{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_29540/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_29540","id":"gutenberg_29540","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/29540","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Religion/Spirituality","Grace (Theology)"],"text":"Grace\n\n                           Actual and Habitual\n\n                           A Dogmatic Treatise\n\n                                    By\n\n               The Rt. Rev. Msgr. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., D.D.\n\n Formerly Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Joseph\u2019s Seminary, Leeds\n    (England), Later Professor of Fundamental Theology at The Catholic\n                          University of America\n\n                          Adapted and Edited by\n\n                              Arthur Preuss\n\n                          Third, Revised Edition\n\n                        W. E. Blake & Son, Limited\n\n                         Catholic Church Supplies\n\n                              123 Church St.\n\n                             Toronto, Canada\n\n                                   1919\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nImprimatur\nIntroduction\nPart I. Actual Grace\n   Chapter I. The Nature Of Actual Grace\n      Section 1. Definition Of Actual Grace\n      Section 2. Division Of Actual Grace\n   Chapter II. The Properties Of Actual Grace\n      Section 1. The Necessity Of Actual Grace\n         Article 1. The Capacity Of Mere Nature Without Grace\n         Article 2. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For All Salutary Acts\n         Article 3. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For The States Of\n         Unbelief, Mortal Sin, And Justification\n      Section 2. The Gratuity Of Actual Grace\n      Section 3. The Universality Of Actual Grace\n         Article 1. The Universality Of God\u2019s Will To Save\n         Article 2. God\u2019s Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human\n         Beings In Particular\n         Article 3. The Predestination Of The Elect\n         Article 4. The Reprobation Of The Damned\n   Chapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will\n      Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists\n      Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of\n      Grace And Free-Will\n         Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism\n         Article 2. Molinism And Congruism\nPart II. Sanctifying Grace\n   Chapter I. The Genesis Of Sanctifying Grace, Or The Process Of\n   Justification\n      Section 1. The Necessity Of Faith For Justification\n      Section 2. The Necessity Of Other Preparatory Acts Besides Faith\n   Chapter II. The State Of Justification\n      Section 1. The Nature Of Justification\n         Article 1. The Negative Element Of Justification\n         Article 2. The Positive Element Of Justification\n      Section 2. Justifying Or Sanctifying Grace\n         Article 1. The Nature Of Sanctifying Grace\n         Article 2. The Effects Of Sanctifying Grace\n         Article 3. The Supernatural Concomitants Of Sanctifying Grace\n      Section 3. The Properties Of Sanctifying Grace\n   Chapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works\n      Section 1. The Existence Of Merit\n      Section 2. The Requisites Of Merit\n      Section 3. The Objects Of Merit\nIndex\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIMPRIMATUR\n\n\n_NIHIL OBSTAT_\n\n_Sti. Ludovici, die 18 Jan. 1919_\n\n_F. G. Holweck,_\n_ Censor Librorum_\n\n_IMPRIMATUR_\n\n_Sti. Ludovici, die 21 Jan. 1919_\n\n_Joannes J. Glennon_\n_ Archiepiscopus_\n_ Sti. Ludovici_\n\n_Copyright, 1914_\n_ by_\n_ Joseph Gummersbach_\n\n_All rights reserved_\n\n_Printed in U. S. A._\n\nBECKTOLD\nPRINTING & BOOK MFG. CO.\nST. LOUIS. U. S. A.\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nHumanity was reconciled to God by the Redemption. This does not, however,\nmean that every individual human being was forthwith justified, for\nindividual justification is wrought by the application to the soul of\ngrace derived from the inexhaustible merits of Jesus Christ.\n\nThere are two kinds of grace: (1) actual and (2) habitual. Actual grace is\na supernatural gift by which rational creatures are enabled to perform\nsalutary acts. Habitual, or, as it is commonly called, sanctifying, grace\nis a habit, or more or less enduring state, which renders men pleasing to\nGod.\n\nThis distinction is of comparatively recent date, but it furnishes an\nexcellent principle of division for a dogmatic treatise on grace.(1)\n\n\n\n\n\nPART I. ACTUAL GRACE\n\n\nActual grace is a transient supernatural help given by God from the\ntreasury of the merits of Jesus Christ for the purpose of enabling man to\nwork out his eternal salvation.\n\nWe shall consider: (1) The Nature of Actual Grace; (2) Its Properties, and\n(3) Its Relation to Free-Will.\n\n\n    GENERAL READINGS:\u2014St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu.\n    109-114, and the commentators, especially Billuart, _De Gratia_\n    (ed. Lequette, t. III); the Salmanticenses, _De Gratia Dei_\n    (_Cursus Theologiae_, Vol. IX sqq., Paris 1870); Thomas de Lemos,\n    _Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, Li\u00e8ge 1676; Dominicus Soto, _De Natura\n    et Gratia_, l. III, Venice 1560; *Ripalda,(2) _De Ente\n    Supernaturali_, 3 vols. (I, Bordeaux 1634; II, Lyons 1645; III,\n    Cologne 1648).\n\n    *C. v. Sch\u00e4zler, _Natur und \u00dcbernatur: Das Dogma von der Gnade_,\n    Mainz 1865; IDEM, _Neue Untersuchungen \u00fcber das Dogma von der\n    Gnade_, Mainz 1867; *J. E. Kuhn, _Die christliche Lehre von der\n    g\u00f6ttlichen Gnade_, T\u00fcbingen 1868; Jos. Kleutgen, S. J., _Theologie\n    der Vorseit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 152 sqq., M\u00fcnster 1872; R.\n    Cerci\u00e0, _De Gratia Christi_, 3 vols., Paris 1879; *C. Mazzella, S.\n    J., _De Gratia Christi_, 4th ed., Rome 1895; *J. H. Oswald, _Die\n    Lehre von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnadenwahl_,\n    3rd ed., Paderborn 1885; *D. Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina\n    Actuali_, Gulpen 1885; *Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische\n    Theologie_, Vol. VIII, Mainz 1897; *S. Schiffini, S. J., _De\n    Gratia Divina_, Freiburg 1901; G. Lahousse, S. J., _De Gratia\n    Divina_, Louvain 1902; Chr. Pesch, S. J., _Praelectiones\n    Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1908; G. van Noort, _De\n    Gratia Christi_, Amsterdam 1908; E. J. Wirth, _Divine Grace_, New\n    York 1903; S. J. Hunter, S. J., _Outlines of Dogmatic Theology_,\n    Vol. III, pp. 1 sqq.; Wilhelm-Scannell, _A Manual of Catholic\n    Theology_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 227 sqq., London 1901; A. Devine,\n    _The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed. pp. 1-43, London 1905.\u2014L.\n    Labauche, S. S., _God and Man, Lectures on Dogmatic Theology II_,\n    pp. 123 sqq., New York 1916.\u2014J. E. Nieremberg, S. J., _The Marvels\n    of Divine Grace_, tr. by Lady Lovat, London 1917.\n\n    On the teaching of the Fathers cfr. Isaac Habert, _Theologiae\n    Gr\u00e6corum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam Gratiae Libri\n    III_, Paris 1646; E. Scholz, _Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der\n    Gnade_, Freiburg 1881; H\u00fcmmer, _Des hl. Gregor von Nazianz Lehre\n    von der Gnade_, Kempten 1890; E. Weigl, _Die Heilslehre des hl.\n    Cyrill von Alexandrien_, Mainz 1905.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. The Nature Of Actual Grace\n\n\n\nSection 1. Definition Of Actual Grace\n\n\n1. GENERAL NOTION OF GRACE.\u2014The best way to arrive at a correct definition\nof actual grace is by the synthetic method. We therefore begin with the\ngeneral notion of grace.\n\nLike \u201cnature,\u201d(3) grace (_gratia_, \u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2) is a word of wide reach, used in\na great variety of senses. Habert(4) enumerates no less than fourteen;\nwhich, however, may be reduced to four.\n\na) Subjectively, grace signifies good will or benevolence shown by a\nsuperior to an inferior, as when a criminal is pardoned by the king\u2019s\ngrace.\n\nb) Objectively, it designates a favor inspired by good will or\nbenevolence. In this sense the term may be applied to any free and\ngratuitous gift (_donum gratis datum_), as when a king bestows graces on\nhis lieges.\n\nc) Grace may also mean personal charm or attractiveness. In this sense the\nterm frequently occurs in Latin and Greek literature (the Three Graces).\nCharm elicits love and prompts a person to the bestowal of favors.\n\nd) The recipient of gifts or favors usually feels gratitude towards the\ngiver, which he expresses in the form of thanks. Hence the word _gratiae_\n(plural) frequently stands for thanksgiving (\u201c_gratias agere_,\u201d \u201c_Deo\ngratias_,\u201d \u201cto say grace after meals\u201d).(5)\n\nThe first and fundamental of these meanings is \u201ca free gift or favor.\u201d The\nbenevolence of the giver and the attractiveness of the recipient are\nmerely the reasons for which the gift is imparted, whereas the expression\nof thanks is an effect following its bestowal.\n\nDogmatic theology is concerned exclusively with grace in the fundamental\nsense of the term.\n\ne) Grace is called a gift (_donum_, \u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u03ac), because it is owing to free\nbenevolence, not required by justice. It is called gratuitous (_gratis\ndatum_), because it is bestowed without any corresponding merit on the\npart of the creature. A gift may be due to the recipient as a matter of\ndistributive or commutative justice, and in that case it would not be\nabsolutely gratuitous (_gratis_). Grace, on the contrary, is bestowed out\nof pure benevolence, from no other motive than sheer love. This is\nmanifestly St. Paul\u2019s idea when he writes: \u201cAnd if by grace, it is not now\nby works: otherwise grace is no more grace.\u201d(6) It is likewise the meaning\nof St. Augustine when he says, in his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John,\nthat grace is \u201csomething gratuitously given ... as a present, not in\nreturn for something else.\u201d(7)\n\n2. NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL GRACE.\u2014Grace is not necessarily supernatural.\nSacred Scripture and the Fathers sometimes apply the word to purely\nnatural gifts. We petition God for our daily bread, for good health, fair\nweather and other temporal favors, and we thank Him for preserving us from\npestilence, famine, and war, although these are blessings which do not\ntranscend the order of nature.(8)\n\na) Our petitions for purely natural favors are inspired by the conviction\nthat creation itself, and everything connected therewith, is a gratuitous\ngift of God. This conviction is well founded. God was under no necessity\nof creating anything: creation was an act of His free-will. Again, many of\nthe favors to which human nature, as such, has a claim, are free gifts\nwhen conferred upon the individual. Good health, fortitude, talent, etc.,\nare natural graces, for which we are allowed, nay obliged, to petition\nGod. The Pelagians employed this truth to conceal a pernicious error when\nthey unctuously descanted on the magnitude and necessity of grace as\nmanifested in creation. It was by such trickery that their leader\nsucceeded in persuading the bishops assembled at the Council of Diospolis\nor Lydda (A. D. 415) that his teaching was quite orthodox. St. Augustine\nand four other African bishops later reported to Pope Innocent I, that if\nthese prelates had perceived that Pelagius meant to deny that grace by\nwhich we are Christians and sons of God, they would not have listened to\nhim so patiently, and that, consequently, no blame attached to these\njudges because they simply took the term \u201cgrace\u201d in its ecclesiastical\nsense.(9)\n\nb) Generally speaking, however, the term \u201cgrace\u201d is reserved for what are\ncommonly called the supernatural gifts of God, the merely preternatural as\nwell as the strictly supernatural.(10) In this sense \"grace\" is as sharply\nopposed to purely natural favors as nature is opposed to the supernatural.\n\nThe importance of the distinction between supernatural and purely natural\ngrace will appear from an analysis of the concept itself. Considered as\ngifts of God, the strictly supernatural graces (_e.g._, justification,\ndivine sonship, the beatific vision) ontologically exceed the bounds of\nnature. Considered as purely gratuitous favors, they are negatively and\npositively undeserved. The grace involved in creation, for instance, is\nnot conferred on some existing beneficiary, but actually produces its\nrecipient. The creation itself, therefore, being entirely _gratis data_,\nall that succeeds it, supernatural grace included, must be negatively\nundeserved, in as far as it was not necessary for the recipient to exist\nat all. But the supernatural graces are _indebitae_ also positively,\n_i.e._ positing the creation, because they transcend every creatural claim\nand power. Both elements are contained in the above-quoted letter of the\nAfrican bishops to Pope Innocent I: \u201cThough it may be said in a certain\nlegitimate sense, that we were created by the grace of God, ... that is a\ndifferent grace by which we are called predestined, by which we are\njustified, and by which we receive eternal beatitude.\u201d(11) Of this\nlast-mentioned grace (_i.e._ grace in the strictly supernatural sense),\nSt. Augustine says: \u201cThis, the grace which Catholic bishops are wont to\nread in the books of God and preach to their people, and the grace which\nthe Apostle commends, is not that by which we are created as men, but that\nby which as sinful men we are justified.\u201d(12) In other words, natural is\nopposed to supernatural grace in the same way that nature is opposed to\nthe supernatural. \u201c[To believe] is the work of grace, not of nature. It\nis, I say, the work of grace, which the second Adam brought us, not of\nnature, which Adam wholly lost in himself.\u201d(13) Adding the new note\nobtained by this analysis we arrive at the following definition: Grace is\na gratuitous _super-natural_ gift.(14)\n\n3. THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE GRACE OF CHRIST.\u2014Though all supernatural\ngraces are from God, a distinction is made between the \u201cgrace of God\u201d and\nthe \u201cgrace of Christ.\u201d The difference between them is purely accidental,\nbased on the fact that the \u201cgrace of Christ\u201d flows exclusively from the\nmerits of the atonement.\n\na) The following points may serve as criteria to distinguish the two\nnotions:\n\nA) The _gratia Dei_ springs from divine benevolence and presupposes a\nrecipient who is unworthy merely in a negative sense (=not worthy, _non\ndignus_), whereas the _gratia Christi_ flows from mercy and benevolence\nand is conferred on a recipient who is positively unworthy (_indignus_).\n\nB) The _gratia Dei_ elevates the soul to the supernatural order (_gratia\nelevans_), while the _gratia Christi_ heals the wounds inflicted by sin,\nespecially concupiscence (_gratia elevans simul et sanans_).\n\nC) The _gratia Dei_ is a gratuitous gift conferred by the Blessed Trinity\nwithout regard to the theandric merits of Jesus Christ, whereas the\n_gratia Christi_ is based entirely on those merits.\n\nb) The Scotists hold that the distinction between _gratia Dei_ and _gratia\nChristi_ is purely logical. They regard the God-man as the predestined\ncentre of the universe and the source of all graces.(15) The Thomists, on\nthe other hand, regard the grace of the angels, and that wherewith our\nfirst parents were endowed in Paradise, purely as _gratia Dei_; they hold\nthat the merits of Christ did not become operative until after the Fall,\nand that, consequently, there is a real distinction between the grace of\nthe angels and that of our first parents on the one hand, and the grace of\nChrist on the other.\n\nAs it cannot reasonably be supposed that the angels are endowed with\nspecifically the same graces by which mankind was redeemed from sin, the\nScotists are forced to admit a distinction between the grace of Christ as\nGod-man (_gratia Christi Dei-hominis_) and the grace of Christ as Redeemer\n(_gratia Christi Redemptoris_), so that even according to them, the\ndogmatic treatise on Grace is concerned solely with the grace of Christ\n_qua_ Redeemer.\n\nHence, grace must be more particularly defined as a gratuitous\nsupernatural gift _derived from the merits of Jesus Christ_.(16)\n\n4. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL GRACE.\u2014External grace (_gratia externa_)\ncomprises all those strictly supernatural institutions which stimulate\npious thoughts and salutary resolutions in the human soul. Such are, for\nexample, Holy Scripture, the Church, the Sacraments, the example of Jesus\nChrist, etc. Internal grace (_gratia interna_) inheres or operates\ninvisibly in the soul, and places it in relation with God as its\nsupernatural end. Internal graces are, _e.g._, the theological virtues,\nthe power of forgiving sins, etc. The Pelagians admitted external, but\nobstinately denied internal grace.(17)\n\nSt. Paul(18) emphasizes the distinction between external and internal\ngrace by designating the former as \u201claw\u201d (_lex_, \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2) and the latter as\n\u201cfaith\u201d (_fides_, \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2). With one exception, (_viz._, the Hypostatic\nUnion, which is the climax of all graces), external is inferior to,\nbecause a mere preparation for, internal grace, which aims at\nsanctification. We are concerned in this treatise solely with internal\ngrace. Hence, proceeding a step further, we may define grace as a\ngratuitous, supernatural, _internal_ gift of God, derived from the merits\nof Jesus Christ.(19)\n\n5. \u201cGRATIA GRATIS DATA\u201d and \u201cGRATIA GRATUM FACIENS.\u201d\u2014The supernatural\ngrace of Christ, existing invisibly in the soul either as a transient\nimpulse (_actus_) or as a permanent state (_habitus_), tends either to the\nsalvation of the person in whom it inheres or through him to the\nsanctification of others. In the former case it is called ingratiating\n(_gratia gratum faciens_), in the latter, gratuitously given (_gratia\ngratis data_). The term _gratia gratis data_ is based on the words of our\nLord recorded in the Gospel of St. Matthew: \u201cHeal the sick, raise the\ndead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely have you received,\nfreely give.\u201d(20)\n\na) The _gratia gratum faciens_ is intended for all men without exception;\nthe _gratia gratis data_ only for a few specially chosen persons. To the\nclass of gratuitously bestowed graces belong the charismata of the\nprophets and the ordinary powers of the priesthood.(21)\n\nEach of these two species of internal grace may exist independently of the\nother because personal holiness is not a necessary prerequisite for the\nexercise of the charismata or the power of forgiving sins, etc.\n\nb) Considered with regard to its intrinsic worth, the _gratia gratum\nfaciens_ is decidedly superior to the _gratia gratis data_. St. Paul,\nafter enumerating all the charismata, admonishes the Corinthians: \u201cBe\nzealous for the better gifts, and I show unto you yet a more excellent\nway,\u201d(22) and then sings the praises of charity:(23) \u201cIf I speak with the\ntongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as\nsounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and\nshould know all the mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all\nfaith, so that I could remove mountains, I am nothing, etc.\u201d(24) Charity\nis a _gratia gratum faciens_. Hence, since the _gratia gratis data_ is\ntreated elsewhere (Apologetics, Mystic and Sacramental Theology), we must\nadd another note to our definition: Grace is a gratuitous, supernatural,\ninternal gift, derived from the merits of Jesus Christ, _by which man is\nrendered pleasing in the sight of God_.(25)\n\n6. ACTUAL AND HABITUAL GRACE.\u2014The _gratia gratum faciens_ is given either\nfor the performance of a supernatural act or for the production of a\npermanent supernatural state (_habitus_). In the latter case it is called\nhabitual, or, as it sanctifies the creature in the eyes of God,\nsanctifying grace.\n\nActual grace comprises two essential elements: (1) divine help as the\nprinciple of every salutary supernatural act, and (2) the salutary act\nitself. Hence its designation by the Fathers as \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, \u1f21 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039b\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c7\u03b5\u03af\u03c1, \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, or, in Latin, _Dei auxilium, subsidium, adiutorium,\nmotio divina_,\u2014all of which appellations have been adopted by the\nSchoolmen. Actual grace invariably tends either to produce habitual or\nsanctifying grace, or to preserve and increase it where it already exists.\nIt follows that, being merely a means to an end, actual grace is inferior\nto sanctifying grace, which is that end itself.\n\n\n    Actual grace may therefore be defined as an unmerited,\n    supernatural, internal divine help, based on the merits of Jesus\n    Christ, which renders man pleasing in the sight of God, enabling\n    him to perform salutary acts; or, somewhat more succinctly, as a\n    supernatural help bestowed for the performance of salutary acts,\n    in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ.\n\n\nActual grace is (1) a _help_ (_auxilium_), because it consists in a\ntransient influence exercised by God on the soul. (2) A _supernatural_\nhelp, to distinguish it from God\u2019s ordinary providence and all such merely\nnatural graces as man would probably have received in the state of pure\nnature.(26) (3) It is attributed to the merits of Jesus Christ, in order\nto indicate that the graces granted to fallen man are all derived from the\natonement both as their efficient and their meritorious cause. (4) Actual\ngrace is said to be given for the performance of salutary acts to show\nthat its immediate purpose or end is an act, not a state, and that the\nacts for which it is given must be in the order of salvation.\n\n7. THE TWOFOLD CAUSALITY OF ACTUAL GRACE.\u2014If grace is a supernatural help,\nmere nature cannot, of its own strength, perform salutary acts.\nConsequently, actual grace exercises a causal influence without which man\nwould be helpless in the matter of salvation.\n\nThe causality of actual grace is both moral and physical.\n\na) As a moral cause grace removes the obstacles which render the work of\nsalvation difficult. Besides this negative it also has a positive effect:\nit inspires delight in virtue and hatred of sin.\n\nThis mode of operation manifestly presupposes a certain weakness of the\nhuman will, _i.e._ _concupiscence_, which is an effect of original sin.\nActual grace exercises a healing influence on the will(27) and is\ntherefore called _gratia sanans sive medicinalis_. \u201cUnless something is\nput before the soul to please and attract it,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201cthe\nwill can in no wise be moved; but it is not in man\u2019s power to bring this\nabout.\u201d(28) Concretely, this moral causality of grace manifests itself as\na divinely inspired joy in virtue and a hatred of sin, both of which\nincline the will to the free performance of salutary acts. These\nsentiments may in some cases be so strong as to deprive the will\ntemporarily of its freedom to resist. The sudden conversion of St. Paul is\na case in point. Holy Scripture expressly assures us that God is the\nabsolute master of the human will and, if He so chooses, can bend it under\nHis yoke without using physical force. Cfr. Prov. XXI, 1: \u201cThe heart of\nthe king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will, he shall turn\nit.\u201d \u201cWho will be so foolish as to say,\u201d queries St. Augustine, \u201cthat God\ncannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever\nHe chooses, and direct them to what is good?\u201d(29) It is but rarely, of\ncourse, that God grants to any man a summary victory over his sinful\nnature; but this fact does not prevent the Church from praying:\n\u201cVouchsafe, O Lord, to compel our wills to thee, even though they be\nrebellious.\u201d(30)\n\nb) Even more important than the moral causality of grace is its physical\ncausality. Man depends entirely on God for the physical strength necessary\nto perform salutary works. Grace elevates the faculties of the soul to the\nsupernatural sphere, thereby enabling it to perform supernatural acts.\n\nPhysical is as distinct from moral causality in the order of grace as in\nthe order of nature. The holding out of a beautiful toy will not enable a\nchild to walk without support from its elders. Moral causality is\ninsufficient to enable a man to perform salutary acts. Grace (as we shall\nshow later) is absolutely, _i.e._ metaphysically, necessary for all\nsalutary acts, whether easy or difficult, and hence the incapacity of\nnature cannot be ascribed solely to weakness and to the moral difficulty\nresulting from sin, but must be attributed mainly to physical impotence. A\nbird without wings is not merely impeded but utterly unable to fly;\nsimilarly, man without grace is not only handicapped but absolutely\nincapacitated for the work of salvation. Considered under this aspect,\nactual grace is called _gratia elevans_, because it elevates man to the\nsupernatural state.(31)\n\nThis double causality of grace is well brought out in Perrone\u2019s classic\ndefinition: \u201c_Gratia actualis est gratuitum illud auxilium,_(_32_)_ quod\nDeus_(_33_)_ per Christi merita_(_34_)_ homini lapso_(_35_)_ largitur, tum\nut eius infirmitati consulat,_(_36_)_ ... tum ut eum erigat ad statum\nsupernaturalem atque idoneum faciat ad actus supernaturales\neliciendos,_(_37_)_ ut iustificationem possit adipisci_(_38_)_ in eaque\niam consecuta perseverare, donec perveniat ad vitam aeternam._\u201d(39) In\nEnglish: \u201cActual grace is that unmerited interior assistance which God, by\nvirtue of the merits of Christ, confers upon fallen man, in order, on the\none hand, to remedy his infirmity resulting from sin and, on the other, to\nraise him to the supernatural order and thereby to render him capable of\nperforming supernatural acts, so that he may attain justification,\npersevere in it to the end, and thus enter into everlasting life.\u201d This\ndefinition is strictly scientific, for it enumerates all the elements that\nenter into the essence of actual grace.\n\n\n\nSection 2. Division Of Actual Grace\n\n\nActual grace may be divided according to: (1) the difference existing\nbetween the faculties of the human soul, and (2) in reference to the\nfreedom of the will.\n\nConsidered in its relation to the different faculties of the soul, actual\ngrace is either of the intellect, or of the will, or of the sensitive\nfaculties. With regard to the free consent of the will, it is either (1)\nprevenient, also called co\u00f6perating, or (2) efficacious or merely\nsufficient.\n\n1. THE ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE INTELLECT.\u2014Actual grace, in so far as it\ninspires salutary thoughts, is called illuminating (_gratia illuminationis\ns. illustrationis_).\n\nThis illumination of the intellect by grace may be either mediate or\nimmediate. It is mediate if grace suggests salutary thoughts to the\nintellect by purely natural means, or external graces, such as a stirring\nsermon, the perusal of a good book, etc.; it is immediate when the Holy\nGhost elevates the powers of the soul, and through the instrumentality of\nthe so-called _potentia obedientialis_,(40) produces in it entitatively\nsupernatural acts.\n\nThe existence of the grace of immediate illumination follows from its\nabsolute necessity as a means of salvation, defined by the Second Council\nof Orange, A. D. 529.(41)\n\na) The grace of mediate illumination may be inferred aprioristically from\nthe existence of a divine revelation equipped with such supernatural\ninstitutions as the Bible, the sacraments, rites, ceremonies, etc. In\nconformity with the psychological laws governing the association of ideas,\nintelligent meditation on the agencies comprised under the term \u201cexternal\ngrace\u201d(42) elicits in the mind salutary thoughts, which are not\nnecessarily supernatural in their inception.\n\nIt is not unlikely that Sacred Scripture refers to such graces as these\nwhen it recommends \u201cthe law of God\u201d or \u201cthe example of Christ\u201d as fit\nsubjects for meditation. Cfr. Ps. XVIII, 8 sq.: \u201cThe law of the Lord is\nunspotted, converting souls, ... the commandment of the Lord is lightsome,\nenlightening the eyes.\u201d(43) 1 Pet. II, 21: \u201cChrist also suffered for us,\nleaving you an example that you should follow his steps.\u201d(44) St.\nAugustine probably had in mind the grace of mediate illumination when he\nwrote: \u201cGod acts upon us by the incentives of visible objects to will and\nto believe, either externally by evangelical exhortations, ... or\ninternally, as no man has control over what enters into his thoughts.\u201d(45)\nThe grace of mediate illumination has for its object to prepare the way\nquietly and unostentatiously for a grace of greater import, namely, the\nimmediate illumination of the mind by the Holy Ghost.\n\nb) The grace of immediate far surpasses that of mediate illumination\nbecause the supernatural life of the soul originates in faith, which in\nturn is based on a strictly supernatural enlightenment of the mind.\n\n\u03b1) St. Paul expressly teaches: \u201cAnd such confidence we have, through\nChrist, towards God; not that we are sufficient to think anything of\nourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is of God.\u201d(46)\n\nThe salient portion of this text reads as follows in the original Greek:\n\u039f\u1f50\u03c7 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03af \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f00\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u1f21\n\u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6. Speaking in the plural (_pluralis\nmaiestaticus_), the Apostle confesses himself unable to conceive a single\nsalutary thought (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9), and ascribes the power (\u1f31\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2) to do so\nto God. Considered merely as vital acts, such thoughts proceed from the\nnatural faculties of the mind (\u1f00\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd), but the power that produces\nthem is divine (\u1f10\u03ba \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6), not human (\u1f10\u03be \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd). Hence each salutary\nthought exceeds the power of man, and is an immediate supernatural grace.\n\nA still more cogent argument can be derived from 1 Cor. III, 6 sq.: \u201cI\nhave planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase. Therefore,\nneither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth; but God that\ngiveth the increase.\u201d(47) In this beautiful allegory the Apostle compares\nthe genesis of supernatural faith in the soul to that of a plant under the\ncare of a gardener, who while he plants and waters, yet looks to God for\n\u201cthe increase.\u201d The Apostle and his disciple Apollo are the spiritual\ngardeners through whose preaching the Corinthians received the grace of\nmediate illumination. But, as St. Paul says, this preaching would have\nbeen useless (_non est aliquid_) had not God given \u201cthe increase.\u201d In\nother words, the grace of immediate illumination was necessary to make the\nApostolic preaching effective. \u201cFor,\u201d in the words of St. Augustine, \u201cGod\nHimself contributes to the production of fruit in good trees, when He both\nexternally waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and\ninternally by Himself also gives the increase.\u201d(48)\n\n\u03b2) The argument from Tradition is based chiefly on St. Augustine, \u201cthe\nDoctor of Grace,\u201d whose authority in this branch of dogmatic theology is\nunique.(49) His writings abound in many such synonymous terms for the\ngrace of immediate illumination, as _cogitatio pia, vocatio alta et\nsecreta, locutio in cogitatione, aperitio veritatis_, etc., etc.\n\nHe says among other things: \u201cInstruction and admonition are external aids,\nbut he who controls the hearts has his cathedra in heaven.\u201d(50) Augustine\nesteems human preaching as nothing and ascribes all its good effects to\ngrace. \u201cIt is the internal Master who teaches; Christ teaches and His\ninspiration.\u201d(51) In harmony with his master, St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, the\nablest defender of the Augustinian (_i.e._ Catholic) doctrine of grace,\nsays: \u201cIn vain will our sacred discourses strike the external ear, unless\nGod by a spiritual gift opens the hearing of the interior man.\u201d(52)\n\n2. THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL.\u2014This grace, usually called _gratia\ninspirationis_,(53) may also be either mediate or immediate, according as\npious affections and wholesome resolutions are produced in the soul by a\npreceding illumination of the intellect or directly by the Holy Ghost.\nOwing to the psychological interaction of intellect and will, every grace\nof the mind, whether mediate or immediate, is _eo ipso_ also a mediate\ngrace of the will, which implies a new act of the soul, but not a new\ngrace. What we are concerned with here is the immediate strengthening\ngrace of the will, which is far more important and more necessary.\n\nWe are not able to demonstrate this teaching from Sacred Scripture. The\ntexts John VI, 44 and Phil. II, 13, which are usually adduced in this\nconnection, are inconclusive.\n\nHence we must rely solely on Tradition. The argument from Tradition is\nbased mainly on St. Augustine. In defending divine grace against Pelagius,\nthis holy Doctor asserts the indispensability and superior value of the\nstrengthening grace of the will.\n\n\u201cBy that grace it is effected, not only that we discover what ought to be\ndone, but also that we do what we have discovered; not only that we\nbelieve what ought to be loved, but also that we love what we have\nbelieved.\u201d(54) And again: \u201cLet him discern between knowledge and charity,\nas they ought to be distinguished, because knowledge puffeth up, but\ncharity edifieth.... And inasmuch as both are gifts of God, although one\nis less and the other greater, he must not extol our righteousness above\nthe praise which is due to Him who justifies us in such a way as to assign\nto the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim\nthe greater one for the control of the human will.\u201d(55) St. Augustine\nemphasized the existence and necessity of this higher grace of the will in\nhis controversy with the Pelagians. He was firmly convinced that a man may\nknow the way of salvation, and yet refuse to follow it.(56) He insisted\nthat mere knowledge is not virtue, as Socrates had falsely taught.\n\nEcclesiastical Tradition was always in perfect accord with this teaching,\nwhich eventually came to be defined by the plenary Council of Carthage (A.\nD. 418) as follows: \u201cIf any one assert that this same grace of God,\ngranted through our Lord Jesus Christ, helps to avoid sin only for the\nreason that it opens and reveals to us an understanding of the [divine]\ncommands, so that we may know what we should desire and what we should\navoid; but that it is not granted to us by the same (grace) to desire and\nbe able to do that which we know we ought to do, let him be\nanathema;\u2014since both are gifts of God: to know what we must do and to have\nthe wish to do it.\u201d(57)\n\nLike the illuminating grace of the intellect the strengthening grace of\nthe will effects vital acts and manifests itself chiefly in what are known\nas the emotions of the will. St. Prosper, after Fulgentius the most\nprominent disciple of St. Augustine, enumerates these as follows: \u201cFear\n(for \u2018the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom\u2019); joy (\u2018I rejoiced\nat the things that were said to me: We shall go into the house of the\nLord\u2019); desire (\u2018My soul longeth and fainteth for the courts of the\nLord\u2019); delight (\u2018How sweet are thy words to my palate, more than honey to\nmy mouth\u2019);\u201d\u2014and he adds: \u201cWho can see or tell by what affections God\nvisits and guides the human soul?\u201d(58)\n\n3. ACTUAL GRACES OF THE SENSITIVE SPHERE.\u2014Though it cannot be determined\nwith certainty of faith, it is highly probable that actual grace\ninfluences the sensitive faculties of the soul as well as the intellect\nand the will.\n\nGod, who is the first and sole cause of all things, is no doubt able to\nexcite in the human imagination phantasms corresponding to the\nsupernatural thoughts produced in the intellect, and to impede or paralyze\nthe rebellious stirrings of concupiscence which resist the grace of the\nwill,\u2014either by infusing contrary dispositions or by allowing spiritual\njoy to run over into the _appetitus sensitivus_. The existence of such\ngraces (which need not necessarily be supernatural except _quoad modum et\nfinem_) may be inferred with great probability from the fact that man is a\ncompound of body and soul. Aristotle holds that the human mind cannot\nthink without the aid of the imagination.(59) If this is true, every\nsupernatural thought must be preceded by a corresponding phantasm to\nexcite and sustain it. As for the sensitive appetite, it may either assume\nthe form of concupiscence and hinder the work of salvation, or aid it by\nfavorable emotions excited supernaturally. St. Augustine says that the\n_delectatio victrix_ has for its object \u201cto impart sweetness to that which\ngave no pleasure.\u201d(60) St. Paul, who thrice besought the Lord to relieve\nhim of the sting of his flesh, was told: \u201cMy grace is sufficient for\nthee.\u201d(61)\n\n4. _The Illuminating Grace of the Mind and the Strengthening Grace of the\nWill Considered as Vital Acts of the Soul._\u2014If we examine these graces\nmore closely to determine their physical nature, we find that they are\nsimply vital acts of the intellect and the will, and receive the character\nof divine \u201cgraces\u201d from the fact that they are supernaturally excited in\nthe soul by God.\n\na) The Biblical, Patristic, and conciliar terms _cogitatio_, _suasio_,\n_scientia_, _cognitio_, as well as _delectatio_, _voluptas_, _desiderium_,\n_caritas_, _bona voluntas_, _cupiditas_, all manifestly point to vital\nacts of the soul. But even where grace is described as _vocatio_,\n_illuminatio_, _illustratio_, _excitatio_, _pulsatio_, _inspiratio_, or\n_tractio_, the reference can only be\u2014if not _formaliter_, at least\n_virtualiter_\u2014to immanent vital acts of the intellect or will. This is the\nconcurrent teaching of SS. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The former says:\n\u201cGod calls [us] by [our] innermost thoughts,\u201d and: \u201cSee how the Father\ndraws [and] by teaching delights [us].\u201d(62) The latter quotes the\nAristotelian axiom: \u201c_Actus moventis in moto est motus._\u201d(63)\n\nIf the graces of the intellect and of the will are supernaturally inspired\nacts of the soul, by what process does the mind of man respond to the\nimpulse of illumination and inspiration?\n\nThe language employed by the Fathers and councils leaves no doubt that\nsupernatural knowledge manifests itself mainly in judgments. But simple\napprehension and ratiocination must also play a part, (1) because these\ntwo operations are of the essence of human thought, and the grace of\nillumination always works through natural agencies; and (2) because some\nintellectual apprehensions are merely condensed judgments and syllogisms.\n\nThe graces of the will naturally work through the spiritual emotions or\npassions, of which there are eleven: love and hatred, joy and sadness,\ndesire and abhorrence, hope and despair, fear and daring, and lastly\nanger. With the exception of despair (for which there is no place in the\nbusiness of salvation), all these passions have a practical relation to\ngood and evil and are consequently called \u201cgraces\u201d both in Scripture and\nTradition. Love (_amor_) is the fundamental affection of the will, to\nwhich all others are reducible, and hence the principal function of grace,\nin so far as it affects the will, must consist in producing acts of\nlove.(64) The Council of Carthage (A. D. 418) declares that \u201cboth to know\nwhat we must do, and to love to do it, is a gift of God.\u201d(65) It would be\na mistake, however, to identify this \u201clove\u201d with theological charity,\nwhich is \u201ca perfect love of God above all things for His own sake.\u201d(66)\nJustification begins with supernatural faith, is followed by fear, hope,\nand contrition, and culminates in charity.(67)\n\nSt. Augustine sometimes employs the word _caritas_ in connections where it\ncannot possibly mean theological love.(68) This peculiar usage is based on\nthe idea that love of goodness in a certain way attracts man towards God\nand prepares him for the theological virtue of charity. In studying the\nwritings of St. Augustine, therefore, we must carefully distinguish\nbetween _caritas_ in the strict, and _caritas_ in a secondary and derived\nsense.(69) The champions of the falsely so-called Augustinian theory of\ngrace(70) disregard this important distinction and erroneously claim that\nSt. Augustine identifies \u201cgrace\u201d with _caritas_ in the sense of\ntheological love; just as if faith, hope, contrition, and the fear of God\nwere not also graces in the true meaning of the term, and could not exist\nwithout theological charity.\n\nb) Not a few theologians, especially of the Thomist school, enlarge the\nlist of actual graces by including therein, besides the supernatural vital\nacts of the soul, certain extrinsic, non-vital qualities (_qualitates\nfluentes, non vitales_) that precede these acts and form their basis. It\nis impossible, they argue, to elicit vital or immanent supernatural acts\nunless the faculties of the soul have previously been raised to the\nsupernatural order by means of the _potentia ob\u0153dientialis_. The _gratia\nelevans_, which produces in the soul of the sinner the same effects that\nthe so-called infused habits produce in the soul of the just, is a\nsupernatural power really distinct from its vital effects. In other words,\nthey say, the vital supernatural acts of the soul are preceded and\nproduced by a non-vital grace, which must be conceived as a \u201cfluent\nquality.\u201d These \u201cfluent\u201d (the opponents of the theory ironically call them\n\u201cdead\u201d) qualities are alleged to be real graces.(71) Alvarez and others\nendeavor to give their theory a dogmatic standing by quoting in its\nsupport all those passages of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers and councils\nin which prevenient grace is described as _pulsatio_, _excitatio_,\n_vocatio_, _tractio_, _tactus_, and so forth. The act of knocking or\ncalling, they say, is not identical with the act of opening, in fact the\nformer is a grace in a higher sense than the latter, because it is\nperformed by God alone, while the response comes from the soul co\u00f6perating\nwith God.(72)\n\nThe theory thus briefly described is both theologically and\nphilosophically untenable.\n\n\u03b1) Holy Scripture and Tradition nowhere mention any such non-vital\nentities or qualities,\u2014a circumstance which would be inexplicable if it\nwere true, what Cardinal Gotti asserts,(73) that the term \u201cgrace\u201d applies\nprimarily and in the strict sense to these qualities, while the vital acts\nare merely effects. Whenever Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church\nspeak literally, without the use of metaphors, they invariably apply the\nterm \u201cgrace\u201d to these vital acts themselves and ascribe their supernatural\ncharacter to an immediate act of God.(74) In perfect conformity with this\nteaching St. Augustine explains such metaphorical terms as _vocare_ and\n_tangere_ in the sense of _credere_ and _fides_.(75) God employs no\n\u201cfluent qualities\u201d or \u201cnon-vital entities\u201d in the dispensation of His\ngrace, but effects the supernatural elevation of the soul immediately and\nby Himself.(76)\n\n\u03b2) The theory under consideration is inadmissible also from the\nphilosophical point of view. A quality does not \u201cflow\u201d or tend to revert\nto nothingness. On the contrary, its very nature demands that it remain\nconstant until destroyed by its opposite or by some positive cause. It is\nimpossible to conceive a quality that would of itself revert to\nnothingness without the intervention of a destructive cause. Billuart\nmerely beats the air when he says: \u201c_Potest dici qualitas incompleta\nhabens se per modum passionis transeuntis._\u201d(77) What would Aristotle have\nsaid if he had been told of a thing that was half \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd and half \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd,\nand consequently neither the one nor the other? Actual grace is\ntransitory; it passes away with the act which it inspires, and\nconsequently may be said to \u201cflow.\u201d But this very fact proves that it is\nnot a dead quality, but a _modus vitalis supernaturalis_. In the\ndispensation of His grace, God employs no fluent qualities or non-vital\nentities, but He Himself is the immediate cause of the supernatural\nelevation of the human soul and its faculties. St. Thomas is perfectly\nconsistent, therefore, when he defines actual grace as a vital act of the\nsoul.(78)\n\n5. PREVENIENT AND CO\u00d6PERATING GRACE.\u2014The vital acts of the soul are either\nspontaneous impulses or free acts of the will. Grace may precede free-will\nor co\u00f6perate with it. If it precedes the free determination of the will it\nis called prevenient; if it accompanies (or coincides with) that\ndetermination and merely co\u00f6perates with the will, it is called\nco\u00f6perating grace.\n\nPrevenient grace, regarded as a divine call to penance, is often styled\n_gratia vocans sive excitans_, and if it is received with a willing heart,\n_gratia adiuvans_. Both species are distinctly mentioned in Holy\nScripture. Cfr. Eph. V, 14: \u201cWherefore he saith: Rise thou that sleepest,\nand arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee.\u201d 2 Tim. I, 9:\n\u201cWho hath delivered us and called us by his holy calling, not according to\nour works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us\nin Christ Jesus before the times of the world.\u201d Rom. VIII, 26: \u201cLikewise\nthe Spirit also helpeth our infirmity.\u201d Rom. VIII, 30: \u201cAnd whom he\npredestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also\njustified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified.\u201d Apoc. III, 20:\n\u201cBehold I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and\nopen to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he\nwith me.\u201d\n\nSt. Augustine says: \u201cForasmuch as our turning away from God is our own act\nand deed, and this is [our] depraved will; but that we turn to God, this\nwe cannot do except He rouse and help us, and this is [our] good\nwill,\u2014what have we that we have not received?\u201d(79)\n\nAn equivalent division is that into _gratia operans_ and _co\u00f6perans_,\nrespectively\u2014names which are also founded on Scripture. Cfr. Phil. II, 13:\n\u201cFor it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,\naccording to his good will.\u201d Mark XVI, 20: \u201cBut they going forth preached\neverywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs\nthat followed.\u201d\n\nSt. Augustine describes the respective functions of these graces as\nfollows: \u201cHe [God] begins His influence by working in us that we may have\nthe will, and He completes it by working with us when we have the\nwill.\u201d(80)\n\nA third division of the same grace is that into _praeveniens_ and\n_subsequens_. It is likewise distinctly Scriptural,(81) and its two\nmembers coincide materially with _gratia vocans_ and _adiuvans_, as can be\nseen by comparing the usage of St. Augustine with that of the Tridentine\nCouncil. \u201cGod\u2019s mercy,\u201d says the holy Doctor, \u201cprevents [_i.e._ precedes]\nthe unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing lest he will in\nvain.\u201d(82) And the Council of Trent declares that \u201cin adults the beginning\nof justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God,\nthrough Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without\nany merits existing on their part, they are called.\u201d(83)\n\nIf we conceive a continuous series of supernatural graces, each may be\ncalled either prevenient or subsequent, according as it is regarded either\nas a cause or as an effect. St. Thomas explains this as follows: \u201cAs grace\nis divided into working and co\u00f6perating grace, according to its diverse\neffects, so it may also be divided into prevenient and subsequent grace,\naccording to the meaning attached to the term grace [_i.e._, either\nhabitual or actual]. The effects which grace works in us are five: (1) It\nheals the soul; (2) moves it to will that which is good; (3) enables man\nefficaciously to perform the good deeds which he wills; (4) helps him to\npersevere in his good resolves; and (5) assists him in attaining to the\nstate of glory. In so far as it produces the first of these effects, grace\nis called prevenient in respect of the second; and in so far as it\nproduces the second, it is called subsequent in respect of the first. And\nas each effect is posterior to one and prior to another, so grace may be\ncalled prevenient or subsequent according as we regard it in its relations\nto different effects.\u201d(84)\n\nAmong so many prevenient graces there must be one which is preceded by\nnone other (_simpliciter praeveniens_), and this is pre\u00ebminently the\n_gratia vocans s. excitans_.\n\nThere is a fourth and last division, mentioned by the Council of Trent,\nwhich is also based on the relation of grace to free-will. \u201cJesus Christ\nHimself,\u201d says the holy Synod, \u201ccontinually infuses His virtue into the\njustified, and this virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their\ngood works.\u201d(85) The opposition here lies between _gratia antecedens_,\nwhich is a spontaneous movement of the soul, and _gratia concomitans_,\nwhich co\u00f6perates with free-will after it has given its consent. This\nterminology may be applied to the good works of sinners and saints alike.\nFor the sinner no less than the just man receives two different kinds of\ngraces\u2014(1) such as precede the free determination of the will and (2) such\nas accompany his free acts.\n\nThus it can be readily seen that the fundamental division of actual grace,\nconsidered in its relation to free-will, is that into prevenient and\nco\u00f6perating grace. All other divisions are based on a difference of\nfunction rather than of nature.(86)\n\na) The existence of prevenient grace (_gratia praeveniens s. excitans s.\nvocans_) may be inferred from the fact that the process of justification\nbegins with the illumination of the intellect, which is by nature unfree,\n_i.e._ devoid of the power of choosing between good and evil. That there\nare also graces which consist in spontaneous, indeliberate motions of the\nwill,(87) is clearly taught by the Council of Trent,(88) and evidenced by\ncertain Biblical metaphors. Thus God is described as knocking at the gate\n(Apoc. III, 20), as drawing men to Him (John VI, 44), and men are said to\nharden their hearts against His voice (Ps. XCIV, 8), etc. Cfr. Jer. XVII,\n23: \u201cBut they did not hear, nor incline their ear: but hardened their\nneck, that they might not hear me, and might not receive instruction.\u201d\n\nThe Catholic tradition is voiced by St. Augustine, who says: \u201cThe will\nitself can in no wise be moved, unless it meets with something which\ndelights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the power of man to bring\nthis about.\u201d(89) St. Prosper enumerates a long list of spontaneous\nemotions which he calls supernatural graces of the will.(90)\n\nPrevenient grace is aptly characterized by the Patristic formula: \u201c_Gratia\nest in nobis, sed sine nobis_,\u201d that is, grace, as a vital act, is in the\nsoul, but as a salutary act it proceeds, not from the free will, but from\nGod. In other words, though the salutary acts of grace derive their\nvitality from the human will, they are mere _actus hominis_ (\u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), not\n_actus humani_ (\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2).(91) \u201cGod,\u201d explains St. Augustine, \u201cdoes many\ngood things in man, which man does not do; but man does none which God\ndoes not cause man to do.\u201d(92) And again: \u201c[God] operates without us, in\norder that we may become willing; but when we once will so as to act, He\nco\u00f6perates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good\nworks of piety without Him either working that we may will, or co\u00f6perating\nwhen we will.\u201d(93) St. Bernard employs similar language.(94)\n\nb) Co\u00f6perating grace (_gratia cooperans s. adiuvans s. subsequens_)\ndiffers from prevenient grace in this, that it supposes a deliberate act\nof consent on the part of the will (\u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, not \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2). St. Gregory\nthe Great tersely explains the distinction as follows: \u201cThe divine\ngoodness first effects something in us without our co\u00f6peration [_gratia\npraeveniens_], and then, as the will freely consents, co\u00f6perates with us\nin performing the good which we desire [_gratia cooperans_].\u201d(95) That\nsuch free and consequently meritorious acts are attributable to grace is\nemphasized by the Tridentine Council: \u201cSo great is the bounty [of God]\ntowards all men that He will have the things which are His own gifts to be\ntheir merits.\u201d(96) Such free salutary acts are not only graces in the\ngeneral sense, but real actual graces, in as far as they produce other\nsalutary acts, and their existence is as certain as the fact that many men\nfreely follow the call of grace, work out their salvation, and attain to\nthe beatific vision. It is only in this way, in fact, that Heaven is\npeopled with Saints.\n\n\u03b1) St. Augustine embodies all these considerations in the following\npassage: \u201cIt is certain that we keep the commandments when we will; but\nbecause the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may\nwill so much as is sufficient to make us act in willing. It is certain\nthat we will whenever we like, but it is He who makes us will what is\ngood, of whom it is said (Prov. VIII, 35): \u2018The will is prepared by the\nLord,\u2019 and of whom it is said (Ps. XXXVI, 32): \u2018The steps of a [good] man\nare ordered by the Lord, and his way doth He will,\u2019 and of whom it is said\n(Phil. II, 13): \u2018It is God who worketh in you, even to will.\u2019 It is\ncertain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He who causes us to\nact, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to our will, who has said\n(Ezech. XXXVI, 27): \u2018I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to\nkeep my judgments, and do them.\u2019 When He says: \u2018I will cause you ... to do\nthem,\u2019 what else does He say in fact than (Ezech. XI, 19): \u2018I will take\naway the stony heart out of their flesh,\u2019 from which used to rise your\ninability to act, and (Ezech. XXXVI, 26): \u2018I will give you a heart of\nflesh,\u2019 in order that you may act.\u201d(97)\n\n\u03b2) The manner in which grace and free-will co\u00f6perate is a profound\nphilosophical and theological problem. A salutary act derives its\nsupernatural character from God, its vitality from the human will. How do\nthese two factors conjointly produce one and the same act? The unity of\nthe act would be destroyed if God and the free-will of man in each case\nperformed, either two separate acts, or each half of the same act. To\npreserve the unity of a supernatural act two conditions are required: (1)\nthe divine power of grace must be transformed into the vital strength of\nthe will and (2) the created will, which by its own power can perform at\nmost a naturally good act, must be equipped with the supernatural power of\ngrace. These conditions are met (a) by the supernatural elevation of the\nwill (_elevatio externa_), and (b) by the supernatural concurrence of God\n(_concursus supernaturalis ad actum secundum_). The supernatural elevation\nof the will is accomplished in this wise: God, by employing the\nilluminating and strengthening grace, works on the _potentia\nob\u0153dientialis_, and thus raises the will above its purely natural powers\nand constitutes it a supernatural faculty _in actu primo_ for the free\nperformance of a salutary act. The divine concursus supervenes to enable\nthe will to perform the _actus secundus_ or salutary act proper. This\nspecial divine concurrence, in contradistinction to the natural concursus\nwhereby God supports the created universe,(98) is a strictly supernatural\nand gratuitous gift. Consequently, God and the human will jointly perform\none and the same salutary act\u2014God as the principal, the will as the\ninstrumental cause.(99)\n\n6. EFFICACIOUS GRACE AND MERELY SUFFICIENT GRACE.\u2014By efficacious grace\n(_gratia efficax_) we understand that divine assistance which with\ninfallible certainty includes the free salutary act. Whether the certainty\nof its operation results from the physical nature of this particular\ngrace, or from God\u2019s infallible foreknowledge (_scientia media_), is a\nquestion in dispute between Thomists and Molinists.(100)\n\nMerely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_) is that divine\nassistance whereby God communicates to the human will full power to\nperform a salutary act (_posse_) but not the action itself (_agere_).\n\nThe division of grace into efficacious and merely sufficient is not\nidentical with that into prevenient and co\u00f6perating. Co\u00f6perating grace\ndoes not _ex vi notionis_ include with infallible certainty the salutary\nact. It may indeed be efficacious, but in matter of fact frequently fails\nto attain its object because the will offers resistance.\n\na) The existence of efficacious graces is as certain as that there is a\nHeaven filled with Saints. God would be neither omnipotent nor infinitely\nwise if all His graces were frustrated by the free-will of man. St.\nAugustine repeatedly expresses his belief in the existence of efficacious\ngraces. Thus he writes in his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: \u201cIt is\ncertain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He [God] who causes\nus to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to the will.\u201d(101) And\nin another treatise: \u201c[Adam] had received the ability (_posse_) if he\nwould [_gratia sufficiens_], but he had not the will to exercise that\nability [_gratia efficax_]; for if he had possessed that will, he would\nhave persevered.\u201d(102)\n\nb) Before demonstrating the existence of sufficient grace it is necessary,\nin view of certain heretical errors, carefully to define the term.\n\n\u03b1) Actual grace may be regarded either in its intrinsic energy or power\n(_virtus_, _potestas agendi_) or in its extrinsic efficacy (_efficientia_,\n_efficacitas_). All graces are efficacious considered in their intrinsic\nenergy, because all confer the physical and moral power necessary to\nperform the salutary act for the sake of which they are bestowed. From\nthis point of view, therefore, and _in actu primo_, there is no real but a\npurely logical distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient\ngrace. If we look to the final result, however, we find that this differs\naccording as the will either freely co\u00f6perates with grace or refuses its\nco\u00f6peration. If the will co\u00f6perates, grace becomes truly efficacious; if\nthe will resists, grace remains \u201cmerely sufficient.\u201d In other words,\nmerely sufficient grace confers full power to act, but is rendered\nineffective by the resistance of the will.\n\nThe inefficacy of merely sufficient grace, therefore, is owing to the\nresistance of the will and not to any lack of intrinsic power. This is a\ntruth to which all Catholic systems of grace must conform.\n\nMerely sufficient grace may be subdivided into _gratia proxime sufficiens_\nand _gratia remote sufficiens_.\n\nProximately sufficient grace (also called _gratia operationis_) confers\nupon the will full power to act forthwith, while remotely sufficient grace\n(also termed _gratia orationis_) confers only the grace of prayer, which\nin its turn brings down full power to perform other salutary acts.\n\nThe _gratia orationis_ plays a most important r\u00f4le in the divine economy\nof grace. God has not obliged Himself to give man immediately all the\ngraces he needs. It is His will, in many instances, as when we are\nbesieged by temptations, that we petition Him for further assistance. \u201cGod\ndoes not enjoin impossibilities,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201cbut in His\ninjunctions He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to\nask His aid in what you cannot do.\u201d(103)\n\nHence, though grace may sometimes remain ineffective (_gratia inefficax_ =\n_gratia vere et mere sufficiens_), it is never insufficient\n(_insufficiens_), that is to say, never too weak to accomplish its\npurpose.\n\nCalvinism and Jansenism, while retaining the name, have eliminated\nsufficient grace from their doctrinal systems.\n\nJansenius (+ 1638) admits a kind of \u201csufficient grace,\u201d which he calls\n_gratia parva_, but it is really insufficient because no action can result\nfrom it unless it is supplemented by another and more powerful grace.(104)\nThis heretic denounced sufficient grace in the Catholic sense as a\nmonstrous conception and a means of peopling hell with reprobates.(105)\nSome of his followers even went so far as to assert that \u201cin our present\nstate sufficient grace is pernicious rather than useful to us, and we have\nreason to pray: From sufficient grace, O Lord, deliver us!\u201d(106)\n\n\u03b2) It is an article of faith that there is a merely sufficient grace and\nthat it is truly sufficient even when frustrated by the resistance of the\nwill. The last-mentioned point is emphasized by the Second Council of\nOrange (A. D. 529): \u201cThis also we believe, according to the Catholic\nfaith, that all baptized persons, through the grace received in Baptism,\nand with the help and co\u00f6peration of Christ, are able and in duty bound,\nif they will faithfully do their share, to comply with all the conditions\nnecessary for salvation.\u201d(107) The existence of sufficient grace was\nformally defined by the Council of Trent as follows: \u201cIf any one saith\nthat man\u2019s free-will, moved and excited by God, ... no wise co\u00f6perates\ntowards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of\njustification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, ... let him\nbe anathema.\u201d(108)\n\nThis dogma can be convincingly demonstrated both from Sacred Scripture and\nTradition.\n\n(1) God Himself complains through the mouth of the prophet Isaias: \u201cWhat\nis there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to\nit? Was it that I looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath\nbrought forth wild grapes?\u201d(109) This complaint clearly applies to the\nJews. Yahweh did for the Jewish nation whatever it behooved Him to do\nlavishly (_gratia vere sufficiens_), but His kindness was unrequited\n(_gratia mere sufficiens_). In the Book of Proverbs He addresses the\nsinner in these terms: \u201cI called, and you refused: I stretched out my\nhand, and there was none that regarded.\u201d(110) What does this signify if\nnot the complete sufficiency of grace? The proffered grace remained\ninefficacious simply because the sinner rejected it of his own free will.\nUpbraiding the wicked cities of Corozain and Bethsaida, our Lord exclaims:\n\u201cIf in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought\nin you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.\u201d(111) The\nomniscient God-man here asserts the existence of graces which remained\ninefficacious in Corozain and Bethsaida, though had they been given to the\ninhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, they would have proved effective. The\nconclusion evidently is: these graces remained ineffective, not because\nthey were unequal to the purpose for which they were conferred, but simply\nand solely because they were rejected by those whom God intended to\nbenefit.(112)\n\n(2) Though they did not employ the name, the Fathers were thoroughly\nfamiliar with the notion of sufficient grace.\n\nThus St. Irenaeus comments on our Lord\u2019s lamentation over the fate of the\nHoly City: \u201cWhen He says: (Matth. XXIII, 37): \u2018How often would I have\ngathered together thy children, ... and thou wouldest not,\u2019 He manifests\nthe ancient liberty of man, because God hath made him free from the\nbeginning.... For God does not employ force, but always has a good\nintention. And for this reason He gives good counsel to all.... And those\nwho do it [_gratia efficax_] will receive glory and honor, because they\nhave done good, though they were free not to do it; but those who do not\ndo good will experience the just judgment of God, because they have not\ndone good [_gratia inefficax_], though they were able to do it [_gratia\nvere et mere sufficiens_].\u201d(113) St. Augustine is in perfect agreement\nwith ecclesiastical tradition, and the Jansenists had no right whatever to\nclaim him for their teaching. \u201cThe grace of God,\u201d he expressly says in one\nplace, \u201cassists the will of men. If in any case men are not assisted by\nit, the reason lies with themselves, not God.\u201d(114) And again: \u201cNo one is\nguilty because he has not received; but he who does not do what he ought\nto do, is truly guilty. It is his duty to act if he has received a free\nwill and amply sufficient power to act.\u201d(115)\n\nREADINGS:\u2014St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1; qu.\n111, art. 1-5.\u2014J. Scheeben, _Natur und Gnade_, Mainz 1861.\u2014M. Glossner,\n_Lehre des hl. Thomas vom Wesen der Gnade_, Mainz 1871.\u2014Palmieri, _De\nGratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 1-16, Gulpen 1885.\u2014Oswald, _Die Lehre von\nder Heiligung_, 3rd ed., \u00a7 1-3, Paderborn 1885.\u2014S. Schiffini, _De Gratia\nDivina_, disp. 1, sect. 2; disp. 3, sect. 1-5, Freiburg\n1901.\u2014Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 3 sqq.,\nMainz 1897.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol.\nII, St. Louis 1918, pp. 234 sqq.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. The Properties Of Actual Grace\n\n\nActual grace has three essential properties: (1) necessity, (2) gratuity,\nand (3) universality. The most important of these is necessity.\n\n\n\nSection 1. The Necessity Of Actual Grace\n\n\nIn treating of the necessity of actual grace we must avoid two extremes.\nThe first is that mere nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing\ngood. This error was held by the early Protestants and the followers of\nBaius and Jansenius. The second is that nature is able to perform\nsupernatural acts by its own power. This was taught by the Pelagians and\nSemipelagians.\n\nBetween these two extremes Catholic theology keeps the golden mean. It\ndefends the capacity of human nature against Protestants and Jansenists,\nand upholds its incapacity and impotence against Pelagians and\nSemipelagians. Thus our present Section naturally falls into three\nArticles.\n\n\nArticle 1. The Capacity Of Mere Nature Without Grace\n\n\nThe capacity of nature in its own domain may be considered with regard\neither to the intellect or to the will.\n\n*Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of his intellect to arrive\nat a knowledge of God from a consideration of the physical universe.*\n\nThis proposition embodies an article of faith defined by the Vatican\nCouncil: \u201cIf any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and\nLord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason\nthrough created things, let him be anathema.\u201d(116)\n\nFor a formal demonstration of this truth we must refer the reader to our\ntreatise on _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 17 sqq.\nThe argument there given may be supplemented by the following\nconsiderations:\n\n1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of the human intellect\nwhen it says: \u201cThe Catholic Church, with one consent, has ever held and\ndoes hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in\nprinciple and in object: in principle, because our knowledge in the one is\nby natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because,\nbesides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are\nproposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely\nrevealed, cannot be known.\u201d(117) This teaching, which the Church had\nrepeatedly emphasized on previous occasions against the scepticism of\nNicholas de Ultricuria,(118) the rationalistic philosophy of Pomponazzi,\nthe \u201clog-stick-and-stone\u201d theory(119) of Martin Luther, the exaggerations\nof the Jansenists, and the vagaries of the Traditionalists,(120) is based\non Revelation as well as on sound reason. Holy Scripture clearly teaches\nthat we can gain a certain knowledge of God from a consideration of the\ncreated universe.(121) Reason tells us that a creature endowed with\nintelligence must be capable of acquiring natural knowledge, and that\nsupernatural faith is based on certain _praeambula_, which are nothing\nelse than philosophical and historical truths.(122) \u201cThe existence of God\nand other like truths,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201care not articles of faith, but\npreambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even\nas grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be\nperfected.\u201d(123) Luther denounced reason as the most dangerous thing on\nearth, because \u201call its discussions and conclusions are as certainly false\nand erroneous as there is a God in Heaven.\u201d(124) The Church teaches, in\naccordance with sound philosophy and experience, that the original powers\nof human nature, especially free-will, though greatly weakened, have not\nbeen destroyed by original sin.(125) The Scholastics, it is true, reckoned\nignorance among the four \u201cwounds of nature\u201d inflicted by original\nsin.(126) But this teaching must be regarded in the light in which the\nChurch condemned Quesnel\u2019s proposition that \u201cAll natural knowledge of God,\neven that found in pagan philosophers, can come from nowhere else than\nGod, and without grace produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and\nopposition against God Himself, instead of adoration, gratitude, and\nlove.\u201d(127) The Traditionalist contention that the intrinsic weakness of\nthe human intellect can be cured only by a primitive revelation handed\ndown through the instrumentality of speech and instruction, or by a\nspecial interior illumination, involves the false assumption that there\ncan be a cognitive faculty incapable of knowledge,\u2014which would ultimately\nlead to a denial of the essential distinction between nature and the\nsupernatural, because it represents exterior revelation or interior grace\nas something positively due to fallen nature.(128) Following the lead of\nSt. Thomas,(129) Catholic apologists, while maintaining the necessity of a\nsupernatural revelation even with regard to the truths of natural religion\nand ethics, base their argument not on the alleged physical incapacity of\nreason to ascertain these truths, but on the moral impossibility (_i.e._\ninsuperable difficulty) of finding them unaided. \u201cIt is to be ascribed to\nthis divine Revelation,\u201d says the Vatican Council, \u201cthat such truths among\nthings divine as are not of themselves beyond human reason, can, even in\nthe present state of mankind, be known by every one with facility and firm\nassurance, and without admixture of error.\u201d(130) In conformity with the\nteaching of Revelation and Tradition, the Church has always sharply\ndistinguished between \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 and \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\u2014faith and knowledge, revelation\nand philosophy,\u2014assigning to reason the double r\u00f4le of an indispensable\nforerunner and a docile handmaid of faith. Far from antagonizing reason,\nas charged by her enemies, the Church has on the contrary always valiantly\nchampioned its rights against Scepticism, Positivism, Criticism,\nTraditionalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, and Modernism.(131)\n\n2. As regards those purely natural truths that constitute the domain of\nscience and art, Catholic divines are practically unanimous(132) in\nholding that, though man possesses the physical ability of knowing every\nsingle one of these truths, even the most highly gifted cannot master them\nall. Cardinal Mezzofanti had acquired a knowledge of many languages,(133)\nand undoubtedly was capable of learning many more; yet without a special\ngrace he could not have learned all the languages spoken on earth, though\ntheir number is by no means infinite. The science of mathematics, which\nembraces but a limited field of knowledge, comprises an indefinite number\nof propositions and problems which even the greatest genius can not\nmaster. Add to these impediments the shortness of human life, the\nlimitations of the intellect, the multitude and intricacy of scientific\nmethods, the inaccessibility of many objects which are in themselves\nknowable, (_e.g._ the interior of the earth, the stellar universe)\u2014and you\nhave a host of limitations which make it physically impossible for the\nmind of man to encompass the realm of natural truths.(134)\n\n*Thesis II: Fallen man, whether pagan or sinner, is able to perform some\nnaturally good works without the aid of grace.*\n\nThis thesis may be technically qualified as _propositio certa_.\n\nProof. A man performing moral acts may be either in a state of unbelief,\nor of mortal sin, or of sanctifying grace. The question here at issue is\nchiefly whether all the works of pagans, that is all acts done without\ngrace of any kind, are morally bad, or whether any purely natural works\nmay be good despite the absence of grace. Baius and Jansenius affirmed\nthis; nay more, they asserted that no man can perform good works unless he\nis in the state of grace and inspired by a perfect love of God\n(_caritas_). If this were true, all the works of pagans and of such\nChristians as have lost the faith, would be so many sins. But it is _not_\ntrue. The genuine teaching of the Church may be gathered from her official\ncondemnation of the twenty-fifth, the twenty-sixth, and the thirty-seventh\npropositions of Baius. These propositions run as follows: \u201cWithout the aid\nof God\u2019s grace free-will hath power only to sin;\u201d(135) \u201cTo admit that\nthere is such a thing as a natural good, _i.e._ one which originates\nsolely in the powers of nature, is to share the error of Pelagius;\u201d(136)\n\u201cAll the actions of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of philosophers\nvices.\u201d(137) To these we may add the proposition condemned by Pope\nAlexander VIII, that \u201cThe unbeliever necessarily sins in whatever he\ndoes.\u201d(138)\n\n1. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, St. Augustine included, admit the\npossibility of performing naturally good, though unmeritorious, works\n(_opera steriliter bona_) in the state of unbelief; and their teaching is\nin perfect conformity with right reason.\n\na) Our Divine Lord Himself says:(139) \u201cIf you love them that love you,\nwhat reward(140) shall you have? Do not even the publicans this? And if\nyou salute(141) your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the\nheathens(142) this?\u201d The meaning plainly is: To salute one\u2019s neighbor is\nan act of charity, a naturally good deed, common even among the heathens,\nand one which, not being done from a supernatural motive, deserves no\nsupernatural reward. But this does not by any means imply that to salute\none\u2019s neighbor is sinful.\n\nSt. Paul(143) says: \u201cFor when the gentiles,(144) who have not the\nlaw,(145) do by nature(146) those things that are of the law; these having\nnot the law are a law to themselves: who shew the work of the law written\nin their hearts.\u201d By \u201cgentiles\u201d the Apostle evidently means genuine\nheathens, not converts from paganism to Christianity, and hence the\nmeaning of the passage is that the heathens who know the natural law\nembodied in the Decalogue only as a postulate of reason, are by\nnature(147) able to \u201cdo those things that are of the law,\u201d(148) _i.e._\nobserve at least some of its precepts. That St. Paul did not think the\ngentiles capable of observing the whole law without the aid of grace\nappears from his denunciation of their folly, a little further up in the\nsame Epistle: \u201cBecause that, when they knew God, they have not glorified\nhim as God, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their\nfoolish heart was darkened, etc.,\u201d(149) and also from the hypothetic form\nof Rom. II, 14 in the original Greek text: \u201c\u1f4d\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f14\u03b8\u03bd\u03b7 ... \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\u2014_Si quando gentes, ... quae legis sunt, faciunt._\u201d(150)\n\nIn Rom. XIV, 23: \u201cFor all that is not faith is sin,\u201d(151) a text often\nquoted against our thesis, \u201cfaith\u201d does not mean the theological habit of\nfaith, but \u201cconscience,\u201d(152) as the context clearly shows.(153)\n\nb) The teaching of the Fathers is in substantial harmony with Sacred\nScripture.\n\n\u03b1) Thus St. Jerome, speaking of the reward which Yahweh gave to\nNabuchodonosor for his services against Tyre,(154) says: \u201cThe fact that\nNabuchodonosor was rewarded for a good work shows that even the gentiles\nin the judgment of God are not passed over without a reward when they have\nperformed a good deed.\u201d(155) In his commentary on St. Paul\u2019s Epistle to\nthe Galatians the same holy Doctor observes: \u201cMany who are without the\nfaith and have not the Gospel of Christ, yet perform prudent and holy\nactions, _e.g._ by obeying their parents, succoring the needy, not\noppressing their neighbors, not taking away the possessions of\nothers.\u201d(156)\n\n\u03b2) The teaching of St. Augustine offers some difficulties. There can be no\ndoubt that this Father freely admitted that pagans and infidels can\nperform naturally good works without faith and grace. Thus he says there\nis no man so wicked that some good cannot be found in him.(157) He extols\nthe moderation of Polemo(158) and the purity of Alypius, who were both\npagans.(159) He admires the civic virtues of the ancient Romans,(160) etc.\nHolding such views, how could Augustine write: \u201cNeither doth free-will\navail for anything except sin, if the way of truth is hidden.\u201d(161) And\nwhat did his disciple Prosper mean when he said: \u201cThe whole life of\nunbelievers is a sin, and nothing is good without the highest good. For\nwherever there is no recognition of the supreme and immutable truth, there\ncan be no genuine virtue, even if the moral standard be of the\nhighest.\u201d(162)\n\nTo understand these and similar passages rightly and to explain at the\nsame time how it was possible for Baius and Jansenius to bolster their\nheretical systems with quotations from the writings of St. Augustine and\nhis disciples, it is necessary to observe that the quondam rhetorician and\nPlatonic idealist of Hippo delights in applying to the genus the\ndesignation which belongs to its highest species, and _vice versa_.(163)\nThus, in speaking of liberty, he often means the perfect liberty enjoyed\nby our first parents in Paradise;(164) in using the term \u201cchildren of God\u201d\nhe designates those who persevere in righteousness;(165) and in employing\nthe phrase \u201ca good work\u201d he means one supernaturally meritorious. Or,\n_vice versa_, he designates the slightest good impulse of the will as\n\u201c_caritas_,\u201d as it were by anticipation, and brands every unmeritorious\nwork (_opus informe s. sterile_) as false virtue (_falsa virtus_), nay sin\n(_peccatum_). To interpret St. Augustine correctly, therefore, allowance\nmust be made for his peculiar idealism and a careful distinction drawn\nbetween the real and the metaphorical sense of the terms which he employs.\nBaius neglected this precaution and furthermore paid no attention to the\ncontroversial attitude of the holy Doctor. Augustine\u2019s peculiar task was\nnot to maintain the possibility of naturally good works without faith and\ngrace, but to defend against Pelagius and Julian the impossibility of\nperforming supernaturally good and meritorious works without the aid of\ngrace. It is this essential difference in their respective points of view\nthat explains how St. Augustine and Baius were able to employ identical or\nsimilar terms to express radically different ideas.(166)\n\nc) It can easily be demonstrated on theological grounds that fallen man is\nable, of his own initiative, _i.e._ without the aid of grace, to perform\nmorally good works, and that Baius erred in asserting that this is\nimpossible without theological faith.\n\n\u03b1) With regard to the first-mentioned point it will be well, for the sake\nof clearness, to adopt Palmieri\u2019s distinction between physical and moral\ncapacity.(167) Man sins whenever he transgresses the law or yields to\ntemptation. This would be impossible if he were physically unable to keep\nthe whole law and resist temptation. Hence he must be physically able to\ndo that which he is obliged to do under pain of sin, though in this or\nthat individual instance the difficulties may be insuperable without the\naid of grace. To put it somewhat differently: Baius and Jansenius hold\nthat fallen man can perform no morally good works because of physical or\nmoral impotence on the part of the will. This assumption is false. Man is\nphysically able to perform good works because they are enjoined by the\nmoral law of nature under pain of sin; he is morally able because, in\nspite of numerous evil tendencies, not a few gentiles and unbelievers have\nled upright lives and thereby proved that man can perform good works\nwithout the aid of grace.(168) This is also the teaching of St.\nThomas.(169)\n\n\u03b2) It is an expressly defined dogma that the process of justification\nstarts with theological faith (_fides_), preceded by the so-called grace\nof vocation, which prepares and effects conversion. To say, as Baius did,\nthat all good works performed in a state of unbelief are so many sins, is\ntantamount to asserting that the preliminary acts leading up to faith, and\nwhich the unbeliever performs by the aid of prevenient grace, are sinful;\nin other words, that God requires the unbeliever to prepare himself for\njustification by committing sin. This is as absurd as it is\nheretical.(170)\n\nThe whole argument of this section applies _a fortiori_ to the theory that\nno act can be morally good unless prompted by both theological charity and\ntheological faith.(171)\n\n2. We must now define the limitations of fallen nature unaided by grace.\nThough the graces dispensed by Providence even for naturally good deeds\nare in the present economy _de facto_ nearly all supernatural, nothing\nprevents us from conceiving a different economy, consisting of purely\nnatural helps, such as would have been necessary in the state of pure\nnature.(172)\n\nAs regards the limitations of man\u2019s moral power in the natural order, we\nmay say, in a general way, that the will is able to keep the easier\nprecepts of the moral law of nature without the assistance of grace\n(either supernatural or natural). However, as it is impossible in many\ninstances to determine just where the easier precepts end and the more\ndifficult ones begin, a broad field is left open for theological\nspeculation.\n\na) Theologians are practically unanimous in holding that man cannot\nobserve the natural law in its entirety for any considerable length of\ntime without the aid of grace.\n\nSuarez is so sure of this that he does not hesitate to denounce the\ncontrary teaching,\u2014which is (perhaps unjustly) ascribed to Durandus,\nScotus, and Gabriel Biel\u2014as \u201crash and verging on error.\u201d(173) In matter of\nfact the Church has formally defined that, because of concupiscence, no\none, not even the justified man, much less the sinner, is able, without\ndivine assistance (grace), to keep for any considerable length of time the\nwhole Decalogue, which embodies the essentials of the moral law.\n\u201cNevertheless,\u201d says the Council of Trent, \u201clet those who think themselves\nto stand take heed lest they fall, and with fear and trembling work out\ntheir salvation, ... for ... they ought to fear for the combat which yet\nremains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they\ncannot be victorious unless they be with God\u2019s grace obedient to the\nApostle, who says: \u2018We are debtors, etc.\u2019 \u201d(174)\n\nSt. Paul, who lived, so to speak, in an atmosphere of grace, yet found\nreason to exclaim: \u201cI am delighted with the law of God, according to the\ninward man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law\nof my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my\nmembers,\u201d(175) and: \u201cUnhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the\nbody of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.\u201d(176)\nSurely it would be vain to expect the proud ideal of the Stoics or\nPelagius\u2019 presumptuous claim of impeccability ever to be realized on earth\nexcept by a special privilege of grace, such as that bestowed upon the\nBlessed Virgin Mary.(177)\n\nThe Fathers follow St. Paul in describing the power of concupiscence, even\nafter justification.(178)\n\nb) A pertinent question, closely allied to the proposition just treated,\nis this: Can the human will, without the aid of grace, overcome all the\ngrievous temptations to mortal sin by which it is besieged?\n\nIt is the common teaching of theologians that, without the aid of grace,\nman in the fallen state succumbs with moral (not physical) necessity to\ngrievous temptations against the moral law, _i.e._ to mortal sin. This\nconclusion flows from the impossibility, which we have demonstrated above,\nof observing the whole law of nature for life or for any considerable\nlength of time without the help of grace. If man were able to resist all\nviolent temptations, he would be able to keep the whole law.\n\nThe theological teaching which we are here expounding may be formulated in\ntwo different ways: (1) No man can overcome all grievous temptations\nagainst the moral law without the aid of grace; (2) there is no man living\nwho is not now and then assailed by temptations to which he would\ninevitably succumb did not God lend him His assistance.\n\nIn its first and rather indefinite form the proposition is attacked by\nRipalda,(179) Molina,(180) and many later Scholastics. These writers argue\nas follows: It is impossible to deduce from Revelation or experience a\ndefinite rule by which man could determine the conditions on which the\ngrievousness of a temptation depends. To say that a temptation is grievous\nwhen it cannot be resisted without the aid of grace, would be begging the\nquestion. Besides, the possibility always remains that there be men who,\nthough in theory unable to withstand all grievous temptations without the\naid of grace, _de facto_ never meet with such temptations, but only with\nthe lighter kind which can be overcome without supernatural help.\n\nThe second and more specific formulation of our proposition is supported\nby Sacred Scripture, which explicitly declares that all men are subject to\ntemptations which they could not resist if God did not uphold them.(181)\n\nIf the just are obliged to watch and pray constantly, lest they fall,(182)\nthis must be true in an even higher degree of sinners and unbelievers. St.\nAugustine writes against the Pelagians: \u201cFaithful men say in their prayer:\n\u2018Lead us not into temptation.\u2019 But if they have the capacity [of avoiding\nevil], why do they pray [for it]? Or, what is the evil which they pray to\nbe delivered from, but, above all else, the body of this death?... the\ncarnal lusts, whence a man is liberated only by the grace of the\nSaviour.... He may be permitted to pray that he may be healed. Why does he\npresume so strongly on the capability of his nature? It is wounded, hurt,\nharassed, destroyed; what it stands in need of is a true confession [of\nits weakness], not a false defense [of its capacity].\u201d(183)\n\nc) Another question, on which Catholic divines disagree, is this: Can\nfallen man, unaided by grace, elicit an act of perfect natural charity\n(_amor Dei naturalis perfectus_)?\n\nScotus answers this question affirmatively,(184) and his opinion is shared\nby Cajetan,(185) Ba\u00f1ez,(186) Dominicus Soto,(187) and Molina.(188) Other\nequally eminent theologians, notably Suarez(189) and Bellarmine,(190) take\nthe negative side.\n\nIn order to obtain a clear understanding of the question at issue we shall\nhave to attend to several distinctions.\n\nFirst and above all we must not lose sight of the important distinction\nbetween the _natural_ and the _supernatural_ love of God. Supernatural\ncharity, in all its stages, necessarily supposes supernatural aid. The\nquestion therefore can refer only to the _amor Dei naturalis_.(191) That\nthis natural charity is no mere figment appears from the ecclesiastical\ncondemnation of two propositions of Baius.(192)\n\nAnother, even more important distinction is that between _perfect_ and\n_imperfect_ charity. Imperfect charity is the love of God as our highest\ngood (_amor Dei ut summum bonum nobis_); perfect charity is the love of\nGod for His own sake above all things (_amor Dei propter se et super\nomnia_). The holy Fathers and a number of councils(193) declare that it is\nimpossible to love God perfectly without the aid of grace. The context and\nsuch stereotyped explanatory phrases as \u201c_sicut oportet_\u201d or \u201c_sicut\nexpedit ad salutem_,\u201d(194) show that these Patristic and conciliary\nutterances apply to the _supernatural_ love of God. Hence the question\nnarrows itself down to this: Can fallen man without the aid of grace love\nGod for His own sake and above all things by a purely natural love? In\nanswering this question Pesch,(195) Tepe,(196) and other theologians\ndistinguish between _affective_ and _effective_ love. They hold that\nwhereas the _amor affectivus_ in all its stages is possible without the\naid of grace, not so the _amor effectivus_, since that would involve the\nobservance of the whole natural law. This compromise theory can be\ndemonstrated as highly probable from Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul\nsays(197) that the gentiles knew God and should have glorified Him. This\nevidently supposes that it was possible for them to glorify God, and\nconsequently to love Him affectively, as easily and with the same means by\nwhich they knew Him. Else how could the Apostle say of those gentiles who,\n\u201cwhen they knew God, glorified him not as God,\u201d that they \u201cchanged the\ntruth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather\nthan the Creator\u201d?(198) This interpretation of Rom. I, 21 sqq. is\nexplicitly confirmed by St. Ambrose when he says: \u201cFor they were able to\napprehend this by the law of nature, inasmuch as the fabric of the cosmos\ntestifies that God, its author, is alone to be loved, as Moses hath set it\ndown in his writings; but they were made impious by not glorifying God,\nand unrighteousness became evident in them when, knowing, they changed the\ntruth into a lie and refused to confess the one God.\u201d(199)\n\n3. It follows, by way of corollary, that Vasquez\u2019s opinion,(200) that\nthere can be no good work without supernatural aid in the shape of a\n_cogitatio congrua_, is untenable, as is also the assertion of\nRipalda(201) that in the present economy purely natural good actions are\nso invariably connected with the prevenient grace of Christ that they\npractically never exist as such.\n\na) Vasquez, whose position in the matter is opposed by most other\ntheologians, contends(202) that no man can perform a good work or resist\nany temptation against the natural law (Decalogue) without the help of\nsupernatural grace derived from the merits of Christ. To avoid the\nheretical extreme of Baianism, however, he makes a twofold limitation. He\nassumes with the Scotists that there is such a thing as a morally\nindifferent act of the will,(203) and defines the grace which he holds to\nbe necessary for the performance of every morally good deed, as _cogitatio\ncongrua_. This \u201ccongruous thought,\u201d he says, is in itself, _i.e._\nontologically, natural, and can be regarded as supernatural only _quoad\nmodum et finem_. The subtle argument by which Vasquez tries to establish\nthis thesis is based principally on St. Augustine and may be summarized as\nfollows: Whenever the Fathers and councils insist on the necessity of\ngrace for the performance of good works, they mean _all_ good works,\nnatural as well as supernatural. The only alternative they know is virtue\nor vice, good or evil. Consequently the grace of Christ, in some form or\nother, is a necessary requisite of all morally good deeds.\n\nAs we have already intimated, we regard this opinion of the learned\nSpanish divine as erroneous.(204) Three solid reasons militate against it.\nThe first is that, to guard against Baianism, Vasquez is compelled to\nassume the existence of morally indifferent acts of the will, which is\nuntenable, as \u201cSt. Augustine and St. Thomas, and theologians generally\nteach that there is no such thing in the concrete as a morally indifferent\nact of the free will, and consequently, if the will is able, without\ngrace, to perform acts that are not evil, it is also able to perform good\nacts.\u201d(205) Second, Vasquez\u2019s theory counterfeits the notion of Christian\ngrace. \u201cGood thoughts\u201d come so natural to man, and are so closely bound up\nwith the grace of creation, that even Pelagius found no difficulty in\nadmitting this sort of \u201cgrace.\u201d(206) Surely fallen nature is not so\nutterly corrupt that a good child is unable to honor and love his parents\nwithout the aid of \u201cgrace\u201d (in the sense of _cogitatio congrua ex meritis\nChristi_). The third reason which constrains us to reject Vasquez\u2019s\ntheory, is that it leaves no room for natural morality (_naturaliter\nhonestum_) to fill the void between those acts that are naturally bad\n(_moraliter inhonesta_, _i.e._ _peccata_) and such as are supernaturally\ngood (_supernaturaliter bona_, _i.e._ _salutaria_). The existence of such\nnaturally good acts would seem to be a highly probable inference from the\ncondemnation, by Pius VI, of a certain proposition taught by the\npseudo-Council of Pistoia.(207)\n\nb) Martinez de Ripalda (+1648) tried to improve Vasquez\u2019s theory by\nrestoring the Christian concept of grace and adding that Providence\ninvariably precedes all naturally good works, including those performed by\nheathens and sinners, with the entitatively supernatural grace of\nillumination and confirmation.(208) In this hypothesis the necessity of\ngrace is not theological but purely historic.(209)\n\nDespite the wealth of arguments by which Ripalda attempted to prove his\ntheory,(210) it has not been generally accepted. While some, _e.g._\nPlatel(211) and Pesch,(212) regard it with a degree of sympathy, others,\nnotably De Lugo(213) and Tepe,(214) are strongly opposed to it. Palmieri\nthinks it may be accepted in a restricted sense, _i.e._ when limited to\nthe faithful.(215)\n\nRipalda\u2019s hypothesis of the universality of grace is truly sublime and\nwould have to be accepted if God\u2019s salvific will could be demonstrated by\nrevelation or some historic law to suffer no exceptions. But Ripalda has\nnot been able to prove this from Revelation.(216) Then, too, his theory\nentails two extremely objectionable conclusions: (1) a denial, not indeed\nof the possibility (Quesnel), but of the existence of purely natural good\nworks, and (2) the possibility of justification without theological faith.\nNeither of these difficulties probably occurred to Vasquez or\nRipalda,(217) because at the time when they wrote Pius VI had not yet\ncondemned the teaching of the pseudo-Council of Pistoia,(218) nor had\nInnocent XI censured the proposition that \u201cFaith in a broad sense, as\nderived from the testimony of creatures or some other similar motive, is\nsufficient for justification.\u201d(219) If the love of God, even perfect love,\n(such as we have shown to be possible in the natural order), were of\nitself necessarily supernatural, as Ripalda contends, it would be possible\nfor a pagan to receive the grace of justification without theological\nfaith, which he does not possess, as is evident from the Vatican teaching\nthat it is \u201crequisite for divine faith that revealed truth be believed\nbecause of the authority of God who reveals it.\u201d(220)\n\n*Thesis III: Not all actions performed by man in the state of mortal sin\nare sinful on account of his not being in the state of grace.*\n\nThis is _de fide_.\n\nProof. Though this thesis is, strictly speaking, included in Thesis II, it\nmust be demonstrated separately on its own merits, because it embodies a\nformally defined dogma which has been denied by the Protestant Reformers\nand by the followers of Baius and Jansenius. Martin Luther taught,\u2014and his\nteaching was adopted in a modified form by the Calvinists,\u2014that human\nnature is entirely depraved by original sin, and consequently man\nnecessarily sins in whatever he does,(221) even in the process of\njustification. Against this heresy the Tridentine Council defined: \u201cIf any\none shall say that all the works done before justification ... are indeed\nsins, ... let him be anathema.\u201d(222)\n\nThe Protestant notion of grace was reduced to a theological system by\nBaius(223) and Jansenius,(224) whose numerous errors may all be traced to\ntheir denial of the supernatural order.\n\nThe Jansenist teaching was pushed to an extreme by Paschasius Quesnel, 101\nof whose propositions were formally condemned by Pope Clement XI in his\nfamous Constitution \u201c_Unigenitus_.\u201d(225) The Jansenistic teachings of the\nCouncil of Pistoia were censured by Pius VI, A. D. 1794, in his Bull\n\u201c_Auctorem fidei_.\u201d The quintessence of this heretical system is embodied\nin the proposition that whatever a man does in the state of mortal sin is\nnecessarily sinful for the reason that he is not in the state of grace\n(_status caritatis_). Baius(226) and Quesnel(227) gave this teaching an\nAugustinian turn by saying that there is no intermediate state between the\nlove of God and concupiscence, and that all the works of a sinner must\nconsequently and of necessity be sinful. This heretical teaching is\nsharply condemned in the Bull \u201c_Auctorem fidei_.\u201d(228) Quesnel pushed it\nto its last revolting conclusion when he said: \u201cThe prayer of the wicked\nis a new sin, and that God permits it is but an additional judgment upon\nthem.\u201d(229)\n\nThe teaching of Baius and Quesnel is repugnant to Revelation and to the\ndoctrine of the Fathers.\n\na) The Bible again and again exhorts sinners to repent, to pray for\nforgiveness, to give alms, etc. Cfr. Ecclus. XXI, 1: \u201cMy son, thou hast\nsinned? Do so no more: but for thy former sins also pray that they may be\nforgiven thee.\u201d Ezech. XVIII, 30: \u201cBe converted, and do penance for all\nyour iniquities: and iniquity shall not be your ruin.\u201d Dan. IV, 24:\n\u201cRedeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to\nthe poor: perhaps he will forgive thy offences.\u201d Zach. I, 3: \u201cThus saith\nthe Lord of hosts: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts: and I will turn\nto you.\u201d If all the works thus enjoined were but so many sins, we should\nbe forced to conclude, on the authority of Sacred Scripture, that God\ncommands the sinner to commit new iniquities and that the process of\njustification with its so-called dispositions consists in a series of\nsinful acts. Such an assumption would be manifestly absurd and\nblasphemous.\n\nQuesnel endeavored to support his heretical conceit by Matth. VII, 17 sq.:\n\u201cEven so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and the evil tree\nbringeth forth evil fruit; a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,\nneither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.\u201d But as our Lord in this\npassage speaks of prophets, the fruits he has in mind must obviously be\ndoctrines not works.(230) And what if they were works? Are not doctrines\nand morals ultimately related, and may we not infer from the lives they\nlead (according to their doctrines) whether prophets are true or false? By\ntheir fruits (_i.e._ works) you shall know them (_i.e._ the soundness or\nunsoundness of the teaching upon which their works are based).\n\nb) In appealing to the testimony of the Fathers the Jansenists were\nnotoriously guilty of misinterpretation.\n\n\u03b1) Origen plainly teaches that prayer before justification is a good work.\n\u201cThough you are sinners,\u201d he says, \u201cpray to God; God hears the\nsinners.\u201d(231) The seemingly contradictory text John IX, 31: \u201cNow we know\nthat God doth not hear sinners,\u201d(232) is thus explained by St. Augustine:\n\u201cHe speaks as one not yet anointed; for God also hears the sinners. If He\ndid not hear sinners, the publican would have cast his eyes to the ground\nin vain and vainly struck his breast saying: O God, be merciful to me, a\nsinner.\u201d(233) Moreover, since there is question here of extraordinary\nworks and signs only (_viz._ miracles), the text is wholly irrelevant in\nregard to works of personal righteousness. St. Prosper teaches: \u201cHuman\nnature, created by God, even after its prevarication, retains its\nsubstance, form, life, senses, and reason, and the other goods of body and\nsoul, which are not lacking even to those who are bad and vicious. But\nthere is no possibility of seizing the true good by such things as may\nadorn this mortal life, but cannot give [merit] eternal life.\u201d(234)\n\n\u03b2) Baius and Quesnel succeeded in veiling their heresy by a phraseology of\nAugustinian color but with implications foreign to the mind of the Doctor\nof Grace. Augustine emphasized the opposition between \u201ccharity\u201d and\n\u201cconcupiscence\u201d so strongly that the intermediary domain of naturally good\nworks was almost lost to view. Thus he says in his _Enchiridion_: \u201cCarnal\nlust reigns where there is not the love of God.\u201d(235) And in his treatise\non the Grace of Christ: \u201cHere there is no love, no good work is reckoned\nas done, nor is there in fact any good work, rightly so called; because\nwhatever is not of faith is sin, and faith worketh by love.\u201d(236) And\nagain in his treatise on Grace and Free Will: \u201cThe commandments of love or\ncharity are so great and such, that whatever action a man may think he\ndoes well, is by no means well done if done without charity.\u201d(237) We have\npurposely chosen passages in which the \u201cDoctor of Grace\u201d obviously treats\nof charity as theological love, not in the broad sense of _dilectio_.(238)\nAt first blush these passages seem to agree with the teaching of Baius,\nwho says: \u201cEvery love on the part of a rational creature is either sinful\ncupidity, by which the world is loved, and which is forbidden by St. John,\nor that praiseworthy charity which is infused into the heart by the Holy\nSpirit, and by which we love God;\u201d\u2014(239) and with the forty-fifth\nproposition of Quesnel: \u201cAs the love of God no longer reigns in the hearts\nof sinners, it is necessary that carnal lust should reign in them and\nvitiate all their actions.\u201d(240) Yet the sense of these propositions is\nanything but Augustinian. Augustine upholds free-will in spite of grace\nand concupiscence, whereas the Jansenists assert that the _carnalis\ncupiditas_ and the _caritas dominans_ produce their effects by the very\npower of nature, _i.e._ necessarily and of themselves.(241)\n\nBesides this capital difference there are many minor discrepancies between\nthe teaching of St. Augustine and that of Baius and Quesnel. Augustine, it\nis true, in his struggle with Pelagianism,(242) strongly emphasized the\nopposition existing between grace and sin, between love of God and love of\nthe world; but he never dreamed of asserting that every act performed in\nthe state of mortal sin is sinful for the reason that it is not performed\nin the state of grace. Scholasticism has long since applied the necessary\ncorrective to his exaggerations. It is perfectly orthodox to say that\nthere is an irreconcilable opposition between the state of mortal sin and\nthe state of grace. \u201cNo one can serve two masters.\u201d(243) This is not,\nhowever, by any means equivalent to saying, as the Jansenists do, that the\nsinner, not being in the state of grace, of necessity sins in whatever he\ndoes. Augustine expressly admits that, no matter how deeply God may allow\na man to fall, and no matter how strongly concupiscence may dominate his\nwill, he is yet able to pray for grace, which is in itself a distinctly\nsalutary act. \u201cIf a sin is such,\u201d he says in his _Retractationes_, \u201cthat\nit is itself a punishment for sin, what can the will under the domination\nof cupidity do, except, if it be pious, to pray for help?\u201d(244) Compare\nthis sentence with the fortieth proposition of Baius: \u201cThe sinner in all\nhis actions serves the lust which rules him,\u201d(245) and you will perceive\nthe third essential difference that separates the teaching of St.\nAugustine from that of the Jansenists. The former, even when he speaks,\nnot of the two opposing habits, but of their respective acts, does not,\nlike Jansenism, represent the universality of sin without theological\ncharity as a physical and fundamental necessity, but merely as a\nhistorical phenomenon which admits of exceptions. Thus he writes in his\ntreatise On the Spirit and the Letter: \u201cIf they who by nature do the\nthings contained in the law, must not be regarded as yet in the number of\nthose whom Christ\u2019s grace justifies, but rather as among those whose\nactions (although they are those of ungodly men who do not truly and\nrightly worship the true God) we not only cannot blame, but actually\npraise, and with good reason, and rightly too, since they have been done,\nso far as we read or know or hear, according to the rule of righteousness;\nthough were we to discuss the question with what motive they are done,\nthey would hardly be found to be such as to deserve the praise and defense\nwhich are due to righteous conduct.\u201d(246)\n\nIn conclusion we will quote a famous passage from St. Augustine which\nreads like a protest against the distortions of Baius and Jansenius.\n\u201cLove,\u201d he says, \u201cis either divine or human; human love is either licit or\nillicit.... I speak first of licit human love, which is free from censure;\nthen, of illicit human love, which is damnable; and in the third place, of\ndivine love, which leads us to Heaven.... You, therefore, have that love\nwhich is licit; it is human, but, as I have said, licit, so much so that,\nif it were lacking, [the want of] it would be censured. You are permitted\nwith human love to love your spouse, your children, your friends and\nfellow-citizens. But, as you see, the ungodly, too, have this love, _e.g._\npagans, Jews, heretics. Who among them does not love his wife, his\nchildren, his brethren, his neighbors, his relations and friends? This,\ntherefore, is human love. If any one would be so unfeeling as to lose even\nhuman love, not loving his own children, ... we should no longer regard\nhim as a human being.\u201d(247) Tepe pertinently observes(248) that St.\nAugustine in this passage asserts not only the possibility but the actual\nexistence of naturally good though unmeritorious works (_opera steriliter\n__ bona_), and that the theory of Ripalda(249) is untenable for this\nreason, if for no other, that the quoted passage is cited in Pius VI\u2019s\nBull \u201c_Auctorem fidei_.\u201d(250)\n\n\nArticle 2. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For All Salutary Acts\n\n\nSalutary acts (_actus salutares_) are those directed to the attainment of\nsanctifying grace and the supernatural end of man.\n\nAccording to this double purpose, salutary acts may be divided into two\nclasses: (1) those that prepare for justification (_actus simpliciter\nsalutares_), and (2) those which, following justification, gain merits for\nHeaven (_actus meritorii_).\n\nIn consequence of the supernatural character of the acts which they\ncomprise, both these categories are diametrically opposed to that class of\nacts which are good only in a natural way,(251) and hence must be\ncarefully distinguished from the latter. The Fathers did not, of course,\nemploy the technical terms of modern theology; they had their own peculiar\nphrases for designating what we call salutary acts, _e.g._ _agere sicut\noportet vel expedit, agere ad salutem, agere ad iustificationem, agere ad\nvitam aeternam_, etc.(252)\n\n1. PELAGIANISM.\u2014Pelagianism started as a reaction against Manichaeism, but\nfell into the opposite extreme of exaggerating the capacity of human\nnature at the expense of grace. It denied original sin(253) and grace.\n\nAs the necessity of grace for all salutary acts is a fundamental dogma of\nthe Christian religion, the Church proceeded with unusual severity against\nPelagian naturalism and condemned its vagaries through the mouth of many\ncouncils.