{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_31550/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_31550","id":"gutenberg_31550","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31550","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Gender & Sexuality Studies","Category: History - Early Modern (c. 1450-1750)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Women -- Suffrage"],"text":"Produced by Meredith Bach, Irma Spehar and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This\nfile was produced from images of public domain material\ngenerously made available by The Online Library of Liberty.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n                            THE FIRST ESSAY\n                                  ON\n                    The Political Rights of Women.\n\n\n         A Translation of CONDORCET'S Essay \"_Sur l'admission\n            des femmes au droit de Cit\u00e9_\" (On the Admission\n                of Women to the Rights of Citizenship).\n                      --_Collected Writings_, 1789.\n\n\n                                  BY\n                      DR. ALICE DRYSDALE VICKERY.\n\n                      (WITH PREFACE AND REMARKS.)\n\n\n                              LETCHWORTH:\n                      GARDEN CITY PRESS LIMITED.\n\n                           =Price Twopence.=\n\n\n\n\nPreface.\n\n\nMore than one hundred years have passed away since, in 1789, the\nMarquis de Condorcet wrote his \"_Esquisse sur l'Admission des Femmes\nau Droit de Cit\u00e9_,\" and yet the problem of women's enfranchisement\nstill awaits an equitable solution. Those of us who are old enough to\nremember the inauguration of the popular movement for the extension of\nthe franchise to women (which may be dated from the day in which our\nlate noble leader, JOHN STUART MILL, addressed the House of Commons on\nthis subject, in May, 1867), feel that our lives are passing away\nwhile wearily awaiting the dilatory educational development of mankind\nin this question.\n\nThe essential principles of our claim have been reiterated again and\nagain. We form one-half of the human race, and need recognition by the\nlaw as much as the other half of the race. But, as long as our\nlaw-makers are not directly responsible to us for their conduct in\nParliament, they may, and do, safely neglect our interests, and pass\nlaws which jeopardise our liberties and subordinate our just rights of\nperson, property, and offspring to the supposed interests of the men\nwhom they represent.\n\nThe spirit which animates Parliament pervades the whole of our social\nlife; and women suffer from lack of educational facilities, and from\nobstacles to success in industrial and professional life, in ways\nwhich have no parallel in the case of men. All these things have been\nurged again and again until we are weary of repeating them; and we ask\nourselves, as we mentally review our position, Where shall we find\nsome new argument wherewith to arrest the attention, and compel the\naction, of those who have the power, but seem to lack the will, to do\njustice? It is curious to note that the great point on which the mass\nof men seem united is their _sex_. Prejudices of race, of caste, of\ncolour may be overcome; but the pride of sex remains. Rights of\ncitizenship are accorded to the small shopkeeper, artisan, lodger,\nagricultural labourer, and to the illiterate who knows no difference\nbetween one party and the other, either as to tendencies or methods of\ngovernment. The Anglo-Saxon confers rights of citizenship upon the\nforeigner, upon the negro (as in the United States), upon the Maori\n(as in New Zealand)--the last of whom, sitting in the New Zealand\nHouse of Representatives, helped to maintain this glorious prerogative\nof sex by giving their casting-votes against a measure intended to\nmeet the claims of the Anglo-Saxon women in New Zealand.[1]\n\n    [1] The Parliamentary Franchise was conferred on the women of\n    New Zealand in 1893, the same year in which the above was\n    printed. In 1907 the Hon. R. Oliver, late member of the\n    Legislative Council, writes: \"The interest now taken by women\n    in New Zealand in the politics of the country is remarkable,\n    and is regarded as a decided gain to the community.\"\n\nAnd all this despite the admitted fact that the social and economic\nproblems, which are coming more and more into the field of\nparliamentary labours, are all but incapable of solution without the\nhelp of enfranchised women.\n\nMust women, then, following the example of men, learn to put sex in\nthe first place and regard all other interests as secondary? Is this\nreally what men wish to force women to do? One would think not. At\npresent women have not adopted any such principle of action. They are\ndivided rather than otherwise, according to the relations they occupy\nwith regard to men. The married woman, on the one hand, seems opposed\nto the claims of the widowed and single, on the other--and _vice\nvers\u00e2_; and both together combine to ostracise some of their own sex.