{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_29554/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_29554","id":"gutenberg_29554","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/29554","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Archaeology & Anthropology","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","History"],"text":"Produced by Julia Miller and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive/American Libraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\nA number of typographical errors have been maintained in this version of\nthis book. They have been marked with a [TN-#], which refers to a\ndescription in the complete list found at the end of the text.\n\n\n\n\n                            AN\n\n              ETHNOLOGIST'S VIEW OF HISTORY.\n\n\n                        AN ADDRESS\n                        BEFORE THE\n  ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL SOCIETY,\n                            AT\n          TRENTON, NEW JERSEY, JANUARY 28, 1896.\n\n                            BY\n\n     DANIEL G. BRINTON, A. M., M. D., LL. D., D. Sc.\n\n  PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF\n       PENNSYLVANIA AND OF GENERAL ETHNOLOGY AT THE\n       ACADEMY OF NATURAL SCIENCES OF PHILADELPHIA.\n\n                    PHILADELPHIA, PA.\n                          1896.\n\n\n\n\nAn Ethnologist's View of History.\n\n\nMR. PRESIDENT:\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe intelligent thought of the world is ever advancing to a fuller\nappreciation of the worth of the past to the present and the future.\nNever before have associations, societies and journals devoted to\nhistorical studies been so numerous. All times and tribes are searched\nfor memorials; the remote corners of modern, medieval and ancient\nperiods are brought under scrutiny; and going beyond these again, the\nsemi-historic eras of tradition and the nebulous gleams from\npre-historic milleniums[TN-1] are diligently scanned, that their\nuncertain story may be prefaced to that registered in \"the syllables of\nrecorded time.\"\n\nIn this manner a vast mass of material is accumulating with which the\nhistorian has to deal. What now is the real nature of the task he sets\nbefore himself? What is the mission with which he is entrusted?\n\nTo understand this task, to appreciate that mission, he must ask himself\nthe broad questions: What is the aim of history? What are the purposes\nfor which it should be studied and written?\n\nHe will find no lack of answers to these inquiries, all offered with\nequal confidence, but singularly discrepant among themselves. His\nembarrassment will be that of selection between widely divergent views,\neach ably supported by distinguished advocates.\n\nAs I am going to add still another, not exactly like any already on the\nlist, it may well be asked of me to show why one or other of those\nalready current is not as good or better than my own. This requires me\nto pass in brief review the theories of historic methods, or, as it is\nproperly termed, of the Philosophy of History, which are most popular\nto-day.\n\nThey may be classified under three leading opinions, as follows:\n\n1. History should be an accurate record of events, and nothing more; an\nexact and disinterested statement of what has taken place, concealing\nnothing and coloring nothing, reciting incidents in their natural\nconnections, without bias, prejudice, or didactic application of any\nkind.\n\nThis is certainly a high ideal and an excellent model. For many, yes,\nfor the majority of historical works, none better can be suggested. I\nplace it first and name it as worthiest of all current theories of\nhistorical composition. But, I would submit to you, is a literary\nproduction answering to this precept, really _History_? Is it anything\nmore than a well-prepared annal or chronicle? Is it, in fact anything\nelse than a compilation containing the materials of which real history\nshould be composed?\n\nI consider that the mission of the historian, taken in its completest\nsense, is something much more, much higher, than the collection and\nnarration of events, no matter how well this is done. The historian\nshould be like the man of science, and group his facts under inductive\nsystems so as to reach the general laws which connect and explain them.\nHe should, still further, be like the artist, and endeavor so to exhibit\nthese connections under literary forms that they present to the reader\nthe impression of a symmetrical and organic unity, in which each part or\nevent bears definite relations to all others. Collection and collation\nare not enough. The historian must \"work up his field notes,\" as the\ngeologists say, so as to extract from his data all the useful results\nwhich they are capable of yielding.\n\nI am quite certain that in these objections I can count on the suffrages\nof most. For the majority of authors write history in a style widely\ndifferent from that which I have been describing. They are distinctly\nteachers, though not at all in accord as to what they teach. They are\ngenerally advocates, and with more or less openness maintain what I call\nthe second theory of the aim of history, to wit:\n\n2. History should be a collection of evidence in favor of certain\nopinions.\n\nIn this category are to be included all religious and political\nhistories. Their pages are intended to show the dealings of God with\nman; or the evidences of Christianity, or of one of its sects,\nCatholicism or Protestantism; or the sure growth of republican or of\nmonarchial institutions; or the proof of a divine government of the\nworld; or the counter-proof that there is no such government; and the\nlike.