe theory that the gods were at first men was not originated by\nEuhemerus, though it takes its name (Euhemerism) from him. The theory had\nsome support in the popular faith which recognised gods (Heracles,\nAsclepius) who had lived as men on earth; and the opinion which was\nfundamental to Greek religion, that the gods had _come into existence_,\nand had not existed from eternity, would favour this theory. Moreover,\nEuhemerus had had an immediate precursor in the slightly earlier Hecataeus\nof Abdera, who had set forth a similar theory, with the difference,\nhowever, that he took the view that all excellent men became real gods.\nBut Euhemerus\u2019s theory appeared just at the right moment and fell on\nfertile soil. Alexander the Great and his successors had adopted the\nOriental policy by which the ruler was worshipped as a god, and were\nsupported in this by a tendency which had already made itself felt\noccasionally among the Greeks in the East. Euhemerus only inverted\nmatters\u2014if the rulers were gods, it was an obvious inference that the gods\nwere rulers. No wonder that his theory gained a large following. Its great\ninfluence is seen from numerous similar attempts in the Hellenistic world.\nAt Rome, in the second century, Ennius translated his works into Latin,\nand as late as the time of Augustus an author such as Diodorus, in his\npopular history of the world, served up Euhemerism as the best scientific\nexplanation of the origin of religion. It is characteristic, too, that\nboth Jews and Christians, in their attacks on Paganism, reckoned with\nEuhemerism as a well-established theory. As every one knows, it has\nsurvived to our day; Carlyle, I suppose, being its last prominent\nexponent.\n\nIt is characteristic of Euhemerism in its most radical form that it\nassumed that the gods of polytheism did not exist; so far it is atheism.\nBut it is no less characteristic that it made the concession to popular\nbelief that its gods had once existed. Hereby it takes its place, in spite\nof its greater radicalism, on the same plane with most other ancient\ntheories about the origin of men\u2019s notions about the gods. The gods of\npopular belief could not survive in the light of ancient thought, which in\nits essence was free-thought, not tied down by dogmas. But the\nphilosophers of old could not but believe that a psychological fact of\nsuch enormous dimensions as ancient polytheism must have something\nanswering to it in the objective world. Ancient philosophy never got clear\nof this dilemma; hence Plato\u2019s open recognition of the absurdity; hence\nAristotle\u2019s delight at being able to meet the popular faith half-way in\nhis assumption of the divinity of the heavenly bodies; hence Xenocrates\u2019s\ndemons, the allegories of the Stoics, the ideal Epicureans of Epicurus,\nEuhemerus\u2019s early benefactors of mankind. And we may say that the more the\nGreeks got to know of the world about them the more they were confirmed in\ntheir view, for in the varied multiplicity of polytheism they found the\nsame principle everywhere, the same belief in a multitude of beings of a\nhigher order than man.\n\nEuhemerus\u2019s theory is no doubt the last serious attempt in the old pagan\nworld to give an explanation of the popular faith which may be called\ngenuine atheism. We will not, however, leave the Hellenistic period\nwithout casting a glance at some personalities about whom we have\ninformation enough to form an idea at first hand of their religious\nstandpoint, and whose attitude towards popular belief at any rate comes\nvery near to atheism pure and simple.\n\nOne of them is Polybius. In the above-cited passage referring to the\ndecline of the popular faith in the Hellenistic period, Polybius also\ngives his own theory of the origin of men\u2019s notions regarding the gods. It\nis not new. It is the theory known from the Critias fragment, what may be\ncalled the political theory. In the fragment it appears as atheism pure\nand simple, and it seems obvious to understand it in the same way in\nPolybius. That he shows a leaning towards Euhemerism in another passage\nwhere he speaks about the origin of religious ideas, is in itself not\nagainst this\u2014the two theories are closely related and might very well be\ncombined. But we have a series of passages in which Polybius expressed\nhimself in a way that seems quite irreconcilable with a purely atheistic\nstandpoint. He expressly acknowledged divination and worship as justified;\nin several places he refers to disasters that have befallen individuals or\na whole people as being sent by the gods, or even as a punishment for\nimpiety; and towards the close of his work he actually, in marked contrast\nto the tone of its beginning, offers up a prayer to the gods to grant him\na happy ending to his long life. It would seem as if Polybius at a certain\nperiod of his life came under the influence of Stoicism and in consequence\ngreatly modified his earlier views. That these were of an atheistic\ncharacter seems, however, beyond doubt, and that is the decisive point in\nthis connexion.\n\nCicero\u2019s philosophical standpoint was that of an Academic, _i.e._ a\nSceptic. But\u2014in accord, for the rest, with the doctrines of the school\njust at this period\u2014he employed his liberty as a Sceptic to favour such\nphilosophical doctrines as seemed to him more reasonable than others,\nregardless of the school from which they were derived. In his philosophy\nof religion he was more especially a Stoic. He himself expressly insisted\non this point of view in the closing words of his work on the _Nature of\nthe Gods_. As he was not, and made no pretence of being, a philosopher,\nhis philosophical expositions have no importance for us; they are\nthroughout second-hand, mostly mere translations from Greek sources. That\nwe have employed them in the foregoing pages to throw light on the\ntheology of the earlier, more especially the Hellenistic, philosophy, goes\nwithout saying. But his personal religious standpoint is not without\ninterest.\n\nAs orator and statesman Cicero took his stand wholly on the side of the\nestablished Roman religion, operating with the \u201cimmortal gods,\u201d with\nJupiter Optimus Maximus, etc., at his convenience. In his works on the\n_State_ and the _Laws_ he adheres decidedly to the established religion.\nBut all this is mere politics. Personally Cicero had no religion other\nthan philosophy. Philosophy was his consolation in adversity, or he\nattempted to make it so, for the result was often indifferent; and he\nlooked to philosophy to guide him in ethical questions. We never find any\nindication in his writings that the gods of popular belief meant anything\nto him in these respects. And what is more\u2014he assumed this off-hand to be\nthe standpoint of everybody else, and evidently he was justified. A great\nnumber of letters from him to his circle, and not a few from his friends\nand acquaintances to him, have been preserved; and in his philosophical\nwritings he often introduces contemporary Romans as characters in the\ndialogue. But in all this literature there is never the faintest\nindication that a Roman of the better class entertained, or could even be\nsupposed to entertain, an orthodox view with regard to the State religion.\nTo Cicero and his circle the popular faith did not exist as an element of\ntheir personal religion.\n\nSuch a standpoint is of course, practically speaking, atheism, and in this\nsense atheism was widely spread among the higher classes of the\nGraeco-Roman society about the time of the birth of Christ. But from this\nto theoretical atheism there is still a good step. Cicero himself affords\nan amusing example of how easily people, who have apparently quite\nemancipated themselves from the official religion of their community, may\nbackslide. When his beloved daughter Tullia died in the year 45 B.C., it\nbecame evident that Cicero, in the first violence of his grief, which was\nthe more overwhelming because he was excluded from political activity\nduring C\u00e6sar\u2019s dictatorship, could not console himself with philosophy\nalone. He wanted something more tangible to take hold on, and so he hit\nupon the idea of having Tullia exalted among the gods. He thought of\nbuilding a temple and instituting a cult in her honour. He moved heaven\nand earth to arrange the matter, sought to buy ground in a prominent place\nin Rome, and was willing to make the greatest pecuniary sacrifices to get\na conspicuous result. Nothing came of it all, however; Cicero\u2019s friends,\nwho were to help him to put the matter through, were perhaps hardly so\neager as he; time assuaged his own grief, and finally he contented himself\nwith publishing a consolatory epistle written by himself, or, correctly\nspeaking, translated from a famous Greek work and adapted to the occasion.\nSo far he ended where he should, _i.e._ in philosophy; but the little\nincident is significant, not least because it shows what practical ends\nEuhemerism could be brought to serve and how doubtful was its atheistic\ncharacter after all. For not only was the contemplated apotheosis of\nTullia in itself a Euhemeristic idea, but Cicero also expressly defended\nit with Euhemeristic arguments, though speaking as if the departed who\nwere worshipped as gods really had become gods.\n\nThe attitude of Cicero and his contemporaries towards popular belief was\nstill the general attitude in the first days of the Empire. It was of no\navail that Augustus re-established the decayed State cult in all its\nsplendour and variety, or that the poets during his reign, when they\nwished to express themselves in harmony with the spirit of the new r\u00e9gime,\ndirectly or indirectly extolled the revived orthodoxy. Wherever we find\npersonal religious feeling expressed by men of that time, in the Epistles\nof Horace, in Virgil\u2019s posthumous minor poems or in such passages in his\ngreater works where he expresses his own ideals, it is philosophy that is\npredominant and the official religion ignored. Virgil was an Epicurean;\nHorace an Eclectic, now an Epicurean, then a Stoic; Augustus had a\ndomestic philosopher. Ovid employed his genius in writing travesties of\nthe old mythology while at the same time he composed a poem, serious for\nhim, on the Roman cult; and when disaster befell him and he was cast out\nfrom the society of the capital, which was the breath of life to him, he\nwas abandoned not only by men, but also by the gods\u2014he had not even a\nphilosophy with which to console himself. It is only in inferior writers\nsuch as Valerius Maximus, who wrote a work on great deeds\u2014good and\nevil\u2014under Tiberius, that we find a different spirit.\n\nDirect utterances about men\u2019s relationship to the gods, from which\nconclusions can be drawn, are seldom met with during this period. The\nwhole question was so remote from the thoughts of these people that they\nnever mentioned it except when they assumed an orthodox air for political\nor aesthetic reasons. Still, here and there we come across something. One\nof the most significant pronouncements is that of Pliny the Elder, from\nwhom we quoted the passage about the worship of Fortune. Pliny opens his\nscientific encyclopedia by explaining the structure of the universe in its\nbroad features; this he does on the lines of the physics of the Stoics,\nhence he designates the universe as God. Next comes a survey of special\ntheology. It is introduced as follows: \u201cI therefore deem it a sign of\nhuman weakness to ask about the shape and form of God. Whoever God is, if\nany other god (than the universe) exists at all, and in whatever part of\nthe world he is, he is all perception, all sight, all hearing, all soul,\nall reason, all self.\u201d The popular notions of the gods are then reviewed,\nin the most supercilious tone, and their absurdities pointed out. A polite\nbow is made to the worship of the Emperors and its motives, the rest is\nlittle but persiflage. Not even Providence, which was recognised by the\nStoics, is acknowledged by Pliny. The conclusion is like the beginning:\n\u201cTo imperfect human nature it is a special consolation that God also is\nnot omnipotent (he can neither put himself to death, even if he would,\nthough he has given man that power and it is his choicest gift in this\npunishment which is life; nor can he give immortality to mortals or call\nthe dead to life; nor can he bring it to pass that those who have lived\nhave not lived, or that he who has held honourable offices did not hold\nthem); and that he has no other power over the past than that of oblivion;\nand that (in order that we may also give a jesting proof of our\npartnership with God) he cannot bring it about that twice ten is not\ntwenty, and more of the same sort\u2014by all which the power of Nature is\nclearly revealed, and that it is this we call God.\u201d\n\nAn opinion like that expressed here must without doubt be designated as\natheism, even though it is nothing but the Stoic pantheism logically\ncarried out. As we have said before, we rarely meet it so directly\nexpressed, but there can hardly be any doubt that even in the time of\nPliny it was quite common in Rome. At this point, then, had the educated\nclasses of the ancient world arrived under the influence of Hellenistic\nphilosophy.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nThough the foundation of the Empire in many ways inaugurated a new era for\nthe antique world, it is, of course, impossible, in an inquiry which is\nnot confined to political history in the narrowest sense of the word, to\noperate with anything but the loosest chronological divisions. Accordingly\nin the last chapter we had to include phenomena from the early days of the\nEmpire in order not to separate things which naturally belonged together.\nFrom the point of view of religious history the dividing line cannot\npossibly be drawn at the Emperor Augustus, in spite of his restoration of\nworship and the orthodox reaction in the official Augustan poetry, but\nrather at about the beginning of the second century. The enthusiasm of the\nAugustan Age for the good old times was never much more than affectation.