{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_31457/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_31457","id":"gutenberg_31457","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31457","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - European","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Law & Criminology","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","World War I","World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes"],"text":"Produced by D Alexander and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n THE EVIDENCE\n IN THE CASE\n\n A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the\n War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic\n Records of England, Germany, Russia,\n France, Austria, Italy and Belgium.\n\n BY\n\n JAMES M. BECK, LL.D.\n Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S.\n Author of \"The War and Humanity.\"\n\n With an Introduction by\n HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE\n Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain\n\n \"_Did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats\n with 'em? Mine ache to think on 't._\"\n          HAMLET--Act V., Sc. 1.\n\n _Revised Edition, with Additional Material_\n\n NEW YORK\n GROSSET & DUNLAP\n PUBLISHERS\n\n Published by Arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons\n\n\n\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY\n JAMES M. BECK\n\n COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY\n JAMES M. BECK\n\n (_For Revised Edition_)\n\n\n Thirteenth Impression\n\n\n BY JAMES M. BECK\n The Evidence in the Case.  The War and Humanity.\n\n\n This edition is issued under arrangement with the publishers,\n G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON\n\n\n\n\n TO\n ALBERT, OF BELGIUM\n\n \"EVERY INCH A KING\"\n\n\n Justum, et tenacem propositi virum\n Non civium ardor prava jubentium,\n Non vultus instantis tyranni,\n     Mente quatit solida, neque Auster\n\n Dux inquieti turbidus Adriae,\n Nec fulminantis magna manus Jovis.\n Si fractus illabatur orbis,\n     Impavidum ferient ruinae.\n\n          HORACE.\n\n\n\n\n=Publishers' Note=\n\n\nThe volume _The Evidence in the Case_ is based upon an article by the\nHon. James M. Beck, which came into print in the \"New York Times\" of\nOctober 25th. The article in question made so deep an impression with\nthinking citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that it has been\ntranslated into a number of European languages, and some 400,000\ncopies have been sold in England alone.\n\nIn making this acknowledgment, which is due for the courtesy of \"The\nTimes\" in permitting an article prepared for its columns to be\nutilized as the basis for the book, it is in order for the publishers\nto explain to the readers that the material in the article has itself\nbeen rewritten and amplified, while the book contains, in addition to\nthis original paper, a number of further chapters comprising together\nmore than six times the material of the first article.\n\nThe present book is an independent work, and is deserving of\nconsideration on the part of all citizens who are interested in\nsecuring authoritative information on the issues of the great European\ncontest.\n\n     New York, December 12, 1914\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nBY THE HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT\nBRITAIN[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Reprinted, by permission, from the N. Y. _Times_.]\n\n\nFor five months now all people who read at all have been reading about\nthe horrible war that is devastating Europe and shedding the best\nblood of the people of five great nations. In fact, they have had no\ntime to read anything else, and everything that is published about it\nis seized upon with great avidity. No wonder, then, that Mr. James M.\nBeck's book, _The Evidence in the Case_, published by G. P. Putnam's\nSons, which has grown out of the article by him contributed to the New\nYork _Times_ Sunday Magazine, has been warmly welcomed both here and\nin England as a valuable addition to the literature of the day.\n\nAn able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate, he presents the matter\nin the unique form of a legal argument, based upon an analysis of the\ndiplomatic records submitted by England, Germany, Russia, France, and\nBelgium, as \"A Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization,\" and the\nconclusions to be deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war.\n\nThe whole argument is founded upon the idea that there is such a thing\nas a public conscience of the world, which must and will necessarily\npass final judgment upon the conduct of the parties concerned in this\ninfernal struggle. Many times in the course of the book he refers\nemphatically to that \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind\" to\nwhich Jefferson appealed in our Declaration of Independence as the\nfinal arbiter upon our conduct in throwing off the British yoke and\ndeclaring our right to be an independent nation. That this \"public\nopinion of the world\" is the final tribunal upon all great\ninternational contests is illustrated by the fact that all mankind,\nincluding Great Britain herself, has long ago adjudged that our great\nDeclaration was not only just, but necessary for the progress of\nmankind.\n\nIt is evident from his brief preface that Mr. Beck is a sincere\nadmirer of historic Germany, and on the eve of the war he was at\nWeimar, after a brief visit to a little village near Erfurt, where one\nof his ancestors was born, who had migrated at an early date to\nPennsylvania, a Commonwealth whose founder had made a treaty with the\nIndians which, so far from being treated as a \"mere scrap of paper,\"\nwas never broken. Like many Americans, Mr. Beck is of mixed ancestry,\nbeing in part English and in part Swiss-German. He has therefore\nviewed the great question objectively, and without any racial\nprejudice.\n\nA careful study of the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the\noutbreak of the war had convinced Mr. Beck that Germany was chiefly\nresponsible for it, and he proceeds _con amore_ to demonstrate the\ntruth of this conviction by the most earnest and forceful presentation\nof the case.\n\nForensic lawyers in the cases they present are about half the time on\nthe wrong side, or what proves by the final judgment to have been the\nwrong side, but it is always easy to tell from the manner of\npresentation whether they themselves are thoroughly convinced of the\njustice of the side which they advocate. It is evident that Mr. Beck\ndid not undertake to convince \"the Supreme Court of Civilization\"\nuntil he was himself thoroughly persuaded of the justice of his cause,\nthat the invasion of Belgium by Germany was not only a gross breach of\nexisting treaties, but was in violation of settled international law,\nand a crime against humanity never to be forgotten, a crime which\nconverted that peaceful and prosperous country into a human\nslaughterhouse, reeking with the blood of four great nations. How any\nintelligent lawyer could have come to any other conclusion it is not\neasy to imagine, since Germany confessed its crime while in the very\nact of committing it, for on the very day that the German troops\ncrossed the Belgian frontier and hostilities began, the Imperial\nChancellor at the great session of the Reichstag on August 4th\ndeclared, to use his own words:\n\n     Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg,\n     and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. _That is\n     a breach of international law.... We were forced to ignore\n     the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and\n     Belgium, and the injustice--I speak openly--the injustice we\n     thereby commit, we will try to make good as soon as our\n     military aims have been attained._ Anybody who is threatened\n     as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest\n     possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his\n     way through.\n\nThank God, their military aims have not yet been attained, and from\npresent appearances are not likely to be, but, as Mr. Beck believes,\nGermany will still be held by the judgment of mankind to make good the\ndamage done.\n\nIn reviewing the diplomatic correspondence published by Germany that\npreceded the outbreak of the war, Mr. Beck lays great stress, and we\nthink justly, upon the obvious suppression of evidence by Germany, in\nomitting substantially all the important correspondence on vital\npoints that passed between Germany and Austria, and the suppression of\nimportant evidence in judicial proceedings always carries irresistible\nweight against the party guilty of it. While England and France and\nRussia were pressing Germany to influence and control Austria in the\ninterests of peace, not a word is disclosed of what, if anything, the\nGerman Foreign Office said to Austria toward that end. To quote Mr.\nBeck's own words:\n\n     Among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German\n     _White Paper_, it is most significant that not a single\n     communication is given of the many which passed from the\n     Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna, and only two\n     which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the\n     German Chancellor, and the purpose of this suppression is\n     even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of\n     Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the\n     scrutiny of a candid world.\n\nNotwithstanding the disavowal given by the German Ambassador at\nPetrograd to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the German\nGovernment had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before\nit was handed in, and did not exercise any influence on its contents,\nMr. Beck establishes clearly by the admissions of the German Foreign\nOffice itself that it was consulted by Austria previous to the\nultimatum, and that it not only approved of its course, but literally\ngave to Austria _carte blanche_ to proceed. And the German Ambassador\nto the United States formally admitted in an article in _The\nIndependent_ of September 7, 1914, that \"Germany had approved in\nadvance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.\"\n\nThis brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty millions of people,\nmaking impossible demands against a little one of four millions which\nhad itself just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffering\nfrom exhaustion--an ultimatum which set all the nations of Europe in\nagitation--is proved to have been jointly concocted by the two members\nof the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria. But the third member of\nthat Alliance, Italy, found it to be an act of aggression on their\npart which brought on the war, and that the terms of the Triple\nAlliance, therefore, did not bind her to take any part.\n\nThe peace parleys which passed between the several nations involved\nare carefully reviewed by Mr. Beck, who concludes, as we think\njustly, that up to the 28th of July, when the German Imperial\nChancellor sent for the English Ambassador and announced the refusal\nof his Government to accept the conference of the Powers proposed by\nSir Edward Grey, every proposal to preserve peace had come from the\nTriple Entente, and that every such proposal had met with an\nuncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive\nquibbles from Germany.\n\nAt this point, the sudden return of the Kaiser to Berlin from his\nannual holiday in Norway, which his own Foreign Office regretted as a\nstep taken on his Majesty's own initiative and which they feared might\ncause speculation and excitement, and his personal intervention from\nthat time until his troops invaded Luxemburg and he made his abrupt\ndemand upon the Belgian Government for permission to cross its\nterritory are reviewed with great force and effect by Mr. Beck, with\nthe conclusion on his part that the Kaiser, who by a timely word to\nAustria might have prevented all the terrible trouble that followed,\nwas the supremely guilty party, and that such will be the verdict of\nhistory.\n\nMr. Beck's review of the case of Belgium is extremely interesting, and\nhis conclusion that England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await\nwith confidence the world's final verdict that their quarrel was just,\nrests safely upon the plea of \"Guilty\" by Germany, a conclusion which\nseems to have been already plainly declared by most of the civilized\nnations of the world.\n\nWe think that Mr. Beck's opinion that England and France were taken\nunawares and were wholly unprepared for war is a little too strongly\nexpressed. France, certainly, had been making ready for war with\nGermany ever since the great conflict of 1870 had resulted in her\nloss of Alsace and Lorraine, and had had a fixed and unalterable\ndetermination to get them back when she could, although it is evident\nthat she did not expect her opportunity to come just when and as it\ndid. That Great Britain had no present expectation of immediate war\nwith Germany is clearly obvious. That she had long been apprehending\nthe danger of it in the indefinite future is very clear, but that Sir\nEdward Grey and the Government and the people that he represented did\nall that they possibly could to prevent the war seems to be clearly\nestablished.\n\nMr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that\nit is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the\nreading, and we shall not be surprised to hear, not only that it has\nhad an immense sale in England and America, but that its translation\ninto the languages of the other nations of Europe has been demanded.\n\n          JOSEPH H. CHOATE.\n\n     NEW YORK, January 10, 1915.\n\n\n\n\nFOREWORD\n\n\nOn the eve of the Great War I sat one evening in the reading room of\nthe Hotel Erbprinz in classic Weimar. I had spent ten happy days in\nThuringia, and had visited with deep interest a little village near\nErfurt, where one of my forbears was born. I had seen Jena, from whose\nhistoric university this paternal ancestor had gone as a missionary\nto North America in the middle of the eighteenth century. This\nsimple-minded German pietist had cherished the apparent delusion\nthat even the uncivilized Indians of the American wilderness\nmight be taught--the Bernhardis and Treitschkes to the contrary\nnotwithstanding--that to increase the political power of a nation by\nthe deliberate and highly systematized destruction of its neighbors\nwas not the truest political ideal, even of an Indian tribe.\n\nThis missionary had gone most fittingly to the Commonwealth of\nPennsylvania, where its enlightened founder had already given a\ndemonstration of the truth that a treaty of peace, even though not\nformally expressed in a \"scrap of paper,\" might be kept by white men\nand so-called savages with scrupulous fidelity for at least three\nquarters of a century, for even the cynical Voltaire said in sincerest\nadmiration that the compact between William Penn and the Indians was\nthe only treaty which was never reduced to parchment, nor ratified by\nan oath and yet was never broken. When Penn, the great apostle of\npeace, died in England, a disappointed, ruined, and heart-broken man,\nand the news reached the Indians in their wigwams along the banks of\nthe Delaware, they had for him, whom they called the \"white Truth\nTeller\" so deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his widow a\nsympathetic gift of valuable skins, in memory of the \"man of unbroken\nfriendship and inviolate treaties.\"\n\nThese reflections in a time of broken friendships and violated\ntreaties are not calculated to fill the man of the twentieth century\nwith any justifiable pride.\n\nMy mind, however, as I spent the quiet evening in the historic inn\nof Thackeray's Pumpernickel, did not revert to these far distant\nassociations but was full of other thoughts suggested by the most\ninteresting section of Germany, through which it had been my privilege\nto pass.\n\nI had visited Eisenach and reverentially stood within the room where\nthe great master of music, John Sebastian Bach, had first seen the\nlight of day, and as I saw the walls that he loved and which are\nforever hallowed because they once sheltered this divine genius, the\nquestion occurred to me whether he may not have done more for Germany\nwith his immortal harmonies, which are the foundation of all modern\nmusic, than all the Treitschkes, and Bernhardis, with their gospel of\nracial hatred, pseudo-patriotism, and imperial aggrandizement.\n\nI had climbed the slopes of the Wartburg and from Luther's room had\ngazed with delight upon the lovely Thuringian forests. Quite apart\nfrom any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed to suggest\nhistoric Germany in its best estate. It recalled that scene of undying\ninterest at the Diet of Worms, when the peaceful adherence to an ideal\nwas shown to be mightier than the power of the greatest empire\nsince the fall of Rome. The monk of Wittenburg, standing alone\nin the presence of the great Emperor, Charles the Fifth, and the\nrepresentatives of the most powerful religious organization that the\nworld has ever known, with his simple, \"_Hier stehe ich; ich kann\nnicht anders,_\" represented the truest soul and highest ideal of the\nnobler Germany.\n\nThese and other glorious memories, suggested by Eisenach, Frankfort,\nErfurt, Weimar, Jena, and Leipzig, made this pilgrimage of intense\ninterest, and almost the only discord was the sight of the Leipzig\nVoelkerschlacht Denkmal, probably the largest, and certainly the\nugliest monument in all the world. It has but one justification, in\nthat it commemorates war, and no monument ever more fully symbolized\nby its own colossal crudity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly\nphenomenon of human life. Let us pray that in the event of final\nvictory Prussia will not commission the architects of the Leipzig\nmonument, or the imperial designer of the Sieges-Allee to rebuild\nthat Gothic masterpiece, the Rheims Cathedral. That day in Leipzig\nan Alsatian cartoonist, Hansi, had been sentenced to one year's\nimprisonment for a harmless cartoon in a book for children, in which\nthe most supersensitive should have found occasion for nothing, except\na passing smile.\n\nOn the library table of the Erbprinz, I found a large book, which\nproved to be a Bismarck memorial volume. It contained hundreds of\npictures glorifying and almost deifying the Iron Chancellor. One\nparticularly arrested my attention. It was the familiar picture of\nthe negotiations for peace between Bismarck and Jules Favre in the\nterrible winter of 1871. The French statesman has sunk into a chair in\nabject despair, struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror.\nBismarck stands triumphant and his proud bearing and arrogant manner\nfail to suggest any such magnanimous courtesy as that with which Grant\naccepted the sword of Lee at Appomattox. The picture breathed the very\nspirit of \"_vae victis_.\" Had a French artist painted this picture,\nI could understand it, for it would serve effectively to stimulate\nundying hatred in the French heart. It seemed strange that a German\nartist should treat a subject, calling for a spirit of most delicate\ncourtesy, in a manner which represented Prussian militarism in its\nmost arrogant form.\n\nThis unworthy picture reminded me of a later scene in the Reichstag,\nin which the Iron Chancellor, after reviewing with complacency the\nprofitable results of Germany's deliberately provoked wars against\nDenmark, Austria, and France, added the pious ejaculation:\n\n     _Wir Deutsche fuerchten Gott sonst nichts in der Welt._\n     (We Germans fear God but nothing else in the world.)\n\nIt is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of this pious\nglorification of the successful results of land grabbing. The mind in\nmoments of exaltation plays strange tricks with the soul. Bismarck may\nhave dissembled on occasion but he was never a hypocrite. It is the\nspirit which inspired this boastful and arrogant speech, which has so\npowerfully stimulated Prussian Junkerism, to which I wish to refer.\n\nHad an American uttered these words we would have treated the boast as\na vulgar exhibition of provincial \"spread-eagleism,\" such as\ncharacterized certain classes in this country before the Civil War,\nand which Charles Dickens somewhat over-caricatured in _Martin\nChuzzlewit_, but in the mouth of Bismarck, with his cynical\nindifference to moral considerations in questions of statecraft, this\npiece of rhetorical _spread double-eagleism_, manifests the spirit of\nthe Prussian military caste since its too easy triumph over France in\n1870-1871, a triumph, which may yet prove the greatest calamity that\never befell Germany, not only in the seeds of hatred which it sowed,\nof which there is now a harvest of blood past precedent, but also in\nthe development of an arrogant pride which has profoundly affected to\nits prejudice the noble Germany of Luther, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe,\nSchiller, Kant, Humboldt, and Lessing.\n\nTo say that Germany \"fears\" nothing save God is contradicted by its\nwhole diplomatic history of the last half century. In this it is not\npeculiar. The curse of modern statecraft is the largely unreasoning\nfear which all nations have of their neighbors. England has feared\nGermany only less than Germany has feared England and this nervous\napprehension has bred jealousy, hatred, suspicion, until to-day all\ncivilized nations are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression.\n\nThe whole history of Germany since 1870 has shown a constant, and at\ntimes an unreasoning fear, first of France, then of the Slav, and\nlatterly and in its most acute form, of England. I do not mean that\nGermany has been or is now animated by any spirit of craven cowardice.\nThere has not been in recorded history a braver nation, and the\ndauntless courage with which, even at this hour, thousands of Germans\nare going with patriotic songs on their lips to \"their graves as to\ntheir beds,\" is worthy of all admiration.\n\nThe whole statecraft of Germany for over forty years has been inspired\nby an exaggerated apprehension of the intentions of its great\nneighbors. This fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of 1871, for\nGermany early showed its apprehension that France might recover its\nmilitary strength. When that fallen but indomitable foe again\nstruggled to its feet in 1875, the Prussian military caste planned to\ngive the stricken gladiator the _coup de grace_ and was only prevented\nby the intervention of England and Russia. Later this acute and\nneurotic apprehension took the form of a hatred and fear of Russia,\nand this notwithstanding the fact that the Kaiser had in the\nRusso-Japanese War exalted the Czar as the \"champion of Christianity\"\nand the \"representative of the white race\" in the Far East.\n\nWhen the psychology of the present conflict is considered by future\nhistorians, this neuropathic feature of Germany's foreign policy will\nbe regarded as a contributing element of first importance.\n\nLatterly the _Furor Teutonicus_ was especially directed against\nEngland, and although it was obvious to the dispassionate observer in\nneutral countries that no nation was making less preparations or was\nin point of fact so illy prepared for a conflict as England,\nnevertheless Germany, with a completeness of preparation such as the\nworld has never witnessed, was constantly indulging in a very hysteria\nof fear at the imaginary designs of England upon Germany's standing as\na world power.\n\nLuther's famous saying, already quoted, and Bismarck's blustering\nspeech to the Reichstag measure the difference between the Germany of\nthe Reformation and the Prussia of to-day.\n\nI refuse to believe that this Bismarckian attitude is that of the\nGerman people. If a censored press permitted them to know the real\ntruth with respect to the present crisis, that people, still sound in\nheart and steadfast in soul, would repudiate a policy of duplicity,\ncunning, and arrogance, which has precipitated their great nation into\nan abyss of disaster. The normal German is an admirable citizen,\nquiet, peaceable, thrifty, industrious, faithful, efficient, and\naffectionate to the verge of sentimentality. He, and not the Junker,\nhas made Germany the most efficient political State in the world. If\nto his genius for organization could be added the individualism of the\nAmerican, the resultant product would be incomparable. A combination\nof the German _fortiter in re_ with the American _suaviter in modo_\nwould make the most efficient republic in the world.\n\nThe Germany of Luther, that still survives and will survive when\n\"Junkerism\" is a dismal memory of the past, believes that \"the supreme\nwisdom, the paramount vitality, is an abiding honesty, the doing of\nright, because right is right, in scorn of consequence.\"\n\nThat the German people have rallied with enthusiastic unanimity to the\nflag in this great crisis, I do not question. This is, in part, due to\nthe fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to them, and is\nnot likely to be until the war is over. They have been taught that in\na time of profound peace England, France, and Russia deliberately\ninitiated a war of aggression to destroy the commercial power of\nGermany. The documents hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly\nbaseless this fiction is. Even if the truth were known, no one can\nblame the German, who now rallies to his flag with such superhuman\ndevotion, for whether the cause of his country is just or unjust, its\nprestige, and perhaps its very existence, is at stake, and there\nshould be for the rank and file of the German people only a feeling of\nprofound pity and deep admiration. Edmund Burke once said, \"We must\npardon something to the spirit of liberty.\" We can paraphrase it and\nsay in this crisis, \"We must pardon something to the spirit of\npatriotism.\" The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its\nflag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Thor did\nnot wield his thunder hammer with greater effect than these\ndescendants of the race of Wotan. If the ethical question depended\nupon relative bravery, who could decide between the German, \"faithful\nunto death\"; the English soldier, standing like a stone wall against\nfearful odds, the French or Russian not less brave or resolute, and\nthe Belgian, now as in Caesar's time the \"bravest of all the tribes of\nGaul.\"\n\nNo consideration, either of sympathy, admiration, or pity, can in any\nmanner affect the determination of the great ethical question as to\nthe moral responsibility for the present crime against civilization.\nThat must be determined by the facts as they have been developed, and\nthe nations and individuals who are responsible for this world-wide\ncatastrophe must be held to a strict accountability. The truth of\nhistory inexorably demands this.\n\nTo determine where this moral responsibility lies is the purpose of\nthese pages.\n\nIn determining this question Posterity will distinguish between the\nmilitary caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which\nprecipitated this great calamity, and the German people.\n\nThe very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the\nfailure to disclose to the German nation the diplomatic communications\nhereinafter quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not\nmerely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived\nand misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially\nprogressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while\nthe ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages.\n\nOne day the German people will know the full truth and then there will\nbe a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble nation into\nthis unfathomable gulf of suffering.\n\n     Though the mills of God grind slowly,\n       Yet they grind exceeding small,\n     Though with patience He stands waiting,\n       With exactness grinds He all.\n\nOr to put this ancient Greek proverb in its German form:\n\n\"_Gottes Muehle geht langsam aber die mahlt fein._\"\n\n          JAMES M. BECK.\n\n     NEW YORK, November 30, 1914.\n\n\n\n\n The Witnesses\n\n\n ENGLAND\n\n HIS MAJESTY, KING GEORGE V.\n\n MR. ASQUITH                          Premier.\n MR. BEAUMONT                         Councilor of Embassy at\n                                        Constantinople.\n SIR F. BERTIE                        Ambassador at Paris.\n SIR G. BUCHANAN                      Ambassador at St. Petersburg.\n SIR M. DE BUNSEN                     Ambassador at Vienna.\n SIR E. GOSCHEN                       Ambassador at Berlin.\n SIR EDWARD GREY                      Foreign Secretary.\n SIR A. JOHNSTONE                     Minister at Luxemburg.\n SIR ARTHUR NICHOLSON                 Under Secretary for Foreign\n                                        Affairs.\n SIR R. RODD                          Ambassador to Italy.\n SIR H. RUMBOLD                       Councilor of Embassy at Berlin.\n SIR F. VILLIERS                      Minister to Belgium.\n\n\n GERMANY\n\n HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR WILLIAM II.\n\n HERR VON BELOW (SALESKE[2])          Minister to Belgium.\n DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG             Chancellor.\n HERR VON BUCH                        Minister at Luxemburg.\n HERR VON HEERINGEN                   Minister of War.\n HERR VON JAGOW                       Secretary of State.\n PRINCE LICHNOWSKY                    Ambassador at London.\n HERR VON MUELLER                     Minister at The Hague.\n COUNT POURTALES                      Ambassador at St. Petersburg.\n BARON VON SCHOEN                     Ambassador at Paris.\n HERR VON ZIMMERMANN                  Under Secretary of State.\n HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY                 Ambassador at Vienna.\n\n [Footnote 2: Herr von Below Saleske is referred to in despatches as\n Herr von Below.]\n\n\n FRANCE\n\n PRESIDENT RAYMOND POINCARE\n\n M. VIVIANI                           Premier of France.\n M. BERTHELOT                         Of the French Ministry for Foreign\n                                        Affairs.\n M. PAUL CAMBON                       Ambassador to England.\n M. KLOBUKOWSKI                       Minister to Belgium.\n M. DE MARGERIE                       Of the French Diplomatic Service.\n M. JULES CAMBON                      Ambassador to Germany.\n\n\n RUSSIA\n\n HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.\n\n M. SAZONOF                           Minister of Foreign Affairs.\n COUNT BENCKENDORFF                   Ambassador at London.\n M. BRONEWSKY                         Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.\n M. DE ETTER                          Councilor of Embassy at London.\n M. ISVOLSKY                          Ambassador to France.\n PRINCE KUDACHEF                      Councilor of Embassy at Vienna.\n M. SALVIATI                          Consul General at Fiume.\n M. SCHEBEKO                          Ambassador to Austria.\n M. SEVASTOPOULO                      Charge d'Affaires at Paris.\n M. STRANDTMAN                        Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade.\n M. SUCHOMLINOF                       Minister for War.\n M. DE SWERBEEW                       Ambassador to Germany.\n\n\n BELGIUM\n\n HIS MAJESTY, KING ALBERT\n\n M. DAVIGNON                          Minister of Foreign Affairs.\n BARON VON DER ELST                   Secretary General to Ministry\n                                        of Foreign Affairs.\n COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE         Minister at Vienna.\n BARON FALLON                         Minister at The Hague.\n BARON GRENIER                        Minister at Madrid.\n BARON GUILLAUME                      Minister at Paris.\n COUNT DE LALAING                     Minister at London.\n\n\n SERVIA\n\n HIS MAJESTY, KING PETER\n\n M. PACHITCH                          Premier and Minister of Foreign\n                                        Affairs.\n M. BOSCHKOVITCH                      Minister at London.\n DR. PATCHOU                          Minister of Finance.\n\n\n AUSTRIA\n\n HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH\n\n COUNT BERCHTOLD                      Minister of Foreign Affairs.\n COUNT CLARY UND ALDRINGEN            Minister at Brussels.\n BARON GIESL VON GIESLINGEN           Minister at Belgrade.\n BARON MACCHIO                        Councilor of Austrian Ministry of\n                                        Foreign Affairs.\n COUNT MENSDORFF                      Ambassador to England.\n COUNT SZAPARY                        Ambassador to Russia.\n\n\n ITALY\n\n HIS MAJESTY, KING VICTOR EMMANUEL III.\n\n MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO              Minister of Foreign Affairs.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\nINTRODUCTION                                                           v\n\nFOREWORD                                                              xv\n\nTHE WITNESSES                                                      xxvii\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION\n\nExistence of the Court--The conscience of mankind--The philosophy\nof Bernhardi--The recrudescence of Machiavelliism--Treitschke\nand Bernhardi's doctrine--Recent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown\nPrince, and representative officials--George Bernard Shaw's\ndefense--Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism                         1\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE RECORD IN THE CASE\n\nThe issues stated--Proximate and underlying causes--A war of\ndiplomats--The masses not parties to the war--The official\ndefenses--The English _White Paper_--The German _White Paper_--The\nRussian _Orange Paper_--The Belgian _Gray Paper_--Austria and\nItaly still silent--Obligation of these nations to disclose facts     18\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE\n\nNo apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium--Suppression\nby Germany of vital documents--Suppression by Austria of entire\nrecord--Significance of such suppression                              27\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nGERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN\nULTIMATUM\n\nSilence which preceded ultimatum--Europe's ignorance of impending\ndevelopments--Duty to civilization--Germany's prior knowledge of\nultimatum--Its disclaimer to Russia, France, and England of any\nresponsibility--Contradictory admission in its official defense--Further\nconfirmation in Germany's simultaneous threat to the Powers--Further\nconfirmation in its confidential notice to States of Germany to prepare\nfor eventualities                                                     31\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA\n\nExtreme brutality of ultimatum--Limited time given to Servia and Europe\nfor consideration--Ultimatum and Servia's reply contrasted in parallel\ncolumns--Relative size of two nations--Germany's intimations to\nServia--Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy--Disclaimer of intention\nto take territory valueless                                           47\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE PEACE PARLEYS\n\nPossibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor--Difficulties\nof peaceful solution not insuperable--Policy of Germany and\nAustria--Russia's and England's request for time--Germany's\nrefusal to cooperate--Germany's and Austria's excuses for refusal\nto give extension of time--Berchtold's absence from Vienna--Austria's\nalleged disclaimer of territorial expansion--Sazonof's conference\nwith English and French Ambassadors--Their conciliatory counsel\nto Servia--Servia's pacific reply to ultimatum--Austria, without\nconsidering Servian reply, declares war--England proposes suspension\nof hostilities for peace parleys--Germany refuses--Its specious\nreasons--Germany's untenable position as to localization of\nconflict--England's proposal for a conference--Germany's\nrefusal--Austria declines all intervention, refusing to discuss\nServian note--Germany supports her with a quibble as to name of\nconference--Russia proposes further discussion on basis of Servian\nnote--Russia then again proposes European conference--Austria\nand Germany decline                                                   61\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE\n\nThe French _Yellow Book_--Its editors and contents--M. Jules\nCambon--The weakness of German diplomacy--Cambon's experience\nand merits--Interview between the German Kaiser and the King of\nBelgium--The Kaiser's change of attitude--The influence of the\nMoroccan crisis--The condition of the German people in 1913--The\nsuppression of news in Austria--Attitude of the military\nparty--Servia's warning to Austria--Germany's knowledge of the Austrian\nultimatum before its issuance--Italy's ignorance of the Austrian\nultimatum--Significance of the fact--Germany's reasons for concealing\nits intentions from Italy--The policy of secrecy--Prince Lichnowsky's\nanxiety--Cambon's interview with von Jagow--The methods of\ndeception--Sazonof's frank offer--Germany's attempt to influence\nFrance--Cambon's dramatic interview with von Jagow--His plea \"In the\nname of humanity\"--The different attitudes of the two groups of\npowers                                                               102\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER\n\nThe Kaiser's return to Berlin--His inconsistent record and complex\npersonality--German Foreign Office deprecates his return--Its many\nblunders--The Kaiser takes the helm--He telegraphs the Czar--The\nCzar's reply--The Kaiser's second telegram--His untenable\nposition--The Czar's explanation of military preparations and pledge\nthat no provocative action would be taken by Russia--King George's\ntelegram proposing temporary occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending\nfurther peace negotiations--The Kaiser's reply--The Kaiser's\ntelegram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of military\npreparations--His insistence upon unilateral conditions--Germany's\npreparations for war--Its offer to England to insure its\nneutrality--England's reply--Russia's offer to stop conditionally\nmilitary preparations--England requests Germany to suggest any peace\nformula--Austria expresses willingness to discuss with Russia Servian\nnote--Motives of Austria for this reversal of policy--The Kaiser\nsends ultimatum to Russia--The Czar's last appeal--The Kaiser's\nreply--Russia's inability to recall mobilization--England's last\nefforts for peace--Germany declares war--The Czar's telegram to King\nGeorge                                                               138\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE CASE OF BELGIUM\n\nThe verdict of history not affected by result of war--Belgium\nat outbreak of war--The Treaty of 1839--Its affirmation by\nBismarck--France's action in 1871--Reaffirmation by Germany of\nBelgian neutrality in 1911-1914--The Hague Peace Conference of\n1907--England asks Germany's and France's intentions with\nrespect to Belgium's neutrality--France replies--Germany's\nrefusal to reply--Germany's second offer to England--Germany's\nultimatum to Belgium--Belgium's reply--France's offer of five\narmy corps--Belgium refuses aid--Germany's declaration of war\nagainst Belgium--The German Chancellor's explanation in the\nReichstag--The Belgian King appeals to England--England's ultimatum\nto Germany--The \"scrap of paper\" incident--England declares war\nagainst Germany--The apologies for Germany's action discussed--Belgium's\nrights independent of Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention--Germany's\nallegation that France had violated Belgium's neutrality an\nafterthought--Von Mach's plea for the suspension of judgment--The\nBrussels documents discussed--The negotiations between England\nand Belgium--The German Chancellor's belated explanation of the\n\"scrap of paper\" phrase--Invasion of Belgium a recrudescence of\nMachiavelliism--The great blunder of Germany's diplomats and\nsoldiers                                                             196\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD\n\nThe completeness of the evidence--The force of public opinion--The\njudgment of neutral States--The United States as a moral arbiter--A\nsummary of the probable verdict of history                           246\n\nEPILOGUE                                                             252\n\n\n\n\nThe Evidence in the Case\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION\n\n\nLet us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 1914, there had\nexisted, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of\nCivilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their\ndifferences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and\nthat each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of\nChristianity or shall we say commonplace, everyday morality, to have\nits grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon, but by the\neternal criterion of justice.\n\n_What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?_\n\nIt may be suggested that the question is academic, as no such Supreme\nCourt exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man.\n\n\nCasuists of the Bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further\nsuggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with\na false premise that such a thing as international morality exists,\nand that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid\naside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that\ndiffers only in degree and not in kind from the methods of Frederick\nthe Great and Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in degree\nfrom those of Alaric and Attila. According to this theory, the only\nlaw of nations is that ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy:\n\n                     \"The good old rule\n     Sufficeth them, the simple plan\n     That they should take who have the power,\n     And they should keep who can.\"\n\nDoes the Twentieth Century only differ from its predecessors in having\na thin veneering of hypocrisy, or has there developed in the progress\nof civilization an international morality, by which, even though\nimperfectly, the moral conduct of nations is judged?\n\nThe answer can be an unqualified affirmative. With the age of the\nprinting press, the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph there\nhas developed _a conscience of mankind_.\n\nWhen the founders of the American Republic severed the tie which bound\nthem to Great Britain, they stated that \"_a decent respect to the\nopinions of mankind requires_ that they should declare the causes\nwhich impel them to the separation.\"\n\nThe Declaration assumed that there was a rule of right and wrong that\nregulated the intercourse of nations as well as individuals; it\nbelieved that there was a great human conscience, which rises higher\nthan the selfish interests and prejudices of nations and races, and\nwhich approves justice and condemns injustice. It felt that this\napproval is more to be desired than national advantage. It constituted\nmankind a judge between contending nations and lest its judgment\nshould temporarily err it established posterity as a court of last\nresort. It placed the tie of humanity above that of nationality. It\nproclaimed the solidarity of mankind.\n\nIn the years that have intervened since this noble Declaration, the\nworld has so far progressed towards an enlightened sense of justice\nthat a \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind\" has proved an\nefficient power in regulating peacefully and justly the intercourse\nof nations. Each nation does at least in some measure fear to-day the\ndisapproval of civilization. The time gives this proof in the eager\ndesire of Germany to-day--despite its policy of \"blood and iron\"--to\ngain the sympathetic approval of the American people, not with the\nremotest hope of any practical cooperation but to avoid that state of\nmoral isolation, in which the land of Luther now finds itself.\n\n_The Supreme Court of Civilization does exist._ It consists of\ncosmopolitan men in every country, who put aside racial and national\nprejudices and determine the right and wrong of every issue between\nnations by that slowly forming system of international morality which\nis the conscience of mankind.\n\nTo a certain class of German statesmen and philosophers this Court of\nPublic Opinion is a visionary abstraction. A group of distinguished\nGerman soldiers, professors, statesmen, and even doctors of divinity,\npretending to speak in behalf of the German nation, have consciously\nor unconsciously attempted to revive in the twentieth century the\ncynical political morality of the sixteenth.\n\nAs Symonds, the historian of the Renaissance, says in his _Age of the\nDespots_, Machiavelli was the first in modern times to formulate a\ntheory of government in which the interests of the ruler are alone\nregarded, which assumes\n\n     a separation between statecraft and morality, which\n     recognizes force and fraud among the legitimate means of\n     attaining high political ends, which makes success alone the\n     test of conduct and which presupposes the corruption,\n     baseness, and venality of mankind at large.\n\nEven the age of Cesare Borgia revolted against this philosophy and the\nname of Machiavelli became a byword. \"Am I a Machiavel?\" says the host\nin _The Merry Wives of Windsor_, and the implication of this question\nindirectly manifests the revolt of the seventeenth century against the\nsinister philosophy of the great Florentine.\n\nNothing can be more amazing than that not only leading militarists of\nGermany but many of its foremost philosophers and teachers have become\nso intoxicated with the dream of Pan-Germanism that in the utmost\nsincerity they have espoused and with a certain pride proclaimed the\nvicious principles of Machiavelli in all their moral nudity. There is\nan emotional and mystical element in the advanced German thinker,\nwhich makes him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual\nand moral absurdities of which the more robust common sense of other\nnations would be incapable. The advanced German doctrinaire is the\n\"wisest fool in Christendom.\" The depth of his learning is generally\nin the inverse ratio to the shallowness of his common sense.\n\nNothing better demonstrates this than the present negation by advanced\nand doubtless sincere German thinkers of the very foundations of\npublic morality and indeed of civilization. They have been led with\nNietzsche to revile the Beatitudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty\nover mercy. Indeed Treitschke in his lectures on _Politik_, which have\nbecome the gospel of Junkerdom, avowedly based his gospel of force\nupon the teaching of Machiavelli, for he points out that it was\nMachiavelli who first clearly saw that the State is power (_der Staat\nist Macht_). Therefore \"to care for this power is the highest moral\nduty of the State\" and \"of all political weaknesses that of feebleness\nis the most abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the holy\nspirit of politics.\" He therefore holds that the State as the ultimate\ngood \"cannot bind its will for the future over against other States,\"\nand that international treaties are therefore only obligatory \"for\nsuch time as the State may find to be convenient.\"\n\nTo enforce the will of the nation contrary to its own solemn promises\nand to increase its might, war is the appointed means. Both Treitschke\nand Moltke conceived it as \"an ordinance set by God\" and \"one of the\ntwo highest functions\" of the State. The doctrine is carried to the\nblasphemous conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and merciful\nGod; that, to quote Bernhardi, \"it is a biological necessity\" and\nthat \"the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as\na terrible medicine for humanity.\" Therefore \"might is at once the\nsupreme right and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the\narbitrament of war,\" which gives a \"biologically just decision.\"\n\nThis means that the 42 centimeter howitzer is more moral than a gun\nof smaller caliber and that the justice of God depends upon the\nsuperiority of Krupp to other ordnance manufacturers.\n\nTreitschke tells us, and the statement is quoted by Bernhardi with\napproval, that \"the end all and be all of a state is power, and he who\nis not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle\nwith politics.\" To this Bernhardi adds that the State's highest moral\nduty is to increase its power and in so doing \"_the State is the sole\njudge of the morality of its own action. It is in fact above morality\nor, in other words whatever is necessary is moral._\"\n\nAgain we learn that the State must not allow any conventional\nsympathies to distract it from its object and that \"conditions may\narise which are more powerful than the most honorable intentions.\"\n\nAll efforts directed towards the abolition of war are denominated as\nnot only \"foolish but absolutely immoral.\" To indicate that in this\nprosecution of war for the increase of dominion, chivalry would be a\nweakness and magnanimity a crime, we are finally told that \"the State\nis a law unto itself\" and that \"weak nations have not the same right\nto live as powerful and vigorous nations.\" Even as to weak nations, we\nare further advised that the powerful and vigorous nation--which alone\napparently has the right to live--must not wait for some act of\naggression or legitimate _casus belli_, but that it is justified in\ndeliberately provoking a war, and that the happiest results have\nalways followed such \"deliberately provoked wars,\" for \"the prospects\nof success are the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be\nselected to suit the political and military situation.\"\n\nAs the weak nations have no moral right to live it becomes important\nto remember that in the economy of Prussian Junkerdom there is only\none strong race--his own. \"_Wir sind die Weltrasse._\" The ultimate\ngoal is the super-nation, and the premise upon which the whole policy\nis based is that Germany is predestined to be that super-nation.\nBernhardi believes--and his belief is but the reflex of the\noft-repeated boast of the Kaiser--that history presents no other\npossibility. \"For us there are two alternatives and no third--world\npower or ruin\" (_Weltmacht oder Niedergang_). To assimilate Germany to\nancient Rome the Kaiser on occasion reminds himself of Caesar and\naffects to reign, not by the will of the people, but by divine right.\nNo living monarch has said or done more to revive this mediaeval\nfetich. To his soldiers he has recently said: \"You think each day of\nyour Emperor. Do not forget God.\" _What magnanimity!_\n\nAt the outbreak of the present war he again illustrated his spirit of\nfanatical absolutism, which at times inspires him, by saying to his\narmy:\n\n     Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On\n     me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am\n     His weapon; His sword; His Vicegerent. Woe to the\n     disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!\n\nThe modern world has had nothing like this since Mahomet and,\naccepted literally, it claims for the Kaiser the divine attributes\nattributed to the Caesars. Even the Caesars, in baser and more primitive\ntimes, found posing as a divine superman somewhat difficult and\ndisconcerting. Shakespeare subtly suggests this when he makes his\nCaesar talk like a god and act with the vacillation of a child.\n\nWhen the war was precipitated as the natural result of such abhorrent\nteachings, the world at large knew little either of Treitschke or\nBernhardi. Thoughtful men of other nations did know that the\nsuccessful political immoralities of Frederick the Great had\nprofoundly affected the policies of the Prussian Court to this day.\nThe German poet, Freiligrath, once said that \"Germany is Hamlet,\" but\nno analogy is less justified. There is nothing in the supersensitive,\nintrospective, and amiable dreamer of Elsinore to suggest the Prussia\nof to-day, which Bebel has called \"_Siegesbetrunken_.\" (Victory-drunk.)\n\nSince the beginning of the present war, the world has become familiar\nwith these abhorrent teachings and as a result of a general revolt\nagainst this recrudescence of Borgiaism attempts have been made by the\napologists for Prussia, especially in the United States, to suggest\nthat neither Treitschke nor Bernhardi fairly reflect the political\nphilosophy of official Germany. Treitschke's influence as an historian\nand lecturer could not well be denied but attempts have been made\nto impress America that Bernhardi has no standing to speak for his\ncountry and that the importance of his teachings should therefore be\nminimized.\n\nApart from the wide popularity of Bernhardi's writings in Germany, the\nGerman Government has never repudiated Bernhardi's conclusions or\ndisclaimed responsibility therefor. While possibly not an officially\nauthorized spokesman, yet he is as truly a representative thinker in\nthe German military system as Admiral Mahan was in the Navy of the\nUnited States. Of the acceptance by Prussia of Bernhardi's teachings\nthere is one irrefutable proof. It is Belgium. The destruction of that\nunoffending country is the full harvest of this twentieth-century\nMachiavelliism.\n\nA few recent utterances from a representative physician, a prominent\njournalist, and a distinguished retired officer of the German Army may\nbe quoted as showing how completely infatuated a certain class of\nGerman thinkers has become with the gospel of force for the purpose of\nattaining world power.\n\nThus a Dr. Fuchs, in a book on the subject of preparedness for war,\nsays:\n\n     Therefore the German claim of the day must be: The family to\n     the front. The State has to follow at first in the school,\n     then in foreign politics. _Education to hate. Education to\n     the estimation of hatred. Organization of hatred. Education\n     to the desire for hatred. Let us abolish unripe and false\n     shame before brutality and fanaticism._ We must not hesitate\n     to announce: To us is given faith, hope, and hatred, _but\n     hatred is the greatest among them_.