{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_31142/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_31142","id":"gutenberg_31142","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31142","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Language & Communication","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Thought and thinking"],"text":"Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was\nproduced from scanned images of public domain material\nfrom the Google Print project.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\nON THE NATURE OF THOUGHT,\n\nOR THE ACT OF THINKING,\n\nAND ITS CONNEXION WITH A PERSPICUOUS SENTENCE.\n\nBY JOHN HASLAM, M.D.\nLATE OF PEMBROKE HALL, CAMBRIDGE,\nAND AUTHOR OF MANY WORKS ON THIS SUBJECT OF INSANITY.\n\nLondon:\n[Printed by G. HAYDEN, Little College Street, Westminster,]\n\nPUBLISHED BY\nLONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, GREEN & LONGMAN,\nPATERNOSTER ROW.\n\n1835.\n\n[_PRICE TWO SHILLINGS._]\n\n\n     _Polonius_--What do you read, my Lord?\n     _Hamlet_--Words, words, words.--_Act 2d._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n                       MEPHISTOPHELES.\n\n     \"Im Ganzen--haltet euch an Worte!\n     Dann geht ihr durch die sichere Pforte\n     Zum Tempel der Gewissheit ein.\"\n\n                          SCHULER.\n\n     \"Doch ein Begriff muss bey dem Worte seyn.\"\n\n                       MEPHISTOPHELES.\n\n     \"Schon gut! nur muss man sich nicht allzu aengstlich quaelen,\n     Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen,\n     Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten zeit sich ein.\n     Mit Worten laesst sich trefflich streiten,\n     Mit Worten ein System bereiten.\n     An Werte laesst sich trefflich glauben,\n     Von einem Wort laesst sich kein Iota rauben.\"--_Goethe's Faust._\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n     \"And when I have enumerated these, I imagine I have comprehended\n     almost every thing which can enter into the composition of the\n     intellectual life of man. With the single exception of reason, (and\n     reason can scarcely operate without the intervention of language,)\n     is there any thing more important to man, more peculiar to him, or\n     more inseparable from his nature than speech? Nature indeed could\n     not have bestowed on us a gift more precious than the human voice,\n     which, possessing sounds for the expression of every feeling, and\n     being capable of distinctions as minute, and combinations as\n     intricate as the most complex instrument of music; is thus enabled\n     to furnish materials so admirable for the formation of artificial\n     language. The greatest and most important discovery of human\n     ingenuity is writing; there is no impiety in saying, that it was\n     scarcely in the power of the Deity to confer on man a more glorious\n     present than LANGUAGE, by the medium of which, he himself has been\n     revealed to us, and which affords at once the strongest bond of\n     union, and the best instrument of communication. So inseparable\n     indeed are mind and language, so _identically one_ are thought and\n     speech, that although we must always hold reason to be the great\n     characteristic and peculiar attribute of man, yet language also,\n     when we regard its original object and intrinsic dignity, is well\n     intitled to be considered as a component part of the intellectual\n     structure of our being. And although, in strict application, and\n     rigid expression, thought and speech always are, and always must\n     be, regarded as two things metaphysically distinct,--yet there only\n     can we find these two elements in disunion, where one or both have\n     been employed imperfectly or amiss. Nay, such is the effect of the\n     original unity or _identity_ that, in their most extensive\n     varieties of application, they can never be totally disunited, but\n     must always remain inseparable, and every where be exerted in\n     combination.\"--_Frederick Schlegel's Lectures on the History of\n     Literature_, (_English Translation_, 1818,) _page 11_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTO\n\n_MRS. HUNTER, DUNDEE._\n\n\n_My dearest Daughter_,\n\n_This Essay on_ THOUGHT _is appropriately dedicated to a lady of whom I\nam constantly thinking:--whose dutiful conduct, and filial affection,\nhave rendered a protracted life the subject of consolation, under all\nits contingent miseries_.\n\n_33, Great Ormond Street,\nJune 1835._\n\n\n\n\nON\n\nTHE NATURE OF THOUGHT,\n\n_&c. &c. &c._\n\n\nIn our survey of the Creation endowed with life and intellect, we are\nimpelled to the conclusion, that the human mind is, beyond all\ncomparison, the most perfect specimen that the Divine Author has chosen\nto allot to his creatures. The history of our species unfolds the\nsplendid catalogue of man's achievements: many monuments, reared by his\npatriotism and piety, and elaborated by his tasteful ingenuity, that\nhave resisted the corrosions of time, and the spoliations of conquest,\nremain in our possession: and we still preserve those intellectual\ntreasures that embalm the poetry, the eloquence, and the wisdom of the\nenlightened nations of antiquity. These are, deservedly, the models we\nhave endeavoured to imitate, and they have even been considered the\nboundaries of attainment: but a new epoch has arisen, distinguished for\nthe cultivation of that which tends to ultimate advantage, where the\nmind, confiding in its native energies, and exercising its own thought\non human affairs, has been less disposed to submit to the dictates of\nauthority.\n\nAt this period we possess abundant facilities for the acquirement of\nvaluable knowledge: under this system, the mental faculties have been\ndirected to their proper objects, and the time consumed in teaching has\nbeen considerably abbreviated. This abridgement of the usual course of\neducation has conduced to the neglect of that classical learning, which\nrequired a painful and enduring attention, even for many years, to two\nlanguages that have ceased to be spoken, and are only addressed to the\neye in written character. It is in no manner intended to under-rate the\nvalue of classical literature, the constituent of a scholar, and the\npassport and ornament of a gentleman; but to introduce a very probable\nopinion, that few of those who have devoted many of the most productive\nyears of their existence to the Greek and Latin writers, ever attain a\ncritical knowledge of those tongues: and that the substance of morals,\nwisdom, and even the elegant turns of expression, may be more certainly\nconveyed through the medium of the best translations, which we now\npossess, and the performance of which has occupied a large portion of\nthe time of accomplished scholars. This conversion of talent to that\nwhich is useful, and productive of emolument, has given a more\nenergetic impulse to the mind, and accelerated that march of which we\nnow so justly boast: but it cannot be denied, that in the rapidity of\nour advancement, and flushed with the ardent hope of arriving at our\ndestination, we have bestowed but little notice on the machinery that\nurged us forwards, or contemplated the scenery through which we passed.\n\nMost persons concur that the human mind is the noblest subject of\ninvestigation; but few will be at the trouble of undertaking its\nanalysis. With the multitude there is neither leisure nor inclination,\nand the doctrines that have been dictated concerning our intellectual\nfaculties and their operations, have tended rather to stifle than to\npromote inquiry. It is therefore unnecessary to enumerate the catalogue\nof illustrious names whose contradictory systems have created suspicion\nand distaste in the student. The science that has been improperly termed\nMetaphysics, ought to be considered a branch of human physiology, not\nabstracted from, but in this state of existence, connected with the\nphenomena of life. The citations on the reverse of the Title-page, to\nwhich many more might have been added, clearly shew that the doctrine of\nwords being the elements of Thought, did not originate from my own\nconjecture or inference, and, consequently, that the endeavour to\ninvestigate its truth has been the sole object of my research; under\nthe persuasion that, if ideas were inadequate, words only remained to\nafford the solution of this important process. The necessary connexion\nof thought with the construction of a perspicuous sentence, has not, to\nmy knowledge, been previously noticed.