{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_29033/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_29033","id":"gutenberg_29033","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/29033","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Sociology","Comte, Auguste, 1798-1857","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Paul Murray, Richard J. Shiffer and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n[Transcriber's Note: Every effort has been made to replicate this\ntext as faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant\nspellings and other inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to\ncorrect an obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook.]\n\n\n\n\n  CRITICAL\n  MISCELLANIES\n\n\n  BY\n\n\n  JOHN MORLEY\n\n\n  VOL. III.\n\n\n  Essay 10: Auguste Comte\n\n\n  London\n  MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n  NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n  1904\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nAUGUSTE COMTE.\n\n                                                                  PAGE\n\n  Introduction                                                     337\n\n  Influence of Saint Simon                                         340\n\n  Marriage                                                         343\n\n  Serious illness                                                  345\n\n  Official work                                                    347\n\n  Completion of _Positive Philosophy_                              349\n\n  J. S. Mill                                                       350\n\n  Question of Subsidy                                              352\n\n  Money                                                            353\n\n  Literary method                                                  354\n\n  _Hygiene cerebrale_                                              356\n\n  Madame de Vaux                                                   356\n\n  _Positive Polity_                                                358\n\n  Death                                                            359\n\n  Comte's philosophic consistency                                  360\n\n  Early writings                                                   361\n\n  Law of the Three States                                          363\n\n  Classification of sciences                                       366\n\n  The double key of Positive Philosophy                            368\n\n  Criticism on Comte's classification                              369\n\n  Sociological conceptions                                         371\n\n  Method                                                           371\n\n  Decisive importance of intellectual development                  373\n\n  Historical elucidations                                          374\n\n  Their value and popularity                                       374\n\n  Social dynamics in the _Positive Polity_                         375\n\n  The Positivist system                                            376\n\n  The key to social regeneration                                   377\n\n  The Religion of Humanity                                         377\n\n  The Great Being                                                  378\n\n  Remarks on the Religion                                          378\n\n  The worship and discipline                                       380\n\n  The priesthood                                                   381\n\n  Women                                                            382\n\n  Conclusion                                                       383\n\n\n\n\nAUGUSTE COMTE.[1]\n\n\nComte is now generally admitted to have been the most eminent and\nimportant of that interesting group of thinkers whom the overthrow of\nold institutions in France turned towards social speculation. Vastly\nsuperior as he was to men like De Maistre on the one hand, and to men\nlike Saint Simon or Fourier on the other, as well in scientific\nacquisitions as in mental capacity, still the aim and interest of all\nhis thinking was also theirs, namely, the renovation of the conditions\nof the social union. If, however, we classify him, not thus according\nto aim, but according to method, then he takes rank among men of a\nvery different type from these. What distinguishes him in method from\nhis contemporaries is his discernment that the social order cannot be\ntransformed until all the theoretic conceptions that belong to it have\nbeen rehandled in a scientific spirit, and maturely gathered up into a\nsystematic whole along with the rest of our knowledge. This presiding\ndoctrine connects Comte with the social thinkers of the eighteenth\ncentury,--indirectly with Montesquieu, directly with Turgot, and more\nclosely than either with Condorcet, of whom he was accustomed to speak\nas his philosophic father.\n\n    [1] Reprinted by the kind permission of Messrs. A. and C. Black\n        from the new edition of the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_.\n\nIsidore-Auguste-Marie-Francois-Xavier Comte was born in January 1798,\nat Montpellier, where his father was a receiver-general of taxes for\nthe district. He was sent for his earliest instruction to the school\nof the town, and in 1814 was admitted to the Ecole Polytechnique. His\nyouth was marked by a constant willingness to rebel against merely\nofficial authority; to genuine excellence, whether moral or\nintellectual, he was always ready to pay unbounded deference. That\nstrenuous application which was one of his most remarkable gifts in\nmanhood showed itself in his youth, and his application was backed or\ninspired by superior intelligence and aptness. After he had been two\nyears at the Ecole Polytechnique he took a foremost part in a mutinous\ndemonstration against one of the masters; the school was broken up,\nand Comte like the other scholars was sent home. To the great\ndissatisfaction of his parents, he resolved to return to Paris (1816),\nand to earn his living there by giving lessons in mathematics.\nBenjamin Franklin was the youth's idol at this moment. 'I seek to\nimitate the modern Socrates,' he wrote to a school friend, 'not in\ntalents, but in way of living. You know that at five and twenty he\nformed the design of becoming perfectly wise, and that he fulfilled\nhis design. I have dared to undertake the same thing, though I am not\nyet twenty.' Though Comte's character and aims were as far removed as\npossible from Franklin's type, neither Franklin nor any man that ever\nlived could surpass him in the heroic tenacity with which, in the face\nof a thousand obstacles, he pursued his own ideal of a vocation.\n\nFor a moment circumstances led him to think of seeking a career in\nAmerica, but a friend who preceded him thither warned him of the\npurely practical spirit that prevailed in the new country. 'If\nLagrange were to come to the United States, he could only earn his\nlivelihood by turning land surveyor.' So Comte remained in Paris,\nliving as he best could on something less than L80 a year, and hoping,\nwhen he took the trouble to break his meditations upon greater things\nby hopes about himself, that he might by and by obtain an appointment\nas mathematical master in a school. A friend procured him a situation\nas tutor in the house of Casimir Perier. The salary was good, but the\nduties were too miscellaneous, and what was still worse, there was an\nend of the delicious liberty of the garret. After a short experience\nof three weeks Comte returned to neediness and contentment. He was not\naltogether without the young man's appetite for pleasure; yet when he\nwas only nineteen we find him wondering, amid the gaieties of the\ncarnival of 1817, how a gavotte or a minuet could make people forget\nthat thirty thousand human beings around them had barely a morsel to\neat. Hardship in youth has many drawbacks, but it has the immense\nadvantage over academic ease of making the student's interest in men\nreal, and not merely literary.\n\nTowards 1818 Comte became associated as friend and disciple with a man\nwho was destined to exercise a very decisive influence upon the turn\nof his speculation. Henry, count of Saint Simon, was second cousin of\nthe famous duke of Saint Simon, the friend of the Regent, and author\nof the most important set of memoirs in a language that is so\nincomparably rich in memoirs. He was now nearly sixty, and if he had\nnot gained a serious reputation, he had at least excited the curiosity\nand interest of his contemporaries by the social eccentricities of his\nlife, by the multitude of his schemes and devices, and by the\nfantastic ingenuity of his political ideas. Saint Simon's most\ncharacteristic faculty was an exuberant imagination, working in the\nsphere of real things. Scientific discipline did nothing for him; he\nhad never undergone it, and he never felt its value. He was an artist\nin social construction; and if right ideas, or the suggestion of right\nideas, sometimes came into his head, about history, about human\nprogress, about a stable polity, such ideas were not the products of\ntrains of ordered reasoning; they were the intuitional glimpses of the\npoet, and consequently as they professed to be in real matter, even\nthe right ideas were as often as not accompanied by wrong ones.\n\nThe young Comte, now twenty, was enchanted by the philosophic veteran.\nIn after years he so far forgot himself as to write of Saint Simon as\na depraved quack, and to deplore his connection with him as purely\nmischievous. While the connection lasted he thought very differently.