\n\nMaximilian Harden, one of the most influential German journalists,\nsays:\n\n     Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's\n     action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by\n     surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture.\n     _We willed it. We had to will it. We do not stand before\n     the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such\n     jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe._\n     It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new\n     domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods\n     will praise the God of War.\n\nStill more striking and morally repellent was the very recent\nstatement by Major-General von Disfurth, in an article contributed by\nhim to the _Hamburger Nachrichten_, which so completely illustrates\nBernhardiism in its last extreme of avowed brutality that it justifies\nquotation _in extenso_.\n\n     No object whatever is served by taking any notice of the\n     accusations of barbarity leveled against Germany by our\n     foreign critics. _Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if\n     by these we understand those who wage war relentlessly and\n     to the uttermost degree...._\n\n     _We owe no explanations to any one. There is nothing for\n     us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act of\n     whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of\n     discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a\n     brave act and a good deed, and is fully justified....\n     Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods,\n     which in the time of war must be dictated to the world...._\n\n     _They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and\n     their abuse. For my part I hope that in this war we have\n     merited the title of barbarians._ Let neutral peoples and\n     our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be\n     compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease their talk\n     of the Cathedral at Rheims and of all the churches and all\n     the castles in France which have shared its fate. These\n     things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory.\n     What else matters?\n\nThese hysterical vaporings of advanced Junkers no more make a case\nagainst the German people than the tailors of Tooley Street had\nauthority to speak for England, but they do represent the spirit of\nthe ruling caste, to which unhappily the German people have committed\ntheir destiny. It would not be difficult to quote both the Kaiser and\nthe Crown Prince, who on more than one occasion have manifested their\nenthusiastic adherence to the gospel of brute force. The world is not\nlikely to forget the Crown Prince's congratulations to the brutal\nmilitary martinet of the Zabern incident, and still less the shameful\nfact that when the Kaiser sent his punitive expedition to China, he\nwho once stood within sight of the Mount of Olives and preached a\nsermon breathing the spirit of Christian humility, said to his\nsoldiers:\n\n     When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him. _No\n     quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken. Let all\n     who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns\n     a thousand years ago under the leadership of Etzel (Attila),\n     gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in\n     historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become\n     known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever\n     again even dare to look askance at a German._\n\nAnd this campaign of extermination--worthy of a savage Indian\nchief--was planned for the most pacific and unaggressive race, the\nChinese, for it is sadly true that the one nation which has more than\nany other been inspired for two thousand years by the spirit of \"peace\non earth\" is the hermit nation, into which until the nineteenth\ncentury the light of Christianity never shone.\n\nIn a recent article, George Bernard Shaw, the Voltaire of the\ntwentieth century, with the intellectual brilliancy and moral\nshallowness of the great cynic, attempts to justify Bernhardiism by\nresort to the unconvincing \"_et tu quoque_\" argument. He contends that\nEngland also has had its \"Bernhardis,\" and refers to a few books which\nhe affects to think bear out his argument. That these books show that\nthere have been advocates of militarism in England is undoubtedly\ntrue. The present war illustrates that there was need of such\nliterature, for a nation which faced so great a trial as the present,\nwith a standing army that was pitiful in comparison with that of\nGermany and without any involuntary service law, certainly had need\nof some literary stimulus to self-preparation. No one quarrels with\nBernhardi in his discussions of the problems of war as such. It is\nonly when the soldier ceases to be a strategist and becomes a moralist\nthat the average man with conventional ideas of morality revolts\nagainst Bernhardiism. The books to which Mr. Shaw refers can be\nsearched in vain for any passages parallel to those which have been\nquoted from Treitschke, Bernhardi, and other German writers. The\nbrilliant but erratic George Bernard Shaw cannot find in all English\nliterature any such Machiavelliisms as those of Treitschke and\nBernhardi.\n\nShaw's whole defense of Germany, betrays his characteristic desire to\nbe clever and audacious without regard to nice considerations of\ntruth. Much as we may admire his intellectual badinage under other\ncircumstances, it may be questioned whether in this supreme tragedy\nof the world it was fitting for Shaw to daub himself anew with his\nfamiliar vermilion and play the intellectual clown.\n\nIt was either courage of an extraordinary but unenviable character or\nelse crass stupidity that led Bernhardi to submit to the civilization\nof the present day such a debasing gospel, for if his brain had not\nbeen hopelessly obfuscated by his Pan-Germanic imperialism, he would\nhave seen that not only would this philosophy do his country\ninfinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery but would\ninevitably carry his memory down to a wondering posterity, like\nMachiavelli, detestable but, unlike Machiavelli, ridiculous.\n\nMachiavelli gave to his _Prince_ a literary finish that placed his\ntreatise among the classics, while Bernhardi has gained recognition\nchiefly because his book is a moral anachronism.\n\nOne concrete illustration from Bernhardi clearly shows that the\nsentences above quoted are truly representative of his philosophy,\nand not unfair excerpts. In explaining that it is the duty of every\nnation to increase its power and territory without regard for the\nrights of others, he alludes to the fact that England committed the\n\"_unpardonable blunder_ from her point of view of not supporting the\nSouthern States in the American War of Secession,\" and thus forever\nsevering in twain the American Republic. In this striking illustration\nof applied Bernhardiism, there is no suggestion as to the moral side\nof such intervention. Nothing is said with respect to the moral\nquestion of slavery, or of the obligations of England to a friendly\nPower. Nothing as to how the best hopes of humanity would have been\nshattered if the American Republic--that \"pillar of cloud by day and\npillar of fire by night\" to struggling humanity--had been brought to\ncureless ruin. All these considerations are completely disregarded,\nand all Bernhardi can see in the situation, as it presented itself to\nEngland in 1861, was its opportunity, by a cowardly stab in the back,\nto remove forever from its path a great and growing nation.\n\nPoor Bernhardi! He thought to serve his royal master. He has simply\ndamned him. As Machiavelli, as the eulogist of the Medicis, simply\nemphasized their moral nudity, so Bernhardi has shown the world the\ninner significance of this crude revival of Caesarism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE RECORD IN THE CASE\n\n\nAll morally sane men in this twentieth century are agreed that\nwar abstractly is an evil thing,--perhaps the greatest of all\nindecencies,--and that while it may be one of the offenses which must\ncome, \"woe to that man (or nation) by whom the offense cometh!\"\n\nThey are of one mind in regarding this present war as a great\ncrime--perhaps the greatest crime--against civilization, and the only\nquestions which invite discussion are:\n\n    Which of the two contending groups of Powers is morally\n    responsible?\n\n    Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?\n\n    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and\n    France?\n\n    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Belgium?\n\n    Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?\n\nPrimarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical questions turn upon\nthe issues developed by the communications which passed between the\nvarious chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is\nthe amazing feature of this greatest of wars that it was precipitated\nby the ruling classes and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely\ndesired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian\nultimatum (which is by no means clear) the war is the result of\nineffective diplomacy.\n\nI quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a\nwar and the anterior or underlying causes. The fundamental cause of\nthe Franco-German War of 1870 was not the incident at Ems nor even the\nquestion of the Spanish succession. These were but the precipitating\npretexts or, as a lawyer would express it, the \"proximate causes.\" The\nunderlying cause was unquestionably the rivalry between Prussia and\nFrance for political supremacy in Europe.\n\nBehind the Austrian ultimatum to Servia were also great questions\nof State policy, not easily determinable upon any tangible ethical\nprinciple, and which involved the hegemony of Europe. Germany's\ndomination of Europe had been established when by the rattling of its\nsaber it compelled Russia in 1908 to permit Austria to disturb the\nthen existing status in the Balkans by the forcible annexation of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and behind the Austrian-Servian question of\n1914, arising out of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria at\nSerajevo, was the determination of Germany and Austria to reassert\nthat dominant position by compelling Russia to submit to a further\nhumiliation of a Slav State.\n\nThe present problem is to inquire how far Germany and her ally\nselected a just pretext to test this question of mastery.\n\nThe pretext was the work of diplomatists. It was not the case of a\nnation rising upon some great cause which appealed to popular\nimagination. The acts of the statesmen in that last fateful week of\nJuly, 1914, were not the mere echo of the popular will.\n\nThe issues were framed by the statesmen and diplomats of Europe\nand whatever efforts were made to preserve the peace and whatever\nobstructive tactics were interposed were not the acts of any of the\nnations now in arms but those of a small coterie of men who, in the\nsecrecy of their respective cabinets, made their moves and\ncountermoves upon the chessboard of nations.\n\nThe future of Europe in that last week of July was in the hands of a\nsmall group of men, numbering not over fifty, and what they did was\nnever known to their respective nations in any detail until after the\nfell Rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated.\n\nIf all of these men had sincerely desired to work for peace, there\nwould not have been any war.\n\nSo swiftly did events move that the masses of the people had time\nneither to think nor to act. The suddenness of the crisis marks it as\na species of \"mid-summer madness,\" a very \"witches' sabbath\" of\ndiplomatic demagoguery.\n\nIn a peaceful summer, when the nations now struggling to exterminate\neach other were fraternizing in the holiday centers of Europe, an\nissue was suddenly precipitated, made the subject of communications\nbetween the various chancelleries, and almost in the twinkling of an\neye Europe found itself wrapped in a universal flame. The appalling\ntoll of death suggests the inquiry of Hamlet: \"Did these bones cost\nno more the breeding, but to play at loggats with 'em?\" and if the\ndiplomatic \"loggats\" of 1914 were ineffectively played, some one must\naccept the responsibility for such failure.\n\nThis sense of responsibility against the dread Day of Accounting has\nresulted in a disposition beyond past experience to justify the\nquarrel by placing before the world the diplomatic record.\n\nThe English Government commenced shortly after the outbreak of\nhostilities by publishing the so-called _White Paper_, consisting of a\nstatement by the British Government and 160 diplomatic documents as an\nappendix. This was preceded by Sir Edward Grey's masterly speech in\nParliament. That speech and all his actions in this fateful crisis may\nrank him in future history with the younger Pitt.\n\nOn August 4th, the German Chancellor for the first time explained to\nthe representatives of his nation assembled in the Reichstag the\ncauses of the war, then already commenced, and there was distributed\namong the members a statement of the German Foreign Office,\naccompanied by 27 Exhibits in the form of diplomatic communications,\nwhich have been erroneously called the German _White Paper_ and which\nsets forth Germany's defense to the world.\n\nShortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the traditional secrecy\nof Muscovite diplomacy, submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds\nin the form of the so-called Russian _Orange Paper_, with 79 appended\ndocuments, and this was followed later by the publication by Belgium\nof the so-called Belgian _Gray Paper_.\n\nLate in November France published its _Yellow Book_, the most\ncomprehensive of these diplomatic records. Of the two groups of\npowers, therefore, only Austria and Italy have failed to disclose\ntheir diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world.\n\nThe former, as the originator of the controversy, should give\nas a matter of \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind\" its\njustification, if any, for what it did. So far, it has only given\nits ultimatum to Servia and Servia's reply.\n\nItaly, as a nation that has elected to remain neutral, is not under\nthe same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its Foreign\nOffice, and while it remains on friendly terms with all the\nPowers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential\ncommunications, but as the whole world is vitally interested in\ndetermining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable\nthat the archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw an\nilluminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved, Italy, in\na spirit of loyalty to civilization, should without further delay\ndisclose the documentary evidence in its possession.\n\nWhile it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not\nmade up, yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in\nthe communications which passed in those fateful days between Berlin,\nSt. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is sufficient before the\ncourt to justify a judgment, especially as there is reason to believe\nthat the documents as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions\nwhich the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests.\n\nThus we can reasonably assume that the Italian documentary evidence\nwould fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of\nGermany and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, by its refusal to\nact with its associates of the Triple Alliance, has in the most\nsignificant manner thus adjudged it.\n\nUnder the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had obligated itself to\nsupport Germany and Austria in any purely _defensive_ war, and if\ntherefore the communications, which undoubtedly passed between Vienna\nand Berlin on the one hand, and Rome on the other, justified the\nconclusion that Germany and Austria had been assailed by Russia,\nEngland, and France or either of them, then we must assume that Italy\nwould have respected its obligation, especially as it would thus\nrelieve Italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies,\nwhose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the\nTriple Alliance was first made.\n\nWhen Italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its\nallies, it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war\nof aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we must therefore\nassume that the archives of the Foreign Office at Rome would merely\nconfirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral\nresponsibility for the war.\n\nSimilarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had\nany experience in the judicial investigation of truth, it must be\nassumed that if Austria had in its secret archives any documentary\nevidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been\nunjustly assailed by one or more of the Powers with which it is now at\nwar, it would have published such documents to the world in its own\nexculpation. The moral responsibility for this war is too great\nfor any nation to accept it unnecessarily. Least of all could\nAustria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by\nits ultimatum to Servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the\nbar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that\nis now drenching Europe with blood. The time is past when any nation\ncan ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its\nconscience. Germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and\nexhibiting a part of its documentary proof, and if its ally, Austria,\ncontinues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the documents in\nits possession, there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt.\n\nUpon the record thus made up in the Supreme Court of Civilization,\nthat tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would\nan ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the\nlitigants has deliberately suppressed documents known to be in its\npossession. It does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the\ncourt to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full\nrecord is made up, when the incompleteness of that record is due to\nits own deliberate suppression of vital documentary proofs.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE\n\n\nThe official defenses of England, Russia, France, and Belgium do not\napparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any\nessential diplomatic document in their possession. They have\nrespectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they\nmade to maintain the peace of the world, and in every instance have\nsupported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and\ncommunications in which such proposals were expressed.\n\nWhen the German _White Paper_ is examined it discloses on its very\nface the suppression of documents of vital importance. The fact that\ncommunications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has\nnever been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany asserts\nas part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory\ninfluence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by\nany practical results, such as we would expect in view of her\ndominating relations with Austria, but the _text_ of these vital\ncommunications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and\nVienna. Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic\nrecords for publication but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.\n\nThus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite\nof the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey\nto treat the Servian reply \"as a basis for further conversations,\"\n\n     we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost\n     and _advised_ Vienna to make any possible compromise\n     consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.[3]\n\n[Footnote 3: German _White Paper_.]\n\nThis would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office had added\nthe _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.\n\nA like significant omission will be found when the same official\ndefense states that on July 29th the German Government advised Austria\n\"to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof.\" But here again the\n_text_ is not found among the documents which the German Foreign\nOffice has given to the world. The communications, which passed\nbetween that office and its ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris,\nand London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven\ncommunications appended to the German _White Paper it is most\nsignificant that not a single communication is given of the many which\npassed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only\ntwo which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German\nChancellor_. While the Kaiser has favored the world with his messages\nto the Czar and King George, he has wholly failed to give us any\nmessage that he sent in those critical days to the Austrian Emperor or\nthe King of Italy. We shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the\nfrequent failure to produce documents, the existence of which is\nadmitted by the exhibits which Germany appended to its _White Paper_.\n\nThis cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to\nthrow the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to\nVienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The\npurpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the\ncomplete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to\nthe scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing\nto put the most important documents in their possession in evidence,\nthey must not be surprised that the World, remembering Bismarck's\ngarbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian\nWar, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific\nprotestations.\n\n\nADDENDUM\n\n     The Austrian _Red Book_, published more than six months\n     after the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy\n     of suppression of vital documents, which we have already\n     discussed. Of its 69 documentary exhibits, _there is not one\n     which passed directly between the Cabinets of Berlin and\n     Vienna_. The text of the communications, in which Germany\n     claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory\n     influence with its ally, is still withheld. _Not a single\n     document is produced which was sent between July the 6th and\n     July the 21st_, the period when the great _coup_ was\n     secretly planned by Berlin and Vienna.\n\n     In the _Red Book_ we find eight communications from Count\n     Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin and four\n     replies from that official, but not a letter or telegram\n     passing between Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or\n     between the German and Austrian Kaisers. The Austrian _Red\n     Book_ gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour,\n     and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia,\n     Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question\n     with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably\n     gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum\n     to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this\n     suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of\n     Germany and Austria, now _partially_ given to the world,\n     disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open\n     confession, that they intended to force their will upon\n     Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous\n     war in the history of mankind.\n\n          March 1, 1915.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nGERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM\n\n\nOn June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.\nFor nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by\nAustria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired\ndispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest\nmoderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files\nof two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news\nservice, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose\na single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the\ndrastic action which Austria was about to take.\n\nThe French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and\nHouse of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that\nFrance, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated in advising Servia to\nmake any reasonable concession to Austria, added:\n\n     This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact\n     that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately\n     foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, _to\n     whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands\n     would be extremely moderate_.\n\nThe movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple\nEntente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had\nbeen lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or,\nas Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of\nthe Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.\n\nThus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, obviously anticipating no\ncrisis, left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence. The President\nof the French Republic and its Premier were far distant from Paris.\nPachitch, the Servian Premier, was absent from Belgrade, when the\nultimatum was issued.\n\nThe testimony of the British Ambassador to Vienna is to the same\neffect. He reports to Sir Edward Grey:\n\n     The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of the note to\n     Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the\n     Ballplatz.\n\nHe proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at\nVienna (note the significance of the exception) not a single member of\nthe Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that\nthe French Ambassador, when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on\nJuly 23d (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in ignorance\nthat the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the\nimpression that its tone would be moderate. Even the Italian\nAmbassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated\nSeptember 1, 1914.]\n\nThe Servian Government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for\nthe assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian\ncitizen implicated therein. No word came from Vienna excepting the\nsemi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course,\nand after the funeral of the Archduke, the world, then enjoying its\nsummer holiday, had almost forgotten the Serajevo incident. The whole\ntragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with\nAustria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who,\nlike King Lear, was \"as full of grief as age, wretched in both.\"\nNever was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply\nin a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.\n\nCan it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of\ncivilization required that Germany and Austria, when they determined\nto make the murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible assassin the\npretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles\nbetween Austria and Servia, should have given all the European nations\nsome intimation of their intention, so that their _confreres_ in the\nfamily of nations could cooperate to adjust this trouble, as they had\nadjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the\nBalko-Turkish War?\n\nWhatever the issue of the present conflict, it will always be to the\nlasting discredit of Germany and Austria that they were false to this\ngreat duty, and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a\nmanner so underhanded as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else\nknew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, that civilization was\nabout to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was\nGermany and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was most effectually\ndone.\n\nThis ignorance of the leading European statesmen (other than those of\nGermany and Austria) as to what was impending is strikingly shown by\nthe first letter in the English _White Paper_ from Sir Edward Grey to\nSir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it\nis altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and unreasonable\nultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna and Berlin,\nand yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly\ncountry, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he\n\n     asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20th) if he had any\n     news of what was going on in Vienna. He replied that he had\n     not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step.\n\nSir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had\nlearned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,\n\n     in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had\n     deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but\n     had said that it should be cleared up.\n\nThe German Minister then replied that it would be desirable \"if Russia\ncould act as a mediator with regard to Servia,\" so that the first\nsuggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the\nGerman Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told\nthe German Ambassador that he\n\n     assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything\n     until they had first disclosed to the public their case\n     against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had\n     discovered at the trial,\n\nand the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: English _White Paper_, No. 1.]\n\nEither the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, or\nthe submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even\nthe German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in\nprogress.\n\nThe interesting and important question here suggests itself whether\nGermany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian\nultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German\nAmbassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign\nAffairs an express assurance that\n\n     _the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the\n     Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised\n     any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute\n     to Germany a threatening attitude._[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 18.]\n\nThis statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the\ntwo allies, and it was Germany's saber that it was rattling in the\nface of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme\nmeasures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize\nRussia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a\nprobability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have\ncommitted itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war\nwithout first consulting Germany.\n\nMoreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English\nAmbassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had \"private\ninformation that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of\nthe Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and\ntelegraphed it to the German Emperor,\" and that the German Ambassador\nhimself \"indorses every line of it.\"[7] As he does not disclose the\nsource of his \"private information,\" this testimony would not by\nitself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense\nin the German _White Paper_, we find that the German Foreign Office\nadmits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and\nnot only approved of Austria's course but literally gave that country\na carte blanche to proceed_.\n\n[Footnote 7: English _White Paper_, No. 95.]\n\nThis point seems so important in determining the sincerity of\nGermany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in\nextenso_. After referring to the previous friction between Austria\nand Servia, the German _White Paper_ says:\n\n     In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that\n     it would not be consistent either with the dignity or\n     self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the\n     operations on the other side of the border without taking\n     action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its\n     view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter.\n     We were able to assure our Ally most heartily of our\n     agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her\n     that any action that she might consider it necessary to take\n     in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed\n     against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy\n     would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this\n     connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary\n     against Servia would bring Russia into the question and\n     might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an\n     Ally.\n\nSir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact\nthat the British Ambassador at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to\nSir Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21st) he\nhad met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an\nallusion was made to a possible action by Austria.\n\n     His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on\n     Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted\n     that the question at issue was one for settlement between\n     Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no\n     interference from outside in the discussions between those\n     two countries.\n\nHe[8] adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his\ncountry should approach Austria in the matter, he had\n\n[Footnote 8: von Jagow.]\n\n     on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian\n     Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that\n     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper\n     footing.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: English _White Paper_, No. 2.]\n\nHere we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter,\na position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable,\nbut to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did\nmuch to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European\ncivilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse\ncontinuing through many centuries a united European State exists, even\nthough its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that\nAustria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against\nServia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was\ninevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of\nthe Balkan States and threaten the European balance of power. The\ninconsistency between Germany's claim that it could give Austria a\n_carte blanche_ to proceed against Servia and agree to support its\naction with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that\nneither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on\nbehalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's\nmany blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.\n\nNo space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this\nAustrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable\nin its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive\ndocument, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time\nwhich it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to\nanswer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually\nadmit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The\nother European nations had little more than a day to consider what\ncould be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was\nfatally compromised.[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: English _White Paper_, No. 5; Russian _Orange Paper_,\nNo. 3.]\n\nFurther confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance\nknowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the\nfact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the\nGerman Empire instructed its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St.\nPetersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that\n\n     the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]\n\n[Footnote 11: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]\n\nHow could Germany thus indorse the \"demands\" if it did not know the\nsubstance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have\ngiven in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of\nAustria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully\nadvised as to their nature?\n\nThe hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it\ndoes not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily\nprior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.\nNevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of\nEurope until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence\nclearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office\nwould have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to\nthe other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not\nonly of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the\nsubstance thereof.\n\nWhile it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy\nof Austria, purposely refrained from examining _the text_ of the\ncommunication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not\nresponsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the\ndiscreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the\npeace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the\nsimultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's\nwarning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had\na common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary\ninferences of human life, would question this conclusion.\n\nThe communication from the German Foreign Office last referred\nto anticipates that Servia \"will refuse to comply with these\ndemands\"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests\nto France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such\nnoncompliance, Austria has \"recourse to military measures,\" that\n\"the choice of means must be left to it.\"\n\nThe German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed\n\n     to lay particular stress on the view that the above question\n     is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon\n     Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should\n     earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,\n\nand the instruction added that Germany strongly desired\n\n     that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of\n     another Power, on account of the various alliance\n     obligations, _would bring consequences impossible to\n     measure_.\n\nThis is one of the most significant documents in the whole\ncorrespondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its\nAmbassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and\nultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting\nAustria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have\nserved this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that\nAustria \"_must_\" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any\nattempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would \"bring\nconsequences impossible to measure\"?[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]\n\nA still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared\nconfidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the\nFederated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was\ngiven.\n\nIn this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call\nto arms to the entire German Empire, and which probably intended to\nconvey the intimation that without formal mobilization the constituent\nstates of Germany should begin to prepare for eventualities, von\nBethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that Russia might\nfeel it a duty \"to take the part of Servia in her dispute with\nAustria-Hungary.\" Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly\njustified?\n\nThe Imperial Chancellor added that\n\n     if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in\n     this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,\n\nbut added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the\nintegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would\ntherefore alone\n\n     bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the\n     Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great\n     European Powers wish to localize.\n\nIn this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor\ndeclares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of\nServia by Austria. He says, \"_our closest interests therefore summon\nus to the side of Austria-Hungary_,\" and he adds that\n\n     if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the\n     intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally,\n     we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the\n     entire might of the German Empire.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: German _White Paper_, Annex 2.]\n\nIt staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning\nto the constituents of the German Empire to prepare for \"the Day\"\nshould not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian\nultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the\nother capitals of Europe on July 24th. The subsequent naive disclaimer\nby the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria's attack\nupon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers\nis hardly consistent with its assertion that Germany's \"closest\ninterests\" were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings\nto the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.\n\nThe German Ambassador to the United States who attempted early in the\ncontroversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of\nindignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the\n_Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that Germany \"_did approve in\nadvance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia_.\"\n\nWhy then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently\nwith its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious.\nThis was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between\nAustria and Servia was purely \"local.\"\n\nNOTE.--In Chapter VII it will appear from the French _Yellow Book_\nthat the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian\nultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA\n\n\nTo convince any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia\nwas brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands, and that the\nreply of Servia was as complete an acquiescence as Servia could make\nwithout a fatal compromise of its sovereignty and self-respect, it is\nonly necessary to print in parallel columns the demands of Austria and\nthe reply of Servia.\n\n                    AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA\n\n     \"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees\n     itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government\n     a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous\n     propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole\n     series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach\n     from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it\n     undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and\n     terrorist propaganda.\n\n     \"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the\n     Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of\n     its '_Official Journal_' of the 26th July, the following\n     declaration:\n\n     \"'The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda\n     directed against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general\n     tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the\n     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and\n     it sincerely deplores the fatal consequence of these\n     criminal proceedings.\n\n     \"'The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers\n     and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned\n     propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly\n     relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged\n     by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.\n\n     \"'The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all\n     idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the\n     destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of\n     Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn\n     officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the\n     kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the\n     utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such\n     machinations, which it will use all its efforts to\n     anticipate and suppress.'\n\n     \"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to\n     the Royal Army as an order of the day by His Majesty the\n     King and shall be published in the '_Official Bulletin_' of\n     the Army.\n\n     \"'The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:\n\n     \"1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and\n     contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general\n     tendency of which is directed against its territorial\n     integrity;\n\n     \"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna\n     Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to\n     proceed in the same manner against other societies and their\n     branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the\n     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take\n     the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved\n     from continuing their activity under another name and form;\n\n     \"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in\n     Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as\n     regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves,\n     or might serve, to foment the propaganda against\n     Austria-Hungary:\n\n     \"4. To remove from the military service, and from the\n     administration in general, all officers and functionaries\n     guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy\n     whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government\n     reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal\n     Government;\n\n     \"5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives\n     of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the\n     subversive movement directed against the territorial\n     integrity of the Monarchy;\n\n     \"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the\n     plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory.\n     Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part\n     in the investigation relating thereto;\n\n     \"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija\n     Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a\n     Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the\n     results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;\n\n     \"8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the\n     Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and\n     explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish\n     severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz\n     and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of\n     the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the\n     frontier;\n\n     \"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with\n     explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high\n     Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who,\n     notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate\n     after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in\n     interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government; and finally,\n\n     \"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without\n     delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the\n     preceding heads.\n\n     \"The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the\n     Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday\n     evening, the 25th July.\"\n\n     \"The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is\n     mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this\n     question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government should not consider itself satisfied with this\n     answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution,\n     either by referring the decision of this question to the\n     international tribunal at The Hague, or by leaving it to the\n     great Powers who cooperated in the preparation of the\n     explanation given by the Servian Government on the 17th-31st\n     March, 1909.\"\n\n                    THE SERVIAN REPLY\n\n     \"The Royal Government has received the notification of the\n     Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is\n     convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding\n     that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations\n     between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian\n     Kingdom.\n\n     \"The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the\n     great neighboring monarchy these protests have under no\n     pretexts been renewed which formerly were made both in the\n     Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of\n     responsible representatives of the State, and which, through\n     the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909,\n     were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the\n     various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of\n     its officers, has made an attempt to change the political\n     and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The\n     Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government has made no representations of any kind along\n     this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which\n     the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely\n     satisfactory reply. Servia, during the Balkan crisis, gave\n     evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate\n     policies, and it will be thanks to Servia alone and the\n     sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European\n     peace if that peace continue.\n\n     \"The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for\n     utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles\n     and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are\n     quite ordinary in almost all countries, and which are not\n     generally under State control, especially since the Royal\n     Government, in the solution of a great number of questions\n     that came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, showed much\n     consideration as a result of which most of these questions\n     were settled in the best interests of the progress of the\n     two neighboring countries.\n\n     \"The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to\n     hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in\n     the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It\n     had hoped to be invited to cooperate in the investigations\n     following this crime, and was prepared, in order to prove\n     the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all\n     persons concerning whom it had received information.\n\n     \"In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to\n     the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian\n     subject concerning whose participation in the crime at\n     Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges\n     itself especially to publish on the first page of the\n     official organ of July 26th the following declaration:\n\n     \"'The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda\n     that may be directed against Austria-Hungary; that is to\n     say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from\n     the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the\n     sad consequences of these criminal machinations.'\n\n     \"The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with\n     advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain\n     Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part\n     in the present propaganda, and that they have thereby\n     jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the\n     maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally\n     pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.\n\n     \"The Government (what follows here is similar to the text\n     demanded).\n\n     \"The Royal Government further pledges itself:\n\n     \"1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the\n     occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina,\n     according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of\n     the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication\n     directed in general against the territorial integrity of\n     Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.\n\n     \"The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the\n     coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII.\n     a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the\n     confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII. of\n     the Constitution, would be impossible.\n\n     \"2. The Government possesses no proof--and the Note of the\n     Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none--that the\n     'Narodna Odbrana' Society and other similar associations\n     have up to the present committed any criminal acts through\n     any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government\n     will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government\n     and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all\n     societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.