\nIt seems probable, however, that we women will have to learn to drop\nall such rivalries, and determine to form one vast organisation, which\nshall include within its ranks all sorts and conditions of women, and\nshall extend over the whole of the United Kingdom, if we would not see\nthis nineteenth century completed without Woman's Emancipation\nbecoming an accomplished fact.\n\n                                                (DR.) ALICE VICKERY.\n\n\n\n\nOn the Admission of Women to the Rights of Citizenship.\n\nBY THE MARQUIS DE CONDORCET.\n\n\nCustom may familiarise mankind with the violation of their natural\nrights to such an extent, that even among those who have lost or been\ndeprived of these rights, no one thinks of reclaiming them, or is even\nconscious that they have suffered any injustice.\n\nCertain of these violations (of natural right) have escaped the notice\nof philosophers and legislators, even while concerning themselves\nzealously to establish the common rights of individuals of the human\nrace, and in this way to lay the foundation of political institutions.\nFor example, have they not all violated the principle of the equality\nof rights in tranquilly depriving one-half of the human race of the\nright of taking part in the formation of laws by the exclusion of\nwomen from the rights of citizenship? Could there be a stronger proof\nof the power of habit, even among enlightened men, than to hear\ninvoked the principle of equal rights in favour of perhaps some 300 or\n400 men, who had been deprived of it by an absurd prejudice, and\nforget it when it concerns some 12,000,000 women?\n\nTo show that this exclusion is not an act of tyranny, it must be\nproved either that the natural rights of women are not absolutely the\nsame as those of men, or that women are not capable of exercising\nthese rights.\n\nBut the rights of men result simply from the fact that they are\nrational, sentient beings, susceptible of acquiring ideas of morality,\nand of reasoning concerning those ideas. Women having, then, the same\nqualities, have necessarily the same rights. Either no individual of\nthe human species has any true rights, or all have the same; and he or\nshe who votes against the rights of another, whatever may be his or\nher religion, colour, or sex, has by that fact abjured his own.\n\nIt would be difficult to prove that women are incapable of exercising\nthe rights of citizenship. Although liable to become mothers of\nfamilies, and exposed to other passing indispositions, why may they\nnot exercise rights of which it has never been proposed to deprive\nthose persons who periodically suffer from gout, bronchitis, etc.?\nAdmitting for the moment that there exists in men a superiority of\nmind, which is not the necessary result of a difference of education\n(which is by no means proved, but which should be, to permit of women\nbeing deprived of a natural right without injustice), this inferiority\ncan only consist in two points. It is said that no woman has made any\nimportant discovery in science, or has given any proofs of the\npossession of genius in arts, literature, etc.; but, on the other\nhand, it is not pretended that the rights of citizenship should be\naccorded only to men of genius. It is added that no woman has the same\nextent of knowledge, the same power of reasoning, as certain men; but\nwhat results from that? Only this, that with the exception of a\nlimited number of exceptionally enlightened men, equality is absolute\nbetween women and the remainder of the men; that this small class\napart, inferiority and superiority are equally divided between the two\nsexes. But since it would be completely absurd to restrict to this\nsuperior class the rights of citizenship and the power of being\nentrusted with public functions, why should women be excluded any more\nthan those men who are inferior to a great number of women? Lastly,\nshall it be said that there exists in the minds and hearts of women\ncertain qualities which ought to exclude them from the enjoyment of\ntheir natural rights? Let us interrogate the facts. Elizabeth of\nEngland, Maria Theresa, the two Catherines of Russia--have they not\nshown that neither in courage nor in strength of mind are women\nwanting?\n\nElizabeth possessed all the failings of women. Did these failings work\nmore harm during her reign than resulted from the failings of men\nduring the reign of her father, Henry VIII., or her successor, James\nI.? Have the lovers of certain empresses exercised a more dangerous\ninfluence than the mistresses of Louis XIV., of Louis XV., or even of\nHenry IV.?