\n\nYou will find that most general histories may be placed in this class.\nProbably a man cannot himself have very strong convictions about\npolitics or religion, and not let them be seen in his narrative of\nevents where such questions are prominently present. A few familiar\ninstances will illustrate this. No one can take either Lingard's or\nMacauley's History of England as anything more than a plea for either\nwriter's personal views. Gibbon's anti-Christian feeling is as\nperceptibly disabling to him in many passages as in the church\nhistorians is their search for \"acts of Providence,\" and the hand of God\nin human affairs.\n\nAll such histories suffer from fatal flaws. They are deductive instead\nof inductive; they are a _defensio sententiarum_ instead of an\n_investigatio veri_; they assume the final truth as known, and go not\nforth to seek it. They are therefore \"teleologic,\" that is, they study\nthe record of man as the demonstration of a problem the solution of\nwhich is already known. In this they are essentially \"divinatory,\"\nclaiming foreknowledge of the future; and, as every ethnologist knows,\ndivination belongs to a stadium of incomplete intellectual culture, one\nconsiderably short of the highest. As has been well said by Wilhelm von\nHumboldt, any teleologic theory \"disturbs and falsifies the facts of\nhistory;\"[6-1] and it has been acutely pointed out by the philosopher\nHegel, that it contradicts the notion of progress and is no advance over\nthe ancient tenet of a recurrent cycle.[6-2]\n\nI need not dilate upon these errors. They must be patent to you. No\nmatter how noble the conviction, how pure the purpose, there is\nsomething nobler and purer than it, and that is, unswerving devotion to\nrendering in history the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the\ntruth.\n\nI now turn to another opinion, that which teaches that--\n\n3. History should be a portraiture, more or less extended, of the\nevolution of the human species.\n\nThis is claimed to be the \"scientific\" view of history. It was tersely\nexpressed by Alexander von Humboldt in the phrase: \"The history of the\nworld is the mere expression of a predetermined, that is, fixed,\nevolution.\"[6-3]\n\nIt is that advocated by Auguste Comte, Draper and Spencer, and a few\nyears ago Prof. Gerland, of Strasburg, formulated its basic maxim in\nthese words: \"Man has developed from the brute through the action of\npurely mechanical, therefore fixed, laws.\"[7-1]\n\nThe scientist of to-day who hesitates to subscribe to these maxims is\nliable to be regarded as of doubtful learning or of debilitated\nintellect. I acknowledge that I am one such, and believe that I can show\nsound reasons for denying the assumption on which this view is based.\n\nIt appears to me just as teleologic and divinatory as those I have\npreviously named. It assumes Evolution as a law of the universe, whereas\nin natural science it is only a limited generalization, inapplicable to\nmost series of natural events, and therefore of uncertain continuance in\nany series. The optimism which it inculcates is insecure and belongs to\ndeductive, not inductive, reasoning. The mechanical theory on which it\nis based lacks proof, and is, I maintain, insufficient to explain\nmotive, and, therefore, historic occurrences. The assumption that\nhistory is the record of a necessary and uninterrupted evolution,\nprogressing under ironclad mechanical laws, is a preconceived theory as\ndetrimental to clear vision as are the preoccupations of the theologian\nor the political partisan.\n\nAny definition of evolution which carries with it the justification of\noptimism is as erroneous in history, as it would be in biology to assert\nthat all variations are beneficial. There is no more certainty that the\nhuman species will improve under the operation of physical laws than\nthat any individual will; there is far more evidence that it will not,\nas every species of the older geologic ages has succumbed to those laws,\nusually without leaving a representative.\n\nI am aware that I am here in opposition to the popular as well as the\nscientific view. No commonplace is better received than that, \"Eternal\nprogress is the law of nature;\" though by what process eternal laws are\ndiscovered is imperfectly explained.\n\nApplied to history, a favorite dream of some of the most recent teachers\nis that the life of the species runs the same course as that of one of\nits members. Lord Acton, of Oxford, in a late lecture states that: \"The\ndevelopment of society is like that of individual;\"[8-1] and Prof.\nFellows, of the University of Chicago, advances the same opinion in the\nwords, \"Humanity as a whole developes[TN-2] like a child.\"[8-2]\n\nThe error of this view was clearly pointed out some years ago by Dr.\nTobler.[8-3] There has been no growth of humanity at large at all\ncomparable to that of the individual. There are tribes to-day in the\nfull stone age, and others in all stages of culture above it. The\nhorizons of progress have been as local as those of geography. No\nsolidarity of advancement exists in the species as a whole. Epochs and\nstadia of culture vary with race and climate. The much talked of \"law of\ncontinuity\" does not hold good either in national or intellectual\ngrowth.\n\nSuch are the criticisms which may be urged against the historical\nmethods now in vogue. What, you will ask, is offered in their stead?