\n\na) Pelagius was a British lay monk, who came to Rome about the year 400 to\npropagate his erroneous views.(254) He found a willing pupil in Celestius,\nwho after distinguishing himself as a lawyer, had been ordained to the\npriesthood at Ephesus, about 411.\n\nThe Pelagian heresy gained another powerful champion in the person of\nBishop Julian of Eclanum in Apulia. Its strongest opponent was St.\nAugustine. Under his powerful blows the Pelagians repeatedly changed their\ntactics, without however giving up their cardinal error in regard to\ngrace. Their teaching on this point may be summarized as follows: The\nhuman will is able by its natural powers to keep all the commandments of\nGod, to resist temptation, and to gain eternal life; in fact it can attain\nto a state of holiness and impeccability(255) in which the petition\n\u201cForgive us our trespasses\u201d no longer has any meaning except perhaps as an\nexpression of humility.(256) In so far, however, as free-will is itself a\ngift of the Creator, man can perform no good works without grace. At a\nlater period of his career Pelagius admitted the existence of merely\nexternal supernatural graces, such as revelation and the example of Christ\nand the saints,\u2014which led St. Augustine to remark: \u201cThis is the hidden and\ndespicable poison of your heresy that you represent the grace of Christ as\nHis example, not His gift, alleging that man is justified by imitating\nHim, not by the ministration of the Holy Spirit.\u201d(257) But even this\nexternal grace, according to Pelagius, does not confer the strength\nnecessary to perform good works; it merely makes it easier to keep the\ncommandments. Pelagius did not deny that justification and adoptive\nsonship, considered in their ideal relation to the \u201ckingdom of Heaven,\u201d as\ndistinguished from \u201ceternal life,\u201d(258) are not identical in adults with\nthe grace of creation, but he denied their gratuity by asserting that the\nfree will is able to merit all these graces by its own power.(259)\n\nWhatever may have been the variations of Pelagianism, it is patent from\nthe writings of St. Augustine that its defenders one and all rejected the\nnecessity and existence of the immediate grace of the will.(260) Their\nattitude towards the illuminating grace of the intellect is in dispute.\nSome theologians(261) think the Pelagians admitted, others(262) that they\ndenied its existence. No matter what they may have held on this point,\nthere can be no doubt that the followers of Pelagius conceived the object\nof grace to be nothing more than to facilitate the work of salvation.\n\nb) Within the short span of twenty years (A. D. 411 to 431) no less than\ntwenty-four councils occupied themselves with this new heresy.\n\nAt first the wily heretic succeeded in deceiving the prelates assembled at\nLydda (Diospolis), A. D. 415; but the bishops of Northern Africa, among\nthem St. Augustine, roundly condemned his teaching at two councils held\nwith the sanction of Pope Innocent I at Carthage and Mileve in 416.\nShortly afterwards, deceived by the terms of the creeds and explanations\nwhich they circulated, Pope Zosimus (417-418) declared both Pelagius and\nCelestius to be innocent. Despite this intervention, however, two hundred\nAfrican bishops, at a plenary council held at Carthage, A. D. 418,\nreiterated the canons of Mileve and submitted them for approval to the\nHoly See. These proceedings induced Zosimus to adopt stronger measures. In\nhis _Epistula Tractoria_ (418) he formally condemned Pelagianism and\npersuaded the Emperor to send Julian of Eclanum and seventeen other\nrecalcitrant bishops into exile. The canons of Carthage and Mileve were\nsubsequently received by the universal Church as binding definitions of\nthe faith. The most important of them in regard to grace is this: \u201cIf\nanyone shall say that the grace of justification is given to us for the\npurpose of enabling us to do more easily by the aid of grace what we are\ncommanded to do by free-will, as if we were able, also, though less\neasily, to observe the commandments of God without the help of grace, let\nhim be anathema.\u201d(263) The Ecumenical Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431), with\nthe approval of Pope Celestine I, renewed the condemnation of Celestius,\nbut it was not until nearly a century later that Pelagianism received its\ndeath-blow. In 529 the Second Council of Orange defined: \u201cIf any one\nassert that he is able, by the power of nature, and without the\nillumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who grants to all men the\ndisposition believingly to accept the truth, rightly (_ut expedit_) to\nthink or choose anything good pertaining to eternal salvation, or to\nassent to salutary, _i.e._ evangelical preaching, such a one is deceived\nby a heretical spirit.\u201d(264) This decision was reiterated by the Council\nof Trent: \u201cIf any one saith that the grace of God through Jesus Christ is\ngiven only for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly and\nto merit eternal life, as if by free-will without grace he were able to do\nboth, though hardly indeed and with difficulty, let him be anathema.\u201d(265)\n\n2. PELAGIANISM REFUTED.\u2014Sacred Scripture and the Fathers plainly teach\nthat man is unable to perform any salutary act by his own power.\n\na) Among the many Biblical texts that can be quoted in support of this\nstatement, our Lord\u2019s beautiful parable of the vine and its branches is\nespecially striking. Cfr. John XV, 4 sq.: \u201cAs the branch cannot bear fruit\nof itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you\nabide in me. I am the vine; you the branches: he that abideth in me, and I\nin him, the same beareth much fruit: for without me you can do\nnothing.\u201d(266)\n\n\u03b1) The context shows that Jesus is not speaking here of purely natural\nworks of the kind for which the _concursus generalis_ of God suffices, but\nthat He has in mind salutary acts in the strictly supernatural sense; and\nthe truth He wishes to inculcate is that fallen nature cannot perform such\nacts except through Him and with His assistance. This supernatural\ninfluence is not, however, to be understood exclusively of sanctifying or\nhabitual grace, because our Divine Saviour refers to the fruits of\njustification and to salutary works. \u201cOf these he does not say: \u2018Without\nme you can do but little,\u2019 but: \u2018Without me you can do nothing.\u2019 Be it\ntherefore little or much, it cannot be done without Him, without whom\nnothing can be done.\u201d(267) If this was true of the Apostles, who were in\nthe state of sanctifying grace,(268) it must be true _a fortiori_ of\nsinners. Consequently, supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for the\nperformance of any and all acts profitable for salvation.\n\n\u03b2) Nowhere is this fundamental truth so clearly and insistently brought\nout as in the epistles of St. Paul, who is pre\u00ebminently \u201cthe Doctor of\nGrace\u201d among the Apostles.\n\nThere are, according to him, three categories of supernatural acts:\nsalutary thoughts, holy resolves, and good works.\n\nSt. Paul teaches that all right thinking is from God. 2 Cor. III, 5: \u201cNot\nthat we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves;\nbut our sufficiency is from God.\u201d(269)\n\nHe also declares that all good resolves come from above. Rom. IX, 15 sq.:\n\u201cFor he saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I\nwill shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy. So then it is not of him that\nwilleth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.\u201d(270)\n\nHe furthermore asserts that all good works come from God. Phil. II, 13:\n\u201cFor it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish,\naccording to his good will.\u201d(271) 1 Cor. XII, 3: \u201cNo man can say: Lord\nJesus, but by the Holy Ghost.\u201d(272) Pronouncing the holy name of Jesus is\nobviously regarded as a salutary act, because mere physical utterance does\nnot require the assistance of the Holy Ghost.(273) But the act as a\nsalutary act is physically impossible without divine assistance, because\nit is essentially supernatural and consequently exceeds the powers of\nnature.(274)\n\nb) The argument from Tradition is based almost entirely on the authority\nof St. Augustine, in whom, as Liebermann observes, God wrought a miracle\nof grace that he might become its powerful defender. There is no need of\nquoting specific texts because this whole treatise is interlarded with\nAugustinian dicta concerning the necessity of grace.\n\n\u03b1) An important point is to prove that the early Fathers held the\nAugustinian, _i.e._ Catholic view. It stands to reason that if these\nFathers had taught a different doctrine, the Church would not have so\nvehemently rejected Pelagianism as an heretical innovation. Augustine\nhimself insists on the novelty of the Pelagian teaching. \u201cSuch is the\nPelagian heresy,\u201d he says, \u201cwhich is not an ancient one, but has only\nlately come into existence.\u201d(275) And this view is confirmed by Pope\nCelestine I, who declares in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul (A. D.\n431): \u201cThis being the state of the question, novelty should cease to\nattack antiquity.\u201d(276)\n\nIn fact the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, although less explicit,\nagrees entirely with that of Augustine. Thus St. Irenaeus says: \u201cAs the\ndry earth, if it receives no moisture, does not bring forth fruit, so we,\nbeing dry wood, could never bear fruit for life without supernatural rain\nfreely given.... The blessing of salvation comes to us from God, not from\nourselves.\u201d(277)\n\nThe necessity of grace is indirectly inculcated by the Church when she\npetitions God to grant salutary graces to all men\u2014a most ancient and\nvenerable practice, which Pope St. Celestine explains as follows: \u201cThe law\nof prayer should determine the law of belief. For when the priests of holy\nnations administer the office entrusted to them, asking God for mercy,\nthey plead the cause of the human race, and together with the whole Church\nask and pray that the unbelievers may receive the faith, that the\nidolaters may be freed from the errors of their impiety, that the veil be\nlifted from the heart of the Jews, and they be enabled to perceive the\nlight of truth, that the heretics may return to their senses by a true\nperception of the Catholic faith, that the schismatics may receive the\nspirit of reborn charity, that the sinners be granted the remedy of\npenance, and that the door of heavenly mercy be opened to the catechumens\nwho are led to the sacraments of regeneration.\u201d(278) In matters of\nsalvation prayer and grace are correlative terms; the practice of the one\nimplies the necessity and gratuity of the other.(279)\n\n\u03b2) That the Fathers not only conceived grace to be necessary for the cure\nof weakness induced by sin (_gratia sanans_) in a merely moral sense, but\nthought it to be metaphysically necessary for the communication of\nphysical strength (_gratia elevans_), is evidenced by such oft-recurring\nsimiles as these: Grace is as necessary for salvation as the eye is to\nsee, or as wings are to fly, or as rain is for the growth of plants.\n\nIt will suffice to quote a passage from the writings of St. Chrysostom.\n\u201cThe eyes,\u201d he says, \u201care beautiful and useful for seeing, but if they\nwould attempt to see without light, all their beauty and visual power\nwould avail them nothing. Thus, too, the soul is but an obstacle in its\nown way if it endeavors to see without the Holy Ghost.\u201d(280)\n\nThis view is strengthened by the further teaching of the Fathers that\nsupernatural grace was as indispensable to the angels in their state of\nprobation (in which they were free from concupiscence) and to our first\nparents in Paradise (gifted as they were with the _donum integritatis_),\nas it is to fallen man; the only difference being that in the case of the\nlatter, grace has the additional object of curing the infirmities and\novercoming the difficulties arising from concupiscence. In regard to the\nangels St. Augustine says; \u201cAnd who made this will but He who created them\nwith a good will, that is to say with a chaste love by which they should\ncleave to Him, in one and the same act creating their nature and endowing\nit with grace?... We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to\nthe Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it\ncan be said that \u2018the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the\nHoly Ghost, who is given unto them.\u2019 \u201d(281)\n\nEqually convincing is the argument that Adam in Paradise was unable to\nperform any salutary acts without divine grace. \u201cJust as it is in man\u2019s\npower to die whenever he will,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201c... but the mere will\ncannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life;\nso man in Paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning\nrighteousness, to destroy himself; but to have led a life of righteousness\nwould have been too much for his will, unless it had been sustained by the\npower of Him who made him.\u201d(282)\n\nThis is also the teaching of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529):\n\u201cEven if human nature remained in the state of integrity, in which it was\nconstituted, it would in no wise save itself without the help of its\nCreator. If it was unable, without the grace of God, to keep what it had\nreceived, how should it be able without the grace of God to regain what it\nhas lost?\u201d(283)\n\nc) The theological argument for the metaphysical necessity of grace is\nbased on the essentially supernatural character of all salutary acts.\n\n\u03b1) St. Thomas formulates it as follows: \u201cEternal life is an end\ntranscending the proportion of human nature, ... and therefore man, by\nnature, can perform no meritorious works proportioned to eternal life, but\nrequires for this purpose a higher power,\u2014the power of grace.\nConsequently, man cannot merit eternal life without grace. He is, however,\nable to perform acts productive of some good connatural to man, such as\ntilling the soil, drinking, eating, acts of friendship, etc.\u201d(284) For the\nreason here indicated it is as impossible for man to perform salutary acts\nwithout grace as it would be to work miracles without that divine\nassistance which transcends the powers of nature.(285)\n\n\u03b2) Catholic theologians are unanimous in admitting that all salutary acts\nare and must needs be supernatural; but they differ in their conception of\nthis supernatural quality (_supernaturalitas_). The problem underlying\nthis difference of opinion may be stated thus: A thing may be supernatural\neither entitatively, _quoad substantiam_, or merely as to the manner of\nits existence, _quoad modum_. The _supernaturale quoad substantiam_ is\ndivided into the strictly supernatural and the merely preternatural.(286)\nThe question is: To what category of the supernatural belong the salutary\nacts which man performs by the aid of grace? Undoubtedly there are actual\ngraces which are entitatively natural, _e.g._ the purely mediate grace of\nillumination,(287) the natural graces conferred in the pure state of\nnature, the actual graces of the sensitive sphere,(288) and the so-called\n_cogitatio congrua_ of Vasquez.(289) The problem therefore narrows itself\ndown to the _immediate_ graces of intellect and will. Before the\nTridentine Council theologians contented themselves with acknowledging the\ndivinely revealed fact that these graces are supernatural; it was only\nafter the Council that they began to speculate on the precise character of\nthis _supernaturalitas_.\n\nSome, following the teaching of the Scotist school, ascribed the\nsupernatural character of salutary acts to their free acceptation on the\npart of God, holding them to be purely natural in their essence and raised\nto the supernatural sphere merely _per denominationem extrinsecam_.(290)\nThis view is untenable. For if nature, as such, possessed the intrinsic\npower to perform salutary acts, irrespective of their acceptation by God,\nthe Fathers and councils would err in teaching that this power is derived\nfrom the immediate graces of illumination and strengthening.(291)\n\nOthers hold that the salutary acts which grace enables man to perform, are\nsupernatural only _quoad modum_; because while it is the Holy Ghost\nHimself who incites the natural faculties to salutary thoughts and good\nresolves, He does not _eo ipso_ raise these thoughts and resolves to the\nsupernatural plane. This theory, besides being open to the same objection\nwhich we have urged against the first, involves another difficulty. If all\nsalutary acts were supernatural only _quoad modum_, sanctifying grace,\nwhich is as certainly supernatural in its essence as the beatific vision\nof God,(292) would cease to have an adequate purpose; for the intrinsic\nreason for its existence is precisely that it raises the nature of the\njustified into a permanent supernatural state of being.\n\nA third school of theologians tries to solve the difficulty by adding to\nthe natural operation of the intellect and the will some accidental\nsupernatural _modus_. There are several such _modi_, which, though\ninhering in nature and really distinct therefrom, depend solely on the\nHoly Ghost, and consequently transcend the natural powers of man, _e.g._\nthe duration or intensity of a salutary act. This theory at first blush\nappears more plausible than the other two, but it cannot be squared with\nthe teaching of Tradition. In the first place, the duration or intensity\nof a salutary act cannot affect its essence or nature. Then again, every\nsuch accidental supernatural _modus_ is produced either by grace alone, or\nby grace working conjointly with free-will. In the former hypothesis it\nwould be useless, because it would not render the free salutary act, as\nsuch, supernatural; in the latter case it could do no more than aid the\nwill to do what is morally impossible, whereas every salutary act is in\nmatter of fact a physical impossibility, that is, impossible to unaided\nnature.(293)\n\nThere remains a fourth explanation, which ascribes to every salutary act\nan ontological, substantial, intrinsic _supernaturalitas_, whereby it is\nelevated to a higher and essentially different plane of being and\noperation. This theory is convincingly set forth by Suarez in his treatise\non the Necessity of Grace.(294)\n\nIt may be asked: If the salutary acts which we perform are supernatural in\nsubstance, why are we not conscious of the fact? The answer is not far to\nseek. Philosophical analysis shows that the intrinsic nature of our\npsychic operations is no more a subject of immediate consciousness than\nthe substance of the soul itself. Consequently, sanctifying grace cannot\nreveal its presence through our inner consciousness. Having no intuitive\nknowledge of our own Ego, we are compelled to specify the different acts\nof the soul by means of their respective objects and their various\ntendencies (cognition, volition). To our consciousness the supernatural\nlove of God does not present itself as essentially different from the\nnatural.(295)\n\n\nArticle 3. The Necessity Of Actual Grace For The States Of Unbelief,\nMortal Sin, And Justification\n\n\nEvery adult man, viewed in his relation to actual grace, is in one of\nthree distinct states:\n\n(1) The state of unbelief (_status infidelitatis_), which may be either\nnegative, as in the case of heathens, or positive, as in the case of\napostates and formal heretics;\n\n(2) The state of mortal sin (_status peccati mortalis_), when the sinner\nhas already received, or not yet lost, the grace of faith, which is the\nbeginning of justification;\n\n(3) The state of justification itself (_status iustitiae sive gratiae\nsanctificantis_), in which much remains yet to be done to attain eternal\nhappiness.\n\nThe question we have now to consider is: Does man need actual grace in\nevery one of these three states, and if so, to what extent?\n\n1. SEMIPELAGIANISM.\u2014Semipelagianism is an attempt to effect a compromise\nbetween Pelagianism and Augustinism by attributing to mere nature a\nsomewhat greater importance in matters of salvation than St. Augustine was\nwilling to admit.\n\na) After Augustine had for more than twenty years vigorously combatted and\nfinally defeated Pelagianism, some pious monks of Marseilles, under the\nleadership of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor,(296) tried to find middle\nground between his teaching and that of the Pelagians. Cassian\u2019s treatise\n_Collationes Patrum_,(297) and the reports sent to St. Augustine by his\ndisciples Prosper and Hilary, enable us to form a pretty fair idea of the\nSemipelagian system. Its principal tenets were the following:\n\n\u03b1) There is a distinction between the \u201cbeginning of faith\u201d (_initium\nfidei_, _affectus credulitatis_) and \u201cincrease in faith\u201d (_augmentum\nfidei_). The former depends entirely on the will, while the latter, like\nfaith itself, requires the grace of Christ.\n\n\u03b2) Nature can merit grace by its own efforts, though this natural merit\n(_meritum naturae_) is founded on equity only (_meritum de congruo_), and\ndoes not confer a right in strict justice, as Pelagius contended.\n\n\u03b3) Free-will, after justification, can of its own power secure the gift of\nfinal perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_); which consequently is not a\nspecial grace, but a purely natural achievement.\n\n\u03b4) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in the case of infants, who\ncan have no previous _merita de congruo_, depends on their hypothetical\nfuture merits or demerits as foreseen by God from all eternity.(298)\n\nb) Informed of these errors by his disciples, St. Augustine energetically\nset to work, and in spite of his advanced age wrote two books against the\nSemipelagians, entitled respectively, _De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_ and\n_De Dono Perseverantiae_. The new teaching was not yet, however, regarded\nas formally heretical, and Augustine treated his opponents with great\nconsideration, in fact he humbly acknowledged that he himself had\nprofessed similar errors before his consecration (A. D. 394).(299)\n\nAfter Augustine\u2019s death, Prosper and Hilary went to Rome and interested\nPope Celestine in their cause. In a dogmatic letter addressed to the\nBishops of Gaul, the Pontiff formally approved the teaching of St.\nAugustine on grace and original sin, but left open such other \u201cmore\nprofound and difficult incidental questions\u201d as predestination and the\nmanner in which grace operates in the soul.(300) But as this papal letter\n(called \u201c_Indiculus_\u201d) was an instruction rather than an ex-cathedra\ndefinition, the controversy continued until, nearly a century later (A. D.\n529), the Second Council of Orange, convoked by St. Caesarius of Arles,\nformally condemned the Semipelagian heresy. This council, or at least its\nfirst eight canons,(301) received the solemn approbation of Pope Boniface\nII (A. D. 530) and thus became vested with ecumenical authority.(302)\n\n2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.\u2014The Catholic Church teaches the absolute\nnecessity of actual grace for all stages on the way to salvation. We shall\ndemonstrate this in five separate theses.\n\n*Thesis I: Prevenient grace is absolutely necessary, not only for faith,\nbut for the very beginning of faith.*\n\nThis is _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: \u201cIf\nany one say that increase in faith, as well as the beginning of faith, and\nthe very impulse by which we are led to believe in Him who justifies the\nsinner, and by which we obtain the regeneration of holy Baptism, is in us\nnot as a gift of grace, that is to say, through the inspiration of the\nHoly Ghost, but by nature, ... is an adversary of the dogmatic teaching of\nthe Apostles....\u201d(303)\n\na) This is thoroughly Scriptural doctrine, as St. Augustine(304) and\nProsper(305) proved. St. Paul\u2019s first epistle to the Corinthians had\nopened the eyes of Augustine, as he himself admits. 1 Cor. IV, 7: \u201cFor who\ndistinguisheth(306) thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?\nAnd if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not\nreceived it?\u201d The Apostle means to say: In matters pertaining to salvation\nno man has any advantage over his fellow men, because all receive of the\ngrace of God without any merits of their own. This statement would be\nfalse if any man were able to perform even the smallest salutary act\nwithout the aid of grace.\n\nWith a special view to faith the same Apostle teaches: \u201cFor by grace you\nare saved through faith,(307) and that not of yourselves,(308) for it is\nthe gift of God;(309) not of works,(310) that no man may glory.\u201d(311)\nThis, too, would be false if faith could be traced to a purely natural\ninstinct or to some _meritum de congruo_ in the Semipelagian sense.(312)\nOur Lord Himself, in his famous discourse on the Holy Eucharist,\nunmistakably describes faith and man\u2019s preparation for it as an effect of\nprevenient grace. \u201cNo man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent\nme, draw him.\u201d(313) The metaphorical expression \u201ccome to me,\u201d according to\nthe context, means \u201cbelieve in me;\u201d whereas the Father\u2019s \u201cdrawing\u201d plainly\nrefers to the operation of prevenient grace. Cfr. John VI, 65 sq.: \u201cBut\nthere are some of you that believe not.... Therefore did I say to you,\nthat no man can come to me, unless it be given him by the Father.\u201d John\nVI, 29: \u201cThis is the work of God,(314) that you believe in him whom he\nhath sent.\u201d According to our Saviour\u2019s own averment, therefore, preaching\nis of no avail unless grace gives the first impulse leading to faith.\n\nb) As regards the argument from Tradition, it will suffice to show that\nthe Fathers who wrote before Augustine, ascribed the beginning of faith to\nprevenient grace.\n\n\u03b1) In the light of the Augustinian dictum that \u201cprayer is the surest proof\nof grace,\u201d(315) it is safe to assume that St. Justin Martyr voiced our\ndogma when he put into the mouth of a venerable old man the words: \u201cBut\nthou pray above all that the gates of light may be opened unto thee; for\nno man is able to understand the words of the prophets [as _praeambula\nfidei_] unless God and His Christ have revealed their meaning.\u201d(316)\nAugustine himself appeals to SS. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of\nNazianzus, and then continues: \u201cSuch doctors, and so great as these,\nsaying that there is nothing of which we may boast as of our own, which\nGod has not given us; and that our very heart and our thoughts are not in\nour own power, ... attribute these things to the grace of God, acknowledge\nthem as God\u2019s gifts, testify that they come to us from Him and are not\nfrom ourselves.\u201d(317)\n\n\u03b2) Like the Pelagians in their teaching on original sin,(318) the\nSemipelagians in their teaching on grace relied mainly on the authority of\nSt. John Chrysostom, from whose writings they loved to quote such\nperplexing passages as this: \u201cWe must first select the good, and then God\nadds what is of His; He does not forestall our will because He does not\nwish to destroy our liberty. But once we have made our choice, He gives us\nmuch help. For while it rests with us to choose and to will antecedently,\nit lies with him to perfect and bring to an issue.\u201d(319)\n\nTo understand St. Chrysostom\u2019s attitude, and that of the Oriental Fathers\ngenerally, we must remember that the Eastern Church considered it one of\nits chief duties to safeguard the dogma of free-will against the\nManichaeans, who regarded man as an abject slave of Fate. In such an\nenvironment it was of supreme importance to champion the freedom of the\nwill(320) and to insist on the maxim: \u201cHelp yourself and God will help\nyou.\u201d If the necessity of prevenient grace was not sufficiently\nemphasized, the circumstances of the time explain, and to some extent\nexcuse, the mistake. St. Augustine himself remarks in his treatise on the\nPredestination of the Saints: \u201cWhat need is there for us to look into the\nwritings of those who, before this heresy sprang up, had no necessity of\ndwelling on a question so difficult of solution as this, which beyond a\ndoubt they would do if they were compelled to answer such [errors as\nthese]? Whence it came about that they touched upon what they thought of\nGod\u2019s grace briefly and cursorily in some passages of their\nwritings.\u201d(321) Palmieri remarks(322) that it would be easy to cite a\nnumber of similar passages from the writings of the early Latin Fathers\nbefore Pelagius, who certainly cannot be suspected of Semipelagian\nleanings.(323)\n\nThe orthodoxy of St. Chrysostom can be positively established by a twofold\nargument. (1) Pope Celestine the First recommended him as a reliable\ndefender of the Catholic faith against Nestorianism and Pelagianism.(324)\n(2) Chrysostom rejected Semipelagianism as it were in advance when he\ntaught: \u201cNot even faith is of ourselves; for if He [God] had not come, if\nHe had not called, how should we have been able to believe?\u201d(325) and\nagain when he says in his explanation of the Pauline phrase \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2:(326) \u201cHe Himself hath implanted the faith in us, He Himself hath\ngiven the beginning.\u201d(327) These utterances are diametrically opposed to\nthe heretical teaching of the Semipelagians.(328)\n\nc) The theological argument for our thesis is effectively formulated by\nOswald(329) as follows: \u201cIt is faith which first leads man from the sphere\nof nature into a higher domain,\u2014faith is the beginning of salutary action.\nThat this beginning must come wholly from God, and that it cannot come\nfrom man, goes without saying. By beginning we mean the very first\nbeginning. Whether we call this first beginning itself faith, or speak, as\nthe Semipelagians did, of certain preambles of faith,\u2014aspirations,\nimpulses, desires leading to faith (_praeambula fidei: conatus, desideria,\ncredulitatis affectus_), makes no difference. Wherever the supernatural\ndomain of salutary action begins\u2014and it is divided off from the natural by\na very sharp line\u2014there it is God who begins and not man, there it is\ngrace which precedes,\u2014_gratia praeveniens_, as it has come to be known by\na famous term.\u201d\n\nIndeed, if man were able by his own power to merit for himself the first\nbeginnings of grace, then faith itself, and justification which is based\non faith, and the beatific vision, would not be strictly graces.\n\nAs for the precise moment when prevenient grace begins its work in the\nsoul, the common opinion is that the very first judgment which a man forms\nas to the credibility of divine revelation (_iudicium credibilitatis_) is\ndetermined by the immediate grace of the intellect,(330) and that the\nsubsequent _affectus credulitatis_ springs from the strengthening grace of\nthe will. St. Augustine, commenting on 2 Cor. III, 5, demonstrates this as\nfollows:\n\n\u201cLet them give attention to this, and well weigh these words, who think\nthat the beginning of faith is of ourselves, and the increase of faith is\nof God. For who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one\nbelieves anything unless he has first thought that it is to be\nbelieved.... Therefore, in what pertains to religion and piety [of which\nthe Apostle was speaking], if we are not capable of thinking anything as\nof ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are certainly not capable\nof believing anything as of ourselves, since we cannot do this without\nthinking, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is of\nGod.\u201d(331)\n\n*Thesis II: The sinner, even after he has received the faith, stands in\nabsolute need of prevenient and co-operating grace for every single\nsalutary act required in the process of justification.*\n\nThis proposition also embodies an article of faith.\n\nProof. The Semipelagians ascribed the dispositions necessary for\njustification to the natural efforts of the will, thereby denying the\nnecessity of prevenient grace. This teaching was condemned as heretical by\nthe Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529),(332) and again by the Council of\nTrent, which defined: \u201cIf any one saith that without the prevenient\ninspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe,\nhope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the grace of justification\nmay be bestowed upon him; let him be anathema.\u201d(333)\n\na) The Scriptural texts which we have quoted against Pelagianism(334) also\napply to the Semipelagian heresy.\n\nOur Lord\u2019s dictum: \u201cWithout me you can do nothing,\u201d(335) proves the\nnecessity of prevenient and co-operating grace, not only at the beginning\nof every salutary act, but also for its continuation and completion. St.\nAugustine clearly perceived this. \u201cThat he might furnish a reply to the\nfuture Pelagius,\u201d he observes, \u201cour Lord does not say: Without me you can\nwith difficulty do anything; but He says: Without me you can do\n_nothing_.... He does not say: Without me you can _perfect_ nothing, but\n_do_ nothing. For if He had said _perfect_, they might say that God\u2019s aid\nis necessary, not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for\nperfecting it.... For when the Lord says, Without me you can do nothing,\nin this one word He comprehends both the beginning and the end.\u201d(336)\n\nSt. Paul expressly ascribes the salvation of man to grace when he says:\n\u201c... with fear and trembling work out your salvation; for it is God who\nworketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.\u201d(337)\n\nThe Tridentine Council, as we have seen, designates the four salutary acts\nof faith, hope, love, and penitence as a preparation for justification.\nNow St. Paul teaches: \u201cThe God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in\nbelieving, that you may abound in hope and in the power of the Holy\nGhost;\u201d(338) and St. John: \u201cCharity is of God.\u201d(339)\n\nb) The argument from Tradition is chiefly based on St. Augustine, who in\nhis two treatises against the Semipelagians, and likewise in his earlier\nwritings, inculcates the necessity of grace for all stages on the way to\nsalvation.\n\nThus he writes in his _Enchiridion_: \u201cSurely, if no Christian will dare to\nsay this: It is not of God that showeth mercy, but of man that willeth,\nlest he should openly contradict the Apostle, it follows that the true\ninterpretation of the saying (Rom. IX, 16): \u2018It is not of him that\nwilleth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,\u2019 is that\nthe whole work belongs to God, who both prepares the good will that is to\nbe helped, and assists it when it is prepared. For the good will of man\nprecedes many of God\u2019s gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included\namong those which it does not precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both\n\u2018God\u2019s mercy shall prevent me\u2019 (Ps. LVIII, 11), and \u2018Thy mercy will follow\nme\u2019 (Ps. XXII, 6). It precedes the unwilling to make him willing; it\nfollows the willing to render his will effectual. Why are we taught to\npray for our enemies, who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life,\nunless it be that God may work willingness in them? And why are we\nadmonished to ask that we may receive, unless it be that He who has\ncreated in us the wish, may Himself satisfy the same? We pray, then, for\nour enemies, that the mercy of God may precede them, as it has preceded\nus; we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may follow us.\u201d(340)\n\nThat grace accompanies us uninterruptedly on the way to Heaven is also the\nteaching of St. Jerome: \u201cTo will and to run is my own act; but without the\nconstant aid of God, even my own act will not be mine; for the Apostle\nsays (Phil. II, 13): \u2018It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to\naccomplish.\u2019... It is not sufficient for me that He gave it once, unless\nHe gives it always.\u201d(341)\n\nSt. Ephraem Syrus prays in the name of the Oriental Church: \u201cI possess\nnothing, and if I possess anything, Thou [O God] hast given it to me.... I\nask only for grace and acknowledge that I shall be saved through\nThee.\u201d(342)\n\nThe Second Council of Orange summarizes the teaching of Tradition on the\nsubject under consideration.(343)\n\nc) The theological argument for our thesis is based on the character of\nthe adoptive sonship resulting from the process of justification.(344)\nThis sonship (_filiatio adoptiva_) is essentially supernatural, and hence\ncan be attained only by strictly supernatural acts, which unaided nature\nis both morally and physically incapable of performing.(345)\n\n*Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace man is not able to\nperform salutary acts, unless aided by actual graces.*\n\nThis is likewise _de fide_.\n\nProof. The faculties of the just man are permanently kept in the\nsupernatural sphere by sanctifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope,\nand charity. Hence the just man in the performance of salutary acts does\nnot require the same measure of prevenient grace as the unregenerate\nsinner, who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits mentioned.\n\nThe question here at issue, therefore, can only be: Is actual grace (as\n_gratia excitans s. vocans_, not _elevans_) absolutely necessary to enable\na man in the state of sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The\nanswer is\u2014Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred Scripture\nand Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned by the Church, that we do\nnot hesitate to follow Perrone in qualifying it as _de fide_.(346) The\ncouncils in their teaching on the necessity of grace, assert that\nnecessity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of Trent\nexpressly declares: \u201cWhereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His\nvirtue into the justified,\u2014as the head into the members, and the vine into\nthe branches,\u2014and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows\ntheir good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and\nmeritorious before God, we must believe that nothing further is wanting to\nthe justified....\u201d(347)\n\na) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. We have already\nshown that the Bible and Tradition make no distinction between the\ndifferent stages on the way to salvation, or between different salutary\nacts, but indiscriminately postulate for all the illuminating grace of the\nintellect and the strengthening grace of the will. It follows that to\nperform salutary acts the justified no less than the unjustified need\nactual grace. Our Saviour\u2019s pithy saying: \u201cWithout me you can do\nnothing,\u201d(348) was not addressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His\nApostles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.(349)\n\nThis interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. St. Augustine, after\nlaying it down as a general principle that \u201cWe can of ourselves do nothing\nto effect good works of piety without God either working that we may will,\nor co-operating when we will,\u201d(350) says of justified man in particular:\n\u201cThe Heavenly Physician cures our maladies, not only that they may cease\nto exist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able to walk\naright,\u2014a task to which we should be unequal, even after our healing, were\nit not for His continued help.... For just as the eye of the body, even\nwhen completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by the brightness of\nlight, so also man, even when fully justified, is unable to lead a holy\nlife, unless he be divinely assisted by the eternal light of\nrighteousness.\u201d(351)\n\nThis agrees with the practice of the Church in exhorting all men without\nexception, saints as well as sinners, to pray: \u201cPrecede, we beseech Thee,\nO Lord, our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on by Thy\ngracious assistance, that every prayer and work of ours may begin always\nfrom Thee, and through Thee be happily ended.\u201d(352)\n\nb) Some theologians have been led by certain speculative difficulties to\ndeny the necessity of actual grace in the state of justification.\n\nMan in the state of justification, they argue, is endowed with sanctifying\ngrace, the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and the\ninfused moral virtues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications\nwhich are necessary to enable him to perform salutary acts with the\nsupernatural concurrence of God. Why should the will, thus supernaturally\nequipped, require the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to\nperform strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, actions?(353)\n\nWe reply: The necessity of actual grace in the state of justification is\nso clearly taught by divine Revelation that no theological theory is\ntenable which denies it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized\ndisregards some very essential considerations, _e.g._ that there remains\nin man, even after justification, concupiscence, which is accompanied by a\ncertain weakness that requires at least the _gratia sanans sive\nmedicinalis_ to heal it.(354) Furthermore, a quiescent _habitus_ cannot\nset itself in motion, but must be determined from without; that is to say,\nin our case, it must be moved by the _gratia excitans_ to elicit\nsupernatural thoughts and to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot\nsprout without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying grace is\nincapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by the sunshine and moisture\nof actual graces. Man may perform purely natural acts even though he be in\nthe supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act of his is to\nbe truly supernatural and conducive to eternal salvation, God must lend\nHis special aid.(355)\n\n*Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine grace, man, even\nthough he be in the state of sanctifying grace, is unable to avoid venial\nsin throughout life.*\n\nThis is likewise _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Pelagians held that man is able to avoid sin, nay to attain to\nabsolute impeccability,(356) without supernatural assistance. Against this\nerror the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 416) defined: \u201cIt likewise hath\npleased [the holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words of the Our\nFather: \u2018Forgive us our trespasses,\u2019 when pronounced by saintly men, are\npronounced in token of humility, but not truthfully, should be\nanathema.\u201d(357) Still more to the point is the following declaration of\nthe Council of Trent: \u201cIf any one saith that a man once justified ... is\nable, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are\nvenial, except by a special grace from God, as the Church holds in regard\nof the Blessed Virgin; let him be anathema.\u201d(358)\n\nTo obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine definition it will be\nwell to ponder the following considerations:\n\nThe Council declares that it is impossible for man, even in the state of\nsanctifying grace, to avoid all sins during his whole life, except by\nvirtue of a special privilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin\nMary.(359) A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance of the\nprecept involved, or in consequence of incomplete consent, does not\ndestroy the state of grace. Such a sin may be either deliberate or\nsemi-deliberate. A semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste or\nsurprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the Tridentine Council had\nin view. For no one would seriously assert that with the aid of divine\ngrace a saint could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a\nconsiderable length of time. The phrase \u201c_in tota vita_\u201d indicates a\nperiod of some length, though its limits are rather difficult to\ndetermine. Were a man to die immediately after justification, the\nTridentine canon would _per accidens_ not apply to him. As the Council\nsays in another place that \u201cmen, how holy and just soever, at times fall\ninto at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,\u201d(360) it\nis safe practically to limit the period of possible freedom from venial\nsin to one day. Theoretically, of course, it may be extended much farther.\nThe phrase \u201c_omnia peccata_\u201d must be interpreted collectively, not\ndistributively, for a sin that could not be avoided would cease to be a\nsin. For the same reason the term \u201c_non posse_\u201d must be understood of\n(moral, not physical) disability; in other words, the difficulty of\navoiding sin with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable length\nof time, is insuperable even for the just. This moral impossibility of\navoiding sin can be removed only by a special privilege, such as that\nenjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked whether\nthis privilege was also granted to other saints, notably St. Joseph and\nSt. John the Baptist. Suarez lays it down as a theological conclusion that\nno human being has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid venial\nsin except by a special privilege, which must in each case be proved.\nPalmieri maintains that the moral impossibility of leading an absolutely\nsinless life without the special assistance of grace is taught by\nindirection in the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which\ndeclare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man without that\nassistance.(361)\n\na) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was fully developed by the\ncouncils just mentioned. The careful student will note, however, that\nthose texts only are strictly conclusive which positively and exclusively\nrefer to venial sins. Thus when St. James says: \u201cIn many things we all\noffend,\u201d(362) he cannot mean that all Christians now and then necessarily\ncommit mortal sin. For St. John expressly declares that \u201cWhosoever abideth\nin him [Christ], sinneth not.\u201d(363)\n\nIt follows that not even the just can wholly avoid venial sin. Hence the\nmost devout and pious Christian may truthfully repeat the petition of the\nLord\u2019s Prayer which says: \u201cForgive us our trespasses,(364) as we forgive\nthose who trespass against us.\u201d(365) Profoundly conscious of the\nsinfulness of the entire human race, the author of the Book of Proverbs\nexclaims: \u201cWho can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?\u201d(366)\n\nOther Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation of our thesis lack\ncogency, because they either deal exclusively with mortal sin or do not\nrefer to sin at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: \u201cA just man shall fall seven\ntimes and shall rise again,\u201d is meant of temporal adversities.(367)\nEccles. VII, 21: \u201cThere is no just man upon earth, that doth good and\nsinneth not,\u201d(368) can scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the\nsacred writer continues: \u201cFor thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast\noften spoken evil of others.\u201d(369) 1 John I, 8: \u201cIf we say that we have no\nsin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us,\u201d(370) would be a\nsplendid argument for our thesis, could it be shown that the Apostle had\nin mind only the venial sins committed in the state of justification. This\nis, however, unlikely, as the term _peccatum_ throughout St. John\u2019s first\nEpistle(371) is obviously employed in the sense of mortal sin.(372)\n\nb) Tradition is again most effectively voiced by St. Augustine, who\nwrites: \u201cThere are three points, as you know, which the Catholic Church\nchiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. One is, that the grace of\nGod is not given according to our merits.... The second, that no one lives\nin this corruptible body in righteousness of any degree without sins of\nany kind. The third, that man is born obnoxious to the first man\u2019s\nsin....\u201d(373) To Pelagius\u2019 objection: \u201cIf all men sin, then the just must\ndie in their sins,\u201d the holy Doctor replies: \u201cWith all his acuteness he\n[Pelagius] overlooks the circumstance that even righteous persons pray\nwith good reason: \u2018Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.\u2019...\nEven if we cannot live without sin, we may yet die without sin, whilst the\nsin committed in ignorance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful\nforgiveness.\u201d(374) In another chapter of the same treatise he says: \u201cIf\n... we could assemble all the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and ask\nthem whether they lived without sin, ... would they not all exclaim with\none voice: \u2018If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth\nis not in us\u2019?\u201d(375)\n\nc) We come to the theological argument. The moral impossibility of\navoiding venial sin for any considerable length of time results partly\nfrom the infirmity of human nature (_infirmitas naturae_), partly from\nGod\u2019s pre-established plan of salvation (_ordo divinae providentiae_).\n\n\u03b1) The infirmity of human nature flows from four separate and distinct\nsources: (1) concupiscence (_fomes peccati_); (2) imperfection of the\nethical judgment (_imperfectio iudicii_); (3) inconstancy of the will\n(_inconstantia voluntatis_); and (4) the weariness caused by continued\nresistance to temptation. In view of these agencies and their combined\nattack upon the will, theologians speak of a _necessitas antecedens\npeccandi_;\u2014not as if the will were predestined to succumb to any one\ntemptation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally unable to\nresist the whole series (_suppositione disiunct\u00e2_). The will simply grows\nweaker and weaker, and in course of time fails to resist sin with\nsufficient energy.\n\nLet us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are scrutinized by several\ntrained readers, yet in spite of the greatest care and many ingenious\ndevices for the elimination of error, a perfect book, _i.e._ one entirely\nfree from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How much harder must it\nbe for man to avoid moral lapses throughout his whole life, considering\nthat he cannot choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must keep\nhis mind and will under constant control and be prepared to resist the\nenemy at any moment.(376)\n\nSt. Thomas Aquinas says: \u201cMan cannot avoid all venial sin, because his\nsensual appetite is depraved. True, reason is able to suppress the\nindividual stirrings of this appetite. In fact, it is on this account that\nthey are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But reason is not\nable to suppress them all [collectively], because, while it tries to\nresist one, there perhaps arises another, and, furthermore, reason is not\nalways in a condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid such\nimpulses.\u201d(377)\n\nIt follows that the _necessitas peccandi antecedens_ does not destroy the\nliberty of the will or the moral imputability of those venial sins which a\nman actually commits; for it is merely a _necessitas indeterminata_, which\nrefers not to certain particular instances, but to the one or other\nindeterminately. It follows further that God does not command the\nimpossible when He insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does\nnot in each single case command something which is physically or morally\nimpossible,(378) but merely demands a perfection which in itself is not\nentirely unattainable _hic et nunc_ with the assistance of ordinary\ngrace.(379)\n\n\u03b2) The second theological reason for the impossibility of avoiding venial\nsin for any considerable time is based on the eternal scheme of salvation\ndecreed by Divine Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of\ncourse, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial sins. It is\nmerely a wise toleration of sin and a just refusal, on the part of the\nAlmighty, to restore the human race to that entirely unmerited state of\nfreedom from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Paradise, and\nwhich alone could guarantee the moral possibility of unspotted innocence.\nBoth factors in their last analysis are based upon the will of God to\nexercise those whom He has justified in humility and to safeguard us\nagainst pride, which is the deadliest enemy of our salvation.(380) In\nmaking this wise decree God, of course, infallibly foresaw that no man\n(with the sole exception of those to whom He might grant a special\nprivilege) would _de facto_ be able to pass through life without\ncommitting venial sins. This infallible foreknowledge is based not alone\non the _scientia media_, but also on the infirmity of human nature.\n\nHence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the singular opinion of\nde Vega,(381) that the Tridentine definition does not exclude the\npossibility of exceptions.(382)\n\nNevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against both indifference and\ndespondency. \u201cLet no one say that he is without sin, but let us not for\nthis reason love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are not\nwithout sins, let us hate them; especially let us avoid grievous sins, and\nvenial sins, too, as much as we can.\u201d(383)\n\n*Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness without special help from\nGod.*\n\nThis proposition is also _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Semipelagians asserted that man is able by his own power to\npersevere in righteousness to the end.(384) Against this teaching the\nSecond Council of Orange defined: \u201cEven those who are reborn and holy must\nimplore the help of God, in order that they may be enabled to attain the\ngood end, or to persevere in the good work.\u201d(385) This definition was\nrepeated in substance by the Council of Trent: \u201cIf any one saith that the\njustified either is able without the special help of God to persevere in\nthe justice received, or that, with that help, he is not able; let him be\nanathema.\u201d(386)\n\nPerfect perseverance is the preservation of baptismal innocence, or, in a\nless strict sense, of the state of grace, until death. Imperfect\nperseverance is a temporary continuance in grace, _e.g._ for a month or a\nyear, until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, according to the\nTridentine Council, requires no special divine assistance (_speciale\nauxilium_).(387)\n\nFinal perseverance is either passive or active, according as the justified\ndies in the state of grace irrespective of his will (as baptized children\nand insane adults),(388) or actively co\u00f6perates with grace whenever the\nstate of grace is imperilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent\nhas especially this latter case in view when it speaks of the necessity of\na _speciale auxilium_, because the special help extended by God\npresupposes co\u00f6peration with grace, and man cannot strictly speaking\nco\u00f6perate in a happy death. The Council purposely speaks of an _auxilium_,\nnot a _privilegium_, because a privilege is by its very nature granted to\nbut few, while the special help of grace extends to all the elect. This\n_auxilium_ is designated as _speciale_, because final perseverance is not\nconferred with sanctifying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of\nperseverance (_posse perseverare_). The state of sanctifying grace simply\nconfers a claim to ordinary graces, while the power of perseverance of\nitself by no means insures actual perseverance (_actu perseverare_). The\npower of perseverance is assured by those merely sufficient graces which\nare constantly at the command of the righteous. Actual perseverance, on\nthe other hand, implies a series of efficacious graces. God is under no\nobligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any man; consequently,\nfinal perseverance is a special grace, or, more correctly, a continuous\nseries of efficacious graces. The Council of Trent is therefore justified\nin speaking of it as \u201ca great gift.\u201d(389)\n\na) Sacred Scripture represents final perseverance as the fruit of prayer\nand as a special gift not included in the bare notion of justification.\n\n\u03b1) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer for His disciples, John\nXVII, 11: \u201cHoly Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me,\nthat they may be one, as we also are.\u201d(390) St. Paul teaches in his\nEpistle to the Colossians: \u201cEpaphras saluteth you ... who is always\nsolicitous for you in prayers, that you may stand perfect and full in all\nthe will of God.\u201d(391) Hence the necessity of constantly watching and\npraying: \u201cWatch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation.\u201d(392)\n\n\u03b2) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion of justification\nappears from such passages as these: Phil. I, 6: \u201cBeing confident of this\nvery thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it\nunto the day of Christ Jesus.\u201d(393) 1 Pet. I, 5: \u201cWho, by the power of\nGod, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last\ntime.\u201d(394)\n\nb) The threads of Tradition run together in the hands of St. Augustine,\nwho has written a special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.(395)\n\nHis main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. \u201cWhy,\u201d he asks, \u201cis\nthat perseverance asked for from God, if it is not given by God? Is it a\nmocking petition inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known He\ndoes not give, but, although He gives it not, is in man\u2019s power?... Or is\nnot that perseverance, perchance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is\nnot to be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed with the\nprayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among them who do not ask for\nthemselves from God that they may persevere in Him, when in that very\nprayer which is called the Lord\u2019s\u2014because the Lord taught it\u2014whenever it\nis prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is understood to be prayed\nfor but perseverance?\u201d(396) He then proceeds to show, in accordance with\nSt. Cyprian\u2019s little treatise On the Lord\u2019s Prayer, that the seven\npetitions of the \u201cOur Father\u201d are all prayers for perseverance, and\nconcludes as follows: \u201cTruly in this matter let not the Church look for\nlaborious disputations, but consider her own daily prayers. She prays that\nthe unbelieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. She\nprays that believers may persevere; therefore God gives perseverance to\nthe end.\u201d(397) And again: \u201cFor who is there that would groan with a\nsincere desire to receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought\nthat he received it from himself and not from the Lord?\u201d(398)\n\nc) From this teaching flows a corollary of great practical importance, to\nwit: The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited by good works, but\nit can be obtained by pious and unremitting prayer.\n\n\u201cThis gift of God,\u201d says St. Augustine, speaking of final perseverance,\n\u201cmay be obtained suppliantly [by prayer], but when it has been given, it\ncannot be lost contumaciously.\u201d(399) And again: \u201cSince it is manifest that\nGod has prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray for\nthem, such as the beginning of faith, and other things not to be given\nexcept to those who pray for them, such as perseverance unto the end,\ncertainly he who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not\npray to obtain it.\u201d(400)\n\nBetween merit (_meritum_) and prayer (_oratio, preces_) there is this\ngreat difference, that merit appeals to God\u2019s justice, prayer to His\nmercy. If man were able to merit final perseverance by good works\n(_meritum de condigno_), God would be in justice bound to give him this\nprecious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the Catholic\nconception of final perseverance.\n\nIt may be asked: Is God determined by the _meritum de congruo_ inherent in\nall good works to grant the gift of final perseverance as a reward to the\nrighteous? Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda(401) thinks\nthat this is the case at least with the more conspicuous good works\nperformed in the state of grace. Suarez modifies this improbable\ncontention somewhat by saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee\nfinal perseverance.(402) Our prayers are infallibly heard if we address\nthe Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ has promised: \u201cIf you ask\nthe Father anything in my name, he will give it you.\u201d(403) To insure its\nbeing infallibly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the state\nof grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not make sanctifying grace a\nnecessary condition of efficacious prayer. But, as Suarez points out,\nprayer cannot be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who is\nin the state of grace, because the moral conditions that render it\nefficacious are found only in that state.(404) As to the second point, if\nwe say that prayer for perseverance must be unremitting, we mean, in the\nwords of the same eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout\nlife and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, especially when\nthere is a duty to be fulfilled or a temptation to be overcome.(405)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. I-II.\u2014*Tricassin, O. Cap., _De\n    Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia_.\u2014Byonius, _De Gratiae Auxiliis_, in\n    Becanus, _Theologia Scholastica_, Rouen, 1658.\u2014Scheeben _Natur und\n    Gnade_, Mainz 1861.\u2014IDEM, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, \u00a7 292-298,\n    Freiburg 1882.\u2014*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 19-29,\n    Gulpen 1885.\u2014Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, \u00a7 9-11, 3rd ed.,\n    Paderborn 1885.\u2014Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp.\n    8-51, Paris 1896.\u2014*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_,\n    Vol. VIII, \u00a7 396-416, Mainz 1897.\u2014Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones\n    Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg\n    1908.\u2014Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 2, Freiburg 1901.\n\n    On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr. *J. Ernst, _Werke und\n    Tugenden der Ungl\u00e4ubigen nach Augustinus_, Freiburg 1871.\u2014F.\n    W\u00f6rter, _Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seiner\n    Taufe_, Paderborn 1898.\u2014Wolfsgruber, _Augustinus_, Paderborn\n    1898.\u2014Boucat, _Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico-Positiva_,\n    disp. 3, Paris 1718.\u2014*Zaccaria, _Dissert. de Adiutorio sine quo\n    non_, in the _Thesaurus Theol._, Vol. V, Venice 1762.\u2014O.\n    Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Geistesfr\u00fcchte aus der Klosterzelle_,\n    M\u00fcnchen 1908.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of\n    Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq.\n\n    On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. W\u00f6rter, _Der Pelagianismus\n    nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre_, Freiburg 1874.\u2014F. Klasen,\n    _Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus_, Freiburg\n    1882.\u2014Schwane, _Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., \u00a7 60 sqq.,\n    Freiburg 1895.\u2014H. Zimmer, _Pelagius in Irland_, Berlin\n    1901.\u2014Warfield, _Two Studies in the History of Doctrine_, New York\n    1897.\u2014Tixeront, _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris\n    1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).\u2014Pohle in the _Catholic\n    Encyclopedia_, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual\n    of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 357 sqq.\n\n    On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, Prolegom., V, 5\n    sqq.\u2014Livinus Meyer, _De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus._\u2014Wiggers,\n    _Geschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Hamburg 1835.\u2014A. Hoch, _Lehre\n    des Johannes Cassianus von Natur und Gnade_, Freiburg 1895.\u2014*A.\n    Koch, _Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez_, Stuttgart 1895.\u2014Fr.\n    W\u00f6rter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_, M\u00fcnster\n    1900.\u2014Sublet, _Le Semip\u00e9lagianisme_, Namur 1897.\u2014Tixeront,\n    _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr.,\n    St. Louis 1914).\u2014Pohle in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XIII,\n    pp. 703-706.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of\n    Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 379 sqq.\n\n    On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris\n    1645.\u2014Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, Vol. III: \u201cContra Baium et\n    Baianos,\u201d Cologne 1648.\u2014Duchesne, _Histoire du Baianisme_, Douai\n    1731.\u2014*Linsenmann, _Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des\n    Jansenismus_, T\u00fcbingen 1867.\u2014A. Schill, _Die Konstitution\n    Unigenitus, ihre Veranlassung und ihre Folgen_, Freiburg\n    1876.\u2014Ingold, _Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du Jans\u00e9nisme_,\n    Paris 1901.\u2014P. Minges, O. F. M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus\n    auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus\n    gepr\u00fcft_, M\u00fcnster 1906.\u2014Lafiteau, _Histoire de la Constitution\n    Unigenitus_, 2 vols., Li\u00e8ge 1738.\u2014Van den Peereboom, _Cornelius\n    Jansenius, Septi\u00e8me \u00c9v\u00eaque d\u2019Ypres_, Bruges 1882.\u2014J. Forget in the\n    _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-294.\u2014B. J. Otten, S.\n    J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, pp. 507 sqq.\n\n\n\nSection 2. The Gratuity Of Actual Grace\n\n\nAll grace _ex vi termini_ is a free gift.(406) This applies particularly\nto Christian grace, which is so absolutely gratuitous that its gratuity,\ntogether with its necessity, may be called the groundwork of the Catholic\nreligion.\n\n1. STATE OF THE QUESTION.\u2014To show what is meant by \u201cgratuity\u201d\n(_gratuitas_) we must first explain the technical term \u201cmerit.\u201d\n\na) \u201cMerit\u201d (_meritum_=that which is earned) is that property of a good\nwork which entitles the performer to receive a reward from him to whose\nadvantage the work redounds.\n\n\u03b1) An analysis of this definition shows that (1) merit is found only in\nsuch works as are positively good; (2) merit and reward are correlative\nterms which postulate each other; (3) merit supposes two distinct persons,\none who deserves and another who awards; (4) the relation between merit\nand reward is based on justice, not on benevolence or mercy. The\nlast-mentioned determination is by far the most important of the\nfour.(407)\n\n\u03b2) Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign\nmerit,(408) which is merit in the strict sense (_meritum adaequatum sive\nde condigno_), and (2) congruous merit (_meritum inadaequatum sive de\ncongruo_), so called because of the congruity, or fitness, that the claim\nshould be recognized. Condign merit presupposes some proportion between\nthe work done and the reward given in compensation for it (_aequalitas s.\ncondignitas dati et accepti_). It is measured by commutative justice and\nthus confers a real claim to a reward. For example, a conscientious\nworkman has a strict claim to his wage. Owing to the lack of intrinsic\nproportion between service and reward, congruous merit can claim a\nremuneration only on grounds of fairness.\n\nA distinction between these two kinds of merit was already made by the\nFathers, though not in the terms of present-day theology. It was known to\nthe older Scholastics and emphasized anew by Luther\u2019s famous adversary\nJohann Eck.(409)\n\nNo relation of strict justice is conceivable between the Creator and His\ncreatures. On the part of God there can only be question of a gratuitous\npromise to reward certain good works,\u2014which promise He is bound to keep\nbecause He is veracious and faithful.(410)\n\nb) Two other terms must also be clearly defined in order to arrive at a\ntrue conception of the gratuity of Christian grace. They are prayer for\ngrace,(411) and a capacity or disposition to receive it.(412) To pray\nmeans to incite God\u2019s liberality or mercy by humble supplication.\n\n\u03b1) Despite the contrary teaching of Vasquez(413) and a few other\ntheologians, congruous merit and prayer are really distinct because one\ncan exist without the other. As the angels in Heaven are able to pray for\nus without earning a _meritum de congruo_, so conversely, all salutary\nworks are meritorious even without prayer. Moreover, humble supplication\ndoes not involve any positive service entitled to a reward.\n\nThere is another important and obvious distinction, _viz._: between purely\nnatural prayer (_preces naturae_) and supernatural prayer inspired by\ngrace (_oratio supernaturalis_).\n\n\u03b2) Capacity or disposition, especially when it takes the form of\npreparation, may be either positive or negative. Positive capacity is\ndefined as \u201cthat real mode by which a subject, in itself indifferent,\nbecomes apt to receive a new form.\u201d Such a capacity or disposition always\nentails a claim to its respective form.\n\nPositive capacity or disposition differs from both prayer or quasi-merit\n(_meritum de congruo_). Quasi-merit is entitled to a reward on the ground\nof fairness, whereas the _capacitas s. dispositio positiva_ is at most the\nfulfilment of an expectation based upon purely teleological\nconsiderations. Again, a reward can be bestowed upon some subject other\nthan the one by whom the service was rendered, whereas the introduction of\na new form necessarily supposes a subject disposed for or prepared to\nreceive it. Thus only he who is hungry is disposed for the reception of\nfood and entitled to have his craving satisfied.\n\nNegative capacity consists in the absence or removal of obstacles that\nimpede the reception of a new form, as when green wood is dried to become\nfit for burning.\n\nc) There arises the important question whether or not divine grace is an\nobject of merit, and if so, to what extent it can be merited by prayer and\npreparation.\n\nIt is of faith that the just man, by the performance of supernaturally\ngood deeds, can merit _de condigno_ an increase in the state of grace and\neternal glory, and that the sinner is able to earn justification _de\ncongruo_. On the other hand, it is also an article of faith that divine\ngrace is strictly gratuitous.(414) The two dogmas seem incompatible, but\nthey are not, as will become evident if we consider that the good works of\nthe just and the salutary works of the sinner are entirely rooted in\ndivine grace and consequently the merits which they contain are strictly\nmerits of grace in no wise due to nature.(415) When we speak of the\nabsolute gratuity of grace, therefore, we mean the very first or initial\ngrace (_gratia prima vocans_), by which the work of salvation is begun. Of\nthis initial grace the Church explicitly teaches that it is absolutely\nincapable of being merited; whence it follows that all subsequent graces,\nup to and including justification, are also gratuitous,(416) _i.e._\nunmerited by nature in strict justice, in so far as they are based on the\n_gratia prima_.\n\n2. THE GRATUITY OF GRACE PROVED FROM REVELATION.\u2014Keeping the above\nexplanation well in mind we now proceed to demonstrate the gratuity of\ndivine grace in five systematic theses.\n\n*Thesis I: Mere nature cannot, in strict justice (de condigno), merit\ninitial grace (gratia prima), nor, consequently, any of the series of\nsubsequent graces in the order of justification.*\n\nThis proposition embodies an article of faith.\n\nProof. It was one of the fundamental errors of Pelagius that grace can be\nmerited by purely natural acts.(417) When, at the instance of the bishops\nassembled at Diospolis (A. D. 415), he retracted his proposition that \u201cthe\ngrace of God is given according to our merits,\u201d(418) he employed the term\n_gratia Dei_ dishonestly for the grace of creation. The Second Council of\nOrange (A. D. 529) formally defined that grace cannot be merited, but is\npurely and strictly gratuitous.(419) And the Council of Trent declared:\n\u201cIn adults the beginning of justification is to be derived from the\nprevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His\nvocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are\ncalled....\u201d(420) The non-existence of merits prior to the bestowal of the\n_prima gratia vocans,_ so positively asserted in this definition, plainly\nexcludes any and all natural merit _de condigno._\n\na) St. Paul demonstrates in his Epistle to the Romans that justification\ndoes not result from obedience to the law, but is a grace freely bestowed\nby God.\n\nThe Apostle regards the merciful dispensations of Providence in favor of\nthe Chosen People, and of the entire sinful race of men in general, as so\nmany sheer graces. Rom. IX, 16: \u201cSo then it is not of him that willeth,\nnor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.\u201d(421) The gratuity\nof grace is asserted in terms that almost sound extravagant two verses\nfurther down in the same Epistle: \u201cTherefore he hath mercy on whom he\nwill; and whom he will, he hardeneth.\u201d(422) The same truth is emphasized\nin Rom. XI, 6: \u201cAnd if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace\nis no more grace.\u201d(423) Lest any one should pride himself on having\nobtained faith, which is the root of justification, by his own merits, St.\nPaul declares in his Epistle to the Ephesians: \u201cFor by grace you are saved\nthrough faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not\nof works, that no man may glory. For we are his workmanship, created in\nChrist Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in\nthem.\u201d(424) These and many similar passages(425) make it plain that grace\ncannot be merited without supernatural aid.\n\nb) The leading champion of the dogma of the gratuity of grace among the\nFathers is St. Augustine, who never tires of repeating that \u201cGrace does\nnot find merits, but causes them,\u201d(426) and substantiates this fundamental\nprinciple thus: \u201cGrace has preceded thy merit; not grace by merit, but\nmerit by grace. For if grace is by merit, thou hast bought, not received\ngratis.\u201d(427)\n\nc) The theological argument is based (1) on the disproportion between\nnature and grace and (2) on the absolute necessity of grace for the\nperformance of salutary works.\n\nThere is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, and it\nwould be a contradiction to say that mere nature can span the chasm\nseparating the two orders. To assume the existence of a strict _meritum\nnaturae_ for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as the supernatural\ncharacter of grace. To deny these would be to deny grace itself and with\nit the whole supernatural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity.\nWe know, on the other hand,(428) that grace is absolutely indispensable\nfor the performance of salutary acts. Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace\nwould be to credit nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its\nown power, or at least to merit grace by the performance of naturally good\ndeeds. In the first hypothesis grace would no longer be necessary for\nsalvation; in the second, it would be proportionate to natural goodness,\nand therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of grace cannot\nbe consistently denied without at the same time denying its\nnecessity.(429)\n\n*Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by which unaided nature could\nacquire even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace.*\n\nThis proposition may be technically qualified as _fidei proxima saltem_.\n\nProof. The Semipelagians held that, though nature cannot merit grace in\nstrict justice, it can merit it at least congruously, _i.e._ as a matter\nof fitness or equity.(430) This contention was rejected by the Second\nCouncil of Orange (A. D. 529), which defined that \u201cGod works many good\nthings in man that man does not work, but man works no good deeds that God\ndoes not give him the strength to do.\u201d(431) And again: \u201c[God] Himself\ninspires us with faith and charity without any preceding [natural] merits\n[on our part].\u201d(432) The phrase \u201cwithout any preceding merits\u201d (_nullis\npraecedentibus meritis_) excludes both the _meritum de condigno_ and the\n_meritum de congruo_.\n\na) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I also covers this\nthesis.\n\nThe Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support of their teaching: \u201cTo\none he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one, to every\none according to his proper ability.\u201d(433) But this text is too vague to\nserve as an argument in such an important matter. Not a few exegetes treat\nit as a kind of rhetorical figure. Others, following the example of the\nFathers, take \u201ctalents\u201d to mean purely natural gifts, or _gratiae gratis\ndatae_, while by \u201cability\u201d (_virtus_) they understand the already existing\ngrace of faith or a certain definite measure of initial grace.(434) But\neven if _virtus_ meant natural faculty or talent, it cannot be identical\nwith \u201cmerit.\u201d Considering the common teaching of theologians that the\nangels were endowed with grace according to the measure of their natural\nperfection,(435) we may well suppose that man receives grace likewise\naccording to his natural constitution (_gratia sequitur naturam_)\u2014a\npredisposition or aptitude which God ordained in His infinite wisdom to be\nthe instrument through which His graces should operate either for personal\nsanctification or the good of others.\n\nb) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending the orthodox faith\nagainst the Semipelagians, strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace\nof faith, and above all of the initial _gratia praeveniens_.\n\n\u03b1) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. IV, 7 as follows: \u201cNothing is so\nopposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits\nin such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the\ngrace of God,\u2014a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the\nwicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked.\u201d(436) And in another\nplace he says: \u201cFor it would not in any sense be the grace of God, were it\nnot in every sense gratuitous.\u201d(437)\n\n\u03b2) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected of Semipelagian\nleanings because they appear to assign the chief r\u00f4le in the business of\nsalvation to nature.(438) A careful study of their writings, however,\nshows that these authors had in mind co-operating, not prevenient grace.\nThe general teaching of the Orientals on the gratuity of grace is\nsufficiently indicated by the demand made at the Council of Lydda (A. D.\n415), that Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: \u201c_Gratiam Dei\nsecundum merita nostra dari._\u201d The Fathers who have been accused of\nSemipelagian sympathies merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite\nthe morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine grace.\n\nSt. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly asserts the absolute gratuity of\ngrace when he says of faith: \u201cThat which is a merit of faith, may not be\nascribed to us, for it is a free gift of God,\u201d(439) and directly\ncontradicts Cassian and the Massilians when he declares: \u201cThou hast it not\nof thyself, thou hast received it from God. Hence thou hast received\nwhatever thou hast, not only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is\nnot thine own merit, but the grace of God. Although thou allegest the\nfaith, thou hast received it by vocation.\u201d(440)\n\nc) The theological argument for our thesis may be succinctly stated thus:\nThe grace of God is the cause of our merits, and hence cannot be itself\nmerited. Being the cause, it cannot be an effect.(441)\n\n*Thesis III: Nature cannot merit supernatural grace even by natural\nprayer.*\n\nThis thesis, like the preceding one, may be technically qualified as\n_fidei proxima saltem_.\n\nProof. Let us first clearly establish the state of the question. Our\nthesis refers to that particular kind of prayer (_preces naturae_) which\nby its intrinsic value, so to speak, obliges Almighty God to grant what\nthe petitioner asks for, as is undoubtedly the case with supernatural\nprayer, according to our Saviour\u2019s own promise: \u201cAsk and ye shall\nreceive.\u201d(442) The inefficacy of natural prayer asserted in our thesis, is\nnot, as in the case of merit,(443) due to any intrinsic impossibility, but\nto a positive divine decree to grant supernatural prayer.\n\nThe Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: \u201cIf any\none says that the grace of God can be obtained by human [_i.e._ natural]\nprayer, and that it is not grace itself which causes us to invoke God, he\ncontradicts the prophet Isaias and the Apostle who say: I was found by\nthem that did not seek me; I appeared openly to them that asked not after\nme.\u201d(444)\n\na) Sacred Scripture teaches that, unless we are inspired by the Holy\nGhost, we cannot pray efficaciously. It follows that to be efficacious,\nprayer must be an effect of prevenient grace. We should not even know for\nwhat or how to pray, if the Holy Ghost did not inspire us. Cfr. Rom. VIII,\n26: \u201cFor we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit\nhimself asketh for us [inspires us to ask] with unspeakable\ngroanings.\u201d(445) 1 Cor. XII, 3: \u201cNo man can say: Lord God, but by the Holy\nGhost.\u201d(446) Supernatural union with Christ is an indispensable condition\nof all efficacious prayer. John XV, 7: \u201cIf you abide in me, and my words\nabide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto\nyou.\u201d(447)\n\nb) This is also the teaching of the Fathers. \u201cWho would truly groan,\ndesiring to receive what he prays for from the Lord,\u201d says St.\nAugustine,(448) \u201cif he thought that he received it from himself, and not\nfrom God? ... We understand that this is also itself the gift of God, that\nwith a true heart and spiritually we cry to God. Let them, therefore,\nobserve how they are mistaken who think that our seeking, asking, knocking\nis of ourselves, and is not given to us; and say that this is the case\nbecause grace is preceded by our merits; that it follows them when we ask\nand receive, and seek and find, and it is opened to us when we\nknock.\u201d(449)\n\nc) From the theological point of view the inefficacy of purely natural\nprayer in matters pertaining to salvation can be demonstrated thus:\nRevelation tells us that the work of salvation requires for its beginning\nan initial supernatural grace. Now prayer, that is to say, efficacious\nprayer, is in itself a salutary act. Consequently, there can be no\nefficacious prayer without prevenient grace, and purely natural prayer is\ninefficacious for salvation.\n\nRipalda holds that, in an economy different from the present, natural\nprayer would have a claim to be heard. This opinion can be defended\nwithout prejudice to the dogma of the gratuity of grace. No doubt God\nmight condescend to hear such petitions if He would, though, of course, He\nis not bound to do so by any intrinsic power inherent in natural prayer.\nUnlike merit, prayer appeals to the mercy of God, not to His justice.\nRipalda\u2019s theory, however, rests upon an unprovable assumption, namely,\nthat man in the state of pure nature would be able to know of the\nexistence, or at least the possibility, of a supernatural order and to\nstrive for the beatific vision as his final end.(450)\n\n*Thesis IV: Man cannot move God to the bestowal of supernatural grace by\nany positive disposition or preparation on his part.*\n\nThis thesis may be qualified as _propositio certa_.\n\nProof. Positive preparation or disposition for grace (_capacitas sive\npraeparatio positiva_) is practically on a level with natural prayer. The\npositive disposition for a natural good sometimes includes a certain\ndemand to satisfaction, as _e.g._ thirst demands to be quenched. This is\nstill more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive\npreparation for the good in question. Thus a student, by conscientiously\npreparing himself for examination, acquires a claim to be admitted to it\nsooner or later. Can this also be said of grace? Does there exist in man a\npositive disposition for grace in the sense that the withholding of it\nwould grievously injure and disappoint the soul? Can man, without\nsupernatural aid, positively dispose himself for the reception of\nsupernatural grace, confident that God will reward his efforts by\nbestowing it on him? Both these questions must be answered in the\nnegative.\n\na) If there were something in the natural make-up of man which would move\nthe Almighty to give him grace, the bestowal of grace would no longer be a\nfree act of God. But to assert the consequent would be Semipelagian, hence\nthe antecedent must be false.\n\nb) This truth can easily be deduced from the teaching of the Fathers in\nthe Semipelagian controversy. They declare, in perfect conformity with St.\nPaul, that grace is bestowed gratuitously because God can give or withhold\nit as He pleases. St. Augustine says(451) that the grace of Baptism is\ngranted freely, that is, without regard to any positive disposition on the\npart of the baptized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that\nnature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted by original\nsin.(452) Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot possibly possess the power\nof meriting divine grace.\n\nc) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that pure nature needs\nactual grace to save itself, and consequently has a claim to such grace at\nleast _ex decentia Creatoris_ and _ex lege iustissimae providentiae_,\nperilously resembles Baius\u2019 condemned proposition that the state of pure\nnature is impossible.(453)\n\n*Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for the reception of\nsupernatural grace by not putting any obstacles in its way.*\n\nThis proposition is held by a majority of Catholic theologians (_sententia\ncommunior_).\n\nProof. The solution of this question is intimately connected with the\nfamous Scholastic axiom: \u201c_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat\ngratiam_,\u201d that is, to the man who does what he can, God does not refuse\ngrace. This axiom is susceptible of three different interpretations.\n\na) It may mean: _Facienti quod est in se cum auxilio gratiae Deus confert\nulteriorem gratiam_, _i.e._, to him who does what he can with the help of\nsupernatural grace, God grants further and more powerful graces up to\njustification. This is merely another way of stating the indisputable\ntruth that, by faithfully co\u00f6perating with the grace of God, man is able\nto merit additional graces, and it holds true even of infidels and\nsinners. The first freely performed salutary act establishes a _meritum de\ncongruo_ towards other acts disposing a man for justification. And since\nthe first as well as all subsequent salutary acts, in this hypothesis, are\npure graces, this interpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible with\nthe dogma of the gratuity of grace.(454)\n\nb) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturalibus Deus non denegat\ngratiam_ (to him who does what he can with his natural moral strength, God\ndoes not refuse grace.) This does not mean that, in consequence of the\nefforts of the natural will, God may not withhold from anyone the first\ngrace of vocation. In this sense the axiom would be Semipelagian, and has\nbeen rejected by a majority of the Schoolmen. It is said of Molina that he\ntried to render it acceptable by the hypothesis that God bound Himself by\na contract with Christ to give His grace to all men who would make good\nuse of their natural faculties. But how could the existence of this\nimaginary contract be proved? In matter of fact Molina taught, with a\nlarge number of other divines,(455) that God in the bestowal of His graces\nfreely bound Himself to a definite rule, which coincides with His\nuniversal will to save all mankind. In the application of this law He pays\nno regard to any positive disposition or preparation, but merely to the\npresence or absence of obstacles which would prove impediments to grace.\nIn other words, God, generally speaking, is more inclined to offer His\ngrace to one who puts no obstacles in its way than to one who wallows in\nsin and neglects to do his share.(456)\n\nc) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturae negative se disponendo\n[i.e. obicem non ponendo] Deus non denegat gratiam_ (to the man who does\nwhat he can with his natural moral strength, disposing himself negatively\n[_i.e._, by not placing any obstacle] God does not deny grace. In this\nform the axiom is identical with our thesis. The question arises: Can it\nbe made to square with the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace?\nVasquez,(457) Glossner,(458) and some others answer this question in the\nnegative, whereas the great majority of Catholic theologians hold with\nSuarez(459) and Lessius,(460) that there is no contradiction between the\ntwo. Though Lessius did not succeed in proving his famous contention that\nthe axiom _Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, was for\nthree full centuries understood in this sense by the schools,(461) there\nis no doubt that many authorities can be cited in favor of his\ninterpretation.(462)\n\nThe theological argument for our thesis may be formulated thus: The\ngratuity of grace does not imply that the recipient must have no sort of\ndisposition. It merely means that man is positively unworthy of divine\nfavor. Otherwise the Church could not teach, as she does, that the grace\nbestowed on the angels and on our first parents in Paradise was absolutely\ngratuitous, nor could she hold that the Hypostatic Union of the two\nnatures in Christ, which is the pattern and exemplar of all true\ngrace,(463) was a pure grace in respect of the humanity of our Lord. The\ndogma of the gratuity of grace is in no danger whatever so long as the\nrelation between negative disposition and supernatural grace is conceived\nas actual (_facienti=qui facit_), not causal (_facienti=quia facit_). The\nmotive for the distribution of grace is to be sought not in the dignity of\nhuman nature, but in God\u2019s will to save all men. We must, however, guard\nagainst the erroneous notion that grace is bestowed according to a fixed\nlaw or an infallible norm regulating the amount of grace in accordance\nwith the condition of the recipient. Sometimes great sinners are\nmiraculously converted, while others of fairly good antecedents perish.\nYet, again, who could say that to the omniscient and all-wise God the\ngreat sinner did not appear better fitted to receive grace than the\n\u201cdecent\u201d but self-sufficient pharisee?\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Hurter, _Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae_, Vol. III,\n    thes. 187.\u2014Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, \u00a7 8, Paderborn\n    1885.\u2014*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, c. 3, Gulpen\n    1885.\u2014Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7\n    417-420, Mainz 1897.\u2014Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol.\n    V, 3rd ed., pp. 105 sqq., Freiburg 1908.\u2014Schiffini, _De Gratia\n    Divina_, pp. 468 sqq., Freiburg 1901.\n\n\n\nSection 3. The Universality Of Actual Grace\n\n\nThe gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though God\ndistributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men without\nexception, because He wills all to be saved.\n\nThis divine \u201cwill to save\u201d (_voluntas Dei salvifica_) may be regarded in\nrelation either to the wayfaring state or to the _status termini_.\nRegarded from the first-mentioned point of view it is a merciful will\n(_voluntas misericordiae_) and is generally called first or antecedent\nwill (_voluntas prima s. antecedens_) or God\u2019s salvific will (_voluntas\nDei salvifica_) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to\nthe _status termini_, it is a just will, as God rewards or punishes each\ncreature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will\n(_voluntas secunda s. consequens_) is called \u201cpredestination\u201d in so far as\nit rewards the just, and \u201creprobation\u201d in so far as it punishes the\nwicked.\n\nGod\u2019s \u201cwill to save\u201d may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere\ndesire to justify all men and make them supernaturally happy. As _voluntas\nantecedens_ it is conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man;\nas _voluntas consequens_, on the other hand, it is absolute, because God\nowes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his\ndeserts.(464)\n\nHence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of\nGod\u2019s will to save; (2) Of the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as the will to\ngive sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of\npredestination, and (4) Of reprobation.\n\n\nArticle 1. The Universality Of God\u2019s Will To Save\n\n\nAlthough God\u2019s will to save all men is practically identical with His will\nto redeem all,(465) a formal distinction must be drawn between the two,\n(a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either\nis supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen\nangels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, _viz._\nthe fate of unbaptized children.\n\n*Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined,\nbut of all the faithful without exception.*\n\nThis proposition embodies an article of faith.\n\nProof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who\nheretically maintain that God wills to save none but the predestined.\nAgainst Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: \u201cIf any one saith that the\ngrace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined unto\nlife, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive\nnot grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him\nbe anathema.\u201d(466)\n\nThe teaching of Jansenius that Christ died exclusively for the\npredestined,(467) was censured as \u201cheretical\u201d by Pope Innocent X. Hence it\nis of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are\nthese \u201cothers\u201d? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: \u201c[Christ]\ndescended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,\u201d(468) it is\ncertain that at least all the faithful are included in the saving will of\nGod. We say, \u201cat least all the faithful,\u201d because in matter of fact the\ndivine _voluntas salvifica_ extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we\nshall show further on.(469)\n\na) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of passages that God\nwills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus\nHimself says in regard to the Jews: Matth. XXIII, 37: \u201cJerusalem,\nJerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent\nunto thee, how often would I (_volui_) have gathered together thy\nchildren, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou\nwouldst not (_noluisti_).\u201d Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our\nLord\u2019s earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the\ninstrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the\nrefusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the\nNew Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (III, 16): \u201cGod so loved\nthe world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in\nhim(470) may not perish, but may have life everlasting.\u201d However, since\nmany who believe in Christ do actually perish,(471) the divine _voluntas\nsalvifica_, in principle, extends not only to the predestined, but to all\nthe faithful, _i.e._ to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism.\n\nb) The teaching of the Fathers can be gathered from the quotations given\nunder Thesis II, _infra_.\n\nc) The theological argument may be briefly summarized as follows: God\u2019s\nwill to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (_filiatio\nadoptiva_), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity.\nNow, some who were once in the state of grace are eternally lost.\nConsequently, God also wills the salvation of those among the faithful who\ndo not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not\npredestined.\n\n*Thesis II: God wills to save every human being.*\n\nThis proposition is _fidei proxima saltem_.\n\nProof. The existence of original sin is no reason why God should exclude\nsome men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the\nCalvinistic \u201cInfralapsarians.\u201d Our thesis is so solidly grounded on\nScripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call it an\narticle of faith.\n\na) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstration to two classical\npassages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.\n\n\u03b1) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God\u2019s omnipotence, says of His\nmercy: \u201cBut thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things,\nand overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou\nlovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast\nmade.... Thou sparest all, because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest\nsouls.\u201d(472)\n\nIn this text the mercy of God is described as universal. _Misereris\nomnium, parcis omnibus_. This universality is based (1) on His omnipotence\n(_quia omnia potes_), which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally\nboundless, must therefore include all men without exception. The\nuniversality of God\u2019s mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship\nand dominion (_quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia quae fecisti_). As there is\nno creature that does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He does\nnot love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of God\u2019s\nmercy in the passage quoted is based (3) on His love for souls (_qui amas\nanimas_). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult,\nChristian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. Consequently the\ndivine _voluntas salvifica_ is universal, not only in a moral, but in the\nphysical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of\nAdam.\n\n\u03b2) 1 Tim. II, 2 sqq.: \u201cI desire therefore, first of all, that\nsupplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all\nmen.... For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour,\nwho will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the\ntruth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man\nChrist Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.\u201d(473)\n\nThe Apostle commands us to pray \u201cfor all men,\u201d because this practice is\n\u201cgood and acceptable in the sight of God.\u201d Why is it good and acceptable?\nBecause God \u201cwill have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of\nthe truth.\u201d In other words, God\u2019s will to save is universal.\n\nThe question arises: Is the universality of the divine _voluntas\nsalvifica_, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical,\nadmitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold\nreason given by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediatorship of\nChrist, and the universality of the Redemption. (1) \u201cFor there is [but]\none God.\u201d(474) As truly, therefore, as God is the God of all men without\nexception, is each and every man included in the divine _voluntas\nsalvifica_. (2) \u201cThere is [but] ... one mediator of God and men, the man\nChrist Jesus.\u201d The human nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is\ncommon to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his\nmediator.(475) (3) Christ \u201cgave himself a redemption [_i.e._ died] for\nall.\u201d That is to say, God\u2019s will to save is co-extensive with His will to\nredeem. The latter is universal,(476) consequently also the former.(477)\n\nb) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their\nteaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated\nthat they regarded the truth therein set forth as divinely revealed.\nPassaglia(478) has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no\nless than two hundred authorities.\n\n\u03b1) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen citations. St. Ambrose\ndeclares that God wills to save all men. \u201cHe willed all to be His own whom\nHe established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants\neven those who flee, and does not will that those in hiding should\nperish.\u201d(479) St. Gregory of Nazianzus holds God\u2019s _voluntas salvifica_ to\nbe co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atonement. \u201cThe law,\nthe prophets, and the sufferings of Christ,\u201d he says, \u201cby which we were\nredeemed, are common property and admit of no exception: but as all [men]\nare participators in the same Adam, deceived by the serpent and subject to\ndeath in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to\nsalvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from\nwhich we had fallen.\u201d(480) St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are\nin duty bound to pray for their fellowmen, God must needs be willing to\nsave all without exception. \u201cWe must sincerely believe,\u201d he says, \u201cthat\nGod wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes\nsupplication to be made for all.\u201d(481) The question why so many perish,\nProsper answers as follows: \u201c[God] wills all to be saved and to come to\nthe knowledge of truth, ... so that those who are saved, are saved because\nHe wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they\ndeserve to perish.\u201d(482) In his _Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum\nVincentianarum_ the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine\nagainst the accusation that his teaching on predestination is incompatible\nwith the orthodox doctrine of the universality of God\u2019s saving will.(483)\n\n\u03b2) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his\ngeneral teaching on predestination and more particularly by his\ninterpretation of 1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this\nPauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise _De\nSpiritu et Litera_ he describes the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as\nstrictly universal in the physical sense.(484) In his _Enchiridion_ he\nrestricts it to the predestined.(485) In his _Contra Iulianum_ he says:\n\u201cNo one is saved unless God so wills.\u201d(486) In his work _De Correptione et\nGratia_: \u201cGod wills all men to be saved, because He makes us to will this,\njust as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba,\nFather, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Father.\u201d(487) How did St.\nAugustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways?\nSome think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and\nSemipelagians with Scriptural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly\nhave induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent interpretations\nwhich never occurred to any other ecclesiastical writer before or after\nhis time. The conundrum can only be solved by the assumption that\nAugustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held\nthat over and above (or notwithstanding) the _sensus obvius_ every exegete\nis free to read as much truth into any given passage as possible, and that\nsuch interpretation lay within the scope of the inspiration of the Holy\nGhost quite as much as the _sensus obvius_. In his _Confessions_(488) he\nactually argues in favor of a _pluralitas sensuum_. He was keen enough to\nperceive, however, that if a Scriptural text is interpreted in different\nways, the several constructions put upon it must not be contradictory. As\nhe was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between _voluntas antecedens_\nand _consequens_,(489) his different interpretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can\nbe reconciled by assuming that he conceived God\u2019s _voluntas salvifica_ as\n_antecedens_ in so far as it is universal, and as _consequens_ in so far\nas it is particular. St. Thomas solves the difficulty in a similar manner:\n\u201cThe words of the Apostle, \u2018God will have all men to be saved, etc.,\u2019 can\nbe understood in three ways: First, by a restricted application, in which\ncase they would mean, as Augustine says, \u2018God wills all men to be saved\nthat are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish to be\nsaved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not\nwill.\u2019 Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of\nindividuals, not of every individual of each class; in which case they\nmean that \u2018God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved,\nmales and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of\nevery condition.\u2019 Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood\nof the antecedent will of God, not of the consequent will. The distinction\nmust not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is\nnothing antecedent or consequent; but to the things willed. To understand\nwhich we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by\nGod. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be\ngood or evil, and yet when some additional circumstance is taken into\naccount, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary.\nThus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil,\nabsolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a\nmurderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him\nlive an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he\nwills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be\nhanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but\nconsequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we\nwill simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a\nqualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in\nthemselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.\nHence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular\ncircumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing\nconsequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the\nhanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to\nlive, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a\nwillingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever\nGod simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not\ntake place.\u201d(490)\n\n*Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though difficult to reconcile\nwith the universality of God\u2019s saving will, furnishes no argument against\nit.*\n\nProof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine _voluntas\nsalvifica_\u2014a real _crux theologorum_\u2014is the fate of unbaptized children.\nThe Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and\ntheologians hold widely divergent opinions.\n\nBellarmine teaches that infants who die without being baptized, are\nexcluded from the divine _voluntas salvifica_, because, while the\nnon-reception of Baptism is the proximate reason of their damnation, its\nultimate reason must be the will of God.\n\na) This rather incautious assertion needs to be carefully restricted. It\nis an article of faith that God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as\nthe ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is\ncertain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his\nrepresentatives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely\nadministration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents\ncannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at\nthe door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional\ncases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood\n(_baptismus sanguinis_), _i.e._ death for Christ\u2019s sake. On the whole it\nmay be said that God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of\nlittle children by the institution of infant Baptism.\n\nb) But there are many cases in which either invincible ignorance or the\norder of nature precludes the administration of Baptism. The well-meant\nopinion of some theologians(491) that the responsibility in all such cases\nlies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does God, then, really\nwill the damnation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the\nphysical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many\ninnocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing\nup the awful mystery.(492) For God is the author of the natural as well as\nof the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing\nobstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary\nprovidence.(493) Klee\u2019s assumption that dying children become conscious\nlong enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (_baptismus\nflaminis_), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of\nFlorence that \u201cthe souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in\noriginal sin, forthwith descend to hell.