{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_31794/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_31794","id":"gutenberg_31794","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31794","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Naturalism","Religion and science"],"text":"Naturalism And Religion\n\n                                    By\n\n                             Dr. Rudolf Otto\n\n           Professor of Theology in the University of G\u00f6ttingen\n\n                              Translated by\n\n                            J. Arthur Thomson\n\n        Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen\n\n                                   and\n\n                           Margaret R. Thomson\n\n                      Edited with an Introduction by\n\n                      The Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D.\n\n                         Williams & Norgate Ltd.\n\n                  38 Great Ormond Street, London, W.C.1\n\n                                   1907\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface.\nChapter I. The Religious Interpretation Of The World.\n   What is Distinctive in the Religious Outlook.\nChapter II. Naturalism.\n   What is Distinctive in the Naturalistic Outlook.\n   The True Naturalism.\n   Goethe\u2019s Attitude to Naturalism.\n   The two Kinds of Naturalism.\n   Aim and Method of Naturalism.\nChapter III. Fundamental Principles.\n   How the Religious and the Naturalistic Outlooks Conflict.\n   Mystery : Dependence : Purpose.\n   The Mystery of Existence Remains Unexplained.\n   Evolution and New Beginnings.\n   The Dependence of the Order of Nature.\n   The \u201cContingency\u201d of the World.\n   The Real World.\n   The Antimony of Our Conception of Time.\n   The Antimony of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned.\n   The Antimony of Our Conception of Space.\n   The Recognition of Purpose.\n   Teleological and Scientific Interpretations are Alike Necessary.\nChapter IV. Darwinism In General.\n   The Development of Darwinism.\n   Darwinism and Teleology.\n   The Characteristic Features of Darwinism.\n   Various Forms of Darwinism.\n   The Theory of Descent.\n   Haeckel\u2019s Evolutionist Position.\n   Weismann\u2019s Evolutionist Position.\n   Virchow\u2019s Position.\n   Other Instances of Dissatisfaction with the Theory of Descent.\nChapter V. Religion And The Theory Of Descent.\n   The Problema Continui.\nChapter VI. Darwinism In The Strict Sense.\n   Differences of Opinion As To the Factors In Evolution.\n   Weismannism.\n   Natural Selection.\nChapter VII. Critics Of Darwinism.\n   Lamarckism and Neo-Lamarckism.\n   Theory of Definite Variation.\n   De Vries\u2019s Mutation-theory.\n   Eimer\u2019s Orthogenesis.\n   The Spontaneous Activity of the Organism.\n   Contrast Between Darwinian and Post-Darwinian Views.\nChapter VIII. The Mechanical Theory Of Life.\n   The Conservation of Matter and Energy.\n   The Organic and the Inorganic.\n   Irritability.\n   Spontaneous Generation.\n   The Mechanics of Development.\n   Heredity.\nChapter IX. Criticism Of Mechanical Theories.\n   The Law of the Conservation of Energy.\n   Criticisms of the Mechanistic Theory of Life.\n   Virchow\u2019s \u201cCaution\u201d.\n   Preyer\u2019s Position.\n   The Position Of Bunge and Other Physiologists.\n   The Views of Botanists Illustrated.\n   Constructive Criticism.\n   The Constructive Work of Driesch.\n   The Views of Albrecht and Schneider.\n   How all this affects the Religious Outlook.\nChapter X. Autonomy Of Spirit.\n   Naturalistic Attacks on the Autonomy of the Spiritual.\n   The Fundamental Answer.\n   Individual Development.\n   Underivability.\n   Pre-eminence of Consciousness.\n   Creative Power of Consciousness.\n   Activity of Consciousness.\n   The Ego.\n   Self-Consciousness.\n   The Unity of Consciousness.\n   Consciousness of the Ego.\nChapter XI. Freedom Of Spirit.\n   Feeling, Individuality, Genius, and Mysticism.\n   Feeling.\n   Individuality.\n   Genius.\n   Mysticism.\n   Mind and Spirit. The Human and the Animal Soul.\n   Personality.\n   Parallelism.\n   No Parallelism.\n   The Supremacy of Mind.\n   \u201cThe Unconscious\u201d.\n   Is there Ageing of the Mind?\n   Immortality.\nChapter XII. The World And God.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIt is a remarkable and in some respects a disquieting fact that whilst\nrival ecclesiastical parties are engaged in a furious and embittered\ndebate as to the precise shade of religious instruction to be given in\npublic elementary schools, the thinking classes in modern Europe are\nbecoming more and more stirred by the really vital question whether there\nis room in the educated mind for a religious conception of the world at\nall. The slow silent uninterrupted advance of research of all kinds into\nnature, life, and history, has imperceptibly but irrevocably,\nrevolutionised our traditional outlook upon the world, and one of the\nsupreme questions before the contemporary mind is the probable issue of\nthe great struggle now taking place between the religious and the\nnon-religious conception of human life and destiny. When we look at the\ndevelopment of this great fundamental conflict we feel that disputes\nbetween rival ecclesiastical systems are of trifling moment; the real task\nat the present time before every form of religion is the task of\nvindicating itself before a hostile view of life and things.\n\nIt is the consciousness of this fact which has led to the translation and\npublication in English of Professor Otto\u2019s volume. Professor Otto is well\nknown on the Continent as a thinker who possesses the rare merit of\ncombining a high philosophic discipline with an accurate and comprehensive\nknowledge of the science of organic nature. It is this combination of\naptitudes which has attracted so much attention to his work on Naturalism\nand Religion, and which gives it a value peculiar to itself. At a time\nwhen so much loose and incoherent thinking exists about fundamental\nproblems, and when so many irrelevant claims are made, sometimes on behalf\nof religion and sometimes on behalf of hypotheses said to be resting upon\nscience, it is a real satisfaction to meet with such a competent guide as\nDr. Otto. Although his book is written for the general reader, it is in\nreality a solid scientific contribution to the great debate at present in\nprogress between two different conceptions of the ultimate nature and\nmeaning of things. As such it is to be hoped that it will receive the\nfavourable consideration which it deserves at the hands of the\nEnglish-speaking world.\n\nW.D.M.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. THE RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD.\n\n\nThe title of this book, contrasting as it does the naturalistic and the\nreligious interpretation of the world, indicates that the intention of the\nfollowing pages is, in the first place, to define the relation, or rather\nthe antithesis, between the two; and, secondly, to endeavour to reconcile\nthe contradictions, and to vindicate against the counter-claims of\nnaturalism, the validity and freedom of the religious outlook. In doing\nthis it is assumed that there is some sort of relation between the two\nconceptions, and that there is a possibility of harmonising them.\n\nWill this be admitted? Is it not possible that the two views are\nincommensurable, and would it not be most desirable for both sides if this\nwere so, for if there is no logical antithesis then there can be no real\nantagonism? And is not this actually the case? Surely we have now left far\nbehind us the primitive expressions of the religious outlook which were\nconcerned with the creation of the world in six days, the making of Eve\nout of Adam\u2019s rib, the story of Paradise and the angelic and demoniacal\nforces, and the accessory miracles and accompanying signs by means of\nwhich the Divine control of the world was supposed to manifest itself. We\nhave surely learnt by this time to distinguish between the simple mythical\nor legendary forms of expression in the religious archives, and their\nspiritual value and ethical content. We can give to natural science and to\nreligious feeling what is due to each, and thus have done for ever with\ntedious apologetic discussion.\n\nIt were well indeed if we had really attained to this! But the relations,\nand therefore the possibilities of conflict between religion and\nworld-science, are by no means so easily disposed of. No actually existing\nform of religion is so entirely made up of \u201cfeeling,\u201d \u201csubjectivity,\u201d or\n\u201cmood,\u201d that it can dispense with all assumptions or convictions regarding\nthe nature and import of the world. In fact, every form, on closer\nexamination, reveals a more or less fixed framework of convictions,\ntheoretical assumptions, and presuppositions in regard to man, the world,\nand existence: that is to say, a theory, however simple, of the universe.\nAnd this theory must be harmonised with the conceptions of things as they\nare presented to us in general world-lore, in natural and historical\nscience, in particular sciences, in theories of knowledge, and perhaps in\nmetaphysics; it must measure itself by and with these, and draw from them\nsupport and corroboration, and possibly also submit to contradiction and\ncorrection.\n\nThere is no form of religion, not even the most rarefied (which makes\nleast claim because it has least content), that does not include in itself\nsome minute Credo, some faith, implying attachment to a set of doctrines\nand conclusions however few. And it is always necessary to show that these\nconclusions are worthy of adherence, and that they are not at variance\nwith conclusions and truths in regard to nature and the world drawn from\nother sources. And if we consider, not the efflorescences and artificial\nproducts of religion, but religion itself, it is certain that there is,\nand always must be, around it a borderland and fringe of religious\nworld-theory, with which it is not indeed identical, but without which it\nis inconceivable; that is, a series of definite and characteristic\nconvictions relating to the world and its existence, its meaning, its\n\u201cwhence\u201d and \u201cwhither\u201d; to man and his intelligence, his place and\nfunction in the world, his peculiar dignity, and his destiny; to time and\nspace, to infinity and eternity, and to the depth and mystery of Being in\ngeneral.\n\nThese convictions and their fundamental implications can be defined quite\nclearly, both singly and as a whole, and later we shall attempt so to\ndefine them. And it is of the greatest importance to religion that these\npresuppositions and postulates should have their legitimacy and validity\nvindicated. For they are at once the fundamental and the minimal\npostulates which religion must make in its outlook on the world, which it\nmust make if it is to exist at all. And they are so constituted that, even\nwhen they are released from their primitive and na\u00efve form and\nassociation, and permitted speculative development and freedom, they must,\nnevertheless, just because they contain a theory of the world, be brought\ninto comparison, contact, or relation of some kind, whether hostile or\nfriendly, with other world-conceptions of different origin. This relation\nwill be hostile or friendly according to the form these other conceptions\nhave taken. It is impossible to imagine any religious view of the world\nwhose network of conceptions can have meshes so wide, or constituents so\nelastic and easily adjustable, that it will allow every theoretical\nconception of nature and the world to pass through it without violence or\nfriction, offering to none either let or hindrance.\n\nIt has indeed often been affirmed that religion may, without anxiety about\nitself, leave scientific knowledge of the world to go its own way. The\nsecret reservation in this position is always the belief that scientific\nknowledge will never in any case reach the real depth and meaning of\nthings. Perhaps this is true. But the assumption itself would remain, and\nwould have to be justified. And if religion had no other interest in\ngeneral world-theory, it would still have this pre-eminent one, that, by\ndefining the limitations of scientific theory, and showing that they can\nnever be transcended, it thus indicates for itself a position beyond them\nin which it can dwell securely. In reality religion has never ceased to\nturn its never-resting, often anxious gaze towards the progress, the\nchanges, the secure results and tentative theories in the domain of\ngeneral world-science, and again and again it has been forced to come to a\nnew adjustment with them.\n\nOne great centre of interest, though by no means the only or even the\nchief one, lies in the special field of world-lore and theoretical\ninterpretation comprised in the natural sciences. And in the following\npages we shall make this our special interest, and shall endeavour to\ninquire whether our modern natural science consists with the \u201cminimal\nrequirements\u201d of the religious point of view, with which we shall make\ncloser acquaintance later; or whether it is at all capable of being\nbrought into friendly relations with that point of view.\n\nSuch a study need not necessarily be \u201capologetic,\u201d that is to say,\ndefensive, but may be simply an examination. For in truth the real results\nof investigation are not now and never were \u201caggressive,\u201d but are in\nthemselves neutral towards not only religious but all idealistic\nconceptions, and leave it, so to speak, to the higher methods of study to\ndecide how the material supplied is to be taken up into their different\ndepartments, and brought under their particular points of view. Our\nundertaking only becomes defensive and critical because, not from caprice\nor godlessness, but, as we shall see, from an inherent necessity, the\nnatural sciences, in association with other convictions and aims, tend\nreadily to unite into a distinctive and independent system of\nworld-interpretation, which, if it were valid and sufficient, would drive\nthe religious view into difficulties, or make it impossible. This\nindependent system is Naturalism, and against its attacks the religious\nconception of the world has to stand on the defensive.\n\n\n\n\nWhat is Distinctive in the Religious Outlook.\n\n\nAt the very beginning and throughout we must keep the following points\nclearly before us, otherwise all our endeavours will only lead us astray,\nand be directed towards an altogether false issue.\n\nFirstly, everything depends and must depend upon vindicating the validity\nand freedom of the religious view of the world as contrasted with\nworld-science in general; but we must not attempt to derive it directly\nfrom the latter. If religion is to live, it must be able to\ndemonstrate\u2014and it can be demonstrated\u2014that its convictions in regard to\nthe world and human existence are not contradicted from any other quarter,\nthat they are possible and may be believed to be true. It can, perhaps,\nalso be shown that a calm and unprejudiced study of nature, both physical\nand metaphysical reflection on things, will supplement the interpretations\nof religion, and will lend confirmation and corroboration to many of the\narticles of faith already assured to it. But it would be quite erroneous\nto maintain that we must be able to read the religious conception of the\nworld out of nature, and that it must be, in the first instance, derivable\nfrom nature, or that we can, not to say must, regard natural knowledge as\nthe source and basis of the religious interpretation of the world. An\napologetic based on such an idea as this would greatly overestimate its\nown strength, and not only venture too high a stake, but would damage the\ncause of religion and alter the whole position of the question. This\nmistake has often been made. The old practice of finding \u201cevidences of the\nexistence of God\u201d had exactly this tendency. It was seriously believed\nthat one could thereby do more than vindicate for religious conviction a\nright of way in the system of knowledge. It was seriously believed that\nknowledge of God could be gained from and read out of nature, the world,\nand earthly existence, and thus that the propositions of the religious\nview of the world could not only gain freedom and security, but could be\nfundamentally proved, and even directly inferred from Nature in the first\ninstance. The strength of these evidences was greatly overestimated, and\nNature was too much studied with reference to her harmony, her marvellous\nwealth and purposeful wisdom, her significant arrangements and endless\nadaptations; and too little attention was paid to the multitudinous\nenigmas, to the many instances of what seems unmeaning and purposeless,\nconfused and dark. People were far too ready to reason from finite things\nto infinite causes, and the validity or logical necessity of the\ninferences drawn was far too rarely scrutinised. And, above all, the main\npoint was overlooked. For even if these \u201cevidences\u201d had succeeded better,\nif they had been as sufficient as they were insufficient, it is certain\nthat religion and the religious conception of the world could never have\narisen from them, but were in existence long before any such\nconsiderations had been taken into account.\n\nLong before these were studied, religion had arisen from quite other\nsources. These sources lie deep in the human spirit, and have had a long\nhistory. To trace them back in detail is a special task belonging to the\ndomain of religious psychology, history, and philosophy, and we cannot\nattempt it here, but must take it for granted. Having arisen from these\nsources, religion has long lived a life of its own, forming its own\nconvictions in regard to the world and existence, possessing these as its\nfaith and truth, basing their credibility, and gaining for them the\nadherence of its followers, on quite other grounds than those used in\n\u201cproving the existence of God.\u201d Ideas and conclusions which have not\narisen in this way can hardly be said to be religious, though they may\nresemble religious ideas. But having thus arisen, the religious view comes\ninto contact with knowledge in general, and then a need for justification,\nor even a state of antagonism, may arise. It may then be asked whether\nconvictions and ideas which, so far, have come solely from within, and\nhave been affirmed and recognised as truths only by heart and conscience,\ncan possibly be adhered to in the face of the insight afforded by an\ninvestigation and scientific knowledge of nature.\n\nLet us take an example, and at once the highest that can be found. The\nreligious recognition of the sway of an eternal Providence cannot possibly\nbe directly derived from, or proved by, any consideration of nature and\nhistory. If we had not had it already, no apologetic and no evidences of\nthe existence of God would have given it to us. The task of an apologetic\nwhich knows its limitations and its true aims can only be to inquire\nwhether there is scope and freedom left for these religious ideas\nalongside of our natural knowledge of the world; to show that the latter,\nbecause of its proper limitations, has no power to make a pronouncement in\nregard to the highest meaning of the world; and to point to certain\nindications in nature and history that justify us in interpreting the\nwhole in terms of purpose and ultimate import. This is the case with all\nthe conceptions and conclusions of the religious view of the world. No\nsingle one of them can be really proved from a study of nature, because\nthey are much too deep to be reached by ordinary reasoning, and much too\npeculiar in their character and content to be discovered by any scientific\nconsideration of nature or interpretation of the world. It is, however, at\nthe same time obvious that all apologetic must follow religion, and can\nnever precede it. Religion can only be awakened, never coerced. Once\nawakened, it can reflect on its validity and freedom; but it alone can\nreally understand both. And apart from religion, or without its presence,\nall apologetic endeavours are gratuitous, and are, moreover, expressly\nforbidden by its own highest authorities (Matt. xxiii. 15).\n\nThe second point is even more important. Religion does not hold its theory\nof the world and its interpretations of the nature and meaning of things\nin the same way as poetry does its fine-spun, airy dreams, whose chief\nvalue lies in the fact that they call up moods and arouse a play of\nfeeling, and which may be grave or gay, elegiac or idyllic, charming or\nsublime, but may be true or false indifferently.\n\nFor there is this outstanding difference between religion and all\n\u201cmoods\u201d\u2014all poetic or fanciful views of nature\u2014that it lives by the\ncertainty of its ideas, suffers if they be uncertain, and dies if they be\nshown to be untenable, however charming or consoling, sublime or simple\nthey may be. Its theories of the world are not poems; they are\nconvictions, and these require to be first of all not pleasing but true.\n(Hence it is that criticism may arise out of religion itself, since\nreligion seeks for its own sake to find secure foundations.) And in this\nrespect the religious conception of the world is quite in line with\nworld-theory in general. Both desire to express reality. They do not wish\nto lay gaily-coloured wreaths and garlands about reality that they may\nenjoy it, plunged in their respective moods; they desire to understand it\nand give an account of it.\n\nBut there is at once apparent a characteristic difference between the\npropositions and conclusions of the religious view and those of the\nsecular, a difference not so much of content, which goes without saying,\nbut in the whole form, manner and method, and tone. As Schleiermacher put\nit: \u201cYou can never say that it advances with the sure tread\u201d of which\nscience in general is capable, and by which it is recognisable. The web of\nreligious certainty is much more finely and delicately woven, and more\nsusceptible of injury than the more robust one of ordinary knowledge.\nMoreover, where religious certainty has attained its highest point in a\nbelieving mind, and is greater rather than less than the certainty of what\nis apprehended by the senses or experienced day by day, this\ncharacteristic difference is most easily discerned. The believer is\nprobably much more confident about \u201cthe care of his Heavenly Father,\u201d or\n\u201cthe life eternal,\u201d than he is about this life with its varying and\ninsignificant experiences and content. For he knows about the life beyond\nin quite a different way. The truths of the religious outlook cannot be\nput on the same level as those of ordinary and everyday life. And when the\nmind passes from one to the other it does so with the consciousness that\nthe difference is in kind. The knowledge of God and eternity, and the real\nvalue, transcending space and time, of our own inner being, cannot even in\nform be mixed up with the trivial truths of the normal human understanding\nor the conclusions of science. In fact, the truths of religion exhibit, in\nquite a special way, the character of all ideal truths, which are not\nreally true for every day at all, but are altogether bound up with exalted\nstates of feeling. This is expressed in the old phrase, \u201cDeus non scitur\nsed creditur\u201d [God is not known but believed in]. For the Sorbonne was\nquite right and protected one of the essential interests of religion, when\nit rejected as heresy the contrary position, that it was possible to\n\u201cknow\u201d God. Thus, in the way in which I \u201cknow\u201d that I am sitting at this\nwriting-table, or that it rained yesterday, or that the sum of the angles\nin a triangle are equal to two right angles, I can know nothing of God.\nBut I can know of Him something in the way in which I know that to tell\nthe truth is right, that to keep faith is duty, propositions which are\ncertain and which state something real and valid, but which I could not\nhave arrived at without conscious consent, and a certain exaltation of\nspirit on my own part. This, and especially the second part of it, holds\ntrue in an increased degree of all religious conceptions. They weave\nthemselves together out of the most inward and subtle experiences, out of\nimpressions which are coarsened in the very act of expressing them. Their\nimport and value must be judged entirely by the standards of conscience\nand feeling, by their own self-sufficiency and validity. The best part of\nthem lies in the intensity and vitality of their experience, and in the\nspontaneous acceptance and recognition which they receive. They cannot be\napprehended by the prosaic, secular mind; whatever is thus apprehended is\nat most an indifferent analogue of religious experience, if it is not\nself-deception. It is only in exaltation, in quiet enthusiasm, that\nreligious feelings can come to life and become pervasive, and religious\ntruth can only become a possession available for everyday use in\nproportion as it is possible to make this non-secular and exalted state of\nmind permanent, and to maintain enthusiasm as the enduring mood of life\nand conduct. And as this is capable of all degrees of intensity from\noverpowering outbursts and isolated raptures to a gentle but permanent\ntension and elevation of spirit, so also is the certainty and actuality of\nour knowledge, whether of the sway of the divine power, or of our own\nhigher nature and destiny, or of any religious truth whatever. This is\nwhat is meant by St. Paul\u2019s \u201cPraying without ceasing\u201d and his \u201cBeing in\nthe Spirit\u201d as a permanent mood; and herein lies the justification of the\nstatement of enthusiasm that truth is only found in moments of ecstasy. In\nfact, religion and religious interpretations are nothing if not\n\u201centhusiasms,\u201d that is to say, expressions of the art of sustaining a\npermanent exaltation of spirit. And any one who is not capable of this\ninward exaltation, or is too little capable of it, is badly qualified for\neither religion or religious outlook. The \u201centhusiasts\u201d will undoubtedly\nmake a better figure in the \u201ckingdom of God,\u201d as well as find an easier\nentrance therein, than the prosaic matter-of-fact people.\n\nThis is really the source of much that is vexatious in all apologetic\nefforts, and indeed in all theorising about religion, as soon as we\nattempt to get beyond the periphery into the heart of the matter. For in\norder to understand the subject at all a certain amount of \u201centhusiasm\u201d is\nnecessary, and in most cases the disputants fail to reach common ground\nbecause this enthusiasm is lacking in one or both. If they both have it,\nin that case also dialectics are out of the question.\n\nFinally, it must be remarked that, as Luther puts it, \u201cFaith always goes\nagainst appearances.\u201d The religious conception of the world not only never\ngrows directly out of a scientific and general study of things, but it can\nnever be brought into absolute congruence with it. There are endless\ntracts and domains of the world, in nature and history, which we cannot\nbring under the religious consideration at all, because they admit of no\ninterpretation from the higher or more general points of view; they lie\nbefore us as everlasting unrelated mysteries, uncomprehended as to their\nimport and purpose. Moreover, the religious theory of the world can never\ntell us, or wish to tell us, what the world is as a whole, or what is the\nmeaning of its being. It is enough for us that it throws light on our own\nbeing, and reveals to us our place and destiny, and the meaning of our\nexistence. It is enough if, in this respect, reality adapts itself to the\ninterpretations of religion, admits of their truth and allows them scope,\nand corroborates them in important ways and instances. It actually does\nthis, and it can be demonstrated that it does. And in demonstrating this\nthe task of an apologetic that knows its own limitations alone consists.\nIt must be aware that it will succeed even in this, only if it is\nsupported by a courageous will to believe and joy in believing, that many\ngaps and a thousand riddles will remain, that the ultimate and highest\ncondition of the search after a world-interpretation is personal decision\nand personal choice, which finally depends upon \u201cwhat manner of man one\nis.\u201d Faith has always meant going against appearances. It has gone against\nthem not from obstinacy or incorrigible lack of understanding, but because\nit has had strong reasons, impossible to set aside, for regarding\nappearances literally as appearances. It has suffered from the apparent,\noften even to the point of extinction, and has again drawn from it and\nfrom its opposition its highest strength. That they overmastered\nappearances made of the heroes of faith the greatest of all heroes. And\nthus religion lives by the very riddles which have frequently caused its\ndeath, and they are a part of its inheritance and constitution. To work\ncontinually towards their solution is a task which it will never give up.\nUntil success has been achieved, it is of importance to show, that what\ncomes into conflict with faith in these riddles at the present day is not\nsomething new and previously unheard of. In cases where faith has died\nbecause of them we almost invariably find the opinion that religion might\nhave been possible in earlier and more na\u00efve times, but that it is no\nlonger possible to us, with our deeper insight into the dark mystery of\nnature and destiny. This is foolishness. When faith dies thus, it dies of\none of its infantile diseases. For from the tragedies of Job and of\nJeremiah to the Tower of Siloam and the horror of the Mont-Pel\u00e9e eruption\nthere runs a direct lineage of the same perennial riddle. Well-developed\nreligion has never existed without this\u2014at once its shadow and its\ntouchstone.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II. NATURALISM.\n\n\nNaturalism is not of to-day or of yesterday, but is very ancient,\u2014as old,\nindeed, as philosophy,\u2014as old as human thought and doubt. Indeed, we may\nsay that it almost invariably played its part whenever man began to\nreflect on the whence and the how of the actual world around him. In the\nphilosophical systems of Leucippus and Democritus and Epicurus it lies\nfully developed before us. It persisted as a latent and silently dreaded\nantagonist, even in times when \u201corthodox\u201d anti-naturalistic and\nsuper-naturalistic systems were the officially prevailing ones, and were\nto all appearance generally adhered to. So in the more modern systems of\nmaterialism and positivism, in the _Syst\u00e8me de la nature_ and in the\ntheory of _l\u2019homme machine_, in the materialistic reactions from the\nidealistic nature-speculations of Schelling and Hegel, in the discussions\nof materialism in the past century, in the naturalistic writings of\nMoleschott, Czolbe, Vogt, B\u00fcchner, and Haeckel, and in the still dominant\nnaturalistic tendency and mood which acquired new form and deep-rooted\nindividuality through Darwinism,\u2014in all these we find naturalism, not\nindeed originating as something new, but simply blossoming afresh with\nincreased strength. The antiquity of Naturalism is no reproach, and no\nreason for regarding it as a matter long since settled; it rather\nindicates that Naturalism is not a chance phenomenon, but an inevitable\ngrowth. The favourite method of treating it as though it were the outcome\nof modern scepticism, malice, or obduracy, is just as absurd as if the\n\u201cnaturalists\u201d were to treat the convictions of their opponents as the\nresult of incredible narrow-mindedness, priestly deception, senility, or\ncalcification of the brain-cells. And as naturalism is of ancient origin\nso also do its different historical phases and forms resemble each other\nin their methods, aims, and arguments, as well as in the moods,\nsympathies, and antipathies which accompany them. Even in its most highly\ndeveloped form we can see that it did not spring originally from a\ncompleted and unified principle, but was primarily criticism of and\nopposition to other views.\n\n\n\n\nWhat is Distinctive in the Naturalistic Outlook.\n\n\nAt first tentative, but becoming ever more distinctly conscious of its\nreal motive, Naturalism has always arisen in opposition to what we may\ncall \u201csupernatural\u201d propositions, whether these be the na\u00efve mythological\nexplanations of world-phenomena found in primitive religions, or the\nsupernatural popular metaphysics which usually accompanies the higher\nforms. It is actuated at the same time by one of the most admirable\nimpulses in human nature,\u2014the impulse to explain and understand,\u2014and to\nexplain, if possible, through simple, familiar, and ordinary causes. The\nsane human understanding sees all about it the domain of everyday and\nfamiliar phenomena. It is quite at home in this domain; everything seems\nto it well-known, clear, transparent, and easily understood; it finds in\nit intelligible causes and certain laws which govern phenomena, as well as\na constant association of cause and effect. Here everything can be\nindividually controlled and examined, and everything \u201chappens naturally.\u201d\nThings govern themselves. Nothing unexpected, nothing that has not its\nobvious causes, nothing mysterious or miraculous happens here. Sharply\ncontrasted with this stands the region of the apparently inexplicable, the\nsupernatural, with all its influences and operations, and results. To the\nreligious interpretation in its na\u00efve, pious, or superstitious forms of\nexpression, this region of the supernatural seems to encroach broadly and\ndeeply on the domain of the everyday world. But with the awakening of\ncriticism and reflection, and the deepening of investigation into things,\nit retreats farther and farther, it surrenders piece after piece to the\nother realm of thought, and this arises doubt and suspicion. With these\nthere soon awakens a profound conviction that a similar mode of causal\nconnection binds all things together, a glimmering of the uniformity and\nnecessity embracing, comprehending, and ultimately explaining all things.\nAnd these presentiments, in themselves at first quite childishly and\nalmost mythologically conceived, may still be, even when they first arise,\nand while they are still only vaguely formulated, anticipations of later\nmore definite scientific conceptions. Such a beginning of naturalistic\nconsciousness may remain quite na\u00efve and go no farther than a silent but\npersistent protest. It makes free use of such familiar expressions as\n\u201ceverything comes about of itself\u201d; \u201ceverything happens by natural means\u201d;\n\u201cit is all \u2018nature\u2019 or \u2018evolution.\u2019 \u201d But from the primitive naturalistic\noutlook there may arise reconstructions of nature and cosmic speculations\non a large scale, expanding into naturalistic systems of the most manifold\nkinds, beginning with those of the Ionic philosophers and coming down to\nthose of the most recent times. Their watchwords remain the same, though\nin an altered dialect: \u201cnature and natural phenomena,\u201d the denial of\n\u201cdualism,\u201d the upholding of the one principle \u201cmonism,\u201d the\nall-sufficiency of nature, and the absence of any intervening influences\nfrom without or beyond nature. Rapidly and of necessity this last item\nbecomes transformed into a \u201cdenial of teleology\u201d: nature knows neither\nwill nor purpose, it has only to do with conditions and results. With\nthese it deals and through them it works. Even in the most elementary\nnaturalistic idea, that \u201ceverything happens of itself,\u201d there lurks that\naversion to purpose which characterises all naturalistic systems.\n\nA naturalism which has arisen and grown in this manner has in itself\nnothing to do with concrete and exact knowledge of nature. It may comprise\na large number of ideas which are sharply opposed to \u201cscience,\u201d and which\nmay be in themselves mythological, or poetical, or even mystical. For what\n\u201cnature\u201d itself really is fundamentally, how it moves, unfolds, or impels,\nhow things actually happen \u201cnaturally,\u201d this naturalism has never\nattempted to think out. Indeed, naturalism of this type, though it opposes\n\u201cdualism,\u201d does not by any means usually intend to set itself against\nreligion. On the contrary, in its later developments, it may take it up\ninto itself in the form of an apotheosis and a worship of nature. Almost\ninvariably naturalism which begins thus develops, not into atheism, but\ninto pantheism. It is true that all is nature and happens naturally. But\nnature itself, as Thales said, is \u201cfull of gods,\u201d instinct with divine\nlife. It is the all-living which, unwearied and inexhaustible, brings\nforth form after form and pours out its fulness. It is Giordano Bruno\u2019s\n\u201cCause, Principle, and Unity,\u201d in endless beauty and overpowering\nmagnificence, and it is Goethe\u2019s \u201cGreat Goddess,\u201d herself the object of\nthe utmost admiration, reverence, and devotion. This mood may readily pass\nover into a kind of worship of God and belief in Him, \u201cGod\u201d being regarded\nas the soul and mind, the \u201cLogos\u201d of Heraclitus and the Stoics, the inner\nmeaning and reason of this all-living nature. And thus naturalism in its\nlast stages may sometimes be quite devout, and may assure us that it is\ncompelled to deny only the transcendental and not the immanent God, the\nDivine being enthroned above the world, but not the living God dwelling\nwithin it. And ever anew Goethe\u2019s verse is quoted:\n\n\n    What God would _outwardly_ alone control,\n    And on His finger whirl the mighty Whole?\n    He loves the _inner_ world to move, to view\n    Nature in Him, Himself in nature too,\n    So that what in Him works, and is, and lives,\n    The measure of His strength, His spirit gives.\n\n\n\n\nThe True Naturalism.\n\n\nBut naturalism becomes fundamentally different when it ceases to remain at\nthe level of na\u00efve or fancifully conceived ideas of \u201cnature\u201d and \u201cnatural\noccurrences,\u201d when, instead of poetry or religious sentiments, it\nincorporates something else, namely, exact natural science and the idea of\na mathematical-mechanical calculability in the whole system of nature.\n\u201cNature\u201d and \u201chappening naturally\u201d, as used by the na\u00efve intelligence, are\nhalf animistic ideas and modes of expression, which import into nature, or\nleave in it, life and soul, impulse, and a kind of will. And that\nspeculative form of naturalism which tends to become religious develops\nthis fault to its utmost. But a \u201cnature\u201d like this is not at all a\npossible subject for natural science and exact methods, not a subject for\nexperiment, calculation, and fixed laws, for precise interpretation, or\nfor interpretation on simple rational principles. Instead of the na\u00efve,\npoetical, and half mystical conceptions of nature we must have a really\nscientific one, so that, so to speak, the supernatural may be eliminated\nfrom nature, and the apparently irrational rationalised; that is, so that\nall its phenomena may be traced back to simple, unequivocal, and easily\nunderstood processes, the actual why and how of all things perceived, and\nthus, it may be, understood; so that, in short, everything may be seen to\ncome about \u201cby natural means.\u201d\n\nThere is obviously one domain and order of processes in nature which\nexactly fulfils those requirements, and is really in the fullest sense\n\u201cnatural,\u201d that is, quite easily understood, quite rational, quite\namenable to computation and measurement, quite rigidly subordinate to laws\nwhich can be formulated. These are the processes of physics and chemistry,\nand in a still higher degree those of movement in general, the processes\nof mechanics in short. And to bring into this domain and subordinate to\nits laws everything that occurs in nature, all becoming, and passing away,\nand changing, all development, growth, nutrition, reproduction, the origin\nof the individual and of the species, of animals and of man, of the living\nand the not living, even of sensation and perception, impulse, desire and\ninstinct, will and thought\u2014this alone would really be to show that things\n\u201chappen naturally,\u201d that is, to explain everything in terms of natural\ncauses. And the conviction that this can be done is the only true\nnaturalism.\n\nNaturalism of this type is fundamentally different in mood and character\nfrom the na\u00efve and poetic form, and is, indeed, in sharp contrast to it.\nIt is working against the very motives which are most vital to the\nlatter\u2014namely, reverence for and deification of nature. Where the two\ntypes of naturalism really understand themselves nothing but sharp\nantagonism can exist between them. Those on the one side must condemn this\nunfeeling and irreverent, cold and mathematical dissection and analysis of\nthe \u201cGreat Goddess\u201d as a sacrilege and outrage. And those on the other\nside must utterly reject as romantic the view which is summed up in the\nconfession: \u201cIst nicht Kern der Natur Menschen im Herzen?\u201d [Is not the\nsecret of nature in the human heart?]\n\n\n\n\nGoethe\u2019s Attitude to Naturalism.\n\n\nThe most instructive example we can take is Goethe: his veneration for\nnature on the one hand, and on the other his pronounced opposition to the\nnaturalism both of the materialists and of the mathematicians. Modern\nnaturalists are fond of seeking repose and mental refreshment in Goethe\u2019s\nconception of the world, under the impression that it fits in best and\nmost closely with their own views. That they do this says much for their\nmood and taste, but not quite so much for their powers of discrimination\nor for their consistency. It is even more thoughtless than when the\nempiricists and sensationalists acclaim as their hero, Spinoza, the\nstrict, pure rationalist, the despiser of empiricism and of knowledge\nacquired through the senses. For to Goethe nature is far from being a\npiece of mechanism which can be calculated on and summed up in\nmathematical formul\u00e6, an everlasting \u201cperpetuum mobile,\u201d a magnificent\nall-powerful machine. In fact, all this and especially the word \u201cmachine\u201d\nexpresses exactly what Goethe\u2019s conception was most directly opposed to.\nTo him nature is truly the \u201cGoddess,\u201d the great Diana of the Ephesians,\nthe everlasting Beauty, the artist of genius, ceaselessly inventing and\ncreating, in floods of Life, in Action\u2019s storm\u2014an infinite ocean, a\nrestless weaving, a glowing Life. Embracing within herself the highest and\nthe humblest, she is in all things, throughout all change and\ntransformation, the same, shadowing forth the most perfect in the\nsimplest, and in the highest only unfolding what she had already shown in\nthe lowliest. Therefore Goethe hated all divisions and rubrics, all the\ncontrasts and boundaries which learned analysis attempts to introduce into\nnature. Passionately he seized on Herder\u2019s idea of evolution, and it was\ntowards establishing it that all his endeavours, botanical, zoological,\nmorphological and osteological, were directed. He discovered in the human\nskull the premaxillary bone which occurs in the upper jaw of all mammals,\nand this \u201ckeystone to man\u201d gave him, as he himself said, \u201csuch joy that\nall his bowels moved.\u201d He interpreted the skull as developed from three\nmodified vertebr\u00e6. He sketched a hypothesis of the primitive plant, and\nthe theory that all the organs of the plant are modifications and\ndevelopments of the leaf. He was a friend of Etienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire,\nwho defended \u201cl\u2019unit\u00e9 de composition organique\u201d in the forms of nature,\nand evolution by gradual stages, and he was the vehement opponent of\nCuvier, who attempted to pick the world to pieces according to strictly\ndefined architectural plans and rigid classes. And what the inner impulse\nto all this was he has summed up in the motto to his \u201cMorphology\u201d from the\nverse in Job:\n\n\n    Lo, he goeth by me, and I see him not;\n    He is transformed, but I perceive him not.\n\n\nHe further declares it in the introductory verse to his Osteology:\n\n\n    Joyfully some years ago,\n      Zealously my spirit sought\n    To explore it all, and know\n      How all nature lived and wrought:\n    And \u2019tis ever One in all,\n      Though in many ways made known;\n    Small in great, and great in small,\n      Each in manner of its own.\n    Ever shifting, yet fast holding;\n      Near and far, and far and near;\n    So, with moulding and remoulding,\u2014\n      To my wonder I am here.\n\n\nIn all this there is absolutely nothing of the characteristic mood and\nspirit of \u201cexact\u201d naturalism, with its mechanical and mathematical\ncategories. It matters little that Goethe, when he thought of evolution,\nnever had present to his mind the idea of Descent which is characteristic\nof \u201cDarwinism,\u201d but rather development in the lofty sense in which it is\nworked out in the nature-philosophy of Schelling and of Hegel. The chief\npoint is, that to him nature was the all-living and ever-living, whose\ncreating and governing cannot be reduced to prosaic numbers or\nmathematical formul\u00e6, but are to be apprehended as a whole by the\nperceptions of genius rather than worked out by calculation or in detail.\nAny other way of regarding nature Goethe early and decisively rejected.\nAnd he has embodied his strong protest against it in his \u201cDichtung und\nWahrheit\u201d:\n\n\u201cHow hollow and empty it seemed to us in this melancholy, atheistical\ntwilight.... Matter, we learnt, has moved from all eternity, and by means\nof this movement to right and left and in all directions, it has been\nable, unaided, to call forth all the infinite phenomena of existence.\u201d\n\nThe book\u2014the \u201cSyst\u00e8me de la Nature\u201d\u2014\u201cseemed to us so grey, so Cimmerian,\nso deathlike that it was with difficulty we could endure its presence.\u201d\n\nAnd in a work with remarkable title and contents, \u201cDie Farbenlehre,\u201d\nGoethe has summed up his antagonism to the \u201cMathematicians,\u201d and to their\nchief, Newton, the discoverer and founder of the new\nmathematical-mechanical view of nature. Yet the mode of looking at things\nwhich is here combated with so much labour, wit, and, in part, injustice,\nis precisely that of those who, to this day, swear by the name of Goethe\nwith so much enthusiasm and so little intelligence\n\n\n\n\nThe two Kinds of Naturalism.\n\n\nBut let us return to the two kinds of naturalism we have already\ndescribed. Much as they differ from one another in reality, they are very\nreadily confused and mixed up with one another. And the chief peculiarity\nof what masquerades as naturalism among our educated or half-educated\nclasses to-day lies in the fact that it is a mingling of the two kinds.\nUnwittingly, people combine the moods of the one with the reasons and\nmethods of the other; and having done so they appear to themselves\nparticularly consistent and harmonious in their thought, and are happy\nthat they have been able thus to satisfy at once the needs of the\nintellect and those of the heart.\n\nOn the one hand they stretch the mathematical-mechanical view as far as\npossible from below upwards, and even attempt to explain the activities of\nlife and consciousness as the results of complex reflex mechanisms. And on\nthe other hand they bring down will soul and instincts into the lowest\nstages of existence, and become quite animistic. They wish to be nothing\nif not \u201cexact,\u201d and yet they reckon Goethe and Bruno among the greatest\napostles of their faith, and set their verses and sayings as a _credo_ and\nmotto over their own opinions. In this way there arises a \u201cworld\nconception\u201d so indiarubber-like and Protean that it is as difficult as it\nis unsatisfactory to attempt to come to an understanding with it. If we\nattempt to get hold of it by the fringe of poetry and idealism it has\nassumed, it promptly retires into its \u201cexact\u201d half. And if we try to limit\nourselves to this, in order to find a basis for discussion, it spreads out\nbefore us all the splendours of a great nature pantheism, including even\nthe ideas of the good, the true, and the beautiful. One thing only it\nneglects, and that is, to show where its two very different halves meet,\nand what inner bond unites them. Thus if we are to discuss it at all, we\nmust first of all pick out and arrange all the foreign and mutually\ncontradictory constituents it has incorporated, then deal with Pantheism\nand Animism, and with the problem of the possibility of \u201cthe true, the\ngood, the beautiful\u201d on the naturalistic-empiric basis, and finally there\nwould remain a readily-grasped residue of naturalism of the second form,\nto come to some understanding with which is both necessary and\ninstructive.\n\nIn the following pages we shall confine ourselves entirely to this type,\nand we shall not laboriously disentangle it from the bewildering medley of\nideas foreign to it, or attempt to make it consistent; we shall neglect\nthese, and have regard solely to its clear fundamental principles and\naims. Thus regarded, its horizons are perfectly well-defined. It is\nstartling in its absolute poverty of ideal content, warmth, and charm, but\nimpressive and grand in the perseverance and tenacity with which it\nadheres to one main point of view throughout. In reality, it is aggressive\nto nothing, but cold and indifferent to everything, and for this very\nreason is more dangerous than all the excited protests and verdicts of the\nenthusiastic type of naturalism, which it is impossible to attack, because\nof its lack of definite principles, and which, in the pathetic stress it\nlays on worshipping nature, lives only by what it has previously borrowed\nfrom the religious conceptions of the world.\n\n\n\n\nAim and Method of Naturalism.\n\n\nThe aim and method of the strict type of naturalism may be easily defined.\nIn its details it will become more distinct as we proceed with our\nanalysis. Taking it as a whole, we may say that it is an endeavour on a\nlarge scale after consistent simplification and gradual reduction to lower\nand lower terms. Since it aims at explaining and understanding everything\naccording to the axiom _principia non temere esse multiplicanda_\n[principles are not to be heedlessly multiplied], explaining, that is,\nwith the fewest, simplest, and most obvious principles possible, it is\nincumbent upon it to attempt to refer all phenomena to a single, uniform\nmode of occurrence, which admits of nothing outside of or beyond itself,\nand which regulates itself according to its own system of fundamentally\nsimilar causal sequences. It is further incumbent upon it to trace back\nthis universal mode of occurrence to the simplest and clearest form\npossible, and its uniformities to the fewest and most intelligible laws,\nthat is, ultimately, to laws which can be determined by calculation and\nsummed up in formul\u00e6. This tracing back is equivalent to an elimination of\nall incommensurable causes, of all \u201cfinal causes,\u201d that is, of ultimate\ncauses and \u201cpurposes\u201d which, in an unaccountable manner, work into the\nnetwork of proximate causes and control them, and by thus interrupting\ntheir connectedness, make it difficult to come to a clear understanding of\nthe \u201cWhy?\u201d of things. And this elimination is again a \u201creduction to\nsimpler terms,\u201d for it replaces the \u201cteleological\u201d consideration of\npurposes, by a purely scientific consideration of causes, which inquires\nonly into the actual conditions antecedent to certain sequences.\n\nBut Being and Becoming include two great realms: that of \u201cNature\u201d and that\nof \u201cMind,\u201d _i.e._ consciousness and the processes of consciousness. And\ntwo apparently fundamentally different branches of knowledge relate to\nthese: the natural sciences, and the mental sciences. If a unified and\n\u201cnatural\u201d explanation is really possible, the beginning and end of all\nthis \u201creducing to simpler terms\u201d must be to bridge over the gulf between\nthese; but this, in the sense of naturalism, necessarily means that the\nmental sciences must in some way be reduced to terms of natural science,\nand that the phenomena, processes, sequences, and laws of consciousness\nmust likewise be made \u201ccommensurable\u201d with and be linked on to the\napparently simpler and clearer knowledge of \u201cNature,\u201d and, if possible, be\nsubordinated to its phenomena and laws, if not indeed derived from them.\nAs it is impossible to regard consciousness itself as corporeal, or as a\nprocess of movement, naturalism must at least attempt to show that the\nphenomena of consciousness are attendant and consequent on corporeal\nphenomena, and that, though they themselves never become corporeal, they\nare strictly regulated by the laws of the corporeal and physical, and can\nbe calculated upon and studied in the same way.\n\nBut even the domain of the natural itself, as we know it, is by no means\nsimple and capable of a unified interpretation. Nature, especially in the\nrealm of organic life, the animal and plant world, appears to be filled\nwith marvels of purposefulness, with riddles of development and\ndifferentiation, in short with all the mysteries of life. Here most of all\nit is necessary to \u201creduce\u201d the \u201cteleological view\u201d to terms of the purely\ncausal, and to prove that all the results, even the evolution of the forms\nof life, up to their highest expressions and in the minutest details of\ntheir marvellous adaptations, came \u201cof themselves,\u201d that is to say, are\nquite intelligible as the results of clearly traceable causes. It is\nnecessary to reduce the physiological and developmental, and all the other\nprocesses of life, to terms of physical and chemical processes, and thus\nto reduce the living to the not living, and to derive the organic from the\nforces and substances of inanimate nature.\n\nThe process of reduction does not stop even here. For physical and\nchemical processes are only really understood when they can be resolved\ninto the simplest processes of movement in general, when all qualitative\nchanges can be traced hack to purely quantitative phenomena, when,\nfinally, in the mechanics of the great masses, as well as of the\ninfinitely small atoms, everything becomes capable of expression in\nmathematical terms.\n\nBut naturalism of this kind is by no means pure natural science; it\nconsciously and deliberately oversteps in speculation the bounds of what\nis strictly scientific. In this respect it bears some resemblance to the\nnature-philosophy associated with what we called the first type of\nnaturalism. But its very poverty enables it to have a strictly defined\nprogramme. It knows exactly what it wants, and thus it is possible to\nargue with it. The religious conception of the world must come to an\nunderstanding with it, for it is quite obvious that the more indifferent\nthis naturalism is to everything outside of itself, and the less\naggressive it pretends to be, the more does the picture of the world which\nit attempts to draw exert a cramping influence on religion. Where the two\ncome into contact we shall endeavour to make clear in the following pages.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.\n\n\nThe fundamental convictions of naturalism, its general tendencies, and the\npoints of view which determine its outlook, are primarily related to that\norder of facts which forms the subject of the natural sciences, to\n\u201cNature.\u201d It is only secondarily that it attempts to penetrate with the\nmethods of the natural sciences into the region of the conscious, of the\nmind, into the domain that underlies the mental sciences, including\nhistory and the \u00e6sthetic, political, and religious sciences, and to show\nthat, in this region as in the other, natural law and the same principles\nof interpretation obtain, that here, too, the \u201cmaterialistic conception of\nhistory holds true, and that there is no autonomy of mind.\u201d\n\nThe interests of religion here go hand in hand with those of the mental\nsciences, in so far as these claim to be distinct and independent. For the\nquestion is altogether one of the reality, pre-eminence, and independence\nof the spiritual as opposed to the \u201cnatural.\u201d Occasionally it has been\nthought that the whole problem of the relations between religion and\nnaturalism was concentrated on this point, and the study of nature has\nbeen left to naturalism as if it were indifferent or even hopeless, thus\nleaving a free field for theories of all kinds, the materialistic\nincluded. It is only in regard to the Darwinian theory of evolution and\nthe mechanical theory of the origin and nature of life, and particularly\nin regard to the relatively unimportant question of \u201cspontaneous\ngeneration\u201d that a livelier interest is usually awakened. But these\nisolated theories are only a part of the \u201creduction,\u201d which is\ncharacteristic of naturalism, and they can only be rightly estimated and\nunderstood in connection with it. We shall turn our attention to them only\nafter we have carefully considered what is fundamental and essential. But\nthe idea that religion may calmly neglect the study of nature as long as\nnaturalism leaves breathing-room for the freedom and independence of mind\nis quite erroneous. If religion is true, nature must be of God, and it\nmust bear tokens which allow us to interpret it as of God. And such signs\nare to be found. What we shall have to say in regard to them may be summed\nup in the following propositions:\u2014\n\n1. Even the world, which has been brought under the reign of scientific\nlaws, is a mystery; it has been _formulated_, but not _explained_.\n\n2. The world governed by law is still dependent, conditioned, and\n\u201ccontingent.\u201d\n\n3. The conception of Nature as obedient to law is not excluded but rather\ndemanded by belief in God.\n\n4, 5. We cannot comprehend the true nature and depth of things, and the\nworld which we do comprehend is not the true Reality of things; it is only\nits appearance. In feeling and intuition this appearance points beyond\nitself to the true nature of things.\n\n6. Ideas and purposes, and with them Providence and the control of things,\ncan neither be established by the natural sciences nor disputed by them.\n\n7. The causal interpretation demanded by natural science fits in with an\nexplanation according to purpose, and the latter presupposes the former.\n\n\n\n\nHow the Religious and the Naturalistic Outlooks Conflict.\n\n\nReligion comes into contact with naturalism and demands to be reconciled\nwith it, not merely at its periphery, but at its very core, namely, with\nits characteristic ideal of a mathematical-mechanical interpretation of\nthe whole world. This ideal seems to be most nearly, if not indeed\ncompletely, attained in reference to the inter-relations of the great\nmasses, in the realm of astronomy, with the calculable, inviolable, and\nentirely comprehensible conditions which govern the purely mechanical\ncorrelations of the heavenly bodies. To bring the same clearness and\nintelligibility, the same inevitableness and calculability into the world\nin general, and into the whole realm of nature down to the mysterious law\ndetermining the development of the daintiest insect\u2019s wing, and the\nstirrings of the grey matter in the cortex of the brain which reveal\nthemselves to us as sensation, desire, and thought, this has always been\nthe aim and secret faith of the naturalistic mode of thought. It is thus\naiming at a Cosmos of all Being and Becoming, which can be explained from\nitself, and comprehended in itself alone, supported by its own complete\nand all-sufficing causality and uniformity, resting in itself, shut up\nwithin itself, complete in itself\u2014a God sufficient unto himself and\nresting in himself.\n\nWe do not need to probe very deeply to find out how strongly religion\nresists this attempt, and we easily discover what is the disturbing\nelement which awakens hostile feeling. It is of three kinds, and depends\non three characteristic aims and requirements of religion, which are\nclosely associated with one another, yet distinct from one another, though\nit is not always easy to represent them in their true proportions and\nrelative values. The first of these interests seems to be \u201cteleology,\u201d the\nsearch after guiding ideas and purposes, after plan and directive control\nin the whole machinery, that sets itself in sharp opposition to a mere\ninquiry into proximate causes. Little or nothing is gained by knowing how\neverything came about or must have come about; all interest lies in the\nfact that everything has come about in such a way that it reveals\nintention, wisdom, providence, and eternal meaning, realising itself in\ndetails and in the whole. This has always been rightly regarded as the\ntrue concern and interest of every religious conception of the world. But\nit has been sometimes forgotten that this is by no means the only, or even\nthe primary interest that religion has in world-lore. We call it its\nhighest and ultimate interest, but we find, on careful study, that two\nothers are associated with and precede it.\n\nFor before all belief in Providence and in the divine meaning of the\nworld, indeed before faith at all, religion is primarily feeling\u2014a deep,\nhumble consciousness of the entire dependence and conditionality of our\nexistence, and of all things. The belief we have spoken of is, in relation\nto this feeling, merely a form\u2014as yet not in itself religious. It is not\nonly the question \u201cHave the world and existence a meaning, and are\nphenomena governed by ideas and purposes?\u201d that brings religion and its\nantagonists into contact; there is a prior and deeper question. Is there\nscope for this true inwardness of all religion, the power to comprehend\nitself and all the world in humility in the light of that which is not of\nthe world, but is above world and existence? But this is seriously\naffected by that doctrine which attempts to regard the Cosmos as\nself-governing and self-sufficing, needing nothing, and failing in\nnothing. It is this and not Darwinism or the descent from a Simian stock\nthat primarily troubles the religious spirit. It is more specially\nsensitive to the strange and antagonistic tendency of naturalism shown\neven in that marvellous and terrifying mathematical-mechanical system of\nthe great heavenly bodies, in this clock of the universe which, in\nobedience to clear and inviolable laws, carries on its soundless play from\neverlasting to everlasting, needing no pendulum and no pedestal, without\nany stoppage and without room for dependence on anything outside of\nitself, apparently entirely godless, but absolutely reason and God enough\nfor itself. It shrinks in terror from the thought that the same autonomy\nand self-regulation may be brought down from the stage of immensity into\nthe play of everyday life and events.\n\nBut we must penetrate still deeper. Schleiermacher has directed our\nattention anew to the fact that the most profound element in religion is\nthat deep-lying consciousness of all creatures, \u201cI that am dust and\nashes,\u201d that humble feeling of the absolute dependence of every being in\nthe world on One that is above all the world. But religion does not fully\nexpress itself even in this; there is yet another note that sounds still\ndeeper and is the keynote of the triad. \u201cLet a man examine himself.\u201d Is it\nnot the case that we ourselves, in as far as the delight in knowledge and\nthe enthusiasm for solving riddles have taken hold of us, rejoice in every\nnew piece of elucidation and interpretation that science succeeds in\nmaking, that we are in the fullest sympathy with the impulse to understand\neverything and bring reason and clearness into it, and that we give hearty\nadherence to the leading ideas which guide the investigations of natural\nscience? Yet on the other hand, in as far as we are religious, do we not\nsometimes feel a sudden inward recoil from this almost profane eagerness\nto penetrate into the mystery of things, this desire to have everything\nintelligible, clear, rational and transparent? This feeling which stirs in\nus has always existed in all religious minds and will only die with them.\nAnd we need not hesitate to say so plainly. For this is the most real\ncharacteristic of religion; it seeks depth in things, reaches out towards\nwhat is concealed, uncomprehended, and mysterious. It is more than\nhumility; it is piety. And piety is experience of mystery.\n\nIt is at this point that religion comes most violently into antagonism\nwith the meaning and mood of naturalism. Here they first conflict in\nearnest. And it is here above all that scientific investigation and its\nmaterialistic complement seem to take away freedom and truth, air and\nlight from religion. For science is seeking especially this: Deeper\npenetration into and illumination of the world. It presses with macroscope\nand microscope into its most outlying regions and most hidden corners,\ninto its abysses and fastnesses. It explains away the old idea of two\nworlds, one on this side and one on that, and rejects heavenly things with\nthe notice \u201cNo Room\u201d of which D. Fr. Strauss speaks. It aims at\ndiscovering the mathematical world-formul\u00e6, if not indeed one great\ngeneral formula which embraces, defines unequivocally, and rationalises\nall the processes of and in infinity, from the movements of Sirius to\nthose of the cilia of the infusorian in the drop of water, and which not\nonly crowds \u201cheaven\u201d out of the world, but strips away from things the\nfringe of the mysterious and incommensurable which seemed to surround\nthem.\n\n\n\n\nMystery : Dependence : Purpose.\n\n\nThere is then a threefold religious interest, and there are three\ncorresponding points of contact between the religious and the naturalistic\ninterpretations of the world, where, as it appears, they are necessarily\nantagonistic to one another. Arranging them in their proper order we find,\nfirst, the interest, never to be relinquished, of experiencing and\nacknowledging the world and existence to be a mystery, and regarding all\nthat is known and manifested in things merely as the thin crust which\nseparates us from the uncomprehended and inexpressible. Secondly, there is\nthe desire on the part of religion to bring ourselves and all creatures\ninto the \u201cfeeling of absolute dependence,\u201d and, as the belief in creation\ndoes, to subordinate ourselves and them to the Eternal Power that is not\nof the world, but is above the world. Finally, there is the interest in a\nteleological interpretation of the world as opposed to the purely causal\ninterpretation of natural science; that is to say, an interpretation of\nthe world according to eternal God-willed purposes, governing ideas, a\nplan and aim. In all three respects, it is important to religion that it\nshould be able to maintain its validity and freedom as contrasted with\nnaturalism.\n\nBut while religion must inquire of itself into the reality of things, with\nspecial regard to its own needs, there are two possibilities which may\nserve to make peace between it and natural science. It may, for instance,\nbe possible that the mathematical-mechanical interpretation of things,\neven if it be sufficient within its own domain, does not take away from\nnature the characters which religion seeks and requires in it, namely,\npurpose, dependence and mystery. Or it may be that nature itself does not\ncorrespond at all to this ideal of mathematical explicability, that this\nideal may be well enough as a guide for investigation, but that it is not\na fundamental clue really applying to nature as a whole and in its\nessence. It may be that nature as a whole cannot be scientifically summed\nup without straining the mechanical categories. And this suggests another\npossibility, namely, that the naturalistic method of interpretation cannot\nbe applied throughout the whole territory of nature, that it embraces\ncertain aspects but not others, and, finally, that it is distinctly\ninterrupted and held in abeyance at particular points by the\nincommensurable which breaks forth spontaneously out of the depths of\nphenomena, revealing a depth which is not to be explained away.\n\nAll these possibilities occur. And though they need not necessarily be\nregarded as the key to our order of discussion, in what follows we shall\noften meet them singly or together.\n\n\n\n\nThe Mystery of Existence Remains Unexplained.\n\n\n1. Let us begin with the problem of the mystery of all existence, and see\nwhether it remains unaffected, or whether it disappears in face of\nnaturalistic interpretation, with its discovery and formulation of law and\norder, with its methods of measuring and computing. More primary even than\nfaith and heartfelt trust in everlasting wisdom and purposeful Providence\nthere is piety; there is devout sense of awe before the marvellous and\nmysterious, before the depth and the hidden nature of all things and all\nbeing, before unspeakable mysteries over which we hover, and abysmal\ndepths over which we are borne. In a world which had not these, and could\nnot be first felt in this way, religion could not live at all. It could\nnot sail on its too shallow waters, or breathe its too thin air. It is\nindeed a fact that what alone we can fitly speak of and love as\nreligion\u2014the sense of mystery and the gentle shuddering of piety before\nthe depth of phenomena and their everlasting divine abysses,\u2014has its true\nplace and kingdom in the world of mind and history, with its experiences,\nriddles, and depths. But mystery is to be found in the world of nature as\nwell. It is only to a very superficial study that it could appear as\nthough nature were, or ever could become, plain and obvious, as if the\nveil of Isis which shrouds its depths from all investigation could ever be\ntorn away. From this point of view it would make no difference even though\nthe attempt to range the whole realm of nature under the sway of\ninviolable laws were to be immediately successful. This is expressed in\nthe first of our main propositions (p. 35).\n\nIn order to realise this it is necessary to reflect for a little on the\nrelation of \u201cexplanation\u201d and \u201cdescription\u201d to one another, and on what is\nmeant by \u201cestablishing laws\u201d and \u201cunderstanding\u201d in general. The aim of\nall investigation is to understand the world. To understand it obviously\nmeans something more than merely to know it. It is not enough for us to\nknow things, that is, to know what, how many, and what different kinds of\nthings there are. On the contrary, we want to understand them, to know how\nthey came to be as they are, and why they are precisely as they are. The\nfirst step towards this understanding is merely to know, that is, we must\nrightly apprehend and disentangle the things and processes of the world,\ngrouping them, and describing them adequately and exhaustively.\n\nBut what I have merely described I have not yet understood; I am only\npreparing to try to understand it. It stands before me enveloped in all\nits mystery, and I must now begin to attempt to solve it, for describing\nis not explaining; it is only challenging explanation. The next step is to\ndiscover and formulate the laws. For when man sifts out things and\nprocesses and follows them out into their changes and stages he discovers\nthe iron regularity of sequences, the strictly defined lines and paths,\nthe inviolable order and connection in things and occurrences, and he\nformulates these into laws, ascribing to them the idea of necessity which\nhe finds in himself. In so doing he makes distinct progress, for he can\nnow go beyond what is actually seen, he can draw inferences with certainty\nas to effects and work back to causes. And thus order, breadth of view,\nand uniformity are brought into his acquaintance with facts, and his\nscience begins. For science does not merely mean acquaintance with\nphenomena in their contingent or isolated occurrence, manifold and varied\nas that may be; it is the discovery and establishment of the laws and\ngeneral modes of occurrence. Without this we might collect curiosities,\nbut we should not have science. And to discover this network of\nuniformities throughout all phenomena, in the movements of the heavenly\nbodies and in the living substance of the cell alike, is the primary aim\nof all investigation. We are still far away from this goal, and it is more\nthan questionable whether we shall ever reach it.\n\nBut if the goal should ever be reached, if, in other words, we should ever\nbe able to say with certainty what must result if occurrences _a_ and _b_\nare given, or what _a_ and _b_ must have been when _c_ occurs, would\nexplanation then have taken the place of description? Or would\nunderstanding have replaced mystery? Obviously not at all. It has indeed\noften been supposed that this would be the case. People have imagined they\nhave understood, when they have seen that \u201cthat is always so, and that it\nalways happens in this particular way.