{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_30061/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_30061","id":"gutenberg_30061","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/30061","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Religion -- Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Julia Miller and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive/American Libraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note\n\nA number of typographical errors have been maintained in this version of\nthis book. They have been marked with a [TN-#], which refers to a\ndescription in the complete list found at the end of the text.\n\nThe following less common character is used. If it doesn't display\nproperly, please try changing your font.\n\n  \u221a  square root sign\n\n\n\n\n_BY THE SAME AUTHOR._\n\n  THE MYTHS OF THE NEW WORLD: A Treatise on the Symbolism and Mythology\n    of the Red Race of America. _Second edition, revised._ Large 12mo,\n    $2.50.\n\n  THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT: Its Source and Aim. A Contribution to the\n    Science and Philosophy of Religion. Large 12mo, $2.50.\n\n\n\n\n  THE\n\n  RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT\n\n  ITS SOURCE AND AIM\n\n  _A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SCIENCE AND\n  PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION._\n\n  BY\n\n  DANIEL G. BRINTON, A.M., M.D.\n\n  _Member of the American Philosophical Society, the American Philological\n  Society, etc.; author of \u201cThe Myths of the New World,\u201d etc._\n\n  [Colophon]\n\n  NEW YORK\n  HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\n  1876.\n\n\n\n\n  COPYRIGHT,\n  BY HENRY HOLT\n  1876.\n\n  JOHN F. TROW & SON, PRINTERS,\n  205-213 EAST 12TH ST., NEW YORK.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nMythology, since it began to receive a scientific handling at all, has\nbeen treated as a subordinate branch of history or of ethnology. The\n\u201cscience of religion,\u201d as we know it in the works of Burnouf, M\u00fcller,\nand others, is a comparison of systems of worship in their historic\ndevelopment. The deeper inquiry as to what in the mind of man gave birth\nto religion in any of its forms, what spirit breathed and is ever\nbreathing life into these dry bones, this, the final and highest\nquestion of all, has had but passing or prejudiced attention. To its\ninvestigation this book is devoted.\n\nThe analysis of the religious sentiment I offer is an inductive one,\nwhose outlines were furnished by a preliminary study of the religions of\nthe native race of America, a field selected as most favorable by reason\nof the simplicity of many of its cults, and the absence of theories\nrespecting them. This study was embodied in \u201cThe Myths of the New World;\na Treatise on the Symbolism and Mythology of the Red Race of America\u201d\n(second edition, N. Y. 1876).\n\nThe results thus obtained I have in the present work expanded by\nincluding in the survey the historic religions of the Old World, and\nsubmitted the whole for solution to the Laws of Mind, regarded as\nphysiological elements of growth, and to the Laws of Thought, these, as\nformal only, being held as nowise a development of those. This latter\nposition, which is not conceded by the reigning school of psychology, I\nhave taken pains to explain and defend as far as consistent with the\nplan of this treatise; but I am well aware that to say all that can be\nsaid in proof of it, would take much more space than here allowed.\n\nThe main questions I have had before me in writing this volume have an\ninterest beyond those which mere science propounds. What led men to\nimagine gods at all? What still prompts enlightened nations to worship?\nIs prayer of any avail, or of none? Is faith the last ground of\nadoration, or is reason? Is religion a transient phase of development,\nor is it the chief end of man? What is its warrant of continuance? If it\noverlive this day of crumbling theologies, whence will come its\nreprieve?\n\nTo such inquiries as these, answers satisfactory to thinking men of this\ntime can, I believe, be given only by an inductive study of religions,\nsupported by a sound psychology, and conducted in a spirit which\nacknowledges as possibly rightful, the reverence which every system\nclaims. Those I propose, inadequate though they may be, can at any rate\npretend to be the result of honest labor.\n\nPHILADELPHIA, _January, 1876_.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n                                                          PAGE.\n  CHAPTER I.\n\n  THE BEARING OF THE LAWS OF MIND ON RELIGION                3\n\n  CHAPTER II.\n\n  THE EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT         47\n\n  CHAPTER III.\n\n  THE RATIONAL POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT        87\n\n  CHAPTER IV.\n\n  THE PRAYER AND ITS ANSWER                                117\n\n  CHAPTER V.\n\n  THE MYTH AND THE MYTHICAL CYCLES                         155\n\n  CHAPTER VI.\n\n  THE CULT, ITS SYMBOLS AND RITES                          199\n\n  CHAPTER VII.\n\n  THE MOMENTA OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT                         231\n\n\n\n\nTHE BEARING OF THE LAWS OF MIND ON RELIGION\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     The distinction between the Science and the Philosophy of religion.\n     It is assumed (1) that religions are products of thought, (2) that\n     they have a unity of kind and purpose. They can be studied by the\n     methods of natural science applied to Mind.\n\n     Mind is co-extensive with organism. Sensation and Emotion are\n     prominent marks of it. These are either pleasurable or painful; the\n     latter _diminish_ vital motions, the former _increase_ them. This\n     is a product of natural selection. A mis-reading of these facts is\n     the fallacy of Buddhism and other pessimistic systems. Pleasure\n     comes from continuous action. This is illustrated by the esthetic\n     emotions, volition and consciousness.\n\n     The climax of mind is Intellect. Physical changes accompany thought\n     but cannot measure it. Relations of thought and feeling. _Truth_ is\n     its only measure. Truth, like pleasure, is desired for its\n     preservative powers. It is reached through the laws of thought.\n\n     These laws are: (1) the natural order of the association of ideas,\n     (2) the methods of applied logic, (3) the forms of correct\n     reasoning. The last allow of mathematical expression. They are\n     three in number, called those of Determination, Limitation and\n     Excluded Middle.\n\n     The last is the key-stone of religious philosophy. Its diverse\n     interpretations. Its mathematical expres ion[TN-1] shows that it\n     does not relate to contradictories. But certain concrete analytic\n     propositions, relating to contraries, do have this form. The\n     contrary as distinguished from the privative. The Conditioned and\n     Unconditioned, the Knowable and Unknowable are not true\n     contradictions. The synthesis of contraries is theoretic only.\n\n     Errors as to the limits of possible explanation corrected by these\n     distinctions. The formal law is the last and complete explanation.\n     The relations of thought, belief and being.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE BEARING OF THE LAWS OF MIND ON RELIGION.\n\n\nThe Science of Religion is one of the branches of general historical\nscience. It embraces, as the domain of its investigation, all recorded\nfacts relating to the displays of the Religious Sentiment. Its limits\nare defined by those facts, and the legitimate inferences from them. Its\naim is to ascertain the constitutive laws of the origin and spread of\nreligions, and to depict the influence they have exerted on the general\nlife of mankind.\n\nThe question whether a given religion is true or false cannot present\nitself in this form as a proper subject of scientific inquiry. The most\nthat can be asked is, whether some one system is best suited to a\nspecified condition of the individual or the community.\n\nThe higher inquiry is the object of the Philosophy of Religion. This\nbranch of study aims to pass beyond recorded facts and local adjustments\nin order to weigh the theoretical claims of religions, and measure their\ngreater or less conformity with abstract truth. The formal or regulative\nlaws of religious thought occupy it.\n\nTheology, dogmatic or polemic, is an explanatory defence of some\nparticular faith. Together with mythology and symbolism, it furnishes\nthe material from which the Science and Philosophy of Religion seek to\neduce the laws and frame the generalizations which will explain the\nsource and aim of religion in general.\n\nThe common source of all devotional displays is the Religious Sentiment,\na complex feeling, a thorough understanding of which is an essential\npreliminary to the study of religious systems.\n\nSuch a study proceeds on the assumption that all religions are products\nof thought, commenced and continued in accordance with the laws of the\nhuman mind, and, therefore, comprehensible to the extent to which these\nlaws are known. No one disputes this, except in reference to his own\nreligion. This, he is apt to assert, had something \u201csupernatural\u201d about\nits origin. If this word be correctly used, it may stand without cavil.\nThe \u201cnatural\u201d is that of which we know in whole or in part the laws; the\n\u201csupernatural\u201d means that of which we do not at present know in any\ndegree the laws. The domain of the supernatural diminishes in the ratio\nof the increase of knowledge; and the inference that it also is\nabsolutely under the control of law, is not only allowable but\nobligatory.\n\nA second assumption must be that there is a unity of kind and purpose in\nall religions. Without this, no common law can exist for them. Such a\nlaw must hold good in all ages, in every condition of society, and in\neach instance. Hence those who explain religious systems as forms of\ngovernment, or as systems of ethics, or as misconceived history, or as\ntheories of natural philosophy, must be prepared to make their view good\nwhen it is universally applied, or else renounce the possibility of a\nScience of Religion; while those who would except their own system from\nwhat they grant is the law of all others, violate the principles of\ninvestigation and thereby the canons of truth.\n\nThe methods of science are everywhere alike. Has the naturalist to\nexplain an organism, he begins with its elements or proximate principles\nas obtained by analysis; he thence passes to the tissues and fluids\nwhich compose its members; these he considers first in a state of\nrepose, their structure and their connections; then he examines their\nfunctions, the laws of their growth and action; and finally he has\nrecourse to the doctrine of relations, _la th\u00e9orie des milieux_, to\ndefine the conditions of its existence. Were such a method applied to a\nreligion, it would lead us first to study its psychological elements,\nthen the various expressions in word and act to which these give\noccasion, next the record of its growth and decay, and finally from\nthese to gather the circumstantials of human life and culture which led\nto its historic existence.\n\nSome have urged that such a method should not be summoned to questions\nin mental philosophy. To do so, say they, is to confound things\ndistinct, requiring distinct plans of study. Such a criticism might have\nhad weight in the days when the mind was supposed to inhabit the body as\na tenant a house, and have no relation to it other than that of a casual\noccupant. But that opinion is antiquated. More than three-fourths of a\ncentury ago the far-seeing thinker, Wilhelm von Humboldt, laid down the\nmaxim that the phenomena of mind and matter obey laws identical in\nkind;[6-1] and a recent historian of science sums up the result of the\nlatest research in these words:\n\n\u201cThe old dualism of mind and body, which for centuries struggled in vain\nfor reconciliation, finds it now, not indeed in the unity of substance,\nbut in the unity of laws.\u201d[6-2]\n\nIt is, therefore, as a question in mental philosophy to be treated by\nthe methods of natural science, that I shall approach the discussion of\nthe religious sentiment. As it is a part, or at least a manifestation of\nmind, I must preface its more particular consideration with some words\non the mind in general, words which I shall make as few and as clear as\npossible.\n\nAt the beginning of this century, the naturalist Oken hazarded the\nassertion: \u201cThe human mind is a memberment of infusorial\nsensation,\u201d[7-1] a phrase which has been the guiding principle of\nscientific psychology ever since. That in the course of this memberment\nor growth wholly new faculties are acquired, is conceded. As the union\nof two inorganic substances may yield a third different in every respect\nfrom either; or, as in the transition of inorganic to organic matter,\nthe power of reproduction is attained; so, positively new powers may\nattend the development of mind. From sensations it progresses to\nemotions, from emotions to reason. The one is the psychical climax of\nthe other. \u201cWe have still to do with the one mind,whose[TN-2] action\ndevelopes itself with perception, through discrimination, till it\narrives at notions, wherein its most general scheme, \u2018truth and error,\u2019\nserves as the principle.\u201d[8-1]\n\nExtravagant as Oken\u2019s expression seemed to many when it was published,\nit now falls short of the legitimate demands of science, and I may add,\nof religion. _Mind is co-extensive with organism_; in the language of\nlogic, one \u201cconnotes\u201d the other; this statement, and nothing short of\nit, satisfies the conditions of the problem. Wherever we see Form\npreserved amid the change of substance, _there_ is mind; it alone can\nwork that miracle; only it gives Life. Matter suffers no increase;\ntherefore the new is but a redistribution of the old; it is new in\n_form_ only; and the maintenance of form under changes of substance is\nthe one distinguishing mark of organism. To it is added the yet more\nwonderful power of transmitting form by reproduction. Wherever these\nare, are also the rudiments of mind. The distinction between the animal\nand the vegetable worlds, between the reasoning and unreasoning animals,\nis one of degree only. Whether, in a somewhat different sense, we should\nnot go yet further, and say that mind is co-extensive with motion, and\nhence with phenomena, is a speculative inquiry which may have to be\nanswered in the affirmative, but it does not concern us here.\n\nThe first and most general mark of Mind is sensation or common feeling.\nIn technical language a sensation is defined to be the result of an\nimpression on an organism, producing some molecular change in its nerve\nor life centres. It is the consequence of a contact with another\nexistence. Measured by its effects upon the individual the common law of\nsensation is: Every impression, however slight, either adds to or takes\nfrom the sum of the life-force of the system; in the former case it\nproduces a pleasurable, in the latter a painful sensation. The\nexceptions to this rule, though many, are such in appearance only.[9-1]\n\nIn the human race the impression can often be made quite as forcibly by\na thought as by an act. \u201cI am confident,\u201d says John Hunter, the\nanatomist, \u201cthat I can fix my attention to any part, until I have a\nsensation in that part.\u201d This is what is called the influence of the\nmind upon the body. Its extent is much greater than used to be imagined,\nand it has been a fertile source of religious delusions. Such sensations\nare called subjective; those produced by external force, objective.\n\nThe immediate consequent of a sensation is _reflex action_, the object\nof which is either to avoid pain or increase pleasure, in other words,\neither to preserve or augment the individual life.\n\nThe molecular changes incident to a sensation leave permanent traces,\nwhich are the physical bases of memory. One or several such remembered\nsensations, evoked by a present sensation, combine with it to form an\nEmotion. Characteristic of their origin is it that the emotions fall\nnaturally into a dual classification, in which the one involves\npleasurable or elevating, the other painful or depressing conditions.\nThus we have the pairs joy and grief, hope and fear, love and hate, etc.\n\nThe question of pleasure and pain is thus seen to be the primary one of\nmental science. We must look to it to explain the meaning of sensation\nas a common quality of organism. What is the significance of pleasure\nand pain?\n\nThe question involves that of Life. Not to stray into foreign topics, it\nmay broadly be said that as all change resolves itself into motion,\nand, as Helmholtz remarks, all science merges itself into mechanics, we\nshould commence by asking what vital motions these sensations stand for\nor correspond to.\n\nEvery organism, and each of its parts, is the resultant of innumerable\nmotions, a composition of forces. As such, each obeys the first law of\nmotion, to wit, indefinite continuance of action until interfered with.\nThis is a modification of Newton\u2019s \u201claw of continuance,\u201d which, with the\nother primary laws of motion, must be taken as the foundation of biology\nas well as of astronomy.[11-1]\n\nThe diminution or dispersion of organic motion is expressed in\nphysiological terms as _waste_; we are admonished of waste by _pain_;\nand thus admonished we supply the waste or avoid the injury as far as we\ncan. But this connection of pain with waste is not a necessary one, nor\nis it the work of a _Providentia particularis_, as the schoolmen said.\nIt is a simple result of natural selection. Many organisms have been\nborn, no doubt, in which waste did not cause pain; caused, perhaps,\npleasure. Consequently, they indulged their preferences and soon\nperished. Only those lived to propagate their kind in whom a different\nsensation was associated with waste, and they transmitted this\nsensitiveness increased by ancestral impression to their offspring. The\ncurses of the human race to-day are alcohol, opium and tobacco, and they\nare so because they cause waste, but do not immediately produce painful\nbut rather pleasurable feelings.\n\nPain, as the sensation of waste, is the precursor of death, of the part\nor system. By parity of evolution, pleasure came to be the sensation of\ncontinuance, of uninterrupted action, of increasing vigor and life.\nEvery action, however, is accompanied by waste, and hence every pleasure\ndevelopes pain. But it is all important to note that the latter is the\nmental correlative not of the action but of its cessation, not of the\nlife of the part but of its ceasing to live. Pain, it is true, in\ncertain limits excites to action; but it is by awakening the\nself-preservative tendencies, which are the real actors. This\nphysiological distinction, capable of illustration from sensitive\nvegetable as well as the lowest animal organisms, has had an intimate\nconnection with religious theories. The problems of suffering and death\nare precisely the ones which all religions set forth to solve in theory\nand in practice. Their creeds and myths are based on what they make of\npain. The theory of Buddhism, which now has more followers than any\nother faith, is founded on four axioms, which are called \u201cthe four\nexcellent truths.\u201d The first and fundamental one is: \u201cPain is\ninseparable from existence.\u201d This is the principle of all pessimism,\nancient and modern. Schopenhauer, an out-and-out pessimist, lays down\nthe allied maxim, \u201cAll pleasure is negative, that is, it consists in\ngetting rid of a want or pain,\u201d[13-1] a principle expressed before his\ntime in the saying \u201cthe highest pleasure is the relief from pain.\u201d\n\nConsistently with this, Buddhism holds out as the ultimate of hope the\nstate of Nirvana, in which existence is not, where the soul is \u201cblown\nout\u201d like the flame of a candle.\n\nBut physiology demolishes the corner-stone of this edifice when it shows\nthat pain, so far from being inseparable from existence, has merely\nbecome, through transmitted experience, nearly inseparable from the\nprogressive cessation of existence. While action and reaction are equal\nin inorganic nature, the principle of life modifies the operation of\nthis universal law of force by bringing in _nutrition_, which, were it\ncomplete, would antagonize reaction. In such a case, pleasure would be\ncontinuous, pain null; action constant, reaction hypothetical. As,\nhowever, nutrition in fact never wholly and at once replaces the\nelements altered by vital action, both physicians and metaphysicians\nhave observed that pleasure is the fore-runner of pain, and has the\nlatter as its certain sequel.[14-1]\n\nPhysiologically and practically, the definition of pleasure is, _maximum\naction with minimum waste_.\n\nThis latter generalization is the explanation of the esthetic emotions.\nThe modern theory of art rests not on a psychological but a\nphysiological, and this in turn on a physical basis. Helmholtz\u2019s theory\nof musical harmony depends on the experimental fact that a continued\nimpression gives a pleasant, a discontinuous an unpleasant sensation.\nThe mechanics of muscular structure prove that what are called graceful\nmotions are those which are the mechanical resultant of the force of\nthe muscle,--those which it can perform at least waste. The pleasure we\ntake in curves, especially \u201cthe line of beauty,\u201d is because our eyes can\nfollow them with a minimum action of its muscles of attachment. The\npopular figure called the Grecian figure or the walls of Troy, is\npleasant because each straight line is shorter, and at right angles to\nthe preceding one, thus giving the greatest possible change of action to\nthe muscles of the eye.\n\nSuch a mechanical view of physiology presents other suggestions. The\nlaws of vibratory motion lead to the inference that action in accordance\nwith those laws gives maximum intensity and minimum waste. Hence the\npleasure the mind takes in harmonies of sound, of color and of odors.\n\nThe correct physiological conception of the most perfect physical life\nis that which will continue the longest in use, not that which can\ndisplay the greatest muscular force. The ideal is one of extension, not\nof intension.\n\nReligious art indicates the gradual recognition of these principles.\nTrue to their ideal of inaction, the Oriental nations represent their\ngods as mighty in stature, with prominent muscles, but sitting or\nreclining, often with closed eyes or folded hands, wrapped in robes, and\nlost in meditation. The Greeks, on the other hand, portrayed their\ndeities of ordinary stature, naked, awake and erect, but the limbs\nsmooth and round, the muscular lines and the veins hardly visible, so\nthat in every attitude an indefinite sense of repose pervades the whole\nfigure. Movement without effort, action without waste, is the\nimmortality these incomparable works set forth. They are meant to teach\nthat the ideal life is one, not of painless ease, but of joyous action.\n\nThe law of continuity to which I have alluded is not confined to simple\nmotions. It is a general mathematical law, that the longer anything\nlasts the longer it is likely to last. If a die turns ace a dozen times\nhandrunning, the chances are large that it will turn ace again. The\nTheory of Probabilities is founded upon this, and the value of\nstatistics is based on an allied principle. Every condition opposes\nchange through inertia. By this law, as the motion caused by a\npleasurable sensation excites by the physical laws of associated motions\nthe reminiscences of former pleasures and pains, a tendency to\npermanence is acquired, which gives the physical basis for Volition.\nExperience and memory are, therefore, necessary to volition, and\npractically self restraint is secured by calling numerous past\nsensations to mind, deterrent ones, \u201cthe pains which are indirect\npleasures,\u201d or else pleasurable ones. The Will is an exhibition under\ncomplex relations of the tendency to continuance which is expressed in\nthe first law of motion. Its normal action is the maintenance of the\nindividual life, the prolongation of the pleasurable sensations, the\nsupport of the forces which combat death.\n\nWhatever the action, whether conscious or reflex, its real though often\nindirect and unaccomplished object is the preservation or the\naugmentation of the individual life. Such is the dictum of natural\nscience, and it coincides singularly with the famous maxim of Spinoza:\n_Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur._\n\nThe consciousness which accompanies volitional action is derived from\nthe common feeling which an organism has, as the result of all its parts\nderiving their nutrition from the same centre. Rising into the sphere of\nemotions, this at first muscular sensation becomes \u201cself-feeling.\u201d The\nIndividual is another name for the boundaries of reflex action.\n\nThrough memory and consciousness we reach that function of the mind\ncalled the intellect or reason, the product of which is _thought_. Its\nphysical accompaniments are chemical action, and an increase of\ntemperature in the brain. But the sum of the physical forces thus\nevolved is not the measure of the results of intellectual action. These\ndiffer from other forms of force in being incommensurate with extension.\nThey cannot be appraised in units of quantity, but in quality only. The\nchemico-vital forces by which a thought rises into consciousness bear\nnot the slightest relation to the value of the thought itself. It is\nhere as in those ancient myths where an earthly maiden brings forth a\ngod. The power of the thought is dependent on another test than physical\nforce, to wit, its _truth_. This is measured by its conformity to the\nlaws of right reasoning, laws clearly ascertained, which are the common\nbasis of all science, and to which it is the special province of the\nscience of logic to give formal expression.\n\nPhysical force itself, in whatever form it appears, is only known to us\nas feeling or as thought; these alone we know to be real; all else is at\nleast less real.[18-1] Not only is this true of the external world, but\nalso of that assumed something, the reason, the soul, the ego, or the\nintellect. For the sake of convenience these words may be used; but it\nis well to know that this introduction of something that thinks, back\nof thought itself, is a mere figure of speech. We say, \u201c_I_ think,\u201d as\nif the \u201cI\u201d was something else than the thinking. At most, it is but the\nrelation of the thoughts. Pushed further, it becomes the limitation of\nthought by sensation, the higher by the lower. The Cartesian maxim,\n_cogito ergo sum_, has perpetuated this error, and the modern philosophy\nof the _ego_ and _non-ego_ has prevented its detection. A false reading\nof self-consciousness led to this assumption of \u201ca thinking mind.\u201d Our\npersonality is but the perception of the solidarity of our thoughts and\nfeelings; it is itself a thought.\n\nThese three manifestations of mind--sensations, emotions and\nthoughts--are mutually exclusive in their tendencies. The patient\nforgets the fear of the result in the pain of the operation; in intense\nthought the pulse falls, the senses do not respond, emotions and action\nare absent. We may say that ideally the unimpeded exercise of the\nintellect forbids either sensation or emotion.\n\nContrasting sensation and emotion, on the one side, with intellect\non the other, feeling with thought, they are seen to be polar or\nantithetical manifestations of mind. Each requires the other for its\nexistence, yet in such wise that the one is developed at the expense\nof the other. The one waxes as the other wanes. This is seen to\nadvantage when their most similar elements are compared. Thus\nconsciousness in sensation is keenest when impressions are strongest;\nbut this consciousness is a bar to intellectual self-consciousness,\nas was pointed out by Professor Ferrier in his general Law of\nconsciousness.[20-1] When emotion and sensation are at their minimum,\none is most conscious of the solidarity of one\u2019s thoughts; and just in\nproportion to the vividness of self-consciousness is thought lucid and\nstrong. In an ideal intelligence, self-consciousness would be\ninfinite, sensation infinitesimal.\n\nYet there is a parallelism between feeling and thought, as well as a\ncontrast. As pain and pleasure indicate opposite tendencies in the\nforces which guide sensation and emotion, so do the true and the untrue\ndirect thought, and bear the same relation to it. For as pain is the\nwarning of death, so the untrue is the detrimental, the destructive. The\nman who reasons falsely, will act unwisely and run into danger thereby.\nTo know the truth is to be ready for the worst. Who reasons correctly\nwill live the longest. To love pleasure is not more in the grain of man\nthan to desire truth. \u201cI have known many,\u201d says St. Augustine, \u201cwho like\nto deceive; to be deceived, none.\u201d Pleasure, joy, truth, are the\nrespective measures of life in sensation, emotion, intellect; one or the\nother of these every organism seeks with all its might, its choice\ndepending on which of these divisions of mind is prominently its own. As\nthe last mentioned is the climax, truth presents itself as in some way\nthe perfect expression of life.\n\nWe have seen what pleasure is, but what is truth? The question of Pilate\nremains, not indeed unanswered, but answered vaguely and\ndiscrepantly.[21-1] We may pass it by as one of speculative interest\nmerely, and turn our attention to its practical paraphrase, what is\ntrue?\n\nThe rules of evidence as regards events are well known, and also the\nprinciples of reaching the laws of phenomena by inductive methods. Many\nsay that the mind can go no further than this, that the truth thus\nreached, if not the highest, is at least the highest for man. It is at\nbest relative, but it is real. The correctness of this statement may be\ntested by analyzing the processes by which we acquire knowledge.\n\nKnowledge reaches the mind in two forms, for which there are in most\nlanguages, though not in modern English, two distinct expressions,\n_connaitre_ and _savoir_, _kennen_ and _wissen_. The former relates to\nknowledge through sensation, the latter through intellection; the former\ncannot be rendered in words, the latter can be; the former is reached\nthrough immediate perception, the latter through logical processes. For\nexample: an odor is something we may certainly know and can identify,\nbut we cannot possibly describe it in words; justice on the other hand\nmay be clearly defined to our mind, but it is equally impossible to\ntranslate it into sensation. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that\nthe one of these processes is, so far as it goes, as conclusive as the\nother, and that they proceed on essentially the same principles.[22-1]\nReligious philosophy has to do only with the second form of knowledge,\nthat reached through notions or thoughts.\n\nThe enchainment or sequence of thoughts in the mind is at first an\naccidental one. They arise through the two general relations of nearness\nin time or similarity in sensation. Their succession is prescribed by\nthese conditions, and without conscious effort cannot be changed. They\nare notions about phenomena only, and hence are infinitely more likely\nto be wrong than right. Of the innumerable associations of thought\npossible, only one can yield the truth. The beneficial effects of this\none were felt, and thus by experience man slowly came to distinguish the\ntrue as what is good for him, the untrue as what is injurious.\n\nAfter he had done this for a while, he attempted to find out some plan\nin accordance with which he could so arrange his thoughts that they\nshould always produce this desirable result. He was thus led to\nestablish the rules for right reasoning, which are now familiarly known\nas Logic. This science was long looked upon as a completed one, and at\nthe commencement of this century we find such a thinker as Coleridge\nexpressing an opinion that further development in it was not to be\nexpected. Since then it has, however, taken a fresh start, and by its\ngrowth has laid the foundation for a system of metaphysics which will be\nfree from the vagaries and unrealities which have thrown general\ndiscredit on the name of philosophy.\n\nIn one direction, as applied logic and the logic of induction, the\nnatural associations of ideas have been thoroughly studied, and the\nmethods by which they can be controlled and reduced have been taught\nwith eminent success. In this branch, Bentham, Mill, Bain, and others\nhave been prominent workers.\n\nDealing mainly with the subjects and materials of reasoning, with\nthoughts rather than with thinking, these writers, with the tendency of\nspecialists, have not appreciated the labors of another school of\nlogicians, who have made the investigation of the process of thinking\nitself their especial province. This is abstract logic, or pure logic,\nsometimes called, inasmuch as it deals with forms only, \u201cformal logic,\u201d\nor because it deals with names and not things, \u201cthe logic of names.\u201d It\ndates its rise as an independent science from the discovery of what is\nknown as \u201cthe quantification of the predicate,\u201d claimed by Sir William\nHamilton. Of writers upon it may be mentioned Professor De Morgan, W.\nStanley Jevons, and especially Professor George Boole of Belfast. The\nlatter, one of the subtlest thinkers of this age, and eminent as a\nmathematician, succeeded in making an ultimate analysis of the laws of\nthinking, and in giving them a symbolic notation, by which not only the\ntruth of a simple proposition but the relative degree of truth in\ncomplex propositions may be accurately estimated.[24-1]\n\nThis he did by showing that the laws of correct thinking can be\nexpressed in algebraic notation, and, thus expressed, will be subject to\nall the mathematical laws of an algebra whose symbols bear the uniform\nvalue of unity or nought (1 or 0)--a limitation required by the fact\nthat pure logic deals in notions of quality only, not of quantity.\n\nThis mathematical form of logic was foreseen by Kant when he declared\nthat all mathematical reasoning derives its validity from the logical\nlaws; but no one before Professor Boole had succeeded in reaching the\nnotation which subordinated these two divisions of abstract thought to\nthe same formal types. His labors have not yet borne fruit in proportion\nto their value, and they are, I believe, comparatively little known. But\nin the future they will be regarded as epochal in the science of mind.\nThey make us to see the same law governing mind and matter, thought and\nextension.\n\nNot the least important result thus achieved was in emphasizing the\ncontrast between the natural laws of mental association, and the laws of\nthinking which are the foundation of the syllogism.\n\nBy attending to this distinction we are enabled to keep the form and the\nmatter of thought well apart--a neglect to do which, or rather a studied\nattempt to ignore which, is the radical error of the logic devised by\nHegel, as I shall show more fully a little later.\n\nAll applied logic, inductive as well as deductive, is based on formal\nlogic, and this in turn on the \u201claws of thought,\u201d or rather of thinking.\nThese are strictly regulative or abstract, and differ altogether from\nthe natural laws of thought, such as those of similarity, contiguity and\nharmony, as well as from the rules of applied logic, such as those of\nagreement and difference. The fundamental laws of thinking are three in\nnumber, and their bearing on all the higher questions of religious\nphilosophy is so immediate that their consideration becomes of the last\nmoment in such a study as this. They are called the laws of\nDetermination, Limitation and Excluded Middle.\n\nThe first affirms that every object thought about must be conceived as\nitself, and not as some other thing. \u201cA is A,\u201d or \u201c_x_ = _x_,\u201d is its\nformal expression. This teaches us that whatever we think of, must be\nthought as one or a unity. It is important, however, to note that this\ndoes not mean a mathematical unit, but a logical one, that is, identity\nand not contrast. So true is this that in mathematical logic the only\nvalue which can satisfy the formula is a concept which does not admit of\nincrease, to wit, a Universal.\n\nFrom this necessity of conceiving a thought under unity has arisen the\ninteresting tendency, so frequently observable even in early times, to\nspeak of the universe as one whole, the \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd of the Greek philosophers;\nand also the monotheistic leaning of all thinkers, no matter what their\ncreed, who have attained very general conceptions. Furthermore, the\nstrong liability of confounding this speculative or logical unity with\nthe concrete notion of individuality, or mathematical unity, has been,\nas I shall show hereafter, a fruitful source of error in both religious\nand metaphysical theories. Pure logic deals with quality only, not with\nquantity.\n\nThe second law is that of Limitation. As the first is sometimes called\nthat of Affirmation, so this is called that of Negation. It prescribes\nthat a thing is not that which it is not. Its formula is, \u201cA is not\nnot-A.\u201d If this seems trivial, it is because it is so familiar.\n\nThese two laws are two aspects of the same law. The old maxim is, _omnis\ndeterminatio est negatio_; a quality can rise into cognition only by\nbeing limited by that which it is not. It is not a comparison of two\nthoughts, however, nor does it limit the quality itself. For the\nnegative is not a thought, and the quality is not _in suo genere\nfinita_, to use an expression of the old logicians; it is limited not by\nitself but by that which it is not. These are not idle distinctions, as\nwill soon appear.\n\nThe third law comes into play when two thoughts are associated and\ncompared. There is qualitative identity, or there is not. A is either B\nor not B. An animal is either a man or not a man. There is no middle\nclass between the two to which it can be assigned. Superficial truism as\nthis appears, we have now come upon the very battle ground of the\nphilosophies. This is the famous \u201cLaw of the contradictories and\nexcluded middle,\u201d on the construction of which the whole fabric of\nreligious dogma, and I may add of the higher metaphysics, must depend.\n\u201cOne of the principal retarding causes of philosophy,\u201d remarks Professor\nFerrier, \u201chas been the want of a clear and developed doctrine of the\ncontradictory.\u201d[28-1] The want is as old as the days of Heraclitus of\nEphesus, and lent to his subtle paradoxes that obscurity which has not\nyet been wholly removed.\n\nFounding his arguments on one construction of this law, expressed in the\nmaxim, \u201cThe conceivable lies between two contradictory extremes,\u201d Sir\nWilliam Hamilton defended with his wide learning those theories of the\nConditioned and the Unconditioned, the Knowable and Unknowable, which\nbanish religion from the realm of reason and knowledge to that of faith,\nand cleave an impassable chasm between the human and the divine\nintelligence. From this unfavorable ground his orthodox followers,\nMansel and Mozley, defended with ability but poor success their\nChristianity against Herbert Spencer and his disciples, who also\naccepted the same theories, but followed them out to their legitimate\nconclusion--a substantially atheistic one.\n\nHamilton in this was himself but a follower of Kant, who brought this\nlaw to support his celebrated \u201cantinomies of the human understanding,\u201d\nwarnings set up to all metaphysical explorers to keep off of holy\nground.\n\nOn another construction of it, one which sought to escape the dilemma of\nthe contradictories by confining them to matters of the understanding,\nHegel and Schelling believed they had gained the open field. They taught\nthat in the highest domain of thought, there where it deals with\nquestions of pure reason, the unity and limits which must be observed in\nmatters of the understanding and which give validity to this third law,\ndo not obtain. This view has been closely criticized, and, I think, with\njustice. Pretending to deal with matters of pure reason, it constantly\nthough surreptitiously proceeds on the methods of applied logic; its\nconclusions are as fallacious logically as they are experimentally. The\nlaws of thought are formal, and are as binding in transcendental\nsubjects as in those which concern phenomena.\n\nThe real bearing of this law can, it appears to me, best be derived from\na study of its mathematical expression. This is, according to the\nnotation of Professor Boole, _x_^{2}=_x_. As such, it presents a\nfundamental equation of thought, and it is because it is of the second\ndegree that we classify in pairs or opposites. This equation can only be\nsatisfied by assigning to _x_ the value of 1 or 0. The \u201cuniversal type\nof form\u201d is therefore _x_(1-_x_)=0.\n\nThis algebraic notation shows that there is, not two, but only one\nthought in the antithesis; that it is made up of a thought and its\nexpressed limit; and, therefore, that the so-called \u201claw of\ncontradictories\u201d does not concern contradictories at all, in pure logic.\nThis result was seen, though not clearly, by Dr. Thompson, who indicated\nthe proper relation of the members of the formula as a positive and a\nprivative. He, however, retained Hamilton\u2019s doctrine that \u201cprivative\nconceptions enter into and assist the higher processes of the reason in\nall that it can know of the absolute and infinite;\u201d that we must, \u201cfrom\nthe seen realize an unseen world, not by extending to the latter the\nproperties of the former, but by assigning to it attributes entirely\nopposite.\u201d[31-1]\n\nThe error that vitiates all such reasoning is the assumption that the\nprivative is an independent thought, that a thought and its limitation\nare two thoughts; whereas they are but the two aspects of the one\nthought, like two sides to the one disc, and the absurdity of speaking\nof them as separate thoughts is as great as to speak of a curve seen\nfrom its concavity as a different thing from the same curve regarded\nfrom its convexity. The privative can help us nowhere and to nothing;\nthe positive only can assist our reasoning.\n\nThis elevation of the privative into a contrary, or a contradictory, has\nbeen the bane of metaphysical reasoning. From it has arisen the doctrine\nof the synthesis of an affirmative and a negative into a higher\nconception, reconciling them both. This is the maxim of the Hegelian\nlogic, which starts from the synthesis of Being and Not-being into the\nBecoming, a very ancient doctrine, long since offered as an explanation\nof certain phenomena, which I shall now touch upon.\n\nA thought and its privative alone--that is, a quality and its\nnegative--cannot lead to a more comprehensive thought. It is devoid of\nrelation and barren. In pure logic this is always the case, and must be\nso. In concrete thought it may be otherwise. There are certain\npropositions in which the negative is a reciprocal quality, quite as\npositive as that which it is set over against. The members of such a\nproposition are what are called \u201ctrue contraries.\u201d To whatever they\napply as qualities, they leave no middle ground. If a thing is not one\nof them, it is the other. There is no third possibility. An object is\neither red or not red; if not red, it may be one of many colors. But if\nwe say that all laws are either concrete or abstract, then we know that\na law not concrete has all the properties of one which is abstract. We\nmust examine, then, this third law of thought in its applied forms in\norder to understand its correct use.\n\nIt will be observed that there is an assumption of space or time in many\npropositions having the form of the excluded middle. They are only true\nunder given conditions. \u201cAll gold is fusible or not,\u201d means that some is\nfusible at the time. If all gold be already fused, it does not hold\ngood. This distinction was noted by Kant in his discrimination between\n_synthetic_ judgments, which assume other conditions; and _analytic_\njudgments, which look only at the members of the proposition.\n\nOnly the latter satisfy the formal law, for the proposition must not\nlook outside of itself for its completion. Most analytic propositions\ncannot extend our knowledge beyond their immediate statement. If A is\neither B or not B, and it is shown not to be B, it is left uncertain\nwhat A may be. The class of propositions referred to do more than this,\ninasmuch as they present alternative conceptions, mutually exhaustive,\neach the privative of the other. Of these two contraries, the one always\nevokes the other; neither can be thought except in relation to the\nother. They do not arise from the dichotomic process of classification,\nbut from the polar relations of things. Their relation is not in the\nmind but in themselves, a real externality. The distinction between such\nas spring from the former and the latter is the most important question\nin philosophy.\n\nTo illustrate by examples, we familiarly speak of heat and cold, and to\nsay a body is not hot is as much as to say it is cold. But every\nphysicist knows that cold is merely a diminution of heat, not a distinct\nform of force. The absolute zero may be reached by the abstraction of\nall heat, and then the cold cannot increase. So, life and death are not\ntrue contraries, for the latter is not anything real but a mere\nprivative, a quantitative diminution of the former, growing less to an\nabsolute zero where it is wholly lost.\n\nThus it is easy to see that the Unconditioned exists only as a part of\nthe idea of the Conditioned, the Unknowable as the foil of the Knowable;\nand the erecting of these mere privatives, these negatives, these\nshadows, into substances and realities, and then setting them up as\nimpassable barriers to human thought, is one of the worst pieces of work\nthat metaphysics has been guilty of.\n\nThe like does not hold in true contrasts. Each of them has an existence\nas a positive,and[TN-3] is never lost in a zero of the other. The one is\nalways thought in relation to the other. Examples of these are subject\nand object, absolute and relative, mind and matter, person and\nconsciousness, time and space. When any one of these is thought, the\nother is assumed. It is vain to attempt their separation. Thus those\nphilosophers who assert that all knowledge is relative, are forced to\nmaintain this assertion, to wit, All knowledge is relative, is\nnevertheless absolute, and thus they falsify their own position. So\nalso, those others who say all mind is a property of matter, assume in\nthis sentence the reality of an idea apart from matter. Some have argued\nthat space and time can be conceived independently of each other; but\ntheir experiments to show it do not bear repetition.\n\nAll true contraries are universals. A universal concept is one of\n\u201cmaximum extension,\u201d as logicians say, that is, it is without limit. The\nlogical limitation of such a universal is not its negation, but its\ncontrary, which is itself also a universal. The synthesis of the two can\nbe in theory only, yet yields a real product. To illustrate this by a\ngeometrical example, a straight line produced indefinitely is, logically\nconsidered, a universal. Its antithesis or true contrary is not a\ncrooked line, as might be supposed, but the straight line which runs at\nright angles to it. Their synthesis is not the line which bisects their\nangle but that formed by these contraries continually uniting, that is,\nthe arc of a circle, the genesis of which is theoretically the union of\ntwo such lines. Again, time can only be measured by space, space by\ntime; they are true universals and contraries; their synthesis is\n_motion_, a conception which requires them both and is completed by\nthem. Or again, the philosophical extremes of downright materialism and\nidealism are each wholly true, yet but half the truth. The insoluble\nenigmas that either meets in standing alone are kindred to those which\npuzzled the old philosophers in the sophisms relating to motion, as, for\ninstance, that as a body cannot move where it is and still less where it\nis not, therefore it cannot move at all. Motion must recognise both time\nand space to be comprehensible. As a true contrary constantly implies\nthe existence of its opposite, we cannot take a step in right reasoning\nwithout a full recognition of both.\n\nThis relation of contraries to the higher conception which logically\nmust include them is one of the well-worn problems of the higher\nmetaphysics.\n\nThe proper explanation would seem to be, as suggested above, that the\nsynthesis of contraries is capable of formal expression only, but not of\ninterpretation. In pursuing the search for their union we pass into a\nrealm of thought not unlike that of the mathematician when he deals with\nhypothetical quantities, those which can only be expressed in symbols--,\n\u221a1 for example,--but uses them to good purpose in reaching\nreal results. The law does not fail, but its operations can no longer be\nexpressed under material images. They are symbolic and for speculative\nthought alone, though pregnant with practical applications.\n\nAs I have hinted, in all real contraries it is theoretically possible to\naccept either the one or the other. As in mathematics, all motion can be\nexpressed either under formulas of initial motion (mechanics), or of\ncontinuous motion (kinematics), or as all force can be expressed as\neither static or as dynamic force; in either case the other form\nassuming a merely hypothetical or negative position; so the logic of\nquality is competent to represent all existence as ideal or as material,\nall truth as absolute or all as relative, or even to express the\nuniverse in formul\u00e6 of being or of not-being. This perhaps was what\nHeraclitus meant when he propounded his dark saying: \u201cAll things are\n_and_ are not.\u201d He added that \u201cAll is not,\u201d is truer than \u201cAll is.\u201d\nPrevious to his day, Buddha Sakyamuni had said: \u201cHe who has risen to the\nperception of the not-Being, to the Unconditioned, the Universal, his\npath is difficult to understand, like the flight of birds in the\nair.\u201d[37-1] Perhaps even he learned his lore from some older song of the\nVeda, one of which ends, \u201cThus have the sages, meditating in their\nsouls, explained away the fetters of being by the not-being.\u201d[37-2] The\nnot-being, as alone free from space and time, impressed these sages as\nthe more real of the two, the only absolute.