\nThat which I offer is the view of the ethnologist. It is not so\nambitious as some I have named. It does not deal in eternal laws, nor\ndivine the distant future. The ethnologist does not profess to have been\nadmitted into the counsels of the Almighty, nor to have caught in his\ngrasp the secret purposes of the Universe. He seeks the sufficient\nreason for known facts, and is content with applying the knowledge he\ngains to present action.\n\nBefore stating the view of the ethnologist, I must briefly describe what\nthe science of Ethnology is. You will see at once how closely it is\nallied to history, and that the explanation of the one almost carries\nwith it the prescription for the other.\n\nIt begins with the acknowledged maxim that man is by nature a gregarious\nanimal, a _zoon politikon_, as Aristotle called him, living in society,\nand owing to society all those traits which it is the business of\nhistory, as distinguished from biology, to study.\n\nFrom this standpoint, all that the man is he owes to others; and what\nthe others are, they owe, in part, to him. Together, they make up the\nsocial unit, at first the family or clan, itself becoming part of a\nlarger unit, a tribe, nation or people. The typical folk, or _ethnos_,\nis a social unit, the members of which are bound together by certain\ntraits common to all or most, which impart to them a prevailing\ncharacter, an organic unity, specific peculiarities and general\ntendencies.\n\nYou may inquire what these traits are to which I refer as making up\nethnic character. The answer cannot be so precise as you would like. We\nare dealing with a natural phenomenon, and Nature, as Goethe once\nremarked, never makes groups, but only individuals. The group is a\nsubjective category of our own minds. It is, nevertheless,\npsychologically real, and capable of definition.\n\nThe _Ethnos_ must be defined, like a species of natural history, by a\nrehearsal of a series of its characteristics, not by one alone. The\nmembers of this series are numerous, and by no means of equal\nimportance; I shall mention the most prominent of them, and in the order\nin which I believe they should be ranked for influence on national\ncharacter.\n\nFirst, I should rank Language. Not only is it the medium of intelligible\nintercourse, of thought-tranference,[TN-3] but thought itself is\npowerfully aided or impeded by the modes of its expression in sound. As\n\"spoken language,\" in poetry and oratory, its might is recognized on all\nhands; while in \"written language,\" as literature, it works silently but\nwith incalculable effect on the character of a people.[10-1]\n\nNext to this I should place Government, understanding this word in its\nwidest sense, as embracing the terms on which man agrees to live with\nhis fellow man and with woman, family, therefore, as well as society\nties. This includes the legal standards of duty, the rules of\nrelationship and descent, the rights of property and the customs of\ncommerce, the institutions of castes, classes and rulers, and those\ninternational relations on which depend war and peace. I need not\nenlarge on the profound impress which these exert on the traits of the\npeople.[10-2]\n\nAfter these I should name Religion, though some brilliant scholars, such\nas Schelling and Max Mueller,[10-3] have claimed for it the first place\nas a formative influence on ethnic character. No one will deny the\nprominent rank it holds in the earlier stages of human culture. It is\nscarcely too much to say that most of the waking hours of the males of\nsome tribes are taken up with religious ceremonies. Religion is,\nhowever, essentially \"divinatory,\" that is, its chief end and aim is\ntoward the future, not the present, and therefore the impress it leaves\non national character is far less permanent, much more ephemeral, than\neither government or language. This is constantly seen in daily life.\nPersons change their religion with facility, but adhere resolutely to\nthe laws which protect their property. The mighty empire of Rome secured\nethnic unity to a degree never since equalled in parallel circumstances,\nand its plan was to tolerate all religions--as, indeed, do all\nenlightened states to-day--but to insist on the adoption of the Roman\nlaw, and, in official intercourse, the Latin language. I have not\nforgotten the converse example of the Jews, which some attribute to\ntheir religion; but the Romany, who have no religion worth mentioning,\nhave been just as tenacious of their traits under similar adverse\ncircumstances.\n\nThe Arts, those of Utility, such as pottery, building, agriculture and\nthe domestication of animals, and those of Pleasure, such as music,\npainting and sculpture, must come in for a full share of the\nethnologist's attention. They represent, however, stadia of culture\nrather than national character. They influence the latter materially and\nare influenced by it, and different peoples have toward them widely\ndifferent endowments; but their action is generally indirect and\nunequally distributed throughout the social unit.\n\nThese four fields, Language, Government, Religion and the Arts, are\nthose which the ethnologist explores when he would render himself\nacquainted with a nation's character; and now a few words about the\nmethods of study he adopts, and the aims, near or remote, which he keeps\nin view.\n\nHe first gathers his facts, from the best sources at his command, with\nthe closest sifting he can give them, so as to exclude errors of\nobservation or intentional bias. From the facts he aims to discover on\nthe above lines what are or were the regular characteristics of the\npeople or peoples he is studying. The ethnic differences so revealed are\nto him what organic variations are to the biologist and morphologist;\nthey indicate evolution or retrogression, and show an advance toward\nhigher forms and wider powers, or toward increasing feebleness and\ndecay.