{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_31933/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_31933","id":"gutenberg_31933","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31933","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Economics","Category: History - European","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Dialectical materialism","D\u00fchring, E. (Eugen), 1833-1921","Economics","Philosophy","Socialism"],"text":"E-text prepared by Jeannie Howse, Adrian Mastronardi, and the Project\nGutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from\npage images generously made available by Internet Archive/Canadian\nLibraries (http://www.archive.org/details/toronto)\n\n\n\nNote: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries. See\n      http://www.archive.org/details/landmarksofscien00engeuoft\n\n\n      +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n      | Transcriber's Note:                                       |\n      |                                                           |\n      | Inconsistent hyphenation and use of quotation marks in    |\n      | the original document have been preserved.                |\n      |                                                           |\n      | Subscripted characters in chemical formulas are enclosed  |\n      | in curly braces after an underscore. For example, the     |\n      | formula for water is represented by H_{2}O. Obvious       |\n      | errors in chemical formulas were corrected without        |\n      | comment.                                                  |\n      |                                                           |\n      | Superscripted numbers are preceded by a carat character.  |\n      | For example, a-squared is represented by a^2.             |\n      |                                                           |\n      | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For     |\n      | a complete list, please see the end of this document.     |\n      |                                                           |\n      +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\n\n\n\n\nLANDMARKS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM\n\n\"Anti-Duehring\"\n\nby\n\nFREDERICK ENGELS\n\nTranslated and Edited by Austin Lewis\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nChicago\nCharles H. Kerr & Company\nCo-Operative\n\nCopyright, 1907\nby Charles H. Kerr & Company\n\nJohn F. Higgins\nPrinter and Binder\n376-382 Monroe Street\nChicago, Illinois\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER I                                                    PAGE\n\nTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION                                       7\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nPREFACES                                                       23\n    Part I                                                     23\n    Part II                                                    27\n    Part III                                                   35\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nINTRODUCTION                                                   36\n     I. In General                                             36\n    II. What Herr Duehring Has to Say                          50\n\n\nPART I\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n        Apriorism                                              54\n        The Scheme of the Universe                             63\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nNATURAL PHILOSOPHY                                             70\n        Time and Space                                         70\n        Cosmogony, Physics, and Chemistry                      82\n        The Organic World                                      94\n        The Organic World (conclusion)                        107\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nMORAL AND LAW                                                 116\n        Eternal Truths                                        116\n        Equality                                              130\n        Freedom and Necessity                                 146\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE DIALECTIC                                                 150\n        Quantity                                              150\n        Negation of the Negation                              159\n        Conclusion                                            175\n\n\nPART II\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nPOLITICAL ECONOMY                                             176\n     I. Objects and Methods                                   176\n    II. The Force Theory                                      184\n   III. Force Theory (continued)                              193\n    IV. Force Theory (conclusion)                             203\n     V. Theory of Value                                       214\n    VI. Simple and Compound Labor                             219\n   VII. Capital and Surplus Value                             223\n  VIII. Capital and Surplus Value (conclusion)                227\n    IX. Natural Economic Laws--Ground Rent                    232\n     X. With Respect to the \"Critical History\"                235\n\n\nPART