\u201d(494) A still more unsatisfactory\nsupposition is that the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of\ndesire and saves their children from hell. This theory, espoused by\nCardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent,(495) and Pope Pius\nV ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan\u2019s\nworks.(496)\n\nA way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who,\nholding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a\nkind of natural beatitude, think it possible that God, in view of their\nsufferings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby\nplace them in a state of innocence.(497) This theory is based on the\nassumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of\nthe beatific vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation (_poena\ndamni, infernum_), and that the remission of original sin has for its\nobject merely to enable these unfortunate infants to enjoy a perfect\nnatural beatitude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable\nto argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness\nthrough no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort\nof natural beatitude, to which their very nature seems to entitle them.\n\u201cHell\u201d for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision\nof God, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere\nof those prerogatives to which human nature has a claim by the fact of\ncreation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of\nsalvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the\ndivine _voluntas salvifica_ in the same measure. Needless to say, it can\nclaim no more than probability, and we find ourselves constrained to\nadmit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and perfect\nsolution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess\ntheir ignorance.(498)\n\nc) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way\nimpair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited\nabove(499) clearly prove that God wills to save all men without exception.\nIn basing the universality of God\u2019s mercy on His omnipotence, His\nuniversal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom(500)\nevidently implies that the unbaptized infants participate in that mercy in\nall three of these respects. How indeed could Divine Omnipotence exert\nitself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are\ninevitably and without any fault of their own deprived of Baptism? Who\nwould deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to God\u2019s\nuniversal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if God\nloves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants?\n\n1 Tim. II, 4(501) applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking\nonly adults can \u201ccome to the knowledge of the truth.\u201d But St. Paul employs\ncertain middle terms which undoubtedly comprise children as well. Thus, if\nall men have but \u201cone God,\u201d this God must be the God of infants no less\nthan of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if\nJesus Christ as God-man is the \u201cone mediator of God and men,\u201d He must also\nhave assumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from\noriginal sin. Again, if Christ \u201cgave himself a redemption for all,\u201d it is\nimpossible to assume that millions of infants should be directly excluded\nfrom the benefits of the atonement.(502)\n\n\nArticle 2. God\u2019s Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human Beings\nIn Particular\n\n\nIn relation to adults, God manifests His saving will by the bestowal of\nsufficient grace upon all.(503) The bestowal of sufficient grace being\nevidently an effluence of the universal _voluntas salvifica_, the granting\nof such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes another\nproof for the universality of grace.\n\nGod gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each\n_efficacious_ graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach\nhis supernatural destiny is co\u00f6peration with sufficient grace, especially\nwith the _gratia prima vocans_, which is the beginning of all salutary\noperation.\n\nTo prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult human beings without\nexception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just,\n(2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three\ndistinct theses.\n\n*Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His\ncommandments.*\n\nThis is _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Tridentine Council teaches: \u201cIf any one saith that the\ncommandments of God are, even for one that is justified and constituted in\ngrace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.\u201d(504)\n\nA contrary proposition in the writings of Jansenius(505) was censured by\nPope Innocent the Tenth as \u201cfoolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and\nheretical.\u201d\n\nThe Church does not assert that God gives to the just sufficient grace at\nall times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal\nwhenever they are called upon to obey the law (_urgente praecepto_). Nor\nneed God always bestow a _gratia proxime sufficiens_; in many instances\nthe grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_) fully serves the\npurpose.(506)\n\nThis dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most\nimportant texts.\n\na) 1 John V, 3 sq.: \u201cFor this is the charity of God, that we keep his\ncommandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born\nof God, overcometh the world.\u201d(507) According to this text the \u201ccharity of\nGod\u201d manifests itself in \u201ckeeping his commandments\u201d and \u201covercoming the\nworld.\u201d This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: \u201cMy\nyoke is sweet and my burden light.\u201d(508) Hence it must be possible to keep\nHis commandments, and therefore God does not withhold the absolutely\nnecessary graces from the just.\n\nSt. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that God will not suffer\nthem to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy\nissue, provided they faithfully co\u00f6perate with His grace. 1 Cor. X, 13:\n\u201cGod is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which\nyou are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be\nable to bear it.\u201d(509) As it is impossible even for the just to overcome\ngrievous temptations without supernatural aid,(510) and as God Himself\ntells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference\nthat He bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that\nSt. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says:\n\u201cTherefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he\nfall.\u201d(511) But there is no exegetical objection to applying the text to\nall the faithful without exception.(512)\n\nb) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writings of the Fathers. Some of\nthem, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended\nthe proposition that \u201cgrace is not given to all men,\u201d(513) but they meant\n_efficacious_ grace.\n\n\u03b1) A typical representative of this group of ecclesiastical writers is the\nanonymous author of the work _De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,(514) whom Pope\nGelasius praised as \u201c_probatus Ecclesiae magister_.\u201d This fifth-century\nwriter, who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, discusses the\nquestion whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are\nnot saved. He begins by drawing a distinction between God\u2019s general and\nHis special providence.(515) \u201cIt so pleased God,\u201d he says, \u201cto give His\nefficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none,\nin order that it might appear from both [actions] that what is conferred\nupon a portion is not denied to the entire race.\u201d(516)\n\n\u03b2) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teaching to such Patristic\npassages as the following: \u201cAfter the withdrawal of the divine assistance\nhe [St. Peter] was unable to stand;\u201d(517) and: \u201cHe had undertaken more\nthan he was able to do.\u201d(518) But the two Fathers from whose writings\nthese passages are taken (SS. Chrysostom and Augustine) speak, as the\ncontext evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately\nsufficient grace in punishment of Peter\u2019s presumption. Had St. Peter\nfollowed our Lord\u2019s advice(519) and prayed instead of relying on his own\nstrength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St.\nAugustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work _De\nUnitate Ecclesiae_: \u201cWho shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not\nhave betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice\ndenied his Master?\u201d(520)\n\nc) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows:\nSince the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happiness, it\nmust also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it.\n\nTo assert that God denies the just sufficient grace to observe His\ncommandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace,\nwould be to gainsay His solemn promise to His adopted children: \u201cThis is\nthe will of my Father that sent me: that every one who seeth the Son and\nbelieveth in him, may have life everlasting, and I will raise him up in\nthe last day.\u201d(521) Consequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to\nbestow sufficient graces upon the just.\n\nAgain, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are\nobliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of God and the\nprecepts of His Church.(522) But this is impossible without the aid of\ngrace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient grace to his servants,\nfor _ad impossibile nemo tenetur_.(523)\n\n*Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (1)\nthat ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin\nand do penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His grace even from\nthe obdurate.*\n\nThe first part of this thesis embodies a theological conclusion; the\nsecond states the common teaching of Catholic theologians.\n\n1. _Proof of the First Part._ The distinction here drawn between\n\u201cordinary\u201d and \u201cobdurate\u201d sinners has its basis in revelation and is\nclearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the\ntwo parts of our thesis.\n\nAn \u201cordinary\u201d sinner is a Christian who has lost sanctifying grace by a\ngrievous sin. An \u201cobdurate\u201d sinner is one who, by repeatedly and\nmaliciously transgressing the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and\nhardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an habitual\nsinner (_consuetudinarius_) and a backslider, without being obdurate, or,\nwhich comes to the same, impenitent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful\nhabits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the Holy\nGhost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion.\n\nWith regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis asserts that they always\nreceive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance.\n\na) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not\nhasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the\nfault of Almighty God, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the\nfault of the sinner who fails to co\u00f6perate with the proffered supernatural\nassistance.\n\n\u03b1) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is\ncontained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that\nGod suffers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,(524) this must\nsurely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing\nmortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of God \u201care not heavy\u201d and\nthat faith is \u201cthe victory which overcometh the world.\u201d(525) Faith in\nChrist remains in the Christian, even though he be guilty of mortal sin,\nand consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace,\nto overcome the \u201cworld,\u201d _i.e._ the temptations arising from\nconcupiscence,(526) and thus to cease committing mortal sins.\n\n\u03b2) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Augustine lays down two\ntheological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike.\n\n\u201cGod does not enjoin impossibilities,\u201d he says, \u201cbut in His injunctions\ncounsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in\nwhat you cannot do.\u201d(527) It follows that the sinner always receives at\nleast the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls _gratia\ninitialis sive parva_, and of which he says that its right use ensures the\n_gratia magna_.\n\nThe second principle is this: \u201c_Cum lege coniuncta est gratia, qu\u00e2 lex\nobservari possit._\u201d That is, every divine law, by special ordinance,\ncarries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the\nlaws of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant\nsufficient grace to keep them.(528)\n\nb) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted,\nfollows from the Scriptural injunction of conversion. If conversion to God\nis a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of\ngrace,(529) the divine command obviously implies the bestowal of\nsufficient grace.\n\nThat conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: \u201cAs\nI live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that\nthe wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil\nways!\u201d(530) \u201cThe Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but\ndealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but\nthat all should return to penance.\u201d(531)\n\nThis teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition.\n\n2. _Proof of the Second Part._ Obduracy is a serious obstacle to\nconversion because the obdurate sinner has confirmed his will in\nmalice(532) and by systematic resistance diminished the influence of\ngrace. The question here is whether or not God in such cases eventually\nwithdraws His grace altogether.\n\nSome rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the\nsinner greater tortures in hell.(533) Though this assertion cannot be said\nto contravene the dogma of the universality of God\u2019s salvific will, (its\ndefenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these\nunfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the _sententia __ communis_,\nthat God grants even the most obdurate sinner\u2014at least now and then,\n_e.g._ during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible\ncatastrophe\u2014sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for\nthis opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last\nanalysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis.\n\na) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no\ndistinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the\nBook of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations,\nthe Canaanites, as a shining object of divine mercy and patience.(534)\nAccording to St. Paul, God calls especially upon hardened and impenitent\nsinners to do penance. Rom. II, 4 sq.: \u201cOr despisest thou the riches of\nhis goodness, and patience, and long suffering? Knowest thou not that the\nbenignity of God leadeth thee to penance? But according to thy hardness\nand impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day\nof wrath, and revelation of the just judgment of God, who will render to\nevery man according to his works.\u201d(535)\n\nThere are some Scriptural passages which seem to imply that God withdraws\nHis grace from those who are obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their\nhearts in punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharao: \u201cI shall harden\nhis heart,\u201d(536) and Moses tells us: \u201cThe Lord hardened Pharao\u2019s heart,\nand he harkened not unto them.\u201d(537) But it would be wrong to assume that\nthis denotes a positive action on the part of God. Pharao, as we are told\nfurther on, \u201chardened his own heart\u201d (_ingravavit cor suum_).(538) The\nfault in all cases lies with the sinner, who obstinately resists the call\nof grace. God\u2019s co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The greater\nand stronger graces which He grants to ordinary sinners, He withholds from\nthe obdurate in punishment of their malice. This is, however, by no means\ntantamount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.(539)\n\nb) The Fathers speak of God\u2019s way of dealing with obdurate sinners in a\nmanner which clearly shows their belief that He never entirely withdraws\nHis mercy. They insist that the light of grace is never extinguished in\nthe present life. \u201cGod gave them over to a reprobate mind,\u201d says St.\nAugustine, \u201cfor such is the blindness of the mind. Whosoever is given over\nthereunto, is shut out from the interior light of God: but not wholly as\nyet, whilst he is in this life. For there is \u2018outer darkness,\u2019 which is\nunderstood to belong rather to the day of judgment; that he should rather\nbe wholly without God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses\ncorrection.\u201d(540)\n\nIt follows that no sinner, how desperate soever his case may appear, need\nbe despaired of. As long as there is life there is hope.(541) The Fathers\nconsistently teach that the reason why reprobates are lost is not lack of\ngrace but their own malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on Isaias\u2019\nprophecy regarding the impenitence of the Jews: \u201cThe reason they did not\nbelieve was not that Isaias had predicted their unbelief, but his\nprediction was based on the fact that they would not believe. They were\nunable to believe, _i.e._ they had not the will to believe.\u201d(542)\n\nc) The theological argument for our thesis is well stated by St. Thomas.\nHe distinguishes between _obstinatio perfecta_ and _obstinatio imperfecta_\nand says: Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy is\nthat of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil that he is\nincapable of any but the faintest impulses towards virtue, though even\nthese are sufficient to prepare the way for grace.(543) \u201cIf any one falls\ninto sin after having received Baptism,\u201d says the Fourth Lateran Council,\n\u201che can always be restored by sincere penance.\u201d(544) As the power of the\nkeys comprises all sins, even those against the Holy Ghost, so divine\ngrace is held out to all sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the\nunforgivableness of the \u201cthree capital sins\u201d (apostasy, murder, and\nadultery) was already condemned as heretical during the life-time of\nTertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness only by receiving the\nsacrament of Penance or making an act of perfect contrition.(545) Justly,\ntherefore, does the Church regard despair of God\u2019s mercy as an additional\ngrievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting that God in the end\nabsolutely abandons the sinner, there could be no hope of forgiveness, and\ndespair would be justified.\n\n*Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient graces for salvation.*\n\nThis proposition may be qualified as _certa_.\n\nProof. The \u201cheathens\u201d are those whom the Gospel has not yet reached. They\nare called _infideles negativi_ in contradistinction to the _infideles\npositivi_, _i.e._ apostates and formal heretics who have fallen away from\nthe faith. We assert that God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to\nknow the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, on December 7, 1690,\ncondemned Arnauld\u2019s Jansenistic proposition that \u201cpagans, Jews, heretics,\nand others of the same kind experience no influence whatever from Christ,\nand it may therefore be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude and\nhelpless will, lacking sufficient grace.\u201d(546) A proposition of similar\nimport, set up by Quesnel, was censured by Clement XI.(547) Though not\nformally defined, it is a certain truth\u2014deducible from the infallible\nteaching of the Church\u2014that God does not permit any one to perish for want\nof grace.\n\na) The Biblical argument for our thesis is based on the dogma that God\nwills all men to be saved. 1 Tim. II, 4: \u201c[God] will have all men to be\nsaved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth [_i.e._ the true faith].\u201d\nIn speaking of the \u201cday of wrath,\u201d St. Paul emphasizes the fact that the\nAlmighty Judge \u201cwill render to every man according to his works,\u201d\u2014eternal\nlife to the good, wrath and damnation to the wicked.(548) And he\ncontinues: \u201cBut glory, and honor, and peace to every one that worketh\ngood, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek; for there is no respect of\npersons with God.\u201d(549) \u201cGreek\u201d is here evidently synonymous with gentile\nor heathen. It follows that the heathens are able to perform supernatural\nsalutary acts with the aid of grace, and that they will receive the reward\nof eternal beatitude if they lead a good life.\n\nIn another passage (1 Tim. IV, 10) the Apostle calls Christ \u201cthe Saviour\nof all men, especially of the faithful.\u201d(550) Consequently, Christ is the\nSaviour also of unbelievers and heathens.(551)\n\nb) St. Paul\u2019s teaching is faithfully echoed by the Fathers. Thus St.\nClement of Rome,(552) in commenting on the penitential sermons of No\u00eb and\nthe prophet Jonas, says: \u201cWe may roam through all the ages of history and\nlearn that the Lord in all generations(553) gave opportunity for penance\nto all who wished to be converted, ... even though they were strangers to\nhim.\u201d(554)\n\nSt. Chrysostom says in explanation of John I, 9: \u201cIf He enlightens every\nman that comes into this world, how is it that so many are without light?\nFor not all know Christ. Most assuredly He illumines, so far as He is\nconcerned.... For grace is poured out over all. It flees or despises no\none, be he Jew, Greek, barbarian or Scythian, freedman or slave, man or\nwoman, old or young. It is the same for all, easily attainable by all, it\ncalls upon all with equal regard. As for those who neglect to make use of\nthis gift, they should ascribe their blindness to themselves.\u201d(555)\n\nSimilar expressions can be culled from the anonymous work _De Vocatione\nOmnium Gentium_(556) and from the writings of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius,\nand especially from those of Orosius, who says that grace is given to all\nmen, including the heathen, without exception and at all times.(557)\n\nc) Catholic theologians have devoted considerable thought to the question\nhow God provides for the salvation of the heathen.\n\nTo the uncivilized tribes may be applied what has been said regarding the\nfate of unbaptized infants. The real problem is: How does the merciful\nCreator provide for those who are sufficiently intelligent to be able to\nspeculate on God, the soul, the future destiny of man, etc.? Holy\nScripture teaches: \u201cWithout faith it is impossible to please God, for he\nthat cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that\nseek him.\u201d(558) Faith here means, not any kind of religious belief, but\nthat theological faith which the Tridentine Council calls \u201cthe beginning,\nthe foundation, and the root of all justification.\u201d(559) Mere intellectual\nassent to the existence of God, immortality, and retribution would not be\nsufficient for salvation, even if elevated to the supernatural sphere and\ntransfigured by grace. This is evident from the condemnation, by Pope\nInnocent XI, of the proposition that \u201cFaith in a wide sense, based on the\ntestimony of the created universe, or some other similar motive, is\nsufficient unto justification.\u201d(560) The only sort of faith that results\nin justification, according to the Vatican Council, is \u201ca supernatural\nvirtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe\nthat the things which He has revealed are true; not because of the\nintrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but\nbecause of the authority of God Himself, who reveals them, and who can\nneither be deceived nor deceive.\u201d(561) Of special importance is the\nfollowing declaration by the same Council: \u201cSince without faith it is\nimpossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship of His children,\ntherefore without faith no one has ever attained justification....\u201d(562)\n\nThe Catechism demands of every one who desires to be saved that he have a\nsupernatural belief in six distinct truths: the existence of God,\nretribution in the next world, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the\nimmortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The first two are\ncertainly necessary for salvation, both _fide explicit\u00e2_ and _necessitate\nmedii_. With regard to the other four there is a difference of opinion\namong theologians. We base our argumentation on the stricter, though not\nabsolutely certain view, that all six articles must be believed\n_necessitate medii_. On this basis God\u2019s method of providing sufficient\ngraces for the heathen may be explained in one of two ways, according as a\n_fides explicita_ is demanded from them with regard to all the\nabove-mentioned dogmas, or a _fides implicita_ is deemed sufficient in\nregard to all but the first two. By _fides explicita_ we understand the\nexpress and fully developed faith of devout Christians; by _fides\nimplicita_, an undeveloped belief of desire or, in other words, general\nreadiness to believe whatever God has revealed.\n\n\u03b1) The defenders of the _fides explicita_ theory are compelled to assume\nthat God must somehow reveal to each individual heathen who lives\naccording to the dictates of his conscience, the six truths necessary for\nsalvation. \u201cFaith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of\nChrist.\u201d(563)\n\nBut how can the gentiles believe in a revelation that has never been\npreached to them? Here is an undeniable difficulty. Some theologians say:\nGod enlightens them interiorly about the truths necessary for salvation;\nor He miraculously sends them an apostle, as He sent St. Peter to\nCornelius;(564) or He instructs them through the agency of an angel.(565)\nNone of these hypotheses can be accepted as satisfactory. \u201cInterior\nillumination\u201d of the kind postulated would practically amount to private\nrevelation. That God should grant a special private revelation to every\nconscientious pagan is highly improbable. Again, an angel can no more be\nthe _ordinary_ means of conversion than the miraculous apparition of a\nmissionary. Nevertheless, these three hypotheses admirably illustrate the\nfirm belief of the Church in the universality of God\u2019s saving will,\ninasmuch as they express the conviction of her theologians that He would\nwork a miracle rather than deny His grace to the poor benighted\nheathen.(566) The difficulties to which we have adverted constitute a\nstrong argument in favor of another theological theory which regards\nexplicit belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation merely as a _necessitas\npraecepti_, from which one may be dispensed.\n\n\u03b2) The _fides implicita_ theory is far more plausible, for it postulates\nno miracles, implicit faith (or _fides in voto_) being independent of the\nexternal preaching of the Gospel, just as the baptism of desire\n(_baptismus in voto_) is independent of the use of water.\n\nCardinal Gotti regards the first-mentioned of the two theories as safer\n(_tutior_), but admits that the other is highly probable, because it has\nthe support of St. Thomas.(567) However, a great difficulty remains.\nThough it may suffice to hold the dogmas of the Trinity and the\nIncarnation, and _a fortiori_ those of the immortality of the soul and the\nnecessity of grace, with an implicit faith, it is the consentient teaching\nof Revelation, the Church, and Catholic divines that the two principal\ntruths of religion, _viz._: the existence of God and retribution, must be\nheld _fide explicit\u00e2_ and _necessitate medii_, because a man cannot be\nconverted to God unless He knows Him. But how is he to acquire a knowledge\nof God? Does this not also necessitate a miracle (_e.g._ the sending of an\nangel or of a missionary, which we have rejected as improbable)? There can\nbe but one answer to this question. Unaided reason may convince a\nthoughtful pagan of the existence of God and of divine retribution, and as\nthese two fundamental truths have no doubt penetrated to the farthest\ncorners of the earth also as remnants of primitive revelation, their\npromulgation may be said to be contained in the traditional instruction\nwhich the heathen receive from their forebears. This external factor of\nDivine Revelation, assisted by interior grace, may engender a supernatural\nact of faith, which implicitly includes belief in Christ, Baptism, etc.,\nand through which the heathen are eventually cleansed from sin and attain\nto justification.(568)\n\nSome theologians hold that those to whom the Gospel has never been\npreached, may be saved by a quasi-faith based on purely natural\nmotives.(569)\n\nFor the rest, no one will presume to dictate to Almighty God how and by\nwhat means He shall communicate His grace to the heathen. It is enough,\nand very consoling, too, to know that all men receive sufficient grace to\nsave their souls, and no one is eternally damned except through his own\nfault.(570)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014*Didacus Ruiz, _De Voluntate Dei_, disp. 19\n    sqq.\u2014Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 4 sqq.; _De Incarnatione_, XIII, 1\n    sqq.\u2014Fontana, _Bulla __\u201c__Unigenitus__\u201d__ Dogmatice Propugnata_,\n    prop. 12, c. 5, Rome 1717.\u2014Passaglia, _De Partitione Voluntatis\n    Divinae in Primam et Secundam_, Rome 1851.\u2014*Franzelin, _De Deo\n    Uno_, thes. 49-51, Rome 1883.\u2014*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n    Actuali_, thes. 59-62, Gulpen 1885.\u2014A. Fischer, _De Salute\n    Infidelium_, Essen 1886.\u2014*J. Bucceroni, _De Auxilio Sufficiente\n    Infidelibus Dato_, Rome 1890.\u2014Fr. Schmid, _Die ausserordentlichen\n    Heilswege f\u00fcr die gefallene Menschheit_, Brixen 1899.\u2014Chr. Pesch,\n    _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 144 sqq.,\n    Freiburg 1906.\u2014L. Cap\u00e9ran, _Le Probl\u00e8me du Salut des Infid\u00e8les_,\n    Paris 1912.\u2014A. Wagner, _Doctrina de Gratia Sufficiente_, Graz\n    1911.\u2014J. Bainvel, S. J., _Is There Salvation Outside the Catholic\n    Church?_ (tr. J. L. Weidenhan), St. Louis 1917.\n\n\nArticle 3. The Predestination Of The Elect\n\n\n1. WHAT IS MEANT BY PREDESTINATION.\u2014We have shown that God antecedently\nwills to save all men,(571) and that He gives to all sufficient grace to\nwork out their eternal salvation.\n\nOn the other hand, Sacred Scripture assures us that some are lost through\ntheir own fault. Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41: \u201cDepart from me, you cursed, into\neverlasting fire.\u201d\n\nIt follows that God\u2019s will to save, considered as _voluntas consequens_,\nremains ineffective with regard to a portion of the human race, and\nconsequently, in this respect, is no longer universal but particular.\n\nBeing omniscient, God has foreseen this from all eternity and disposed His\ndecrees accordingly. It is in this sense that Catholic theology teaches\nthe existence of a twofold predestination: one to Heaven, for those who\ndie in the state of grace, another to hell, for those who depart this life\nin mortal sin.\n\nPresent-day usage reserves the term _predestination_ for the election of\nthe blessed.\n\na) Rightly does the Council of Trent call predestination a \u201chidden\nmystery.\u201d(572) For in the last analysis it rests solely with God, who are\nto be admitted to Heaven and who condemned to hell. But why does God give\nto some merely sufficient grace, with which they neglect to co\u00f6perate,\nwhile on others He showers efficacious graces that infallibly lead to\neternal salvation? In this unequal distribution of efficacious grace lies\nthe sublime mystery of predestination, as St. Augustine well knew, for he\nsays in his treatise On the Gift of Perseverance: \u201cTherefore, of two\ninfants equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other\nleft; and of two wicked men already mature in years, why one should be so\ncalled that he follows Him that calleth, while the other is either not\ncalled at all, or is not called in such a manner,\u2014are unsearchable\njudgments of God.\u201d(573)\n\nb) What is meant by \u201cpredestination of the elect\u201d? In view of the many\nerrors that have arisen with regard to this important dogma, it is\nnecessary to start with clearly defined terms.\n\nPredestination may mean one of three different things. A man may be simply\npredestined to receive certain graces (_praedestinatio ad gratiam\ntantum_); or he may be predestined to enjoy eternal happiness without\nregard to any merits of his own (_praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_); or,\nagain, he may be predestined to both grace and glory, glory as the end,\ngrace as a means to that end\u2014vocation, justification, and final\nperseverance. When the concepts of grace and glory are considered\nseparately, and each is made the object of a special predestination, we\nhave what is called incomplete or inadequate predestination\n(_praedestinatio incompleta sive inadaequata_). It is this incomplete\npredestination that St. Paul(574) and St. Augustine(575) have in mind when\nthey apply the term to the vocation of men to grace, faith, and\njustification. Theologians speak of _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_,\nthat is, _ante praevisa merita_, as a true predestination, but disagree as\nto its existence.(576)\n\nThe dogma of predestination, which mainly concerns us here, has for its\nsole object predestination in the complete or adequate sense of the term,\nwhich is explained by St. Augustine as follows: \u201cPredestination is nothing\nelse than the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of God\nwhereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered [_i.e._\nsaved].\u201d(577) St. Thomas expresses himself more succinctly:\n\u201cPredestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory\nin the future.\u201d(578)\n\n2. THE DOGMA.\u2014Complete predestination involves: (a) the first grace of\nvocation (_gratia prima praeveniens_), especially faith as the beginning,\nfoundation, and root of justification; (b) a number of additional actual\ngraces for the successful accomplishment of the process; (c) justification\nitself as the beginning of the state of grace; (d) the grace of final\nperseverance; (e) eternal happiness in Heaven.\n\nThe question arises; Do men really seek and find their eternal salvation\nwith infallible certainty by passing through these successive stages\u2014not\nmerely in the foreknowledge of God (_praescientia futurorum_), but by\nvirtue of an eternal decree (_decretum praedestinationis_)?\n\nThe Pelagians asserted that man works out his eternal salvation of his own\nfree will, and that consequently God merely foreknows but does not\nfore-ordain who shall be saved. The Semipelagians held that the beginning\nof faith (_initium fidei_) and final perseverance (_donum perseverantiae_)\nare not pure graces but may be obtained by natural means, without special\naid from above. Against these heretics the Catholic Church has always\ntaught the eternal predestination of the elect as an article of\nfaith.(579)\n\na) St. Paul says explicitly: \u201cWe know that to them that love God, all\nthings work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are\ncalled to be saints. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be\nmade conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn\namongst many brethren. And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And\nwhom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he\nalso glorified.\u201d(580) Here we have all the elements of complete\npredestination: God\u2019s eternal foreknowledge (_praescivit_, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ad\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9), an\neternal decree of the divine will (_praedestinavit_, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ce\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5), and the\nvarious stages of justification, beginning with vocation (_vocavit_,\n\u1f10\u03ba\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5) up to justification proper (_iustificavit_, \u1f10\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5), and\neternal beatitude (_glorificavit_, \u1f10\u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd).(581)\n\nb) The Fathers of the fifth century undoubtedly taught the predestination\nof the elect as an article of faith. Thus St. Augustine says: \u201cThere never\nwas a time when the Church of Christ did not hold this faith in\npredestination, which is now defended with fresh solicitude against the\nnew heretics.\u201d(582) His faithful disciple St. Prosper writes: \u201cNo Catholic\ndenies predestination by God.\u201d(583) And again: \u201cIt would be as impious to\ndeny predestination as to oppose grace itself.\u201d(584)\n\nc) Several important theological corollaries follow from the dogma of\npredestination.\n\n\u03b1) The first is the immutability of the divine decree of predestination.\nThis immutability is based on God\u2019s infallible foreknowledge that certain\nindividuals will die in the state of grace, and on His unchangeable will\nto reward them with eternal happiness.\n\nSt. Augustine says: \u201cIf any one of these [the predestined] perishes, God\nis mistaken; but none of them perish because God is not mistaken.\u201d(585)\n\nGod\u2019s unerring foreknowledge is symbolized by the \u201cBook of Life.\u201d(586)\nChrist Himself said to His Apostles: \u201cRejoice in this, that your names are\nwritten in heaven.\u201d(587) The \u201cBook of Life\u201d admits neither addition nor\nerasure. This does not, however, mean that a man is unable to change God\u2019s\nhypothetical decree of predestination with regard to himself into an\nabsolute one. He can do this by prayer, good works, and faithful\nco-operation with grace.(588) Whatever promotes our salvation is included\nin the infallible foreknowledge of God, and consequently also in the scope\nof predestination. In this sense, but in no other, can we accept the\nsomewhat paradoxical maxim: \u201cIf you are not predestined, conduct yourself\nso that you may be predestined.\u201d Sacred Scripture occasionally refers to\nanother \u201cBook of Life,\u201d which contains the names of all the faithful,\nirrespective of their predestination. This \u201cbook,\u201d of course, is capable\nof alterations. Cfr. Apoc. III, 5: \u201cI will not blot out his name out of\nthe book of life.\u201d(589) Finally, there is the \u201cBook of Reprobation,\u201d which\nrecords the wicked deeds of men and by which the unrepentant sinners will\nbe judged. This is the \u201c_liber scriptus_\u201d of the \u201c_Dies Irae_\u201d:\n\n\n    \u201c_Liber scriptus proferetur._\n    _In quo totum continetur._\u201d(590)\n\n\n\u03b2) If the divine decree of predestination is immutable, the number of the\nelect must be definitively fixed. \u201cThe number [of those who are\npredestined to the kingdom of God] is so certain,\u201d says St. Augustine,\n\u201cthat no one can either be added to or taken from them.\u201d(591) We must\ndistinguish between the absolute and the relative number of the\npredestined.\n\nGod, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract number of the elect,\nbut every individual predestined to Heaven. To us the number of the elect\nis wrapped in impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: \u201cSome say\nthat as many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were\nangels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell,\nadded to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to\nsay that \u2018God alone knows the number for whom is reserved eternal\nhappiness,\u2019 as the prayer for the living and the dead expresses it.\u201d(592)\nWhether God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly\nprecipitating the end of the world or by a sort of \u201cnatural selection,\u201d is\nan open question. To assume the latter could hardly be reconciled with the\ndogma of the universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to favor\nthe former.(593)\n\nAs regards the relative number of the elect, some writers (_e.g._\nMassillon) represent it as so infinitesimally small that it would almost\ndrive a saint to despair,\u2014\u201cas if the Church had been established for the\nexpress purpose of populating hell.\u201d(594) Even St. Thomas held that\nrelatively few are saved.(595) But the arguments adduced in support of\nthis contention are by no means convincing.(596) Recently, the Jesuit\nFather Castelein(597) impugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments.\nHe was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,(598) who marshalled a\ngreat number of authorities in favor of the sterner view. The controversy\ncannot be decided either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our\npessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to assume that the\nmajority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved.(599) If we\nadd to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is\nprobably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to\nthat of the reprobates. Were it smaller, \u201cit could be said to the shame\nand offense of the divine majesty and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of\nSatan is larger than the kingdom of Christ.\u201d(600)\n\n3. THE MOTIVE OF PREDESTINATION.\u2014The efficient cause of predestination is\nGod; its instrumental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine glory; its\nprimary meritorious cause, the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus\nChrist. On these points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to the\nmotive that induced God to predestine certain individuals to the exclusion\nof others. The question narrows itself down to this: What influence, if\nany, do the merits of a man exert on the eternal decree of\npredestination?\u2014and may be formulated in three different ways.\n\na) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to\nthe initial grace of vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute\ngratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. For whatever merits one may\nhave acquired before he receives the initial grace of vocation, must be\npurely natural, and consequently worthless in the eyes of God for\nsupernatural predestination. \u201cTo assume,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201cthat there is\non our part some merit, the foreknowledge of which [on the part of God]\nwould be the cause [motive] of our predestination, would be to assume that\ngrace is given to us [as a reward] of our [natural] merits.\u201d(601)\n\nb) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to\ngrace and glory? Catholic theologians are unanimous in holding that, since\ngrace is absolutely gratuitous and inseparably connected with glory as its\neffect, the union of both can no more be based upon _natural_ merit than\nthe initial grace of vocation itself, which transmits the quality of\ngratuitousness to each and every one of the graces that follow in its\nwake, up to and including justification and eternal beatitude. Those among\nthe Fathers who defended the gratuity of predestination against the\nPelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at safeguarding the gratuity of\ninitial grace, in order not to be constrained to say with Pelagius that\n\u201cthe grace of God is given as a reward of merit.\u201d(602) \u201cWhat compelled me\nin this work of mine [_De Dono Perseverantiae_] to defend more abundantly\nand clearly those passages of Scripture in which predestination is\ncommended,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201cif not the Pelagian assertion that God\u2019s\ngrace is given according to our [natural] merits?\u201d(603) Obviously these\nFathers did not have in view the _praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum_, as\nthe champions of the _praedestinatio ante praevisa merita_ mistakenly\nassert, but what they meant was that complete predestination which\ncomprises grace and glory as one whole. Similarly, the early Schoolmen,\nwhen they speak of the \u201cgratuity of predestination,\u201d usually mean complete\npredestination.(604) D\u2019Argentr\u00e9\u2019s researches show how necessary it is to\ndraw sharp distinctions and carefully to establish the real state of the\nquestion before claiming the common teaching of the Scholastics in favor\nof any particular theory of predestination.\n\nc) What influence do the _supernatural_ merits of a man exert on his\npredestination to glory as such? Here the controversy begins.\nPredestination may be considered either as the cause of supernatural merit\nor as its effect. If it is considered as the cause, the problem takes this\nshape: Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any regard to their\nfuture supernatural merits, eternally predestine certain men to the glory\nof heaven, and only subsequently decide to give them the efficacious\ngraces necessary to reach that end, particularly final perseverance? If,\non the other hand, predestination be considered as an effect of\nsupernatural merit, the question will be: Did God predestine certain men\nto the glory of Heaven by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will to\nsave them dependent on His infallible foreknowledge of their supernatural\nmerits? The lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on this\nsubject has led to a division of Catholic opinion, some theologians\nfavoring absolute predestination _ante praevisa merita_, others\nhypothetical predestination _post praevisa merita_. Without concealing our\nconviction that absolute predestination is untenable, we shall set forth\nboth theories impartially and examine the arguments on which they rely.\n\n4. ORTHODOX PREDESTINATIONISM, OR THE THEORY OF PREDESTINATION ANTE\nPRAEVISA MERITA.\u2014Some theologians conceive the divine scheme of salvation\nin this wise: (a) _In ordine intentionis_, God, by an absolute decree,\nfirst predestines certain men to eternal salvation, and then, in\nconsequence of this decree, decides to give them all the graces necessary\nto be saved; (b) in time, however, or _in ordine executionis_, He observes\nthe reverse order, that is to say, He first bestows the pre-appointed\ngraces and subsequently the glory of heaven as a reward of supernatural\nmerit acquired by the aid of those graces.\n\nThis theory reverses the relation of grace and glory. While it\ncorrectly(605) represents glory as the fruit and reward of supernatural\nmerit in the order of execution, it wrongly represents it in the order of\nintention as the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an\neffect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,(606) some\nAugustinians,(607) and a few Molinists.(608) Their arguments may be\nsketched as follows:\n\na) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scripture predestination to eternal\nhappiness is represented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an\narbitrary act of God. Take, _e.g._, Matth. XXIV, 22 sqq.: \u201cAnd unless\nthose days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake\nof the elect those days shall be shortened.... For there shall arise false\nChrists and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders,\ninsomuch as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.\u201d(609) Here, it is\nclaimed, the elect are represented as so thoroughly confirmed in faith and\nin good works as to be proof against error.\n\nThis conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase \u201cthose days\u201d manifestly refers\neither to the destruction of Jerusalem or to the end of the world. If it\nrefers to the destruction of Jerusalem, the \u201celect,\u201d according to Biblical\nusage,(610) are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy City, for\nwhose sake God promises to shorten the terrible siege. If it referred to\nthe end of the world, _electi_ would indeed stand for _praedestinati_, but\nthe context would not forbid us to interpret their predestination\nhypothetically, as merely indicating the immutability of the divine\ndecree, which is not denied by the opponents of the theory.\n\nAnother text quoted in favor of absolute predestination _ante praevisa\nmerita_, is Acts XIII, 48: \u201cAs many as were ordained (_praeordinati_,\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9) to life everlasting, believed.\u201d Here, we are told,\npredestination to eternal life is given as the motive why many believed.\nBut the text really says nothing at all about predestination. \u03a4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\nis not synonymous with \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 or \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9. The more probable\nexplanation is the following: As many believed as were disposed to receive\nthe faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all who received the\nfaith at that time were predestined, while those that refused to be\nconverted were without exception reprobates. But even if _praeordinati_\nwere synonymous with _praedestinati_, the text would merely say that\ncertain predestined souls embraced the faith, without affording any clue\nas to the relation between conversion and predestination.\n\nThe ninth chapter of St. Paul\u2019s Epistle to the Romans is the main reliance\nof the advocates of absolute predestinationism, though the passage is\nunfit to serve as a _locus classicus_ because of its obscurity. Let us\nexamine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. IX, 13: \u201cJacob I\nhave loved, but Esau I have hated,\u201d is alleged to prove the absolute\npredestination of Jacob and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many\ntheologians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the Apostle is not\ndealing with predestination to glory, but with Jacob\u2019s vocation to be the\nprogenitor of the Messias. Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean,\nwas simply passed over in this choice (_odio habere __ minus diligere_;\ncfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is interpreted typically, it should be\ndone in harmony with the context, that is to say, as referring to the\ngratuity of grace, not to predestination.\n\nThe same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: \u201cIt is not of him that\nwilleth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.... He\nhath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.\u201d(611)\n\nThe strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute predestination is\nRom. IX, 20 sq.: \u201cO man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the\nthing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or\nhath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one\nvessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?\u201d Here the Apostle really\nseems to have thought of predestination. But the simile must not be\npressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy that God positively\npredestined some men to heaven and others to hell. The _tertium\ncomparationis_ is not the act of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness\nof man to yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter.\n\nNor is it admissible to read into the Apostle\u2019s thought even a _negative_\nreprobation of certain men. For the primary intention of the Epistle to\nthe Romans is to insist on the gratuity of man\u2019s vocation to Christianity\nand to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and their bodily descent\nfrom Abraham gave the Jews preference over the heathens. The Epistle to\nthe Romans has no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether or\nnot the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of eternal\npredestination to glory.(612)\n\nb) Among the Fathers the only one to whom the advocates of absolute\npredestinationism can appeal with some show of justice is St. Augustine,\nwho, with the possible exception of Prosper and Fulgentius, was the most\nrigorous among early ecclesiastical writers,\u2014so rigorous, in fact, that\nOswald does not hesitate to call him \u201cthe head and front of all rigorists\nin the Church.\u201d(613)\n\nHowever, this is saying too much. Augustine\u2019s genuine teaching is still in\ndispute among our ablest theologians. Some(614) deny that he broke with\nthe almost unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others think that\nin the treatises _De Dono Perseverantiae_ and _De Praedestinatione\nSanctorum_, and in several of his letters, the Saint frankly taught\nabsolute predestinationism. The latter group of writers is split into two\nclasses. A number of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert that\nAugustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly adopt his supposed\nteaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, Cerci\u00e0, Oswald, and others censure this\nview. Franzelin(615) undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: \u201cIf\nthere were a manifest discrepancy between Augustine\u2019s teaching and that of\nthe other Fathers, I should not hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus,\nOsorius, Camerarius, Maldonatus,(616) Toletus,(617) and Petavius(618) in\nreverently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we should be\ndealing merely with a private opinion.\u201d(619) Under these circumstances the\nPatristic argument for the theory of absolute predestination evidently\nlacks convincingness.(620)\n\nc) It was probably because they felt its weakness that some of the later\nchampions of the theory attempted to prove absolute predestination _ante\npraevisa merita_ by philosophical arguments. Gonet reasons as follows: \u201cHe\nwho proceeds in an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the means\nnecessary to attain it. But God proceeds in an orderly way. Therefore he\nwills the end before the means. Now, glory is an end, and merits are means\nto attain that end. Consequently, God wills glory before He wills merits,\nand a man\u2019s pre\u00eblection to glory cannot be based on foreknowledge of his\nmerits.\u201d(621) This argument, if it proved anything, would prove the\nlogical impossibility of conditional predestination. But it overshoots the\nmark and consequently proves nothing at all. _Qui nimium probat, nihil\nprobat._\n\nGonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, namely, that God\n_voluntate antecedente_ decreed the glory of certain men to the exclusion\nof others. This _petitio principii_ vitiates the entire polysyllogism.\nGod\u2019s will to save is universal. He wills the eternal happiness of all men\n_antecedenter_, and the reprobation of some only _consequenter_; hence\neternal predestination is not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it\ndepends on merit. That the divine scheme of grace can take a different\ncourse _in ordine intentionis_ from that _in ordine executionis_ is a mere\nfiction. If eternal salvation in the order of temporal execution is given\nonly as a reward of merit, it must be a reward of merit also in the order\nof intention. In both cases predestination depends upon a future\ncondition.\n\nPerhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute predestination is the\nfact that it involves the absolute reprobation of those not predestined to\nglory. \u201cIf it could be validly argued,\u201d says Gutberlet, \u201cthat, since the\nend must be willed before the means, salvation must be decreed before the\nmeans to its attainment (_i.e._ merits), the argument would be applicable\nalso to the damned. If God _voluntate antecedente_ wills to lead only a\nfew to salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, then He\nmust likewise _voluntate antecedente_ have in view the end of the\nreprobates, which is His own glorification through the manifestation of\nHis justice and mercy. Hence He must also decree the means necessary to\nobtain this end, _i.e._ He must cause these unfortunate creatures to sin,\nin order that they may reach the end for which He has predestined them; in\nother words, He must pre-ordain them to sin and eternal damnation,\u201d(622)\nwhich is what Calvin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink\nfrom adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall back upon the theory\nof _negative_ reprobation, which, however, amounts practically to the same\nthing.(623)\n\n5. THE THEORY OF HYPOTHETICAL PREDESTINATION POST PRAEVISA\nMERITA.\u2014Predestination, like God\u2019s will to save all men, is based on a\nhypothetical decree. Those only are predestined to eternal happiness who\nshall merit it as a reward. It is solely by reason of His infallible\nforeknowledge of these merits that God\u2019s hypothetical decree of\npredestination becomes absolute. Or, as Becanus puts it, \u201cGod first\nprepared the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life those whose\ngood use of the gifts He foresaw.\u201d(624)\n\nThis view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason that it sets aside\nthe cruel theory of \u201cnegative reprobation,\u201d was defended by such earlier\nScholastics as Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent\nlater writers, _e.g._ Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, Tournely, and\nis held to-day by nearly all theologians outside the Thomist school. What\ngave it special authority in modern times was the recommendation of St.\nFrancis de Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) described\nthe theory of conditional predestination _post praevisa merita_ as \u201cmore\nin harmony with the mercy and grace of God, truer and more\nattractive.\u201d(625) This view has a solid basis both in Scripture and\nTradition.\n\na) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of God\u2019s saving will.\nNow if God _voluntate antecedente_ wills the eternal salvation of all men\nwithout exception,(626) He cannot possibly intend that only some shall be\nsaved.\n\nIt is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only the temporal\nrealization but likewise the eternal promise of glory dependent on the\nperformance of good works. St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited\nas a _locus classicus_ by the advocates of the theory,(627) wrote towards\nthe end of his life to Timothy: \u201cI have fought a good fight, I have\nfinished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid\nup for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to\nme in that day.\u201d(628) In writing these lines the Apostle no doubt had in\nmind the sentence of the Universal Judge: \u201cCome, ye blessed of my Father,\npossess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the\nworld,\u201d(629)\u2014which may with far greater reason be termed a \u201cclassical\u201d\ntext than the obscure ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To\nprepare for men the kingdom of heaven from the foundation (_i.e._\nbeginning) of the world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now,\nGod has \u201cprepared\u201d the kingdom of heaven for men in view of their foreseen\nmerits, that is to say, conditionally. The causal conjunction _enim_ in\nthe sentence following the one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): \u201c_Esurivi\nenim et dedistis mihi manducare_, etc.,\u201d refers to the entire preceding\nsentence, not only to the _possidete_ in time, but also to the _paratum_\nin eternity. Consequently, the eternal decree of predestination itself,\nlike its temporal execution, depends on good works or merit. This\ninterpretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the sentence\npronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, 41 sqq.: \u201cDepart from me, you\ncursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his\nangels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc.\u201d The\n\u201ceverlasting fire\u201d is manifestly decreed from all eternity in the same\nsense in which it is inflicted in time, namely, _propter et post praevisa\nmerita_. Billuart\u2019s contention(630) that hell has been prepared solely for\n\u201cthe devil and his angels\u201d is untenable, because in several other\nScriptural passages(631) the reprobates are expressly classed among the\nfollowers of Satan. If we add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling\nthe last judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as not\nonly to show its absolute justice but likewise to intimate that, had they\nso willed, the damned might have had their place on the right hand of the\nGreat Judge, we must admit that the theory of predestination _post\npraevisa merita_ has a solid foundation in Scripture.(632)\n\nb) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hypothetical predestination, which\nfact has caused the theory to be commonly referred to as \u201c_sententia\nGraecorum_.\u201d(633)\n\nThus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the Son of Man as follows:\n\u201cPossess ye the kingdom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal\nheritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was prepared and arranged for\nyou before you came into existence, because I knew beforehand that you\nwould be what you are.\u201d(634) Theodoret says: \u201cHe did not simply predestine\n[men], but He predestined them because He foreknew [their merits].\u201d(635)\n\nThe Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all without exception taught\nhypothetical predestination. St. Hilary says: \u201cMany are called, but few\nare chosen.... Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice,\nbut a selection based on merit.\u201d(636) And St. Ambrose: \u201cTherefore the\nApostle says: \u2018Whom he foreknew he also predestined\u2019 (Rom. VIII, 29); for\nHe did not predestine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward to\nthose whose merits He foresaw.\u201d(637)\n\nThe question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,(638) be decided on the sole\nauthority of St. Augustine, because he is claimed by both parties to the\ncontroversy.(639)\n\nOn account of the existing differences of opinion it is impossible to\nestablish the theory of hypothetical predestination on the basis of\nScholastic teaching.(640) The opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute;(641)\nlikewise that of St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry of\nGhent shows a disposition to favor absolute predestination, but leaves the\nquestion open. \u201cLet every one,\u201d he says,(642) \u201cchoose whichever opinion\nsuits him best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be\nsafeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths that are to be held\nin respect of God.\u201d(643)\n\n6. A COMPROMISE THEORY.\u2014For the sake of completeness we will add a few\nwords on a theory which takes middle ground between the two just reviewed,\nholding that, while the common run of humanity is predestined\nhypothetically, a few exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of\nabsolute predestination.\n\nAmong the champions of this \u201ceclectic\u201d theory may be mentioned:\nOckam,(644) Gabriel Biel,(645) Ysambert,(646) and Ambrosius\nCatharinus.(647) The Saints regarded by these writers as absolutely\npredestined to eternal glory are: the Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets\nand Apostles, St. Joseph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all\ninfants dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,(648) Dominicus Soto, and\ncertain other divines attack this theory on the ground that it makes the\nsalvation of the great majority of the elect a matter of chance and\nthereby imperils the dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is\nunfounded. For though the \u201ceclectic\u201d theory has little or no support\neither in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently safeguards the dogma of\npredestination by admitting that _voluntate consequente_ none but the\npredestined can attain to eternal beatitude.\n\nOnly with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we inclined to make an\nexception. It is probable that she was predestined to eternal glory _ante\npraevisa merita_, because, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she\nenjoyed \u201cexceed all measure and must not be extended to any other human\nbeing.\u201d(649)\n\n\nArticle 4. The Reprobation Of The Damned\n\n\nThe reprobation of the damned is sometimes called _praedestinatio ad\ngehennam_, though, as we have remarked, the term \u201cpredestination\u201d should\nproperly be restricted to the blessed.\n\nThere can be no absolute and positive predestination to eternal\npunishment, and the pains of hell can be threatened only in view of mortal\nsin. Hence reprobation may be defined, in the words of Peter Lombard, as\n\u201cGod\u2019s foreknowledge of the wickedness of some creatures and the\npreparation of their damnation.\u201d(650)\n\nA distinction must, however, be made (at least in theory), between\n_positive_ and _negative_ reprobation. To teach positive reprobation would\nbe heretical. Negative reprobation, on the other hand, is defended by all\nthose Catholic theologians who advocate the theory of absolute\npredestination _ante praevisa merita_.(651)\n\n1. HERETICAL PREDESTINARIANISM OR THE THEORY OF THE POSITIVE REPROBATION\nOF THE DAMNED.\u2014Heretical Predestinarianism was taught by Lucidus,\nGottschalk, Wiclif, Hus, the younger Jansenius, and especially by Calvin.\nThe latter asserted that the salvation of the elect and the damnation of\nthe reprobate are the effects of an unconditional divine decree.(652)\n\nAccording to this abominable heresy, the sin of Adam and the spiritual\nruin which it entailed upon his descendants are attributable solely to the\nwill of God. God produces in the reprobate a \u201csemblance of faith,\u201d only to\nmake them all the more deserving of damnation. In the beginning of the\nseventeenth century Arminius and a few other theologians of the Dutch\nReformed Church, repelled by Calvin\u2019s _decretum horribile_, ascribed the\npositive reprobation of the damned to original sin (_lapsus_). These\nwriters, called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians, were opposed by the\nstrict school of Calvinist divines under the leadership of Gomarus. The\ngreat Calvinist Synod of Dordrecht (1618-1619) condemned the principles of\nArminius, and subsequently his adherents were driven from Holland.\n\nThe Catholic Church condemned Predestinarianism as early as 529 at the\nSecond Council of Orange, which among other things declared: \u201cWe not only\nrefuse to believe that some men are by divine power predestined to evil,\nbut if there be any who hold such a wicked thing, we condemn them with\nutter detestation.\u201d(653)\n\nThe Tridentine Council defined against Calvin: \u201cIf any one saith that the\ngrace of justification is attained to only by those who are predestined\nunto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but\nreceive not grace, as being by divine power predestined unto evil; let him\nbe anathema.\u201d(654)\n\nCalvinism, both supra- and infra-lapsarian, is easily refuted from\nRevelation and Tradition.\n\na) It runs counter to all those texts of the Bible which assert the\nuniversality of God\u2019s saving will,(655) the bestowal of sufficient grace\non all sinners,(656) and the divine attribute of holiness.(657)\n\nCalvin endeavored to prove his blasphemous doctrine chiefly from the ninth\nchapter of St. Paul\u2019s Epistle to the Romans.(658) His disciple Beza relied\nmainly on 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: \u201cBut to them that believe not, the stone which\nthe builders rejected, the same is made the head of the corner: and a\nstone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, to them who stumble at the\nword, neither do believe, whereunto also they are set,\u201d(659) _i.e._,\naccording to Beza, predestined not to believe.(660) But this\ninterpretation is obviously wrong. For we know from Is. VIII, 14(661) and\nMatth. XXI, 44,(662) that those who fall on this stone are ground to\npowder as a punishment for the sin of unbelief.(663)\n\nb) The Fathers, especially those of the East, are unanimous in upholding\nthe orthodox teaching of the Church. The only one whom adherents of\nPredestinarianism have dared to claim is St. Augustine.\n\nYet the \u201cDoctor of Grace\u201d expressly teaches: \u201cGod is good, God is just. He\ncan deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any\none without demerits, because He is just.\u201d(664) St. Prosper re-echoes this\nteaching when he says of the reprobates: \u201cOf their own will they went out;\nof their own will they fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they\nwere not predestined. They would, however, be predestined if they were to\nreturn and persevere in holiness; hence God\u2019s predestination is for many\nthe cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away.\u201d(665) St.\nFulgentius expresses himself in similar language.(666)\n\n2. THE THEORY OF \u201cNEGATIVE REPROBATION.\u201d\u2014Negative reprobation is defined\nby its defenders as an eternal decree by which God excludes from Heaven\nthose not absolutely predestined, in other words, determines not to save\nthem.\n\na) Gonet explains the difference between negative and positive reprobation\nin Scholastic terminology as follows: \u201c_... quod haec [i.e. positiva]\nhabet non solum terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam\nterminum ad quem, scil. poenam sive damni sive sensus; illa vero [i.e.\nnegativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria ut\nbeneficio indebito, non vero terminum ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut\nsic praecise et ut habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur\nreprobus esse damnandus aut ulli poenae sive damni sive sensus\ndeputandus._\u201d(667)\n\nThe general principle laid down in this quotation is variously developed\nby Thomist theologians.\n\nThe rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Sylvius) assign as the\nmotive of reprobation the sovereign will of God. God, they say, without\ntaking into account possible sins and demerits, determined _a priori_ to\nexclude from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, Gotti, Gonet,\nGazzaniga, and others condemn this view as incompatible with the teaching\nof St. Thomas, and, appealing to St. Augustine\u2019s doctrine of the _massa\ndamnata_, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the reprobates\nfrom heaven in original sin, in which God, without being unjust, could\nleave as many as He saw fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others assume\nthat the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory but\nmerely from \u201ceffective election\u201d thereunto, God simply having decreed\n_ante praevisa merita_ to leave them to their weakness.(668)\n\nWhile the Thomists found no difficulty in harmonizing this view with their\ntheory of physical premotion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard\nput in trying to square it with the _scientia media_.(669) On the whole\nthese Molinists endorse the third and mildest of the above-quoted\nopinions, which differs only theoretically from the rigoristic view\ndescribed in the first place. Practically it makes no difference whether\nGod directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give him the graces\nnecessary to attain it.\n\nSurveying all three of the theories under consideration we cannot but\nregard the first and third as heartless and cruel, because they attribute\neternal reprobation to a positive decree that takes effect independently\nof sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original sin), is open\nto the serious dogmatic objection that it contradicts the teaching of St.\nPaul and the Tridentine declaration that \u201cthere is no condemnation (_nihil\ndamnationis_) in those who are truly buried together with Christ by\nbaptism into death.\u201d(670)\n\nb) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as the logical counterpart of\nabsolute predestination.(671) If Almighty God, by an absolute decree,\nwithout regard to any possible merits, merely to reveal His divine\nattributes and to \u201cembellish the universe,\u201d had determined that only those\ncould enter the \u201cHeavenly Jerusalem\u201d who were antecedently predestined\nthereto, it would inevitably follow that the unfortunate remainder of\nhumanity by the very same decree were \u201cpassed over,\u201d \u201comitted,\u201d\n\u201coverlooked,\u201d \u201cnot elected,\u201d or, as Gonet honestly admits, \u201cexcluded from\nHeaven,\u201d which is the same thing as being negatively condemned to hell.\n\nThe logical distinction between positive and negative reprobation,\ntherefore, consists mainly in this, that the former signifies absolute\ndamnation to hell, the latter (equally absolute) non-election to Heaven.\nTo protect the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against unjust\naspersions, however, it is necessary to point out certain fundamental\ndifferences between their theory and the heresy of Calvin.\n\nCalvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality both of God\u2019s\nsaving will and of the atonement; they refuse to admit the actual bestowal\nof sufficient grace upon those fore-ordained to eternal damnation; and\nclaim that the human will loses its freedom under the predominance of\nefficacious grace or concupiscence. The Catholic defenders of negative\nreprobation indignantly reject the charge that their position logically\nleads to any such heretical implications.\n\nc) The theory of negative reprobation can be sufficiently refuted by\nshowing that it is incompatible with the universality of God\u2019s will to\nsave all men. For if God willed absolutely and antecedently to \u201cexclude\nsome men from Heaven,\u201d as Gonet asserts, or \u201cnot to elect them to eternal\nglory,\u201d as Suarez contends, then it would be His absolute will that they\nperish.\n\n\u03b1) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphysically impossible to\nattain eternal salvation. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to\nassuming that an essentially absolute decree of God can be frustrated.\nThis consideration led certain Thomists(672) to describe the divine\n_voluntas salvifica_ as rather an ineffectual _velleitas_.(673) But this\nconflicts with the obvious teaching of Revelation.(674) Suarez labors in\nvain to reconcile the sincerity of God\u2019s salvific will with the theory of\nnegative reprobation. The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could God\nsincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as Suarez says,\nthat \u201cit is not in man\u2019s power to work out his eternal salvation in case\nhe falls under non-election, non-predestination, or, which amounts to the\nsame thing, negative reprobation\u201d?(675)\n\n\u03b2) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative reprobation becomes fully\napparent when we consider the attitude it ascribes to God. Gonet writes:\n\u201cForeseeing that the whole human race would be depraved by original sin,\nGod, in view of the merits of Christ who was to come, elected some men to\nglory and, in punishment of original sin and to show His justice towards\nthem and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted others to miss the\nattainment of beatitude, in other words, He positively willed that they\nshould not attain it.... In virtue of this efficacious intention He\ndevised appropriate means for the attainment of His purpose, and seeing\nthat some would miss beatitude by simply being left in the state of\noriginal sin, and others by being permitted to fall into actual sins and\nto persevere therein, He formally decreed this permission, and finally ...\nby a command of His intellect ordained these means towards the attainment\nof the aforesaid end.\u201d(676) Translated into plain every-day language this\ncan only mean that God tries with all His might to prevent the reprobate\nfrom attaining eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the state\nof sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing Gonet\u2019s teaching as\n\u201cincompatible with sound doctrine.\u201d(677) But his own teaching is equally\nunsound and cruel. For he, too, is compelled to assert: \u201cPredestination to\nglory is the motive for which efficacious or infallible means towards\nattaining that end are bestowed. Hence to refuse to predestine a man for\nglory is to deny him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to\nattain that end.\u201d(678)\n\nHoly Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. It describes God\nas a loving Father, who \u201cwills not that any should perish, but that all\nshould return to penance.\u201d(679)\n\n\u03b3) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is positively\ncondemned to eternal damnation, as Calvin and the Jansenists assert, or\nnegatively excluded from Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom\nwe have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive and negative\nreprobation is \u201ca distinction without a difference.\u201d For an adult to be\nexcluded from Heaven simply means that he is damned. There is no such\nthing as a middle state or a purely natural beatitude. Lessius justly says\nthat to one reprobated by God it would be all the same whether his\nreprobation was positive or negative, because in either case he would be\ninevitably lost.(680)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014*Ruiz, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, Lyons\n    1628.\u2014Ramirez, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, 2 vols.,\n    Alcal\u00e1 1702.\u2014*Lessius, _De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis_,\n    XIV, 2.\u2014*IDEM, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_ (_Opusc._,\n    Vol. II, Paris 1878).\u2014Tournely, _De Deo_, qu. 22 sqq.\u2014Schrader,\n    _Commentarii_, I-II, _De Praedestinatione_, Vienna 1865.\u2014J. P.\n    Baltzer, _Des hl. Augustinus Lehre \u00fcber Pr\u00e4destination und\n    Reprobation_, Vienna 1871.\u2014Mannens, _De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et\n    Praedestinatione_, Louvain 1883.\u2014O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der\n    Augustinismus_, M\u00fcnchen 1892.\u2014O. Pf\u00fclf, S. J., \u201c_Zur\n    Pr\u00e4destinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_,\u201d in the Innsbruck\n    _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.\u2014B. J. Otten,\n    S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis\n    1917, pp. 281, 378, 382 sqq.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will\n\n\nWhen we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious\ngrace; merely sufficient grace, as such, does not involve consent.\n\nThe Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the\nhuman will under the influence of efficacious grace.\n\nCatholic theologians have always staunchly upheld both the freedom of the\nwill and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual\nrelations between grace and free-will.\n\n\n\nSection 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists\n\n\n1. THE HERETICAL ERRORS OF LUTHER, CALVIN, AND JANSENIUS CONTRASTED WITH\nTHE ORTHODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.\u2014Luther and Calvin asserted that the\nfreedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius\ntaught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same\nway as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against\nboth these heresies the Church has always maintained that the will remains\nfree under the influence of efficacious grace.\n\na) Luther taught(681) that original sin has so completely annihilated\nman\u2019s free-will that he resembles a horse compelled to go in whatever\ndirection it is driven (according as \u201cGod or the devil rides him\u201d),(682)\nand that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man\u2019s liberty, compels\nhim to act with intestine necessity.\n\nCalvin(683) carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by asserting:\n(1) that the will of our first parents was free in Paradise, but lost its\nfreedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery\nof Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore\nliberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will\nunder the influence of grace is passive, and must needs follow the impulse\nto which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous.(684)\n\nAgainst these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of\nfree-will both in the state of original sin(685) and under the influence\nof efficacious grace: \u201cIf any one saith that man\u2019s free-will, moved and\nexcited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, ... cannot\nrefuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does\nnothing whatever and is merely passive: let him be anathema.\u201d(686)\n\nb) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper\ndistinction between freedom from external constraint (_libertas a\ncoactione_) and freedom from internal compulsion (_libertas a\nnecessitate_), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of\ngrace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from interior\ncompulsion, and that the _libertas a coactione_ is entirely sufficient to\ngain merit or demerit in the fallen state.(687)\n\nThe Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows:\n(1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in\nParadise and became subject to a twofold delectation\u2014_delectatio coelestis\nvictrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two\ndelectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger\nalways defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance,\nis alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4)\nIn each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the\n_delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it\nis stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes\n_efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_\nsin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the\n_delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is\ncalled by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two\ndelectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a\ndefinite decision.\n\nThis false teaching inspired the famous \u201cfive propositions\u201d of Jansenius,\nto-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God\u2019s commandments for want of\ngrace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior\ngrace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is\nsufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian\nheresy consisted in assuming the existence of a grace which man may either\nobey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the\npredestined.\n\nThese propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his\ndogmatic Bull \u201c_Cum occasione_,\u201d of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly\ncontained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever\nresists interior grace. \u201cIf it is true that fallen man never resists\ninterior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who\nviolates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he\ntherefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first\nproposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is\nclear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of\ndemerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative,\nmerit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the\njust whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is\ntherefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to\nevery man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a\nfurther consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the\nuniversal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth\nproposition).\u201d(689)\n\n2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED FROM REVELATION.\u2014Far from favoring\nthe determinism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition\npositively contradict the contention that free-will is overpowered by\ngrace.\n\na) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in\nSacred Scripture as mutually exclusive, but invariably as co\u00f6perating\nfactors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other,\naccording to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view.\n\nThe Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this:(690) \u201cWhen it is\nsaid in the sacred writings, \u2018Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,\u2019(691)\nwe are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: \u2018Convert us, O God,\nto thee, and we shall be converted,\u2019(692) we confess that we are\nforestalled by the grace of God.\u201d\n\nSt. Paul, it is true, asks: \u201cWho resisteth his [God\u2019s] will?\u201d(693) But he\nalso admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: \u201cExercise thyself unto\ngodliness.\u201d(694) St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost\ndoes not compel the will. \u201cYou always resist the Holy Ghost,\u201d he tells the\nJews; \u201cas your fathers did, so do you also.\u201d(695) Our Lord Himself teaches\nthat grace exerts no interior compulsion but invites free co\u00f6peration: \u201cIf\nthou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.\u201d(696) The exhortations,\npromises, and threats uttered in various portions of Holy Writ would be\nmeaningless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.(697)\n\nb) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine\ndefended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were\nsubsequently accused of harboring Pelagian and Semipelagian errors.(698)\nCalvin himself admits that with but one exception the Fathers are\nunanimously opposed to his teaching.(699)\n\nThe one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and\nJansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that\nthe point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with\nthe Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace,\nnot its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the\nlatter, he shows by the manner in which he formulates his sentences that\nhe regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he\ndoes not try to solve this mystery in the manner in which Alexander the\nGreat cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything,\nfree-will is nothing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the\nhuman will, their mutual relation would be no problem.(700) Possibly St.\nAugustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in\nlanguage open to misinterpretation, as when he said: \u201cTherefore aid was\nbrought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be\nunchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace.\u201d(701) But this and\nsimilar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the\ncontext shows, Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of grace in\nall things pertaining to salvation, and to emphasize the fact that\nfree-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous\ntemptations.(702) At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom\nof the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of\nmany available passages in proof of this statement. \u201cTo yield consent or\nto withhold it, whenever God calls, is the function of one\u2019s own\nwill.\u201d(703) \u201cFor the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will\nis aided; but it is aided precisely for the reason that it remains\nfree.\u201d(704) St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own\ningenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: \u201cTake away\nfree will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and\nthere will be no means left of salvation.\u201d(705)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014*Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_ (_Opera\n    Omnia_, ed. F\u00e8vre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873).\u2014*Dechamps, S. J.,\n    _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.\u2014F. W\u00f6rter, _Die christliche\n    Lehre \u00fcber das Verh\u00e4ltnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf\n    Augustinus_, Freiburg 1856.\u2014*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,\n    thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.\u2014S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.\n    357 sqq., 377 sqq., Freiburg 1901.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual\n    of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 sqq.\n\n\n\nSection 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of Grace\nAnd Free-Will\n\n\nThe relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of\nview. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action\non the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to\nascertain how free-will is affected by grace.\n\nThe first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related\ntheological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism\nand Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.\n\nBesides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two\nextremes and may therefore be called eclectic.\n\nThat the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an\narticle of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It\nis in trying to explain how grace and free-will co\u00f6perate, that the\nabove-mentioned schools differ.\n\nIn approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it\nour duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind\nhim that the different systems which we are about to examine are all\ntolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at\nstake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient\ncontroversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.\n\n\nArticle 1. Thomism And Augustinianism\n\n\nThomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab\nintrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even\nthe existence of such a grace.\n\n1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.\u2014The true founder of the Thomistic system\nis not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the\nlearned Dominican theologian Ba\u00f1ez (1528-1604). His teaching may be\nsummarized as follows:\n\na) God is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_)\nof all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_)\nderive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any\ncreature could act independently of God, God would cease to be _causa\nprima_ and _motor primus_.(706)\n\nThe influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces\nall creatural acts without exception,\u2014necessary and free, good and\nbad,\u2014because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in\nmotion by the _motor primus_.\n\nIn influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar\nnature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the\nfree causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode\nof action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His\ndetermining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not\nmoved.\n\nb) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His\nrational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute\nand omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills\ninfallibly happens.(708)\n\nNevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform\nan act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of\nsin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)\n\nc) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God\u2019s\nconcurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be\nconceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only\nmakes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from\npotentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which\nthe Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a\n_praemotio_,\u2014and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio\nphysica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that God\u2019s prevenient\ninfluence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to\ntheir assent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines\nitself.(713)\n\nd) If we analyse God\u2019s physical predeterminations in so far as they are\ncreated entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and\nexecution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio\nphysica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called\n_praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a\ntemporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the\nterms are often used synonymously.(714)\n\nViewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal\npredetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to\ndetermine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and\nconditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination\nwithout regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical\npredetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow\ntheir future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia\nmedia_. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free\ndeterminations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very\nfoundation of His foreknowledge.(715)\n\nThis is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its\nchampions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as\nfollows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the\nsupernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)\n\ne) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there\ncorresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which\npredetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts\nfreely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate\nconsequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say\nthat efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may\nco-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The\nwill freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved\nthereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its\nefficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and\nintrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)\n\nIt follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio\nad unum_.(719)\n\nf) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature\ninseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ\nessentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which\nconfers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu\noperari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free\nconsent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent,\nbecause with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become\nefficacious.(720)\n\nHere the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can\nsufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this\nquestion in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers\nthe power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for\nthe deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely\nsufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist,\nGod would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)\n\nCRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.\u2014The Thomistic system\nundoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine\ngrace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently\nworks out the concept of God as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in\nthe natural and the supernatural order.\n\nBut Thomism also has its weak points.\n\nA. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious\ntheological difficulties.\n\n(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious\nand merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.\n\n(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the\ndogma of free-will.\n\nThough in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the\nfreedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their\nattempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their\nsystem.\n\na) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient\nto enable a man to perform a salutary act, because _ex vi notionis_ it\nconfers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a\nsubstantially new grace (_gratia efficax_). A grace which requires to be\nentitatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform\na salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act.\n\u201cTo be truly sufficient for something\u201d and \u201cto require to be complemented\nby something else\u201d are mutually exclusive notions, and hence \u201csufficient\ngrace\u201d as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.\n\nMany subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty.\nBilluart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has\nreceived sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied\nthe _gratia efficax_, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the\nwill.(724) But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic\nteaching that together with the _gratia sufficiens_ there co-exists in the\nsoul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable _praemotio physica_ to\nthe entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound\nup.(725) If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so\nlong as God denies him the _gratia ab intrinseco efficax_?\n\nSpeaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct\nattitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it\nmay remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a\npredetermining _gratia efficax_, to merit which is beyond its power. If it\nwithstands, it _eo ipso_ renders itself unworthy of the _gratia efficax_.\nIf it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and\nawaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?\n\nTo resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does\nthe right use of liberty come in? If co\u00f6peration with sufficient grace\nmoves God to bestow the _gratia per se efficax_, as the Thomists contend,\nthen the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the _gratia\nsufficiens_ and the _gratia efficax per se_. But there is absolutely no\nplace for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the\npurpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or\nto unaided nature. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would\nlead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving\nin a vicious circle, thus: \u201cBecause the will offers no resistance, it is\nefficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful\nresistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform\na salutary act.\u201d(726)\n\nIt is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty\nwhich will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the\nThomistic system rests, viz.: \u201c_Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi\nsit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad\nactum]_,\u201d that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be\nefficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the\nlatter to the former as of potency to act.\n\nb) The Thomistic _gratia efficax_, conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad\nunum_, inevitably destroys free-will.\n\n\u03b1) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion\nas such,(727) but the implied connotation of _praevia determinatio ad\nunum_, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the\nwill does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely\npassive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to\nwill, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical\npredetermination, in so far as it is a _determinatio ad unum_, must\nnecessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical\npredetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the\nThomists hold that the _gratia per se efficax_ operates in the manner of a\nsupernatural _praedeterminatio ad unum_. If this were true, the will under\nthe influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.\n\nTo perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in\nmind the Thomistic definition of _praemotio physica_ as \u201c_actio Dei, qu\u00e2\nvoluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet\ninsuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa\npraemotione coniungere_.\u201d(728) That is to say: As the non-performance of\nan act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the\nrespective _praemotio physica_, so conversely, the performance of an act\nis conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion;\nthe will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because\nthis would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the\ndivine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by\nGod, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.\n\n                  -------------------------------------\n\n\u03b2) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a\ndistinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really\nnecessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does\nnot. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion,\nbut it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a\n_determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of\nthe will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_\u2014it is a _necessitas\nconsequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as\na created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with\nfree-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is\nable to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The\nobvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by\nan appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do\nwhat is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a\n_determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a\nsquare circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction.\nFurthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to\nperform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio\nphysica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so,\nreplies Alvarez; \u201cfor the will remains free so long as the intellect\nrepresents to it an object as indifferent.\u201d(731) That is to say: Liberty\nremains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present.\nBut this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the\nquestion. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the\nintellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless\nit possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This\n_indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is\nabsolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would\nit avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit\nto compulsion from some other quarter?\n\n\u03b3) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous\ndistinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The\nMolinists argue: \u201c_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non\npotest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._\u201d The Thomists reply:\n\u201c_Distinguo:\u2014non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest\ndissentire in sensu composito, concedo._\u201d They explain this distinction by\ncertain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says:\n\u201c_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod\npossit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub\nsessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum\nsessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis,\nsensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._\u201d(732) As one who sits cannot\nat the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise\n(_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious\ngrace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will\nretains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and\nthis is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.\n\nIs the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_\ncorrectly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence\nof the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and\nas easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby\ndemonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733)\ndescribes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can\nnever under any circumstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is\nreally no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand;\nhis natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint.\nSimilarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia\nefficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia\nresistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.\n\n\u03b4) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists\ntriumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that \u201cman\n... while he receives that inspiration [_i.e._ efficacious grace], ... is\nalso able to reject it.\u201d And again: \u201cIf any one saith that man\u2019s\nfree-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and\ncalling, does in no wise co\u00f6perate towards disposing and preparing itself\nfor obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its\nconsent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing\nwhatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.\u201d(734) To adjust their\nsystem to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed\nthat the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the _gratia sufficiens_, to\nwhich the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is\nuntenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will\nco\u00f6perates by giving its consent (_cooperatur assentiendo_) and which it\ncan render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with\nthe grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and\nunder the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will\nremains inanimate and merely passive. This can only be the _gratia\nefficax_. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious\nsense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally\nchose the term _dissentire_ (_sensus divisus_) rather than _resistere_\n(_sensus compositus_), in order to indicate that under the predetermining\ninfluence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent\n(_posse dissentire_) but not to offer resistance (_posse resistere_).(735)\nThis interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has\ndefined that \u201cFaith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a\ngift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by\nwhich man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and\nco\u00f6perating with His grace, which he is able to resist.\u201d(736) If\nefficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that\n\u201cirresistible\u201d influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.(737)\n\n                  -------------------------------------\n\nB. The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the\nphilosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God\nforeknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His\nrelation to sin.\n\na) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course,\nunderestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God\u2019s\nforeknowledge of the free acts of the future.\n\n                  -------------------------------------\n\nThe Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous\nand weighty that in our treatise on God(738) we made no attempt to\ndemonstrate the _scientia media_ by stringent arguments, but merely\naccepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific\nbasis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the\nnatural and the supernatural order.\n\nb) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the\nThomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that God\npredetermines men to sin.\n\n\u03b1) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles God would have\nto be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the\nwill to justification can take no other form than the _gratia per se\nefficax_, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the\npredetermining influence of the _motor primus_.(739) Without this\nassumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the\nabsolute will of God an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future\nsins. Ba\u00f1ez says on this point: \u201cGod knows sin with an intuitive\nknowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the\nsame time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe\nthe law.\u201d(740) Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the\nimmediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises.\nAnd this for two reasons. First, because the alleged _praemotio ad malum_\nis as irresistible as the _praemotio ad bonum_; and secondly, because the\nmaterial element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element;\notherwise God would foreknow sin merely _materialiter_ as an act but not\n_formaliter_ as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was\nclearly defined by the Council of Trent: \u201cIf any one saith that it is not\nin man\u2019s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God\nworketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly\nand of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own\nproper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.