\nIt quickly evaporated when the promised millennium was not forthcoming,\nand was replaced by a reserve which developed into cynicism\u2014but, be it\nunderstood, in the upper circles of the capital only. In the empire at\nlarge the development took its natural tranquil course, unaffected by the\nmanner in which the old Roman nobility was effacing itself; and this\ndevelopment did not tend towards atheism.\n\nThe reaction towards positive religious feeling, which becomes clearly\nmanifest in the second century after Christ, though the preparation for it\nis undoubtedly of earlier date, is perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon\nin the religious history of antiquity. This is not the place to inquire\ninto its causes, which still remain largely unexplained; there is even no\nreason to enter more closely into its outer manifestations, as the thing\nitself is doubted by nobody. It is sufficient to mention as instances\nauthors like Suetonius, with his na\u00efve belief in miracles, and the\nrhetorician Aristides, with his Asclepius-cult and general\nsanctimoniousness; or a minor figure such as Aelian, who wrote whole books\nof a pronounced, nay even fanatical, devotionalism; or within the sphere\nof philosophy movements like Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism, both of\nwhich are as much in the nature of mystic theology as attempts at a\nscientific explanation of the universe. It is characteristic, too, that an\nessentially anti-religious school like that of the Epicureans actually\ndies out at this time. Under these conditions our task in this chapter\nmust be to bring out the comparatively few and weak traces of other\ncurrents which still made themselves felt.\n\nOf the earlier philosophical schools Stoicism flowered afresh in the\nsecond century; the Emperor Marcus Aurelius himself was a prominent\nadherent of the creed. This later Stoicism differs, however, somewhat from\nthe earlier. It limits the scientific apparatus which the early Stoics had\noperated with to a minimum, and is almost exclusively concerned with\npractical ethics on a religious basis. Its religion is that of ordinary\nStoicism: Pantheism and belief in Providence. But, on the whole, it takes\nup a more sympathetic attitude towards popular religion than early\nStoicism had done. Of the bitter criticism of the absurdities of the\nworship of the gods and of mythology which is still to be met with as late\nas Seneca, nothing remains. On the contrary, participation in public\nworship is still enjoined as being a duty; nay, more: attacks on belief in\nthe gods\u2014in the plain popular sense of the word\u2014are denounced as\npernicious and reprehensible. Perhaps no clearer proof could be adduced of\nthe revolution which had taken place in the attitude of the educated\nclasses towards popular religion than this change of front on the part of\nStoicism.\n\nContrary to this was the attitude of another school which was in vogue at\nthe same time as the Stoic, namely, the Cynic. Between Cynicism and\npopular belief strained relations had existed since early times. It is\ntrue, the Cynics did not altogether deny the existence of the gods; but\nthey rejected worship on the ground that the gods were not in need of\nanything, and they denied categorically the majority of the popular ideas\nabout the gods. For the latter were, in fact, popular and traditional, and\nthe whole aim of the Cynics was to antagonise the current estimate of\nvalues. A characteristic instance of their manner is provided by this very\nperiod in the fragments of the work of Oenomaus. The work was entitled\n_The Swindlers Unmasked_, and it contained a violent attack on oracles.\nIts tone is exceedingly pungent. In the extant fragments Oenomaus\naddresses the god in Delphi and overwhelms him with insults. But we are\nexpressly told\u2014and one utterance of Oenomaus himself verifies it\u2014that the\nattack was not really directed against the god, but against the men who\ngave oracles in his name. In his opinion the whole thing was a priestly\nfraud\u2014a view which otherwise was rather unfamiliar to the ancients, but\nplayed an important part later. Incidentally there is a violent attack on\nidolatry. The work is not without acuteness of thought and a certain\ncoarse wit of the true Cynical kind; but it is entirely uncritical\n(oracles are used which are evidently inventions of later times) and of no\ngreat significance. It is even difficult to avoid the impression that the\nauthor\u2019s aim is in some degree to create a sensation. Cynics of that day\nwere not strangers to that kind of thing. But it is at any rate a proof of\nthe fact that there were at the time tendencies opposed to the religious\nreaction.\n\nA more significant phenomenon of the same kind is to be found in the\nwritings of Lucian. Lucian was by education a rhetorician, by profession\nan itinerant lecturer and essayist. At a certain stage of his life he\nbecame acquainted with the Cynic philosophy and for some time felt much\nattracted to it. From that he evidently acquired a sincere contempt of the\nvulgar superstition which flourished in his time, even in circles of which\none might have expected something better. In writings which for the\ngreater part belong to his later period, he pilloried individuals who\ntraded (or seemed to trade) in the religious ferment of the time, as well\nas satirised superstition as such.  In this way he made an important\ncontribution to the spiritual history of the age. But simultaneously he\nproduced, for the entertainment of his public, a series of writings the\naim of which is to make fun of the Olympian gods. In this work also he\nleant on the literature of the Cynics, but substituted for their grave and\nbiting satire light causeries or slight dramatic sketches, in which his\nwit\u2014for Lucian was really witty\u2014had full scope. As an instance of his\nmanner I shall quote a short passage from the dialogue _Timon_. It is Zeus\nwho speaks; he has given Hermes orders to send the god of wealth to Timon,\nwho has wasted his fortune by his liberality and is now abandoned by his\nfalse friends. Then he goes on: \u201cAs to the flatterers you speak of and\ntheir ingratitude, I shall deal with them another time, and they will meet\nwith their due punishment as soon as I have had my thunderbolt repaired.\nThe two largest darts of it were broken and blunted the other day when I\ngot in a rage and flung it at the sophist Anaxagoras, who was trying to\nmake his disciples believe that we gods do not exist at all. However, I\nmissed him, for Pericles held his hand over him, but the bolt struck the\ntemple of the Dioscuri and set fire to it, and the bolt itself was nearly\ndestroyed when it struck the rock.\u201d This sort of thing abounds in Lucian,\neven if it is not always equally amusing and to the point. Now there is\nnothing strange in the fact that a witty man for once should feel inclined\nto make game of the old mythology; this might have happened almost at any\ntime, once the critical spirit had been awakened. But that a man, and\nmoreover an essayist, who had to live by the approval of his public,\nshould make it his trade, as it were, and that at a time of vigorous\nreligious reaction, seems more difficult to account for. Lucian\u2019s\ncontroversial pamphlets against superstition cannot be classed off-hand\nwith his _Dialogues of the Gods_; the latter are of a quite different and\nfar more harmless character. The fact is rather that mythology at this\ntime was fair game. It was cut off from its connexion with religion\u2014a\nconnexion which in historical times was never very intimate and was now\nentirely severed. This had been brought about in part by centuries of\ncriticism of the most varied kind, in part precisely as a result of the\nreligious reaction which had now set in. If people turned during this time\nto the old gods\u2014who, however, had been considerably contaminated with new\nelements\u2014it was because they had nothing else to turn to; but what they\nnow looked for was something quite different from the old religion. The\npowerful tradition which had bound members of each small community\u2014we\nshould say, of each township\u2014to its familiar gods, with all that belonged\nto them, was now in process of dissolution; in the larger cities of the\nworld-empire with their mixed populations it had entirely disappeared.\nReligion was no longer primarily a concern of society; it was a personal\nmatter. In the face of the enormous selection of gods which ancient\npaganism came gradually to proffer, the individual was free to choose, as\nindividual or as a member of a communion based upon religious, not\npolitical, sympathy. Under these circumstances the existence of the gods\nand their power and will to help their worshippers was the only thing of\ninterest; all the old tales about them were more than ever myths of no\nreligious value. On closer inspection Lucian indeed proves to have\nexercised a certain selection in his satire. Gods like Asclepius and\nSerapis, who were popular in his day, he prefers to say nothing about; and\neven with a phenomenon like Christianity he deals cautiously; he sticks to\nthe old Olympian gods. Thus his derision of these constitutes an indirect\nproof that they had gone out of vogue, and his forbearance on other points\nis a proof of the power of the current religion over contemporary minds.\nAs to ascribing any deeper religious conviction to Lucian\u2014were it even of\na purely negative kind\u2014that is, in view of the whole character of his\nwork, out of the question. To be sure, his polemical pamphlets against\nsuperstition show clearly, like those of Oenomaus, that the religious\nreaction did not run its course without criticism from certain sides; but\neven here it is significant that the criticism comes from a professional\njester and not from a serious religious thinker.\n\nA few words remain to be said about the two monotheistic religions which\nin the days of the Roman Empire came to play a great, one of them indeed a\ndecisive, part. I have already referred to pagan society\u2019s attitude\ntowards Judaism and Christianity, and pointed out that the adherents of\nboth were designated and treated as atheists\u2014the Jews only occasionally\nand with certain reservations, the Christians nearly always and\nunconditionally. The question here is, how far this designation was\njustified according to the definition of atheism which is the basis of our\ninquiry.\n\nIn the preceding pages we have several times referred to the fact that the\nreal enemy of Polytheism is not the philosophical theology, which\ngenerally tends more or less towards Pantheism, but Monotheism. It is in\nkeeping with this that the Jews and the Christians in practice are\ndownright deniers of the pagan gods: they would not worship them; whereas\nthe Greek philosophers as a rule respected worship, however far they went\nin their criticism of men\u2019s ideas of the gods. We shall not dwell here on\nthis aspect of the matter; we are concerned with the theory only. Detailed\nexpositions of it occur in numerous writings, from the passages in the Old\nTestament where heathenism is attacked, to the defences of Christianity by\nthe latest Fathers of the Church.\n\nThe original Jewish view, according to which the heathen gods are real\nbeings just as much as the God of the Jews themselves\u2014only Jews must not\nworship them\u2014is in the later portions of the Old Testament superseded by\nthe view that the gods are only images made of wood, stone or metal, and\nincapable of doing either good or evil. This point of view is taken over\nby later Jewish authors and completely dominates them. In those acquainted\nwith Greek thought it is combined with Euhemeristic ideas: the images\nrepresent dead men. The theory that the gods are really natural\nobjects\u2014elements or heavenly bodies\u2014is occasionally taken into account\ntoo. Alongside of these opinions there appears also the view that the\npagan gods are evil spirits (demons). It is already found in a few places\nin the Old Testament, and after that sporadically and quite incidentally\nin later Jewish writings; in one place it is combined with the Old\nTestament\u2019s account of the fallen angels. The demon-theory is not an\ninstrument of Jewish apologetics proper, not even of Philo, though he has\na complete demonology and can hardly have been ignorant of the\nPlatonic-Stoic doctrine of demons.\n\nApart from the few and, as it were, incidental utterances concerning\ndemons, the Jewish view of the pagan gods impresses one as decidedly\natheistic. The god is identical with the idol, and the idol is a dead\nobject, the work of men\u2019s hands, or the god is identical with a natural\nobject, made by God to be sure, but without soul or, at any rate, without\ndivinity. It is remarkable that no Jewish controversialist seriously\nenvisaged the problem of the real view of the gods embodied in the popular\nbelief of the ancients, namely, that they are personal beings of a higher\norder than man. It is inconceivable that men like Philo, Josephus and the\nauthor of the Wisdom of Solomon should have been ignorant of it. I know\nnothing to account for this curious phenomenon; and till some light has\nbeen thrown upon the matter, I should hesitate to assert that the Jewish\nconception of Polytheism was purely atheistic, however much appearance it\nmay have of being so.\n\nIt was otherwise with Christian polemical writing. As early as St. Paul\nthe demon-theory appears distinctly, though side by side with utterances\nof seemingly atheistic character. Other New Testament authors, too,\ndesignate the gods as demons. The subsequent apologists, excepting the\nearliest, Aristides, lay the main stress on demonology, but include for\nthe sake of completeness idolatry and the like, sometimes without caring\nabout or trying to conciliate the contradictions. In the long run\ndemonology is victorious; in St. Augustine, the foremost among Christian\napologists, there is hardly any other point of view that counts.