\n\nTo understand them they must be studied in connection and causation.\nHence, the method of the ethnologist becomes that which in the natural\nsciences is called the \"developmental\" method. It may be defined as the\nhistoric method where history is lacking. The biologist explains the\npresent structure of an organ by tracing it back to simpler forms in\nlower animals until he reaches the germ from which it began. The\nethnologist pursues the same course. He selects, let us say, a peculiar\ninstitution, such as caste, and when he loses the traces of its origin\nthrough failure of written records, he seeks for them in the survivals\nof unwritten folk-lore, or in similar forms in primitive conditions of\nculture.\n\nHere is where Archaeology renders him most efficient aid. By means of it\nhe has been able to follow the trail of most of the arts and\ninstitutions of life back to a period when they were so simple and\nuncomplicated that they are quite transparent and intelligible. Later\nchanges are to be analyzed and explained by the same procedure.[12-1]\n\nThis is the whole of the ethnologic method. It is open and easy when the\nfacts are in our possession. There are no secret springs, no occult\nforces, in the historic development of culture. Whatever seems hidden or\nmysterious, is so only because our knowledge of the facts is imperfect.\nNo magic and no miracle has aided man in his long conflict with the\nmaterial forces around him. No ghost has come from the grave, no God\nfrom on high, to help him in the bitter struggle. What he has won is his\nown by the right of conquest, and he can apply to himself the words of\nthe poet:\n\n    \"Hast du nicht alles selbst vollendet,\n    Heilig gluehend Herz?\" (_Goethe_).\n\nFreed from fear we can now breathe easily, for we know that no _Deus ex\nmachina_ meddles with those serene and mighty forces whose adamantine\ngrasp encloses all the phenomena of nature and of life.\n\nThe ethnologist, however, has not completed his task when he has defined\nan _ethnos_, and explained its traits by following them to their\nsources. He has merely prepared himself for a more delicate and\ndifficult part of his undertaking.\n\nIt has been well said by one of the ablest ethnologists of this\ngeneration, the late Dr. Post, of Bremen, that \"The facts of ethnology\nmust ever be regarded as the expressions of the general consciousness of\nHumanity.\"[13-1] The time has passed when real thinkers can be satisfied\nwith the doctrines of the positive philosophers, who insisted that\nevents and institutions must be explained solely from the phenomenal or\nobjective world, that is, by other events.\n\nSounder views prevail, both in ethnology and its history. \"The history\nof man,\" says a German writer, \"is neither a divine revelation, nor a\nprocess of nature; it is first and above all, the work of man;\"[13-2] an\nopinion reiterated by Prof. Flint in his work on the philosophy of\nhistory in these words: \"History is essentially the record of the work\nand manifestation of _human nature_.\"[14-1] In both sciences it is the\nessentially human which alone occupies us; it is the _life of man_.\n\nNow men do not live in material things, but in mental states; and solely\nas they affect these are the material things valuable or valueless.\nReligions, arts, laws, historic events, all have but one standard of\nappraisement, to wit, the degree to which they produce permanently\nbeneficial mental states in the individuals influenced by them. All must\nagree to this, though they may differ widely as to what such a mental\nstate may be; whether one of pleasurable activity, or that of the\nBuddhist hermit who sinks into a trance by staring at his navel, or that\nof the Trappist monk whose occupations are the meditation of death and\ndigging his own grave.\n\nThe ethnologist must make up his own mind about this, and with utmost\ncare, for if his standard of merit and demerit is erroneous, his\nresults, however much he labors on them, will have no permanent value.\nThere are means, if he chooses to use them, which will aid him here.\n\nHe must endeavor to picture vividly to himself the mental condition\nwhich gave rise to special arts and institutions, or which these evolved\nin the people. He must ascertain whether they increased or diminished\nthe joy of living, or stimulated the thirst for knowledge and the love\nof the true and the beautiful. He must cultivate the liveliness of\nimagination which will enable him to transport himself into the epoch\nand surroundings he is studying, and feel on himself, as it were, their\npeculiar influences. More than all, chief of all, he must have a broad,\nmany-sided, tender sympathy with all things human, enabling him to\nappreciate the emotions and arguments of all parties and all peoples.\n\nSuch complete comprehension and spiritual accord will not weaken, but\nwill strengthen his clear perception of those standards by which all\nactions and institutions must ultimately be weighed and measured. There\nare such standards, and the really learned ethnologist will be the last\nto deny or overlook them.\n\nThe saying of Goethe that \"The most unnatural action is yet natural,\" is\na noble suggestion of tolerance; but human judgment can scarcely go to\nthe length of Madame de Stael's opinion, when she claims that \"To\nunderstand all actions is to pardon all.