\n\nWill it be maintained that Mistress Macaulay would not have expressed\nher opinions in the House of Commons better than many representatives\nof the British nation? In dealing with the question of liberty of\nconscience, would she not have expressed more elevated principles than\nthose of Pitt, as well as more powerful reasoning? Although as great\nan enthusiast on behalf of liberty as Mr. Burke could be on behalf of\nits opposite, would she, while defending the French Constitution, have\nmade use of such absurd and offensive nonsense as that which this\ncelebrated rhetorician made use of in attacking it? Would not the\nadopted daughter of Montaigne have better defended the rights of\ncitizens in France, in 1614, than the Councillor Courtin, who was a\nbeliever in magic and occult powers? Was not the Princesse des Ursins\nsuperior to Chamillard? Could not the Marquise de Chatelet have\nwritten equally as well as M. Rouill\u00e9? Would Mme. de Lambert have made\nlaws as absurd and as barbarous as those of the \"garde des Sceaux,\" of\nArmenouville, against Protestants, invaders of domestic privacy,\nrobbers and negroes? In looking back over the list of those who have\ngoverned the world, men have scarcely the right to be so very\nuplifted.\n\nWomen are superior to men in the gentle and domestic virtues; they, as\nwell as men, know how to love liberty, although they do not\nparticipate in all its advantages; and in republics they have been\nknown to sacrifice themselves for it. They have shown that they\npossess the virtues of citizens whenever chance or civil disasters\nhave brought them upon a scene from which they have been shut out by\nthe pride and the tyranny of men in all nations.\n\nIt has been said that women, in spite of much ability, of much\nsagacity, and of a power of reasoning carried to a degree equalling\nthat of subtle dialecticians, yet are never governed by what is called\n\"reason.\"\n\nThis observation is not correct. Women are not governed, it is true,\nby the reason (and experience) of men; they are governed by their own\nreason (and experience).\n\nTheir interests not being the same (as those of men) by the fault of\nthe law, the same things not having the same importance for them as\nfor men, they may, without failing in rational conduct, govern\nthemselves by different principles, and tend towards a different\nresult. It is as reasonable for a woman to concern herself respecting\nher personal attractions as it was for Demosthenes to cultivate his\nvoice and his gestures.\n\nIt is said that women, although superior in some respects to man--more\ngentle, more sensitive, less subject to those vices which proceed from\negotism and hardness of heart--yet do not really possess the sentiment\nof justice; that they obey rather their feelings than their\nconscience. This observation is more correct, but it proves nothing;\nit is not nature, it is education, it is social existence which\nproduces this difference.\n\nNeither the one nor the other has habituated women to the idea of what\nis just, but only to the idea of what is \"honn\u00eate,\" or respectable.\nExcluded from public affairs, from all those things which are judged\nof according to rigorous ideas of justice, or according to positive\nlaws, the things with which they are occupied and which are affected\nby them are precisely those which are regulated by natural feelings of\nhonesty (or, rather, propriety) and of sentiment. It is, then, unjust\nto allege as an excuse for continuing to refuse to women the enjoyment\nof all their natural rights motives which have only a kind of reality\nbecause women lack the experience which comes from the exercise of\nthese rights.\n\nIf reasons such as these are to be admitted against women, it will\nbecome necessary to deprive of the rights of citizenship that portion\nof the people who, devoted to constant labour, can neither acquire\nknowledge nor exercise their reason; and thus, little by little, only\nthose persons would be permitted to be citizens who had completed a\ncourse of legal study. If such principles are admitted, we must, as a\nnatural consequence, renounce the idea of a liberal constitution. The\nvarious aristocracies have only had such principles as these for\nfoundation or excuse. The etymology of the word is a sufficient proof\nof this.\n\nNeither can the subjection of wives to their husbands be alleged\nagainst their claims, since it would be possible in the same statute\nto destroy this tyranny of the civil law. The existence of one\ninjustice can never be accepted as a reason for committing another.\n\nThere remain, then, only two objections to discuss. And, in truth,\nthese can only oppose motives of expediency against the admission of\nwomen to the right of voting; which motives can never be upheld as a\nbar to the exercise of true justice. The contrary maxim has only too\noften served as the pretext and excuse of tyrants; it is in the name\nof expediency that commerce and industry groan in chains; and that\nAfrica remains afflicted with slavery: it was in the name of public\nexpediency that the Bastille was crowded; that the censorship of the\npress was instituted; that accused persons were not allowed to\ncommunicate with their advisers; that torture was resorted to.\nNevertheless, we will discuss these objections, so as to leave nothing\nwithout reply.