\n\nWe are said to THINK on certain subjects, and this process is confessed\nto require an intense exertion of our intellectual faculties: but for\nthis operation, the materials have not been clearly specified, nor the\nmanner of the elaboration defined. It has been held, that our thoughts\nare produced by some mysterious assemblage and arrangement of IDEAS,\nwhich the mind or soul performs by a dexterous and imperceptible\ncontrivance; although we are conscious of all our acts of intelligence,\nand on a moment's consideration it will be evident, that such\nintelligence would be useless without our consciousness.\n\nMr. LOCKE, whose name can never be mentioned without a grateful\nrecollection for the instruction he has afforded us, and for the candour\nwith which he has recorded the difficulties that obstructed the progress\nof his inquiries, has employed this ideal system most extensively: but\nit is evident, that he felt the obscurity of his own definition. In his\nIntroduction to the Essay, p. 5, 6th edition, he says, \"Before I proceed\non what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg\npardon of my reader, for the frequent use of the word Idea, which he\nwill find in the following Treatise. It being that term which, I think,\nserves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding,\nwhen a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is meant by\nPhantasm, Notion, Species, OR WHATEVER IT IS, which the mind can be\nemployed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.\"\nDr. REID follows nearly in the same track:--\"It is a fundamental\nprinciple of the Ideal system, that every object of thought, must be an\n_impression_ or an _Idea_, that is, a _faint copy_ of some preceding\nimpression.\"--_Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common\nSense_, 1765, p. 41.\n\nThe doctrine of Innate Ideas having been deservedly exploded, it follows\nthat these Ideas must be derived from our intercourse with the world we\ninhabit. For this purpose we are furnished with five senses, from each\nof which we obtain a separate and different kind of intelligence, which\nis denominated Perception. The perceptions of the Eye, under an\nattentive inspection, leave on the Sensorium a phantasm or Idea of the\nobject, a vivid memorial of that which has been perceived; but the\nother senses do not convey any similar phantasm.[1] The doctrine of\nIdeas appears to have been countenanced, and reconciled under all its\ndifficulties, from a presumed spiritual operation and guidance in the\nact of thinking, and especially to an implacable aversion to any\nexplanation that might be deemed to savour of _materialism_. This term,\nthe denunciation of the pious, the convenient obloquy of the ignorant,\nbeing equal in its sweeping persecution, to the horrible word craven,\ndemands a brief and modest exposition. That we exist in a material\nworld, will scarcely be denied, and it is a fair inference, that the\nannihilation of matter would involve our globe and its inhabitants in\nequal destruction. Of this matter, the concentrated power of man cannot\ncreate nor exterminate a single atom. The human body is a material\nfabric: the brain and nerves, together with those delicate organs that\nare the instruments of our perceptions,--whereby we receive light,\ndetect fragrance, apprehend sounds, relish viands, and enjoy the\ngratifications of contact, are all of material structure: and when that\nstate, called Death, has ensued, their offices cease, and they undergo\nthe decompositions to which all animal matter is subjected.\n\nThe _Capacities_, by which we feel, experience pleasure and pain,\nperceive, remember, exercise volition, and become conscious, may be\ntermed Spiritual, or if it be preferred, Divine endowments; and it is\nnot probable that we shall ever detect the immediate agency by which\nthese operations are performed. The state of _Life_, the indispensable\nmedium for the display of the phenomena of intelligence in our present\ncondition of existence, is equally inscrutable by human sagacity,\nalthough different hypotheses have been adventured for its solution.\n\nTo account for the harmonious concurrence of motions and processes that\ndistinguish living animals, a MATTER OF LIFE has been supposed, and its\nnature conjectured to be some modification[2] of electricity or\ngalvanism, and which being unsupported, is not deserving of further\ncomment. Another sect of physiologists has conceived that life is the\nimmediate result of a particular organization; but they are unable to\ndemonstrate that any arrangement of parts is consequently endowed with\nvital actions. This arrangement of particular tissues, may be absolutely\nnecessary for the performance of various functions in the living state:\nbut this is altogether different from the energy or cause that excites\nthe action. A violin and its bow are prepared to \"discourse most\nexcellent music,\" yet they are mute until guided by the skilful hands of\nthe performer. When death ensues from many diseases, the organization\nremains, for without this concession our anatomical knowledge must be\nvery imperfect. Thus the nature of life, whether it be developed in the\nvegetable creation, or display its admirable complications in the higher\nanimals, is inexplicable on any of the principles that regulate our\nphilosophy, and can only be referred to the contrivance and disposition\nof infinite wisdom: yet the vehicle in which these stupendous operations\nare conducted owns a material basis: even the confused mass that\ncomposes the earth we tread on possesses certain intrinsic properties.\nEvery atom is subjected to definite regulation, and without\nexaggeration, may be considered endowed with instinctive tendency to\ncoalesce or disunite under favourable opportunities, and the correct\nobservation of these habitudes, constitutes the foundations of chemical\nscience. When the power and intelligence of the supreme Artificer is\nconspicuous in the ultimate particles of matter, we ought to be more\ntemperate in our invectives against the doctrine of materialism.\n\nIdeas have been generally employed, and held competent, by many of the\ntribe of metaphysicians, to explain the phenomena and operations of our\nintellectual nature: but they have failed in the attempt. They have\nendeavoured to confer on them an agency they do not possess, and have\ngiven the mind a dominion over them that it cannot exert.[3] Ideas are\nthe memorial phantasms of visual perception, a largess bestowed, perhaps\nexclusively, on the sense of sight, and this bounty contributes\nessentially to the acquirement and retention of knowledge. They are the\nunfading transcripts of vision, and they exhibit the original picture to\nthe retrospect of memory. They are but little under the immediate\ndirection of the will, and cannot be arbitrarily summoned or dismissed,\nbut owe their introduction to a different source, to be explained\nhereafter. They perform important offices, although they are not the\nmaterials to rear and consolidate the edifice of thought.\n\nThose writers on the human mind who have adhered to the doctrine of\nIdeas, and have been the advocates for the Spirituality of Thought, have\ninsufficiently considered, or held in subordinate regard, Language; the\nprominent criterion, by which a human being is proudly elevated above\nthe rest of the animated creation. Speech, and its representation by\ncharacters, are exclusively comprehensible by man; and these have been\nthe sources of his vast attainments and rapid progression. The ear\nreceives the various intonations that convey intelligence, and the\ncharacters or symbols of these significant sounds are detected by the\nhuman eye. Some of the more docile animals have been supposed capable of\ncomprehending the meaning of a few individual words, but no one worthy\nof belief, has affirmed that they could understand a sentence or\ndistinct proposition: still less, has any person, however confiding in\nthe marvellous, ever ventured to assert that they were able to read. The\nimportant feature, and obvious utility of language, consists in the\ncommutation of our perceptions for a significant sound or word, which by\nconvention may be communicated to others, bearing a common and identical\nmeaning. In this manner we become intelligible to each other, by the\ntransmission and reception of these articulate and significant sounds.