{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_28393/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_28393","id":"gutenberg_28393","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/28393","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","China -- Foreign relations -- Japan","China -- Foreign relations -- United States","Eastern question (Far East)","Japan -- Foreign relations -- China","United States -- Foreign relations -- China"],"text":"Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n                    CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U. S. A.\n\n                        Present-day Conditions\n                           in the Far East\n                         and Their Bearing on\n                            the Washington\n                              Conference\n\n\n                                 _by_\n\n\n                              JOHN DEWEY\n\n                      Professor of Philosophy at\n                         Columbia University\n\n\n                     _New Republic Pamphlet No. 1_\n\n                           Published by the\n                    REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO., INC.\n                     421 West Twenty-first Street\n                           _New York City_\n                                 1921\n\n\n\n\n                            Copyright 1921\n                     REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO. INC.\n\n\n\n\n_Introductory Note_\n\n\n_The articles following are reprinted as they were written in spite of\nthe fact that any picture of contemporary events is modified by\nsubsequent increase of knowledge and by later events. In the main,\nhowever, the writer would still stand by what was said at the time. A\nfew foot notes have been inserted where the text is likely to give\nrise to misapprehensions. The date of writing has been retained as a\nguide to the reader._\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nOn Two Sides of the Eastern Seas\n\n\nIt is three days' easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtful\nwhether anywhere in the world another journey of the same length\nbrings with it such a complete change of political temper and belief.\nCertainly it is greater than the alteration perceived in journeying\ndirectly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The difference is not one in\ncustoms and modes of life; that goes without saying. It concerns the\nideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the same\nfact: the status of Japan in the international world and especially\nits attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a feeling of\nuncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There is a subtle nervous\ntension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of change but\nnot knowing where the change will take it. Liberalism is in the air,\nbut genuine liberals are encompassed with all sorts of difficulties\nespecially in combining their liberalism with the devotion to\ntheocratic robes which the imperialist militarists who rule Japan have\nso skilfully thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what one\nsenses in China from the first moment is the feeling of the\nall-pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate to its\nunhesitating conclusion--the domination of Chinese politics and\nindustry by Japan with a view to its final absorption. It is not my\nobject to analyze the realities of the situation or to inquire whether\nthe universal feeling in China is a collective hallucination or is\ngrounded in fact. The phenomenon is worthy of record on its own\naccount. Even if it be merely psychological, it is a fact which must\nbe reckoned with in both its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. In the\nfirst place, as to the differences in psychological atmosphere.\nEverybody who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land of\nreserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell you that\nthis is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The informed know\nthat it is an attitude shown to foreigners only because it is deeply\nengrained in the moral and social tradition of Japan; and that, if\nanything, the Japanese are more likely to be communicative--about many\nthings at least--to a sympathetic foreigner, than to one another. The\nhabit of reserve is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette,\nconvention and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals of\nstrength of character, that only the Japanese who have subjected\nthemselves to foreign influences escape it--and many of them revert.\nTo put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious people; they have\nthe gift of doing rather than of gab.\n\nWhen accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist engages\nin unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting forth the aims and\nprocedures of Japan, the student of politics who has been long in the\nEast at once becomes alert, not to say suspicious. A recent\nillustration is so extreme that it will doubtless seem fantastic\nbeyond belief. But the student at home will have to take these seeming\nfantasies seriously if he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphere\nof China. Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses of\nBaron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere these have\nthe effect of reassuring America as to any improper ambitions on the\npart of Japan. In China, they were taken as announcements that Japan\nhas about completed its plans for the absorption of China, and that\nthe lucubration preliminary to operations of swallowing are about to\nbegin. The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels about\nboth the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the belief in\nthe alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what I should feel\nin his place. But the suspicion aroused by such statements as this and\nthe recent interview of Foreign Minister Uchida and Baron Ishii must\nbe noted as evidences of the universal belief in China that Japan has\none mode of diplomacy for the East and another for the West, and that\nwhat is said in the West must be read in reverse in the East.\n\nChina, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It is a\nproverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The Chinese talk\nmore easily than they act--especially in politics. They are adepts in\nrevealing their own shortcomings. They dissect their own weaknesses\nand failures with the most extraordinary reasonableness. One of the\ndefects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes for\npositive action, of avoiding entering upon a course of action which\nmight be irrevocable. One almost wonders whether their power of\nself-criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At all\nevents, they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the opposite\ncamps there are always communications flowing. Among official enemies\nthere are \"sworn friends.\" In a land of perpetual compromise,\netiquette as well as necessity demands that the ways for later\naccommodations be kept open. Consequently things which are spoken of\nonly under the breath in Japan are shouted from the housetops in\nChina. It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the report\nthat influential Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese\nfunds and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which political\nand economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe and\nAmerica were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes the\ntrouble to deny it or even to discuss it. What is psychologically most\nimpressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it is\nspoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day.\n\nIn speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan\nitself, one must refer to the economic situation because of its\nobvious connection with the international situation. In the first\nplace, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended.\nEven in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreign\nmarkets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. And there\nis the belief that Japan _must_ do so, because only by large foreign\nsellings--large in comparison with the purchasing power of a people\nstill having a low standard of life--can it purchase the raw\nmaterials--and even food--it has to have. But during the war, the\ndependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign market\nwas greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though very\ngreat, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriously\nthe internal demand for goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy for\nJapan as being in a somewhat precarious situation.\n\nAnother item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itself\nin a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (or\nrather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women's\nlabor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she now\ncounts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand,\nstrikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc., are\nconstantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere is\nunmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memory\npersists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directly\npolitical aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of the\naspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and the\ngrowth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminate\nthose aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow to\nbureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will it\nhave the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope that\nit will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japan\nwhich is beginning to undergo the throes of transition.\n\nAs for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling in\nJapan is that of the threatening danger of isolation. Germany is gone;\nRussia is gone. While those facts simplify matters for Japan somewhat,\nthere is also the belief that in taking away potential allies, they\nhave weakened Japan in the general game of balance and counter-balance\nof power. Particularly does the removal of imperialistic Russia\nrelieve the threat on India which was such a factor in the willingness\nof Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. The\nrevelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is another\nserious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of Japan,\nItaly and France is no adequate substitute for a realignment of\ninternational forces in which a common understanding between Great\nBritain and America is a dominant factor. This factor explains, if it\ndoes not excuse, some of the querulousness and studied discourtesies\nwith which the Japanese press for some months treated President\nWilson, the United States in general and its relation to the League of\nNations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor with\nwhich the opportune question of racial discrimination was discussed.\n(The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense of humor. It was\ninteresting to note the delight with which they received the utterance\nof the Japanese Foreign Minister, after Japanese success at Paris,\nthat \"his attention had recently been called\" to various press attacks\non America which he much deprecated). In any case there is no\nmistaking the air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attends\nall discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, there\nare characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs and\nmovement along new lines. Japan seems to be much in the same mood as\nthat which it experienced in the early eighties before, toward the\nclose of that decade, it crystallized its institutions through\nacceptance of the German constitution, militarism, educational system,\nand diplomatic methods. So that, once more, the observer gets the\nimpression that substantially all of Japan's energy, abundant as that\nis, must be devoted to her urgent problems of readjustment.\n\nCome to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost seems as if\none were living in a dream; or as if some new Alice had ventured\nbehind an international looking-glass wherein everything is reversed.\nThat we in America should have little idea of the state of things and\nthe frame of mind in China is not astonishing--especially in view of\nthe censorship and the distraction of attention of the last few years.\nBut that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and yet\nevery fact that concerns them appear in precisely opposite\nperspective, is an experience of a life time. Japanese liberalism?\nYes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form which the\nlonging for the miraculous _deus ex machina_ takes. Perhaps a\nrevolution in Japan may intervene to save China from the fate which\nnow hangs over her. But there is no suggestion that anything less than\na complete revolution will alter or even retard the course which is\nattributed to Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanese\nbusiness interests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany?\nThese things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen complete\nheir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions in Manchuria and\nOuter Mongolia, and has had opportunities in Siberia thrown into her\nhands which she could hardly have hoped for in her most optimistic\nmoments. And now Japan has, with the blessing of the great Powers at\nParis, become also the heir of German concessions, intrigues and\nambitions, with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetent\nand corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was busy\nwith war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan that they\ngive way to her every wish, what is China that she can escape the doom\nprepared for her? That is the cry of helplessness going up all over\nChina. And Japanese propagandists take advantage of the situation,\npointing to the action of the Peace Conference as proof that the\nAllies care nothing for China, and that China must throw herself into\nthe arms of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short,\nJapan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee the\nintegrity and independence of China. And the fear that the latter\nmust, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept this fate in\norder to escape something worse swims in the sinister air. It is the\nexact counterpart of the feeling current among the liberals in Japan\nthat Japan has alienated China permanently when a considerate and\nslower course might have united the two countries. If the economic\nstraits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has\nhurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings\nwith Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the western\nworld supposes that the military and the industrial party in Japan\nhave opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese supremacy\nin the East, it is the universal opinion in China that they two are\nworking in complete understanding with one another, and the\ndifferences that sometimes occur between the Foreign Office in Tokyo\nand the Ministry of War (which is extra-constitutional in its status)\nare staged for effect.\n\nThese are some of the aspects of the most complete transformation\nscene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. May\nit turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological experience! But\nin the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident of\nChina, Chinese or American, with whom I have talked in the last four\nweeks has volunteered the belief that all the seeds of a future great\nwar are now deeply implanted in China. To avert such a calamity they\nlook to the League of Nations or to some other force outside the\nimmediate scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attempt\nto discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts as\nevidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now has its\neyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its hands on\nAsia. Consequently America is interested in trying to foster ill-will\nbetween China and Japan. If the pro-American Japanese do not enlighten\ntheir fellow-countrymen as to the facts, then America ought to return\nsome of the propaganda that visits its shores. But every American who\ngoes to Japan ought also to visit China--if only to complete his\neducation.\n\nMay, 1919.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nShantung, As Seen From Within\n\n\n1.\n\nAmerican apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty which relates to\nChina have the advantage of the illusions of distance. Most of the\narguments seem strange to anyone who lives in China even for a few\nmonths. He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying about\nterritory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He reads in\nJapanese papers and hears from moderately liberal Japanese that Japan\nmust protect China, as well as Japan, against herself, against her own\nweak or corrupt government, by keeping control of Shantung to prevent\nChina from again alienating that territory to some other power.\n\nThe history of European aggression in China gives this argument great\nforce among the Japanese, who for the most part know nothing more\nabout what actually goes on in China than they used to know about\nKorean conditions. These considerations, together with the immense\nexpectations raised among the Japanese during the war concerning their\ncoming domination of the Far East and the unswerving demand of excited\npublic opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference for the\nsettlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn to the\nstatement so often made that Japan may be trusted to carry out her\npromises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that is precisely what\nChina fears, that Japan will carry out her promises, for then China is\ndoomed. To one who knows the history of foreign aggression in China,\nespecially the technique of conquest by railway and finance, the irony\nof promising to keep economic rights while returning sovereignty lies\nso on the surface that it is hardly irony. China might as well be\noffered Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as be\noffered sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is equally\nmetaphysical.