\nSaint Simon is described as the most estimable and lovable of men, and\nthe most delightful in his relations; he is the worthiest of\nphilosophers. Even after the association had come to an end, and at\nthe very moment when Comte was congratulating himself on having thrown\noff the yoke, he honestly admits that Saint Simon's influence has been\nof powerful service in his philosophic education. 'I certainly,' he\nwrites to his most intimate friend, 'am under great personal\nobligations to Saint Simon; that is to say, he helped in a powerful\ndegree to launch me in the philosophical direction that I have now\ndefinitely marked out for myself, and that I shall follow without\nlooking back for the rest of my life.' Even if there were no such\nunmistakable expressions as these, the most cursory glance into Saint\nSimon's writings is enough to reveal the thread of connection between\nthe ingenious visionary and systematic thinker. We see the debt, and\nwe also see that when it is stated at the highest possible, nothing\nhas really been taken either from Comte's claims as a powerful\noriginal thinker, or from his immeasurable pre-eminence over Saint\nSimon in intellectual grasp and vigour and coherence. As high a degree\nof originality may be shown in transformation as in invention, as\nMoliere and Shakespeare have proved in the region of dramatic art. In\nphilosophy the conditions are not different. _Il faut prendre son\nbien ou on le trouve._\n\nIt is no detriment to Comte's fame that some of the ideas which he\nrecombined and incorporated in a great philosophic structure had their\norigin in ideas that were produced almost at random in the incessant\nfermentation of Saint Simon's brain. Comte is in no true sense a\nfollower of Saint Simon, but it was undoubtedly Saint Simon who\nlaunched him, to take Comte's own word, by suggesting to his strong\nand penetrating mind the two starting-points of what grew into the\nComtist system--first, that political phenomena are as capable of\nbeing grouped under laws as other phenomena; and second, that the true\ndestination of philosophy must be social, and the true object of the\nthinker must be the reorganisation of the moral, religious, and\npolitical systems. We can readily see what an impulse these\nfar-reaching conceptions would give to Comte's meditations. There were\nconceptions of less importance than these, in which it is impossible\nnot to feel that it was Saint Simon's wrong or imperfect idea that put\nhis young admirer on the track to a right and perfected idea. The\nsubject is not worthy of further discussion. That Comte would have\nperformed some great intellectual achievement, if Saint Simon had\nnever been born, is certain. It is hardly less certain that the great\nachievement which he did actually perform was originally set in motion\nby Saint Simon's conversation, though it was afterwards directly\nfiliated with the fertile speculations of Turgot and Condorcet. Comte\nthought almost as meanly of Plato as he did of Saint Simon, and he\nconsidered Aristotle the prince of all true thinkers; yet their vital\ndifference about Ideas did not prevent Aristotle from calling Plato\nmaster.\n\nAfter six years the differences between the old and the young\nphilosopher grew too marked for friendship. Comte began to fret under\nSaint Simon's pretensions to be his director. Saint Simon, on the\nother hand, perhaps began to feel uncomfortably conscious of the\nsuperiority of his disciple. The occasion of the breach between them\n(1824) was an attempt on Saint Simon's part to print a production of\nComte's as if it were in some sort connected with Saint Simon's\nschemes of social reorganisation. Comte was never a man to quarrel by\nhalves, and not only was the breach not repaired, but long afterwards\nComte, as we have said, with painful ungraciousness took to calling\nthe encourager of his youth by very hard names.\n\nIn 1825 Comte married. His marriage was one of those of which\n'magnanimity owes no account to prudence,' and it did not turn out\nprosperously. His family were strongly Catholic and royalist, and they\nwere outraged by his refusal to have the marriage performed other than\ncivilly. They consented, however, to receive his wife, and the pair\nwent on a visit to Montpellier. Madame Comte conceived a dislike to\nthe circle she found there, and this was the too early beginning of\ndisputes which lasted for the remainder of their union. In the year of\nhis marriage we find Comte writing to the most intimate of his\ncorrespondents:--'I have nothing left but to concentrate my whole\nmoral existence in my intellectual work, a precious but inadequate\ncompensation; and so I must give up, if not the most dazzling, still\nthe sweetest part of my happiness.' We cannot help admiring the\nheroism which cherishes great ideas in the midst of petty miseries,\nand intrepidly throws all squalid interruptions into the background\nwhich is their true place. Still, we may well suppose that the sordid\ncares that come with want of money made a harmonious life none the\nmore easy. Comte tried to find pupils to board with him, but only one\npupil came, and he was soon sent away for lack of companions. 'I would\nrather spend an evening,' wrote the needy enthusiast, 'in solving a\ndifficult question, than in running after some empty-headed and\nconsequential millionaire in search of a pupil.' A little money was\nearned by an occasional article in _Le Producteur_, in which he began\nto expound the philosophic ideas that were now maturing in his mind.\nHe announced a course of lectures (1826), which it was hoped would\nbring money as well as fame, and which were to be the first dogmatic\nexposition of the Positive Philosophy. A friend had said to him, 'You\ntalk too freely, your ideas are getting abroad, and other people use\nthem without giving you the credit; put your ownership on record.' The\nlectures were intended to do this among other things, and they\nattracted hearers so eminent as Humboldt the cosmologist, as Poinsot\nthe geometer, as Blainville the physiologist.\n\nUnhappily, after the third lecture of the course, Comte had a severe\nattack of cerebral derangement, brought on by intense and prolonged\nmeditation, acting on a system that was already irritated by the\nchagrin of domestic failure. He did not recover his health for more\nthan a year, and as soon as convalescence set in he was seized by so\nprofound a melancholy at the disaster which had thus overtaken him,\nthat he threw himself into the Seine. Fortunately he was rescued, and\nthe shock did not stay his return to mental soundness. One incident of\nthis painful episode is worth mentioning. Lamennais, then in the\nheight of his Catholic exaltation, persuaded Comte's mother to insist\non her son being married with the religious ceremony, and as the\nyounger Madame Comte apparently did not resist, the rite was duly\nperformed, in spite of the fact that the unfortunate man was at the\ntime neither more nor less than raving mad. To such shocking\nconspiracies against common sense and decency does ecclesiastical\nzealotry bring even good men like Lamennais. On the other hand,\nphilosophic assailants of Comtism have not always resisted the\ntemptation to recall the circumstance that its founder was once out of\nhis mind,--an unworthy and irrelevant device, that cannot be excused\neven by the provocation of Comte's own occasional acerbity. As has\nbeen justly said, if Newton once suffered a cerebral attack without on\nthat account forfeiting our veneration for the _Principia_, Comte may\nhave suffered in the same way, and still not have forfeited our\nrespect for what is good in the systems of Positive Philosophy and\nPositive Polity.\n\nIn 1828 the lectures were renewed, and in 1830 was published the first\nvolume of the _Course of Positive Philosophy_. The sketch and ground\nplan of this great undertaking had appeared in 1826. The sixth and\nlast volume was published in 1842. The twelve years covering the\npublication of the first of Comte's two elaborate works were years of\nindefatigable toil, and they were the only portion of his life in\nwhich he enjoyed a certain measure, and that a very modest measure, of\nmaterial prosperity. In 1833 he was appointed examiner of the boys in\nthe various provincial schools who aspired to enter the Ecole\nPolytechnique at Paris. This and two other engagements as a teacher of\nmathematics secured him an income of some L400 a year. He made M.\nGuizot, then Louis Philippe's minister, the important proposal to\nestablish a chair of general history of the sciences. If there are\nfour chairs, he argued, devoted to the history of philosophy, that is\nto say, the minute study of all sorts of dreams and aberrations\nthrough the ages, surely there ought to be at least one to explain the\nformation and progress of our real knowledge? This wise suggestion,\nwhich still remains to be acted upon, was at first welcomed, according\nto Comte's own account, by Guizot's philosophic instinct, and then\nrepulsed by his 'metaphysical rancour.'\n\nMeanwhile Comte did his official work conscientiously, sorely as he\ngrudged the time which it took from the execution of the great object\nof his thoughts. We cannot forbear to transcribe one delightful and\ntouching trait in connection with this part of Comte's life. 'I hardly\nknow if even to you,' he writes in the expansion of domestic\nconfidence to his wife, 'I dare disclose the sweet and softened\nfeeling that comes over me when I find a young man whose examination\nis thoroughly satisfactory. Yes, though you may smile, the emotion\nwould easily stir me to tears if I were not carefully on my guard.'