{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_2940/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_2940","id":"gutenberg_2940","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2940","summary":null,"tags":["Capital","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics, Evolutionary","Salvation Army"],"text":"EVOLUTION AND ETHICS\nAND OTHER ESSAYS\n\nBY THOMAS H. HUXLEY\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nTHE discourse on \"Evolution and Ethics,\" reprinted in the first half of\nthe present volume, was delivered before the University of Oxford, as\nthe second of the annual lectures founded by Mr. Romanes: whose name I\nmay not write without deploring the untimely death, in the flower of\nhis age, of a friend endeared to me, as to so many others, by his\nkindly nature; and justly valued by all his colleagues for his powers\nof investigation and his zeal for the advancement of knowledge. I well\nremember, when Mr. Romanes' early work came into my hands, as one of\nthe secretaries of the Royal Society, how much I rejoiced in the\naccession to the ranks of the little army of workers in science of a\nrecruit so well qualified to take a high place among us.\n\nIt was at my friend's urgent request that I agreed to undertake the\nlecture, should I be honoured with an official proposal to give it,\nthough I confess not without misgivings, if only on account of the\nserious fatigue and hoarseness which public speaking has for some\nyears caused me; while I knew that it would be my fate to follow the\nmost accomplished and facile orator of our time, whose indomitable\nyouth is in no matter more manifest than in his penetrating and\nmusical voice. A certain saying about comparisons intruded itself\nsomewhat importunately.\n\nAnd even if I disregarded the weakness of my body in the matter of\nvoice, and that of my mind in the matter of vanity, there remained a\nthird difficulty. For several reasons, my attention, during a number\nof years, has been much directed to the bearing of modern scientific\nthought on the problems of morals and of politics, and I did not care\nto be diverted from that topic. Moreover, I thought it the most\nimportant and the worthiest which, at the present time, could engage\nthe attention even of an ancient and renowned University.\n\nBut it is a condition of the Romanes foundation that the lecturer\nshall abstain from treating of either Religion or Politics; and it\nappeared to me that, more than most, perhaps, I was bound to act, not\nmerely up to the letter, but in the spirit, of that prohibition. Yet\nEthical Science is, on all sides, so entangled with Religion and\nPolitics that the lecturer who essays to touch the former without\ncoming into contact with either of the latter, needs all the dexterity\nof an egg-dancer; and may even discover that his sense of clearness\nand his sense of propriety come into conflict, by no means to the\nadvantage of the former.\n\nI had little notion of the real magnitude of these difficulties when I\nset about my task; but I am consoled for my pains and anxiety by\nobserving that none of the multitudinous criticisms with which I have\nbeen favoured and, often, instructed, find fault with me on the score\nof having strayed out of bounds.\n\nAmong my critics there are not a few to whom I feel deeply indebted for\nthe careful attention which they have given to the exposition thus\nhampered; and further weakened, I am afraid, by my forgetfulness of a\nmaxim touching lectures of a popular character, which has descended to\nme from that prince of lecturers, Mr. Faraday. He was once asked by a\nbeginner, called upon to address a highly select and cultivated\naudience, what he might suppose his hearers to know already. Whereupon\nthe past master of the art of exposition emphatically replied\n\"Nothing!\"\n\nTo my shame as a retired veteran, who has all his life profited by\nthis great precept of lecturing strategy, I forgot all about it just\nwhen it would have been most useful. I was fatuous enough to imagine\nthat a number of propositions, which I thought established, and which,\nin fact, I had advanced without challenge on former occasions, needed\nno repetition.\n\nI have endeavoured to repair my error by prefacing the lecture with\nsome matter--chiefly elementary or recapitulatory--to which I have\ngiven the title of \"Prolegomena\" I wish I could have hit upon a\nheading of less pedantic aspect which would have served my purpose;\nand if it be urged that the new building looks over large for the\nedifice to which it is added, I can only plead the precedent of the\nancient architects, who always made the adytum the smallest part of\nthe temple.\n\nIf I had attempted to reply in full to the criticisms to which I have\nreferred, I know not what extent of ground would have been covered by\nmy pronaos. All I have endeavoured to do, at present, is to remove\nthat which seems to have proved a stumbling-block to many--namely, the\napparent paradox that ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is\nnecessarily at enmity with its parent. Unless the arguments set forth\nin the Prolegomena, in the simplest language at my command, have some\nflaw which I am unable to discern, this seeming paradox is a truth, as\ngreat as it is plain, the recognition of which is fundamental for the\nethical philosopher.\n\nWe cannot do without our inheritance from the forefathers who were the\npuppets of the cosmic process; the society which renounces it must be\ndestroyed from without. Still less can we de with too much of it; the\nsociety in which it dominates must be destroyed from within.\n\nThe motive of the drama of human life is the necessity, laid upon every\nman who comes into the world, of discovering the mean between\nself-assertion and self-restraint suited to his character and his\ncircumstances. And the eternally tragic aspect of the drama lies in\nthis: that the problem set before us is one the elements of which can\nbe but imperfectly known, and of which even an approximately right\nsolution rarely presents itself, until that stern critic, aged\nexperience, has been furnished with ample justification for venting\nhis sarcastic humour upon the irreparable blunders we have already\nmade.\n\nI have reprinted the letters on the \"Darkest England\" scheme, published\nin the \"Times\" of December, 1890, and January, 1891; and subsequently\nissued, with additions, as a pamphlet, under the title of \"Social\nDiseases and Worse Remedies,\" because, although the clever attempt to\nrush the country on behalf of that scheme has been balked, Booth's\nstanding army remains afoot, retaining all the capacities for mischief\nwhich are inherent in its constitution. I am desirous that this fact\nshould be kept steadily in view; and that the moderation of the\nclamour of the drums and trumpets should not lead us to forget the\nexistence of a force, which, in bad hands, may, at any time, be used\nfor bad purposes.\n\nIn 1892, a Committee was \"formed for the purpose of investigating the\nmanner in which the moneys, subscribed in response to the appeal made\nin the book entitled 'In Darkest England and the Way out,' have been\nexpended.\" The members of this body were gentlemen in whose competency\nand equity every one must have complete confidence; and in December,\n1892, they published a report in which they declare that, \"with the\nexception of the sums expended on the 'barracks' at Hadleigh,\" the\nmoneys in question have been \"devoted only to the objects and expended\nin the methods set out in that appeal, and to and in no others.\"\n\nNevertheless, their final conclusion runs as follows: \"(4) That whilst\nthe invested property, real and personal, resulting from such Appeal\nis so vested and controlled by the Trust of the Deed of January 30th,\n1891, that any application of it to purposes other than those declared\nin the deed by any 'General' of the Salvation Army would amount to a\nbreach of trust, and would subject him to the proceedings of a civil\nand criminal character, before mentioned in the Report, ADEQUATE LEGAL\nSAFEGUARDS DO NOT AT PRESENT EXIST TO PREVENT THE MISAPPLICATION OF\nSUCH PROPERTY.\"\n\nThe passage I have italicised forms part of a document dated December\n19th, 1892. It follows, that, even after the Deed of January 30th,\n1891, was executed, \"adequate legal safeguards\" \"to prevent the\nmisapplication of the property\" did not exist. What then was the state\nof things, up to a week earlier, that is on January 22nd, 1891, when\nmy twelfth and last letter appeared in the \"Times\"? A better\njustification for what I have said about the want of adequate security\nfor the proper administration of the funds intrusted to Mr. Booth\ncould not be desired, unless it be that which is to be found in the\nfollowing passages of the Report (pp. 36 and 37):--\n\n\"It is possible that a 'General' may be forgetful of his duty, and\nsell property and appropriate the proceeds to his own use, or to\nmeeting the general liabilities of the Salvation Army. As matters now\nstand, he, and he alone, would have control over such a sale. Against\nsuch possibilities it appears to the Committee to be reasonable that\nsome check should be imposed.\"\n\nOnce more let it be remembered that this opinion given under the hand\nof Sir Henry James, was expressed by the Committee, with the Trust\nDeed of 1891, which has been so sedulously flaunted before the public,\nin full view.\n\nThe Committee made a suggestion for the improvement of this very\nunsatisfactory state of things; but the exact value set upon it by the\nsuggestors should be carefully considered (p.37).\n\n\"The Committee are fully aware that if the views thus expressed are\ncarried out, the safeguards and checks created will not be sufficient\nfor all purposes absolutely to prevent possible dealing with the\nproperty and moneys inconsistent with the purposes to which they are\nintended to be devoted.\"\n\nIn fact, they are content to express the very modest hope that \"if the\nsuggestion made be acted upon, some hindrance will thereby be placed in\nthe way of any one acting dishonestly in respect of the disposal of\nthe property and moneys referred to.\"\n\nI do not know, and, under the circumstances, I cannot say I much care,\nwhether the suggestions of the Committee have, or have not, been acted\nupon.  Whether or not, the fact remains that an unscrupulous \"General\"\nwill have a pretty free hand, notwithstanding \"some\" hindrance.\n\nThus, the judgment of the highly authoritative, and certainly not\nhostile, Committee of 1892, upon the issues with which they concerned\nthemselves is hardly such as to inspire enthusiastic confidence. And\nit is further to be borne in mind that they carefully excluded from\ntheir duties \"any examination of the principles, government, teaching,\nor methods of the Salvation Army as a religious organization, or of\nits affairs\" except so far as they related to the administration of\nthe moneys collected by the \"Darkest England\" appeal.\n\nConsequently, the most important questions discussed in my letters were\nnot in any way touched by the Committee. Even if their report had been\nfar more favourable to the \"Darkest England\" scheme than it is; if it\nhad really assured the contributors that the funds raised were fully\nsecured against malversation; the objections, on social and political\ngrounds, to Mr.  Booth's despotic organization, with its thousands of\ndocile satellites pledged to blind obedience, set forth in the\nletters, would be in no degree weakened. The \"sixpennyworth of good\"\nwould still be out-weighed by the \"shillingsworth of harm\"; if indeed\nthe relative worth, or unworth, of the latter should not be rated in\npounds rather than in shillings.\n\nWhat would one not give for the opinion of the financial members of\nthe Committee about the famous Bank; and that of the legal experts\nabout the proposed \"tribunes of the people\"?\n\nHODESLEA, EASTBOURNE,\n        July, 1894.\n\n\n\n\n                   CONTENTS\n\n                       I\n\n                                                  PAGE\nEVOLUTION AND ETHICS. PROLEGOMENA [1894] . . . . . . 1\n\n                       II\n\nEVOLUTION AND ETHICS [1893]. . . . . . . . . . . . .46\n\n                       III\n\nSCIENCE AND MORALS [1886]. . . . . . . . . . . . . 117\n\n                       IV\n\nCAPITAL--THE MOTHER OF LABOUR [1890] . . . . . . . 147\n\n                       V\n\nSOCIAL DISEASES AND WORSE REMEDIES [1891]. . . . . 188\n\nPreface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188\nThe Struggle for Existence in Human Society. 195\nLetters to the Times . . . . . . . . . . . . 237\nLegal Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312\nThe Articles of War of the Salvation Army. . 321\n\n\n\n\n[1]\n\n\n                       I.\n\n              EVOLUTION AND ETHICS.\n\n                  PROLEGOMENA.\n\n                    [1894.]\n\n\n                       I.\n\nIT may be safely assumed that, two thousand years ago, before Caesar\nset foot in southern Britain, the whole country-side visible from the\nwindows of the room in which I write, was in what is called \"the state\nof nature.\" Except, it may be, by raising a few sepulchral mounds,\nsuch as those which still, here and there, break the flowing contours\nof the downs, man's hands had made no mark upon it; and the thin veil\nof vegetation which overspread the broad-backed heights and the\nshelving sides of the coombs was unaffected by his industry. The\nnative grasses and weeds, the scattered patches of gorse, contended\nwith one another for the possession of the scanty surface soil; they\nfought against the droughts of summer, the frosts of winter, and the\nfurious gales which swept, with unbroken force, now from the [2]\nAtlantic, and now from the North Sea, at all times of the year; they\nfilled up, as they best might, the gaps made in their ranks by all\nsorts of underground and overground animal ravagers. One year with\nanother, an average population, the floating balance of the unceasing\nstruggle for existence among the indigenous plants, maintained itself.\nIt is as little to be doubted, that an essentially similar state of\nnature prevailed, in this region, for many thousand years before the\ncoming of Caesar; and there is no assignable reason for denying that\nit might continue to exist through an equally prolonged futurity,\nexcept for the intervention of man.\n\nReckoned by our customary standards of duration, the native vegetation,\nlike the \"everlasting hills\" which it clothes, seems a type of\npermanence. The little Amarella Gentians, which abound in some places\nto-day, are the descendants of those that were trodden underfoot, by\nthe prehistoric savages who have left their flint tools, about, here\nand there; and they followed ancestors which, in the climate of the\nglacial epoch, probably flourished better than they do now. Compared\nwith the long past of this humble plant, all the history of civilized\nmen is but an episode.\n\nYet nothing is more certain than that, measured by the liberal scale\nof time-keeping of the universe, this present state of nature, however\nit may seem to have gone and to go on for ever, is [3] but a fleeting\nphase of her infinite variety; merely the last of the series of\nchanges which the earth's surface has undergone in the course of the\nmillions of years of its existence. Turn back a square foot of the\nthin turf, and the solid foundation of the land, exposed in cliffs of\nchalk five hundred feet high on the adjacent shore, yields full\nassurance of a time when the sea covered the site of the \"everlasting\nhills\"; and when the vegetation of what land lay nearest, was as\ndifferent from the present Flora of the Sussex downs, as that of\nCentral Africa now is.* No less certain is it that, between the time\nduring which the chalk was formed and that at which the original turf\ncame into existence, thousands of centuries elapsed, in the course of\nwhich, the state of nature of the ages during which the chalk was\ndeposited, passed into that which now is, by changes so slow that, in\nthe coming and going of the generations of men, had such witnessed\nthem, the contemporary conditions would have seemed to be unchanging\nand unchangeable.\n\n    * See \"On a piece of Chalk\" in the preceding volume of these\n    Essays (vol.  viii. p. 1).\n\nBut it is also certain that, before the deposition of the chalk, a\nvastly longer period had elapsed; throughout which it is easy to\nfollow the traces of the same process of ceaseless modification and of\nthe internecine struggle for existence of living things; and that even\nwhen we can get no further [4] back, it is not because there is any\nreason to think we have reached the beginning, but because the trail\nof the most ancient life remains hidden, or has become obliterated.\n\nThus that state of nature of the world of plants which we began by\nconsidering, is far from possessing the attribute of permanence. Rather\nits very essence is impermanence. It may have lasted twenty or thirty\nthousand years, it may last for twenty or thirty thousand years more,\nwithout obvious change; but, as surely as it has followed upon a very\ndifferent state, so it will be followed by an equally different\ncondition. That which endures is not one or another association of\nliving forms, but the process of which the cosmos is the product, and\nof which these are among the transitory expressions. And in the living\nworld, one of the most characteristic features of this cosmic process\nis the struggle for existence, the competition of each with all, the\nresult of which is the selection, that is to say, the survival of\nthose forms which, on the whole, are best adapted, to the conditions\nwhich at any period obtain; and which are, therefore, in that respect,\nand only in that respect, the fittest.* The acme reached by the cosmic\n[5] process in the vegetation of the downs is seen in the turf, with\nits weeds and gorse. Under the conditions, they have come out of the\nstruggle victorious; and, by surviving, have proved that they are the\nfittest to survive.\n\n    * That every theory of evolution must be consistent not merely\n    with progressive development, but with indefinite persistence\n    in the same condition and with retrogressive modification, is a\n    point which I have insisted upon repeatedly from the year 1862\n    till now. See Collected Essays, vol. ii. pp. 461-89; vol. iii.\n    p. 33; vol. viii. p. 304. In the address on \"Geological\n    Contemporaneity and Persistent Types\" (1862), the\n    paleontological proofs of this proposition were, I believe,\n    first set forth.\n\nThat the state of nature, at any time, is a temporary phase of a\nprocess of incessant change, which has been going on for innumerable\nages, appears to me to be a proposition as well established as any in\nmodern history.\n\nPaleontology assures us, in addition, that the ancient philosophers\nwho, with less reason, held the same doctrine, erred in supposing that\nthe phases formed a cycle, exactly repeating the past, exactly\nforeshadowing the future, in their rotations. On the contrary, it\nfurnishes us with conclusive reasons for thinking that, if every link\nin the ancestry of these humble indigenous plants had been preserved\nand were accessible to us, the whole would present a converging series\nof forms of gradually diminishing complexity, until, at some period in\nthe history of the earth, far more remote than any of which organic\nremains have yet been discovered, they would merge in those low groups\namong which the Boundaries between animal and vegetable life become\neffaced.*\n\n    * \"On the Border Territory between the Animal and the Vegetable\n    Kingdoms,\" Essays, vol. viii. p. 162\n\n[6] The word \"evolution,\" now generally applied to the cosmic process,\nhas had a singular history, and is used in various senses.* Taken in\nits popular signification it means progressive development, that is,\ngradual change from a condition of relative uniformity to one of\nrelative complexity; but its connotation has been widened to include\nthe phenomena of retrogressive metamorphosis, that is, of progress\nfrom a condition of relative complexity to one of relative uniformity.\n\nAs a natural process, of the same character as the development of a\ntree from its seed, or of a fowl from its egg, evolution excludes\ncreation and all other kinds of supernatural intervention. As the\nexpression of a fixed order, every stage of which is the effect of\ncauses operating according to definite rules, the conception of\nevolution no less excludes that of chance.  It is very desirable to\nremember that evolution is not an explanation of the cosmic process,\nbut merely a generalized statement of the method and results of that\nprocess. And, further, that, if there is proof that the cosmic process\nwas set going by any agent, then that agent will be, the creator of it\nand of all its products, although supernatural intervention may remain\nstrictly excluded from its further course.\n\nSo far as that limited revelation of the nature of things, which we\ncall scientific knowledge, has [7] yet gone, it tends, with constantly\nincreasing emphasis, to the belief that, not merely the world of\nplants, but that of animals; not merely living things, but the whole\nfabric of the earth; not merely our planet, but the whole solar\nsystem; not merely our star and its satellites, but the millions of\nsimilar bodies which bear witness to the order which pervades\nboundless space, and has endured through boundless time; are all\nworking out their predestined courses of evolution.\n\n    * See \"Evolution in Biology,\" Essays, vol. ii. p. 187\n\nWith none of these have I anything to do, at present, except with that\nexhibited by the forms of life which tenant the earth. All plants and\nanimals exhibit the tendency to vary, the causes of which have yet to\nbe ascertained; it is the tendency of the conditions of life, at any\ngiven time, while favouring the existence of the variations best\nadapted to them, to oppose that of the rest and thus to exercise\nselection; and all living things tend to multiply without limit, while\nthe means of support are limited; the obvious cause of which is the\nproduction of offspring more numerous than their progenitors, but with\nequal expectation of life in the actuarial sense. Without the first\ntendency there could be no evolution.  Without the second, there would\nbe no good reason why one variation should disappear and another take\nits place; that is to say there would be no selection. Without the [8]\nthird, the struggle for existence, the agent of the selective process\nin the state of nature, would vanish.*\n\n    * Collected Essays, vol. ii. passim.\n\nGranting the existence of these tendencies, all the known facts of the\nhistory of plants and of animals may be brought into rational\ncorrelation.  And this is more than can be said for any other\nhypothesis that I know of.  Such hypotheses, for example, as that of\nthe existence of a primitive, orderless chaos; of a passive and\nsluggish eternal matter moulded, with but partial success, by\narchetypal ideas; of a brand-new world-stuff suddenly created and\nswiftly shaped by a supernatural power; receive no encouragement, but\nthe contrary, from our present knowledge. That our earth may once have\nformed part of a nebulous cosmic magma is certainly possible, indeed\nseems highly probable; but there is no reason to doubt that order\nreigned there, as completely as amidst what we regard as the most\nfinished works of nature or of man.** The faith which is born of\nknowledge, finds its object in an eternal order, bringing forth\nceaseless change, through endless time, in endless space; the\nmanifestations of the cosmic energy alternating between phases of\npotentiality and phases of explication. It may be that, as Kant\nsuggests,*** every cosmic [9] magma predestined to evolve into a new\nworld, has been the no less predestined end of a vanished predecessor.\n\n    **Ibid., vol. iv. p. 138; vol. v. pp. 71-73.\n    ***Ibid., vol. viii. p. 321.\n\n\n                    II.\n\nThree or four years have elapsed since the state of nature, to which I\nhave referred, was brought to an end, so far as a small patch of the\nsoil is concerned, by the intervention of man. The patch was cut off\nfrom the rest by a wall; within the area thus protected, the native\nvegetation was, as far as possible, extirpated; while a colony of\nstrange plants was imported and set down in its place. In short, it\nwas made into a garden. At the present time, this artificially treated\narea presents an aspect extraordinarily different from that of so much\nof the land as remains in the state of nature, outside the wall.\nTrees, shrubs, and herbs, many of them appertaining to the state of\nnature of remote parts of the globe, abound and flourish. Moreover,\nconsiderable quantities of vegetables, fruits, and flowers are\nproduced, of kinds which neither now exist, nor have ever existed,\nexcept under conditions such as obtain in the garden; and which,\ntherefore, are as much works of the art of man as the frames and\nglasshouses in which some of them are raised. That the \"state of Art,\"\nthus created in the state of nature by man, is sustained by and\ndependent on him, would at once become [10] apparent, if the watchful\nsupervision of the gardener were withdrawn, and the antagonistic\ninfluences of the general cosmic process were no longer sedulously\nwarded off, or counteracted. The walls and gates would decay;\nquadrupedal and bipedal intruders would devour and tread down the\nuseful and beautiful plants; birds, insects, blight, and mildew would\nwork their will; the seeds of the native plants, carried by winds or\nother agencies, would immigrate, and in virtue of their long-earned\nspecial adaptation to the local conditions, these despised native\nweeds would soon choke their choice exotic rivals. A century or two\nhence, little beyond the foundations of the wall and of the houses and\nframes would be left, in evidence of the victory of the cosmic powers\nat work in the state of nature, over the temporary obstacles to their\nsupremacy, set up by the art of the horticulturist.\n\nIt will be admitted that the garden is as much a work of art,* or\nartifice, as anything that can be mentioned. The energy localised in\ncertain human bodies, directed by similarly localised intellects, has\nproduced a collocation of other material bodies which could not be\nbrought about in the state of nature. The same proposition is true of\nall the\n\n    * The sense of the term \"Art\" is becoming narrowed; \"work of\n    Art\" to most people means a picture, a statue, or a piece of\n    bijouterie; by way of compensation \"artist\" has included in its\n    wide embrace cooks and ballet girls, no less than painters and\n    sculptors.\n\n[11] works of man's hands, from a flint implement to a cathedral or a\nchronometer; and it is because it is true, that we call these things\nartificial, term them works of art, or artifice, by way of\ndistinguishing them from the products of the cosmic process, working\noutside man, which we call natural, or works of nature. The\ndistinction thus drawn between the works of nature and those of man,\nis universally recognized; and it is, as I conceive, both useful and\njustifiable.\n\n\n                   III.\n\nNo doubt, it may be properly urged that the operation of human energy\nand intelligence, which has brought into existence and maintains the\ngarden, by what I have called \"the horticultural process,\" is,\nstrictly speaking, part and parcel of the cosmic process. And no one\ncould more readily agree to that proposition than I. In fact, I do not\nknow that any one has taken more pains than I have, during the last\nthirty years, to insist upon the doctrine, so much reviled in the\nearly part of that period, that man, physical, intellectual, and\nmoral, is as much a part of nature, as purely a product of the cosmic\nprocess, as the humblest weed.*\n\n    * See \"Man's Place in Nature,\" Collected Essays, vol. vii., and\n    \"On the Struggle for Existence in Human Society\" (1888), below.\n\nBut if, following up this admission, it is urged [12] that, such being\nthe case, the cosmic process cannot be in antagonism with that\nhorticultural process which is part of itself--I can only reply, that\nif the conclusion that the two are antagonistic is logically absurd,\nI am sorry for logic, because, as we have seen, the fact is so. The\ngarden is in the same position as every other work of man's art; it is\na result of the cosmic process working through and by human energy and\nintelligence; and, as is the case with every other artificial thing\nset up in the state of nature, the influences of the latter, are\nconstantly tending to break it down and destroy it. No doubt, the\nForth bridge and an ironclad in the offing, are, in ultimate resort,\nproducts of the cosmic process; as much so as the river which flows\nunder the one, or the seawater on which the other floats.\nNevertheless, every breeze strains the bridge a little, every tide\ndoes something to weaken its foundations; every change of temperature\nalters the adjustment of its parts, produces friction and consequent\nwear and tear.  From time to time, the bridge must be repaired, just\nas the ironclad must go into dock; simply because nature is always\ntending to reclaim that which her child, man, has borrowed from her\nand has arranged in combinations which are not those favoured by the\ngeneral cosmic process.\n\nThus, it is not only true that the cosmic energy, working through man\nupon a portion of [13] the plant world, opposes the same energy as it\nworks through the state of nature, but a similar antagonism is\neverywhere manifest between the artificial and the natural. Even in\nthe state of nature itself, what is the struggle for existence but the\nantagonism of the results of the cosmic process in the region of life,\none to another?*\n\n    * Or to put the case still more simply. When a man lays hold of\n    the two ends of a piece of string and pulls them, with intent\n    to break it, the right arm is certainly exerted in antagonism\n    to the left arm; yet both arms derive their energy from the\n    same original source.\n\n\n                  IV.\n\nNot only is the state of nature hostile to the state of art of the\ngarden; but the principle of the horticultural process, by which the\nlatter is created and maintained, is antithetic to that of the cosmic\nprocess. The characteristic feature of the latter is the intense and\nunceasing competition of the struggle for existence. The\ncharacteristic of the former is the elimination of that struggle, by\nthe removal of the conditions which give rise to it. The tendency of\nthe cosmic process is to bring about the adjustment of the forms of\nplant life to the current conditions; the tendency of the\nhorticultural process is the adjustment of the conditions to the needs\nof the forms of plant life which the gardener desires to raise.\n\nThe cosmic process uses unrestricted multiplication [14] as the means\nwhereby hundreds compete for the place and nourishment adequate for\none; it employs frost and drought to cut off the weak and unfortunate;\nto survive, there is need not only of strength, but of flexibility and\nof good fortune.\n\nThe gardener, on the other hand, restricts multiplication; provides\nthat each plant shall have sufficient space and nourishment; protects\nfrom frost and drought; and, in every other way, attempts to modify\nthe conditions, in such a manner as to bring about the survival of\nthose forms which most nearly approach the standard of the useful or\nthe beautiful, which he has in his mind.\n\nIf the fruits and the tubers, the foliage and the flowers thus\nobtained, reach, or sufficiently approach, that ideal, there is no\nreason why the status quo attained should not be indefinitely\nprolonged. So long as the state of nature remains approximately the\nsame, so long will the energy and intelligence which created the\ngarden suffice to maintain it. However, the limits within which this\nmastery of man over nature can be maintained are narrow. If the\nconditions of the cretaceous epoch returned, I fear the most skilful\nof gardeners would have to give up the cultivation of apples and\ngooseberries; while, if those of the glacial period once again\nobtained, open asparagus beds would be superfluous, and the training\nof fruit [15] trees against the most favourable of South walls, a\nwaste of time and trouble.\n\nBut it is extremely important to note that, the state of nature\nremaining the same, if the produce does not satisfy the gardener, it\nmay be made to approach his ideal more closely. Although the struggle\nfor existence may be at end, the possibility of progress remains. In\ndiscussions on these topics, it is often strangely forgotten that the\nessential conditions of the modification, or evolution, of living\nthings are variation and hereditary transmission. Selection is the\nmeans by which certain variations are favoured and their progeny\npreserved. But the struggle for existence is only one of the means by\nwhich selection may be effected. The endless varieties of cultivated\nflowers, fruits, roots, tubers, and bulbs are not products of\nselection by means of the struggle for existence, but of direct\nselection, in view of an ideal of utility or beauty. Amidst a multitude\nof plants, occupying the same station and subjected to the same\nconditions, in the garden, varieties arise. The varieties tending in a\ngiven direction are preserved, and the rest are destroyed. And the\nsame process takes place among the varieties until, for example, the\nwild kale becomes a cabbage, or the wild Viola tricolor, a prize\npansy.\n\n[16]\n\n\n                  V.\n\nThe process of colonisation presents analogies to the formation of a\ngarden which are highly instructive. Suppose a shipload of English\ncolonists sent to form a settlement, in such a country as Tasmania was\nin the middle of the last century. On landing, they find themselves in\nthe midst of a state of nature, widely different from that left behind\nthem in everything but the most general physical conditions. The\ncommon plants, the common birds and quadrupeds, are as totally\ndistinct as the men from anything to be seen on the side of the globe\nfrom which they come. The colonists proceed to put an end to this\nstate of things over as large an area as they desire to occupy.  They\nclear away the native vegetation, extirpate or drive out the animal\npopulation, so far as may be necessary, and take measures to defend\nthemselves from the re-immigration of either. In their place, they\nintroduce English grain and fruit trees; English dogs, sheep, cattle,\nhorses; and English men; in fact, they set up a new Flora and Fauna and\na new variety of mankind, within the old state of nature. Their farms\nand pastures represent a garden on a great scale, and themselves the\ngardeners who have to keep it up, in watchful antagonism to the old\nregime. Considered as a whole, the colony is a composite unit\nintroduced into the old state of nature; and, [17] thenceforward, a\ncompetitor in the struggle for existence, to conquer or be vanquished.\n\nUnder the conditions supposed, there is no doubt of the result, if the\nwork of the colonists be carried out energetically and with\nintelligent combination of all their forces. On the other hand, if\nthey are slothful, stupid, and careless; or if they waste their\nenergies in contests with one another, the chances are that the old\nstate of nature will have the best of it. The native savage will\ndestroy the immigrant civilized man; of the English animals and plants\nsome will be extirpated by their indigenous rivals, others will pass\ninto the feral state and themselves become components of the state of\nnature. In a few decades, all other traces of the settlement will have\nvanished.\n\n\n                   VI.\n\nLet us now imagine that some administrative authority, as far superior\nin power and intelligence to men, as men are to their cattle, is set\nover the colony, charged to deal with its human elements in such a\nmanner as to assure the victory of the settlement over the\nantagonistic influences of the state of nature in which it is set\ndown. He would proceed in the same fashion as that in which the\ngardener dealt with his garden. In the first place, he would, as far\nas possible, put a [18] stop to the influence of external competition\nby thoroughly extirpating and excluding the native rivals, whether\nmen, beasts, or plants. And our administrator would select his human\nagents, with a view to his ideal of a successful colony, just as the\ngardener selects his plants with a view to his ideal of useful or\nbeautiful products.\n\nIn the second place, in order that no struggle for the means of\nexistence between these human agents should weaken the efficiency of\nthe corporate whole in the battle with the state of nature, he would\nmake arrangements by which each would be provided with those means;\nand would be relieved from the fear of being deprived of them by his\nstronger or more cunning fellows.  Laws, sanctioned by the combined\nforce of the colony, would restrain the self-assertion of each man\nwithin the limits required for the maintenance of peace. In other\nwords, the cosmic struggle for existence, as between man and man,\nwould be rigorously suppressed; and selection, by its means, would be\nas completely excluded as it is from the garden.\n\nAt the same time, the obstacles to the full development of the\ncapacities of the colonists by other conditions of the state of nature\nthan those already mentioned, would be removed by the creation of\nartificial conditions of existence of a more favourable character:\nProtection against extremes of heat and cold would [19] be afforded by\nhouses and clothing; drainage and irrigation works would antagonise\nthe effects of excessive rain and excessive drought; roads, bridges,\ncanals, carriages, and ships would overcome the natural obstacles to\nlocomotion and transport; mechanical engines would supplement the\nnatural strength of men and of their draught animals; hygienic\nprecautions would check, or remove, the natural causes of disease.\nWith every step of this progress in civilization, the colonists would\nbecome more and more independent of the state of nature; more and\nmore, their lives would be conditioned by a state of art. In order to\nattain his ends, the administrator would have to avail himself of the\ncourage, industry, and co-operative intelligence of the settlers; and\nit is plain that the interest of the community would be best served by\nincreasing the proportion of persons who possess such qualities, and\ndiminishing that of persons devoid of them. In other words, by\nselection directed towards an ideal.\n\nThus the administrator might look to the establishment of an earthly\nparadise, a true garden of Eden, in which all things should work\ntogether towards the well-being of the gardeners: within which the\ncosmic process, the coarse struggle for existence of the state of\nnature, should be abolished; in which that state should be replaced by\na state of art; [20] where every plant and every lower animal should\nbe adapted to human wants, and would perish if human supervision and\nprotection were withdrawn; where men themselves should have been\nselected, with a view to their efficiency as organs for the\nperformance of the functions of a perfected society. And this ideal\npolity would have been brought about, not by gradually adjusting the\nmen to the conditions around them, but by creating artificial\nconditions for them; not by allowing the free play of the struggle for\nexistence, but by excluding that struggle; and by substituting\nselection directed towards the administrator's ideal for the selection\nit exercises.\n\n\n                VII.\n\nBut the Eden would have its serpent, and a very subtle beast too. Man\nshares with the rest of the living world the mighty instinct of\nreproduction and its consequence, the tendency to multiply with great\nrapidity. The better the measures of the administrator achieved their\nobject, the more completely the destructive agencies of the state of\nnature were defeated, the less would that multiplication be checked.\n\nOn the other hand, within the colony, the enforcement of peace, which\ndeprives every man of the power to take away the means of existence\nfrom another, simply because he is the stronger, [21] would have put\nan end to the struggle for existence between the colonists, and the\ncompetition for the commodities of existence, which would alone\nremain, is no check upon population.\n\nThus, as soon as the colonists began to multiply, the administrator\nwould have to face the tendency to the reintroduction of the cosmic\nstruggle into his artificial fabric, in consequence of the\ncompetition, not merely for the commodities, but for the means of\nexistence. When the colony reached the limit of possible expansion,\nthe surplus population must be disposed of somehow; or the fierce\nstruggle for existence must recommence and destroy that peace, which\nis the fundamental condition of the maintenance of the state of art\nagainst the state of nature.\n\nSupposing the administrator to be guided by purely scientific\nconsiderations, he would, like the gardener, meet this most serious\ndifficulty by systematic extirpation, or exclusion, of the superfluous.\nThe hopelessly diseased, the infirm aged, the weak or deformed in body\nor in mind, the excess of infants born, would be put away, as the\ngardener pulls up defective and superfluous plants, or the breeder\ndestroys undesirable cattle. Only the strong and the healthy,\ncarefully matched, with a view to the progeny best adapted to the\npurposes of the administrator, would be permitted to perpetuate their\nkind.\n\n[22]\n\n\n                VIII.\n\nOf the more thoroughgoing of the multitudinous attempts to apply the\nprinciples of cosmic evolution, or what are supposed to be such, to\nsocial and political problems, which have appeared of late years, a\nconsiderable proportion appear to me to be based upon the notion that\nhuman society is competent to furnish, from its own resources, an\nadministrator of the kind I have imagined. The pigeons, in short, are\nto be their own Sir John Sebright.* A despotic government, whether\nindividual or collective, is to be endowed with the preternatural\nintelligence, and with what, I am afraid, many will consider the\npreternatural ruthlessness, required for the purpose of carrying out\nthe principle of improvement by selection, with the somewhat drastic\nthoroughness upon which the success of the method depends.  Experience\ncertainly does not justify us in limiting the ruthlessness of\nindividual \"saviours of society\"; and, on the well-known grounds of\nthe aphorism which denies both body and soul to corporations, it seems\nprobable (indeed the belief is not without support in history) that a\ncollective despotism, a mob got to believe in its own divine right by\ndemagogic missionaries, would be capable of more thorough [23] work in\nthis direction than any single tyrant, puffed up with the same\nillusion, has ever achieved.  But intelligence is another affair. The\nfact that \"saviours of society\" take to that trade is evidence enough\nthat they have none to spare. And such as they possess is generally\nsold to the capitalists of physical force on whose resources they\ndepend. However, I doubt whether even the keenest judge of character,\nif he had before him a hundred boys and girls under fourteen, could\npick out, with the least chance of success, those who should be kept,\nas certain to be serviceable members of the polity, and those who\nshould be chloroformed, as equally sure to be stupid, idle, or\nvicious. The \"points\" of a good or of a bad citizen are really far\nharder to discern than those of a puppy or a short-horn calf; many do\nnot show themselves before the practical difficulties of life\nstimulate manhood to full exertion. And by that time the mischief is\ndone. The evil stock, if it be one, has had time to multiply, and\nselection is nullified.\n\n    * Not that the conception of such a society is necessarily based\n    upon the idea of evolution. The Platonic state testifies to the\n    contrary.\n\n\n                           IX.\n\nI have other reasons for fearing that this logical ideal of\nevolutionary regimentation--this pigeon-fanciers' polity--is\nunattainable. In the absence of any such a severely scientific\nadministrator as we have been dreaming of, human society [24] is kept\ntogether by bonds of such a singular character, that the attempt to\nperfect society after his fashion would run serious risk of loosening\nthem. Social organization is not peculiar to men. Other societies,\nsuch as those constituted by bees and ants, have also arisen out of\nthe advantage of co-operation in the struggle for existence; and their\nresemblances to, and their differences from, human society are alike\ninstructive. The society formed by the hive bee fulfils the ideal of\nthe communistic aphorism \"to each according to his needs, from each\naccording to his capacity.\" Within it, the struggle for existence is\nstrictly limited.  Queen, drones, and workers have each their allotted\nsufficiency of food; each performs the function assigned to it in the\neconomy of the hive, and all contribute to the success of the whole\ncooperative society in its competition with rival collectors of nectar\nand pollen and with other enemies, in the state of nature without. In\nthe same sense as the garden, or the colony, is a work of human art,\nthe bee polity is a work of apiarian art, brought about by the cosmic\nprocess, working through the organization of the hymenopterous type.\n\nNow this society is the direct product of an organic necessity,\nimpelling every member of it to a course of action which tends to the\ngood of the whole. Each bee has its duty and none [25] has any rights.\nWhether bees are susceptible of feeling and capable of thought is a\nquestion which cannot be dogmatically answered. As a pious opinion, I\nam disposed to deny them more than the merest rudiments of\nconsciousness.* But it is curious to reflect that a thoughtful drone\n(workers and queens would have no leisure for speculation) with a turn\nfor ethical philosophy, must needs profess himself an intuitive\nmoralist of the purest water. He would point out, with perfect\njustice, that the devotion of the workers to a life of ceaseless toil\nfor a mere subsistence wage, cannot be accounted for either by\nenlightened selfishness, or by any other sort of utilitarian motives;\nsince these bees begin to work, without experience or reflection, as\nthey emerge from the cell in which they are hatched. Plainly, an\neternal and immutable principle, innate in each bee, can alone account\nfor the phenomena. On the other hand, the biologist, who traces out\nall the extant stages of gradation between solitary and hive bees, as\nclearly sees in the latter, simply the perfection of an automatic\nmechanism, hammered out by the blows of the struggle for existence\nupon the progeny of the former, during long ages of constant\nvariation.\n\n    * Collected Essays, vol. i., \"Animal Automatism\"; vol. v.,\n    \"Prologue,\" pp. 45 et seq.\n\n[26]\n\n\n                 X.\n\nI see no reason to doubt that, at its origin, human society was as much\na product of organic necessity as that of the bees.* The human family,\nto begin with, rested upon exactly the same conditions as those which\ngave rise to similar associations among animals lower in the scale.\nFurther, it is easy to see that every increase in the duration of the\nfamily ties, with the resulting co-operation of a larger and larger\nnumber of descendants for protection and defence, would give the\nfamilies in which such modification took place a distinct advantage\nover the others. And, as in the hive, the progressive limitation of\nthe struggle for existence between the members of the family would\ninvolve increasing efficiency as regards outside competition.\n\nBut there is this vast and fundamental difference between bee society\nand human society. In the former, the members of the society are each\norganically predestined to the performance of one particular class of\nfunctions only. If they were endowed with desires, each could desire\nto perform none but those offices for which its organization specially\nfits it; and which, in view of the good of the whole, it is proper it\nshould do. So long as a new queen does not make her appearance,\nrivalries, and competition are absent from the bee polity.\n\n    * Collected Essays, vol v., Prologue, pp. 50-54,\n\n[27] Among mankind, on the contrary, there is no such predestination to\na sharply defined place in the social organism. However much men may\ndiffer in the quality of their intellects, the intensity of their\npassions, and the delicacy of their sensations, it cannot be said that\none is fitted by his organization to be an agricultural labourer and\nnothing else, and another to be a landowner and nothing else.\nMoreover, with all their enormous differences in natural endowment,\nmen agree in one thing, and that is their innate desire to enjoy the\npleasures and to escape the pains of life; and, in short, to do\nnothing but that which it pleases them to do, without the least\nreference to the welfare of the society into which they are born. That\nis their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of\noriginal sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human\nand brutal, in whom the strength of this innate tendency to\nself-assertion was the condition of victory in the struggle for\nexistence. That is the reason of the aviditas vitae*--the insatiable\nhunger for enjoyment--of all mankind, which is one of the essential\nconditions of success in the war with the state of nature outside; and\nyet the sure agent of the destruction of society if allowed free play\nwithin.\n\n    * See below. Romanes' Lecture, note 7.\n\nThe check upon this free play of self-assertion, or natural liberty,\nwhich is the necessary condition for the origin of human society, is\nthe product [28] of organic necessities of a different kind from those\nupon which the constitution of the hive depends. One of these is the\nmutual affection of parent and offspring, intensified by the long\ninfancy of the human species.  But the most important is the tendency,\nso strongly developed in man, to reproduce in himself actions and\nfeelings similar to, or correlated with, those of other men. Man is\nthe most consummate of all mimics in the animal world; none but\nhimself can draw or model; none comes near him in the scope, variety,\nand exactness of vocal imitation; none is such a master of gesture;\nwhile he seems to be impelled thus to imitate for the pure pleasure of\nit.  And there is no such another emotional chameleon. By a purely\nreflex operation of the mind, we take the hue of passion of those who\nare about us, or, it may be, the complementary colour. It is not by\nany conscious \"putting one's self in the place\" of a joyful or a\nsuffering person that the state of mind we call sympathy usually\narises; * indeed, it is often contrary to one's sense of [29] right,\nand in spite of one's will, that \"fellow-feeling makes us wondrous\nkind,\" or the reverse. However complete may be the indifference to\npublic opinion, in a cool, intellectual view, of the traditional sage,\nit has not yet been my fortune to meet with any actual sage who took\nits hostile manifestations with entire equanimity. Indeed, I doubt if\nthe philosopher lives, or ever has lived who could know himself to be\nheartily despised by a street boy without some irritation. And,\nthough one cannot justify Haman for wishing to hang Mordecai on such a\nvery high gibbet, yet, really, the consciousness of the Vizier of\nAhasuerus, as he went in and out of the gate, that this obscure Jew\nhad no respect for him, must have been very annoying.**\n\n    * Adam Smith makes the pithy observation that the man who\n    sympathises with a woman in childbed, cannot be said to put\n    himself in her place. (\"The Theory of the Moral Sentiments,\"\n    Part vii. sec. iii. chap. i.) Perhaps there is more humour than\n    force in the example; and, in spite of this and other\n    observations of the same tenor, I think that the one defect of\n    the remarkable work in which it occurs is that it lays too much\n    stress on conscious substitution, too little on purely reflex\n    sympathy.\n\n    ** Esther v. 9-13. \". . . but when Haman saw Mordecai in the\n    king's gate, that he stood not up, nor moved for him, he was\n    full of indignation against Mordecai. . . . And Haman told them\n    of the glory of his riches . . . and all the things wherein the\n    king had promoted him . . . Yet all this availeth me nothing,\n    so long as I see Mordecai the Jew sitting at the king's gate.\"\n    What a shrewd exposure of human weakness it is!\n\nIt is needful only to look around us, to see that the greatest\nrestrainer of the anti-social tendencies of men is fear, not of the\nlaw, but of the opinion of their fellows. The conventions of honour\nbind men who break legal, moral, and religious bonds; and, while\npeople endure the extremity of physical pain rather than part with\nlife, shame drives the weakest to suicide.\n\nEvery forward step of social progress brings [30] men into closer\nrelations with their fellows, and increases the importance of the\npleasures and pains derived from sympathy. We judge the acts of others\nby our own sympathies, and we judge our own acts by the sympathies of\nothers, every day and all day long, from childhood upwards, until\nassociations, as indissoluble as those of language, are formed between\ncertain acts and the feelings of approbation or disapprobation. It\nbecomes impossible to imagine some acts without disapprobation, or\nothers without approbation of the actor, whether he be one's self, or\nany one else. We come to think in the acquired dialect of morals. An\nartificial personality, the \"man within,\" as Adam Smith* calls\nconscience, is built up beside the natural personality. He is the\nwatchman of society, charged to restrain the anti-social tendencies of\nthe natural man within the limits required by social welfare.\n\n    * \"Theory of the Moral Sentiments,\" Part iii. chap. 3. On the\n    Influence and Authority of Conscience.\n\n\n                   XI.\n\nI have termed this evolution of the feelings out of which the\nprimitive bonds of human society are so largely forged, into the\norganized and personified sympathy we call conscience, the ethical\nprocess.* So far as it tends to\n\n    * Worked out, in its essential features, chiefly by Hartley and\n    Adam Smith, long before the modern doctrine of evolution was\n    thought of. See Note below, p. 45.\n\n[31] make any human society more efficient in the struggle for\nexistence with the state of nature, or with other societies, it works\nin harmonious contrast with the cosmic process. But it is none the\nless true that, since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle\nfor existence between men in society, the ethical process is in\nopposition to the principle of the cosmic process, and tends to the\nsuppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that\nstruggle.*\n\n    * See the essay \"On the Struggle for Existence in Human Society\"\n    below; and Collected Essays, vol. i. p. 276, for Kant's\n    recognition of these facts.\n\nIt is further to be observed that, just as the self-assertion,\nnecessary to the maintenance of society against the state of nature,\nwill destroy that society if it is allowed free operation within; so\nthe self-restraint, the essence of the ethical process, which is no\nless an essential condition of the existence of every polity, may, by\nexcess, become ruinous to it.\n\nMoralists of all ages and of all faiths, attending only to the\nrelations of men towards one another in an ideal society, have agreed\nupon the \"golden rule,\" \"Do as you would be done by.\" In other words,\nlet sympathy be your guide; put yourself in the place of the man\ntowards whom your action is directed; and do to him what you would\nlike to have done to yourself under the circumstances. However much\none may admire the generosity of such a rule of [32] conduct; however\nconfident one may be that average men may be thoroughly depended upon\nnot to carry it out to its full logical consequences; it is\nnevertheless desirable to recognise the fact that these consequences\nare incompatible with the existence of a civil state, under any\ncircumstances of this world which have obtained, or, so far as one can\nsee, are, likely to come to pass.\n\nFor I imagine there can be no doubt that the great desire of every\nwrongdoer is to escape from the painful consequences of his actions.\nIf I put myself in the place of the man who has robbed me, I find that\nI am possessed by an exceeding desire not to be fined or imprisoned;\nif in that of the man who has smitten me on one cheek, I contemplate\nwith satisfaction the absence of any worse result than the turning of\nthe other cheek for like treatment.  Strictly observed, the \"golden\nrule\" involves the negation of law by the refusal to put it in motion\nagainst law-breakers; and, as regards the external relations of a\npolity, it is the refusal to continue the struggle for existence. It\ncan be obeyed, even partially, only under the protection of a society\nwhich repudiates it. Without such shelter, the followers of the\n\"golden rule\" may indulge in hopes of heaven, but they must reckon with\nthe certainty that other people will be masters of the earth.\n\nWhat would become of the garden if the [33] gardener treated all the\nweeds and slugs, and birds and trespassers as he would like to be\ntreated, if he were in their place?\n\n\n                 XII.\n\nUnder the preceding heads, I have endeavoured to represent in broad,\nbut I hope faithful, outlines the essential features of the state of\nnature and of that cosmic process of which it is the outcome, so far\nas was needful for my argument; I have contrasted with the state of\nnature the state of art, produced by human intelligence and energy, as\nit is exemplified by a garden; and I have shown that the state of art,\nhere and elsewhere, can be maintained only by the constant\ncounteraction of the hostile influences of the state of nature.\nFurther, I have pointed out that the \"horticultural process,\" which\nthus sets itself against the \"cosmic process\" is opposed to the latter\nin principle, in so far as it tends to arrest the struggle for\nexistence, by restraining the multiplication which is one of the chief\ncauses of that struggle, and by creating artificial conditions of\nlife, better adapted to the cultivated plants than are the conditions\nof the state of nature. And I have dwelt upon the fact that, though\nthe progressive modification, which is the consequence of the struggle\nfor existence in the state of nature, is at an end, such modification\nmay still be effected [34] by that selection, in view of an ideal of\nusefulness, or of pleasantness, to man, of which the state of nature\nknows nothing.\n\nI have proceeded to show that a colony, set down in a country in the\nstate of nature, presents close analogies with a garden; and I have\nindicated the course of action which an administrator, able and\nwilling to carry out horticultural principles, would adopt, in order\nto secure the success of such a newly formed polity, supposing it to\nbe capable of indefinite expansion. In the contrary case, I have shown\nthat difficulties must arise; that the unlimited increase of the\npopulation over a limited area must, sooner or later, reintroduce into\nthe colony that struggle for the means of existence between the\ncolonists, which it was the primary object of the administrator to\nexclude, insomuch as it is fatal to the mutual peace which is the\nprime condition of the union of men in society.\n\nI have briefly described the nature of the only radical cure, known to\nme, for the disease which would thus threaten the existence of the\ncolony; and, however regretfully, I have been obliged to admit that\nthis rigorously scientific method of applying the principles of\nevolution to human society hardly comes within the region of practical\npolitics; not for want of will on the part of a great many people; but\nbecause, for one reason, there is no hope that mere human beings will\never possess enough intelligence to select the fittest. And I [35]\nhave adduced other grounds for arriving at the same conclusion.\n\nI have pointed out that human society took its rise in the organic\nnecessities expressed by imitation and by the sympathetic emotions;\nand that, in the struggle for existence with the state of nature and\nwith other societies, as part of it, those in which men were thus led\nto close co-operation had a great advantage.* But, since each man\nretained more or less of the faculties common to all the rest, and\nespecially a full share of the desire for unlimited\nself-gratification, the struggle for existence within society could\nonly be gradually eliminated. So long as any of it remained, society\ncontinued to be an imperfect instrument of the struggle for existence\nand, consequently, was improvable by the selective influence of that\nstruggle. Other things being alike, the tribe of savages in which\norder was best maintained; in which there was most security within the\ntribe and the most loyal mutual support outside it, would be the\nsurvivors.\n\n    * Collected Essays, vol. v., Prologue, p. 52.\n\nI have termed this gradual strengthening of the social bond, which,\nthough it arrest the struggle for existence inside society, up to a\ncertain point improves the chances of society, as a corporate whole,\nin the cosmic struggle--the ethical process. I have endeavoured to\nshow that, when the ethical process has advanced so far as to secure\n[36] every member of the society in the possession of the means of\nexistence, the struggle for existence, as between man and man, within\nthat society is, ipso facto, at an end. And, as it is undeniable that\nthe most highly civilized societies have substantially reached this\nposition, it follows that, so far as they are concerned, the struggle\nfor existence can play no important part within them.* In other words,\nthe kind of evolution which is brought about in the state of nature\ncannot take place.\n\n    * Whether the struggle for existence with the state of nature\n    and with other societies, so far as they stand in the relation\n    of the state of nature with it, exerts a selective influence\n    upon modern society, and in what direction, are questions not\n    easy to answer. The problem of the effect of military and\n    industrial warfare upon those who wage it is very complicated.\n\nI have further shown cause for the belief that direct selection, after\nthe fashion of the horticulturist and the breeder, neither has played,\nnor can play, any important part in the evolution of society; apart\nfrom other reasons, because I do not see how such selection could be\npractised without a serious weakening, it may be the destruction, of\nthe bonds which hold society together. It strikes me that men who are\naccustomed to contemplate the active or passive extirpation of the\nweak, the unfortunate, and the superfluous; who justify that conduct\non the ground that it has the sanction of the cosmic process, and is\nthe only way of ensuring the progress of the race; who, if [37] they\nare consistent, must rank medicine among the black arts and count the\nphysician a mischievous preserver of the unfit; on whose matrimonial\nundertakings the principles of the stud have the chief influence;\nwhose whole lives, therefore, are an education in the noble art of\nsuppressing natural affection and sympathy, are not likely to have any\nlarge stock of these commodities left. But, without them, there is no\nconscience, nor any restraint on the conduct of men, except the\ncalculation of self-interest, the balancing of certain present\ngratifications against doubtful future pains; and experience tells us\nhow much that is worth. Every day, we see firm believers in the hell\nof the theologians commit acts by which, as they believe when cool,\nthey risk eternal punishment; while they hold back from those which are\nopposed to the sympathies of their associates.\n\n\n                XIII.\n\nThat progressive modification of civilization which passes by the name\nof the \"evolution of society,\" is, in fact, a process of an\nessentially different character, both from that which brings about the\nevolution of species, in the state of nature, and from that which\ngives rise to the evolution of varieties, in the state of art.\n\nThere can be no doubt that vast changes have taken place in English\ncivilization since the reign [38] of the Tudors. But I am not aware of\na particle of evidence in favour of the conclusion that this\nevolutionary process, has been accompanied by any modification of the\nphysical, or the mental, characters of the men who have been the\nsubjects of it. I have not met with any grounds for suspecting that\nthe average Englishmen of to-day are sensibly different from those\nthat Shakspere knew and drew. We look into his magic mirror of the\nElizabethan age, and behold, nowise darkly, the presentment of\nourselves.\n\nDuring these three centuries, from the reign of Elizabeth to that of\nVictoria, the struggle for existence between man and man has been so\nlargely restrained among the great mass of the population (except for\none or two short intervals of civil war), that it can have had little,\nor no, selective operation. As to anything comparable to direct\nselection, it has been practised on so small a scale that it may also\nbe neglected. The criminal law, in so far as by putting to death or by\nsubjecting to long periods of imprisonment, those who infringe its\nprovisions, prevents the propagation of hereditary criminal\ntendencies; and the poor-law, in so far as it separates married\ncouples, whose destitution arises from hereditary defects of\ncharacter, are doubtless selective agents operating in favour of the\nnon-criminal and the more effective members of society. But the\nproportion of the population which they influence [39] is very small;\nand, generally, the hereditary criminal and the hereditary pauper have\npropagated their kind before the law affects them. In a large\nproportion of cases, crime and pauperism have nothing to do with\nheredity; but are the consequence, partly, of circumstances and,\npartly, of the possession of qualities, which, under different\nconditions of life, might have excited esteem and even admiration.  It\nwas a shrewd man of the world who, in discussing sewage problems,\nremarked that dirt is riches in the wrong place; and that sound\naphorism has moral applications. The benevolence and open-handed\ngenerosity which adorn a rich man, may make a pauper of a poor one;\nthe energy and courage to which the successful soldier owes his rise,\nthe cool and daring subtlety to which the great financier owes his\nfortune, may very easily, under unfavourable conditions, lead their\npossessors to the gallows, or to the hulks. Moreover, it is fairly\nprobable that the children of a \"failure\" will receive from their\nother parent just that little modification of character which makes\nall the difference. I sometimes wonder whether people, who talk so\nfreely about extirpating the unfit, ever dispassionately consider\ntheir own history. Surely, one must be very \"fit,\" indeed, not to know\nof an occasion, or perhaps two, in one's life, when it would have been\nonly too easy to qualify for a place among the \"unfit.\"\n\n[40] In my belief the innate qualities, physical, intellectual, and\nmoral, of our nation have remained substantially the same for the last\nfour or five centuries. If the struggle for existence has affected us\nto any serious extent (and I doubt it) it has been, indirectly,\nthrough our military and industrial wars with other nations.\n\n\n                  XIV.\n\nWhat is often called the struggle for existence in society (I plead\nguilty to having used the term too loosely myself), is a contest, not\nfor the means of existence, but for the means of enjoyment. Those who\noccupy the first places in this practical competitive examination are\nthe rich and the influential; those who fail, more or less, occupy the\nlower places, down to the squalid obscurity of the pauper and the\ncriminal. Upon the most liberal estimate, I suppose the former group\nwill not amount to two per cent. of the population. I doubt if the\nlatter exceeds another two per cent.; but let it be supposed, for the\nsake of argument, that it is as great as five per cent.*\n\n    * Those who read the last Essay in this volume will not accuse\n    me of wishing to attenuate the evil of the existence of this\n    group, whether great or small.\n\nAs it is only in the latter group that any thing comparable to the\nstruggle for existence in the state of nature can take place; as it is\n[41] only among this twentieth of the whole people that numerous men,\nwomen, and children die of rapid or slow starvation, or of the\ndiseases incidental to permanently bad conditions of life; and as\nthere is nothing to prevent their multiplication before they are\nkilled off, while, in spite of greater infant mortality, they increase\nfaster than the rich; it seems clear that the struggle for existence\nin this class can have no appreciable selective influence upon the\nother 95 per cent. of the population.\n\nWhat sort of a sheep breeder would he be who should content himself\nwith picking out the worst fifty out of a thousand, leaving them on a\nbarren common till the weakest starved, and then letting the survivors\ngo back to mix with the rest? And the parallel is too favourable;\nsince in a large number of cases, the actual poor and the convicted\ncriminals are neither the weakest nor the worst.\n\nIn the struggle for the means of enjoyment, the qualities which ensure\nsuccess are energy, industry, intellectual capacity, tenacity of\npurpose, and, at least, as much sympathy as is necessary to make a man\nunderstand the feelings of his fellows. Were there none of those\nartificial arrangements by which fools and knaves are kept at the top\nof society instead of sinking to their natural place at the bottom,*\nthe struggle for the means [42] of enjoyment would ensure a constant\ncirculation of the human units of the social compound, from the bottom\nto the top and from the top to the bottom.  The survivors of the\ncontest, those who continued to form the great bulk of the polity,\nwould not be those \"fittest\" who got to the very top, but the great\nbody of the moderately \"fit,\" whose numbers and superior propagative\npower, enable them always to swamp the exceptionally endowed minority.\n\n    * I have elsewhere lamented the absence from society of a\n    machinery for facilitating the descent of incapacity.\n    \"Administrative Nihilism.\" Collected Essays, vol. i. p. 54.\n\nI think it must be obvious to every one, that, whether we consider the\ninternal or the external interests of society, it is desirable they\nshould be in the hands of those who are endowed with the largest share\nof energy, of industry, of intellectual capacity, of tenacity of\npurpose, while they are not devoid of sympathetic humanity; and, in so\nfar as the struggle for the means of enjoyment tends to place such men\nin possession of wealth and influence, it is a process which tends to\nthe good of society. But the process, as we have seen, has no real\nresemblance to that which adapts living beings to current conditions\nin the state of nature; nor any to the artificial selection of the\nhorticulturist.\n\n[43] To return, once more, to the parallel of horticulture. In the\nmodern world, the gardening of men by themselves is practically\nrestricted to the performance, not of selection, but of that other\nfunction of the gardener, the creation of conditions more favourable\nthan those of the state of nature; to the end of facilitating the free\nexpansion of the innate faculties of the citizen, so far as it is\nconsistent with the general good.  And the business of the moral and\npolitical philosopher appears to me to be the ascertainment, by the\nsame method of observation, experiment, and ratiocination, as is\npractised in other kinds of scientific work, of the course of conduct\nwhich will best conduce to that end.