\n\nA visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, Tsinan,\nmade the conclusions, which so far as I know every foreigner in China\nhas arrived at, a living thing. It gave a vivid picture of the many\nand intimate ways in which economic and political rights are\ninextricably entangled together. It made one realize afresh that only\na President who kept himself innocent of any knowledge of secret\ntreaties during the war, could be naive enough to believe that the\npromise to return complete sovereignty retaining _only_ economic\nrights is a satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon the\ncontention that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over German\nrights, and that since we had acquiesced in the latter's arrogations\nwe had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed the hollowness\nof the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had wilfully misled Americans\ninto confusing the few hundred square miles around the port of\nTsing-tao with the Province of Shantung with its thirty millions of\nChinese population.\n\nAs for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might suppose that the\nobjects for which America nominally entered the war had made, in any\ncase, a difference. But aside from this consideration, the Germans\nexclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops and for all the\nminor positions on the railway itself. The railway guards (the\ndifference between police and soldiers is nominal in China) were all\nChinese, the Germans merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded\nShantung and took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese\nmilitary guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take\ntheir places. Tsinan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German railway,\nis over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the Japanese took over\nthe German railway business office, they at once built barracks, and\ntoday there are several hundred soldiers still there--where Germany\nkept none. Since the armistice even, Japan has erected a powerful\nmilitary wireless within the grounds of the garrison, against of\ncourse the unavailing protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner can\nbe found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port and\nrailway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese can be found\nwho will claim that this ownership was used to force the Chinese out\nof business, or to extend German economic rights beyond those\ndefinitely assigned her by treaty. Common sense should also teach even\nthe highest paid propagandist in America that there is, from the\nstandpoint of China, an immense distinction between a national menace\nlocated half way around the globe, and one within two days' sail over\nan inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially as\nthe remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby one already\ndominates additional territory of enormous strategic and economic\nvalue--namely, Manchuria.\n\nThese facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the Tsing-tao\nand the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid distinction between\nGerman and Japanese occupancy. If there still seemed to be a thin wall\nbetween Japanese possession of the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation of\nShantung, it was enough to stop off the train in Tsinan-fu to see the\nwall crumble. For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the army\nof occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within a few\nhundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via the important\ncenter of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you see Japanese\nsoldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding their barracks.\nThen you learn that if you travel upon the ex-German railway towards\nTsing-tao, you are ordered to show your passport as if you were\nentering a foreign country. And as you travel along the road\n(remembering that you are over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) you\nfind Japanese soldiers at every station, and several garrisons and\nbarracks at important towns on the line. Then you realize that at the\nshortest possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between\nsouthern China (together with the rich Yangste region) and the\ncapital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway at the\nnorth of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its good\npleasure upon Peking.\n\nYou are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when Japan made\nits Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns were actually in\nposition at strategic points throughout Shantung, with trenches dug\nand sandbags placed. You know that the Japanese liberal spoke the\ntruth, who told you, after a visit to China and his return to protest\nagainst the action of his government, that the Japanese already had\nsuch a military hold upon China that they could control the country\nwithin a week, after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. You\nalso realize the efficiency of official control of information and\ndomestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that these\nthings were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi cabinet,\nbut had been completely reversed by the present Hara ministry. For I\nhave yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese who is conscious of any\ndifference of policy, save as the end of the war has forced the\nnecessity of caution, since other nations can now look China-wards as\nthey could not during the war.\n\nAn American can get an idea of the realities of the present situation\nif he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in Wilmington,\nwith a railway from that point to a fortified sea-port controlled by\nthe foreign power, at which the foreign nation can land, without\nresistance, troops as fast as they can be transported, and with bases\nof supply, munitions, food, uniforms, etc., already located at\nWilmington, at the sea-port and several places along the line. Reverse\nthe directions from south to north, and Wilmington will stand for\nTsinan-fu, Shanghai for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Peking\nstanding for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin for\nBaltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is the sole\nmeans of communication between Washington and the chief commercial and\nindustrial centers, and you have the framework of the Shantung picture\nas it presents itself daily to the inhabitants of China. Upon second\nthought, however, the parallel is not quite accurate. You have to add\nthat the same foreign nation controls also all coast communications\nfrom, say, Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearby\ncoast and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) this\ncorresponds to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with its\nrailways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve hours sail from\na great military center in Japan proper. These are not remote\npossibilities nor vague prognostications. They are accomplished facts.\n\nYet the facts give _only_ the framework of the picture. What is\nactually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of the\n\"postponed\" group of the Twenty-one Demands was that Japan should\nsupply military and police advisers to China. They are not so much\npostponed but that Japan enforced specific concessions from China\nduring the war by diplomatic threats to reintroduce their discussion,\nor so postponed that Japanese advisers are not already installed in\nthe police headquarters of the city of Tsinan, the capital city of\nShantung of three hundred thousand population where the Provincial\nAssembly meets and all the Provincial officials reside. Within recent\nmonths the Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers with\nhim when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain demands\nupon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious surrounding of\nthe Governor's yamen by these troops. Within the past few weeks, two\nhundred cavalry came to Tsinan and remained there while Japanese\nofficials demanded of the Governor drastic measures to suppress the\nboycott, while it was threatened to send Japanese troops to police the\nforeign settlement if the demand was not heeded.\n\nA former consul was indiscreet enough to put into writing that if the\nChinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the students' movement\nby force if need be, he would take matters into his own hands. The\nchief tangible charge he brought against the Chinese as a basis of his\ndemand for \"protection\" was that Chinese store-keepers actually\nrefused to accept Japanese money in payment for goods, not ordinary\nJapanese money at that, but the military notes with which, so as to\nsave drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation is paid.\nAnd all this, be it remembered, is more than two hundred miles from\nTsing-tao and from eight to twelve months after the armistice. Today's\npaper reports a visit of Japanese to the Governor to inform him that\nunless he should prevent a private theatrical performance from being\ngiven in Tsinan by the students, they would send their own forces into\nthe settlement to protect themselves. And the utmost they might need\nprotection from, was that the students were to give some plays\ndesigned to foster the boycott!\n\nJapanese troops overran the Province before they made any serious\nattempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say\nthat they \"took\" the Chinese Tsinan before they took the German\nTsing-tao. Propaganda in America has justified this act on the ground\nthat a German railway to the rear of Japanese forces would have been a\nmenace. As there were no troops but only legal and diplomatic papers\nwith which to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the\n\"menace\" was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, and\nconcerned the danger of Chinese control of their own territory.\nChinese have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan and\nsubjected to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has made\nsickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries were\nreceived while the men were resisting arrest. Considering that there\nwas no more legal ground for arrest than there would be if Japanese\npolice arrested Americans in New York, almost anybody but the pacifist\nChinese certainly would have resisted. But official hospital reports\ntestify to bayonet wounds and the marks of flogging. In the interior\nwhere the Japanese had been disconcerted by the student propaganda\nthey raided a High School, seized a school boy at random, and took him\nto a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When the\nJapanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials in protest\nagainst these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed all jurisdiction.\nThe matter, he said, was wholly in the hands of the military\nauthorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was emphasized by the fact\nthat some of the kidnapped Chinese were taken to Tsing-tao for\n\"trial.\"\n\nThe matter of economic rights in relation to political domination will\nbe discussed later in this article. It is no pleasure for one with\nmany warm friends in Japan, who has a great admiration for the\nJapanese people as distinct from the ruling military and bureaucratic\nclass, to report such facts as have been stated. One might almost say,\none might positively say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that the\nworst thing that can be charged against the policy of Japan in China\nfor the last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. No nation has\never misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan has\nthat of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, bitter.\nEven the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that China is to\nundergo a complete economic and political domination by Japan do not\nthink it can last, even without outside intervention, more than half a\ncentury.\n\nToday, at the beginning of a new year, (1920) the boycott is much more\ncomplete and efficient than in the most tense days of last summer.\nUnfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be under a truly Greek\nfate which drives it on. Concessions that would have produced a\nrevulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year ago will now merely\nsalve the surface of the wound. What would have been welcomed even\neight months ago would now be received with contempt. There is but one\nway in which Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less than\ncomplete withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercial\nconcession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian, Open Door.\n\nAccording to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in Tsinan, the\nJapanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently made a speech to\nvisiting journalists from Tokyo in which he said: \"The suspicions of\nChina cannot now be allayed merely by repeating that we have no\nterritorial ambitions in China. We must attain complete economic\ndomination of the Far East. But if Chino-Japanese relations do not\nimprove, some third party will reap the benefit. Japanese residing in\nChina incur the hatred of the Chinese. For they regard themselves as\nthe proud citizens of a conquering country. When the Japanese go into\npartnership with the Chinese they manage in the greater number of\ncases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship between\nChina and Japan is to depend wholly upon the government it will come\nto nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, journalists should\nrepent the past. The change must be complete.\" But it will not be\ncomplete until the Japanese withdraw from Shantung leaving their\nnationals there upon the footing of other foreigners in China.\n\n\n2.\n\nIn discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysical\nsovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat the\ndetails of German treaty rights as to the railway and the mines. The\nreader is assumed to be familiar with those facts. The German seizure\nwas outrageous. It was a flagrant case of Might making Right. As von\nBuelow cynically but frankly told the Reichstag, while Germany did not\nintend to partition China, she also did not intend to be the passenger\nleft behind in the station when the train started. Germany had the\nexcuse of prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation was\nthe precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on a\ncomparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing that\ncan be derived from the provocations of European imperialistic powers,\nincluding those countries that in domestic policy are democratic. And\nevery fairminded person will recognize that, leaving China out of the\nreckoning, Japan's proximity to China gives her aggressions the color\nof self-defence in a way that cannot be urged in behalf of any\nEuropean power.\n\nIt is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa as\nincidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy in Asia\ncan shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For continental Asia\nis, for practical purposes, India and China, representing two of the\noldest civilizations of the globe and presenting two of its densest\npopulations. If there is any such thing in truth as a philosophy of\nhistory with its own inner and inevitable logic, one may well shudder\nto think of what the closing acts of the drama of the intercourse of\nthe West and East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfort\nmay be derived from the fact that the American continents have not\ntaken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator to avert\nthe final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one the realization\nthat Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future reckoning of\nhistory. Asia is really here after all. It is not simply a symbol in\nwestern algebraic balances of trade. And in the future, so to speak,\nit is going to be even more here, with its awakened national\nconsciousness of about half the population of the whole globe.\n\nLet the agreements of France and Great Britain made with Japan during\nthe war stand for the measure of western consciousness of the reality\nof only a small part of Asia, a consciousness generated by the\npatriotism of Japan backed by its powerful army and navy. The same\nagreement measures western unconsciousness of the reality of that part\nof Asia which lies within the confines of China. An even better\nmeasure of western unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such a\ntrifling incident as this:--An English friend long resident in\nShantung told me of writing indignantly home concerning the British\npart in the Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently stating\nthat Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could not\nproperly refuse to recognize Japan's claims. The secret agreements\nthemselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of China from\nthe average western consciousness. In saying that China and Asia are\nto be enormously significant figures in future reckonings, the spectre\nof a military Yellow Peril is not meant nor even the more credible\nspectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. But Asia has come to\nconsciousness, and her consciousness of herself will soon be such a\nmassive and persistent thing that it will force itself upon the\nreluctant consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon its\nconscience. And for this fact, China and the western world are\nindebted to Japan.\n\nThese remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the relationship\nof economic and political rights in Shantung than they perhaps seem.\nFor a moment's reflection will call to mind that all political foreign\naggression in China has been carried out for commercial and financial\nends, and usually upon some economic pretext. As to the immediate part\nplayed by Japan in bringing about a consciousness which will from the\npresent time completely change the relations of the western powers to\nChina, let one little story testify. Some representatives of an\nEnglish missionary board were making a tour of inspection through\nChina. They went into an interior town in Shantung. They were received\nwith extraordinary cordiality by the entire population. Some time\nafterwards some of their accompanying friends returned to the village\nand were received with equally surprising coldness. It came out upon\ninquiry that the inhabitants had first been moved by the rumor that\nthese people were sent by the British government to secure the removal\nof the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they had\nbeen disappointed.