\nSuch sympathy with youthful hope; in union with the industry and\nintelligence that are the only means of bringing the hope to\nfulfilment, shows that Comte's dry and austere manner veiled the fires\nof a generous social emotion. It was this which made the overworked\nstudent take upon himself the burden of delivering every year from\n1831 to 1848 a course of gratuitous lectures on astronomy for a\npopular audience. The social feeling that inspired this disinterested\nact showed itself in other ways. He suffered the penalty of\nimprisonment rather than serve in the national guard; his position was\nthat though he would not take arms against the new monarchy of July,\nyet being a republican he would take no oath to defend it. The only\namusement that Comte permitted himself was a visit to the opera. In\nhis youth he had been a playgoer, but he shortly came to the\nconclusion that tragedy is a stilted and bombastic art, and after a\ntime comedy interested him no more than tragedy. For the opera he had\na genuine passion, which he gratified as often as he could, until his\nmeans became too narrow to afford even that single relaxation.\n\nOf his manner and personal appearance we have the following account\nfrom one who was his pupil:--'Daily as the clock struck eight on the\nhorologe of the Luxembourg, while the ringing hammer on the bell was\nyet audible, the door of my room opened, and there entered a man,\nshort, rather stout, almost what one might call sleek, freshly shaven,\nwithout vestige of whisker or moustache. He was invariably dressed in\na suit of the most spotless black, as if going to a dinner party; his\nwhite neckcloth was fresh from the laundress's hands, and his hat\nshining like a racer's coat. He advanced to the arm-chair prepared for\nhim in the centre of the writing-table, laid his hat on the left-hand\ncorner; his snuff-box was deposited on the same side beside the quire\nof paper placed in readiness for his use, and dipping the pen twice\ninto the ink-bottle, then bringing it to within an inch of his nose,\nto make sure it was properly filled, he broke silence: \"We have said\nthat the chord AB,\" etc. For three quarters of an hour he continued\nhis demonstration, making short notes as he went on, to guide the\nlistener in repeating the problem alone; then, taking up another\ncahier which lay beside him, he went over the written repetition of\nthe former lesson. He explained, corrected, or commented till the\nclock struck nine; then, with the little finger of the right hand\nbrushing from his coat and waistcoat the shower of superfluous snuff\nwhich had fallen on them, he pocketed his snuff-box, and resuming his\nhat, he as silently as when he came in made his exit by the door which\nI rushed to open for him.'\n\nIn 1842, as we have said, the last volume of the _Positive Philosophy_\nwas given to the public. Instead of that contentment which we like to\npicture as the reward of twelve years of meritorious toil devoted to\nthe erection of a high philosophic edifice, the author of this great\ncontribution found himself in the midst of a very sea of small\ntroubles. And they were troubles of that uncompensated kind that\nharass without elevating, and waste a man's spirit without softening\nor enlarging it. First, the jar of temperament between Comte and his\nwife had become so unbearable that they separated (1842). It is not\nexpedient for strangers to attempt to allot blame in such cases, for\nit is impossible for strangers to know all the deciding circumstances.\nWe need only say that in spite of one or two disadvantageous facts in\nher career which do not concern the public, Madame Comte seems to have\nuniformly comported herself towards her husband with an honourable\nsolicitude for his wellbeing. Comte made her an annual allowance, and\nfor some years after the separation they corresponded on friendly\nterms. Next in the list of the vexations that greeted Comte on\nemerging from the long tunnel of philosophising was a lawsuit with his\npublisher. The publisher had impertinently inserted in the sixth\nvolume a protest against a certain foot-note, in which Comte had used\nsome hard words about M. Arago. Comte threw himself into the suit with\nan energy worthy of Voltaire, and he won it. Third, and worst of all,\nhe had prefixed a preface to the sixth volume, in which he\ndeliberately went out of his way to rouse the active enmity of the\nvery men on whom depended his annual re-election to the post of\nexaminer for the Polytechnic School. The result of this perversity was\nthat by and by he lost the appointment, and with it one half of his\nvery modest income. This was the occasion of an episode, which is of\nmore than merely personal interest.\n\nBefore 1842 Comte had been in correspondence with our distinguished\ncountryman, J. S. Mill. Mr. Mill had been greatly impressed by Comte's\nphilosophic ideas; he admits that his own _System of Logic_ owes many\nvaluable thoughts to Comte, and that, in the portion of that work\nwhich treats of the logic of the moral sciences, a radical improvement\nin the conceptions of logical method was derived from the _Positive\nPhilosophy_. Their correspondence, which was extremely full and\ncopious, and which we may hope will one day be made accessible to the\npublic, turned principally upon the two great questions of the\nequality between men and women, and of the expediency and\nconstitution of a sacerdotal or spiritual order. When Comte found\nhimself straitened, he confided the entire circumstances to his\nEnglish friend. As might be supposed by those who know the\naffectionate anxiety with which Mr. Mill regarded the welfare of any\none whom he believed to be doing good work in the world, he at once\ntook pains to have Comte's loss of income made up to him, until Comte\nshould have had time to repair that loss by his own endeavour. Mr.\nMill persuaded Grote, Molesworth, and Raikes Currie to advance the sum\nof L240. At the end of the year (that is in 1845) Comte had taken no\nsteps to enable himself to dispense with the aid of the three\nEnglishmen. Mr. Mill applied to them again, but with the exception of\nGrote, who sent a small sum, they gave Comte to understand that they\nexpected him to earn his own living. Mr. Mill had suggested to Comte\nthat he should write articles for the English periodicals, and\nexpressed his own willingness to translate any such articles from the\nFrench. Comte at first fell in with the plan, but he speedily\nsurprised and disconcerted Mr. Mill by boldly taking up the position\nof 'high moral magistrate,' and accusing the three defaulting\ncontributors of a scandalous falling away from righteousness and a\nhigh mind. Mr. Mill was chilled by these pretensions; they struck him\nas savouring of a totally unexpected charlatanry; and the\ncorrespondence came to an end. For Comte's position in the argument\none feels that there is much to be said. If you have good reason for\nbelieving that a given thinker is doing work that will destroy the\nofficial system of science or philosophy, and if you desire its\ndestruction, then you may fairly be asked to help to provide for him\nthe same kind of material freedom that is secured to the professors\nand propagators of the official system by the state or by the\nuniversities. And if it is a fine thing for a man to leave money\nbehind him in the shape of an endowment for the support of a\nscientific teacher of whom he has never heard, why should it not be\njust as natural and as laudable to give money, while he is yet alive,\nto a teacher whom he both knows and approves of? On the other hand,\nGrote and Molesworth might say that, for anything they could tell,\nthey would find themselves to be helping the construction of a system\nof which they utterly disapproved. And, as things turned out, they\nwould have been perfectly justified in this serious apprehension. To\nhave done anything to make the production of the _Positive Polity_\neasier would have been no ground for anything but remorse to any of\nthe three. It is just to Comte to remark that he always assumed that\nthe contributors to the support of a thinker should be in all\nessentials of method and doctrine that thinker's disciples; aid from\nindifferent persons he counted irrational and humiliating. But is an\nendowment ever a blessing to the man who receives it? The question is\ndifficult to answer generally; in Comte's case there is reason in the\ndoubts felt by Madame Comte as to the expediency of relieving the\nphilosopher from the necessity of being in plain and business-like\nrelations with indifferent persons for a certain number of hours in\nthe week. Such relations do as much as a doctrine to keep egoism\nwithin decent bounds, and they must be not only a relief, but a\nwholesome corrective to the tendencies of concentrated thinking on\nabstract subjects.\n\nWhat finally happened was this. From 1845 to 1848 Comte lived as best\nhe could, as well as made his wife her allowance, on an income of L200\na year. We need scarcely say that he was rigorously thrifty. His\nlittle account books of income and outlay, with every item entered\ndown to a few hours before his death, are accurate and neat enough to\nhave satisfied an ancient Roman householder. In 1848, through no fault\nof his own, his salary was reduced to L80. M. Littre and others, with\nComte's approval, published an appeal for subscriptions, and on the\nmoney thus contributed Comte subsisted for the remaining nine years of\nhis life. By 1852 the subsidy produced as much as L200 a year. It is\nworth noticing, after the story we have told, that Mr. Mill was one of\nthe subscribers, and that M. Littre continued his assistance after he\nhad been driven from Comte's society by his high pontifical airs. We\nare sorry not to be able to record any similar trait of magnanimity on\nComte's part. His character, admirable as it is for firmness, for\nintensity, for inexorable will, for iron devotion to what he thought\nthe service of mankind, yet offers few of those softening qualities\nthat make us love good men and pity bad ones. He is of the type of\nBrutus or of Cato--a model of austere fixity of purpose, but\nungracious, domineering, and not quite free from petty bitterness.