\u201d But this is a na\u00efve idea. The\nregion of the described has merely become larger, and the riddle has\nbecome more complex. For now we have before us not only the things\nthemselves, but the more marvellous laws which \u201cgovern\u201d them. But laws are\nnot forces or impelling causes. They do not cause anything to happen, and\nthey do not explain anything. And as in the case of things so in that of\nlaws, we want to know how they are, whence they come, and why they are as\nthey are and not quite different. The fact that we have described them\nsimply excites still more strongly the desire to explain them. To explain\nis to be able to answer the question \u201cWhy?\u201d\n\nNatural science is very well aware of this. It calls its previous\ndescriptions \u201cmerely historical,\u201d and it desires to supplement these with\n\u00e6tiology, causal explanation, a deeper interpretation, that in its turn\nwill make laws superfluous, because it will penetrate so deeply into the\nnature of things that it will see precisely why these, and not other laws\nof variation, of development, of becoming, hold sway. This is just the\nmeaning of the \u201creductions\u201d of which we have already spoken. For instance,\nin regard to crystal formation, \u201cexplanation\u201d will have replaced\ndescription only when, instead of demonstrating the forms and laws\naccording to which a particular crystal always and necessarily arises out\nof a particular solution, we are able to show why, from a particular\nmixture and because of certain co-operating molecular forces, and of other\nmore primary, more remote, but also intelligible conditions, these forms\nand processes of crystallisation should always and of necessity occur. If\nthis explanation were possible, the \u201claw\u201d would also be explained, and\nwould therefore become superfluous. From this and similar examples we can\nlearn at what point \u201cexplanation\u201d begins to replace description, namely,\nwhen processes resolve themselves into simpler processes from the\nconcurrence of which they arise. This is exactly what natural science\ndesires to bring about, and what naturalism hopes ultimately to succeed\nin, thereby solving the riddle of existence.\n\nBut this kind of reduction to simpler terms only becomes \u201cexplanation\u201d\nwhen these simpler terms are themselves clear and intelligible and not\nmerely simple; that is to say, when we can immediately see why the simpler\nprocess occurs, and by what means it is brought about, when the question\nas to the \u201cwhy\u201d is no longer necessary, because, on becoming aware of the\nprocess, we immediately and directly perceive that it is a matter of\ncourse, indisputable, and requiring no proof. If this is not the case, the\nreduction to simpler terms has been misleading. We have only replaced one\nunintelligibility by another, one description by another, and so simply\npushed back the whole problem. Naturalism supposes that by this gradual\npushing back the task will at least become more and more simple, until at\nlast a point is reached where the riddle will solve itself, because\ndescription becomes equivalent to explanation. This final stage is\nsupposed to be found in the forces of attraction and repulsion, with which\nthe smallest similar particles of matter are equipped. Out of the\nendlessly varied correlations of these there arise all higher forms of\nenergy and all the combinations which make up more complex phenomena.\n\nBut in reality this does not help us at all. For now we are definitely\nbrought face to face with the quite unanswerable question, How, from all\nthis homogeneity and unity of the ultimate particles and forces, can we\naccount for the beginnings of the diversity which is so marked a\ncharacteristic of this world? Whence came the causes of the syntheses to\nhigher unities, the reasons for the combination into higher resultants of\nenergy?\n\nBut even apart from that, it is quite obvious that we have not yet reached\nthe ultimate point. For can \u201cattraction,\u201d influence at a distance, _vis a\nfronte_, be considered as a fact which is in itself clear? Is it not\nrather the most puzzling fundamental riddle we can be called upon to\nexplain? Assuredly. And therefore the attempt is made to penetrate still\ndeeper to the ultimate point, the last possible reduction to simpler\nterms, by referring all actual \u201cforces\u201d and reducing all movement, and\ntherewith all \u201caction,\u201d to terms of attraction and repulsion, which are\nfree from anything mysterious, whose mode of working can be unambiguously\nand plainly set forth in the law of the parallelogram of forces. Law? Set\nforth? Therefore still only description? Certainly only description, not\nexplanation in the least. Even assuming that it is true, instead of a mere\nUtopia, that all the secrets and riddles of nature can be traced back to\nmatter moved by attraction and repulsion according to the simplest laws of\nthese, they would still only be summed up into a great general riddle,\nwhich is only the more colossal because it is able to embrace all others\nwithin itself. For attraction and repulsion, the transference of motion,\nand the combination of motion according to the law of the parallelogram of\nforces\u2014all this is merely description of processes whose inner causes we\ndo not understand, which appear simple, and are so, but are nevertheless\nnot self-evident or to be taken as a matter of course; they are not in\nthemselves intelligible, but form an absolute \u201cworld-riddle.\u201d From the\nvery root of things there gazes at us the same Sphinx which we had\napparently driven from the foreground.\n\nBut furthermore, this reduction to simpler terms is an impossible and\nnever-ending task. There is fresh confusion at every step. In reducing to\nsimpler terms, it is often forgotten that the principle of combination is\nnot inherent in the more simple, and cannot be \u201creduced.\u201d Or else there is\nan ignoring of the fact that a transition has been made, not from\nresultants to components, but to quite a different kind of phenomena.\nInnumerable as are the possible reductions to simpler terms, and mistaken\nas it would be to remain prematurely at the level of description, it\ncannot be denied that the fundamental facts of the world are pure facts\nwhich must simply be accepted where they occur, indisputable,\ninexplicable, impenetrable, the \u201cwhence\u201d and the \u201chow\u201d of their existence\nquite uncomprehended. And this is especially true of every new and\npeculiar expression of what we call energy and energies. Gravitation\ncannot be reduced to terms of attraction and repulsion, nor action at a\ndistance to action at close quarters; it might, indeed, be shown that\nrepulsion in its turn presupposes attraction before it can become\npossible; the \u201cenergies\u201d of ponderable matter cannot be reduced to the\n\u201cether\u201d and its processes of motion, nor the complex play of the chemical\naffinities to the attraction of masses in general or to gravity. And thus\nthe series ascends throughout the spheres of nature up to the mysterious\ndirective energies in the crystal, and to the underivable phenomena of\nmovement in the living substance, perhaps even to the functions of\nwill-power. All these can be discovered, but not really understood. They\ncan be described, but not explained. And we are absolutely ignorant as to\nwhy they should have emerged from the depth of nature, what that depth\nreally is, or what still remains hidden in her mysterious lap. Neither\nwhat nature reveals to us nor what it conceals from us is in any true\nsense \u201ccomprehended,\u201d and we flatter ourselves that we understand her\nsecrets when we have only become accustomed to them. If we try to break\nthe power of this accustomedness and to consider the actual relations of\nthings there dawns in us a feeling already awakened by direct impressions\nand experience; the feeling of the mysterious and enigmatical, of the\nabyssmal depths beneath, and of what lies far above our comprehension,\nalike in regard to our own existence and every other. The world is at no\npoint self-explanatory, but at all points marvellous. Its laws are only\nformulated riddles.\n\n\n\n\nEvolution and New Beginnings.\n\n\nAll this throws an important light upon two subjects which are relevant in\nthis connection, but which cannot here be exhaustively dealt\nwith,\u2014evolution and new beginnings. Let us consider, for instance, the\nmarvellous range and diversity of the characteristic chemical properties\nand interrelations of substances. Each one of them, contrasted with the\npreceding lower forms and stages of \u201cenergy,\u201d contrasted with mere\nattraction, repulsion, gravitation, is something absolutely new, a new\ninterpolation (of course not in regard to time but to grade), a phenomenon\nwhich cannot be \u201cexplained\u201d by what has gone before. It simply occurs, and\nwe find it in its own time and place. We may call this new emergence\n\u201cevolution,\u201d and we may use this term in connection with every new stage\nhigher than those preceding it. But it is not evolution in a crude and\nquantitative sense, according to which the \u201cmore highly evolved\u201d is\nnothing more than an addition and combination of what was already there;\nit is evolution in the old sense of the word, according to which the more\ndeveloped is a higher analogue of the less developed, but is in its own\nway as independent, as much a new beginning as each of the antecedent\nstages, and therefore in the strict sense neither derivable from them nor\nreducible to them.\n\nIt must be noted that in this sense evolution and new beginnings are\nalready present at a very early stage in nature and are part of its\nessence. We must bear this in mind if we are rightly to understand the\nsubtler processes in nature which we find emerging at a higher level. It\nis illusory to suppose that it is a \u201cnatural\u201d assumption to \u201cderive\u201d the\nliving from lower processes in nature. The non-living and the inorganic\nare also underivable as to their individual stages, and the leap from the\ninorganic to the organic is simply much greater than that from attraction\nin general to chemical affinity. As a matter of fact, the first\noccurrence\u2014undoubtedly controlled and conditioned by internal necessity\u2014of\ncrystallisation, or of life, or of sensation has just the same\nmarvellousness as everything individual and everything new in any\nascending series in nature. In short, every new beginning has the same\nmarvel.\n\nPerhaps this consideration goes still deeper, throwing light upon or\nsuggesting the proper basis for a study of the domain of mind and of\nhistory. It is immediately obvious that there, at any rate, we enter into\na region of phenomena which cannot be derived from anything antecedent, or\nreduced to anything lower. It must be one of the chief tasks of naturalism\nto explain away these facts, and to maintain the sway of \u201cevolution,\u201d not\nin our sense but in its own, that is \u201cto explain\u201d everything new and\nindividual from that which precedes it. But the assertion that this can be\ndone is here doubly false. For, in the first place, it cannot be proved\nthat methods of study which are relatively valid for natural phenomena are\napplicable also to those of the mind. And in the second place we must\nadmit that even in nature\u2014apart from mind\u2014we have to do with new\nbeginnings which are underivable from their antecedents.\n\nAll being is inscrutable mystery as a whole, and from its very foundations\nupwards through each successively higher stage of its evolution, in an\nincreasing degree, until it reaches a climax in the incomprehensibility of\nindividuality. It is a mystery that does not force itself into nature as\nsupernatural or miraculous, but is fundamentally implicit in it, a mystery\nthat in its unfolding assuredly follows the strictest law, the most\ninviolable rules, whether in the chemical affinities a higher grade of\nenergies reveals itself, or whether\u2014unquestionably also in obedience to\neverlasting law\u2014the physical and chemical conditions admit of the\noccurrence of life, or whether in his own time and place a genius\narises.(1)\n\n\n\n\nThe Dependence of the Order of Nature.\n\n\n(2 and 3). The \u201cdependence\u201d of all things is the second requirement of\nreligion, without which it is altogether inconceivable. We avoid the words\n\u201ccreation\u201d and \u201cbeing created,\u201d because they involve anthropomorphic and\naltogether insufficient modes of representation. But throughout we have in\nmind, as suggested by Schleiermacher\u2019s expression already quoted, what all\nreligion means when it declares nature and the world to be _creatures_.\nThe inalienable content of this idea is that deep and assured feeling that\nour nature and all nature does not rest in its own strength and\nself-sufficiency, that there must be more secure reasons for nature which\nare absolutely outside of it, and that it is dependent upon, and\nconditioned through and through by something above itself, independent,\nand unconditioned. \u201cI believe that God has created me together with all\ncreatures.\u201d (Luther.)\n\nThis faith seemed easier in earlier times, when men\u2019s eyes were not yet\nopened to see the deep-lying connectedness of all phenomena, the\ninexorableness of causal sequences, when it was believed that, in the\napparently numerous interruptions of the causal sequences, the frailty and\ndependence of this world and its need for heavenly aid could be directly\nobserved, when, therefore, it was not difficult to believe that the world\nwas \u201cnothing\u201d and perishable, that it had been called forth out of\nnothing, and that in its transient nature it carried for ever the traces\nof this origin. But to-day it is not so easy to believe in this\ndependence, for nature seems to show itself, in its inviolable laws and\nunbroken sequences, as entirely sufficient unto itself, so that for every\nphenomenon a sufficient cause is to be found within nature, that is, in\nthe sum of the antecedent states and conditions which, according to\ninevitable laws, must result in and produce what follows.\n\nWe have already noted that this is most obviously discernible in the world\nof the great masses, the heavenly bodies which pursue their courses from\neverlasting to everlasting, mutually conditioning themselves and betraying\nno need for or dependence upon anything outside of themselves. Everything,\neven the smallest movement, is here determined strictly by the dependence\nof each upon all and of all upon each. There is no variation, no change of\nposition for which an entirely satisfactory cause cannot be found in the\nsystem as a whole, which works like an immense machine. Nothing indicates\ndependence upon anything external. And as it is to-day so it was\nyesterday, and a million years ago, and innumerable millions of years ago.\nIt seems quite gratuitous to suppose that something which does not occur\nto-day was necessary at an earlier period, and that everything has not\nbeen from all eternity just as it is now.\n\nWe saw that naturalism is attempting to extend this character of\nindependence and self-sufficiency from the astronomical world to the world\nas a whole. Shall we attempt, then, to oppose it in this ambition, but\nsurrender the realm of the heavenly bodies as already conquered? By no\nmeans. For religion cannot exclude the solar system from the dependence of\nall being upon God. And this very example is the most conspicuous one, the\none in regard to which the whole problem can be most definitely\nformulated.\n\nAstronomy teaches us that all cosmic processes are governed by a\nmarvellous far-reaching uniformity of law, which unites in strictest\nharmony the nearest and the most remote. Has this fact any bearing upon\nthe problem of the dependence of the world? No. It surely cannot be that a\nworld without order could be brought under the religious point of view\nmore readily than one governed by law! Let us suppose for a moment that we\nhad to do with a world without strict nexus and definite order of\nsequence, without law and without order, full of capricious phenomena,\nunregulated associations, an inconstant play of causes. Such a world would\nbe to us unintelligible, strange, absurd. But it would not necessarily be\nmore \u201cdependent,\u201d more \u201cconditioned\u201d than any other. Had I no other\nreasons for looking beyond the world, and for regarding it as dependent on\nsomething outside of itself, the absence of law and order would assuredly\nfurnish me with none. For, assuming that it is possible at all to conceive\nof a world and its contents as independent, and as containing its own\nsufficient cause within itself, it would be quite as easily thought of as\na confused lawless play of chances as a well-ordered Cosmos. Perhaps more\neasily; for it goes without saying that such a conglomeration of\npromiscuous chances could not possibly be thought of as a world of God.\nOrder and strict obedience to law, far from being excluded, are required\nby faith in God, are indeed a direct and inevitable preliminary to\nthinking of the world as dependent upon God. Thus we may state the\nparadox, that only a Cosmos which, by its strict obedience to law, gives\nus the impression of being sufficient unto itself, can be conceived of as\nactually dependent upon God, as His creation. If any man desires to stop\nshort at the consideration of the apparent self-sufficiency of the Cosmos\nand its obedience to law, and refuses to recognise any reasons outside of\nthe world for this, we should hardly be able, according to our own\nproposition, to require him to go farther. For we maintained that God\ncould not be read out of nature, that the idea of God could never have\nbeen gained in the first instance from a study of nature and the world.\nThe problem always before us is rather, whether, having gained the idea\nfrom other sources, we can include the world within it. Our present\nquestion is whether the world, as it is, and just because it is as it is,\ncan be conceived of as dependent upon God. And this question can only be\nanswered in the affirmative, and in the sense of Schiller\u2019s oft-quoted\nlines:\n\n\n                        The great Creator\n    We see not\u2014He conceals himself within\n    His own eternal laws. The sceptic sees\n    Their operation, but beholds not Him,\n    \u201cWherefore a God!\u201d he cries, \u201cthe world itself\n    Suffices for itself!\u201d and Christian prayer\n    Ne\u2019er praised him more, than does this blasphemy.\n\n\nGod\u2019s world could not possibly be a conglomeration of chances; it must be\norderly, and the fact that it is so proves its dependence.\n\nBut while we thus hold fast to our canon, we shall find that the assertion\nof the world\u2019s dependence receives indirect corroboration even in regard\nto the astronomical realm, from certain signs which it exhibits, from\ncertain suggestions which are implied in it. We must not wholly overlook\ntwo facts which, to say the least, are difficult to fit in with the idea\nof the independence and self-sufficiency of the world; these are, on the\none hand, the difficulties involved in the idea of an eternal machine, and\non the other the difficult fact of \u201centropy.\u201d We have already compared the\nworld to a mighty clock, or a machine which, as a whole, represents what\ncan never be found in one of its parts, a _perpetuum mobile_. Let us\nhowever leave aside the idea of a _perpetuum mobile_, and dwell rather on\nthe comparison with a machine. It seems obvious that in order to be a\nmachine there must be a closed solidarity in the system. But how could a\nmachine have come into existence and become functional if it is driven by\nwheels, which are driven by wheels, which are again driven by wheels ...\nand so on unceasingly? It would not be a machine. The idea falls to pieces\nin our hands. Yet our world is supposed to be just such an infinitely\ncontinuous \u201csystem.\u201d How does it begin to depend upon and be sufficient\nunto itself? But further. It is a clock, we are told, which ever winds\nitself up anew, which, without fatigue and in ceaseless repetition,\nadjusts the universal cycles of becoming, and disappearing, and becoming\nagain. It seems a corroboration of the old Heraclitian and Stoic\nconception, that the eternal primitive fire brings forth all things out of\nitself, and takes them back into itself to bring them forth anew. Even\nto-day the conception is probably general that, out of the original states\nof the world-matter, circling fiery nebul\u00e6 form themselves and throw off\ntheir rings, that the breaking up of these rings gives rise to planets\nwhich circle in solar systems for many \u00e6ons through space, till, finally,\ntheir energy lessened by friction with the ether, they plunge into their\nsuns again, that the increased heat restores the original state and the\nwhole play begins anew.\n\nAll this was well enough in the days of na\u00efvely vitalistic ideas of the\nworld as having a life and soul. But not in these days of mechanics, the\nstrict calculation of the amount of energy used, and the mechanical theory\nof heat. The world-clock cannot wind itself up. It, too, owes its activity\nto the transformation of potential energy into kinetic energy. And, since\nmovement and work take place within it, there is in the clock as a whole\njust as in every one of its parts, a mighty process of relaxation of an\noriginally tense spring, there is dissipation and transformation of the\nstored potential energy into work and ultimately into heat. And with every\nrevolution of the earth and its moon the world is moving slowly but\ninexorably towards a final stage of complete relaxation of her powers of\ntension, a state in which all energy will be transformed into heat, in\nwhich there will be no different states but only the most uniform\ndistribution, in which also all life and all movement will cease and the\nworld-clock itself will come to a standstill.\n\nHow does this fit in with the idea of independence and self-sufficiency?\nHow could the world-clock ever wind itself up again to the original state\nof tension which was simply there as if shot from a pistol \u201cin the\nbeginning\u201d? Where is the everlasting impressive uniformity and constancy\nof the world? How does it happen that the world-clock has not long ago\ncome to a standstill? For even if the original sum of potential energy is\npostulated as infinite, the eternity that lies behind us is also infinite.\nAnd so one infinity swallows another. And innumerable questions of a\nsimilar kind are continually presenting themselves.\n\n\n\n\nThe \u201cContingency\u201d of the World.\n\n\nBut we need not dwell in the meantime on these and the many other\ndifficulties and riddles presented by our cosmological hypothesis. However\nthese may be solved, a general consideration will remain\u2014namely, that\nwhether the world is governed by law or not, whether it is sufficient unto\nitself or not, there _is_ a world full of the most diverse phenomena, and\nthere _are_ laws. Whence then have both these come? Is it a matter of\ncourse, is it quite obvious that they should exist at all, and that they\nshould be exactly as they are? We do not here appeal without further\nceremony to the saying \u201ceverything must have a cause, therefore the world\nalso.\u201d It is not absolutely correct. For instance, if the world were so\nconstituted that it would be impossible for it not to exist, that the\nnecessity for its existence and the inconceivability of its non-existence\nwere at once explicit and obvious, then there would be no sense in\ninquiring after a cause. In regard to a \u201cnecessary\u201d thing, if there were\nany such, we cannot ask, \u201cWhy, and from what cause does this exist?\u201d If it\nwas necessary, that implies that to think of it as not existing would be\nridiculous, and logically or metaphysically impossible. Unfortunately\nthere are no \u201cnecessary\u201d things, so that we cannot illustrate the case by\nexamples. But there are at least necessary truths as distinguished from\ncontingent truths. And thus some light may be brought into the matter for\nthe inexpert. For instance, a necessary truth is contained in the\nsentence, \u201cEverything is equal to itself,\u201d or, \u201cThe shortest distance\nbetween two points is a straight line.\u201d We cannot even conceive of the\ncontrary. Therefore these axioms have no reasons, and can neither be\ndeduced nor proved. Every question as to their reasons is quite\nmeaningless. As examples of a \u201ccontingent\u201d truth we may take \u201cIt rains\nto-day,\u201d or \u201cThe earth revolves round the sun.\u201d For neither one nor the\nother of these is necessarily so. It is so as a matter of fact, but under\nother circumstances it might have been otherwise. The contrary can be\nconceived of and represented, and has in itself an equal degree of\npossibility. Therefore such a fact requires to be and is capable of being\nreasoned out. I can and must ask, \u201cHow does it happen that it rains\nto-day? What are the reasons for it?\u201d But as we must seek for sufficient\nreasons for \u201ccontingent\u201d truths, that is, for those of which the contrary\nwas equally possible, so assuredly we must seek for sufficient causes for\n\u201ccontingent\u201d phenomena and events, those which can be thought of as not\nexisting, or as existing in a different form. For these we must find\ncauses and actual reasons. Otherwise they have no foundation. The element\nof \u201ccontingency\u201d must be done away with; they must be shown to result from\nsufficient causes. That is to say nothing less than that they must be\ntraced back to some necessity. For it is one of the curious fundamental\nconvictions of our reason, and one in which all scientific investigation\nhas its ultimate roots, that what is \u201ccontingent\u201d is only apparently so,\nand in reality is in some way or other based on necessity. Therefore\nreason seeks causes for everything.\n\nThe search for causes involves showing that a thing was necessary. And\nthis must obviously apply to the world as a whole. If it were quite\nobvious that the world and its existence as it is were necessary, that is,\nthat it would be contrary to reason to think of the world, and its\nphenomena, and their obedience to law as non-existent, or as different\nfrom what they are, all inquiry would be at an end. This would be _the_\nultimate necessity in which all the apparent contingency of isolated\nphenomena and existences was firmly based. But this is far from being the\ncase. That anything exists, and that the world exists, is for us\nabsolutely the greatest \u201ccontingency\u201d of all, and in regard to it we can\nand must continually ask, \u201cWhy does anything exist at all, and why should\nit not rather be non-existent?\u201d Indeed, all our quest for sufficient\ncauses here reaches its climax. In more detail: that these celestial\nsystems and bodies, the ether, attraction and gravitation should exist,\nand that everything should be governed by definite laws, all literally \u201cas\nif shot from a pistol,\u201d there must undoubtedly be some sufficient reason,\ncertain as it is that we shall never discover it. It is true, as some one\nhas said, that we live not only in a very fortuitous world, but in an\nincredibly improbable one. And this is not affected by the fact that the\nworld is completely governed by law. Law only confirms it. The fact that\nall details may be clearly and mathematically calculated in no way\nprevents them from being fundamentally contingent. For they are only so\ncalculable on the basis of the given fundamental characters of the world.\nAnd that is precisely the problem: \u201cWhy do these characters exist and not\nquite different ones, and why should any exist at all?\u201d\n\nIf any one should say: \u201cWell, we must just content ourselves with\nrecognising the essentially \u2018contingent\u2019 nature of existence, for we shall\nnever be able to get beyond that,\u201d he would be right in regard to the\nsecond statement. To get beyond that and to see what it is\u2014eternal and in\nitself necessary\u2014that lies at the basis of this world of \u201ccontingency\u201d is\nindeed impossible. But he would be wrong as to the first part of the\nassertion. For no one _will_ \u201ccontent himself.\u201d For that all chance is\nonly apparently chance, and is ultimately based in necessity, is a\ndeeply-rooted and fundamental conviction of our reason, one which directs\nall scientific investigation, and which cannot be ignored. It demands\nceaselessly something necessary as the permanent basis of contingent\nexistence. And this fact is and remains the truth involved in the\n\u201ccosmological proofs of the existence of God\u201d of former days. It was\ncertainly erroneous to suppose that \u201cGod\u201d could be proved. For it is a\nlong way from that \u201cidea of necessity\u201d to religious experience of God. And\nit was erroneous, too, to suppose that anything could be really \u201cproved.\u201d\nWhat is necessary can never really be proved from what is contingent. But\nthe recognition of the contingent nature of the world is a stimulus that\nstirs up within our reason the idea of the necessary, and it is a fact\nthat reason finds rest only in this idea.\n\n\n\n\nThe Real World.\n\n\n(4.) What was stated separately in our first and second propositions, and\nhas hitherto been discussed, now unites and culminates in the fourth. For\nif we note the vital expressions of religion wherever it occurs, we find\nabove all one thing as its most characteristic sign, indeed as its very\nessence, in all places and all times, often only as a scarce uttered wish\nor longing, but often breaking forth with impetuous might. This one thing\nis the impulse and desire to get beyond time and space, and beyond the\noppressive narrowness and crampingness of the world surrounding us, the\ndesire to see into the depth and \u201cother side\u201d of things and of existence.\nFor it is the very essence of religion to distinguish this world from, and\ncontrast it as insufficient with the real world which is sufficient, to\nregard this world which we see and know and possess as only an image, as\nonly transiently real, in contrast with the real world of true being which\nis believed in. Religion has clothed this essential feature in a hundred\nmythologies and eschatologies, and one has always given place to another,\nthe more sublimed to the more robust. But the fundamental feature itself\ncannot disappear.\n\nIn apologetics and dogmatics the interest in this matter is often\nconcentrated more or less exclusively upon the question of \u201cimmortality.\u201d\nWrongly so, however, for this quest after the real world is not a final\nchapter in religion, it is religion itself. And in the religious sense the\nquestion of immortality is only justifiable and significant when it is a\npart of the general religious conviction that this world is not the truly\nessential world, and that the true nature of things, and of our own being,\nis deeper than we can comprehend, and lies beyond this side of things,\nbeyond time and space. To the religious mind it cannot be of great\nimportance whether existence is to be continued for a little at least\nbeyond this life. In what way would such a wish be religious? But the\ninward conviction that \u201call that is transitory is only a parable,\u201d that\nall here is only a veil and a curtain, and the desire to get beyond\nsemblance to truth, beyond insufficiency to sufficiency, concentrate\nthemselves especially in the assertion of the eternity of our true being.\n\nIt is with this characteristic of religion that the spirit and method of\nnaturalism contrast so sharply. Naturalism points out with special\nsatisfaction that this depth of things, this home of the soul is nowhere\ndiscoverable. The great discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton have\ndone away with the possibility of that. No empyrean, no corner of the\nworld remains available. Even the attempted flight to sun, moon, or stars\ndoes not help. It is true that the newly discovered world is without end,\nbut, beyond a doubt, in its outermost and innermost depths it is a world\nof space and time. Even in the stellar abysses \u201ceverything is just the\nsame as with us.\u201d\n\nAll this is doubtless correct, and it is very wholesome for religion. For\nit prompts religion no longer to seek its treasure, the true nature of\nthings, and its everlasting home in time and space, as the mythologies and\neschatologies have sought them repeatedly. It throws religion back on the\nfundamental insight and on the convictions which it had attained long\nbefore philosophy and criticism of knowledge had arrived at similar views:\nnamely, that time and space, and this world of time and space, do not\ncomprise the whole of existence, nor existence as it really is, but are\nonly a manifestation of it to our finite and limited knowledge. Before the\ndays of modern astronomy, and without its help, religion knew that God was\nnot confined to \u201cheaven,\u201d or anywhere in space, and that time as it is for\nus was not for Him. Even in the terms \u201ceternity\u201d and \u201cinfinity\u201d it shows\nan anticipatory knowledge of a being and reality above time and space.\nThese ideas were not gained from a contemplation of nature, but before it\nand from independent sources.\n\nBut though it is by no means the task of apologetics to build up these\nideas directly from a study of things, it is of no little importance to\ninquire whether religion possesses in these convictions only postulates of\nfaith, for which it must laboriously and forcibly make a place in the face\nof knowledge, or whether a thorough and self-critical knowledge does not\nrather confirm them, and show us, within the world of knowledge itself,\nunmistakable signs that it cannot be the true, full reality, but points to\nsomething beyond itself.\n\nTo study this question thoroughly would involve setting forth a special\ntheory of knowledge and existence. This cannot be attempted here. But\nKant\u2019s great doctrine of the \u201cAntinomy of Reason\u201d has for all time broken\nup for us the narrowness of the naturalistic way of thinking. Every one\nwho has felt cramped by the narrow limits in which reality was confined by\na purely mundane outlook must have experienced the liberating influence of\nthe Kantian Antinomy if he has thought over it carefully. The thick\ncurtain which separates being from appearance seems to be torn away, or at\nany rate to reveal itself as a curtain. Kant shows that, if we were to\ntake this world as it lies before us for the true reality, we should land\nin inextricable contradictions. These contradictions show that the true\nworld itself cannot coincide with our thought and comprehension, for in\nbeing itself there can be no contradictions. Otherwise it would not exist.\nThe ancient problems of philosophy, from the time of the Eleatic school\nonwards, find here their adequate formulation. Kant\u2019s disciple, Fries, has\ncarried the matter further, and has attempted to develop what for Kant\nstill remained a sort of embarrassment of reason to more precise\npronouncements as to the relation of true being to its manifestation,\n\n\n\n\nThe Antimony of Our Conception of Time.\n\n\nA few examples may serve to make the point clear. The first of the\nantinomies is also the most impressive. It brings before us the\ninsufficiency of our conceptions of time, and shows the impossibility of\ntransferring, from the world as it appears to us, to real Being any mode\nof conceiving time which we possess. The difficulty is, whether we are to\nthink of our world as having had a beginning or not. The na\u00efve outlook\nwill at once assume without further ado a beginning of all things.\nEverything must have had a beginning, though that may have been a very\nlong time ago. But on more careful reflection it is found impossible to\nimagine this, and then the assumption that things had no beginning is made\nwith as little scruple. Let us suppose that the beginning of things was\nsix thousand, or, what is quite as easy, six thousand billion years ago.\nWe are at once led to ask what there was the year before or many years\nbefore, and what there was before that again, and so on until we face the\ninfinite and beginningless. Thus we find that we have never really thought\nof a beginning of things, and never could think of it, but that our\nthinking always carries us into the infinite. Time, at any rate, we have\nthought of as infinite. We may then amuse ourselves by trying to conceive\nof endless time as empty, but we shall hardly be able to give any reason\nfor arriving at that idea. If time goes back to infinity, it seems\ndifficult to see why it should not always have been filled, instead of\nonly being so filled from some arbitrary point. And in any case the very\nfact of the existence of time makes the problem of beginning or not\nbeginning insoluble. For such reasons Aristotle asserted that the world\nhad no beginning, and rejected the contrary idea as childish.\n\nBut the idea of no beginning is also childish or rather impossible, and in\nreality inconceivable. For if it be assumed that the world and time have\nnever had a beginning, there stretches back from the time at which I now\nfind myself a past eternity. It must have passed completely as a whole,\nfor otherwise this particular point in time could never have been arrived\nat. So that I must think of an infinity which nevertheless comes to an\nend. I cannot do this. It would be like wooden iron.\n\nThe matter sounds simple but is nevertheless difficult in its\nconsequences. It confronts us at once with the fact, confirmed by the\ntheory of knowledge, that time as we know it is an absolutely necessary\nand fundamental form of our conceptions and knowledge, but is likewise the\nveil over what is concealed, and cannot be carried over in the same form\ninto the true nature of things. As the limits and contradictions in the\ntime-conception reveal themselves to us, there wakes in us the idea which\nwe accept as the analogue of time in true being, an idea of existence\nunder the form of \u201ceternity,\u201d which, since we are tied down to temporal\nconcepts, cannot be expressed or even thought of with any content.(2)\n\n\n\n\nThe Antimony of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned.\n\n\nThe antinomy of the conditioned and the unconditioned leads us along\nsimilar lines. Every individual finite thing or event is dependent on its\ncauses and conditions, which precede it or co-exist in inter-relation with\nit. It is conditioned, and is only possible through its conditions. But\nthat implies that it can only occur or be granted when all its conditions\nare first given in complete synthesis. If any one of them failed, it would\nnot have come about. But every one of its conditioning circumstances is in\nits turn conditioned by innumerable others, and every one of these again\nby others, and so on into the infinite, backwards and on all sides, so\nthat here again something without end and incapable of end must have come\nto an end, and must be thought of as having an end, before any event\nwhatever can really come to pass. But this again is a sheer impossibility\nfor our thinking: we require and must demand something completed, because\nnow is really now, and something happens now, and yet in the world as it\nappears to us we are always forced to face what cannot have an end.\n\n\n\n\nThe Antimony of Our Conception of Space.\n\n\nTo bring our examples to a conclusion, we find the same sort of antinomy\nin regard to space, and the world as it is extended in space. Here, too,\nit becomes apparent that space as we imagine it, and as we carry it with\nus as a concept for arranging our sense-impressions, cannot correspond to\nthe true reality. As in regard to time, so also in regard to space, we can\nnever after any distance however enormous come to a halt and say, \u201cHere is\nthe end of space.\u201d Whether we think of the diameter of the earth\u2019s orbit\nor the distance to Sirius, and multiply them by a million we always ask,\n\u201cWhat lies behind?\u201d and so extend space into the infinite. And as a matter\nof course we people it also without end with heavenly bodies, stars,\nnebulae, Milky Ways and the like. For here again there can be no obvious\nreason why space in our neighbourhood should be filled, while space at a\ngreater distance should be thought of as empty. Therefore we actually\nthink of star beyond star, and, as far as we can reckon, stars beyond that\nwithout end. For space extends not merely so far, but always farther. And\nthe number of the stars is not so many, but always one more. This sounds\nquite obvious, but it has exactly the same impossibility as we found in\nour \u201cpast infinity.\u201d For although we are carried by our conceptions into\nthe infinite, and to what never could have an end, it is impossible to\nassume the same of reality.\n\nIt is remarkable and quite characteristic that the whole difficulty and\nits peculiar nature become much more intelligible to us through the\nfamiliar images and expressions of religion. There we readily admit that\nwe cannot comprehend the number of the stars and stellar spaces, because\nfor us they never reach an end, there being always one more; but that in\nthe eyes of God all is embraced in His universality, in a \u201cperfect\nsynthesis,\u201d and that to Him Being is never and in no point \u201calways one\nmore.\u201d God does not count.\n\nWithout the help of religious expressions we say: Being itself is always\nitself and never implies any more; for if there were \u201calways one more\u201d it\nwould not be Being. It can only exist \u201cas a perfect synthesis,\u201d which does\nnot mean an endless number, which nevertheless somewhere comes to an\nend\u2014again wooden iron\u2014but something above all reckoning and beyond all\nnumber, as it is beyond space and time. And that which we are able to\nweigh and measure and number is therefore not reality itself, but only its\ninadequate manifestation to our limited capacity for understanding.\n\nBut enough of this. The puzzles in the doctrines of the simple and the\ncomplex, of the causeless and the caused, into which this world of ours\nforces us, should teach us further to recognise it for what it\nis\u2014insufficient and pointing beyond itself,\u2014to its own transcendent\ndepths. So, too, the problems that arise when we penetrate farther and\nfarther into the ever more and more minute, and the indefiniteness of our\nthought-horizons in general should have the same effect.\n\n\n\n\nIntuitions of Reality.\n\n\n(5.) There are other evidences of this depth and hidden nature of things,\ntowards which an examination of our knowledge points. For \u201cin feeling and\nintuition appearance points beyond itself to real being.\u201d So ran our fifth\nproposition. This subject indeed is delicate, and can only be treated of\nin the hearing of willing ears. But all apologetic counts upon willing\nears; it is not conversion of doubters that is aimed at, it is religion\nwhich seeks to reassure itself. Our proposition does not speak of dreams\nbut of facts, which are not the less facts because they are more subtle\nthan others. What we are speaking of are the deep impressions, which\ncannot properly be made commensurable at all, which may spring up directly\nout of an inward experience, an apprehension of nature, the world and\nhistory, in the depths of the spirit. They call forth in us an\n\u201canamnesis,\u201d a \u201creminiscence\u201d in Plato\u2019s sense, awakening within us moods\nand intuitions in which something of the essence and meaning of being is\ndirectly experienced, although it remains in the form of feeling, and\ncannot easily, if at all, find expression in definable ideas or clear\nstatements. Fries, in his book, \u201cWissen, Glaube, und Ahnung,\u201d unhappily\ntoo much forgotten, takes account of this fact, for he places this region\nof spiritual experience beside the certainties of faith and knowledge, and\nregards these as \u201canimated\u201d by it. He has in mind especially the\nimpressions of the beautiful and the sublime which far transcend our\nknowledge of nature, and to which knowledge and its concepts can never do\nadequate justice, facts though they undoubtedly are. In them we experience\ndirectly, in intuitive feeling, that the reality is greater than our power\nof understanding, and we feel something of its true nature and meaning.\nThe utterances of Schleiermacher(3) in regard to religion follow the same\nlines. For this is precisely what he means when he insists that the\nuniverse must be experienced in intuition and feeling as well as in\nknowing and doing. He is less incisive in his expressions than Fries, but\nwider in ideas. He includes in this domain of \u201cintuitive feeling\u201d not only\nthe aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and sublime, but takes the much\nmore general and comprehensive view, that the receptive mind may gather\nfrom the finite impressions of the infinite, and may through its\nexperiences of time gain some conception of the eternal. And he rightly\nemphasises, that such intuition has its true place in the sphere of mind\nand in face of the events of history, rather than in the outer court of\nnature. He, too, lays stress on the fact that doctrinal statements and\nideas cannot be formulated out of such subtle material.\n\nThe experience of which we are speaking may be most directly and\nimpressively gained from the great, the powerful, the sublime in nature.\nIt may be gained from the contemplation of nature\u2019s harmonies and\nbeauties, but also of her overflowing abundance and her enigmatical\nd\u00e6monic strength, from the purposeful intelligibility as well as the\nterrifying and bewildering enigmas of nature\u2019s operations, from all the\nmanifold ways in which the mind is affected and startled, from all the\nsuggestive but indefinable sensations which may be roused in us by the\nactivity of nature, and which rise through a long scale to intoxicated\nself-forgetfulness and wordless ecstasy before her beauty, and her\nhalf-revealed, half-concealed mystery. If any or all of these be stirred\nup in a mind which is otherwise godless or undevout, it remains an\nindefinite, vacillating feeling, bringing with it nothing else. But in the\nreligious mind it immediately unites with what is akin to it or of similar\nnature, and becomes worship. No dogmas or arguments for disputatious\nreasoning can be drawn from it. It can hardly even be expressed, except,\nperhaps, in music. And if it be expressed it tends easily to become\nfantastic or romantic pomposity, as is shown even by certain parts of the\nwritings of Schleiermacher himself.\n\n\n\n\nThe Recognition of Purpose.\n\n\n(6.) We must now turn to the question of \u201cteleology.\u201d Only now, not\nbecause it is a subordinate matter, for it is in reality the main one, but\nbecause it is the culminating point, not the starting point, of our\nargument. If the world be from God and of God, it and all that it contains\nmust be for some definite purpose and for special ends. It must be swayed\nby eternal ideas, and must be subject to divine providence and guidance.\nBut naturalism, and even, it appears, natural science, declares: Neither\npurposes nor ideas are of necessity to be assumed in nature. They do not\noccur either in the details or in the whole. The whole is an absolutely\nclosed continuity of causes, a causal but blind machinery, in regard to\nwhich we cannot ask, What is meant to be produced by this? but only, What\ncauses have produced what exists? This opposition goes deep and raises\ndifficulties. And in all vindication or defence of religion it ought\nrightly to be kept in the foreground of attention, although the points we\nhave already insisted on have been wrongly overlooked. The opposition\nconcentrates itself to-day almost entirely around two theories of\nnaturalism, which do not, indeed, set forth the whole case, but which are\ncertainly typical examples, so that, if we analyse them, we shall have\narrived at an orientation of the fundamental points at issue. The two\ndoctrines are Darwinism and the mechanical theory of life, and it is to\nthese that we must now turn our attention. And since the best elucidation\nand criticism of both theories is to be found in their own history, and in\nthe present state of opinion within their own school, we shall have to\ncombine our study of their fundamental principles with that of their\nhistory.\n\nWe can here set forth, however, only the chief point of view, the gist of\nthe matter, which will continue to exist and hold good however the\nanalysis of details may turn out. For the kernel of the question may be\ndiscussed independently, without involving the particular interests of\nzoology or biology, though we shall constantly come across particular and\nconcrete cases of the main problem in our more detailed study.\n\nThe struggle against, and the aversion to ideas and purposes on the part\nof the nature-interpreters is not in itself directed against religion. It\ndoes not arise from any antagonism of natural science to the religious\nconception of the world, but is primarily an antagonism of one school of\nscience to another, the modern against the medi\u00e6val-Aristotelian. The\nlatter, again, was not in itself a religious world-outlook, it was simply\nan attempt at an interpretation of the processes of nature, and especially\nof evolution, which might be quite neutral towards religion, or might be\npurely naturalistic. It was the theory of Entelechies and _form\u00e6\nsubstaniales_. In order to explain how a thing had come to be, it taught\nthat the idea of the finished thing, the \u201cform,\u201d was implicit in it from\nthe very beginning, and determined the course of its development. This\n\u201cform,\u201d the end aimed at in development, was \u201cpotentially,\u201d \u201cideally,\u201d or\n\u201cvirtually\u201d implicit in the thing from the beginning, was the _causa\nfinalis_, the ultimate cause which determined the development. Modern\nnatural science objects to this theory that it offers no explanation, but\nmerely gives a name to what has to be explained. The aim of science, it\ntells us, is to elucidate the play of causes which brought about a\nparticular result. The hypothetical _causa finalis_ it regards as a mere\n_asylum ignoranti\u00e6_, and as the problem itself not as its solution. For\ninstance, if we inquire into the present form and aspect of the earth,\nnothing is advanced by stating that the \u201cform,\u201d the primitive model of the\nevolving earth was implicit in it from the beginning, and that it\ngradually determined the phases and transition-stages of its evolution,\nuntil the ultimate state, the end aimed at, was attained. The task of\nscience is, through geology, geognosy, mineralogy, geodesy, physical\ngeography, meteorology, and other sciences to discover the physical,\nchemical, and mechanical causes of the earth\u2019s evolution and their laws,\nand from the co-operation of these to interpret everything in detail and\nas a whole.\n\nWhether modern natural science is right in this or not, whether or not it\nhas neglected an element of truth in the old theory of Entelechies which\nit cannot dispense with, especially in regard to living organisms, it is\nbeyond dispute that, from the most general point of view, and in\nparticular with reference to teleology, religion does not need to concern\nitself in the least about this opposition. \u201cPurposes,\u201d \u201cideas,\u201d \u201cguidance\u201d\nin the religious sense, are quite unaffected by the manner in which the\nresult is realised; everything depends upon the special and particular\nvalue of what has been attained or realised. If a concatenation of causes\nand stages of development lead to results in which we suddenly discern a\nspecial and particular value, then, and not till then, have we a reason\nand criterion for our assumption that it is not simply a result of a play\nof chances, but that it has been brought about by purposeful thought, by\nhigher intervention and guidance of things. Certainly not before then.\nThus we can only speak of purposes, aims, guidance, and creation in so far\nas we have within us the capacity for feeling and recognising the value,\nmeaning and significance of things. But natural science itself cannot\nestimate these. It can or will only examine how everything has come about,\nbut whether this result has a higher value than another, or has a lower,\nor none at all, it can neither assert nor deny. That lies quite outside of\nits province.\n\nLet us try to make this clear by taking at once the highest example\u2014man\nand his origin. Let it be assumed that natural science could discover all\nthe causes and factors which, operating for many thousands of years, have\nproduced man and human existence. Even if these causes and factors had\nactually been pure \u201cideas,\u201d _form\u00e6 substantiales_ and the like, that would\nin no way determine whether the whole process was really subject to a\ndivine idea of purpose or not. If we had not gained, from a different\nsource, an insight into the supreme and incomparable worth of human\nexistence, spiritual, rational, and free, with its capacity for morality,\nreligion, art and science, we should be compelled to regard man, along\nwith every other natural result, as the insignificant product of a blind\nplay of nature. But, on the other hand, if we have once felt and\nrecognised this value of human existence, its highest dignity, the\nknowledge that man has been produced through a play of highly complex\nnatural processes, fulfilling themselves in absolute obedience to law, in\nno way prevents our regarding him as a \u201cpurpose,\u201d as the realisation of a\ndivine idea, in accordance with which nature in its orderliness was\nplanned. In fact, this consideration leads us to discover and admire\neternal plan and divine guidance in nature.\n\nFor it does not rest with natural science either to discover or to deny\n\u201cpurpose\u201d in the religious sense in nature; it belongs to quite a\ndifferent order of experience, an entirely inward one. Just in proportion\nas I become aware of, and acknowledge in the domain of my inward\nexperience and through my capacity of estimating values, the worth of the\nspiritual and moral life of man, so, with the confidence of this peculiar\nmode of conviction, I subordinate the concatenations of events and causes\non which the possibility and the occurrence of the spiritual and moral\nlife depend, to an eternal teleology, and see the order of the world that\nleads to this illuminated by everlasting meaning and by providence.\n\n\n\n\nTeleological and Scientific Interpretations are Alike Necessary.\n\n\n(7.) Thus religion confidently subjects the world to a teleological\ninterpretation. And to a teleological study in this sense the strictly\ncausal interpretations of natural science are not hostile, but\nindispensable. For how do things stand? Natural science endeavours by\npersistent labour to comprehend the whole of the facts occurring in our\nworld, up to the existence of man, as the final outcome and result of an\nage-long process of evolution, attempts also to follow this process ever\nhigher up the ladder of strictly causal and strictly law-governed\nsequences, and finally to connect it with the primary and simplest\nfundamental facts of existence, beyond which it cannot go, and which must\nsimply be accepted as \u201cgiven.\u201d If these results of this causally\ninterpreted evolution reveal themselves to our inward power of valuation\nas full of meaning and value, indeed of the deepest and most incomparable\nvalue, the causal mode of explanation is in no way affected, but its\nresults are all at once placed in a new light and reveal a peculiarity\nwhich was previously not discoverable, yet which is their highest import.\nThey become a strictly united system of _means_. And purposefulness as a\npotentiality is thus carried back to the very foundation and \u201cbeginning,\u201d\nto the fundamental conditions and primary factors of the cosmos itself.\nThe strict nexus of conditions and causes is thus nothing more than the\n\u201cendeavour after end and aim,\u201d the carrying through and realisation of the\neternal purpose, which was implicit potentially in the fundamental nature\nof things. The absolute obedience to law, and the inexorableness of chains\nof sequence are, instead of being fatal to this position, indispensable to\nit. When there is a purpose in view, it is only where the system of means\nis perfect, unbroken, and absolute, that the purpose can be realised, and\ntherefore that intention can be inferred. In the inexplicable datum of the\nfundamental factors of the world\u2019s existence, in the strict nexus of\ncauses, in the unfailing occurrence of the results which are determined by\nboth these, and which reveal themselves to us as of value and purpose,\nteleology and providence are directly realised. The only assumptions are,\nthat it is possible to judge the results according to their value, and\nthat both the original nature of the world and the system of its causal\nsequences\u2014that is, the world as we know it\u2014can be conceived of in\naccordance with the ideas of dependence and conditionedness. Both\nassumptions are not only possible, but necessary.\n\nIn thinking out this most general consideration, we find the real and\nfundamental answer to the question as to the validity and freedom of the\nreligious conception of the world with regard to teleology in nature. And\nif it be held fast and associated with the insight into the autonomy of\nthe spiritual and its underivability from the natural, we are freed at\nonce from all the petty strife with the naturalistic doctrines of\nevolution, descent, and struggle for existence. We shall nevertheless be\nobliged to discuss these to some extent, because it is not a matter of\nindifference whether the detailed study of natural evolution fits in more\nor less easily with the conception of purpose whose validity we have\ndemonstrated in general. If that proves to be the case, it will be an\nimportant factor in apologetics. The conclusion which we have already\narrived at on abstract grounds will then be corroborated and emphasised in\nthe concrete.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. DARWINISM IN GENERAL.\n\n\nDarwinism, which was originally a technical theory of the biological\nschools, has long since become a veritable tangle of the most diverse\nproblems and opinions, and seems to press hardly upon the religious\nconception of the world from many different sides. In its theory of blind\n\u201cnatural selection\u201d and the fortuitous play of the factors in the struggle\nfor existence, it appears to surrender the whole of this wonderful world\nof life to the rough and ready grip of a process without method or plan.\nIn the general theory of evolution and the doctrine of the descent of even\nthe highest from the lowest, it seems to take away all special dignity\nfrom the human mind and spirit, all the freedom and all the nobility of\npure reason and free will; it seems to reduce the higher products of\nreligion, morality, poetry, and the \u00e6sthetic sense to the level of an\nignoble tumult of animal impulses, desires and sensations. Purely\nspeculative questions relative to the evolution theory, psychological and\nmetaphysical, logical and epistemological, ethical, \u00e6sthetic, and finally\neven historical and politico-economical questions have been drawn into the\ncoil, and usually receive from the Darwinians an answer at once robust and\nself-assured. A zoological theory seems suddenly to have thrown light and\nintelligibility into the most diverse provinces of knowledge.\n\nBut in point of fact it can be shown that Darwinism has not really done\nthis and cannot do it. It leaves unaffected the problem of the mind with\nits peculiar and underivable laws, from the logical to the ethical.\nWhether it be right or wrong in its physiological theories, its\ngenealogical trees and fortuitous factors, preoccupation with this theory\nis a task of the second order. Nevertheless it is necessary to study it,\nbecause the chief objections to the religious interpretation of the world\nhave come from it.\n\n\n\n\nThe Development of Darwinism.\n\n\nIn studying it we should like to follow a method somewhat different from\nthat usually observed in apologetic writings. \u201cDarwinism,\u201d even in its\ntechnical, biological form, never was quite, and is to-day not at all a\nunified and consistent system. It has been modified in so many ways and\npresented in such different colours, that we must either refrain\naltogether from attempting to get into close quarters with it, or we must\nmake ourselves acquainted to some extent with the phases of the theory as\nit has gradually developed up to the present day. This is the more\nnecessary and useful since it is precisely within the circle of technical\nexperts that revolts from and criticisms of the Darwinian theory have in\nrecent years arisen; and these are so incisive, so varied, and so\ninstructive, that through them we can adjust our standpoint in relation to\nthe theory better than in any other way. And in thus letting the\nbiologists speak for themselves, we are spared the fatal task of entering\ninto the discussion of questions belonging to a region outside our own\nparticular studies.\n\nWe cannot, however, give more than a short sketch. But even such a sketch\nmay do more towards giving us a general knowledge of the question and\nshowing us a way out of the difficulties it raises than any of the current\n\u201crefutations.\u201d To supplement this sketch, and facilitate a thorough\nunderstanding of the problem, we shall give somewhat fuller references\nthan are usual to the relevant literature. And the same method will be\npursued in the following chapter, which deals with the mechanical theory\nof life. This method throws more upon the reader, but it is probably the\nmost satisfactory one for the serious student.\n\nThe reactions from the Darwinism of the schools which we have just\nreferred to, and to which the second half of this chapter is devoted, are,\nof course, of a purely scientific kind. And while we are devoting our\nattention to them, we must not be unfaithful to the canon laid down in the\nprevious chapter, namely that with reference to the question of teleology\nin the religious sense no real answer can be looked for from scientific\nstudy, not even if it be anti-Darwinian. In this case, too, it is\nimpossible to read the convictions and intuitions of the religious\nconception of the world out of a scientific study of nature: they precede\nit. But here, too, we may find some accessory support and indirect\ncorroboration more or less strong and secure. This may be illustrated by a\nsingle example. It will be shown that, on closer study, it is not\nimpossible to subordinate even the apparently confused tangle of\nnaturalistic factors of evolution which are summed up in the phrase\n\u201cstruggle for existence\u201d to interpretation from the religious point of\nview. But matters will be in quite a different position if the whole\ntheory collapses, and instead of evolution and its paths being given over\nto confusion and chance, it appears that from the very beginning and at\nevery point there is a predetermination of fixed and inevitable lines\nalong and up which it must advance. In many other connections\nconsiderations of a like nature will reveal themselves to us in the course\nof our study.\n\nDarwinism, as popularly understood, is the theory that \u201cmen are descended\nfrom monkeys,\u201d and in general that the higher forms of life are descended\nfrom the lower, and it is regarded as Darwin\u2019s epoch-making work and his\nchief merit\u2014or fault according to the point of view\u2014that he established\nthe Theory of Descent. This is only half correct, and it leaves out the\nreal point of Darwinism altogether. The Theory of Descent had its way\nprepared by the evolutionist ideas and the speculative nature-philosophy\nof Goethe, Schelling, Hegel and Oken; by the suggestions and glimmerings\nof the nature-mysticism of the romanticists; by the results of comparative\nanatomy and physiology; was already hinted at, at least as far as\nderivation of species was concerned, in the works of Linn\u00e9 himself; was\nworked out in the \u201czoological philosophies,\u201d by the elder Darwin, by\nLamarck, Etienne Geoffrey St. Hilaire and Buffon; was in the field long\nbefore Charles Darwin\u2019s time; was already in active conflict with the\nantagonistic theory of the \u201cconstancy of species,\u201d and had its more or\nless decided adherents. Yet undoubtedly it was through and after Darwin\nthat the theory grew so much more powerful and gained general acceptance.\n\n\n\n\nDarwinism and Teleology.\n\n\nBut the essential and most characteristic importance of Darwin and his\nwork, the reason for which he was called the Newton of biology, and which\nmakes Darwinism at once interesting and dangerous to the religious\nconception of the world, is something quite special and new. It is its\nradical opposition to teleology. Du Bois-Reymond, in his witty lecture\n\u201cDarwin versus Galiani,\u201d(4) explains the gist of the matter. \u201cLes d\u00e9s de\nla nature sont pip\u00e9s\u201d (nature\u2019s dice are loaded). Nature is almost always\nthrowing aces. She brings forth not what is meaningless and purposeless,\nbut in great preponderance what is full of meaning and purpose. What\n\u201cloaded\u201d her dice like this? Even if the theory of descent be true, in\nwhat way does it directly help the purely scientific interpretation of the\nworld? Would not this evolution from the lowest to the highest simply be a\nseries of the most astonishing lucky throws of the dice by which in\nperplexing \u201cendeavour after an aim,\u201d the increasingly perfect, and\nultimately the most perfect is produced? And, on the other hand, every\nindividual organism, from the Am\u0153ba up to the most complex vertebrate, is,\nin its structure, its form, its functions, a stupendous marvel of\nadaptation to its end and of co-ordination of the parts to the whole, and\nof the whole and its parts to the functions of the organism, the functions\nof nutrition, self-maintenance, reproduction, maintenance of the species,\nand so on. How account for the adaptiveness, both general and special,\nwithout _caus\u00e6 finales_, without intention and purposes, without guidance\ntowards a conscious aim? How can it be explained as the necessary result\nsolely of _caus\u00e6 efficientes_, of blindly working causes without a\ndefinite aim? Darwinism attempts to answer this question. And its answer\nis: \u201cWhat appears to us \u2018purposeful\u2019 and \u2018perfect\u2019 is in truth only the\nmanifold adaptation of the forms of life to the conditions of their\nexistence. And this adaptation is brought about solely by means of these\nconditions themselves. Without choice, without aim, without conscious\npurpose nature offers a wealth of possibilities. The conditions of\nexistence act as a sieve. What chances to correspond to them maintains\nitself, gliding through the meshes of the sieve, what does not perishes.\u201d\nIt is an old idea of the naturalistic philosophies, dating from\nEmpedocles, which Darwin worked up into the theory of \u201cnatural selection\u201d\nthrough \u201cthe survival of the fittest\u201d \u201cin the struggle for existence.\u201d Of\ncourse the assumption necessary to his idea is that the forms of life are\ncapable of variation, and of continually offering in ceaseless flux new\nproperties and characters to the sieve of selection, and of being raised\nthereby from the originally homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the\nsimple to the complex, from the lower to the higher. This is the theory of\ndescent, and it is, of course, an essential part and the very foundation\nof Darwin\u2019s theory. But it is _the doctrine of descent based upon natural\nselection_ that is Darwinism itself.\n\n\n\n\nThe Characteristic Features of Darwinism.\n\n\nWe do not propose to expound the Darwinian theory for the hundredth time;\na knowledge of it must be taken for granted. We need only briefly call to\nmind the characteristic features and catchwords of the theory as Darwin\nfounded it, which have also been the starting points of subsequent\nmodifications and controversies.\n\nAll living creatures are bound together in genetic solidarity. Everything\nhas evolved through endless deviations, gradations, and differentiations,\nbut at the same time by a perfectly continuous process. Variation\ncontinually produced a crop of heterogeneous novelties. The struggle for\nexistence sifted these out. Heredity fixed and established them. Without\nmethod or plan variations continue to occur (indefinite variations). They\nmanifest themselves in all manner of minute changes (\u201cfluctuating\u201d\nvariations). Every part, every function of an organism may be subject\nindividually to variation and selection. The world is strictly governed by\nwhat is useful. The whole organisation as well as the individual organs\nand functions bear the stamp of utility, at least, they must bear it if\nthe theory is correct. In the general continuity the transitions are\nalways easy; there are no fundamentally distinct \u201ctypes,\u201d architectural\nplans, or groups of forms. Where gaps yawn the intermediate links have\ngone amissing. There is no fundamental difference between _genus_,\n_species_, and _variety_. Even the most complicated organ such as the eye,\nthe most puzzling function such as the instinct of the bee, may be\nexplained as the outcome of many more primitive stages.\n\nThe chief evidences of the theory of descent are to be found in\nhomologies, in the correspondences of organs and functions, as revealed by\ncomparative anatomy and physiology, in the recapitulation revealed by\nembryology, in the structure of parasites, in rudimentary organs and\nreversions to earlier stages, in the distribution of animals and plants,\nand in the possibility of still transforming, at least to a slight extent,\none species into another, by experimental breeding.\n\nTransformation and differentiation go on in nature as a vast, ceaseless,\nbut blind process of selection. In artificial selection evolution is\nsecured by choosing the most fit for breeding purposes; so it is secured\nin natural selection by the favouring and survival of those forms which\nare the most fit among the many unfit or less fit, which happened to be\nexposed to the struggle for existence, that is, to the competition for the\nmeans of subsistence, to the struggle with enemies, to hostile\nenvironment, and to dangers of every kind. The adaptation thus brought\nabout is of a purely \u201cpassive\u201d kind. The variations arise fortuitously out\nof the organism, and present themselves for selection in the struggle for\nexistence; they are not actively acquired by means of the struggle. The\nsecondary factors of evolution recognised are: correlation in the growth\nand in the development of parts, the origin of new characters through use,\ntheir disappearance through disuse (Lamarck), the transmission of\ncharacters thus acquired, the influence of environment and sexual\nselection.(5)\n\nThe Darwinian theory, the interpretation of the teleological in the\nanimate world by means of the theory of descent based upon natural\nselection, entered like a ferment into the scientific thought-movement,\nand in a space of forty years it has itself passed through a series of\nstages, differentiations, and transformations which have in part resulted\nin the present state of the theory, and have in part anticipated it. These\nare represented by the names of workers belonging to a generation which\nhas for the most part already passed away: Darwin\u2019s collaborateurs, such\nas Alfred Russel Wallace, who independently and simultaneously expounded\nthe theory of natural selection, Haeckel and Fritz M\u00fcller, N\u00e4geli and\nAskenasy, von K\u00f6lliker, Mivart, Romanes and others. The differentiation\nand elaboration of Darwin\u2019s theories has gone ever farther and farther;\nthe grades and shades of doctrine held by his disciples are now almost\nbeyond reckoning.\n\n\n\n\nVarious Forms of Darwinism.\n\n\nThe great majority of these express what may be called popular Darwinism\n[\u201cDarwinismus vulgaris\u201d], theoretically worthless, but practically\npossessed of great powers of attraction and propagandism. It expresses in\nthe main a conviction, usually left unexplained, that everything \u201chappens\nnaturally,\u201d that man is really descended from monkeys, and that life has\n\u201cevolved from lower stages\u201d of itself, that dualism is wrong, and that\nmonism is the truth. It is exactly the standpoint of the popular\nnaturalism we have already described, which here mingles unsuspectingly\nand without scruple Lamarckian and other principles with the Darwinian,\nwhich is enthusiastic on the one hand over the \u201cpurely mechanical\u201d\ninterpretation of nature, and on the other drags in directly psychical\nmotives, unconscious consciousness, impulses, spontaneous\nself-differentiation of organisms, which nevertheless adheres to \u201cmonism\u201d\nand possibly even professes to share Goethe\u2019s conception of nature!