\n\nTo trace the Christian demonology in detail and give an account of its\nvarious aspects is outside the scope of this essay. Its origin is a\ntwofold one, partly the Jewish demonology, which just at the commencement\nof our era had received a great impetus, partly the theory of the Greek\nphilosophers, which we have characterised above when speaking of\nXenocrates. The Christian doctrine regarding demons differs from the\nlatter, especially by the fact that it does not acknowledge good demons;\nthey were all evil. This was the indispensable basis for the interdict\nagainst the worship of demons; in its further development the Christians,\nfollowing Jewish tradition, pointed to an origin in the fallen angels, and\nthus effected a connexion with the Old Testament. While they at the same\ntime retained its angelology they had to distinguish good and evil beings\nintermediate between god and man; but they carefully avoided designating\nthe angels as demons, and kept them distinct from the pagan gods, who were\nall demons and evil.\n\nThe application of demonology to the pagan worship caused certain\ndifficulties in detail. To be sure, it was possible to identify a given\npagan god with a certain demon, and this was often done; but it was\nimpossible to identify the Pagans\u2019 conceptions of their gods with the\nChristians\u2019 conceptions of demons. The Pagans, in fact, ascribed to their\ngods not only demoniac (diabolical) but also divine qualities, which the\nChristians absolutely denied them. Consequently they had to recognise that\npagan worship to a great extent rested on a delusion, on a misconception\nof the essential character of the gods which were worshipped. This view\nwas corroborated by the dogma of the fallen angels, which was altogether\nalien to paganism. By identifying them with the evil spirits of the Bible,\ndemon-names were even obtained which differed from those of the pagan gods\nand, of course, were the correct ones; were they not given in Holy Writ?\nIn general, the Christians, who possessed an authentic revelation of the\nmatter, were of course much better informed about the nature of the pagan\ngods than the Pagans themselves, who were groping in the dark. Euhemerism,\nwhich plays a great part in the apologists, helped in the same direction:\nthe supposition that the idols were originally men existed among the\nPagans themselves, and it was too much in harmony with the tendency of the\napologists to be left unemployed. It was reconciled with demonology by the\nsupposition that the demons had assumed the masks of dead heroes; they had\nbeguiled mankind to worship them in order to possess themselves of the\nsacrifices, which they always coveted, and by this deception to be able to\nrule and corrupt men. The Christians also could not avoid recognising that\npart of the pagan worship was worship of natural objects, in particular of\nthe heavenly bodies; and this error of worshipping the \u201ccreation instead\nof the creator\u201d was so obvious that the Christians were not inclined to\nresort to demonology for an explanation of this phenomenon, the less so as\nthey could not identify the sun or the moon with a demon. The conflict of\nthese different points of view accounts for the peculiar vacillation in\nthe Christian conception of paganism. On one hand, we meet with crude\nconceptions, according to which the pagan gods are just like so many\ndemons; they are specially prominent when pagan miracles and prophecies\nare to be explained. On the other hand, there is a train of thought which\ncarried to its logical conclusion would lead to conceiving paganism as a\nwhole as a huge delusion of humanity, but a delusion caused indeed by\nsupernatural agencies. This conclusion hardly presented itself to the\nearly Church; later, however, it was drawn and caused a not inconsiderable\nshifting in men\u2019s views and explanations of paganism.\n\nDemonology is to such a degree the ruling point of view in Christian\napologetics that it would be absurd to make a collection from these\nwritings of utterances with an atheistic ring. Such utterances are to be\nfound in most of them; they appear spontaneously, for instance, wherever\nidolatry is attacked. But one cannot attach any importance to them when\nthey appear in this connexion, not even in apologists in whose works the\ndemon theory is lacking. No Christian theologian in antiquity advanced,\nmuch less sustained, the view that the pagan gods were mere phantoms of\nhuman imagination without any corresponding reality.\n\nRemarkable as this state of things may appear to us moderns, it is really\nquite simple, nay even a matter of course, when regarded historically.\nChristianity had from its very beginning a decidedly dualistic character.\nThe contrast between this world and the world to come was identical with\nthe contrast between the kingdom of the Devil and the kingdom of God. As\nsoon as the new religion came into contact with paganism, the latter was\nnecessarily regarded as belonging to the kingdom of the Devil; thus the\nconception of the gods as demons was a foregone conclusion. In the minds\nof the later apologists, who became acquainted with Greek philosophy, this\nconception received additional confirmation; did it not indeed agree in\nthe main with Platonic and Stoic theory? Details were added: the\nChristians could not deny the pagan miracles without throwing a doubt on\ntheir own, for miracles cannot be done away with at all except by a denial\non principle; neither could they explain paganism\u2014that gigantic,\nmillennial aberration of humanity\u2014by merely human causes, much less lay\nthe blame on God alone. But ultimately all this rests on one and the same\nthing\u2014the supernatural and dualistic hypothesis. Consequently demonology\nis the kernel of the Christian conception of paganism: it is not merely a\nnatural result of the hypotheses, it is the one and only correct\nexpression of the way in which the new religion understood the old.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\nIn the preceding inquiry we took as our starting-point not the ancient\nconception of atheism but the modern view of the nature of the pagan gods.\nIt proved that this view was, upon the whole, feebly represented during\nantiquity, and that it was another view (demonology) which was transmitted\nto later ages from the closing years of antiquity. The inquiry will\ntherefore find its natural conclusion in a demonstration of the time and\nmanner in which the conception handed down from antiquity of the nature of\npaganism was superseded and displaced by the modern view.\n\nThis question is, however, more difficult to answer than one would perhaps\nthink. After ancient paganism had ceased to exist as a living religion, it\nhad lost its practical interest, and theoretically the Middle Ages were\noccupied with quite other problems than the nature of paganism. At the\nrevival of the study of ancient literature, during the Renaissance, people\ncertainly again came into the most intimate contact with ancient religion\nitself, but systematic investigations of its nature do not seem to have\nbeen taken up in real earnest until after the middle of the sixteenth\ncentury. It is therefore difficult to ascertain in what light paganism was\nregarded during the thousand years which had then passed since its final\nextinction. From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the other\nhand, the material is extraordinarily plentiful, though but slightly\ninvestigated. Previous works in this field seem to be entirely wanting; at\nany rate it has not been possible for me to find any collective treatment\nof the subject, nor even any contributions worth mentioning towards the\nsolution of the numerous individual problems which arise when we enter\nupon what might be called \u201cthe history of the history of religion.\u201d(1) In\nthis essay I must therefore restrict myself to a few aphoristic remarks\nwhich may perhaps give occasion for this subject, in itself not devoid of\ninterest, to receive more detailed treatment at some future time.\n\nMilton, in the beginning of _Paradise Lost_, which appeared in 1667, makes\nSatan assemble all his angels for continued battle against God. Among the\ndemons there enumerated, ancient gods also appear; they are, then, plainly\nregarded as devils. Now Milton was not only a poet, but also a sound\nscholar and an orthodox theologian; we may therefore rest assured that his\nconception of the pagan gods was dogmatically correct and in accord with\nthe prevailing views of his time. In him, therefore, we have found a fixed\npoint from which we can look forwards and backwards; as late as after the\nmiddle of the seventeenth century the early Christian view of the nature\nof paganism evidently persisted in leading circles.\n\nWe seldom find definite heathen gods so precisely designated as demons as\nin Milton, but no doubt seems possible that the general principle was\naccepted by contemporary and earlier authors. The chief work of the\nseventeenth century on ancient religion is the _De Theologia Gentili_ of\nG. I. Voss; he operates entirely with the traditional view. It may be\ntraced back through a succession of writings of the seventeenth and\nsixteenth centuries. They are all, or almost all, agreed that antique\npaganism was the work of the devil, and that idolatry was, at any rate in\npart, a worship of demons. From the Middle Ages I can adduce a pregnant\nexpression of the same view from Thomas Aquinas; in his treatment of\nidolatry and also of false prophecy he definitely accepts the demonology\nof the early Church. On this point he appeals to Augustine, and with\nperfect right; from this it may presumably be assumed that the Schoolmen\nin general had the same view, Augustine being, as we know, an authority\nfor Catholic theologians.\n\nIn mediaeval poets also we occasionally find the same view expressed. As\nfar as I have been able to ascertain, Dante has no ancient gods among his\ndevils, and the degree to which he had dissociated himself from ancient\npaganism may be gauged by the fact that in one of the most impassioned\npassages of his poem he addresses the Christian God as \u201cGreat Jupiter.\u201d\nBut he allows figures of ancient mythology such as Charon, Minos and\nGeryon to appear in his infernal world, and when he designates the pagan\ngods as \u201cfalse and _untruthful_,\u201d demonology is evidently at the back of\nhis mind. The mediaeval epic poets who dealt with antique subjects took\nover the pagan gods more or less. Sometimes, as in the Romance of Troy,\nthe Christian veneer is so thick that the pagan groundwork is but slightly\napparent; in other poems, such as the adaptation of the _Aeneid_, it is\nmore in evidence. In so far as the gods are not eliminated they seem as a\nrule to be taken over quite na\u00efvely from the source without further\ncomment; but occasionally the poet expresses his view of their nature.\nThus the French adapter of Statius\u2019s _Theba\u00efs_, in whose work the\nChristian element is otherwise not prominent, cautiously remarks that\nJupiter and Tisiphone, by whom his heroes swear, are in reality only\ndevils. Generally speaking, the gods of antiquity are often designated as\ndevils in mediaeval poetry, but at times the opinion that they are\ndeparted human beings crops up. Thus, as we might expect, the theories of\nancient times still survive and retain their sway.\n\nThere is a domain in which we might expect to find distinct traces of the\nsurvival of the ancient gods in the mediaeval popular consciousness,\nnamely, that of magic. There does not, however, seem to be much in it; the\nforms of mediaeval magic often go back to antiquity, but the beings it\noperates with are pre-eminently the Christian devils, if we may venture to\nemploy the term, and the evil spirits of popular belief. There is,\nhowever, extant a collection of magic formulae against various ailments in\nwhich pagan gods appear: Hercules and Juno Regina, Juno and Jupiter, the\nnymphs, Luna Jovis filia, Sol invictus. The collection is transmitted in a\nmanuscript of the ninth century; the formulae mostly convey the impression\nof dating from a much earlier period, but the fact that they were copied\nin the Middle Ages suggests that they were intended for practical\napplication.\n\nA problem, the closer investigation of which would no doubt yield an\ninteresting result, but which does not seem to have been much noticed, is\nthe European conception of the heathen religions with which the explorers\ncame into contact on their great voyages of discovery. Primitive\nheathenism as a living reality had lain rather beyond the horizon of the\nMiddle Ages; when it was met with in America, it evidently awakened\nconsiderable interest. There is a description of the religion of Peru and\nMexico, written by the Jesuit Acosta at the close of the sixteenth\ncentury, which gives us a clear insight into the orthodox view of\nheathenism during the Renaissance. According to Acosta, heathenism is as a\nwhole the work of the Devil; he has seduced men to idolatry in order that\nhe himself may be worshipped instead of the true God. All worship of idols\nis in reality worship of Satan. The individual idols, however, are not\nidentified with individual devils; Acosta distinguishes between the\nworship of nature (heavenly bodies, natural objects of the earth, right\ndown to trees, etc.), the worship of the dead, and the worship of images,\nbut says nothing about the worship of demons. At one point only is there a\ndirect intervention of the evil powers, namely, in magic, and particularly\nin oracles; and here then we find, as an exception, mention of individual\ndevils which must be imagined to inhabit the idols. The same conception is\nfound again as late as the seventeenth century in a story told by G. I.\nVoss of the time of the Dutch wars in Brazil. Arcissewski, a Polish\nofficer serving in the Dutch army, had witnessed the conjuring of a devil\namong the Tapuis. The demon made his appearance all right, but proved to\nbe a native well known to Arcissewski. As he, however, made some true\nprognostications, Voss, as it seems at variance with Arcissewski, thinks\nthat there must have been some supernatural powers concerned in the game.