III\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nSOCIALISM                                                     236\n        Production                                            236\n        Distribution                                          245\n        The State, The Family, and Education                  256\n\nAPPENDIX                                                      261\n\n\n\n\nLANDMARKS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION\n\n\nWhen Dr. Eugene Duehring, privat docent at Berlin University, in 1875,\nproclaimed the fact that he had become converted to Socialism, he was\nnot content to take the socialist movement as he found it, but set out\nforthwith to promulgate a theory of his own. His was a most elaborate\nand self-conscious mission. He stood forth as the propagandist not\nonly of certain specific and peculiar views of socialism but as the\noriginator of a new philosophy, and the propounder of strange and\nwonderful theories with regard to the universe in general. The taunt\nas to his all-comprehensiveness of intellect, with which Engels\npursues him somewhat too closely and much too bitterly, could not have\naffected Herr Duehring very greatly. He had his own convictions with\nrespect to that comprehensive intellect of his and few will be found\nto deny that he had the courage of his convictions.\n\nThirty years have gone since Duehring published the fact of his\nconversion to socialism. The word \"conversion\" contains in itself the\ndistinction between the socialism of thirty years ago and that of\nto-day. What was then a peculiar creed has now become a very\nwidespread notion. Men are not now individually converted to\nsocialism but whole groups and classes are driven into the socialist\nranks by the pressure of circumstances. The movement springs up\ncontinually in new and unexpected places. Here it may languish\napparently, there it gives every indication of strong, new and\nvigorous life.\n\nThe proletariat of the various countries race as it were towards the\nsocialist goal and, as they change in their respective positions, the\neconomic and political fields on which they operate furnish all the\nsurprises and fascinations of a race course. In 1892 Engels wrote that\nthe German Empire would in all probability be the scene of the first\ngreat victory of the European proletariat. But thirteen years have\nsufficed to bog the German movement in the swamps of Parliamentarianism.\nGreat Britain, whose Chartist movement was expected to provide the\nBritish proletariat with a tradition, has furnished few examples of\nskill in the management of proletarian politics, but existing society in\nGreat Britain has none the less been thoroughly undermined. The year\nbefore that in which Herr Duehring made his statement of conversion, the\nBritish Liberals had suffered a defeat which, in spite of an apparent\nrecuperation in 1880, proved the downfall of modern Liberalism in Great\nBritain, and showed that the Liberal Party could no longer claim to be\nthe party of the working class. Not only that, but the British\nphilosophic outlook has become completely changed. The nonconformist\nconscience grows less and less the final court of appeal in matters\npolitical. A temporary but fierce attack of militant imperialism coupled\nwith the very general acceptance of an empiric collectivism has sufficed\nto destroy old ideas and to make the road to victory easier for a\ndetermined and relentless working class movement.\n\nBut if thirty years have worked wonders in Europe, and disintegration\ncan be plainly detected in the social fabric, the course of social and\npolitical development in the United States has been still more\nremarkable. In 1875 the country was still a farming community living\non the edge of a vast wilderness through which the railroad was just\nbeginning to open a path. Thirty years have been sufficient to convert\nit into the greatest of manufacturing and commercial states. The\noccupation of the public lands, the establishment of industry on an\nhitherto undreamed of scale, the marvellous, almost overnight creation\nof enormous cities, all these have resulted in the production of a\nproletariat, cosmopolitan in its character, and with no traditions of\nother than cash relations with the class which employs it. The purity\nof the economic fact is unobscured. Hence a socialistic agitation has\narisen in the United States, the enthusiasm of which vies with that in\nany of the European countries and the practical results of which bid\nfair to be even more striking. This movement has arisen almost\nspontaneously as the result of economic conditions. It is a natural\ngrowth not the result of the preaching of abstract doctrines or the\npicturing of an ideal state. The modern American proletariat is, as a\nmatter of fact, given neither to philosophic speculation nor to the\nimagination which is necessary to idealism. Such socialism as it has\nadopted it has taken up because it has felt impelled thereto by\neconomic pressure.\n\nHence, apart from all socialistic propaganda, a distinct\ndisintegration-process has been proceeding in modern society. Each\nepoch carries within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. Things\nhave just this much value, they are transitory, says Engels in his\nparaphrase of Hegel, and this is in fact the central idea of his\ndialectic philosophy.