\n\nBut, supposing this course of conduct to be scientifically determined\nand carefully followed out, it cannot put an end to the struggle for\nexistence in the state of nature; and it will not so much as tend, in\nany way, to the adaptation of man to that state. Even should the whole\nhuman race be absorbed in one vast polity, within which \"absolute\npolitical justice\" reigns, the struggle for existence with the state\nof nature outside it, and the tendency to the return to the struggle\nwithin, in consequence of over-multiplication, will remain; and,\nunless men's inheritance from the ancestors who fought a good fight in\nthe state of [44] nature, their dose of original sin, is rooted out by\nsome method at present unrevealed, at any rate to disbelievers in\nsupernaturalism, every child born into the world will still bring with\nhim the instinct of unlimited self-assertion. He will have to learn\nthe lesson of self-restraint and renunciation. But the practice of\nself-restraint and renunciation is not happiness, though it may be\nsomething much better.\n\nThat man, as a \"political animal,\" is susceptible of a vast amount of\nimprovement, by education, by instruction, and by the application of\nhis intelligence to the adaptation of the conditions of life to his\nhigher needs, I entertain not the slightest doubt. But so long as he\nremains liable to error, intellectual or moral; so long as he is\ncompelled to be perpetually on guard against the cosmic forces, whose\nends are not his ends, without and within himself; so long as he is\nhaunted by inexpugnable memories and hopeless aspirations; so long as\nthe recognition of his intellectual limitations forces him to\nacknowledge his incapacity to penetrate the mystery of existence; the\nprospect of attaining untroubled happiness, or of a state which can,\neven remotely, deserve the title of perfection, appears to me to be as\nmisleading an illusion as ever was dangled before the eyes of poor\nhumanity. And there have been many of them.\n\nThat which lies before the human race is a [45] constant struggle to\nmaintain and improve, in opposition to the State of Nature, the State\nof Art of an organized polity; in which, and by which, man may develop\na worthy civilization, capable of maintaining and constantly improving\nitself, until the evolution of our globe shall have entered so far\nupon its downward course that the cosmic process resumes its sway;\nand, once more, the State of Nature prevails over the surface of our\nplanet.\n\n     Note: (See p. 30).--It seems the fashion nowadays to ignore\nHartley; though, a century and a half ago, he not only laid the\nfoundations but built up much of the superstructure of a true theory\nof the Evolution of the intellectual and moral faculties. He speaks of\nwhat I have termed the ethical process as \"our Progress from\nSelf-interest to Self-annihilation.\" Observations on Man (1749), vol.\nii p. 281.\n\n[46]\n\n                         II.\n\n                  EVOLUTION AND ETHICS.\n\n             [The Romanes Lecture, 1893.]\n\nSoleo enim et in aliena castra transire, non tanquam transfuga sed\ntanquam explorator. (L. ANNAEI SENECAE EPIST. II. 4.)\n\nTHERE is a delightful child's story, known by the title of \"Jack and\nthe Bean-stalk,\" with which my contemporaries who are present will be\nfamiliar.  But so many of our grave and reverend Juniors have been\nbrought up on severer intellectual diet, and, perhaps, have become\nacquainted with fairyland only through primers of comparative\nmythology, that it may be needful to give an outline of the tale. It\nis a legend of a bean-plant, which grows and grows until it reaches\nthe high heavens and there spreads out into a vast canopy of foliage.\nThe hero, being moved to climb the stalk, discovers that the leafy\nexpanse supports a world composed of the same elements as that below\nbut yet strangely new; and his adventures there, on which I may not\ndwell, must [47] have completely changed his views of the nature of\nthings; though the story, not having been composed by, or for,\nphilosophers, has nothing to say about views.\n\nMy present enterprise has a certain analogy to that of the daring\nadventurer. I beg you to accompany me in an attempt to reach a world\nwhich, to many, is probably strange, by the help of a bean. It is, as\nyou know, a simple, inert-looking thing. Yet, if planted under proper\nconditions, of which sufficient warmth is one of the most important,\nit manifests active powers of a very remarkable kind. A small green\nseedling emerges, rises to the surface of the soil, rapidly increases\nin size and, at the same time, undergoes a series of metamorphoses\nwhich do not excite our wonder as much as those which meet us in\nlegendary history, merely because they are to be seen every day and\nall day long.\n\nBy insensible steps, the plant builds itself up into a large and\nvarious fabric of root, stem, leaves, flowers, and fruit, every one\nmoulded within and without in accordance with an extremely complex\nbut, at the same time, minutely defined pattern. In each of these\ncomplicated structures, as in their smallest constituents, there is an\nimmanent energy which, in harmony with that resident in all the\nothers, incessantly works towards the maintenance ,of the whole and\nthe efficient performance of the part which it has to play in the\neconomy of nature.\n\n[48] But no sooner has the edifice, reared with such exact\nelaboration, attained completeness, than it begins to crumble. By\ndegrees, the plant withers and disappears from view, leaving behind\nmore or fewer apparently inert and simple bodies, just like the bean\nfrom which it sprang; and, like it, endowed with the potentiality of\ngiving rise to a similar cycle of manifestations. Neither the poetic\nnor the scientific imagination is put to much strain in the search\nafter analogies with this process of going forth and, as it were,\nreturning to the starting-point. It may be likened to the ascent and\ndescent of a slung stone, or the course of an arrow along its\ntrajectory. Or we may say that the living energy takes first an upward\nand then a downward road. Or it may seem preferable to compare the\nexpansion of the germ into the full-grown plant, to the unfolding of a\nfan, or to the rolling forth and widening of a stream; and thus to\narrive at the conception of \"development,\" or \"evolution.\" Here, as\nelsewhere, names are \"noise and smoke\"; the important point is to have\na clear and adequate conception of the fact signified by a name. And,\nin this case, the fact is the Sisyphaean process, in the course of\nwhich, the living and growing plant passes from the relative\nsimplicity and latent potentiality of the seed to the full epiphany of\na highly differentiated type, thence to fall back to simplicity and\npotentiality.\n\n[49] The value of a strong intellectual grasp of the nature of this\nprocess lies in the circumstance that what is true of the bean is true\nof living things in general. From very low forms up to the highest--in\nthe animal no less than in the vegetable kingdom--the process of life\npresents the same appearance [Note 1] of cyclical evolution. Nay, we\nhave but to cast our eyes over the rest of the world and cyclical\nchange presents itself on all sides.  It meets us in the water that\nflows to the sea and returns to the springs; in the heavenly bodies\nthat wax and wane, go and return to their places; in the inexorable\nsequence of the ages of man's life; in that successive rise, apogee,\nand fall of dynasties and of states which is the most prominent topic\nof civil history.\n\nAs no man fording a swift stream can dip his foot twice into the same\nwater, so no man can, with exactness, affirm of anything in the\nsensible world that it is.[Note 2] As he utters the words, nay, as he\nthinks them, the predicate ceases to be applicable; the present has\nbecome the past; the \"is\" should be \"was.\" And the more we learn of\nthe nature of things, the more evident is it that what we call rest is\nonly unperceived activity; that seeming peace is silent but strenuous\nbattle. In every part, at every moment, the state of the cosmos is the\nexpression of a transitory adjustment of contending forces; a scene,\nof strife, in which all the combatants fall in turn. What is [50] true\nof each part, is true of the whole. Natural knowledge tends more and\nmore to the conclusion that \"all the choir of heaven and furniture of\nthe earth\" are the transitory forms of parcels of cosmic substance\nwending along the road of evolution, from nebulous potentiality,\nthrough endless growths of sun and planet and satellite; through all\nvarieties of matter; through infinite diversities of life and thought;\npossibly, through modes of being of which we neither have a\nconception, nor are competent to form any, back to the indefinable\nlatency from which they arose. Thus the most obvious attribute of the\ncosmos is its impermanence. It assumes the aspect not so much of a\npermanent entity as of a changeful process in which naught endures\nsave the flow of energy and the rational order which pervades it.\n\nWe have climbed our bean-stalk and have reached a wonderland in which\nthe common and the familiar become things new and strange. In the\nexploration of the cosmic process thus typified, the highest\nintelligence of man finds inexhaustible employment; giants are subdued\nto our service; and the spiritual affections of the contemplative\nphilosopher are engaged by beauties worthy of eternal constancy.\n\nBut there is another aspect of the cosmic process, so perfect as a\nmechanism, so beautiful as a work of art. Where the cosmopoietic energy\n[51] works through sentient beings, there arises, among its other\nmanifestations, that which we call pain or suffering. This baleful\nproduct of evolution increases in quantity and in intensity, with\nadvancing grades of animal organization, until it attains its highest\nlevel in man. Further, the consummation is not reached in man, the\nmere animal; nor in man, the whole or half savage; but only in man,\nthe member of an organized polity. And it is a necessary consequence\nof his attempt to live in this way; that is, under those conditions\nwhich are essential to the full development of his noblest powers.\n\nMan, the animal, in fact, has worked his way to the headship of the\nsentient world, and has become the superb animal which he is, in\nvirtue of his success in the struggle for existence. The conditions\nhaving been of a certain order, man's organization has adjusted itself\nto them better than that of his competitors in the cosmic strife. In\nthe case of mankind, the self-assertion, the unscrupulous seizing upon\nall that can be grasped, the tenacious holding of all that can be\nkept, which constitute the essence of the struggle for existence, have\nanswered. For his successful progress, throughout the savage state,\nman has been largely indebted to those qualities which he shares with\nthe ape and the tiger; his exceptional physical organization; his\ncunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his\nruthless and [52] ferocious destructiveness when his anger is roused\nby opposition.\n\nBut, in proportion as men have passed from anarchy to social\norganization, and in proportion as civilization has grown in worth,\nthese deeply ingrained serviceable qualities have become defects.\nAfter the manner of successful persons, civilized man would gladly\nkick down the ladder by which he has climbed. He would be only too\npleased to see \"the ape and tiger die.\" But they decline to suit his\nconvenience; and the unwelcome intrusion of these boon companions of\nhis hot youth into the ranged existence of civil life adds pains and\ngriefs, innumerable and immeasurably great, to those which the cosmic\nprocess necessarily brings on the mere animal. In fact, civilized man\nbrands all these ape and tiger promptings with the name of sins; he\npunishes many of the acts which flow from them as crimes; and, in\nextreme cases, he does his best to put an end to the survival of the\nfittest of former days by axe and rope.\n\nI have said that civilized man has reached this point; the assertion\nis perhaps too broad and general; I had better put it that ethical man\nhas attained thereto. The science of ethics professes to furnish us\nwith a reasoned rule of life; to tell us what is right action and why\nit is so.  Whatever differences of opinion may exist among experts\nthere is a general consensus that the ape and [53] tiger methods of\nthe struggle for existence are not reconcilable with sound ethical\nprinciples.\n\nThe hero of our story descended the bean-stalk, and came back to the\ncommon world, where fare and work were alike hard; where ugly\ncompetitors were much commoner than beautiful princesses; and where\nthe everlasting battle with self was much less sure to be crowned with\nvictory than a turn-to with a giant. We have done the like. Thousands\nupon thousands of our fellows, thousands of years ago, have preceded\nus in finding themselves face to face with the same dread problem of\nevil. They also have seen that the cosmic process is evolution; that\nit is full of wonder, full of beauty, and, at the same time, full of\npain. They have sought to discover the bearing of these great facts on\nethics; to find out whether there is, or is not, a sanction for\nmorality in the ways of the cosmos.\n\nTheories of the universe, in which the conception of evolution plays a\nleading part, were extant at least six centuries before our era.\nCertain knowledge of them, in the fifth century, reaches us from\nlocalities as distant as the valley of the Ganges and the Asiatic\ncoasts of the Aegean. To the early philosophers of Hindostan, no less\nthan to those of Ionia, the salient and characteristic feature of the\nphenomenal world was its [54] changefulness; the unresting flow of all\nthings, through birth to visible being and thence to not being, in\nwhich they could discern no sign of a beginning and for which they saw\nno prospect of an ending. It was no less plain to some of these\nantique forerunners of modern philosophy that suffering is the badge\nof all the tribe of sentient things; that it is no accidental\naccompaniment, but an essential constituent of the cosmic process. The\nenergetic Greek might find fierce joys in a world in which \"strife is\nfather and king;\" but the old Aryan spirit was subdued to quietism in\nthe Indian sage; the mist of suffering which spread over humanity hid\neverything else from his view; to him life was one with suffering and\nsuffering with life.\n\nIn Hindostan, as in Ionia, a period of relatively high and tolerably\nstable civilization had succeeded long ages of semi-barbarism and\nstruggle. Out of wealth and security had come leisure and refinement,\nand, close at their heels, had followed the malady of thought. To the\nstruggle for bare existence, which never ends, though it may be\nalleviated and partially disguised for a fortunate few, succeeded the\nstruggle to make existence intelligible and to bring the order of\nthings into harmony with the moral sense of man, which also never\nends, but, for the thinking few, becomes keen er with every increase\nof knowledge and with every step towards the realization of a worthy\nideal of life.\n\n[55] Two thousand five hundred years ago, the value of civilization was\nas apparent as it is now; then, as now, it was obvious that only in\nthe garden of an orderly polity can the finest fruits humanity is\ncapable of bearing be produced. But it had also become evident that\nthe blessings of culture were not unmixed. The garden was apt to turn\ninto a hothouse. The stimulation of the senses, the pampering of the\nemotions, endlessly multiplied the sources of pleasure. The constant\nwidening of the intellectual field indefinitely extended the range of\nthat especially human faculty of looking before and after, which adds\nto the fleeting present those old and new worlds of the past and the\nfuture, wherein men dwell the more the higher their culture.  But that\nvery sharpening of the sense and that subtle refinement of emotion,\nwhich brought such a wealth of pleasures, were fatally attended by a\nproportional enlargement of the capacity for suffering; and the divine\nfaculty of imagination, while it created new heavens and new earths,\nprovided them with the corresponding hells of futile regret for the\npast and morbid anxiety for the future. [Note 3] Finally, the\ninevitable penalty of over-stimulation, exhaustion, opened the gates\nof civilization to its great enemy, ennui; the stale and flat\nweariness when man delights-not, nor woman neither; when all things\nare vanity and vexation; and life seems not worth living except to\nescape the bore of dying.\n\n[56] Even purely intellectual progress brings about its revenges.\nProblems settled in a rough and ready way by rude men, absorbed in\naction, demand renewed attention and show themselves to be still\nunread riddles when men have time to think. The beneficent demon,\ndoubt, whose name is Legion and who dwells amongst the tombs of old\nfaiths, enters into mankind and thenceforth refuses to be cast out.\nSacred customs, venerable dooms of ancestral wisdom, hallowed by\ntradition and professing to hold good for all time, are put to the\nquestion. Cultured reflection asks for their credentials; judges them\nby its own standards; finally, gathers those of which it approves into\nethical systems, in which the reasoning is rarely much more than a\ndecent pretext for the adoption of foregone conclusions.\n\nOne of the oldest and most important elements in such systems is the\nconception of justice. Society is impossible unless those who are\nassociated agree to observe certain rules of conduct towards one\nanother; its stability depends on the steadiness with which they abide\nby that agreement; and, so far as they waver, that mutual trust which\nis the bond of society is weakened or destroyed. Wolves could not hunt\nin packs except for the real, though unexpressed, understanding that\nthey should not attack one another during the chase. The most\nrudimentary polity is a pack of men living under the like tacit, or\nexpressed, [57] understanding; and having made the very important\nadvance upon wolf society, that they agree to use the force of the\nwhole body against individuals who violate it and in favour of those\nwho observe it. This observance of a common understanding, with the\nconsequent distribution of punishments and rewards according to\naccepted rules, received the name of justice, while the contrary was\ncalled injustice. Early ethics did not take much note of the animus of\nthe violator of the rules.  But civilization could not advance far,\nwithout the establishment of a capital distinction between the case of\ninvoluntary and that of wilful misdeed; between a merely wrong action\nand a guilty one. And, with increasing refinement of moral\nappreciation, the problem of desert, which arises out of this\ndistinction, acquired more and more theoretical and practical\nimportance. If life must be given for life, yet it was recognized that\nthe unintentional slayer did not altogether deserve death; and, by a\nsort of compromise between the public and the private conception of\njustice, a sanctuary was provided in which he might take refuge from\nthe avenger of blood.\n\nThe idea of justice thus underwent a gradual sublimation from\npunishment and reward according to acts, to punishment and reward\naccording to desert; or, in other words, according to motive.\nRighteousness, that is, action from right motive, [58] not only became\nsynonymous with justice, but the positive constituent of innocence and\nthe very heart of goodness.\n\nNow when the ancient sage, whether Indian or Greek, who had attained to\nthis conception of goodness, looked the world, and especially human\nlife, in the face, he found it as hard as we do to bring the course of\nevolution into harmony with even the elementary requirement of the\nethical ideal of the just and the good.\n\nIf there is one thing plainer than another, it is that neither the\npleasures nor the pains of life, in the merely animal world, are\ndistributed according to desert; for it is admittedly impossible for\nthe lower orders of sentient beings, to deserve either the one or the\nother. If there is a generalization from the facts of human life which\nhas the assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that\nthe violator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment which\nhe deserves; that the wicked flourishes like a green bay tree, while,\nthe righteous begs his bread; that the sins of the fathers are visited\nupon the children; that, in the realm of nature, ignorance is punished\njust as severely as wilful wrong; and that thousands upon thousands of\ninnocent beings suffer for the crime, or the unintentional trespass of\none.\n\nGreek and Semite and Indian are agreed upon [59] this subject. The book\nof Job is at one with the \"Works and Days\" and the Buddhist Sutras;\nthe Psalmist and the Preacher of Israel, with the Tragic Poets of\nGreece. What is a more common motive of the ancient tragedy in fact,\nthan the unfathomable injustice of the nature of things; what is more\ndeeply felt to be true than its presentation of the destruction of the\nblameless by the work of his own hands, or by the fatal operation of\nthe sins of others?  Surely Oedipus was pure of heart; it was the\nnatural sequence of events--the cosmic process--which drove him, in\nall innocence, to slay his father and become the husband of his\nmother, to the desolation of his people and his own headlong ruin. Or\nto step, for a moment, beyond the chronological limits I have set\nmyself, what constitutes the sempiternal attraction of Hamlet but the\nappeal to deepest experience of that history of a no less blameless\ndreamer, dragged, in spite of himself, into a world out of joint\ninvolved in a tangle of crime and misery, created by one of the prime\nagents of the cosmic process as it works in and through man?\n\nThus, brought before the tribunal of ethics, the cosmos might well seem\nto stand condemned. The conscience of man revolted against the moral\nindifference of nature, and the microcosmic atom should have found the\nillimitable macrocosm guilty. But few, or none, ventured to record\nthat verdict.\n\n[60] In the great Semitic trial of this issue, Job takes refuge in\nsilence and submission; the Indian and the Greek, less wise perhaps,\nattempt to reconcile the irreconcilable and plead for the defendant.\nTo this end, the Greeks invented Theodicies; while the Indians devised\nwhat, in its ultimate form, must rather be termed a Cosmodicy. For,\nalthough Buddhism recognizes gods many and lords many, they are\nproducts of the cosmic process; and transitory, however long enduring,\nmanifestations of its eternal activity.  In the doctrine of\ntransmigration, whatever its origin, Brahminical and Buddhist\nspeculation found, ready to hand[Note 4] the means of constructing a\nplausible vindication of the ways of the cosmos to man. If this world\nis full of pain and sorrow; if grief and evil fall, like the rain,\nupon both the just and the unjust; it is because, like the rain, they\nare links in the endless chain of natural causation by which past,\npresent, and future are indissolubly connected; and there is no more\ninjustice in the one case than in the other. Every sentient being is\nreaping as it has sown; if not in this life, then in one or other of\nthe infinite series of antecedent existences of which it is the latest\nterm. The present distribution of good and evil is, therefore, the\nalgebraical sum of accumulated positive and negative deserts; or,\nrather, it depends on the floating balance of the account. For it was\nnot thought necessary that a complete settlement [61] should ever take\nplace. Arrears might stand over as a sort of \"hanging gale;\" a period\nof celestial happiness just earned might be succeeded by ages of\ntorment in a hideous nether world, the balance still overdue for some\nremote ancestral error. [Note 5]\n\nWhether the cosmic process looks any more moral than at first, after\nsuch a vindication, may perhaps be questioned. Yet this plea of\njustification is not less plausible than others; and none but very\nhasty thinkers will reject it on the ground of inherent absurdity.\nLike the doctrine of evolution itself, that of transmigration has its\nroots in the world of reality; and it may claim such support as the\ngreat argument from analogy is capable of supplying.\n\nEveryday experience familiarizes us with the facts which are grouped\nunder the name of heredity. Every one of us bears upon him obvious\nmarks of his parentage, perhaps of remoter relationships. More\nparticularly, the sum of tendencies to act in a certain way, which we\ncall \"character,\" is often to be traced through a long series of\nprogenitors and collaterals. So we may justly say that this\n\"character\"--this moral and intellectual essence of a man--does\nveritably pass over from one fleshly tabernacle to another, and does\nreally transmigrate from generation to generation. In the new-born\ninfant, the character of the stock lies latent, and the Ego is little\nmore [62] than a bundle of potentialities. But, very early, these\nbecome acutalities; from childhood to age they manifest themselves in\ndulness or brightness, weakness or strength, viciousness or\nuprightness; and with each feature modified by confluence with another\ncharacter, if by nothing else, the character passed on to its\nincarnation in new bodies.\n\nThe Indian philosophers called character, as thus defined,\n\"karma.\"[Note 6] It is this karma which passed from life to life and\nlinked them in the chain of transmigrations; and they held that it is\nmodified in each life, not merely by confluence of parentage, but by\nits own acts. They were, in fact, strong believers in the theory, so\nmuch disputed just at present, of the hereditary transmission of\nacquired characters. That the manifestation of the tendencies of a\ncharacter may be greatly facilitated, or impeded, by conditions, of\nwhich self-discipline, or the absence of it, are among the most\nimportant, is indubitable; but that the character itself is modified\nin this way is by no means so certain; it is not so sure that the\ntransmitted character of an evil liver is worse, or that of a\nrighteous man better, than that which he received. Indian philosophy,\nhowever, did not admit of any doubt on this subject; the belief in the\ninfluence of conditions, notably of self-discipline, on the karma was\nnot merely a necessary postulate of its theory of retribution, but it\npresented [63] the only way of escape from the endless round of\ntransmigrations.\n\nThe earlier forms of Indian philosophy agreed with those prevalent in\nour own times, in supposing the existence of a permanent reality, or\n\"substance,\" beneath the shifting series of phenomena, whether of\nmatter or of mind. The substance of the cosmos was \"Brahma,\" that of\nthe individual man \"Atman;\" and the latter was separated from the\nformer only, if I may so speak, by its phenomenal envelope, by the\ncasing of sensations, thoughts and desires, pleasures and pains, which\nmake up the illusive phantasmagoria of life. This the ignorant take\nfor reality; their \"Atman\" therefore remains eternally imprisoned in\ndelusions, bound by the fetters of desire and scourged by the whip of\nmisery. But the man who has attained enlightenment sees that the\napparent reality is mere illusion, or, as was said a couple of\nthousand years later, that there is nothing good nor bad but thinking\nmakes it so. If the cosmos is just \"and of our pleasant vices makes\ninstruments to scourge us,\" it would seem that the only way to escape\nfrom our heritage of evil is to destroy that fountain of desire whence\nour vices flow; to refuse any longer to be the instruments of the\nevolutionary process, and withdraw from the struggle for existence. If\nthe karma is modifiable by self-discipline, if its coarser desires,\none after another, can be extinguished, the ultimate [64] fundamental\ndesire of self-assertion, or the desire to be, may also be destroyed.\n[Note 7] Then the bubble of illusion will burst, and the freed\nindividual \"Atman\" will lose itself in the universal \"Brahma.\"\n\nSuch seems to have been the pre-Buddhistic conception of salvation, and\nof the way to be followed by those who would attain thereto. No more\nthorough mortification of the flesh has ever been attempted than-that\nachieved by the Indian ascetic anchorite; no later monachism has so\nnearly succeeded in reducing the human mind to that condition of\nimpassive quasi-somnambulism, which, but for its acknowledged\nholiness, might run the risk of being confounded with idiocy.\n\nAnd this salvation, it will be observed, was to be attained through\nknowledge, and by action based on that knowledge; just as the\nexperimenter, who would obtain a certain physical or chemical result,\nmust have a knowledge of the natural laws involved and the persistent\ndisciplined will adequate to carry out all the various operations\nrequired. The supernatural, in our sense of the term, was entirely\nexcluded. There was no external power which could affect the sequence\nof cause and effect which gives rise to karma; none but the will of\nthe subject of the karma which could put an end to it.\n\nOnly one rule of conduct could be based upon the remarkable theory of\nwhich I have endeavoured to give a reasoned outline. It was folly to\ncontinue [65] to exist when an overplus of pain was certain; and the\nprobabilities in favour of the increase of misery with the\nprolongation of existence, were so overwhelming. Slaying the body only\nmade matters worse; there was nothing for it but to slay the soul by\nthe voluntary arrest of all its activities.  Property, social ties,\nfamily affections, common companionship, must be abandoned; the most\nnatural appetites, even that for food, must be suppressed, or at least\nminimized; until all that remained of a man was the impassive,\nextenuated, mendicant monk, self-hypnotised into cataleptic trances,\nwhich the deluded mystic took for foretastes of the final union with\nBrahma.\n\nThe founder of Buddhism accepted the chief postulates demanded by his\npredecessors. But he was not satisfied with the practical annihilation\ninvolved in merging the individual existence in the unconditioned--the\nAtman in Brahma. It would seem that the admission of the existence of\nany substance whatever--even of the tenuity of that which has neither\nquality nor energy and of which no predicate whatever can be\nasserted--appeared to him to be a danger and a snare. Though reduced\nto a hypostatized negation, Brahma was not to be trusted; so long as\nentity was there, it might conceivably resume the weary round of\nevolution, with all its train of immeasurable miseries. Gautama got\nrid of even that [66] shade of a shadow of permanent existence by a\nmetaphysical tour de force of great interest to the student of\nphilosophy, seeing that it supplies the wanting half of Bishop\nBerkeley's well-known idealistic argument.\n\nGranting the premises, I am not aware of any escape from Berkeley's\nconclusion, that the \"substance\" of matter is a metaphysical unknown\nquantity, of the existence of which there is no proof. What Berkeley\ndoes not seem to have so clearly perceived is that the non-existence\nof a substance of mind is equally arguable; and that the result of the\nimpartial applications of his reasonings is the reduction of the All\nto coexistences and sequences of phenomena, beneath and beyond which\nthere is nothing cognoscible. It is a remarkable indication of the\nsubtlety of Indian speculation that Gautama should have seen deeper\nthan the greatest of modern idealists; though it must be admitted\nthat, if some of Berkeley's reasonings respecting the nature of spirit\nare pushed home, they reach pretty much the same conclusion. [Note 8]\n\nAccepting the prevalent Brahminical doctrine that the whole cosmos,\ncelestial, terrestrial, and infernal, with its population of gods and\nother celestial beings, of sentient animals, of Mara and his devils,\nis incessantly shifting through recurring cycles of production and\ndestruction, in each of which every human being has his transmigratory\n[67] representative, Gautama proceeded to eliminate substance\naltogether; and to reduce the cosmos to a mere flow of sensations,\nemotions, volitions, and thoughts, devoid of any substratum. As, on\nthe surface of a stream of water, we see ripples and whirlpools, which\nlast for a while and then vanish with the causes that gave rise to\nthem, so what seem individual existences are mere temporary\nassociations of phenomena circling round a centre, \"like a dog tied to\na post.\" In the whole universe there is nothing permanent, no eternal\nsubstance either of mind or of matter. Personality is a metaphysical\nfancy; and in very truth, not only we, but all things, in the worlds\nwithout end of the cosmic phantasmagoria, are such stuff as dreams are\nmade of.\n\nWhat then becomes of karma? Karma remains untouched. As the peculiar\nform of energy we call magnetism may be transmitted from a loadstone\nto a piece of steel, from the steel to a piece of nickel, as it may be\nstrengthened or weakened by the conditions to which it is subjected\nwhile resident in each piece, so it seems to have been conceived that\nkarma might be transmitted from one phenomenal association to another\nby a sort of induction. However this may be, Gautama doubtless had a\nbetter guarantee for the abolition of transmigration, when no wrack of\nsubstance, either of Atman or of Brahma, was left behind; when, in\nshort, a man had but to [68] dream that he willed not to dream, to put\nan end to all dreaming.\n\nThis end of life's dream is Nirvana. What Nirvana is the learned do\nnot agree. But, since the best original authorities tell us there is\nneither desire nor activity, nor any possibility of phenomenal\nreappearance for the sage who has entered Nirvana, it may be safely\nsaid of this acme of Buddhistic philosophy--\"the rest is silence.\"\n\n[Note 9] Thus there is no very great practical disagreement between\nGautama and his predecessors with respect to the end of action; but it\nis otherwise as regards the means to that end. With just insight into\nhuman nature, Gautama declared extreme ascetic practices to be useless\nand indeed harmful.  The appetites and the passions are not to be\nabolished by mere mortification of the body; they must, in addition,\nbe attacked on their own ground and conquered by steady cultivation of\nthe mental habits which oppose them; by universal benevolence; by the\nreturn of good for evil; by humility; by abstinence from evil thought;\nin short, by total renunciation of that self-assertion which is the\nessence of the cosmic process.\n\nDoubtless, it is to these ethical qualities that Buddhism owes its\nmarvellous success.[Note 10] A system which knows no God in the\nwestern sense; which denies a soul to man; which counts the belief in\nimmortality a blunder and the hope of it a sin; [69] which refuses any\nefficacy to prayer and sacrifice; which bids men look to nothing but\ntheir own efforts for salvation; which, in its original purity, knew\nnothing of vows of obedience, abhorred intolerance, and never sought\nthe aid of the secular arm; yet spread over a considerable moiety of\nthe Old World with marvellous rapidity, and is still, with whatever\nbase admixture of foreign superstitions, the dominant creed of a large\nfraction of mankind.\n\nLet us now set our faces westwards, towards Asia Minor and Greece and\nItaly, to view the rise and progress of another philosophy, apparently\nindependent, but no less pervaded by the conception of evolution.[Note\n11]\n\nThe sages of Miletus were pronounced evolutionists; and, however dark\nmay be some of the sayings of Heracleitus of Ephesus, who was probably\na contemporary of Gautama, no better expressions of the essence of the\nmodern doctrine of evolution can be found than are presented by some\nof his pithy aphorisms and striking metaphors. [Note 12] Indeed, many\nof my present auditors must have observed that, more than once, I have\nborrowed from him in the brief exposition of the theory of evolution\nwith which this discourse commenced.\n\nBut when the focus of Greek intellectual activity shifted to Athens,\nthe leading minds [70] concentrated their attention upon ethical\nproblems.  Forsaking the study of the macrocosm for that of the\nmicrocosm, they lost the key to the thought of the great Ephesian,\nwhich, I imagine, is more intelligible to us than it was to Socrates,\nor to Plato. Socrates, more especially, set the fashion of a kind of\ninverse agnosticism, by teaching that the problems of physics lie\nbeyond the reach of the human intellect; that the attempt to solve\nthem is essentially vain; that the one worthy object of investigation\nis the problem of ethical life; and his example was followed by the\nCynics and the later Stoics. Even the comprehensive knowledge and the\npenetrating intellect of Aristotle failed to suggest to him that in\nholding the eternity of the world, within its present range of\nmutation, he was making a retrogressive step. The scientific heritage\nof Heracleitus passed into the hands neither of Plato nor of\nAristotle, but into those of Democritus. But the world was not yet\nready to receive the great conceptions of the philosopher of Abdera.\nIt was reserved for the Stoics to return to the track marked out by\nthe earlier philosophers; and, professing themselves disciples of\nHeracleitus, to develop the idea of evolution systematically. In doing\nthis, they not only omitted some characteristic features of their\nmaster's teaching, but they made additions altogether foreign to it.\nOne of the most influential of these importations was the\ntranscendental [71] theism which had come into vogue. The restless,\nfiery energy, operating according to law, out of which all things\nemerge and into which they return, in the endless successive cycles of\nthe great year; which creates and destroys worlds as a wanton child\nbuilds up, and anon levels, sand castles on the seashore; was\nmetamorphosed into a material world-soul and decked out with all the\nattributes of ideal Divinity; not merely with infinite power and\ntranscendent wisdom, but with absolute goodness.\n\nThe consequences of this step were momentous. For if the cosmos is the\neffect of an immanent, omnipotent, and infinitely beneficent cause,\nthe existence in it of real evil, still less of necessarily inherent\nevil, is plainly inadmissible. [Note 13] Yet the universal experience\nof mankind testified then, as now, that, whether we look within us or\nwithout us, evil stares us in the face on all sides; that if anything\nis real, pain and sorrow and wrong are realities.\n\nIt would be a new thing in history if a priori philosophers were\ndaunted by the factious opposition of experience; and the Stoics were\nthe last men to allow themselves to be beaten by mere facts. \"Give me\na doctrine and I will find the reasons for it,\" said Chrysippus. So\nthey perfected, if they did not invent, that ingenious and plausible\nform of pleading, the Theodicy; for the purpose of showing firstly,\nthat there is no such [72] thing as evil; secondly, that if there is,\nit is the necessary correlate of good; and, moreover, that it is\neither due to our own fault, or inflicted for our benefit. Theodicies\nhave been very popular in their time, and I believe that a numerous,\nthough somewhat dwarfed, progeny of them still survives. So far as I\nknow, they are all variations of the theme set forth in those famous\nsix lines of the \"Essay on Man,\" in which Pope sums up Bolingbroke's\nreminiscences of stoical and other speculations of this kind--\n\n    \"All nature is but art, unknown to thee;\n     All chance, direction which thou canst not see;\n     All discord, harmony not understood;\n     All partial evil, universal good;\n     And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,\n     One truth is clear: whatever is is right.\"\n\nYet, surely, if there are few more important truths than those\nenunciated in the first triad, the second is open to very grave\nobjections. That there is a \"soul of good in things evil\" is\nunquestionable; nor will any wise man deny the disciplinary value of\npain and sorrow. But these considerations do not help us to see why\nthe immense multitude of irresponsible sentient beings, which cannot\nprofit by such discipline, should suffer; nor why, among the endless\npossibilities open to omnipotence--that of sinless, happy existence\namong the rest--the actuality in which sin and misery abound should be\nthat selected.\n\n[73] Surely it is mere cheap rhetoric to call arguments which have\nnever yet been answered by even the meekest and the least rational of\nOptimists, suggestions of the pride of reason. As to the concluding\naphorism, its fittest place would be as an inscription in letters of\nmud over the portal of some \"stye of Epicurus\"[Note 14]; for that is\nwhere the logical application of it to practice would land men, with\nevery aspiration stifled and every effort paralyzed. Why try to set\nright what is right already? Why strive to improve the best of all\npossible worlds? Let us eat and drink, for as today all is right, so\nto-morrow all will be.\n\nBut the attempt of the Stoics to blind themselves to the reality of\nevil, as a necessary concomitant of the cosmic process, had less\nsuccess than that of the Indian philosophers to exclude the reality of\ngood from their purview.  Unfortunately, it is much easier to shut\none's eyes to good than to evil.  Pain and sorrow knock at our doors\nmore loudly than pleasure and happiness; and the prints of their heavy\nfootsteps are less easily effaced. Before the grim realities of\npractical life the pleasant fictions of optimism vanished.  If this\nwere the best of all possible worlds, it nevertheless proved itself a\nvery inconvenient habitation for the ideal sage.\n\nThe stoical summary of the whole duty of man, \"Live according to\nnature,\" would seem to imply that the cosmic process is an exemplar\nfor human [74] conduct. Ethics would thus become applied Natural\nHistory. In fact, a confused employment of the maxim, in this sense,\nhas done immeasurable mischief in later times. It has furnished an\naxiomatic foundation for the philosophy of philosophasters and for the\nmoralizing of sentimentalists. But the Stoics were, at bottom, not\nmerely noble, but sane, men; and if we look closely into what they\nreally meant by this ill-used phrase, it will be found to present no\njustification for the mischievous conclusions that have been deduced\nfrom it.\n\nIn the language of the Stoa, \"Nature\" was a word of many meanings.\nThere was the \"Nature\" of the cosmos and the \"Nature\" of man. In the\nlatter, the animal \"nature,\" which man shares with a moiety of the\nliving part of the cosmos, was distinguished from a higher \"nature.\"\nEven in this higher nature there were grades of rank. The logical\nfaculty is an instrument which may be turned to account for any\npurpose. The passions and the emotions are so closely tied to the\nlower nature that they may be considered to be pathological, rather\nthan normal, phenomena. The one supreme, hegemonic, faculty, which\nconstitutes the essential \"nature\" of man, is most nearly represented\nby that which, in the language of a later philosophy, has been called\nthe pure reason. It is this \"nature\" which holds up the ideal of the\nsupreme good and demands absolute submission of the will to its\nbehests. It is [75] which commands all men to love one another, to\nreturn good for evil, to regard one another as fellow-citizens of one\ngreat state. Indeed, seeing that the progress towards perfection of a\ncivilized state, or polity, depends on the obedience of its members to\nthese commands, the Stoics sometimes termed the pure reason the\n\"political\" nature. Unfortunately, the sense of the adjective has\nundergone so much modification, that the application of it to that\nwhich commands the sacrifice of self to the common good would now\nsound almost grotesque. [Note 15]\n\nBut what part is played by the theory of evolution in this view of\nethics?  So far as I can discern, the ethical system of the Stoics,\nwhich is essentially intuitive, and reverences the categorical\nimperative as strongly as that of any later moralists, might have been\njust what it was if they had held any other theory; whether that of\nspecial creation, on the one side, or that of the eternal existence of\nthe present order, on the other.[Note 16] To the Stoic, the cosmos had\nno importance for the conscience, except in so far as he chose to\nthink it a pedagogue to virtue. The pertinacious optimism of our\nphilosophers hid from them the actual state of the case. It prevented\nthem from seeing that cosmic nature is no school of virtue, but the\nheadquarters of the enemy of ethical nature. The logic of facts was\nnecessary to convince them [76] that the cosmos works through the\nlower nature of man, not for righteousness, but against it. And it\nfinally drove them to confess that the existence of their ideal \"wise\nman\" was incompatible with the nature of things; that even a passable\napproximation to that ideal was to be attained only at the cost of\nrenunciation of the world and mortification, not merely of the flesh,\nbut of all human affections. The state of perfection was that\n\"apatheia\"[Note 17] in which desire, though it may still be felt, is\npowerless to move the will, reduced to the sole function of executing\nthe commands of pure reason. Even this residuum of activity was to be\nregarded as a temporary loan, as an efflux of the divine\nworld-pervading spirit, chafing at its imprisonment in the\nflesh, until such time as death enabled it to return to its source in\nthe all-pervading logos.\n\nI find it difficult to discover any very great difference between\nApatheia and Nirvana, except that stoical speculation agrees with\npre-Buddhistic philosophy, rather than with the teachings of Gautama,\nin so far as it postulates a permanent substance equivalent to\n\"Brahma\" and \"Atman;\" and that, in stoical practice, the adoption of\nthe life of the mendicant cynic was held to be more a counsel of\nperfection than an indispensable condition of the higher life.\n\nThus the extremes touch. Greek thought and [77] Indian thought set out\nfrom ground common to both, diverge widely, develop under very\ndifferent physical and moral conditions, and finally converge to\npractically the same end.\n\nThe Vedas and the Homeric epos set before us a world of rich and\nvigorous life, full of joyous fighting men\n\n     That ever with a frolic welcome took\n     The thunder and the sunshine ....\n\nand who were ready to brave the very Gods themselves when their blood\nwas up. A few centuries pass away, and under the influence of\ncivilization the descendants of these men are \"sicklied o'er with the\npale cast of thought\"--frank pessimists, or, at best, make-believe\noptimists. The courage of the warlike stock may be as hardly tried as\nbefore, perhaps more hardly, but the enemy is self. The hero has\nbecome a monk. The man of action is replaced by the quietist, whose\nhighest aspiration is to be the passive instrument of the divine\nReason. By the Tiber, as by the Ganges, ethical man admits that the\ncosmos is too strong for him; and, destroying every bond which ties\nhim to it by ascetic discipline, he seeks salvation in absolute\nrenunciation.[Note 18]\n\nModern thought is making a fresh start from the base whence Indian and\nGreek philosophy set out; and, the human mind being very much what\n[78] it was six-and-twenty centuries ago, there is no ground for\nwonder if it presents indications of a tendency to move along the old\nlines to the same results.\n\nWe are more than sufficiently familiar with modern pessimism, at least\nas a speculation; for I cannot call to mind that any of its present\nvotaries have sealed their faith by assuming the rags and the bowl of\nthe mendicant Bhikku, or the cloak and the wallet of the Cynic. The\nobstacles placed in the way of sturdy vagrancy by an unphilosophical\npolice have, perhaps, proved too formidable for philosophical\nconsistency. We also know modern speculative optimism, with its\nperfectibility of the species, reign of peace, and lion and lamb\ntransformation scenes; but one does not hear so much of it as one did\nforty years ago; indeed, I imagine it is to be met with more commonly\nat the tables of the healthy and wealthy, than in the congregations of\nthe wise. The majority of us, I apprehend, profess neither pessimism\nnor optimism. We hold that the world is neither so good, nor so bad,\nas it conceivably might be; and, as most of us have reason, now and\nagain, to discover that it can be. Those who have failed to experience\nthe joys that make life worth living are, probably, in as small a\nminority as those who have never known the griefs that rob existence\nof its savour and turn its richest fruits into mere dust and ashes.\n\n[79] Further, I think I do not err in assuming that, however diverse\ntheir views on philosophical and religious matters, most men are\nagreed that the proportion of good and evil in life may be very\nsensibly affected by human action. I never heard anybody doubt that\nthe evil may be thus increased, or diminished; and it would seem to\nfollow that good must be similarly susceptible of addition or\nsubtraction. Finally, to my knowledge, nobody professes to doubt that,\nso far forth as we possess a power of bettering things, it is our\nparamount duty to use it and to train all our intellect and energy to\nthis supreme service of our kind.\n\nHence the pressing interest of the question, to what extent modern\nprogress in natural knowledge, and, more especially, the general\noutcome of that progress in the doctrine of evolution, is competent to\nhelp us in the great work of helping one another?\n\nThe propounders of what are called the \"ethics of evolution,\" when the\n\"evolution of ethics\" would usually better express the object of their\nspeculations, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts and\nmore or less sound arguments in favour of the origin of the moral\nsentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process\nof evolution. I have little doubt, for my own part, that they are on\nthe right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been\nevolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the [80] one\nas the other. The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as\nthe philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the\nevil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is\nincompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is\npreferable to what we call evil than we had before. Some day, I doubt\nnot, we shall arrive at an understanding of the evolution of the\n\u00e6sthetic faculty; but all the understanding in the world will neither\nincrease nor diminish the force of the intuition that this is\nbeautiful and that is ugly.\n\nThere is another fallacy which appears to me to pervade the so-called\n\"ethics of evolution.\" It is the notion that because, on the whole,\nanimals and plants have advanced in perfection of organization by\nmeans of the struggle for existence and the consequent \"survival of\nthe fittest;\" therefore men in society, men as ethical beings, must\nlook to the same process to help them towards perfection. I suspect\nthat this fallacy has arisen out of the unfortunate ambiguity of the\nphrase \"survival of the fittest.\" \"Fittest\" has a connotation of\n\"best;\" and about \"best\" there hangs a moral flavour. In cosmic\nnature, however, what is \"fittest\" depends upon the conditions. Long\nsince [Note 19], I ventured to point out that if our hemisphere were\nto cool again, the survival of the fittest might bring about, in the\nvegetable kingdom, a population of more and more stunted and humbler\n[81] and humbler organisms, until the \"fittest\" that survived might be\nnothing but lichens, diatoms, and such microscopic organisms as those\nwhich give red snow its colour; while, if it became hotter, the\npleasant valleys of the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any\nanimated beings save those that flourish in a tropical jungle. They,\nas the fittest, the best adapted to the changed conditions, would\nsurvive.\n\nMen in society are undoubtedly subject to the cosmic process. As among\nother animals, multiplication goes on without cessation, and involves\nsevere competition for the means of support. The struggle for\nexistence tends to eliminate those less fitted to adapt themselves to\nthe circumstances of their existence. The strongest, the most\nself-assertive, tend to tread down the weaker. But the influence of\nthe cosmic process on the evolution of society is the greater the more\nrudimentary its civilization.  Social progress means a checking of the\ncosmic, process at every step and the substitution for it of another,\nwhich may be called the ethical process; the end of which is not the\nsurvival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the\nwhole of the conditions which obtain, but of those who are ethically\nthe best.[Note 20]\n\nAs I have already urged, the practice of that which is ethically\nbest--what we call goodness or virtue--involves a course of conduct\nwhich, in all [82] respects, is opposed to that which leads to success\nin the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless\nself-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside,\nor treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual\nshall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is\ndirected, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the\nfitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the\ngladiatorial theory of existence. It demands that each man who enters\ninto the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity shall be mindful of\nhis debt to those who have laboriously constructed it; and shall take\nheed that no act of his weakens the fabric in which he has been\npermitted to live. Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of\ncurbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to\nthe community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if\nnot existence itself, at least the life of something better than a\nbrutal savage.\n\nIt is from neglect of these plain considerations that the fanatical\nindividualism [Note 21] of our time attempts to apply the analogy of\ncosmic nature to society. Once more we have a misapplication of the\nstoical injunction to follow nature; the duties of the individual to\nthe state are forgotten, and his tendencies to self-assertion are\ndignified by the name of rights. It is seriously debated whether the\nmembers of a community are justified in using [83] their combined\nstrength to constrain one of their number to contribute his share to\nthe maintenance of it; or even to prevent him from doing his best to\ndestroy it. The struggle for existence which has done such admirable\nwork in cosmic nature, must, it appears, be equally beneficent in the\nethical sphere. Yet if that which I have insisted upon is true; if the\ncosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends; if the imitation\nof it by man is inconsistent with the first principles of ethics; what\nbecomes of this surprising theory?\n\nLet us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society\ndepends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running\naway from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious proposal\nthus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set man to\nsubdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think that the\ngreat intellectual difference between the ancient times with which we\nhave been occupied and our day, lies in the solid foundation we have\nacquired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet with a certain\nmeasure of success.\n\nThe history of civilization details the steps by which men have\nsucceeded in building up an artificial world within the cosmos.\nFragile reed as he may be, man, as Pascal says, is a thinking reed:\n[Note 22] there lies within him a fund of energy operating\nintelligently and so far akin to that which pervades the universe,\nthat it is competent [84] to influence and modify the cosmic process.\nIn virtue of his intelligence, the dwarf bends the Titan to his will.\nIn every family, in every polity that has been established, the cosmic\nprocess in man has been restrained and otherwise modified by law and\ncustom; in surrounding nature, it has been similarly influenced by the\nart of the shepherd, the agriculturist, the artisan. As civilization\nhas advanced, so has the extent of this interference increased; until\nthe organized and highly developed sciences and arts of the present\nday have endowed man with a command over the course of non-human\nnature greater than that once attributed to the magicians. The most\nimpressive, I might say startling, of these changes have been brought\nabout in the course of the last two centuries; while a right\ncomprehension of the process of life and of the means of influencing\nits manifestations is only just dawning upon us.  We do not yet see\nour way beyond generalities; and we are befogged by the obtrusion of\nfalse analogies and crude anticipations. But Astronomy, Physics,\nChemistry, have all had to pass through similar phases, before they\nreached the stage at which their influence became an important factor\nin human affairs. Physiology, Psychology, Ethics, Political Science,\nmust submit to the same ordeal. Yet it seems to me irrational to doubt\nthat, at no distant period, they will work as great a revolution in\nthe sphere of practice.\n\n[85] The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations.\nIf, for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet,\nsome time, the summit will be reached and the downward route will be\ncommenced. The most daring imagination will hardly venture upon the\nsuggestion that the power and the intelligence of man can ever arrest\nthe procession of the great year.\n\nMoreover, the cosmic nature born with us and, to a large extent,\nnecessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of\nsevere training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries\nwill suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends.\nEthical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and\npowerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on the other hand, I\nsee no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by\nsound principles of investigation, and organized in common effort, may\nmodify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that now\ncovered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man\nhimself. [Note 23] The intelligence which has converted the brother of\nthe wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to\ndo something towards curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized\nmen.\n\nBut if we may permit ourselves at larger hope of abatement of the\nessential evil of the world than was possible to those who, in the\ninfancy of [86] exact knowledge, faced the problem of existence more\nthan a score of centuries ago, I deem it an essential condition of the\nrealization of that hope that we should cast aside the notion that the\nescape from pain and sorrow is the proper object of life.\n\nWe have long since emerged from the heroic childhood of our race, when\ngood and evil could be met with the same \"frolic welcome;\" the\nattempts to escape from evil, whether Indian or Greek, have ended in\nflight from the battle-field; it remains to us to throw aside the\nyouthful overconfidence and the no less youthful discouragement of\nnonage. We are grown men, and must play the man\n\n     \"...strong in will\n     To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield,\"\n\ncherishing the good that falls in our way, and bearing the evil, in\nand around us, with stout hearts set on diminishing it. So far, we all\nmay strive in one faith towards one hope:\n\n     \"... It may be that the gulfs will wash us down,\n     It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,\n\n     ... but something ere the end,\n     Some work of noble note may yet be done.\" [Note 24]\n\n[187]\n\n                               NOTES.\n\nNote 1 (p. 49).\n\nI have been careful to speak of the \"appearance\" of cyclical evolution\npresented by living things; for, on critical examination, it will be\nfound that the course of vegetable and of animal life is not exactly\nrepresented by, the figure of a cycle which returns into itself. What\nactually happens, in all but the lowest organisms, is that one part of\nthe growing germ (A) gives rise to tissues and organs; while another\npart (B) remains in its primitive condition, or is but slightly\nmodified. The moiety A becomes the body of the adult and, sooner or\nlater, perishes, while portions of the moiety B are detached and, as\noffspring, continue the life of the species.  Thus, if we trace back\nan organism along the direct line of descent from its remotest\nancestor, B, as a whole, has never suffered death; portions of it,\nonly, have been cast off and died in each individual offspring.\n\nEverybody is familiar with the way in which the \"suckers\" of a\nstrawberry plant behave. A thin cylinder of living tissue keeps on\ngrowing at its free end, until it attains a considerable length. At\n[88] successive intervals, it develops buds which grow into strawberry\nplants; and these become independent by the death of the parts of the\nsucker which connect them. The rest of the sucker, however, may go on\nliving and growing indefinitely, and, circumstances remaining\nfavourable, there is no obvious reason why it should ever die. The\nliving substance B, in a manner, answers to the sucker. If we could\nrestore the continuity which was once possessed by the portions of B,\ncontained in all the individuals of a direct line of descent, they\nwould form a sucker, or stolon, on which these individuals would be\nstrung, and which would never have wholly died.\n\nA species remains unchanged so long as the potentiality of development\nresident in B remains unaltered; so long, e.g., as the buds of the\nstrawberry sucker tend to become typical strawberry plants. In the case\nof the progressive evolution of a species, the developmental\npotentiality of B becomes of a higher and higher order. In\nretrogressive evolution, the contrary would be the case. The phenomena\nof atavism seem to show that retrogressive evolution that is, the\nreturn of a species to one or other of its earlier forms, is a\npossibility to be reckoned with. The simplification of structure,\nwhich is so common in the parasitic members of a group, however, does\nnot properly come under this head. The worm-like, limbless Lernoea has\nno resemblance to any of the stages of development of the many-limbed\nactive animals of the group to which it belongs. [89] Note 2 (p. 49).\n\nHeracleitus says,[Greek phrase Potamo gar ouk esti dis embenai to suto]\nbut, to be strictly accurate, the river remains, though the water of\nwhich it is composed changes--just as a man retains his identity\nthough the whole substance of his body is constantly shifting.\n\nThis is put very well by Seneca (Ep. lvii. i. 20, Ed. Ruhkopf):\n\"Corpora nostra rapiuntur fluminum more, quidquid vides currit cum\ntempore; nihil ex his quae videmus manet. Ego ipse dum loquor mutari\nista, mutatus sum. Hoc est quod ait Heraclitus 'In idem flumen bis non\ndescendimus.' Manet idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est. Hoc in\namne manifestius est quam in homine, sed nos quoque non minus velox\ncursus praetervehit.\"\n\nNote 3 (p. 55).\n\n\"Multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris enim tormentum memorin\nreducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum praesentibus miser est.\"\n(Seneca, Ed. v.  7.)\n\nAmong the many wise and weighty aphorisms of the Roman Bacon, few sound\nthe realities of life more deeply than \"Multa bona nostra nobis\nnocent.\" If there is a soul of good in things evil, it is at least\nequally true that there is a soul of evil in things good: for things,\nlike men, have \"les defauts de leurs qualites.\" It is one of the last\nlessons one learns from experience, but not the least important, that\na [90] heavy tax is levied upon all forms of success, and that failure\nis one of the commonest disguises assumed by blessings.\n\nNote 4 (p. 60).\n\n\"There is within the body of every man a soul which, at the death of\nthe body, flies away from it like a bird out of a cage, and enters\nupon a new life ... either in one of the heavens or one of the hells\nor on this earth.  The only exception is the rare case of a man having\nin this life acquired a true knowledge of God. According to the\npre-Buddhistic theory, the soul of such a man goes along the path of\nthe Gods to God, and, being united with Him, enters upon an immortal\nlife in which his individuality is not extinguished. In the latter\ntheory his soul is directly absorbed into the Great Soul, is lost in\nit, and has no longer any independent existence. The souls of all\nother men enter, after the death of the body, upon a new existence in\none or other of the many different modes of being. If in heaven or\nhell, the soul itself becomes a god or demon without entering a body;\nall superhuman beings, save the great gods, being looked upon as not\neternal, but merely temporary creatures. If the soul returns to earth\nit may or may not enter a new body; and this either of a human being,\nan animal, a plant, or even a material object. For all these are\npossessed of souls, and there is no essential difference between these\nsouls and the souls of men--all being alike mere sparks of the Great\nSpirit, who is [91] the only real existence.\" (Rhys Davids, Hibbert\nLectures, 1881, p. 83.)\n\nFor what I have said about Indian Philosophy, I am particularly\nindebted to the luminous exposition of primitive Buddhism and its\nrelations to earlier Hindu thought, which is given by Prof. Rhys\nDavids in his remarkable Hibbert Lectures for 1881, and Buddhism\n(1890). The only apology I can offer for the freedom with which I have\nborrowed from him in these notes, is my desire to leave no doubt as to\nmy indebtedness. I have also found Dr. Oldenberg's Buddha (Ed. 2,\n1890) very helpful. The origin of the theory of transmigration stated\nin the above extract is an unsolved problem. That it differs widely\nfrom the Egyptian metempsychosis is clear. In fact, since men usually\npeople the other world with phantoms of this, the Egyptian doctrine\nwould seem to presuppose the Indian as a more archaic belief.\n\nProf. Rhys Davids has fully insisted upon the ethical importance of\nthe transmigration theory. \"One of the latest speculations now being\nput forward among ourselves would seek to explain each man's\ncharacter, and even his outward condition in life, by the character he\ninherited from his ancestors, a character gradually formed during a\npractically endless series of past existences, modified only by the\nconditions into which he was born, those very conditions being also,\nin like manner, the last result of a practically endless series of\npast causes. Gotama's; speculation might be stated in the same words.\nBut it attempted also to explain, in a way different from [92] that\nwhich would be adopted by the exponents of the modern theory, that\nstrange problem which it is also the motive of the wonderful drama of\nthe book of Job to explain--the fact that the actual distribution here\nof good fortune, or misery, is entirely independent of the moral\nqualities which men call good or bad. We cannot wonder that a teacher,\nwhose whole system was so essentially an ethical reformation, should\nhave felt it incumbent upon him to seek an explanation of this\napparent injustice. And all the more so, since the belief he had\ninherited, the theory of the transmigration of souls, had provided a\nsolution perfectly sufficient to any one who could accept that\nbelief.\" (Hibbert Lectures, p. 93.) I should venture to suggest the\nsubstitution of \"largely\" for \"entirely\" in the foregoing passage.\nWhether a ship makes a good or a bad voyage is largely independent of\nthe conduct of the captain, but it is largely affected by that\nconduct. Though powerless before a hurricane he may weather a bad\ngale.\n\nNote 5 (P. 61).\n\nThe outward condition of the soul is, in each new birth, determined by\nits actions in a previous birth; but by each action in succession, and\nnot by the balance struck after the evil has been reckoned off against\nthe good. A good man who has once uttered a slander may spend a\nhundred thousand years as a god, in consequence of his goodness, and\nwhen the power of his good actions is exhausted, may be born [93] as a\ndumb man on account of his transgression; and a robber who has once\ndone an act of mercy, may come to life in a king's body as the result\nof his virtue, and then suffer torments for ages in hell or as a ghost\nwithout a body, or be re-born many times as a slave or an outcast, in\nconsequence of his evil life.\n\n\"There is no escape, according to this theory, from the result of any\nact; though it is only the consequences of its own acts that each soul\nhas to endure. The force has been set in motion by itself and can\nnever stop; and its effect can never be foretold. If evil, it can\nnever be modified or prevented, for it depends on a cause already\ncompleted, that is now for ever beyond the soul's control. There is\neven no continuing consciousness, no memory of the past that could\nguide the soul to any knowledge of its fate.  The only advantage open\nto it is to add in this life to the sum of its good actions, that it\nmay bear fruit with the rest. And even this can only happen in some\nfuture life under essentially them same conditions as the present one:\nsubject, like the present one, to old age, decay, and death; and\naffording opportunity, like the present one, for the commission of\nerrors, ignorances, or sins, which in their turn must inevitably\nproduce their due effect of sickness, disability, or woe. Thus is the\nsoul tossed about from life to life, from billow to billow in the\ngreat ocean of transmigration.  And there is no escape save for the\nvery few, who, during their birth as men, attain to a right knowledge\nof the Great Spirit: and thus enter into immortality, or, as the later\n[94] philosophers taught, are absorbed into the Divine Essence.\" (Rhys\nDavids, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 85, 86.)\n\nThe state after death thus imagined by the Hindu philosophers has a\ncertain analogy to the purgatory of the Roman Church; except that\nescape from it is dependent, not on a divine decree modified, it may\nbe, by sacerdotal or saintly intercession, but by the acts of the\nindividual himself; and that while ultimate emergence into heavenly\nbliss of the good, or well-prayed for, Catholic is professedly\nassured, the chances in favour of the attainment of absorption, or of\nNirvana, by any individual Hindu are extremely small.\n\nNote 6 (P. 62).\n\n\"That part of the then prevalent transmigration theory which could not\nbe proved false seemed to meet a deeply felt necessity, seemed to\nsupply a moral cause which would explain the unequal distribution here\nof happiness or woe, so utterly inconsistent with the present\ncharacters of men.\" Gautama \"still therefore talked of men's previous\nexistence, but by no means in the way that he is generally represented\nto have done.\" What he taught was \"the transmigration of character.\"\nHe held that after the death of any being, whether human or not, there\nsurvived nothing at all but that being's \"Karma,\" the result, that is,\nof its mental and bodily actions. Every individual, whether human or\ndivine, was the last inheritor and the last result of the Karma of a\nlong series of past individuals--\"a series [95] so long that its\nbeginning is beyond the reach of calculation, and its end will be\ncoincident with the destruction of the world.\" (Rhys Davids, Hibbert\nLectures, p. 92.)\n\nIn the theory of evolution, the tendency of a germ to develop according\nto a certain specific type, e.g. of the kidney bean seed to grow into\na plant having all the characters of Phaseolus vulgaris, is its\n\"Karma.