\n\nIt takes no forcing to see a symbol in this incident. Part of it\nstands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered China so\nimpotent nationally speaking. The other part of it stands for the new\nspirit which has been aroused even among the common people in remote\ndistricts. Those who fear, or who pretend to fear, a new Boxer\nmovement, or a definite general anti-foreign movement, are, I think,\nmistaken. The new consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policies\nthat fail to take it into account and that think that relations with\nChina can be conducted upon the old basis will find this new\nconsciousness obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways.\n\nOne might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is part of\nthe bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and the opportunity\nthe war gave her to outdo the aggressions of European powers, have\nmade her the first victim of this disconcerting change. Whatever the\nmotives of the American Senators in completely disassociating the\nUnited States from the peace settlement as regards China, their action\nis a permanent asset to China, not only in respect to Japan but with\nrespect to all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit to\nTsinan, the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution of\nthanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact that they\npassed another resolution to be cabled to the English Parliament,\ncalling attention to the action of the American Senate and inviting\nsimilar action. China in general and Shantung in particular feels the\nreinforcement of an external approval. With this duplication, its\nnational consciousness has as it were solidified. Japan is simply the\nfirst object to be affected.\n\nThe concrete working out of economic rights in Shantung will be\nillustrated by a single case which will have to stand as typical.\nPo-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were not part of the\nGerman booty; they were Chinese owned. The Germans, whatever their\nulterior aims, had made no attempt at dispossessing the Chinese. The\nmines, however, are at the end of a branch line of the new Japanese\nowned railway--owned by the government, not by a private corporation,\nand guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanese\nhave worked their way, in only four years, into all but four.\nDifferent methods are used. The simplest is, of course, discrimination\nin the use of the railway for shipping. Downright refusal to furnish\ncars while competitors who accepted Japanese partners got them, is one\nmethod. Another more elaborate method is to send but one car when a\nlarge number is asked for, and then when it is too late to use cars,\nsend the whole number asked for or even more, and then charge a large\nsum for demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants them\nor has cancelled the order. Redress there is none.\n\nTsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a \"treaty\nport\" where nationals of all friendly powers can do business. But\nPo-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speaking no foreigners can\nlease land or carry on any business there. Yet the Japanese have\nforced a settlement as large in area as the entire foreign settlement\nin the much larger town of Tsinan. A Chinese refused to lease land\nwhere the Japanese wished to relocate their railway station. Nothing\nhappened to him directly. But merchants could not get shipping space,\nor receive goods by rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. After\na time, they used their influence with their compatriot to lease his\nland. Immediately the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has been\nsecured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly by\nChinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any legal\nsanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control of the\nelectric light works and some pottery factories, etc.\n\nNow even admitting that this is typical of the methods by which the\nJapanese plant themselves, a natural American reaction would be to say\nthat, after all, the country is built up industrially by these\nenterprises, and that though the rights of some individuals may have\nbeen violated, there is nothing to make a national, much less an\ninternational fuss about. More or less unconsciously we translate\nforeign incidents into terms of our own experience and environment,\nand thus miss the entire point. Since America was largely developed by\nforeign capital to our own economic benefit and without political\nencroachments, we lazily suppose some such separation of the economic\nand political to be possible in China. But it must be remembered that\nChina is not an open country. Foreigners can lease land, carry on\nbusiness, and manufacture only in accord with express treaty\nagreements. There are no such agreements in the cases typified by the\nPo-shan incident. We may profoundly disagree with the closed economic\npolicy of China, or we may believe that under existing circumstances\nit represents the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference.\n_Given the frequent occurrence of such economic invasions, with the\nbacking of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid of the\nImperial Railway, and with the refusal of Imperial officials to\nintervene, there is clear evidence of the attitude and intention of\nthe Japanese government in Shantung._\n\nBecause the population of Shantung is directly confronted with an\nimmense amount of just such evidence, it cannot take seriously the\nprofessions of vague diplomatic utterances. What foreign nation is\ngoing to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in such a case as\nPo-shan? Which one is going effectively to call the attention of Japan\nto such evidences of its failure to carry out its promise? Yet the\naccumulation of precisely such seemingly petty incidents, and not any\nsingle dramatic great wrong, will secure Japan's economic and\npolitical domination of Shantung. It is for this reason that\nforeigners resident in Shantung, no matter in what part, say that they\nsee no sign whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on the\ncontrary, everything points to a determination to consolidate her\nposition. How long ago was the Portsmouth treaty signed, and what were\nits nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian territory?\n\nNot a month will pass without something happening which will give a\npretext for delay, and for making the surrender of Shantung\nconditional upon this, that and the other thing. Meantime the\npenetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimination, railway\nmilitary guards, continual nibblings here and there, will be going on.\nIt would make the chapter too long to speak of the part played by\nmanipulation of finance in achieving this process of attrition of\nsovereignty. Two incidents must suffice. During the war, Japanese\ntraders with the connivance of their government gathered up immense\namounts of copper cash from Shantung and shipped it to Japan against\nthe protests of the Chinese government. What does sovereignty amount\nto when a country cannot control even its own currency system? In\nManchuria the Japanese have forced the introduction of several hundred\nmillion dollars of paper currency, nominally, of course, based on a\ngold reserve. These notes are redeemable, however, only in Japan\nproper. And there is a law in Japan forbidding the exportation of\ngold. And there you are.\n\nJapan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actual\nconnection of economic and political rights in China. It is so\nbeautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely unconscious.\nWithin the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister in Peking,\nhas waited upon the government with a memorandum saying that the\nFoochow incident was the culminating result of the boycott; that if\nthe boycott continues, a series of such incidents is to be\napprehended, saying that the situation has become \"intolerable\" for\nJapan, and disavowing all responsibility for further consequences\nunless the government makes a serious effort to stop the boycott.\nJapan then immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stop\nthe circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge the\nboycott, the destruction of Japanese goods that have become Chinese\nproperty--none have been destroyed that are Japanese owned. Volumes\ncould not say more as to the real conception of Japan of the\nconnection between the economic and the political relations of the two\ncountries. Surely the pale ghost of \"Sovereignty\" smiled ironically as\nhe read this official note. President Wilson after having made in the\ncase of Shantung a sharp and complete separation of economic and\npolitical rights, also said that a nation boycotted is within sight of\nsurrender. Disassociation of words from acts has gone so far in his\ncase that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of Mr. Obata's\ncommunication. The American sense of humor and fair-play may however\nbe counted upon to get its point.\n\nJanuary, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nHinterlands in China\n\n\nOne of the two Presidents of China--it is unnecessary to specify\nwhich--recently stated that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance\nmeant a partition of China. In this division, Japan would take the\nnorth and Great Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meant\nto be taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation,\nbut rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of policies and\nevents. Even so, the statement will appear exaggerated or wild to\npersons outside of China, who either believe that the Open Door policy\nis now irrevocably established or that Japan is the only foreign Power\nwhich China has to fear. But a recent visit to the south revealed that\nin that section, especially in Canton, the British occupy much the\nsame position of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese in\nthe north.\n\nUpon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible in the\nprovince of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. There are said to\nbe more Americans in Canton than Japanese, and the American colony is\nnot extensive. Upon the positive side the history of the Cassell\ncollieries contract is instructive. It illustrates the cause of the\npopular attitude toward the British, and quite possibly explains the\nbitterness in the remark quoted. The contract is noteworthy from\nwhatever standpoint it is viewed, whether that of time, of the\nconditions it contains or of the circumstances which accompany it.\n\nPremising that the contract delivers to a British company a monopoly\nof the rich coal deposits of the province for a period of ninety years\nand--quite incidentally of course--the right to use all means of\ntransportation, water or rail, wharves and ports now in existence, and\nalso to \"construct, manage, superintend and work other roads, railways\nwaterways as may be deemed advisable\"--which reads like a monopoly of\nall further transportation facilities of the province--first take up\nthe time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April, 1920\nand confirmed a few months later. It was made, of course, with the\nauthorities of the Kwantung province, subject to confirmation at\nPeking. During this period, Kwantung province was governed by military\ncarpet-baggers from the neighboring province of Kwangsei, which was\npractically alone of the southern provinces allied with the northern\ngovernment, then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter of\ncommon knowledge that the people of Canton and of the province were\nbitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted to it only\nbecause of military coercion. Civil strife for the expulsion of the\noutsiders was already going on, continually gaining headway, and a few\nmonths later the Kwangsei troops were defeated and expelled from the\nprovince by the forces of General Chen, now the civil governor of\nKwantung, who received a triumphal ovation upon his entrance into\nCanton. At this time the present native government was established, a\nchange which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followers\nfrom their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the collieries\ncontract giving away the natural resources of the people of the\nprovince, was knowingly made by a British company with a government\nwhich no more represented the people of the province than the military\ngovernment of Germany represented the people of Belgium during the\nwar.\n\nAs to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave the\nBritish company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the province, was\nnot literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two districts are enumerated.\nBut these are the districts along the lines of the only railways in\nthe province and the only ones soon to be built, including the as yet\nuncompleted Hankow-Canton railway. Possibly this fact accounts for the\nanxiety of the British partners in the Consortium that the completion\nof this line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. The\ndocument also includes what is perhaps a novelty in legal documents\nhaving such a momentous economic importance, namely, the words \"etc.\"\nafter the districts enumerated by name.\n\nFor this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay the\nprovincial government the sum of $1,000,000 (silver of course). This\nmillion dollars is to bear six per cent interest to the company, and\ncapital and interest are to be paid back to the company by the\nprovincial government out of the dividends (if any) it is to receive.\nThe nature of these \"dividends\" is set forth in an article which\nshould receive the careful attention of promoters elsewhere as a model\nof the possibilities of exploiting contracts. The ten million capital\nis divided equally into \"A\" shares and \"B\" shares. The \"A\" shares go\nunreservedly to the directors of the company, and three millions of\nthe \"B\" shares are to be allotted by the directors of the company at\ntheir discretion. The other two million are again divided into equal\nportions, one portion representing the sum advanced by the company to\nthe province and to be paid back as just specified, while the other\nmillion--one-tenth of the capitalization--is to be a trust fund the\ndividends of which are to go for the \"benefit of the poor people of\nthe province\" and for an educational fund for the province. But before\nany dividends are paid upon the \"B\" shares, eight per cent dividends\nare to be paid upon the \"A\" shares and a _dollar a ton royalty_ upon\nall coal mined. Those having any familiarity with the coal business\nwith its usual royalty of about ten cents a ton can easily calculate\nthe splendid prospects of the \"poor people\" and the schools, prospects\nwhich represent the total return to the provinces of a concession of\nuntold worth. The contract also guarantees to the company the\nassistance of the provincial government in expropriating the owners of\nall coal mines which have been granted to other companies but not yet\nworked. These technical details make dry reading, but they throw light\nupon the spirit with which the British company undertook its predatory\nnegotiations with a government renounced by the people it professed to\ngovern. In comparison with the relatively crude methods of Japan in\nShantung, they show the advantages of wide business experience.\n\nAs for the circumstances and context which give added menace to the\ncontract, the following facts are significant. Hong Kong, a British\ncrown colony, lies directly opposite the river upon which Canton is\nsituated. It is the port of export and import for the vast districts\nserved by the mines and railways of the province. It is unnecessary to\npoint out the hold upon all economic development which is given\nthrough a monopolistic control of coal. It is hardly too much to say\nthat the enforcement of the contract would enable British interests in\nHong Kong to control the entire industrial development of the most\nflourishing of the provinces of China. It would be a comparatively\neasy and inexpensive matter to provide the main land with a first\nclass modern harbor and port near Canton. But such a port would tend\nto reduce the assets of Hong Kong to the possession of the most\nbeautiful scenery in the world. There is already fear that a new\nharbor will be built. Many persons think that the concession of\nbuilding such railways etc., \"as are deemed advisable for the purpose\nof the business of the company and to improve those now existing\" is\nthe object of the contract, even more than the coal monopoly. For the\nBritish already own a considerable part of the mainland, including\npart of the railway connecting the littoral with Canton. By building a\ncross-cut from the British owned portion of this railway to the\nHankow-Canton line, the latter would become virtually the Hankow-Hong\nKong line, and Canton would be a way-station. With the advantages thus\nsecured, the project for building a new port could be indefinitely\nblocked.\n\nDuring the period in which the contract was being secured, a congress\nof British Chambers of Commerce was held in Shanghai. Resolutions were\npassed in favor of abolishing henceforth the whole principle of\nspecial nationalistic concessions, and of cooperating with the Chinese\nfor the upbuilding of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairman\nannounced that a new era for China had finally dawned. All of the\nBritish newspapers in China lauded the wise action of the Chambers. At\nthe same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting forth that\nthe object of the Consortium was the abolition of further concessions,\nand the uniting of the financial resources of the banks in the\nConsortium for the economic development of China itself. By an\nironical coincidence, the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, which is the\nfinancial power behind the contract and the new company, is the\nleading British partner in the Consortium. It is difficult to see how\nthe British can henceforth accuse the Japanese of bad faith if any of\nthe banking interests of that country should enter upon independent\nnegotiations with any government in China.\n\nBy the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking in order to\nsecure the confirmation of the central government, the Anfu regime was\nno more, and as yet no confirmation has been secured. The new\ngovernment at Canton has declined to recognize the contract as having\nany validity. An official of the Hong Kong government has told an\nofficial of the Canton government that the Hong Kong government stands\nbehind the enforcement of the contract, and that Kwantung province is\na British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor of Hong\nKong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong who is a British\nsubject have visited Peking. Rumors were rife in the south as to the\nobject of the visit. British sources published the report that one\nobject was to return Weihaiwei to China--in case Peking agreed to turn\nover more of the Kwantung mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo.\nChinese opinion in the south was that one main object was to secure\nthe Peking confirmation of the Cassell contract, in which case\n$900,000 more would be forthcoming, $100,000 having been paid down\nwhen the contract was signed with the provincial government. Peking\ndoes not recognize the present Canton government but regards it as an\noutlaw. The crowd that signed the contract is still in control of the\nneighboring province of Kwangsei and they are relied upon by the north\nto effect the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fighting\nhas already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsei militarists are badly in\nneed of money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large part of the\nfunds will be paid over to them--all that isn't lost by the wayside to\nthe northern militarists.[1] Meantime British news agencies keep up a\nconstant circulation of reports tending to discredit the Kwantung\ngovernment, although all impartial observers on the spot regard it as\naltogether the most promising one in China.\n\n    [1] Since the text was written, the newspapers have stated\n        that the Peking Government has officially refused to\n        validate the agreement.\n\nThese considerations not only throw light on some of the difficulties\nof the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an indispensable\nbackground for judging the actual effect of the renewal of the\nAnglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each government,\neven against its own wish, will be compelled to wink at the predatory\npolicies of the other; and the tendency will be to create a division\nof spheres of influence between the north and south in order to avoid\nmore direct conflicts. The English liberals who stand for the renewal\nof the alliance on the ground that it will enable England to exercise\na check on Japanese policies, are more naive than was Mr. Wilson with\nhis belief in the separation of the economic and political control of\nShantung.\n\nIt cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction\nbetween the United States and Japan is not in California but in China.\nIt is silly--unless it is calculated--for English authorities to keep\nrepeating that under no circumstances does the alliance mean that\nGreat Britain would support Japan in a war with the United States. The\nday the alliance is renewed, the hands of the militarists in Japan\nwill be strengthened and the hands of the liberals--already weak\nenough--be still further weakened. In consequence, all the sources of\nfriction in China between the United States and Japan will be\nintensified. I do not believe in the predicted war. But should it\ncome, the first act of Japan--so everyone in China believes--will be\nto seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to make\nsure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw materials. The act\nwould be justified as necessary to national existence. Great Britain\nin alliance with Japan would be in no position to protest in anything\nbut the most perfunctory way. The guarantee of such abstinence would\nbe for Japan the next best thing to open naval and financial support.\nWithout the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chinese\nports. In recent years diplomatists have shown themselves capable of\nunlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the men in the\nBritish Foreign Office are not aware of these elementary facts. If\nthey renew the alliance they knowingly take the responsibility for the\nconsequences.\n\nMay 24, 1921.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nA Political Upheaval in China\n\n\nEven in America we have heard of one Chinese revolution, that which\nthrust the Manchu dynasty from the throne. The visitor in China gets\nused to casual references to the second revolution, that which\nfrustrated Yuan Shi Kai's aspirations to be emperor, and the third,\nthe defeat in 1917 of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boy\nemperor back into power. And within the last few weeks the (September\n1920) fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by the\nname of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state has not been\nchanged by it. But as a manifestation of the forces that shape Chinese\npolitical events, for evil and for good, perhaps this last disturbance\nsurpasses the last two \"revolutions\" in significance.\n\nChinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess of\npersonalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow who\ndoes not know a multitude of personal, family and provincial\nhistories. But occasionally something happens which simplifies the\ntangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out of the swirling\ncriss-cross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, at present, the\ncomplete collapse of the Anfu clique which owned the central\ngovernment for two years marks the end of that union of internal\nmilitarism and Japanese foreign influence which was, for China, the\nmost marked fruit of the war. When China entered the war a \"War\nParticipation\" army was formed. It never participated; probably it was\nnever meant to. But its formation threw power wholly into the hands of\nthe military clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. And\nin return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria,\nShantung, new railways, etc., Japan supplied money, munitions,\ninstructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of foreign and\ndomestic politics. The war came to an unexpected and untimely end, but\nby this time the offspring of the marriage of the militarism of Yuan\nShi Kai and Japanese money and influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevism\nwas induced to take the place of Germany as a menace requiring the\nkeeping up of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuaded\nto cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her independence\nand come again under Chinese sovereignty.\n\nThe army and its Japanese support and instruction was, accordingly,\ncontinued. In place of the \"War Participation\" army appeared the\n\"Frontier Defense\" army. Marshal Tuan, the head of the military party,\nremained the nominal political power behind the presidential chair,\nand General Hsu (commonly known as little Hsu, in distinction from old\nHsu, the president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolian\nadventure which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, land\ndevelopment companies and railway schemes, as well as an army. About\nthis military centre as a nucleus gathered the vultures who fed on the\ncarrion. This flock took the name of the Anfu Club. It did not control\nthe entire cabinet, but to it belonged the Minister of Justice, who\nmanipulated the police and the courts, persecuted the students,\nsuppressed liberal journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. And\nthe Club owned the ministers of finance and communications, the two\ncabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make loans.\nIt also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail and\ntelegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic inefficiency, tempered\nonly by the student revolt, set in. In two years the Anfu Club got\naway with two hundred millions of public funds directly, to say\nnothing of what was wasted by incompetency and upon the army. The\nAllies had set out to get China into the war. They succeeded in\ngetting Japan into control of Peking and getting China, politically\nspeaking, into a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion.\n\nThe militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided into two\nfactions, each called after a province. The Anwhei party gathered\nabout little Hsu and was almost identical with the Anfus. The Chili\nfaction had been obliged, so far as Peking was concerned, to content\nitself with such leavings as the Anfu Club tossed to it. Apparently it\nwas hopelessly weaker than its rival, although Tuan, who was\npersonally honest and above financial scandal, was supported by both\nfactions and was the head of both. About three months ago there were a\nfew signs that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself in\nPeking, the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in the\nprovinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (military governors of the\nprovinces) came to the assistance of the president against some\nunusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite of the fact\nthat the military governor of the three Manchurian provinces, Chang\nTso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor of Manchuria, lined up with\nthis league, practically nobody expected anything except some\nmanoeuvering to get a larger share of the spoils.\n\nBut late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to Peking. The\nlatter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded by evil advisers,\ndemanded that he cut loose from little Hsu and the Anfu Club, and\ndeclared open war upon little Hsu--the two had long and notoriously\nbeen bitter enemies. Even then people had great difficulty in\nbelieving that anything would happen except another Chinese\ncompromise. The president was known to be sympathetic upon the whole\nwith the Chili faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese,\nis at least typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin,\nnon-resistant, compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, covering\nup, evading issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. A\nmandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military and\ncivil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and bringing it\nunder the control of the Ministry of War (usually armies in China\nbelong to some general or Tuchun, not to the country). For almost\nforty-eight hours it was thought that Tuan had consented to sacrifice\nlittle Hsu and that the latter would submit at least temporarily. Then\nwith equally sensational abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear on\nthe president. The latter was appointed head of a national defense\narmy, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of the Chili\nfaction, nothing, however, being said about Chang Tso Lin, who had\nmeanwhile returned to Mukden and who still professed allegiance to\nTuan. Troops were mobilized; there was a rush of officials and of the\nwealthy to the concessions of Tientsin and to the hotels of the\nlegation quarter.\n\nThis sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indication of\nthe forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that two weeks after\nTuan and little Hsu had intimidated the president and proclaimed\nthemselves the saviors of the Republic, they were in hiding, their\nenemies of the Chili party were in complete control of Peking, and\nrewards from fifty thousand dollars down were offered for the arrest\nof little Hsu, the ex-ministers of justice, finance and\ncommunications, and other leaders of the Anfu Club. The political\nturnover was as complete as it was sensational. The seemingly\nimpregnable masters of China were impotent fugitives. The carefully\nbuilt up Anfu Club, with its military, financial and foreign support,\nhad crumbled and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen a\npolitical upheaval more sudden and more thoroughgoing. It was not so\nmuch a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a total\ndisappearance, an evaporation.\n\nCorruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing.\nJapanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters vanished\nwith the funds with which stores were to be bought; troops went\nwithout anything to eat for two or three days; large numbers,\nincluding the larger part of one division, went over to the enemy en\nmasse; those who did not desert had no heart for fighting and ran away\nor surrendered on the slightest provocation, saying they were willing\nto fight for their country but saw no reason why they should fight for\na faction, especially a faction that had been selling the country to a\nforeign nation. In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at the\nheight of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat,\nlies the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is a\nstriking exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese--the\npower of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of the coolie\non the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. It went down not so\nmuch because of the strength of the other side as because of its own\nrottenness.\n\nSo far the results are to all appearances negative. The most marked is\nthe disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of the leading men in\nthe War Office said: \"For over a year now the people have been\nstrongly opposed to the Japanese government on account of Shantung.\nBut now even the generals do not care for Japan any more.\" It is\nhardly logical to take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supported\nAnfu party as a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is always\na matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were intimidated to\nthe point of hypnotism by the idea of the irresistible power of Japan\nare now freely laughing at the inefficiency of Japanese leadership. It\nwould not be safe to predict that Japan will not come back as a force\nto be reckoned with in the internal as well as external politics of\nChina, but it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure as\nsuperman to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result.\n\nAnd so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of the\nmilitarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very optimistic\nabout the immediate outcome. They have mostly given up the idea that\nthe country can be reformed by political means. They are sceptical\nabout the possibility of reforming even politics until a new\ngeneration comes on the scene. They are now putting their faith in\neducation and in social changes which will take some years to\nconsummate themselves visibly. The self-styled southern republican\nconstitutional party has not shown itself in much better light than\nthe northern militarist party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen now\ncuts one of the most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly before\nthis upheaval he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and little\nHsu.[2]\n\n    [2] This was written of course several months before Sun Yat\n        Sen was reinstated in control of Canton by the successful\n        revolt of his local adherents against the southern\n        militarists who had usurped power and driven out Sun Yat Sen\n        and his followers. But up to the time when I left China, in\n        July of this year, it was true that the liberals of northern\n        and central China who were bitterly opposed to the Peking\n        Government, did not look to the Southern Government with\n        much hope. The common attitude was a \"plague upon both of\n        your houses\" and a desire for a new start. The conflict\n        between North and South looms much larger in the United\n        States than it did in China.\n\nThis does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks nothing\nhas been gained. The demonstration of the inherent weakness of corrupt\nmilitarism will itself prevent the development of any militarism as\ncomplete as that of the Anfus. As one Chinese gentleman said to me:\n\"When Yuan Shi Kai was overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now a\nsnake has killed the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake may\nbecome, some smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his life\nwill be shorter than that of either lion or tiger.\" In short, each\nsuccessive upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy will\nbe established. This result will be achieved partly because of the\nrepeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military despotism to\nthe Chinese spirit, and partly because with every passing year\neducation will have done its work. Suppressed liberal papers are\ncoming to life, while over twenty Anfu subsidized newspapers and two\nsubsidized news agencies have gone out of being. The soldiers,\nincluding many officers in the Anwhei army, clearly show the effects\nof student propaganda. And it is worth while to note down the name of\none of the leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troops\ndid any particular fighting, and that against great odds in numbers.\nThe name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought for the Chili\nfaction against the Anwhei faction. He has proclaimed from the first\nthat he was fighting to rid the country of military control of civil\ngovernment, and against traitors who would sell their country to\nforeigners. He has come out strongly for a new popular assembly, to\nform a new constitution and to unite the country. And although Chang\nTso Lin has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate could\nnot be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found it\nconvenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. Meanwhile the\nliberals are organizing their forces, hardly expecting to win a\nvictory, but resolved, win or lose, to take advantage of the\nopportunity to carry further the education of the Chinese people in\nthe meaning of democracy.\n\nAugust, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nDivided China\n\n\n1.\n\nIn January 1920 the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming the\nunification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated\nin Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six months\nbeen twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once from\nthe southern. Each act of \"unification\" is in fact a symbol of the\ndivision of China, a division expressing differences of language,\ntemperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography,\npersons and factions. This division has been one of the outstanding\nfacts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten years\nago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet there\nare two other statements which are equally true, although they flatly\ncontradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that so\nfar as the people of China are concerned there is no real division on\ngeographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere\nbetween conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead of\ntwo divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in both\nthe north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region,[3]\neach one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional and\nprovincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably this\nlast statement is the most significant of the three. That all three\nstatements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to\nunderstand even in their larger features.