\" We must brush away the\nsophisms which insist that all standards are merely relative, and that\ntime and place alone decide on right and wrong. Were that so, not only\nall morality, but all science and all knowledge were fluctuating as\nsand. But it is not so. The principles of Reason, Truth, Justice and\nLove have been, are, and ever will be the same. Time and place, race and\nculture, make no difference. Whenever a country is engaged in the\ndiffusion of these immortal verities, whenever institutions are\ncalculated to foster and extend them, that country, those institutions,\ntake noble precedence over all others whose efforts are directed to\nlower aims.[15-1]\n\nSomething else remains. When the ethnologist has acquired a competent\nknowledge of his facts, and deduced from them a clear conception of the\nmental states of the peoples he is studying, he has not finished his\nlabors. Institutions and arts in some degree reflect the mental\nconditions of a people, in some degree bring them about; but the\nunderlying source of both is something still more immaterial and\nintangible, yet more potent, to wit, Ideas and Ideals. These are the\nprimary impulses of conscious human endeavor, and it is vain to attempt\nto understand ethnology or to write history without assigning their\nconsideration the first place in the narration.\n\nI am anxious to avoid here any metaphysical obscurity. My assertion is,\nthat the chief impulses of nations and peoples are abstract ideas and\nideals, unreal and unrealizable; and that it is in pursuit of these that\nthe great as well as the small movements on the arena of national life\nand on the stage of history have taken place.\n\nYou are doubtless aware that this is no new discovery of mine. Early in\nthis century Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote: \"The last and highest duty of\nthe historian is to portray the effort of the Idea to attain realization\nin fact;\" and the most recent lecture on the philosophy of history which\nI have read, that by Lord Acton, contains this maxim: \"Ideas which in\nreligion and politics are truths, in history are living forces.\"\n\nI do claim that it is timely for me to repeat these doctrines and to\nurge them with vehemence, for they are generally repudiated by the\nprevailing schools of ethnology and history in favor of the opinion that\nobjective, mechanical influences alone suffice to explain all the\nphenomena of human life. This I pronounce an inadequate and an\nunscientific opinion.\n\nThere is in living matter everywhere something which escapes the most\nexhaustive investigation, some subtle center of impulse, which lies\nbeyond the domain of correlated energy, and which acts directively,\nwithout increasing or diminishing the total of that energy. Also in the\ntransformations of organic forms, there are preparations and propulsions\nwhich no known doctrine of the mechanical, natural causes can interpret.\nWe must accept the presence of the same powers, and in a greater\ndegree, in the life and the history of man.[17-1]\n\nIt may be objected that abstract ideas are far beyond the grasp of the\nuncultivated intellect. The reply is, consciously to regard them as\nabstract, may be; but they exist and act for all that. All sane people\nthink and talk according to certain abstract laws of grammar and logic;\nand they act in similar unconsciousness of the abstractions which impel\nthem. Moreover, the Idea is usually clothed in a concrete Ideal, a\npersonification, which brings it home to the simplest mind. This was\nlong ago pointed out by the observant Machiavelli in his statement that\nevery reform of a government or religion is in the popular mind\npersonified as the effort of one individual.\n\nIn every nation or _ethnos_ there is a prevailing opinion as to what the\nhighest typical human being should be. This \"Ideal of Humanity,\" as it\nhas been called, is more or less constantly and consciously pursued, and\nbecomes a spur to national action and to a considerable degree an\narbiter of national destiny. If the ideal is low and bestial, the course\nof that nation is downward, self-destroying; if it is lofty and pure,\nthe energies of the people are directed toward the maintenance of those\nprinciples which are elevating and preservative. These are not\nmechanical forces, in any rational sense of the term; but they are\nforces the potent directive and formative influence of which cannot be\ndenied and must not be underestimated.\n\nJust in proportion as such ideas are numerous, clear and true in the\nnational mind, do their power augment and their domain extend; just so\nmuch more quickly and firmly do they express themselves, in acts, forms\nand institutions, and thus enable the nation to enrich, beautify and\nstrengthen its own existence. We have but to glance along the nations\nof the world and to reflect on the outlines of their histories, to\nperceive the correctness of the conclusion which Prof. Lazarus, perhaps\nthe most eminent analyst of ethnic character of this generation, reaches\nin one of his essays: \"A people which is not rich in ideas, is never\nrich; one that is not strong in its thinking powers, is never\nstrong.\"[18-1]\n\nI claim, therefore, that the facts of ethnology and the study of racial\npsychology justify me in formulating this maxim for the guidance of the\nhistorian: _The conscious and deliberate pursuit of ideal aims is the\nhighest causality in human history._\n\nThe historian who would fulfil his mission in its amplest sense must\ntrace his facts back to the ideas which gave them birth; he must\nrecognize and define these as the properties of specific peoples; and he\nmust estimate their worth by their tendency to national preservation or\nnational destruction.