\" It is the \"last inheritor and the last result\" of all the\nconditions that have affected a line of ancestry which goes back for\nmany millions of years to the time when life first appeared on the\nearth. The moiety B of the substance of the bean plant (see Note 1) is\nthe last link in a once continuous chain extending from the primitive\nliving substance: and the characters of the successive species to\nwhich it has given rise are the manifestations of its gradually\nmodified Karma. As Prof. Rhys Davids aptly says, the snowdrop \"is a\nsnowdrop and not an oak, and just that kind of snowdrop, because it is\nthe outcome of the Karma of an endless series of past existences.\"\n(Hibbert Lectures, p. 114.)\n\nNote 7 (p. 64).\n\n\"It is interesting to notice that the very point which is the weakness\nof the theory--the supposed concentration of the effect of the Karma\nin one new being--presented itself to the early Buddhists themselves\nas a difficulty.  They avoided it, partly by explaining that it was a\nparticular thirst in the creature dying (a craving, Tanha, which plays\nother [96] wise a great part in the Buddhist theory) which actually\ncaused the birth of the new individual who was to inherit the Karma of\nthe former one. But, how this too place, how the craving desire\nproduced this effect, was acknowledged to be a mystery patent only to\na Buddha.\" (Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, P. 95.)\n\nAmong the many parallelisms of Stoicism and Buddhism, it is curious to\nfind one for this Tanha, \"thirst,\" or \"craving desire\" for life.\nSeneca writes (Epist. lxxvi. 18): \"Si enim ullum aliud est bonum quam\nhonestum, sequetur nos aviditas vitae aviditas rerum vitam\ninstruentium: quod est intolerabile infinitum, vagum.\"\n\nNote 8 (P. 66).\n\n\"The distinguishing characteristic of Buddhism was that it started a\nnew line, that it looked upon the deepest questions men have to solve\nfrom an entirely different standpoint. It swept away from the field of\nits vision the whole of the great soul theory which had hitherto so\ncompletely filled and dominated the minds of the superstitious and the\nthoughtful alike. For the first time in the history of the world, it\nproclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself and by\nhimself, in this world, during this life, without any the least\nreference to God, or to Gods, either great or small. Like the\nUpanishads, it placed the first importance on knowledge; but it was no\nlonger a knowledge of God, it was a clear perception of the real\nnature, as [97] they supposed it to be, of men and things. And it added\nto the necessity of knowledge, the necessity of purity, of courtesy,\nof uprightness, of peace and of a universal love far reaching, grown\ngreat and beyond measure.\" (Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, p. 29.)\n\nThe contemporary Greek philosophy takes an analogous direction.\nAccording to Heracleitus, the universe was made neither by Gods nor\nmen; but, from all eternity, has been, and to all eternity, will be,\nimmortal fire, glowing and fading in due measure. (Mullach, Heracliti\nFragmenta, 27.) And the part assigned by his successors, the Stoics,\nto the knowledge and the volition of the \"wise man\" made their\nDivinity (for logical thinkers) a subject for compliments, rather than\na power to be reckoned with. In Hindu speculation the \"Arahat,\" still\nmore the \"Buddha,\" becomes the superior of Brahma; the stoical \"wise\nman\" is, at least, the equal of Zeus.\n\nBerkeley affirms over and over again that no idea can be formed of a\nsoul or spirit--\"If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here\ndelivered, let him but reflect and try if he can form any idea of\npower or active being; and whether he hath ideas of two principal\npowers marked by the names of will and understanding distinct from\neach other, as well as from a third idea of substance or being in\ngeneral, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject\nof the aforesaid power, which is signified by the name soul or spirit.\nThis is what some hold but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul,\nspirit, do not stand for different ideas or, in truth, for any idea at\nall, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which,\nbeing an agent, cannot be like unto or represented by Any idea\nwhatever [though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some\nnotion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as\nwilling, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning\nof these words\". (The Principles of Human Knowledge, lxxvi. See also\nsections lxxxix., cxxxv., cxlv.)\n\nIt is open to discussion, I think, whether it is possible to have\n\"some notion\" of that of which we can form no \"idea.\"\n\nBerkeley attaches several predicates to the \"perceiving active being\nmind, spirit, soul or myself\" (Parts I. II.) It is said, for example,\nto be \"indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and incorruptible.\" The\npredicate indivisible, though negative in form, has highly positive\nconsequences. For, if \"perceiving active being\" is strictly\nindivisible, man's soul must be one with the Divine spirit: which is\ngood Hindu or Stoical doctrine, but hardly orthodox Christian\nphilosophy. If, on the other hand, the \"substance\" of active\nperceiving \"being\" is actually divided into the one Divine and\ninnumerable human entities, how can the predicate \"indivisible\" be\nrigorously applicable to it?\n\nTaking the words cited, as they stand, the amount to the denial of the\npossibility of any knowledge of substance. \"Matter\" having been\nresolved into mere affections of \"spirit\", \"spirit\" melts away into an\nadmittedly inconceivable and unknowable [99] hypostasis of thought and\npower--consequently the existence of anything in the universe beyond a\nflow of phenomena is a purely hypothetical assumption. Indeed a\npyrrhonist might raise the objection that if \"esse\" is \"percipi\"\nspirit itself can have no existence except as a perception,\nhypostatized into a \"self,\" or as a perception of some other spirit.\nIn the former case, objective reality vanishes; in the latter, there\nwould seem to be the need of an infinite series of spirits each\nperceiving the others.\n\nIt is curious to observe how very closely the phraseology of Berkeley\nsometimes approaches that of the Stoics: thus (cxlviii.) \"It seems to\nbe a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God.\n. . But, alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of\nall things with a more full and clear view, than we do any of our\nfellow-creatures . .  . we do at all times and in all places perceive\nmanifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or any\nwise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God\" .\n. . cxlix. \"It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to\nany one that is capable of the least reflection, than the existence of\nGod, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in\nthem all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect\nus, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, in\nwhom we live and move and have our being.\" cl. \"[But you will say hath\nNature no share in the production of natural things, and must they all\nbe ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? ... if by\nNature is [100] meant some being distinct from God, as well as from\nthe laws of nature and things perceived by sense, I must confess that\nword is to me an empty sound, without any intelligible meaning annexed\nto it.] Nature in this acceptation is a vain Chimaera introduced by\nthose heathens, who had not just notions of the omnipresence and\ninfinite perfection of God.\"\n\nCompare Seneca (De Beneficiis, iv. 7):\n\n\"Natura, inquit, haec mihi praestat. Non intelligis te, quum hoc\ndicis, mutare Nomen Deo? Quid enim est aliud Natura quam Deus, et\ndivina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta? Quoties voles tibi\nlicet aliter hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare, et Jovem illum\noptimum et maximum rite dices, et tonantem, et statorem: qui non, ut\nhistorici tradiderunt, ex eo quod post votum susceptum acies Romanorum\nfugientum stetit, sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnina, stator,\nstabilitorque est: hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris, nam\nquum fatum nihil aliud est, quam series implexa causarum, ille est\nprima omnium causa, ea qua caeterae pendent.\" It would appear,\ntherefore, that the good Bishop is somewhat hard upon the \"heathen,\"\nof whose words his own might be a paraphrase.\n\nThere is yet another direction in which Berkeley's philosophy, I will\nnot say agrees with Gautama's, but at any rate helps to make a\nfundamental dogma of Buddhism intelligible.\n\n\"I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift\nthe scene as often as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and\nstraightway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same\npower [101] it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making\nand unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active.\nThis much is certain and grounded on experience. . .\" (Principles,\nxxviii.)\n\nA good many of us, I fancy, have reason to think that experience tells\nthem very much the contrary; and are painfully familiar with the\nobsession of the mind by ideas which cannot be obliterated by any\neffort of the will and steadily refuse to make way for others. But\nwhat I desire to point out is that if Gautama was equally confident\nthat he could \"make and unmake\" ideas--then, since he had resolved\nself into a group of ideal phantoms--the possibility of abolishing\nself by volition naturally followed.\n\nNote 9 (P. 68).\n\nAccording to Buddhism, the relation of one life to the next is merely\nthat borne by the flame of one lamp to the flame of another lamp which\nis set alight by it. To the \"Arahat\" or adept \"no outward form, no\ncompound thing, no creature, no creator, no existence of any kind,\nmust appear to be other than a temporary collocation of its component\nparts, fated inevitably to be dissolved.\"--(Rhys Davids, Hibbert\nLectures, p. 211.)\n\nThe self is nothing but a group of phenomena held together by the\ndesire of life; when that desire shall have ceased, \"the Karma of that\nparticular chain of lives will cease to influence any longer any\ndistinct individual, and there will be no more birth; [102] for birth,\ndecay, and death, grief, lamentation, and despair will have come, so\nfar as regards that chain of lives, for ever to an end.\"\n\nThe state of mind of the Arahat in which the desire of life has ceased\nis Nirvana. Dr. Oldenberg has very acutely and patiently considered\nthe various interpretations which have been attached to \"Nirvana\" in\nthe work to which I have referred (pp. 285 et seq.). The result of his\nand other discussions of the question may I think be briefly stated\nthus:\n\n1. Logical deduction from the predicates attached to the term\n\"Nirvana\" strips it of all reality, conceivability, or perceivability,\nwhether by Gods or men. For all practical purposes, therefore, it\ncomes to exactly the same thing as annihilation.\n\n2. But it is not annihilation in the ordinary sense, inasmuch as it\ncould take place in the living Arahat or Buddha.\n\n3. And, since, for the faithful Buddhist, that which was abolished in\nthe Arahat was the possibility of further pain, sorrow, or sin; and\nthat which was attained was perfect peace; his mind directed itself\nexclusively to this joyful consummation, and personified the negation\nof all conceivable existence and of all pain into a positive bliss.\nThis was all the more easy, as Gautama refused to give any dogmatic\ndefinition of Nirvana. There is something analogous in the way in\nwhich people commonly talk of the \"happy release\" of a man who has\nbeen long suffering from mortal disease. According to their own views,\nit must always be extremely doubtful whether the man will be any\nhappier after the \"release\" [103] than before. But they do not choose\nto look at the matter in this light.\n\nThe popular notion that, with practical, if not metaphysical,\nannihilation in view, Buddhism must needs be a sad and gloomy faith\nseems to be inconsistent with fact; on the contrary, the prospect of\nNirvana fills the true believer, not merely with cheerfulness, but\nwith an ecstatic desire to reach it.\n\nNote 10 (P. 68.)\n\nThe influence of the picture of the personal qualities of Gautama,\nafforded by the legendary anecdotes which rapidly grew into a\nbiography of the Buddha; and by the birth stories, which coalesced\nwith the current folk-lore, and were intelligible to all the world,\ndoubtless played a great part. Further, although Gautama appears not\nto have meddled with the caste system, he refused to recognize any\ndistinction, save that of perfection in the way of salvation, among\nhis followers; and by such teaching, no less than by the inculcation\nof love and benevolence to all sentient beings, he practically\nlevelled every social, political, and racial barrier. A third\nimportant condition was the organization of the Buddhists into\nmonastic communities for the stricter professors, while the laity were\npermitted a wide indulgence in practice and were allowed to hope for\naccommodation in some of the temporary abodes of bliss. With a few\nhundred thousand years of immediate paradise in sight, the average man\ncould be content to shut his eyes to what might follow.\n\n[104]\n\nNote 11 (P. 69).\n\nIn ancient times it was the fashion, even among the Greeks themselves,\nto derive all Greek wisdom from Eastern sources; not long ago it was\nas generally denied that Greek philosophy had any connection, with\nOriental speculation; it seems probable, however, that the truth lies\nbetween these extremes.\n\nThe Ionian intellectual movement does not stand alone. It is only one\nof several sporadic indications of the working of some powerful mental\nferment over the whole of the area comprised between the Aegean and\nNorthern Hindostan during the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries\nbefore our era. In these three hundred years, prophetism attained its\napogee among the Semites of Palestine; Zoroasterism grew and became\nthe creed of a conquering race, the Iranic Aryans; Buddhism rose and\nspread with marvellous rapidity among the Aryans of Hindostan; while\nscientific naturalism took its rise among the Aryans of Ionia. It\nwould be difficult to find another three centuries which have given\nbirth to four events of equal importance. All the principal existing\nreligions of mankind have grown out of the first three: while the\nfourth is the little spring, now swollen into the great stream of\npositive science. So far as physical possibilities go, the prophet\nJeremiah and the oldest Ionian philosopher might have met and\nconversed. If they had done so, they would probably have disagreed a\ngood deal; and it is interesting to reflect that their discussions\nmight have [105] embraced Questions which, at the present day, are\nstill hotly controverted.\n\nThe old Ionian philosophy, then, seems to be only one of many results\nof a stirring of the moral and intellectual life of the Aryan and the\nSemitic populations of Western Asia. The conditions of this general\nawakening were doubtless manifold; but there is one which modern\nresearch has brought into great prominence. This is the existence of\nextremely ancient and highly advanced societies in the valleys of the\nEuphrates and of the Nile.\n\nIt is now known that, more than a thousand--perhaps more than two\nthousand--years before the sixth century B.C., civilization had\nattained a relatively high pitch among the Babylonians and the\nEgyptians. Not only had painting, sculpture, architecture, and the\nindustrial arts reached a remarkable development; but in Chaldaea, at\nany rate, a vast amount of knowledge had been accumulated and\nmethodized, in the departments of grammar, mathematics, astronomy, and\nnatural history. Where such traces of the scientific spirit are\nvisible, naturalistic speculation is rarely far off, though, so far as\nI know, no remains of an Accacian, or Egyptian, philosophy, properly\nso called, have yet been recovered.\n\nGeographically, Chaldaea occupied a central position among the oldest\nseats of civilization. Commerce, largely aided by the intervention of\nthose colossal pedlars, the Phoenicians, had brought Chaldaea into\nconnection with all of them, for a thousand years before the epoch at\npresent under consideration. And in the ninth, eighth and seventh\n[106] centuries, the Assyrian, the depositary of Chaldaean\ncivilization, as the Macedonian and the Roman, at a later date, were\nthe depositories of Greek culture, had added irresistible force to the\nother agencies for the wide distribution of Chaldaean literature, art,\nand science.\n\nI confess that I find it difficult to imagine that the Greek\nimmigrant--who stood in somewhat the same relation to the Babylonians\nand the Egyptians as the later Germanic barbarians to the Romans of\nthe Empire--should not have been immensely influenced by the new life\nwith which they became acquainted.  But there is abundant direct\nevidence of the magnitude of this influence in certain spheres. I\nsuppose it is not doubted that the Greek went to school with the\nOriental for his primary instruction in reading, writing, and\narithmetic; and that Semitic theology supplied him with some of his\nmythological lore. Nor does there now seem to be any question about\nthe large indebtedness of Greek art to that of Chaldaea and that of\nEgypt.\n\nBut the manner of that indebtedness is very instructive. The obligation\nis clear, but its limits are no less definite. Nothing better\nexemplifies the indomitable originality of the Greeks than the\nrelations of their art to that of the Orientals. Far from being\nsubdued into mere imitators by the technical excellence of their\nteachers, they lost no time in bettering the instruction they\nreceived, using their models as mere stepping stones on the way to\nthose unsurpassed and unsurpassable achievements which are all their\nown. The shibboleth of Art is [107] the human figure. The ancient\nChaldaeans and Egyptians, like the modern Japanese, did wonders in the\nrepresentation of birds and quadrupeds; they even attained to\nsomething more than respectability in human portraiture. But their\nutmost efforts never brought them within range of the best Greek\nembodiments of the grace of womanhood, or of the severer beauty of\nmanhood.\n\nIt is worth while to consider the probable effect upon the acute and\ncritical Greek mind of the conflict of ideas, social, political, and\ntheological, which arose out of the conditions of life in the Asiatic\ncolonies. The Ionian polities had passed through the whole gamut of\nsocial and political changes, from patriarchal and occasionally\noppressive kingship to rowdy and still more burdensome mobship--no\ndoubt with infinitely eloquent and copious argumentation, on both\nsides, at every stage of their progress towards that arbitrament of\nforce which settles most political questions. The marvellous\nspeculative faculty, latent in the Ionian, had come in contact with\nMesopotamian, Egyptian, Phoenician theologies and cosmogonies; with\nthe illuminati of Orphism and the fanatics and dreamers of the\nMysteries; possibly with Buddhism and Zoroasterism; possibly even with\nJudaism. And it has been observed that the mutual contradictions of\nantagonistic supernaturalisms are apt to play a large part among the\ngenerative agencies of naturalism.\n\nThus, various external influences may have contributed to the rise of\nphilosophy among the Ionian Greeks of the sixth century. But the\nassimilative [108] capacity of the Greek mind--its power of\nHellenizing whatever it touched--has here worked so effectually, that,\nso far as I can learn, no indubitable traces of such extraneous\ncontributions are now allowed to exist by the most authoritative\nhistorians of Philosophy.  Nevertheless, I think it must be admitted\nthat the coincidences between the Heracleito-stoical doctrines and\nthose of the older Hindu philosophy are extremely remarkable. In both,\nthe cosmos pursues an eternal succession of cyclical changes. The\ngreat year, answering to the Kalpa, covers an entire cycle from the\norigin of the universe as a fluid to its dissolution in fire--\"Humor\ninitium, ignis exitus mundi,\" as Seneca has it. In both systems, there\nis immanent in the cosmos a source of energy, Brahma, or the Logos,\nwhich works according to fixed laws. The individual soul is an efflux\nof this world-spirit, and returns to it. Perfection is attainable only\nby individual effort, through ascetic discipline, and is rather a\nstate of painlessness than of happiness; if indeed it can be said to\nbe a state of anything, save the negation of perturbing emotion. The\nhatchment motto \"In Coelo Quies\" would serve both Hindu and Stoic; and\nabsolute quiet is not easily distinguishable from annihilation.\n\nZoroasterism, which, geographically, occupies a position intermediate\nbetween Hellenism and Hinduism, agrees with the latter in recognizing\nthe essential evil of the cosmos; but differs from both in its\nintensely anthropomorphic personification of the two antagonistic\nprinciples, to the one of which it ascribes all the good; and, to the\nother, all the evil.\n\n[109] In fact, it assumes the existence of two worlds, one good and one\nbad; the latter created by the evil power for the purpose of damaging\nthe former.  The existing cosmos is a mere mixture of the two, and the\n\"last judgment\" is a root-and-branch extirpation of the work of\nAhriman.\n\nNote 12 (p. 69).\n\nThere is no snare in which the feet of a modern student of ancient lore\nare more easily entangled, than that which is spread by the similarity\nof the language of antiquity to modern modes of expression. I do not\npresume to interpret the obscurest of Greek philosophers; all I wish\nis to point out, that his words, in the sense accepted by competent\ninterpreters, fit modern ideas singularly well.\n\nSo far as the general theory of evolution goes there is no difficulty.\nThe aphorism about the river; the figure of the child playing on the\nshore; the kingship and fatherhood of strife, seem decisive. The\n[Greek phrase osod ano kato mie] expresses, with singular aptness, the\ncyclical aspect of the one process of organic evolution in individual\nplants and animals: yet it may be a question whether the Heracleitean\nstrife included any distinct conception of the struggle for existence.\nAgain, it is tempting to compare the part played by the Heracleitean\n\"fire\" with that ascribed by the moderns to heat, or rather to that\ncause of motion of which heat is one expression; and a little\ningenuity might find a foreshadowing of the doctrine of the\nconservation of energy, in the saying [110] that all the things are\nchanged into fire and fire into all things, as gold into goods and\ngoods into gold.\n\nNote 13 (p. 71).\n\nPope's lines in the Essay on Man(Ep. i. 267-8),\n\n     All are but parts of one stupendous whole,\n     Whose body Nature is, and God the soul,\"\n\nsimply paraphrase Seneca's \"quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc\nin homine animus: quod est illic materia, id nobis corpus est.\"--(Ep.\nlxv. 24); which again is a Latin version of the old Stoical doctrine,\n[Greek phrase eis apan tou kosou meros diekei o nous, kataper aph emon\ne psuche].\n\nSo far as the testimony for the universality of what ordinary people\ncall \"evil\" goes, there is nothing better than the writings of the\nStoics themselves. They might serve, as a storehouse for the epigrams\nof the ultra-pessimists. Heracleitus (circa 500 B.C.) says just as\nhard things about ordinary humanity as his disciples centuries later;\nand there really seems no need to seek for the causes of this dark\nview of life in the circumstances of the time of Alexander's\nsuccessors or of the early Emperors of Rome. To the man with an\nethical ideal, the world, including himself, will always seem full of\nevil.\n\nNote 14 (P. 73).\n\nI use the well-known phrase, but decline responsibility for the libel\nupon Epicurus, whose doctrines [111] were far less compatible with\nexistence in a stye than those of the Cynics. If it were steadily\nborne in mind that the conception of the \"flesh\" as the source of\nevil, and the great saying \"Initium est salutis notitia peccati,\" are\nthe property of Epicurus, fewer illusions about Epicureanism would\npass muster for accepted truth.\n\nNote 15 (P. 75).\n\nThe Stoics said that man was a [Greek phrase zoon logikon politikon\nphilallelon], or a rational, a political, and an altruistic or\nphilanthropic animal. In their view, his higher nature tended to\ndevelop in these three directions, as a plant tends to grow up into\nits typical form. Since, without the introduction of any consideration\nof pleasure or pain, whatever thwarted the realization of its type by\nthe plant might be said to be bad, and whatever helped it good; so\nvirtue, in the Stoical sense, as the conduct which tended to the\nattainment of the rational, political, and philanthropic ideal, was\ngood in itself, and irrespectively of its emotional concomitants.\n\nMan is an \"animal sociale communi bono genitum.\" The safety of society\ndepends upon practical recognition of the fact. \"Salva autem esse\nsocietas nisi custodia et amore partium non possit,\" says Seneca. (De.\nIra, ii. 31.)\n\nNote 16 (P. 75).\n\nThe importance of the physical doctrine of the Stoics lies in its\nclear recognition of the universality [112] of the law of causation,\nwith its corollary, the order of nature: the exact form of that order\nis an altogether secondary consideration.\n\nMany ingenious persons now appear to consider that the incompatibility\nof pantheism, of materialism, and of any doubt about the immortality\nof the soul, with religion and morality, is to be held as an\naxiomatic truth. I confess that I have a certain difficulty in\naccepting this dogma. For the Stoics were notoriously materialists and\npantheists of the most extreme character; and while no strict Stoic\nbelieved in the eternal duration of the individual soul, some even\ndenied its persistence after death. Yet it is equally certain that of\nall gentile philosophies, Stoicism exhibits the highest ethical\ndevelopment, is animated by the most religious spirit, and has exerted\nthe profoundest influence upon the moral and religious development not\nmerely of the best men among the Romans, but among the moderns down to\nour own day.\n\nSeneca was claimed as a Christian and placed among the saints by the\nfathers of the early Christian Church; and the genuineness of a\ncorrespondence between him and the apostle Paul has been hotly\nmaintained in our own time, by orthodox writers. That the letters, as\nwe possess them, are worthless forgeries is obvious; and writers as\nwide apart as Baur and Lightfoot agree that the whole story is devoid\nof foundation.\n\nThe dissertation of the late Bishop of Durham (Epistle to the\nPhilippians) is particularly worthy of study, apart from this\nquestion, on account of [113] evidence which it supplies of the\nnumerous similarities of thought between Seneca and the writer of the\nPauline epistles. When it is remembered that the writer of the Acts\nputs a quotation from Aratus, or Cleanthes, into the mouth of the\napostle; and that Tarsus was a great seat of philosophical and\nespecially stoical learning (Chrysippus himself was a native of the\nadjacent town of Soli), there is no difficulty in understanding the\norigin of these resemblances. See, on this subject, Sir Alexander\nGrant's dissertation in his edition of The Ethics of Aristotle (where\nthere is an interesting reference to the stoical character of Bishop\nButler's ethics), the concluding pages of Dr. Weygoldt's instructive\nlittle work Die Philosophie der Stoa, and Aubertin's Seneque et Saint\nPaul.\n\nIt is surprising that a writer of Dr. Lightfoot's stamp should speak\nof Stoicism as a philosophy of \"despair.\" Surely, rather, it was a\nphilosophy of men who, having cast off all illusions, and the\nchildishness of despair among them, were minded to endure in patience\nwhatever conditions the cosmic process might create, so long as those\nconditions were compatible with the progress towards virtue, which\nalone, for them, conferred a worthy object on existence. There is no\nnote of despair in the stoical declaration that the perfected \"wise\nman\" is the equal of Zeus in everything but the duration of his\nexistence. And, in my judgment, there is as little pride about it,\noften as it serves for the text of discourses on stoical arrogance.\nGrant the stoical postulate that there is no good except virtue; grant\nthat [114] the perfected wise man is altogether virtuous, in\nconsequence of being guided in all things by the reason, which is an\neffluence of Zeus, and there seems no escape from the stoical\nconclusion.\n\nNote 17 (p. 76).\n\nOur \"Apathy\" carries such a different set of connotations from its\nGreek original that I have ventured on using the latter as a technical\nterm.\n\nNote 18 (P. 77).\n\nMany of the stoical philosophers recommended their disciples to take\nan active share in public affairs; and in the Roman world, for several\ncenturies, the best public men were strongly inclined to Stoicism.\nNevertheless, the logical tendency of Stoicism seems to me to be\nfulfilled only in such men as Diogenes and Epictetus.\n\nNote 19 (P. 80).\n\n\"Criticisms on the Origin of Species,\" 1864. Collected Essays, vol. ii.\np.  91.[1894.]\n\nNote 20 (P. 81).\n\nOf course, strictly speaking, social life, and the ethical process in\nvirtue of which it advances towards perfection, Are part and parcel of\nthe general process of evolution, just as the gregarious habit of in\n[115] numerable plants and animals, which has been of immense\nadvantage to them, is so. A hive of bees is an organic polity, a\nsociety in which the part played by each member is determined by\norganic necessities. Queens, workers, and drones are, so to speak,\ncastes, divided from one another by marked physical barriers. Among\nbirds and mammals, societies are formed, of which the bond in many\ncases seems to be purely psychological; that is to say, it appears to\ndepend upon the liking of the individuals for one another's company.\nThe tendency of individuals to over self-assertion is kept down by\nfighting.  Even in these rudimentary forms of society, love and fear\ncome into play, and enforce a greater or less renunciation of\nself-will. To this extent the general cosmic process begins to be\nchecked by a rudimentary ethical process, which is, strictly speaking,\npart of the former, just as the \"governor\" in a steam-engine is part\nof the mechanism of the engine.\n\nNote 21 (p. 82).\n\nSee \"Government: Anarchy or Regimentation,\" Collected Essays, vol. i.\npp.  413-418. It is this form of political philosophy to which I\nconceive the epithet of \"reasoned savagery\" to be strictly\napplicable.[1894.]\n\nNote 22 (p. 83).\n\n\"L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est\nun roseau pensant. Il ne faut [116] pas que l'univers entier s'arme\npour l'ecraser. Une vapour, une goutte d'eau, suffit pour le tuer.\nMais quand l'univers l'ecraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble\nque ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il muert; et l'avantage que\nl'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien.\"--Pensees de Pascal.\n\nNote 23 (p. 85).\n\nThe use of the word \"Nature\" here may be criticised. Yet the\nmanifestation of the natural tendencies of men is so profoundly\nmodified by training that it is hardly too strong. Consider the\nsuppression of the sexual instinct between near relations.\n\nNote 24 (p. 86).\n\nA great proportion of poetry is addressed by the young to the young;\nonly the great masters of the art are capable of divining, or think it\nworth while to enter into, the feelings of retrospective age. The two\ngreat poets whom we have so lately lost, Tennyson and Browning, have\ndone this, each in his own inimitable way; the one in the Ulysses,\nfrom which I have borrowed; the other in that wonderful fragment\n\"Childe Roland to the dark Tower came.\"\n\n[147]\n\n(Note: Section III came from a different source than the\nother sections and thus does not have page numbers.\n\nSection III of the volume, \"Science and Theology\", is not Huxley's text\nand is not by Huxley. It reprints instead an entirely different essay,\none by Asa Gray on Darwin, published in the Atlantic in 1860 as\nspecified in a note before the text here; what looks like a subheading,\n\"NATURAL SELECTION NOT INCONSISTENT WITH NATURAL THEOLOGY\", is the title\ngiven to Gray's essay in some reprints.)\n\n\t\t\t\t III.\n\n\t\t\t  SCIENCE AND MORALS\n\n\t\t\t\t[1886]\n\n\nNATURAL SELECTION\n\nNOT INCONSISTENT WITH\n\nNATURAL THEOLOGY\n\n(Atlantic Monthly for July, August, and October, 1860, reprinted in\n1861)\n\n\nI\n\n\nNovelties are enticing to most people; to us they are simply annoying.\nWe cling to a long-accepted theory, just as we cling to an old suit of\nclothes.  A new theory, like a new pair of breeches (the Atlantic still\naffects the older type of nether garment), is sure to have hard-fitting\nplaces; or, even when no particular fault can be found with the\narticle, it oppresses with a sense of general discomfort. New notions\nand new styles worry us, till we get well used to them, which is only\nby slow degrees.\n\nWherefore, in Galileos time, we might have helped to proscribe, or to\nburn--had he been stubborn enough to warrant cremation--even the great\npioneer of inductive research; although, when we had fairly recovered\nour composure, and bad leisurely excogitated the matter, we might have\ncome to conclude that the new doctrine was better than the old one,\nafter all, at least for those who had nothing to unlearn.\n\nSuch being our habitual state of mind, it may well be believed that the\nperusal of the new book \"On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural\nSelection\" left an uncomfortable impression, in spite of its plausible\nand winning ways. We were not wholly unprepared for it, as many of our\ncontemporaries seem to have been. The scientific reading in which we\nindulge as a relaxation from severer studies had raised dim\nforebodings.  Investigations about the succession of species in time,\nand their actual geographical distribution over the earths surface,\nwere leading up from all sides and in various ways to the question of\ntheir origin. Now and then we encountered a sentence, like Prof. Owens\n\"axiom of the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of living\nthings,\" which haunted us like an apparition. For, dim as our\nconception must needs be as to what such oracular and grandiloquent\nphrases might really mean, we felt confident that they presaged no good\nto old beliefs. Foreseeing, yet deprecating, the coming time of\ntrouble, we still hoped that, with some repairs and makeshifts, the old\nviews might last out our days. Apres nous le deluge.  Still, not to lag\nbehind the rest of the world, we read the book in which the new theory\nis promulgated. We took it up, like our neighbors, and, as was natural,\nin a somewhat captious frame of mind.\n\nWell, we found no cause of quarrel with the first chapter. Here the\nauthor takes us directly to the barn-yard and the kitchen-garden. Like\nan honorable rural member of our General Court, who sat silent until,\nnear the close of a long session, a bill requiring all swine at large\nto wear pokes was introduced, when he claimed the privilege of\naddressing the house, on the proper ground that he had been \"brought up\namong the pigs, and knew all about them\"--so we were brought up among\ncows and cabbages; and the lowing of cattle, the cackle of hens, and\nthe cooing of pigeons, were sounds native and pleasant to our ears. So\n\"Variation under Domestication\" dealt with familiar subjects in a\nnatural way, and gently introduced \"Variation under Nature,\" which\nseemed likely enough. Then follows \"Struggle for Existence\"--a\nprinciple which we experimentally know to be true and cogent--bringing\nthe comfortable assurance, that man, even upon Leviathan Hobbess theory\nof society, is no worse than the rest of creation, since all Nature is\nat war, one species with another, and the nearer kindred the more\ninternecine--bringing in thousandfold confirmation and extension of the\nMalthusian doctrine that population tends far to outrun means of\nsubsistence throughout the animal and vegetable world, and has to be\nkept down by sharp preventive checks; so that not more than one of a\nhundred or a thousand of the individuals whose existence is so\nwonderfully and so sedulously provided for ever comes to anything,\nunder ordinary circumstances; so the lucky and the strong must prevail,\nand the weaker and ill-favored must perish; and then follows, as\nnaturally as one sheep follows another, the chapter on \"Natural\nSelection,\" Darwins cheval de bataille, which is very much the\nNapoleonic doctrine that Providence favors the strongest\nbattalions--that, since many more individuals are born than can\npossibly survive, those individuals and those variations which possess\nany advantage, however slight, over the rest, are in the long-run sure\nto survive, to propagate, and to occupy the limited field, to the\nexclusion or destruction of the weaker brethren. All this we pondered,\nand could not much object to. In fact, we began to contract a liking\nfor a system which at the outset illustrates the advantages of good\nbreeding, and which makes the most \"of every creatures best.\"\n\nCould we \"let by-gones be by-gones,\" and, beginning now, go on\nimproving and diversifying for the future by natural selection, could\nwe even take up the theory at the introduction  of the actually\nexisting species, we should be well content; and so, perhaps, would\nmost naturalists be. It is by no means difficult to believe that\nvarieties are incipient or possible species, when we see what trouble\nnaturalists, especially botanists, have to distinguish between\nthem--one regarding as a true species what another regards as a\nvariety; when the progress of knowledge continually increases, rather\nthan diminishes, the number of doubtful instances; and when there is\nless agreement than ever among naturalists as to what is the basis in\nNature upon which our idea of species reposes, or how the word is to be\ndefined.  Indeed, when we consider the endless disputes of naturalists\nand ethnologists over the human races, as to whether they belong to one\nspecies or to more, and, if to more, whether to three, or five, or\nfifty, we can hardly help fancying that both may be right--or rather,\nthat the uni-humanitarians would have been right many thousand years\nago, and the multi-humanitarians will be several thousand years later;\nwhile at present the safe thing to say is, that probably there is some\ntruth on both sides.\n\n\"Natural selection,\" Darwin remarks, \"leads to divergence of character;\nfor the more living beings can be supported on the same area, the more\nthey diverge in structure, habits, and constitution\" (a principle\nwhich, by-the-way, is paralleled and illustrated by the diversification\nof human labor); and also leads to much extinction of intermediate or\nunimproved forms. Now, though this divergence may \"steadily tend to\nincrease,\" yet this is evidently a slow process in Nature, and liable\nto much counteraction wherever man does not interpose, and so not\nlikely to work much harm for the future. And if natural selection, with\nartificial to help it, will produce better animals and better men than\nthe present, and fit them better to the conditions of existence, why,\nlet it work, say we, to the top of its bent There is still room enough\nfor improvement. Only let us hope that it always works for good: if\nnot, the divergent lines on Darwin's lithographic diagram of\n\"Transmutation made Easy,\" ominously show what small deviations from\nthe straight path may come to in the end.\n\nThe prospect of the future, accordingly, is on the whole pleasant and\nencouraging. It is only the backward glance, the gaze up the long vista\nof the past, that reveals anything alarming. Here the lines converge as\nthey recede into the geological ages, and point to conclusions which,\nupon the theory, are inevitable, but hardly welcome. The very first\nstep backward makes the negro and the Hottentot our\nblood-relations--not that reason or Scripture objects to that, though\npride may. The next suggests a closer association of our ancestors of\nthe olden time with \"our poor relations\" of the quadrumanous family\nthan we like to acknowledge. Fortunately, however--even if we must\naccount for him scientifically --man with his two feet stands upon a\nfoundation of his own. Intermediate links between the Bimana and the\nQuadrumana are lacking altogether; so that, put the genealogy of the\nbrutes upon what footing you will, the four-handed races will not serve\nfor our forerunners--at least, not until some monkey, live or fossil,\nis producible with great-toes, instead of thumbs, upon his nether\nextremities; or until some lucky geologist turns up the bones of his\nancestor and prototype in France or England, who was so busy \"napping\nthe chuckie-stanes\" and chipping out flint knives and arrow-heads in\nthe time of the drift, very many ages ago--before the British Channel\nexisted, says Lyell [III-1]--and until these men of the olden time are\nshown to have worn their great-toes in the divergent and thumblike\nfashion. That would be evidence indeed: but, until some testimony of\nthe sort is produced, we must needs believe in the separate and special\ncreation of man, however it may have been with the lower animals and\nwith plants.\n\nNo doubt, the full development and symmetry of Darwin's hypothesis\nstrongly suggest the evolution of the human no less than the lower\nanimal races out of some simple primordial animal--that all are equally\n\"lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the\nfirst bed of the Silurian system was deposited.\" But, as the author\nspeaks disrespectfully of spontaneous generation, and accepts a\nsupernatural beginning of life on earth, in some form or forms of being\nwhich included potentially all that have since existed and are yet to\nbe, he is thereby not warranted to extend his inferences beyond the\nevidence or the fair probability. There seems as great likelihood that\none special origination should be followed by another upon fitting\noccasion (such as the introduction of man), as that one form should be\ntransmuted into another upon fitting occasion, as, for instance, in the\nsuccession of species which differ from each other only in some\ndetails. To compare small things with great in a homely illustration:\nman alters from time to time his instruments or machines, as new\ncircumstances or conditions may require and his wit suggest. Minor\nalterations and improvements he adds to the machine he possesses; he\nadapts a new rig or a new rudder to an old boat: this answers to\nVariation. \"Like begets like,\" being the great rule in Nature, if boats\ncould engender, the variations would doubtless be propagated, like\nthose of domestic cattle. In course of time the old ones would be worn\nout or wrecked; the best sorts would be chosen for each particular use,\nand further improved upon; and so the primordial boat be developed into\nthe scow, the skiff, the sloop, and other species of water-craft--the\nvery diversification, as well as the successive improvements, entailing\nthe disappearance of intermediate forms, less adapted to any one\nparticular purpose; wherefore these go slowly out of use, and become\nextinct species: this is Natural Selection. Now, let a great and\nimportant advance be made, like that of steam navigation: here, though\nthe engine might be added to the old vessel, yet the wiser and\ntherefore the actual way is to make a new vessel on a modified plan:\nthis may answer to Specific Creation. Anyhow, the one does not\nnecessarily exclude the other.  Variation and natural selection may\nplay their part, and so may specific creation also. Why not?\n\nThis leads us to ask for the reasons which call for this new theory of\ntransmutation. The beginning of things must needs lie in obscurity,\nbeyond the bounds of proof, though within those of conjecture or of\nanalogical inference. Why not hold fast to the customary view, that all\nspecies were directly, instead of indirectly, created after their\nrespective kinds, as we now behold them--and that in a manner which,\npassing our comprehension, we intuitively refer to the supernatural?\nWhy this continual striving after \"the unattained and dim?\" why these\nanxious endeavors, especially of late years, by naturalists and\nphilosophers of various schools and different tendencies, to penetrate\nwhat one of them calls \"that mystery of mysteries,\" the origin of\nspecies?\n\nTo this, in general, sufficient answer may be found in the activity of\nthe human intellect, \"the delirious yet divine desire to know,\"\nstimulated as it has been by its own success in unveiling the laws and\nprocesses of inorganic Nature; in the fact that the principal triumphs\nof our age in physical science have consisted in tracing connections\nwhere none were known before, in reducing heterogeneous phenomena to a\ncommon cause or origin, in a manner quite analogous to that of the\nreduction of supposed independently originated species to a common\nultimate origin--thus, and in various other ways, largely and\nlegitimately extending the domain of secondary causes.  Surely the\nscientific mind of an age which contemplates the solar system as\nevolved from a common revolving fluid mass--which, through experimental\nresearch, has come to regard light, heat, electricity, magnetism,\nchemical affinity, and mechanical power as varieties or derivative and\nconvertible forms of one force, instead of independent species--which\nhas brought the so-called elementary kinds of matter, such as the\nmetals, into kindred groups, and pertinently raised the question,\nwhether the members of each group may not be mere varieties of one\nspecies--and which speculates steadily in the direction of the ultimate\nunity of matter, of a sort of prototype or simple element which may be\nto the ordinary species of matter what the Protozoa or what the\ncomponent cells of an organism are to the higher sorts of animals and\nplants--the mind of such an age cannot be expected to let the old\nbelief about species pass unquestioned. It will raise the question, how\nthe diverse sorts of plants and animals came to be as they are and\nwhere they are and will allow that the whole inquiry transcends its\npowers only when all endeavors have failed Granting the origin to be\nsuper natural or miraculous even, will not arrest the inquiry All real\norigination the philosophers will say, is supernatural, their very\nquestion is, whether we have yet gone back to the origin and can affirm\nthat the present forms of plants and animals are the primordial, the\nmiraculously created ones.  And, even if they admit that, they will\nstill inquire into the order of the phenomena, into the form of the\nmiracle You might as well expect the child to grow up content with what\nit is told about the advent of its infant brother Indeed, to learn that\nthe new comer is the gift of God, far from lulling inquiry, only\nstimulates speculation as to how the precious gift was bestowed That\nquestioning child is father to the man--is philosopher in\nshort-clothes.\n\nSince, then questions about the origin of species will be raised, and\nhave been raised--and since the theorizings, however different in\nparticulars, all proceed upon the notion that one species of plant or\nanimal is somehow derived from another, that the different sorts which\nnow flourish are lineal (or unlineal) descendants of other and earlier\nsorts--it now concerns us to ask, What are the grounds in Nature, the\nadmitted facts, which suggest hypotheses of derivation in some :shape\nor other? Reasons there must be, and plausible ones, for the persistent\nrecurrence of theories upon this genetic basis. A study of Darwins\nbook, and a general glance at the present state of the natural\nsciences, enable us to gather the following as among the most\nsuggestive and influential. We can only enumerate them here, without\nmuch indication of their particular bearing. There is--\n\n1. The general fact of variability, and the general tendency of the\nvariety to propagate its like--the patent facts that all species vary\nmore or less; that domesticated plants and animals, being in conditions\nfavorable to the production and preservation of varieties, are apt to\nvary widely; and that, by interbreeding, any variety may be fixed into\na race, that is, into a variety which comes true from seed. Many such\nraces, it is allowed, differ from each other in structure and\nappearance as widely as do many admitted species; and it is practically\nvery difficult, even impossible, to draw a clear line between races and\nspecies. Witness the human races, for instance.  Wild species also\nvary, perhaps about as widely as those of domestication, though in\ndifferent ways. Some of them apparently vary little, others moderately,\nothers immoderately, to the great bewilderment of systematic botanists\nand zoologists, and increasing disagreement as to whether various forms\nshall be held to be original species or strong varieties. Moreover, the\ndegree to which the descendants of the same stock, varying in different\ndirections, may at length diverge, is unknown. All we know is, that\nvarieties are themselves variable, and that very diverse forms have\nbeen educed from one stock.\n\n2. Species of the same genus are not distinguished from each other by\nequal amounts of difference. There is diversity in this respect\nanalogous to that of the varieties of a polymorphous species, some of\nthem slight, others extreme. And in large genera the unequal\nresemblance shows itself in the clustering of the species around\nseveral types or central species, like satellites around their\nrespective planets. Obviously suggestive this of the hypothesis that\nthey were satellites, not thrown off by revolution, like the moons of\nJupiter, Saturn, and our own solitary moon, but gradually and\npeacefully detached by divergent variation. That such closely-related\nspecies may be only varieties of higher grade, earlier origin, or more\nfavored evolution, is not a very violent supposition. Anyhow, it was a\nsupposition sure to be made.\n\n3. The actual geographical distribution of species upon the earths\nsurface tends to suggest the same notion. For, as a general thing, all\nor most of the species of a peculiar genus or other type are grouped in\nthe same country, or occupy continuous, proximate, or accessible areas.\nSo well does this rule hold, so general is the implication that kindred\nspecies are or were associated geographically, that most trustworthy\nnaturalists, quite free from hypotheses of transmutation, are\nconstantly inferring former geographical continuity between parts of\nthe world now widely disjoined, in order to account thereby for certain\ngeneric similarities among their inhabitants; just as philologists\ninfer former connection of races, and a parent language, to account for\ngeneric similarities among existing languages. Yet no scientific\nexplanation has been offered to account for the geographical\nassociation of kindred species, except the hypothesis of a common\norigin.\n\n4. Here the fact of the antiquity of creation, and in particular of the\npresent kinds of the earths inhabitants, or of a large part of them,\ncomes in to rebut the objection that there has not been time enough for\nany marked diversification of living things through divergent\nvariation--not time enough for varieties to have diverged into what we\ncall species.\n\nSo long as the existing species of plants and animals were thought to\nhave originated a few thousand years ago, and without predecessors,\nthere was no room for a theory of derivation of one sort from another,\nnor time enough even to account for the establishment of the races\nwhich are generally believed to have diverged from a common stock. Not\nso much that five or six thousand years was a short allowance for this;\nbut because some of our familiar domesticated varieties of grain, of\nfowls, and of other animals, were pictured and mummified by the old\nEgyptians more than half that number of years ago, if not earlier.\nIndeed, perhaps the strongest argument for the original plurality of\nhuman species was drawn from the identification of some of the present\nraces of men upon these early historical monuments and records.\n\nBut this very extension of the current chronology, if we may rely upon\nthe archaeologists, removes the difficulty by opening up a longer\nvista. So does the discovery in Europe of remains and implements of\nprehistoric races of men, to whom the use of metals was unknown--men of\nthe stone age, as the Scandinavian archaeologists designate them. And\nnow, \"axes and knives of flint, evidently wrought by human skill, are\nfound in beds of the drift at Amiens (also in other places, both in\nFrance and England), associated with the bones of extinct species of\nanimals.\" These implements, indeed, were noticed twenty years ago; at a\nplace in Suffolk they have been exhumed from time to time for more than\na century; but the full confirmation, the recognition of the age of the\ndeposit in which the implements occur, their abundance, and the\nappreciation of their bearings upon most interesting questions, belong\nto the present time. To complete the connection of these primitive\npeople with the fossil ages, the French geologists, we are told, have\nnow \"found these axes in Picardy associated with remains of Elephas\nprimigenius, Rhinoceros tichorhinus, Equus fossilis, and an extinct\nspecies of Bos.\"[III-2] In plain language, these workers in flint lived\nin the time of the mammoth, of a rhinoceros now extinct, and along with\nhorses and cattle unlike any now existing--specifically different, as\nnaturalists say, from those with which man is now associated.  Their\nconnection with existing human races may perhaps be traced through the\nintervening people of the stone age, who were succeeded by the people\nof the bronze age, and these by workers in iron.[III-3] Now, various\nevidence carries back the existence of many of the present lower\nspecies of animals, and probably of a larger number of plants, to the\nsame drift period. All agree that this was very many thousand years\nago. Agassiz tells us that the same species of polyps which are now\nbuilding coral walls around the present peninsula of Florida actually\nmade that peninsula, and have been building there for many thousand\ncenturies.\n\n5.  The overlapping of existing and extinct species, and the seemingly\ngradual transition of the life of the drift period into that of the\npresent, may be turned to the same account. Mammoths, mastodons, and\nIrish elks, now extinct, must have lived down to human, if not almost\nto historic times.  Perhaps the last dodo did not long outlive his huge\nNew Zealand kindred. The aurochs, once the companion of mammoths, still\nsurvives, but owes his present and precarious existence to mans care.\nNow, nothing that we know of forbids the hypothesis that some new\nspecies have been independently and supernaturally created within the\nperiod which other species have survived.  Some may even believe that\nman was created in the days of the mammoth, became extinct, and was\nrecreated at a later date. But why not say the same of the aurochs,\ncontemporary both of the old man and of the new? Still it is more\nnatural, if not inevitable, to infer that, if the aurochs of that olden\ntime were the ancestors of the aurochs of the Lithuanian forests, so\nlikewise were the men of that age the ancestors of the present human\nraces.  Then, whoever concludes that these primitive makers of rude\nflint axes and knives were the ancestors of the better workmen of the\nsucceeding  stone age, and these again of the succeeding artificers in\nbrass and iron, will also be likely to suppose that the Equus and Bos\nof that time, different though they be, were the remote progenitors of\nour own horses and cattle. In all candor we must at least concede that\nsuch considerations suggest a genetic descent from the drift period\ndown to the present, and allow time enough--if time is of any account--\nfor variation and natural selection to work out some appreciable\nresults in the way of divergence into races, or even into so-called\nspecies. Whatever might have been thought, when geological time was\nsupposed to be separated from the present era by a clear line, it is\nnow certain that a gradual replacement of old forms by new ones is\nstrongly suggestive of some mode of origination which may still be\noperative. When species, like individuals, were found to die out one by\none, and apparently to come in one by one, a theory for what Owen\nsonorously calls \"the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of\nliving things\" could not be far off.\n\nThat all such theories should take the form of a derivation of the new\nfrom the old seems to be inevitable, perhaps from our inability to\nconceive of any other line of secondary causes in this connection. Owen\nhimself is apparently in travail with some transmutation theory of his\nown conceiving, which may yet see the light, although Darwins came\nfirst to the birth.  Different as the two theories will probably be,\nthey cannot fail to exhibit that fundamental resemblance in this\nrespect which betokens a community of origin, a common foundation on\nthe general facts and the obvious suggestions of modern science.\nIndeed--to turn the point of a pungent simile directed against\nDarwin--the difference between the Darwinian and the Owenian hypotheses\nmay, after all, be only that between homoeopathic and heroic doses of\nthe same drug.\n\nIf theories of derivation could only stop here, content with explaining\nthe diversification and succession of species between the teritiary\nperiod and the present time, through natural agencies or secondary\ncauses still in operation, we fancy they would not be generally or\nviolently objected to by the savants of the present day. But it is\nhard, if not impossible, to find a stopping-place. Some of the facts or\naccepted conclusions already referred to, and several others, of a more\ngeneral character, which must be taken into the account, impel the\ntheory onward with accumulated force. Vires (not to say virus) acquirit\neundo. The theory hitches on wonderfully well to Lyells uniformitarian\ntheory in geology--that the thing that has been is the thing that is\nand shall be--that the natural operations now going on will account for\nall geological changes in a quiet and easy way, only give them time\nenough, so connecting the present and the proximate with the farthest\npast by almost imperceptible gradations--a view which finds large and\nincreasing, if not general, acceptance in physical geology, and of\nwhich Darwins theory is the natural complement.\n\nSo the Darwinian theory, once getting a foothold, marches; boldly on,\nfollows the supposed near ancestors of our present species farther and\nyet farther back into the dim past, and ends with an analogical\ninference which \"makes the whole world kin.\" As we said at the\nbeginning, this upshot discomposes us. Several features of the theory\nhave an uncanny look. They may prove to be innocent: but their first\naspect is suspicious, and high authorities pronounce the whole thing to\nbe positively mischievous. In this dilemma we are going to take advice.\nFollowing the bent of our prejudices, and hoping to fortify these by\nnew and strong arguments, we are going now to read the principal\nreviews which undertake to demolish the theory--with what result our\nreaders shall be duly informed.\n\n\nII\n\n\n\"I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and\ndispassionate judgment of which I am capable, that the view which most\nnaturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertained, namely, that\neach species has been independently created, is erroneous. I am fully\nconvinced that species are not immutable; but that those belonging to\nwhat are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other\nand generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged\nvarieties of any one species are the descendants of that species.\nFurthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main,\nbut not exclusive, means of modification.\"\n\n\nThis is the kernel of the new theory, the Darwinian creed, as recited\nat the close of the introduction to the remarkable book under\nconsideration.  The questions, \"What will he do with it?\" and \"How far\nwill he carry it?\" the author answers at the close of the volume:\n\n\n\"I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces\nall the members of the same class.\" Furthermore, \"I believe that all\nanimals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and\nplants from an equal or lesser number.\"\n\n\nSeeing that analogy as strongly suggests a further step in the same\ndirection, while he protests that \"analogy may be a deceitful guide,\"\nyet he follows its inexorable leading to the inference that--\n\n\"Probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this ear have\ndescended from some one primordial form, into which life was first\nbreathed.\"[III-4]\n\n\nIn the first extract we have the thin end of the wedge driven a little\nway; in the last, the wedge driven home.\n\nWe have already sketched some of the reasons suggestive of such a\ntheory of derivation of species, reasons which gave it plausibility,\nand even no small probability, as applied to our actual world and to\nchanges occurring since the latest tertiary period. We are well pleased\nat this moment to find that the conclusions we were arriving at in this\nrespect are sustained by the very high authority and impartial judgment\nof Pictet, the Swiss paleontologist. In his review of Darwins\nbook[III-5] -- the fairest and most admirable opposing one that has\nappeared--he freely accepts that ensemble of natural operations which\nDarwin impersonates under the now familiar name of Natural Selection,\nallows that the exposition throughout the first chapters seems \"a la\nfois prudent et fort,\" and is disposed to accept the whole argument in\nits foundations, that is, so far as it relates to what is now going on,\nor has taken place in the present geological period--which period he\ncarries back through the diluvial epoch to the borders of the\ntertiary.[III-6]  Pictet accordingly admits that the theory will very\nwell account for the origination by divergence of nearly-related\nspecies, whether within the present period or in remoter geological\ntimes; a very natural view for him to take, since he appears to have\nreached and published, several years ago, the pregnant conclusion that\nthere most probably was some material connection between the\nclosely-related species of two successive faunas, and that the numerous\nclose species, whose limits are so difficult to determine, were not all\ncreated distinct and independent.  But while thus accepting, or ready\nto accept, the basis of Darwins theory, and all its legitimate direct\ninferences, he rejects the ultimate conclusions, brings some weighty\narguments to bear against them, and is evidently convinced that he can\ndraw a clear line between the sound inferences, which he favors, and\nthe unsound or unwarranted theoretical deductions, which he rejects. We\nhope he can.\n\nThis raises the question, Why does Darwin press his theory to these\nextreme conclusions? Why do all hypotheses of derivation converge so\ninevitably to one ultimate point? Having already considered some of the\nreasons which suggest or support the theory at its outset--which may\ncarry it as far as such sound and experienced naturalists as Pictet\nallow that it may be true--perhaps as far as Darwin himself unfolds it\nin the introductory proposition cited at the beginning of this\narticle--we may now inquire after the motives which impel the theorist\nso much farther. Here proofs, in the proper sense of the word, are not\nto be had. We are beyond the region of demonstration, and have only\nprobabilities to consider. What are these probabilities? What work will\nthis hypothesis do to establish a claim to be adopted in its\ncompleteness? Why should a theory which may plausibly enough account\nfor the diversification of the species of each special type or genus be\nexpanded into a general system for the origination or successive\ndiversification of all species, and all special types or forms, from\nfour or five remote primordial forms, or perhaps from one? We accept\nthe theory of gravitation because it explains all the facts we know,\nand bears all the tests that we can put it to. We incline to accept the\nnebular hypothesis, for similar reasons; not because it is proved--thus\nfar it is incapable of proof--but because it is a natural theoretical\ndeduction from accepted physical laws, is thoroughly congruous with the\nfacts, and because its assumption serves to connect and harmonize these\ninto one probable and consistent whole. Can the derivative hypothesis\nbe maintained and carried out into a system on similar grounds? If so,\nhowever unproved, it would appear to be a tenable hypothesis, which is\nall that its author ought now to claim. Such hypotheses as, from the\nconditions of the case, can neither be proved nor disproved by direct\nevidence or experiment, are to be tested only indirectly, and therefore\nimperfectly, by trying their power to harmonize the known facts, and to\naccount for what is otherwise unaccountable. So the question comes to\nthis: What will an hypothesis of the derivation of species explain\nwhich the opposing view leaves unexplained?\n\nQuestions these which ought to be entertained before we take up the\narguments which have been advanced against this theory. We can barely\nglance at some of the considerations which Darwin adduces, or will be\nsure to adduce in the future and fuller exposition which is promised.\nTo display them in such wise as to indoctrinate the unscientific reader\nwould require a volume. Merely to refer to them in the most general\nterms would suffice for those familiar with scientific matters, but\nwould scarcely enlighten those who are not. Wherefore let these trust\nthe impartial Pictet, who freely admits that, \"in the absence of\nsufficient direct proofs to justify the possibility of his hypothesis,\nMr. Darwin relies upon indirect proofs, the bearing of which is real\nand incontestable;\" who concedes that \"his theory accords very well\nwith the great facts of comparative anatomy and zoology--comes in\nadmirably to explain unity of composition of organisms, also to explain\nrudimentary and representative organs, and the natural series of genera\nand species--equally corresponds with many paleontological data--agrees\nwell with the specific resemblances which exist between two successive\nfaunas, with the parallelism which is sometimes observed between the\nseries of paleontological succession and of embryonal development,\"\netc.; and finally, although he does not accept the theory in these\nresults, he allows that \"it appears to offer the best means of\nexplaining the manner in which organized beings were produced in epochs\nanterior to our own.\"\n\nWhat more than this could be said for such an hypothesis? Here,\nprobably, is its charm, and its strong hold upon the speculative mind.\nUnproven though it be, and cumbered prima facie with cumulative\nimprobabilities as it proceeds, yet it singularly accords with great\nclasses of facts otherwise insulated and enigmatic, and explains many\nthings which are thus far utterly inexplicable upon any other\nscientific assumption.\n\nWe have said that Darwins hypothesis is the natural complement to\nLyells uniformitarian theory in physical geology. It is for the organic\nworld what that is for the inorganic; and the accepters of the latter\nstand in a position from which to regard the former in the most\nfavorable light.  Wherefore the rumor that the cautious Lyell himself\nhas adopted the Darwinian hypothesis need not surprise us. The two\nviews are made for each other, and, like the two counterpart pictures\nfor the stereoscope, when brought together, combine into one apparently\nsolid whole.\n\nIf we allow, with Pictet, that Darwins theory will very well serve for\nall that concerns the present epoch of the worlds history--an epoch in\nwhich this renowned paleontologist includes the diluvial or quaternary\nperiod--then Darwins first and foremost need in his onward course is a\npracticable road from this into and through the tertiary period, the\nintervening region between the comparatively near and the far remote\npast.  Here Lyells doctrine paves the way, by showing that in the\nphysical geology there is no general or absolute break between the two,\nprobably no greater between the latest tertiary and the quaternary\nperiod than between the latter and the present time. So far, the\nLyellian view is, we suppose, generally concurred in. It is largely\nadmitted that numerous tertiary species have continued down into the\nquaternary, and many of them to the present time. A goodly percentage\nof the earlier and nearly half of the later tertiary mollusca,\naccording to Des Hayes, Lye!!, and, if we mistake not, Bronn, still\nlive. This identification, however, is now questioned by a naturalist\nof the very highest authority. But, in its bearings on the new theory,\nthe point here turns not upon absolute identity so much as upon close\nresemblance. For those who, with Agassiz, doubt the specific identity\nin any of these cases, and those who say, with Pictet, that \"the later\ntertiary deposits contain in general the debris of species very nearly\nrelated to those which still exist, belonging to the same genera, but\nspecifically different,\" may also agree with Pictet, that the\nnearly-related species of successive faunas must or may have had \"a\nmaterial connection.\" But the only material connection that we have an\nidea of in such a case is a genealogical one. And the supposition of a\ngenealogical connection is surely not unnatural in such cases--is\ndemonstrably the natural one as respects all those tertiary species\nwhich experienced naturalists have pronounced to be identical with\nexisting ones, but which others now deem distinct For to identify the\ntwo is the same thing as to conclude the one to be the ancestor of the\nother No doubt there are differences between the tertiary and the\npresent individuals, differences equally noticed by both classes of\nnaturalists, but differently estimated By the one these are deemed\nquite compatible, by the other incompatible, with community of origin\nBut who can tell us what amount of difference is compatible with\ncommunity of origin?  This is the very question at issue, and one to be\nsettled by observation alone Who would have thought that the peach and\nthe nectarine came from one stock? But,  this being proved is it now\nvery improbable that both were derived from the almond, or from some\ncommon amygdaline progenitor? Who would have thought that the cabbage,\ncauliflower, broccoli kale, and kohlrabi are derivatives of one\nspecies, and rape or colza, turnip, and probably ruta-baga, of  another\nspecies? And who that is convinced of this can long undoubtingly hold\nthe original distinctness of turnips from cabbages as an article of\nfaith? On scientific grounds may not a primordial cabbage or rape be\nassumed as the ancestor of all the cabbage races, on much the same\nground that we assume a common ancestry for the diversified human\nraces? If all Our breeds of cattle came from one stock why not this\nstock from the auroch, which has had all the time between the diluvial\nand the historic periods in which to set off a variation perhaps no\ngreater than the difference between some sorts of domestic cattle?\n\nThat considerable differences are often discernible between tertiary\nindividuals and their supposed descendants of the present day affords\nno argument against Darwins theory, as has been rashly thought, but is\ndecidedly in its favor. If the identification were so perfect that no\nmore differences were observable between the tertiary and the recent\nshells than between various individuals of either, then Darwins\nopponents, who argue the immutability of species from the ibises and\ncats preserved by the ancient Egyptians being just like those of the\npresent day, could triumphantly add a few hundred thousand years more\nto the length of the experiment and to the force of their argument.