\nWords are not only the representatives of the perceptions we receive\nthrough the medium of our five senses, but likewise of many internal\nfeelings, passions, and emotions, together with all that the _Mind_ (the\naggregate of capacity and acquired intelligence) has elaborated. The\nresult of this commutation renders the word the intelligible substitute\nfor the thing perceived, so that the presence of the object recalls its\nname, and the name when uttered excites the immediate recollection of\nthe absent object. This reciprocal substitution or mutual exchange,\nforms the basis, and affords a reason for Language. Whoever will take\nthe trouble to watch the progress of the child from the commencement of\nits efforts to speak, will be surprised with its display of curiosity\nand intelligence. It feels delighted with the existence it enjoys, and\nwith the power its senses possess to examine the objects of the world\nthat surrounds it. Every organ, in succession, is occupied in noticing\nthe wonders and mysteries that are presented. This incessant, but silent\nplay of perception, proceeds until a sound, often repeated, interests\nthe sense of hearing, and although at first dimly comprehended, is meant\nto represent some present object or person, and which, by an excitement\nlittle understood, urges the effort of imitation. The success of\nintelligible pronunciation impels it forward to other attempts, _vires\nacquirit eundo_, and in a time comparatively short, it accumulates a\ncopious vocabulary. These are the incipient efforts to establish that\ncommutation of the object of perception for the word, on which the\nstructure of language is erected. It is unnecessary further to trace\nthese dawnings of speech, or to describe the satisfaction that is felt,\nwhen the child by this commutation of perceptions for words, can\ncommunicate the wonders it has seen, the delicacies it has tasted, or\nthe flattering commendations bestowed on its person and accomplishments.\nThis commutation confers additional satisfaction by being enabled to\ninvest the object of immediate perception with an appropriate and\nintelligible name. Thus by the repeated exercise of this commutation,\nwhich soon becomes confirmed into habit, we speak of the past, by the\nassistance of memory, with the correctness and feeling of the present.\nAt a certain age we learn to discriminate the characters that compose\nwords, (letters)--the order in which they are placed, (orthography,) and\nwith greater difficulty, the position of these words, to convey a\ndefinite and connected meaning. When reading has been fully attained, it\nmust be recollected that all the sentences in the volume we peruse, are\ncomposed of individual words, that are examples of the commutation\nmentioned; and although the objects are absent, and the actions have\nbeen long since performed, often for centuries, we are interested in the\nnarrative, and bestow the appropriate tribute of sympathy or admiration.\nWords, thus impregnated with definite meaning, become the floating\ncurrency of the mind, are the efficient materials of Thought, and of its\nperspicuous expression.\n\nIt has been frequently remarked, that the mind is more delighted by\nmaking distant excursions, than in the examination of surrounding\nobjects, or of those directly obvious. Such immediate assistance for the\npursuit and development of this inquiry is presented in two remarkable\ninstances, where Nature digresses from her usual course, and which are\nnot of rare occurrence. 1st. Some persons are born with their ears\nimpervious to sound, and as language is acquired by imitation,[4] such\nas are deaf, remain mute or dumb.[5] With the exception of the sense of\nhearing, they are like animals the creatures of perception. Some have\ndisplayed considerable curiosity in examining objects by the eye, and by\nthe organs of touch, taste, and smell: but they do not, with these\nelements of knowledge, progressively advance in intelligence, until\nthey have been circuitously taught the characters that are the\nconstituents of words, and also to comprehend, that the word itself is\nthe commuted substitute for the object perceived. Notwithstanding these\ndeficiencies, and disqualifications for human intercourse, these deaf,\nand consequently dumb persons, must be, in a very high degree, the\nsubjects of Ideas, or of those phantasms that are associated with visual\nperception.\n\nThe second instance, is of those who are born blind, and continue\nsightless through life. A person under such total privation of vision,\nmust be exempt from those phantasms or Ideas, that are connected with,\nor are the residuary contingents on visual perception: yet the blind\nacquire speech, when young, with equal facility, as the children who\nenjoy sight; but visible objects must, to them, be abstract or complex\nterms, as all such necessarily are, that cannot be the objects of\nperception. The other sensitive organs, and especially the touch, to a\nlimited extent, become the substitutes for visual defect, although they\nare no actual compensations for sight. By models the blind can become\nacquainted with alphabetic characters, and unite them into words: and in\nthe same manner discriminate, and record the musical notes. Some of the\nblind have become highly intelligent, and have excelled in\nconversational acuteness; and as human beings have left the deaf and\ndumb in the rear, notwithstanding the latter are furnished with all the\n_Ideas_ that can be inherited from sight. This constant employment of\nwords, impregnated with meaning, affords the blind considerable facility\nin acquiring information by pertinent questions, and enables him to\ncommunicate his thoughts with precision and correctness. These words,\nand the intelligence that resides in them, are the only sources of his\nknowledge, (his perceptions being commuted for words,) and the meaning\nthey import is all that it is necessary for him to comprehend. It may\nhere be repeated that the capacity by which man exclusively exercises\nthe range of thought by sounds that are significant, and receives from\nothers the same oral intelligence, has no material basis that we can\npossibly detect or logically infer: but must be considered an endowment\nof infinite power and wisdom.\n\nBefore we attribute such vast powers to these Ideas or phantasms, the\nshadows of visual perception, it will be convenient to inquire into\ntheir nature, and endeavour to ascertain the laws by which they are\nregulated. In that state of mental relaxation, when the intellect is not\nintently occupied on any particular subject, numberless phantasms will\ninvoluntarily intrude: for, during the time we are awake, the mind is\nnever wholly unoccupied, and such irregular presentations of Ideas\nconstitute our reveries. However these ignes fatui may glimmer in their\nwanderings, tumultuously assemble, or abruptly depart; such confluence\nor dispersion contributes nothing to effective thought. As far as these\nIdeas or phantasms, the obsequious shadows of visual perception, can be\ntraced, they are incapable of being summoned to appear by any voluntary\ncommand; but are consequently revived by the term or word for which the\nperception is commuted. Thus, having previously noticed them with\nattention, when we speak of St. Paul's Cathedral or Westminster Abbey,\nthe attendant visions of these buildings immediately arise, and we are\nimpressed with a memorial picture in conjunction with, and through the\nintervention of the word. The will possesses no power to unite or\nseparate Ideas; they adhere to, and remain the unalterable deposits of\nperception. Let it next be asked, what human purpose can be effected by\ntheir sole agency? On those solemn occasions when we address our prayers\nto the Divine Source, can these effusions of grateful feeling, and\nhumble petition, be conveyed in phantasms? Does not the lamenting and\nrepentant sinner emphatically articulate his anxious supplications? Can\nany human contract be concluded by mere Ideas, or any system of\njurisprudence be established on such visionary basis? Ideas therefore\ncannot enable us to perform our duty towards God, or our neighbour.