\n\nAn exceptional place is occupied by the attempt made during the\nRenaissance at an actual revival of ancient paganism and the worship of\nits gods. It proceeded from Plethon, the head of the Florentine Academy,\nand seems to have spread thence to the Roman Academy. The whole movement\nmust be viewed more particularly as an outcome of the enthusiasm during\nthe Renaissance for the culture of antiquity and more especially for its\nphilosophy rather than its religion; the gods worshipped were given a new\nand strongly philosophical interpretation. But it is not improbable that\nthe traditional theory of the reality of the ancient deities may have had\nsomething to do with it.\n\nSimultaneously with demonology, and while it was still acknowledged in\nprinciple, there flourished more naturalistic conceptions of paganism,\nboth in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance. As remarked above, the\nway was already prepared for them during antiquity. In Thomas Aquinas we\nfind a lucid explanation of the origin of idolatry with a reference to the\nancient theory. Here we meet with the familiar elements: the worship of\nthe stars and the cult of the dead. According to Thomas, man has a natural\ndisposition towards this error, but it only comes into play when he is led\nastray by demons. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Devil is\nmentioned oftener than the demons (compare Acosta\u2019s view of the heathenism\nof the American Indians); evidently the conception of the nature of evil\nhad undergone a change in the direction of monotheism. In this way more\nscope was given for the adoption of naturalistic views in regard to the\nindividual forms in which paganism manifested itself than when dealing\nwith a multiplicity of demons that answered individually to the pagan\ngods, and we meet with systematic attempts to explain the origin of\nidolatry by natural means, though still with the Devil in the background.\n\nOne of these systems, which played a prominent part, especially in the\nseventeenth century, is the so-called Hebraism, _i.e._ the attempt to\nderive the whole of paganism from Judaism. This fashion, for which the way\nhad already been prepared by Jewish and Christian apologists, reaches its\nclimax, I think, with Abbot Huet, who derived all the gods of antiquity\n(and not only Greek and Roman antiquity) from Moses, and all the goddesses\nfrom his sister; according to him the knowledge of these two persons had\nspread from the Jews to other peoples, who had woven about them a web of\n\u201cfables.\u201d Alongside of Hebraism, which is Euhemeristic in principle,\nallegorical methods of interpretation were put forward. The chief\nrepresentative of this tendency in earlier times is Natalis Comes (No\u00ebl du\nComte), the author of the first handbook of mythology; he directly set\nhimself the task of allegorising all the myths. The allegories are mostly\nmoral, but also physical; Euhemeristic interpretations are not rejected\neither, and in several places the author gives all three explanations side\nby side without choosing between them.  In the footsteps of du Comte\nfollows Bacon, in his _De Sapientia Veterum_; to the moral and physical\nallegories he adds political ones, as when Jove\u2019s struggle with Typhoeus\nis made to symbolise a wise ruler\u2019s treatment of a rebellion. While these\nattempts at interpretation, both the Euhemeristic and the allegorical, are\nin principle a direct continuation of those of antiquity, another method\npoints plainly in the direction of the fantastic notions of the Middle\nAges. As early as the sixteenth century the idea arose of connecting the\ntheology of the ancients with alchemy. The idea seemed obvious because the\nmetals were designated by the names of the planets, which are also the\nnames of the gods. It found acceptance, and in the seventeenth century we\nhave a series of writings in which ancient mythology is explained as the\nsymbolical language of chemical processes.\n\nWithin the limits of the supernatural explanation the interest centred\nmore and more in a single point: the oracles. As far back as in Aquinas,\n\u201cfalse prophecy\u201d is a main section in the chapter on demons, whose power\nto foretell the future he expressly acknowledges. In the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries, when the interest in the prediction of the future\nwas so strong, the ancient accounts of true prognostications were the real\nprop of demonology. Hence demons generally play a great part in these\nexplanations, even though in other cases the Devil fills the bill. Thus\nAcosta in his account of the American religions; thus Voss and numerous\nother writers of the seventeenth century; and it is hardly a mere\naccident, one would think, when Milton specially mentions Dodona and\nDelphi as the seats of worship of the Greek demons. Among a few of the\nhumanists we certainly find an attempt to apply the natural explanation\neven here; thus Caelius Rhodiginus asserted that a great part (but not\nall!) of the oracular system might be explained as priestly imposture, and\nhis slightly younger contemporary Caelius Calcagninus, in his dialogue on\noracles, seems to go still further and to deny the power of predicting the\nfuture to any other being than the true God. An exceptional position is\noccupied by Pomponazzi, who in his little pamphlet _De Incantationibus_\nseems to wish to derive all magic, including the oracles, from natural\ncauses, though ultimately he formally acknowledges demonology as the\nauthoritative explanation. But these advances did not find acceptance; we\nfind even Voss combating the view on which they were founded. It is\ncharacteristic of the power of demonology in this domain that in support\nof his point of view he can quote no less a writer than Machiavelli.\n\nThe author who opened battle in real earnest against demonology was a\nDutch scholar, one van Dale, otherwise little known. In a couple of\ntreatises written about the close of the seventeenth century he tried to\nshow that the whole of idolatry (as well as the oracles in particular) was\nnot dependent on the intervention of supernatural beings, but was solely\ndue to imposture on the part of the priests. Van Dale was a Protestant, so\nhe easily got over the unanimous recognition of demonology by the Fathers\nof the Church. The accounts of demons in the Old and New Testaments proved\nmore difficult to deal with; it is interesting to see how he wriggles\nabout to get round them\u2014and it illustrates most instructively the degree\nto which demonology affords the only reasonable and natural explanation of\npaganism on the basis of early Christian belief.\n\nVan Dale\u2019s books are learned works written in Latin, full of quotations in\nLatin, Greek, and Hebrew, and moreover confused and obscure in exposition,\nas is often the case with Dutch writings of that time. But a clever\nFrenchman, Fontenelle, took upon himself the task of rendering his work on\nthe oracles into French in a popular and attractive form. His book called\nforth an answering pamphlet from a Jesuit advocating the traditional view;\nthe little controversy seems to have made some stir in France about the\nyear 1700. At any rate Banier, who, in the beginning of the eighteenth\ncentury, treated ancient mythology from a Euhemeristic point of view, gave\nsome consideration to it. His own conclusion is\u2014in 1738!\u2014that demonology\ncannot be dispensed with for the explanation of the oracles. He gives his\ngrounds for this in a very sensible criticism of van Dale\u2019s priestly fraud\ntheory, the absurdity of which he exposes with sound arguments.\n\nBanier is the last author to whom I can point for the demon-theory applied\nas an explanation of a phenomenon in ancient religion; I have not found it\nin any other mythologist of the eighteenth century, and even in Banier,\nwith the exception of this single point, everything is explained quite\nnaturally according to the best Euhemeristic models. But in the positive\nunderstanding of the nature of ancient paganism no very considerable\nadvance had actually been made withal. A characteristic example of this is\nthe treatment of ancient religion by such an eminent intellect as\nGiambattista Vico. In his _Scienza Nuova_, which appeared in 1725, as the\nfoundation of his exposition of the religion of antiquity he gives a\ncharacterisation of the mode of thought of primitive mankind, which is so\npertinent and psychologically so correct that it anticipates the results\nof more than a hundred years of research. Of any supernatural explanation\nno trace is found in him, though otherwise he speaks as a good Catholic.\nBut when he proceeds to explain the nature of the ancient ideas of the\ngods in detail, all that it comes to is a series of allegories, among\nwhich the politico-social play a main part. Vico sees the earliest history\nof mankind in the light of the traditions about Rome; the Graeco-Roman\ngods, then, and the myths about them, become to him largely an expression\nof struggles between the \u201cpatricians and plebeians\u201d of remote antiquity.\n\nMost of the mythology of the eighteenth century is like this. The\nEuhemeristic school gradually gave up the hypothesis of the Jewish\nreligion as the origin of paganism; Banier, the chief representative of\nthe school, still argues at length against Hebraism. In its place,\nPhoenicians, Assyrians, Persians and, above all, Egyptians, are brought\ninto play, or, as in the case of the Englishman Bryant, the whole of\nmythology is explained as reminiscences of the exploits of an aboriginal\nrace, the Cuthites, which never existed. The allegorist school gradually\nrallied round the idea of the cult of the heavenly bodies as the origin of\nthe pagan religions; as late as the days of the French Revolution, Dupuis,\nin a voluminous work, tried to trace the whole of ancient religion and\nmythology back to astronomy. On the whole the movement diverged more and\nmore from Euhemerism towards the conception of Greek religion as a kind of\ncult of nature; when the sudden awakening to a more correct understanding\ncame towards the close of the century, Euhemerism was evidently already an\nantiquated view. Thus, since the Renaissance, by a slow and very devious\nprocess of development, a gradual approach had been made to a more correct\nview of the nature of ancient religion. After the Devil had more or less\ntaken the place of the demons, the rest of demonology, the moral allegory,\nHebraism and Euhemerism were eliminated by successive stages, and\nnature-symbolism was reached as the final stage.\n\nWe know now that even this is not the correct explanation of the nature\nand origin of the conception of the gods prevailing among the ancients.\nRecent investigations have shown that the Greek gods, in spite of their\napparent simplicity and clarity, are highly complex organisms, the\nproducts of a long process of development to which the most diverse\nfactors have contributed. In order to arrive at this result another\ncentury of work, with many attempts in the wrong direction, has been\nrequired. The idea that the Greek gods were nature-gods really dominated\nresearch through almost the whole of the nineteenth century. If it has now\nbeen dethroned or reduced to the measure of truth it contains\u2014for\nundoubtedly a natural object enters as a component into the essence of\nsome Greek deities\u2014this is in the first place due to the intensive study\nof the religions of primitive peoples, living or obsolete; and the results\nof this study were only applied to Greek religion during the last decade\nof the century. But the starting-point of modern history of religion lies\nmuch farther back: its beginnings date from the great revival of\nhistorical research which was inaugurated by Rousseau and continued by\nHerder. Henceforward the unhistorical methods of the age of enlightenment\nwere abolished, and attention directed in real earnest towards the earlier\nstages of human civilisation.\n\nThis, however, carries us a step beyond the point of time at which this\nsketch should, strictly speaking, stop. For by the beginning of the\neighteenth century\u2014but not before\u2014the negative fact which is all important\nin this connexion had won recognition: namely, that there existed no\nsupernatural beings latent behind the Greek ideas of their gods, and\ncorresponding at any rate in some degree to them; but that these ideas\nmust be regarded and explained as entirely inventions of the human\nimagination.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nAt the very beginning of this inquiry it was emphasised that its theme\nwould in the main be the religious views of the upper class, and within\nthis sphere again especially the views of those circles which were in\nclose touch with philosophy. The reason for this is of course in the first\nplace that only in such circles can we expect to find expressed a point of\nview approaching to positive atheism. But we may assuredly go further than\nthis. We shall hardly be too bold in asserting that the free-thinking of\nphilosophically educated men in reality had very slight influence on the\ngreat mass of the population. Philosophy did not penetrate so far, and\nwhatever degree of perception we estimate the masses to have had of the\nfact that the upper layer of society regarded the popular faith with\ncritical eyes\u2014and in the long run it could not be concealed\u2014we cannot fail\nto recognise that religious development among the ancients did not tend\ntowards atheism. Important changes took place in ancient religion during\nthe Hellenistic Age and the time of the Roman Empire, but their causes\nwere of a social and national kind, and, if we confine ourselves to\npaganism, they only led to certain gods going out of fashion and others\ncoming in. The utmost we can assert is that a certain weakening of the\nreligious life may have been widely prevalent during the time of\ntransition between the two ages\u2014the transition falls at somewhat different\ndates in the eastern and western part of the Empire\u2014but that weakening was\nsoon overcome.