\n\nAs the facts stand, it appears that, while some tertiary forms are\nessentially undistinguishable from existing ones, others are the same\nwith a difference, which is judged not to be specific or aboriginal;\nand yet others show somewhat greater differences, such as are\nscientifically expressed by calling them marked varieties, or else\ndoubtful species; while others, differing a little more, are\nconfidently termed distinct, but nearly-related species. Now, is not\nall this a question of degree, of mere gradation of difference? And is\nit at all likely that these several gradations came to be established\nin two totally different ways--some of them (though naturalists cant\nagree which) through natural variation, or other secondary cause, and\nsome by original creation, without secondary cause? We have seen that\nthe judicious Pictet answers such questions as Darwin would have him\ndo, in affirming that, in all probability, the nearly-related species\nof two successive faunas were materially connected, and that\ncontemporaneous species, similarly resembling each other, were not all\ncreated so, but have become so. This is equivalent to saying that\nspecies (using the term as all naturalists do, and must continue to\nemploy the word) have only a relative, not an absolute fixity; that\ndifferences fully equivalent to what are held to be specific may arise\nin the course of time, so that one species may at length be naturally\nreplaced by another species a good deal like it, or may be diversified\ninto two, three, or more species, or forms as different as species.\nThis concedes all that Darwin has a right to ask, all that he can\ndirectly infer from evidence. We must add that it affords a locus\nstandi, more or less tenable, for inferring more.\n\nHere another geological consideration comes in to help on this\ninference.  The species of the later tertiary period for the most part\nnot only resembled those of our days--many of them so closely as to\nsuggest an absolute continuity--but also occupied in general the same\nregions that their relatives occupy now. The same may be said, though\nless specially, of the earlier tertiary and of the later secondary; but\nthere is less and less localization of forms as we recede, yet some\nlocalization even in palaeozoic times. While in the secondary period\none is struck with the similarity of forms and the identity of many of\nthe species which flourished apparently at the same time in all or in\nthe most widely-separated parts of the world, in the tertiary epoch, on\nthe contrary, along with the increasing specialization of climates and\ntheir approximation to the present state, we find abundant evidence of\nincreasing localization of orders, genera and species, and this\nlocalization strikingly accords with the present geographical\ndistribution of the same groups of species Where the imputed\nforefathers lived their relatives and supposed descendants now flourish\nAll the actual classes of the animal and vegetable kingdoms were\nrepresented in the tertiary faunas and floras and in nearly the same\nproportions and the same diversities as at present The faunas of what\nis now Europe, Asia America and Australia, differed from each other\nmuch as they now differ: in fact--according to Adolphe Brongniart,\nwhose statements we here condense[III-7]--the inhabitants of these\ndifferent regions appear for the most part to have acquired, before the\nclose of the tertiary period, the characters which essentially\ndistinguish their existing faunas. The Eastern Continent had then, as\nnow, its great pachyderms, elephants, rhinoceros, hippopotamus; South\nAmerica, its armadillos, sloths, and anteaters; Australia, a crowd of\nmarsupials; and the very strange birds of New Zealand had predecessors\nof similar strangeness.\n\nEverywhere the same geographical distribution as now, with a difference\nin the particular area, as respects the northern portion of the\ncontinents, answering to a warmer climate then than ours, such as\nallowed species of hippopotamus, rhinoceros, and elephant, to range\neven to the regions now inhabited by the reindeer and the musk-ox, and\nwith the serious disturbing intervention of the glacial period within a\ncomparatively recent time. Let it be noted also that those tertiary\nspecies which have continued with little change down to our days are\nthe marine animals of the lower grades, especially mollusca. Their low\norganization, moderate sensibility, and the simple conditions of an\nexistence in a medium like the ocean, not subject to great variation\nand incapable of sudden change, may well account for their continuance;\nwhile, on the other hand, the more intense, however gradual, climatic\nvicissitudes on land, which have driven all tropical and subtropical\nforms out of the higher latitudes and assigned to them their actual\nlimits, would be almost sure to extinguish such huge and unwieldy\nanimals as mastodons, mammoths, and the like, whose power of enduring\naltered circumstances must have been small.\n\nThis general replacement of the tertiary species of a country by others\nso much like them is a noteworthy fact. The hypothesis of the\nindependent creation of all species, irrespective of their antecedents,\nleaves this fact just as mysterious as is creation itself; that of\nderivation undertakes to account for it. Whether it satisfactorily does\nso or not, it must be allowed that the facts well accord with that\nhypothesis. The same may be said of another conclusion, namely, that\nthe geological succession of animals and plants appears to correspond\nin a general way with their relative standing or rank in a natural\nsystem of classification. It seems clear that, though no one of the\ngrand types of the animal kingdom can be traced back farther than the\nrest, yet the lower classes long preceded the higher; that there has\nbeen on the whole a steady progression within each class and order; and\nthat the highest plants and animals have appeared only in relatively\nmodern times. It is only, however, in a broad sense that this\ngeneralization is now thought to hold good. It encounters many apparent\nexceptions, and sundry real ones. So far as the rule holds, all is as\nit should be upon an hypothesis of derivation.\n\nThe rule has its exceptions. But, curiously enough, the most striking\nclass of exceptions, if such they be, seems to us even more favorable\nto the doctrine of derivation than is the general rule of a pure and\nsimple ascending gradation. We refer to what Agassiz calls prophetic\nand synthetic types; for which the former name may suffice, as the\ndifference between the two is evanescent.\n\n\n\"It has been noticed,\" writes our great zoologist, \"that certain types,\nwhich are frequently prominent among the representatives of past ages,\ncombine in their structure peculiarities which at later periods are\nonly observed separately in different, distinct types. Sauroid fishes\nbefore reptiles, Pterodactyles before birds, Ichthyosauri before\ndolphins, etc.  There are entire families, of nearly every class of\nanimals, which in the state of their perfect development exemplify such\nprophetic relations.\n\nThe sauroid fishes of the past geological ages are an example of this\nkind These fishes which preceded the appearance of reptiles present a\ncombination of ichthyic and reptilian characters not to be found in the\ntrue members of this class, which form its bulk at present. The\nPterodactyles, which preceded the class of birds, and the Ichthyosauri,\nwhich preceded the Cetacea, are other examples of such prophetic\ntypes.\"--(Agassiz, \"Contributions, Essay on Classification,\" p. 117.)\n\n\nNow, these reptile-like fishes, of which gar-pikes are the living\nrepresentatives, though of earlier appearance, are admittedly of higher\nrank than common fishes. They dominated until reptiles appeared, when\nthey mostly gave place to (or, as the derivationists will insist, were\nresolved by divergent variation and natural selection into) common\nfishes, destitute of reptilian characters, and saurian reptiles--the\nintermediate grades, which, according to a familiar piscine saying, are\n\"neither fish, flesh, nor good red-herring,\" being eliminated and\nextinguished by natural consequence of the struggle for existence which\nDarwin so aptly portrays. And so, perhaps, of the other prophetic\ntypes. Here type and antitype correspond. If these are true prophecies,\nwe need not wonder that some who read them in Agassizs book will read\ntheir fulfillment in Darwins.\n\nNote also, in this connection, that along with a wonderful persistence\nof type, with change of species, genera, orders, etc., from formation\nto formation, no species and no higher group which has once\nunequivocally died out ever afterward reappears. Why is this, but that\nthe link of generation has been sundered? Why, on the hypothesis of\nindependent originations, were not failing species recreated, either\nidentically or with a difference, in regions eminently adapted to their\nwell-being? To take a striking case. That no part of the world now\noffers more suitable conditions for wild horses and cattle than the\npampas and other plains of South America, is shown by the facility with\nwhich they have there run wild and enormously multiplied, since\nintroduced from the Old World not long ago. There was no wild American\nstock. Yet in the times of the mastodon and megatherium, at the dawn of\nthe present period, wild-horses--certainly very much like the existing\nhorse--roamed over those plains in abundance. On the principle of\noriginal and direct created adaptation of species to climate and other\nconditions, why were they not reproduced, when, after the colder\nintervening era, those regions became again eminently adapted to such\nanimals? Why, but because, by their complete extinction in South\nAmerica, the line of descent was there utterly broken? Upon the\nordinary hypothesis, there is no scientific explanation possible of\nthis series of facts, and of many others like them.  Upon the new\nhypothesis, \"the succession of the same types of structure within the\nsame areas during the later geological periods ceases to be mysterious,\nand is simply explained by inheritance.\" Their cessation is failure of\nissue.\n\nAlong with these considerations the fact (alluded to on page 98) should\nbe remembered that, as a general thing, related species of the present\nage are geographically associated. The larger part of the plants, and\nstill more of the animals, of each separate country are peculiar to it;\nand, as most species now flourish over the graves of their by-gone\nrelatives of former ages, so they now dwell among or accessibly near\ntheir kindred species.\n\nHere also comes in that general \"parallelism between the order of\nsuccession of animals and plants in geological times, and the gradation\namong their living representatives\" from low to highly organized, from\nsimple and general to complex and specialized forms; also \"the\nparallelism between the order of succession of animals in geological\ntimes and the changes their living representatives undergo during their\nembryological growth,\" as if the world were one prolonged gestation.\nModern science has much insisted on this parallelism, and to a certain\nextent is allowed to have made it out. All these things, which conspire\nto prove that the ancient and the recent forms of life \"are somehow\nintimately connected together in one grand system,\" equally conspire to\nsuggest that the connection is one similar or analogous to generation.\nSurely no naturalist can be blamed for entering somewhat confidently\nupon a field of speculative inquiry which here opens so invitingly; nor\nneed former premature endeavors and failures utterly dishearten him.\n\nAll these things, it may naturally be said, go to explain the order,\nnot the mode, of the incoming of species. But they all do tend to bring\nout the generalization expressed by Mr. Wallace in the formula that\n\"every species has come into existence coincident both in time and\nspace with preexisting closely-allied species.\" Not, however, that this\nis proved even of existing species as a matter of general fact. It is\nobviously impossible to prove anything of the kind. But we must concede\nthat the known facts strongly suggest such an inference. And--since\nspecies are only congeries of individuals, since every individual came\ninto existence in consequence of preexisting individuals of the same\nsort, so leading up to the individuals with which the species began,\nand since the only material sequence we know of among plants and\nanimals is that from parent to progeny--the presumption becomes\nexceedingly strong that the connection of the incoming with the\npreexisting species is a genealogical one.\n\nHere, however, all depends upon the probability that Mr. Wallaces\ninference is really true. Certainly it is not yet generally accepted;\nbut a strong current is setting toward its acceptance.\n\nSo long as universal cataclysms were in vogue, and all life upon the\nearth was thought to have been suddenly destroyed and renewed many\ntimes in succession, such a view could not be thought of. So the\nequivalent view maintained by Agassiz, and formerly, we believe, by\nDOrbigny, that irrespectively of general and sudden catastrophes, or\nany known adequate physical cause, there has been a total depopulation\nat the close of each geological period or formation, say forty or fifty\ntimes or more, followed by as many independent great acts of creation,\nat which alone have species been originated, and at each of which a\nvegetable and an animal kingdom were produced entire and complete,\nfull-fledged, as flourishing, as wide-spread, and populous, as varied\nand mutually adapted from the beginning as ever afterward--such a view,\nof course, supersedes all material connection between successive\nspecies, and removes even the association and geographical range of\nspecies entirely out of the domain of physical causes and of natural\nscience. This is the extreme opposite of Wallaces and Darwin s view,\nand is quite as hypothetical. The nearly universal opinion, if we\nrightly gather it, manifestly is, that the replacement of the species\nof successive formations was not complete and simultaneous, but partial\nand successive; and that along the course of each epoch some species\nprobably were introduced, and some, doubtless, became extinct. If all\nsince the tertiary belongs to our present epoch, this is certainly true\nof it: if to two or more epochs, then the hypothesis of a total change\nis not true of them.\n\nGeology makes huge demands upon time; and we regret to find that it has\nexhausted ours--that what we meant for the briefest and most general\nsketch of some geological considerations in favor of Darwins hypothesis\nhas so extended as to leave no room for considering \"the great facts of\ncomparative anatomy and zoology\" with which Darwins theory \"very well\naccords,\" nor for indicating how \"it admirably serves for explaining\nthe unity of composition of all organisms, the existence of\nrepresentative and rudimentary organs, and the natural series which\ngenera and species compose.\" Suffice it to say that these are the real\nstrongholds of the new system on its theoretical side; that it goes far\ntoward explaining both the physiological and the structural gradations\nand relations between the two kingdoms, and the arrangement of all\ntheir forms in groups subordinate to groups, all within a few great\ntypes; that it reads the riddle of abortive organs and of morphological\nconformity, of which no other theory has ever offered a scientific\nexplanation, and supplies a ground for harmonizing the two fundamental\nideas which naturalists and philosophers conceive to have ruled the\norganic world, though they could not reconcile them; namely, Adaptation\nto Purpose and Conditions of Existence, and Unity of Type. To reconcile\nthese two undeniable principles is the capital problem in the\nphilosophy of natural history; and the hypothesis which consistently\ndoes so thereby secures a great advantage.\n\nWe all know that the arm and hand of a monkey, the foreleg and foot of\na dog and of a horse, the wing of a bat, and the fin of a porpoise, are\nfundamentally identical; that the long neck of the giraffe has the same\nand no more bones than the short one of the elephant; that the eggs of\nSurinam frogs hatch into tadpoles with as good tails for swimming as\nany of their kindred, although as tadpoles they never enter the water;\nthat the Guinea-pig is furnished with incisor teeth which it never\nuses, as it sheds them before birth; that embryos of mammals and birds\nhave branchial slits and arteries running in loops, in imitation or\nreminiscence of the arrangement which is permanent in fishes; and that\nthousands of animals and plants have rudimentary organs which, at least\nin numerous cases, are wholly useless to their possessors, etc., etc.\nUpon a derivative theory this morphological conformity is explained by\ncommunity of descent; and it has not been explained in any other way.\n\nNaturalists are constantly speaking of \"related species,\" of the\n\"affinity\" of a genus or other group, and of \"family\nresemblance\"--vaguely conscious that these terms of kinship are\nsomething more than mere metaphors, but unaware of the grounds of their\naptness. Mr. Darwin assures them that they have been talking derivative\ndoctrine all their lives--as M. Jourdain talked prose--without knowing\nit.\n\nIf it is difficult and in many cases practically impossible to fix the\nlimits of species, it is still more so to fix those of genera; and\nthose of tribes and families are still less susceptible of exact\nnatural circumscription. Intermediate forms occur, connecting one group\nwith another in a manner sadly perplexing to systematists, except to\nthose who have ceased to expect absolute limitations in Nature. All\nthis blending could hardly fail to suggest a former material connection\namong allied forms, such as that which the hypothesis of derivation\ndemands.\n\nHere it would not be amiss to consider the general principle of\ngradation throughout organic Nature--a principle which answers in a\ngeneral way to the Law of Continuity in the inorganic world, or rather\nis so analogous to it that both may fairly be expressed by the\nLeibnitzian axiom, Natura non agit saltatim. As an axiom or\nphilosophical principle, used to test modal laws or hypotheses, this in\nstrictness belongs only to physics. In the investigation of Nature at\nlarge, at least in the organic world, nobody would undertake to apply\nthis principle as a test of the validity of any theory or supposed law.\nBut naturalists of enlarged views will not fail to infer the principle\nfrom the phenomena they investigate--to perceive that the rule holds,\nunder due qualifications and altered forms, throughout the realm of\nNature; although we do not suppose that Nature in the organic world\nmakes no distinct steps, but only short and serial steps--not\ninfinitely fine gradations, but no long leaps, or few of them.\n\nTo glance at a few illustrations out of many that present themselves.\nIt would be thought that the distinction between the two organic\nkingdoms was broad and absolute.  Plants and animals belong to two very\ndifferent categories, fulfill opposite offices and, as to the mass of\nthem are so unlike that the difficulty of the ordinary observer would\nbe to find points of comparison Without entering into details which\nwould fill an article, we may safely say that the difficulty with the\nnaturalist is all the other way--that all these broad differences\nvanish one by one as we approach the lower confines of the two\nkingdoms, and that no absolute distinction whatever is now known\nbetween them. It is quite possible that the same organism may be both\nvegetable and animal, or may be first the one and then the other. If\nsome organisms may be said to be at first vegetables and then animals,\nothers, like the spores and other reproductive bodies of many of the\nlower Algae, may equally claim to have first a characteristically\nanimal, and then an unequivocally vegetable existence. Nor is the\ngradation restricted to these simple organisms. It appears in general\nfunctions, as in that of reproduction, which is reducible to the same\nformula in both kingdoms, while it exhibits close approximations in the\nlower forms; also in a common or similar ground of sensibility in the\nlowest forms of both, a common faculty of effecting movements tending\nto a determinate end, traces of which pervade the vegetable\nkingdom--while, on the other hand, this indefinable principle, this\nvegetable\n\n\"Animula vagula, blandula, Hospes comesque corporis,\"\n\ngraduates into the higher sensitiveness of the lower class of animals.\nNor need we hesitate to recognize the fine gradations from simple\nsensitiveness and volition to the higher instinctive and to the other\npsychical manifestations of the higher brute animals. The gradation is\nundoubted, however we may explain it.\n\nAgain, propagation is of one mode in the higher animals, of two in all\nplants; but vegetative propagation, by budding or offshoots, extends\nthrough the lower grades of animals. In both kingdoms there may be\nseparation of the offshoots, or indifference in this respect, or\ncontinued and organic union with the parent stock; and this either with\nessential independence of the offshoots, or with a subordination of\nthese to a common whole; or finally with such subordination and\namalgamation, along with specialization of function, that the same\nparts, which in other cases can be regarded only as progeny, in these\nbecome only members of an individual.\n\nThis leads to the question of individuality, a subject quite too large\nand too recondite for present discussion. The conclusion of the whole\nmatter, however, is, that individuality--that very ground of being as\ndistinguished from thing--is not attained in Nature at one leap. If\nanywhere truly exemplified in plants, it is only in the lowest and\nsimplest, where the being is a structural unit, a single cell,\nmember-less and organless, though organic--the same thing as those\ncells of which all the more complex plants are built up, and with which\nevery plant and (structurally) every animal began its development. In\nthe ascending gradation of the vegetable kingdom individuality is, so\nto say, striven after, but never attained; in the lower animals it is\nstriven after with greater though incomplete success; it is realized\nonly in animals of so high a rank that vegetative multiplication or\noffshoots are out of the question, where all parts are strictly members\nand nothing else, and all subordinated to a common nervous centre--is\nfully realized only in a conscious person.\n\nSo, also, the broad distinction between reproduction by seeds or ova\nand propagation by buds, though perfect in some of the lowest forms of\nlife, becomes evanescent in others; and even the most absolute law we\nknow in the physiology of genuine reproduction--that of sexual\ncooperation--has its exceptions in both kingdoms in parthenogenesis, to\nwhich in the vegetable kingdom a most curious and intimate series of\ngradations leads. In plants, likewise, a long and finely graduated\nseries of transitions leads from bisexual to unisexual blossoms; and so\nin various other respects. Everywhere we may perceive that Nature\nsecures her ends, and makes her distinctions on the whole manifest and\nreal but everywhere without abrupt breaks We need not wonder therefore\nthat gradations between species and varieties should occur; the more\nso, since genera, tribes, and other groups into which the naturalist\ncollocates species, are far from being always absolutely limited in\nNature, though they are necessarily represented to be so in systems.\nFrom the necessity of the case, the classifications of the naturalist\nabruptly define where Nature more or less blends. Our systems are\nnothing, if not definite. They express differences, and some of the\ncoarser gradations. But this evinces not their perfection, but their\nimperfection. Even the best of them are to the system of Nature what\nconsecutive patches of the seven colors are to the rainbow.\n\nNow the principle of gradation throughout organic Nature may, of\ncourse, be interpreted upon other assumptions than those of Darwins\nhypothesis--certainly upon quite other than those of a materialistic\nphilosophy, with which we ourselves have no sympathy. Still we conceive\nit not only possible, but probable, that this gradation, as it has its\nnatural ground, may yet have its scientific explanation. In any case,\nthere is no need to deny that the general facts correspond well with an\nhypothesis like Darwins, which is built upon fine gradations.\n\nWe have contemplated quite long enough the general presumptions in\nfavor of an hypothesis of the derivation of species. We cannot forget,\nhowever, while for the moment we overlook, the formidable difficulties\nwhich all hypotheses of this class have to encounter, and the serious\nimplications which they seem to involve. We feel, moreover, that\nDarwins particular hypothesis is exposed to some special objections. It\nrequires no small strength of nerve steadily to conceive, not only of\nthe diversification, but of the formation of the organs of an animal\nthrough cumulative variation and natural selection. Think of such an\norgan as the eye, that most perfect of optical instruments, as so\nproduced in the lower animals and perfected in the higher! A friend of\nours, who accepts the new doctrine, confesses that for a long while a\ncold chill came over him whenever he thought of the eye. He has at\nlength got over that stage of the complaint, and is now in the fever of\nbelief, perchance to be succeeded by the sweating stage, during which\nsundry peccant humors may be eliminated from the system. For ourselves,\nwe dread the chill, and have some misgivings about the consequences of\nthe reaction.  We find ourselves in the \"singular position\"\nacknowledged by Pictet--that is, confronted with a theory which,\nalthough it can really explain much, seems inadequate to the heavy task\nit so boldly assumes, but which, nevertheless, appears better fitted\nthan any other that has been broached to explain, if it be possible to\nexplain, somewhat of the manner in which organized beings may have\narisen and succeeded each other. In this dilemma we might take\nadvantage of Mr. Darwins candid admission, that he by no means expects\nto convince old and experienced people, whose minds are stocked with a\nmultitude of facts all regarded during a long course of years from the\nold point of view. This is nearly our case. So, owning no call to a\nlarger faith than is expected of us, but not prepared to pronounce the\nwhole hypothesis untenable, under such construction as we should put\nupon it, we naturally sought to attain a settled conviction through a\nperusal of several proffered refutations of the theory. At least, this\ncourse seemed to offer the readiest way of bringing to a head the\nvarious objections to which the theory is exposed. On several accounts\nsome of these opposed reviews especially invite examination. We\npropose, accordingly, to conclude our task with an article upon \"Darwin\nand his Reviewers.\"\n\n\nIII\n\n\nThe origin of species, like all origination, like the institution of\nany other natural state or order, is beyond our immediate ken. We see\nor may learn how things go on; we can only frame hypotheses as to how\nthey began.\n\nTwo hypotheses divide the scientific world, very unequally, upon the\norigin of the existing diversity of the plants and animals which\nsurround us. One assumes that the actual kinds are primordial; the\nother, that they are derivative. One, that all kinds originated\nsupernaturally and directly as such, and have continued unchanged in\nthe order of Nature; the other, that the present kinds appeared in some\nsort of genealogical connection with other and earlier kinds, that they\nbecame what they now are in the course of time and in the order of\nNature.\n\nOr, bringing in the word species, which is well defined as \"the\nperennial succession of individuals,\" commonly of very like\nindividuals--as a close corporation of individuals perpetuated by\ngeneration, instead of election--and reducing the question to\nmathematical simplicity of statement:  species are lines of individuals\ncoming down from the past and running on to the future; lines receding,\ntherefore, from our view in either direction.  Within our limited\nobservation they appear to be parallel lines, as a general thing\nneither approaching to nor diverging from each other.\n\nThe first hypothesis assumes that they were parallel from the unknown\nbeginning and will be to the unknown end. The second hypothesis assumes\nthat the apparent parallelism is not real and complete, at least\naboriginally, but approximate or temporary; that we should find the\nlines convergent in the past, if we could trace them far enough; that\nsome of them, if produced back, would fall into certain fragments of\nlines, which have left traces in the past, lying not exactly in the\nsame direction, and these farther back into others to which they are\nequally unparallel. It will also claim that the present lines, whether\non the whole really or only approximately parallel, sometimes fork or\nsend off branches on one side or the other, producing new lines\n(varieties), which run for a while, and for aught we know indefinitely\nwhen not interfered with, near and approximately parallel to the parent\nline. This claim it can establish; and it may also show that these\nclose subsidiary lines may branch or vary again, and that those\nbranches or varieties which are best adapted to the existing conditions\nmay be continued, while others stop or die out. And so we may have the\nbasis of a real theory of the diversification of species and here\nindeed, there is a real, though a narrow, established ground to build\nupon But as systems of organic Nature, both doctrines are equally\nhypotheses, are suppositions of what there is no proof of from\nexperience, assumed in order to account for the observed phenomena, and\nsupported by such indirect evidence as can be had.\n\nEven when the upholders of the former and more popular system mix up\nrevelation with scientific discussion--which we decline to do--they by\nno means thereby render their view other than hypothetical. Agreeing\nthat plants and animals were produced by Omnipotent fiat does not\nexclude the idea of natural order and what we call secondary causes.\nThe record of the fiat--\"Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb\nyielding seed,\" etc., \"and it was so;\" \"let the earth bring forth the\nliving creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing and beast of\nthe earth after his kind, and it was so\"--seems even to imply them.\nAgreeing that they were formed of \"the dust of the ground,\" and of thin\nair, only leads to the conclusion that the pristine individuals were\ncorporeally constituted like existing individuals, produced through\nnatural agencies. To agree that they were created \"after their kinds\"\ndetermines nothing as to what were the original kinds, nor in what\nmode, during what time, and in what connections it pleased the Almighty\nto introduce the first individuals of each sort upon the earth.\nScientifically considered, the two opposing doctrines are equally\nhypothetical.\n\nThe two views very unequally divide the scientific world; so that\nbelievers in \"the divine right of majorities\" need not hesitate which\nside to take, at least for the present. Up to a time quite within the\nmemory of a generation still on the stage, two hypotheses about the\nnature of light very unequally divided the scientific world. But the\nsmall minority has already prevailed:  the emission theory has gone\nout; the undulatory or wave theory, after some fluctuation, has reached\nhigh tide, and is now the pervading, the fully-established system.\nThere was an intervening time during which most physicists held their\nopinions in suspense.\n\nThe adoption of the undulatory theory of light called for the extension\nof the same theory to heat, and this promptly suggested the hypothesis\nof a correlation, material connection, and transmutability of heat,\nlight, electricity, magnetism, etc.; which hypothesis the physicists\nheld in absolute suspense until very lately, but are now generally\nadopting. If not already established as a system, it promises soon to\nbecome so. At least, it is generally received as a tenable and probably\ntrue hypothesis.\n\nParallel to this, however less cogent the reasons, Darwin and others,\nhaving shown it likely that some varieties of plants or animals have\ndiverged in time into cognate species, or into forms as different as\nspecies, are led to infer that all species of a genus may have thus\ndiverged from a common stock, and thence to suppose a higher community\nof origin in ages still farther back, and so on. Following the safe\nexample of the physicists, and acknowledging the fact of the\ndiversification of a once homogeneous species into varieties, we may\nreceive the theory of the evolution of these into species, even while\nfor the present we hold the hypothesis of a further evolution in cool\nsuspense or in grave suspicion. In respect to very many questions a\nwise mans mind rests long in a state neither of belief nor unbelief.\nBut your intellectually short-sighted people are apt to be\npreternaturally clear-sighted, and to find their way very plain to\npositive conclusions upon one side or the other of every mooted\nquestion.\n\nIn fact, most people, and some philosophers, refuse to hold questions\nin abeyance, however incompetent they may be to decide them. And,\ncuriously enough, the more difficult, recondite, and perplexing, the\nquestions or hypotheses are--such, for instance, as those about organic\nNature--the more impatient they are of suspense. Sometimes, and\nevidently in the present case, this impatience grows out of a fear that\na new hypothesis may endanger cherished and most important beliefs.\nImpatience under such circumstances is not unnatural, though perhaps\nneedless, and, if so, unwise.\n\nTo us the present revival of the derivative hypothesis, in a more\nwinning shape than it ever before had, was not unexpected. We wonder\nthat any thoughtful observer of the course of investigation and of\nspeculation in science should not have foreseen it, and have learned at\nlength to take its inevitable coming patiently; the more so, as in\nDarwins treatise it comes in a purely scientific form, addressed only\nto scientific men. The notoriety and wide popular perusal of this\ntreatise appear to have astonished the author even more than the book\nitself has astonished the reading world Coming as the new presentation\ndoes from a naturalist of acknowledged character and ability and marked\nby a conscientiousness and candor which have not always been\nreciprocated we have thought it simply right to set forth the doctrine\nas fairly and as favorably as we could There are plenty to decry it and\nthe whole theory is widely exposed to attack For the arguments on the\nother side we may look to the numerous adverse publications which\nDarwin s volume has already called out and especially to those reviews\nwhich propose directly to refute it. Taking various lines and\nreflecting very diverse modes of thought, these hostile critics may be\nexpected to concentrate and enforce the principal objections which can\nbe brought to bear against the derivative hypothesis in general, and\nDarwins new exposition of it in particular.\n\nUpon the opposing side of the question we have read with attention--1.\nAn article in the North American Review for April last; 2. One in the\nChristian Examiner, Boston, for May; 3. M. Pictets article in the\nBibliotheque Universelle, which we have already made considerable use\nof, which seems throughout most able and correct, and which in tone and\nfairness is admirably in contrast with--4. The article in the Edinburgh\nReview for May, attributed--although against a large amount of internal\npresumptive evidence--to the most distinguished British comparative\nanatomist; 5. An article in the North British Review for May; 6. Prof.\nAgassiz has afforded an early opportunity to peruse the criticisms he\nmakes in the forthcoming third volume of his great work, by a\npublication of them in advance in the American Journal of Science for\nJuly.\n\nIn our survey of the lively discussion which has been raised, it\nmatters little how our own particular opinions may incline. But we may\nconfess to an impression, thus far, that the doctrine of the permanent\nand complete immutability of species has not been established, and may\nfairly be doubted.  We believe that species vary, and that \"Natural\nSelection\"\n works; but we suspect that its operation, like every analogous natural\noperation, may be limited by something else. Just as every species by\nits natural rate of reproduction would soon completely fill any country\nit could live in, but does not, being checked by some other species or\nsome other condition--so it may be surmised that variation and natural\nselection have their struggle and consequent check, or are limited by\nsomething inherent in the constitution of organic beings.\n\nWe are disposed to rank the derivative hypothesis in its fullness with\nthe nebular hypothesis, and to regard both as allowable, as not\nunlikely to prove tenable in spite of some strong objections, but as\nnot therefore demonstrably true. Those, if any there be, who regard the\nderivative hypothesis as satisfactorily proved, must have loose notions\nas to what proof is. Those who imagine it can be easily refuted and\ncast aside, must, we think, have imperfect or very prejudiced\nconceptions of the facts concerned and of the questions at issue.\n\nWe are not disposed nor prepared to take sides for or against the new\nhypothesis, and so, perhaps, occupy a good position from which to watch\nthe discussion and criticise those objections which are seemingly\ninconclusive.  On surveying the arguments urged by those who have\nundertaken to demolish the theory, we have been most impressed with a\nsense of their great inequality. Some strike us as excellent and\nperhaps unanswerable; some, as incongruous with other views of the same\nwriters; others, when carried out, as incompatible with general\nexperience or general beliefs, and therefore as proving too much; still\nothers, as proving nothing at all; so that, on the whole, the effect is\nrather confusing and disappointing. We certainly expected a stronger\nadverse case than any which the thoroughgoing opposers of Darwin appear\nto have made out. Wherefore, if it be found that the new hypothesis has\ngrown upon our favor as we proceeded, this must be attributed not so\nmuch to the force of the arguments of the book itself as to the want of\nforce of several of those by which it has been assailed. Darwins\narguments we might resist or adjourn; but some of the refutations of it\ngive us more concern than the book itself did.\n\nThese remarks apply mainly to the philosophical and theological\nobjections which have been elaborately urged, almost exclusively by the\nAmerican reviewers. The North British reviewer, indeed, roundly\ndenounces the book as atheistical, but evidently deems the case too\nclear for argument. The Edinburgh reviewer, on the contrary, scouts all\nsuch objections--as well he may, since he records his belief in \"a\ncontinuous creative operation,\" a constantly operating secondary\ncreational law,\" through which species are successively produced; and\nhe emits faint, but not indistinct, glimmerings of a transmutation\ntheory of his own;[III-8] so that he is equally exposed to all the\nphilosophical objections advanced by Agassiz, and to most of those\nurged by the other American critics, against Darwin himself.\n\nProposing now to criticise the critics, so far as to see what their\nmost general and comprehensive objections amount to, we must needs\nbegin with the American reviewers, and with their arguments adduced to\nprove that a derivative hypothesis ought not to be true, or is not\npossible, philosophical, or theistic.\n\nIt must not be forgotten that on former occasions very confident\njudgments have been pronounced by very competent persons, which have\nnot been finally ratified. Of the two great minds of the seventeenth\ncentury, Newton and Leibnitz, both profoundly religious as well as\nphilosophical, one produced the theory of gravitation, the other\nobjected to that theory that it was subversive of natural religion. The\nnebular hypothesis--a natural consequence of the theory of gravitation\nand of the subsequent progress of physical and astronomical\ndiscovery--has been denounced as atheistical even down to our own day.\nBut it is now largely adopted by the most theistical natural\nphilosophers as a tenable and perhaps sufficient hypothesis, and where\nnot accepted is no longer objected to, so far as we know, on\nphilosophical or religious grounds.\n\nThe gist of the philosophical objections urged by the two Boston\nreviewers against an hypothesis of the derivation of species--or at\nleast against Darwins particular hypothesis-- is, that it is\nincompatible with the idea of any manifestation of design in the\nuniverse, that it denies final causes.  A serious objection this, and\none that demands very serious attention.\n\nThe proposition, that things and events in Nature were not designed to\nbe so, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism.\nYet most people believe that some were designed and others were not,\nalthough they fall into a hopeless maze whenever they undertake to\ndefine their position.  So we should not like to stigmatize as\natheistically disposed a person who regards certain things and events\nas being what they are through designed laws (whatever that expression\nmeans), but as not themselves specially ordained, or who, in another\nconnection, believes in general, but not in particular Providence. We\ncould sadly puzzle him with questions; but in return he might equally\npuzzle us. Then, to deny that anything was specially designed to be\nwhat it is, is one proposition; while to deny that the Designer\nsupernaturally or immediately made it so, is another: though the\nreviewers appear not to recognize the distinction.\n\nAlso, \"scornfully to repudiate\" or to \"sneer at the idea of any\nmanifestation of design in the material universe,\"[III-9] is one thing;\nwhile to consider, and perhaps to exaggerate, the difficulties which\nattend the practical application of the doctrine of final causes to\ncertain instances, is quite another thing: yet the Boston reviewers, we\nregret to say, have not been duly regardful of the difference. Whatever\nbe thought of Darwins doctrine, we are surprised that he should be\ncharged with scorning or sneering at the opinions of others, upon such\na subject. Perhaps Darwins view is incompatible with final causes--we\nwill consider that question presently-- but as to the Examiners charge,\nthat he \"sneers at the idea of any manifestation of design in the\nmaterial universe,\" though we are confident that no misrepresentation\nwas intended, we are equally confident that it is not at all warranted\nby the two passages cited in support of it.  Here are the passages:\n\n\n\"If green woodpeckers alone had existed, or we did not know that there\nwere many black and pied kinds, I dare say that we should have thought\nthat the green color was a beautiful adaptation to hide this\ntree-frequenting bird from its enemies.\"\n\n\"If our reason leads us to admire with enthusiasm a multitude of\ninimitable contrivances in Nature, this same reason tells us, though we\nmay easily err on both sides, that some contrivances are less perfect.\nCan we consider the sting of the wasp or of the bee as perfect, which,\nwhen used against many attacking animals, cannot be withdrawn, owing to\nthe backward serratures, and so inevitably causes the death of the\ninsect by tearing out its viscera?\"\n\n\nIf the sneer here escapes ordinary vision in the detached extracts (one\nof them wanting the end of the sentence), it is, if possible, more\nimperceptible when read with the context. Moreover, this perusal\ninclines us to think that the Examiner has misapprehended the\nparticular argument or object, as well as the spirit, of the author in\nthese passages. The whole reads more naturally as a caution against the\ninconsiderate use of final causes in science, and an illustration of\nsome of the manifold errors and absurdities which their hasty\nassumption is apt to involve--considerations probably equivalent to\nthose which induced Lord Bacon to liken final causes to \"vestal\nvirgins.\" So, if any one, it is here Bacon that \"sitteth in the seat of\nthe scornful.\" As to Darwin, in the section from which the extracts\nwere made, he is considering a subsidiary question, and trying to\nobviate a particular difficulty, but, we suppose, is wholly unconscious\nof denying \"any manifestation of design in the material universe.\" He\nconcludes the first sentence:\n\n\n--\"and consequently that it was a character of importance, and might\nhave been acquired through natural selection; as it is, I have no doubt\nthat the color is due to some quite distinct cause, probably to sexual\nselection.\"\n\n\nAfter an illustration from the vegetable creation, Darwin adds:\n\n\n\"The naked skin on the head of a vulture is generally looked at as a\ndirect adaptation for wallowing in putridity; and so it may be, or it\nmay possibly be due to the direct action of putrid matter; but we\nshould be very cautious in drawing any such inference, when we see that\nthe skin on the head of the clean-feeding male turkey is likewise\nnaked. The sutures in the skulls of young mammals have been advanced as\na beautiful adaptation for aiding parturition, and no doubt they\nfacilitate or may be indispensable for this act; but as sutures occur\nin the skulls of young birds and reptiles, which have only to escape\nfrom a broken egg, we may infer that this structure has arisen from the\nlaws of growth, and has been taken advantage of in the parturition of\nthe higher animals.\"\n\n\nAll this, simply taken, is beyond cavil, unless the attempt to explain\nscientifically how any designed result is accomplished savors of\nimpropriety.\n\nIn the other place, Darwin is contemplating the patent fact that\n\"perfection here below\" is relative, not absolute--and illustrating\nthis by the circumstance that European animals, and especially plants,\nare now proving to be better adapted for New Zealand than many of the\nindigenous ones--that \"the correction for the aberration of light is\nsaid, on high authority, not to be quite perfect even in that most\nperfect organ, the eye.\" And then follows the second extract of the\nreviewer. But what is the position of the reviewer upon his own\ninterpretation of these passages? If he insists that green woodpeckers\nwere specifically created so in order that they might be less liable to\ncapture, must he not equally hold that the black and pied ones were\nspecifically made of these colors in order that they might be more\nliable to be caught? And would an explanation of the mode in which\nthose woodpeckers came to be green, however complete, convince him that\nthe color was undesigned?\n\nAs to the other illustration, is the reviewer so complete an optimist\nas to insist that the arrangement and the weapon are wholly perfect\n(quoad the insect) the normal use of which often causes the animal\nfatally to injure or to disembowel itself? Either way it seems to us\nthat the argument here, as well as the insect, performs hari-kari. The\nExaminer adds:\n\n\n\"We should in like manner object to the word favorable, as implying\nthat some species are placed by the Creator under unfavorable\ncircumstances, at least under such as might be advantageously\nmodified.\"\n\n\nBut are not many individuals and some races of men placed by the\nCreator \"under unfavorable circumstances, at least under such as might\nbe advantageously modified?\" Surely these reviewers must be living in\nan ideal world, surrounded by \"the faultless monsters which our world\nneer saw,\" in some elysium where imperfection and distress were never\nheard of! Such arguments resemble some which we often hear against the\nBible, holding that book responsible as if it originated certain facts\non the shady side of human nature or the apparently darker lines of\nProvidential dealing, though the facts are facts of common observation\nand have to be confronted upon any theory.\n\nThe North American reviewer also has a world of his own--just such a\none as an idealizing philosopher would be apt to devise--that is, full\nof sharp and absolute distinctions: such, for instance, as the\n\"absolute invariableness of instinct;\" an absolute want of intelligence\nin any brute animal; and a complete monopoly of instinct by the brute\nanimals, so that this \"instinct is a great matter\" for them only, since\nit sharply and perfectly distinguishes this portion of organic Nature\nfrom the vegetable kingdom on the one hand and from man on the other:\nmost convenient views for argumentative purposes, but we suppose not\nborne out in fact.\n\nIn their scientific objections the two reviewers take somewhat\ndifferent lines; but their philosophical and theological arguments\nstrikingly coincide. They agree in emphatically asserting that Darwins\nhypothesis of the origination of species through variation and natural\nselection \"repudiates the whole doctrine of final causes,\" and \"all\nindication of design or purpose in the organic world . . . is neither\nmore nor less than a formal denial of any agency beyond that of a blind\nchance in the developing or perfecting of the organs or instincts of\ncreated beings. . . . It is in vain that the apologists of this\nhypothesis might say that it merely attributes a different mode and\ntime to the Divine agency--that all the qualities subsequently\nappearing in their descendants must have been implanted, and have\nremained latent in the original pair.\" Such a view, the Examiner\ndeclares, \"is nowhere stated in this book, and would be, we are sure,\ndisclaimed by the author.\"\n\nWe should like to be informed of the grounds of this sureness. The\nmarked rejection of spontaneous generation--the statement of a belief\nthat all animals have descended from four or five progenitors, and\nplants from an equal or lesser number, or, perhaps, if constrained to\nit by analogy, \"from some one primordial form into which life was first\nbreathed\"--coupled with the expression, \"To my mind it accords better\nwith what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that\nthe production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of\nthe world should have been due to secondary causes,\" than \"that each\nspecies has been independently created\"--these and similar expressions\nlead us to suppose that the author probably does accept the kind of\nview which the Examiner is sure he would disclaim. At least, we\ncharitably see nothing in his scientific theory to hinder his adoption\nof Lord Bacons \"Confession of Faith\" in this regard-- \"That,\nnotwithstanding God hath rested and ceased from creating, yet,\nnevertheless, he doth accomplish and fulfill his divine will in all\nthings, great and small, singular and general, as fully and exactly by\nprovidence as he could by miracle and new creation, though his working\nbe not immediate and direct, but by compass; not violating Nature,\nwhich is his own law upon the creature.\"\n\n\nHowever that may be, it is undeniable that Mr. Darwin has purposely\nbeen silent upon the philosophical and theological applications of his\ntheory.  This reticence, under the circumstances, argues design, and\nraises inquiry as to the final cause or reason why. Here, as in higher\ninstances, confident as we are that there is a final cause, we must not\nbe overconfident that we can infer the particular or true one. Perhaps\nthe author is more familiar with natural-historical than with\nphilosophical inquiries, and, not having decided which particular\ntheory about efficient cause is best founded, he meanwhile argues the\nscientific questions concerned--all that relates to secondary\ncauses--upon purely scientific grounds, as he must do in any case.\nPerhaps, confident, as he evidently is, that his view will finally be\nadopted, he may enjoy a sort of satisfaction in hearing it denounced as\nsheer atheism by the inconsiderate, and afterward, when it takes its\nplace with the nebular hypothesis and the like, see this judgment\nreversed, as we suppose it would be in such event.\n\nWhatever Mr. Darwins philosophy may be, or whether he has any, is a\nmatter of no consequence at all, compared with the important questions,\nwhether a theory to account for the origination and diversification of\nanimal and vegetable forms through the operation of secondary causes\ndoes or does not exclude design; and whether the establishment by\nadequate evidence of Darwin s particular theory of diversification\nthrough variation and natural selection would essentially alter the\npresent scientific and philosophical grounds for theistic views of\nNature. The unqualified affirmative judgment rendered by the two Boston\nreviewers, evidently able and practised reasoners, \"must give us\npause.\" We hesitate to advance our conclusions in opposition to theirs.\nBut, after full and serious consideration, we are constrained to say\nthat, in our opinion, the adoption of a derivative hypothesis, and of\nDarwins particular hypothesis, if we understand it, would leave the\ndoctrines of final causes, utility, and special design, just where they\nwere before. We do not pretend that the subject is not environed with\ndifficulties. Every view is so environed; and every shifting of the\nview is likely, if it removes some difficulties, to bring others into\nprominence. But we cannot perceive that Darwins theory brings in any\nnew kind of scientific difficulty, that is, any with which\nphilosophical naturalists were not already familiar.\n\nSince natural science deals only with secondary or natural causes, the\nscientific terms of a theory of derivation of species--no less than of\na theory of dynamics--must needs be the same to the theist as to the\natheist.  The difference appears only when the inquiry is carried up to\nthe question of primary cause--a question which belongs to philosophy.\nWherefore, Darwin s reticence about efficient cause does not disturb\nus. He considers only the scientific questions. As already stated, we\nthink that a theistic view of Nature is implied in his book, and we\nmust charitably refrain from suggesting the contrary until the contrary\nis logically deduced from his premises. If, however, he anywhere\nmaintains that the natural causes through which species are diversified\noperate without an ordaining  and directing intelligence, and that the\norderly arrangements and admirable adaptations we see all around us are\nfortuitous or blind, undesigned results--that the eye, though it came\nto see, was not designed for seeing, nor the hand for handling--then,\nwe suppose, he is justly chargeable with denying, and very needlessly\ndenying, all design in organic Nature; otherwise, we suppose not.  Why,\nif Darwins well-known passage about the eye[III-10] equivocal though\nsome of the language be--does not imply ordaining and directing\nintelligence, then he refutes his own theory as effectually as any of\nhis opponents are likely to do. He asks:\n\n\n\"May we not believe that [under variation proceeding long enough,\ngeneration multiplying the better variations times enough, and natural\nselection securing the improvements] a living optical instrument might\nbe thus formed as superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator\nare to those of man?\"\n\nThis must mean one of two things: either that the living instrument was\nmade and perfected under (which is the same thing as by) an intelligent\nFirst Cause, or that it was not. If it was, then theism is asserted;\nand as to the mode of operation, how do we know, and why must we\nbelieve, that, fitting precedent forms being in existence, a living\ninstrument (so different from a lifeless manufacture) would be\noriginated and perfected in any other way, or that this is not the\nfitting way? If it means that it was not, if he so misuses words that\nby the Creator he intends an unintelligent power, undirected force, or\nnecessity, then he has put his case so as to invite disbelief in it.\nFor then blind forces have produced not only manifest adaptions of\nmeans to specific ends--which is absurd enough--but better adjusted and\nmore perfect instruments or machines than intellect (that is, human\nintellect) can contrive and human skill execute--which no sane person\nwill believe.\n\nOn the other hand, if Darwin even admits--we will not say adopts--the\ntheistic view, he may save himself much needless trouble in the\nendeavor to account for the absence of every sort of intermediate form.\nThose in the line between one species and another supposed to be\nderived from it he may be bound to provide; but as to \"an infinite\nnumber of other varieties not intermediate, gross, rude, and\npurposeless, the unmeaning creations of an unconscious cause,\" born\nonly to perish, which a relentless reviewer has imposed upon his\ntheory--rightly enough upon the atheistic alternative--the theistic\nview rids him at once of this \"scum of creation.\" For, as species do\nnot now vary at all times and places and in all directions, nor produce\ncrude, vague, imperfect, and useless forms, there is no reason for\nsupposing that they ever did. Good-for-nothing monstrosities, failures\nof purpose rather than purposeless, indeed, sometimes occur; but these\nare just as anomalous and unlikely upon Darwins theory as upon any\nother. For his particular theory is based, and even over-strictly\ninsists, upon the most universal of physiological laws, namely, that\nsuccessive generations shall differ only slightly, if at all, from\ntheir parents; and this effectively excludes crude and impotent forms.\nWherefore, if we believe that the species were designed, and that\nnatural propagation was designed, how can we say that the actual\nvarieties of the species were not equally designed? Have we not similar\ngrounds for inferring design in the supposed varieties of species, that\nwe have in the case of the supposed species of a genus? When a\n\nnaturalist comes to regard as three closely related species what he\nbefore took to be so many varieties of one species how has he thereby\nstrengthened our conviction that the three forms are designed to have\nthe differences which they actually exhibit? Wherefore so long as\ngradatory, orderly, and adapted forms in Nature argue design, and at\nleast while the physical cause of variation is utterly unknown and\nmysterious, we should advise Mr. Darwin to assume in the philosophy of\nhis hypothesis that variation has been led along certain beneficial\nlines. Streams flowing over a sloping plain by gravitation (here the\ncounterpart of natural selection) may have worn their actual channels\nas they flowed; yet their particular courses may have been assigned;\nand where we see them forming definite and useful lines of irrigation,\nafter a manner unaccountable on the laws of gravitation and dynamics,\nwe should believe that the distribution was designed.\n\nTo insist, therefore, that the new hypothesis of the derivative origin\nof the actual species is incompatible with final causes and design, is\nto take a position which we must consider philosophically untenable. We\nmust also regard it as highly unwise and dangerous, in the present\nstate and present prospects of physical and physiological science. We\nshould expect the philosophical atheist or skeptic to take this ground;\nalso, until better informed, the unlearned and unphilosophical\nbeliever; but we should think that the thoughtful theistic philosopher\nwould take the other side. Not to do so seems to concede that only\nsupernatural events can be shown to be designed, which no theist can\nadmit--seems also to misconceive the scope and meaning of all ordinary\narguments for design in Nature. This misconception is shared both by\nthe reviewers and the reviewed. At least, Mr. Darwin uses expressions\nwhich imply that the natural forms which surround us, because they have\na history or natural sequence, could have been only generally, but not\nparticularly designed--a view at once superficial and contradictory;\nwhereas his true line should be, that his hypothesis concerns the order\nand not the cause, the how and not the why of the phenomena, and so\nleaves the question of design just where it was before.\n\nTo illustrate this from the theists point of view: Transfer the\nquestion for a moment from the origination of species to the\norigination of individuals, which occurs, as we say, naturally. Because\nnatural, that is, \"stated, fixed, or settled,\" is it any the less\ndesigned on that account? We acknowledge that God is our maker--not\nmerely the originator of the race, but our maker as individuals--and\nnone the less so because it pleased him to make us in the way of\nordinary generation. If any of us were born unlike our parents and\ngrandparents, in a slight degree, or in whatever degree, would the case\nbe altered in this regard?\n\nThe whole argument in natural theology proceeds upon the ground that\nthe inference for a final cause of the structure of the hand and of the\nvalves in the veins is just as valid now, in individuals produced\nthrough natural generation, as it would have been in the case of the\nfirst man, supernaturally created. Why not, then, just as good even on\nthe supposition of the descent of men from chimpanzees and gorillas,\nsince those animals possess these same contrivances? Or, to take a more\nsupposable case: If the argument from structure to design is convincing\nwhen drawn from a particular animal, say a Newfoundland dog, and is not\nweakened by the knowledge that this dog came from similar parents,\nwould it be at all weakened if, in tracing his genealogy, it were\nascertained that he was a remote descendant of the mastiff or some\nother breed, or that both these and other breeds came (as is suspected)\nfrom some wolf? If not, how is the argument for design in the structure\nof our particular dog affected by the supposition that his wolfish\nprogenitor came from a post-tertiary wolf, perhaps less unlike an\nexisting one than the dog in question is to some other of the numerous\nexisting races of dogs, and that this post-tertiary came from an\nequally or more different tertiary wolf? And if the argument from\nstructure to design is not invalidated by our present knowledge that\nour\n\nindividual dog was developed from a single organic cell, how is it\ninvalidated by the supposition of an analogous natural descent, through\na long line of connected forms, from such a cell, or from some simple\nanimal, existing ages before there were any dogs?\n\nAgain, suppose we have two well-known and apparently most decidedly\ndifferent animals or plants, A and D, both presenting, in their\nstructure and in their adaptations to the conditions of existence, as\nvalid and clear evidence of design as any animal or plant ever\npresented: suppose we have now discovered two intermediate species, B\nand C, which make up a series with equable differences from A to D. Is\nthe proof of design or final cause in A and D, whatever it amounted to,\nat all weakened by the discovery of the intermediate forms? Rather does\nnot the proof extend to the intermediate species, and go to show that\nall four were equally designed? Suppose, now, the number of\nintermediate forms to be much increased, and therefore the gradations\nto be closer yet--as close as those between the various sorts of dogs,\nor races of men, or of horned cattle: would the evidence of design, as\nshown in the structure of any of the members of the series, be any\nweaker than it was in the case of A and D? Whoever contends that it\nwould be, should likewise maintain that the origination of individuals\nby generation is incompatible with design, or an impossibility in\nNature. We might all have confidently thought the latter, antecedently\nto experience of the fact of reproduction. Let our experience teach us\nwisdom.\n\nThese illustrations make it clear that the evidence of design from\nstructure and adaptation is furnished complete by the individual animal\nor plant itself, and that our knowledge or our ignorance of the history\nof its formation or mode of production adds nothing to it and takes\nnothing away.  We infer design from certain arrangements and results;\nand we have no other way of ascertaining it. Testimony, unless\ninfallible, cannot prove it, and is out of the question here. Testimony\nis not the appropriate proof of design: adaptation to purpose is. Some\narrangements in Nature appear to be contrivances, but may leave us in\ndoubt. Many others, of which the eye and the hand are notable examples,\ncompel belief with a force not appreciably short of demonstration.\nClearly to settle that such as these must have been designed goes far\ntoward proving that other organs and other seemingly less explicit\nadaptations in Nature must also have been designed, and clinches our\nbelief, from manifold considerations, that all Nature is a preconcerted\narrangement, a manifested design. A strange contradiction would it be\nto insist that the shape and markings of certain rude pieces of flint,\nlately found in drift-deposits, prove design, but that nicer and\nthousand-fold more complex adaptations to use in animals and vegetables\ndo not a fortiori argue design.\n\nWe could not affirm that the arguments for design in Nature are\nconclusive to all minds. But we may insist, upon grounds already\nintimated, that, whatever they were good for before Darwins book\nappeared, they are good for now. To our minds the argument from design\nalways appeared conclusive of the being and continued operation of an\nintelligent First Cause, the Ordainer of Nature; and we do not see that\nthe grounds of such belief would be disturbed or shifted by the\nadoption of Darwins hypothesis. We are not blind to the philosophical\ndifficulties which the thoroughgoing implication of design in Nature\nhas to encounter, nor is it our vocation to obviate them It suffices us\nto know that they are not new nor peculiar difficulties--that, as\nDarwin s theory and our reasonings upon it did not raise these\nperturbing spirits, they are not bound to lay them. Meanwhile, that the\ndoctrine of design encounters the very same difficulties in the\nmaterial that it does in the moral world is Just what ought to be\nexpected.\n\nSo the issue between the skeptic and the theist is only the old one,\nlong ago argued out--namely, whether organic Nature is a result of\ndesign or of chance. Variation and natural selection open no third\nalternative; they concern only the question how the results, whether\nfortuitous or designed, may have been brought about. Organic Nature\nabounds with unmistakable and irresistible indications of design, and,\nbeing a connected and consistent system, this evidence carries the\nimplication of design throughout the whole. On the other hand, chance\ncarries no probabilities with it, can never be developed into a\nconsistent system, but, when applied to the explanation of orderly or\nbeneficial results, heaps up improbabilities at every step beyond all\ncomputation. To us, a fortuitous Cosmos is simply inconceivable.  The\nalternative is a designed Cosmos.\n\nIt is very easy to assume that, because events in Nature are in one\nsense accidental, and the operative forces which bring them to pass are\nthemselves blind and unintelligent (physically considered, all forces\nare), therefore they are undirected, or that he who describes these\nevents as the results of such forces thereby assumes that they are\nundirected. This is the assumption of the Boston reviewers, and of Mr.\nAgassiz, who insists that the only alternative to the doctrine, that\nall organized beings were supernaturally created just as they are, is,\nthat they have arisen spontaneously through the omnipotence of\nmatter.[III-11]\n\nAs to all this, nothing is easier than to bring out in the conclusion\nwhat you introduce in the premises. If you import atheism into your\nconception of variation and natural selection, you can readily exhibit\nit in the result.  If you do not put it in, perhaps there need be none\nto come out. While the mechanician is considering a steamboat or\nlocomotive-engine as a material organism, and contemplating the fuel,\nwater, and steam, the source of the mechanical forces, and how they\noperate, he may not have occasion to mention the engineer. But, the\norderly and special results accomplished, the why the movements are in\nthis or that particular direction, etc., is inexplicable without him.\nIf Mr. Darwin believes that the events which he supposes to have\noccurred and the results we behold were undirected and undesigned, or\nif the physicist believes that the natural forces to which he refers\nphenomena are uncaused and undirected, no argument is needed to show\nthat such belief is atheism. But the admission of the phenomena  and of\nthese natural processes and forces does not necessitate any such\nbelief, nor even render it one whit less improbable than before.\n\nSurely, too, the accidental element may play its part in Nature without\nnegativing design in the theists view. He believes that the earths\nsurface has been very gradually prepared for man and the existing\nanimal races, that vegetable matter has through a long series of\ngenerations imparted fertility to the soil in order that it may support\nits present occupants, that even beds of coal have been stored up for\nmans benefit Yet what is more accidental, and more simply the\nconsequence of physical agencies than the accumulation of vegetable\nmatter in a peat bog and its transformation into coal? No scientific\nperson at this day doubts that our solar system is a progressive\ndevelopment, whether in his conception he begins with molten masses, or\naeriform or nebulous masses, or with a fluid revolving mass of vast\nextent, from which the specific existing worlds have been developed one\nby one What theist doubts that the actual results of the development in\nthe inorganic worlds are not merely compatible with design but are in\nthe truest sense designed re suits? Not Mr. Agassiz, certainly, who\nadopts a remarkable illustration of design directly founded on the\nnebular hypothesis drawing from the position and times of the\nrevolution of the world, so originated direct evidence that the\nphysical world has been ordained in conformity with laws which obtain\nalso among living beings But the reader of the interesting\nexposition[III-12] will notice that the designed result has been\nbrought to pass through what, speaking after the manner of men, might\nbe called a chapter of accidents.\n\nA natural corollary of this demonstration would seem to be, that a\nmaterial connection between a series of created things--such as the\ndevelopment of one of them from another,  or of all from a common\nstock--is highly compatible with their intellectual connection, namely,\nwith their being designed and directed by one mind. Yet upon some\nground which is not explained, and which we are unable to conjecture,\nMr. Agassiz concludes to the contrary in the organic kingdoms, and\ninsists that, because the members of such a series have an intellectual\nconnection, \"they cannot be the result of a material differentiation of\nthe objects themselves,\"[III-13] that is, they cannot have had a\ngenealogical connection. But is there not as much intellectual\nconnection between the successive generations of any species as there\nis between the several species of a genus, or the several genera of an\norder? As the intellectual connection here is realized through the\nmaterial connection, why may it not be so in the case of species and\ngenera? On all sides, therefore, the implication seems to be quite the\nother way.