[6]\n\nIn pursuing this important subject, the candid confession of Mr. LOCKE\nbewrays his distrust of the powers and efficiency of his favourite\nIdeas. \"To form a clear notion of _Truth_, it is very necessary to\nconsider Truth of Thought, and Truth of words distinctly one from\nanother: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because\nit is unavoidable, in treating of mental propositions to make use of\nwords; and then the instances given of _mental_ propositions, cease\nimmediately to be barely mental, and become _verbal_. For a mental\nproposition, being nothing _but a bare consideration of the Ideas_, as\nthey are in our minds _stripped_ of names, they lose the nature of\npurely mental propositions, as soon as they are put into words. And that\nwhich makes it _yet harder_ to treat of mental and verbal Propositions\nseparately, is, that most men, if not all, in their THINKING, and\nreasonings within themselves, make use of WORDS, instead of Ideas, at\nleast when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex Ideas.\nWhich is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our\nIdeas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a\nmark to shew us, what are those things, we have clear and perfect\nestablished Ideas of, and what not.\"--_Vol._ II. _C._ 5, _p._ 195. Mr.\nLOCKE was a patient and acute observer of that which passed in his own\nmind, when he strictly meditated any particular subject: and in this\nprocess he was likewise aware, in common with others, that he employed\n_words_ instead of Ideas in his thinking and reasoning within himself.\nBy Ideas alone, he confesses that he could not advance; and for this\nevident reason, because Ideas are incapable of being communicated to\nothers, or received by ourselves, excepting through a verbal medium.\nThere is no evidence of Thought without it be perspicuously expressed in\nwords addressed to the ear, or by their characters presented to the eye;\nand the vain consciousness we may feel that our mind is teeming with\nimportant Thoughts, is little to be relied on, until we are capable of\nexpressing them orally, or exhibiting them in writing. It has been a\nprevailing opinion with those attached to the Ideal doctrine, and who\nare advocates for the spiritual process of Thought, that the Idea is\nfirst conceived mentally, and subsequently, by some process not\nexplained, invested with the corresponding expression. It is however\ncertain that the word itself, with the meaning that is attached to it,\nmust be previously acquired, and thoroughly comprehended, before the\nabstract Idea, or naked Thought, can select the befitting expression,\nand ransack the vast range of a copious vocabulary. The believers in the\nextreme rapidity of thought to which we shall presently advert, must be\nalarmed at this manner of explanation, which necessarily constitutes\nThought a two-fold process, and consequently would consume, at least\ndouble the time for its disclosure. Perhaps in all instances the\nphraseology we employ, like our manners, is derived from the society we\nfrequent: that which is imbibed from persons of good education bears the\nstamp of superior discrimination and correctness, contrasted with the\nrude dialect of the vulgar: but it still remains unsolved, by what means\nthese phantasms, or Ideas, accommodate themselves with the appropriate\nwords to express the Thoughts they have conceived.\n\nCan it be supposed that the abstract, naked, and incommunicable\nconception possesses an innate sagacity to clothe itself with a verbal\ngarb, at best of capricious and transient fashion?\n\n\n     \"Multa renascentur, quae jam cecidere, cadentque\n     Quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus,\n     Quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi.\"\n\n\nIt is certain that Ideas may exist in the mind, as the connected\nresults, and enduring phantasms of visual perception, independently of\nwords, and such condition is exemplified in those born deaf, who are\nconsequently dumb: to whom the business of life is a mere pantomime, who\nonly communicate the impulses of passion, and expose their want of\ncomprehension.\n\n\n     \"In dumb significants proclaim their Thoughts.\"--_Henry VIth._\n\n\nFrom these examples it appears that a human being may possess a\nmultitude of Ideas, and yet be wholly ignorant of language: and in the\ninstances of those born blind, he may acquire speech to its fullest\nextent without having any Ideas, which therefore cannot be considered\nthe necessary instruments of Thought. Thus, the presumed mutual\nintercourse, and reciprocal correspondence between Ideas and words is a\nvery disputable conclusion.\n\nWhen the Idea or phantasm that is connected with visual perception\nappears, in consequence of the word being mentioned (which by\ncommutation is its substitute), the presentation is immediate. He who\nhas visited and attentively noted interesting scenes, mountainous\ndistricts, cataracts or prospects, when they are mentioned, will have\ntheir phantasms or pictured images occur to him, and he will be aware of\nthem, like the intrusion of a sudden flash. From this phenomenon the\ngenerally received opinion of the _rapidity_ of _Thought_ may in all\nprobability have originated.\n\nAll popular and settled notions, however unfounded, like prejudices\nearly imbibed, are with difficulty eradicated. Among these may be\ninstanced the dictum of the astonishing rapidity of Thought, which is\nalmost proverbial, and generally believed: even Mr. TOOKE, Vol. I., p.\n28, conforms to this established maxim. \"Words have been called\n_winged_: and they well deserve that name, when their abbreviations are\ncompared with the progress which speech could make without these\ninventions; but when compared with the _rapidity_ of _thought_, they\nhave not the smallest claim to that title.\" By calculation, the progress\nof light from the sun and other luminaries is said to be ascertained;\nand likewise the rate at which sound travels: but hitherto no\ncontrivance has been fabricated to estimate the rapidity of thought. If\nthe succession of our thoughts should be more rapid than they can be\ndistinctly apprehended, confusion must ensue, and their rapidity would\nrender them useless. Our perceptions are regulated by the same law. If\nthe prismatic colours be painted on a surface which is revolved with\ngreat rapidity, the individual colours will not be apparent. The\nsuccession of sounds to a definite number, may be severally\ndistinguished, in a certain interval: but if the succession be\nincreased beyond the power of discrimination, they will impress the ear\nas one uniform sound. The same principle must regulate our thoughts,\nwhether they be composed of Ideas or words, or, if it be possible, of\nboth jumbled together. It does not appear that our thoughts for any\nuseful purpose, which must imply their communication to others, or for a\nrecord in written characters, _can_ be more rapid than the intelligible\npronunciation of the words themselves, and which, when delivered in\nquick succession, leave the short-hand-writer behind.[7]\n\nAs Ideas can be nothing more than the mere phantasms attendant on visual\nperception, which, like the perceptions of the other senses, are\ncommuted for words, that, by the aid of memory, recall in their absence\nthe objects that have been perceived; it would be difficult to suppose\nthat Ideas could fortuitously or voluntarily assemble in a more rapid\nsuccession, than the words for which they have been commuted, without\nproducing confusion. It frequently happens to inexperienced persons, in\ngiving evidence before a legal tribunal, or in addressing a popular\nassembly, that they cannot proceed; and they are generally disposed to\ninterpret this failure, to their thoughts occurring in a succession too\nrapid for their utterance. Allowing the apology to be correct, it is a\nproof that such rapidity is inconvenient, and renders the Thought wholly\nuseless if it cannot be communicated.