\n\nThis is the maxim, the axiom, if you please, which both the ethnologist\nand the historian must bear ever present in mind if they would\ncomprehend the meaning of institutions or the significance of events.\nThey must be referred to, and explained by, the ideas which gave them\nbirth. As an American historian has tersely put it, \"The facts relating\nto successive phases of _human thought_ constitute History.\"[18-2]\n\nI am aware that a strong school of modern philosophers will present the\nobjection that thought itself is but a necessary result of chemical and\nmechanical laws, and therefore that it cannot be an independent cause.\nDr. Post has pointedly expressed this position in the words: \"We do not\nthink; thinking goes on within us,\"[19-1] just as other functions, such\nas circulation and secretion, go on.\n\nIt is not possible for me at this time to enter into this branch of the\ndiscussion. But I may ask your attention to the fact that one of the\nhighest authorities on the laws of natural science, the late George J.\nRomanes, reached by the severest induction an exactly opposite opinion,\nwhich he announced in these words: \"The human mind is itself a causal\nagent. Its motives are in large part matters of its own creation. * * *\nIntelligent volition is a true cause of adjustive movement.\"[19-2]\n\nFor myself, after what I have endeavored to make an unbiased study of\nboth opinions, I subscribe unhesitatingly to the latter, and look upon\nMind not only as a potent but as an independent cause of motion in the\nnatural world, of action in the individual life, and, therefore, of\nevents in the history of the species.\n\nConfining ourselves to ethnology and history, the causative idea, as I\nhave said, makes itself felt through ethnic ideals. These are\ninfluential in proportion as they are vividly realized by the national\ngenius; and elevating in proportion as they partake of those final\ntruths already referred to, which are all merely forms of expression of\nright reasoning. These ideals are the _idola fori_, which have sometimes\ndeluded, sometimes glorified, those who believed in them.\n\nI shall mention a few of them to make my meaning more apparent.\n\nThat with which we are most familiar in history is the warrior ideal,\nthe personification of military glory and martial success. It is present\namong the rudest tribes, and that it is active to-day, events in recent\nEuropean history prove only too clearly; and among ourselves, little\nwould be needed to awaken it to vivid life.\n\nWe are less acquainted with religious ideals, as they have weakened\nunder the conditions of higher culture. They belong in European history\nmore to the medieval than to the modern period. Among Mohammedans and\nBrahmins we can still see them in their full vigor. In these lower\nfaiths we can still find that intense fanaticism which can best be\ndescribed by the expression of Novalis, \"intoxicated with God,\" drunk\nwith the divine;[20-1] and this it is which preserves to these nations\nwhat power they still retain.\n\nWould that I could claim for our own people a grander conception of the\npurpose of life than either of these. But alas! their ideal is too\nevident to be mistaken. I call it the \"divitial\" ideal, that of the rich\nman, that which makes the acquisition of material wealth the one\nstandard of success in life, the only justifiable aim of effort. To most\nAmerican citizens the assertion that there is any more important, more\nsensible purpose than this, is simply incomprehensible or incredible.\n\nIn place of any of these, the man who loves his kind would substitute\nothers; and as these touch closely on the business of the ethnologist\nand the historian when either would apply the knowledge he has gained to\nthe present condition of society, I will briefly refer to some advanced\nby various writers.\n\nThe first and most favorite is that of _moral perfection_. It has been\nformulated in the expression: \"In the progress of ethical conceptions\nlies the progress of history itself.\" (Schaefer.) To such writers the\nideal of duty performed transcends all others, and is complete in\nitself. The chief end of man, they say, is to lead the moral life,\ndiligently to cultivate the ethical perception, the notion of \"the\nought,\" and to seek in this the finality of his existence.[21-1]\n\nKeener thinkers have, however, recognized that virtue, morality, the\nethical evolution, cannot be an end in itself, but must be a means to\nsome other end. Effort directed toward other, altruism in any form, must\nhave its final measurement of value in terms of self; otherwise the\nimmutable principles of justice are attacked. I cannot enlarge upon this\npoint, and will content myself with a reference to Prof. Steinthal's\nadmirable essay on \"The Idea of ethical Perfection,\" published some\nyears ago.[21-2] He shows that in its last analysis the Good has its\nvalue solely in the freedom which it confers. Were all men truly\nethical, all would be perfectly free. Therefore Freedom, in its highest\nsense, according to him and several other accomplished reasoners, is the\naim of morality, and is that which gives it worth.\n\nThis argument seems to me a step ahead, but yet to remain incomplete.\nFor after all, what is freedom? It means only opportunity, not action;\nand opportunity alone is a negative quantity, a zero. Opportunity for\nwhat, I ask?\n\nFor an answer, I turn with satisfaction to an older writer on the\nphilosophy of history, one whose genial sympathy with the human heart\nglows on every page of his volumes, to Johann Gottfried von\nHerder.