\n\nHe criticises the work of Duehring from this standpoint. He labors not\nso much to show that Duehring is mistaken in certain conclusions as to\nprove that the whole method of his argument is wrong. His diatribes,\nthough the subject matter of his argument requires him to attack the\nBerlin tutor, are directed chiefly against all absolute theories.\n\"Eternal truth,\" in the realm of science, equally with that of\nphilosophy, he scouts as absurd. To interpret the history of the time\nin terms of the spirit of the time, to discover the actual beneath the\ncrust of the conventional, to analyse the content of the formulae which\nthe majority are always ready to take on trust, and to face the fact\nwith a mind clear of preconceived notions is what Engels set out to\ndo. It cannot be said that he altogether succeeded. No man can succeed\nin such a task. The prejudices and animosities created by incessant\ncontroversy warped his judgment in some respects, and tended on more\nthan one occasion to destroy his love of fair play. The spirit which\nis occasionally shown in his controversial writing is to be deplored\nbut it may be said in extenuation that all controversies of that time\nwere disfigured in the same way. He pays the penalty for the fault.\n\nMuch of the work is valueless to-day because of Engels' eagerness to\nscore a point off his adversary rather than to state his own case. But\nwhere the philosopher lays the controversialist on one side for a\nbrief period, and takes the trouble to elucidate his own ideas we\ndiscover what has been lost by these defects of temperament. He\npossesses in a marked degree the gift of clear analysis and of keen\nand subtle statement.\n\nThe socialist movement everywhere arrives some time or other at what\nmay be called the Duehring stage of controversy. There are two very\ndistinct impulses towards socialism. The individuals who are\ninfluenced by these impulses must sooner or later come into collision,\nand as a result of the impact the movement is for a time divided into\nhostile parties and a war of pamphleteering and oratory supervenes.\nThis period has just ended in France. For the last few years the\nFrench movement has been divided upon the question of the\nphilosophical foundation of the movement, and the parties to the\ncontroversy may be divided into those who sought to justify the\nmovement upon ethical grounds and those who have regarded it as a\nmodern political phenomenon dependent alone upon economic conditions.\nThe former of these parties based its claims to the suffrages of the\nFrench people upon the justice of the socialistic demands. It\nproclaimed socialism to be the logical result of the Revolution, the\nnecessary conclusion from the teachings of the revolutionary\nphilosophers. Justice was the word in which they summed up the claims\nof socialism, that and Equality, for which latter term as Engels\npoints out in the present work, the French have a fondness which\namounts almost to a mania. Hence one party of the French socialist\nmovement chose as a platform those very \"eternal truths\" which Engels\nridicules and which it is the sole purpose of the present work to\nattack.\n\nTo kill \"eternal truths\" is however by no means an easy matter. Years\nof habit have made them part of the mental structure of the citizens\nof the modern democratic or semi-democratic states. Not only in France\nbut to an even greater degree in the English speaking countries these\n\"eternal truths\" persist, they form the stock in trade of the\nclergyman and the ordinary politician. Bernard Shaw directs the\nshafts of his ridicule against these \"eternal truths\" and smites with\na sarcasm which is more fatal than all the solemn German philosophy\nwhich Engels has at his command. But Shaw is not appreciated by the\nBritish socialist. The latter cannot imagine that the writer is really\npoking fun at things so exceedingly serious and so essential to any\nwell constituted man, to a well-constituted Briton in particular. The\nBritish socialist is as much in love with \"eternal truths\" as is the\nstiffest and most unregenerate of his bourgeois opponents. He\ntherefore toploftily declares that Mr. Shaw is an unbalanced person, a\nlicensed jester. Precisely the same results would attend the efforts\nof an American iconoclast who would venture to ridicule the \"eternal\ntruths\" which have been handed down to us in documents of\nunimpeachable respectability, like the Declaration of Independence,\nand by Fourth of July orators, portly of person and of phrase.\n\nThe \"eternal truth\" phase of socialist controversy seems to be as\neternal as the truth, and must necessarily be so as long as the\nmovement is recruited by men who bring into it the ideas which they\nhave derived from the ordinary training of the American citizen.