\n\nWhen we attentively measure the steps of our own minds in the act of\nthinking, and also observe the progress of others, it will be found that\neffective Thought does not result from this rapid and tumultuous rush of\nIdeas; but is a very deliberate, and in many cases painful elaboration:\nand must, when committed to writing, be subjected to subsequent revisals\nand repeated corrections, and which must be applied to the _words_\nconstituting the sentence in which the thought is contained. From this\ngeneral view of the subject, it is concluded that Ideas, the residuary\nphantasms of visual perception, cannot directly constitute or become the\nimmediate instruments of Thought.\n\nThe present Essay being considered an humble attempt to investigate a\nportion of intellectual physiology, an apology will scarcely be deemed\nnecessary for a short digression to inquire into the powers and\nfaculties of the human mind: and which, when determined, may be viewed\nas the alphabet of mental science.\n\nSystems prematurely constructed, and under the impression of authority,\nhave been especial impediments to our intellectual progress: and this\ntruth has been remarkably exemplified in the works that have treated of\nthe human mind. In the numerous treatises on this subject that have\nissued from the press, there is but little agreement concerning these\npowers or faculties, and it is evident that a definite number must be\nrequired: some writers enumerate more, others less, and it is not\nunusual for some of these metaphysical projectors to split a single and\npresumed faculty into a variety of subdivisions. To the acute and\npatient observer, it will appear that the operations of Nature are\ncontrived with admirable simplicity; but man, in his endeavours to\nexplain them, has generally resorted to a mysterious and discouraging\ncomplexity. Thus, as might be expected, the same faculty, according to\ndifferent authorities, has dissimilar energies,--one is detected to\nencroach on the boundary of another, and when the mechanism of mind,\nfabricated by these scholastic dictators, is attempted to be set in\nmotion, it is found incapable of working. For the grand moving power we\nhave an undefined, and consequently unintelligible doctrine of _Ideas_,\nof supposed spiritual and directing agency; the admission of which\nwould destroy the responsibility of a human being both here and\nhereafter, and degrade his ennobled condition to the instinct of the\nspeechless brute. To endow these insubstantial and reflected phantasms\nwith some activity and mimic play, a theory of the _association of\nIdeas_ has been erected, without having previously established that they\nare capable of such confederation. A wearisome catalogue of faculties,\nmany of which are conjectural, has been enumerated; Abstraction,\nConception, Contemplation, Consciousness, Comparison, Imagination,\nJudgment, Memory, Recollection, Reminiscence, Retention, Perception,\nSensation, Reflection, Thought, Understanding, Volition, and many others\nthat caprice has created, or a subtle discrimination helped to multiply.\nThese are the materials out of which scholastic metaphysicians have\nfashioned their unresembling model, and deserted Nature. It is not\nintended in this abbreviated essay to settle the pretensions of these\nnumerous faculties, the discussion of which would require an ample\nvolume: and the award might probably be protracted, till the claim was\nforgotten. When we contemplate the dexterities that the hand performs,\nand the monuments of skill and taste that it has elaborated; it would\nonly create unnecessary distinctions to affirm that it possessed the\nfaculties of sculpturing, painting, writing, spinning, weaving, sewing,\nand numberless other manipulations: besides those that ulterior\ndiscoveries may enable it to accomplish. However profuse these\nconstructors of the mind may have been in the accumulation of its\ncomponent faculties, they appear to have little regarded language, its\nmost prominent and important feature; _the universal menstruum of\nintelligence, and accredited currency for the circulation and exchange\nof thought_. There are two faculties or capacities that are peculiar to\nthe human intellect, by which our species has attained a supremacy that\nleaves all other animated beings in a distant rear: the possession of\nwhich has rendered man a progressive being, and the race of animals so\nnearly stationary, that however they may be tortured into improvement,\nthey feel no emulation to proceed, and the acquirement perishes where\nthe brute expires. These undisputed faculties are Speech, with its\nrecording characters, and the comprehension of numbers, the powerful\nsources of that pre-eminence which man has already attained, and to\nwhich he must be indebted for his further advancement.\n\nAs Ideas are wholly incompetent to explain the process of thought, the\nnext inquiry will be, whether words are capable of affording the\nadequate solution. For this purpose, the simple experiment would be\nsufficient; and as we are conscious, under due attention of all the acts\nthat the mind performs, every person, in proportion to his habits of\ndeliberately noting that which passes within himself, will be enabled\nto institute this examination. It is however to be lamented, that\nThought is not the constant or habitual exercise of the mind on the\nphenomena of Nature, the occurrences of life, or the subjects we listen\nto and peruse: but is only occasionally awakened by difficulties,\nexcited by contention, or invoked by the promise of fame and by the hope\nof emolument. The usual course of education is but little calculated to\npromote the habitudes of thinking, and especially that teaching where\nauthority dictates, and demonstration is neglected. Much of this\ninstruction is enforced by degradation and terror; and the pupil, at an\nearly age, is compelled to swallow doctrines which he is unable to\ncomprehend, and consequently cannot digest, except through the peptic\nassistance of the scourge: and which, when matured by manhood, and\nenlightened by reason, he is forced to reject.\n\nThought requires knowledge as its basis, and in proportion to its extent\non any given subject, the investigation will be productive. This\nknowledge may be acquired by conversation, reading, or experiment, and\nthese require Language, or a composition of words. Knowledge supplies\nthe materials for thought, and every thought must be a distinct\nproposition, or sentence composed of words. A single word, although it\npossesses a distinct meaning, cannot constitute a thought, which\nimplies a separate proposition or inference contained in a sentence:\nstill less can it be supposed to result from an individual phantasm or\nIdea. When it is considered that language is composed of words adapted\nby position to represent all the phenomena and contingencies of human\naffairs, and that we employ them, _by commutation_, for all that we can\nexperience as sentient and intellectual beings, we shall be able to\nunderstand that they are the mental currency previously described, and\nthat they are the only instruments of intelligence to which we can\nresort for the communication of our thoughts, or for the process of\ntheir elaboration. They must be expressed in words, and by words\nprepared for such expression. Without attempting to investigate the\ndifferent kinds of words, or parts of speech, the province of general or\nphilosophical grammarians, whose unsettled disputes still perplex the\npatient and modest inquirer, it will be sufficient to remark that we\npossess words adapted to convey all the shades of opinion and degrees of\nfeeling: and when these words, under the guidance of acquired knowledge,\nare perspicuously arranged into a proposition or sentence, they\nconstitute Thought: and the act of thinking consists in their correct\nselection and arrangement for the purpose of promulgation by speech or\nwriting, and which is very properly termed composition. When we\nreflect, that from our infancy to the natural decline of our\nintellectual powers, we are employed, during our waking hours, in the\nexercise of language;[8]--by conversation, often desultory, where we\nrange through a variety of topics, as the bird sports from branch to\ntwig; to the more deliberate act of composition, where the mind\nenduringly broods on the subject;--or when we read, and attentively\nconsider the thoughts of others:--these occupations contribute to\naugment our vocabulary, and fix the meaning of the words we employ. By\nthese words, and the intelligence that resides in them, although many\ncenturies have passed by, we participate, and feel impregnated with the\npure and exalted spirit that conceived the Iliad and Odyssey. Time has\nnot diminished the vigour or impaired the beauty of those memorials that\nhave survived the extinction of the Grecian states, and the glory of the\neternal city; and such is the luminous correspondence of Language, that\nby transfusion into our vernacular idiom, we may receive a satisfactory\nmeasure of the original inspiration. Let it be kept in view, that Ideas,\nthe frail associates of a perception, possess no permanence, are\nincapable of being transferred, and must fade away when our existence\nterminates. It is the word that forms the nucleus, and contains the\nintellectual deposit, that may become the inheritance of future\ngenerations.