\n\n\nReturning to the accidental element, it is evident that the strongest\npoint against the compatibility of Darwins hypothesis with design in\nNature is made when natural selection is referred to as picking out\nthose variations which are improvements from a vast number which are\nnot improvements, but perhaps the contrary, and therefore useless or\npurposeless, and born to perish. But even here the difficulty is not\npeculiar; for Nature abounds with analogous instances. Some of our race\nare useless, or worse, as regards the improvement of mankind; yet the\nrace may be designed to improve, and may be actually improving. Or, to\navoid the complication with free agency--the whole animate life of a\ncountry depends absolutely upon the vegetation, the vegetation upon the\nrain. The moisture is furnished by the ocean, is raised by the suns\nheat from the oceans surface, and is wafted inland by the winds. But\nwhat multitudes of raindrops fall back into the ocean--are as much\nwithout a final cause as the incipient varieties which come to\nnothing!  Does it therefore follow that the rains which are bestowed\nupon the soil with such rule and average regularity were not designed\nto support vegetable and animal life? Consider, likewise, the vast\nproportion of seeds and pollen, of ova and young--a thousand or more to\none--which come to nothing, and are therefore purposeless in the same\nsense, and only in the same sense, as are Darwins unimproved and unused\nslight variations. The world is full of such cases; and these must\nanswer the argument--for we cannot, except by thus showing that it\nproves too much.\n\nFinally, it is worth noticing that, though natural selection is\nscientifically explicable, variation is not. Thus far the cause of\nvariation, or the reason why the offspring is sometimes unlike the\nparents, is just as mysterious as the reason why it is generally like\nthe parents. It is now as inexplicable as any other origination; and,\nif ever explained, the explanation will only carry up the sequence of\nsecondary causes one step farther, and bring us in face of a somewhat\ndifferent problem, but which will have the same element of mystery that\nthe problem of variation has now.  Circumstances may preserve or may\ndestroy the variations man may use or direct them but selection whether\nartificial or natural no more originates them than man originates the\npower which turns a wheel when he dams a stream and lets the water fall\nupon it The origination of this power is a question about efficient\ncause. The tendency of science in respect to this obviously is not\ntoward the omnipotence of matter, as some suppose, but to ward the\nomnipotence of spirit.\n\nSo the real question we come to is as to the way in which we are to\nconceive intelligent and efficient cause to be exerted, and upon what\nexerted. Are we bound to suppose efficient cause in all cases exerted\nupon nothing to evoke something into existence--and this thousands of\ntimes repeated, when a slight change in the details would make all the\ndifference between successive species? Why may not the new species, or\nsome of them, be designed diversifications of the old?\n\nThere are, perhaps, only three views of efficient cause which may claim\nto be both philosophical and theistic:\n\n1.  The view of its exertion at the beginning of time, endowing matter\nand created things with forces which do the work and produce the\nphenomena.\n\n2.  This same view, with the theory of insulated interpositions, or\noccasional direct action, engrafted upon it--the view that events and\noperations in general go on in virtue simply of forces communicated at\nthe first, but that now and then, and only now and then, the Deity puts\nhis hand directly to the work.\n\n3.  The theory of the immediate, orderly, and constant, however\ninfinitely diversified, action of the intelligent efficient Cause.\n\nIt must be allowed that, while the third is preeminently the Christian\nview, all three are philosophically compatible with design in Nature.\nThe second is probably the popular conception. Perhaps most thoughtful\npeople oscillate from the middle view toward the first or the\nthird--adopting the first on some occasions, the third on others. Those\nphilosophers who like and expect to settle all mooted questions will\ntake one or the other extreme. The Examiner inclines toward, the North\nAmerican reviewer fully adopts, the third view, to the logical extent\nof maintaining that \"the origin of an individual, as well as the origin\nof a species or a genus, can be explained only by the direct action of\nan intelligent creative cause.\" To silence his critics, this is the\nline for Mr. Darwin to take; for it at once and completely relieves his\nscientific theory from every theological objection which his reviewers\nhave urged against it.\n\nAt present we suspect that our author prefers the first conception,\nthough he might contend that his hypothesis is compatible with either\nof the three. That it is also compatible with an atheistic or\npantheistic conception of the universe, is an objection which, being\nshared by all physical, and some ethical or moral science, cannot\nspecially be urged against Darwins system. As he rejects spontaneous\ngeneration, and admits of intervention at the beginning of organic\nlife, and probably in more than one instance, he is not wholly excluded\nfrom adopting the middle view, although the interventions he would\nallow are few and far back. Yet one interposition admits the principle\nas well as more. Interposition presupposes particular necessity or\nreason for it, and raises the question, when and how often it may have\nbeen necessary. It might be the natural supposition, if we had only one\nset of species to account for, or if the successive inhabitants of the\nearth had no other connections or resemblances than those which\nadaptation to similar conditions, which final causes in the narrower\nsense, might explain. But if this explanation of organic Nature\nrequires one to \"believe that, at innumerable periods in the earths\nhistory, certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash\ninto living tissues,\" and this when the results are seen to be strictly\nconnected and systematic, we cannot wonder that such interventions\nshould at length be considered, not as interpositions or interferences,\nbut rather--to use the reviewers own language--as \"exertions so\nfrequent and beneficent that we come to regard them as the ordinary\naction of Him who laid the foundation of the earth, and without whom\nnot a sparrow falleth to the ground.\"[III-14] What does the difference\nbetween Mr. Darwin and his reviewer now amount to? If we say that\naccording to one view the origination of species is natural, according\nto the other miraculous, Mr. Darwin agrees that \"what is natural as\nmuch requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so--\nthat is, to effect it continually or at stated times--as what is\nsupernatural does to effect it for once.\"[III-15] He merely inquires\ninto the form of the miracle, may remind us that all recorded miracles\n(except the primal creation of matter) were transformations or actions\nin and upon natural things, and will ask how many times and how\nfrequently may the origination of successive species be repeated before\nthe supernatural merges in the natural.\n\nIn short, Darwin maintains that the origination of a species, no less\nthan that of an individual, is natural; the reviewer, that the natural\norigination of an individual, no less than the origination of a\nspecies, requires and presupposes Divine power. A fortiori, then, the\norigination of a variety requires and presupposes Divine power. And so\nbetween the scientific hypothesis of the one and the philosophical\nconception of the other no contrariety remains. And so, concludes the\nNorth American reviewer, \"a proper view of the nature of causation\nplaces the vital doctrine of the being and the providence of a God on\nground that can never be shaken.\"[III-16] A worthy conclusion, and a\nsufficient answer to the denunciations and arguments of the rest of the\narticle, so far as philosophy and natural theology are concerned. If a\nwriter must needs use his own favorite dogma as a weapon with which to\ngive coup de grace to a pernicious theory, he should be careful to\nseize his edge-tool by the handle, and not by the blade.\n\nWe can barely glance at a subsidiary philosophical objection of the\nNorth American reviewer, which the Examiner also raises, though less\nexplicitly.  Like all geologists, Mr. Darwin draws upon time in the\nmost unlimited manner. He is not peculiar in this regard. Mr. Agassiz\ntells us that the conviction is \"now universal, among well-informed\nnaturalists, that this globe has been in existence for innumerable\nages, and that the length of time elapsed since it first became\ninhabited cannot be counted in years;\" Pictet, that the imagination\nrefuses to calculate the immense number of years and of ages during\nwhich the faunas of thirty or more epochs have succeeded one another,\nand developed their long succession of generations.  Now, the reviewer\ndeclares that such indefinite succession of ages is \"virtually\ninfinite,\" \"lacks no characteristic of eternity except its name,\" at\nleast, that \"the difference between such a conception and that of the\nstrictly infinite, if any, is not appreciable.\" But infinity belongs to\nmetaphysics. Therefore, he concludes, Darwin supports his theory, not\nby scientific but by metaphysical evidence; his theory is \"essentially\nand completely metaphysical in character, resting altogether upon that\nidea of the infinite which the human mind can neither put aside nor\ncomprehend.\"[III-17] And so a theory which will be generally regarded\nas much too physical is transferred by a single syllogism to\nmetaphysics.\n\nWell, physical geology must go with it: for, even on the soberest view,\nit demands an indefinitely long time antecedent to the introduction of\norganic life upon our earth. A fortiori is physical astronomy a branch\nof metaphysics, demanding, as it does, still larger \"instalments of\ninfinity,\" as the reviewer calls them, both as to time and number.\nMoreover, far the greater part of physical inquiries now relate to\nmolecular actions, which, a distinguished natural philosopher informs\nus, \"we have to regard as the results of an infinite number of in\nfinitely small material particles, acting on each other at infinitely\nsmall distances\"--a triad of infinities--and so physics becomes the\nmost metaphysical of sciences.  Verily, if this style of reasoning is\nto prevail--\n\n\"Thinking is but an idle waste of thought,\n\t  And naught is everything, and everything is naught.\"\n\n\nThe leading objection of Mr. Agassiz is likewise of a philosophical\ncharacter. It is, that species exist only \"as categories of\nthought\"--that, having no material existence, they can have had no\nmaterial variation, and no material community of origin. Here the\npredication is of species in the subjective sense, the inference in the\nobjective sense. Reduced to plain terms, the argument seems to be:\nSpecies are ideas; therefore the objects from which the idea is derived\ncannot vary or blend, and cannot have had a genealogical connection.\n\nThe common view of species is, that, although they are generalizations,\nyet they have a direct objective ground in Nature, which genera,\norders, etc., have not. According to the succinct definition of\nJussieu--and that of Linnaeus is identical in meaning--a species is the\nperennial succession of similar individuals in continued generations.\nThe species is the chain of which the individuals are the links. The\nsum of the genealogically-connected similar individuals constitutes the\nspecies, which thus has an actuality and ground of distinction not\nshared by genera and other groups which were not supposed to be\ngenealogically connected. How a derivative hypothesis would modify this\nview, in assigning to species only a temporary fixity, is obvious. Yet,\nif naturalists adopt that hypothesis, they will still retain Jussieus\ndefinition, which leaves untouched the question as to how and when the\n\"perennial successions\" were established. The practical question will\nonly be, How much difference between two sets of individuals entitles\nthem to rank under distinct species? and that is the practical question\nnow, on whatever theory. The theoretical question is--as stated at the\nbeginning of this article--whether these specific lines were always as\ndistinct as now.\n\nMr. Agassiz has \"lost no opportunity of urging the idea that, while\nspecies have no material existence, they yet exist as categories of\nthought in the same way [and only in the same way] as genera, families,\norders, classes,\" etc. He\n\n\"has taken the ground that all the natural divisions in the animal\nkingdom are primarily distinct, founded upon different categories of\ncharacters, and that all exist in the same way, that is, as categories\nof thought, embodied in individual living forms. I have attempted to\nshow that branches in the animal kingdom are founded upon different\nplans of structure, and for that very reason have embraced from the\nbeginning representatives between which there could be no community of\norigin; that classes are founded upon different modes of execution of\nthese plans, and therefore they also embrace representatives which\ncould have no community of origin; that orders represent the different\ndegrees of complication in the mode of execution of each class, and\ntherefore embrace representatives which could not have a community of\norigin any more than the members of different classes or branches; that\nfamilies are founded upon different patterns of form, and embrace,\nrepresentatives equally independent in their origin; that genera are\nfounded upon ultimate peculiarities of structure, embracing\nrepresentatives which, from the very nature of their peculiarities,\ncould have no community of origin; and that, finally, species are based\nupon relations--and proportions that exclude, as much as all the\npreceding distinctions, the idea of a common descent.\n\n\"As the community of characters among the beings belonging to these\ndifferent categories arises from the intellectual connection which\nshows them to be categories of thought, they cannot be the result of a\ngradual\n\nmaterial differentiation of the objects themselves. The argument on\nwhich these views are founded may be summed up in the following few\nwords:  Species, genera, families, etc., exist as thoughts, individuals\nas facts.\"[III-18]\n\nAn ingenious dilemma caps the argument:\n\n\n\"It seems to me that there is much confusion of ideas in the general\nstatement of the variability of species so often repeated lately. If\nspecies do not exist at all, as the supporters of the transmutation\ntheory maintain, how can they vary? And if individuals alone exist, how\ncan the differences which may be observed among them prove the\nvariability of species?\"\n\n\nNow, we imagine that Mr. Darwin need not be dangerously gored by either\nhorn of this curious dilemma. Although we ourselves cherish\nold-fashioned prejudices in favor of the probable permanence, and\ntherefore of a more stable objective ground of species, yet we\nagree--and Mr. Darwin will agree fully with Mr. Agassiz--that species,\nand he will add varieties, \"exist as categories of thought,\" that is,\nas cognizable distinctions--which is all that we can make of the phrase\nhere, whatever it may mean in the Aristotelian metaphysics. Admitting\nthat species are only categories of thought, and not facts or things,\nhow does this prevent the individuals, which are material things, from\nhaving varied in the course of time, so as to exemplify the present\nalmost innumerable categories of thought, or embodiments of Divine\nthought in material forms, or--viewed on the human side--in forms\nmarked with such orderly and graduated resemblances and differences as\nto suggest to our minds the idea of species, genera, orders, etc., and\nto our reason the inference of a Divine Original? We have no clear idea\nhow Mr. Agassiz intends to answer this question, in saying that\nbranches are founded upon different plans of structure, classes upon\ndifferent mode of execution of these plans, orders on different degrees\nof complication in the mode of execution, families upon different\npatterns of form, genera upon ultimate peculiarities of structure, and\nspecies upon relations and proportions. That is, we do not perceive how\nthese several \"categories of thought\" exclude the possibility or the\nprobability that the individuals which manifest or suggest the thoughts\nhad an ultimate community of origin.\n\nMoreover, Mr. Darwin might insinuate that the particular philosophy of\nclassification upon which this whole argument reposes is as purely\nhypothetical and as little accepted as is his own doctrine. If both are\npure hypotheses, it is hardly fair or satisfactory to extinguish the\none by the other. If there is no real contradiction between them,\nnothing is gained by the attempt.\n\nAs to the dilemma propounded, suppose we try it upon that category of\nthought which we call chair. This is a genus, comprising a common chair\n(Sella vulgaris), arm or easy chair (S. cathedra), the rocking-chair\n(S.  oscillans)--widely distributed in the United States--and some\nothers, each of which has sported, as the gardeners say, into many\nvarieties. But now, as the genus and the species have no material\nexistence, how can they vary? If only individual chairs exist, how can\nthe differences which may be observed among them prove the variability\nof the species? To which we reply by asking, Which does the question\nrefer to, the category of thought, or the individual embodiment? If the\nformer, then we would remark that our categories of thought vary from\ntime to time in the readiest manner. And, although the Divine thoughts\nare eternal, yet they are manifested to us in time and succession, and\nby their manifestation only can we know them, how imperfectly! Allowing\nthat what has no material existence can have had no material connection\nor variation, we should yet infer that what has intellectual existence\nand connection might have intellectual variation; and, turning to the\nindividuals, which represent the species, we do not see how all this\nshows that they may not vary. Observation shows us that they do.\nWherefore, taught by fact that successive individuals do vary, we\nsafely infer that the idea must have varied, and that this variation of\nthe individual representatives proves the variability of the species,\nwhether objectively or subjectively regarded.\n\nEach species or sort of chair, as we have said, has its varieties, and\none species shades off by gradations into another. And--note it\nwell--these numerous and successively slight variations and gradations,\nfar from suggesting an accidental origin to chairs and to their forms,\nare very proofs of design.\n\nAgain, edifice is a generic category of thought. Egyptian, Grecian,\nByzantine, and Gothic buildings are well-marked species, of which each\nindividual building of the sort is a material embodiment. Now, the\nquestion is, whether these categories or ideas may not have been\nevolved, one from another in succession, or from some primal, less\nspecialized, edificial category. What better evidence for such\nhypothesis could we have than the variations and grades which connect\nthese species with each other? We might extend the parallel, and get\nsome good illustrations of natural selection from the history of\narchitecture, and the origin of the different styles under different\nclimates and conditions. Two considerations may qualify or limit the\ncomparison. One, that houses do not propagate, so as to produce\ncontinuing lines of each sort and variety; but this is of small moment\non Agassizs view, he holding that genealogical connection is not of the\nessence of a species at all. The other, that the formation and\ndevelopment of the ideas upon which human works proceed are gradual;\nor, as the same great naturalist well states it, \"while human thought\nis consecutive, Divine thought is simultaneous.\" But we have no right\nto affirm this of Divine action.\n\nWe must close here. We meant to review some of the more general\nscientific objections which we thought not altogether tenable. But,\nafter all, we are not so anxious just now to know whether the new\ntheory is well founded on facts, as whether it would be harmless if it\nwere. Besides, we feel quite unable to answer some of these objections,\nand it is pleasanter to take up those which one thinks he can.\n\nAmong the unanswerable, perhaps the weightiest of the objections, is\nthat of the absence, in geological deposits, of vestiges of the\nintermediate forms which the theory requires to have existed. Here all\nthat Mr. Darwin can do is to insist upon the extreme imperfection of\nthe geological record and the uncertainty of negative evidence. But,\nwithal, he allows the force of the objection almost as much as his\nopponents urge it--so much so, indeed, that two of his English critics\nturn the concession unfairly upon him, and charge him with actually\nbasing his hypothesis upon these and similar difficulties--as if he\nheld it because of the difficulties, and not in spite of them; a\nhandsome return for his candor!\n\nAs to this imperfection of the geological record, perhaps we should get\na fair and intelligible illustration of it by imagining the existing\nanimals and plants of New England, with all their remains and products\nsince the arrival of the Mayflower, to be annihilated; and that, in the\ncoming time, the geologists of a new colony, dropped by the New Zealand\nfleet on its way to explore the ruins of London, undertake, after fifty\nyears of examination, to reconstruct in a catalogue the flora and fauna\nof our day, that is, from the close of the glacial period to the\npresent time. With all the advantages of a surface exploration, what a\nbeggarly account it would be! How many of the land animals and plants\nwhich are enumerated in the Massachusetts official reports would it be\nlikely to contain?\n\nAnother unanswerable question asked by the Boston reviewers is, Why,\nwhen structure and instinct or habit vary-- as they must have varied,\non Darwins hypothesis--they vary together and harmoniously, instead of\nvaguely? We cannot tell, because we cannot tell why either varies at\nall. Yet, as they both do vary in successive generations--as is seen\nunder domestication--and are correlated, we can only adduce the fact.\nDarwin may be precluded from our answer, but we may say that they vary\ntogether because designed to do so. A reviewer says that the chance of\ntheir varying together is inconceivably small; yet, if they do not, the\nvariant individuals must all perish. Then it is well that it is not\nleft to chance. To refer to a parallel case: before we were born,\nnourishment and the equivalent to respiration took place in a certain\nway. But the moment we were ushered into this breathing world, our\nactions promptly conformed, both as to respiration and nourishment, to\nthe before unused structure and to the new surroundings.\n\n\"Now,\" says the Examiner, \"suppose, for instance, the gills of an\naquatic animal converted into lungs, while instinct still compelled a\ncontinuance under water, would not drowning ensue?\" No doubt.\nBut--simply contemplating the facts, instead of theorizing--we notice\nthat young frogs do not keep their heads under water after ceasing to\nbe tadpoles. The instinct promptly changes with the structure, without\nsupernatural interposition--just as Darwin would have it, if the\ndevelopment of a variety or incipient species, though rare, were as\nnatural as a metamorphosis.\n\n\"Or if a quadruped, not yet furnished with wings, were suddenly\ninspired with the instinct of a bird, and precipitated itself from a\ncliff, would not the descent be hazardously rapid?\" Doubtless the\nanimal would be no better supported than the objection. But Darwin\nmakes very little indeed of voluntary efforts as a cause of change, and\neven poor Lamarck need not be caricatured. He never supposed that an\nelephant would take such a notion into his wise head, or that a\nsquirrel would begin with other than short and easy leaps; yet might\nnot the length of the leap be increased by practice?\n\nThe North American reviewers position, that the higher brute animals\nhave comparatively little instinct and no intelligence, is a heavy blow\nand great discouragement to dogs, horses, elephants, and monkeys. Thus\nstripped of their all, and left to shift for themselves as they may in\nthis hard world, their pursuit and seeming attainment of knowledge\nunder such peculiar difficulties are interesting to contemplate.\nHowever, we are not so sure as is the critic that instinct regularly\nincreases downward and decreases upward in the scale of being. Now that\nthe case of the bee is reduced to moderate proportions,[III-19] we know\nof nothing in instinct surpassing that of an animal so high as a bird,\nthe talegal, the male of which plumes himself upon making a hot-bed in\nwhich to batch his partners eggs--which he tends and regulates the beat\nof about as carefully and skillfully as the unplumed biped does an\neccaleobion.[III-20]\n\nAs to the real intelligence of the higher brutes, it has been ably\ndefended by a far more competent observer, Mr. Agassiz, to whose\nconclusions we yield a general assent, although we cannot quite place\nthe best of dogs \"in that respect upon a level with a considerable\nproportion of poor humanity,\" nor indulge the hope, or indeed the\ndesire, of a renewed acquaintance with the whole animal kingdom in a\nfuture life.\n\nThe assertion that acquired habitudes or instincts, and acquired\nstructures, are not heritable, any breeder or good observer can\nrefute.\n     That \"the human mind has become what it is out of a developed\ninstinct,\" is a statement which Mr. Darwin nowhere makes, and, we\npresume, would not accept. That he would have us believe that\nindividual animals acquire their  instincts gradually,[III-21] is a\nstatement which must have been penned in inadvertence both of the very\ndefinition of instinct, and of everything we know of in Mr. Darwins\nbook.\n\nIt has been attempted to destroy the very foundation of Darwins\nhypothesis by denying that there are any wild varieties, to speak of,\nfor natural selection to operate upon. We cannot gravely sit down to\nprove that wild varieties abound. We should think it just as necessary\nto prove that snow falls in winter. That variation among plants cannot\nbe largely due to hybridism, and that their variation in Nature is not\nessentially different from much that occurs in domestication, and, in\nthe long-run, probably hardly less in amount, we could show if our\nspace permitted.\n\nAs to the sterility of hybrids, that can no longer be insisted upon as\nabsolutely true, nor be practically used as a test between species and\nvarieties, unless we allow that hares and rabbits are of one species.\nThat such sterility, whether total or partial, subserves a purpose in\nkeeping species apart, and was so designed, we do not doubt. But the\ncritics fail to perceive that this sterility proves nothing whatever\nagainst the derivative origin of the actual species; for it may as well\nhave been intended to keep separate those forms which have reached a\ncertain amount of divergence, as those which were always thus\ndistinct.\n\nThe argument for the permanence of species, drawn from the identity\nwith those now living of cats, birds, and other animals preserved in\nEgyptian catacombs, was good enough as used by Cuvier against\nSt.-Hilaire, that is, against the supposition that time brings about a\ngradual alteration of whole species; but it goes for little against\nDarwin, unless it be proved that species never vary, or that the\nperpetuation of a variety necessitates the extinction of the parent\nbreed. For Darwin clearly maintains--what the facts warrant--that the\nmass of a species remains fixed so long as it exists at all, though it\nmay set off a variety now and then. The variety may finally supersede\nthe parent form, or it may coexist with it; yet it does not in the\nleast hinder the unvaried stock from continuing true to the breed,\nunless it crosses with it. The common law of inheritance may be\nexpected to keep both the original and the variety mainly true as long\nas they last, and none the less so because they have given rise to\noccasional varieties. The tailless Manx cats, like the curtailed fox in\nthe fable, have not induced the normal breeds to dispense with their\ntails, nor have the Dorkings (apparently known to Pliny) affected the\npermanence of the common sort of fowl.\n\nAs to the objection that the lower forms of life ought, on Darwins\ntheory, to have been long ago improved out of existence, and replaced\nby higher forms, the objectors forget what a vacuum that would leave\nbelow, and what a vast field there is to which a simple organization is\nbest adapted, and where an advance would be no improvement, but the\ncontrary. To accumulate the greatest amount of being upon a given\nspace, and to provide as much enjoyment of life as can be under the\nconditions, is what Nature seems to aim at; and this is effected by\ndiversification.\n\nFinally, we advise nobody to accept Darwins or any other derivative\ntheory as true. The time has not come for that, and perhaps never will.\nWe also advise against a similar credulity on the other side, in a\nblind faith that species--that the manifold sorts and forms of existing\nanimals and vegetables--\"have no secondary cause.\" The contrary is\nalready not unlikely, and we suppose will hereafter become more and\nmore probable. But we are confident that, if a derivative hypothesis\never is established, it will be so on a solid theistic ground.\n\nMeanwhile an inevitable and legitimate hypothesis is on trial--an\nhypothesis thus far not untenable--a trial just now very useful to\nscience, and, we conclude, not harmful to religion, unless injudicious\nassailants temporarily make it so.\n\nOne good effect is already manifest; its enabling the advocates of the\nhypothesis of a multiplicity of human species to perceive the double\ninsecurity of their ground. When the races of men are admitted to be of\none species, the corollary, that they are of one origin, may be\nexpected to follow. Those who allow them to be of one species must\nadmit an actual diversification into strongly-marked and persistent\nvarieties, and so admit the basis of fact upon which the Darwinian\nhypothesis is built; while those, on the other hand, who recognize\nseveral or numerous human species, will hardly be able to maintain that\nsuch species were primordial and supernatural in the ordinary sense of\nthe word.\n\nThe English mind is prone to positivism and kindred forms of\nmaterialistic philosophy, and we must expect the derivative theory to\nbe taken up in that interest. We have no predilection for that school,\nbut the contrary. If we had, we might have looked complacently upon a\nline of criticism which would indirectly, but effectively, play into\nthe hands of positivists and materialistic atheists generally. The\nwiser and stronger ground to take is, that the derivative hypothesis\nleaves the argument for design, and therefore for a designer, as valid\nas it ever was; that to do any work by an instrument must require, and\ntherefore presuppose, the exertion rather of more than of less power\nthan to do it directly; that whoever  would be a consistent theist\nshould believe that Design in the natural world is coextensive with\nProvidence, and hold as firmly to the one as he does to the other, in\nspite of the wholly similar and apparently insuperable difficulties\nwhich the mind encounters whenever it endeavors to develop the idea\ninto a system, either in the material and organic, or in the moral\nworld. It is enough, in the way of obviating objections, to show that\nthe philosophical difficulties of the one are the same, and only the\nsame, as of the other.\n\n\n\n                  IV.\n\n       CAPITAL--THE MOTHER OF LABOUR\n\n    AN ECONOMICAL PROBLEM DISCUSSED FROM A\n        PHYSIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW\n\n                [1890.]\n\nTHE first act of a new-born child is to draw a deep breath. In fact, it\nwill never draw a deeper, inasmuch as the passages and chambers of the\nlungs, once distended with air, do not empty themselves again; it is\nonly a fraction of their contents which passes in and out with the\nflow and the ebb of the respiratory tide. Mechanically, this act of\ndrawing breath, or inspiration, is of the same nature as that by which\nthe handles of a bellows are separated, in order to fill the bellows\nwith air; and, in like manner, it involves that expenditure of energy\nwhich we call exertion, or work, or labour. It is, therefore, no mere\nmetaphor to say that man is destined to a life of toil: the work of\nrespiration which began with his first breath ends only with his last;\nnor does one born in the purple get off with a lighter task than the\nchild who first sees light under a hedge.\n\n[148] How is it that the new-born infant is enabled to perform this\nfirst instalment of the sentence of life-long labour which no man may\nescape?  Whatever else a child may be, in respect of this particular\nquestion, it is a complicated piece of mechanism, built up out of\nmaterials supplied by its mother; and in the course of such\nbuilding-up, provided with a set of motors--the muscles. Each of these\nmuscles contains a stock of substance capable of yielding energy under\ncertain conditions, one of which is a change of state in the nerve\nfibres connected with it. The powder in a loaded gun is such another\nstock of substance capable of yielding energy in consequence of a\nchange of state in the mechanism of the lock, which intervenes between\nthe finger of the man who pulls the trigger and the cartridge. If that\nchange is brought about, the potential energy of the powder passes\nsuddenly into actual energy, and does the work of propelling the\nbullet. The powder, therefore, may be appropriately called work-stuff,\nnot only because it is stuff which is easily made to yield work in the\nphysical sense, but because a good deal of work in the economical sense\nhas contributed to its production. Labour was necessary to collect,\ntransport, and purify the raw sulphur and saltpetre; to cut wood and\nconvert it into powdered charcoal; to mix these ingredients in the\nright proportions; to give the mixture the proper grain, and so on.\nThe powder [149] once formed part of the stock, or capital, of a\npowder-maker: and it is not only certain natural bodies which are\ncollected and stored in the gunpowder, but the labour bestowed on the\noperations mentioned may be figuratively said to be incorporated in\nit.\n\nIn principle, the work-stuff stored in the muscles of the new-born\nchild is comparable to that stored in the gun-barrel. The infant is\nlaunched into altogether new surroundings; and these operate through\nthe mechanism of the nervous machinery, with the result that the\npotential energy of some of the work-stuff in the muscles which bring\nabout inspiration is suddenly converted into actual energy; and this,\noperating through the mechanism of the respiratory apparatus, gives\nrise to an act of inspiration. As the bullet is propelled by the\n\"going off\" of the powder, as it might be said that the ribs are\nraised and the midriff depressed by the \"going off\" of certain\nportions of muscular work-stuff. This work-stuff is part of a stock or\ncapital of that commodity stored up in the child's organism before\nbirth, at the expense of the mother; and the mother has made good her\nexpenditure by drawing upon the capital of food-stuffs which furnished\nher daily maintenance.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it does not appear to me to be open to doubt\nthat the primary act of outward labour in the series which necessarily\naccompany [150] the life of man is dependent upon the pre-existence of\na stock of material which is not only of use to him, but which is\ndisposed in such a manner as to be utilisable with facility. And I\nfurther imagine that the propriety of the application of the term\n'capital' to this stock of useful substance cannot be justly called in\nquestion; inasmuch as it is easy to prove that the essential\nconstituents of the work-stuff accumulated in the child's muscles have\nmerely been transferred from the store of food-stuffs, which everybody\nadmits to be capital, by means of the maternal organism to that of the\nchild, in which they are again deposited to await use. Every\nsubsequent act of labour, in like manner, involves an equivalent\nconsumption of the child's store of work-stuff--its vital capital; and\none of the main objects of the process of breathing is to get rid of\nsome of the effects of that consumption. It follows, then, that, even\nif no other than the respiratory work were going on in the organism,\nthe capital of work-stuff, which the child brought with it into the\nworld, must sooner or later be used up, and the movements of breathing\nmust come to an end; just as the see-saw of the piston of a\nsteam-engine stops when the coal in the fireplace has burnt away.\n\nMilk, however, is a stock of materials which essentially consists of\nsavings from the food-stuffs supplied to the mother. And these savings\nare [151] in such a physical and chemical condition that the organism\nof the child can easily convert them into work-stuff. That is to say,\nby borrowing directly from the vital capital of the mother, indirectly\nfrom the store in the natural bodies accessible to her, it can make\ngood the loss of its own. The operation of borrowing, however,\ninvolves further work; that is, the labour of sucking, which is a\nmechanical operation of much the same nature as breathing. The child\nthus pays for the capital it borrows in labour; but as the value in\nwork-stuff of the milk obtained is very far greater than the value of\nthat labour, estimated by the consumption of work-stuff it involves,\nthe operation yields a large profit to the infant. The overplus of\nfood-stuff suffices to increase the child's capital of work-stuff; and\nto supply not only the materials for the enlargement of the \"buildings\nand machinery\" which is expressed by the child's growth, but also the\nenergy required to put all these materials together, and to carry them\nto their proper places. Thus, throughout the years of infancy, and so\nlong thereafter as the youth or man is not thrown upon his own\nresources, he lives by consuming the vital capital provided by others.\nTo use a terminology which is more common than appropriate, whatever\nwork he performs (and he does a good deal, if only in mere locomotion)\nis unproductive.\n\n[152] Let us now suppose the child come to man's estate in the\ncondition of a wandering savage, dependent for his food upon what he\ncan pick up or catch, after the fashion of the Australian aborigines.\nIt is plain that the place of mother, as the supplier of vital\ncapital, is now taken by the fruits, seeds, and roots of plants and by\nvarious kinds of animals. It is they alone which contain stocks of\nthose substances which can be converted within the man's organism into\nwork-stuff; and of the other matters, except air and water, required\nto supply the constant consumption of his capital and to keep his\norganic machinery going. In no way does the savage contribute to the\nproduction of these substances. Whatever labour he bestows upon such\nvegetable and animal bodies, on the contrary, is devoted to their\ndestruction; and it is a mere matter of accident whether a little\nlabour yields him a great deal--as in the case, for example, of a\nstranded whale; or whether much labour yields next to nothing--as in\ntimes of long-continued drought. The savage, like the child, borrows\nthe capital he needs, and, at any rate, intentionally, does nothing\ntowards repayment; it would plainly be an improper use of the word\n\"produce\" to say that his labour in hunting for the roots, or the\nfruits, or the eggs, or the grubs and snakes, which he finds and eats,\n\"produces\" or contributes to \"produce\" them. The same thing is true\nof more advanced tribes, who [153] are still merely hunters, such as\nthe Esquimaux. They may expend more labour and skill; but it is spent\nin destruction.\n\nWhen we pass from these to men who lead a purely pastoral life, like\nthe South American Gauchos, or some Asiatic nomads, there is an\nimportant change. Let us suppose the owner of a flock of sheep to live\non the milk, cheese, and flesh which they yield. It is obvious that\nthe flock stands to him in the economic relation of the mother to the\nchild, inasmuch as it supplies him with food-stuffs competent to make\ngood the daily and hourly losses of his capital of workstuff. If we\nimagine our sheep-owner to have access to extensive pastures and to be\ntroubled neither by predacious animals nor by rival shepherds, the\nperformance of his pastoral functions will hardly involve the\nexpenditure of any more labour than is needful to provide him with the\nexercise required to maintain health. And this is true, even if we\ntake into account the trouble originally devoted to the domestication\nof the sheep. It surely would be a most singular pretension for the\nshepherd to talk of the flock as the \"produce\" of his labour in any\nbut a very limited sense. In truth, his labour would have been a mere\naccessory of production of very little consequence. Under the\ncircumstances supposed, a ram and some ewes, left to themselves for a\nfew years, would probably generate as large a flock; [154] and the\nsuperadded labour of the shepherd would have little more effect upon\ntheir production than upon that of the blackberries on the bushes\nabout the pastures. For the most part the increment would be\nthoroughly unearned; and, if it is a rule of absolute political ethics\nthat owners have no claim upon \"betterment\" brought about\nindependently of their own labour, then the shepherd would have no\nclaim to at least nine-tenths of the increase of the flock.\n\nBut if the shepherd has no real claim to the title of \"producer,\" who\nhas?  Are the rams and ewes the true \"producers\"? Certainly their\ntitle is better if, borrowing from the old terminology of chemistry,\nthey only claim to be regarded as the \"proximate principles\" of\nproduction. And yet, if strict justice is to be dispensed, even they\nare to be regarded rather as collectors and distributors than as\n\"producers.\" For all that they really do is to collect, slightly\nmodify, and render easily accessible, the vital capital which already\nexists in the green herbs on which they feed, but in such a form as to\nbe practically out of the reach of man.\n\nThus, from an economic point of view, the sheep are more comparable to\nconfectioners than to producers. The usefulness of biscuit lies in the\nraw flour of which it is made; but raw flour does not answer as an\narticle of human diet, and biscuit does. So the usefulness of mutton\nlies mainly in certain chemical compounds which it [155] contains: the\nsheep gets them out of grass; we cannot live on grass, but we can on\nmutton.\n\nNow, herbaceous and all other green plants stand alone among\nterrestrial natural bodies, in so far as, under the influence of\nlight, they possess the power to build up, out of the carbonic acid\ngas in the atmosphere, water and certain nitrogenous and mineral\nsalts, those substances which in the animal organism are utilised as\nwork-stuff. They are the chief and, for practical purposes, the sole\nproducers of that vital capital which we have seen to be the necessary\nantecedent of every act of labour. Every green plant is a laboratory\nin which, so long as the sun shines upon it, materials furnished by\nthe mineral world, gases, water, saline compounds, are worked up into\nthose foodstuffs without which animal life cannot be carried on. And\nsince, up to the present time, synthetic chemistry has not advanced so\nfar as to achieve this feat, the green plant may be said to be the\nonly living worker whose labour directly results in the production of\nthat vital capital which is the necessary antecedent of human labour.*\nNor is this statement a paradox involving perpetual motion, because\nthe energy by which the plant does its work is supplied by the\nsun--the primordial capitalist so far as we are concerned. But [156]\nit cannot be too strongly impressed upon the mind that sunshine, air,\nwater, the best soil that is to be found on the surface of the earth,\nmight co-exist; yet without plants, there is no known agency competent\nto generate the so-called \"protein compounds,\" by which alone animal\nlife can be permanently supported. And not only are plants thus\nessential; but, in respect of particular kinds of animals, they must\nbe plants of a particular nature. If there were no terrestrial green\nplants but, say, cypresses and mosses, pastoral and agricultural life\nwould be alike impossible; indeed, it is difficult to imagine the\npossibility of the existence of any large animal, as the labour\nrequired to get at a sufficiency of the store of food-stuffs,\ncontained in such plants as these, could hardly extract from them an\nequivalent for the waste involved in that expenditure of work.\n\n    * It remains to be seen whether the plants which have no\n    chlorophyll, and flourish in darkness, such as the Fungi, can\n    live upon purely mineral food.\n\nWe are compact of dust and air; from that we set out, and to that\ncomplexion must we come at last. The plant either directly, or by some\nanimal intermediary, lends us the capital which enables us to carry on\nthe business of life, as we flit through the upper world, from the one\nterm of our journey to the other. Popularly, no doubt, it is\npermissible to speak of the soil as a \"producer,\" just as we may talk\nof the daily movement of the sun.  But, as I have elsewhere remarked,\npropositions which are to bear any deductive strain that may be put\nupon them must run the risk of [157] seeming pedantic, rather than\nthat of being inaccurate. And the statement that land, in the sense of\ncultivable soil, is a producer, or even one of the essentials of\neconomic production, is anything but accurate. The process of\nwater-culture, in which a plant is not \"planted\" in any soil, but is\nmerely supported in water containing in solution the mineral\ningredients essential to that plant, is now thoroughly understood;\nand, if it were worth while, a crop yielding abundant food-stuffs\ncould be raised on an acre of fresh water, no less than on an acre of\ndry land. In the Arctic regions, again, land has nothing to do with\n\"production\" in the social economy of the Esquimaux, who live on seals\nand other marine animals; and might, like Proteus, shepherd the flocks\nof Poseidon if they had a mind for pastoral life. But the seals and\nthe bears are dependent on other inhabitants of the sea, until,\nsomewhere in the series, we come to the minute green plants which\nfloat in the ocean, and are the real \"producers\" by which the whole of\nits vast animal population is supported.* Thus, when we find set forth\nas an \"absolute\" [158] truth the statement that the essential factors\nin economic production are land, capital and labour--when this is\noffered as an axiom whence all sorts of other important truths may be\ndeduced--it is needful to remember that the assertion is true only\nwith a qualification. Undoubtedly \"vital capital\" is essential; for,\nas we have seen, no human work can be done unless it exists, not even\nthat internal work of the body which is necessary to passive life.\nBut, with respect to labour (that is, human labour) I hope to have\nleft no doubt on the reader's mind that, in regard to production, the\nimportance of human labour may be so small as to be almost a vanishing\nquantity. Moreover, it is certain that there is no approximation to a\nfixed ratio between the expenditure of labour and the production of\nthat vital capital which is the foundation of all wealth. For, suppose\nthat we introduce into our suppositious pastoral paradise beasts of\nprey and rival shepherds, the amount of labour thrown upon the\nsheep-owner may increase almost indefinitely, and its importance as a\ncondition of production may be enormously augmented, while the\nquantity of produce remains stationary. Compare for a moment the\nunimportance of the shepherd's labour, under the circumstances first\ndefined, with its indispensability in countries in which the water for\nthe sheep has to be drawn from deep [159] wells, or in which the flock\nhas to be defended from wolves or from human depredators. As to land,\nit has been shown that, except as affording mere room and standing\nground, the importance of land, great as it may be, is secondary. The\none thing needful for economic production is the green plant, as the\nsole producer of vital capital from natural inorganic bodies. Men\nmight exist without labour (in the ordinary sense) and without land;\nwithout plants they must inevitably perish.\n\n    * In some remarkable passages of the Botany of Sir James Ross's\n    Antarctic voyage, which took place half a century ago, Sir\n    Joseph Hooker demonstrated the dependence of the animal life of\n    the sea upon the minute, indeed microscopic, plants which float\n    in it: a marvellous example of what may be done by\n    water-culture. One might indulge in dreams of cultivating and\n    improving diatoms, until the domesticated bore the same\n    relation to the wild forms, as cauliflowers to the primitive\n    Brassica oleracea, without passing beyond the limits of fair\n    scientific speculation.\n\nThat which is true of the purely pastoral condition is a fortiori true\nof the purely agricultural* condition, in which the existence of the\ncultivator is directly dependent on the production of vital capital by\nthe plants which he cultivates. Here, again, the condition precedent\nof the work of each year is vital capital. Suppose that a man lives\nexclusively upon the plants which he cultivates. It is obvious that he\nmust have food-stuffs to live upon, while he prepares the soil for\nsowing and throughout the period which elapses between this and\nharvest. These food-stuffs must be yielded by the stock remaining over\nfrom former crops. The result is the same as before--the pre-existence\nof vital capital is the necessary antecedent of labour. Moreover, the\namount of labour which contributes, as an accessory condition, to the\nproduction [160] of the crop varies as widely in the case of\nplant-raising as in that of cattle-raising. With favourable soil,\nclimate and other conditions, it may be very small, with unfavourable,\nvery great, for the same revenue or yield of food-stuffs.\n\n    * It is a pity that we have no word that signifies plant-culture\n    exclusively. But for the present purpose I may restrict\n    agriculture to that sense.\n\nThus, I do not think it is possible to dispute the following\nproposition:  the existence of any man, or of any number of men,\nwhether organised into a polity or not, depends on the production of\nfoodstuffs (that is, vital capital) readily accessible to man, either\ndirectly or indirectly, by plants. But it follows that the number of\nmen who can exist, say for one year, on any given area of land, taken\nby itself, depends upon the quantity of food-stuffs produced by such\nplants growing on the area in one year. If a is that quantity, and b\nthe minimum of food-stuffs required for each man, A/B=N, the maximum\nnumber of men who can exist on the area. Now the amount of production\n(a) is limited by the extent of area occupied; by the quantity of\nsunshine which falls upon the area; by the range and distribution of\ntemperature; by the force of the winds; by the supply of water; by the\ncomposition and the physical characters of the soil; by animal and\nvegetable competitors and destroyers. The labour of man neither does,\nnor can, produce vital capital; all that it can do is to modify,\nfavourably or unfavourably, the conditions of its production. The most\nimportant of these-- [161] namely, sunshine, range of daily and\nnightly temperature, wind--are practically out of men's reach.* On the\nother hand, the supply of water, the physical and chemical qualities\nof the soil, and the influences of competitors and destroyers, can\noften, though by no means always, be largely affected by labour and\nskill. And there is no harm in calling the effect of such labour\n\"production,\" if it is clearly understood that \"production\" in this\nsense is a very different thing from the \"production\" of food-stuffs\nby a plant.\n\n    * I do not forget electric lighting, greenhouses and hothouses,\n    and the various modes of affording shelter against violent\n    winds: but in regard to production of food-stuffs on the large\n    scale they may be neglected. Even if synthetic chemistry should\n    effect the construction of proteids, the Laboratory will\n    hardly enter into competition with the Farm within any time\n    which the present generation need trouble itself about.\n\nWe have been dealing hitherto with suppositions the materials of which\nare furnished by everyday experience, not with mere a priori\nassumptions. Our hypothetical solitary shepherd with his flock, or the\nsolitary farmer with his grain field, are mere bits of such\nexperience, cut out, as it were, for easy study. Still borrowing from\ndaily experience, let us suppose that either sheep-owner or farmer,\nfor any reason that may be imagined, desires the help of one or more\nother men; and that, in exchange for their labour, he offers so many\nsheep, or quarts of milk, or pounds of [162] cheese, or so many\nmeasures of grain, for a year's service. I fail to discover any a\npriori \"rights of labour\" in virtue of which these men may insist on\nbeing employed, if they are not wanted. But, on the other hand, I\nthink it is clear that there is only one condition upon which the\npersons to whom the offer of these \"wages\" is made can accept it; and\nthat is that the things offered in exchange for a year's work shall\ncontain at least as much vital capital as a man uses up in doing the\nyear's work. For no rational man could knowingly and willingly accept\nconditions which necessarily involve starvation. Therefore there is an\nirreducible minimum of wages; it is such an amount of vital capital as\nsuffices to replace the inevitable consumption of the person hired.\nNow, surely, it is beyond a doubt that these wages, whether at or\nabove the irreducible minimum, are paid out of the capital disposable\nafter the wants of the owner of the flock or of the crop of grain are\nsatisfied; and, from what has been said already, it follows that there\nis a limit to the number of men, whether hired, or brought in any other\nway, who can be maintained by the sheep owner or landowner out of his\nown resources. Since no amount of labour can produce an ounce of\nfoodstuff beyond the maximum producible by a limited number of plants,\nunder the most favourable circumstances in regard to those conditions\nwhich are not affected by labour, it follows [163] that, if the number\nof men to be fed increases indefinitely, a time must come when some\nwill have to starve. That is the essence of the so-called Malthusian\ndoctrine; and it is a truth which, to my mind, is as plain as the\ngeneral proposition that a quantity which constantly increases will,\nsome time or other, exceed any greater quantity the amount of which is\nfixed.\n\nThe foregoing considerations leave no doubt about the fundamental\ncondition of the existence of any polity, or organised society of men,\neither in a purely pastoral or purely agricultural state, or in any\nmixture of both states. It must possess a store of vital capital to\nstart with, and the means of repairing the consumption of that capital\nwhich takes place as a consequence of the work of the members of the\nsociety. And, if the polity occupies a completely isolated area of the\nearth's surface, the numerical strength of that polity can never\nexceed the quotient of the maximum quantity of food-stuffs producible\nby the green plants on that area, in each year, divided by the\nquantity necessary for the maintenance of each person during the year.\nBut, there is a third mode of existence possible to a polity; it may,\nconceivably, be neither purely pastoral nor purely agricultural, but\npurely manufacturing. Let us suppose three islands, like Gran Canaria,\nTeneriffe and Lanzerote, in the Canaries, to be quite cut off from the\nrest of the world. Let Gran Canaria be [164] inhabited by\ngrain-raisers, Teneriffe by cattle-breeders; while the population of\nLanzerote (which we may suppose to be utterly barren) consists of\ncarpenters, woollen manufacturers, and shoemakers. Then the facts of\ndaily experience teach us that the people of Lanzerote could never\nhave existed unless they came to the island provided with a stock of\nfood-stuffs; and that they could not continue to exist, unless that\nstock, as it was consumed, was made up by contributions from the vital\ncapital of either Gran Canaria, or Teneriffe, or both. Moreover, the\ncarpenters of Lanzerote could do nothing, unless they were provided\nwith wood from the other islands; nor could the wool spinners and\nweavers or the shoemakers work without wool and skins from the same\nsources. The wood and the wool and the skins are, in fact, the capital\nwithout which their work as manufacturers in their respective trades\nis impossible--so that the vital and other capital supplied by Gran\nCanaria and Teneriffe is most indubitably the necessary antecedent of\nthe industrial labour of Lanzerote. It is perfectly true that by the\ntime the wood, the wool, and the skins reached Lanzerote a good deal\nof labour in cutting, shearing, skinning, transport, and so on, would\nhave been spent upon them. But this does not alter the fact that the\nonly \"production\" which is essential to the existence of the\npopulation of Teneriffe and Gran Canaria is that effected by the [165]\ngreen plants in both islands; and that all the labour spent upon the\nraw produce useful in manufacture, directly or indirectly yielded by\nthem--by the inhabitants of these islands and by those of Lanzerote\ninto the bargain--will not provide one solitary Lanzerotian with a\ndinner, unless the Teneriffians and Canariotes happen to want his\ngoods and to be willing to give some of their vital capital in\nexchange for them.\n\nUnder the circumstances defined, if Teneriffe and Gran Canaria\ndisappeared, or if their inhabitants ceased to care for carpentry,\nclothing, or shoes, the people of Lanzerote must starve. But if they\nwish to buy, then the Lanzerotians, by \"cultivating\" the buyers,\nindirectly favour the cultivation of the produce of those buyers.\n\nThus, if the question is asked whether the labour employed in\nmanufacture in Lanzerote is \"productive\" or \"unproductive\" there can\nbe only one reply. If anybody will exchange vital capital, or that\nwhich can be exchanged for vital capital, for Lanzerote goods, it is\nproductive; if not, it is unproductive.\n\nIn the case of the manufacturer, the dependence of labour upon capital\nis still more intimate than in that of the herdsman or agriculturist.\nWhen the latter are once started they can go on, without troubling\nthemselves about the existence of any other people. But the\nmanufacturer depends on pre-existing capital, not only at the [166]\nbeginning, but at the end of his operations. However great the\nexpenditure of his labour and of his skill, the result, for the\npurpose of maintaining his existence, is just the same as if he had\ndone nothing, unless there is a customer able and willing to exchange\nfood-stuffs for that which his labour and skill have achieved.\n\nThere is another point concerning which it is very necessary to have\nclear ideas. Suppose a carpenter in Lanzerote to be engaged in making\nchests of drawers. Let us suppose that a, the timber, and b, the grain\nand meat needful for the man's sustenance until he can finish a chest\nof drawers, have to be paid for by that chest. Then the capital with\nwhich he starts is represented by a + b. He could not start at all\nunless he had it; day by day, he must destroy more or less of the\nsubstance and of the general adaptability of a in order to work it up\ninto the special forms needed to constitute the chest of drawers; and,\nday by day, he must use up at least so much of b as will replace his\nloss of vital capital by the work of that day.  Suppose it takes the\ncarpenter and his workmen ten days to saw up the timber, to plane the\nboards, and to give them the shape and size proper for the various\nparts of the chest of drawers. And suppose that he then offers his\nheap of boards to the advancer of a + b as an equivalent for the wood\n+ ten days' supply of vital capital? The latter will surely say: \"No.\n[167] I did not ask for a heap of boards. I asked for a chest of\ndrawers. Up to this time, so far as I am concerned, you have done\nnothing and are as much in my debt as ever.\" And if the carpenter\nmaintained that he had \"virtually\" created two-thirds of a chest of\ndrawers, inasmuch as it would take only five days more to put together\nthe pieces of wood, and that the heap of boards ought to be accepted\nas the equivalent of two-thirds of his debt, I am afraid the creditor\nwould regard him as little better than an impudent swindler. It\nobviously makes no sort of difference whether the Canariote or\nTeneriffian buyer advanced the wood and the food-stuffs, on which the\ncarpenter had to maintain himself; or whether the carpenter had a stock\nof both, the consumption of which must be recouped by the exchange of\na chest of drawers for a fresh supply. In the latter case, it is even\nless doubtful that, if the carpenter offered his boards to the man who\nwanted a chest of drawers, the latter would laugh in his face. And if\nhe took the chest of drawers for himself, then so much of his vital\ncapital would be sunk in it past recovery. Again, the payment of goods\nin a lump, for the chest of drawers, comes to the same thing as the\npayment of daily wages for the fifteen days that the carpenter was\noccupied in making it. If, at the end of each day, the carpenter chose\nto say to himself \"I have 'virtually' created, by my day's labour, a\nfifteenth of what I shall get for the chest [168] of\ndrawers--therefore my wages are the produce of my day's labour\"--there\nis no great harm in such metaphorical speech, so long as the poor man\ndoes not delude himself into the supposition that it represents the\nexact truth.  \"Virtually\" is apt to cover more intellectual sins than\n\"charity\" does moral delicts. After what has been said, it surely must\nbe plain enough that each day's work has involved the consumption of\nthe carpenter's vital capital, and the fashioning of his timber, at\nthe expense of more or less consumption of those forms of capital.\nWhether the a + b to be exchanged for the chest has been advanced as a\nloan, or is paid daily or weekly as wages, or, at some later time, as\nthe price of a finished commodity--the essential element of the\ntransaction, and the only essential element, is, that it must, at\nleast, effect the replacement of the vital capital consumed. Neither\nboards nor chest of drawers are eatable; and, so far from the\ncarpenter having produced the essential part of his wages by each\nday's labour, he has merely wasted that labour, unless somebody who\nhappens to want a chest of drawers offers to exchange vital capital,\nor something that can procure it, equivalent to the amount consumed\nduring the process of manufacture.*\n\n    * See the discussion of this subject further on.\n\nThat it should be necessary, at this time of day, to set forth such\nelementary truths as these may [169] well seem strange; but no one who\nconsults that interesting museum of political delusions, \"Progress and\nPoverty,\" some of the treasures of which I have already brought to\nlight, will doubt the fact, if he bestows proper attention upon the\nfirst book of that widely-read work. At page 15 it is thus written:\n\n\"The proposition I shall endeavour to prove is: that wages, instead of\nbeing drawn from capital, are, in reality, drawn from the product of\nthe labour for which they are paid.\"\n\nAgain at page 18:--\n\n\"In every case in which labour is exchanged for commodities,\nproduction really precedes enjoyment . . . wages are the\nearnings--that is to say, the makings--of labour--not the advances\nof capital.\"\n\nAnd the proposition which the author endeavours to disprove is the\nhitherto generally accepted doctrine\n\n     ...\"that labour is maintained and paid out of existing capital,\n        before the product which constitutes the ultimate object is\n        secured\" (p. 16).\n\nThe doctrine respecting the relation of capital and wages, which is\nthus opposed in \"Progress and Poverty,\" is that illustrated in the\nforegoing pages; the truth of which, I conceive, must be plain to any\none who has apprehended the very simple arguments by which I have\nendeavoured to [170] demonstrate it. One conclusion or the other must\nbe hopelessly wrong; and, even at the cost of going once more over\nsome of the ground traversed in this essay and that on \"Natural and\nPolitical Rights,\"* I propose to show that the error lies with\n\"Progress and Poverty\"; in which work, so far as political science is\nconcerned, the poverty is, to my eye, much more apparent than the\nprogress.\n\n    * Collected Essays, vol. i. pp. 359-382.\n\nTo begin at the beginning. The author propounds a definition of\nwealth:  \"Nothing which nature supplies to man without his labour is\nwealth\" (p. 28).  Wealth consists of \"natural substances or products\nwhich have been adapted by human labour to human use or gratification,\ntheir value depending upon the amount of labour which, upon the\naverage, would be required to produce things of like kind\" (p. 27).\nThe following examples of wealth are given:--\n\n     . . . \"Buildings, cattle, tools, machinery, agricultural and\n           mineral products, manufactured goods, ships, waggons,\n           furniture, and the like\" (p. 27).\n\nI take it that native metals, coal and brick clay, are \"mineral\nproducts\"; and I quite believe that they are properly termed \"wealth.\"\nBut when a seam of coal crops out at the surface, and lumps of coal\nare to be had for the picking up; or when native copper lies about in\nnuggets, or [171] when brick clay forms a superficial stratum, it\nappears to me that these things are supplied to, nay almost thrust\nupon, man without his labour. According to the definition, therefore,\nthey are not \"wealth.\" According to the enumeration, however, they are\n\"wealth\": a tolerably fair specimen of a contradiction in terms. Or\ndoes \"Progress and Poverty\" really suggest that a coal seam which\ncrops out at the surface is not wealth; but that if somebody breaks\noff a piece and carries it away, the bestowal of this amount of labour\nupon that particular lump makes it wealth; while the rest remains \"not\nwealth\"? The notion that the value of a thing bears any necessary\nrelation to the amount of labour (average or otherwise) bestowed upon\nit, is a fallacy which needs no further refutation than it has already\nreceived.  The average amount of labour bestowed upon warming-pans\nconfers no value upon them in the eyes of a Gold-Coast negro; nor\nwould an Esquimaux give a slice of blubber for the most elaborate of\nice-machines.\n\nSo much for the doctrine of \"Progress and Poverty\" touching the nature\nof wealth. Let us now consider its teachings respecting capital as\nwealth or a part of wealth. Adam Smith's definition \"that part of a\nman's stock which he expects to yield him a revenue is called his\ncapital\" is quoted with approval (p. 32); elsewhere capital is said to\nbe that part of wealth \"which [172] is devoted to the aid of\nproduction\" (p. 28); and yet again it is said to be\n\n     . . . \"wealth in course of exchange,* understanding exchange to\n           include, not merely the passing from hand to hand, but\n           also such transmutations as occur when the reproductive\n           or transforming forces of nature are utilised for the\n           increase of wealth\" (p. 32).\n\n    * The italics are the author's.\n\nBut if too much pondering over the possible senses and scope of these\ndefinitions should weary the reader, he will be relieved by the\nfollowing acknowledgment:--\n\n     . . . \"Nor is the definition of capital I have suggested of\n           any importance\" (p. 33).\n\nThe author informs us, in fact, that he is \"not writing a text-book,\"\nthereby intimating his opinion that it is less important to be clear\nand accurate when you are trying to bring about a political revolution\nthan when a merely academic interest attaches to the subject treated.\nBut he is not busy about anything so serious as a textbook: no, he \"is\nonly attempting to discover the laws which control a great social\nproblem\"--a mode of expression which indicates perhaps the high-water\nmark of intellectual muddlement. I have heard, in my time, of \"laws\"\nwhich control other \"laws\"; but this is the first occasion on which\n\"laws\" which \"control a problem\" have come under my notice. Even the\ndisquisitions \"of [173] those flabby writers who have burdened the\npress and darkened counsel by numerous volumes which are dubbed\npolitical economy\" (p. 28) could hardly furnish their critics with a\nfiner specimen of that which a hero of the \"Dunciad,\" by the one flash\nof genius recorded of him, called \"clotted nonsense.\"\n\nDoubtless it is a sign of grace that the author of these definitions\nshould attach no importance to any of them; but since, unfortunately,\nhis whole argument turns upon the tacit assumption that they are\nimportant, I may not pass them over so lightly. The third I give up.\nWhy anything should be capital when it is \"in course of exchange,\" and\nnot be capital under other circumstances, passes my understanding. We\nare told that \"that part of a farmer's crop held for sale or for seed,\nor to feed his help, in part payment of wages, would be accounted\ncapital; that held for the care of his family would not be\" (p. 31).\nBut I fail to discover any ground of reason or authority for the\ndoctrine that it is only when a crop is about to be sold or sown, or\ngiven as wages, that it may be called capital. On the contrary,\nwhether we consider custom or reason, so much of it as is stored away\nin ricks and barns during harvest, and remains there to be used in any\nof these ways months or years afterwards, is customarily and rightly\ntermed capital.  Surely, the meaning of the clumsy phrase that capital\nis \"wealth in the [174] course of exchange\" must be that it is \"wealth\ncapable of being exchanged\" against labour or anything else. That, in\nfact, is the equivalent of the second definition, that capital is\n\"that part of wealth which is devoted to the aid of production.\"\nObviously, if you possess that for which men will give labour, you can\naid production by means of that labour. And, again, it agrees with the\nfirst definition (borrowed from Adam Smith) that capital is \"that part\nof a man's stock which he expects to yield him a revenue.\" For a\nrevenue is both etymologically and in sense a \"return.\" A man gives\nhis labour in sowing grain, or in tending cattle, because he expects a\n\"return\"--a \"revenue\"--in the shape of the increase of the grain or of\nthe herd; and also, in the latter case, in the shape of their labour\nand manure which \"aid the production\" of such increase. The grain and\ncattle of which he is possessed immediately after harvest is his\ncapital; and his revenue for the twelvemonth, until the next harvest,\nis the surplus of grain and cattle over and above the amount with\nwhich he started. This is disposable for any purpose for which he may\ndesire to use it, leaving him just as well off as he was at the\nbeginning of the year. Whether the man keeps the surplus grain for\nsowing more land, and the surplus cattle for occupying more pasture;\nwhether he exchanges them for other commodities, such as the use of\nthe land (as rent); or labour (as [175] wages); or whether he feeds\nhimself and his family, in no way alters their nature as revenue, or\naffects the fact that this revenue is merely disposable capital.