\n\nNow the peculiar result of this investigation of the state of religion\namong the upper classes seems to me to be this: the curve of intensity of\nreligious feeling which conjecture leads us to draw through the spiritual\nlife of the ancients as a whole, that same curve, but more distinct and\nsharply accentuated, is found again in the relations of the upper classes\nto the popular faith. Towards the close of the fifth century it looks as\nif the cultured classes that formed the centre of Greek intellectual life\nwere outgrowing the ancient religion. The reaction which set in with\nSocrates and Plato certainly checked this movement, but it did not stop\nit. Cynics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, in spite of\ntheir widely differing points of view, were all entirely unable to share\nthe religious ideas of their countrymen in the form in which they were\ncast in the national religion. However many allowances they made, their\nattitude towards the popular faith was critical, and on important points\nthey denied it. It is against the background thus resulting from ancient\nphilosophy\u2019s treatment of ancient religion that we must view such\nphenomena as Polybius, Cicero, and Pliny the Elder, if we wish to\nunderstand their full significance.\n\nOn the other hand, it is certain that this was not the view that conquered\nin the end among the educated classes in antiquity. The lower we come down\nin the Empire the more evident does the positive relation of the upper\nclass to the gods of the popular faith become. Some few examples have\nalready been mentioned in the preceding pages. In philosophy the whole\nmovement finds its typical expression in demonology, which during the\nlater Empire reigned undisputed in the one or two schools that still\nretained any vitality. It is significant that its source was the earlier\nPlatonism, with its very conservative attitude towards popular belief, and\nthat it was taken over by the later Stoic school, which inaugurated the\ngeneral religious reaction in philosophy. And it is no less significant\nthat demonology was swallowed whole by the monotheistic religion which\nsuperseded ancient paganism, and for more than a thousand years was the\nrecognised explanation of the nature thereof.\n\nIn accordance with the line of development here sketched, the inquiry has\nof necessity been focused on two main points: Sophistic and the\nHellenistic Age. Now it is of peculiar interest to note what small traces\nof pure atheism can after all be found here, in spite of all criticism of\nthe popular faith. We have surmised its presence among a few prominent\npersonalities in fifth-century Athens; we have found evidence of its\nextension in the same place in the period immediately following; and in\nthe time of transition between the fourth and third centuries we have\nthought it likely that it existed among a very few philosophers, of whom\nnone are in the first rank. Everywhere else we find adjustments, in part\nvery serious and real concessions, to popular belief. Not to mention the\nattitude towards worship, which was only hostile in one sect of slight\nimportance: the assumption of the divinity of the heavenly bodies which\nwas common to the Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics is really in\nprinciple an acknowledgement of the popular faith, whose conception of the\ngods was actually borrowed and applied, not to some philosophical\nabstraction, but to individual and concrete natural objects. The\nanthropomorphic gods of the Epicureans point in the same direction. In\nspite of their profound difference from the beings that were worshipped\nand believed in by the ordinary Greek, they are in complete harmony with\nthe opinion on which all polytheism is based: that there are individual\nbeings of a higher order than man. And though the Stoics in theory\nconfined their acknowledgment of this doctrine to the heavenly bodies, in\npractice\u2014even if we disregard demonology\u2014they consistently brought it to\nbear upon the anthropomorphic gods, in direct continuation of the Socratic\nreaction against the atheistic tendencies of Sophistic.\n\nIf now we ask ourselves what may be the cause of this peculiar dualism in\nthe relationship of ancient thought to religion, though admitting the\nhighly complex nature of the problem, we can scarcely avoid recognising a\ncertain principle. Ancient thought outgrew the ancient popular faith; that\nis beyond doubt. Hence its critical attitude. But it never outgrew that\nsupernaturalist view which was the foundation of the popular faith. Hence\nits concessions to the popular faith, even when it was most critical, and\nits final surrender thereunto. And that it never outgrew the foundation of\nthe popular faith is connected with its whole conception of nature and\nespecially with its conception of the universe. We cannot indeed deny that\nthe ancients had a certain feeling that nature was regulated by laws, but\nthey only made imperfect attempts at a mechanical theory of nature in\nwhich this regulation of the world by law was carried through in\nprinciple, and with one brilliant exception they adhered implicitly to the\ngeocentric conception of the universe. We may, I think, venture to assert\nwith good reason that on such assumptions the philosophers of antiquity\ncould not advance further than they did. In other words, on the given\nhypotheses the supernaturalist view was the correct one, the one that was\nmost probable, and therefore that on which people finally agreed. A few\nchosen spirits may at any time by intuition, without any strictly\nscientific foundation, emancipate themselves entirely from religious\nerrors; this also happened among the ancients, and on the first occasion\nwas not unconnected with an enormous advance in the conception of nature.\nBut it is certain that the views of an entire age are always decisively\nconditioned by its knowledge and interpretation of the universe\nsurrounding it, and cannot in principle be emancipated therefrom.\n\nSeen from this point of view, our brief sketch of the attitude of\nposterity towards the religion of the pagan world will also not be without\ninterest. If, after isolated advances during the mighty awakening of the\nRenaissance, it is not until the transition from the seventeenth to the\neighteenth century that we find the modern atheistic conception of the\nnature of the gods of the ancients established in principle and\nconsistently applied, we can scarcely avoid connecting this fact with the\nadvance of natural science in the seventeenth century, and not least with\nthe victory of the heliocentric system. After the close of antiquity the\npagan gods had receded to a distance, practically speaking, because they\nwere not worshipped any more. No one troubled himself about them. But in\ntheory one had got no further, _i.e._ no advance had been made on the\nancients, and no advance could be made as long as supernaturalism was\nadhered to in connexion with the ancient view of the universe. Through\nmonotheism the notions of the divinity of the sun, moon and planets had\ncertainly been got rid of, but not so the notion of the world\u2014_i.e._ the\nglobe enclosed within the firmament\u2014as filled with personal beings of a\nhigher order than man; and even the duty of turning the spheres to which\nthe heavenly bodies were believed to be fastened was\u2014quite\nconsistently\u2014assigned to some of these beings. As long as such notions\nwere in operation, not only were there no grounds for denying the reality\nof the pagan gods, but there was every reason to assume it. So far we may\nrightly say that it was Copernicus, Galileo, Giordano Bruno, Kepler and\nNewton that did away with the traditional conception of ancient paganism.\n\nNatural science, however, furnishes only the negative result that the gods\nof polytheism are not what they are said to be: real beings of a higher\norder than man. To reveal what they are, other knowledge is required. This\nwas not attained until long after the revival of natural science in the\nsixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The vacillation in the eighteenth\ncentury between various theories of the explanation of the nature of\nancient polytheism\u2014theories which were all false, though not equally\nfalse\u2014is in this respect significant enough; likewise the gradual progress\nwhich characterises research in the nineteenth century, and which may be\nindicated by such names as Heyne, Buttmann, K. O. M\u00fcller, Lobeck,\nMannhardt, Rohde, and Usener, to mention only some of the most important\nand omitting those still alive. Viewed in this light the development\nsketched here within a narrowly restricted field is typical of the course\nof European intellectual history from antiquity down to our day.\n\n\n\n\n\nNOTES\n\n\nOf Atheism in Antiquity as defined here no treatment is known to me; but\nthere exist an older and a newer book that deal with the question within a\nwider compass. The first of these is Krische, _Die theologischen Lehren\nder griechischen Denker_ (G\u00f6ttingen, 1840); it is chiefly concerned with\nthe philosophical conceptions of deity, but it touches also on the\nrelations of philosophers to popular religion. The second is Decharme, _La\ncritique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs_ (Paris, 1904); it is\nnot fertile in new points of view, but it has suggested several details\nwhich I might else have overlooked. Such books as Caird, _The Evolution of\nTheology in the Greek Philosophers_ (Glasgow, 1904), or Moon, _Religious\nThought of the Greeks_ (Cambridge, Mass., 1919), barely touch on the\nrelation to popular belief; of Louis, _Les doctrines religieuses des\nphilosophes grecs_, I have not been able to make use. I regret that Poul\nHelms, _The Conception of God in Greek Philosophy_ (Danish, in _Studier\nfor Sprog-og Oldtidsforskning_, No. 115), was not published until my essay\nwas already in the press. General works on Atheism are indicated in\nAveling\u2019s article, \u201cAtheism,\u201d in the _Catholic Encyclop\u00e6dia_, vol. ii.,\nbut none of them seem to be found at Copenhagen. In the _Dictionary of\nReligion and Ethics_, ii., there is a detailed article on Atheism in its\nrelation to different religions; the section treating of Antiquity is\nwritten by Pearson, but is meagre. Works like Zeller, _Philosophie der\nGriechen_, and Gomperz, _Griechische Denker_, contain accounts of the\nattitude of philosophers (Gomperz also includes others) towards popular\nbelief; of these books I have of course made use throughout, but they are\nnot referred to in the following notes except on special occasion.\nScattered remarks and small monographs on details are naturally to be\nfound in plenty. Where I have met with such and found something useful in\nthem, or where I express dissent from them, I have noticed it; but I have\nnot aimed at exhausting the literature on my subject. On the other hand I\nhave tried to make myself completely acquainted with the first-hand\nmaterial, wherever it gave a direct support for assuming Atheism, and to\ntake my own view of it. In many cases, however, the argumentation has had\nto be indirect: it has been necessary to draw inferences from what an\nauthor does not say in a certain connexion when he might be expected to\nsay it, or what he generally and throughout avoids mentioning, or from his\ngeneral manner and peculiarities in his way of speaking of the gods. In\nsuch cases I have often had to be content with my previous knowledge and\nmy general impression of the facts; but then I have as a rule made use of\nthe important modern literature on the subject. In working out the sketch\nof the ideas after the end of Antiquity, I have been almost without any\nguidance in modern literature. I have accordingly had to try, on the basis\nof a superficial acquaintance with some of the chief types, to form for\nmyself, as best I might, some idea of the course of the evolution; but I\nhave not been able to go systematically through the immense material,\nhowever fruitful such a research appeared to be. In the meantime, between\nthe publication of my Danish essay and this translation, there has\nappeared a work by Mr. Gruppe, _Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und\nReligionsgeschichte_ (Leipzig, 1921). My task in writing my last chapters\nwould have been much easier if I could have made use of Mr. Gruppe\u2019s\nlearned and comprehensive treatment of the subject; but it would not have\nbeen superfluous, for Mr. Gruppe deals principally with the history of\nclassical mythology, not with the history of the belief in the gods of\nantiquity. So I have ventured to let my sketch stand as it is, only\nreducing some of the notes (which I had on purpose made rather full, to\naid others who might pursue the subject) by referring to Mr. Gruppe\ninstead of to the sources themselves.\n\nFor kindly helping me to find my bearings in out-of-the-way parts of my\nsubject, I am indebted to my colleagues F. Buhl, I.L. Heiberg, I.C.\nJacobsen and Kr. Nyrop, as well as to Prof. Martin P. Nilsson in Lund.\n\nP. 1. Definition of Atheism: see the article in the _Catholic Encycl._\nvol. ii.\n\nP. 5. Atheism: see Murray, _New Engl. Dict._, under Atheism and -ism. The\nword seems to have come up in the Renaissance.\n\nP. 6. Criminal Law at Athens: see Lipsius, _Das attische Recht und\nRechtsverfahren_, i. p. 358.\u2014The definition in Aristotle, _de virt. et\nvit._ 7, p. 1251_a_, has, I think, no legal foundation.\n\nP. 9. On the legal foundation for the trials of Christians, see Mommsen,\n_Der Religionsfreuel nach r\u00f6mischem Recht_ (_Ges. Schr._ iii. p.\n389).\u2014Mommsen goes too far, I think, in supposing a legal foundation for\nthe trials of Christians; above all, I do not believe that the defection\nfrom the Roman religion was ever considered as maiestas in the technical\nsense of the word, the more so as it is certain that, after the earliest\nperiod, no difference was made in the treatment of citizens and aliens.