\n\nIf you seek to place yourself in sympathy with Comte it is best to\nthink of him only as the intellectual worker, pursuing in uncomforted\nobscurity the laborious and absorbing task to which he had given up\nhis whole life. His singularly conscientious fashion of elaborating\nhis ideas made the mental strain more intense than even so exhausting\na work as the abstract exposition of the principles of positive\nscience need have been, if he had followed a more self-indulgent plan.\nHe did not write down a word until he had first composed the whole\nmatter in his mind. When he had thoroughly meditated every sentence,\nhe sat down to write, and then, such was the grip of his memory, the\nexact order of his thoughts came back to him as if without an effort,\nand he wrote down precisely what he had intended to write, without the\naid of a note or a memorandum, and without check or pause. For\nexample, he began and completed in about six weeks a chapter in the\n_Positive Philosophy_ (vol. v. ch. lv.), which would fill forty of the\nlarge pages of the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_. Even if his subject had\nbeen merely narrative or descriptive, this would be a very\nsatisfactory piece of continuous production. When we reflect that the\nchapter in question is not narrative, but an abstract exposition of\nthe guiding principles of the movements of several centuries, with\nmany threads of complex thought running along side by side all\nthrough the speculation, then the circumstances under which it was\nreduced to literary form are really astonishing. It is hardly possible\nfor a critic to share the admiration expressed by some of Comte's\ndisciples for his style. We are not so unreasonable as to blame him\nfor failing to make his pages picturesque or thrilling; we do not want\nsunsets and stars and roses and ecstasy; but there is a certain\nstandard for the most serious and abstract subjects. When compared\nwith such philosophic writing as Hume's, Diderot's, Berkeley's, then\nComte's manner is heavy, laboured, monotonous, without relief and\nwithout light. There is now and then an energetic phrase, but as a\nwhole the vocabulary is jejune; the sentences are overloaded; the\npitch is flat. A scrupulous insistence on making his meaning clear led\nto an iteration of certain adjectives and adverbs, which at length\ndeaden the effect beyond the endurance of all but the most resolute\nstudents. Only the profound and stimulating interest of much of the\nmatter prevents one from thinking of Rivarol's ill-natured remark upon\nCondorcet, that he wrote with opium on a page of lead. The general\neffect is impressive, not by any virtues of style, for we do not\ndiscern one, but by reason of the magnitude and importance of the\nundertaking, and the visible conscientiousness and the grasp with\nwhich it is executed. It is by sheer strength of thought, by the\nvigorous perspicacity with which he strikes the lines of cleavage of\nhis subject, that he makes his way into the mind of the reader; in the\npresence of gifts of this power we need not quarrel with an ungainly\nstyle.\n\nComte pursued one practice which ought to be mentioned in connection\nwith his personal history, the practice of what he styled _hygiene\ncerebrale_. After he had acquired what he considered to be a\nsufficient stock of material, and this happened before he had\ncompleted the _Positive Philosophy_, he abstained deliberately and\nscrupulously from reading newspapers, reviews, scientific\ntransactions, and everything else whatever, except two or three poets\n(notably Dante) and the _Imitatio Christi_. It is true that his\nfriends kept him informed of what was going on in the scientific\nworld. Still this partial divorce of himself from the record of the\nsocial and scientific activity of his time, though it may save a\nthinker from the deplorable evils of dispersion, moral and\nintellectual, accounts in no small measure for the exaggerated egoism,\nand the absence of all feeling for reality, which marked Comte's later\ndays.\n\nOnly one important incident in Comte's life now remains to be spoken\nof. In 1845 he made the acquaintance of Madame Clotilde de Vaux, a\nlady whose husband had been sent to the galleys for life, and who was\ntherefore, in all but the legal incidents of her position, a widow.\nVery little is known about her qualities. She wrote a little piece\nwhich Comte rated so preposterously as to talk about George Sand in\nthe same sentence; it is in truth a flimsy performance, though it\ncontains one or two gracious thoughts. There is true beauty in the\nsaying--_'It is unworthy of a noble nature to diffuse its pain.'_\nMadame de Vaux's letters speak well for her good sense and good\nfeeling, and it would have been better for Comte's later work if she\nhad survived to exert a wholesome restraint on his exaltation. Their\nfriendship had only lasted a year when she died (1846), but the period\nwas long enough to give her memory a supreme ascendency in Comte's\nmind. Condillac, Joubert, Mill, and other eminent men have shown what\nthe intellectual ascendency of a woman can be. Comte was as\ninconsolable after Madame de Vaux's death as D'Alembert after the\ndeath of Mademoiselle L'Espinasse. Every Wednesday afternoon he made a\nreverential pilgrimage to her tomb, and three times every day he\ninvoked her memory in words of passionate expansion. His disciples\nbelieve that in time the world will reverence Comte's sentiment about\nClotilde de Vaux, as it reveres Dante's adoration of Beatrice--a\nparallel that Comte himself was the first to hit upon. It is no doubt\nthe worst kind of cynicism to make a mock in a realistic vein of any\npersonality that has set in motion the idealising thaumaturgy of the\naffections. Yet we cannot help feeling that it is a grotesque and\nunseemly anachronism to apply in grave prose, addressed to the whole\nworld, those terms of saint and angel which are touching and in their\nplace amid the trouble and passion of the great mystic poet. Only an\nenergetic and beautiful imagination, together with a mastery of the\nrhythm and swell of impassioned speech, can prevent an invitation to\nthe public to hearken to the raptures of intense personal attachment\nfrom seeming ludicrous and almost indecent. Whatever other gifts Comte\nmay have had--and he had many of the rarest kind,--poetic imagination\nwas not among them, any more than poetic or emotional expression was\namong them. His was one of those natures whose faculty of deep feeling\nis unhappily doomed to be inarticulate, and to pass away without the\nmagic power of transmitting itself.\n\nComte lost no time, after the completion of his _Course of Positive\nPhilosophy_, in proceeding with the _System of Positive Polity_, to\nwhich the earlier work was designed to be a foundation. The first\nvolume was published in 1851, and the fourth and last in 1854. In\n1848, when the political air was charged with stimulating elements, he\nfounded the Positive Society, with the expectation that it might grow\ninto a reunion as powerful over the new revolution as the Jacobin Club\nhad been in the revolution of 1789. The hope was not fulfilled, but a\ncertain number of philosophic disciples gathered round Comte, and\neventually formed themselves, under the guidance of the new ideas of\nthe latter half of his life, into a kind of church. In the years 1849,\n1850, and 1851, Comte gave three courses of lectures at the Palais\nRoyal. They were gratuitous and popular, and in them he boldly\nadvanced the whole of his doctrine, as well as the direct and\nimmediate pretensions of himself and his system. The third course\nended in the following uncompromising terms--'In the name of the Past\nand of the Future, the servants of Humanity--both its philosophical\nand its practical servants--come forward to claim as their due the\ngeneral direction of this world. Their object is to constitute at\nlength a real Providence in all departments,--moral, intellectual, and\nmaterial. Consequently they exclude once for all from political\nsupremacy all the different servants of God--Catholic, Protestant, or\nDeist--as being at once behindhand and a cause of disturbance.' A few\nweeks after this invitation a very different person stepped forward to\nconstitute himself a real Providence.\n\nIn 1852 Comte published the _Catechism of Positivism_. In the preface\nto it he took occasion to express his approval of Louis Napoleon's\n_coup d'etat_ of the 2d of December,--'a fortunate crisis which has\nset aside the parliamentary system, and instituted a dictatorial\nrepublic.' Whatever we may think of the political sagacity of such a\njudgment, it is due to Comte to say that he did not expect to see his\ndictatorial republic transformed into a dynastic empire, and, next,\nthat he did expect from the Man of December freedom of the press and\nof public meeting. His later hero was the Emperor Nicholas, 'the only\nstatesman in Christendom,'--as unlucky a judgment as that which placed\nDr. Francia in the Comtist Calendar.\n\nIn 1857 he was attacked by cancer, and died peaceably on the 5th of\nSeptember of that year. The anniversary is always celebrated by\nceremonial gatherings of his French and English followers, who then\ncommemorate the name and the services of the founder of their\nreligion. Comte was under sixty when he died. We cannot help\nreflecting that one of the worst of all the evils connected with the\nshortness of human life is the impatience that it breeds in some of\nthe most ardent and enlightened minds to hurry on the execution of\nprojects, for which neither the time nor the spirit of their author is\nfully ripe.