\n\n     \"3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate\n     forthwith from public education in Servia everything that\n     might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided\n     that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof\n     of this propaganda.\n\n     \"4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from\n     military and civil service such officers--provided it is\n     proved against them by legal investigation--who have\n     implicated themselves in acts directed against the\n     territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; the\n     Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting\n     proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the\n     names of these officers and employes and the acts of which\n     they are accused.\n\n     \"5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is\n     not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire\n     of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the\n     Royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the\n     cooperation within its territory of representatives of the\n     Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares\n     itself willing to permit such cooperation as might be in\n     conformity with international law and criminal procedure,\n     as well as with friendly neighborly relations.\n\n     \"6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to\n     institute an investigation against all such persons as were\n     concerned in the plot of June 15th-28th, or are supposed to\n     have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to\n     the cooperation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government in this investigation, the Servian Government\n     cannot accept such cooperation, since this would be a\n     violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in\n     individual cases, information as to the progress of the\n     investigation might be given to the Austro-Hungarian\n     delegates.\n\n     \"7. On the very evening on which your Note arrived the Royal\n     Government caused the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic.\n     But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the\n     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who was employed until June\n     15th (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads it has\n     not been possible to arrest this man up till now, for which\n     reason a warrant has been issued against him.\n\n     \"The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that\n     the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make\n     known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist,\n     and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in\n     Serajevo.\n\n     \"8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and\n     scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and\n     explosives.\n\n     \"It goes without saying that it will at once start an\n     investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier\n     officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty\n     and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the\n     frontier.\n\n     \"9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of\n     the statements made in interviews by its officials in Servia\n     and foreign countries after the crime, and which, according\n     to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as\n     soon as the said Government indicates where these statements\n     were made, and provides proofs that such statements were\n     actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government\n     will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and\n     means of transmission for this purpose.\n\n     \"10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not\n     already occurred in this Note, inform the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government of the taking of the measures concerning the\n     foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been\n     ordered and carried out.\n\nIt increases the ineffaceable discredit of this brutal ultimatum when\nwe consider the relative size of the two nations. Austria has a\npopulation of over 50,000,000 and Servia about 4,000,000. Moreover,\nServia had just emerged from two terrible conflicts, from which it\nwas still bleeding to exhaustion. Austria's ultimatum was that of a\nGoliath to David, and, up to the hour that this book goes to press,\nthe result has not been different from that famous conflict.\n\nGermany itself had already given to Servia an intimation of its\nintended fate. It had anticipated the Austrian ultimatum by some\npointed suggestions to Servia on its own account, for in the letter\nalready quoted from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, we learn that\nthe German Secretary of State told the British Ambassador before the\nultimatum was issued that he\n\n     on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian\n     Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that\n     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper\n     footing.[14]\n\n[Footnote 14: In English _White Paper_, No. 2.]\n\nThis pointed intimation from Germany, thus preceding the formal\nultimatum from Austria, naturally gave Servia a quick appreciation\nthat within the short space allowed by the ultimatum, it must either\nacquiesce in grossly unreasonable demands or perish as an independent\nnation.\n\nTo appreciate fully the brutality of this ultimatum let us imagine a\nprecise analogy.\n\nThe relations of France and Germany--leaving aside the important\ndifference of relative size--are not unlike the relations that existed\nbetween Servia and Austria. In 1908, Austria had forcibly annexed\nBosnia and Herzegovina, both of them Slav countries, and when Servia\nhad emerged from the Balko-Turkish War with signal credit to itself,\nit was again Austria that had intervened and deprived it of the fruit\nof its victories by denying it access to the sea.\n\nSimilarly, by the Treaty of Frankfort, Germany had forcibly annexed\nAlsace and Lorraine from France. As there existed in Servia voluntary\norganizations of men, which ceaselessly agitated for the recovery of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, so in France similar patriotic organizations\nhave for the last forty years continuously agitated for a war which\nwould lead to the ultimate recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. The statue\nof Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde has been covered with the\nemblems of mourning from the time that Bismarck wrung from Jules Favre\nthe cession of the Rhine territory. If Austria's grievance against\nServia were just, Germany has an equal and similar grievance against\nFrance.\n\nUnder these circumstances let us suppose that on the occasion of the\nvisit of the German Crown Prince to Strassburg, that an Alsatian\ncitizen of German nationality, having strong French sympathies, had\nassassinated the Crown Prince, and that France had formally disclaimed\nany complicity in the assassination and expressed its sympathy and\nregret.\n\n_Mutatis mutandis_, let us suppose that Germany had thereupon issued\nto France the same ultimatum that Austria issued to Servia, requiring\nFrance to acknowledge moral responsibility for a crime, which it\nsteadily disavowed. The ultimatum to France in that event would have\nincluded a peremptory demand that the government of France, a proud\nand self-respecting country, should publish in the _Official Journal_,\nand communicate as an \"order of the day\" to the army of France, a\nstatement that the French Government formally denounced all attempts\nto recover Alsace and Lorraine; that it regretted the participation of\nFrench officers in the murder of the German Crown Prince; that it\nengaged to suppress in the Press of France any expressions of hatred\nor contempt for Germany; that it would dissolve all patriotic\nsocieties that have for their object the recovery of the \"lost\nprovinces\"; that it would eliminate from the public schools of France\nall instruction which served to foment feeling against Germany; that\nit would remove from its army all officers who had joined in the\nagitation against Germany; that it would accept in the courts of\nFrance the participation of German officials in determining who were\nguilty, either of the Strassburg murder or of the propaganda for the\nrecovery of Alsace and Lorraine; that it would further proceed to\narrest and punish certain French officers, whom the German Government\ncharged with participating in the offensive propaganda, and that\nit would furnish the German Government with full explanations and\ninformation in reference to its execution of these peremptory demands.\n\nLet us suppose that such an ultimatum having been sent, that France\nhad been given forty-eight hours to comply with conditions which were\nobviously fatal to its self-respect and forever destructive of its\nprestige as a great Power.\n\nCan it be questioned what the reply of France or the judgment of the\nworld would be in such a quarrel?\n\n_Every fair-minded man would say without hesitation that such an\nultimatum would be an unprecedented outrage upon the fine proprieties\nof civilized life._\n\nThe only difference between the two cases is the fact that in the case\nof Germany and France the power issuing the ultimatum would be less\nthan double the size of that nation which it sought to coerce, while\nin the case of Austria and Servia, the aggressor was twelve times as\npowerful as the power whose moral prestige and political independence\nit sought to destroy.\n\nIn view of the nature of these demands, the assurance which Austria\nsubsequently gave Russia, that she would do nothing to lessen the\nterritory of Servia, goes for nothing. From the standpoint of Servia,\nit would have been far better to lose a part of its territory and keep\nits independence and self-respect as to the remainder, than to retain\nall its existing land area, and by submitting to the ultimatum become\nvirtually a vassal state of Austria. Certainly if Servia had\nacquiesced fully in Austria's demands without any qualification or\nreservation (as for the sake of peace it almost did), then Austria\nwould have enjoyed a moral protectorate over all of Servia's\nterritory, and its ultimate fate might have been that of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, which Austria first governed as a protectorate, and later\nforcibly annexed.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nTHE PEACE PARLEYS\n\n\nThe issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a grave crisis.\n_It did not, however, present any insoluble problem._ Peace could and\nshould have been preserved. Its preservation is always possible when\nnations, which may be involved in a controversy, are inspired by a\nreasonably pacific purpose. Only when the masses of the people are\ninflamed with a passionate desire for war, and in a time of popular\nhysteria responsible statesmen are helplessly borne along the turgid\nflow of events as bubbles are carried by the swift current of a\nswollen river, is peace a visionary dream.\n\nIt is the peculiarity of the present crisis that no such popular\nhysteria existed. No popular demand for war developed until after it\nwas virtually precipitated. Even then large classes of workingmen,\nboth in Germany and France, protested.\n\nThe peoples of the various countries had scant knowledge of the issues\nwhich had been raised by their diplomats and had little, if any,\ninterest in the Servian trouble. The chief exception to this was in\nAustria, where unquestionably popular feeling had been powerfully\nexcited by the murder of the Archduke and where there had been,\nespecially in Vienna, popular manifestations in favor of war. In\nRussia also there was not unnaturally a strong undercurrent of popular\nsympathy for Servia.\n\nThe writer was in the Engadine at the time referred to, and\ncosmopolitan St. Moritz, although a little place, was, in its\nheterogeneous population, Europe in microcosmic form. There the\naverage man continued to enjoy his mid-summer holiday and refused to\nbelieve that so great a catastrophe was imminent until the last two\nfateful days in July. The citizens of all nations continued to\nfraternize, and were one in amazement that a war could be precipitated\non causes in which the average man took so slight an interest.\n\nUnembarrassed by any popular clamor, this war could have been\nprevented, and the important question presents itself to the Supreme\nCourt of Civilization as to the moral responsibility for the failure\nof the negotiations.\n\nWhich of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which\nobstructed those efforts?\n\nIn reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court would pay little\nattention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an\nindividual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, \"Art\nthou in health, my brother?\" and even the peace of civilization can be\nbetrayed by a Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of\ndiplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.\n\nNo war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending\nthat his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for\nits murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a\nnoted occasion, when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of \"honor,\" it\nmight be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the\nquestion.\n\nThe writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, which he thinks\nthese records indisputably show, as to suggest the respective\nattitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as\nrevealed by these papers. If the reader will realize fully the policy\nwhich from the first animated Germany and Austria, then the documents\nhereinafter quoted will acquire new significance.\n\nGermany and Austria had determined to impose their will upon Servia,\neven though it involved a European war. From the outset they clearly\nrecognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the\nresponsibility.\n\nThe object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of\nthe pro-Slav propaganda. It was to subject Servia to such severe\npunitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral\nsovereignty would be largely impaired, if not altogether destroyed.\nTo do this it was not enough to have Servia take measures to prevent\npro-Slav agitation within her borders. Austria neither wanted nor\nexpected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum.\n\nIt planned to submit such an ultimatum as Servia could not possibly\naccept and, to make this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable\nto give not only Servia but Europe the minimum time to take any\npreventive measures. Giving to Servia only forty-eight hours within\nwhich to reach a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours to\nprotect the peace of the world, it was thought that Servia would do\none of two things, either of which would be of incalculable importance\nto Germany and Austria.\n\nIf Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it, then\nits self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence\nlargely destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least morally, a mere\nvassal of Austria.\n\nIf, however, Servia declined to accept the ultimatum, then war would\nimmediately begin and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily\nsubjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the\nsame result would be attained.\n\nFrom the commencement, both Germany and Austria recognized the\npossibility that Russia might intervene to protect Servia. To prevent\nthis it was important that Russia and her allies of the Triple Entente\nshould be given as little time as possible to consider their action,\nand it was thought that this would probably lead to Russia's\nacquiescence in the punishment of Servia and, if so, France and\nEngland, having no direct interest in Servia, would also undoubtedly\nacquiesce.\n\nIf, however, slow-moving Russia, instead of acquiescing, as she did\nin 1908 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should take up the\ngauntlet which Germany and Austria had thrown down, _then it was all\nimportant to Germany and Austria that Russia should seem to be the\naggressor_.\n\nFor this there were two substantial reasons: the one was Italy and the\nother was England. Germany and Austria desired the cooperation of\nItaly and could not claim it as of right under the terms of the\nTriple Alliance, unless they were attacked. Upon the other hand, if\nEngland believed that Russia and France had declared war upon Germany\nand Austria, there was little probability of her intervention. For\nthese reasons it was important that Germany and Austria should impress\nboth England and Italy that their purposes were sincerely pacific and\nthat on the other hand they should so clearly provoke Russia and\nFrance that those nations would declare war.\n\nIf the reader will keep this Janus-faced policy steadily in mind,\nhe will understand the apparent inconsistencies in the diplomatic\nrepresentations of the German Foreign Office. He will understand why\nGermany and Austria, while at times flouting Russia in the most\nflagrant manner and refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic\nintercourse, were at the same time giving to England the most emphatic\nassurance of pacific intentions.\n\nWith this preliminary statement, let the record speak for itself. We\nhave seen that the first great, and as events proved, fatal obstacle\nto peace which Germany interposed was practically contemporaneous with\nthe issuance of the ultimatum. Germany did not wait for any efforts at\nconciliation. On the contrary, it attempted to bar effectually all\nsuch efforts by serving notice upon France, England, and Russia almost\nsimultaneously with the issuance of the Austrian ultimatum,\n\n     that the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified;\n\nand the communication concluded:\n\n     We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any\n     intervention of any Power on account of the various alliance\n     obligations would bring consequences impossible to\n     measure.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: German _White Paper_, Annex, 1 B.]\n\nThis had only one meaning. Austria was to be left to discipline\nServia at will, or there would be war. Germany did not even wait\nfor any suggestion of intervention, whether conciliatory or otherwise,\nbut sought to interpose to any plan of peace, short of complete\nsubmission, an insuperable barrier by this threat of war. With this\npointed threat to Europe, the next move was that of Russia, and it may\nbe remarked that throughout the entire negotiations Russian diplomacy\nwas more than equal to that of Germany.\n\nRussia contented itself in the first instance by stating on the\nmorning of July 24th, that Russia could not remain indifferent to the\nAustro-Servian conflict. This attitude could not surprise any one, for\nRussia's interest in the Balkans was well known and its legitimate\nconcern in the future of any Slav state was, as Sir Edward Grey had\nsaid in Parliament in March, 1913, \"a commonplace in European\ndiplomacy in the past.\"\n\nWith this simple statement of its legitimate interest in a matter\naffecting the balance of power in Europe, Russia, instead of issuing\nan ultimatum or declaring war, as Germany and Austria may have hoped,\njoined with England in asking for a reasonable extension of time for\nall the Powers to concert for the preservation of peace. On July 24th,\nthe very day that the Austrian ultimatum had reached St. Petersburg,\nthe Russian Foreign Minister transmitted to the Austrian Government\nthrough its Charge in Vienna the following communication:\n\n     The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the\n     Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to\n     Belgrade _leaves to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient\n     to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening\n     out of the complications that have arisen_. To prevent the\n     incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the\n     Powers, which can follow the method of action of the\n     Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us\n     that above all the delay given to Servia to reply should be\n     extended. _Austria-Hungary, declaring herself disposed to\n     inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which\n     the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations,\n     should at least give them also the time to take note of them\n     (de s'en rendre compte)._ In this case, if the Powers should\n     convince themselves of the well-groundedness of certain of\n     the Austrian demands _they would find themselves in a\n     position to send to the Servian Government consequential\n     advice_. A refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum\n     would deprive of all value the step taken by the\n     Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the Powers and\n     would be in contradiction with the very bases of\n     international relations.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 4.]\n\nCould any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of\nthe world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done\nto preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the\nuttermost.\n\nGermany had only to intimate to Austria that \"a decent respect to the\nopinions of mankind,\" as well as common courtesy to great and friendly\nnations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia,\nbut to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially\nas the period was one of mid-summer dullness, and many of the leading\nrulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.\n\n_If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of\npeace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world._ A word from\nBerlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with\nsincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation\nof peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that\nword.\n\nEngland had already anticipated the request of Russia that a\nreasonable time should be given to all interested parties. When the\nAustrian Minister in London handed the ultimatum to Sir Edward Grey on\nJuly the 24th, the following conversation took place, which speaks for\nitself:\n\n     In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I (Sir\n     Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to me a matter for\n     great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at\n     that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the\n     proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the\n     circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused\n     sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, _but at the same\n     time I had never before seen one State address to another\n     independent State a document of so formidable a character_.\n     Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might\n     never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the\n     murder of the Archduke. Servia had, however, shown no sign\n     of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed\n     since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was\n     essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.\n\n     I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time\n     limit could have been introduced later; _but, as things now\n     stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by\n     Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a\n     demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from\n     its presentation_.\n\nUnfortunately both Russia and England's requests for time were\nrefused, on the plea that they had reached the Austrian Foreign\nMinister too late, although it has never yet been explained why, even\nif Count Berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the\nexpiration of the ultimatum, the matter might not have been reopened\nfor a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit.\n\nIn the absence of some explanation, which as yet remains to be\nmade, the absence of the Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time\nintervening between the issuance of the _ultimatum_ and the expiration\nof the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of\ndiplomatic finesse. He had without any warning to the great Powers of\nEurope, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever was a time when a\npacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to\nsuggestions of peace, it was in those two critical days. And yet,\nafter issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes himself beyond reach\nof personal parleys by going to Ischl, and this was taken by the\nGerman Foreign Office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated\nfailure to extend this courtesy to Russia and England. Upon this we\nhave the testimony of the English Ambassador at Berlin, who in his\nreport to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says:\n\n     [The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says\n     that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this morning\n     from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed\n     German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to the Austrian\n     Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an\n     extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency\n     about it. Unfortunately it appeared from the press that\n     Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought\n     that in these circumstances there would be delay and\n     difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of\n     State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had\n     ready on the spot, _but he admitted quite freely that\n     Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a\n     lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also\n     admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain\n     of the Austro-Hungarian demands...._\n\nA like excuse is found in a conversation with the Russian Charge at\nBerlin, in which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed the fear \"that in\nconsequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack\nof time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg's telegrams suggesting delay) will\nremain without result.\"[17]\n\n[Footnote 17: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 14.]\n\nThese conversations are most illuminating. They refer to instructions\nto the German Ambassador in Vienna, _which are not found in the German\nWhite Paper_, although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the\nsincerity with which Germany \"passed on\" the most important request of\nEngland and Russia for a little time to save the peace of Europe, and\nit strongly suggests the possibility that Count Berchtold's most\ninopportune absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross\ndiscourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time.\n\nKudachef, the Russian Charge at Vienna, did not content himself with\nsubmitting the request to the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio)\nbut to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berchtold's absence at\nIschl, the Russian Charge went over the head of the Austrian Acting\nForeign Minister and telegraphed the request for time to Count\nBerchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for itself how this most\nreasonable request was made and refused.\n\nThe Russian Charge sent on July 25th the two following telegrams to\nthe Russian Foreign Minister:\n\n     Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of\n     arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal\n     to extend the delay of the ultimatum, and I have repeated it\n     verbally to Baron Macchio. This latter promised me to\n     communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,\n     _but added that he could predict with assurance a\n     categorical refusal_.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 11.]\n\n     Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just received from\n     Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the\n     note.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 12.]\n\nIt is evident from the Russian _Orange Paper_ that that country had no\nillusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has\ncontended that on July the 24th, before Count Berchtold made his\ninopportune visit to Ischl, he sent for the Russian Charge at Vienna\nand assured him that the punitive measures which Austria had\ndetermined to take against Servia at all costs would not involve any\nterritorial acquisitions.\n\nOf this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two\nsources, which are not entirely in accord.\n\nIn a telegram from the German Ambassador at Vienna to the German\nChancellor, dated July 24th, it is said:\n\n     Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Charge\n     d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in\n     friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia.\n     After going over the historical developments of the last few\n     years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy\n     did not wish to appear against Servia in the role of a\n     conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no\n     territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure\n     against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt\n     herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly\n     behavior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no\n     intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of\n     power in the Balkans. The Charge d'Affaires, who as yet had\n     no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations\n     of the Minister _ad referendum_ adding that he would\n     immediately transmit them to Sazonof.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: German _White Paper_, No. 3.]\n\nIn a report of the same interview from the English Ambassador at\nVienna to Sir Edward Grey, it is said:\n\n     Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by\n     Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own\n     personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form\n     rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that\n     it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister of\n     Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under\n     instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were\n     accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency\n     added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at\n     stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction\n     throughout the country. He did not think that objections to\n     what had been done could be raised by any power.[21]\n\n[Footnote 21: English _White Papers_, No. 7.]\n\nIt will be noted that in the report of the English Ambassador there is\nno suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take Servian\nterritory.\n\nIn the Russian _Orange Paper_, we find no report from its\nrepresentative at Vienna of any such interview and Austria has never\nproduced any document or memorandum either of such an interview or of\nsuch a concession to Russia. It is probable that such a concession was\nmade, as Germany contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too\nkeen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the\nevidences multiplied that Austria would not consider either an\nextension of time or any modification of its terms and that Germany\nwas acting in complete accord and cooperated with her Ally, the\nprobability of war was unmistakable.\n\nSazonof at once sent for the English and French Ambassadors, and the\nsubstance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the\nBritish Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July\n24th, which throws a strong light upon the double effort of Russia and\nFrance to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to\nprepare for the more probable issue of war:\n\n     Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was\n     both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken\n     such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of\n     her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped\n     that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim\n     their solidarity with Russia and France.\n\n     The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France\n     would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance\n     with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia\n     strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.\n\n     I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what\n     their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of\n     course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but\n     personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of\n     solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail\n     an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia\n     and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in\n     Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would\n     never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.\n     Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general\n     European question was involved, the Servian question being\n     but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not\n     afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.\n\n     In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from\n     what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great\n     Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to\n     the effect that active intervention by her in the internal\n     affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing\n     Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military\n     measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was\n     it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to\n     declare war on Austria?\n\n     M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian\n     mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but\n     a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to\n     consider the whole question. A further council would be\n     held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would\n     preside, when a decision would be come to....\n\nHad England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would\nwar have been averted?\n\nPossibly, perhaps probably. Germany's principal fear was the\nintervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was\nnatural. It was England's intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911,\nmade in Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which at that time\ninduced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation\nin 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The\nanswer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how\ndeep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European\nwar at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.\n\nIt does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was\nnecessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia\nand France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation\nand could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as\nthe Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have\nbeen necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while\nwith a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet\nit would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such\nvehement protests that England would have stood before the world \"as\na house divided against itself.\"\n\nBoth Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their respective standpoints\nwere right. Neither made a single false step in the great controversy.\n\nAs a result of this interview, Russia, England, and France, after the\nrequest for time had been abruptly refused, next proceeded in the\ninterests of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory a reply\nto the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise\nof her political independence.\n\nWhile the lack of time prevented France and Russia from making any\nformal communication to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a\nconference with the Servian Minister and discussed the wisdom of\navoiding an attack on Belgrade by having the Servian forces withdrawn\nto the interior and then appealing to the Powers, and Russia thereupon\nmade the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should appeal\nto the Powers, _Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave\nthe question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy_.\n\nThis interview, as reported by the British Ambassador at St.\nPetersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, is as follows:\n\n     I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and\n     communicated to his Excellency the substance of your\n     telegram of to-day to Paris, and this afternoon, I discussed\n     with him the communication which the French Ambassador\n     suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as\n     recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade....\n\n     The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite\n     ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved\n     to be guilty, but that no independent State could be\n     expected to accept the political demands which had been put\n     forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a\n     conversation which he had with the Servian Minister\n     yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians attacking\n     Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and\n     withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at\n     the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His\n     Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He\n     would like to see the question placed on an international\n     footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to\n     which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were\n     given not to Austria, but to the Powers.\n\n     _If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be\n     quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the\n     hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was\n     possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to\n     submit the question to arbitration._\n\nPursuant to this policy of conciliation Sir Edward Grey in direct\ncommunication with the Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe,\nthe British Ambassador at Belgrade, in direct communication with the\nServian Foreign Ministry, and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian\nMinister at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence upon Servia\nto make a conciliatory reply.\n\nThus Sir Edward Grey instructed Crackenthorpe:\n\n     Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that Servian\n     officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices\n     in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give\n     Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to\n     express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government\n     must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in\n     Servian interests.\n\n     It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria\n     when time limit expires can be averted by anything but\n     unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance\n     appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying\n     favorably to as many points as the time limit allows....\n\n     I have urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should\n     not precipitate military action.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: English _White Paper_, No. 12.]\n\nIn response to these suggestions, Mr. Crackenthorpe communicated Sir\nEdward Grey's pacific suggestions to the Servian Minister and received\nthe following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe's report to Sir\nEdward Grey, dated July 25th.\n\n     The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to\n     the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of\n     State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory\n     and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as\n     is possible....\n\n     The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian\n     Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content\n     with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.[23]\n\n[Footnote 23: English _White Paper_, No. 21.]\n\nThese pacific suggestions to Servia met with complete success, and as\na result that country on July 25th, and before the expiration of the\nultimatum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the world with its\nspirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic\nhopes of peace.\n\nAt some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it\naccepted substantially the demands of Austria, with a few minor\nreservations, which it expressed its willingness to refer either to\narbitration at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the\nPowers.[24]\n\n[Footnote 24: English _White Paper_, No. 39.]\n\nNeither Germany nor Austria seriously contended that the reply was not\non its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian\ndemands. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of\nthe assurances, calling the concessions \"shams.\" Unless Austria, in\nasking assurances from Servia, were content to accept them as made in\ngood faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds,\nwhy should the ultimatum, calling for such assurances, have been made?\nIf Germany and Austria had accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and\nServia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost\ngood faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no\ngeneral war. Russia and England pledged their influence to compel\nServia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria.\nThe principal outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate\nor leave to the Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in\nthe Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem.\nAustria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have\nbeen easily attained by having the Powers appoint a commission of\nneutral jurists to make such investigation.\n\nIn any event, Austria could have accepted the very substantial\nconcessions of Servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to\nThe Hague Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the few and\ncomparatively simple open points. When one recalls the infinite\ntreasure of property and life, which would thus have been saved the\nworld, had Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and pacific\ncourse, one can only exclaim, \"_But oh, the pity of it!_\"\n\nIt is significant that while the entire official German press gave\nample space to the Austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria's\nenergetic attitude, it withheld from the German people any adequate\ninformation as to the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, for\nthe Russian Charge at Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof:\n\n     The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian\n     response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment\n     this note has not appeared _in extenso_ in any of local\n     journals, which according to all the evidence do not wish to\n     give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming\n     effect which this publication would produce upon the German\n     readers.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 46.]\n\nInstead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace proceeded to make\nriotous demonstrations against the Russian and Servian Embassies.\n\nThe time limit on the ultimatum expired on July the 25th at six\no'clock in the evening.\n\nThere is no more significant and at the same time discreditable\nfeature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that\nthe Austrian Government, _without giving the Servian answer the\nconsideration even of a single hour_, immediately severed all\ndiplomatic intercourse with Belgrade and at 6.30 P.M. the Minister\nof Austria\n\n     informed the Servian Government by note that, not having\n     received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he\n     is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the\n     legation.\n\nOn the same night Austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable\npart of its army.\n\nNotwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, and Russia continued\nto labor for peace, and made further pacific suggestions, all of which\nfell upon deaf ears.\n\nOn July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (England,\nFrance, Italy, and Germany) should unite\n\n     in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross\n     the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at\n     Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If\n     Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and\n     ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly\n     cooperate.[26]\n\n[Footnote 26: English _White Paper_, Nos. 24 and 25.]\n\nTo this reasonable request the German Chancellor replied:\n\n     The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the\n     Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct.\n     We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first\n     and last, we take the ground that this question must be\n     localized by the abstention of all the Powers from\n     intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that\n     Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious\n     of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the\n     situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are\n     ready, with the reservation of our known duties as Allies,\n     to cooperate with the other great Powers in mediation\n     between Russia and Austria.[27]\n\n[Footnote 27: German _White Paper_, Exhibit 13.]\n\nThis distinction is hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the\ndifference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's current\ndifference with Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to\ncrush Servia without interference. Russia claimed such right of\nintervention. Germany would not interfere in the former matter, but\nwould abstractly but not concretely mediate between Russia and Austria\nin the latter. Mediate about what? To refuse to mediate over the\nServian question was to refuse to mediate at all. For all practical\npurposes the two things were indistinguishable.\n\nAll that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the record discloses,\nwas to \"pass on\" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but\nsubsequent events indicate that it was \"passed on\" without any\nendorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its\nally's request for more time if it had ever been made? Here again we\nnote with disappointment the absence from the record of Germany's\nmessage to Austria, \"passing on\" the reasonable request for an\nextension of time. The result indicates that the request received,\nif any endorsement, the \"faint praise\" which is said to \"damn.\"\n\nWas ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A\nlittle time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to\npreserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.\n_A snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats._ The\npeace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy. The\nAustrian Government could wait nearly three months to try the\nassassin, who admittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not\nwait even a few hours before condemning Servia to political death. It\ncould not grant Russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting\nits interests, even if the peace of Europe and the happiness of the\nworld depended on it. It would be difficult to find in recorded\nhistory a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not\nat war with Russia.\n\nDefeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,\nand Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily\narresting military proceedings until further efforts toward\nconciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany,\nFrance, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and\nServia not to cross the frontier \"until we had had time to try and\narrange matters between them,\" but the German Ambassador read Sir\nEdward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign\nOffice saying\n\n     that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no\n     more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the\n     Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that\n     note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said,\n     however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between\n     Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to\n     accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to\n     this suggestion.\n\nIt will be noted that Germany thus gave to England, as it had\nalready given to Russia and France in the most unequivocal terms, a\ndisclaimer of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, but we\nhave already seen that when the German Foreign Office prepared its\nstatement for the German nation, which was circulated in the Reichstag\non August 4th, Germany confessed the insincerity of these assurances\nby admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian\nGovernment had advised the German Foreign Office of its intentions and\nasked its opinion and that\n\n     we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our\n     agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her\n     that any action that she might consider it necessary to take\n     ... would receive our approval.\n\nHere again it is to be noted that the telegram, which the German\nForeign Office sent to Prince Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat\nsimply read to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits to\nthe German _White Paper_.\n\nAs we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought\nin any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession until\nafter the Kaiser's return from Norway and then only if we accept the\nassurances of its Foreign Office which are not supported by official\ndocuments. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its\nAmbassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which,\nwhile again disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian\nultimatum, yet added that Germany \"approved\" its point of view,\n\n     and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany could not\n     allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally.[28]\n\n[Footnote 28: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 19.]\n\nThis seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, that its duties to\ncivilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,\nwhether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it\ncarried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual\nwar without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible,\nbut to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a\npolicy of gross discourtesy to friendly States offends every sense of\ninternational morality.\n\nOn the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter\ninto an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in\ncommon of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. _To this Austria\nnever even replied._\n\nThe Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German\nMinister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would\n\"find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal,\" but this did\nnot accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador\nin Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and\nsubmitted the following formal declaration:\n\n     \"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek\n     territorial acquisitions, and that she does not threaten the\n     integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own\n     tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid\n     war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen\n     desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France\n     will use her influence at St. Petersburg in the direction of\n     moderation.\" _The [French] Minister observed that Germany\n     could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially\n     in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown.\n     The Ambassador answered that that was not possible, in\n     view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the\n     Austro-Servian conflict._ Thereupon the Minister asked if\n     the four Powers--England, Germany, Italy, and France--were\n     not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since\n     the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict\n     between Russia and Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the\n     absence of instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to\n     adhere to the German proposal.[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 28.]\n\nThis significant interview states the consistent attitude of Germany.\nThe burden is put upon France to induce its ally to desist from any\nintervention and thus give Austria a free hand, while Germany\nemphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting\nto Austria a more conciliatory course.