\n\nAbove this stratum we come to that of the real experts, the only one which\nconcerns us in the least. Here too we find an ever-growing distance\nbetween divergent views, the most manifold differences amounting sometimes\nto mutual exclusion. These differences occur even with reference to the\nfundamental doctrine generally adhered to, the doctrine of descent. To one\nparty it is a proved fact, to another a probable, scientific working\nhypothesis, to a third a \u201crescuing plank.\u201d One party is always finding\nfresh corroborations, another new difficulties. And within the same group\nwe find the contrasts of believers in monophyletic and believers in\npolyphyletic evolution, the mechanists and the half-confessed or\nthoroughgoing vitalists, the preformationists and the believers in\nepigenesis. Opinions differ even more widely in regard to the _r\u00f4le_ of\nthe \u201cstruggle for existence\u201d in the production of species. On the one hand\nwe have the Darwinism of Darwin freed from inconsequent additions and\nformulated as orthodox \u201cneo-Darwinism\u201d; on the other hand we have\nheterodox Lamarckism. The \u201call-sufficiency\u201d of natural selection is\nproclaimed by some, its impotence by others. Indefinite variation is\nopposed by orthogenesis, fluctuating variation by saltatory mutation\n(Halmatogenesis in \u201cGreek\u201d), passive adaptation by the spontaneous\nactivity and self-regulation of the living organism. The struggle for\nexistence is variously regarded as the chief factor, or as a co-operating\nfactor, or as an indifferent, or even an inimical factor in the\norigination of new species.\n\nAnd among the representatives of these different standpoints there are\nmost interesting personal differences: in some, like Weismann, we find a\ngreat loyalty to, and persistence in the position once arrived at, in\nothers the most surprising transitions and changes of opinion. Thus\nFleischmann, a pupil of Selenka\u2019s, after illustrating during many years of\npersonal research the orthodox Darwinian standpoint, finally developed\ninto an outspoken opponent not only of the theory of selection but of the\ndoctrine of descent. So also Friedmann.(6) Driesch started from the\nmechanical theory of life and advanced through the connected series of his\nown biological essays to vitalism. Romanes, a prominent disciple of\nDarwin, ended in Christian theism, and Wallace, the discoverer of \u201cthe\nstruggle for existence,\u201d landed in spiritualism.\n\nNothing like an exhaustive view of the present state of Darwinism and its\nmany champions can here be attempted. But it will be necessary to get to\nknow what we may call its possibilities by a study of typical and leading\nexamples. In the course of our study many of the problems to which the\ntheory gives rise will reveal themselves, and their orientation will be\npossible.\n\nThis task falls naturally into two subdivisions: (1) the present state of\nthe theory of Evolution and Descent, and how far the religious conception\nof the world is or is not affected by it; (2) the truth as to the\noriginative and directive factors of Evolution, especially as to \u201cnatural\nselection in the struggle for existence,\u201d whether they are tenable and\nsufficient, and what attitude religion must take towards them. These two\nproblems must be kept distinct throughout, and must be discussed in order.\nFor the validity of what is characteristically _Darwinism_ is in no way\ndecided by proving descent and evolution, although it appears so in most\npopular expositions.(7)\n\n\n\n\nThe Theory of Descent.\n\n\nAgain and again we hear and read, even in scientific circles and journals,\nthat Darwinism breaks down at many points, that it is insufficient, and\neven that it has quite collapsed. Even the assurances of its most\nconvinced champions are rather forced, and are somewhat suggestive of\nbills payable in the future.(8) But here again it is obvious that we must\ndistinguish clearly between the Theory of Descent and Darwinism. Of the\nTheory of Descent it is by no means true that it has \u201cbroken down.\u201d With a\nslight exaggeration, but on the whole with justice, Weismann has asserted\nthat the Theory of Descent is to-day a \u201cgenerally accepted truth.\u201d Even\nWeismann\u2019s most pronounced opponents, such as Eimer, Wolff, Reinke, and\nothers, are at one with him in this, that there has been evolution in some\nform; that there has been a progressive transformation of species; that\nthere is real (not merely ideal) relationship or affiliation connecting\nour modern forms of life, up to and including man, with the lower and\nlowest forms of bygone \u00e6ons.\n\nThe evidences are the same as those adduced by Darwin and before his time,\nbut they have been multiplied and more sharply defined:\u2014namely, that the\nforms of life can be arranged in an ascending scale of evolution, both in\ntheir morphological and their physiological aspects, both as regards the\ngeneral type and the differentiation of individual organs and particular\ncharacters, bodily and mental. All the rubrics used by Darwin in this\nconnection, from comparative anatomy, from the pal\u00e6ontological record\nitself, and so on, have been filled out with ever-increasing detail.\nPal\u00e6ontology, in particular, is continually furnishing new illustrations\nof descent and new evidence of its probability, more telling perhaps in\nrespect of general features and particular groups than in regard to the\nhistorical process in detail. For certain species and genera pal\u00e6ontology\ndiscloses the primitive forms, discovers \u201csynthetic types\u201d which were the\nstarting-point for diverging branches of evolution, bridges over or\nnarrows the yawning gulfs in evolution by the discovery of \u201cintermediate\nforms\u201d; and, in the case of certain species, furnishes complete\ngenealogical trees. The same holds true of the facts of comparative\nanatomy, embryology, and so on. In all detailed investigations into an\nanimal type, in the study of the structure, functions, or the instincts of\nan ant, or of a whale or of a tape-worm, the standpoint of the theory of\ndescent is assumed, and it proves a useful clue for further investigation.\n\nIn regard to man\u2014so we are assured\u2014the theory finds confirmation through\nthe discovery of the Neanderthal, Spy, Schipka, La Naulette skulls and\nbones\u2014the remains of a prehistoric human race, with \u201cpithecoid\u201d (ape-like)\ncharacters. And the theory reaches its climax in Dubois\u2019 discovery of the\nremains of \u201cPithecanthropus,\u201d the upright ape-man, in Java, 1891-92, the\nlong sought-for Missing Link between animals and man;(9) and in the still\nmore recent proofs of \u201caffinity of blood\u201d between man and ape, furnished\nby experiments in transfusion. Friedenthal has revived the older\nexperiments of transfusing the blood of one animal into another, the blood\nof an animal of one species into that of another, of related species into\nrelated species, more remote into more remote, and finally even from\nanimals into man. The further apart the two species are, the more\ndifferent are the physiological characters of the blood, and the more\ndifficult does a mingling of the two become. Blood of a too distantly\nrelated form does not unite with that of the animal into which it is\ntransfused, but the red corpuscles of the former are destroyed by the\nserum of the latter, break up and are eliminated. In nearly related\nspecies or races, however, the two kinds of blood unite, as in the case of\nhorse and ass, or of hare and rabbit. Human blood serum behaves in a\nhostile fashion to the blood of eel, pigeon, horse, dog, cat, and even to\nthat of Lemuroids, or that of the more remotely related \u201cnon-anthropoid\u201d\nmonkey; human blood transfused from a negro into a white unites readily,\nas does also that of orang-utan transfused into a gibbon. But human blood\nalso unites without any breaking-up or disturbance with the blood of a\nchimpanzee; from which the inference is that man is not to be placed in a\nseparate sub-order beside the other sub-orders of the Primates, the\nplatyrrhine and catarrhine monkeys, not even in a distinct sub order\nbeside the catarrhines; but is to be included with them in one zoological\nsub-order. This classification was previously suggested by Selenka on\nother grounds, namely, because of the points in common in the embryonic\ndevelopment of the catarrhine monkeys and of man, and their common\ndistinctiveness as contrasted with the platyrrhines.(10)\n\n\n\n\nHaeckel\u2019s Evolutionist Position.\n\n\nThe average type of the Theory of Descent of the older or orthodox school,\nwhich still lingers in the background with its Darwinism unshaken, is that\nset forth by Haeckel, scientifically in his \u201cGenerelle Morphologie der\nOrganismen\u201d (1866), and \u201cSystematische Phylogenie\u201d (1896), and popularly\nin his \u201cNatural History of Creation\u201d and \u201cRiddles of the Universe,\u201d with\ntheir many editions. We may assume that it is well known, and need only\nbriefly recall its chief characteristics. The \u201cinestimable value,\u201d the\n\u201cincomparable significance,\u201d the \u201cimmeasurable importance\u201d of the Theory\nof Descent lies, according to Haeckel, in the fact that by means of it we\ncan explain the origin of the forms of life \u201cin a mechanical manner.\u201d The\ntheory, especially in regard to the descent of man from the apes, is to\nhim not a working hypothesis or tentative mode of representation; it is a\nresult comparable to Newton\u2019s law of gravitation or the Kant-Laplace\ncosmogony. It is \u201ca certain historical fact.\u201d The proofs of it are those\nalready mentioned.\n\nWhat is especially Haeckelian is the \u201cfundamental biogenetic law,\u201d\n\u201contogeny resembles phylogeny,\u201d that is to say, in development, especially\nin embryonic development, the individual recapitulates the history of the\nrace. Through \u201cpalingenesis,\u201d man, for instance, recapitulates his\nancestral stages (protist, gastr\u00e6ad, vermine, piscine, and simian). This\nrecapitulation is condensed, disarranged, or obscured in detail by\n\u201ccenogenesis\u201d or \u201cc\u00e6nogenesis.\u201d The groups and types of organisms exhibit\nthe closest genetic solidarity. The genealogical tree of man in particular\nruns directly through a whole series. From the realm of the protists it\nleads to that of the gastr\u00e6ad\u00e6 (nowadays represented by the C\u0153lentera),\nthence into the domain of the worms, touches the hypothetical \u201cprimitive\nchordates\u201d (for the necessary existence of which \u201ccertain proofs\u201d can be\ngiven), the class of tunicates, ascends through the fishes, amphibians and\nreptiles to forms parallel to the modern monotremes, then directly through\nthe marsupials to the placentals, through lemuroids and baboons to the\nanthropoid apes, from them to the \u201cfamous Pithecanthropus\u201d discovered in\nJava, out of which _homo sapiens_ arose. (The easy transition from one\ngroup of forms to another is to be noted. For it is against this point\nthat most of the opposition has been directed, whether from \u201cgrumbling\u201d\ncritics, or thoroughgoing opponents of the Theory of Descent.)\n\nHaeckel\u2019s facile method of constructing genealogical trees, which ignores\ndifficulties and discrepant facts, has met with much criticism and\nridicule even among Darwinians. The \u201corator of Berlin,\u201d Du Bois-Reymond,\ndeclared that if he must read romances he would prefer to read them in\nsome other form than that of genealogical trees. But they have at least\nthe merit that they give a vivid impression of what is most plausible and\nattractive in the idea of descent, and moreover they have helped towards\norientation in the discussion. Nor can we ignore the very marked taxonomic\nand architectonic talent which their construction displays.\n\n\n\n\nWeismann\u2019s Evolutionist Position.\n\n\nThe most characteristic representative, however, of the modern school of\nunified and purified Darwinism is not Haeckel, but the Freiburg zoologist,\nWeismann. Through a long series of writings he has carried on the conflict\nagainst heterodox, and especially Lamarckian theories of evolution, and\nhas developed his theories of heredity and the causes of variation, of the\nnon-transmissibility of acquired characters, and the all-sufficiency of\nnatural selection. In his latest great work, in two volumes, \u201cLectures on\nthe Theory of Descent,\u201d(11) he has definitely summed up and systematised\nhis views. These will interest us when we come to inquire into the problem\nof the factors operative in evolution. For the moment we are only\nconcerned with his attitude to the Theory of Descent as such. It is\nprecisely the same as Haeckel\u2019s, although he is opposed to Haeckel in\nregard to the strictly Darwinian standpoint. The Theory of Descent has\nconquered, and it may be said with assurance, for ever. That is the firm\nconviction on which the whole work is based, and it is really rather\ntreated as a self-evident axiom than as a statement to be proved. Weismann\ntakes little trouble to prove it. All the well-known, usually very clear\nproofs from pal\u00e6ontology, comparative anatomy, &c., which we are\naccustomed to meet with in evolutionist books are wanting here, the\ngenealogical trees of the Equid\u00e6, with the gradually diminishing number of\ntoes and the varying teeth, of _Planorbis multiformis_, of the ammonites,\nthe graduated series of stages exhibited by individual organs, for\ninstance, from the ganglion merely sensitive to light up to the intricate\neye, or from the rayed skeleton of the paired fins in fishes up to the\nfive-fingered hands and feet of the higher vertebrates, &c. These are only\nbriefly touched upon in the terse \u201cIntroduction,\u201d and the whole of the\ncomprehensive work is then directed to showing what factors can have been\noperative, and to proving that they must have been \u201cDarwinian\u201d (selection\nin the struggle for existence), and not Lamarckian or any other. This is\nshown in regard to the coloration of animals, the phenomena of mimicry,\nthe protective arrangements of plants, the development of instinct in\nanimals, and the origin of flowers.\n\nIn reality Weismann only adduces _one_ strict proof, and even that is only\nlaying special stress on what is well known in comparative embryology;\nnamely, the possibility of \u201cpredicting\u201d on the basis of the theory of\ndescent, as Leverrier \u201cpredicted\u201d Neptune. For instance, in the lower\nvertebrates from amphibians upwards there is an _os centrale_ in the\nskeleton of wrist, but there is none in man. Now if man be descended from\nlower vertebrates, and if the fundamental biogenetic law be true (that\nevery form of life recapitulates in its own development, especially in its\nembryonic development, the evolution of its race, though with\nabbreviations and condensations), it may be predicted that the _os\ncentrale_ is to be found in the early embryonic stages of man. And\nRosenberg found it. In the same way the \u201cgill-clefts\u201d of the fish-like\nancestors have long since been discovered in the embryo of the higher\nvertebrates and of man. Weismann himself \u201cpredicted\u201d that the markings of\nthe youngest stage of the caterpillars of the Sphingid\u00e6 (hawk-moths) would\nbe found to be not oblique but longitudinal stripes, and ten years later a\nfortunate observation verified the prediction. Because of the abundance of\nevidential facts Weismann does not go into any detailed proof of\nevolution. \u201cOne can hardly take up any work, large or small, on the finer\nor more general structural relations, or on the development of any animal,\nwithout finding in it proofs for the evolution theory.\u201d\n\nBut assured as the doctrine of descent appears,(12) and certain as it is\nthat it has not only maintained its hold since Darwin\u2019s day, but has\nstrengthened it and has gained adherents, this foundation of Darwinism is\nnevertheless not the unanimous and inevitable conclusion of all scientific\nmen in the sense and to the extent that the utterances of Weismann and\nothers would lead us to suppose. Apart from all apologetic attempts either\nin religious, ethical, or \u00e6sthetic interests, apart, too, from the\nsuperior standpoint of the philosophers, who have not, so to speak, taken\nthe theory very seriously, but regard it as a provisional theory, as a\nmore or less necessary and useful method of grouping our ideas in regard\nto the organic world, there are even among the biologists themselves some\nwho, indifferent towards religious or philosophical or naturalistic dogma,\nhold strictly to fact, and renounce with nonchalance any pretensions at\ncompleteness of knowledge if the data do not admit of it, and on these\ngrounds hold themselves aloof from evolutionist generalisation. From among\nthese come the counsels of \u201ccaution,\u201d admissions that the theory is a\nscientific hypothesis and a guide to research, but not knowledge, and\nconfessions that the Theory of Descent as a whole is verifiable rather as\na general impression than in detail.\n\n\n\n\nVirchow\u2019s Position.\n\n\nWarnings of this kind have come occasionally from Du Bois-Reymond, but the\ntrue type of this group, and its mode of thought, is Virchow. It will\nrepay us and suffice us to make acquaintance with it through him. His\nopposition to Darwinism and the theory of descent was directed at its most\nsalient point: the descent of man from the apes. In lectures and\ntreatises, at zoological and anthropological congresses, especially at the\nmeetings of his own Anthropological-Ethnological Society in Berlin, from\nhis \u201cVortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Menschen-und Affen-Sch\u00e4del\u201d (Lectures on the Skulls of\nMan and Apes, 1869), to the disputes over Dubois\u2019 _Pithecanthropus\nerectus_ in the middle of the nineties, he threw the whole weight of his\nimmense learning\u2014ethnological and anthropological, osteological, and above\nall \u201ccraniological\u201d\u2014into the scale against the Theory of Descent and its\nsupporters. Virchow has therefore been reckoned often enough among the\nanti-Darwinians, and has been quoted by apologists and others as against\nDarwinism, and he has given reason for this, since he has often taken the\nfield against \u201cthe Darwinists\u201d or has scoffed at their \u201clonging for a\npro-anthropos.\u201d(13) Sometimes even it has been suggested that he was\nactuated by religious motives, as when he occasionally championed not only\nfreedom for science, but, incidentally, the right of existence for \u201cthe\nchurches,\u201d leaving, for instance, in his theory of psychical life, gaps in\nknowledge which faith might occupy in moderation and modesty. But this\nlast proves nothing. With Virchow\u2019s altogether unemotional nature it is\nunlikely that religious or spiritual motives had any r\u00f4le in the\nestablishment of his convictions, and in Haeckel\u2019s na\u00efve blustering at\nreligion, there is, so to speak, more religion than in the cold-blooded\nconnivance with which Virchow leaves a few openings in otherwise frozen\nponds for the ducks of faith to swim in! And he has nothing of the pathos\nof Du Bois-Reymond\u2019s \u201cignorabimus.\u201d He is the neutral, prosaic scientist,\nwho will let nothing \u201ctempt him to a transcendental consideration,\u201d(14)\neither theological or naturalistic, who holds tenaciously to matters of\nfact, who, without absolutely rejecting a general theory, will not concern\nhimself about it, except to point out every difficulty in the way of it;\nin short, he is the representative of a mood that is the ideal of every\ninvestigator and the despair of every theoriser.\n\nHis lecture of 1869 already indicates his subsequent attitude. \u201cConsidered\nlogically and speculatively\u201d the Theory of Descent seems to him\n\u201cexcellent,\u201d(15) indeed a logical moral(!) hypothesis, but unproved in\nitself, and erroneous in many of its particular propositions. As far back\nas 1858, before the publication of Darwin\u2019s great work, he stated at the\nNaturalists\u2019 Congress in Carlsruhe, that the origin of one species out of\nanother appeared to him a necessary scientific inference, but\u2014\u2014And\nthroughout the whole lecture he alternates between favourable recognition\nof the theory in general, and emphasis of the difficulties which confront\nit in detail. The skull, which, according to Goethe\u2019s theory, has evolved\nfrom three modified vertebr\u00e6, is fundamentally different in man and\nmonkeys, both in regard to its externals, crests, ridges and shape, and\nespecially in regard to the nature of the cavity which it forms for the\nbrain. Specifically distinctive differences in the development and\nstructure of the rest of the body must also be taken into account. The\nso-called ape-like structures in the skull and the rest of the body, which\noccasionally occur in man (idiots, microcephaloids, &c.) cannot be\nregarded as atavisms and therefore as proofs of the Theory of Descent;\nthey are of a pathological nature, entirely facts _sui generis_, and \u201cnot\nto be placed in a series with the normal results of evolution.\u201d A man\nmodified by disease \u201cis still thoroughly a man, not a monkey.\u201d\n\nVirchow continued to maintain this attitude and persisted in this kind of\nargument. He energetically rejected all attempts to find \u201cpithecoid\u201d\ncharacters in the prehistoric remains of man. He declared the narrow and\nless arched forehead, the elliptical form, and the unusually large frontal\ncavities of the \u201cNeanderthal skull\u201d found in the Wupperthal in 1856, to be\nsimply pathological features, which occur as such in certain examples of\n_homo sapiens_.(16) He explained the abnormal appearance of the jaw from\nthe Moravian cave of Schipka as a result of the retention of teeth,(17)\naccompanied by directly \u201cantipithecoid\u201d characters.\n\nThe proceedings at the meetings of the Ethnological Society in 1895, at\nwhich Dubois was present, had an almost dramatic character.(18) In the\ndiverse opinions of Dubois, Virchow, Nehring, Kollmann, Krause and others,\nwe have almost an epitome of the present state of the Darwinian question.\nVirchow doubted whether the parts put together by Dubois (the head of a\nfemur, two molar teeth, and the top of a skull) belonged to the same\nindividual at all, disputed the calculations as to the large capacity of\nthe skull, placed against Dubois\u2019 very striking and clever drawing of the\ncurves of the skull-outline, which illustrated, with the help of the\nPithecanthropus, the gradual transition from the skull of a monkey to that\nof man, his own drawing, according to which the Pithecanthropus curve\nsimply coincides with that of a gibbon (_Hylobates_), and asserted that\nthe remains discovered were those of a species of gibbon, refusing even to\nadmit that they represented a new genus of monkeys. He held fast to his\n_ceterum censeo_: \u201cAs yet no diluvial discovery has been made which can be\nreferred to a man of a pithecoid type.\u201d Indeed, his polemic or \u201ccaution\u201d\nin regard to the Theory of Descent went even further. He not only refused\nto admit the proof of the descent of man from monkey, he would not even\nallow that the descent of one race from another has been demonstrated.(19)\nIn spite of all the plausible hypotheses it remains \u201cso far only a _pium\ndesiderium_.\u201d The race obstinately maintains its specific distinctness,\nand resists variation, or gradual transformation into another. The negro\nremains a negro in America, and the European colonist of Australia remains\na European.\n\nYet all Virchow\u2019s opposition may be summed up in the characteristic words,\nwhich might almost be called his motto, \u201cI warn you of the need for\ncaution,\u201d and it is not a seriously-meant rejection of the Theory of\nDescent. In reality he holds the evolution-idea as an axiom, and in the\nlast-named treatise he shows distinctly how he conceives of the process.\nHe starts with variation (presumably \u201ckaleidoscopic\u201d), which comes about\nas a \u201cpathological\u201d phenomenon, that is to say, not spontaneously, but as\nthe result of environmental stimulus, as the organism\u2019s reaction to\nclimatic and other conditions of life. The result is an alteration of\nprevious characteristics, and a new stable race is established by an\n\u201cacquired anomaly.\u201d(20)\n\n\n\n\nOther Instances of Dissatisfaction with the Theory of Descent.\n\n\nWhat was with Virchow only a suggestion of the need for caution, or\ncontroversial matter to be subsequently allowed for or contradicted, had\nmore serious consequences to others, and led to still greater hesitancy as\nregards evolutionist generalisations and speculations, and sometimes to\nsharp antagonism to them.\n\nOne of the best known of the earlier examples of this mood is Kerner von\nMarilaun\u2019s large and beautiful work on \u201cPlant Life.\u201d(21) He does, indeed,\nadmit that our species are variations of antecedent forms, but only in a\nvery limited sense. Within the stocks or grades of organisation which have\nalways existed, variations have come about, through \u201chybridisation,\u201d\nthrough the crossing of similar, but relatively different forms; these\nvariations alter the configuration and appearance in detail, but neither\naffect the general character nor cause any transition from \u201clower\u201d to\n\u201chigher.\u201d\n\nKerner disposes of the chief argument in favour of the theory of descent,\nthe homology of individual organs, by explaining that the homology is due\nto the similarity of function in the different organisms. A similar\nargument is used in regard to \u201contogeny recapitulating phylogeny.\u201d\nPal\u00e6ontology does not disclose in the plant-world any \u201csynthetic types,\u201d\nwhich might have been the common primitive stock from which many now\ndivergent branches have sprung, nor does it disclose any \u201ctransition\nlinks\u201d really intermediate, for instance, between cryptogams and\ngymnosperms, or between gymnosperms and angiosperms. That the higher races\nare apparently absent from the earlier strata is not a proof that they\nhave never existed. The peat-bog flora must have involved the existence of\na large companion-flora, without which the peat could not have been\nformed, but all trace of this is absent in the still persistent vestiges\nof these times.(22) Life, with energy and matter, has existed as a\nphenomenon of the universe from all eternity, and thus its chief forms and\nmanifestations have not \u201carisen,\u201d but have always been. If facts such as\nthese contradict the Kant-Laplace theory of the universe, then the latter\nmust be corrected in the light of them, not conversely. The extreme\nisolation of Kerner and his theory is probably due especially to this\ncorollary of his views.\n\nAmong the most recent examples of antagonism to the Evolution-Theory, the\nmost interesting is a book by Fleischmann, professor of zoology in\nErlangen, published in 1901, and entitled, \u201cThe Theory of Descent.\u201d It\nconsists of \u201cpopular lectures on the rise and decline of a scientific\nhypothesis\u201d (namely, the Theory of Descent), and it is a complete\nrecantation by a quondam Darwinian of the doctrine of his school, even of\nits fundamental proposition, the concept of evolution itself. For\nFleischmann is not guilty, like Weismann, of the inaccuracy of using\n\u201cTheory of Descent\u201d as equivalent to Darwinism; he is absolutely\nindifferent to the theory of natural selection. His book keeps strictly to\nmatters of fact, and rejects as speculation everything in the least beyond\nthese; it does not express even an opinion on the question of the origin\nof species, but merely criticises and analyses.\n\nIt does not bring forward any new and overwhelming arguments in refutation\nof the Theory of Descent, but strongly emphasises difficulties that have\nalways beset it, and discusses these in detail. The old dispute which\ninterested Goethe, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, and Cuvier, as to the unity or\nthe fundamental heterogeneity of the \u201carchitectural plan\u201d in nature is\nrevived. Modern zoology recognises not merely the four types of Cuvier,\nbut seventeen different styles, \u201cphyla,\u201d or groups of forms, to derive one\nof which from another is hopeless. And what is true of the whole is true\nalso of the subdivisions within each phylum; _e.g._, within the vertebrate\nphylum with its fishes, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals. No bridge\nleads from one to the other. This is proved particularly by the very\ninstance which is the favourite illustration in support of the Theory of\nDescent\u2014the fin of fishes and its relation to the five-fingered hand of\nvertebrates. The so-called transition forms (Arch\u00e6opteryx, monotremes,\n&c.) are discredited. So with the \u201cstalking-horse\u201d of evolutionists\u2014the\ngenealogical tree of the Equid\u00e6, which is said to be traceable\npal\u00e6ontologically right back, without a break, from the one-toed horses of\nthe present day to the normal five-toed ancestry; and so with another\nfavourite instance of evolution, the history of the pond-snails\n(_Planorbis multiformis_), the numerous varieties of which occur with\ntransitions between them in actual contiguity in the Steinheim beds, and\nthus seem to afford an obvious example of the transformation of species.\nAgainst these cases, and against using the pal\u00e6ontological archives as a\nbasis for the construction of genealogical trees in general, the weighty\nand apparently decisive objection is urged, that nowhere are the soft\nparts of the earlier forms of life preserved, and that it is impossible to\nestablish relationships with any certainty on the basis of hard parts\nonly, such as bones, teeth and shells. Even Haeckel admits that snails of\nvery different bodily structure may form very similar and even hardly\ndistinguishable shells.\n\nFleischmann further asserts that Haeckel\u2019s \u201cfundamental biogenetic law\u201d\nhas utterly collapsed. \u201cRecapitulation\u201d does not occur. Selenka\u2019s figures\nof ovum-segmentation show that there are specific differences in the\nindividual groups. The origin and development of the blastoderm or\ngerminal disc has nothing to do with recapitulation of the phylogeny. It\nis not the case that the embryos of higher vertebrates are\nindistinguishable from one another. Even the egg-cell has a specific\ncharacter, and is totally different from any unicellular organism at the\nProtistan level. The much-cited \u201cgill-clefts\u201d of higher vertebrates in the\nembryonic stage are not persistent reminiscences of earlier lower stages;\nthey are rudiments or primordia shared by all vertebrates, and developing\ndifferently at the different levels; (thus in fishes they become breathing\norgans, and in the higher vertebrates they become in part associated with\nthe organs of hearing, or in part disappear again).\n\nThough Fleischmann\u2019s vigorous protest against over-hastiness in\nconstruction and over-confidence on the part of the adherents of the\ndoctrine of descent is very interesting, and may often be justified in\ndetail, it is difficult to resist the impression that the wheat has been\nrejected with the chaff.(23)\n\nEven a layman may raise the following objections: Admitting that the great\ngroups of forms cannot be traced back to one another, the pal\u00e6ontological\nrecord still proves, though it may be only in general outline, that within\neach phylum there has been a gradual succession and ascent of forms. How\nis the origin of what is new to be accounted for? Without doing violence\nto our thinking, without a sort of intellectual autonomy, we cannot rest\ncontent with the mere fact that new elements occur. So, in spite of all\n\u201cdifficulties,\u201d the assumption of _an actual descent_ quietly forces\nitself upon us as the only satisfactory clue. And the fact, which\nFleischmann does not discuss, that even at present we may observe the\nestablishment of what are at least new breeds, impels us to accept an\nanalogous origin of new species. Even if the biogenetic law really \u201cfinds\nits chief confirmation in its exceptions,\u201d even if we cannot speak of a\nstrict recapitulation of earlier stages of evolution, there are\nindisputable facts which are most readily interpreted as reminiscences, as\ndue to affiliation (ideal or hereditary), with ancestral forms. (Note, for\ninstance, Weismann\u2019s \u201cprediction,\u201d &c.(24)) Even if Arch\u00e6opteryx and other\nintermediate forms cannot be regarded as connecting links in the strict\nsense, _i.e._, as being stages in the actual pedigree, yet the occurrence\nof reptilian and avian peculiarities side by side in one organism, goes\nfar to prove the close relationship of the two classes.\n\nFleischmann\u2019s book strengthens the impression gained elsewhere, that a\ngeneral survey of the domain of life as a whole gives force and\nconvincingness to the Theory of Descent, while a study of details often\nresults in breaking the threads and bringing the difficulties into\nprominence. But the same holds true of many other theoretical\nconstructions, and yet we do not seriously doubt their validity. (Take,\nfor instance, the Kant-Laplace theory, and theories of ethnology, of the\nhistory of religion, of the history of language, and so on.) And it is\nquite commonly to be observed that those who have an expert and specialist\nknowledge, who are aware of the refractoriness of detailed facts, often\ntake up a sceptical attitude towards every comprehensive theory, though\nthe ultimate use of detailed investigation is to make the construction of\ngeneral theories possible. Fleischmann does exactly what, say, an\nanthropologist would do if, under the impression of the constancy and\ndistinctiveness of the human races, which would become stronger the more\ndeeply he penetrated, he should resignedly renounce all possibility of\naffiliating them, and should rest content with the facts as he found them.\nSimilarly, those who are most intimately acquainted with the races of\ndomesticated animals often resist most strenuously all attempts, although\nthese seem to others a matter of course, to derive our \u201ctame\u201d forms from\n\u201cwild\u201d species living in freedom.\n\nBut to return. Even where the Theory of Descent is recognised, whether\nfully or only half-heartedly, the recognition does not always mean the\nsame thing. Even the adherents of the general, but in itself quite vague\nview that a transformation from lower forms to higher, and from similar to\ndifferent forms, has taken place, may present so many points of\ndisagreement, and may even stand in such antagonism to one another, that\nonlookers are apt to receive the impression that they occupy quite\ndifferent standpoints, and are no longer at one even in the fundamentals\nof their hypotheses.\n\nThe most diverse questions and answers crop up; whether evolution has been\nbrought about \u201cmonophyletically\u201d or \u201cpolyphyletically,\u201d _i.e._, through\none or many genealogical trees; whether it has taken place in a continuous\neasy transition from one type to another, or by leaps and bounds; whether\nthrough a gradual transformation of all organs, each varying individually,\nor through correlated \u201ckaleidoscopic\u201d variations of many kinds throughout\nthe whole system; whether it is essentially asymptotic, or whether\norganisms pass from \u201clabile\u201d phases of vital equilibrium by various\nhalting-places to stable states, which are definitive, and are, so to\nspeak, the blind alleys and terminal points of evolutionary possibilities,\n_e.g._, the extinct gigantic saurians, and perhaps also man. And to these\nproblems must be added the various answers to the question, What precedes,\nor may have preceded, the earliest stages of life of which we know? Whence\ncame the first cell? Whence the first living protoplasm? and How did the\nliving arise from the inorganic? These deeper questions will occupy us in\nour chapter on the theory of life. Some of the former, in certain of their\naspects, will be considered in the sixth chapter, which deals with factors\nin evolution.\n\nThe Theory of Descent itself and the differences that obtain even among\nits adherents can best be studied by considering for a little the works of\nReinke and of Hamann.\n\nReinke, Professor of Botany in Kiel, has set forth his views in his book,\n\u201cDie Welt als Tat,\u201d(25) and more recently in his \u201cEinleitung in die\ntheoretische Biologie\u201d (1901). Both books are addressed to a wide circle\nof readers. Reinke and Hamann both revive some of the arguments and\nopinions set forth in the early days of Darwinism by Wigand,(26) an author\nwhose works are gradually gaining increased appreciation.\n\nIt is Reinke\u2019s \u201cunalterable conviction\u201d that organisms have evolved, and\nthat they have done so after the manner of fan-shaped genealogical trees.\nThe Theory of Descent is to him an axiom of modern biology, though as a\nmatter of fact the circumstantial evidence in favour of it is extremely\nfragmentary. The main arguments in favour of it appear to him to be the\ngeneral ones; the homologies and analogies revealed by comparative\nmorphology and physiology, the ascending series in the pal\u00e6ontological\nrecord, vestigial organs, parasitic degeneration, the origin of those\nvital associations which we call consortism and symbiosis. These he\nillustrates mainly by examples from his own special domain and personal\nobservation.\n\nThe simplest unicellular forms of life are to be thought of as at the\nbeginning of evolution; and, since mechanical causes cannot explain their\nascent, it must be assumed that they have an inherent \u201cphylogenetic\npotential of development,\u201d which, working epigenetically, results in\nascending evolution. He leaves us to choose between monophyletic and\npolyphyletic evolution, but himself inclines towards the latter,\nassociating with it a rehabilitation of Wigand\u2019s theory of the primitive\ncells. If, in the beginning, primitive forms of life arose (probably as\nunicellulars) from the not-living, it is not obvious why we need think of\nonly one so arising, and, if many did so, why they should not have\ninherent differences which would at once result in typically different\nevolutionary series and groups of forms. But evolution does not go on _ad\nlibitum_ or _ad infinitum_, for the capacity for differentiation and\ntransformation gradually diminishes. The organisation passes from a labile\nstate of equilibrium to an increasingly stable state, and at many points\nit may reach a terminus where it comes to a standstill. Man, the dog, the\nhorse, the cereals, and fruit trees appear to Reinke to have reached their\ngoal. The preliminary stages he calls \u201cPhylembryos,\u201d because they bear to\nthe possible outcome of their evolution the same relation that the embryo\ndoes to the perfect individual. Thus, _Phenacodus_ may be regarded as the\nPhylembryo of the modern horse. It is quite conceivable that each of our\nmodern species may have had an independent series of Phylembryos reaching\nback to the primitive cells. But the pal\u00e6ontological record, and\nespecially its synthetic types, lead Reinke rather to assume that instead\nof innumerable series, there have been branching genealogical trees, not\none, however, but several.\n\nThese views, together or separately, which are characterised chiefly by\nthe catch-words \u201cpolyphyletic descent,\u201d \u201clabile and stable equilibrium,\u201d\nand so on, crop up together or separately in the writings of various\nevolutionists belonging to the opposition wing. They are usually\nassociated with a denial of the theory of natural selection, and with\ntheories of \u201cOrthogenesis,\u201d \u201cHeterogenesis,\u201d and \u201cEpigenesis.\u201d\n\nWe shall discuss them later when we are considering the factors in\nevolution. But we must first take notice of a work in which the theories\nopposed to Darwinian orthodoxy have been most decisively and aggressively\nset forth. As far back as 1892 O. Hamann, then a lecturer on zoology in\nG\u00f6ttingen, gathered these together and brought them into the field,\nagainst Haeckel in particular, in his book \u201cEntwicklungslehre und\nDarwinismus.\u201d(27)\n\nHamann\u2019s main theme is that Darwinism overlooks the fact that \u201cthere\ncannot have been an origin of higher types from types already finished.\u201d\nFor this \u201cunfortunate and unsupported assumption\u201d there are no proofs in\nembryology, pal\u00e6ontology, or anatomy. He adopts and expands the arguments\nand anti-Haeckelian deliverances of His in embryology, of Snell and Heer\nin pal\u00e6ontology, of K\u00f6lliker and von Baer in their special interpretation\nof evolution, of Snell particularly as regards the descent of man. It is\nimpossible to derive Metazoa from Protozoa in their present finished state\nof evolution; even the Amoeba is so exactly adapted in organisation and\nfunctional activity to the conditions of its existence that it is a\n\u201cfinished\u201d type. It is only by a stretch of fancy that fishes can be\nderived from worms, or higher vertebrates from fishes. One of his\nfavourite arguments\u2014and it is a weighty one, though neglected by the\northodox Darwinians\u2014is that living substance is capable, under similar\nstimuli, of developing spontaneously and afresh, at quite different points\nand in different groups, similar organs, such as spots sensitive to light,\naccumulations of pigment, eye-spots, lenses, complete eyes, and similarly\nwith the notochord, the excretory organs, and the like. Therefore homology\nof organs is no proof of their hereditary affiliation.(28) They rather\nillustrate \u201citerative evolution.\u201d\n\nAnother favourite argument is the fact of \u201cP\u00e6dogenesis.\u201d Certain animals,\nsuch as _Amphioxus lanceolatus_, _Peripatus_, and certain Medus\u00e6, are very\nfrequently brought forward as examples of persistent primitive stages and\n\u201ctransitional connecting links.\u201d But considered from the point of view of\nP\u00e6dogenesis, they all assume quite a different aspect, and seem rather to\nrepresent very highly evolved species, and to be, not primitive forms, but\nconservative and regressive forms. P\u00e6dogenesis is the phenomenon exhibited\nby a number of species, which may stop short at one of the stages of their\nembryonic or larval development, become sexually mature, and produce\noffspring without having attained their own fully developed form.\n\nAnother argument is the old, suggestive, and really important one urged by\nK\u00f6lliker, that \u201cinorganic nature shows a natural system among minerals\n(crystals) just as much as animals and plants do, yet in the former there\ncan be no question of any genetic connection in the production of forms.\u201d\n\nYet another argument is found in the occurrence of \u201cinversions\u201d and\nanomalies in the pal\u00e6ontological succession of forms, which to some extent\nupsets the Darwinian-Haeckelian genealogical trees. (Thus there are forms\nin the Cambrian whose alleged ancestors do not appear till the Silurian.\nForaminifera and other Protozoa do not appear till the Silurian.)\n\nFrom embryology in particular, as elsewhere in general, we read the\n\u201cfundamental biogenetic law,\u201d that evolution is from the general to the\nspecial, from the imperfect to the more perfect, from what is still\nindefinite and exuberant to the well-defined and precise, but never from\nthe special to the special. According to Hamann\u2019s hypothesis we must think\nof evolution as going on, so to speak, not about the top but about the\nbottom. The phyla or groups of forms are great trunks bearing many\nbranches and twigs, but not giving rise to one another. Still less do the\nlittle side branches of one trunk bear the whole great trunk of another\nanimal or plant phylum. But they all grow from the same roots among the\nprimitive forms of life. Unicellulars these must have been, but not like\nour \u201cProtists.\u201d They should be thought of as primitive forms having within\nthemselves the potentialities of the most diverse and widely separate\nevolution-series to which they gave rise, as it were, along diverging\nfan-like rays.\n\nIt would be instructive to follow some naturalist into his own particular\ndomain, for instance a pal\u00e6ontologist into the detailed facts of\npal\u00e6ontology, or an embryologist into those of embryology, in order to\nlearn whether these corroborate the assumptions of the Theory of Descent\nor not. It is just in relation to these detailed facts that criticisms or\neven denials of the theory have been most frequent. Koken, otherwise a\nconvinced supporter of the theory, inquires in his \u201cVorwelt,\u201d _apropos_ of\nthe tortoises, what has become of the genealogical trees that were\nscattered abroad in the world as proved facts in the early days of\nDarwinism. He asserts, in regard to _Arch\u00e6opteryx_, the instance which is\nalways put forward as the intermediate link in the evolution of birds,\nthat it does not show in any of its characters a fundamental difference\nfrom any of the birds of to-day, and further, that, through convergent\ndevelopment under similar influences, similar organs and structural\nrelations result, iterative arrangements which come about quite\nindependently of descent. He maintains, too, that the principle of the\nstruggle for existence is rather disproved than corroborated by the\npal\u00e6ontological record.\n\nIn embryology, so competent an authority as O. Hertwig\u2014himself a former\npupil of Haeckel\u2019s\u2014has reacted from the \u201cfundamental biogenetic law.\u201d His\ntheory of the matter is very much that of Hamann which we have already\ndiscussed; development is not so much a recapitulation of finished\nancestral types as the laying down of foundations after the pattern of\ngeneralised simple forms, not yet specialised; and from these foundations\nthe special organs rise to different levels and grades of differentiation\naccording to the type.(29) But we must not lose ourselves in details.\n\nLooking back over the whole field once more, we feel that we are justified\nin maintaining with some confidence that the different pronouncements in\nregard to the detailed application and particular features of the Theory\nof Descent, and the different standpoints that are occupied even by\nevolutionists, are at least sufficient to make it obvious that, even if\nevolution and descent have actually taken place, they have not run so\nsimple and smooth a course as the over-confident would have us believe;\nthat the Theory of Descent rather emphasises than clears away the riddles\nand difficulties of the case, and that with the mere corroboration of the\ntheory we shall have gained only something relatively external, a clue to\ncreation, which does not so much solve its problems as restate them. The\nwhole criticism of the \u201cright wing,\u201d from captious objections to actual\ndenials, proves this indisputably. And it seems likely that in the course\nof time a sharpening of the critical insight and temper will give rise to\nfurther reactions from the academic theory as we have come to know it.(30)\nOn the other hand, it may be assumed with even greater certainty that the\ngeneral evolutionist point of view and the great arguments for descent in\nsome form or other will ultimately be victorious if they are not so\nalready, and that, sooner or later, we shall take the Theory of Descent in\nits most general form as a matter of course, just as we now do the\nKant-Laplace theory.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. RELIGION AND THE THEORY OF DESCENT.\n\n\nIn seeking to define our position in regard to the theory of descent it is\nmost important that we should recognise that, when it is looked into\nclosely, the true problem at issue is not a special zoological one, but is\nquite general, and also that it is not a new growth which has sprung up\nsuddenly and found us unprepared, but that it is very ancient and has long\nexisted in our midst. In the whole theory the question of \u201cdescent\u201d is\nafter all a mere accessory. Even if it fell through and were seen to be\nscientifically undemonstrable, \u201cevolution in the realm of life\u201d would\nremain an indisputable fact, and with it there would arise precisely the\nsame difficulties for the religious interpretation of the world which are\nusually attributed to the Theory of Descent.\n\nEvolution or development has been a prominent idea in the history of\nthought since the time of Aristotle, but descent is, so to speak, a modern\nupstart. According to long-established modes of thought, to _evolve_ means\nto pass from \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 to \u1f30\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f34\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, from _potentia_ to _actus_, from\nthe existence of the rudiment as in the seed to full realisation as in the\ntree. In the course of its development the organism passes through many\nsuccessive phases, which are related to one another like steps, each\nrising directly from the one beneath, and preparing for the one above.\nThus all nature, and especially the realm of life, implies a ladder of\n\u201cevolution.\u201d What is \u201cpotentially\u201d inherent in the lowest form of life has\nin the highest, as in man, become actual or \u201crealised\u201d through a\ncontinuous sequence of phases, successively more and more evolved. This\nview in its earlier forms was very far from implying that each higher step\nwas literally \u201cdescended\u201d from the one below it, through the physical and\nmental transformation of some of its representatives. As the world, in\nAristotle\u2019s view for instance, had existed from all eternity, so also had\nthe stages and forms of life, each giving rise again to its like. Indeed,\nthe essential idea was that each higher step is simply a development, a\nfuller unfolding of the lower stage, and finally that man was the complete\nrealisation of what was potentially inherent in the lowest of all.\n\nThis doctrine of evolution was in modern times the fundamental idea of\nLeibnitz and Kant, of Goethe, Schelling and Hegel. It brought unity and\nconnectedness into the system of nature, united everything by steps,\ndenied the existence of gaping chasms, and proclaimed the solidarity of\nall the forms of life. But to all this the idea of actual descent was\nunnecessary. An actual material variation and transition from one stage to\nanother seemed to it a wooden and gross expression of the evolution idea,\nan \u201call too childish and nebulous hypothesis\u201d (Hegel).\n\nAll the important results of comparative morphology and physiology, which\nthe modern supporters of the doctrine of descent so confidently utilise as\narguments in its favour, would have been welcomed by those who held the\noriginal and general evolution idea, as a corroboration of their own\nstandpoint. And as a matter of fact they all afford conclusive proofs of\n_evolution_; but not one of them, including even the fundamental\nbiogenetic law and the inoculated chimpanzee, is decisive in regard to\n_descent_. This contention is sufficiently important to claim our\nattention for a little. Let us take the last example. Transfusion of blood\nbetween two species is possible, not necessarily because they are\ndescended from one another or from a common root, but solely because of\ntheir systematic (ideal) relationship, that is to say because they are\nsufficiently near to one another and like one another in their\nphysiological qualities and functions. If, assuming descent, this homology\nwere disturbed, and the systematic relationship done away with, for\ninstance through saltatory evolution, the mere fact of descent would not\nbring the two species any nearer one another. Thus the case proves only\nsystematic relationship, and only evolution. But as to the meaning of this\nsystematic relationship, whether it can be \u201cexplained\u201d by descent, whether\nit has existed from all eternity, or how it has arisen, the experiment\ndoes not inform us.\n\nThe same idea may be illustrated in regard to Weismann\u2019s \u201cpredicting.\u201d\nThis, too, is a proof of evolution, but not of descent. Exactly as\nWeismann predicted the striping of the hawk-moth caterpillars and the\nhuman _os centrale_, Goethe predicted the formation of the skull from\nmodified vertebr\u00e6, and the premaxillary bone in man. In precisely the same\nway he \u201cderived\u201d the cavities in the human skull from those of the animal\nskull. This was quite in keeping with the manner and style of his Goddess\nNature and her creative transformations, raising the type of her creations\nfrom stage to stage, developing and expanding each new type from an\nearlier one, yet keeping the later analogous to and recapitulative of the\nearlier, recording the earlier by means of vestigial and gradually\ndwindling parts.\n\nBut what has all this to do with descent? Even the \u201cbiogenetic law\u201d\nitself, especially if it were correct, would fit admirably into the frame\nof the pure evolution idea. For it is quite consistent with that idea to\nsay that the higher type in the course of its development, especially in\nits embryonic stages, passes through stages representative of the forms of\nlife which are below it and precede it in the (ideal) genealogical tree.\nIndeed, the older doctrine of evolution took account of this long ago.\n\n\u201cThe same step-ladder which is exhibited by the whole animal kingdom, the\nsteps of which are the different races and classes, with at the one\nextreme the lowliest animals and at the other the highest, is exhibited\nalso by every higher animal in its development, since from the moment of\nits origin until it has reached its full development it passes\nthrough\u2014both as regards internal and external organisation\u2014the essentials\nof all the forms which become permanent for a lifetime in the animals\nlower than itself. The more perfect the animal is, the longer is the\nseries of forms it passes through.\u201d\n\nSo J. Fr. Meckel wrote in 1812 in his \u201cHandbook of Pathological Anatomy,\u201d\n_with no thought of descent_. And the facts which led to the construction\nof the biogenetic law were discovered in no small measure by Agassiz, who\nwas an opponent of the doctrine of descent.(31)\n\nBut the advance from the doctrine of evolution to that of descent was\nimperatively prompted by a recognition of the fact that the earth is not\nfrom everlasting, and that the forms of life upon it are likewise not from\neverlasting, that, in fact, their several grades appear in an orderly\nascending series. It is therefore simpler and more plausible to suppose\nthat each higher step has arisen from the one before it, than to suppose\nthat each has, so to speak, begun an evolution on its own account. A\nseries of corroborative arguments might be adduced, and there is no doubt,\nas we have said before, that the transition from the general idea of\nevolution to that of descent will be fully accomplished. But it is plain\nthat the special idea of descent contributes nothing essentially new on\nthe subject.\n\nIt is an oft-repeated and self-evident statement, that it is in reality a\nmatter of entire indifference whether man arose from the dust of the earth\nor from living matter already formed, or, let us say, from one of the\nhigher vertebrates. The question still would be, how much or how little of\nany of them does he still retain, and how far does he differ from all?\nEven if there be really descent, the difference may quite as well be so\ngreat\u2014for instance, through saltatory development\u2014that man, in spite of\nphysical relationship, might belong to quite a new category far\ntranscending all his ancestors in his intellectual characteristics, in his\nemotional and moral qualities. There is nothing against the assumption,\nand there is much to be said in its favour, that the last step from animal\nto man was such an immense one that it brought with it a freedom and\nrichness of psychical life incomparable with anything that had gone\nbefore\u2014as if life here realised itself for the first time in very truth,\nand made everything that previously had been a mere preliminary play.\n\nOn the other hand, even were there no descent but separate individual\ncreation, man might, in virtue of his ideal relationship and evolution,\nappear nothing more than a stage relatively separate from those beneath\nhim in evolution. It was not the doctrine of descent, it was the doctrine\nof evolution that first ranked man in a series with the rest of creation,\nand regarded him as the development of what is beneath him and leads up to\nhim through a gradual sequence of stages. And his nearness, analogy, or\nrelationship to what is beneath him is in no way increased by descent, or\nrendered a whit more intimate or more disturbing.\n\n\n\n\nThe Problema Continui.\n\n\nThe problem of descent thus shows itself to be one which has neither\nisolated character nor special value. It is an accessory accompaniment of\nall the questions and problems which have been raised by, or are\nassociated with, the doctrine of evolution, which would have been in our\nmidst without Darwin, which are made neither easier nor more difficult by\nzoological knowledge, and the difficulties of which, if solved, would\nsolve at the same time any difficulties presented by descent. The\nfollowing considerations will serve to make this clear. The most\noppressive corollary of the doctrine of descent is undoubtedly that\nthrough it the human race seems to become lost in the infra-human, from\nwhich it cannot be separated by any hard and fast boundaries, or absolute\nlines of demarcation. But it is easy to see that this problem is in fact\nonly a part of a larger problem, and that it can really be solved only\nthrough the larger one. Even if it were possible to do away with this\nunpleasing inference as regards the whole human race, so that it could be\nin some way separated off securely from the animal kingdom, the same\nfatality would remain in regard to each individual human being. For we\nhave here to face the problem of individual development by easy\ntransitions, the ascent from the animal to the human state, and the\nquestion: When is there really soul and spirit, when man and ego, when\nfreedom and responsibility? But this is the same problem again, only\nwritten with smaller letters, the general _problema continui_ in the\ndomain of life and mind. And the problem is very far-reaching. In all\nquestions concerning mental health and disease, abnormalities or cases of\narrest at an early stage of mental development, concerning the greater or\nless degree of endowment for intellectual, moral, and religious life, down\nto utter absence of capacity, and this in relation to individuals as well\nas races and peoples, and times; and again, concerning the gradual\ndevelopment of the ethical and religious consciousness in the long course\nof history, in its continuity and gradual transition from lower to higher\nforms: everywhere we meet this same _problema continui_. And our\noppressive difficulty is bound up with this problem, and can be dispelled\nonly by its solution, for the gist of the difficulty is nothing else than\nthe _gradualness of human becoming_.\n\nThis is not the place for a thoroughgoing discussion of this _problema\ncontinui_. We can only call to mind here that the \u201cevolution idea\u201d has\nbeen the doctrine of the great philosophical systems from Aristotle to\nLeibnitz, and of the great German idealist philosophers, in whose school\nthe religious interpretation of the world is at home. We may briefly\nemphasise the most important considerations to be kept in mind in forming\na judgment as to gradual development.\n\n1. To recognise anything as in course of evolving does not mean that we\nunderstand its \u201cbecoming.\u201d The true inwardness of \u201cbecoming\u201d is hidden in\nthe mystery of the transcendental.\n\n2. The gradual origin of the highest and most perfect from the primitive\nin no way affects the specific character, the uniqueness and newness of\nthe highest stage, when compared with its antecedents. For, close as each\nstep is to the one below, and directly as it seems to arise out of it,\neach higher step has a minimum and differentia of newness (or at least an\nindividual grouping of the elements of the old), which the preceding stage\ndoes not explain, or for which it is not a sufficient reason, but which\nemerges as new from the very heart of things.\n\n3. Evolution does not diminish the absolute value of the perfect stage,\nwhich is incomparably greater than the value of the intermediate stages,\nit rather accentuates it. The stages from the half-developed acorn-shoot\nare not equivalent in value to the perfect tree; they are to it as means\nto an end, and are of minimal value compared with it.\n\n4. All \u201cdescent\u201d and \u201cevolution,\u201d which, even in regard to the gradual\ndevelopment of physical organisation and its secrets, offer not so much an\nexplanation as a clue, are still less sufficient in regard to the origin\nand growth of psychical capacity in general, and in relation to the\nawakening and autonomy of the mind in man, because the psychical and\nspiritual cannot be explained in terms of physiological processes, from\neither the quantity or the quality of nervous structure.\n\nThis problem, and the relation of the human spirit to the animal mind,\nwill fall to be dealt with in Chapter XI. It is neither the right nor the\nduty of the religious conception of the world to inquire into and choose\nbetween the different forms of the idea of descent which we have met with.\nIf it has made itself master of the general evolution idea, then descent,\neven in its most gradual, continuous, monophyletic form, affects it not at\nall. It can then look on, perhaps not with joy, but certainly without\nanxiety, at Dubois\u2019 monkey-man and Friedenthal\u2019s chimpanzee. On the other\nhand, it is obvious that a secret bond of sympathy will always unite it\nwith the right wing of the theory of descent, with the champions of\n\u201chalmatogenesis,\u201d(32) heterogenesis,(33) kaleidoscopic readjustment, &c.,\nbecause in all these the depth and wealth and the mystery of phenomena are\nmore obviously recognisable. For the same reasons the religious outlook\nmust always be interested in all protests against over-hastiness, against\ntoo great confidence in hypotheses, and against too rapid simplification\nand formulation. And it is not going beyond our province to place some\nreliance on the fact that there are increasing signs of revolt from the\ntoo great confidence hitherto shown in relation to the Theory of Descent.\nThe general frame of the theory will certainly never be broken, but the\nenclosed picture of natural evolution will be less plain and plausible,\nmore complex and subtle, more full of points of interrogation and\nrecognitions of the limits of our knowledge and the depths of things.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. DARWINISM IN THE STRICT SENSE.\n\n\nIt remains for us to consider what is essentially Darwinian in Darwinism,\nnamely, the theory of natural selection as the determining factor in\nevolution. For, given the reality of evolution and descent, and that\ntransformations from one form to another, from lower to higher, have\nreally taken place, what was the guiding and impelling factor in\nevolution, what forced it forwards and upwards? It is here that the real\nproblem of Darwinism begins. Only from this point onwards does the\ndoctrine of evolution, which is not in itself necessarily committed to any\ntheory of the factors, become definitely Darwinian or anti-Darwinian. And\nit is this problem that is mainly concerned in the discussions taking\nplace to-day as to whether Darwin was right, or whether Darwinism as a\nhypothesis has not broken down.\n\nThe most characteristic feature of Darwin\u2019s theory was \u201cnatural\nteleology,\u201d that is, the explanation of what is apparently full of purpose\nand plan in the world, purely as the necessary consequence of very simple\nconditions, without purpose or any striving after an aim. He sought to\nshow that evolution and ascent can be realised through purely \u201cnatural\u201d\ncauses, that this world of life, man included, must have come about, but\nnot because it was intended so to do. In this sense, indeed, his doctrine\nis an attempt to do away with teleology. But in another sense it is so\neven more emphatically. The world, and especially the world of life, is\nundoubtedly full of what is _de facto_ purposive. The living organism, as\na whole and in every one of its parts, is marvellously adapted to the end\nof performing its functions, maintaining its own life and reproducing.\nEvery single living being is a miracle of inexhaustible adaptations to an\nend. Whence came these? They, too, are products, unsought for, unintended,\nand yet necessary, and coming about \u201cof themselves,\u201d that is without\nteleological or any supernatural guiding principles. To eliminate purpose\nand the purposive creating and guiding activity of transcendental\nprinciples from interpretations of nature, and to introduce purely\nnaturalistic principles\u2014\u201cprinciples of chance,\u201d if we understand chance in\nthis connection not as opposed to necessity, but to plan and purpose\u2014this\nis the aim of the Darwinian theory. And it only becomes definitely\nanti-theological because it is anti-teleological.\n\nThe conclusions which Darwin arrived at as to the factors in the\ntransformation of species, and in the production of \u201cadaptations,\u201d have\nbeen in part supported by the specialists he influenced, in part\nstrengthened, but in part modified and even reversed, so that a great\ncrisis has come about in regard to Darwinism in the strict sense\u2014a crisis\nwhich threatens to be fatal to it. We must here attempt to take a general\nsurvey of the state of the question and to define our own position.\n\nDarwin\u2019s interpretation is well known. It is the theory of the natural\nselection of the best adapted through the struggle for existence, which is\nof itself a natural selection, and results in the sifting out of\nparticular forms and of higher forms. Darwin\u2019s thinking follows the course\nthat all anti-teleological thought has followed since the earliest times.\nIn bringing forth the forms of life, nature offers, without choice or aim\nor intention, a wealth of possibilities. The forms which happen to be best\nadapted to the surrounding conditions of life maintain themselves, and\nreproduce; the others perish, and are eliminated (survival of the\nfittest). Thus arises adaptation at first in the rough, but gradually in\nmore and more minute detail. This adaptation, brought about by chance,\ngives _the impression_ of intelligent creative purpose.\n\nIn Darwin this fundamental mode of naturalistic interpretation took, under\nthe influence of the social-economic theories of Malthus, the special form\nof natural selection by means of the struggle for existence, in\nassociation with the assumption of unlimited and fluctuating variability\nin the forms of life. All living beings have a tendency to increase in\nnumber without limit. But the means of subsistence and other conditions of\nexistence do not increase at the same rate; they are relatively constant.\nThus competition must come about. Any organism that is, by fortuitous\nvariation, more favourably equipped than its fellows maintains itself and\nreproduces itself; the less favoured perish. For all things living are\nexposed to enemies, to untoward circumstances, and the like. Every\nindividual favoured above its rivals persists, and can transmit to its\ndescendants its own more favourable, more differentiated, more highly\nequipped character. Thus evolution is begun, and is forced on into the\never more diverse and ever \u201chigher.\u201d\n\nTo Darwin this struggle for existence and this selection according to\nutility seemed, at any rate, the chief factor in progress. He did, indeed,\nmake some concessions to the Lamarckian principle that new characters may\nbe acquired by increased use, and to other \u201csecondary\u201d principles. But\nthese are of small importance as compared with his main factor.\n\n\n\n\nDifferences of Opinion As To the Factors In Evolution.\n\n\nThe theory of natural selection in the struggle for existence rapidly\ngained wide acceptance, but from the first it was called in question from\nmany sides. Bronn, who translated Darwin\u2019s works into German, was and\nremained loyal to the idea of a \u201cdevelopmental law\u201d\u2014that there is within\nthe organism an innate tendency towards self-differentiation and progress,\nthus a purely teleological principle.(34) Similarly, von Baer emphasised\nthe idea of an endeavour to realise an aim; von K\u00f6lliker, that of\n\u201cheterogenesis\u201d; N\u00e4geli, that of an impulse towards perfection\u2014all three\nthus recognising the theory of evolution, but dissenting from the view\nthat the struggle for existence is the impelling factor and actual guide\nin the process. Very soon, in another direction, antagonism became\npronounced between the strictly Darwinian elements of the theory (the\nstruggle for existence and its corollaries) and the accessory Lamarckian\nelements. Through these and other controversies the present state of the\nquestion has emerged.\n\nThe main antithesis at present is the following. On the one side, the\n\u201call-sufficiency of natural selection\u201d is maintained, that is, progressive\nevolution is regarded as coming about without direct self-exertion on the\npart of the organisms themselves, simply through the fact that fortuitous\nvariations are continually presenting themselves, and are being selected\nand established according to their utility in the struggle for existence.\nOn the other side\u2014with Lamarck\u2014the progress is regarded as due to effort\nand function on the part of the organism itself. (Increased use of an\norgan strengthens it; a changed use transforms it; disuse causes it to\ndegenerate. Thus new characters appear, old ones pass away, and in the\ncourse of thousands of years the manifold diversity of the forms of life\nhas been brought about.)\n\nFurther, by those of the one side variation is regarded as occurring by\nthe smallest steps that could have selective value in the struggle for\nexistence. To the others variation seems to have taken place by leaps and\nbounds, with relatively sudden transformations of the functional and\nstructural equilibrium on a large scale. In regard to these the _r\u00f4le_ of\nthe struggle for existence must be merely subsidiary. This saltatory kind\nof evolution-process is called \u201chalmatogenesis,\u201d or, more neatly,\n\u201ckaleidoscopic variation,\u201d because, as the pictures in a kaleidoscope\nchange not gradually but by a sudden leap to an essentially new pattern,\nso also do the forms of life. Associated with this is the following\ncontrast. One side believes in free and independent variation of any\norgan, any part, any function, physical or mental, any instinct, and so\non, apart from change or persistence in the rest of the organism; the\nother side believes in the close connectedness of every part with the\nwhole, in the strict \u201ccorrelation\u201d of all parts, in variation in one part\nbeing always simultaneously associated with variation in many other parts,\nall being comprised in the \u201cwhole,\u201d which is above and before all the\nparts and determines them. And further, to one school variation seems\nwithout plan in all directions, simply plus or minus on either side of a\nmean; to the other, variation seems predetermined and in a definite\ndirection\u2014an \u201corthogenesis,\u201d in fact, which is inherent in the organism,\nand which is indifferent to utility or disadvantage, or natural selection,\nor anything else, but simply follows its prescribed path in obedience to\ninnate law. The representatives of this last position differ again among\nthemselves. Some regard it as true in detail, in regard, for instance, to\nthe markings of a butterfly\u2019s wing, the striping of a caterpillar, the\ndevelopment of spots on a lizard; while others regard it as governing the\ngeneral process of evolution as a whole. Finally, there is the most\nimportant contrast of all. On the one side, subordination, passivity,\ncomplete dependence on the selective or directive factors in evolution,\nwhich alone have any power; on the other, activity, spontaneous power of\nadaptation and transformation, the relative freedom of all things living,\nand\u2014the deepest answer to the question of the controlling force in\nevolution\u2014_the secret of life_. This last contrast goes deeper even than\nthe one we have already noted, that between the Darwinian and the\nLamarckian principle of explanation; and it leads ultimately from the\nspecial Darwinian problem to quite a new one, to be solved by itself\u2014the\nproblem of the nature and secret of living matter.\n\n\n\n\nWeismannism.