{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_30743/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_30743","id":"gutenberg_30743","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/30743","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Biology","Evolution","Science"],"text":"Produced by David Edwards, Martin Pettit and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This\nbook was produced from scanned images of public domain\nmaterial from the Google Print project.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION\n\nTOGETHER WITH A PRELIMINARY ESSAY ON\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF SCIENCE.\n\n\nTWO PAPERS\n\nRead before THE WISCONSIN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ARTS, AND LETTERS\nat the Annual Meetings of February, 1873 and February, 1874.\n\nBY\n\nSTEPHEN H. CARPENTER, LL. D.,\n\n_Professor of Logic, etc., in the University of Wisconsin,\nand President of the Department of Speculative Philosophy\nin the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters._\n\n\n[REPRINTED FROM THE ACADEMY'S TRANSACTIONS.]\n\n\nMADISON, WIS.:\nATWOOD & CULVER, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS.\n1874.\n\n\n\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF SCIENCE.\n\n\nAll knowledge is essentially one. The object-matter upon which intellect\nexerts itself, does not affect the subjective act of knowing. Physics,\nwhen stripped of that which is merely contingent, becomes metaphysics.\nPhysical science deals with object-matter, and discusses the signs by\nwhich nature communicates her message--that is, phenomena. Metaphysical\nscience has to do with the subject-mind, and discusses the meaning of\nthe message. The one converts God's hieroglyphics into\neasily-intelligible language; the other translates this language into\nIdea. If this be true, there must be a unity of method in all science,\nhowever great the diversity of the object-matter investigated. This\nmethod is subjectively determined, that is, by the constitution of the\nmind, and not by the particular form of matter upon which intellectual\nenergy may be exerted. If there is an essential unity in all knowledge,\nit is because there is a corresponding unity of method in all mental\nactivity. It is only when we look upon what is to be known, that truth\nseparates into sciences; but particular truths become particular\nsciences only under assumed relations to the whole of which they form a\npart.\n\nObjectively considered, science is classified knowledge; subjectively\nviewed, it is the laws or principles according to which knowledge is\nclassified. Every actor implies an act--every thinker a thought. We may\ntherefore universally make this dual classification, according as we\nview the mental operation involved, or the attributes of objects which\nform the subject of thought. The possibility of science is conditioned\nupon the possibility of classification. Mere knowledge is not science,\nas the world ought to have learned by costly experience. Even classified\nknowledge may not be science; it becomes science not through previous\nclassification, but in the act of being classified, and therefore only\nas the principle of classification is apprehended--that is, only as the\nparticular application of the law of generalization is distinctly\nrecognized. A man may know a book and know nothing more; he knows the\nscience only when he is capable of making the book for himself. Mere\nknowledge thus differs from science in that the one is held only by the\napprehensive powers of the mind, while the other passes beyond these\ninto the reflective or ratiocinative. Pure science, then, must be wholly\nabstract. The forms and substances of Nature with which the scientific\nstudent deals, are only the discrete figures of the young mathematician,\nto be thrown aside with advancing knowledge. Matter is only the staff on\nwhich the mind leans, while too feeble to go alone. It is not the finely\nchiseled statue that renders a man a sculptor; it is the conception\nwhich is therein embodied. A day-laborer may have cut the stone, but\nonly the artist could conceive the idea. So in science, we care but\nlittle for the particular results at which we arrive, compared with the\nlaws, according to which the results have been attained.\n\nBut conceptions cannot be communicated without being rendered objective.\nThe ideal of the artist is locked up in his own mind, until on canvas,\nin marble, or by means of some other physical symbol, he communicates\nhis high imaginings. Matter, then, according to the present constitution\nof things is the condition of intellectual communication. Law cannot be\nstudied as abstract law; it can be studied only while acting, and that\nwhich exhibits this activity must be matter--something which will\nalways and uniformly obey. There can be no conception of force except as\nacting, and the sole medium of such activity is matter. Thus again,\nmatter is the condition of all communication from nature to man. Science\nis thus, in a measure, determined by the conditions of its discovery and\ncommunication. But we must distinguish between an invariable condition\nand that which is thus conditioned. Matter is not science; it is only\nthe condition of its discovery and communication. Air is not hearing; it\nis the condition of hearing. We do not study matter for the sake of the\nmatter when we study science, but for the sake of the law communicated\nto us in these changes of matter, and Law is a metaphysical, not a\nphysical idea. Reason, not sense, apprehends it. Law is, so to speak,\nformulated in the physical, but it is not material. Matter is only the\nvehicle of science, as language is the vehicle of thought.\n\nIt is plain, then, that just as in mathematics we have a division into\npure and mixed, according as we deal with matter in the abstract or in\nthe concrete, so we may in any science make a corresponding division,\naccording as we confine our attention to the laws revealed by matter or\nto the matter revealing the laws: in other words; just as we give\nattention to the ideas of the message, or to the language in which it is\ncommunicated. The language must first be learned, but the words used to\ncommunicate the message may be separately understood, and yet the\nmeaning of the message wholly missed. Knowing only the one makes a\ncharlatan; knowing the other makes a savan. The sciences based upon this\nobjective study of Nature are denominated Natural Sciences; and because\nthey lisp the first syllables of Nature's message to man, they should be\nhis primary teachers. It is by their aid that the universal message of\nGod to man must be read. They form, as it were, a public highway leading\nfrom Nature to God. But the difficulty is that observing men become so\nabsorbed in admiring some splendid piece of Divine engineering that\nthey stop to gaze and wonder, until losing sight of everything above and\nbeyond, they refuse to advance, fondly imagining that they have reached\nthe end of the journey.\n\nThe science based upon this subjective study of Nature is called\nmetaphysics. Logic has been defined as \"The Science of Thought;\" it\nshould be termed \"The Science of Thinking.\" It is not a dead body which\nwe are studying by dissection, but a living, vital Force, which we study\nby observing its activities. We find here the same error which we find\nelsewhere--a stopping with the material symbol, and an ignoring of the\nintellectual force which clothed itself with the symbol. Astronomy is\nnot the science of circles and spheres, ellipses and ellipsoids, but of\nthe Force whose sensible utterances are given in these curves. We might\nas well call Painting the science of pictures, or Sculpture the science\nof statues. So Language, the medium of thought, is only a symbol, less\nmaterial indeed than pictures and statues, but still physical. What we\nwant in \"The Science of Thinking\" is not the knowledge of symbols, but\nthe knowledge of that which is symbolized. The chemist does not care for\nthe compounds he finds in his retort; he seeks after the truth which\nthese compounds formulate. Metaphysics and Physics evidently agree in\nthis; that both are seeking to frame an articulate utterance of the Idea\ngiven in the diverse manifestations of Force--the Idea which includes\nall Potencies, the summing up of all phenomena into that final\ngeneralization which includes the intellectual as well as the material,\nuntil at last we reach the essential unity of all Truth.