\n\nThis process, in no manner or degree tends to subvert the spiritual\nnature of Thought, which has its source in the capacities whereby we\nperceive, remember, and comprehend that significant sounds or words are\nthe commuted representatives of the objects of intelligence. The\nperceptive organs of many animals are more exquisitely endowed than man,\nand their local memory more retentive; yet they are wholly incapable of\ncomprehending language or calculating numbers;--capacities by which the\nCreator has exclusively dignified the human race.\n\nIt may excite some surprise that an Essay on Thought should be connected\nwith the construction of a perspicuous sentence. To explain this\nconjunction, it may be urged, that there can be no evidence of thought,\nuntil it is promulgated by speech or written character: and, on all\nimportant occasions, such communications of meaning become absolutely\nnecessary. Acquiescence or dissent may indeed be tacitly conveyed, by\nholding up the hand, or by ballot, without condescending to offer any\nverbal reasons for the adoption or rejection of the proposed measure.\nAffirmation or negation does not in any manner constitute Thought; such\ndetermination may result from caprice, from ignorance, or from\nprejudice, without the slightest consideration. Thought requires some\nproposition clearly conceived and perspicuously expressed in a sentence;\nand the clearness of the Thought will be ascertained by the perspicuity\nof its verbal expression. There may be some difficulty respecting the\nprecise meaning of individual words, arising from the corruptions of the\nignorant; but more especially from the perversions of writers who have\nbeen deemed authorities. This distortion of the original sense, is, in a\ncertain degree, incidental to all living languages, which being in\nchildhood acquired by the ear, the learner is compelled to adopt the\nsignification of words, and employ the current phraseology of those with\nwhom he associates. When he is subsequently taught to speak and write by\nrule, or grammatically, generally at an age anterior to the exercise of\nreason, he is coerced to imbibe that which is forced in the way of\ninstruction. Even at a more advanced period the student cannot readily\ncomprehend how a perspicuous sentence is formed by the position of\nindividual words, each bearing a distinct signification, which it is\npresumed must be the fact: but Mr. DUGALD STEWART, in his _Philosophical\nEssays_, _p._ 155, has introduced a doctrine entirely opposite to this\nwell-founded position. \"So different is all this from the fact, that our\nwords when examined _separately_, are _often_ as completely\ninsignificant as the letters of which they are composed: deriving their\nmeaning _solely_ from the connexion, or relation in which they stand to\nothers.\"\n\nFor the memory of Mr. STEWART, in common with his surviving pupils, I\nfeel the reverence that is due to a learned, eloquent and amiable\ninstructor, although I may now differ with him in many essential points\nrelating to his philosophy of the human mind. The fact, that every word\npossesses a distinct meaning, appears to constitute one of the\nfoundations of language: and it is impossible to conceive that any word,\nin itself completely insignificant, can impart signification to others;\nthat which it does not contain cannot be communicated. The reservation\ncontained in the word _often_, implies that some words really are\nsignificant; but no directions are given how to discover, and select\nfrom the copious vocabulary of our language, such as are impregnated\nwith meaning, in order to expunge those that are insignificant. When we\nconsult Dr. JOHNSON'S Dictionary, we find that the greater part of the\nwords enumerated in his ample collection, instead of being senseless,\nenjoy an exuberance of meaning. Thus the verb to think has ten\nsignifications; the substantive Thought (the preterite of the verb), 12;\nSomething, n. s., 5; Nothing, n. s., 11; Smooth, adj., 6; Rough, adj.,\n12; To stand, v. n., 69; To run, v. n., 62; Empty, adj., 9; Full, adj.,\n15; Beginning, n. s., 5; End, n. s., 20; Before, prepos., 12; After,\nprep., 6. However strange, or perhaps ludicrous, these numbers may seem,\nyet, in the progress of language from barbarism to refinement, from the\nassumed authority of writers, this accumulation of meanings is\ninevitable. However precise the primitive signification of words may\nhave been, imagination, passion, or feeling would readily train them to\ndeflect from their original import, under the effusions of the \"poet,\nthe lunatic, or the lover.\" A correct etymology would unfold the rude\nand simple origin of many words, that our Anglo-saxon, and Norman\nancestors have bequeathed to us; although we are now but little sensible\nof the legacy; as the great mass feels no inclination to revert to the\nsource of derivation. Many have been distorted by corruption, and these\nare the most difficult to trace: to which may be added, that the terms\nwe now employ to express our feelings and passions, and all that depicts\nmind and its operations, are of a figurative or metaphorical origin.\nInstead of any word being insignificant, there is no one but may become\nthe keystone in a sentence; and therefore a word blotted out in a\nperspicuous, that is, a properly constructed sentence, would render it\nunintelligible. To the composition of a sentence, whatever may be the\nthought, certain words are absolutely necessary, each containing an\nindividual meaning; which, like a sum in addition, composed of different\nunits, each possessing a separate and intrinsic value, may, when added\ntogether, produce the total. To those who have not attentively\nconsidered the subject, there is considerable difficulty in\nunderstanding how a determinate number of words can include the\nintelligence contained in a proposition or sentence: and especially how\nthese components of separate significations can become connected for\nsuch general and comprehensive meaning. It should be recollected that\nsuch is the amazing inclosure of language, that it comprehends all the\nliving and inanimate materials of this world, all that perception can\ndetect, memory recall, or thought elaborate. This exposition includes\nthe present posture of human affairs, and the movements we\nobserve:--much that has heretofore occurred, which the characters of\nlanguage have preserved unfaded from dark and remote ages: and are\ncompetent to transmit to a distant posterity, with accumulated interest:\nall that experience has amassed, accompanied with the consoling\npromises of the future, which Revelation has unfolded. The extended\nempire of speech, and its perpetuating characters, embrace this\nprodigious range; but their comprehension is exclusively limited to the\nhuman race. When words can represent all that is evident and all that is\nconjectural--the works of Omnipotence, and the fabrications of man--we\nneed to seek no further for the necessary materials of thought. The\ndifficulty that has perplexed many persons respecting the compactness\nand unity of intelligence that a sentence contains, principally arises\nfrom their ignorance of the precise meaning of individual words.