\n\n\nIn regard to almost all the points to which we have referred, the most\nconsistent and decided champion of Darwinism in its essential principles\nis the zoologist of Freiburg, August Weismann.(35) In long chapters on the\nprotective coloration of animals, on the phenomena of mimicry\u2014that\nresemblance to foreign objects (leaves, pieces of wood, bark, and\nwell-protected animals) by which the mimics secure their own safety from\nenemies\u2014on the protective devices in plants, the selective value of \u201cthe\nuseful\u201d is demonstrated. In regard to the marvellous phenomena of\n\u201ccarnivorous\u201d plants, the still more marvellous instincts of animals,\nwhich cannot be interpreted on Lamarckian lines as \u201cinherited habit,\u201d but\nonly as due to the cumulative influence of selection on inborn tendencies,\nas well as in regard to \u201csymbiosis,\u201d \u201cthe origin of flowers,\u201d and so on,\nhe attempts to show that the heterodox attempts at explanation are\ninsufficient, and that selection alone really explains. At the same time\nthe Darwinian principle is carried still further. It is not only among the\nindividuals, the \u201cpersons,\u201d that the selective struggle for existence goes\non. Personal selection depends upon a \u201cgerminal selection\u201d within the\ngerm-plasm, influencing it, and being influenced by it\u2014for instance,\nrestrained.\n\nIn order to explain the mystery of heredity, Weismann long ago elaborated,\nin his germ-plasm theory, the doctrine that the developing individual is\nmaterially preformed, or rather predetermined in the \u201cidants\u201d and \u201cids\u201d of\nthe germ-cell. Thus every one of its physical characters (and, through\nthese, its psychical characters), down to hairs, skin spots, and\nbirth-marks, is represented in the \u201cid\u201d by \u201cdeterminants\u201d which control\nthe \u201cdeterminates\u201d in development. In the course of their growth and\ndevelopment these determinants are subject to diverse influences due to\nthe position they happen to occupy, to their quality, to changes in the\nnutritive conditions, and so on. Through these influences variations in\nthe determinants may be brought about. And thus there comes about a\n\u201cstruggle\u201d and a process of selection among the determinants, the result\nof which is expressed in changes in the determinates, in the direction of\ngreater or less development. On this basis Weismann attempts to reach\nexplanations of the phenomena of variation, of many apparently Lamarckian\nphenomena, and of recognised cases of \u201corthogenesis,\u201d and seeks to\ncomplete and deepen Roux\u2019s theory of the \u201cstruggle of parts,\u201d which was\njust another attempt to carry Darwinism within the organism.\n\nWhat distinguishes Weismann, and makes him especially useful for our\npresent purpose of coming to an understanding in regard to the theory of\nselection is, that his views are unified, definite and consistent. In his\ncase we have not to clear up the ground and to follow things out to their\nconclusions, nor to purge his theories from irrelevant, vitalistic, or\npantheistic accessory theories, as we have, for instance, in the case of\nHaeckel. His book, too, is kept strictly within its own limits, and does\nnot attempt to formulate a theory of the universe in general, or even a\nnew religion on the basis of biological theories. Let us therefore inquire\nwhat has to be said in regard to this clearest and best statement of the\ntheory of selection when we consider it from the point of view of the\nreligious conception of the world.\n\nWhatever else may be said as to the all-sufficiency of natural selection\nthere can be no doubt that it presupposes two absolute mysteries which\ndefy naturalistic explanation and every other, and which are so important\nthat in comparison with them the problem of the struggle for efficacy and\nits meaning fades into insignificance. These are the functions and\ncapacities of living organisms in general, and in particular those of\nvariation and inheritance, of development and self-differentiation. What\nis, and whence comes this mysterious power of the organism to build itself\nup from the smallest beginnings, from the germ? And the equally mysterious\npower of faithfully repeating the type of its ancestors? And, again, of\nvarying and becoming different from its ancestors? Even the \u201cmechanical\u201d\ntheory of selection is forced to presuppose the secret of life. Weismann\nindeed attempts to solve this riddle through his germ-plasm theory, the\npredisposition of the future organism in the \u201cids,\u201d determinants, and\nbiophors, and through the variation of the determinants in germinal\nselection, amphimixis and so on. But this is after all only shifting the\nproblem to another place, and translating the mystery into algebraical\nterms, so to speak, into symbols with which one can calculate and work for\na little, which formulate a definite series of observations, an orderly\nsequence of phenomena, which are, however, after all, \u201cunknown quantities\u201d\nthat explain nothing.\n\nIn order to explain the developing organism Weismann assumes that each of\nits organs or parts, or \u201cindependent regions,\u201d is represented in the\ngerm-plasm by a determinant, upon the fate of which the development of the\nfuture determinate depends. It is thought of as a very minute corpuscle of\nliving matter. Thus there are determinants of hairs and scales, pieces of\nskin, pits, marks, &c. But every determined organ, or part, or\n\u201cindependent region,\u201d is itself in its turn an \u201corganism,\u201d is indeed a\nsystem of an infinite number of interrelated component parts, and each of\nthese again is another, down to the individual cells. And each cell is an\n\u201corganism\u201d in itself, and so on into infinity. Is all this represented in\nthe determinants? And how?\n\nFurther, the individual determinate, for instance of a piece of skin, is\nnot something isolated, but passes over without definite boundary into\nothers. Therefore the determinants also cannot be isolated, but must be\nsystems within systems, dependent upon and merging into one another. How,\nat the building up of the organism, do the determinants find their\ndirection and their localisation? And, especially, how do they set to work\nto build up their organ? Here the whole riddle of the theory of\nepigenesis, which Weismann wished to do away with as a mystery, is\nrepeated a thousand times and made more difficult. In order to explain\npuzzling processes on a large scale, others have been constructed, which\non close investigation prove to be just the same mysterious and\nunexplained processes, only made infinitely smaller.\n\nMoreover, even if the whole of \u201cWeismannism,\u201d including germinal\nselection, could be accepted, and if it were as sufficient as it is\ninsufficient, what we advanced at the end of Chapter III. as a standpoint\nof general validity in relation to teleology and theology would still hold\ngood. Even an entirely na\u00efve, anthropomorphic, \u201csupernatural\u201d theology is\nready to see, in the natural course of things, in the \u201c_caus\u00e6\nsecundari\u00e6,_\u201d the realisation of Divine purpose, teleology, and does not\nfail to recognise that the Divine purpose may fulfil itself not only in an\nextraordinary manner, through \u201cmiracles\u201d and \u201cunconditioned\u201d events, but\nalso in ordinary ways, \u201cthrough means\u201d and the universal causal nexus.\nThus it is quite consistent even with a theology of this kind to regard\nthe whole system of causes and effects, which, according to the\nDarwin-Weismann doctrine, have gradually brought forth the whole diversity\nof the world of life, with man at its head, in a purely causal way without\nteleological intervention, as an immense system of means marvellous in its\nintricacy, in the inevitable necessity of its inter-relations, and in the\nexactness of its work, the ultimate result of which _must_ have come\nabout, but perhaps at the same time was _intended_ to come about. Whether\nI regard this ultimate result as the mere consequence of blind happenings,\nor as an intended purpose, does not depend, as we have seen, upon the\nknowledge gained by natural science, but depends above all on whether this\nultimate result seems to me of sufficient _value_ to be thought of as the\npurpose of a world-governing intelligence, and thus depends upon my\npersonal attitude to human nature, reason, mind, and the spiritual,\nreligious, and moral life. If I venture to attribute worth, and absolute\nworth, to these things, nothing, not even the fact of the \u201cstruggle for\nexistence\u201d in its thousand forms, in its gradually transforming effects,\nin the almost endless nexus of its causes and results, germinal selection\nincluded, can take away my right (and eventually my duty) to regard the\nultimate result _as an end_, and the nexus of causes as a system of means.\nTo enable me to do this, it is only requisite that internal necessity\nshould govern the system, and that the result should not be a chance one,\nso that it might even have been suppressed, have failed, or have turned\nout quite differently. Necessity and predetermination are characteristic\nof the relation between means and purpose. But this requisite is precisely\nthat which natural science does afford us,\u2014namely, the proof that all\nphenomena are strictly governed by law, and are absolutely predetermined\nby their antecedents. At this point the religious and the scientific\nconsideration coincide exactly. The hairs of our head, and the hairs in\nthe fur of a polar bear, which is varying towards white, and is therefore\nselected in the struggle for existence,(36) even the fluctuating\nvariations of a determinant in the germ, are \u201cnumbered\u201d according to both\nconceptions. Every variation that cropped up, every factor that \u201cselected\u201d\nthe fit, and eliminated the unfit, was strictly predestined, and must of\nnecessity have appeared as, and when, and where it did appear.(37)\n\nThe whole nexus of conditions and results, the inclined plane of evolution\nand the power of Being to move up it, has its sufficient reason in the\nnature and original state of the cosmos, in the constitution of its\n\u201cmatter,\u201d its \u201cenergy,\u201d its laws, its sequences and the grouping of its\nphenomena. Only from beginnings so constituted could our present world\nhave come to be as it is, and that necessarily. Only because the primary\npossibility and fitness for life\u2014vegetable, animal and human\u2014was in it\nfrom the beginning, could all these have come to be. This primary\npossibility did not \u201ccome into being,\u201d it was _\u00e0 priori_ immanent in it.\nWhence came this? There is no logical, comprehensible, or any other\nnecessity why there should be a world at all, or why it should be such\nthat life and evolution must become part of it. Where then lies the reason\nwhy it is, rather than is not, and why it is as it is?\n\nTo this must be added what Weismann himself readily admits and expressly\nemphasises. The whole theory treats, and must treat plant, animal, and man\nas only ingenious machines, mere systems of physical processes. This is\nthe ideal aimed at\u2014to interpret all the phenomena of life, growth, and\nreproduction thus. Even instincts and mental endowments are so\ninterpreted, since there must be corresponding morphological variations of\nthe fine structure of the nervous organ, and instinctive actions are then\n\u201cexplained\u201d as the functions of these. But how \u201cmechanical happening\u201d\ncomes to have this marvellous inwardness, which we call sensation,\nfeeling, perception, thought and will, which is neither mechanical nor\nderivable from anything mechanical; and, further, how physical and\npsychical can condition one another without doing violence to the law of\nthe conservation of the sum of energy, is an absolute riddle. But this\nwhole psychical world exists, with graduated stages perhaps as close to\neach other as in the physical world, but even less capable than these of\nbeing explained as having arisen out of their antecedent lower stages. And\nthis psychical world, which is, indeed, related to and dependent upon the\ncorporeal life, as also conversely, has its own quite peculiar laws:\nthought does not follow natural laws, but those of logic, which is\nentirely indifferent to exciting stimuli, for instance of the brain, which\nconform to natural laws. But this world, its riddles and mysteries, its\ngreat content and its history, beyond the reach of mechanical theories, is\nso absolutely the main thing (especially in regard to the question of the\npossibility of religion), that the question of bodily structure and\nevolution becomes beside it a mere accessory problem, and even the last is\nonly a relatively unimportant roundabout way of coming at the gist of the\nbusiness. How completely the evolution of the higher mental faculties\ntranscends such narrow and meagre formul\u00e6 as the struggle for existence\nand the like, Weismann himself indicates in connection with man\u2019s musical\nsense, and its relation to the \u201cmusical\u201d instinct in animals. The same and\nmuch more might be alleged in regard to the whole world of mind, of the\n\u00e6sthetic, ethical and religious, of the kingdom of thought, of science,\nand of poetry.\n\n\n\n\nNatural Selection.\n\n\nWe have for the moment provisionally admitted the theory of natural\nselection, in order to see whether it could be included in a religious\ninterpretation of things. But in reality such an admission is not to be\nthought of, in face of what is at present so apparent\u2014the breaking down of\nthis hypothesis, which has been upheld with so much persistence. We shall\nhave to occupy ourselves with this later on. In the meantime a few more\nremarks must be added to what has been already said.\n\nIt might be said, paradoxically, that the worst fate that could befall\nthis hypothesis would be to be proved, for then it would be most certainly\nrefuted. What we mean is this: If it is really \u201cutility\u201d that rules the\nworld and things, there can be no certainty and objectivity of knowledge,\nno guarantee of truth. The \u201cstruggle for existence\u201d is not concerned with\nselecting beings who see the world as it is. It selects only the\ninterpretation and conception of the environment that is most serviceable\nfor the existence and maintenance of the species. But there is nothing to\nguarantee that the \u201ctrue\u201d knowledge will also be the most useful. It might\nquite well be that an entirely subjective and in itself wholly false\ninterpretation would be the most serviceable. And if, by some\nextraordinary chance, the selected interpretation should be also the true\none, there would be no means of establishing the fact. And what is true of\nthis interpretation is true also of all theories that are derived from it,\nfor example of the theory of selection itself.\n\nFurthermore, a great part, perhaps the greatest part of the confidence\nplaced in the theory of selection is due to an involuntary, but entirely\nfallacious habit of crediting it with the probabilities in favour of the\ndoctrine of descent. The main arguments in favour of evolution and descent\nare very often, though unwittingly, adduced in support of Darwinism in\nparticular. This is a great mistake. Take, for instance, the evidence of\nthe \u201cpal\u00e6ontological\u201d record. It affords hundreds of proofs of evolution,\nbut not a single proof of selection. Its \u201cintermediate\u201d and \u201cconnecting\nlinks\u201d do possibly prove the affiliation of species and the validity of\ngenealogical trees. But precisely the \u201cintermediate links\u201d which\n_selection_ requires\u2014the myriads of forms of life which were not\nsuccessfully adapted, the unfit competitors in the struggle for existence\nwhich must have accompanied the favourably adapted variants from step to\nstep, from generation to generation\u2014these are altogether awanting.\n\nAnother circumstance seems to us to have been entirely overlooked, and it\nis one which gives the theory of selection an inevitable appearance of\ntruth, even if it is essentially false, and thus makes it very difficult\nto refute. Assuming that the recognition of teleological factors is valid,\nthat there is an inward law of development, that \u201cMoses\u201d or whoever one\nwill was undoubtedly right, it is self-evident that, because of the\nindubitable over-production of organisms, there would even then be a\nstruggle for existence on an immense scale, and that it would have a\nfar-reaching \u201cselective\u201d influence, because of the relative plasticity of\nmany forms of life. Beyond doubt it would, in the course of \u00e6ons, have\napplied its shears to many forms of life, and probably there would be no\norganisms, organs, or associations in the evolution of the ultimate form\nof which it had not energetically co-operated. Its influence would,\nperhaps, be omnipresent, yet it might be far from being the all-sufficient\nfactor in evolution; indeed, as far as the actual impulse of evolution is\nconcerned, it might be a mere accessory. Unless we are to think of the\nforms of life as wholly passive and wooden, the struggle for existence\nmust necessarily be operative, and the magnitude of its results, and their\nstriking and often bizarre outcome, will tend ever anew to conceal the\nfact that the struggle is after all only an inevitable accompaniment of\nevolution. And thus we understand how it is that interpretations from the\npoint of view of an inward law of development, of orthogenesis, or of\nteleology, notwithstanding their inherent validity, have _\u00e0 priori_ always\nhad a relatively difficult position as compared with the Darwinian view.\n\nIt is usual to speak of the \u201call-sufficiency of natural selection,\u201d yet\nthe champion of the selection-theory admits, as he needs must, that the\nstruggle for existence and selection can of themselves create absolutely\nnothing, no new character, no new or higher combination of the vital\nelements; they can only take what is already given; they can only select\nand eliminate among the wealth of what is offered.(38) And the offerer is\nLife itself by virtue of its mysterious capacity for boundless and\ninexhaustible variability, self-enrichment and increase. The \u201cstruggle for\nexistence\u201d only digs the bed through which life\u2019s stream flows, draws the\nguiding-line, and continually stimulates it to some fresh revelation of\nits wealth. But this wealth was there from the beginning; it was, to use\nthe old word, \u201cpotential\u201d in the living, and included with it in the\nuniversal being from which life was called forth. The struggle for\nexistence is only the steel which strikes the spark from the flint; is,\nwith its infinite forms and components, only the incredibly complex\nchannel through which life forces its way upwards. If we keep this clearly\nin mind, the alarming and ominous element in the theory shrinks to half\nits dimensions.\n\nAnd, finally, if we can rid ourselves of the peculiar fascination which\nthis theory exercises, we soon begin to discover what extraordinary\nimprobability and fundamental artificiality it implies. \u201cUtility\u201d is\nmaintained to be that which absolutely, almost tyrannically, determines\nform and development in the realm of the living. Is this an idea that\nfinds any analogy elsewhere in nature? Those who uphold the theory most\nstrongly are wont to compare the development of organisms to\ncrystal-formation in order in some way to tack on the living to the\nnot-living. Crystal-formation, with its processes of movement and\nform-development, is, they say, a kind of connecting link between the\nliving and the not-living. And in truth we find here, as in the realm of\nlife, species-formation, development into individuals, stages and systems.\nBut all this takes place without any hint of \u201cstruggle for existence,\u201d of\nlaboriously \u201cselective\u201d processes, or of ingenious accumulation of\n\u201cvariations.\u201d The \u201cspecies\u201d of crystals are formed not according to\nutility, but according to inherent, determining laws of development, to\nwhich the diversity of their individual appearances is due. If \u201cLife\u201d were\nonly a higher potential of what is already stirring in crystallisation, as\nthis view suggests, then we should expect to find fixed tendencies,\ndetermined from within, in accordance with which life would pass through\nthe cycle of its forms and possibilities, and rise spontaneously through\ngradual stages.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. CRITICS OF DARWINISM.\n\n\nLet us turn now to the other side. What is opposed to Darwinism in the\nbiological investigations of the experts of to-day is in part simple\ncriticism of the Darwinian position as a whole or in some of its details,\nand in part constructive individual theories and interpretations of the\nevolution of organisms.\n\nA. Fleischmann\u2019s book, \u201cDie Darwinsche Theorie,\u201d(39) is professedly only\ncritical. He suggests no theory of his own as to the evolution of life in\ncontrast to Darwin\u2019s; for, as we have already seen in connection with his\nearlier book, \u201cDie Deszendenztheorie,\u201d he denies evolution altogether. His\nagnostic position is maintained, if possible, more resolutely than before.\nNatural science, according to him, must keep to facts. Drawing conclusions\nand spinning theories is inexact, and distracts from objective study. The\nDarwinian theory of selection seems to him a particularly good example of\nthis, for it is built up _\u00e0 priori_ on theories and hypotheses, it stands\napart from experimentation, and it twists facts forcibly to its own ends.\nIt has, however, to be acknowledged that Fleischmann\u2019s book is without any\n\u201capologetic\u201d intentions. It holds equally aloof from teleology. To seek\nfor purposes and aims in nature he holds to be outside the business of\nscience, as Kant\u2019s \u201cCritique of Judgment\u201d suffices to show. After having\nbeen more than a decade under the charm of the theory of selection,\nFleischmann knows its fascination well, but he now regards it as so\nerroneous that no one who wishes to do serious work should concern himself\nabout it at all. Point by point he follows all the details of Darwin\u2019s\nwork, and seeks to analyse the separate views and theories which go to\nmake up Darwinism as a whole. Darwin\u2019s main example of the evolution of\nthe modern races of pigeons from one ancestral form, _Columba livia_, is,\naccording to Fleischmann, not only unproved but unprovable.(40) For this\nitself is not a unified type. The process of \u201cunconscious selection\u201d by\nman is obscure, and it is not demonstrable, especially in regard to\npigeon-breeding. It is a hazy idea which cannot be transferred to the\nrealm of nature. The Malthusian assumption of the necessity of the\nstruggle for existence is erroneous. Malthus was wrong in his law of\npopulation as applied to human life, and Darwin was still more mistaken\nwhen he transferred it to the organic world in general. It was mere\ntheory. Statistics should have been collected, and observations instead of\ntheories should have been sought for. The alleged superabundance of\norganisms is not a fact. The marvellously intertwined conditions in the\neconomy of nature make the proportion of supply and demand relatively\nconstant. And even when there is actual struggle for existence, advantages\nof situation,(41) which are quite indifferent as far as selection is\nconcerned, are much more decisive than any variational differences. The\ntheory does not explain the first origin of new characters, which can only\nbecome advantageous when they have attained to a certain degree of\ndevelopment. As to the illustrations of the influence of selection given\nby Darwin, from the much discussed fictitious cases, in which the fleet\nstags select the lithe wolf, to the marvellous mutual adaptations of\ninsects and flowers, Fleischmann objects that there is not even\ntheoretical justification for any one of them. The spade-like foot of the\nmole is not \u201cmore useful\u201d than the form of foot which probably preceded it\n(_cf._ Goette), it is merely \u201cdifferent.\u201d For when the mole took to\nburrowing in the earth and adapting itself to that mode of life, it _ipso\nfacto_ forfeited all the advantages of living above ground. The postulated\nmyriads of less well-adapted forms of life are no more to be found to-day\nthan they are in the fauna and flora of pal\u00e6ontological times. The famous\ngiraffe story has already been disposed of by Mivart\u2019s objections. As to\nthe whales, it is objected that the earliest stages of their whalebone and\ntheir exaggerated nakedness can have been of no use, and a series of other\nalleged selective effects of \u201cutility\u201d are critically analysed. The\nrefutation of the most brilliant chapter in the Darwinian theory, that on\nprotective coloration and mimicry, is very insufficient. A long concluding\nchapter sums up the fundamental defects of the Darwinian theory.\n\nFor the most part, Fleischmann simply brings forward objections which have\nbeen urged against the theory of selection from the first, either by\nnaturalists or from other quarters. The chief and the most fatal of these\nwhich are still current are the following: The theory of selection does\nnot explain the actually existing discontinuity of species. The real\ncharacteristics which distinguish species from species are in innumerable\ncases quite indifferent from the point of view of \u201cutility\u201d (N\u00e4geli,\nBateson). \u201cSelection preserves the good and weeds out the bad.\u201d But where\ndoes the good come from? (De Vries). The first beginnings of what may\nlater be useful are almost always useless. The theory of selection might\nperhaps explain the useful qualities, but not the superfluous, useless, or\ndirectly injurious characters which actually exist. Confirmation of the\ntheory of descent may be found in the pal\u00e6ontological record, but it\naffords none of the theory of selection. Natural selection is continually\nbeing neutralised by subsequent inter-crossing and reversion. Natural\nselection may indeed prevent degeneration within the limits of the species\nby weeding out what is weak and bad, but it is powerless beyond these\nlimits, and so forth.(42)\n\nThese ever-repeated and ever-increasing objections are purely critical. As\nthis is true of Fleischmann\u2019s whole book, it is therefore unsatisfactory.\nIt leaves everything in the mist, and puts nothing in place of what it\nattempts to demolish. But attempts are being made in other quarters,\nespecially among the Lamarckians, to build up an opposition theory.\n\n\n\n\nLamarckism and Neo-Lamarckism.\n\n\nThe \u201cLamarckian\u201d view as opposed to the Darwinian continues to hold its\nown, and indeed is more ardently supported than ever. On this view,\nevolution has been accomplished not by a laborious selection of the best\nwhich chanced to present itself\u2014a selection in relation to which organisms\nremained passive, but rather through the exertions of the organisms\nthemselves. It has been especially through the use and exercise of the\nvarious organs in response to the requirements of life, through the\nincreased exercise of physical and mental functions, that the organism has\nadapted itself more diversely and more fully to the conditions of its\nlife. What one generation acquired in differentiation of structure, in\ncapacities and habits, through its own exertions, it handed on to the\nnext. By cumulative inheritance there ultimately arose the fixed specific\ncharacters, and the diversity and progressive gradations of organisms have\ngone hand in hand with an ever increasing activity. And as with the\nphysical so it has been with the mental. Through continual use and\nexercise of the functions their capacity has been increased and modified.\nThrough the frequent repetition of voluntary actions necessary to life the\nhabitual use of them has come about. Habits that have become fixed are\ncorrelated with habitual psychical predispositions. These, gradually\nhanded on by inheritance to the descendants, have resulted in the\nmarvellous instincts of animals. Instinct is inherited habit that has\nbecome fixed. Corresponding to this there is on the other hand the\nrecognition\u2014in theory at least\u2014that the disuse of an organ, the\nnon-exercising of a function leads to degeneration of structure and so\nco-operates in bringing about a gradual but persistent modification of the\nfeatures and constitution of organisms.\n\nThese views, which have grown out of Lamarck\u2019s fundamental ideas\n(\u201cPhilosophie zoologique,\u201d 1809) are now usually associated with the\ntheory advanced chiefly by Etienne Geoffrey St. Hilaire (\u201cPhilosophie\nzoologique,\u201d 1830), the opponent of Cuvier, and the ally of Goethe, of the\ndirect influence of the _monde ambiant_. The \u201csurrounding world,\u201d the\ninfluences of climate, of locality, of the weather, of nutrition, of\ntemperature, of the salinity of the water, of the moisture in the air, and\nall other conditions of existence, influence the living organism. And they\ndo so not indirectly, as is implied in the process of selection, simply\nplaying the part of a sieve, and not themselves moulding and transforming,\nbut _directly_ by necessitating the production of new developments in the\nliving substance, new chemical and physiological activities, new groupings\nand changes of form, and new organs.\n\nDarwin himself did not regard these two theories as opposed to the theory\nof selection, but utilised them as subsidiary interpretations. It is\nobvious, however, that at bottom they conceal an essentially different\nfundamental idea, which, if followed out to its logical consequences,\nreduces the \u201cstruggle for existence\u201d to at most a wholly indifferent\naccessory circumstance. Weismann felt this, and hence his entirely\nconsistent endeavours to show by great examples, such as the origin of\nflowers, the mutual adaptations of flowers and insects, the phenomena of\nmimicry, and many other cases, that neither the Lamarckian nor any other\nfactor in evolution, except only natural, passive selection, suffices as\nan interpretation. From the Darwinian standpoint he is absolutely right,\nand must needs speak of the \u201comnipotence of natural selection,\u201d for it\nmust either be omnipotent, or it must give place to the other two factors,\nand retain only the significance we attributed to it in another connection\n(p. 157), which amounts to saying none at all. It is obvious enough why\nthe discussion as to these factors should centre round the question of the\n\u201cinheritance of acquired characters,\u201d \u201cacquired\u201d either through the use or\ndisuse of organs, the exercise or non-exercise of functions, or through\nthe stimuli of the external world.\n\nThe neo-Lamarckian conflict with Darwinism has become more and more acute\nin recent times, and the neo-Lamarckians have sometimes passed from\ncontrasting rival interpretations to excluding the Darwinian factor\naltogether. As the particular champion of the neo-Lamarckian view, we must\nname Th. Eimer, the recently deceased T\u00fcbingen zoologist. His chief work\nis in three volumes, entitled \u201cDie Entstehung der Arten auf Grund von\nVererbung erworbener Eigenschaften, nach Gesetzen organischen\nWachsens.\u201d(43) It is a polemic against Weismannism in all details, even to\nthe theory of \u201cgerminal selection.\u201d Eimer follows in the footsteps of St.\nHilaire, and shows what a relatively plastic and sensitive creature the\norganism is to the surrounding world, the conditions of nutrition and\nother such influences. There is in this connection a particularly\ninstructive chapter on the physiological and other variations brought\nabout by external influences which act as \u201cstimuli of the nervous system.\u201d\nThe whole theory of Lamarck and St. Hilaire transcends\u2014notwithstanding the\nprotests of Eimer to the contrary\u2014the categories of the mechanical theory\nof life, and this chapter does so in particular. The array of facts here\nmarshalled as to the spontaneous self-adaptation of organisms to their\nenvironment\u2014in relation to colour mainly\u2014forms the most thoroughgoing\nrefutation of Darwinism that it is possible to imagine. It is shown, too,\nby a wealth of examples from osteology, how use (and the necessities of\nthe case\u2014a consideration which again goes beyond the bounds of mere\nLamarckism) may modify, increase or diminish vertebr\u00e6, ribs, skull and\nlimbs, in short, the whole skeleton.\n\nKassowitz is equally keen and convinced in his opposition to natural\nselection, and in his comprehensive \u201cAllgemeine Biologic\u201d(44) he attacks\northodox Darwinism from the neo-Lamarckian standpoint. The whole of the\nfirst volume is almost chapter for chapter a critical analysis, and the\npolemical element rather outweighs his positive personal contribution. He\ncriticises very severely all attempts to carry the Darwinian principle of\nexplaining adaptations into internal and minute details, arguing against\nRoux\u2019s \u201cStruggle of Parts\u201d and Weismann\u2019s \u201cGerminal Selection.\u201d And though\nhe himself maintains very decidedly that the ultimate aim of biology is to\nfind a mechanical solution of the problem of life, he criticises the\nmodern hypotheses in this direction without prejudice, and declares them\nunsuccessful and insufficient, inclining himself towards the\n\u201cneo-vitalistic reaction\u201d in its most recent expression. Along with Eimer\nand Kassowitz, we may name W. Haacke, especially in relation to his views\non the acquisition and transmission of functional modifications and his\nthoroughgoing denial of Darwinism proper. But his work must be dealt with\nlater in a different connection.(45)\n\nThese neo-Lamarckian views give us a picture of the evolution of the world\nthat is much more convincing than the strictly Darwinian one. Instead of\npassive and essentially unintelligent \u201cadaptation\u201d through the sieve of\nselection, we have here direct self-adaptation of organisms to the\nconditions of their existence, through their own continual restless\nactivity and exertion, an ascent of their own accord to ever greater\nheights and perfections. A theory of this kind might easily form part of a\nreligious conception of the world. We might think of the world with\nprimitive tendencies and capacities, in which the potentialities of its\nevolution were implied, and so ordered that it had to struggle by its own\nexertions to achieve the full realisation of its possibilities, to attain\nto ever higher\u2014up to the highest\u2014forms of Being. The process of nature\nwould thus be the direct anticipation of what occurs in the history of man\nand of mind. And the task set to the freedom of individual men, and to\nmankind as a whole, namely, to work out their own nature through their own\nlabour and exertion, and to ascend to perfection\u2014this deepest meaning of\nall individual and collective existence\u2014would have its exact prelude and\npreparation in the general nature and evolution of all living creatures.\nThe transition from these theories of nature to a teleological outlook\nfrom the highest and most human point of view is so obvious as to be\nalmost unavoidable. And although a natural science which keeps to its own\nbusiness and within its own boundaries has certainly no right to make this\ntransition for itself, it has still less right to prevent its being made\noutside of its limits.\n\n\n\n\nTheory of Definite Variation.\n\n\nBut the question now arises, whether both Darwinism and Lamarckism must\nnot be replaced, or at least reduced to the level of accessory theories\nand factors, by another theory of evolution which was in the field before\nDarwin, and which since his time has been advanced anew, especially by\nN\u00e4geli, and has now many adherents who support it in whole or in part.\nThis view affects the very foundations of the Darwinian doctrine. The\ntheory of \u201cindefinite\u201d variation, bringing about easy transitions and\naffecting every part of the organism separately, which is the necessary\ncorrelate of the \u201cstruggle for existence,\u201d is rejected altogether.\nEvolution takes place only along a few definite lines, predetermined\nthrough the internal organisation and the laws of growth. It is wholly\nindifferent to \u201cutility,\u201d and brings forth only what it must according to\nits own inner laws, not seldom even the monstrous. According to this view,\nnew species arise, not in easy transition, but with a visible leap, by a\nconsiderable and far-reaching displacement of the organic equilibrium.\nWhat Darwin calls the correlation of parts, and in no way denies, is here\nmaintained in strong opposition to his doctrine of the isolated variation\nof individual parts; every member or character of the organism depends\nupon others, and variation of one affects many, and in some way all of the\nrest.\n\nThis theory is for the most part intended by its champions to be purely\nnaturalistic. But every one of its points yields support to teleological\nconsiderations, most obviously so the concrete instances of correlation.\nIf any one were to attempt to make a theory of evolution from a decidedly\nteleological standpoint, he would probably construct one very similar to\nthe one we are now considering.\n\nIt is noteworthy that it has generally been the botanists who have\nespecially supported these views of saltatory evolution in a definite\ndirection and according to internal law, who have therefore tended to\nreact most strongly from Darwinism. We find examples in N\u00e4geli\u2019s large and\ncomprehensive work, \u201cMechanisch-physikalische Theorie der\nAbstammungslehre\u201d; and, before him, in Wigand\u2019s \u201cDarwinismus und die\nNaturforschung Newton\u2019s und Cuvier\u2019s\u201d; in von K\u00f6lliker\u2019s \u201cHeterogenesis\u201d;\nin von Baer\u2019s \u201cEndeavour after an End\u201d; in the chapter added by the\ntranslator, Bronn, to the first German edition of the \u201cOrigin of Species,\u201d\nwhere he urges weighty objections against the theory of selection, and\nrefers to the \u201cinnate impulse to development, persistently varying in a\ndefinite direction\u201d; in Askenasy\u2019s oft-quoted \u201cBeitr\u00e4ge zur Kritik der\nDarwinschen Lehre,\u201d also referring to \u201cvariation in a definite direction,\u201d\nfor instance, in flowers; in Delpino\u2019s views, and in the works of many\nother older writers. But we must leave all these out of account here,\nsince we are concerned only with the present state of the question.\n\n\n\n\nDe Vries\u2019s Mutation-theory.\n\n\nThe work that has probably excited most interest in this connection is De\nVries\u2019 \u201cDie Mutationstheorie: Versuche und Beobachtungen \u00fcber die\nEntstehung von Arten im Pflanzenleben.\u201d(46) In a short preliminary paper\nhe had previously given some account of his leading experiments on a\nspecies of evening primrose (_\u0152nothera lamarckiana_), and the outlines of\nhis theory. In the work itself he extends this, adding much concrete\nmaterial, and comparing his views in detail with other theories. Darwin,\nhe says, had already distinguished between variability and mutability; the\nformer manifesting itself in gradual and isolated changes, the latter in\nsaltatory changes on a larger scale. The mistake made by Wallace and by\nthe later Darwinians has been that they regarded this latter form (\u201csingle\nvariation\u201d) as unimportant and not affecting evolution, and the former as\nthe real method of evolutionary process. That fluctuating individual\nvariations do occur De Vries admits, but only within narrow limits, never\noverstepping the type of the species. Here De Vries utilises the recent\nstatistical investigations into the phenomena of individual variation and\ntheir laws, as formulated chiefly by Quetelet and Bateson, which were\nunknown to Darwin and the earlier Darwinians. The actual transition from\n\u201cspecies to species\u201d is made suddenly, by mutation, not through variation.\nAnd the state of equilibrium thus reached is such a relatively stable one\nthat individual variations can only take place within its limits, but can\nin no way disturb it.\n\nDe Vries marshals a series of facts which present insurmountable\ndifficulties to the Darwinian theory, but afford corroboration of the\nMutation theory. In particular, he brings forward, from his years of\nexperiment and horticultural observation, comprehensive evidence of the\nmutational origin of new species from old ones by leaps, and this not in\nlong-past geological times, but in the course of a human life and before\nour very eyes. The main importance of the book lies in the record of these\nexperiments and observations, rather than in the theory as such, for the\nway had been paved for it by other workers.\n\nIn contrast to Darwinism, De Vries states the case for \u201cHalmatogenesis\u201d\n(saltatory evolution) and \u201cHeterogenesis\u201d (the production of forms unlike\nthe parents), taking his examples from the plant world, but his attitude\nto Darwinism is conciliatory throughout. Eimer, on the other hand, is\nsharply antagonistic, especially to Weismann; he takes his proofs from the\nanimal kingdom, and in the second volume of his large work already\nmentioned, which deals with the \u201corthogenesis of butterflies,\u201d he attempts\nto set against the Darwinism \u201cchance theory,\u201d a proof of \u201cdefinitely\ndirected evolution,\u201d and therefore of the \u201cinsufficiency of natural\nselection in the formation of species.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nEimer\u2019s Orthogenesis.\n\n\nOrganisation is due to internal causes. Structural characters crystallise\nout, as it were. \u201cOrthogenesis,\u201d or the definitely determined tendency of\nevolution to advance in a few directions, is a law for the whole of the\nanimate world. In active response to the stimuli and influences of the\nenvironment the organism expresses itself in \u201corganic growth\u201d without any\nrelation to utility. Butterflies in particular, and especially their\nmarkings and coloration, are taken as illustrations. In the Darwinian\ntheory of \u201cmimicry\u201d these played a brilliant part. The great resemblance\nto leaves, to dried twigs, or to well-protected species which are secure\nfrom enemies, was regarded as the most convincing proof of the operation\nof natural selection. But Eimer shows that markings, striping, spots, the\ndevelopment of pattern, and the alleged or real resemblances to leaves,\nare really subject to definite laws of growth, in obedience to which they\ngradually appear, developing according to their own internal laws, varying\nand progressing altogether by internal necessity, and without any\nreference to advantage or disadvantage, In association with this\northogenesis, Eimer recognises halmatogenesis, correlation and\n\u201cgenepistasis\u201d (coming to a standstill at a fixed and definite stage), and\nthese seem to him to make the Darwinian theory utterly impossible. The\ntext and the illustrations of the book show how, in the sequence of\nevolution (according to Eimer\u2019s laws of transformation), the groupings of\nstripes, bands, and eye-spots must have appeared on the butterfly\u2019s wing,\nhow convex or concave curvings of the contour must have come about at\ncertain points, so that the form of a \u201cleaf\u201d and the lines of its venation\nresulted, how the eye-spots must have been moulded and shunted, so that\nthey produced the effect of rust or other spots on withered leaves.\nParticular interest attaches to the detailed arguments against the idea\nthat the butterfly must receive some advantage from its \u201cmimicry.\u201d Even\nthe Darwinians have to admit that in a whole series of cases the advantage\nis not obvious. They talk with some embarrassment of \u201cpseudomimicry.\u201d Some\nbutterflies that are supposed to be protected have the protective markings\non the underside, so that these are actually hidden when the insects are\nflying from pursuing birds. Many of the leaf-like butterflies are not\nwood-butterflies at all, but meadow species,(47) and so Eimer\u2019s arguments\ncontinue.\n\nA specially energetic fellow-worker on Eimer\u2019s line is W. Haacke, a\nzoologist of Jena, author of \u201cGestaltung und Vererbung,\u201d and \u201cDie\nSch\u00f6pfung des Menschen und seiner Ideale.\u201d(48) In the first of these works\nHaacke combats, energetically and with much detail, Weismann\u2019s\n\u201cpreformation theory,\u201d and defends \u201cepigenesis,\u201d for which he endeavours\nto construct graphic diagrams, his aim being to make a foundation for the\ninheritance of acquired characters, definitely directed evolution,\nsaltatory, symmetrical, and correlated variation.\n\nThe principles of the new school are very widespread to-day, but we cannot\nhere follow their development in the works of individual investigators,\nsuch as Reinke, R. Hertwig, O. Hertwig, Wiesner, Hamann, Dreyer, Wolff,\nGoette, Kassowitz, v. Wettstein, Korschinsky, and others.(49)\n\n\n\n\nThe Spontaneous Activity of the Organism.\n\n\nWhat is particularly luminous in all the theories that express the most\nrecent anti-Darwinian tendency is that they tend to bring into prominence\nthe mysterious powers of living organisms, by means of which, instead of\npassively waiting for natural selection and the continual accumulation of\nunceasing variations, they are able spontaneously and of themselves to\nbring forth what is necessary for self-maintenance, often what is new and\ndifferent, of course not unlimitedly, but with considerable freedom and\noften with a surprising range of possibilities. It is, perhaps, partly the\nfault of the one-sidedness of strict Darwinism that this consideration has\nbeen so slowly brought into prominence and subjected to investigation and\nexperiment. It is bound up with the capacity that all forms of life have\nof reacting spontaneously to \u201cstimuli\u201d and, to a certain extent, of\nhelping themselves if the conditions of existence be unfavourable. They\nare able, for instance, to produce protective adaptations against cold or\nheat, to \u201cregenerate\u201d lost parts, often to replace entire organs that have\nbeen lost, and, under certain circumstances, to produce new organs\naltogether. If all this be true, it seems almost like caprice to follow\nonly the roundabout theory of the struggle for existence, and not to take\naccount of these spontaneous capacities of the living organism directly\nand before all other factors in the attempt to explain evolution. There is\nno end to the illustrations that are being adduced, that must force\ninvestigation to pass from merely superficial considerations of the\nstruggle for existence type to the deeper and more real problems\nthemselves.\n\nAn effectively modified and adapted type of Alpine flora has not been\nevolved by a laborious process of selection lasting for many thousand\nyears; the organism may quickly and immediately produce the new characters\nby its own reaction. Crustaceans gradually transferred from a salt-water\nto a fresh-water habitat, or conversely, produce in a few generations the\ntype of a new \u201cspecies\u201d with correlated variations (Schmankewitsch). Birds\nweaned by careful experiment from a diet of seeds to one of flesh, or\nconversely, produce changes of effective correlation and adaptation in the\ncharacters of their alimentary system. Plants that have been deprived of\ntheir normal organs for absorbing water and prevented from growing new\nones produce entirely new and effective \u201chydatodes.\u201d(50)\n\nIt is instructive to notice that Darwinism seems likely to be robbed of\nits stock illustration, namely, \u201cprotective coloration.\u201d By its own\ninternal power of reaction, and sometimes within one generation, and even\nin the lifetime of an individual, an organism may assume the colour of the\nsubstratum beneath it (soles, grasshoppers), of its surroundings (Eimer\u2019s\ntree frogs), the colour and spottiness of the granite rock on which it\nhangs, the colour of the leaves and twigs among which it lives (Poulton\u2019s\nbutterfly pup\u00e6), and even that of the brightly coloured sheets of paper\namidst which it is kept imprisoned. Certain spiders assume a white, pink,\nor greenish \u201cprotective coloration\u201d corresponding to the tinted blossom of\nthe plants which they frequent, and so on.(51) Eimer alleged that direct\npsychical factors co-operated in bringing about these changes. In any\ncase, all this carries us far beyond the domain of mere naturalistic\nfactors into the mystery of life itself. Even what is called the\n\u201cinfluence of the external world,\u201d and the \u201cactive acquirement of new\ncharacters,\u201d have their basis and the reason of their possibility in this\ndomain. And the whole domain is saturated through and through with\n\u201cteleology.\u201d\n\nA recognition of the impressive secret of the organism led Gustav Wolff to\nbecome a very pronounced critic of Darwinism, especially in the form of\nWeismannism. As far back as 1896, in a lecture \u201cOn the present position of\nDarwinism,\u201d in which he dealt only with Weismann, he criticised and\nanalysed that author\u2019s last attempt to uphold Darwinism by the\nconstruction of his theory of \u201cgerminal selection.\u201d He concluded with the\nwish:\n\n\u201cThat a spirit of earnestness would once more enter into biological\ninvestigation, which would no longer attempt to find in nature just what\nit wanted to find, but would be ready to follow truth at all costs, and to\napproach the riddle of life with an open mind.\u201d\n\nHis \u201cBeitr\u00e4ge zur Kritik der Darwinischen Lehre,\u201d which appeared first as\npapers in the \u201cBiologisches Centralblatt,\u201d did not see the light in book\nform until 1898. The doctrine of selection was regarded as so unassailable\nthat no publisher would take the risk of the book. Its appearance is a\nsure indication of the general modification of opinions that had taken\nplace in the interval. The first and second essays are merely critical\nobjections to the theory of selection, very similar to those frequently\nurged before, but more precisely stated.(52) The third is intended to show\nthat there is in the forms of life themselves, as a faculty of adaptation\npeculiar to them, a primary purposiveness, which is unquestionably active\nthroughout the lifetime and development of every individual, but which is\nalso the deepest cause of \u201cphylogenesis,\u201d or the formation of a race. This\ndoctrine makes both the Darwinian and Lamarckian theories merely\nsecondary. For the phenomena which suggest the Lamarckian interpretation\npresuppose this most essential factor\u2014the primary adaptiveness. Wolff\nconcludes with a very striking instance\u2014discovered by himself\u2014of this\nprimary adaptiveness of the organism\u2014the regeneration of the lens in the\nnewt\u2019s eye.\n\nMore comprehensively, but from a precisely similar standpoint, Driesch has\nfollowed up the discussion of this problem.(53) He is, of all modern\ninvestigators, perhaps the one who has most persistently and thoroughly\nworked out the problem of causal and teleological interpretation, and he\nhas also thrown much light on the scientific and epistemological aspects\nof the problem. That he could, in a recent volume of the \u201cBiologisches\nZentralblatt,\u201d write a respectful and sympathetic exposition of the\nHegelian nature-philosophy\u2014as regards its aims, though not its methods\u2014is\nas remarkable a symptom as we can instance of the modern trend of views\nand opinions.(54)\n\n\n\n\nContrast Between Darwinian and Post-Darwinian Views.\n\n\nThe new views that have thus arisen have been definitely summarised and\nclearly contrasted with Darwinism by the botanist Korschinsky. He died\nbefore completing his general work, \u201cHeterogenesis und Evolution,\u201d but he\nhas elsewhere(55) given an excellent summary of his results, which we\nappend in abstract.\n\nDARWIN. (1) Everything organic is capable of variation. Variations arise\nin part from internal, in part from external causes. They are slight,\ninconspicuous, individual differences.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (1) Everything organic is capable of\nvariation. This capability is a fundamental, inherent character of living\nforms in general, and is independent of external conditions. It is usually\nkept latent by \u201cheredity,\u201d but occasionally breaks forth in sudden\nvariations.\n\nDARWIN. (2) The struggle for existence. This combines, increases, fixes\nuseful variations, and eliminates the useless. All the characters and\npeculiarities of a finished species are the results of long-continued\nselection; they must therefore be adapted to the external conditions.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (2) Saltatory variations.\u2014These are, under\nfavourable circumstances, the starting-point of new and constant races.\nThe characters may sometimes be useful, sometimes quite indifferent,\nneither advantageous nor disadvantageous. Sometimes they are not in\nharmony with external circumstances.\n\nDARWIN. (3) The species is subject to constant variation. It is\ncontinually subject to selection and augmentation of its characters. Hence\nagain the origin of new species.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (3) All fully developed species persist, but\nthrough heterogenesis a splitting up into new forms may take place, and\nthis is accompanied by a disturbance of the vital equilibrium. The new\nstate is at first insecure and fluctuating, and only gradually becomes\nstable. Thus new forms and races arise with gradual consolidation of their\nconstitution.\n\nDARWIN. (4) The sharper and more acute the effect of the environment, the\nkeener is the struggle for existence, and the more rapidly and certainly\ndo new forms arise.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (4) Only in specially favourable conditions,\nonly when the struggle for existence is weak, or when there is none, can\nnew forms arise and become fixed. When the conditions are severe no new\nforms arise, or if they do they are speedily eliminated.\n\nDARWIN. (5) The chief condition of evolution is therefore the struggle for\nexistence and the selection which this involves.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (5) The struggle for existence simply\ndecimates the overwhelming abundance of possible forms. Where it occurs it\nprevents the establishment of new variations, and in reality stands in the\nway of new developments. It is rather an unfavourable than an advantageous\nfactor.\n\nDARWIN. (6) If there were no struggle for existence there would be no\nadaptation, no perfecting.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (6) Were there no struggle for existence,\nthere would be no destruction of new forms, or of forms in process of\narising. The world of organisms would then be a colossal genealogical tree\nof enormous luxuriance, and with an incalculable wealth of forms.\n\nDARWIN. (7) Progress in nature, the \u201cperfecting\u201d of organisms, is only an\nincreasingly complex and ever more perfect adaptation to the external\ncircumstances. It is attained by purely mechanical methods, by an\naccumulation of the variations most useful at the time.\n\nKORSCHINSKY AND THE MODERNS. (7) The adaptation which the struggle for\nexistence brings about has nothing to do with perfecting, for the\norganisms which are physiologically and morphologically higher are by no\nmeans always better adapted to external circumstances than those lower in\nthe scale. Evolution cannot be explained mechanically. The origin of\nhigher forms from lower is only possible if there is a tendency to\nprogress innate in the organism itself. This tendency is nearly related to\nor identical with the tendency to variation. It compels the organism to\nperfect itself as far as external circumstances will permit.\n\nAll this implies an admission of evolution and of descent, but a setting\naside of Darwinism proper as an unsuccessful hypothesis, and a positive\nrecognition of an endeavour after an aim, internal causes, and teleology\nin nature, as against fortuitous and superficial factors. This opens up a\nvista into the background of things, and thereby yields to the religious\nconception all that a study of nature can yield\u2014namely, an acknowledgment\nof the possibility and legitimacy of interpreting the world in a religious\nsense, and assistance in so doing.\n\nThe most important point has already been emphasised. Even if the theory\nof the struggle for existence were correct, it would be possible to\nsubject the world as a whole to a teleological interpretation. But these\nanti-Darwinian theories now emerging, though they do not directly induce\nteleological interpretation, suggest it much more strongly than orthodox\nDarwinism does. A world which in its evolution is not exposed, for good or\nill, to the action of chance factors\u2014playing with it and forcing it hither\nand thither\u2014but which, exposed indeed to the most diverse conditions of\nexistence and their influences, and harmonising with them, nevertheless\ncarries implicitly and infallibly within itself the laws of its own\nexpression, and especially the necessity to develop upwards into higher\nand higher forms, is expressly suited for teleological consideration, and\nwe can understand how it is that the old physico-teleological evidences of\nthe existence of God are beginning to hold up their heads again. They are\nwrong when they try to demonstrate God, but quite right when they simply\nseek to show that nature does not contradict\u2014in fact that it allows room\nand validity to\u2014belief in the Highest Wisdom as the cause and guide of all\nthings natural.\n\nAs far as the question of the right to interpret nature teleologically is\nconcerned, it would be entirely indifferent whether what Korschinsky calls\n\u201cthe tendency to progress,\u201d and the system of laws in obedience to which\nevolution brings forth its forms, can be interpreted \u201cmechanically\u201d or\nnot; that is to say, whether or not evolution depends on conditions and\npotentialities of living matter, which can be demonstrated and made\nmechanically commensurable or not. It may be that they can neither be\ndemonstrated nor made mechanically commensurable, but lie in the\nimpenetrable mystery inherent in all life. Whether this mystery really\nexists, and whether religion has any particular interest in it if it does,\nmust be considered in the following chapter.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF LIFE.\n\n\nWhat is life\u2014not in the spiritual and transcendental sense, but in its\nphysical and physiological aspects? What is this mysterious complex of\nprocesses and phenomena, common to everything animate, from the seaweed to\nthe rose, and from the human body to the bacterium, this ability to \u201cmove\u201d\nof itself, to change and yet to remain like itself, to take up dead\nsubstances into itself, to assimilate and to excrete, to initiate and\nsustain, in respiration, in nutrition, in external and internal movements,\nthe most complex chemical and physical processes, to develop and build up\nthrough a long series of stages a complete whole from the primitive\nbeginnings in the germ, to grow, to become mature, and gradually to break\nup again, and with all this to repeat in itself the type of its parent,\nand to bring forth others like itself, thus perpetuating its own species,\nto react effectively to stimuli, to produce protective devices against\ninjury, and to regenerate lost parts? All this is done by living\norganisms, all this is the expression in them of \u201cLife.\u201d What is it?\nWhence comes it? And how can it be explained?\n\nThe problem of the nature of life, of the principle of vitality, is almost\nas old as philosophy itself, and from the earliest times in which men\nbegan to ponder over the problem, the same antitheses have been apparent\nwhich we find to-day. Disguised under various catchwords and with the\ngreatest diversities of expression, the antitheses remain essentially the\nsame through the centuries, competing with one another, often mingling\ncuriously, so that from time to time one or other almost disappears, but\nalways crops up again, so that it seems as if the conflict would be a\nnever-ending one\u2014the antitheses between the mechanical and the\n\u201cvitalistic\u201d view of life. On the one side there is the conviction that\nthe processes of life may be interpreted in terms of natural processes of\na simple and obvious kind, indeed directly in terms of those which are\nmost general and most intelligible\u2014namely, the simplest movements of the\nsmallest particles of matter, which are governed by the same laws as\nmovement in general. And associated with this is the attempt to take away\nany special halo from around the processes of life, to admit even here no\nother processes but the mechanical ones, and to explain everything as the\neffect of material causes. On the opposite side is the conviction that\nvital phenomena occupy a special and peculiar sphere in the world of\nnatural phenomena, a higher platform; that they cannot be explained by\nmerely physical or chemical or mechanical factors, and that, if\n\u201cexplaining\u201d means reducing to terms of such factors, they do in truth\ninclude something inexplicable. These opposing conceptions of the living\nand the organic have been contrasted with one another, in most precise\nform and exact expression, by Kant in certain chapters of the Kritik der\nUrteilskraft, which must be regarded as a classic for our subject.(56) But\nas far as their general tendency is concerned, they were already\nrepresented in the nature-philosophies of Democritus on the one hand, and\nof Aristotle on the other.\n\nAll the essential constituents of the modern mechanical theories are\nreally to be found in Democritus, the causal interpretation, the denial of\nany operative purposes or formative principles, the admission and\nassertion of quantitative explanations alone, the denial of qualities, the\nreduction of all cosmic developments to the \u201cmechanics of the atom\u201d (even\nto attractions and repulsions, thus setting aside the \u201cenergies\u201d), the\ninevitable necessity of these mechanical sequences, indeed at bottom even\nthe conviction of the \u201cconstancy of the sum of matter and energy.\u201d (For,\nas he says, \u201cnothing comes out of nothing.\u201d) And although he makes the\n\u201csoul\u201d the principle of the phenomena of life, that is in no way\ncontradictory to his general mechanical theory, but is quite congruent\nwith it. For the \u201csoul\u201d is to him only an aggregation of thinner,\nsmoother, and rounder atoms, which as such are more mobile, and can, as it\nwere, quarter themselves in the body, but nevertheless stand in a purely\nmechanical relation to it.\n\nAristotle, who was well aware of the diametrical opposition, represents,\nas compared with Democritus, the Socratic-Platonic teleological\ninterpretation of nature, and in regard to the question of living\norganisms his point of view may quite well be designated by the modern\nname of \u201cvitalism.\u201d Especially in his theory of the vegetable soul, the\nessence of vitalism is already contained. It is the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 (logos\nenhylos), the idea immanent in the matter, the conceptual essence of the\norganism, or its ideal whole, which is inherent in it from its beginnings\nin the germ, and determines, like a directing law, all its vegetative\nprocesses, and so raises it from a state of \u201cpossibility\u201d to one of\n\u201creality.\u201d All that we meet with later as \u201cnisus formativus,\u201d as\n\u201clife-force\u201d (vis vitalis), as \u201cendeavour after an end\u201d (Zielstrebigkeit),\nis included in the scope of Aristotelian thought. And he has the advantage\nover many of his successors of being very much clearer.(57)\n\nThe present state of the problem of life may be regarded as due to a\nreaction of biological investigation and opinion from the \u201cvitalistic\u201d\ntheories which prevailed in the first half of last century, and which were\nin turn at once the root and the fruit of the German Nature-philosophy of\nthat time.\n\nLotze in his oft-quoted article, \u201cLeben, Lebenskraft\u201d (Life, Vital Force),\nin Wagner\u2019s \u201cHand-W\u00f6rterbuch der Physiologie,\u201d 1842, gave the signal for\nthis reaction. The change, however, did not take place suddenly. The most\nimportant investigators in their special domain, the physiologist Johannes\nM\u00fcller, the chemist Julius Liebig, remained faithful to a modified\nvitalistic standpoint. But in the following generation the revolution was\ncomplete and energetic. With Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Haeckel, the\nanti-vitalistic trend became more definite and more widespread. It had a\npowerful ally in the Darwinian theory, which had been promulgated\nmeanwhile, and at the same time in the increasingly materialistic tendency\nof thought, which afforded support to the mechanical system and also\nsought foundations in it.\n\nThe naturalistic, \u201cmechanical\u201d interpretation of life was so much in the\ntenor of Darwin\u2019s doctrine that it would have arisen out of it if it had\nnot existed before. It is so generally regarded as a self-evident and\nnecessary corollary of the strictly Darwinian doctrine, that it is often\nincluded with it under the name of Darwinism, although Darwin personally\ndid not devote any attention to the problem of the mechanical\ninterpretation of life. Any estimate of the value of one must be\nassociated with an estimate of the other also.\n\nIt goes without saying that the theory of life is dependent upon, and in a\nlarge measure consists of physico-chemical interpretations,\ninvestigations, and methods. For ever since the attention of investigators\nwas directed to the problems of growth, of nutrition, of development and\nso on, and particularly as knowledge has passed from primitive and\nunmethodical forms to real science, it has been taken as a matter of\ncourse that chemical and physical processes play a large part in life, and\nindeed that everything demonstrable, visible, or analysable, does come\nabout \u201cnaturally,\u201d as it is said. And from the vitalistic standpoint it\nhas to be asked whether detailed biological investigation and analysis can\never accomplish more than the observation and tracing out of these\nchemical and physical processes. Anything beyond this will probably be\nonly the defining and formulating of the limits of its own proper sphere\nof inquiry, and a recognition, though no knowledge, of what lies beyond\nand of the co-operative factors. The difference between vitalism and the\nmechanical theory of life is not, that the one regards the processes in\nthe organism as opposed to those in the inorganic world while the other\nidentifies them, but that vitalism regards life as a combination of\nchemical and physical processes, with the co-operation and under the\nregulation of other principles, while the mechanical theory leaves these\nother principles out.\n\nNotwithstanding the many noteworthy reactions, we are bound to regard the\npresent state of the theory of life as on the whole mechanical. The\nmajority of experts\u2014not to speak of the popular materialists, and\nespecially those who, sailing under the flag of materialistic\ninterpretation, have their ships full of vitalistic contraband\u2014regard as\nthe ideal of their science an ultimate analysis of the phenomena of life\ninto mechanical processes, into \u201cmechanics of the atom.\u201d They believe in\nthis ideal, and without concealing that it is still very far off, do not\ndoubt its ultimate attainability, and regard vitalistic assumptions as\nobstacles to the progress of investigation. Moreover, this aspect of the\nproblem seems likely enough to be permanent with the majority, or, at any\nrate, with many naturalists, though it is obviously one-sided. For it has\nalways been the task of this line of investigation to extend the sphere\nwithin which physical and chemical laws can be validly applied in\ninterpreting vital processes, and the results reached along this line will\nalways be so numerous and important that even on psychological grounds the\nmechanical point of view has the best chance for the future. Furthermore,\nthe maxim that all the phenomena of nature must be explained by means of\nthe simplest factors and according to the smallest possible number of\nlaws, is usually regarded as one of the most legitimate maxims of science\nin general, so that the resolute pertinacity with which many investigators\nmaintain the entire sufficiency of the mechanical interpretation, far from\nbeing condemned as materialistic fanaticism, must be respected as the\nexpression of scientific conscience. Even when confidence in the one-sided\nmechanical interpretation of vital processes sometimes fails in face of\nthe great and striking riddles of life, it is to be expected that it will\nrevive again with each new success, great or small.(58)\n\nThe mechanical conception of life which now prevails is made up of the\nfollowing characteristics and component elements. These also indicate the\nlines along which the arguments are worked out\u2014lines which glimmered\nfaintly through the mechanical theories of ancient times, but which have\nnow been definitely formulated and supported by evidence.\n\n\n\n\nThe Conservation of Matter and Energy.\n\n\n1. The whole mechanical theory is based upon a law which is not strictly\nbiological but belongs to science in general\u2014the law of the conservation\nof matter and energy. This was first recognised by Kant as a general\nrational concept in his \u201cCritique\u201d and in the \u201cGrundlegung der Metaphysik\nder Naturwissenschaft,\u201d and was transferred by Robert Mayer and\nHelmholtz(59) to the domain of natural science. Just as no particle of\nmatter can come from nothing or become nothing, so no quantum of energy\ncan come from nothing or become nothing. It must come from somewhere and\nmust remain somewhere. The form of energy is continually changing, but the\nsum of energy in the universe remains invariable and constant. Therefore,\nit seems to follow, there can be no specific vital phenomena. The energies\nconcerned in the up-building, growth, and decay of the organism, and the\nsum of the functions performed by it, must be the exact resultant and\nequivalent of the potential energies stored in its material substance and\nthe co-operative energies of its environment. The particular course of\ntransformations they follow must have its sufficient reason in the\nconfiguration of the parts of the organism, in its relations to the\nenvironment, and the like. An intervention of \u201cvitalistic\u201d principles,\ndirections and so forth, would, we are told, involve a sudden obtrusion\nand disappearance again of energy-effects which had no efficient cause in\nthe previous phenomena. From any point of view it would be a miracle, and\nin particular it would be doing violence to the law of the constancy of\nthe sum of energy.\n\nApart from the inherent general \u201cinstinct\u201d\u2014_sit venia verbo_, for no more\ndefinite word is available\u2014which is the quiet Socius, the concealed but\npowerful spring of the mechanistic convictions, as of most others, this\nlaw of the conservation of energy is probably the really central argument,\nand it meets us again more or less disguised in what follows.\n\n\n\n\nThe Organic and the Inorganic.\n\n\n2. What is on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds demanded as a necessity, or set aside as\nimpossible, on the strength of the axiom of the conservation of energy,\nmust be proved _\u00e0 posteriori_ by investigation. It must be shown in detail\nthat the difference between the organic and the inorganic is only\napparent. And it is here that the mechanical view of life celebrates its\ngreatest triumph.\n\nFor a long time it seemed as though there were an absolute difference\nbetween \u201cinorganic\u201d and \u201corganic\u201d chemistry, between the chemical\nprocesses and products found in free nature, and those within the \u201cliving\u201d\nbody. The same elements were indeed found in both, but it seemed as if\nthey were subject in the living body to other and higher laws than those\nobserved in inanimate nature. Out of these elements the organism builds\nup, by unexplained processes, peculiar chemical individualities, highly\norganised and complex combinations which are never attained in inorganic\nnature. This seems to afford indubitable evidence of a vital force with\nmysterious super-chemical capacities.\n\nBut modern chemical science has succeeded in doing away with this absolute\ndifference between the two departments of chemistry, for it has achieved,\nin retorts, in the laboratory, and with \u201cnatural\u201d chemical means, what had\nhitherto only been accomplished by \u201corganic\u201d chemistry. Since W\u00f6hler\u2019s\ndiscovery that urea could be built up by artificial combination, more and\nmore of the carbon-compounds which were previously regarded as\nspecialities of the vital force have been produced by artificial\nsyntheses. The highest synthesis, that of proteids, has not yet been\ndiscovered, but perhaps that, too, may yet be achieved.