\n\nScience, then, is classification, or the discovery of the principles of\nclassification, rather than an arbitrary acquaintance with things\nclassified. Every science, however, must have an objective\nexpression--that is, must be formulated. In this, both metaphysical and\nphysical science agree; the only difference in this respect is, that in\nPhysics, Nature gives us in the first place the material interpretation\nof the idea--that is, the basis of classification--which we have only\nto translate into idea: while in metaphysics, we first have the idea to\nwhich we must furnish the objective utterance. We see here the precise\ndifference between what is called the logical and the natural\nmethod--the one being usually called the reverse of the other. The\ndifference is not so much a difference in intellectual procedure as in\nobjective expression. For instance: The botanist has before him the\nwhole range of vegetable forms. He notes resemblances and differences,\nand groups plants into species and genera, but his work is not ended\nwhen these are named and known, and their qualities discovered. He is\nseeking amidst these multifarious forms for the law of vegetable growth\nand reproduction. Every organ of the plant is the symbol of an idea, and\nthese ideas form the science of Botany. These Ideas are\nmetaphysical--that is intellectual, and only their sensible\nmanifestation is physical. The symbols of these Ideas, being given in\nNature, must be learned from observation before they can be used\nintelligently, just as words must be learned before one can speak a\nlanguage. Mastery of the means of expression is as essential to the\ncommunication of ideas an is the possession of the ideas themselves. The\nbotanist observes an individual plant, and notes its characteristics. He\nobserves others which possess some of these characteristics whilst\nothers are wanting. He forms a class-type from these agreeing\nattributes, and gives this new collocation of characteristics a name.\nNature never presents this class-type absolutely; it is found nowhere\nbut in intellect. What has the botanist done but to retranslate the\ncommunication of Nature into Idea, and then to express this idea by less\ncomplicated and less physical symbols? Man's province in this case is\nsimply to interpret the hieroglyphics of Nature into a more readily\ncomprehended language--to express that simply which nature has expressed\nconfusedly. The scientist restricts himself to the interpretation of a\nsingle class of symbols, as the Botanist to plants, the Zoologist to\nanimals, but the end sought in each case is the same--that is, to\nchange all these physical utterances of Nature into Idea, and to secure\nfor this Idea a method of expression involving the least possible\nmateriality of symbol--that is, to change individual facts and phenomena\ninto general principles, which, because abstract, are unchangeable. When\nthis has been done, the work of the Naturalist ceases, but the work of\nMan, the Thinker is not done; it is only just begun. By assuming the\nultimate expressions of the various natural sciences as individual and\nnot as typical, we can treat the truths reached by them precisely as the\nBotanist treated plants, and, rejecting points of of difference, may\nfind in them all some central idea. This is the province of the\nmetaphysician. He seeks the law of Idea, he determines the law of\nThinking, just as all other laws are determined, from a study of the\nsymbols formulating its expression in Nature. When this law has been\ndistinctly enunciated, and freed from all intermixture with the\ncontingent, then the work of the metaphysician ceases, the _summum\ngenus_ has been reached. The truths communicated in the symbols of\nNature, have been correlated and enunciated, and finally translated from\nthe dialect of man the physical into the language of man the\nintellectual. Physical science determines the separate words of this\nmessage of God, the letters of which are scattered throughout Nature.\nMetaphysics combines these words into propositions which enunciate a\ndistinct truth. There is therefore neither conflict nor variation\nbetween the method of Logic and the method of Nature. The movement of\nboth is in the same direction; the only difference is in the point of\nstarting. And another truth no less important, which follows from the\nforegoing discussion, is that the method of Nature is fundamental to the\nmethod of Logic. Physics should precede metaphysics, but not exclude it;\nboth are essential to every true science, and physics, which stops with\nphysics, leads man by dazzling promises into some Utopian desert only to\nleave him there to die of hunger. And it is no less true that\nmetaphysics, without this basis in experimental science, is illusory\nand untrustworthy, wherever the original data are necessarily empirical.\n\nTwo conditions are thus necessary to all science: a body of knowable\ntruth capable of being systematized; and an intelligence capable of\napprehending and systematizing it. One of these conditions is physical\nand one is metaphysical; and all true science must be the resultant of\nLaw and Idea, the Objective and the Subjective, the twin forces of\nNature and Man. If either of these conditions be wanting, there can be\nno true science, for science can neither be \"evolved from the depths of\nthe personal consciousness,\" nor can the scattered letters of scientific\ntruth, as given in nature, arrange themselves into the words of a\nsignificant message. Knowledge must be classified before it is science,\nand that which classifies can only be intellect--discovering and\nenunciating this classification according to the laws of mental action.\nAs prominence is given to one or other of these two conditions we have\nthe division into Logical and Natural, but the fundamental principle of\nclassification is the same in both--it being simply the law of\nintellectual action--just as the law which governs the action of the\nlevers of a loom will determine the pattern of the woven fabric. There\ncan, therefore, be no conflict between the methods of Logic and those of\nNature. The determining element in all classification, whether of the\nphenomena of Mind or of the grosser phenomena of Matter is uniformly and\nalways the same--the law of intellectual action.\n\nScience then resolves itself into a determination of this Law of mental\nactivity, so that in an ultimate analysis, all science is metaphysical,\njust as all science primarily is physical. Here, as elsewhere, Law can\nbe studied only in its objective manifestations. The Law of Thinking can\nbe educed only from expressed Thought, but the Law is not objective\nthought, any more than the idea of the sculptor is marble, or the\nconception of the painter is paint. The simplest expression of thought\nis not the syllogism but the logical proposition. Now, it is plain that\nif the proposition is the formulation--the material representative of\nthought--if we study it as we study other natural symbols, we will find\nin it the fundamental Law of Thinking, and ultimately the fundamental\nLaw of all Science: just as, if it were possible to reduce all\nelementary substances to one, the chemist would be able to find in that\none a condensed expression of chemical science.\n\nWhat then is a proposition? Simply stated, it is the assertion of\nrelation between two terms; or more abstractly, it is the reference of\nan individual to its species--the assertion of a classification. We find\nhere the same duality which we noticed above. If we give prominence to\nthe individual notion, we consider the proposition in extension; if we\nturn our attention to the specific notion we consider the proposition in\nintention: in the one case referring to the individuals composing the\nclass, in the other to the attributes composing the class-type. The\nfirst corresponds to induction, the second to deduction. When we study\nindividuals we study physics; when we study the attributes composing the\nclass-type, we study metaphysics. The Law of Thinking as educed from a\nstudy of the proposition is the law of classification. The proposition,\nconsidered affirmatively, asserts explicitly agreement between certain\nattributes of two terms; that is, it asserts a classification. The aim\nof science is to reach this proposition, to discover and assert the\nprinciple of classification--in other words, to formulate metaphysically\nwhat nature has presented physically. We must find, then, the first or\nfundamental law of thinking in this _integration_ or classification.