[21-3] The one final aim, he tells us, of all institutions, laws,\ngovernments and religions, of all efforts and events, is that each\nperson, undisturbed by others, may employ his own powers to their\nfullest extent, and thus gain for himself a completer existence, a more\nbeautiful enjoyment of his faculties.\n\nThus, to the enriching of the individual life, its worth, its happiness\nand its fullness, does all endeavor of humanity tend; in it, lies the\nend of all exertion, the reward of all toil; to define it, should be the\nobject of ethnology; and to teach it, the purpose of history.\n\nLet me recapitulate.\n\nThe ethnologist regards each social group as an entity or individual,\nand endeavors to place clearly before his mind its similarities and\ndifferences with other groups. Taking objective facts as his guides,\nsuch as laws, arts, institutions and language, he seeks from these to\nunderstand the mental life, the psychical welfare of the people, and\nbeyond this to reach the ideals which they cherished and the ideas which\nwere the impulses of their activities. Events and incidents, such as are\nrecorded in national annals, have for him their main, if not only value,\nas indications of the inner or soul life of the people.\n\nBy the comparison of several social groups he reaches wider\ngeneralizations; and finally to those which characterize the common\nconsciousness of Humanity, the psychical universals of the species. By\nsuch comparison he also ascertains under what conditions and in what\ndirections men have progressed most rapidly toward the cultivation and\nthe enjoyment of the noblest elements of their nature; and this strictly\ninductive knowledge is that alone which he would apply to furthering the\npresent needs and aspirations of social life.\n\nThis is the method which he would suggest for history in the broad\nmeaning of the term. It should be neither a mere record of events, nor\nthe demonstration of a thesis, but a study, through occurrences and\ninstitutions, of the mental states of peoples at different epochs,\nexplanatory of their success or failure, and practically applicable to\nthe present needs of human society.\n\nSuch explanation should be strictly limited in two directions. First, by\nthe principle that man can be explained only by man, and can be so\nexplained completely. That is, no super-human agencies need be invoked\nto interpret any of the incidents of history: and, on the other hand, no\nmerely material or mechanical conditions, such as climate, food and\nenvironment, are sufficient for a full interpretation. Beyond these lie\nthe inexhaustible sources of impulse in the essence of Mind itself.\n\nSecondly, the past can teach us nothing of the future beyond a vague\nsurmise. All theories which proceed on an assumption of knowledge\nconcerning finalities, whether in science or dogma, are cobwebs of the\nbrain, not the fruit of knowledge, and obscure the faculty of\nintellectual perception. It is wasteful of one's time to frame them, and\nfatal to one's work to adopt them.\n\nThese are also two personal traits which, it seems to me, are requisite\nto the comprehension of ethnic psychology, and therefore are desirable\nto both the ethnologist and the historian. The one of these is the\npoetic instinct.\n\nI fear this does not sound well from the scientific rostrum, for the\nprevailing notion among scientists is that the poet is a fabulist, and\nis therefore as far off as possible from the platform they occupy. No\none, however, can really understand a people who remains outside the\npale of the world of imagination in which it finds its deepest joys; and\nnowhere is this depicted so clearly as in its songs and by its bards.\nThe ethnologist who has no taste for poetry may gather much that is\ngood, but will miss the best; the historian who neglects the poetic\nliterature of a nation turns away his eyes from the vista which would\ngive him the farthest insight into national character.\n\nThe other trait is more difficult to define. To apprehend what is\nnoblest in a nation one must oneself be noble. Knowledge of facts and an\nunbiased judgment need to be accompanied by a certain development of\npersonal character which enables one to be in sympathy with the finest\ntissue of human nature, from the fibre of which are formed heroes and\nmartyrs, patriots and saints, enthusiasts and devotees. To appreciate\nthese something of the same stuff must be in the mental constitution of\nthe observer.\n\nSuch is the ethnologist's view of history. He does not pretend to be\neither a priest or a prophet. He claims neither to possess the final\ntruth nor to foresee it. He is, therefore equally unwelcome to the\ndogmatist, the optimistic naturalist and the speculative philosopher. He\nrefuses any explanations which either contradict or transcend human\nreason; but he insists that human reason is one of the causal facts\nwhich he has to consider; and this brings him into conflict with both\nthe mystic and the materialist.\n\nThough he exalts the power of ideas, he is no idealist, but practical to\nthe last degree; for he denies the worth of any art, science, event or\ninstitution which does not directly or indirectly contribute to the\nelevation of the individual man or woman, the common average person, the\nhuman being.\n\nTo this one end, understanding it as we best can, he claims all effort\nshould tend; and any other view than this of the philosophy of history,\nany other standard of value applied to the records of the past, he looks\nupon as delusive and deceptive, no matter under what heraldry of title\nor seal of sanctity it is offered.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[6-1] In his epochal essay \"Die Aufgabe des Geschichtschreibers.