\u201d(741)\n\nIf the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act,\nresistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an\nact practically cannot be separated from its physical entity, then in the\nThomistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the _entitas_ but\nlikewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral\nmeans, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us\nphysically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the\n_praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This\nconsideration may be supplemented by another. So-called \u201csins of malice\u201d\nare comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some\npleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology\nin forbidding sin forbids its physical entity. How gladly would not those\nwho are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the\nentity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their\npassion without offending God!\n\n\u03b2) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend\nthemselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him\nindeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the\nsoul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such\nreasoning as follows: \u201cThe will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked\nshinbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through\nphysical premotion.\u201d(742)\n\nAnother and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that\nMolinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. \u201cIt is\nimpossible for a man to sin unless God lends His co\u00f6peration. Do not,\ntherefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?\u201d Those who argue\nin this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction\nbetween the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio\nphysica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful\nact without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to\noffer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins\nas a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits\nas it were the free consent of the will before it co\u00f6perates with the\nsinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743)\nFor this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a\nwell-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in\nthat of the Thomists.(744)\n\n2. AUGUSTINIANISM.\u2014This system, so called because its defenders pretend to\nbase it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity\nwith Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect,\nespecially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with\ngreat deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not\nphysically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence\nAugustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the\n_praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti,\nO. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis\nDisciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that\nArchbishop Jean d\u2019Yse de Sal\u00e9on, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary\ntheologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict\nXIV instituted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree\npermitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.\n\na) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor\nprimus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_\nor _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1)\nActual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial\ndelectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally\nprecedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every\ninstance constitutes the law and standard of the will\u2019s disposition to do\ngood.\n\n(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence\n(_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man,\nand the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as\ncelestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with,\nconcupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to\nwhich it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio\ncoelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that\nfree-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth\nprinciple, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the\nessential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the\n_delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to\nchoose between good and evil.(748)\n\nb) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the\nAugustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely\nsufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or\nat best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_\n(_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio\ncoelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to\nperform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and\nspecific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the\nperformance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on\nthe _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as\n_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)\n\nc) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_,\naccording to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of\nthe _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to\na constitutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its\nevil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_\n(_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall,\nwhen the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo\nnon_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)\n\nd) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the\ndelectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically\ncompel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while\nthe will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it\ndoes not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty,\nthough not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient\ngrace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of\nthe will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of\nexemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who,\nthough physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on\na public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.\n\nCRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.\u2014On account of its uncritical methods\nAugustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so\nfar as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.\n\nLike the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in\nsupport of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian\nterms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have\na strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet\nhow widely does not the \u201cAugustinus Iprensis,\u201d as he has been called,\ndiffer from the \u201cAugustinus Hipponensis\u201d! Augustinianism, too, utterly\nmisconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call\nattention to one or two points only.\n\na) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false\nconception of sufficient grace.\n\nHow can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first\ndescribed in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same\nbreath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia\nmagna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of \u201cgrace\u201d can that\nbe which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the\nprevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of\nthat to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the\ndistinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St.\nAugustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace,\nbut the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia\nmagna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a\ngood act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)\n\nb) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio\nmoralis_ with the dogma of free-will.\n\nUnder the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be\nconceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is\nphysically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough\nthat the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty.\nIn the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines\nthe will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter,\nthere can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of\nrational creatures on the part of God, because the Augustinians reject the\n_scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace\nwhich proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because\nof the condition of his heart.(755)\n\nc) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are\nfalse and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.\n\nIt is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of\nall supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred,\nfear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of God or a sense of duty\nis as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of\ntreading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard \u201ccelestial\ndelectation\u201d as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence\nas the characteristic note of sin.(757)\n\nThe second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise\nfalse. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity\ncannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that\nthe will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively\nstronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that\ndoes not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but\nnot that _libertas a necessitate_ which constitutes the notion of liberty.\nThere can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist\ndelectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the\nAugustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also\nfalse.(758)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014The literature on the different systems of grace is\n    enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.\n\n    On the Thomist side: *Ba\u00f1ez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S.\n    Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.\u2014*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae\n    et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.\u2014IDEM, _Responsionum Libri\n    Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.\u2014Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae\n    Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.\u2014*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae\n    Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.\u2014Contenson, O. P.,\n    _Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.\u2014De Lemos, O. P.,\n    _Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Li\u00e8ge 1676.\u2014Goudin, O. P.,\n    _De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.\u2014*Gotti, O.\n    P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_,\n    Venice 1750.\u2014Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema\n    Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.\u2014*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5\n    (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).\u2014IDEM, _Le Thomisme\n    Triomphant_, Paris 1725.\u2014*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des\n    hl. Thomas \u00fcber die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.\u2014IDEM, in\n    Commer\u2019s _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_,\n    1894 sqq.\u2014*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis\n    Physicae_, Paris 1886.\u2014I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis\n    Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.\u2014Joh. Ude,\n    _Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_,\n    Graz 1905.\u2014Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols.,\n    Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.\u2014P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et\n    le N\u00e9omolinisme_, Paris 1917.\n\n    On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae\n    Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.\u2014*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_,\n    8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.\u2014Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo\n    Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.\u2014L. de\n    Thomassin, _M\u00e9moires sur la Gr\u00e2ce, etc._, Louvain 1668.\n\n    For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.\n\n\nArticle 2. Molinism And Congruism\n\n\nThe point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they\ndiffer from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of efficacious\ngrace as _efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_.\n\nThis conception was violently attacked by the Spanish Dominican Ba\u00f1ez and\nother divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Ba\u00f1ez\nand the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special\ncommission to settle it. This was the famous _Congregatio de Auxiliis_,\nconsisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit\norders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a\ndecision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the suggestion of St. Francis de Sales,\ndeclared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade\nthe contending parties to denounce each other as heretical.(759)\n\nWhile Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the defense of grace, Molinism\nmade it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will.\n\n1. MOLINISM.\u2014Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who\npublished a famous treatise under the title _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum\nGratiae Donis_ at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as\nfollows:\n\na) In _actu primo_ there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an\nextrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient\ngrace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes\nefficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains\ninefficacious (_inefficax_) and _merely_ sufficient (_gratia mere\nsufficiens_). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in\none case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.(760)\n\nb) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of\ngrace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty,\nand _in actu primo_, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient\ngrace (_gratia praeveniens_), which imparts to it all the moral and\nphysical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the\n_actus secundus_ be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the\nresult of grace co\u00f6perating with free-will.(761) Consequently, the will by\ngiving its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace\nwhich makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts.\nTo say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to\nassert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the\nfreedom of the latter.(762)\n\nc) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to\nbe explained not by God\u2019s absolute will, but by His infallible\nforeknowledge through the _scientia media_,\u2014a Molinistic postulate which\nwas first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.\nJ., the teacher of Suarez.(763) God foreknows not only the absolutely free\nacts (_futura_) of His rational creatures by the _scientia visionis_, but\nlikewise their hypothetically free acts (_futuribilia_) by means of the\n_scientia media_, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what\nattitude the free-will of man would assume in each case if grace were\ngiven him. Consequently, when God, in the light of this eternal\nforeknowledge, actually bestows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious\nor inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give\nor withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace\nbe reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other\ndogmas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because\nGod by virtue of the _scientia media_ has it absolutely in His power to\ngive or withhold His graces in each individual case.(764)\n\nCRITICAL ESTIMATE OF MOLINISM.\u2014Even the most determined opponents of\nMolinism admit that this system possesses three important advantages.\n\na) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the sufficiency of \u201cmerely\nsufficient grace,\u201d which in its physical nature does not differ\nessentially from efficacious grace.\n\nSecond, Molinism safeguards free-will by denying that efficacious grace\neither physically or morally predetermines the will to one course of\naction.\n\nThird, Molinism explains in a fairly satisfactory manner why efficacious\ngrace is infallibly efficacious. God in virtue of the _scientia media_\nknows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each\nindividual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the\nwill and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow\nor withhold grace according to His absolute decrees.\n\nb) The question may justly be raised, however, whether, in endeavoring to\nsafeguard freewill, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after\nall the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation.\n\nThere is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or\ninefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a\ncreated will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by\nthe consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be\nan effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the councils of the\nChurch do not say: \u201c_Deus facit, si volumus_,\u201d but they declare: \u201c_Deus\nfacit, ut faciamus_,\u201d \u201c_Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et\nperficere_,\u201d and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need\nnot concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, humors, etc.,\nbut it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard\nto anything except the decree of the Divine Will. On account of this and\nsimilar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector\nof P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism(765) in favor of\nCongruism.(766)\n\nc) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably\nled the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers\nof theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic\nelement in the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in\nharmony with the principles defended by the Jesuit members of the\n_Congregatio de Auxiliis_ before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva\u2019s order\nis of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume:\n\u201c_Nostri in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re\nips\u00e2 habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non\ntantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu liberi arbitrii etiam\ncooperantem gratiam habentis effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in\nipso actu primo, quod posit\u00e2 scienti\u00e2 conditionalium [scienti\u00e2 medi\u00e2] ex\nefficaci Dei proposito atque intentione efficiendi certissime in nobis\nboni, de industria ipse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert,\nquo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, aliis usurus, si haec\ninefficacia praevidisset. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione beneficii\nplus aliquid in efficaci, quam in sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo\ncontineri: atque hac ratione efficere Deum, ut re ips\u00e2 faciamus, non\ntantum quia dat gratiam qu\u00e2 facere possimus. Quod idem dicendum est de\nperseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est._\u201d This modified, or perhaps we\nhad better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called\nCongruism.(767)\n\n2. CONGRUISM.\u2014The system thus recommended by Aquaviva in its fundamental\nprinciples really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the\ngreat Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the\nofficial system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645)\nand Piccolomini (d. 1651).\n\na) The distinction between _gratia congrua_ and _gratia incongrua_ is\nfounded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as\n\u201c_congruenter vocati_.\u201d(768) The Congruists maintain against the extreme\nMolinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free\ndetermination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace\nis bestowed under circumstances favorable to its operation, _i.e._\n\u201ccongruous\u201d in that sense. When the circumstances are comparatively\nadverse (_incongrua_), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father\nwho knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the\nright word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if\nit is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case,\nthereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the\ncity streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded\nconvent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his\nenvironment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is\nconferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations,\nprejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort\nof intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible\nmeans of executing His decrees.(769)\n\nb) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, considered _in actu primo_, is\nundoubtedly a special gift of God, and hence the _gratia congrua_\npossesses a higher value than the _gratia incongrua sive inefficax_. An\nentitatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under comparatively\nfavorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails\nin its purpose by reason of unfavorable circumstances created by\ninclination, training, or environment. Little David accomplished more with\na handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.(770)\n\nc) Congruism assigns a far more important r\u00f4le to grace than extreme\nMolinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy\nof grace upon the will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the\nexample of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribution of\ninternal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another\nuntouched.(771)\n\nCRITICAL ESTIMATE OF CONGRUISM.\u2014Among the different systems devised for\nthe purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism\nprobably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two\nextremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism\nand Jansenism on the other, and its principal theses can be supported by\nclear and unmistakable passages from the writings of St. Augustine.\n\na) Other points in its favor are the following: \u201cSufficient grace,\u201d in the\nCongruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as God is concerned,\nbecause its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will.\nThat free-will is properly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious\ngrace (_gratia congrua_) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing\nschools. True, Congruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion,\nbut as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circumstances of\ndaily life. As favorable circumstances (education, association,\ntemperament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so\nsupernatural grace (_gratia congrua s. efficax_) may soften the will and\noccasionally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases\nexcepted)(772) will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct\nadvance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference\nbetween _gratia efficax_ (_congrua_) and _gratia inefficax_ not entirely\non the will of man, but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able to\nexplain such formulas as \u201c_Deus facit, ut faciamus_,\u201d \u201c_Deus est, qui\ndiscernit_,\u201d _etc._, in a manner entirely compatible with the dogmatic\nteaching of the Church.(773)\n\nThe _modus operandi_ of the _gratia congrua_ (efficacious grace) is\nexplained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a\nthreefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (_efficacia virtutis_), the\nefficacy of union (_efficacia connexionis_), and the efficacy of\ninfallible success (_efficacia infallibilitatis_). Grace (both efficacious\nand sufficient) does not derive its _efficacia virtutis_ from the\nfree-will of man, nor from the knowledge of God (_scientia media_), but\nfrom itself. The _efficacia connexionis_ (of union between act and grace)\non the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to\nthe Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace\ndoes not operate irresistibly but can be \u201ccast off.\u201d The _efficacia\ninfallibilitatis_ springs from God\u2019s certain foreknowledge (_scientia\nmedia_), which cannot be deceived.(774)\n\nb) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend that Congruism solves\nall difficulties. The mystery surrounding both the unequal distribution of\nefficacious grace and the _scientia media_ still remains. Moreover, the\ntheory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circumstances of His\ncreatures, can hardly be reconciled with His dignity and omnipotence. It\nwould no doubt be far worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will\nof man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He wishes it to\nperform. Whoever has studied the lives of saints and eminent converts\nknows that the sudden and seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which\nmany of them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles in the\nstrict sense, though on the other hand it seems certain that grace worked\nin them with little or no regard to the \u201ccongruity\u201d of circumstances.\nAgain, it is one of the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to\nbe balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape them by changing a\nman\u2019s temperament, dulling concupiscence, weakening the power of\ntemptation, and so forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but\ncontrols and fashions the circumstances of the recipient.\n\nAfter all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and free-will still\nremains an unsolved mystery.(775)\n\n3. SYNCRETISM.\u2014Seeing that each of the different systems which we so far\nreviewed contains grains of truth, some theologians(776) have adopted the\ngood points of all four and combined them into a fifth, called Syncretism.\n\nThese authors begin by assuming the existence of two quite distinct sorts\nof efficacious grace, the (Thomistic-Augustinian) _gratia efficax ab\nintrinseco_, and the (Molinistic-Congruistic) _gratia efficax ab\nextrinseco_. The former, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of\nmore difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temptations,\nobserving onerous precepts, exercising patience in severe tribulation,\netc.; while the latter enables man to accomplish less difficult acts, such\nas short prayers, slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between\nthe two is prayer, which has been instituted for the purpose of enabling\nman to obtain that _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_ which is necessary for\nthe performance of the more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture\nteaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding upon all men,\nand that it accomplishes its purpose infallibly.(777)\n\nCRITICAL ESTIMATE OF SYNCRETISM.\u2014The outstanding characteristic of\nSyncretism is its insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to say\nthe most important, factor in the work of salvation.\n\na) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubtedly right. Sacred Scripture\nand Tradition both strongly emphasize the importance and necessity of\nprayer, so much so that one naturally expects to find prayer playing an\nessential and indispensable r\u00f4le in every complete and orthodox system of\ngrace. \u201cThe present economy of grace is essentially and intrinsically an\neconomy of prayer,\u201d is a theological axiom which cannot be too strongly\ninsisted upon. To have brought out this great truth forcibly and\nluminously is the merit of Syncretism.\n\nb) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the Syncretistic theory has\nsolved the problem of the relation between free-will and grace. On the\ncontrary, by adopting two such heterogeneous concepts as _gratia efficax\nab intrinseco_ and _gratia efficax ab extrinseco_ it has actually\nincreased the difficulties found in the other systems. For now we are put\nbefore the dilemma:\u2014the Thomistic _gratia efficax_ either supposes\nfree-will or it does not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this\ngrace to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does not, then the\n_gratia efficax_ can be of no assistance in the performance of more\ndifficult works, because these too, to be meritorious, require the\nco\u00f6peration of free-will.\n\nThe Syncretists try to evade this dilemma by contending that prayer, as\nthe connecting link, communicates its own liberty and meritoriousness to\nthe salutary acts performed through its agency, in other words, that these\nacts are the effect of prayer (_effectus orationis_). But aside from the\nfact that prayer itself is quite often a difficult act, the more arduous\nworks of salvation would in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their\nmeritoriousness and degraded to the level of a _voluntarium in causa_,\nwhich is an untenable assumption.(778) Finally, there is something\nillogical and unsatisfactory in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two\nsuch incompatible notions as the Thomistic _cognitio Dei in decretis\npraedeterminantibus_ and the Molinistic _scientia media_.\n\nThus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas of grace and\nfree-will fail to solve the mystery, and we are compelled to exclaim with\nSt. Paul: \u201cO the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of\nGod! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His\nways!\u201d(779)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance are:\n    *Molina, S. J., _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_,\n    Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876).\u2014Platel, S. J., _Auctoritas contra\n    Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media_, Douai\n    1669.\u2014Henao, S. J., _Scientia Media Historice Propugnata_, Lyons\n    1655.\u2014IDEM, _Scientia Media Theologice Defensa_, Lyons 1674-6.\u2014De\n    Aranda, S. J., _De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante seu\n    Schola Scientiae Mediae_, Saragossa 1693.\u2014*Suarez, S. J., _De\n    Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei_, new ed., Paris 1856.\u2014IDEM, _De\n    Auxilio Efficaci_, Paris ed., 1856, t. XI.\u2014IDEM, _De Vera\n    Intelligentia Auxilii Efficacis_ (_Op. Posthum._, t. X,\n    Appendix).\u2014*Lessius, S. J., _De Gratia Efficaci_ (_Opusc._, t. II,\n    Paris 1878).\u2014Sardagna, S. J., _Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica_,\n    Ratisbon 1771.\u2014Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), _De Gratia_, new\n    ed., Paris 1853.\u2014Murray, _De Gratia_, Dublin 1877.\u2014B. Jungmann, S.\n    J., _De Gratia_, 6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.\u2014Th. de R\u00e9gnon, S. J.,\n    _Ba\u00f1ez et Molina, Histoire, Doctrines, Critique, M\u00e9taphysique_,\n    Paris 1883.\u2014Card. Mazzella, S. J., _De Gratia Christi_, 3rd ed.,\n    Rome 1882.\u2014Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.\n    49-58, Gulpen 1885.\u2014*V. Frins, S. J., _S. Thomae Doctrina de\n    Cooperatione Dei cum Omni __ Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu\n    S. Thomas Praedeterminationis Physicae Adversarius_, Paris\n    1890.\u2014*Schiffini, S. J., _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 5, Freiburg\n    1901.\u2014Card. Billot, S. J., _De Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis\n    Arbitrio_, I, Rome 1908.\u2014Limbourg, S. J. \u201c_Selbstzeichnung der\n    thomistischen Gnadenlehre_,\u201d in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\n    kath. Theologie_, 1877.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the\n    History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 493 sqq.\n\n    Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism and\n    Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphonsus de\u2019\n    Liguori, *Tournely, _De Gratia_, Venice 1755.\u2014Card. Jos. Pecci,\n    _Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l\u2019Influsso di Dio sulle Azioni delle\n    Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media_, Rome 1885.\u2014A.\n    Adeodatus, J. _Pecci\u2019s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas \u00fcber den\n    Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert_, Mainz 1888.\u2014C. Krogh-Tonning,\n    _De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina_,\n    Christiania 1898.\u2014J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., _De Divina Gratia_, Rome\n    1904.\n\n    The history of the great controversy between Thomism and Molinism\n    can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., _Historia Congregationum de\n    Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae_, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 1709.\u2014Livinus\n    de Meyer, S. J., _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae\n    Auxiliis_, Antwerp 1705.\u2014*Schneemann, S. J., _Entstehung der\n    thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg 1879.\u2014*IDEM,\n    _Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_,\n    Freiburg 1880.\u2014*IDEM, _Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae\n    Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881.\n\n\n\n\n\nPART II. SANCTIFYING GRACE\n\n\nThe grace of justification, commonly called sanctifying grace, is related\nto actual grace as an end to its means. Actual grace introduces the state\nof sanctifying grace or preserves and augments it where it already exists.\n\nThis fact makes it advisable to consider the genesis of sanctifying grace\nbefore studying its nature and effects.\n\nWe shall therefore treat in three chapters: (1) of the Process of\nJustification (_iustificatio in fieri_); (2) of the State of Justification\n(_iustificatio in esse_), and (3) of the Fruits of Justification\n(_iustificatio in facto esse_), or the Merit of Good Works.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. The Genesis Of Sanctifying Grace, Or The Process Of\nJustification\n\n\nThe justification of an adult human being does not take place suddenly,\nbut runs through certain well-defined stages, which in their totality are\ncalled the process of justification.\n\nBeing a \u201cregeneration in God,\u201d justification bears a striking resemblance\nto the development of the f\u0153tus in the maternal womb. Like physical birth,\nspiritual regeneration is preceded by travailing, _i.e._ fear and painful\ncontrition.\n\nThe dogmatic teaching of the Catholic Church on justification is formally\ndefined by the Tridentine Council, whose decrees(780) contain a masterly\nanalysis of this most interesting of psychological processes. The holy\nSynod puts faith at the beginning. \u201cFaith,\u201d it says, \u201cis the beginning of\nhuman salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification.\u201d(781)\nThe nature of faith and the part it plays in justification were the chief\npoints in dispute between the Church and the so-called Reformers. Luther\nand his followers denatured the traditional Catholic teaching by basing\njustification solely on faith, which they falsely defined as mere\nconfidence or trust in the mercy of God.\n\n\n\nSection 1. The Necessity Of Faith For Justification\n\n\n1. THE LUTHERAN HERESY VS. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.\u2014The Protestant\nReformers, notably Luther and Calvin, did not deny that justification is\nwrought by faith, but they defined justifying faith in a manner altogether\nforeign to the mind of the Church.\n\na) They distinguished three kinds of faith: (1) belief in the existence of\nGod and the historical fact that Christ has come on earth, suffered, and\nascended (_fides historica_); (2) the sort of trust which is required for\nexercising the gift of miracles (_fides miraculorum_); and (3) faith in\nthe divine promises with regard to the remission of sin (_fides\npromissionum_). The last-mentioned species of faith they subdivided into\ngeneral and particular. _Fides generalis_ is that by which we believe that\nthe righteousness of Christ \u201ccovers\u201d (but does not wipe out) our sins.\n_Fides specialis_ or fiduciary faith (_fiducia_) is that by which a man\napplies to himself the righteousness of the Redeemer, firmly trusting that\nhis sins are for Christ\u2019s sake not imputed to him. Thus the Reformers\nerroneously transferred the seat of justifying faith from the intellect to\nthe will and completely subverted the Catholic notion of faith as an\nintellectual assent to revealed truth.\n\nb) To this fundamental error the Fathers of Trent opposed the orthodox\ndoctrine that (adults) \u201care disposed unto justice when, excited and\nassisted by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are freely\nmoved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has\nrevealed and promised, ...\u201d(782) and they solemnly anathematized those who\nassert \u201cthat justifying faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine\nmercy which remits sin for Christ\u2019s sake, or that this confidence alone is\nthat whereby we are justified.\u201d(783)\n\nHence it is _de fide_ that the faith whereby man is justified, is not a\nconfident persuasion of being esteemed righteous in the sight of God, but\na dogmatic or theoretical belief in the truths of Divine Revelation.\n\n2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FIDUCIARY FAITH.\u2014Whenever Sacred\nScripture and Tradition speak of justifying faith, they mean a dogmatic\nbelief in the truths of Revelation,\u2014that faith which the Protestants call\n_fides historica_.\n\na) Christ Himself solemnly commanded His Apostles and their successors to\npreach the Gospel to all nations, and before baptizing them to convert\nthem to a firm belief in certain specified truths which no man may reject\nexcept at the peril of his eternal salvation.\n\n\u03b1) Mark XVI, 15 sq.: \u201cGo ye into the whole world, and preach the\ngospel(784) to every creature: He that believeth [_i.e._ in the Gospel]\nand is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be\ncondemned.\u201d Agreeable to this injunction St. John declares it to be the\nobject of his Gospel \u201cthat you may believe that(785) Jesus is the Christ,\nthe Son of God, and that believing, you may have life in his name.\u201d(786)\nThe Gospel is written \u201cthat we may believe.\u201d What must we believe? That\n\u201cJesus is the Christ, the Son of God.\u201d This is a revealed truth by firmly\nbelieving which we shall be saved. When the treasurer of Queen Candace\nbegged to be baptized, Philip the deacon said to him: \u201cIf thou believest\nwith all thy heart, thou mayest.\u201d The eunuch replied: \u201cI believe that\nJesus Christ is the Son of God,\u201d whereupon Philip baptized him.(787)\n\n\u03b2) St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians eloquently\ninsists on the necessity of faith, not a mere _fides fiducialis_, but a\nbelieving acceptance of Divine Revelation. Cfr. Rom. X, 9 sq.: \u201cFor if\nthou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that\nGod hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the\nheart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto\nsalvation.\u201d(788) We must confess with the mouth and believe with the\nheart. External profession and internal faith go together and have for\ntheir common object a certain truth open to our knowledge, _viz._: the\nresurrection of Christ,\u2014a dogma in which the whole teaching of the\natonement lies imbedded.\n\nThe character of justifying faith is still more plainly evident from Heb.\nXI, 6: \u201cWithout faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh\nto God [he that is to be justified], must believe that He is [the\nexistence of God], and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.\u201d(789) The\nApostle here clearly asserts both the necessity of justifying faith and\nthe minimum of doctrine to be explicitly \u201cbelieved,\u201d _viz._: the existence\nof God and eternal retribution.(790)\n\n\u03b3) The Lutherans appeal chiefly to Matth. IX, 2, Luke XVII, 19, Rom. IV,\n5, and Heb. XI, 1. But not a single one of these texts represents\nfiduciary faith as the instrumental cause of justification. The word\n\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 occurs no less than eighty times in the Synoptic Gospels and in St.\nPaul\u2019s Epistle to the Romans, but there are only six passages in which it\ncould possibly be construed as synonymous with _fiducia_, and in none of\nthese is the interpretation entirely certain. Not once does the New\nTestament employ \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 in the sense of \u201cfiduciary faith,\u201d _i.e._ a\nconfident persuasion of one\u2019s own righteousness.(791)\n\nb) Tradition is in such perfect agreement with Scripture on this point\nthat the Reformers did not venture to deny that their doctrine ran counter\nto the time-honored teaching of the Church. The Fathers unanimously insist\non the necessity of dogmatic faith as a requisite of justification.\n\n\u03b1) St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, who is regarded as \u201cthe best theologian of his\ntime\u201d (468-533),(792) in his golden booklet _De Fide seu de Regula Verae\nFidei ad Petrum_, says: \u201cI rejoice that you take care to preserve the true\nfaith without which conversion is useless, nay, impossible. Apostolic\nauthority tells us that we cannot please God without faith. For faith is\nthe foundation of all good [works]; it is the beginning of human\nsalvation, and without it no one can obtain a place among the children of\nGod, because without it no one can obtain the grace of justification in\nthis world or possess eternal life in the next.\u201d(793) St. Fulgentius was a\nfaithful disciple of St. Augustine, and the whole trend of his treatise\nshows that by _vera fides_ he understands not the Lutheran _fiducia\npropriae iustificationis_, but Catholic belief in revealed truth.(794)\n\n\u03b2) This teaching is corroborated by the ancient practice of instructing\nthe catechumens in the truths of revelation and requiring them to make a\npublic profession of faith before Baptism. It was because they believed\nand professed the true faith that the early Christians, who knew nothing\nof the Lutheran _fides fiducialis_, were called \u201cfaithful\u201d (_fideles_,\n\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03af), to distinguish them from false believers or heretics\n(_haeretici_, \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, from \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 to choose), who denied some\nportion or other of the orthodox creed.\n\nc) In analyzing the notions of _fides_ and _necessitas_ theologians\ndistinguish between _fides explicita_ and _fides implicita_, and between\n_necessitas medii_ and _necessitas praecepti_.\n\n_Fides explicita_ is an express and fully developed belief in the truths\nof revelation; _fides implicita_, a virtual belief in whatever may be\ncontained in a dogma explicitly professed. I make an act of implicit faith\nwhen I say, for instance: \u201cI believe whatever the Church teaches,\u201d or: \u201cI\nheartily accept whatever God has revealed.\u201d\n\nThe _necessitas medii_ is based on the objective relation of means to an\nend, and consequently binds all men, even the ignorant and those who are\nin error without their own fault. Such, for example, is the necessity of\nthe eye for seeing, of wings for flying, of grace for performing salutary\nacts, of the _lumen gloriae_ for the beatific vision. The _necessitas\npraecepti_, on the other hand, is founded entirely on the will of God, who\npositively commands or forbids under pain of grievous sin, but is willing\nto condone non-compliance with his precepts when it is owing to guiltless\nignorance. This applies to all positive divine precepts, _e.g._ the law of\nfasting and abstinence. It is to be noted that the _necessitas medii_\nalways involves the _necessitas praecepti_, because God must needs will\nand impose upon us by positive precept whatever is objectively necessary\nas a means of salvation.\n\n\u03b1) The first question that arises with regard to this twofold faith and\nnecessity is: Are sinners preparing for justification, and the faithful in\ngeneral, obliged by necessity of precept to believe explicitly all\nrevealed truths? The answer is, No; because this is practically\nimpossible, and God does not demand the impossible.\n\nGenerally speaking, it is sufficient to have an explicit knowledge of, and\ngive one\u2019s firm assent to, the more important dogmas and moral\nprecepts\u2014the twelve articles of the Apostles\u2019 Creed, the Commandments of\nGod and the Church, the Sacraments (as needed), and the Our Father. All\nother revealed truths need be held only _fide implicit\u00e2_.(795) More is of\ncourse demanded of educated persons and those who are in duty bound to\ninstruct others, such as priests and teachers.(796)\n\n\u03b2) A more important and more difficult question is this: Are there any\ndogmas, and if so how many, which must be believed by all men _fide\nexplicit\u00e2_ and _necessitate medii_? St. Paul says: \u201cWithout faith it is\nimpossible to please God, for he that cometh to God, must believe that He\nis, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.\u201d(797)\n\nWith but few exceptions,(798) Catholic theologians maintain that the\nApostle in this passage means theological faith, based upon supernatural\nmotives. This interpretation is borne out by the context, by such parallel\ntexts as John III, 11 sqq., 32 sqq., 2 Tim. I, 12, 1 John V, 9 sq., and by\nthe decisions of several councils.(799) There can be no reasonable doubt\nthat all men, to be justified and saved, must have an explicit belief in\nat least two dogmas, _viz._: the existence of God and eternal retribution.\nPope Innocent XI condemned the Jansenist proposition that explicit belief\nin divine retribution is not necessary for salvation.(800)\n\nAre there any other dogmas which must be explicitly believed _necessitate\nmedii_? The only dogmas which might come in question are: the Trinity, the\nIncarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The\nlast-mentioned two may be omitted from the list, because St. Paul does not\nmention them,(801) and for the additional reason that belief in\nimmortality is included in the dogma of eternal retribution, while the\nnecessity of grace is inseparably bound up with the dogma of Divine\nProvidence, which in its turn is but a particular aspect of eternal\nretribution.(802) Hence the only two dogmas in regard to which the\nquestion at the beginning of this paragraph can reasonably be asked, are\nthe Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation.\n\nTheologians are divided in the matter. Some maintain that no human being\ncan or could ever be saved without explicit belief in both the Trinity and\nthe Incarnation. Others(803) hold that this _necessitas medii_ did not\nexist under the Old Covenant. A third school(804) avers that no such\nnecessity can be proved either for the Old or the New Dispensation.\n\nThe first of these three opinions is excessively rigorous and\nintrinsically improbable. The Jews had no clearly revealed knowledge of\nthe Trinity and the Incarnation, and consequently were under no obligation\nto believe them. As the divinely constituted guardians of the Messianic\nprophecies, they were bound to believe in the Redeemer, though only\n_necessitate praecepti_. The gentiles were dispensed even from this.\n\nThe second opinion, which limits the _necessitas medii_ to the New\nTestament, lacks solid proof. The Scripture texts cited in its support\nmerely prove the efficaciousness of belief in Christ,(805) or the duty of\nembracing that belief on the strength of the Apostolic preaching,(806) or,\nfinally, the impossibility of redemption except through the mediation of\nJesus;(807)\u2014all truths which in themselves have nothing to do with the\nquestion under discussion.\n\nThe third and most probable opinion is that even under the New Covenant,\nexplicit faith in Christ, and _a fortiori_ in the Divine Trinity, cannot\nbe regarded as an indispensable medium of justification and salvation, (1)\nbecause St. Paul does not mention these two dogmas in the decisive\npassage, Heb. XI, 6; and (2) because a supernatural act of justifying love\nand contrition may be inspired by belief in the existence of God and\ndivine retribution; and (3) because this latter belief implicitly, by way\nof desire (_fides in voto_), includes belief in Christ and the\nTrinity.(808) Nevertheless it must be held that an adult who desires to be\nreceived into the Church and is baptized in the name of the Most Holy\nTrinity, is bound to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation by more\nthan a mere _necessitas praecepti_, namely, by what is technically called\n_necessitas medii per accidens_, a necessity from which God dispenses only\nin exceptional cases, when it is either physically or morally impossible\nto elicit an act of explicit faith.(809) It is for this reason that the\nSacred Congregation of the Holy Office decided, February 28, 1703, that\nmissionaries are bound to explain to all adult converts who have the use\nof reason, even though they be near death, those mysteries of the faith\nwhich are necessary for salvation _necessitate medii_, especially the\nTrinity and the Incarnation.(810)\n\n\n\nSection 2. The Necessity Of Other Preparatory Acts Besides Faith\n\n\n1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.\u2014Martin Luther, to\nquiet his conscience, evolved the notion that faith alone justifies and\nthat the Catholic doctrine of the necessity of good works is pharisaical\nand derogatory to the merits of Jesus Christ. This teaching was\nincorporated into the symbolic books of the Lutherans(811) and adopted by\nCalvin.(812) It has been called one of the two basic errors of\nProtestantism. The Tridentine Council solemnly condemns it as follows: \u201cIf\nanyone saith that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as\nto mean that nothing else is required to co\u00f6perate in order to obtain the\ngrace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be\nprepared and disposed by the movement of his own will; let him be\nanathema.\u201d(813) Other acts that dispose or prepare the soul for\njustification, according to the same Council, are: the fear of divine\njustice; hope in God\u2019s mercy; charity, which is the font of all\nrighteousness; detestation of sin, and penitence.(814)\n\n2. REFUTATION OF THE SOLA FIDES THEORY.\u2014The Lutheran theory involves an\nopen rupture with the traditional teaching of the Church and is positively\nunscriptural. Luther himself felt this, as appears from his interpolation\nof the word \u201calone\u201d in Rom. III, 28 and his rejection of the entire\ncanonical Epistle of St. James.(815)\n\na) The teaching of the Bible in regard to the r\u00f4le played by good works in\nthe process of justification may be summarized as follows:\n\n(1) A man may believe all that the Church teaches and yet be lost for want\nof good works or because he has not the love of God; consequently, faith\nalone does not justify or insure eternal salvation. Our Divine Saviour\nHimself declares: \u201cNot every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter\ninto the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father who is\nin heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.\u201d(816) St. James\nsays: \u201cDo you not see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith\nonly?\u201d(817) And St. Paul: \u201cIf I should have all faith, so that I could\nremove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.\u201d(818)\n\n(2) Besides faith, justification requires certain other preparatory or\ndispositive acts. There is, for example, the fear of divine justice. Cfr.\nEcclus. I, 28: \u201cHe that is without fear cannot be justified.\u201d(819) Also,\nhope in God\u2019s mercy. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 24: \u201cFor we are saved by hope.\u201d(820)\nAgain, charity. Cfr. Luke VII, 47: \u201cMany sins are forgiven her because she\nhath loved much.\u201d(821) Furthermore, contrition or penitence. Cfr. Luke\nXIII, 3: \u201cUnless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise\nperish.\u201d(822) Finally, good works in general. Cfr. St. James II, 17: \u201cSo\nfaith also, if it have not works, is dead in itself.\u201d(823) No one who\nponders these and similar texts can maintain, as Calvin and Melanchthon\ndid, that the good works mentioned merely accompany justification, for\nthey are unmistakably described as causes which dispose and prepare the\nsinner for it.\n\n(3) It is not faith alone that justifies, but faith informed and actuated\nby charity. Cfr. Gal. V, 6: \u201cFor in Christ Jesus neither circumcision\navaileth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh by\ncharity.\u201d(824) The Greek text shows that the word _operatur_ in the\nVulgate must be taken passively, so that a more correct translation would\nbe: \u201c... but faith effected or formed by charity.\u201d But even if \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\nwere used as a deponent (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9=_agere_, _operari_) the meaning would\nbe substantially the same, _i.e._ a dead faith, without charity, avails\nnothing. Cfr. St. James II, 26: \u201cFor even as the body without the spirit\nis dead, so also faith without works is dead.\u201d(825)\n\nIn Rom. III, 28: \u201cFor we account a man to be justified by faith, without\nthe works of the law,\u201d(826) Luther deliberately inserted the word \u201calone.\u201d\nThe context shows that this is a falsification. The Apostle contrasts\njustifying faith, not with those preparatory acts of salvation which\nspring from it, but with the sterile \u201cworks of the law\u201d (_i.e._ the Old\nTestament), which, as such, possessed no more power to justify than the\ngood works of the heathen. Keeping this contrast in mind, it would not be\nincorrect to say, and St. Paul might well have said, that \u201csupernatural\nfaith alone (_i.e._ only) justifies, while the works of the law do not.\u201d\nBut if faith be taken in contradistinction to the other acts operative in\nthe process of justification, such as fear, hope, contrition, love,\u2014and\nthis is the sense in which Luther takes it,\u2014then it is false and contrary\nto the mind of St. Paul to say: \u201cFaith alone justifies, nothing else is\nrequired.\u201d For in this sense faith is merely the beginning, the\nfoundation, the root of justification and cannot justify the sinner until\nit has absorbed the other preparatory acts required by Holy Scripture and\ntransformed them into perfect love. This fact was already pointed out by\nSt. Augustine. \u201cUnintelligent persons,\u201d he says, \u201cwith regard to the\nApostle\u2019s statement: \u2018We conclude that a man is justified by faith without\nthe works of the law,\u2019 have thought him to mean that faith is sufficient\nfor a man, even if he leads a bad life and has no good deeds to allege. It\nis impossible that such a character should be deemed \u2018a vessel of\nelection\u2019 by the Apostle, who, after declaring that \u2018in Christ Jesus\nneither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision,\u2019 adds the\nimportant remark: \u2018but faith that worketh by charity.\u2019 It is such faith\nwhich separates the faithful children of God from unclean devils,\u2014for even\nthese \u2018believe and tremble,\u2019 as the Apostle James says, but they do no\ngood works. Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just man\nlives,\u2014the faith which operates through love in such wise that God\nrecompenses it according to its works with eternal life.\u201d(827)\n\nThere is another sense in which faith alone may be said to justify,\n_viz._: if the term be taken to include all those things which God has\nordained for our salvation, that is to say, the sum-total of \u201crevelation\u201d\nor \u201cthe true religion\u201d as opposed to \u201cheresy.\u201d The term \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 (_fides_)\nis sometimes employed in this sense by the Fathers, but never in Sacred\nScripture.(828)\n\nb) There is a unanimous and unbroken tradition in favor of the Catholic\ndoctrine. St. Polycarp writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: \u201c... the\nfaith (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2) given you, which is the mother of us all when hope (\u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03c2)\nfollows and love (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7) goes before.\u201d(829) St. Augustine teaches that\nwhile faith is _per se_ separable from hope and love, it is ineffective\nwithout them. \u201cMan begins with faith, but the demons, too, believe and\ntremble; to faith, therefore, must be added hope, and to hope, love.\u201d(830)\nAnd again: \u201cWithout love, faith can indeed exist, but it availeth\nnothing.\u201d(831) St. Gregory the Great, paraphrasing St. James, says:\n\u201cPerhaps some one will say to himself: I have believed, I shall be saved.\nHe speaks truly if he sustains faith by works. For that is true faith\nwhich does not contradict by deeds what it asserts in words.\u201d(832)\n\nc) This teaching is in perfect conformity with reason.\n\n\u03b1) No supernatural enlightenment is needed to perceive the intrinsic\npropriety of a moral preparation for justification. Not only must the\nsinner learn to know God as His supernatural end and the source of all\nrighteousness, but he must also be persuaded that it is his duty, with the\nhelp of sufficient grace, to direct his will towards this final end.\n\nEvery tendency or movement presupposes a _terminus a quo_, from which it\nstarts, and a _terminus ad quem_, to which it tends. The movement of the\nwill in the process of justification, besides faith, demands a voluntary\nwithdrawal from sin (contrition, good resolutions) and an approach to\nrighteousness (hope, love, desire).(833)\n\nThis argument would have made no impression on Luther, since he bluntly\ndenied free-will in the moral order and regarded human nature as so\nradically depraved by original sin as to be incapable of co\u00f6perating with\ndivine grace. In fact he compared man to a \u201clog, stick or stone.\u201d This\nview was shared by Amsdorf, Flacius, and others, whereas Osiander and\nButzer admitted that \u201cinherent righteousness\u201d is at least a partial factor\nin justification. Melanchthon, in an endeavor to reconcile the\ncontradictions of this discordant system, unwittingly gave rise to the\nso-called Synergist dispute. When Pfeffinger(834) undertook the defence of\nfree-will, many Lutheran theologians, especially of the University of\nJena, boldly attacked the log-stick-and-stone theory(835) and tried to\nforce their adversaries to admit that man is able to co\u00f6perate with grace.\nThe \u201cHalf-Melanchthonians,\u201d as they were called, succeeded in smuggling\nSynergism into the \u201cBook of Torgau;\u201d(836) but before the \u201cFormulary of\nConcord\u201d was finally printed in the monastery of Bergen, near Magdeburg\n(A. D. 1577), the strict Lutherans had eliminated that article as\nheterodox and substituted for it the log-stick-and-stone theory as it\nappears in the official symbols of the Lutheran Church. In the Syncretist\ndispute, and through the efforts of the Pietists, this harsh teaching was\nafterwards moderated. But what probably contributed most to the crumbling\nof the system was the rapid growth of Socinianism and Rationalism among\nthe Lutherans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, with\nthe exception of a small band of \u201corthodox\u201d Lutherans in Saxony and the\nUnited States, Protestants no longer hold the log-stick-and-stone theory.\nThe school of Luther proclaimed it as the distinguishing tenet of\nProtestantism, as \u201cthe criterion of a standing or falling\nchurch,\u201d(837)\u2014and by this criterion the Lutheran Church has indeed fallen.\nCommon sense has led modern Protestants to admit that contrition and\npenance are quite as necessary for justification as faith, an opinion\nwhich, in the words of Dorner,(838) \u201ccomes dangerously near the Catholic\nsystem.\u201d In Scandinavia, according to Dr. Krogh-Tonning,(839) the Lutheran\nChurch has experienced a \u201cquiet reformation\u201d and now unconsciously defends\nthe Catholic doctrine of justification.(840)\n\n\u03b2) As the sufficiency of the Bible without Tradition is the formal\nprinciple of \u201corthodox\u201d Protestantism, so justification by faith alone may\nbe said to be its material principle. The absurdity of the Lutheran\nposition is evident from the fact that these two principles are mutually\ndestructive. So far from teaching justification by faith alone, the Bible\ninculcates the exact contrary, while its sufficiency as the source of\nfaith could be proved from its own pages, if at all, only by a vicious\ncircle.(841) Thus the whole Protestant system is based on contradiction.\n\nThe _sola fides_ theory is open to serious objection also from the ethical\npoint of view. It cannot be put into practice without grave danger. \u201cSin\nlustily,\u201d writes Luther, \u201cbut be yet more lusty in faith.\u201d(842) The first\npart at least of this injunction was promptly obeyed by his followers, and\nthe rapid deterioration of morals which followed was but a natural sequel\nof the _sola fides_ theory. If faith alone were sufficient for\njustification, it would make no difference what kind of life a man led,\nfor unbelief, _i.e._ the loss of fiduciary faith, would be the only sin.\nNo wonder this ethical antinomism of the Lutheran system, so radically\nopposed to the teaching of St. James, was rejected by Hugo Grotius, George\nBuller, and other honest Protestants.\n\nAnother weighty objection against the Lutheran theory of justification is\nthat it disregards the law of causation. According to Luther a man is\njustified by the firm belief and trust that his sins are forgiven. This\n\u201cbelief\u201d is either true or false. If it is false, I can have no certainty\nwith regard to my salvation, but am deceiving myself. If true, it\npresupposes that which it is to effect, in other words, it puts the cause\nbefore the effect. An orthodox Lutheran theologian of the old school would\nprobably retort: My sins are actually forgiven by virtue of the atonement,\nbecause all men without exception are redeemed through the merits of Jesus\nChrist. If this be true, then why not be consistent and say: All men are\njustified because all are redeemed, consequently there is no need of faith\nand sacraments, and keeping the commandments is a matter of indifference!\nIt is at this point that the incompatibility of Luther\u2019s teaching with the\nBible and sound ethics becomes most glaringly apparent. True, Luther\nhimself at times emphasized the necessity of good works; but this merely\nproves that he had lucid intervals when his honest nature rebelled against\nthe inconsistency of his teaching.(843)\n\n3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.\u2014The Council of Trent assigned to\nfaith its proper place in the process of justification,(844) and gave a\nluminous and profound analysis of the process itself.(845) Scholastic\ntheology, in elaborating the teaching of Scripture and Tradition, drew a\ndistinction between _fides formata_, which truly justifies, and _fides\ninformis_, which falls short of justification.\n\na) As regards the intrinsic relation of (dogmatic) faith to other\npreparatory acts in the process of justification, the Tridentine Council\ndeclares: \u201cFaith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and\nthe root of all justification.\u201d(846) Supernatural faith, therefore, is the\nbeginning of salvation, and not, as Harnack makes Luther say, \u201cat once the\nbeginning, the middle, and the end,\u201d because no man can be converted\nunless he has believingly embraced God as his final goal. This faith is\npreceded by certain preliminary conditions, of which the first is an\nillumination of the intellect and a strengthening of the will, which\nresults in the _affectus credulitatis_ (_initia fidei_). For justifying\nfaith does not flash forth suddenly, like a _deus ex machina_, but\nrequires time for its development, as the history of many conversions\nproves.(847)\n\nFaith is called the \u201cfoundation\u201d of justification because it not only\nmarks its beginning, but constitutes the basis upon which all subsequent\nstages of the process rest. To exclude the mistaken notion that the\nprocess of justification is a series of mechanical and disconnected acts,\nthe Council calls faith the \u201croot\u201d of justification, from which the other\npreparatory acts spring organically, as the trunk of a tree from its root.\n\nThe psychological description of the whole process given by the Tridentine\nFathers, which even Harnack admits to be \u201ca masterly piece of work,\u201d runs\nas follows: \u201cNow they [adults] are disposed unto justice when, excited and\nassisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by hearing, they are freely\nmoved towards God, believing those things to be true which God has\nrevealed and promised,\u2014and this especially, that God justifies the impious\nby His grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ; and when,\nunderstanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves from\nthe fear of divine justice, whereby they are profitably agitated, to\nconsider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, confiding that God will\nbe propitious to them for Christ\u2019s sake; and they begin to love Him as the\nfountain of all justice, and are therefore moved against sins by a certain\nhatred and detestation, to wit: by that penitence which must be performed\nbefore Baptism; lastly, when they purpose to receive Baptism, to begin a\nnew life, and to keep the commandments of God....\u201d(848) The four ordinary\nstages in the process of justification, therefore, are: (1) From faith to\nfear of divine justice; (2) from fear to hope; (3) from hope to initial\nlove;(849) (4) from initial love to contrition and a firm purpose of\namendment.(850) If contrition is dictated and transfused by perfect\nlove,(851) and the sinner has an explicit or at least implicit desire for\nthe Sacrament,(852) justification takes place at once. If, on the other\nhand, the sinner\u2019s sorrow is imperfect (_attritio_), he attains\njustification only by actual reception of the Sacrament (Baptism or\nPenance).(853)\n\nb) Does conversion always follow this conciliary schema? No. The Council\ndid not mean to define that these acts must follow one another in strict\nsequence or that they are one and all absolutely indispensable for\njustification. It is certain, however, that the process invariably begins\nwith faith and ends with contrition accompanied by a firm purpose of\namendment. In exceptional cases (_e.g._ the Prodigal Son, Mary Magdalen)\nperfect charity seems immediately to follow faith, and may then be said\nvirtually to include the intermediate stages of fear, hope, and\ncontrition. Yet this is not the usual way. Ordinarily faith elicits fear,\nwhich in turn produces two kinds of hope\u2014hope of forgiveness (_spes\nveniae_) and hope in God (_spes theologica_), which marks the beginning of\ncharity (_amor concupiscentiae_). Contrition is always a _conditio sine\nqua non_, because there can be no forgiveness of sin without sorrow for\nit.(854) It is for this reason that, according to St. Thomas, explicit\ncontrition for mortal sins is necessary for justification even when there\nis perfect charity, and the sufficiency of the so-called _poenitentia\nvirtualis_ is limited to venial offenses and such grievous sins as cannot\nbe remembered.(855) Fear, while not absolutely indispensable, is seldom\nabsent. Holy Scripture tells us that \u201cthe fear of God is the beginning of\nwisdom,\u201d and it is natural for the sinner seeking forgiveness to detest\nhis sins out of fear of divine justice before he attains to the motive of\nperfect charity.(856)\n\nc) Certain utterances of Scripture and the Fathers with regard to the\npossibility of a \u201cdead\u201d faith(857) have led theologians to distinguish\nbetween _fides informis_ and _fides formata_. _Fides informis_ is a dead\nfaith, devoid of charity, and without justifying power. The only faith\nthat can justify a man is that which is animated by charity and productive\nof good works.(858) This is the _fides formata_ of the Schoolmen, which\nincludes all the preparatory acts enumerated by the Tridentine Council,\nfrom fear to perfect charity. These acts, however, though united in the\n_fides formata_, retain their respective independence, and can disappear\nsingly, one after another, as they came. Zwingli\u2019s assertion that faith,\nhope, and charity are identical, or at least inseparable, has been\nexpressly condemned by the Tridentine Council: \u201cIf any one saith that,\ngrace being lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that\nthe faith which remains, though it be no live faith, is not a true faith;\nor that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian; let him be\nanathema.\u201d(859)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Besides the respective chapters in the various\n    text-books, the student may consult: *A. Vega, _De Iustificatione\n    Doctrina Universa Libris XV Absolute Tradita_, Venice 1548\n    (reprinted at Cologne, 1572).\u2014*Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione\n    Impii_, 1. V (ed. F\u00e8vre, Vol. VI, pp. 149 sqq. Paris\n    1873).\u2014*Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. VI sqq.\u2014Becanus, _Theol.\n    Scholast._, \u201c_De Gratia Habituali_,\u201d Rouen 1658.\u2014L. Nussbaum, _Die\n    Lehre der kath. Kirche \u00fcber die Rechtfertigung_, M\u00fcnchen 1837.\u2014C.\n    von Sch\u00e4tzler, _Neue Untersuchungen \u00fcber das Dogma von der Gnade\n    und das Wesen des christl. Glaubens_, Mainz 1867.\u2014Oswald, _Die\n    Lehre von der Heiligung_, \u00a7 5, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.\u2014B.\n    Bartmann, _St. Paulus und St. Jakobus und die Rechtfertigung_,\n    Freiburg 1897.\u2014L. Galey, _La Foi et les Oeuvres_, Montauban\n    1902.\u2014W. Liese, _Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, sein Begriff und\n    Inhalt_, Freiburg 1902.\u2014Card. Newman, _Lectures on the Doctrine of\n    Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900.\u2014Hugh Pope, O. P.,\n    art. \u201cFaith\u201d in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. V.\u2014J. Mausbach,\n    _Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_ (tr. by A. M.\n    Buchanan), pp. 150 sqq., New York 1914.\u2014L. Labauche, S. S., _God\n    and Man_, pp. 203 sqq., N. Y. 1916.\n\n    On the teaching of the Reformers cfr. *M\u00f6hler, _Symbolik_, \u00a7 18\n    sqq., 11th ed., Mainz 1890 (English tr. by James Burton Robertson,\n    pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906); Ad. Harnack, _Lehrbuch der\n    Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1910;\n    Denifle-Weiss, O. P., _Luther und Luthertum in der ersten\n    Entwicklung_, Vol. II, Mainz 1909; H. Grisar, S. J., _Luther_,\n    Vol. I, Freiburg 1911 (English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913).\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. The State Of Justification\n\n\nThough the term \u201cjustification\u201d may be extended to the preparatory acts\nthat lead up to the state of justice, strictly speaking it signifies only\nthat decisive moment in which the sinner is cleansed from mortal sin by an\ninfusion of sanctifying grace. Hence a careful distinction must be made\nbetween justification as an act (_actus iustificationis_) and\njustification as an habitual state (_habitus iustificationis s. status\ngratiae sanctificantis_). The transient act introduces a permanent state,\njust as the Sacrament of Holy Orders constitutes a man in the sacerdotal\nstate or priesthood.\n\nBoth as an act and as a state justification possesses three distinct\nproperties; it is uncertain, unequal, and capable of being lost.\n\nThis gives us the basis for a division of the present Chapter into three\nSections: (1) On the Nature of Justification, (2) On Justifying, _i.e._\nSanctifying Grace, and (3) On the Properties of that Grace.\n\n\n\nSection 1. The Nature Of Justification\n\n\nJustification in the active sense (_iustificatio_, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) is defined\nby the Tridentine Council as \u201ca translation from that state wherein man is\nborn a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and of the adoption\nof the sons of God through the second Adam, Jesus Christ, our\nSaviour.\u201d(860)\n\nJustification, therefore, has both a negative and a positive element. The\npositive element is interior sanctification through the merits of Jesus\nChrist. The negative element consists in the forgiveness of sin. Though\nthese elements are objectively inseparable, the forgiveness of sin being\npractically an effect of interior sanctification, yet we must treat them\nseparately in order to be able to refute more effectively the Lutheran\nheresy that sin is not wiped out but merely \u201ccovered,\u201d and that\njustification consists in an external \u201cimputation\u201d of the righteousness of\nChrist.\n\n\nArticle 1. The Negative Element Of Justification\n\n\n1. THE HERESY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMERS AND THE TEACHING OF THE\nCHURCH.\u2014Luther held that human nature was radically depraved by original\nsin(861) and that justification consists in this, that sin (original and\nmortal) is no longer \u201cimputed\u201d to the sinner; that is to say, it is not\nblotted out but merely \u201ccovered\u201d by the merits of Christ.\n\na) Forgiveness of sins, therefore, according to Luther, consists simply in\ntheir being no longer imputed.(862) This heresy was incorporated in the\nFormula of Concord and other symbolical books of the Lutheran Church,(863)\nand subsequently adopted by Calvin.(864)\n\nb) The Catholic Church has always maintained that justification is a\nrenewal of the soul by which a man\u2019s sins are blotted out and he becomes\ntruly just. This applies first of all to original sin. \u201cIf,\u201d says the\nCouncil of Trent, \u201canyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus\nChrist, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is\nremitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and\nproper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only raised or\nnot imputed, let him be anathema.\u201d(865) What it here defines in regard to\noriginal sin, the Council elsewhere reaffirms in respect of mortal\nsin.(866)\n\n2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY.\u2014The theory thus solemnly condemned\nby the Tridentine Fathers is unscriptural and opposed to Catholic\nTradition.\n\na) The teaching of the Bible on this point may be reduced to four distinct\nheads.\n\n(1) The remission of sin granted in the process of justification is a real\nannihilation of guilt; that is to say, the sins remitted cease to exist in\nthe moral (though not, of course, in the historical) order. Cfr. Ps. L, 3:\n\u201cHave mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy; and according to\nthe multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my iniquity.\u201d(867) Is. XLIII,\n25: \u201cI am he that blot out thy iniquities.\u201d(868) After God has blotted out\na sin, it no longer exists. Cfr. Is. XLIV, 22: \u201cI have blotted out thy\niniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist.\u201d(869) Acts III, 19: \u201cBe\npenitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted\nout.\u201d(870) Elsewhere God is said to \u201ctake away\u201d sin. Cfr. 2 Kings XII, 13:\n\u201cThe Lord also hath taken away thy sin.\u201d(871) 1 Paral. XXI, 8: \u201cI beseech\nthee, take away the iniquity of thy servant.\u201d(872) When He takes away sin,\nit is really and truly blotted out. Cfr. Mich. VII, 18 sq.: \u201cWho is a God\nlike to thee, who takest away iniquity?... He will put away our\niniquities, and he will cast all our sins into the bottom of the\nsea.\u201d(873) Ps. X, 15: \u201cHis sin shall be sought, and shall not be\nfound.\u201d(874) Ps. CII, 12: \u201cAs far as the east is from the west, so far\nhath he removed our iniquities from us.\u201d(875) Consequently, when our\nDivine Saviour said of Mary Magdalen: \u201cMany sins are forgiven her,\u201d(876)\nHe meant that her sins were completely blotted out and taken away.\n\n(2) Justification washes the soul from iniquity and purifies the heart.\nCfr. Ps. L, 4: \u201cWash me yet more from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my\nsin.\u201d(877) Is. I, 16: \u201cWash yourselves, be clean.\u201d(878) After one\u2019s sins\nare washed away, the heart is clean and pure. Cfr. Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: \u201cAnd\nI will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your\nfilthiness, ... and I will give you a new heart.\u201d(879) 1 Cor. VI, 11: \u201cAnd\nsuch [fornicators, etc.] some of you were; but you are washed, but you are\nsanctified, but you are justified.\u201d(880) Spotless purity takes the place\nof the impurity that previously defiled the soul of the sinner. Cfr. Ps.\nL, 9: \u201cThou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed: thou\nshalt wash me, and I shall be made whiter than snow.\u201d(881) Is. I, 18: \u201cIf\nyour sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow: and if they\nbe red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.\u201d(882) No trace of sin\nremains in the soul after it has been washed in the Precious Blood of\nChrist. Apoc. I, 5: \u201c... Jesus Christ, ... hath loved us, and washed us\nfrom our sins in his own blood.\u201d(883) 1 John I, 7: \u201c... the blood of Jesus\nChrist ... cleanseth us from all sin.\u201d(884)\n\n(3) Justification is an awakening of the sinner from death to life, a\ntransition from darkness to light. Cfr. 1 John III, 14: \u201cWe know that we\nhave passed from death to life, because we love the brethren; he that\nloveth not, abideth in death.\u201d(885) Col. II, 13: \u201cAnd you, when you were\ndead in your sins, ... he hath quickened together with him, forgiving you\nall offences.\u201d(886) Eph. V, 8: \u201cFor you were heretofore darkness, but now\nlight in the Lord.\u201d(887)\n\n(4) Baptism, in particular, completely removes all guilt. Cfr. Acts XXII,\n16: \u201cRise up, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins.\u201d(888) Hence, though\nconcupiscence remains, the soul has no longer in it anything damnable,\n_i.e._ any trace of original or mortal sin. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 1: \u201cThere is\nnow therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.\u201d(889)\n\nIt requires no special acuteness to perceive that this Biblical teaching\nis irreconcilably opposed to the Protestant theory of non-imputation. If,\nas the Lutherans allege, God merely _declared_ the believer just,\njustification would not blot out or take away sin, nor could it be\ntruthfully said that light and life take the place of death and darkness;\nsomething deserving of condemnation would still remain in those that are\nin Christ Jesus.(890)\n\nThere are a few Scriptural texts that seem to favor the Lutheran view, but\nthey must be interpreted in conformity with the general teaching of the\nBible as outlined above. Among these texts is Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: \u201cBlessed\nare they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.\nBlessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose\nspirit there is no guile.\u201d(891) The parallelism apparent in this verse\nallows us to conclude that \u201ccovered\u201d is used in the sense of \u201cremitted\u201d\nand that \u201che to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin\u201d is identical with the\nman \u201cin whose spirit there is no guile.\u201d The text manifestly refers to a\nreal _forgiveness_ of sins, for any sin that God \u201ccovers\u201d and ceases to\n\u201cimpute,\u201d must be blotted out and swept away, because \u201call things are\nnaked and open to the eyes\u201d of the omniscient Creator.(892)\n\nAnother favorite text of the Lutheran theologians is Rom. VII, 17: \u201cNow\nthen it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.\u201d(893) This\npassage clearly refers to concupiscence, which remains in the sinner after\njustification, but, according to Rom. VIII, 1 and James I, 14 sq., is not\ntruly and properly sin but merely called \u201csin\u201d(894) by metonymy,\n\u201cbecause,\u201d in the words of the Tridentine Council, \u201cit is of sin and\ninclines to sin.\u201d(895)\n\nb) The Fathers of the Church, both Greek and Latin, unanimously teach that\njustification effects the forgiveness of sins.\n\nSt. Justin Martyr says: \u201cBy doing penance, all who desire it can obtain\nmercy from God, and Scripture calls them blessed in saying: \u2018Blessed is he\nto whom God hath not imputed sin,\u2019 which means that he receives\nforgiveness of his sins from God, not as you, deceiving yourselves, and\nothers like you aver, that God does not impute [their] sin to them, though\nthey are [still] sinners.\u201d(896) Clement of Alexandria likens Baptism to \u201ca\nbath in which sins are washed off.\u201d(897) St. Gregory Nazianzen says: \u201cIt\nis called Baptism [\u03b2\u03b1\u03c0\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, from \u03b2\u03ac\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, to immerse] because the sin is\nburied in water, ... and a bath (\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd), because it washes off.\u201d(898)\nSt. Augustine indignantly opposes the erroneous opinion of the Pelagians\nthat Baptism does not take away sins but merely \u201ctrims them off.\u201d \u201cWho but\nan unbeliever,\u201d he exclaims, \u201ccan affirm this against the Pelagians? We\nsay, therefore, that Baptism gives remission of all sins and takes away\ncrimes, not merely trims them off (_radere_) in such wise that the roots\nof all sins may be preserved in an evil flesh, as of hair trimmed on the\nhead, when the sins cut down may grow again.\u201d(899) Pope St. Gregory the\nGreat seems almost to have foreseen the heresy of the Protestant\nReformers, for he says: \u201cBut if there are any who say that in Baptism sins\nare forgiven as to outward appearance only, what can be more un-Catholic\nthan such preaching?... He who says that sins are not completely forgiven\nin Baptism might as well say that the Egyptians did not perish in the Red\nSea. But if he admits that the Egyptians actually died [in the Red Sea],\nlet him also admit that of necessity sins completely die in Baptism.\u201d(900)\n\nc) The theological argument may be briefly formulated as follows: We can\nimagine but two reasons why God should not truly forgive us our sins in\nthe process of justification: inability and unwillingness. To say that He\nis _unable_ to forgive us our sins would be to assert that the remission\nof sin involves a metaphysical impossibility. This no Protestant will\nadmit, because all believe that \u201cnothing defiled shall enter into\nheaven.\u201d(901) To assert that God is _unwilling_ to forgive our sins would\nbe to contradict the plain teaching of Scripture, as set forth above.\nConsequently there is no reason whatever for assuming that God does not\ntruly forgive us our sins in the process of justification. Furthermore, it\nwould be incompatible with His veracity and holiness to assume that He\nmerely declares the sinner to be \u201cfree from sin,\u201d without actually\ncleansing his soul. It would be a contradiction to assert that a man whom\nthe truthful and all-holy God has declared free from sin, remains steeped\nin iniquity. Cfr. Prov. XVII, 15: \u201cHe that justifieth the wicked [_i.e._\nabsolves him from his sins], and he that condemneth the just, both are\nabominable before God.\u201d\n\nAccording to Revelation the justification of the sinner is not a mere\nchange, with a privation for its _terminus a quo_(902) and an indifferent\nform for its _terminus ad quem_, but involves a movement from extreme to\nextreme, and hence the genesis of the one extreme must coincide with the\ndestruction of the other. Sin, being in contrary opposition to\nrighteousness, must depart when righteousness enters the soul.(903)\n\n\nArticle 2. The Positive Element Of Justification\n\n\n1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE CHURCH.\u2014Calvin held that justification\nconsists essentially and exclusively in the remission of sins.(904) The\nother \u201cReformers\u201d maintained that there must also be a positive element in\nthe process, but differed in determining its nature.\n\na) The ambiguous language employed by Luther and Melanchthon gave rise to\nmany different opinions, which agreed only in one point, that is, in\nholding, contrary to Catholic teaching, that the positive element of\njustification is not inward sanctification or inherent righteousness\n(_i.e._ sanctifying grace). Probably the view most common among the\nsupporters of the Augsburg Confession was that the sinner, by a \u201cfiduciary\napprehension\u201d of God\u2019s mercy, as proclaimed in the Gospel, \u201capprehends\u201d\nthe extrinsic justice of Christ, and with it covers his sins, which are\nthereupon no longer \u201cimputed\u201d to him. In other words, he is outwardly\naccounted and declared righteous in the sight of God, though inwardly he\nremains a sinner. With the exception of \u201c_sola fides_\u201d there was probably\nno shibboleth in the sixteenth century so persistently dinned into the\nears of Catholics and Protestants alike as \u201c_iustitia Christi extra nos_.\u201d\nIt is found in the _Apologia_ written in defence of the Augsburg\nConfession(905) and recurs in the Formula of Concord.(906) According to\nthe \u201corthodox\u201d Lutheran view, therefore, justification on its positive\nside is a purely forensic and outward imputation of the righteousness of\nChrist, which the sinner seizes with the arm of faith and puts on like a\ncloak to hide the wounds of his soul.(907)\n\nb) Against this dismal heresy the Tridentine Council solemnly declared\nthat \u201cJustification ... is not remission of sins merely, but also the\nsanctification and renewal of the inward man through the voluntary\nreception of the grace and of the gifts,\u201d(908) and anathematized all those\nwho say that \u201cmen are justified either by the sole imputation of the\njustice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of\nthe grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the\nHoly Ghost and is inherent in them, or even that the grace whereby we are\njustified is only the favor of God.\u201d(909)\n\nIn thus defining the doctrine of the Church, the Council did not, however,\nmean to deny that the sinner is in a true sense \u201cjustified by the justice\nof Christ,\u201d\u2014in so far namely, as our Lord has merited for us the grace of\njustification. He merely wished to emphasize the fact that a sinner is not\n_formaliter_ justified by the imputation of Christ\u2019s justice. For the sake\nof greater clearness the various \u201ccauses\u201d of justification are enumerated\nas follows: \u201cOf this justification the causes are these: the final cause\nindeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting;\nwhile the efficient cause is a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies\ngratuitously; ... but the meritorious cause is His most beloved\nonly-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who ... merited justification\nfor us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the Cross; ... the\ninstrumental cause is the Sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of\nfaith, without which no man was ever justified; lastly, the sole formal\ncause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that\nwhereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed are\nrenewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed, but are truly\ncalled, and are, just.\u201d(910)\n\nSo important did the distinction between the _causa meritoria_ and the\n_causa formalis_ of justification appear to the Fathers of Trent, that\nthey made it the subject of a separate canon, to wit: \u201cIf anyone saith\nthat men are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us\nto be justified; or that it is by that justice itself that they are\nformally just; let him be anathema.\u201d(911) Justification in the Catholic\nsense, therefore, is not a mere outward imputation of the justice of\nChrist, but a true inward renewal and sanctification wrought by a grace\nintrinsically inhering in the soul. This grace theologians call the \u201cgrace\nof justification.\u201d\n\n2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION.\u2014Nothing is so foreign\nto both the spirit and the letter of Holy Scripture as the idea that\njustification merely covers a man\u2019s sins with a cloak of justice and\nleaves him unsanctified within.\n\nJustification is described in the Bible not only as a remission of\nsins,(912) but likewise as the beginning of a new life,(913) a renewal of\nthe spirit,(914) a new creation,(915) a regeneration,(916) a supernatural\nlikeness of God,(917) etc. All these similes point to a permanent state of\nsanctity in the soul of the just.\n\n\u03b1) The Lutheran theory of imputation can be most effectively refuted by an\nanalysis of the Scriptural term \u201cregeneration\u201d (_regeneratio_,\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1). \u201cUnless a man be born again of water and the\nHoly Ghost,\u201d says our Divine Lord, \u201che cannot enter into the kingdom of\nGod.\u201d(918) This spiritual rebirth wipes out sin and inwardly sanctifies\nthe soul. The regenerate sinner receives a new and godlike nature. That\nthis nature can be conceived in no other way than as a state of sanctity\nand justice appears clearly from Tit. III, 5 sqq.: \u201cNot by the works of\njustice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us, by\nthe laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom he hath\npoured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour: that,\nbeing justified by His grace, we may be heirs, according to the hope of\nlife everlasting.\u201d(919) Both text and context show that the Apostle is\nhere speaking of the justification of adult sinners in Baptism, which he\ndescribes as a \u201claver of regeneration and renovation\u201d resulting in an\n\u201coutpouring of the Holy Ghost.\u201d These phrases plainly denote a positive\nquality of the soul as well as a permanent interior grace. Regeneration\nconsists in the remission of sin through Baptism, and also, more\nparticularly, in man being made like God, _i.e._ becoming a child of\nGod,(920) while \u201crenovation\u201d means \u201cputting off the old man\u201d(921) and\n\u201cputting on the new.\u201d(922) The \u201coutpouring of the Holy Ghost\u201d effected by\nBaptism is not, of course, an outpouring of the Hypostasis of the Third\nPerson of the Trinity, but of created grace, which re-forms the sinner and\nmakes him just.(923) This justifying grace must not be conceived as an\nactual grace, much less as a series of actual graces, for it is not given\nus merely as an aid in the performance of some particular act, but as a\nnew nature. Regeneration and renovation denote a state of being, as we can\nplainly see in the case of baptized infants. It is for this reason that\nthe Apostle speaks of it as a lasting state;\u2014that which theologians call\nthe _status gratiae sanctificantis_.(924)\n\nClosely akin to the notion of \u201cregeneration\u201d is that of \u201cre-creation.\u201d\nJustification renews the sinner inwardly and makes of him, so to speak, a\nnew creature, which has sloughed off sin and become just and holy in the\nsight of God. Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17: \u201cIf then any be in Christ a new creature,\nthe old things are passed away, behold all things are made new.\u201d(925) This\nis all the more true since re-creation effects an \u201cincorporation of man\nwith Christ,\u201d and is closely connected with \u201cregeneration of God.\u201d Cfr.\nJames I, 18: \u201cFor of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of\ntruth, that we might be some beginning of his creature.\u201d(926) A comparison\nwith Gal. VI, 15 and Gal. V, 6 fully establishes it as a Biblical truth\nthat in the process of justification the sinner, through faith informed by\ncharity, is changed into a new creature. \u201cFor in Christ Jesus,\u201d says St.\nPaul, \u201cneither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a\nnew creature.\u201d(927) And again: \u201cIn Christ Jesus neither circumcision\navaileth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by\ncharity.\u201d(928) In both these texts the Jewish rite of circumcision is\nrejected as useless and contrasted with justification, which by means of\nthe _fides formata_ gives birth to a \u201cnew creature.\u201d This is incompatible\nwith the Protestant notion that a man is justified by being declared\nrighteous in the sight of God, though he remains inwardly unchanged.(929)\n\n\u03b2) The Lutherans vainly appeal to the fact that Holy Scripture employs the\nword \u201cjustify\u201d(930) for the purpose of declaring a man to be just in a\npurely forensic sense, as in Is. V, 23: \u201cWho justify the wicked for\ngifts.\u201d This proves nothing against the Catholic doctrine, which is based\nentirely on texts that exclude the judicial meaning of the term and\nplainly refer to inward sanctification.(931)\n\nThe word \u201cjustification\u201d also occurs in two other meanings in the Bible.\nPs. CXVIII, 8 and 26 it stands in the plural for the \u201claw\u201d: \u201cI will keep\nthy justifications;\u201d(932) and \u201cTeach me thy justifications.\u201d(933) Apoc.\nXXII, 11 and in a few other passages it signifies \u201cgrowth\u201d in interior\nholiness, which theologians call _iustificatio secunda_.(934)\n\nThe Lutherans are equally unfortunate in maintaining that St. Paul\ncountenances their theory when he speaks of \u201cputting on Christ.\u201d Cfr. Gal.\nIII, 27: \u201cFor as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on\nChrist.\u201d(935) The Apostle in employing this simile does not mean to say\nthat justification consists in putting on an outward cloak of grace to\ncover sins which inwardly endure, but precisely the contrary, _viz._: that\nthe sinner by being justified is inwardly cleansed from sin and becomes a\nnew creature and a child of God. This interpretation is supported by\nvarious parallel texts(936) and by the staple of St. Paul\u2019s teaching.\n\nAnother passage which the Lutherans cite in their favor is 1 Cor. I, 30:\n\u201c... who [Christ Jesus] of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and\nsanctification, and redemption.\u201d(937) Christ is made unto us justice and\nsanctification, in what sense? Manifestly in the same sense in which He is\nmade unto us wisdom of God, that is to say, in so far as He imparts to us\nwisdom, which thereupon becomes our own, but not in the sense that the\nwisdom of Christ is outwardly imputed to us. Note that St. Paul in this\nand many other passages of his Epistles merely wishes to emphasize the\ngratuity of the Redemption and of grace to the exclusion of all natural\nmerit on the part of man.(938)\n\nb) As regards the teaching of the Fathers, the \u201cReformers\u201d themselves\nadmitted that it was against them.(939)\n\nWe read in the Epistle of Barnabas, which was probably composed about A.\nD. 100:(940) \u201cSince then He made us new by the remission of sins, he made\nus another type, that we should have the soul of children, as though He\nwere creating us afresh.\u201d\n\nThe reason why St. Paul calls Baptism the \u201claver of regeneration\u201d rather\nthan the laver of forgiveness, is explained by St. John Chrysostom(941) as\nfollows: \u201cBecause it [Baptism] not only remits our sins and wipes out our\nmisdeeds, but accomplishes all this in such a way as if we were born\nanew;(942) for it entirely re-creates and re-forms us.\u201d(943)\n\nSt. Ambrose regards innocence as the positive element of justification:\n\u201cAfter this [_i.e._ Baptism] you received a white robe, to indicate that\nyou stripped off the vesture of sin and put on the chaste garments of\ninnocence.\u201d(944)\n\nHarnack claims that St. Augustine first stemmed the current dogmatic\ntradition and reshaped it by going back to St. Paul. Bellarmine(945)\nrefuted this audacious assertion long before it was rehashed by the German\nrationalist. The Council of Trent was so thoroughly imbued with the\nteaching of Augustine that its decrees and canons on justification read as\nthough they were lifted bodily from his writings. The great \u201cDoctor of\nGrace\u201d flatly contradicts the Protestant theory of imputation in such\nutterances as these: \u201cHe [St. Paul] does not say, \u2018the righteousness of\nman,\u2019 ... but \u2018the righteousness of God,\u2019\u2014meaning not that whereby He is\nHimself righteous, but that with which He endows man when He justifies the\nungodly.... The righteousness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ, that is,\nby the faith wherewith one believes in Christ. For _here_ is not meant the\nfaith with which Christ Himself believes, just as _there_ was not meant\nthe righteousness whereby God is Himself righteous. Both no doubt are\nours; but yet they are called [in one case] God\u2019s, and [in the other]\nChrist\u2019s, because it is by their bounty that these gifts are bestowed upon\nman.\u201d(946) Again: \u201cWhen righteousness is given to us, it is not called our\nown righteousness, but God\u2019s, because it becomes ours only so that we have\nit from God.\u201d(947) Again: \u201cThe grace of God is called the righteousness of\nGod through our Lord Jesus Christ, not that by which the Lord is just, but\nthat by which He justifies those whom from unrighteous He makes\nrighteous.\u201d(948) Again: \u201cThe love of God is said to be shed abroad in our\nhearts, not because He loves us, but because He makes us lovers of\nHimself; just as the righteousness of God is used in the sense of our\nbeing made righteous by His gift.\u201d(949) According to St. Augustine,\ntherefore, justification culminates in a true sanctification of the soul.\n\u201cWhen he [St. Paul] says: \u2018We are transformed into the same image,\u2019 he\nassuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it \u2018the\nsame,\u2019 he means that very image which we see in the glass,... and that we\npass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright,... and this\n[human] nature, being the most excellent among things created, is changed\nfrom a form that is defaced into a form that is beautiful, when it is\njustified by its Creator from ungodliness.\u201d(950)\n\nThe Augustinian passages which we have quoted (and they are not by any\nmeans all that could be quoted) enumerate the distinguishing marks of\nsanctifying grace in so far as it is the formal cause of\njustification.(951)\n\nc) The argument from Revelation can be reinforced by certain philosophical\nconsiderations which show the absurdity of the imputation theory from the\nstandpoint of common sense.\n\nA man outwardly justified but inwardly a sinner would be a moral monster,\nand Almighty God would be guilty of an intrinsic contradiction were He to\nregard and treat such a one as just. This contradiction is not removed but\nrather intensified by the Lutheran appeal to the extraneous justice of\nChrist.(952)\n\nThe incongruity of the Lutheran doctrine of justification becomes fully\napparent from the consequences which it involves, to wit: (1) all\nChristians without distinction would possess exactly the same degree of\nsanctity and justice; (2) justification once obtained by fiduciary faith\ncould not be lost except by the sin of unbelief; and (3) children would\nnot be justified by Baptism because they are not sufficiently advanced in\nthe use of reason to enable them to \u201capprehend\u201d the external righteousness\nof Christ. The first of these inferences runs counter to common sense and\nexperience. The second, which Luther clothed in the shameful exhortation,\n\u201c_Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et nihil nocebunt centum homicidia et\nmille stupra_,\u201d(953) is repugnant to the teaching of Scripture and\ndestructive of morality.(954) The third consistently led to the rejection\nof infant baptism by the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other Protestant\nsects.\n\n3. SANCTIFYING GRACE THE SOLE FORMAL CAUSE OF JUSTIFICATION.\u2014In declaring\nthat \u201cinherent grace\u201d is the \u201csole formal cause of justification,\u201d the\nCouncil of Trent(955) defined it as an article of faith that sanctifying\ngrace of itself is able to produce all the formal effects of\njustification, _e.g._ forgiveness of sins, the sanctification of the\nsinner, his adoption by God, etc.,(956) and consequently requires no\nsupplementary or contributory causes. In other words, justification is\nwholly and fully accomplished by the infusion of sanctifying grace.\n\na) It appears from the discussions preceding its sixth session that the\nTridentine Council not only meant to condemn the heretical contention of\nButzer that \u201cinherent grace\u201d must be supplemented by the \u201cimputed justice\nof Christ\u201d as the really essential factor of justification,(957) but also\nwished to reject the view of divers contemporary Catholic theologians(958)\nthat \u201cintrinsic righteousness\u201d is inadequate to effect justification\nwithout a special _favor Dei externus_.(959) In this the Fathers of the\nCouncil were on Scriptural ground. The principal effects of\njustification,\u2014forgiveness of sins and internal sanctification,\u2014are both\nproduced by sanctifying grace. Sacred Scripture is perfectly clear on this\npoint. It represents sin as opposed to grace in the same way in which\ndarkness is opposed to light,(960) life to death,(961) the new man to the\nold.(962) The one necessarily excludes the other. Sanctifying grace and\nsin cannot co-exist in the same subject.\n\nInternal sanctification may be defined as a permanent, vital union with\nGod, by which the soul becomes righteous and holy in His sight and obtains\na claim to Heaven. That this is also a function of sanctifying grace\nappears from those Scriptural texts which treat of the positive element of\njustification.(963) With this doctrine Tradition is in perfect accord, and\nconsequently the Fathers of Trent were right in teaching as they did, in\nfact they could not have taught otherwise.(964)\n\nb) While all Catholic theologians admit the incompatibility of grace and\nsin in the same subject, they differ as to the kind and degree of\nopposition existing between the two. Some hold that this opposition is\npurely moral, others that it is physical, again others that it is\nmetaphysical.\n\n\u03b1) Nominalists(965) and Scotists(966) before the Tridentine decision\nmaintained that the distinction between sanctifying grace and (original or\nmortal) sin is based on a free decree of the Almighty, and therefore\npurely moral. God, they held, by a _favor externus superadditus_,\nexternally supplies what sanctifying grace internally lacks, just as a\ngovernment\u2019s stamp raises the value of a coin beyond the intrinsic worth\nof the bullion. Followed to its legitimate conclusions, this shallow\ntheory means that sanctifying grace is of itself insufficient to wipe out\nsin, and that, but for the superadded divine favor, grace and sin might\nco-exist in the soul. This is tantamount to saying that justification\nrequires a twofold formal cause, _viz._: sanctifying grace and a _favor\nDei superadditus_,\u2014which runs counter to the teaching of Trent. Henno\ntries to escape this objection by explaining that the _favor Dei\nacceptans_ appertains not to the formal but merely to the efficient cause\nof justification. But this contention is manifestly untenable. Sanctifying\ngrace is either able to wipe out sin, or it is unable: if it is unable to\nproduce this effect, the _favor Dei acceptans_ must be part of the _causa\nformalis_ of justification, and then, in Henno\u2019s hypothesis, we should\nhave a _duplex causa formalis_, which contradicts the Tridentine decree.\nIf, on the other hand, sanctifying grace is able to wipe out sin without\nany _favor superadditus_, then the Scotistic theory has no _raison\nd\u2019\u00eatre_.\n\n\u03b2) From what we have said it follows that there must be at least a\nphysical contrariety between grace and sin. The difference between\nphysical and metaphysical opposition may be illustrated by the example of\nfire and water. These two elements are incompatible by a law of nature.\nBut as there is no metaphysical contradiction between them, Almighty God\ncould conceivably bring them together. It is this physical kind of\nopposition that Suarez and a few of his followers assume to exist between\ngrace and sin. Absolutely speaking, they say, there is no intrinsic\ncontradiction in the assumption that God could preserve the physical\nentity of sanctifying grace in a soul guilty of mortal sin.(967) In so far\nas this school admits the existence of an internal opposition, which\nactually prevents original or mortal sin from ever co-existing in the soul\nwith justifying grace, its teaching may be said to be acceptable to all\nCatholic theologians. The Scotistic view, on account of its\nincompatibility with the teaching of the Tridentine Council, is no longer\nheld.\n\nIt may be questioned, however, whether Suarez goes far enough in this\nmatter, and whether the opposition between grace and sin could really be\novercome by a miracle. The simultaneous co-existence of grace and sin\nseems to involve an absolute, _i.e._ metaphysical, contradiction.\n\n\u03b3) This is what the Thomists maintain with the majority of Jesuit\ntheologians.(968) As some subtle objections have been raised against this\nview, it cannot be accepted as theologically certain; but it undoubtedly\ncorresponds better than its opposite to the spirit and letter of\nScripture. The Bible, as we have already pointed out, likens the\nopposition existing between grace and sin to that between life and\ndeath,(969) justice and injustice, Christ and Belial, God and an\nidol.(970) But these are contradictories, _ergo_.(971) The same conclusion\ncan be reached by arguing from the character of sanctifying grace as a\n_participatio divinae naturae_.(972) If grace is a participation in the\ndivine nature, it must be opposed to sin in the same way in which God\nHimself is opposed to it. Now God as the All-Holy One is metaphysically\nopposed to sin; consequently, the same kind of opposition must exist\nbetween sanctifying grace and sin.\n\nIt is alleged against this teaching that between habitual grace and\nhabitual sin there is merely a disparate opposition, _i.e._ that of a\nphysical to a moral form, the concepts of which are not mutually\nexclusive. But sanctifying grace is more than a physical ornament of the\nsoul; it is an ethical form which has for its essential function to render\nthe soul holy and righteous in the sight of God.(973)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, and the\n    commentators, especially Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 7, art. 1\n    sqq.; *Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, l. II (_Opera Omnia_, ed.\n    F\u00e8vre, Vol. VI, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1873).\n\n    Besides the current text-books cfr. *Jos. Wieser, _S. Pauli\n    Apostoli Doctrina de Iustificatione_, Trent 1874; H. Th. Simar,\n    _Die Theologie des hl. Paulus_, 2nd ed., \u00a733 sqq. Freiburg 1883.\n\n    On the Protestant notion of justification cfr. M\u00f6hler, _Symbolik_,\n    \u00a710 sqq., Mainz 1890 (Robertson\u2019s translation, pp. 82 sqq., 5th\n    ed., London 1906); _Realenzyklop\u00e4die f\u00fcr prot. Theologie_, Vol.\n    XVI, 3rd ed., pp. 482 sqq., Leipzig 1905 (summarized in English in\n    the _New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge_, Vol.\n    VI, pp. 275 sqq., New York 1910); Card. Newman, _Lectures on the\n    Doctrine of Justification_, 8th impression, London 1900; J.\n    Mausbach, _Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists_, New York\n    1914, pp. 150 sqq.\u2014B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of\n    Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 246 sqq., 464 sq., 470 sqq.\n\n\n\nSection 2. Justifying Or Sanctifying Grace\n\n\nSanctifying grace is defined by Deharbe as \u201can unmerited, supernatural\ngift, imparted to the soul by the Holy Ghost, by which we are made just,\nchildren of God, and heirs of Heaven.