\nThis fundamental law may be subdivided into two species, according to\nthe two terms of the proposition; of which the first may be stated thus:\n\"Every possible object of thought is to a certain extent identical with\nevery other\"; and as the proposition implicitly states disagreement, the\nsecond may be stated thus: \"Every possible object of thought is to a\ncertain extent diverse from every other.\" The first gives the positive\n(subjective) condition of the proposition, the second the negative\n(objective) condition: both together constitute the conditions of\nthinking. The proposition is thus the assertion of the same in the\ndifferent. The proposition also asserts, implicitly, the _tertium quid_,\nor the basis of classification--the class-type, to which both terms are\nreferred--that is, the proposition secondarily asserts an analysis.\nAccording to the first condition we have the inductive process;\naccording to the second we have the deductive process. A complete\nmovement of idea from its purely physical symbolization to its\nmetaphysical interpretation, must involve both these processes.\n\nThe mind possesses the power of analysis; it can watch its own\noperations and retrace its steps, until it arrives at the original data\nof consciousness; but analysis cannot comprise the whole of the logical\nprocess. Before there can be analysis there must be something to be\nanalyzed; before steps can be retraced, they must be taken. We must not\nconfound a condition with a Law--the one is a conception antecedent to\nall action, a genus to which the particular activity may be referred;\nthe other is coincident with action. The one is the medium of the other.\nWe may illustrate this idea by science itself, which is reached only by\nan analysis of Art. Matter is the condition of the expression of an\nidea; hence to all but the artist, Art must precede Science, but this\ncannot be in the case of the artist; in his mind the Idea is first\nconceived, and there it is given expression in the forms of Art. Here,\nas uniformly in Nature, the whole absolutely precedes the part--the\nuniversal exists before the particular--God before man. Truth absolute\nthus exists before truth conditioned. Science before Art. Remove\nconditions and the conditioned becomes the absolute; art and science\ncoincide. But truth which is assumed to be out of all relations, cannot\nbe comprehended by man, and practically is not. Even the universal\npropositions of deduction express universality under conditions--that\nis universality of relation; just as infinity in mathematics means that\nwhich passes measurement, while in fact between infinity and measurement\nthere is no relation, and the infinite is thus incomprehensible as an\nobject of thought, although by no means unrecognizable as a necessary\ncondition antecedent to all intellectual action. It is of vital\nimportance that we note this distinction, because reasoning, i. e.\nclassification, is possible only so long as we deal with what is\nadmitted to be under relation: if we assume a term to be out of all\nrelation, it ceases to be an object of thought--it can neither be\nclassified nor unclassified; it is beyond reason. Mathematics can\nproceed with its investigations only so long as it treats all quantities\nas measurable; it must wholly cease its calculations if an infinite term\nbe introduced. To claim that analysis represents the complete normal\naction of the intellect in reasoning, is ultimately to claim that the\ninitial point of thinking is the _summum genus_ of thought--God. Now God\nis undoubtedly the initial point of absolute thought, but he is not the\nbeginning of human thought. Intellectually speaking, God is the final\ngeneralization; every movement possible to him must be one of\nanalysis--a differentiation of Himself, so to speak, by negatives. Thus\nthe course of absolute Thought, beginning with God, must be first\ntowards a complete differentiation into ultimate individualization; and\nlastly a complete integration again of individuals into an infinite\nwhole. This dual action completes the circle of intellectual activity.\nWe have dropped attribute after attribute until we have reached the last\npossible analysis; but we do not stop here, but by the assumption of\nattributes we again reach the highest possible synthesis. This must be\nthe method of the divine activity, successive differentiation and\nintegration, the closing in of a mighty circle of infinity, embracing\nall the finite, but never losing the essential characteristic of the\ninfinite.\n\nNow, if this also represent the exact movement of the finite mind in\naction--that is, in reasoning, man must be God. Man is finite. Even his\ninfinite is only the immeasurable--not that which is without the\ncategory of measure. He cannot begin where the Infinite begins, at the\nhighest possible generalization,--but he must begin with the finite. If\nwhat we have shown above be true, man must begin with the individual,\nand the first mental act of the positive character of thinking, is the\nreference of this individual notion to a class. Now the _class-notion_\nis the same as the individual notion, less certain attributes as\n_individual_ attributes, but gathered into a larger whole. This process\nis plainly integration; we are rejecting from the new conception\nwhatever prevents enlarging the class. Each higher generalization\ninvolves all the attributes of the lower, not individually, but\nspecifically or generically. In the final generalization, extension and\nintension coalesce. Just as we reach the individual by differentiating a\nuniversal through successive negations, we reach the universal again, by\nintegration, by successively denying the negations through which we just\nnow differentiated. The movement of the finite mind in reasoning is thus\nfrom the individual through the universal to the individual again.\n\nScience thus parts into two great branches--one seeking to establish\nprinciples by what we have called integration, and the other the\nelucidation of facts by _a priori_ reasoning instead of observation.\nThat is, the aim of true science is to free man from the restrictions of\nthe finite, and to place him in possession of the infinite--the closing\nin of a lesser circle of infinite truth, yet never losing hold upon the\nfinite. In accordance with this view we see science pursuing its\nintegrations until it has identified as composing an essential unity all\nthe various manifestations of force. This is the finite becoming the\ninfinite, for unity is, in so far, infinity--God is one, a unity, not a\nunit. But we also see science going beyond this point, and by a new\nseries of differentiations reaching truths new to experience, if indeed\nnot impossible to experience.\n\nBetween these two limits all knowledge is forever moving. It can never\nrest. The tide of thought sweeps onward towards the infinite--God\nfollowing it to its final absorption into the _I Am_, simple\nbeing,--while finite man, because of his finiteness, can only reach\nthose universals which are infinite only to human thought. Like men on a\njourney we leave the train when we have reached our journey's end, but\nthe train passes on out of sight in the distance, sending back, now and\nthen, tokens of its progress, as it thunders over a bridge, or whistles\nshrill as it nears some further stopping place, until at last all is\nstill, not because the train has stopped, but because we can follow it\nno further with our senses. Even after science has reached the utmost\nlimit possible to it, it is not satisfied to rest there, but starts at\nonce upon its return trip, to bring to notice undiscovered facts hidden\nin these mighty generalizations. Thus the pendulum of intellectual\nactivity unceasingly vibrates between the infinite and the finite, never\nresting, because Idea and Matter, the force of Man and the force of\nNature can never be completely identified.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION.\n\n\nThe intellectual processes of a rational being must proceed according to\nsome law. They cannot succeed each other at hap-hazard. The notion of\nrationality is conditioned upon this regular procedure; if this be\nwanting, the essential character of rational action is wanting. But to\nsay that rational processes are determined by law, and conditioned upon\na regular procedure, is simply to assert that the steps in ratiocination\nare so related to each other that the relation of each to every other\nmay be determined by the application of the law--the difference between\nany two steps being analogous to the difference between any other two.\nThe astronomer determines the orbit of a planet from three observations,\nbecause he thereby determines the law of variation between these points;\nfrom which he assumes that this law will be constant, presenting a\nseries of terms each differentiated according the series of differences\nalready determined.\n\nApplying the same principle to mental phenomena, we may determine the\nlaw of intellectual action. Thoughts are discriminated by the presence\nor absence of certain attributes. At one extreme we find the _summum\ngenus_, comprising the fewest possible attributes distinguishing an\nidea; at the other extreme we find the individual, comprising any number\nof attributes. Between these two extremes we find a regular series of\nintermediate terms. The movement of an idea from the general to the\nindividual is like the motion of a planet through one-half of its orbit;\nwhile the return movement from the individual to the general,\ncorresponds to the motion of the planet over the remaining half of its\norbit. The same law governs both movements and unites the two halves of\nthe orbit into a single whole; and a series of observations taken at\nequal distances, will, by the uniformity of differences presented,\nreveal the operation of the same law in this dual manifestation. Upon\nexamining the processes of deduction and induction, we find in each the\nsame series of terms, differing only in the fact that they are in\ninverse order, and this correspondence reveals the operation of one and\nthe same law. An inductive series is only a deductive series read\nbackward. Any two terms in a series whether inductive or deductive,\ndiffer only in the degree of generality, and differ similarly from a\nthird term, so that two being known the third can be therefrom\ndetermined. In a deductive series the terms differ by a constant\nincrease in the number of individualizing attributes--a concept being\nexpanded into a deductive series by such regular additions. Having two\nterms we can proceed to the third--that is, from two propositions\nexpressing this relation, we can proceed to a conclusion. In an\ninductive series the terms differ by a constant diminution in the number\nof individualizing attributes--an individual term being expanded into an\ninductive series, by successively dropping the attributes which compose\nthe individual term, until we reach the required degree of\ngeneralization.\n\nThought must proceed in one of these two directions. The object-matter\nof thought being composed wholly of attributes can differ only in the\npresence or absence of certain attributes. A combination, then, of these\ntwo movements must complete the intellectual orbit. The direction of the\nmovement of the mind will be determined by the end proposed. When we\npossess the knowledge of phenomena and wish to discover law--that is,\nwhen we seek information--we proceed by induction, from the individual\nto the general. When possessed of knowledge, we wish to discover its\napplications, when knowing the law, we wish to determine the phenomena\nnecessarily resulting therefrom, we proceed by deduction--from the\ngeneral to the individual. Complete knowledge, then, consists in the\nhighest possible generalization, and the expansion of this term into a\nseries, ending only with the last possible individualization. The aim of\nphysical science is to determine that half of the intellectual orbit\nwhich lies between the individual and the general--the aim of\nmetaphysical science is to trace the other half which lies between the\ngeneral and the individual. When we seek to know what is, we proceed by\ninduction--the method of the phenomenal. When, knowing what is, we\nproceed to determine what hence must be, we proceed by deduction--the\nmethod of the Necessary. Thus Science, at first seeking principles,\nproceeds by induction to establish them; but after these fundamental\nprinciples have been established, it proceeds deductively to determine\nwhat must result from them, without waiting to discover these truths by\nobservation.\n\nKnowledge is thus complete just in proportion to the extension of its\nscope through generalization. The higher the generalization, the more\ninclusive will it be, and the _summum genus_, or the final\ngeneralization, will be the highest attainable reach of knowledge. When\nman can make no further generalization, his knowledge will be, in so\nfar, absolute and complete, and all that remains possible to him will be\nthe practical application of what he already knows. Perfect knowledge is\nnothing but perfect generalization. The Supreme Intelligence being\nhypothetically possessed of all knowledge, that is, having discriminated\nthe absolute _summum genus_, can proceed no further in this direction;\nhis intellectual activity must be exerted in a descending series, or\nfrom the general towards the individual, and this process must be, as we\nhave seen above, by a determinate series of steps, fixed by the\noperation of a definite law, which law proceeds by the successive\naddition of attributes to the general.\n\nComplete knowledge, being complete generalization, the lines of all\nscience will necessarily converge, as they approach this generalization,\nuntil all sciences coalesce in one science, and all truth is reduced to\na single expression in the utterance of the final conception. In\naccordance with the laws of thinking, this general term is reached by\nsuccessive omissions of particularizing attributes, until at last we\nreach Being--the absolute _summum genus_, wholly free from individual\nattributes, and thereby embracing everything possible to thought,\nwhether material or immaterial. But this _summum genus_ must be\npredicable of this whole. Matter and mind may thus be reduced to a\nsingle category, and the physical and the intellectual finally coalesce\nin this last generalization. Materialism and idealism thus differ merely\nin the degree of generalization reached--or rather they both agree in\navoiding the final generalization which identifies both matter and mind.\nMaterialism must always deal with the individual, for matter can appear\nunder no other form. Idealism must always rest upon the general, for\nthought, to be thought, must state a generalization. Each, however,\nfinds its explanation in the other, and both are harmonized by the\napplication of the law of intellectual action above given. Matter and\nMind are complementary, not incompatible. They differ with each other,\nbut they agree in being similarly related to a third term. Matter is\nobjective; it is thought taking form, becoming individual, manifesting\nitself in space. Mind is subjective. The one appeals to the senses; the\nother is known only to the consciousness.\n\nScience reaches its full development only when it includes both physical\nand intellectual phenomena within its scope. Every step which it takes\ncarries it further from the purely physical, and brings it nearer the\npurely intellectual--that is the development of physical science is from\nthe individual towards the general, and it reaches its end, its\ncompletion, only when the last distinction, that of subjective and\nobjective, has disappeared in the last possible generalization. When the\nobjective has been identified with the subjective, the distinction\nbetween Mind and Matter has been obliterated, and we have reached the\nSupreme Intelligence--the \"I Am\" of Scripture--simple Being.\n\nMatter is the formal expression of thought, or the necessary condition\nof such expression, and in this condition is found the link that\nconnects the subjective and objective manifestations of _being_.