\n\nOn the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in\nLondon for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe,\nand to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved that peace,\nthe German Secretary of State, after conferring with the British\nAmbassador at Berlin, replied that the conference\n\n     would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could\n     not, in his opinion, be called together except at the\n     request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall\n     in with your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion, desirous though\n     he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E.\n     Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do\n     with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four\n     nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest\n     means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He [von Jagow]\n     maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed\n     was not practicable.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: English _White Paper_, No. 43.]\n\nGermany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the Powers even\nfor their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that\non the same day the German Ambassador at London quoted the German\nSecretary of State as saying\n\n     that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia\n     could hardly be expected to accept,\n\nthus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part,\nunjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention\nto the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia\nand marched into that country\n\n     it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all\n     costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be\n     involved.\n\nHe added that the Servian reply\n\n     should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and\n     pause,\n\nand asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna but,\nas we have already seen, the German Secretary of State had already\nreplied that such a conference \"was not practicable,\" and that it\n\"would practically amount to a court of arbitration,\" and could not,\nin his opinion, be called together \"except at the request of Austria\nand Russia.\"[31]\n\n[Footnote 31: English _White Paper_, No. 16.]\n\nThat this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew\nthat Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had\nalready refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had\nactually commenced its military operations.\n\nGermany's attitude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the\nRussian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he\nstates that on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office and\nasked it,\n\n     to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up\n     this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied that he could\n     not advise Austria to yield.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 38.]\n\nWhy not? Russia and its allies had advised Servia to yield and Servia\nhad conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign\nOffice advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its\ndesire for peace were sincere?\n\nBefore this interview took place, the French Ambassador had called at\nthe German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English\nsuggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,\nRussia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that\nAustria and Servia\n\n     should abstain from any act which might aggravate the\n     situation at the present hour.\n\nBy this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no\ninvasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this\nthe German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._\n\nOn the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had \"a long and\nearnest conversation\" with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for\nForeign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that\n\n     something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.\n     Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a\n     skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the\n     Servians had been aggressors.\n\nThe Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it\ncould to keep the Servians quiet, \"and even to fall back before an\nAustrian advance in order to gain time.\"\n\nHe urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be\nfurnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian\nMinister for Foreign Affairs,\n\n     who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that\n     could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power.\n\nThe only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be\nsubmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: English _White Paper_, No. 56.]\n\nOn the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the\nFrench Foreign Office and \"_strongly insisted on the exclusion\nof all possibility of mediation or a conference_\"[34]; and yet\ncontemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London\nthat he had\n\n     started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately\n     in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further\n     communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of\n     the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.\n\n[Footnote 34: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 34.]\n\nWhat hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the German Foreign\nOffice, after stating its conviction\n\n     that an act of mediation could not take into consideration\n     the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an\n     Austro-Hungarian affair,\n\nclaimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further\nsuggestion to Vienna, in which Austro-Hungary was urged\n\n     either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient\n     or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations;\n\nbut the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked\npartner of the combination--\"in full appreciation of our mediatory\nactivity\" (so says the German _White Paper_ with sardonic humor),\nreplied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of\nhostilities, \"_it was too late_.\"\n\nCan it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more\nthan merely \"transmit\" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria\nwould have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that\nAustria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had\ngiven any intimation of such a wish?\n\nOn the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any\npossibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign\nAffairs\n\n     said, quietly, but firmly, _that no discussion could be\n     accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would\n     be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific\n     character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own,\n     might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just\n     and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled\n     directly between the two parties immediately concerned.\n\nTo this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept\nthe guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness\nof Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested \"the larger\naspect of the question,\" namely, the peace of Europe, and to this\n\"larger aspect,\" which should have given any reasonable official some\nground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he\n\n     had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to\n     oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at\n     territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be\n     postponed.[35]\n\n[Footnote 35: English _White Paper_, No. 62.]\n\nThe private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus\nfailed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to\npreserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th had a\nfurther conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for\npeace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and\nServia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light\nof present developments is so significant that it bears quotation _in\nextenso_:\n\n     I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it\n     was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating\n     the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia,\n     should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious\n     guarantees for its future relations with Servia.\n\n     _I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the\n     dangers to the peace of Europe_ which would be brought about\n     by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.\n\n     Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well\n     the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a\n     frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. _He\n     told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian\n     Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the\n     energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could\n     now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the\n     terms of the Austro-Hungarian note._\n\n     Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute\n     and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree\n     that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer\n     consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very\n     reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its\n     promises for the future.\n\nOn the same day, July 28th, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for\nthe English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposed\nconference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think\nit would be effective,\n\n     because such a conference would, in his opinion, have the\n     appearance of an \"Areopagus\" consisting of two Powers of\n     each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining\n     Powers.\n\nAfter engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble, and, being\nreminded of Servia's conciliatory reply,\n\n     his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the\n     Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he\n     agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely\n     Austrian concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_.[36]\n\n[Footnote 36: English _White Paper_, No. 71.]\n\nAt this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal\nto preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente and that every such\nproposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and\neither that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE\n\n\nBefore proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace\nparleys, in which the German Kaiser became the protagonist, it is\ndesirable to interpolate the additional data, which the French _Yellow\nBook_ has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written\nand the first editions of this book were printed. This can be done\nwith little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative.\n\nThe evidence of the _Yellow Book_ is fuller in scope and greater in\ndetail than the other governmental publications, and while largely\ncumulative in its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light\ncertain phases of this extraordinary controversy.\n\nIt has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was\nthe French Ambassador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de\nMargerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the\nFrench Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 documents,\nclassified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods\nof time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is\nsomewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is\nthus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.\n\nThe French _Yellow Book_ confirms the impression that France was most\nfortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of\nBerlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a\ndiplomat as M. Jules Cambon.\n\nThroughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply\nimpressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany\nare themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in\nits incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for\nconjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince\nBismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding\nprinciples of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to\nisolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him\nas effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated\nthis war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.\n\nIn the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due\nto the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its\ndiplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--_une\npetite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide_, as Bismarck once described\nthem--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly\nattempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly\nor unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany,\nconsolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them\nsimultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not\nwise statecraft. The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset\nthese blundering disciples of Machiavelli.\n\nRussia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their\nrepresentatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual\ndistinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished\ndiplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in\nvarious capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor\nof his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Washington, already\nknew, what the documents in the French _Yellow Book_ so clearly\nreveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability.\nWith acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful\nevents, in which he was a participant. To his calm and well-poised\nintellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear\nintegrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.\n\nOn more than one occasion he spoke \"in the name of humanity,\" and in\nhis constant attempt to convince the German Foreign Office as to its\nclear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world, he\nbecame the representative, not merely of France, but of civilization\nitself.\n\nIn this great diplomatic controversy, one of the greatest in the\nhistory of the world, the three representatives, who stand out with\nthe greatest intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, Grey,\nand Cambon.\n\nThe first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very\noutset the real purposes of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the\ndiplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia apparently the\naggressor.\n\nSir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual\nefforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in\nthe absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on\nthe one hand with the efforts of Russia and France to align England\non their side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the other, to\ncontinue friendly negotiations with Germany and Austria, without in\nany respect unfairly misleading them as to England's possible ultimate\naction.\n\nThe French Ambassador will justly receive the approval of posterity\nfor the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon\nthe German Foreign Office the inevitable consequences of its acts.\n\nThe first chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ consists largely of\ncommunications written from Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year\n1913. Its most interesting document is his report from Berlin under\ndate November 22, 1913, as to a conversation between the Kaiser and\nthe King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the pacific\nattitude, which Cambon had previously imputed to the Kaiser.\n\nTo the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the\nsource of the information had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules\nCambon, however, will have a reasonable confidence that when he states\nthat he received the record of this conversation \"from an absolutely\nsure source,\" more than usual credence can be given to the statement.\nReading between the lines, the implication is not unreasonable that\nthe source of Cambon's authority was King Albert himself, but this\nrests only on a plausible conjecture.\n\nThe fact that so trained an observer as the French Ambassador had seen\nin the Kaiser a marked change as early as 1913 is significant, and\nhistory may justify Cambon in his shrewd conjecture that \"the\nimpatience of the soldiers,\" meaning thereby the German General Staff,\nand the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, the Crown Prince,\nhad appreciably modified the pacific attitude of the Kaiser, which had\nserved the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. Cambon's\nrecital of the incident in question, written on November 22, 1913,\njustifies quotation _in extenso_.\n\n     I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a\n     conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the\n     King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the\n     General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago--a\n     conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King\n     Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created,\n     which corresponds with that made on me some time ago.\n     Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the\n     Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German\n     Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did\n     everybody, that William II., whose personal influence has\n     been exerted in many critical circumstances in favor of the\n     maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind.\n     This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The\n     German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of\n     peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German\n     parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with\n     France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day\n     or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes\n     in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its\n     assured success.\n\n     General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his\n     sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and\n     inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of\n     success. \"For,\" said he to the King, \"this time we must put\n     an end to it\" (_cette fois il faut en finir_), \"and your\n     Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which\n     on that day will carry away the whole German people.\"\n\n     The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the\n     intentions of the French Government in this manner was to\n     travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the\n     feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few\n     hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.\n\n     The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less\n     persisted in their point of view.\n\n     During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared\n     overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon\n     William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings\n     of the Court, and, above all, _the impatience of the\n     soldiers_, are gaining more ascendency over his mind.\n     Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the\n     popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of\n     the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position\n     of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its\n     power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last\n     increase in the German army, the object of which was to\n     place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for\n     something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it\n     is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may\n     ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his\n     Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King\n     of the Belgians, and _to lead him not to resist in case a\n     conflict with us should arise_[37]....\n\n[Footnote 37: French _Yellow Book_, No. 6.]\n\nThis picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.\n\nGermany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the\nKaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his\nsomewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated\nthe desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a\nwar, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose\npolicy. Until that time he had been quite content to _play_ the part\nof Caesar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire\nto _be_ a Caesar. To describe himself metaphorically as \"clad in\nshining armor\" and to shake the \"mailed fist\" was his constant pose.\n\"And so he played his part.\" As long as the world was content to take\nthis imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial\n_impresario_ found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus\non the boards of the Berlin Theater.\n\nThe Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning\nof a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the\ntorch to civilization itself.\n\nPrior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than\nthe congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference\nfor peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost\nhim his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too\nrecent to be ignored.\n\nIn the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to\nall demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally,\npresented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases,\nand the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a\nvery considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans\nfavored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word\nwas wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.\n\nThe Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who\nhad expected a more warlike attitude from the knight \"clad in shining\narmor,\" and the expression \"William the Peaceful\" was bandied about\nwith increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose passions\nthe Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely\nfrom the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning.\n\nWhile the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer\nbelieves that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have\nfull knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance\nand gave his consent to the policy of that _coup_ in the hope that it\nwould somewhat restore his diminished prestige. He probably followed\nthis policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as\nit had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered\nin Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any\nreasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate\ninterests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated\nin the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted\nto reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.\n\nUnfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had\ndetermined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and\nthe German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately\nshutting the door upon any possibility of peace.\n\nTo withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant\na substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A\nWashington would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a\nWashington.\n\nAnother most illuminating feature of this chapter of the _Yellow Book_\nis a report from the French Embassy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on\nthe public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, as disclosed by\nthe reports of the French consular representatives in Germany. It\ngives an extraordinary analysis of conditions in Germany prior to the\nwar, and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were\ncontributory to the creation of a powerful war party in Germany. As\nit is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, it is not\nembodied in the text of this book, but its value as an acute analysis\nof conditions in Germany--made before the passions of the war had\nclouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration.\n\nThe second chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ deals with the events\nwhich took place between the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian\nultimatum and presents new and cumulative evidence of substantial\nvalue.\n\nThe French Consul General at Budapest, in a report to his Foreign\nOffice under date July 11, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian\nPremier, Count Tisza, had refused to disclose, even to the Hungarian\nChamber, the results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo murder\nand the decision taken by the Austrian Cabinet, proceeds to show how\nthe suppression of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme to\nmake the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would\nbe open to Servia and Europe other than an immediate and unconditional\nsurrender.\n\n     Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of\n     the public believes in war and fears it.... The Government,\n     whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be\n     _preparing a coup_, is now doing everything it can to allay\n     this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government\n     newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by\n     two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the\n     Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the\n     alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo.\n     The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot\n     neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception,\n     have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per\n     cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never\n     been quoted since the first issue.[38]\n\n[Footnote 38: French _Yellow Book_, No. 11.]\n\nSimultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the\nmilitary party in Vienna. The _Militaerische Rundschau_, a few days\nbefore the ultimatum to Servia, said:\n\n     \"The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide\n     upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three\n     years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less\n     propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not\n     ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.\n     _Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us\n     provoke it at once._\"[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._, No. 12.]\n\nBefore the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some\npreliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the\nlatter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample\nreparation \"provided that she did not demand judiciary cooperation,\"\nand the Servian Minister at Berlin warned \"the German Government that\nit would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (_i.e._, by the\nparticipation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage\nthe prestige of Servia.\"[40]\n\n[Footnote 40: French _Yellow Book_, No. 15.]\n\nIt thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the\nissuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were\nincluded it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate\nthis war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by\nthe fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would\nnot be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and\nfinally became the principal outstanding difference after Servia had\naccepted substantially all the other demands of Austria. This was\nreported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum\nwas issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one\ndemand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept.\nIn the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had\nalready issued the \"preliminary warning of mobilization, which places\nGermany in a sort of _garde-a-vous_ during periods of tension.\"[41]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ibid._, No. 15.]\n\nA further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian\nultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French\nMinister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day\nwhen the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it\nreached any capital except Berlin and Belgrade. He writes:\n\n     The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful\n     solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible\n     but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for\n     some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity\n     positive pessimism.\n\n     _The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the\n     Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his\n     opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the\n     present situation appeared to him none the less to be very\n     grave._[42]\n\n[Footnote 42: French _Yellow Book_, No. 21.]\n\nAs it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt\ndirectly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications\nto the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that\nthe German Foreign Office and probably each of the constituent States\nof Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that\nwhich Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination\nto refuse. Under these circumstances the repeated and insistent\nassurances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France,\nand Russia that it \"_had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note\nbefore it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its\ncontents_\"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great\nnation or of the twentieth century.\n\n[Footnote 43: _Ante_, p. 36.]\n\nIt regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only\nto throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming,\nbut also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia\nand Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had\ninstigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its\nfirst contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not\nreasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose\nthe fable was invented. It deceived no one.\n\nThe French _Yellow Book_ discloses another even more amazing feature\nof this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the\nItalian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take\ntheir own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact\ncannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly\ndemonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set\na trap for the rest of Europe.\n\nUnder the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member\nto submit to its associates all matters which might involve the\npossibility of joint cooperation. Even if this had not been written\nin the very terms of the Alliance, it would follow as a necessary\nimplication, for when each member obligated itself to cooperate\nwith its allies in any attack upon either of them, but not in any\n_aggressive_ war, it necessarily followed that each ally had the right\nto the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve\nsuch action, so that it might determine whether it fell within the\nterms of the obligation.\n\nNeither the German nor the Austrian Foreign Office have ever submitted\nany documentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their\nally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so.\n\nIf further proof were needed, we find in the French _Yellow Book_ a\nreport from the French Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, under\ndate July the 27th, reporting a conversation between the French\nMinister and the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San\nGiuliano, on that day, in which the latter spoke of the\n\n     contents of the Austrian note, _and assured me that he had\n     had no previous knowledge of them whatever_.\n\n     He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and\n     energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could\n     take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated\n     in certain newspapers, that in this connection he had\n     expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had\n     given the assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as\n     an ally towards Austria. He replied, \"_In no way have we\n     been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever._ We have\n     therefore had no reason to make any communication of this\n     nature in Vienna.\"[44]\n\n[Footnote 44: French _Yellow Book_, No. 72.]\n\nThe reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. Almost a year before\nthe Archduke's death, Austria had sounded Italy as to its willingness\nto acquiesce or participate in a war by Austria against Servia, and\nItaly had refused. For this reason and also because an Austrian war\nagainst Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Austria and Germany\nboth recognized, without even consulting their ally, that they could\nnot count upon its cooperation in such a war. To submit their proposed\naction to Italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval,\nand this would make it more difficult for them to demand its\ncooperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting\nRussia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly\nhoped to do.\n\nThere was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure\nto consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the\nAustrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to\nEurope no possible intimation of the intended action until it was\naccomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within\nwhich to deliberate or act. If as a matter of courtesy Austria and\nGermany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action,\nItaly, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia,\nmight find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a\nconfidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was\nin preparation. This would defeat the principal purpose of Germany and\nAustria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities\nbefore any other country could make ready. Germany and Austria\ntherefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy\nto its discreditable end.\n\nWhen their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this\nfeature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.\n\nWe have already seen (_ante_, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three\ndays before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked\nPrince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, as to what news\nhe had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country,\nPrince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a\nletter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July\nthe 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from\nBerlin about a month before and had \"displayed pessimistic views as to\nthe relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin.\" Cambon adds that the\nEnglish Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all\nbeen struck \"by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his\nreturn from Berlin.\"[46]\n\n[Footnote 45: The French Ambassador at London.]\n\n[Footnote 46: French _Yellow Book_, No. 32.]\n\nSo designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the\nchancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day\nfollowing its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M.\nJules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and\nhe thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and asked him whether\nsuch an ultimatum had been sent.\n\n     Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note\n     was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian\n     Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He\n     considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of\n     a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localized. I\n     then said to him that, not having received any instructions,\n     I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange\n     of views. I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really\n     been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before\n     they were communicated to Belgrade, _and as he replied that\n     this was so_, I expressed my surprise that he should thus\n     undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of\n     which he ignored.\n\n     \"It is only,\" said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, \"because\n     we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you\n     to say that to me.\"\n\n     \"Certainly,\" I replied, \"but if Peter I. humiliates himself\n     Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles.\n     That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you\n     know where Vienna will lead you?\" I added that the language\n     of the German Press was not that of a people who were\n     indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active\n     support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time\n     given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad\n     impression upon Europe.\n\n     Herr von Jagow replied that he expected \"_un peu\n     d'emotion_,\" on the part of Servia's friends, but that he\n     counted upon their giving Servia good advice.\n\n     \"I do not doubt,\" I then said, \"that Russia will make an\n     effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to make what\n     concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one,\n     why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that\n     advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to\n     expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered\n     to Vienna?\"\n\n     The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that\n     would depend on circumstances, but, recovering himself\n     immediately, declared that the matter must be localized. He\n     asked me if really I considered the situation serious.\n     \"Assuredly,\" I replied, \"for, if what is going on has been\n     pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their\n     bridges behind them.\"[47]\n\n[Footnote 47: French _Yellow Book_, No. 30.]\n\nThe _Yellow Book_ throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty\nfinesse, with which the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted\nto take a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We learn from Exhibit\nNo. 55 that Count Berchtold had given to the Russian Ambassador at\nVienna, prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express assurance\n\"that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable,\" and\nthat upon this assurance Count Schebeko had left Vienna on a leave of\nabsence. During his absence and at a time when the President of the\nFrench Republic, the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign\nAffairs were far distant from Paris and on the high seas, the\nultimatum was issued, and, as we have seen, Count Berchtold\nimmediately betook himself to Ischl and remained there until the\nexpiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum.\n\nThe same policy was pursued with reference to other Ambassadors, for\nwhen France instructed its representative in Vienna \"to call the\nattention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe,\nBaron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian\nnote and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a\npacific denouement.\"[48]\n\n[Footnote 48: French _Yellow Book_, No. 20.]\n\nIn the same communication, in which this information is embodied, we\ngain the important information that \"in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps\nthe German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring\nostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not _wholly_ in agreement\nwith him on this point.\"\n\nPursuant to the same ostrich policy, the German Secretary of State, as\nwe have previously seen (_ante_, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French\nand English Ambassadors the absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl as an\nexcuse for the failure of Germany to get any extension of the time\nlimit, and not only did he assure them repeatedly and in the most\nunequivocal way that the German Foreign Office had no knowledge of,\nor responsibility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on July the\n25th the Russian Charge requested a personal appointment with von\nJagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension,\nthe German Secretary of State only gave \"him an appointment at the end\nof the afternoon, that is to say, _at the moment when the ultimatum\nwill expire_,\" and in view of this illusory appointment the Russian\nCharge (M. Bronewsky)\n\n     sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary of\n     State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the\n     communication made by Austria to the Powers rendered the\n     effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give\n     the Powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged\n     before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very\n     urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in\n     view the creation of a great crisis.[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: French _Yellow Book_, No. 42.]\n\nThus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action the representatives of\nEngland, France, and Russia were evaded until the time limit for\nServia had expired.\n\nContrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which Sazonof\nattempted to reach an agreement with the Austrian Ambassador at St.\nPetersburg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of the French\nAmbassador at St. Petersburg, under that date. He says:\n\n     The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy\n     perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful\n     solution. \"I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the\n     last instant,\" he said to me.\n\n     It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary[50] to\n     come and see him for a \"frank and loyal explanation.\" In his\n     presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian\n     ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting\n     character of the different clauses. \"The intention which\n     inspired this document,\" he said, \"is legitimate if you\n     pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory\n     against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to\n     which you have had recourse is not defensible.\" He\n     concluded, \"Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, _and\n     I will guarantee the result_.\"[51]\n\n[Footnote 50: The Austrian Ambassador.]\n\n[Footnote 51: French _Yellow Book_, No. 54.]\n\nUpon one phase of Germany's foreign policy in this crisis the French\n_Yellow Book_ naturally throws more light than the other publications.\nI refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France into a position of\nneutrality, or possibly to secure from it some definition of its\nattitude, which would compromise its relations with Russia. The\n_Yellow Book_ charges that the German Ambassador, under the pretext\nof securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public\nexcitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The documents go far\nto suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing.\n\nThe German Ambassador on July the 24th, the very day that the\nultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von\nJagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called\nupon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal\nnote, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he\ncharacterized it as a note of importance.\n\nIt may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic\ncrisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of\nthe diplomatic messages which they orally communicated.\n\nIn his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says:\n\n     The German Ambassador especially directed my attention to\n     the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He\n     indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of\n     the actual text, which is as follows: \"The German Government\n     considers that the present question is a matter to be\n     settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and\n     that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting\n     it to the two interested parties. The German Government\n     ardently desires the localization of the conflict, since by\n     the natural play of alliances any intervention by another\n     Power would have incalculable consequences.\"\n\n     I remarked to the German Ambassador that just as it appeared\n     to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those\n     concerned in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it\n     seemed difficult to require measures which could not be\n     accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of\n     Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to\n     submit to them, would risk being carried away by a\n     revolution.\n\n     I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen[52] that his note\n     only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and\n     simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the\n     part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave\n     the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken\n     into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of\n     her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the\n     punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the\n     suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they\n     were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.\n\n[Footnote 52: The German Ambassador.]\n\n     I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired\n     by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it\n     could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill\n     it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take\n     part in the conversation.\n\n     Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third\n     party Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally\n     cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which\n     was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the\n     dispute.\n\n     Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these\n     considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always\n     possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian\n     note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which\n     permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that\n     personally he had no views.[53]\n\n[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]\n\nOn the following day the German Ambassador again called at the French\nForeign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in\na Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the\npreceding day as the \"German menace.\" The German Ambassador again gave\nan unequivocal assurance\n\n     that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over\n     the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was\n     ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently\n     approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same\n     time as the other Powers_.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]\n\nThe hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the\npreceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the\nthreatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading\nEuropean chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia\nmust be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German\nAmbassador, then denied that his suggestion of \"incalculable\nconsequences,\" if the dispute were not localized, was a \"menace.\" This\nstatement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches\nthe ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises\nother nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and\ninterests, \"incalculable consequences\" will follow, and it is gravely\nsuggested that this is not a \"menace.\"\n\nOn the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French\nForeign Office and assured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs\nthat\n\n     Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for\n     the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that\n     France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St.\n     Petersburg.\n\n     I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that\n     she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation,\n     and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a\n     peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to\n     me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where\n     the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to\n     avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of\n     Servia.\n\n     The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was\n     irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, \"that\n     the question only concerned Austria and Servia,\" I said to\n     him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be\n     made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in\n     the matter.\n\n     Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of\n     instructions on this point, and I told him that in these\n     circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg\n     alone.\n\n     Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the\n     Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he\n     declared, was with France on this point.[55]\n\n[Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]\n\nThe incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign\noffice a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of\nFrance with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second\nvisit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign\nOffice to give to the public a statement with reference to the\npreceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to\nthe French official:\n\n     \"The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs\n     had a further interview in the course of the afternoon,\n     during which they examined, _in_ _the most friendly spirit\n     and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which\n     might be employed for the maintenance of general peace_.\"\n\n     The Acting Political Director at once replied: \"Then, in\n     your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the\n     assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be\n     willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?\"\n\n     The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, and made a\n     vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if\n     nothing had changed in the negative attitude of Germany, the\n     terms of the suggested \"note to the Press\" were excessive,\n     and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of\n     security by creating illusions as to the actual situation,\n     the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]\n\n[Footnote 56: French _Yellow Book_, No. 57.]\n\nIt is not surprising that the French Foreign Office looked askance at\nthese German suggestions of \"pacific solidarity\" with France, which\ncontrasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to work for peace and\nits sinister menaces to other countries. France's suspicion that Baron\nvon Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes\nof Russia cannot be said to be without some foundation, although\nit is as reasonable to assume that these professions of the German\nAmbassador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling France\nand its allies into a false sense of security. Here again the full\ntruth can only be ascertained when Germany is willing to submit to the\nscrutiny of the world the records of its Foreign Office.\n\nOn July 26th, M. Jules Cambon had an interview with the German\nSecretary of State and earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's\nsuggestion that a conference be called in which England, France,\nGermany, and Italy should participate for the preservation of peace.\nThis interview is at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that it\njustifies quotation _in extenso_:\n\n     To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as he did to the\n     British Ambassador, that he could not accept a proposal to\n     charge the Italian, French, and German Ambassadors with the\n     task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving\n     the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a\n     regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and\n     Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his\n     response, but that the great object, which Sir Edward Grey\n     had in view, _was above a question of form_, and what was\n     important was the association of England and France with\n     Germany and Italy in laboring for peace; that this\n     association could show itself in common action in St.