\n\nIn proceeding to give an outline of Comte's system, we shall consider\nthe _Positive Polity_ as the more or less legitimate sequel of the\n_Positive Philosophy_, notwithstanding the deep gulf which so eminent\na critic as Mr. Mill insisted upon fixing between the earlier and the\nlater work.[2] There may be, as we think there is, the greatest\ndifference in their value, and the temper is not the same, nor the\nmethod. But the two are quite capable of being regarded, and for the\npurposes of an account of Comte's career ought to be regarded, as an\nintegral whole. His letters when he was a young man of one and twenty,\nand before he had published a word, show how strongly present the\nsocial motive was in his mind, and in what little account he should\nhold his scientific works, if he did not perpetually think of their\nutility for the species. 'I feel,' he wrote, 'that such scientific\nreputation as I might acquire would give more value, more weight, more\nuseful influence to my political sermons.' In 1822 he published a\n_Plan of the Scientific Works necessary to Reorganise Society_. In\nthis opuscule he points out that modern society is passing through a\ngreat crisis, due to the conflict of two opposing movements,--the\nfirst, a disorganising movement owing to the break-up of old\ninstitutions and beliefs; the second, a movement towards a definite\nsocial state, in which all means of human prosperity will receive\ntheir most complete development and most direct application. How is\nthis crisis to be dealt with? What are the undertakings necessary in\norder to pass successfully through it towards an organic state? The\nanswer to this is that there are two series of works. The first is\ntheoretic or spiritual, aiming at the development of a new principle\nof co-ordinating social relations and the formation of the system of\ngeneral ideas which are destined to guide society. The second work is\npractical or temporal; it settles the distribution of power and the\ninstitutions that are most conformable to the spirit of the system\nwhich has previously been thought out in the course of the theoretic\nwork. As the practical work depends on the conclusions of the\ntheoretical, the latter must obviously come first in order of\nexecution.\n\n    [2] The English reader is specially well placed for\n        satisfying such curiosity as he may have about Comte's\n        philosophy. Miss Martineau condensed the six volumes of the\n        _Philosophie Positive_ into two volumes of excellent English\n        (1853); Comte himself gave them a place in the Positivist\n        Library. The _Catechism_ was translated by Dr. Congreve in\n        1858. The _Politique Positive_ has been reproduced in English\n        (Longmans, 1875-1877) by the conscientious labour of Comte's\n        London followers. This translation is accompanied by a\n        careful running analysis and explanatory summary of contents,\n        which make the work more readily intelligible than the\n        original. For criticisms, the reader may be referred to Mr.\n        Mill's _Auguste Comte and Positivism_; Dr. Bridges's reply to\n        Mr. Mill, _The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrines_ (1866);\n        Mr. Herbert Spencer's essay on the Genesis of Science, and\n        pamphlet on _The Classification of the Sciences_; Professor\n        Huxley's 'Scientific Aspects of Positivism,' in his _Lay\n        Sermons_; Dr. Congreve's _Essays Political, Social, and\n        Religious_ (1874); Mr. Fiske's _Outlines of Cosmic\n        Philosophy_ (1874); Mr. Lewes's _History of Philosophy_, vol.\n        ii.\n\nIn 1826 this was pushed further in a most remarkable piece called\n_Considerations on the Spiritual Power_--the main object of which is\nto demonstrate the necessity of instituting a spiritual power,\ndistinct from the temporal power and independent of it. In examining\nthe conditions of a spiritual power proper for modern times, he\nindicates in so many terms the presence in his mind of a direct\nanalogy between his proposed spiritual power and the functions of the\nCatholic clergy at the time of its greatest vigour and most complete\nindependence,--that is to say, from about the middle of the eleventh\ncentury until towards the end of the thirteenth. He refers to De\nMaistre's memorable book, _Du Pape_, as the most profound, accurate,\nand methodical account of the old spiritual organisation, and starts\nfrom that as the model to be adapted to the changed intellectual and\nsocial conditions of the modern time. In the _Positive Philosophy_,\nagain (vol. v. p. 344), he distinctly says that Catholicism,\nreconstituted as a system on new intellectual foundations, would\nfinally preside over the spiritual reorganisation of modern society.\nMuch else could easily be quoted to the same effect. If unity of\ncareer, then, means that Comte from the beginning designed the\ninstitution of a spiritual power and the systematic reorganisation of\nlife, it is difficult to deny him whatever credit that unity may be\nworth, and the credit is perhaps not particularly great. Even the\nre-adaptation of the Catholic system to a scientific doctrine was\nplainly in his mind thirty years before the final execution of the\n_Positive Polity_, though it is difficult to believe that he foresaw\nthe religious mysticism in which the task was to land him. A great\nanalysis was to precede a great synthesis, but it was the synthesis on\nwhich Comte's vision was centred from the first. Let us first sketch\nthe nature of the analysis. Society is to be reorganised on the base\nof knowledge. What is the sum and significance of knowledge? That is\nthe question which Comte's first master-work professes to answer.\n\nThe _Positive Philosophy_ opens with the statement of a certain law of\nwhich Comte was the discoverer, and which has always been treated both\nby disciples and dissidents as the key to his system. This is the Law\nof the Three States. It is as follows. Each of our leading\nconceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through\nthree different phases; there are three different ways in which the\nhuman mind explains phenomena, each way following the other in order.\nThese three stages are the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the\nPositive. Knowledge, or a branch of knowledge, is in the Theological\nstate, when it supposes the phenomena under consideration to be due\nto immediate volition, either in the object or in some supernatural\nbeing. In the Metaphysical state, for volition is substituted abstract\nforce residing in the object, yet existing independently of the\nobject; the phenomena are viewed as if apart from the bodies\nmanifesting them; and the properties of each substance have attributed\nto them an existence distinct from that substance. In the Positive\nstate inherent volition or external volition and inherent force or\nabstraction personified have both disappeared from men's minds, and\nthe explanation of a phenomenon means a reference of it, by way of\nsuccession or resemblance, to some other phenomenon,--means the\nestablishment of a relation between the given fact and some more\ngeneral fact. In the Theological and Metaphysical state men seek a\ncause or an essence; in the Positive they are content with a law. To\nborrow an illustration from an able English disciple of Comte:--'Take\nthe phenomenon of the sleep produced by opium. The Arabs are content\nto attribute it to the \"will of God.\" Moliere's medical student\naccounts for it by a _soporific principle_ contained in the opium. The\nmodern physiologist knows that he cannot account for it at all. He can\nsimply observe, analyse, and experiment upon the phenomena attending\nthe action of the drug, and classify it with other agents analogous in\ncharacter' (_Dr. Bridges_).\n\nThe first and greatest aim of the Positive Philosophy is to advance\nthe study of society into the third of the three stages,--to remove\nsocial phenomena from the sphere of theological and metaphysical\nconceptions, and to introduce among them the same scientific\nobservation of their laws which has given us physics, chemistry,\nphysiology. Social physics will consist of the conditions and\nrelations of the facts of society, and will have two departments,--one\nstatical, containing the laws of order; the other dynamical,\ncontaining the laws of progress. While men's minds were in the\ntheological state, political events, for example, were explained by\nthe will of the gods, and political authority based on divine right.\nIn the metaphysical state of mind, then, to retain our instance,\npolitical authority was based on the sovereignty of the people, and\nsocial facts were explained by the figment of a falling away from a\nstate of nature. When the positive method has been finally extended to\nsociety, as it has been to chemistry and physiology, these social\nfacts will be resolved, as their ultimate analysis, into relations\nwith one another, and instead of seeking causes in the old sense of\nthe word, men will only examine the conditions of social existence.\nWhen that stage has been reached not merely the greater part, but the\nwhole, of our knowledge will be impressed with one character--the\ncharacter, namely, of positivity or scientificalness; and all our\nconceptions in every part of knowledge will be thoroughly homogeneous.