\n\nThe error of assigning to the one universal a preponderance over the\nother arose from the easy confusion of pure with applied thought. The\nsynthesis of contraries exists in the formal law alone, and this is\ndifficult to keep before the mind. In concrete displays they are forever\nincommensurate. One seems to exclude the other. To see them correctly we\nmust there treat them as alternates. We may be competent, for instance,\nto explain all phenomena of mind by organic processes; and equally\ncompetent to explain all organism as effects of mind; but we must never\nsuppose an immediate identity of the two; this is only to be found in\nthe formal law common to both; still less should we deny the reality of\neither. Each exhausts the universe; but at every step each presupposes\nthe other; their synthesis is life, a concept hopelessly puzzling unless\nregarded in all its possible displays as made up of both.\n\nThis indicates also the limits of explanation. By no means every man\u2019s\nreason knows when it has had enough. The less it is developed, the\nfurther is it from such knowledge. This is plainly seen in children, who\noften do not rest satisfied with a really satisfactory explanation. It\nis of first importance to be able to recognize what is a good reason.\n\nI may first say what it is _not_. It is not a _cause_. This is nothing\nmore than a prior arrangement of the effect; the reason for an\noccurrence is never assigned by showing its cause. Nor is it a\n_caprice_, that is, motiveless volition, or will as a motor. In this\nsense, the \u201cwill of God\u201d is no good reason for an occurrence. Nor is it\n_fate_, or physical necessity. This is denying there is any explanation\nto give.\n\nThe reason can only be satisfied with an aliment consubstantial with\nitself. Nothing material like cause, nor anything incomprehensible like\ncaprice, meets its demands. Reason is allied to order, system and\npurpose above all things. That which most completely answers to these\nwill alone satisfy its requirements. They are for an ideal of order.\nTheir complete satisfaction is obtained in universal types and measures,\npure abstractions, which are not and cannot be real. The _formal law_ is\nthe limit of explanation of phenomena, beyond which a sound intellect\nwill ask nothing. It fulfils all the requirements of reason, and leaves\nnothing to be desired.\n\nThose philosophers, such as Herbert Spencer, who teach that there is\nsome incogitable \u201cnature\u201d of something which is the immanent \u201ccause\u201d of\nphenomena, delude themselves with words. The history and the laws of a\nphenomenon _are_ its nature, and there is no chimerical something beyond\nthem. They are exhaustive. They fully answer the question _why_, as well\nas the question _how_.[39-1]\n\nFor it is important to note that the word \u201claw\u201d is not here used in the\nsense which Blackstone gives to it, a \u201crule of conduct;\u201d nor yet in that\nwhich science assigns to it, a \u201cphysical necessity.\u201d Law in its highest\nsense is the type or form, perceived by reason as that toward which\nphenomena tend, but which they always fail to reach. It was shown by\nKant that all physical laws depend for their validity on logical laws.\nThese are not authoritative, like the former, but purposive only. But\ntheir purpose is clear, to wit, the attainment of proportion,\nconsistency or truth. As this purpose is reached only in the abstract\nform, this alone gives us the absolutely true in which reason can rest.\n\nIn the concrete, matter shows the law in its efforts toward form, mind\nin its struggle for the true. The former is guided by physical force,\nand the extinction of the aberrant. The latter, in its highest\nexhibition in a conscious intelligence, can alone guide itself by the\nrepresentation of law, by the sense of Duty. Such an intelligence has\nboth the faculty to see and the power to choose and appropriate to its\nown behoof, and thus to build itself up out of those truths which are\n\u201cfrom everlasting unto everlasting.\u201d\n\nA purely formal truth of this kind as something wholly apart from\nphenomena, not in any way connected with the knowledge derived through\nthe senses, does not admit of doubt and can never be changed by future\nconquests of the reasoning powers. We may rest upon it as something more\npermanent than matter, greater than Nature.\n\nSuch was the vision that inspired the noble lines of Wordsworth:--\n\n    \u201cWhat are things eternal?--Powers depart,\n    Possessions vanish, and opinions change,\n    And passions hold a fluctuating seat;\n    But, by the storms of circumstance unshaken,\n    And subject neither to eclipse nor wane,\n    Duty exists; immutably survive\n    For our support, the measures and the forms\n    Which an abstract intelligence supplies;\n    Whose kingdom is where time and space are not.\u201d\n\nThere is no danger that we shall not know what is thus true when we see\nit. The sane reason cannot reject it. \u201cThe true,\u201d says Novalis, \u201cis that\nwhich we cannot help believing.\u201d It is the _perceptio per solam\nessentiam_ of Spinoza. It asks not faith nor yet testimony; it stands in\nneed of neither.\n\nMathematical truth is of this nature. We cannot, if we try, believe\nthat twice two is five. Hence the unceasing effort of all science is to\ngive its results mathematical expression. Such truth so informs itself\nwith will that once received, it is never thereafter alienated;\nobedience to it does not impair freedom. Necessity and servitude do not\narise from correct reasoning, but through the limitation of fallacies.\nThey have nothing to do with\n\n          \u201cThose transcendent truths\n    Of the pure intellect, that stand as laws\n    Even to Thy Being\u2019s infinite majesty.\u201d\n\nIt is not derogatory, but on the contrary essential to the conception of\nthe Supreme Reason, the Divine Logos, to contemplate its will as in\naccord and one with the forms of abstract truth. \u201cThe \u2018will of God\u2019\u201d\nsays Spinoza, \u201cis the refuge of ignorance; the true Will is the spirit\nof right reasoning.\u201d\n\nThis identification of the forms of thought with the Absolute is almost\nas old as philosophy itself. The objections to it have been that no\nindependent existence attaches to these forms; that they prescribe the\nconditions of thought but are not thought itself, still less being; that\nthey hold good to thought as known to man\u2019s reason, but perchance not to\nthought in other intelligences; and, therefore, that even if through the\ndialectical development of thought a consistent idea of the universe\nwere framed, that is, one wherein every fact was referred to its\nappropriate law, still would remain the inquiry, Is this the last and\nabsolute truth?\n\nThe principal points in these objections are that abstract thought does\nnot postulate being; and that possibly all intelligence is not one in\nkind. To the former objection the most satisfactory, reply has been\noffered by Professor J. F. Ferrier. He has shown that the conception of\nobject, even ideal object, implies the conception of self in the\nsubject; and upon this proposition which has been fully recognized even\nby those who differ from him widely, he grounds the existence of Supreme\nThought as a logical unity. Those who would pursue this branch of the\nsubject further, I would refer to his singularly able work.[43-1]\n\nThe latter consideration will come up in a later chapter. If it be shown\nthat all possible intelligence proceeds on the same laws as that of man,\nand that the essence of this is activity, permanence, or\ntruth--synonymous terms--then the limitation of time ceases, and\nexistence not in time but without regard to time, is a necessary\nconsequence. Knowledge through intellection can alone reach a truth\nindependent of time; that through sensation is always relative, true\nfor the time only. The former cannot be expressed without the\nimplication of the conceptions of the universal and the eternal as\n\u201cdominant among the subjects of thought with which Logic is\nconcerned;\u201d[44-1] and hence the relation which the intellect bears to\nthe absolute is a real and positive one.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[6-1] In his essay entitled, _Ueber den Geschlechtsunterschied und\ndessen Einfluss auf die organische Natur_, first published in 1795.\n\n[6-2] \u201cDer alte Dualismus von Geist und K\u00f6rper, der Jahrhunderte\nhindurch nach Vers\u00f6hnung gerungen, findet diese heute nicht\nzwar in der Einheit der Substanz, wohl aber in der Einheit des\nGesetzes.\u201d Dr. Heinrich Boehmer, _Geschichte der Entwickelung der\nNaturwissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung in Deutschland_, s. 201 (Gotha,\n1872).\n\n[7-1] _Elements of Physio-Philosophy_, \u00a73589. Eng. trans., London, 1847.\n\n[8-1] Von Feuchtersleben, _The Principles of Medical Psychology_, p. 130\n(Eng. trans., London, 1847).\n\n[9-1] \u201cThe fundamental property of organic structure is to seek what is\nbeneficial, and to shun what is hurtful to it.\u201d Dr. Henry Maudsley,\n_Body and Mind_, p. 22.\n\n\u201cThe most essential nature of a sentient being is to move _to_ pleasure\nand _from_ pain.\u201d A. Bain, _On the Study of Character_, p. 292 (London,\n1861).\n\n\u201cStates of Pleasure are connected with an increase, states of Pain with\nan abatement of some or all of the vital functions.\u201d A. Bain, _Mind and\nBody_, p. 59.\n\n\u201cAffectus est confusa idea, qu\u00e2 Mens majorem, vel minorem sui corporis,\nvel alicujus ejus partis, existendi vim affirmat.\u201d Spinoza, _Ethices_,\nLib. III. _ad finem_.\n\n[11-1] The extension of the mechanical laws of motion to organic motion\nwas, I believe, first carried out by Comte. His biological form of the\nfirst law is as follows: \u201cTout \u00e9tat, statique ou dynamique, tend \u00e0\npersister spontan\u00e9ment, sans aucune alt\u00e9ration, en resistant aux\nperturbations ext\u00e9rieures.\u201d _Syst\u00e8me de Politique Positive_, Tome iv. p.\n178. The metaphysical ground of this law has, I think, been very well\nshown by Schopenhauer to be in the Kantian principle that time is not a\nforce, nor a quality of matter, but a condition of perception, and hence\nit can exert no physical influence. See Schopenhauer, _Parerga und\nParalipomena_, Bd. II, s. 37.\n\n[13-1] \u201cAller Genuss, seiner Natur nach, ist negativ, d. h., in\nBefreiung von einer Noth oder Pein besteht.\u201d _Parerga und Paralipomena._\nBd. II, s. 482.\n\n[14-1] \u201cNo impression whatever is pleasant beyond the instant of its\nrealization; since, at that very instant, commences the change of\nsusceptibility, which suggests the desire for a change of impression or\nfor a renewal of that impression which is fading away.\u201d Dr. J. P.\nCatlow, _The Principles of Aesthetic Medicine_, p. 155 (London, 1867).\n\n\u201cDum re, quem appetamus fruimur, corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat\nconstitutionem, \u00e1 qu\u00e1 aliter determinatur, et ali\u00e6 rerum imagines in eo\nexcitantur,\u201d etc. Spinoza, _Ethices_, Pars III, Prop. lix.\n\n[18-1] \u201cFeeling and thought are much more real than anything else; they\nare the only things which we directly know to be real.\u201d--John Stuart\nMill.--_Theism_, p. 202. How very remote external objects are from what\nwe take them to be, is constantly shown in physiological studies. As\nHelmholtz remarks: \u201cNo kind and no degree of similarity exists between\nthe quality of a sensation, and the quality of the agent inducing it and\nportrayed by it.\u201d--_Lectures on Scientific Subjects_, p. 390.\n\n[20-1] _The Philosophy of Consciousness_, p. 72.\n\n[21-1] The Gospel of John (ch. xviii.) leaves the impression that Pilate\neither did not wait for an answer but asked the question in contempt, as\nBacon understood, or else that waiting he received no answer. The Gospel\nof Nicodemus, however, written according to Tischendorf in the second\ncentury, probably from tradition, gives the rest of the conversation as\nfollows: \u201cPilate says to him: What is truth? Jesus says: Truth is from\nheaven. Pilate says: Is not there truth upon earth? Jesus says to\nPilate: See how one who speaks truth is judged by those who have power\nupon earth!\u201d [ch. iii.]\n\n[22-1] The most acute recent discussion of this subject is by Helmholtz,\nin his essay entitled, \u201c_Recent Progress in the Theory of Vision_.\u201d\n\n[24-1] George Boole, Professor of Mathematics in Queen\u2019s College, Cork,\nwas born Nov. 2, 1815, died Dec. 8, 1864. He was the author of several\ncontributions to the higher mathematics, but his principal production is\nentitled: _An Investigation into the Laws of Thought, on which are\nfounded the mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities_ [London,\n1854.] Though the reputation he gained was so limited that one may seek\nhis name in vain in the _New American Cyclopedia_ [1875], or the\n_Dictionnaire des Contemporains_ [1859], the few who can appreciate his\ntreatise place the very highest estimate upon it. Professor Todhunter,\nin the preface to his _History of the Theory of Probabilities_, calls it\n\u201ca marvellous work,\u201d and in similar language Professor W. Stanley Jevons\nspeaks of it as \u201cone of the most marvellous and admirable pieces of\nreasoning ever put together\u201d (_Pure Logic_, p. 75). Professor Bain, who\ngives a synopsis of it in his _Deductive Logic_, wholly misapprehends\nthe author\u2019s purpose, and is unable to appraise justly his conclusions.\n\n[28-1] _The Institutes of Metaphysic_, p. 459, (2nd edition.)\n\n[31-1] _An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought_, p. 113 (New York,\n1860).\n\n[37-1] _The Dhamapada_, verse 93.\n\n[37-2] Koppen, _Der Buddhismus_, s. 30.\n\n[39-1] Spencer in assuming an \u201cunknowable universal causal agent and\nsource of things,\u201d as \u201cthe nature of the power manifested in phenomena,\u201d\nand in calling this the idea common to both religion and \u201cideal\nscience,\u201d fell far behind Comte, who expressed the immovable position,\nnot only of positive science but of all intelligence, in these words:\n\u201cLe v\u00e9ritable esprit positif consiste surtout \u00e0 substituer toujours\nl\u2019\u00e9tude des _lois_ invariables des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes \u00e0 celles de leurs _causes_\nproprement dites, premi\u00e8res ou finales, en un mot la determination du\n_comment_ \u00e0 celle du _pourquoi_.\u201d--_Syst\u00e8mede[TN-4] Politique Positive_,\ni. p. 47. Compare Spencer\u2019s Essay entitled, \u201cReasons for dissenting from\nComte.\u201d The purposive law is the only final cause which reason allows.\nComte\u2019s error lay in ignoring this class of laws.\n\n[43-1] _The Institutes of Metaphysic_, 2d Ed. See also Bain, _The\nEmotions and the Will_, the closing note.\n\n[44-1] Boole, _Laws of Thought_, p. 401.\n\n\n\n\nTHE EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     The Religious Sentiment is made up of emotions and thoughts. The\n     emotions are historically first and most prominent. Of all\n     concerned, Fear is the most obvious. Hope is its correlate. Both\n     suppose Experience, and a desire to repeat or avoid it. Hence a\n     Wish is the source of both emotions, and the proximate element of\n     religion. The significance of desire as the postulate of\n     development. The influence of fear and hope. The conditions which\n     encourage them.\n\n     The success of desire fails to gratify the religious sentiment. The\n     alternative left is eternal repose, or else action, unending yet\n     which aims at nothing beyond. The latter is reached through Love.\n     The result of love is _continuance_. Illustrations of this. Sexual\n     love and the venereal sense in religions. The hermaphrodite gods.\n     The virgin mother. Mohammed was the first to proclaim a deity above\n     sex. The conversion of sexual and religious emotion exemplified\n     from insane delusions. The element of fascination. The love of God.\n     Other emotional elements in religions.\n\n     The religious wish defined to be one _whose fruition depends upon\n     unknown power_. To be religious, one must desire and be ignorant.\n     The unknown power is of religious interest only in so far as it is\n     believed to be in relation to men\u2019s desires. In what sense\n     ignorance is the mother of devotion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.\n\n\nThe discussion in the last chapter illustrated how closely pain and\npleasure, truth and error, and thought and its laws have been related to\nthe forms of religions, and their dogmatic expressions. The character of\nthe relatively and absolutely true was touched upon, and the latter, it\nwas indicated, if attainable at all by human intelligence, must be found\nin the formal laws of that intelligence, those which constitute its\nnature and essence, and in the conclusions which such a premise forces\nupon the reason. The necessity of this preliminary inquiry arose from\nthe fact that every historical religion claims the monopoly of the\nabsolutely true, and such claims can be tested only when we have decided\nas to whether there is such truth, and if there is, where it is to be\nsought. Moreover, as religions arise from some mental demand, the\ndifferent manifestations of mind,--sensation, emotion and\nintellect--must be recognized and understood.\n\nPassing now to a particular description of the Religious Sentiment, it\nmay roughly be defined to be the feeling which prompts to thoughts or\nacts of worship. It is, as I have said, a complex product, made up of\nemotions and ideas, developing with the growth of mind, wide-reaching in\nits maturity, but meagre enough at the start. We need not expect to find\nin its simplest phases that insight and tender feeling which we\nattribute to the developed religious character. \u201cThe scent of the\nblossom is not in the bulb.\u201d Its early and ruder forms, however, will\nbest teach the mental elements which are at its root.\n\nThe problem is, to find out why the primitive man figured to himself any\ngods at all; what necessity of his nature or his condition led him so\nuniversally to assume their existence, and seek their aid or their\nmercy? The conditions of the solution are, that it hold good everywhere\nand at all times; that it enable us to trace in every creed and cult the\nsame sentiments which first impelled man to seek a god and adore him.\nWhy is it that now and in remotest history, here and in the uttermost\nregions, there is and always has been this that we call _religion_?\nThere must be some common reason, some universal peculiarity in man\u2019s\nmental formation which prompts, which forces him, him alone of animals,\nand him without exception, to this discourse and observance of religion.\nWhat this is, it is my present purpose to try to find out.\n\nIn speaking of the development of mind through organism, it was seen\nthat the emotions precede the reason in point of time. This is daily\nconfirmed by observation. The child is vastly more emotional than the\nman, the savage than his civilized neighbor. Castren, the Russian\ntraveller, describes the Tartars and Lapps as a most nervous folk. When\none shocks them with a sudden noise, they almost fall into convulsions.\nAmong the North American Indians, falsely called a phlegmatic race,\nnervous diseases are epidemic to an almost unparalleled extent. Intense\nthought, on the other hand, as I have before said, tends to lessen and\nannul the emotions. Intellectual self-consciousness is adverse to them.\n\nBut religion, we are everywhere told, is largely a matter of the\nemotions. The pulpit constantly resounds with appeals to the feelings,\nand not unfrequently with warnings against the intellect. \u201cI acknowledge\nmyself,\u201d says the pious non-juror, William Law, \u201ca declared enemy to the\nuse of reason in religion;\u201d and he often repeats his condemnation of\n\u201cthe labor-learned professors of far-fetched book-riches.\u201d[49-1] As the\neye is the organ of sight, says one whose thoughts on such matters equal\nin depth those of Pascal, so the heart is the organ of religion.[49-2]\nIn popular physiology, the heart is the seat of the emotions as the\nbrain is that of intellect. It is appropriate, therefore, that we\ncommence our analysis of the religious sentiment with the emotions which\nform such a prominent part of it.\n\nNow, whether we take the experience of an individual or the history of a\ntribe, whether we have recourse to the opinions of religious teachers or\nirreligious philosophers, we find them nigh unanimous that the emotion\nwhich is the prime motor of religious thought is _fear_. I need not\ndepend upon the well-known line of Petronius Arbiter,\n\n    Primus in orbe deos fecit timor;\n\nfor there is plenty of less heterodox authority. The worthy Bishop Hall\nsays, \u201cSeldom doth God seize upon the heart without a vehement\nconcussion going before. There must be some blustering and flashes of\nthe law. We cannot be too awful in our fear.\u201d[50-1] Bunyan, in his\nbeautiful allegory of the religious life, lets Christian exclaim: \u201cHad\neven Obstinate himself felt what I have felt of the terrors of the yet\nunseen, he would not thus lightly have given us the _back_.\u201d The very\nword for God in the Semitic tongues means \u201cfear;\u201d[50-2] Jacob swore to\nLaban, \u201cby Him whom Isaac feared;\u201d and Moses warned his people that\n\u201cGod is come, that his fear may be before your faces.\u201d To _venerate_ is\nfrom a Sanscrit root (_s\u00eav_), to be afraid of.\n\nBut it is needless to amass more evidence on this point. Few will\nquestion that fear is the most prominent emotion at the awakening of the\nreligious sentiments. Let us rather proceed to inquire more minutely\nwhat fear is.\n\nI remarked in the previous chapter that \u201cthe emotions fall naturally\ninto a dual classification, in which the one involves pleasurable or\nelevating, the other painful or depressing conditions.\u201d Fear comes of\ncourse under the latter category, as it is essentially a painful and\ndepressing state of mind. But it corresponds with and implies the\npresence of Hope, for he who has nothing to hope has nothing to\nfear.[51-1] \u201cThere is no hope without fear, as there is no fear without\nhope,\u201d says Spinoza. \u201cFor he who is in fear has some doubt whether what\nhe fears will take place, and consequently hopes that it will not.\u201d\n\nWe can go a step further, and say that in the mental process the hope\nmust necessarily precede the fear. In the immediate moment of losing a\npleasurable sensation we hope and seek for its repetition. The mind,\nuntutored by experience, confidently looks for its return. The hope only\nbecomes dashed by fear when experience has been associated with\ndisappointment. Hence we must first look to enjoy a good before we can\nbe troubled by a fear that we shall not enjoy it; we must first lay a\nplan before we can fear its failure. In modern Christianity hope, hope\nof immortal happiness, is more conspicuous than fear; but that hope is\nalso based on the picture of a pleasant life made up from experience.\n\nBoth hope and fear, therefore, have been correctly called secondary or\nderived emotions, as they presuppose experience and belief, experience\nof a pleasure akin to that which we hope, belief that we can attain such\na pleasure. \u201cWe do not hope first and enjoy afterwards, but we enjoy\nfirst and hope afterwards.\u201d[52-1] Having enjoyed, we seek to do so\nagain. A desire, in other words, must precede either Hope or Fear. They\nare twin sisters, born of a Wish.\n\nThus my analysis traces the real source of the religious sentiment, so\nfar as the emotions are concerned, to a Wish; and having arrived there,\nI find myself anticipated by the words of one of the most reflective\nminds of this century: \u201cAll religion rests on a mental want; we hope,\nwe fear, because we wish.\u201d[53-1] And long before this conclusion was\nreached by philosophers, it had been expressed in unconscious religious\nthought in myths, in the Valkyria, the Wish-maidens, for instance, who\ncarried the decrees of Odin to earth.\n\nThis is no mean origin, for a wish, a desire, conscious or unconscious,\nin sensation only or in emotion as well, is the fundamental postulate of\nevery sort of development, of improvement, of any possible future, of\nlife of any kind, mental or physical. In its broadest meaning, science\nand history endorse the exclamation of the unhappy Obermann: \u201c_La perte\nvraiment irr\u00e9parable est celle des d\u00e9sirs._\u201d[53-2]\n\nThe sense of unrest, the ceaseless longing for something else, which is\nthe general source of all desires and wishes, is also the source of all\nendeavor and of all progress. Physiologically, it is the effort of our\norganization to adapt itself to the ever varying conditions which\nsurround it; intellectually, it is the struggle to arrive at truth; in\nboth, it is the effort to attain a fuller life.\n\nAs stimuli to action, therefore, the commonest and strongest of all\nemotions are Fear and Hope. They are the emotional correlates of\npleasure and pain, which rule the life of sensation. Their closer\nconsideration may well detain us awhile.\n\nIn the early stages of religious life, whether in an individual or a\nnation, the latter is half concealed. Fear is more demonstrative, and as\nit is essentially destructive, its effects are more sudden and visible.\nIn its acuter forms, as Fright and Terror, it may blanch the hair in a\nnight, blight the mind and destroy the life of the individual. As Panic,\nit is eminently epidemic, carrying crowds and armies before it; while in\nthe aggravated form of Despair it swallows up all other emotions and\nprompts to self destruction. Its physiological effect is a direct\nimpairment of vitality.\n\nHope is less intense and more lasting than fear. It stimulates the\nsystem, elates with the confidence of control, strengthens with the\ncourage derived from a conviction of success, and bestows in advance the\nimagined joy of possession. As Feuchtersleben happily expresses it:\n\u201cHope preserves the principle of duration when other parts are\nthreatened with destruction, and is a manifestation of the innermost\npsychical energy of Life.\u201d[54-1]\n\nBoth emotions powerfully prompt to action, and to that extent are\nopposed to thought. Based on belief, they banish uncertainty, and\nantagonize doubt and with it investigation. The religion in which they\nenter as the principal factors will be one intolerant of opposition,\nenergetic in deed, and generally hostile to an unbiased pursuit of the\ntruth.\n\nNaturally those temperaments and those physical conditions which chiefly\nfoster these emotions will tend to religious systems in which they are\nprominent. Let us see what some of these conditions are.\n\nIt has always been noticed that impaired vitality predisposes to fear.\nThe sick and feeble are more timorous than the strong and well. Further\npredisposing causes of the same nature are insufficient nourishment,\ncold, gloom, malaria, advancing age and mental worry. For this reason\nnearly invariably after a general financial collapse we witness a\nreligious \u201crevival.\u201d Age, full of care and fear, is thus prompted to\npiety, willing, as La Rochefoucauld remarks, to do good by precept when\nit can no longer do evil by example. The inhabitants of swampy,\nfever-ridden districts are usually devout. The female sex, always the\nweaker and often the worsted one in the struggle for existence, is when\nfree more religious than the male; but with them hope is more commonly\nthe incentive than fear.\n\nAlthough thus prominent and powerful, desire, so far as its fruition is\npleasure, has expressed but the lowest emotions of the religious\nsentiment. Something more than this has always been asked by sensitively\nreligious minds. Success fails to bring the gratification it promises.\nThe wish granted, the mind turns from it in satiety. Not this, after\nall, was what we sought.\n\nThe acutest thinkers have felt this. Pascal in his _Pens\u00e9es_ has such\nexpressions as these: \u201cThe present is never our aim. The future alone is\nour object.\u201d \u201cForever getting ready to be happy, it is certain we never\ncan be.\u201d \u201c\u2019Tis the combat pleases us and not the victory. As soon as\nthat is achieved, we have had enough of the spectacle. So it is in play,\nso it is in the search for truth. We never pursue objects, but we pursue\nthe pursuit of objects.\u201d But no one has stated it more boldly than\nLessing when he wrote: \u201cIf God held in his right hand all truth, and in\nhis left the one unceasingly active desire for truth, although bound up\nwith the law that I should forever err, I should choose with humility\nthe left and say: \u2018Give me this, Father. The pure truth is for thee\nalone.\u2019\u201d[56-1] The pleasure seems to lie not in the booty but in the\nbattle, not in gaining the stakes but in playing the game, not in the\nwinning but in the wooing, not in the discovery of truth but in the\nsearch for it.\n\nWhat is left for the wise, but to turn, as does the preacher, from this\ndelusion of living, where laughter is mad and pleasure is vain, and\npraise the dead which are dead more than the living which are yet alive,\nor to esteem as better than both he that hath never been?\n\nSuch is the conclusion of many faiths. Wasted with combat, the mortal\nlongs for the rest prepared for the weary. Buddha taught the\nextinguishment in Nirvana; the Brahman portrays the highest bliss as\n_shanti_, complete and eternal repose; and that the same longing was\nfamiliar to ancient Judaism, and has always been common to Christianity,\nnumerous evidences testify.[57-1] Few epitaphs are more common than\nthose which speak of the mortal resting _in pace, in quiete_.\n\nThe supposition at the root of these longings is that action must bring\nfatigue and pain, and though it bring pleasure too, it is bought too\ndearly. True in fact, I have shown that this conflicts with the theory\nof perfect life, even organic life. The highest form of life is the most\nunceasing living; its functions ask for their completest well being\nconstant action, not satisfaction. That general feeling of health and\nstrength, that _sens de bien \u00eatre_, which goes with the most perfect\nphysical life, is experienced only when all the organs are in complete\nworking order and doing full duty. They impart to the whole frame a\ndesire of motion. Hence the activity of the young and healthy as\ncontrasted with the inertness of the exhausted and aged.\n\nHow is it possible to reconcile this ideal of life, still more the hope\nof everlasting life, with the acknowledged vanity of desire? It is\naccomplished through the medium of an emotion which more than any I have\ntouched upon reveals the character of the religious sentiment--Love.\nThis mighty but protean feeling I shall attempt to define on broader\nprinciples than has hitherto been done. The vague and partial meanings\nassigned it have led to sad confusion in the studies of religions. In\nthe language of feeling, love is a passion; but it does not spring from\nfeeling alone. It is far more fervid when it rises through intellect\nthan through sense. \u201cMen have died from time to time, and worms have\neaten them, but not for love,\u201d says the fair Rosalind; and though her\nsaying is not very true as to the love of sense, it is far less true as\nto the love of intellect. The martyrs to science and religion, to\nprinciples and faith, multiply a hundred-fold those to the garden god.\nThe spell of the idea is what\n\n  \u201cTurns ruin into laughter and death into dreaming.\u201d\n\nSuch love destroys the baser passion of sense, or transfigures it so\nthat we know it no longer. The idea-driven is callous to the\nblandishments of beauty, for his is a love stronger than the love to\nwoman. The vestal, the virgin, the eunuch for the kingdom of heaven\u2019s\nsake are the exemplars of the love to God.\n\nWhat common trait so marks these warring products of mind, that we call\nthem by one name? In what is all love the same? The question is\npertinent, for the love of woman, the love of neighbor, the love of\ncountry, the love of God, have made the positive side of most religions,\nthe burden of their teachings. The priests of Cotytto and Venus, Astarte\nand Melitta, spoke but a more sensuous version of the sermon of the aged\napostle to the Ephesians,--shortest and best of all sermons--\u201cLittle\nchildren, love one another.\u201d[59-1]\n\nThe earliest and most constant sign of reason is \u201cworking for a remote\nobject.\u201d[59-2] Nearly everything we do is as a step to something beyond.\nForethought, conscious provision, is the measure of intelligence. But\nthere must be something which is the object, the aim, the end-in-view of\nrational action, which is sought for itself alone, not as instrumental\nto something else. Such an object, when recognized, inspires the\nsentiment of love. It springs from the satisfaction of reason.\n\nThis conclusion as to the nature of love has long been recognized by\nthinkers. Richard Baxter defined it as \u201cthe volition of the end,\u201d \u201cthe\nmotion of the soul that tendeth to the end,\u201d and more minutely, \u201cthe\nwill\u2019s volition of good apprehended by the understanding.\u201d[60-1] In\nsimilar language Bishop Butler explains it as \u201cthe resting in an object\nas an end.\u201d[60-2] Perhaps I can better these explanations by the phrase,\n_Love is the mental impression of rational action whose end is in\nitself_.\n\nNow this satisfaction is found only in one class of efforts, namely,\nthose whose result is continuity, persistence, in fine, _preservation_.\nThis may be toward the individual, self-love, whose object is the\ncontinuance of personal existence; toward the other sex, where the\nhidden aim is the perpetuation of the race; toward one\u2019s fellows, where\nthe giving of pleasure and the prevention of pain mean the maintenance\nof life; toward one\u2019s country, as patriotism; and finally toward the\neternally true, which as alone the absolutely permanent and\npreservative, inspires a love adequate and exhaustive of its conception,\ncasting out both hope and fear, the pangs of desire as well as the\nsatiety of fruition.\n\nIn one or other of these forms love has at all times been the burden of\nreligion: the glad tidings it has always borne have been \u201clove on\nearth.\u201d The Ph\u0153nix in Egyptian myth appeared yearly as newly risen,\nbut was ever the same bird, and bore the egg from which its _parent_ was\nto have birth. So religions have assumed the guise in turn of self-love,\nsex-love, love of country and love of humanity, cherishing in each the\ngerm of that highest love which alone is the parent of its last and only\nperfect embodiment.\n\nFavorite of these forms was sex-love. \u201cWe find,\u201d observes a recent\nwriter, \u201cthat all religions have engaged and concerned themselves with\nthe sexual passion. From the times of phallic worship through Romish\ncelibacy down to Mormonism, theology has linked itself with man\u2019s\nreproductive instincts.\u201d[61-1] The remark is just, and is most\nconspicuously correct in strongly emotional temperaments. \u201cThe\ndevotional feelings,\u201d writes the Rev. Frederick Robertson in one of his\nessays, \u201care often singularly allied to the animal nature; they conduct\nthe unconscious victim of feelings that appear divine into a state of\nlife at which the world stands aghast.\u201d Fanaticism is always united with\neither excessive lewdness or desperate asceticism. The physiological\nperformance of the generative function is sure to be attacked by\nreligious bigotry.\n\nSo prominent is this feature that attempts have been made to explain\nnearly all symbolism and mythology as types of the generative procedure\nand the reproductive faculty of organism. Not only the pyramids and\nsacred mountains, the obelisks of the Nile and the myths of light have\nreceived this interpretation, but even such general symbols as the\nspires of churches, the cross of Christendom and the crescent of\nIslam.[62-1]\n\nWithout falling into the error of supposing that any one meaning or\norigin can be assigned such frequent symbols, we may acknowledge that\nlove, in its philosophical sense, is closely akin to the mystery of\nevery religion. That, on occasions, love of sex gained the mastery over\nall other forms, is not to be doubted; but that at all times this was\nso, is a narrow, erroneous view, not consistent with a knowledge of the\nhistory of psychical development.\n\nSex-love, as a sentiment, is a cultivated growth. All it is at first is\na rude satisfaction of the erethism. The wild tribes of California had\ntheir pairing seasons when the sexes were in heat, \u201cas regularly as the\ndeer, the elk and the antelope.\u201d[63-1] In most tongues of the savages of\nNorth America there are no tender words, as \u201cdear,\u201d \u201cdarling,\u201d and the\nlike.[63-2] No desire of offspring led to their unions. The women had\nfew children, and their fathers paid them little attention. The family\ninstinct appears in conditions of higher culture, in Judea, Greece, Rome\nand ancient Germany. Procreation instead of lust was there the aim of\nmarriage. To-day, mere sentiment is so much in the ascendant that both\nthese elements are often absent. There is warm affection without even\ninstinctive knowledge of the design of the bond assumed.[63-3]\n\nThose who would confine the promptings of the passion of reproduction as\nit appears in man to its objects as shown in lower animals, know little\nhow this wondrous emotion has acted as man\u2019s mentor as well as paraclete\nin his long and toilsome conflict with the physical forces.\n\nThe venereal sense is unlike the other special senses in that it is\ngeneral, as well as referable to special organs and nerves. In its\npsychological action it \u201cespecially contributes to the development of\nsympathies which connect man not only with his coevals, but with his\nfellows of all preceding and succeeding generations as well. Upon it is\nerected this vast superstructure of intellect, of social and moral\nsentiment, of voluntary effort and endeavor.\u201d[64-1] Of all the\nproperties of organized matter, that of transmitting form and life is\nthe most wonderful; and if we examine critically the physical basis of\nthe labors and hopes of mankind, if we ask what prompts its noblest and\nholiest longings, we shall find them, in the vast majority of instances,\ndirectly traceable to this power. No wonder then that religion, which we\nhave seen springs from man\u2019s wants and wishes, very often bears the\ndistinct trace of their origin in his reproductive functions. The liens\nof the family are justly deemed sacred, and are naturally associated\nwith whatever the mind considers holy.\n\nThe duty of a citizen to become a father was a prominent feature in\nmany ancient religions. How much honor the sire of many sons had in Rome\nand Palestine is familiar to all readers. No warrior, according to\nGerman faith, could gain entrance to Valhalla unless he had begotten a\nson. Thus the preservation of the species was placed under the immediate\nguardianship of religion.\n\nSuch considerations explain the close connection of sexual thoughts with\nthe most sacred mysteries of faith. In polytheisms, the divinities are\nuniversally represented as male or female, virile and fecund. The\nprocesses of nature were often held to be maintained through such\ncelestial nuptials.\n\nYet stranger myths followed those of the loves of the gods. Religion, as\nthe sentiment of continuance, finding its highest expression in the\nphenomenon of generation, had to reconcile this with the growing concept\nof a divine unity. Each separate god was magnified in praises as\nself-sufficient. Earth, or nature, or the season is one, yet brings\nforth all. How embody this in concrete form?\n\nThe startling refuge was had in the image of a deity at once of both\nsexes. Such avowedly were Mithras, Janus, Melitta, Cybele, Aphrodite,\nAgdistis; indeed nearly all the Syrian, Egyptian, and Italic gods, as\nwell as Brahma, and, in the esoteric doctrine of the Cabala, even\nJehovah, whose female aspect is represented by the \u201cShekinah.\u201d To this\nabnormal condition the learned have applied the adjectives epicene,\nandrogynous, hermaphrodite, arrenothele. In art it is represented by a\nblending of the traits of both sexes. In the cult it was dramatically\nset forth by the votaries assuming the attire of the other sex, and\ndallying with both.[66-1] The phallic symbol superseded all others; and\nin Cyprus, Babylonia and Phrygia, once in her life, at least, must every\nwoman submit to the embrace of a stranger.\n\nSuch rites were not mere sensualities. The priests of these divinities\noften voluntarily suffered emasculation. None but a eunuch could become\nhigh priest of Cybele. Among the sixteen million worshippers of Siva,\nwhose symbol is the Lingam, impurity is far less prevalent than among\nthe sister sects of Hindoo religions.[66-2] To the Lingayets, the member\ntypifies abstractly the idea of life. Therefore they carve it on\nsepulchres, or, like the ancient nations of Asia Minor, they lay clay\nimages of it on graves to intimate the hope of existence beyond the\ntomb.\n\nThis notion of a hermaphrodite deity is not \u201cmonstrous,\u201d as it has been\ncalled. There lies a deep meaning in it. The gods are spirits, beings\nof another order, which the cultivated esthetic sense protests against\nclassing as of one or the other gender. Never can the ideal of beauty,\neither physical or moral, be reached until the characteristics of sex\nare lost in the concept of the purely human. In the noblest men of\nhistory there has often been noted something feminine, a gentleness\nwhich is not akin to weakness; and the women whose names are ornaments\nto nations have displayed a calm greatness, not unwomanly but something\nmore than belongs to woman. Art acknowledges this. In the Vatican Apollo\nwe see masculine strength united with maidenly softness; and in the\ntraditional face and figure of Christ a still more striking example how\nthe devout mind conjoins the traits of both sexes to express the highest\npossibility of the species. \u201cSoaring above the struggle in which the\nreal is involved with its limitations, and free from the characteristics\nof gender, the ideal of beauty as well as the ideal of humanity, alike\nmaintain a perfect sexual equilibrium.\u201d[67-1]\n\nAnother and more familiar expression of the religious emotion, akin to\nthe belief in double-sexed deities,--nay, in its physiological aspect\nidentical with it, as assuming sexual self-sufficiency, is the myth of\nthe Virgin-Mother.\n\nWhen Columbus first planted the cross on the shores of San Domingo, the\nlay brother Roman Pane, whom he sent forth to convert the natives of\nthat island, found among them a story of a virgin Mam\u00f3na, whose son\nYoca\u00fana, a hero and a god, was chief among divinities, and had in the\nold times taught this simple people the arts of peace and guided them\nthrough the islands.[68-1] When the missionaries penetrated to the\nIroquois, the Aztecs, the Mayas, and many other tribes, this same story\nwas told them with such startling likeness to one they came to tell,\nthat they felt certain either St. Thomas or Satan had got the start of\nthem in America.\n\nBut had these pious men known as well as we do the gentile religions of\nthe Old World, they would have seasoned their admiration. Long before\nChristianity was thought of, the myth of the Virgin-Mother of God was in\nthe faith of millions, as we have had abundantly shown us of late years\nby certain expounders of Christian dogmas.\n\nHow is this strange, impossible belief to be explained? Of what secret,\nunconscious, psychological working was it the expression? Look at its\nresult. It is that wherever this doctrine is developed the _status\nmatrimonialis_ is held to be less pure, less truly religious, than the\n_status virginitatis_. Such is the teaching to-day in Lhassa, in Rome;\nso it was in Yucatan, where, too, there were nunneries filled with\nspouses of God. I connect it with the general doctrine that chastity in\neither sex is more agreeable to God than marriage, and this belief, I\nthink, very commonly arises at a certain stage of development of the\nreligious sentiment, when it unconsciously recognises the indisputable\nfact that sex-love, whether in its form of love of woman, family, or\nnation, is not what that sentiment craves. This is first shown by\nrejecting the idea of sex-love in the birth of the god; then his priests\nand priestesses refuse its allurements, and deny all its claims, those\nof kindred, of country, of race, until the act of generation itself is\nheld unholy and the thought of sex a sin. By such forcible though rude\ndisplays do they set forth their unconscious acknowledgment of that\neternal truth: \u201cHe that loveth son or daughter more than Me, is not\nworthy of Me.\u201d\n\nThe significance of these words is not that there is an antagonism in\nthe forms of love. It is not that man should hate himself, as Pascal,\nfollowing the teachings of the Church, so ably argued; nor that the one\nsex should be set over against the other in sterile abhorrence; nor yet\nthat love of country and of kindred is incompatible with that toward the\nSupreme of thought; but it is that each of these lower, shallower,\nevanescent forms of emotion is and must be lost in, subordinated to,\nthat highest form to which these words have reference. Reconciliation,\nnot abnegation, is what they mean.\n\nEven those religions which teach in its strictness the oneness of God\nhave rarely separated from his personality the attribute of sex. He is\nthe father, _pater et genitor_, of all beings. The monotheism which we\nfind in Greece and India generally took this form. The ancient Hebrews\nemphasized the former, not the latter sense of the word, and thus\ndepriving it of its more distinctive characteristics of sex, prepared\nthe way for the teachings of Christianity, in which the Supreme Being\nalways appears with the attributes of the male, but disconnected from\nthe idea of generation.\n\nSingularly enough, the efforts to which this latent incongruity prompts,\neven in persons speaking English, in which tongue the articles and\nadjectives have no genders, point back to the errors of an earlier age.\nA recent prayer by an eminent spiritualist commences:--\u201cOh Eternal\nSpirit, our Father and our Mother!\u201d The expression illustrates how\nnaturally arises the belief in a hermaphrodite god, when once sex is\nassociated with deity.\n\nOf all founders of religions, Mohammed first proclaimed a divinity\nwithout relation to sex. One of his earliest suras reads:\n\n    \u201cHe is God alone,\n    God the eternal.\n    He begetteth not, and is not begotten;\n    And there is none like unto him.\u201d\n\nAnd elsewhere:--\n\n    \u201cHe hath no spouse, neither hath he any offspring.\u201d[71-1]\n\nWhile he expressly acknowledged the divine conception of Jesus, he\ndenied the coarse and literal version of that doctrine in vogue among\nthe ignorant Christians around him. Enlightened christendom, to-day,\ndoes not, I believe, differ from him on this point.\n\nSuch sexual religions do not arise, as the theory has hitherto been,\nfrom study and observation of the generative agencies in nature, but\nfrom the identity of object between love in sense and love in intellect,\nprofane and sacred passion. The essence of each is _continuance_,\npreservation; the origin of each is subjective, personal; but the former\nhas its root in sensation, the latter in reason.\n\nThe sex-difference in organisms, the \u201cabhorrence of self-fertilization\u201d\nwhich Mr. Darwin speaks of as so conspicuous and inexplicable a\nphenomenon, is but one example of the sway of a law which as action and\nreaction, thesis and antithesis, is common to both elementary motion and\nthought. The fertile and profound fancy of Greece delighted to prefigure\nthis truth in significant symbols and myths. Love, Eros, is shown\ncarrying the globe, or wielding the club of Hercules; he is the unknown\nspouse of Psyche, the soul; and from the primitive chaos he brings forth\nthe ordered world, the Kosmos.\n\nThe intimate and strange relation between sensuality and religion, so\noften commented upon and denied, again proven, and always\nmisinterpreted, thus receives a satisfactory explanation. Some singular\nmanifestations of it, of significance in religious history, are\npresented by the records of insane delusions. They confirm what I have\nabove urged, that the association is not one derived from observation\nthrough intellectual processes, but is a consequence of physiological\nconnections, of identity of aim in the distinct realms of thought and\nemotion.\n\nThat eminent writer on mental diseases, Schroeder van der Kolk, when\nspeaking of the forms of melancholy which arise from physical\nconditions, remarks: \u201cThe patient who is melancholy from disorders of\nthe generative organs considers himself sinful. His depressed tone of\nmind passes over into religious melancholy; \u2018he is forsaken by God; he\nis lost.\u2019 All his afflictions have a religious color.\u201d In a similar\nstrain, Feuchtersleben says: \u201cIn the female sex especially, the erotic\ndelusion, unknown to the patient herself, often assumes the color of the\nreligious.\u201d[73-1] \u201cThe unaccomplished sexual designs of nature,\u201d\nobserves a later author speaking of the effects of the single life,\n\u201clead to brooding over supposed miseries which suggest devotion and\nreligious exercise as the nepenthe to soothe the morbid longings.\u201d[73-2]\n\nStimulate the religious sentiment and you arouse the passion of love,\nwhich will be directed as the temperament and individual culture prompt.\nDevelope very prominently any one form of love, and by a native affinity\nit will seize upon and consecrate to its own use whatever religious\naspirations the individual has. This is the general law of their\nrelation.\n\nAll the lower forms of love point to one to which they are the gradual\nascent, both of the individual and on a grander scale of the race, to\nwit, the love of God. This is the passion for the highest attainable\ntruth, a passion which, as duty, prompts to the strongest action and to\nthe utter sacrifice of all other longings. No speculative acquaintance\nwith propositions satisfies it, no egotistic construction of systems,\nbut the truth expressed in life, the truth as that which alone either\nhas or can give being and diuturnity, this is its food, for which it\nthirsts with holy ardor. Here is the genuine esoteric gnosis, the sacred\nsecret, which the rude and selfish wishes of the savage, the sensual\nrites of Babylon, \u201cmother of harlots,\u201d and the sublimely unselfish\ndreams of a \u201creligion of humanity,\u201d have alike had in their hearts, but\nhad no capacity to interpret, no words to articulate.\n\nRelated to this emotional phase of the religious sentiment is the\ntheurgic power of certain natural objects over some persons. The\nbiblical scholar Kitto confesses that the moon exerted a strange\ninfluence on his mind, stirring his devotional nature, and he owns that\nit would not have been hard for him to join the worshippers of the\ngoddess of the night. Wilhelm von Humboldt in one of his odes refers to\nsimilar feelings excited in him by the gloom and murmur of groves. The\nsacred poets and the religious arts generally acknowledge this\n_fascination_, as it has been called, which certain phenomena have for\nreligious temperaments.