\n     Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to\n     me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always\n     opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an\n     opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by\n     showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in\n     common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow\n     evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements\n     with Austria. _I pointed out that the relations of Germany\n     with Vienna were no more close than those of France with\n     Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question\n     of the two opposed groups of alliances._\n\n     The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to\n     act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but\n     that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict.\n     \"One is the consequence of the other,\" I said, \"and it would\n     be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs\n     calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia.\"\n\n     As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was\n     obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria,\n     _I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria\n     everywhere blindfold_, and if he had made himself acquainted\n     with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to\n     him that morning by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. \"_I have\n     not yet had time_,\" he said. \"I regret it,\" I replied. \"You\n     will see that except on points of detail Servia has yielded\n     completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has\n     obtained the satisfaction, which your support procured her,\n     you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine\n     with Servia the terms of the Servian reply.\"\n\n     As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, I asked him if\n     Germany wanted war. He protested energetically, saying that\n     he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely\n     incorrect. \"You must then,\" I replied, \"act in consequence.\n     _When you read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with your\n     conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, and do not\n     personally assume a portion of the responsibility for the\n     catastrophe, whose preparation you are allowing._\" Herr von\n     Jagow protested again, adding that he was ready to join\n     England and France in any common effort, but that some form\n     must be found for this intervention which he could accept\n     and that the Cabinets should agree among themselves upon the\n     matter. \"Moreover,\" he added, \"direct conversations between\n     Vienna and St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I\n     expect much good of them, and I have hope.\"[57]\n\n[Footnote 57: French _Yellow Book_, No. 74.]\n\nIn his solemn injunction to von Jagow \"_in the name of humanity_\" _to\nweigh the terms in his conscience_, Cambon struck a loftier note than\nany of the diplomatic disputants. Macaulay has said that the \"French\nmind has always been the interpreter between national ideas and those\nof universal mankind,\" and at least since the French Revolution the\ntribute has been deserved.\n\nHe, who carefully and dispassionately reads the diplomatic\ncorrespondence which preceded the war, must be impressed with the\ndifferent point of view of the two groups of disputants. Both the\nwritten and oral communications of the German and Austrian\nrepresentatives failed to suggest at any time a note other than\none of selfish nationalism. We search in vain for the most distant\nrecognition of the fact that the world at large had any legitimate\ninterest in the controversy. The insistent note, which Austria\nsounded, was that its interests required its punitive action against\nServia, even though the peace of the world were thereby sacrificed,\nand that of Germany repeated with equal insistence that its \"closest\ninterests\" summoned it to the side of Austria.\n\nIn marked contrast to this spirit of national selfishness is the\nrepeated admonition of Sir Edward Grey that the whole question should\nbe considered in its \"larger aspects,\" thereby meaning the peace and\nwelfare of Europe; while the Czar, with evident sincerity, suggested\nto the Kaiser that \"with the aid of God it must be possible to our\nlong tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood,\" and proposed\na reference of the question to the Hague. Similarly the appeal of\nJules Cambon to von Jagow, \"in the name of humanity\" was more than the\nordinary exchange of diplomatic views. Von Jagow's conception of his\nduty is shown by the fact that he had taken a position involving\n\"incalculable consequences\" without even reading the Servian reply.\n\nCambon approved himself a worthy \"yoke fellow in equity\" with Sir\nEdward Grey, and no loftier tone was sounded by any participant in\nthis great controversy, unless we except Goschen's solemn statement\nto von Bethmann-Hollweg in the equally dramatic interview, which\nsucceeded the rupture of relations between England and Germany, when\nGoschen stated that \"it was so to speak a matter of life and death for\nthe honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement\nto do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked,\" and\nadded, \"that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an\nexcuse for breaking solemn promises.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER\n\n\nThe Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace\nof Europe. One fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute.\nWhen peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight\nprogress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of Austria on July\n31 to discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian question, the\nKaiser--like Brennus with his _vae victis_--threw his sword into the\ntrembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace\nof the world.\n\nWas it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the Rubicon, at whose\nfateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign\nwithout destroying that peace?\n\nOur information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer\nat this time. Not only are the premises in dispute, but the inferences\nfrom admitted premises are too conflicting.\n\nAt the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered the Kaiser was in\nBerlin, and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in\nall that it portended. It was officially announced that he planned to\nattend the funeral in Vienna, but later the world was advised that he\nhad suffered a \"chill,\" which would prevent such attendance. Perhaps\nit was a diplomatic chill. He then left for Norway, where he remained\nin the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of July 26th,\nwhen he suddenly returned to his Capitol.\n\nEvidently his return was unexpected, for we learn from a telegram from\nSir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that,\n\n     the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the German]\n     Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the\n     Foreign Office _regrets this step which was taken on His\n     Majesty's own initiative_. They fear that His Majesty's\n     sudden return may cause speculation and excitement.\n\nAs the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian reply and its\nseverance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already\nthrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is\ndifficult to understand why the German Foreign Office should have felt\nthat the very natural return of the Kaiser to his Capitol at one of\nthe greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world\nshould be regarded as giving rise to \"speculation and excitement,\"\nespecially as the President of the French Republic was hastening back\nto Paris.\n\nThe Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of the Kaiser's return\nsuggests the possibility that the German Foreign Office, which had\nalready made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis, did not\nwish the Kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert, as in the\nMoroccan crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace.\n\nIt felt that it had the matter well in hand, but never before did a\nforeign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results.\nFrom beginning to end every anticipation that the German Chancellor\nhad was falsified by events. This discreditable and blundering chapter\nof German diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious\nBismarck turn in his grave.\n\nAs appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated\nJuly 26th, it was the confident belief of the German diplomats that\n\"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia,\" and that\n\"France too was not at all in a position for facing the war.\"[58]\n\n[Footnote 58: English _White Paper_, No. 32.]\n\nWhen the full history of this imbroglio is written, it will probably\nbe found that the extensive labor troubles in St. Petersburg, the\nmilitary unpreparedness of Russia and France, and the political schism\nin England, then verging to civil war, had deeply impressed both\nVienna and Berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon\nEurope with reference to Servia without any serious risk of a European\nwar.\n\nWhile for these reasons Germany and Austria may not have regarded such\na war or the intervention of England therein as probable, yet the dual\nalliance recognized from the outset such a possibility. The\nuncertainty as to the Kaiser's attitude with respect to such a war may\ntherefore explain the \"regret,\" with which the German Foreign Office\nwitnessed his sudden and uninvited return.\n\nOn his return the diplomatic negotiations, which had commenced with an\n_allegro con brio_, for a time changed under the baton of the Imperial\nConductor into a more peaceful _andante_, until the Kaiser made one of\nhis characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the\nwar by an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that country could not\npossibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and\nprestige as a nation.\n\nIf it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was\nplanned by Germany at least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then\nthe Kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot\nbe doubted. It is inconceivable that the German Foreign Office could\npursue for three years the policy of precipitating a European war\nwithout the knowledge and consent of the \"Over War Lord.\"\n\nWhen full data are accessible as to the importations by Germany in\nadvance of the war, as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and\nplacing of foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential\ninvestors, and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and\nfoodstuffs, a strong circumstantial case may be developed of a\ndeliberate purpose to retrieve the Moroccan fiasco by an audacious\n_coup_ which would determine the mastery of Europe. The levy in 1913\nof an extraordinary tax upon capital, which virtually confiscated the\nearnings of the German people for military purposes, adds much support\nto this contention. According to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier,\nAustria sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness to\nparticipate in a war against Servia.[59]\n\n[Footnote 59: Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914.]\n\nThe inferences to be drawn from the Kaiser's personality are\nsomewhat conflicting. Like all self-centered and highly neurotic\npersonalities, his nature is essentially a dual one. This does not\nmean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one of the engaging\nfeatures of his attractive personality has been the candor and\nsincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts. He has shown\nhimself to be a man of opposite moods, and conflicting purposes,\nhaving almost as many public poses as he has costumes, and a strong\ndesire to play as many varied _roles_ as possible on the stage of the\nworld. Like Bottom in the _Midsummer Night's Dream_, he would play\nall parts from the \"roaring lion\" to the shrinking Thisbe.\n\nThe ruler who sent a sympathetic message to Kruger as an insult to\nEngland is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen\nVictoria military plans for the subjugation of the Boers.\n\nThe ruler, who sent the _Panther_ to Agadir, later restrained his\ncountry from declaring war against England, when Lloyd George threw\ndown the gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the Moroccan crisis.\n\nAs preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of the Mount of Olives\nthe precepts of Christian humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on\ntheir departure to China, to \"take no prisoners and give no quarter.\"\nThe most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another\nmood assume the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A democratic\nbusiness monarch, and as such the advance agent of German prosperity,\nhe yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world\nby posing as a combination of Caesar and Mahomet.\n\nThe avowed champion of Christianity, who has preached with the fervor\nof Peter the Hermit against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless,\nsince this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to proclaim in\nthe Moslem world a \"holy war\" against his Christian enemies.\n\nPacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who throughout his whole\nreign has hitherto kept the peace of the world, has yet on slight\npretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements.\n\nHow is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality, of\nwhom it could be said, as Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell,\nthat\n\n     there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would\n     perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter's, assume\n     (with or without ten minutes' notice) the command of the\n     Channel Fleet, and no one would discover from his manner\n     that the patient had died, that St. Peter's had tumbled\n     down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms.\n\nWe should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex\npersonality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he\nsuddenly arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance by his\ndirect order of the fatal ultimatum to Russia.\n\nBefore proceeding to analyze the very interesting and dramatic\ncorrespondence, which passed between the rulers of Germany, England,\nand Russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and\nthe unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is\nwell to inquire what the Kaiser could have done that would have\nimmediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation. So far as the\npublished record goes, he did not send a single telegram in the\ninterests of peace to his illustrious ally, the Emperor Francis\nJoseph.\n\nLet us suppose that he had sent the following:\n\n     I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe on the verge\n     of war. I sympathize entirely with you and your country in\n     its demands upon Servia. I agree with you that the Servian\n     reply is not satisfactory. In accordance with the\n     obligations of our alliance, I shall in any event support\n     with the full power of the German sword the cause of\n     Austria. Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility\n     for the murder of the Archduke and has unreservedly accepted\n     certain of your demands, and as to others has agreed to\n     submit them either to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or\n     to a concert of Powers. You will decide whether Austria is\n     satisfied to accept either of these suggestions, but as\n     England, France, and Russia have asked that time be granted\n     to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the\n     difficulty, and as the questions reserved by Servia can be\n     used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice\n     to the rights of Austria, and as it is to the interest of\n     every country and the entire world that its peace should not\n     be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if you can\n     agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of\n     courtesy to Russia, England, and France, in order that it\n     may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not\n     possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any\n     respect the legitimate demands of Austria, which have my\n     full sympathy and support.\n\n          WILHELM.\n\nWould the Austrian Emperor, himself a noble-minded and peace-loving\nmonarch, have refused this reasonable request? A little time, a little\npatience and some forbearance for the rights of other States and the\nyouth of Europe need not have perished. Again, \"the pity of it.\"\n\nIn its place the following correspondence took place between the\nKaiser on the one hand and the Czar and King George on the other. It\nis so dramatic that it justifies quotation _in extenso_.\n\nOn the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the following dispatch to\nthe Czar:\n\n     I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression\n     which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against\n     Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on\n     for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which\n     Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit\n     which made the Servians murder their own King and his\n     consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will\n     agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all\n     other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all\n     those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall\n     suffer their deserved punishment.\n\n     On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty\n     encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of\n     public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has\n     joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use\n     my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a\n     frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope\n     confidently that You will support me in my efforts to\n     overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.[60]\n\n[Footnote 60: German _White Paper_, No. 20. The Capitals to the\npronouns follow the original correspondence.]\n\nThis telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a pacific attitude on\nthe part of the Kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from\nNorway. Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as presented by\nthe German Government, does not disclose any communication which he\nsent to his Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have the\nfrequent assurances of the Kaiser to the Czar that he was exerting\nall his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory\nunderstanding with Russia, _but neither over the signature of the\nKaiser nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a\nsingle communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace_.\n\nThe Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his reply to the Kaiser\nrings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem. It\nreads:\n\n     I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious\n     moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war\n     has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the\n     indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that\n     very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised\n     upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which\n     will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European\n     war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship\n     to do all in Your power _to restrain Your ally from going\n     too far_.[61]\n\n[Footnote 61: German _White Paper_, No. 21.]\n\nWho can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized? It was Austria\nwhich was the provocative factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade and\nendeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. It had declared war, and\nbrusquely refused even to discuss the question with Russia. It was\nmobilizing its army, and making every effort to make a speedy\nsubjugation of Servia. If peace was to be preserved, the pressure must\nbegin with Austria. If any question remained for peace parleys, the\n_status quo_ must be preserved. Russia could not permit Austria to\ndestroy Servia first and then discuss its justice.\n\nThereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as follows:\n\n     I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for\n     the conservation of peace. However I cannot--as I told You\n     in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary\n     as an \"ignominious war.\" Austria-Hungary knows from\n     experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are\n     merely on paper are entirely unreliable.\n\n     According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to\n     be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that\n     the promises of Servia are effectively translated into\n     deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation\n     of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no\n     territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore\n     of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to\n     remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing\n     Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I\n     believe that a direct understanding is possible and\n     desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an\n     understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my\n     Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort.\n     Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be\n     construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a\n     calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would\n     undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to\n     my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.[62]\n\n[Footnote 62: German _White Paper_, No. 22. See note, _post._, p.\n189.]\n\nThe Kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this\ntelegram, in claiming that Russia should not take any military\nmeasures pending the Kaiser's mediation, _although Austria should be\nleft free not merely to make such preparations against Russia, but to\npursue its aggressive war then already commenced against Servia_. If\nthe belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations,\nshould not the obligation be reciprocal?\n\nLater that night the Kaiser again telegraphed the Czar:\n\n     My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of\n     Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a\n     mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.\n     Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only\n     a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case\n     according to Your advice and that of Your Government,\n     mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator,\n     with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner\n     and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is\n     threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of\n     decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the\n     responsibility for war or peace.[63]\n\n[Footnote 63: German _White Paper_, No. 23.]\n\nTo which the Czar replied as follows:\n\n     I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending\n     to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser)\n     with instructions. The military measures now taking form\n     were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of\n     defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all\n     my heart that these measures will not influence in any\n     manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very\n     highly. _We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that\n     an understanding can be arrived at with us._[64]\n\n[Footnote 64: German _White Paper_, No. 23 A.]\n\nLater the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser:\n\n     I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the\n     hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is\n     technically impossible to discontinue our military\n     preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian\n     mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the\n     negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops\n     will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn\n     word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of\n     God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna\n     for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.\n\nWhat more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? Here was an assurance from\nthe ruler of a great nation, and his royal cousin, that on his \"solemn\nword\" no provocative action would be taken by Russia \"as long as\nthe negotiations between Austria and Servia continue\" and this\nnotwithstanding the fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia,\nhad declared war against Servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate\nit quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with\nsuperior forces.\n\nIt is true that the Czar did not order demobilization, and apart from\nhis unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of\nthe failure of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized in a\nlater telegram that in the case of Germany when mobilization had once\nbeen started it could not be immediately arrested.\n\nSimultaneously King George had telegraphed the Kaiser through Prince\nHenry as follows:\n\n     Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of William's\n     efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am\n     earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a\n     European war should be averted. My Government is doing its\n     utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further\n     military preparations if Austria will consent to be\n     satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring\n     Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement\n     of her demands; other countries meanwhile suspending their\n     war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence\n     to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that\n     Germany and England are working together to prevent what\n     would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I\n     am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power\n     to preserve peace of Europe.[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Second German _White Paper_.]\n\nThe fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed. It conceded to\nAustria the right to occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a\nhostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to\ncontinue her military preparations, while all other nations, including\nRussia, were to suspend their military preparations. As the Kaiser\nprecipitated the war because Russia would not cease its preparations\nfor eventualities, King George's proposal, upon which neither the\nKaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met his demands.\n\nTo this the Kaiser replied on July 31st:\n\n     Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with\n     My ideas and with the statements I got this night from\n     Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received\n     news from Chancellor that official notification has just\n     reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the\n     mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even\n     awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, and\n     left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take\n     measures for ensuring safety of My eastern frontiers where\n     strong Russian troops are already posted.[66]\n\n[Footnote 66: Second German _White Paper_.]\n\nOn its face this reply seems not unreasonable, but it must not be\nforgotten that Austria continued not only to bombard Belgrade but to\nmobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. Russia agreed to\nstop all military preparations, if Austria would consent to discuss\nthe Servian question with a view to peace. Austria until the eleventh\nhour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the Servian\nquestion and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack\nupon Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course.\n\nWhile in principle the Kaiser agreed with the King as to the method of\nadjustment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser\never made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its\noperations against Servia after capturing Belgrade, and await the\nadjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels.\n\nThereupon King George sent a brief telegram, stating that he had sent\nan urgent telegram to the Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st\nthe Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar:\n\n     Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my\n     aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and\n     the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was\n     taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my\n     ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already\n     communicated to You, my mediation has become almost\n     illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I\n     receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are\n     going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the\n     security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I\n     have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts\n     for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I\n     who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now\n     threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand\n     to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia\n     which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.\n     The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me\n     by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred\n     to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in\n     serious affliction, especially during its last war. _The\n     peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia\n     decides to discontinue those military preparations which\n     menace Germany and Austria-Hungary._\n\nIn this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that\nAustria would stop its mobilization, or its military operations\nagainst Servia. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to which he\nadhered with fatal consistency to the end, was that Austria should be\ngiven the full right to mobilize against Russia as well as Servia, and\nthat his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive\noperations against Servia by taking possession of its capital and\nholding it as a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not make any\nmilitary preparations, either to move effectually against Austria in\nthe event of the failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself.\n\nThe Kaiser's suggestion did not even carry with it the implication\nthat Germany would stop the military preparations that it was then\ncarrying on in feverish haste, so that the contention of the Kaiser,\nhowever plausibly it was veiled in his telegram, was that _Germany and\nAustria_ _should have full freedom to prepare for war against Russia,\nwhile Russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further\nparleys, with Austrian cannon bombarding Belgrade_.\n\nIn this correspondence the Kaiser displayed his recognized ability as\na writer and speaker, for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the\nKaiser was easily the better controversialist.\n\nHe assumed the role of a disinterested party, who, at the request of a\nlitigant, agrees to become an impartial mediator. He was neither. The\nCzar had not asked him to be a mediator, although in the later\ntelegrams the Russian monarch accepted that term. The Czar in his\nfirst telegram had asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel \"to\nrestrain your ally from going too far.\" The Kaiser, having adroitly\naccepted a very different role, promptly shifts the responsibility\nupon the Czar of embarrassing the so-called \"mediation.\" This enabled\nhim to assume the attitude of \"injured innocence\" and very skillfully\nhe played that part.\n\nThis at least is clear that in this correspondence the Kaiser was\neither guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to\ngrasp the essentials of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction\nof his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his Foreign Office\nand his General Staff, I believe that for dynastic reasons he strove\nfor a time to adjust the difficulty, but his egomania and his\nlife-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he\nwas taking an untenable, indeed an impossible, position, in contending\nthat Russia should effectually tie its hands while Germany and Austria\nshould be left free to prepare for eventualities. Had there been a\nbreathing spell and the Kaiser had had more time for reflection,\npossibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested\nitself, but he found on his sudden return from Norway that his\ncountry, through the fatuous folly of its military party, was almost\nirrevocably committed to war. Probably he did not dare to reverse\nopenly and formally its policy. His popularity had already suffered in\nthe Moroccan crisis. This consideration and the histrionic side to his\ncomplex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal\nposition.\n\nThe Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability.\nTime and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may\nbe to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless\nenergy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict\nwill go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot,\nGermany's real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it\nwas the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser\nhas united his enemies with \"hoops of steel,\" driven Russia and\nEngland into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple\nAlliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results,\nhe has gained the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, of which he\nis likely to say before many months are over: \"Who shall deliver me\nfrom the body of this death?\"\n\nIn the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for\neventualities.\n\nThe Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for\nthe war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and\nsecure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having\nvisited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Ambassador, and\nmade the following significant offer:\n\n     [67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His\n     Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.\n\n[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]\n\n     He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European\n     conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to\n     Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his\n     continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to\n     make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He\n     said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the\n     main principle which governed British policy, that Great\n     Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed\n     in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the\n     object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of\n     Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given\n     to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed\n     at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,\n     should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.\n\n     I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and\n     he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in\n     that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency\n     said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the\n     integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was\n     ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she\n     would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France\n     what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in\n     Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would\n     be respected if she had not sided against Germany.\n\n     His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been\n     Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were\n     aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he\n     trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that\n     understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a\n     general neutrality agreement between England and Germany,\n     though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to\n     discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in\n     the conflict which the present crisis might possibly\n     produce, would enable him to look forward to a realization\n     of his desire.\n\n     In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his\n     request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it\n     probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind\n     yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion\n     that you would desire to retain full liberty.[68]\n\n[Footnote 68: English _White Paper_, No. 85.]\n\nWhile the German Foreign Office was thus endeavoring to keep England\nneutral, its army was on the move against France. This does not rest\nupon vague allegation, but upon the detailed specifications in a\ncommunication from the French Foreign Office, which the French\nAmbassador in London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st. Its\nsignificance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously\nthe Kaiser was invoking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease\nmilitary preparations.\n\n     The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers\n     yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to\n     our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance\n     of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is\n     protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the\n     enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to\n     public opinion and to the British Government that in no case\n     will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th Corps from\n     Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and\n     Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg\n     side. The 15th Army Corps from Strassburg has closed up on\n     the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are\n     prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the\n     frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by\n     tens of thousands. This is the last stage before\n     mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single\n     reservist.\n\n     As you see, Germany has done it. _I would add that all my\n     information goes to show that the German preparations began\n     on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was\n     handed in._[69]\n\n[Footnote 69: English _White Paper_, No. 105 \"Austrian\" obviously\nmeans \"Servian.\"]\n\nIn reply to the suggestion of the German Chancellor as to the\nneutrality of England, Sir Edward Grey advised the English Ambassador\non July 30th, as follows:\n\n     His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the\n     Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to\n     neutrality on such terms.\n\n     What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while\n     French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as\n     Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the\n     colonies.\n\n     From the material point of view such a proposal is\n     unacceptable, for France, without further territory in\n     Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose\n     her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to\n     German policy.\n\n     Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to\n     make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a\n     disgrace from which the good name of this country would\n     never recover.\n\n     The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away\n     whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the\n     neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain\n     either.\n\n     Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether\n     the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement\n     between England and Germany offered positive advantages\n     sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must\n     preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem\n     to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable\n     development of the present crisis as the Chancellor\n     contemplates.\n\n     You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and\n     add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good\n     relations between England and Germany is that they should\n     continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe;\n     if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of\n     Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_\n     improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's\n     Government will work in that way with all sincerity and\n     goodwill.\n\n     _And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be\n     preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own\n     endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which\n     Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that\n     no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her\n     or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or\n     separately._\n\nThis letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting glory in the history of\ncivilization. Its chivalrous fairness to France needs no comment, but\nits most significant feature is the concluding portion, in which the\nEnglish Foreign Minister suggested to Germany that if peace could be\npreserved, England stood ready to join with Germany in an alliance\nwhich would have insured all the great European nations against any\naggressive war on the part of either of them.\n\nIt was, in fact, the \"United States of Europe\" in embryo. It\nwas the one solution possible for these long-continued European\nwars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six\ngreat Powers,--a merger of the Triple Alliance and the Triple\nEntente,--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them\nwould be prevented by the others. What an infinite pity that the\nimprudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his advisers\nprobably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the\nunification of Europe an impossibility for another century!\n\nIn order that Germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on\naccount of Russia's preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw the\nGerman Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 30th, _and then offered on\nbehalf of Russia to stop all military preparations_, provided that\nAustria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the\nServian question had assumed the character of a question of European\ninterest. As this proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser with\nrespect to the cessation by Russia of military preparations, the\nconversation as reported by the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg\nto Sir Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation _in extenso_:\n\n     French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs\n     this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had\n     told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were\n     willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be\n     respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might\n     be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian\n     vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had\n     become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in\n     Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.\n\n     M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of\n     Russian Government, that Germany was making military and\n     naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the\n     direction of the Gulf of Finland.\n\n     German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for\n     Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down\n     on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof\n     to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German\n     Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up\n     and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of\n     which the following is a translation:\n\n     \"_If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has\n     assumed character of question of European interest, declares\n     herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which\n     violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages\n     to stop all military preparations._\"\n\nLater in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the Russian\nForeign Minister still further modified in the interests of peace the\nproposition upon which Russia was willing to cease all military\npreparations.\n\n     If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon\n     Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the\n     Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a\n     question of European interest, she admits that the great\n     Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to\n     the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her\n     rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia\n     undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude.\n\nIt will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some\nreparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the\njudgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation.\n\nIt simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to \"examine\"--not\nthe original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what\nreparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and\nindependence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to\nstay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to\ndesist from further preparations or mobilization.\n\nCould the offer have been more liberal? In face of this assurance, how\ncan the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the\nmobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war.\n\nIn the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some\npeace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for\na conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia\nand Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext\nthat such a conference was \"too formal a method,\" quite ignoring the\nfact that its very formality would have necessarily given a \"cooling\ntime\" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged\nthat,\n\n     _the German Government should suggest any method by which\n     the influence of the four Powers could be used together to\n     prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed.\n     Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating\n     influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method\n     that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In\n     fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any\n     method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would\n     \"press the button\" in the interests of peace_.[70]\n\n[Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.]\n\nLater in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the\nGerman Ambassador in London and urged that Germany should,\n\n     _propose some method_ by which the four Powers should be\n     able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed\n     out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of\n     mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military\n     operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise\n     a mediation would only drag on matters _and give Austria\n     time to crush Servia_. It was of course too late for all\n     military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a\n     short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in\n     Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But\n     even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into\n     existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the\n     occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from\n     Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending\n     an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.\n\nThe only reply that England received to this reiterated request that\nGermany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was\nset forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin to Sir Edward\nGrey:\n\n     I was informed last night that they (the German Foreign\n     Office) had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in\n     reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether\n     the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action,\n     _the [German] Secretary of State said that he felt that time\n     would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that\n     he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would\n     satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned._\n\n     The Chancellor told me last night that he was \"pressing the\n     button\" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure\n     whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at\n     Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than\n     otherwise.[71]\n\n[Footnote 71: See English _White Paper_, No. 84.]\n\nThe Court of Public Opinion unfortunately is not favored in the German\n_White Paper_ with the text of its communication on this subject to\nVienna, nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which\nthe German Chancellor \"pressed the button.\"\n\nWhat the world knows without documentary proof is that Austria\ncontinued its military preparations and operations and that Russia\nthen ordered a general mobilization. The only assurance which Russia\nreceived from Austria as a result of the alleged \"pressing of the\nbutton\" is set forth in the following dispatch from the Russian\nAmbassador at Vienna to Sazonof, dated July 31st:\n\n     In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange\n     views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist\n     on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of\n     Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in\n     regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity\n     for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and\n     of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute\n     a certain guarantee for the future_.\n\nThis was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise\npacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by\ngiving it \"a serious lesson\"--what such a lesson is let Louvain,\nLiege, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.\n\nConcurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that\nGermany had declared that day the \"_Kriegsgefahr_\" and that the German\nChancellor had expressed the opinion that \"all hope of a peaceful\nsolution of the crisis\" was at an end. The British Ambassador then\nasked the Chancellor,--\n\n     whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities\n     at Vienna to do something in the general interests to\n     reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue\n     discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night\n     he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and\n     that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian\n     Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the\n     Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]\n\n[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]\n\nHere again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in\nwhich the Chancellor \"begged Austria to reply,\" nor with that of the\nAustrian Foreign Minister's reply.\n\nWhile these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian\nAmbassador in Vienna advised Sazonof \"that Austria has determined not\nto yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving\ntroops against Russia as well as Servia.\"[73]\n\n[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]\n\nRussia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her\narmy.\n\nConcurrently with these interviews, the English Ambassador in Vienna\nhad a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and\n\n     called his attention to the fact that during the discussion\n     of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of\n     Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia,\n     and that a compromise between the views of Russia and\n     Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.\n     Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not\n     regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him\n     any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present\n     case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the\n     Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above\n     conversation.[75]\n\n[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]\n\n[Footnote 75: English _White Paper_, No. 118.]