\u201d As it makes sinners just,\nsanctifying grace is also called justifying, though this appellation can\nnot be applied to the sanctification of our first parents in Paradise or\nto that of the angels and the sinless soul of Christ. Justification, as we\nhave shown, consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace, and hence it is\nimportant that we obtain a correct idea of the latter. We will therefore\nconsider (1) The Nature of Sanctifying Grace, (2) Its Effects in the Soul,\nand (3) Its Supernatural Concomitants.\n\n\nArticle 1. The Nature Of Sanctifying Grace\n\n\n1. SANCTIFYING GRACE A \u201cPERMANENT QUALITY\u201d OF THE SOUL.\u2014Having no\nintuitive knowledge of sanctifying grace, we are obliged, in order to\nobtain an idea of its true nature, to study its effects, as made known to\nus by Revelation. Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church do,\nhowever, enable us to form certain well-defined conclusions, of which the\nmost important is that sanctifying grace must be conceived as a permanent\nquality (_qualitas permanens_) of the soul. If it is a permanent quality,\nsanctifying grace cannot be identical with actual grace or with \u201cuncreated\ngrace,\u201d _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost.\n\na) In conformity with such Biblical expressions as \u201cthe new life,\u201d\n\u201crenovation of the spirit,\u201d \u201cregeneration,\u201d \u201cdivine sonship,\u201d etc., the\nCouncil of Trent defines justifying grace as a supernatural something\n\u201cinfused\u201d into and \u201cinherent\u201d in the soul. Both ideas denote a permanent\nstate, not a mere transient act or the result of such acts. \u201cThe charity\nof God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those that are\njustified, and is inherent therein.\u201d(974) \u201cThat justice which is called\nours, because we are justified from its being inherent in us, that same is\n(the justice of God) because it is infused into us by God, through the\nmerit of Christ.\u201d(975) \u201cIf any one saith that men are justified ... to the\nexclusion of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their\nhearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them,... let him be\nanathema.\u201d(976) Hence Justification is defined by the Fathers of Trent as\n\u201ca translation ... to the state of grace and adoption of the sons of\nGod.\u201d(977)\n\nBefore the Tridentine Council a number of theologians held that\nsanctifying grace consists in some particular actual grace or in a\nconsecutive series of actual graces. This view is incompatible with the\ndefinition just quoted; in fact Suarez, Bellarmine, Ripalda, and others\nregard it as positively heretical or at least intolerably rash. During the\npreliminary debates at Trent some of the Fathers asked for an express\ndeclaration of the Council to the effect that justification is wrought by\nthe instrumentality of an infused habit; but their request was set aside\non the ground that the nature of justifying grace as a stable habit is\nsufficiently indicated by the word \u201c_inhaeret_.\u201d(978)\n\nThat sanctifying grace is a permanent state of the soul may also be\ninferred from the Catholic teaching that the grace which Baptism imparts\nto children does not differ essentially from that which it imparts to\nadults. True, this teaching was not always regarded as certain;(979) but\nat the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, A. D. 1311, Pope Clement V declared\nit to be \u201cthe more probable opinion,\u201d(980) and it was rendered absolutely\ncertain by the Tridentine decision that infant Baptism results not only in\nthe remission of sins, but likewise in an infusion of sanctifying grace.\nThis being so, there can be no essential difference between the\njustification of children and that of adults. Now it cannot be actual\ngrace which renders children righteous in the sight of God, for they are\nunable to avail themselves of actual grace on account of the undeveloped\nstate of their intellect. The grace that Baptism imparts to them is\nconsequently a _gratia inhaerens et informans_, that is, a permanent state\nof grace; and it must be the same in adults.(981)\n\nPeter Lombard(982) identified sanctifying grace with the _gratia\nincreata_, _i.e._ the Person of the Holy Ghost. This notion was combatted\nby St. Thomas(983) and implicitly rejected by the Tridentine Council when\nit declared that sanctifying grace inheres in the soul and may be\nincreased by good works.(984) To say that the Holy Ghost is poured forth\nin the hearts of men, or that He may be increased by good works, would\nevidently savor of Pantheism. The Holy Ghost pours forth sanctifying grace\nand is consequently not the formal but the efficient cause of\njustification.(985)\n\nb) The _gratia inhaerens permanens_ is not a mere relation or _denominatio\nextrinseca_, but a positive entity productive of real effects,(986) and\nmust consequently be conceived either as a substance or as an accident. We\nhave shown that it is not identical with the uncreated substance of the\nHoly Ghost. Neither can it be a created substance. The idea of an\nintrinsically supernatural created substance involves a\ncontradiction.(987) Moreover, sanctifying grace in its nature and purpose\nis not an entity independently co-existing with the soul but something\nphysically inherent in it. Now, a thing which has its existence by\ninhering in some other thing is in philosophic parlance an \u201caccident.\u201d St.\nThomas expressly teaches that, \u201csince it transcends human nature, grace\ncannot be a substance nor a substantial form, but is an accidental form of\nthe soul itself.\u201d(988) Agreeable to this conception is the further\nThomistic teaching that sanctifying grace is not directly created by God,\nbut drawn (_educta_) from the _potentia obedientialis_ of the soul.(989)\nNot even the Scotists, though they held grace to be created out of\nnothing(990) claimed that it was a new substance.\n\nAn accident that inheres in a substance permanently and physically is\ncalled a quality (_qualitas_, \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2). Consequently, sanctifying grace\nmust be defined as a supernatural quality of the soul. This is the express\nteaching of the Roman Catechism: \u201cGrace ... is a divine quality inherent\nin the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light that effaces\nall the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and\nmore beautiful.\u201d(991)\n\n2. SANCTIFYING GRACE AN INFUSED HABIT.\u2014Sanctifying grace may more\nspecifically, though with a lesser degree of certainty, be described as a\nhabit (_habitus_). Being entitatively supernatural, this habit must be\ninfused or \u201cdrawn out\u201d by the Holy Ghost.\n\na) Aristotle(992) distinguishes four different sets of qualities: (1)\nhabit and disposition; (2) power and incapacity; (3) _passio_ (the power\nof causing sensations) and _patibilis qualitas_ (result of the\nmodification of sense); (4) figure and circumscribing form (of extended\nbodies). As sanctifying grace manifestly cannot come under one of the\nthree last-mentioned heads, it must be either a habit or a disposition.\nHabit denotes a permanent and comparatively stable quality, by which a\nsubstance, considered as to its nature or operation, is well or ill\nadapted to its natural end.(993) As a permanently inhering quality,\nsanctifying grace must be a habit. Hence its other name, \u201chabitual grace.\u201d\nThe Scholastics draw a distinction between entitative and operative\nhabits. An operative habit (_habitus operativus_) gives not only the power\n(_potentia_) to act, but also a certain facility, and may be either good,\nbad, or indifferent. An entitative habit (_habitus entitativus_) is an\ninherent quality by which a substance is rendered permanently good or bad,\n_e.g._ beauty, ugliness, health, disease.\n\nPhilosophy knows only operative habits. But sanctifying grace affects the\nvery substance of the soul. Hence the supplementary theological category\nof entitative habits. \u201cGrace,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201cbelongs to the first\nspecies of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit, because\nit is not immediately ordained to action, but to a kind of spiritual\nbeing, which it produces in the soul.\u201d(994) There is another reason why\ngrace cannot be called a habit in the philosophical sense of the term:\u2014it\nsupplies no acquired facility to act. This consideration led Suarez to\nabstain altogether from the use of the term \u201chabit\u201d in connection with\ngrace,(995) and induced Cardinal Bellarmine to describe sanctifying grace\nas a _qualitas per modum habitus_,(996) by which phrase he wished to\nindicate that it imparts a supernatural perfection of being rather than a\nfacility to act. To obviate these and similar subtleties the Council of\nTrent defined sanctifying grace simply as a permanent quality.\n\nNevertheless scientific theology employs the term _habitus_ because it has\nno other philosophical category ready to hand. This defect in the\nAristotelian system is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that\nbesides the supernatural, there are distinctly natural qualities which\n\u201cbelong to the first species,\u201d though they impart no facility to act but\nmerely a disposition to certain modes of being, _e.g._ beauty, health,\netc.\n\nThere is also a positive reason which justifies the definition of\nsanctifying grace as a habit. It is that grace imparts to the soul, if not\nthe facility, at least the power to perform supernaturally meritorious\nacts, so that it is really more than a _habitus entitativus_, namely, a\n_habitus_ (at least remotely) _operativus_.(997)\n\nb) The Scholastic distinction between native and acquired habits does not\napply in the supernatural domain, because the supernatural by its very\ndefinition can never be either a part or an acquisition of mere\nnature.(998) It follows from this that supernatural habits, both\nentitative and operative, can be imparted to the human soul in no other\nway than by infusion (or excitation) from above. Hence the name _habitus\ninfusus_. When the Holy Ghost infuses sanctifying grace, the _habitus\nentitativus_ imparts to the soul a supernatural principle of being, while\nthe _habitus operativus_ confers upon it a supernatural power, which by\nfaithful co\u00f6peration with (actual) grace may be developed into a facility\nto perform salutary acts. Hence, if we adopt the division of habits into\nentitative and operative, sanctifying grace must be defined first as an\nentitative habit (_habitus entitativus_), because it forms the groundwork\nof permanent righteousness, sanctity, divine sonship, etc.; and, secondly,\nas an infused habit, because it is not born in the soul and cannot be\nacquired by practice. This view is in accord with Sacred Scripture, which\ndescribes the grace of justification as a divine seed abiding in man,(999)\na treasure carried in earthen vessels,(1000) a regeneration by which the\nsoul becomes the abode of God(1001) and a temple of the Holy Ghost.(1002)\n\n3. THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE ALLEGED IDENTITY OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND\nCHARITY.\u2014As justifying grace and theological love (charity) are both\ninfused habits, the question arises as to their objective identity. The\nanswer will depend on the solution of the problem, just treated, whether\nsanctifying grace is primarily an entitative or an operative habit. Of\ntheological love we know that it is essentially an operative habit, being\none, and indeed the chief of the \u201cthree theological virtues.\u201d What we have\nsaid in the preceding paragraph will enable the reader to perceive, at the\noutset, that there is a real distinction between grace and charity, and\nthat consequently the two can not be identical.\n\na) Nevertheless there is an imposing school of theologians who maintain\nthe identity of grace with charity. They are Scotus(1003) and his\nfollowers,(1004) Cardinal Bellarmine,(1005) Molina, Lessius, Salmeron,\nVasquez, Sardagna, Tournely, and others. Their principal argument is that\nHoly Scripture ascribes active justification indiscriminately to\ntheological love and sanctifying grace, and that some of the Fathers\nfollow this example. Here are a few of the Scriptural texts quoted in\nfavor of this opinion. Luke VII, 47: \u201cMany sins are forgiven her, because\nshe hath loved much.\u201d(1006) 1 Pet. IV, 8: \u201cCharity covereth a multitude of\nsins.\u201d(1007) 1 John IV, 7: \u201cEvery one that loveth is born of God.\u201d(1008)\nSt. Augustine seems to identify the two habits in such passages as the\nfollowing: \u201cInchoate love, therefore, is inchoate righteousness; ... great\nlove is great righteousness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.\u201d(1009)\nAccording to the Tridentine Council, \u201cthe justification of the impious\u201d\ntakes place when \u201cthe charity of God is poured forth ... in the hearts of\nthose that are justified, and is inherent therein.\u201d(1010) It is argued\nthat, if charity and grace produce the same effects, they must be\nidentical as causes, and there can be at most a virtual distinction\nbetween them. This argument is strengthened by the observation that\nsanctifying grace and theological love constitute the supernatural life of\nthe soul and the loss of either entails spiritual death.\n\nThese arguments prove that grace and charity are inseparable, but nothing\nmore. All the Scriptural and Patristic passages cited can be explained\nwithout recourse to the hypothesis that they are identical. Charity is not\nsuperfluous alongside of sanctifying grace, because the primary object of\ngrace is to impart supernatural being, whereas charity confers a special\nfaculty which enables the intellect and the will to elicit supernatural\nsalutary acts.\n\nb) The majority of Catholic theologians(1011) hold with St. Thomas(1012)\nand his school that grace and charity, while inseparable, are really\ndistinct, sanctifying grace as a _habitus entitativus_ imparting to the\nsoul a supernatural being, whereas charity, being purely a _habitus\noperativus_, confers a supernatural power.\n\nLet us put the matter somewhat differently. Grace inheres in the substance\nof the soul, while charity has its seat in one of its several faculties.\nInhering in the very substance of the soul, grace, by a physical or moral\npower, produces the three theological virtues\u2014faith, hope, and love. \u201cAs\nthe soul\u2019s powers, which are the wellsprings of its acts, flow from its\nessence,\u201d says the Angelic Doctor, \u201cso the theological virtues flow from\ngrace into the faculties of the soul and move them to act.\u201d(1013) And St.\nAugustine: \u201cGrace precedes charity.\u201d(1014)\n\nThis is a more plausible view than the one we have examined a little\nfarther up, and it can claim the authority of Scripture, which, though it\noccasionally identifies the effects of grace and charity, always clearly\ndistinguishes the underlying habits. Cfr. 2 Cor. XIII, 13: \u201cThe grace of\nour Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God.\u201d(1015) 1 Tim. I 14: \u201cThe\ngrace of our Lord hath abounded exceedingly with faith and love.\u201d(1016)\nFurthermore, \u201cregeneration\u201d and \u201cnew-creation\u201d in Biblical usage affect\nnot only the faculties of the soul, but its substance. Finally, many\ncouncils consistently distinguish between _gratia_ and _caritas_ (_dona_,\n_virtutes_)\u2014a distinction which has almost the force of a proof that grace\nand charity are not the same thing.(1017) These councils cannot have had\nin mind a purely virtual distinction, because theological love presupposes\nsanctifying grace in exactly the same manner as a faculty presupposes a\nsubstance or nature in which it exists. The Roman Catechism expressly\ndesignates the theological virtues as \u201cconcomitants of grace.\u201d(1018)\n\nThe question nevertheless remains an open one, as neither party can fully\nestablish its claim, and the Church has never rendered an official\ndecision either one way or the other.(1019)\n\n4. SANCTIFYING GRACE A PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUL IN THE DIVINE NATURE.\u2014The\nhighest and at the same time the most profound conception of sanctifying\ngrace is that it is a real, though of course only accidental and\nanalogical, participation of the soul in the nature of God. That\nsanctifying grace makes us \u201cpartakers of the divine nature\u201d is of faith,\nbut the manner in which it effects this participation admits of different\nexplanations.\n\na) The fact itself can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 4:\n\u201cBy whom [Christ] He [the Father] hath given us great and precious\npromises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine\nnature.\u201d(1020) To this text may be added all those which affirm the\nregeneration of the soul in God, because regeneration, being a new birth,\nmust needs impart to the regenerate the nature of his spiritual\nprogenitor. Cfr. John I, 13: \u201cWho are born, not of blood, ... but of\nGod.\u201d(1021) John III, 5: \u201cUnless a man be born again of water and the Holy\nGhost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.\u201d(1022) St. James I, 18:\n\u201cFor of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth.\u201d(1023) 1\nJohn III, 9: \u201cWhosoever is born of God, committeth no sin.\u201d(1024)\n\nThe Fathers of the Church again and again extol the deification\n(_deificatio_, \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of man effected by sanctifying grace and compare\nthe union of the soul with God to the commingling of water with wine, the\npenetration of iron by fire, etc. St. Athanasius(1025) begins his\nChristological teaching with the declaration: \u201cHe was not, therefore,\nfirst man and then God, but first God and then man, in order that He might\nrather deify us.\u201d(1026) St. Augustine describes the process of deification\nas follows: \u201cHe justifies who is just of Himself, not from another; and He\ndeifies who is God of Himself, not by participation in another. But He who\njustifies also deifies, because He makes [men] sons of God through\njustification.... We have been made sons of God and gods; but this is a\ngrace of the adopting [God], not the nature of the progenitor. The Son of\nGod alone is God; ... the others who are made gods are made gods by His\ngrace; they are not born of His substance, so as to become that which He\nis, but in order that they may come to Him by favor and become co-heirs\nwith Christ.\u201d(1027) The idea underlying this passage has found its way\ninto the liturgy of the Mass,(1028) and Ripalda is justified in declaring\nthat it cannot be denied without rashness.(1029)\n\nb) In trying to explain in what manner grace enables us to partake of the\ndivine nature, it is well to keep in view the absolutely supernatural\ncharacter of sanctifying grace and the impossibility of any deification of\nthe creature in the strict sense of the term. The truth lies between these\ntwo extremes.\n\nA few medieval mystics(1030) and modern Quietists(1031) were guilty of\nexaggeration when they taught that grace transforms the human soul into\nthe substance of the Godhead, thus completely merging the creature in its\nCreator. This contention(1032) leads to Pantheism. How can the soul be\nmerged in the Creator, since it continues to be subject to concupiscence?\n\u201cWe have therefore,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201ceven now begun to be like Him,\nas we have the first-fruits of the Spirit; but yet even now we are unlike\nHim, by reason of the old nature which leaves its remains in us. In as\nfar, then, as we are like Him, in so far are we, by the regenerating\nSpirit, sons of God; but in as far as we are unlike Him, in so far are we\nthe children of the flesh and of this world.\u201d(1033)\n\nOn the other hand it would be underestimating the power of grace to say\nthat it effects a merely external and moral participation of the soul in\nthe divine nature, similar to that by which those who embraced the faith\nof Abraham were called \u201cchildren of Abraham,\u201d and those who commit heinous\ncrimes are called \u201csons of the devil.\u201d According to the Fathers(1034) and\ntheologians, to \u201cpartake of the divine nature\u201d means to become internally\nand physically like God and to receive from Him truly divine gifts, _i.e._\nsuch as are proper to God alone and absolutely transcend the order of\nnature.(1035) Being self-existing, absolutely independent, and infinite,\nGod cannot, of course, be regarded as the formal cause of created\nsanctity; yet the strictly supernatural gifts which He confers on His\ncreatures, especially the beatific vision and sanctifying grace, can be\nconceived only _per modum causae formalis_ (not _informantis_), because\nthrough them God gives Himself to the creature in such an intimate way\nthat the creature is raised up to and transfigured by Him.(1036)\nConsequently, the so-called _deificatio_ of the soul by grace is not a\nreal deification, but an assimilation of the creature to God.(1037)\n\nc) Which one of God\u2019s numerous attributes forms the basis of the\nsupernatural communication made to the soul in the bestowal of grace, is a\nquestion on which theologians differ widely. The so-called incommunicable\nattributes, (self-existence, immensity, eternity, etc.), of course, cannot\nbe imparted to the creature except by way of a hypostatic union.(1038)\n\nGonet(1039) misses the point at issue, therefore, when He declares the\nessential characteristic of deification to be the communication to the\ncreature of the divine attributes of self-existence and infinity.\nSelf-existence is absolutely incommunicable.(1040) Somewhat more\nplausible, though hardly acceptable, is Ripalda\u2019s opinion that deification\nformally consists in the participation of the creature in the holiness of\nthe Creator, particularly in the supernatural vital communion of the soul\nwith God in faith, hope, and charity, thus making sanctifying grace the\n_radix totius honestatis moralis_.(1041) While it is perfectly true that\nthe supernatural life of the soul is a life in and through God, and that\nthe very concept of sanctifying grace involves a peculiar and special\nrelation of the soul to God, the Biblical term \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\npoints to a still deeper principle of the sanctifying _vita deiformis_.\nThis principle, as some of the Fathers intimate, and St. Thomas expressly\nteaches,(1042) is the absolute intellectuality of God. Hence the object of\nsanctifying grace is to impart to the soul in a supernatural manner such a\ndegree of intellectuality as is necessary to perceive the absolute\nSpirit\u2014here on earth in the obscurity of faith, and in the life beyond by\nthe _lumen gloriae_.(1043) This view is to a certain extent confirmed by\nSacred Scripture, which describes the regeneration of the sinner as a\nbirth of spirit from spirit.(1044) It is also held by some of the Fathers,\nwho attribute to sanctifying grace both a deifying and a spiritualizing\npower. Thus St. Basil(1045) says: \u201cThe spirit-bearing souls, illuminated\nby the Holy Ghost, themselves become spiritual(1046) and radiate grace to\nothers. Hence ... to become like unto God,(1047) is the highest of all\ngoals: to become God.\u201d(1048) Finally, since the Holy Ghost, as the highest\nexponent of the spirituality of the divine nature, by His personal\nindwelling crowns and consummates both the regeneration of the soul and\nits assimilation to God, there is a strong theological probability in\nfavor of Suarez\u2019s view. Of course the process does not attain its climax\nuntil the creature is finally admitted to the beatific vision in Heaven.\nCfr. 1 John III, 2: \u201cWe are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet\nappeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be\nlike to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.\u201d(1049)\n\n\nArticle 2. The Effects Of Sanctifying Grace\n\n\nWe shall better understand the nature of sanctifying grace by studying\nwhat are known as its \u201cformal effects.\u201d As the _causa efficiens_ of a\nthing is commonly farther removed from our mental grasp than its effects,\nwe are ordinarily more familiar with the latter than with the former. For\nthis reason the glories of divine grace can be best explained to children\nand to the faithful in general by describing the effects it produces in\nthe soul.(1050)\n\n1. SANCTITY.\u2014The first among the formal effects of sanctifying grace (an\neffect connoted by its very name) is sanctity. Eph. IV, 24: \u201cPut on the\nnew man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of\ntruth.\u201d(1051) The Tridentine Council explicitly mentions sanctity as an\neffect of sanctifying grace: \u201cJustification ... is not remission of sins\nmerely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man through\nthe voluntary reception of the grace and of the gifts whereby man from\nunjust becomes just.\u201d(1052) It follows that the two elements of active\njustification, _viz._: remission of sin and sanctification, are also\nconstitutive elements of habitual or sanctifying grace. For it is\nprecisely by the infusion of sanctifying grace that sin is wiped out and\nsanctity established in its place.(1053)\n\na) By sanctifying grace the justified man becomes a living member\n(_membrum vivum_) of the mystical body of Christ. His sins, it is true,\ndid not forfeit membership in the Church, so long as he preserved the\nfaith, but by sinning he became a dead member who can regain life only by\nreturning to the state of grace. Grace is the life of the soul, sin its\ndeath. Hence the evil of mortal sin can be most effectively illustrated by\ncontrast with the glory of divine grace, and _vice versa_. Cfr. Gal. II,\n20: \u201cAnd I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.\u201d(1054)\n\nb) He who hates mortal sin and faithfully obeys the will of God, enjoys\npeace of heart,(1055) whereas the sinner is incessantly harassed by qualms\nof conscience. The faithful Christian rejoices in serving His Master and\ncombats the flesh, the world, and the devil with a fortitude that not\ninfrequently rises to heroic proportions, as the example of many holy men\nand women proves.\n\nc) Sanctifying grace entails a particular providence, inasmuch as, by\nmeans of it, God grants man His special assistance towards preserving the\nstate of grace, without, of course, interfering with free-will. Cfr. Is.\nXLIX, 16: \u201cBehold, I have graven thee in my hands.\u201d(1056) Rom. VIII, 28:\n\u201c... to them that love God, all things work together unto good.\u201d(1057)\nMediately, God also proves his special love for the just man by shielding\nhim from bodily and spiritual danger.\n\n2. SUPERNATURAL BEAUTY.\u2014Though we can quote no formal ecclesiastical\ndefinition to prove that sanctifying grace beautifies the soul, the fact\nis sufficiently certain from Revelation. If, as is quite generally held by\nCatholic exegetes, the Spouse of the Canticle typifies the human soul\nendowed with sanctifying grace, all the passages describing the beauty of\nthat Spouse must be applicable to the souls of those whom Christ embraces\nwith His tender love. The Fathers of the Church frequently extol the\nsupernatural beauty of the soul in the state of grace. Ambrose calls it \u201ca\nsplendid painting made by God Himself;\u201d Chrysostom compares it to \u201ca\nstatue of gold;\u201d Cyril, to \u201ca divine seal;\u201d Basil, to \u201ca shining light,\u201d\nand so forth. St. Thomas says: \u201cDivine grace beautifies [the soul] like\nlight,\u201d(1058) and the Roman Catechism declares: \u201cGrace ... is a certain\nsplendor and light that effaces all the stains of our souls and renders\nthe souls themselves brighter and more beautiful.\u201d(1059)\n\nIn defining beauty as \u201cthe representation of an idea in a sensual form,\u201d\nmodern aesthetics has eliminated the spiritual element and in consequence\nis unable to appreciate the spiritual beauty of God and of the soul. Being\ncomposed of body and soul, man is naturally most impressed by beauty when\nit appears in a material guise. But this does not prove that there is no\nspiritual beauty, or that true beauty abides solely in matter. Some\npresent-day writers strongly emphasize the need of realism as against an\nidealism which, they claim, is not truly human because it exalts the\nspiritual at the expense of the material. In its last conclusions this\nperverted realism harks back to the sophistry of Protagoras who held that\n\u201cman is the measure of all things.\u201d(1060) Idealism, on the other hand, is\nbased on the true Platonic doctrine that God is the measure of all\nthings.(1061) St. Augustine defines beauty as \u201cunity in variety,\u201d which is\na correct definition, because it is adaptable to both the spiritual and\nthe material order.(1062) Applying this definition we find that the soul\nis not only naturally beautiful by the substantial unity and simplicity\nwhich shines forth in the variety of its faculties and powers, but also\nsupernaturally by virtue of sanctifying grace, which transfuses nature\ninto a new unity with the supernatural,\u2014at the same time producing a\nvariety of theological and moral virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy\nGhost, and thus creating a true work of art. Moreover, by enabling man to\nparticipate in the Divine Nature,(1063) grace produces in the soul a\nphysical reflection of the uncreated beauty of God, a likeness of the\ncreature with its Creator, which far transcends the natural likeness\nimprinted by creation. True, only God and the Elect in Heaven perceive and\nenjoy this celestial beauty; but we terrestrial pilgrims can, as it were,\nsense it from afar and indulge the hope that we may one day be privileged\nto contemplate and enjoy the divine beauty that envelops the souls endowed\nwith grace.\n\nThe beauty produced by sanctifying grace must be conceived not merely as a\nreflection of the absolute nature of God, who is the pattern-exemplar of\nall beauty, but more specifically as an image of the Trinity impressed\nupon the soul. St. Paul teaches that the soul is transformed into an image\nof the Divine Logos, to whom, as the holy Fathers tell us, beauty is\nappropriated in an especial manner.(1064) Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29: \u201cWhom he\nforeknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his\nSon.\u201d(1065) Gal. IV, 19: \u201cMy little children, of whom I am in labor again,\nuntil Christ be formed in you.\u201d(1066) In virtue of the adoptive sonship\neffected by grace,(1067) the soul becomes a true \u201ctemple of the Holy\nGhost.\u201d(1068)\n\n3. THE FRIENDSHIP OF GOD.\u2014Closely connected with the beauty which\nsanctifying grace confers, is the supernatural friendship it establishes\nbetween God and the soul. True beauty elicits love and benevolence. By\nnature man is merely a servant of God; in fact, since the fall, he is His\nenemy. Sanctifying grace transforms this hostile relation into genuine\nfriendship. By grace, says the Council of Trent, \u201cman of unjust becomes\njust, and of an enemy a friend.\u201d(1069) And again: \u201cHaving been thus\njustified and made the friends and domestics of God.\u201d(1070) God loves the\njust man as His intimate friend and enables and impels him, by means of\nhabitual grace and habitual charity, to reciprocate that love with all his\nheart. Here we have the two constituent elements of friendship. The Bible\nfrequently speaks of friendship existing between God and the just. Cfr.\nWisd. VII, 14: \u201cThey [the just] become the friends of God.\u201d(1071) John XV,\n14 sq.: \u201cI will not now call you servants, ... but I have called you\nfriends.\u201d(1072) This friendship is sometimes compared to a mystic\nmarriage. Cfr. Matth. IX, 15: \u201cAnd Jesus said to them: Can the children of\nthe bridegroom mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them?\u201d(1073) Apoc.\nXIX, 7: \u201cThe marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath prepared\nherself.\u201d(1074)\n\na) Friendship (\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1), according to Aristotle,(1075) is \u201cthe conscious\nlove of benevolence of two persons for each other.\u201d Hence, to constitute\nfriendship, there must be (1) two or more distinct persons; (2) pure love\nof benevolence _(amor benevolentiae_, not _concupiscentiae_), because only\nunselfish love can truly unite hearts; (3) mutual consciousness of\naffection, because without a consciousness of the existing relation on\nboth sides there would be merely one-sided benevolence, not friendship. It\nfollows that true friendship is based on virtue and that a relation not\nbased on virtue can be called friendship in a qualified or metaphorical\nsense only (_amicitia utilis, delectabilis_).\n\nFrom what we have said it is easy to deduce the essential characteristics\nof true friendship. They are: (1) benevolence; (2) love consciously\nentertained by both parties; (3) a mutual exchange of goods or community\nof life; (4) equality of rank or station. The first condition is based on\nthe fact that a true friend will not seek his own interest, but that of\nhis friend. It is to be noted, however, that one\u2019s joy at the presence or\nprosperity of a friend must not be inspired by selfishness or sensual\ndesire, for in that case there would be no true friendship.(1076) The\nsecond condition is based on the necessity of friendship being mutual\nlove, for friendship is not a one-sided affection, nor does it spend\nitself in mutual admiration. The third condition is necessary for the\nreason that love, if it is to be more than \u201cPlatonic,\u201d must result in acts\nof benevolence and good will.(1077) Of the fourth condition St. Jerome\nsays: \u201cFriendship finds men equal or makes them equal.\u201d(1078)\n\nb) All these conditions are found in the friendship with which Almighty\nGod deigns to honor those who are in the state of sanctifying grace.\n\n(1) That God loves the just man with a love of pure benevolence and\neagerly seeks his companionship, is proved by the mysteries of the\nIncarnation and the Holy Eucharist. Cfr. Prov. VIII, 31: \u201cAnd my delight\n[is] to be with the children of men.\u201d(1079)\n\n(2) The just man is enabled to return God\u2019s love by the habit of\ntheological charity, which is inseparably bound up with and spontaneously\nflows from sanctifying grace.(1080) God\u2019s consciousness of this mutual\nlove is, of course, based on certain knowledge, whereas man can have\nmerely a probable conjecture. This, however, suffices to establish a true\nfriendship, as the example of human friends shows.(1081)\n\n(3) There is also community of life and property between God and man when\nthe latter is in the state of sanctifying grace; for not only is he\nindebted to God for his very nature and all natural favors which he\nenjoys, but likewise and especially for the supernatural blessings\nbestowed upon him.(1082) On his own part, it is true, he cannot give his\nBenefactor anything in return which that Benefactor does not already\npossess; but the just man is ever eager to further God\u2019s external\nglorification, agreeable to the first petition of the Our Father:\n\u201cHallowed by Thy name.\u201d(1083) God has furthermore given him a kind of\nsubstitute for operative charity in the love of his neighbor, which has\nprecisely the same formal object as the love of God. Cfr. 1 John III, 17:\n\u201cHe that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in\nneed, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God\nabide in him?\u201d(1084)\n\n(4) There can be no real equality between God and the human soul, but God\nin His infinite goodness, elevating the soul to a higher plane and\nallowing it to participate in His own nature,(1085) makes possible an\n_amicitia excellentiae s. eminentiae_, which is sufficient to constitute a\ntrue relation of friendship. Without this elevation of the soul by grace\nthere could be no friendship between God and man.(1086)\n\n4. ADOPTIVE SONSHIP.\u2014The formal effects of sanctifying grace culminate in\nthe elevation of man to the rank of an adopted child of God (_filius Dei\nadoptivus_), with a claim to the paternal inheritance, _i.e._ the beatific\nvision in Heaven. This truth is so clearly stated in Scripture and\nTradition that its denial would be heretical. The Tridentine Council\nsummarily describes justification as \u201cthe state of grace and of the\nadoption of the sons of God,\u201d(1087) The teaching of Holy Scripture can be\ngathered from such texts as the following. Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: \u201c... You\nhave received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba\n(Father). For the spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we\nare the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and\njoint heirs with Christ.\u201d(1088) 1 John III, 1 sq.: \u201cBehold what manner of\ncharity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and\nshould be the sons of God.... Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of\nGod.\u201d(1089) Gal. IV, 5: \u201c... that we might receive the adoption of\nsons.\u201d(1090) That the just become the adopted sons of God follows likewise\nas a corollary from the doctrine of regeneration so frequently taught by\nScripture. This regeneration is not a procession of the soul from the\ndivine essence, but a kind of accidental and analogical procreation\nsubstantially identical with adoption (_filiatio adoptiva_, \u03c5\u1f31\u03bf\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1).\nCfr. John I, 12 sq.: \u201c... He gave them power to be made the sons of God,\n... who are born ... of God.\u201d(1091)\n\na) St. Thomas defines adoption as \u201cthe gratuitous acceptance of a child of\nother parents to be the same as one\u2019s own child and heir.\u201d(1092) Adoption\nimplies (1) that the adopted child be a stranger to the adopting father;\n(2) that it have no legal claim to adoption; (3) that it give its consent\nto being adopted; (4) that it be received by the adopting father with\nparental love and affection. All these elements are present, in a far\nhigher and more perfect form, in the adoption of a soul by God.\n\n(1) The rational creature, as such, is not a \u201cson\u201d but merely a \u201cservant\nof God,\u201d(1093) and, if he be in the state of mortal sin, His enemy.\n\n(2) That adoption is a gratuitous favor on the part of the Almighty,\nfollows from the fact that the adopted creature is His enemy and that\ngrace is a free supernatural gift, to which no creature has a natural\nclaim. Adoption furthermore implies the right of inheritance.(1094) The\nheritage of the children of God is a purely spiritual possession which can\nbe enjoyed simultaneously by many, and consequently excels every natural\nheritage. Men, as a rule, do not distribute their property during life,\nwhile, after their death, it is usually divided up among several\nheirs.(1095)\n\n(3) Whereas adoption among men owes its existence to the desire of\noffspring on the part of childless parents, the adoption of the soul by\nGod springs from pure benevolence and unselfish love, and for this reason\npresupposes (in the case of adults) the free consent of the adopted. No\none can become an adopted son of God against his will.(1096)\n\n(4) Whereas human adoption supposes substantial equality between father\nand child, and therefore at best amounts to no more than a legal\nacceptance, adoption by God elevates the soul to a higher level by\nallowing it to participate in the Divine Nature, and consequently is a\ntrue (even though merely an accidental and analogical) regeneration in\nGod.\n\nb) From what we have said it follows\u2014and this is a truth of considerable\nspeculative importance\u2014that there are essential points of difference as\nwell as of resemblance between Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and the\njustified sinner adopted by the Heavenly Father.\n\n\u03b1) The difference between the \u201cnatural Son of God\u201d and an \u201cadopted son\u201d is\nexactly like that between God and creature. The Logos-Son, engendered by\neternal generation from the divine substance, is the true natural Son of\nthe Father, the Second Person of the Divine Trinity, and Himself\nGod.(1097) The just man, on the other hand, is a child of God merely by\nthe possession of sanctifying grace,(1098) which can be lost by mortal sin\nand consequently is founded upon a free relation that may be terminated by\nman as freely as it was entered into between himself and God.\n\nIntimately related to this distinction is another:\u2014Christ is the Son of\nthe Father alone, the just man is an adopted child of the whole\nTrinity.(1099) This fact does not, however, prevent us from\n\u201cappropriating\u201d adoptive sonship to each of the three Divine Persons\naccording to His peculiar hypostatic character:\u2014the Father as its author,\nthe Son as its pattern, and the Holy Ghost as its conveyor.(1100) Now, if\nChrist, as the true Son of God, is the efficient cause (_causa efficiens_)\nof that adoptive sonship of which, as God, He is also the pattern-exemplar\n(_causa exemplaris_), it follows that He cannot be an adopted son of God.\n\u201c_Christus est incapax adoptionis_,\u201d as Suarez puts it.(1101) To say that\nHe is both the natural and an adopted Son of God would be heretical.(1102)\nConsequently, sanctifying grace, in Him, did not exercise one of the\nfunctions it invariably exercises in the souls of men, _i.e._ it did not\nmake Him an adopted son of God.\n\n\u03b2) It is to be noted, however, that the unique position enjoyed by our\nLord gives rise, not only to essential distinctions but also to an equal\nnumber of analogies between the Only-begotten Son of God and His adopted\nsons. The first and most fundamental of these analogies is the attribution\nof the common appellation \u201cson of God\u201d both to Christ and to the just.\nThough Christ is the only true Son of God, the Heavenly Father has\nnevertheless charitably \u201cbestowed upon us, that we should be called, and\nshould be, the sons of God.\u201d(1103) According to John I, 13, Christ \u201cgave\npower to be made the sons of God\u201d to them \u201cwho are born ... of God.\u201d Hence\ndivine sonship formally consists in an impression of the hypostatic\nlikeness of the Only-begotten Son of God, by which the soul in a\nmysterious manner becomes an image of the Trinity, and especially of the\nOnly-begotten Son of God, who is the archetype and pattern-exemplar of\nadoptive sonship. This hypostatic propriety and exemplariness was the\nreason why the Second Person of the Trinity became man.(1104) That the\nsoul of the justified is transformed into \u201can image of the Son of God\u201d is\nexpressly taught by the Greek Fathers. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says:\n\u201cChrist is truly formed in us, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost impresses on us\na certain divine likeness by means of sanctity and justice.... But if any\none is formed in Christ, he is formed into a child of God.\u201d(1105)\n\nThese considerations also explain the points of resemblance between the\nadoptive sonship of God and the Holy Eucharist. Being our Father by\nadoption, God is bound to provide us with food worthy of a divine\nprogenitor. The food He gives us (the Holy Eucharist) corresponds to our\ndignity as His children, sustains us in this sublime relation, and at the\nsame time constitutes the pledge of a glorious resurrection and an eternal\nbeatitude.\n\nc) Is the adoptive sonship of the children of God constituted entirely by\nsanctifying grace, or does it require for its full development the\npersonal indwelling in the soul of the Holy Ghost?(1106) This subtle\nquestion formed the subject of an interesting controversy between Joseph\nScheeben and Theodore Granderath, S. J. Father Granderath claimed on the\nauthority of the Tridentine Council that divine sonship is an inseparable\nfunction of sanctifying grace, and through that grace alone, without the\n_inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, constitutes the _unica causa formalis_ of\njustification. Against this theory Dr. Scheeben maintained with great\nacumen and, we think, successfully, that sanctifying grace of itself\nalone, without the aid of any other factor, not only completely justifies\nthe sinner but raises him to the rank of an adopted son of God, though\nthere is nothing to prevent us from holding that the indwelling of the\nHoly Ghost forms the climax of the process, and develops and perfects the\nalready existing _filiatio adoptiva_.(1107)\n\nPetavius had contended(1108) that the just men of the Old Testament,\nthough in the state of sanctifying grace, were not adopted children of\nGod, because the _filiatio adoptiva_ is an exclusive privilege of those\nliving under the Christian Dispensation. This theory became untenable when\nthe Tridentine Council defined sanctity and adoptive sonship as\ninseparable formal effects of sanctifying grace. There can no longer be\nany doubt, therefore, that the patriarchs, together with sanctifying grace\nalso enjoyed the privilege of adoptive sonship, though, as Suarez\nobserves,(1109) adoptive sonship under the Old Covenant depended both as\nto origin and value upon the adoptive sonship of the New Testament, and\ntherefore was inferior to it in both respects.(1110)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Scheeben, _Lehrbuch der Dogmatik_, Vol. II, \u00a7 168 sqq.,\n    Freiburg 1878.\u2014J. Kirschkamp, _Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren\n    Zusammenhang_, W\u00fcrzburg 1878.\u2014P. Hagg, _Die Reicht\u00fcmer der\n    g\u00f6ttlichen Gnade und die Schwere ihres Verlustes_, Ratisbon\n    1889.\u2014Card. Katschthaler, _De Gratia Sanctificante_, 3rd ed.,\n    Salzburg 1886.\u2014P. Einig, _De Gratia Divina_, Part II, Treves\n    1896.\u2014Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp.\n    575 sqq., Mainz 1897.\u2014Scheeben, _Die Herrlichkeiten der g\u00f6ttlichen\n    Gnade_, 8th ed., by A. M. Weiss, O. P., Freiburg 1908 (English\n    translation, _The Glories of Divine Grace_, 3rd ed., New York _s.\n    a._).\u2014Th. Bourges, O. P., _L\u2019Ordre Surnaturel et le Devoir\n    Chr\u00e9tien_, Paris 1901.\u2014*B. Terrien, _La Gr\u00e2ce et la Gloire ou la\n    Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu Etudi\u00e9e dans sa R\u00e9alit\u00e9,\n    ses Principes, son Perfectionnement et son Couronnement Final_, 2\n    vols., Paris 1897.\u2014*P. Villada, _De Effectibus Formalibus Gratiae\n    Habitualis_, Valladolid 1899.\u2014L. Hubert, _De Gratia\n    Sanctificante_, Paris 1902.\n\n\nArticle 3. The Supernatural Concomitants Of Sanctifying Grace\n\n\nBesides producing the effects described in the preceding Article,\nsanctifying grace also confers certain supernatural privileges, which,\nthough not of the essence of grace, are, in the present economy at least,\ninseparably connected with it and may therefore be regarded as its regular\nconcomitants.\n\nThe existence of these privileges is established by the fact that certain\ncouncils (_e.g._ those of Vienne and Trent), couple \u201cgrace and gifts\u201d in\ntheir official definitions.(1111) The doctrine is clearly stated by the\nRoman Catechism as follows: \u201cTo this [sanctifying grace] is added a most\nnoble accompaniment of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the\nsoul together with grace.\u201d(1112)\n\nWe will treat of the supernatural concomitants of sanctifying grace in\nfour theses.\n\n*Thesis I: The three divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity are\ninfused into the soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace.*\n\nSome theologians (notably Suarez, Ripalda, and De Lugo) declare this\nthesis to be _de fide_, while others (Dom. Soto, Melchior Cano, and\nVasquez) hold it merely as certain. Under the circumstances it will be\nsafest to take middle ground by characterizing it as _fidei proxima_.\n\nProof. The Council of Trent teaches: \u201cMan through Jesus Christ, in whom he\nis ingrafted, receives, in the said justification, together with the\nremission of sins, all these [gifts] infused at once\u2014faith, hope, and\ncharity.\u201d(1113)\n\na) That theological charity, as a habit, is infused together with\nsanctifying grace can be convincingly demonstrated from Holy Scripture.\nCfr. Rom. V, 5: \u201c... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by\nthe Holy Ghost, who is given to us.\u201d(1114) In connection with charity,\nHoly Scripture frequently mentions faith. Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 2: \u201cAnd if I\nshould have ... all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not\ncharity, I am nothing.\u201d(1115) All three of the theological virtues are\nexpressly enumerated in 1 Cor. XIII, 13: \u201cAnd now there remain faith,\nhope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is\ncharity.\u201d(1116) Unlike certain other texts, the one last quoted leaves no\ndoubt that faith, hope, and charity are to be conceived as _dona\ninhaerentia_, _i.e._ habits or qualities inherent in the soul. This\ninterpretation is approved by the Fathers and Scholastics.\n\nb) St. Thomas proves the necessity of the three theological virtues for\nsalvation as follows: \u201cIn order that we be properly moved towards our end\n[God], that end must be both known and desired. Desire of an end includes\ntwo things: first, hope of attaining it, because no prudent man will\naspire to that which he cannot attain; and secondly, love, because nothing\nis desired that is not loved. And hence there are three theological\nvirtues,\u2014faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust to obtain\nHim; and charity, by which we love Him.\u201d(1117)\n\nWhen are the three theological virtues infused into the soul? This is an\nopen question so far as faith and hope are concerned. Of charity we know\nthat it is always infused with habitual grace. Suarez contends that, when\nthe soul is properly disposed, faith and hope are infused before\njustification proper, that is to say, in the process leading up to it. St.\nThomas and St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, hold that faith and hope,\nlike charity, are infused at the moment when justification actually takes\nplace in the soul. This last-mentioned opinion is favored by the\nTridentine Council.(1118)\n\nMortal sin first destroys sanctifying grace together with the habit of\ncharity that is inseparable from it. Faith and hope may continue to exist\nin the soul, and if hope, too, departs, faith may remain alone. But the\nloss of faith invariably entails the destruction of hope and charity.\n\n*Thesis II: Together with sanctifying grace there are also infused the\nsupernatural moral virtues.*\n\nThis proposition may be characterized as _sententia communior et\nprobabilior_. Though denied by some theologians, it can claim a high\ndegree of probability.(1119)\n\nProof. The infused moral virtues (_virtutes morales infusae_) differ from\nthe theological virtues in that they have for their immediate formal\nobject, not God Himself, but the creature in its relation to the moral\nlaw.\n\nThe moral virtues may be reduced to four, _viz._: prudence, justice,\nfortitude, and temperance. These are called the \u201ccardinal\u201d virtues; first,\nbecause they perfect the principal faculties of the soul; secondly,\nbecause all the other virtues may be scientifically deduced from\nthem.(1120) In the supernatural order the infusion of the cardinal virtues\nand of the other virtues subordinate to them has for its object the\ngovernment of intellect and will in their relation towards created things\nand the guidance of these faculties to their supernatural end.\n\na) The existence of supernaturally infused moral virtues is intimated in\nWis. VIII, 7: \u201cAnd if a man love justice: her labors have great virtues;\nfor she teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,\nwhich are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in\nlife.\u201d(1121) The teacher of the three cardinal virtues here mentioned is\n\u201cDivine Wisdom,\u201d _i.e._ God Himself, and we may assume that He inculcates\nthem by the same method which He employs in infusing the theological\nvirtues of faith, hope, and charity.\n\nAnother relevant text is Ezechiel XI, 19 sq.: \u201c... and I will take away\nthe stony heart out of their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh, that\nthey may walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments.\u201d(1122) Here\nYahweh promises to give the just men of the New Covenant a \u201cheart of\nflesh\u201d as opposed to the \u201cstony heart\u201d of the Jews. The meaning evidently\nis that a disposition to do good will be a characteristic of the New\nTestament Christians in contradistinction to the hardhearted Old Testament\nJews. He who has a \u201cheart of flesh\u201d will walk in God\u2019s commandments and\nkeep His judgments. Hence \u201cheart\u201d signifies the sum-total of all those\nhabits which impel and enable a man to lead a good life. Since it is God\nHimself who gives the \u201cheart of flesh,\u201d _i.e._ the moral virtues, it\nfollows that they are supernaturally infused.(1123)\n\nb) Some of the Fathers ascribe the moral virtues directly to divine\ninfusion.\n\nThus St. Augustine observes that the cardinal virtues \u201care given to us\nthrough the grace of God.\u201d(1124) And St. Gregory the Great says that the\nHoly Ghost does \u201cnot desert the hearts of those who are perfect in faith,\nhope, and charity, and in those other goods without which no man can\nattain to the heavenly fatherland.\u201d(1125) St. Thomas shows the theological\nreason for this by pointing to the parallel that exists between nature and\nthe supernatural. \u201cEffects,\u201d he says, \u201cmust always be proportionate to\ntheir causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral,\nwhich we acquire by our acts, proceed from certain natural principles\npre\u00ebxisting in us.... In lieu of these natural principles God confers on\nus the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural\nend.... Hence there must correspond to these theological virtues,\nproportionally, other habits caused in us by God, and which bear the same\nrelation to the theological virtues that the moral and intellectual\nvirtues bear to the natural principles of virtue.\u201d(1126)\n\n*Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are also infused with\nsanctifying grace.*\n\nThis proposition may be qualified as \u201c_probabilis_.\u201d\n\nProof. The Church\u2019s teaching with regard to the seven gifts of the Holy\nGhost is based on Isaias XI, 2 sq.: \u201cAnd the spirit of the Lord shall rest\nupon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of\ncounsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. And\nhe shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.\u201d Four of these\nsupernatural gifts (wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge) perfect\nthe intellect in matters pertaining to salvation, while the remaining\nthree (fortitude, godliness, and the fear of the Lord) direct the will to\nits supernatural end. Are these seven gifts, (or some of them), really\ndistinct from the infused moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual\ndispositions, or merely transient impulses or inspirations? What are their\nmutual relations and how can they be divided off from one another? These\nand similar questions are in dispute among theologians. The prevailing\nopinion is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused habitual\ndispositions, _realiter_ distinct from the theological and moral virtues,\nby which the soul is endowed with a supernatural capacity for receiving\nthe inspirations of the Holy Ghost and a supernatural readiness to obey\nHis impulses in all important matters pertaining to salvation.(1127)\n\nThat the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into the soul simultaneously\nwith sanctifying grace, can be demonstrated as follows: Christ, as the\nmystical head, is the pattern of justification for the members of His\nspiritual body, who are united to Him by sanctifying grace.(1128) Now the\nHoly Ghost dwelled in Christ with all His gifts as permanent habits.(1129)\nConsequently, these gifts are imparted by infusion to those who receive\nthe grace of justification. This is manifestly the belief of the Church,\nfor she prays in the \u201c_Veni Sancte Spiritus_\u201d:\n\n\n    \u201cShed upon thy faithful fold,\n    By unbounded hope controlled,\n    Thy seven gifts.\u201d(1130)\n\n\n*Thesis IV: The process of justification reaches its climax in the\npersonal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the just.*\n\nThis thesis embodies what is technically called a _propositio certa_.\n\nProof. There are two ways in which God may dwell in the soul, either by\nvirtue of His created grace (_inhabitatio per dona accidentalia_,\n\u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd) or by virtue of His uncreated substance\n(_inhabitatio substantialis sive personalis_, \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd). The\npersonal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, therefore, may consist in a twofold\ngrace: _gratia creata_ and _gratia increata_, of which the former is the\ngroundwork and necessary condition of the latter, while the latter may be\ndescribed as the climax and consummation of the former.(1131) The\nindwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just is taught by Holy\nScripture and attested by the Fathers.\n\na) Holy Scripture draws a clear-cut distinction between the accidental and\nthe substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost.\n\n\u03b1) Our Lord Himself, in addition to the charismata, promised His Apostles\nthe Holy Ghost in Person. John XIV, 16 sq.: \u201c... the Father ... shall give\nyou another Paraclete, that he may abide with you for ever, ... but you\nshall know him, because he shall abide with you, and shall be in\nyou.\u201d(1132) This promise was made to all the faithful. Cfr. Rom. V, 5:\n\u201c... the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,\nwho is given to us.\u201d(1133) Hence the Holy Ghost abides in the just and\nsets up His throne in their souls. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 11: \u201cAnd if the spirit\nof him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up\nJesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because\nof his Spirit that dwelleth in you.\u201d(1134) By His indwelling our souls\nbecome temples of God. 1 Cor. III, 16 sq.: \u201cKnow you not that you are the\ntemple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?... For the\ntemple of God is holy, which you are.\u201d(1135) 1 Cor. VI, 19: \u201cOr know you\nnot that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you,\nwhom you have from God; and you are not your own?\u201d(1136)\n\n\u03b2) Agreeable to this teaching of Scripture the Fathers, especially those\nof the East, assert the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the\nsouls of the just.\n\nThe fact that no one but God can dwell substantially and personally in a\ncreature was cited by the Greek Fathers in their controversies with the\nPneumatomachians to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. St. Athanasius\nwrites to Serapion:(1137) \u201cIf we by receiving the Holy Ghost are allowed\nto participate in the Divine Nature, no one but a fool will assert that\nthe Holy Ghost is not of divine but of human nature. For all those in whom\nHe abides become deified(1138) for no other reason. But if He constitutes\nthem gods, there can be no doubt that His nature is divine.\u201d St. Basil\ncomments as follows on Ps. LXXXI, 6 (_Ego dixi, dii estis_): \u201cBut the\nSpirit that causes the gods to be gods, must be divine, and from God, ...\nand God.\u201d(1139) St. Cyril of Alexandria(1140) glowingly describes the soul\ninhabited by the Holy Ghost as inlaid with gold, transfused by fire,\nfilled with the sweet odor of balsam, and so forth.\n\nThe Latin Fathers, with one exception, are less definite on this point.\nSt. Augustine says that the Holy Ghost \u201cis given as a gift of God in such\na way that He Himself also gives Himself as being God,\u201d(1141) and that\n\u201cthe grace of God is a gift of God, but the greatest gift is the Holy\nSpirit Himself, who therefore is called a grace.\u201d(1142) Again: \u201c... the\nHoly Spirit is the gift of God, the gift being Himself indeed equal to the\ngiver, and therefore the Holy Ghost also is God, not inferior to the\nFather and the Son.\u201d(1143)\n\nb) While theologians are unanimous in accepting the doctrine of the\npersonal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the just as clearly contained in\nSacred Scripture and Tradition, they differ in explaining the manner in\nwhich He dwells in the soul.\n\n\u03b1) The great majority hold that the Holy Ghost can not dwell in the soul,\nas the human soul dwells in the body, _per modum informationis_, nor yet\nby a hypostatic union, as godhead and manhood dwell together in the Person\nof Christ; and that consequently His indwelling is objectively an\nindwelling of the whole Trinity, which is appropriated to the Third Person\nmerely because the Holy Ghost is \u201chypostatic holiness\u201d or \u201cpersonal love.\u201d\nThis view is based on what is called \u201cthe fundamental law of the Trinity,\u201d\n_viz._: \u201cIn God all things are one except where there is opposition of\nrelation.\u201d(1144) Sacred Scripture speaks of the personal indwelling of the\nFather and the Son as well as of the Holy Ghost. Cfr. John XIV, 23: \u201cIf\nany one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we\nwill come to him and will make our abode with him.\u201d(1145) St. Athanasius\nconcludes from these words that \u201cthe _energia_ of the Trinity is one....\nIndeed when the Lord says: I and the Father will come, the Spirit also\ncomes, to dwell in us in precisely the same manner in which the Son dwells\nin us.\u201d(1146) And St. Augustine teaches: \u201cLove, therefore, which is of God\nand is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed\nabroad in our hearts,\u2014that love by which the whole Trinity dwells in\nus.\u201d(1147) Accordingly, the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost consists\nin the state of grace as bearing a special relation to the Third Person of\nthe Trinity; the \u201chigher nature\u201d which sanctifying grace imparts to the\nsoul is not an absolute but a relative form (\u03c3\u03c7\u03ad\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2), by which the soul is\nmysteriously united with the Three Divine Persons and, by appropriation,\nwith the Holy Ghost, thereby becoming a throne and temple of God. It is in\nthis sense that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul is called the\nclimax of justification.(1148)\n\n\u03b2) Other eminent theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, Schrader, Scheeben,\nHurter, _et al._) regard the explanation just given as unsatisfactory.\nThey contend that the Fathers, especially those of the East, conceived the\nindwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just, not as an\nindwelling (\u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of the Trinity, appropriated to the Holy Ghost, but\nas a union (\u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of the Holy Ghost Himself with the soul.(1149) This\nunion, they say, is neither physical nor hypostatic, but an altogether\nunique and inexplicable relation by which the soul is morally,\naccidentally, and actively united to the person of the Holy Ghost.(1150)\n\n\u03b3) Unfortunately this exalted and mystic theory cannot be squared with the\ntheological principles underlying the Catholic teaching on the Trinity,\nespecially that portion of it which concerns the appropriations and\nmissions of the three Divine Persons.(1151) It is true that sanctifying\ngrace culminates in a communication of the Divine Nature, and that this\n\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 is effected by imprinting upon the soul an image of the divine\nprocesses of generation and spiration,\u2014the first by adoptive filiation,\nthe second by an indwelling of the Holy Ghost.(1152) In fact all the\nTrinitarian relations are reflected in the justification of the sinner.\nThus regeneration corresponds to the generation of the Logos by the\nFather; adoptive sonship and the accompanying participation of the soul in\nthe Divine Nature corresponds to our Lord\u2019s natural sonship and his\nconsubstantiality with the Father; the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and\nHis union with the soul, on the other hand, corresponds to the divine\nprocess of Spiration, inasmuch as it is pre\u00ebminently a supernatural union\nof love and effects a sort of mutual inexistence or perichoresis of the\nsoul in the Holy Ghost or the three Divine Persons respectively.(1153)\nSince, however, this union of the soul with the substance of the three\nDivine Persons in general, and the Holy Ghost in particular, is not a\nsubstantial and physical but only an accidental and moral union, the\nregeneration of the sinner must be conceived as generation in a\nmetaphorical sense only, divine sonship as adoptive sonship, the\ndeification of man as a weak imitation of the divine _homoousia_, and the\nindwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul as a shadowy analogue of the\nDivine Perichoresis.(1154)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014Deharbe, _Die vollkommene Liebe Gottes nach dem hl.\n    Thomas von Aquin_, Ratisbon 1856.\u2014Marchant, _Die theologischen\n    Tugenden_, Ratisbon 1864.\u2014Mazzella, _De Virtutibus Infusis_, 4th\n    ed., Rome 1894.\u2014G. Lahousse, S. J., _De Virtutibus Theologicis_,\n    Louvain 1890.\u2014S. Schiffini, S. J., _Tractatus de Virtutibus\n    Infusis_, Freiburg 1904.\u2014J. Kirschkamp, _Der Geist des\n    Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe_,\n    Paderborn 1894.\u2014C. Weiss, _S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis\n    Spiritus Sancti Doctrina Proposita et Explicata_, Vienna 1895.\n\n    On the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just see\n    A. Scholz, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti_, W\u00fcrzburg\n    1856.\u2014*Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, pp. 625 sqq., Rome\n    1881.\u2014Oberd\u00f6rffer, _De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in Animabus\n    Iustorum_, Tournai 1890.\u2014* B. Froget, O. P., _De l\u2019Inhabitation du\n    S. Esprit dans les \u00c2mes Justes d\u2019apr\u00e8s la Doctrine de S. Thomas\n    d\u2019Aquin_, Paris 1901.\u2014De Bellevue, _L\u2019Oeuvre du S. Esprit ou la\n    Sanctification des \u00c2mes_, Paris 1901.\n\n    On the historic development of the dogma see Schwane,\n    _Dogmengeschichte_, 2nd ed., Vol. II, \u00a7 56-75, Freiburg 1895.\n\n\n\nSection 3. The Properties Of Sanctifying Grace\n\n\nBy a property (_proprium_, \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) we understand a quality which, though\nnot part of the essence of a thing, necessarily flows from that essence by\nsome sort of causation and is consequently found in all individuals of the\nsame species.(1155) A property, as such, is opposed to an accident\n(_accidens_, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2), which is neither part of, nor necessarily\nattached to, the essence, but may or may not be present in the individual.\nThus the ability to laugh is a property of human nature, whereas the color\nof the skin is an accident.\n\nHow do the properties of grace differ from its formal effects, and from\nits supernatural concomitants? The formal effects of grace, as we have\nseen, are the elements constituting its nature, the properties are\ndeterminations necessarily flowing from that nature, while the\nsupernatural concomitants are free gifts superadded by God.\n\nAccording to the Protestant theory, justification is absolutely certain,\nequal in all men, and incapable of being lost. The Catholic Church, on the\ncontrary, teaches that justification is (1) uncertain, (2) unequal, and\n(3) amissible. We will explain this teaching in three theses.\n\n*Thesis I: No man knows with certainty of faith whether he is justified or\nnot.*\n\nThis proposition is _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Tridentine Council rejected the \u201cfiduciary faith\u201d(1156) of\nLuther as \u201can empty heretical confidence,\u201d(1157) and in three distinct\ncanons denied the properties attributed to faith by the early Protestant\ndogmaticians.(1158)\n\na) Holy Scripture again and again warns us that we can never be sure of\nour salvation. St. Paul, though himself \u201ca vessel of election,\u201d freely\nadmits: \u201cI am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet I am not hereby\njustified; but he that judgeth me is the Lord,\u201d(1159) and declares: \u201cI\nchastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have\npreached to others, I myself should become a castaway.\u201d(1160) He exhorts\nthe faithful to work out their salvation \u201cwith fear and trembling.\u201d(1161)\n\nb) The Fathers also teach the uncertainty of justification in the\nindividual, and attribute it to the fact that, while we know that God\npardons penitent sinners, no man can be entirely certain that he has\ncomplied with all the conditions necessary for justification.\n\n\u201cOur fate,\u201d says St. Chrysostom, \u201cis uncertain for a number of reasons,\none of which is that many of our own works are hidden from us.\u201d(1162) St.\nJerome, commenting on Eccles. IX, 1 sq.,(1163) observes: \u201cIn the future\nthey will know all, and all things are manifest to them, that is to say,\nthe knowledge of this matter will precede them when they depart this life,\nbecause _then_ the judgment will be pronounced, while _now_ we are still\nbattling, and it is now uncertain whether those who bear adversities, bear\nthem for the love of God, like Job, or because they hate Him, as do many\nsinners.\u201d(1164) Pope St. Gregory the Great said to a noble matron who\nasked him whether she could be sure of her salvation: \u201cYou ask me\nsomething which is both useless and difficult [to answer]; difficult,\nbecause I am unworthy to receive a revelation; useless, because it is\nbetter that you be uncertain with regard to your sins, lest in your last\nhour you should be unable to repent.\u201d(1165)\n\nc) We now proceed to the theological explanation of the dogma embodied in\nour thesis.\n\n\u03b1) The purpose of this dogma is not, as Harnack(1166) thinks, \u201cpartly to\nassuage and partly to excite the restlessness that still remains, by means\nof the sacraments, indulgences, liturgical worship and ecclesiastical\nencouragement of mystical and monkish practices,\u201d but to prevent undue\nsecurity and careless assurance. What the Church condemns, in accordance\nwith Sacred Scripture and Tradition, is the _certitudo fidei_, that vain\nconfidence which leads men to feel certain that they are in the state of\ngrace (_inanis fiducia_), not the _certitudo spei_, _i.e._ humble trust in\nGod\u2019s abundant mercy. \u201cAs no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of\nGod, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the\nsacraments,\u201d says the Tridentine Council, \u201ceven so each one, when he\nregards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and\napprehension touching his own grace; seeing that no one can know with a\ncertainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained\nthe grace of God.\u201d(1167)\n\nOne needs but to apply to theology the epistemological principles and\ncriteria furnished by philosophy to perceive that the Catholic dogma is as\nreasonable as the Protestant theory is absurd. The Protestant syllogism:\n\u201cI know with a certainty of faith that the penitent sinner who does his\nshare, is justified through the grace of Christ; now, I, who am a penitent\nsinner, know with a certainty of faith that I have done my share;\ntherefore, I know with a certainty of faith that I am justified,\u201d may be\nformally correct, but the minor premise embodies a material error, because\nno man knows with a certainty of faith that he has done his share, unless\nit be specially revealed to him by God. No matter how sure I may feel of\nmy own goodness, I have no certainty of faith, such as that which Mary\nMagdalen had, or that which was vouchsafed to the penitent thief on the\ncross, that I am justified. It is one of the approved rules of syllogistic\nreasoning that \u201cthe conclusion must follow the weaker premiss.\u201d(1168)\nHence, in the above syllogism the certainty cannot be of faith, but human\nand moral only. We do not mean to deny that God may grant to this or that\nindividual a certainty of faith with regard to his justification; in fact\ntheologians expressly teach that in such a rare and exceptional case the\nprivileged person would be obliged to believe in his own justification,\n_fide divin\u00e2_.(1169)\n\n\u03b2) Can any one, without a special revelation, be _theologically_ certain\nthat he is justified? Theological certainty (_certitudo theologica_) is\nthe result of a syllogism which embodies an article of faith in one of its\npremises and an obvious truth of reason in the other. Ambrosius\nCatharinus(1170) stands alone among Catholic theologians in holding that\nthere are rare cases in which men do have a theological certainty as to\ntheir justification without a private revelation. All other writers deny\nthe possibility: (1) because Scripture and Tradition do not countenance\nthe proposition; (2) because there are no criteria available for such\ncertainty outside of private revelation, and (3) because the Tridentine\nCouncil censured the assertion \u201cthat they who are truly justified must\nneeds, without any doubt whatever, settle within themselves that they are\njustified.\u201d(1171)\n\n\u03b3) For precisely the same reasons no man can be _metaphysically_ certain\nof his own justification. Hence there remains only _moral_ certainty.\nMoral certainty admits of varying degrees. The highest degree of moral\ncertainty concerning justification can be had in the case of baptized\ninfants, though, of course, we can never be metaphysically certain even in\nregard to them, because there is always room for doubt as to the intention\nof the minister and the validity of the matter and form employed in the\nadministration of the sacrament. In the case of adults, certainty\nregarding justification varies in proportion to the measure in which it\ncan be ascertained whether one has complied with all the requirements\ndemanded by God. However, certainty may be so great as to exclude all\nreasonable doubt. St. Paul says: \u201cI am sure that neither death nor life\n... shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ\nJesus our Lord.\u201d(1172) And St. Augustine: \u201cWhat do we know? We know that\nwe have passed from death to life. Whence do we know this? Because we love\nour brethren. Let no one ask another. Let each question his own heart; if\nhe there finds fraternal charity, let him be sure that he has passed from\ndeath to life.\u201d(1173) This teaching has led theologians to set up certain\ncriteria by which the faithful may be relieved of unreasonable anxiety and\nobtain some sort of assurance as to the condition of their souls. Such\ncriteria are: a taste for things spiritual; contempt of earthly pleasures;\nzeal and perseverance in doing good; love of prayer and pious meditation;\npatience in suffering and adversity; a fervent devotion to the Blessed\nVirgin Mary; frequent reception of the sacraments, etc.(1174)\n\n*Thesis II: Sanctifying grace admits of degrees and therefore can be\nincreased by good works.*\n\nBoth propositions contained in this thesis are _de fide_.\n\nProof. The Protestant contention that the grace of justification is shared\nin an equal measure by all the justified, was a logical deduction from\nLuther\u2019s false principle that men are justified by faith alone through the\nexternal justice of Christ. If this were true, good works would be\nsuperfluous, and all Christians would enjoy an equal measure of grace.\nLuther formally asserted this in his sermon on the nativity of the Blessed\nVirgin: \u201cAll we who are Christians are equally great and holy with the\nMother of God.\u201d(1175) The Catholic Church rejects this teaching. She holds\nthat justification is an intrinsic process by which the justice and\nholiness of Christ becomes our own through sanctifying grace, and that\nconsequently sanctifying grace may be present in the soul in a greater or\nless degree, according to the liberality of God and the disposition of the\nindividual Christian, and those who are in the state of grace may augment\nit by good works. The Council of Trent formally defines these truths when\nit says: \u201c[We receive] justice within us, each one according to his own\nmeasure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and\naccording to each one\u2019s proper disposition and co\u00f6peration.\u201d(1176) And:\n\u201c[The justified], faith co\u00f6perating with good works, increase in that\njustice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are\nstill further justified....\u201d(1177) The second and more important of these\ntruths is re-iterated and emphasized in the canons of Session VI: \u201cIf\nanyone saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased\nbefore God through good works, but that those works are merely the fruits\nand signs of justification obtained, but not a cause of the increase\nthereof: let him be anathema.\u201d(1178)\n\na) The Tridentine Fathers base their teaching on a number of Scriptural\ntexts which either expressly declare or presuppose that grace is capable\nof being increased in the soul after justification.\n\nThus we read in Prov. IV, 18: \u201cThe path of the just, as a shining light,\ngoeth forwards and increaseth even to perfect day.\u201d(1179) Ecclus. XVIII,\n22: \u201cLet nothing hinder thee from praying always, and be not afraid to be\njustified even to death: for the reward of God continueth for ever.\u201d(1180)\n2 Pet. III, 18: \u201cGrow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and\nSaviour Jesus Christ.\u201d(1181) 2 Cor. IX, 10: \u201c[God] will increase the\ngrowth of the fruits of your justice.\u201d(1182) Eph. IV, 7: \u201cBut to every one\nof us is given grace, according to the measure of the giving of\nChrist.\u201d(1183) Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: \u201cHe that is just, let him be justified\nstill; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still. Behold, I come\nquickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every man according to his\nworks.\u201d(1184)\n\nSuch texts could easily be multiplied.\n\nb) Tradition found definite utterance as early as the fourth century.\n\nWhen Jovinian attempted to revive the Stoic theory of the absolute\nequality of all virtues and vices, he met with strenuous opposition on the\npart of St. Jerome, who wrote a special treatise _Contra Iovinianum_, in\nwhich he said: \u201cEach of us receives grace according to the measure of the\ngrace of Christ (Eph. IV, 7); not as if the measure of Christ were\nunequal, but so much of His grace is infused into us as we are capable of\nreceiving.\u201d(1185) St. Augustine teaches that the just are as unequal as\nthe sinners. \u201cThe saints are clad with justice (Job XXIX, 14), some more,\nsome less; and no one on this earth lives without sin, some more, some\nless: but the best is he who has least.\u201d(1186) But, we are told, life as\nsuch is not capable of being increased; how then can there be an increase\nof spiritual life? St. Thomas answers this objection as follows: \u201cThe\nnatural life pertains to the substance of man, and therefore can be\nneither augmented nor diminished; but in the life of grace man\nparticipates _accidentaliter_, and consequently he can possess it in a\nlarger or smaller degree.\u201d(1187)\n\nc) From what we have said it is easy to understand the distinction which\ntheologians make between justification as _gratia prima_ and justification\nas _gratia secunda_. The latter is merely another term for an increase of\ngrace after justification.\n\n\u03b1) Such an increase may be effected either _ex opere operantis_, that is,\nby good works, or _ex opere operato_, through the sacraments, and is\ncalled justification (_iustificatio_, \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) partly because Sacred\nScripture refers to it by that name(1188) and partly because \u201cto become\njust\u201d (_iustum fieri_) and \u201cto become more just\u201d (_iustiorem fieri_) both\nimply true sanctification.\n\nIn this connection the question may be raised whether sanctifying grace is\ndiminished by venial sin. Venial sin does not destroy the state of grace\nand consequently cannot augment or diminish grace. To assume that it\ncould, would lead to the absurd conclusion that a definite number of\nvenial sins might eventually grow into a mortal sin, or that repeated\nvenial sins gradually diminish grace until finally it disappears. The\nfirst-mentioned assumption is impossible because venial differs\ngenerically from mortal sin, and a transition from the one to the other\nwould be a \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. The second assumption would entail\nthe heretical inference that the state of grace can be lost without mortal\nsin.(1189) No doubt venial sin influences the state of grace unfavorably;\nbut this evil influence must be conceived as indirect\u2014by committing venial\nsins man weakens his will-power, and temptation eventually grows so strong\nas to make mortal sin inevitable. \u201cHe that contemneth small things, shall\nfall little by little.\u201d(1190)\n\n\u03b2) If we inquire how sanctifying grace increases in the soul, we find that\nthe process must be conceived as a growing intensity analogous to that of\nlight and heat in the physical order.\n\n_Gratia prima_, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is a supernatural\nphysical quality.(1191) Hence its increase, _i.e._ _gratia secunda_, must\nbe an increase of physical quality. Such an increase is called in\nScholastic parlance _intensio_.(1192) In what does this process consist?\nCertain Thomists(1193) describe it as a _maior radicatio in subiecto_,\nwhile the majority of theologians hold that it is simply an _additio\ngradus ad gradum_. This latter explanation is probably the correct one.\nSanctifying grace is either capable of gradual increase, or it is not. If\nit is, there is no reason why God should deny such an increase under\ncertain conditions. If it is not, Luther would have been right in\ncontending that a newly baptized infant enjoys the same measure of\nholiness as the Blessed Virgin Mary or the human soul of our Divine Lord.\nIt is impossible to imagine how grace could produce a quantitatively\nhigher holiness by simply striking its roots deeper into the soul.(1194)\n\n\u03b3) A question of greater practical importance is this: Is the increase of\nsanctifying grace accompanied by a corresponding increase of the infused\nvirtues, and _vice versa._\n\nEvery increase or decrease of sanctifying grace must _eo ipso_ entail a\ncorresponding increase or decrease, respectively, of theological charity.\nCharity is either identical with grace or it is not.(1195) If it is, an\nincrease of the one implies an increase of the other; if it is not, the\none cannot increase without an increase of the other, because they are\ninseparable and related to each other as nature to faculty, or root to\nblossom. Moreover, the degree of heavenly glory enjoyed by a soul will be\ncommensurate with the measure of charity which it possessed at death. Now\ngrace and glory bear a proportional relation to each other. Consequently,\ngrace is augmented as charity increases, and _vice versa_. The same\nargument applies to the infused moral virtues.\n\nThe case is different, however, with the theological virtues of faith and\nhope. These may continue to exist in the soul after charity has departed,\nand hence are not inseparable from sanctifying grace and charity, nor from\nthe moral virtues. This consideration led Suarez to infer that, as the\ntheological virtues of faith and hope may be infused into the soul\nindependently of charity and before justification, they must be\nsusceptible of increase in the course of justification without regard to\nthe existing state of grace and charity.(1196) This is true of the sinner.\nIn the justified, as Suarez himself admits, an increase of grace (or\ncharity) probably always entails an increase of faith and hope,(1197)\u2014a\nproposition which finds strong support in the decree of Trent which says:\n\u201cThis increase of justification Holy Church begs, when she prays: \u2018Give\nunto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and charity.\u2019 \u201d(1198)\n\n\u03b4) A final question forces itself upon the enquiring mind, _viz._: Is\nsanctifying grace capable of an indefinite increase, or is there a limit\nbeyond which it cannot grow? In trying to find an answer to this question\nwe must draw a careful distinction between the absolute and the ordinary\npower of God.\n\nThere is no intrinsic contradiction in the assumption that grace can be\nindefinitely augmented. True, it can never become actually infinite, as\nthis would involve an absurdity.(1199) But if we regard the power of God\nas He sees fit to exercise it in the present economy (_potentia Dei\nordinata_), we find that it is limited by two sublime ideals of holiness\nto which neither man nor angel can attain, _viz._: the overflowing measure\nof sanctifying grace in the human soul of our Lord Jesus Christ(1200) and\nthe \u201cfulness of grace\u201d granted to His Mother.(1201) Though these ideals\nare beyond our reach, we must not be discouraged, but try to approach them\nas nearly as possible.(1202)\n\n*Thesis III: Sanctifying grace is lost by mortal sin.*\n\nThis thesis also embodies an article of faith.\n\nProof. Calvin asserted that neither justification nor faith can be lost by\nthose who are predestined to salvation, and that the unpredestined are\nnever truly justified. Luther held that justifying grace is lost solely\nthrough the sin of infidelity. Against the former the Council of Trent\ndeclared: \u201cIf anyone saith that a man once justified can sin no more, nor\nlose grace, and that therefore he that falls and sins was never truly\njustified; ... let him be anathema.\u201d(1203) Against the latter the same\ncouncil defined: \u201cIf anyone saith that there is no mortal sin but that of\ninfidelity, or that grace once received is not lost by any other sin,\nhowever grievous and enormous, save by that of infidelity, let him be\nanathema.\u201d(1204) At the same time, however, the Holy Synod expressly\ndeclared that venial sin does not destroy the state of grace: \u201cFor\nalthough during this mortal life, men, how holy and just soever, at times\nfall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,\nthey do not therefore cease to be just.\u201d(1205)\n\na) This teaching is so obviously in accord with Sacred Scripture that we\nconfine ourselves to quoting three or four passages. Ezechiel says that\nsanctifying grace may be irretrievably lost: \u201cIf the just man turn himself\naway from his justice, and do iniquity according to all the abominations\nwhich the wicked man useth to work, shall he live? All his justices which\nhe hath done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication, by which he\nhath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he\nshall die.\u201d(1206) Our Lord Himself admonishes His Apostles: \u201cWatch ye and\npray, that ye enter not into temptation.\u201d(1207) St. Paul not only warns\nthe faithful in general terms: \u201cHe that thinketh himself to stand, let him\ntake heed lest he fall;\u201d(1208) but expressly designates certain mortal\nsins as a bar to Heaven: \u201cNeither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor\nadulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor\ncovetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the\nkingdom of God.\u201d(1209)\n\nb) The teaching of Tradition was brought out clearly in the fight against\nJovinian.\n\nThat wily heretic claimed the authority of St. John for the assertion that\nthe grace of Baptism can never be lost. The Johannean passage in question\nreads: \u201cWhosoever is born of God, committeth no sin: for His seed abideth\nin him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.\u201d(1210) St. Jerome in\nhis reply paraphrases the passage as follows: \u201cTherefore I tell you, my\nlittle children, whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, in order\nthat you may not sin and that you may know that you will remain sons of\nGod so long as you refrain from sin.\u201d(1211) St. Augustine teaches: \u201cIf a\nman, being regenerate and justified, relapses of his own will into an evil\nlife, assuredly he cannot say: \u2018I have not received,\u2019 because of his own\nfree choice of evil he has lost the grace of God that he has\nreceived.\u201d(1212) And St. Gregory the Great:\n\n\u201cAs he who falls away from the faith is an apostate, so he who returns to\nan evil deed is regarded by Almighty God as an apostate, even though he\nmay seem to retain the faith; for the one without the other can be of no\nuse, because faith availeth nought without [good] works, nor [good] works\nwithout faith.\u201d(1213) The penitential discipline of the primitive Church\nfurnishes additional proofs for the doctrine under consideration. If grace\ncould be lost in no other way than by unbelief, the Sacrament of Penance\nwould be useless.(1214)\n\nc) In connection with this subject theologians are wont to discuss the\nquestion whether or not the forfeiture of sanctifying grace involves the\nloss of its supernatural concomitants.\n\nTheological love or charity is substantially identical with sanctifying\ngrace, or at least inseparable from it, and hence both are gained and lost\ntogether. This is an article of faith. To lose sanctifying grace,\ntherefore, is to lose theological love. On the other hand, it is equally\n_de fide_ that theological faith (_habitus fidei_) is not destroyed by\nmortal sin;(1215) it can be lost only by the sin of unbelief.(1216) The\nsame is true, _mutatis mutandis_, of theological hope. True, the Church\nhas not definitely declared her mind with regard to hope, but it may be\nset down as her teaching that hope is not lost with grace and charity but\nsurvives like faith.(1217) The two contrary opposites of hope are\ndesperation and presumption, concerning which theologians commonly hold\nthat the former destroys hope, while the latter probably does not. But\neven if hope and charity are lost, faith may remain in the soul like a\nsolitary root, from which, under more favorable conditions, new life is\napt to spring. As regards the infused moral virtues and the seven gifts of\nthe Holy Ghost (and, _a fortiori_, His personal indwelling in the\nsoul),(1218) it is the unanimous teaching that these disappear with\nsanctifying grace and charity, even though faith and hope survive. The\nreason is that these virtues and gifts are merely supernatural adjuncts of\nsanctifying grace and cannot persist without it. \u201c_Accessorium sequitur\nprincipale._\u201d(1219)\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. The Fruits Of Justification, Or The Merit Of Good Works\n\n\nThe principal fruit of justification, according to the Tridentine\nCouncil,(1220) is the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the\nstate of sanctifying grace.\n\nMerit (_meritum_), as we have explained in the first part of this\ntreatise,(1221) is that property of a good work which entitles the doer to\na reward (_praemium, merces_).\n\nEthics and theology distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit or\nmerit in the strict sense of the term (_meritum adaequatum sive de\ncondigno_), and (2) congruous merit or quasi-merit (_meritum inadaequatum\nsive de congruo_). Condign merit supposes an equality between service and\nreturn. It is measured by commutative justice and confers a strict claim\nto a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of\nstrict proportion between service and recompense, confers no such claim\nexcept on grounds of equity.(1222)\n\nIn this treatise we are concerned with merit only in the theological sense\nof the term, _i.e._ supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its\nExistence,(1223) (2) its Requisites,(1224) and (3) its Objects.(1225)\n\n\n\nSection 1. The Existence Of Merit\n\n\n1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.\u2014a) The medieval\nBeguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state\nof holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or\ngood works.(1226) Luther, holding that justification consists in the\ncovering up of sin and the external imputation of the justice of Christ,\nconsistently though falsely asserted that \u201cthe just man sins in every good\nwork,\u201d(1227) that \u201ca good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial\nsin,\u201d(1228) and that \u201cevery work of the just deserves damnation and is\nmortally sinful, if it be considered as it really is in the judgment of\nGod.\u201d(1229) Calvin rejected good works as \u201cimpurities and\ndefilements,\u201d(1230) which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus\nChrist and which He sometimes rewards with temporal blessings but never\nwith eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least\nattenuated these harsh doctrines.(1231)\n\nb) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the\ntime of the \u201cReformers.\u201d Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as\nearly as 529: \u201cGood works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace,\nwhich is a free gift, precedes good works and is a necessary condition of\nthem.\u201d(1232) The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: \u201cNot\nonly virgins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who\nplease God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to\nobtain eternal happiness.\u201d(1233) The Tridentine Council goes into the\nmatter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we\nread _inter alia_: \u201cAnd for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to\nthose working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace\nmercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a\nreward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully\nrendered to their good works and merits.\u201d(1234)\n\nThe same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical:\n\u201cIf anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least\nvenially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently\ndeserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not\ndamned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be\nanathema.\u201d(1235) The positive teaching of the Church may be gathered from\nthe following condemnation: \u201cIf anyone saith that the just ought not, for\ntheir good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense\nfrom God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that\nthey persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments;\nlet him be anathema.\u201d(1236) The existence of merit in the true and proper\nsense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: \u201cIf anyone saith\nthat ... the justified, by the good works which he performs through the\ngrace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is,\ndoes not truly merit increase of grace...; let him be anathema.\u201d(1237) The\nquietistic errors of Michael de Molinos were condemned by Pope Innocent\nXI, Nov. 20, 1687.(1238)\n\n2. THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF GOOD WORKS DEMONSTRATED FROM SCRIPTURE AND\nTRADITION.\u2014Both Holy Scripture and Tradition employ _opus bonum_ and\n_meritum_ as reciprocal or correlative terms.\n\na) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to\nbe meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: \u201cBut the just shall\nlive for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.\u201d(1239) Ecclus.\nXVIII, 22: \u201cBe not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of\nGod continueth for ever.\u201d(1240) The New Testament teaching culminates in\nthe \u201ceight beatitudes,\u201d each of which is accompanied by a special reward.\nAfter enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine\nSaviour significantly adds: \u201cBe glad and rejoice, for your reward is very\ngreat in heaven.\u201d(1241)\n\nSt. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratuitousness of\nChristian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to\nwhich a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. II, 6 sq.: \u201c[God] will render to\nevery man according to his works, to them indeed who according to patience\nin good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.\u201d(1242)\n2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: \u201cI have fought a good fight, I have finished my course,\nI have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of\njustice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and\nnot only to me, but to them also that love his coming.\u201d(1243) 1 Cor. III,\n8: \u201cEvery man shall receive his own reward, according to his own\nlabor.\u201d(1244) Col. III, 23 sq.: \u201cWhatsoever you do, do it from the heart,\nas to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord\nthe reward of inheritance.\u201d(1245) The most eloquent exponent of the\nnecessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their\nmeritoriousness: \u201cBlessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he\nhath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath\npromised to them that love him.\u201d(1246) In the Apocalypse Jesus says: \u201cBe\nthou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life.\u201d(1247)\n\nb) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective commentary on the\nScriptural doctrine just expounded, as may be seen from their homilies\nreproduced in the Roman Breviary.\n\nSt. Ignatius of Antioch says: \u201cSuffer me to be eaten by the beasts,\nthrough whom I can attain to God.\u201d(1248) St. Iren\u00e6us: \u201cPrecious should be\nto us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by\ncombat, the more precious it is.\u201d(1249) St. Ambrose: \u201cIs it not evident\nthat the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?\u201d(1250) St.\nAugustine: \u201cEternal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which\nwe rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man\nbefore he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is\nmore just than God? We should not then demand the reward before we deserve\nto get it.\u201d(1251) And again: \u201cAs death is given, so to speak, to reward\nthe merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice,\n... and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.\u201d(1252)\n\nc) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the\nprovidence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the\ndivine laws,\u2014not only the natural law (_lex naturae_), but, _a fortiori_,\nthe \u201claw of grace\u201d (_lex gratiae_), as the supernatural order is so much\nmore important than the natural.\n\n\u03b1) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace,\nand with the aid of actual graces (_in gratia et ex gratia_), man acquires\na twofold merit,\u2014he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in\nregard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the external\nglory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of creation. For this he is\nentitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double\npunishment for the injury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he\nreflects upon his Creator.(1253)\n\nIt is objected against this argument that our supernatural merits, being\nfinite, are in no proportion to the possession and enjoyment of an\nInfinite Good. This objection vanishes in the light of the following\nconsiderations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of _deificatio_, which\nraises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his\nactions.(1254) (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally\ngood works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus\nChrist.(1255) (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in\nan infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there _is_ a due\nproportion between good works and merit.(1256)\n\nOne difficulty still remains, _viz._: By what title do infants who die in\nthe state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they\nhave been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims\nto Heaven, one as a child of God,(1257) and another as a laborer in His\nvineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason,\npossess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life\nenjoy also the _titulus mercedis_ and consequently are entitled to a\nricher reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the merits of Jesus\nChrist.(1258)\n\n\u03b2) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion\nthat the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good works\nderogates from the merits of Christ and fosters \u201cself-righteousness.\u201d\nWould it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume\nthat He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a\nlimited capacity for gaining merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity\nof God as the _causa prima_ to assume that He communicates to His\ncreatures a limited causality, by which they are enabled to act as true\n_causae secundae_, instead of being mere _causae occasionales_, as the\nOccasionalists assert?(1259) As regards the other charge, no true Catholic\nis guilty of \u201cself-righteousness\u201d because he regards his good works as\n\u201cfruits of justification,\u201d owing purely to grace. The \u201cself-righteousness\u201d\nof which Luther speaks is incompatible with the virtue of humility. The\nfaithful Christian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his\nmerits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness\nthat his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection\nagainst self-righteousness and presumption.(1260)\n\n3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.\u2014Though the Tridentine Council\nmerely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state\nof sanctifying grace are meritorious,(1261) it is theologically certain\nthat the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity.\n\na) According to Pallavicini(1262) the Fathers of Trent without exception\nwere convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a _meritum de\ncondigno_, based upon divine justice, and they purposely employed the term\n_vere_ to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of\nthe Schools is called _meritum de congruo_.(1263) They refrained from\nexpressly employing the term _meritum de condigno_, because _meritum\nverum_ is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that\nthey wished to avoid certain theological controversies regarding the\nnature of the _meritum de condigno_ and its requisites.(1264)\n\nb) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign\nmerit supposes an equality between service and reward. The proposition can\nbe proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The _meritum de\ncondigno_ is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now\nthe Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man\nin strict justice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: \u201cFor God is not unjust, that he\nshould forget your work.\u201d(1265) 2 Tim. IV, 8: \u201c... there is laid up for me\na crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in\nthat day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his\ncoming.\u201d(1266) James I, 12: \u201cBlessed is the man that endureth temptation;\nfor when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which\nGod hath promised to them that love him.\u201d(1267) That there must be a\n_condignitas_ between service and reward is clearly apparent from such\ntexts as these:\u2014Wis. III, 5: \u201c... God hath tried them and found them\nworthy of himself.\u201d(1268) 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: \u201c... in all your persecutions\nand tribulations, which you endure, for an example [as a token] of the\njust judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of\nGod, for which also you suffer.\u201d(1269) Apoc. III, 4: \u201c... they shall walk\nwith me in white, because they are worthy.\u201d(1270) Not merely as their\nbenefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say to the elect on judgment\nday: \u201cCome, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for\nyou from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to\neat....\u201d(1271) Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the _principium\ndignificativum operum_, called the \u201cseed of God,\u201d(1272) because it\ncontains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St.\nThomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,(1273) in another part of\nthe _Summa_(1274) defends the theological axiom: \u201c_Deus punit circa\ncondignum et remunerat ultra condignum_,\u201d but he does not mean to deny the\nequality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity\nthat prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more\nbountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: \u201cGive, and it shall be\ngiven to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and\nrunning over shall they give into your bosom.\u201d(1275)\n\n\n\nSection 2. The Requisites Of Merit\n\n\nAs we are dealing with the \u201cfruits of justification,\u201d it becomes necessary\nto ascertain the requisites or conditions of true merit. There are seven\nsuch; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent\nwho performs it, and one to God who gives the reward.\n\n1. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE MERITORIOUS WORK.\u2014A work, to be\nmeritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of\nactual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive.\n\na) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so\nthe notion of merit supposes a morally good work (_opus honestum_).\n\nCfr. Eph. VI, 8: \u201cKnowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the\nsame shall he receive from the Lord.\u201d(1276) 2 Cor. V, 10: \u201cWe must all be\nmanifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive\nthe proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be\ngood or evil.\u201d(1277) There are no morally indifferent works _in\nindividuo_, _i.e._ practically; and if there were, they could be neither\nmeritorious nor demeritorious, but would become meritorious in proportion\nas they are made morally good by means of a \u201cgood intention.\u201d It would be\nabsolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of\nsupererogation (_opera supererogatoria_), such as the vow of perpetual\nchastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful\nobservance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of\nobligation are also meritorious, because goodness and meritoriousness are\ncorrelative terms.(1278) Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in\nitself meritorious, is doubtful.(1279) But most theologians are agreed in\nholding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal\nact, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and\nintensifies its operation. This and similar questions properly belong to\nmoral theology.\n\nb) The second requisite of merit is moral liberty (_libertas indifferens\nad actum_), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal\ncompulsion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.(1280)\n\nThat there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred\nScripture. Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 17: \u201cFor if I do this willingly, I have a\nreward.\u201d(1281) Matth. XIX, 17: \u201cIf thou wilt enter into life, keep the\ncommandments.\u201d(1282) \u201cWhere there is compulsion,\u201d says St. Jerome, \u201cthere\nis neither a crown nor damnation.\u201d(1283) The morality of an act depends\nentirely on its being an _actus humanus_. Now no act is truly \u201chuman\u201d\nunless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an\nindispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit.\n\nWhat kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit?\nTheologians answer by saying that it is _libertas contradictionis sive\nexercitii_. If I do a good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I\nperform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the\n_libertas specificationis_, (that freedom by which a person may act thus\nor otherwise, _e.g._ give alms to one applicant in preference to another,\nor mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no\ndoubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and\nmeritorious. However, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in\nwhich an action may be _physically_ free without being meritorious. It is\nwhen one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as\nhe is able to choose between two actions exactly equal in moral worth.\nThis would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten\ndollars and were left free to pay it either in coin or in currency. The\nmore common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack\nof that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and\ntherefore meritorious.(1284)\n\nc) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident\nfrom the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and\nconsequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and\nco\u00f6perating grace.(1285)\n\nd) Merit further requires a supernatural motive, for the reason that every\ngood work must be supernatural, both as regards object and circumstances\n(_ex obiecto et circumstantiis_), and the end for which it is performed\n(_ex fine_). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive,\nhowever, theologians differ widely.