\n\nThe explanation which suggests itself is that of individual and\nancestral association. In the case of Kitto it was probably the latter.\nHis sensitively religious nature experienced in gazing at the moon an\nimpression inherited from some remote ancestor who had actually made it\nthe object of ardent worship. The study of the laws of inherited memory,\nso successfully pursued of late by Professor Laycock, take away anything\neccentric about this explanation, though I scarcely expect it will be\nreceived by one unacquainted with those laws.\n\nThe emotional aspect of religion is not exhausted by the varieties of\nfear and hope and love. Wonder, awe, admiration, the \u00e6sthetic emotions,\nin fact all the active principles of man\u2019s mental economy are at times\nexcited and directed by the thought of supernatural power. Some have\nattempted to trace the religious sentiment exclusively to one or the\nother of these. But they are all incidental and subsidiary emotions.\n\nCertain mental diseases, by abnormally stimulating the emotions,\npredispose strongly to religious fervor. Epilepsy is one of these, and\nin Swedenborg and Mohammed, both epileptics, we see distinguished\nexamples of religious mystics, who, no doubt honestly, accepted the\nvisions which accompanied their disease as revelations from another\nworld. Very many epileptics are subject to such delusions, and their\ninsanity is usually of a religious character.\n\nOn the other hand, devotional excitement is apt to bring about mental\nalienation. Every violent revival has left after it a small crop of\nreligious melancholies and lunatics. Competent authorities state that in\nmodern communities religious insanity is most frequent in those sects\nwho are given to emotional forms of religion, the Methodists and\nBaptists for example; whereas it is least known among Roman Catholics,\nwhere doubt and anxiety are at once allayed by an infallible referee,\nand among the Quakers, where enthusiasm is discouraged and with whom the\nrestraint of emotion is a part of discipline.[76-1] Authoritative\nassurance in many disturbed conditions of mind is sufficient to relieve\nthe mental tension and restore health.\n\nIf, by what has been said, it is clear that the religious sentiment has\nits origin in a wish, it is equally clear that not every wish is\nconcerned in it. The objects which a man can attain by his own unaided\nefforts, are not those which he makes the subjects of his prayers; nor\nare the periodic and regular occurrences in nature, how impressive they\nmay be, much thought of in devotional moods. The moment that an event is\nrecognized to be under fixed law, it is seen to be inappropriate to seek\nby supplication to alter it. No devotee, acquainted with the theory of\nthe tides, would, like Canute the King, think of staying their waves\nwith words. Eclipses and comets, once matters of superstitious terror,\nhave been entirely shorn of this attribute by astronomical discovery.\nEven real and tragic misfortunes, if believed to be such as flow from\nfixed law, and especially if they can be predicted sometime before they\narrive, do not excite religious feeling. As Bishop Hall quaintly\nobserves, referring to a curious medieval superstition: \u201cCrosses, after\nthe nature of the cockatrice, die if they be foreseen.\u201d\n\nOnly when the event suggests the direct action of _mind_, of some free\nintelligence, is it possible for the religious sentiment to throw around\nit the aureole of sanctity. Obviously when natural law was little known,\nthis included vastly more occurrences than civilized men now think of\nholding to be of religious import. Hence the objective and material form\nof religion is always fostered by ignorance, and this is the form which\nprevails exclusively in uncultivated societies.\n\nThe manifestations of motion which the child first notices, or which the\nsavage chiefly observes, relate to himself. They are associated with the\nindividuals around him who minister to his wants; the gratification of\nthese depend on the volitions of others. As he grows in strength he\nlearns to supply his own wants, and to make good his own volitions as\nagainst those of his fellows. But he soon learns that many events occur\nto thwart him, out of connection with any known individual, and these\nof a dreadful nature, hurricanes and floods, hunger, sickness and death.\nThese pursue him everywhere, foiling his plans, and frustrating his\nhopes. It is not the show of power, the manifestations of might, that he\ncares for in these events, but that they touch _him_, that they spoil\n_his_ projects, and render vain _his_ desires; _this_ forces him to cast\nabout for some means to protect himself against them.\n\nIn accordance with the teaching of his experience, and true moreover to\nthe laws of mind, he refers them, collectively, to a mental source, to a\nvague individuality. This loose, undefined conception of an unknown\nvolition or power forms the earliest notion of Deity. It is hardly\nassociated with personality, yet it is broadly separated from the human\nand the known. In the languages of savage tribes, as I have elsewhere\nremarked, \u201ca word is usually found comprehending all manifestations of\nthe unseen world, yet conveying no sense of personal unity.\u201d[78-1]\n\nBy some means to guard against this undefined marplot to the\naccomplishment of his wishes, is the object of his religion. Its\nprimitive forms are therefore defensive and conciliatory. The hopes of\nthe savage extend little beyond the reach of his own arm, and the tenor\nof his prayers is that the gods be neuter. If they do not interfere he\ncan take care of himself. His religion is a sort of assurance of life.\n\nNot only the religion of the savage, but every religion is this and not\nmuch but this. With nobler associations and purer conceptions of life,\nthe religious sentiment ever contains these same elements and depends\nupon them for its vigor and growth. It everywhere springs from _a desire\nwhose fruition depends upon unknown power_. To give the religious wish a\ndefinition in the technic of psychology, I define it as: _Expectant\nAttention, directed toward an event not under known control, with a\nconcomitant idea of Cause or Power_.\n\nThree elements are embraced in this definition, a wish, an idea of\npower, ignorance of the nature of that power. The first term prompts the\nhope, the third suggests the fear, and the second creates the\npersonality, which we see set forth in every religious system. Without\nthese three, religion as dogma becomes impossible.\n\nIf a man wishes for nothing, neither the continuance of present comforts\nnor future blessings, why need he care for the gods? Who can hurt him,\nso long as he stays in his frame of mind? He may well shake off all\nreligions and every fear, for he is stronger than God, and the universe\nholds nothing worth his effort to get. This was the doctrine taught by\nBuddha Sakyanuni, a philosopher opposed to every form of religion, but\nwho is the reputed founder of the most numerous sect now on the globe.\nHe sought to free the minds of his day from the burden of the Brahmanic\nritual, by cultivating a frame of mind beyond desire or admiration, and\nhence beyond the need of a creed.\n\nThe second element, the idea of power, is an intellectual abstraction.\nIts character is fluctuating. At first it is most vague, corresponding\nto what in its most general sense we term \u201cthe supernatural.\u201d Later, it\nis regarded under its various exhibitions as separable phenomena, as in\npolytheisms, in which must be included trinitarian systems and the\ndualistic doctrine of the Parsees. But among the Egyptians, Greeks and\nAztecs, as well as in the words of Zarathustra and in the theology of\nChristianity, we frequently meet with the distinct recognition of the\nfundamental unity of all power. At core, all religions have seeds of\nmonotheism. When we generalize the current concepts of motion or force\nbeyond individual displays and relative measures of quantity, we\nrecognize their qualitative identity, and appreciate the logical unity\nunder which we must give them abstract expression. This is the process,\noften unconscious, which has carried most original thinkers to\nmonotheistic doctrines, no matter whence they started.\n\nThe idea of power controlling the unknown would of itself have been of\nno interest to man had he not assumed certain relations to exist between\nhim and it on the one hand, and it and things on the other. A\ndispassionate inquiry disproves entirely the view maintained by various\nmodern writers, prominently by Bain, Spencer and Darwin, that the\ncontemplation of power or majesty in external nature prompts of itself\nthe religious sentiment, or could have been its historical origin. Such\na view overlooks the most essential because the personal factor of\nreligion--the wish. Far more correct are the words of David Hume, in the\nlast century, by which he closes his admirable _Natural History of\nReligions_: \u201cWe may conclude, therefore, that in all nations the first\nideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature,\nbut from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the\nincessant hopes and fears which actuate the human mind.\u201d A century\nbefore him Hobbes had written in his terse way: \u201cThe natural seed of\nreligion lies in these four things: the fear of spirits, ignorance of\nsecondary causes, the conciliation of those we fear, and the assumption\nof accidents for omens.\u201d[81-1] The sentiment of religion is in its\norigin and nature purely personal and subjective. The aspect of power\nwould never have led man to worship, unless he had assumed certain\nrelations between the unseen author or authors of that power and\nhimself. What these assumptions were, I shall discuss in the next\nchapter.\n\nFinally, as has so often been remarked in a flippant and contemptuous\nway,[82-1] which the fact when rightly understood nowise justifies,\nreligion cannot exist without the aid of ignorance. It is really and\ntruly the mother of devotion. The sentiment of religious fear does not\napply to a _known_ power--to the movement of an opposing army, or the\naction of gravity in an avalanche for example. The prayer which under\nsuch circumstances is offered, is directed to an unknown intelligence,\nsupposed to control the visible forces. As science--which is the\nknowledge of physical laws--extends, the object of prayer becomes more\nand more intangible and remote. What we formerly feared, we learn to\ngovern. No one would pray God to avert the thunderbolt, if lightning\nrods invariably protected houses. The Swiss clergy opposed the system of\ninsuring growing crops because it made their parishioners indifferent to\nprayers for the harvest. With increasing knowledge and the security\nwhich it brings, religious terror lessens, and the wants which excite\nthe sentiment of devotion diminish in number and change in character.\n\nThis is apt to cast general discredit on religion. When we make the\ndiscovery that so many events which excited religious apprehension in\nthe minds of our forefathers are governed by inflexible laws which we\nknow all about, we not only smile in pity at their superstitions, but\nmake the mental inference that the diminished emotion of this kind we\nyet experience is equally groundless. If at the bottom of all displays\nof power lies a physical necessity, our qualms are folly. Therefore, to\nthe pious soul which still finds the bulk of its religious aspirations\nand experiences in the regions of the emotions and sensations, the\nprogress of science seems and really does threaten its cherished\nconvictions. The audacious mind of man robs the gods of power when he\ncan shield himself from their anger. The much-talked-of conflict between\nreligion and science is no fiction; it exists, and is bound to go on,\nand religion will ever get the worst of it until it learns that the\nwishes to which it is its proper place to minister are not those for\npleasure and prosperity, not for abundant harvests and seasonable\nshowers, not success in battle and public health, not preservation from\ndanger and safety on journeys, not much of anything that is spoken of\nin litanies and books of devotion.\n\nLet a person who still clings to this form of religion imagine that\nscience had reached perfection in the arts of life; that by skilled\nadaptations of machinery, accidents by sea and land were quite avoided;\nthat observation and experience had taught to foresee with certainty and\nto protect effectively against all meteoric disturbances; that a\nperfected government insured safety of person and property; that a\nconsummate agriculture rendered want and poverty unknown; that a\ndeveloped hygiene completely guarded against disease; and that a\npainless extinction of life in advanced age could surely be calculated\nupon; let him imagine this, and then ask himself what purpose religion\nwould subserve in such a state of things? For whatever would occupy it\nthen--if it could exist at all--should _alone_ occupy it now.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[49-1] _Address to the Clergy_, pp. 42, 43, 67, 106, etc.\n\n[49-2] E. von Hardenberg [Novalis], _Werke_, s. 364.\n\n[50-1] _Treatises Devotional and Practical_, p. 188. London, 1836.\n\n[50-2] In Aramaic _dachla_ means either a god or fear. The Arabic Allah\nand the Hebrew Eloah are by some traced to a common root, signifying to\ntremble, to show fear, though the more usual derivation is from one\nmeaning to be strong.\n\n[51-1] \u201cWen die Hoffnung, den hat auch die Furcht verlassen.\u201d Arthur\nSchopenhauer, _Parerga und Paralipomena_. Bd. ii. s. 474.\n\n[52-1] Alexander Bain, _On the Study of Character_, p. 128. See also his\nremarks in his work, _The Emotions and the Will_, p. 84, and in his\nnotes to James Mill\u2019s _Analysis of the Mind_, vol. i., pp. 124-125.\n\n[53-1] Wilhelm von Humboldt\u2019s _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. vii., s. 62.\n\n[53-2] De Senancourt, _Obermann_, Lettre xli.\n\n[54-1] _Elements of Medical Psychology_, p. 331.\n\n[56-1] Lessing\u2019s _Gesammelte Werke_. B. ii. s. 443 (Leipzig, 1855).\n\n[57-1] See Exodus, xxiii. 12; Psalms, lv. 6; Isaiah, xxx. 15; Jeremiah,\nvi. 16; Hebrews, v. 9. So St. Augustine: \u201cet nos post opera nostra\nsabbato vit\u00e6 etern\u00e6 requiescamus in te.\u201d _Confessionum Lib._ xiii. cap.\n36.\n\n[59-1] \u201cFilioli, diligite alterutrum.\u201d This is the \u201ctestamentum\nJohannis,\u201d as recorded from tradition by St. Jerome in his notes to the\nEpistle to the Galatians.\n\n[59-2] Alexander Bain, _The Senses and the Intellect_, Chap. I.\n\n[60-1] _A Christian Directory._ Part I. Chap. III.\n\n[60-2] \u201cThe very nature of affection, the idea itself, necessarily\nimplies resting in its object as an end.\u201d _Fifteen Sermons by Joseph\nButler, late Lord Bishop of Durham_, Preface, and p. 147 (London, 1841).\n\n[61-1] Dr. J. Milner Fothergill, _Journal of Mental Science_, Oct. 1874,\np. 198.\n\n[62-1] The most recent work on the topic is that of Messrs. Westropp and\nWake, _The Influence of the Phallic Idea on the Religions of Antiquity_,\nLondon, 1874.\n\n[63-1] Schoolcraft\u2019s _History and Statistics of the Indian Tribes_, Vol.\niv. p. 224.\n\n[63-2] Richardson, _Arctic Expedition_, p. 412.\n\n[63-3] Most physicians have occasion to notice the almost entire loss in\nmodern life of the instinctive knowledge of the sex relation. Sir James\nPaget has lately treated of the subject in one of his _Clinical\nLectures_ (London, 1875).\n\n[64-1] Dr. J. P. Catlow, _Principles of Aesthetic Medicine_, p. 112.\nThis thoughtful though obscure writer has received little recognition\neven in the circle of professional readers.\n\n[66-1] This is probably what was condemned in Deuteronomy xxii. 5, and\nRomans, i. 26.\n\n[66-2] \u201cThe worship of Siva is too severe, too stern for the softer\nemotions of love, and all his temples are quite free from any allusions\nto it.\u201d--Ferguson, _Tree and Serpent Worship_, p. 71.\n\n[67-1] W. von Humboldt, in his admirable essay _Ueber die M\u00e4nnliche und\nWeibliche Form_ (_Werke, Bd. I._). Elsewhere he adds: \u201cIn der Natur des\nG\u0153ttlichen strebt alles der Reinheit und Vollkommenheit des\nGattungsbegriff entgegen.\u201d\n\n[68-1] I have collected the Haitian myths, chiefly from the manuscript\n_Historia Apologetica de las Indias Occidentales_ of Las Casas, in an\nessay published in 1871, _The Arawack Language of Guiana in its\nLinguistic and Ethnological Relations_.\n\n[71-1] _The Koran_, Suras,[TN-5] cxii., lxii., and especially xix.\n\n[73-1] _Elements of Medical Psychology_, p. 281.\n\n[73-2] J. Thompson Dickson, _The Science and Practice of Medicine in\nrelation to Mind_, p. 383 (New York, 1874).\n\n[76-1] Dr. Joseph Williams, _Insanity, its Causes, Prevention and Cure_,\npp. 68, 69; Dr. A. L. Wigan, _The Duality of the Mind_, p. 437.\n\n[78-1] _The Myths of the New World, a Treatise on the Symbolism and\nMythology of the Red Race of America_, p. 145.\n\n[81-1] _Leviathan, De Homine_, cap. xii.\n\n[82-1] For instance, of later writers from whom we might expect better\nthings, Arthur Schopenhauer. He says in his _Parerga_ (Bd. ii. s. 290):\n\u201cEin gewisser Grad allgemeiner Unwissenheit ist die Bedingung aller\nReligionen;\u201d a correct remark, and equally correct of the pursuit of\nscience and philosophy. But the ignorance which is the condition of such\npursuit is not a part of science or philosophy, and no more is it of\nreligion.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RATIONAL POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     Religion often considered merely an affair of the feelings. On the\n     contrary, it must assume at least three premises in reason, its\n     \u201crational postulates.\u201d\n\n     I. There is Order in things.\n\n     The religious wish involves the idea of cause. This idea not\n     exhausted by uniformity of sequence, but by quantitative relation,\n     that is, Order as opposed to Chance. Both science and religion\n     assume order in things; but the latter includes the Will of God in\n     this order, while the former rejects it.\n\n     II. This order is one of Intelligence.\n\n     The order is assumed to be a comprehensible one, whether it be of\n     law wholly or of volition also.\n\n     III. All Intelligence is one in kind.\n\n     This postulate indispensable to religion, although it has been\n     attacked by religious as well as irreligious philosophers. Its\n     decision must rest on the absoluteness of the formal laws of\n     thought. The theory that these are products of natural selections\n     disproved by showing, (1) that they hold true throughout the\n     material universe, and (2) that they do not depend on it for their\n     verity. Reason sees beyond phenomena, but descries nothing alien to\n     itself.\n\n     The formal laws of reason are purposive. They therefore afford a\n     presumption of a moral government of the Universe, and point to an\n     Intelligence fulfilling an end through the order in physical laws.\n     Such an assumption, common to all historic religions, is thus\n     justified by induction.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE RATIONAL POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.\n\n\nIn philosophical discussions of religion as well as in popular\nexhortations upon it, too exclusive stress has been laid upon its\nemotional elements. \u201cIt is,\u201d says Professor Bain, \u201can affair of the\nfeelings.\u201d[87-1] \u201cThe essence of religion,\u201d observes John Stuart Mill,\n\u201cis the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards\nan ideal object.\u201d \u201cIt must be allowed,\u201d says Dr. Mansel,[87-2] \u201cthat it\nis not through reasoning that men obtain their first intimation of their\nrelation to a deity.\u201d In writers and preachers of the semi-mystical\nschool, which embraces most of the ardent revivalists of the day, we\nconstantly hear the \u201cfeeling of dependence\u201d quoted as the radical\nelement of religious thought.[87-3] In America Theodore Parker, and in\nGermany Schleiermacher, were brilliant exponents of this doctrine. To\nthe latter the philosopher Hegel replied that if religion is a matter of\nfeeling, an affectionate dog is the best Christian.\n\nThis answer was not flippant, but founded on the true and only worthy\nconception of the religious sentiment. We have passed in review the\nemotions which form a part of it, and recognize their power. But neither\nthese nor any other mere emotions, desires or feelings can explain even\nthe lowest religion. It depends for its existence on the essential\nnature of reason. We cannot at all allow, as Dr. Mansel asks of us, that\nman\u2019s first intimations of Deity came in any other way than as one of\nthe ripest fruits of reason. Were such the case, we should certainly\nfind traces of them among brutes and idiots, which we do not. The slight\nsigns of religious actions thought to have been noticed by some in the\nlower animals, by Sir John Lubbock in ants, and by Charles Darwin in\ndogs, if authenticated, would vindicate for these species a much closer\nmental kinship to man than we have yet supposed.\n\nIf we dispassionately analyze any religion whatever, paying less\nattention to what its professed teachers say it is, than to what the\nmass of the votaries believe it to be, we shall see that every form of\nadoration unconsciously assumes certain premises in reason, which give\nimpulse and character to its emotional and active manifestations. They\nare its data or axioms, or, as I shall call them, its \u201crational\npostulates.\u201d They can, I believe, be reduced to three, but not to a\nlesser number.\n\nBefore the religious feeling acquires the distinctness of a notion and\nurges to conscious action, it must assume at least these three\npostulates, and without them it cannot rise into cognition. These, their\nnecessary character and their relations, I shall set forth in this\nchapter.\n\nThey are as follows:--\n\n    I. There is Order in things.\n   II. This order is one of Intelligence.\n  III. All Intelligence is one in kind.\n\nI. The conscious or unconscious purpose of the religious sentiment, as\nI have shown in the last chapter, is the _fruition of a wish_, the\nsuccess of which depends upon unknown power. The votary asks help where\nhe cannot help himself. He expects it through an exertion of power,\nthrough an efficient cause. Obviously therefore, he is acting on the\nlogical idea of Causality. This underlies and is essential to the\nsimplest prayer. He extends it, moreover, out of the limits of\nexperience into the regions of hypothesis. He has carried the analogy\nof observation into the realm of abstract conceptions. No matter if he\ndoes believe that the will of God is the efficient cause. Perhaps he is\nright; at any rate he cannot be denied the privilege of regarding\nvolition as a co-operating cause. Limited at first to the transactions\nwhich most concerned men, the conception of order as a divine act\nextended itself to the known universe. Herodotus derives the Greek word\nfor God \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 from a root which gives the meaning \u201cto set in order,\u201d and\nthe Scandinavians gave the same sense to their word, _Regin_.[90-1]\nThus the abstract idea of cause or power is a postulate of all\nreligious thought. Let us examine its meaning.\n\nEvery reader, the least versed in the history of speculative thought for\nthe last hundred years, knows how long and violent the discussions have\nbeen of the relations of \u201ccause and effect.\u201d Startled by the criticisms\nof Hume, Kant sought to elude them by distinguishing between two spheres\nof thought, the understanding and the reason. Sir William Hamilton at\nfirst included the \u201cprinciple of sufficient reason\u2019[TN-6] in the laws of\nthought, but subsequently rejected it as pertaining to judgments, and\ntherefore material, not formal. Schopenhauer claimed to have traced it\nto a fourfold root, and Mill with most of the current English schools,\nBain, Austin, Spencer, &c., maintained that it meant nothing but\n\u201cuniformity of sequence.\u201d\n\nIt would be vain to touch upon a discussion so extended as this. In the\nfirst chapter I have remarked that the idea of cause does not enter into\nthe conceptions of pure logic or thought. It is, as Hamilton saw,\nmaterial. I shall only pause to show what is meant by the term \u201ccause\u201d\nin the physical sciences. When one event follows another, time after\ntime, we have \u201cuniformity of sequence.\u201d Suppose the constitution of the\nrace were so happy that we slept at night only, and always awoke a few\nmoments before sunrise. Such a sequence quite without exception, should,\nif uniform experience is the source of the idea of cause, justly lead to\nthe opinion that the sun rises because man awakes. As we know this\nconclusion would be erroneous, some other element beside sequence must\ncomplete a real cause. If now, it were shown that the relation of cause\nto effect which we actually entertain and cannot help entertaining is in\nsome instances flatly contrary to all experience, then we must\nacknowledge that the idea of cause asks to confirm it something quite\nindependent of experience, that is abstract. But such examples are\ncommon. We never saw two objects continue to approach without meeting;\nbut we are constrained to believe that lines of certain descriptions can\nforever approach and never meet.\n\nThe uniformity of sequence is, in fact, in the physical sciences never\nassumed to express the relation of cause and effect, until the\nconnection between the antecedent and consequent can be set forth\nabstractly in mathematical formul\u00e6. The sequence of the planetary\nmotions was discovered by Kepler, but it was reserved for Newton to\nprove the theoretical necessity of this motion and establish its\nmathematical relations. The sequence of sensations to impressions is\nwell known, but the law of the sequence remains the desideratum in\npsychology.[92-1]\n\nScience, therefore, has been correctly defined as \u201cthe knowledge of\nsystem.\u201d Its aim is to ascertain the laws of phenomena, to define the\n\u201corder in things.\u201d Its fundamental postulate is that order exists, that\nall things are \u201clapped in universal law.\u201d It acknowledges no exception,\nand it considers that all law is capable of final expression in\nquantity, in mathematical symbols. It is the manifest of reason, \u201cwhose\nunceasing endeavor is to banish the idea of Chance.\u201d[93-1]\n\nWe thus see that its postulate is the same as that of the religious\nsentiment. Wherein then do they differ? Not in the recognition of\nchance. Accident, chance, does not exist for the religious sense in any\nstage of its growth. Everywhere religion proclaims in the words of\nDante:--\n\n              \u201cle cose tutte quante,\n    Hann\u2019 ordine tra loro;\u201d\n\neverywhere in the more optimistic faiths it holds this order, in the\nwords of St. Augustine, to be one \u201cmost fair, of excellent\nthings.\u201d[93-2]\n\nWhat we call \u201cthe element of chance\u201d is in its scientific sense that of\nwhich we do not know the law; while to the untutored religious mind it\nis the manifestation of divine will. The Kamschatkan, when his boat is\nlost in the storm, attributes it to the vengeance of a god angered\nbecause he scraped the snow from his shoes with a knife, instead of\nusing a piece of wood; if a Dakota has bad luck in hunting, he says it\nis caused by his wife stepping over a bone and thus irritating a\nspirit. The idea of cause, the sentiment of order, is as strong as ever,\nbut it differs from that admitted by science in recognizing as a\npossible efficient motor that which is incapable of mathematical\nexpression, namely, a volition, a will. _Voluntas Dei asylum\nignoranti\u00e6_, is no unkind description of such an opinion.\n\nSo long as this recognition is essential to the life of a religious\nsystem, just so long it will and must be in conflict with science, with\nevery prospect of the latter gaining the victory. Is the belief in\nvolition as an efficient cause indispensable to the religious sentiment\nin general? For this vital question we are not yet prepared, but must\nfirst consider the remaining rational postulates it assumes. The second\nis\n\nII. This order is one of intelligence.\n\nBy this is not meant that the order is one of _an_ Intelligence, but\nsimply that the order which exists in things is conformable to man\u2019s\nthinking power,--that if he knows the course of events he can appreciate\ntheir relations,--that facts can be subsumed under thoughts. Whatever\nscheme of order there were, would be nothing to him unless it were\nconformable to his intellectual functions. It could not form the matter\nof his thought.[94-1]\n\nScience, which deals in the first instance exclusively with phenomena,\nalso assumes this postulate. It recognizes that when the formal laws,\nwhich it is its mission to define, are examined apart from their\nmaterial expression, when they are emptied of their phenomenal contents,\nthey show themselves to be logical constructions, reasoned truths, in\nother words, forms of intelligence. The votary who assumes the order one\nof volition alone, or volition with physical necessity, still assumes\nthe volitions are as comprehensible as are his own; that they are\npurposive; that the order, even if not clear to him, is both real and\nreasonable. Were it not so, did he believe that the gods carried out\ntheir schemes through a series of caprices inconceivable to\nintelligence, through absolute chance, insane caprice, or blind fate, he\ncould neither see in occurrences the signs of divine rule, nor hope for\naid in obtaining his wishes. In fact, order is only conceivable to man\nat all as an order conformable to his own intelligence.\n\nThis second postulate embraces what has been recently called the\n\u201cPrinciple of continuity,\u201d indispensable to sane thought of any kind. A\nlate work defines it as \u201cthe trust that the Supreme Governor of the\nUniverse will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion.\u201d[96-1]\nLooked at closely, it is the identification of order with reason.\n\nThe third and final postulate of the religious sentiment is that\n\nIII. All intelligence is one in kind.\n\nReligion demands that there be a truth which is absolutely true, and\nthat there be a goodness which is universally and eternally good. Each\nsystem claims the possession, and generally the exclusive possession,\nof this goodness and truth. They are right in maintaining these views,\nfor unless such is the case, unless there is an absolute truth,\ncognizable to man, yet not transcended by any divine intelligence, all\npossible religion becomes mere child\u2019s play, and its professed\ninterpretation of mysteries but trickery.\n\nThe Grecian sophists used to meet the demonstrations of the\nmathematicians and philosophers by conceding that they did indeed set\nforth the truth, so far as man\u2019s intelligence goes, but that to the\nintelligence of other beings--a bat or an angel, for example--they might\nnot hold good at all; that there is a different truth for different\nintelligences; that the intelligence makes the truth; and that as for\nthe absolutely true, true to every intelligence, there is no such thing.\nThey acknowledged that a simple syllogism, constructed on these\npremises, made their own assertions partake of the doubtful character\nthat was by them ascribed to other human knowledge. But this they\ngracefully accepted as the inevitable conclusion of reasoning. Their\nposition is defended to-day by the advocates of \u201cpositivism,\u201d who\nmaintain the relativity of all truth.\n\nBut such a conclusion is wholly incompatible with the religious mind. It\nmust assume that there are some common truths, true infinitely, and\ntherefore, that in all intelligence there is an essential unity of kind.\n\u201cThis postulation,\u201d says a close thinker, \u201cis the very foundation and\nessence of religion. Destroy it, and you destroy the very possibility of\nreligion.\u201d[97-1]\n\nClear as this would seem to be to any reflective mind, yet, strange to\nsay, it is to-day the current fashion for religious teachers to deny it.\nScared by a phantasm of their own creation, they have deserted the only\nposition in which it is possible to defend religion at all. Afraid of\nthe accusation that they make God like man, they have removed Him\nbeyond the pale of all intelligence, and logically, therefore,\nannihilated every conception of Him.\n\nTeachers and preachers do not tire of telling their followers that God\nis incomprehensible; that his ways are past finding out; that he is the\nUnconditioned, the Infinite, the Unknowable. They really mean that he is\nanother order of intelligence, which, to quote a famous comparison of\nSpinoza, has the same name as ours, but is no more one with it than the\ndog is one with his namesake, the dog-star!\n\nThey are eagerly seconded in this position by a school of writers who\ndistinctly see where such a doctrine leads, and who do not hesitate to\ncarry it home. Mr. Mill is right in his scorn for those who \u201cerect the\nincurable limitations of the human conceptive faculty into laws of the\noutward universe,\u201d if there are such limitations. And Mr. Spencer is\njustified in condemning \u201cthe transcendent audacity which passes current\nas piety,\u201d if his definition of the underlying verity of religion is\nadmitted--that it is \u201cthe consciousness of an inscrutable power which,\nin its nature, transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination.\u201d[98-1]\nThey are but following the orthodox Sir William Hamilton, who says:\n\u201cCreation must be thought as the incomprehensible evolution of power\ninto energy.\u201d[99-1] We are to think that which by the terms of the\nproposition is unthinkable! A most wise master!\n\nLet it be noted that the expressions such as inscrutable,\nincomprehensible, unknowable, etc., which such writers use, are avowedly\nnot limited to man\u2019s intelligence in its present state of cultivation,\nbut are applied to his _kind_ of intelligence, no matter how far\ntrained. They mean that the inscrutable, etc., is not merely not _at\npresent_ open to man\u2019s observation--that were a truism--but that it\ncannot be subsumed under the laws of his reasoning powers. In other\nwords, they deny that all intelligence is one in _kind_. Some accept\nthis fully, and concede that what are called the laws of order, as shown\nby science, are only matters of experience, true here and now, not\nnecessarily and absolutely true.\n\nThis is a consistent inference, and applies, of course, with equal force\nto all moral laws and religious dogmas.\n\nThe arguments brought against such opinions have been various. The old\nreply to the sophists has been dressed in modern garb, and it has been\nrepeatedly put that if no statement is really true, then this one, to\nwit \u201cno statement is really true,\u201d also is not true; and if that is the\ncase, then there are statements which really are true. The theory of\nevolution as a dogma has been attacked by its own maxims; in asserting\nthat all knowledge is imperfect, it calls its own verity into question.\nIf all truth is relative, then this at least is absolutely true.\n\nIt has also been noted that all such words as incomprehensible,\nunconditioned, infinite, unknowable, are in their nature privatives,\nthey are not a thought but are only one element of a thought. As has\nbeen shown in the first chapter, every thought is made up of a positive\nand a privative, and it is absurd and unnatural to separate the one from\nthe other. The concept man, regarded as a division of the higher concept\nanimal, is made up of man and not-man. In so far as other animals are\nincluded under the term \u201cnot-man\u201d they do not come into intelligent\ncognition; but that does not mean that they cannot do so. So \u201cthe\nunconditioned\u201d is really a part of the thought of \u201cthe conditioned,\u201d the\n\u201cunknowable\u201d a part of the \u201cknowable,\u201d the \u201cinfinite\u201d a part of the\nthought of the \u201cfinite.\u201d Under material images these privatives, as\nsuch, cannot be expressed; but in pure thought which deals with symbols\nand types alone, they can be.\n\nBut if the abstract laws of thought themselves are confined in the\nlimits of one kind of intelligence, then we cannot take an appeal to\nthem to attack this sophism. Therefore on maintaining their integrity\nthe discussion must finally rest. This has been fully recognized by\nthinkers, one of whom has not long since earnestly called attention to\n\u201cthe urgent necessity of fathoming the psychical mechanism on which\nrests all our intellectual life.\u201d[101-1]\n\nIn this endeavor the attempt has been made to show that the logical laws\nare derived in accordance with the general theory of evolution from the\nnatural or material laws of thinking. These, as I have previously\nremarked, are those of the association of ideas, and come under the\ngeneral heads of contiguity and similarity. Such combinations are\nindependent of the aim of the logical laws, which is _correct_ thinking.\nA German writer, Dr. Windelband, has therefore argued that as\nexperience, strengthened by hereditary transmission, continued to show\nthat the particular combinations which are in accord with what we call\nthe laws of thought furnished the best, that is, the most useful\nresults, they were adopted in preference to others and finally assumed\nas the criteria of truth.\n\nOf course it follows from this that as these laws are merely the outcome\nof human experience they can have no validity outside of it.\nConsequently, adds the writer I have quoted, just as the study of optics\nteaches us that the human eye yields a very different picture of the\nexternal world from that given by the eye of a fly, for instance, and\nas each of them is equally far from the reality, so the truth which our\nintelligence enables us to reach is not less remote from that which is\nthe absolutely true. He considers that this is proven by the very nature\nof the \u201claw of contradiction\u201d itself, which must be inconsistent with\nthe character of absolute thought. For in the latter, positive truth\nonly can exist, therefore no negation, and no law about the relation of\naffirmative to negative.[102-1]\n\nThe latter criticism assumes that negation is of the nature of error, a\nmistake drawn from the use of the negative in applied logic. For in\nformal logic, whether as quantity or quality, that is, in pure\nmathematics or abstract thought, the reasoning is just as correct when\nnegatives are employed as when positives, as I have remarked before. The\nother criticism is more important, for if we can reach the conclusion\nthat the real laws of the universe are other than as we understand them,\nthen our intelligence is not of a kind to represent them.\n\nSuch an opinion can be refuted directly. The laws which we profess to\nknow are as operative in the remotest nebulae as in the planet we\ninhabit. It is altogether likely that countless forms of intelligent\nbeings inhabit the starry wastes, receiving through sensory apparatus\nwidely different from ours very diverse impressions of the external\nworld. All this we know, but we also know that if those beings have\ndefined the laws which underlie phenomena, they have found them to be\nthe same that we have; for were they in the least different, in\nprinciple or application, they could not furnish the means, as those we\nknow do, of predicting the recurrence of the celestial motions with\nunfailing accuracy. Therefore the demonstrations of pure mathematics,\nsuch as the relation of an absciss to an ordinate, or of the diameter to\nthe circumference, must be universally true; and hence the logical laws\nwhich are the ultimate criteria of these truths must also be true to\nevery intelligence, real or possible.[103-1]\n\nAnother and forcible reply to these objections is that the laws which\nour intelligence has reached and recognizes as universally true are not\nonly not derived from experience, but are in direct opposition to and\nare constantly contradicted by it. Neither sense nor imagination has\never portrayed a perfect circle in which the diameter bore to the\ncircumference the exact proportion which we know it does bear. The very\nfact that we have learned that our senses are wholly untrustworthy, and\nthat experience is always fallacious, shows that we have tests of truth\ndepending on some other faculty. \u201cEach series of connected facts in\nnature furnishes the intimation of an order more exact than that which\nit directly manifests.\u201d[104-1]\n\nBut, it has been urged, granted that we have reached something like\npositive knowledge of those laws which are the _order_ of the\nmanifestation of phenomena, the real Inscrutable, the mysterious\nUnknowable, escapes us still; this is the _nature_ of phenomenal\nmanifestation, \u201cthe secret of the Power manifested in Existence.\u201d[104-2]\nAt this point the physicist trips and falls; and here, too, the\nmetaphysician stumbles.\n\nI have already spoken of our aptitude to be frightened by a chimera, and\ndeceived by such words as \u201cnature\u201d and \u201ccause.\u201d Laws and rules, by which\nwe express Order, are restrictive only in a condition of intelligence\nshort of completeness, only therefore in that province of thought which\nconcerns itself with material facts. The musician is not fettered by the\nlaws of harmony, but only by those of discord. The truly virtuous man,\nremarks Aristotle, never has occasion to practise self-denial. Hence,\nmathematically, \u201cthe theory of the intellectual action involves the\nrecognition of a sphere of thought from which all limits are\nwithdrawn.\u201d[105-1] True freedom, real being, is only possible when law\nas such is inexistent. Only the lawless makes the law. When the idea of\nthe laws of order thus disappears in that of free function consistent\nwith perfect order, when, as Kant expresses it, we ascend from the\ncontemplation of things acting according to law, to action according to\nthe representation of law,[105-2] we can, without audacity, believe that\nwe have penetrated the secret of existence, that we have reached the\nlimits of explanation and found one wholly satisfying the highest\nreason. Intelligence, not apart from phenomena, but parallel with them,\nnot under law, but through perfect harmony above it, _power one with\nbeing_, the will which is \u201cthe essence of reason,\u201d the emanant cause of\nphenomena, immanent only by the number of its relations we have not\nlearned, this is the satisfying and exhaustive solution. The folly lies\nnot in claiming reason as the absolute, but in assuming that the\nabsolute is beyond and against reason.\n\nThere is nothing new in this explanation; and it is none the worse for\nbeing old. If Anaxagoras discerned it dimly, and many a one since him\nhas spoken of Intelligence, Reason, Nous or Logos as the constructive\nfactor of the creation; if \u201call the riper religions of the Orient\nassumed as their fundamental principle that unless the Highest\npenetrates all parts of the Universe, and itself conditions whatever is\nconditioned, no universal order, no Kosmos, no real existence is\nthinkable;\u201d[106-1] such inadequate expressions should never obscure the\ntruth that reason in its loftiest flights descries nothing nobler than\nitself.\n\nThe relative, as its name implies, for ever presupposes and points to\nthe absolute, the latter an Intelligence also, not one that renders ours\nfutile and fallacious, but one that imparts to ours the capacity we\npossess of reaching eternal and ubiquitous truth. The severest\nmathematical reasoning forces us to this conclusion, and we can dispense\nwith speculation about it.\n\nOnly on the principle which here receives its proof, that man has\nsomething in him of God, that the norm of the true holds good\nthroughout, can he know or care anything about divinity. \u201cIt takes a\ngod to discern a god,\u201d profoundly wrote Novalis.\n\nWhen a religion teaches what reason disclaims, not through lack of\ntestimony but through a denial of the rights of reason, then that\nreligion wars against itself and will fall. Faith is not the acceptance\nof what intelligence rejects, but a suspension of judgment for want of\nevidence. A thoroughly religious mind will rejoice when its faith is\nshaken with doubt; for the doubt indicates increased light rendering\nperceptible some possible error not before seen.\n\nLeast of all should a believer in a divine revelation deny the oneness\nof intelligence. For if he is right, then the revealed truth he talks\nabout is but relative and partial, and those inspired men who claimed\nfor it the sign manual of the Absolute were fools, insane or liars.\n\nIf the various arguments I have rehearsed indicate conclusively that in\nthe laws of thought we have the norms of absolute truth--and skepticism\non this point can be skepticism and not belief only by virtue of the\nvery law which it doubts--some important corollaries present themselves.\n\nRegarding in the first place the nature of these laws, we find them very\ndifferent from those of physical necessity--those which are called the\nlaws of nature. The latter are authoritative, they are never means to an\nend, they admit no exception, they leave no room for error. Not so with\nthe laws of reasoning. Man far more frequently disregards than obeys\nthem; they leave a wide field for fallacy. Wherein then lies that\ntheoretical necessity which is the essence of law? The answer is that\nthe laws of reasoning are _purposive_ only, they are regulative, not\nconstitutive, and their theoretical necessity lies in the end, the\nresult of reasoning, that is, in the knowing, in the recognition of\ntruth. They are what the Germans call _Zweckgesetze_.[108-1]\n\nBut in mathematical reasoning and in the processes of physical nature\nthe absolute character of the laws which prevail depends for its final\nnecessity on their consistency, their entire correspondence with the\nlaws of right reasoning. Applied to them the purposive character of the\nlaws is not seen, for their ends are fulfilled. We are brought,\ntherefore, to the momentous conclusion that the manifestation of Order,\nwhether in material or mental processes, \u201caffords a presumption, not\nmeasurable indeed but real, of the fulfilment of an end or\npurpose;\u201d[108-1][TN-7] and this purpose, one which has other objects in\nview than the continuance of physical processes. The history of mind,\nfrom protoplasmic sensation upward, must be a progression, whose end\nwill be worth more than was its beginning, a process, which has for its\npurpose the satisfaction of the laws of mind. This is nothing else than\ncorrect thinking, the attainment of truth.\n\nBut this conclusion, reached by a searching criticism of the validity of\nscientific laws, is precisely that which is the postulate of all\ndeveloped creeds. \u201cThe faith of all historical religions,\u201d says Bunsen,\n\u201cstarts from the assumption of a universal moral order, in which the\ngood is alone the true, and the true is the only good.\u201d[109-1]\n\nThe purposive nature of the processes of thought, as well as the manner\nin which they govern the mind, is illustrated by the history of man. His\nactions, whether as an individual or as a nation, are guided by ideas\nnot derived from the outer world, for they do not correspond to actual\nobjects, but from mental pictures of things as he wants them to exist.\nThese are his hopes, his wishes, his ideals; they are the more potent,\nand prompt to more vigorous action, the clearer they are to his mind.\nEven when he is unconscious of them, they exist as tendencies, or\ninstincts, inherited often from some remote ancestor, perhaps even the\nheir-loom of a stage of lower life, for they occur where sensation\nalone is present, and are an important factor in general evolution.\n\nIt is usually conceded that this theory of organic development very much\nattenuates the evidence of what is known as the argument from design in\nnature, by which the existence of an intelligent Creator is sought to be\nshown. If the distinction between the formal laws of mathematics, which\nare those of nature, and logic, which are those of mind, be fully\nunderstood, no one will seek such an argument in the former but in the\nlatter only, for they alone, as I have shown, are purposive, and they\nare wholly so. The only God that nature points to is an adamantine Fate.\n\nIf religion has indeed the object which Bunsen assigns it, physical\nphenomena cannot concern it. Its votaries should not look to change the\noperation of natural laws by incantations, prayers or miracles.\n\nWhenever in the material world there presents itself a seeming\nconfusion, it is certain to turn out but an incompleteness of our\nobservation, and on closer inspection it resolves itself into some\nhigher scheme of Order. This is not so in the realm of thought. Wrong\nthinking never can become right thinking. A profound writer has said:\n\u201cOne explanation only of these facts can be given, viz., that the\ndistinction between _true_ and _false_, between _correct_ and\n_incorrect_, exists in the processes of the intellect, but not in the\nregion of a physical necessity.\u201d[111-1] A religion therefore which\nclaims as its mission the discovery of the true and its identification\nwith the good,--in other words the persuading man that he should always\nact in accordance with the dictates of right reasoning--should be\naddressed primarily to the intellect.\n\nAs man can attain to certain truths which are without any mixture of\nfallacy, which when once he comprehends them he can never any more\ndoubt, and which though thus absolute do not fetter his intellect but\nfirst give it the use of all its powers to the extent of those truths;\nso he can conceive of an Intelligence in which all truth is thus without\ntaint of error. Not only is such an Intelligence conceivable, it is\nnecessary to conceive it, in order to complete the scientific induction\nof \u201ca sphere of thought from which all limits are withdrawn,\u201d forced\nupon us by the demonstrations of the exact sciences.[111-2]\n\nThus do we reach the foundation for the faith in a moral government of\nthe world, which it has been the uniform characteristic of religions to\nassert; but a government, as thus analytically reached, not easily\ncorresponding with that which popular religion speaks of. Such feeble\nsentiments as mercy, benevolence and effusive love, scarcely find place\nin this conception of the source of universal order. In this cosmical\ndust-cloud we inhabit, whose each speck is a sun, man\u2019s destiny plays a\nmicroscopic part. The vexed question whether ours is the best possible\nor the worst possible world, drops into startling insignificance.