\n\nNotwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs, Sir Edward\nGrey, that unwearying friend of peace, still continued to make a last\nattempt to preserve peace by instructing the British Ambassador in\nBerlin to sound the German Foreign Office, as he would sound the\nRussian Foreign Office,\n\n     whether it would be possible for the four disinterested\n     Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see\n     that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on\n     Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian\n     sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your\n     Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her\n     willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the\n     four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian\n     demands from going the length of impairing Servian\n     sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course\n     suspend further military operations or preparations.\n\nHe further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to advise the German Foreign\nOffice that he, Sir Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the\nGerman Ambassador in London,\n\n     _that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put\n     forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were\n     striving to preserve European peace_, and that Russia and\n     France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, _I would\n     support it at St. Petersburg and Paris_, and go the length\n     of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it,\n     _his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with\n     the consequences_; that, otherwise, I told the German\n     Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn\n     in.[76]\n\n[Footnote 76: English _White Paper_, No. 111.]\n\nWhat, then, was the position when the last fatal step was taken? The\nCzar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should\nbe taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in progress, and the\nRussian Foreign Minister had agreed to cease all military\npreparations, provided that Austria would recognize that the question\nof Servia had become one of European interest, and that its\nsovereignty would be respected.\n\nOn July 31st, Austria _for the first time_ in the negotiations agreed\nto discuss with the Russian Government the merits of the Servian note.\nUntil this eleventh hour Austria had consistently contended that her\ndifficulty with Servia was her own question, in which Russia had no\nright to intervene, and which it would not under any circumstances\neven discuss with Russia. For this reason it had refused any time for\ndiscussion, abruptly declared war against Servia, commenced its\nmilitary operations, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few\nquestions left open in the Servian reply as a basis for further peace\nparleys.\n\nAs recently as July 30th, the Austrian Government had declined or\nrefused any \"direct exchange of views with the Russian Government.\"\n\nBut late on July 31st, a so-called \"conversation\" took place at Vienna\nbetween Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, and as a result,\nthe Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to \"converse\"\nwith the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This important\nconcession of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian\nAmbassador at St. Petersburg, who expressed\n\n     the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of\n     the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by\n     expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that\n     the discussions should take place in London with the\n     participation of the Great Powers.\n\n     M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume\n     the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe\n     would be thankful to them. It would be very important that\n     Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her\n     military action on Servian territory.[77]\n\n[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]\n\n_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by\nsome hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place\nsome time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St.\nPetersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that\nwhile Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to \"discuss the\nsubstance of the ultimatum,\" it did not offer to suspend military\npreparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession\nof its chief value.[78]\n\n[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]\n\nThe cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at\npresent writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria\npublishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.\n\nTwo theories are equally plausible:\n\nAustria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to\nchampion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified\nreversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at\nBerlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that\nevent, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more\niniquitous.[79]\n\n[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]\n\nThe supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised\nfrom Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve\nthe peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war\ninevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world\nwould be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the\nattitude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more\nplausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not\nAustria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the\nconflict.\n\n_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that\nAustria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that\na ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds, either on\nhis own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military\ncamarilla, directed the issuance of the ultimatum to Russia and thus\nblasted the last hope of peace.\n\nOn midnight of July 31st, the German Chancellor sent the following\ntelegram to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:\n\n     In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and\n     although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no\n     measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire\n     army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also.\n     By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the\n     safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that danger of war\n     threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization.\n     Mobilization, however, must follow _unless Russia ceases\n     within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and\n     Austria-Hungary_ and gives us definite assurance thereof.\n     Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour\n     of its communication to him.\n\nAt midnight the fateful message was delivered. As Sazonof reports the\ninterview:\n\n     At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by\n     order of his Government, that if within twelve hours,\n     that is at midday of Saturday, we did not commence\n     demobilization, _not only in regard to Germany but also in\n     regard to Austria_, the German Government would be forced to\n     give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was\n     war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that\n     we were very near it.\n\nIt will be noted by the italicized portion that Germany did not\nrestrict its demand that Russia cease its preparations against\nGermany, but it should also desist from any preparations to defend\nitself or assert its rights against Austria, although Austria had\nmade no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its\ngeneral mobilization order.\n\nThe twelve hours elapsed and Russia, standing upon its dignity as a\nsovereign nation of equal standing with Germany, declined to answer\nthis unreasonable and most arrogant demand, which under the\ncircumstances was equivalent to a declaration of war.\n\nSimultaneously a like telegram was sent to the Ambassador at Paris,\nrequiring the French Government to state in eighteen hours whether it\nwould remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war.\n\nThe reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the\nwhole course of German diplomacy in this matter. The statement that\nGermany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its\nstatement that it had taken no measures for mobilization. Equally\ndisingenuous was the statement with respect to the _Kriegsgefahr_\n(state of martial law), for when that was declared on July 31st,\nthe railroad, telegraph, and other similar public utilities were\nimmediately taken over by Germany and the movement of troops to the\nfrontier began.\n\nAfter the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by Germany to Russia,\nthe British Ambassador, pursuant to the instructions of his home\noffice, saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, and urged him\n\n     most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey's] proposal\n     and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe\n     of a European war.\n\n     He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympathetically toward\n     your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to\n     maintain peace _but said it was impossible for the Imperial\n     Government to consider any proposal until they had received\n     an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day_;\n     this communication, which he admitted had the form of an\n     ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the\n     Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would\n     immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and\n     Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at\n     once.\n\n     I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even\n     more difficult for Russia to accept _by asking them to\n     demobilize in the south as well_. He replied that it was in\n     order to prevent Russia from saying that all her\n     mobilization was only directed against Austria.[80]\n\n[Footnote 80: English _White Paper_, No. 121.]\n\nThe German Secretary of State also stated to Sir E. Goschen that both\nthe Emperor William and the German Foreign Office\n\n     had even up till last night been urging Austria to show\n     willingness to continue discussions, and telegraphic and\n     telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a\n     promising nature, but Russia's mobilization had spoiled\n     everything.\n\nHere again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from\nVienna have not yet been published by the Austrian Government, nor by\nthe German Foreign Office in its official defense.\n\nSir Edward Grey's last attempt to preserve peace was on August 1st,\nwhen he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen:\n\n     I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if\n     only a little respite in time can be gained before any great\n     power begins war.\n\n     The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness\n     of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of\n     Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to\n     the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia\n     originally suggested.\n\n     Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and\n     Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German\n     Government may be able to make use of the Russian\n     communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.\n     His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any\n     act which may precipitate matters.[81]\n\n[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]\n\nAt that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired,\nbut the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August\n1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's\ntelegram last quoted,\n\n     spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute\n     was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only\n     drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and\n     Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and\n     Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to\n     me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and\n     continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of\n     State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to\n     discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,\n     had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have\n     been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering\n     Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused\n     Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her\n     mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she\n     could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without\n     making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the\n     speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the\n     German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time\n     to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide\n     dominions _. The situation now was that, though the\n     Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the\n     specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,\n     therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German\n     representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within\n     a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the\n     Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as\n     creating a state of war.[82]\n\n[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]\n\nIt will thus be seen that although Germany was urged to the very last\nto await the result of the conferences, which had just commenced with\nsome slight promise of success between Austria and Russia, it\nnevertheless elected to declare war against Russia and thus blast\nbeyond possible recall any possibility of peace. Its justification for\nthis course, as stated in the interview with the German Secretary of\nState last quoted, was that it did not propose to forego its advantage\nof speed as against the advantage of Russia's numerical superiority.\nFor this there might be some justification, if Russia had shown an\nunyielding and bellicose attitude, but apart from the fact that\nRussia had consistently worked in the interests of peace, Germany\nhad the express assurance of the Czar that no provocative action\nwould be taken while peace conferences continued. To disregard these\nassurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations, in\norder not to lose a tactical advantage, was the clearest disloyalty to\ncivilization. In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its\nadvantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive\noperations against Servia, for in that event Russia had expressly\nobligated itself to suspend all military preparations.\n\nAs the final document in this shameful chapter of diplomacy, there\nneed only be added the telegram, sent by the German Chancellor to his\nAmbassador at St. Petersburg on August 1, 1914, in which war was\ndeclared by Germany against Russia on the ground that while Germany\nand Austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military\npreparations, Russia should, on the peremptory demand of another\nnation, cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. It\nreads:\n\n     The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of\n     the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance\n     with a desire which had been expressed to him by His Majesty\n     the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany\n     in accord with England had applied himself to filling a\n     mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and St.\n     Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of\n     this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces\n     on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening\n     measure, motived by no military \"_presage_\" on the part of\n     Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave\n     and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed\n     to safeguard herself against this peril it would have\n     compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany.\n     Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to\n     address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all\n     the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the said\n     military acts. Russia, having refused to accede to (not\n     having thought it should reply to), this demand, and having\n     manifested by this refusal (this attitude) that its action\n     was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known\n     to your Excellency the following:\n\n     His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of\n     the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a\n     state of war with Russia.\n\nThe feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken, is shown by\nthe fact that the German Ambassador could not even wait to state\nwhether Russia had refused to answer or answered negatively. This\nwar--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at\nleisure.\n\nA few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made\nthe Czar made his last appeal for peace. With equal solemnity and\npathos he telegraphed the Kaiser:\n\n     _I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are\n     forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the\n     same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these\n     measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to\n     negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the\n     universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid\n     of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to\n     prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence\n     your urgent reply._\n\nThis touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the\nCzar. Had the Kaiser been as pacific, had he been inspired by the same\nenlightened spirit in the interests of peace, had he been as truly\nmindful of the God of nations, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would\nhave been possible to prevent the \"shedding of blood,\" which has now\nswept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth\nof Europe.\n\nTo this the Kaiser replied:\n\n     I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to\n     Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be\n     averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no\n     telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of\n     Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my\n     army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your\n     Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until\n     I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to\n     enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most\n     earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to\n     commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of\n     our frontiers.\n\nIn this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of\nthe unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia\nshould by demobilizing make itself \"naked to its enemies,\" while\nGermany and Austria, without making any real concession in the\ndirection of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and\ndefense.\n\nThere were practical reasons which made the Kaiser's demand\nunreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece\nof governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities\nare of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily\ntakes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of\ntransportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization\norder that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great\nEmpire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact,\nfor in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with\nrespect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:\n\n     I just received the communication from Your Government\n     offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great\n     Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under\n     these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking\n     France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had\n     already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against\n     two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be\n     countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so\n     late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be\n     guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course\n     refrain from attacking France and employ My troops\n     elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The\n     troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by\n     telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due\nto a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir\nEdward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King George promptly\ncorrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.\n\nSee also Addendum, p. 192.]\n\nIf it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the exceptional\nfacilities of the German Empire, to arrest his mobilization for\n\"technical\" reasons, it was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to\narrest immediately his military preparations. The demand of Germany\nwas not that Russia should simply cancel the mobilization order. It\nwas that Russia should \"cease within twelve hours all warlike\nmeasures,\" and it demanded a physical impossibility.\n\nIn any event, mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but\nsimply preparation, as the Czar had so clearly pointed out to the\nKaiser in the telegram already quoted. It is the right of a sovereign\nState and by no code of ethics a _casus belli_. Germany's demand that\nRussia should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige as a great\nEuropean power was at stake and when Austria was pushing her\naggressive preparations, treated Russia as an inferior, almost a\nvassal, State. Its rejection must have been recognized by the Kaiser\nand his advisers as inevitable, and, on the theory that a man intends\nthe natural consequences of his acts, it must be assumed that the\nKaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war,\nhowever pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the\nhelm.\n\nSuch will be his awful responsibility \"to the last syllable of\nrecorded time.\"\n\nHow well prepared Germany was, the sequel developed only too surely.\n_On the following day_--August 2d--its troops invaded Luxemburg and an\nabrupt demand was made upon Belgium for permission to cross its\nterritory.\n\nUpon the declaration of war, the Czar telegraphed to King George of\nEngland as follows:\n\n\"In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once more I have done all\nin my power to avert war.\"\n\n_Such will be the verdict of history._\n\n\nADDENDUM\n\nI\n\nTHE SUPPRESSED TELEGRAM FROM THE CZAR\n\nIt is a curious and suggestive fact that the German Foreign Office in\npublishing the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar omitted\none of the most important telegrams.\n\nThe Russian Government on January 31, 1915, therefore, made public the\nfollowing telegram which the Czar sent to the Kaiser on July 29, 1914:\n\n     \"Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram.\n     Inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by your\n     Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different\n     tone, I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be\n     right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague\n     Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.\"\n\nThe German Foreign Office has since explained that they regarded this\ntelegram as too \"_unimportant_\" for publication. Comment is\nunnecessary.\n\nIt thus appears that the Czar at the beginning of his correspondence\nwith the Kaiser suggested that the whole dispute be submitted to The\nHague Tribunal for adjustment. Servia had already made the same\nsuggestion.\n\nAs the world owes the first Hague Convention to the Czar's initiative,\nit can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at least was loyal\nto the pacific ideal of that great convention of the nations.\n\n\nII\n\nTHE AUSTRIAN OFFER OF JULY 31, 1914\n\nThe author has noted (_ante_, p. 175) that as the belated offer of\nAustria on July the 31st \"to discuss [with Russia] the substance of\nthe Austrian ultimatum to Servia\" did not offer to suspend military\npreparations or operations, the concession was more nominal than real.\nThe Austrian _Red Book_ converts this inference into a certainty, and\nmakes clear that Austria's pretended change of policy was only\ndiplomatic finesse, as it contained no substantial modification of its\nuncompromising attitude.\n\nRussia had proposed on July the 30th (_ante_, p. 166) that \"if Austria\nconsents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory\" and\nfurther agreed that the question of \"the reparation which Servia could\naccord to the Government of Austria-Hungary\" could be examined by the\nGreat Powers, Russia would suspend her military preparations. As the\nunderlying question was whether Austria should be permitted to\nsubjugate Servia without interference, it was vital that that\nsubjugation should not proceed pending an examination by all\ninterested powers into its justice and ultimate ends.\n\nSir Edward Grey had previously requested Germany on July the 28th \"to\nuse its influence\" with the Austrian Government \"to the effect that\nthe latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or\nelse accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.\" The\nGerman Foreign Office then instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna\n\"to submit the British proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for its\nconsideration\" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 43). As a result of this\nsuggestion, Count Berchtold on July the 29th (Austrian _Red Book_, No.\n44) again shut the door upon any compromise by the contention that\nAustria\n\n     \"no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the\n     spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when\n     the German request was presented here, a state of war\n     already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, _and\n     thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events_.\"\n\nThe only counter-suggestion which Austria then made was as follows:\n\n     \"Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its\n     influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of\n     peace among the Great Powers, and for a localization of the\n     war, which had been forced upon us by the Servian agitation\n     of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the\n     Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation.\" (Austrian\n     _Red Book_, No. 44.)\n\nOn July 31st the German Ambassador at Vienna, acting on instructions\n(which instructions are again not disclosed in the German _White\nBook_) informed Count Berchtold \"of a conversation between Sir Edward\nGrey and Prince Lichnowsky,\" in the course of which the British\nSecretary of State declared to the German Ambassador that Russia felt\nunable \"to treat directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore requested\nGreat Britain to resume her mediation\" and that \"as a condition of\nthis mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the\nsuspension of hostilities in the meanwhile.\" (Austrian _Red Book_, No.\n51.)\n\nThereupon Count Berchtold made the eleventh hour offer in question by\ninstructing the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg\n\n     \"to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's\n     proposition to mediate between us and Servia despite the\n     changes brought about in the situation by Russia's\n     mobilization. _Our acceptance, however, is subject to the\n     condition that our military action against Servia shall\n     nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall\n     induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilization\n     directed against us. It is understood that in this case we\n     would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures\n     in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's\n     mobilization._\" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 51.)\n\nThis suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required Russia\nto suspend its preparations to defend its interests while permitting\nAustria to proceed with the subjugation of Servia. As the \"bone\nof contention\" was this subjugation of Servia, this belated and\nostensibly conciliatory proposal of Austria amounted to an absurdity.\nIn that classic of nonsense, _Alice in Wonderland_, the unreasonable\nand violent Queen announced in the trial of the Knave the similar\nprocedure of \"sentence first, verdict afterwards,\" and Austria's final\nproposal was essentially a like folly, for, stripped of diplomatic\npretense, it amounted to this, that Austria, while tying Russia's\nhands, should proceed not merely to sentence but even to execute\nServia and subsequently discuss the justice of its action when it had\nbecome irremediable.\n\nThe possible theory which we suggested (_ante_, p. 175), that Austria\nat the eleventh hour may have experienced a change of heart and had\nadopted a more conciliatory course, is apparently untenable.\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE INVASION OF FRANCE ON AUGUST 1ST\n\nIt has been Germany's contention that not only did the mobilization of\nRussia cause the war, but that its eastern and western frontiers were\nviolated by Russian and French soldiers at a time when Germany's\nintentions were sincerely pacific.\n\nAt 7 P.M. on July the 31st, Germany had given France until 1 P.M. of\nthe following day to declare whether it would remain neutral in the\nevent of a Russian-German war, and at that hour Viviani advised the\nGerman Ambassador that France \"would do that which her interests\ndictated.\" (German _White Paper_, No. 27.) Notwithstanding France's\nvirtual refusal to meet the demand of Germany, the latter did not\ndeclare war on France on that day, and this is the more significant as\nit immediately declared war on Russia. The German Ambassador remained\nin Paris until August the 3d, and only then demanded his passports\nwhen his position in the French Capitol had become untenable.\n\nIn the meantime Germany was awaiting some act of aggression on the\npart of France, that would enable it under the terms of the Triple\nAlliance to demand as of right the cooperation of Italy, while\nFrance, determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor,\nhad withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused\nto take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of\nthe ultimatum.\n\nThe confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George suggests\nthe possibility that on August the 1st, about the time that the\neighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready and intended to\ncommence an immediate invasion of France, for on that day the Kaiser\ntelegraphs to King George:\n\n     \"_I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on\n     my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and\n     telephone from crossing into France._\" (_Ante_, p. 187.)\n\nThe exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message is\nconjectural. We know from the German _White Paper_ that at 11 A.M.\non that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince Lichnowsky over the\ntelephone whether Germany was \"in a position to declare that we would\nnot attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France\nshould remain neutral.\"\n\nThis message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. How soon\nthereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not know, but as the\nimpossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in Berlin on\nreceipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 P.M. on that day, it is\naltogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent between those\nhours.\n\nIf the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural\nimport is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the\ninvasion of France, either before or in any event simultaneously with\nthe expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been determined\nupon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the Kaiser's intimation\nthat he has \"stopped by telegraph and telephone [his army] from\ncrossing into France\" fairly implies that previous orders had been\ngiven to commence such invasion and that these orders had been\nhurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way, upon the supposed\nintimation of Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the\nneutrality of France.\n\nUnder these circumstances, with the German Ambassador still at Paris\nand ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is evident that the\ninvasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the\nseverance of diplomatic relations. This in itself may not be\nindefensible under international law, but it throws a searchlight upon\nthe contention of Germany that its intentions were pacific and that it\nhad been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of\nRussia, France, and England.\n\nThe difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention of\nthe Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 1st and the\naction of his Foreign Office in failing to make any declaration of war\nagainst France and in retaining its Ambassador at Paris and permitting\nthe French Ambassador to remain at Berlin. The diplomatic records\nabundantly show that this latter policy of the German Foreign Office\nwas followed in the hope that France would become the aggressor, but\nits inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the\nKaiser's telegram is obvious.\n\nPossibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in\ncomplete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders of German\ndiplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the War\nOffice and it is possible that some of von Bethmann-Hollweg's and von\nJagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the\nKaiser and Moltke.\n\nIt is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's\nlanguage above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to King\nGeorge did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been\ncancelled but simply that the army leaders on the Western frontier had\nbeen cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders.\n\nAnother possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons may\nhave exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified the\nurgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by\nGreat Britain.\n\nBut the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at Paris\ncannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the \"injured\ninnocence\" protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an\nunexpected attack. Always with Prussia, \"the readiness is all.\"\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE USE OF THE WORD \"ENGLAND\"\n\nIn making these scattered _addenda_, I take this occasion to make the\n_amende honorable_ to some of my readers, who since the first editions\nof this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word\n\"England\" and \"English,\" where obviously \"Great Britain\" and \"British\"\nwere meant. These critics are technically correct, but I hope that\nthey will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the\nBritish Empire in using a term, which by common and immemorial usage\nhas been applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great\nEmpire. I should deeply regret it, if any other intention were imputed\nto me, for in the magnificent struggle which Great Britain has made\nfor the highest ideals of civilization and the basic rights of\nhumanity, no one now or hereafter can ever ignore the heroic part\nwhich has been played by Scotland, Ireland, Canada, and the over-sea\ndominions\n\nMay I not plead that the word \"England,\" has to common intent a\nbroader as well as a more restricted meaning and that when the poet,\nthe historian or--as in my case--the student uses the word \"England\"\nin reference to a world-wide controversy, no one is likely to\nmisapprehend his meaning. Such use is certainly as common and as\ngenerally understood as that of the word \"American\" as applied to a\nCitizen of the United States, although in both cases the\ncharacterization is not strictly accurate. To my critics in Scotland\nand Ireland who have made this criticism of my book, I can only say:\n\n     \"Let my disclaiming from a purposed evil\n     Free me so far in your most generous thoughts,\n     That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house,\n     And hurt my brother.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE CASE OF BELGIUM\n\n\nThe callous disregard by Germany of the rights of Belgium is one of\nthe most shocking exhibitions of political iniquity in the history of\nthe world.\n\nThat it has had its parallel in other and less civilized ages may be\nfreely admitted, but until German scientists, philosophers, educators,\nand even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this wanton outrage,\nit had been hoped that mankind had made some progress since the times\nof Wallenstein and Tilly.\n\nThe verdict of Civilization in this respect will be little affected by\nthe ultimate result of the war, for even if Germany should emerge\nfrom this titanic conflict as victor, and become, as it would then\nundoubtedly become, the first power in the world, it would none the\nless be a figure for the \"time of scorn to point his slow unmoving\nfinger at.\" To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca was wont\nto say, \"Yes, but he murdered Callisthenes,\" and to the eulogists of\nvictorious Germany, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise and\njust of all future ages will say, \"Yes, but it devastated Belgium.\"\n\nThe fact that many distinguished and undoubtedly sincere partisans of\nGermany have attempted to justify this atrocious rape, suggests a\nproblem of psychology rather than of logic or ethics. It strongly\nillustrates a too familiar phenomenon that great intellectual and\nmoral astigmatism is generally incident to any passionate crisis in\nhuman history. It shows how pitifully unstable the human intellect is\nwhen a great man like Dr. Haeckel, a scholar and historian like Dr.\nvon Mach, or a doctor of divinity like Dr. Dryander, can be so warped\nwith the passions of the hour as to ignore the clearest considerations\nof political morality.\n\nAt the outbreak of the present war Belgium had taken no part whatever\nin the controversy and was apparently on friendly relations with all\nthe Powers. It had no interest whatever in the Servian question. A\nthrifty, prosperous people, inhabiting the most densely populated\ncountry of Europe, and resting secure in the solemn promises, not\nmerely of Germany, but of the leading European nations that its\nneutrality should be respected, it calmly pursued the even tenor of\nits way, and was as unmindful of the disaster, which was so suddenly\nto befall it, as the people of Pompeii were on the morning of the\ngreat eruption when they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of\npleasure and disregarded the ominous curling of the smoke from the\ncrater of Vesuvius.\n\nOn April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed a treaty which provided\nthat \"Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality.\" To\ninsure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and\nRussia on the same date signed a treaty, by which it was provided that\nthese nations jointly \"became the guarantors\" of such \"perpetual\nneutrality.\"\n\nIn his recent article on the war, George Bernard Shaw, who is\ninimitable as a farceur but not quite convincing as a jurist, says:\n\n     As all treaties are valid only _rebus sic stantibus_, and\n     the state of things which existed at the date of the Treaty\n     of London (1839) had changed so much since then ... that in\n     1870 Gladstone could not depend on it, and resorted to a\n     special temporary treaty not now in force, the technical\n     validity of the 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful.\n\nUnfortunately for this contention, the Treaty of 1870, to which Mr.\nShaw refers, provided for its own expiration after twelve months and\nthen added:\n\n     And on the expiration of that time the independence and\n     neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting\n     parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as\n     heretofore on the 1st Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the\n     19th of April, 1839.\n\nMuch has been made by Mr. Shaw and others of an excerpt from a speech\nof Mr. Gladstone in 1870. In that speech, Mr. Gladstone, as an\nabstract proposition, declined to accept the broad statement that\nunder all circumstances the obligations of a treaty might continue,\nbut there is nothing to justify the belief that Mr. Gladstone in any\nrespect questioned either the value or the validity of the Treaty of\n1839 with respect to Belgium.\n\nThose who invoke the authority of Gladstone should remember that he\nalso said:\n\n     We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is\n     wider than that which we may have in the literal operation\n     of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question\n     whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country,\n     endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly\n     stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime\n     that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become\n     participators in the sin.\n\nThese words of the great statesman read as a prophecy.\n\nWhile these treaties were simply declaratory of the rights, which\nBelgium independently enjoyed as a sovereign nation, yet this\nsolemn guarantee of the great Powers of Europe was so effective that\neven in 1870, when France and Germany were locked in vital conflict,\nand the question arose whether Prussia would disregard her treaty\nobligation, the Iron Chancellor, who ordinarily did not permit moral\nconsiderations to warp his political policies, wrote to the Belgian\nminister in Berlin on July 22, 1870:\n\n     In confirmation of my verbal assurance, I have the honor to\n     give in writing a declaration, which, in view of the\n     treaties in force, _is quite superfluous_, that the\n     Confederation of the North and its allies (Germany) will\n     respect the neutrality of Belgium on the understanding of\n     course that it is respected by the other belligerent.\n\nAt that time, Belgium had so fine a sense of honor, that although it\nwas not inconsistent with the principles of international law, yet in\norder to discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit as well\nas the letter, she restricted the clear legal right of her people to\nsupply arms and ammunition to the combatants, thus construing the\ntreaty to her own disadvantage.\n\nIt can be added to the credit of both France and Prussia that in\ntheir great struggle of 1870-71, each scrupulously respected that\nneutrality, and France carried out her obligations to such an extreme\nthat although Napoleon and his army could have at one time escaped\nfrom Sedan into Belgium, and renewed the attack and possibly--although\nnot probably--saved France, if they had seen fit to violate that\nneutrality, rather than break the word of France the Emperor Napoleon\nand his army consented to the crowning humiliation of Sedan.\n\nIn the year 1911, in the course of a discussion in Belgium in respect\nto the fortifications at Flushing, certain Dutch newspapers asserted\nthat in the event of a Franco-German war, the neutrality of Belgium\nwould be violated by Germany. It was then suggested that if a\ndeclaration were made to the contrary in the Reichstag, that such a\ndeclaration, \"would be calculated to appease public opinion and to\ncalm its suspicions.\"\n\nThis situation was communicated to the present German Chancellor, von\nBethmann-Hollweg, who instructed the German Ambassador at Brussels to\nassure the Belgian Foreign Minister,\n\n     that he was most appreciative of the sentiment which had\n     inspired our [Belgium's] action. _He declared that Germany\n     had no intention of violating our neutrality_, but he\n     considered that by making a declaration publicly, Germany\n     would weaken her military preparation with respect to\n     France, and being reassured in the northern quarter would\n     direct her forces to the eastern quarter.[84]\n\n[Footnote 84: Belgian _Gray Book_, enclosure No. 12.]\n\nGermany's recognition of the continuing obligation of this treaty was\nalso shown when the question of Belgium's neutrality was suggested at\na debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 1913. In the course of that\ndebate a member of the Social Democratic Party said:\n\n     In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed\n     with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will\n     not respect Belgian neutrality.[85]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Idem._]\n\n     Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,\n     replied: \"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by\n     international conventions, and Germany is resolved to\n     respect these conventions.\"\n\n     This declaration did not satisfy another member of the\n     Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that he had\n     nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered\n     with reference to the relations between Germany and Belgium.\n\n     In reply to further interrogations from a member of the\n     Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minister of\n     War, stated: \"Belgium does not play any part in the\n     justification of the German scheme of military\n     reorganization; the scheme is justified by the position of\n     matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact\n     that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international\n     treaties.\"\n\n     A member of the same party, having again referred to\n     Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his\n     declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear.[86]\n\n[Footnote 86: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 12.]\n\nOn July 31, 1914, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in a conversation with\nHerr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, asked him whether he\nknew of the assurance which, as above stated, had been given by von\nBethmann-Hollweg through the German Ambassador at Brussels to the\nGovernment at Belgium in 1911, and Herr von Below replied that he did,\nand added, \"that he was certain that the sentiments to which\nexpression was given at that time had not changed.\"\n\nThus _on July 31, 1914_, Germany, through its accredited\nrepresentative at Brussels, repeated the assurances contained in the\ntreaty of 1839, as reaffirmed in 1870, and again reaffirmed in 1911\nand 1913.\n\nGermany's moral obligation had an additional express confirmation.\n\nThe second International Peace Conference was held at The Hague in\n1907. There were present the representatives of forty-four nations,\nthus making as near an approach to the poet's dream of the \"federation\nof the world\" and the \"parliament of man\" as has yet been possible in\nthe slow progress of mankind.\n\nThat convention agreed upon a certain declaration of principles, and\namong the signatures appended to the document was the representative\nof His Majesty, the German Emperor.\n\nThey agreed upon certain principles of international morality, most\nof them simply declaratory of the uncodified international law then\nexisting, and these were subsequently ratified by formal treaties of\nthe respective governments, including Germany, which were deposited in\nthe archives of The Hague. While this treaty _as an express covenant_\nwas not binding, unless all belligerents signed it, yet, it recognized\nan existing _moral_ obligation. The Hague Peace Conference proceeded\nto define the rights of neutral powers, and in so doing simply\nreaffirmed the existing international law.\n\nThe pertinent parts of this great compact, with reference to the\nsanctity of neutral territory, are as follows:\n\n                    _CONVENTION V_\n\n     _CHAPTER I.--\"THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS_\"\n\n                    ARTICLE I.\n\n     _The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable._\n\n                    ARTICLE II.\n\n     _Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of\n     either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of\n     a neutral Power._\n\n                    ARTICLE X.\n\n     _The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,\n     attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a\n     hostile act._\n\nNotwithstanding these assurances, it had been from time to time\nintimated by German military writers, and notably by Bernhardi, that\nGermany would, in the event of a future war, make a quick and possibly\na fatal blow at the heart of France by invading Belgium upon the first\ndeclaration of hostilities, and it was probably these intimations that\nled the Belgian Government on July 24, 1914, to consider:\n\n     Whether in the existing circumstances, it would not be\n     proper to address to the Powers, who had guaranteed\n     Belgium's independence and its neutrality, a communication\n     for the purpose of confirming to them its resolution to\n     carry out the international duties which are imposed upon\n     it by treaties in the event of war breaking out on the\n     Belgian frontiers.\n\nConfiding in the good faith of France and Germany, the Belgian\nGovernment concluded that any such declaration was premature.\n\nOn August 2, 1914, the war having already broken out, the Belgian\nForeign Minister took occasion to tell the German Ambassador that\nFrance had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neutrality of\nBelgium, and Herr von Below, the German Ambassador, after thanking\nDavignon for his information, added that up to the present he had not\nbeen\n\n     instructed to make us any official communication, but we\n     were aware of his personal opinion respecting the security\n     with which we had the right to regard our eastern neighbors.\n     I [Davignon] replied at once that all we knew of the\n     intentions of the latter, intentions set forth in many\n     former interviews, did not allow us to doubt their\n     [Germany's] perfectly correct attitude toward Belgium.\n\nIt thus appears that as late as _August 2, 1914_, Germany had not\ngiven to Belgium any intimation as to its intention, _and, what is\nmore important, it had not either on that day or previously made any\ncharge that Belgium had in any way violated its obligations of\nneutrality, or that France had committed any overt act in violation\nthereof_.\n\nOn July 31, 1914, England, not unreasonably apprehensive as to the\nsincerity of Germany's oft-repeated protestations of good faith,\ndirected the English Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to ask the\nrespective governments of those countries \"whether each is prepared to\nrespect the neutrality of Belgium, provided it is violated by no other\nPower.\"\n\nThis question was communicated by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian\nGovernment, with the addition that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that\n\"the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her\nneutrality which I desire, and expect other Powers to uphold and\nobserve.\"\n\nPursuant to these instructions, the English Ambassador to Paris, on\nthe night of July 31, 1914, called upon Viviani, the Minister of\nForeign Affairs, and on the same night received a reply which is\nreported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as follows:\n\n     French Government is resolved to respect the neutrality of\n     Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other\n     Power violating that neutrality that France might find\n     herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of\n     her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been\n     given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of\n     it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister to\n     Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the\n     Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.[87]\n\n[Footnote 87: English _White Paper_, No. 125.]\n\nConfirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, on August 1st, made\nto the Belgian Foreign Minister the following declaration:\n\n     I am authorized to declare that in the event of an\n     international conflict, the government of the Republic will,\n     as it has always declared, respect the neutrality of\n     Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected\n     by another Power, the French Government, in order to insure\n     its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude.[88]\n\n[Footnote 88: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 15.]\n\nOn July 31, 1914, the English Ambassador at Berlin saw the German\nSecretary of State, and submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed\ninterrogation, and the only reply that was given was that \"he must\nconsult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly\nanswer,\" and the German Secretary of State very significantly added\nthat for strategic reasons it was \"very doubtful whether they would\nreturn any answer at all.\"\n\nGoschen also submitted the matter to the German Chancellor, who also\nevaded the question by stating that \"Germany would in any case desire\nto know the reply returned to you [the English Ambassador] by the\nFrench Government.\"\n\nThat these were mere evasions the events on the following day\ndemonstrated.