\nThe gains of such a change are enormous. The new philosophical unity\nwill now in its turn regenerate all the elements that went to its own\nformation. The mind will pursue knowledge without the wasteful jar and\nfriction of conflicting methods and mutually hostile conceptions;\neducation will be regenerated; and society will reorganise itself on\nthe only possible solid base--a homogeneous philosophy.\n\nThe _Positive Philosophy_ has another object besides the demonstration\nof the necessity and propriety of a science of society. This object is\nto show the sciences as branches from a single trunk,--is to give to\nscience the ensemble or spirit of generality hitherto confined to\nphilosophy, and to give to philosophy the rigour and solidity of\nscience. Comte's special object is a study of social physics, a\nscience that before his advent was still to be formed; his second\nobject is a review of the methods and leading generalities of all the\npositive sciences already formed, so that we may know both what system\nof inquiry to follow in our new science, and also where the new\nscience will stand in relation to other knowledge.\n\nThe first step in this direction is to arrange scientific method and\npositive knowledge in order, and this brings us to another cardinal\nelement in the Comtist system, the classification of the sciences. In\nthe front of the inquiry lies one main division, that, namely, between\nspeculative and practical knowledge. With the latter we have no\nconcern. Speculative or theoretic knowledge is divided into abstract\nand concrete. The former is concerned with the laws that regulate\nphenomena in all conceivable cases; the latter is concerned with the\napplication of these laws. Concrete science relates to objects or\nbeings; abstract science to events. The former is particular or\ndescriptive; the latter is general. Thus, physiology is an abstract\nscience; but zoology is concrete. Chemistry is abstract; mineralogy is\nconcrete. It is the method and knowledge of the abstract sciences that\nthe Positive Philosophy has to reorganise in a great whole.\n\nComte's principle of classification is that the dependence and order\nof scientific study follows the dependence of the phenomena. Thus, as\nhas been said, it represents both the objective dependence of the\nphenomena and the subjective dependence of our means of knowing them.\nThe more particular and complex phenomena depend upon the simpler and\nmore general. The latter are the more easy to study. Therefore science\nwill begin with those attributes of objects which are most general,\nand pass on gradually to other attributes that are combined in greater\ncomplexity. Thus, too, each science rests on the truths of the\nsciences that precede it, while it adds to them the truths by which it\nis itself constituted. Comte's series or hierarchy is arranged as\nfollows:--(1) Mathematics (that is, number, geometry, and mechanics),\n(2) Astronomy, (3) Physics, (4) Chemistry, (5) Biology, (6) Sociology.\nEach of the members of this series is one degree more special than the\nmember before it, and depends upon the facts of all the members\npreceding it, and cannot be fully understood without them. It follows\nthat the crowning science of the hierarchy, dealing with the\nphenomena of human society, will remain longest under the influence of\ntheological dogmas and abstract figments, and will be the last to pass\ninto the positive stage. You cannot discover the relations of the\nfacts of human society without reference to the conditions of animal\nlife; you cannot understand the conditions of animal life without the\nlaws of chemistry; and so with the rest.\n\nThis arrangement of the sciences and the Law of the Three States are\ntogether explanatory of the course of human thought and knowledge.\nThey are thus the double key of Comte's systematisation of the\nphilosophy of all the sciences from mathematics to physiology, and his\nanalysis of social evolution, which is the basis of sociology. Each\nscience contributes its philosophy. The co-ordination of all these\npartial philosophies produces the general Positive Philosophy.\n'Thousands had cultivated science, and with splendid success; not one\nhad conceived the philosophy which the sciences when organised would\nnaturally evolve. A few had seen the necessity of extending the\nscientific method to all inquiries, but no one had seen how this was\nto be effected.... The Positive Philosophy is novel as a philosophy,\nnot as a collection of truths never before suspected. Its novelty is\nthe organisation of existing elements. Its very principle implies the\nabsorption of all that great thinkers had achieved; while\nincorporating their results it extended their methods.... What\ntradition brought was the results; what Comte brought was the\norganisation of these results. He always claimed to be the founder of\nthe Positive Philosophy. That he had every right to such a title is\ndemonstrable to all who distinguish between the positive sciences and\nthe philosophy which co-ordinated the truths and methods of these\nsciences into a doctrine' (_G. H. Lewes_).\n\nWe may interrupt our short exposition here to remark that Comte's\nclassification of the sciences has been subjected to a vigorous\ncriticism by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Mr. Spencer's two chief points are\nthese:--(1) He denies that the principle of the development of the\nsciences is the principle of decreasing generality; he asserts that\nthere are as many examples of the advent of a science being determined\nby increasing generality as by increasing speciality. (2) He holds\nthat any grouping of the sciences in a succession gives a radically\nwrong idea of their genesis and their interdependence; no true\nfiliation exists; no science develops itself in isolation; no one is\nindependent, either logically or historically. M. Littre, by far the\nmost eminent of the scientific followers of Comte, concedes a certain\nforce to Mr. Spencer's objections, and makes certain secondary\nmodifications in the hierarchy in consequence, while still cherishing\nhis faith in the Comtist theory of the sciences. Mr. Mill, while\nadmitting the objections as good, if Comte's arrangement pretended to\nbe the only one possible, still holds that arrangement as tenable for\nthe purpose with which it was devised. Mr. Lewes asserts against Mr.\nSpencer that the arrangement in a series is necessary, on grounds\nsimilar to those which require that the various truths constituting a\nscience should be systematically co-ordinated, although in nature the\nphenomena are intermingled.\n\nThe first three volumes of the _Positive Philosophy_ contain an\nexposition of the partial philosophies of the five sciences that\nprecede sociology in the hierarchy. Their value has usually been\nplaced very low by the special followers of the sciences concerned;\nthey say that the knowledge is second-hand, is not coherent, and is\ntoo confidently taken for final. The Comtist replies that the task is\nphilosophic, and is not to be judged by the minute accuracies of\nscience. In these three volumes Comte took the sciences roughly as he\nfound them. His eminence as a man of science must be measured by his\nonly original work in that department,--the construction, namely, of\nthe new science of society. This work is accomplished in the last\nthree volumes of the _Positive Philosophy_ and the second and third\nvolumes of the _Positive Polity_. The Comtist maintains that even if\nthese five volumes together fail in laying down correctly and finally\nthe lines of the new science, still they are the first solution of a\ngreat problem hitherto unattempted. 'Modern biology has got beyond\nAristotle's conception; but in the construction of the biological\nscience, not even the most unphilosophical biologist would fail to\nrecognise the value of Aristotle's attempt. So for sociology.\nSubsequent sociologists may have conceivably to remodel the whole\nscience, yet not the less will they recognise the merit of the first\nwork which has facilitated their labours' (_Congreve_).\n\nWe shall now briefly describe Comte's principal conceptions in\nsociology, his position in respect to which is held by himself, and by\nothers, to raise him to the level of Descartes or Leibnitz. Of course\nthe first step was to approach the phenomena of human character and\nsocial existence with the expectation of finding them as reducible to\ngeneral laws as the other phenomena of the universe, and with the hope\nof exploring these laws by the same instruments of observation and\nverification as had done such triumphant work in the case of the\nlatter. Comte separates the collective facts of society and history\nfrom the individual phenomena of biology; then he withdraws these\ncollective facts from the region of external volition, and places them\nin the region of law. The facts of history must be explained, not by\nprovidential interventions, but by referring them to conditions\ninherent in the successive stages of social existence. This conception\nmakes a science of society possible. What is the method? It comprises,\nbesides observation and experiment (which is, in fact, only the\nobservation of abnormal social states), a certain peculiarity of\nverification. We begin by deducing every well-known historical\nsituation from the series of its antecedents. Thus we acquire a body\nof empirical generalisations as to social phenomena, and then we\nconnect the generalisations with the positive theory of human nature.\nA sociological demonstration lies in the establishment of an\naccordance between the conclusions of historical analysis and the\npreparatory conceptions of biological theory. As Mr. Mill puts\nit:--'If a sociological theory, collected from historical evidence,\ncontradicts the established general laws of human nature; if (to use\nM. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any very\ndecided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it\nsupposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over\nthe desires or the disinterested desires over the personal,--we may\nknow that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is\nfalse. On the other hand, if laws of social phenomena, empirically\ngeneralised from history, can, when once suggested, be affiliated to\nthe known laws of human nature; if the direction actually taken by the\ndevelopments and changes of human society can be seen to be such as\nthe properties of man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently\nprobable, the empirical generalisations are raised into positive laws,\nand sociology becomes a science.' The result of this method is an\nexhibition of the events of human experience in co-ordinated series\nthat manifest their own graduated connection.\n\nNext, as all investigation proceeds from that which is known best to\nthat which is unknown or less well known, and as, in social states, it\nis the collective phenomenon that is more easy of access to the\nobserver than its parts, therefore we must consider and pursue all\nthe elements of a given social state together and in common. The\nsocial organisation must be viewed and explored as a whole. There is a\nnexus between each leading group of social phenomena and other leading\ngroups; if there is a change in one of them, that change is\naccompanied by a corresponding modification of all the rest. 'Not only\nmust political institutions and social manners on the one hand, and\nmanners and ideas on the other, be always mutually connected; but\nfurther, this consolidated whole must be always connected by its\nnature with the corresponding state of the integral development of\nhumanity, considered in all its aspects of intellectual, moral and\nphysical activity' (_Comte_).\n\nIs there any one element which communicates the decisive impulse to\nall the rest,--any predominating agency in the course of social\nevolution? The answer is that all the other parts of social existence\nare associated with, and drawn along by, the contemporary condition of\nintellectual development. The Reason is the superior and preponderant\nelement which settles the direction in which all the other faculties\nshall expand. 'It is only through the more and more marked influence\nof the reason over the general conduct of man and of society that the\ngradual march of our race has attained that regularity and persevering\ncontinuity which distinguish it so radically from the desultory and\nbarren expansion of even the highest animal orders, which share, and\nwith enhanced strength, the appetites, the passions, and even the\nprimary sentiments of man.' The history of intellectual development,\ntherefore, is the key to social evolution, and the key to the history\nof intellectual development is the Law of the Three States.\n\nAmong other central thoughts in Comte's explanation of history are\nthese:--The displacement of theological by positive conceptions has\nbeen accompanied by a gradual rise of an industrial _regime_ out of\nthe military _regime;_--the great permanent contribution of\nCatholicism was the separation which it set up between the temporal\nand the spiritual powers;--the progress of the race consists in the\nincreasing preponderance of the distinctively human elements over the\nanimal elements;--the absolute tendency of ordinary social theories\nwill be replaced by an unfailing adherence to the relative point of\nview, and from this it follows that the social state, regarded as a\nwhole, has been as perfect in each period as the co-existing condition\nof humanity and its environment would allow.\n\nThe elaboration of these ideas in relation to the history of the\ncivilisation of the most advanced portion of the human race occupies\ntwo of the volumes of the _Positive Philosophy_, and has been accepted\nby competent persons of very different schools as a masterpiece of\nrich, luminous, and far-reaching suggestion. Whatever additions it may\nreceive, and whatever corrections it may require, this analysis of\nsocial evolution will continue to be regarded as one of the great\nachievements of human intellect. The demand for the first of Comte's\ntwo works has gone on increasing in a significant degree. It was\ncompleted, as we have said, in 1842. A second edition was published in\n1864; a third some years afterwards; and while we write (1876) a\nfourth is in the press. Three editions within twelve years of a work\nof abstract philosophy in six considerable volumes are the measure of\na very striking influence. On the whole, we may suspect that no part\nof Comte's works has had so much to do with this marked success as his\nsurvey and review of the course of history.\n\nThe third volume of the later work, the _Positive Polity_, treats of\nsocial dynamics, and takes us again over the ground of historic\nevolution. It abounds with remarks of extraordinary fertility and\ncomprehensiveness; but it is often arbitrary; its views of the past\nare strained into coherence with the statical views of the preceding\nvolume; and so far as concerns the period to which the present writer\nhappens to have given special attention, it is usually slight and\nsometimes random. As it was composed in rather less than six months,\nand as the author honestly warns us that he has given all his\nattention to a more profound co-ordination, instead of working out the\nspecial explanations more fully, as he had promised, we need not be\nsurprised if the result is disappointing to those who had mastered the\ncorresponding portion of the _Positive Philosophy_. Comte explains the\ndifference between his two works. In the first his 'chief object was\nto discover and demonstrate the laws of progress, and to exhibit in\none unbroken sequence the collective destinies of mankind, till then\ninvariably regarded as a series of events wholly beyond the reach of\nexplanation, and almost depending on arbitrary will. The present work,\non the contrary, is addressed to those who are already sufficiently\nconvinced of the certain existence of social laws, and desire only to\nhave them reduced to a true and conclusive system.'\n\nWhat that system is it would take far more space than we can afford to\nsketch even in outline. All we can do is to enumerate some of its main\npositions. They are to be drawn not only from the _Positive Polity_,\nbut from two other works,--the _Positivist Catechism: a Summary\nExposition of the Universal Religion, in Twelve Dialogues between a\nWoman and a Priest of Humanity_; and second, _The Subjective\nSynthesis_ (1856), which is the first and only volume of a work upon\nmathematics announced at the end of the _Positive Philosophy_. The\nsystem for which the _Positive Philosophy_ is alleged to have been the\nscientific preparation contains a Polity and a Religion; a complete\narrangement of life in all its aspects, giving a wider sphere to\nIntellect, Energy, and Feeling than could be found in any of the\nprevious organic types,--Greek, Roman, or Catholic-feudal. Comte's\nimmense superiority over such prae-Revolutionary Utopians as the Abbe\nSaint Pierre, no less than over the group of post-revolutionary\nUtopians, is especially visible in his firm grasp of the cardinal\ntruth that the improvement of the social organism can only be\neffected by a moral development, and never by any changes in mere\npolitical mechanism, or any violences in the way of an artificial\nredistribution of wealth. A moral transformation must precede any real\nadvance. The aim, both in public and private life, is to secure to the\nutmost possible extent the victory of the social feeling over\nself-love, or Altruism over Egoism. This is the key to the\nregeneration of social existence, as it is the key to that unity of\nindividual life which makes all our energies converge freely and\nwithout wasteful friction towards a common end. What are the\ninstruments for securing the preponderance of Altruism? Clearly they\nmust work from the strongest element in human nature, and this element\nis Feeling or the Heart. Under the Catholic system the supremacy of\nFeeling was abused, and the intellect was made its slave. Then\nfollowed a revolt of Intellect against Sentiment. The business of the\nnew system will be to bring back the Intellect into a condition, not\nof slavery, but of willing ministry to the Feelings. The subordination\nnever was, and never will be, effected except by means of a religion,\nand a religion, to be final, must include a harmonious synthesis of\nall our conceptions of the external order of the universe. The\ncharacteristic basis of a religion is the existence of a Power without\nus, so superior to ourselves as to command the complete submission of\nour whole life. This basis is to be found in the Positive stage, in\nHumanity, past, present, and to come, conceived as the Great Being.\n\n     A deeper study of the great universal order reveals to us at\n     length the ruling power within it of the true Great Being, whose\n     destiny it is to bring that order continually to perfection by\n     constantly conforming to its laws, and which thus best represents\n     to us that system as a whole. This undeniable Providence, the\n     supreme dispenser of our destinies, becomes in the natural course\n     the common centre of our affections, our thoughts, and our\n     actions. Although this Great Being evidently exceeds the utmost\n     strength of any, even of any collective, human force, its\n     necessary constitution and its peculiar function endow it with\n     the truest sympathy towards all its servants. The least amongst\n     us can and ought constantly to aspire to maintain and even to\n     improve this Being. This natural object of all our activity, both\n     public and private, determines the true general character of the\n     rest of our existence, whether in feeling or in thought; which\n     must be devoted to love, and to know, in order rightly to serve,\n     our Providence, by a wise use of all the means which it furnishes\n     to us. Reciprocally this continued service, while strengthening\n     our true unity, renders us at once both happier and better.