\n\nThat (even apart from etymology) cattle are typical examples of\ncapital cannot be denied (\"Progress and Poverty,\" p. 25); and if we\nseek for that particular quality of cattle which makes them \"capital,\"\nneither has the author of \"Progress and Poverty\" supplied, nor is any\none else very likely to supply, a better account of the matter than\nAdam Smith has done. Cattle are \"capital\" because they are \"stock\nwhich yields revenue.\" That is to say, they afford to their owner a\nsupply of that which he desires to possess.  And, in this particular\ncase, the \"revenue\" is not only desirable, but of supreme importance,\ninasmuch as it is capable of maintaining human life. The herd yields a\nrevenue of food-stuffs as milk and meat; a revenue of skins; a revenue\nof manure; a revenue of labour; a revenue of exchangeable commodities\nin the shape of these things, as well as in that of live cattle.  In\neach and all of these capacities cattle are capital; and, conversely,\nthings which possess any or all of these capacities are capital.\n\nTherefore what we find at page 25 of \"Progress and Poverty\" must be\nregarded as a welcome lapse into clearness of apprehension:--\n\n\"A fertile field, a rich vein of ore, a falling stream which supplies\npower, may give the possessor advantages [176] equivalent to the\npossession of capital; but to class such things as capital would be to\nput an end to the distinction between land and capital.\"\n\nJust so. But the fatal truth is that these things are capital; and\nthat there really is no fundamental distinction between land and\ncapital. Is it denied that a fertile field, a rich vein of ore, or a\nfalling stream, may form part of a man's stock, and that, if they do,\nthey are capable of yielding revenue? Will not somebody pay a share of\nthe produce in kind, or in money, for the privilege of cultivating the\nfirst royalties for that of working the second; and a like equivalent\nfor that of erecting a mill on the third? In what sense, then, are\nthese things less \"capital\" than the buildings and tools which on page\n27 of \"Progress and Poverty\" are admitted to be capital? Is it not\nplain that if these things confer \"advantages equivalent to the\npossession of capital,\" and if the \"advantage\" of capital is nothing\nbut the yielding of revenue, then the denial that they are capital is\nmerely a roundabout way of self-contradiction?\n\nAll this confused talk about capital, however, is lucidity itself\ncompared with the exposition of the remarkable thesis, \"Wages not\ndrawn from capital, but produced by labour,\" which occupies the third\nchapter of \"Progress and Poverty.\"\n\n\"If, for instance, I devote my labour to gathering birds' eggs or\npicking wild berries, the eggs or berries I thus [177] get are my\nwages. Surely no one will contend that, in such a case, wages are\ndrawn from capital. There is no capital in the case\" (p. 34).\n\nNevertheless, those who have followed what has been said in the first\npart of this essay surely neither will, nor can, have any hesitation\nabout substantially adopting the challenged contention, though they\nmay possibly have qualms as to the propriety of the use of the term\n\"wages.\"* They will have no difficulty in apprehending the fact that\nbirds' eggs and berries are stores of foodstuffs, or vital capital;\nthat the man who devotes his labour to getting them does so at the\nexpense of his personal vital capital; and that, if the eggs and the\nberries are \"wages\" for his work, they are so because they enable him\nto restore to his organism the vital capital which he has consumed in\ndoing the work of collection. So that there is really a great deal of\n\"capital in the case.\"\n\n    * Not merely on the grounds stated below, but on the strength\n    of Mr. George's own definition. Does the gatherer of eggs, or\n    berries, produce them by his labour? If so, what do the hens\n    and the bushes do?\n\nOur author proceeds:--\n\n\"An absolutely naked man, thrown on an island where no human being has\nbefore trod, may gather birds' eggs or pick berries\" (p. 34).\n\nNo doubt. But those who have followed my argument thus far will be\naware that a man's vital capital does not reside in his clothes; and,\ntherefore, [178] they will probably fail, as completely as I do, to\ndiscover the relevancy of the statement.\n\nAgain:--\n\n     . . . Or, if I take a piece of leather and work it up into a\n           pair of shoes, the shoes are my wages--the reward of my\n           exertion. Surely they are not drawn from capital--either\n           my capital or anybody else's capital--but are brought\n           into existence by the labour of which they became the\n           wages; and, in obtaining this pair of shoes as the wages\n           of my labour, capital is not even momentarily lessened\n           one iota. For if we call in the idea of capital, my\n           capital at the beginning consists of the piece of\n           leather, the thread, &c. (p. 34).\n\nIt takes away one's breath to have such a concatenation of fallacies\nadministered in the space of half a paragraph. It does not seem to\nhave occurred to our economical reformer to imagine whence his\n\"capital at the beginning,\" the \"leather, thread, &c.\" came. I venture\nto suppose that leather to have been originally cattle-skin; and since\ncalves and oxen are not flayed alive, the existence of the leather\nimplies the lessening of that form of capital by a very considerable\niota. It is, therefore, as sure as anything can be that, in the long\nrun, the shoes are drawn from that which is capital par excellence; to\nwit, cattle. It is further beyond doubt that the operation of tanning\nmust involve loss of capital in the shape of bark, to say nothing of\nother losses; and that the use of the awls and knives of the shoemaker\ninvolves loss of capital in the shape of the store of [179] iron;\nfurther, the shoemaker has been enabled to do his work not only by the\nvital capital expended during the time occupied in making the pair of\nshoes, but by that expended from the time of his birth, up to the time\nthat he earned wages that would keep him alive.\n\n\"Progress and Poverty\" continues:--\n\n     . . . As my labour goes on, value is steadily added until,\n           when my labour results in the finished shoes, I have my\n           capital plus the difference in value between the\n           material and the shoes. In obtaining this additional\n           value--my wages--how is capital, at any time, drawn\n           upon? (p, 34).\n\nIn return we may inquire, how can any one propound such a question?\nCapital is drawn upon all the time. Not only when the shoes are\ncommenced, but while they are being made, and until they are either\nused by the shoemaker himself or are purchased by somebody else; that\nis, exchanged for a portion of another man's capital. In fact\n(supposing that the shoemaker does not want shoes himself), it is the\nexistence of vital capital in the possession of another person and the\nwillingness of that person to part with more or less of it in exchange\nfor the shoes--it is these two conditions, alone, which prevent the\nshoemaker from having consumed his capital unproductively, just as\nmuch as if he had spent his time in chopping up the leather into\nminute fragments.\n\nThus, the examination of the very case selected [180] by the advocate\nof the doctrine that labour bestowed upon manufacture, without any\nintervention of capital, can produce wages, proves to be a delusion of\nthe first magnitude; even though it be supported by the dictum of Adam\nSmith which is quoted in its favour (p. 34)--\n\n     . . . \"The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompense\n           or wages of labour. In that original state of things which\n           precedes both the appropriation of land and the\n           accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs\n           to the labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to\n           share with him\" (\"Wealth of Nations,\" ch. viii).\n\nBut the whole of this passage exhibits the influence of the French\nPhysiocrats by whom Adam Smith was inspired, at their worst; that is to\nsay, when they most completely forsook the ground of experience for a\npriori speculation. The confident reference to \"that original state of\nthings\" is quite in the manner of the Essai sur l'Inegalie. Now, the\nstate of men before the \"appropriation of land\" and the \"accumulation\nof stock\" must surely have been that of purely savage hunters. As, by\nthe supposition, nobody would have possessed land, certainly no man\ncould have had a landlord; and, if there was no accumulation of stock\nin a transferable form, as surely there could be no master, in the\nsense of hirer. But hirer and hire (that is, wages) are correlative\nterms, like mother and child. As \"child\" implies \"mother,\" so does\n\"hire\" or \"wages\" imply a [181] \"hirer\" or \"wage-giver.\" Therefore,\nwhen a man in \"the original state of things\" gathered fruit or killed\ngame for his own sustenance, the fruit or the game could be called his\n\"wages\" only in a figurative sense; as one sees if the term \"hire,\"\nwhich has a more limited connotation, is substituted for \"wage.\" If\nnot, it must be assumed that the savage hired himself to get his own\ndinner; whereby we are led to the tolerably absurd conclusion that, as\nin the \"state of nature\" he was his own employer, the \"master\" and the\nlabourer, in that model age, appropriated the produce in equal shares!\nAnd if this should be not enough, it has already been seen that, in\nthe hunting state, man is not even an accessory of production of vital\ncapital; he merely consumes what nature produces.\n\nAccording to the author of \"Progress and Poverty\" political economists\nhave been deluded by a \"fallacy which has entangled some of the most\nacute minds in a web of their own spinning.\"\n\n\"It is in the use of the term capital in two senses. In the primary\nproposition that capital is necessary to the exertion of productive\nlabour, the term \"capital\" is understood as including all food,\nclothing, shelter, &c.; whereas in the deductions finally drawn from\nit, the term is used in its common and legitimate meaning of wealth\ndevoted, not to the immediate gratification of desire, but to the\nprocurement of more wealth--of wealth in the hands of employers as\ndistinguished from labourers\" (p. 40).\n\n[182] I am by no means concerned to defend the political economists who\nare thus charged with blundering; but I shall be surprised to learn\nthat any have carried the art of self-entanglement to the degree of\nperfection exhibited by this passage. Who has ever imagined that\nwealth which, in the hands of an employer, is capital, ceases to be\ncapital if it is in the hands of a labourer? Suppose a workman to be\npaid thirty shillings on Saturday evening for six days' labour, that\nthirty shillings comes out of the employer's capital, and receives the\nname of \"wages\" simply because it is exchanged for labour. In the\nworkman's pocket, as he goes home, it is a part of his capital, in\nexactly the same sense as, half an hour before, it was part of the\nemployer's capital; he is a capitalist just as much as if he were a\nRothschild. Suppose him to be a single man, whose cooking and\nhousehold matters are attended to by the people of the house in which\nhe has a room; then the rent which he pays them out of this capital\nis, in part, wages for their labour, and he is, so far, an employer.\nIf he saves one shilling out of his thirty, he has, to that extent,\nadded to his capital when the next Saturday comes round. And if he\nputs his saved shillings week by week into the Savings Bank, the\ndifference between him and the most bloated of bankers is simply one\nof degree.\n\nAt page 42, we are confidently told that [183] \"labourers by receiving\nwages\" cannot lessen \"even temporarily\" the \"capital of the employer,\"\nwhile at page 44 it is admitted that in certain cases the capitalist\n\"pays out capital in wages.\" One would think that the \"paying out\" of\ncapital is hardly possible without at least a \"temporary\" diminution\nof the capital from which payment is made. But \"Progress and Poverty\"\nchanges all that by a little verbal legerdemain:--\n\n     . . . \"For where wages are paid before the object of the labour\n           is obtained, or is finished--as in agriculture, where\n           ploughing and sowing must precede by several months the\n           harvesting of the crop; as in the erection of buildings,\n           the construction of ships, railroads, canals, &c.--it is\n           clear that the owners of the capital paid in wages cannot\n           expect an immediate return, but, as the phrase is, must\n           \"outlay it\" or \"lie out of it\" for a time which sometimes\n           amounts to many years. And hence, if first principles are\n           not kept in mind, it is easy to jump to the conclusion\n           that wages are advanced by capital\" (p. 44).\n\nThose who have paid attention to the argument of former parts of this\npaper may not be able to understand how, if sound \"first principles\nare kept in mind,\" any other conclusion can be reached, whether by\njumping, or by any other mode of logical progression. But the first\nprinciple which our author \"keeps in mind\" possesses just that amount\nof ambiguity which enables him to play hocus-pocus with it. It is\nthis; that \"the creation of value does not depend upon the finishing\nof the product\" (p. 44).\n\n[184] There is no doubt that, under certain limitations, this\nproposition is correct. It is not true that \"labour always adds to\ncapital by its exertion before it takes from capital its wages\" (p.\n44), but it is true that it may, and often does, produce that effect.\n\nTo take one of the examples given, the construction of a ship. The\nshaping of the timbers undoubtedly gives them a value (for a\nshipbuilder) which they did not possess before. When they are put\ntogether to constitute the framework of the ship, there is a still\nfurther addition of value (for a shipbuilder); and when the outside\nplanking is added, there is another addition (for a shipbuilder).\nSuppose everything else about the hull is finished, except the one\nlittle item of caulking the seams, there is no doubt that it has still\nmore value for a shipbuilder. But for whom else has it any value,\nexcept perhaps for a fire-wood merchant? What price will any one who\nwants a ship--that is to say, something that will carry a cargo from\none port to another--give for the unfinished vessel which would take\nwater in at every seam and go down in half an hour, if she were\nlaunched? Suppose the shipbuilder's capital to fail before the vessel\nis caulked, and that he cannot find another shipbuilder who cares to\nbuy and finish it, what sort of proportion does the value created by\nthe labour, for which he has paid out of his capital, stand to that of\nhis advances?\n\n[185] Surely no one will give him one-tenth of the capital disbursed\nin wages, perhaps not so much even as the prime cost of the raw\nmaterials.  Therefore, though the assertion that \"the creation of\nvalue does not depend on the finishing of the product\" may be strictly\ntrue under certain circumstances, it need not be and is not always\ntrue. And, if it is meant to imply or suggest that the creation of\nvalue in a manufactured article does not depend upon the finishing of\nthat article, a more serious error could hardly be propounded.\n\nIs there not a prodigious difference in the value of an uncaulked and\nin that of a finished ship; between the value of a house in which only\nthe tiles of the roof are wanting and a finished house; between that\nof a clock which only lacks the escapement and a finished clock?\n\nAs ships, house, and clock, the unfinished articles have no value\nwhatever--that is to say, no person who wanted to purchase one of\nthese things, for immediate use, would give a farthing for either. The\nonly value they can have, apart from that of the materials they\ncontain, is that which they possess for some one who can finish them,\nor for some one who can make use of parts of them for the construction\nof other things. A man might buy an unfinished house for the sake of\nthe bricks; or he might buy an incomplete clock to use the works for\nsome other piece of machinery.\n\nThus, though every stage of the labour [186] bestowed on raw material,\nfor the purpose of giving rise to a certain product, confers some\nadditional value on that material in the estimation of those who are\nengaged in manufacturing that product, the ratio of that accumulated\nvalue, at any stage of the process, to the value of the finished\nproduct is extremely inconstant, and often small; while, to other\npersons, the value of the unfinished product may be nothing, or even a\nminus quantity. A house-timber merchant, for example, might consider\nthat wood which had been worked into the ribs of a ship was\nspoiled--that is, had less value than it had as a log.\n\nAccording to \"Progress and Poverty,\" there was, really, no advance of\ncapital while the great St. Gothard tunnel was cut. Suppose that, as\nthe Swiss and the Italian halves of the tunnel approached to within\nhalf a kilometre, that half-kilometre had turned out to be composed of\npractically impenetrable rock--would anybody have given a centime for\nthe unfinished tunnel? And if not, how comes it that \"the creation of\nvalue does not depend on the finishing of the product\"?\n\nI think it may be not too much to say that, of all the political\ndelusions which are current in this queer world, the very stupidest\nare those which assume that labour and capital are necessarily\nantagonistic; that all capital is produced by labour and therefore, by\nnatural right, is the property of [187] the labourer; that the\npossessor of capital is a robber who preys on the workman and\nappropriates to himself that which he has had no share in producing.\n\nOn the contrary, capital and labour are, necessarily, close allies;\ncapital is never a product of human labour alone; it exists apart from\nhuman labour; it is the necessary antecedent of labour; and it\nfurnishes the materials on which labour is employed. The only\nindispensable form of capital--vital capital--cannot be produced by\nhuman labour. All that man can do is to favour its formation by the\nreal producers. There is no intrinsic relation between the amount of\nlabour bestowed on an article and its value in exchange. The claim of\nlabour to the total result of operations which are rendered possible\nonly by capital is simply an a priori iniquity.\n\n[188]\n\n\n                             V.\n\n              SOCIAL DISEASES AND WORSE REMEDIES\n\n        LETTERS TO THE \"TIMES\" ON MR. BOOTH'S SCHEME.\n           WITH A PREFACE AND INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.\n\n                          [1891]\n\n                          PREFACE\n\nThe letters which are here collected together were published in the\n\"Times\" in the course of the months of December, 1890, and January,\n1891.\n\nThe circumstances which led me to write the first letter are\nsufficiently set forth in its opening sentences; and the materials on\nwhich I based my criticisms of Mr. Booth's scheme, in this and in the\nsecond letter, were wholly derived from Mr. Booth's book. I had some\nreason to know, however, that when anybody allows his sense of duty so\nfar to prevail over his sense of the blessedness of peace as to write\na letter to the \"Times,\" on any subject of public interest, his\nreflections, before he has done with the business, will be very like\n[189] those of Johnny Gilpin, \"who little thought, when he set out, of\nrunning such a rig.\" Such undoubtedly are mine when I contemplate\nthese twelve documents, and call to mind the distinct addition to the\nrevenue of the Post Office which must have accrued from the mass of\nletters and pamphlets which have been delivered at my door; to say\nnothing of the unexpected light upon my character, motives, and\ndoctrines, which has been thrown by some of the \"Times'\"\ncorrespondents, and by no end of comments elsewhere.\n\nIf self-knowledge is the highest aim of man, I ought by this time to\nhave little to learn. And yet, if I am awake, some of my\nteachers--unable, perhaps, to control the divine fire of the poetic\nimagination which is so closely akin to, if not a part of, the\nmythopoeic faculty--have surely dreamed dreams. So far as my humbler\nand essentially prosaic faculties of observation and comparison go,\nplain facts are against them. But, as I may be mistaken, I have\nthought it well to prefix to the letters (by way of \"Prolegomena\") an\nessay which appeared in the \"Nineteenth Century\" for January, 1888, in\nwhich the principles that, to my mind, lie at the bottom of the\n\"social question\" are stated. So far as Individualism and Regimental\nSocialism are concerned, this paper simply emphasizes and expands the\nopinions expressed in an address to the members of the Midland\nInstitute, delivered seventeen years earlier, [190] and still more\nfully developed in several essays published in the \"Nineteenth\nCentury\" in 1889, which I hope, before long, to republish.*\n\n    * See Collected Essays, vol. i. p. 290 to end; and this volume,\n    p. 147.\n\nThe fundamental proposition which runs through the writings, which\nthus extend over twenty years, is, that the common a priori\ndoctrines and methods of reasoning about political and social\nquestions are essentially vicious; and that argumentation on this\nbasis leads, with equal logical force, to two contradictory and\nextremely mischievous systems, the one that of Anarchaic\nIndividualism, the other that of despotic or Regimental Socialism.\nWhether I am right or wrong, I am at least consistent in opposing both\nto the best of my ability. Mr. Booth's system appears to me, and, as I\nhave shown, is regarded by Socialists themselves, to be mere\nautocratic Socialism, masked by its theological exterior. That the\n\"fantastic\" religious skin will wear away, and the Socialistic reality\nit covers will show its real nature, is the expressed hope of one\ncandid Socialist, and may be fairly conceived to be the unexpressed\nbelief of the despotic leader of the new Trades Union, who has shown\nhis zeal, if not his discretion, in championing Mr. Booth's projects.\n[See Letter VIII.]\n\nYet another word to commentators upon my letters. There are some who\nrather chuckle, and [191] some who sneer, at what they seem to\nconsider the dexterity of an \"old controversial hand,\" exhibited by\nthe contrast which I have drawn between the methods of conversion\ndepicted in the New Testament and those pursued by fanatics of the\nSalvationist type, whether they be such as are now exploited by Mr.\nBooth, or such as those who, from the time of the Anabaptists, to go\nno further back, have worked upon similar lines.\n\nWhether such observations were intended to be flattering or sarcastic,\nI must respectfully decline to accept the compliment, or to apply the\nsarcasm to myself. I object to obliquity of procedure and ambiguity of\nspeech in all shapes. And I confess that I find it difficult to\nunderstand the state of mind which leads any one to suppose, that deep\nrespect for single-minded devotion to high aims is incompatible with\nthe unhesitating conviction that those aims include the propagation of\ndoctrines which are devoid of foundation--perhaps even mischievous.\n\nThe most degrading feature of the narrower forms of Christianity (of\nwhich that professed by Mr. Booth is a notable example) is their\ninsistence that the noblest virtues, if displayed by those who reject\ntheir pitiable formulae, are, as their pet phrase goes, \"splendid\nsins.\" But there is, perhaps, one step lower; and that is that men,\nwho profess freedom of thought, should fail to see and [192]\nappreciate that large soul of goodness which often animates even the\nfanatical adherents of such tenets. I am sorry for any man who can\nread the epistles to the Galatians and the Corinthians without\nyielding a large meed of admiration to the fervent humanity of Paul of\nTarsus; who can study the lives of Francis of Assisi, or of Catherine\nof Siena, without wishing that, for the furtherance of his own ideals,\nhe might be even as they; or who can contemplate unmoved the steadfast\nveracity and true heroism which loom through the fogs of mystical\nutterance in George Fox. In all these great men and women there lay\nthe root of the matter; a burning desire to amend the condition of\ntheir fellow-men, and to put aside all other things for that end. If,\nin spite of all the dogmatic helps or hindrances in which they were\nentangled, these people are not to be held in high honour, who are?\n\nI have never expressed a doubt--for I have none--that, when Mr. Booth\nleft the Methodist connection, and started that organisation of the\nSalvation Army upon which, comparatively recently, such ambitious\nschemes of social reform have been grafted, he may have deserved some\nshare of such honour. I do not say that, so far as his personal\ndesires and intentions go, he may not still deserve it. But the\ncorrelate of despotic authority is unlimited responsibility. If Mr.\nBooth is to take [193] credit for any good that the Army system has\neffected, he must be prepared to bear blame for its inherent evils. As\nit seems to me, that has happened to him which sooner or later happens\nto all despots: he has become the slave of his own creation--the\nprosperity and glory of the soul-saving machine have become the end,\ninstead of a means, of soul-saving; and to maintain these at the\nproper pitch, the \"General\" is led to do things which the Mr. Booth of\ntwenty years ago would probably have scorned.\n\nAnd those who desire, as I most emphatically desire, to be just to Mr.\nBooth, however badly they may think of the working of the organization\nhe has founded, will bear in mind that some astute backers of his\nprobably care little enough for Salvationist religion; and, perhaps,\nare not very keen about many of Mr. Booth's projects. I have referred\nto the rubbing of the hands of the Socialists over Mr. Booth's\nsuccess;* but, unless I err greatly, there are politicians of a\ncertain school to whom it affords still greater satisfaction. Consider\nwhat electioneering agents the captains of the Salvation Army,\nscattered through all our towns, and directed from a political\n\"bureau\" in London, would make! Think how political adversaries could\nbe harassed by our local attorney--\"tribune of the people,\" I mean;\nand how a troublesome man, on the other side, could be \"hunted [194]\ndown\" upon any convenient charge, whether true or false, brought by\nour Vigilance-familiar!**\n\n    * See Letter VIII.\n    ** See Letter II.\n\nI entirely acquit Mr. Booth of any complicity in far-reaching schemes\nof this kind; but I did not write idly when, in my first letter, I\ngave no vague warning of what might grow out of the organised force,\ndrilled in the habit of unhesitating obedience, which he has created.\n\n[195]\n\n\n                         INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.\n\n             THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE IN HUMAN SOCIETY.\n\n                              [1888].\n\nThe vast and varied procession of events, which we call Nature, affords\na sublime spectacle and an inexhaustible wealth of attractive problems\nto the speculative observer. If we confine our attention to that\naspect which engages the attention of the intellect, nature appears a\nbeautiful and harmonious whole, the incarnation of a faultless logical\nprocess, from certain premises in the past to an inevitable conclusion\nin the future. But if it be regarded from a less elevated, though more\nhuman, point of view; if our moral sympathies are allowed to influence\nour judgment, and we permit ourselves to criticise our great mother as\nwe criticise one another; then our verdict, at least so far as\nsentient nature is concerned, can hardly be so favourable.\n\nIn sober truth, to those who have made a study of the phenomena of life\nas they exhibited by the higher forms of the animal world, [196] the\noptimistic dogma, that this is the best of all possible worlds, will\nseem little better than a libel upon possibility. It is really only\nanother instance to be added to the many extant, of the audacity of a\npriori speculators who, having created God in their own image, find no\ndifficulty in assuming that the Almighty must have been actuated by\nthe same motives as themselves. They are quite sure that, had any\nother course been practicable, He would no more have made infinite\nsuffering a necessary ingredient of His handiwork than a respectable\nphilosopher would have done the like.\n\nBut even the modified optimism of the time-honoured thesis of\nphysico-theology, that the sentient world is, on the whole, regulated\nby principles of benevolence, does but ill stand the test of impartial\nconfrontation with the facts of the case. No doubt it is quite true\nthat sentient nature affords hosts of examples of subtle contrivances\ndirected towards the production of pleasure or the avoidance of pain;\nand it may be proper to say that these are evidences of benevolence.\nBut if so, why is it not equally proper to say of the equally numerous\narrangements, the no less necessary result of which is the production\nof pain, that they are evidences of malevolence?\n\nIf a vast amount of that which, in a piece of human workmanship, we\nshould call skill, is [197] visible in those parts of the organization\nof a deer to which it owes its ability to escape from beasts of prey,\nthere is at least equal skill displayed in that bodily mechanism of\nthe wolf which enables him to track, and sooner or later to bring\ndown, the deer. Viewed under the dry light of science, deer and wolf\nare alike admirable; and, if both were non-sentient automata, there\nwould be nothing to qualify our admiration of the action of the one on\nthe other. But the fact that the deer suffers, while the wolf inflicts\nsuffering, engages our moral sympathies. We should call men like the\ndeer innocent and good, men such as the wolf malignant and bad; we\nshould call those who defended the deer and aided him to escape brave\nand compassionate, and those who helped the wolf in his bloody work\nbase and cruel. Surely, if we transfer these judgments to nature\noutside the world of man at all, we must do so impartially. In that\ncase, the goodness of the right hand which helps the deer, and the\nwickedness of the left hand which eggs on the wolf, will neutralize\none another: and the course of nature will appear to be neither moral\nnor immoral, but non-moral.\n\nThis conclusion is thrust upon us by analogous facts in every part of\nthe sentient world; yet, inasmuch as it not only jars upon prevalent\nprejudices, but arouses the natural dislike to that which is painful,\nmuch ingenuity has been exercised in devising an escape from it.\n\nFrom the theological side, we are told that [198] this is a state of\nprobation, and that the seeming injustices and immoralities of nature\nwill be compensated by and by. But how this compensation is to be\neffected, in the case of the great majority of sentient things, is not\nclear. I apprehend that no one is seriously prepared to maintain that\nthe ghosts of all the myriads of generations of herbivorous animals\nwhich lived during the millions of years of the earth's duration,\nbefore the appearance of man, and which have all that time been\ntormented and devoured by carnivores, are to be compensated by a\nperennial existence in clover; while the ghosts of carnivores are to\ngo to some kennel where there is neither a pan of water nor a bone\nwith any meat on it. Besides, from the point of view of morality, the\nlast stage of things would be worse than the first. For the\ncarnivores, however brutal and sanguinary, have only done that which,\nif there is any evidence of contrivance in the world, they were\nexpressly constructed to do.  Moreover, carnivores and herbivores\nalike have been subject to all the miseries incidental to old age,\ndisease, and over-multiplication, and both might well put in a claim\nfor \"compensation\" on this score.\n\nOn the evolutionist side, on the other hand, we are told to take\ncomfort from the reflection that the terrible struggle for existence\ntends to final good, and that the suffering of the ancestor is paid\nfor by the increased perfection of the progeny. There would be\nsomething in this argument if, in [199] Chinese fashion, the present\ngeneration could pay its debts to its ancestors; otherwise it is not\nclear what compensation the Eohippus gets for his sorrows in the fact\nthat, some millions of years afterwards, one of his descendants wins\nthe Derby. And, again, it is an error to imagine that evolution\nsignifies a constant tendency to increased perfection. That process\nundoubtedly involves a constant remodelling of the organism in\nadaptation to new conditions; but it depends on the nature of those\nconditions whether the direction of the modifications effected shall\nbe upward or downward. Retrogressive is as practicable as progressive\nmetamorphosis. If what the physical philosophers tell us, that our\nglobe has been in a state of fusion, and, like the sun, is gradually\ncooling down, is true; then the time must come when evolution will\nmean adaptation to an universal winter, and all forms of life will die\nout, except such low and simple organisms as the Diatom of the arctic\nand antarctic ice and the Protococcus of the red snow. If our globe is\nproceeding from a condition in which it was too hot to support any but\nthe lowest living thing to a condition in which it will be too cold to\npermit of the existence of any others, the course of life upon its\nsurface must describe a trajectory like that of a ball fired from a\nmortar; and the sinking half of that course is as much a part of the\ngeneral process of evolution as the rising.\n\nFrom the point of view of the moralist the [200] animal world is on\nabout the same level as a gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly\nwell treated, and set to fight--whereby the strongest, the swiftest,\nand the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no\nneed to turn his thumbs down, as no quarter is given. He must admit\nthat the skill and training displayed are wonderful. But he must shut\nhis eyes if he would not see that more or less enduring suffering is\nthe meed of both vanquished and victor. And since the great game is\ngoing on in every corner of the world, thousands of times a minute;\nsince, were our ears sharp enough, we need not descend to the gates of\nhell to hear--\n\n    . . . sospiri, pianti, ed alti guai.\n    Voci alte e floche, e suon di man con elle\n\n--it seems to follow that, if the world is governed by benevolence, it\nmust be a different sort of benevolence from that of John Howard.\n\nBut the old Babylonians wisely symbolized Nature by their great\ngoddess Istar, who combined the attributes of Aphrodite with those of\nAres. Her terrible aspect is not to be ignored or covered up with\nshams; but it is not the only one. If the optimism of Leibnitz is a\nfoolish though pleasant dream, the pessimism of Schopenhauer is a\nnightmare, the more foolish because of its hideousness. Error which is\nnot pleasant is surely the worst form of wrong.\n\n[201] This may not be the best of all possible worlds, but to say that\nit is the worst is mere petulant nonsense. A worn-out voluptuary may\nfind nothing good under the sun, or a vain and inexperienced youth,\nwho cannot get the moon he cries for, may vent his irritation in\npessimistic moanings; but there can be no doubt in the mind of any\nreasonable person that mankind could, would, and in fact do, get on\nfairly well with vastly less happiness and far more misery than find\ntheir way into the lives of nine people out of ten. If each and all of\nus had been visited by an attack of neuralgia, or of extreme mental\ndepression, for one hour in every twenty-four--a supposition which\nmany tolerably vigorous people know, to their cost, is not\nextravagant--the burden of life would have been immensely increased\nwithout much practical hindrance to its general course. Men with any\nmanhood in them find life quite worth living under worse conditions\nthan these.\n\nThere is another sufficiently obvious fact, which renders the\nhypothesis that the course of sentient nature is dictated by\nmalevolence quite untenable. A vast multitude of pleasures, and these\namong the purest and the best, are superfluities, bits of good which\nare to all appearances unnecessary as inducements to live, and are, so\nto speak, thrown into the bargain of life. To those who experience\nthem, few delights can be more entrancing than such as are afforded by\nnatural [202] beauty, or by the arts, and especially by music; but\nthey are products of, rather than factors in, evolution, and it is\nprobable that they are known, in any considerable degree, to but a\nvery small proportion of mankind.\n\nThe conclusion of the whole matter seems to be that, if Ormuzd has not\nhad his way in this world, neither has Ahriman. Pessimism is as little\nconsonant with the facts of sentient existence as optimism. If we\ndesire to represent the course of nature in terms of human thought,\nand assume that it was intended to be that which it is, we must say\nthat its governing principle is intellectual and not moral; that it is\na materialized logical process, accompanied by pleasures and pains,\nthe incidence of which, in the majority of cases, has not the\nslightest reference to moral desert. That the rain falls alike upon\nthe just and the unjust, and that those upon whom the Tower of Siloam\nfell were no worse than their neighbours, seem to be Oriental modes of\nexpressing the same conclusion.\n\nIn the strict sense of the word \"nature,\" it denotes the sum of the\nphenomenal world, of that which has been, and is, and will be; and\nsociety, like art, is therefore a part of nature.  But it is\nconvenient to distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays the\npart of immediate cause, as some thing apart; and, therefore, society,\nlike art, [203] is usefully to be considered as distinct from nature.\nIt is the more desirable, and even necessary, to make this\ndistinction, since society differs from nature in having a definite\nmoral object; whence it comes about that the course shaped by the\nethical man--the member of society or citizen--necessarily runs\ncounter to that which the non-ethical man--the primitive savage, or\nman as a mere member of the animal kingdom--tends to adopt. The latter\nfights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any\nother animal; the former devotes his best energies to the object of\nsetting limits to the struggle.*\n\nIn the cycle of phenomena presented by the life of man, the animal, no\nmore moral end is discernible than in that presented by the lives of\nthe wolf and of the deer. However imperfect the relics of prehistoric\nmen may be, the evidence which they afford clearly tends to the\nconclusion that, for thousands and thousands of years, before the\norigin of the oldest known civilizations, men were savages of a very\nlow type. They strove with their enemies and their competitors; they\npreyed upon things weaker or less cunning than themselves; they were\nborn, multiplied without stint, and died, for thousands of generations\nalongside the mammoth, the urus, the lion, and the hyaena, whose lives\nwere spent in the same way; [204] and they were no more to be praised\nor blamed on moral grounds, than their less erect and more hairy\ncompatriots.\n\n    * [The reader will observe that this is the argument of the\n    Romanes Lecture, in brief.--1894.]\n\nAs among these, so among primitive men, the weakest and stupidest went\nto the wall, while the toughest and shrewdest, those who were best\nfitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other\nsense, survived. Life was a continual free fight, and beyond the\nlimited and temporary relations of the family, the Hobbesian war of\neach against all was the normal state of existence. The human species,\nlike others, plashed and floundered amid the general stream of\nevolution, keeping its head above water as it best might, and thinking\nneither of whence nor whither.\n\nThe history of civilization--that is, of society--on the other hand, is\nthe record of the attempts which the human race has made to escape\nfrom this position. The first men who substituted the state of mutual\npeace for that of mutual war, whatever the motive which impelled them\nto take that step, created society. But, in establishing peace, they\nobviously put a limit upon the struggle for existence. Between the\nmembers of that society, at any rate, it was not to be pursued a\noutrance. And of all the successive shapes which society has taken,\nthat most nearly approaches perfection in which the war of individual\nagainst individual is most strictly limited.\n\n[205] The primitive savage, tutored by Istar, appropriated whatever\ntook his fancy, and killed whomsoever opposed him, if he could. On the\ncontrary, the ideal of the ethical man is to limit his freedom of\naction to a sphere in which he does not interfere with the freedom of\nothers; he seeks the common weal as much as his own; and, indeed, as\nan essential part of his own welfare. Peace is both end and means with\nhim; and he founds his life on a more or less complete self-restraint,\nwhich is the negation of the unlimited struggle for existence. He\ntries to escape from his place in the animal kingdom, founded on the\nfree development of the principle of non-moral evolution, and to\nestablish a kingdom of Man, governed upon the principle of moral\nevolution. For society not only has a moral end, but in its\nperfection, social life, is embodied morality.\n\nBut the effort of ethical man to work towards a moral end by no means\nabolished, perhaps has hardly modified, the deep-seated organic\nimpulses which impel the natural man to follow his non-moral course.\nOne of the most essential conditions, if not the chief cause, of the\nstruggle for existence, is the tendency to multiply without limit,\nwhich man shares with all living things. It is notable that \"increase\nand multiply\" is a commandment traditionally much older than the ten;\nand that it is, perhaps, the only one which has been spontaneously and\nex animo obeyed by [206] the great majority of the human race. But, in\ncivilized society, the inevitable result of such obedience is the\nre-establishment, in all its intensity, of that struggle for\nexistence--the war of each against all--the mitigation or abolition of\nwhich was the chief end of social organization.\n\nIt is conceivable that, at some period in the history of the fabled Atlantis,\nthe production of food should have been exactly sufficient to meet the\nwants of the population, that the makers of the commodities of the\nartificer should have amounted to just the number supportable by the\nsurplus food of the agriculturists. And, as there is no harm in adding\nanother monstrous supposition to the foregoing, let it be imagined\nthat every man, woman, and child was perfectly virtuous, and aimed at\nthe good of all as the highest personal good. In that happy land, the\nnatural man would have been finally put down by the ethical man. There\nwould have been no competition, but the industry of each would have\nbeen serviceable to all; nobody being vain and nobody avaricious,\nthere would have been no rivalries; the struggle for existence would\nhave been abolished, and the millennium would have finally set in. But\nit is obvious that this state of things could have been permanent only\nwith a stationary population. Add ten fresh mouths; and as, by the\nsupposition, there was only exactly enough before, somebody must go on\nshort rations. The [207] Atlantis society might have been a heaven\nupon earth, the whole nation might have consisted of just men, needing\nno repentance, and yet somebody must starve. Reckless Istar, non-moral\nNature, would have riven the ethical fabric. I was once talking with a\nvery eminent physician* about the vis medicatrix naturae. \"Stuff!\"\nsaid he; \"nine times out of ten nature does not want to cure the man:\nshe wants to put him in his coffin.\" And Istar-Nature appears to have\nequally little sympathy with the ends of society. \"Stuff! she wants\nnothing but a fair field and free play for her darling the strongest.\"\n\n    * The late Sir W. Gull\n\nOur Atlantis may be an impossible figment, but the antagonistic\ntendencies which the fable adumbrates have existed in every society\nwhich was ever established, and, to all appearance, must strive for\nthe victory in all that will be. Historians point to the greed and\nambition of rulers, to the reckless turbulence of the ruled, to the\ndebasing effects of wealth and luxury, and to the devastating wars\nwhich have formed a great part of the occupation of mankind, as the\ncauses of the decay of states and the foundering of old civilizations,\nand thereby point their story with a moral.  No doubt immoral motives\nof all sorts have figured largely among the minor causes of these\nevents. But beneath all this [208] superficial turmoil lay the\ndeep-seated impulse given by unlimited multiplication. In the swarms\nof colonies thrown out by Phoenicia and by old Greece; in the ver\nsacrum of the Latin races; in the floods of Gauls and of Teutons which\nburst over the frontiers of the old civilization of Europe; in the\nswaying to and fro of the vast Mongolian hordes in late times, the\npopulation problem comes to the front in a very visible shape. Nor is\nit less plainly manifest in the everlasting agrarian questions of\nancient Rome than in the Arreoi societies of the Polynesian Islands.\n\nIn the ancient world, and in a large part of that in which we live,\nthe practice of infanticide was, or is, a regular and legal custom;\nfamine, pestilence, and war were and are normal factors in the\nstruggle for existence, and they have served, in a gross and brutal\nfashion, to mitigate the intensity of the effects of its chief cause.\n\nBut, in the more advanced civilizations, the progress of private and\npublic morality has steadily tended to remove all these checks. We\ndeclare infanticide murder, and punish it as such; we decree, not\nquite so successfully, that no one shall die of hunger; we regard\ndeath from preventible causes of other kinds as a sort of constructive\nmurder, and eliminate pestilence to the best of our ability; we\ndeclaim against the curse [209] of war, and the wickedness of the\nmilitary spirit, and we are never weary of dilating on the blessedness\nof peace and the innocent beneficence of Industry. In their moments of\nexpansion, even statesmen and men of business go thus far. The finer\nspirits look to an ideal civitas Dei; a state when, every man having\nreached the point of absolute self-negation, and having nothing but\nmoral perfection to strive after, peace will truly reign, not merely\namong nations, but among men, and the struggle for existence will be\nat an end.\n\nWhether human nature is competent, under any circumstances, to reach,\nor even seriously advance towards, this ideal condition, is a question\nwhich need not be discussed. It will be admitted that mankind has not\nyet reached this stage by a very long way, and my business is with the\npresent. And that which I wish to point out is that, so long as the\nnatural man increases and multiplies without restraint, so long will\npeace and industry not only permit, but they will necessitate, a\nstruggle for existence as sharp as any that ever went on under the\nregime of war. If Istar is to reign on the one hand, she will demand\nher human sacrifices on the other.\n\nLet us look at home. For seventy years peace and industry have had\ntheir way among us with less interruption and under more favourable\nconditions than in any other country on the face of the earth. The\nwealth of Croesus was nothing to [210] that which we have accumulated,\nand our prosperity has filled the world with envy. But Nemesis did not\nforget Croesus: has she forgotten us?\n\nI think not. There are now 36,000,000 of people in our islands, and\nevery year considerably more than 300,000 are added to our numbers.*\nThat is to say, about every hundred seconds, or so, a new claimant to\na share in the common stock or maintenance presents him or herself\namong us. At the present time, the produce of the soil does not\nsuffice to feed half its population.  The other moiety has to be\nsupplied with food which must be bought from the people of\nfood-producing countries. That is to say, we have to offer them the\nthings which they want in exchange for the things we want. And the\nthings they want and which we can produce better than they can are\nmainly manufactures--industrial products.\n\n    * These numbers are only approximately accurate. In 1881, our\n    population amounted to 35,241,482, exceeding the number in 1871\n    by 3,396,103. The average annual increase in the decennial.\n    1871--1881 is therefore 339,610. The number of minutes in a\n    calendar year is 525,600.\n\nThe insolent reproach of the first Napoleon had a very solid\nfoundation. We not only are, but, under penalty of starvation, we are\nbound to be, a nation of shopkeepers. But other nations also lie under\nthe same necessity of keeping shop, and some of them deal in the same\ngoods as ourselves. Our customers naturally seek to get the most and\n[211] the best in exchange for their produce. If our goods are\ninferior to those of our competitors, there is no ground, compatible\nwith the sanity of the buyers, which can be alleged, why they should\nnot prefer the latter. And, if that result should ever take place on a\nlarge and general scale, five or six millions of us would soon have\nnothing to eat. We know what the cotton famine was; and we can\ntherefore form some notion of what a dearth of customers would be.\n\nJudged by an ethical standard, nothing can be less satisfactory than\nthe position in which we find ourselves. In a real, though incomplete,\ndegree we have attained the condition of peace which is the main\nobject of social organization; and, for argument's sake, it may be\nassumed that we desire nothing but that which is in itself innocent\nand praiseworthy--namely, the enjoyment of the fruits of honest\nindustry. And lo! in spite of ourselves, we are in reality engaged in\nan internecine struggle for existence with our presumably no less\npeaceful and well-meaning neighbours. We seek peace and we do not\nensue it. The moral nature in us asks for no more than is compatible\nwith the general good; the non-moral nature proclaims and acts upon\nthat fine old Scottish family motto, \"Thou shalt starve ere I want.\"\nLet us be under no illusions, then. So long as unlimited multiplication\ngoes on, no social organization which has ever been devised, or is\nlikely to [212] be devised, no fiddle-faddling with the distribution\nof wealth, will deliver society from the tendency to be destroyed by\nthe reproduction within itself, in its intensest form, of that\nstruggle for existence the limitation of which is the object of\nsociety. And however shocking to the moral sense this eternal\ncompetition of man against man and of nation against nation may be;\nhowever revolting may be the accumulation of misery at the negative\npole of society, in contrast with that of monstrous wealth at the\npositive pole;* this state of things must abide, and grow continually\nworse, so long as Istar holds her way unchecked. It is the true riddle\nof the Sphinx; and every nation which does not solve it will sooner or\nlater be devoured by the monster itself has generated.\n\nThe practical and pressing question for us, just now, seems to me to be\nhow to gain time. \"Time brings counsel,\" as the Teutonic proverb has\nit; and wiser folk among our posterity may see their way out of that\nwhich at present looks like an impasse.\n\nIt would be folly to entertain any ill-feeling towards those neighbours\nand rivals who, like ourselves, are slaves of Istar; but, if somebody\nis to be starved, the modern world has no Oracle of Delphi to which\nthe nations can appeal for an [213] indication of the victim. It is\nopen to us to try our fortune; and, if we avoid impending fate, there\nwill be a certain ground for believing that we are the right people to\nescape. Securus judicat orbis.\n\n    * [It is hard to say whether the increase of the unemployed\n    poor, or that of the unemployed rich, is the greater social\n    evil. -- 1894]\n\nTo this end, it is well to look into the necessary condition of our\nsalvation by works. They are two, one plain to all the world and\nhardly needing insistence; the other seemingly not so plain, since too\noften it has been theoretically and practically left out of sight. The\nobvious condition is that our produce shall be better than that of\nothers. There is only one reason why our goods should be preferred to\nthose of our rivals--our customers must find them better at the price.\nThat means that we must use more knowledge, skill, and industry in\nproducing them, without a proportionate increase in the cost of\nproduction; and, as the price of labour constitutes a large element in\nthat cost, the rate of wages must be restricted within certain limits.\nIt is perfectly true that cheap production and cheap labour are by no\nmeans synonymous; but it is also true that wages cannot increase\nbeyond a certain proportion without destroying cheapness.  Cheapness,\nthen, with, as part and parcel of cheapness, a moderate price of\nlabour, is essential to our success as competitors in the markets of\nthe world.\n\nThe second condition is really quite as plainly indispensable as the\nfirst, if one thinks seriously [214] about the matter. It is social\nstability.  Society is stable, when the wants of its members obtain as\nmuch satisfaction as, life being what it is, common sense and\nexperience show may be reasonably expected. Mankind, in general, care\nvery little for forms of government or ideal considerations of any\nsort; and nothing really stirs the great multitude to break with\ncustom and incur the manifest perils of revolt except the belief that\nmisery in this world, or damnation in the next, or both, are\nthreatened by the continuance of the state of things in which they\nhave been brought up. But when they do attain that conviction, society\nbecomes as unstable as a package of dynamite, and a very small matter\nwill produce the explosion which sends it back to the chaos of\nsavagery.\n\nIt needs no argument to prove that when the price of labour sinks below\na certain point, the worker infallibly falls into that condition which\nthe French emphatically call la misere--a word for which I do not\nthink there is any exact English equivalent. It is a condition in\nwhich the food, warmth, and clothing which are necessary for the mere\nmaintenance of the functions of the body in their normal state cannot\nbe obtained; in which men, women, and children are forced to crowd\ninto dens wherein decency is abolished and the most ordinary\nconditions of healthful existence are impossible of attainment; in\nwhich the [215] pleasures within reach are reduced to bestiality and\ndrunkenness; in which the pains accumulate at compound interest, in\nthe shape of starvation, disease, stunted development, and moral\ndegradation; in which the prospect of even steady and honest industry\nis a life of unsuccessful battling with hunger, rounded by a pauper's\ngrave.\n\nThat a certain proportion of the members of every great aggregation of\nmankind should constantly tend to establish and populate such a Slough\nof Despond as this is inevitable, so long as some people are by nature\nidle and vicious, while others are disabled by sickness or accident,\nor thrown upon the world by the death of their bread-winners. So long\nas that proportion is restricted within tolerable limits, it can be\ndealt with; and, so far as it arises only from such causes, its\nexistence may and must be patiently borne.  But, when the organization\nof society, instead of mitigating this tendency, tends to continue and\nintensify it; when a given social order plainly makes for evil and not\nfor good, men naturally enough begin to think it high time to try a\nfresh experiment. The animal man, finding that the ethical man has\nlanded him in such a slough, resumes his ancient sovereignty, and\npreaches anarchy; which is, substantially, a proposal to reduce the\nsocial cosmos to chaos, and begin the brute struggle for existence\nonce again.\n\nAny one who is acquainted with the state of [216] the population of\nall great industrial centres, whether in this or other countries, is\naware that, amidst a large and increasing body of that population, la\nmisere reigns supreme. I have no pretensions to the character of a\nphilanthropist, and I have a special horror of all sorts of\nsentimental rhetoric; I am merely trying to deal with facts, to some\nextent within my own knowledge, and further evidenced by abundant\ntestimony, as a naturalist; and I take it to be a mere plain truth\nthat, throughout industrial Europe, there is not a single large\nmanufacturing city which is free from a vast mass of people whose\ncondition is exactly that described; and from a still greater mass\nwho, living just on the edge of the social swamp, are liable to be\nprecipitated into it by any lack of demand for their produce. And,\nwith every addition to the population, the multitude already sunk in\nthe pit and the number of the host sliding towards it continually\nincrease.\n\nArgumentation can hardly be needful to make it clear that no society\nin which the elements of decomposition are thus swiftly and surely\naccumulating can hope to win in the race of industries.\n\nIntelligence, knowledge, and skill are undoubtedly conditions of\nsuccess; but of what avail are they likely to be unless they are\nbacked up by honesty, energy, goodwill, and all the physical and moral\nfaculties that go to the making of manhood, and unless they are\nstimulated by hope of such [217] reward as men may fairly look to? And\nwhat dweller in the slough of want, dwarfed in body and soul,\ndemoralized, hopeless, can reasonably be expected to possess these\nqualities?\n\nAny full and permanent development of the productive powers of an\nindustrial population, then, must be compatible with and, indeed,\nbased upon a social organization which will secure a fair amount of\nphysical and moral welfare to that population; which will make for\ngood and not for evil. Natural science and religious enthusiasm rarely\ngo hand in hand, but on this matter their concord is complete; and the\nleast sympathetic of naturalists can but admire the insight and the\ndevotion of such social reformers as the late Lord Shaftesbury, whose\nrecently published \"Life and Letters\" gives a vivid picture of the\ncondition of the working classes fifty years ago, and of the pit which\nour industry, ignoring these plain truths, was then digging under its\nown feet.\n\nThere is, perhaps, no more hopeful sign of progress among us, in the\nlast half-century, than the steadily increasing devotion which has\nbeen and is directed to measures for promoting physical and moral\nwelfare among the poorer classes. Sanitary reformers, like most other\nreformers whom I have had the advantage of knowing, seem to need a\ngood dose of fanaticism, as a sort of moral coca, to keep them up to\nthe mark, and, doubtless, they have made many mistakes; but that the\n[218] endeavour to improve the condition under our industrial\npopulation live, to amend the drainage of densely peopled streets, to\nprovide baths, washhouses, and gymnasia, to facilitate habits of\nthrift, to furnish some provision for instruction and amusement in\npublic libraries and the like, is not only desirable from a\nphilanthropic point of view, but an essential condition of safe\nindustrial development, appears to me to be indisputable. It is by\nsuch means alone, so far as I can see, that we can hope to check the\nconstant gravitation of industrial society towards la misere, until\nthe general progress of intelligence and morality leads men to grapple\nwith the sources of that tendency. If it is said that the carrying out\nof such arrangements as those indicated must enhance the cost of\nproduction, and thus handicap the producer in the race of competition,\nI venture, in the first place, to doubt the fact; but if it be so, it\nresults that industrial society has to face a dilemma, either\nalternative of which threatens destruction.\n\nOn the one hand, a population the labour of which is sufficiently\nremunerated may be physically and morally healthy and socially stable,\nbut may fail in industrial competition by reason of the dearness of\nits produce.  On the other hand, a population the labour of which is\ninsufficiently remunerated must become physically and morally\nunhealthy, and socially unstable; and though it [219] may succeed for\na while in industrial competition, by reason of the cheapness of its\nproduce, it must in the end fall, through hideous misery and\ndegradation, to utter ruin.\n\nWell, if these are the only possible alternatives, let us for ourselves\nand our children choose the former, and, if need be, starve like men.\nBut I do not believe that the stable society made up of healthy,\nvigorous, instructed, and self-ruling people would ever incur serious\nrisk of that fate. They are not likely to be troubled with many\ncompetitors of the same character, just yet; and they may be safely\ntrusted to find ways of holding their own.\n\nAssuming that the physical and moral well-being and the stable social\norder, which are the indispensable conditions of permanent industrial\ndevelopment, are secured, there remains for consideration the means of\nattaining that knowledge and skill without which, even then, the\nbattle of competition cannot be successfully fought. Let us consider\nhow we stand. A vast system of elementary education has now been in\noperation among us for sixteen years, and has reached all but a very\nsmall fraction of the population. I do not think that there is any\nroom for doubt that, on the whole, it has worked well, and that its\nindirect no less than its direct benefits have been immense. But, as\nmight be expected, it exhibits the defects of all our educational\nsystems--fashioned [220] as they were to meet the wants of a bygone\ncondition of society. There is a widespread and, I think,\nwell-justified complaint that it has too much to do with books and too\nlittle to do with things. I am as little disposed as any one can well\nbe to narrow early education and to make the primary school a mere\nannexe of the shop. And it is not so much in the interests of\nindustry, as in that of breadth of culture, that I echo the common\ncomplaint against the bookish and theoretical character of our primary\ninstruction.\n\nIf there were no such things as industrial pursuits, a system of\neducation which does nothing for the faculties of observation, which\ntrains neither the eye nor the hand, and is compatible with utter\nignorance of the commonest natural truths, might still be reasonably\nregarded as strangely imperfect. And when we consider that the\ninstruction and training which are lacking are exactly; those which\nare of most importance for the great mass of our population, the fault\nbecomes almost a crime, the more that there is no practical difficulty\nin making good these defects. There really is no reason why drawing\nshould not be universally taught, and it is an admirable training for\nboth eye and hand. Artists are born, not made; but everybody may be\ntaught to draw elevations, plans, and sections; and pots and pans are\nas good, indeed better, models for [221] this purpose than the Apollo\nBelvedere. The plant is not expensive; and there is this excellent\nquality about drawing of the kind indicated, that it can be tested\nalmost as easily and severely as arithmetic. Such drawings are either\nright or wrong, and if they are wrong the pupil can be made to see\nthat they are wrong. From the industrial point of view, drawing has\nthe further merit that there is hardly any trade in which the power of\ndrawing is not of daily and hourly utility.  In the next place, no\ngood reason, except the want of capable teachers, can be assigned why\nelementary notions of science should not be an element in general\ninstruction. In this case, again, no expensive or elaborate apparatus\nis necessary. The commonest thing--a candle, a boy's squirt, a piece\nof chalk--in the hands of a teacher who knows his business, may be\nmade the starting-point whence children may be led into the regions of\nscience as far as their capacity permits, with efficient exercise of\ntheir observational and reasoning faculties on the road. If object\nlessons often prove trivial failures, it is not the fault of object\nlessons, but that of the teacher, who has not found out how much the\npower of teaching a little depends on knowing a great deal, and that\nthoroughly; and that he has not made that discovery is not the fault\nof the teachers, but of the detestable system of training them which\nis widely prevalent.*\n\n    * Training in the use of simple tools is no doubt desirable,\n    on all grounds. From the point of view of \"culture,\" the\n    man whose \"fingers are all thumbs\" is but a stunted\n    creature. But the practical difficulties in the way of\n    introducing handiwork of this kind into elementary schools\n    appear to me to be considerable.\n\n[222] As I have said, I do not regard the proposal to add these to the\npresent subjects of universal instruction as made merely in the\ninterests of industry. Elementary science and drawing are just as\nneedful at Eton (where I am happy to say both are now parts of the\nregular course) as in the lowest primary school. But their importance\nin the education of the artisan is enhanced, not merely by the fact\nthat the knowledge and skill thus gained--little as they may amount\nto--will still be of practical utility to him; but, further, because\nthey constitute an introduction to that special training which is\ncommonly called \"technical education.\"\n\nI conceive that our wants in this last direction may be grouped under\nthree heads: (1) Instruction in the principles of those branches of\nscience and of art which are peculiarly applicable to industrial\npursuits, which may be called preliminary scientific education. (2)\nInstruction in the special branches of such applied science and art,\nas technical education proper. (3) Instruction of teachers in both\nthese branches. (4) Capacity-catching machinery.\n\nA great deal has already been done in each of these directions, but\nmuch remains to be done. If elementary education is amended in the way\n[223] that has been suggested, I think that the school boards will\nhave quite as much on their hands as they are capable of doing well.\nThe influences under which the members of these bodies are elected do\nnot tend to secure fitness for dealing with scientific or technical\neducation; and it is the less necessary to burden them with an\nuncongenial task as there are other organizations, not only much\nbetter fitted to do the work, but already actually doing it.\n\nIn the matter of preliminary scientific education, the chief of these\nis the Science and Art Department, which has done more during the last\nquarter of a century for the teaching of elementary science among the\nmasses of the people than any organization which exists either in this\nor in any other country. It has become veritably a people's\nuniversity, so far as physical science is concerned. At the foundation\nof our old universities they were freely open to the poorest, but the\npoorest must come to them. In the last quarter of a century, the\nScience and Art Department, by means of its classes spread all over\nthe country and open to all, has conveyed instruction to the poorest.\nThe University Extension movement shows that our older learned\ncorporations have discovered the propriety of following suit.\n\nTechnical education, in the strict sense, has become a necessity for\ntwo reasons. The old apprenticeship system has broken down, partly by\n[224] reason of the changed conditions of industrial life, and partly\nbecause trades have ceased to be \"crafts,\" the traditional secrets\nwhereof the master handed down to his apprentices. Invention is\nconstantly changing the face of our industries, so that \"use and\nwont,\" \"rule of thumb,\" and the like, are gradually losing their\nimportance, while that knowledge of principles which alone can deal\nsuccessfully with changed conditions is becoming more and more\nvaluable. Socially, the \"master\" of four or five apprentices is\ndisappearing in favour of the \"employer\" of forty, or four hundred, or\nfour thousand, \"hands,\" and the odds and ends of technical knowledge,\nformerly picked up in a shop, are not, and cannot be, supplied in the\nfactory. The instruction formerly given by the master must therefore\nbe more than replaced by the systematic teaching of the technical\nschool.\n\nInstitutions of this kind on varying scales of magnitude and\ncompleteness, from the splendid edifice set up by the City and Guilds\nInstitute to the smallest local technical school, to say nothing of\nclasses, such as those in technology instituted by the Society of Arts\n(subsequently taken over by the City Guilds), have been established in\nvarious parts of the country, and the movement in favour of their\nincrease and multiplication is rapidly growing in breadth and\nintensity. But there is much difference of opinion as to the best\n[225] way in which the technical instruction, so generally desired,\nshould be given. Two courses appear to be practicable: the one is the\nestablishment of special technical schools with a systematic and\nlengthened course of instruction demanding the employment of the whole\ntime of the pupils. The other is the setting afoot of technical\nclasses, especially evening classes, comprising a short series of\nlessons on some special topic, which may be attended by persons\nalready earning wages in some branch of trade or commerce.\n\nThere is no doubt that technical schools, on the plan indicated under\nthe first head, are extremely costly; and, so far as the teaching of\nartisans is concerned, it is very commonly objected to them that, as\nthe learners do not work under trade conditions, they are apt to fall\ninto amateurish habits, which prove of more hindrance than service in\nthe actual business of life.  When such schools are attached to\nfactories under the direction of an employer who desires to train up a\nsupply of intelligent workmen, of course this objection does not\napply; nor can the usefulness of such schools for the training of\nfuture employers and for the higher grade of the employed be doubtful;\nbut they are clearly out of the reach of the great mass of the people,\nwho have to earn their bread as soon as possible. We must therefore\nlook to the classes, and especially to evening classes, as the great\ninstrument for the technical [226] education of the artisan. The\nutility of such classes has now been placed beyond all doubt; the only\nquestion which remains is to find the ways and means of extending\nthem.\n\nWe are here, as in all other questions of social organization, met by\ntwo diametrically opposed views. On the one hand, the methods pursued\nin foreign countries are held up as our example. The State is exhorted\nto take the matter in hand and establish a great system of technical\neducation. On the other hand, many economists of the individualist\nschool exhaust the resources of language in condemning and\nrepudiating, not merely the interference of the general government in\nsuch matters, but the application of a farthing of the funds raised by\nlocal taxation to these purposes. I entertain a strong conviction\nthat, in this country, at any rate, the State had much better leave\npurely technical and trade instruction alone. But, although my\npersonal leanings are decidedly towards the individualists, I have\narrived at that conclusion on merely practical grounds. In fact, my\nindividualism is rather of a sentimental sort, and I sometimes think I\nshould be stronger in the faith if it were less vehemently advocated.