\n\nP. 13. Lists of atheists: Cicero, _de nat. deor._ 1. 1, 2 (comp. 1. 23,\n26). Sext. Emp. _hypotyp._ 3. 213; _adv. math._ 9. 50. Aelian, _v.h._ 2.\n31; _de nat. an._ 6. 40.\u2014The predicate _atheos_ is once applied to\nAnaxagoras by a Christian author (Irenaeus: see Diels, _Vorsokr._ 46, A\n113; compare also Marcellinus, _vit. Thuc._, see below, note on p. 29). Of\nsuch isolated cases I have taken no account.\n\nP. 16. On the dualism in the Greek conception of the nature of gods see\nN\u00e4gelsbach, _Hom. Theol._ p. 11.\u2014Pindar: _Ol._ 1. 28, 9. 35; _Pyth._ 3.\n27.\n\nP. 17. Xenophanes: Einhorn, _Zeit- und Streitfragen der modernen\nXenophanesforschung_ (_Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos._ xxxi.).\n\nP. 18. Xenophanes\u2019s age: Diels, _Vorsokr._ 11, B 8.\u2014His criticism of Homer\nand Hesiod: _ibid._ 11, 12.\u2014Titans and Giants: _ibid._ 1. 22.\u2014Criticism of\nAnthropomorphism: _ibid._ 14-16.\u2014Divination: Cic. _de div._ 1. 3, 5.\n\nP. 19. On Xenophanes\u2019s conception of God, comp. _Vorsokr._ 11, B 23-26; on\nthe identification of God with the universe: _Vorsokr._ 11, A 30, 31,\n33-36.\u2014Cicero: _de div._ 1. 3, 5.\n\nP. 21. For Xenophanes\u2019s theology, comp. Freudenthal, _Arch. f. Gesch. d.\nPhilos._ i. p. 322, and Zeller\u2019s criticism, _ibid._ p. 524. Agreeing with\nFreudenthal: Decharme, p. 46; Campbell, _Religion in Greek Literature_, p.\n293.\n\nP. 21. Parmenides does not even appear to have designated his \u201cBeing\u201d as\nGod (Zeller, i. p. 563).\n\nP. 23. In the eighteenth century people discussed diffusely the question\nwhether Thales was an atheist (of course in the sense in which the word\nwas taken at that time); comp. Tennemann, _Gesch. d. Philos._ i. pp. 62\nand 422. Tennemann remarks quite truly that the question is put wrongly.\n\nP. 24. Thales: Diels, _Vorsokr._ 1, A 22-23.\u2014Attitude of Democritus\ntowards popular belief: _Vorsokr._ 55, A 74-79; comp. 116, 117; B 166, and\nalso B 30. Diels, _Ueber den D\u00e4monenglauben des D._ (_Arch. f. Gesch. d.\nPhilos._ 1894, p. 154).\n\nP. 25. Trial of Anaxagoras: _Vorsokr._ 46, A 1, 17, 18, 19.\n\nP. 26. Ram\u2019s head: _Vorsokr._ 46, A 16.\n\nP. 27. Geffcken (in _Hermes_, 42, p. 127) has tried to make out something\nabout a criticism of popular belief by Anaxagoras from some passages in\nAristophanes (_Nub._ 398) and Lucian (_Tim._ 10, etc.), but I do not think\nhe has succeeded.\u2014Pericles a free-thinker: Plut. _Pericl._ 6 and 38; comp.\nDecharme, p. 160.\u2014Personality of Anaxagoras: _Vorsokr._ 46, A 30\n(Aristotle, _Eud. Ethics_, A 4, p. 1215_b_, 6).\n\nP. 28. Herodotus: 8, 77.\u2014Sophocles: _Oed. rex._ 498, 863.\u2014Diopeithes:\nPlut. _Pericl._ 32 (_Vorsokr._ 46, A 17).\u2014Thucydides: Classen in the\npreface to his 3rd ed., p. lvii.\n\nP. 29. Thucydides, a disciple of Anaxagoras: Marcellinus, _vit. Thuc._\n22.\u2014Generally Thucydides is thought to have been more conservative in his\nreligious opinions than I consider probable; see Classen, _loc. cit._;\nDecharme, p. 83; Gertz in his preface to the Danish translation of\nThucydides, p. xxvii.\u2014Hippo: _Vorsokr._ 26, A 4, 6, 8, 9; B 2, 3.\n\nP. 30. Aristotle: _Vorsokr._ 26, A 7.\u2014Diogenes an atheist: Aelian, _v.h._\n2, 31.\u2014The air his god: _Vorsokr._ 51, A 8 (he thought that Homer\nidentified Zeus with the air, and approved of this as \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03c5\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1ff6\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd); B 5, 7, 8.\u2014Allusions to his doctrines by Aristophanes:\n_Nub._ 225, 828 (_Vorsokr._ 51, C 1, 2).\n\nP. 31. A chief representative of the na\u00efvely critical view of natural\nphenomena is for us Herodotus. The _locus classicus_ is vii. 129; comp.\nGomperz, _Griech. Denker_, i. p. 208; Heiberg, _Festskrift til Ussing_\n(Copenhagen, 1900), p. 91; Decharme, p. 69.\u2014Principal passages about\nDiagoras: Sext. Emp. _adv. math._ 9, 53; Suidas, art. _Diagoras II._;\nschol. Aristoph. _Nub._ 830 (the legend); Suidas, art. _Diagoras I._;\nAristoph. _Av._ 1071 with schol.; schol. Aristoph. _Ran._ 320; [Lysias]\nvi. 17; Diod. xiii. 16 (the decree); Philodem. _de piet._ p. 89 Gomp.\n(comments of Aristoxenus); Aelian, _v.h._ ii. 22 (legislation at\nMantinea).\u2014Wilamowitz (_Textgesch. d. Lyr._ p. 80) has tried to save the\ntradition by supposing that the _acme_ of Diagoras has been put too early.\nComp. also his remarks, _Griech. Verskunst._ p. 426, where he has taken up\nthe question again with reference to my treatment of it. As he has now\nconceded the possibility of referring the legislation to the earlier date,\nthe difference between us is really very slight, and it is of course\npossible, perhaps even probable, that the acme of the poet has been\nantedated.\u2014Aristoph. _Av._ 1071: \u201cOn this very day it is made public, that\nif one of you kills Diagoras from Melos, he shall have a talent, and if\none kills one of the dead tyrants, he shall have a talent.\u201d The parallel\nbetween the two decrees, of which the latter is of course an invention of\nAristophanes, would be without point if the decree against Diagoras was\nnot as futile as the decree against the tyrants (_i.e._ the sons of\nPeisistratus, who had been dead some three-quarters of a century), that\nis, if it did not come many years too late.\u2014Wilamowitz (_Griech.\nVerskunst, loc. cit._) takes the sense to be: \u201cYou will not get hold of\nDiagoras any more than you did of the tyrants.\u201d But this, besides being\nsomewhat pointless, does not agree so well as my explanation with the\nintroductory words: \u201cOn this very day.\u201d On the other hand, I never meant\nto imply that Diagoras was dead in 415, but only that his offence was an\nold one\u2014just as that of Protagoras probably was (see p. 39).\n\nP. 39. Trial of Protagoras: _Vorsokr._ 74, A 1-4, 23; the passage\nreferring to the gods: _ibid._ B 4.\u2014Plato: _Theaet._ p. 162_d_ (_Vorsokr._\n74, A 23).\n\nP. 41. Distinction between belief and knowledge by Protagoras: Gomperz,\n_Griech. Denker_, i. p. 359.\n\nP. 42. Prodicus: _Vorsokr._ 77, B 5. Comp. Norvin, _Allegorien i den\ngr\u00e6ske Philosophi_ (_Edda_, 1919), p. 82. I cannot, however, quite adopt\nNorvin\u2019s view of the theory of Protagoras.\n\nP. 44. Critias: _Vorsokr._ 81, B 25.\u2014W. Nestle, _Jahrbb. f. Philol._ xi.\n(1903), pp. 81 and 178, gives an exhaustive treatment of the subject, but\nI cannot share his view of it.\n\nP. 46. Euripides: _Suppl._ 201.\u2014Moschion: _Trag. Fragm._ ed. Nauck (2nd\ned.), p. 813.\u2014Plato: _Rep._ ii. 369b.\n\nP. 47. Democritus: Reinhardt in _Hermes_, xlvii (1912), p. 503 In spite of\nWilamowitz\u2019s objections (in his _Platon_, ii. p. 214), I still consider it\nprobable that Plato alludes to a philosophical theory.\u2014Protagoras on the\noriginal state: _Vorsokr._ 74, B 8_b_.\n\nP. 48. Euripides: _Electra, 737_ (Euripides does not believe in the tale\nthat the sun reversed its course on account of Thyestes\u2019s fraud against\nAtreus, and then adds: \u201cFables that terrify men are a profit to the\nworship of the gods\u201d).\u2014Aristotle: _Metaph._ A 8, 1074_b_; see text, p.\n85.\u2014Polybius: vi. 56; see text pp. 90 and 114.\u2014Plato\u2019s _Gorgias_, p. 482\nand foll.\n\nP. 49.\u2014Callicles: see _e.g._ Wilamowitz, _Platon_, i. p. 208.\n\nP. 50.\u2014Thrasymachus: Plato, _Rep._ i. pp. 338_c_, 343_a_; comp. also ii.\np. 358_b_. His remark on Providence (_Vorsokr._ 78, B 8) runs thus: \u201cThe\ngods do not see the things that are done among men; if they did, they\nwould not overlook the greatest human good, justice. For we find that men\ndo not follow it.\u201d Comp. text, p. 61.\u2014Diagoras as Critias\u2019s source:\nNestle, _Jahrbb._, 1903, p. 101.\n\nP. 51. Euripides: see W. Nestle, _Euripides_ (Stuttgart, 1901) pp. 51-152.\nHere, too, the material is set forth exhaustively; the results seem to me\ninadmissible. Browning\u2019s theory (_The Ring and the Book_, x. 1661 foll.)\nthat Euripides did believe in the existence of the gods, but did not\nbelieve them to be perfect, is a possible, perhaps even a probable,\nexplanation of many of his utterances; but it will hardly fit all of them.\nI have examined the question in an essay, \u201cBrowning om Euripides\u201d in my\n_Udvalgte Afhandlinger_, p. 55.\n\nP. 52. Gods identified with the Elements: _Bacch._ 274; fragm. 839. 877,\n941 (Nestle, p. 153).\n\nP. 53. Polemic against sophists: Nestle, p. 206.\u2014_Bellerophon_: fragm.\n286.\n\nP. 54. \u201cIf the gods\u2014\u2014\u201d: fragm. 292, 7.\n\nP. 55. _Melanippe_: fragm. 480. The words are said to have given offence\nat the rehearsal, so that Euripides altered them at the production of the\nplay (Plut. _Amat._ ch. 13).\u2014Aeschylus: _Agam._ 160.\u2014Aristophanes:\n_Thesmoph._ 450.\u2014In the _Frogs_, 892, Euripides prays to the Ether and\nother abstractions, not to the gods.\u2014_Clouds_: 1371.\n\nP. 56. Plato: _Republ._ viii. p. 568a.\u2014Quotation from _Melanippe_: Plut.\n_Amat._ 13.\n\nP. 57. Aristophanes and Naturalism: see note to p. 30.\n\nP. 58. Denial of the gods in the _Clouds_, 247, 367, 380, 423, 627, 817,\n825, 1232.\u2014Moral of the piece: 1452-1510.\u2014In Aristophanes\u2019s own travesties\nof the gods, scholars have found evidence for a weakening of popular\nbelief, but this is certainly wrong; comp. Decharme, p. 109.\u2014Words like\n\u201cbelieve\u201d and \u201cbelief\u201d do not cover the Greek word \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, which\nsignifies at once \u201cbelieve\u201d and \u201cbe in the habit,\u201d \u201cuse habitually,\u201d so\nthat it covers both belief and worship\u2014an ambiguity that is characteristic\nof Greek religion.\u2014Xenophon: _Memorab._ i. 1; _Apol. Socr._ 10 and foll.\n\nP. 59. Plato: _Apol._ p. 24_b_ (the indictment); 26_b_ (the refutation).\n\nP. 60. Aristodemus: Xenoph. _Memor._ i. 4.\u2014Cinesias: Decharme, p. 135.\u2014The\nHermocopidae: Decharme, p. 152. Beloch, _Hist. of Greece_, ii. 1, p. 360,\nhas another explanation. To my argument it is of no consequence what\nspecial motive is assigned for the crime, as long as it is a political\none.\n\nP. 61. Plato on impiety: _Laws_, x. p. 886b; comp. xii. p. 967_a_.\nCuriously enough, the same tripartition of the wrong attitude towards the\ngods occurs already in the _Republic_, ii. p. 365_d_, where it is\nintroduced incidentally as well known and a matter of course.\n\nP. 62. Euripides: _e.g._ _Hecuba_, 488; _Suppl._ 608.\u2014Reference to\nAnaxagoras: _Laws_, x. p. 886_d_; to Sophistic, 889_b_.\n\nP. 65. Plato in the _Apology_: p. 19_c_.\u2014Socrates\u2019s _daimonion_ a proof of\n_asebeia_: Xenoph. _Memorab._ i. 1, 2; _Apol_. _Socr._ 12; Plato, _Apol._\np. 31_d_.\n\nP. 66. Accusation of teaching the doctrine of Anaxagoras: Plato, _Apol._\np. 26_d_; comp. Xenoph. _Memor._ i. 1, 10.\u2014Plato\u2019s defence of Socrates:\n_Apol._ p. 27_a_.\n\nP. 67. Xenophon\u2019s defence of Socrates: _Memor._ i. 1, 2; 6 foll., 10\nfoll.\u2014Teleological view of nature: Xenoph. _Memor._ i. 4; iv. 3.\u2014On the\nreligious standpoint of Socrates, comp. my _Udvalgte Afhandlinger_, p. 38.\n\nP. 68. Plato\u2019s _Apology_, p. 21_d_, 23_a_ and _f_, etc.\u2014The gods\nall-knowing: _Odyss._ iv. 379 and 468; comp. N\u00e4gelsbach, _Hom. Theol._ p.\n18; _Nachhom. Theol._ p. 23.\n\nP. 69. The gods just: N\u00e4gelsbach, _Hom. Theol._ p. 297; _Nachhom. Theol._\np. 27.\n\nP. 71. The relation between early religious thought and Delphi has been\nexplained correctly by Sam Wide, _Einleit. in die Altertumswissensch._,\nii. p. 221; comp. also I. L. Heiberg in _Tilskueren_, 1919, ii. p.\n44.\u2014Honours shown to Pindar at Delphi: schol. Pind. ed. Drachm. i. p. 2,\n14; 5, 6. Pausan, x. 24. 5.\n\nP. 72. Plato on the Delphic Oracle: _Apol._ p. 20_e_. On the following\ncomp. I. L. Heiberg, _loc. cit._ p. 45.\u2014Socrates on his _daimonion_:\nPlato, _Apol._ p. 31_c_.\n\nP. 74. Antisthenes: Ritter, _Hist. philos. Gr.__9_ 285.\u2014On the later\nCynics, especially Diogenes, see Diog. Laert. vi. 105 (the gods are in\nneed of nothing); Julian, _Or._ vi. p. 199_b_ (Diogenes did not worship\nthe gods).\n\nP. 75. Cyrenaics: Diog. Laert. ii. 91.\u2014Date of Theodorus: Diog. Laert. ii.\n101, 103; his book on the gods: Diog. Laert. ii. 97, Sext. Emp. _adv.\nmath._ ix. 55; his trial: Diog. Laert. ii. 101.\n\nP. 76. Theodorus\u2019s book used by Epicurus: Diog. Laert. ii. 97.\u2014Zeller:\n_Philos. d. Griechen_, ii. 1, p. 925.\u2014Euthyphron: see especially p. 14_b_\nfoll.\n\nP. 77. Criticism of Mythology in the _Republic_: ii. p. 377_b_ foll.;\nworship presupposed: _e.g._ iii. p. 415_e_; v. p. 459_e_, 461_a_, 468_d_,\n469_a_, 470_a_; vii. p. 540_b_; reference to the Oracle: iv. p.\n427_b_.\u2014_Timaeus_: p. 40_d_ foll.\u2014_Laws_, rules of worship: vi. p. 759_a_,\nvii. p. 967_a_ and elsewhere, x. p. 909_d_; capital punishment for\natheists: x. p. 909_a_. Comp. above, on p. 61.\n\nP. 78. Atheism a sin of youth: _Laws_, x. p. 888_a_.\u2014Goodness and truth of\nthe gods: _Republ._ ii. p. 379_a_, 380_d_, 382_a_.\u2014Belief in Providence:\n_Laws_, x. p. 885_c_, etc.; _Republ._ x. p. 612_e_; _Apol._ p. 41_d_.\n\nP. 79. _Laws_, x. p. 888_d_, 893_b_ foll., especially 899_c-d_; comp. also\nxii. p. 967_a-c._\u2014_Timaeus_: p. 40_d-f_. Comp. _Laws_, xii. p. 948_b_.\n\nP. 80. The gods in the _Republic_, ii. p. 380_d_. This passage, taken\ntogether with Plato\u2019s general treatment of popular belief, might lead to\nthe hypothesis that it was Plato\u2019s doctrine of ideas rather than the\nrationalism of his youth that brought about strained relations between his\nthought and popular belief. I incline to think that such is the case; but\nthere is a long step even from such a state of things to downright\natheism, and the stress Plato always laid on the belief in Providence is a\nstrong argument in favour of his belief in the gods, for he could never\nmake his ideas act in the capacity of Providence.\u2014The gods as creators of\nmankind: _Timaeus_, p. 41_a_ foll.\n\nP. 81. Xenocrates: the exposition of his doctrine given in the text is\nbased upon Heinze\u2019s _Xenokrates_ (Leipzig, 1892).