\nEtymologists would employ them in their original sense, and consider\nthemselves justified by referring to their primitive import: others\nwould use them according to their ordinary acceptation, which may be\nperverted; for in the currency of language, much is defective and\ncounterfeit: but in general the authority of writers who are accredited,\nhowever they may disagree, is adopted. The intrinsic meaning of many\nwords, especially the particles, will appear obscure; because they are\ndisguised abbreviations of other words, and, in some instances, are sunk\nso deeply, that they cannot be fathomed. A protracted life might now be\nconsumed in the investigation of these convenient and necessary\nparticles, including the voluminous efforts of those illustrious\ngrammarians who have terminated their discordant labours, without\narriving at their primitive signification. The chemical elements of\nmatter have undergone various reforms, and actual revolutions, and still\nawait ulterior confusion.\n\nThe clearness of the thought will be manifested by the perspicuity of\nthe sentence that expresses it. Whatever may be related, is most readily\ncomprehended, when detailed in the strict order of its occurrence. If a\nprocession be described, the exact sequence of its train must be noted,\notherwise it will become a confused mixture of persons, or a mob. The\nsame regularity is required in the construction of a sentence; and it\nappears fortunate that the English language reconciles this direct\nlocation of words, on which, its conformity to natural events and human\ntransactions principally depends. From this straight-forward expression\nof meaning we may expect a future excellence of composition, and a more\ndirect elaboration of thought. This distant prospect which imagination\npaints, and hope promotes, can only be realized under a system where\nlight streams uncontrolled, and the atmosphere we breathe is free. The\nspirit of liberty must preside where improvement is expected. When we\nhave acquired the power and habit of original thinking, the most\nimportant part of education, the mind is emancipated, and its\nindependence commences: we cease to be espaliers, and become standards.\nHitherto we have been principally trained according to the ancient\nmodels. The Greek and Latin historians, orators, and poets, have\nconsumed, to a great extent, the docile season of youth: when perception\nis active, and memory most permanently retains its various deposits, to\nthe dereliction of the great presentations of Nature, the operations of\nnumbers, the foundations of science, and more especially the exercise of\nthought. After we have quitted school, and commenced our career of\nprofitable employment, these studies are seldom continued, and from\ndesuetude are soon forgotten; or only revived, perhaps unaptly, in an\noccasional quotation. Even a living language, when not exercised, fades\nfrom the recollection. The indirect location of words which prevails in\nLatin, can be no model for English composition, where regular and\nconsecutive meaning constitute the perspicuity of the sentence; and\naccording to the reasoning that has been adopted, of the thought itself.\nWords, and the meaning which resides in each individual, are the only\nmedia by which our thoughts can be conveyed; and if these, which are\nconnected by sense and subject, are so separated, or dislocated, that it\nbecomes a puzzle to reduce them to their natural order, such distraction\nought not to be considered an example for the process of thinking, and\nits development by composition or construction of sentences in the\nEnglish language. The connexion that exists in a perspicuous sentence,\nis the conjunction of meaning, a further proof of the individual\nsignification of words, and which bearing a definite sense, are selected\nfor the purpose of that composition, which we term the process of\nthinking. To this connexion we are directed by the knowledge we possess\nof any particular subject, when we are intently occupied in its\ninvestigation, with a view to confute or confirm it, or by a more\nsuccessful effort to arrive at discovery: and these acts of thought\ninvolve the continuation of meaning by the addition of words adapted to\nfulfil such intention.\n\nConnexion, in a great degree, is the contrivance of our own minds, and\nhas been frequently confounded with successive occurrences, many of\nwhich, on examination, are detected to be in no manner related; most\npersons link together circumstances that ought to be kept apart, and\nwhich often prove the source of unsurmountable prejudices.\n\nIt will scarcely be contended, that the order of time establishes such\nconcatenation, although it forms the basis of historical narrative. Each\nportion of time must be individual and distinct, and essentially\nconsists in its subdivisions: indeed, if we were to fuse together hours,\ndays and years, our existence would only amount to a tedious dream. The\nletters of the alphabet are insulated symbols, and have no natural\nconnexion with each other, but may be arranged to constitute words,\nwhich possess a definite meaning. Words are in the same situation, there\nis no connexion in a vocabulary; they resemble the individuals of our\nspecies. Each is a separate being, charged with his own propensities and\npeculiar character; but he may become connected with others in\nfriendship, in interest, or as the member of a society for particular\nobjects: he may confederate with immense bodies, for the protection of\nhis rights, or become part of an army for the destruction of his\nneighbours. Thus one philosophical system, in pamphlets or in formidable\nvolumes, endeavours to overturn another: but the words are individual,\nand have no tendency to associate until they are enlisted and\ndisciplined into the composition of sentences.\n\nWhen the proposition or sentence is formed, it ought to bear evidence of\nthe most direct connexion, for the purposes of being readily\ncomprehended and enduringly retained. From the nature of our minds, we\nrecollect events, however unconnected, in the order of their occurrence,\nand we acquire by heart any passage, of level construction, with greater\nfacility than where the natural sequence is disarranged; we repeat\nlines from Pope with superior fidelity than quotations from MILTON.\n\nTo compress this Essay into the smallest compass, citations have been\nstudiously avoided; yet there is a temptation to illustrate this subject\nby the introduction of an Epigram from MARTIAL, _Lib. 5, Epig. 1._\n\n\n      13   14     18    15     17      16    18\n     \"Hoc tibi Palladiae seu collibus uteris Albae,\n\n       2   19  20     22      21      23    24\n     Caesar et hinc Triviam prospicis inde Thetin:\n\n      25 28     26        27     28       26\n     Seu tua veridicae discunt responsa sorores,\n\n      30      31     29   32    30   31\n     Plana suburbani qua cubat unda freti:\n\n      33   30    35    34    37   38    39\n     Seu placet AEneae nutrix, seu filia solis,\n\n      40       42        41     41    42\n     Sive salutiferis candidus anxur aquis;\n\n        12    1   6     3     8     5    4\n     Mittimus o rerum felix tutela salusque,\n\n        7     7    12      8      10    9\n     Sospite quo gratum credimus esse Jovem.\"\n\n\nThe figures pointing out the \"_ordo verborum_\" are according to the\nsubjoined interpretation of Mons. COLLESSON, who prepared this Delphine\nedition. The same figures have been placed where the adjective agrees\nwith the substantive or pronoun; and for this clew to the consecutive\narrangement of these disbanded and dispersed members of the sentence,\nsome young gentlemen at school, and many who have finished their\neducation, will be under considerable obligations.