\n\nIt is necessary, we are warned, to be on guard against the influence\nexercised by women over men. We reply at once that this, like any\nother influence, is much more to be feared when not exercised openly;\nand that, whatever influence may be peculiar to women, if exercised\nupon more than one individual at a time, will in so far become\nproportionately lessened. That since, up to this time, women have not\nbeen admitted in any country to absolute equality; since their empire\nhas none the less existed everywhere; and since the more women have\nbeen degraded by the laws, the more dangerous has their influence\nbeen; it does not appear that this remedy of subjection ought to\ninspire us with much confidence. Is it not probable, on the contrary,\nthat their special empire would diminish if women had less interest in\nits preservation; if it ceased to be for them their sole means of\ndefence, and of escape from persecution?\n\nIf politeness does not permit to men to maintain their opinions\nagainst women in society, this politeness, it may be said, is near\nakin to pride; we yield a victory of no importance; defeat does not\nhumiliate when it is regarded as voluntary. Is it seriously believed\nthat it would be the same in a public discussion on an important\ntopic? Does politeness forbid the bringing of an action at law against\na woman?\n\nBut, it will be said, this change will be contrary to general\nexpediency, because it will take women away from those duties which\nnature has reserved for them. This objection scarcely appears to me\nwell founded. Whatever form of constitution may be established, it is\ncertain that in the present state of civilisation among European\nnations there will never be more than a limited number of citizens\nrequired to occupy themselves with public affairs. Women will no more\nbe torn from their homes than agricultural labourers from their\nploughs, or artisans from their workshops. And, among the richer\nclasses, we nowhere see women giving themselves up so persistently to\ndomestic affairs that we should fear to distract their attention; and\na really serious occupation or interest would take them less away than\nthe frivolous pleasures to which idleness, a want of object in life,\nand an inferior education have condemned them.\n\nThe principal source of this fear is the idea that every person\nadmitted to exercise the rights of citizenship immediately aspires to\ngovern others. This may be true to a certain extent, at a time when\nthe constitution is being established, but the feeling can scarcely\nprove durable. And so it is scarcely necessary to believe that because\nwomen may become members of national assemblies, they would\nimmediately abandon their children, their homes, and their needles.\nThey would only be the better fitted to educate their children and to\nrear men. It is natural that a woman should suckle her infant; that\nshe should watch over its early childhood. Detained in her home by\nthese cares, and less muscular than the man, it is also natural that\nshe should lead a more retired, a more domestic life. The woman,\ntherefore, as well as the man in a corresponding class of life, would\nbe under the necessity of performing certain duties at certain times\naccording to circumstances. This may be a motive for not giving her\nthe preference in an election, but it cannot be a reason for legal\nexclusion. Gallantry would doubtless lose by the change, but domestic\ncustoms would be improved by equality in this as in other things.\n\nUp to this time the manners of all nations have been more or less\nbrutal and corrupt. I only know of one exception, and that is in\nfavour of the Americans of the United States, who are spread, few in\nnumber, over a wide territory. Up to this time, among all nations,\nlegal inequality has existed between men and women; and it would not\nbe difficult to show that, in these two phenomena, the second is one\nof the causes of the first, because inequality necessarily introduces\ncorruption, and is the most common cause of it, if even it be not the\nsole cause.\n\nI now demand that opponents should condescend to refute these\npropositions by other methods than by pleasantries and declamations;\nabove all, that they should show me any natural difference between men\nand women which may legitimately serve as foundation for the\ndeprivation of a right.\n\nThe equality of rights established between men by our new constitution\nhas brought down upon us eloquent declamations and never-ending\npleasantries; but up till now no one has been able to oppose to it one\nsingle reason, and this is certainly neither from lack of talent nor\nlack of zeal. I venture to believe that it will be the same with\nregard to equality of rights between the two sexes. It is sufficiently\ncurious that, in a great number of countries, women have been judged\nincapable of all public functions yet worthy of royalty; that in\nFrance a woman has been able to be regent, and yet that up to 1776 she\ncould not be a milliner or dressmaker (\"marchande des modes\") in\nParis, except under cover of her husband's name;[2] and that, lastly,\nin our elective assemblies they have accorded to rights of property\nwhat they have refused to natural right. Many of our noble deputies\nowe to ladies the honour of sitting among the representatives of the\nnation. Why, instead of depriving of this right women who were owners\nof landed estates, was it not extended to all those who possessed\nproperty or were heads of households? Why, if it be found absurd to\nexercise the right of citizenship by proxy, deprive women of this\nright, rather than leave them the liberty of exercising it in person?