\nReligion has taught the abnegation of self; science is first to teach\nthe humiliation of the race. Not for man\u2019s behoof were created the\ngreater and the lesser lights, not for his deeds will the sun grow dark\nor the stars fall, not with any reference to his pains or pleasure was\nthis universe spread upon the night. That Intelligence which pursues its\nown ends in this All, which sees from first to last the chain of causes\nwhich mould human action, measures not its purposes by man\u2019s halting\nsensations. Such an Intelligence is fitly described by the\nphilosopher-poet as one,\n\n    \u201cWo die Gerechtigkeit so Wurzel schl\u00e4get,\n    Und Schuld und Unschuld so erhaben w\u00e4get\n    Dass sie vertritt die Stelle aller G\u00fcte.\u201d[112-1]\n\nIn the scheme of the universe, pain and pleasure, truth and error, has\neach its fitness, and no single thought or act can be judged apart from\nall others that ever have been and ever shall be.\n\nSuch was the power that was contemplated by the Hebrew prophet, one from\nwhich all evil things and all good things come, and who disposes them\nall to the fulfilment of a final purpose:\n\n     \u201cI am the Lord and there is none else. I form the light and create\n     darkness; I make peace and create evil.\u201d\n\n     \u201cI am God and there is none like me, declaring the end from the\n     beginning, and from ancient times the things which are not yet\n     done.\u201d[113-1]\n\nIn a similar strain the ancient Aryan sang:--\n\n    \u201cThis do I ask thee, tell me, O Ahura!\n    Who is he, working good, made the light and also darkness?\n    Who is he, working good, made the sleep as well as waking?\n    Who the night, as well as noon and the morning?\u201d\n\nAnd the reply came:\n\n     \u201cKnow also this, O pure Zarathustra: through my wisdom, through\n     which was the beginning of the world, so also its end shall\n     be.\u201d[113-2]\n\nOr as the Arabian apostle wrote, inspired by the same idea:--\n\n    \u201cPraise the name of thy Lord, the Most High,\n    Who hath created and balanced all things,\n    Who hath fixed their destinies and guideth them.\u201d\n\n     \u201cThe Revelation of this book is from the Mighty, the Wise. We have\n     not created the Heavens and the Earth and all that is between them\n     otherwise than with a purpose and for a settled term.\u201d[113-3]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[87-1] _The Emotions and Will_, p. 594. So Professor Tyndall speaks of\nconfining the religious sentiment to \u201cthe region of emotion, which is\nits proper sphere.\u201d\n\n[87-2] H. L. Mansel, _The Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 115. (Boston,\n1859.)\n\n[87-3] \u201cThe _one relation_ which is the ground of all true religion is a\ntotal dependence upon God.\u201d William Law, _Address to the Clergy_, p. 12.\n\u201cThe essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the\nabsolute feeling of dependence on infinite power.\u201d J. D. Morell, _The\nPhilosophy of Religion_, p. 94. (New York, 1849.) This accomplished\nauthor, well known for his _History of Philosophy_, is the most able\nEnglish exponent of the religious views of Schleiermacher and Jacobi.\n\n[90-1] \u201cWeil sie die Welt _eingerichtet_ haben.\u201d Creuzer, _Symbolik und\nMythologie der alten V\u0153lker_, Bd. I. s. 169. It is not of any importance\nthat Herodotus\u2019 etymology is incorrect: what I wish to show is that he\nand his contemporaries entertained the conception of the gods as the\nauthors of order.\n\n[92-1] This distinction is well set forth by A. von Humboldt, _Kosmos_,\np. 388 (Phila., 1869).\n\n[93-1] \u201cUeberall den Zufall zu verbannen, zu verhindern, dass in dem\nGebiete des Beobachtens und Denkens er nicht zu herrschen scheine, im\nGebiete des Handelns nicht herrsche, ist das Streben der Vernunft.\u201d\nWilhelm von Humboldt, _Ueber Goethe\u2019s Hermann und Dorothea_, iv.\n\n[93-2] \u201cIste ordo pulcherrimus rerum valde bonarum.\u201d _Confessiones_,\nLib. xiii. cap. xxxv.\n\n[94-1] \u201cThe notion of a God is not contained in the mere notion of\nCause, that is the notion of Fate or Power. To this must be added\nIntelligence,\u201d etc. Sir Wm. Hamilton, _Lectures on Metaphysics_, Lecture\nii.\n\n[96-1] _The Unseen Universe_, p. 60.\n\n[97-1] James Frederick Ferrier, _Lectures on Greek Philosophy_, p. 13\n(Edinburgh, 1866). On a question growing directly out of this, to wit,\nthe relative character of good and evil, Mr. J. S. Mill expresses\nhimself thus: \u201cMy opinion of this doctrine is, that it is beyond all\nothers which now engage speculative minds, the decisive one between\nmoral good and evil for the Christian world.\u201d _Examination of Hamilton\u2019s\nPhilosophy_, p. 90.\n\n[98-1] _First Principles_, pp. 108, 127.\n\n[99-1] _Lectures on Metaphysics_, Vol. I., p. 690.\n\n[101-1] Professor Steinthal in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_.\n\n[102-1] Dr. W. Windelband, _Die Erkenntnissiehre unter dem\nvoelkerpsychologischem Gesichtspunkte_, in the _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nV\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, 1874, _Bd. VIII._ S. 165 _sqq._\n\n[103-1] I would ask the reader willing to pursue this reasoning further,\nto peruse the charming essay of Oersted, entitled _Das ganze Dasein Ein\nVernunftreich_.\n\n[104-1] Geo. Boole, _An Investigation of the Laws of Thought_, p. 407.\n\n[104-2] Herbert Spencer, _First Principles_, p. 112. Spinoza\u2019s famous\nproposition, previously quoted, _Unaqu\u00e6que res quantum in se est, in suo\nesse perseverare conatur_, (_Ethices, Pars III., Prop. VI._,) expresses\nalso the ultimate of modern investigation. A recent critic considers it\nis a fallacy because the conatus \u201csurreptitiously implies a sense of\neffort or struggle for existence,\u201d whereas the logical concept of a res\ndoes not involve effort (S. N. Hodgson, _The Theory of Practice_, vol.\nI. pp. 134-6, London, 1870.) The answer is that identity implies\ncontinuance. In organic life we have the fact of nutrition, a function\nwhose duty is to supply waste, and hence offer direct opposition to\nperturbing forces.\n\n[105-1] Geo. Boole, _The Laws of Thought_, p. 419.\n\n[105-2] Kant, _The Metaphysic of Ethics_, p. 23 (Eng. Trans. London,\n1869.)\n\n[106-1] Creuzer, _Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Voelker_, Bd. I. s.\n291.\n\n[108-1] See this distinction between physical and thought laws fully set\nforth by Prof. Boole in the appendix to _The Laws of Thought_, and by\nDr. Windelband, _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Voelkerpsychologie_, Bd. VIII., s. 165\nsqq.\n\n[108-2] Geo. Boole, u. s. p. 399.\n\n[109-1] \u201cDer Glaube aller geschichtlichen Religionen geht aus von dieser\nAnnahme einer sittlichen, in Gott bewusst lebenden, Weltordnung, wonach\ndas Gute das allein Wahre ist, and das Wahre das allein Gute.\u201d _Gott in\nder Geschichte_, Bd. I. s. xl. Leipzig, 1857.\n\n[111-1] Geo. Boole, _Laws of Thought_, p. 410.\n\n[111-2] The latest researches in natural science confirm the expressions\nof W. von Humboldt: \u201cDas Streben der Natur ist auf etwas Unbeschr\u00e4nktes\ngerichtet.\u201d \u201cDie Natur mit endlichen Mitteln unendliche Zwecke\nverfolgt.\u201d _Ueber den Geschlechtsunterschied, etc._\n\n[112-1] Wilhelm von Humboldt, _Sonnette_, \u201cH\u00f6chste Gerechtigkeit.\u201d\n\n[113-1] Isaiah, xlv. 7; xlvi. 10.\n\n[113-2] _Khordah--avesta_, _Ormazd--Yasht_, 38, and _Ya\u00e7na_, 42.\n\n[113-3] _The Koran_, Suras lxxxvii., xlvi.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRAYER AND ITS ANSWER.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     Religion starts with a Prayer. This is an appeal to the unknown,\n     and is indispensable in religious thought. The apparent exceptions\n     of Buddhism and Confucianism.\n\n     All prayers relate to the fulfilment of a wish. At first its direct\n     object is alone thought of. This so frequently fails that the\n     indirect object rises into view. This stated to be the increase of\n     the pleasurable emotions. The inadequacy of this statement.\n\n     The answers to prayer. As a form of Expectant Attention, it exerts\n     much subjective power. Can it influence external phenomena? It is\n     possible. Deeply religious minds reject both these answers,\n     however. They claim the objective answer to be Inspiration. All\n     religions unite in this claim.\n\n     Inspirations have been contradictory. That is genuine which teaches\n     truths which cannot be doubted concerning duty and deity. A certain\n     mental condition favors the attainment of such truths. This\n     simulated in religious entheasm. Examples. It is allied to the most\n     intense intellectual action, but its steps remain unknown.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nTHE PRAYER AND ITS ANSWER.\n\n\nThe foregoing analysis of the religious sentiment results in finding it,\neven in its simplest forms, a product of complicated reasoning forced\ninto action by some of the strongest emotions, and maintaining its\nposition indefeasibly through the limitations of the intellect. This it\ndoes, however, with a certain nobleness, for while it wraps the unknown\nin sacred mystery, it proclaims man one in nature with the Highest, by\nbirthright a son of the gods, of an intelligence akin to theirs, and\nless than they only in degree. Through thus presenting at once his\nstrength and his feebleness, his grandeur and his degradation, religion\ngoes beyond philosophy or utility in suggesting motives for exertion,\nstimuli to labor. This phase of it will now occupy us.\n\nThe Religious Sentiment manifests itself in thought, in word and in act\nthrough the respective media of the Prayer, the Myth and the Cult. The\nfirst embraces the personal relations of the individual to the object\nof his worship, the second expresses the opinions current in a community\nabout the nature and actions of that object, the last includes the\nsymbols and ceremonies under and by which it is represented and\npropitiated.\n\nThe first has the logical priority. Man cares nothing for God--_can_\ncare nothing for him practically--except as an aid to the fulfilment of\nhis desires, the satisfaction of his wants, as the \u201cground of his\nhopes.\u201d The root of the religious sentiment, I have said, is \u201ca wish\nwhose fruition depends upon unknown power.\u201d An appeal for aid to this\nunknown power, is the first form of prayer in its religious sense. It is\nnot merely \u201cthe soul\u2019s sincere desire.\u201d This may well be and well\ndirected, and yet not religious, as the devotion of the mathematician to\nthe solution of an important problem. With the desire must be the\nearnest appeal to the unknown. A theological dictionary I have at hand\nalmost correctly defines it as \u201ca petition for spiritual or physical\nbenefits which [we believe] we cannot obtain without divine\nco-operation.\u201d The words in brackets must be inserted to complete the\ndefinition.\n\nIt need not be expressed in language. Rousseau, in his _Confessions_,\ntells of a bishop who, in visiting his diocese, came across an old woman\nwho was troubled because she could frame no prayer in words, but only\ncry, \u201cOh!\u201d \u201cGood mother,\u201d said the wise bishop, \u201cPray always so. Your\nprayers are better than ours.\u201d[119-1]\n\nA petition for assistance is, as I have said, one of its first forms;\nbut not its only one. The assistance asked in simple prayers is often\nnothing more than the neutrality of the gods, their non-interference;\n\u201cno preventing Providence,\u201d as the expression is in our popular\nreligion. Prayers of fear are of this kind:\n\n    \u201cAnd they say, God be merciful,\n    Who ne\u2019er said, God be praised.\u201d\n\nSome of the Egyptian formul\u00e6 even threaten the gods if they prevent\nsuccess.[119-2] The wish accomplished, the prayer may be one of\ngratitude, often enough of that kind described by La Rochefoucauld, of\nwhich a prominent element is \u201ca lively sense of possible favors to\ncome.\u201d[119-3]\n\nOr again, self-abasement being so natural a form of flattery that to\ncall ourselves \u201cobedient and humble servants\u201d of others, has passed\ninto one of the commonest forms of address, many prayers are made up of\nsimilar expressions of humility and contrition, the votary calling\nhimself a \u201cmiserable sinner\u201d and a \u201cvile worm,\u201d and on the other hand\nmagnifying his Lord as greater than all other gods, mighty and helpful\nto those who assiduously worship him.\n\nIn some form or other, as of petition, gratitude or contrition, uttered\nin words or confined to the aspirations of the soul, prayer is a\nnecessary factor in the religious life. It always has been, and it must\nbe present.\n\nThe exceptions which may be taken to this in religious systems are\nchiefly two, those supposed to have been founded by Buddha Sakyamuni and\nConfucius.\n\nIt is undoubtedly correct that Buddha discouraged prayer. He permitted\nit at best in the inferior grades of discipleship. For himself, and all\nwho reached his stage of culture, he pronounced it futile.\n\nBut Buddha did not set out to teach a religion, but rather the inutility\nof all creeds. He struck shrewdly at the root of them by placing the\nhighest condition of man in the total extinguishment of desire. He bound\nthe gods in fetters by establishing a theory of causal connection (the\ntwelve Nidana) which does away with the necessity of ruling powers. He\nthen swept both matter and spirit into unreality by establishing the\ncanon of ignorance, that the highest knowledge is to know that nothing\nis; that there is neither being nor not-being, nor yet the becoming.\nAfter this wholesale iconoclasm the only possible object in life for the\nsage is the negative one of avoiding pain, which though as unreal as\nanything else, interferes with his meditations on its unreality. To this\nnegative end the only aid he can expect is from other sages who have\ngone farther in self-cultivation. Self, therefore, is the first, the\ncollective body of sages is the second, and the written instruction of\nBuddha is the third; and these three are the only sources to which the\nconsistent Buddhist looks for aid.\n\nThis was Buddha\u2019s teaching. But it is not Buddhism as professed by the\nhundreds of millions in Ceylon, in Thibet, China, Japan, and Siberia,\nwho claim Sakyamuni under his names Buddha, the awakened, Tathagata,\nthus gone, or gone before, Siddartha, the accomplisher of the wish, and\nthreescore and ten others of like purport, as their inspired teacher.\nMillions of saints, holy men, Buddhas, they believe, are ready to aid in\nevery way the true believer, and incessant, constant prayer is, they\nmaintain, the one efficient means to insure this aid. Repetition,\ndinning the divinities and wearying them into answering, is their\ntheory. Therefore they will repeat a short formula of four words (_om\nmani padme hum_--Om! the jewel in the lotus, amen) thousands of times a\nday; or, as they correctly think it not a whit more mechanical, they\nwrite it a million times on strips of paper, fasten it around a\ncylinder, attach this to a water or a wind-wheel, and thus sleeping or\nwaking, at home or abroad, keep up a steady fire of prayer at the gods,\nwhich finally, they sanguinely hope, will bring them to submission.\n\nNo sect has such entire confidence in the power of prayer as the\nBuddhists. The most pious Mahometan or Christian does not approach their\nfaith. After all is said and done, the latter has room to doubt the\nefficacy of his prayer. It may be refused. Not so the Buddhists. They\nhave a syllogism which covers the case completely, as follows:--\n\n    All things are in the power of the gods.\n    The gods are in the power of prayer.\n    Prayer is at the will of the saint.\n    Therefore all things are in the power of the saint.\n\nThe only reason that any prayer fails is that it is not repeated often\nenough--a statement difficult to refute.\n\nThe case with Confucius was different.[122-1] No speculative dreamer,\nbut a practical man, bent on improving his fellows by teaching them\nself-reliance, industry, honesty, good feeling and the attainment of\nmaterial comfort, he did not see in the religious systems and doctrines\nof his time any assistance to these ends. Therefore, like Socrates and\nmany other men of ancient and modern times, without actually condemning\nthe faiths around him, or absolutely neglecting some external respect to\ntheir usages, he taught his followers to turn away from religious topics\nand occupy themselves with subjects of immediate utility. For questions\nof duty, man, he taught, has a sufficient guide within himself. \u201cWhat\nyou do not like,\u201d he said, \u201cwhen done to yourself, do not to others.\u201d\nThe wishes, he adds, should be limited to the attainable; thus their\ndisappointment can be avoided by a just estimate of one\u2019s own powers. He\nused to compare a wise man to an archer: \u201cWhen the archer misses the\ntarget, he seeks for the cause of his failure within himself.\u201d He did\nnot like to talk about spiritual beings. When asked whether the dead had\nknowledge, he replied: \u201cThere is no present urgency about the matter. If\nthey have, you will know it for yourself in time.\u201d He did not deny the\nexistence of unseen powers; on the contrary, he said: \u201cThe _kwei shin_\n(the most general term for supernatural beings) enter into all things,\nand there is nothing without them;\u201d but he added, \u201cWe look for them and\ndo not see them; we listen, but do not hear them.\u201d In speaking of deity,\nhe dropped the personal syllable (_te_) and only spoke of heaven, in the\nindefinite sense. Such was this extraordinary man. The utilitarian\ntheory, what we call the common sense view of life, was never better\ntaught. But his doctrine is not a religion. His followers erect temples,\nand from filial respect pay the usual honors to their ancestors, as\nConfucius himself did. But they ignore religious observances, strictly\nso-called.\n\nThese examples, therefore, do not at all conflict with the general\nstatement that no religion can exist without prayer. On the contrary, it\nis the native expression of the religious sentiment, that to which we\nmust look for its most hidden meaning. The thoughtful Novalis, whose\nmeditations are so rich in reflections on the religious nature of man,\nwell said: \u201cPrayer is to religion what thought is to philosophy. To pray\nis to make religion. The religious sense prays with like necessity that\nthe reason thinks.\u201d\n\nWhatever the form of the prayer, it has direct or indirect relation to\nthe accomplishment of a wish. David prays to the Lord as the one who\n\u201csatisfies the desire of every living thing,\u201d who \u201cwill fulfil the\ndesire of them that fear him,\u201d and it is with the like faith that the\nheart of every votary is stirred when he approaches in prayer the\ndivinity he adores.\n\nWidely various are the things wished for. Their character is the test of\nreligions. In primitive faiths and in uncultivated minds, prayers are\nconfined to the nearest material advantages; they are directed to the\nattainment of food, of victory in combat, of safety in danger, of\npersonal prosperity. They may all be summed up in a line of one which\noccurs in the Rig Veda: \u201cO Lord Varuna! Grant that we may prosper in\n_getting and keeping_!\u201d\n\nBeyond this point of \u201cgetting and keeping,\u201d few primitive prayers take\nus. Those of the American Indians, as I have elsewhere shown, remained\nin this stage among the savage tribes, and rose above it only in the\ncivilized states of Mexico and Peru. Prayers for health, for plenteous\nharvests, for safe voyages and the like are of this nature, though from\ntheir familiarity to us they seem less crude than the simple-hearted\npetition of the old Aryan, which I have quoted. They mean the same.\n\nThe more thoughtful votaries of the higher forms of religion have,\nhowever, frequently drawn the distinction between the direct and\nindirect fulfilment of the wish. An abundant harvest, restoration to\nhealth, or a victory in battle is the object of our hopes, not in\nitself, but for its results upon ourselves. These, in their final\nexpression, can mean nothing else than agreeable sensations and\npleasurable emotions. These, therefore, are the real though indirect\nobjects of such prayers; often unconsciously so, because the ordinary\ndevotee has little capacity and less inclination to analyze the nature\nof his religious feelings.\n\nA recent writer, Mr. Hodgson, has said: \u201cThe real answer to prayer is\nthe increase of the joyful emotions, the decrease of the painful\nones.\u201d[126-1] It would seem a simpler plan to make this directly the\npurport of our petitions; but to the modern mind this naked simplicity\nwould be distasteful.\n\nNor is the ordinary supplicant willing to look so far. The direct, not\nthe indirect object of the wish, is what he wants. The lazzarone of\nNaples prays to his patron saint to favor his choice of a lottery\nticket; if it turn out an unlucky number he will take the little leaden\nimage of the saint from his pocket, revile it, spit on it, and trample\nit in the mud. Another man, when his prayer for success is not followed\nby victory, sends gifts to the church, flogs himself in public and\nfasts. Xenophon gives us in his _Economics_ the prayer of a pious\nAthenian of his time, in the person of Ischomachus. \u201cI seek to obtain,\u201d\nsays the latter, \u201cfrom the gods by just prayers, strength and health,\nthe respect of the community, the love of my friends, an honorable\ntermination to my combats, and riches, the fruit of honest industry.\u201d\nXenophon evidently considered these appropriate objects for prayer, and\nfrom the petitions in many recent manuals of devotion, I should suppose\nmost Christians of to-day would not see in them anything inappropriate.\n\nIn spite of the effort that has been made by Professor Creuzer[127-1] to\nshow that the classical nations rose to a higher use of prayer, one\nwhich made spiritual growth in the better sense of the phrase its main\nend; I think such instances were confined to single philosophers and\npoets. They do not represent the prayers of the average votary. Then and\nnow he, as a rule, has little or no idea of any other answer to his\nprayer than the attainment of his wish.\n\nAs such petitions, however, more frequently fail than succeed in their\ndirect object, and as the alternative of considering them impotent is\nnot open to the votary, some other explanation of their failure was\ntaught in very early day. At first, it was that the god was angered, and\nrefused the petition out of revenge. Later, the indirect purpose of such\na prayer asserted itself more clearly, and aided by a nobler conception\nof Divinity, suggested that the refusal of the lower is a preparation\nfor a higher reward. Children, in well-ordered households, are\nfrequently refused by parents who love them well; this present analogy\nwas early seized to explain the failure of prayer. Unquestioning\nsubmission to the divine will was inculcated. Some even went so far as\nto think it improper to define any wish at all, and subsumed all prayer\nunder the one formula, \u201cThy will be done.\u201d Such was the teaching of St.\nAugustine, whose favorite prayer was _Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis_,\na phrase much criticized by Pelagius and others of his time as too\nquietistic.[128-1] The usual Christian doctrine of resignation proceeds\nin theory to this extent. Such a notion of the purpose of prayer leads\nto a cheerful acceptance of the effects of physical laws, effects which\nan enlightened religious mind never asks to be altered in its favor, for\nthe promises and aims of religion should be wholly outside the arena of\ntheir operation. The ideal prayer has quite other objects than to work\nmaterial changes.\n\nTo say, as does Mr. Hodgson, that its aim is the increase of the joyful\nemotions is far from sufficient. The same may be said of most human\neffort, the effort to make money, for instance. The indirect object of\nmoney-making is also the increase of the agreeable feelings. The\nsimilarity of purpose might lead to a belief that the aims of religion\nand business are identical.\n\nBefore we can fully decide on what, in the specifically religious sense\nof the word, is the answer to prayer, we should inquire as a matter of\nfact what effect it actually exerts, and to do this we should understand\nwhat it is as a psychological process. The reply to this is that prayer,\nin its psychological definition, is a form of Expectant Attention. It is\nalways urged by religious teachers that it must be very earnest and\ncontinuous to be successful. \u201cImportunity is of the essence of\nsuccessful prayer,\u201d says Canon Liddon in a recent sermon. In the New\nTestament it is likened to a constant knocking at a door; and by a\ncurious parity of thought the Chinese character for prayer is composed\nof the signs for a spirit and an axe or hammer.[129-1] We must \u201ckeep\nhammering\u201d as a colloquial phrase has it. Strong belief is also\nrequired. To pray with faith we must expect with confidence.\n\nNow that such a condition of expectant attention, prolonged and earnest,\nwill have a very powerful subjective effect, no one acquainted with the\nfunctions of the human economy can doubt. \u201cAny state of the body,\u201d\nobserves the physiologist M\u00fcller, \u201cexpected with certain confidence is\nvery prone to ensue.\u201d A pill of bread-crumbs, which the patient supposes\nto contain a powerful cathartic, will often produce copious evacuations.\nNo one who studies the history of medicine can question that scrofulous\nswellings and ulcerations were cured by the royal touch, that paralytics\nhave regained the use of their limbs by touching the relics of the\nsaints, and that in many countries beside Judea the laying on of hands\nand the words of a holy man have made issues to heal and the lame to\nwalk.[130-1]\n\nSuch effects are not disputed by physicians as probable results of\nprayer or faith considered as expectant attention. The stigmata of St.\nFrancis d\u2019Assisi are more than paralleled by those of Louise Lateau, now\nliving at Bois d\u2019Haine in Belgium, whose hands, feet and side bleed\nevery Friday like those of Christ on the cross. A commission of medical\nmen after the most careful precautions against deception attributed\nthese hemorrhages to the effect of expectation (prayer) vastly\nincreased in force by repetition.[131-1] If human testimony is worth\nanything, the cures of Porte Royale are not open to dispute.[131-2]\n\nThe mental consequences of a prayerful condition of mind are to inspire\npatience under afflictions, hope in adversity, courage in the presence\nof danger and a calm confidence in the face of death itself. How\nmightily such influences have worked in history is shown in every\nreligious war, and in the lives of the martyrs of all faiths. It matters\nnot what they believed, so only that they believed it thoroughly, and\nthe gates of Hades could not prevail against them.\n\nNo one will question that these various and momentous results are the\nlegitimate effects or answers to prayers. But whether prayer can\ninfluence the working of the material forces external to the individual\nis a disputed point. If it cannot in some way do this, prayers for rain,\nfor harvests, for safety at sea, for restoration to health, for delivery\nfrom grasshoppers[131-3] and pestilence, whether for our own benefit or\nothers, are hardly worth reciting. A physicist expresses the one opinion\nin these words: \u201cScience asserts that without a disturbance of natural\nlaw, quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of\nthe St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation,\nindividual or national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect\ntoward us a single beam of the sun.\u201d \u201cAssuming the efficacy of free\nprayer to produce changes in external nature, it necessarily follows\nthat natural laws are more or less at the mercy of man\u2019s\nvolition.\u201d[132-1]\n\nThis authoritative statement, much discussed at the time it was\npublished, does not in fact express the assertion of science. To the\nscientific apprehension, man\u2019s volitions and his prayers are states of\nemotion, inseparably connected in their manifestations with changes in\nhis cerebral structure, with relative elevation of temperature, and with\nthe elimination of oxygen and phosphorus, in other words with\nchemico-vital phenomena and the transformation of force. Science also\nadds that there is a constant interaction of all force, and it is not\nprepared to deny that the force expended by a national or individual\nprayer may become a co-operating cause in the material change asked\nfor, even if the latter be a rain shower. This would not affect a\nnatural law but only its operation, and that much every act of our life\ndoes. The fact that persistency and earnestness in prayer--_i. e._, the\nincreased development of force--add to its efficacy, would accord with\nsuch a scientific view. It would further be very materially corroborated\nby the accepted doctrine of the orders of force. A unit of electrical or\nmagnetic force equals many of the force of gravity; a number of\nelectrical units are required to make one of chemical force; and\nchemico-vital or \u201cmetabolic\u201d force is still higher; whereas thought\nregarded as a form of force must be vastly beyond this again.\n\nTo render a loadstone, which lifts filings of iron by its magnetic\nforce, capable of doing the same by the force of gravity, its density\nwould have to be increased more than a thousand million times. All\nforces differ in like degree. Professor Faraday calculated that the\nforce latent in the chemical composition of one drop of water, equals\nthat manifested in an average thunderstorm. In our limited knowledge of\nthe relation of forces therefore, a scientific man is rash to deny that\nthe chemico-vital forces set loose by an earnest prayer may affect the\noperation of natural laws outside the body as they confessedly do in\nit.\n\nExperience alone can decide such a question, and I for one, from theory\nand from observation, believe in the material efficacy of prayer. In a\ncertain percentage of the cases where the wished-for material result\nfollowed, the physical force of the active cerebral action has seemed to\nme a co-operating cause. A physician can observe this to best advantage\nin the sickness of children, as they are free from subjective bias,\ntheir constitutions are delicately susceptible, and the prayers for them\nare in their immediate vicinity and very earnest.\n\nBut this admission after all is a barren one to the truly devout mind.\nThe effect gained does not depend on the God to whom the prayer is\noffered. Blind physical laws bring it about, and any event that comes\nthrough their compulsive force is gelded of its power to fecundate the\ngerms of the better religious life. The knowledge of this would paralyze\nfaith.\n\nFurther to attenuate the value of my admission, another consideration\narises, this time prompted not by speculative criticism, but by\nreverence itself. A scholar whom I have already quoted justly observes:\n\u201cWhenever we prefer a request as a means of obtaining what we wish for,\nwe are not praying in the religious sense of the term.\u201d[134-1] Or, as a\nrecent theologian puts the same idea: \u201cEvery true prayer prays to be\nrefused, if the granting of it would be hurtful to us or subversive of\nGod\u2019s glory.\u201d[135-1] The real answer to prayer can never be an event or\noccurrence. Only in moments of spiritual weakness and obscured vision,\nwhen governed by his emotions or sensations, will the reverent soul ask\na definite transaction, a modification in the operation of natural laws,\nstill less such vulgar objects as victory, wealth or health.\n\nThe prayer of faith finds its only true objective answer in itself, in\naccepting whatever befalls as the revelation of the will of God as to\nwhat is best. This temper of mind as the real meaning of prayer was\nbeautifully set forth by St. John: \u201cIf we know that he hear us,\nwhatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of\nhim.\u201d[135-2]\n\nBut this solution of the problem does not go far enough. Prayer is\nclaimed to have a positive effect on the mind other than resignation.\nJoyful emotions are its fruits, _spiritual enlightenment_ its reward.\nThese are more than cheerful acquiescence, nor can the latter come from\nobjects of sense.\n\nThe most eminent teachers agree in banishing material pleasure and\nprosperity from holy desires. They are of one mind in warning against\nwhat the world and the flesh can offer, against the pursuit of riches,\npower and lust. Many counsel poverty and deliberate renunciation of all\nsuch things. Nor is the happiness they talk of that which the pursuit of\nintellectual truth brings. This, indeed, confers joy, of which whoever\nhas tasted will not hastily return to the fleshpots of the senses, but\nit is easy to see that it is not religious. Prayer and veneration have\nnot a part in it. Great joy is likewise given by the exercise of the\nimagination when stirred by art in some of its varied forms, and a joy\nmore nearly allied to religion than is that of scientific investigation.\nBut the esthetic emotions are well defined, and are distinctly apart\nfrom those concerned with the religious sentiment. Their most complete\nsatisfaction rather excludes than encourages pious meditations. That\nwhich prayer ought to seek outside of itself is different from all of\nthese, its dower must be divine.\n\nWe need not look long for it. Though hidden from the wise, it has ever\nbeen familiar to the unlearned. Man has never been in doubt as to what\nit is. He has been only too willing to believe he has received it.\n\nIn barbarism and civilization, in the old and new worlds, the final\nanswer to prayer has ever been acknowledged to be _inspiration_,\nrevelation, the thought of God made clear to the mind of man, the\nmystical hypostasis through which the ideas of the human coincide with\nthose of universal Intelligence. This is what the Pythian priestess, the\nSiberian shaman, the Roman sibyl, the Voluspan prophetess, the Indian\nmedicine-man, all claimed in various degrees along with the Hebrew seers\nand the Mahometan teacher.[137-1]\n\nThe TRUTH, the last and absolute truth, is what is everywhere recognized\nas, if not the only, at least the completest, the highest answer to\nprayer. \u201cWhere I found the truth, there I found my God, himself the\ntruth,\u201d says St. Augustine; and in a prayer by St. Chrysostom, the\n\u201cGolden Mouth,\u201d unsurpassed in its grand simplicity, it is said:\n\u201cAlmighty Father, * * grant us in this world _knowledge of Thy truth_,\nand in the world to come, life everlasting.\u201d Never has the loftiest\npurpose of prayer been more completely stated. This it was that had been\npromised them by Him, to whom they looked as an Intercessor for their\npetitions, who had said: \u201cI will send unto you the Comforter. * * When\nhe, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you unto all truth.\u201d\n\nThe belief that this answer is at all times attainable has always been\nrecognized by the Christian Church, Apostolic, Catholic, and Protestant.\nBaptism was called by the Greek fathers, \u201cenlightenment\u201d (\u03a6\u03c9\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2), as\nby it the believer received the spirit of truth. The Romanist, in the\ndogma of infallibility, proclaims the perpetual inspiration of a living\nman; the Protestant Churches in many creeds and doctrinal works extend a\nsubstantial infallibility to all true believers, at least to the extent\nthat they can be inspired to recognize, if not to receive divine verity.\n\nThe Gallican Confession of Faith, adopted in 1561, rests the principal\nevidence of the truth of the Scriptures on \u201c_le t\u00e9moignage et\nl\u2019int\u00e9rieure persuasion du Saint Esprit_,\u201d and the Westminster\nConfession on \u201cthe inward work of the holy spirit.\u201d The Society of\nFriends maintain it as \u201ca leading principle, that the work of the Holy\nSpirit in the soul is not only immediate and direct, but perceptible;\u201d\nthat it imparts truth \u201cwithout any mixture of error;\u201d and thus is\nsomething quite distinct from conscience, which is common to the race,\nwhile this \u201cinward light\u201d is given only to the favored of God.[138-1]\n\nThe non-juror, William Law, emphatically says: \u201cThe Christian that\nrejects the necessity of immediate divine inspiration, pleads the whole\ncause of infidelity; he has nothing to prove the goodness of his own\nChristianity, but that which equally proves to the Deist the goodness of\nhis infidelity.\u201d[139-1] That by prayer the path of duty will be made\nclear, is a universal doctrine.\n\nThe extent to which the gift of inspiration is supposed to be granted is\nlargely a matter of church government. Where authority prevails, it is\napt to be confined to those in power. Where religion is regarded as\nchiefly subjective and individual, it is conceded that any pious votary\nmay become the receptacle of such special light.\n\nExperience, however, has too often shown that inspiration teaches such\ncontradictory doctrines that they are incompatible with any standard.\nThe indefinite splitting of Protestant sects has convinced all clear\nthinkers that the claim of the early Confessions to a divinely given\npower of distinguishing the true from the false has been a mistaken\nsupposition. As a proof to an unbeliever, such a gift could avail\nnothing; and as evidence to one\u2019s own mind, it can only be accepted by\nthose who deliberately shut their eyes to the innumerable contradictions\nit offers.[140-1]\n\nWhile, therefore, in this, if anywhere, we perceive the only at once fit\nand definite answer to prayer, and find that this is acknowledged by all\nfaiths, from the savage to the Christian, it would seem that this answer\nis a fallacious and futile one. The teachings of inspiration are\ninfinitely discrepant and contradictory, and often plainly world-wide\nfrom the truth they pretend to embody. The case seems hopeless; yet, as\nreligion of any kind without prayer is empty, there has been a proper\nunwillingness to adopt the conclusion just stated.\n\nThe distinction has been made that \u201cthe inspiration of the Christian is\naltogether _subjective_, and directed to the moral improvement of the\nindividual,\u201d[140-2] not to facts of history or questions of science,\neven exegetic science. The term _illumination_ has been preferred for\nit, and while it is still defined as \u201ca spiritual intelligence which\nbrings truth within the range of mental apprehension by a kind of\nintuition,\u201d[141-1] this truth has reference only to immediate matters of\nindividual faith and practice. The Roman church allows more latitude\nthan this, as it sanctions revelations concerning events, but not\nconcerning doctrines.[141-2]\n\nLooked at narrowly, the advantage which inspiration has been to\nreligions has not so much depended on what it taught, as on its strength\nas a psychological motive power. As a general mental phenomenon it does\nnot so much concern knowledge as belief; its province is to teach faith\nrather than facts. No conviction can equal that which arises from an\nassertion of God directly to ourselves. The force of the argument lies\nnot in the question whether he did address us, but whether we believe he\ndid. As a stimulus to action, prayer thus rises to a prime power.\n\nBelief is considered by Professor Bain and his school to be the ultimate\npostulate, the final ground of intellection. It is of the utmost\nimportance, however,--and this Professor Bain fails to do--to\ndistinguish between two kinds of belief. There are men who believe and\nothers who disbelieve the Koran or the Bible; I can accept or reject\nthe historical existence of King Arthur or Napoleon; but, if I\nunderstand them, I cannot disbelieve the demonstrations of Euclid, nor\nthe relations of subject and object, nor the formal laws of thought. No\nsane man, acquainted with the properties of numbers, can believe that\ntwice three are ten, or that a thing can be thought as other than\nitself. These truths that \u201cwe cannot help believing,\u201d I have defined in\nthe first chapter as absolute truths. They do not come to us through\ntestimony and induction, but through a process variously called\n\u201cimmediate perception,\u201d \u201capprehension,\u201d or \u201cintuition,\u201d a process long\nknown but never satisfactorily explained.\n\nAll such truths are analytic, that is, they are true, not merely for a\ngiven time or place, but at all times and places conceivable, or, time\nand space out of the question, they still remain formally true. Of\ncourse, therefore, they cannot refer to historic occurrences nor\nphenomena. The modern position, that truth lies in facts, must be\nforsaken, and with the ancients, we must place it in ideas.\n\nIf we define inspiration as that condition of mind which is in the\nhighest degree sensitive to the presence of such truth, we have of it\nthe only worthy idea which it is possible to frame. The object of\nscientific investigation is to reach a truth which can neither be denied\nnor doubted. If religion is willing to content itself with any lower\nform of truth, it cannot support its claims to respect, let alone\nreverence.\n\nIt may be said that the subjects with which the religious sentiment\nconcerns itself are not such as are capable of this absolute expression.\nThis is, however, disclaimed by all great reformers, and by none more\nemphatically than by him who said: \u201cHeaven and earth shall pass away,\nbut my statements (\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9) shall not pass away.\u201d There is clear reference\nhere to absolute truths. If what we know of God, duty and life, is not\ncapable of expression except in historic narrative and synthetic terms,\nthe sooner we drop their consideration the better. That form sufficed\nfor a time, but can no longer, when a higher is generally known. As the\nmathematical surpasses the historic truth, so the former is in turn\ntranscended by the purely logical, and in this, if anywhere, religion\nmust rest its claims for recognition. Here is the arena of the theology\nof the future, not in the decrees of councils, nor in the records of\npast time.\n\nInspiration, in its religious sense, we may, therefore, define to be\nthat condition of mind in which the truths relating to deity and duty\nbecome in whole or in part the subjects of immediate perception.\n\nThat such a condition is possible will be granted. Every reformer who\nhas made a permanent betterment in the religion of his time has\npossessed it in some degree. He who first conceived the Kosmos under\nlogical unity as an orderly whole, had it in singular power; so too had\nhe who looking into the mind became aware of its purposive laws which\nare the everlasting warrants of duty. Some nations have possessed it in\nremarkable fulness, none more so than the descendants of Abraham, from\nhimself, who left his kindred and his father\u2019s house at the word of God,\nthrough many eminent seers down to Spinoza, who likewise forsook his\ntribe to obey the inspirations vouchsafed him; surpassing them all,\nJesus of Nazareth, to whose mind, as he waxed in wisdom, the truth\nunfolded itself in such surpassing clearness that neither his immediate\ndisciples nor any generations since have fathomed all the significance\nof his words.\n\nSuch minds do not need development and organic transmission of thought\nto enrich their stores. We may suppose the organization of their brains\nto be so perfect that their functions are always accordant with true\nreasoning, so self-prompting, that a hint of the problem is all they ask\nto arrive at its demonstration. Blaise Pascal, when a boy of twelve,\nwhose education had been carefully restrained, once asked his father\nwhat is geometry. The latter replied that it is a method devised to draw\nfigures correctly, but forbade any further inquiry about it. On this\nhint Pascal, by himself, unassisted, without so much as knowing the name\nof a line or circle, reached in a few weeks to the demonstration of the\nthirty-second problem of the first book of Euclid! Is it not possible\nfor a mind equally productive of religious truth to surpass with no less\nease its age on such subjects?\n\nAs what Newton so well called \u201cpatient thought,\u201d constant application,\nprolonged attention, is the means on which even great minds must rely in\norder to reach the sempiternal verities of science, so earnest continued\nprayer is that which all teachers prescribe as the only avenue to\ninspiration in its religious sense. While this may be conceded,\ncollaterals of the prayer have too often been made to appear trivial and\nridiculous.\n\nIn the pursuit of inspiration the methods observed present an\ninteresting similarity. The votary who aspires to a communion with the\ngod, shuts himself out from the distraction of social intercourse and\nthe disturbing allurements of the senses. In the solitude of the forest\nor the cell, with complete bodily inaction, he gives himself to fasting\nand devotion, to a concentration of all his mind on the one object of\nhis wish, the expected revelation. Waking and sleeping he banishes all\nother topics of thought, perhaps by an incessant repetition of a\nformula, until at last the moment comes, as it surely will come in some\naccess of hallucination, furor or ecstasy, the unfailing accompaniments\nof excessive mental strain, when the mist seems to roll away from the\nmortal vision, the inimical powers which darkened the mind are baffled,\nand the word of the Creator makes itself articulate to the creature.\n\nTake any connected account of the revelation of the divine will, and\nthis history is substantially the same. It differs but little whether\ntold of Buddha Sakyamuni, the royal seer of Kapilavastu, or by Catherine\nWabose, the Chipeway squaw,[146-1] concerning the _Revelations_ of St.\nGertrude of Nivelles or of Saint Brigida, or in the homely language of\nthe cobbler George Fox.\n\nFor six years did Sakyamuni wander in the forest, practising the\nmortifications of the flesh and combatting the temptations of the\ndevil,before[TN-8] the final night when, after overcoming the crowning\nenticements of beauty, power and wealth, at a certain moment he became\nthe \u201cawakened,\u201d and knew himself in all his previous births, and with\nthat knowledge soared above the \u201cdivine illusion\u201d of existence. In the\ncave of Hari, Mohammed fasted and prayed until \u201cthe night of the divine\ndecisions;\u201d then he saw the angel Gabriel approach and inspire him:\n\n    \u201cA revelation was revealed to him:\n    One terrible in power taught it him,\n    Endowed with wisdom. With firm step stood he,\n    There, where the horizon is highest,\n    Then came he near and nearer,\n    A matter of two bowshots or closer,\n    And he revealed to his servant a revelation;\n    He has falsified not what he saw.\u201d[147-1]\n\nWith not dissimilar preparation did George Fox seek the \u201copenings\u201d which\nrevealed to him the hollowness of the Christianity of his day, in\ncontrast to the truth he found. In his _Journal_ he records that for\nmonths he \u201cfasted much, walked around in solitary places, and sate in\nhollow trees and lonesome places, and frequently in the night walked\nmournfully about.\u201d When the word of truth came to him it was of a\nsudden, \u201cthrough the immediate opening of the invisible spirit.\u201d Then a\nnew life commenced for him: \u201cNow was I come up in Spirit through the\nflaming sword into the Paradise of God. All things were new: all the\ncreation gave another smell unto me than before.\u201d The healing virtues of\nall herbs were straightway made known to him, and the needful truths\nabout the kingdom of God.[147-2]\n\nThese are portraitures of the condition of _entheasm_. Its lineaments\nare the same, find it where we may.\n\nHow is this similarity to be explained? Is it that this alleged\ninspiration is always but the dream of a half-crazed brain? The deep and\nreal truths it has now and then revealed, the noble results it has\noccasionally achieved, do not allow this view. A more worthy explanation\nis at hand.\n\nThese preliminaries of inspiration are in fact but a parody, sometimes a\ncaricature, of the most intense intellectual action as shown in the\nefforts of creative thought. The physiological characteristics of such\nmental episodes indicate a lowering of the animal life, the respiration\nis faint and slow, the pulse loses in force and frequency, the nerves of\nspecial sense are almost inhibited, the eye is fixed and records no\nimpression, the ear registers no sound, necessary motions are performed\nunconsciously, the condition approaches that of trance. There is also an\nalarming similarity at times between the action of genius and of\nmadness, as is well known to alienists.\n\nWhen the creative thought appears, it does so suddenly; it breaks upon\nthe mind when partly engaged with something else as an instantaneous\nflash, apparently out of connection with previous efforts. This is the\nhistory of all great discoveries, and it has been abundantly illustrated\nfrom the lives of inventors, artists, poets and mathematicians. The\nlinks of such a mental procedure we do not know. \u201cThe product of\ninspiration, genius, is incomprehensible to itself. Its activity\nproceeds on no beaten track, and we seek in vain to trace its footsteps.\nThere is no warrant for the value of its efforts. This it can alone\nsecure through voluntary submission to law. All its powers are centred\nin the energy of production, and none is left for idle watching of the\nprocess.\u201d[149-1]\n\nThe prevalent theory of the day is that this mental action is one\nessentially hidden from the mind itself. The name \u201cunconscious\ncerebration\u201d has been proposed for it by Dr. Carpenter, and he has amply\nand ably illustrated its peculiarities. But his theory has encountered\njust criticism, and I am persuaded does not meet the requirements of the\ncase. Whether at such moments the mind actually receives some impulse\nfrom without, as is the religious theory, or, as science more willingly\nteaches, certain associations are more easily achieved when the mind is\npartially engaged with other trains of ideas, we cannot be sure. We can\nonly say of it, in the words of Dr. Henry Maudsley, the result \u201cis truly\nan inspiration, coming we know not whence.\u201d Whatever it is, we recognize\nin it the original of that of which religious hallucination is the\ncounterfeit presentment. So similar are the processes that their\nliability to be confounded has been expressly guarded against.[150-1]\n\nThe prevalence of such caricatures does not prove the absence of the\nsterling article. They rather show that the mind is conscious of the\npossibility of reaching a frame or mood in which it perceives what it\nseeks, immediately and correctly. Buddhism distinctly asserts this to be\nthe condition of \u201cthe stage of intuitive insight;\u201d and Protestant\nChristianity commenced with the same opinion. Every prayer for guidance\nin the path of duty assumes it. The error is in applying such a method\nwhere it is incompatible, to facts of history and the phenomena of\nphysical force. Confined to the realm of ideas, to which alone the norm\nof the true and untrue is applicable, there is no valid evidence\nagainst, and many theoretical reasons for, respecting prayer as a fit\npsychological preparation for those obscure and unconscious processes,\nthrough which the mind accomplishes its best work.