\n\nThe other side of the controversy to which reference has been made\nderived its philosophy from the experience of the proletariat. This\nmodern proletariat, trained to, the machine, is a distinct product of\nthe occupation by which it lives. The organisation of industry in the\ngrasp of which the workman is held during all his working hours and\nmanufacture by the machine-process, the motions of which he is\ncompelled to follow have produced in him a mental condition which does\nnot readily respond to any sentimental stimulus. The incessant process\nfrom cause to effect endows him with a sort of logical sense in\naccordance with which he works out the problems of life independent of\nthe preconceptions and prejudices which have so great a hold upon the\nreason of his fellow citizens who are not of the industrial\nproletariat. Without knowing why he arrives by dint of the experience\nof his daily toil at the same conclusions as Engels attained as the\nresult of philosophic training and much erudition. The Church is well\naware of this fact to her sorrow for the industrial proletarian seldom\ndarkens her portals. He has no hatred of religion, as the atheistic\nradical bourgeois had, but with a good-natured \"non possumus\" says by\nhis actions what Engels says by his philosophy.\n\nRevolution is an every day occurrence with the industrial proletarian.\nHe sees processes transformed in the twinkling of an eye. He wakes up\none morning to find that the trade which he has learned laboriously\nhas overnight become a drug on the market. He is used to seeing the\nmachine whose energy has enchained him flung on the scrap heap and\ncontemptuously disowned, in favor of a more competent successor whose\nmotions he must learn to follow or be himself flung on the scrap heap\nalso. This constant revolution in the industrial process enters into\nhis blood. He becomes a revolutionist by force of habit. There is no\nneed to preach the dialectic to him. It is continually preached. The\ntransitoriness of phenomena is impressed upon him by the changes in\nindustrial combinations, by the constant substitution of new modes of\nproduction for those to which he has been accustomed, substitutions\nwhich may make \"an aristocrat of labor\" of him to-day, and send him\ntramping to-morrow.\n\nThe industrial proletarian therefore knows practically what Engels has\ntaught philosophically. So that when in the course of his political\nperegrinations he strays into the socialist movement and there finds\nthose who profess a socialism based upon abstract conceptions and\n\"eternal truths\" his contempt is as outspoken as that of a Friedrich\nEngels who chances upon a certain Eugen Duehring spouting paraphrases\nof Rousseau by the socialistic wayside. Engels simply anticipated by\nthe way of books the point of view reached by the industrial\nproletarian of to-day by the way of experience, and by the American\nmachine-made proletarian in particular. This is a matter of no mean\nimportance. In the following pages we can detect if we can look beyond\nand beneath the mere criticism of Duehring, an attitude of mind, not\nof one controversialist to another merely but of an entire class, the\nclass upon which modern society is driven more and more to rely, to\nthe class which relies upon it.\n\nFor their popular support classes and governments rely upon formulae.\nWhen the cry of \"Down with the Tsar\" takes the place of the humbly\nspoken \"Little Father\" what becomes of the Tsardom? When the terms\n\"Liberty\" and \"Equality\" become the jest of the workshop, upon what\nbasis can a modern democratic state depend? This criticism of \"eternal\ntruths\" is destructive criticism, and destructive of much more than\nthe \"truths.\" It is more destructive than sedition itself. Sedition\nmay be suppressed cheaply in these days of quick-firing guns and open\nstreets. But society crumbles away almost insensibly beneath the\nmordant acid of contemptuous analysis. So to-day goaded on the one\nside by the gibes of the machine-made proletariat, and on the other,\nby the raillery of the philosophic jester, society staggers along like\na wounded giant and is only too glad to creep into its cave and to\nforget its sorrows in drink.\n\nAs for 1875, \"Many things have happened since then\" as Beaconsfield\nused to say, but of all that has happened nothing could have given\nmore cynical pleasure to the \"Old Jew\" than the lack of faith in its\nown shibboleths which has seized the cocksure pompous society in which\nhe disported himself. The rhetoric of a Gladstone based upon the\n\"eternal truths\" which constituted always the foundations of his\npolitical appeals would fail to affect the masses to-day with any\nother feeling than that of ridicule. We have already arrived at the\n\"Twilight of the Idols\" at least so far as \"eternal truths\" are\nconcerned. They still find however an insecure roosting place in the\npulpits of the protestant sects.\n\nIf blows have been showered upon the political \"eternal truths\" in the\nname of which the present epoch came into existence social and ethical\nideals have by no means escaped attack. Revolt has been the watchword\nof artist and theologian alike. The pre-Rafaelite school, a not\naltogether unworthy child of the Chartist movement, raised the cry of\nartistic revolt against absolutism and the revolt spread in ever\nwidening circles until it has exhausted itself in the sickly egotism\nof the \"art nouveau.\" Even Engels, with all his independence and\nglorification of change as a philosophy, can find an opportunity to\nfling a sneer at Wagner and the \"music of the future.