*\nI am unable to see that civil society is anything but a corporation\nestablished [227] for a moral object only--namely, the good of its\nmembers--and therefore that it may take such measures as seem fitting\nfor the attainment of that which the general voice decides to be the\ngeneral good. That the suffrage of the majority is by no means a\nscientific test of social good and evil is unfortunately too true;\nbut, in practice, it is the only test we can apply, and the refusal to\nabide by it means anarchy. The purest despotism that ever existed is\nas much based upon that will of the majority (which is usually\nsubmission to the will of a small minority) as the freest republic.\nLaw is the expression of the opinion of the majority; and it is law,\nand not mere opinion, because the many are strong enough to enforce\nit.\n\n    * In what follows I am only repeating and emphasizing\n    opinions which I expressed seventeen years ago, in an\n    Address to the members of the Midland Institute\n    (republished in Critiques and Addresses in 1873, and in Vol.\n    I. of these Essays ). I have seen no reason to modify them,\n    notwithstanding high authority on the other side.\n\nI am as strongly convinced as the most pronounced individualist can be,\nthat it is desirable that every man should be free to act in every way\nwhich does not limit the corresponding freedom of his fellow-man. But\nI fail to connect that great induction of political science with the\npractical corollary which is frequently drawn from it: that the\nState--that is, the people in their corporate capacity--has no\nbusiness to meddle with anything but the administration of justice and\nexternal defence. It appears to me that the [228] amount of freedom\nwhich incorporate society may fitly leave to its members is not a\nfixed quantity, to be determined a priori by deduction from the\nfiction called \"natural rights\"; but that it must be determined by,\nand vary with, circumstances. I conceive it to be demonstrable that\nthe higher and the more complex the organization of the social body,\nthe more closely is the life of each member bound up with that of the\nwhole; and the larger becomes the category of acts which cease to be\nmerely self-regarding, and which interfere with the freedom of others\nmore or less seriously.\n\nIf a squatter, living ten miles away from any neighbour, chooses to\nburn his house down to get rid of vermin, there may be no necessity\n(in the absence of insurance offices) that the law should interfere\nwith his freedom of action; his act can hurt nobody but himself. But,\nif the dweller in a street chooses to do the same thing, the State\nvery properly makes such a proceeding a crime, and punishes it as\nsuch. He does meddle with his neighbour's freedom, and that seriously.\nSo it might, perhaps, be a tenable doctrine, that it would be\nneedless, and even tyrannous, to make education compulsory in a sparse\nagricultural population, living in abundance on the produce of its own\nsoil; but, in a densely populated manufacturing country, struggling\nfor existence with competitors, every ignorant person tends to [229]\nbecome a burden upon, and, so far, an infringer of the liberty of, his\nfellows, and an obstacle to their success. Under such circumstances an\neducation rate is, in fact, a war tax, levied for purposes of defence.\n\nThat State action always has been more or less misdirected, and always\nwill be so, is, I believe, perfectly true. But I am not aware that it\nis more true of the action of men in their corporate capacity than it\nis of the doings of individuals. The wisest and most dispassionate man\nin existence, merely wishing to go from one stile in a field to the\nopposite, will not walk quite straight--he is always going a little\nwrong, and always correcting himself; and I can only congratulate the\nindividualist who is able to say that his general course of life has\nbeen of a less undulatory character. To abolish State action, because\nits direction is never more than approximately correct, appears to me\nto be much the same thing as abolishing the man at the wheel\naltogether, because, do what he will, the ship yaws more or less. \"Why\nshould I be robbed of my property to pay for teaching another man's\nchildren?\" is an individualist question, which is not unfrequently put\nas if it settled the whole business. Perhaps it does, but I find\ndifficulties in seeing why it should. The parish in which I live makes\nme pay my share for the paving and lighting of a great many streets\nthat I never pass through; [230] and I might plead that I am robbed to\nsmooth the way and lighten the darkness of other people. But I am\nafraid the parochial authorities would not let me off on this plea;\nand I must confess I do not see why they should.\n\nI cannot speak of my own knowledge, but I have every reason to believe\nthat I came into this world a small reddish person, certainly without\na gold spoon in my mouth, and in fact with no discernible abstract or\nconcrete \"rights\" or property of any description. If a foot was not\nset upon me, at once, as a squalling nuisance, it was either the\nnatural affection of those about me, which I certainly had done\nnothing to deserve, or the fear of the law which, ages before my\nbirth, was painfully built up by the society into which I intruded,\nthat prevented that catastrophe. If I was nourished, cared for,\ntaught, saved from the vagabondage of a wastrel, I certainly am not\naware that I did anything to deserve those advantages. And, if I\npossess anything now, it strikes me that, though I may have fairly\nearned my day's wages for my day's work, and may justly call them my\nproperty--yet, without that organization of society, created out of\nthe toil and blood of long generations before my time, I should\nprobably have had nothing but a flint axe and an indifferent hut to\ncall my own; and even those would be mine only so long as no stronger\nsavage came my way.\n\nSo that if society, having, quite gratuitously, [231] done all these\nthings for me, asks me in turn to do something towards its\npreservation--even if that something is to contribute to the teaching\nof other men's children--I really in spite of all my individualist\nleanings, feel rather ashamed to say no. And if I were not ashamed, I\ncannot say that I think that society would be dealing unjustly with me\nin converting the moral obligation into a legal one. There is a\nmanifest unfairness in letting all the burden be borne by the willing\nhorse.\n\nIt does not appear to me, then, that there is any valid objection to\ntaxation for purposes of education; but, in the case of technical\nschools and classes, I think it is practically expedient that such a\ntaxation should be local. Our industrial population accumulates in\nparticular towns and districts; these districts are those which\nimmediately profit by technical education; and it is only in them that\nwe can find the men practically engaged in industries, among whom some\nmay reasonably be expected to be competent judges of that which is\nwanted, and of the best means of meeting the want.\n\nIn my belief, all methods of technical training are at present\ntentative, and, to be successful, each must be adapted to the special\npeculiarities of its locality. This is a case in which we want twenty\nyears, not of \"strong government,\" but of cheerful and hopeful\nblundering; and we may be [232] thankful if we get things straight in\nthat time.\n\nThe principle of the Bill introduced, but dropped, by the Government\nlast session, appears to me to be wise, and some of the objections to\nit I think are due to a misunderstanding. The bill proposed in\nsubstance to allow localities to tax themselves for purposes of\ntechnical education--on the condition that any scheme for such purpose\nshould be submitted to the Science and Art Department, and declared by\nthat department to be in accordance with the intention of the\nLegislature.\n\nA cry was raised that the Bill proposed to throw technical education\ninto the hands of the Science and Art Department. But, in reality, no\npower of initiation, nor even of meddling with details, was given to\nthat Department--the sole function of which was to decide whether any\nplan proposed did or did not come within the limits of \"technical\neducation.\" The necessity for such control, somewhere, is obvious. No\nlegislature, certainly not ours, is likely to grant the power of\nself-taxation without setting limits to that power in some way; and it\nwould neither have been practicable to devise a legal definition of\ntechnical education, nor commendable to leave the question to the\nAuditor-General, to be fought out in the law-courts. The only\nalternative was to leave the decision to an appropriate State\nauthority. If it is [233] asked what is the need of such control if\nthe people of the localities are the best judges, the obvious reply is\nthat there are localities and localities, and that while Manchester,\nor Liverpool, or Birmingham, or Glasgow might, perhaps, be safely left\nto do as they thought fit, smaller towns, in which there is less\ncertainty of full discussion by competent people of different ways of\nthinking, might easily fall a prey to crocheteers.\n\nSupposing our intermediate science teaching and our technical schools\nand classes are established, there is yet a third need to be supplied,\nand that is the want of good teachers. And it is necessary not only to\nget them, but to keep them when you have got them.\n\nIt is impossible to insist too strongly upon the fact that the\nefficient teachers of science and of technology are not to be made by\nthe processes in vogue at ordinary training colleges. The memory\nloaded with mere bookwork is not the thing wanted--is, in fact, rather\nworse than useless--in the teacher of scientific subjects. It is\nabsolutely essential that his mind should be full of knowledge and not\nof mere learning, and that what he knows should have been learned in\nthe laboratory rather than in the library. There are happily already,\nboth in London and in the provinces, various places in which such\ntraining is to be had, and the main thing at present is to make it in\nthe first place accessible, and in the next [234] indispensable, to\nthose who undertake the business of teaching. But when the well-trained\nmen are supplied, it must be recollected that the profession of\nteacher is not a very lucrative or otherwise tempting one, and that it\nmay be advisable to offer special inducements to good men to remain in\nit. These, however, are questions of detail into which it is\nunnecessary to enter further.\n\nLast, but not least, comes the question of providing the machinery for\nenabling those who are by nature specially qualified to undertake the\nhigher branches of industrial work, to reach the position in which\nthey may render that service to the community. If all our educational\nexpenditure did nothing but pick one man of scientific or inventive\ngenius, each year, from amidst the hewers of wood and drawers of\nwater, and give him the chance of making the best of his inborn\nfaculties, it would be a very good investment.  If there is one such\nchild among the hundreds of thousands of our annual increase, it would\nbe worth any money to drag him either from the slough of misery, or\nfrom the hotbed of wealth, and teach him to devote himself to the\nservice of his people. Here, again, we have made a beginning with our\nscholarships and the like, and need only follow in the tracks already\nworn.\n\nThe programme of industrial development briefly set forth in the\npreceding pages is not what Kant calls a \"Hirngespinnst,\" a cobweb\n[235] spun in the brain of a Utopian philosopher. More or less of it\nhas taken bodily shape in many parts of the country, and there are\ntowns of no great size or wealth in the manufacturing districts\n(Keighley, for example) in which almost the whole of it has, for some\ntime, been carried out, so far as the means at the disposal of the\nenergetic and public-spirited men who have taken the matter in hand\npermitted. The thing can be done; I have endeavoured to show good\ngrounds for the belief that it must be done, and that speedily, if we\nwish to hold our own in the war of industry. I doubt not that it will\nbe done, whenever its absolute necessity becomes as apparent to all\nthose who are absorbed in the actual business of industrial life as it\nis to some of the lookers on.\n\nPerhaps it is necessary for me to add that technical education is not\nhere proposed as a panacea for social diseases, but simply as a\nmedicament which will help the patient to pass through an imminent\ncrisis.\n\nAn ophthalmic surgeon may recommend an operation for cataract in a man\nwho is going blind, without being supposed to undertake that it will\ncure him of gout. And I may pursue the metaphor so far as to remark,\nthat the surgeon is justified in pointing out that a diet of\npork-chops and burgundy will probably kill his patient, though he may\nbe quite able to suggest a mode of living [236] which will free him\nfrom his constitutional disorder.\n\nMr. Booth asks me, Why do you not propose some plan of your own?\nReally, that is no answer to my argument that his treatment will make\nthe patient very much worse. [Note added in Social Diseases and Worse\nRemedies, January, 1891.]\n\n[237]\n\n\n          LETTERS TO THE \"Times\"\n\n                ON THE\n\n         \"DARKEST ENGLAND SCHEME.\"\n\n                   I.\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 1st, 1890\n\nSIR: A short time ago a generous and philanthropic friend wrote to me,\nplacing at my disposal a large sum of money for the furtherance of the\nvast scheme which the \"General\" of the Salvation Army has propounded,\nif I thought it worthy of support. The responsibility of advising my\nbenevolent correspondent has weighed heavily upon me, but I felt that\nit would be cowardly, as well as ungracious, to refuse to accept it. I\nhave therefore studied Mr. Booth's book with some care, for the\npurpose of separating the essential from the accessory features of his\nproject, and I have based my judgment--I am sorry to say an\nunfavourable one--upon the data thus obtained. Before communicating my\nconclusions to my friend, however, I am desirous to know what there\nmay be to be said in arrest of that judgment; [238] and the matter is\nof such vast public importance that I trust you will aid me by\npublishing this letter, notwithstanding its length.\n\nThere are one or two points upon which I imagine all thinking men have\narrived at the same convictions as those from which Mr. Booth starts.\nIt is certain that there is an immense amount of remediable misery\namong us, that, in addition to the poverty, disease, and degradation\nwhich are the consequences of causes beyond human control, there is a\nvast, probably a very much larger, quantity of misery which is the\nresult of individual ignorance, or misconduct, and of faulty social\narrangements. Further, I think it is not to be doubted that, unless\nthis remediable misery is effectually dealt with, the hordes of vice\nand pauperism will destroy modern civilization as effectually as\nuncivilized tribes of another kind destroyed the great social\norganization which preceded ours. Moreover, I think all will agree\nthat no reforms and improvements will go to the root of the evil\nunless they attack it in its ultimate source--namely, the motives of\nthe individual man. Honest, industrious, and self-restraining men will\nmake a very bad social organization prosper; while vicious, idle, and\nreckless citizens will bring to ruin the best that ever was, or ever\nwill be, invented.\n\nThe leading propositions which are peculiar to Mr. Booth I take to be\nthese:--\n\n[239] (1) That the only adequate means to such reformation of the\nindividual man is the adoption of that form of somewhat corybantic\nChristianity of which the soldiers of the Salvation Army are the\nmilitant missionaries. This implies the belief that the excitement of\nthe religious emotions (largely by processes described by their\nemployers as \"rousing\" and \"convivial\") is a desirable and trustworthy\nmethod of permanently amending the conduct of mankind.\n\nI demur to these propositions. I am of opinion that the testimony of\nhistory, no less than the cool observation of that which lies within\nthe personal experience of many of us, is wholly adverse to it.\n\n   (2) That the appropriate instrument for the propagation and\nmaintenance of this peculiar sacramental enthusiasm is the Salvation\nArmy--a body of devotees, drilled and disciplined as a military\norganization, and provided with a numerous hierarchy of officers,\nevery one of whom is pledged to blind and unhesitating obedience to\nthe \"General,\" who frankly tells us that the first condition of the\nservice is \"implicit, unquestioning obedience.\" \"A telegram from me\nwill send any of them to the uttermost parts of the earth\"; every one\n\"has taken service on the express condition that he or she will obey,\nwithout questioning, or gainsaying, the orders from headquarters\"\n(\"Darkest England,\" p. 243).\n\n[240] This proposition seems to me to be indisputable. History confirms\nit.  Francis of Assisi and Ignatius Loyola made their great\nexperiments on the same principle. Nothing is more certain than that a\nbody of religious enthusiasts (perhaps we may even say fanatics)\npledged to blind obedience to their chief, is one of the most\nefficient instruments for effecting any purpose that the wit of man\nhas yet succeeded in devising. And I can but admire the insight into\nhuman nature which has led Mr. Booth to leave his unquestioning and\nunhesitating instruments unbound by vows. A volunteer slave is worth\nten sworn bondsmen.\n\n   (3) That the success of the Salvation Army, with its present force\nof 9416 officers \"wholly engaged in the work,\" its capital of three\nquarters of a million, its income of the same amount, its 1375 corps\nat home, and 1499 in the colonies and foreign countries (Appendix, pp.\n3 and 4), is a proof that Divine assistance has been vouchsafed to its\nefforts.\n\nHere I am not able to agree with the sanguine Commander-in-chief of\nthe new model, whose labours in creating it have probably interfered\nwith his acquisition of information respecting the fate of previous\nenterprises of like kind.\n\nIt does not appear to me that his success is in any degree more\nremarkable than that of Francis of Assisi or that of Ignatius Loyola,\nthan that [241] of George Fox, or even than that of the Mormons, in\nour own time. When I observe the discrepancies of the doctrinal\nfoundations from which each of these great movements set out, I find\nit difficult to suppose that supernatural aid has been given to all of\nthem; still more, that Mr. Booth's smaller measure of success is\nevidence that it has been granted to him.\n\nBut what became of the Franciscan experiment?* If there was one rule\nrather than another on which the founder laid stress, it was that his\narmy of friars should be absolute mendicants, keeping themselves\nsternly apart from all worldly entanglements. Yet, even before the\ndeath of Francis, in 1226, a strong party, headed by Elias of Cortona,\nthe deputy of his own appointment, began to hanker after these very\nthings; and, within thirty years of that time, the Franciscans had\nbecome one of the most powerful, wealthy, and worldly corporations in\nChristendom, with their fingers in every sink of political and social\ncorruption, if so be profit for the order could be fished out of it;\ntheir principal interest being to fight their rivals, the Dominicans,\nand to persecute such of their own brethren as were honest enough to\ntry to carry out their founder's plainest injunctions. We also know\nwhat has become of Loyola's experiment. For two centuries the Jesuits\nhave been the hope of the enemies of the Papacy; whenever it becomes\ntoo prosperous, they are sure to bring about a catastrophe by their\ncorrupt use of the political and social influence which their\norganization and their wealth secure.\n\n    * See note pp. 245-247]\n\n[242] With these examples of that which may happen to institutions\nfounded by noble men, with high aims, in the hands of successors of a\ndifferent stamp, armed with despotic authority, before me, common\nprudence surely requires that, before advising the handing over of a\nlarge sum of money to the general of a new order of mendicants, I\nshould ask what guarantee there is that, thirty years hence, the\n\"General\" who then autocratically controls the action, say, of 100,000\nofficers pledged to blind obedience, distributed through the whole\nlength and breadth of the poorer classes, and each with his finger on\nthe trigger of a mine charged with discontent and religious\nfanaticism; with the absolute control, say, of eight or ten millions\nsterling of capital and as many of income; with barracks in every town,\nwith estates scattered over the country, and with settlements in the\ncolonies--will exercise his enormous powers, not merely honestly, but\nwisely? What shadow of security is there that the person who wields\nthis uncontrolled authority over many thousands of men shall use it\nsolely for those philanthropic and religious objects which, I do not\ndoubt, are alone in the mind of Mr. Booth? Who is to say that the\nSalvation Army, in the year [243] 1920, shall not be a replica of what\nthe Franciscan order had become in the year 1260?\n\nThe personal character and the intentions of the founders of such\norganizations as we are considering count for very little in the\nformation of a forecast of their future; and if they did, it is no\ndisrespect to Mr.  Booth to say that he is not the peer of Francis of\nAssisi. But if Francis's judgment of men was so imperfect as to permit\nhim to appoint an ambitious intriguer of the stamp of Brother Elias\nhis deputy, we have no right to be sanguine about the perspicacity of\nMr. Booth in a like matter.\n\nAdding to all these considerations the fact that Mr. Llewelyn Davies,\nthe warmth of whose philanthropy is beyond question, and in whose\ncompetency and fairness I, for one, place implicit reliance, flatly\ndenies the boasted success of the Salvation Army in its professed\nmission, I have arrived at the conclusion that, as at present advised,\nI cannot be the instrument of carrying out my friend's proposal.\n\nMr. Booth has pithily characterized certain benevolent schemes as\ndoing sixpennyworth of good and a shilling's worth of harm. I grieve\nto say that, in my opinion, the definition exactly fits his own\nproject. Few social evils are of greater magnitude than uninstructed\nand unchastened religious fanaticism; no personal habit more surely\ndegrades the conscience and the intellect than [244] blind and\nunhesitating obedience to unlimited authority. Undoubtedly, harlotry\nand intemperance are sore evils, and starvation is hard to bear, or\neven to know of; but the prostitution of the mind, the soddening of\nthe conscience, the dwarfing of manhood are worse calamities. It is a\ngreater evil to have the intellect of a nation put down by organized\nfanaticism; to see its political and industrial affairs at the mercy\nof a despot whose chief thought is to make that fanaticism prevail; to\nwatch the degradation of men, who should feel themselves individually\nresponsible for their own and their country's fates, to mere brute\ninstruments, ready to the hand of a master for any use to which he may\nput them.\n\nBut that is the end to which, in my opinion, all such organizations as\nthat to which kindly people, who do not look to the consequences of\ntheir acts, are now giving their thousands, inevitably tend. Unless\nclear proof that I am wrong is furnished, another thousand shall not\nbe added by my instrumentality.\n\n              I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                  T. H. Huxley.\n\n[245]\n\n                     NOTE.\n\nAn authoritative contemporary historian, Matthew Paris, writes thus of\nthe Minorite, or Franciscan, Friars in England in 1235, just nine\nyears after the death of Francis of Assisi:--\n\n\"At this time some of the Minorite brethren, as well as some of the\nOrder of Preachers, unmindful of their profession and the restrictions\nof their order, impudently entered the territories of some noble\nmonasteries, under pretense of fulfilling their duties of preaching,\nas if intending to depart after preaching the next day. Under pretence\nof sickness, or on some other pretext, however, they remained, and,\nconstructing an altar of wood, they placed on it a consecrated stone\naltar, which they had brought with them, and clandestinely and in a\nlow voice performed mass, and even received the confessions of many of\nthe parishioners, to the prejudice of the priests.  And if by chance\nthey were not satisfied with this, they broke forth in insults and\nthreats, reviling every other order except their own, and asserting\nthat all the rest were doomed to damnation, and that they would not\nspare the soles of their feet till they had exhausted the wealth of\ntheir opposers, however great it might be. The religious men,\ntherefore, gave way to them in many points, yielding to avoid scandal,\nand offending those in power. For they were the councillors and\nmessengers of the nobles, and even secretaries of the Pope, and\ntherefore obtained much [246] secular favour. Some, however, finding\nthemselves opposed by the Court of Rome, were restrained by obvious\nreasons, and went away in confusion; for the Supreme Pontiff, with a\nscowling look, said to them, 'What means this, my brethren?  To what\nlengths are you going? Have you not professed voluntary poverty, and\nthat you would traverse towns and castles and distant places, as the\ncase required, barefooted and unostentatiously, in order to preach the\nword of God in all humility? And do you now presume to usurp these\nestates to yourselves against the will of the lords of these fees?\nYour religion appears to be in a great measure dying away, and your\ndoctrines to be confuted.\"\n\nUnder date of 1243, Matthew writes:--\n\n\"For three or four hundred years or more the monastic order did not\nhasten to destruction so quickly as their order [Minorites and\nPreachers] of whom now the brothers, twenty-four years having scarcely\nelapsed, had first built in England dwellings which rivalled regal\npalaces in height. These are they who daily expose to view their\ninestimable treasures, in enlarging their sumptuous edifices, and\nerecting lofty walls, thereby impudently transgressing the limits of\ntheir original poverty and violating the basis of their religion,\naccording to the prophecy of German Hildegarde. When noblemen and rich\nmen are at the point of death, whom they know to be possessed of great\nriches, they, in their love of gain, diligently urge them, to the\ninjury and loss of the ordinary pastors, and extort confessions and\nhidden wills, lauding themselves and their own order only, [247] and\nplacing themselves before all others. So no faithful man now believes\nhe can be saved, except he is directed by the counsels of the\nPreachers and Minorites.\"--Matthew Paris's English History. Translated\nby the Rev. J. A.  Giles, 1889, Vol. I.\n\n\n                     II\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 9th, 1890\n\nSir,--The purpose of my previous letter about Mr. Booth's scheme was\nto arouse the contributors to the military chest of the Salvation Army\nto a clear sense of what they are doing. I thought it desirable that\nthey should be distinctly aware that they are setting up and endowing\na sect, in many ways analogous to the \"Ranters\" and \"Revivalists\" of\nundesirable notoriety in former times; but with this immensely\nimportant difference, that it possesses a strong, far-reaching,\ncentralized organization, the disposal of the physical, moral, and\nfinancial strength of which rests with an irresponsible chief, who,\naccording to his own account, is assured of the blind obedience of\nnearly 10,000 subordinates. I wish them to ask themselves, Ought\nprudent men and good citizens to aid in the establishment of an\norganization which, under sundry, by no means improbable,\ncontingencies, may easily become a worse and more [248] dangerous\nnuisance than the mendicant friars of the middle ages? If this is an\nacademic question, I really do not know what questions deserve to be\ncalled practical. As you divined, I purposely omitted any\nconsideration of the details of the Salvationist scheme, and of the\nprinciples which animate those who work it, because I desired that the\npublic appreciation of the evils, necessarily inherent in all such\nplans of despotic social and religious regimentation should not be\nobscured by the raising of points of less comparative, however great\nabsolute, importance.\n\nBut it is now time to undertake a more particular criticism of\n\"Darkest England.\" At the outset of my examination of that work, I was\nstartled to find that Mr. Booth had put forward his scheme with an\nalmost incredibly imperfect knowledge of what had been done and is\ndoing in the same direction. A simple reader might well imagine that\nthe author of \"Darkest England\" posed as the Columbus, or at any rate\nthe Cortez, of that region.  \"Go to Mudie's,\" he tells us, and you\nwill be surprised to see how few books there are upon the social\nproblem. That may or may not be correct; but if Mr. Booth had gone to\na certain reading-room not far from Mudie's, I undertake to say that\nthe well-informed and obliging staff of the national library in\nBloomsbury would have provided him with more books on this topic, in\nalmost all European languages, than he would [249] read in three\nmonths.  Has socialism no literature? And what is socialism but an\nincarnation of the social question? Moreover, I am persuaded that even\n\"Mudie's\" resources could have furnished Mr. Booth with the \"Life of\nLord Shaftesbury\" and Carlyle's works. Mr. Booth seems to have\nundertaken to instruct the world without having heard of \"Past and\nPresent\" or of \"Latter-Day Pamphlets\"; though, somewhat late in the\nday, a judicious friend calls his attention to them. To those of my\ncontemporaries on whom, as on myself, Carlyle's writings on this topic\nmade an ineffaceable impression forty years ago, who know that, for\nall that time, hundreds of able and devoted men, both clerical and\nlay, have worked heart and soul for the permanent amendment of the\ncondition of the poor, Mr. Booth's \"Go to Mudie's\" affords an apt\nmeasure of the depth of his preliminary studies. However, I am bound\nto admit that these earlier labourers in the field laboured in such a\ndifferent fashion, that the originality of the plan started by Mr.\nBooth remains largely unaffected. For them no drums have beat, no\ntrombones brayed; no sanctified buffoonery, after the model of the\noration of the Friar in Wallenstein's camp dear to the readers of\nSchiller, has tickled the ears of the groundlings on their behalf.\nSadly behind the great age of rowdy self-advertisement in which their\nlot has fallen, they seem not to have advanced one whit [250] beyond\nJohn the Baptist and the Apostles, 1800 years ago, in their notions of\nthe way in which the metanoia, the change of mind of the ill-doer, is\nto be brought about. Yet the new model was there, ready for the\nimitation of those ancient savers of souls. The ranting and roaring\nmystagogues of some of the most venerable of Greek and Syrian cults\nalso had their processions and banners, their fifes and cymbals and\nholy chants, their hierarchy of officers to whom the art of making\ncollections was not wholly unknown; and who, as freely as their modern\nimitators, promised an Elysian future to contributory converts. The\nsuccess of these antique Salvation armies was enormous. Simon Magus\nwas quite as notorious a personage, and probably had as strong a\nfollowing as Mr. Booth. Yet the Apostles, with their old-fashioned\nways, would not accept such a success as a satisfactory sign of the\nDivine sanction, nor depart from their own methods of leading the way\nto the higher life.\n\nI deem it unessential to verify Mr. Booth's statistics. The exact\nstrength of the population of the realm of misery, be it one, two, or\nthree millions, has nothing to do with the efficacy of any means\nproposed for the highly desirable end of reducing it to a minimum. The\nsole question for consideration at present is whether the scheme,\nkeeping specially in view the spirit in which it is to be worked, is\nlikely to do more good than harm.\n\n[251] Mr. Booth tells us, with commendable frankness, that \"it is\nprimarily and mainly for the sake of saving the soul that I seek the\nsalvation of the body\" (p. 45), which language, being interpreted,\nmeans that the propagation of the special Salvationist creed comes\nfirst, and the promotion of the physical, intellectual, and purely\nmoral welfare of mankind second in his estimation. Men are to be made\nsober and industrious, mainly, that, as washed, shorn, and docile\nsheep, they may be driven into the narrow theological fold which Mr.\nBooth patronizes. If they refuse to enter, for all their moral\ncleanliness, they will have to take their place among the goats as\nsinners, only less dirty than the rest.\n\nI have been in the habit of thinking (and I believe the opinion is\nlargely shared by reasonable men) that self-respect and thrift are the\nrungs of the ladder by which men may most surely climb out of the\nslough of despond of want; and I have regarded them as perhaps the\nmost eminent of the practical virtues. That is not Mr. Booth's\nopinion. For him they are mere varnished sins--nothing better than\n\"Pride re-baptised\" (p. 46). Shutting his eyes to the necessary\nconsequences of the struggle for life, the existence of which he\naccepts as fully as any Darwinian,* Mr. Booth tells men, whose evil\ncase is one of those consequences, that envy is a corner-stone of our\n[252] competitive system. With thrift and self-respect denounced as\nsin, with the suffering of starving men referred to the sins of the\ncapitalist, the gospel according to Mr. Booth may save souls, but it\nwill hardly save society.\n\n    * See p. 100\n\nIn estimating the social and political influence which the Salvation\nArmy is likely to exert, it is important to reflect that the officers\n(pledged to blind obedience to their \"General\") are not to confine\nthemselves to the functions of mere deacons and catechists (though,\nunder a \"General\" like Cyril, Alexandria knew to her cost what even\nthey could effect); they are to be \"tribunes of the people,\" who are\nto act as their gratuitous legal advisers; and, when law is not\nsufficiently effective, the whole force of the army is to obtain what\nthe said tribunes may conceive to be justice, by the practice of\nruthless intimidation. Society, says Mr. Booth, needs \"mothering\"; and\nhe sets forth, with much complacency, a variety of \"cases,\" by which\nwe may estimate the sort of \"mothering\" to be expected at his parental\nhands. Those who study the materials thus set before them will, I\nthink, be driven to the conclusion that the \"mother\" has already\nproved herself a most unscrupulous meddler, even if she has not fallen\nwithin reach of the arm of the law.\n\nConsider this \"case.\" A, asserting herself to have been seduced twice,\n\"applied to our people. We hunted up the man, followed him to the\ncountry, [253] threatened him with public exposure, and forced from\nhim the payment to his victim of [Pounds] 60 down, an allowance of\n[Pounds] 1 a week, and an insurance policy on his life for [Pounds]\n450 in her favour\" (p. 222) .\n\nJedburgh justice this. We \"constitute ourselves prosecutor, judge,\njury, sheriff's officer, all in one;\" we \"practice intimidation as\ndeftly as if we were a branch of another League; and, under threat of\nexposure,\" we \"extort a tolerably heavy hush-money in payment of our\nsilence. \"\n\nWell, really, my poor moral sense is unable to distinguish these\nremarkable proceedings of the new popular tribunate from what, in\nFrench, is called chantage and, in plain English, blackmailing. And\nwhen we consider that anybody, for any reason of jealousy, or personal\nspite, or party hatred, might be thus \"hunted,\" \"followed,\"\n\"threatened,\" and financially squeezed or ruined, without a particle\nof legal investigation, at the will of a man whom the familiar charged\nwith the inquisitorial business dare not hesitate to obey, surely it\nis not unreasonable to ask how far does the Salvation Army, in its\n\"tribune of the people\" aspect, differ from a Sicilian Mafia? I am no\napologist of men guilty of the acts charged against the person who\nyet, I think, might be as fairly called a \"victim,\" in this case, as\nhis partner in wrong-doing. It is possible that, in so peculiar a\ncase, Solomon himself might have been puzzled [254] to apportion the\nrelative moral delinquency of the parties. However that may be, the\nman was morally and legally bound to support his child, and any one\nwould have been justified in helping the woman to her legal rights,\nand the man to the legal consequences (in which exposure is included)\nof his fault.\n\nThe action of the \"General\" of the Salvation Army in extorting the\nheavy fine he chose to impose as the price of his silence, however\nexcellent his motives, appears to me to be as immoral as, I hope, it\nis illegal.\n\nSo much for the Salvation Army as a teacher of questionable ethics and\nof eccentric economics, as the legal adviser who recommends and\npractices the extraction of money by intimidation, as the fairy\ngodmother who proposes to \"mother\" society, in a fashion which is not\nto my taste, however much it may commend itself to some of Mr. Booth's\nsupporters.\n\n                  I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                      T. H. Huxley.\n\n[255]\n\n\n                    III\n\n       The \"Times,\" December 11th, 1890\n\nSir,--When I first addressed you on the subject of the projected\noperations of the Salvation Army, all that I knew about that body was\nderived from the study of Mr. Booth's book, from common repute, and\nfrom occasional attention to the sayings and doings of his noisy\nsquadrons, with which my walks about London, in past years, have made\nme familiar. I was quite unaware of the existence of evidence\nrespecting the present administration of the Salvation forces, which\nwould have enabled me to act upon the sagacious maxim of the American\nhumourist, \"Don't prophesy unless you know.\" The letter you were good\nenough to publish has brought upon me a swarm of letters and\npamphlets.  Some favour me with abuse; some thoughtful correspondents\nwarmly agree with me, and then proceed to point out how much worthier\ncertain schemes of their own are of my friend's support; some send\nvaluable encouragement, for which I offer my hearty thanks, and ask\nthem to excuse any more special acknowledgment. But that which I find\nmost to the purpose, just now, is the revelation made by some of the\ndocuments which have reached me, of a fact of which I was wholly\nignorant--namely, that [256] persons who have faithfully and zealously\nserved in the Salvation Army, who express unchanged attachment to its\noriginal principles and practice, and who have been in close official\nrelations with the \"General\" have publicly declared that the process\nof degradation of the organization into a mere engine of fanatical\nintolerance and personal ambition, which I declared was inevitable,\nhas already set in and is making rapid progress.\n\nIt is out of the question, Sir, that I should occupy the columns of\nthe \"Times\" with a detailed exposition and criticism of these pieces\njustificatives of my forecast. I say criticism, because the assertions\nof persons who have quitted any society must, in fairness, be taken\nwith the caution that is required in the case of all ex parte\nstatements of hostile witnesses. But it is, at any rate, a notable\nfact that there are parts of my first letter, indicating the inherent\nand necessary evil consequences of any such organization, which might\nserve for abstracts of portions of this evidence, long since printed\nand published under the public responsibility of the witnesses.\n\nLet us ask the attention of your readers, in the first place, to \"An\nex-Captain's Experience of the Salvation Army,\" by J. J. R. Redstone,\nthe genuineness of which is guaranteed by the preface (dated April\n5th, 1888) which the Rev. Dr. Cunningham Geikie has supplied. Mr.\nRedstone's story is well worth reading on its own account.\n\n[257] Told in simple, direct language such as John Bunyan might have\nused, it permits no doubt of the single-minded sincerity of the man,\nwho gave up everything to become an officer of the Salvation Army,\nbut, exhibiting a sad want of that capacity for unhesitating and blind\nobedience on which Mr.  Booth lays so much stress, was thrown aside,\npenniless--no, I am wrong, with 2s. 4d. for his last week's salary--to\nshift, with his equally devoted wife, as he best might. I wish I could\ninduce intending contributors to Mr.  Booth's army chest to read Mr.\nRedstone's story. I would particularly ask them to contrast the pure\nsimplicity of his plain tale with the artificial pietism and\nslobbering unction of the letters which Mr. Ballington Booth addresses\nto his \"dear boy\" (a married man apparently older than himself), so\nlong as the said \"dear boy\" is facing brickbats and starvation, as per\norder.\n\nI confess that my opinion of the chiefs of the Salvation Army has been\nso distinctly modified by the perusal of this pamphlet that I am glad\nto be relieved from the necessity of expressing it. It will be much\nbetter that I should cite a few sentences from the preface written by\nDr. Cunningham Geikie, who expresses warm admiration for the early and\nuncorrupted work of the Salvation Army, and cannot possibly be accused\nof prejudice against it on religious grounds:--\n\n   (1) \"The Salvation Army is emphatically a [258] family concern. Mr.\nBooth, senior, is General; one son is chief of the staff, and the\nremaining sons and daughters engross the other chief positions. It is\nBooth all over; indeed, like the sun in your eyes, you can see nothing\nelse wherever you turn. And, as Dr. Geikie shrewdly remarks, 'to be\nthe head of a widely spread sect carries with it many advantages--not\nall exclusively spiritual.'\"\n\n   (2) \"Whoever becomes a Salvation officer is henceforth a slave,\nhelplessly exposed to the caprice of his superiors.\"\n\n\"Mr. Redstone bore an excellent character both before he entered the\narmy and when he left it. To join it, though a married man, he gave up\na situation which he had held for five years, and he served Mr. Booth\ntwo years, working hard in most difficult posts. His one fault, Major\nLawley tells us, was, that he was 'too straight'--that is, too honest,\ntruthful, and manly--or, in other words, too real a Christian. Yet\nwithout trial, without formulated charges, on the strength of secret\ncomplaints which were never, apparently, tested, he was dismissed with\nless courtesy than most people would show a beggar--with 2s. 4d. for\nhis last week's salary. If there be any mistake in this matter, I\nshall be glad to learn it.\"\n\n   (3) Dr. Geikie confirms, on the ground of information given\nconfidentially by other officers, [259] Mr. Redstone's assertion that\nthey are watched and reported by spies from headquarters.\n\n   (4) Mr. Booth refuses to guarantee his officers any fixed amount of\nsalary. While he and his family of high officials live in comfort, if\nnot in luxury, the pledged slaves whose devotion is the foundation of\nany true success the Army has met with often have \"hardly food enough\nto sustain life. One good fellow frankly told me that when he had\nnothing he just went and begged.\"\n\nAt this point, it is proper that I should interpose an apology for\nhaving hastily spoken of such men as Francis of Assisi, even for\npurposes of warning, in connection with Mr. Booth. Whatever may be\nthought of the wisdom of the plans of the founders of the great\nmonastic orders of the middle ages, they took their full share of\nsuffering and privation, and never shirked in their own persons the\nsacrifices they imposed on their followers.\n\nI have already expressed the opinion, that whatever the ostensible\npurpose of the scheme under discussion, one of its consequences will\nbe the setting up and endowment of a new Ranter-Socialist sect. I may\nnow add that another effect will be--indeed, has been--to set up and\nendow the Booth dynasty with unlimited control of the physical, moral,\nand financial resources of the sect. Mr. Booth is already a printer\nand publisher, who, it is plainly declared, utilizes the officers of\nthe [260] Army as agents for advertising and selling his publications;\nand some of them are so strongly impressed with the belief that active\npushing of Mr. Booth's business is the best road to their master's\nfavour, that when the public obstinately refuse to purchase his papers\nthey buy them themselves and send the proceeds to headquarters. Mr.\nBooth is also a retail trader on a large scale, and the Dean of Wells\nhas, most seasonably, drawn attention to the very notable banking\nproject which he is trying to float. Any one who follows Dean\nPlumptre's clear exposition of the principles of this financial\noperation can have little doubt that, whether they are, or are not,\nadequate to the attainment of the first and second of Mr. Booth's\nostensible objects, they may be trusted to effect a wide extension of\nany kingdom in which worldly possessions are of no value. We are, in\nfact, in sight of a financial catastrophe like that of Law a century\nago. Only it is the poor who will suffer.\n\nI have already occupied too much of your space, and yet I have drawn\nupon only one of the sources of information about the inner working of\nthe Salvation Army at my disposition. Far graver charges than any here\ndealt with are publicly brought in the others.\n\n                   I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                       T. H. Huxley.\n\n[261] P.S.-- I have just read Mr. Buchanan's letter in the Times of\nto-day.  Mr. Buchanan is, I believe, an imaginative writer. I am not\nacquainted with his works, but nothing in the way of fiction he has\nyet achieved can well surpass his account of my opinions and of the\npurport of my writings.\n\n\n\n                     IV\n\nThe \"Times\" December 20th, 1890\n\nSir,--In discussing Mr. Booth's projects I have hitherto left in the\nbackground a distinction which must be kept well in sight by those who\nwish to form a fair judgment of the influence, for good or evil, of\nthe Salvation Army. Salvationism, the work of \"saving souls\" by\nrevivalist methods, is one thing; Boothism, the utilization of the\nworkers for the furtherance of Mr.  Booth's peculiar projects, is\nanother. Mr. Booth has captured, and harnessed with sharp bits and\neffectual blinkers, a multitude of ultra-Evangelical missionaries of\nthe revivalist school who were wandering at large. It is this\nskilfully, if somewhat mercilessly, driven team which has dragged the\n\"General's\" coach-load of projects into their present position.\n\n[262] Looking, then, at the host of Salvationists proper, from the\n\"captains\" downwards (to whom, in my judgment, the family hierarchy\nstands in the relation of the Old Man of the Sea to Sinbad), as an\nindependent entity, I desire to say that the evidence before me,\nwhether hostile or friendly to the General and his schemes, is\ndistinctly favourable to them.  It exhibits them as, in the main,\npoor, uninstructed, not unfrequently fanatical, enthusiasts, the\npurity of whose lives, the sincerity of whose belief, and the\ncheerfulness of whose endurance of privation and rough usage, in what\nthey consider a just cause, command sincere respect. For my part,\nthough I conceive the corybantic method of soul-saving to be full of\ndangers, and though the theological speculations of these good people\nare to me wholly unacceptable, yet I believe that the evils which must\nfollow in the track of such errors, as of all other errors, will be\nlargely outweighed by the moral and social improvement of the people\nwhom they convert. I would no more raise my voice against them (so\nlong as they abstain from annoying their neighbours) than I would\nquarrel with a man, vigorously sweeping out a stye, on account of the\nshape of his broom, or because he made a great noise over his work. I\nhave always had a strong faith in the principle of the injunction,\n\"Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn.\" If a\nkingdom is worth a Mass, as a great [263] ruler said, surely the reign\nof clean living, industry, and thrift is worth any quantity of\ntambourines and eccentric doctrinal hypotheses. All that I have\nhitherto said, and propose further to say, is directed against Mr.\nBooth's extremely clever, audacious, and hitherto successful attempt\nto utilize the credit won by all this honest devotion and\nself-sacrifice for the purposes of his socialistic autocracy.\n\nI now propose to bring forward a little more evidence as to how things\nreally stand where Mr. Booth's system has had a fair trial. I obtain\nit, mainly, from a curious pamphlet, the title of which runs: \"The New\nPapacy.  Behind the Scenes in the Salvation Army,\" by an ex-Staff\nOfficer. \"Make not my Father's house a house of merchandise\" (John ii.\n16). 1889. Published at Toronto, by A. Britnell. On the cover it is\nstated that \"This is the book which was burned by the authorities of\nthe Salvation Army.\" I remind the reader, once more, that the\nstatements which I shall cite must be regarded as ex parte; all I can\nvouch for is that, on grounds of internal evidence and from other\nconcurrent testimony respecting the ways of the Booth hierarchy, I\nfeel justified in using them.\n\nThis is the picture the writer draws of the army in the early days of\nits invasion of the Dominion of Canada:--\n\n[264] \"Then, it will be remembered, it professed to be the humble\nhandmaid of the existing churches; its professed object was the\nevangelization of the masses. It repudiated the idea of building up a\nseparate religious body, and it denounced the practice of gathering\ntogether wealth and the accumulation of property. Men and women other\nthan its own converts gathered around it and threw themselves heart\nand soul into the work, for the simple reason that it offered, as they\nsupposed, a more extended and widely open field for evangelical\neffort. Ministers everywhere were invited and welcomed to its\nplatforms, majors and colonels were few and far between, and the\nsupremacy and power of the General were things unknown . . .  Care was\ntaken to avoid anything like proselytism; its converts were never\ncoerced into joining its ranks...  In a word, the organization\noccupied the position of an auxiliary mission and recruiting agency\nfor the various religious bodies.... The meetings were crowded, people\nprofessed conversion by the score, the public liberally supplied the\nmeans to carry on the work in their respective communities; therefore\nevery corps was wholly self-supporting, its officers were properly, if\nnot luxuriously, cared for, the local expenditure was amply provided,\nand, under the supervision of the secretary, a local member, and the\nofficer in charge, the funds were disbursed in the towns where they\nwere collected, and the [265] spirit of satisfaction and confidence\nwas mutual all around\" (pp. 4, 5).\n\nSuch was the army as the green tree. Now for the dry:--\n\n\"Those who have been daily conversant with the army's machinery are\nwell aware how entirely and radically the whole system has changed,\nand how, from a band of devoted and disinterested workers, united in\nthe bonds of zeal and charity for the good of their fellows, it has\ndeveloped into a colossal and aggressive agency for the building up of\na system and a sect, bound by rules and regulations altogether\nsubversive of religious liberty and antagonistic to every (other?)\nbranch of Christian endeavour, and bound hand and foot to the will of\none supreme head and ruler.... As the work has spread through the\ncountry, and as the area of its endeavours has enlarged, each leading\nposition has been filled, one after the other, by individuals strangers\nto the country, totally ignorant of the sentiments and idiosyncrasies\nof the Canadian people, trained in one school under the teachings and\ndominance of a member of the Booth family, and out of whom every idea\nhas been crushed, except that of unquestioning obedience to the\nGeneral, and the absolute necessity of going forward to his bidding\nwithout hesitation or question\" (p. 6).\n\n[266] \"What is the result of all this? In the first place, whilst\nmaterial prosperity has undoubtedly been attained, spirituality has\nbeen quenched, and, as an evangelical agency, the army has become\nalmost a dead letter...  In seventy-five per cent of its stations its\nofficers suffer need and privation, chiefly on account of the heavy\ntaxation that is placed upon them to maintain an imposing headquarters\nand a large ornamental staff. The whole financial arrangements are\ncarried on by a system of inflation and a hand-to-mouth extravagance\nand blindness as to future contingencies. Nearly all of its original\nworkers and members have disappeared\" (p. 7). \"In reference to the\nreligious bodies at large the army has become entirely antagonistic.\nSoldiers are forbidden by its rules to attend other places of worship\nwithout the permission of their officers...  Officers or soldiers who\nmay conscientiously leave the service or the ranks are looked upon and\noften denounced publicly as backsliders...  Means of the most\ndespicable description have been resorted to in order to starve them\nback to the service\" (p. 8). \"In its inner workings the army system is\nidentical with Jesuitism...  That 'the end justifies the means,' if\nnot openly taught, is as tacitly agreed as in that celebrated order\"\n(p. 9).\n\nSurely a bitter, overcharged, anonymous libel, is the reflection which\nwill occur to many who read [267] these passages, especially the last.\nWell, I turn to other evidence which, at any rate, is not anonymous.\nIt is contained in a pamphlet entitled \"General Booth, the Family, and\nthe Salvation Army, showing its Rise, Progress, and Moral and\nSpiritual Decline,\" by S. H.  Hodges, LL.B., late Major in the Army,\nand formerly private secretary to General Booth (Manchester, 1890). I\nrecommend potential contributors to Mr.  Booth's wealth to study this\nlittle work also. I have learned a great deal from it. Among other\ninteresting novelties, it tells me that Mr. Booth has discovered \"the\nnecessity of a third step or blessing, in the work of Salvation. He\nsaid to me one day, 'Hodges, you have only two barrels to your gun; I\nhave three'\" (p. 31). And if Mr. Hodges's description of this third\nbarrel is correct--\"giving up your conscience\" and, \"for God and the\narmy, stooping to do things which even honourable worldly men would\nnot consent to do\" (p. 32)--it is surely calculated to bring down a\ngood many things, the first principles of morality among them.\n\nMr. Hodges gives some remarkable examples of the army practice with\nthe \"General's\" new rifle. But I must refer the curious to his\ninstructive pamphlet. The position I am about to take up is a serious\none; and I prefer to fortify it by the help of evidence which, though\nsome of it may be anonymous, cannot be sneered away. And I shall [268]\nbe believed, when I say that nothing but a sense of the great social\ndanger of the spread of Boothism could induce me to revive a scandal,\neven though it is barely entitled to the benefit of the Statute of\nLimitations.\n\nOn the 7th of July, 1883, you, Sir, did the public a great service by\nwriting a leading article on the notorious \"Eagle\" case, from which I\ntake the following extract:--\n\n\"Mr. Justice Kay refused the application, but he was induced to refuse\nit by means which, as Mr. Justice Stephen justly remarked, were highly\ndiscreditable to Mr. Booth. Mr. Booth filed an affidavit which appears\ntotally to have misled Mr. Justice Kay, as it would have misled any one\nwho regarded it as a frank and honest statement by a professed teacher\nof religion.\"\n\nWhen I addressed my first letter to you I had never so much as heard of\nthe \"Eagle\" scandal. But I am thankful that my perception of the\ninevitable tendency of all religious autocracies towards evil was\nclear enough to bring about a provisional condemnation of Mr. Booth's\nschemes in my mind.  Supposing that I had decided the other way, with\nwhat sort of feeling should I have faced my friend, when I had to\nconfess that the money had passed into the absolute control of a\nperson about the character of whose administration this [269]\nconcurrence of damnatory evidence was already extant?\n\nI have nothing to say about Mr. Booth personally, for I know nothing.\nOn that subject, as on several others, I profess myself an agnostic.\nBut, if he is, as he may be, a saint actuated by the purest of\nmotives, he is not the first saint who, as you have said, has shown\nhimself \"in the ardour of prosecuting a well-meant object\" to be\ncapable of overlooking \"the plain maxims of every-day morality.\" If I\nwere a Salvationist soldier, I should cry with Othello, \"Cassio, I\nlove thee; but never more be officer of mine.\"\n\n               I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                   T. H. Huxley.\n\n\n\n                       V\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 24th, 1890--\n\nSir,--If I have any strong points, finance is certainly not one of\nthem. But the financial, or rather fiscal, operations of the General\nof the Salvation Army, as they are set forth and exemplified in \"The\nNew Papacy,\" possess that grand simplicity which is the mark of\ngenius; [270] and even I can comprehend them--or, to be more modest, I\ncan portray them in such a manner that every lineament, however harsh,\nand every shade, however dark, can be verified by published evidence.\n\nSuppose there is a thriving, expanding colonial town, and that,\nscattered among its artisans and labourers, there is a sprinkling of\nMethodists, or other such ultra-evangelical good people, doing their\nbest, in a quiet way, to \"save souls.\" Clearly, this is an outpost\nwhich it is desirable to capture. \"We,\" therefore, take measures to\nget up a Salvation \"boom\" of the ordinary pattern. Enthusiasm is\nroused. A score or two of soldiers are enlisted into the ranks of the\nSalvation Army. \"We\" select the man who promises to serve our purposes\nbest, make a \"captain\" of him, and put him in command of the \"corps.\"\nHe is very pleased and grateful; and indeed he ought to be. All he has\ndone is that he has given up his trade; that he has promised to work\nat least nine hours a day in our service (none of your eight-hour\nnonsense for us) as collector, bookseller, general agent, and anything\nelse we may order him to be. \"We,\" on the other hand, guarantee him\nnothing whatever; to do so might weaken his faith and substitute\nworldly for spiritual ties between us. Knowing that, if he exerts\nhimself in a right spirit, his labours will surely be blessed, we\ncontent ourselves with telling him that if, after all [271] expenses\nare paid and our demands are satisfied each week, 25s. remains, he may\ntake it. And, if nothing remains, he may take that, and stay his\nstomach with what the faithful may give him.  With a certain grim\nplayfulness, we add that the value of these contributions will be\nreckoned as so much salary. So long as our \"captain\" is successful,\ntherefore, a beneficent spring of cash trickles unseen into our\ntreasury; when it begins to dry up we say, \"God bless you, dear boy,\"\nturn him adrift (with or without 2s. 4d. in his pocket), and put some\nother willing horse in the shafts.\n\nThe \"General,\" I believe, proposes, among other things, to do away\nwith \"sweating.\" May he not as well set a good example by beginning at\nhome? My little sketch, however, looks so like a monstrous caricature\nthat, after all, I must produce the original from the pages of my\nCanadian authority. He says that a \"captain\" \"has to pay 10 per cent.\nof all collections and donations to the divisional fund for the\nsupport of his divisional officer, who has also the privilege of\narranging for such special meetings as he shall think fit, the\nproceeds of which he takes away for the general needs of the division.\nHeadquarters, too, has the right to hold such special meetings at the\ncorps and send around such special attractions as its wisdom sees fit,\nand to take away the proceeds for the purposes it decides upon.\n\n[272] He has to pay the rent of his building, either to headquarters or\na private individual; he has to send the whole collection of the\nafternoon meeting of the first Sunday in the month to the 'Extension\nFund' at headquarters; he has to pay for the heating, lighting, and\ncleaning of his hall, together with such necessary repairs as may be\nneeded; he has to provide the food, lodging, and clothing of his\ncadet, if he has one; headquarters taxes him with so many copies of\nthe army papers each week, for which he has to pay, sold or unsold;\nand when he has done this, he may take $6 (or $5, being a woman), or\nsuch proportion of it as may be left, with which to clothe and feed\nhimself and to pay the rent and provide for the heating and lighting\nof his quarters. If he has a lieutenant he has to pay him $6 per week,\nor such proportion of it as he himself gets, and share the house\nexpenses with him. Now, it will be easily understood that at least 60\nper cent. of the stations in Canada the officer gets no money at all,\nand he has to beg specially amongst his people for his house-rent and\nfood. There are few places in the Dominion in which the soldiers do\nnot find their officers in all the food they need; but it must be\nremembered that the value of the food so received has to be accounted\nfor at headquarters and entered upon the books of the corps as cash\nreceived, the amount being deducted from any moneys that the officer\nis able to take from the [273] week's collections. So that, no matter\nhow much may be specially given, the officer cannot receive more than\nthe value of $6 per week. The officer cannot collect any arrears of\nsalary, as each week has to pay its own expenses; and if there is any\nsurplus cash after all demands are met it must be sent to the 'war\nchest' at headquarters.\"--\"The New Papacy\" (pp. 35, 36).\n\nEvidently, Sir, \"headquarters\" has taken to heart the injunction about\ncasting your bread upon the waters. It casts the crumb of a day or\ntwo's work of an emissary, and gets back any quantity of loaves of\ncash, so long as \"captains\" present themselves to be used up and\nreplaced by new victims.  What can be said of these devoted poor\nfellows except, O sancta simplicitas!\n\nBut it would be a great mistake to suppose that the money-gathering\nefficacy of Mr. Booth's fiscal agencies is exhausted by the foregoing\nenumeration of their regular operations. Consider the following\nedifying history of the \"Rescue Home\" in Toronto:--\n\n\"It is a fine building in the heart of the city; the lot cost $7,000,\nand a building was put up at a cost of $7,000 more, and there is a\nmortgage on it amounting to half the cost of the whole. The land\nto-day would probably fetch double its original price, and every year\nenhances its value....In the first five months of its [274] existence\nthis institution received from the public an income of $1,812 70c.;\nout of this $600 was paid to headquarters for rent, $590 52c. was\nspent upon the building in various ways, and the balance of $622 18c.\npaid the salaries of the staff and supported the inmates\" (pp. 24,\n25).\n\nSaid I not truly that Mr. Booth's fisc bears the stamp of genius? Who\nelse could have got the public to buy him a \"corner lot,\" put a\nbuilding upon it, pay all its working expenses: and then, not content\nwith paying him a heavy rent for the use of the handsome present they\nhad made him, they say not a word against his mortgaging it to half\nits value? And, so far as any one knows, there is nothing to stop\nheadquarters from selling the whole estate tomorrow, and using the\nmoney as the \"General\" may direct.\n\nOnce more listen to the author of \"The New Papacy,\" who affirms that\n\"out of the funds given by the Dominion for the evangelization of the\npeople by means of the Salvation Army, one sixth had been spent in the\nextension of the Kingdom of God, and the other five sixths had been\ninvested in valuable property, all handed over to Mr. Booth and his\nheirs and assigns, as we have already stated\" (p. 26).\n\nAnd this brings me to the last point upon which I wish to touch. The\nanswer to all inquiries as to what has become of the enormous [275]\npersonal and real estate which has been given over to Mr. Booth is\nthat it is held \"in trust.\" The supporters of Mr. Booth may feel\njustified in taking that statement \"on trust.\" I do not. Anyhow, the\nmore completely satisfactory this \"trust\" is, the less can any man who\nasks the public to put blind faith in his integrity and his wisdom\nobject to acquaint them exactly with its provisions. Is the trust\ndrawn up in favour of the Salvation Army? But what is the legal status\nof the Salvation Army? Have the soldiers any claim?  Certainly not.\nHave the officers any legal interest in the \"trust\"? Surely not. The\n\"General\" has taken good care to insist on their renouncing all claims\nas a condition of their appointment. Thus, to all appearance, the\narmy, as a legal person, is identical with Mr. Booth. And, in that\ncase, any \"trust\" ostensibly for the benefit of the army is--what\nshall we say that is at once accurate and polite?\n\nI conclude with these plain questions--Will Mr. Booth take counsel's\nopinion as to whether there is anything in such legal arrangements as\nhe has at present made which prevents him from disposing of the wealth\nhe has accumulated at his own will and pleasure? Will anybody be in a\nposition to set either the civil or the criminal law in motion against\nhim or his successors if he or they choose to spend every farthing in\nways very different from those contemplated by the donors?\n\n[276] I may add that a careful study of the terms of a \"Declaration of\nTrust by William Booth in favour of the Christian Mission,\" made in\n1878, has not enabled persons of much greater competence than myself\nto answer these questions satisfactorily.*\n\n                 I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                     T. H. Huxley.\n\n    * See Preface to this volume, pp. ix-xiii.\n\nOn December 24th a letter appeared in the \"Times\" signed \"J. S.\nTrotter,\" in which the following passages appear:--\n\n\"It seems a pity to put a damper on the spirits of those who agree\nwith Professor Huxley in his denunciation of General Booth and all his\nworks. May I give a few particulars as to the 'book' which was\npublished in Canada? I had the pleasure of an interview with the\nauthor of a book written in Canada. The book was printed at Toronto,\nand two copies only struck off by the printers; one of these copies\nwas stolen from the printer, and the quotation sent to you by\nProfessor Huxley was inserted in the book, and is consequently a\nforgery. The book was published without the consent and against the\nwill of the author.\n\n[277] \"So the quotation is not only 'a bitter, overcharged anonymous\nlibel,' as Professor Huxley intimates, but a forgery as well. As to\nMr. Hodges, it seems to me to be simply trifling with your readers to\nbring him in as an authority. He was turned out of the army, out of\nkindness taken on again, and again dismissed. If this had happened to\none of your staff, would his opinion of the 'Times' as a newspaper be\ntaken for gospel?\"\n\nBut in the \"Times\" of December 29th Mr. J. S. Trotter writes:--\n\n\"I find I was mistaken in saying, in my letter of Wednesday, to the\n'Times' that Mr. Hodges was dismissed from the service of General\nBooth, and regret any inconvenience the statement may have caused to\nMr. Hodges.\"\n\nAnd on December 30th the \"Times\" published a letter from Mr. Hodges in\nwhich he says that Mr. Trotter's statements as they regard himself\n\"are the very reverse of truth.--I was never turned out of the\nSalvation Army. Nor, so far as I was made acquainted with General\nBooth's motives, was I taken on again out of kindness. In order to\nrejoin the Salvation Army, I resigned the position of manager in a\nmill where I was in [278] receipt of a salary of [Pounds] 250 per\nannum, with house-rent and one third of the profits. Instead of this\nMr. Booth allowed me [Pounds] 2 per week and house-rent.\"\n\n\n\n                 VI\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 26th, 1890\n\nSir,--I am much obliged to Mr. J. S. Trotter for the letter which you\npublished this morning. It furnishes evidence, which I much desired to\npossess on the following points:--\n\n   1. The author of \"The New Papacy\" is a responsible, trustworthy\nperson; otherwise Mr. Trotter would not speak of having had \"the\npleasure of an interview\" with him.\n\n   2. After this responsible person had taken the trouble to write a\npamphlet of sixty-four closely printed pages, some influence was\nbrought to bear upon him, the effect of which was that he refused his\nconsent to its publication. Mr. Trotter's excellent information will\nsurely enable him to tell us what influence that was.\n\n   3. How does Mr. Trotter know that any passage I have quoted is an\ninterpolation? Does he possess that other copy of the \"two\" which\nalone, as he affirms, were printed?\n\n[279] 4. If so, he will be able to say which of the passages I have\ncited is genuine and which is not; and whether the tenor of the whole\nuninterpolated copy differs in any important respect from that of the\ncopy I have quoted.\n\nIt will be interesting to hear what Mr. J. S. Trotter has to say upon\nthese points. But the really important thing which he has done is that\nhe has testified, of his own knowledge, that the anonymous author of\n\"The New Papacy\" is no mere irresponsible libeller, but a person of\nwhom even an ardent Salvationist has to speak with respect.\n\n            I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                T. H. Huxley.\n\n[I may add that the unfortunate Mr. Trotter did me the further service\nof eliciting the letter from Mr. Hodges referred to on p. 277--which\nsufficiently establishes that gentleman's credit, and leads me to\nattach full weight to his evidence about the third barrel.]\n\n     January, 1891.\n\n[280]\n\n\n                  VII\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 27th, 1890\n\nSIR,--In making use of the only evidence of the actual working of Mr.\nBooth's autocratic government accessible to me, I was fully aware of\nthe slippery nature of the ground upon which I was treading. For, as I\npointed out in my first letter, \"no personal habit more surely\ndegrades the conscience and the intellect than blind and unhesitating\nobedience to unlimited authority.\" Now we have it, on Mr. Booth's own\nshowing that every officer of his has undertaken to \"obey without\nquestioning or gainsaying the orders from headquarters.\" And the\npossible relations of such orders to honour and veracity are\ndemonstrated not only by the judicial deliverance on Mr. Booth's\naffidavit in the \"Eagle\" case, which I have already cited; not only by\nMr. Bramwell Booth's admission before Mr. Justice Lopes that he had\nstated what was \"not quite correct\" because he had \"promised Mr. Stead\nnot to divulge\" the facts of the case (the \"Times,\" November 4th,\n1885); but by the following passage in Mr. Hodges's account of the\nreasons of his withdrawal from the Salvation Army:--\n\n\"The general and Chief did not and could [281] not deny doing these\nthings; the only question was this, Was it right to practise this\ndeception? These points of difference were fully discussed between\nmyself and the Chief of the Staff on my withdrawal, especially the\nLeamington incident, which was the one that finally drove me to\ndecision. I had come to the conclusion, from the first, that they had\nacted as they supposed with a single eye to the good of God's cause,\nand had persuaded myself that the things were, as against the devil,\nright to be done, that as in battle one party captured and turned the\nenemy's own guns upon them, so, as they were fighting against the\ndevil, it would be fair to use against him his weapons. And I wrote to\nthis effect to the \"General\" (p. 63).