\n\nIt is of considerable moment that this question should be fully\ndiscussed in order to be finally determined. The groundwork is\nphysiological, the superstructure involves some moral considerations:\nand the conclusions will have an extensive influence on the system of\neducation that ought to be adopted. If the perceptions of the eye, and\nits associated phantasms, or memorial visions, under the name of IDEAS,\nare to be viewed as the effective materials of our Thoughts; such\ninference is directly confuted by the instances of those born blind, and\ncontinue through life without sight, and who must necessarily be\ndeficient of such materials. If Thought be the result of any immediate\nspiritual dictation, which the difficulty of accounting for it without\nsuch mysterious agency, has led many to suppose: and of which we are not\nconscious, the responsibility of our species is destroyed. If Thought be\neffected by the selection and arrangement of words, each of which\npossesses a definite meaning, and is capable when conjoined with other\nwords, of adding to their significance: of which process, and the\nindividual steps that compose it, we _are_ conscious under due\nattention, the mystery vanishes, and the act of thinking becomes\nunfolded in the progressive formation of a perspicuous sentence.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] The eye is the only organ of sense that affords a connected\nphantasm, vision or Idea. In the other senses, there is a memorial\nconnection, by which the perception is recognised as having previously\noccurred, and consequently a consciousness of former perception. Without\nthese adjuncts the repetition of these perceptions would be useless as\ninstruments of knowledge. Avoiding a lengthened detail concerning the\nother senses, it will be sufficient to instance the olfactory organ. If\nwe scent the essences of rose or jasmine, on the second presentation,\nthey are recognised as having occurred before: should we have smelled\nthe same perfumes from the living plants that exhale them, and by the\n_eye_ noticed them, we should experience a phantasm or Idea of the\nfigure of the plants, but there would be no phantasm of the odour. The\nexcitation of the phantasm associated with the perception, and the\nrecollection of the perception without the phantasm, by the attribution\nof a name, is, for the present, purposely concealed.\n\n[2] Modification. A word of useless application, unless the _modus in\nquo agit_, be defined.\n\n[3] Of the supposed operations of these Ideas, and the purposes to which\nthey are subjected, a few, among abundant instances, are selected from\nMr. Locke's Essay. \"Some Ideas _forwardly_ offer themselves to all men's\nunderstanding; some sorts of truths result from any Ideas, as soon as\nthe mind puts _them_ into propositions: other Truths require a _train_\nof Ideas _placed in order_.\"--_Vol._ I. _p._ 63.\n\n\"When the understanding is once stored with these simple Ideas, it has\nthe power to _repeat_, _compare_, and _unite_ them, even to an almost\ninfinite variety, and so can make at pleasure _new_ complex\nIdeas.\"--_Vol._ I. _p._ 81.\n\n\"The next operation we may observe in the mind about its Ideas, is\nCOMPOSITION, whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it\nhas received from sensation and reflection, and _combines_ them into\ncomplex ones.\"--_Vol._ I. _p._ 118.\n\n\"If either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his\nfancy upon one sort of thoughts, _incoherent_ Ideas have been _cemented_\ntogether so powerfully, as to remain united.\"--_Vol._ I. _p._ 121.\n\n\"But there are degree of Madness as of folly, the disorderly _jumbling_\nIdeas together, in some more, and some less.\" _Vol._ I. _p._ 122.\n\n\"The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple Ideas,\nare chiefly three. 1st. Combining several simple Ideas into one\n_compound one_, and _thus_ all complex Ideas are made. The second, is\nbringing _two Ideas_, whether simple or complex together, and _setting_\nthem by one another, so as to take a view of them _at once_, without\nuniting them into one; by which way it gets all its Ideas of relations.\nThe third, is _separating_ them from all other Ideas that _accompany_\nthem in their real existence; this is called Abstraction.\"--_Vol._ I.\n_p._ 124.\n\n[4] The acquirement of language does not wholly consist in the\nimitation of the word, but likewise in the comprehension that the\narticulate sound is the representative of the object perceived. There\nare some persons of defective intellect that I have seen, whose hearing\nwas perfect, and who could whistle some tunes, but who were unable to\nlearn their native language so as to understand what was said to them,\nand consequently incompetent to afford an answer. In this particular\nthey approximate to the state of animals.\n\n[5] \"Nec missas audire queunt, nec reddere voces.\"\n\n[6] On consulting the Concordance of CRUDEN, it does not appear\nthat the word IDEA, is to be found in our Translations of the Old and\nNew Testament. CRUDEN, although deemed a Lunatic, was a man of\npersevering research and scrupulous accuracy.\n\n[7] It is very probable that MARTIAL, in his eulogy of the\nRoman Notarius, may have exceeded the actual performance.\n\n\n     \"Currant verba licet, manus est velocior illis:\n     Nondum linga suum, dextra peregit opus.\"\n                                       _Lib. 14, Epig. 208._\n\n[8] In imitation of the Auburn (American) prison, the Middlesex\nmagistrates, in their judicial wisdom, have adopted an entirely opposite\nsystem; by imposing an awful silence in their house of correction. This\npenance must press sorely on the criminals of the softer sex, to whom\ntea and conversation (errors excepted) constitute the principal comforts\nof life. CATULLUS seems to allude to this infernal art of exasperating\nthe miseries of incarceration.\n\n\n     \"Nulla fugae ratio, nulla spes: OMNIA MUTA,\n     Omnia sunt deserta: ostentant omnia Lethum.\"\n\n\nPRINTED BY G. HAYDEN, LITTLE COLLEGE STREET, WESTMINSTER.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_LIST OF WORKS BY THE AUTHOR._\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS on MADNESS & MELANCHOLY. Octavo, 1809.\n\nILLUSTRATIONS of MADNESS. Octavo, 1810.\n\nMEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, as it relates to Insanity, according to the Law\nof England. Octavo, 1817.\n\nCONSIDERATIONS on the MORAL MANAGEMENT of INSANE PERSONS. Octavo, 1817.\n\nA LETTER to the GOVERNORS of BETHLEM HOSPITAL. Octavo, 1818.\n\nSOUND MIND. Octavo, 1819.\n\nLETTER to the LORD CHANCELLOR, on UNSOUNDNESS of MIND and Imbecility of\nIntellect. Octavo, 1823.\n\nSix LECTURES on the INTELLECTUAL COMPOSITION of MAN.--_Vide Lancet for\n1827._\n\nLETTER to the METROPOLITAN COMMISSIONERS in LUNACY. Octavo, 1830.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n(_Shortly will be published_)\n\nBY DR. HASLAM,\n\nA WORK on the TREATMENT of INSANITY conducive to its CURE.\n\nThis Treatise will contain the practical experience of forty years.\nThree preliminary Dissertations will be prefixed. 1st. How far Insanity\nought to be considered a _mental_ affection. 2d. On the influence which\nindividuals are capable of exerting on the minds of others, both in the\nsane and insane state: the latter of course becomes the basis of that\nregulation which is termed _moral management_. 3d. On the connexion\nbetween the sexual organs and the mind, including the disorders that\nhave been termed nymphomania, furor uterinus, puerperal insanity,\nbarrenness, impotence, and the attacks that supervene at the period of\ncessation. On the disorders that resemble and are not unfrequently\nconfounded with Insanity, viz. Delirium, Hypochondriasis, Morbid\nActivity of Mind, certain degrees of Paralysis, and various nervous\naffections. An investigation of the existing laws that apply to\nLunatics, Idiots, and persons denominated of _Unsound_ Mind: with an\naccurate examination of the degree of incapacity or imbecility that\nought to subject them to legal protection. Reflections on the\nparliamentary inquiries relating to insane persons, and the regulations\nenacted respecting the houses in which lunatics are confined. Candid\nremarks on the establishment and duties of the Metropolitan\nCommissioners. Estimate of the probability of the lives of insane\npersons, and of those who have been visited with mental derangement;\ncalculated for the guidance of assurance offices.","title":"On the nature of thought : $b or, The act of thinking and its connexion with a perspicuous sentence","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":10174}