\nSubjectivity is ideality, as objectivity is materiality. The\nconsciousness can take cognizance only of what is within itself, and\ntherefore without every other. Consciousness is therefore wholly\npersonal. To communicate an idea it must be placed within the\nconsciousness of another. To reach this result it must cease to be\npersonal, must pass out of the subjective consciousness into objective\nform, so as to be placed in the same relation to the speaker and the\nhearer. Thought, out of the consciousness of the thinker, is objective\nto him, and to render thought objective is to give it material form.\nThought to be communicated, must pass out of the consciousness of the\nthinker into a material representation. The assumption of material form\nindividualizes the idea. The artist's mind may be filled with splendid\nconceptions, but no one but he can look within his consciousness and see\nthem. Before others can have any knowledge of his thoughts, he must give\nthem form, or embody them in statues or paintings. The soul of the\nmusician may be thrilled by the harmonies that his imagination creates,\nbut no other soul can join him in this ecstasy until he has given form\nto his conceptions. So the thinker must embody his thoughts in language\nbefore he can communicate them to another. Matter, then, is the vehicle\nby which thought is communicated, and, so far as we are concerned, the\nnecessary condition of such communication, so that the conception of\nthought apart from the thinker involves the intervention of material\nforms, and it is by the interpretation of these symbolical forms that we\ndiscover the idea.\n\nNow, let us suppose a Supreme Intelligence. The intellectual processes\nof such a Being, to be conceived as rational by us, must be identical\nwith ours, or at least analogous to ours. The possession of infinite\nattributes may in fact free him from the control of any law, but it is\nimpossible for us to conceive an intelligence acting otherwise than in\naccordance with law. So that if the Supreme Intelligence is to\ncommunicate with man, it must be in obedience to the laws which control\nour mental activities. The Divine thought must, then, like human\nconceptions, be communicated by means of physical symbols.\n\nThe Supreme Intelligence, being the final generalization, must possess\nall knowledge, and the only intelligent action possible to him from our\npoint of view, is from this absolute generalization towards the concrete\nand individual. The absolute general is purely subjective, which, to\nbecome cognizable, must be rendered objective. This can be secured to us\nonly through the intervention of material forms. From this point of\nview, matter is only the symbol of thought--thought apart from the\nthinker. The first result of the divine activity in self-manifestation\nwould be the analysis of _being_ into subjective and objective--that is\nthe discrimination of mind and matter, which terms are severally the\nfinal generalizations of the two fundamental divisions of science.\nMatter, then, mere formless, chaotic matter, would be the first result\nof creative activity. Following the development of this idea in its\ncontinually increasing individuality, as new attributes are severally\nadded, matter assumes determinate form and becomes related in systems,\nas the various so-called elementary substances are discriminated, until\nfinally all truth, capable of being revealed by inorganic matter, is\npresented to us.\n\nAdd the idea of organism and we have the two great divisions of\nphenomena--material and vital. The higher the generalization, the fewer\nwill be the attributes composing the concept, and thus the simpler will\nbe the form symbolizing its expression. As in the case of matter, the\nfirst result of the divine activity was more matter, undiscriminated by\nany further attribute; so here, we have, as the first organic creation,\na concrete expression of the highest possible generalization comprising\nthe fewest possible attributes--that is, forms of life involving the\nfewest individual characteristics. To matter add the simplest organic\nattribute--that is, the one lying nearest the genus--and we have mere\norganized matter, the simple cell, the foundation of all life, no matter\nhow great its future complexity, equally the origin of animal and\nvegetable growth, which are as yet entirely undiscriminated. This would\nbe the first appearance of life.[1] Differentiating again by the\naddition of a new attribute, and organic being is subdivided into the\ntwo species, vegetable and animal. Beginning with these typical forms,\nadding single attributes in a continuous series, we at last reach the\nhighest types of animals and plants. Finally, add rationality to the\nanimal, and we reach man, the highest and therefore the most complex\ntype of life, and who, so far as we are concerned, must be the end of\ncreation. We cannot conceive of any higher creation, because we cannot\nadd an attribute to those we already possess, any more than we can\nconceive of an additional sense by which to cognize such new attribute.\n\nThis process has been determined from the very outset by those\nintellectual laws which we cannot disobey, and which we cannot conceive\ndisobeyed by an intelligent creator. If the law of intellectual action\nrequire this process from the simple to the complex, the concrete\nrepresentation of the steps of this process must indicate the operation\nof this law, and must also proceed from the simple and rudimentary to\nthe complex and highly developed. An intelligent Creator in revealing\nhis thought must follow the method which our minds must follow in\ninterpreting this revelation. When we know and seek to communicate our\nknowledge, we proceed from the general to the specific.[2] The Creator\nassumed to be infinite in knowledge would therefore follow this process\ninstead of the method peculiar to investigation. The law of intellectual\naction determines this method, and the conditions of intellectual\ncommunication determine the representation of this method in the\nmaterial expression of the ideas communicated. Considering the operation\nof this law under these conditions, we find that the thought\ncommunicating only, as nearly as may be, the generic idea, will be\ndistinguished from it by the addition of but a single attribute as the\ngeneric by itself is incapable of being represented in concrete form,\nthe expression of this thought in form will present us matter\ndistinguished from matter in general by but a single attribute. The\nleast possible individualizing attribute added to the highest possible\ngeneralization gives us the simplest expression of an idea, and the form\nor the organism symbolizing this thought will be the simplest form and\nthe simplest organism possible. For instance: in organic life the\nhighest generalization barely individualized will give us the simple\ncell; and no matter what degree of complexity we subsequently reach by\nthe addition of an almost infinite number of attributes, we nevertheless\nbegin in every case with the same starting point.\n\nEach higher type is reached by adding to a lower. The higher thus\nembraces all that can be found in the lower, and something besides. This\nmethod is invariable, and can never be departed from. The genus must\nalways be predicable of every individual component of every species\ncontained under it. Translating this law into the forms of material\nexpression, and it requires each higher species to physically include\nall lower species, and to differ from them only by addition. Man, the\nhighest type, must thus include all the attributes of the cell as\nphysically expressed, and without them he would not be man. The\ndifferences between no two terms in a series can be total. If the\nsuccessive steps in a train of thought must be related, so that no two\nnotions will be wholly distinct from each other, these notions will\nconstitute a series, each term of which will, in a measure, determine\nthe next, so soon as the law of the series is discovered; and if this\ntrain of thought be objectively presented, it will afford a\ncorresponding series of physical terms, each one of which will in like\nmanner determine the next. But thought is impossible unless by a train\nof ideas so related. Its physical expression will therefore be equally\nimpossible except by a series of physical terms similarly related, each\none of which in some manner determines the next. There must then be a\nperfect continuity in the line that reaches from the simplest form of\nmatter through all grades of organic life up to man, the highest\nexpression of the divine idea. There can be no break in the chain of\nthought, because the law of the logical process forbids it: there can be\nno break in the series of material symbols for the conditions of\nconcrete expression equally forbid it. A symbol is nothing except as it\nrepresents that which is to be symbolized. So the symbols form a\nphysical series, because the thoughts symbolized form a logical series.