\n\nP. 83. Trial of Aristotle: Diog. Laert. v. 5; Athen. xv. p. 696.\u2014The\nwritings of Aristotle that have come down to us are almost all of them\ncompositions for the use of his disciples, and were not accessible to the\ngeneral public during his lifetime.\n\nP. 84. On the religious views of Aristotle see in general Zeller, ii. 2,\np. 787 (Engl. transl. ii. p. 325); where the references to his writings\nare given in full. In the following I indicate only a few passages of\nspecial interest.\u2014Discussion of worship precluded: _Top._ A, xi. p.\n105_a_, 5.\u2014Aristotle\u2019s Will: _Diog_. Laert. v. 15.\u2014The gods as determining\nthe limits of the human: _e.g._ _Nic. Eth._ K, viii. p. 1178b, 33: \u201c(the\nwise) will also be in need of outward prosperity, as he is (only) a\nman.\u201d\u2014Reservations in speaking of the gods, _e.g._ _Nic. Eth._ K, ix. p.\n1179_a_, 13: \u201che who is active in accordance with reason ... must also be\nsupposed to be the most beloved of the gods; for if the gods trouble\nthemselves about human affairs\u2014_and that they do so is generally taken for\ngranted_\u2014it must be probable that they take pleasure in what is best and\nmost nearly related to themselves (_and that must be the reason_), and\nthat they reward those who love and honour this most highly,\u201d etc. The\npassage is typical both of the hypothetical way of speaking, and of the\ntwist in the direction of Aristotle\u2019s own conception of the deity (whose\nessence is reason); also of the Socratic manner of dealing with the gods.\n\nP. 85. The passage quoted is from the _Metaphysics_, A viii. p. 1074_a_,\n38. Comp. _Metaph._ B, ii. p. 997_b_, 8; iv. p. 1000_a_, 9.\n\nP. 86. Theophrastus: Diog. Laert. v. 37.\n\nP. 87. Strato: Diels, _Ueber das physikal. System des S., Sitzungsber. d.\nBerl. Akad._, 1893, p. 101.\u2014His god the same as nature: _Cic. de nat.\ndeor._ i. 35.\n\nP. 89. On the history of Hellenistic religion, see Wendland, _Die\nhellenistisch-r\u00f6mische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen z. Judentum u.\nChristentum_ (T\u00fcbingen, 1907).\n\nP. 90. The passage quoted is Polyb. vi. 56, 6.\n\nP. 92. On the Tyche-Religion, see N\u00e4gelsbach, _Nachhom. Theologie_, p.\n153; Lehrs, _Popul\u00e4re Aufs\u00e4tze_, p. 153; Rohde, _Griech. Roman_, p. 267\n(1st ed.); Wendland, p. 59.\u2014Thucydides: see Classen in the introduction to\nhis (3rd) edition, pp. lvii-lix, where all the material is collected. A\nconclusive passage is vii. 36, 6, where Thuc. makes the bigoted Nicias\nbefore a decisive battle express the hope that \u201cFortune\u201d will favour the\nAthenians.\u2014Demosthenes\u2019s dream: _Aeschin._ iii. 77.\u2014Demosthenes on Tyche:\n_Olynth._ ii. 22; _de cor._ 252.\n\nP. 93. Demosthenes and the Pythia: _Aesch._ iii. 130. Comp. _ibid._ 68,\n131, 152; Plutarch, _Dem._ 20.\u2014Demetrius of Phalerum: Polyb. xxix.\n21.\u2014Temples of Tyche: Roscher, _Mythol. Lex._, art. _Fortuna_.\n\nP. 94. Tyche mistress of the gods: _Trag. adesp. fragm._ 506, Nauck; [Dio\nChrys.] lxiv. p. 331 R.\u2014Polybius: i. 1; iii. 5, 7.\u2014The reservations\nagainst Tyche as a principle for the explaining of historical facts, and\nthe twisting of the notion in the direction of Providence found in certain\npassages in Polybius, do not concern us here; they are probably due to the\nStoic influence he underwent during his stay at Rome. Comp. below, on p.\n114, and see Cuntz, _Polybios_ (Leipzig, 1902), p. 43.\u2014Pliny: ii. 22 foll.\n\nP. 95. Tyche in the novels: Rohde, _Griech. Rom._ p. 280.\n\nP. 97. Strabo: xvii. p. 813.\u2014Plutarch: _de def. or._ 5 and 7.\n\nP. 98. The Aetolians at Dium: Polyb. iv. 62; at Dodona, iv. 67; Philip at\nThermon, v. 9; Dicaearchus, xviii. 54.\u2014Decay of Roman worship: Wissowa,\n_Religion u. Kultus d. R\u00f6mer_, p. 70 (2nd ed.). To this work I must refer\nfor indications of the sources; but the polemic in the text is chiefly\ndirected against Wissowa.\n\nP. 99. Ennius: comp. below, p. 112.\n\nP. 100. Varro: in Augustine, _de civ. Dei_, vi. 2.\n\nP. 103. Theology of the Stoics: Zeller, iii. 1, p. 309-45.\n\nP. 104. Demonology of the Stoics: Heinze, _Xenokrates_, p. 96.\n\nP. 105. Epicurus\u2019s theology: Zeller, iii. 1, pp. 427-38. Comp. Schwartz,\n_Charakterk\u00f6pfe_, ii. p. 43.\n\nP. 106. Epicurus\u2019s doctrine of the eternity of the gods criticised: Cic.\n_de nat. deor._ i. 68 foll.\n\nP. 107. The Sceptics: Zeller, iii. 1, pp. 507 and 521.\n\nP. 109. Diogenes: see note on p. 74.\u2014Bion: Diog. Laert. iv. 52 and 54.\n\nP. 110. Menippos: R. Helm, _Lukian u. Menipp_ (Leipzig and Berlin, 1906).\n\nP. 111. Euhemerus: Jacoby in Pauly-Wissowa\u2019s _Realencyclop._, art.\n\u201cEuemeros\u201d; Wendland, _Hellenist. Kultur_, p. 70.\u2014Euhemerism before\nEuhemerus: Lobeck, _Aglaophamus_, p. 9; Wendland, p. 67.\n\nP. 112. A Danish scholar, Dr. J. P. Jacobsen (_Afhandlinger og Artikler_,\np. 490), seems to think that Euhemerus\u2019s theory was influenced by the\nworship of heroes. But there is nothing to show that Euhemerus supposed\nhis gods to have continued their existence after their death, though this\nwould have been in accordance with Greek belief even in the Hellenistic\nperiod; he seems rather to have insisted that they were worshipped as gods\nduring their lifetime (comp. Jacoby, _loc. cit._).\n\nP. 114. Euhemerism in Polybius: xxxiv. 2; comp. x. 10, 11.\u2014Relapse into\northodoxy: xxxvii. 9 (the decisive passage); xxxix. 19, 2 (concluding\nprayer to the gods); xviii. 54, 7-10; xxiii. 10, 14 (the gods punish\nimpiety; comp. xxxvii. 9, 16). There is a marked contrast between such\npassages and the way Polybius speaks of Philip\u2019s destruction of the\nsanctuary at Thermon; he blames it severely, but merely on political, not\non religious grounds (v. 9-12). Orthodox utterances in the older portions\nof the work (i. 84, 10; x. 2, 7) may be due to that accommodation to\npopular belief which Polybius himself acknowledges as justifiable (xvi.\n12, 9), but also to later revision.\u2014Influence of Stoicism: Hirzel,\n_Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philos. Schriften_, ii. p. 841.\n\nP. 115. Cicero\u2019s Stoicism in his philosophy of religion: _de nat. deor._\niii. 40, 95.\n\nP. 116. Sanctuary to Tullia: Cic. _ad Att._ xii. 18 foll.; several of the\nletters (23, 25, 35, 36) show that Atticus disapproved of the idea, and\nthat Cicero himself was conscious that it was unworthy of him.\n\nP. 117. Euhemeristic defence: _fragm. consol._ 14, 15.\u2014Augustus\u2019s\nreorganisation of the cults: Wissowa, _Religion u. Kultus d. R\u00f6mer_, p.\n73. Recent scholars, especially when treating of Virgil (Heinze, _Vergils\nep. Technik_, 3rd ed. p. 291; Norden, _Aeneis_, vi. 2nd ed. pp. 314, 318,\n362), speak of the reform of Augustus as if it involved a real revulsion\nof feeling in his contemporaries. This is in my opinion a complete\nmisunderstanding of the facts. Virgil\u2019s religious views: _Catal. v.,\nGeorgics_, ii. 458.\n\nP. 118. Pliny: _hist. nat._ ii. 1-27. The passages translated are \u00a7\u00a7 14\nand 27.\n\nP. 122. Seneca: fragm. 31-39, Haase.\u2014Stoic polemic against atheism:\nEpictetus, _diss._ ii. 20, 21; comp. Marcus Aurelius, vi. 44.\u2014Later\nCynicism: Zeller, iii. 1, p. 763.\u2014Oenomaus: only preserved in excerpts by\nEuseb. _praep. evang._ 5-6 (a separate edition is wanted).\u2014His polemic\ndirected against the priests: Euseb. 5, p. 213_c_; comp. Oenomaus himself,\n_ibid._ 6, p. 256_d_.\n\nP. 123. Lucian: see Christ, _Gesch. d. griech. Litt._ ii. 2, p. 550 (5th\ned.), and R. Helm, _Lukian u. Menipp_ (see note to p. 110).\n\nP. 124. Timon: ch. x.\n\nP. 126. On Lucian\u2019s caution in attacking the really popular gods, see\nWilamowitz, in _Kultur d. Gegenwart_, i. 8, p. 248.\u2014The Jews atheists:\nHarnack, _Der Vorwurf d. Atheismus in den 3 ersten Jahrh_. (_Texte u.\nUnters._, N.F., xiii. 4), p. 3.\n\nP. 127. I have met with no comprehensive treatment of Jewish and Christian\npolemic against Paganism; Geffcken, _Zwei griech. Apologeten_ (Leipzig,\n1907), is chiefly concerned with investigations into the sources. I shall\ntherefore indicate the principal passages on which my treatment is\nbased.\u2014Polemic against images in the Old Testament: Isaiah 44.10 etc.; in\nlater literature: Epistle of Jeremiah; Wisdom of Solomon 13 foll.; Philo,\n_de decal._ 65 foll., etc.\u2014Euhemerism: Wisdom of Solomon 14.15; Epistle of\nAristeas, 135; Sibyll. iii. 547, 554, 723.\u2014Elements and celestial bodies:\nWisdom of Solomon 13; Philo, _de decal._ 52 foll.\u2014The tenacity of\ntradition is apparent from the fact that even Maimonides in his treatise\nof idolatry deals only with star-worship and image-worship. I know the\ntreatise only from the Latin translation by D. Voss (in G. I. Voss\u2019s\n_Opera_, vol. v.).\u2014Demons: Deuteron. 32.17; Psalms 106.37; add (according\nto LXX.) Isaiah 65.11; Psalms 96.5. Later writers: Enoch 19.99, 7; Baruch\n4.7. Such passages as Jub. 22, 17 or Sibyll. prooem. 22 are possibly\nEuhemeristic.\u2014Fallen angels: Enoch, 19.\u2014Philo\u2019s demonology: _de gig._\n6-18, etc.\n\nP. 128. St. Paul: 1 Cor. 10.20; comp. 8.4 and Rom. 1.23.\n\nP. 129. Image-worship and demon-worship not conciliated: _e.g._ Tertull.\n_Apologet._ 10-15 and 22-23, comp. 27.\u2014Jewish demonology: Bousset,\n_Religion d. Judentums_, p. 326 (1st ed.).\u2014Fallen angels: _e.g._ Athenag.\n24 foll.; Augustine, _Enchir._ 9, 28 foll.; _de civ. Dei_, viii. 22.\n\nP. 130. Euhemerism in the Apologists: _e.g._ Augustine, _de civ. Dei_, ii.\n10; vi. 7; vii. 18 and 33; viii. 26.\u2014Euhemerism and demonology combined:\n_e.g._ Augustine, _de civ. Dei_, ii. 10; vii. 35; comp. vii. 28\nfin.\u2014Worship of the heavenly bodies: _e.g._ Aristid. 3 foll.; Augustine,\n_de civ. Dei_, vii. 29 foll.\n\nP. 131. Paganism a delusion caused by demons: Thomas Aq. _Summa theol._ P.\nii. 2, Q. 94, art. 4; comp. below, note on p. 135.\n\nP. 133. For the following sketch I have found valuable material in\nGedike\u2019s essay, _Ueber die mannigfaltigen Hypothesen z. Erkl\u00e4rung d.\nMythologie_ (_Verm. Schriften_, Berlin, 1801, p. 61).\n\nP. 134. Milton: _Paradise Lost_, i. 506. The theory that the pagan oracles\nfell mute at the rise of Christianity is also found in Milton, _Hymn on\nthe Morning of Christ\u2019s Nativity_, st. xviii. foll.\n\nP. 135. G. I. Voss; _De Theologia Gentili_, lib. i. (published,\n1642)\u2014Voss\u2019s view is in the main that idolatry as a whole is the work of\nthe Devil. What is worshipped is partly the heavenly bodies, partly\ndemons, partly (and principally) dead men; most of the ancient gods are\nidentified with persons from the Old Testament. Demon-worship is dealt\nwith in ch. 6; it is proved among other things by the true predictions of\nthe oracles. Individual Greek deities are identified with demons in ch. 7,\nin a context where oracles are dealt with. On older works of the same\ntendency, see below, note on p. 140; on Natalis Comes, _ibid._ A fuller\ntreatment of Voss\u2019s theories is found in Gruppe\u2019s work, \u00a7 25.\u2014Thomas\nAquinas: _Summa theol._ P. ii. 2, Q. 94, art. 4; comp. also Q. 122, art.\n2.\u2014Dante: Sommo Giove for God, _Purg._ vi. 118; his devils: Charon, _Inf._\niii. 82 (109 expressly designated as \u201cdimonio\u201d); Minos, _Inf._ v. 4;\nGeryon, _Inf._ xviii. (there are more of the same kind).\u2014\u201cDei falsi e\nbugiardi\u201d: _Inf._ i. 72. (Plutus, who appears as a devil in _Inf._ vii.\nwas probably taken by Dante for an antique god; but the name may also be a\nclassicising translation of Mammon.)\n\nP. 136. Mediaeval epic poets: Nyrop, _Den oldfranske Heltedigtning_, p.\n255 and 260; Dernedde, _Ueber die den altfranz\u00f6s. Dichtern bekannten\nStoffe aus dem Altertum_ (Diss. G\u00f6tting. 1887).\u2014Confusion of ancient and\nChristian elements: Dernedde, p. 10; the gods are devils: Dernedde, pp.\n85, 88.\u2014Euhemerism: Dernedde, p. 4.\u2014I have tried to get a first-hand\nimpression of the way the gods are treated by the old French epic poets,\nbut the material is too large, and indexes suited to the purpose are\nwanting. The paganism of the original is taken over na\u00efvely, _e.g._, by\nVeldeke, _Eneidt_, i. 45, 169.\u2014On magic I have consulted Horst\u2019s\n_D\u00e4monomagie_ (Frankf. 1818); and his _Zauber-Bibliothek_ (Mainz,\n1821-26); Schindler, _Der Aberglaube des Mittelalters_ (Breslau, 1858);\nMaury, _La magie et l\u2019astrologie dans l\u2019antiquit\u00e9 et au moyen \u00e2ge_ (Paris,\n1860). These authors all agree that mediaeval magic is dependent on\nantiquity, but that the pagan gods are superseded by devils (or the\nDevil). The connexion in substance with antiquity, on which Maury\nspecially insists, is certain enough, but does not concern us here, where\nthe question is about the theory. In the _Zauber-Bibl._ i. p. 137 (in the\ntreatise _Pneumatologia vera et occulta_), the snake Python is put down\namong the demons, with the remark that Apollo was called after it.\u2014Magic\nformulae with antique gods: Heim, _Incantamenta magica_ (in the _Neue\nJahrbb. f. Philologie_, Suppl. xix. 1893, p. 557; I owe this reference to\nthe kindness of my colleague, Prof. Groenbeck). Pradel, _Religionsgesch.\nVers. u. __ Vorarb._ iii., has collected prayers and magic formulae from\nItaly and Greece; they do not contain names of antique gods.\n\nP. 137. Acosta: Joseph de Acosta, _Historia naturale e morale delle\nIndie_, Venice, 1596. I have used this Italian translation; the original\nwork appeared in 1590.\u2014Demons at work in oracles: bk. v. ch. 9; in magic:\nch. 25.\n\nP. 138. Demon in Brazil: Voss, _Theol. Gent._ i. ch. 8.\u2014Pagan worship in\nthe Florentine and Roman Academies: Voigt, _Wiederbelebung d. klass.\nAltertums_, ii. p. 239 (2nd ed.); Hettner, _Ital. Studien_, p. 174.\u2014On the\nconception of the antique gods in the earlier Middle Ages, see Gruppe, \u00a7\n4.\u2014Thomas Aquinas: _Summa theol._ P. ii. 2, Q. 94, art. 4.\u2014Curious and\ntypical of the mediaeval way of reasoning is the idea of seeking\nprototypes of the Christian history of salvation in pagan mythology. See\nv. Eicken, _Gesch. u. System d. mittelalt. Weltanschauung_ (Stuttg. 