\n\n\u03b1) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist persuasion, demand the\nmotive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of\ncharity (_caritas habitualis sive status caritatis et gratiae_) as\nessential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state\nof grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural\nthough inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This\nrigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every single\ngood work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of\ndivine charity (_toties quoties_), or whether the virtual influence of one\nact is sufficient to endow a series of subsequent acts with\nmeritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians(1286) defend the\nfirst-mentioned theory. The majority(1287) hold that the _influxus\nvirtualis caritatis_ is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by\nCardinal Bellarmine, who says: \u201cIt is not enough to make a general good\nintention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all\nfuture actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each\nparticular act to God before it is performed.\u201d(1288) The advocates of this\ntheory base their opinion on certain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and\nespecially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand.(1289)\n\nThe dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being\ninspired by supernatural charity, has nothing to do with the moral problem\nwhether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to\ntime, except in so far as habitual charity,\u2014_i.e._ the state of charity,\nwhich is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of\nsanctifying grace,\u2014cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from\ntime to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.(1290) St.\nAlphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at\nleast once a month, but he is contradicted by other eminent moralists. In\npractice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such\nacts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good\nworks incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the\nimportance of making a \u201cgood intention\u201d every morning before beginning the\nday\u2019s work.(1291)\n\n\u03b2) There is a second group of very eminent theologians, including\nSuarez,(1292) Vasquez,(1293) De Lugo, and Ballerini, who hold that, to be\nmeritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need\nonly conform to the divine law, no special motive being required. These\nwriters base their teaching on the Tridentine decree which says: \u201cFor this\nis that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight\nand course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and\nnot only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus\nChrist Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified,\u2014as\nthe head into the members and the vine into the branches,\u2014and this virtue\nalways precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which\nwithout it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God\n(can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified\nto prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have\nbeen done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of\nthis life, and to have truly merited eternal life, to be obtained also in\nits [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.\u201d(1294) This\nteaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act\nof charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the \u201ceight\nbeatitudes\u201d(1295) our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which\nare not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal\nor virtual. When He was asked: \u201cMaster, what good shall I do that I may\nhave life everlasting?\u201d(1296) he did not answer with Bellarmine: \u201cSteep\nall thy works in the motive of charity,\u201d but declared: \u201cIf thou wilt enter\ninto life, keep the commandments.\u201d(1297) And when requested to specify, He\nsimply cited the ordinary precepts of the Decalogue.(1298) We also know\nthat at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the \u201ckingdom of\nHis Father\u201d solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have\ndone.(1299)\n\nTheological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works\nperformed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally\nmeritorious, this would be attributable to one of three causes. Either the\njust would sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity\nwould not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be\nno strict equality between service and reward. All three of these\nsuppositions are untenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or\nJansenism.(1300) The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite\nproportion (_condignitas_) between service and reward is furnished by\nsanctifying grace or habitual charity, which, as _deificatio_, adoptive\nsonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which\nthe _motivum caritatis_ is demanded.\n\nWe might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opinion, whence the act of\ncharity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar\nproportionality or _condignitas_ with the beatific vision. Surely not from\nitself, because as an act it is merely _primus inter pares_, without in\nany essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but\nto attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just\nman and his works by sanctifying grace.\n\nFor these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as\nsufficiently well established and the faithful are largely guided by it in\npractice.(1301)\n\n2. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE AGENT WHO MERITS.\u2014The agent who\nmerits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace.\n\na) The wayfaring state (_status viae_) is merely another name for life on\nearth. Death as the natural, though not essentially necessary limit of\nlife, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy\nScripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the\nnext.(1302)\n\nb) The second requisite is the state of sanctifying grace. Only the just\ncan be \u201csons of God\u201d and \u201cheirs of heaven.\u201d(1303) Cfr. John XV, 4: \u201cAs the\nbranch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so\nneither can you, unless you abide in me.\u201d(1304) Rom. VIII, 17: \u201cAnd if\nsons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.\u201d(1305)\n\nDoes the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive\ninfluence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This\nquestion can be easily solved on the theological principle that the\nsupernatural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in\nsanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who\nis holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who\nis less holy.(1306) All other theologians(1307) hold with St. Thomas(1308)\nthat the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in proportion to the\ngodlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of\nsanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of\nthe greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often\ndeigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to\nothers.(1309)\n\n3. THE REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF GOD.\u2014Merit requires but one\nthing on the part of God, _viz._: that He accept the good work _in actu\nsecundo_ as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not\nagreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less\nwell-founded opinion.\n\nThough the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from\nthe godlike dignity of adoptive sonship, and, consequently, _in actu\nprimo_, are truly meritorious prior to and apart from their acceptance by\nGod, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a\nwide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious _in actu\nsecundo_, the divine acceptance and promise of reward must be expressly\nsuperadded.\n\nIn regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians\nare divided into three schools.\n\nThe Scotists(1310) hold that the _condignitas_ of a good work rests\nentirely on God\u2019s gratuitous promise and free acceptance, without which\neven the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it\neven naturally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow\ntheory almost completely loses sight of the godlike dignity peculiar to\nthe just in their capacity of \u201cadopted children of God\u201d and \u201ctemples of\nthe Holy Ghost,\u201d and is unable to account for such important Biblical\nterms as \u201ccrown of justice,\u201d \u201cprize of victory,\u201d \u201cjust judge,\u201d etc.\n\nSuarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced\nequality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice\n(_ex obligatione iustitiae_), prior to and apart from any formal act of\nacceptance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific\nvision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on\nwhich to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His\ncreatures,(1311) and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that \u201cThe\nsufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to\ncome.\u201d(1312)\n\nHence we prefer to hold with Lessius,(1313) Vasquez,(1314) and De\nLugo(1315) that the _condignitas_ or equality existing between merit and\nreward, owes its origin both to the intrinsic value of the good work\nitself and to the free acceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This\nsolution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit _in actu primo_,\nwithout derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works\nnot because He is obliged to do so by the merits of a mere creature, but\nsolely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus\nGod\u2019s justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there\nis no violation of justice (_iniuria_) on His part. \u201cFrom the fact that\nour actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,\u201d\nsays St. Thomas, \u201cit does not follow that God is simply our debtor; He is\nHis own debtor, _i.e._ He owes it to Himself to see that His commands are\nobeyed.\u201d(1316) This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cfr.\nJames I, 12: \u201cHe shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised\nto them that love him.\u201d(1317) It is reechoed by St. Augustine: \u201cGod is\nmade our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased\nHim to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say to\na man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: You\nowe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give\nback to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since\nit is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we\npossess? We have therefore given Him nothing.... In this manner,\ntherefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast\npromised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself\nthat hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.\u201d(1318) The\nTridentine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: \u201cLife eternal\nis to be proposed to those ... hoping in God ... as a reward which is,\naccording to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to\ntheir good works and merits.\u201d(1319)\n\n\n\nSection 3. The Objects Of Merit\n\n\nAfter defining the existence of merit the Tridentine Council enumerates\nits objects as follows: \u201cIf anyone saith that the justified, by the good\nworks which he performs, ... does not truly merit increase of grace,\neternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,\u2014if it be so,\nhowever, that he depart in grace,\u2014and also an increase of glory: let him\nbe anathema.\u201d(1320) Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an\nincrease of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of\nthat glory. The expression \u201c_vere mereri_\u201d shows that all three of these\nobjects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (_de\ncondigno_). This is, however, no more than a theologically certain\nconclusion.\n\n1. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.\u2014The first grace of justification\n(_gratia prima_) can never be merited;(1321) hence the meaning of the\nabove-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good\nworks. This increase is technically called _gratia secunda_. All\nScriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is unequal in\ndifferent individuals, also prove that it can be increased or augmented by\nthe performance of meritorious works.(1322)\n\na) No adult person can merit the first grace of assistance (_gratia prima\nactualis_), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it,\nand by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely\ngratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (_gratia\nprima habitualis_) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for\njustification. This is the express teaching of Trent: \u201cBut we are\ntherefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things\nwhich precede justification\u2014whether faith or works\u2014merit the grace itself\nof justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works;\notherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.\u201d(1323) To\ndeny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace\n(because if the first grace given before active justification could be\nstrictly merited, this would necessarily involve the _gratia prima\nactualis_), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the _gratia\nprima habitualis_ is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains\nwhy St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both\nof the first grace of assistance and the grace of justification\nproper.(1324) \u201cThis grace of Christ,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201cwithout which\nneither infants nor adults can be saved, is not bestowed for any merits,\nbut is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. \u2018Being\njustified,\u2019 says the Apostle, \u2018freely through His blood.\u2019 \u201d(1325)\n\nIn the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by\nVasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely _per modum\ndispositionis_ or _per modum causae formalis_. Both contrition and\ncharity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose\nthe soul for justification.(1326) Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is\ncapable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (_merendo_),\nnay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal\ncause of justification, because, according to the Tridentine Council,\nsanctifying grace and not perfect contrition is the _unica causa formalis_\nof justification.(1327)\n\nb) In connection with the dogma just explained theologians discuss the\nquestion whether a just man may strictly (_de condigno_) merit the actual\ngraces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between\nmerely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theologians commonly hold(1328)\nthat merely sufficient graces may be merited _de condigno_, not so\nefficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would\nnecessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (_donum\nperseverantiae_), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming\nthat the justified could by good works strictly merit the _prima gratia\nefficax_ (an impossible hypothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious\ngrace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth\ngrace\u2014and ultimately to the final grace of perseverance, which, in matter\nof fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict\nright to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the\ngreatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from\nrighteousness.(1329) For this reason the Tridentine Council mentions\nneither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of\nmerit.(1330)\n\n2. ETERNAL LIFE OR HEAVENLY GLORY.\u2014The second object of merit is eternal\nlife. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.(1331)\nEternal life is described by the Tridentine Council(1332) both as a grace\nand as a reward.\n\na) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Section the same\nCouncil(1333) enumerates four apparently separate and distinct objects of\nmerit, _viz._: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal\nlife, and increase of glory. Why the distinction between \u201ceternal life\u201d\nand the \u201cattainment of eternal life\u201d? Does this imply a twofold reward,\nand consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was\nthe intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently\ncoincides with the right to the payment of the same. An unattainable\neternal life would be a chimera.(1334) Nevertheless, the distinction is\nnot superfluous, since the attainment of eternal life does not coincide\nwith the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then\ndepends upon the condition of the soul: \u201c_si tamen in gratia decesserit_\u201d\n(provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod\nalso wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying\ngrace _ipso facto_ entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired\nmerits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal\nsin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his\nformer merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new\njustification.(1335)\n\nb) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under review gives rise to\nanother difficulty. Can the _gloria prima_ be merited? In defining the\n_gratia secunda_ as an object of strict merit, the Council expressly\nexcludes the _gratia prima_. It makes no such distinction in regard to\nglory, but names both \u201ceternal life\u201d (_gloria prima_) and \u201cincrease of\nglory\u201d (_gloria secunda_) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the\nquery: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the _gloria prima_,\nseeing that he is unable to merit the _gratia prima_? Some\ntheologians(1336) contend that the justified are entitled to the _gloria\nprima_ only as a heritage (_titulo haereditatis_), never as a reward\n(_titulo mercedis_). Because of its intimate causal connection with the\n_gratia prima_, which is beyond the reach of merit, the _gloria prima_,\nthey argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the\nassumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to\nthe _gloria prima_. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying\ngrace no condign merits can be acquired.(1337) In spite of this\ndifficulty, however, most theologians(1338) hold that, unlike the _gratia\nprima_, the _gloria prima_ may under certain conditions be an object of\nstrict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a\nnecessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state\nof grace is, the former may _positis ponendis_ be an effect of the\n_meritum de congruo_, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the\nproblem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we\ndistinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct\nhypotheses. It is generally agreed that infants dying in the state of\nbaptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in\nHeaven, solely to God\u2019s mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than\nthat of heredity (_titulus hereditatis_). Adults who preserve their\nbaptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the _gloria\nprima_ by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to\nit through Baptism.(1339) It follows that their good works increase, but\ndo not merit, the _gloria prima_, to which these souls are already\nentitled _titulo haereditatis_. The case is quite different with\ncatechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an\nact of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament\nof Penance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that\nthey merit for themselves _de condigno_, not indeed the first grace of\njustification, but the _gloria prima_, because perfect contrition, being\nan _opus operans_, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an _opus\nmeritorium_ entitled to eternal glory.(1340) As regards the great majority\nof adult Catholics who, because of defective preparation, never get beyond\nimperfect contrition (_attritio_), and therefore are not justified until\nthey actually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever\ngrace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to\nthe _opus operatum_ of the Sacrament.(1341)\n\n3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLORY.\u2014The third object of merit, according to the\nTridentine Council, is \u201cincrease of glory.\u201d This must evidently correspond\nto an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the\nperformance of additional good works. That there is a causal connection\nbetween meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in\nHeaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: \u201cFor the\nSon of man shall ... render to every man according to his works.\u201d(1342) 1\nCor. III, 8: \u201cAnd every man shall receive his own reward, according to his\nown labor.\u201d(1343) A further argument may be derived from the unequal\napportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.(1344) This inequality is\nbased on inequality of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that\ngrace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of\nglory depends ultimately on good works.(1345)\n\n4. NOTE ON THE MERITUM DE CONGRUO.\u2014Congruous, as distinguished from\ncondign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi-claim\nbased on equity (_ex quadam aequitate_, _congruentia_, _decentia_).\n\nHence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus,\nbut merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word \u201cequity\u201d\nDominicus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of\nthe term _meritum de congruo_ in theology. But this was a mistake. The\nFathers engaged in the Semipelagian controversy, notably St.\nAugustine,(1346) did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is\nentirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical\nwith those of condign merit(1347) in all respects except one,\u2014the _meritum\nde congruo_ does not require the state of grace.\n\na) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians\ndissent,(1348) a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment\nhe begins to co\u00f6perate with supernatural grace, merit _de congruo_ by good\nworks, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification,\nand ultimately justification itself.\n\n\u201cPrayer relies on mercy,\u201d says St. Thomas, \u201ccondign merit on justice. And\ntherefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he\ndoes not merit in strict justice.\u201d(1349) This teaching is based partly on\nHoly Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augustine, and is\nconfirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By\nconscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner\nprobably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps.\nL, 19: \u201cA sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a contrite and humbled\nheart, O God, thou wilt not despise.\u201d(1350) Dan. IV, 24: \u201cRedeem thou thy\nsins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor:\nperhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.\u201d(1351) St. Augustine says:\n\u201cThe remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for\nit. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was\nmoved to say: \u2018God, be merciful to me, a sinner,\u2019 and then went away\njustified through the merit of faithful humility.\u201d(1352)\n\nb) By good works the just may merit for themselves, not in strict justice\n(_de condigno_), but as a matter of equity (_de congruo_), final\nperseverance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and\nalso such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation.\n\n\u03b1) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians\nwithout exception, that the grace of final perseverance (_donum\nperseverantiae_) cannot be merited in the strict sense (_de condigno_).\nMost authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This\n_meritum_ is technically called _meritum de congruo fallibili_. Those who\ndeny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly\nobtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.(1353)\n\n\u03b2) It is impossible to answer with anything like certainty the question\nwhether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of\nconversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin.\nFollowing the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative\nview,(1354) on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace\nand annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings,\nhowever, the Angelic Doctor says: \u201cThere are two kinds of merit, one based\non justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon\nmercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it\nis just, _i.e._ congruous, that a man who has performed many good works\nshould merit.... And in this wise God does not forget our work and\nlove.\u201d(1355) Scotus,(1356) Bonaventure,(1357) and Suarez(1358) regard this\nas \u201ca pious and probable opinion,\u201d well supported by Holy Scripture. The\nprophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: \u201cThou helpest the ungodly,\nand thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and\ntherefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works\nare found in thee.\u201d(1359) To this argument add the following\nconsideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby\nman is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent\nmeritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by\nsubsequent mortal sin will not be imputed to the sinner, with due regard,\nof course, to a certain proportion between past merits and future\nsins.(1360) To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventuality of\nfuture mortal sin, is always good and useful,(1361) because it cannot but\nplease God to know that we sincerely desire to be restored to His\nfriendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.(1362)\n\n\u03b3) The just man may congruously merit for others whatever he is able to\nmerit for himself, _e.g._ the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and\nalso the first prevenient grace (_gratia prima praeveniens_), which no man\nin the state of original sin is able to merit for himself.(1363) The\nreason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of\nfriendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and\nGod.(1364) However, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of\nthe just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the\nabrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor\nwould be, for example, the justification of a sinner without the medium of\ngrace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreasonable\npetition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be\nobtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained\nby prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: \u201cPray for one another\nthat you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth\nmuch.\u201d(1365) This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the\nCommunion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible(1366) and\necclesiastical history,(1367) and by the traditional practice of the\nChurch in praying God to give strength and perseverance to the faithful\nand the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.(1368)\n\n\u03b4) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit\nsuch temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success\nin business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to\neternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas\nseems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as\nobjects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of\ncongruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.(1369) We have no\nspace left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish\nto call attention to two important facts: first, that prayer is more\neffective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual\nfavors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for\nearthly goods, but direct our thoughts, desires, prayers, and actions to\nGod, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our \u201cexceeding great\nreward.\u201d(1370)\n\n\n    READINGS:\u2014St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1\n    sqq.\u2014Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 1-5.\u2014*Bellarmine, _De\n    Iustificatione_, V, 1-22.\u2014*Suarez, _Opusc. de Divina\n    Iustitia_.\u2014IDEM, _De Gratia_, l. XII, cap. 1 sqq.\u2014Oswald, _Lehre\n    von der Heiligung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnodenwahl_, \u00a7 7,\n    3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.\u2014Tepe, _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol.\n    III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.\u2014*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische\n    Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.\u2014Chr. Pesch,\n    _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq.,\n    Freiburg 1908.\u2014*S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 594 sqq.,\n    Freiburg 1901.\u2014Kneib, _Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral_,\n    Vienna 1904.\u2014I. J. Remler, C. M., _Supernatural Merit_, St. Louis\n    1914.\u2014A. Devine, C. P., _The Sacraments Explained_, 3rd ed.,\n    London 1905, pp. 74-89.\u2014L. Labauche, S. S., _God and Man_, pp.\n    254-270, N. Y. 1916. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, _The\n    Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.)\u2014B. J.\n    Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St.\n    Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq.\n\n    On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see M\u00f6hler,\n    _Symbolik_, \u00a7 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.).\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nA\n\nAcceptance of good works by God, 419 sqq.\n\nActual Grace, 3 sqq.;\n  Its nature, 5 sqq.;\n  Its relation to habitual Grace, 14 sqq.;\n  Definition of, 15;\n  Its two-fold causality, 15 sqq.;\n  Division of, 19 sqq.;\n  Properties of, 49 sqq.;\n  Necessity of, 50 sqq.;\n  Gratuity of, 131 sqq.;\n  Universality of, 152 sqq.;\n  Its relation to free-will, 222 sqq.;\n  As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqq.\n\n_Actus humanus_, 412.\n\nAdoption, 357.\n\nAdoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq.\n\nAdults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq.\n\n_Affectus credulitatis_, 105.\n\nAlbertus Magnus, 206, 432.\n\nAlexander VIII, 179 sq.\n\nAlexander of Hales, 206.\n\nAloysius, St., 211.\n\nAlphonsus, St., 415.\n\nAlvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243.\n\nAmbrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404.\n\n_Amor affectivus et effectivus_, 68.\n\nAmsdorf, 291.\n\nAnabaptists, 322.\n\nAquaviva, 260, 262.\n\nAristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353.\n\nArnauld, 180.\n\nAthanasius, St., 341 sq., 373, 374.\n\nAttributes, Divine, 344 sq.\n\n\u201c_Auctorem Fidei_,\u201d Bull, 74 sq.\n\nAugustine, St., 7, 8, 9, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24 sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36,\n            37, 39, 42, 43, 47, 56, 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,\n            83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108\n            sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159\n            sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq., 191 sq., 194, 197, 203 sq.,\n            210, 215, 228 sqq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 264, 289,\n            308, 319 sq., 337 sq., 339, 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 sq., 375,\n            383, 387, 394, 404, 421, 424 sq., 430, 431.\n\nAugustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq.\n\nB\n\nBaius and Bajanism, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 67, 70, 74 sqq., 147, 417.\n\nBallerini, 415.\n\nBa\u00f1ez, 232 sqq., 246, 255.\n\nBaptism, 163 sqq., 279, 306, 308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 330 sq., 394,\n            428, 434.\n\nBarnabas, Epistle of, 318.\n\nBasil, St., 346, 349, 373.\n\nBeatitudes, 402, 416.\n\nBeauty, Supernatural, an effect of sanctifying grace, 349 sqq.\n\nBecanus, 206.\n\nBeghards, 399.\n\nBeguins, 399.\n\nBellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 263, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414.\n\nBenedict XIV, 249.\n\nBernard, St., 37, 230.\n\nBerti, 249.\n\nBeza, 214.\n\nBiel, Gabriel, 63, 211.\n\nBilluart, 31, 211, 216, 238, 242.\n\nBonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433.\n\nBoniface II, 99.\n\nBook of Life, The, 192 sq.\n\nBook of Torgau, 292.\n\nButzer, 292, 322.\n\nC\n\nC\u00e6sarius of Arles, St., 99.\n\nCajetan, 165.\n\nCalvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 156, 206, 212, 213, 214, 218, 221, 223 sq.,\n            228, 285, 302, 310, 392, 399.\n\nCamerarius, 204.\n\nCano, Melchior, 363.\n\nCapacity for grace, 133 sqq., 145 sqq.\n\nCapacity of nature, 50 sqq.\n\nCarthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 85, 116.\n\nCassian, John, 97, 142.\n\nCastelein, 195.\n\nCatharinus, 204, 211, 382.\n\nCausality of Grace, 15 sqq.\n\nCelestine I, St., 89, 90, 99, 104.\n\nCelestius, 83, 85, 86.\n\nCerci\u00e0, 203.\n\nCertainty regarding justification, 379 sqq.\n\nCharismata, 13.\n\nCharity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 395, 413\n            sqq., 417.\n\nChildren, see Infants.\n\nChrist, The Grace of, 10, 70, 226.\n\nChrysostom, St., 91, 102 sqq., 141, 171, 178, 181, 209, 318, 349, 380.\n\nClement of Alexandria, 308.\n\nClement of Rome, 181.\n\nClement V, 331.\n\nClement VIII, 255, 261.\n\nClement XI, 74, 180.\n\n_Cogitatio congrua_, 69 sqq., 94.\n\nConcupiscence, 64, 120.\n\n_Condignitas_ (equality) between merit and reward, 417 sqq.\n\nCondign Merit, 132 sq., 397 sq., 407 sqq.\n\n_Congregatio de Auxiliis_, 255, 261.\n\nCongruism, 261 sqq.\n\nCongruous Grace, 262 sqq.\n\nCongruous Merit, 132, 397, 407 sqq., 430 sqq.\n\nConversion, 174 sqq., 297, 432 sq.\n\nCo\u00f6perating Grace, 32 sqq.\n\nCyprian, St., 102, 126.\n\nCyril of Alexandria, St., 349, 360, 373.\n\nD\n\nD\u2019Argentr\u00e9, 198.\n\nDefinition of Grace, 5 sqq.\n\nDeharbe, 328.\n\nDeification of man, 341 sq., 405.\n\n_Delectatio victrix_, 27, 225, 249 sqq.\n\nDe Lemos, 216, 236.\n\nDe Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420.\n\nDespair, 179.\n\n\u201c_De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,\u201d 170, 182.\n\nDiospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 136, 141.\n\nDordrecht, Synod of, 213.\n\nDorner, 293.\n\nDurandus, 63.\n\nE\n\nEck, Johann, 132.\n\nEfficacious Grace, 41 sqq.\n\nEfficacy, Threefold, 265 sq.\n\nElect, Number of the, 194 sq.\n\nEphesus, Ecumenical Council of, 86.\n\nEphrem, St., 109.\n\nEstius, 216.\n\nEternal life, 426 sqq.\n\nEucharist, The Holy, 360.\n\nExternal and Internal Grace, 11 sqq.\n\nF\n\n_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, 147 sqq.\n\nFaith, 62, 73, 100 sqq., 272, 274 sqq., 298 sqq., 363 sq., 390 sq., 395.\n\n_Fides explicita\u2014implicita_, 184 sqq., 279.\n\nFiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 sq.\n\n_Filiatio adoptiva_, 110.\n\nFinal perseverance, see Perseverance.\n\nFlacius, 291.\n\nFlorence, Council of, 164.\n\nFonseca, 257.\n\nFrancis de Sales, St., 207, 256.\n\nFranzelin, 203.\n\nFrassen, 206.\n\nFreedom a requisite of merit, 411 sqq.\n\nFree-will, 32 sqq.;\n  How Grace co\u00f6perates with, 40 sq.;\n  Its relation to Grace, 222 sqq.\n\nFriendship, 353.\n\nFriendship of God, an effect of sanctifying grace, 351 sqq.\n\nFulgentius, St., 23, 182, 215, 278.\n\nG\n\nGazzaniga, 216, 236.\n\nGelasius, Pope, 170.\n\nGifts of the Holy Ghost, 369 sq.\n\nGlory, 426 sqq.\n\nGlossner, 149.\n\nGod, The Grace of, 10.\n\nGodts, 195.\n\nGomarus, 213.\n\nGonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 sq., 345.\n\nGood intention, 411, 414.\n\nGood works, Merit of, 397 sqq.\n\nGotti, 30, 185, 216.\n\nGottschalk, 212.\n\nGoudin, 216.\n\nGrace of justification, 313.\n\nGranderath, 361.\n\n_Gratia antecedens\u2014concomitans_, 35.\n\n_Gratia congrua\u2014incongrua_, 262 sqq.\n\n_Gratia efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_, 255 sqq., 268.\n\n_Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_, 232 sqq., 267, 268.\n\n_Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis_, 37.\n\n_Gratia gratis data_, 12 sqq.\n\n_Gratia gratum faciens_, 12 sqq.\n\n_Gratia inspirationis_, 23.\n\n_Gratia magna_, 252 sq.\n\n_Gratia orationis_, 43.\n\n_Gratia parva_ (of Jansenius) 44, 252 sq.\n\n_Gratia prima_, 136 sqq., 388 sqq., 424, 427 sqq.\n\n_Gratia sanans s. medicinalis_, 16, 91, 114.\n\n_Gratia secunda_, 388 sqq.\n\n_Gratia vocans_, 32, 35, 111.\n\nGratuity of Grace, 131 sqq.\n\nGraveson, 216.\n\nGregory of Nazianzus, 102, 159, 308.\n\nGregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 308, 368, 380, 394.\n\nGrotius, Hugo, 294.\n\nGutberlet, 165, 205.\n\nH\n\nHabits, 333 sqq.\n\n\u201cHalf-Melanchthonians,\u201d 292.\n\nHarnack, 295, 296, 319, 381.\n\nHeathens, The, receive sufficient grace for salvation, 179 sqq.\n\nHenno, 324.\n\nHenry of Ghent, 210.\n\nHilary, St., 97, 99, 209.\n\nHoly Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 361 sq., 368, 369 sq.\n\nHope, 363 sqq., 390, 396.\n\nHurter, 375.\n\nHus, 212.\n\nHypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345.\n\nI\n\nIgnatius of Antioch, St., 404.\n\nIlluminating grace of the intellect, 19 sqq.\n\nImputation, Lutheran theory of, 313 sqq.\n\nIncarnation, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.\n\nIncompatibility of Grace and sin, 323 sqq.\n\nIncrease of glory, 429 sq.\n\nIncrease of sanctifying grace, 384 sqq., 423 sqq., 429.\n\n\u201cIndiculus,\u201d 99.\n\nInfants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq.,\n  Baptized, 406.\n\nInfralapsarians, 156, 213.\n\n_Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti_, 361 sq., 370 sqq.\n\nInnocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154.\n\nInnocent X, 168, 226.\n\nInnocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402.\n\n_Intensio gratiae_, 389.\n\nIren\u00e6us, St., 47, 90, 404.\n\nIsaias, 178.\n\nJ\n\nJacob and Esau, 201 sq.\n\nJames, St., 286, 287, 288, 289, 294, 403, 434.\n\nJansenius and Jansenism, 44, 52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 sq., 168,\n            171, 180, 212, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 249, 252, 281,\n            411, 417.\n\nJehu, 433.\n\nJerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 387, 394, 412.\n\nJews, 137, 155, 195, 282, 367.\n\nJohn a S. Thoma, 216.\n\nJohn the Baptist, St., 116.\n\nJoseph, St., 116, 211.\n\nJovinian, 387, 394.\n\nJulian of Eclanum, 83, 85.\n\nJustification, 36, 73, 97, 113 sq., 136 sqq.;\n  Process of, 272 sqq.;\n  Necessity of faith for, 274 sqq.;\n  Necessity of other preparatory acts, 285 sqq.;\n  The state of, 300 sqq.;\n  The nature of, 301 sqq.;\n  Negative element, 302 sqq.;\n  Positive element, 310 sqq.;\n  Sanctifying Grace the sole formal cause of, 322 sqq.;\n  Qualities of, 378 sqq.;\n  Increase of Grace, 388;\n  Fruits of, 397 sqq.\n\nJustin Martyr, St., 102, 308.\n\nK\n\nKlee, 164.\n\n\u039a\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, 345.\n\nKrogh-Tonning, 293.\n\nL\n\nLateran, Fourth Council of the, 179, 400.\n\nLaw of grace, 405.\n\nLessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 337, 420.\n\nLiberty, see Freedom.\n\nLiebermann, 89.\n\nLogos, The Divine, 358, 359 sq.\n\nLog-stick-and-stone theory, 291, 292.\n\nLucidus, 212.\n\n_Lumen gloriae_, 345.\n\nLuther, 52, 74, 132, 223, 285, 288, 291, 293, 295, 302, 310, 322, 384,\n            389, 392, 399, 407.\n\nM\n\nMaldonatus, 203, 204.\n\nMary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 389, 391.\n\nMassillon, 194.\n\nMelanchthon, 292, 310.\n\nMennonites, 322.\n\nMercy, Works of, 416.\n\nMerely sufficient Grace, 41 sqq.\n\nMerit, 128, 131 sqq., 397 sqq., 430.\n\n_Meritum de congruo_, 430 sqq.\n\n_Meritum naturae_, 138.\n\nMezzofanti, Cardinal, 54.\n\nMileve, Council of, 85, 114, 116.\n\nModernism, 54.\n\nMolina and Molinism, 65, 148, 200, 217, 255 sqq., 337.\n\nMolinos, M. de, 401.\n\nMoral virtues, Infused, 366 sqq.\n\nMortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 sqq.\n\nN\n\nNabuchodonosor, 58.\n\nNatural and Supernatural Grace, 7 sqq.\n\nNature, Capacity of, 50 sqq.\n\n_Necessitas antecedens peccati_, 120 sqq.\n\n_Necessitas medii\u2014praecepti_, 279 sqq.\n\nO\n\nObduracy, 175 sq.\n\nObjects of merit, 423 sqq.\n\nObstinacy, 178 sq.\n\nOccasionalists, 406.\n\nOckam, 211.\n\n_Opera steriliter bona_, 57, 81 sq.\n\nOrange, Second Council of, 20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110, 123, 136,\n            139, 143, 213, 400.\n\nOrigen, 77.\n\nOriginal sin, 303, 434.\n\nOrosius, 182.\n\nOsiander, 292.\n\nOsorius, 204.\n\nOswald, 104, 203.\n\nP\n\nPalmieri, 61, 72, 103, 116.\n\nPantheism, 343.\n\nPassaglia, 158, 375.\n\nPassions, The, 28.\n\nPaul, St., 12, 13, 16, 21, 22, 27, 57, 64, 65, 68, 88, 100 sq., 105, 107,\n            125, 137, 146, 157 sq., 166, 169 sq., 180, 189, 191, 201 sq.,\n            207, 227 sq., 259, 269, 276, 277, 281 sq., 283, 288 sq., 314,\n            316, 317, 318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 402, 407, 420, 424.\n\nPaul V, 256, 261.\n\nPelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 103, 114,\n            119, 136, 141, 170, 190, 197, 228, 308.\n\nPenance, Sacrament of, 395, 428.\n\nPerrone, 18.\n\nPerseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 425 sq., 432 sqq.\n\nPesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248.\n\nPetavius, 203, 204, 361, 375.\n\nPeter Lombard, 331.\n\nPeter, St., 171, 184.\n\nPfeffinger, 292.\n\nPiccolomini, 262.\n\nPighius, 204.\n\n\u03a0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2, 277 sq., 290.\n\nPistoia, Council of, 71, 74.\n\nPius V, 165.\n\nPius VI, 71, 73.\n\nPlatel, 72.\n\nPlato, 350.\n\nPneumatomachians, 373.\n\nPolycarp, St., 290.\n\nPomponazzi, 52.\n\nPostlapsarians, 213.\n\n_Potentia obedientialis_, 19, 30, 40.\n\n_Praeambula fidei_, 52, 102, 105.\n\n_Praemotio moralis_, 249, 253.\n\n_Praemotio physica_, 233 sqq., 248.\n\nPrayer, 43, 91, 127 sqq., 133, 142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 435.\n\nPredestinarianism, Heretical, 212.\n\nPredestination, 152, 187 sqq.;\n  _ante praevisa nierita_, 199 sqq.;\n  _post praevisa merita_, 206 sqq.\n\nPredestinationism, Orthodox, 199 sqq.\n\nPrevenient Grace, 32 sqq.\n\nPriesthood, 13.\n\nProperties of sanctifying Grace, 378 sqq.\n\nProsper, St., 25, 37, 59, 77, 97, 99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215.\n\nProtagoras, 350.\n\nQ\n\nQualitates Fluentes, 29 sqq.\n\nQualities, 333 sq.\n\nQuasi-Merit, 134.\n\nQuesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180.\n\nQuietists, 343, 401.\n\nR\n\nRe-Creation, 315, 339.\n\nRegeneration, 314 sq., 329, 339, 341, 346.\n\nRepentance, 176.\n\nReprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq.\n\nRequisites of supernatural merit, 410 sqq.\n\nRipalda, 65, 69, 71 sqq., 128, 145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363.\n\nRoman Catechism, 333, 340, 349, 363.\n\nS\n\nSaints absolutely predestined, 211;\n  Favored by God, 419.\n\nSalmeron, 337.\n\nSalutary acts, 82 sqq.\n\nSanctification, Internal, 323, 347, 348.\n\nSanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.;\n  Genesis of, 272 sqq.;\n  The sole formal cause of justification, 322 sqq.;\n  Nature of, 328 sqq.;\n  A permanent quality of the soul, 328 sqq.;\n  An infused habit, 333 sqq.;\n  Not identical with charity, 336 sqq.;\n  A participation of the soul in the divine nature, 340 sqq.;\n  The effects of, 347 sqq.;\n  Sanctity, 347 sqq.;\n  Supernatural beauty, 349 sqq.;\n  Divine friendship, 351 sqq.;\n  Adoptive sonship, 356 sqq.;\n  Supernatural concomitants, 362 sqq.;\n  Properties of, 378 sqq.;\n  Admits of degrees and therefore can be increased, 384 sqq.;\n  Lost by mortal sin, 392 sqq.;\n  Fruits of, 397 sqq.;\n  As a requisite of merit, 418 sq.;\n  Increased by merit, 424 sqq.\n\nSanctity, an effect of sanctifying Grace, 347 sqq.\n\nSardagna, 337.\n\nScheeben, 361, 375.\n\nSchrader, 375.\n\n_Scientia media_, 245, 253, 257 sq., 266.\n\nScotus and the Scotists, 10, 63, 67, 94, 210, 325, 332, 337, 419, 433.\n\n\u201cSeed of God,\u201d Why grace is called the, 409.\n\nSelf-righteousness, 406 sq.\n\nSemipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 226, 228,\n            239.\n\nSensitive sphere, Graces of the, 26 sqq.\n\nSinners, Ordinary and obdurate, 172 sqq.\n\nSin, Incompatible with Grace, 323 sqq.;\n  Is sanctifying Grace diminished by venial sin? 388 sq.\n\nSins of malice, 247.\n\nSociety of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325.\n\nSocinianism, 292.\n\nSocrates, 25.\n\nSola fides theory, 286 sqq.\n\nSoto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430.\n\nStapleton, 206.\n\nStoics, 64, 387.\n\nStrengthening Grace of the will, 23 sqq.\n\nSuarez, 63, 96, 116, 122, 128, 150, 218, 219, 257, 262, 325, 330, 334,\n            346, 359, 362, 363, 365, 390 sq., 415, 420, 433.\n\nSufficient Grace, 41 sqq., 167 sqq.\n\nSupererogation, Works of, 411.\n\nSupernatural character of merit, 413 sqq.\n\nSylvius, 216, 434.\n\nSyncretism, 267 sqq.\n\nSynergist dispute, 292.\n\nT\n\nTemporal blessings, 435.\n\nTemptations, 65 sqq.\n\nTepe, 68, 72, 81.\n\nTertullian, 179.\n\n\u0398\u03b5\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, 341, 376.\n\nTheodoret, 209.\n\nTheological systems devised to harmonize the dogmas of grace and\n            free-will, 231 sqq.;\n  Thomism, 232 sqq.;\n  Augustinianism, 248 sqq.;\n  Molinism, 255 sqq.;\n  Congruism, 261 sqq.;\n  Syncretism, 267 sqq.\n\nThomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 62, 70, 93, 121, 149, 161, 165, 178, 185,\n            194, 210, 232, 298, 331, 332, 334, 338, 339, 345, 349, 357,\n            365, 368 sq., 387, 409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 435.\n\nThomism and the Thomists, 11, 29, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 sqq., 325, 332,\n            389, 413, 414.\n\nToletus, 204, 206.\n\nTournely, 207, 337.\n\nTraditionalism, 52.\n\nTrent, Council of, 34, 35, 36, 38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, 111, 115 sq.,\n            122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 153, 165, 168, 182, 188, 213, 224,\n            227, 243 sq., 247, 265, 272, 275, 285, 295 sqq., 303, 307, 311\n            sqq., 319, 322 sq., 324, 325, 329 sq., 331, 335, 338, 352,\n            361, 363, 365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, 401, 407 sq., 415, 421\n            sq., 423, 425, 426, sqq., 431.\n\nTrinity, Dogma of the, 282 sqq.\n\nU\n\nUltricuria, Nicholas de, 52.\n\nUnbelief, 97.\n\n\u201cUnigenitus,\u201d Constitution, 74.\n\nV\n\nVasquez, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133, 149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 420, 425.\n\nVatican Council, 51, 54, 73, 183, 244 sq., 265.\n\nVega, 122.\n\nVenial sin, Possibility of avoiding, 117 sqq.;\n  Is sanctifying Grace diminished by? 388 sq.\n\nVienne, Council of, 331, 363.\n\nVital acts of the soul, 27 sqq.\n\nVitelleschi, 262.\n\nVocation, The grace of, 190, 196.\n\n_Voluntas salvifica Dei_, 152 sqq.\n\nW\n\nWiclif, 212.\n\nWill to save, God\u2019s, 152 sqq.\n\nY\n\nYsambert, 211.\n\nZ\n\nZosimus, 85.\n\nZwingli, 298.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen \u201cdo not emphasize the difference, and\n      frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole.\n      Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of\n      the older theologians should constantly bear in mind.\u201d\n      (Wilhelm-Scannell, _Manual of Catholic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 229,\n      2nd ed., London 1901.)\n\n    2 The asterisk before an author\u2019s name indicates that his treatment of\n      the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is\n      invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his\n      name never means that we consider his work inferior to that of other\n      writers. There are vast stretches of theology which he scarcely\n      touched.\n\n    3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912.\n\n_    4 Theologiae Graecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam\n      Gratiae Libri III_, I, 4, Paris 1646.\n\n    5 \u201cThe same name is loosely applied to the act of \u2018blessing\u2019 the food\n      before taking it, which is properly the function of a priest, but\n      which is suitably performed by every Christian.\u201d (Hunter, _Outlines\n      of Dogmatic Theology_, Vol. III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, _Summa\n      Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: \u201c_Secundum communem loquendi\n      modum tripliciter gratia accipi consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione\n      alicuius...; secundo sumitur pro aliquo dono gratis dato...; tertio\n      modo sumitur pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati, secundum\n      quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum._\u201d\n\n    6 Rom. XI, 6: \u201c_Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia\n      iam non est gratia._\u201d\n\n_    7 Tract. in Ioannem_, III, n. 9: \u201c_Quid est gratia? Gratis data. Quid\n      est gratis data? Donata, non reddita._\u201d\n\n_    8 Debitum naturae._\n\n_    9 Epistula ad Innocent._, n. 2: \u201c_Nam si intellexissent illi\n      episcopi, eam illum dicere gratiam, quam etiam cum impiis habemus,\n      cum quibus homines sumus, negare vero eam qu\u00e2 Christiani et filii\n      Dei sumus, quis eum patienter ... ante oculos suos ferret?\n      Quapropter non culpandi sunt iudices, qui ecclesiastic\u00e2 consuetudine\n      nomen gratiae_ [_i.e._ _christianae] audierunt._\u201d\n\n   10 On the difference between these two categories see Pohle-Preuss,\n      _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 180 sqq.\n\n_   11 Epist. ad Innocent._, _l.c._: \u201c_Etsi qu\u00e2dam non improband\u00e2 ratione\n      dicitur gratia Dei qu\u00e2 creati sumus [gratia naturalis], ... alia est\n      tamen, qu\u00e2 praedestinati vocamur, iustificamur, glorificamur [gratia\n      supernaturalis]._\u201d\n\n_   12 Epist. ad Sixt._, 194, n. 8: \u201c_Haec est enim gratia, quam in libris\n      Dei legere et populis praedicare catholici antistites consueverunt,\n      et gratia quam commendat Apostolus non est ea qu\u00e2 creati sumus, ut\n      homines essemus, sed qu\u00e2 iustificati sumus, quum mali homines\n      essemus._\u201d\n\n   13 St. Augustine, _Ep._, 217: \u201c_Hoc [scil. credere] opus est gratiae,\n      non naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae quam nobis attulit secundus\n      Adam, non naturae quam totam perdidit in seipso Adam._\u201d\n\n_   14 Gratia est donum gratis datum supernaturale._\n\n   15 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology. A Dogmatic Treatise on the\n      Redemption_, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914.\n\n_   16 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, ex meritis Christi._\n\n   17 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum_, IV, 15.\n\n   18 Cfr. Rom. III, 21 sqq.; Gal. II, 16.\n\n_   19 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, ex meritis\n      Christi._\n\n   20 St. Matthew X, 8: \u201c_Infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos\n      mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis accepistis, gratis date_ (\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03b5\u1f70\u03bd\n      \u03b4\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5).\u201d\u2014The name \u201cgratuitously given,\u201d as Fr. Hunter observes\n      (_Outlines_, III, 10), is \u201ctautological and not particularly\n      expressive,\u201d and \u201chelps in no way to indicate what is the nature of\n      the graces which it is intended to exclude. These are such as, for\n      want of a better word, we call ingratiating: the Latin name used by\n      theologians (_gratum faciens_) denotes that they make a man pleasing\n      to God, grateful to Him, if we understand _grateful_ of that which\n      gives pleasure, and not in its commoner sense, which is nearly the\n      same as thankful.\u201d\n\n   21 For a list of the charismata see 1 Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann,\n      _Von den Charismen im allgemeinen und von dem Sprachencharisma im\n      besonderen_, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, _Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem\n      Epistolam ad Corinthios_, pp. 410 sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch,\n      _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 243 sqq., Freiburg 1908.\n\n   22 1 Cor. XII, 31: \u201c_Aemulamini autem charismata meliora, et adhuc\n      excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro._\u201d\n\n_   23 Caritas_, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7.\n\n   24 1 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae,\n      qu. 111, art. 5: \u201c_Unaquaeque virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto\n      ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper autem finis potior est his, quae\n      sunt ad finem [i.e. media]. Gratia autem gratum faciens ordinat\n      hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis; gratiae autem\n      gratis datae ordinant hominem ad quaedam praeparatoria finis ultimi,\n      sicut per prophetiam et miracula et huiusmodi homines inducuntur ad\n      hoc quod ultimo fini coniungantur. Et ideo gratia gratum faciens est\n      multo excellentior quam gratia gratis data._\u201d\n\n_   25 Gratia est donum gratis datum, supernaturale, internum, gratum\n      faciens, ex meritis Christi._\n\n   26 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 229 sq.\n\n_   27 Ibid._, pp. 298 sq.\n\n_   28 Ep. ad Simplician._, I, 9, 22: \u201c_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid\n      occurrerit quod delectet et invitet animum, moveri nullo modo\n      potest; hoc autem, ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._\u201d\n\n_   29 Enchiridion_, c. 98: \u201c_Quis tam impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum\n      malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi\n      voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere?_\u201d\n\n   30 \u201c_Domine, ... ad te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius\n      voluntates._\u201d For a full treatment of God\u2019s moral causality the\n      student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 109,\n      sect. 2 sq.\n\n   31 Cfr. D. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 15.\n\n_   32 Causa formalis._\n\n_   33 Causa efficiens._\n\n_   34 Causa meritoria._\n\n_   35 Causa materialis._\n\n_   36 Causalitas moralis._\n\n_   37 Causalitas physica._\n\n_   38 Causa finalis inadaequata._\n\n_   39 Causa finalis adaequata._\n\n   40 On the _potentia obedientialis_ see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of\n      Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 188 sqq.\n\n   41 Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.\n\n_   42 Supra_, p. 11.\n\n   43 \u201c_Lex Domini immaculata, convertens animas, ... praeceptum Domini\n      lucidum, illuminans oculos._\u201d\n\n   44 \u201c_Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut\n      sequamini vestigia eius._\u201d\n\n_   45 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 34: \u201c_Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut\n      velimus et ut credamus, sive extrinsecus per evangelicas\n      exhortationes sive intrinsecus, ubi nemo habet in potestate, quid ei\n      veniat in mentem._\u201d\n\n   46 2 Cor. III, 4 sq.: \u201c_Fiduciam autem talem habemus per Christum ad\n      Deum; non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex\n      nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est._\u201d\n\n   47 1 Cor. III, 6: \u201c_Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incrementum\n      dedit_ (\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b7\u1f54\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd). _Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid\n      neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus_ (\u1f41 \u03b1\u1f50\u03be\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2).\u201d\n\n_   48 De Gratia Christi_, c. 19: \u201c_Ipse in bonis arboribus cooperatur\n      fructum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet\n      ministrum et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum._\u201d Cfr. also Eph. I,\n      17 sq., Acts XXVI, 16 sqq., 2 Cor. IV, 6, 1 John II, 20 and 27.\n\n   49 Cfr. Mazzella, _De Gratia_, disp. 1, art. 1, \u00a74, 3rd ed., Rome 1882.\n\n_   50 Tract. in Ioa._, III, 13: \u201c_Magisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam\n      sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet, qui corda tenet._\u201d\n\n_   51 L.c._: \u201c_Interior magister est, qui docet; Christus docet,\n      inspiratio ipsius docet._\u201d\n\n_   52 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat._ n. 67: \u201c_Frustra [divinus sermo]\n      exterioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spiritali munere auditum\n      hominis interioris aperiat._\u201d Other Patristic texts will be found in\n      the classic work of Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 101,\n      sect. 3-4.\n\n   53 It is to be noted, however, that the term _gratia inspirationis_,\n      both in the writings of St. Augustine and in the decrees of Trent\n      (Sess. VI, can. 3), sometimes also denotes the immediate\n      illuminating grace of the mind.\n\n_   54 De Gratia Christi_, c. 12: \u201c_Qu\u00e2 grati\u00e2 agitur, non solum ut\n      facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus, nec ut solum\n      diligenda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus._\u201d\n\n_   55 Op. cit._, c. 26: \u201c_Cognitionem et dilectionem, sicut sunt\n      discernenda, discernat, quia scientia inflat, quando caritas\n      aedificat.... Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, sed unum minus,\n      alterum maius, non sic iustitiam nostram super laudem iustificatoris\n      extollat, ut horum duorum quod minus est divino tribuat adiutorio,\n      quod autem maius est humano usurpet arbitrio._\u201d\n\n   56 He applies a variety of practically synonymous terms to the\n      strengthening grace of the will, for instance: _delectatio\n      coelestis_, _spiritus caritatis_, _inspiratio dilectionis_, _bona\n      voluntas_, _voluptas_, _sanctum desiderium_, _inspiratio\n      suavitatis_, _cupiditas boni_, etc.\n\n   57 Canon 4: \u201c_Quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum\n      D. N. propter hoc tantum adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam\n      nobis aperitur el revelatur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus\n      quid appetere et quid vitare debeamus, non autem per illam nobis\n      praestari ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus\n      atque valeamus, a. s.; ... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire\n      quid facere debeamus et diligere ut faciamus._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart,\n      n. 104.)\n\n_   58 Contra Collator._, c. VII, 2: \u201c_Trahit timor; principium enim\n      sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). Trahit laetitia, quoniam\n      laetatus sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: in domum Domini ibimus\n      (Ps. CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quoniam concupiscit et deficit\n      anima mea in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). Trahunt delectationes:\n      quam dulcia enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel et favum ori\n      meo (Ps. CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per\n      quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum?_\u201d Cfr. Schiffini,\n      _De Gratia Divina_, thes. 11; Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,\n      thes. 8.\n\n_   59 De Anima_, I, 8: \u1f0c\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n_   60 De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione_, II, 19, 33: \u201c_... ut suave\n      faciat, quod non delectabat._\u201d\n\n   61 2 Cor. XII, 9: \u201c_Sufficit tibi gratia mea._\u201d For further information\n      on this point the student is referred to Ripalda, _De Ente\n      Supernaturali_, disp. 44, sect. 9.\n\n_   62 In Psalmos_, 102, n. 16: \u201c_Vocat [Deus] per intimam\n      cognitionem._\u201d\u2014_Tract. in Ioa._, 26, n. 7: \u201c_Videte quomodo trahit\n      Pater, docendo delectat._\u201d\n\n_   63 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.\n\n_   64 S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 25, art. 2.\n\n   65 \u201c_... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et\n      diligere ut faciamus._\u201d (_V. supra_, p. 25.)\n\n   66 \u201c_Amor Dei propter se super omnia._\u201d\n\n_   67 V. infra_, Part II, Ch. I.\n\n   68 Cfr., _e.g._, _De Trinitate_, VIII, 10: \u201c_Quid est dilectio vel\n      caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura divina laudat et praedicat, nisi\n      amor boni?_\u201d\u2014_Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag._, II, 9, 21: \u201c_Quid est\n      boni cupiditas nisi caritas?_\u201d\u2014_De Gratia Christi_, c. 21: \u201c_Quasi\n      vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam caritas._\u201d\n\n   69 It should also be noted that in Augustine\u2019s writings _inspiratio\n      caritatis_, as an immediate grace of the will, is not necessarily\n      identical with the infusion of theological love.\n\n_   70 E.g._ Berti, _De Theol. Discipl._, XIV, 7.\n\n   71 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Aux._, disp. 67, n. 6.\n\n   72 Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 74.\u2014Cfr. John VI, 44: \u201c_Nemo potest\n      venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me, traxerit eum._\u201d Apoc. III,\n      20: \u201c_Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit vocem meam et\n      aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum._\u201d\n\n_   73 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aquinatis_, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. 2,\n      art. 2, \u00a72.\n\n_   74 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 2.\n\n_   75 Ad Simplic._, I, 2, n. 21: \u201c_Quis potest credere, nisi aliqu\u00e2\n      vocatione, h. e. aliqu\u00e2 rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in\n      potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur\n      ad fidem?_\u201d\n\n   76 Cfr. Suarez, _De Div. Grat._, III, 4: \u201c_In Conciliis et Patribus\n      nullum vestigium talis gratiae invenimus, quin potius ipsam\n      inspirationem ponunt ut gratiam primam et praeterea indicant\n      immediate infundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non mediante aliqu\u00e2\n      qualitate._\u201d\n\n_   77 De Gratia_, diss. 4, art. 2.\n\n_   78 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2: \u201c_In eo, qui dicitur\n      gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei\n      voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, art. 1), quod\n      dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno modo\n      inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel\n      volendum vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine\n      non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae; actus enim moventis in\n      moto est motus, ut dicitur (Phys. 1, 3, text. 18). Alio modo\n      adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod\n      habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur ... et sic donum gratiae\n      qualitas quaedam est._\u201d\u2014Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Actuali_,\n      thes. 16; Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.;\n      Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 220 sqq. The Thomistic doctrine\n      on this point is viewed with favor by several Molinist theologians,\n      _e.g._, Platel (_De Gratia_, n. 547) and Gutberlet (_Dogmatische\n      Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897).\n\n_   79 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem._, II, 18: \u201c_Quoniam quod a Deo nos\n      avertimus nostrum est, et haec est voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum\n      nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante et adiuvante non possumus, et\n      haec est voluntas bona._\u201d\n\n_   80 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, 33: \u201c_Ipse ut velimus, operatur\n      incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens._\u201d\u2014On certain\n      differences of opinion on this point between Suarez (_De Div.\n      Motione_, III, 5) and St. Thomas (_Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111,\n      art. 2), see Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 252 sqq.\n\n   81 Cfr. Ps. LVIII, 11; XXII, 6.\n\n_   82 Enchiridion_, c. 32: \u201c_Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem\n      subsequitur, ne frustra velit._\u201d\n\n_   83 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 5: \u201c_Declarat praeterea, ipsius\n      justificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Iesum Christum\n      praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione, qua\n      nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart,\n      n. 797.)\n\n_   84 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 3: \u201c_Sicut gratia dividitur in\n      operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in\n      praevenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque gratia accipiatur\n      (i.e. sive habitualis sive actualis). Sunt autem quinque effectus\n      gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut\n      bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult efficaciter operetur;\n      quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam\n      perveniat. Et ideo gratia, secundum quod causat in nobis primum\n      effectum, vocatur praeveniens respectu secundi effectus; et prout\n      causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi\n      effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior\n      alio, ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens secundum\n      eundem effectum respectu diversorum._\u201d\n\n_   85 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Iesus Christus in ipsos\n      iustificatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae virtus bona eorum opera\n      semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur._\u201d\n\n   86 On the distinction to be drawn between the various members of these\n      pairs, whether it be real or merely logical, theologians differ.\n      Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat._, thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, _Praelect.\n      Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 sqq.; Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 241 sqq.\n\n_   87 V. supra_, Nos. 1 and 4.\n\n   88 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart\u2019s\n      _Enchiridion_, n. 797 and 814.\n\n_   89 Ad Simplic._, I, qu. 2, n. 22: \u201c_Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid\n      occurrerit, quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo\n      potest; hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate._\u201d\n\n_   90 Contr. Collator._, c. VII, 2: \u201c_Et quis perspicere aut enarrare\n      possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum, ut\n      quae fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat diligat, quae fastidiebat\n      esuriat, ac subit\u00e2 commutatione mirabili quae clausa ei fuerant sint\n      aperta, quae onerosa levia, quae amara sint dulcia, quae obscura\n      sint lucida?_\u201d\n\n   91 Cfr. M. Cronin, _The Science of Ethics_, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin\n      1909.\n\n_   92 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian._, II, 9, 21: \u201c_Multa Deus facit in\n      homine bona, quae non facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non\n      facit Deus, ut faciat homo._\u201d\n\n_   93 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 17, n. 33: \u201c_Ut ergo velimus, sine\n      nobis operatur; quum autem volumus et sic volumus ut faciamus,\n      nobiscum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel\n      cooperante quum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus._\u201d\n\n_   94 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 14: \u201c_Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e.\n      bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5;\n      Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum,\n      tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem, nos\n      praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem sibi per consensum\n      iungit; ministrando et consensui facultatem foris per apertum opus\n      nostrum internus opifex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos praevenire\n      nequaquam possumus. Qui autem bonum neminem invenit, neminem salvat,\n      quem non praevenit. A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis\n      exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et opus,\n      etsi non ex nobis, non iam tamen sine nobis._\u201d\u2014On the\n      misinterpretation of this text by the Jansenists, see Palmieri, _De\n      Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 84 sq.\n\n_   95 Moral._, XVI, 10: \u201c_Superna pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine\n      nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut subsequente libero arbitrio bonum,\n      quod appetimus, agat nobiscum [gratia cooperans]._\u201d\n\n_   96 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, c. 16: \u201c_Tanta est [Dei] erga homines\n      bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita quae sunt ipsius dona._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 810.)\n\n_   97 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: \u201c_Certum enim est nos mandata\n      servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo\n      petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo\n      faciamus. Certum est nos velle, quum volumus; sed ille facit ut\n      velimus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII,\n      35): ____Praeparatur voluntas a Domino____; de quo dictum est (Ps.\n      XXXVI, 32): ____A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius\n      volet____; de quo dictum est (Phil. II, 13): ____Deus est qui\n      operatur in nobis et velle.____ Certum est nos facere quum facimus;\n      sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas\n      voluntati, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ____Faciam ut in\n      iustificationibus meis ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis et\n      faciatis.____ Quum dicit: ____Faciam ut faciatis,____ quid aliud\n      dicit nisi (Ezech. XI, 19): ____Auferam a vobis cor lapideum,____\n      unde non faciebatis, (Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et ____dabo vobis cor\n      carneum,____ unde facitis._\u201d\u2014On the subject of this paragraph see\n      Palmieri, _op. cit._, thes. 10, and Chr. Pesch, _op. cit._, pp. 14\n      sqq.\n\n   98 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 67 sqq.\n\n   99 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat. Actuali_; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch,\n      _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 28 sqq.\n\n_  100 V. infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 2.\n\n_  101 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, c. 16, 32: \u201c_Certum est nos facere, quum\n      facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas\n      voluntati._\u201d\n\n_  102 De Corrept. et Grat._, c. 11: \u201c_Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia\n      sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam\n      si habuisset, perseverasset._\u201d Cfr. Palmieri, _De Div. Grat.\n      Actuali_, thes. 11.\n\n_  103 De Nat. et Grat._, 43: \u201c_Nam Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed\n      iubendo monet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et\n      adiuvat ut possis._\u201d\n\n_  104 De Gratia Christi_, IV, 10: \u201c_... ita inefficax, ex qua operatio ne\n      possit quidem sequi, nisi eius inefficacia per aliam suppleatur._\u201d\n\n  105 \u201c_Illud a recentioribus prolatum gratiae sufficientis genus, quo\n      adiuvante nullum unquam opus factum est aut fiet unquam, videtur\n      monstrum quoddam singulare gratiae, solummodo peccatis faciendis\n      maiorique damnationi accersendae serviens._\u201d (_De Grat. Christi_,\n      III, 3).\n\n  106 \u201c_Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa\n      est, sic ut proinde merito possimus petere: A gratia sufficienti\n      libera nos, Domine._\u201d This assertion was condemned by Pope Alexander\n      VIII in 1690. It is convincingly refuted by Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 354 sqq.\n\n  107 \u201c_Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod accept\u00e2 per\n      baptismum grati\u00e2 omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et cooperante,\n      quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare\n      voluerint, adimplere._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)\n\n  108 Sess. VI, can. 4: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo\n      motum et excitatum nihil cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dissentire,\n      si velit, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)\n\n  109 Is. V, 4: \u201c_Quid est, quod debui ultra facere vineae meae et non\n      feci ei? An quod exspectavi, ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas?_\u201d\n\n  110 Prov. I, 24: \u201c_Vocavi et renuistis, extendi manum meam et non fuit\n      qui adspiceret._\u201d\n\n  111 Matth. XI, 21.\n\n  112 Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 37; Acts VII, 51; 1 Cor. X, 13; 2 Cor. VI, 1; 1\n      Thess. V, 19.\n\n_  113 Contra Haer._, IV, 37, 1: \u201c_Illud autem quod dicit (Matth. XXIII,\n      37): Quoties volui colligere filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem\n      libertatem hominis manifestat, quia liberum eum fecit Deus ab\n      initio.... Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona sententia adest illi\n      semper. Et propter hoc consilium quidem bonum dat omnibus.... Et qui\n      operantur quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam et honorem\n      percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, quum possint non operari\n      illud; hi autem, qui illud non operantur, indicium iustum excipient\n      Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum [gratia inefficax], quum possint\n      operari illud [gratia vere et mere sufficiens]._\u201d\n\n  114 \u201c_Gratia Dei ... quae hominum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut non\n      adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo._\u201d _De Peccat.\n      Mer. et Rem._, II, 17.\n\n_  115 De Lib. Arbitr._, III, 16: \u201c_Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus\n      est; ex eo autem quod non facit quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet\n      autem [facere], si accepit et voluntatem liberam et\n      sufficientissimam facultatem._\u201d On the Jansenist distortions of St.\n      Augustine\u2019s teaching see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.\n      48. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers is thoroughly rehearsed by\n      Isaac Habert, _Theol. Patr. Graec._, II, 6 sq.\n\n_  116 Conc. Vat.,_ Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, Deum\n      unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta\n      sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse,\n      anathema sit._\u201d\n\n_  117 Conc. Vat._, Sess. III, cap. 4: \u201c_Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae\n      catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, duplicem esse ordinem\n      cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum:\n      principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione et altero fide\n      divin\u00e2 cognoscimus; obiecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae\n      naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur\n      mysteria in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata divinitus,\n      innotescere non possunt._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1795.)\n\n  118 Nicholas d\u2019Autricourt, a master in the University of Paris, in 1348,\n      was compelled by the Sorbonne and the Apostolic See to retract a\n      number of propositions taken from his writings which were infected\n      with scepticism. These propositions, most of which had been censured\n      as heretical, and some as merely false, may be found in Natalis\n      Alexander, _Hist. Eccles._, ed. Bing., XV, 195, and also, with some\n      explanatory remarks, in Denifle-Chatelain, _Chartularium Univ.\n      Paris._, II, 1, Paris 1891.\n\n  119 \u201c_Klotz-, Stock- und Steintheorie_.\u201d\n\n  120 On Traditionalism, see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence,\n      and Attributes_, pp. 44 sqq., 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914.\n\n  121 Wisd. XIII, 1 sqq.; Rom. I, 20 sq.; Rom. II, 14 sq. Cfr.\n      Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._, pp. 17 sqq.\n\n_  122 Ibid._, pp. 38 sqq.\n\n_  123 Summa Theol_., 1a, qu. 2, art. 2, ad 1: \u201c_Deum esse et alia\n      huiusmodi ... non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos;\n      sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia\n      naturam et perfectio perfectibile_.\u201d\n\n_  124 Luther\u2019s Werke_, ed. Walch, XII, 400, Halle 1742: \u201c_Alles, was sie\n      \u00f6rtert und schleusst, so gewisslich falsch und irrig ist, als Gott\n      lebt._\u201d\n\n_  125 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 1 and canon 5.\n\n  126 On the _vulnera naturae_ cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of\n      Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 298 sqq., St. Louis 1912. Already\n      St. Augustine observed: \u201c_Ad miseriam iustae damnationis pertinet\n      ignorantia et difficultas, quam patitur homo ab exordio nativitatis\n      suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei grati\u00e2 liberatur._\u201d (_Retract._, I.\n      9.)\n\n_  127 Propos._ 41: \u201c_Omnis cognitio Dei etiam naturalis, etiam in\n      philosophis ethnicis, non potest venire nisi a Deo; et sine gratia\n      non producit nisi praesumptionem, vanitatem et oppositionem ad ipsum\n      Deum loco affectuum adorationis, gratitudinis et amoris._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1391.)\n\n  128 On the _debitum naturae_ cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of\n      Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 184 sq.\n\n_  129 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 4.\n\n_  130 Conc. Vatic._, Sess. III, _De Revel._, cap. 2: \u201c_Ut ea, quae in\n      rebus divinis humanae rationi per se impervia non sunt, in praesenti\n      quoque generis humani conditione ab omnibus expedite, firm\u00e2\n      certitudine et nullo admixto errore cognosci possint._\u201d\n\n  131 Cfr. Chastel, S. J., _De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine_, Paris\n      1854; O. Willmann, _Geschichte des Idealismus_, Vol. III, 2nd ed.,\n      pp. 811 sqq., Braunschweig 1908; Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero\n      Arbitrio_, V, 1 sqq.\n\n  132 The only dissenting voice is that of Cardinal Cajetan.\n\n  133 Mezzofanti spoke perfectly thirty-eight languages, thirty others\n      less perfectly, and was more or less familiar with fifty dialects.\n      Cfr. U. Benigni in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. X, p. 271.\n\n  134 On the question whether grace can enable a man to acquire an\n      unlimited, universal knowledge, see Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp.\n      258 sqq., St. Louis 1913. Cfr. also St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a\n      2ae, qu. 109, art. 1, and Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_,\n      thes. 19.\n\n_  135 Prop. Baii Damn._, 27: \u201c_Liberum arbitrium sine gratiae Dei\n      adiutorio nonnisi ad peccandum valet._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1027.)\n\n_  136 Prop. Baii Damn._, 37: \u201c_Cum Pelagio sentit, qui boni aliquid\n      naturalis, i.e. quod ex naturae solis viribus ortum ducit,\n      agnoscit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1037.)\n\n_  137 Prop. Baii Damn._, 25: \u201c_Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et\n      philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1025.)\n\n_  138 Prop. Damn. ab Alex. VIII_: \u201c_Necesse est infidelem in omni opere\n      peccare._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1298.)\n\n  139 Matth. V, 46 sq.\n\n_  140 Mercedem_, \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n_  141 Salutaveritis_, \u1f70\u03c3\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5.\n\n_  142 Ethnici_, \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f10\u03b8\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03af.\n\n  143 Rom. II, 14 sqq.\n\n_  144 Gentes_, \u1f14\u03b8\u03bd\u03b7.\n\n  145 That is, the _Mosaic_ law.\n\n_  146 Naturaliter_, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n_  147 Naturaliter_, \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n  148 \u201c_Quae legis sunt, faciunt._\u201d\n\n  149 Rom. I, 21 sqq.\n\n  150 For other germane texts see Ezech. XXIX, 18 sqq.; Rom. I, 21.\n\n  151 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f45 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd.\n\n  152 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 = \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n  153 Cfr. also 1 Cor. VIII, 10 sqq. For a fuller explanation see\n      Scheeben, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 954 sqq.\n\n  154 Ezech. XXIX, 20: \u201cAnd for the service that he hath done me against\n      it [the city of Tyre], I have given him the land of Egypt, because\n      he hath labored for me, saith the Lord God.\u201d\n\n_  155 In Ezech._, XXIX, 20: \u201c_Ex eo quod Nabuchodonosor accepit mercedem\n      boni operis, intelligimus etiam ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, non\n      absque mercede Dei iudicio praeteriri._\u201d\n\n_  156 In Gal._, I, 15: \u201c_Multi absque fide et evangelio Christi vel\n      sapienter faciunt aliquid vel sancte, ut parentibus obsequantur, ut\n      inopi manum porrigant, non opprimant vicinos, non aliena diripant._\u201d\n\n_  157 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 28: \u201c_Sicut enim non impediunt a vita\n      aeterna iustum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non\n      ducitur, sic ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio aliqua bona\n      opera, sine quibus difficillime vita cuiuslibet pessimi hominis\n      invenitur._\u201d\n\n_  158 Ep._, 144, 2.\n\n_  159 Confess._, VI, 10.\n\n_  160 Ep._, 138, c. 3: \u201c_Deus enim sic ostendit in opulentissimo et\n      praeclaro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine\n      ver\u00e2 religione virtutes, ut intelligeretur h\u00e2c addit\u00e2 fieri homines\n      cives alterius civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex caritas,\n      cuius modus aeternitas._\u201d\n\n_  161 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 3, n. 5: \u201c_Neque liberum arbitrium\n      quidquam nisi ad peccandum valet, si lateat veritatis via._\u201d\n\n_  162 Sent. ex August._, n. 106: \u201c_Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est et\n      nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio summae et\n      incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est etiam in optimis\n      moribus._\u201d\n\n  163 What Augustine himself observes of the literary style of St. Cyprian\n      (_Ep._, 93, c. 10, n. 39): \u201c_Habet quandam propriam faciem, qu\u00e2\n      possit agnosci_,\u201d applies in an even truer sense to his own\n      writings.\n\n  164 Cfr. _Enchirid._, c. 30.\n\n  165 Cfr. _De Correptione et Gratia_, c. 9, n. 20 sqq.\n\n  166 For a fuller and more adequate treatment of this question see J.\n      Ernst, _Werke und Tugenden der Ungl\u00e4ubigen nach Augustinus_,\n      Freiburg 1871; Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, t. III, Cologne\n      1648; S. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645; and, more\n      briefly, Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 21.\n\n  167 Palmieri, _l.c._, thes. 20. Concerning the effects of original sin\n      on free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the\n      Supernatural_, pp. 291 sq.\n\n  168 On this distinction see _supra_, pp. 15 sqq.\n\n_  169 Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: \u201c_Bona opera, ad quae\n      sufficit bonum naturae, aliqualiter operari possunt [infideles].\n      Unde non oportet quod in omni suo opere peccent; sed quandocunque\n      aliquod opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc peccant._\u201d\n\n  170 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 7: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, opera\n      omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint,\n      vere esse peccata vel odium Dei mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis\n      nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto eum gravius peccare, anathema\n      sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 817.)\n\n_  171 V. infra_, No. 3.\n\n  172 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 226 sqq.\n\n  173 \u201c_Propositio temeraria et errori proxima._\u201d\n\n_  174 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 13: \u201c_Verumtamen qui se existimant\n      stare, videant ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam\n      operentur.... Formidare enim debent ... de pugna, quae superest cum\n      carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, in qua victores esse non possunt,\n      nisi cum Dei grati\u00e2 Apostolo obtemperent dicenti: Debitores etc._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 806.)\n\n  175 Rom. VII, 22 sqq.\n\n  176 Rom. VII, 24 sq.\n\n  177 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_, pp. 80 sqq., St. Louis 1914.\n\n  178 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5;\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 416, Mainz\n      1897.\n\n_  179 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 114, sect. 18.\n\n_  180 Concord._, art. 13, disp. 19.\n\n  181 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, pp. 87 sqq.\n\n  182 Cfr. the following passage from the Tridentine Council: \u201c_... cum\n      timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur in laboribus, in vigiliis,\n      in eleemosynis, in orationibus et oblationibus, in ieiuniis et\n      castitate._\u201d\n\n_  183 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 48, n. 62: \u201c_Fideles enim orantes dicunt:\n      Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Si adest possibilitas, ut quid orant?\n      Aut a quo malo se liberari orant nisi maxime de corpore mortis\n      huius?... de vitiis carnalibus, unde non liberatur homo sine grati\u00e2\n      Salvatoris.... Orare sinatur, ut sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae\n      possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est;\n      ver\u00e2 confessione, non fals\u00e2 defensione opus habet._\u201d The necessity\n      of grace, and of prayer to obtain grace, is admirably and\n      exhaustively treated by Suarez, _De Necessitate Gratiae_, I, 23,\n      sqq. Cfr. also Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, V, 7 sqq.\n\n_  184 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 27, qu. unica:\n      \u201c_Ratio recta docet, solum summum bonum infinitum esse summe\n      diligendum et per consequens voluntas hoc potest ex puris\n      naturalibus; nihil enim potest intellectus recte dictare, in quod\n      dictatum non possit voluntas rationalis naturaliter tendere._\u201d\n\n_  185 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 2a 2ae, qu. 171, art. 2.\n\n_  186 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 2.\n\n_  187 De Natura et Gratia_, I, 21.\n\n_  188 Concord._, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 14.\n\n_  189 De Gratia_, I, 33.\n\n_  190 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, VI, 7: \u201c_Existimamus non posse Deum\n      sine ope ipsius diligi neque ut auctorem naturae neque ut largitorem\n      gratiae et gloriae, neque perfecte neque imperfecte ullo modo, ...\n      quicquid aliqui minus considerate in hac parte scripserint._\u201d On the\n      attitude of St. Thomas (_Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3)\n      cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 3, art. 4.\n\n  191 It is not true, as Bellarmine argues, that the _amor Dei naturalis_\n      at its highest would result in justification.\n\n_  192 Prop. Baii Damn._, 34: \u201c_Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis\n      videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus\n      amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commentitia._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1034).\u201436: \u201c_Amor naturalis, qui ex viribus\n      naturae exoritur, ex sola philosophia per elationem praesumptionis\n      humanae cum iniuria crucis Christi defenditur a nonnullis\n      doctoribus._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1036.)\n\n_  193 Cfr. Conc. Arausic._ II, a. 529, can. 25: \u201c_Prorsus donum Dei est\n      diligere Deum._\u201d\n\n  194 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 3.\n\n_  195 Praelect. Dogm._, Vol. V, pp. 73 sqq.\n\n_  196 Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III, pp. 19 sqq.\n\n  197 Rom. I, 21.\n\n  198 Rom. I, 25.\n\n_  199 In Epist. ad Roman._, I, 18: \u201c_Potuerunt enim id per legem naturae\n      apprehendere, fabric\u00e2 mundi testificante auctorem Deum solum\n      diligendum, quod Moyses literis tradidit; sed impii facti sunt non\n      colendo Creatorem et iniustitia in eis apparet, dum videntes\n      dissimulabant a veritate, non fatentes unum Deum._\u201d\n\n_  200 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, 1a 2ae, disp. 189 sq.\n\n_  201 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20.\n\n_  202 Op. cit._\n\n  203 To admit the possibility of true _actus humani_ that are neither\n      good nor bad, but ethically indifferent, is to escape the error of\n      Baius that \u201cFree-will without the aid of divine grace avails for\n      nothing but sin.\u201d (_Prop. Damn._, 27.)\n\n  204 We should not, however, apply the ecclesiastical censures pronounced\n      against Baius to the writings of Vasquez. This, as Schiffini\n      convincingly shows (_De Gratia Divina_, pp. 159 sqq.), would be an\n      injustice.\n\n  205 Suarez, _De Gratia_, I, 8, 46: \u201c... _quia secundum Augustini et divi\n      Thomae sententiam communis a theologis probatam non datur in\n      voluntate libere operante actus indifferens in individuo, et ideo\n      iuxta veram theologiam recte sequitur, si liberum arbitrium potest\n      sine gratia non male operari, posse etiam bene._\u201d\n\n_  206 Supra_, p. 8.\n\n  207 \u201c_Qu\u00e2 vero parte inter dominantem cupiditatem et caritatem\n      dominantem nulli ponuntur affectus medii, a natura ipsa insiti\n      suapteque natur\u00e2 laudabiles ... falsa, alias damnata._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524.)\n\n_  208 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20, sect. 2: \u201c_Quotiescunque homo\n      agit quod sibi datum est, ut actum virtutis naturalem efficiat, iam\n      adesse antecedenter Deum auxilio intrinsece supernaturali gratiae,\n      ... ita [ut] nullus sit conatus moraliter bonus naturae, quem aliqua\n      gratia supernaturalis non praeveniat._\u201d\n\n  209 This must be kept in mind in judging Ripalda\u2019s famous thesis: \u201c_Ad\n      quodlibet bonum opus morale sive ad quemlibet virtutis moralis actum\n      necessarium esse per se naturae rationali elevatae auxilium\n      theologicum gratiae._\u201d (_Ibid._, sect. 3.)\n\n  210 He urges the supernatural character, in principle, of the present\n      economy of salvation; the practical identity of the naturally good\n      with the supernaturally salutary acts of the will, which he claims\n      is taught in Sacred Scripture (cfr. Acts XIV, 14 sqq.; Rom. I, 19\n      sqq.), and also by St. Augustine and his disciples Prosper and\n      Orosius; the merciful dispensation of grace towards heathens,\n      unbelievers, and sinners (_v. infra_, Sect. 3, Art. 2); the\n      universal belief of Christians in the salutary effects of all good\n      works, including those of the purely natural order, etc. For a\n      discussion of these arguments consult Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, pp. 254 sqq.\n\n_  211 Synopsis de Gratia_, n. 530.\n\n_  212 Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, p. 72.\n\n_  213 De Virtute Fidei Divinae_, disp. 12, sect. 2.\n\n_  214 Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III, pp. 22 sq., 248 sqq.\n\n_  215 De Gratia Div. Actuali_, p. 268: \u201c_Si tamen ad solos fideles\n      coarctetur, quum nulla argumenta obstent et pro hac hypothesi maxime\n      valeant rationes Ripaldae, eam censemus veram esse._\u201d\n\n_  216 V. supra_, No. 1.\n\n  217 Cfr. Mazzella, _De Gratia Christi_, disp. 2, art. 9.\n\n_  218 V. supra_, p. 71.\n\n  219 \u201c_Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad\n      iustificationem sufficit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.)\n\n_  220 Conc. Vat._, Sess. III, De Fide, can. 2: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, ... ad\n      fidem divinam non requiri, ut revelata veritas propter auctoritatem\n      Dei revelantis credatur, anathema sit._\u201d On this whole dispute cfr.\n      Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 156 sqq. The arguments adduced by\n      the defenders of Ripalda\u2019s opinion can be studied in Palmieri, _De\n      Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 265 sqq. Cfr. also Scheeben, _Dogmatik_,\n      Vol. III, pp. 996 sqq. A difficulty arises from the twenty-second\n      canon of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529): \u201c_Nemo habet de\n      suo nisi mendacium et peccatum._\u201d But this canon was probably never\n      approved by the Holy See. It is ably discussed by Gutberlet in his\n      continuation of Heinrich\u2019s _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7\n      415.\n\n  221 \u201c_Ex viribus suis [natura] coram Deo nihil nisi peccare potest._\u201d\n      (_Solida Declar._, I, \u00a7 22.) Cfr. J. A. M\u00f6hler, _Symbolik_, \u00a7 6-7\n      (English tr. by J. B. Robertson, _Symbolism_, 5th ed., London 1906,\n      pp. 54 sqq.)\n\n_  222 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 7: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, opera omnia,\n      quae ante iustificationem fiunt, ... vere esse peccata, ... anathema\n      sit._\u201d\n\n  223 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 183 sqq., _et passim_.\n\n  224 A. D. 1585-1638. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._, pp. 223 sqq.\n\n  225 On this important document (issued A. D. 1713) see A. Schill, _Die\n      Konstitution Unigenitus_, Freiburg 1876; Thuillier, _La Seconde\n      Phase du Jans\u00e9nisme_, Paris 1901; M. Ott, art. \u201cUnigenitus\u201d in Vol.\n      XV of the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.\n\n_  226 Prop. Damn._, 38.\n\n_  227 Prop. Damn._, 44.\n\n  228 \u201c_Doctrina synodi de duplici amore enuntians, hominem sine gratia\n      esse sub virtute peccati ipsumque in eo statu per generalem\n      cupiditatis dominantis influxum omnes suas actiones inficere et\n      corrumpere\u2014quatenus insinuat, in homine, dum est sub servitute sive\n      in statu peccati, ... sic dominari cupiditatem ut per generalem\n      huius influxum omnes illius actiones in se inficiantur et\n      corrumpantur, aut opera omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt,\n      quacunque ratione fiant, sint peccata, quasi in omnibus suis actibus\n      peccator serviat dominanti cupiditati: falsa, perniciosa, inducens\n      in errorem a Tridentino damnatum ut haereticum, iterum in Baio\n      damnatum art. 40._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1523).\n\n_  229 Prop. Damn._, 59: \u201c_Oratio impiorum est novum peccatum, et quod\n      Deus illis concedit, est novum in eos iudicium._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1409.)\n\n  230 This passage, and the meaning it evidently bears in the context of\n      St. Matthew\u2019s Gospel, is thoroughly discussed by Suarez, _De\n      Gratia_, I, 4. Cfr. also J. B. Faure, _Notae in Enchiridion S.\n      August._, c. 15. Other Scriptural texts distorted by the Jansenists\n      are quoted and explained in their true sense by Scheeben,\n      _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 923 sqq.\n\n_  231 Hom. in Is._, 5, n. 2.\n\n  232 \u201c_Scimus autem quia peccatores Deus non audit._\u201d\n\n_  233 Tract. in Ioa._, 44, n. 13: \u201c_Adhuc inunctus loquitur; nam et\n      peccatores exaudit Deus. Si enim peccatores Deus non exaudiret,\n      frustra ille publicanus oculos in terram demittens et pectus suum\n      percutiens diceret: Domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori [Luc.\n      XVIII, 13]._\u201d\n\n_  234 Contr. Collat._, n. 36: \u201c_Naturae humanae, cuius creator est Deus,\n      etiam post praevaricationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet\n      vita et sensus et ratio ceteraque corporis et animi bona, quae etiam\n      malis vitiosisque non desunt. Sed non illis veri boni perceptio est,\n      quae mortalem vitam honestare possunt, aeternam conferre non\n      possunt._\u201d For additional Patristic texts in confirmation of our\n      thesis see Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, t. III, disp. 20, sect.\n      4.\n\n_  235 Enchiridion_, c. 117, n. 31: \u201c_Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non\n      est Dei caritas._\u201d\n\n_  236 De Gratia Christi_, c. 26: \u201c_Ubi non est dilectio, nullum bonum\n      opus imputatur, non recte bonum opus vocatur, quia omne quod non est\n      ex fide peccatum est et fides per dilectionem operatur._\u201d\n\n_  237 De Gratia et Libero Arbitr\u00eco_, c. 18: \u201c_Praecepta dilectionis, i.e.\n      caritatis, tanta et talia sunt, ut quidquid se putaverit homo facere\n      bene, si fiat sine caritate, nullo modo fiat bene._\u201d\n\n  238 Cfr. _supra_, p. 29.\n\n_  239 Proposit. Baii Damn._, 38: \u201c_Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut\n      vitiosa est cupiditas qu\u00e2 mundus diligitur, quae a Ioanne\n      prohibetur, aut laudabilis caritas qu\u00e2 per Spiritum Sanctum in corde\n      diffusa Deus amatur._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038.)\n\n_  240 Prop. Quesnelli Damn._, 45: \u201c_Amore Dei in corde peccatorum non\n      amplius regnante necesse est, ut in eo carnalis regnet cupiditas\n      omnesque actiones eius corrumpat._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1395.)\n\n_  241 Infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 1.\n\n  242 Especially against Julian of Eclanum. Cfr. _Contra Iulianum_, IV, 3.\n\n  243 Matth. VI, 24.\n\n_  244 Retract._, I, 15: \u201c_Quando peccatum tale est, ut idem sit poena\n      peccati, quantum est quod valet voluntas sub dominante cupiditate,\n      nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium?_\u201d\n\n_  245 Prop. Baii Damn._, 40: \u201c_In omnibus suis actibus peccator servit\n      dominanti cupiditati._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1040.)\n\n_  246 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 27, n. 48: \u201c_Si hi qui naturaliter, quae\n      legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt habendi in numero eorum quos\n      Christi iustificat gratia [Rom. II, 24], sed in eorum potius, quorum\n      (etiam impiorum nec Deum verum veraciter iusteque colentium) quaedam\n      tamen facta vel legimus vel novimus vel audimus, quae secundum\n      iustitiae regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum etiam\n      merito recteque laudamus; quamquam si discutiantur, quo fine fiant,\n      vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae debitam laudem defensionemve\n      mereantur._\u201d\n\n_  247 Serm. de Temp._, 349, c. 1, 1 sq.: \u201c_Caritas alia est divina, alia\n      humana; alia est humana licita, alia illicita.... Prius ergo loquor\n      de humana licita, quae non reprehenditur; deinde de humana illicita,\n      quae damnatur; tertio de divina, quae nos perducit ad regnum....\n      Licitam ergo caritatem habete; humana est, sed ut dixi licita, sed\n      ita licita ut, si defuerit, reprehendatur. Liceat vobis human\u00e2\n      caritate diligere coniuges, diligere filios, diligere amicos\n      vestros, diligere cives vestros. Sed videtis istam caritatem esse\n      posse et impiorum, i.e. paganorum, Iudaeorum, haereticorum. Quis\n      enim eorum non amat uxorem, filios, fratres, vicinos, affines,\n      amicos? Haec ergo humana est. Si ergo tali quisque crudelitate\n      effertur, ut perdat etiam humanum dilectionis affectum, et non amat\n      filios suos, ... nec inter homines numerandus est._\u201d (Migne, _P.\n      L._, XXXIX, 1529.)\n\n_  248 Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, p. 23.\n\n  249 As explained above, pp. 71 sqq.\n\n  250 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1524. On the teaching of St. Augustine, see\n      J. Mausbach, _Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus_, Vol. II, pp. 260 sqq.,\n      Freiburg 1909.\n\n  251 Cfr. _supra_, Art. 1.\n\n  252 On these and similar formulas see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, thes. 22.\n\n  253 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 218 sqq.\n\n  254 For details of his life see J. Pohle, art. \u201cPelagius and\n      Pelagianism\u201d in Vol. XI of the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.\n\n_  255 Impeccantia_, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.\n\n  256 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Haeres. ad Quodvultdeum_, n. 88.\n\n  257 \u201c_Hoc est occultum et horrendum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis\n      gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius, dicentes\n      quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per subministrationem\n      Spiritus Sancti._\u201d (S. Aug., _Opus Imperf. contr. Iulian._, II,\n      146.)\n\n  258 On the _regnum coelorum_ in contradistinction to _vita aeterna_, in\n      the teaching of Pelagius, see St. Augustine, _De Pecc. Mer. et\n      Rem._, I, 18 sqq.\n\n_  259 V. infra_, Sect. 2.\n\n_  260 V. supra_, p. 8.\n\n_  261 e.g._ Petavius, _De Pelag. et Semipelag._, c. 8 sq.; Wirceburg.,\n      _De Gratia_, n. 182; Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Actuali_, pp. 140\n      sqq.\n\n  262 Among them Suarez, _Prolegom. de Gratia_, c. 3, and J. Scheeben,\n      _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, pp. 739 sq.\n\n  263 \u201c_Quicunque dixerit, ideo nobis gratiam iustificationis dari, ut\n      quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitrium facilius possimus implere\n      per gratiam, tamquam etsi gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed\n      tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere divina mandata, anathema\n      sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 105.)\n\n  264 \u201c_Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquod, quod ad salutem\n      pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit aut eligere sive\n      salutari, i.e. evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat\n      absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, qui dat\n      omnibus suavitatem in consentiendo et credendo veritati, haeretico\n      fallitur spiritu._\u201d (Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.)\n\n  265 Sess. VI, can. 2: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum divinam gratiam\n      per Iesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo iuste vivere ac vitam\n      aeternam promereri possit, quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia\n      utrumque, sed aegre tamen et difficulter possit, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 812.)\n\n  266 \u201c_Sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum a semetipso, nisi manserit\n      in vite: sic nec vos, nisi in me manseritis. Ego sum vitis, vos\n      palmites: qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic fert fructum multum:\n      quia sine me nihil potestis facere_ (\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1f76\u03c3 \u1f10\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5\n      \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd).\u201d\n\n  267 St. Augustine, _Tract. in Ioa._, 81, n. 3: \u201c_Non ait, quia sine me\n      parum potestis facere, sed nihil potestis facere. Sive ergo parum\n      sive multum, sine illo fieri non potest, sine quo nihil fieri\n      potest._\u201d\n\n  268 Cfr. John XV, 3.\n\n  269 \u201c_Non quod sufficientes simus, cogitate aliquid a nobis quasi ex\n      nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est._\u201d On this text cfr.\n      Cornely, _Comment. in h. l._, Paris 1892.\n\n  270 \u201c_Moysi enim dicit: Miserebor cuius misereor et misericordiam\n      praestabo cuius miserebor. Igitur non volentis neque currentis_ (\u03bf\u1f50\n      \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2), _sed miserentis est Dei._\u201d (Rom.\n      IX, 15 sq.)\n\n  271 \u201c_Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere_ (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n      \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd) _pro bona voluntate._\u201d (Phil. II, 13.)\n\n  272 \u201c_Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Iesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto._\u201d (1\n      Cor. XII, 3.)\n\n  273 Cfr. Matth. VII, 21; VIII, 29.\n\n  274 Others explain the passage 1 Cor. XII, 3 differently. Cfr. also Rom.\n      VIII, 26; Phil. I, 6; Eph. II, 5 sqq.\n\n_  275 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, c. 4: \u201c_Talis est haeresis\n      pelagiana, non antiqua, sed ante non multum tempus exorta._\u201d\n\n  276 \u201c_Desinat, si res ita sunt, incessere novitas vetustatem._\u201d\n\n_  277 Adv. Haer._, III, 17, 2: \u201c_Sicut arida terra, si non percipiat\n      humorem, non fructificat, sic et nos lignum aridum existentes\n      nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia.... Non\n      a nobis, sed a Deo est bonum salutis nostrae._\u201d\n\n  278 \u201c_Legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi. Quum enim sanctarum\n      plebium praesules madat\u00e2 sibi legatione fungantur apud divinam\n      clementiam, humani generis agunt causam et tota secum Ecclesia\n      congemiscente postulant et precantur, ut infidelibus donetur fides,\n      ut idololatrae ab impietatis suae liberentur erroribus, ut Iudaeis\n      ablato cordis velamine lux veritatis appareat, ut haeretici\n      catholicae fidei perceptione resipiscant, ut schismatici spiritum\n      redivivae caritatis accipiant, ut lapsis poenitentiae remedia\n      conferantur, ut denique catechumenis ad regenerationis sacramenta\n      perductis coelestis misericordiae aula reseretur._\u201d (Migne, _P. L._,\n      XLV, 1759.)\n\n  279 For additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, thes. 26.\n\n_  280 Hom. in 1 Cor., 7._\n\n_  281 De Civitate Dei_, XII, 9: \u201c_Istam [bonam voluntatem] quis fecerat\n      nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, i.e. cum amore casto quo illi\n      adhaererent creavit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens\n      gratiam?... Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude Creatoris, non\n      ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis angelis\n      posse dici, quod caritas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum\n      Sanctum, qui datus est eis._\u201d\n\n_  282 Enchiridion_, c. 106: \u201c_Sicut mori est in hominis potestate, quum\n      velit, ... ad vitam vero tenendam voluntas non satis est, si\n      adiutoria sive alimentorum sive quorumcunque tutaminum desint, sic\n      homo in paradiso ad se occidendum relinquendo iustitiam idoneus erat\n      per voluntatem; ut autem ab eo teneretur vita iustitiae, parum erat\n      velle nisi ille, qui eum fecerat, adiuvaret._\u201d\n\n  283 Can. 19: \u201c_Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate in qua est\n      condita permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creatore suo non adiuvante,\n      servaret. Unde quum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire\n      quae accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare quod\n      perdidit?