\" The remnants of\nearly Victorianism cling persistently to Engels. He cannot release\nhimself altogether from the bonds of the bourgeois doctrine which he\nis so anxious to despise. He is in many respects the revolutionist of\n'48, a bourgeois politician possessed at intervals by a proletarian\nghost, such as he says himself ever haunts the bourgeois. The younger\ngeneration without any claims to revolutionism has gone further than\nhe in the denunciation of authority and without the same self\nconsciousness. The scorn of Bernard Shaw for the moguls of the\nacademies and for social ideals is greater than the scorn of Engels\nfor \"eternal truths.\" Says Mr. Shaw, \"The great musician accepted by\nhis unskilled listener is vilified by his fellow musician. It was the\nmusical culture of Europe that pronounced Wagner the inferior of\nMendelssohn and Meyerbeer. The great artist finds his foes among the\npainters and not among the men in the street. It is the Royal Academy\nthat places Mr. Marcus Stone above Mr. Burne Jones. It is not rational\nthat it should be so but it is so for all that. The realist at last\nloses patience with ideals altogether and finds in them only something\nto blind us, something to numb us, something to murder self in us.\nSomething whereby instead of resisting death we disarm it by\ncommitting suicide.\" Here is a note of modernity which Engels was\nhardly modern enough to appreciate and yet it was written before he\ndied.\n\nNietzsche, Tolstoy and a host of minor writers have all had their\nfling at \"eternal truths\" and modern ideals. The battle has long since\nrolled away from the ground on which Engels fought. His arguments on\nthe dialectic are commonplaces to-day which it would be a work of\nsupererogation to explain to anyone except the persistent victim of\nLittle Bethel. The world has come to accept them with the equanimity\nwith which it always accepts long disputed truths.\n\nThe sacred right of nationality for which men contended in Engels'\nyouth, as a direct consequence of political \"eternal truths\" has been\nruthlessly brushed aside. The philosopher talks of the shameful\nspoliation of the smaller by the larger nations, a moral view of\ncommercial progress, which an age, grown more impatient of \"eternal\ntruths\" than Engels himself simply ignores, and moves on without a\nqualm to the destruction of free governments in South Africa. Backward\nand unprogressive peoples jeer, it is true, and thereby show their\npolitical ineptitude, for even the American Republic, having freed the\nnegro under the banner of \"eternal truth\" annexes the Philippines and\nraids Panama in defiance of it.\n\nAnd so since the days of 1875 the world has come to accept the general\ncorrectness of Engels' point of view.\n\nThe enemy which Engels was most anxious to dislodge was \"mechanical\nsocialism,\" a naive invention of a perfect system capable of\nwithstanding the ravages of time, because founded upon eternal\nprinciples of truth and justice. That enemy has now obeyed the law of\nthe dialectic and passed away. Nobody builds such systems, nowadays.\nThey have ceased their building however not in obedience to the\ncommands of Friedrich Engels but because the lapse of time and the\nchange in conditions have proved the dialectic to the revolutionist.\nWith the annihilation of \"eternal truths,\" system building ceased to\nbe even an amusing pastime. The revolutionist has been revolutionized.\nHe no longer fancies that he can make revolutions. He knows better. He\nis content to see that the road is kept clear so that revolutions may\ndevelop themselves. Your real revolutionist, for example, puts no\nobstacle in the path of the Trust, he is much too wise. He leaves that\nto the corrosion of time and the development of his pet dialectic. He\nsees the contradiction concealed in the system which apparently\ntriumphs, and in the triumph of the system he sees also the triumph of\nthe contradiction. He waits until that shadowy proletariat which\nhaunts the system takes on itself flesh and blood and shakes the\nsystem with which it has grown up. But this waiting for the\ndevelopment of the inevitable is weary work to those who want to\nrealise forthwith, so they, unable to confound the logic of Engels,\nattack the \"abstractions\" on which his theory is founded. They still\noppose their \"eternal truths\" to the dialectic.\n\nThus in England, where the strife between the two parties in the\nsocialist movement has lately been waged with a somewhat amusing\nferocity, Engels is charged with a wholesale borrowing from Hegel. In\nany other country than England this would not be laid up against a\nwriter, but the Englishman is so averse to philosophy that the\nassociation of one's name with that of a philosopher, and a German\nphilosopher in particular, is tantamount to an accusation of keeping\nbad company. But a glance at the following pages should tend to\ndispose of so romantic a statement which could, in fact, only have\nbeen made by those who know neither Hegel nor Engels.