\n\n    [3] Since the writing of this and the former chapter there\n        are some signs that Wu Pei Fu wants to set up in control of\n        the middle districts.\n\nBy the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton when the\ninauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in more\nthan distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the two\nplaces; what filters through into either city and gets published\nconsists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. In\nCanton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and in\nPeking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other\nweek open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and\nGeneral Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There is\nnothing to give the impression--even in circles which accept the\nPeking government only as an evil necessity--that the pretensions of\nSun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small and\ndiscredited group to get some slight power for themselves at the\nexpense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north of\nKwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize the\nimportance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the north\nas well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is\ngeneral that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it\nrepresents the cause of national unity, while the southern government\nrepresents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes her\nweak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue and\naggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has some\nreturned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the \"wrong\ndope\" on the south, and that they were really trying \"to do something\ndown there.\"\n\nConsequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacle\nafforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the only\ndemonstration I have seen in China during the last two years which\ngave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkers\nare accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations and\naccompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a\ndemonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or\nspontaneity--in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked in\nin such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in the\nriver boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localities\nwhich were not able to get a place in the regular procession organized\nminor ones on their own account on the day before and after the\nofficial demonstration. Making all possible allowance for the\nintensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might be\ncelebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene was\nsufficiently impressive to revise one's preconceived ideas and to make\none try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement its\nvitality.\n\nA demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in\nsignificance. However one found foreigners on the ground--at least\nAmericans--saying that in the last few months the men in power in\nCanton were the only officials in China who were actually doing\nsomething for the people instead of filling their own pockets and\nmagnifying their personal power. Even the northern newspapers had not\nentirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed gambling. On\nthe spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine and\nthorough, but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of\nnearly ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief\ndifficulty is financial, and where--apart from motives of personal\nsqueeze--it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarily\nthe end justified the means in retaining this source of revenue.\nEnglish papers throughout China have given much praise to the\ngovernment of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue from\neight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction.\nYet Hong Kong is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and\nit only needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of\nmaintaining its existence in a crisis.\n\nUnder the circumstances, the action of the southern government was\nhardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the most sensational act\nof the Canton government, but one soon learns that it is the\naccompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrative\nundertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the local\nmagistracies throughout the province, the establishment of municipal\ngovernment in Canton--something new in China where local officials are\nall centrally appointed and controlled--based upon the American\nCommission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political\nscience in the United States; plans for introducing local\nself-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction of\nuniversal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps.\n\nThese reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a general\nmovement against centralization and toward local autonomy which is\ngaining headway all over China, a protest against the appointment of\nofficials from Peking and the management of local affairs in the\ninterests of factions--and pocketbooks--whose chief interest in local\naffairs is what can be extracted in the way of profit. For the only\nanalogue of provincial government in China at the present time is the\ncarpet bag government of the south in the days following our civil\nwar. These things explain the restiveness of the country, including\ncentral as well as southern provinces, under Peking domination. But\nthey do not explain the setting up of a new national, or federal\ngovernment, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. To\nunderstand this event it is necessary to go back into history.\n\nIn June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt a\nconstitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the old\nrevolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan and with the\nexecutive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists,\nwasting time in discussing and theorizing when the country needed\naction. Japan had changed her tactics regarding the participation of\nChina in the war, and having got her position established through the\nTwenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and\nvirtually amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own through\nsupervising China's entrance into the war. The British and French were\npressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and\nTang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse,\nsince they regarded the war as none of China's business and were upon\nthe whole more anti-British than anti-German--a fact which partly\naccounts for the share of British journals in the present press\npropaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters to\na head was the fact that the constitution which was about to be\nadopted eliminated the military governors or tuchuns of the provinces,\nand restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been destroyed\nby Yuan Shi Kai, in addition to introducing a policy of\ndecentralization. Coached by members of the so-called progressive\nparty which claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a\nfactionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who\ncontrolled the legislative branch if not the executive, the military\ngovernors demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss\nthe legislators. This demand was more than passively supported by all\nthe Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of the\nAmerican legation. The president weakly yielded and issued an edict\ndispelling parliament, virtually admitting in the document the\nillegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was a\nrefugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchical\nrestoration staged by Chang Shun--who at the present time is again\ncoming to the front in the north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tso\nLin, the present \"strong man\" of China. Later, elections were held and\na new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as the\nlegislature of China at Peking and elected the president, Hsu Shi\nChang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers--in\nshort it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint,\nthe Peking government from a domestic standpoint.\n\nThe revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized the\nlegality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit the\nlegal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogus\nparliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the new\nlegislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down by\nthe constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the old\nparliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led an\nintermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authentic\nconstitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president of\nChina and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported.\n\nSuch is the technical and formal background of the present southern\ngovernment. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government is\ndoubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its own\npositive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms \"bogus\" and\n\"defunct,\" so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider to\nbe justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appear\nto invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of the\nbelated character of its final action. A protest which waits four\nyears to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legal\ntechnicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality\nfor legality, the southern government has a bare shade the better of\nthe technical argument. But in the face of a government which has\nforeign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion\nfor four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is\nwiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government,\nwhich in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionary\nmovement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset as\na protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of the\nPeking government.\n\nIt is an open secret that the southern movement has not received the\nundivided support of all the forces present in Canton which are\nopposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, was\nnotable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having found\nit convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. The\nprovincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor of\nconfining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and the\nencouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward\nto an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all\nthe provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted to\npostpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliance\nwith the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to be\nable to resist the north should the latter undertake a military\nexpedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the new\nmove was being overworked, and while having no objections to an out\nand out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the time\nfor it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's\nattempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popular\nrevulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such a\nmovement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite of\nreports of open strife freely circulated by British and Peking\ngovernment newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyally\nsuppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun Yat\nSen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal government\nwill confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincial\nmatters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. There\nis still room for friction however, especially as to the control of\nrevenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for one\nadministration, let alone two.\n\n\n2.\n\nThe members of the new southern government are strikingly different in\ntype from those one meets elsewhere whether in Peking or the\nprovincial capitals. The latter men are literally mediaeval when they\nare not late Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little\nmodern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated men,\nnot only in the school sense and in the sense that they have had some\nspecial training for their jobs, but in the sense that they think the\nideas and speak the language current among progressive folk all over\nthe world. They welcome inquiry and talk freely of their plans, hopes\nand fears. I had the opportunity of meeting all the men who are most\ninfluential in both the local and federal governments; these\nconversations did not take the form of interviews for publication, but\nI learned that there are at least three angles from which the total\nsituation is viewed.\n\nGovernor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no English. He\nis distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. He is a man of\nforce, capable of drastic methods, straightforward intellectually and\nphysically, of unquestioned integrity and of almost Spartan life in a\ncountry where official position is largely prized for the luxuries it\nmakes possible. For example, practically alone among Chinese\nprovincial officials of the first rank he has no concubines. Not only\nthis, but he proposed to the provincial assembly a measure to\ndisenfranchise all persons who have concubines. (The measure failed\nbecause it is said its passage would have deprived the majority of the\nassemblymen of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of\nall the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select a man\nlikely to become a national figure of the first order in the future,\nit would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can give and also\ncommand loyalty--a fact which in itself makes him almost unique.\n\nHis views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems in China is\nthat of real unification. Industry and education are held back because\nof lack of stability of government, and the better elements in society\nseclude themselves from all public effort. The question is how this\nunification is to be obtained. In the past it has been tried by force\nused by strong individuals. Yuan Shi Kai tried and failed; Feng Kuo\nChang tried and failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method\nmust be surrendered. China can be unified only by the people\nthemselves, employing not force but the methods of normal political\nevolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to\ndecentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization must be\nabandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the provinces the\nmaximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals must give as much\nauthority as possible to the districts, and the districts to the\ncommunities. Officials must be chosen by and from the local districts\nand everything must be done to encourage local initiative. Governor\nChen's chief ambition is to introduce this system into Kwantung\nprovince. He believes that other provinces will follow as soon as the\nmethod has been demonstrated, and that national unity will then be a\npyramid built out of the local blocks.\n\nWith extreme self-government in administrative matters, Governor Chen\nwill endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized economic control. He\nsays in effect that the west has developed economic anarchy along with\npolitical control, with the result of capitalistic domination and\nclass struggle. He wishes to avert this consequence in China by having\ngovernment control from the first of all basic raw materials and all\nbasic industries, mines, transportation, factories for cement, steel,\netc. In this way the provincial authorities hope to secure an equable\nindustrial development of the province, while at the same time\nprocuring ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since\nalmost all the other governors in China are using their power, in\ncombination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, to\nmonopolize the natural resources of their provinces for private\nprofit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are felt to be\na menace to privilege and that he is advertised all over China as a\ndevout Bolshevist. His views have special point in view of British\nefforts to get an economic stranglehold upon the province--efforts\nwhich are dealt with in a prior chapter.\n\nAnother type of views lays chief stress upon the internal political\ncondition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make such a fuss\nabout having two governments for China, when, in point of fact, China\nis torn into dozens of governments? In the north, war is sure to break\nout sooner or later between Chang Tso Lin and his rivals. Each\nmilitary governor is afraid of his division generals. The brigade\ngenerals intrigue against the division leaders, and even colonels are\ndoing all they can to further their personal power. The Peking\ngovernment is a stuffed sham, taking orders from the military\ngovernors of the provinces, living only on account of jealousies among\nthese generals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is\nactually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally\nrecognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain in good\nfaith the work of the revolution, give this province the best possible\ncivil administration; then in the inevitable approaching debacle, the\nsouthern government will be ready to serve as the nucleus of a genuine\nreconstruction. Meantime we want, if not the formal recognition of\nforeign governments, at least their benevolent neutrality.