\n\nAnd further: intensive observation through the microscope and in the\nlaboratory increases the knowledge of processes which can be analysed into\nsimple chemical processes, both in the plant and the animal body. These\nare astonishing in their diversity and complexity, but nevertheless they\nfulfil themselves according to known chemical laws, and they can be\nimitated apart from the living substance. The \u201cbreaking up\u201d of the\nmolecules of nutritive material,\u2014that is to say, the preparation of them\nas building material for the body,\u2014does not take place magically and\nautomatically, but is associated with definitely demonstrable chemical\nstuffs, which produce their effect even outside of the organism. The\nfundamental function of living matter\u2014\u201cmetabolism,\u201d\u2014that is, the constant\ndisruption and reconstruction of its own substance, has, it seems, been\nbrought at least nearer to a possible future explanation by the\nrecognition of a series of phenomena of a purely chemical nature, the\ncatalytic phenomena (the effects of ferments or \u201cenzymes\u201d). Ingenious\nhypotheses are already being constructed, if not to explain, at least to\ngive a general formulation of these facts, which will serve as a framework\nand guiding clue, as a \u201cworking hypothesis\u201d for the further progress of\ninvestigation.\n\nThe most recent of these hypotheses is that set forth by Verworn in his\nbook \u201cDie Biogenhypothese.\u201d(60) He assumes, as the central vehicle of the\nvital functions, a unified living substance, the \u201cbiogen,\u201d nearly related\nto the proteids which form the fundamental substance of protoplasm and of\nthe cell-nucleus, and in contrast to which the other substances found in\nthe living body are in part raw materials and reserves, and in part of a\nderivative nature, or the results of disruptive metabolism. Very complex\nchemically, \u201cbiogen\u201d is able to operate upon the circulating or reserve\n\u201cnutritive\u201d materials in a way comparable, for instance, to the action of\n\u201cnitric acid in the production of English sulphuric acid.\u201d That is to say,\nit is able to set up processes of disruption and of recombination,\napparently by its mere presence, but, in reality, by its own continual\nbreaking down and building up again. At the same time it has the power,\nanalogous to that of polymerisation in molecules, of increasing, of\n\u201cgrowing.\u201d\n\nThe case is the same in regard to physical laws. They are identical in the\nliving and the non-living. And many of the processes of life have already\nbeen analysed into a complex of simpler physical processes. The\ncirculation of the blood is subject to the same laws of hydrostatics as\nare illustrated in all other fluids. Mechanical, static, and osmotic\nprocesses occur in the organism and constitute its vital phenomena. The\neye is a _camera obscura_, an optical apparatus; the ear an acoustic\ninstrument; the skeleton an ingenious system of levers, which obey the\nsame laws as all other levers. E. du Bois-Reymond, in his lectures on \u201cThe\nPhysics of Organic Metabolism\u201d (\u201cPhysik des organischen\nStoffwechsels\u201d),(61) compiles a long and detailed list of the physical\nfactors associated and intertwined in the most diverse ways with the\nfundamental phenomenon of life, namely, metabolism:\u2014the capacities and\neffects of solution, diffusion of liquids, capillarity, surface tension,\ncoagulation, transfusion with filtration, the capacities and effects of\ngases, aero-diffusion through porous walls, the absorption of gases\nthrough solid bodies and through fluids, and so on.\n\nVery impressive, too, are the manifold \u201cmechanical\u201d interpretations of\nintimate vital characteristics, such as the infinitely fine structure of\nprotoplasm. For protoplasm does not fill the cell as a compact mass, but\nspreads itself out and builds itself up in the most delicate network or\nmeshwork, of which it forms the threads and walls, enclosing innumerable\nvacuoles and alveoli, and B\u00fctschli succeeded in making a surprisingly good\nimitation of this \u201cstructure\u201d by mechanical means. Drops of oil intimately\nmixed with potash and placed between glass plates formed a very similar\nemulsion-like or foam-like structure with a visible network and with\nenclosed alveoli.(62)\n\nRhumbler, too, succeeded in explaining by \u201cdevelopmental mechanics\u201d some\nof the apparently extremely subtle processes at the beginning of embryonic\ndevelopment (the invagination of the blastula to form the gastrula); by\nimitating the sphere of cells which compose the blastula with elastic\nsteel bands he deduced the invagination mechanically from the model.(63)\n\nHere, too, must be mentioned Verworn\u2019s attempts to explain \u201cthe movements\nof the living substance.\u201d(64) \u201cKinesis,\u201d the power to move, has since the\ntime of Aristotle been regarded as one of the peculiar characteristics of\nlife. From the gliding \u201cam\u0153boid\u201d movements of the moneron, with its\nmysterious power of shifting its position, spreading itself out, and\nspinning out long threads (\u201cpseudopodia\u201d), up to the contractility of the\nmuscle-fibre, the same riddle reappears in many different forms. Verworn\nattacks it at the lowest level, and attempts to solve it by reference to\nthe surface tension to which all fluid bodies are subject, and to the\npartial relaxation of this, which forces the mass to give off radiating\nprocesses or \u201cpseudopodia.\u201d The mechanical causes of the suspension of the\nsurface tension are inquired into, and striking examples of pseudopod-like\nrays are found in the inorganic world, for instance, in a drop of oil.\nThus a starting-point is discovered for mechanical interpretations at a\nhigher level.(65)\n\n\n\n\nIrritability.\n\n\n3. A property which seems to be quite peculiar to living matter is\nirritability, or the power of responding to \u201cstimuli,\u201d that is to say, of\nreacting to some influence from without in such a manner that _the\nreaction_ is not the mere equivalent of the action, but that the stimulus\nis to the organism as a contingent cause or impulse setting up a new\nprocess or a new series of processes, which seem as though they occurred\nspontaneously and freely. Thus the sensitive plant _Mimosa pudica_ droops\nits feathery leaves when touched. Here, too, must be classed also all the\ninnumerable phenomena of Heliotropism, Geotropism, Rheotropism,\nChemotropism, and other tropisms, in which the sun, or the earth, or\ncurrents, or chemical stimuli so affect a form of life\u2014plant, alga, or\nspore\u2014that it disposes its own movements or the arrangements of its parts\naccordingly, turning towards, or away from, or in an oblique direction to\nthe source of stimulus, or otherwise behaving in some definite manner\nwhich could not have been deduced or predicted from the direct effects of\nthe stimulating factors. The upholders of the mechanical theory have\nattempted to conquer this vast and mysterious domain of facts by seeking\nto do away with the appearance of spontaneity and freedom, by\ndemonstrating in suitable cases that these phenomena of spontaneity and\nthe like would be impossible were it not that the potential energies\npreviously stored up within the organism are liberated by the stimulus.\nThus the effect caused is not equivalent to the stimulus alone, but is\nrather the resultant of the conditions given in the chemo-physical\npredispositions of the organism itself, and in the architecture of its\nparts, _plus_ the stimulus.\n\nDirectly associated with this property of irritability is another form of\nspontaneity and freedom in living beings\u2014the power of adapting themselves\nto changed conditions of existence. Some do not show this at all, while\nothers show it in an astonishing degree, helping themselves out by new\ncontrivances, so to speak. Thus the organism may protect itself against\ntemperature and other influences, against injury, making damages good\nagain by self-repairing processes, \u201cregenerating\u201d lost organs, and\nsometimes even building up the whole organism anew from amputated parts.\nThe mechanical interpretation must here proceed in the same way as in\ndealing with the question of stimuli, applying to the development of form\nthe same explanations as are there employed. And just because this domain\ndoes not lend itself readily to mechanical explanation, we can understand\nthat confidence in the sufficiency of this mode of interpretation grows\nrapidly with each fresh conquest, when this or that particular process is\nshown to be actually explicable on mechanical principles. Processes of\ndevelopment or morphogenesis\u2014which are among the most intricate and\ndifficult\u2014are attacked in various ways. The processes of regeneration, for\ninstance, are compared with the similar tendencies observed in crystals,\nwhich when they are injured have the capacity of restoring their normal\nform. This capacity therefore obtains in the realm of the inorganic as\nwell as among organisms, and is referred to the tendency of all substances\nto maintain a definite state of equilibrium, conditioned by their form,\nand, if that is disturbed, to return to a similar or a new state of\nequilibrium. Or, the procedure may be to reduce the processes of a\ndevelopmental or morphogenetic category to processes of stimulation in\ngeneral, and then it is believed, or even demonstrated, that\nchemo-physical analogies or explanations can be found for them.\n\nThus, for instance, it is shown that the egg of the sea-urchin may be\n\u201cstimulated\u201d to development, not exclusively by the fertilising sperm, but\neven by a simple chemical agent, or that spermatozoids which are seeking\nthe ovum to be fertilised may be attracted by malic acid. These are\n\u201creductions\u201d of the higher phenomena of life to the terms of a lower and\nsimpler process of \u201cstimulus,\u201d that is to say, to chemotropism in the\nsecond case and something analogous in the first. A further reduction\nwould be to show that the movement of the spermatozoids towards the malic\nacid is not a \u201cvitalistic\u201d act, much less a psychically conditioned one,\n(that is, conditioned by \u201ctaste,\u201d \u201csensation,\u201d and the voluntary or\ninstinctive impulse liberated thereby), but is a chemo-physical process,\nalthough perhaps an exceedingly complex one. It would be another\n\u201creduction\u201d of this second kind, if, for instance, the well-known effect\nof light on plants, which makes them turn their leaves towards it\n(heliotropism), could be shown to be due to more rapid growth of the leaf\non the shaded side, which would lift up the leaf and cause it to turn, or\nto an increase of turgescence on the shaded side, and if it could be shown\nthat the increase in either case was a simple and obvious physical\nprocess, the necessary consequence of the decreased amount of light.\n\nIt is obvious, and it is also thoroughly justifiable, that all attempts\nalong these lines of interpretation should be undertaken in the first\nplace in connection with the simplest and lowest forms of life. It is in\nthe investigation of the \u201cProtists,\u201d the study of the vital phenomena of\nthe microscopically minute unicellular organisms, that attempts of this\nkind have been most frequently made. And they follow the course we have\njust indicated; the \u201capparently\u201d vitalistic and psychical behaviour of\nunicellulars (impulse, will, spontaneous movement, selecting and\nexperimenting) is interpreted in terms of reflex processes and the\n\u201cirritability\u201d of the cell, and these again are traced back, like all\nstimulus-processes, to the subtle mechanics of the atoms.\n\n\n\n\nSpontaneous Generation.\n\n\n4. This reduction of known biological phenomena to simpler terms, the\nlessening of the gap between inorganic and organic chemistry, and the\nformulation of the doctrine of the conservation of energy, have all\nprepared the way for a fourth step, the establishment of the inevitable\ntheory of _generatio spontanea sive equivoca_, the spontaneous generation\nof the living, that is to say, the gradual evolution of the living from\nthe not living. Since the earth, and with it the conditions under which\nalone life is possible, have had a beginning in time, life upon the earth\nmust also have had a beginning. The assumption that the first living\norganisms may have come to the earth on meteorites simply shifts the\nproblem a step farther back, for according to all current theories of the\nuniverse, if there are in any of the heavenly bodies conditions admitting\nof the presence of life, these conditions have arisen from others in which\nlife was impossible. Therefore, since this suggestion is on the face of it\na mere evasion of the difficulty, the theory of spontaneous generation\nnaturally arose. There is something almost comical in the change in the\nattitude of the natural sciences to this theory. For centuries it was one\nof the beliefs of popular superstition, with its na\u00efve way of regarding\nnature, that earthworms \u201cdeveloped\u201d from damp soil, and vermin from\nshavings, and in general that the living arose from the non-living. On the\nother hand it was one of the characteristics and axioms of scientific\nthought to reject this na\u00efve _generatio equivoca_, and to hold fast to the\nproposition, _omne vivum ex ovo_, or, at least, _omne vivum ex vivo_. And\nit was regarded as one of the triumphs of modern science when, about the\nmiddle of the last century, Pasteur gave definiteness to this doctrine,\nand when through him, through Virchow, and indeed the whole younger\ngeneration of naturalists, the proposition was modified, on the basis of\nthe newly discovered cell-theory, to _omnis cellula ex cellula_. But a\nshort time after Pasteur\u2019s discoveries, the ideas of Darwinism and the\ntheory of evolution gained widespread acceptance. And now it appeared\nthat, in rejecting the theory of _generatio equivoca_, naturalists had, so\nto speak, sawn off the branch on which they desired to sit, and thus many,\nlike Haeckel, became enthusiastic converts to the theory which natural\nscience had previously rejected.\n\nConstructing theories and speculations as to the possibilities of\nspontaneous generation is regarded by some naturalists as somewhat\ngratuitous (_cf._ Du Bois-Reymond). In general, it is regarded as\nsufficient to point out that the reduction of the phenomena of life as we\nknow them to those of a simpler order, and the unification of organic and\ninorganic chemistry, have made the problem of the first origin of life\nessentially simpler, and that the law of the constancy and identity of\nenergy throughout the universe permits no other theory. But others go more\ndeterminedly to work, and attempt to give concrete illustrations of the\nproblem. The most elementary form of life known to us is the cell. From\ncells and their combinations, their products and secretions, all\norganisms, plant and animal alike, are built up. If we succeed in deriving\nthe cell, the derivation of the whole world of life seems, with the help\nof the doctrine of descent, a comparatively simple matter. The cell itself\nseems to stand nearer to the inorganic, and to be less absolutely apart\nfrom the inanimate world than a highly organised body, differentiated as\nto its functions and organs, such as a mammal. It almost seems as if we\nmight regard the lowest forms of life known to us, which seem little more\nthan aggregated homogeneous masses of flowing rather than creeping\nprotoplasm, as an intermediate link between the higher forms of life and\nthe non-living. But the theory does not begin with the cell; it assumes a\nseries of connecting-links (which may of course be as long and as\ncomplicated as the series from the cell upwards to man) between the cell\nand matter which is still quite \u201cinorganic\u201d and which is capable only of\nthe everyday chemical and physical phenomena, and not of the higher\nsyntheses of these, which in their increasing complexity and diversity\nultimately come to represent \u201clife\u201d in its most primitive forms. As\nproteid is the chief constituent of protoplasm, it is regarded as the\nspecific physical basis of life, and life is looked upon as the sum of its\nfunctions. And it is not doubted that, if the conditions of the universe\nbrought about a natural combination of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and\noxygen in certain proportions, so that proteid resulted, the transition to\nproteid which forms itself and renews itself from the surrounding\nelements, to assimilating, growing, dividing proteid, and ultimately to\nthe most primitive plasmic structure, to non-nucleated, nucleated, and\nfinally fully formed cells, could also come about.\n\nHaeckel\u2019s demonstration of the possibility of spontaneous generation is\nalong these lines. He refers to the cytodes, the blood corpuscles, to\nalleged or actual non-nucleated cells, to bacteria, to the simplest forms\nof cell-structure, as proofs of the possibility of a descending series of\nconnecting-links. He (and with him N\u00e4geli) calls these links, below the\nlevel of the cell, Probia or Probions, and for a time he believed that he\nhad discovered in _Bathybius Haeckeli_ presently existing homogeneous\nliving masses, without cell division, nucleus or structure, the \u201cprimitive\nslime\u201d which apparently existed in the abysmal depths of the ocean to this\nday. Unfortunately, this primitive slime soon proved itself an illusion.\n\nOpinions differ as to whether spontaneous generation took place only in\nthe beginning of evolution, or whether it occurred repeatedly and is still\ngoing on. Most naturalists incline to the former idea; N\u00e4geli champions\nthe latter. There are also differences of opinion as to whether the origin\nof life from the non-living was manifold, and took place at many different\nplaces on the earth, or whether all the forms of life now in existence\nhave arisen from a common source (monophyletic and polyphyletic theories).\n\n\n\n\nThe Mechanics of Development.\n\n\n5. The minds of the supporters of the mechanical theory had still to move\nalong a fifth line in order to solve the riddle of the development of the\nliving individual from the egg, or of the germ to its finished form, the\nriddle of morphogenesis. They cannot assume the existence of \u201cthe whole\u201d\nbefore the part, or equip it with the idea of the thing as a _spiritus\nrector_, playing the part of a metaphysical controlling agency. Here as\nelsewhere they must demonstrate the existence of purely mechanical\nprinciples. It is simply from the potential energies inherent in its\nconstituent parts that the supply of energy must flow, by means of which\nthe germ is able to make use of inorganic material from without, to\nassimilate it and increase its own substance, and, by using it up, to\nmaintain and increase its power of work, to break up the carbonic acid of\nthe atmosphere and to gain the carbon which is so important for its vital\nfunctions, to institute and organise the innumerable chemico-physical\nprocesses by means of which its form is built up. Purely as a consequence\nof the chemico-physical nature of the germ, of the properties of the\nsubstances included in it on the one hand, and of the implicit structure\nand configuration of its parts, down to the intrinsic specific undulatory\nrhythm of its molecules, it must follow that its mass grows exactly as it\ndoes, and not otherwise, that it behaves as it does and not otherwise,\nduplicating itself by division after division, and by intricate changes\narranging and rearranging the results of division until the embryo or\nlarva, and finally the complete organism, is formed.\n\nAn extraordinary amount of ingenuity has been expended in this connection,\nin order to avoid here, where perhaps it is most difficult of all, the use\nof \u201cteleological\u201d principles, and to remain faithful to the orthodox,\nexclusively mechanical mode of interpretation. To this category belong\nDarwin\u2019s gemmules, Haeckel\u2019s plastidules, N\u00e4geli\u2019s micell\u00e6, Weismann\u2019s\nlabyrinth of ids, determinants, and biophors within the germ-plasm, and\nRoux\u2019s ingenious hypothesis of the struggle of parts, which is an attempt\nto apply the Darwinian principle within the organism in order here also to\nrebut the teleological interpretation by giving a scientific one.(66)\n\n\n\n\nHeredity.\n\n\n6. With this fifth line of thought a sixth is associated and intertwined.\nThe problem of development is closely bound up with that of \u201cheredity.\u201d A\ndeveloping organism follows the parental type. The acorn in its growth\nfollows the type of the parent oak, repeating all its morphological and\nphysiological characters down to the most intimate detail. And the animal\norganism adds to this also the whole psychical equipment, the instincts,\nthe capacities of will and consciousness which distinguish its parents.\nThe problems of the fifth and sixth order are closely inter-related, the\nsixth problem being in reality the same as the fifth, only in greater\ncomplexity.\n\nA step towards the mechanical solution of this problem was indicated in\nthe \u201cpreformation theory\u201d advanced by Leibnitz, and elaborated by Bonnet.\nAccording to this theory the developing organism is enclosed in the\nminutest possible form within the egg, and is thus included in the\nparental organism, in miniature indeed, but quite complete. Thus the\nproblem of the \u201cdevelopment of form\u201d or of \u201cheredity\u201d was, so to speak,\nruled out of court; all that was assumed was continuous growth and\nself-unfolding.\n\nOpposed to this theory was one of later growth, the theory of epigenesis,\nwhich maintained that the organism developed without preformation from the\nstill undifferentiated and homogeneous substance of the egg. The\nsupporters of the first theory considered themselves much more scientific\nand exact than those of the second. And not without reason. For the theory\nof epigenesis obviously required mysterious formative principles, and\nequally mysterious powers of recollection and recapitulation, which\nimpelled the undifferentiated ovum substance into the final form,\nprecisely like that of its ancestors. Nor need the preformationists have\ngreatly feared the reproach, that the parental organism must have been\nincluded within the grand-parental, and so on backwards to the first\nparents in Paradise. For this \u201cChinese box\u201d encapsulement theory only\nrequires that we should grant the idea of the infinitely little, and that\nidea is already an integral part of our thinking.\n\nModern biologists ridicule the preformation hypothesis as altogether too\nartificial. And undoubtedly it founders on the facts of embryology, which\ndisclose nothing to suggest the unfolding of a pre-existent miniature\nmodel, but show us how the egg-cell divides into two, into four, and so\non, with continued multiplication followed by varied arrangements and\nrearrangements of cells\u2014in short, all the complex changes which constitute\ndevelopment. But a preformation in some sense or other there must be;\u2014some\npeculiar material predisposition of the germ, which, as such, supplies the\ndirecting principle for the development, and the sufficient reason for the\nrepetition of the parental form. This is of such obvious importance from\nthe mechanical point of view that the speculations of to-day tend to move\nalong the old preformationist lines. To these modern preformationists are\nopposed the modern upholders of epigenesis or gradual differentiation, who\nattempt to elaborate a mechanical theory of development. And with the\ncontrast between these two schools there is necessarily associated the\ndiscussion as to the inheritance or non-inheritance of acquired\ncharacters.\n\nDarwin\u2019s contribution to the problem of the sixth order was his rather\nvague theory of \u201cPangenesis.\u201d The living organism, according to him, forms\nin its various organs, parts, and cells exceedingly minute particles of\nliving matter (gemmules), which, \u201cin some way or other,\u201d bear within them\nthe special characteristics of the part in which they are produced. These\nmay wander through the organism and meet in the germ-plasm, and then, when\na child-organism is produced, they \u201cswarm,\u201d so to speak, in it again \u201cin\nsome way or other,\u201d and in some fashion control the development. This\ngemmule-theory was too obviously a _quid pro quo_ to hold its ground for\nlong. Various theories were elaborated, and the world of the invisibly\nminute was flooded with speculations.\n\nThe most subtle of these, on the side of consistent Darwinism, is that of\nWeismann, a pronounced preformation theory which has been increasingly\nrefined and elaborated in the course of years of reflection. According to\nWeismann, the individual parts and characteristics of the organism are\nrepresented in the germ-plasm, not in finished form, but as \u201cdeterminants\u201d\nin a definite system which is itself the directing principle in the\nbuilding up of the bodily system, and with definite characteristics, which\ndetermine the peculiarities of the individual organs and parts, down to\nscales, hairs, skin-spots, and birth-marks. As the germ-cells have the\npower of growth, and can increase endlessly by dividing and re-dividing,\nand as each process of division takes place in such a way that each half\n(each product of division) maintains the previous system, there arise\ninnumerable germ-cells corresponding to one another, from which,\ntherefore, corresponding bodies must arise (inheritance). It is not in\nreality the newly developed bodies which give rise to new germ-cells and\ntransfer to them something of their own characters; the germ-cells of the\nchild-organism develop from that of the parent (\u201cimmortality\u201d of the\ngerm-cells). Therefore there can be no inheritance of acquired characters,\nand no modifications of type through external causes; and all variations\nwhich appear in a series of generations are due solely to internal\nvariations in the germ-cells, whether brought about by the complication of\ntheir system through the fusion of the male and female germ-cells, or\nthrough differences in the growth of the individual determinants\nthemselves. The numerous subsidiary theses interwoven in Weismann\u2019s theory\nare entirely coherent, and have been thought out to their conclusions with\npraiseworthy determination.(67) To the theory as a whole, because of its\nfundamental conception of preformation, and to its subsidiary hypotheses,\npiece by piece, there has been energetic opposition on the part of the\nupholders of the modern mechanical theory of epigenesis. This opposition\nis most concretely and comprehensively expressed in Haacke\u2019s \u201cGestaltung\nund Vererbung.\u201d The infinitely complex intricacy of Weismann\u2019s minute\nmicrocosm within the germ-cell, indeed within every id in it, is justly\ndescribed as a mere duplication, a repetition in the infinitely little of\nthe essential difficulties to be explained. The complicated processes of\ndeveloping in the growing and inheriting organism cannot be explained,\nthey say, in terms of processes of the equally complex and likewise\ndeveloping germ-plasm. The complex, if it is to be explained at all, must\nbe explained by the simple\u2014in this case by the functions of a homogeneous\nuniform plasm.\n\nAt an earlier date Haeckel had made an attempt in this direction in his\ntheory of the \u201cperigenesis of the plastidules.\u201d Peculiar states of\noscillation and rhythm in the molecules of the germ-substance, handed on\nto it from the parent organism and transferable to all the assimilated\nmatter of the offspring, represent, according to this theory, the\nprinciple which impels development to follow a particular course\ncorresponding to the type of the parents. This was a _physical_ way of\ninterpreting the matter. Other investigators have given a _chemical_\nexpression to their theoretical schemes for explaining heredity.\n\nHaacke declares both these to be unsatisfactory, and replaces them by\nmorphological formative principles. It is the _structure_ of the otherwise\nhomogeneous living matter that explains morphogenesis and inheritance.\nMinute \u201cgemm\u00e6,\u201d homogeneous fundamental particles of living substance, not\nto be compared to or confused with Darwin\u2019s \u201cgemmules,\u201d are aggregated in\n\u201cGemmaria,\u201d whose configuration, stability, symmetrical or asymmetrical\nstructure, and so on, are determined by the relative positions of the\ngemm\u00e6 to each other, and these in their turn control the organism and give\nit a corresponding symmetrical or asymmetrical, a firmly or loosely\naggregated structure. The completed organism then forms a system in\norganic equilibrium, which is constantly exposed to variations and\ninfluences due to external causes (St. Hilaire), and to use and disuse of\norgans (Lamarck). These influences affect the structure of the gemmaria,\nand as the germ-cells consist of gemmaria, like those of the rest of the\norganism, the possibility of the transmission of acquired new characters\nis self-evident. The importance of correlated growth and orthogenesis is\nexplained on a similar basis, and the Darwinian conceptions of the\nindependent variation of individual parts, of the exclusive dominance of\nutility, of the influence of the struggle for existence in regard to\nindividual selection, and of the omnipotence of natural selection, are\nenergetically denied.\n\nOscar Hertwig,(68) de Vries, Driesch(69) and others attempt to reconcile\nthe preformationist and the epigenetic standpoints, and \u201cto extract what\nis good and usable out of both.\u201d Hertwig and Driesch, however, can only be\nmentioned with reservations in this connection.\n\nWe cannot better sum up the whole tendency of the construction of\nmechanical theories on these last lines than in the words of Schwann:\n\u201cThere is within the organism no fundamental force working according to a\ndefinite idea; it arises in obedience to the blind laws of necessity.\u201d\n\nSo much for the different lines followed by the mechanical theories of\nto-day. An idea of their general tenor can be gained from a series of much\nquoted general treatises, of which we must mention at least the\n\u201cclassics.\u201d In Wagner\u2019s \u201cHandw\u00f6rterbuch der Physiologie,\u201d 1842, Vol. I.,\nLotze wrote a long introductory article to the whole work, on \u201cLife and\nVital Force.\u201d It was the challenge of the newer views to the previously\nvitalistic standpoint, and at the same time it was based on Lotze\u2019s\ngeneral principles and interspersed with philosophical criticism of the\nconcepts of force, cause, effect, law, &c.(70) A similar train of ideas to\nLotze\u2019s is followed to-day by O. Hertwig, especially in his \u201cMechanismus\nund Biologie.\u201d(71) Lighter and more elegant was the polemic against vital\nforce, and the outline of a mechanical theory which Du Bois-Reymond\nprefaced to his great work, \u201cUntersuchungen \u00fcber die tierische\nElectricit\u00e4t\u201d (1849). It did not go nearly so deep as Lotze\u2019s essay, but\nperhaps for that very reason its phrases and epigrams soon became common\nproperty. We may recall how he speaks of vital force as a \u201cgeneral servant\nfor everybody,\u201d of the iron atom which remains the same whether it be in\nthe meteorite in cosmic space, in the wheel of the railway carriage, or in\nthe blood of the thinker, and of analytic mechanics which may be applied\neven to the problem of personal freedom.\n\nThe most comprehensive and detailed elaboration of the mechanical theory\nof life is to be found in Herbert Spencer\u2019s \u201cPrinciples of Biology.\u201d(72)\nFriedrich Albert Lange\u2019s \u201cHistory of Materialism\u201d is a brilliant plea for\nmechanical theories,(73) which he afterwards surpassed and neutralised by\nhis Kantian Criticism. Verworn, too, in his \u201cPhysiology\u201d(74) gives a clear\nexample of the way in which the mechanical theory in its most consistent\nform is sublimed, apparently in the idealism of Kant and Fichte, but in\nreality in its opposite\u2014the Berkeleyan psychology. A similar outcome is in\nvarious ways indicated in the modern trend of things.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. CRITICISM OF MECHANICAL THEORIES.\n\n\nIn attempting to define our attitude to the mechanical theory of life, we\nhave first of all to make sure that we have a right to take up a definite\nposition at all. We should have less right, or perhaps none, if this\ntheory of life were really of a purely \u201cbiological\u201d nature, built up\nentirely from the expert knowledge and data which the biologist alone\npossesses. But the principles, assumptions, supplementary ideas and modes\nof expression along all the six lines we have discussed, the style and\nmethod according to which the hypothesis is constructed, the multitude of\nseparate presuppositions with which it works, and indeed everything that\nhelps to build up and knit the biological details into a scientific\nhypothesis, are the materials of rational synthesis in general, and as\nsuch are subject to general as well as to biological criticism. What is\nthere, for instance, in Weismann\u2019s ingenious biophor-theory that can be\ncalled specifically biological, and not borrowed from other parts of the\nscientific system?\n\nOne advantage, indeed, the biologist always has in this matter, apart from\nhis special knowledge; that is, the technical instinct, the power of\nscenting out, so to speak, and immediately feeling the importance of the\nfacts pertaining to his own discipline. It is this that gives every\nspecialist the advantage over the layman in dealing with the data of his\nown subject. This power of instinctively appraising facts, which develops\nin the course of all special work, can, for instance in hypotheses in the\ndomain of history, transform small details, which to the layman seem\ntrivial, into weighty arguments. Similarly it may be that the success of\nthe mechanical interpretation in regard to isolated processes may make its\nvalidity for many other allied processes certain, even though there is no\nprecise proof of this. But we cannot regard this as a final demonstration\nof the applicability of the mechanical theory, since the same technical\ninstinct in other experts leads them to reject the whole hypothesis.\n\nBut here we are met with something surprising. May it not be that while we\nare impelled on general grounds to contend against the mechanical\ninterpretation of vital phenomena, we are not so impelled on _religious_\ngrounds? May it not be that the instinct of the religious consciousness is\nmisleading when it impels us\u2014as probably every one will be able to certify\nfrom his own experience\u2014to rebel against this mechanisation of life, the\nmechanical solution of its mysteries? Lotze, the energetic antagonist of\n\u201cvital force,\u201d the founder of the mechanical theory of vital processes,\nwas himself a theist, and was so far from recognising any contradiction\nbetween the mechanical point of view and the Christian belief in God, that\nhe included the former without ceremony in his theistic philosophical\nspeculations. His view has become that of many theologians, and is often\nexpressed in a definition of the boundaries between theology and natural\nscience. According to the idea which was formulated by Lotze, and\ndeveloped by others along his lines, the matter is quite simple. The\ninterest which religion has in the processes of nature is at once and\nexclusively to be found in teleology. Are there purposes, plans, and ideas\nwhich govern and give meaning to the whole? The interest of natural\nscience is purely in recognising inviolable causality; every phenomenon\nmust have its compelling and sufficient reason in the system of causes\npreceding it. All that is and happens is absolutely determined by its\ncauses, and nothing, no _caus\u00e6 finales_ for instance, can co-operate with\nthese causes in determining the result. But, as Lotze says, and as we have\nrepeatedly pointed out, causal explanation does not exclude a\nconsideration from the point of view of purpose, and the mechanical\ninterpretation does not do so either. For this is nothing more than the\ncausal explanation itself, only carried to complete consistency and\ndefiniteness. Purposes and ideas are not efficient causes but results.\nWhere, for instance, there is a controlled purposive occurrence, the\n\u201cpurpose\u201d nowhere appears as a factor co-operating with the series of\ncauses, for these follow according to strict law, and the \u201cpurpose\u201d\nreveals itself at the close of the series, as the result of a closed\ncausal nexus, complete in itself, always provided that the initial links\nin the chain have been accurately estimated. The same is true of the\nprocesses of life. They are the ultimate result, strictly necessary and\nsufficiently accounted for in terms of mechanical sequence, of a long\nchain of causes whose initial links imply a definite constitution which\ncould not be further reduced. Whether this ultimate result is merely a\nresult or whether it is also a \u201cpurpose\u201d is a question which, as we have\nseen twice already, it is wholly beyond the power of the causal mode of\ninterpretation to answer. Given that an infinite intelligence in the world\nwished to realise purposes without instituting them as directly\naccomplished, but by letting them express themselves through a gradual\n\u201cbecoming,\u201d the method would be exactly what is shown in the mechanical\ntheory of life, that is, the primitive data and starting-points would have\ninherent in them a peculiar constitution and a rigidly inexorable\norderliness of causal sequence. And Lotze emphasises that it would also be\nworthier of God to achieve the greatest by means of the simplest, and to\nwork out the realisation of His eternal purposes according to the strict\ninevitableness of mechanism, than to attain His ends through the\ncomplicated means, the adventitious aids, and all the irregularities\nimplied in the incommensurable activities of a \u201cvital force.\u201d (\u201cGod needs\nno minor gods.\u201d)\n\nTo Lotze himself these original data and starting points are the primitive\nforms of life, which, according to his view, are directly \u201cgiven,\u201d and\ncannot be referred back to anything else (except to \u201ccreation\u201d). But it is\nobvious that his view can be enlarged and extended so as to refer the\nderivation of the whole animate world to the original raw materials of the\ncosmos (energy, matter, or whatsoever they may be), and to the orderly\nprocess by which these materials were combined in various configurations\nto form the chemical elements, the chemical compounds, living proteids,\nthe first cell, and the whole series of higher forms. If this nexus has\ntaken place, it is nothing else than the transformation of the \u201cpotential\u201d\ninto the \u201cactual\u201d through strict causality. And if this actuality proves\nitself to have claims, because of its own intrinsic worth, to be\nconsidered as intelligent \u201cpurpose,\u201d the whole system of means, including\nthe starting-point, can be recognised as the means to an end, and the\noriginal wisdom and the intelligence which ordained the purpose is only\nglorified the more through the great simplicity, the rational\ncomprehensibility, and the inexorable necessity of the system, which\nexcludes all chance, and therewith all possibility of error.\n\nThis extension of Lotze\u2019s reconciliation of the mechanical causal with the\nteleological point of view is impressive and, as far as it goes, also\nquite convincing. It will never be given up, even if the point of view\nshould change somewhat. And we have already seen that it is quite\nsufficient as long as we are dealing only with the question of teleology.\nBut we must ask whether religion will be satisfied with \u201cteleology\u201d alone,\nor whether this is even the first requirement that it makes in regard to\nnatural phenomena. We have already asked the question and attempted to\nclear the ground for an answer. Let us try to make it more definite.\n\nMany people will have a certain uneasiness in regard to the Lotzian ideas;\nthey will be unable to rid themselves of a feeling that this way of\nlooking at things is only a _pis aller_ for the religious point of view,\nand that the fundamental requirements of religious feeling receive very\ninadequate satisfaction on this method. The world of life which has arisen\nthus is altogether too rational and transparent. It is calculable and\nmathematical. It satisfies well enough the need for teleology, and with\nthat the need for a supreme, universally powerful and free intelligence;\nbut it gives neither support nor nourishment to the essential element in\nreligious feeling, through which alone faith becomes in the strict sense\nreligious. Religion, even Christian religion, is, so to speak, a\nstratified structure, a graduated pyramid, expressing itself, at its\nsecond (and undoubtedly higher) level, in our recognition of purpose, the\nrationality of the world, our own spiritual and personal being and worth,\nbut implying at its basis an inward sense of the mysterious, a joy in that\nwhich is incommensurable and unspeakable, which fills us with awe and\ndevotion. And religion at the second stage must not sweep away the essence\nof the stage below, but must include it, at the same time informing it\nwith new significance. Whoever does not possess his religion in this way\nwill agree with, and will be quite satisfied with the Lotzian standpoint.\nBut to any one who has experience of the most characteristic element in\nreligion, it will be obvious that there must be a vague but deep-rooted\nantipathy between religion and the mathematical-mechanical conception of\nthings. Evidence of the truth of this is to be found in the instinctive\nperceptions and valuations which mark even the na\u00efve expressions of the\nreligious consciousness.(75) For it is in full sympathy with a world which\nis riddled with what is inconceivable and incommensurable, in full\nsympathy with every evidence of the existence of such an element in the\nworld of nature and mind, and therefore with every proof that the merely\nmechanical theory has its limits, that it does not suffice, and that its\nvery insufficiency is a proof that the world is and remains in its depths\nmysterious. Now we have already said that the true sphere for such feeling\nis not the outer court of nature, but within the realm of the emotional\nlife and of history, and, on the other hand, that even if the attempt to\ntrace life back to the simpler forces of nature were successful, we should\nstill be confronted with the riddle of the sphinx. But any one who would\nsay frankly what he felt would at once be obliged to admit that the\nreligious sense is very strongly stirred by the mystery of vital\nphenomena, and that in losing this he would lose a domain very dear to\nhim. These sympathies and antipathies are in themselves sufficient to give\nan interest to the question of the insufficiency of the mechanical view of\nthings.\n\nFor it is by no means the case that the mechanical theory, with its\npremisses and principles, is the interpretation that best fits the facts,\nand that most naturally arises out of a calm consideration of the animate\nworld. It is an artificial scheme, and astonishing energy has been\nexpended on the attempt to fit it to the actual world, that it may make\nthis orderly and translucent. It certainly yields this service so far, but\nnot without often becoming a kind of strait-jacket, and revealing itself\nas an artificiality. In so far as the special problems of biology are\nconcerned, we shall afterwards follow our previous method of taking our\norientation from those specialists in the subject who, in reaction from\nthe one-sidedness of the mechanical doctrine, have founded the\n\u201cneo-vitalism\u201d of to-day. Here we are only concerned with the generalities\nand presuppositions of the theory.\n\nWe must dispute even the main justification of the theory, which is sought\nfor in the old maxim of parsimony in the use of principles of explanation\n(_entia_, and also _principia, pr\u00e6ter necessitatem non esse\nmultiplicanda_), and in Kant\u2019s \u201cregulative principle,\u201d that science must\nproceed as if everything could ultimately be explained in terms of\nmechanism. For surely our task is to try to explain things, not at any\ncost with the fewest possible principles, but rather with the aid of those\nprinciples which appear most correct. If nature is not fundamentally\nsimple, then it is not scientific but unscientific to simplify it\ntheoretically. And the proposition bracketed above has its obvious\nconverse side, that while entities and principles must not be multiplied\nexcept when it is necessary, on the other hand their number must not be\narbitrarily lessened. To proceed according to the fundamental maxims of\nthe mechanistic view can only be wholesome for a time and, so to speak,\nfor p\u00e6dagogical reasons. To apply them seriously and permanently would be\nhighly injurious, for, by prejudging what is discoverable in nature, it\nwould tend to prevent the calm, objective study of things which asks for\nnothing more than to see them as they are. It would thus destroy the\nfineness of our appreciation of what there really is in nature. This is\ntrue alike of forcible attempts to reduce the processes of life to\nmechanical processes, and of the Darwinian doctrine of the universal\ndominance of utility. Both bear unmistakably the stamp of foregone\nconclusions, and betray a desire for the simplest, rather than for the\nmost correct principles of interpretation.\n\nThere is one point which presses itself on the notice even of outsiders,\nand is probably realised even more keenly by specialists. The confidence\nof the supporters of the mechanical theories of earlier days, from\nDescartes onward, that animals and the bodies of men were machines,\nmechanical automata, down to the mechanical theories of Lamettrie and\nHolbach, of _l\u2019homme machine_, and of the _syst\u00e8me de la nature_, was at\nleast as great as, probably greater than, that of the supporters of the\nmodern theories. Yet how na\u00efve and presumptuous seem the crude and wooden\ntheories upon which the mechanical system was formerly built up, and how\nfalsely interpreted seem the physiological and other facts which lent them\nsupport, when seen in the light of our modern physiological knowledge.\nVaucanson\u2019s or Drozsch\u2019s duck-automaton or clockwork-man, with which the\nmechanical theorists of bygone days amused themselves, would not go far to\nencourage the physiologist of to-day to pursue his mechanical studies, but\nwould rather throw a vivid light on the impossibility of comparing the\nliving \u201cmachine\u201d with machines in the usual sense. For things emphatically\ndo not happen within the living organism in the same way as in the\nautomatic duck, and the more exact the resemblance to the functions of a\n\u201creal\u201d duck became, the more did the system of means by which the end was\nattained become unlike vital processes. It is difficult to resist the\nimpression that in another hundred years,\u2014perhaps again from the\nstandpoint of new and definitely accepted mechanical explanations,\u2014people\nwill regard our developmental mechanics, cellular mechanics, and other\nvital mechanics much in the same way as we now look on Vaucanson\u2019s duck.\n\nAssociated or even identical with this is the fact that in proportion as\nmechanical interpretation advances, the difficulties it has to surmount\ncontinually crop up anew. Processes which seem of the simplest kind and\nthe most likely to be capable of purely mechanical explanation, processes\nsuch as those of assimilation, digestion, respiration, for which it was\nbelieved that exact parallels existed in the purely mechanical domain, as,\nfor instance, in the osmotic processes of porous membranes, are seen when\nclosely scrutinised as they occur in the living body to be extremely\ncomplex; in fact they have to be transferred \u201cprovisionally\u201d from the\nmechanical to the vital rubric. To this category belong the whole modern\ndevelopment of the cell-theory, which replaces the previously _single_\nmechanism in the living body by millions of them, every one of which\nraises as many problems as the one had done in the days of cruder\ninterpretation. Every individual cell, as it appears to our understanding\nto-day, is at least as complicated a riddle as the whole organism formerly\nappeared.\n\nBut further: the modern development of biology has emphasised a special\nproblem, which was first formulated by Leibnitz (though it is in\nantithesis to his fundamental Monad-theory), and which appears incapable\nof solution on mechanical lines. Leibnitz declared living beings to be\n\u201cmachines,\u201d but machines of a peculiar kind. Even the most complicated\nmachine, in the ordinary sense, consists of a combination of smaller\n\u201cmachines,\u201d that is to say, of wheels, systems of levers, &c., of a\nsimpler kind. And these sub-machines may in their turn consist of still\nsimpler ones, and so on. But ultimately a stage is reached when the\ncomponent parts are homogeneous, and cannot be analysed into simpler\nmachines. It is otherwise with the organism. According to Leibnitz it\nconsists of machines made up of other machines, and so on, into the\ninfinitely little. However far we can proceed in our analysis of the\nparts, we shall still find that they are syntheses, made up of most\ningeniously complex component parts, and this as far as our powers of\nseeing and distinguishing will carry us. That is to say: organisation is\ncontinued on into the infinitely little.\n\nLeibnitz\u2019s illustration of the fish-pond is well known. He could have no\nbetter corroboration of his theory than the results of modern\ninvestigation afford. His doctrine of the continuation of organisation\ndownwards into ever smaller expression is confirmed to a certain extent\neven by anatomy. By analysing structural organisation down to cells a\ndefinite point seemed to have been reached. But it now appears that at\nthat point the problem is only beginning. One organisation is made up of\nother organisations\u2014cells, protoplasm, nucleus, nucleolus, centrosomes,\nand so on, according to the power of the microscope; and these structures,\ninstead of explaining the vital functions of growth, development,\nmultiplication by division, and the rest, simply repeat them on a smaller\nscale, and are thus in their turn living units, the aggregation of which\nis illustrated better by the analogy of a social organism than by that of\na mechanical structure.\n\nIn order to follow the mechanical explanation along the six lines we have\npreviously indicated, we shall, as we have already said, entrust ourselves\nto the specialists who are on the opposite side. The difficulties and\nobjections which the mechanical theory has to face have forced themselves\ninsistently upon us even in the course of a short sketch such as has just\nbeen given, but they will be clearly realised if we approach them from the\nother side. But, first of all, a word as to the fundamental and, it is\nalleged, unassailable doctrine on which the theory as a whole is based,\nthe \u201claw of the conservation of energy.\u201d The appeal to this, at any rate\nin the way in which it is usually made, is apt to be so distorted that the\ncase must first be clearly stated before we can get further with the\ndiscussion.\n\n\n\n\nThe Law of the Conservation of Energy.\n\n\nHelmholtz\u2019s proof established mathematically what Kant had already, by\ndirect insight, advanced as an _\u00e0 priori_ fundamental axiom: that in any\ngiven system the sum of energy can neither increase (impossibility of a\n_perpetuum mobile_) nor diminish (there is no disappearance of energy, but\nonly transformation into another form). But even the vitalist had no need\nto deny this proposition. The \u201cenergy\u201d which is required for the work of\ndirecting, setting agoing, changing and rearranging the chemico-physical\nprocesses in the body, and bringing about the effective reactions to\nstimuli which result in \u201cdevelopment,\u201d \u201ctransmission,\u201d \u201cregeneration,\u201d and\nso on\u2014if indeed any energy is required\u2014of course could not come \u201cfrom\nwithin\u201d as a spontaneous increase of the existing sum of energy\u2014that\nwould, indeed, be a magical becoming out of nothing!\u2014but must naturally be\nthought of as coming \u201cfrom without.\u201d The appeal to the law of the\nconservation of energy is therefore in itself irrelevant; but it conceals\nbehind it an assertion of a totally different kind, namely, that in\nrelation to physico-chemical sequences there can be no \u201cwithout,\u201d nothing\ntranscending them\u2014an assertion which Helmholtz\u2019s arguments cannot and were\nnever intended to establish. But before any definite attitude to this\nnewly imported assertion could be taken up, it would require to be\ndistinctly defined, and that would lead us at once into all the depths of\nepistemological discussion. Here, therefore, we can only say so much: If\nthis assertion is accepted it is well to see where it carries us; namely,\nback to the first-described na\u00efve standpoint, which, without critical\nscruples, quite seriously accepts the world as it appears to it for the\nreality, and quite seriously speaks of an infinity lying in time behind\nus\u2014and therefore come to an end\u2014and is not in the least disturbed from its\n\u201cdogmatic slumber\u201d by this or any of the other great antinomies of our\nconception of the universe. And it remains, too, for this standpoint to\ncome to terms with the fact that, in voluntary actions, of which we have\nthe most direct knowledge, we have through our will the power of\nintervention in the physico-chemical nexus of our bodily energies\u2014a fact\nwhich implies the existence of a \u201cwithout,\u201d from which interpolations or\ninfluences may flow into the physico-chemical system, even if there be\nnone in regard to the domain of \u201cvital\u201d phenomena. And we should require\nto find out through what parallelistic or abruptly idealistic system the\n\u201cwithout\u201d was done away with in this case. For if a transcendental basis,\nor reverse side, or cause of things, be admitted\u2014even if only in the form\nof our materialistic popular metaphysics (the \u201csubstance\u201d of Haeckel\u2019s\n\u201cworld-riddle\u201d)\u2014then a \u201cwithout,\u201d from which primarily the cosmic system\nwith its constant sum of matter and energy is explained, is also admitted,\nand it is difficult to see why it should have exhausted itself in this\nsingle effort.\n\n\n\n\nCriticisms of the Mechanistic Theory of Life.\n\n\nThe course of the mechanistic theory of life has been surprisingly similar\nto that of its complement, the theory of the general evolution of the\norganic world. The two great doctrines of the schools, Darwinism on the\none hand, the mechanical interpretation of life on the other, are both\ntottering, not because of the criticism of outsiders, but of specialists\nwithin the schools themselves. And the interest which religion has in this\nis the same in both cases: the transcendental nature of things, the\nmysterious depth of appearance, which these theories denied or obscured,\nbecome again apparent. The incommensurableness and mystery of the world,\nwhich are, perhaps, even more necessary to the very life of religion than\nthe right to regard it teleologically, reassert themselves afresh in the\nall-too-comprehensible and mathematically-formulated world, and\nre-establish themselves, notwithstanding obstinate and persistent attempts\nto do away with them. This is perhaps to the advantage of both natural\nscience and religion: to the advantage of religion because it can with\ndifficulty co-exist with the universal dominance of the mathematical way\nof looking at things; to the advantage of natural science because, in\ngiving up the one-sidedness of the purely quantitative outlook, it does\nnot give up its \u201cfoundations,\u201d its \u201cright to exist,\u201d but only a _petitio\nprincipii_ and a prejudice that compelled it to exploit nature rather than\nto explain it, and to prescribe its ways rather than to seek them out.\n\nThe reaction from the one-sided mechanical theories shows itself in many\ndifferent ways and degrees. It may, according to the individual\nnaturalist, affect the theory as a whole, or only certain parts of it, or\nonly particular lines. It starts with mere criticism and with objections,\nwhich go no further than saying that \u201cin the meantime\u201d we are still far\nfrom having reached a physico-chemical solution of the riddle of life; it\nmay ascend through all stages up to an absolute rejection of the theory as\nan idiosyncrasy of the time which impedes the progress of investigation,\nand as an uncritical prejudice of the schools. It may remain at the level\nof mere protest, and content itself with demonstrating the insufficiency\nof the mechanical explanation, without attempting to formulate any\nindependent theory for the domain of the vital; or it may construct a\nspecifically biological theory, claiming independence amid other\ndisciplines, and basing this claim on the autonomy of vital processes; or\nit may widen out deliberately into metaphysical study and speculation.\nTaken at all these levels it presents such a complete section of the trend\nof modern ideas and problems that it would be an attractive study even\napart from the special interest which attaches to it from the point of\nview of religious and idealistic conceptions of the universe.\n\nBoth Liebig and Johannes M\u00fcller remained vitalists, notwithstanding the\ndiscovery of the synthesis of urea and the increasing number of organic\ncompounds which were built up artificially by purely chemical methods. It\nwas only about the middle of the last century that the younger generation,\nunder the leadership, in Germany, of Du Bois-Reymond in particular, went\nover decidedly to the mechanistic side, and carried the doctrines of the\nschool to ever fresh victories. But opposition was not lacking from the\noutset, though it was restrained and cautious.\n\n\n\n\nVirchow\u2019s \u201cCaution\u201d.\n\n\nHere, as also in regard to \u201cDarwinism,\u201d which was advanced about the same\ntime, the typical advocate of \u201ccaution\u201d was Rudolf Virchow. His doubts and\nreservations found utterance very soon after the theory itself had been\npromulgated. In his \u201cCellular Pathologie,\u201d(76) and in an essay on \u201cThe Old\nVitalism and the New,\u201d(77) he puts in a word for a _vis vitalis_. The old\nvitalism, he declared, had been false because it assumed, not a _vis_, but\na _spiritus vitalis_. The substances in animate and in inanimate bodies\nhave undoubtedly absolutely the same properties. Nevertheless, \u201cwe must at\nonce rid ourselves of the scientific prudery of regarding the processes of\nlife solely as the mechanical result of the molecular forces inherent in\ntheir constituent bodily parts.\u201d The essential feature of life is a\nderived and communicated force _additional_ to the molecular forces.\nWhence it comes we are not told. He glided all round the problem with\nplatitudinarian expressions, which were intended to show his own adherence\nas a matter of course to the new biological school, and which revealed at\nthe same time his striking incapacity for defining a problem with any\nprecision. At a \u201ccertain period in the evolution of the earth\u201d this force\narose, as the ordinary mechanical movements \u201cswung over\u201d into the vital.\nBut it is thus a special form of movement, which detaches itself from the\ngreat constants of general movement, and runs its course alongside of, and\nin constant relation to, these. (Did ever vitalist assert more?) After\nthus preparing the way for a return of the veering process at a particular\nstage of evolution, and giving the necessary assurances against the\n\u201cdiametrically opposed dualistic position,\u201d Virchow employs almost all the\narguments against the mechanical theory which vitalists have ever brought\nforward. Even the catalytic properties of ferments are above the\n\u201cordinary\u201d physical and chemical forces. The movement of crystallisation,\ntoo, cannot be compared with the vital movement. For vital force is not\nimmanent in matter, but is always the product of previous life.(78) In the\nsimplest processes of growth and nutrition the _vis vitalis_ plays its\nvital _r\u00f4le_. This is true in a much greater degree of the processes of\ndevelopment and morphogenesis. In the phenomena of irritability life\nreveals its spontaneity through \u201cresponses,\u201d and so on. \u201cPeu d\u2019anatomie\npathologique \u00e9loigne du vitalisme, beaucoup d\u2019anatomie pathologique y\nram\u00e8ne.\u201d\n\nIt is impossible to make much of this position. It leaves the theory with\none of the opposing parties, the practice with the other, and the problem\njust where it was before.\n\n\n\n\nPreyer\u2019s Position.\n\n\nAlong with Virchow, we must name another of the older generation, the\nphysiologist William Preyer, who combated \u201cvitalism,\u201d \u201cdualism,\u201d and\n\u201cmechanism\u201d with equal vehemence, and issued a manifesto, already somewhat\nsolemn and official, against \u201cvital force.\u201d And yet he must undoubtedly be\nregarded as a vitalist by mechanists and vitalists alike.(79) He is more\ndefinite than Virchow, for he does not content himself with general\nstatements as to the \u201corigin\u201d of vital force, and of the \u201cswinging over\u201d\nof the merely mechanical energies into the domain of the vital, but holds\ndecidedly to the proposition _omne vivum e vivo_. He therefore maintains\nthat life has always existed in the cosmos, and entirely rejects\nspontaneous generation.\n\nThe fallacy, he says, of the mechanistic claims was due to the increasing\nnumber of physical explanations of isolated vital phenomena, and of\nimitations of the chemical products of organic metabolism. A wrong\nconclusion was drawn from these. \u201cAny one who hopes to deduce from the\nchemical and physical properties of the fertilised egg the necessity that\nan animal, tormented by hunger and love must, after a certain time, arise\ntherefrom, has a pathetic resemblance to the miserable manufacturers of\nhomunculi.\u201d Life is one of the underivable and inexplicable fundamental\nfunctions of universal being. From all eternity life has only been\nproduced from life.\n\nAs Preyer accepts the Kant-Laplace theory of the origin of our earth from\nthe sun, he reaches ideas which have points of contact with the\n\u201ccosmo-organic\u201d ideas of Fechner. Life was present even when the earth was\na fiery fluid sphere, and was possibly more general and more abundant then\nthan it is now. And life as we know it may only be a smaller and isolated\nexpression of that more general life.(80)\n\nAmong the younger generation of specialists, those most often quoted as\nopponents of the mechanical theory are probably Bunge, Rindfleisch, Kerner\nvon Marilaun, Neumeister and Wolff. A special group among them, not very\neasy to classify, may be called the Tectonists. Associated with them is\nReinke\u2019s \u201cTheory of Dominants.\u201d Driesch started from their ranks, and is a\nmost interesting example of consistent development from a recognition of\nthe impossibilities of the mechanistic position to an individually\nthought-out vitalistic theory. Hertwig, too, takes a very definite\nposition of his own in regard to these matters. Perhaps the most original\ncontribution in the whole field is Albrecht\u2019s \u201cTheory of Different Modes\nof Regarding Things.\u201d We may close the list with the name of K. C.\nSchneider, who has carried these modern ideas on into metaphysical\nspeculation. Several others might be mentioned along with and connecting\nthese representative names.(81)\n\n\n\n\nThe Position Of Bunge and Other Physiologists.\n\n\nFor a long time one of the most prominent figures in the controversy was\nProf. G. Bunge, of Basle, who was one of the first modern physiologists to\nchampion vitalism, and who has tried to show by analogies and\nillustrations what is necessarily implied in vital activity.(82) The\nmechanical reduction of vital phenomena to physico-chemical forces, he\nsays, is impossible, and becomes more and more so as our knowledge\ndeepens. He brings forward a series of convincing examples of the way in\nwhich apparent mechanical explanations have broken down. The absorption of\nthe chyle through the walls of the intestine seemed to be a mechanically\nintelligible process of osmosis and diffusion. But in reality it proves to\nbe rather a process of selection on the part of the epithelial cells of\nthe intestine, analogous to the selection and rejection exercised\nelsewhere by unicellular organisms. In the same way the epithelial cells\nof the mammary glands \u201cselect\u201d the suitable substances from the blood. It\nis impossible to explain in a mechanical way the power which directs the\ninnumerable different chemical and physical processes within the organism,\nwhether they be the bewilderingly purposeful reactions in the individual\nlife of the cell, which seem to point to psychic processes within the\nplasm, or the riddles of development and of inheritance in particular; for\nhow can a spermatozoon, so small that 500 millions can lie on a cubic\nline, be the bearer of all the peculiarities of the father to the son?\n\nIn Lecture III. Bunge defines his attitude towards the law of the\nconservation of energy. In so doing he unconsciously follows the lines\nlaid down by Descartes. All processes of movement and all functions\nexhibited by the living substance are the results of the accumulated\npotential energies, and the sums of work done and energy utilised remain\nthe same. But the liberation and the direction of these energies is a\nfactor by itself, which neither increases nor diminishes the sum of\nenergies. \u201c_Occasiones_\u201d and \u201c_caus\u00e6_\u201d are brought into the field once\nmore. The energies effect the phenomena, but they require \u201c_occasiones_\u201d\nto liberate them\u2014thus a stone may fall to the ground by virtue of the\npotential energies stored in it at the time of its suspension, but it\ncannot fall until the thread by which it hangs has been cut. The function\nof the \u201c_occasio_\u201d itself is something quite outside of and without\nrelation to the effect caused; it is a matter of indifference whether the\nthread be cut gently through with a razor or shot in two with a cannon\nball.\n\nKassowitz(83) is an instructive example of how much the force of criticism\nhas been recognised even by those occupying a convinced mechanical point\nof view. He subjects all the different theories which attempt to explain\nthe chief vital phenomena in mechanical terms to a long and exhaustive\nexamination. The theories of the organism as a thermodynamic engine,\nosmotic theories, theories of ferments, interpretations in terms of\nelectro-dynamics and molecular-physics\u2014are all examined (chap. iv.); and\nthe failure of all these hypotheses, notwithstanding the enormous amount\nof ingenuity expended in their construction, is summed up in an emphatic\n\u201c_Ignoramus_.\u201d \u201cThe failure is a striking one,\u201d and it is frankly admitted\nthat, in strong contrast to the earlier mood of confident hope, there now\nprevails a mood of resignation in regard to the mechanical-experimental\ninvestigation of the living organism, and that even specialists of the\nfirst rank are finding that they have to reckon again seriously with vital\nforce. This breakdown and these admissions do not exactly tend to\nprejudice us in favour of the author\u2019s own attempt to substantiate new\nmechanical theories.\n\nIn the comprehensive text-book of physiological chemistry by R.\nNeumeister, the mechanical standpoint seemed to be adhered to as the\nideal. But the same writer forsakes it entirely, and disputes it\nenergetically in his most recent work, \u201cBetrachtungen \u00fcber das Wesen der\nLebenserscheinungen\u201d(84) (\u201cConsiderations as to the Nature of Vital\nPhenomena\u201d). He passes over all the larger problems, such as those of\ndevelopment, inheritance, regeneration, and confines himself in the main\nto the physiological functions of protoplasm, especially to those of the\nabsorption of food and metabolism. And he shows, by means of\nillustrations, in part Bunge\u2019s, in part his own, and in close sympathy\nwith Wundt\u2019s views, that even these vital phenomena cannot possibly be\nexplained in terms of chemical affinity, physical osmosis, and the like.\nIn processes of selection (such as, for instance, the excretion of urea\nand the retention of sugar in the blood), the \u201caim is obvious, but the\ncauses cannot be recognised.\u201d Psychical processes play a certain part in\nthe functions of protoplasm in the form of qualitative and quantitative\nsensitiveness. All the mechanical processes in living organisms are\ninitiated and directed by psychical processes. Physical, chemical and\nmechanical laws are perfectly valid, but they are not absolutely dominant.\nLiving matter is to be defined as \u201ca unique chemical system, the molecules\nof which, by their peculiar reciprocal action, give rise to psychical and\nmaterial processes in such a way that the processes of the one kind are\nalways causally conditioned and started by those of the other kind.\u201d The\npsychical phenomena he regards as transcendental, supernatural,\n\u201cmystical,\u201d yet unquestionably also subject to a strict causal nexus,\nalthough the causality must remain for ever concealed. Starting from this\nbasis, he analyses and rejects the explanations which have been offered in\nterms of the analogy of ferments, enzymes, or catalytic processes. In\nparticular, he disputes Ostwald\u2019s \u201cEnergismus\u201d and Verworn\u2019s Biogen\nhypothesis.(85)\n\nAmong the vitalists of to-day, one of the most frequently cited, perhaps,\nexcept Driesch the most frequently cited, is G. Wolff, a _Privatdozent_,\nformerly at W\u00fcrzburg, now at Basle. He has only published short lectures\nand essays, and these deal not so much with the mechanical theory as with\nDarwinism.(86) But in these writings his main argument is that of his\nconcluding chapter: the spontaneous adaptiveness of the organism, which\nnullifies all contingent theories to explain the purposiveness in ontogeny\nand phylogeny. And in his lecture, \u201cMechanismus und Vitalismus,\u201d(87) in\nwhich he directs his attention especially to criticising B\u00fctschli\u2019s\ndefence of mechanism, the only problem to which prominence is given is the\none with which we are here concerned. In spite of their brevity, these\nwritings have given rise to much controversy, because what is peculiar to\nthe two standpoints is described with precision, and the problem is\nclearly defined. His criticism had its starting-point in, and received a\nspecial impulse from an empirical proof, due to a very happy experiment of\nhis own, of the marvellous regenerative capacity, and the inherent\npurposive activity of the living organism. He succeeded in proving that if\nthe lens of the eye of the newt be excised, it may be regrown. The\nimportance of this fact is greatly increased if we trace out in detail the\nvarious impossible rival mechanical interpretations which have grown up\naround this interesting case. As Driesch says, \u201cIt is not a restoration\nstarting from the wound, it is a substitution starting from a different\nplace.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nThe Views of Botanists Illustrated.\n\n\nIt might have been expected that in the domain of plant-biology, if\nanywhere, the mechanistic standpoint would have been the prevailing one.\nFor it is almost a matter of course to regard plants as devoid of\nsensation or \u201cpsychical\u201d life, and as mechanical systems, chemical\nlaboratories, and reflex mechanisms, and this way of regarding them has\nbeen made easy by the very marked uniformity and lack of spontaneity in\ntheir vital processes as compared with those of animals. But it is not the\ncase that mechanical theories have here prevailed. The opposition to them\nis just as great here as elsewhere, and from the days of Wigand onwards it\nhas been almost continuously sustained.(88) Very characteristic is\nPfeffer\u2019s \u201cPflanzen-Physiologie\u201d (1897), which is written professedly from\nthe mechanist point of view. \u201cVitalism,\u201d according to this authority, is\nto be rejected, but instead of \u201cvital force\u201d he offers us \u201cgiven\nproperties,\u201d and the alleged machine-like collocations of the most minute\nelements. In regard, for instance, to the riddle of development and\nmorphogenesis, we must simply accept it as a \u201cgiven property,\u201d that the\nacorn grows in an oak and nothing else. The chemical explanation of the\nvital functions of protoplasm is also to be rejected; as a shattered watch\nis no longer a watch though it remains chemically the same, so it is with\nprotoplasm. The available chemical knowledge of the substances of which\nprotoplasm is made up is insufficient to render the vital processes\nintelligible. Here, as everywhere else, we have to reckon with ultimate\n\u201cproperties (entities), which we neither can, nor desire to analyse\nfurther.