\"\n_Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. I., s. 13. It was republished with a\ndiscriminating introduction by Professor Steinthal in _Die\nSprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm von Humboldt's_ (Berlin, 1883).\n\n[6-2] \"Der Zweck-Begriff bewirkt nur sich selbst, und ist am Ende was er\nim Anfange, in der Unspruenglichkeit, war.\" _Encyclopaedie der\nphilosophischen Wissenschaften._ Theil,[TN-4] I., Sec. 204.\n\n[6-3] \"Die Weltgeschichte ist der blosse Ausdruck einer vorbestimmten\nEntwicklung.\" (Quoted by Lord Acton.)\n\n[7-1] \"Die Menschheit hat sich aus natuerlicher, tierischer Grundlage auf\nrein natuerliche mechanische Weise entwickelt.\" _Anthropolgische\nBeitraege_, s. 21.\n\n[8-1] _A Lecture on the Study of History_, p. 1 (London, 1895).\n\n[8-2] See his article \"The Relation of Anthropology to the Study of\nHistory,\" in _The American Journal of Sociology_, July, 1895.\n\n[8-3] Ludwig Tobler, in his article \"Zur Philosophie der Geschichte,\" in\nthe _Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsychologie_, Bd. XII., s. 195.\n\n[10-1] One of the most lucid of modern German philosophical writers\nsays, \"Without language, there could be no unity of mental life, no\nnational life at all.\" Friedrich Paulsen, _Introduction to Philosophy_,\np. 193. (English translation, New York, 1895.) I need scarcely recall to\nthe student that this was the cardinal principle of the ethnological\nwritings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and that his most celebrated essay is\nentitled \"Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und\nihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts.\"\nThe thought is well and tersely put by Prof. Frank Granger--\"Language is\nthe instinctive expression of national spirit.\" (_The Worship of the\nRomans_, p. 19, London, 1896.)\n\n[10-2] \"Law, in its positive forms, may be viewed as an instrument used\nto produce a certain kind of character.\" Frank Granger, ubi supra, p.\n19.\n\n[10-3] _Lectures on the Science of Religion_, p. 55.\n\n[12-1] How different from the position of Voltaire, who,\nexpressing,[TN-5] the general sentiment of his times, wrote,--\"The\nhistory of barbarous nations has no more interest than that of bears and\nwolves!\"\n\n[13-1] _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, Bd. I., s. 5.\n(Leipzig, 1894.)\n\n[13-2] \"Das Geschichte ist weder eine Offenbarung Gottes, noch ein\nNaturprocess, sondern eben Menschenwerk.\" Tobler in the _Zeitschrift fuer\nVoelkerpsychologie_, Bd. XII., s. 201.\n\n[14-1] _History of the Philosophy of History_, p. 579.\n\n[15-1] There is nothing in this inconsistent with the principle laid\ndown by Lecky: \"The men of each age must be judged by the ideal of their\nown age and country, and not by the ideal of ourselves.\"--_The Political\nValue of History_, p. 50, New York, 1892. The distinction is that\nbetween the relative standard, which we apply to motives and persons,\nand the absolute standard, which we apply to actions. The effects of the\nlatter, for good or evil, are fixed, and independent of the motives\nwhich prompt them.\n\n[17-1] \"The historian,\" says Tolstoi, \"is obliged to admit an\ninexplicable force, which acts upon his elementary forces.\" _Power and\nLiberty_, p. 28 (Eng. Trans., New York, 1888).\n\n[18-1] See his article \"Ueber die Ideen in der Geschichte,\" in the\n_Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsychologie_.[TN-6] Bd. III., S. 486.\n\n[18-2] Brooks Adams, _The Law of Civilization and Decay_, Preface\n(London, 1895). This author has reached an advanced position with\nreference to thought and emotion as the impulses of humanity.\n\n[19-1] _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, Band I., s. 4.\n\n[19-2] _Mind and Motion_, pp. 29, 140, etc. (London, 1895.) Prof.\nPaulsen goes much further, as, \"The inner disposition spontaneously\ndetermines the development of the individual,\" and \"The organism is, as\nit were, congealed voluntary action.\"--_Introduction to Philosophy_,\npp,[TN-7] 187, 190.\n\n[20-1] Before him, however, the expression \"ebrius Deo\" was applied to\nthe ancient rhapsodists.\n\n[21-1] As expressed by Prof. Droysen, in his work, _Principles of\nHistory_, (p. 16, New York, 1893), recently translated by President\nAndrews, of Brown University--\"Historical things are the perpetual\nactualization of the moral forces.\" Elsewhere he says--\"History is\nhumanity becoming conscious concerning itself,\"[TN-8] There is no\nobjection to such expressions; they are good as far as they go; but\nthey do not go to the end.\n\n[21-2] In the _Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerpsychologie_, Band XI., Heft II.\n\n[21-3] _Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_, B. XV., Cap. I.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\n\nThe following misspellings and typographical errors were maintained.\n\n       Page       Error\n  TN-1   3        milleniums should read millenniums\n  TN-2   8        developes should read develops\n  TN-3  10        thought-tranference, should read thought-transference\n  TN-4  fn. 6-2   Theil, should read Theil\n  TN-5  fn. 12-1  expressing, should read expressing\n  TN-6  fn. 18-1  _Voelkerpsychologie_. should read _Voelkerpsychologie_,\n  TN-7  fn. 19-2  pp, should read pp.\n  TN-8  fn. 21-1  itself,\" should read itself.\"","title":"An Ethnologist's View of History: An Address Before the Annual Meeting of the New Jersey Historical Society, at Trenton, New Jersey, January 28, 1896","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":7209}