1887),\np. 648, and (with more detail) F. Piper, _Mythologie u. Symbolik d.\nchristl. Kunst_ (Weimar, 1847-51), i. p. 143; comp. also Gruppe, \u00a7 8 foll.\nGood instances are the myths in the _Speculum humanae salvationis_, chs. 3\nand 24.\n\nP. 139. On Hebraism in general, see Gruppe, \u00a7 19 and \u00a7 24 foll.; on Huet,\n\u00a7 28. Nevertheless, Huet operates with demonology in connexion with the\noracles (_Dem. evang._ ii. 9, 34, 4).\n\nP. 140. On Natalis Comes, see Gruppe, \u00a7 19. In bk. i. ch. 7, Natalis Comes\ngives an account of the origin of antiquity\u2019s conceptions of the gods; it\nhas quite a naturalistic turn. Nevertheless, we find in ch. 16 a remark\nwhich shows that he embraced demonology in its crudest form; compare also\nthe theory set forth in ch. 10. His interpretations of myths are collected\nin bk. x.\u2014On Bacon, see Gruppe, \u00a7 22. Typhoeus-myth: introduct. to _De\nsapientia veterum._\u2014Alchemistic interpretations: Gedike, _Verm.\nSchriften_, p. 78; Gruppe, \u00a7 30. Of the works quoted by Gedike, I have\nconsulted Faber\u2019s _Panchymicum_ (Frankf. 1651) and Toll\u2019s Fortuita\n(Amsterd. 1687). Faber has only some remarks on the matter in bk. i. ch.\n5; by Toll the alchemistic interpretation is carried through. Gedike\nquotes, moreover, a work by Suarez de Salazar, which must date from the\nsixteenth century; according to J\u00f6cher (iv. 1913) it only exists in MS.,\nand I do not know where Gedike got his reference.\u2014Thomas: _Summa_, P. ii.\n2, Q. 172, arts. 5 and 6.\n\nP. 141. Demonology as explanation of the oracles: see van Dale, _De\noraculis_, p. 430 (Amsterd. 1700); he quotes numerous treatises from the\nsixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I have glanced at Moebius, _De\noraculorum ethnicorum origine_, etc. (Leipzig, 1656).\u2014Caelius Rhodiginus:\n_Lectionum antiq._ (Leyden, 1516), lib. ii. cap. 12; comp. Gruppe, \u00a7\n15.\u2014Caelius Calcagninus: _Oraculorum liber_ (in his _Opera_, Basle, 1544,\np. 640). The little dialogue is not very easy to understand; it is\nevidently a satire on contemporary credulity; but that Caelius completely\nrejected divination seems to be assumed also by G. I. Voss, _Theol. Gent._\ni. 6.\u2014Machiavelli: _Discorsi_, i. 56.\u2014Van Dale: _De oraculis gentilium_\n(1st ed. Amsterd. 1683); _De idololatria_ (Amsterd. 1696). Difficulties\nwith the biblical accounts of demons: _De idol._, dedication.\u2014Fontenelle:\n_Histoire des oracles_ (Paris, 1687). The little book has an amusing\npreface, in which Fontenelle with na\u00efve complacency (and with a sharp eye\nfor van Dale\u2019s deficiencies of style) gives an account of his\npopularisation of the learned work. On Fontenelle and the answer by the\nJesuit, Balthus, see for further details Banier, _La mythologie et les\nfables expliqu\u00e9es par l\u2019histoire_ (Paris, 1738), bk. iii. ch. 1. Van\nDale\u2019s book itself had called forth an answer by Moebius (included in the\nedition of 1690 of his work, _de orac. ethn. orig._).\u2014On the influence\nexercised by van Dale and Fontenelle on the succeeding mythologists, see\nGruppe, \u00a7 34.\u2014Banier: see Gruppe, \u00a7 35.\n\nP. 143. Vico: _Scienza nuova_ (Milan, 1853), p. 168 (bk. ii. in the\nsection, Della metafisica poetica); political allegories, _e.g._ p. 309\n(in the Canone mitologico). Comp. Gruppe, \u00a7 44.\u2014Banier: in the work\nindicated above, bk. i. ch. 5.\n\nP. 144. On the mythological theories of the eighteenth century, comp.\nGruppe, \u00a7 36 foll.; on Bryant, \u00a7 40; on Dupuis, \u00a7 41.\u2014Polemic against\nEuhemerism from the standpoint of nature-symbolism: de la Barre, _M\u00e9moires\npour servir \u00e0 l\u2019histoire de la religion en Gr\u00e8ce_, in _M\u00e9m. de l\u2019Acad. des\nInscr._ xxiv. (1749; the treatise had already been communicated in 1737\nand 1738); a posthumous continuation in _M\u00e9m._ xxix. (1770) gives an idea\nof de la Barre\u2019s own point of view, which was not a little in advance of\nhis time. Comp. Gruppe, \u00a7 37.\n\nP. 145. A good survey of modern investigations in the field of the history\nof ancient religion is given by Sam Wide in the _Einleit. in die\nAltertumswissensch._ ii.; here also remarks on the mythology of older\ntimes. The later part of Gruppe\u2019s work contains a very full treatment of\nthe subject.\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nAbsolute definitions of the divine, 16, 19, 68, 69, 82, 88.\n\nAcademics, 149.\n\nAcademy, later, 108, 114.\n\nAcosta, 137, 139, 141.\n\nAelian, 121.\n\nAeneid (mediaeval), 136.\n\nAeschines, 93.\n\nAeschylus, 54, 55.\n\nAetolians, 97, 98.\n\nAlchemistic explanation of Paganism, 140.\n\nAlcibiades, 60.\n\nAlexander the Great, 93, 112.\n\nAllegorical interpretation, 104, 113, 139, 140, 143, 144.\n\nAmerican Paganism, 137, 139, 141.\n\nAnaxagoras of Clazomenae, 7, 13, 25-29, 30, 31, 40, 62, 63, 66, 124.\n\nAnaximenes, 30.\n\nAngelology, 129.\n\nAnthropomorphism, 14, 18, 19, 69.\n\nAntisthenes, 13, 74, 109.\n\nApologists, 128, 130, 132, 139.\n\nArcissewsky, 138.\n\nAristides the Apologist, 129.\n\nAristides Rhetor, 121.\n\nAristodemus, 60, 62.\n\nAristophanes, 30, 32, 33, 39, 55, 56-58, 65.\n  _Birds_, 32.\n  _Clouds_, 30, 55, 56-58\n  _Frogs_, 55.\n\nAristotle, 13, 30, 32, 46, 83-87, 104, 113.\n  _Ethics_, 84.\n  _Metaphysics_, 85-86.\n  _Politics_, 84.\n\nAristoxenus, 32, 33.\n\nAsclepius, 111, 121, 126.\n\n_Asebeia_, 6, 7, 8.\n\nAspasia, 27.\n\nAtheism (and Atheist) defined, 1;\n  rare in antiquity, 2, 133;\n  of recent origin, 2, 143;\n  origin of the words, 5;\n  lists of atheists, 13;\n  punishable by death in Plato\u2019s _Laws_, 77;\n  sin of youth, 78.\n\nAthene, 74.\n\nAthens, its treatment of atheism, 6-8, 9, 12, 25, 39, 65 foll., 74, 75,\n            83, 86;\n  its view of sophistic, 58-59.\n\n_Atheos_ (_atheoi_), 2, 10, 13, 14, 19, 23, 29, 43, 75, 110.\n\n_Atheotes_, 2.\n\nAugustine, St., 129, 135.\n\nAugustus, 117;\n  religious reaction of, 100, 113, 117, 120.\n\nAurelius, Marcus, 11, 121.\n\nBacon, Francis (_De Sap. Vet._) 140.\n\nBanier, 142, 143.\n\nBible, 130, 142.\n\nBion, 13, 109.\n\nBrazil, 138.\n\nBruno, Giordano, 151.\n\nBryant, 144.\n\nButtmann, 152.\n\nCaelius Calcagninus, 141.\n\nCaelius Rhodiginus, 141.\n\nCallicles, 48 foll., 63.\n\nCarlyle, 112.\n\nCarneades, 8, 108.\n\nCassander of Macedonia, 111.\n\nCharon, 135.\n\nChristianity, 126, 128-32.\n\nChristians, their atheism, 9;\n  prosecutions of, 10;\n  demonology, 83.\n\nCicero, 19, 105, 114-17, 147.\n  _Nature of the Gods_, 115.\n  _On the State_, 115.\n  _On the Laws_, 115.\n  _De consolatione_, 116.\n\nCinesias, 60.\n\nCopernicus, 151.\n\nCritias, 13, 44-50.\n  _Sisyphus_, 44 f., 114.\n\nCriticism of popular religion, 16, 17, 19, 35 foll., 74, 78, 82, 84, 88,\n            90, 99, 104, 109, 110, 122, 124-26.\n\nCuthites, 144.\n\nCynics, 74, 109-10, 122, 124, 147.\n\nCyrenaics, 75.\n\n_Daimonion_ of Socrates, 65, 66, 72-73.\n\nvan Dale, 141-42.\n\nDante, 135.\n\nDeisidaimon, 75.\n\nDemeter, 42, 43, 81.\n\nDemetrius of Phalerum, 75, 93.\n  _On Tyche_, 93.\n\nDemocritus, 24, 42, 43, 44, 47, 52.\n\nDemonology, 81-83, 105, 113, 127-32, 134-42, 148, 149.\n\nDemosthenes, 92-93, 96.\n\nDevil, 132, 137, 139, 141, 144.\n\nDiagoras of Melos, 13, 31-34, 39, 50.\n  _Apopyrgizontes logoi_, 32, 33.\n\nDicaearchus, 98.\n\nDiodorus Siculus, 112.\n\nDiogenes of Apollonia, 13, 29-30, 57.\n\nDiogenes the Cynic, 109.\n\nDionysus, 42, 43.\n\nDiopeithes, 28.\n\nDioscuri, 124.\n\nDium, 98.\n\nDivination, 18, 20, 26, 27, 28, 40, 97, 114, 131, 135, 137, 140-42.\n  Comp. Oracle.\n\nDodona, 98, 141.\n\nDogmatics, 108.\n\nDomitian, 11.\n\nDupuis, 144.\n\nElements, divine, 23, 24, 30, 52 foll., 57, 81, 103, 127.\n\nEleusinian Mysteries, 32, 33, 40, 60.\n\nEnnius, 99, 112.\n\nEpicureans, Epicurus, 13, 76, 80, 83, 105-7, 113, 147, 149.\n\nEuhemerus, Euhemerism, 13, 110-12, 113, 114, 117, 127, 130, 136, 137, 139,\n            140, 142, 143, 144.\n\nEuripides, 16, 17, 21, 45, 46, 48, 51-56, 62.\n  _Bellerophon_, 53.\n  _Melanippe_, 55, 56.\n\nFallen angels, 128, 129, 130.\n\nFlorentine Academy, 138.\n\nForeign gods, 70, 89, 103.\n\nFontenelle, 142.\n\nGeocentric view, 150.\n\nGeryon, 135.\n\nGiants, 18.\n\nGorgias, 37.\n\nHades, 81.\n\nHeavenly bodies, 2, 20, 22, 25, 43, 62, 66, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 104, 127,\n            128, 130, 137, 139, 144, 149, 151.\n\nHeavenly phenomena, 22.\n\nHebraism, 139, 143, 144.\n\nHecataeus of Abdera, 112.\n\nHeliocentric view, 151.\n\nHellenistic philosophy, 94, 103-10, 119.\n\nHephaestus, 42, 43.\n\nHeracles, 74, 111.\n\nHercules, 136.\n\nHerder, 145.\n\nHermae, 40, 60.\n\nHermes, 124.\n\nHermias, 83.\n\nHerodotus, 28, 29.\n\nHesiod, 16, 18.\n\nHeyne, 152.\n\nHippo of Rhegium, 13, 29-30.\n\nHoly War, 96.\n\nHomer, 16, 18, 43, 68, 106.\n\nHorace, 117.\n\nHuet, 139.\n\nHylozoism, 23.\n\nIdeas, Platonic, 80.\n\nIdolatry attacked, 123.\n  See also Image Worship.\n\nIgnorance, Socratic, 68.\n\nImage Worship, 127, 128, 131-37.\n\nJews, their atheism, 9, 126.\n\nJosephus, 128.\n\nJudaism, 126, 127-28, 129.\n\nJuno Regina, 136.\n\nJupiter (in Dante), 135;\n  (in the Theba\u00efs,) 136.\n\nJupiter-priest, 100.\n\nKepler, 151.\n\nKronos, 111.\n\nLampon, 26.\n\nLobeck, 152.\n\nLucian, 110, 123-26.\n  _Timon_, 124.\n  _Dialogues of the Gods_, 125.\n\nLucretius, 106.\n\nLuna Jovis filia, 136.\n\nMacedonia, 93.\n\nMachiavelli, 141.\n\nMagic, 136-37.\n\nMannhardt, 152.\n\nMantinea, constitution of, 32.\n\nMarcus Aurelius, 11, 121.\n\nMediaeval epic poets, 136.\n\nMegarians, 74, 107.\n\nMenippus of Gadara, 110.\n\nMexico, 137.\n\nMiddle Ages, 133, 135-39.\n\nMilton (_Paradise Lost_), 134, 135, 141.\n\nMinos, 135.\n\nMiracles, pagan, 131, 132.\n\nModesty, religions, 55, 70, 73.\n\nMoschion, 46.\n\nMoses and his sister, 139.\n\nMonotheism, 9, 12, 23, 74, 80, 83, 127 foll., 139, 148, 151.\n\nM\u00fcller, K. O., 152.\n\nNatalis Comes, 139 foll.\n\nNaturalism, Ionian, 21, 22-25, 30-31, 52, 57.\n\nNegroes, 18.\n\nNeo-Platonists, 83, 121.\n\nNeo-Pythagoreans, 83, 121.\n\nNero, 11.\n\nNewton, 151.\n\nNile, 42.\n\n_Nomos_ (and _Physis_), 35, 36, 38, 63, 74.\n\nNymphs, 136.\n\nOenomaus (_The Swindlers Unmasked_), 122-23, 126.\n\nOld Testament, 127, 129.\n\nOracle of Ammon, 97; oracles of Boeotia, 97;\n  Delphic Oracle, 28, 60, 67, 68, 71, 72, 77, 93, 96, 97, 123, 141;\n  decay of oracles, 96-97;\n  oracles explained by priestly fraud, 123, 141-42.\n  Ovid, 117.\n\nPaganism of Antiquity, its character, 15.\n\nPanchaia, 111.\n\nParmenides, 21.\n\nPantheism, 20, 23, 103, 119, 122, 127.\n\nPaul, St., 128.\n\nPericles, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 124.\n\nPeripatetics, 147, 149.\n\nPeru, 137.\n\nPheidias, 27.\n\nPhilip III. of Macedonia, 96.\n\nPhilip V. of Macedonia, 97-98.\n\nPhilo, 128.\n\nPhocians, 96.\n\n_Physis_ (and _Nomos_), 35, 36, 63, 74.\n\nPindar, 16, 17, 52, 71.\n\nPlato, 13, 39, 48, 49, 50, 56, 59, 61-63, 65, 66, 72, 76-81, 82, 84, 113,\n            147.\n  _Apology_, 59, 65, 66, 68, 72, 78, 79.\n  _Euthyphron_, 67, 76.\n  _Gorgias_, 48 foll., 63, 77.\n  _Laws_, 61 foll., 77, 78, 79, 80.\n  _Republic_, 50, 56, 77, 78.\n  _Symposium_, 82.\n  _Timaeus_, 77, 79, 80.\n\nPlatonism, 148.\n\nPlethon, 138.\n\nPliny the Elder, 94, 95, 118, 147.\n\nPlutarch (_de def. orac._), 97.\n\nPolybius, 48, 90-91, 94, 99, 113-14, 147;\n  Stoicism in P., 114.\n\nPomponazzi (_De Incantat._), 141.\n\nPoseidon, 42, 81.\n\nPoseidonius, 104.\n\nProdicus of Ceos, 13, 42-44, 104.\n\nProtagoras of Abdera, 13, 39-42, 47.\n  _On the Gods_, 39 foll.\n  _Original State_, 47.\n\nProvidence, 60, 61, 78, 105, 118, 122.\n\nPythia, 93.\n\nReaction, religious, of second century, 120-21, 125;\n  of Augustus, see Augustus.\n\nReinterpretation of the conceptions of the gods, 2.\n  See also Allegorical interpretation.\n\nReligion a political invention, 47, 114.\n\nReligious thought, early, of Greece, 16-17, 52, 54, 55, 69-70, 71, 84, 88,\n            98, 107.\n\nRenaissance, 133, 138, 139 foll., 141.\n\nRohde, 152.\n\nRoman Academy, 138.\n\nRoman religion, 90, 99-100, 101-2.\n\nRoman State-worship, decay of, 98-103.\n\nRomance of Troy, 136.\n\nRomances, 95-96.\n\nRome\u2019s treatment of atheism, 8-11.\n\nRousseau, 145.\n\nScepticism, 107-8, 114, 147.\n\nSchoolmen, 135.\n\nSeneca, 110, 122.\n\nSibylline books, 97.\n\nSisyphus, 45, 48.\n\nSocrates, 7, 13, 40, 46, 49, 56, 58, 64-73, 84, 107, 147. See also\n            _Daimonion_ of S.\n\nSocratic philosophy, 64, 87, 149.\n\nSocratic Schools, 73, 87-88.\n\nSol invictus, 136.\n\nSolon, 16.\n\nSophistic, 35-38, 57, 64, 87, 104, 148, 149.\n\nSophocles, 28, 54.\n\nStilpo, 13, 74, 108.\n\nStoics, 83, 103-5, 113, 118, 119, 121-22, 147, 148, 149.\n\nStrabo, 97.\n\nStrato, 87, 108.\n\nSuetonius, 121.\n\nSupernaturalism, 149-51.\n\nSuperstition, 75, 90, 102, 123, 126.\n\nTapuis, 138.\n\nThales, 24.\n\nTheba\u00efs (mediaeval), 136.\n\nTheodicy (Socratic), 67.\n\nTheodoras, 13, 75-76, 108, 109.\n  _On the Gods_, 75.\n\nTheophrastus, 13, 86.\n\nThermon, 98.\n\nThomas Aquinas, 131, 135, 138, 139, 140.\n\nThracians, 18.\n\nThrasymachus, 50, 62.\n\nThucydides (the historian), 28-29, 92, 94.\n\nThucydides (the statesman), 26.\n\nTiberius, 118.\n\nTisiphone, 136.\n\nTitans, 18.\n\nTolerance in antiquity, 9, 11.\n\nTrajan, 11.\n\nTullia, 116.\n\nTyche, 91-96, 118.\n\nTyphoeus, 140.\n\nUranos, 111.\n\nUsener, 152.\n\nValerius Maximus, 118.\n\nVarro, 100, 110.\n\nVico (_Scienza Nuova_), 143.\n\nViolation of sanctuaries, 40, 60, 97, 100.\n\nVirgil, 117.\n\nVoss, G. I., 135, 138, 141.\n\nWisdom of Solomon, 128.\n\nWorship rejected, 9-13, 60, 74, 77, 84, 109, 123, 125.\n\nXenocrates, 81-82, 105, 113, 129.\n\nXenophanes of Colophon, 13, 17-21,\n52, 56.\n\nXenophon, 58, 59, 62, 66, 67.\n  _Memorab._ 58, 60.\n  _Apology_, 58.\n\nZeller, 76, 79.\n\nZeno of Elea, 21.\n\nZeus, 16, 22, 30, 43, 55, 57, 58, 81, 105, 111, 124.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 This was written before the appearance of Mr. Gruppe\u2019s work,\n      _Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte_.\n      Compare _infra_, p. 154.","title":"Atheism in Pagan Antiquity","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":47720}