\n\nIf the creator has fully revealed his thought, it must be by a series of\nphysical terms arranged in such a manner as to indicate the logical\nseries of ideas symbolized. Every form of matter is a symbol of thought,\nand challenges interpretation. Every change in form corresponds to an\nantecedent change in idea, and must be intended to reveal it. As\nthought, then, begins its evolution with the general and proceeds to the\nindividual by a series of terms each of which is similarly related to\nboth extremes, we must find the material enunciation of this process\nassuming the form of a series of terms, beginning with mere nebulous\nmatter, grading into organic life, and organic life presenting us with a\nsimilar series beginning with the mere cell and ending with man. So\nrigid and invariable must this serial arrangement be that if a term in\neither series be wanting, we are authorized to hypothetically\ninterpolate it.\n\n\"Nature never makes a leap,\" says the scientific investigator, as he\nstudies the material symbols of thought. \"Thought never makes a leap,\"\nsays the metaphysician, as he studies the necessary laws of rational\naction: and both have uttered the same truth. We prove a proposition by\ndetermining the steps by which it was educed from a more generic\nstatement. Science must proceed in the same manner, for science only\ndiscovers the track of mind--it does not make the track, it only follows\nit. If then we find the chain of evolution broken at any point, science\nmust either stop there, or assume the wanting term in the series. We\nhave the right to interpolate these missing terms, for we must assume\nthat the thoughts of God communicated to us in material forms constitute\na continuous revelation, beginning with Himself, the final\ngeneralization, and ending with man the highest individualization. These\nlimits are fixed--the one by the nature of God, and the other by the\nnature of man. Between these two extremes we must find a series of\nintermediate terms. Any other conception of their relation than that of\na determinate series is impossible and irrational; and a series, so far\nas it means anything, means evolution of some sort. Finding the relation\nbetween these terms--distinguishing the _same_ which reproduces itself,\nand the _different_ which introduces a new term--that is, determining\nthe law of apparent evolution--is the problem presented to science.\n\nThe astronomer found Bode's law to all appearance violated by the\nomission of a planet between Mars and Jupiter. He could see no reason\nfor the law, but if the planets had been placed by an intelligent\nCreator, some order of arrangement must be discoverable according to\nwhich their position was determined. The Creator being intelligent, it\nis impossible to conceive them placed fortuitously. There must then be a\nlink between Mars and Jupiter, because the law once established cannot\nbe broken. The same law may be observed in the arrangement of leaves\naround the axis of a plant. If intelligence arranged them they must be\narranged in some order, for intelligence never performs the least act\nwithout a purpose. Each leaf or pair of leaves is not a mere duplication\nof the previous leaf or pair of leaves. The relation which subsists\nbetween any two sets in the series expresses the idea of the Creator,\nand this must be constant. Completing the series as indicated by\ndifferent plants, we may assume that if any term is apparently wanting,\nit is only because it has not been discovered. In neither of these cases\nwould it be asserted that any physical evolution had taken place--the\nterms form a series of which each term is equally determined by the\noperation of a fixed law; and yet it is an operation precisely analogous\nto that which in the case of animals presents every appearance of a real\nevolution. Take, for instance, a series of animals, presenting at one\nperiod of time the simplest and most rudimentary forms, and at another\nthe most complex and highly organized; we cannot do otherwise than\nconceive these two extremes as related by intermediate terms, through\nthe operation of some law which holds good throughout the series. The\nrelation subsisting between any two, must be the same as that subsisting\nbetween any other two similarly situated, or a departure from that\nrelation which is itself governed by a definite law discoverable from a\ncomparison of two sets of terms. The application of this law is so\nuniversal and so rigid that we need not hesitate to interpolate a\nmissing term, and confidently assert that it either does exist or has\nexisted. To deny this principle is to deny the necessity of continuity\nin reasoning. This continuity of thought is represented in matter by the\npersistence of generic forms under specific differences. But just as the\nspecific is the generic with certain additions, so the individual is\nthis same generic with still further additions; and these additions,\nwhether considered solely in space, as given in the symbols of physical\nscience, or in time as in the conceptions of intellectual science, must\nbe determined by the same unvarying law. The persistence of the same\nform furnishes us the means of identifying this relation, while the\ndifferences reveal to us the successive steps by which the generic was\ndifferentiated into the individual.\n\nIf the creative thought has been expressed by the forms of matter, the\nlaws of thought must be thus expressed in the relative forms of matter.\nAnything less than this, while it might interpret isolated ideas, would\nnot communicate the method of the creative process, and science is\nnothing but the discovery of this method. If the terms of the logical\nprocess must be arranged in a series, the physical symbols rendering\nthis logical process cognizable, must be arranged in a similar series,\nfor science becomes impossible when the logical process becomes\nundiscoverable.\n\nThe differences between the terms in this series must be cognizable. Two\nterms which are indistinguishable are practically identical; and two\nterms which are not identical vary by a difference which is cognizable\nby itself apart from either term. The steps in the logical evolution of\nthe final term. _Being_ must be separable to be cognizable, and the\nmaterial forms interpreting these steps to the senses must also be\ndistinguishable. A species differs from the genus by the addition of at\nleast one attribute. Now, if the species is distinguishable from the\ngenus, the attribute which differentiates it, must be separately\ncognizable--so also the individual differs from the species by the\naddition of attributes, which must in like manner be separately\ncognizable, or the species will never be conceived independently of the\nindividuals. A thought cannot proceed by insensible steps, nor can its\nmaterial expression vary otherwise than by determinate and\ndistinguishable differences. The distinction of species is thus a\nlogical necessity. The addition of distinct attributes to the genus\ngives origin to distinct species; variation in attributes not affecting\ntheir substantial identity gives rise to varieties. One species, then,\ncannot become another, except by the assumption of a new specific\nattribute, so that one species passes into another precisely as the\ngenus passes into the species, and that is just as, and not otherwise,\nthan one thought passes into another.\n\nThe fundamental law of the logical process is that we pass from the\ngeneric towards the individual; from the simple to the complex.\nInduction can proceed only by assuming a genus at the outset--that is,\nby assuming certain attributes in the individual to be generic.