\n\nThe intellect, exalted by dwelling upon the sublimest subjects of\nthought, warmed into highest activity by the flames of devotion,\nspurning as sterile and vain the offers of time and the enticements of\nsense, may certainly be then in the mood fittest to achieve its greatest\nvictories. But no narrowed heaven must cloud it, no man-made god\nobstruct its gaze. Free from superstition and prejudice, it must be\nready to follow wherever the voice of reason shall lead it. All inspired\nmen have commenced by freeing themselves from inherited forms of Belief\nin order that with undiverted attention they might listen to the\npromptings of the divinity within their souls. One of the greatest of\nthem and one the most free from the charge of prejudice, has said that\nto this end prayer is the means.[151-1]\n\nHe who believes that the ultimate truth is commensurate with reason,\nfinds no stumbling-block in the doctrine that there may be laws through\nwhose action inspiration is the enlightenment of mind as it exists in\nman, by mind as it underlies the motions which make up matter. The truth\nthus reached is not the formul\u00e6 of the Calculus, nor the verbiage of the\nDialectic, still less the events of history, but that which gives what\nvalidity they have to all of these, and moreover imparts to the will and\nthe conscience their power to govern conduct.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[119-1] The \u201csilent worship\u201d of the Quakers is defended by the writers\nof that sect, on the ground that prayer is \u201coften very imperfectly\nperformed and sometimes materially interrupted by the use of words.\u201d\nJoseph John Gurney, _The Distinguishing Views and Practice of the\nSociety of Friends_, p. 300. (London, 1834.)\n\n[119-2] Creuzer, _Symbolik und Mythologie der alten V\u00f6lker_, Bd. I., s.\n162.\n\n[119-3] The learned Bishop Butler, author of the _Analogy of Religion_,\njustly gives prominence to \u201cour expectation of future benefits,\u201d as a\nreason for gratitude to God. _Sermons_, p. 155. (London, 1841.)\n\n[122-1] The expressions of Confucius\u2019 religious views may be found in\n_The Doctrine of the Mean_, chaps. xiii., xvi., the _Analects_, i., 99,\n100, vii., and in a few other passages of the canonical books.\n\n[126-1] _An Inquiry into the Theory of Practice_, p. 330.\n\n[127-1] _Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten V\u00f6lker._ Bd. I., ss. 165,\nsqq. One of the most favorable examples (not mentioned by Creuzer) is\nthe formula with which Apollonius of Tyana closed every prayer and gave\nas the summary of all: \u201cGive me, ye Gods, what I deserve\u201d--\u0394\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\n\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. The Christian\u2019s comment on this would be in the words of\nHamlet\u2019s reply to Polonius: \u201cGod\u2019s bodkin, man! use every man after his\ndesert and who should \u2019scape whipping?\u201d\n\n[128-1] Aurelii Augustini, _De Dono Perseveranti\u00e6_, cap. xx. Comte\nremarks \u201cDepuis St. Augustin toutes les \u00e2mes pures ont de plus en plus\nsenti, \u00e0 travers l\u2019\u00e9goisme Chr\u00e9tien, que prier peut n\u2019\u00eatre pas\ndemander.\u201d _Syst\u00e8me de Politique Positive_, I., p. 260. Popular\nProtestantism has retrograded in this respect.\n\n[129-1] Plath, _Die Religion und Cultus der alten Chineser_, s. 836.\nThis author observes that the Chinese prayers are confined to temporal\nbenefits only, and are all either prayers of petition or gratitude.\nPrayers of contrition are unknown.\n\n[130-1] Numerous examples can be found in medical text books, for\ninstance in Dr. Tuke\u2019s, _The Influence of the Mind on the Body_. London,\n1873.\n\n[131-1] The commission appointed by the Royal Academy of Medicine of\nBelgium on Louise Lateau reported in March, 1875, and most of the\nmedical periodicals of that year contain abstracts of its paper.\n\n[131-2] They may be found in the life of Pascal, written by his sister,\nand in many other works of the time.\n\n[131-3] It is worthy of note, as an exponent of the condition of\nreligious thought in 1875, that in May of that year the Governor of the\nState of Missouri appointed by official proclamation a day of prayer to\ncheck the advance of the grasshoppers. He should also have requested the\nclergy to pronounce the ban of the Church against them, as the Bishop of\nRheims did in the ninth century.\n\n[132-1] Tyndall, _On Prayer and Natural Law_, 1872.\n\n[134-1] S. M. Hodgson, _An Inquiry into the Theory of Practice_, pp.\n329, 330.\n\n[135-1] The Rev. Dr. Thomas K. Conrad, _Thoughts on Prayer_, p. 54: New\nYork, 1875.\n\n[135-2] I. John, v. 15. \u201cThere are millions of prayers,\u201d says Richard\nBaxter, \u201cthat will all be found answered at death and judgment, which we\nknow not to be answered any way but by believing it.\u201d _A Christian\nDirectory_, Part II. chap. xxiii.\n\n[137-1] \u201cSo wie das Gebet ein Hauptwurzel alter Lehre war, so war das\nDeuten und Offenbaren ihre urspr\u00fcngliche Form.\u201d Creuzer, _Symbolik und\nMythologie der alten V\u00f6lker_, Bd. I., s. 10. It were more accurate to\nsay that divination is the answer to, rather than a form of prayer.\n\n[138-1] Joseph John Gurney, _The Distinguishing Views and Practices of\nthe Society of Friends_, pp. 58, 59, 76, 78. An easy consequence of this\nview was to place the decrees of the internal monitor above the written\nword. This was advocated mainly by Elias Hicks, who expressed his\ndoctrine in the words: \u201cAs no spring can rise higher than its fountain,\nso likewise the Scriptures can only direct to the fountain whence they\noriginated--the Spirit of Truth.\u201d _Letters of Elias Hicks_, p. 228\n(Phila., 1861).\n\n[139-1] _Address to the Clergy_, p. 67.\n\n[140-1] See an intelligent note on this subject in the Rev. Wm. Lee\u2019s\nwork, entitled _The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures_, pp. 44, 47\n(London and New York, 1857).\n\n[140-2] Rev. William Lee, _u. s._, p. 243.\n\n[141-1] Blunt, _Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology_, s. v.\n\n[141-2] There is a carefully written essay on the views of the Romish\nChurch on this subject, preceding _The Revelations of Saint Brigida_ (N.\nY. 1875).\n\n[146-1] Chusco or Catherine Wabose, \u201cthe prophetess of Chegoimegon,\u201d has\nleft a full and psychologically most valuable account of her\ninspiration. It is published in Schoolcraft\u2019s _History and Statistics of\nthe Indian Tribes_, Vol. I., p. 390, sqq.\n\n[147-1] _The Koran_, Sura liii. This is in date one of the earliest\nsuras.\n\n[147-2] _The Journal of George Fox_, pp. 59, 67, 69.\n\n[149-1] Wilhelm von Humboldt, _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. iv., s. 278.\n\n[150-1] In his treatise _De Veritate_, itself the subject, as its author\nthought, of a special revelation, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, gives as one\nof the earmarks of a real revelation: \u201cut afflatum Divini numinis\nsentias, ita enim intern\u00e6 Facultatum circa veritatem operationes a\nrevelationibus externis distinguuntur.\u201d p. 226.\n\n[151-1] Spinoza, _Espistol\u00e6 et Responsionnes_, Ep. xxxiv.\n\n\n\n\nTHE MYTH AND THE MYTHICAL CYCLES.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     Myths are inspirations concerning the Unknown. Science treats them\n     as apperceptions of the relations of man and nature. Moments of\n     their growth, as treated by mythological science. Their similar\n     forms, explained variously, the topic of the philosophy of\n     mythology. The ante-mythical period. Myths have centred chiefly\n     around three subjects, each giving rise to a Mythical Cycle.\n\n     I. The Epochs of Nature.\n\n     The idea of Time led to the myth of a creation. This starting the\n     question, What was going on before creation? recourse was had to\n     the myth of recurrent epochs. The last epoch gave origin to the\n     Flood Myths; the coming one to that of the Day of Judgment.\n\n     II. The Paradise lost and to be re-gained.\n\n     To man, the past and the future are ever better than the present.\n     He imagines a Golden Age in the past and believes it will return.\n     The material Paradise he dreams of in his ruder conditions, becomes\n     a spiritual one with intellectual advancement. The basis of this\n     belief.\n\n     III. The Hierarchy of the Gods.\n\n     The earliest hierarchy is a dual classification of the gods into\n     those who help and those who hinder the fruition of desire. Light\n     and darkness typify the contrast. Divinity thus conceived under\n     numerical separateness. Monotheisms do not escape this. The triune\n     nature of single gods. The truly religious and only philosophic\n     notion of divinity is under logical, not mathematical unity. This\n     discards mythical conceptions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE MYTH AND THE MYTHICAL CYCLES.\n\n\nReturning again to the definition of the elemental religious\nsentiment--\u201ca Wish whose fruition depends upon unknown power\u201d--it\nenables us to class all those notions, opinions and narratives, which\nconstitute mythologies, creeds and dogmas, as theories respecting the\nnature and action of the unknown power. Of course they are not\nrecognized as theories. They arise unconsciously or are received by\ntradition, oral or written, and always come with the stamp of divinity\nthrough inspiration and revelation. None but a god can tell the secrets\nof the gods.\n\nTherefore they are the most sacred of all things, and they partake of\nthe holiness and immutability which belong to the unknown power itself.\nTo misplace a vowel point in copying the sacred books was esteemed a sin\nby the Rabbis, and a pious Mussulman will not employ the same pen to\ncopy a verse of the Koran and an ordinary letter. There are many\nChristians who suppose the saying: \u201cHeaven and earth shall pass away,\nbut My Words shall not pass away,\u201d has reference to the words of the Old\nand New Testament. \u201cWhat shall remain to us,\u201d asked Ananda, the disciple\nof Buddha, \u201cwhen thou shalt have gone hence into Nirvana?\u201d \u201cMy Word\n(_dharma_),\u201d replied the Master. Names thus came to be as holy as the\nobjects to which they referred. So sacred was that of Jehovah to the\nIsraelites that its original sound was finally lost. Such views are\nconsistent enough to the Buddhist, who, assuming all existence to be but\nimaginary, justly infers that the name is full as much as the object.\n\nThe science of mythology has made long strides in the last half century.\nIt has left far behind it the old euphemeristic view that the myth is a\ndistorted historical tradition, as well as the theories not long since\nin vogue, that it was a system of natural philosophy, a device of shrewd\nrulers, or as Bacon thought, a series of \u201cinstructive fables.\u201d The\nprimitive form of the myth is now recognized to be made up from the\nnotions which man gains of the manifestations of force in external\nnature, in their supposed relations to himself. In technical language it\nmay be defined as _the apperception of man and nature under synthetic\nconceptions_.[156-1]\n\nThis primitive form undergoes numerous changes, to trace and illustrate\nwhich, has been the special task assumed by the many recent writers on\nmythology. In some instances these changes are owing to the blending of\nthe myth with traditions of facts, forming a quasi-historical narrative,\nthe _saga;_ in others, elaborated by a poetic fancy and enriched by the\nimagination, it becomes a fairy tale, the _m\u00e4rchen_. Again, the myth\nbeing a product of creative thought, existing in words only, as language\nchanges, it alters through forgetfulness of the earlier meanings of\nwords, through similarities in sounds deceiving the ear, or through a\nconfusion of the literal with the metaphorical signification of the same\nword. The character of languages also favors or retards such changes,\npliable and easily modified ones, such as those of the American Indians,\nand in a less degree those of the Aryan nations, favoring a developed\nmythology, while rigid and monosyllabic ones, as the Chinese and Semitic\ntypes, offer fewer facilities to such variations. Furthermore, tribal or\nnational history, the peculiar difficulties which retard the growth of\na community, and the geographical and climatic character of its\nsurroundings, give prominence to certain features in its mythology, and\nto the absence of others. Myths originally diverse are blended, either\nunconsciously, as that of the Roman Saturn with the Greek Cronus; or\nconsciously, as when the medieval missionaries transferred the deeds of\nthe German gods to Christian saints. Lastly, the prevailing temperament\nof a nation, its psychology, gives a strong color to its mythical\nconceptions, and imprints upon them the national peculiarities.\n\nThe judicious student of mythology must carefully weigh all these\nformative agents, and assign each its value. They are all present in\nevery mythology, but in varying force. His object is accomplished when\nhe can point out the causal relation between the various features of a\nmyth and these governing agencies.\n\nSuch is the science of mythology. The philosophy of mythology undertakes\nto set forth the unities of form which exist in various myths, and\nputting aside whatever of this uniformity is explainable historically,\nproposes to illustrate from what remains the intellectual need myths\nwere unconsciously framed to gratify, to measure their success in this\nattempt, and if they have not been wholly successful, to point out why\nand in what respect they have failed. In a study preliminary to the\npresent one, I have attempted to apply the rules of mythological science\nto the limited area of the native American race; in the present chapter\nI shall deal mainly with the philosophy of mythology.\n\nThe objection may be urged at starting that there is no such unity of\nform in myths as the philosophy of mythology assumes; that if it\nappears, it is always explainable historically.\n\nA little investigation sets this objection aside. Certain features must\nbe common to all myths. A divinity must appear in them and his doings\nwith men must be recorded. A reasonable being can hardly think at all\nwithout asking himself, \u201cWhence come I, my fellows, and these things\nwhich I see? And what will become of us all?\u201d So some myth is sure to be\ncreated at an early stage of thought which the parent can tell the\nchild, the wise man his disciple, containing responses to such\nquestions.\n\nBut this reasoning from probability is needless, for the similarity of\nmythical tales in very distant nations, where no hypothesis of ancient\nintercourse is justified, is one of the best ascertained and most\nstriking discoveries of modern mythological investigation.[159-1] The\ngeneral character of \u201csolar myths\u201d is familiar to most readers, and the\npersistency with which they have been applied to the explanation of\ngenerally received historical facts, as well as to the familiar fairy\ntales of childhood, has been pushed so far as to become the subject of\nsatire and caricature. The myths of the Dawn have been so frequently\nbrought to public notice in the popular writings of Professor Max\nM\u00fcller, that their general distribution may be taken as well known. The\nsame may be said of the storm myths. Wilhelm von Humboldt, who thought\ndeeply on the religious nature of man, said early in this century:\n\u201cWholly similar myths can very readily arise in different localities,\neach independent of the others.\u201d[160-1]\n\nThis similarity is in a measure owing to the similar impressions which\nthe same phenomenon, the sunrise or the thunder-storm for instance,\nmakes on the mind--and to this extent the science of mythology is\nadequate to its explanation. But that it falls short is so generally\nacknowledged, that various other explanations have been offered.\n\nThese may be classed as the skeptical explanation, which claims that the\nlikeness of the myths is vastly exaggerated and much more the work of\nthe scholar at his desk than of the honest worshipper; the historical\nexplanation, which suggests unrecorded proselytisms, forgotten\ncommunications and the possible original unity of widely separated\nnations; the theological explanations, often discrepant, one suggesting\ncaricatures of the sacred narrative inspired by the Devil, another\nreminiscences of a primeval inspiration, and a third the unconscious\ntestimony of heathendom to orthodoxy;[161-1] and lastly the metaphysical\nexplanation, which seems at present to be the fashionable one, expressed\nnearly alike by Steinthal and Max M\u00fcller, which cuts the knot by\ncrediting man with \u201can innate consciousness of the Absolute,\u201d or as\nRenan puts it, \u201ca profound instinct of deity.\u201d\n\nThe philosophy of mythology, differing from all these, finding beyond\nquestion similarities which history cannot unriddle, interprets them by\nno incomprehensible assumption, but by the identity of the laws of\nthought acting on similar impressions under the guidance of known\ncategories of thought. Nor does it stop here, but proceeds to appraise\nthese results by the general scheme of truth and error. It asks for\nwhat psychological purpose man has so universally imagined for himself\ngods--pure creations of his fancy;--whether that purpose can now or will\nultimately be better attained by an exercise of his intellect more in\naccordance with the laws of right reasoning; and thus seeking to define\nthe genuine food of the religious desire, estimates the quality and\nvalue of each mythological system by the nearness of its approach to\nthis standard.\n\nThe philosophy of mythology, starting with the wish or prayer as the\nunit of religious thought, regards all myths as theories about the\nunknown power which is supposed to grant or withhold the accomplishment\nof the wish. These theories are all based upon the postulate of the\nreligious sentiment, that there is order in things; but they differ from\nscientific theories in recognizing volition as an efficient cause of\norder.\n\nThe very earliest efforts at religious thought do not rise to the\nformation of myths, that is, connected narratives about supernatural\nbeings. All unknown power is embraced under a word which does not convey\nthe notion of personality; single exhibitions of power which threaten\nman\u2019s life are supposed to be the doings of an unseen person, often of a\ndeceased man, whose memory survives; but any general theory of a\nhierarchy, or of the world or man, is not yet visible. Even such\nimmature notions are, however, so far as they go, framed within the\ncategory of causality; only, the will of the god takes the place of all\nother force. This stage of religious thought has been called Animism, a\nname which does not express its peculiarity, which is, that all force is\nnot only supposed to proceed from mind, but through what metaphysicians\ncall \u201cimmanent volition,\u201d that is, through will independent of relation.\nMind as \u201cemanant volition,\u201d in unison with matter and law, the \u201cseat of\nlaw,\u201d to use an expression of Professor Boole\u2019s, may prove the highest\nconception of force.\n\nAs the slowly growing reason reached more general notions, the law which\nprescribes unity as a condition of thought led man early in his history\nto look upon nature as one, and to seek for some one law of its changes;\nthe experience of social order impressed him with the belief that the\nunseen agencies around him also bore relations to each other, and\nacknowledged subjection to a leader; and the pangs of sickness, hunger\nand terror to which he was daily exposed, and more than all the \u201clast\nand greatest of all terribles, death,\u201d which he so often witnessed,\nturned his early meditations toward his own origin and destiny.\n\nAround these three subjects of thought his fancy busied itself, striving\nto fabricate some theory which would solve the enigmas which his reason\neverywhere met, some belief which would relieve him from the haunting\nhorror of the unknown. Hence arose three great cycles of myths, which\nrecur with strangely similar physiognomies in all continents and among\nall races. They are the myths of the Epochs of Nature, the Hierarchy of\nthe Gods, and of the Paradise lost but to be regained. Wherever we turn,\nwhether to the Assyrian tablets or to the verses of the Voluspa, to the\ncrude fancies of the red man of the new world or the black man of the\nAfrican plateau, to the sacred books of the modern Christian or of the\nancient Brahman, we find these same questions occupying his mind, and in\nmeaning and in form the same solutions proffered. Through what\nintellectual operations he reached these solutions, and their validity,\nas tested by the known criteria of truth, it is the province of the\nphilosophy of mythology to determine.\n\nLet us study the psychological growth of the myth of the Epochs of\nNature. This tells of the World, its beginning, its convulsions and its\nending, and thus embraces the three minor cycles of the cosmogonical,\nthe cataclysmal and the eschatological myths.\n\nNature is known to man only as _force_, which manifests itself in\n_change_. He is so constituted that \u201cthe idea of an event, a change,\nwithout the idea of a cause, is impossible\u201d to him. But in passing from\nthe occurrence to its cause the idea of Time is unavoidable; it presents\nitself as the one inevitable condition of change; itself unwearing, it\nwears out all else; it includes all existence, as the greater does the\nless; and as \u201ccausation is necessarily within existence,\u201d[165-1] time is\nbeyond existence and includes the nonexistent as well. Whatever it\ncreates, it also destroys; and as even the gods are but existences, it\nwill swallow them. It renders vain all pleasures, and carries the balm\nof a certain oblivion for all woes.\n\nThis oppressive sense of time, regarded not in its real meaning as one\nof the conditions of perception, but as an active force destroying\nthought as well as motion, recurs continually in mythology. To the\nGreek, indefinite time as Cronos, was the oldest of the gods, begetting\nnumberless children, but with unnatural act consuming them again; while\ndefinite time, as the Hor\u00e6, were the blithe goddesses of the order in\nnature and the recurrent seasons. Osiris, supreme god of the Egyptians,\nwas born of a yet older god, Sev, Time. Adonis and Aeon acknowledge the\nsame parentage.[165-2] The ancient Arab spoke of time (_dahr_, _zaman_)\nas the final, defining principle; as uniting and separating all things;\nand as swallowing one thing after another as the camel drains the water\nfrom a trough.[166-1] In the Koran it is written: \u201cTime alone destroys\nus.\u201d Here and there, through the sacred songs of the Parsees, composed\nlong before Aristotle wrote, beyond all the dust and noise of the\neverlasting conflict of good and evil, of Ahura Mazda and Anya-Mainyus,\nthere are glimpses of a deeper power, Zeruana Akerana, Eternal Duration,\nunmoved by act or thought, in the face of which these bitter opponents\nare seen to be children, brethren, \u201ctwin sons of Time.\u201d[166-2] The\nAlexandrian Gnostics, in their explanations of Christian dogmas,\nidentify Aeon, infinite time, with God the Father, as the source and\nfount of existence; not merely as a predicate of the highest, but the\nHighest himself.\n\nThis heavy-weighing sense of the infinity of duration, and the urgency\nof escaping from the weariness of thinking it, led to the construction\nof the myth of the Creation. Man devised it so that he might be able to\nsay, \u201cin the beginning.\u201d But a new difficulty met him at the\nthreshold--as change must be in existence, \u201cwe cannot think of a change\nfrom non-existence to existence.\u201d His only refuge was to select some\napparently primordial, simple, homogeneous substance from which, by the\nexertion of volition, things came into being. The one which most\nnaturally suggested itself was _water_.[167-1] This does in fact cover\nand hide the land, and the act of creation was often described as the\nemerging of the dry land from the water; it dissolves and wears away the\nhard rock; and, diminishing all things, itself neither diminishes nor\nincreases. Therefore nearly all cosmogonical myths are but variations of\nthat one familiar to us all: \u201cAnd God said, Let the waters under the\nheaven be gathered together in one place, and let the dry land appear;\nand it was so.\u201d The manifestation of the primordial energy was supposed\nto have been akin to that which is shown in organic reproduction. The\nmyths of the primeval egg from which life proceeded, of the mighty bird\ntypical of the Holy Spirit which \u201cbrooded\u201d upon the waters, of Love\ndeveloping the Kosmos from the Chaos, of the bull bringing the world\nfrom the waters, of Protogonus, the \u201cegg-born,\u201d the \u201cmultispermed,\u201d and\ncountless others, point to the application of one or the other, or of\nboth these explanations.[167-2]\n\nIn them the early thinkers found some rest: but not for long. The\nperplexity of the presence of this immediate order of things seemed\nsolved; but another kept obtruding itself: what was going on before that\n\u201cbeginning?\u201d Vain to stifle the inquiry by replying, \u201cnothing.\u201d[168-1]\nFor time, which knows no beginning, was there, still building, still\ndestroying; nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it. What\nthen is left but the conclusion of the Preacher: \u201cThat which hath been,\nis now; and that which is to be, hath already been?\u201d Regarding time as a\nform of force, the only possible history of the material universe is\nthat it is a series of destructions and restorations, force latent\nevolving into force active or energy, and this dissipated and absorbed\nagain into latency.\n\nExpressed in myths, these destructions and restorations are the Epochs\nof Nature. They are an essential part of the religious traditions of the\nBrahmans, Persians, Parsees, Greeks, Egyptians, Jews, Mexicans, Mayas,\nand of all nations who have reached a certain stage of culture. The\nlength of the intervening periods may widely differ. The kalpa or great\nyear of the Brahmans is so long that were a cube of granite a hundred\nyards each way brushed once in a century by a soft cloth, it would be\nquite worn to dust before the kalpa would close: or, as some Christians\nbelieve, there may be but six thousand years, six days of God in whose\nsight \u201ca thousand years are as one day,\u201d between the creation and the\ncremation of the world, from when it rose from the waters until it shall\nbe consumed by the fire.\n\nThere were also various views about the agents and the completeness of\nthese periodical destructions. In the Norse mythology and in the\ndoctrine of Buddhism, not one of the gods can survive the fire of the\nlast day. Among the Greeks, great Jove alone will await the appearance\nof the virgin world after the icy winter and the fiery summer of the\nGreat Year. The Brahmans hold that the higher classes of gods outlive\nthe wreck of things which, at the close of the day of Brahm, involves\nall men and many divinities in elemental chaos; while elsewhere, in the\nlater Puranas and in the myths of Mexico, Peru, and Assyria, one or a\nfew of the race of man escape a deluge which is universal, and serve to\npeople the new-made earth. This latter supposition, in its application\nto the last epoch of nature, is the origin of the myth of the Flood.\n\nIn its general features and even in many details, the story of a vast\noverflow which drowned the world, and from which by the timely succor\nof divinity some man was preserved, and after the waters had subsided\nbecame the progenitor of the race, is exceedingly common among distant\ntribes, where it is impossible to explain it as a reminiscence of a\nhistoric occurrence, or by community of religious doctrine. In Judea\nNoah, in India Manu, in Chaldea Xisuthrus, in Assyria Oannes, in Aztlan\nNata, in Algonkin tradition Messou, in Brazil Monan, etc., are all\nheroes of similar alleged occurrences. In all of them the story is but a\nmodification of that of the creation in time from the primeval\nwaters.[170-1]\n\n\u201cAs it was once, so it shall be again,\u201d and as the present age of the\nworld wears out, the myth teaches that things will once more fall back\nto universal chaos. \u201cThe expectation of the end of the world is a\nnatural complement to the belief in its periodical destructions.\u201d It is\ntaught with distinctness by all religious systems, by the prophetess in\nthe Voluspa, by the Hebrew seers,[171-1] by the writer of the\nApocalypse, by the Eastern sages, Persian and Indian, by the Roman\nSibyl, and among the savage and semi-civilized races of the New World.\n\nOften that looked for destruction was associated with the divine plans\nfor man. This was an addition to the simplicity of the original myth,\nbut an easy and a popular one. The Indian of our prairies still looks\nforward to the time when the rivers shall rise, and submerging the land\nsweep from its surface the pale-faced intruders, and restore it to its\noriginal owners. Impatient under the ceaseless disappointments of life,\nand worn out with the pains which seem inseparable from this condition\nof things, the believer gives up his hopes for this world, and losing\nhis faith in the final conquest of the good, thinks it only attainable\nby the total annihilation of the present conditions. He looks for it,\ntherefore, in the next great age, in the new heaven and the new earth,\nwhen the spirit of evil shall be bound and shut up, and the chosen\npeople possess the land, \u201cand grow up as calves of the stall.\u201d[172-1]\n\nThis is to be inaugurated by the Day of Judgment, \u201cthe day of wrath, the\ndreadful day,\u201d in which God is to come in his power and pronounce his\nfinal decrees on those who have neglected the observance due him. The\nmyth, originally one relating to the procession of natural forces, thus\nassumed with the increasing depth of the religious sentiment more and\nmore a moral and subjective coloring, until finally its old and simple\nform was altogether discarded, or treated as symbolic only.\n\nThe myth of the Epochs of Nature was at first a theory to account for\nthe existing order of nature. For a long time it satisfied the inquiring\nmind, if not with a solution at least with an answer to its queries.\nAfter geologic science had learned to decipher the facts of the world\u2019s\ngrowth as written on the stones which orb it, the religious mind fondly\nidentified the upheavals and cataclysms there recorded with those which\nits own fancy had long since fabricated. The stars and suns, which the\nold seer thought would fall from heaven in the day of wrath, were seen\nto be involved in motions far beyond the pale of man\u2019s welfare, and,\ntherefore, the millennial change was confined to the limits of our\nplanet. Losing more and more of its original form as an attempted\nexplanation of natural phenomena, the myth now exists in civilized\nnations as an allegorical type of man\u2019s own history and destiny, and\nthus is slowly merging into an episode of the second great cycle of the\nmythus, that of the Paradise lost and regained. It, too, finds its\ninterpretation in psychology.\n\nBroadly surveying the life of man, philosophers have found in it much\nmatter fit either for mockery or tears. We are born with a thirst for\npleasure; we learn that pain alone is felt. We ask health; and having\nit, never notice it till it is gone. In the ardent pursuit of enjoyment,\nwe waste our capacity of appreciation. Every sweet we gain is sauced\nwith a bitter. Our eyes forever bent on the future, which can never be\nours, we fritter away the present, which alone we possess. Ere we have\ngot ourselves ready to live, we must die. Fooling ourselves even here,\nwe represent death as the portal to joy unspeakable; and forthwith\ndiscredit our words by avoiding it in every possible way.\n\nPitiable spectacle of weakness and folly, is it capable of any\nexplanation which can redeem man from the imputation of unreason? Is\nWisdom even here justified of her children by some deeper law of being?\n\nThe theologian explains it as the unrest of the soul penned in its house\nof clay; the physiologist attributes it to the unceasing effort of\norganic functions to adapt themselves to ever varying external\nconditions. They are both right, for the theologian, were his words\ntranslated into the language of science, refers to the _effort to adapt\ncondition to function_, which is the peculiar faculty of intelligence,\nand which alone renders man unable to accept the comfort of merely\nanimal existence, an inability which he need never expect to outlive,\nfor it will increase in exact proportion to his mental development.\nAction, not rest, as I have elsewhere said, must be his ideal of life.\n\nIn even his lowest levels man experiences this dissatisfaction. It may\nthere be confined to a pain he would be free from, or a pleasure he\ndreams of. Always the future charms him, and as advancing years increase\nthe number of his disappointments and bring with them the pains of\ndecrepitude, he also recurs to the past, when youth was his, and the\nworld was bright and gay. Thus it comes that most nations speak of some\nearlier period of their history as one characterized by purer public\nvirtues than the present, one when the fires of patriotism burned\nbrighter and social harmony was more conspicuous. In rude stages of\nsociety this fancy receives real credit and ranks as a veritable record\nof the past, forming a Golden Age or Saturnian Era. Turned in the\nkaleidoscope of the mythus, it assumes yet more gorgeous hues, and\nbecomes a state of pure felicity, an Eden or a Paradise, wherein man\ndwelt in joy, and from which he wandered or was driven in the old days.\n\nIt is almost needless to quote examples to show the wide distribution of\nthis myth. The first pages of the Vendidad describe the reign of Yima in\n\u201cthe garden of delight,\u201d where \u201cthere was no cold wind nor violent heat,\nno disease and no death.\u201d The northern Buddhist tells of \u201cthe land of\njoy,\u201d Sukhavati, in the far west, where ruled Amitabha, \u201cinfinite\nLight.\u201d[175-1] The Edda wistfully recalls the pleasant days of good King\nGudmund who once held sway in Odainsakr, where death came not.[175-2]\nPersian story has glad reminiscences of the seven hundred years that\nJemschid sat on the throne of Iran, when peace and plenty were in the\nland.\n\nThe garden \u201ceastward in Eden\u201d of the Pentateuch, the land of Tulan or\nTlapallan in Aztec myth, the islands of the Hesperides, the rose garden\nof Feridun, and a score of other legends attest with what strong\nyearning man seeks in the past the picture of that perfect felicity\nwhich the present never yields.\n\nNor can he be persuaded that the golden age has gone, no more to return.\nIn all conditions of progress, and especially where the load of the\npresent was the most wearying, has he counted on a restoration to that\npast felicity. The paradise lost is to be regained. How it is to be done\nthe sages are not agreed. But they of old were unanimous that some\ndivinity must lend his aid, that some god-sent guide is needed to rescue\nman from the slough of wretchedness in which he hopelessly struggles.\n\nTherefore in the new world the red men looked for the ruler who had\ngoverned their happy forefathers in the golden age, and who had not died\nbut withdrawn mysteriously from view, to return to them, protect them,\nand insure them long bliss and ease. The ancient Persians expected as\nmuch from the coming of Craoshan\u00e7; the Thibetan Buddhists look to the\nadvent of a Buddha 5000 years after Sakyamuni, one whose fortunate names\nare Ma\u00eetr\u00eaya, the Loving one, and Adjita, the Unconquerable;[176-1] and\neven the practical Roman, as we learn from Virgil, was not a stranger to\nthis dream. Very many nations felt it quite as strongly as the\nIsraelites, who from early time awaited a mighty king, the Messiah, the\nAnointed, of whom the Targums say: \u201cIn his days shall peace be\nmultiplied;\u201d \u201cHe shall execute the judgment of truth and justice on the\nearth;\u201d \u201cHe shall rule over all kingdoms.\u201d\n\nThe early forms of this conception, such as here referred to, looked\nforward to an earthly kingdom, identified with that of the past when\nthis was vigorous in the national mythology. Material success and the\nutmost physical comfort were to characterize it. It was usually to be a\nnational apotheosis, and was not generally supposed to include the human\nrace, though traces of this wider view might easily be quoted from\nAvestan, Roman, and Israelitic sources. Those who were to enjoy it were\nnot the dead, but those who shall be living.\n\nAs the myth grew, it coalesced with that of the Epochs of Nature, and\nassumed grander proportions. The deliverer was to come at the close of\nthis epoch, at the end of the world; he was to embrace the whole human\nkind in his kingdom; even those who died before his coming, if they had\nobeyed his mandates, should rise to join the happy throng; instead of a\nmere earthly king, he should be a supernatural visitant, even God\nhimself; and instead of temporal pleasures only, others of a spiritual\ncharacter were to be conferred. There are reasons to believe that even\nin this developed form the myth was familiar to the most enlightened\nworshippers of ancient Egypt; but it was not till some time after the\ndoctrines of Christianity had been cast into mythical moulds by the\noriental fancy, that it was introduced in its completed form to modern\nthought. Although expressly repudiated by Jesus of Nazareth himself, and\napplied in maxim and parable as a universal symbol of intelligence to\nthe religious growth of the individual and race, his followers reverted\nto the coarser and literal meaning, and ever since teach to a greater or\nless extent the chiliastic or millennial dogma, often mathematically\ncomputing, in direct defiance of his words, the exact date that event is\nto be expected.\n\nIf we ask the psychological construction of this myth, and the ever\npresent conditions of man\u2019s life which have rendered him always ready to\ncreate it and loath to renounce it, we trace the former distinctly to\nhis sense of the purposive nature of the laws of thought, and the latter\nto the wide difference between desire and fulfilment. His intellectual\nnature is framed to accord with laws which are ever present but are not\nauthoritative; they admonish but they do not coerce; _that_ is done\nsurely though oft remotely by the consequences of their violation. At\nfirst, unaware of the true character of these laws, he fancies that if\nhe were altogether comfortable physically, his every wish would be\ngratified. Slowly it dawns upon him that no material gratification can\nsupply an intellectual craving; that this is the real want which haunts\nhim; and that its only satisfaction is _to think rightly_, to learn the\ntruth. Then he sees that the millennial kingdom is \u201cnot of this world;\u201d\nthat heaven and earth may pass away, but that such truth as he seeks\ncannot pass away; and that his first and only care should be as a\nfaithful and wise servant to learn and revere it.\n\nThe sentiments which created this mythical cycle, based as they are now\nseen to be on ultimate psychological laws, are as active to-day as ever.\nThis century has witnessed the rise of a school of powerful thinkers and\ntrue philanthropists who maintained that the noblest object is the\nsecuring to our fellow-men the greatest material comfort possible; that\nthe religious aspirations will do well to content themselves with this\ngospel of humanity; and that the approach of the material millennium,\nthe perfectibility of the human race, the complete adaptation of\nfunction to condition, the \u201cdistant but not uncertain final victory of\nGood,\u201d[179-1] is susceptible of demonstration. At present, these views\nare undergoing modification. It is perceived with more or less\ndistinctness that complete physical comfort is not enough to make a man\nhappy; that in proportion as this comfort is attained new wants develope\nthemselves, quite as importunate, which ask what material comfort\ncannot give, and whose demand is neither for utility nor pleasurable\nsensation. Such wants are created by the sense of duty and the love of\ntruth.\n\nThe main difference between the latest exponents of the utilitarian\ndoctrines and the heralds of distinctively religious thought, is that\nthe former consider that it is most important in the present condition\nof man for him to look after his material welfare; while the latter\nteach that if he first subject thought and life to truth and duty, \u201call\nthese things will be added unto him.\u201d Wordsworth has cast this latter\nopinion, and the myths which are its types, into eloquent verse:\n\n                        \u201cParadise and groves\n    Elysian, Fortunate Fields--like those of old\n    Sought in the Atlantic main, why should they be\n    A history only of departed things,\n    Or a mere fiction of what never was?\n    For the discerning intellect of man,\n    When wedded to this goodly universe\n    In love and holy passion, shall find these\n    A simple produce of the common day.\u201d\n\nThe incredulity and even derision with which the latter doctrine is\nreceived by \u201cpractical men,\u201d should not affright the collected thinker,\nas it certainly is not so chimerical as they pretend. The writer De\nSenancourt, not at all of a religious turn, in speculating on the\nshortest possible road to general happiness, concluded that if we were\nable to foretell the weather a reasonable time ahead, and if men would\nmake it a rule to speak the truth as near as they can, these two\nconditions would remove nine-tenths of the misery in the world. The\nmore carefully I meditate on this speculation, the better grounded it\nseems. The weather we are learning to know much more about than when the\nsolitary Obermann penned his despondent dreams; but who shall predict\nthe time when men will tell the truth?\n\nI now pass to the third great mythical cyclus, which I have called that\nof the Hierarchy of the Gods. This was created in order to define that\nunknown power which was supposed to give to the wish frustration or\nfruition. It includes every statement in reference to the number,\nnature, history and character of supernatural beings.\n\nThe precise form under which the intellect, when the religious\nconception of unknown power first dawns upon it, imagines this unknown,\nis uncertain. Some have maintained that the earliest religions are\nanimal worships, others that the spirits of ancestors or chiefs are the\nprimitive gods. Local divinities and personal spirits are found in the\nrudest culture, while simple fetichism, or the vague shapes presented by\ndreams, play a large part in the most inchoate systems. The prominence\nof one or the other of these elements depends upon local and national\nmomenta, which are a proper study for the science of mythology, but need\nnot detain us here. The underlying principle in all these conceptions of\ndivinity is that of the _res per accidens_, an accidental relation of\nthe thought to the symbol, not a general or necessary one. This is seen\nin the nature of these primitive gods. They have no decided character as\npropitious or the reverse other than the objects they typify, but are\nsupposed to send bad or good fortune as they happen to be pleased or\ndispleased with the votary. No classification as good and evil deities\nis as yet perceptible.\n\nThis undeveloped stage of religious thought faded away, as general\nconceptions of man and his surroundings arose. Starting always from his\nwish dependent on unknown control, man found certain phenomena usually\nsoothed his fears and favored his wishes, while others interfered with\ntheir attainment and excited his alarm. This distinction, directly\nfounded on his sensations of pleasure and pain, led to a general, more\nor less rigid, classification of the unknown, into two opposing classes\nof beings, the one kindly disposed, beneficent, good, the other\nuntoward, maleficent, evil.\n\nAt first this distinction had in it nothing of a _moral_ character. It\nis in fact a long time before this is visible, and to-day but two or\nthree religions acknowledge it even theoretically. All, however, which\nclaim historical position set up a dual hierarchy in the divine realms.\nAhura-mazda and Anya-mainyus, God and Satan, Jove and Pluto, Pachacamac\nand Supay, Enigorio and Enigohatgea are examples out of hundreds that\nmight be adduced.\n\nThe fundamental contrast of pleasure and pain might be considered enough\nto explain this duality. But in fact it is even farther reaching. The\nemotions are dual as well as the sensations, as we have seen in the\nfirst chapter. All the operations of the intellect are dichotomic, and\nin mathematical logic must be expressed by an equation of the second\ndegree. Subject and object must be understood as polar pairs, and in\nphysical science polarization, contrast of properties corresponding to\ncontrast of position, is a universal phenomenon. Analogy, therefore,\nvindicates the assumption that the unknown, like the known, is the field\nof the operation of contradictory powers.\n\nA variety of expression is given this philosophic notion in myths. In\nEgypt, Syria, Greece and India the contrast was that of the sexes, the\nmale and female principles as displayed in the operations of nature. The\ntype of all is that very ancient Phrygian cult in which by the side of\nMa, mother of mountains and mistress of herds, stood Papas, father of\nthe race of shepherds and inventor of the rustic pipe.[183-1] Quite\ncharacteristic was the classification of the gods worshipped by the\nminers and metal workers of Phrygian Ida. This was into right and left,\nand the general name of Dactyli, Fingers, was given them. The right gods\nbroke the spells which the left wove, the right pointed out the ore\nwhich the left had buried, the right disclosed the remedies for the\nsickness which the left had sent. This venerable division is still\nretained when we speak of a _sinister_ portent, or a _right_ judgment.\nIt is of physiological interest as showing that \u201cdextral pre-eminence\u201d\nor right-handedness was prevalent in earliest historic times, though it\nis unknown in any lower animal.\n\nThe thoughtful dwellers in Farsistan also developed a religion close to\nman\u2019s wants by dividing the gods into those who aid and those who harm\nhim, subject the one class to Ahura-Mazda, the other to Anya-Mainyus.\nEarly in their history this assumed almost a moral aspect, and there is\nlittle to be added to one of the most ancient precepts of their\nlaw--\u201cHappiness be to the man who conduces to the happiness of\nall.\u201d[184-1]\n\nWhen this dual classification sought expression through natural\ncontrasts, there was one which nigh everywhere offered itself as the\nmost appropriate. The savage, the nomad, limited to the utmost in\nartificial contrivances, met nothing which more signally aided the\naccomplishment of his wishes than _light_; nothing which more certainly\nfrustrated them than _darkness_. From these two sources flow numerous\nmyths, symbols, and rites, as narratives or acts which convey religious\nthought to the eye or the ear of sense.\n\nAs the bringers of light, man adored the sun, the dawn, and fire;\nassociated with warmth and spring, his further meditations saw in it the\nsource of his own and of all life, and led him to connect with its\nworship that of the reproductive principle. As it comes from above, and\nseems to dwell in the far-off sky, he located there his good gods, and\nlifted his hands or his eyes when he prayed. As light is necessary to\nsight, and as to see is to know, the faculty of knowing was typified as\nenlightenment, an inward god-given light. The great and beneficent\ndeities are always the gods of light. Their names often show this. Deva,\nDeus, means the shining one; Michabo, the great white one; the Mongols\ncall Tien, the chief Turanian god, the bright one, the luminous one; the\nnorthern Buddhist prays to Amitabha, Infinite Light; and the Christian\nto the Light of the World.\n\nOn the other hand, darkness was connected with feelings of helplessness\nand terror. It exposed him to attacks of wild beasts and all accidents.\nIt was the precursor of the storm. It was like to death and the grave.\nThe realm of the departed was supposed to be a land of shadows, an\nunderground region, an unseeing Hades or hell.\n\nThe task would be easy to show many strange corroborations of these\nearly chosen symbols by the exacter studies of later ages. Light, as the\nindispensable condition of life, is no dream, but a fact; sight is the\nhighest sentient faculty; and the luminous rays are real intellectual\nstimulants.[186-1] But such reflections will not escape the\ncontemplative reader.\n\nI hasten to an important consequence of this dual classification of\ndivinities. It led to what I may call the _quantification of the gods_,\nthat is, to conceiving divinity under notions of number or quantity, a\nstep which has led to profound deterioration of the religious sentiment.\nI do not mean by this the distinction between polytheism and monotheism.\nThe latter is as untrue and as injurious as the former, nor does it\ncontain a whit the more the real elements of religious progress.\n\nIt is indeed singular that this subject has been so misunderstood. Much\nhas been written by Christian theologians to show the superiority of\nmonotheisms; and by their opponents much has been made of Comte\u2019s _loi\ndes trois \u00e9tats_, which defines religious progress to be first\nfetichism, secondly polytheism, finally monotheism. Of this Mr. Lewes\nsays: \u201cThe theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which\nit is capable when it substituted the providential action of a single\nbeing, for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had\nbefore been imagined.\u201d[187-1] Nothing could be more erroneous than the\nspirit of this statement; nothing is more correct, if the ordinary talk\nof the superiority of monotheism in religion be admitted.\n\nHistory and long experience show that monotheistic religions have no\nspecial good effect either on the morals or the religious sensibility of\nraces.[187-2] Buddhism,[187-3] Mohammedanism and Judaism are, at least\nin theory, uncompromising monotheisms; modern Christianity is less so,\nas many Catholics pray to the Virgin and Saints, and many Protestants to\nChrist. So long as _the mathematical conception of number_, whether one\nor many, is applied to deity by a theological system, it has not yet\n\u201carrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable.\u201d\n\nFor let us inquire what a monotheism is? It is a belief in one god as\ndistinct from the belief in several gods. In other words, it applies to\nGod the mathematical concept of unity, a concept which can only come\ninto cognition by virtue of contrasts and determinations, and which\nforces therefore the believer either to Pantheism or anthropomorphism to\nreconcile his belief with his reason. No other resource is left him.\nWith monotheism there must always be the idea of numerical separateness,\nwhich is incompatible with universal conceptions.\n\nLet him, however, clear his mind of the current admiration for\nmonotheisms, and impress upon himself that he who would form a\nconception of supreme intelligence must do so under the rules of pure\nthought, not numerical relation. The logical, not the mathematical,\nunity of the divine is the perfection of theological reasoning. Logical\nunity does not demand a determination by contrasts; it conveys only the\nidea of identity with self. As the logical attainment of truth is the\nrecognition of identities in apparent diversity, thus leading from the\nlogically many to the logically one, the assumption of the latter is\neminently justified. Every act of reasoning is an additional proof of\nit.[188-1]\n\nNor does the duality of nature and thought, to which I have alluded, in\nany wise contradict this. In pure thought we must understand the\ndichotomic process to be the distinction of a positive by a privative,\nboth logical elements of the same thought, as I have elsewhere shown.\nThe opposites or contraries referred to as giving rise to the dualistic\nconceptions of divinity are thus readily harmonized with the conception\nof logical unity. This was recognized by the Hindoo sage who composed\nthe Bhagavad Git\u00e0, early in our era. Krishna, the Holy One, addressing\nthe King Ardjuna says: \u201cAll beings fall into error as to the nature of\ncreation, O Bharata, by reason of that delusion of natural opposites\nwhich springs from liking and disliking, oh thou tormentor of thy\nfoes!\u201d[189-1]\n\nThe substitution of the conception of mathematical for logical unity in\nthis connection has left curious traces in both philosophy and religion.\nIt has led to a belief in the triplicate nature of the supreme Being,\nand to those philosophical triads which have often attracted thinkers,\nfrom Pythagoras and Heraclitus down to Hegel and Ghiberti.\n\nPythagoras, who had thought profoundly on numbers and their relations,\nis credited with the obscure maxim that every thought is made up of a\ndefinite one and an indefinite two (a \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 and an \u03b1\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c5\u03b1\u03c2). Some\nof his commentators have added to rather than lessened the darkness of\nthis saying. But applied to concrete number, it seems clear enough. Take\nany number, ten, for example, and it is ten by virtue of being a _one_,\none ten, and because on either side counting upward or downward, a\ndifferent number appears, which two are its logical determinants, but,\nas not expressed, make up an _indefinite two_.\n\nSo the number one, thought as concrete unity, is really a trinity, made\nup of its definite self and its indefinite next greater and lesser\ndeterminants. The obscure consciousness of this has made itself felt in\nmany religions when they have progressed to a certain plane of thought.\nThe ancient Egyptian gods were nearly all triune; Phanes, in the Orphic\nhymns the first principle of things, was tripartite; the Indian\ntrinities are well known; the Celtic triads applied to divine as well as\nhuman existence; the Jews distinguished between Jehovah, his Wisdom and\nhis Word; and in Christian religion and philosophy the doctrine of the\ntrinity, though nowhere taught by Christ, has found a lasting foothold,\nand often presents itself as an actual tritheism.[190-1]\n\nThe triplicate nature of number, thus alluded to by Pythagoras, springs\nfrom the third law of thought, and holds true of all concrete notions.\nEvery such notion stands in necessary relation to its privative, and to\nthe logical concept of next greater extension, _i. e._, that which\nincludes the notion and its privative, as I explained in the first\nchapter. This was noted by the early Platonists, who describe a certain\nconcrete expression of it as \u201cthe intelligential triad;\u201d and it has been\nrepeatedly commented upon by later philosophers, some of whom avowedly\nderive from it the proof of the trinitarian dogma as formulated by\nAthanasius. Even modern mathematical investigations have been supposed\nto point to a _Deus triformis_, though of course quite another one from\nthat which ancient Rome honored. A late work of much ability makes the\nstatement: \u201cThe doctrine of the Trinity, or something analogous to it,\nforms, as it were, the avenue through which the universe itself leads us\nup to the conception of the Infinite and Eternal One.\u201d[191-1] The\nexplanation of this notion is the same as that of the \u201cTrinity of the\nGentiles,\u201d always hitherto a puzzling mythological concept.\n\nFor reasons previously given, an analysis of the formal law itself does\nnot yield these elements. They belong to a certain class of values\nassigned it, not to the law itself; hence it is only when deity is\nconceived under the conditions of numerical oneness that the tripartite\nconstitution of a whole number makes itself felt, and is applied to the\ndivine nature.\n\nThe essence of a logical unit is identity, of a mathematical,\ndifference. The qualities of the latter are limitations--_so much of a\nthing_; those of the former are coincidences--_that kind of a thing_.\n\nTo be sure it is no easy matter to free ourselves from the habit of\nconfounding identity and individuality. We must cultivate a much greater\nfamiliarity with the forms of thought, and the character of universals,\nthan every-day life requires of us, before the distinction grows facile.\nThe individual, not the species, exists; our own personality, our\nthinking faculty is what we are most certain of. On it rests the reality\nof everything, the Unknown as well. But the rejection of a mathematical\nunity does not at all depreciate the force of such an argument.\nIndividuality regarded as mathematical unity rests on the deeper law of\nlogical identity from which the validity of numbers rises; it is not\nthe least diminished, but intensified, in the conception of a Supreme\nIntelligence, as the font of truth, though the confinements and\nlimitations of the mathematical unit fall away, and all contrasts\ndisappear.\n\nThe reverse conception, however, has prevailed in religious systems,\npolytheistic or monotheistic. Man has projected on the cloudy unknown\nthe magnified picture of his own individuality and shuddered with terror\nat the self-created plantasm,[TN-9] like the peasant frightened by the\nspectre of the Brocken, formed by the distorted image of himself. In his\nhappier moments, with his hopes gratified, the same vice of thought,\nstill active, prevented him from conceiving any higher ideal than his\nbetter self. \u201cEverywhere the same tendency was observed; the gods,\nalways exaggerations of human power and passions, became more and more\npersonifications of what was most admirable and lovable in human nature,\ntill in Christianity there emerged the avowed ideal man.\u201d What could it\nend in but anthropomorphism, or pantheism, or, rejecting both, a\nReligion of Humanity, with a background of an imbecile Unknowable?\n\nIs it necessary to point out how none of these conclusions can satisfy\nthe enlightened religious sentiment? How anthropomorphism,which[TN-10]\nmakes God in the image of man, instead of acknowledging that man is\nmade in the image of God, belittles divinity to a creature of passions\nand caprices? How pantheism, increasing God at the expense of man, wipes\nout the fundamental difference of true and false, calls bad \u201cgood in the\nmaking,\u201d and virtually extinguishes the sense of duty and the permanence\nof personality? And how the denial of all possible knowledge of the\nabsolute digs away the only foundation on which sanity can establish a\nreligion, and then palms off material comfort as the proper food for\nreligious longing?\n\nThe long story of religious effort is not from fetichism to monotheism,\nas Comte read it; nor is its only possible goal inside the limits of the\nego, as Feuerbach and the other Neo-Hegelians assert; but it is on its\ntheoretical side to develope with greater and greater distinctness the\nimmeasurable reality of pure thought, to dispense more and more with the\nquantification of the absolute, and to avoid in the representation of\nthat Being the use of the technic of concrete existence.\n\nLittle by little we learn that the really true is never true in fact,\nthat the really good is never good in act.[194-1] Carefully cherishing\nthis distinction taught by mathematics and ethics, the religious mind\nlearns to recognize in that only reality darkly seen through the glass\nof material things, that which should fix and fill its meditations.\nPassing beyond the domain of physical law, it occupies itself with that\nwhich defines the conditions of law. It contemplates an eternal\nactivity, before which its own self-consciousness seems a flickering\nshadow, yet in that contemplation is not lost but gains an evergrowing\npersonality.\n\nThis is the goal of religious striving, the hidden aim of the wars and\npersecutions, the polemics and martyrdoms, which have so busied and\nbloodied the world. This satisfies the rational postulates of religion.\nDoes some one say that it does not stimulate its emotional elements,\nthat it does not supply the impulses of action which must ever be the\ncriteria of the true faith? Is it not a religion at all, but a\nphilosophy, a search, or if you prefer, a love for the truth?\n\nLet such doubter ponder well the signification of truth, its relation to\nlife, its identity with the good, and the paramount might of wisdom and\na clear understanding, and he will be ready to exclaim with the\npassionate piety of St. Augustine: \u201c_Ubi inveni veritatem, ibi inveni\nDeum meum, ipsam veritatem, quam, ex quo didici, non sum oblitus._\u201d\n\nFrom this brief review of its character, the Myth will be seen to be one\nof the transitory expressions of the religious sentiment, which in\nenlightened lands it has already outgrown and should lay aside. So far\nas it relates to events, real or alleged, historic or geologic, it deals\nwith that which is indifferent to pure religion; and so far as it\nassumes to reveal the character, plans and temper of divinity, it is too\nevidently a reflex of man\u2019s personality to be worthy of serious\nrefutation where it conflicts with the better guide he has within him.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[156-1] In this definition the word _apperception_ is used in the sense\nassigned it by Professor Lazarus--the perception modified by imagination\nand memory. \u201cMythologie ist eine Apperceptionsform der Natur und des\nMenschen.\u201d (_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, Bd. i., s. 44). Most\nrecent mythologists omit the latter branch of the definition; for\ninstance, \u201cA myth is in its origin an explanation by the uncivilized\nmind of some natural phenomenon.\u201d (John Fiske, _Myths and Myth Makers_,\np. 21). This is to omit that which gives the myth its only claim to be a\nproduct of the religious sentiment. Schopenhauer, in calling dogmas and\nmyths \u201cthe metaphysics of the people,\u201d fell into the same error.\nReligion, as such, is always concrete.\n\n[159-1] Half a century ago the learned Mr. Faber, in his _Origin of\nPagan Idolatry_, expressed his astonishment at \u201cthe singular, minute and\nregular accordance\u201d between the classical myths. That accordance has now\nbeen discovered to be world-wide.\n\n[160-1] \u201cGanz gleiche Mythen k\u00f6nnen sehr f\u00fcglich, jede selbstst\u00e4ndig, an\nverschiedenen Oerter emporkommen.\u201d _Briefe an Woelcker._\n\n[161-1] The last two are the modern orthodox theories, supported by\nBryant, Faber, Trench, De Maistre and Sepp. Medieval Christianity\npreferred the direct agency of the Devil. Primitive Christianity leaned\nto the opinion that the Grecian and Roman myth makers had stolen from\nthe sacred writings of the Jews.\n\n[165-1] Sir Wm. Hamilton, _Lectures on Metaphysics_. Appendix, p. 691.\n\n[165-2] Creuzer, _Symbolik und Mythologie_, Bd. ii., s. 107.\n\n[166-1] Th. N\u00f6ldeke, _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, Bd. iii., s.\n131.\n\n[166-2] See a note of Prof. Spiegel to Ya\u00e7na, 29, of the _Khordah-Avesta_.\n\n[167-1] \u1f29 \u03c5\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n  Plutarch, _De Iside_.\n\nAccording to the Koran and the Jewish Rabbis, the throne of God rested\non the primeval waters from which the earth was produced. See a note in\nRodwell\u2019s translation of the Koran, _Sura_. xi.\n\n[167-2] I have discussed some of these myths in the seventh chapter of\nthe _Myths of the New World_.\n\n[168-1] How it troubled the early Christians who dared not adopt the\nrefuge of the Epochs of Nature, may be seen in the _Confessions_ of St.\nAugustine, Lib. XI, cap. 10, et seq. He quotes the reply of one pushed\nby the inquiry, what God was doing before creation: \u201cHe was making a\nhell for inquisitive busy-bodies.\u201d _Alta spectantibus gehennas parabat._\n\n[170-1] Many interesting references to the Oriental flood-myth may be\nfound in Cory\u2019s _Ancient Fragments_. See also, Dr. Fr. Windischmann,\n_Die Ursagen der Arischen V\u00f6lker_, pp. 4-10. It is probable that in very\nancient Semitic tradition Adam was represented as the survivor of a\nflood anterior to that of Noah. Maimonides relates that the Sabians\nbelieved the world to be eternal, and called Adam \u201cthe Prophet of the\nMoon,\u201d which symbolized, as we know from other sources, the deity of\nwater. Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, _More Nevochim_, cap. iv. In early\nChristian symbolism Christ was called \u201cthe true Noah\u201d; the dove\naccompanied him also, and as through Noah came \u201csalvation by wood and\nwater,\u201d so through Christ came \u201csalvation by spirit and water.\u201d (See St.\nCyril of Jerusalem\u2019s _Catechetical Lectures_, Lect. xvii., cap. 10). The\nfish (\u03b9\u03c7\u03b8\u03c5\u03c2) was the symbol of Christ as well as of Oannes. As the\nsecond coming of Christ was to be the destruction of the world, how\nplainly appear the germs of the myth of the Epochs of Nature in the\nJud\u00e6o-Christian mind!\n\n[171-1] Besides the expressions in the Book of Ecclesiastes and the\nlater prophets, the doctrine is distinctly announced in one of the most\nsublime of the Psalms (xc), one attributed to \u201cMoses the Man of God.\u201d\n\n[172-1] Malachi, ch. iv., v. 2.\n\n[175-1] C. F. Koppen, _Die Lamaische Hierarchie_, s. 28.\n\n[175-2] Odainsakr, \u00f4 privative, _dain_ death, _akr_ land, \u201cthe land of\nimmortal life.\u201d Saxo Grammaticus speaks of it also. Another such land\nfaintly referred to in the Edda is Breidablick, governed by Baldur, the\nLight-god.\n\n[176-1] C. F. Koppen, _Die Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche_, p. 17.\n\n[179-1] John Stuart Mill, _Theism_, p. 256.\n\n[183-1] Creuzer, _Symbolik und Mythologie_, Bd. II., s. 47\n\n[184-1] This is the first line of Ya\u00e7na, 42, of the _Khordah-Avesta_.\nThe Parsees believe that it is the salutation which meets the soul of\nthe good on entering the next world.\n\n[186-1] \u201cSight is the light sense. Through it we become acquainted with\nuniversal relations, this being _reason_. Without the eye there would be\nno reason.\u201d Lorenz Oken, _Elements of Physio-Philosophy_, p. 475.\n\n[187-1] _History of Philosophy_, Vol. II. p. 638 (4th ed.)\n\n[187-2] \u201cThe intolerance of almost all religions which have maintained\nthe unity of God, is as remarkable as the contrary principle in\npolytheism.\u201d Hume, _Nat. Hist. of Religion_, Sec. ix.\n\n[187-3] \u201cThe Lamas emphatically maintain monotheism to be the real\ncharacter of Buddhism.\u201d Emil Schlagintweit, _Buddhism in Tibet_, p. 108.\n\n[188-1] No one has seen the error here pointed out, and its injurious\nresults on thought, more clearly than Comte himself. He is emphatic in\ncondemning \u201cle tendance involontaire \u00e0 constituer l\u2019unit\u00e9 sp\u00e9culative\npar l\u2019ascendant universel des plus grossi\u00e8res contemplations num\u00e9rique,\ngeom\u00e9trique ou m\u00e9caniques.\u201d _Syst\u00eame de Politique Positive_; Tome I., p.\n51. But he was too biassed to apply this warning to Christian thought.\nThe conception of the Universe in the logic of Professor De Morgan and\nBoole is an example of speculative unity.\n\n[189-1] _Bhagavad Git\u00e0_, ch. iv.\n\n[190-1] See the introduction by Mr. J. W. Etheridge to _The Targums of\nOnkelos and Jonathan Ben Uzziel_ (London, 1862). St. Augustine believed\nthe trinity is referred to in the opening verses of Genesis.\n_Confessiones_, Lib. xiii. cap. 5. The early Christian writer,\nTheophilus of Antioch (circa 225), in his _Apologia_, recognizes the\nJewish trinity only. It was a century later that the dogma was defined\nin its Athanasian form. See further, Isaac Preston Cory, _Ancient\nFragments, with an Inquiry into the Trinity of the Gentiles_ (London,\n1832).\n\n[191-1] _The Unseen Universe_, p. 194.\n\n[194-1] \u201cA good will is the only altogether good thing in the\nworld.\u201d--_Kant._ \u201cWhat man conceives in himself is always superior to\nthat reality which it precedes and prepares.\u201d--_Comte._\n\n\n\n\nTHE CULT, ITS SYMBOLS AND RITES.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     The Symbol represents the unknown; the Rite is the ceremony of\n     worship.\n\n     A symbol stands for the supernatural, an emblem for something\n     known. The elucidation of symbolism is in the laws of the\n     association of ideas. Associations of similarity give related\n     symbols, of contiguity coincident symbols. Symbols tend either\n     toward personification (iconolatry), or toward secularization. The\n     symbol has no fixed interpretation. Its indefiniteness shown by the\n     serpent symbol, and the cross. The physiological relations of\n     certain symbols. Their classification. The Lotus. The Pillar.\n     Symbols discarded by the higher religious thought. Esthetic and\n     scientific symbolism (the \u201cDoctrine of Correspondences\u201d).\n\n     Rites are either propitiatory or memorial. The former spring either\n     from the idea of sacrifice or of specific performance. A sacrifice\n     is a gift, but its measure is what it costs the giver. Specific\n     performance means that a religious act should have no ulterior aim.\n     Vicarious sacrifice and the idea of sin.\n\n     Memorial rites are intended to recall the myth, or else to keep up\n     the organization. The former are dramatic or imitative, the latter\n     institutionary. Tendency of memorial rites to become propitiatory.\n     Examples.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE CULT, ITS SYMBOLS AND RITES.\n\n\nAs the side which a religious system presents to the intellect is shown\nin the Myth, so the side that it presents to sense is exhibited in the\nCult. This includes the representation and forms of worship of the\nunknown power which presides over the fruition of the Prayer or\nreligious wish. The representation is effected by the Symbol, the\nworship by the Rite. The development of these two, and their relation to\nreligious thought, will be the subject of the present chapter.\n\nThe word Symbolism has a technical sense in theological writings, to\nwit, the discussion of creeds, quite different from that in which it is\nused in mythological science. Here it means the discussion of the\nnatural objects which have been used to represent to sense supposed\nsupernatural beings. As some conception of such beings must first be\nformed, the symbol is necessarily founded upon the myth, and must be\nexplained by it.\n\nA symbol is closely allied to an emblem, the distinction being that the\nlatter is intended to represent some abstract conception or concrete\nfact, not supposed to be supernatural. Thus the serpent is the emblem of\nEsculapius, or, abstractly, of the art of healing; but in its use as a\nsymbol in Christian art it stands for the Evil One, a supernatural\nbeing. The heraldric insignia of the Middle Ages were emblematic\ndevices; but the architecture of the cathedrals was largely symbolic.\nBoth agree in aiming to aid the imagination and the memory, and both may\nappeal to any special sense, although the majority are addressed to\nsight alone.\n\nSymbolism has not received the scientific treatment which has been so\nliberally bestowed on mythology. The first writer who approached it in\nthe proper spirit was Professor Creuzer.[200-1] Previous to his labors\nthe distinction between pictographic and symbolic art was not well\ndefined. He drew the line sharply, and illustrated it abundantly; but he\ndid not preserve so clearly the relations of the symbol and the myth.\nIndeed, he regarded the latter as a symbol, a \u201cphonetic\u201d one, to be\ntreated by the same processes of analysis. Herein later students have\nnot consented to follow him. The contrast between these two expressions\nof the religious sentiment becomes apparent when we examine their\npsychological origin. This Professor Creuzer did not include in his\nresearches, nor is it dwelt upon at any length in the more recent works\non the subject.[201-1] The neglect to do this has given rise to an\narbitrariness in the interpretation of many symbols, which has often\nobscured their position in religious history.\n\nWhat these principles are I shall endeavor to indicate; and first of the\nlaws of the origin of symbols, the rules which guided the early\nintellect in choosing from the vast number of objects appealing to sense\nthose fit to shadow forth the supernatural.\n\nIt may safely be assumed that this was not done capriciously, as the\nmodern parvenue makes for himself a heraldric device. The simple and\ndevout intellect of the primitive man imagined a real connection between\nthe god and the symbol. Were this questioned, yet the wonderful\nunanimity with which the same natural objects, the serpent, the bird,\nthe tree, for example, were everywhere chosen, proves that their\nselection was not the work of chance. The constant preference of these\nobjects points conclusively to some strong and frequent connection of\ntheir images with mythical concepts.\n\nThe question of the origin of symbols therefore resolves itself into one\nof the association of ideas, and we start from sure ground in applying\nto their interpretation the established canons of association. These, as\nI have elsewhere said, are those of contiguity and similarity, the\nformer producing association by the closeness of succession of\nimpressions or thoughts, the latter through impressions or thoughts\nrecalling like ones in previous experience. When the same occurrence\naffects different senses simultaneously, or nearly so, the association\nis one of _contiguity_, as thunder and lightning, for a sound cannot be\n_like_ a sight; when the same sense is affected in such a manner as to\nrecall a previous impression, the association is one of _similarity_, as\nwhen the red autumn leaves recall the hue of sunset. Nearness in time or\nnearness in kind is the condition of association.\n\nThe intensity or permanence of the association depends somewhat on\ntemperament, but chiefly on repetition or continuance. Not having an ear\nfor music, I may find it difficult to recall a song from hearing its\ntune; but by dint of frequent repetition I learn to associate them.\nLight and heat, smoke and fire, poverty and hunger so frequently occur\ntogether, that the one is apt to recall the other. So do a large number\nof antithetical associations, as light and darkness, heat and cold, by\n_inverse similarity_, opposite impressions reviving each other, in\naccordance with the positive and privative elements of a notion.\n\nThis brief reference to the laws of applied thought,--too brief, did I\nnot take for granted that they are generally familiar--furnishes the\nclue to guide us through the labyrinth of symbolism, to wit, the\nrepeated association of the event or power recorded in the myth with\nsome sensuous image. Where there is a connection in kind between the\nsymbol and that for which it stands, there is _related_ symbolism; where\nthe connection is one of juxtaposition in time, there is _coincident_\nsymbolism. Mother Earth, fertile and fecund, was a popular deity in many\nnations, and especially among the Egyptians, who worshipped her under\nthe symbol of a cow; this is related symbolism; the historical event of\nthe execution of Christ occurred by crucifixion, one of several methods\ncommon in that age, and since then the cross has been the symbol of\nChristianity; this is coincident symbolism. It is easy for the two to\nmerge, as when the cross was identified with a somewhat similar and much\nolder symbol, one of the class I have called \u201crelated,\u201d signifying the\nreproductive principle, and became the \u201ctree of life.\u201d As a coincident\nsymbol is to a certain extent accidental in origin, related symbols\nhave always been most agreeable to the religious sentiment.\n\nThis remark embodies the explanation of the growth of religious\nsymbolism, and also its gradual decay into decorative art and mnemonic\ndesign. The tendency of related symbolism is toward the identification\nof the symbol with that for which it stands, toward personification or\nprosopopeia; while what I may call the _secularization_ of symbols is\nbrought about by regarding them more and more as accidental connections,\nby giving them conventional forms, and treating them as elements of\narchitectural or pictorial design, or as aids to memory.\n\nThis tendency of related symbolism depends on a law of applied thought\nwhich has lately been formulated by a distinguished logician in the\nfollowing words: \u201cWhat is true of a thing, is true of its like.\u201d[204-1]\nThe similarity of the symbol to its prototype assumed, the qualities of\nthe symbol, even those which had no share in deciding its selection, no\nlikeness to the original, were lumped, and transferred to the divinity.\nAs those like by similarity, so those unlike, were identified by\ncontiguity, as traits of the unknown power. This is the active element\nin the degeneracy of religious idealism. The cow or the bull, chosen\nfirst as a symbol of creation or fecundity, led to a worship of the\nanimal itself, and a transfer of its traits, even to its horns, to the\ngod. In a less repulsive form, the same tendency shows itself in the\npietistic ingenuity of such poets as Adam de Sancto Victore and George\nHerbert, who delight in taking some biblical symbol, and developing from\nit a score of applications which the original user never dreamt of. In\nsuch hands a chance simile grows to an elaborate myth.\n\nCorrect thought would prevent the extension of the value of the symbol\nbeyond the original element of similarity. More than this, it would\nrecognize the fact that similarity does not suppose identity, but the\nreverse, to wit, defect of likeness; and this dissimilitude must be the\ngreater, as the original and symbol are naturally discrepant. The\nsupernatual,[TN-11] however, whether by this term we mean the unknown or\nthe universal--still more if we mean the incomprehensible--is utterly\ndiscrepant with the known, except by an indefinitely faint analogy. In\nthe higher thought, therefore, the symbol loses all trace of identity\nand becomes merely emblematic.\n\nThe ancients defended symbolic teaching on this very ground, that the\nsymbol left so much unexplained, that it stimulated the intellect and\ntrained it to profounder thinking;[205-1] practically it had the\nreverse effect, the symbol being accepted as the thing itself.\n\nPassing from these general rules of the selection of symbols, to the\nhistory of the symbol when chosen, this presents itself to us in a\nreciprocal form, first as the myth led to the adoption and changes in\nthe symbol, and as the latter in turn altered and reformed the myth.\n\nThe tropes and figures of rhetoric by which the conceptions of the\nsupernatural were first expressed, give the clue to primitive symbolism.\nA very few examples will be sufficient. No one can doubt that the figure\nof the serpent was sometimes used in pictorial art to represent the\nlightning, when he reads that the Algonkins _straightly_ called the\nlatter a snake; when he sees the same adjective, spiral or winding,\n(\u1f11\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2) applied by the Greeks to the lightning and a snake; when\nthe Quich\u00e9 call the electric flash a strong serpent; and many other such\nexamples. The Pueblo Indians represent lightning in their pictographs by\na zigzag line. A zigzag fence is called in the Middle States a worm or\n\u201csnake\u201d fence. Besides this, adjectives which describe the line traced\nby the serpent in motion are applied to many twisting or winding\nobjects, as a river, a curl or lock of hair, the tendrils of a vine, the\nintestines, a trailing plant, the mazes of a dance, a bracelet, a broken\nray of light, a sickle, a crooked limb, an anfractuous path, the\nphallus, etc. Hence the figure of a serpent may, and in fact has been,\nused with direct reference to every one of these, as could easily be\nshown. How short-sighted then the expounder of symbolism who would\nexplain the frequent recurrence of the symbol or the myth of the serpent\nwherever he finds it by any one of these!\n\nThis narrowness of exposition becomes doubly evident when we give\nconsideration to two other elements in primitive symbolism--the\nmultivocal nature of early designs, and the misapprehensions due to\ncontiguous association.\n\nTo illustrate the first, let us suppose, with Schwarz[207-1] and others,\nthat the serpent was at first the symbol of the lightning. Its most\nnatural representation would be in motion; it might then stand for the\nother serpentine objects I have mentioned; but once accepted as an\nacknowledged symbol, the other qualities and properties of the serpent\nwould present themselves to the mind, and the effort would be made to\ndiscover or to imagine likenesses to these in the electric flash. The\nserpent is venomous; it casts its skin and thus seems to renew its life;\nit is said to fascinate its prey; it lives in the ground; it hisses or\nrattles when disturbed: none of these properties is present to the mind\nof the savage who scratches on the rock a zigzag line to represent the\nlightning god. But after-thought brings them up, and the association of\ncontiguity can apply them all to the lightning, and actually has done so\nover and over again; and not only to it, but also to other objects\noriginally represented by a broken line, for example, the river gods and\nthe rays of light.\n\nThis complexity is increased by the ambiguous representation of symbolic\ndesigns. The serpent, no longer chosen for its motion alone, will be\nexpressed in art in that form best suited to the meaning of the symbol\npresent in the mind of the artist. Realism is never the aim of religious\nart. The zigzag line, the coil, the spiral, the circle and the straight\nline, are all geometrical radicals of various serpentine forms. Any one\nof these may be displayed with fanciful embellishments and artistic\naids. Or the artist, proceeding by synecdoche, takes a part for the\nwhole, and instead of portraying the entire animal, contents himself\nwith one prominent feature or one aspect of it. A striking instance of\nthis has been developed by Dr. Harrison Allen, in the prevalence of what\nhe calls the \u201ccrotalean curve,\u201d in aboriginal American art, a line which\nis the radical of the profile view of the head of the rattlesnake\n(_crotalus_).[208-1] This he has detected in the architectural monuments\nof Mexico and Yucatan, in the Maya phonetic scrip, and even in the rude\nefforts of the savage tribes. Each of these elective methods of\nrepresenting the serpent, would itself, by independent association,\ncall up ideas out of all connection whatever with that which the figure\nfirst symbolized. These, in the mind entertaining them, will supersede\nand efface the primitive meaning. Thus the circle is used in\nconventional symbolic art to designate the serpent; but also the eye,\nthe ear, the open mouth, the mamma, the sun, the moon, a wheel, the\nwomb, the vagina, the return of the seasons, time, continued life, hence\nhealth, and many other things. Whichever of these ideas is easiest\nrecalled will first appear on looking at a circle. The error of those\nwho have discussed mythological symbolism has been to trace a connection\nof such adventitious ideas beyond the symbol to its original meaning;\nwhereas the symbol itself is the starting-point. To one living in a\nregion where venomous serpents abound, the figure of one will recall the\nsense of danger, the dread of the bite, and the natural hostility we\nfeel to those who hurt us; whereas no such ideas would occur to the\nnative of a country where there are no snakes, or where they are\nharmless, unless taught this association.\n\nFew symbols have received more extended study than that of the cross,\nowing to its prominence in Christian art. This, as I have said, was\ncoincident or incidental only. It corresponded, however, to a current\n\u201cphonetic symbol,\u201d in the expression common to the Greeks and Romans of\nthat day, \u201cto take up one\u2019s cross,\u201d meaning to prepare for the worst, a\nmetaphor used by Christ himself.\n\nNow there is no agreement as to what was the precise form of the cross\non which he suffered. Three materially unlike crosses are each equally\nprobable. In symbolic art these have been so multiplied that now _two\nhundred and twenty-two_ variants of the figure are described![210-1] Of\ncourse there is nothing easier than to find among these similarities,\nwith many other conventional symbols, the Egyptian Tau, the Hammer of\nThor, the \u201cTree of Fertility,\u201d on which the Aztecs nailed their victims,\nthe crossed lines which are described on Etruscan tombs, or the logs\ncrossed at rectangles, on which the Muskogee Indians built the sacred\nfire. The four cardinal points are so generally objects of worship, that\nmore than any other mythical conception they have been represented by\ncruciform figures. But to connect these in any way with the symbol as it\nappears in Christian art, is to violate every scientific principle.\n\nEach variant of a symbol may give rise to myths quite independent of its\noriginal meaning. A symbol once adopted is preserved by its sacred\ncharacter, exists long as a symbol, but with ever fluctuating\nsignifications. It always takes that which is uppermost in the mind of\nthe votary and the congregation. Hence, psychology, and especially the\npsychology of races, is the only true guide in symbolic exegesis.\n\nNor is the wide adoption and preservation of symbols alone due to an\neasily noticed similarity between certain objects and the earliest\nconceptions of the supernatural, or to the preservative power of\nreligious veneration.\n\nI have previously referred to the associations of ideas arising from\nancestral reversions of memory, and from the principles of minimum\nmuscular action and harmonic excitation. Such laws make themselves felt\nunconsciously from the commencement of life, with greater or less power,\ndependent on the susceptibility of the nervous system. They go far\ntoward explaining the recurrence and permanence of symbols, whether of\nsight or sound. Thus I attribute the prevalence of the serpentine curve\nin early religious art largely to its approach to the \u201cline of beauty,\u201d\nwhich is none other than that line which the eye, owing to the\narrangement of its muscles, can follow with the minimum expenditure of\nnervous energy. The satisfaction of the mind in viewing symmetrical\nfigures or harmonious coloring, as also that of the ear, in hearing\naccordant sounds, is, as I have remarked, based on the principle of\nmaximum action with minimum waste. The mind gets the most at the least\ncost.\n\nThe equilateral triangle, which is the simplest geometrical figure which\ncan enclose a space, thus satisfying the mind the easiest of any, is\nnigh universal in symbolism. It is seen in the Egyptian pyramids, whose\nsides are equilateral triangles with a common apex, in the medi\u00e6val\ncathedrals, whose designs are combinations of such triangles, in the\nsign for the trinity, the pentalpha, etc.\n\nThe classification of some symbols of less extensive prevalence must be\nmade from their phonetic values. One class was formed as were the\n\u201ccanting arms\u201d in heraldry, that is, by a rebus. This is in its simpler\nform, direct, as when Quetzalcoatl, the mystical hero-god of Atzlan, is\nrepresented by a bird on a serpent, _quetzal_ signifying a bird, _coatl_\na serpent; or composite, two or more of such rebus symbols being blended\nby synecdoche, like the \u201cmarshalling\u201d of arms in heraldry, as when the\nsame god is portrayed by a feathered serpent; or the rebus may occur\nwith paronymy, especially when the literal meaning of a name of the god\nis lost, as when the Algonkins forgot the sense of the word _wabish_,\nwhite or bright, as applied to their chief divinity, and confounding it\nwith _wabos_, a rabbit, wove various myths about their ancestor, the\nGreat Hare, and chose the hare or rabbit as a totemic badge.[212-1]\n\nIt is almost needless to add further that the ideas most frequently\nassociated with the unknown object of religion are those, which,\nstruggling after material expression, were most fecund in symbols. We\nhave but to turn to the Orphic hymns, or those of the Vedas or the\nHebrew Psalms, to see how inexhaustible was the poetic fancy, stirred by\nreligious awe, in the discovery of similitudes, any of which, under\nfavoring circumstances, might become a symbol.\n\nBefore leaving this branch of my subject, I may illustrate some of the\npreceding comments by applying them to one or two well known subjects of\nreligious art.\n\nA pleasing symbol, which has played a conspicuous part in many\nreligions, is the Egyptian lotus, or \u201clily of the Nile.\u201d It is an\naquatic plant, with white, roseate or blue flowers, which float upon the\nwater, and send up from their centre long stamens. In Egypt it grows\nwith the rising of the Nile, and as its appearance was coincident with\nthat important event, it came to take prominence in the worship of Isis\nand Osiris as the symbol of fertility. Their mystical marriage took\nplace in its blossom. In the technical language of the priests, however,\nit bore a profounder meaning, that of the supremacy of reason above\nmatter, the contrast being between the beautiful flower and the muddy\nwater which bears it.[214-1] In India the lotus bears other and\nmanifold meanings. It is a symbol of the sacred river Ganges, and of the\nmorally pure. No prayer in the world has ever been more frequently\nrepeated than this: \u201cOm! the jewel in the lotus. Amen\u201d (_om mani padme\nhum_). Many millions of times, every hour, for centuries, has this been\niterated by the Buddhists of Thibet and the countries north of it. What\nit means, they can only explain by fantastic and mystical guesses.\nProbably it refers to the legendary birth of their chief saint,\nAvalokitesvara, who is said to have been born of a lotus flower. But\nsome say it is a piece of symbolism not strange to its meaning in\nEgypt,[214-2] and borrowed by Buddhism from the Siva worship. In the\nsymbolic language of this sect the lotus is the symbol of the vagina,\nwhile the phallus is called \u201cthe jewel.\u201d With this interpretation the\nBuddhist prayer would refer to the reproductive act; but it is\nillustrative of the necessity of attributing wholly diverse meanings to\nthe same symbol, that the Buddhists neither now nor at any past time\nattached any such signification to the expression, and it would be most\ndiscrepant with their doctrines to do so.[214-3]\n\nAnother symbol has frequently been open to this duplicate\ninterpretation, that is, the upright pillar. The Egyptian obelisk, the\npillars of \u201cIrmin\u201d or of \u201cRoland,\u201d set up now of wood, now of stone by\nthe ancient Germans, the \u201cred-painted great warpole\u201d of the American\nIndians, the May-pole of Old England, the spire of sacred edifices, the\nstaff planted on the grave, the terminus of the Roman landholders, all\nthese objects have been interpreted to be symbols of life, or the\nlife-force. As they were often of wood, the trunk of a tree for\ninstance, they have often been called by titles equivalent to the \u201ctree\nof life,\u201d and are thus connected with the nigh innumerable myths which\nrelate to some mystic tree as the source of life. The ash Ygdrasyl of\nthe Edda, the oak of Dordona and of the Druid, the modern Christmas\ntree, the sacred banyan, the holy groves, illustrate but faintly the\nprevalence of tree worship. Even so late as the time of Canute, it had\nto be forbidden in England by royal edict.\n\nNow, the general meaning of this symbol I take to be the same as that\nwhich led to the choice of hills and \u201chigh places,\u201d as sites for altars\nand temples, and to the assigning of mountain tops as the abodes of the\nchief gods. It is seen in adjectives applied, I believe, in all\nlanguages, certainly all developed ones, to such deities themselves.\nThese adjectives are related to adverbs of place, signifying _above_,\n_up_ or _over_. We speak of the supernatural, or supernal powers, the\nSupreme Being, the Most High, He in Heaven, and such like. So do all\nAryan and Semitic tongues. Beyond them, the Chinese name for the Supreme\nDeity, Tien, means _up_. I have elsewhere illustrated the same fact in\nnative American tongues. The association of light and the sky above, the\nsun and the heaven, is why we raise our hands and eyes in confident\nprayer to divinity. That at times, however, a religion of sex-love did\nidentify these erect symbols with the phallus as the life-giver, is very\ntrue, but this was a temporary and adventitious meaning assigned a\nsymbol far more ancient than this form of religion.\n\nIn this review of the principles of religious symbolism, I have\nattempted mainly to exhibit the part it has sustained in the development\nof the religious sentiment. It has been generally unfavorable to the\ngrowth of higher thought. The symbol, in what it is above the emblem,\nassumes more than a similarity, a closer relation than analogy; to some\ndegree it pretends to a hypostatic union or identity of the material\nwith the divine, the known to sense with the unknown. Fully seen, this\nbecomes object worship; partially so, personification.\n\nThere is no exception to this. The refined symbolisms which pass current\nto day as religious philosophies exemplify it. The one, esthetic\nsymbolism, has its field in musical and architectural art, in the study\nand portraiture of the beautiful; the other, scientific symbolism,\nclaims to discover in the morphology of organisms, in the harmonic laws\nof physics, and in the processes of the dialectic, the proof that\nsymbolism, if not a revelation, is at least an unconscious inspiration\nof universal truth. This is the \u201cDoctrine of Correspondences,\u201d much in\nfavor with Swedenborgians, but by no means introduced by the founder of\nthat sect. The recognition of the identity in form of the fundamental\nlaws of motion and thought, and the clearer understanding of the\ncharacter of harmony which the experiments of Helmholtz and others give\nus, disperse most of the mystery about these similarities. The religion\nof art, as such, will come up for consideration in the next chapter.\n\nThe second form of the Cult is the Rite. This includes the acts or\nceremonies of worship. Considered in the gross, they can be classed as\nof two kinds, the first and earliest propitiatory, the second and later\nmemorial or institutionary.\n\nWe have but to bear in mind the one aspiration of commencing religious\nthought, to wit, the attainment of a wish, to see that whatever action\narose therefrom must be directed to that purpose. Hence, when we analyze\nthe rude ceremonies of savage cults, the motive is extremely apparent.\nThey, like their prayers, all point to the securing of some material\nadvantage. They are designed\n\n                                    \u201cto cozen\n    The gods that constrain us and curse.\u201d\n\nThe motives which underlie these simplest as well as the most elaborate\nrituals, and impress upon them their distinctively religious character\ncan be reduced to two, the idea of _sacrifice_ and the idea of _specific\nperformance_.\n\nThe simplest notion involved in a sacrifice is that of _giving_. The\nvalue of the gift is not, however, the intrinsic worth of the thing\ngiven, nor even the pleasure or advantage the recipient derives\ntherefrom, but, singularly enough, the amount of pain the giver\nexperiences in depriving himself of it! This is also often seen in\nordinary transactions. A rich man who subscribes a hundred dollars to a\ncharity, is thought to merit less commendation than the widow who gives\nher mite. Measured by motive, this reasoning is correct. There is a\njustice which can be vindicated in holding self-denial to be a standard\nof motive. All developed religions have demanded the renunciation of\nwhat is dearest. The Ynglyngasaga tells us that in a time of famine, the\nfirst sacrifice offered to the gods was of beasts only; if this failed,\nmen were slain to appease them; and if this did not mitigate their\nanger, the king himself was obliged to die that they might send plenty.\nThe Latin writers have handed it down that among the Germans and Gauls a\nhuman sacrifice was deemed the more efficacious the more distinguished\nthe victim, and the nearer his relationship to him who offered the\nrite.[219-1] The slaughter of children and wives to please the gods was\ncommon in many religions, and the self-emasculation of the priests of\nCybele, with other such painful rites, indicates that the measure of the\nsacrifice was very usually not what the god needed, but the willingness\nof the worshipper to give.\n\nThe second idea, that of _specific performance_, has been well expressed\nand humorously commented upon by Hume in his _Natural History of\nReligions_. He says: \u201cHere I cannot forbear observing a fact which may\nbe worth the attention of those who make human nature the object of\ntheir inquiry. It is certain that in every religion, many of the\nvotaries, perhaps the greatest number, will seek the divine favor, not\nby virtue and good morals, but either by frivolous observances, by\nintemperate zeal, by rapturous ecstasies, or by the belief of mysterious\nand absurd opinions.\n\n* * * In all this [_i. e._, in virtue and good morals], a superstitious\nman finds nothing, which he has properly performed for the sake of his\ndeity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to divine favor and\nprotection. * * * * But if he fast or give himself a sound whipping,\nthis has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No\nother motive could engage him to such austerities.\u201d\n\nThe philosopher here sets forth in his inimitable style a marked\ncharacteristic of religious acts. But he touches upon it with his usual\nsuperficiality. It is true that no religion has ever been content with\npromoting the happiness of man, and that the vast majority of votaries\nare always seeking to do something specifically religious, and are not\nsatisfied with the moral only. The simple explanation of it is that the\nreligious sentiment has a purpose entirely distinct from ethics, a\npurpose constantly felt as something peculiar to itself, though\nobscurely seen and often wholly misconceived. It is only when an action\nis utterly dissevered from other ends, and is purely and solely\nreligious, that it can satisfy this sentiment. \u201c_La religion_,\u201d most\ntruly observes Madame Necker de Saussure, \u201c_ne doit point avoir d\u2019autre\nb\u00fbt qu\u2019elle m\u00eame_.\u201d\n\nThe uniform prevalence of these ideas in rites may be illustrated from\nthe simplest or the most elaborate. Father Brebeuf, missionary to the\nHurons in 1636, has a chapter on their superstitions. He there tells us\nthat this nation had two sorts of ceremonies, the one to induce the\ngods to grant good fortune, the other to appease them when some ill-luck\nhad occurred. Before running a dangerous rapid in their frail canoes\nthey would lay tobacco on a certain rock where the deity of the rapid\nwas supposed to reside, and ask for safety in their voyage. They took\ntobacco and cast it in the fire, saying: \u201cO Heaven (_Aronhiat\u00e9_), see, I\ngive you something; aid me; cure this sickness of mine.\u201d When one was\ndrowned or died of cold, a feast was called, and the soft parts of the\ncorpse were cut from the bones and burned to conciliate the personal\ngod, while the women danced and chanted a melancholy strain. Here one\nsacrifice was to curry favor with the gods, another to soothe their\nanger, and the third was a rite, not a sacrifice, but done for a\nreligious end, whose merit was specific performance.\n\nAs the gift was valued at what it cost the giver, and was supposed to be\nefficacious in this same ratio, self-denial soon passed into\nself-torture, prolonged fasts, scourging and lacerations, thus becoming\nlegitimate exhibitions of religious fervor. As mental pain is as keen as\nbodily pain, the suffering of Jephthah was quite as severe as that of\nthe Flagellants, and was expected to find favor in the eyes of the gods.\n\nA significant corrollary[TN-12] from such a theory follows: that which is\nthe efficacious part of the sacrifice is the suffering; given a certain\ndegree of this, the desired effect will follow. As to what or who\nsuffers, or in what manner he or it suffers, these are secondary\nconsiderations, even unimportant ones, so far as the end to be obtained\nis concerned. This is the germ of _vicarious_ sacrifice, a plan\nfrequently observed in even immature religions. What seems the\ndiabolical cruelty of some superstitious rites, those of the\nCarthaginians and Celts, for example, is thoroughly consistent with the\nabstract theory of sacrifice, and did not spring from capricious malice.\nThe Death of Christ, regarded as a general vicarious atonement, has had\nits efficiency explained directly by the theory that the pain he\nsuffered partook of the infinity of his divine nature; as thus it was\nexcruciating beyond measure, so it was infinitely effectual toward\nappeasing divinity.\n\nIt is well known that this doctrine was no innovation on the religious\nsentiment of the age when it was preached by the Greek fathers. For\ncenturies the Egyptian priests had taught the incarnation and sufferings\nof Osiris, and his death for the salvation of his people. Similar myths\nwere common throughout the Orient, all drawn from the reasoning I have\nmentioned.