\n\nThe exaltation of Humanity into the throne occupied by the Supreme\nBeing under monotheistic systems made all the rest of Comte's\nconstruction easy enough. Utility remains the test of every\ninstitution, impulse, act; his fabric becomes substantially an arch of\nutilitarian propositions, with an artificial Great Being inserted at\nthe top to keep them in their place. The Comtist system is\nutilitarianism crowned by a fantastic decoration. Translated into the\nplainest English, the position is as follows: 'Society can only be\nregenerated by the greater subordination of politics to morals, by the\nmoralisation of capital, by the renovation of the family, by a higher\nconception of marriage, and so on. These ends can only be reached by a\nheartier development of the sympathetic instincts. The sympathetic\ninstincts can only be developed by the Religion of Humanity.' Looking\nat the problem in this way, even a moralist who does not expect\ntheology to be the instrument of social revival, might still ask\nwhether the sympathetic instincts will not necessarily be already\ndeveloped to their highest point, before people will be persuaded to\naccept the religion, which is at bottom hardly more than sympathy\nunder a more imposing name. However that may be, the whole\nbattle--into which we shall not enter--as to the legitimateness of\nComtism as a religion turns upon this erection of Humanity into a\nBeing. The various hypotheses, dogmas, proposals, as to the family, to\ncapital, etc. are merely propositions measurable by considerations of\nutility and a balance of expediencies. Many of these proposals are of\nthe highest interest, and many of them are actually available; but\nthere does not seem to be one of them of an available kind which could\nnot equally well be approached from other sides, and even incorporated\nin some radically antagonistic system. Adoption, for example, as a\npractice for improving the happiness of families and the welfare of\nsociety, is capable of being weighed, and can in truth only be weighed\nby utilitarian considerations, and has been commended by men to whom\nthe Comtist religion is naught. The singularity of Comte's\nconstruction, and the test by which it must be tried, is the transfer\nof the worship and discipline of Catholicism to a system in which 'the\nconception of God is superseded' by the abstract idea of Humanity,\nconceived as a kind of Personality.\n\nAnd when all is said, the invention does not help us. We have still to\nsettle what _is_ for the good of Humanity, and we can only do that in\nthe old-fashioned way. There is no guidance in the conception. No\neffective unity can follow from it, because you can only find out the\nright and wrong of a given course by summing up the advantages and\ndisadvantages, and striking a balance, and there is nothing in the\nReligion of Humanity to force two men to find the balance on the same\nside. The Comtists are no better off than other utilitarians in\njudging policy, events, conduct.\n\nThe particularities of the worship, its minute and truly ingenious\nre-adaptation of sacraments, prayers, reverent signs, down even to the\ninvocation of a new Trinity, need not detain us. They are said, though\nit is not easy to believe, to have been elaborated by way of Utopia.\nIf so, no Utopia has ever yet been presented in a style so little\ncalculated to stir the imagination, to warm the feelings, to soothe\nthe insurgency of the reason. It is a mistake to present a great body\nof hypotheses--if Comte meant them for hypotheses--in the most\ndogmatic and peremptory form to which language can lend itself. And\nthere is no more extraordinary thing in the history of opinion than\nthe perversity with which Comte has succeeded in clothing a\nphilosophic doctrine, so intrinsically conciliatory as his, in a\nshape that excites so little sympathy and gives so much provocation.\nAn enemy defined Comtism as Catholicism _minus_ Christianity, to which\nan able champion retorted by calling it Catholicism _plus_ Science.\nHitherto Comte's Utopia has pleased the followers of the Catholic,\njust as little as those of the scientific spirit.\n\nThe elaborate and minute systematisation of life, proper to the\nreligion of Humanity, is to be directed by a priesthood. The priests\nare to possess neither wealth nor material power; they are not to\ncommand, but to counsel; their authority is to rest on persuasion, not\non force. When religion has become positive and society industrial,\nthen the influence of the church upon the state becomes really free\nand independent, which was not the case in the Middle Age. The power\nof the priesthood rests upon special knowledge of man and nature; but\nto this intellectual eminence must also be added moral power and a\ncertain greatness of character, without which force of intellect and\ncompleteness of attainment will not receive the confidence they ought\nto inspire. The functions of the priesthood are of this kind:--To\nexercise a systematic direction over education; to hold a consultative\ninfluence over all the important acts of actual life, public and\nprivate; to arbitrate in cases of practical conflict; to preach\nsermons recalling those principles of generality and universal harmony\nwhich our special activities dispose us to ignore; to order the due\nclassification of society. To perform the various ceremonies\nappointed by the founder of the religion. The authority of the\npriesthood is to rest wholly on voluntary adhesion, and there is to be\nperfect freedom of speech and discussion; though, by the way, we\ncannot forget Comte's detestable congratulations to the Czar Nicholas\non the 'wise vigilance' with which he kept watch over the importation\nof Western books.\n\nFrom his earliest manhood Comte had been powerfully impressed by the\nnecessity of elevating the condition of women (see remarkable passage\nin his letters to M. Valat, pp. 84-87). His friendship with Madame de\nVaux had deepened the impression, and in the reconstructed society\nwomen are to play a highly important part. They are to be carefully\nexcluded from public action, but they are to do many more important\nthings than things political. To fit them for their functions, they\nare to be raised above material cares, and they are to be thoroughly\neducated. The family, which is so important an element of the Comtist\nscheme of things, exists to carry the influence of woman over man to\nthe highest point of cultivation. Through affection she purifies the\nactivity of man. 'Superior in power of affection, more able to keep\nboth the intellectual and the active powers in continual subordination\nto feeling, women are formed as the natural intermediaries between\nHumanity and man. The Great Being confides specially to them its moral\nProvidence, maintaining through them the direct and constant\ncultivation of universal affection, in the midst of all the\ndistractions of thought or action, which are for ever withdrawing men\nfrom its influence.... Beside the uniform influence of every woman on\nevery man, to attach him to Humanity, such is the importance and the\ndifficulty of this ministry that each of us should be placed under the\nspecial guidance of one of these angels, to answer for him, as it\nwere, to the Great Being. This moral guardianship may assume three\ntypes,--the mother, the wife, and the daughter; each having several\nmodifications, as shown in the concluding volume. Together they\nform the three simple modes of solidarity, or unity with\ncontemporaries,--obedience, union, and protection,--as well as the\nthree degrees of continuity between ages, by uniting us with the past,\nthe present, and the future. In accordance with my theory of the\nbrain, each corresponds with one of our three altruistic\ninstincts,--veneration, attachment, and benevolence.\n\nHow the positive method of observation and verification of real facts\nhas landed us in this, and much else of the same kind, is extremely\nhard to guess. Seriously to examine an encyclopaedic system, that\ntouches life, society, and knowledge at every point, is evidently\nbeyond the compass of such an article as this. There is in every\nchapter a whole group of speculative suggestions, each of which would\nneed a long chapter to itself to elaborate or to discuss. There is at\nleast one biological speculation of astounding audacity that could be\nexamined in nothing less than a treatise. Perhaps we have said enough\nto show that after performing a great and real service to thought,\nComte almost sacrificed his claims to gratitude by the invention of a\nsystem that, as such, and independently of detached suggestions, is\nmarkedly retrograde. But the world has strong self-protecting\nqualities. It will take what is available in Comte, while forgetting\nthat in his work which is as irrational in one way as Hegel is in\nanother.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh_.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nThe transcriber made the following changes to the text to correct\nobvious errors:\n\n  1. p. 347, \"delighful\" changed to \"delightful\"\n  2. p. 382, \"'Superior in power of ...\" no ending single quote","title":"Critical Miscellanies (Vol. 3 of 3), Essay 10: Auguste Comte","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":12457}