\nTranslate this law into material forms, and we have each higher--that is\nmore complex--species evolved from the lower by the addition of some new\ncharacteristic. This new attribute cannot be added by the functional\nactivity of the lower organism; that can only reproduce itself. A\nthought does not change merely through repeated expression. We pass to\nthe conclusion of a syllogism, not from each term, but from a comparison\nof the premises--and this requires an intellectual operation entirely\ndistinct from a mere apprehension of the terms. It is one thing to\ncomprehend the premises; it is quite another to deduce a conclusion from\nthem. It may necessarily follow, but it requires a separate act of the\nmind to reach it. Premises will not of themselves reach a conclusion.\n\nReading this same truth in the forms of matter, we may say that species\nwill not pass into higher species without the intervention of a force\ndistinct from either. The impulse which adds a new attribute must be\nintellectually separable from all those pre-existing, and its material\nrepresentation must be physically distinct from pre-existing forms. This\ncomplete separability precludes the possibility of mere physical\ngenesis. The added attribute is presented by a new form of matter,\nrevealing the presence of a new thought--a new effect, requiring the\nagency of a new cause. In accordance with the usual economy of nature,\nwho never duplicates her forces, change will be made only so far as may\nbe necessary to communicate the additional idea. Organisms representing\nprevious thoughts will be added to, in order to express the expansion of\nthe thought, instead of a creation _de novo_ in each instance. Thus an\nidentical cellular structure will be found in all organic beings, from\nthe lowest to the highest, each higher type carrying forward the idea\nand its physical expression found in the lower. The differences between\nno two terms in the series can be total, nor can any two terms be\nidentical, as each higher species will embrace all the attributes of the\nlower, differing only by the addition of others. This is simply the\nphysical expression of the logical truth that whatever can be predicated\nof the genus can be predicated of every individual contained under it.\nAs the individual is only the expansion of the genus, so higher physical\ntypes must also be similar expansions of lower.\n\nHere, then, is evolution, or development: primarily an evolution of the\ngeneric into the individual, the continued differentiation of a generic\nidea through successive individualizations, each adding to the previous\ngroup of attributes, thus rendering the idea increasingly complex; and,\nsecondly, an apparent physical evolution or development, interpreting\nthis logical process by a series of physical forms so related as to\nreveal the relation existing between the thoughts thus interpreted. In\nthe physical representation of the ideas so related, there must be an\napparent physical evolution--that is, the process of evolution logically\nmust, like the ideas thus evolved, have a physical expression, and the\nsuccessive steps in this logical evolution must be revealed by material\nforms bearing an analogous relation, and thereby expressing the logical\nprocess. Matter is nothing, so far as we are now concerned, but the\ncondition necessary to the objective expression of thought. Every phase\nof matter is simply an objective formulation of a corresponding phase of\nthought. Every addition to form implies an antecedent increase of\nthought, as there can be no formal expression until there is something\nto be expressed. There can, then, be no such thing as mere material\nevolution, for whatever is material is only symbolical.\n\nMatter being thus wholly inert, the origin of the impulse towards\ngreater complexity must be sought for outside of that which undergoes\nthe change. The movement by which one species becomes a higher is not an\nelaboration, an extension or a differentiation of existing attributes,\nbut involves the positive addition of a new attribute, different and\ndistinct from any or all previously existing. One species cannot pass\ninto another by an innate impulse, for a species is an entity composed\nof a determinate number of attributes, and all attributes potentially\npresent must be considered as actually present. We cannot say that the\nchild is a different species from the man, and that one passes into the\nother by a process of evolution, because all the essential attributes of\nthe man are potentially present in the child. If the polyp, by the\naction of innate forces, operating through a series of ages, however\nextended, can, without any impulse from without, develop itself into a\nman, then the polyp is as much a man as a boy is, differing only in the\ntime required for development: and the data for the final deduction of\nthe highest types of creation must be furnished in the most elementary\nforms of life.\n\nThe force manifesting itself in organic life is readily distinguishable\nfrom the organism by which it is manifested. Life and organization are\nnot synonyms; one is the condition of the other, but a condition is not\na cause. We can consider force apart from organism, and this possible\nseparation in thought proves that the same form may not represent both,\nbut that life can absolutely exist apart from organs which serve to give\nit a physical manifestation.[3] Physical life being conditioned upon\norganization, whenever the organism varies, the vital force thus\nmanifested must also vary, such variation being necessarily antecedent\nto its manifestation. The organism varies, because it must, in order to\nexpress the added thought. Change in organism, therefore, is not induced\nby simple organic action, because the organs and the force acting\nthrough them can be distinguished. Assuming that matter is the objective\nor formal representation of thought, there can be no change in the\nmaterial expression without a corresponding change in the antecedent\nconception. There can, then, be physical evolution, only as there is\nantecedent logical evolution, and then only because of this logical\nevolution and not because of the operation of an innate organic force.\nForce, whatever may be its genesis, is only the exertion of power, not\nthe increase of it. Exertion limits the view to the force immediately in\noperation. We may replace one manifestation by another, but the quantity\nis neither increased nor diminished by this change. Change in form\nimplies the operation of force: and apart from such manifestation in\nmatter, it escapes the tests of science, and passes into the purely\nmetaphysical notion of cause. And unless the operation of force be\nconstant, or, if different forces are blended, variable according to\nsome determinate law, the action of which is constant and discoverable,\nso that the different units of force are separately measurable, the\nforce thus irregular in its action can never be placed in any scientific\ncategory. Evolution, then, cannot proceed from any innate organic\nimpulse, unless the force that tends to exact reproduction, and the\nforce that induces a change be equally and separately cognizable. Change\nmust proceed according to some law which accounts for the change, and\ndistinguishes between the normal exertion of power and that exertion\nwhich causes a deviation. Science, to be science, must explain apparent\nexceptions as fully as the regular operation of forces, and that which\ncauses the irregularity must be as distinctly cognizably by itself as\nthe force which acts regularly. Anything less than this is not science.\nThe discovery of Neptune was the result of the application of this\nprinciple; it was a successful attempt to discriminate the force which\ncaused variation from the force which operated regularly.\n\nEach species represents the operation of certain vital forces, and one\ncannot physically pass into another except by the increase of this\nforce, or at least by a change in the manner of its manifestation; and\nthis increase in amount or this change in direction must separately be\naccounted for. Nor does it matter, for the purposes of this discussion,\nas to the genesis of this added increment, further than to show that its\norigin must be exterior to the organism by which its presence is\nmanifested; for vital energy acting through an organism is a unit, and\ncannot, even in thought, be separated into distinguishable portions.