[222-1]\n\nThey have been variously criticized. Apart from the equivocal traits\nthis theory of atonement attributes to the supernatural powers--a\nfeature counterbalanced, in modern religion, by subduing its harshest\nfeatures--it is rooted essentially in the material view of religion. The\nreligious value of an act is to be appraised by the extent to which it\nfollows recognition of duty. To acknowledge an error is unpleasant; to\nrenounce it still more so, for it breaks a habit; to see our own errors\nin their magnitude, sullying our whole nature and reaching far ahead to\ngenerations yet unborn, is consummately bitter, and in proportion as it\nis bitter, will keep us from erring.[223-1] This is the \u201csacrifice of a\ncontrite heart,\u201d which alone is not despicable; and this no one can do\nfor us. We may be sure that neither the physical pain of victims burning\nin a slow fire, nor the mental pain of yielding up whatever we hold\ndearest upon earth, will make our views of duty a particle clearer or\nour notion of divinity a jot nobler; and whatever does neither of these\nis not of true religion.\n\nThe theory of sacrifice is intimately related with the idea of sin. In\nthe quotation I have made from Father Brebeuf we see that the Hurons\nrecognized a distinct form of rite as appropriate to appease a god when\nangered. It is a matter of national temperament which of these forms\ntakes the lead. Joutel tells of a tribe in Texas who paid attention only\nto the gods who worked them harm, saying that the good gods were good\nanyhow. By parity of reasoning, one sect of Mohammedans worship the\ndevil only. It is well to make friends with your enemy, and then he will\nnot hurt you; and if a man is shielded from his enemies, he is safe\nenough.\n\nBut where, as in most Semitic, Celtic and various other religions, the\nchief gods frowned or smiled as they were propitiated or neglected, and\nwhen a certain amount of pain was the propitiation they demanded, the\nnecessity of rendering this threw a dark shadow on life. What is the\ncondition of man, that only through sorrow he can reach joy? He must be\nunder a curse.\n\nPhysical and mental processes aided by analogy this gloomy deduction. It\nis only through pain that we are stimulated to the pursuit of pleasure,\nand the latter is a phantom we never catch. The laws of correct\nreasoning are those which alone should guide us; but the natural laws of\nthe association of ideas do not at all correspond with the one\nassociation which reason accepts. Truth is what we are born for, error\nis what is given us.\n\nInstead of viewing this state of things as one inseparable to the\nrelative as another than the universal, and, instead of seeing the means\nof correcting it in the mental element of attention, continuance or\nvolition, guided by experience and the growing clearness of the purposes\nof the laws of thought, the problem was given up as hopeless, and man\nwas placed under a ban from which a god alone could set him free; he was\nsunk in original sin, chained to death.\n\nTo reach this result it is evident that a considerable effort at\nreasoning, a peculiar view of the nature of the gods, and a temperament\nnot the most common, must be combined. Hence it was adopted as a\nreligious dogma by but a few nations. The Chinese know nothing of the\n\u201csense of sin,\u201d nor did the Greeks and Romans. The Parsees do not\nacknowledge it, nor do the American tribes. \u201cTo sin,\u201d in their\nlanguages, does not mean to offend the deity, but to make a mistake, to\nmiss the mark, to loose one\u2019s way as in a wood, and the missionaries\nhave exceeding difficulty in making them understand the theological\nsignification of the word.\n\nThe second class of rites are memorial in character. As the former were\naddressed to the gods, so these are chiefly for the benefit of the\npeople. They are didactic, to preserve the myth, or institutionary, to\nkeep alive the discipline and forms of the church.\n\nOf this class of rites it may broadly be said they are the myth\ndramatized. Indeed, the drama owes its origin to the mimicry by\nworshippers of the supposed doings of the gods. The most ancient\nfestivals have reference to the recurrence of the seasons, and the\nceremonies which mark them represent the mythical transactions which are\nsupposed to govern the yearly changes. The god himself was often\nrepresented by the\n\nhigh priest, and masked figures took the parts of attendant deities.\n\nInstitutionary rites are those avowedly designed to commemorate a myth\nor event, and to strengthen thereby the religious organization.\nChristian baptism is by some denominations looked upon as a\ncommemorative or institutionary rite only; and the same is the case with\nthe Lord\u2019s Supper. These seem to have been the only rites recommended,\nthough the former was not practiced by Christ. In any ordinary meaning\nof his words, he regarded them both as institutionary.\n\nThe tendency of memorial to become propitiatory rites is visible in all\nmaterialistic religions. The procedure, from a simple commemorative act,\nacquires a mystic efficacy, a supernatural or spiritual power, often\nsupposed to extend to the deity as well as the votary. Thus the Indian\n\u201crain-maker\u201d will rattle his gourd, beat his drum, and blow through his\npipe, to represent the thunder, lightning, and wind of the storm; and\nhe believes that by this mimicry of the rain-god\u2019s proceedings he can\nforce him to send the wished-for showers. The charms, spells and\nincantations of sorcery have the same foundation. Equally visible is it\nin the reception of the Christian rites above mentioned, baptism and the\nEucharist, as \u201csacraments,\u201d as observances of divine efficacy in\nthemselves. All such views arise from the material character of the\nreligious wants.\n\nThe conclusion is that, while emblems and memorial rites have nothing in\nthem which can mar, they also have nothing which can aid the growth and\npurity of the religious sentiment, beyond advancing its social\nrelations; while symbols, in the proper sense of the term, and\npropitiatory rites, as necessarily false and without foundation, always\ndegrade and obscure religious thought. Their prominence in a cult\ndeclines, as it rises in quality; and in a perfected scheme of worship\nthey would have no place whatever.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[200-1] In his chapter _Ideen zu einer Physik des Symbols und des\nMythus_, of his _Symbolik und Mythologie_.\n\n[201-1] Dr. H. C. Barlow\u2019s _Essays on Symbolism_ (London, 1866),\ndeserves mention as one of the best of these.\n\n[204-1] W. S. Jevons, _The Substitution of Similars_, p. 15 (London,\n1869.)\n\n[205-1] Creuzer, _Symbolik_, Bd. I, s. 59.\n\n[207-1] _Ursprung der Mythologie_ (Berlin, 1862).\n\n[208-1] Harrison Allen, M. D., _The Life Form in Art_, Phila. 1874.\n\n[210-1] Cussans, _Grammar of Heraldry_, p. 16.\n\n[212-1] Numerous examples from classical antiquity are given by Creuzer,\n_Symbolik_, Bd. i. s. 114. sqq.\n\n[214-1] W. von Humboldt, _Gesammelte Werke_, Bd. iv., s. 332.\n\n[214-2] Creuzer, _Symbolik und Mythologie_, Bd. i., s. 282.\n\n[214-3] Carl Frederick Koppen, _Die Lamaische Hierarchie and[TN-13]\nKirche_, ss. 59, 60, 61.\n\n[219-1] Adolph Holtzmann, _Deutsche Mythologie_, p. 232 (Leipzig, 1874).\n\n[222-1] \u201cEs ist so gewissermassen in allen ernsten orientalischen Lehren\ndas Christenthum in seinem Keime vorgebildet.\u201d Creuzer, _Symbolik und\nMythologie der Alten V\u00f6lker_, Bd. i., s. 297.\n\n[223-1] In a conversation reported by Mr. John Morley, John Stuart Mill\nexpressed his belief that \u201cthe coming modification of religion\u201d will be\ncontrolled largely through men becoming \u201cmore and more impressed with\nthe awful fact that a piece of conduct to-day may prove a curse to men\nand women scores and even hundreds of years after the author of it is\ndead.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nTHE MOMENTA OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n     National impulses and aims as historic ideas. Their recurrence and\n     its explanation. Their permanence in relation to their truth and\n     consciousness. The historic ideas in religious progress are chiefly\n     three.\n\n     I. The Idea of the Perfected Individual.\n\n     First placed in physical strength. This gave way in Southern Europe\n     to the idea of physical symmetry, a religion of beauty and art.\n     Later days have produced the idea of mental symmetry, the religion\n     of culture. All have failed, and why? The momenta of true religion\n     in each.\n\n     II. The Idea of the Perfected Commonwealth.\n\n     Certain national temperaments predispose to individualism, others\n     to communism. The social relations governed at first by divine law.\n     Later, morality represents this law. The religion of conduct. The\n     religion of sentiment and of humanity. Advantages and disadvantages\n     in this idea.\n\n     Comparisons of these two ideas as completed respectively by Wilhelm\n     von Humboldt and Auguste Comte.\n\n     III. The Idea of Personal Survival.\n\n     The doctrine of immortality the main moment in Christianity, Islam\n     and Buddhism. Unfamiliar to old and simple faiths. Its energy and\n     speculative relations. It is decreasing as a religious moment owing\n     to, (1) a better understanding of ethics, (2) more accurate\n     cosmical conceptions, (3) the clearer defining of life, (4) the\n     increasing immateriality of religions.\n\n     The future and final moments of religious thought.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE MOMENTA OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.\n\n\nThe records of the past can be studied variously. Events can be arranged\nin the order of their occurrence: this is chronology or annals; in\naddition to this, their connections and mutual relations as cause and\neffect may be shown: this is historical science; or, thirdly, from a\ngeneral view of trains of related events some abstract aim as their\nfinal cause may be theoretically deduced and confirmed by experience:\nthis is the philosophy of history. The doctrine of final causes, in its\nold form as the _argumentum de appetitu_, has been superseded. Function\nis not purpose; desire comes from the experience of pleasure, and\nrealizes its dreams, if at all, by the slow development of capacity. The\nwish carries no warrant of gratification with it. No \u201cargument from\ndesign\u201d can be adduced from the region where the laws of physical\nnecessity prevail. Those laws are not designed for an end.\n\nWhen, however, in the unfolding of mind we reach the stage of notions,\nwe observe a growing power to accomplish desire, not only by altering\nthe individual or race organism, but also by bringing external objects\ninto unison with the desire, reversing the process common in the life of\nsensation. This spectacle, however, is confined to man alone, and man as\nguided by prospective volition, that is, by an object ahead.\n\nWhen some such object is common to a nation or race, it exercises a wide\ninfluence on its destiny, and is the key to much that otherwise would be\ninexplicable in its actions. What we call national hopes, ambitions and\nideals are such objects. Sometimes they are distinctly recognized by the\nnation, sometimes they are pursued almost unconsciously. They do not\ncorrespond to things as they are, but as they are wished to be. Hence\nthere is nothing in them to insure their realization. They are like an\nappetite, which may and may not develope the function which can gratify\nit. They have been called \u201chistoric ideas,\u201d and their consideration is a\nleading topic in modern historical science.\n\nReason claims the power of criticizing such ideas, and of distinguishing\nin them between what is true and therefore obtainable, and what is false\nand therefore chimerical or even destructive. This is the province of\nthe philosophy of history. It guides itself by those general principles\nfor the pursuit of truth which have been noticed in brief in the earlier\npages of this book. Looking before as well as after, it aspires in the\nunited light of experience and the laws of mind, to construct for the\nrace an ideal within the reach of its capacities, yet which will\ndevelope them to the fullest extent, a pole-star to which it can trust\nin this night teeming with will-o\u2019-the wisps.\n\nThe opinion that the history of mind is a progress whose end will be\nworth more than was its beginning, may not prove true in fact--the\nconcrete expression never wholly covers the abstract requirements--but\nit is undoubtedly true in theory. The progress, so far, has been by no\nmeans a lineal one--each son a better man than his father--nor even, as\nsome would have it, a spiral one--periodical recurrences to the same\nhistorical ideas, but each recurrence a nearer approach to the\nphilosophical idea--but it has been far more complex and irregular than\nany geometrical figure will illustrate. These facile generalizations do\nnot express it.\n\nFollowing the natural laws of thought man has erred infinitely, and his\nerrors have worked their sure result--they have destroyed him. There is\nno \u201crelish of salvation\u201d in an error; otherwise than that it is sure to\nkill him who obstructs the light by harboring it. There is no sort of\nconvertability of the false into the true, as shallow thinkers of the\nday teach.\n\nMan has only escaped death when at first by a lucky chance, and then by\npersonal and inherited experience, his thoughts drifted or were forced\ninto conformity with the logical laws of thought.\n\nA historic idea is a complex product formed of numerous conceptions,\nsome true and others false. Its permanency and efficacy are in direct\nproportion to the number and clearness of the former it embraces. When\nit is purging itself of the latter, the nation is progressive; when the\nfalse are retained, their poison spreads and the nation decays.\n\nThe _periodical recurrence_ of historic ideas is one of their most\nstriking features. The explanations offered for it have been various.\nThe ancient doctrines of an exact repetition of events in the cycles of\nnature, and of the transmigration of souls, drew much support from it;\nand the modern modification of the latter theory as set forth by\nWordsworth and Lessing, are distinctly derived from the same source.\nRightly elucidated, the philosophical historian will find in it an\ninvaluable clue to the unravelment of the tangled skein of human\nendeavor.\n\nHistoric periodicity is on the one side an organic law of memory,\ndependent upon the revival of transmitted ancestral impressions. A\nprevailing idea though over-cultivation exhausts its organic correlate,\nand leads to defective nutrition of that part in the offspring. Hence\nthey do not pursue the same idea as their fathers, but revert to a\nremoter ancestral historic idea, the organic correlate of which has\nlain fallow, thus gained strength. It is brought forth as new, receives\nadditions by contiguity and similarity, is ardently pursued,\nover-cultivated, and in time supplanted by another revival.\n\nBut this material side corresponds to an all-important mental one. As an\norganic process only, the history of periodic ideas is thus\nsatisfactorily explained, but he who holds this explanation to be\nexhaustive sees but half the problem.\n\nThe permanence of a historic idea, I have stated, is in direct\nproportion to the number of true ideas in its composition; the\nimpression it makes on the organic substrata of memory is in turn in\nproportion to its permanence. The element of decay is the destructive\neffects of natural trains of thought out of accord with the logically\ntrue trains. These cause defective cerebral nutrition, which is thus\nseen to arise, so far as influenced by the operations of the memory,\nfrom relations of truth and error. There is a physiological tendency in\nthe former to preserve and maintain in activity; in the latter to\ndisappear. The percentage of true concepts which makes up the complexity\nof a historic idea gives the principal factor towards calculating its\nprobable recurrence. Of course, a second factor is the physiological one\nof nutrition itself.\n\nThe next important distinction in discussing historic ideas is between\nthose which are held consciously, and those which operate\nunconsciously. The former are always found to be more active, and more\namenable to correction. An unconscious idea is a product of the natural,\nnot the logical laws of mind, and is therefore very apt to be largely\nfalse. It is always displaced with advantage by a conscious aim.\n\nOne of the superficial fallacies of the day, which pass under the name\nof philosophy, is to maintain that any such historic idea is the best\npossible one for the time and place in which it is found. I am led to\nrefer to this by the false light it has thrown on religious history.\nHerbert Spencer remarks in one of his essays:[236-1] \u201cAll religious\ncreeds, during the eras in which they are severally held, are the best\nthat could be held.\u201d \u201cAll are good for their times and places.\u201d So far\nfrom this being the case, there never has been a religion but that an\nimprovement in it would have straightway exerted a beneficent effect.\nMan, no matter what his condition, can always derive immediate good\nfrom higher conceptions of Deity than he himself has elaborated. Nor is\nthe highest conception possible an idealization of self, as I have\nsufficiently shown in a previous chapter, but is one drawn wholly from\nthe realm of the abstract. Moreover, as a matter of history, we know\nthat in abundant instances, the decay of nations can be traced largely\nto the base teachings of their religious instructors. To maintain that\nsuch religions were \u201cthe best possible ones\u201d for the time and place is\nthe absurdest optimism. In what a religion shares of the abstractly true\nit is beneficent; in what it partakes of the untrue it is deleterious.\nThis, and no other canon, must be our guide.\n\nThe ideas of religious history obey the same laws as other historic\nideas. They grow, decay, are supplanted and revive again in varying\nguises, in accordance with the processes of organic nutrition as\ninfluenced by the truth or falsity of their component ideas. Their\ntendency to personification is stronger, because of the much greater\nnearness they have to the individual desire. The one aspiration of a\nhigh-spirited people when subjugated will be freedom; and in the lower\nstages of culture they will be very certain to fabricate a myth of a\ndeliverer to come.\n\nIn like manner, every member of a community shares with his fellow\nmembers some wish, hope or ambition dependent on unknown control and\ntherefore religious in character, which will become the \u201cformative idea\u201d\nof the national religious development.\n\nOf the various ideas in religious history there are three which, through\ntheir permanence and frequent revival, we may justly suppose in\naccordance with the above-mentioned canons to contain a large measure of\ntruth, and yet to be far from wholly true. They may be considered as\nleading moments in religious growth, yet withal lacking something or\nother essential to the satisfaction of the religious sentiment. The\nfirst of these is the idea of the _perfected individual_; the second the\nidea of the _perfected commonwealth_; the third, that of _personal\nsurvival_. These have been the formative ideas (_Ideen der Gestaltung_)\nin the prayers, myths, rites and religious institutions of many nations\nat widely separated times.\n\nOf the two first mentioned it may be said that every extended faith has\naccepted them to some degree. They are the secret of the alliances of\nreligion with art, with government, with ethics, with science, education\nand sentiment.\n\nThese alliances have often been taken by historians to contain the vital\nelements of religion itself, and many explanations based on one or\nanother assumption of the kind have been proffered. Religion, while it\nmay embrace any of them, is independent of them all. Its relations to\nthem have been transitory, and the more so as their aims have been\nlocal and material. The brief duration of the subjection of religion to\nsuch incongenial ties was well compared by Lord Herbert of Cherbury to\nthe early maturity of brutes, who attain their full growth in a year or\ntwo, while man needs a quarter of a century.[239-1] The inferior aims of\nthe religious sentiment were discarded one after another to make way for\nhigher ones, which were slowly dawning upon it. In this progress it was\nguided largely by the three ideas I have mentioned, which have been in\nmany forms leading stimuli of the religious thought of the race.\n\nFirst, of the _idea of the perfected individual_.\n\nMany writers have supposed that the contemplation of Power in nature\nfirst stirred religious thought in man. Though this is not the view\ntaken in this book, no one will question that the leading trait in the\ngods of barbarism is physical strength. The naive anthropomorphism of\nthe savage makes his a god of a mighty arm, a giant in stature, puissant\nand terrible. He hurls the thunderbolt, and piles up the mountains in\nsport. His name is often The Strong One, as in the Allah, Eloah of the\nSemitic tongues. Hercules, Chon, Melkarth, Dorsanes, Thor and others\nwere of the most ancient divinities in Greece, Egypt, Ph\u0153nicia, India,\nand Scandinavia, and were all embodiments of physical force. Such, too,\nwas largely the character of the Algonkin Messou, who scooped out the\ngreat lakes with his hands and tore up the largest trees by the roots.\nThe huge boulders from the glacial epoch which are scattered over their\ncountry are the pebbles he tossed in play or in anger. The cleft in the\nAndes, through which flows the river Funha, was opened by a single blow\nof Nemqueteba, chief god of the Muyscas. In all such and a hundred\nsimilar legends, easy to quote, we see the notion of strength, brute\nforce, muscular power, was that deemed most appropriate to divinity, and\nthat which he who would be godlike must most sedulously seek. When\nfilled with the god, the votary felt a surpassing vigor. The Berserker\nfury was found in the wilds of America and Africa, as well as among the\nFiords. Sickness and weakness, on the contrary, were signs that the gods\nwere against him. Therefore, in all early stages of culture, the office\nof priest and physician was one. Conciliation of the gods was the\ncatholicon.\n\nSuch deities were fearful to behold. They are represented as mighty of\nstature and terrible of mien, calculated to appal, not attract, to\ninspire fear, not to kindle love. In tropical America, in Egypt, in\nThibet, almost where you will, there is little to please the eye in the\npictures and statues of deities.\n\nIn Greece alone, a national temperament, marvellously sensitive to\nsymmetry, developed the combination of maximum strength with perfect\nform in the sun-god, Apollo, and of grace with beauty in Aphrodite. The\nGreeks were the apostles of the religion of beauty. Their philosophic\nthought saw the permanent in the Form, which outlives strength, and is\nthat alone in which the race has being. In its transmission love is the\nagent, and Aphrodite, unmatched in beauty and mother of love, was a\ncreation worthy of their devotion. Thus with them the religious\nsentiment still sought its satisfaction in the individual, not indeed in\nthe muscle, but in the feature and expression.\n\nWhen the old gods fell, the Christian fathers taught their flocks to\nabhor the beautiful as one with the sensual. St. Clement of Alexandria\nand Tertullian describe Christ as ugly of visage and undersized, a sort\nof Socrates in appearance.[241-1] Christian art was long in getting\nrecognition. The heathens were the first to represent in picture and\nstatues Christ and the apostles, and for long the fathers of the church\nopposed the multiplication of such images, saying that the inward beauty\nwas alone desirable. Christian art reached its highest inspiration under\nthe influence of Greek culture after the fall of Constantinople. In the\nvery year, however, that Rafaello Sanzio met his premature death, Luther\nburned the decretals of the pope in the market-place of Wittenberg, and\npreached a doctrine as hostile to art as was that of Eusebius and\nChrysostom. There was no longer any hope for the religion of beauty.\n\nNevertheless, under the influence of the revival of ancient art which\narose with Winckelmann towards the close of the last century, a gospel\nof esthetics was preached. Its apostles were chiefly Germans, and among\nthem Schiller and Goethe are not inconspicuous names. The latter, before\nhis long life was closed, began to see the emptiness of such teachings,\nand the violence perpetrated on the mind by forcing on the religious\nsentiment the food fit only for the esthetic emotions.\n\nThe highest conception of individual perfection is reached in a\ncharacter whose physical and mental powers are symmetrically trained,\nand always directed by conscious reason to their appropriate ends.\nSelf-government, founded on self-knowledge, wards off the pangs of\ndisappointment by limiting ambition to the attainable. The affections\nand emotions, and the pleasures of sensation as well, are indulged in or\nabstained from, but never to the darkening of the intellect. All the\ntalents are placed at usury; every power exercised systematically and\nfruitfully with a consecration to a noble purpose.\n\nThis is the religion of culture. None other ranks among its adherents so\nmany great minds; men, as Carlyle expresses it, of much religiosity, if\nof little religion. The ideal is a taking one. Such utter self-reliance,\nnot from ignorance, but from the perfection of knowledge, was that which\nBuddha held up to his followers: \u201cSelf is the God of self; who else\nshould be the God?\u201d In this century Goethe, Wordsworth, beyond all\nothers Wilhelm von Humboldt, have set forth this ideal. Less strongly\nintellectual natures, as Maine de Biran, De Senancourt, and Matthew\nArnold, listen with admiration, but feel how unknown to the mass of\nhuman kind must remain the tongue these masters speak.\n\nThus did the religious sentiment seek its satisfaction in the\nidealization, first of physical force, then of form, and last of mental\nforce, but in each case turned away unsatisfied. Wherein did these\nideals fail? The first mentioned in exalting power over principle, might\nover right. As was well said by the philosophical Novalis: \u201cThe ideal of\nmorality has no more dangerous rival than the ideal of physical\nstrength, of the most vigorous life. Through it man is transformed into\na reasoning beast, whose brutal cleverness has a fascination for weak\nminds.\u201d[243-1] The religion of beauty failed in that it addressed the\nesthetic emotions, not the reasoning power. Art does not promote the\ngood; it owes no fealty to either utility or ethics: in itself, it must\nbe, in the negative sense of the words, at once useless and immoral.\n\u201cNature is not its standard, nor is truth its chief end.\u201d[244-1] Its\nspirit is repose, \u201cthe perfect form in perfect rest;\u201d whereas the spirit\nof religion is action because of imperfection. Even the gods must know\nof suffering, and partake, in incarnations, of the miseries of men.\n\nIn the religion of culture what can we blame? That it is lacking in the\nimpulses of action through the isolation it fosters; that it is and must\nbe limited to a few, for it provides no defense for the weaknesses the\nmany inherit; that its tendency is antagonistic to religion, as it cuts\naway the feeling of dependence, and the trust in the unknown; that it\nallows too little to enthusiasm ever to become a power.\n\nOn the other hand, what momenta of true religious thought have these\nideals embraced? Each presents some. Physical vigor, regarded as a sign\nof complete nutrition, is an indispensable preliminary to the highest\nreligion. Correct thought cannot be, without sufficient and appropriate\nfood. If the nourishment is inadequate, defective energy of the brain\nwill be transmitted, and the offspring will revert ancestrally to a\nlower plane of thought. \u201cIt thus happens that the minds of persons of\nhigh religious culture by ancestral descent, and the intermarriage of\nreligious families, so strangely end in the production of children\ntotally devoid of moral sense and religious sentiment--moral imbeciles\nin short.\u201d[245-1] From such considerations of the necessity of physical\nvigor to elevated thought, Descartes predicted that if the human race\never attain perfection it will be chiefly through the art of medicine.\nNot alone from emotions of sympathy did the eminent religious teachers\nof past ages maintain that the alleviation and prevention of suffering\nis the first practical duty of man; but it was from a perhaps\nunconscious perception of the antagonism of bodily degeneration to\nmental progress.\n\nSo, too, the religion of beauty and art contains an indefeasible germ of\ntrue religious thought. Art sees the universal in the isolated fact; it\nredeemed the coarse symbol of earlier days by associating it with the\nemotions of joy, instead of fear; commencing with an exaltation of the\nlove to sex, it etherealized and ennobled passion; it taught man to look\nelsewhere than to material things for his highest pleasure, for the work\nof art always has its fortune in the imagination and not in the senses\nof the observer; conceptions of order and harmony are familiar to it;\nits best efforts seek to bring all the affairs of life under unity and\nsystem;[246-1] and thus it strengthens the sentiment of moral\ngovernment, which is the first postulate of religion.\n\nThe symmetry of the individual, as understood in the religion of\nculture, is likewise a cherished article of true religion. Thus only can\nit protect personality against the pitfalls of self-negation and\nabsorption, which communism and pantheism dig for it. The integrity and\npermanence of the person is the keystone to religion, as it is to\nphilosophy and ethics. None but a false teacher would measure our duty\nto our neighbor by a higher standard than our love to ourselves. The\nlove of God alone is worthy to obscure it.\n\nProfessor Steinthal has said: \u201cEvery people has its own religion. The\nnational temperament hears the tidings and interprets them as it\ncan.\u201d[246-2] On the other hand, Humboldt--perhaps the profoundest\nthinker on these subjects of his generation--doubted whether religions\ncan be measured in reference to nations and sects, because \u201creligion is\naltogether subjective, and rests solely on the conceptive powers of the\nindividual.\u201d[247-1] Whatever the creed, a pure mind will attach itself\nto its better elements, a base one to its brutal and narrow doctrines. A\nnational religion can only be regarded as an average, applicable to the\nmajority, not entirely correct of the belief of any one individual,\nwholly incorrect as to a few. Yet it is indubitable that the national\ntemperament creates the ideal which gives the essence of religion. Races\nlike the Tartar Mongols, who, as we are informed by the Abb\u00e9 Huc, not\nunfrequently move their tents several times a day, out of simple\nrestlessness, cannot desire the same stability that is sought by other\nraces, who have the beaver\u2019s instinct for building and colonizing, such\nas the Romans. Buddhism, which sets up the ideal of the individual, is\nan acceptable theory to the former, while the latter, from earliest\nages, fostered religious views which taught the subordination of the\nindividual to the community, in other words, the _idea of the perfected\ncommonwealth_.\n\nThis is the conception at the base of all theocracies, forms of\ngovernment whose statutes are identified with the precepts of religion.\nInstead of a constitution there is the Law, given and sanctioned by God\nas a rule of action.\n\nThe Law is at first the Myth applied. Its object is as much to\npropitiate the gods as to preserve social order. It is absolute because\nit is inspired. Many of its ordinances as drawn from the myth are\ninapplicable to man, and are unjust or frivolous. Yet such as it is, it\nrules the conduct of the commonwealth and expresses the ideal of its\nperfected condition.\n\nAll the oldest codes of laws are religious, and are alleged revelations.\nThe Pentateuch, the Avesta, the Laws of Manu, the Twelve Tables, the\nLaws of Seleucus, all carry the endorsement, \u201cAnd God said.\u201d Their real\nintention is to teach the relation of man to God, rather than the\nrelations of man to man. On practical points--on the rights of property,\non succession and wills, on contracts, on the adoption of neighbors, and\non the treatment of enemies--they often violate the plainest dictates of\nnatural justice, of common humanity, even of family affection. Their\nprecepts are frequently frivolous, sometimes grossly immoral. But if\nthese laws are compared with the earliest myths and cults, and the\nopinions then entertained of the gods, and how to propitiate them, it\nbecomes easy to see how the precepts of the law flowed from these\ninchoate imaginings of the religious sentiment.[249-1]\n\nThe improvement of civil statutes did not come through religion.\nExperience, observation and free thought taught man justice, and his\nkindlier emotions were educated by the desire to cherish and preserve\nwhich arose from family and social ties. As these came to be recognized\nas necessary relations of society, religion appropriated them,\nincorporated them into her ideal, and even claimed them as her\nrevelations. History largely invalidates this claim. The moral progress\nof mankind has been mainly apart from dogmatic teachings, often in\nconflict with them. An established rule of faith may enforce obedience\nto its statutes, but can never develop morals. \u201cTrue virtue is\nindependent of every religion, and incompatible with any which is\naccepted on authority.\u201d[249-2]\n\nYet thinkers, even the best of them, appear to have had difficulty in\ndiscerning any nobler arena for the religious sentiment than the social\none. \u201cReligion,\u201d says Matthew Arnold, \u201cis conduct.\u201d It is the power\n\u201cwhich makes for righteousness.\u201d \u201cAs civil law,\u201d said Voltaire,\n\u201cenforces morality in public, so the use of religion is to compel it in\nprivate life.\u201d \u201cA complete morality,\u201d observes a contemporary Christian\nwriter, \u201cmeets all the practical ends of religion.\u201d[250-1] In such\nexpressions man\u2019s social relations, his duty to his neighbor, are taken\nto exhaust religion. It is still the idea of the commonwealth, the\nreligion of morality, the submission to a law recognized as divine.\nWhether the law is a code of ethics, the decision of a general council,\nor the ten commandments, it is alike held to be written by the finger of\nGod, and imperative. Good works are the demands of such religion.\n\nCatholicism, which is altogether theocratic and authoritative, which\npictures the church as an ideal commonwealth, has always most flourished\nin those countries where the Roman colonies left their more important\ntraces. The reformation of Protestantism was a reversion to the ideal of\nthe individual, which was that of ancient Teutonic faith. In more recent\ntimes Catholicism itself has modified the rigidity of its teachings in\nfavor of the religion of sentiment, as it has been called, inaugurated\nby Chateaubriand, and which is that attractive form seen in the writings\nof Madame Swetchine and the La Ferronnais. These elevated souls throw a\ncharm around the immolation of self, which the egotism of the Protestant\nrarely matches.\n\nThus the ideal of the commonwealth is found in those creeds which give\nprominence to law, to ethics, and to sentiment, the altruistic elements\nof mind. It fails, because its authority is antagonistic to morality in\nthat it impedes the search for the true. Neither is morality religion,\nfor it deals with the relative, while religion should guide itself by\nthe absolute. Every great religious teacher has violated the morality of\nhis day. Even sentiment, attractive as it is, is no ground on which to\nbuild a church. It is, at best, one of the lower emotional planes of\naction. Love itself, which must be the kernel of every true religion, is\nnot in earthly relations an altruistic sentiment. The measure and the\nsource of all such love, is self-love. The creed which rejects this as\nits corner stone will build in vain.\n\nWhile, therefore, the advantages of organization and action are on the\nside of the faiths which see in religion a form of government, they\npresent fewer momenta of religious thought than those which encourage\nthe greater individuality. All forms and reforms, remarks Machiavelli,\nin one of his notes to Livy, have been brought about by the exertions of\none man.[251-1] Religious reforms, especially, never have originated in\nmajorities. The reformatory decrees of the Council of Trent are due to\nMartin Luther.\n\nEither ideal, raised to its maximum, not only fails to satisfy the\nreligious sentiment, but puts upon it a forced meaning, and is therefore\nnot what this sentiment asks. This may be illustrated by comparing two\nremarkable works, which, by a singular coincidence, were published in\nthe same year, and which better than any others present these ideals\npushed to their extreme. It is characteristic of them that neither\nprofesses to treat of religion, but of politics. The one is entitled,\n\u201c_An Attempt to define the limits of Government_,\u201d and is by Wilhelm von\nHumboldt; the other is the better known work of Auguste Comte, his\n\u201c_System of Positive Polity_.\u201d[252-1]\n\nThe first lays down the principle that the highest end of man is the\nutmost symmetrical education of his own powers in their individual\npeculiarities. To accomplish this, he must enjoy the largest freedom of\nthought and action consistent with the recognition of the same right in\nothers. In regard to religion, the state should have nothing to do with\naiding it, but should protect the individual in his opposition to any\nauthoritative form of it. As a wholly personal and subjective matter,\nsocial relations do not concern it. In fine, the aim of both government\nand education should be the development of an individualism in which an\nenlightened intellect controls and directs all the powers toward an\nexalted self-cultivation.\n\nComte reverses this picture. His fundamental principle is to subordinate\nthe sum total of our existence to our social relations; real life is to\nlive in others; not the individual but humanity is the only worthy\nobject of effort. Social polity therefore includes the whole of\ndevelopment; the intellect should have no other end but to subserve the\nneeds of the race, and always be second to the altruistic sentiments.\nLove toward others should absorb self-love. \u201c_Il est encore meilleur\nd\u2019aimer que d\u2019\u00eatre aim\u00e9._\u201d\n\nSuch is the contrast between the ideal of the individual as exhibited by\nthe Religion of Culture, and the ideal of the commonwealth as portrayed\nin the Religion of Humanity.\n\nThe whole duty of man, says the one school, is to live for others; nay,\nsays the other, it is to live intelligently for himself; the intellect,\nsays the former, should always be subordinated to society, and be led by\nthe emotions; intellect, says the latter, should ever be in the\nascendant, and absolutely control and direct the emotions; the\ntheoretical object of government, says the former, is to enable the\naffections and thoughts to pass into action; not so, says the latter,\nits only use is to give the individual secure leisure to develope his\nown affections and thoughts. Mutual relation is the key note of the\nformer, independence of the latter; the former is the apotheosis of\nlove, the latter of reason.\n\nStrictly and literally the apotheosis. For, differing as they do on such\nvital points, they both agree in dispensing with the ideas of God and\nimmortality as conceptions superfluous in the realization of the\ntheoretical perfection they contemplate. Not that either scheme omits\nthe religious sentiment. On the contrary, it is especially prominent in\none, and very well marked in the other. Both assume its growing\nprominence, never its extinction. Both speak of it as an integral part\nof man\u2019s highest nature.\n\nComte and Humboldt were thinkers too profound to be caught by the facile\nfallacy that the rapid changes in religious thought betoken the early\nabrogation of all creeds. Lessing, the philosophers of the French\nrevolution, James Mill, Schopenhauer and others fell into this error.\nThey were not wiser than the clown of Horace, who seated himself by the\nrushing stream, thinking it must soon run itself out--\n\n    Expectat rusticus dum defluat amnis; at ille\n    Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis \u00e6vum.\n\nVain is the dream that man will ever reach the point when he will think\nno more of the gods. Dogmas may disappear, but religion will flourish;\ndestroy the temple and sow it with salt, in a few days it rises again\nbuilt for aye on the solid ground of man\u2019s nature.\n\nSo long as the race is upon earth, just so long will the religious\nsentiment continue to crave its appropriate food, and this at last is\nrecognized even by those who estimate it at the lowest. \u201cTo yield this\nsentiment reasonable satisfaction,\u201d observes Professor Tyndall in one of\nhis best known addresses, \u201cis the problem of problems at the present\nhour. It is vain to oppose it with a view to its extirpation.\u201d The\n\u201cgeneral thaw of theological creeds,\u201d which Spencer remarks upon, is no\nsign of the loss of interest in religious subjects, but the reverse.\nColdness and languor are the premonitions of death, not strife and\ndefence.\n\nBut as the two moments of religious thought which I have now discussed\nhave both reached their culmination in a substantial repudiation of\nreligion, that which stimulates the religious sentiment to-day must be\nsomething different from either. This I take to be the _idea of personal\nsurvival_ after physical death, or, as it is generally called, the\ndoctrine of the immortality of the soul.\n\nThis is the main dogma in the leading religions of the world to-day. \u201cA\nGod,\u201d remarks Sir William Hamilton, speaking for the enlightened\nChristians of his generation, \u201cis to us of practical interest, only\ninasmuch as he is the condition of our immortality.\u201d[256-1] In his\nattractive work, _La Vie Eternelle_, whose large popularity shows it to\nexpress the prevailing views of modern Protestant thought, Ernest\nNaville takes pains to distinguish that Christianity is not a means of\nliving a holy life so much as one of gaining a blessed hereafter. The\npromises of a life after death are numerous and distinct in the New\nTestament. Most of the recommendations of action and suffering in this\nworld are based on the doctrine of compensation in the world to come.\n\nMohammed taught the same tenet with equal or even greater emphasis. In\none sura he says: \u201cTo whatever is evil may they be likened who believe\nnot in a future life;\u201d and elsewhere: \u201cAs for the blessed ones--their\nplace is Paradise. There shall they dwell so long as the heavens and the\nearth endure, enjoying the imperishable bounties of God. But as for\nthose who shall be consigned to misery, their place is the Fire. There\nshall they abide so long as the heavens and the earth shall last, unless\nGod wills it otherwise.\u201d[256-2]\n\nIn Buddhism, as generally understood, the doctrine of a future life is\njust as clear. Not only does the soul wander from one to another animal\nbody, but when it has completed its peregrinations and reaches its final\nabode, it revels in all sorts of bliss. For the condition of Nirvana,\nunderstood by philosophical Buddhists as that of the extinction of\ndesires even to the desire of life, and of the complete enlightenment of\nthe mind even to the recognition that existence itself is an illusion,\nhas no such meaning to the millions who profess themselves the followers\nof the sage of Kapilavastu. They take it to be a material Paradise with\npleasures as real as those painted by Mohammed, wherein they will dwell\nbeyond all time, a reward for their devotions and faith in this life.\n\nThese three religions embrace three-fourths of the human race and all\nits civilized nations, with trifling exceptions. They displaced and\nextinguished the older creeds and in a few centuries controlled the\nearth; but as against each other their strife has been of little avail.\nThe reason is, they share the same momentum of religious thought,\ndiffering in its interpretation not more among themselves than do\northodox members of either faith in their own fold. Many enlightened\nMuslims and Christians, for example, consider the descriptions of\nParadise given in the Koran and the Apocalypse to convey wholly\nspiritual meanings.\n\nThere has been so much to surprise in the rapid extension of these\nfaiths that the votaries of each claim manifest miraculous\ninterposition. The religious idea of an after life is a sufficient\nmoment to account for the phenomenon. I say the _religious_ idea, for,\nwith one or two exceptions, however distinct had been the belief in a\nhereafter, that belief had not a religious coloring until they gave it\nsuch. This distinction is an important one.\n\nStudents of religions have hitherto attributed too much weight to the\nprimitive notion of an existence after death. It is common enough, but\nit rarely has anything at all to do with the simpler manifestations of\nthe religious sentiment. These are directed to the immediate desires of\nthe individual or the community, and do not look beyond the present\nlife. The doctrine of compensation hereafter is foreign to them. I have\nshown this at length so far as the religions of America were concerned.\n\u201cNeither the delights of a heaven on the one hand, nor the terrors of a\nhell on the other were ever held out by priests or sages as an incentive\nto well doing, or a warning to the evil disposed.\u201d[258-1] The same is\ntrue of the classical religions of Greece and Rome, of Carthage and\nAssyria. Even in Egypt the manner of death and the rites of interment\nhad much more to do with the fate of the soul, than had its thoughts\nand deeds in the flesh. The opinions of Socrates and Plato on the soul\nas something which always existed and whose after life is affected by\nits experiences here, struck the Athenians as novel and innovating.\n\nOn the other hand, the ancient Germans had a most lively faith in the\nlife hereafter. Money was loaned in this world to be repaid in the next.\nBut with them also, as with the Aztecs, the future was dependent on the\ncharacter or mode of death rather than the conduct of life. He who died\nthe \u201cstraw-death\u201d on the couch of sickness looked for little joy in the\nhereafter; but he who met the \u201cspear-death\u201d on the field of battle went\nat once to Odin, to the hall of Valhalla, where the heroes of all time\nassembled to fight, eat boar\u2019s fat and drink beer. Even this rude belief\ngave them such an ascendancy over the materialistic Romans, that these\ndistinctly felt that in the long run they must succumb to a bravery\nwhich rested on such a mighty moment as this.[259-1]\n\nThe Israelites do not seem to have entertained any general opinion on an\nexistence after death. No promise in the Old Testament refers to a\nfuture life. The religion there taught nowhere looks beyond the grave.\nIt is materialistic to the fullest extent. Hence, a large body of\northodox Jewish philosophers, the Sadducees, denied the existence of the\nsoul apart from the body.\n\nThe central doctrine of the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, the leading\nimpulse which he gave to the religious thought of his age, was that the\nthinking part of man survives his physical death, and that its condition\ndoes not depend on the rites of interment, as other religions then\ntaught,[260-1] but on the character of its thoughts during life here.\nFilled with this new and sublime idea, he developed it in its numerous\napplications, and drew from it those startling inferences, which, to\nthis day, stagger his followers, and have been in turn, the terror and\nderision of his foes. This he saw, that against a mind inwardly\npenetrated with the full conviction of a life hereafter, obtainable\nunder known conditions, the powers of this world are utterly futile, and\nits pleasures hollow phantoms.\n\nThe practical energy of this doctrine was immensely strengthened by\nanother, which is found very obscurely, if at all, stated in his own\nwords, but which was made the central point of their teaching by his\nimmediate followers. The Christianity they preached was not a\nphilosophical scheme for improving the race, but rested on the\nhistorical fact of a transaction between God and man, and while they\nconceded everlasting existence to all men, all would pass it in the\nutmost conceivable misery, except those who had learned of these\nhistorical events, and understood them as the church prescribed.\n\nAs the ancient world placed truth in ideas and not in facts, no teaching\ncould well have been more radically contrary to its modes of thought;\nand the doctrine once accepted, the spirit of proselytizing came with\nit.\n\nI have called this idea a new one to the first century of our era, and\nso it was in Europe and Syria. But in India, Sakyamuni, probably five\nhundred years before, had laid down in sententious maxims the\nphilosophical principle which underlies the higher religious doctrine of\na future life. These are his words, and if through the efforts of\nreasoning we ever reach a demonstration of the immortality of the soul,\nwe shall do it by pursuing the argument here indicated: \u201cRight thought\nis the path to life everlasting. Those who think do not die.\u201d[262-1]\n\nTruth alone contains the elements of indefinite continuity; and truth is\nfound only in the idea, in correct thought.\n\nError in the intellectual processes corresponds to pain in sensation; it\nis the premonition of waning life, of threatened annihilation; it\ncontains the seed of cessation of action or death. False reasoning is\nself-destructive. The man who believes himself invulnerable will\nscarcely survive his first combat. A man\u2019s true ideas are the most he\ncan hope, and all that he should wish, to carry with him to a life\nhereafter. Falsehood, sin, is the efficient agent of death. As Bishop\nHall says: \u201cThere is a kind of not-being in sin; for sin is not an\nexistence of somewhat that is, but a deficiency of that rectitude which\nshould be; it is a privation, as blindness is a privation of sight.\u201d\n\nWhile the religious doctrine of personal survival has thus a position\ndefensible on grounds of reason as being that of the inherent permanence\nof self-conscious truth, it also calls to its aid and indefinitely\nelevates the most powerful of all the emotions, _love_. This, as I have\nshown in the second chapter, is the sentiment which is characteristic\nof _preservative_ acts. Self-love, which is prominent in the idea of the\nperfected individual, sex-love, which is the spirit of the multiform\nreligious symbolism of the reproductive act, and the love of race, which\nis the chief motor in the religion of humanity, are purified of their\ngrosser demands and assigned each its meet post in the labor of uniting\nthe conceptions of the true under the relation of personality.