\u201d \u201cThe human mind is no more capable of forming a conception of\nthe ultimate cause of things than of eternity.\u201d If all the views here\nindicated were followed out to their logical conclusions, they would\nhinder rather than further the process of reduction to terms of\nphysico-chemical sequences.\n\nKerner von Marilaun in his \u201cPflanzenleben\u201d deliberately takes up a\nthorough-going vitalist position, and on this point as well as on many\nothers he opposed the current theory of the school (Darwinism). It is\ntrue, he admits, that many of the phenomena in plants can be explained in\npurely mechanical terms, but they are only those which may occur also in\nnon-living structures. The specific expressions of life cannot be\nexplained in this way. He shows this more fully in regard to the most\nfundamental of all the vital processes in the plant-body\u2014the breaking up\nof carbonic acid gas by the chlorophyll to obtain the carbon which is the\nfundamental element in all living organisms. We know the requisite\nconditions: the supply of raw material, and the sunlight from which the\nenergy is derived. But how the chlorophyll makes use of these to effect\nthe breaking up, and how it starts the subsequent syntheses of the carbon\ninto the most complex organic compounds remains a mystery. And so on\nupwards through all the strictly vital phenomena.\n\nWiesner\u2019s(89) view of things is essentially similar. He gives a very\nimpressive picture of the mystery of the chemistry of the plant, showing\nhow small is the number of food-stuffs and raw materials in comparison to\nthe thousands of highly complex chemical substances which the plant\nproduces, and how much work there is involved in de-oxydising the food and\nin forming syntheses. He, too, refuses, as usual, to postulate \u201cvital\nforce.\u201d Yet to speak of \u201cthe fundamental peculiarities of the living\nmatter inherent in the organism\u201d and to admit that plants are \u201cirritable,\u201d\n\u201cheliotropic,\u201d \u201cgeotropic,\u201d &c., amounts to much the same thing as\npostulating vital force; that is to say, to a mere naming of the specific\nproblem of life without explaining it. The author himself admits this when\nhe says in another place: \u201cIf I compare organisms with inorganic systems,\nI find that the progress of our knowledge is continually enlarging the\ngulf which separates the one from the other!\u201d\n\nThese anti-mechanical tendencies show themselves most emphatically in the\nwork of Fr. Ludwig.(90) In his concluding chapter, after a discussion of\nthe theories of Darwin, N\u00e4geli, and Weismann, he postulates, for\nvariation, heredity, and species-formation in particular, \u201cforces other\nthan physico-chemical,\u201d \u201clet us call them frankly psychical.\u201d\n\nIt is instructive to see how these \u201cvitalistic\u201d views crop up even in\nstudies of detail and of the microscopically small, as for instance in E.\nCrato\u2019s \u201cBeitr\u00e4ge zur Anatomie und Physiologie des Elementar-organismus.\u201d\nHow the living organism contains within itself what is in its turn living,\ndown into ever smaller detail, (am\u0153boid movements of certain plastines,\nphysodes,) how incomparable the living organism is with a \u201cmachine,\u201d to\nwhich its libellers are so fond of likening it, how it builds itself up,\nsteers, and stokes itself, how it produces with \u201cplayful ease\u201d the most\nmarvellous and graceful forms, makes combinations and breaks them up, how\nanalogous its whole activity is to \u201cbeing able\u201d and \u201cwilling,\u201d all this is\nclearly brought out.(91)\n\nA very fresh and lucid presentation of the whole case is given by Borodin,\nProfessor of Botany in St. Petersburg, in his essay, \u201cProtoplasm and Vital\nForce.\u201d(92) He sharply castigates the one-sidedness and impetuosity of the\nmechanical theory, as in Haeckel\u2019s discovery of Bathybius and of\nnon-nucleated bacteria. The latter are problematical, and the former has\nbeen proved an illusion. To penetrate farther into the processes of life\nis simply to become aware of an ever-deepening series of riddles. There is\nno such thing as \u201cprotoplasm,\u201d or \u201cliving proteid,\u201d or indeed any unified,\nsimple \u201cliving matter\u201d whatever. Artificial \u201coil-emulsion amoeb\u00e6\u201d(93) bear\nthe same relation to living ones that Vaucanson\u2019s mechanical duck bears to\na real one; that is, none at all. Our \u201cprotoplasm\u201d is as mystical as the\nold \u201cvital force,\u201d and both are only camping-grounds for our ignorance.\nNeither the mechanical nor the atomic theory were the results of exact\ninvestigations; they were borrowed from philosophy. We do indeed\ninvestigate the typically vital process of irritability by physical\nmethods. But the response made by the organism to physical coercion may be\ncalled a mockery of physics. The mechanists help themselves out with crude\nanalogies from the mechanical, conceal the problem with the name\n\u201cirritability,\u201d and thus get rid of the greatest marvels. If vital force\nitself were to call out from its cells, \u201cHere I am,\u201d they would probably\nsee in it only a remarkable case of \u201cirritability.\u201d Mechanism is no more\npositive knowledge than vitalism is; it is only the dogmatic faith of the\nmajority of present-day naturalists.\n\n\n\n\nConstructive Criticism.\n\n\nThose whose protests we have hitherto been considering have not added to\ntheir criticism of the mechanical theory any positive contribution of\ntheir own, or at least they give nothing more than very slight hints\npointing towards a psychical theory. But there are others who have sought\nto overcome the mechanical theory by gaining a deeper grasp of the nature\nof \u201cforce\u201d in general. Their attempts have been of various kinds, but\nusually tend in one direction, which can perhaps be most precisely and\nbriefly indicated through Lloyd Morgan\u2019s views, as summed up, for\ninstance, in his essay on \u201cVitalism.\u201d(94) In the beginning of biological\ntext-books, we usually find (he says) a chapter on the nature of \u201cforce,\u201d\nbut it is \u201clike grace before meat\u201d\u2014without influence on quality or\ndigestion. Yet this problem must be cleared up before we can arrive at any\nunderstanding of the whole subject. In all attempts at \u201creducing to\nsimpler terms,\u201d it must be borne in mind that \u201cforce\u201d reveals its nature\nin ever higher stages, of which every one is new. Even cohesion cannot be\nreduced to terms of gravitation, nor the chemical affinities and molecular\nforces to something more primitive. They are already something \u201coutside\nthe recognised order of nature.\u201d In a still higher form force is expressed\nin the processes of crystallisation. At the formation of the first crystal\nthere came into action a directing force of the same kind as the will of\nthe sculptor at the making of the Venus of Melos. This new element, which\nintervenes every time, Lloyd Morgan regards, with Herbert Spencer\n(\u201cPrinciples of Biology\u201d), as \u201cdue to that ultimate reality which\nunderlies this manifestation, as it underlies all other manifestations.\u201d\nThere can be no \u201cunderstanding\u201d in the sense of \u201cgetting behind things\u201d:\neven the actions of \u201cbrute matter\u201d cannot be \u201cunderstood.\u201d The play of\nchance not only does not explain the living; it does not even explain the\nnot-living. But life in particular can neither be brought into the cell\nfrom without, nor be explained as simply \u201cemerging from the co-operation\nof the components of the protoplasm,\u201d and it is \u201cin its essence not to be\nconceived in physico-chemical terms,\u201d but represents \u201cnew modes of\nactivity in the noumenal cause,\u201d which, just because it is noumenal, is\nbeyond our grasp. For only phenomena are \u201caccessible to thought.\u201d\n\nAmong the biologists who concern themselves with deeper considerations,\nOscar Hertwig,(95) the Director of the Anatomical Institute at Berlin, has\nexpressed ideas similar to those we have been discussing, little as this\nmay seem to be the case at first sight. He desires to oust the ordinary\nmechanism, so to speak, by replacing it by a mechanism of a higher order,\nand in making the attempt he examines and deepens the traditional ideas of\ncausality and \u201cforce,\u201d and defines the right and wrong of the\nquantitative-mathematical interpretation of nature in general, and of\nmechanics in particular. He follows confessedly in Lotze\u2019s path, not so\nmuch in regard to that thinker\u2019s insistence upon the association of the\ncausal and the teleological modes of interpretation, as in modifying the\nidea of causality. O. Hertwig puts forward his own theories with special\nreference to those of W. Roux, the founder of the new \u201cScience of the\nFuture\u201d\u2014the mechanical, and therefore only scientific theory of\ndevelopment, which no longer only describes, but understands and causally\nexplains phenomena (\u201cArchiv f\u00fcr Entwicklungsmechanik\u201d). There are two\nkinds of mechanism (Hertwig says): that in the higher philosophical sense,\nand that in the purely physical sense. The former declares that all\nphenomena are connected by a guiding thread of causal connection and can\nbe causally explained. As such, its application to the domain of vital\nphenomena is justifiable and self-evident. But it is not justifiable if\ncause be simply made identical with and limited to \u201cforce,\u201d if the causal\nconnection be only admitted in the technical sense of the transference and\ntransformation of energy, and if, over and above, it is supposed to give\nan \u201cexplanation,\u201d in the sense of an insight into things themselves. Even\nmechanics is (as Kirchoff maintained) a \u201cdescriptive\u201d science. Hertwig\nagrees with Schopenhauer and Lotze in regarding every primitive natural\n\u201cforce\u201d as unique, not reducible to simpler terms, but qualitatively\ndistinct,\u2014a \u201cqualitas occulta,\u201d capable not of physical but only of\nmetaphysical explanation. And thus his conclusions imply rejection of\nmechanism in the cruder sense. As such, it has only a very limited sphere\nof action in the realm of the living. The history of mechanical\ninterpretations is a history of their collapse. The attempt to derive the\norganic from the inorganic has often been made. But no such attempts have\nheld the field for long. We can now say with some reason that \u201cthe gulf\nbetween the two kingdoms of nature has become deeper just in proportion as\nour physical and chemical, our morphological and physiological knowledge\nof the organism has deepened.\u201d Mach\u2019s expression \u201cmechanical mythology,\u201d\nis quoted, and then a fine passage on the insufficiency of the\nmathematical view of things in general concludes thus: \u201cMathematics is\nonly a method of thought, an excellent tool of the human mind, but it is\nvery far from being the case that all thought and knowledge moves in this\none direction, and that the content of our minds can ever find exhaustive\nexpression through it alone.\u201d\n\nIn his \u201cTheory of Dominants,\u201d(96) Reinke, the botanist of Kiel, has\nattempted to formulate his opposition to the physico-chemical conception\nof life into a vitalistic theory of his own. Among biologists who confess\nthemselves supporters of the mechanical theory, there are some who\nexpressly reject explanations in terms of chemical and physical\nprinciples, and emphasise, more energetically than others, that these can\nonly give rise to vital phenomena and complex processes of movement, on\nthe basis of a most delicately differentiated structure and architecture\nof the living substance in its minute details, and from the egg onwards.\nThey have created the strict \u201cmachine theory,\u201d and they may be grouped\ntogether as the \u201ctectonists.\u201d \u201cA watch that has been stamped to pieces is\nno longer a watch.\u201d Thus the merely material and chemical is not the\nessential part of the living; it is the tectonic, the machinery of\nstructure that is essential. The fundamental idea in this position is\nprecisely that of Lotze. It is not a \u201cmystical,\u201d vital principle, that\nsets up, controls, and regulates the physical and chemical processes\nwithin the developed or developing organism. They receive their direction\nand impulse through the fact that they are associated with a given\npeculiar mechanical structure. This theory certainly contains all the\nmonstrosities of preformation in the germ, the mythologies of the\ninfinitely small, and it suffers shipwreck in ways as diverse as the\nnumber of its sides and parts. But it has the merit of clearly disclosing\nthe impossibilities of purely chemical explanations. Reinke\u2019s \u201cTheory of\nDominants\u201d started from such tectonic conceptions, and so originally did\nDriesch\u2019s Neovitalism, of which we shall presently have to speak.\n\nReinke\u2019s theory has gone through several stages of development. At first\nits general tenor was as follows: Every living thing is typically\ndifferent from everything that is not living. What explains this\ndifference? Certainly not the hypothesis of vital force, which is far from\nbeing clear. The idea that forces of a psychic nature are inherent in the\norganism is also rejected. The illustration of a watch helps us to\nunderstand. The impelling force in it is certainly not merely the ordinary\nforce of gravity or the general elasticity of steel. The efficacy of\nsimple forces such as these can be increased in infinite diversity by the\n\u201cconstruction of the apparatus\u201d in which they operate. Life is the\nfunction of a quite unique, marvellously complex, inimitable combination\nof machines. If these be given, the most complex processes fulfil\nthemselves of necessity and without the intervention of special vital\nforces. But how can they be \u201cgiven\u201d? The sole analogy to be found is the\nmaking of real machines, artificial products as distinguished from\nfortuitous products. They cannot be made without the influence and\nactivity of intelligence. To explain the incomparably more ingenious and\ncomplex vital machine as due to a fortuitous origin and collocation of its\nindividual parts would be more absurd than it would be to think of a watch\nbeing made in this way. The dominance of a creative idea cannot but be\nrecognised. An intelligent natural force which is conscious of its aims\nand calculates its means must be presupposed, if we are really to satisfy\nour sense of causality. It is a matter of personal conviction whether we\nfind this force in \u201cGod\u201d or in the \u201cAbsolute.\u201d\n\nThese views are more fully developed in the theory of dominants expounded\nin Reinke\u2019s later work, \u201cDie Welt as Tat\u201d (after what has been said the\nmeaning of the title will be self-evident), and in his \u201cTheoretische\nBiologie.\u201d(97) Very vigorous and convincing are the author\u2019s objections to\nthe naturalistic theories of organic life, especially to the \u201cself-origin\u201d\nof the living, or spontaneous generation. In all vital processes we must\nreckon with a \u201cphysiological _x_,\u201d which cannot be eliminated, which gives\nto life its unique and underivable character. There are \u201csecondary\nforces,\u201d \u201csuperforces,\u201d \u201cdominants,\u201d which bring about what is peculiar in\nvital functions and direct their processes. \u201cVitalism\u201d in the strict sense\nis thus here also rejected. The machine-theory is held valid. There are\n\u201cdominants\u201d even in our tools and utensils, in our hammer and spoon, and\nthe \u201coperation\u201d of these cannot be explained merely physico-chemically,\nbut through the dominants of the form, structure and composition, with\nwhich they have been invested by intelligence. The association with the\nviews of the tectonists is so far quite apparent. But the idea of\n\u201cdominants\u201d soon broadens out. We find dominants of form-development, of\nevolution, and so on. What were at first only peculiarities of structure\nand architecture have grown almost unawares into dynamic principles of\nform which have nothing more to do with the mechanical theory, and which,\nbecause of their dualistic nature, result in conclusions and modes of\nexplanation which can hardly be called very useful. The lines along which\nthe idea has developed are intelligible enough. It started originally from\nthat of the organism as a finished product, functioning actively,\nespecially in its metabolism. Here the comparison with a steam engine with\nself-regulators and automatic whistles is admissible, and one may speak of\ndominants in the sense of mechanical dominants. But the idea thus started\nwas pressed into general service. And thus arose dominants of development,\nof morphogenesis, even of phylogenetic evolution (\u201cphylogenetic\nevolution-potential\u201d). New dominants are added, and the theory advances\nfarther and farther from the \u201cmachine theory,\u201d becomes ever more\nenigmatical, and more vitalistic.\n\n\n\n\nThe Constructive Work of Driesch.\n\n\nWhat in Reinke\u2019s case came about almost unperceived, Driesch did with full\nconsciousness and intention, following the necessity laid upon him by his\nown gradual personal development and by his consistent, tenacious\nprosecution of the problem. The acuteness of his thinking, the\nconcentration of his endeavours through long years, his comprehensive\nknowledge and mastery of the material, the deep logicalness and consistent\nevolution of his \u201cstandpoints,\u201d and his philosophical and theoretical\ngrasp of the subject make him probably the most instructive type, indeed,\nwe may almost say, the very incarnation of the whole disputed question. In\n1891 he published his \u201cMathematisch\u2014mechanische Betrachtung\nmorphologischer Probleme der Biologie,\u201d the work in which he first touched\nthe depths of the problem. It is directed chiefly against the merely\n\u201chistorical\u201d methods in biology, used by the current schools in the form\nof Darwinism. Darwinism and the Theory of Descent have been so far nothing\nmore than \u201cgalleries of ancestors,\u201d and the science ranged under their\nbanner is only descriptive, not explanatory. Instead of setting up\ncontingent theories we must form a \u201cconception\u201d of the internal necessity,\ninherent in the substratum itself, in accordance with which the forms of\nlife have found expression\u2014a necessity corresponding to that which\nconditions the form-development of the crystal.\n\nExperimental investigations and discoveries, and further reflection,\nresulted, in 1892, in his \u201cEntwicklungsmechanische Studien,\u201d and led him\nto insist on the need for what the title of his next year\u2019s work calls\n\u201cBiologie als selbst\u00e4ndige Grundwissenschaft.\u201d In this work two important\npoints are emphasised. The first is, that biology must certainly strive\nafter precision, but that this precision consists not in subordination to,\nbut in co-ordination with physics. Biology must rank side by side with\nphysics as an \u201cindependent fundamental science,\u201d and that in the form of\ntectonic. And the second point is, that the teleological point of view\nmust take its place beside the causal. Only by recognising both can\nbiology become a complete science.\n\nIn the \u201cAnalytische Theorie der organischen Entwicklung\u201d (1894) Driesch\npicks up the thread where he dropped it in the book before, and spins it\nfarther, \u201ctraversing\u201d his previous theoretical and experimental results.\nIn this work the author still strives to remain within the frame of the\ntectonic and machine-theory, but the edges are already showing signs of\ngiving way. Life, he says, is a mechanism based upon a given structure (it\nis however a machine which is constantly modifying and developing itself).\nOntogenesis(98) is a strictly causal nexus, but following \u201ca natural law\nthe workings of which are entirely enigmatical\u201d (with Wigand). Causality\nfulfils itself through \u201cliberations,\u201d that is to say, cause and effect are\nnot quantitatively equivalent; and all effect is, notwithstanding its\ncausal conditioning, something absolutely new and not to be calculated\nfrom the cause, so that there can be no question of mechanism in the\nstrict sense. And the whole is directed by purpose.(99) The vital\nprocesses compel us to admit that it seems \u201cas if intelligence determined\nquality and order.\u201d Driesch still tries to reconcile causes and purposes\nas different \u201cmodes of regarding things,\u201d but this device he afterwards\nabandons. We cannot penetrate to the nature of things either by the causal\nor by the teleological method. But they are\u2014as Kant maintained\u2014two modes\nof looking at things, both of which are postulates of our capacity for\nknowing. Each must stand by itself, and neither can have its sequence\ndisturbed by the interpolation of pieces from the other. In the domain of\nthe causal there can be no teleological explanation, and conversely; one\nmight as well seek for an optical explanation of the synthesis of water;\nbut both are true in their own place. The Madonna della Sedia, looked at\nmicroscopically, is a mass of blots, looked at macroscopically it is a\npicture. And it \u201cis\u201d both of these.\n\nDriesch\u2019s conclusions continue to advance, led steadily onwards by his\nexperimental studies. In the \u201cMaschinentheorie des Lebens,\u201d(100) he\nattacks his own earlier theories with praiseworthy determination, and\nremorselessly pursues them to the monstrous conclusions to which they\nlead, and shows that they necessarily perish because of these. He had\npreviously declared, at first emphatically, later with hesitation (we have\nalready seen why), that every single vital process is of a\nphysico-chemical kind, on the basis of a given \u201cstructure\u201d of living\nbeings. But now he considers the living organism as itself a result of\nvital processes\u2014that is, of development. If this also is to be explained\nmechanically (as physico-chemical processes based on material structure),\nthen the ovum must possess _in parvo_ this infinitely fine structure, by\nvirtue of which it fulfils its own physiological processes of maintenance,\nand also becomes the efficient cause of the subsequent development. It\nmust bear the type of the individual and of the species, as a rudiment (or\nprimordium) within its own structure. Every specific type must, however,\naccording to the theory of descent, be derived through an endless process\nof evolution, by gradual stages, from some primitive organism. Just as in\nthe mechanical becoming of the individual organism, so the primitive\nprotovum must also be extraordinarily intricate and complex in its\norganisation if it is to give rise to all the processes of evolution and\ndevelopment involved in the succeeding ontogenies, phylogenies,\nregenerations, and so forth. This is a necessary conclusion if the\nmachine-theory be correct, and if we refuse to admit that vital phenomena\nare governed by specific laws. This consequence is monstrous, and the\ntheory of the tectonists therefore false. But if it be false, what then?\n\nDriesch answers this question in the books published in subsequent\nyears.(101) In these he attains his final standpoint, and makes it more\nand more secure. The \u201cmachine-theory,\u201d and all others like it, are now\ndefinitely abandoned. They represent the uncritical dogmatism of a\nmaterialistic mode of thought, which binds all phenomena to substance, and\nrefuses to admit any immaterial or dynamic phenomena. The alleged initial\nstructure is nowhere to be found. The pursuit of things into the most\nminute details leads to no indication of it. The chromatin, in which the\nmost important vital processes have their basis, is very far from having\nthis machine-like structure; it is homogeneous. The formation of the\nskeleton, for instance, of a Plubeus larva is due to migratory\nspontaneously moving cells (comparable to the leucocytes of our own body,\nwhose migrations and activities remind one much more of a social organism\nthan of a machine). The organism arises, not from mechanical, but from\n\u201charmoniously-equipotential systems\u201d: that is to say, from systems every\nelement of which has equal functional efficiency; so that each individual\npart bears within itself in an equal degree the potentiality of the\nwhole\u2014an impossibility from the mechanical point of view.\n\nDriesch had given an experimental basis for this theory at an earlier\nstage, in his experiments on the initial stages of the development of\nsea-urchins, starfishes, zoophytes, and the like. A Planarian worm cut\ninto pieces developed a new worm of smaller size from each part. A\nmutilated Pluteus larva developed a new food-canal, and restored the whole\ntypical form. His experiment of 1892 went farther still, for he succeeded\nin separating the first four segmentation-cells of the sea-urchin\u2019s egg;\nand from each cell obtained a developing embryo. These facts, he\nmaintains, compel us to assume a mode of occurrence which is dynamically\n_sui generis_, a \u201cprospective tendency\u201d which is a sub-concept in the\nAristotelian \u201cDynamis.\u201d And the essential difference between this kind of\noperation and a mechanical operation is, that the same typical effect is\nalways reached, even if the whole normal causal nexus be disturbed. Even\nwhen forced into circuitous paths the embryo advances towards the same\ngoal. Thus \u201cvitalism,\u201d that is, the independence and autonomy of the vital\nprocesses, is proved. The effect required is attained through \u201caction at a\ndistance,\u201d a mode of happening which is specifically different from\nanything to be found in the inorganic world, and which has its\n_directive_, for instance, in the regeneration of lost parts, _not_ in\nanything corporeal or substantial, but in the end to be attained.\n\nIn his work on \u201cOrganic Regulations,\u201d Driesch collects from the most\ndiverse biological fields more and more astonishing proofs of the activity\nof the living as contrasted with physico-chemical phenomena, and of the\nmarvellous power the organism has to \u201chelp itself\u201d and to attain the\ntypical form and reach the end aimed at, even under the greatest diversity\nin the chain of conditions. The material here brought forward is enormous,\nand the author\u2019s grasp of it very remarkable; and not the least of the\nmerits of the book is, that the bewildering wealth and diversity of these\nphenomena, which are usually presented to us as isolated and uncoordinated\ninstances, is here definitely systematised according to their\ncharacteristic peculiarities, and from the point of view of the increasing\ndistinctness of the \u201cautonomy\u201d of the processes. The system begins with\nthe active regulatory functions of living matter in the chemistry of\nmetabolism (see particularly the phenomena of immunisation), and ascends\nthrough different stages up to the regulations of regeneration. There\ncould be no more impressive way of showing how little life and its\n\u201cregulations\u201d can be compared to the \u201cself-regulations\u201d of machines, or to\nthe restoring of typical states of equilibrium and of form in the physical\nand chemical domain, to which the mechanists are fond of referring.\n\nThe facts thus empirically brought together are then linked together in a\ntheory, and considered epistemologically. We may leave out of account all\nthat is included in the treatment of modern idealism,\nimmanence-philosophy, and solipsism. All this does not arise directly out\nof the vitalistic ideas, though the latter are fitted into an idealistic\nframework. Extremely vivid is the excursus on respiration and\nassimilation. (All processes of building up and breaking down take place\nwithin the organism under conditions notoriously different from those\nobtaining in the laboratory. It is radically impossible to speak of a\nliving \u201csubstance\u201d according to the formula CxHyOz, which assimilates and\ndisassimilates itself [sibi].) Excellent, too, are Driesch\u2019s remarks on\nmaterialistic elucidations of inheritance and morphogenesis. It is quite\nimpossible to succeed with epigenetic speculations on a material basis\n(_cf._ Haacke). Weismann is so far right, he admits, from his\nmaterialistic premisses when he starts with preformations. But his theory,\nand all others of the kind, can do nothing more than make an infinitely\nsmall photograph of the difficulty. They \u201cexplain\u201d the processes of\nform-development and the regeneration of animals and plants, by\nconstructing infinitely small animals and plants, which develop their form\nand regenerate lost parts. And Driesch holds it to be impossible to\ndistribute a complicated tectonic among the elements of an equipotential\nsystem. In denying the materialistic theory of development, Driesch again\ndeterminedly \u201ctraverses\u201d his own earlier views. He does this, too, when he\nnow rejects the reconciliation between causality and teleology as\ndifferent modes of looking at things. The teleological now seems to him\nitself a factor playing a part in the chain of causes, and thus making it\nteleological. The key-word of all is to him the \u201centelechy\u201d of Aristotle.\n\nIn his last work on \u201cThe Soul,\u201d Driesch follows the impossibilities of the\nmechanical theories from the domain of vital processes into that of\nbehaviour and voluntary actions.\n\n\n\n\nThe Views of Albrecht and Schneider.\n\n\nAn outlook and interpretation which Driesch(102) maintained for a while,\nbut afterwards abandoned, has been developed in an original and peculiar\nfashion by Eugen Albrecht, Prosector and Pathologist in Munich.(103) It is\nthe theory of different ways of looking at things. Albrecht indeed firmly\nadheres to the chemical and physical interpretation of vital processes,\nregards approximate completeness along these lines as the ideal of\nscience, and maintains their essential sufficiency. But he holds that the\nmechanists have been mistaken and one-sided in that they have upheld this\ninterpretation and mode of considering things as the sole and the \u201ctrue\u201d\none. According to our subjective attitude to things and their changes,\nthey appear to us in quite different series of associations, each of which\nforms a complete series in itself, running parallel to the others, but not\nintruding to fill up gaps in them. Microscopic and macroscopic study of\nthings illustrate such separate and complete series. The classical example\nfor the whole theory is the psycho-physical parallelism. Psychical\nphenomena are not \u201cexplained\u201d when the correlated line of material changes\nand the phenomena of the nervous system have been traced out. Similarly\nwith the series of \u201cvital\u201d phenomena, \u201cvital\u201d interpretation from the\npoint of view of the \u201cliving organism,\u201d runs parallel to, but distinct\nfrom the chemical and physical analyses of vital processes. But each of\nthese parallel ways of regarding things is \u201ctrue.\u201d For the current\nseparation of the \u201cappearance\u201d and \u201cnature\u201d of things is false, since it\nassumes that only one of the possible ways of regarding things, _e.g._,\nthe mechanical-causal mode of interpretation is essential, and that all\nthe others deal only with associated appearance.\n\nThe idea that only one or two of these series can represent the \u201ctrue\nnature\u201d of the phenomenon \u201ccan only be called cheap dogma.\u201d Each series is\ncomplete in itself, and every successive phase follows directly and\nwithout a break from the antecedent one, which alone explains it. In this\nlies the relative justification of the ever-recurring reactions to\n\u201cvitalism.\u201d\n\nThis theory of Albrecht\u2019s has all the charms and difficulties, or\nimpossibilities, of parallelistic interpretations in general. Its validity\nmight be discussed with reference to the particular case of\npsycho-physical parallelism.(104)\n\nTo make a sound basis for itself it would require first to clear up the\ncausality problem, and to answer, or at least definitely formulate the\ngreat question whether causing (Bewirkung) is to be replaced by mere\nnecessary sequence\u2014for this is where it ends. The conclusion which, with\nregard to biological methods and ideals, seems to make all concessions to\nthe purely mechanical mode of interpretation, is not sufficiently obvious\nfrom the premisses. If the vital series be a \u201creal\u201d one, we should expect\nthat a \u201cvitalistic\u201d mode of interpretation, with methods and aims of its\nown, would be required, just as a special science of psychology is\nrequired. The assumption that each series is complete without a break, and\nthat an all-including analysis of vital processes in terms of mechanical\nprocesses must ultimately be possible, is a _petitio principii_, and\nbreaks down before the objections raised by the vitalists. The most\ncentral problem in the whole matter, namely, the relation of the causal to\nthe teleological, has not been touched. These two concepts would, of\ncourse, not yield \u201cparallels,\u201d but would be different points of view,\nwhich could eventually be applied to each series.\n\nK. Camillo Schneider,(105) Privatdozent in Vienna, uses the soul, the\npsychical in the true sense, as the explanation of the vital. What had\nbeen thought secretly and individually by some of the vitalists already\nmentioned, but had, so to speak, cropped up only as the incidentally\nrevealed reverse side of their negations of mechanism, Schneider attempts\ndefinitely to formulate into a theory. The chief merit of his book on\n\u201cVitalism\u201d is to be found, in Chapters II. to X., in his thorough\ndiscussion of the chemical, physical, and mechanical theories along the\nspecial lines of each.\n\nThe list of critics might be added to, and the number of standpoints in\nopposition to mechanism greatly increased. This diversity of standpoint,\nand the individual way in which each independent thinker reacts from the\nmechanical theory shows that here, as also in regard to Darwin\u2019s theory of\nselection, we have to do with a dogmatic theory and a forced\nsimplification of phenomena, not with an objective and calm consideration\nof things as they are. It is a theory where _simplex_ has become _sigillum\nfalsi_.\n\n\n\n\nHow all this affects the Religious Outlook.\n\n\nThese denials and destructive criticisms of the mechanical theory, which\nare now continually cropping up, lead, as must be obvious, towards a\ndeeper conception and interpretation of reality in general, and towards a\nreligious conception in particular. Unquestionably the most important fact\nin connection with them is the fresh revelation of the depth of things and\nof appearance, the increased recognition that our knowledge is only\nleading us towards mystery.\n\nIt is indeed questionable whether anything more than this can be said in\nregard to the problem of life, whether we ought not to content ourselves\nwith recognising the limits of our knowledge, and reject all positive\nstatements that go beyond these limits. For the mechanists are undoubtedly\nright in this, that \u201centelechy,\u201d \u201cthe idea of the whole,\u201d \u201cco-operation,\u201d\n\u201cguidance,\u201d \u201cpsychical factors,\u201d and the like, are only names for riddles,\nand do not in themselves constitute knowledge.(106) The case here is\nsomewhat similar to what we have already seen in connection with\n\u201cantinomies.\u201d They, too, give us no positive insight into the true nature\nof things, but they at any rate prove to us that we have not yet\nunderstood what that is. And, just as they show us that our knowledge of\nthe world as it appears to us can never be complete, so here it appears\nthat we come upon inexplicabilities even within the domain accessible to\nour knowledge. Thus the religious conception of the world gains something\nhere as from the antinomies, namely, a fresh proof that the world which\nappears to us and can be comprehended by us, proclaims its true nature and\ndepths, but does not reveal them. Perhaps there is still another gain. For\nin any case the vital processes and the marvels of evolution and\ndevelopment are examples of the way in which physical processes are\nconstantly subject to a peculiar guidance, which certainly cannot be\nexplained from themselves or in terms of mechanism, organisation, and the\nlike. All attempts to demonstrate this in detail, all \u201cexplanations\u201d in\nterms of dynamic co-operation, of dominants, of ideas, or anything else,\nare vague, and seem to go to pieces when we try to take firm hold of them.\nBut the fact remains none the less.\n\nMay not this be a paradigm of the processes and development of the world\nat large, and even of evolution in the domain of history? Here, too, all\nideas of guidance, of endeavour after an aim, &c., which philosophical\nstudy of history or religious intuition seems to find, make shipwreck\nagainst the fact that every attempt to demonstrate their nature, fails.\nAll these theories of influx, concursus, and so on, whether transcendental\nor immanent factors be employed, immediately become wooden, and never\nadmit of verification in detail. But precisely the same is true of the\ndominance of the \u201cidea,\u201d or of the \u201claw of evolution,\u201d or of the\n\u201cpotential of development\u201d in every developing organism. Yet\nincomprehensible and undemonstrable in detail as this \u201cdominance\u201d is, and\ncompletely as it may be concealed behind the play of physical causes, it\nis there, none the less.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. AUTONOMY OF SPIRIT.\n\n\nThe aim of our study has been to define our attitude to naturalism, and to\nmaintain in the teeth of naturalism the validity and freedom of the\nreligious conception of the world. This seemed to be cramped and menaced\nby those \u201creductions to simpler terms\u201d which we have already discussed.\n\nBut one of these reductions, the most important of all, we have not yet\nencountered, and it remains to be dealt with now. In comparison with this\none all others are relatively unimportant, and it is easy to understand\nhow some have regarded the problem of the relations of the naturalistic\nand the religious outlook as beginning at this point, and have neglected\neverything below it. For we have now to consider the attempt of naturalism\nto \u201creduce\u201d spirit itself to terms of nature, either to derive it from\nnature, or, when that is recognised as quite too confused and impossible,\nto make it subject to nature and her system of laws, or to similar laws,\nand thus to rob it of its freedom and independence, of its essential\ncharacter as above nature and free from it, and to bring it down to the\nlevel of an accompanying shadow or a mere reverse side of nature. The\naggressive naturalism which we have discussed has from very early times\nexercised itself on this point, and has instinctively and rightly felt\nthat herein lies the kernel of the whole problem under dispute. It has for\nthe most part concentrated its interest and its attacks upon the\n\u201cimmortality of the soul.\u201d But while this was often the starting-point,\nthe nature of soul, and spirit, and consciousness in general have been\nbrought under discussion and subjected to attacks which sought to show how\nvague and questionable was the reality of spirit as contrasted with the\npalpable, solid and indubitable reality of the outer world. Prominence was\ngiven to the fact that the spiritual side of our nature is dependent on\nand conditioned by the body and bodily states, the external environment,\nexperiences and impressions. These were often the sole, and always the\nchief subjects of the doctrine of the vulgar naturalism. But the same is\ntrue of the naturalism of the higher order, as we described it in Chapter\nII. In order to acquire definite guiding principles of investigation, it\nmakes the attempt to find the true reality of phenomena in the mechanical,\ncorporeal, physiological processes, and to take little or no account of\nthe co-operation, the interpolation, the general efficiency of sensation,\nperception, thought, or will, and to treat them as though they were a\nshadow and accompaniment of reality, but not as an equivalent, much less a\npreponderating constituent of it. Out of these fundamental principles of\ninvestigation, and out of the opposition and doubt with which the\nspiritual is regarded, there is compounded the current mongrel naturalism,\nwhich, without precision in its ideas, and without any great clearness or\nlogical consequence in its views, is thoroughly imbued with the notion\nthat that only is truly real which we can see, hear, and touch\u2014the solid\nobjective world of matter and energy, and that \u201cscience\u201d begins and ends\nwith this. As for anything outside of or beyond this, it is at most a\nbeautiful dream of fancy, with which it is quite safe to occupy oneself as\nlong as one clearly understands that of course it is not true. \u201cNature\u201d is\nthe only indubitable reality, and mind is but a kind of _lusus_ or _luxus\nnatur\u00e6_, which accompanies it at some few places, like a peculiarly\ncoloured aura or shadow, but which must, as far as reality is concerned,\nyield pre-eminence to \u201cNature\u201d in every respect.\n\nThe religious conception is deeply and essentially antagonistic to all\nsuch attempts to range spirit, spiritual being, and the subjective world\nunder \u201cnature,\u201d \u201cmatter,\u201d \u201cenergy,\u201d or whatever we may call what is\nopposed to mind and ranked above it in reality and value. The religious\nconception is made up essentially of a belief in spirit, its worth and\npre-eminence. It does not even seek to compare the reality and origin of\nspirit with anything else whatever. For all its beliefs, the most sublime\nand the crudest alike, conceal within them the conviction that\nfundamentally spirit alone has truth and reality, and that everything else\nis derived from it. It is a somewhat pitiful mode of procedure to direct\nall apologetic endeavours towards the one relatively small question of\n\u201cimmortality,\u201d thus following exactly the lines usually adopted by the\naggressive exponents of naturalism, and thus allowing opponents to dictate\nthe form of the questions and answers. It is quite certain that all\nreligion which is in any way complete, includes within itself a belief in\nthe everlastingness of our spiritual, personal nature, and its\nindependence of the becoming or passing away of external things. But, on\nthe one hand, this particular question can only be settled in connection\nwith the whole problem, and, on the other hand, it is only a fraction of\nthe much farther-reaching belief in the reality of spirit and its\nsuperiority to nature. The very being of religion depends upon this. That\nit may be able to take itself seriously and regard itself as true; that\nall deep and pious feelings, of humility and devotion, may be cherished as\ngenuine and as founded in truth; that it behoves it to find and experience\nthe noble and divine in the world\u2019s course, in history and in individual\nlife; that the whole world of feeling with all its deep stirrings and\nmysteries is of all things the most real and true, and the most\nsignificant fact of existence\u2014all these are features apart from which it\nis impossible to think of religion at all. But they all depend upon the\nreality, independence and absolute pre-eminence of spirit. Freedom and\nresponsibility, duty, moral control and self-development, the valuation of\nlife and our life-work according to our life\u2019s mission and ideal aims,\neven according to everlasting aims, and \u201csub specie \u00e6terni,\u201d the idea of\nthe good, the true and the beautiful\u2014all things apart from which religion\ncannot be thought of\u2014all these depend upon spirit and its truth. And\nfinally \u201cGod is Spirit\u201d: religion cannot represent, or conceive, or\npossess its own highest good and supreme idea, except by thinking in terms\nof the highest analogies of what it knows in itself as spiritual being and\nreality. If spirit is not real and above all other realities; if it is\nderivable, subordinate and dependent, it is impossible to think of\nanything whatever to which the name of \u201cGod\u201d can be given. And this is as\ntrue of the refined speculations of the pantheistic poetic religions, as\nof the idea of God in simple piety. The interest of religion as against\nthe claims of naturalism includes all this. And it would be doing the\ncause of religion sorry service to extract from this whole some isolated\nquestion to which the mood of the time or traditional custom has given\nprominence. Our task must be to show that religion maintains its validity\nand freedom because of the truth and independence of spirit and its\nsuperiority to nature.\n\nIt is, of course, impossible to give an exhaustive treatment of this\nproblem in a short study like this. The answer to this question would\ninclude the whole range of mental science with all its parts and branches.\nMental science, from logic and epistemology up to and including the moral\nand \u00e6sthetic sciences, proves by its very existence, and by the fact that\nit cannot be reduced to terms of natural science, that spirit can neither\nbe derived from nor analysed into anything else. And it is only when we\nhave mastered all this that we can say how far and how strongly knowledge\nand known realities corroborate religion and its great conclusions as to\nspirit and spiritual existence, how they reinforce it and admit its\nvalidity and freedom. Since this is so, all isolated and particular\nendeavours in this direction can only be a prelude or introduction, and a\nmore or less arbitrary selection from the relevant material of facts and\nideas. And nothing more than this is aimed at in the following pages.\n\n\n\n\nNaturalistic Attacks on the Autonomy of the Spiritual.\n\n\nThe attacks that have been made by naturalism upon the independence and\nfreedom of the spiritual are so familiar to every one\u2014even from school\ndays\u2014through books of the type of B\u00fcchner\u2019s \u201cKraft und Stoff,\u201d and\nHaeckel\u2019s \u201cThe Riddle of the Universe,\u201d and other half or wholly\nmaterialistic popular dogmatics, that it is unnecessary to enter into any\ndetail. Very little that is new has been added in this connection to the\nattack made by Plato on himself in the \u201cPh\u00e6do\u201d through Simmias and Kebes.\nIt is only apparently that the modern attacks have become more serious\nthrough the deepened knowledge of natural science. At all times they have\nbeen as serious and as significant as possible, and the religious and\nevery other idealistic conception of the universe has always suffered from\nthem. It is plain that here, if anywhere, \u201cfaith goes against\nappearances,\u201d and that in the last resource we have to postulate free\nmoral resolution, the will to believe, the desire for the ideal, for\nfreedom, and for the eternity of the spirit, and the confidence of the\nspirit in itself. All this is, or at least ought to be, self-evident and\ngenerally admitted.\n\nLet us once more take a brief survey of the reasons on the other side and\narrange them in order.\n\nThat nature is everything and spirit very little seems to follow from a\nvery simple circumstance. There are whole worlds of purely natural and\ncorporeal existence without mind, sensation, or consciousness, which,\nquite untroubled by their absence, simply exist according to the\neverlasting laws of matter and energy. But nowhere do we find spirit or\nmind without a material basis. All that is psychical occurs in connection\nwith a physical being, and with relatively few physical beings. Spirit\nseems wholly bound up with and dependent upon the states, development, and\nconditions of material being. With the body of living beings there arises\nwhat we call \u201csoul\u201d; with the body it grows, gains content, changes,\nmatures, ages, and disappears. According as the body is constituted and\ncomposed, as it is influenced by heredity, race, and selection, by\nnutrition, mode of life, climate, and other circumstances, there are\ndeveloped in a hundred different ways what we call the natural disposition\nor character, inclinations, virtues or vices, passions or temperaments.\nEven the names given to the different temperaments emphasise this\ndependence of what is innermost in us, the deepest tendencies of our\nbeing, on the bodily organisation and the nature of its physiological\nconstitution. The man whose blood flows easily and freely is called\nsanguine, and the melancholic is the victim of his liver. According as our\norgans are good or bad, function freely or sluggishly, our mood rises or\nsinks, we are bold or cowardly, languid or impetuous, and enthusiasm is\noften enough only a peculiar name for a state which, physiologically\nexpressed, might be called alcoholic poisoning. There is one soul in the\nsound body, another in the sickly. Fever, and the impotence of the soul\nagainst it, made Holbach a materialist. If the brain be diseased, that\nmarvellous order of psychical processes which we call reasoning is broken;\nthe \u201csoul\u201d is wholly or partly eliminated; it fades away, or becomes\nnothing more than a confused disconnected medley of images and desires.\nEven artificial interference with, and changes in the bodily organisation\nreact upon the mind. The removal of the thyroid gland may result in\nidiocy. Castration not only prevents the \u201cbreaking\u201d of the voice in the\nSistine choristers, it damps the fires of life to dulness, and makes of\nthe impetuous Abelard a comfortable discursive father-confessor. The mind\nis bound up almost piece by piece with its material basis. Through the\n\u201clocalisation\u201d of psychic processes in the particular parts of the brain,\nnaturalism has enormously strengthened the impression that existed even\namong the ancients, that sensation and imagination are nothing more than,\nlet us say, what the note is to a tightly stretched string. Cerebrum and\ncerebellum are regarded as the seats of different psychic processes. The\nsecret of the higher processes is believed to be hidden in the grey matter\nof the cortex of the cerebrum. We seek and find in the various lobes and\nconvolutions of the brain the \u201ccentres\u201d for the different capacities, the\npower of sight, of smell, of moving the arms, of moving the legs, of\nassociating ideas, of co-ordinated speech, and so on. When brain and\nspinal cord are injured or removed piece by piece from a pigeon or a frog,\nit seems as if the \u201csoul\u201d were eliminated piece by piece,\u2014the capacity for\nspontaneous free co-ordination, for voluntary action, for the various\nsense-impressions, and so on from the higher to the lower. It has even\nbeen maintained that the different feelings and perceptions which are\ngradually acquired can be apportioned among the individual cells of the\nbrain in which they are localised, and the thought-processes, the\nassociations of percepts, the origin of consecutive ideas, the rapid and\neasy recalling of memory-images, and the process of voluntary control, of\ninstincts, can be explained as due to the \u201cgradual laying down of\nnerve-paths\u201d between the different centres and areas of localisation in\nthe brain. All this seems to refute utterly the old belief in the unity\nand personality of the soul. It is different in youth and in age, and\nindeed varies continually. It is the ever-varied harmony of the notes of\nall the strings which are represented by the fibres and ganglion-cells of\nthe nerve-substance. It apparently can not only be completely confused and\nbrought to disharmony, but it may be halved and divided. An almost\nterrifying impression was produced when Trembley in 1740 made the\nexperiment of cutting a \u201chydra\u201d in two, and showed that each of the halves\nbecame a complete animal, so that obviously each of the two halves of the\nsoul grew into a new hydra-soul. And Trembley\u2019s hydra was only the\nprecursor of all the cut-up worms, of the frogs, birds, and guinea-pigs\nthat have been beheaded, or have had their brain removed, or their nerves\ncut, and have furnished further examples of this divisibility of \u201csouls.\u201d\n\nIf the independence of the spiritual is thus shown to be a vain\nassumption, the alleged difference between the animal and the human Psyche\nis much more so. Not from the days of Darwinism alone, but from the very\nbeginning, naturalism has opposed this claim to distinctiveness. But it is\ndue to Darwinism that the fundamental similarity of the psychical in man\nand animals has come to be regarded as almost self-evident. The mental\norganisation of man, as well as his corporeal organisation, is traced back\nthrough gradual stages to animal antecedents, and in thus tracing it there\nare two favourite methods of procedure, which are, however, apt to be\nmutually destructive.\n\nOn the one hand, some naturalists regard the animal anthropomorphically,\ninsist on its likeness to man, discovering and extolling, not without\nemotion, all the higher and nobler possessions of the human mind,\nintellectual capacities, reason, reflection, synthesis, fancy, the power\nof forming ideas and judgments, of drawing conclusions and learning from\nexperience, besides will in the true sense, ethical, social and political\ncapacities, \u00e6sthetic perceptions, and even fits of religion in elephants,\napes, dogs, down even to ants and bees, and these naturalists reject\nold-fashioned explanations in terms of instinct, and find the highest\nalready contained in the lowest. Those of another school are inclined to\nregard man theriomorphically, to insist on his likeness to animals,\nexplaining reason in terms of perception and sensation, deriving will from\nimpulse and desire, and ethical and \u00e6sthetic valuations from physiological\nantecedents and purely animal psychological processes, thus, in short,\nseeking to find the lowest in the highest. (We have already met with an\nanalogous instance of a similarly fallacious double-play on parallel\nlines.) So it comes about that both the origin and the development of the\npsychical and spiritual seem to be satisfactorily cleared up and\nexplained, and at the same time a new proof is adduced for its dependence\nupon the physical. For what is true of all other parts of the\norganisation, of the building up and perfecting of every member and every\nsystem of organs, the bony skeleton, the circulatory system, the\nalimentary canal, that they can be referred back to very simple\nbeginnings, and that their evolution may be traced through all its\nstages\u2014is equally true of the nervous system in general and of the brain\nin particular. It increases more and more in volume and in intricacy of\nstructure, it expands the cranial cavity and diversifies its convolutions.\nAnd the more it grows, and the more complex it becomes, the more do the\nmental capacities increase in perfection, so that here again it seems once\nmore apparent that the psychical is an accompaniment and result of the\nphysical.\n\nPopular naturalism usually stops short here, and contents itself with\nhalf-truths and inconsequences, for it na\u00efvely admits that psychical\nprocesses, sensation, perception, will, have a real influence upon the\nphysical, and, not perceiving how much the admission involves, it does not\ntrouble itself over the fact that, for instance in the so-called voluntary\nmovements of the body, in ordinary behaviour, the psychical, and the will,\nin particular, is capable of real effect, and can move hand and foot and\nthe whole body, and thus has a real reciprocal relation with the physical.\nThis form of popular naturalism sometimes amuses itself with assuming a\npsychical inwardness even in non-living matter, and admitting the\nco-operation of psychical motives even in regard to it.\n\nBut it is far otherwise with naturalism in the strict sense, which takes\nits fundamental principles and its method of investigation seriously. It\nis aware that such half-and-half measures interrupt the continuity of the\nsystem at the most decisive point. And therefore with the greatest\ndetermination it repeats along psychological lines the same kind of\ntreatment that it has previously sought to apply to biological phenomena:\nthe corporeal must form a sequence of phenomena complete in itself and not\nbroken into from without. All processes of movement, all that looks as if\nit happened \u201cthrough our will,\u201d through a resolve due to the intervention\nof a psychical motive, every flush of shame that reddens the cheek, every\nstroke executed by the hand, every sound-wave caused by tongue and lips,\nmust be the result of conditions of stimulation and tension in the energy\nof the body itself.\n\nThis is the meaning of all those psycho-physical experiments that have\nbeen carried on with so much ingenuity and persistence (usually associated\nwith attempts to explain vital phenomena in terms of mechanism). First,\nthey attempt to interpret the expressions of will, feeling and need, the\nspontaneous activities and movements of the lowest forms of\nlife\u2014protists\u2014as \u201cpure reflexes,\u201d as processes which take place in\nobedience to stimuli, and thus are ultimately due to chemical and physical\ninfluences and causes without the intervention of a psychical motive; and,\nsecondly, when this has been apparently or really achieved, the theory of\nirritability and reflex mechanism is pushed from below upwards, until even\nthe most intricate and complex movements and operations of our own body,\nwhich we have wrongly distinguished as acts or behaviour from mere\nprocesses of stimulation, are finally recognised as reflexes and\nliberations due to stimuli. Some stimulus or other, from light or sound or\nsomething else, is, according to this theory, conducted to the nervous\ncentre, the ganglion, the spinal cord, the cerebellum or the cerebrum.\nHere it produces an effect, not of a psychical nature, but some minute\nchemical, or physical,\u2014or purely mechanical change, which goes through\nmany permutations within the nervous centre itself, unites there with the\nstored energies, and then, thus altered, returns by the efferent nerve\npaths to effect a muscle-contraction in some organ, a stretching of the\nhand, or a movement of the whole body. The physical process is accompanied\nby a peculiar inward mirroring, which is the psychical penumbra or shadow\nof the whole business. Thus what is in reality a purely mechanical and\nreflex sequence appears like a psychical experience, like choice and will\nand psychical causality. We may be compared to Spinoza\u2019s stone; it was\nthrown, and it thought it was flying.\n\nThe reasons for interpreting things in this way lie in the principles of\ninvestigation. It is only in this way, we are told, that nature can be\nreduced to natural terms, that is, to chemistry, physics, and mechanics.\nOnly in this way is it possible to gain a true insight into and\nunderstanding of things, and to bring them under mathematical formul\u00e6.\nThus only, too, can \u201cthe miraculous\u201d be eliminated. For if we are obliged\nto admit that the will has a real influence on the corporeal, for instance\nupon our brain, and nerves, and arm-muscles, this would be a violation of\nthe law of the constancy of the sum of energy. For in this case there\nwould occur, at a certain point in the nexus of phenomena, a piece of work\ndone, however small it might be, for which there was no equivalent of\nenergy in the previous constitution. But this is, since the days of\nHelmholtz, an impossible assumption. And thus all those experiments and\ntheories on what we have called the \u201csecond line\u201d of mechanistic\ninterpretation of the universe show themselves to be relevant to our\npresent subject.\n\nInterpretations of the psychical such as these have given rise to four\npeculiar \u201cisms\u201d of an epistemological nature, _i.e._, related to a theory\nof knowledge. Not infrequently they are the historical antecedents which\nresult in the naturalistic theory of the psychical. These are nominalism\nand sensualism, empiricism and a-posteriorism, which, setting themselves\nagainst epistemological rationalism, assail the dignity, the independence,\nand the autonomy of the thinking mind. They are so necessarily and closely\nassociated with naturalism that their fate is intimately bound up with its\nfate, and they are corroborated or refuted with it. And it would be\npossible to conduct the whole discussion with which we are concerned\npurely with reference to these four \u201cisms.\u201d The strife really begins in\ntheir camp.\n\nThe soul is a _tabula rasa_, all four maintain, a white paper on which, to\nbegin with, nothing is inscribed. It brings with it neither innate\nknowledge nor commands. What it possesses in the way of percepts,\nconcepts, opinions, convictions, principles of action, rules of conduct,\nare inscribed upon it through experience (empiricism). That is, not\nantecedent to, but subsequent to experience (a posteriori). But experience\ncan only be gained through the senses. Only thus does reality penetrate\ninto and stamp itself upon us. \u201cWhat was not first in the senses (sensus)\ncannot be in the intelligence.\u201d What the senses convey to us alone builds\nup our mental content, from mere sensory perceptions upwards to the most\nabstract ideas from the simplest psychical elements up to the most complex\nideas, concepts, and conclusions, to the most varied imaginative\nconstructions. And in the development of the mental content the \u201csoul\u201d\nitself is merely the stage upon which all that is acquired through the\nsenses crowds, and jostles, and unites to form images, perceptions, and\nprecepts. But it is itself purely passive, and it becomes what happens to\nit. Therefore it is not really spirit at all, for spirit implies\nspontaneity, activity, and autonomy.\n\nPhilosophy and the mental sciences have always had to carry on the strife\nwith these four opponents. And it is in the teacup of logic and\nepistemology that the storm in regard to theories of the universe has\narisen. It is there, and not in the domain of neurology, or zoology, that\nthe real battlefield lies, upon which the controversy must be fought out\nto the end. What follows is only a sort of skirmish about the outposts.\n\nWhat naturalism holds in regard to the psychical and spiritual may be,\nperhaps, most simply expressed by means of an illustration. Over a wide\nfield there glide mighty shadows in constant interplay. They expand and\ncontract, become denser or lighter, disappear for a little, and then\nreveal themselves again. While they are thus forming and changing, one\nstate follows quite connectedly on another. At first one is tempted to\nbelieve that they are self-acting and self-regulating, that they move\nfreely and pass from one state to another according to causes within\nthemselves. But then one sees that they are thrown upon the earth from the\nclouds above, now in this way and now in that, that all their states and\nforms and changes are nothing in themselves, and neither effect anything\nin themselves nor react upon the occurrences and realities up above, which\nthey only accompany, and by which they are determined without any\nco-operation on their own part, even in determining their own form. So it\nis with nature and spirit. Nature is the true effective reality; spirit is\nits shadow, which effects nothing either within or outside of itself, but\nsimply happens.\n\n\n\n\nThe Fundamental Answer.\n\n\nHow can the religious conception of the world justify itself and maintain\nits freedom in face of such views of spirit and spiritual being? It is\nquestionable whether it is worth while attempting to do so. Is not the\nessence of the validity and freedom of spirit made most certain simply\nthrough the fact that it is able to inquire into it? If we leave popular\nnaturalism out of the question, is not the attempt made by scientific\nnaturalism the best witness against itself? For scientific study, and the\nestablishment of fundamental conceptions and guiding principles are only\npossible if mind and thought are free and active and creative. The direct\nexperience that spirit has of itself, of its individuality and freedom, of\nits incomparability with all that is beneath it, is far too constant and\ngenuine to admit of its being put into a difficulty by a doctrine which it\nhas itself established. And this doctrine has far too much the character\nof a \u201cfixed theory\u201d to carry permanent inward conviction with it. Here\nagain, the mistake made is in starting with scepticism and with the fewest\nand simplest assumptions. It is by no means the case that in order to\ndiscover the truth we must start always from a position of scepticism,\ninstead of from calm confidence in ourselves and in our conviction that we\npossess in direct experience the best guarantee of truth. For we\nexperience nothing more certainly than the content and riches of our own\nmind, its power of acting and creating, and all its great capacities. And\nit is part of the duty laid upon us by the religious conception of the\nuniverse, as well as by all other idealistic conceptions, to follow this\npath of self-assurance alone, that is, through self-development and\nself-deepening, through self-realisation and self-discipline, to use to\nthe full in our lives all that we have in heart and mind as possibilities,\ntendencies, content, and capacities, and so practically to experience the\nreality and power of the spiritual that the mood of suspicion and distrust\nof it must disappear. The validity of this method is corroborated by all\nthe critical insight into the nature of our knowledge that we have gained\nin the course of our study, and it might be deepened in regard to this\nparticular case. For here, if anywhere, we must recognise the limitations\nof our knowledge; the impossibility of attaining to a full understanding\nof the true nature and depths of things applies to the inquiring mind and\nits hidden nature. From Descartes to Leibnitz, Kant, and Fries, down to\nthe historian of materialism itself, F. A. Lange, it has been an axiom of\nthe idealistic philosophy, expressed now in dogmatic, now in critical\nform, that the mathematical-mechanical outlook and causal interpretation\nof things, not excluding a naturalistic psychology, is thoroughly\njustifiable as a method of arranging scientifically the phenomena\naccessible to us and of penetrating more deeply towards an understanding\nof these. It is, indeed, justifiable, so long as it does not profess to\nreveal the true nature of things, but remains conscious of the free\nspirit, whose own work and undertaking the whole is.\n\nYet here again it is by no means necessary to surrender to naturalism a\nfield which it has tried to take possession of, but is certainly unable to\nhold. We need not try to force naturalism to read out of empirical\npsychology the high conclusions as to human nature and spirit which\npertain to the religious outlook, or to find in the \u201csimplicity\u201d of the\n\u201csoul monad\u201d a kind of physical proof of its indestructibility, or\nanything of that kind. We maintain that to comprehend the true inwardness\nof the vitality, freedom, dignity, and power of the spirit is not the\nbusiness of psychology at all, but may perhaps be dealt with in ethics, if\nit be not admitted that with these concepts one has already entered the\nrealm of religious experience, and that they are the very centre of\nreligious theory. But undoubtedly we must reject in great measure the\nclaims which naturalism makes upon our domain, and maintain that the most\nimportant starting-points for the higher view are to be found in the\npriority of everything spiritual over everything material, in the\nunderivability of the spiritual and the impossibility of describing it in\ncorporeal-mathematical terms and concepts.\n\n\n\n\nIndividual Development.\n\n\nWhat lives in us, as far as we can perceive and trace it in its empirical\nexpression, is not a finished and spiritual being that leaps, mature and\ncomplete, from some pre-existence or other into its embodied form, but is\nobviously something that only develops and becomes actual very gradually.\nIts becoming is conditioned by \u201cstimuli,\u201d influences, impressions from\nwithout, and perfects itself in the closest dependence upon the becoming\nof the body, is inhibited or advanced with it, and may be entirely\narrested by it, forced into abnormal developments which never attain to\nthe level of an \u201cego\u201d or \u201cpersonality,\u201d but remain incomprehensible\nanomalies and monstrosities. In general, the psychical struggles slowly\nand laboriously free from purely vegetative and physiological processes,\nand gains control over itself and over the body. Its self-development and\nconcentration to full unity and completeness of personality is only\nachieved through the deepest self-culture, through complete\n\u201csimplification\u201d as the ancients said, through great acts and experiences\nof inward centralisation such as that which finds religious expression in\nthe metaphor of \u201cregeneration.\u201d What \u201cbuilding up\u201d and self-development of\nthe psychical means remains obscure. If we think of it as a summation, an\nadding on of new parts and constituents, and thus try to form a concrete\nimage of the process, we spoil it altogether. If we speak of the\ntransition from the potential to the actual, from the tendency to the\nrealisation, we may not indeed spoil it, but we have done little to make\nthe process more intelligible. So much only we can say: certain as it is\nthat the Psyche, especially as conscious inner life, only gradually\ndevelops and becomes actual, and that in the closest dependence upon the\ndevelopment, maturing, and establishment of the nervous basis and the\nbodily organisation in general, yet the naturalistic view, _a fortiori_\nthe materialistic, is never at any point correct. There are three things\nto be borne in mind. First, the origin, the \u201cwhence\u201d of the psychical is\nwholly hidden from us, and, notwithstanding the theory of evolution and\ndescent, it remains an insoluble riddle. And secondly, however closely it\nis associated with and tied down to the processes of bodily development,\nit is never at any stage of its development really a function of it in\nactual and exact correspondence and dependence. And finally, the further\nit advances in its self-realisation, the further the relation of\ndependence recedes into the background, and the more do the independence\nand autonomy of the psychical processes become prominent.\n\nWe have still to consider and amplify this in several respects, and then\nwe may go on to still more important matters.\n\n\n\n\nUnderivability.\n\n\nThe first of the three points we have called attention to has, so to\nspeak, become famous through the lectures of du Bois-Reymond, which\nattracted much attention, on \u201cThe Limits of Natural Knowledge,\u201d and \u201cThe\nSeven Riddles of the Universe.\u201d That these thoughtful lectures made so\ngreat an impression did not mean that a great new discovery had been made,\nbut was rather a sign of the general lack of reflection on the part of the\npublic, for they only expressed what had always been self-evident, and\nwhat had only been forgotten through thoughtlessness, or concealed by\npolemical rhetoric. Consciousness, thought, even the commonest sensation\nof pleasure and pain, or the simplest sense-perception, cannot be compared\nwith \u201cmatter and energy,\u201d with the movements of masses. They represent a\nforeign and altogether inexplicable guest in this world of matter,\nmolecules, and elements. Even if we could follow the play of the nervous\nprocesses with which sensation, consciousness, pain, or pleasure are bound\nup, into their most intricate and delicate details, if we could make the\nbrain transparent, and enlarge its cells to the size of houses, so that,\nwith searching glance, we could count and observe all the processes, and\neven follow the dance of the molecules within it, we should never see\n\u201cpain,\u201d \u201cpleasure,\u201d or \u201cthought,\u201d or anything more than bodies and their\nmovements. A thought, such as, for instance, the perception that two and\ntwo make four, is not long or broad, above or beneath; it cannot be\nmeasured or weighed in inches or pounds like matter, tested with the\nmanometer, thermometer, or electrometer for its potential or intensity and\ntension, measured by amp\u00e8res or volts or horse-powers like energies and\nelectric currents; it is something wholly different, which can be known\nonly through inner experience, but which is much better known than\nanything else whatever, and which it is absolutely impossible to compare\nwith anything but itself. Even if we admit that it can only become actual\nand develop as an accompaniment of processes within bodies, and only\nwithin those bodies we call \u201cliving,\u201d and that wherever bodies exist\npsychical phenomena occur; even if we were able, as we never shall be\nable, to produce living beings artificially in a retort, and even if\npsychical phenomena occurred in these also, we should still have made no\nprogress towards explaining what the psychical really is. It would still\nonly be the blazing up in these bodies of a flame which, in some\ninexplicable way, had fallen upon them, and associated itself with them.