\n\nDr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution of\n1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essence\nnationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after the\ninauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the seventy-two\npatriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in Canton to throw off\nthe Manchu yoke, some six months before the successful revolt. The\nmonument is the most instructive single lesson which I have seen in\nthe political history of the revolution. It is composed of seventy-two\ngranite blocks. Upon each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National\nLeague of Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or\nSingapore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migration\nto foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores financed\nthe revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and provided its\norganization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation of this nationalism,\nwhich was more concerned with freeing China--and Asia--from all\nforeign domination than with particular political problems. And in\nspite of the movement of events since that day, he remains essentially\nat that stage, being closer in spirit to the nationalists of the\nEuropean irredentist type than to the spirit of contemporary young\nChina. A convinced republican, he nevertheless measures events and men\nin the concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the\nindependence of China from foreign control, rather than by what they\nwill do to promote a truly democratic government. This is the sole\nexplanation that can be given for his unfortunate coquetting a year\nago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu Club. He allowed himself\nto be deceived into thinking that they were ready to turn against the\nJapanese if he would give them his support; and his nationalist\nimagination was inflamed by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for\nthe Chinese subjugation of Mongolia.\n\nMore openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the new southern\ngovernment as representing a division of China. If, he insists, it had\nnot been for the secession of the south in 1917, Japan would now be in\nvirtually complete control of all China. A unified China would have\nmeant a China ready to be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession\nlocalized Japanese aggressions, made it evident that the south would\nfight rather than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which\npublic opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands and\nagainst the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independence\nof China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not checkmate her. She\nstill expects with the assistance of Chang Tso Lin to make northern\nChina her vassal. The support which foreign governments in general and\nthe United States in particular are giving Peking is merely playing\ninto the hands of the Japanese. The independent south affords the only\nobstacle which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern\nChina in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authentic\nrumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the Japanese consul\ngeneral to the new president (no other foreign official has made an\nofficial visit), the former offered from his government the official\nrecognition of Dr. Sun as president of all China, if the latter would\nrecognize the Twenty-one Demands as an accomplished fact. From the\nJapanese standpoint the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of\nJapanese claims is the one thing impossible to the new government. But\nmeantime the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun's\ntype in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintaining\nthe political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, that a\ndivided China is for the time being the only means to an ultimately\nindependent China.\n\nThese views are not given as stating the whole truth of the situation.\nThey are ex parte. But they are given as setting forth in good faith\nthe conceptions of the leaders of the southern movement and as\nrequiring serious attention if the situation of China, domestic and\ninternational, is to be understood. Upon my own account, and not\nsimply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusion\nquite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it is\nnot possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as a\npart of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to\nattach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as a\nsymbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southern\nleader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do other\nthan recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no need\nto coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains a\nnominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military and\ncorrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreign\naggression.\n\nIn my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of the Chinese\nsituation, the real interests of both China and the United States\nwould be served if, in the first place, the United States should take\nthe lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving of\nexpress notice upon the Peking government that in no case would a\nrestoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seem\nin America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of\na foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact.\nThe present government endures only in virtue of the support of\nforeign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue,\none kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry and\neducation back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest and\ninstability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in which\nwhatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The second\nmeasure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United States\nshould take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises about\nthe disbanding of the army, and the introduction of general\nretrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will\npursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking\ngovernment, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans as\nthey fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meeting\nof all its obligations. The notification to be effective might well\ninclude a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case the\ngovernment does not seriously try to put its profuse promises into\nexecution. It should also include a definite discouragement of any\nexpenditures designed for military conquest of the south.\n\nDiplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of the\nquestion at present. It is not out of the question to put on the\nfinancial screws so that the southern government will be allowed space\nand time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful means to give one\nor more provinces a decent, honest and progressive civil\nadministration. It is unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles in the\nway of carrying out such a policy. But in my judgment it is the only\npolicy by which the Great Powers will not become accomplices in\nperpetuating the weakness and division of China. It is the most\nstraightforward way of meeting whatever plans of aggression Japan may\nentertain.\n\nMay, 1921.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nFederalism in China\n\n\nThe newcomer in China in observing and judging events usually makes\nthe mistake of attaching too much significance to current happenings.\nOccurrences take place which in the western world would portend\nimportant changes--and nothing important results. It is not easy to\nloosen the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event\nwhich is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be part\nof a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid plan must\nbe behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience added to time\nand experience to make one realize that even when there is a rhythm in\nevents the tempo is so retarded that one must wait a long time to\njudge what is really going on. Most political events are like daily\nchanges in the weather, fluctuations back and forth which may\nseriously affect individuals but which taken one by one tell little\nabout the movement of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due\nto human intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer\nerrs by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme,\ntoo farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to be only\nsome immediate advantage, some direct increase of power, the overthrow\nof a rival, the grasping at greater wealth by an isolated act, without\nany consecutive or systematic looking ahead.\n\nForeigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, in judging\nthe Chinese political situation of the last few years. Beginning two\nyears ago, one heard experienced Chinese with political affiliations\nsaying that it was impossible for things to go on as they were for\nmore than three months longer. Some decisive change must occur. Yet\noutwardly the situation has remained much the same not only for three\nmonths but for two years, the exception being the overthrow of the\nAnfu faction a year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite\nturn in events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting\nof power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set.\nNevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy which I\nhave been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that the last few\nmonths _have_ revealed a definite and enduring trend--that through the\ndiurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal power and wealth a\nseasonal political change in society is now showing itself. Certain\nlines of cleavage seem to show themselves, so that through the welter\nof striking, picturesque, sensational but meaningless events, a\ndefinite pattern is revealed.\n\nThis pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter--a movement\ntoward the development of a federal form of government. In calling the\nmovement one toward federalism, there is, however, more of a jump into\nthe remote future than circumstances justify. It would be more\naccurate, as well as more modest, to say that there is a well defined\nand seemingly permanent trend toward provincial autonomy and local\nself-government accompanied by a hope and a vague plan that in the\nfuture the more or less independent units will recombine into the\nUnited or Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future\nanticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the present\nsecessionist movement; the second the formation of northern and\nsouthern confederations respectively; the third a reunion into a\nsingle state.\n\nTo go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite and\nlasting movement of this sort would presume too much on the reader's\nknowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance with specific\nrecent events. I shall confine myself to quite general features of the\nsituation. The first feature is the new phase which has been assumed\nby the long historic antagonism of the north and the south. Roughly\nspeaking, the revolution which established the republic and overthrew\nthe Manchus represented a victory for the south. But the\ntransformation during the last five years of the nominal republic into\na corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lords\nhas represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact,\nsymbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or\nmilitary governor in China--in some respects the only powerful one who\nhas survived the vicissitudes of the last few years--namely Chang Tso\nLin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The\nso-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be\nunderstood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and\nmilitarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts.\nThe \"civil war\" till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict of\nmilitary governors and factions, part of that struggle for personal\npower and wealth which has been going on all over China.\n\nBut recently events have taken a different course. In four of the\nsouthern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have toppled over,\nand the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed their\nindependence of both the Peking and the former military Canton\ngovernments--the province in which Canton situated being one of the\nfour. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provinces\nto get comparative independence, last fall, not long after the\noverthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with the\naid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held in\nChangsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was\n\"Hunan for the Hunanese.\" The slogan embodies the spirit of two powers\neach aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of the\nprinciple of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically more\nmature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented by\nPeking.\n\nAs I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is obscured\nby the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who with\nnominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south.\nIf, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. He\nmay use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northern\nmilitarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with the\nsoutherners and establish him as the antagonist of the federal\nprinciple. This is the course which his earlier record would call for.\nOr he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and try\nonce more the Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization with\nhimself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as\nhis rival. This is the course which the past record of military\nleaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent and goes\nbad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not prophecy. It\nis only a statement of what has uniformly happened in China just at\nthe moment a military leader seemed to have complete power in his\ngrasp. In other words, a victory for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate\nor may retard the development of provincial autonomy according to the\ncourse he pursues. It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it.\n\nThe basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward local\nautonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaningless\nshiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is in accord\nwith Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. Feudalism is\npast and gone two thousand years ago, and at no period since has China\npossessed a working centralized government. The absolute empires which\nhave come and gone in the last two millenniums existed by virtue of\nnon-interference and a religious aura. The latter can never be\nrestored; and every episode of the republic demonstrates that China\nwith its vast and diversified territories, its population of between\nthree hundred and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude of\nlanguages and lack of communications, its enormous local attachments\nsanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, cannot be\nmanaged from a single and remote centre. China rests upon a network of\nlocal and voluntary associations cemented by custom. This fact has\ngiven it its unparallelled stability and its power to progress even\nunder the disturbed political conditions of the past ten years. I\nsometimes think that Americans with their own traditional contempt for\npolitics and their spontaneous reliance upon self-help and local\norganization are the ones who are naturally fitted to understand\nChina's course. The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the\nstate have continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand\nbetter than we do the significance of local self-government; but they\nare misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot readily\nfind or see government when it does not take political form.\n\nIt is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow of\nthe Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure of international\nrelations they attempted to force, especially in fiscal matters, a\ncentralization upon the provinces wholly foreign to the spirit of the\npeople. This created hostility where before there had been\nindifference. China may possibly not emerge from her troubles a\nunified nation, any more than a much smaller and less populous Europe\nemerged from the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state.\nIndeed one often wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is\nnot much more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain.\nWhatever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from a\nvariety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will be\neffected by means of associations and organizations which even though\nthey assume a political form are not primarily political in nature.\n\nCriticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the present\ntrend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. It is evident\nthat the present weakness of China is due to her divided condition.\nHence it is natural to argue that the present movement being one of\nsecession and general disintegration will increase the weakness of the\ncountry. It is also evident that many of China's troubles are due to\nthe absence of any efficient administrative system; it is reasonable\nto argue that China cannot get even railways and universal education\nwithout a strong and stable central government. There is no doubt\nabout the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China\ndeeply deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final\naccomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But remedies\nfor China's ills based upon ignoring history, psychology and actual\nconditions are so utopian that it is not worth while to argue whether\nor not they are theoretically desirable. The remedy of China's\ntroubles by a strong, centralized government is on a par with curing\ndisease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil of sectionalism is real,\nbut since it is real it cannot be dealt with by trying a method which\nimplies its non-existence. If the devil is really there, he will not\nbe exorcized by a formula. If the trouble is internal, not due to an\nexternal demon, the disease can be cured only by using the factors of\nhealth and vigor which the patient already possesses. And in China\nwhile these factors of recuperation and growth are numerous, they all\nexist in connection with local organizations and voluntary\nassociations. The increasing volume of the cry that the \"tuchuns must\ngo\" comes from the provincial and local interests which have been\ninsulted and violated by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic\nsituation. After this negative work is completed, the constructive\nrebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and\nabilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that which\noccurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre.\n\nAnother objection to the present tendency has force especially from\nthe foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchu\ndynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due to\ninternational pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were a\ncapital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meet\nforeign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result was\ndisaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre which\nmay be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, this\ndesire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationals\nto the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to\ntake a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime\nwhere and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic\nrelations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of\nconcessions?\n\nIn one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herself\nas well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate the\ndesire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China's domestic\naffairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues and\nfrom which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is also\ndanger that one foreign nation may line up with one group of\nprovinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so that\ninternational friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sources\nand even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young's Japan\nChronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese\nexperiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists\nin the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for a\nsinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation that may\ncome into existence if there are several political centres in China\nand one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another.\n\nThe danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attempting\nthe impossible--namely checking the movement toward local autonomy,\neven though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The danger\nonly emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation;\nthat its essence is time. The evils and troubles of China are real\nenough, and there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her\nown making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular\neducation. But no one who knows the common people doubts that they\nwill win through if they are given time. And in the concrete this\nmeans that they be left politically alone to work out their own\ndestiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific Conference\nto place China under some kind of international tutelage. This chapter\nand the events connected with the tendency which it reports will be\ncited as showing this need. Some of the schemes will spring from\nmotives that are hostile to China. Some will be benevolently conceived\nin a desire to save China from herself and shorten her period of chaos\nand confusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as of\nChina's freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give China\na chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, in\nimpatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that we are a\npower in international affairs and that we too have a positive foreign\npolicy. And a benevolent policy of supporting China from without,\ninstead of promoting her aspirations from within, may in the end do\nChina about as much harm as a policy conceived in malevolence.\n\nJuly, 1921.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nA Parting of the Ways for America\n\n\n1\n\nThe realities of American policy in China and toward China are going\nto be more seriously tested in the future than they ever have been in\nthe past. Japanese papers have been full of protests against any\nattempt by the Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would that\nAmerican journals were full of warnings that America is on trial at\nthe Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent goodwill behind her\namiable professions. The world will not stop with the Pacific\nConference; the latter, however important, will not arrest future\ndevelopments, and the United States will continue to be on trial till\nshe has established by her acts a permanent and definite attitude. For\nthe realities of the situation cannot be exhausted in any formula or\nin any set of diplomatic agreements, even if the Conference confounds\nthe fears of pessimists and results in a harmonious union of the\npowers in support of China's legitimate aspirations for free political\nand economic growth.\n\nThe Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger situation;\nand its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable factor in the\ndetermination of subsequent events. Sometimes one is obliged to fall\nback on a trite phrase. We are genuinely at a parting of the ways.\nEven if we should follow in our old path, there would none the less be\na parting of the ways, for we cannot consistently tread the old path\nunless we are animated by a much more conscious purpose and a more\ngeneral and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled our\nactivities in the past.\n\nThe ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the fear that\nAmerica is soon to be an active source of danger in the Far East are\nnot confined to persons on foreign shores. The prevailing attitude in\nsome circles of American opinion is that called by President Hibben\ncynical pessimism. All professed radicals and many liberals believe\nthat if our course has been better in the past it has been due to\ngeographical accidents combined with indifference and with our\nundeveloped economic status. Consequently they believe that since we\nhave now become what is called a world-power and a nation which\nexports instead of importing capital, our course will soon be as bad\nas that of any of the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion is\nclearly an emotional reaction following the disillusionments of\nVersailles. In others, it is due to adherence to a formula: nothing in\ninternational affairs can come out of capitalism and America is\nemphatically a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings are\ncorrect, they are not discussable; neither an emotion nor an absolute\nformula is subject to analysis.\n\nBut there are specific elements in the situation which give grounds\nfor apprehension as to the future. These specific elements are capable\nof detection and analysis. An adequate realization of their nature\nwill be a large factor in preventing cynical apprehensions from\nbecoming actual. This chapter is an attempt at a preliminary listing,\ninadequate, of course, as any preliminary examination must be. While\nan a priori argument based on a fatalistic formula as to how a\n\"capitalistic nation\" must conduct itself does not appeal to me, there\nare nevertheless concrete facts which are suggested by that formula.\nPart of our comparatively better course in China in the past is due to\nthe fact that we have not had the continuous and close alliance\nbetween the State Department and big banking interests which is found\nin the case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history of\ndevelopments in China could be written in which the Russian Asiatic\nBank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo-China Bank and\nBanque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Hongkong-Shanghai\nBank, etc., did not figure prominently. These banks work in the\nclosest harmony, not only with railway and construction syndicates and\nbig manufacturing interests at home, but also with their respective\nforeign offices. It is hardly too much to say that legations and banks\nhave been in most important matters the right and left hands of the\nsame body. American business interests have complained an the past\nthat the American government does not give to American traders abroad\nthe same support that the nationals of other states receive. In the\npast these complaints have centred largely about actual wrongs\nsuffered or believed to have been suffered by American business\nundertakings carried on in a foreign country. With the present\nexpansion of capital and of commerce, the same complaints and demands\nare going to be made not with reference to grievances suffered, but\nwith reference to furthering, to pushing American commercial interests\nin connection with large banking groups. It would take a credulous\nperson to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. As\nwe become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises what\nassurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred to\ninternational politics?\n\nIt should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed by the\ngreat powers--and as frequently violated by them--even if it be\nhenceforth observed in good faith, does not adequately protect us from\nthis danger. The open door policy is not primarily a policy about\nChina herself but rather about the policies of foreign powers toward\none another with respect to China. It demands equality of economic\nopportunity for different nations. Were it enforced, it would prevent\nthe granting of monopolies to any one nation: there is nothing in it\nto render impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreign\npowers, an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due share\nwith respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably reduce\nfriction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the danger of\nfuture wars--as long as China herself is impotent to go to war. The\nagreement might conceivably for a considerable time be of benefit to\nChina herself. But it is clear that for the United States to become a\npartner in any such arrangement would involve a reversal of our\nhistoric policy in the Far East. It might be technically consistent\nwith the open door policy, but it would be a violation of the larger\nsense in which the American people has understood and praised that\nideal. He is blind who does not see that there are forces making for\nsuch a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an opening\nof our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not being\nrealized.\n\nOne of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase that\nan international agreement on an economic and financial basis might be\nof value to China herself. The mere suggestion that such a thing is\npossible is abhorrent to many, especially to radicals. There seems to\nbe something sinister in it. So it is worth explaining how and why it\nmight be so. In the first place, it would obviously terminate the\nparticularistic grabbing for \"leased\" territory, concessions and\nspheres of influence which has so damaged China. At the present time,\nthe point of this remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as at\none time it might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan's aims in\nChina is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. An\ninternational economic arrangement may therefore be plausibly\npresented as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China of\nthe Japanese menace. For Japan to stay out would be to give herself\naway; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities to constant\nscrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part of the fear of Japan\nregarding the Pacific Conference is due to a belief that some such\narrangement is contemplated. The case is easily capable of such\npresentation as to make it appeal to Americans who are really friendly\nto China and who haven't the remotest interest in her economic\nexploitation.\n\nThe arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate the\nLansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous recognition of\nJapan's _special_ interests in China.\n\nThe other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars of China\nare commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the military governors\nand generals. The greater one's knowledge, the more one perceives how\nintimately the former evil is dependent upon the latter. The financial\nplight of the Chinese government, its continual foreign borrowings\nwhich threaten bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristic\ndomination and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and squeeze.\nWithout this expense, China would have no great difficulty henceforth\nin maintaining a balance in her budget. The retardation of public\neducation whose advancement--especially in elementary schools--is\nChina's greatest single need is due to the same cause. So is the\ngrowth in official corruption which is rapidly extending into business\nand private life.\n\nIn fact, every one of the obstacles to the progress of China is\nconnected with the rule of military factions and their struggles with\none another for complete mastery. An economic international agreement\namong the great powers can be made which would surely reduce and\npossibly eliminate the greatest evils of \"militarism.\" Many liberal\nChinese say in private that they would be willing to have a temporary\ninternational receivership for government finance, provided they could\nbe assured of its nature and the exact date and conditions of its\ntermination--a proviso which they are sensible enough to recognize\nwould be extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership in\nforming and executing any such scheme would, they feel, afford the\nbest reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such circumstances\na plausible case can be made out for proposals which, under the guise\nof traditional American friendship for China, would in fact commit us\nto a reversal of our historic policy.\n\nThere are radicals abroad and at home who think that our entrance into\na Consortium already proves that we have entered upon the road of\nreversal and who naturally see in the Pacific Conference the next\nlogical step. I have previously stated my own belief that our State\nDepartment proposed the Consortium primarily for political ends, as a\nmeans of checking the policy pursued by Japan of making unproductive\nloans to China in return for which she was getting an immediate grip\non China's natural resources and preparing the way for direct\nadministrative and financial control when the day of reckoning and\nforeclosure should finally come. I also said that the Consortium was\nbetween two stools, the financial and the political and that up to the\npresent its chief value had been negative and preventive, and that\njealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great Britain in any\nconstructive policy on the part of the Consortium was likely to\nmaintain the same condition. I have seen no reason thus far to change\nmy mind on this point, nor in regard to the further belief that\nprobably the interests of China in the end will be best served by the\ncontinuation of this deterrent function. But the question is bound to\narise: why continue the Consortium if it isn't doing anything? The\npressure of foreign powers interested in the exploitation of China and\nof impatient American economic interests may combine to put an end to\nthe present rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two\nstools between which the past action of the American government has\nmanaged to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single solid\nbench.\n\nAt the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or something\nworse, I add that up to the present time the American phase of the\nConsortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of becoming a club exercised\nby American finance over China's economic integrity and independence.\nI believe the repeated statements of the American representative that\nhe himself and the interests he represents would be glad if China\nproved her ability to finance her own public utilities without\nresorting to foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first\npublic utterance of the new American minister to China who in his\nreference to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent function\nand upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers to finance\npublic utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. Stevens, the\nAmerican representative, to say that he represents the conservative\ninvestment type of banker, not the \"promotion\" type, and that thus far\nhis great concern has been the problem of protecting the buyer of such\nsecurities as are passed on by the banks to the ultimate investor--so\nmuch so that he has aroused criticism from American business interests\nimpatient for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the\nConsortium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably be\nentertained.\n\nSuppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American government\nis genuinely interested in China and in making the policy of the open\ndoor and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity a reality,\nnot merely a name, and suppose that it is interested in doing so from\nan American self-interest sufficiently enlightened to perceive that\nthe political and economic advancement of the United States is best\nfurthered by a policy which is identical with China's ability to\ndevelop herself freely and independently: what then would be the wise\nAmerican course? In short, it would be to view our existing European\ninterests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern interests\nand issues as parts of one and the same problem. If we are actuated by\nthe motive hypothetically imputed to our government and we fail in its\nrealization, the chief reason will be that we regard the European\nquestion and the Asiatic problem as two different questions, or\nbecause we identify them from the wrong end.\n\nOur present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It involves not\nmerely foreign governmental loans but a multitude of private advances\nand commitments. These financial entanglements affect not merely our\nindustry and commerce but our politics. They involve much more\nimmediately pressing concerns than to our Asiatic relations, and they\ninvolve billions where the latter involve millions. The danger under\nsuch conditions that our Asiatic relations will be sacrificed to our\nEuropean is hardly fanciful.\n\nTo make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, J. P.\nMorgan & Co., which is most heavily involved in European indebtedness\nto the United States, is the firm which is the leading spirit in the\nConsortium for China. It seems almost inevitable that the Asiatic\nproblem should look like small potatoes in comparison with the\nEuropean one, especially as our own industrial recuperation is so\nclosely connected with European relations, while the Far East cuts a\nnegligible figure. To my mind the real danger to set out upon selfish\nexploitation of China: intelligent self-interest, tradition and the\nfact that our chief asset in China is our past freedom from a\npredatory course, dictate a course of cooperation with China. The\ndanger is that China will be subordinated and sacrificed because of\nprimary preoccupation with the high finance and politics of Europe,\nthat she will be lost in the shuffle.