\nChange in the direction of vital energy indicates that the original\nimpulse has been modified in its action by encountering another force,\nfor nothing but force can change the direction of force. It does not\nfall within the range of this paper to determine the nature of this\nexterior force which is thus distinguishable from that acting through\nthe vital organization, and therefore capable of separate objective\nrepresentation. Metaphysically we may say that force is resolvable into\nwill, but will being purely personal is incapable of material\nrepresentation, and thus cannot enter into the determinations of\nphysical science, which does not seek to discover the origin of force,\nbut deals solely with its presence.\n\nAs the logician must assume his premises, and, as a logician, cannot\nquestion their truth, so the physicist must assume a force in operation,\nand, as a physicist, cannot examine its genesis. The physical or the\nmetaphysical method of inquiry is valid only so long as restricted to\nphysical or metaphysical processes: a mixture of the two methods will\ngive results satisfactory neither to science nor to philosophy. As logic\nfurnishes no criterion by which to test the absolute truth of\npropositions, but deals wholly with conclusions drawn from given\npremises, so science furnishes no data by which to determine the\nabsolute genesis of force, but restricts its enquiries to the phenomena\nresulting from a force given. For the student of physical science cause\nand effect is only the transference of a given and determined force from\none material form to another. If this idea is to be traced further, it\nmust be studied outside the limits of physics. This study belongs to\nmetaphysics.\n\nNow, if physical science does not deal with the origin of the initial\nforce, but assumes at the outset its presence, no more does it fall\nwithin its province to examine into the origin of the increments which\ngive to physical forms that variety which renders science possible.\nScience deals with results, not antecedents; and after having determined\nresults, it is not authorized to affirm that one species has produced\nanother by evolution, or has produced it at all. If there are agreements\nbetween different organisms by which they are brought into relation,\nthere are also differences by which they are discriminated, and these\ndifferences imply increments of force; and to assert that one organism\nhas evolved another is to determine not merely the presence of this new\nincrement, but also to determine its origin. Scientific investigation\ndeals with phenomena which give evidence to the senses of a\n_transference_ of force from one form or from one manifestation to\nanother. Transference is not increase--an effect can be no more than the\nevolution of what was potentially present in the cause; it cannot add to\nit. The origin of the force must be investigated according to\nintellectual laws.\n\n\nIt has been argued that a Supreme Intelligence in manifesting his\nthought will, according to the necessary laws of rational activity, pass\nfrom the universal and general to the particular and individual, or from\nconcepts involving few attributes to those involving these and others;\nand that these steps in the rational process must be represented in a\ncorresponding physical series; and that the communication of thought is\nconditioned upon this physical representation. If the logical series\ncomprises one thousand terms, each related to the preceding according to\nlogical law the physical series must comprise one thousand terms, each\nphysically related in such a manner as to reveal this law. As the\nhighest generalization comprises the fewest attributes, the concrete\nexpression of this idea will present the simplest possible physical form\nand the least complexity of organization, and thus will present the\nlowest types of life; and as the individual comprises the greatest\nnumber of attributes, its concrete expression will present the greatest\ncomplexity, and consequently the highest type of life. We have seen\nthat the logical process begins with the general and ends with the\nindividual; its material expression must therefore begin with the lowest\norders and end with the highest. But the individual cannot be\nimmediately derived from the general without the intervention of\nintermediate generalizations. No more in the concrete expression of this\ndeduction can we pass from the lowest types to the highest without the\nintervention of an intermediate series. These intermediate terms are not\ncapable of independent interpretation; they find their full explanation\nonly in the extremes of the series--God and Man.\n\nIf, then, in the intellectual process from the abstract and universal\ntowards the concrete and individual, we find a constant evolution of\nidea, each advance being an addition to the previous conception, each\nnew term in the series embracing all the attributes of the preceding,\nand differing only by addition; and if thought is possible only on this\ncondition; it necessarily follows that the material representation of\nthis thought must present physical forms similarly related, so that,\nleaving out of view the intellectual genesis of this relation, the\nobserver might conclude that these forms compose a series evolved from a\nprimordial cell in accordance with an organic law. But such we find to\nbe the universal law of intellectual procedure: this apparent\ndevelopment or evolution must, therefore, be the condition of the\ncommunication of such intellectual process, and the physical terms are\nbrought into this relation by the fact that they symbolize the logical\nprocess. If the material symbols of thought were unrelated physically,\nthe thoughts thus expressed would also be unrelated and independent. But\nsuch a supposition readers Science impossible, for its one aim is to\nfind the _same_ in the _different_. If there be no _same_, there can be\nno science: if there be no _different_, there can be no science. Thought\nproceeds by adding the _different_ to the _same_ in an endless series,\nand this addition of the _different_ to the _same_ expressed in concrete\nforms is what is called evolution. If no evolution were apparent in\nNature, there could be no Science; for those steps which to the\nnaturalist indicate evolution, being only the physical expression--the\nformulation--of the logical process, afford the means by which the\nstudent reaches the highest generalization. If these steps be wanting,\nhe cannot proceed.\n\nAdmitting then to its fullest extent the fact that, judged from a purely\nphysical point of view, all organic forms seem to have been derived each\nfrom its immediate predecessor, by a mere functional impulse; and\nadmitting that science is possible upon no other condition; we claim\nthat these material forms are brought into such relation by intellectual\nevolution, and not by physical genesis; they represent an evolution of\nThought and not an evolution of Matter. We know from consciousness that\nthis process of evolution is the method of our thinking. We know also\nthat the divine thought can be rendered intelligible to us upon no other\nhypothesis than that which supposes it to be governed by the laws which\ncontrol human thought. Translating the physical symbols which we see\nabout us, and which present this appearance of evolution, we infer that\nthis is the method according to which the divine mind proceeded. Science\nwill not materially err in its physical results, if it adopt the\nhypothesis of physical evolution, but it must confine its attention to\nphysics; it is only as we attempt higher generalizations that the\ninsufficiency of the hypothesis becomes manifest in its failure to\nsatisfy the conditions of the problem as presented to philosophy.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] This, of course, does not absolutely determine the order of organic\ncreation; as in the case of the syllogism the conclusion or either\npremise may be the proposition first enunciated, the order of expression\nbeing determined by circumstances.\n\n[2] Compare the demonstrations of Geometry.\n\n[3] As in the case of man after the death of the body.","title":"The Philosophy of Evolution: Together With a Preliminary Essay on The Metaphysical Basis of Science","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":10639}