\nWe do not doubt that this association, where it takes place, does so in\nobedience to the strictest law and the most inexorable necessity;\ntherefore, that wherever and however the corporeal conditions are\nproduced, sensation and consciousness will awaken. For we believe in a\nworld governed by law. But the mystery is in no way lessened by this, and\nthe modern theory of evolution throws no light into this utterly\nimpenetrable darkness. In the first place, the whole idea of \u201cexplaining\u201d\nin terms of \u201cevolution\u201d is a futile one. The process of becoming is\npictured as a simple process of cumulation, a gradual increase of\nintensities, while the business is really one of change in quality and the\nintroduction of what is new. In the second place, the occurrence even of\nthe first and most primitive sensation contains the whole riddle\nconcentrated on a single point. In the third place, the riddle meets us\nanew and undiminished in every developing individual. For to say that the\nphysical inwardness, once it has arisen, is \u201ctransmitted,\u201d is not an\nexplanation but merely an admission that the riddle exists. And the idea\nthat the psychical is just a penumbra or shadow of reality, which comes of\nitself and so to speak gratis, is quite inadmissible from the point of\nview of strict natural science. There are no longer _luxus_ and _lusus\nnatur\u00e6_. Reality cannot throw a \u201cshadow.\u201d According to the principles of\nthe conservation of matter and energy, we must be able to show whence it\ngets the so-called shadow, and with what it compensates for it.\n\n\n\n\nPre-eminence of Consciousness.\n\n\nBut we have already spent too much time over this na\u00efve mode of looking at\nthings, which, though it professes to place things in their true light, in\nreality distorts them and turns them upside down. As if this world of the\nexternal and material, all these bodies and forces, were our first and\nmost direct data, and were not really all derived from, and only\ndiscoverable by, consciousness. We have here to do with the ancient view\nof all philosophy and all reflection in general, although in modern days\nit has taken its place as a great new discovery even among naturalists\nthemselves, by whom it is extolled and recognised as \u201cthe conquest of\nmaterialism.\u201d Such exaggerated emphasis tends to conceal the fact that\nthis truth has been regarded as self-evident from very early times.\n\nWhat is a body, extension, movement, colour, smell and taste? What do I\npossess of them, or know of them, except through the images, sensations\nand feelings which they call up in my receptive mind? No single thing\nwanders into me as itself, or reveals itself to me directly; only through\nthe way in which they affect me, the peculiar changes which they work in\nme, do things reveal to me their existence and their special character. I\nhave no knowledge of an apple-tree or of an apple, except through the\nsense perceptions they call up in me. But these sense perceptions, what\nare they but different peculiar states of my consciousness, peculiar\ndeterminations of my mind? I see that the tree stands there, but what is\nit to see? What is the perception of a colour, of light, of shade, and\ntheir changes? Surely only a peculiar change of my mind itself, a\nparticular state of stimulus and awareness brought about in myself. And in\nthe same way I can feel that the apple lies there. But what is the\nperception of resistance, of hardness, of impenetrability? Nothing more\nthan a feeling, a change in my psychical state, which is unique and cannot\nbe described in terms of anything but itself. Even as regards \u201cattraction\nand repulsion,\u201d external existence only reveals itself to us through\nchanges in the mind and consciousness, which we then attribute to a cause\noutside ourselves.\n\nIt is well enough known that this simple but incontrovertible fact has\noften led to the denial of the existence of anything outside of ourselves\nand our consciousness. But even if we leave this difficult subject alone,\nit is quite certain that, if the question as to the pre-eminence of\nconsciousness and its relation to external things is to be asked at all,\nit should be formulated as follows, and not conversely: \u201cHow can I,\nstarting from the directly given reality and certainty of consciousness\nand its states, arrive at the certainty and reality of external things,\nsubstances, forces, physics and chemistry?\u201d\n\n\n\n\nCreative Power of Consciousness.\n\n\nTo this insight into the underivability and pre-eminence of consciousness\nover the world of external reality there must be added at this stage a\nrecognition of its peculiar creative character. We have here to recognise\nthat consciousness itself creates its world,\u2014that is, the world that\nbecomes our own through actual experience, possession, and enjoyment. We\nare led to this position even by the conception now current in natural\nscience of the world as it is, not as it is mirrored in consciousness, and\nthe theory of the \u201csubjectivity of sensory qualities.\u201d The qualities which\nwe perceive in things through the senses are \u201csubjective\u201d; philosophy has\nlong taught that, and now natural science teaches it too. That is to say,\nthese qualities are not actually present in the things themselves; they\nare rather the particular responses which our consciousness makes to\nstimuli. Take, for instance, tone or colour. What we call tone or sound is\nnot known to acoustics. That takes cognisance only of vibrations and the\nconditions of vibration in elastic bodies, which, by means of the ear and\nthe nerves of hearing, become a stimulus of consciousness. Consciousness\n\u201cresponds\u201d to this stimulus by receiving a sense-impression of hearing.\nBut in this, obviously, there is nothing of the nature of oscillations and\nvibrations, but something quite different. What outside of us is nothing\nmore than a complex process of movement according to mathematical\nconditions, blossoms within us to a world of sound, tone, and music. The\nworld itself is soundless, toneless. And the same is true of light and\ncolour; \u201clight\u201d and \u201cblue\u201d are nothing in themselves\u2014are not properties of\nthings themselves. They are only the infinitely rapid movements of an\ninfinitely delicate substance, the ether. But when these meet our\nconsciousness, they spin themselves within us into this world of light and\ncolour, of brilliance and beauty. Thus without us there is a world of a\npurely mathematical nature, without quality, charm, or value. But the\nworld we know, the world of sound, light, and colour, of all properties\nwhatsoever, of the ugly or the beautiful, of pain and pleasure, is in the\nmost real sense the product of consciousness itself, a creation which,\nincited by something outside of itself and of a totally different nature,\nwhich we can hardly call \u201cworld,\u201d evolves out of itself and causes to\nblossom. No part of this creation is given from without; not the blue of\nthe heavens, for outside of us there is no colour, only vibrations of the\nether; not the gold of the sun nor the red glory of the evening sky.\nExternal nature is nothing more than the stimulus, the pressure upon the\nmind, which liberates from its depths the peculiar reactions and responses\nto this stimulus, and calls them forth from its own treasure-stores.\nCertainly in this creating the consciousness is entirely dependent on the\nimpressions stamped on it from outside, and to that extent upon\n\u201cexperience.\u201d But it is by no means a _tabula rasa_, and a merely passive\nmirror of the outer world, for it translates the stimulus thus received\ninto quite a different language, and builds up from it a new reality,\nwhich is quite unlike the mathematical and qualityless reality without.\nAnd this activity on the part of consciousness begins on the very lowest\nstages. The simplest perception of light or colour, the first feeling of\npleasure or discomfort, is a reaction of the psychical, which brings about\nsomething entirely new and unique. \u201cThe spirit is never passive.\u201d\n\nThat the psychical is not derivable from the physical, that it does not\narise out of it, is not secondary to it, but pre-eminent over it, is not\npassive but creative; so much we have already gained to set over against\nnaturalism. But its claims are even more affected by the fact of real\npsychical causality. We need not here concern ourselves with the difficult\nquestion, whether the mind can of itself act upon the body, and through it\nupon the external world. But in the logical consistence of naturalism\nthere was implied not only a negative answer to this last question, but\nalso a denial of the causality of the psychical, even within itself and\nits own domain. This is well illustrated in the figure of the cloud\nshadows. In consciousness state follows upon state, a upon b, b upon c.\nAccording to naturalism, b is not really the result of a, nor c of b, for\nin that case there would be independence of phenomena, and distinctness of\nlaws in the psychical. But as all the states, a, b, and c, of the cloud\nshadows, depend upon states _a_, _b_, and _c_, of the clouds themselves,\nbut do not themselves form a concatenation of causes, so all the states of\nthe mind depend upon those of the body, in which alone there is a true\nchain of causes because they alone have true reality.\n\nThis is a complete distortion of the facts of the case. It would never be\npossible to persuade oneself or any one else that the arm, for instance,\ndid not bend simply because we willed that it should. And it is still less\npossible to doubt that there are sequences of causes within the psychical,\nthat in the world of thought and feeling, of desire and will, one thing\ncalls up another, awakes it, impels it onwards, and influences it. Indeed,\nthe mode of influence is peculiarly rich, subtle, and certain. Mental\nimages and experiences arouse joy or sorrow, admiration or repulsion. One\nimage calls up another, forces it to appear according to quite peculiar\nlaws, or may crowd it out. Feelings call up desires, desires lead to\ndetermination. Good news actually causes joy, this is actually\nstrengthened to willing, and the new situation gives rise to actual\nresolves. All this is so obvious and so unquestionable that no naturalism\ncan possibly prevail against it. It has also long been made the subject of\nspecial investigation and carefully regulated experiment, and it is one of\nthe chief subjects of modern psychological science. And especially as\nregards the different forms of \u201cassociation of ideas,\u201d the particular laws\nof this psychical causality have been established.\n\nIt cannot be denied, however, that this psychology of association has\nitself in a deeper sense certain dangers from the point of view of the\nfreedom of the mind, and it is apt to lead, not indeed to naturalistic\nconceptions, but to views according to which the \u201csoul\u201d is reduced to the\nlevel of a passive frame and stage, so to speak, for the exhibition of\nmental mechanics and statics. \u201cIdeas\u201d or thoughts, or states of feelings,\nare sometimes represented almost as actual little realities, which come\nand go in accordance with their own laws of attraction and repulsion,\nunite and separate again, by virtue of a kind of mental gravitation, move\nand crowd one another, so that one must almost say \u201cit thinks,\u201d as one\nsays \u201cit rains,\u201d and not \u201cthe mind thinks\u201d or \u201cI think.\u201d But more of this\nlater. This psychological orderliness is in sharp antagonism to pure\nnaturalism. It describes the laws of a sequence of causes, which have\nnothing to do with the physical, chemical, or mechanical, and clearly\nestablishes the uniqueness, independence, and underivability of the\npsychical as contrasted with the physical.\n\nThe individuality and incommensurability of this psychical causality shows\nitself in another series of factors which make even the _form_ of the\npsychical process quite distinctive, and produce phenomena which have no\nparallel in the material sequences of the world, indeed, conflict with all\nits fundamental laws. The great psychologists of to-day, Wundt in\nparticular, and James, have frequently emphasised these factors. We can\nonly briefly call attention to a few points, as, for instance, Wundt\u2019s\ntheory of the creative resultants through which the psychical processes\nshow themselves to be quite outside of the scope of the laws of\nequivalence which hold good in the physical. If, in the realm of the\ncorporeal, two components of energy, a and b, come together, they unite in\na common resultant c, which includes in part a new movement, in part\ntransformation into heat, but always in such a way that c remains equal to\na and b. But it is otherwise in the psychical. Here there occurs what may\nbe called an increase (and a qualitative change) of the psychical energy.\nIf we take the notes, c, e, and g, and call the sensation- and\nperception-value of the individual notes x, y, z, when they come together,\nthe resulting sensation-value is by no means simply x + y + z, for a\n\u201charmony\u201d results of which the effect is not only greater than the mere\nsum of x + y + z, but is _qualitatively_ different. This is true of all\ndomains of psychical experience. The parallels from mechanical operation\ncannot be applied in any case. These only supply inadequate analogies and\nsymbols which never really represent the actual state of the case.\n\nLet us take, for instance, a motive, _m_, that impels us towards a\nparticular action, and another, _n_, that hinders us. If these meet in us,\nthe result is not simply a weakening of the power of the one, and a\nremaining motive of the strength of _m_ minus _n_. The meeting of the two\ncreates an entirely new and peculiar mental situation, which gives rise to\nconflict and choice, and the resultant victorious motive is never under\nany circumstances _m-n_, but may be a double or three-fold _m_ or _n_.\nThus, in the different aspects of psychical activity, there are factors\nwhich make it impossible to compare these with other activities, remove\nthem outside of the scope of the law of the equivalence of cause and\neffect, and prove that there is self-increase and growth on the part of\npsychical energies. And all such phenomena lead us away from the\nstandpoint of any mere theory of association.\n\n\n\n\nActivity of Consciousness.\n\n\nNaturalism takes refuge in the doctrine of association, when it does not\nattain anything with its first claims, and applies this theory in such a\nway that it seems possible from this standpoint to interpret mental\nprocesses as having an approximate resemblance to mechanically and\nmathematically calculable phenomena. As in physics the molecules and\natoms, so here the smallest mental elements, the simplest units of feeling\nare sought for, and from their relations of attraction and repulsion,\ntheir groupings and movements, it is supposed that the whole mental world\nmay be constructed up to its highest contents, will, ideals, and\ndevelopment of character. But even the analogy, the model which is\nfollowed, and the fact that a model is followed at all, show that this\nmethod is uncritical and not unprejudiced. What reason is there for\nregarding occurrences in the realm of physics as a _norm_ for the\npsychical? Why should one not rather start from the peculiar and very\nstriking differences between the two, from the primary and fundamental\nfact, not indeed capable of explanation, but all the more worthy of\nattention on that account, that there is an absolute difference between\nphysical occurrences and mental behaviour, between physical and mental\ncausality? These most primitive and simplest mental elements which are\nsupposed to float and have their being within the mind as in a kind of\nspiritual ether are not atoms at all, but deeds, actions, performances.\nThe laws of the association of ideas are not the laws of a mental\nchemistry, but laws of mental behaviour; very fixed and reliable laws, but\nstill having to do with modes of behaviour. Their separating and uniting,\ntheir relations to one another, their grouping into unities, their\n\u201csyntheses,\u201d are not automatic permutations and combinations, but express\nthe _activity_ of a thinking intelligence. Not even the simplest actual\nsynthesis comes about of itself, as psychologists have shown by a neat\nillustration.\n\n[Illustration: Square _a_2, next to smaller square _b_2. Above them are\nhorizontal lines _a_ and _b_, the same lengths as the widths of the\nsquares below them. Caption: _a_ and _b_ only associated. Squares of _a_\nand _b_ in juxtaposition.]\n\n[Illustration: Square _c_2. Above it is horizontal line _c_, the same\nlength as the width of the square below it. Caption: _a_ and _b_ really\nsynthetised to _c_. Square of _a_ + _b_ as a true unity = _c_2.]\n\nGiven that, through some association, the image of the line _a_ calls up\nthat of the line _b_, and both are associatively ranged together, we have\nstill not made the real synthesis _a_ + _b_ = _c_. For to think of _a_ and\n_b_ side by side is not the same thing as thinking of _c_, as we shall\nreadily see if we square them. The squares of _a_ and _b_ thought of\nbeside one another, that is, _a_2 and _b_2, are something quite different\nfrom the square of the really synthetised _a_ and _b_, which is (_a_ +\n_b_)2 = _a_2 + 2_ab_ + _b_2, or _c_ 2. This requires quite a new view, a\nspontaneous synthesis, which is an action and not a mere experience.\n\n\n\n\nThe Ego.\n\n\nIt was customary in earlier psychology, as it still is in all apologetic\npsychology, to regard the soul as a unified, immaterial, indivisible and\ntherefore indestructible _substance_, as a monad, which, as a unity\nwithout parts, superior to its own capacities and the changes of its\nstates, is at all times one and the same subject. Many attempts have been\nmade since the time of Plotinus to accumulate proofs of this substantial\nunity. We may leave this question untouched here, and need not even\ninquire whether these definitions are not themselves things of the\nexternal world employed as images and analogies and pushed too far. But\nthere are three factors which may be established in regard to the\npsychical in spite of all naturalistic opposition; and those who have\nattempted to find proofs for the traditional idea we have noted, have\nusually really had these three in mind, and quite rightly so: they are,\nself-consciousness, the unity of consciousness, and the consciousness of\nthe ego.\n\n\n\n\nSelf-Consciousness.\n\n\n1. Our consciousness is not merely a knowledge of many individual things,\nthe possession of concrete and abstract, particular or general conceptions\nand ideas, the cherishing of sensations, feelings and the like. We not\nonly know, but we know that we know, and we can ponder in thought over the\nvery fact that we are able thus to reflect in thought. Thought can turn\nits attention upon itself, can establish that it takes place, and how it\nruns its course, can reflect upon the forms in which it expresses itself,\nits powers, its laws, possibilities, and limits, and can ponder over the\ngeneral nature of thought and the contingent individual nature of the\nparticular thinking subject. (The very possibility and preliminary\ncondition of moral freedom is implied in this.) How naturalism is to do\njustice to this fact it is not easy to see. Even if it were possible that\nthe mental content was gained through mere experience, that comparisons,\nsyntheses, and abstractions were formed simply according to the laws of\nassociation, and that these were sublimed and refined to general ideas,\nand could grow into axioms of logic and of geometry, or crystallise into\nnecessary and axiomatic principles\u2014none of which can happen\u2014yet it would\nalways be a knowledge of something. But how this something could be given\nto itself remains undiscoverable. The soul is a _tabula rasa_ and a mere\nmirror, says this theory. But it would still require to show how the\nsilver layer behind the mirror began to see itself in the mirror.\n\n\n\n\nThe Unity of Consciousness.\n\n\n2. The same holds true of the unity of consciousness, of which we are\ndirectly convinced. It is quite inexplicable if consciousness is a\nfunction of the extended and divisible physical substratum which is built\nup of nerve-cells and nerve-fibres. And yet this unity is the fundamental\ncondition of our whole inner life.\n\nEven the facts of association demonstrate it. Two images could not come\ntogether, the one could not call up the other, if they were not possessed\nin the same consciousness, and could unite in it. It is the preliminary\ncondition of every higher mode of thought, of every relating of things, of\nevery comparison and abstraction. No judgment can be formed, no conclusion\ndrawn without this. How could a predicate become associated with its\nsubject, or a principal clause with its subordinate clause, if they were\nin separate consciousnesses, and how could the conclusion be drawn from\nthem?\n\n\n\n\nConsciousness of the Ego.\n\n\n3. This unified self-consciousness is consciousness of the ego. It is only\nby means of an artificial abstraction that we can leave out of account in\nthe consideration of processes of thought the peculiar factor of personal\nrelationship that absolutely attaches to every thought within us. There\nare no thoughts in general that play their part of themselves alone. \u201cIt\u201d\nnever \u201cthinks\u201d in me. On the contrary, all sensation, thought, and will\nhas in every human being a peculiar central relationship to which we refer\nwhen we say \u201cmy idea,\u201d \u201cmy sensation.\u201d What the \u201cI\u201d is cannot be defined.\nIt is that through which the relation of all experiences and actions is\nreferred to a point, and through which the treasuring of them for good or\nill, the appreciation, the valuation of them is accomplished. And it plays\nits part even in the case of cold and indifferent items of knowledge. For\ninstance, that twice two are four is not simply a perception, it is _my_\nperception. Of the ego itself nothing more can be said than that it is the\nthought of me as the subject of all experience, willing, and action, and\nif we try to take hold of it nothing more than this formula remains. Yet\nthe fact that the ego is the subject of all this, gives conduct, will, and\nexperience that peculiar character which distinguishes them from mere\naction and reaction. For it is directly certain that all the psychical\ncontents are not only co-existences in one consciousness but that they are\npossessed by it.\n\nThus in summing up we have to say, that it is through the ego that all\npsychical activities and experiences are centred and related, that the ego\nis itself the point of relation, that it is the reason of the unity of\nconsciousness and of the possibility of self-consciousness, and that in\nall this it is the most certain reality, without which the simplest\npsychical life would be impossible. At the same time, it is difficult to\nstate what the \u201cego\u201d is in itself, apart from the effects in which it\nreveals itself.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI. FREEDOM OF SPIRIT.\n\n\nThe consciousness of the ego leads us naturally to the consciousness of\nfreedom. Freedom of the mind is no simple idea; it embraces various\ncontents which bear the relation of stages to one another, and each higher\nstage presupposes the one below it. Freedom is, first of all, the word\nwhich expresses that we are really agents, not mere points of transit for\nphenomena foreign to ourselves, but starting-points of phenomena peculiar\nto us, actual causes, beings who are able to initiate activity, to control\nthings and set them in motion. Here the whole question of freedom becomes\nsimply the question of the reality and causality of the will. Is the will\nsomething really factual, or is it only the strange illusion to which\nSpinoza, for instance, referred in his illustration of the flying stone?\nIt would be purely an illusion of that kind if materialism were the true\ninterpretation of things, and the psychical were nothing more than an\naccompaniment of other \u201ctrue\u201d realities, and even if the doctrine of\npsychical atoms we have already mentioned were correct.\n\nThis idea of freedom speedily rises to a higher plane. Freedom is always\nfreedom from something, in this case from a compulsion coming from\noutside, and from things and circumstances foreign to us. In maintaining\nfreedom of the mind it is asserted that it can preserve its own nature and\nlaws in face of external compulsion or laws, and in face of the merely\npsychological compulsion of the \u201clower courses of thought,\u201d even from the\n\u201chalf-natural\u201d laws of the association of ideas. Thus \u201cfreedom\u201d is\npre-eminently freedom of thought. And in speaking thus we are presupposing\nthat the mind has a nature of its own, distinguished even from the purely\npsychological nature, and has a code of laws of its own, lying beyond the\nscope of all natural laws, which psychical motives and physical conditions\nmay prevent it following, but which they can never suspend or pull down to\ntheir own level.\n\n\u201cDer Mensch ist frei, und w\u00e4r\u2019 er in Ketten geboren.\u201d\n\nHere at last we arrive at what is so often exclusively, but erroneously,\nincluded under the name of freedom, or \u201cfreedom of the will,\u201d that is\npractical freedom, the freedom to recognise moral laws and ideals, and to\nform moral judgments against all psychological compulsion, and to will to\nallow ourselves to be determined by these. From this question of moral\nfreedom we might finally pass to that with which it is usual over-hastily\nto begin: the problem of so-called freedom of choice, of the \u201cequilibrium\u201d\nof the will, a problem in which are centred all the purely theoretical\ninterests of the doctrine of the will in general, and ethical interests in\nparticular. The whole domain is so enormous that we cannot even attempt to\nsketch it here. The general bearing of the whole can be made clearest at\nthe second stage, but we cannot entirely pass over the first.\n\nIn this inquiry into the problem of the will it is not necessary to\ndiscuss whether we are able by it to bring about external effects,\nmovements, and changes in our bodies. We may postpone this question once\nmore. The most important part of the problem lies in the domain of the\npsychical. To move an arm or a leg is a relatively unimportant function of\nthe will as compared with the deliberate adoption of a rule of conduct,\nwith inward self-discipline, self-culture, and the development of\ncharacter.\n\nThat we \u201cwill,\u201d and what it is to will, cannot really be demonstrated at\nall, or defended against attacks. It simply _is_ so. It is a fundamental\npsychical fact which can only be proved by being experienced. If there\nwere anywhere a will-less being, I could not prove to him that there is\nsuch a thing as will, because I could never make clear to him what will\nis. And the theories opposed to freedom of the will cannot be refuted in\nany way except by simply saying that they are false. They do not describe\nwhat really takes place in us. We do not find within ourselves either the\ncloud-shadows or the play of psychical, minima already referred to, with\ntheir crowding up of images, bringing some into prominence and displacing\nthem again while we remain passive\u2014we find ourselves _willing_. These\ntheories should at least be able to explain whence came this marvellous\nhallucination, this appearance of will in us, which must have its cause,\nand they should also be able to say whence came the idea of the will.\nSpinoza\u2019s example of the stone, which seemed to itself to fly when it was\nsimply thrown, does not meet the facts of the case. If the thrown stone\nhad self-consciousness, it would certainly not say, \u201cI am flying,\u201d but\nwould merely wonder, \u201cWhat has happened to me suddenly?\u201d\n\nWe cannot demonstrate what will is, we can only make it clear to ourselves\nby performing an act of will and observing ourselves in the doing of it.\nLet us compare, for instance, a psychical state which we call \u201cattention\u201d\nwith another which we call \u201cdistraction.\u201d In this last there is a stage\nwhere the will rests. There is actually an uninhibited activity of \u201cthe\nlower course of thought,\u201d a disconnected \u201cdreaming,\u201d a confused automatic\nmovement of thoughts and feelings according to purely associative laws.\nThen suddenly we pull ourselves together, rouse ourselves out of this\nstate of distraction. Something new comes into the course of our thoughts.\nIt is the will. Now there is control and definite guidance of our thoughts\nand rejection of subsidiary association\u2014ideas that thrust themselves upon\nus. Particular thoughts can be selected, particular feelings or mental\ncontents kept in focus as long as we desire. In thus selecting and guiding\nideas, in keeping them in mind or letting them go, we see the will in\naction.\n\nThis brings us to freedom of thought. This lies in the fact, not merely\nthat we can think, but that we can and desire to think rightly, and that\nwe are able to measure our thoughts by the standard of \u201ctrue\u201d or \u201cfalse.\u201d\nNaturalism is proud of the fact that it desires nothing more than to\nsearch after truth. To this it is ready to sacrifice all expressions of\nfeeling or sentiment, and all prejudices. The truth, the whole truth, and\nnothing but the truth is its ideal, even if all pet ideas have to give way\nbefore it. It usually saddles itself with the idea of the good and the\nbeautiful along with this \u201cidea of truth,\u201d but is resolved, since it must\nsoon see for itself that it is able to secure only a very doubtful basis\nfor these, to sacrifice them to truth if need be. This is worthy of\nhonour,(107) but it implies a curious self-deception. For if naturalism be\nin the right, thought is not free, and if thought be not free there can be\nno such thing as truth, for there can be no establishing of what truth is.\n\nLet us attempt to make this plain in the following manner: According to\nthe naturalistic-psychological theory, the play of our thoughts, our\nimpressions of things and properties, their combination in judgments or in\n\u201cperceptions,\u201d are dependent on physiological processes of the brain, and\ntherefore upon natural laws, or, according to some, on peculiar\nattractions and repulsions among the impressions themselves, regulated by\nthe laws of association. If that and that only were the case, I should be\nable to say that such a conception was present in my mind, or that this or\nthat thought had arisen in me, and I might perhaps be able to trace the\nconnection which made it necessary that it should arise at that particular\ntime. But every thought would be equally right. Or rather there could be\nno question of right or wrong in the matter at all. I could not forbid any\nthought to be there, could not compel it to make way for another, perhaps\nexactly its opposite. Yet I do this continually. I never merely observe\nwhat thoughts are in my own mind or in another\u2019s. For I have a constant\nideal, a plumb-line according to which I measure, or can measure, every\ntrain of thought. And I can compel others to apply this same plumb-line to\ntheir thoughts. This plumb-line is logic. It is the unique law of the mind\nitself which concerns itself about no law of nature or of association\nwhatsoever. And however mighty a flood of conceptions and associations may\nat times pour through me in consequence of various confused physiological\nstates of excitement affecting the brain, or in consequence of the\nfantastic dance of the associations of ideas, the ego is always able in\nfree thought to intervene in its own psychical experiences, and to test\nwhich combinations of ideas have been logically thought out and are\ntherefore right, and which are wrong. It often enough refrains from\nexercising this control, leaving the lower courses of thought free play.\nHence the mistakes in our thinking, the errors in judgment, the thousand\ninconsistencies and self-deceptions. But the mind can do otherwise, can\ndefend itself from interruptions and extraneous influences by making use\nof its freedom and of its power to follow its own laws and no others. It\nis thus possible for us to have not only psychical experiences but\nknowledge; only in this way can truth be reached, and error rejected. Thus\nscience can follow a sure course. Thus alone, for instance, could the\ngreat edifice of geometry and arithmetic have been built up in its\nindestructible certainty. The progress from axiom to theorem and to all\nthat follows is due to free thought, obeying the laws of inference and\ndemonstration, and entirely unconcerned about the laws of association or\nthe natural laws of the nervous agitations, the electric currents, and\nother plays of energy which may go on in the brain at the same time. What\nhave the laws of the syllogism to do with the temporary states of tension\nin the brain, which, if they had free course, would probably follow lines\nvery different from those of Euclid, and if they chanced once in a way to\nfollow the right lines from among the millions of possibilities, would\ncertainly soon turn to different ones, and could never examine them to see\nwhether they were right or not. Thus it is not any highly aspiring\nemotional desire or any premature prejudice, but the solid old science of\nlogic that first and most determinedly shuts the door in face of the\nclaims of naturalism. If we combine this with what has already been said\non page 154, we shall see how dangerous it would be for naturalism to be\nproved right in the dispute; for then it would be wholly wrong.\n\nFor, as it is only through the free, thinking mind that true and false can\nbe distinguished and brought into relation with things, so only through it\ncan we have an ideal of truth to be recognised and striven after, and that\nspontaneous, pertinacious, searching, following, and discovering which\nconstitutes science as a whole and in detail. And in so far as naturalism\nitself claims to be nothing more than an attempt towards this goal, it is\nitself only possible on the basis of something which it denies.\n\nFreedom of thought is also the most obvious example of that freedom of the\nspirit in morally \u201cwilling,\u201d which it is the business of ethical science\nto teach and defend. As in the one case thought shows itself superior to\nthe physiologically or psychologically conditioned sequence of its\nconcepts, so the free spirit, in the uniqueness of its moral laws, reveals\nitself as lord over all the motives, the lower feelings of pleasure and\npain that have their play within us. As in the one case it is free to\nmeasure according to the criteria of true or false, and thus is able to\nintervene in the sequence of its own conceptions, correcting and\nconfirming, so in the other it is able to estimate by the criteria of good\nor bad. As in the one case it carries within it its own fundamental laws\nas logic, so in the other the moral ideals and fundamental judgments which\narise out of its own being. And in both cases it is free from nature and\nnatural law, and capable of subordinating nature to its own rules, in so\nfar as it \u201cwills,\u201d and of becoming subordinate to nature\u2014in erroneous\nthinking and non-moral acting\u2014in so far as it does not will.\n\n\n\n\nFeeling, Individuality, Genius, and Mysticism.\n\n\nThe four things here mentioned are very closely associated with one\nanother, especially the second and third, as is easily perceived, but the\nsecond is rooted in the first. And in the second and third there is\nalready to be discovered a factor which goes beyond the sphere of the\npurely rational, and is no longer accessible to our comprehension, but\ncarries us over into the sphere of the fourth. This is really true even of\nthe phenomena of moral consciousness and moral \u201cfreedom.\u201d In this quality,\nand in the ethical ideal of \u201cpersonality,\u201d there is implied something that\nis inaccessible to a purely rational consideration, and is directly\nrelated to mystery and divination. (What is \u201cpersonality\u201d? We all feel it.\nWe respect it from the depths of our soul wherever we meet it. We bow down\nbefore it unconditionally. But what it is no philosophy has ever yet been\nable definitely to state. In seeking to comprehend it intuition and\nfeeling must always play the largest part.)\n\n\n\n\nFeeling.\n\n\nIt is in the four attributes here emphasised that the true nature of mind\nin its underivability and superiority to all nature first becomes clear.\nAll that we have so far considered under the name of mind is only\npreliminary and leads up to this. All reality of external things is of\nlittle account compared with that of the mind. It does not occur to any\none in practice to regard anything in the whole world as more real and\ngenuine than his own love and hate, fear and hope, his pain, from the\nsimplest discomfort due to a wound to the pangs of conscience and the\ngnawings of remorse\u2014his pleasure, from the merest comfort to the highest\nraptures of delight. This world of feeling is for us the meaning of all\nexistence. The more we plunge ourselves into it, the deeper are the\nintricacies and mysteries it reveals. At every point underivable and\nunintelligible in terms of physiological processes, it reveals itself from\nstage to stage as more deeply and wholly unique in its relations,\ninteractions, and processes, and grows farther and farther beyond the\nlaboured and insufficient schemes and formulas under which science desires\nto range all psychical phenomena.\n\n\n\n\nIndividuality.\n\n\nIt is especially in \u201cfeeling\u201d that what we call individuality has its\nroots. The individual really means the \u201cindivisible,\u201d and in the strict\nsense of the word need mean nothing more than the ego, and the unity of\nconsciousness of which we have already spoken. But through a change in the\nmeaning of the word we have come to mean much more than that by it. This\nindividuality forces itself most distinctly upon our attention in regard\nto prominent and distinguished persons. It is the particular determination\nof their psychical nature that marks them out so distinctly, and it often\nrather escapes analysis and characterisation than is attained by it.\n\u201cIndividuum est ineffabile.\u201d It can only be grasped intuitively and by\nexperience. And people of a non-reflective mood are usually more\nsuccessful in understanding it than those who reflect and analyse. It\nrequires \u201cfine feeling,\u201d which knows exactly how it stands towards the\nperson in question, which yet can seldom give any definite account of his\ncharacteristics. Individuality usually meets us most obviously in\nexceptional men, and we are apt to contrast these with ordinary men. But\non closer examination we see that this difference is only one of degree.\n\u201cIndividuality\u201d in a less marked manner belongs to them all, and where it\nexists it is a distinctly original thing, which cannot be derived from its\nantecedents. No psyche is simply derivable from other psyches. What a\nchild receives from its parents by \u201cheredity\u201d are factors which, taken\ntogether, amount to more than the mere sum of them. The synthesis of these\nis at once the creation of something new and peculiar, and what has been\nhanded down is merely the building material. This can be felt in an\nintensified and striking degree in regard to \u201cpronounced individuality,\u201d\nbut careful study will disclose the fact that there are no men quite\nalike. This kind of \u201ccreative synthesis,\u201d that is, the underivability of\nthe individual, was the element of truth in the mythologies of\n\u201ccreationism\u201d held by the Church fathers, or in the theory of the\n\u201cpre-existence of the soul\u201d maintained by Plato and others.\n\nAnd from this point of view we must safeguard what has already been said\nin regard to the culture and gradual development of our psychical inner\nnature. It is true that the \u201csoul\u201d does not spring up ready-made in the\ndeveloping body, lying dormant in it, and only requiring to waken up\ngradually. It really becomes. But the becoming is a self-realisation. It\nis not true that it is put together and built up bit by bit by experience,\nso that a different being might develop if the experiences were different.\nIt is undoubtedly dependent upon experience, impressions, and\ncircumstances, and without these its development would be impossible. But\nthese impressions act as a stimulus, developing only what is previously\ninherent. They do not themselves create anything. A characteristic\npredetermination restricts the development to comparatively narrow limits.\nAnd this is identical with the individuality itself. A man may turn out\nvery different according to circumstances, education, influences. But he\nwould nevertheless recognise \u201chimself\u201d under any circumstances. He will\nnever become anything of which he had not the possibility within him from\nthe very beginning, any more than the rose will become a violet if it is\nnurtured with a different kind of manure.\n\n\n\n\nGenius.\n\n\nWe cannot venture to say much about genius and the mystery of it. In it\nand its creative power something of the spirit, the nature of the spirit,\nseems to look up at us, as we might think of it in itself and apart from\nthe limits of existence in time and space. It is usually most obvious and\nmost accessible to us in the domain of art. But it has its place too in\nthe realm of science. And it is most of all genius, and therefore most\ninaccessible to us ordinary mortals, in the domain of religion.\n\n\n\n\nMysticism.\n\n\nEven \u201cpronounced individuality\u201d \u201chas an element of mysticism\u201d in it\u2014of the\nnon-rational, which we feel the more distinctly the more decidedly we\nreject all attempts to make it rational again through crude or subtle\nmythologies. This is much more true of genius, artistic insight, and\ninspiration. But these are much too delicate to be exposed to the\nbuffeting of controversy, much more so the dark and mysterious boundary\nregion in the life of the human spirit which we know under the name of\nmysticism in the true sense, without inverted commas. It is not a subject\nthat is adapted for systematic treatment. Where it has been subjected to\nit, everything becomes crude and repulsive, a mere caricature of pure\nmysticism like the recrudescent occultism of to-day. Therefore it is\nenough simply to call the attention of the sympathetic reader to it and\nthen to pass it by. In face of the witness borne to it by all that is\nfinest and deepest in history, especially in the history of religion,\nnaturalism is powerless.\n\n\n\n\nMind and Spirit. The Human and the Animal Soul.\n\n\nWhat is the relation between the human and the animal mind? This has\nalways been a vital question in the conflict between naturalism and the\nreligious outlook. And as in the whole problem of the psychical so here\nthe interest on both sides has been mainly concentrated on the question of\n\u201cmortality\u201d or \u201cimmortality.\u201d Man is immortal because he has a soul.\nAnimals \u201chave no souls.\u201d \u201cAnimals also have souls, differing only in\ndegree but not in substantial nature from the soul of man: as they are\nmortal, man must be so too.\u201d \u201cAnimals have minds: the merely psychical\npasses away with the body. But man has spirit in addition. It is\nimperishable.\u201d These and many other assertions were made on one side or\nthe other. And both sides made precisely the same mistake: they made the\nbelief in the immortality of our true nature dependent upon a proof that\nthe soul has a physical \u201csubstantial nature,\u201d which is to be regarded as\nan indestructible substance, a kind of spiritual atom. And on the other\nhand they overlooked the gist of the whole matter, the true\nstarting-point, which cannot be overlooked if the religious outlook is not\nto be brought into discredit. It is undoubtedly a fundamental postulate,\nand one which the religious outlook cannot give up, that the human spirit\nis more than all creatures, and is in quite a different order from stars,\nplants, and animals. But absolutely the first necessity from the point of\nview of the religious outlook is to establish the incomparable value of\nthe human spirit; the question of its \u201csubstantial nature\u201d is in itself a\nmatter of entire indifference. The religious outlook observes that man can\nwill good and can pray, and no other creature can do this. And it sees\nthat this makes the difference between two worlds. Whether the bodily and\nmental physics in both these worlds is the same or different, is to it a\nmatter rather of curiosity than of importance.\n\nWhat occurs or does not occur within the animal mind is, as a matter of\nfact, wholly hidden from us. We have no way of determining this except by\nanalogy with ourselves, and therefore our idea of it is necessarily\nanthropomorphic. And apologists are undoubtedly right when they maintain\nthat this is far too much the case. To reach a more unprejudiced attitude\ntowards the customary anthropomorphisation of animals, it is profitable to\nstudy Wundt\u2019s lectures on \u201cThe Human and the Animal Mind\u201d (see especially\nLecture XX.). Perhaps it is true that, notwithstanding all the\nmuch-praised cleverness, intelligence and teachableness of elephants,\ndogs, and chimpanzees, they are incapable of forming \u201cgeneral ideas,\u201d\n\u201crules,\u201d and \u201claws,\u201d of forming judgments in the strict sense, and\nconstructive syllogisms, that they have only associations of ideas, and\nexpectations of similar experience, but no thinking in conceptual terms,\nand cannot perceive anything general or necessary, that they recognise _\u00e0\nposteriori_ but not _\u00e0 priori_, as Leibnitz supposed, and that they form\nonly perceptual inferences, not judgments from experience. But it is not\neasy to see that this contributes anything of importance to our problem.\nIt does not even help us in regard to the interesting question of a\nphysical guarantee for the indestructibility of the soul. For even if the\npsychical acts of animals were fewer and less important than they are\nadmitted to be, they have certainly sensations, images, feelings,\npleasure, pain, and desire. All these are of a psychical nature,\nimmaterial, and underivable from the material. And it is difficult to see,\nfor instance, why the forming of judgments should be regarded as more\ndurable and indestructible than sensation and desire. The difference lies\nhigher than this,\u2014not in the fact that man has a few \u201ccapacities\u201d more\nthan the animal, but in the difference in principle, that the psychical in\nman can be developed to spirit, and that this is impossible anywhere else.\nThe very example that naturalism loves to cite in its own favour makes its\nerror clear. It asks whether the difference, let us say, between a Fuegian\nand one of the higher mammals such as an ape, is not much less than that\nbetween a Fuegian and a European. This sounds obvious, if we measure\nsimply by habits, morals, and possibly also the content of feeling and\nimagination in a \u201csavage\u201d as we find him. And yet it is obviously false. I\ncan _train_ a young ape or an elephant, can teach it to open wine-bottles\nand perform tricks. But I can _educate_ the child of the savage, can\ndevelop in him a mental life equal in fineness, depth, and energy,\nfrequently more than equal, to that of the average European, as the\nmission to the Eskimos and to the Fuegians proves, and as Darwin frankly\nadmitted. Psychical capacity is nothing more than raw material. It is in\nthe possibility of raising this to the level of spirit, of using the raw\nmaterial to its purpose, that the absolute difference, the impassable gulf\nbetween man and animals lies.\n\nEven in animals there is a primitive thinking, rising above the level of\nblind instinct. But it can neither be schooled, nor is it capable of\ndeveloping even the crudest beginnings of science. Even the animal has a\nsensory satisfaction in colour, form and tone (not nearly so much,\nhowever, as the theory of sexual selection requires us to suppose). But\nart, even the most rudimentary self-expression of the spirit upon this\nbasis, is wholly sealed to it. Even the animal possesses strong altruistic\ninstincts, impulses towards companionship, pairing, and caring for its\nyoung, and some have seen in this the beginnings of morality. But morality\nis a matter of the spirit, which begins with the idea of duty and rises to\nthe recognition of an ideal of life. Nowhere else do we see so directly\nand emphatically the incomparability of the natural-psychical and the\nspiritual as in the idea of duty and an ideal of life, although the\ncontrast is equally great at all points of the spiritual life.\n\nFinally and highest of all, we have the capacity of the human spirit to\nrise to religion and the greatest heights of feeling. In science and art,\nin morality and religion, the spirit possesses itself. And as such it is a\nunique and strange guest in this world, absolutely incomparable with\nanything beneath or around it. It may, perhaps, be true that the psychical\ndifference between the ape and man is smaller than that between the ape\nand unicellular organisms (though we really can know nothing about that).\nBut nowhere in the animal world does the psychical overstep the limits of\npurely natural existence, of striving after and being prompted by the\ndirectly and purely natural ends of a vegetative and animal instinctive\nlife, physical pleasure, self-preservation, and the maintenance of the\nspecies.\n\nAnd there is more than this. However different the psychical equipment may\nbe at different animal stages, it has one thing in common in them all, it\nis absolutely limited to what is given it by nature. An animal species may\nlast for a million years. But it has no history. It is and remains the\nsame history-less natural product. In this respect the animal is not a\nstep in advance of the stone or the crystal. The only thing it can achieve\nis to express more or less perfectly the character of the species. This is\nthe utmost height of its capacity. But for man this is only the\nstarting-point, and the really human begins just there. What is implicit\nin him as _homo sapiens_, a member of a zoological order, is nothing more\nthan the natural basis upon which, in human and individual history, he may\nbuild up an entirely unique and new creation, an upper story: the world\nand life of the spirit.\n\nIt is also erroneous to regard the gradual development of the psychical\ncapacities at the different levels of animal evolution as the development\nof and preparation for the human spirit. It is not the spirit, but the raw\nmaterial of it, that is thus being prepared and developed. It is as if, in\nthe history of colour manufacture, an \u201cevolution\u201d of colour were taking\nplace. The quality of the colour gradually becomes better and better. Each\ngeneration learns to make it purer and more brilliant. But the painting\nwhich is painted with the most brilliant colour cannot be regarded as a\nlink in the evolutionary sequence, and is certainly not the crown and\nculmination of the pigment; the latter is only the gradual perfecting of a\nnecessary preliminary condition.\n\nIt is only of secondary interest to point out the immense leaps in the\nevolution of colour and colour-technique, and especially the vast\ndifference between the last stage and the one before it, or, to drop the\nmetaphor, the enormous psychological differences between the animal and\nthe human mind.\n\nThere is no doubt that an apologetic which interests itself in such\nmatters would find abundant opportunity for work, and could find a\npowerful argument against a too hasty naturalism in the differences\nbetween animal and human psychical capacities, which have been recognised\nmuch more sanely and clearly through recent investigation than they\nusually were in earlier times. But the question has no special interest\nfor us here.\n\n\n\n\nPersonality.\n\n\nIn as far as man is endowed with a capacity for spiritual life and\nspiritual possession, he is likewise destined for personality. This\nincludes and designates everything that expresses the peculiar dignity of\nhuman nature. Personality is a word which gives us an inward thrill. It\nexpresses what is most individual in us, what is set before us, our\nhighest task and the inmost tendency of our being. What is personality?\nCertainly something which is only a rudiment in us at birth, and is not\nthen realised, and at the same time an ideal which we feel more or less\nindistinctly, but without being able to outline it clearly. To exhaust the\nidea as far as possible is the task of ethical science. But one thing at\nany rate we can affirm about it with certainty: it is absolutely bounded\noff from the whole world and all existence as a self-contained and\nindependent world in itself. The more we become persons, the more clearly,\ndefinitely, and indissolubly we raise ourselves with our spiritual life\nand spiritual possessions out of all the currents of natural phenomena,\nthe more do we cease to be mere modes of a general existence and happening\nthat flows about us, and in which we would otherwise float with vaguely\ndefined outlines. A microcosm forms itself in contradistinction to the\nmacrocosm, and a unity, a monad, arises, in regard to which there is now\nwarrant for inquiring into its duration and immortality as compared with\nthe stream of general becoming and passing away. For what does it matter\nto religion whether, in addition to physical indivisible atoms, there are\nspiritual ones which, by reason of their simplicity, are indestructible?\nBut that the unities which we call personalities are superior to all the\nmanifoldness and diversity of the world, that they are not fleeting\nfortuitous formations among the many which evolution is always giving rise\nto and breaking down again, but that they are the aim and meaning of all\nexistence, and that as such they are above the common lot of all that has\nonly a transient meaning and a temporal worth\u2014to inquire into all this and\nto affirm it is religion itself.\n\n\n\n\nParallelism.\n\n\nThe independence and underivability of the psychical, the incomparability\nof its uniformities with those of mechanical or physico-chemical laws, has\nproved itself so clear and incontrovertible, notwithstanding all the\ndistortions of naturalism, that it is now regarded as a self-evident fact,\nnot only among philosophers and epistemologists, and technical\npsychologists, but for the last decade even among all thinking men, and\n\u201cmaterialism\u201d is now an obsolete position. It was too crude and too\ncontrary to all experience to define the relation between physical and\nmental, as if the latter were a mere secretion of the former, although a\nvery subtle one, or a mere epi-phenomenon of it, in such a way that all\nreality and effectiveness was on the side of the physical.\n\nIn place of this, another theory has become widespread, which claims to\ndefine the relation of the two series of phenomena better and more\nadequately: the theory of psychophysical parallelism. It is not new. There\nare occasional indications of it even in Aristotle\u2019s psychology. It was\nsuggested by Descartes in his automaton theory, by the occasionalists in\ntheir parable of the two watches running in exact agreement; it was\ndeveloped by Spinoza and Leibnitz, and refined by the idealistic\nphilosophers, by Schopenhauer, Fechner, and the modern psychologists. The\nform in which it is most prevalent now is that given to it by Spinoza, and\nhe is usually referred to in connection with it. Its general tenor is as\nfollows: The physical cannot be referred back to the psychical, nor the\npsychical to the physical. Both orders of phenomena run side by side as\nparallels that never separate. Both represent a concatenation of causes\ncomplete in itself, that is never broken, or interrupted, or completed.\nAnd in both there is real causality. Thought really causes thoughts and\nfeelings. Movement really causes movements. But the one series is always\nstrictly correlated with the other, and corresponds with it. And thus all\nexistence is double, and man is an obvious illustration of this. To every\nthought, feeling, or exercise of will there corresponds some excitement,\nmovement or change in the body. I will: my arm moves. Subtle nervous\nprocesses run their course in my brain, and I think. That I will has its\nsufficient reasons, its causes lie entirely in the preceding state of my\nmind, in motives of feeling, in ideas which again have their efficient\ncauses in a previous psychical condition, and so on. And that my arm moves\nhas its efficient cause in the stored-up energies of the muscle-substance,\nin the stimulus and impulse conveyed by the motor nerve from the brain.\nAnd these conditions have their purely physiological causes and reasons\nagain in preceding purely physiological states and processes. (It goes\nwithout saying that a mechanical theory of life is the necessary\npresupposition of this parallelistic theory.) But both sets of processes\ncorrespond exactly one to another, and the first is only the inner aspect\nof the second, and the second the outer aspect of the first. Thus it is\nquite true that my arm moves when I will. But in reality it is quite as\ntrue to say that when my arm moves I will. But we must not substitute\n\u201cbecause\u201d for \u201cwhen.\u201d This theory must maintain, and does maintain, that\neven the most abstract and subtle ideas, the deepest processes of\nconsciousness, have some corresponding bodily processes, either in the\nbrain or in the nervous substance generally, and, on the other hand, that\nno physical process is without this psychical inwardness. The result is\nthat this inwardness and soul are attributed also to the purely material\nworld, the world of \u201cdead\u201d matter. In this way it is believed that\neverything gets its due; the thorough mechanical explicability of bodily\nphenomena, and the law of the conservation of energy and of matter, and,\non the other hand, very decisively also, the independence and uniqueness\nof law which can no longer be denied to the psychical. And from this\nlatter standpoint sharp protests are raised against all materialistic\ndistortions. The only thing denied is the old idea of the \u201cinfluxus\nphysicus,\u201d the idea, that is, that mind can operate beyond itself and take\neffect on the physical world, and conversely the physical world upon it.\nThis again is regarded as a breach of the law of the conservation of\nenergy. For if the bodily affects consciousness, then at a given moment a\ncertain amount of energy must be transformed into something that is not\nenergy. And if consciousness affects the bodily, a process of movement\nmust suddenly occur, for which no previous equivalent of energy can be\nshown.\n\nThis standpoint is most impressively set forth in Paulsen\u2019s widely read\n\u201cIntroduction to Philosophy.\u201d The same ideas form the central feature in\nthe work of Fechner, which is having such a marked renaissance to-day.\n\nIt seems as though all higher estimates of spirit, even the religious\nestimate, could quite well rest upon this basis. For full scope is here\ngiven to the idea that mind and the mental sciences have their own\nparticular field. God, as the absolute all-consciousness and\nself-consciousness, comprehending within Himself all individual\nconsciousness, is thought of as the eternal correlate of this universe in\nspace. And the theory has room also for a belief in immortality. Of all\nimaginative attempts to make the idea of immortality clear and possible,\nundoubtedly that of Fechner is the grandest and most effective. And it,\ntoo, is based entirely upon the idea of parallelism. (Yet as a matter of\nfact it could be shown that neither mortality nor immortality really fit\ninto the scheme of this conception.)\n\nThough its main features are very similar as set forth by its various\nchampions, this theory differs according to the way in which this\nastonishing and mysterious co-ordination, this parallelism itself, is\nexplained. How is it that \u201cthought\u201d and \u201cextension\u201d can correspond to one\nanother?\n\nThe answer may be either na\u00efvely dogmatic, that this is one of the great\nriddles of the universe, and that we must simply take it for granted.\nOthers declare with Spinoza that the two series of phenomena are only the\ntwo sides of one and the same fundamental being and happening, which may\nbe designated as _natura sive deus_, and that what is inwardly unified\nexpresses itself outwardly in these two forms of being. But because both\nsides, thought and extension, are only expressions of one and the same\nfundamental substance, they correspond exactly to one another. The best\nillustration of this is Fechner\u2019s simile of the curved line. It is concave\non one side, convex on the other, and thus entirely different on the two\nsides. But at every point the concavity corresponds exactly to the\nconvexity. And this is possible because the two are the inner and the\nouter aspects of the same line.\n\nOthers, again, go back to the fundamental ideas of critical idealism, and\ndeclare the whole extended world accessible to the senses and the\nmechanical-physical nexus of cause and phenomena, to be simply the form of\nappearance in which the fundamentally spiritual existence presents itself\nto our senses. Body, movement, physiological processes, are all nothing\nmore than the will, to speak with Fichte and Schopenhauer, or the idea, or\nthe spirit itself, which appears thus to sensory beings. Other theories,\nsome of them new, are also put forward.\n\n\n\n\nNo Parallelism.\n\n\nFor a long time it seemed as if the theory of parallelism was to gain\ngeneral acceptance. One might write a whole history of the gradually\nincreasing criticisms of, and reactions from the academic theories which\nhad become almost canonical. But we may here confine ourselves to the most\ngeneral of the objections to the parallelistic theory. They apply to the\ngeneral idea of parallelism itself, and affect the different standpoints\nof the parallelists in different degrees. The theory in no way corresponds\nto what we find in ourselves from direct experience. It is only with the\ngreatest difficulty that we can convince ourselves that our arm moves only\nwhen and not because we will. The consciousness of being, through the\nwill, the actual cause of our own bodily movements is so energetic and\ndirect and certain, that it maintains its sway in spite of all objections,\nand confuses the argument even of the parallelists themselves. Usually\nafter they have laid the foundations of a purely parallelistic theory,\nthey abandon it again as quickly as possible, and revert to the\nexpressions and images of ordinary thought. Indeed we have no clearer and\nmore certain example of causality in general than in our own capacity for\ncontrolling changes in our own bodies. Further, a very fatal addition and\nburdensome accessory of the parallelistic theory is involved in the two\ncorollaries it has above and beneath it. On the one hand there is the\nnecessity for attributing soul to everything. These mythologies of\natom-souls, molecule-souls, this hatred and love which are the inner\naspects even of the simple facts of attraction and repulsion among the\nelements, fit better into the nature-philosophy of Empedocles and\nAnaxagoras than into ours. The main support, indeed the sole support, of\nthis position is that this world of the infinitely little cannot be\nbrought under control as far as its \u201csoul\u201d is concerned. Thus we can\nimpute \u201ca soul\u201d to it without danger. On the other hand, there is a\ndifficulty which made itself felt even in regard to Spinoza\u2019s system. All\nbodily processes must have psychical processes corresponding to them, said\nSpinoza. Conversely, all ideas in their turn must have bodily processes.\nTo the system including all bodily processes corresponds the sum-total of\npsychical processes. This sum-total we call the soul. And in its entirety\nit is the _idea corporis_. If \u201csoul\u201d were really nothing more than this,\nthe theory of parallelism might be right. But it is more than this. It\nrises above itself, and becomes also the _idea ide\u00e6_; it is\nself-consciousness and the consciousness of the ego; it makes its own\nthought and the laws of it, its feelings and their intensity\u2014its\nexperiences in short\u2014a subject of thought. How does this fit in with\nparallelism? Wundt himself, the most notable modern champion of\nparallelism, admits and defines these limits of the parallelistic theory\non both sides.\n\nFurthermore, the theory of parallelism, notwithstanding its opposition to\nmaterialism, must presuppose that localisation of psychical processes of\nwhich we have already spoken, and to which all naturalism appeals with so\nmuch emphasis. Because of the fact that particular psychical functions\nseem to be limited to a particular and definable area of the brain-cortex,\nor to a spot which could be isolated on a particular convolution, it\nseemed as if naturalism could prove that \u201csoul\u201d was obviously a function\nof this particular organ or part of an organ. According to the theory of\nparallelism this does not follow. It would assert: \u201cWhat in one aspect\nappears to be a psychical process, appears in another aspect to be a\ndefinite physiological process of the brain.\u201d Yet it is clear that in\norder to gain support for the doctrine of mutual correspondence,\nparallelism has also the same interest in such localisation. For this is\nthe only method by which it can empirically control its theory. But this\nwhole idea of localisation does not hold good to anything like the extent\nto which the members of the naturalistic school are wont to assert that it\ndoes. In regard to this point, too, there has been considerable\ndisillusioning in recent years. Perhaps all that can be said is, that\nlocalisation of psychical processes is a fact analogous to the fact that\nsight is associated with the optic nerves and hearing with the auditory\nnerves. Progressive investigation leads more and more clearly to the\nrecognition of a fact which makes localisation comparatively unimportant,\nnamely, the vicarious functioning of different parts of the brain. In many\ncases where this or that \u201ccentre\u201d is injured, and rendered incapable of\nfunction, or even extirpated, the corresponding part of the mind is by no\nmeans destroyed along with it. At first the mind may suffer from \u201cthe\neffect of shock\u201d as the phrase runs, but gradually it may recover and the\nsame function may be transferred to another part of the brain, and there\nbe fulfilled sometimes less perfectly, sometimes quite as perfectly as\nbefore. We had to deal with this fact of vicarious function in discussing\nthe general theory of life. It is one of the greatest difficulties in the\nway of the mechanistic and materialistic theories. But it must give some\ntrouble to the parallelists too.\n\nWe need not speak of the wonderful duplication of all existence which\nparallelism must establish, though it is difficult to evade the question\nhow a _natura sive deus_ could have come, so superfluously, to say the\nsame thing twice over. Superfluously, for since both are alike\nself-contained and independent of one another, one can have no need of the\nother.\n\nOne objection, however, may be urged against both parallelism and\nmaterialism, which makes them both impossible, and that is, automatism.\nBoth parallelism and materialism maintain that the sequence of physical\nprocesses is complete in itself and can be explained in terms of itself.\n_All_ physical processes! Not only the movements of the stars, the changes\nin inanimate matter, the origin and evolution of the forms of life, but\nalso what we call actions, for instance the movements of our arms and our\nlegs, and the complicated processes affecting the breathing organs and\ntongue, which we call \u201cspeech.\u201d Every plant, every animal, every human\nbeing must be as it is and where it is, must move and act, must perform\nits functions, which we explain as due to love or hate, to fear or hope,\neven if there were no such thing as sensation, will, idea, neither love\nnor hate, fear nor hope. More than this, all that we call history,\nbuilding towns and destroying them, carrying on war and concluding peace,\nuniting into states and holding national assemblies, going to school and\nexercising mouth and tongue, argument, making books and forming letters,\nwriting Iliads, Bibles, and treatises on the soul or on free will, holding\npsychological congresses and talking about parallelism;\u2014all this must have\nbeen done even if there had been no consciousness, no psychical activity\nin any brain! This is the necessary consequence to which the theories of\nparallelism and materialism lead. If it does not follow, then there was\nfrom the outset no meaning in establishing them. But the monstrosity of\ntheir corollary is fatal to them. It is idle to set up theories in which\nit is impossible to believe.\n\nThere is another consideration that affects parallelism alone. Since the\ntheory credits each of the two series with a closed and sufficient causal\nsequence, each of which excludes the other, it does away with causality\naltogether. That the one line runs parallel with the other excludes the\nidea that a unique system of laws prevails, determining the character and\ncourse of each line. One of the two lines must certainly be dependent, and\none must lead. Otherwise there can be no distinctness of laws in either.\nLet us recall our illustration of the cloud shadows once more; the\nchanging forms of the shadows correspond point for point with those of the\nclouds only because they are entirely dependent upon them. We may\nillustrate it in this way: a parallel may be drawn to an ellipse, it also\nforms a closed curved line. But it is by no means again an ellipse, but is\nan entirely dependent figure without any formula or law of its own.\nParallelism must make one of its lines the leading one, which is guided\nand directed by an actual causal connection within itself. The other line\nmay then run parallel with this, but its course must certainly be\ndetermined by the other. And as the line of corporeal processes, with its\ninviolable nexus of sequences, is not easily broken, parallelism, after\nmany hard words against materialism, frequently returns to that again or\nbecomes inconsistent. But if one says that the two aspects of phenomena\nare only the forms of one fundamental phenomenon, that means taking away\nactual causality from both alike, and leaving only a temporal sequence.\nFor then the actually real is the hidden something that throws the\ncloud-shadows to right and left. But in the sequence of shadows there is\nno causal connection, only a series of states succeeding one another in\ntime, and this points to a causal connection elsewhere.\n\nIt is easy enough to find examples to prove that the mental in us\ninfluences the bodily. But the most convincing, deepest and most\ntrustworthy of these are not the voluntary actions which are expressed in\nbodily movements, nor even the passions and emotions, the joy which makes\nour blood circulate more quickly, and the shame which brings a flush to\nour foreheads, the suggestions which work through the mind towards the\nreviving, vitalising or healing of the body, but the cold and simple\ncourse of logical thought itself. Through logical thinking we have the\npower to correct the course of our conceptions, to inhibit, modify, or\nlogically direct the natural course, as it would have been had it been\nbrought about by our preceding physiological and psychical states, if they\nwere dominant and uncontrolled. But if so, then we must also have the\npower, especially if it be widely true that physiological states\ncorrespond to psychical states, to influence, inhibit, modify the\nnerve-processes in our brain, or to liberate entirely new ones, namely,\nthose that correspond to the corrected conceptions.