\"\n\nNow, I do not wish to say anything needlessly harsh, but I ask any\nprudent man these questions. Could I, under these circumstances, trust\nany uncorroborated statement emanating from headquarters, or made by\nthe General's order? Had I any reason to doubt the truth of Mr.\nHodges's naive confession of the corrupting influence of Mr. Booth's\nsystem? And did it not behove me to pick my way carefully through the\nmass of statements before me, many of them due to people whose moral\nsense might, by possibility, have been as much blunted by the army\ndiscipline in the [282] use of the weapons of the devil as Mr. Hodges\naffirms that his was?\n\nTherefore, in my third letter, I commenced my illustrations of the\npractical working of Boothism with the evidence of Mr. Redstone,\nfortified and supplemented by that of a non-Salvationist, Dr.\nCunningham Geikie. That testimony has not been challenged, and, until\nit is, I shall assume that it cannot be. In my fourth letter, I cited\na definite statement by Mr. Hodges in evidence of the Jesuitical\nprinciples of headquarters. What sort of answer is it to tell us that\nMr. Hodges was dismissed the army? A child might expect that some such\nred herring would be drawn across the trail; and, in anticipation of\nthe stale trick, I added the strong prima facie evidence of the\ntrustworthiness of my witness, in this particular, which is afforded\nby the \"Eagle\" case. It was not until I wrote my fourth letter to you,\nSir--until the exploitation of the \"captains\" and the Jesuitry of\nheadquarters could be proved up to the hilt--that I ventured to have\nrecourse to \"The New Papacy.\" So far as the pamphlet itself goes, this\nis an anonymous work; and, for sufficient reasons, I did not choose to\ngo beyond what was to be found between its covers. To any one\naccustomed to deal with the facts of evolution, the Boothism of \"The\nNew Papacy\" was merely the natural and necessary development of the\nBoothism of Mr. Redstone's case and of the [283] \"Eagle\" case.\nTherefore, I felt fully justified in using it, at the same time\ncarefully warning my readers that it must be taken with due caution.\n\nMr. Trotter's useful letter admits that such a book was written by a\nperson with whom he had the \"pleasure of an interview,\" and that a\nversion of it (interpolated, according to his assertion) was published\nagainst the will of the author. Hence I am justified in believing that\nthere is a foundation of truth in certain statements, some of which\nhave long been in my possession, but which for lack of Mr. Trotter's\nvaluable corroboration I have refrained from using. The time is come\nwhen I can set forth some of the heads of this information, with the\nrequest that Mr. Trotter, who knows all about the business, will be so\ngood as to point out any error that there may be in them. I am bound\nto suppose that his sole object, like mine, is the elucidation of the\ntruth, and to assume his willingness to help me therein to the best of\nhis ability.\n\n   1. \"The author of 'The New Papacy' is a Mr. Sumner, a person of\nperfect respectability, and greatly esteemed in Toronto, who held a\nhigh position in the Army. When he left, a large public meeting,\npresided over by a popular Methodist minister, passed a vote of\nsympathy with him.\"\n\n[284] Is this true or false?\n\n   2. \"On Saturday last, about noon, Mr. Sumner, the author of the\nbook, and Mr. Fred Perry, the Salvation Army printer, accompanied by a\nlawyer, went down to Messrs. Imrie and Graham's establishment, and\nasked for all the manuscript, stereotype plates, &c., of the book. Mr.\nSumner explained that the book had been sold to the Army, and, on a\ncheque for the amount due being given, the printing material was\ndelivered up.\"\n\nDid these paragraphs appear in the \"Toronto Telegram\" of April 24th,\n1889, or did they not? Are the statements they contain true or false?\n\n3. \"Public interest in the fate or probable outcome of that mysterious\nbook called 'The New Papacy; or, Behind the Scenes in the Salvation\nArmy,' continues unabated, though the line of proceedings by the\npublisher and his solicitor, Mr. Smoke, of Watson, Thorne, Smoke, and\nMasten, has not been altered since yesterday. The book, no doubt, will\nbe issued in some form. So far as known, only one complete copy\nremains, and the whereabouts of this is a secret which will be\nprofoundly kept. It is safe to say that if the Commissioner kept on\nguessing until the next anniversary, he would not strike the secluded\n[285] location of the one volume among five thousand which escaped,\nwhen he and his assistant, Mr. Fred Perry, believed they had cast\nevery vestige of the forbidden work into the fiery furnace. On Tuesday\nlast, when the discovery was made that a copy of 'The New Papacy' was\nin existence, Publisher Britnell, of Yonge Street, was at once the\nsuspected holder, and in a short time his book-store was the resort of\narmy agents sent to reconnoitre\" (\"Toronto News,\" April 28th, 1889).\n\nIs this a forgery, or is it not? Is it in substance true or false?\n\nWhen Mr. Trotter has answered these inquiries categorically, we may\nproceed to discuss the question of interpolations in Mr. Sumner's\nbook.\n\n          I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                              T. H. Huxley.\n\n[On the 26th of December a letter, signed J. T. Cunningham, late Fellow of\nUniversity College, Oxford, called forth the following commentary.]\n\n[286]\n\n\n\n                VIII\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 29th, 1890--\n\nSir,--If Mr. Cunningham doubts the efficacy of the struggle for\nexistence, as a factor in social conditions, he should find fault with\nMr. Booth and not with me.\n\n\"I am labouring under no delusion as to the possibility of inaugurating\nthe millennium by my social specific. In the struggle of life the\nweakest will go to the wall, and there are so many weak. The fittest\nin tooth and claw will survive. All that we can do is to soften the\nlot of the unfit, and make their suffering less horrible than it is at\npresent\" (\"In Darkest England,\" p. 44).\n\nThat is what Mr. Cunningham would have found if he had read Mr. Booth's\nbook with attention. And, if he will bestow equal pains on my second\nletter, he will discover that he has interpolated the word \"wilfully\"\nin his statement of my \"argument,\" which runs thus: \"Shutting his eyes\nto the necessary consequences of the struggle for life, the existence\nof which he admits as fully as any Darwinian, Mr. Booth tells men\nwhose evil case is one of those consequences that envy is a\ncorner-stone of our competitive system.\" Mr.  [287] Cunningham's\nphysiological studies will have informed him that the process of\n\"shutting the eyes,\" in the literal sense of the words, is not always\nwilful; and I propose to illustrate, by the crucial instance his own\nletter furnishes, that the \"shutting of the eyes\" of the mind to the\nobvious consequences of accepted propositions may also be involuntary.\nAt least, I hope so.\n\n   1. \"Sooner or later,\" says Mr. Cunningham, \"the population problem\nwill block the way once more.\" What does this mean, except that\nmultiplication, excessive in relation to the contemporaneous means of\nsupport, will create a severe competition for those means? And this\nseems to me to be a pretty accurate \"reflection of the conceptions of\nMalthus\" and the other poor benighted folks of a past generation at\nwhom Mr. Cunningham sneers.\n\n   2. By way of leaving no doubt upon this subject, Mr. Cunningham\nfurther tells us, \"The struggle for existence is always going on, of\ncourse; let us thank Darwin for making us realize it.\" It is pleasant\nto meet with a little gratitude to Darwin among the epigoni who are\nsquabbling over the heritage he conquered for them, but Mr.\nCunningham's personal expression of that feeling is hasty. For it is\nobvious that he has not \"realized\" the significance of Darwin's\nteaching--indeed, I fail to discover in Mr.  Cunningham's letter any\nsign that he has even \"realized\" what [288] he would be at. If the\n\"struggle for existence is always going on\"; and if, as I suppose will\nbe granted, industrial competition is one phase of that struggle, I\nfail to see how my conclusion that it is sheer wickedness to tell\nignorant men that \"envy\" is a corner-stone of competition can be\ndisputed.\n\nMr. Cunningham has followed the lead of that polished and instructed\nperson, Mr. Ben Tillett, in rebuking me for (as the associates say)\nattacking Mr.  Booth's personal character. Of course, when I was\nwriting, I did not doubt that this very handy, though not too clean,\nweapon would be used by one or other of Mr. Booth's supporters. And my\naction was finally decided by the following considerations: I happen\nto be a member of one of the largest life insurance societies. There\nis a vacancy in the directory at present, for which half a dozen\ngentlemen are candidates. Now, I said to myself, supposing that one of\nthese gentlemen (whose pardon I humbly beg for starting the\nhypothesis), say Mr. A., in his administrative capacity and as a man\nof business, has been the subject of such observations as a Judge on\nthe Bench bestowed upon Mr. Booth, is he a person for whom I can\nproperly vote? And, if I find, when I go to the meeting of the\npolicy-holders, that most of them know nothing of this and other\nevidences of what, by the mildest judgment, must be termed Mr. A.'s\nunfitness for administrative [289] responsibilities, am I to let them\nremain in their ignorance? I leave the answer and its application to\nmen of sense and integrity.\n\nThe mention of Mr. Cunningham's ally reminds me that I have omitted to\nthank Mr. Tillett for his very useful and instructive letter; and I\nhasten to repair a neglect which I assure Mr. Tillett was more\napparent than real. Mr.  Tillett's letter is dated December 20th. On\nthe 21st the following pregnant (however unconscious) commentary upon\nit appeared in \"Reynolds's Newspaper\":-\n\n\"I have always maintained that the Salvation Army is one of the\nmightiest Socialistic agencies in the country; and now Professor\nHuxley comes in to confirm that view. How could it be otherwise? The\nfantastic religious side of Salvationism will disappear in the course\nof time, and what will be left?  A large number of men and women who\nhave been organized, disciplined, and taught to look for something\nbetter than their present condition, and who have become public\nspeakers and not afraid of ridicule. There you have the raw materials\nfor a Socialist army.\"\n\nMr. Ben Tillett evidently knows Latin enough to construe proximus\nardet.\n\nI trust that the public will not allow themselves to be led away by\nthe false issues which are [290] dangled before them. A man really may\nlove his fellow-men; cherish any form of Christianity he pleases; and\nhold not only that Darwinism is \"tottering to its fall,\" but, if he\npleases, the equally sane belief that it never existed; and yet may\nfeel it his duty to oppose, to the best of his capacity, despotic\nSocialism in all its forms, and, more particularly, in its Boothian\ndisguise.\n\n             I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                                 T.H. Huxley.\n\n[Persons who have not had the advantage of a classical education might\nfairly complain of my use of the word epigoni. To say truth, I had\nbeen reading Droysen's \"Geschichte des Hellenismus,\" and the familiar\nhistorical title slipped out unawares. In replying to me, however, the\nlate \"Fellow of University College,\" Oxford, declares he had to look\nthe word out in a Lexicon. I commend the fact to the notice of the\ncombatants over the desirability of retaining the present compulsory\nmodicum of Greek in our Universities.]\n\n[291]\n\n\n                  IX.\n\nThe \"Times,\" December 30th, 1890\n\nSir,--I am much obliged to Messrs. Ranger, Burton, and Matthews for\ntheir prompt answer to my questions. I presume it applies to all money\ncollected by the agency of the Salvation Army, though not specifically\ngiven for the purposes of the \"Christian Mission\" named in the deed of\n1878; to all sums raised by mortgage upon houses and land so given;\nand, further, to funds subscribed for Mr. Booth's various projects,\nwhich have no apparent reference to the objects of the \"Christian\nMission\" as defined in the deed.  Otherwise, to use a phrase which has\nbecome classical, \"it does not assist us much.\" But I must leave these\npoints to persons learned in the law.\n\nAnd, indeed, with many thanks to you, Sir, for the amount of valuable\nspace which you have allowed me to occupy, I now propose to leave the\nwhole subject. My sole purpose in embarking upon an enterprise which\nwas extremely distasteful to me was to prevent the skilful \"General,\"\nor rather \"Generals,\" who devised the plan of campaign from sweeping\nall before them with a rush. I found the pass already held by such\nstout defenders as Mr.  Loch and the Dean [292] of Wells, and, with\nyour powerful help, we have given time for the reinforcements, sure to\nbe sent by the abundant, though somewhat slowly acting, common sense\nof our countrymen, to come up.\n\nI can no longer be useful, and I return to more congenial occupations.\n\n        I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                            T. H. Huxley.\n\nThe following letter appeared in the \"Times\" of January 2nd, 1891:--\n\n\"Dear Mr. Tillett,--I have not had patience to read Professor Huxley's\nletters. The existence of hunger, nakedness, misery, 'death from\ninsufficient food,' even of starvation, is certain, and no agency as\nyet reaches it. How can any man hinder or discourage the giving of\nfood or help?  Why is the house called a workhouse? Because it is for\nthose who cannot work? No, because it was the house to give work or\nbread. The very name is an argument. I am very sure what Our Lord and\nHis Apostles would do if they were in London. Let us be thankful even\nto have a will to do the same.\n\n\"Yours faithfully,\nHenry E. Card. Manning.\"\n\n[293]\n\n\n                    X.\n\nThe \"Times,\" January 3rd, 1891\n\nSIR,--In my old favourite, \"The Arabian Nights,\" the motive of the\nwhole series of delightful narratives is that the sultan, who refuses\nto attend to reason, can be got to listen to a story. May I try\nwhether Cardinal Manning is to be reached in the same way? When I was\nattending the meeting of the British Association in Belfast nearly\nforty years ago, I had promised to breakfast with the eminent scholar\nDr. Hincks. Having been up very late the previous night, I was behind\ntime; so, hailing an outside car, I said to the driver as I jumped on,\n\"Now drive fast, I am in a hurry.\" Whereupon he whipped up his horse\nand set off at a hand-gallop. Nearly jerked off my seat, I shouted,\n\"My good friend, do you know where I want to go?\" \"No, yer honner,\"\nsaid the driver, \"but, any way, I am driving fast.\" I have never\nforgotten this object-lesson in the dangers of ill-regulated\nenthusiasm. We are all invited to jump on to the Salvation Army car,\nwhich Mr. Booth is undoubtedly driving very fast. Some of us have a\nfirm conviction, not only that he is taking a very different direction\nfrom that in which we wish to go, but that, before long, car and\ndriver will come to grief. Are we to accept [294] the invitation, even\nat the bidding of the eminent person who appears to think himself\nentitled to pledge the credit of \"Our Lord and His Apostles\" in favour\nof Boothism?\n\n   I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                       T. H. Huxley.\n\n\n\n                XI.\n\nThe \"Times,\" January 13th, 1891\n\nSIR,--A letter from Mr. Booth-Clibborn, dated January 3rd, appeared in\nthe \"Times\" of yesterday. This elaborate document occupies three\ncolumns of small print--space enough, assuredly, for an effectual\nreply to the seven letters of mine to which the writer refers, if any\nsuch were forthcoming.  Mr. Booth-Clibborn signs himself \"Commissioner\nof the Salvation Army for France and Switzerland,\" but he says that he\naccepts my \"challenge\" without the knowledge of his chiefs.\nConsidering the self-damaging character of his letter, it was,\nperhaps, hardly necessary to make that statement.\n\nMr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn speaks of my \"challenge.\" I presume\nthat he refers to my request for information about the authorship and\nfate of \"The New Papacy,\" in the letter [295] published in the \"Times\"\non December 27th, 1890. The \"Commissioner\" deals with this matter in\nparagraph No. 4 of his letter; and I observe, with no little\nsatisfaction, that he does not venture to controvert any one of the\nstatements of my witnesses. He tacitly admits that the author of \"The\nNew Papacy\" was a person \"greatly esteemed in Toronto,\" and that he\nheld \"a high position in the army\"; further, that the Canadian\n\"Commissioner\" thought it worth while to pay the printer's bill, in\norder that the copies already printed off might be destroyed and the\npamphlet effectually suppressed. Thus the essential facts of the case\nare admitted and established beyond question.\n\nHow does Mr. Booth-Clibborn try to explain them away?\n\n\"Mr. Sumner, who wrote the little book in a hot fit, soon regretted it\n(as any man would do whose conscience showed him in a calmer moment\nwhen his 'respectability' returned with his repentance, that he had\ngrossly misrepresented), and just before it appeared offered to order\nits suppression if the army would pay the costs already incurred, and\nwhich he was unable to bear.\"\n\n\"The New Papacy\" fills sixty closely printed duodecimo pages. It is\ncarefully written, and for the most part in studiously moderate\nlanguage; moreover, it contains many precise details and [296]\nfigures, the ascertainment of which must have taken much time and\ntrouble. Yet, forsooth, it was written in \"a hot fit.\"\n\nI sincerely hope, for the sake of his own credit, that Mr.\n\"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn does not know as much about this\nmelancholy business as I do.  My hands are unfortunately tied, and I\nam not at liberty to use all the information in my possession. I must\ncontent myself with quoting the following passage from the preface to\n\"The New Papacy\":--\n\n\"It has not been without considerable thought and a good deal of urging\nthat the following pages have been given to the public. But though we\nwould have shrunk from a labour so distasteful, and have gladly\navoided a notoriety anything but pleasant to the feelings, or\nconducive to our material welfare, we have felt that in the interests\nof the benevolent public, in the interests of religion, in the\ninterests of a band of devoted men and women whose personal ends are\nbeing defeated, and the fruit of whose labour is being destroyed, and,\nabove all, in the interests of that future which lies before the\nSalvation Army itself, if purged and purified in its executive and\nreturned to its original position in the ranks of Canadian Christian\neffort, it is no more than our duty to throw such light as we are able\nupon its true inwardness, and with that object and for the [297]\nfurtherance of those ends we offer our pages to the public view.\"\n\nThe preface is dated April 1889. According to the statement in the\n\"Toronto Telegram\" which Mr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn does not\ndare to dispute, his Canadian fellow-\"Commissioner\" bought and\ndestroyed the whole edition of \"The New Papacy\" about the end of the\nthird week in April. It is clear that the writer of the paragraph\nquoted from the preface was well out of a \"hot fit,\" if he had ever\nbeen in one, while he had not entered on the stage of repentance\nwithin three weeks of that time. Mr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn's\nscandalous insinuations that Mr. Sumner was bribed by \"a few\nsovereigns,\" and that he was \"bought off,\" in the face of his own\nadmission that Mr. Sumner \"offered to order its suppression if the\narmy would pay the costs already incurred, and which he was unable to\nbear\" is a crucial example of that Jesuitry with which the officials\nof the army have been so frequently charged.\n\nMr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn says that when \"London headquarters\nheard of the affair, it disapproved of the action of the\nCommissioner.\" That circumstance indicates that headquarters is not\nwholly devoid of intelligence; but it has nothing to do with the value\nof Mr. Sumner's evidence, which is all I am concerned about. Very\nlikely London headquarters will disapprove of its French [298]\n\"Commissioner's\" present action. But what then? The upshot of all this\nis that Mr. Booth-Clibborn has made as great a blunder as simple Mr.\nTrotter did. The pair of Balaams greatly desired to curse, but have\nbeen compelled to bless. They have, between them, completely justified\nmy reliance on Mr. Sumner as a perfectly trustworthy witness; and\nneither of them has dared to challenge the accuracy of one solitary\nstatement made by that worthy gentleman, whose full story I hope some\nday or other to see set before the public. Then the true causes of his\naction will be made known.\n\nParagraph 2 of the \"Commissioner's\" letter says many things, but not\nmuch about Mr. Hodges. The columns of the \"Times\" recently showed that\nMr. Hodges was able to compel an apology from Mr. Trotter. I leave it\nto him to deal with the \"Commissioner.\"\n\nAs to the \"Eagle\" case, treated of in paragraph No. 3, a gentleman\nwell versed in the law, who was in court during the hearing of the\nappeal, has assured me that the argument was purely technical; that\nthe facts were very slightly gone into; and that, so far as he knows,\nno dissenting comment was made on the strictures of the Judge before\nwhom the case first came.  Moreover, in the judgment of the Master of\nthe Rolls, fully recorded in the \"Times\" of February 14th, 1884, the\nfollowing passages occur:--\n\n[299] \"The case had been heard by a learned Judge, who had exercised\nhis discretion upon it, and the Court would not interfere with his\ndiscretion unless they could see that he was wrong. The learned Judge\nhad taken a strong view of the conduct of the defendant, but\nnevertheless had said that he would have given relief if he could have\nseen how far protection and compensation could be given. And if this\nCourt differed from him in that view, and could give relief without\nforfeiture, they would be acting on his own principle in doing so.\nCertain suggestions had been made with that view, and the Court had to\nconsider the case under all the circumstances.... He himself (the\nMaster of the Rolls) considered that it was probable the defendant,\nwith his principles, had intended to destroy the property as a\npublic-house, and that it was not right thus to take property under a\ncovenant to keep it up as a public-house, intending to destroy it as\nsuch.  He did not, however, think this was enough to deprive him of\nall relief. The defendant could only expect severe terms.\"\n\nYet, Sir, Mr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn, this high official of the\nSalvation Army, has the audacity to tell the public that if I had made\ninquiries I should have found that \"in the Court of Appeal the Judge\nreversed the decision of his predecessor as regards seven eighths of\nthe property, and the General was declared to have acted [300] all\nalong with straight forwardness and good faith.\"\n\nBut the nature of Mr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn's conceptions of\nstraightforwardness and good faith is so marvellously illustrated by\nthe portions of his letter with which I have dealt that I doubt not\nhis statements are quite up to the level of the \"Army\" Regulations and\nInstructions in regard to those cardinal virtues. As I pointed out must\nbe the case, the slave is subdued to that he works in.\n\nFor myself, I must confess that the process of wading through Mr.\n\"Commissioner's\" verbose and clumsy pleadings has given me a \"hot\nfit,\" which, I undertake to say, will be followed by not so much as a\npassing shiver of repentance. And it is under the influence of the\ngenial warmth diffused through the frame, on one of those rare\noccasions when one may be \"angry and sin not,\" that I infringe my\nresolution to trouble you with no more letters. On reflection, I am\nconvinced that it is undesirable that the public should be misled, for\neven a few days, by misrepresentations so serious.\n\nI am copiously abused for speaking of the Jesuitical methods of the\nsuperior officials of the Salvation Army. But the following facts have\nnot been, and, I believe, cannot be, denied:--\n\n   1. Mr. Booth's conduct in the \"Eagle\" case has been censured by two\nof the Judges.\n\n[301] 2. Mr. Bramwell Booth admitted before Mr. Justice Lopes that he\nhad made an untrue statement because of a promise he had made to Mr.\nStead.*\n\n    * This statement has been disputed, but not yet publicly. (See p. 305.)\n\nAnd I have just proved that Mr. \"Commissioner\" Booth-Clibborn asserts\nthe exact contrary of that which your report of the judgment of the\nMaster of the Rolls tells us that distinguished judge said.\n\nUnder these circumstances, I think that my politeness in applying no\nharder adjective than \"Jesuitical\" to these proceedings is not\nproperly appreciated.\n\n      I am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                          T. H. Huxley.\n\n\n\n                XII.\n\nThe \"Times,\" January 22nd, 1891\n\nSIR,--I think that your readers will be interested in the accompanying\nopinion, written in consultation with an eminent Chancery Queen's\nCounsel, with which I have been favoured. It will be observed that\nthis important legal deliverance [302] justifies much stronger\nlanguage than any which I have applied to the only security (?) for\nthe proper administration of the funds in Mr. Booth's hands which\nappears to be in existence.\n\nI am, Sir, your obedient servant,\n                           T. H. Huxley.\n\n       1, Dr. Johnson's Buildings, Temple, E.C.,\n                  January 14, 1891.\n\nMR. BOOTH'S DECLARATION OF TRUST DEED, 1878.\n\n\"I am of opinion, subject to the question whether there may be any\nprovision in the Charitable Trusts Acts which can be made available\nfor enforcing some scheme for the appropriation of the property, and\nwith regard to the real and leasehold properties whether the\nconveyances and leases are not altogether void, as frauds on the\nMortmain Acts, that nothing can be done to control or to interfere\nwith Booth in the disposition or application of the properties or\nmoneys purported to be affected by the deed.\n\n\"As to the properties vested in Booth himself, it appears to me that\nsuch are placed absolutely under his power and control both as to the\ndisposal and application thereof, and that there are no trusts for any\nspecific purposes declared which [303] could be enforced, and that\nthere are no defined persons nor classes of persons who can claim to\nbe entitled to the benefits of them, or at whose instance they could\nbe enforced by any legal process.\n\n\"As to the properties (if any) vested in trustees appointed by Booth,\nit appears to me that the only person who has a locus standi to\nenforce these trusts is Booth himself, and that he would have absolute\npower over the trusts and the property, and might deal with the\nproperty as he pleased, and that, as in the former case, nothing could\nbe done in the way of enforcing any trusts against him.\n\n\"As to the moneys contributed or raised by mortgage for the general\npurposes of the mission, it appears to me that Booth may expend them\nas he pleases, without being subject to any legal control, and that he\ncannot even be compelled to publish any balance-sheets.\n\n\"Whether there are any provisions in the Charitable Trusts Acts which\ncould be made available for enforcing some scheme for the application\nof the property or funds is a question to which I should require to\ngive a closer consideration should it become necessary to go into it;\nbut at present, after perusing these Acts, and especially 16 and 17\nVict. c. 137 and 18 and 19 Vict. c. 124, I cannot see how they could\nbe made applicable to the trusts as declared in this deed.\n\n[304] \"As to the Mortmain Acts, the matter is clearly charitable, and\nunless in the conveyances and leases to Booth, or to the trustees (if\nany) named by him, all the provisions of the Acts have been complied\nwith, and the deeds have been enrolled under the Acts, they would be\nvoid. It is probable, however, that every conveyance and lease has\nbeen taken without disclosing any charitable trust, for the purpose of\npreventing it from being void on the face of it. It is to be noted\nthat the deed is a mere deed poll by Booth himself, without any other\nparty to it, who, as a contracting party, would have a right to\nenforce it.\n\n\"Whether there are any objects of the trust I cannot say. If there is,\nas the recital indicates, a society of enrolled members called 'The\nChristian Mission,' those members would be objects of the trust, but\nthen, it appears to me, Booth has entire control and determination of\nthe application. And, as to the trusts enuring for the benefit of the\n'Salvation Army,' I am not aware what is the constitution of the\n'Salvation Army,' but there is no reference whatever to any such body\nin the deed. I have understood the army as being merely the\nmissionaries, and not the society of worshippers.\n\n\"If there is no Christian Mission Society of enrolled members, then\nthere are no objects of the trust. The trusts are purely religious,\nand trading is entirely beyond its purposes. Booth can [305] 'give\naway' the property, simply because there is no one who has any right\nto prevent his doing so.\n\n\"Ernest Hatton.\"\n\nIt is probably my want of legal knowledge which prevents me from\nappreciating the value of the professed corrections of Mr. Hatton's\nopinion contained in the letters of Messrs. Ranger, Burton, and\nMatthews, \"Times,\" January 28th and 29th, 1891.\n\nThe note on page 301 refers to a correspondence, incomplete at the\ntime fixed for the publication of my pamphlet, the nature of which is\nsufficiently indicated by the subjoined extracts from Mr. Stead's\nletter in the \"Times\" of January 20th, and from my reply in the\n\"Times\" of January 24th. Referring to the paragraphs numbered 1, 2, at\nthe end of my letter XI., Mr. Stead says:--\n\n\"On reading this, I at once wrote to Professor Huxley, stating that, as\nhe had mentioned my name, I was justified in intervening to explain\nthat, so far as the second count in his indictment went--for the Eagle\ndispute is no concern of mine--he had been misled by an error in the\nreports of the case which appeared in the daily papers [306] of\nNovember 4, 1885. I have his reply to-day, saying that I had better\nwrite to you direct. May I ask you, then, seeing that my name has been\nbrought into the affair, to state that, as I was in the dock when Mr.\nBramwell Booth was in the witness-box, I am in a position to give the\nmost unqualified denial to the statement as to the alleged admission\non his part of falsehood? Nothing was heard in Court of any such\nadmission. Neither the prosecuting counsel nor the Judge who tried the\ncase ever referred to it, although it would obviously have had a\ndirect bearing on the credit of the witness; and the jury, by\nacquitting Mr.  Bramwell Booth, showed that they believed him to be a\nwitness of truth. But fortunately the facts can be verified beyond all\ngainsaying by a reference to the official shorthand-writer's report of\nthe evidence. During the hearing of the case for the prosecution,\nInspector Borner was interrupted by the Judge, who said:--\n\n\"'I want to ask you a question. During the whole of that conversation,\ndid Booth in any way suggest that that child had been sold?' Borner\nreplied:--\n\n\"'Not at that interview, my Lord.'\n\n\"It was to this that Mr. Bramwell Booth referred when, after\nexamination, cross-examination, [307] and re-examination, during which\nno suggestion had been made that he had ever made the untrue statement\nnow alleged against him, he asked and received leave from the Judge to\nmake the following explanation, which I quote from the official\nreport:--\n\n\"'Will you allow me to explain a matter mentioned yesterday in\nreference to a question asked by your Lordship some days ago with\nrespect to one matter connected with my conduct? Your Lordship asked,\nI think it was Inspector Borner, whether I had said to him at either\nof our interviews that the child was sold by her parents, and he\nreplied \"No.\" That is quite correct; I did not say so to him, and what\nI wish to say now is that I had been specially requested by Mr. Stead,\nand had given him a promise, that I would not under any circumstances\ndivulge the fact of that sale to any person which would ma ke it at\nall probable that any trouble would be brought upon the persons who\nhad taken part in this investigation.' (Central Criminal Court Reports,\nVol.  CII., part 612, pp. 1,035-6.)\n\n\"In the daily papers of the following day this statement was\nmisreported as follows:--\n\n\"'I wish to explain, in regard to your Lordship's condemnation of my\nhaving said \"No\" to [308] Inspector Borner when he asked me whether\nthe child had been sold by her parents--the reason why I stated what\nwas not correct was that I had promised Mr. Stead not to divulge the\nfact of the sale to any person which would make it probable that any\ntrouble should be brought on persons taking part in this proceeding.'\n\n\"Hence the mistake into which Professor Huxley has unwittingly fallen.\n\n\"I may add that, so far from the statement never having been challenged\nfor five years, it was denounced as 'a remarkably striking lie' in the\n'War Cry' of November 14th, and again the same official organ of the\nSalvation Army of November 18th specifically adduced this misreport as\nan instance of 'the most disgraceful way' in which the reports of the\ntrial were garbled by some of the papers. What, then, becomes of one\nof the two main pillars of Professor Huxley's argument?\"\n\nIn my reply, I point out that, on the 10th of January, Mr. Stead\naddressed to me a letter, which commences thus: \"I see in the 'Times'\nof this morning that you are about to republish your letters on\nBooth's book.\"\n\nI replied to this letter on the 12th of January:--\n\n[309] \"Dear Mr. Stead,--I charge Mr. Bramwell Booth with nothing. I\nsimply quote the 'Times' report, the accuracy of which, so far as I\nknow, has never been challenged by Mr. Booth. I say I quote the\n'Times' and not Mr. Hodges,* because I took some pains about the\nverification of Mr. Hodges's citation.\n\n    * This is a slip of the pen. Mr. Hodges had nothing to do\n    with the citation of which I made use.\n\n\"I should have thought it rather appertained to Mr. Bramwell Booth to\ncontradict a statement which refers, not to what you heard, but to what\nhe said. However, I am the last person to wish to give circulation to\na story which may not be quite correct; and I will take care, if you\nhave no objection (your letter is marked 'private'), to make public as\nmuch of your letter as relates to the point to which you have called\nmy attention.\n\n           \"I am, yours very faithfully,\n                          T. H. Huxley.\"\n\nTo this Mr. Stead answered, under date of January 13th, 1891:--\n\n\"Dear Professor Huxley,--I thank you for your letter of the 12th inst.\nI am quite sure you would not wish to do any injustice in this matter.\nBut, instead of publishing any extract from my letter, might I ask you\nto read the passage as it [310] appears in the verbatim report of the\ntrial which was printed day by day, and used by counsel on both sides,\nand by the Judge during the case? I had hoped to have got you a copy\nto-day, but find that I was too late. I shall have it first thing\nto-morrow morning. You will find that it is quite clear, and\nconclusively disposes of the alleged admission of untruthfulness.\nAgain thanking you for your courtesy,\n\n           \"I am, yours faithfully,\n                      W. T. Stead.\"\n\nThus it appears that the letter which Mr. Stead wrote to me on the 13th\nof January does not contain one word of that which he ways it\ncontains, in the statement which appears in the \"Times\" to-day.\nMoreover, the letter of mine to which Mr. Stead refers in his first\ncommunication to me is not the letter which appeared on the 13th, as\nhe states, but that which you published on December 27th, 1890.\nTherefore, it is not true that Mr. Stead wrote \"at once.\" On the\ncontrary, he allowed nearly a fortnight to elapse before he addressed\nme on the 10th of January 1891. Furthermore, Mr. Stead suppresses the\nfact that, since the 13th of January, he has had in his possession my\noffer to publish his version of the story; and he leads the reader to\nsuppose that my only answer was that he \"had better write to [311] you\ndirect. All the while, Mr. Stead knows perfectly well that I was\nwithheld from making public use of his letter of the 10th by nothing\nbut my scruples about using a document which was marked \"private\"; and\nthat he did not give me leave to quote his letter of the 10th of\nJanuary until after he had written that which appeared yesterday.\n\nAnd I add:--\n\nAs to the subject-matter of Mr. Stead's letter, the point which he\nwishes to prove appears to be this--that Mr. Bramwell Booth did not\nmake a false statement, but that he withheld from the officers of\njustice, pursuing a most serious criminal inquiry, a fact of grave\nimportance, which lay within his own knowledge. And this because he\nhad promised Mr. Stead to keep the fact secret. In short, Mr. Bramwell\nBooth did not say what was wrong; but he did what was wrong.\n\nI will take care to give every weight to the correction. Most people,\nI think, will consider that one of the \"main pillars of my argument,\"\nas Mr.  Stead is pleased to call them, has become very much\nstrengthened.\n\n[312]\n\n        LEGAL OPINIONS RESPECTING\n         \"GENERAL\" BOOTH'S ACTS.\n\nIn referring to the course of action adopted by \"General\" Booth and\nMr.  Bramwell Booth in respect of their legal obligations to other\npersons, or to the criminal and civil law, I have been as careful as I\nwas bound to be, to put any difficulties suggested by mere lay\ncommonsense in an interrogative or merely doubtful form; and to\nconfine myself, for any positive expressions, to citations from\npublished declarations of the judges before whom the acts of \"General\"\nBooth came; from reports of the Law Courts; and from the deliberate\nopinions of legal experts. I have now some further remarks to make on\nthese topics.\n\n   I. The observations at p. 305 express, with due reserve, the\nimpression which the counsel's opinions, quoted by \"General\" Booth's\nsolicitors, made on my mind. They were written and sent to the printer\nbefore I saw the letter from a \"Barrister NOT Practising on the Common\nLaw Side,\" and those from Messrs. Clarke and Calkin and Mr. George\nKebbell, which appeared in the \"Times\" of February 3rd and 4th.\n\nThese letters fully bear out the conclusion which I had formed, but\nwhich it would have [313] been presumptuous on my part to express,\nthat the opinions cited by \"General\" Booth's solicitors were like the\nfamous broken tea-cups \"wisely ranged for show\"; and that, as Messrs.\nClarke and Calkin say, they \"do not at all meet the main points on\nwhich Mr. Hatton advised.\" I do not think that any one who reads\nattentively the able letter of \"A Barrister NOT Practicing on the\nCommon Law Side\" will arrive at any other conclusion; or who will not\nshare the very natural desire of Mr. Kebbell to be provided with clear\nand intelligible answers to the following inquiries:--\n\n   (1) Does the trust deed by its operation empower any one legally to\ncall upon Mr. Booth to account for the application of the funds?\n\n   (2) In the event of the funds not being properly accounted for, is\nany one, and, if so, who, in a position to institute civil or criminal\nproceedings against any one, and whom, in respect of such refusal or\nneglect to account?\n\n   (3) In the event of the proceedings, civil or criminal, failing to\nobtain restitution of misapplied funds, is or are any other person or\npersons liable to make good the loss?\n\nOn December 24th, 1890, a letter of mine appeared in the \"Times\" (No.\nV.  above) in which I put questions of the same import, and asked Mr.\nBooth if he would not be so good as to take counsel's opinion on the\n\"trusts\" of which so [314] much has been heard and so little seen, not\nas they stood in 1878, or in 1888, but as they stand now? Six weeks\nhave elapsed, and I wait for a reply.\n\nIt is true that Dr. Greenwood has been authorized by Mr. Booth to\npublish what he calls a \"Rough outline of the intended Trust Deed\"\n(\"General Booth and His Critics,\" p. 120), but unfortunately we are\nespecially told that it \"does not profess to be an absolutely accurate\nanalysis.\" Under these circumstances I am afraid that neither lawyers\nnor laymen of moderate intelligence will pay much attention to the\nassertion, that \"it gives a fair idea of the general effect of the\ndraft,\" even although \"the words in quotation marks are taken from it\nverbatim.\"\n\nThese words, which I give in italics, (1) define the purposes of the\nscheme to be \"for the social and moral regeneration and improvement of\npersons needy, destitute, degraded, or criminal, in some manner\nindicated, implied, or suggested in the book called 'In Darkest\nEngland.'\" Whence I apprehend that, if the whole funds collected are\napplied to \"mothering society\" by the help of speculative attorney\n\"tribunes of the people,\" the purposes of the trust will be\nunassailably fulfilled. (2) The name is to be \"Darkest England\nScheme,\" (3) the General of the Salvation Army is to be \"Director of\nthe Scheme.\" Truly valuable information all this! But taking it for\nwhat it is worth, the [315] public must not be misled into supposing\nthat it has the least bearing upon the questions to which neither I,\nnor anybody else, has yet been able to obtain an intelligible answer,\nand that is, where are the vast funds which have been obtained, in one\nway or another, during the last dozen years in the name of the\nSalvation Army? Where is the presumably amended Trust Deed of 1888? I\nask once more: Will Mr. Booth submit to competent and impartial legal\nscrutiny the arrangements by which he and his successors are prevented\nfrom dealing with the funds of the so-called \"army chest\" exactly as\nhe or they may please?\n\nII. With respect to the \"Eagle\" case, I am advised that Dr. Greenwood,\nwhose good faith I do not question, has been misled into\nmisrepresenting it in the appendix to his pamphlet. And certainly, the\nevidence of authoritative records which I have had the opportunity of\nperusing, appears to my non-legal mind to be utterly at variance with\nthe statement to which Dr.  Greenwood stands committed. I may observe,\nfurther, that the excuse alleged on behalf of Mr. Booth, that he\nsigned the affidavit set before him by his solicitors without duly\nconsidering its contents, is one which I should not like to have put\nforward were the case my own. It may be, and often is, necessary for a\nperson to sign an affidavit without [316] being able fully to\nappreciate the technical language in which it is couched. But his\nsolicitor will always instruct him as to the effect of these terms.\nAnd, in this particular case where the whole matter turns on Mr.\nBooth's personal intentions, it was his plainest duty to inquire, very\nseriously, whether the legal phraseology employed would convey neither\nmore nor less than such intentions to those who would act on the\naffidavit, before he put his name to it.\n\nIII. With respect to Mr. Bramwell Booth's case, I refer the reader to\np. 311.\n\nIV. As to Mr. Booth-Clibborn's misrepresentations, see above, pp. 298,\n299.\n\nThis much for the legal questions which have been raised by various\npersons since the first edition of the pamphlet was published.\n\nDR. GREENWOOD'S \"GENERAL BOOTH AND HIS CRITICS\"\n\nSo far as I am concerned, there is little or nothing in this brochure\nbeyond a reproduction of the vituperative stuff which has been going\nthe round of those newspapers which favour \"General\" Booth for some\nweeks. Those who do not want to see the real worth of it all will not\nread [317] the preceding pages; and those who do will need no help\nfrom me.\n\nI fear, however, that in justice to other people I must put one of Dr.\nGreenwood's paragraphs in the pillory. He says that I have \"built up,\non the flimsy foundation of stories told by three or four deserters\nfrom the Army\" (p. 114), a sweeping indictment against General Booth.\nThis is the sort of thing to which I am well accustomed at the hands\nof anonymous newspaper writers. But in view of the following easily\nverifiable statements, I do not think that an educated and, I have no\ndoubt, highly respectable gentleman like Dr. Greenwood can, in cold\nblood, contemplate that assertion with satisfaction.\n\nThe persons here alluded to as \"three or four deserters from the army\"\nare:--\n\n   (1) Mr. Redstone, for whose character Dr. Cunningham Geikie is\nguarantee, and whom it has been left to Dr. Greenwood to attempt to\nbesmirch.\n\n   (2) Mr. Sumner, who is a gentleman quite as worthy of respect as\nDr. Greenwood, and whose published evidence not one of the champions\nof the Salvation Army has yet ventured to impugn.\n\n   (3) Mr. Hodges, similarly libelled by that unhappy meddler Mr.\nTrotter, who was compelled to the prompt confession of his error (see\np. 277).\n\n   (4) Notwithstanding this evidence of Mr. Trotter's claims to\nattention, Dr. Greenwood quotes a [318] statement of his as evidence\nthat a statement quoted by me from Mr. Sumner's work is a \"forgery.\"\nBut Dr. Greenwood unfortunately forgets to mention that on the 27th of\nDecember 1890 (Letter No. VII. above) Mr. Trotter was publicly\nrequired to produce proof of his assertion; and that he has not\nthought fit to produce that proof.\n\nIf I were disposed to use to Dr. Greenwood language of the sort he so\nfreely employs to me, I think that he could not complain of a handsome\nscolding.  For what is the real state of the case? Simply this--that\nhaving come to the conclusion, from the perusal of \"In Darkest\nEngland,\" that \"General\" Booth's colossal scheme (as apart from the\nlocal action of Salvationists) was bad in principle and must produce\ncertain evil consequences, and having warned the public to that\neffect, I quite unexpectedly found my hands full of evidence that the\nexact evils predicted had, in fact, already shown themselves on a\ngreat scale; and, carefully warning the public to criticize this\nevidence, I produced a small part of it. When Dr. Greenwood talks\nabout my want of \"regard to the opinion of the nine thousand odd who\nstill remain among the faithful\" (p. 114), he commits an imprudence.\nHe would obviously be surprised to learn the extent of the support,\nencouragement, and information which I have received from active and\nsincere members of the Salvation Army [319] --but of which I can make\nno use, because of the terroristic discipline and systematic espionage\nwhich my correspondents tell me is enforced by its chief. Some of\nthese days, when nobody can be damaged by their use, a curious light\nmay be thrown upon the inner workings of the organization which we are\nbidden to regard as a happy family, by these documents.\n\n[320] (blank page)\n[321]\n\n\n\n          THE SALVATION ARMY\n          ARTICLES OF WAR,\n\nTo be signed by all who wish to be entered on the roll as soldiers.\n\nHaving received with all my heart the Salvation offered to me by the\ntender mercy of Jehovah, I do here and now publicly acknowledge God to\nbe my Father and King, Jesus Christ to be my Saviour, and the Holy\nSpirit to be my Guide, Comforter, and Strength; and that I will, by\nHis help, love, serve, worship, and obey this glorious God through all\ntime and through all eternity.\n\nBelieving solemnly that The Salvation Army has been raised up by God,\nand is sustained and directed by Him, I do here declare my full\ndetermination, by God's help, to be a true soldier of the Army till I\ndie.\n\n   I am thoroughly convinced of the truth of the Army's teaching.\n\n   I believe that repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus\nChrist, and conversion by the Holy Spirit, are necessary to Salvation,\nand that all men may be saved.\n\n   I believe that we are saved by grace, through faith in our Lord\nJesus Christ, and he that believeth hath the witness of it in himself.\nI have got it. Thank God!\n\n   I believe that the Scriptures were given by inspiration of God, and\nthat they teach that not only does continuance in the favour of God\ndepend upon continued faith in, and obedience to, Christ, [322] but\nthat it is possible for those who have been truly converted to fall\naway and be eternally lost.\n\n   I believe that it is the privilege of all God's people to be\n\"wholly sanctified,\" and that \"their whole spirit and soul and body\"\nmay \"be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.\"\nThat is to say, I believe that after conversion there remain in the\nheart of the believer inclinations to evil, or roots of bitterness,\nwhich, unless overpowered by Divine grace, produce actual sin; but\nthese evil tendencies can be entirely taken away by the Spirit of God,\nand the whole heart thus cleansed from anything contrary to the will\nof God, or entirely sanctified, will then produce the fruit of the\nSpirit only. And I believe that persons thus entirely sanctified may,\nby the power of God, be kept unblamable and unreprovable before Him.\n\n   I believe in the immortality of the soul; in the resurrection of\nthe body; in the general judgment at the end of the world; in the\neternal happiness of the righteous; and in the everlasting punishment\nof the wicked.\n\nTHEREFORE, I do here, and now, and for ever, renounce the world with\nall its sinful pleasures, companionship treasures, and objects, and\ndeclare my full determination boldly to show myself a Soldier of Jesus\nChrist in all places and companies, no matter what I may have to\nsuffer, do, or lose, by so doing.\n\n   I do here and now declare that I will abstain from the use of all\nintoxicating liquors, and also from the habitual use of opium,\nlaudanum, morphia, and all other baneful drugs, except when in illness\nsuch drugs shall be ordered for me by a doctor.\n\n   I do here and now declare that I will abstain from [323] the use of\nall low or profane language; from the taking of the name of God in\nvain; and from all impurity, or from taking part in any unclean\nconversation or the reading of any obscene book or paper at any time,\nin any company, or in any place.\n\n   I do here declare that I will not allow myself in any falsehood,\ndeceit, misrepresentation, or dishonesty; neither will I practise any\nfraudulent conduct, either in my business, my home, or in any other\nrelation in which I may stand to my fellow men, but that I will deal\ntruthfully, fairly, honourably, and kindly with all those who may\nemploy me or whom I may myself employ.\n\n   I do here declare that I will never treat any woman, child, or\nother person, whose life, comfort, or happiness may be placed within\nmy power, in an oppressive, cruel, or cowardly manner, but that I will\nprotect such from evil and danger so far as I can, and promote, to the\nutmost of my ability, their present welfare and eternal salvation.\n\n   I do here declare that I will spend all the time, strength, money,\nand influence I can in supporting and carrying on this War, and that I\nwill endeavour to lead my family, friends, neighbours, and all others\nwhom I can influence, to do the same, believing that the sure and only\nway to remedy all the evils in the world is by bringing men to submit\nthemselves to the government of the Lord Jesus Christ.\n\n   I do here declare that I will always obey the lawful orders of my\nOfficers, and that I will carry out to the utmost of my power all the\nOrders and Regulations of The Army; and further, that I will be an\nexample of faithfulness to its principles, advance to the utmost of my\nability its operations, and never allow, where I can prevent it, any\ninjury to its interests or hindrance to its success.\n\n[324] And I do here and now call upon all present to witness that I\nenter into this undertaking and sign these Articles of War of my own\nfree will, feeling that the love of Christ who died to save me\nrequires from me this devotion of my life to His service for the\nSalvation of the whole world, and therefore wish now to be enrolled as\na Soldier of the Salvation Army.\n\n________________________________________\n\n_____________CORPS______________ 18___\n\n                                      ____________________________________\n                                      ______________________________ Corps\n                                      ___________________________ Division\n                                      _____________________ 18____\n\n                              (SINGLE)\n\n                       FORM OF APPLICATION\n                    FOR AN APPOINTMENT AS AN\n                  OFFICER IN THE SALVATION ARMY\n\nName _____________________________________________________________________\n\nAddress __________________________________________________________________\n\n1. What was your AGE last birthday? ___________________\n   What is the date of your birthday? _________________\n\n2. What is your height? __________________\n\n3. Are you free from bodily defect or disease? ____\n\n4. What serious illnesses have you had, and when? ________________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n5. Have you ever had fits of any kind? __________________\nIf so how long, and what kind? ___________________________________________\n\n6. Do you consider your health good, and that you are strong enough for\nthe work of an officer? __________________________________________________\nIf not, or if you are doubtful, write a letter and explain the matter.\n\n7. Is your doctor's certificate a full and correct statement so far as you\nknow? ___________________________________________________________\n\n8. Are you, or have you ever been, married? ___________\n\n9. When and where CONVERTED? ____________________________\n\n10. What other Religious Societies have you belonged to? _________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n11. Were you ever a Junior Soldier? _____________________\nIf so, how long? ________________________________________\n\n12. How long have you been enrolled as a SOLDIER? _______\nand signed Articles of War? ____________________\n\n13. If you hold any office in your Corps, say what and how long held? ____\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n14. Do you intend to live and die in the ranks of the Salvation Army? ____\n\n                   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n\n15. Have you ever been an open BACKSLIDER? ______________\nIf so, how long? ________________________________________\n\n16. Why? _________________________________________________________________\nDate of your Restoration? ___________________\n\n17. Are you in DEBT? __________________\nIf so, how much? ______________________\n\n18. How long owing? ______________________________________________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n19. Did you ever use Intoxicating Drink? _____________\nIf so, how long is it since you entirely gave up its use? ________________\n\n20. Did you ever use Tobacco or Snuff? _________\nIf so, how long is it since you gave up using either? ____________________\n\n                       ------------------------\n\n21. What UNIFORM do you wear? ____________________________________________\n\n22. How long have you worn it? ___________________________________________\n\n23. Do you agree to dress in accordance with the direction of Headquarters?\n_________________\n\n24. Can you provide your own uniform and \"List of Necessaries\" before\nentering the Service? ____________________________________________________\n\n                    --------------------------------\n\n25. Are you in a Situation? _____________\nIf so, how long? ________________________\n\n26. Nature of duties, and salary _________________________________________\n\n27. Name and address of employer? ________________________________________\n\n28. If out, date of leaving last situation? _________________________\nHow long there? _____________________________________________________\n\n29. Why did you leave? ___________________________________________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n30. Name and address of last employer? ___________________________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n31. Can you start the SINGING? __________\n\n32. Can you play any musical instrument? _________________\nIf so, what? _____________________________________________________________\n\n33. Is this form filled up by you? ________________________\nCan you read well at first sight? _________________________\n\n34. Can you write SHORTHAND? _________________________\nIf so, what speed and system? ____________________________________________\n\n35. Can you speak any language other than English? _______________________\nIf so, what? _____________________________________________________________\n\n36. Have you had any experience and success in the JUNIOR SOLDIERS' WAR? _\n\n37. If so, what? _________________________________________________________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n_\n\n38. Are you willing to sell the \"WAR CRY\" on Sundays? ____________\n\n39. Do you engage not to publish any books, songs, or music except for the\nbenefit of the Salvation Army, and then only with the consent of\nHeadquarters? ________________\n\n40. Do you promise not to engage in any trade, profession, or other money-\nmaking occupation, except for the benefit of the Salvation Army, and then\nonly with the consent of Headquarters? _________________________\n\n41. Would you be willing to go ABROAD if required? _______________________\n\n42. Do you promise to do your utmost to help forward the Junior Soldiers'\nwork if accepted? _____________\n\n43. Do you pledge yourself to spend not less than nine hours every day in\nthe active service of the Army, of which not less than three hours of each\nweek day shall be spent in VISITATION? ______________________\n\n44. Do you pledge yourself to fill up and send to Headquarters forms as to\nhow your day is spent? ______________________\n\n                      ----------------------------\n\n45. Have you read, and do you believe, the DOCTRINES printed on the other\nside? ____________________\n\n46. Have you read the \"Orders and Regulations for Field Officers\" of the\nArmy? ________________________________\n\nIf you have not got a copy of \"Orders and Regulations,\" get one from\nCandidates' Department at once. The price to Candidates is 2s. 6d.\n\n47. Do you pledge yourself to study and carry out and to endeavour to\ntrain others to carry out all Orders and Regulations of the Army? ________\n\n48. Have you read the Order on page 3 of this Form as to PRESENTS and\nTESTIMONIALS, and do you engage to carry it out? _________________________\n\n49. Do you pledge yourself never to receive any sum in the form of pay\nbeyond the amount of allowances granted under the scale which  follows?\n___________\n\n   ALLOWANCES-- From the day of arrival at his station, each officer is\nentitled to draw the following allowances, provided the amount remains in\nhand after meeting all local expenses, namely:\n\n-- For Single Men: Lieutenants, 16s. weekly, and Captains, 18s.\n\n-- for Single Women: Lieutenants, 12s. weekly, and Captains, 15s. weekly.\n\n-- Married Men, 27s. per week, and ls. per week for each child under 14\nyears of age; in all cases without house-rent.\n\n50. Do you perfectly understand that no salary or allowance is guaranteed\nto you, and that you will have no claim against the Salvation Army, or\nagainst any one connected therewith, on account of salary or allowances\nnot received by you? _____________________________________________________\n\n                      -----------------------------\n\n51. Have you ever APPLIED BEFORE? ___  If so, when? ______________________\n\n52. With what result? ____________________________________________________\n\n53. If you have ever been in the service of the Salvation Army in any\nposition, say what? ______________________________________________________\n\n54. Why did you leave? ___________________________________________________\n\n55. Are you willing to come into TRAINING that we may see whether you\nhave the necessary goodness and ability for an Officer in the Salvation\nArmy, and should we conclude that you have not the necessary qualifications,\ndo you pledge yourself to return home and work in your Corps without\ncreating any dissatisfaction? ____________________________________________\n\n56. Will you pay your own travelling expenses if we decide to receive you\nin Training? _____________________________________________________________\n\n57. How much can you pay for your maintenance while in Training? _________\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n58. Can you deposit [Pound] 1 so that we can provide you with a suit of\nUniform when you are Commissioned?\n______________________________________________________\n\n59. What is the shortest NOTICE you require should we want you? __________\n\n60. Are your PARENTS willing that you should become an Officer? __________\n\n61. Does any one depend upon you for support? _________ If so, who? ______\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n62. To what extent? ______________________________________________________\n\n63. Give your parents', or nearest living relatives', full address _______\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n                 ---------------------------------\n\n64. Are you COURTING? ________ If so, give name and address of the person:\n__________________________________________________________________________\n\n65. How long have you been engaged? _____________ What is the person's age?\n__________________________________________\n\n66. What is the date of Birthday? _______________________\nHow long enrolled as a SOLDIER? _________________________\n\n67. What Uniform does the person wear? ___________________________________\nHow long worn? ______________________\n\n68. What does the person do in the Corps? ________________________________\n\n69. Has the person applied for the work? _________________________________\n\n70. If not, when does the person intend doing so? ________________________\n\n71. Do the parents agree to the person coming into Training? _____________\n\n                 ---------------------------------\n\n72. Do you understand that you may not be allowed to marry until three\nyears after your appointment as an Officer, and do you engage to abide\nby this? __________________\n\n73. If you are not courting, do you pledge yourself to abstain from\nanything of the kind during Training and for at least twelve months\nafter your appointment as a Commissioned Field Officer? __________________\n\n74. Do you pledge yourself not to carry on courtship with any one at the\nstation to which you are at the time appointed? __________________________\n\n75. Do you pledge yourself never to commence, or allow to commence, or\nbreak off anything of the sort, without first informing your Divisional\nOfficer, or Headquarters, of your intention to do so? ____________________\n\n76. Do you pledge yourself never to marry any one marriage with whom would\ntake you out of the Army altogether? _____________________________________\n\n77. Have you read, and do you agree to carry out, the following\nRegulations as to Courtship and Marriage? ___________________\n\n(a) \"Officers must inform their Divisional Officer or Headquarters of\ntheir desire to enter into or break off any engagement, and no Officer is\npermitted to enter into or break off an engagement without the consent of\nhis or her D.O.\n\n(b) \"Officers will not be allowed to carry on any courtship in the Town in\nwhich they are appointed; nor until twelve months after the date of their\nCommission.\n\n(c) \"Headquarters cannot consent to the engagement of Male Lieutenants,\nuntil their Divisional Officer is prepared to recommend them for command\nof a Station as Captain.\n\n(d) \"Before Headquarters can consent to the marriage of any Officer, the\nDivisional Officer must be prepared to give him three stations as a married\nman.\n\n(e) \"No Officer accepted will be allowed to marry until he or she has been\nat least three years in the field, except in cases of long-standing\nengagements before application for the work.\n\n(f) \"No Male Officer will, under any circumstances, be allowed to marry\nbefore he is twenty-two years of age, unless required by Headquarters for\nspecial service.\n\n(g) \"Headquarters will not agree to the Marriage of any Male Officer\n(except under extraordinary circumstances) until twelve months after\nconsenting to his engagement.\n\n(h) \"Consent will not be given to the engagement of any male Officer\nunless the young woman is likely to make a suitable wife for an Officer,\nand (if not already an Officer) is prepared to come into Training at once.\n\n(i) \"Consent will be given to engagements between Female Officers and\nSoldiers, on condition that the latter are suitable for Officers, and are\nwilling to come into Training if called upon.\n\n(j) \"Consent will never be given to any engagement or marriage which would\ntake an Officer out of the Army.\n\n(k) \"Every Officer must sign before marriage the Articles of Marriage,\ncontained in the Orders and Regulations for Field Officers.\"\n\n                          ----------------------------\n\n              PRESENTS AND TESTIMONIALS.\n\n1. Officers are expected to refuse utterly, and to prevent, if possible,\neven the proposal of any present or testimonial to them.\n\n2. Of course, an Officer who is receiving no salary, or only part salary,\nmay accept food or other gifts, such as are needed to meet his wants; but\nit is dishonourable for any one who is receiving their salary to accept\ngifts of food also.\n\n         THE DOCTRINES OF THE SALVATION ARMY.\n\nThe principal Doctrines taught in the Army are as follows: --\n\n1. We believe that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were given\nby inspiration of God, and that they only constitute the Divine rule of\nChristian faith and practice.\n\n2. We believe there is only one God, who is infinitely perfect, the\nCreator, Preserver, and Governor of all things.\n\n3. We believe that there are three persons in the Godhead--the Father, the\nSon, and the Holy Ghost, undivided in essence, coequal in power and glory,\nand the only proper object of religious worship.\n\n4. We believe that, in the person of Jesus Christ, the Divine and human\nnatures are united, so that He is truly and properly God, and truly and\nproperly man.\n\n5. We believe that our first parents were created in a state of innocency,\nbut by their disobedience they lost their purity and happiness; and that,\nin consequence of their fall, all men have become sinners, totally\ndepraved, and as such are justly exposed to the wrath of God.\n\n6. We believe that the Lord Jesus Christ has, by His suffering and death,\nmade an atonement for the whole world, so that whosoever will may be\nsaved.\n\n7. We believe that repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus Christ,\nand regeneration by the Holy Spirit, are necessary to Salvation.\n\n8. We believe that we are justified by grace, through faith in our Lord\nJesus Christ, and that he that believeth hath the witness in himself.\n\n9. We believe the Scriptures teach that not only does continuance in the\nfavour of God depend upon continued faith in, and obedience to, Christ,\nbut that it is possible for those who have been truly converted to fall\naway and be eternally lost.\n\n10. We believe that it is the privilege of all believers to be \"wholly\nsanctified,\" and that \"the whole spirit and soul and body\" may \"be\npreserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.\" That is to\nsay, we believe that after conversion there remain in the heart of the\nbeliever inclinations to evil, or roots of bitterness, which, unless\noverpowered by Divine grace, produce actual sin; but that these evil\ntendencies can be entirely taken away by the Spirit of God, and the whole\nheart, thus cleansed from everything contrary to the will of God, or\nentirely sanctified, will then produce the fruit of the Spirit only. And\nwe believe that persons thus entirely sanctified may, by the power of God,\nbe kept unblamable and unreprovable before Him.\n\n11. We believe in the immortality of the soul; in the resurrection of the\nbody; in the general judgment at the end of the world; in the eternal\nhappiness of the righteous; and in the everlasting punishment of the\nwicked.\n\n                   -----------------------------\n\n                    DECLARATION.\n\nI HEREBY DECLARE that I will never, on any consideration, do anything\ncalculated to injure The Salvation Army, and especially, that I will\nnever, without first having obtained the consent of The General, take any\npart in any religious services or in carrying on services held in\nopposition to the Army.\n\nI PLEDGE MYSELF to make true records, daily, on the forms supplied to me,\nof what I do, and to confess, as far as I am concerned, and to report, as\nfar as I may see in others, any neglect or variation from the orders or\ndirections of The General.\n\nI FULLY UNDERSTAND that he does not undertake to employ or to retain in\nthe service of The Army any one who does not appear to him to be fitted\nfor the work, or faithful and successful in it, and I solemnly pledge\nmyself quietly to leave any Army Station to which I may be sent, without\nmaking any attempt to disturb or annoy The Army in any way, should The\nGeneral desire me to do so. And I hereby discharge The Army and The\nGeneral from all liability, and pledge myself to make no claim on account\nof any situation, property, or interest I may give up in order to secure\nan engagement in The Army.\n\nI understand that The General will not be responsible in any way for any\nloss I may suffer in consequence of being dismissed from Training; as I am\naware that the Cadets are received into Training for the very purpose of\ntesting their suitability for the work of Salvation Army Officers.\n\nI hereby declare that the foregoing answers appear to me to fully express\nthe truth as to the questions put to me, and that I know of no other facts\nwhich would prevent my engagement by The General, if they were known to\nhim.\n\nCandidate to sign here.........................................\n\n                    --------------------------\n\n               NOTICE TO CANDIDATES.\n\n1. All Candidates are expected to fill up and sign this form themselves,\nif they can write at all.\n\n2. You are expected to have obtained and read \"Orders and Regulations for\nField Officers\" before you make this application.\n\n3. Making this application does NOT imply that we can receive you as an\nofficer, and you are, therefore, NOT to leave your home, or give notice to\nleave your situation, until you hear again from us.\n\n4. If you are appointed as an Officer, or received into Training and it is\nafterwards discovered that any of the questions in this form have not been\ntruthfully answered, you will be instantly dismissed.\n\n5. If you do not understand any question in this form, or if you do not\nagree to any of the requirements stated upon it, return it to\nHeadquarters, and say so in a straightforward manner.\n\n6. Make the question for this appointment a matter of earnest prayer, as\nit is the most important step you have taken since your conversion.\n\nWe must have your Photo. Please enclose it with your forms, and address\nthem to \"Candidate Department,\" 101, Queen Victoria Street, London, E.C.","title":"Evolution and Ethics, and Other Essays","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":96991}