\n\nOn August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German Ambassador in London,\nand the following significant conversation took place:\n\n     I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the\n     German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium\n     was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of\n     Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could\n     see her way to give the same assurance as that which had\n     been given by France it would materially contribute to\n     relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if\n     there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one\n     combatant, while the other respected it, it would be\n     extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this\n     country. I said that we had been discussing this question at\n     a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this\n     I gave him a memorandum of it.\n\n     He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to\n     violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain\n     neutral.\n\n     I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still\n     free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.\n     All I could say was that our attitude would be determined\n     largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of\n     Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.\n     I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality\n     on that condition alone.[89]\n\n[Footnote 89: English _White Paper_, No. 123.]\n\nOn the following day, August 2d, the German Minister at Brussels\nhanded to the Belgian Foreign Office the following \"highly\nconfidential\" document. After stating that \"the German Government has\nreceived _reliable information_, according to which the French forces\nintend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur,\" and after\nsuggesting a \"fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in\nno position to repulse such a largely developed French march without\naid,\" the document adds:\n\n     It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to\n     forestall this attack of the enemy. The German Government\n     would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of\n     hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the\n     enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian\n     territory.[90]\n\n[Footnote 90: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 20.]\n\nSome hours later, at 1.30 A.M. on August 3d, the German Minister\naroused the Belgian Secretary General for the Minister of Foreign\nAffairs from his slumbers and,\n\n     asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was\n     instructed by his Government to inform us that French\n     dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French\n     cavalry, violating international law, seeing that war was\n     not declared, had crossed the frontier.\n\n     The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these\n     events had taken place; _in Germany, he was answered_. Baron\n     von der Elst observed that in that case he could not\n     understand the object of his communication. Herr von Below\n     said that these acts, contrary to international law, _were\n     of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to\n     international law would be perpetrated by France_.[91]\n\n[Footnote 91: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 21.]\n\nAs to these last communications, it should be noted that the German\nGovernment, neither then nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to\nthe world the \"reliable information,\" which it claimed to have of the\nintentions of the French Government, and the event shows beyond a\npossibility of contradiction that at that time France was unprepared\nto make any invasion of Belgium or even to defend its own\nnorth-eastern frontier.\n\nIt should further be noted that the alleged aggressive acts of France,\nwhich were made the excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to\nthe statement of the German Ambassador himself, _did not take place in\nBelgium but in Germany_.\n\nOn August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Belgium served upon the\nGerman Ambassador at Brussels the following reply to the German\nultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of the German demand,\ncontinued:\n\n     This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's\n     Government.\n\n     The intentions which it attributed to France are in\n     contradiction with the express declarations which were made\n     to us on the 1st August in the name of the Government of the\n     Republic.\n\n     Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of\n     Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium\n     would fulfill all her international duties, and her army\n     would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.\n\n     The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870,\n     establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium\n     under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the\n     Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.\n\n     Belgium has always been faithful to her international\n     obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of\n     loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain\n     her neutrality or to make it respected.\n\n     The attempt against her independence, with which the German\n     Government threatens her, would constitute a flagrant\n     violation of international law. No strategic interest\n     justifies the violation of that law.\n\n     _The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions\n     which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation\n     while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe._\n\n     Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than\n     eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses\n     to believe that her independence can be preserved only at\n     the expense of the violation of her neutrality.\n\n     If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has\n     firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any\n     attack upon her rights.\n\nIn the records of diplomacy there are few nobler documents than this.\nBelgium then knew that she was facing possible annihilation. Every\nmaterial interest suggested acquiescence in the peremptory demands of\nher powerful neighbor. In the belief that then so generally prevailed,\nbut which recent events have somewhat modified, the success of Germany\nseemed probable, and if so, Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of\nGermany, would be in a position to participate in the spoils of the\nvictory.\n\nIf Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as Germany and felt that\nthe matter of self-preservation would excuse any moral dereliction,\nshe would have imitated the example of Luxemburg, also invaded, and\npermitted free passage to the German army without essential loss of\nher material prosperity, but with a fatal sacrifice to her national\nhonor.\n\nEven under these conditions Belgium evidently entertained a hope that\nGermany at the last moment would not, in view of its promises and the\nprotest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage.\n\nThe military attache of the French Government, being apprised of\nGermany's virtual declaration of war, offered \"the support of five\nFrench army corps to the Belgian Government,\" and in reply Belgium,\nstill jealously regardful of her obligation of neutrality, replied:\n\n     We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for\n     offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances,\n     however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the\n     Powers. The Belgian Government will decide later on the\n     action which they think it necessary to take.\n\nAs in Caesar's time, the Belgae, of all the tribes of Gaul, are in truth\n\"the bravest.\"\n\nLater in the evening, the King of Belgium met his Ministers, and the\noffer of France was communicated to them, and again the Belgian\nGovernment, still reposing some confidence in the Punic faith of\nPrussia, decided not to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers, or to\navail itself of the offers of France.\n\nOn the following morning at 6 o'clock the German Minister handed this\nformal declaration of war to the Belgian Government:\n\n     I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your\n     Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of His\n     Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned\n     proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the\n     latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry\n     out--if necessary by force of arms--the measures of security\n     which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the\n     French menaces.\n\nHere again, no active violation of Belgium's neutrality by France is\nalleged, only \"French menaces.\"\n\nThe conjecture is plausible that in the case of the Prussian General\nStaff, it was their \"own hard dealings\" which thus taught them to\n\"suspect the thoughts of others.\"\n\nOn that day the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier and\nhostilities began.\n\nOn the same day, at the great session of the Reichstag, when the\nImperial Chancellor attempted to justify to the world the hostile acts\nof Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium, the pretended\ndefense was thus bluntly stated by the German Premier:\n\n     We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no\n     law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are\n     already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the\n     dictates of international law._ It is true that the French\n     Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing\n     to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her\n     opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood\n     ready for invasion. _France could wait, but we could not\n     wait._ A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine\n     might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override\n     the _just protest_ of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments.\n     _The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing_ we will\n     endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been\n     reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened,\n     and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have\n     one thought--how he is to hack his way through.\n\nIt will be noted that on this occasion, when above all other occasions\nit was not only the duty, but to the highest interests of Germany, to\ngive to the world any substantial reason for violating the neutrality\nof Belgium, the defense of Germany is rested upon the ground of\nself-interest,--euphemistically called \"necessity,\"--_and upon none\nother_.\n\nWhile von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement does state that \"France held\nherself in readiness to invade Belgium,\" there was no intimation that\nFrance had done so, or had any immediate intention of doing so. On the\ncontrary, it was added, \"_France could wait, we (Germany) could not._\"\nIf Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors to France or\nEngland, _why did the Chancellor characterize its protest as \"just\"?_\n\nHow Germany fulfilled the promise of its Chancellor, to \"make good\"\nthe admitted wrong which it did Belgium, subsequent events have shown.\n\nIt may be questioned whether, since the Thirty Years' War, any country\nhas been subjected to such general devastating horrors. So little\neffort has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the inevitable\nsuffering, that fines have been levied upon this impoverished people,\nwhich would be oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It is\nannounced from Holland, as this book goes to press, that Germany has\nimposed upon this war-desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month\nand an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its \"violation of\nneutrality.\"\n\nWere this episode not a tragedy, the sardonic humor, which caused the\nGerman General Staff to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for\nits \"violation of neutrality,\" would have the tragi-comical aspects of\nBedlam. It recalls the fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb\nwas muddying the stream and when the lamb politely called the wolf's\nattention to the fact that it stood lower down on the river side than\nthe wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour the lamb in\nany event. Such is probably the intention of Prussia. If it prevail\nBelgium as an independent State will cease to exist and it will be\nmourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it may have a resurrection.\n\nThe war having thus commenced between Germany and Belgium, the brave\nruler of the latter country--\"every inch a King\"--addressed to the\nKing of England the following appeal:\n\n     Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship\n     and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of\n     England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just\n     given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic\n     intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the\n     integrity of Belgium.[92]\n\n[Footnote 92: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 25.]\n\nIn reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous nation could have\ndisregarded, Sir Edward Grey immediately, on August 4th, advised the\nBritish Ambassador in Berlin as follows:\n\n     We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian\n     Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government\n     will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of\n     arms, the measures considered indispensable.\n\n     We are also informed that Belgian territory has been\n     violated at Gemmenich.\n\n     In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany\n     declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as\n     France gave last week in reply to our request made\n     simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that\n     request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my\n     telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock\n     to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your\n     passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel\n     bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the\n     neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to\n     which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: English _White Paper_. No. 159.]\n\nThereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, called\nupon the Secretary of State and stated in the name of His Majesty's\nGovernment that unless the Imperial Government\n\n     could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they\n     would proceed no further with their violation of the\n     Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been\n     instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial\n     Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take\n     all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium\n     and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much\n     a party as themselves.\n\n     Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could\n     give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier\n     in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered\n     it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should\n     advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written\n     summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had\n     mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's\n     Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in\n     view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily\n     ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that\n     their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the\n     time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer\n     must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to\n     demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7\n     o'clock....\n\n     I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor,\n     as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an\n     opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found\n     the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a\n     harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said\n     that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible\n     to a degree; just for a word--\"neutrality,\" a word which in\n     war time had so often been disregarded--_just for a scrap of\n     paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred\n     nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with\n     her._ All his efforts in that direction had been rendered\n     useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which,\n     as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to\n     office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had\n     done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind\n     while he was fighting for his life against two assailants.\n     He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible\n     events that might happen. I protested strongly against that\n     statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von\n     Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons\n     it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance\n     through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, _so I\n     would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a\n     matter of \"life and death\" for the honor of Great Britain\n     that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost\n     to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked_. That solemn\n     compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any\n     one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the\n     future? The Chancellor said, \"But at what price will that\n     compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought\n     of that?\" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could\n     that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an\n     excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency\n     was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our\n     action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I\n     refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further\n     argument....[94]\n\n[Footnote 94: British _White Paper_, No. 160.]\n\nHere again it is most significant, in view of the subsequent clumsily\nframed defense by German apologists, to note that the German Secretary\nof State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the German Chancellor, did\nnot pretend to suggest that the invasion of Belgium was due to any\novert act of France.\n\nWith even greater frankness von Jagow stated the real purpose, which\nwas, \"to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way,\" and to\n\"avoid the more Southern route,\" which, \"in view of the paucity of\nroads and the strength of the fortresses,\" would have entailed \"great\nloss of time.\"\n\nThe damning conclusion as to the guilt of Germany, which irresistibly\nfollows from these admitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a\npamphlet entitled \"_The Truth about Germany_,\" and subscribed to by a\nnumber of distinguished Germans, who are in turn vouched for in\nAmerica by Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. He tells\nus that they are the \"salt of the earth,\" and \"among the greatest\nthinkers, moralists, and philanthropists of the age.\" To overbear the\ndoubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this\ndefense has the support of the great theologian, Harnack, the sound\nand accomplished political scientist and economist, von Schmoller, the\ndistinguished philologian, von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian,\nLamprecht, the profound statesman, von Posadowsky, the brilliant\ndiplomatist, von Buelow, the great financier, von Gwinner, the great\npromoter of trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, Siemens,\nthe brilliant preacher of the Gospel, Dryander, and the indispensable\nDirector in the Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives are\nthose of Professor Burgess.)\n\nThe average American, as indeed the average citizen of any country,\nwhen his natural passions are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a\nvery prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, and when he has\nreached his conclusion based upon everyday, commonplace morality, he\nis not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names, fortified\nby an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy\nof brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often best grasped by the\ndemocracy of common sense.\n\nThe defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems\nto be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that \"England and\nFrance were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium.\"\n\nThey say:\n\n     It would have been a crime against the German people if the\n     German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The\n     inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual,\n     whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to\n     resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times\n     of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a\n     friendly neutrality, which would permit the unobstructed\n     passage of German troops through small portions of her\n     territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German\n     General Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to\n     avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most\n     unfavorable ground.\n\nIn other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that\nit should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason\nBelgium must be ruined.\n\nNotwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abhorrent\nin their political immorality, it is yet gravely suggested by Dr.\nDernberg and others that Bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect the\ntrue thought of the Prussian ruling classes. Here are representative\ntheologians, economists, historians, statesmen, diplomatists,\nfinanciers, inventors, and educators, who, in invoking the support of\nthe educated classes in the United States, deliberately subscribe to\na proposition at which even Machiavelli might have gagged.\n\nWe are further told that \"the German troops, with their iron\ndiscipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the\nindividual in Belgium just as they did in France in 1870,\" and these\nscientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity add that \"Belgium\nwould have been wise, if it had permitted the passage of the German\ntroops,\" for the Belgian people \"_would have fared well from the\nbusiness point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer\nand paid well._\"\n\nTo this defense we are led in the last analysis, that Belgium should\nhave preferred cash to her honor, just as the German General Staff\npreferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military\nadvantage.\n\nThe possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the\nattempt of these apologists for Germany to defend the forcible\ninvasion of Belgium.\n\nThe ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon\nthe express contractual obligations of England, Germany, and France\nwith respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The indictment of Germany\nhas been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the\nTreaty of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had\nobligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both\nof Luxemburg and Belgium.\n\nIf, however, there had been no Hague Convention and no Treaty of 1839,\nand if Germany, England, and France had never entered into reciprocal\nobligations in the event of war to respect Belgium's neutrality,\nnevertheless upon the broadest considerations of international law the\ninvasion without its consent would be without any justification\nwhatever.\n\nIt is a fundamental axiom of international law that each nation is the\nsole and exclusive judge of the conditions under which it will permit\nan alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is _sacrosanct_. No\nnation may invade the territory of another without its consent. To do\nso by compulsion is an act of war. Each nation's land is its castle of\nasylum and defense. This fundamental right of Belgium should not be\nconfused or obscured by balancing the subordinate equities between\nFrance, Germany, and England with respect to their formal treaty\nobligations.\n\nBelgium's case has thus been weakened in the forum of public opinion\nby too insistent reference to the special treaties. The right of\nBelgium and of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their\npossessions rests upon the sure foundation of inalienable right and\nis guarded by the immutable principle of moral law, \"Thou shalt not\nsteal.\" It was well said by Alexander Hamilton:\n\n     The sacred rights of man are not to be searched for in old\n     parchments and musty records; they are written as with a\n     sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of\n     Divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power.\n\nThis truth can be illustrated by an imaginary instance. Let us suppose\nthat the armies of the Kaiser had made the progress which they so\nconfidently anticipated, and had not simply captured Paris, but had\nalso invaded England, and that, in an attempt to crush the British\nEmpire, the German General Staff planned an invasion of Canada. Let us\nfurther suppose that Germany thereupon served upon the United States\nsuch an arrogant demand as it made upon Belgium, requiring the United\nStates to permit it to land an army in New York, with the accompanying\nassurance that neither its territory nor independence would be\ninjured, and that Germany would generously reimburse it for any\ndamage.\n\nLet us further suppose--and it is not a very fanciful\nsupposition--that the United States would reply to the German demand\nthat under no circumstances should a German force be landed in New\nYork or its territory be used as a base of hostile operations against\nCanada. To carry out the analogy in all its details, let us then\nsuppose that the German fleet should land an army in the city of New\nYork, arrest its Mayor, and check the first attempt of its outraged\ninhabitants to defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the\nMetropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other structures, and\nshooting down remorselessly large numbers of citizens, because a few\nnon-combatants had not accepted the invasion with due humility.\n\nAlthough Germany had not entered into any treaty to respect the\nterritory of the United States, no one would seriously contend that\nGermany would be justified in such an invasion.\n\nThe alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 being thus unimportant,\nDr. Dernberg and Professor von Mach fall back upon the only remaining\ndefense, that France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium\nwith the latter's consent. _Of this there is no evidence whatever._ We\nhave, on the contrary, the express assurance, which France gave on the\neve of the German invasion both to Belgium and England, that it would\nnot violate the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have the\nsignificant fact that when Belgium was invaded, and it was vitally\nnecessary that the French Army should go with all possible speed to\nits relief and thus stop the invasion and save France itself from\ninvasion, it was ten days before France could send any adequate\nsupport. Unhappily it was then too late.\n\nIf it were true that France intended to invade Belgium, then of all\nthe blunders that the German Foreign Office has made, the greatest was\nthat it did not permit France to carry out this step, for it would\nhave palliated the action of Germany in meeting such violation by a\nsimilar invasion, and it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for\nGermany and a greater injury to France.\n\nGermany's greatest weakness to-day is its moral isolation. It stands\ncondemned by the judgment of the civilized world. No physical power it\ncan exercise can compensate for this loss of moral power. Even success\nwill be too dearly bought at such a price. There are things which\nsucceed better than success. Truth is one of them.\n\nUnder the plea of necessity, which means Germany's desire to minimize\nits losses of life, Germany has turned Belgium into a shambles,\ntrampled a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its soul\nbeneath the iron tread of its mighty armies.\n\nAlmost wounded unto death, and for a time prostrate under the heel of\nthe conqueror, the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any selfish\ninterests, personal dishonor, or lack of courage.\n\nIt is claimed that there were officers of the French Army in Liege and\nNamur before the war broke out. Neither names nor dates have been\ngiven, and the allegation might be fairly dismissed because of the\nvery vagueness of the charge. But even if it were true, international\nlaw does not forbid the officers of one nation serving with the armies\nof another. German officers have for many years been thus employed in\nTurkey and engaged in training and developing the Turkish Army, but no\none has ever contended that the employment by that country of German\nmilitary officers was a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a\n_casus belli_.\n\nIt is wholly probable that there were some German officers in Belgium\nbefore the war commenced, and if not, there were certainly hundreds\nof spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian people were to\nlearn later to their infinite sorrow, but because Germany employed an\nelaborate system of espionage in Belgium, it could not justify France\nin invading its territory without its permission.\n\nTo a lawyer, who has had experience in the judicial ascertainment of\ntruth, there is one consideration that justifies him in disposing\nof all these vague allegations with respect to French activities in\nBelgium on the eve of the war, and that is that Germany has not only\nfailed to give any testimony in support of the charges, _but it never\nsuggested this defense until the judgment of the civilized world had\nbranded it with an ineffaceable stain_.\n\nProfessor von Mach, a former educator of Harvard University and an\napologist for Germany, feels this poverty of evidence and has rather\nnaively suggested an adjournment of the case. He says:\n\n     Did French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian\n     fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to\n     go through Belgium? Germany has officially made both claims.\n     The first can easily be substantiated by The Supreme Court\n     of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war\n     taken in Belgium. Until an impartial investigation becomes\n     possible no further proof than the claim made by the German\n     Government can be produced.\n\nAs the French officers taken in Belgium are presumably in German\ndetention camps, it would seem that Germany should first substantiate\nits defense by names, dates, and places, although even then the mere\ncapture of French officers in Belgium after the invasion had begun\ndoes not necessarily indicate that they were in Belgium before the\ninvasion.\n\nDr. von Mach adds in the reply, which he made in the New York _Times_\nto an article contributed by the writer to that journal:\n\n     _It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are\n     which Germany possesses, and which for military reasons it\n     has not yet been able to divulge...._ This is an important\n     question, and the answer must be left to The Supreme Court\n     of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to\n     point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of\n     Germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer\n     a verdict until such time when Germany can present her\n     complete proof to the world, and this may be when the war is\n     over.\n\nThis naive suggestion, that the vital question of fact should be\npostponed, and in the meantime judgment should be entered for Germany,\nis refreshing in its novelty. Its only parallel was the contention of\nthe celebrated Dr. Cook, who contended that the world should accept\nhis claim as to the discovery of the North Pole and await the proofs\nlater.\n\nProfessor von Mach, in his book, \"_What Germany Wants_,\" further\nexplains this dilatory defense and amplifies it in a manner that is\ncertainly unusual in an historian. He recognizes that the speech of\nthe German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4th, in which von\nBethmann-Hollweg admitted that the action of Germany in invading\nBelgium was wrong and only justified it on the ground of\nself-preservation, was a virtual plea of guilty by Prussia of the\ncrime, of which it stands indicted at the bar of the civilized world.\n\nGermany's scholarly apologist, as _amicus curiae_, then suggests that\nin criminal procedure, when a defendant pleads guilty, the Court often\nrefuses to accept his plea, enters a plea of not guilty for him, and\nassigns counsel to defend the case. He therefore suggests that the\nChancellor's plea of guilty should be disregarded and the Court should\nassign counsel.\n\nOne difficulty with the analogy is that courts do not ordinarily\nrefuse to accept a plea of guilty. On the contrary, they accept it\nalmost invariably, for why try the guilt of a man when he himself in\nthe most formal way acknowledges it?\n\nThe only instance in which a court does show such consideration to a\nprisoner is when the defendant is both poor and ignorant. Then, and\nonly then, with a fine regard for human right, is the procedure\nsuggested by Prof. von Mach followed.\n\nTo this humiliating position, Professor von Mach as _amicus curiae_\nconsigns his great nation. For myself, as one who admires Germany and\nbelieves it to be much greater and truer than its ruling caste or its\nover-zealous apologists, I refuse to accept the justification of such\nan absurd and degrading analogy.\n\nThe blunt acknowledgment of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag,\nalready quoted, is infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses\nof Germany's ardent but sophistical apologists. Fully recognizing\nthe import of his words, von Bethmann-Hollweg, addressing the\nrepresentatives of the German nation, put aside with admirable candor\nall these sophistical artifices and rested the defense of Germany upon\nthe single contention that Germany was beset by powerful enemies and\nthat it was a matter of necessity for her to perpetrate this \"wrong\"\nand in this manner to \"hack her way through.\"\n\nThis defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a\nplea of \"Guilty\" at the bar of the world. It has one merit. It does\nnot add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy.\n\nAfter the civilized world had condemned the invasion of Belgium with\nan unprecedented approach to unanimity, the German Chancellor rather\ntardily discovered that public opinion was still a vital force in the\nworld and that the strategic results of the occupation of Belgium had\nnot compensated for the moral injury. For this reason he framed five\nmonths after this crime against civilization a belated defense, which\nproved so unconvincing that the Bernhardi plea of military necessity\nis clearly preferable, as at least having the merit of candor.\n\nAfter proclaiming to the world that the German Foreign Office had\ndiscovered in Brussels certain secret documents, which disclosed the\nfact that the neutrality of Belgium at the time of the invasion was a\nsham and after the civilized world had refused to accept this bald and\nunsupported assertion, as it had also refused to accept the spurious\nevidence of a well-known Arctic explorer, the German Foreign Office in\nDecember, 1914 published its alleged proofs.\n\nThe first purported to be a report of the Chief of the Belgian General\nStaff to the Minister of War and reported his conversations in 1906\nwith a military attache of the British Legation in Brussels.\n\nThe second purported to be a report of similar conversations in 1912\nbetween the same officials.\n\nIn an authorized statement, published on January 27, 1915, Sir Edward\nGrey states that there is no record of either of these negotiations in\nthe English Foreign Office or the War Office; but this fact is not in\nitself conclusive and as there is no evidence that the documents were\nforged, their genuineness should be assumed in the absence of some\nmore specific denial.\n\nThe documents, however, do not appreciably advance the cause of\nGermany, for they disclose on their face that the conversations were\nnot binding on the Governments of England or Belgium but were simply\nan informal exchange of view between the officials, and what is far\nmore to the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of April 10,\n1906, was expressly based upon the statement that \"_the entry of the\nEnglish into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our\nneutrality by Germany_.\"\n\nThe second document also shows that the Belgian Chief of Staff\nexpressly stated that any invasion of Belgium by England, made to\nrepel a prior German invasion, could not take place without the\nexpress consent of Belgium, to be given when the occasion arose, and\nit is further evident that the statement of the English military\nattache--clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign policy\nof a great Empire--expressly predicated his assumption, that England\nmight disembark troops in Belgium, upon the statement that its object\nwould be to repel a German invasion of Belgian territory.\n\nIf it be asked why England and Belgium were thus in 1906 and 1912\nconsidering the contingency of a German invasion of Belgium and the\nmethod of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that such\ninvasion, in the event of a war between Germany and France, was a\ncommonplace of German military strategists. Of this purpose they made\nlittle, if any, concealment. The construction by Germany of numerous\nstrategic railway lines on the Belgian frontier, which were out of\nproportion to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to Europe\nsome indication of Germany's purpose and there could have been little\ndoubt as to such intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign\nOffice, given, as previously shown, repeated and continuous assurances\nto Belgium that such was not its intention.\n\nThe German Chancellor--whose stupendous blunders of speech and action\nin this crisis will be the marvel of posterity--has further attempted\nto correct his record by two equally disingenuous defenses. Speaking\nto the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, he said:\n\n     When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we\n     were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known\n     for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of\n     need would not decide after all to spare the country and to\n     retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after\n     the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army leaders\n     I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military\n     reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about\n     the 4th of August, the possibility for such a development\n     should be kept open. _Even then the guilt of the Belgian\n     Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not\n     yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal._\n\nThis is much too vague to excuse a great crime. The guilt of Belgium\nis said to be \"apparent from many a sign,\" but what these signs are\nthe Chancellor still fails to state. He admits that they were not\ndocumentary in character. If the guilt of Belgium had been so apparent\nto the Chancellor on August the 4th, when he made his confession of\nwrong doing in the Reichstag, then it is incredible that he would have\nmade such an admission.\n\nAs to the overt acts of France, all that the Chancellor said in his\nspeech of December 2 was \"that France's plan of campaign was known to\nus and that it compelled us for reasons of self-preservation to march\nthrough Belgium.\" But it is again significant that, speaking nearly\nfive months after his first public utterance on the subject and with a\nfull knowledge that the world had visited its destructive condemnation\nupon Germany for its wanton attack upon Belgium, _the Chancellor can\nstill give no specific allegation of any overt act by France which\njustified the invasion_. All that is suggested is a supposed \"plan of\ncampaign.\"\n\nFollowing this unconvincing and plainly disingenuous speech, the\nChancellor proceeded in an authorized newspaper interview on January\n25, 1915 to state that his now famous--or infamous--remark about \"the\nscrap of paper\" had been misunderstood.\n\nAfter stating that he felt a painful \"surprise to learn that my\nphrase, 'a scrap of paper,' should have caused such an unfavorable\nimpression on the United States,\" he proceeds to explain that in his\nnow historic interview with the British Ambassador,\n\n     he (von Bethmann-Hollweg) had spoken of the treaty not as a\n     \"scrap of paper\" for Germany, but as an instrument which\n     had become obsolete through Belgium's forfeiture of its\n     neutrality and that Great Britain had quite other reasons\n     for entering into the war, compared with which the\n     neutrality treaty appeared to have only the value of a scrap\n     of paper.\n\nLet the reader here pause to note the twofold character of this\ndefense.\n\nIt suggests that Germany's guaranty of Belgium's neutrality had become\nfor Germany \"a scrap of paper\" because of Belgium's alleged forfeiture\nof its rights as a neutral nation, although at the time referred to\nthe German Chancellor had not only asked the permission of Belgium to\ncross its territory but immediately before his interview with the\nBritish Ambassador he had publicly testified in his speech in the\nReichstag to the justice of Belgium's protest.\n\nThe other and inconsistent suggestion is that, without respect to\nBelgium's rights under the treaty of 1839, the violation of its\nterritory by Germany was not the cause of England's intervention; but\nobviously this hardly explains the German Chancellor's contemptuous\nreference to the long standing and oft repeated guaranty of Belgium's\nneutrality as merely a \"scrap of paper.\"\n\nHaving thus somewhat vaguely suggested a twofold defense, the\nChancellor, without impeaching the accuracy of Goschen's report of the\ninterview, then proceeded to state that the conversation in question\ntook place immediately after his speech in the Reichstag, in which, as\nstated, he had admitted the justice of Belgium's protest against the\nviolation of its territory, and he adds that,\n\n     when I spoke, I already had _certain indications but no\n     absolute proof_ upon which to base a public accusation\n     that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in\n     its relations with England. Nevertheless I took Germany's\n     responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously that\n     I spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany.\n\nIf the German Chancellor is truthful in his statement that on August\nthe 4th, when he spoke in the Reichstag and an hour later had his\nconversation with Goschen, he had \"certain indications\" that Belgium\nhad forfeited its rights as an independent nation by hostile acts,\nthen the German Chancellor took such a serious view of \"Germany's\nresponsibilities\" that, without any necessity or justification, he\nindicted his country at the bar of the whole world of a flagrant\nwrong. If he could not at that time justify the act of the German\nGeneral Staff, he should at least have been silent, but, according to\nhis incredible statement, although he had these \"certain indications\"\nand thus _knew_ that Germany, in invading Belgium, was simply\nattacking an already hostile country, he deliberately explains, not\nonly to his nation but to the whole world, that such invasion was a\nwrong and had no justification in international law. How can any\nreasonable man, whose eyes are not blinded with the passions of the\nhour, accept this explanation?\n\nIt is even more remarkable that immediately following the session of\nthe Reichstag, when he had his interview with Goschen, the German\nChancellor never suggested in his own defense or that of his country,\nthat he had \"certain indications,\" which justified the action that day\ntaken, although he then knew that, unless he could justify it, England\nwould immediately join the already powerful foes of Germany.\n\nThe reader need only reread Goschen's report of that interview\n(_ante_, p. 214) to know how disingenuous this belated explanation\nis. With the whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the German\nChancellor, after five months of reflection, can only make this\npitiful defense. Its acceptance subjects even the most credulous to\na severe strain. It exhausts the limit of gullibility.\n\nThe defense wholly ignores the fact that the Chancellor had previously\nsought to bribe England to condone in advance the invasion of Belgium\nby Germany, and that Germany had also coerced Luxemburg into a passive\nacquiescence in a similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense\nthat Luxemburg had failed in its obligation of neutrality.\n\nShould the judgment of the civilized world turn from the terrible fate\nof Belgium and consider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, then the\nGerman Chancellor may, unless better advised, frame further maladroit\nexcuses with reference to that country.\n\nAll these explanations, as senseless as they are false, and savoring\nmore of the tone of a criminal court then that of an imperial\nchancellery, should shock those who admire historic Germany. They are\nunworthy of so great a nation. Bismarck would never have stooped to\nsuch pitiful and transparent deception. The blunt candor of Maximilian\nHarden, which we have already quoted on page 12, is infinitely\npreferable and the position of Germany at the bar of the civilized\nworld will improve, when its maladroit Chancellor has the courage and\nthe candor to say, as Harden did, that all this was done because\nGermany regarded it as for its vital interests and because \"we willed\nit.\"\n\nUnless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of\nbarbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of\nthe rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind, after\nuncounted centuries, has made no real advance in political morality\nbeyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot\nsatisfy the \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind.\" It is the\nnegation of all that civilization stands for.\n\nBelgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of\nany offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its\nvoluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality\nwill \"plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation\nof its taking off.\"\n\nIt may be questioned whether, since the fall of Poland, Civilization\nhas been stirred to more profound pity and intense indignation than by\nthis wanton outrage. Pity, radiating to the utmost corners of the\nworld by the \"sightless couriers of the air,\"\n\n     \"Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye\n     That tears shall drown the wind.\"\n\nWas it also, as with Macbeth, a case of\n\n     \"Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself\n     And falls on the other\"?\n\nTime will tell.\n\nHad Germany not invaded Belgium, it is an even chance that England\nwould not have intervened, at least at the beginning of the war.\n\nGermany could have detached a relatively small part of its army to\ndefend its highly fortified Western frontier, and leaving France to\nwaste its strength on frontal attacks on that almost impregnable line\nof defense, Germany with the bulk of its army and that of Austria\ncould have made a swift drive at Russia.\n\nIs it not possible that that course would have yielded better results\nthan the fiasco, which followed the fruitless drive at Paris?\n\nIf Germany succeeds, it will claim that \"nothing succeeds like\nsuccess,\" and to the disciples of Treitschke and Bernhardi this will\nbe a sufficing answer.\n\nIf it fail, posterity will be at a loss to determine which blundered\nthe worst, the German Foreign Office or its General Staff, its\ndiplomats or its generals.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD\n\n\nThe record has now been laid before the reader in all its essential\ndetails. The witnesses for the different countries have taken the\nstand and we have their respective contentions in their own words.\nCzar, Emperor, and King, as well as Prime Minister, Chancellor, and\nAmbassador, have testified as to the fateful events, which preceded\nthe outbreak of the war, with a fullness of detail, to which history\npresents few parallels. The evidence which Germany and Austria have\nsuppressed does not prevent the determination of the issue.\n\nIt is a great tribute to the force of public opinion and a clear\nrecognition that the conscience of mankind does exist as something\nmore than a visionary abstraction, that the secrets of diplomacy have\nbeen laid bare by most of the contending nations, and that there is an\nearnest desire on the part of all of them to justify their conduct\nrespectively at the bar of the civilized world.\n\nEven more impressive to the sincere friends of peace is the\nsignificant fact that concurrently with the most amazing display of\nphysical force that the world has ever known has come a direct appeal\nby the belligerent nations to the neutral States, and especially to\nthe United States, not for practical cooperation in the hostilities\nbut for moral sympathy.\n\nAll past wars are insignificant in dimensions in comparison with this.\nThe standing army of the Roman Empire, according to the estimate of\nGibbon, did not exceed 400,000, and guarded that mighty Empire from\nthe Euphrates to the Thames. The grand army of Napoleon, which was\nsupposed to mark the maximum of human effort in the art of war and\nwith which he crossed a century ago the Niemen, did not exceed\n700,000. To-day at least fifteen millions of men are engaged in a\ntitanic struggle, with implements of destruction, to which all past\ndevices in the science of destruction are insignificant.\n\nApparently, therefore, the ideals of the pacificist are little better\nthan a rainbow, a rainbow of promise, perhaps, but still a rainbow,\nformed by the rays of God's justice shining through the tears of human\npity.\n\nBut when, in contrast to this amazing display of physical power,\nthere is contrasted an equally unprecedented desire on the part of the\ncontending nations to justify their case at the bar of public opinion\nand to gain the moral sympathy of the neutral States, then it is seen\nthat the \"decent respect to the opinions of mankind\" is still a mighty\nfactor in human affairs, and the question as to the judgment of the\nworld, upon the moral issues raised by this great controversy, becomes\nnot merely of academic but of great practical interest.\n\nWhat that judgment will be it is not difficult to determine, for the\nevidence in the case can admit of but one conclusion. It may be, as\nMr. George Bernard Shaw says, that in the contending nations, the ears\nare too greatly deafened by the roar of the cannon and the eyes too\nblinded by the smoke of battle, to reach a dispassionate conclusion.\nBut in the neutral States of the world, and especially in that\ngreatest of all the neutral Powers, the United States of America, a\njudgment has been pronounced that is unmistakable.\n\nThe great Republic is more free than any other nation to reach a just\nconclusion \"without fear, favor, or affection.\" Without alliances with\nany Power and with no practical interest in the European balance of\npower, itself composed of men of all the contending nations, it can,\nabove every other people, proceed to judgment, \"with malice toward\nnone and with charity for all.\"\n\nIt is a tribute to its unique position among the nations of the world\nthat from the beginning of the war each of the contending Powers\nhas invoked its judgment. The Kaiser, the President of the French\nRepublic, and the King of Belgium have each in an especial way sought\nits moral support, while to the other nations the question of the\nattitude of the United States has been one of practical and recognized\nimportance.\n\nIf the United States is thus a moral arbiter in the greatest war of\nhistory, its judgment is now, and may hereafter increasingly become, a\npotential factor of great significance.\n\nThe nature of that judgment is already apparent to all men. The people\nof the United States, numbering nearly one hundred millions, have\nreached, with an amazing approach to unanimity, certain clear and\ndefinite conclusions.\n\nThese conclusions maybe summarized as follows:\n\n     1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace\n     secretly concerted to impose their will upon Europe in a\n     matter affecting the balance of power. Whether in so doing\n     they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the\n     hegemony of Europe is not satisfactorily established,\n     although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a\n     possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (_a_)\n     issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and\n     disproportionate to any grievance that Austria may have had,\n     and (_b_) in giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time\n     to consider the rights and obligations of all interested\n     nations.\n\n     2. That Germany had at all times the power to induce Austria\n     to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no\n     time effectively exerted its influence. On the contrary, it\n     certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its\n     unreasonable course.