\n\nThe law of the conservation of energy is here applied in as distorted a\nsense as we detected before in regard to the general theory of life. And\nwhat we said there holds good here also. That something which is in itself\nnot energetic should determine processes and directions of energy is\nundoubtedly an absolute riddle. But to recognise this is less difficult\nthan to accept the impossibilities which mechanism and automatism offer us\nhere, even more pronouncedly than in regard to the theory of life. Perhaps\none of the familiar antinomies of Kant shows us the way, not, indeed, to\nfind the solution of the riddle, but to recognise, so to speak, its\ngeometrical position and associations. We have already seen that inquiry\ninto the causal conditions of processes lands us in contradictions of\nthought, which show us that we can never really penetrate into the actual\nstate of the matter.\n\nPerhaps we have here to do only with the obverse side of the problem dealt\nwith there. There the chain of conditions could not be finished because it\nled on to infinity, where, however, it was required that it should be\ncomplete. Here again the chain is incomplete. In the previous case a\nsolution is found through the na\u00efve proceeding of simply breaking the\nempirical connection of conditions and postulating beginnings in time. In\nthis case, the admission of an _influxus physicus_ transforms\nconsciousness almost unnoticed into a mechanically operative causality.\nThe proper attitude in both cases is a critical one. We must admit that we\ncannot penetrate into the true state of the case, because the world is\ndeeper than our knowledge, we must reject parallelism as being, like the\n_influxus physicus_, an unsatisfactory cutting of the critical knot, and\nwe must frankly recognise the incontrovertible fact, never indeed\nseriously called in question, of the controlling power of the mind, even\nover the material.\n\n\n\n\nThe Supremacy of Mind.\n\n\nFrom the standpoint we have now reached we can look back once more on\nthose troublesome naturalistic insinuations as to the dependence of the\nmind upon the body, which we have already considered. It is evident to us\nall that our mental development and the fate of our inner life are closely\nbound up with the states and changes of the body. And it did not need the\nattacks and insinuations of naturalism to point this out. But the reasons\nbrought forward by naturalism are not convincing, and all the weighty\nfacts it adduces could be balanced by facts equally weighty on the other\nside. We have already shown that the apparently dangerous doctrine of\nlocalisation is far from being seriously prejudicial. But if the\ndependence of the mind upon the body be great, that of the body upon the\nmind is greater still. Even Kant wrote tersely and drily about \u201cthe power\nof our mind through mere will to be master over our morbid feelings.\u201d And\nevery one who has a will knows how much strict self-discipline and firm\nwilling can achieve even with a frail and wretched body, and handicapped\nby exhaustion and weakness. Joy heals, care wastes away, and both may\nkill. The influence which \u201cblood\u201d and \u201cbile\u201d or any other predisposition\nmay have upon temperament and character can be obviated or modified\nthrough education, or transformed and guided into new channels through\nstrong psychical impressions and experiences, most of all by great\nexperiences in the domain of morals and religion. No one doubts the\nreality of those great internal revolutions of which religion is well\naware, which arise purely from the mind, and are able to rid us of all\nnatural bonds and burdens. This mysterious region of the influence of the\nmind in modifying bodily states or producing new ones is in these days\nbeing more and more opened up. That grief can turn the hair grey and\ndisgust bring out eruptions on the skin has long been known. But new and\noften marvellous facts are being continually added to our knowledge\nthrough curious experiments with suggestion, hypnosis, and\nauto-suggestion. And we are no longer far from believing that through\nexaltations, forced states of mind associated with auto-suggestion, many\nphenomena, such as \u201cstigmata,\u201d for instance, which have hitherto been over\nhastily relegated to the domain of pious legend, may possibly have a\n\u201cscientific\u201d background.\n\n\n\n\n\u201cThe Unconscious\u201d.\n\n\nBut one has a repugnance to descending into this strange region. And\nreligion, with its clear and lofty mood, can never have either taste for\nor relationship with considerations which so easily take an \u201coccult\u201d turn.\nNor is its mysticism concerned with physiologies. But it is instructive\nand noteworthy that the old idealistic faith, \u201cIt is the mind that builds\nup the body for itself,\u201d is becoming stronger again in all kinds of\nphilosophies and physiologies of \u201cthe unconscious,\u201d as a reaction from the\nonesidedness of the mechanistic theories, and that it draws its chief\nsupport from the dependence of nervous and other bodily processes upon the\npsychical, which is being continually brought into greater and greater\nprominence. The moderate and luminous views of the younger Fichte, who\nprobably also first introduced the now current term \u201cthe unconscious,\u201d\nmust be at least briefly mentioned. According to him, the impulse towards\nthe development of form which is inherent in everything living, and which\nbuilds up the organism from the germ to the complete whole, by forcing the\nchemical and physical processes into particular paths, is identical with\nthe psychical itself. In instincts, the unconscious purposive actions of\nthe lower animals in particular, he sees only a special mode of this at\nfirst unconscious psychical nature, which, building up organ after organ,\nmakes use in doing so of all the physical laws and energies, and is at\nfirst wholly immersed in purely physiological processes. It is only after\nthe body has been developed, and presents a relatively independent system\ncapable of performing the necessary functions of daily life, that it rises\nbeyond itself and gradually unfolds to conscious psychical life in\nincreasing self-realisation. Edward von Hartmann has attempted to apply\nthis principle of the unconscious as a principle of all cosmic existence.\nAnd wherever, among the younger generation of biologists, one has broken\naway from the fascinations of the mechanistic theory, he has usually\nturned to \u201cpsychical\u201d co-operating factors.\n\n\n\n\nIs there Ageing of the Mind?\n\n\nNaturalism is also only apparently right in asserting that the mind ages\nwith the body. To learn the answer which all idealism gives to this\ncomfortless theory, it is well to read Schleiermacher\u2019s \u201cMonologues,\u201d and\nespecially the chapter \u201cYouth and Age.\u201d The arguments put forward by\nnaturalism, the blunting of the senses, the failing of the memory, are\nwell known. But here again there are luminous facts on the other side\nwhich are much more true. It is no wonder that a mind ages if it has never\ntaken life seriously, never consolidated itself to individual and definite\nbeing through education and self-culture, through a deepening of morality,\nand has gained for itself no content of lasting worth. How could he do\notherwise than become poor, dull and lifeless, as the excitability of his\norgan diminishes and its susceptibility to external impressions\ndisappears? But did Goethe become old? Did not Schleiermacher, frail and\nailing as he was by nature, prove the truth of what he wrote in his youth,\nthat there is no ageing of the mind?\n\nThe whole problem, in its highest aspects, is a question of will and\nfaith. If I know mind and the nature of mind, and believe in it, I believe\nwith Schleiermacher in eternal youth. If I do not believe in it, then I\nhave given away the best of all means for warding off old age. For the\nmind can only hold itself erect while trusting in itself. And this is the\nbest argument in the whole business.\n\nBut even against the concrete special facts and the observable processes\nof diminution of psychical powers, and of the disappearance of the whole\nmental content, we could range other concrete and observable facts, which\npresent the whole problem in quite a different light from that in which\nnaturalism attempts to show it. They indicate that the matter is rather\none of the rusting of the instrument to which the mind is bound than an\nactual decay of the mind itself, and that it is a withdrawing of the mind\nwithin itself, comparable rather to sleep than to decay. The remarkable\npower of calling up forgotten memories in hypnosis, the suddenly\nre-awakening memory a few minutes before death, in which sometimes the\nwhole past life is unrolled with surprising clearness and detail, the\nflaming up anew of a rusty mind in moments of great excitement, the great\nclearing up of the mind before its departure, and many other facts of the\nsame nature, are rather to be regarded as signs that in reality the mind\nnever loses anything of what it has once experienced or possessed. It has\nonly become buried under the surface. It has been withdrawn from the\nstage, but is stored up in safe treasure-chambers. And the whole stage may\nsuddenly become filled with it again.\n\nThe simile of an instrument and the master who plays upon it, which is\noften used of the relation between body and mind, is in many respects a\nvery imperfect one; for the master does not develop with and in his\ninstrument. But in regard to the most oppressive arguments of naturalism,\nthe influence of disease, of old age, of mental disturbances due to brain\nchanges, the comparison serves our turn well enough, for undoubtedly the\nmaster is dependent upon his instrument; upon an organ which is going more\nand more out of tune, rusting, losing its pipes, his harmonies will become\npoorer, more imperfect. And if we think of the association between the two\nas further obstructed, the master becoming deaf, the stops confused, the\nrelation between the notes and pipes altered, then what may still live\nwithin him in perfect and unclouded purity, and in undiminished richness,\nmay present itself outwardly as confused and unintelligible, may even find\nonly disconnected expression, and finally cease altogether; so that no\nconclusion would be possible except that the master himself had become\ndifferent or poorer. The melancholy field of mental diseases perhaps\nyields proofs against naturalism to an even greater degree than for it. It\nis by no means the case that all mental diseases are invariably diseases\nof the brain, for even more frequently they are real sicknesses of the\nmind, which yield not to physical but to psychical remedies. And the fact\nthat the mind can be ill, is a sad but emphatic proof that it goes its own\nway.\n\n\n\n\nImmortality.\n\n\nIt is in a faith in a Beyond, and in the immortality of our true being,\nthat what lies finely distributed through all religion sums itself up and\ncomes to full blossoming: the certainty that world and existence are\ninsufficient, and the strong desire to break through into the true being,\nof which at the best we have here only a foretaste and intuition. The\ndoctrine of immortality stands by itself as a matter of great solemnity\nand deep rapture. If it is to be talked about, both speaker and hearers\nought to be in an exalted mood. It is the conviction which, of all\nreligious convictions, can be least striven for consciously; it must well\nforth from devotional personal experience of the spirit and its dignity,\nand thus can maintain itself without, and indeed against much reasoning.\nTo educate and cultivate it in us requires a discipline of meditation, of\nconcentration, and of spiritual self-culture from within outwards. If we\nunderstood better what it meant to \u201clive in the spirit,\u201d to develop the\nreceptivity, fineness, and depth of our inner life, to listen to and\ncultivate what belongs to the spirit, to inform it with the worth and\ncontent of religion and morality, and to integrate it in the unity and\ncompleteness of a true personality, we should attain to the certainty that\npersonal spirit is the fundamental value and meaning of all the confused\nplay of evolution, and is to be estimated on quite a different scale from\nall other being which is driven hither and thither in the stream of\nBecoming and Passing away, having no meaning or value because of which it\nmust endure. And it would be well also if we understood better how to\nlisten with keener senses to our intuitions, to the direct\nself-consciousness of the spirit in regard to itself, which sleeps in\nevery mind, but which few remark and fewer still interpret. Here, where\nthe gaze of self-examination reaches its horizon, and can only guess at\nwhat lies beyond, but can no longer interpret it, lie the true motives and\nreasons for our conviction of immortality. An apologetic cannot do more\nthan clear away obstacles, nor need it do much more than has hitherto been\ndone. It reminds us, as we have already seen, that the world which we know\nand study, and which includes ourselves, does not show its true nature to\nus; hidden depths lie behind appearances. And it gathers together and sums\nup all the great reasons for the independence and underivability of the\nspiritual as contrasted with the corporeal. The spiritual has revealed\nitself to us as a reality in itself, which cannot be explained in terms of\nthe corporeal, and which has dominion over it. Its beginning and its end\nare wholly unfathomable. There is no practical meaning in discussing its\n\u201corigin\u201d or its \u201cpassing away,\u201d as we do with regard to the corporeal.\nUnder certain corporeal conditions it is there, it simply appears. But it\ndoes not arise out of them. And as it is not nothing, but an actual and\neffective reality, it can neither have come out of nothing nor disappear\ninto nothing again. It appears out of the absolutely transcendental,\nassociates itself with corporeal processes, determines these and is\ndetermined by them, and in its own time passes back from this world of\nappearance to the transcendental again. It is like a great unknown sea,\nthat pours its waters into the configuration of the shore and withdraws\nthem again. But neither the flowing in nor the ebbing again is of nothing\nor in nothing. Whether and how it retains the content, form, and structure\nthat it assumes in other spheres of animate and conscious nature, when it\nretires into the transcendental again; or whether it dissolves and breaks\nup into the universal we do not know; nor do we attribute everlastingness\nto those individual forms of consciousness which we call animal souls. But\nof the self-conscious, personal spirit religion knows that it is\neverlasting. It knows this from its own sources. In its insight into the\nunderivability and autonomy of the spiritual it finds warrant and freedom\nto maintain this knowledge as something apart from or even in contrast to\nthe general outlook on the world.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. THE WORLD AND GOD.\n\n\nThe world and nature are marvellous in their being, but they are not\n\u201cdivine\u201d! The formula \u201c_natura sive deus_\u201d is a monstrous misuse of the\nword \u201c_deus_,\u201d if we are to use the words in the sense which history has\ngiven to them. God is the Absolute Being, perfect, wholly independent,\nresting in Himself, and necessary; nature is entirely contingent and\ndependent, and at every point of it we are impelled to ask \u201cWhy?\u201d God is\nthe immeasurable fulness of Being, nature is indeed diverse in the\nmanifoldness of her productions, but she is nevertheless limited, and her\npossibilities are restricted within narrow limits. God is the\nunrestrained, and everlasting omnipotence itself, and the perfect wisdom;\nnature is indeed mighty enough in the attainment of her ends, but how\noften is she obstructed, how often does she fail to reach them, and how\nseldom does she do so perfectly and without mistakes? She shows wisdom,\nindeed, cunning in her products, subtlety and daintiness, taste and\nbeauty, all these often in an overwhelming degree, yet just as often she\nbrings forth what is meaningless, contradictory and mutually hurtful,\ntraverses her own lines, and bewilders us by the brutality, the\nthoughtlessness, and purposelessness, the crookedness, incompleteness, and\ndistortedness of her operations. And what is true of the world of external\nnature is true in a far greater degree of the world of history. Nature is\nnot a god, but a demigod, says Aristotle. And on this, Pantheism with its\ncreed, \u201c_natura sive deus_,\u201d makes shipwreck. The words of this _credo_\nare either a mere tautology, and \u201c_deus_\u201d is misused as a new name for\nnature; or they are false. It is not possible to transfer to nature and\nthe world all the great ideas and feelings which the religious mind\ncherishes under the name of \u201cGod.\u201d\n\nOn the other hand, nature is really, as Aristotle said, \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, that is,\nstrange, mysterious, and marvellous, indicating God, and pointing, all\nnaturalism and superficial consideration notwithstanding, as we have seen,\nto something outside of and beyond itself. Religion demands no more than\nthis. It does not insist upon finding a solution for all the riddles of\ntheoretical world-lore. It is not distressed because the course of nature\noften seems to our eyes confused, and to our judgment contradictory and\nunintelligible at a hundred places and in a hundred respects. On the\ncontrary, that this is the case is to religion in another aspect a strong\nstimulus and corroboration. \u201cThe world is an odd fellow; may God soon make\nan end of it,\u201d said Luther, and thus gave a crude but truly religious\nparallel to the words of Aristotle, \u1f21 \u03b3\u1f00\u03c1 \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03b1,\n(Aristot. \u201cDe Divin. in Somn.,\u201d c. ii.). It is part of the very essence of\nreligion, as we have seen, to read in the pages of nature, insufficiency,\nillusion, and perplexities, and to be made thereby impatient and desirous\nof penetrating to the true nature of things. Religion does not claim to be\ndirectly deducible out of a consideration of nature; it demands only the\nright and freedom to interpret the world in its own way. And for this it\nis sufficient that this world affords those hints and suggestions for its\nconvictions that we have seen it does afford. To form clear ideas in\nregard to the actual relations of the infinite to the finite, and of God\nto the world, and of what religion calls creation, preservation, and\neternal providence, self-revelation in the world and in history, is hardly\nthe task of religion at all, but rather pertains to our general\nspeculative instinct, which can only satisfy itself with the help of\nimagination. Attempts of this kind have often been made. They are by no\nmeans valueless, for even if no real knowledge can be gained by this\nmethod, we may perhaps get an analogue of it which will help us to\nunderstand existence and phenomena, and to define our position, as well as\nto give at least provisional answers to many pressing questions (such, for\ninstance, as the problem of theodicy).\n\nIf we study the world unprejudiced by the naturalistic interpretation, or\nhaving shaken ourselves free from it, we are most powerfully impressed by\none fundamental phenomenon in all existence: it is the fact of evolution.\nIt challenges attention and interpretation, and analogies quickly reveal\nthemselves which give something of the same trend to all such\ninterpretations. From stage to stage existence advances onwards, from the\nworld of large masses subject only to the laws of mechanics, to the\ndelicately complex play of the forces of development in growth and other\nvital processes. The nature of the forces is revealed in ever higher\nexpression, and at the same time in ever more closely connected series of\nstages. Even between the inorganic and the organic there is an\nintermediate stage\u2014crystal formation\u2014which is no longer entirely of the\none, yet not of the other. And in the organic world evolution reveals\nitself most clearly of all; from the crudest and simplest it presses\nonwards to the most delicate and complex. In the corporeal as in the\npsychical, in the whole as in each of its parts, there are ever higher\nstages, sometimes far apart, sometimes close together. However we picture\nto ourselves the way in which evolution accomplishes itself in time, we\ncan scarcely describe it without using such expressions as \u201cnature\nadvances upwards step by step,\u201d \u201cit presses and strives upwards and\nunfolds itself stage by stage.\u201d\n\nAnd it is with us as it was with Plato; we inform the world with a soul,\nwith a desire and endeavour which continually expresses itself in higher\nand higher forms. And it is with us also as with Fichte; we speak of the\nwill which, unconscious of itself, pours itself forth in unconscious and\nlifeless nature, and then on this foundation strives forward, expressing\nits activity in ever higher developments, breaking forth in life,\nsensation, and desire, and finally coming to itself in conscious existence\nand will. The whole world seems to us a being which wills to become,\npresses restlessly forward, and passes from the potential to the actual,\nrealising itself. And the height of its self-realisation is conscious,\nwilling life.\n\nThis outlook is lofty and significant, it supplies a guiding clue by which\nthe facts of life and nature can be arranged. The religious outlook, too,\nwhen it wishes to indulge in speculation, can make use of this guiding\nthread. It will then say: God established the world as \u201ca will to\nexistence, to consciousness, to spirit.\u201d He established it, not as\ncomplete, but as becoming. He does not build it as a house, but plants it,\nlike a flower, in the seed, that it may grow, that it may struggle upwards\nstage by stage to fuller existence, aspiring with toil and endeavour\ntowards the height where, in the image of the Creator, as a free and\nreasonable spirit capable of personality, it may realise the aim of its\nbeing. Thus the world is _of_ God, that is, its rudiments came from God,\nand it is _to_ God, in the purpose of likeness to God. And it is imbued\nwith the breath of Godhead which moves in it and impels it onwards, with\nthe logos of the everlasting Zeus of whom Cleanthes sings, with the spirit\nof Jehovah whom Isaiah and the Psalmist praise, and whom the poet of the\nCreation figuratively paints; the divine breath is in everything that\nlives, from grass to flower, from animal to man. But it is implanted as\nbecoming. And in regard to this, religion can say of the whole world what\nit says of man. For man, too, is not given as a finished product, either\nas regards the genus or the individual, but as a rudiment, with his\ndestiny to work out, in historical becoming, by realising what is inherent\nin him. We call this freedom. And an adumbration of such freedom, which is\nthe aim of self-realisation, would help us to penetrate deeply into the\nnature of things. Many riddles and apparent contradictions could be fitted\nin with this view of things: the unity of the world, and yet the\ngradations; the relationship of all living creatures, the unity of all\npsychical life, and yet the uniqueness of the rational spirit; causal\nconcatenation, yet guidance by means of the highest ideas and purposes;\nthe tentativeness, illogicalness, and ineffectiveness of nature,\nunconsciously pressing forward along uncertain paths, yet the directness\nand purposefulness of the main lines of evolution in general. This\nGod-awakened will to be lies at the roots of the mysteries of development\nin all living creatures, of the unconscious purposiveness of instinctive\naction, of the gradually ascending development of psychical life and its\norgan. Operating in crystals and plants purely as a formative impulse and\n\u201centelechy,\u201d it awakes in the bodies of animals more and more as \u201csoul.\u201d\nThen it awakes fully in man, and in him, in an entirely new phase of real\nfree development, it builds itself up to spirit. It resembles a stream\nwhose waves flow casually and transiently in animal consciousness, and are\nsoon withdrawn again, to break forth anew at another place, in the\npersonal spirit, where they attain to permanent indissoluble form, since\nthey have now at last attained to self-realisation, and fulfilled the\npurpose of all cosmic existence, the reflecting of the eternal personality\nin the creature. But it is only in human history that what was prepared\nfor in natural evolution is completed.\n\nThe riddle of theodicy thus becomes easier, for what surrounds us in\nnature and history has not come direct from the hand of eternal wisdom,\nbut is in the first place the product of the developing, striving world,\nwhich only gradually and after many mistakes and failures works out what\nis inherent in it as eternal idea and aim. We see and blame its mistakes,\nfor instance in our own human structure. We see the deficiencies in the\nhistorical course of things. But when we find fault we do not see that\nevolution and self-realisation and freedom are more worthy of praise than\nready-made existence incapable of independent action.\n\nThis principle of development, wherever it is regarded as \u201cworld-soul\u201d or\nas \u201cwill\u201d or as the \u201cunconscious,\u201d is frequently, through pantheism and\nthe doctrine of immanence, made equivalent with the object of religion,\nwith God. This is an impossible undertaking. We cannot worship what only\nreaches its full development in ourselves. But that we _can_ worship, and\nthat it is only in the feeling of complete dependence that the full depth\nof what is developing within us to conscious life reveals itself, proves\nbetter than anything else that God is above all \u201cWorld-will.\u201d It was more\nthan allegory when Plato in Tim\u00e6us set the \u201ceternal father and creator of\nthe world\u201d above all soul and psyche. And it was religion that broke\nthrough when Fichte in his little book, \u201cAnweisung zum seeligen Leben,\u201d\nset being before becoming, and God above the creatures struggling towards\nself-realisation. Religion knows in advance that this is so. And calm\nreflection confirms it. All that we have already learnt of the dependence,\nconditionedness, and contingent nature of the world is equally true of a\nworld \u201cevolving itself\u201d out of its potentiality, of a will to existence,\nand of an unconscious realising itself. No flower can grow and develop\nwithout being first implicit in the seed. Nothing can attain to\n\u201cactuality,\u201d to realisation, that was not potentially implied in the\nbeginning. But who originated the seed of the world-flower? Who enclosed\nwithin it the \u201ctendencies,\u201d the \u201crudiments\u201d which realise themselves in\nevolution? Invariably \u201cthe actual is before the potential\u201d and Being\nbefore Becoming. A world could only become if it were called to become by\nan everlasting Being. God planting the world-flower that it might radiate\nforth in its blossoms His own image and likeness, is an allegory which may\nwell symbolise for religion the relation between God and the world. And\nthus it is possible to draw the outline of a religious outlook on the\nworld, into which the results of world-lore could well be fitted. This\nframe was constructed by Plato on the basis of a religious study of\nthings, and after Plato it was first definitely outlined in Fichte\u2019s too\nmuch forgotten but unforgettable books \u201cBestimmung des Menschen\u201d and\n\u201cAnweisung zum seeligen Leben,\u201d and it is thus a new creation of the great\nGerman idealism and its mighty faith. And it is not easy to see why it\nshould be abandoned, why we should give it up in favour of an irreligious,\nsemi-naturalistic outlook on the world.\n\nOne thing, however, must be kept constantly in mind: even such an\ninterpretation of the world as this is poetry, not knowledge. There is a\npoetry of the will to live, of the unconscious, which is struggling\ntowards existence, but there is no philosophy. There are only analogies\nand hints of what goes on at the foundations of the world. In particular,\nthe unconscious creative impulse in all living organisms, this \u201cwill\u201d\ntowards form, its relationship with instinct and the relationship of\ninstinct to conscious psyche, afford us a step-ladder of illustrations,\nand an illustration of the step-ladder of the \u201cwill towards existence,\u201d\nwhich invite us to overstep the bounds of our knowledge, and indulge in\nour imagination. We can say nothing of pre-conscious consciousness and\nwill, we can at best only make guesses about them. We cannot think\ndefinitely of a general world-will, which wills and aspires in individual\nbeings; we cannot picture to ourselves the emergence of the individual\n\u201csouls\u201d of animals and man from a universal psyche. Imagination plays a\nlarger part here than clear thinking. And for our present purpose it must\nbe clearly borne in mind that religion does not require any speculative\nconstruction of theories of the world. But \u201cyou shall know that it is your\nimagination which creates the world for you.\u201d(108) And if a speculative\nconstruction be desired, it will always be most easily attained along\nthese lines, and will in this way come nearest to our modern knowledge of\nnature. We must remember, too, that the objections which may be urged\nagainst this form of speculation are equally applicable against any other.\nFor the origin of the individual psyche, the graduated series of its\nforms, the development of one after the other, and of that of the child\nfrom that of its parents, are riddles which cannot be solved by any\nspeculative thinking. Monadology, theories of the pre-existence of the\nsoul, creationism, or the current traducianism\u2014which to-day, with its\npartly or wholly materialistic basis, is just as na\u00efve as the older\u2014all\nreveal equal darkness. But the speculation we have hinted at, if it gives\nno explanation, at least supplies a framework for many questions which\nattract us, and do so even from the point of view of religion: for\ninstance the collective, diffuse, and almost divisible nature of\nconsciousness in the lower stages, its increasing and ever more strict\ncentralisation, the natural relationship of the psychical in man to the\npsychical in general, and yet its incommensurability and superiority to\nall the world.\n\nBut let us once more turn from all the poetical and imaginative\nillustrations of the relation of God to the world, which can at best be\nonly provisional, and only applicable at certain points, to the more\ngeneral aspect of the problem. Religion itself consists in this: believing\nand experiencing that in time the Eternal, in the finite the Infinite, in\nthe world God is working, revealing Himself, and that in Him lies the\nreason and cause of all being. For this it has names like creation,\nprovidence, self-revelation of God in the world, and it lives by the\nmysteries which are indicated under these names. The mysteries themselves\nit recognises in vague or na\u00efve forms of conception long before it\nattempts any definite formulation. If dogmatics begin with the latter,\nsome form or other of the stiff and wooden doctrines of _concursus_, of\n_influxus ordinarius_ and _extraordinarius_ usually develops with many\nother subtleties, which are nothing more than attempts to formulate the\ndivine influence in finite terms, and to think of it as a force along with\nother forces. Two series of causes are usually distinguished; the system\nof causes and effects within the world, according to which everything\nnatural takes place, the \u201c_caus\u00e6 secundari\u00e6_\u201d; and in addition to these\nthe divine causality co-operating and influencing the others, ordering\nthem with gentle and delicate pressure, and guiding them towards their\ntrue end, and which may also reveal itself as \u201c_extraordinaria_\u201d in\nmiracles and signs. This double operation is regarded as giving rise to\nall phenomena, and in it consists guidance, dispensation, providence, and\nnatural revelation.\n\nThis kind of conception is extremely primitive, and is unfavourable to\nreligion itself, for in it mystery is done away with and arranged\naccording to rubric, and everything has become quite \u201csimple.\u201d Moreover,\nthis doctrine has a necessary tendency to turn into the dreaded \u201cDeism.\u201d\nAccording to the deistic view, God made the world in the beginning, and\nset the system of natural causes in motion, in such a way that no farther\nassistance was given, and everything went on of itself. This theory is\nincredibly profane, and strikes God out of the world, and nature, and\nhistory at a single stroke, substituting for Him the course of a\nwell-arranged system of clockwork. But the former theory is a very\nunsatisfactory and doubtful makeshift as compared with that of deism, for\nit is impossible to see why, if God arranged these _caus\u00e6 secundari\u00e6_, He\nshould have made them so weak and ineffective that they need all these\ningenious _concursus_, _influxus_, _determinationes_, _gubernationes_, and\nthe like. Both theories are crude fabrications of the dogmatists, and they\nhave nothing left in them of the piety they were intended to protect, nor\ndo they become any better in this respect, however many attempts are made\nto define them. Religion possesses, without the aid of any stilted and\nartificial theories, all the things we have named above, and especially\nand most directly the last of them, namely, the experience of the\nrevelation and communication of the Divine in the great developments and\nmovements of spiritual and religious history. And it finds its\ncorroboration and justification and freedom not by way of dogmatics but of\ncriticism. It is impossible to distinguish artificially two sets of\ncauses, and to give to the world what is alleged to be of the world, and\nto God what is alleged to be of God. But it is permissible to point to the\ninsufficiency of our causal study in general, and to the limits of our\nknowledge. Even when we have established it as a fact that all phenomena\nare linked together in a chain of causes we are still far from having\ndiscovered how things actually come to pass. Every qualitative effect and\nchange is entirely hidden from us as far as the cause of its coming about\nand its real and inner nature are concerned. Every effect which in kind or\nquantity goes beyond its cause (and we cannot make anything of the domain\nof living forms, of the psychical and of history without these), shows us\nthat we are still only at the surface. Indeed, even mechanical action,\noften alleged to be entirely intelligible, such as the transference or\ntransformation of energy, is, as we have seen, a complete riddle. In\naddition, all causality runs its course in time, and therefore partakes of\nall the defects and limitations of our views of time. And finally we are\nguided by the Kantian antinomy regarding the conditions of what is\n\u201cgiven.\u201d It destroys the charm of the \u201cpurely causal\u201d point of view by\nshowing that this in itself cannot be made complete and is therefore\ncontradictory. Moreover, in the phenomena of life, and in the fact that\nconsciousness and will control our corporeal processes, and yet can hardly\nbe thought of as a cause \u201cco-operating\u201d with other causes, we found an\nanalogy, if a weak and obscure one, of the relation that a divine\nteleology and governing of the world may bear to mundane phenomena. Thus\nmystery remains in all its strength and is not replaced by the surrogate\nof a too simple and shallow dogmatic theory. In confessing mystery and\nresting content with it we are justified by reflection on the nature and\nantinomy of our knowledge.\n\nAll this is true also of what religion means by creation. In the feeling\nof complete humility, in its experience of absolute dependence and\nconditionedness, the creature becomes conscious of itself as a creature,\nand experiences with full clearness what it means to be a \u201ccreature\u201d and\n\u201ccreated.\u201d The dogmatic theory is here again only a surrogate of mystery.\nAnd again critical self-reflection proves a better guide than any theory\nof creation, which is quite in its place as a means of expression in\nreligious discourse and poetry, but is quite insufficient as true\nknowledge. That we must but cannot think of this world either as beginning\nor as not-beginning is the analogue in knowledge of what religion\nexperiences in mystery; and that this contingent and conditioned world is\nfounded in everlasting, necessary, true Being, is the analogue of what\nreligion possesses and knows through devout feeling, more directly and\nclearly than by any thinking, of the relations of God to the world.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 This has been urged often enough even by scientific investigators.\n      In such cases they have frequently been reproached for dragging\n      miracles into nature when they call a halt in face of the\n      \u201cunderivable\u201d and the \u201cmysterious.\u201d This is a complete\n      misunderstanding. With miracles and with the supernatural in the\n      historical sense of these words, this mode of regarding nature has\n      nothing whatever to do. It would be much more reasonable to maintain\n      the converse: that there exists between supernatural ideas and the\n      belief in the absolute explicability and rationalisation of nature a\n      peculiar mutual relation and attraction. For, if we think out the\n      relation clearly, we must see that all real and consistent belief in\n      miracles demands as its most effective background the clearest\n      possible explicability of nature. It pictures to itself two natures,\n      so to speak: nature and supernature, and the latter of these\n      interpolates itself into the former in the form of sudden and\n      occasional interruptions; that is to say, as miracles. The purpose\n      of miracles is to be recognised as such, as events absolutely\n      different from the ordinary course of happening. And they are most\n      likely thus to be recognised when nature itself is translucent and\n      mathematical. Thus we find that supernaturalism quite readily\n      accepts, and even insists upon a rationalistic explanation of\n      nature. But this is quite incorrect. Nature is not so thoroughly\n      rationalised and calculable as such a point of view would have us\n      believe.\n\n      The really religious element in belief in miracles is that it, too,\n      in its own way, is seeking after mystery, dependence and providence.\n      It fails because it na\u00efvely seeks for these in isolated and\n      exceptional acts, which have no analogy to other phenomena. It\n      regards these as arbitrary acts, and does so because it overlooks or\n      underestimates the fact that they have to be reckoned with\n      throughout the whole of nature.\n\n    2 Not even after the scholastic manner of regarding eternity as a\n      \u201cnunc stans,\u201d a stationary now, an everlasting present. \u201cPresent\u201d is\n      a moment in our own time, and an \u201ceverlasting\u201d present is nonsense.\n\n    3 \u201cReden \u00fcber die Religion, an die Gebildeten unter ihren Ver\u00e4chtern.\u201d\n      Neu herausgegeben von R. Otto. 1906.\n\n    4 Kgl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1876.\n\n    5 Some of these subsidiary factors are difficult to harmonise with the\n      main principle of selection; they endanger it or it endangers them,\n      as we shall see when we consider the controversies within the\n      Darwinian camp.\n\n    6 H. Friedmann, \u201cDie Konvergenz der Organismen,\u201d Berlin, 1904.\n\n    7 It is somewhat confusing that even Weismann in his most recent work\n      professes to give \u201cLectures on the Theory of Descent,\u201d and in\n      reality only assumes it, concerning himself with the Darwinian\n      theory in the strict sense. The English translation is more\n      correctly entitled \u201cThe Evolution Theory.\u201d\n\n_    8 Cf._ Wagner, \u201cZur gegenw\u00e4rtigen Lage des Darwinismus.\u201d \u201cDie\n      Umschau,\u201d January, 1900.\n\n    9 Eugen Dubois (Military Surgeon of the Dutch Army), \u201cPithecanthropus\n      erectus, a man-like transition-form from Java.\u201d Batavia. 1904.\n\n   10 H. Friedenthal. \u201cUeber einen experimentellen Nachweis von\n      Blutsverwandtschaft.\u201d Archiv. f. Anatomie und Physiologie, 1900, p.\n      404.\n\n   11 Jena, 1904. Trans. \u201cThe Evolution Theory,\u201d Arnold. London 1904.\n\n   12 A defence of this very confident Darwinian point of view, for the\n      benefit of non-scientific readers, will be found in the recent\n      \u201cGemeinverst\u00e4ndlichen darwinistischen Vortr\u00e4gen und Abhandlungen,\u201d\n      by Plate, Simroth, Schmidt, and others. See also Ziegler\u2019s \u201cUeber\n      den derzcitigen Stand der Descendenzlehre in der Zoologie.\u201d\n\n   13 \u201cRassenbildung und Erblichkeit,\u201d Festschrift f\u00fcr Bastian, p. 9.\n\n   14 \u201cRassenbildung und Erblichkeit,\u201d Festschrift f\u00fcr Bastian, p. 6.\n\n   15 \u201cSammlung gemeinverst\u00e4ndl. Vortr\u00e4ge, hrsg. v. Virchow und\n      Holtzendorf,\u201d Heft 96. \u201cMenschen und Affensch\u00e4del,\u201d Berlin, 1870.\n\n   16 \u201cZeitschrift f\u00fcr Ethnologie,\u201d 1882, p. 276.\n\n   17 \u201cVerh. Berlin anthropolog. Gesellschaft iv.\u201d (1872), p. 132. It\n      does, however, appear strange to the lay mind that it should have\n      been only the pathological subjects of prehistoric times that had\n      their remains preserved for our modern study.\n\n_   18 Cf._ \u201cZeitschrift f\u00fcr Ethnologie,\u201d 1895, pp. 78, 735.\n\n_   19 Cf._ \u201cRassenbildung und Erblichkeit.\u201d Festschrift f\u00fcr Bastian,\n      1895.\n\n   20 See also \u201cDescendenz und Pathologie.\u201d Arch. f. path. Anat. a.\n      Physiol., 1886; \u201cTransformation und Abstammung.\u201d Berliner Klin.\n      Wochenschrift, 1893.\n\n   21 First edition, Leipzig, 1887. A second edition and an English\n      translation have since been published. See especially the discussion\n      of the origin and history of species in the second volume.\n\n   22 See English translation of Kerner\u2019s Plant Life.\n\n_   23 Cf._ a criticism of the book from the Darwinian point of view by\n      Plate in Biologisches Centralblatt, 1901.\n\n   24 That this points only to the fact of evolution, and not necessarily\n      to actual descent, will be seen later on.\n\n   25 First edition, 1899; now in a second edition.\n\n   26 \u201cGenealogie der Urzellen als L\u00f6sung des Descendenzproblems\u201d (1872),\n      and \u201cDer Darwinismus und die Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers\u201d\n      (1874-1877).\n\n   27 \u201cEine kritische Darstellung der modernen Entwicklungslehre,\u201d Jena,\n      1892.\n\n   28 Compare Darwin\u2019s derivation of fishes from Tunicata because of the\n      notochord which occurs in the tunicate larv\u00e6.\n\n   29 See Hertwig\u2019s \u201cBiological Problem of To-day.\u201d London 1896.\n\n   30 The justice of this prophecy has been meanwhile illustrated by the\n      recent work of H. Friedmann, \u201cDie Konvergenz der Organismen,\u201d\n      Berlin, 1904.\n\n   31 If we wish to, we can even read the \u201cbiogenetic law\u201d in Dante. See\n      \u201cPurgatory,\u201d p. 26, where the embryo attains successively to the\n      plant, animal and human stages:\n\n      \u201cAnima fatta la virtute attiva,\n      Qual d\u2019una _pianta_....\n\n      Come fungo marino ...\n\n      Ma come _d\u2019animal_ divenga _fante_.\u201d\n\n      This is, of course, nothing else than Aristotle\u2019s theory of\n      evolution, done into terzarima, and corrected by St. Thomas.\n\n      For the latest application of these views, even in relation to the\n      \u201cbiogenetic fundamental law,\u201d see the finely finished\n      \u201cMorpho-genetic Studies\u201d of T. Garbowski (Jena, 1903): \u201cThe greater\n      part of what is usually referred to the so-called fundamental\n      biogenetic law depends on illusion, since all things undeveloped or\n      imperfect must bear a greater or less resemblance one to another.\u201d\n\n_   32 I.e._, The occurrence of saltatory, transilient, or discontinuous\n      variations or mutations.\n\n_   33 I.e._, The emergence of a distinctively new pattern of\n      organisation.\n\n   34 See H. G. Bronn\u2019s Appendix to his translation of Darwin\u2019s \u201cOrigin of\n      Species.\u201d First German edition.\n\n   35 Finally and comprehensively in the two volumes we have already\n      mentioned, \u201cVortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber die Deszendenztheorie,\u201d Jena, 1902 (Eng.\n      trans., London, 1904). \u201cNatural selection depends essentially upon\n      the cumulative augmentation of the most minute useful variations in\n      the direction of their utility; only the useful is developed and\n      increased, and great effects are brought about slowly through the\n      summing up of many very minute steps.... But the philosophical\n      significance of natural selection lies in the fact that it shows us\n      how to explain the origin of useful, well-adapted structures purely\n      by mechanical factors, and without having to fall back upon a\n      directive principle.\u201d\n\n   36 If it were not white it would be observed by the seals, which would\n      thus avoid being devoured by it. See Weismann, I., p. 70. (English\n      edition, p. 65.)\n\n   37 It is almost comical when Weismann, the champion of the purely\n      naturalistic outlook, occasionally forgets his r\u00f4le altogether, and\n      puts in a word for \u201cchance,\u201d or attempts to soften absolute\n      predetermination. For if even a single wolf should destroy a stag\n      \u201cby chance,\u201d or if a single \u201cid\u201d should \u201cchance\u201d to grow in a manner\n      slightly different from that laid down for it by the compelling\n      force of preceding and accompanying circumstances, the whole\n      Darwinian edifice would be labour lost.\n\n   38 See Darwin, \u201c... chance variations. Unless such occur, natural\n      selection can do nothing.\u201d\n\n   39 \u201cDie Darwinsehe Theorie. Gemeinverst\u00e4ndliche Vorlesungen \u00fcber die\n      Naturphilosophie der Gegenwart gehalten vor Studierenden aller\n      Fakult\u00e4ten,\u201d Leipzig, 1903. This book is the continuation of the\n      author\u2019s \u201cDeszendenztheorie.\u201d\n\n   40 Fleischmann\u2019s book compares favourably with those of other\n      naturalists, in that he does not contrast \u201cMoses\u201d and natural\n      science, as is customary, but has a deeper knowledge of the modern\n      view of Genesis I. than is usually found among naturalists, whether\n      of the \u201cpositive\u201d or \u201cnegative\u201d standpoint.\n\n   41 See also Wolff.\n\n   42 See C.C. Coe, \u201cNature versus Natural Selection,\u201d London, 1895.\n      Perhaps the most comprehensive, many-sided, critical analysis of the\n      theory of natural selection. See also Herbert Spencer, \u201cThe\n      Inadequacy of Natural Selection,\u201d 1893.\n\n   43 Leipzig, 1888, 1897, 1901. In part translated as \u201cOrganic\n      Evolution.\u201d We are here mainly concerned with Vols. I. and III.\n      Later on we shall have to discuss Vol. II.\n\n   44 Wien, 1899.\n\n   45 See Wettstein, \u201cNeolamarckism,\u201d Jena, 1902. See also Demoor,\n      Massart, Vandervelde, \u201cL\u2019Evolution r\u00e9gressive en Biologie et\n      Sociologie,\u201d Paris, 1897. Biblioth\u00e8que scientific internationale,\n      vol. lxxxv. This work is on the Lamarckian basis. It is original in\n      applying Lamarckian principles to a theory of society.\n\n   46 Two vols., Leipzig, 1901 and 1902.\n\n   47 It remains open to question whether Eimer\u2019s explanation is\n      sufficient in all cases, even those of the exaggeratedly deceptive\n      copies of leaves or bark, or the colour of the environment. It is\n      certainly not the sorry explanation in terms of \u201cVariation and\n      Selection,\u201d but that of a spontaneous imitation of the surroundings,\n      that forces itself irresistibly upon us in this connection.\n\n   48 Jena, 1892 and 1895.\n\n   49 See Reinke, \u201cEinleitung in die theoretische Biologie,\u201d 1901,\n      especially pp. 463 onwards on \u201cPhylogenetisches Bildungspotential.\u201d\n      von Wettstein (On direct adaptation), \u201cNeolamarkismus,\u201d Jena, 1902.\n      _Cf._ \u201cWissensch-Beitr\u00e4ge zum 15 Jahresberichte (1902) der Philos.\n      Gesellschaft an der Universit\u00e4t zu Wien: Vortr\u00e4ge und Besprechungen\n      \u00fcber die Krisis der Darwinismus.\u201d M. Kassowitz, \u201cAllgemeine\n      Biologie,\u201d I. and II., 1899. O. Hertwig, \u201cEntwicklung der Biologie\n      im 19. Jahrhundert.\u201d Wiesner, \u201cElemente der wissenschaftlichen\n      Botanik.\u201d (_cf._ especially III. \u201cBiologie der Pflanzen\u201d), and on p.\n      288 the summary of propositions which are very similar to those\n      formulated later by Korschinsky. (\u201cAuf Grund des den Organismen\n      innewohnenden Vervollkommnungstriebes.\u201d)\n\n   50 See the particularly beautiful and suggestive experiments of\n      Haberlandt: \u201cExperimentelle Hervorrufung eines neuen Organs.\u201d In\n      \u201cFestschrift f\u00fcr Schwendener,\u201d Berlin Borntraeger, 1899.\n\n   51 See \u201cNature,\u201d 1891, p. 441\n\n   52 See \u201cNature,\u201d 1891, p. 441.\n\n   53 The variation-increment of the selection theory ought to be a\n      differential. But in many cases it is not so. As for instance in\n      symmetrical correlated variation, &c. In the struggle for existence\n      it is usually not advantages of organisation which are decisive, but\n      the chance advantages of situation, though these have no \u201cselective\u201d\n      influence. The case of the tapeworm is illustrative.\n\n      His work, \u201cDie organischen Regulationen, Vorbereitungen zu einer\n      Theorie des Lebens,\u201d 1901, is a systematic survey of illustrations\n      of the \u201cautonomy\u201d of vital processes. In his \u201cAnalytischen Theorie\n      der organischen Entwicklung,\u201d Leipzig, 1894, his special biological\n      (\u201contogenetic\u201d) views are still in process of development. But even\n      here his sharp rejection of Darwinism is complete (see VI., Par. 3,\n      on \u201cthe absurd assumption of a contingent character of\n      morphogenesis\u201d). It is not for nothing that the book is dedicated to\n      Wigand and C. F. von Baer. He says that in regard to development we\n      must \u201cpicture to ourselves external agents acting as stimuli and\n      achieving transformations which have the character, not analysable\n      as to its causes, of being adapted to their end, that is, capable of\n      life.\u201d Incomplete, but very instructive too, are his discussions on\n      the causal and the teleological outlook, the necessity for both, and\n      the impossibility of eliminating the latter from the study of\n      nature. In a series of subsequent works, Driesch has defined and\n      strengthened this position, finally reaching the declaration:\n      \u201cDarwin belongs to history, just like that other curiosity of our\n      century, the Hegelian philosophy. Both are variations on the theme,\n      \u2018How to lead a whole generation by the nose!\u2019 \u201d (\u201cBiolog.\n      Zentralbl.\u201d 1896, p. 16). We are concerned with Driesch more\n      particularly in Chapter IX.\n\n   54 See Driesch \u201cKritisches und Polemisches,\u201d Biol. Zentrabl., 1902, p.\n      187, Note 2.\n\n   55 \u201cNaturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift,\u201d xiv., p. 273.\n\n   56 See \u00a7 70 and subsequent sections. Take, for instance, the\n      sentences:\u2014\u201cEvery production of material things and of their forms\n      must be interpreted as possible in terms of purely mechanical laws,\u201d\n      and the contrast: \u201cSome products of material nature cannot be\n      interpreted as possible in terms of purely mechanical laws.\u201d\n\n   57 To Aristotle the \u201cSoul\u201d (\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f74 \u03d5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae Psyche, phytike) was in the\n      first place a purely biological principle. But by means of his\n      elastic formula of Potentiality and Actuality he was able to make\n      the transition to the psychological with apparent ease. The\n      biological is to him in \u201cpotentiality\u201d what sensation, impulse,\n      imagination are in \u201crealisation.\u201d But the biological and the\n      psychological are not related to one another as stages. Growth,\n      form, development, &c., cannot be carried over through any\n      \u201cactualisatio\u201d into sensation, consciousness and the like.\n\n      An essentially different question is, whether the biological may not\n      be not indeed derivable from the psychological\u2014that would be the\n      same mistake\u2014but dependent on, and conditioned by it, just as we\n      regard the voluntary moving and directing of the body as dependent\n      on it. An imaginative interpretation of the world will always take\n      this course.\n\n   58 Of course all this still gives us no ground for drawing conclusions\n      as to the correctness of the mechanistic theory, but only affords a\n      reason for its power of persistence. Indeed, the very fact that, in\n      investigating the problem of life, instinct directs us towards\n      mechanical interpretations, should give added weight to the other\n      fact, that among the ranks of naturalists themselves there\n      constantly arise doubts and criticisms of the adequacy of this mode\n      of interpretation, and that many of them go over more or less\n      completely to the vitalistic point of view.\n\n   59 H. Helmholtz, \u201cUeber die Erhaltung der Kraft, eine physikalische\n      Abhandlung,\u201d Berlin, 1847.\n\n   60 Max Verworn, \u201cDie Biogenhypothese,\u201d Jena, 1903. _Cf._ criticisms by\n      Czapek in the \u201cBotanische Zeitung,\u201d No. 2, 1903, and by Loeb in the\n      \u201cBiologisches Zentralblatt,\u201d 1902.\n\n   61 Berlin, 1900. Edited by R. du Bois-Reymond.\n\n   62 B\u00fctschli, \u201cUntersuchungen \u00fcber microscopische Sch\u00e4ume und das\n      Protoplasma,\u201d Leipzig, 1892. _Cf._ Berthold, \u201cStudien zur\n      Protoplasmamechanik.\u201d\n\n   63 Rhumbler, \u201cZur Mechanik des Gastrulationvorganges ...\u201d in \u201cArchiv.\n      f. Entwicklungsmechanik,\u201d Bd. 14.\n\n   64 \u201cBewegung der lebendigen Substanz.\u201d Jena, 1892.\n\n   65 A short, very attractive description of these mechanical methods,\n      and one which appeals particularly to us laymen because of its\n      excellent illustrations, is Dreyer\u2019s \u201cZiele und Wege biologischer\n      Forschung\u201d (Jena, 1892), especially the first part, \u201cDie\n      Fl\u00fcssigkeitsmechanik als eine Grundlage der organischen Form- und\n      Ger\u00fcst-Bildung.\u201d The astonishing and fascinating forms of\n      Radiolarian frameworks and \u201cskeletons\u201d (the artistic appreciation of\n      which was made possible to a wider public by Haeckel\u2019s \u201cKunstformen\n      der Natur\u201d) are here made the subject of mechanical explanations,\n      which are certainly in a high degree plausible.\n\n_   66 Cf._ Roux, \u201cArchiv. fur Entwicklungsmechanik.\u201d The name\n      sufficiently indicates the scope.\n\n   67 For a discussion of the difficulties and impossibilities of this\n      theory see page 148 above.\n\n   68 \u201cPreformation oder Epigenesis?\u201d Outlines of a theory of the\n      development of organisms. Jena, 1894. (Part I. of \u201cZeit- und\n      Streit-fragen der Biologie.\u201d) Translated by P. Chalmers Mitchell,\n      \u201cThe Biological Problem of To-day.\u201d\n\n   69 In his earlier period. Later he rejects both preformation and\n      epigenesis, as mechanical distortions of vital processes.\n\n   70 See also Lotze\u2019s interesting article \u201cInstinct\u201d in the same work.\n\n   71 Part II. of his \u201cZeit- und Streit-fragen der Biologie.\u201d\n\n   72 Second Edition, 1902.\n\n   73 In Vol. II. p. 139. 1898.\n\n   74 \u201cGeneral Physiology.\u201d Translated by Lee. London. 1899. P. 170.\n\n   75 As a remarkable instance and corroboration of this, we may refer to\n      the ever-recurring, instinctive antipathy of deeply religious\n      temperaments, from Augustine to Luther and Schleiermacher, to the\n      Aristotelian mood and its conception of the world, and their\n      sympathy with Plato\u2019s (mostly and especially in their \u201cPlatonised\u201d\n      expressions). The clear-cut, luminous, conception of the world which\n      expresses everything in terms of commensurable concepts is\n      thoroughly Aristotelian. But it would be difficult to find a place\n      in it for the peculiar element which lies at the root of all true\n      devotional feeling, and which makes faith something more than the\n      highest \u201creverence, love and trust.\u201d\n\n   76 \u201cArch. f\u00fcr pathol. Anatomie und Physiologie,\u201d Bd. VIII. 1855.\n\n   77 Vol. IX., 1856.\n\n   78 The same is true even of crystals, \u201c_omne crystallum e crystallo_.\u201d\n\n_   79 Cf._ \u201cUeber die Aufgabe der Naturwissenschaft,\u201d Jena, 1876.\n      \u201cNaturwissenschaftliche Tatsachen und Probleme.\u201d \u201cPhysiologie und\n      Entwicklungslehre,\u201d 1886, in the collection of the \u201cAllgemeiner\n      Vereins f\u00fcr Deutsche Literatur.\u201d Also in the same collection, \u201cAus\n      Natur- und Menschen-leben.\u201d\n\n   80 These ideas are not fully worked out, and they are disguised in\n      poetic form\u2014for instance, when even the play of flames is compared\n      to vital processes. But if they be stripped of their poetic garb,\n      they lead to the same conclusions to which one is always led when\n      one approaches the problem unprejudiced by naturalistic or\n      anthropomorphic preconceptions of the relation of the infinite to\n      the finite, or the divine to the natural. If we exclude the\n      materialistic or semi-materialistic position which regards\n      teleological phenomena, vital processes, and even states of\n      sensation and consciousness as the function of a \u201csubstance\u201d or of\n      matter, we can quite well speak of them as general \u201ccosmo-organic\u201d\n      functions of universal being, meaning that they occur of necessity\n      wherever the proper conditions exist. According to the doctrine of\n      potentiality and actuality, this is to say that all possible stages\n      of the higher and highest phenomena are _semper et ubique_\n      potentially present in universal being, and that they become actual\n      wherever the physical processes are far enough advanced to afford\n      the necessary conditions.\n\n      Preyer\u2019s ideas have been revived of late, especially in the romantic\n      form, as, for instance, in Willy Pastor\u2019s \u201cLebensgeschichte der\n      Erde\u201d (\u201cLeben und Wissen,\u201d Vol. I., Leipzig, 1903). And in certain\n      circles, characterised by a simultaneous veneration for and\n      combination of modern natural science\u2014Haeckel, Romanticism, Novalis\n      and other antitheses\u2014Fechner appears to have come to life again. The\n      type of this group is W. B\u00f6lsche. Naturally enough, Pastor has\n      turned his attention also to the recent views of Schroen in regard\n      to crystallisation. The fact, _omne crystallum e crystallo_, like\n      the corresponding fact, _omne vivum e vivo_, was long a barrier\n      against mechanistic derivation. But Schroen draws a parallel between\n      crystallisation and organic processes, so that the alleged clearness\n      and obviousness of the inorganic can no longer be carried over\u2014in\n      the old fashion\u2014into the realm of life, but, conversely, the mystery\n      of life must be extended downwards, and continued into the\n      inorganic.\n\n   81 Worthy of note and much cited is a somewhat indefinite essay on\n      \u201cNeovitalism,\u201d by the Wurzburg pathologist, E. von Rindfleisch (in\n      \u201cDeutsche Medizinische Wochensehrift,\u201d 1895, No. 38).\n\n   82 Already given in detail in his \u201cLehrbuch der phys. und pathol.\n      Chemie\u201d (Second Edition, 1889), in the first chapter, \u201cVitalism and\n      Mechanism.\u201d In the meantime a fifth revised and enlarged edition of\n      Bunge\u2019s book has appeared as a \u201cLehrbuch der Physiologie des\n      Menschen\u201d (Leipzig, 1901), The relevant early essays appear here\n      again under the title \u201cIdealism and Mechanism.\u201d The arguments are\n      the same. It is often supposed that it is merely a question of time,\n      and that in the long run we must succeed in finding proofs that the\n      whole process of life is only a complex process of movement; but the\n      history of physiology shows that the contrary is the case. All the\n      processes which can be explained mechanically are those which are\n      not vital phenomena at all. It is in activity that the riddle of\n      life lies. The solution of this riddle is looked for, more decidedly\n      than before but still somewhat vaguely, in the \u201cidealism\u201d of\n      self-consciousness and its implications, \u201c_Physiologus nemo nisi\n      psychologus_.\u201d These views have been also stated in a separate\n      lecture: G. Bunge, \u201cVitalismus und Mechanismus,\u201d (Leipzig, 1886).\n\n   83 \u201cAllgemeine Biologie\u201d (2 vols.), Vienna, 1899.\n\n   84 Jena, 1903.\n\n_   85 Cf._ especially Verworn\u2019s example of the manufacture of sulphuric\n      acid. See what we have previously said on the \u201csecond line\u201d of\n      mechanistic theory, along which Neumeister\u2019s thought mainly moves.\n      See especially p. 198. As regards the \u201cfifth line,\u201d the problem of\n      the development of form in its present phase, there is an\n      instructive short essay by Fr. Merkel (Nachrichten der K.\n      Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften G\u00f6ttingen. Gesch\u00e4ftl. Mitt. 1897,\n      Heft 2)\u2014\u201cWelche Kr\u00e4fte wirken gestaltend auf den K\u00f6rper der Menschen\n      und Tiere?\u201d This essay avoids, obviously intentionally, the\n      shibboleths of controversy. The mechanical point of view and the\n      play with mechanical analogies and models are abruptly dismissed.\n      \u201cIf things, which were in themselves susceptible of mechanical\n      explanations, occur in the absence of the mechanical antecedent\n      conditions, then we must seek for other forces to enable us to\n      understand them.\u201d And quite calmly a return is made to the old,\n      simple conception of a \u201cregulative\u201d and a \u201cformative force,\u201d\n      inherent as a capacity _sui generis_ within the \u201cenergids,\u201d the\n      really living parts of the cell. The cell-energid carries within it\n      the \u201cpattern\u201d of the organisation, and the partial or perfect\n      \u201ccapacity\u201d (\u201cFertigkeit\u201d) for producing and reproducing the whole\n      organism. But these two forces \u201cmake use of\u201d the physico-chemical\n      forces as tools to work out details. So to describe the state of the\n      case is not of course a solution of the problem; it is only a\n      figurative formulation of it. But that, at the present day, we can\n      and must return to doing this if we are to describe things simply\n      and as they actually occur, is precisely what is most instructive in\n      the matter.\n\n   86 \u201cBeitr\u00e4ge zur Kritik der Darwinschen Lehre,\u201d which was first\n      published in the \u201cBiologisches Zentralblatt,\u201d 1898.\n\n   87 Leipzig, 1892.\n\n   88 Before Wigand\u2019s larger works there had appeared F. Delpino:\n      \u201cApplicazione della Teoria Darwinia ai Fiori ed agli Insetti\n      Visitatori dei Fiori\u201d (Bull. della Societa Entomologica Ital.,\n      Florence 1870). He says: \u201cUn principio intrinsico, reagente, finch\u00e8\n      dura la vita, contro le influenze estrinseche ossia contro gli\n      agenti chimici e fisici.\u201d\n\n   89 \u201cElemente der Wissenschaftlichen Botanik. Biologie der Pflanzen.\u201d\n      1889.\n\n   90 \u201cLehrbuch der Biologie der Pflanzen.\u201d Stuttgart, 1895.\n\n_   91 Cf._ Cohn, \u201cBeitr\u00e4ge zur Biologie der Pflanzen,\u201d vii. 407, See\n      especially the concluding chapter, \u201cEiniges \u00fcber Functionen der\n      einzelnen Zellorgane.\u201d From Zoology we may cite E. Teichmann\u2019s\n      investigation, \u201cUeber die Beziehung zwischen Astrosph\u00e4ren und\n      Furchen.\u201d \u201cExperimentelle Untersuchungen am Seeigelei\u201d (\u201cArchiv. f.\n      Entw. Mech.\u201d xvi. 2, 1903). This paper contains no references to\n      \u201cpsychical phenomena,\u201d \u201cpower,\u201d or \u201cwill,\u201d and we cannot but approve\n      of this in technical research. But it is pointed out that the\n      mechanistic interpretation of the detailed processes of development\n      has definite limitations, and we are referred to \u201cfundamental\n      characters of living matter which we must take for granted.\u201d\n\n      This is even more decidedly the case in Tad. Garbowski\u2019s beautiful\n      \u201cMorphogenetische Studien, als Beitrag zur Methodologie zoologischer\n      Forschung.\u201d These belong to the line of thought followed by Driesch\n      and Wolff, who are both frequently and approvingly quoted, and they\n      afford an excellent instance of that mood of dissatisfaction with\n      and protest against the \u201cdogmas\u201d of descent, selection and\n      phylogeny, which is observable in many quarters among the younger\n      generation of investigators. Garbowski vigorously combats Haeckel\u2019s\n      theories of development, especially \u201cthe fundamental biogenetic law,\n      and the Gastr\u00e6a theory.\u201d He criticises \u201cmechanistic\u201d interpretations\n      of the development of the embryo, which \u201ctreat the living being\n      morphologically, as if the matter were one of vesicles, cylinders\n      and plates, and not of vital units\u201d: and he does not look with\n      favour on \u201cartificial amoeb\u00e6,\u201d which can move, creep, and do\n      everything except live. The ideal of biology is of course always a\n      science with laws and equations, but the key to these will not be\n      found in mechanics. Garbowski\u2019s studies may be highly recommended as\n      giving a sharp and vivid impression of the modern anti-mechanistic\n      tendencies observable even in technical research.\n\n   92 Trans. by Levinsohn. \u201cBeilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung,\u201d Munich,\n      1898, No. 166.\n\n   93 B\u00fctschli, _op. cit._, p. 200.\n\n   94 \u201cThe Monist,\u201d 1899, p. 179.\n\n_   95 Cf._ \u201cEntwicklung der Biologie in 19. Jahrhundert\u201d (\u201cNaturforscher\n      Versammlung,\u201d 1900), and \u201cZeit- und Streit-fragen der Biologie,\u201d\n      1894-7, especially Part II., \u201cMechanik und Zoologie.\u201d\n\n   96 \u201cDie Organismen und ihr Ursprung,\u201d published in \u201cNord und S\u00fcd,\u201d\n      xviii., p. 201 _seq._\u2014\u201cDie Welt als Tat,\u201d Berlin 1899, since then in\n      second edition.\u2014\u201cEinleitung in die theoretische Biologie,\u201d 1901.\u2014And\n      \u201cDer Ursprung des Lebens auf der Erde,\u201d in the \u201cT\u00fcrmer-Jahrbuch,\u201d\n      1903.\n\n_   97 Cf._, the discussion by A. Drews in the \u201cPreuss. Jahrbuch,\u201d\n      October, 1902, p. 101, a review of Reinke\u2019s \u201cEinleitung in die\n      theoretische Biologie.\u201d\n\n   98 Of all the bad Greek zoology has produced, \u201cOntogenesis\u201d is probably\n      the worst. The Becoming of the Being! The word is used in contrast\n      to Phylogenesis, the becoming of the race or of the species, and it\n      denotes the development of the individual.\n\n_   99 Cf._ p. 130. Excellent observations on \u201cpurpose.\u201d If two or more\n      chains of causes meet, we call it \u201cchance;\u201d if they do so constantly\n      and in a typical manner, we call it \u201cpurpose.\u201d\n\n  100 \u201cBiolog. Centralbl.,\u201d 1896, p. 363.\n\n  101 \u201cDie Lokalisation (= spatial determination) morphogenetischer\n      Vorg\u00e4nge, ein Beweis vitalistischen Geschehens,\u201d 1899 (in \u201cArchiv.\n      f. Entw.-Mechanik,\u201d viii., 1, and separately published), and \u201cDie\n      organischen Regulationen: Vorbereitungen zu einer Theorie des\n      Lebens,\u201d Leipzig, 1901. Also \u201cDie \u2018Seele\u2019 als elementarer\n      Natur-factor,\u201d (studies on the movements of organisms), Leipzig,\n      1903. He gives a general review of his own evolution in the\n      \u201cS\u00fcddeutsche Monatshefte,\u201d January 1904, under the title \u201cDie\n      Selbst\u00e4ndigkeit der Biologie und ihre Probleme.\u201d\n\n  102 In the \u201cBiol. Zentralbl.,\u201d June 1903, p. 427, Driesch is criticised\n      by Moszkowski, who rejects Driesch\u2019s teleological standpoint. But\n      even this criticism shows us how far the untenability of the\n      mechanistic position has been recognised. It is based upon a\n      somewhat vague dynamism, which admits that the physico-chemical and\n      all other mechanical interpretations have been destructively\n      criticised by Driesch, and recognises entelechy (\u201c\u1f10\u03bd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff7 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2\n      \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u201d). An entelechy without \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2!\n\n  103 \u201cVorfragen der Biologie,\u201d 1899. \u201cDie \u2018Ueberwindung des Mechanismus\u2019\n      in der Biologie.\u201d \u201cBiolog. Zentralbl.,\u201d 1901, p. 130.\n\n_  104 Cf._ Tad. Garbowski, \u201cMorphogenetische Studien,\u201d p. 167. The\n      illustration here employed of the arc and the \u201cexplanation of form\n      by form\u201d would be a good criticism of many of Albrecht\u2019s statements.\n\n  105 Schneider has expounded his physiological and morphological view in\n      his \u201cComparative Histology.\u201d In \u201cVitalismus\u201d (\u201cElementare\n      Lebensfunctionen,\u201d Vienna, 1903) he sums up his vitalistic views. It\n      is a comprehensive work which goes deeper than others of its class\n      into the detailed description and analysis of the intimate phenomena\n      of life. Indeed it almost amounts to an independent biology. But the\n      most essential vital problems, the development of form,\n      regeneration, and inheritance, to which Driesch gives the fullest\n      consideration, are all too briefly treated. In Chapters XI. and XII.\n      the question of vitalism expands into a far-reaching discussion of\n      the general outlook upon nature. We need not here concern ourselves\n      with his more general views. Schneider must be regarded as a\n      representative of the most modern tendency of \u201cPsychism,\u201d which,\n      stimulated by Mach, Avenarius, and the school of\n      \u201cimmanence-philosophy,\u201d finds expression among the younger\n      physiologists and biologists, from Schneider to Driesch, Verworn,\n      Albrecht, and others. To overthrow \u201cmaterialism\u201d and \u201crealism,\u201d they\n      utilise, with impetuous delight, the ancient self-evident idea that\n      what is given to us is sensation. They confuse and identify such\n      opposites as Kant and Berkeley, and their own position with that of\n      \u201csolipsism.\u201d This outlook is still vague and vacillating, and it may\n      perhaps compel epistemology to return on its old path from the\n      sophists to Plato, from Hume to Kant. In Schneider\u2019s case, however,\n      the thin stream of this new sensualism is intermingled with so many\n      intuitions and perceptions of the deeper nature of knowledge that\n      one is now curious to know how this strange mixture of\n      semi-materialism, idealism, solipsism, and a priorism is to make the\n      transition from its present extremely labile phase to a condition of\n      stable equilibrium. One fears lest sooner or later a reaction\n      against the contortions of this empiricism and psychism should lead\n      to a modern rehabilitation of mysticism or occultism. (_Cf._ p. 295\n      ff.)\n\n      In an essay on \u201cVitalism\u201d in the \u201cPreuss. Jahrbuch,\u201d Aug. 1903, p.\n      276, Schneider has supplemented his previous work.\n\n  106 If the protest of natural science against these means no more than\n      that they should be excluded as inaccessible to scientific\n      understanding, from the domain of its investigation, but not from\n      reality, it is perhaps fully justified in its methods.\n\n  107 Though somewhat inconsequent, since at any rate the enthusiasm for\n      truth could not result from a naturalistic, but only from some kind\n      of idealistic basis.\n\n  108 Schleiermacher, \u201cReden \u00fcber die Religion,\u201d ii.","title":"Naturalism and Religion","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":92301}