_\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 192.)\u2014St. Augustine holds that\n      our first parents would have been able to preserve the state of\n      grace by the divine _adiutorium sine quo non_, and that consequently\n      the _adiutorium quo_ would have been superfluous to them. On this\n      subtle question cfr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, pp.\n      55 sqq., and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 472 sqq.\n\n_  284 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5: \u201c_Vita aeterna est finis\n      excedens proportionem naturae humanae ... et ideo homo per sua\n      naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae\n      aeternae; sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus\n      gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam.\n      Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad bonum aliquod homini\n      connaturale, sicut laborare in agro, bibere, manducare et habere\n      amicum et alia huiusmodi._\u201d\n\n  285 For the necessary Augustinian citations in proof of this assertion\n      see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 174 sqq.\n\n  286 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 186 sqq.\n\n_  287 V. supra_, pp. 20.\n\n_  288 V. supra_, pp. 26 sq.\n\n_  289 V. supra_, pp. 69 sqq.\n\n  290 On the teaching of Scotus himself with regard to this point cfr. P.\n      Minges, O.F.M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren\n      angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus gepr\u00fcft_, M\u00fcnster\n      1906.\n\n  291 This is true of man even in the exalted state in which he existed in\n      Paradise. It is true also of the angels. It is true even of the\n      human nature of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss,\n      _Christology_, pp. 221 sqq.\n\n  292 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 190 sqq.\n\n  293 Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, p. 184.\n\n  294 Suarez, _De Necessitate Gratiae_, II, 4.\n\n  295 On the whole subject of this Article cfr. S. Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 227 sqq.; Rademacher, _Natur und Gnade_, M. Gladbach\n      1908.\n\n  296 Died 432. On his life and works see Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_,\n      pp. 515 sqq.\n\n  297 Reproduced in Migne, _P. L._, XLIX, 477-1328.\n\n  298 This contention is false, but it has never been proscribed as\n      heretical. Prosper says in his _Ep._ 226, 5: \u201c_Tales aiunt perdi\n      talesque [infantes] salvari, quales futures illos in annis\n      maioribus, si ad activam servarentur vitam, scientia divina\n      praeviderit._\u201d On this absurd assertion see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His\n      Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 380 sq.\n\n_  299 De Praedest. Sanctorum_, c. 3, n. 7: \u201c_... putans fidem, qu\u00e2 in\n      Deum credimus, non esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis et per\n      illam nos impetrare Dei dona, quibus temperanter et iuste et pie\n      vivamus in hoc saeculo._\u201d\n\n  300 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, _Enchiridion_, n. 128 sqq.\n\n  301 Ernst (_Werke und Tugenden der Ungl\u00e4ubigen nach Augustinus_,\n      Freiburg 1871) contends that the approbation of Boniface II\n      comprised all the canons of this synod.\n\n  302 Cfr. F. W\u00f6rter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_,\n      M\u00fcnster 1900.\n\n_  303 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 5 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 178): \u201c_Si quis\n      sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis\n      affectum, quo in eum credimus qui iustificat impium et ad\n      regenerationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiae donum,\n      i.e. per inspirationem Spiritus S., ... sed naturaliter nobis inesse\n      dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur._\u201d Cfr. _Conc.\n      Vatican._, Sess. III, cap. 3. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1791).\n\n  304 In his treatise _De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_.\n\n  305 In his work _Adversus Collatorem_.\n\n_  306 Discernit_, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n_  307 Per fidem_, \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n\n_  308 Non ex vobis_, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03be \u1f51\u03bc\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n_  309 Dei donum_, \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1ff6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n_  310 Non ex operibus_, \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03be \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n  311 Eph. II, 8 sq.\n\n  312 Cfr. Rom. III, 20 sqq., IX, 15 sqq.\n\n  313 John VI, 44: \u201c_Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit me,\n      traxerit_ (\u1f10\u03bb\u03ba\u03cd\u03c3\u1fc3) _eum._\u201d\n\n_  314 Opus Dei_, \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n_  315 Ep._, 177: \u201c_Oratio est clarissima gratiae testificatio._\u201d\n\n_  316 Dial. c. Tryph._\n\n_  317 De Dono Persev._, c. 19, n. 50: \u201c_Isti tales tantique doctores\n      dicentes non esse aliquid, de quo tamquam de nostro quod nobis Deus\n      non dederit gloriemur nec ipsum cor nostrum et cogitationes nostras\n      in potestate nostra esse, ... haec utique gratiae Dei tribuunt, Dei\n      munera agnoscunt, ab ipso nobis, non a nobis esse testantur._\u201d\u2014For\n      additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, _De Gratia Div. Act._, pp.\n      290 sqq.\n\n  318 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 239 sqq.\n\n_  319 Hom. in Heb._, 12, n. 3.\n\n_  320 V. infra_, Ch. III, Sect. 1.\n\n_  321 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 14: \u201c_Quid opus est ut eorum scrutemur\n      opuscula, qui priusquam ista haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt\n      necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari? Quod\n      procul dubio facerent, si respondere talibus cogerentur. Unde factum\n      est, ut de gratia Dei quid sentirent breviter quibusdam scriptorum\n      suorum locis et transeunter attingerent._\u201d\n\n_  322 De Gratia Div. Act._, p. 288.\n\n  323 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, l. I, disp. 17, sect. 11.\n\n_  324 Ep._, 24 (to Maximilian, Patriarch of Constantinople): \u201c_Sequere\n      priorum, a quibus eruditus es et nutritus, exempla pontificum,\n      beatissimi Ioannis scientiam, sancti Attici in repugnandis\n      haeresibus vigilantiam._\u201d\n\n_  325 Hom. in 1 Cor._, XII, n. 2.\n\n_  326 Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr._, XII, 2.\n\n  327 \u0391\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd \u1f14\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n  328 They are fully explained by Palmieri, _l.c._, pp. 295 sqq.\n\n_  329 Die Lehre von der Heiligung_, p. 161, Paderborn 1885.\n\n_  330 V. supra_, pp. 19 sqq., 27 sq.\n\n_  331 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 2, p. 5: \u201c_Attendant hic et verba\n      perpendant, qui putant ex nobis esse fidei coeptum et ex Deo esse\n      fidei supplementum. Quis enim non videat prius esse cogitare quam\n      credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid nisi prius cogitaverit esse\n      credendum.... Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem atque pietatem, si\n      non sumus idonei cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed\n      sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, profecto non sumus idonei credere\n      aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, quod sine cogitatione non possumus,\n      sed sufficientia nostra, qu\u00e2 credere incipiamus, ex Deo est._\u201d\u2014Cfr.\n      also the seventh canon of the Second Council of Orange\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180), and Suarez, _De Fide_, disp. 6, sect.\n      7 sq.; IDEM, _De Gratia_, III, 7.\n\n_  332 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 7.\n\n  333 Sess. VI, can. 3: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, sine praeveniente Spiritus\n      Sancti inspiratione atque eius adiutorio hominem credere, sperare,\n      diligere aut poenitere posse, sicut oportet, ut ei iustificationis\n      gratia conferatur, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 813.)\n\n_  334 Supra_, pp. 87 sqq.\n\n  335 John XV, 5: \u201c_Sine me nihil potestis facere._\u201d\n\n_  336 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag._, II, 8: \u201c_Dominus ut responderet\n      futuro Pelagio non ait: Sine me difficile potestis facere, sed ait:\n      Sine me nihil potestis facere.... Non ait: sine me nihil potestis\n      perficere, sed facere. Hoc uno verbo initium finemque\n      comprehendit._\u201d\n\n  337 Phil. II, 12 sq.: \u201c_Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem_ (\u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd)\n      _operamini; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et\n      perficere._\u201d\n\n  338 Rom. XV, 13: \u201c_Deus autem spei repleat vos omni gaudio et pace in\n      credendo_ (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), _ut abundetis in spe (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03b4\u03b9) et\n      virtute Spiritus Sancti._\u201d\n\n  339 1 John IV, 7: \u201c_Caritas ex Deo est_ (\u1f21 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd).\u201d\n      Cfr. also John VI, 44 sqq., which text is fully explained by\n      Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 128 sqq.\n\n_  340 Enchiridion_, c. 32: \u201c_Porro si nullus dicere Christianus audebit:\n      Non miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis, ne Apostolo\n      apertissime contradicat, restat ut propterea dictum intelligatur\n      (Rom. IX, 16): ____Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est\n      Dei,____ ut totum Deo detur, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et\n      praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona\n      voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia; quae autem non\n      praecedit ipsa, in iis est et ipsa. Nam utrumque legitur in sanctis\n      eloquiis: et (Ps. LVIII, 11): ____Misericordia eius praeveniet\n      me,____ et (Ps. XXII, 6): ____Misericordia eius subsequetur me.____\n      Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra\n      velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris, utique\n      nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in illis operetur et velle?\n      Itemque cur admonemur petere ut accipiamus, nisi ut ab illo fiat\n      quod volumus, a quo factum est ut velimus? Oramus ergo pro inimicis\n      nostris, ut misericordia Dei praeveniat eos, sicut praevenit et nos;\n      oramus autem pro nobis, ut misericordia eius subsequatur nos._\u201d On\n      this important passage cfr. J. B. Faure, _Notae in Enchiridion S.\n      Augustini_, c. 32. Similar expressions will be found in _Contra Duas\n      Epist. Pelag._, II, 9 and _De Gratia et Lib. Arb._, c. 17.\n\n_  341 Ep. ad Ctesiph._, 133: \u201c_Velle et currere meum est, sed ipsum meum\n      sine Dei semper auxilio non erit meum; dicit enim Apostolus (Phil.\n      II, 13): ____Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et\n      perficere.____... Non mihi sufficit, quod semel donavit, nisi semper\n      donaverit._\u201d\n\n_  342 Serm. de Pret. Marg._\n\n_  343 Conc. Arausic._ II. (A. D. 529); \u201c_Hoc etiam salubriter profitemur\n      et credimus, quod in omni opere bono non nos incipimus et postea per\n      Dei misericordiam adiuvamur, sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus\n      bonis meritis et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat, ut et baptismi\n      sacramenta fideliter requiramus et post baptismum cum ipsius\n      adiutorio ea, quae sibi sunt placita, implere possimus._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)\n\n  344 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 192 sqq.\n\n  345 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 132 sq.\n\n  346 Perrone, _De Gratia_, n. 203: \u201c_Quaestio haec non ad scholasticas\n      quaestiones pertinet, sed est dogma fidei ab Ecclesia definitum._\u201d\n\n  347 Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Quum enim ille ipse Christus Iesus tamquam\n      caput in membra et tamquam vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos\n      iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper\n      antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine qua nullo pacto Deo\n      grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis iustificatis amplius\n      deesse credendum est._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.) Cfr. Tepe,\n      _Institutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp. 41 sqq., Paris 1896.\n\n  348 John XV, 5.\n\n_  349 V. supra_, pp. 87 sq. Other pertinent Scriptural texts are: 2 Cor.\n      III, 5; Phil. II, 12 sq.; III, 13 sq.; Heb. XIII, 21.\n\n_  350 De Gratia et Lib. Arb._, c. 17: \u201c_Sine illo vel operante vel\n      cooperante quum volumus ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus._\u201d\n\n_  351 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 26: \u201c_Mala nostra non ad hoc solum medicus\n      supernus sanat, ut illa iam non sint, sed ut de cetero recte\n      ambulare possimus, quod quidem etiam sani nonnisi illo adiuvante\n      poterimus.... Sicut oculus corporis etiam plenissime sanus, nisi\n      candore lucis adiutus non potest cernere, sic et homo etiam\n      perfectissime iustificatus, nisi aeternae luce iustitiae divinitus\n      adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere._\u201d\n\n  352 \u201c_Actiones nostras, quaesumus Domine, aspirando praeveni et\n      adiuvando prosequere, ut cuncta nostra oratio et operatio a te\n      semper incipiat et per te coepta finiatur._\u201d (_Missale Romanum._)\n      The argument from Tradition is more fully developed by Palmieri, _De\n      Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 28.\n\n  353 Thus Molina (_Concord._, qu. 14, art. 13 disp. 8), Bellarmine (_De\n      Gratia et Lib. Arb._, VI, 15), and Thomassin; the question is well\n      treated by Ruiz, _De Providentia Divina_, disp. 41, sect. 5 sq.\n\n  354 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 399,\n      Mainz 1897.\n\n  355 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 106, sect. 3 sqq.\n\n_  356 Impeccantia_, \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1.\n\n  357 \u201c_Item placuit ut quicunque ipsa verba dominicae orationis, ubi\n      dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, ita volunt a sanctis dici, ut\n      humiliter hoc, non veraciter dicatur, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 108.)\n\n  358 Sess. VI, can. 23: \u201c_Si quis hominem semel iustificatum dixerit ...\n      posse in tota vita peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare nisi ex\n      speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata virgine tenet\n      Ecclesia, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.)\n\n  359 On this privilege of our Blessed Lady see Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_,\n      pp. 72 sqq., St. Louis 1914.\n\n  360 Sess. VI, cap. 11: \u201c_... quantumvis sancti et iusti in levia saltem\n      et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur, peccata quandoque\n      cadunt._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 804.)\n\n_  361 De Gratia Divina Actuali_, p. 236.\n\n  362 Epistle of St. James, III, 2: \u201c_In multis enim offendimus omnes_\n      (\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f04\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2).\u201d\n\n  363 1 John III, 6: \u201c_Omnis qui in eo [scil. Christo] manet, non\n      peccat._\u201d\n\n  364 \u1f40\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1.\n\n  365 Matth. VI, 12. Cfr. Mark XI, 25.\n\n  366 Prov. XX, 9: \u201c_Quis potest dicere: Mundum est cor meum, purus sum a\n      peccato?_\u201d\n\n  367 On this text cfr. J. V. Bainvel, _Les Contresens Bibliques des\n      Pr\u00e9dicateurs_, 2nd ed., pp. 102 sq., Paris 1906: \u201c_... ces chutes\n      sont surtout les souffrances, les tribulations. Le contexte\n      l\u2019indique clairement: __\u2039 __N\u2019attaquez pas le juste (15); car Dieu\n      le defend, et s\u2019il tombe il se rel\u00e8vera; mais pour l\u2019impie c\u2019est la\n      ruine irr\u00e9parable.__ \u203a__ Peut-on, comme on le fait d\u2019ordinaire,\n      entendre le texte des chutes morales, des p\u00e9ch\u00e9s v\u00e9niels? Plusieurs\n      commentateurs r\u00e9pondent: non; et ils citent \u00e0 l\u2019appui saint\n      Augustin: Septies cadet iustus et resurget, id est, quotiescumque\n      cediderit, non peribit: quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de\n      tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intelligi voluit_ (Civ.\n      D. xi, 31).\u2014_D\u2019autres P\u00e8res, saint J\u00e9r\u00f4me par exemple, sont moins\n      exclusifs; et de fait, pourquoi la maxime, dans sa pl\u00e9nitude, ne\n      comprendrait-elle pas toutes sortes de chutes, p\u00e9ch\u00e9s ou\n      afflictions? En tout cas, c\u2019est aller trop loin que de vouloir\n      prouver par l\u00e0 la th\u00e8se catholique sur l\u2019impossibilit\u00e9 morale\n      d\u2019\u00e9viter pendant longtemps tout p\u00e9ch\u00e9 de fragilit\u00e9. L\u2019\u00e9crivain sacr\u00e9\n      veut dire autre chose, et nous avons des textes meilleures_ ...\u201d\n\n  368 Eccles. VII, 21: \u201c_Non est enim homo iustus in terra, qui faciat\n      bonum et non peccet_.\u201d\n\n_  369 Ibid._, v, 23: \u201c_Scit enim conscientia tua, quia et tu crebro\n      maledixisti aliis_.\u201d\n\n  370 1 John I, 8: \u201c_Si dixerimus, quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos\n      seducimus et veritas in nobis non est_.\u201d\n\n_  371 E.g._ 1 John I, 10, III, 4, III 8, _et passim_.\n\n  372 The Johannine text here under consideration does, however, furnish a\n      telling argument against the Pelagians, in so far as they denied the\n      necessity of the atonement. The passage is effectively employed for\n      this purpose by the Second Council of Mileve (can. 6, quoted in\n      Denzinger-Bannwart\u2019s _Enchiridion_, n. 106). Cfr. Chr. Pesch,\n      _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., p. 99 and Al. Wurm,\n      _Die Irrlehrer im ersten Johannesbrief_, Freiburg 1903.\n\n_  373 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 2, n. 4: \u201c_Tria sunt, ut scitis, quae\n      maxime adversus eos [scil. Pelagianos] defendit Ecclesia, quorum est\n      unum, gratiam Dei non secundum merita nostra dari.... Alterum est,\n      in quantacunque iustitia sine qualibuscunque peccatis in hoc\n      corruptibili corpore neminem vivere. Tertium est, obnoxium nasci\n      hominem peccato primi hominis_.\u201d\n\n_  374 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 35, n. 41: \u201c_Ubi parum attendit, quum sit\n      acutissimus, non frustra etiam iustos in oratione dicere: Dimitte\n      nobis debita nostra.... Etiamsi hic non vivatur sine peccato, licet\n      mori sine peccato, dum subinde veni\u00e2 deletur, quod subinde\n      ignoranti\u00e2 vel infirmitate committitur_.\u201d\n\n_  375 Ibid._, c. 36. \u201c_Si omnes illos sanctos et sanctas, quum hic\n      viverent, congregare possemus et interrogare, utrum essent sine\n      peccato, ... nonne un\u00e2 voce clamassent: Si dixerimus quia peccatum\n      non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est?_\u201d\u2014For\n      other confirmatory Patristic texts see Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 8.\n\n  376 The above-quoted analogy is taken from Heinrich-Gutberlet,\n      _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 81.\n\n_  377 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 8: \u201c_Non potest homo abstinere\n      ab omni peccato veniali propter corruptionem inferioris appetitus\n      sensualitatis, cuius motus singulos quidem ratio reprimere potest,\n      et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et voluntarii, non autem omnes,\n      quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit, et etiam\n      quia ratio non potest semper esse pervigil ad huiusmodi motus\n      vitandos_.\u201d\n\n  378 Sardagna (_De Gratia_, n. 336) incorrectly asserts this.\n\n  379 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theolog._, Vol. III. pp. 47 sq.\n\n  380 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Contra Iulian._, IV, 3, 28: \u201c_Ideo factum est\n      in loco infirmitatis, ne superbe viveremus, ut sub quotidiana\n      peccatorum remissione vivamus_.\u201d\n\n  381 Andr. de Vega, _De Iustificatione Doctrina Universa_, 1. XIV, cap.\n      ult.\n\n  382 Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 8, 14: \u201c_quia si vel in uno homine posset\n      contingere, ut illa duo coniungerentur, scil. carere speciali\n      privilegio et nihilominus cavere omne peccatum veniale per totam\n      vitam, propositio Concilii esset simpliciter falsa; nam est absoluta\n      et universalis, ad cuius falsitatem satis est quod in uno\n      deficiat_.\u201d\n\n  383 Aug., _Ep._, 181, n. 8: \u201c_Nemo itaque dicat, se esse sine peccato,\n      sed non tamen ideo debemus amare peccatum. Oderimus ea, fratres;\n      etsi non sumus sine peccatis, oderimus tamen ea, et maxime a\n      criminibus nos abstineamus; abstineamus quantum possumus a levibus\n      peccatis._\u201d\u2014On the whole subject of this thesis cfr. Schiffini, _De\n      Gratia Divina_, pp. 181 sqq.\n\n_  384 V. supra_, pp. 98 sqq.\n\n_  385 Conc. Arausic._ II, can. 10: \u201c_Adiutorium Dei etiam renatis ac\n      sanctis semper est implorandum, ut ad finem bonum pervenire vel in\n      bono possint opere perdurare_.\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 183.)\n\n  386 Sess. VI, can. 22: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali\n      auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia perseverare posse vel cum eo non\n      posse, anathema sit_.\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 832.)\n\n  387 Sess. VI, cap. 11: \u201c_Deus namque su\u00e2 grati\u00e2 semel iustificatos non\n      deserit, nisi ab eis prius deseratur_.\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      804.)\n\n  388 Cfr. Wisd. IV, 11: \u201c_Raptus est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum\n      eius_.\u201d\n\n  389 Sess. VI, can. 16: \u201c_magnum illud usque in finem perseverantiae\n      donum_.\u201d On St. Augustine\u2019s teaching in regard to the different\n      heads of doctrine defined above, see Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones\n      Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 103 sqq.\n\n  390 John XVII, 11: \u201c_Pater sancte, serva eos in nomine tuo_ (\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd\n      \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f40\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03af \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5), _quos dedisti mihi, ut sint unum, sicut\n      et nos_.\u201d\n\n  391 Col. IV, 12: \u201c_Salutat vos Epaphras ... semper sollicitus pro vobis\n      in orationibus, ut stetis perfecti_ (\u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9) _et pleni in\n      omni voluntate Dei_.\u201d\n\n  392 Matth. XXVI, 41: \u201c_Vigilate, et orate, ut non intretis in\n      tentationem_.\u201d\n\n  393 Phil. I, 6: \u201c... _confidens hoc ipsum, quia qui coepit in vobis opus\n      bonum, perficiet_ (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9) _usque in diem Christi Iesu_.\u201d\n\n  394 1 Pet. I, 5: \u201c..._qui in virtute Dei custodimini per fidem in\n      salutem, paratam revelari in tempore novissimo_.\u201d\u2014For Old Testament\n      texts in confirmation of this thesis see Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 198 sq.\n\n_  395 De Dono Perseverantiae_. An English translation of this treatise\n      may be found in _The Anti-Pelagian Works of Saint Augustine, Bishop\n      of Hippo_, Translated by Peter Holmes and R. E. Wallis, Vol. III,\n      pp. 171 sqq. (Vol. XV of Dods\u2019 translation of the _Works of St.\n      Augustine_), Edinburg 1876.\n\n_  396 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 2, n. 3: \u201c_Cur autem perseverantia ista\n      poscitur a Deo, si non datur a Deo? An et ista irrisoria petitio\n      est, quum id ab eo petitur quod scitur non ipsum dare, sed ipso non\n      dante esse in hominis potestate?... An ab illo perseverantia ista\n      forte non poscitur? Iam hoc qui dicit, non meis disputationibus\n      refellendus, sed sanctorum orationibus onerandus est. An vero\n      quisquam eorum est, qui non sibi poscat a Deo ut perseveret in eo,\n      quum ips\u00e2 oratione quae dominica nuncupatur, quia eam Dominus\n      docuit, quando oratur a sanctis, nihil paene aliud quam\n      perseverantia posci intelligatur_?\u201d\n\n_  397 Op. cit._, c. 7, n. 15: \u201c_Prorsus in hac re non operosas\n      disputationes exspectet Ecclesia, sed attendat quotidianas orationes\n      suas. Orat ut increduli credant: Deus ergo convertit ad fidem. Orat\n      ut credentes perseverent; Deus ergo donat perseverantiam usque in\n      finem_.\u201d\n\n_  398 Op. cit._, c. 23, n. 63: \u201c_Quis enim veraciter gemat desiderans\n      accipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a seipso se sumere existimet,\n      non ab illo_?\u201d\n\n_  399 Op. cit._, c. 6, n. 10: \u201c_Hoc Dei donum suppliciter emereri potest,\n      sed quum datum fuerit, amitti contumaciter non potest_.\u201d\n\n_  400 Op. cit._, c. 16, n. 39: \u201c... _quum constet Deum alia danda etiam\n      non orantibus, sicut initium fidei, alia nonnisi orantibus\n      praeparasse, sicut in finem perseverantiam, profecto qui ex se ipso\n      se hanc habere putat, non orat ut habeat_.\u201d\n\n_  401 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 94, sect. 2.\n\n  402 Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38: \u201c_Infallibilitas non convenit merito\n      de congruo ratione sui, ut ita dicam, sed ratione impetrationis quae\n      propriae soli orationi, ut talis est, respondet. Ratio est, quia\n      haec infallibilitas solum fundatur in promissione divina, quae non\n      invenitur facta operibus iustorum quatenus meritoriis de congruo,\n      sed tantum orationi; quare ut fructus huius meriti certior sit,\n      adiungenda semper est petitio perseverantiae_.\u201d\n\n  403 John XVI, 23.\n\n  404 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, n. 14: \u201c... _quia ut oratio\n      habeat perseverantiam debitam, perdurare debet cum illis\n      circumstantiis moralibus, quas a principio habere etiam debuit, ut\n      congrue fieret; unde eo ipso quod novum impedimentum ponitur\n      [peccando] effectui orationis, deficit perseverantia in orando,\n      saltem debito modo._\u201d\n\n_  405 Ibid._, n. 17: \u201c_Igitur perseverantia orationis in tali materia\n      requisita est, ut non semel tantum aut iterum fiat, set ut toto\n      tempore vitae duret, et praesertim ut in occurrentibus occasionibus\n      servandi mandata aut vincendi tentationes cum debita fiducia\n      repetatur._\u201d\u2014For more detailed information we must refer the reader\n      to Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 36, n. vi sqq. The\n      theological argument for our thesis is convincingly set forth by\n      Gutberlet in Heinrich\u2019s _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 404.\n      The _donum perseverantiae_ must not be confounded with the\n      _confirmatio in gratia_; on this point see Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 197 sqq.\n\n_  406 V. supra_, pp. 7 sq.\n\n  407 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1: \u201c_Meritum\n      et merces ad idem referuntur. Id enim merces dicitur quod alicui\n      recompensatur pro retributione operis vel laboris quasi quoddam\n      pretium ipsius. Unde sicut reddere iustum pretium pro re accepta ab\n      aliquo est actus iustitiae, ita etiam recompensare mercedem operis\n      vel laboris est actus iustitiae._\u201d Cfr. Taparelli, _Saggio Teoretico\n      del Diritto Naturale_, diss. 1, c. 6, n. 130, Palermo 1842.\n\n  408 \u201cThis word is scarcely used in modern English, except as expressing\n      that punishment which is fully deserved, a usage originating with\n      the Tudor Parliaments; but it was once commonly used in the language\n      in a wider sense, for whatever had been justly earned, and some\n      attempts to revive it have been made in recent times; certainly some\n      word is wanted to express the idea.\u201d (Hunter, _Outlines of Dogmatic\n      Theology_, Vol. III, pp. 58 sq.) Cfr. Dr. Murray\u2019s _New English\n      Dictionary_, Vol. II, p. 784, Oxford 1893.\n\n  409 Eck did not, however, approve the term _meritum de condigno_; he\n      preferred _meritum digni_. Cfr. J. Greving, _Johann Eck als junger\n      Gelehrter_, pp. 153 sqq., M\u00fcnster 1906.\n\n  410 Cfr. St. Augustine, _In Ps._, 86: \u201c_Debitorem Deus ipse fecit se,\n      non accipiendo, sed promittendo._\u201d On this point consult\n      Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes,_ pp.\n      455 sqq.\n\n_  411 Oratio, preces._\n\n_  412 Capacitas, dispositio._\n\n  413 Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aquin._, 1a 2ae, disp.\n      216, c. 4.\n\n  414 Already in the fourth century the Church emphasized the proposition\n      \u201c_Gratiam Christi non secundum merita dari_\u201d against Pelagius.\n\n  415 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Ep._ 194 _ad Sixt._, n. 19: ___Vita etiam\n      aeterna, quam certum est bonis operibus debitam reddi, ab Apostolo\n      tamen gratia nuncupatur, nec ideo quia meritis non datur, sed quia\n      data sunt ipsa merita, quibus datur.___ The dogma was formally\n      defined by the Council of Trent: \u201c... _cuius tanta est erga omnes\n      homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius\n      dona._\u201d (Sess. VI, cap. 16, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart\u2019s\n      _Enchiridion_, n. 809.)\n\n  416 For further information on this point see Palmieri, _De Gratia\n      Divina Actuali,_ thes. 35.\n\n_  417 V. supra_, pp. 83 sqq.\n\n  418 \u201c_Gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari._\u201d\n\n  419 \u201c_Debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant; sed gratia quae non\n      debetur praecedit, ut fiant._\u201d (Arausic. II, can. 18; see\n      Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.)\n\n  420 \u201c... _ipsius iustificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum\n      Iesum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vocatione,\n      qu\u00e2 nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur._\u201d (Sess. VI, cap. 5.\n      Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.)\n\n  421 Rom. IX, 16: \u201c_Igitur non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis\n      est Dei._\u201d\n\n  422 Rom. IX, 18: \u201c_Ergo cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat_ (\u1f04\u03c1\u03b1\n      \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1fbd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9.\u201d)\n\n  423 Rom. XI, 6: \u201c_Si autem grati\u00e2, iam non ex operibus_ (\u1f10\u03be \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd),\n      _alioquin gratia iam non est gratia._\u201d\n\n  424 Eph. II, 8-10: \u201c_Grati\u00e2 enim estis salvati per fidem et hoc non ex\n      vobis: Dei enim donum est, non ex operibus, ut ne quis glorietur.\n      Ipsius enim sumus factura_ (\u03c0\u03bf\u03af\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1), _creati in Christo Iesu in\n      operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus._\u201d\n\n_  425 E.g._, 2 Cor. V, 14; Gal. III, 22; 2 Tim. I, 9; Tit. III, 5; 1 Pet.\n      I, 3; 1 John IV, 10.\n\n_  426 Tract, in Ioa._, 86: \u201c_Gratia non invenit, sed efficit merita._\u201d\n\n_  427 Serm._, 169, c. 2: ___Gratia praecessit meritum tuum, non gratia ex\n      merito, sed meritum ex gratia. Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti non\n      gratis accepisti.___ Other Patristic texts quoted by Ripalda, _De\n      Ente Supernaturali,_ disp. 15 sqq.\n\n_  428 V. supra_, pp. 50 sqq.\n\n  429 For a more extensive treatment of this important point the reader is\n      referred to Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII,\n      \u00a7 418, Mainz 1897.\n\n_  430 V. supra_, p. 98.\n\n  431 Can. 20: \u201c_Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo;\n      nulla vero facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat\n      homo._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 193.)\n\n  432 \u201c_Sed ipse [Deus] nobis nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis [scil.\n      naturalibus] et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)\n\n  433 Matth. XXV, 15: \u201c_Et uni dedit quinque talenta, alii autem duo, alii\n      vero unum, unicuique secundum propriam virtutem_ (\u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n      \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd).\u201d\n\n  434 Cfr. Maldonatus\u2019 commentary on this text.\n\n  435 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      p. 326.\n\n_  436 De Praedest. Sanct._, 3, 10, 31: \u201c_Nihil huic sensui tam contrarium\n      est quam de suis meritis sic quemquam gloriari, tamquam ipse sibi ea\n      fecerit, non Dei gratia, sed gratia quae bonos discernit a malis,\n      non quae communis est bonis et malis._\u201d\n\n_  437 De Peccato Orig._, c. 24, n. 28: \u201c_Non enim gratia Dei erit ullo\n      modo, nisi gratuita fuerit omni modo._\u201d\n\n  438 Cyril of Jerusalem (_Catech._, I, 17), Athanasius (_C. Gent._, n.\n      30), Basil (_Epist._, 294: \u201c_Divinum auxilium in nostra situm est\n      potestate_\u201d), Gregory of Nazianzus (_Or._, 31), and especially\n      Chrysostom (_Hom. in Gen._, 12; _Hom. in Epist. ad Rom._, 2).\n\n_  439 Hom. in Epist. ad Ephes._, 4.\n\n_  440 Hom. in 1 Epist. ad Cor._, 12. Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, thes. 33.\n\n  441 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 5: \u201c_Donum\n      gratiae considerari potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem\n      gratuiti doni, et sic manifestum est quod omne meritum repugnat\n      gratiae, quia ut Rom. XI, 9 Apostolus dicit: ____Si autem gratia,\n      iam non ex operibus.____ Altero modo potest considerari secundum\n      naturam ipsius rei, quae donatur, et sic etiam non potest cadere sub\n      merito non habentis gratiam, tum quia excedit proportionem naturae,\n      tum etiam quia ante gratiam in statu peccati homo habet impedimentum\n      promerendi gratiam, scil. ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem aliquis iam\n      habet gratiam, non potest gratia iam habita sub merito cadere, quia\n      merces est terminus operis, gratia autem est principium cuiuslibet\n      boni operis in nobis._\u201d This is equally true of the _meritum de\n      condigno_ and the _meritum de congruo_.\n\n  442 John XVI, 24: \u201c_Petite et accipietis._\u201d\n\n_  443 V. supra_, theses I and II.\n\n  444 \u201c_Si quis ad invocationem humanam [i.e. naturalem] gratiam Dei dicit\n      posse conferri, non autem ipsam gratiam facere, ut invocetur a\n      nobis, contradicit Isaiae prophetae vel Apostolo idem dicenti:\n      Inventus sum a non quaerentibus me, palam apparui his, qui me non\n      interrogabant._\u201d (Can. 3, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 176.)\n\n  445 Rom. VIII, 26: \u201c_Quid oremus, sicut oportet, nescimus, sed ipse\n      Spiritus postulat [postulare facit] pro nobis gemitibus\n      inenarrabilibus._\u201d\n\n  446 1 Cor. XII, 3: \u201c_Nemo potest dicere Dominus Deus, nisi in Spiritu\n      sancto._\u201d\n\n  447 John XV, 7: \u201c_Si manseritis in me et verba mea in vobis manserint,\n      quodcunque volueritis, petetis et fiet vobis._\u201d\n\n_  448 De Dono Perseverantiae_, 23, n. 63 sq.: \u201c_Quis veraciter gemat,\n      desiderans accipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a se ipso sumere\n      existimet, non ab illo?... Ubi intelligimus et hoc ipsum esse donum\n      Dei, ut veraci corde et spiritualiter clamemus ad Deum. Attendant\n      ergo, quomodo falluntur, qui putant esse a nobis, non dari nobis ut\n      petamus, quaeramus, pulsemus_, etc.\u201d\n\n  449 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 32.\n\n  450 On this difficult question consult Ruiz, _De Provid._, disp. 18,\n      sect. 3. and De Lugo, _De Fide_, disp. 12, sec. 3.\n\n_  451 De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 12.\n\n  452 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 226 sqq.\n\n_  453 Op. cit._, pp. 228 sq.\n\n  454 Further information on this head _infra_, Part II, Ch. III.\n\n  455 Cfr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 117 sqq.\n\n_  456 \u00c0 titre de curiosit\u00e9_ we may note the opinion of Ripalda (_De Ente\n      Supernat._, disp. 17, sect. 1) and Vasquez (_Comment. in S. Theol._,\n      1a, disp. 91, c. 10) that some pre-Tridentine theologians ascribed\n      to nature the ability of positively disposing itself for actual\n      graces and thereby, though in perfect good faith, entertained\n      Semipelagian views. Even St. Thomas has been accused of conceding\n      too much to Semipelagianism in two of his earlier works (_Comment.\n      in Quatuor Libros Sent._, II, dist. 28, qu. 1, art. 4, and _De\n      Veritate_, qu. 14, art. 11), though his teaching in the _Summa_ is\n      admittedly orthodox. On the extremely doubtful character of such a\n      summary indictment see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes.\n      34; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 495 sqq., 542 sqq.; Glossner,\n      _Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Gnade_, Mainz 1871.\n\n  457 Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a, disp. 91, c. 10-11.\n\n_  458 Dogmatik_, Vol. II, pp. 191 sq., Ratisbon 1874.\n\n_  459 De Auxil._, III, 2, 3.\n\n_  460 De Gratia Effic._, c. 10.\n\n  461 Disproved historically by Palmieri.\n\n  462 Cfr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 119 sqq.\n\n  463 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Praedest. Sanct._, c. 15.\n\n  464 Cfr. St. Augustine, _Tract. in Ioa._, 36, n. 4: \u201c_Venit Christus,\n      sed primo salvare, postea iudicare, eos iudicando in poenam, qui\n      salvari noluerunt, eos perducendo ad vitam, qui credendo salutem non\n      respuerunt._\u201d\n\n  465 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 75 sqq., St. Louis 1914.\n\n  466 Sess. VI, can. 17: \u201c_Si quis iustificationis gratiam nonnisi\n      praedestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes qui\n      vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divin\u00e2\n      potestate praedestinatos ad malum, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.)\n\n  467 Prop. 5, _apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1096. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss,\n      _Soteriology_, p. 76.\n\n  468 \u201c_Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de\n      coelis._\u201d (_Credo_).\n\n_  469 V. infra_, Thesis II.\n\n  470 \u03c0\u1fb6\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd.\n\n  471 Among them was one of our Lord\u2019s own chosen Apostles.\n\n  472 Wisd. XI, 24 sqq.: \u201c_Sed misereris omnium, quia omnia potes, et\n      dissimulas peccata hominum propter poenitentiam. Diligis enim omnia\n      quae sunt et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.... Parcis autem\n      omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui amas animas._\u201d\n\n  473 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.: \u201c_Obsecro igitur primum omnium fieri\n      obsecrationes, orationes, postulationes, gratiarum actiones pro\n      omnibus hominibus_ (\u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd).... _Hoc enim bonum est et\n      acceptum coram Salvatore nostro Deo, qui omnes homines vult salvos\n      fieri_ (\u1f41\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b8\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c9\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) _et ad agnitionem\n      veritatis venire: unus enim Deus_ (\u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u0398\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2), _unus et mediator_\n      (\u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2) _Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus, qui dedit\n      redemptionem semetipsum pro omnibus_ (\u1f51\u03c0\u1f72\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd).\u201d\n\n  474 \u201c_Unus enim Deus._\u201d Cfr. Rom. III, 29 sq., X, 12.\n\n  475 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 77 sqq.\n\n  476 Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 11; 2 Cor. V, 15. That God\u2019s will to redeem\n      mankind is universal has been proved in _Soteriology_, pp. 77 sqq.\n\n  477 Cfr. on this text Estius, _Comment. in Epist. S. Pauli, h. l._\n\n  478 In his work _De Partitione Voluntatis Divinae in Primam et\n      Secundam_, Rome 1851.\n\n_  479 In Ps._, 39, n. 20: \u201c_Ille omnes suos vult esse, quos condidit et\n      creavit. Utinam tu homo non fugias et te abscondas! Ille etiam\n      fugientes requirit et absconditos non vult perire._\u201d\n\n_  480 Orat._, 33, n. 9.\n\n_  481 Resp. ad Capitula Gallor._, c. 2: \u201c_Sincerissime credendum est,\n      Deum velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant, siquidem Apostolus\n      sollicite praecipit, ut Deo pro omnibus supplicetur._\u201d\n\n_  482 Op. cit._, c. 8: \u201c... _qui et omnes vult salvos fieri et ad\n      agnitionem veritatis venire, ... ut et qui salvantur ideo salvi\n      sint, quia illos voluit Deus salvos fieri, et qui pereunt, ideo\n      pereant, quia perire meruerunt._\u201d\n\n  483 For further information on this subject consult Ruiz, _De Voluntate\n      Dei_, disp. 19 sqq.; Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 4 sq.\n\n_  484 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 33, n. 58: \u201c_Vult Deus omnes homines\n      salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut iis\n      adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime\n      iudicentur._\u201d\n\n_  485 Enchiridion_, c. 103.\n\n_  486 Contra Iulian._, IV, 8, 42: \u201c_Nemo salvatur nisi volente Deo._\u201d\n\n_  487 De Corrept. et Gratia_, c. 15, n. 47: \u201c_Omnes homines vult Deus\n      salvos fieri, quoniam nos facit velle, sicut misit Spiritum Filii\n      sui clamantem: Abba, pater, i.e. nos clamare facientem._\u201d\n\n_  488 Confessiones_, XII, 17 sqq.\n\n  489 Faure has proved this in his _Notae in Enchiridion S. Augustini_, c.\n      103, Naples 1847, pp. 195 sqq.\n\n_  490 Summa Theol._, 1a, qu. 19, art. 6, ad 1. On Augustine\u2019s teaching\n      see Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 51 sq., and, less favorably,\n      Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, pp. 498 sqq., Freiburg 1908.\n\n_  491 E.g._ Arrubal (_Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a, disp. 91, c. 3 sq.) and\n      Kilber (_Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo_, disp. 4, c. 2, art. 3).\n\n  492 Cfr. Albertus a Bulsano, _Theol. Dogmat._, ed. Graun, Vol. II, p.\n      141, Innsbruck 1894.\n\n  493 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, II, 12: \u201c... _haec\n      responsio non videtur digna Chritianis, qui providentiam Dei erga\n      homines ex sacris literis et ecclesiastica traditione didicerunt.\n      Nam si non cadit passer in terram sine Patre nostro, qui in coelis\n      est, quanto magis nos apud Deum pluris sumus illis?_\u201d\n\n  494 \u201c_Definimus illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo\n      originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere._\u201d (_Decret.\n      Unionis_, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.)\n\n  495 Cfr. Pallavicini, _Hist. Conc. Trid._, IX, 8.\n\n  496 It occurs in his commentary on the _Summa_, 3a, qu. 68, art. 2, 11.\n\n  497 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 295,\n      Mainz 1897.\n\n  498 On the probable fate of unbaptized infants cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God\n      the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 300 sqq.\n\n  499 Thesis II.\n\n  500 Quoted _supra_, p. 156.\n\n  501 Quoted _supra_, p. 157.\n\n  502 On the whole question consult Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 53, 3rd\n      ed., Rome 1883.\n\n  503 On the notion and existence of sufficient grace see _supra_, Ch. I,\n      Sect. 2, No. 6.\n\n_  504 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 18: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, Dei\n      praecepta homini etiam iustificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad\n      observandum impossibilia, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      828). Cfr. Sess. VI, cap. 11 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 804).\n\n  505 \u201c_Aliqua Dei praecepta hominibus iustis volentibus et conantibus\n      secundum praesentes, quas habent vires, sunt impossibilia: deest\n      quoque illis gratia, qu\u00e2 possibilia fiant._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1092.)\n\n  506 On the distinction between _gratia proxime sufficiens_ and _gratia\n      remote sufficiens_, cfr. _supra_, pp. 43 sq.\n\n  507 1 John V, 3 sq.: \u201c_Haec est caritas Dei, ut mandata eius custodiamus\n      et mandata eius gravia non sunt_ (\u03b1\u1f31 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba\n      \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03af\u03bd): _quoniam omne quod natum est ex Deo [= iustus] vincit\n      mundum._\u201d\n\n  508 Matth. XI, 30.\n\n  509 1 Cor. X, 13: \u201c_Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari\n      supra id quod potestis_ (\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2\u03b8\u1fc6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b5), _sed faciet\n      etiam cum tentatione proventum_ (\u1f14\u03ba\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd), _ut possitis sustinere._\u201d\n\n_  510 V. supra_, pp. 65 sq.\n\n  511 1 Cor. X, 12: \u201c_Itaque qui se existimat stare, videat ne cadat._\u201d\n\n_  512 V. infra_, Thesis II. Cfr. also Ecclus. II, 11 sqq.; John VI, 37; 2\n      Pet I, 10 sq.\n\n  513 \u201c_Gratiam non omnibus dari._\u201d\n\n  514 Migne, _P. L._, XVII, 1073 sqq. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan,\n      _Patrology_, p. 515.\n\n_  515 Benignitas Dei generalis\u2014specialis Dei misericordia._\n\n  516 \u201c_Deo autem placuit et hanc [gratiam efficacem] multis tribuere et\n      illam [sufficientem] a nemine submovere, ut ex utraque appareat, non\n      negatum universitati, quod collatum est portioni._\u201d (_De Vocatione\n      Omnium Gentium_, II, 25.) For further information on the doctrinal\n      character of this work see Fr. W\u00f6rter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des\n      Semipelagianismus_, M\u00fcnster 1900.\n\n  517 Chrysostom, _Hom. in Matth._, 82, n. 3.\n\n  518 Augustine, _Serm._, 296: \u201c_Plus ausus erat, quam eius capacitas\n      sustinebat._\u201d\n\n  519 Matth. XXVI, 41: \u201cWatch ye and pray that ye enter not into\n      temptation.\u201d\n\n_  520 Lib. de Unitate Ecclesiae_, 9: \u201c_Quis dubitaverit quod Iudas\n      Christum, si voluisset, non utique tradidisset, et Petrus, si\n      voluisset, ter Dominum non negasset?_\u201d\n\n  521 John VI, 40.\n\n  522 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 19-21.\n\n  523 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 573 sqq.\n\n  524 Cfr. 1 Cor. X, 13.\n\n  525 1 John V, 3 sq.\n\n  526 Cfr. 1 John II, 16.\n\n_  527 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 43, n. 50: \u201c_Deus impossibilia non iubet,\n      sed iubendo admonet, et facere quod possis et petere quod non\n      possis._\u201d\n\n  528 For an explanation of certain difficult passages bearing on this\n      point in the writings of St. Augustine, see Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 531 sqq.\n\n_  529 V. supra_, pp. 104 sq.\n\n  530 Ez. XXXIII, 11: \u201c_Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem impii,\n      sed ut convertatur impius a via sua et vivat. Convertimini,\n      convertimini a viis vestris pessimis._\u201d\n\n  531 2 Pet. III, 9: \u201c_Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, sicut quidam\n      existimant, sed patienter agit_ (\u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03bf\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6) _propter vos, nolens\n      aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poenitentiam reverti_ (\u03bc\u1f74 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03c2\n      \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c7\u03c9\u03c1\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9).\u201d\n\n  532 Cfr. Is. V, 20.\n\n  533 According to Ruiz (_De Praedest._, disp. 39, sect. 1), there are but\n      very few divines (_valde pauci_) who hold this view.\n\n  534 Wisd. XII, 10.\n\n  535 Rom. II, 4 sq.: \u201c_An divitias bonitatis eius et patientiae et\n      longanimitatis contemnis? Ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei ad\n      poenitentiam_ (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd) _te adducit? Secundum autem duritiem_\n      (\u03c3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1) _tuam et impoenitens cor_ (\u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd)\n      _thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae et revelationis iusti iudicii\n      Dei, qui reddet unicuique secundum opera eius._\u201d Cfr. Prov. I, 20\n      sqq.\n\n  536 Ex. VII, 3: \u201c_Ego indurabo cor eius._\u201d\n\n  537 Ex. IX, 12: \u201c_Induravitque Dominus cor Pharaonis, etc._\u201d\n\n  538 Ex. VIII, 15.\n\n  539 For the solution of other difficulties see Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 529 sq.\n\n  540 St. Augustine, _Enarr. in Ps._, VI, n. 8: \u201c_Dedit illos in reprobum\n      sensum (Rom. I, 28); nam ea est caecitas mentis. In eam quisquis\n      datus fuerit, ab interiore Dei luce secluditur, sed nondum penitus,\n      quum in hac vita est. Sunt enim tenebrae exteriores, quae magis ad\n      diem iudicii pertinere intelliguntur, ut penitus extra Deum sit,\n      quisquis, dum tempus est, corrigi noluerit._\u201d\n\n  541 St. Augustine, _Retractationes_, 419: \u201c_De quocunque quamvis pessimo\n      homine hac in vita constituto non est desperandum._\u201d\n\n_  542 Tract. in Ioa._, XII, 39. Similarly _ibid._, LIII, n. 6. For a\n      complete exposition of St. Augustine\u2019s teaching on this point\n      consult Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, III, 6 sqq., and\n      Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 40.\n\n  543 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Veritate_, qu. 24, art. 11: \u201c_Haec est\n      obstinatio imperfecta, qu\u00e2 aliquis potest esse obstinatus in statu\n      viae, dum scilicet habet aliquis ita firmatam voluntatem in peccato,\n      quod non surgunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles. Quia tamen aliqui\n      surgunt, ex iis datur via, ut praeparentur ad gratiam._\u201d\n\n_  544 Conc. Lateran._ IV (1215), cap. \u201c_Firmiter_\u201d: \u201c_Et si post\n      susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per\n      veram potest semper poenitentiam reparari._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      430.)\n\n  545 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 14; Sess. XIV, cap. 1.\n\n  546 \u201c_Pagani, Iudaei, haeretici aliique huius generis nullum omnino\n      accipiunt a Iesu Christo influxum, adeoque hinc recte inferes, in\n      illis esse voluntatem nudam et inermem sine omni gratia\n      sufficienti._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1295.)\n\n  547 \u201c_Extra ecclesiam nulla conceditur gratia._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1379.)\n\n  548 Rom. II, 6 sqq.\n\n  549 Rom. II, 10 sq.: \u201c_Gloria autem et honor et pax omni operanti bonum,\n      Iudaeo primum et Graeco (\u1f1c\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bd\u03b9=pagano); non enim est acceptio\n      personarum (\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03af\u03b1) apud Deum._\u201d\n\n  550 \u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u1ff6\u03bd.\n\n  551 Cfr. 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.; John I, 9.\n\n_  552 Ep. ad Corinth._, 1, 7.\n\n  553 \u1f10\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u1fb7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u1fb7.\n\n  554 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u03cc\u03c4\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6.\n\n_  555 Hom. in Ioa._, VIII, 1.\n\n  556 II, c. 31.\n\n  557 De _Arbitrii Libertate_, n. 19: \u201c_... quotidie per tempora, per\n      dies, per momenta, per \u1f04\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1 et cunctis et singulis._\u201d\n\n  558 Heb. XI, 6.\n\n  559 \u201c_Initium, fundamentum et radix omnis iustificationis._\u201d Sess. VI,\n      cap. 8, _apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.\n\n  560 \u201c_Fides late dicta, ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo, ad\n      iustificationem sufficit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.)\n\n  561 \u201c_... fides, qu\u00e2 Dei aspirante et adiuvante grati\u00e2 ab eo revelata\n      vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali\n      rationis lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei\n      revelantis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest._\u201d (Sess. III, cap. 3;\n      Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1789.)\n\n  562 \u201c_Quoniam vero sine fide impossible est placere Deo, ... ideo nemini\n      unquam sine illa contigit iustificatio._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1793.)\n\n  563 Rom. X, 17.\n\n  564 Cfr. Acts X, 1 sqq.\n\n  565 Card. Toletus, _Comment. in S. Th._, I, qu. 1, art. 1.\n\n  566 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Verit._, qu. 14, art. 11, ad 1: \u201c_Hoc ad\n      divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis\n      ad salutem, dummodo ex parte eius non impediatur. Si enim aliquis\n      taliter (in silvis vel inter bruta animalia) nutritus ductum\n      naturalis rationis sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga mali,\n      certissime est tenendum quod ei Deus vel per internam inspirationem\n      revelaret ea, quae sunt ad credendum necessaria, vel aliquem fidei\n      praedicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut misit Petrum ad Cornelium._\u201d\n\n  567 Gotti, _De Fide_, qu. 2, dub. 4, \u00a7 1: \u201c_Sententia negans fidem\n      explicitam Christi et Trinitatis esse ita necessariam, ut sine ea\n      nemo iustificari vel salvari queat, valde probabilis est. Eam enim\n      videtur docere S. Thomas tum 2\u20142 p., qu. 10, art. 4, tum 3 p., qu.\n      69, art. 4, ubi de Cornelio Centurione ait: Ante baptismum Cornelius\n      et alii similes consequuntur gratiam et virtutes per fidem Christi\n      et desiderium baptismi implicite vel explicite._\u201d\n\n  568 Cfr. Fr. Schmid, _Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege f\u00fcr die gefallene\n      Menschheit_, pp. 225 sqq., Brixen 1899.\n\n  569 A. Fischer, _De Salute Infidelium_, Essen 1886; Heinrich-Gutberlet,\n      _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 491 sqq. On their teaching\n      see P. Minges, O. F. M., _Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae\n      Generalis_, pp. 270 sqq., Munich 1902.\n\n  570 With regard to certain other controversies on this subject consult\n      Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 535 sqq., and Tepe, _Instit.\n      Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 109 sqq., Paris 1896.\n\n  571 See Articles 1 and 2, _supra_.\n\n_  572 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 12: \u201c_Arcanum divinae\n      praedestinationis mysterium._\u201d\n\n_  573 De Dono Perseverantiae_, n. 21: \u201c_Ex duobus parvulis originali\n      peccato pariter obstrictis cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur et\n      ex duobus aetate iam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur ut\n      vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur [praedicatione fidei]\n      aut non ita vocetur, inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei._\u201d On this\n      mysterious dispensation see Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des\n      Christentums_, \u00a7 99-103, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912, and Palmieri, _De\n      Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 62.\n\n  574 Eph. I, 3 sqq., and in other passages.\n\n_  575 De Dono Persev._, c. 10, n. 19: \u201c_Praedestinatio est gratiae\n      praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio._\u201d\n\n_  576 V. infra_, pp. 199 sqq.\n\n_  577 De Dono Persev._, c. 14, n. 35: \u201c_Praedestinatio nihil est aliud\n      quam praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime\n      liberantur [scil. salvantur] quicunque liberantur._\u201d\n\n_  578 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 2: \u201c_Praedestinatio est praeparatio\n      gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro._\u201d On the Biblical, the\n      Patristic, and the theological use of the term, see Chr. Pesch,\n      _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 189 sqq., Freiburg 1906.\n\n  579 The Tridentine Council presupposes it as an unquestioned dogma\n      (Sess. VI, cap. 12).\n\n  580 Rom. VIII, 28 sqq.; \u201c_Scimus autem quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia\n      cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti\n      (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd). Nam quos praescivit, et\n      praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse\n      primogenitus in multis fratribus; quos autem praedestinavit, hos et\n      vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit: quos autem\n      iustificavit, illos et glorificavit._\u201d\n\n  581 Cfr. Eph. I, 4-11.\n\n_  582 De Praedestinatione Sanctorum_, c. 25: \u201c_Praedestinationis huius\n      fidem, quae contra novos haereticos nov\u00e2 nunc solicitudine\n      defenditur, nunquam Ecclesia Christi non habuit._\u201d\n\n_  583 Resp. ad Obiect. Gallor._, 1: \u201c_Praedestinationem Dei nullus\n      Catholicus negat._\u201d\n\n_  584 Ep. ad Rufin._: \u201c_Praedestinationem tam impium est negare quam ipsi\n      gratiae contraire._\u201d\n\n_  585 De Correptione et Gratia_, c. 7, n. 14: \u201c_Horum si quisquam perit,\n      fallitur Deus; sed nemo eorum perit, quia non fallitur Deus._\u201d On\n      the question how this infallible foreknowledge is compatible with\n      the dogma of free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, _God, His Knowability,\n      Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 364 sqq.\n\n  586 Cfr. Apoc. XVII, 8: \u201c_Liber vitae_, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03b9\u03b2\u03bb\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc6\u03c2.\u201d Cfr. St.\n      Augustine, _De Civ. Dei_, XX, 13: \u201c_Praescientia Dei, quae non\n      potest falli, liber vitae est._\u201d\n\n  587 Luke X, 20: \u201c_Gaudete quod nomina vestra scripta sunt in coelis._\u201d\n\n  588 Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 10: \u201c_Satagite, ut per bona opera certam (\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b1\u03af\u03b1\u03bd)\n      vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis._\u201d\n\n  589 Apoc. III, 5: \u201c_Non delebo nomen eius de libro vitae._\u201d Cfr. Ex.\n      XXXII, 32; Ps. LXVIII, 29.\n\n  590 On the _liber vitae_, cfr. St. Thomas, _S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 24, art.\n      1-3; and Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7\n      435.\n\n_  591 De Corrept. et Grat._, c. 13: \u201c_... quorum ita certus est numerus,\n      ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuatur ex eis._\u201d\n\n_  592 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 7: \u201c_De numero omnium praedestinatorum\n      hominum quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur,\n      quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus\n      salvabuntur, quot angeli remanserunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex\n      hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt et insuper tot quot\n      fuerunt angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod soli Deo est cognitus\n      numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus, ut habet collecta\n      pro vivis et defunctis._\u201d\n\n_  593 De Bono Viduitatis_, n. 28: \u201c_Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc\n      saeculum, nisi ut impleatur praedestinatus numerus ille sanctorum,\n      quo citius impleto profecto nec terminus saeculi differetur._\u201d\n\n  594 Dieringer, _Epistelbuch_, \u201cFest Allerheiligen.\u201d\n\n_  595 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, art. 7, ad 3: \u201c_Pauciores sunt qui\n      salvantur._\u201d\n\n  596 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, pp. 363 sqq.,\n      and W. Schneider, _Das andere Leben_, 9th ed., pp. 476 sqq.,\n      Paderborn 1908.\n\n_  597 Le Rigorisme, le Nombre des \u00c9lus et la Doctrine du Salut_, 2nd ed.,\n      Bruxelles 1899.\n\n_  598 De Paucitate Salvandorum quid Docuerunt Sancti_, 3d ed., Bruxelles\n      1899.\n\n  599 Cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 10: \u03c3\u03c9\u03c4\u1f74\u03c1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd. This\n      opinion is convincingly defended by the Spanish theologian Gen\u00e9r\n      (_Theol. Dogmat. Scholast._, II, 342 sqq., Rome 1767.) Timid souls\n      may profitably ponder what Thomas \u00e0 Kempis says in the _Imitation_,\n      I, 25.\n\n  600 Gen\u00e9r, _Theol. Dogmat. Scholast._, II, 342: \u201c_... ne dici possit cum\n      dedecore et iniuria divinae maiestatis et clementiae, maius esse\n      imperium daemonis quam Christi._\u201d\n\n_  601 Lect. in Ep. ad Rom._, VIII, 6: \u201c_Unde ponere quod aliquod meritum\n      ex parte nostra praesupponatur, cuius praescientia sit ratio [scil.\n      motivum] praedestinationis, nihil est aliud quam supponere gratiam\n      dari ex meritis nostris [scil. naturalibus]._\u201d _V. supra_, Ch. II,\n      Sect. 2.\n\n  602 \u201c_Gratiam Dei secundum merita dari._\u201d\n\n_  603 De Dono Perseverant._, n. 53: \u201c_Quid autem coegit loca\n      Scripturarum, quibus praedestinatio commendata est, copiosius et\n      enucleatius isto nostro labore defendi, nisi quod Pelagiani dicunt,\n      gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra [naturalia] dari?_\u201d\n\n  604 Charles Du Plessis d\u2019Argentr\u00e9 (d. 1740), after a careful study of\n      all Scholastic works written between 1120 and 1708, concluded:\n      \u201c_Veteres Scholastici de causa praedestinationis omnino considerate\n      et ad gratiam et ad gloriam praecipue agebant. Idea nolebant eam\n      esse ex praevisis meritis, quia gratia, quae in ea includitur, non\n      datur nec proin praedestinatur ob praevisa merita._\u201d (_De\n      Praedest._, c. 10, \u00a7 1).\n\n_  605 V. infra_, Part II, Ch. III, Sect. 3.\n\n_  606 E.g._, Ba\u00f1ez, Alvarez, Lemos, Gonet, Contenson, Goudin.\n\n_  607 E.g._, Berti and Norisius.\n\n_  608 E.g._, Suarez, Ruiz, De Lugo, Bellarmine.\n\n  609 \u201c_Nisi breviati fuissent dies illi, non fieret salva omnis caro, sed\n      propter electos (\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03bb\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2) breviabuntur dies illi....\n      Surgent enim pseudochristi, ... ita ut in errorem inducantur, si\n      fieri potest, etiam electi._\u201d\n\n  610 Cfr. Col. III, 12; 1 Pet. I, 1.\n\n  611 \u201c_Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei ... Cuius\n      vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat._\u201d On the meaning of this text\n      _v. supra_, pp. 137, 177.\n\n  612 Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 65; Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat.\n      Theol._, Vol. VIII, pp. 345 sqq.; Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol.\n      II, 3rd ed., pp. 212 sqq., Freiburg 1906; Val. Weber, _Kritische\n      Geschichte der Exegese des 9. Kapitels des R\u00f6merbriefes_, W\u00fcrzburg\n      1889.\n\n_  613 Die Lehre von der Heiligung_, p. 242, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.\n\n_  614 E.g._, Petrus de Comitibus, O. S. A. (_De Praedest. et Reprobat._,\n      disp. 3, art. 4 sqq.), Tricassinus (_De Praedest._), and the Jesuits\n      Lessius, Gregory of Valentia, Franzelin, and Schrader.\n\n_  615 De Deo Uno_, p. 677: \u201c_Si vero dissensus esset manifestus, ut\n      prudenter [cum ceteris patribus] conciliari non posset, tum sane non\n      dubitarem, cum Pighio, Catharino, Osorio, Camerario, Maldonato,\n      Toleto, Petavio, reverenter ab Augustino discedere, quum haec non\n      posset esse nisi privata eius sententia._\u201d\n\n_  616 De Praedest._, qu. 4.\n\n_  617 Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aqu._, I, qu. 23, art. 5, conclus.\n      2.\n\n_  618 De Deo_, X, col. 9.\n\n  619 A careful analysis of the Augustinian texts bearing on this question\n      will be found in the _Theol. Wirceburg._, _De Deo Uno_, n. 231 sqq.,\n      and Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 53.\n\n  620 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 351\n      sqq.\n\n_  621 Clypeus Thomist._, _De Praedest._, disp. 2, \u00a7 2, n. 26: \u201c_Qui\n      ordinate vult, prius vult finem quam media ad finem. Sed Deus\n      ordinate vult. Ergo prius vult finem quam media ad illum. Atqui\n      gloria est finis et merita sunt media ad illum conducentia. Ergo\n      prius vult gloriam quam merita, et consequenter electio ad gloriam\n      non potest esse ex praevisione meritorum._\u201d\n\n  622 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, p. 330.\n\n_  623 V._ Art. 4, No. 2, _infra_. The opposite opinion is defended by\n      Billuart _De Deo_, diss. 9, art. 4, \u00a7 3 (ed. Lequette, p. 386).\n\n_  624 Orth. Praed._, c. 1, n. 7: \u201c_Deus primo praeparavit dona gratiae ac\n      deinde eos, quos praevidebat bene usuros eiusmodi donis, elegit ad\n      vitam aeternam._\u201d\n\n  625 \u201c_... sententiam illam antiquitate, suavitate ac Scripturarum nativ\u00e2\n      auctoritate nobilissimam de praedestinatione ad gloriam post\n      praevisa merita semper ut Dei misericordiae ac gratiae magis\n      consentaneam, veriorem ac amabiliorem existimavi._\u201d (Cfr. _Trait\u00e9 de\n      l\u2019Amour de Dieu_, III, 5).\n\n_  626 V. supra_, pp. 153 sqq.\n\n_  627 V. supra_, No. 4.\n\n  628 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: \u201c_Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem\n      servavi; in reliquo reposita est (\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9=praeparata ab aeterno)\n      mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet (\u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9) mihi Dominus in illa\n      die, iustus index._\u201d Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 24 sqq.; Apoc. II, 7, 26.\n\n  629 Matth. XXV, 34 sqq.: \u201c_Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete\n      paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi._\u201d\n\n_  630 De Deo_, ed. Lequette, p. 391.\n\n  631 For instance, John VIII, 44; 1 John III, 8; Acts XIII, 10.\n\n  632 Cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 289 sqq., Paris 1896;\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theol._, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 430.\n\n  633 Lessius, _Antapol._, prop. 8: \u201c_Tenent hanc sententiam omnes Patres\n      Graeci, adeo ut communiter dicatur esse sententia Graecorum._\u201d\n\n_  634 Hom. in Matth._, 80, n. 2: \u201c_Haereditate possidete regnum quasi\n      proprium, quasi paternum et vestrum, iam olim vobis debitum;\n      priusquam enim existeretis, haec vobis parata erant et disposita,\n      quia ego vos tales futuros esse praescivi._\u201d\n\n_  635 In Rom._, VIII, 29 (Migne, _P. G._, LXXXII, 142): \u201c_Non simpliciter\n      praedestinavit, sed quum praescivisset, praedestinavit._\u201d\n\n_  636 In Ps._, 64, n. 5: \u201c_Multi vocati sunt, sed pauci electi.... Itaque\n      non res indiscreti iudicii est electio, sed ex meriti delectu facta\n      discretio est._\u201d\n\n_  637 De Fide_, V, 6, 83: \u201c_Unde et Apostolus ait: quos praescivit, et\n      praedestinavit (Rom. VIII, 29); non enim ante praedestinavit quam\n      praescivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, eorum praemia\n      praedestinavit._\u201d Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 59; Lessius,\n      _De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect. 2, n. 7 sqq.\n\n_  638 De Gratia_, II, 11.\n\n  639 Cfr. O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der Augustinismus_, M\u00fcnchen 1892; O.\n      Pf\u00fclf, S. J., \u201c_Zur Pr\u00e4destinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_\u201d in the\n      Innsbruck _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.\n\n_  640 V. supra_, pp. 200 sqq., 216 sqq.\n\n  641 Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, thes. 64.\n\n_  642 Comment. in IV Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41: \u201c_Eligatur [ea\n      sententia] quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina\n      sine aliqua iniustitia et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum._\u201d\n\n  643 Many Scholastic utterances bearing on this subject have been\n      collected by Lessius, _De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect. 2, n. 7\n      (_Opusc._ II, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1878).\n\n_  644 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41, qu. 1.\n\n_  645 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, 1, dist. 41, art. 2.\n\n_  646 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 23, disp. 3, art. 4.\n\n  647 In his treatise _De Praedestinatione_, dedicated to the Council of\n      Trent.\n\n_  648 De Deo_, disp. 9, art. 3.\n\n_  649 De Praedest. et Reprob._, Paris edition of the _Opuscula_, 1878, p.\n      412: \u201c_... privilegia eius omnem modum superant et ad nullum alium\n      sunt extendenda._\u201d\n\n_  650 Sent._, 1, dist. 40: \u201c_... est praescientia iniquitatis quorundam\n      et praeparatio damnationis eorumdem._\u201d\n\n_  651 Supra_, Art. 3, No. 4.\n\n  652 Calvin\u2019s teaching in his _Inst._, l. III, c. 21, 24. On Arminianism\n      see J. F. Loughlin in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. I, pp. 740\n      sqq.\n\n  653 \u201c_Aliquos vero ad malum divin\u00e2 potestate praedestinatos esse non\n      solum non credimus, sed etiam, si sunt qui tantum malum credere\n      velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 200.)\n\n  654 Sess. VI, can. 17: \u201c_Si quis iustificationis gratiam nonnisi\n      praedestinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes qui\n      vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divin\u00e2\n      potestate praedestinatos ad malum, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.)\n\n_  655 V. supra_, Art. 1.\n\n_  656 V. supra_, Art. 2, Thesis II.\n\n  657 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 251 sqq.\n\n_  658 V. supra_, pp. 201 sqq.\n\n  659 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: \u201c_Non credentibus autem [Christus] ... lapis\n      offensionis ... qui offendunt verbo nec credunt, in quo (\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4) et\n      positi sunt._\u201d\n\n  660 \u201c_In hoc positi, i.e. praedestinati sunt, ut non credant._\u201d\n\n  661 \u201cAnd he shall be a sanctification to you. But for a stone of\n      stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel, for\n      a snare and a ruin to the inhabitants of Jerusalem.\u201d\n\n  662 \u201cAnd whosoever shall fall on this stone, shall be broken: but on\n      whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder.\u201d\n\n  663 Cfr. Oecumen., _in h. l._: \u201c_Ad quod positi sunt, non dicitur, quasi\n      a Deo ad hoc essent destinati; nulla enim causa perditionis\n      ministratur ab eo, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri._\u201d\n\n_  664 Contr. Iulian._, III, 18, 35: \u201c_Bonus est Deus, iustus est Deus:\n      potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non\n      potest quemquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia iustus est._\u201d\n\n_  665 Resp. ad XII Object. Vincent._: \u201c_Voluntate exierunt, voluntate\n      ceciderunt, et quia praesciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati;\n      essent autem praedestinati, si essent reversuri et in sanctitate\n      remansuri, ac per hoc praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi,\n      nemini est causa labendi._\u201d\n\n_  666 Ad Monim._, l. I. Cfr. Petavius, _De Deo_, X, 7 sqq.\n\n_  667 Clypeus Thomist._, Vol. II, tr. 5, disp. 5, art. 2, n. 23.\n\n  668 Cfr. Limbourg, S. J., in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr kath.\n      Theologie_, 1879, pp. 203 sqq.\n\n  669 Cfr. Suarez, _De Praedest._, V, 4 sqq.\n\n_  670 Conc. Trident._, Sess. V, can. 5.\n\n  671 Which explains why both theories have the same defenders. _V.\n      supra_, Art. 3, No. 4.\n\n  672 Ba\u00f1ez, Alvarez, Gonet.\n\n  673 \u201c_Deus non serio vult, sed vellet salvare etiam reprobos, nisi per\n      hoc impediretur pulchritudo universi._\u201d\n\n_  674 V. supra_, Art. 1 and 2.\n\n_  675 De Praedest._, V, 8, 8: \u201c_Non est in potestate hominis, cum\n      non-electione seu cum non-praedestinatione aut, quod idem est, cum\n      reprobatione negativa actu ponere seu componere suam aeternam\n      salutem._\u201d Cfr. Franzelin, _De Deo Uno_, p. 583, 3rd ed., Rome 1888.\n\n  676 \u201c_Deus ex omnibus hominibus, quos infectos originali peccato\n      praevidit, efficaciter ex meritis Christi venturi quosdam elegit ad\n      gloriam, et alios in poenam eiusdem originalis peccati et ad\n      ostensionem suae iustitiae erga illos et maioris misericordiae erga\n      electos voluit permittere, ut deficerent a consecutione gloriae seu\n      positive eis non voluit gloriam.... Ex vi huius intentionis\n      efficacis excogitavit media apta ad consecutionem talis finis, et\n      videns in aliquibus hominibus esse aptum medium in solo originali\n      peccato eos relinquere, in aliis vero permittere, ut cadant in haec\n      vel illa peccata actualia ac in illis perseverent, has permissiones\n      per subsequentem electionem approbavit. Et tandem ... per actum\n      imperii sui intellectus haec media ad praedictum finem ordinavit._\u201d\n      _Clyp. Thomist._, Vol. II, disp. 5, art. 4, n. 155.\n\n_  677 De Reprob._, c. 3, n. 6.\n\n_  678 De Praedest._, V, 7, 14: \u201c_Electio ad finem est ratio dandi media\n      efficacia seu infallibilia ad illum; ergo negatio illius electionis\n      erit suo modo ratio non dandi media, quae cognoscuntur congrua et\n      infallibilia ad illum finem consequendum._\u201d\n\n  679 2 Pet. III, 9: \u201c_... nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad\n      poenitentiam reverti._\u201d\n\n_  680 De Praedest._, sect. 2, n. 13: \u201c_Secundum communem aestimationem\n      hominum paria videntur, Deum velle ut pereas et nolle te ponere in\n      electorum suorum numero neque gratiam congruam et perseverantiam\n      dare; aeque enim infallibiliter ex huiusmodi decretis sequeretur\n      damnatio. Et si alterutrum horum decretorum esset subeundum, quivis\n      censeret sibi esse indifferens, utrum eligatur, quum utrumque ante\n      praevisionem operum sit conceptum._\u201d The teaching of St. Augustine\n      and that of St. Thomas on this point is in dispute. See Chr. Pesch,\n      _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 230 sqq., and\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theol._, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 433.\n\n  681 In his treatise _De Servo Arbitrio_.\n\n  682 Cfr. Denifle, _Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwicklung_, Vol.\n      I, Mainz 1904.\n\n_  683 Instit. Christ. Religionis_, l. II.\n\n  684 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 378 sqq.\n\n  685 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 291 sqq.\n\n  686 Sess. VI, can. 4: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo\n      motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo vocanti ... neque\n      posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino\n      agere mereque passive se habere, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)\n\n  687 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _op. cit._ (note 5), pp. 295 sq.\n\n  688 In support of this contention Jansenius quoted St. Augustine, _In\n      Gal._, n. 49: \u201c_Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur\n      necesse est._\u201d\n\n  689 J. Forget in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 288 sqq. On\n      Jansenism see Hergenr\u00f6ther, _Kirchengeschichte_, 4th ed., ed. by J.\n      P. Kirsch, Vol. III, pp. 386 sqq., 466 sqq., Freiburg 1909.\n\n  690 Sess. VI, cap. 5: \u201c_Unde in sacris literis quum dicitur:\n      ____Convertimini ad me et ego convertar ad vos,____ libertatis\n      nostrae admonemur; quum respondemus: ____Converte nos, Domine, ad te\n      et convertemur,____ Dei nos grati\u00e2 praeveniri confitemur._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) Cfr. Oswald, _Die Lehre von der\n      Heiligung_, 3rd ed., pp. 186 sq.\n\n  691 Zach. I, 3.\n\n  692 Jer. XXXI, 21.\n\n  693 Rom. IX, 19: \u201c_Voluntati enim eius quis resistit?_\u201d\n\n  694 1 Tim. IV, 7: \u201c_Exerce autem teipsum (\u03b3\u03cd\u03bc\u03bd\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5 \u03b4\u03ad \u03c3\u03b5\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd) ad\n      pietatem._\u201d\n\n  695 Acts VII, 51: \u201c_Vos semper Spiritui Sancto resistitis (\u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5),\n      sicut patres vestri, ita et vos._\u201d\n\n  696 Matth. XIX, 17: \u201c_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._\u201d\n      Cfr. Apoc. IV, 20: \u201c_Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis audierit\n      vocem meam et aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum._\u201d\n\n  697 Cfr. the Scriptural argument for the existence of sufficient grace,\n      _supra_, pp. 45 sq.\n\n_  698 V. supra_, pp. 102 sq., 141 sq.\n\n_  699 Instit._, l. II, c. 3, sect. 10: \u201c_Voluntatem movet [gratia\n      Christi], non qualiter multis saeculis traditum est et creditum, ut\n      nostrae postea sit electionis, motioni aut obtemperare aut\n      refragari, sed illam efficaciter afficiendo. Illud ergo toties a\n      Chrysostomo repetitum repudiari necesse est: ____Quem trahit,\n      volentem trahit.___\u201d Many Patristic texts of similar tenor have been\n      gathered and explained by Cardinal Bellarmine in his treatise _De\n      Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, VI, 11.\n\n  700 Cfr. _De Gratia Christi_, c. 47: \u201c_Ista quaestio, ubi de arbitrio\n      voluntatis et Dei gratia disputatur, ita est ad discernendum\n      difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari Dei\n      gratia videatur; quando autem asseritur Dei gratia, liberum\n      arbitrium putetur auferri._\u201d\n\n_  701 De Corrept. et Gratia_, XII, 38: \u201c_Subventum est infirmitati\n      voluntatis humanae, ut divin\u00e2 grati\u00e2 indeclinabiliter et\n      insuperabiliter ageretur._\u201d\n\n  702 Cfr. his _Sermones_, 163, c. 11, n. 13: \u201c_Totum ex Deo, non tamen\n      quasi dormientes, non quasi ut non conemur, non quasi ut non\n      velimus. Sine voluntate tua non erit in te iustitia Dei. Voluntas\n      quidem non est nisi tua, iustitia non est nisi Dei.... Sine te fecit\n      te Deus. Non enim adhibuisti aliquem consensum, ut te faceret Deus.\n      Quomodo consentiebas, qui non eras? Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non\n      te iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, iustificat volentem.\n      Tamen ipse iustificat, ne sit iustitia tua._\u201d\n\n_  703 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 34: \u201c_Consentire vocationi Dei vel ab\n      ipsa dissentire propriae voluntatis est._\u201d\n\n_  704 Ep._, 157, 2, 10: \u201c_Neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur,\n      quia iuvatur; sed ideo iuvatur, quia non tollitur._\u201d (Migne, _P.\n      L._, XXXIII, 677).\n\n_  705 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 2: \u201c_Tolle liberum arbitrium et\n      non erit, quod salvetur; tolle gratiam et non erit, unde salvetur._\u201d\n      On other difficult passages in the writings of St. Augustine cfr.\n      Mausbach, _Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus_, Vol. II, pp. 208 sqq.,\n      Freiburg 1909.\n\n  706 Cfr. Ba\u00f1ez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13: \u201c_Nulla\n      secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a\n      prima._\u201d\n\n  707 Cfr. Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4: \u201c_Movet nempe Deus non\n      solum ad substantiam actus, sed etiam ad modum eius, qui est\n      libertas._\u201d\n\n  708 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 83, n. 9: \u201c_Quando agens\n      infinitae virtutis movet aliquod subiectum, tale subiectum\n      infallibiliter movetur, quid tunc resistentia passi non superat nec\n      adaequat virtutem agentis. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis.\n      Ergo motio Dei efficax respectu cuiuscumque hominis in quibuslibet\n      circumstantiis positi erit medium congruum et aptum, ut\n      infallibiliter inducat effectum, ad quem ex Dei intentione datur._\u201d\n\n  709 Cfr. Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 5: \u201c_Restat ergo tertia\n      sententia, scilicet Deum praemovere physice ad entitatem peccati et\n      sic se effecturum definivisse decreto positivo et effectivo;\n      operatur enim omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae._\u201d\n\n  710 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 73 sqq.\n\n  711 Cfr. De Lemos, _Acta Congr. de Aux._, p. 1065: \u201c_Illa praepositio\n      \u2019prae\u2019 nihil aliud denotat aut denotare potest quam Deum esse\n      priorem et primam causam, prius natur\u00e2 et causalitate moventem,\n      applicantem, inclinantem et determinantem voluntatem, quam ipsa\n      voluntas se determinet._\u201d\n\n  712 Cfr. Gonet, _Clypeus Theol. Thomist._, disp. 11, art. 5: \u201c_Haec\n      divina motio in creatura recepta a Thomistis ____physica____\n      appellatur, ... quia ex propria essentia et ab intrinseco est\n      efficax, independenter a quocumque creato consensu._\u201d\n\n  713 Cfr. Graveson, _Epist. Theol. Polem._, t. I, ep. 11: \u201c_Voluntas\n      creata priusquam se determinet, a Deo debet determinari, quia scil.\n      indifferens sit eaque indifferentia non solvatur quam per praeviam\n      Dei motionem._\u201d Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 28: \u201c_Liberum\n      arbitrium, quia creatum est, licet determinet sibi actum, illum\n      tamen determinat praedeterminatum a Deo._\u201d\n\n  714 Cfr. Reginald., _De Novit. Antiquit. Nominis Praedeterm. Phys._, l.\n      II, c. 36: \u201c_Quum Deus hanc motionem det causis sciens et volens\n      atque adeo cum [aeterna] cognitione et intentione certa cuiusdam\n      determinati effectus, alias haec essent a casu respectu Dei:\n      consequitur illam praemotionem physicam esse praedeterminationem._\u201d\n\n  715 Cfr. Nazarius, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 22, art.\n      4: \u201c_Sublat\u00e2 a Deo physicae praemotionis efficacitate nulla\n      relinquitur alia in Deo sufficiens causalitas respectu\n      determinationis liberorum actuum et consequenter neque in Deo esse\n      poterit talium praescientia futurorum._\u201d See also Pohle-Preuss,\n      _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 383 sqq., 400\n      sqq.\n\n  716 Cfr. Contenson, _Theol. Mentis et Cordis_, l. VIII, diss. 2, specul.\n      3: \u201c_Generalem praemotionem ideo solum adstruimus, ut per eam ad\n      gratiam per se efficacem uberius fortiusque stabiliendam viam\n      muniamus ad eamque propugnandam serviat etiam philosophia._\u201d\n\n  717 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 92, n. 6: \u201c_Repugnant ad invicem\n      auxilium efficax ad consentiendum et actualis dissensus._\u201d\n\n  718 Cfr. Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 122, n. 16: \u201c_Efficacia auxilii\n      praevenientis gratiae et connexio eius infallibilis cum libera\n      cooperatione arbitrii tota fundatur et desumitur, tamquam ex prima\n      radice, ex omnipotentia Dei atque ex absoluto et efficaci decreto\n      voluntatis eius volentis, ut homo quem movet convertatur et pie\n      operetur, nec huiusmodi efficacia ullo modo dependet etiam, tamquam\n      a conditione sine qua non, ex futura cooperatione arbitrii creati._\u201d\n\n  719 Cfr. Alvarez, _op. cit._, disp. 19, n. 7: \u201c_Praedictum auxilium\n      actuale determinat liberum arbitrium ad unam numero actionem, non\n      subditur libero arbitrio quantum ad usum._\u201d\n\n  720 Cfr. Graveson, _Epist. Theol. Polem._, t. I, ep. 1: \u201c_Gratia\n      thomistice sufficiens ita ex natur\u00e2 sua essentialiter distinguitur a\n      gratia thomistice efficaci, ut numquam et in nullo casu gratia\n      thomistice sufficiens evadere possit gratia efficax thomistice nec\n      umquam ponatur actus secundus, nisi accesserit gratia efficax\n      thomistice._\u201d\n\n_  721 Prael. Theol._, disp. 5, c. 6: \u201c_In gratia sufficiente totum id\n      continetur quod ad potentiam bene operandi exigitur, non autem totum\n      id quod ulterius requiritur ad actum; certum est enim in omni causa\n      agente aliquid plus ad actum quam ad potentiam requiri._\u201d\n\n_  722 Panoplia_, t. IV, p. 2, tr. 3, c. 2: \u201c_Auxilium sufficiens ita\n      sufficientiam tribuit ad operandum, si homo velit, quod defectus\n      operationis nullo modo provenit ex insufficientia aliqua ipsius\n      auxilii, sed tantum ex defectu arbitrii, quod ei resistit et\n      impedimentum ponit._\u201d\n\n  723 Cfr. Limbourg, S. J., \u201c_Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen\n      Gnadenlehre_\u201d in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr kath. Theologie_,\n      1877.\n\n  724 Billuart, _De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4. \u00a7 3.\n\n  725 Cfr. Ba\u00f1ez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13,\n      concl. 14: \u201c_Nam voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet circa\n      quamcumque materiam virtutis, nisi efficaciter determinetur a divina\n      voluntate ad bene operandum._\u201d\n\n  726 Other evasions are treated by Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 400\n      sqq. On the true notion of merely sufficient grace, _v._ Ch. I,\n      Sect. 2, No. 6, _supra_.\n\n  727 The Molinists also regard supernatural grace as a _praemotio\n      physica_; cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp.\n      145 sq., Freiburg 1908.\n\n  728 Gonet, _Clypeus Theol. Thomist._, disp. 9, art 5, \u00a7 3.\n\n  729 Cfr. Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 22, n. 39: \u201c_Solus Deus propter\n      suam infinitatem et omnipotentiam, quia est auctor voluntatis\n      creatae, potest illam immutare conformiter ad suam naturam et movere\n      efficaciter atque applicare ad producendum actum in particulari, non\n      solum secundum substantiam, sed etiam secundum modum libertatis,\n      quod tamen non potest alia causa creata._\u201d\n\n  730 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 282 sqq.\n\n  731 Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 22, n. 19: \u201c_Nam tamdiu manet libertas\n      in voluntate, quamdiu intellectus illi repraesentat obiectum cum\n      indifferentia._\u201d\n\n_  732 De Deo_, diss. 8, art. 4, \u00a7 2.\n\n_  733 De Auxiliis_, disp. 92, n. 11: \u201c_Etiam posito auxilio efficaci in\n      voluntate componitur cum illo potentia ad dissentiendum, quamvis\n      nulla sit potentia ad coniungendum actualem dissensum cum auxilio\n      efficaci_ [not: _cum actuali consensu_].\u201d]\n\n  734 Sess. VI, cap. 5: \u201c_Homo ... inspirationem illam [gratiam efficacem]\n      recipiens ... illam et abiicere potest._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      797). Sess. VI, can. 4: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium\n      a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti\n      atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam iustificationis gratiam se disponat\n      ac praeparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime\n      quoddam nihil omnino agere mereque passive se habere, anathema\n      sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.)\n\n  735 Thus Alvarez, _De Auxiliis_, disp. 93, art. 1: \u201c_Nunc autem dicimus\n      Concilium Tridentinum ... numquam usum fuisse verbo illo\n      ____resistere,____ sed verbo ____dissentire____ et\n      ____[abiicere],____ ut insinuaret non esse idem formaliter resistere\n      seu posse resistere auxilio efficaci et posse dissentire seu\n      abiicere gratiam vocationis.... Unde licet arbitrium motum auxilio\n      efficaci ad consentiendum possit dissentire, si velit, non tamen\n      potest Deo resistere vel auxilio eius efficaci, secundum quod est\n      instrumentum voluntatis divinae._\u201d\n\n  736 Sess. III, cap. 3: \u201c_Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per caritatem\n      non operetur, donum Dei est et actus eius est opus ad salutem\n      pertinens, quo homo liberam praestet ipsi Deo obedientiam, gratiae\n      eius cui resistere possit consentiendo et cooperando._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1791.)\n\n  737 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 74 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr.\n      Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 140 sqq., Freiburg\n      1908; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 405 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On\n      the teaching of St. Augustine see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, thes. 50; on that of St. Thomas, L. de San, S. J., _De Deo\n      Uno_, t. I: _De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes Physicas_,\n      Louvain 1894.\n\n  738 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq.\n\n  739 \u201c_Quidquid entitatis reperitur in quocumque actu peccati, etiamsi\n      alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum tamquam in primam\n      causam praemoventem et praedeterminantem actuali motione voluntatem\n      creatam ad talem actum, inquantum actus est, secundum quod est\n      ens._\u201d Alvarez, _De Auxil._, disp. 24, n. 15.\n\n  740 Cfr. Ba\u00f1ez, _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, 1 p., qu. 23, art. 3,\n      dub. 2, conclus. 2: \u201c_Deus cognoscit cognitione intuitiv\u00e2 peccatum\n      quatenus Dei voluntas est causa entitatis actus peccati et simul\n      permittens, quod ad eundem actum concurrat liberum arbitrium\n      deficiendo a regula._\u201d\n\n  741 Sess. VI, can. 6. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence,\n      and Attributes_, pp. 253 sqq., 442 sqq.\n\n  742 \u201c_Voluntas Adami ante peccatum non erat tibia curva, sed omnino\n      recta, facta autem est curva ex promotione physica._\u201d _Praelect.\n      Dogmat._, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 137.\n\n  743 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 72 sqq.\n\n  744 Cfr. on this subject Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 41;\n      T. Papagni, O. P., _La Mente di S. Tommaso intorno alla Mozione\n      Divina nelle Creature_, p. 44, Benevento 1901.\n\n  745 The principal representatives of Augustinianism are Berti, Bellelli,\n      and Bertieri.\n\n  746 Published at Rome in 1739 sqq.\n\n  747 Cfr. his work _Le Bajanisme et le Jans\u00e9nisme Resuscit\u00e9s dans les\n      Livres de Bellelli et Berti, s. l._, 1745.\n\n  748 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 419 sqq.\n\n  749 Cfr. Berti, _De Theol. Disciplinis_, XIV, 9, n. 6: \u201c_Sententia est\n      Thomistarum et Augustinensium omnium affirmantium, gratiam efficacem\n      esse se ips\u00e2, non talem reddi aut cooperatione liberi arbitrii aut\n      ex circumstantiis congruis, utque certissime et infallibiliter cum\n      effectu coniunctam esse._\u201d\n\n  750 Cfr. Berti, _op. cit._, XIV, 11: \u201c_In aequali gradu concupiscentiae\n      et gratiae gratia concupiscentiae, non concupiscentia gratiae\n      succumbet, quia homo etiam cum aequali virtute maiorem habet ad\n      malum quam ad bonum inclinationem.... Agere et non agere in\n      aequilibrio virium et determinare seipsum absque efficaci Dei\n      praemotione est liberi arbitrii sani et robusti, non autem\n      infirmi._\u201d\n\n  751 Cfr. Berti, _De Theol. Disciplinis_, XIV, 8, n. 18: \u201c_Quamvis sit\n      haec efficax gratia antecedens et Deus sine nobis faciat ut velimus,\n      nihilo tamen minus per illam non proponitur nobis bonum sub ratione\n      omnis boni, quemadmodum proponitur beatis per lumen gloriae, ideoque\n      remanet indifferentia iudicii et vera libertas._\u201d\n\n  752 Calvinism, Bajanism, Jansenism\u2014Thomism, Augustinianism, Molinism,\n      and Congruism.\n\n_  753 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, c. 17.\n\n  754 Cfr. Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, pp. 433 sqq.\n\n  755 On the insufficiency of the _indifferentia iudicii_ to preserve\n      free-will, _v. supra_, p. 242.\n\n_  756 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 6.\n\n  757 \u201c_Proponitur praemium ut pecces, i.e. quod te delectat_,\u201d he says;\n      \u201c... _Terreris minis, facis propter quod times.... Si cupiditas non\n      valuit, forte timor valebit ut pecces.... Itaque ad omne recte\n      factum amor et timor ducit. Ut facias bene, amas Deum et times Deum;\n      ut autem facias male, amas mundum et times mundum._\u201d _In Ps._, 79,\n      c. 13.\n\n  758 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 422 sqq.; Palmieri, _De\n      Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 54.\n\n  759 On the _Congregatio de Auxiliis_, so called because the principal\n      question under discussion was the help (_auxilia_) afforded by\n      grace, see Astrain, S. J., in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. IV,\n      pp. 238 sq., and Schneemann, S. J., _Die Entstehung und weitere\n      Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg\n      1879; also in a Latin translation, Freiburg 1881.\n\n  760 Cfr. Molina, _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_, qu. 14,\n      art. 13, dip. 38: \u201c_Asserimus auxilia praevenientis atque adiuvantis\n      gratiae ... pendere a libero consensu et cooperatione liberi\n      arbitrii nostri cum illis atque adeo in libera potestate nostra\n      esse, vel illa efficacia reddere consentiendo et cooperando cum\n      illis ad actus, quibus ad iustificationem disponimur, vel\n      inefficacia illa reddere continendo consensum et cooperationem\n      nostram aut ettam eliciendo contrarium consensum._\u201d _Ibid._, disp.\n      12: \u201c_Quare fieri potest, ut duorum qui aequali auxilio interius a\n      Deo vocantur, unus pro libertate sui arbitrii convertatur et alter\n      infidelitate permaneat._\u201d\n\n  761 \u201c_Auxilium gratiae praevenientis_,\u201d says Molina, \u201c_est influxus Dei\n      in liberum arbitrium, quo illud movet et excitat potensque reddit,\n      ut eo pacto motum tamquam habens iam in se ipso principium efficiens\n      actuum supernaturalium simul influendo ulterius eos producat._\u201d\n      Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 41.\n\n  762 Cfr. Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 23, art. 4, disp. 1: \u201c_Quando audis\n      consensum nostrum efficacia reddere auxilia gratiae, non ita id\n      intelligas, quasi arbitrium nostrum vim aliquam seu efficacitatem\n      tribuat auxiliis ipsis; arbitrium enim et influxus noster nullam vim\n      conferunt gratiae auxiliis, sed potius auxilia vim et propensionem\n      arbitrio tribuunt ad consensum eliciendum._\u201d _Ibid._, _Appendix ad\n      obi._ 3 (ed. Paris., 1876, p. 595): \u201c_Solum significare volumus,\n      auxilium illud liberum nobis relinquere consensum nostrum ad\n      conversionem, nec tale esse, ut nullam necessitatem, etiam\n      consequentiae, arbitrio ad talem consensum aut conversionem ponat._\u201d\n\n  763 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 383 sqq.\n\n  764 Cfr. Molina, _op. cit._, qu. 19, art. 6, disp. 2: \u201c_Hac ratione Deus\n      O. M. vult omnia bona, quae per arbitrium nostrum sunt futura, non\n      solum voluntate conditionali, si nos quoque ea velimus, sed etiam\n      voluntate absoluta, quatenus ipsi praevidenti ea futura placent\n      eademque divina eius ac singularis bonitas per arbitrium nostrum\n      intendit ac vult. Quod autem haec etiam absoluta voluntas semper\n      impleatur, ex eo est manifestum, quia nititur certitudine\n      praescientiae divinae, quod ita res futura sit per nostrum\n      arbitrium._\u201d\u2014_Ibid._, qu. 23, art. 4, disp. 3: \u201c_Quoniam quod Deus\n      elegerit eum rerum ordinem, circumstantiarum et auxiliorum, sive\n      maiorum sive minorum, in quo praevidebat eos pro sua libertate\n      salvandos, qui electione eius ordinis eo ipso praedestinati sunt\n      vitamque aeternam pro sua libertate consequuntur, potius quam alium\n      ex infinitis, in quo res aliter pro eadem ipsorum libertate\n      habuisset, non fuit ex nobis aut pro meritorum et cooperationis\n      nostrae qualitate, sed ex sola misericordia Dei._\u201d Cfr. G.\n      Schneemann, _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique\n      Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881, pp. 38 sqq.\n\n  765 Cfr. his treatise _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 12 (ed. F\u00e8vre,\n      tom. V, p. 527, Paris 1873): \u201c_Prima opinio eorum est, qui gratiam\n      efficacem constituunt in assensu et cooperatione humana, ita ut ab\n      eventu dicatur gratia efficax, quia videlicet sortitur effectum et\n      ideo sortitur effectum, quia voluntas humana cooperatur. Itaque\n      existimant hi autores, in potestate hominis esse ut gratiam faciat\n      esse efficacem, quae alioquin ex se non esset nisi sufficiens._\u201d\n      Bellarmine treats this opinion as the extreme counterpart of Thomism\n      (which he also combats) and disposes of it thus: \u201c_Haec opinio\n      aliena est omnino a sententia b. Augustini et, quantum ego existimo,\n      a sententia etiam Scripturarum divinarum._\u201d (_l.c._) Among the\n      Scriptural texts which he quotes in support of this view are John\n      VI, 45, 1 Cor. IV, 7, Rom. IX, 11.\n\n  766 The learned Cardinal describes the difference between Congruism and\n      extreme Molinism (which latter, it may be remarked, was not defended\n      by Molina himself) as follows: \u201c_Neque enim intelligi potest, quo\n      pacto gratia efficax consistat in illa interna suasione, quae per\n      liberum arbitrium respui potest, et tamen infallibilem effectum\n      habeat, nisi addamus, Deum iis quos efficaciter et infallibiliter\n      trahere decrevit, eam suasionem adhibere quam videt congruere\n      ingenio eorum et quam certo novit ab eis non contemnendam._\u201d (_Op.\n      cit._, p. 531.) The objection that this explanation eventually\n      resolves itself into the Molinistic theory which he had censured,\n      Bellarmine meets as follows: \u201c_Respondeo sententiam nostram, quam S.\n      Augustini esse demonstravimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa opinione\n      convenire, sed in multis ab illa discrepare. Convenit enim in eo\n      quod utraque sententia gratiam sufficentem et efficacem ponit in\n      auxilio excitante potissimum, non in adiuvante. Sed discrepant inter\n      se, quod prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate\n      humana, nostra vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei._\u201d (_l.c._, cap.\n      13.)\n\n  767 Further details in Schneemann, _Hist. Controv._, pp. 302 sqq.\n\n  768 Cfr. _Ad Simplician._, I, qu. 2, n. 13: \u201c_Si vellet [Deus] etiam\n      ipsorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut\n      et moverentur et intelligerent et sequerentur. Verum est ergo: Multi\n      vocati, pauci electi. Illi enim electi, qui congruenter vocati; illi\n      autem qui non congruebant neque contemperabantur vocationi, non\n      electi, quia non secuti, quamvis vocati. Item verum est: Neque\n      volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei, quia etiamsi\n      multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo iis\n      vocari aptum est ut sequantur. Falsum est autem, si quis dicit:\n      Igitur non miserentis Dei, sed volentis atque currentis est hominis,\n      quia nullius Deus frustra miseretur. Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum\n      vocat quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat._\u201d\n\n  769 Cfr. Suarez, _De Aux._, V, 25: \u201c_Vocatio efficax illa est, quae ...\n      includit congruitatem quandam respectu personae, cui datur, ut sit\n      illi proportionata et accommodata, sicut oportet, ut in tali\n      persona, in tali tempore et occasione infallibiliter effectum\n      habeat, et per hoc habet illa vocatio quod congrua et efficax sit._\u201d\n\n  770 1 Kings XVII, 38 sqq.\u2014Cfr. Lessius, _De Praedest. et Reprob._, sect.\n      5, n. 106: \u201c_Ex quibus patet, gratiam efficacem, si physice\n      spectetur, non semper esse maius beneficium, quum saepenumero ea,\n      quae effectu caret, secundum suam entitatem longe sit praestantior.\n      Si tamen spectetur moraliter, nimirum ut subest praescientiae\n      infallibili effectus, sic semper maius est beneficium, etiam ut\n      praecisa ab actuali effectu et gratia cooperante seu ut prior\n      actuali suo influxu in opus, quum Deus, qui non caeco modo operatur,\n      ex mero suo beneplacito et inscrutabili iudicio seligat pro\n      quibusdam gratias illas quas effectum habituras videt, non solum ut\n      gratiae quaedam sunt, sed etiam formaliter, ut effectum habiturae\n      sunt.... Ex quibus constat, quo sensu distinctio gratiae congruae et\n      non congruae admittenda sit, quam numquam reieci, sed totis animis\n      et sensu et praxi semper sum amplexus._\u201d\n\n_  771 De Grat. et Lib. Arbitr._, ed. F\u00e8vre, t. V, p. 533.\n\n_  772 V. supra_, p. 16.\n\n  773 For the proofs of this assertion see Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina\n      Actuali_, thes. 50.\n\n  774 Cfr. St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, V, 9, 4: \u201c_Quod [voluntates]\n      facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae, quia facturas ille praescivit,\n      cuius praescientia falli non potest._\u201d\n\n  775 On Congruism cfr. Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp.\n      167 sqq.; Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 447.\n      On the various interpretations of the _praedefinitio actuum\n      salutarium_, within as well as without the Jesuit Order, see Tepe,\n      _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 93 sqq., Paris 1896, and especially\n      Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 458 sqq.\n\n  776 Chief among them Ysambert, Tournely, St. Alphonsus de\u2019 Liguori,\n      Albert Knoll, and more recently Cardinal Katschthaler.\n\n  777 For a more detailed account see Tournely, _De Gratia Christi_, qu.\n      7, art. 4, concl. 5; Katschthaler, _De Gratia_, pp. 173 sqq.,\n      Ratisbon 1880.\n\n  778 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, V, 20, 2.\n\n  779 Rom. XI, 33. On Syncretism cfr. Alb. a Bulsano, _Inst. Theol.\n      Dogmat. Specialis_, ed. by Gottfried a Graun, O. M. Cap., tom. II,\n      pp. 193 sqq., Innsbruck 1894.\n\n_  780 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 5: \u201c_De Necessitate Praeparationis_,\u201d\n      and cap. 6: \u201c_De Modo Praeparationis_.\u201d\n\n  781 Sess. VI, cap. 8: \u201c_Fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum\n      et radix omnis iustificationis._\u201d\n\n  782 Sess. VI, cap. 6: \u201c_Disponuntur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum\n      excitati divin\u00e2 grati\u00e2 et adiuti fidem ex auditu concipientes libere\n      moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quae divinitus revelata et\n      promissa sunt._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798).\n\n  783 Sess. VI, can. 12: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil\n      aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordiae peccata remittentis\n      propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse, qu\u00e2 iustificamur,\n      anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 822.) Cfr. _Conc. Vatic._,\n      Sess. III, cap. 3, \u201c_De Fide_\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1789).\n\n  784 \u03ba\u03b7\u03c1\u03cd\u03be\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n  785 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9.\n\n  786 John XX, 31.\n\n  787 Acts VIII, 37.\n\n  788 Rom. X, 9 sq.: \u201c_Quia si confitearis in ore tuo Dominum Iesum et in\n      corde tuo credideris quod Deus illum suscitaverit a mortuis, salvus\n      eris. Corde enim creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad\n      salutem._\u201d\n\n  789 Heb. XI, 6: \u201c_Sine fide autem impossibile est placere Deo; credere\n      enim oportet accedentem ad Deum [i.e. iustificandum] quia est\n      [=existentia Dei] et inquirentibus se remunerator sit._\u201d\n\n  790 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 39 sq.\n\n  791 Murray, _De Gratia_, disp. 10, n. 18. Cfr. Becanus, _De Gratia\n      Habituali_, c. I, qu. 7, art. 6 sq.; Bellarmine, _De\n      Iustificatione_, I, 5 sqq.\n\n  792 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, p. 616, Freiburg and St. Louis\n      1908.\n\n_  793 Prologus: ____Gaudeo quod pro fide vera sine ullo perfidiae vitio\n      custodienda sollicitudinem geris, sine qua nulla potest prodesse,\n      imo nec esse conversio. Apostolica quippe dicit auctoritas, quia\n      sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Fides namque est bonorum\n      omnium fundamentum. Fides est humanae salutis initium. Sine hac fide\n      nemo ad filiorum Dei numerum potest pervenire, quia sine ipsa nec in\n      hoc saeculo quisquam iustificationis gratiam consequitur nec in\n      futuro possidebit vitam aeternam.___\n\n  794 On the traditional concepts of \u201cfaith\u201d and \u201cjustification\u201d as held\n      in the Church before Luther\u2019s time, see Denifle, O. P., _Die\n      abendl\u00e4ndischen Schriftausleger bis Luther \u00fcber die Iustitia Dei und\n      Iustificatio_, Mainz 1905.\n\n  795 Cfr. Mark XVI, 15 sq.; Gal. I, 6 sqq.; Tit. III, 10 sq.\n\n  796 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7: \u201c_Post\n      tempus autem gratiae revelatae tam maiores quant minores tenentur\n      [necessitate praecepti] habere fidem explicitam de mysteriis\n      Christi, praecipue quantum ad ea, quae communiter in Ecclesia\n      solemnizantur et publice proponuntur, sicut sunt articuli\n      Incarnationis.... Alias autem subtiles considerationes circa\n      Incarnationis articulos tenentur aliqui magis vel minus explicite\n      credere, secundum quod convenit statui et officio uniuscuiusque._\u201d\n      This point is well developed by Ballerini, _Opus Theologicum\n      Morale_, ed. D. Palmieri, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 9 sqq., Prati 1898.\n\n  797 Heb. XI, 6.\n\n  798 Chiefly Andrew Vega, Ripalda, and some modern writers.\n\n_  799 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 6; _Conc. Vatican._, Sess. III, cap.\n      3, _V. supra_, pp. 182 sqq.\n\n  800 \u201c_Nonnisi fides unius Dei necessaria videtur necessitate medii, non\n      autem explicita remuneratoris._\u201d _Prop. Damn. ab Innocenti XI._,\n      prop. 22, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1172.\n\n  801 Heb. XI, 6.\n\n  802 Cfr. Wirceburg, _De Gratia_, n. 120: \u201c_Quia tamen qui credit et\n      sperat remuneratorem supernaturalem, satis hoc ipso etiam credit\n      animae perpetuitatem et necessitatem auxilii melioris ad salutem,\n      fides horum explicita et per distinctos conceptus non semper in re\n      et actualiter necessaria existimatur._\u201d\n\n  803 Gregory of Valentia, Becanus, Thomas Sanchez, and many Thomists.\n\n  804 Suarez, De Lugo, and a large number of other theologians.\n\n  805 Cfr. Rom. III, 22.\n\n  806 Cfr. John III, 18.\n\n  807 Cfr. Acts IV, 12.\n\n  808 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7, ad 3: \u201c_Si\n      qui salvati fuerunt, quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt\n      salvati absque fide mediatoris, quia, etsi non habuerunt fidem\n      explicitam, habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina providentia,\n      credentes Deum esse liberatorem hominum secundum modos sibi\n      placitos._\u201d\n\n  809 The practical bearing of this question on the heathens is treated\n      _supra_, pp. 179 sqq.