\n\n     3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia throughout the\n     diplomatic controversy sincerely worked for peace, and in\n     this spirit not only overlooked the original misconduct of\n     Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of\n     preserving peace.\n\n     4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was\n     reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of\n     mobilization is the right of any sovereign State, and as\n     long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take\n     any aggressive action, no other nation had any just right to\n     complain, each having the same right to make similar\n     preparations.\n\n     5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia\n     for failure to demobilize, when the other Powers had offered\n     to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were\n     still in progress, precipitated the war.\n\n     6. That the invasion of Belgium by Germany was without any\n     provocation and in violation of Belgium's inherent rights as\n     a sovereign State. The sanctity of its territory does not\n     depend exclusively upon the Treaty of 1839 or The Hague\n     Convention, but upon fundamental and axiomatic principles of\n     international law. These treaties were simply declaratory of\n     Belgium's rights as a sovereign nation and simply reaffirmed\n     by a special covenant the duty of Germany and the other\n     Powers to respect the neutrality of Belgium.\n\n     7. England was justified in its declaration of war upon\n     Germany, not only because of its direct interests in the\n     neutrality of Belgium, but also because of the ethical duty\n     of the strong nations to protect the weak upon adequate\n     occasion from indefensible wrong. Apart from this general\n     ethical justification, England was, under the Treaty of\n     1839, under an especial obligation to defend the neutrality\n     of Belgium, and had it failed to respect that obligation it\n     would have broken its solemn covenant.\n\nIf they are \"thrice armed\" who have their \"quarrel just,\" then\nEngland, France, Russia, and Belgium can await with confidence, not\nmerely the immediate issue of the titanic conflict, but also the\nequally important judgment of history.\n\n\n\n\nEPILOGUE\n\n\nOn the evening of July 31, 1914, the author reached Basle. The rapid\nprogress of events, narrated in this volume, suggested the wisdom of\ncontinuing the journey to Paris that night, but as I wanted to see the\ntomb of Erasmus in the Basle Cathedral I determined to break my long\njourney from St. Moritz.\n\nIt seemed a fitting time to make a pilgrimage to the last\nresting-place of the great humanist philosopher of Rotterdam and\nLouvain, for in that prodigious upheaval of the sixteenth century,\nwhich has passed into history as the Reformation, Erasmus was the one\nnoble spirit who looked with a tolerant and philosophical mind upon\nboth parties to the great controversy. He suffered the fate of the\nconservative in a radical time, and as the great storm convulsed\nEurope the author of the _Praise of Folly_ probably said on more than\none occasion: \"A plague o' both your houses.\" Nearly four centuries\nhave passed since he joined the \"silent majority,\" between whom is no\nquarreling, and the desolated Louvain, which he loved, is to-day in\nits ruins a standing witness that immeasurable folly still rules the\ndarkened counsels of men.\n\nAs I reached Basle and saw the spires of the Cathedral rising above\nthe Rhine, it seemed to me that the great convulsion, which was then\nrocking all Europe with seismic violence, was the greatest since that\nof the French Revolution and might have as lasting results as the\ngreat schism of the sixteenth century.\n\nI was not fated to see the tomb, for when I reached my hotel the\nfacilities of civilization had broken down so abruptly that if I did\nnot wish to be interned in Switzerland I must leave early on the\nfollowing morning for Paris. Transportation had almost entirely\ncollapsed, communication was difficult, and credit itself was so\nstrained that \"mine host\" of the Three Kings was disposed to look\naskance even at gold.\n\nOur journey took us to France by way of Delle. Twenty-four hours after\nwe passed that frontier town, German soldiers entered and blew out the\nbrains of a French custom-house officer, thus the first victim in the\ngreatest war that the world has ever known.\n\nAs we journeyed from Basle to Paris on that last day of July the fair\nfields of France never looked more beautiful. In the gleaming summer\nsun they made a new \"field of the cloth of gold,\" and the hayricks\nlooked like the aureate tents of a mighty army. It was harvest time,\nbut already the laborers had deserted their fields which, although\n\"white unto the harvest,\" seemed bereft of the tillers. Some had left\nthe bounty of nature to join in the harvest of death. From the high\npasture lands of the Alps the herdsmen at the ringing of the village\nchurch bells had left their herds and before night had fallen were on\ntheir way to the front.\n\nAt Belfort the station was crowded with French troops and an elderly\nFrench couple came into our compartment. The eyes of the wife were red\nwith weeping, while the man sank into his seat and with his head upon\nhis breast gazed moodily into vacancy. They had just parted with their\nson, who had joined the colors. I stood for a time with this French\ngentleman in the corridor of the train, but as he could not speak\nEnglish or German and I could not speak French, it was impossible for\nus to communicate the intense and tragical thoughts that were passing\nthrough our minds. Suddenly he pointed to the smiling harvest fields,\nby which we passed so swiftly, and said \"_Perdu! perdu!_\" This word\nof tragical import could have been applied to all civilization as well.\n\nThe night of our arrival in Paris I fully expected to see a half a\nmillion Frenchmen parading the streets and enthusiastically cheering\nfor war and crying, as in 1870, \"a Berlin!\" I was to witness an\nextraordinary transformation of a great nation. An unusual silence\nbrooded over the city. A few hundred people paraded the chief avenues,\ncrying \"down with war!\", while a separate crowd of equal size sang\nthe national hymn. With these exceptions there was no cheering or\nenthusiasm, such as I would have expected from my preconceived idea of\nFrench excitability. Men spoke in undertones, with a quiet but subdued\nintensity of feeling rather than with frenzied enthusiasm.\n\nWith a devotion that was extraordinary and a pathetically brave\nsubmission to a possible fate, they seemed to be sternly resolved to\ndie to the last man, if necessary, in defense of their noble nation.\nAlthough I subsequently saw in the thrilling days of mobilization many\nthousands of soldiers pass through the railroad stations on their way\nto the front, I never heard the rumble of a drum or saw the waving of\nregimental colors.\n\nNo sacrifice seemed to be too great, whether it was asked of man,\nwoman, or child. The spirit of materialism for the time being\nvanished. The newspapers shrunk to a single sheet and all commercial\nadvertisements disappeared. Theaters, art galleries, museums,\nlibraries, closed their doors. Upon some streets nearly every shop\nwas closed, with the simple but eloquent placard \"Gone to join the\ncolors.\" The French people neither exulted, boasted, nor complained.\nThe only querulous element was a small minority of the large body of\nAmerican tourists, so suddenly caught in a terrific storm of human\npassions, who seemed to feel that this Red Sea of blood should part\nuntil they could walk dry-shod to the shore of safety.\n\nIn Germany similar scenes were enacted and a like spirit of courage\nand self-sacrifice was shown.\n\nIt is a reflection upon civilization that two nations, each so brave,\nheroic, and self-sacrificing, should, without their consent and by the\nmiserable and iniquitous folly of scheming statesmen and diplomats, be\nplunged into a war, of which no man can see the end and which has\nalready swept away the flower of their manhood.\n\nOne great lesson of this conflict may be that no aggressive war ought\nto be initiated unless the policy of that war is first submitted to\nthe masses of the people, upon whom the burdens in the last analysis\nfall and who must pay the dreadful penalty with their treasure and\ntheir lives.\n\nIf the policy of this war had been submitted by a referendum to the\nAustrian and German peoples with a full statement of the facts of\nthe Servian controversy, would they not have rejected a form of\narbitrament, which creates but does not settle questions, convinces no\none, and only sows the seeds of greater hatred for future and richer\nharvests of death? If the be-ribboned diplomats and decorated generals\nof the General Staffs at Berlin and Vienna had been without power to\nprecipitate this war, unless they themselves were willing to occupy\nthe trenches on the firing line, this war might never have been.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNearly five months have passed since that summer day, when I passed\nthrough smiling harvest fields from the mountains to the Seine. The\ntrenches, in which innumerable brave men are writing with their blood\nthe records of their statesmen's follies, are filled with snow. The\nblackest Christmas Eve within the memory of living man has come and\ngone, perhaps the blackest, since in the stillness of the night there\nfell upon the wondering ears of the shepherds the gracious refrain of\n\"Peace on earth, good will among men.\" On that night devout German\nsoldiers sang in their trenches in Flanders and along the Vistula the\nhymn of Christmas Eve, \"_Stille Nacht, heilige Nacht_.\"\n\nWas this unconscious mockery, an expression of invincible faith, or a\nreversion from habit to the gentler associations of childhood? The\nspirit of Christmas was not wholly dead, for it is narrated that these\nbrave men in English and German trenches on this saddest of Christmas\nEves declared for a few hours of their own volition a Christmas truce.\n\n     \"Some say that ever 'gainst that season comes\n     Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated\n     The bird of dawning singeth all night long,\n     And then, they say, no spirit dare stir abroad,\n     The nights are wholesome, then no planets strike,\n     So hallowed and so gracious is the time.\"\n\nThere is not between the men in one trench and those in another, each\nseeking the speediest opportunity to kill the other, any personal\nquarrel. On occasion they even fraternize, only to resume the work\nof mutual extermination. They would not have quarreled, if the\nBerchtolds, the von Bethmann-Hollwegs, and the von Jagows had had\nsufficient loyalty to civilization to submit any possible grievance,\nwhich either had, to the judgment of Europe.\n\nA spectacle more ghastly than this \"far-flung battle line\" has never\nbeen witnessed since the world began, for these soldiers in gray or\nkhaki are not savages but are beings of an advanced civilization.\nTheir fighting can have in method none of the old-time chivalry, such\nas was witnessed at Fontenoy when the French commander courteously\ninvited his English rival to fire first. The present is a chemical,\nmechanical war, than which no circle in Dante's _Inferno_ is more\nhorribly repellent.\n\nWhen was better justified the terrible but beautiful imagery in\nMilton's poem of _The Nativity_, when he says of Nature:\n\n     \"Only with speeches fair\n     She woos the gentle air\n     To hide her guilty front with innocent snow,\n     And on her naked shame\n     Pollute with sinful blame\n     The saintly veil of maiden white to throw;\n     _Confounded that her Maker's eyes\n     Should look so near upon her foul deformities._\"\n\nThe snow cannot hide the horrors of the present conflict. Even night,\nin other wars more merciful, no longer throws its sable mantle of\nmercy over the dying and the dead. By the use of powerful searchlights\nthe work of destruction continues. As though the surface of the earth\nwere no longer sufficient for this malignant exercise of the genius\nof man, the heavens above and the waters under the earth have become\nat length the battlefields of the nations. Even from the infinite\nazure falls\n\n     \"....                            a ghastly dew\n     From the nations' airy navies, grappling in the central blue.\"\n\nCan all history afford a parallel in malignity to the submarine,\nwhich, having sunk one vessel with all its human lives, calmly awaits,\nwith its periscope projecting above the water like the malignant eye\nof a devil fish, the arrival of rescuing ships to sink them also?\n\nWas the gracious refrain of \"Peace on earth, good will among men,\"\nmerely a mockery of man's hope, making of his civilization a mere\nmirage? Will\n\n     \"Caesar's spirit ranging for revenge\n     With Ate from his side come hot from Hell\"--\n\nforever crucify afresh and put to an open shame the gentle Galilean?\n\nThe angelic song of Bethlehem was neither the statement of a fact nor\neven a prophecy. In its true translation it was the statement of a\nprofound moral truth, upon which in the last analysis the pacification\nof humanity must depend. The great promise was \"Peace on earth _to men\nof good will_.\"\n\n_Peace to the pacific_, that was the great message. For all others the\ngreat Teacher had but one prediction and that was \"the distress of\nnations, ... men's hearts failing them for fear.\" Until civilization\ncan grasp the truth that there can be no peace until there is among\nall nations a spirit of conciliation and a common desire of justice,\nthe cause of peace can be little more than a beautiful dream. Hague\nconventions, international tribunals, and agreements to arbitrate,\nwhile minimizing the causes of war and affording the machinery for the\npacific adjustment of justiciable questions, will yet prove altogether\nineffectual, irrespective of the size of the parchment, the imposing\ncharacter of the seals, or the length of the red tape, unless the\nnations which execute them have sufficient loyalty to civilization to\nask only that which seems just and to submit any disputable question\nto the pacific adjustment of an impartial tribunal.\n\nI appreciate that some questions are not justiciable and cannot be\narbitrated. The historic movements of races, like those of glaciers,\ncannot be stopped by mortal hands, and yet even these slow-moving\nmasses of ice are stayed by an Invisible Hand and melt at length into\ngentle and fructifying streams. To create the universal state and to\ndevelop a spirit of paramount loyalty to it affords the only solution\nof this seemingly insoluble problem.\n\nHistory affords no more striking illustration of this fact than the\npresent war. Each of the contending nations was pledged to peace. All\nof the greater ones were signatories to the Hague Convention, but as\nthe chain can never be stronger than its weakest link, the pacific\nefforts of England, France, and Russia to adjust a purely justiciable\nquestion by negotiation and mediation wholly failed because Austria\nand Germany had determined to test the mastery of Europe by an appeal\nto the sword. The fundamental cause of the conflict was their lack of\nloyalty to civilization, due to a misguided and perverted spirit of\nexcessive nationalism.\n\nUntil with the slow-moving progress of mankind the greater unit of the\nUniversal State can be created, it should be the common and equal\nconcern of all nations, not merely to defeat this primitive appeal\nto brute force but to make impossible the recurrence of such an\niniquitous reversion to barbarism. To do this, while any nation\nunjustly appeals to force, force is unhappily necessary, but there\nwould be few occasions to repel force by force if there were\nsufficient solidarity in mankind to make it the common concern of the\ncivilized world to suppress promptly and effectually any disturber of\nits peace.\n\nIf the present wanton attack upon the very foundations of civilization\nhad been regarded as the common concern of all nations, it would\nnever have taken place and might never occur again. To prevent such\nrecurrence, thoughtful men of all nations should cooperate, so that\nwhen the present titanic struggle is over, an earnest and universal\neffort can be made to create such a compact between the civilized\nnations as will insure cooperative effort when any nation attempts to\napply the torch of war to the stately edifice of civilization. May not\nthis great war prove the supreme travail of humanity, whereof this\nnobler era will be born?\n\nIt should be the especial duty of the United States to lead in this\nonward movement. It has been in no small measure the liberator of\nmankind. Let it now be its pacificator! Can it do so in any better\nspirit than that voiced by one of the noblest of its Presidents at the\nclose of another gigantic conflict, of which he was to be the last and\ngreatest martyr, when he said:\n\n     With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness\n     in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us\n     strive to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's\n     wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and\n     for his widow and orphan; _and to do all which may achieve\n     and cherish a just and lasting peace_.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n                    A\n\nAlbert, King of the Belgians, conversation of, with Kaiser, 107 ff.;\n  appeal of, to England, 218\n\nAttila, Kaiser's reference to, quoted, 14\n\nAustria, given _carte blanche_, x;\n  refuses peace proposals, xi;\n  underlying causes of her ultimatum to Servia, 19 ff.;\n  annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20;\n  keeps secret diplomatic correspondence, 23;\n  Crown Prince of, assassinated, 20, 31;\n  silence of, proves guilt, 25, 26;\n  refuses England's propositions, 28;\n  Germany's communications to, withheld from public, 28, 29;\n  _Red Book_ of, analyzed, 30;\n  attitude of, false, 34;\n  ignorance of ultimatum of, among diplomatic corps, 33;\n  insists situation will \"be cleared up,\" 35;\n  of necessity supported by Germany before ultimatum, 36, 37;\n  would not have sent ultimatum without Germany's backing, 36 ff.;\n  ultimatum of, examined and characterized, 40, 41;\n  ultimatum of, to Servia quoted in full, 47 _et seq._;\n  population of, 55;\n  Austria-Servian relations, 56;\n  promises to respect Servian territory, 59, 60;\n  effect of ultimatum of, 61;\n  attitude of, towards Servia's reply, 83, 84;\n  most discreditable action of, 86;\n  mobilizes, 86;\n  not urged by Germany to consider peace proposals, 88;\n  does not reply to Russian proposal, 91;\n  claims Servia to be aggressor in first skirmish, 96;\n  refuses discussion of Servian note, 98;\n  again refuses Russia's pleas for peace, 99, 100;\n  suppression of news in, 113;\n  offered reparation by Servia, 114;\n  knew that Servia would refuse demand of \"judiciary cooperation,\" 115;\n  sounds Italy regarding war on Servia, 119;\n  ultimatum designedly withheld from powers, 121;\n  petty finesse of, 123;\n  ultimatum issued when foreign diplomats were out of the way, 123, 124;\n  avoids foreign diplomats, 125;\n  believes its interests require punishment of Servia, 136;\n  national selfishness, 136;\n  bombards Belgrade, 149;\n  insists upon pursuing action against Servia, 170;\n  at last agrees to discuss Servian note with Russia, 173;\n  causes of partial reversal of policy, 175 ff.;\n  offer of July 31, 1914, 190 _et seq._;\n  offer to discuss ultimatum merely nominal, 190;\n  refuses Russia's stipulation concerning mediation, 191;\n  counter suggestions of, to British Government, 191;\n  proposal of, absurd, 192;\n  signs \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  suppression of evidence by, useless, 246;\n  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;\n  see Berchtold, Szapary, Triple Alliance\n\n\n                    B\n\nBalkans, existing status of, upset, 20\n\nBalko-Turkish War, 34\n\nBallin, 223\n\nBeck, James M., ancestry of, vii\n\nBelgium, invasion of, a crime, vii;\n  German demand on, xi;\n  the proof of Germany's belief in von Bernhardi, 11;\n  publishes _Gray Paper_, 23;\n  Germany's disregard of rights of, 196 ff.;\n  took no part in preliminary war controversy, 197;\n  held no interest in Servian question, 197;\n  treaty of neutrality signed, 198;\n  restricts sale of munitions of war in 1870, 200;\n  Bismarck's letter to, 200;\n  feared invasion by Germany, 201;\n  Germany professes intention of respecting neutrality of, 201 ff.;\n  government fears German invasion, 205, 206;\n  requests further assurance of Germany's intentions to respect\n    neutrality, 206;\n  reassured by France, 208;\n  advised by Germany of intended invasion, 210;\n  reply of, to German ultimatum, 212;\n  hopes that Germany would respect neutrality, 213, 214;\n  offered military support by France, 214;\n  refuses French aid, 214;\n  fined by Germany, 217, 218;\n  compared to Poland, 218;\n  appeal of, to England, 218;\n  effect of German invasion, 229, 230;\n  French officers in, 230;\n  German officers and spies in, 230;\n  Germany claims neutrality of, a sham, 235;\n  anticipating German invasion, 236 ff.;\n  German railroads on frontier of, 237;\n  \"guilt of,\" 238;\n  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;\n  _see_ Albert, Davignon, Von der Elst\n\nBerchtold, Count, removes himself beyond reach of personal parleys,\n    70, 71;\n  conversation of, with Russian Ambassador, 99, 100;\n  assures Russia that \"claim against Servia would be acceptable,\" 123;\n  contends that British suggestions for peace came too late, 190;\n  offer of, concerning mediation, 191;\n  _see_ Austria\n\nBernhardi, doctrines of, xvii;\n  opinions of, on war quoted, 7 ff.;\n  influence of, 10, 11;\n  indictment of, 15, 16;\n  failure of, 17;\n  opinion of, concerning England's attitude to America during Civil\n    War, 17, 205\n\nBerthelot, M., prepares _Yellow Book_, 102\n\nBertie, Sir F., 207\n\nBethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, quoted, viii;\n  message of, to Federated Governments of Germany quoted, 44, 45;\n  blunders of, 194;\n  declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 202;\n  attempts to justify Germany's actions toward Belgium, 215, 216;\n  \"scrap of paper\" speech quoted, 220, 221;\n  speech of, concerning invasion of Belgium, 238;\n  discusses \"scrap of paper\" remark, 239 ff.;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nBismarck, and militarism, xix ff.;\n  attitude of, during peace negotiations, xix;\n  and \"spread eagleism,\" xix, xx;\n  respects neutrality of Belgium, 200; 103\n\nBosnia annexed by Austria, 20\n\nBrussels, secret documents in, 235\n\nBunsen, Sir M. de, report of, to Sir Edward Grey regarding ignorance\n    of Diplomatic Corps concerning Austria's ultimatum, 32, 33;\n  quoted regarding Germany's knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 37\n\nBurgess, Prof. John W., supports Germany, 222\n\n\n                    C\n\nCambon, Jules, prepares _Yellow Book_, 102;\n  an estimate of his abilities, 104, 105;\n  advises France of Germany's early mobilization, 120;\n  interviews von Jagow on Austrian ultimatum, 121 ff.;\n  urges peace conference, 133;\n  _see_ France\n\nCook, Dr., Germany compared to, 232\n\nCrackenthorpe, Mr., British Ambassador at Belgrade, instructions to,\n    82 ff.\n\nCrown Prince of Germany, the, an adherent of brute force, 13\n\nCzar, \"the champion of Christianity,\" xxii;\n  despatch to, from Kaiser regarding murder of Archduke, 147;\n  reply of, to Kaiser, 148;\n  reply to third message of Kaiser, 151;\n  last message of, to Kaiser, 184, 185;\n  telegram of, to King George, 189;\n  telegram of, to Kaiser, suppressed by German Foreign Office, 189;\n  \"not guilty,\" 189\n\n\n                    D\n\nDavignon, M., conversation of, with von Below quoted, 206\n\n\"Decent respect to the opinions of mankind,\" vi\n\nDeclaration of Independence cited, 3\n\nDernberg, Dr., 224;\n  claims France violated Belgian neutrality, 228\n\nDisfurth, Major-General von, on Germany's war policy, quoted, 12, 13\n\nDryander, Dr., 197, 223\n\n\n                    E\n\nEngland, anticipation of war in, xii;\n  fear of, for Germany, xxi;\n  has also had its \"Bernhardis,\" 15;\n  Bernhardi's opinion of attitude during Civil War, 17;\n  publishes _White Paper_, 22;\n  testimony of British Ambassador at Vienna cited, 32, 33;\n  probability of intervention of, 66;\n  requests time, 70, 71;\n  assured of French and Russian alliance, 77;\n  refuses to align definitely with Russia and France, 79;\n  suggests peace conference in London, 93;\n  assures Germany of her desire for peace, 153;\n  requested to act as mediator, 191;\n  reason for use of word instead of \"Great Britain,\" 195;\n  signs \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  inquires as to German and French intentions toward Belgium, 207;\n  requests Belgium to maintain her neutrality, 207;\n  questions Germany as to intentions concerning Belgium, 208;\n  ultimatum of, to Germany, 218;\n  reply of, to Belgian appeal, 219;\n  anticipating German invasion of Belgium, 236 ff.;\n  entered war because of invasion of Belgium, 245;\n  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;\n  _see_ Bertie, Bunsen, George, King, Goschen, Grey, Triple Entente\n\n\n                    F\n\nFrance, preparation in, for war, xii;\n  fear of Germany for, xxi;\n  publishes _Yellow Book_, 23;\n  French Premier quoted on Austrian Servian troubles, 31, 32;\n  relations of, with Germany, 56;\n  assures Russia and England of her support, 77;\n  refuses Germany's request to influence Russia, 92;\n  urges Germany to join Powers in preventing invasion of Servia, 95;\n  assured that Germany wishes peace, 131;\n  suspicion of, toward Germany, 132;\n  supports England's request for conference, 133;\n  declaration of war on, delayed, 192; ultimatum to, 192;\n  invasion of, 192 _et seq._\n  reason of, for not assuming aggressive, 193;\n  invasion of, to follow immediately or to precede severance of\n    diplomatic relations, 194;\n  signs \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  respects Belgium neutrality, 200;\n  reaffirms intention of respecting Belgian neutrality, 206;\n  reply of, to England's query regarding Belgian neutrality, 207;\n  declares to Belgium intention of respecting neutrality, 208;\n  cited by Germany as cause for violation of Belgian neutrality, 210,\n    211;\n  offers military support to Belgium, 214;\n  \"overt acts of,\" 238, 239;\n  first death in war, 253; attitude of people in, 254 ff.;\n  _see_ Berthelot, Cambon, Triple Entente, Viviani\n\nFranco-German War, cause of, 19\n\nFrederick the Great, 2;\n  effect of, on Germany to-day, 10\n\nFuchs, Dr., on hatred, quoted, 11;\n  on preparedness for war, quoted, 11\n\n_Furor Teutonicus_ directed against England, xxii\n\n\n                    G\n\nGeorge, King of England, message of, to Kaiser, 153;\n  telegram of, to Czar, 155;\n  message to, from Kaiser regarding neutrality of France, 187\n\nGermany, confesses its crime, viii;\n  suppression of evidence by, ix;\n  gives Austria _carte blanche_, x;\n  refuses to accept peace proposals, xi;\n  invades Luxemburg, xi;\n  \"fears God but nothing else,\" xix ff.;\n  attitude of, toward rest of\n  world, xix _et seq._;\n  foreign policy of, xxii;\n  real attitude of people, xxiii;\n  German people misled, xxvi;\n  endeavors to gain approval of America, 4;\n  espouses visions of Machiavelli, 5 ff.;\n  attitude of, toward war, 6 ff.;\n  avowed attitude of, towards world, 6 _et seq._;\n  doctrine of, 11 _et seq._;\n  war policies of, shown by quotations, 11 _et seq._;\n  spirit of the ruling classes, 13;\n  domination of Europe established, 19, 20;\n  attitude of, on the Balkans, 19 _et seq._;\n  publishes _White Paper_, 22;\n  suppression of facts by, 27;\n  communications of, to Austria withheld from _White Paper_,\n    28, 29;\n  advance knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 32 _et seq._;\n  only power to know of Austria's ultimatum, 33;\n  attitude of, false, 34;\n  Ambassador to England suggests Russia as \"mediator with regard to\n    Servia,\" 35;\n  Ambassador to England denies knowledge of Austria's actions, 35;\n  disclaims knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 36;\n  guilty of duplicity regarding Austria's ultimatum, 36;\n  unquestionably had previous knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 37;\n  sincerity of attitude examined, 38 ff.;\n  pacific protestations of, insincere, 38;\n  first statement of Germany's position regarding Austro-Servian\n    problem, 39 ff.;\n  greatest diplomatic blunder, 39, 40;\n  further proof of her knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 41;\n  supports Austria, 41;\n  anticipates Servia's refusal, 42;\n  instructions to Ambassador, 43;\n  Ambassador to U. S. admits advance knowledge of Austrian ultimatum,\n    46;\n  takes steps to allay indignation of U. S., 46;\n  warnings of, to Servia, 56;\n  relations of, with France, 56;\n  reason for actions of, 65 ff.;\n  fails to move for peace, 69, 70;\n  excuses for not granting time extension, 71 ff.;\n  refuses Russia's request for time extension, 73 ff.;\n  fear of, for England's, 79;\n  principal fear of, 79;\n  attitude of, toward Servia's reply, 83, 84;\n  withholds from people adequate information on Servia's reply, 85;\n  reply to England's further requests for time, 87;\n  disclaims any responsibility for Austrian ultimatum, 89, 90;\n  willing to have England mediate between Austria and Russia, 89;\n  states that Austria cannot draw back in Servian matter, 89;\n  fatal policy of, 91;\n  declares Russia responsible for war, 92;\n  requests France to influence Russia, 92;\n  refuses to attend peace conference in London, 93;\n  refuses Russia's request to urge conciliation in Austria, 95;\n  refuses France's request to prevent invasion of Servia, 96;\n  insists on \"exclusion of all possibility of mediation,\" 97;\n  claims efforts for mediation came too late, 98;\n  excuse of, for not assenting to peace conference, 100, 101;\n  incapable diplomats of, 103;\n  attitude of people toward Kaiser, 109 ff.;\n  knew that Servia would refuse demand of \"judiciary cooperation\", 115;\n  further proof of Germany's advance knowledge of Austria's ultimatum,\n    116;\n  petty finesse of, 123;\n  excuse of, for not getting extension of time, 124;\n  avoids foreign diplomats, 125;\n  diplomats reluctant to leave copies of notes, 127 ff.;\n  Ambassador to France denies agreement with Austria over note to\n    Servia, 129;\n  assures France that she is for peace, 130;\n  refuses France's request for peace conference, 133;\n  \"closest interests\" of, 136;\n  national selfishness, 136;\n  believes Russia will keep out, 140;\n  believes France \"in no position for war,\" 140;\n  belief of, regarding war preparedness and action of other nations,\n    140, 141;\n  ultimatum to Russia, 141;\n  preparedness for war, 142;\n  assured of no provocative action on part of Russia, 152;\n  offer of, to England, 159 ff.;\n  advances upon France, 161;\n  French report of army movements, 161, 162;\n  evades England's request for peace suggestion, 169;\n  declaration of war by, quoted, 183, 184;\n  proof of preparedness of, 188, 189;\n  declares war on Russia, 192;\n  ultimatum of, to France, 192;\n  delays declaration of war upon France, 192;\n  awaits French act of aggression, 192;\n  Ambassador leaves Paris, 192;\n  ready for invasion of France, 193;\n  pacific intentions of, false, 193, 194;\n  inconsistency in policies of, 194;\n  diplomats and army not in harmony, 194;\n  disregard of, for rights of Belgium, 196;\n  respected neutrality of Belgium in 1870, 200;\n  professes intention of respecting Belgian neutrality, 201 ff.;\n  recognizes obligations of neutrality treaty, 202;\n  Foreign Office suppresses telegram of Czar, 189;\n  places responsibility for war upon Russia, 192;\n  evades England's question concerning Belgian neutrality, 208;\n  insists she is forced to invade Belgium, 210;\n  declares France will invade Belgium, 210;\n  excuses of, for invasion of Belgium, 210 ff.;\n  declares war upon Belgium, 215;\n  invades Belgium, 215;\n  invasion of Belgium considered and analyzed, 217 ff.;\n  imposes fines upon Belgium, 217 ff.;\n  reply of, to English ultimatum, 220;\n  declares necessity forces invasion of Belgium, 220;\n  defense of, for invasion of Belgium, 224;\n  moral isolation of, 229;\n  compared to Dr. Cook, 232;\n  plea of guilty, 233 ff.;\n  claims discovery of secret documents in Brussels, 235;\n  strategic railroads of, 237;\n  campaign which should have been followed, 245;\n  suppression of evidence by, useless, 246;\n  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;\n  attitude of people in, 256;\n  _see_ Kaiser, Lichnowsky, Prussia, Triple Alliance, von Below,\n    Bethmann-Hollweg, von Heeringen, von Jagow, von Schoen\n\nGladstone, did not rely on \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  speech of, concerning Belgium, quoted, 199;\n  speech of, cited by Shaw, 199\n\nGoschen, Sir E., on Germany's position in Austro-Servian trouble,\n    quoted, 39;\n  report of, regarding England's request for time, 72;\n  conversation of, with von Jagow preceding England's declaration of\n    war, 220 ff.;\n  instructions to, August 4th, 219\n\n_Gray Paper_ (Belgium), Belgium publishes, 23;\n  quoted, 202, 208, 210, 211, 218\n\nGreat Britain, _see_ England\n\nGrey, Sir Edward, compared to Pitt, 22;\n  conversation of, with German Ambassador regarding Austro-Servian\n    trouble, 35 ff.;\n  advised that Germany had knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 37;\n  report to, from British Ambassador at Berlin, July 22d, 38, 39, 28;\n  did not anticipate Austrian ultimatum;\n  deceived by Germany, 36;\n  conversation of, with Austrian Minister, quoted, 70, 71;\n  restrictions binding actions of, 79, 80;\n  instructions of, to British Ambassador at Belgrade, 82;\n  further plea for time, 86;\n  further proposals of, for peace, 89;\n  suggests peace conference of Powers in London, 93;\n  chief merit of, 105;\n  report of, by France, of German army movements, 161, 162;\n  replies to Germany on neutrality of England, 162;\n  that Germany suggest means of preventing Austro-Servian war, 167;\n  continues his efforts for peace, 172, 173;\n  last attempt of, to preserve peace, 180, 181;\n  conversation of, cited by Germany, 191;\n  inquiry of, concerning results of England's neutrality, 193;\n  conversations of, with German Ambassador concerning Belgian\n    neutrality, 209;\n  instructions to British Ambassador at Berlin, August 4th, 219;\n  refutes statement concerning secret documents, 236;\n  _see_ Bunsen; England; George, King; Goschen\n\n\n                    H\n\nHaeckel, Ernst, 197\n\nHague Tribunal, due to Czar's initiative, 189;\n  Russia desires Austro-Servian problem referred to, 189;\n  actions taken by, in 1907, 204 ff.; 226; 251\n\n_Hamburger Nachrichten_, quoted, 12, 13\n\nHamilton, Alexander, quoted, 227\n\nHarden, Maximilian, on Germany's war policies, quoted, 12; 243\n\nHarnack, 222\n\nHerzegovina annexed by Austria, 20\n\n\n                    I\n\nItaly, not bound by Triple Alliance, x;\n  attitude of, 23 ff.;\n  as affected by Triple Alliance, 24;\n  attitude of, 24, 25;\n  German messages to, suppressed, 29;\n  told that situation would \"be cleared up,\" 35;\n  cooperation of, dependent upon Russia's actions, 65;\n  not advised of intended actions of Germany and Austria, 117;\n  previously sounded by Austria, 119;\n  Germany schemes to acquire support of, 191, 192;\n  _see_ San Giuliano\n\n\n                    J\n\nJefferson, Thomas, quoted, vi\n\nJunkerdom, _see_ Prussia\n\n\n                    K\n\nKaiser, returns to Berlin from Norway, xi;\n  extols the Czar, xxii;\n  spirit of absolutism of, 9;\n  \"divine right\" of, 9;\n  quoted, 9;\n  fanatic absolutism of, 9;\n  an adherent of brute force, 13;\n  \"China speech\" of, quoted, 14;\n  \"Hun\" speech, quoted, 14;\n  Cambon 1913 report concerning, 107;\n  position of, 109 _et seq._;\n  attitude and actions of, in early part of trouble, 138 _et seq._;\n  ultimatum of, to Russia, 141;\n  responsibility of, for war, 141, 142;\n  character of, 142 ff.;\n  does not act in interests of peace, 145 ff.;\n  despatch of, to Czar regarding murder of Archduke, quoted, 147;\n  second message to Czar, 149;\n  fatal error of, 150;\n  third message to Czar, 151;\n  reply of, to King George, 154;\n  message of, to Czar regarding Russia's mobilization, 155;\n  estimate and discussion of actions of, 157;\n  preparing for war, 159;\n  taking steps to alienate England from Allies, 159 ff.;\n  issues ultimatum to Russia, 176;\n  reply of, to last message of Czar, 185, 186;\n  message of, to England regarding neutrality of France, 187;\n  \"awful responsibility of,\" 188;\n  telegram of, to King George, quoted, 193;\n  reason of, for telegram to King George, 193;\n  telegram of, analyzed, 193;\n  blunders of, 194;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nKudachef, Prince, action of, regarding time extension, 73\n\n\n                    L\n\nLamprecht, 223\n\nLichnowsky, Prince, affects ignorance, 121;\n  conversation with, cited, 191;\n  query to, regarding results of England's neutrality, 193;\n  conversation of, with Sir Edward Grey concerning Belgian neutrality,\n    209; 89, 90;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nLiege, French officers at, 230\n\nLuxemburg, invaded, xi;\n  wrong done to, 243\n\n\n                    M\n\nMachiavelli, vicious principles of, 4;\n  Bernhardi compared to, 16\n\nMahan, Admiral, 11\n\nMargerie, M. de, prepares _Yellow Book_, 102\n\n_Militaerische Rundschau_, quoted, 114\n\nMoltke, von, opinion of, cited, 6, 7\n\nMorocco controversy, 109 ff.\n\n\n                    N\n\nNamur, French officers at, 230\n\nNapoleon III., honor of, 201\n\nNewspapers, American, lack of Austrian dispatches to, before war, 31\n\nNietzsche, 6\n\n\n                    O\n\n_Orange Paper_ (Russia), Russia publishes, 22;\n  quoted regarding Germany's knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 36;\n  quoted, 36, 68, 69, 73, 74, 85, 91, 92, 95, 97\n\n\n                    P\n\nPachitch, Servian Premier, absent from Belgrade, 32\n\nPenn, William, treaty of, compared to the \"scrap of paper,\" xvi\n\nPoland, compared to Belgium, 218\n\nPrussia, Prussian Junkerdom, 8 ff.;\n  signs \"neutrality of Belgium,\" treaty, 198\n\n\n                    R\n\n_Red Book_, analyzed, 30;\n  discloses true Austrian policy, 190;\n  quoted, 190, 191\n\nReichstag, debate in, quoted, 201, 202, 240, 241\n\nRumbold, Sir H., letter to, quoted in _White Paper_, 35\n\nRussia, intimidated by Germany, 20;\n  forced to submit in Balkans, 20;\n  publishes _Orange Paper_, 22;\n  suggested by Germany as mediator between Austria and Servia, 35;\n  assured of Germany's ignorance of Austrian ultimatum, 36;\n  assured that Austria will not seize Servian territory, 59, 60;\n  possibility of intervention of, 65;\n  attitude of, 67 ff.;\n  message of, to Austria, quoted, 68, 69;\n  request for time refused, 71;\n  assured that Austria contemplates no acquisition of Servian territory,\n    74, 75;\n  confers with France and England, 77;\n  suggestions of, to avoid conflict, 77, 78;\n  willing to leave Austro-Servian trouble in hands of the Powers, 80,\n    81,;\n  proposal of, to Austria, 91;\n  requests Germany to urge conciliation with Austria, 95;\n  proposes its services in keeping Servia quiet, 96;\n  again proposes peace conference, 99;\n  assured that Austria's claims would be acceptable, 123;\n  charge put off until too late, 125;\n  ultimatum of Germany to, 141,;\n  assures Germany of no provocative action upon her part, 152;\n  offers to stop all military preparations, 164 ff;\n  orders general mobilization, 171;\n  refuses to reply to Germany's ultimatum, 178;\n  suggests referring Austro-Servian problem to Hague, 189;\n  \"not guilty,\" 189;\n  offer of, to suspend military preparations, 190;\n  cannot treat direct with Austria, 191;\n  requests England to act as mediator, 191;\n  stipulates suspension of hostilities during mediation, 191;\n  signs \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  _see_ Czar, Kudachef, Sazonof;\n  _see also_ Triple Entente\n\nRusso-Japanese war, xxii\n\n\n                    S\n\nSan Giuliano, Marquis di, Italian Foreign Minister, quoted, 119\n\nSazonof, suggestion of, to avoid conflict, 77, 78;\n  good work of, 105;\n  message of, to Austria regarding ultimatum, 126, 28\n\nSchmidt, 223\n\n\"Scrap of Paper,\" vi; xvi;\n  Bethmann-Hollweg's remark, quoted, 220, 221;\n  discusses his remark, 239 ff.;\n  defense for, use of phrase, 239 ff.;\n  \"Secret Documents,\" contents of supposed, 235 ff.\n\nSedan, battle of, result of Belgium neutrality, 201\n\nSerajevo, murder of Crown Prince of Austria at, 20, 31\n\nServia, ultimatum to, 19;\n  advised by France, Russia, and Great Britain, 31;\n  formally disclaims responsibility for murder of Archduke, 33;\n  probable effect of humiliation of, 40;\n  refusal of Austrian demands anticipated, 42;\n  reply to Austrian ultimatum quoted in full, 47 _et seq._;\n  population of, 55;\n  warned by Germany, 56;\n  Austro-Servian relations, 56;\n  result of acquiescence to Austria, 60;\n  requested by Triple Entente to make conciliatory reply, 80;\n  reply of, in accord with requests of Triple Entente, 83;\n  offers Austria ample reparation, 114;\n  subjugation of, the \"bone of contention,\" 192\n\nShaw, George Bernard, opinions of, cited, 14, 15;\n  defense of Germany, 14 ff.;\n  quoted regarding \"neutrality of Belgium\" treaty, 198;\n  quoted, 248\n\nSiemens, 223\n\nSlav, the, fear of Germany for, xxi\n\nSymonds, John Addington, quoted, 4, 5\n\nSzapary, Count, 126\n\n\n                    T\n\nTisza, Count, refuses to disclose results of judicial inquiry into\n    murder of Archduke, 113\n\nTreitschke, doctrines of, xvii;\n  _Politik_, cited, 6;\n  doctrines of, based on Machiavelli, 6;\n  influence of, 10\n\nTreaty of 1870, 198 ff.\n\nTreaty of 1839, 198 ff.; 225; 251\n\nTriple Alliance, x;\n  as affecting Italy, 24;\n  terms of, 24; 192;\n  _see_ Austria, Germany, Italy\n\nTriple Entente, proposes peace, xi;\n  lulled into false security, 32 ff.;\n  movements and reports of leading statesmen of, just previous to\n    declaration of war, 32 ff.;\n  ignorant of Austria's ultimatum, 33, 65;\n  still labors for peace, 86;\n  _see also_, France, Great Britain, Russia\n\nTurkey, German officers in, 230\n\n\n                    U\n\nUnited States, supposititious invasion of, by Germany, 225 ff.;\n  position of, 248 ff.\n\n\n                    V\n\nViviani, Premier, quoted regarding Austro-Servian trouble, 31, 32;\n  reply of, to Germany, 192;\n  reply of, to England's query regarding Belgian neutrality, 207;\n  _see_ France\n\nVoltaire, quoted, xvi\n\nVon Below, declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 203; 206;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nVon Buelow, 223\n\nVon der Elst, Baron, 210, 211;\n  _see_ Belgium\n\nVon Gwinner, 223\n\nVon Heeringen, declares Belgian neutrality will be respected, 203;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nVon Jagow, Herr, conversation of, cited, 38, 39;\n  representations of, on Germany's position in Austro-Servian matter,\n    39;\n  refuses to attend peace conference in London, 93;\n  on Austrian ultimatum, quoted, 94;\n  conversations of, with Cambon, 122 ff.;\n  refuses peace conference, 133;\n  blunders of, 194;\n  declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 202;\n  conversations with Sir Edward Goschen preceding England's declaration\n    of war, 219 ff.;\n  states real purpose of Germany's invasion of Belgium, 222;\n  _see_ Germany\n\nVon Mach, claims France violated Belgian neutrality, 228;\n  on French officers in Belgium, quoted, 231, 232;\n  _What Germany Wants_, 233;\n  arguments of, in defense of Germany, 233 ff.; 197\n\nVon Moltke, General, blunders of, 194\n\nVon Posadowsky, 223\n\nVon Schmoller, 223\n\nVon Schoen, Baron, assures France that Germany is for peace, 130;\n  makes public statement through French Foreign Office, 131 ff.\n\nVon Wilamowitz, 223\n\n\n                    W\n\n_What Germany Wants_, cited, 233\n\n_White Paper_ (English), published, 22;\n  analyzed, 27 ff.;\n  quoted, 34 ff.; 36; 37; 38; 39; 41; 56; 76; 82, 83; 86; 93; 94; 97;\n    99; 159 ff.; 167, 168, 169; 207, 208; 209; 219 _et seq._;\n  _see_ England\n\n_White Paper_ (German), published, 22;\n  suppression of facts in, 27 ff.;\n  suppresses instructions to Ambassador, 191;\n  quoted, 28; 38; 41; 43, 44; 45; 67; 75; 87; 147; 149 ff.; ix; 192;\n    193;\n  _see_ Germany\n\n\n                    Y\n\n_Yellow Book_ (France), published, 23;\n  additional data in, 102 ff.;\n  contents of first chapter of, 106 ff.;\n  throws light on petty finesse of Germany and Austria, 123;\n  cited, 46;\n  quoted, 107 ff.;\n  second chapter of, 113 _et seq._;\n  quoted, 113, 114, 115; 116, 117; 122, 123; 125; 129; 133 ff.;\n  _see_ France\n\n\n                    Z\n\nZabern incident, the, attitude of Crown Prince toward, 14\n\n\n\n\nMYRTLE REED'S NOVELS\n\nMay be had wherever books are sold. Ask for Grosset & Dunlap's list\n\n=LAVENDER AND OLD LACE.=\n\nA charming story of a quaint corner of New England where bygone\nromance finds a modern parallel. The story centers round the coming of\nlove to the young people on the staff of a newspaper--and it is one of\nthe prettiest, sweetest and quaintest of old fashioned love stories,\n... a rare book, exquisite in spirit and conception, full of delicate\nfancy, of tenderness, of delightful humor and spontaneity.\n\n=A SPINNER IN THE SUN.=\n\nMiss Myrtle Reed may always be depended upon to write a story in which\npoetry, charm, tenderness and humor are combined into a clever and\nentertaining book. Her characters are delightful and she always\ndisplays a quaint humor of expression and a quiet feeling of pathos\nwhich give a touch of active realism to all her writings. In \"A\nSpinner in the Sun\" she tells an old-fashioned love story, of a veiled\nlady who lives in solitude and whose features her neighbors have never\nseen. There is a mystery at the heart of the book that throws over it\nthe glamour of romance.\n\n=THE MASTER'S VIOLIN.=\n\nA love story in a musical atmosphere. A picturesque, old German\nvirtuoso is the reverent possessor of a genuine \"Cremona.\" He consents\nto take for his pupil a handsome youth who proves to have an aptitude\nfor technique, but not the soul of an artist. The youth has led the\nhappy, careless life of a modern, well-to-do young American and he\ncannot, with his meagre past, express the love, the passion and the\ntragedies of life and all its happy phases as can the master who has\nlived life in all its fulness. But a girl comes into his life--a\nbeautiful bit of human driftwood that his aunt had taken into her\nheart and home, and through his passionate love for her, he learns the\nlessons that life has to give--and his soul awakes.\n\nFounded on a fact that all artists realize.\n\n_Ask for a compete free list of G. & D. Popular Copyrighted Fiction_\n\nGROSSET & DUNLAP, 526 WEST 26th ST., NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\nZANE GREY'S NOVELS\n\nMay be had wherever books are sold. Ask for Grosset & Dunlap's list\n\n=THE LIGHT OF WESTERN STARS.=\n\nColored frontispiece by W. Herbert Dunton.\n\nMost of the action of this story takes place near the turbulent\nMexican border of the present day. A New York society girl buys a\nranch which becomes the center of frontier warfare. Her loyal cowboys\ndefend her property from bandits, and her superintendent rescues her\nwhen she is captured by them. A surprising climax brings the story to\na delightful close.\n\n=DESERT GOLD.=\n\nIllustrated by Douglas Duer.\n\nAnother fascinating story of the Mexican border. Two men, lost in the\ndesert, discover gold when, overcome by weakness, they can go no\nfarther. The rest of the story describes the recent uprising along the\nborder, and ends with the finding of the gold which the two\nprospectors had willed to the girl who is the story's heroine.\n\n=RIDERS OF THE PURPLE SAGE.=\n\nIllustrated by Douglas Duer.\n\nA picturesque romance of Utah of some forty years ago when Mormon\nauthority ruled. In the persecution of Jane Withersteen, a rich ranch\nowner, we are permitted to see the methods employed by the invisible\nhand of the Mormon Church to break her will.\n\n=THE LAST OF THE PLAINSMEN.=\n\nIllustrated with photograph reproductions.\n\nThis is the record of a trip which the author took with Buffalo Jones,\nknown as the preserver of the American bison, across the Arizona\ndesert and of a hunt in \"that wonderful country of yellow crags, deep\ncanons and giant pines.\" It is a fascinating story.\n\n=THE HERITAGE OF THE DESERT.=\n\nJacket in color. Frontispiece.\n\nThis big human drama is played in the Painted Desert. A lovely\ngirl, who has been reared among Mormons, learns to love a young New\nEnglander. The Mormon religion, however, demands that the girl shall\nbecome the second wife of one of the Mormons--\n\nWell, that's the problem of this sensational, big selling story.\n\n=BETTY ZANE.=\n\nIllustrated by Louis F. Grant.\n\nThis story tells of the bravery and heroism of Betty, the beautiful\nyoung sister of old Colonel Zane, one of the bravest pioneers. Life\nalong the frontier, attacks by Indians, Betty's heroic defense of the\nbeleaguered garrison at Wheeling, the burning of the Fort, and Betty's\nfinal race for life, make up this never-to-be-forgotten story.\n\nGROSSET & DUNLAP, PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\nJOHN FOX, JR'S.\n\nSTORIES OF THE KENTUCKY MOUNTAINS\n\nMay be had wherever books are sold. Ask for Grosset and Dunlap's list.\n\n=THE TRAIL OF THE LONESOME PINE.=\n\nIllustrated by F. C. Yohn.\n\nThe \"lonesome pine\" from which the story takes its name was a tall\ntree that stood in solitary splendor on a mountain top. The fame of\nthe pine lured a young engineer through Kentucky to catch the trail,\nand when he finally climbed to its shelter he found not only the pine\nbut the _foot-prints of a girl_. And the girl proved to be lovely,\npiquant, and the trail of these girlish foot-prints led the young\nengineer a madder chase than \"the trail of the lonesome pine.\"\n\n=THE LITTLE SHEPHERD OF KINGDOM COME.=\n\nIllustrated by F. C. Yohn.\n\nThis is a story of Kentucky, in a settlement known as \"Kingdom Come.\"\nIt is a life rude, semi-barbarous; but natural and honest, from which\noften springs the flower of civilization.\n\n\"Chad,\" the \"little shepherd\" did not know who he was nor whence he\ncame--he had just wandered from door to door since early childhood,\nseeking shelter with kindly mountaineers who gladly fathered and\nmothered this waif about whom there was such a mystery--a charming\nwaif, by the way, who could play the banjo better than anyone else\nin the mountains.\n\n=A KNIGHT OF THE CUMBERLAND.=\n\nIllustrated by F. C. Yohn.\n\nThe scenes are laid along the waters of the Cumberland, the lair of\nmoonshiner and feudsman. The knight is a moonshiner's son, and the\nheroine a beautiful girl perversely christened \"The Blight.\" Two\nimpetuous young Southerners fall under the spell of \"The Blight's\"\ncharms and she learns what a large part jealousy and pistols have in\nthe love making of the mountaineers.\n\nIncluded in this volume is \"Hell fer-Sartain\" and other stories, some\nof Mr. Fox's most entertaining Cumberland valley narratives.\n\n_Ask for complete list of G. & D. Popular Copyrighted Fiction_\n\nGROSSET & DUNLAP, 526 WEST 26TH ST., NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\nJACK LONDON'S NOVELS\n\nMay be had wherever books are sold. Ask for Grosset & Dunlap's list.\n\n=JOHN BARLEYCORN.= Illustrated by H. T. Dunn.\n\nThis remarkable book is a record of the author's own amazing\nexperiences This big, brawny world rover, who has been acquainted with\nalcohol from boyhood, comes out boldly against John Barleycorn. It is\na string of exciting adventures, yet it forcefully conveys an\nunforgettable idea and makes a typical Jack London book.\n\n=THE VALLEY OF THE MOON.= Frontispiece by George Harper.\n\nThe story opens in the city slums where Billy Roberts, teamster and ex\nprize fighter, and Saxon Brown, laundry worker, meet and love and\nmarry. They tramp from one end of California to the other, and in the\nValley of the Moon find the farm paradise that is to be their\nsalvation.\n\n=BURNING DAYLIGHT.= Four illustrations.\n\nThe story of an adventurer who went to Alaska and laid the foundations\nof his fortune before the gold hunters arrived. Bringing his fortunes\nto the States he is cheated out of it by a crowd of money kings, and\nrecovers it only at the muzzle of his gun. He then starts out as a\nmerciless exploiter on his own account. Finally he takes to drinking\nand becomes a picture of degeneration. About this time he falls in\nlove with his stenographer and wins her heart but not her hand and\nthen--but read the story!\n\n=A SON OF THE SUN.= Illustrated by A. O. Fischer and C. W. Ashley.\n\nDavid Grief was once a light haired, blue eyed youth who came from\nEngland to the South Seas in search of adventure. Tanned like a native\nand as lithe as a tiger, he became a real son of the sun. The life\nappealed to him and he remained and became very wealthy.\n\n=THE CALL OF THE WILD.= Illustrations by Philip R. Goodwin and Charles\nLivingston Bull. Decorations by Charles E. Hooper.\n\nA book of dog adventures as exciting as any man's exploits could be.\nHere is excitement to stir the blood and here is picturesque color to\ntransport the reader to primitive scenes.\n\n=THE SEA WOLF.= Illustrated by W. J. Aylward.\n\nTold by a man whom Fate suddenly swings from his fastidious life into\nthe power of the brutal captain of a sealing schooner. A novel of\nadventure warmed by a beautiful love episode that every reader will\nhail with delight.\n\n=WHITE FANG.= Illustrated by Charles Livingston Bull.\n\n\"White Fang\" is part dog, part wolf and all brute, living in the\nfrozen north; he gradually comes under the spell of man's\ncompanionship, and surrenders all at the last in a fight with a bull\ndog. Thereafter he is man's loving slave.\n\nGROSSET & DUNLAP, PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:\n\n1. Changes have been made to correct obvious typesetters' errors;\notherwise, every effort has been made to remain true to the author's\nwords and intent.\n\n2. On some pages in this book, titles were underlined; this has been\nindicated by the equals sign (=) before and\nafter the title.","title":"The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":67175}