\n\nThe highest development of which such love is capable arises through the\ncontemplation of those verities which are abstract and eternal, and\nwhich thus set forth, to the extent the individual mind is capable of\nreceiving it, the completed notion of diuturnity. This highest love is\nthe \u201clove of God.\u201d A Supreme Intelligence, one to which all truth is\nperfect, must forever dwell in such contemplation. Therefore the deeper\nminds of Christianity define man\u2019s love of God, as God\u2019s love to\nhimself. \u201cEternal life,\u201d says Ernest Naville, \u201cis in its principle the\nunion with God and the joy that results from that union.\u201d[263-1] The\npious William Law wrote: \u201cNo man can reach God with his love, or have\nunion with Him by it, but he who is inspired with that one same spirit\nof love, with which God loved himself from all eternity, before there\nwas any creation.\u201d[264-1]\n\nAttractive as the idea of personal survival is in itself, and potent as\nit has been as a moment of religious thought, it must be ranked among\nthose that are past. While the immortality of the soul retains its\ninterest as a speculative inquiry, I venture to believe that as an idea\nin religious history, it is nigh inoperative; that as an element in\ndevotional life it is of not much weight; and that it will gradually\nbecome less so, as the real meaning of religion reaches clearer\ninterpretations.\n\nIts decay has been progressive, and common to all the creeds which\ntaught it as a cardinal doctrine, though most marked in Christianity. A\ncentury ago Gibbon wrote: \u201cThe ancient Christians were animated by a\ncontempt for their present existence, and by a just confidence of\nimmortality, of which the doubtful but imperfect faith of modern ages\ncannot give us any adequate notion.\u201d[264-2] How true this is can be\nappreciated only by those who study this doctrine in the lives and\nwritings of the martyrs and fathers of the primitive church.\n\nThe breach which Gibbon remarked has been indefinitely widened since his\ntime. What has brought this about, and what new moment in religious\nthought seems about to supply its place, will form an appropriate close\nto the present series of studies. In its examination, I shall speak only\nof Christian thought, since it leads the way which other systems will\nultimately follow.\n\nIn depicting the influences which have led and are daily leading with\naugmented force to the devitalizing of the doctrine of immortality, I\nmay with propriety confine myself to those which are themselves strictly\nreligious. For the change I refer to is not one brought about by the\nopponents of religion, by materialistic doctrines, but is owing to the\ndevelopment of the religious sentiment itself. Instead of tending to an\nabrogation of that sentiment, it may be expected to ennoble its\nemotional manifestations and elevate its intellectual conceptions.\n\nSome of these influences are historical, as the repeated disappointments\nin the second coming of Christ, and the interest of proselytizing\nchurches to interpret this event allegorically. Those which I deem of\nmore importance, however, are such as are efficient to-day, and probably\nwill continue to be the main agents in the immediate future of religious\ndevelopment. They are:\n\n(1.) The recognition of the grounds of ethics.\n\n(2.) The recognition of the cosmical relations.\n\n(3.) The clearer defining of life.\n\n(4.) The growing immateriality of religious thought.\n\n(1.) The authority of the Law was assumed in the course of time by most\nChristian churches, and the interests of morality and religion were\nclaimed to be identical. The Roman church with its developed casuistry\nis ready to prescribe the proper course of conduct in every emergency;\nand if we turn to many theological writers of other churches, Dick\u2019s\n_Philosophy of Religion_ for instance, we find moral conduct regarded as\nthe important aim of the Christian life. Morality without religion,\nworks without faith, are pronounced to be of no avail in a religious,\nand of very questionable value in a social sense. Some go so far as to\ndeny that a person indifferent to the prevailing tenets of religion can\nlead a pure and moral life. Do away with the belief in a hereafter of\nrewards and punishments, say these, and there is nothing left to\nrestrain men from the worst excesses, or at least from private sin.\n\nNow, however, the world is growing to perceive that morality is\nseparable from religion; that it arose independently, from a gradual\nstudy of the relations of man to man, from principles of equity inherent\nin the laws of thought, and from considerations of expediency which\ndeprive its precepts of the character of universality. Religion is\nsubjective, and that in which it exerts an influence on morality is not\nits contents, but the reception of them peculiar to the individual.\nExperience alone has taught man morals; pain and pleasure are the forms\nof its admonitions; and each generation sees more clearly that the\nprinciples of ethics are based on immutable physical laws. Moreover, it\nhas been shown to be dangerous to rest morality on the doctrine of a\nfuture life; for apart from the small effect the terrors of a hereafter\nhave on many sinners, as that doctrine is frequently rejected, social\ninterests suffer. And, finally, it is debasing and hurtful to religion\nto make it a substitute for police magistracy.[267-1]\n\nThe highest religion would certainly enforce the purest morality; but it\nis equally true that such a religion would enjoin much not approved by\nthe current opinions of the day. The spirit of the reform inaugurated by\nLuther was a protest against the subjection of the religious sentiment\nto a moral code. With the independence thus achieved, it came to be\nrecognized that to the full extent that morality is essential to\nreligion, it can be reached as well or better without a system of\nrewards and punishments after death, than with one. Both religion and\nmorality stand higher, when a conception of an after life for this\npurpose is dropped.\n\n(2.) The recognition of the cosmical relations has also modified the\nviews of personal survival. The expansion of the notions of space and\ntime by the sciences of geology and astronomy has, as I before remarked,\ndone away with the ancient belief that the culminating catastrophe of\nthe universe will be the destruction of this world. An insignificant\nsatellite of a third rate sun, which, with the far grander suns whose\nlight we dimly discern at night, may all be swept away in some flurry of\n\u201ccosmical weather,\u201d that the formation or the dissolution of such a body\nwould be an event of any beyond the most insignificant importance, is\nnow known to be almost ridiculous. To assert that at the end of a few or\na few thousand years, on account of events transpiring on the surface of\nthis planet, the whole relationship of the universe will be altered, a\nnew heaven and a new earth be formed, and all therein be made\nsubservient to the joys of man, becomes an indication of an arrogance\nwhich deserves to be called a symptom of insanity. Thus, much of the\nteleology both of the individual and the race taught by the primitive\nand medieval church undergoes serious alterations. The literal meaning\nof the millennium, the New Jerusalem, and the reign of God on earth has\nbeen practically discarded.\n\nWith the disappearance of the ancient opinion that the universe was\ncreated for man, the sun to light him by day and the stars by night,\ndisappeared also the later thesis that the happiness or the education of\nman was the aim of the Order in Things. The extent and duration of\nmatter, if they indicate any purpose at all, suggest one incomparably\nvaster than this; while the laws of mind, which alone distinctly point\nto purpose, reveal one in which pain and pleasure have no part or lot,\nand one in which man has so small a share that it seems as if it must be\nindifferent what his fate may be. The slightest change in the atmosphere\nof the globe will sweep away his species forever.\n\nSchopenhauer classified all religions as optimisms or pessimisms. The\nfaith of the future will be neither. What is agreeable or disagreeable\nto man will not be its standard of the excellence of the universe.\nHowever unwillingly, he is at last brought to confess that his comfort\nis not the chief nor even any visible aim of the order in things. In the\ncourse of that order it may be, nay, it is nigh certain, that the human\nspecies will pass through decadence to extinction along with so many\nother organisms. Neither as individuals nor as a race, neither in regard\nto this life nor to the next, does the idea of God, when ennobled by a\ncontemplation of the cosmical relations, permit to man the effrontery\nof claiming that this universe and all that therein is was made with an\neye to his wants and wishes, whether to gratify or to defeat them.\n\n(3.) The closer defining of life as a result of physical force, and the\nrecognition of mind as a connotation of organism, promise to be active\nin elevating religious conceptions, but at the expense of the current\nnotions of personality. Sensation and voluntary motion are common to the\nfetus, the brute and the plant, as well as to man. They are not part of\nhis \u201csoul.\u201d Intellect and consciousness, as I have shown, exclude\nsensation, and in these, if anywhere, he must look for his immortal\npart. Even here, error works destruction, and ignorance plants no seed\nof life. We are driven back to the teaching of Buddha, that true thought\nalone is that which does not die.\n\nWhy should we ask more? What else is worth saving? Our present\npersonality is a train of ideas base and noble, true and false, coherent\nthrough the contiguity of organs nourished from a common center. Another\npersonality is possible, one of true ideas coherent through conscious\nsimilarity, independent of sensation, as dealing with topics not\ncommensurate with it. Yet were this refuge gained, it leaves not much of\nthe dogma that every man has an indestructible conscious soul, which\nwill endure always, no matter what his conduct or thoughts have been.\nRather does it favor the opinion expressed so well by Matthew Arnold in\none of his sonnets:\n\n    \u201cHe who flagged not in the earthly strife\n    From strength to strength advancing--only he,\n    His soul well knit and all his battles won,\n    Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life.\u201d\n\nNot only has the received doctrine of a \u201csoul,\u201d as an undying something\ndifferent from mind and peculiar to man, received no support from a\ncloser study of nature,--rather objections amounting to refutation,--but\nit has reacted injuriously on morals, and through them on religion\nitself. Buddha taught that the same spark of immortality exists in man\nand brute, and actuated by this belief laid down the merciful rule to\nhis disciples: \u201cDo harm to no breathing thing.\u201d The apostle Paul on the\nother hand, recognizing in the lower animals no such claim on our\nsympathy, asks with scorn: \u201cDoth God care for oxen?\u201d and actually strips\nfrom a humane provision of the old Mosaic code its spirit of charity, in\norder to make it subserve a point in his polemic.\n\n(4.) As the arrogance of the race has thus met a rebuke, so has the\negotism of the individual. His religion at first was a means of securing\nmaterial benefits; then a way to a joyous existence beyond the tomb: the\nlove of self all the time in the ascendant.\n\nThis egoism in the doctrine of personal survival has been repeatedly\nflung at it by satirists, and commented on by philosophers. The\nChristian who \u201chopes to be saved by grossly believing\u201d has been felt on\nall hands to be as mean in his hope, as he is contemptible in his way of\nattaining it. To center all our religious efforts to the one end of\ngetting joy--however we may define it--for our individual selves, has\nsomething repulsive in it to a deeply religious mind. Yet that such in\nthe real significance of the doctrine of personal survival is granted by\nits ablest defenders. \u201cThe general expectation of future happiness can\nafford satisfaction only as it is a present object to the principle of\nself-love,\u201d says Dr. Butler, the eminent Lord Bishop of Durham, than\nwhom no acuter analyst has written on the religious nature of man.\n\nYet nothing is more certain than that the spirit of true religion wages\nconstant war with the predominance or even presence of selfish aims.\nSelf-love is the first and rudest form of the instinct of preservation.\nIt is sublimed and sacrificed on the altar of holy passion. \u201cSelf,\u201d\nexclaims the fervid William Law, \u201cis both atheist and idolater; atheist,\nbecause it rejects God; idolater, because it is its own idol.\u201d Even when\nthis lowest expression of the preservative instinct rises but to the\nheight of sex-love, it renounces self, and rejoices in martyrdom. \u201cAll\nfor love, or the world well lost,\u201d has been the motto of too many\ntragedies to be doubted now. By the side of the ancient Roman or the\nsoldier of the French revolution, who through mere love of country\nmarched joyously to certain death from which he expected no waking, does\nnot the martyr compare unfavorably, who meets the same death, but does\nso because he believes that thereby he secures endless and joyous life?\nIs his love as real, as noble, as unselfish?\n\nEven the resistless physical energy which the clear faith in the life\nhereafter has so often imparted, becomes something uncongenial to the\nripened religious meditation. Such faith brings about mighty effects in\nthe arena of man\u2019s struggles, but it does so through a sort of\nmechanical action. An ulterior purpose is ahead, to wit, the salvation\nof the soul, and it may be regarded as one of the best established\nprinciples of human effort that every business is better done, when it\nis done for its own sake, out of liking for it, than for results\nexpected from it.\n\nOf nothing is this more just than religion. Those blossoms of spiritual\nperfection, the purified reason, the submissive will, the sanctifying\ngrace of abstract ideas, find no propitious airs amid the violent toil\nfor personal survival, whether that is to be among the mead jugs of\nValhalla, the dark-eyed houris of Paradise, or the \u201csolemn troops and\nsweet society\u201d of Christian dreams. Unmindful of these, the saintly\npsyche looks to nothing beyond truth; it asks no definite, still less\npersonal, end to which this truth is to be applied; to find it is to\nlove it, and to love it is enough.\n\nThe doctrine I here broach, is no strange one to Christian thought. To\nbe sure the exhortation, \u201cSave your soul from Hell,\u201d was almost the sole\nincentive to religion in the middle ages, and is still the burden of\nmost sermons. But St. Paul was quickened with a holier fire, that\nconsumed and swept away such a personal motive, when he wrote: \u201cYea, I\ncould wish that I myself were cast out from Christ as accursed, for the\nsake of my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.\u201d[274-1] St.\nAugustine reveals the touch of the same inspiration in his passionate\nexclamation: \u201cFar, O Lord, far from the heart of thy servant be it that\nI should rejoice in any joy whatever. The blessed life is the joy in\ntruth alone.\u201d[274-2] And amid the p\u00e6ans to everlasting life which fill\nthe pages of the _De Imitatione Christi_, the medieval monk saw\nsomething yet greater, when he puts in the mouth of God the Father, the\nwarning: \u201cThe wise lover thinks not of the gift, but of the love of the\ngiver. He rests not in the reward, but in Me, beyond all\nrewards.\u201d[275-1] The mystery of great godliness is, that he who has it\nis as one who seeking nothing yet finds all things, who asking naught\nfor his own sake, neither in the life here nor yet hereafter, gains that\nalone which is of worth in either.\n\nPressed by such considerations, the pious Schleiermacher threw down the\nglaive on the side of religion half a century ago when he wrote: \u201cLife\nto come, as popularly conceived, is the last enemy which speculative\ncriticism has to encounter, and, if possible, to overcome.\u201d The course\nhe marked out, however, was not that which promises success. Recurring\nto the austere theses of Spinoza, he sought to bring them into accord\nwith a religion of emotion. The result was a refined Pantheism with its\nusual deceptive solutions.\n\nWhat recourse is left? Where are we to look for the intellectual moment\nof religion in the future? Let us review the situation.\n\nThe religious sentiment has been shown to be the expression of\nunfulfilled desire, but this desire peculiar as dependent on unknown\npower. Material advantages do not gratify it, nor even spiritual joy\nwhen regarded as a personal sentiment. Preservation by and through\nrelation with absolute intelligence has appeared to be the meaning of\nthat \u201clove of God\u201d which alone yields it satisfaction. Even this is\nsevered from its received doctrinal sense by the recognition of the\nspeculative as above the numerical unity of that intelligence, and the\nlimitation of personality which spiritual thought demands. The eternal\nlaws of mind guarantee perpetuity to the extent they are obeyed--and no\nfarther. They differ from the laws of force in that they convey a\nmessage which cannot be doubted concerning the purport of the order in\nnature, which is itself \u201cthe will of God.\u201d That message in its\napplication is the same which with more or less articulate utterance\nevery religion speaks--Seek truth: do good. Faith in that message,\nconfidence in and willing submission to that order, this is all the\nreligious sentiment needs to bring forth its sweetest flowers, its\nrichest fruits.\n\nSuch is the ample and satisfying ground which remains for the religion\nof the future to build upon. It is a result long foreseen by the clearer\nminds of Christendom. One who more than any other deserves to be classed\namong these writes: \u201cResignation to the will of God is the whole of\npiety. * * * Our resignation may be said to be perfect when we rest in\nhis will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good.\nNeither is this at bottom anything more than faith, and honesty and\nfairness of mind; in a more enlarged sense, indeed, than these words are\ncommonly used.\u201d[277-1]\n\nGoethe, who studied and reflected on religious questions more than is\ngenerally supposed, saw that in such a disposition of mind lie the\nnative and strongest elements of religion. In one of his conversations\nwith Chancellor M\u00fcller, he observed: \u201cConfidence and resignation, the\nsense of subjection to a higher will which rules the course of events\nbut which we do not fully comprehend, are the fundamental principles of\nevery better religion.\u201d[277-2]\n\nBy the side of two such remarkable men, I might place the opinion of a\nthird not less eminent than they--Blaise Pascal. In one part of his\nwritings he sets forth the \u201cmarks of a true religion.\u201d Sifted from its\nphysical ingredients, the faith he defines is one which rests on love\nand submission to God, and a clear recognition of the nature of man.\n\nHere I close these studies on the Religious Sentiment. They show it to\nbe a late and probably a final development of mind. The intellect first\nreaches entire self-consciousness, the emotions first attain perfection\nof purpose, when guided by its highest manifestation. Man\u2019s history\nseems largely to have been a series of efforts to give it satisfaction.\nThis will be possible only when he rises to a practical appreciation of\nthe identity of truth, love and life.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[236-1] _Essay on the use of Anthropomorphism._ Mr. Spencer\u2019s argument,\nin his own words, is this:--\u201cFrom the inability under which we labor to\nconceive of a Deity save as some idealization of ourselves, it\ninevitably results that in each age, among each people, and to a great\nextent in each individual, there must arise just that conception of\nDeity best adapted to the needs of the case.\u201d \u201cAll are good for their\ntimes and places.\u201d \u201cAll were beneficent in their effects on those who\nheld them.\u201d It would be hard to quote from the records of theory-making\nan example of more complete indifference to acknowledged facts than\nthese quotations set forth.\n\n[239-1] _De Veritate_, p. 216.\n\n[241-1] August Neander, _Geschichte der Christlichen Religion und\nKirche_, Bd. i., ss. 160, 346. (Gotha, 1856.) St. Clement\u2019s description\nof Christ is \u03a4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. Tertullian says: \u201cNec human\u00e6 honestatis\ncorpus fuit, nedum celestis claritatis.\u201d\n\n[243-1] Novalis, _Schriften_, B. i., s. 244.\n\n[244-1] A. Bain, _The Senses and the Intellect_, p. 607.\n\n[245-1] Dr. T. Laycock, _On some Organic Laws of Memory_, in the\n_Journal of Mental Science_, July, 1875, p. 178.\n\n[246-1] Speaking of the mission of the artist, Wilhelm von Humboldt\nsays: \u201cDie ganze Natur, treu und vollst\u00e4ndig beobachtet, mit sich\nhin\u00fcber zu tragen, d. h. den Stoff seiner Erfahrungen dem Umfange der\nWelt gleich zu machen, diese ungeheure Masse einzelner und abgerissener\nErscheinungen in eine l\u2019ungetrennte Einheit und ein organisirtes Ganzes\nzu verwandeln; und dies durch alle die Organe zu thun, die ihm hierzu\nverliehen sind,--ist das letzte Ziel seines intellectuellen Bem\u00fchen.\u201d\n_Ueber Goethe\u2019s Hermann und Dorothea_, Ab. IV.\n\n[246-2] _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, B. I. s. 48.\n\n[247-1] _Gesammelte Werke_. Bd. VII., s. 63.\n\n[249-1] See this forcibly brought out and abundantly illustrated in the\nwork of M. Coulange, _La Cit\u00e9 Antique_.\n\n[249-2] W. von Humboldt, _Gesammelte Werke_. Bd. VII., p. 72.\n\n[250-1] H. L. Liddon, Canon of St. Paul\u2019s. _Some Elements of Religion_,\np. 84.\n\n[251-1] The Chevalier Bunsen completed the moral estimate of the\none-man-power, thus acknowledged by Machiavelli, in these words: \u201cAlles\nGrosse geht aus vom Einzelnen, _aber nur in dem Masse, als dieser das\nIch dem Ganzen opfert_.\u201d _Gott in der Geschichte_, Bd. I., s. 38.\n\n[252-1] W. von Humboldt, _Ideen zu einem Vorsuch, die Gr\u00e4nzen der\nWirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen_, Breslau, 1851. Auguste Comte,\n_Syst\u00e8me de Politique Positive_, Paris, 1851-4. The former was written\nmany years before its publication.\n\n[256-1] _Lectures on Metaphysics_, Vol. I., p. 23.\n\n[256-2] _The Koran_, Suras xi., xvi.\n\n[258-1] _The Myths of the New World_, Chap. IX.\n\n[259-1] Jacob Grimm quite overlooked this important element in the\nreligion of the ancient Germans. It is ably set forth by Adolf\nHoltzmann, _Deutsche Mythologie_, s. 196 sqq. (Leipzig, 1874).\n\n[260-1] The seemingly heartless reply he made to one of his disciples,\nwho asked permission to perform the funeral rites at his father\u2019s grave:\n\u201cFollow me; and let the dead bury their dead,\u201d is an obvious\ncondemnation of one of the most widespread superstitions of the ancient\nworld. So, according to an ingenious suggestion of Lord Herbert of\nCherbury, was the fifth commandment of Moses: \u201cNe parentum seriem\ntanquam primam aliquam causam suspicerent homines, et proinde cultum\naliquem Divinum illis deferrent, qualem ex honore parentum sperare\nliceat benedictionem, docuit.\u201d _De Veritate_, p. 231.\n\nHerbert Spencer in his _Essay on the Origin of Animal Worship_, calls\nancestral worship \u201cthe universal first form of religious belief.\u201d This\nis very far from correct, but it is easy to see how a hasty thinker\nwould be led into the error by the prominence of the ancient funereal\nceremonies.\n\n[262-1] Dhammapada, 21.\n\n[263-1] _La Vie Eternelle_, p. 339.\n\n[264-1] _The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, Vol. I., ch. XV.\n\n[264-2] _Address to the Clergy_, p. 16.\n\n[267-1] \u201cToute religion, qu\u2019on se permet de d\u00e9fendre comme une croyance\nqu\u2019il est utile de laisser au peuple, ne peut plus esp\u00e9rer qu\u2019une agonie\nplus ou moins prolong\u00e9e.\u201d Condorcet, _De l\u2019Esprit Humain_, Ep. V.\n\n[274-1] _Romans_, ch. ix., v. 3.\n\n[274-2] \u201cBeata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate.\u201d Augustini\n_Confessionum_, Lib. x., caps. xxii., xxiii.\n\n[275-1] \u201cPrudens amator non tam donum amantis considerat, quam dantis\namorem. Nobilis amator non quiescit in dono, sed in me super omne\ndonum.\u201d _De Imitatione Christi_, Lib. iii., cap. vi.\n\n[277-1] _Fifteen Sermons_ by Joseph Butler, Lord Bishop of Durham.\nSermon \u201cOn the love of God.\u201d\n\n[277-2] _Unterhaltungen_, p. 131.\n\n\n\n\nINDICES.\n\n\nI. AUTHORS QUOTED.\n\n  Allen, H., 208.\n\n  Anaxagoras, 106.\n\n  Arnold, M., 249, 271.\n\n  Aristotle, 105.\n\n  Augustine, St., 20, 57, 93, 128, 191, 194, 274.\n\n\n  Bain, A., 9, 25, 52, 59, 87, 91, 244.\n\n  Barlow, H. C., 201.\n\n  Baxter, Richard, 60.\n\n  Boehmer, H., 7.\n\n  Boole, Geo., 24, 44, 104, 105, 108, 111.\n\n  Bunsen, 109, 251.\n\n  Butler, Bishop, 60, 119, 276.\n\n\n  Carlyle, 243.\n\n  Catlow, J. P., 14, 64.\n\n  Chateaubriand, 250.\n\n  Comte, A., 11, 39, 128, 187, 194, 252.\n\n  Condorcet, 267.\n\n  Cory, J. P., 191.\n\n  Coulange, 245.\n\n  Creuzer, 90, 106, 119, 127, 200, 212, 222.\n\n  Cussans, 210.\n\n\n  Dante, 93.\n\n  Darwin, C., 71, 88.\n\n  Dick, 266.\n\n  Dickson, J. T., 73.\n\n\n  Etheridge, J. W., 190.\n\n\n  Ferguson, 66.\n\n  Ferrier, J. F., 20, 28, 43, 97.\n\n  Feuchtersleben, 8, 54, 73.\n\n  Feuerbach, 194.\n\n  Fothergill, J. M., 61.\n\n\n  Gibbon, 264.\n\n  Goethe, 277.\n\n  Gurney, J. J., 119.\n\n\n  Hall, Bishop, 50, 77.\n\n  Hamilton, Sir W., 24, 29, 91, 95, 99, 256.\n\n  Helmholtz, 11, 14, 18, 22.\n\n  Hegel, 29, 88.\n\n  Herbert of Cherbury, 149, 260.\n\n  Hobbes, 81.\n\n  Hodgson, S. N., 104, 126, 128, 134.\n\n  Holtzmann, A., 259.\n\n  Humboldt, A. von, 92.\n\n  Humboldt, W. von, 6, 53, 67, 93, 112, 113, 214, 246, 252.\n\n  Hume, David, 81, 187, 219.\n\n  Hunter, John, 9.\n\n\n  Jacobi, 88.\n\n  Jevons, W. S., 25, 204.\n\n  Kant, I., 25, 29, 32, 40, 91, 105, 194.\n\n\n  Kolk, Schroeder van der, 72.\n\n  Kitto, 74.\n\n  Koppen, 37, 214.\n\n\n  Law, Wm., 49, 87, 263, 272.\n\n  Laycock, 75, 245.\n\n  Lessing, 56, 254.\n\n  Lewes, 187.\n\n  Liddon, H. L., 129, 250.\n\n\n  Mansel, 87, 88.\n\n  Maudsley, H., 9, 150.\n\n  Mill, J. S., 18, 87, 91, 97, 223.\n\n  Mohammed, 71, 75, 114, 256.\n\n  Morell, J. D., 88.\n\n  Morley, J., 223.\n\n  M\u00fcller, 130.\n\n  M\u00fcller, Max, _preface_.\n\n\n  Naville, E., 256, 263.\n\n  Neander, A., 241.\n\n  Novalis, 41, 49, 107, 124, 243.\n\n\n  Oersted, 103.\n\n  Oken, L., 7, 186.\n\n\n  Paget, J., 63.\n\n  Parker, Theo., 88.\n\n  Pascal, 56.\n\n  Plath, 129.\n\n  Rousseau, J. J., 118.\n\n  Saussure, Necker de, 220.\n\n  Schlagintweit, E., 187.\n\n  Schleiermacher, 88, 275.\n\n  Schoolcraft, 63, 146.\n\n  Schopenhauer, A., 11, 13, 51, 82, 91, 269.\n\n  Schwarz, 207.\n\n  Senancourt de, 53, 180.\n\n  Spinoza, 9, 14, 17, 41, 42, 51, 98, 104.\n\n  Spencer, Herbert, 29, 39, 98, 104, 236, 260.\n\n  Swedenborg, 75.\n\n  Steinthal, 101, 246.\n\n  Tertullian, 241.\n\n  Theophilus, 191.\n\n  Thompson, 31.\n\n  Todhunter, 25.\n\n  Tyndall, 87, 132, 255.\n\n  Voltaire, 249.\n\n  Westropp, 62.\n\n  Wigan, A. L., 76.\n\n  Williams, J., 76.\n\n  Wordsworth, 41, 42, 180.\n\n  Windelband, Dr., 101, 102, 108.\n\n\n  II. SUBJECTS.\n\n  Absolute, the, 102, 106.\n    consciousness of, 161.\n\n  Adam, as prophet of the moon, 170.\n\n  Adjita, 178.\n\n  Adonis, 165.\n\n  Aeon, 163, 166.\n\n  Agdistis, an epicene deity, 65.\n\n  Ahura-Mazda, 113, 166, 184.\n\n  Allah, 239.\n\n  Amitabha, 175, 185.\n\n  Analytic propositions, 32.\n\n  Androgynous deities, 66.\n\n  Animism, 163.\n\n  Anointed, the, 176.\n\n  Anya-Mainyus, 166, 184.\n\n  Anthropomorphism, 193.\n\n  Antinomies, of Kant, 29.\n\n  Aphrodite, 65, 241.\n\n  Apocalypse, the, 171.\n\n  Apollo, 67, 241.\n\n  Apperception, 156.\n\n  Apprehension, 142.\n\n  Arab idea of time, 165.\n\n  Argumentum de appetitu, 231.\n\n  Aronhiate, a Huron deity, 221.\n\n  Arrenothele deities, 66.\n\n  Art, religious, in Orient, 15;\n    in Greece, 16;\n    Christian, 209, 241;\n    useless and immoral, 244.\n\n  Assyria, flood myth of, 169.\n\n  Athanasius, his doctrine of the Trinity, 191.\n\n  Atonement, doctrine of, 222.\n\n  Avalokitesvara, 214.\n\n  Aztecs, 80.\n\n\n  Baghavad Gita, the, 189.\n\n  Babylon, rites of, 74.\n\n  Baldur, 176.\n\n  Baptism, 138, 226.\n\n  Beauty, the line of, 15, 211.\n    the religion of, 241, 244, 245.\n\n  Belief, its kinds, 141.\n\n  Brahma, 65, 169.\n\n  Brahmans, highest bliss of, 57;\n    doctrines, 168, 169.\n\n  Breidablick, 176.\n\n  Brutes, religious feeling in, 88.\n\n  Buddha, 37, 57, 80, 120, 146, 156, 261, 271.\n\n  Buddhism, four truths of, 13;\n    theories of prayer, 121, 150, 214;\n    last day, 169;\n    myths, 175, 176;\n    monotheism of, 187, 247, 256.\n\n  Bull, as a symbol, 204.\n\n\n  Cabala, Jehova in, 65.\n\n  Canting arms, 212.\n\n  Cause, not a reason, 38;\n    in physical science, 91.\n\n  Celibacy, Romish, 61.\n\n  Cerebration, unconscious, 149.\n\n  Chance, the idea of, 93.\n\n  Chinese character for prayer, 129.\n\n  Christ, _see_ Jesus.\n\n  Christianity, doctrines of, 190, 257, 264, 274;\n    symbol of, 203.\n\n  Christmas tree, the, 215.\n\n  Cockatrice, the, 77.\n\n  Commonwealth, ideal of, 247.\n\n  Consciousness, forms of, 17, 20.\n\n  Confucius, doctrine, 122, sq.\n\n  Continuity, law of, 11, 16;\n    principle of, 95.\n\n  Contradiction, law of, 27, 102.\n\n  Correspondences, doctrine of, 217.\n\n  Cosmical relations of man, 112, 268.\n\n  Cotytto, 65.\n\n  Cow, as a symbol, 204.\n\n  Craoshan\u00e7, 176.\n\n  Creation, myth of, 166.\n\n  Crescent, a phallic symbol, 62.\n\n  Cross, a phallic symbol, 62;\n    as phonetic symbol, 210;\n    variants of, 210.\n\n  Cult, the, 199 sq.\n\n  Culture, religion of, 243, 244, 253.\n\n  Cybele, 65; priests of, 66, 219.\n\n\n  Dactyli, the, 184.\n\n  Darkness, terror of, 185.\n\n  Day of Judgment, the, 172.\n\n  Deity, _see_ God.\n\n  Design, argument from, 110.\n\n  Desire, meaning of, 53.\n\n  Deus, 185; triformis, 191.\n\n  Deva, 185.\n\n  Didactic rites, 225.\n\n  Divination and prayer, 137.\n\n  Dramatic rites, 226.\n\n  Dual law of thought, 27, 102;\n    division of the gods, 182, 183.\n\n\n  Edda, mythology of, 175, 215.\n\n  Eden, garden of, 175.\n\n  Ego, the, 19.\n\n  Egoism of religion, 272.\n\n  Egyptians, doctrines of, 80, 222;\n    prayers, 115;\n    pyramids, 212;\n    lotus of, 214.\n\n  Emotions, origin of, 10;\n    exclude thought, 19;\n    in religion, 49;\n    of fear and hope, 50, 51;\n    esthetic, 14.\n\n  Entheasm, 148.\n\n  Epochs of nature, 164 sq.\n\n  Epicene deities, 66.\n\n  Epilepsy and religious delusions, 75.\n\n  Eros, 72.\n\n  Esculapius, emblem of, 200.\n\n  Esthetic emotions, 14, 244.\n\n  Ethics, grounds of, 266.\n\n  Excluded middle, law of, 27, sqq.\n\n  Expectant attention, 74, 129.\n\n  Explanation, limits of, 38.\n\n\n  Faith in religion, 107.\n\n  Fascination, 74.\n\n  Fear, in religion, 50, sqq.\n\n  Female principle in religion, 62, 183.\n\n  Feridun, garden of, 175.\n\n  Flood, myth of, 169, sq.\n\n  Fingers, as gods, 184.\n\n  Force, orders of, 133.\n\n  Freedom, 105.\n\n  Friends, sect of, _see_ Quakers.\n\n  Future life, doctrine of, 256, sq.\n\n\n  Gallican confession, the, 138.\n\n  Generative function in religion, 62, 72, 73.\n\n  Genius as inspiration, 149.\n\n  Gnosis, the genuine, 74.\n\n  Gnostic doctrines, 166.\n\n  God, as father, 70;\n    spouses of, 69, 71;\n    mother of, 68;\n    sexless, 71;\n    earliest notions of, 78;\n    incomprehensible, 98;\n    throne of, 167;\n    love of, 73, 263, 276.\n\n  Gods,\n    hierarchy of, 181;\n    quantification of the, 186;\n    of lightning, 207.\n\n  Good, final victory of, 179.\n\n  Grasshoppers, prayers against, 131.\n\n  Greeks, art of, 16;\n    doctrines of, 80;\n    sophists, 96.\n\n  Gudmund, King, 175.\n\n\n  Hades, 186.\n\n  Hare, the Great, 212.\n\n  Hell, 186, 258, 274.\n\n  Hercules, 72.\n\n  Hermaphrodite deities, 66.\n\n  Hesperides, the, 175.\n\n  Hierarchy of the gods, 181.\n\n  High places, worship of, 215, 216.\n\n  Historic ideas, 232.\n\n  Holy spirit, as inspiring, 138;\n    brooding, 167.\n\n  Hope, in religion, 51 sqq.\n\n  Hor\u00e6, the, 165.\n\n  Humanity, the religion of, 194, 253.\n\n\n  Ignorance, in relation to religion, 82.\n\n  Illumination, 140.\n\n  Immortality, doctrine of, 255.\n\n  Indians, American, 125, 157.\n\n  Insanity, religious, 76.\n\n  Inspiration, 137.\n\n  Intelligence, one in kind, 96;\n    as the first cause, 106, 111.\n\n  Irmin, pillars of, 215.\n\n  Ischomachus, prayer of, 126.\n\n  Israelites, the Messiah of, 176.\n\n\n  Janus, an epicene deity, 65.\n\n  Jehovah, 65, 156.\n\n  Jemschid, king, 175.\n\n  Jesus, face of, 67, 241;\n    conception of, 71;\n    wounds of, 130;\n    wisdom of, 144;\n    as second Noah, 170;\n    teachings, 178, 260;\n    prayer to, 187;\n    execution of, 203;\n    death of, 222.\n\n  Judaism, 187.\n\n  Judgment, day of, 172.\n\n\n  Kalpa, of Brahmans, 168.\n\n  Knowledge, forms of, 21.\n\n  Kosmos, the, 72, 144, 167.\n\n\n  Lateau, Louise, 130.\n\n  Law, defined, 40;\n    of excluded middle, 27;\n    oldest, 248.\n\n  Laws, the, of thought, 26, sq.; 101, sq.;\n    not restrictive, 105;\n    as purposive, 108.\n\n  Light, as object of worship, 185.\n\n  Lightning, the, in symbolic art, 207.\n\n  Life, the perfect, 57.\n\n  Lingam, the, 66.\n\n  Lingayets, sect of, 66.\n\n  Logic, applied, 23;\n    abstract or formal, 24;\n    mathematical, 24;\n    laws of, 101, sq.\n\n  Logos, the, 42, 106.\n\n  Lotus, as symbol, 213, sq.\n\n  Love, as religious emotion, defined, 58, 60, 262;\n    of sex, 61, 63;\n    law of, 73;\n    of God, 73, 263, 276.\n\n\n  Ma, a goddess, 183.\n\n  Maitreya, 176.\n\n  Mamona, a Haitian deity, 68.\n\n  M\u00e4rchen, the, defined, 157.\n\n  Marriage condemned, 69.\n\n  Maypole, as a symbol, 215.\n\n  Melitta, 65.\n\n  Memory, physical basis of, 10;\n    ancestral, 75.\n\n  Memorial, rites, 225.\n\n  Messiah, the, 176.\n\n  Millennium, the, 173, 268.\n\n  Michabo, an Algonkin deity, 185.\n\n  Mind,\n    growth of, 7;\n    extent of, 8, 271;\n    as seat of law, 163.\n\n  Miracles, 110, 130.\n\n  Mithras, 65.\n\n  Mohammed,\n    notion of god, 71;\n    inspired, 146.\n\n  Mohammedanism, 187, 224.\n\n  Monotheism, origin of, 80, 81; 186, sq.\n\n  Moral government of the world, 112.\n\n  Morality, independent of religion, dualism of deities, 182, 249, 266, 267.\n\n  Mormonism, 61.\n\n  Motion, first law of, 11;\n    relation to time and space, 35;\n    manifestations of, 77.\n\n  Myth, the, defined, 156.\n\n\n  Names, sacred, 156.\n\n  Natural selection, in sensation, 10;\n    in logic, 101.\n\n  Nature,\n    meaning of, 4, 39, 105;\n    epochs of, 164.\n\n  Nemqueteba, 240.\n\n  Neo-Hegelian doctrine, 194.\n\n  Nirvana, the, 13, 57, 257.\n\n  Noah, 170.\n\n  Nous, the, 106.\n\n\n  Oannes, 170.\n\n  Obelisk as symbol, 215.\n\n  Odainsakr, 175.\n\n  Odin, 53, 259.\n\n  Optimism, 112, 269.\n\n  Order, in things, 90, sq.\n\n  Osiris, 165.\n\n\n  Pain, defined, 17.\n\n  Parsees, doctrine of, 80, 166, 184.\n\n  Pantheism, 188, 194, 247.\n\n  Papas, a Phrygian god, 183.\n\n  Paradise, lost and regained, myths of, 173, sq;\n    future, 257.\n\n  Pentalpha, the, 212.\n\n  Perfected commonwealth, idea of, 247.\n\n  Perfected individual, idea of, 239.\n\n  Personal survival, idea of, 255.\n\n  Pessimism, 11, 112, 269.\n\n  Persians, ancient, 176.\n\n  Personality, the, 19, 270.\n\n  Phallus, worship of, 62, 66, 214, 216.\n\n  Phanes, the orphic principle, 190.\n\n  Philosophy of religion, defined, 3;\n    of mythology, 159;\n    of history, 232.\n\n  Phrygian divinities, 183.\n\n  Pillar worship, 215.\n\n  Pleasure, defined, 14.\n\n  Polarization, as a principle of thought, 183.\n\n  Porte Royale, miracles of, 131.\n\n  Postulates of religion, 89.\n\n  Prayer, 117, sq.\n\n  Progression of development, 109.\n\n  Protestantism, 128, 139, 250.\n\n  Protogonus, 167.\n\n  Psyche, and love, 72.\n\n  Pythagoras, his thoughts on number, 189.\n\n\n  Quakers, sect of, 76, 115, 138, 147.\n\n  Quantification of the predicate, 22;\n    of the gods, 186.\n\n  Quetzalcoatl, 212.\n\n\n  Reason in religion, 106, 107;\n    drawn from sight, 186.\n\n  Rebus in symbolism, 212.\n\n  Regin, as name of gods, 90.\n\n  Relative, the, 106.\n\n  Religion, science of, 3;\n    philosophy of, 3;\n    personal factor of, 81;\n    not concerned with phenomena, 110.\n\n  Reproductive function in religion, 62.\n\n  Res per accidens, 182.\n\n  Resignation, doctrine of, 128, 135.\n\n  Revelation, marks of, 149.\n\n  Rig Veda, the, 125.\n\n  Rite, the, 217, seq.\n\n  Roland, pillars of, 215.\n\n  Roman Catholics, 76, 138, 141, 187, 250.\n\n\n  Sabians, myths of, 170.\n\n  Sacraments, 227.\n\n  Sacrifice, idea in, 218;\n    vicarious, 222.\n\n  Saga, the, defined, 157.\n\n  Saint Brigida, 146.\n\n  Saint Gertrude of Nivelles, 146.\n\n  Sakyamuni, _see_ Buddha.\n\n  Saturnian Era, the, 175.\n\n  Science of Religion, 3;\n    as knowledge of system, 92;\n    of mythology, 158.\n\n  Secularization of symbols, 204.\n\n  Sensation, defined, 9;\n    excludes thought, 19;\n    of pain and pleasure, 10.\n\n  Sentiment, the religious, 3;\n    emotional elements of, 79;\n    rational postulates of, 87;\n    religion of, 250.\n\n  Serpent, as emblem and symbol, 200, 206, 207.\n\n  Sev, an Egyptian deity, 165.\n\n  Sex, love of, 61, 63;\n    in nature, 71, 72, 216.\n\n  Shekinah, the, 66.\n\n  Siddartha, a name of Buddha, 121.\n\n  Similars, law of, 204.\n\n  Sin, sense of, 225.\n\n  Sight, as the light-sense, 186.\n\n  Siva, worship of, 66, 214.\n\n  Soul, the, 19, 271.\n\n  Specific performance in rites, 218, sq.\n\n  Stigmata, the, 130.\n\n  Sufficient reason, principle of, 91.\n\n  Sukhavati, 175.\n\n  Supernatural, defined, 4;\n    its relation to symbols, 205.\n\n  Swedenborg, 75, 217.\n\n  Symbol, the phonetic, 200;\n    origin of, 202;\n    related and coincident, 203.\n\n  Symbolism, defined, 200.\n\n  Synthesis of contraries, 37.\n\n  Synthetic propositions, 32.\n\n\n  Tathagata, a name of Buddha, 121.\n\n  Tau, the Egyptian, 210.\n\n  Theology, 4.\n\n  Thor, hammer of, 210, 239.\n\n  Thought, as a function, 17;\n    laws of, 26, 101, sq.;\n    as purposive, 108.\n\n  Tien, Mongolian deity, 185, 216.\n\n  Time, not a force, 11;\n    but believed to be one, 165.\n\n  Tlapallan, 175.\n\n  Tree worship, 215.\n\n  Triads, the Celtic, 190;\n    Platonic, 191.\n\n  Triangle, the equilateral, 212.\n\n  Trinity, the doctrine of, 191;\n    symbol of, 212.\n\n  Triplicate relation of numbers, 190.\n\n  Tritheism, of Christianity, 190.\n\n  Truth, what is, 21;\n    eternal, 41;\n    as answer to prayer, 137.\n\n  Tulan, 175.\n\n\n  Unconditioned, the, 29, 34, 37, 98, 100.\n\n  Uniformity of sequence, as cause, 91, 92.\n\n  Unknowable, the, 29, 34, 99, 100.\n\n\n  Valkyria, the, 53.\n\n  Valhalla, 259.\n\n  Varuna, an Aryan god, 125.\n\n  Vendidad, the, 175.\n\n  Venereal sense, the, 64.\n\n  Vicarious sacrifice, theory of, 222.\n\n  Virginity, sacredness of, 69.\n\n  Virgin Mother, the, 68.\n\n  Volition, _see_ Will.\n\n  Voluspa, the, 171.\n\n\n  Wabose, Catherine, 146.\n\n  Water, as the primitive substance, 167.\n\n  Will, the, 16;\n    of God, 38, 42;\n    as a cause, 90.\n\n  Wish, the religious, 52;\n    definition of, 79.\n\n  World, moral government of, 112;\n    creation and changes, 164;\n    light of the, 185.\n\n\n  Xisuthrus, 170.\n\n\n  Year, the Great, 169.\n\n  Yima, reign of, 175.\n\n  Ynglyngasaga, the, 218.\n\n  Yocauna, a Haitian deity, 68.\n\n\n  Zarathustra, 80, 114.\n\n  Zeruana akerana, 166.\n\n  Zweckgesetze, 108.\n\n\n\n\n_PUBLISHED BY HENRY HOLT & CO._\n\n\n=BRINTON\u2019S (D. G.) WORKS. The Myths of the New World.= A Treatise on the\nSymbolism and Mythology of the Red Race of America. Second edition,\nlarge 12mo, $2.50. Large-paper (first) edition. $6.00.\n\n\u201cThe philosophical spirit in which it is written is deserving of\nunstinted praise, and justifies the belief that in whatever Dr. Brinton\nmay in future contribute to the literature of Comparative Mythology, he\nwill continue to reflect credit upon himself and his country.\u201d--_N. A.\nReview._\n\n=The Religious Sentiment, its Source and Aim.= A contribution to the\nscience and philosophy of religion. Large 12mo. $2.50. (_Just ready._)\n\n=CONWAY\u2019S (M. D.) Sacred Anthology.= 8vo. $4.00.\n\n\u201cHe deserves our hearty thanks for the trouble he has taken in\ncollecting these gems, and stringing them together for the use of those\nwho have no access to the originals, and we trust that his book will\narouse a more general interest in a long-neglected and even despised\nbranch of literature, the Sacred Books of the East.\u201d--_Prof._ MAX\nMULLER.\n\n=DEUTSCH\u2019S (E.) LITERARY REMAINS.= With a Brief Memoir. 8vo. $4.00.\n\n     CONTENTS:--The Talmud--Islam--Egypt. Ancient and Modern--Hermes\n     Trismegistus--Judeo-Arabic Metaphysics--Semitic\n     Pal\u00e6ography--Renan\u2019s \u201cLes Ap\u00f4tres\u201d--Worship of Baalim in\n     Israel--The \u0152cumenical Council--Apostolic\u00e6 Sedes?--Roman Passion\n     Drama--Semitic Languages--Samaritan Pentateuch--The Targums--Book\n     of Jashar--Arabic Poetry.\n\n\u201cA noble monument of study and erudition.\u201d--_N. Y. Tribune._\n\n=GOULD\u2019S (REV. S. B.) LEGENDS of the PATRIARCHS AND PROPHETS.= Crown 8vo.\n$2.00.\n\n\u201cThere are few Bible readers who have not at some time wished for just\nsuch a volume.\u201d--_Congregationalist._\n\n=HAWEIS\u2019 (REV. H. R.) THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES.= Sermons by the author of\n\u201cMusic and Morals.\u201d 12mo. $1.50.\n\n\u201cThey have a special interest as exhibiting the treatment which\nold-fashioned orthodoxy is just now undergoing at the hands of the\nliberal clergy.[TN-14]--_Pall Mall Gazette._\n\n=MARTINEAU\u2019S (JAMES) WORKS.=\n\n=Essays, Theological and Philosophical.= 2 vols. 8vo. $5.00.\n\nMr. Martineau\u2019s contributions to the _Prospective_, _Westminster_,\n_National_, and other Reviews attracted the attention of the best minds\nin both England and America, and produced a marked and favorable\nimpression upon men of all denominations.\n\n=The New Affinities of Faith.= 12mo, paper. 25 cents.\n\n=STRAUSS\u2019 (D. F.) THE OLD FAITH AND THE NEW.= 12mo. $2.00.\n\n\u201cWill make its mark upon the time, not so much as an attack upon what we\nvenerate as an apology for those who honestly differ from the majority\nof their brothers.\u201d--_Atlantic Monthly._\n\n=TYLOR\u2019S (E. B.) PRIMITIVE CULTURE:= Researches into the Development of\nMythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. 2 vols., 8vo. $5.00.\n\n\u201cOne of the most remarkable and interesting books of the present\nday.... It takes up man ... at the remotest periods of which we have\nany knowledge, and traces his intellectual growth ... from that time\nforth ... Admirably written, often with great humor, and at times with\neloquence, and never with a dull line.... The many students of Darwin\nand Spencer in this country cannot do better than to supplement the\nbooks of those writers by ... these really delightful volumes.\u201d--\n_Atlantic Monthly._\n\n\u201cOne of the few erudite treatises which are at once truly great and\nthoroughly entertaining.\u201d--_North American Review._\n\n=AUSTIN\u2019S (JOHN) JURISPRUDENCE.= Lectures on Jurisprudence, the Philosophy\nof Positive Law. By the late John Austin, of the Inner Temple,\nBarrister-at-Law. Abridged from the larger work for the use of students.\nBy ROBERT CAMPBELL, 1 vol. 8vo. $3.00.\n\n=MAINE\u2019S (SIR HENRY SUMNER) WORKS. Ancient Law:= Its Connection with the\nEarly History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas. By HENRY\nSUMNER MAINE. 8vo. $3.50.\n\n\u201cHistory read from the point of Law, and Law studied by the light of\nHistory. It is consequently a book that addresses itself as much to the\ngeneral student as to the lawyer.\u201d--_Westminster Review._\n\n\u201cMr. Maine\u2019s profound work on Ancient Law in its relation to modern\nideas.\u201d--_John Stuart Mill._\n\n\u201cSir Henry Maine\u2019s great work on Ancient Law.\u201d--_Nation._\n\n\u201cA text-book for all English students of jurisprudence.\u201d--_Saturday\nReview._\n\n=Lectures on the Early History of Institutions.= 8vo. $3.50.\n\n\u201cIn the power of tracing analogies between different institutions, in\nthe capacity for seeing the bearing of obscure and neglected facts, he\nsurpasses any living writer.\u201d--_Nation._\n\n=Village Communities and Miscellanies.= (_In preparation._)\n\n=MILL\u2019S (JOHN STUART) MISCELLANEOUS WORKS.=\n\nUniform Library edition. 8vo. Tinted and laid paper, $2.50 per volume\n(except volume on Comte). The 12 volumes in a box, $29.00; half calf or\nhalf morocco, $59.00.\n\n  =Three Essays on Religion.= 1 vol.\n  =The Autobiography.= 1 vol.\n  =Dissertations and Discussions.= 5 vols.\n  =Considerations on Representative Government.= 1 vol.\n  =Examination of Sir William Hamilton\u2019s Philosophy.= 2 vols.\n  =On Liberty: The Subjection of Women.= Both in 1 vol.\n  =Comte\u2019s Positive Philosophy.= 1 vol. $1.50.\n\n_CHEAP EDITIONS._\n\n=The Subjection of Women.= 12mo. $1.25.\n\n=Principles of Political Economy.= 12mo. $2.50.\n\n=Memorial Volume. John Stuart Mill: His Life and Works.=\n\nTwelve Sketches, as follows: (His[TN-15] Life, by J. R. Fox Bourne; His\nCareer in the India House, by W. T. Thornton; His Moral Character, by\nHerbert Spencer; His Botanical Studies, by Henry Turner; His Place as a\nCritic, by W. Minto; His Work in Philosophy, by J. H. Levy; His Studies\nin Morals and Jurisprudence, by W. A. Hunter; His Work in Political\nEconomy, by J. E. Cairnes; His Influence at the Universities, by Henry\nFawcett; His Influence as a Practical Politician, by Mrs. Fawcett; His\nRelation to Positivism, by Frederick Harrison; His Position as a\nPhilosopher, by W. A. Hunter. 16mo. $1.00.\n\n=STEPHEN\u2019S (J. F.) LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY.= Large 12mo. $2.00.\n\n_A criticism of \u201cMill on Liberty.\u201d_\n\n\u201cOne of the most thorough overhaulings of the moral, religious, and\npolitical bases of society which they have recently received....\nEverybody who wants to see all the recent attempts to set things right\nanalyzed by a master-hand, and in English which stirs the blood, will\nhave a great treat in reading him.\u201d--_Nation._\n\n\u201cOne of the most valuable contributions to political philosophy which\nhave been published in recent times.\u201d--_London Saturday Review._\n\n=ADAMS\u2019 (PROF. C. K.) DEMOCRACY AND MONARCHY IN FRANCE=, from the\nInception of the Great Revolution to the Overthrow of the Second Empire.\nBy Prof. C. K. Adams, of the University of Michigan. Large 12mo. Cloth.\n$2.50.\n\n\u201cA valuable example of the scientific mode of dealing with political\nproblems.\u201d--_Nation._\n\n\u201cFull of shrewd and suggestive criticism, and few readers will peruse it\nwithout gaining new ideas on the subject.\u201d--_London Saturday Review._\n\n\u201cRemarkably lucid writing.\u201d--_London Academy._\n\n=CHESNEY\u2019S (C. C.) MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.= Essays in Military Biography. By\nCHARLES CORNWALLIS CHESNEY, Colonel in the British Army,\nLieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Engineers. Large 12mo. $2.50.\n\n\u201cVery able.\u201d--_Nation._\n\n\u201cUncommonly entertaining and instructive.\u201d--_N. Y. Evening Post._\n\n\u201cFull of interest, not only to the professional soldier, but to the\ngeneral reader.\u201d--_Boston Globe._\n\n=FAMILY RECORD ALBUM.= In Blanks classified on a New System. Large quarto,\ngilt edges, 328 pages. Cloth, $5. Half Morocco, $8. Full Morocco, $15.\nLevant or Russia, $25.\n\nTHIS BOOK for keeping family records has been made because the editor\nfelt the need of it and supposed that many others felt the same need.\n\nThe pages are of eight kinds, called respectively Family, Genealogical,\nTabular, Biographical Heirloom, Domestic Economy, Travel, and\nMiscellaneous.\n\n=FREEMAN\u2019S (EDWARD A.) HISTORICAL COURSE.=\n\nA series of historical works on a plan entirely different from that of\nany before published for the general reader or educational purposes. It\nembodies the results of the latest scholarship in comparative philology,\nmythology, and the philosophy of history. Uniform volumes. 16mo.\n\n=1. General Sketch of History.= By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, D.C.L. 16mo. $1.25.\n\n=2. History of England.= By MISS EDITH THOMPSON. $1.00.\n\n=3. History of Scotland.= By MARGARET MACARTHUR. $1.00.\n\n=4. History of Italy.= By Rev. W. HUNT, M.A. $1.00.\n\n=5. History of Germany.= By JAMES SIME. $1.00.\n\n=6. History of the United States.= By J. A. DOYLE. With Maps by Francis A.\nWalker, Prof. in Yale College. $1.40.\n\n=7. History of France.= By Rev. J. R. GREEN. (_In preparation._)\n\n=8. History of Greece.= By J. ANNAN BRYCE. (_In preparation._)\n\n\u201cUseful not only for school study, but for the library.\u201d--_Boston\nAdvertiser._\n\n=SUMNER\u2019S (PROF. W. G.) HISTORY OF AMERICAN CURRENCY.= With Chapters on\nthe English Bank Restriction and Austrian Paper Money. To which is\nappended \u201cThe Bullion Report.\u201d Large 12mo. With diagrams. $3.00.\n\n\u201cThe historical information which it contains has never been brought\ntogether before within the compass of a single work.\u201d--_N. Y. Tribune._\n\n\u201cA most valuable collection of facts, thoroughly digested and properly\narranged.... Has a freshness and vivacity rarely found in works of the\nkind.\u201d--_Atlantic Monthly._\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber\u2019s Note\n\n\nThe following misspellings and typographical errors were maintained.\n\n       Page       Error\nTN-1     2   expres ion should read expression\nTN-2    15   mind,whose should read mind, whose\nTN-3    34   positive,and should read positive, and\nTN-4   fn. 39-1   Syst\u00e8mede should read Syst\u00e8me de\nTN-5   fn. 71-1   Suras, should read Suras\nTN-6    91   reason\u2019 should read reason\u201d\nTN-7   108   [108-1] should read [108-2]\nTN-8   146   devil,before should read devil, before\nTN-9   193   plantasm should read phantasm\nTN-10  193   anthropomorphism,which should read anthropomorphism, which\nTN-11  205   supernatual should read supernatural\nTN-12  221   corrollary should read corollary\nTN-13  fn. 214-3   and should read und\nTN-14  Ads. p. 1   clergy. should read clergy.\u201d\nTN-15  Ads. p. 2   (His should read His\n\nAccents in foreign words are inconsistent and have been left as\noriginally printed.\n\nThe following words were inconsistenly spelled or hyphenated:\n\n  develop / develope\n  key-stone / keystone\n  May-pole / Maypole\n  re-gained / regained\n  thunder-storm / thunderstorm\n  _u. s._ / u. s.\n  Voelker / V\u0153lker","title":"The Religious Sentiment: Its Source and Aim: A Contribution to the Science and; Philosophy of Religion","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":66015}