\n\n  810 \u201c_Missionarium teneri adulto etiam moribundo, qui incapax omnino non\n      sit, explicare fidei mysteria, quae sunt necessaria necessitate\n      medii, ut sunt praecipue mysteria Trinitatis et Incarnationis._\u201d\n      Cfr. _Prop. Damn. ab Innocentio XI. a._ 1679, prop. 64\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1214). For a full explanation of the topics\n      treated in the present Section consult Suarez, _De Fide_, disp. 12,\n      sect. 4; De Lugo, _De Fide_, disp. 12, sect. 4 sq.; W. Liese, _Der\n      heilsnotwendige Glaube_, Freiburg 1902.\n\n  811 Cfr. _Solid. Declar._, art. 3: \u201c_Neque contritio neque dilectio\n      neque ulla virtus, sed sola fides [=fiducia] est medium et\n      instrumentum, quo gratiam Dei, merita Christi et remissionem\n      peccatorum apprehendere possumus._\u201d\n\n_  812 Instit._, III, 11, \u00a7 19: \u201c_Dicimus hominem sol\u00e2 fide iustificari._\u201d\n      For a classic exposition of the Lutheran and Calvinistic views of\n      faith, see M\u00f6hler, _Symbolik_, \u00a7 16; English tr. by James Burton\n      Robertson, 5th ed., London 1906, pp. 124 sqq.\n\n  813 Sess. VI, can. 9: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, sol\u00e2 fide impium iustificari,\n      ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requiri quod ad iustificationis\n      gratiam consequendam cooperetur et null\u00e2 ex parte necesse esse, eum\n      suae voluntatis motu praeparari atque disponi, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 819.)\n\n  814 Sess. VI, cap. 6. The passage is quoted _infra_, p. 296.\n\n  815 He contemptuously called it \u201c_ein str\u00f6herne Epistel_,\u201d a letter of\n      straw.\n\n  816 Matth. VII, 21: \u201c_Non omnis, qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine,\n      intrabit in regnum caelorum: sed qui facit voluntatem Patris mei,\n      qui in caelis est, ipse intrabit in regnum caelorum._\u201d\n\n  817 Jas. II, 24: \u201c_Videtis quoniam ex operibus iustificatur homo, et non\n      ex fide tantum (\u1f10\u03be \u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03ba \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\n      \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd)._\u201d\n\n  818 1 Cor. XIII, 2: \u201c_Et si habuero omnem fidem (\u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd), ita\n      ut montes transferam, caritatem (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03bd) autem non habuero, nihil\n      sum._\u201d\n\n  819 Ecclus. I, 28: \u201c_Qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari._\u201d\n\n  820 Rom. VIII, 24: \u201c_Spe enim salvi facti sumus._\u201d\n\n  821 Luke VII, 47: \u201c_Remittuntur ei peccata multa, quoniam (\u1f45\u03c4\u03b9) dilexit\n      multum._\u201d\n\n  822 Luke XIII, 3: \u201c_Nisi poenitentiam habueritis, omnes similiter\n      peribitis._\u201d\n\n  823 Jac. II, 17: \u201c_Fides, si non habet opera, mortua est in semetipso._\u201d\n\n  824 Gal. V, 6: \u201c_In Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque\n      praeputium, sed fides quae per caritatem operatur_ (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fbd\n      \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7).\u201d\n\n  825 Jac. II, 26: \u201c_Sicut enim corpus sine spiritu mortuum est, ita et\n      fides sine operibus mortua est._\u201d\n\n  826 Rom. III, 28: \u201c_Arbitramur enim hominem iustificari per fidem sine\n      operibus legis._\u201d\n\n_  827 De Fide et Lib. Arbitrio_, c. 7, n. 18.\n\n  828 On the misinterpretation of other Scripture texts by the Reformers\n      see Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, I, 19-24.\n\n_  829 Ep. ad Philipp._, 3.\n\n  830 Serm., XVI, c. 6: \u201c_A fide incipit homo, sed et daemones credunt et\n      contremiscunt; adde ergo fidei spem speique ipsi adde caritatem._\u201d\n\n_  831 De Trinit._, XXV, 18: \u201c_Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem\n      esse, sed non et prodesse._\u201d\n\n_  832 Hom. in Evang._, 29: \u201c_Fortasse unusquisque apud semetipsum dicat:\n      Ego iam credidi, salvus ero. Verum dicit, si fidem operibus tenet.\n      Vera etenim fides est, quae in hoc quod verbis dicit moribus non\n      contradicit._\u201d As to the sense in which some of the Fathers speak of\n      faith as the only thing that can save men, cfr. Bellarmine _De\n      Iustificat._, I, 26.\n\n  833 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, art. 5:\n      \u201c_Iustificatio impii est quidam motus, quo humana mens movetur a Deo\n      a statu peccati in statum iustitiae.... Unde oportet quod mens\n      humana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii recedat a\n      peccato et accedat ad iustitiam. Recessus autem et accessus in motu\n      liberi arbitru accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium....\n      Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impii sit motus liberi\n      arbitrii duplex: unus quo per desiderium tendat in Dei iustitiam, et\n      alius quo detestetur peccatum._\u201d\n\n_  834 De Libertate Voluntatis Humanae_, Leipzig 1555.\n\n  835 \u201c_Klotz-, Stock- und Stein-theorie._\u201d\n\n  836 \u201c_Das Torgische Buch_,\u201d A. D. 1576.\n\n  837 \u201c_Articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae._\u201d Cfr. Newman, _Lectures\n      on Justification_, p. 113.\n\n_  838 Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie_, p. 583, M\u00fcnchen 1867.\n\n_  839 Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation_, Christiania 1894. Not\n      long after writing this book Dr. Krogh-Tonning became a Catholic.\n\n  840 How Luther came to adopt the _sola fides_ theory is exhaustively\n      explained by H. Grisar, S. J., _Luther_, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911;\n      English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913. Cfr. also F. Hettinger,\n      _Die Krisis des Christentums_, pp. 72 sqq., Freiburg 1881.\n\n  841 Cfr. Pohle, art. on \u201cTradition\u201d in Herder\u2019s _Kirchenlexikon_, 2nd\n      ed., Vol. XI, 1933 sqq., Freiburg 1899.\n\n  842 \u201c_Pecca fortiter, crede fortius._\u201d Cfr. M\u00f6hler, _Symbolism_ (English\n      tr., p. 130).\n\n  843 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7455,\n      Mainz 1899. The \u201corthodox\u201d Lutheran teaching is strongly stated by\n      the famous convert Dr. Edw. Preuss in his work, still regarded as a\n      classic by \u201corthodox\u201d Lutherans, _Die Rechtfertigung des S\u00fcnders vor\n      Gott_, Berlin 1868.\n\n  844 Sess. VI, cap. 8.\n\n  845 Sess. VI, cap. 6.\n\n  846 Sess. VI, cap. 8: \u201c_Fides est humanae salutis initium, fundamentum\n      et radix omnis iustificationis._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.)\n\n_  847 V. supra_, pp. 100 sq.\n\n  848 Sess. VI, cap. 6: \u201c_Disponuntur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum\n      excitati divin\u00e2 grati\u00e2 et adiuti, fidem ex auditu concipientes,\n      libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse, quae divinitus\n      revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo iustificari\n      impium per gratiam eius, per redemptionem, quae est in Christo Iesu,\n      et dum peccatores se esse intelligentes, a divinae iustitiae timore,\n      quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se\n      convertendo, in spem eriguntur fidentes, Deum sibi propter Christum\n      propitium fore, illumque tamquam omnis iustitiae fontem diligere\n      incipiunt: ac propterea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod\n      et detestationem, hoc est, per eam poenitentiam, quam ante baptismum\n      agi oportet: denique dum proponunt suscipere baptismum, inchoare\n      novam vitam et servare divina mandata._\u201d\n\n  849 \u201c_Diligere incipiunt._\u201d (_ibid._)\n\n_  850 Contritio cum proposito novae vitae._\n\n_  851 Contritio caritate perfecta._\n\n_  852 Votum sacramenti, sacramentum in voto._\n\n  853 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 4 and 14.\n\n  854 Cfr. Ez. XVIII, 30; Joel II, 12; Luke XIII, 3; Acts II, 38. Cfr.\n      _Conc. Trid._, Sess. XIV, cap. 4: \u201c_Contritio, quae primum locum\n      inter dictos poenitentis actus habet, animi dolor ac detestatio est\n      de peccato commisso cum proposito non peccandi de cetero. Fuit autem\n      quovis tempore ad impetrandam veniam peccatorum hic contritionis\n      motus necessarius._\u201d\n\n  855 Cfr. _Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 87, art. 1: \u201c_Exigitur autem ad\n      remissionem peccati mortalis perfectior poenitentia, ut scil. homo\n      actualiter pecoatum mortale commissum detestetur, quantum in ipso\n      est, ut scil. diligentiam adhibeat ad memorandum singula peccata\n      mortalia, ut singula detestetur. Sed hoc non requiritur ad\n      remissionem venialium peccatorum.... Unde sequitur quod requiratur\n      quaedam virtualis displicentia, ... quod tamen non sufficit ad\n      remissionem peccati mortalis, nisi quantum ad peccata oblita post\n      diligentem inquisitionem._\u201d\n\n  856 Cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 204 sqq., Paris 1896.\n\n_  857 Fides mortua_ in contradistinction to _fides viva_.\n\n  858 Gal. V, 6.\n\n_  859 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 28: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, amiss\u00e2 per\n      peccatum grati\u00e2 simul et fidem semper amitti aut fidem, quae\n      remanet, non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, aut eum qui fidem\n      sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 838.) The Scriptural argument for this\n      thesis is developed by Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, I, 15.\n\n_  860 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 4: \u201c_Iustificatio impii [est]\n      translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adae, in\n      statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam Iesum\n      Christum Salvatorem nostrum._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 796.)\n\n  861 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 221 sq.\n\n  862 Cfr. the second on the list of Lutheran propositions condemned by\n      Leo X, A. D. 1520: \u201c_In puero post baptismum negare remanens\n      peccatum est Paulum et Christum simul conculcare._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 742.)\n\n_  863 Form. Conc._, p. 2, c. 3: \u201c_Quando autem docemus, quod per\n      operationem Spiritus Sancti regeneramur et iustificamur, non ita\n      accipiendum est quod iustificatis et renatis nulla prorsus\n      iniustitia substantiae ipsorum et conversationi adhaereat, sed quod\n      Christus perfectissim\u00e2 obedienti\u00e2 su\u00e2 omnia ipsorum peccata tegat,\n      quae quidem in ipsa natura infixa haerent. Nihilominus tamen per\n      fidem propter obedientiam Christi boni et iusti pronuntiantur et\n      reputantur, etiamsi ratione corruptae naturae suae sint maneantque\n      peccatores, dum mortale hoc corpus circumferunt._\u201d\n\n_  864 Antid. Conc. Trid._, ad Sess. V: \u201c_Manet vere peccatum in nobis\n      neque per baptismum statim uno die extinguitur._\u201d Cfr. M\u00f6hler,\n      _Symbolik_, \u00a7 14 (Robertson\u2019s translation, 5th ed., pp. 110 sqq.).\n\n_  865 Conc. Trid._, Sess. V, can. 5: \u201c_Si quis per Iesu Christi D. N.\n      gratiam, quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati\n      remitti negat aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id quod veram et\n      propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non\n      imputari, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 792.)\n\n  866 Sess. VI, cap. 14; Sess. XIV, cap. 2. See Pohle-Preuss, _The\n      Sacraments_, Vol. II, _Penance_.\n\n  867 \u201c_Dele iniquitatem meam._\u201d\n\n  868 Is. XLIII, 25: \u201c_Ego sum ipse, qui deleo iniquitates tuas._\u201d\n\n  869 Is. XLIV, 22: \u201c_Delevi ut nubem iniquitates tuas et quasi nebulam\n      peccata tua._\u201d\n\n  870 Acts III, 19: \u201c_Poenitemini igitur et convertimini, ut deleantur\n      peccata vestra._\u201d\n\n  871 2 Kings XII, 13: \u201c_Dominus quoque transtulit peccatum tuum._\u201d\n\n  872 1 Paral. XXI, 8: \u201c_Obsecro, aufer iniquitatem servi tui._\u201d\n\n  873 Mich. VII, 18 sq.: \u201c_Quis, Deus, similis tui, qui aufers\n      iniquitatem?... Deponet [Deus] iniquitates nostras et proiiciet in\n      profundum maris omnia peccata nostra._\u201d\n\n  874 Ps. X, 15: \u201c_Quaeretur peccatum illius, et non invenietur._\u201d\n\n  875 Ps. CII, 12: \u201c_Quantum distat ortus ab occidente, longe fecit a\n      nobis iniquitates nostras._\u201d\n\n  876 Luke VII, 47: \u201c_Remittuntur ei peccata multa._\u201d\n\n  877 Ps. L, 4: \u201c_Amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea et a peccato meo munda\n      me._\u201d\n\n  878 Is. I, 16: \u201c_Lavamini, mundi estote._\u201d\n\n  879 Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: \u201c_Effundam super vos aquam mundam et mundabimini\n      ab omnibus inquinamentis vestris.... Et dabo vobis cor novum._\u201d\n\n  880 1 Cor. VI, 11: \u201c_Et haec quidam [fornicarii etc.] fuistis, sed\n      abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed iustificati estis._\u201d\n\n  881 Ps. L, 9: \u201c_Asperges me hyssopo et mundabor, lavabis me et super\n      nivem dealbabor._\u201d\n\n  882 Is. I, 18: \u201c_Si fuevint peccata vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix\n      dealbabuntur, et si fuerint rubra quasi vermiculus, velut lana alba\n      erunt._\u201d\n\n  883 Apoc. I, 5: \u201c_... dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in\n      sanguine suo._\u201d\n\n  884 1 John I, 7: \u201c_Sanguis Iesu Christi ... emundat nos ab omni\n      peccato._\u201d\n\n  885 1 John III, 14: \u201c_Translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam\n      diligimus fratres: qui non diligit, manet in morte._\u201d\n\n  886 Col. II, 13: \u201c_Et vos, quum mortui essetis in delictis, ...\n      convivificavit cum illo donans vobis omnia delicta._\u201d\n\n  887 Eph. V, 8: \u201c_Eratis enim aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in\n      Domino._\u201d\n\n  888 Acts XXII, 16: \u201c_Exsurge et baptizare et ablue peccata tua._\u201d\n\n  889 Rom. VIII, 1: \u201c_Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est iis, qui sunt in\n      Christo Iesu._\u201d Cfr. on this point the dogmatic treatise on the\n      Sacrament of Baptism.\n\n  890 Cfr. Becanus, _Theol. Scholast._, P. II, tr. 5, cap. 1, qu. 1.\n\n  891 Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: \u201c_Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum\n      tecta sunt peccata; beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum\n      nec est in spiritu eius dolus._\u201d\n\n  892 Heb. IV, 13. Cfr. St. Augustine, _Enarr. in Ps._, II, 31, n. 12:\n      \u201c_Deus tegat vulnera, noli tu. Nam si tu tegere volueris erubescens,\n      medicus non curabit. Medicus tegat et curet; emplastro enim tegit.\n      Sub tegmine medici curatur vulnus, sub tegmine vulnerati celatur\n      vulnus._\u201d\n\n  893 Rom. VII, 17: \u201c_Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod\n      habitat in me peccatum._\u201d\n\n_  894 Peccatum_, \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1.\n\n  895 Sess. V, can. 5: \u201c_... ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat._\u201d\n      Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 242 sqq., 261 sqq. On Jas. I, 14 sq., St. Augustine observes:\n      \u201c_Profecto in his verbis partus a pariente discernitur. Pariens enim\n      est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit\n      nisi conceperit, nec concipit nisi illexerit, h. e. ad malum\n      perpetrandum obtinuerit volentis assensum. Quod ergo adversus eam\n      dimicamur, hoc agitur, ne concipiat pariatque peccatum._\u201d (_Contra\n      Iulian._, VI, 15, 47.) For a more exhaustive discussion of this\n      subject see Bellarmine, _De Justif._, II, 9.\n\n_  896 Dial. c. Tryph._, n. 141.\n\n_  897 Strom._, l. II.\n\n_  898 Or._, 40.\n\n_  899 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagian._, I, 13, 26: \u201c_Quis hoc adversus\n      Pelagianos nisi infidelis affirmet? Dicimus ergo baptisma dare\n      omnium indulgentiam peccatorum et auferre crimina, non radere; nec\n      ut omnium peccatorum radices in mala carne teneantur, quasi rasorum\n      in capite capillorum, unde crescunt iterum resecanda peccata._\u201d\n\n_  900 Ep._, l. II, ep. 45: \u201c_Si qui vero sunt qui dicunt, peccata in\n      baptismate superficie tenus dimitti, quid est hac praedicatione\n      infidelius?... Qui dicit peccata in baptismate funditus non dimitti,\n      dicat in mari rubro Aegyptios non veraciter mortuos. Si autem\n      fatetur, Aegyptios veraciter mortuos, fateatur necesse est, peccata\n      in baptismate funditus mori._\u201d Other confirmatory texts _apud_ Alb.\n      a Bulsano, _Instit. Theol. Dogmat. Specialis_, ed. P. Gottfr. a\n      Graun, O. Cap., Vol. II, pp. 226 sq., Innsbruck 1894.\n\n  901 Apoc. XXI, 27: \u201c_Non intrabit in coelum aliquod coinquinatum._\u201d\n\n_  902 Privatio_, \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n  903 Cfr. St. Thomas, _De Veritate_, qu. 28, art. 1 sqq.; IDEM, _Summa\n      Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 113, art. 2.\n\n  904 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, II, 1 and 6.\n\n_  905 Apol. Confess. August._, c. 3, art. 6: \u201c_Iustificare veto hoc loco\n      (Rom. VIII, 1) forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et\n      pronuntiare iustum, sed propter alienam iustitiam, videl. Christi,\n      quae aliena iustitia nobis communicatur per fidem._\u201d\n\n_  906 Solida Declar._, III, \u201c_De Fide Iustif._,\u201d \u00a7 11: \u201c_Vocabulum\n      iustificationis in hoc negotio significat iustum pronuntiare, a\n      peccatis et aeternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere propter\n      iustitiam Christi, quae a Deo fidei imputatur._\u201d\n\n  907 The Lutheran doctrine is fully and lucidly set forth by Dr. Edward\n      Preuss in his work, _Die Rechtfertigung des S\u00fcnders vor Gott_\n      (Berlin 1868), which he retracted at his conversion, in 1872. Cfr.\n      also Newman\u2019s _Lectures on Justification_, Lecture I (8th\n      impression, London 1900).\n\n  908 Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_Iustificatio non est sola peccatorum remissio,\n      sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam\n      susceptionem gratiae et donorum...._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.)\n\n  909 Sess. VI, cap. 11: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari vel sol\u00e2\n      imputatione iustitiae Christi vel sol\u00e2 peccatorum remissione,\n      exclus\u00e2 grati\u00e2 et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum\n      Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, aut etiam gratiam qu\u00e2\n      iustificamur esse tantum favorem Dei, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 821.)\n\n  910 Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_Huius iustificationis causae sunt: formalis\n      quidem gloria Dei et Christi ac vita aeterna; efficiens vero\n      misericors Deus, qui gratuito abluit et sanctificat; ... meritoria\n      autem dilectissimus Unigenitus suus D. N. Iesus Christus, qui ...\n      su\u00e2 sanctissim\u00e2 passione in ligno crucis nobis iustificationem\n      meruit; ... instrumentalis item sacramentum baptismi, quod est\n      sacramentum fidei, sine qu\u00e2 nulli unquam contigit iustificatio;\n      demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qu\u00e2 ipse iustus\n      est, sed qu\u00e2 nos iustos facit, qu\u00e2 videl. ab eo donati renovamur\n      spiritu mentis nostrae et non modo reputamur, sed vere iusti\n      nominamur et sumus._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799).\n\n  911 Sess. VI, can. 10: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, homines sine Christi iustitia,\n      per quam nobis meruit iustificari aut per eam ipsam formaliter\n      iustos esse, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 820.)\n\n_  912 V. supra_, Article 1.\n\n  913 Cfr. Eph. II, 5; Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.\n\n  914 Cfr. Eph. IV, 23 sq.\n\n  915 Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17; Gal. VI, 15; Jas. I, 18; Ps. L, 12.\n\n  916 Cfr. John III, 5; Tit. III, 5.\n\n  917 Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29; 2 Cor. III, 18; 2 Pet. I, 4.\n\n  918 John III, 5.\n\n  919 Tit. III, 5 sqq.: \u201c_Non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed\n      secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit (\u1f14\u03c3\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2) per\n      lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis (\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n      \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2) Spiritus Sancti, quem effudit (\u1f10\u03be\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b5\u03bd) in nos\n      abunde per Iesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum, ut iustificati\n      (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2) grati\u00e2 ipsius haeredes simus secundum spem vitae\n      aeternae._\u201d\n\n  920 Cfr. John I, 12 sq.; Rom. VIII, 16; Gal. III, 7; IV, 6 sq.; 1 John\n      III, 1.\n\n  921 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.\n\n  922 Cfr. Col. III, 9 sq.\n\n  923 Cfr. Acts II, 38; X, 45 sqq.; Rom. V, 5.\n\n  924 Cfr. J. Pohle, article \u201cRegeneration\u201d in the _Catholic\n      Encyclopedia_, Vol. XII, and A. Rademacher, _Die \u00fcbernat\u00fcrliche\n      Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_,\n      pp. 41 sqq., Freiburg 1903.\n\n  925 2 Cor. V, 17: \u201c_Si qua ergo in Christo nova creatura (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2),\n      vetera transierunt; ecce facta sunt omnia nova._\u201d Cfr. Eph. II, 10.\n\n  926 Jac. I, 18: \u201c_Voluntarie enim genuit (\u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03ba\u03cd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd) nos verbo\n      veritatis, ut simus initium aliquod creaturae eius._\u201d\n\n  927 Gal. VI, 15: \u201c_In Christo enim Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet\n      neque praeputium, sed nova creatura (\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u03ba\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2)._\u201d\n\n  928 Gal. V, 6: \u201c_Nam in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet\n      neque praeputium, sed fides quae per caritatem operatur_ (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u1fbd\n      \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7).\u201d\n\n  929 On the argument from Rom. V, 15 sqq. cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the\n      Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, pp. 247 sqq.\n\n_  930 Iustificare,_ \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd.\n\n_  931 E.g._, Rom. V, 15 sqq. and Gal. III, 8 sqq.\n\n  932 Ps. CXVIII, 8: \u201c_Iustificationes tuas custodiam._\u201d\n\n  933 Ps. CXVIII, 26: \u201c_... doce me iustificationes tuas._\u201d\n\n  934 Apoc. XXII, 11: \u201c_Qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sanctus\n      sanctificetur adhuc_.\u201d On the different meanings of the term\n      justification in Scripture see Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, I, 1; II,\n      3.\n\n  935 Gal. III, 27: \u201c_Quicunque enim in Christo baptizati estis, Christum\n      induistis._\u201d\n\n  936 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 8 sqq.\n\n  937 1 Cor. I, 30: \u201c_Qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia\n      (\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7) et sanctificatio (\u1f01\u03b3\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2) et redemptio_.\u201d\n\n  938 Other objections are refuted by Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, II, 9 sqq.\n\n  939 Cfr. Calvin, _Instit._, III, 11, \u00a7 15: \u201c_Ac nec Augustini quidem\n      sententia recipienda est, qui gratiam ad sanctificationem refert,\n      qu\u00e2 in vitae novitatem per Spiritum Sanctum regeneramur._\u201d\n\n  940 On the Epistle of Barnabas see Bardenhewer-Shahan, _Patrology_, p.\n      24. The passage quoted will be found _Ep. Barn._, VI, 11.\n\n_  941 Hom. ad Illumin._, I, n. 3.\n\n  942 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd.\n\n  943 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f04\u03bd\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n_  944 De Myst._, c. 7: \u201c_Accepisti post haec vestimenta candida [scil.\n      post baptismum], ut sint indicium quod exueris involucrum peccati,\n      indueris innocentiae casta velamina._\u201d\n\n_  945 De Iustific._, II, 8.\n\n_  946 De Spiritu et Litera_, c. 9, n. 15: \u201c_Non dicit iustitia\n      hominis,... sed iustitia Dei, non qu\u00e2 Deus iustus est, sed qu\u00e2\n      induit hominem, quum iustificat impium.... Iustitia autem Dei per\n      fidem Iesu Christi, hoc est, per fidem qu\u00e2 creditur in Christum.\n      Sicut autem ista fides Christi dicta est, non qu\u00e2 credit Christus,\n      sic et illa iustitia Dei, non qu\u00e2 iustus est Deus. Utrumque enim\n      nostrum est; sed ideo Dei et Christi dicuntur, quod eius nobis\n      largitate donatur._\u201d\n\n_  947 De Gratia Christi_, c. 13: \u201c_Si data est nobis iustitia, non\n      dicitur iustitia nostra, sed Dei, quia sic fit nostra, ut sit nobis\n      ex Deo._\u201d\n\n_  948 Serm._, 131: \u201c_Dei gratia per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum\n      iustitia Dei dicitur, non qu\u00e2 iustus est Dominus, sed qu\u00e2 iustificat\n      eos, quos ex impiis iustos facit._\u201d\n\n_  949 De Spir. et Lit._, c. 32, n. 56: \u201c_Caritas Dei dicta est diffundi\n      in cordibus nostris, non qu\u00e2 ipse nos diligit, sed qu\u00e2, nos facit\n      dilectores suos, sicut iustitia Dei, qu\u00e2 nos iusti eius munere\n      efficimur._\u201d\n\n_  950 De Trinit._, XV, 8, 14: \u201c_Quod vero ait_ (2 Cor. III, 18): ___In\n      eandem imaginem transformamur,____ utique imaginem Dei vult\n      intellegi, eandem dicens istam ipsam, scil., quam speculamur ...\n      atque transimus de forma obscura in formam lucidam.... Quae natura\n      [humana] in rebus creatis excellentissima, quum a suo Creatore ab\n      impietate iustificatur, a deformi forma formosam transfertur in\n      formam._\u201d\n\n  951 Other Patristic texts can be seen in Ripalda, _De Ente Supernal._,\n      disp. 132, sect. 7; Petavius, _De Trinit._, VIII, 4-7; Bellarmine,\n      _De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio_, I, 4.\n\n  952 For a more detailed treatment of this point we must refer the reader\n      to Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmat. Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 537 sqq.\n\n  953 Quoted by De Wette, II, 37.\n\n_  954 V. infra_, Section 3.\n\n  955 Sess. IV, cap. 7.\n\n_  956 V. infra_, Sect. 2, Art. 2.\n\n  957 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, II, 1.\n\n  958 Seripando, Albertus Pighius, Gropper, and others.\n\n  959 On the discussion referred to in the text see Pallavicini, _Hist.\n      Conc. Trid._, VIII, 11, 12; Aug. Theiner, _Acta Genuina Concil.\n      Trid._, tom. I, pp. 222 sqq., Leipzig 1874.\n\n  960 Eph. V, 8; 2 Cor. VI, 14.\n\n  961 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.\n\n  962 Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 9.\n\n_  963 V. supra_, No. 2.\n\n  964 On the history of the Tridentine decree regarding justification cfr.\n      J. Hefner, _Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter\n      Rechtfertigungsdekretes_, Paderborn 1909.\n\n  965 Ockam, Gabriel Biel, _et al._\n\n  966 Henno, Mastrius, _et al._\n\n  967 Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. VII, c. 20, n. 7: \u201c... _non obstante ill\u00e2\n      oppositione et repugnanti\u00e2 connaturali potest Deus de su\u00e2 absolut\u00e2\n      potenti\u00e2 eam vincere et conservare gratiam in eo, qui peccavit, non\n      remittendo illi peccatum._\u201d\n\n  968 Vasquez, Sardagna, Antoine, Mazzella, Tepe, _et al._\n\n  969 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14.\n\n  970 2 Cor. VI, 14 sqq.\n\n  971 Cfr. 1 John III, 9: \u201c_Omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non\n      facit, quoniam semen ipsius_ (\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6) _in eo manet et non\n      potest peccare_ (\u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f01\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd), _quoniam ex Deo natus\n      est._\u201d\n\n_  972 V. infra_, Sect. 2, Art. 1.\n\n  973 For the solution of other difficulties consult Tepe, _Inst. Theol._,\n      Vol. VIII, pp. 152 sqq. On the whole subject of this subdivision\n      cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 7, art. 2 sq. On certain\n      incidental questions, _e.g._ whether justification takes place _in\n      instanti_, whether the infusion of sanctifying grace _in ordine\n      naturae_ precedes or follows the forgiveness of sins, whether\n      justification is the greatest of God\u2019s works, whether it is to be\n      regarded as a miracle, etc., see St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae,\n      qu. 113, art. 7-10; cfr. also Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des\n      Christentums_, 3rd ed., pp. 543 sqq., Freiburg 1912.\n\n_  974 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_Per spiritum sanctum caritas Dei\n      diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui iustificantur, atque ipsis\n      inhaeret._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.)\n\n  975 Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Quae enim iustitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam\n      nobis inhaerentem iustificamur, illa eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis\n      infunditur per Christi meritum._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.)\n\n  976 Sess. VI, can. 11: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari ...\n      exclus\u00e2 grati\u00e2 et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum\n      sanctum diffundatur atque in illis inhaereat, ... anathema\n      sit._\u201d(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 821.)\n\n  977 Sess. VI, cap. 4: \u201c_[Iustificatio est] translatio ... in statum\n      gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 796.)\n\n  978 Cfr. Pallavicini, _Hist. Conc. Trid._, VIII, 14, 3: \u201c_Postulantibus\n      quibusdam, ut expressius declararetur fieri iustitiam per habitum\n      infusum, delecti Patres ad id responderunt, id satis explicari per\n      vocem ____inhaeret,____ quae stabilitatem significat et habitibus\n      congruit, non actibus._\u201d It was on the same ground that Pius V\n      censured the forty-second proposition of Baius, _viz._: \u201c_Iustitia\n      qu\u00e2 iustificatur per fidem impius, consistit formaliter in\n      obedientia mandatorum, quae est operum iustitia; non autem in gratia\n      aliqua animae infusa, qu\u00e2 adoptatur homo in filium Dei, et secundum\n      interiorem hominem renovatur ac divinae naturae consors efficitur._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1042.)\n\n  979 Cfr. the _Cap. Maiores_ of Pope Innocent III (_Decret._, l. 3, tit.\n      42, _De Bapt._): \u201c_Aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi\n      parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis\n      dicentibus, dimitti peccatum et virtutes infundi quantum ad habitum,\n      non quoad usum._\u201d\n\n_  980 De Summa Trinit. et Fide Cath._: \u201c_Quantum ad effectum baptismi in\n      parvulis reperiuntur doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias\n      habuisse, quibusdam ex ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptismi\n      parvulis quidem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri, aliis e\n      contra asserentibus, quod et culpa eisdem in baptismo remittitur et\n      virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro\n      illo tempore quoad usum. Nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis\n      Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptizatis,\n      opinionem secundam tamquam probabiliorem et dictis sanctorum et\n      modernorum theologorum magis consonam et conformem sacro approbante\n      concilio duximus eligendam._\u201d\n\n  981 Cfr. _Conc. Trid._, Sess. V, can. 4; Sess. VII, can. 13. For a\n      fuller treatment consult Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 3; Vasquez,\n      _Comment. in S. Th._, I, 2, disp. 203, cap. 6. The false views of\n      Hermes and Hirscher are refuted by Kleutgen, _Theologie der\n      Vorzeit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 254-343, M\u00fcnster 1872.\n\n_  982 Libri Quatuor Sent._, I, dist 17, \u00a7 18.\n\n_  983 Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 23, art. 2.\n\n_  984 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, can. 24.\n\n  985 Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 263 sq.\n\n  986 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1; _Summa\n      contra Gentiles_, III, 150.\n\n  987 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      p. 193.\n\n_  988 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2, ad 2: \u201c_Omnis substantia\n      vel est ipsa natura rei, cuius est substantia, vel est pars naturae,\n      secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia\n      gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit\n      substantia aut forma substantialis, sed est forma accidentalis\n      ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo,\n      accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem._\u201d\n\n  989 Cfr. Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 6, art. 2.\n\n  990 This theory was based on such texts as Ps. L, 12: \u201c_Cor mundum crea\n      in me._\u201d\n\n_  991 Cat. Rom._, P. II, c. 2 _de Bapt._, qu. 49: \u201c_Est autem gratia ...\n      divina qualitas in anima inhaerens ac veluti splendor quidam et lux,\n      quae animarum nostrarum maculas omnes delet ipsasque animas\n      pulchriores et splendidiores reddit._\u201d On the supernatural character\n      of sanctifying grace see Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and\n      the Supernatural_, pp. 191 sqq.\n\n_  992 Categ._, 6.\n\n  993 \u201c_... qualitas difficile mobilis, secundum quam res bene vel male se\n      habet in ordine ad suam naturam et ad operationem vel finem eius._\u201d\n      Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 2; S.\n      Schiffini, _Principia Philosophica ad Mentem Aquinatis_, pp. 574\n      sqq., Turin 1886; A. Lehmen, _Lehrbuch der Philosophie auf\n      aristotelisch-thomistischer Grundlage_, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 398\n      sqq., Freiburg 1904.\n\n_  994 De Veritate_, qu. 27, art. 2, ad 7: \u201c_Gratia est in prima specie\n      qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non\n      immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spiritale, quod in\n      anima facit._\u201d\n\n_  995 De Gratia_, VI, 4, 1: \u201c_Abstinuimus ab hac voce, quia per habitum\n      solet intelligi principium actus; quamvis, si vox illa latius\n      sumatur, pro quacumque qualitate perficiente animam, quae non sit\n      actus secundus, eadem certitudine, qu\u00e2 ostendimus dari gratiam\n      permanentem, concluditur esse qualitatem habitualem._\u201d\n\n_  996 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 3.\n\n  997 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 30. Under these\n      circumstances Suarez was justified in saying, in regard to the\n      degree of certitude to be attributed to this teaching: \u201c_Si quis\n      negaret gratiam sanctificantem esse habitum, licet esse temere\n      dictum, non posset tamen ut haereticum damnari._\u201d\n\n  998 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 190 sqq.\n\n  999 Cfr. 1 John, III, 9: \u201c\u03c3\u03c0\u03ad\u03c1\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 [scil. \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6] \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9.\u201d\n\n 1000 Cfr. 2 Cor. IV, 7: \u201c_... thesaurum in vasis fictilibus._\u201d\n\n 1001 Cfr. John XIV, 23: \u201c_Mansionem apud eum faciemus._\u201d\n\n 1002 Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 16.\u2014On the subtle question whether habitual grace\n      is to be regarded as a real or merely as a modal accident of the\n      soul, see Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 154 sqq., Paris 1896;\n      Chr. Pesch, _Prael. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 181 sqq.,\n      Freiburg 1908. An extreme and altogether unacceptable view is that\n      of Billuart (_De Gratia_, diss. 6, art. 2), who regards sanctifying\n      grace as an absolute accident, _i.e._ one which the omnipotence of\n      God could miraculously sustain if the soul ceased to exist. Cfr.\n      Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 15; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, p. 259;\n      Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 164 sqq.\n\n_ 1003 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, II, dist. 27.\n\n_ 1004 E.g._, Mastrius, _De Iustif._, disp. 7, qu. 6.\n\n_ 1005 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 6.\n\n 1006 Luke VII, 47: \u201c_Remittuntur ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit\n      (\u1f20\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03bd) multum._\u201d\n\n 1007 1 Pet. IV, 8: \u201c_Caritas (\u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7) operit multitudinem peccatorum._\u201d\n\n 1008 1 John IV, 7: \u201c_Omnis qui diligit (\u03c0\u1fb6\u03c3 \u1f41 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03c0\u1ff6\u03bd) ex Deo natus est._\u201d\n\n_ 1009 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 70, n. 84: \u201c_Caritas ergo inchoata,\n      inchoata iustitia est, ... caritas magna, magna iustitia est,\n      caritas perfecta, perfecta iustitia est._\u201d\n\n_ 1010 Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_... dum caritas Dei diffunditur\n      in cordibus eorum qui iustificantur atque ipsis inhaeret._\u201d\n\n 1011 Pre\u00ebminently Suarez, Tanner, Ripalda.\n\n_ 1012 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3 sq.; _De Veritate_, qu. 27,\n      art. 2.\n\n_ 1013 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4, ad 1: \u201c_Sicut ab essentia\n      animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia, ita\n      etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes [theologicae] in potentias\n      animae, per quas [virtutes] potentiae moventur ad actus._\u201d\n\n_ 1014 De Dono Perseverantiae_, c. 16, n. 41: \u201c_Gratia praevenit\n      caritatem._\u201d\n\n 1015 2 Cor. XIII, 13: \u201c_Gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi et caritas\n      Dei._\u201d\n\n 1016 1 Tim. I, 14: \u201c_Superabundavit autem gratia Domini nostri cum fide\n      et dilectione._\u201d\n\n 1017 Cfr. _Conc. Viennense_, A. D. 1311: \u201c_... gratiam informantem et\n      virtutes._\u201d _Conc. Trid._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_... per voluntariam\n      susceptionem gratiae et donorum._\u201d Sess. VI, can. 11: \u201c_... exclus\u00e2\n      grati\u00e2 et caritate._\u201d\n\n 1018 For a fuller treatment of this topic consult Billuart, _De Gratia_,\n      diss. 4, art. 4.\n\n 1019 Ripalda justly observes (_De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, n. 132,\n      n. 53): \u201c_Haec controversia olim Celebris fuit. Nunc facile\n      dirimitur, quum iam constiterit nullius partis argumenta plane\n      convincere._\u201d On the theological aspects of Herbart\u2019s philosophy,\n      which denies the existence of qualities and faculties in the soul,\n      see Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, p. 560,\n      Mainz 1897.\n\n 1020 2 Pet. I, 4: \u201c_... per quem [i.e. Christum] maxima et pretiosa nobis\n      promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae_\n      (\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2).\u201d\n\n 1021 John I, 13: \u201c_... qui non ex sanguinibus, ... sed ex Deo nati\n      sunt._\u201d\n\n 1022 John III, 5: \u201c_Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto,\n      non potest introire in regnum Dei._\u201d\n\n 1023 Jac. I, 18: \u201c_Voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis._\u201d\n\n 1024 1 John III, 9: \u201c_Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit._\u201d\n\n_ 1025 Or. contr. Arian._, I, 39.\n\n 1026 \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b7.\n\n_ 1027 In Psalmos_, 49, n. 2: \u201c_Ille iustficat, qui per seipsum, non ex\n      alio iustus est; et ille deificat qui per seipsum non alterius\n      participatione Deus est. Qui autem iustificat, ipse deificat, quia\n      iustificando filios Dei facit.... Filii Dei facti sumus et dii facti\n      sumus; sed hoc gratia est adoptantis, non natura generantis. Unicum\n      enim Dei Filius Deus, ... ceteri qui dii fiunt, grati\u00e2 ipsius fiunt,\n      non de substantia ipsius nascuntur, ut hoc sint quod ille, sed ut\n      per beneficium perveniant ad eum et sint cohaeredes Christi._\u201d Many\n      other cognate Patristic texts in Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_,\n      disp. 132, sect. 7-9.\n\n 1028 See, _e.g._, the Offertory and Preface for the festival of the\n      Ascension of our Lord and the _Secreta_ for the fourth Sunday after\n      Easter.\n\n 1029 Cfr. Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, sect. 7: \u201c_Per\n      gratiam vero habitualem fieri hominem participem divinae naturae\n      ideoque gratiam esse participationem deitatis, adeo frequens est et\n      constans theologorum assertum, ut absque temeritate negari non\n      possit._\u201d On the teaching of St. Thomas and the Thomists see\n      Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 4, art. 3.\n\n 1030 Cfr. _Prop. Ekkardi a. 1329 damn. a Ioanne XXII_, prop. 10, quoted\n      in Denzinger-Bannwart\u2019s _Enchiridion_, n. 510.\n\n 1031 Cfr. _Prop. Mich. de Molinos a. 1687 damn, ab Innocentio XI_, prop.\n      5, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1225.\n\n 1032 The Fourth Council of the Lateran (A. D. 1215) calls it \u201c_doctrina\n      non tam haeretica quam insana_.\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 433.)\n\n 1033 St. Augustine, _De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione_, II, 8, 10:\n      \u201c_Nunc ergo et similes esse iam coepimus primitias spiritus\n      habentes, et adhuc dissimiles sumus per reliquias vetustatis.\n      Proinde inquantum similes, in tantum regenerante Spiritu filii Dei;\n      inquantum autem dissimiles, in tantum filii carnis et saeculi._\u201d\n\n 1034 Quoted by Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 132, sect. 9.\n\n 1035 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae qu. 112, art. 1: \u201c_Donum\n      autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, quum nihil\n      aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit\n      omnem aliam naturam._\u201d\n\n 1036 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 165 sqq.; _Christology_, pp. 85 sqq.\n\n 1037 Cfr. St. John of Damascus, _De Fide Orthodoxa_, II, 12 \u201c[\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd]\n      \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c7\u1fc7 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03bc\u03c8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03bd\n      \u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd.\u201d\n\n 1038 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 165 sqq.\n\n_ 1039 Clyp. Thomist._, tom. VI, disp. 2, \u00a7 10.\n\n 1040 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 1, 27: \u201c_Eo ipso quod divinum esse\n      participatur, non participatur ut imparticipatum est._\u201d\n\n_ 1041 De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 20, sect. 14.\n\n_ 1042 S. Theol._, 1a, qu. 93, art. 4.\n\n 1043 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VII, 1, 30: \u201c_Vera ergo excellentia\n      gratiae habitualis, propter quam dicitur esse singularis\n      participatio divinae naturae, est ... quia, quum natura divina sit\n      quaedam intellectualis natura altioris ordinis quam sit vel esse\n      possit ulla substantia intellectualis creata, ille gradus\n      intellectualitatis, qui est in divina natura, divino quodam et\n      supernaturali modo participatur per habitualem gratiam, quo quidem\n      modo a nulla substantia creata per se ipsam vel per potentiam sibi\n      connaturalem participari potest.... Divina enim essentia in ratione\n      obiecti intelligibilis in se et per visionem intuitivam ad ipsam Dei\n      essentiam immediate terminatam adeo est elevata et excellens ratione\n      purissimae actualitatis et immaterialitatis suae, ut a nulla\n      substantia intellectuali possit connaturaliter videri, nisi a\n      seipsa. Per gratiam vero et dona supernaturalia elevatur natura\n      creata intellectualis ad participationem illius gradus\n      intellectualitatis divinae, in quo possit obiectum illud\n      intelligibile divinae essentiae in se intueri._\u201d\n\n 1044 John III, 6; cfr. 2 Cor. III, 18; Eph. V, 18.\n\n_ 1045 De Spiritu Sancto_, c. 9, n. 23.\n\n 1046 \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af.\n\n 1047 \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n 1048 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n 1049 1 John III, 2: \u201c_Nunc filii Dei sumus et nondum apparuit, quid\n      erimus; scimus quoniam, quum apparuerit, similes ei erimus (\u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9\n      \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1), quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est._\u201d On this passage\n      see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      pp. 96 sq. On the whole subject treated in this subdivision consult\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 588\n      sqq.; A. Rademacher, _Die \u00fcbernat\u00fcrliche Lebensordnung nach der\n      paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_, pp. 88 sqq., Freiburg\n      1903; A. Prumbs, _Die Stellung des Trienter Konzils zu der Frage\n      nach dem Wesen der heiligmachenden Gnade_, Paderborn 1910.\n\n 1050 For a fuller treatment we must refer the reader to Scheeben, _Die\n      Herrlichkeiten der g\u00f6ttlichen Gnade_, 8th ed., Freiburg 1908;\n      English translation by a Benedictine monk of St. Meinrad\u2019s Abbey,\n      _The Glories of Divine Grace_, 3rd ed., New York _s. a._\n\n 1051 Eph. IV, 24: \u201c_Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est\n      in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis._\u201d On this text see\n      Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_, p.\n      197.\n\n 1052 Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_... non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et\n      sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam\n      susceptionem gratiae et donorum, unde homo ex iniusto fit iustus._\u201d\n\n 1053 On the concept of sanctity see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability,\n      Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 251 sqq.\n\n 1054 Gal. II, 20: \u201c_Vivo autem iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus._\u201d\n      On the life of the soul in and through grace cfr.\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 466.\n\n 1055 Cfr. 2 Cor. VII, 4: \u201c_Superabundo gaudio in omni tribulatione\n      nostra._\u201d\n\n 1056 Is. XLIX, 16: \u201c_Ecce in manibus meis descripsi te._\u201d\n\n 1057 Rom. VIII, 28: \u201c_Diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum._\u201d\n\n_ 1058 In Ps._, 25: \u201c_Gratia divina pulchrificat sicut lux._\u201d\n\n_ 1059 Cat. Rom._, P. II, Ch. II, qu. 49: \u201c_Est autem gratia ... splendor\n      quidam et lux, quae animarum maculas delet ipsasque animas\n      pulchriores et splendidiores reddit._\u201d On the aptness of this simile\n      see Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, p. 268. Freiburg 1901.\n\n 1060 \u1f0c\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n 1061 \u0398\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n 1062 On the notion of beauty see Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability,\n      Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 265 sqq.\n\n_ 1063 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 4.\n\n 1064 On the divine appropriations see Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_,\n      pp. 244 sqq.\n\n 1065 Rom. VIII, 29: \u201c_... praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii\n      sui._\u201d\n\n 1066 Gal. IV, 19: \u201c_Filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec formetur\n      Christus in vobis._\u201d\n\n_ 1067 V. infra_, No. 4.\n\n_ 1068 V. infra_, Art. 3, No. 4. On the whole subject cfr.\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 465; H.\n      Krug, _De Pulchritudine Divina_, pp. 53 sqq., 144 sqq., 241 sqq.,\n      Freiburg 1902.\n\n 1069 Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_... unde homo ex iniusto fit iustus et ex\n      inimico amicus._\u201d\n\n 1070 Sess. VI, cap. 10: \u201c_Sic ergo iustificati et amici Dei ac domestici\n      facti...._\u201d\n\n 1071 Wisd. VII, 14: \u201c_Participes facti sunt amicitiae Dei._\u201d\n\n 1072 John XV, 14 sq.: \u201c_Iam non dicam vos servos, ... vos autem dixi\n      amicos._\u201d\n\n 1073 Matth. IX, 15: \u201c_Numquid possunt filii sponsi lugere, quamdiu cum\n      illis est sponsus?_\u201d\n\n 1074 Apoc. XIX, 7: \u201c_Venerunt nuptiae Agni et uxor eius praeparavit se._\u201d\n      Cfr. John III, 29; Eph. V, 23 sqq.; 2 Cor. XI, 2; Cant. IV, 1 sqq.;\n      Ps. XLIV, 22 sqq. On the teaching of the Fathers see Cornelius a\n      Lapide, _Comment. in 2 Cor._, XI, 2.\n\n_ 1075 Eth. ad Nichom._, VIII sq.\n\n 1076 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 27,\n      qu. 2, art. 1, ad 1: \u201c_Amicitia vera desiderat videre amicum et\n      colloquiis mutuis gaudere facit, ad quem principaliter est amicitia;\n      non autem ita, quod delectatio ex amici visione et perfruitione,\n      finis amicitiae ponatur._\u201d\n\n 1077 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 28, art. 1: \u201c_Quum\n      aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum, sicut et sibi\n      vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scil. ei\n      vult bonum, sicut et sibi vult bonum. Et inde est, quod amicus\n      dicitur esse alter ipse. Et Augustinus dicit in l. 4 Confess.: Bene\n      quidam dixit de amico suo, ____dimidium animae meae____._\u201d\n\n 1078 \u201c_Amicitia pares aut invenit aut facit._\u201d _In Mich._, 7.\n\n 1079 Prov. VIII, 31: \u201c_Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum._\u201d\n\n_ 1080 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 3.\n\n 1081 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent._, III, dist. 37,\n      qu. 2, art. 1, ad 10: \u201c_Amicitia dicitur esse non latens, non quod\n      per certitudinem amor amid cognoscatur, sed quia per signa\n      probabilia amor mutuus habentium coligitur. Et talis manifestatio\n      potest esse de caritate, inquantum per aliqua signa potest aliquis\n      probabiliter aestimare se habere caritatem._\u201d\n\n 1082 Cfr. Ecclus. XXXIV, 14 sqq.\n\n 1083 Cfr. St. Thomas, _op. cit._, III, dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 3, ad 4:\n      \u201c_Si esset possibile, quod ex nostris operibus aliquid Deo\n      accresceret, habens caritatem multo plura faceret propter\n      beatitudinem ei conservandam, quam propter eam sibi adipiscendam._\u201d\n\n 1084 1 John III, 17: \u201c_Qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi et viderit\n      fratrem suum necessitatem habere et clauserit viscera sua ab eo,\n      quomodo caritas Dei_ (\u1f21 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6) _manet in ea?_\u201d\n\n_ 1085 V. supra_, Art. 1, No. 4.\n\n 1086 The singular opinion of Ripalda (_De Caritate_, disp. 33), that such\n      a relation would be possible even in the state of pure nature, is\n      rejected by Suarez as incorrect (_De Caritate_, disp. 3, sect. 5, n.\n      4). On the whole question cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.\n      305 sqq.\n\n_ 1087 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 4: \u201c_... status gratiae et\n      adoptionis filiorum Dei._\u201d\n\n 1088 Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: \u201c_Accepistis ... spiritum adoptionis filiorum,\n      in quo clamamus Abba, Pater; ipse enim Spiritus testimonium reddit\n      spiritui nostro, quod sumus filii Dei; si autem filii, et haeredes:\n      haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi._\u201d\n\n 1089 1 John III, 1 sq.: \u201c_Videte, qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut\n      filii Dei nominemur et simus ... Carissimi, nunc filii Dei sumus._\u201d\n\n 1090 Gal. IV, 5: \u201c_... ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus._\u201d\n\n 1091 John I, 12 sq.: \u201c_... dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui ...\n      ex Deo nati sunt_ (\u1f14\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03ad\u03ba\u03bd\u03b1 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n      ... \u1f10\u03ba \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd).\u201d\n\n_ 1092 Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 1: \u201c_Adoptio est personae extraneae\n      in filium et haeredem gratuita assumptio._\u201d\n\n 1093 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7: \u201c_Itaque iam non est servus, sed filius; quod si\n      filius, et haeres per Deum._\u201d\n\n 1094 Cfr. Rom. VIII, 17; Gal. IV, 7.\n\n 1095 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 1, ad 2.\n\n 1096 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_... per voluntariam\n      susceptionem gratiae et donorum._\u201d\n\n 1097 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 49 sqq.\n\n 1098 Cfr. John III, 5 sq.; 2 Cor. III, 18; Tit. III, 5 sqq.\n\n 1099 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 3a, qu. 23, art. 2, ad. 2: \u201cFor\n      He [God the Father] is Christ\u2019s father by natural generation; and\n      this is proper to him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary\n      operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and the Holy Ghost:\n      so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are.\u201d\n\n 1100 Cfr. St. Thomas, _l.c._, ad 2.\n\n 1101 Suarez, _De Incarnatione_, disp. 49, sect. 2, n. 5.\n\n 1102 This heresy is called Adoptionism; for a refutation of it see\n      Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp. 196 sqq.\n\n 1103 1 John III, 1.\n\n 1104 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Soteriology_, pp. 15 sqq.\n\n_ 1105 Or. in Is._, II, 4.\n\n_ 1106 V. infra_, Art. 3, No. 4.\n\n 1107 Cfr. J. Scheeben, \u201c_Kontroverse \u00fcber die Formalursache der\n      Kindschaft Gottes_,\u201d in the _Katholik_, of Mayence, 1883, I, pp. 142\n      sqq., II, pp. 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq. II, 465 sqq., 610 sqq.;\n      Granderath, \u201c_Kontroverse \u00fcber die Gotteskindschaft_,\u201d in the\n      Innsbruck _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr kath. Theologie_, 1881, pp. 283 sqq.,\n      1883, pp. 491 sqq., 593 sqq., 1884, pp. 545 sqq.\n\n_ 1108 De Trinitate_, VIII, 4 sqq.\n\n_ 1109 Comment. in S. Theol._, 3a, qu. 23, art. 3.\n\n 1110 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7. On the subject of the adoptive sonship of the just\n      the student may profitably consult A. Rademacher, _Die\n      \u00fcbernat\u00fcrliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen\n      Theologie_, pp. 97 sqq., Freiburg 1903.\n\n_ 1111 V. supra_, p. 340.\n\n_ 1112 Cat. Rom._, P. II, c. 1, n. 51: \u201c_Huic [gratiae sanctificanti]\n      additur nobilissimus omnium virtutum comitatus, quae in animam cum\n      gratia divinitus infunduntur._\u201d\n\n_ 1113 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_Unde in ipsa iustificatione\n      cum remissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accipit homo per\n      Iesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et caritatem._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.) The question whether the three\n      theological virtues are genuine _habitus operativi_, must be\n      answered in the affirmative; but its denial incurs no censure so\n      long as the distinction existing between these habitual virtues and\n      actual grace is left intact. It is of faith that habitual charity is\n      infused simultaneously with habitual grace. Cfr. _Conc. Trident._,\n      Sess. VI, can. 11: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, homines iustificari ...\n      exclus\u00e2 grati\u00e2 et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum\n      Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, anathema sit._\u201d On the\n      bearing of this definition see Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp.\n      175 sq., Paris 1896; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 315 sqq.,\n      Freiburg 1901.\n\n 1114 Rom. V, 5: \u201c_Caritas Dei (\u1f21 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6) diffusa est (\u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03ad\u03c7\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9)\n      in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis._\u201d\n\n 1115 1 Cor. XIII, 2: \u201c_Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes\n      transferam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum._\u201d\n\n 1116 1 Cor. XIII, 13: \u201c_Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas (\u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2,\n      \u1f10\u03bb\u03c0\u03af\u03c2, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7), tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas._\u201d\n\n_ 1117 Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi_, art. 12: \u201c_Ad hoc\n      autem, quod moveamur recte in finem [scil. Deum], oportet finem esse\n      et cognitum et desideratum. Desiderium autem finis duo exigit, scil.\n      fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod\n      consequi non potest; et amorem finis, quia non desideratur nisi\n      amatum. Et ideo virtutes theologicae sunt tres, scil. fides qu\u00e2 Deum\n      cognoscimus, spes qu\u00e2 ipsum nos obtenturos esse speramus, et caritas\n      qu\u00e2 eum diligimus._\u201d\n\n 1118 Sess. VI, cap. 7.\n\n 1119 This thesis is not, however, so certain that it would be wrong to\n      contradict it, as has actually been done by Scotus, Durandus, and\n      others. Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 9, 12.\n\n 1120 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 57 sqq. That the\n      cardinal virtues are four in number, St. Thomas proves as follows:\n      \u201c_[Bonum rationis] potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, prout\n      habet rationein consiliabilis et eligibilis, secundum quam ratio\n      circa illud operatur et sic est prudentia, quae est media inter\n      intellectuales et morales; ... alio modo, secundum quod habet\n      rationem boni appetibilis. Ad appetitum autem duo pertinent, scil.\n      actio et passio; passio autem est in irascibili et concupiscibili.\n      Circa actiones ergo est iustitia, circa passiones irascibiles est\n      fortitudo, circa passiones concupiscibiles est temperantia. Et sic\n      sunt quatuor virtutes cardinales._\u201d (_Comment. in Quatuor Libros\n      Sent._, III, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, solut. 3.)\n\n 1121 Wis. VIII, 7: \u201c_Et si iustitiam quis diligit, labores huius magnas\n      habent virtutes; sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet [Deus] et\n      iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus._\u201d\n\n 1122 Ez. XI, 19 sq.: \u201c_Et auferam cor lapideum de came eorum et dabo eis\n      cor carneum, ut in praeceptis meis ambulent et iudicia mea\n      custodiant._\u201d\n\n 1123 Cfr. Jer. XXXI, 33; Col. I, 10 sq.; 1 John II, 27.\n\n_ 1124 In Ps._, 83: \u201c_Istae virtutes nunc in convalle plorationis per\n      gratiam Dei donantur nobis._\u201d\n\n_ 1125 Hom. in Ezech._, I, 5, n. 11: \u201c_In fide enim, spe atque caritate,\n      et in aliis bonis, sine quibus ad coelestem patriam non potest\n      perveniri, ... perfectorum corda [Spiritus Sanctus] non deserit._\u201d\n\n_ 1126 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 63, art. 3: \u201c_Oportet effectus esse suis\n      causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam\n      intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur,\n      procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis\n      praeexistentibus.... Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur\n      nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem\n      supernaturalem.... Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus\n      theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus\n      causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas sicut se\n      habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia\n      virtutum._\u201d For further information on this subject consult\n      Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, \u00a7 471, Mainz\n      1897; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 319 sqq., Freiburg 1901;\n      Van Noort, _De Gratia Christi_, pp. 161 sqq., Amsterdam 1908.\n\n 1127 Cfr. Gregory of Valentia, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 5,\n      qu. 8, p. 1: \u201c_Dona Spiritus S. potentias animae perficiunt ad\n      actiones quasdam heroicas, ... qu\u00e2 ratione peculiariter procedunt ex\n      divino quodam Spiritus S. instinctu, quo mens nostra plerumque\n      mirabiliter solet agi et impelli ad quaedam opera praestantia et\n      rara.... Atque ita in usu donorum homo potius agitur, in usu autem\n      virtuturn se habet potius ut agens._\u201d Cfr. Simar, _Dogmatik_, Vol.\n      II, 4th ed., pp. 641 sqq., Freiburg 1899; Van Noort, _De Gratia\n      Christi_, pp. 174 sqq.\n\n 1128 Rom. VIII, 9 sqq.\n\n 1129 Cfr. Is. XI, 1 sqq.; LXI, 1; Luke IV, 18.\n\n 1130 \u201c_Da tuis fidelibus, in te confitentibus, sacrum septenarium._\u201d\n      (_Missale Rom._, Sequence for Whit Sunday.) For a more detailed\n      treatment of the subject dealt with in Thesis III consult J.\n      Kleutgen, _Theologie der Vorzeit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 365 sqq.,\n      M\u00fcnster 1872; C. Weiss, _S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis\n      Spiritus S. Doctrina_, Vienne 1895; J. Regler, _Die sieben Gaben des\n      Hl. Geistes in ihrer Bedeutung f\u00fcr das christliche Leben_, Ratisbon\n      1899; Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 337 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On\n      the connection of the gifts of the Holy Ghost with the beatitudes\n      (cfr. Matth. V, 3 sqq.) and the \u201ctwelve fruits of the Holy Ghost\u201d\n      (cfr. Gal. V, 22 sq.), see St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu.\n      69 and 70. The student may also consult Suarez, _De Gratia_, VI, 10,\n      and Vasquez, _Comment. in S. Theol._, III, disp. 44, cap. 2.\n\n 1131 Cfr. St. Bonaventure, _Compendium Theol. Verit._, I, 9: \u201c_In\n      iustificatione duplex caritas nobis datur, scil. creata et increata:\n      illa qu\u00e2 diligimus, et illa qu\u00e2 diligimur.... Ex his colligitur,\n      quod licet Deus sit in omnibus per essentiam, praesentiam et\n      potentiam, non tamen habetur ab omnibus per gratiam._\u201d\n\n 1132 John XIV, 16 sq.: \u201c_... alium Paraclitum dabit vobis, ut maneat\n      vobiscum in aeternum.... Vos autem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos\n      manebit et in vobis (\u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd) erit._\u201d\n\n 1133 Rom. V, 5: \u201c_Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per\n      Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis._\u201d\n\n 1134 Rom. VIII, 11: \u201c_Quodsi Spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a\n      mortuis, habitat in vobis (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd), qui suscitavit Iesnm\n      Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra propter\n      inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis (\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n      \u03c0\u03bd\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd)._\u201d\n\n 1135 \u201c_Nescitis, quia templum Dei (\u03bd\u03b1\u1f78\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u03bf\u1fe6) estis et Spiritus Dei\n      habitat in vobis (\u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f10\u03bd \u1f51\u03bc\u1fd6\u03bd)?... Templum enim Dei sanctum est,\n      quod estis vos._\u201d\n\n 1136 1 Cor. 6, 19: \u201c_An nescitis, quoniam membra vestra templum sunt\n      Spiritus S., qui in vobis est, quem habetis a Deo et non estis\n      vestri?_\u201d Cfr. Rom. VIII, 9; Gal. IV, 6; 2 Cor. VI, 16.\n\n_ 1137 Ep. ad Serap._, I, n. 24.\n\n 1138 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\n\n_ 1139 Contra Eunom._, I, V.\n\n_ 1140 Dialog._, VII, _per totum_.\n\n_ 1141 De Trinitate_, XV, n. 36: \u201c_Ita enim datur sicut donum Dei, ut\n      etiam seipsum det sicut Deus._\u201d\n\n_ 1142 Serm._, 144, c. 1: \u201c_Gratia quippe Dei donum Dei est; donum autem\n      maximum ipse Spiritus Sanctus est, et ideo gratia dicitur._\u201d\n\n_ 1143 Enchiridion_, c. 37: \u201c_Et utique Spiritus Sanctus Dei donum est,\n      quod quidem et ipsum est aequale donanti; et ideo Deus est etiam\n      Spiritus Sanctus, Patre Filioque non minor._\u201d Additional Patristic\n      texts of like tenor in Petavius, _De Trinitate_, l. VIII, cap. 4\n      sq.: Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, thes. 43; J. Kleutgen, _Theologie\n      der Vorseit_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 369 sqq.\n\n 1144 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 230 sqq.\n\n 1145 John XIV, 23: \u201c_Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et Pater\n      meus diliget eum, et ad eum veniemus et mansionem (\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03ae\u03bd) apud eum\n      faciemus._\u201d\n\n_ 1146 Ep. 1 ad Serap._, n. 30: \u201c_Ex his una Trinitatis \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\n      ostenditur ... profecto quum Dominus ait: Veniemus ego et Pater,\n      simul venit Spiritus, non alio modo quam ut Filius in nobis\n      habitaturus._\u201d\n\n_ 1147 De Trinit._, XV, 18, 32: \u201c_Dilectio igitur, quae ex Deo est et Deus\n      est, proprie Spiritus S. est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus\n      nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas._\u201d\n\n 1148 For a more detailed treatment see Franzelin, _De Deo Trino_, thes.\n      43-48, Rome 1881.\n\n 1149 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionys. Areop., _De Hier. Eccl._, 1, \u00a7 3 (Migne, _P.\n      G._, III, 376): \u1f29 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f21 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u0398\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c6\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03af\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n      \u1f15\u03bd\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n 1150 Cfr. Petavius, _De Trinit._, VIII, 7, 12: \u201c_Ostendimus enim non\n      semel, coniunctionem illam Spiritus S. neque \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd neque\n      \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03bd esse, h. e. neque naturalem neque personalem, quasi una\n      fiat ex ambobus natura vel persona. Non enim quia et illi per\n      adoptionis gratiam filii Dei sunt, ait Augustinus (In Ps. 67), ideo\n      quisquam illorum est unigenitus. Neque enim ex personarum duarum\n      copulatione unum aliquid per sese, sed \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03b2\u03b7\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 potest\n      effici._\u201d\n\n 1151 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _The Divine Trinity_, pp. 244 sqq.\n\n 1152 Cfr. Scheeben, _Die Mysterien des Christentums_, 2nd ed., p. 165,\n      Freiburg 1898.\n\n 1153 Cfr. John XIV, 23; XVII, 20 sqq.\n\n 1154 Gutberlet takes middle ground between the two theories and tries to\n      reconcile them. Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_,\n      Vol. VIII, \u00a7 468. See also A. Rademacher, _Die \u00fcbernat\u00fcrliche\n      Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie_,\n      pp. 193 sqq., Freiburg 1903.\n\n 1155 Cfr. R. F. Clarke, S. J., _Logic_, p. 174.\n\n 1156 \u201c_Fides fiducialis_,\u201d _v. supra_, pp. 255 sqq.\n\n 1157 Sess. VI, cap. 9; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 684.\n\n 1158 Sess. VI, can. 13-15; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 823 sqq.\n\n 1159 1 Cor. IV, 4: \u201c_Nihil enim mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc\n      iustificatus sum; qui autem iudicat me, Dominus est._\u201d\n\n 1160 1 Cor. IX, 27: \u201c_Castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne\n      forte, quum aliis praedicaverim, ipse reprobus (\u1f00\u03b4\u03cc\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2)\n      efficiar._\u201d\n\n 1161 Phil. II, 12: \u201c_Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini._\u201d\n      Other Scriptural texts in Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, III, 4\n      sqq. For the solution of certain exegetical difficulties see the\n      same author, _op. cit._, III, 9, and Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol.\n      III, pp. 210 sqq., Paris 1896.\n\n_ 1162 Hom. in I. Epist. ad Cor._, 2.\n\n 1163 Eccles. IX, 1 sq.: \u201c_Nescit homo, utrum amore an odio dignus, etc._\u201d\n\n_ 1164 Hieronymus in h. l._ (Migne, _P. L._, XXIII, 1080): \u201c_In futuro\n      igitur scient omnia et in vultu eorum sunt omnia, i.e. antecedet\n      eos, quum de hac vita decesserint, notitia istius rei quia tunc est\n      iudicum et nunc certamen. Et quicunque adversa sustinent, utrum per\n      amorem Dei sustineant, ut Iob, an per odium, ut plurimi peccatores,\n      nunc habetur incertum._\u201d\n\n_ 1165 Ep._, VII, 25: \u201c_Rem et inutilem et difficilem postulasti:\n      difficilem quidem, quia ego indignus sum, cui revelatio fieri\n      debeat; inutilem vero, quia secura de peccatis tuis fieri non debes,\n      nisi quum iam in die vitae tuae ultimo plangere eadem peccata minime\n      valebis._\u201d The Patristic argument is more fully developed by\n      Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, III, 7.\n\n_ 1166 Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. III, p. 617.\n\n_ 1167 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 9: \u201c_Sicut nemo pius de Dei\n      misericordia, de Christi merito deque sacramentorum efficacia\n      dubitare debet, sic quilibet, dum seipsum suamque propriam\n      infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare et\n      timere potest, quum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, cui non\n      potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 802.)\n\n 1168 \u201c_Peirorem sequitur semper conclusio partem._\u201d Cfr. Clarke, _Logic_,\n      p. 322.\n\n 1169 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 16: \u201c_Si quis magnum illud\n      usque in finem perseverantiae donum se certo habiturum absolut\u00e2 et\n      infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc speciali revelatione\n      didicerit, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 826.)\n\n 1170 In his little treatise _De Certitudine Gratiae_.\n\n 1171 Sess. VI, cap. 9: \u201c_... iustificatos absque ulla dubitatione apud\n      semetipsos statuere, se esse iustificatos._\u201d\n\n 1172 Rom. VIII, 38 sq.: \u201c_Certus sum enim (\u03c0\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9=persuasum habeo),\n      quia neque mors neque vita ... poterit nos separare a caritate Dei,\n      quae est in Christo Iesu._\u201d\n\n_ 1173 Tract. in Ioa._, I, 3, 5, n. 10: \u201c_Quid nos scimus? Quia\n      transivimus de morte ad vitam. Unde scimus? Quia diligimus fratres.\n      Nemo interroget hominem, redeat unusquisque ad cor suum; si ibi\n      invenerit caritatem fraternam, securus sit, quia transiit a morte ad\n      vitam._\u201d\n\n 1174 Cfr. the _Imitation of Christ_ by Thomas \u00e0 Kempis, III, 54 sqq. On\n      the whole subject of this subdivision the student may profitably\n      consult the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art.\n      5; Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 9-11, and Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss.\n      6, art. 4.\n\n_ 1175 Serm. de Nativitate Mariae_: \u201c_Omnes Christiani aeque magni sumus\n      sicut mater Dei, et aeque sancti sicut ipsa._\u201d\n\n 1176 Sess. VI, cap. 7: \u201c_Iustitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam\n      secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout\n      vult, et secundum propriam cuiusque dispositionem et\n      cooperationem._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.)\n\n 1177 Sess. VI, cap. 10: \u201c_Iustificati ... in ipsa iustitia per Christi\n      gratiam accepta, cooperante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis\n      iustificantur._\u201d  (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803.)\n\n 1178 Sess. VI, can. 24: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, iustitiam acceptam non\n      conservari atque etiam augeri coram Deo per bona opera, sed opera\n      ipsa fructus solummodo et signa esse iustificationis adeptae, non\n      autem ipsius augendae causam, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart,\n      n. 834.)\n\n 1179 Prov. IV, 18: \u201c_Iustorum autem semita quasi lux splendens procedit\n      et crescit usque ad perfectam diem._\u201d\n\n 1180 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: \u201c_Non impediaris orare semper et ne verearis\n      usque ad mortem iustificari, quoniam merces Dei manet in aeternum._\u201d\n\n 1181 2 Pet. III, 18: \u201c_Crescite vero in gratia et in cognitione Domini\n      nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi._\u201d\n\n 1182 2 Cor. IX, 10: \u201c_[Deus] augebit incrementa frugum iustitiae\n      vestrae._\u201d\n\n 1183 Eph. IV, 7: \u201c_Unicuique autem nostrum data est gratia secundum\n      mensuram donationis Christi._\u201d\n\n 1184 Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: \u201c_Qui iustus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sanctus\n      sanctificetur adhuc. Ecce venio cito et merces mea mecum est,\n      reddere unicuique secundum opera sua._\u201d Cfr. Bellarmine, _De\n      Iustific._, III, 16.\n\n_ 1185 Contra Iovin._, II, n. 23: \u201c_Unicuique nostrum data est gratia\n      iuxta mensuram gratiae (Eph. 4, 7); non quod mensura Christi diversa\n      sit, sed tantum gratiae eius infunditur, quantum valemus haurire_.\u201d\n\n_ 1186 Ep._, 167, n. 13: \u201c_Induti sunt sancti iustiti\u00e2 (Job 29, 14), alius\n      magis, alius minus; et nemo hic vivit sine peccato et hoc alius\n      magis, alius minus: optimus autem est qui minimum._\u201d\n\n_ 1187 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 4, ad 3: \u201c_Vita naturalis\n      pertinet ad substantiam hominis, et ideo non recipit magis et minus;\n      sed vitam gratiae participat homo accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest\n      homo magis vel minus habere._\u201d On the teaching of Tradition cfr.\n      Alb. a Bulsano, _Instit. Theol. Dogmat._, ed. G. a Graun, O. Cap.,\n      Vol. II, p. 254, Innsbruck 1894.\n\n 1188 Ecclus. XVIII, 22; Apoc. XXII, 11.\n\n 1189 Cfr. Vasquez, _Comment. in Summam Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 221, cap.\n      9, n. 77.\n\n 1190 Ecclus. XIX, 1: \u201c_Qui spernit modica, paulatim decidet._\u201d For a\n      fuller treatment of this subject we refer the student to St. Thomas,\n      _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 10.\n\n_ 1191 V. supra_, pp. 328 sqq.\n\n 1192 Cfr. Suarez, _Disp. Metaph._, l. II, disp. 16.\n\n 1193 The authority of St. Thomas himself can be invoked by neither party\n      to this controversy. Cfr. Sylvius, _Comment. in S. Theol._, 2a 2ae,\n      qu. 24, art. 3.\n\n 1194 For a fuller treatment of this topic see Tepe, _Instit. Theol._,\n      Vol. III, pp. 217 sqq.\n\n_ 1195 V. supra_, pp. 336 sqq.\n\n 1196 Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 2, 13.\n\n 1197 Suarez, _op. cit._, IX, 4, 15.\n\n 1198 Sess. VI, cap. 10: \u201c_Hoc vero iustitiae incrementum petit sancta\n      Ecclesia, quum orat: Da nobis, Domine, fidei, spei et caritatis\n      augmentum._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803). Cfr. De Lugo, _De Fide_,\n      disp. 16, sect. 2.\n\n 1199 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 7.\n\n 1200 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Christology_, pp. 231 sqq.\n\n 1201 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _Mariology_, pp. 24 sqq.\n\n 1202 For a more elaborate treatment the reader is referred to Suarez, _De\n      Gratia_, IX, 6, 11, and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 570 sq.,\n      Freiburg 1901.\n\n 1203 Sess. VI, can. 23: \u201c_Si quis hominem semel iustificatum dixerit\n      amplius peccare non posse neque gratiam amittere atque ideo eum, qui\n      labitur et peccat, numquam vere fuisse iustificatum; ... anathema\n      sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.)\n\n 1204 Sess. VI, can. 27: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, nullum esse mortale peccatum\n      nisi infidelitatis, aut nullo alio quantumvis gravi et enormi\n      praeterquam infidelitatis peccato semel acceptam gratiam amitti,\n      anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 837).\n\n 1205 Sess. VI, cap. 11: \u201c_Licet in hac mortali vita quantumvis sancti et\n      iusti in levia saltem et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur,\n      peccata quandoque cadant, non propterea desinunt esse iusti._\u201d\n\n 1206 Ez. XVIII, 24: \u201c_Si autem averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, et\n      fecerit iniquitatem secundum omnes abominationes, quas operari solet\n      impius, numquid vivet? Omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecerat, non\n      recordabuntur; in praevaricatione, qu\u00e2 praevaricatus est, et in\n      peccato suo, quod peccavit, in ipsis morietur._\u201d\n\n 1207 Matth. XXVI, 41: \u201c_Vigilate et orate, ut non intretis in\n      tentationem._\u201d\n\n 1208 1 Cor. X, 12: \u201c_Qui se existitmat stare, videat ne cadat._\u201d\n\n 1209 1 Cor. VI, 9 sq.: \u201c_Nolite errare, neque fornicarii neque idolis\n      servientes neque adulteri neque molles neque masculorum concubitores\n      neque fures neque avari neque ebriosi neque maledici neque rapaces\n      regnum Dei possidebunt._\u201d Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 15\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 808).\n\n 1210 1 John III, 9: \u201c_Omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit:\n      quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare, quoniam ex\n      Deo natus est._\u201d\n\n_ 1211 Contra Iovin._, 1. II: \u201c_Propterea scribo vobis, filioli mei, omnis\n      qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat, ut non peccetis et tamdiu sciatis\n      vos in generatione Domini permanere, quamdiu non peccaveritis._\u201d On\n      the different interpretations of 1 John III, 9, an admittedly\n      difficult text, see Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, III, 15.\n\n_ 1212 De Corrept. et Gratia_, c. VI, n. 9: \u201c_Si iam regeneratus et\n      iustificatus in malam vitam su\u00e2 voluntate relabitur, certe iste non\n      potest dicere: Non accepti, quia acceptam gratiam Dei suo in malum\n      libero amisit arbitrio._\u201d\n\n_ 1213 Hom. in Ez._, 9, 1: \u201c_Sicuti qui a fide recedit, apostata est, ita\n      qui ad perversum opus, quod deseruerit, redit, ab omnipotente Deo\n      apostata deputatur, etiamsi fidem tenere videatur; unum enim sine\n      altero nil prodesse valet, quia nec fides sine operibus nec opera\n      adiuvant sine fide._\u201d\n\n 1214 For the solution of certain difficulties see Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 591 sqq. On the penitential discipline of the early\n      Church cfr. G. Rauschen, _Eucharist and Penance in the First Six\n      Centuries_, pp. 152 sqq., St. Louis 1913.\n\n 1215 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 28: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, amiss\u00e2\n      per peccatum grati\u00e2 simul et fidem semper amitti, aut fidem quae\n      remanet non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, aut eum qui fidem\n      sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 838.)\n\n 1216 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 15: \u201c_Non modo infidelitate,\n      per quam et ipsa fides amittitur, sed etiam quocunque alio mortali\n      peccato, quamvis non amittatur fides, acceptam iustificationis\n      gratiam amitti._\u201d\n\n 1217 Cfr. _Prop. Quesnelli damn. a Clemente XI_, prop. 57: \u201c_Totum deest\n      peccatori, quando ei deest spes, et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est\n      amor Dei._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1407.)\n\n_ 1218 V. supra_, Section 2.\n\n 1219 The questions discussed in this subdivision of our treatise are more\n      fully treated by Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 128, sect.\n      4, and by Suarez, _De Gratia_, IX, 3 sqq.\n\n 1220 Sess. VI, cap. 16.\n\n_ 1221 V. supra_, p. 131.\n\n_ 1222 V. supra_, pp. 132 sqq.\n\n_ 1223 Realitas sive existentia meriti._\n\n_ 1224 Conditiones meriti._\n\n_ 1225 Obiecta meriti._\n\n 1226 Cfr. _Conc. Viennense_, A. D. 1311 (_Clementin._, l. V, tit. 3: \u201cDe\n      Haereticis\u201d) in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 471 sqq.\n\n 1227 \u201c_In omni opere bono iustus peccat._\u201d _Prop. Lutheri Damnatae A. D.\n      1520 a Leone X_, prop. 31 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 771).\n\n 1228 \u201c_Opus bonum, optime factum est veniale peccatum_.\u201d Prop. 32, _l.\n      c._, n. 772.\n\n 1229 \u201c_Omne opus iusti damnabile est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio Dei\n      iudicetur._\u201d\n\n 1230 \u201c_Inquinamenta et sordes._\u201d _Instit._, III, 12, 4.\n\n 1231 Quietism (Michael de Molinos _et al._) denied the meritoriousness of\n      good works performed in the \u201cstate of passive repose\u201d (_quies_).\n\n 1232 \u201c_Debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant; sed gratia, quae non\n      debetur, praecedit ut fiant._\u201d Can. 18 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.)\n\n_ 1233 Cap. Firmiter_: \u201c_Non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum\n      etiam coniugati per rectam fidem et operationem bonam placentes Deo\n      ad aeternam merentur beatitudinem pervenire._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart,\n      n. 430.)\n\n 1234 Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Atque ideo bene operantibus usque in finem et\n      in Deo sperantibus proponenda est vita aeterna et tamquam gratia\n      filiis Dei per Christum Iesum misericorditer promissa et tamquam\n      merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis\n      fideliter reddenda._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.)\n\n 1235 Sess. VI, can. 25: \u201c_Si quis in quolibet bono opere iustum saltem\n      venialiter peccare dixerit, aut quod intolerabilius est, mortaliter\n      atque ideo poenas aeternas mereri, tantumque ob id non damnari quia\n      Deus ea opera non imputat ad damnationem, anathema sit._\u201d\n      (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 835.)\n\n 1236 Sess. VI, can. 26: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis\n      operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, exspectare et sperare aeternam\n      retributionem a Deo per eius misericordiam et Iesu Christi meritum,\n      si bene agendo et divina mandata custodiendo usque in finem\n      perseveraverint, anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 836.)\n\n 1237 Sess. VI, can. 32: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, ... ipsum iustificatum bonis\n      operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et Iesu Christi meritum, cuius\n      vivum membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, ...\n      anathema sit._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 842.)\n\n 1238 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1221 sqq.\n\n 1239 Wisd. V, 16: \u201c_Iusti autem in perpetuum vivent et apud Dominum est\n      merces eorum._\u201d\n\n 1240 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: \u201c_Ne verearis usque ad mortem iustificari,\n      quoniam merces Dei manet in aeternum._\u201d Cfr. Gen. XV, 1.\n\n 1241 Matth. V, 12: \u201c_Gaudete et exultate, quoniam merces vestra copiosa\n      est in caelis._\u201d\n\n 1242 Rom. II, 6 sq.: \u201c_... qui reddet unicuique secundum opera eius, iis\n      quidem, qui secundum patientiam boni operis gloriam et honorem et\n      incorruptionem quaerunt, vitam aeternam._\u201d\n\n 1243 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: \u201c_Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem\n      servavi. In reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet\n      mihi Dominus in illa die iustus iudex; non solum autem mihi, sed et\n      iis qui diligunt adventum eius._\u201d Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 25.\n\n 1244 1 Cor. III, 8: \u201c_Unusquisque autem propriam mercedem accipiet,\n      secundum suum laborem._\u201d\n\n 1245 Col. III, 23 sq.: \u201c_Quodcunque facitis, ex animo operamini sicut\n      Domino et non hominibus, scientes quod a Domino accipietis\n      retributionem haereditatis._\u201d\n\n 1246 Iac. I, 12: \u201c_Beatus vir, qui suffert tentationem, quoniam, quum\n      probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus\n      diligentibus se._\u201d\n\n 1247 Apoc. II, 10: \u201c_Esto fidelis usque ad mortem, et dabo tibi coronam\n      vitae._\u201d For additional Scripture texts see Bellarmine, _De\n      Iustificatione_, V, 3, 5.\n\n_ 1248 Ep. ad Rom._, IV, 1.\n\n_ 1249 Adv. Haer._, IV, 37.\n\n_ 1250 De Offic._, I, 15, 57: \u201c_Nonne evidens est, meritorum aut praemia\n      aut supplicia post mortem manere?_\u201d\n\n_ 1251 De Moribus Ecclesiae_, I, 25: \u201c_Vita aeterna est totum praemium,\n      cuius promissione gaudemus, nec praemium potest praecedere merita\n      priusque homini dari, quam dignus est. Quid enim hoc iniustius et\n      quid iustius Deo? Non ergo debemus poscere praemia, antequam\n      mereamur accipere._\u201d\n\n_ 1252 Ep. ad Sixt._, 194, n. 20: \u201c_Sicut merito peccati tamquam\n      stipendium redditur mors, ita merito iustitiae tamquam stipendium\n      vita aeterna.... Unde etiam et merces appellatur plurimis s.\n      Scripturarum locis._\u201d Other Patristic texts inculcating the\n      meritoriousness of good works performed in the state of grace can be\n      found in Bellarmine, _De Iustif._, V, 4, 6. For the solution of\n      objections raised against the Patristic argument consult Schiffini,\n      _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 609 sqq.\n\n 1253 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 21, art. 4.\n\n_ 1254 Cfr. Prop. Baii damn, a Pio V_, 13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1013):\n      \u201c_Opera bona a filiis adoptionis facta non accipiunt rationem meriti\n      ex eo, quod fiunt per Spiritum adoptionis inhabitantem corda\n      filiorum Dei, sed tantum ex eo, quod sunt conformia legi quodque per\n      ea praestatur obedientia legi._\u201d\n\n 1255 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Absit, ut Christianus\n      homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur, et non in Domino, cuius\n      tanta est erga homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae\n      sunt ipsius dona._\u201d\n\n_ 1256 Conc. Florent._, A. D. 1439, (_apud_ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693):\n      \u201c_... et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro\n      meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius._\u201d\n\n_ 1257 V. supra_, pp. 356 sqq.\n\n_ 1258 Conc. Trident._, Sess. XIV, cap. 8: \u201c_Ita non habet homo, unde\n      glorietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra in Christo est, in quo\n      vivimus, in quo movemur, in quo satisfacimus facientes fructus\n      dignos poenitentiae, qui ex illo vim habent, ab illo offeruntur\n      Patri et per illum acceptantur a Patre._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      904.)\n\n 1259 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, can. 33: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, per\n      hanc doctrinam catholicam de iustificatione, a s. Synodo hoc\n      praesenti decreto expressam, aliqu\u00e2 ex parte gloriae Dei vel meritis\n      Iesu Christi D. N. derogari, et non potius veritatem fidei nostrae,\n      Dei denique ac Christi Iesu gloriam illustrari, anathema sit._\u201d\n\n 1260 Cfr. Bellarmine, _De Iustificatione_, V, 7. See also the article on\n      \u201cMerit\u201d in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. X.\n\n 1261 Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_vere promeruisse_;\u201d Sess. VI, can. 32: \u201c_vere\n      mereri_.\u201d\n\n_ 1262 Hist. Conc. Trident._, VIII, 4.\n\n 1263 \u201c_Operibus post acceptam iustificationem peractis adeoque divin\u00e2\n      grati\u00e2 informatis redditisque ob merita Christi potentioribus, cuius\n      vivum membrum est is qui ea peragit, omnes concedebant rationem\n      meriti condigni ad conservandam augendamque eandem gratiam\n      aeternaeque felicitatis consequendam._\u201d (Pallavicini, _l.c._)\n\n_ 1264 V. infra_, Sect. 2.\n\n 1265 Heb. VI, 10: \u201c_Non enim iniustus est Deus, ut obliviscatur operis\n      vestri._\u201d\n\n 1266 2 Tim. IV, 8: \u201c_... reposita est mihi_,\u201d etc. See note 24, _supra_,\n      p. 403.\n\n 1267 Iac. I, 12: \u201c_Beatus vir, qui suffert tentationem_,\u201d etc. _V.\n      supra_, note 27, p. 403.\n\n 1268 Wisd. III, 5: \u201c_Deus tentavit eos et invenit illos dignos se._\u201d\n\n 1269 2 Thess. I, 4 sq.: \u201c_In omnibus persecutionibus vestris et\n      tribulationibus, quas sustinetis in exemplum iusti iudicii Dei, ut\n      digni habeamini in regno Dei, pro quo et patimini._\u201d\n\n 1270 Apoc. III, 4: \u201c_Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quia digni sunt._\u201d\n\n 1271 Matth. XXV, 34 sq.: \u201c_Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete\n      paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi; esurivi enim et dedistis\n      mihi manducare...._\u201d\n\n 1272 1 John III, 9.\n\n_ 1273 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 3, ad 3: \u201c_Gratia Spiritus S.,\n      quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu,\n      est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut semen arboris, in quo est\n      virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem\n      Spiritus S., qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et\n      dicitur esse pignus h\u00e6reditatis nostrae._\u201d\n\n_ 1274 Summa Theol._, 1a, qu. 21, art. 4, ad 1.\n\n 1275 Luke VI, 38: \u201c_Date, et dabitur vobis: mensuram bonam, et confectam,\n      et coagitatam, et supereffluentem dabunt in sinum vestrum._\u201d Cfr.\n      _Prop. Baii damn. A. D. 1567 a Pio V_, 14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1014): \u201c_Opera bona iustorum non accipient in die iudicii extremi\n      mercedem ampliorem, quam iusto Dei iudicio mereantur accipere._\u201d For\n      further information on this topic consult Bellarmine, _De\n      Iustificatione_, V, 19; De Lugo, _De Poenitentia_, disp. 24, n. 10.\n      The Thomistic axiom, \u201c_Deus punit citra condignum et remunerat ultra\n      condignum_\u201d and Baius\u2019 condemned proposition are interpreted\n      somewhat differently than we have explained them by Suarez, _De\n      Gratia_, XII, 31, 14. On the general argument of this Section the\n      student may profitably consult St. Bonaventure, _Breviloquium_, P.\n      V, \u00a7 12; Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 3; Tepe, _Instit.\n      Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 226 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, _Praelect.\n      Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 218 sqq., Freiburg 1908; Schiffini,\n      _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 614 sqq., Freiburg 1901.\n\n 1276 Eph. VI, 8: \u201c_Scientes, quoniam unusquisque, quodcunque fecerit\n      bonum, hoc recipiet a Domino._\u201d\n\n 1277 2 Cor. V, 10: \u201c_Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal\n      Christi, ut referat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive\n      bonum sive malum._\u201d\n\n 1278 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1, ad 1:\n      \u201c_Homo, in quantum propri\u00e2 voluntate facit illud quod debet,\n      meretur; alioquin actus iustitiae, quo quis reddit debitum, non\n      esset meritorius._\u201d\n\n 1279 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, X, 2, 5 sqq.\n\n 1280 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural_,\n      pp. 291 sqq.\n\n 1281 1 Cor. IX, 17: \u201c_Si enim volens hoc ago, mercedem habeo._\u201d\n\n 1282 Matth. XIX, 17: \u201c_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._\u201d\n\n_ 1283 Contra Jovin._, 1. II, n. 3: \u201c_Ubi necessitas est, nec corona nec\n      damnatio est._\u201d\n\n 1284 For a more extensive treatment of this and allied questions consult\n      Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, disp. 74, sect. 3; De Lugo, _De\n      Incarnatione_, disp. 26, sect. 10, n. 126 sq.\n\n_ 1285 V. supra_, pp. 82 sqq.\n\n 1286 Especially Ba\u00f1ez (_Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 6,\n      dub. 6). This view is also taken by the so-called Augustinians.\n\n 1287 Notably Billuart; see his treatise _De Gratia_, diss. 8, art. 4.\n\n_ 1288 De Iustificatione_, V, 15: \u201c_Non sufficere, si quis ad initium anni\n      vel mensis vel etiam diei generali quadam intentione referat omnia\n      sua futura opera in Deum, sed necesse esse ut illud ipsum opus\n      particulare referatur in Deum, quod postea faciendum est._\u201d\n\n_ 1289 Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 4: \u201c_Et ideo meritum vitae\n      aeternae primo pertinet ad caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes\n      secundario, secundum quod earum actus a caritate imperantur._\u201d And\n      again, _l.c._, ad 3: \u201c_Similiter etiam actus patientiae et\n      fortitudinis non est meritorius, nisi aliquis ex caritate haec\n      operetur._\u201d On the true sense of these passages cfr. Schiffini, _De\n      Gratia Divina_, pp. 647 sqq.\n\n 1290 Cfr. _Prop. damn. ab Innocentio XI_, prop. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      1156): \u201c_Probabile est, ne singulis quidem rigorose quinquenniis per\n      se obligare praeceptum caritatis erga Deum._\u201d\n\n 1291 Cfr. J. Ernst, _Die Notwendigkeit der guten Meinung. Untersuchungen\n      \u00fcber die Gottesliebe als Prinzip der Sittlichkeit und\n      Verdienstlichkeit_, Freiburg 1905.\n\n_ 1292 De Gratia_, IX, 3.\n\n_ 1293 Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 220.\n\n_ 1294 Concilium Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_Haec est enim illa corona\n      iustitiae, quam post suum certamen et cursum repositam sibi esse\n      aiebat Apostolus a iusto iudice sibi reddendam, non solum autem\n      sibi, sed et omnibus qui diligunt adventum eius. Quum enim ille ipse\n      Christus Iesus tamquam caput in membra et tamquam vitis in palmites\n      in ipsos iustificatos iugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona\n      eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine qu\u00e2\n      nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis\n      iustificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quominus plene illis\n      quidem operibus, quae in Deo_ [=_per Deum_; v. Sess. VI, can. 26,\n      32] _sunt facta, divinae legi pro huius vitae statu satisfecisse et\n      vitam aeternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint,\n      consequendam vere promeruisse censeantur._\u201d (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      809.)\n\n 1295 Cfr. Matth. V, 2 sqq.\n\n 1296 Matth. XIX, 16: \u201c_Quid boni faciam, ut habeam vitam aeternam?_\u201d\n\n 1297 Matth. XIX, 17: \u201c_Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata._\u201d\n\n 1298 Cfr. Matth. XIX, 18 sqq.\n\n 1299 The Scriptural argument is more fully developed by Tepe, _Inst.\n      Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 233 sqq.\n\n_ 1300 V. supra_, pp. 73 sqq.\n\n 1301 On a similar controversy regarding the necessity of the motive of\n      faith, see Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 225\n      sqq., and Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 649 sqq.\n\n 1302 The Scriptural proof for this proposition will be found in the\n      dogmatic treatise on Eschatology. On the absurdity of the\n      semi-Pelagian hypothesis of _merita sub conditione futura_ see\n      Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp.\n      375 sq.\n\n 1303 Cfr. _Prop. Baii damn. 1567 a Pio V_, prop. 17 (Denzinger-Bannwart,\n      n. 1017): \u201c_Sentiunt cum Pelagio, qui dicunt esse necessarium ad\n      rationem meriti, ut homo per gratiam adoptionis sublimetur ad statum\n      deificum._\u201d\n\n 1304 John XV, 4: \u201c_Sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum a semetipso,\n      nisi manserit in vite, sic nec vos, nisi in me manseritis._\u201d\n\n 1305 Rom. VIII, 17: \u201c_Si autem filii, et haeredes; haeredes quidem Dei,\n      cohaeredes autem Christi._\u201d Additional Biblical texts in Bellarmine,\n      _De Iustificatione_, V, 12 sq.\n\n_ 1306 Comment. in S. Theol._, 3a, disp. 6, cap. 4.\n\n 1307 Suarez (_De Gratia_, XII, 22), Ripalda (_De Ente Supernaturali_,\n      disp. 81), De Lugo (_De Incarnatione_, disp. 6, sect. 2, n. 37).\n\n_ 1308 Comment. in Sent._, II, dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 4.\n\n 1309 Cfr. Job XLII, 8; Dan. III, 35.\n\n 1310 Cfr. Scotus, _Comment. in Sent._, I, dist. 17, qu. 2.\n\n 1311 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, _God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_,\n      PP. 456 sq.\n\n 1312 Rom. VIII, 18: \u201c_Non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad\n      futuram gloriam._\u201d\n\n_ 1313 De Perfect. Divin._, XIII, 2.\n\n_ 1314 Comment. in S. Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 214, 223.\n\n_ 1315 De Incarnatione_, disp. 3, sect. 1 sq.\n\n_ 1316 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1, ad 3: \u201c_Dicendum quod, quia\n      actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione\n      divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter\n      debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquantum debitum est, ut sua\n      ordinatio impleatur._\u201d\n\n 1317 Iac. I, 12: \u201c_Accipiet coronam vitae_ [St. Paul says: \u1f41 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2\n      \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2], _quam repromisit (\u1f10\u03c0\u03b7\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf) Deus\n      diligentibus se._\u201d\n\n_ 1318 Serm._, 158, c. 2, n. 2: \u201c_Debitor factus est Deus non aliquid a\n      nobis accipiendo, sed quod ei placuit promittendo. Aliter enim\n      dicimus homini: Debes mihi, quia dedi tibi; et aliter dicimus: Debes\n      mihi, quia promisisti mihi. Deo autem nunquam dicimus: Redde mihi,\n      quia dedi tibi. Quid dedimus Deo, quando totum quod sumus et quod\n      habemus boni, ab illo habemus? Nihil ergo ei dedimus.... Illo ergo\n      modo possumus exigere Dominum nostrum ut dicamus: Redde, quod\n      promisisti, quia fecimus quod iussisti, et hoc tu fecisti, quia\n      laborantes iuvisti._\u201d\n\n_ 1319 Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 16: \u201c_In Deo sperantibus proponenda\n      est vita aeterna ... tamquam merces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis\n      ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter [i.e. ex fidelitate]\n      reddenda._\u201d Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 416 sqq.\n\n 1320 Sess. VI, can. 32: \u201c_Si quis dixerit, iustificatum bonis operibus\n      ... non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius\n      vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem atque\n      etiam gloriae augmentum, anathema sit._\u201d\n\n 1321 See the article on \u201cMerit\u201d in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_.\n\n_ 1322 V. supra_, Ch. II, Sect. 3, Thesis II.\n\n 1323 Sess. VI, cap. 8: \u201c_Gratis autem iustificari ideo dicimur, quia\n      nihil eorum quae iustificationem praecedunt, sive fides, sive opera,\n      ipsam iustificationis gratiam promeretur; si enim gratia est, iam\n      non ex operibus, alioquin, ut idem Apostolus inquit, gratia iam non\n      est gratia._\u201d\n\n_ 1324 V. supra_, Sect. 2, No. 2.\n\n_ 1325 De Natura et Gratia_, c. 4, n. 4: \u201c_Haec Christi gratia, sine qu\u00e2\n      nec infantes nec aetate grandes salvi fieri possunt, non meritis\n      redditur, sed gratis datur, propter quod et gratia nominatur.\n      Iustificati, inquit (Rom. III, 24; V, 4), gratis per sanguinem\n      ipsius._\u201d\n\n 1326 Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 6; Sess. VI, cap. 3; Sess.\n      XIV, cap. 4; _supra_, pp. 286 sqq.\n\n 1327 For a more exhaustive treatment of this topic consult Tepe, _Instit.\n      Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 158 sqq.\n\n 1328 See, for example, Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 26: \u201c_De auxiliis\n      sufficientibus et necessariis, quae post aliquod meritum de condigno\n      augmenti gratiae dantur, vel offeruntur, probabile est concomitanter\n      cadere sub idem meritum de condigno augmenti gratiae; nam qui\n      meretur de condigno aliquam formam, meretur quidquid connaturaliter\n      sequitur ex tali forma vel ei connaturaliter debetur._\u201d On the\n      actual distribution of sufficient grace, v. _supra_, pp. 167 sqq.\n\n_ 1329 V. supra_, pp. 392 sqq.\n\n 1330 For a fuller treatment cfr. Tepe, _Inst. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 258\n      sqq., and Chr. Pesch, _Praelect. Dogmat._, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 237\n      sqq.\n\n_ 1331 V. supra_, Sect. 1.\n\n 1332 Sess. VI, cap. 16; v. _supra_, pp. 400 sq.\n\n 1333 Sess. VI, can. 32.\n\n 1334 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 29: \u201c_Dicendum vitam aeternam et\n      vitae aeternae consecutionem non esse duo praemia distincta, quia\n      mereri mercedem et solutionem mercedis non sunt duae mercedes._\u201d\n\n 1335 On the _reviviscentia meritorum_ see the treatise on the Sacrament\n      of Penance, Vol. X of this series; cfr. also Schiffini, _De Gratia\n      Divina_, pp. 661 sqq.\n\n_ 1336 E.g._ Ripalda (_De Ente Supernat._, disp. 89, sect. 1) and De Lugo\n      (_De Incarnatione_, disp. 3, n. 59).\n\n_ 1337 V. supra_, Sect. 2, No. 2.\n\n 1338 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 28, and Vasquez, _Comment. in S.\n      Theol._, 1a 2ae, disp. 219, c. 2.\n\n 1339 Despite Bellarmine\u2019s contradiction (_De Iustificatione_, V, 20.)\n\n 1340 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 122, art. 2, ad 1:\n      \u201c_Praeparatio hominis ad gratiam habendam quaedam est simul cum ipsa\n      infusione gratiae; et talis operatio est quidem meritoria, sed non\n      gratiae quae iam habetur, sed gloriae quae nondum habetur._\u201d\n\n 1341 Cfr. Tepe, _Instit. Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 266 sqq.\n\n 1342 Matth. XVI, 27: \u201c_Et tunc reddet unicuique secundum opera eius_\n      (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6).\u201d\n\n 1343 1 Cor. III, 8: \u201c_Unusquisque autem propriam mercedem (\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n      \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd) accipiet secundum suum laborem_ (\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f34\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03cc\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd).\u201d\n\n 1344 See Eschatology.\n\n 1345 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 8.\n\n_ 1346 De Praed. Sanctorum_, c. 2.\n\n_ 1347 V. supra_, Sect. 2.\n\n 1348 Prominent among the dissenters is Billuart (_De Gratia_, diss. 8,\n      art. 5).\n\n_ 1349 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6, ad 2: \u201c_Impetratio\n      orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum autem condigni innititur\n      iustitiae. Et ideo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina\n      misericordia, quae tamen non meretur secundum iustitiam._\u201d\n\n 1350 Ps. L, 19: \u201c_Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despicies._\u201d\n\n 1351 Dan. IV, 24: \u201c_Peccata tua eleemosynis redime et iniquitates tuas\n      misericordiis pauperum; forsitan ignoscet delictis tuis._\u201d\n\n_ 1352 Ep. ad Sixt._, 194, c. 3, n. 9: \u201c_Sed nec ipsa remissio peccatorum\n      sine aliquo merito est, si fides hanc impetret. Neque enim nullum\n      est meritum fidei, qu\u00e2 fide ille dicebat: Deus propitius esto mihi\n      peccatori, et descendit iustificatus merito fidelis humilitatis._\u201d\n      Cfr. _Conc. Trident._, Sess. VI, cap. 7 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n.\n      799): \u201c_Hanc dispositionem seu praeparationem iustificatio ipsa\n      consequitur._\u201d For a fuller treatment cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII,\n      37.\n\n_ 1353 V. supra_, pp. 123 sqq. The student may also consult Tepe, _Instit.\n      Theol._, Vol. III, pp. 258 sqq., and Bellarmine, _De Iustific._, V,\n      22.\n\n_ 1354 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 7: \u201c_Respondeo dicendum quod\n      nullus potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum neque\n      merito condigni neque merito congrui._\u201d\n\n_ 1355 Lect. in Hebr._, III, 6, 10: \u201c_Duplex est meritum. Unum quod\n      innititur iustitiae et istud est meritum condigni; aliud quod soli\n      misericordiae innititur, quod dicitur meritum congrui. Et de isto\n      dicit [Paulus], quod iustum est, i.e. congruum, quod homo, qui multa\n      bona fecit, mereatur.... Et isto modo non obliviscitur Deus operis\n      nostri et dilectionis._\u201d\n\n_ 1356 Comment. in Sent._, IV, dist. 2, qu. 1, art. 2.\n\n_ 1357 Comment. in Sent._, II, dist. 28, dub. 2.\n\n_ 1358 De Gratia_, XII, 38, 6.\n\n 1359 2 Paral. XIX, 2 sq.: \u201c_Impio praebes auxilium et his, qui oderunt\n      Dominum, amiciti\u00e2 iungeris et idcirco iram quidem Domini merebaris;\n      sed bona opera inventa sunt in te._\u201d\n\n 1360 Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, 7: \u201c_Possunt enim praecedentia merita\n      esse tam pauca et tot peccata postea multiplicata, ut omnino obruant\n      merita et efficiant, ut nullo modo Deum ad misericordiam provocent;\n      secus vero erit, si e contrario merita magna fuerint et peccatum\n      subsequens et rarum sit et excusationem aliquam ex ignorantia vel\n      infirmitate habeat._\u201d\n\n 1361 Ps. LXX, 9: \u201c_Quum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me._\u201d\n\n 1362 Cfr. St. Thomas, _Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 7, ad 1:\n      \u201c_Desiderium, quo quis desiderat reparationem post lapsum, iustum\n      dicitur; et similiter oratio, qu\u00e2 petit eiusmodi reparationem,\n      dicitur iusta, quia tendit ad iustitiam; non tamen ita quod\n      iustitiae innitatur per modum meriti, sed solum misericordiae._\u201d\n      Cfr. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 687 sq.\n\n_ 1363 V. supra_, pp. 136 sqq.\n\n_ 1364 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6: \u201c_Quia enim homo in gratia\n      constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiae\n      proportionem ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione\n      alterius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte\n      illius, cuius aliquis sanctus iustificationem desiderat._\u201d\n\n 1365 Iac. V, 16: \u201c_Orate pro invicem, ut salvemini; multum enim valet\n      deprecatio iusti assidua._\u201d\n\n_ 1366 E.g._ Abraham, Job, St. Stephen.\n\n_ 1367 E.g._ St. Augustine and his mother St. Monica.\n\n 1368 Cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, XII, 38, 21.\n\n_ 1369 Summa Theol._, 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 10: \u201c_Dicendum est quod, si\n      temporalia bona considerentur, prout sunt utilia ad opera virtutum,\n      quibus perducimur in vitam aeternam, secundum hoc directe et\n      simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sicut et augmentum gratiae et omnia\n      illa, quibus homo adiuvatur ad perveniendum in beatitudinem post\n      primam gratiam.... Si autem considerentur huiusmodi temporalia bona\n      secundum se, sic non sunt simpliciter bona hominis, sed secundum\n      quid, et ita non simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sed secundum quid,\n      inquantum scil. homines moventur a Deo ad aliqua temporaliter\n      agenda, quibus suum propositum consequuntur Deo favente._\u201d\n\n 1370 Gen. XV, 1: \u201c_Ego ... merces tua magna nimis._\u201d","title":"Grace, Actual and Habitual: A Dogmatic Treatise","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":129189}