\n\nThe European aspect of the problem can be made more concrete by\nreference to Great Britain in particular. That country suffers from\nthe embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She has already made it\nsufficiently clear that she would like to draw America into the\nalliance, making it tripartite, since that would be the easiest way of\nmaintaining good relations with both Japan and the United States.\nThere is no likelihood that any such step will be consummated. But\nBritish diplomacy is experienced and astute. And by force of\ncircumstances our high finance has contracted a sort of economic\nalliance with Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtue\nfor America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-British\nsentiment. But the British foreign office exists and operates apart\nfrom the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated English\ndomestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the _Empire_ side of the\nBritish Empire, no matter what party is in the saddle in domestic\naffairs. Every resource will be employed to bring about a settlement\nat the Pacific Conference which, even though it includes some degree\nof compromise on the part of Great Britain, will bend the Asiatic\npolicy of the United States to the British traditions in the Far East,\ninstead of committing Great Britain to combining with the United\nStates in making a reality of the integrity of China to which both\ncountries are nominally committed. It does not seem an extreme\nstatement to say that the immediate issues of the Conference depend\nupon the way in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated,\neither as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or on\nthe other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the European\npowers to the traditional American policy.\n\nA publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere friend of\nChina remarked in private conversation that if the United States could\nnot secure the adherence of Great Britain to her Asiatic policy by\npersuasion (he was deploring the Japanese alliance) she might do so by\nbuying it--through remission of her national debt to us. It is not\nnecessary to resort to the measure so baldly suggested. But the remark\nat least suggests that our involvement in European, especially\nBritish, finance and politics may be treated in either of two ways for\neither of two results.\n\n\n2\n\nThat the Chinese people generally speaking has a less antagonistic\nfeeling toward the United States than towards other powers seems to me\nan undoubted fact. The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by\nthe treatment of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion\nact, by the turning over of our interest in the building of the\nPeking-Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the\nLansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by President\nWilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. Those\ndisturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious as to our\nskill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our good-will.\nAmericans, taken individually and collectively, are to the Chinese--at\nleast such was my impression--a rather simple folk, taking the word in\nits good and its deprecatory sense. In noting the Chinese reaction to\nthe proposed Pacific Conference, it was interesting to see the\ncombination of an almost unlimited hope that the United States was to\nlead in protecting them from further aggressions and in rectifying\nexisting evils, with a lack of confidence, a fear that the United\nStates would have something put over on it.\n\nFriendly feeling is of course mainly based upon a negative fact, the\nfact that the United States has taken no part in \"leasing\"\nterritories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-national\npost-offices. On the positive side stands the contribution made by\nAmericans to education, especially medical, and that of girls and\nwomen, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, there are the\nearly service of Burlinghame, the open door policy of John Hay (though\nfailure to maintain it in fact while securing signatures to it on\npaper is a considerable part of the Chinese belief in our defective\nenergy) and the part played by the United States in moderating the\nterms of the settlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a\nconsiderable number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that\nwe were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodying\nthe Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly made on the\nbasis of our own interests which these treaties might injuriously\naffect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge of assistance\nto China when the time should be opportune for raising the whole\nquestion. And without doubt the reservation made on May 16, 1915, by\nour State Department is a strong card at the forthcoming Conference if\nthe Department wishes to play it.\n\nFrom an American standpoint, the open door principle represents one of\nthe only two established principles of American diplomacy, the other\nbeing, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with sentimental\nor idealistic associations which have clustered about it, it\nconstitutes us in some vague fashion in both the Chinese and American\npublic opinion a sort of guardian or at least spokesman of the\ninterests of China in relation to foreign powers. Although, as was\npointed out in a former chapter, the open door policy directly\nconcerns other nations in their relation to China rather than China\nherself, yet the violation of the policy by other powers has been so\nfrequent and so much to the detriment of China, that American\ninterest, prestige and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an\nenforcement of it as will redound to the advantage of China.\n\nCitizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion of\nsuch a relationship between the United States and China. It presents\nitself as a proclamation of superior national virtue under cover of\nwhich the United States aims to establish its influence in China at\nthe expense of other countries. The irritation is exasperated by the\nfact that the situation as it stands is an undoubted economic and\npolitical asset of the United States in China. We may concede without\nargument any contention that the situation is not due to any superior\nvirtue but rather to contingencies of history and geography--in which\nrespect it is not unlike many things that pass for virtues with\nindividuals. The contention may be admitted without controversy\nbecause it is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so\nmuch how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is\nto be treated and what consequences are in flow from it. It is a fact\nthat up to the present an intelligent self-interest of America has\ncoincided with the interests of a stable, independent and progressive\nChina. It is also a fact that American traditions and sentiments have\ngathered about this consideration so that now there is widespread\nconviction in the American people of moral obligations of assistance\nand friendly protection owed by us to China. At present, no policy can\nbe entered upon that does not bear the semblance of fairness and\ngoodwill. We have at least so much protection against the dangers\ndiscussed in the prior chapter.\n\nAmong Americans in China and presumably at home there is a strong\nfeeling that we should adopt for the future stronger and more positive\npolicies than we have maintained in the past. This feeling seems to me\nfraught with dangers unless we make very clear to ourselves in just\nwhat respects we are to continue and make good in a more positive\nmanner our traditional policy. To some extent our past policy has been\none of drifting. Radical change in this respect may go further than\nappears upon the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our\npolicy. What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same\nthing that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled\npolicy, no matter how \"constructive\" it may appear to be, can hardly\nhelp involving us in the domestic policies of China, an affair of\nfactions and a game which the Chinese understand and play much better\nthan any foreigners. Such an involvement would at once lessen a\npresent large asset in China, aloofness from internal intrigues and\nstruggles.\n\nThe specific protests of Chinese in this country--mainly\nCantonese--against the Consortium seem to me mainly based on\nmisapprehension. But their _general_ attitude of opposition\nnevertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief that\nthe effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government a\nfactitious advantage in the internal conflict which is waging in\nChina, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark a taking of\nsides on our part. It is well remembered that the effect of the\n\"reorganization\" loan of the prior Consortium--in which the United\nStates was _not_ a partner--was to give Yuan Shi Kai the funds which\nseated him and the militarist faction after him, firmly in the\ngovernmental saddle. Viewing the matter from a larger point of view\nthan that of Canton vs. Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard\nbrought by Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows:\nThe republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the\nbeginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to fight it\nout. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial and economic\ninterest in China, even admitting that its industrial effect was\nadvantageous to China, would be to create an interest in _stabilizing_\nChina politically, which in effect would mean to sanctify the status\nquo, and prevent the development of a revolution which cannot be\naccomplished without internal disorders that would affect foreign\ninvestments unfavorably. These considerations are not mentioned for\nthe sake of throwing light on the Consortium: they are cited as an\nillustration of the probability that a too positive and constructive\ndevelopment of our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in\nan interference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China's\nwelfare, to that free and independent development in which we profess\nsuch interest.\n\nBut how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreign\ndepredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to change our\nnominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter much more positive\nand detailed policies? If there was in existence at the present time\nany such thing as a diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a diplomacy\nof governments, the question would mean something quite different from\nwhat it now means. As things now stand the people should profoundly\ndistrust the _politicians'_ love for China. It is too frequently the\nreverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps by\nanti-British feeling.\n\nThere should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressive\nactivities of other nations in China, centering but not exhausted at\nthis time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble to China but\nthey are potential causes of trouble in our own international\nrelationships. We are committed by our tradition and by the present\nactualities of the situation to attempting something positive for\nChina as respects her international status, to live up to our\nresponsibility is a most difficult and delicate matter. We have on the\none side to avoid getting entangled in quasi-imperialistic European\npolicies in Asia, whether under the guise of altruism, of putting\nourselves in a position where we can exercise a more effective\nsupervision of their behavior, or by means of economic expansion. On\nthe other side, we have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or\navowed antagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will only\nincrease friction, encourage a combination especially of Great Britain\nand Japan---or of France and Japan--against us, and bring war\nappreciably nearer.\n\nWe need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from outside\nherself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve China from\nJapanese encroachments, from all encroachments, China would not of\nnecessity be brought nearer her legitimate goal of orderly and\nprosperous internal development. Apart from the question of how far\nwar can now settle any fundamental issues without begetting others as\ndangerous, China of all countries is the one where settlement by\nforce, especially by outside force, is least applicable, and most\nlikely to be enormously disserviceable. China is used to taking time\nto deal with her problems: she can neither understand not profit by\nimpatient methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to\nher genius. Moreover a civilization which is on a continental scale,\nwhich is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, which\nis thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in its development\nwithout disaster. Transformation from within is its sole way out, and\nwe can best help China by trying to see to it that she gets the time\nshe needs in order to effect this transformation, whether or not we\nlike the particular form it assumes at any particular time.\n\nA successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched her problems\nof education, of factional and sectional forces, of political\nimmaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. It\nwould affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, but in all human\nprobability for the worse, increasing the likelihood that she would\nenter upon an industrialization which would repeat the worst evils of\nwestern industrial life, without the immunities, resistances and\nremedial measures which the West has evolved. The imagination cannot\nconceive a worse crime than fastening western industrialism upon China\nbefore she has developed within herself the meaning of coping with the\nforces which it would release. The danger is great enough as it is.\nWar waged in China's behalf by western powers and western methods\nwould make the danger practically irresistible. In addition we should\ngain a permanent interest in China which is likely to be of the most\ndangerous character to ourselves. If we were not committed by it to\nfuture imperialism, we should be luckier than we have any right to\nhope to be. These things are said against a mental protest to\nadmitting even by implication the prospect of war with Japan, but it\nseems necessary to say them.\n\nThese remarks are negative and vague as to our future course. They\nimply a confession of lack of such wisdom as would enable me to make\npositive definite proposals. But at least I have confidence in the\nwisdom and goodwill of the American and other peoples to deal with the\nproblem, if they are only called into action. And the first condition\nof calling wisdom and goodwill into effective existence is to\nrecognize the seriousness of the problem and the utter futility of\ntrying to force its solution by impatient and hurried methods.\nPro-Japanese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of\nthe situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the\nsolution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is equally\nfatal to discovering and applying a proper method.\n\nMore specifically and also more generically, proper publicity is the\ngreatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, a settlement of\nthe problems of the Pacific is made a condition of arriving at an\nagreement regarding reduction and limitation of armaments, it is\nlikely that the Conference might better never be held. In eagerness to\ndo something which will pass as a settlement, either China's--and\nSiberia's--interests will be sacrificed in some unfair compromise, or\nirritation and friction will be increased--and in the end so will\narmaments. In any literal sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the\nproblems of the Pacific can be settled in a few weeks, or months--or\nyears. Yet the discussion of the problems, in separation from the\nquestion of armament, may be of great use. For it may further that\npublicity which is a pre-condition of any genuine settlement. This\ninvolves the public in diplomacy. But it also involves a wider\npublicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of Asia,\ninternal and international.\n\nScepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, is\njustified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, if it can\nbe aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office policies means\nhopelessness about the future of the world. Let everything possible be\ndone to reduce armament, if only to secure a naval holiday on the part\nof the three great naval powers, and if only for the sake of lessening\ntaxation. Let the Conference on Problems devote itself to discussing\nand making known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope\nof those problems, and the fears--or should one call them hopes?--of\nthe cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important that a decision\nin the American sense of the Yap question be finally and forever\narrived at, as it is that the need of China and the Orient in general\nfor freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world be made\nclear--and so on, down or up the list of agenda. The commercial open\ndoor is needed. But the need is greater that the door be opened to\nlight, to knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create\na public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just\nsettlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of\ncivilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting failure\nand impugning motives. They can work for the opened door of open\ndiplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, of discussion free\nfrom propaganda. To shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground\nthat economic imperialism and organized greed will surely bring the\nConference to failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors\nthat may lead the United States to take the wrong course in the\nparting of the ways.\n\nOctober, 1921.","title":"China, Japan and the U.S.A.: Present-Day Conditions in the Far East and Their Bearing on the Washington Conference","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":24389}