\n\n    [2] Before the suppression of \"jurandes,\" in 1776, women\n    could neither carry on a business of a \"marchande des modes\"\n    (milliner and dressmaker) nor of any other profession\n    exercised by them, unless they were married, or unless some\n    man lent or sold them his name for that purpose.--_See_\n    preamble of the Edict of 1776.\n\n\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n\nAlthough I am not aware of any previous translation of the foregoing\nessay, and do not remember to have seen anywhere any allusion to this\nfirst publication on the subject of woman's emancipation, yet I have\nbeen struck by the close similarity of the arguments used by J. S.\nMill and by those who have succeeded him in the advocacy of women's\nelectoral freedom to those used by the Marquis de Condorcet in this\nessay. It could not, indeed, well be otherwise, since the fundamental\nprinciple of equal rights, and equal claim to protection in the\nexercise of these rights, must present itself in the same forcible\nlight to any really intelligent person who is truly anxious to lay\ndown just and fair principles of government. That it should be within\nthe reach of every individual of the human race to attain to the power\nof influencing the Government under which he or she lives, follows\ninevitably to logical minds, and the only exceptions which can fairly\nbe made are those of the immature and the failures.\n\nThe immature, indeed, can scarcely be called exceptions, since\nmaturity succeeds immaturity--the child becomes the adult; and as\nphysical, moral, and intellectual powers are acquired, civil rights\nmust be accorded.\n\nThe failures, then, include all those who can with due regard to just\nprinciples be entirely excluded; and these are the idiot, who never\nreaches maturity; the lunatic, who, becoming diseased, loses the\nmental and moral characteristics of maturity; and the criminal, who is\ncoming more and more to be looked upon as partaking of the character\nof the idiot and the lunatic. I venture to think, then, that the real\nissue is narrowing itself down to this: that the opponents of women's\nemancipation really regard all women either as perpetually immature\n(to whom they will accord more or less protection, privilege, or even\nadoration, just as they admire the innocence of childhood), or as the\nperpetual failures of the race.\n\nIf women continue to be excluded from electoral functions, it will be\nbecause a majority of men in their secret hearts relegate them to one\nor other of these classes. But there are, happily, increasing numbers\nof men who are perfectly aware of, and sympathise with the indignation\nof women at the affront thus put upon them. These men cannot but feel\nthat the insult thus publicly affixed to all women affects them also.\nThey say: \"We are the sons of women, and may in our turn also become\nfathers of women. Are we, then, sons of slaves, and shall we in turn\ncreate slaves to hinder the development and lower the morality of our\nsons? No! we believe that women ought to be free and equal before the\nlaw, so that they may become mothers of free and equal sons and\ndaughters, helping in each other's development, ennobling and no\nlonger enslaving each other.\"\n\nIf the issue narrows down, looked at from first principles, it\nbroadens out indefinitely as the details of its applications and\neffects come before us. These are wide and far-reaching, and space\nfails for entering upon them here. But in the struggles of the\nlabouring classes, in the societies for reform of evils, for the\nspread of improvements, in the work of the County Council, etc., we\nfind that women's help is needed, and that it either cannot be given\nat all, or is miserably curtailed in its power for good and useful\nwork, because it is not accompanied by the electoral powers which back\nup men's endeavours. So it must remain till the power of the vote is\ngranted, and so does the Nemesis of injustice and inequality before\nthe law daily work out its revenge.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:\n\nOriginal spelling and punctuation have been preserved. Two printer's\nerrors have been fixed: on page 3, the year 1879 has been changed to\n1789. On page 5, the second and third lines were reversed. The proper\nword order has been restored.","title":"The first essay on the political rights of women","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":4069}