\n\nThat Hegel furnished the original philosophic impetus to both Marx and\nEngels is true beyond question, but the impetus once given, the course\nof the founders of modern socialism tended ever further from the\nopinions of the idealistic philosopher. In fact Engels says somewhat\nself consciously, not to say boasts, that he and his followers were\npioneers in applying the dialectic to materialism. Whatever accusation\nmay be made against Engels, this much is certain that he was no\nHegelian. In fact both in the present work and in \"Feuerbach\" he is at\ngreat pains to show the relation of the socialist philosophy as\nconceived by himself and Marx to that of the great man for whom he\nalways kept a somewhat exaggerated respect, but from whom he differed\nfundamentally. Engels' attack upon the philosophy of Duehring is based\nupon dislike of its idealism, the fundamental thesis upon which the\nwork depends being entirely speculative. Duehring insisted that his\nphilosophy was a realist philosophy and Engels' serious arguments,\napart from the elaborate ridicule with which he covers his opponent\nand which is by no means a recommendation to the book, is directed to\nshow that it is not realist, that it depends upon certain preconceived\nnotions. Of these notions some are axiomatic, as Duehring claims, that\nis they are propositions which are self evident to Herr Duehring but\nwhich will not stand investigation. Others again are untrue and are\npreconceptions so far as they are out of harmony with established\nfacts.\n\nMuch of Engels' work is out of date judged by recent biological and\nother discoveries, but the essential argument respecting the\ninterdependence of all departments of knowledge, and the impossibility\nof making rigid classifications holds good to-day in a wider sense\nthan when Engels wrote. Scientific truths which have been considered\nabsolute, theories which have produced approximately correct results,\nhave all been discredited. The dogmas of science against which the\ndogmatic ecclesiastics have directed their scornful contempt have\nshared the same fate as the ecclesiastical dogmas. Nothing remains\ncertain save the certainty of change. There are no ultimates. Even the\natom is suspect and the claims of the elements to be elementary are\nrejected wholesale with something as closely resembling scorn as the\nscientist is ever able to attain. A scientific writer has recently\nsaid \"What is undeniable is that the Daltonian atom has within a\ncentury of its acceptance as a fundamental reality suffered\ndisruption. Its proper place in nature is not that formerly assigned\nto it. No longer 'in seipso totus, teres, atque rotundus' its\nreputation for inviolability and indestructibility is gone for ever.\nEach of these supposed 'ultimates' is now known to be the scene of\nindescribable activities, a complex piece of mechanism composed of\nthousands of parts, a star-cluster in miniature, subject to all kinds\nof dynamical vicissitudes, to perturbations, accelerations, internal\nfriction, total or partial disruption. And to each is appointed a\nfixed term of existence. Sooner or later the balance of equilibrium is\ntilted, disturbance eventuates in overthrow; the tiny exquisite system\nfinally breaks up. Of atoms, as of men, it may be said with truth\n'Quisque suos patitur manes.'\"\n\nThe discovery of radium was in itself sufficient to revolutionise the\nheretofore existing scientific theories and the revolution thereby\neffected has been enough to cause Sir William Crookes to say, \"There\nhas been a vivid new start, our physicists have remodelled their views\nas to the constitution of matter.\" In his address to the physicists at\nBerlin the same scientist said, \"This fatal quality of atomic\ndissociation appears to be universal, and operates whenever we brush a\npiece of glass with silk; it works in the sunshine and raindrops in\nlightnings and flame; it prevails in the waterfall and the stormy sea\"\nand a writer in the Edinburgh Review (December, 1903) remarks in this\nconnection \"Matter he (Sir William Crookes) consequently regards as\ndoomed to destruction. Sooner or later it will have dissolved into the\n'formless mist' of protyle and 'the hour hand of eternity will have\ncompleted one revolution.' The 'dissipation of energy' has then found\nits correlative in the 'dissolution of Matter.'\"\n\nThe scope of this revolution may only be gauged by the fact that one\nwriter (\"The Alchemy of the Sea,\" London \"Outlook,\" Feb. 11, 1905) has\nventured to say, and this is but one voice in a general chorus: \"To-day\nno one believes in the existence of elements; no one questions the\npossibility of a new alchemy; and the actual evolution of one element\nfrom another has been observed in the laboratory--observed by Sir\nWilliam Ramsey in London, and confirmed by a chemist in St. Petersburg.\"\nHelium being an evolution of radium and it is expected furthermore that\nradium will prove to be an evolution of uranium and so there is a\nconstant process as the writer points out of what was formerly called\nalchemy the transmutation of one metal into another.\n\nIt is clear that in face of these facts the arguments of Engels\npossess even greater force at the present day than when they were\nenunciated and that the old hard and fast method of arguing from\nabsolute truths is dead and done for.\n\nOnly statesmen see fit to still harp on the same phrases which have\nbecome as it were a part of the popular mental structure and by\nconstant appeals to the old watchwords to obscure the fact of change.\nWere one not acquainted with the essential stupidity of the political\nmind and the lack of grasp which is the characteristic of statesmen,\nit might be imagined that all this was done with malice aforethought\nand that there was a sort of tacit conspiracy on the part of the\npoliticians to delude the people. But experience of the inexcusable\nblunders and the inexplicable errors into which statesmen are\ncontinually driven forces the conclusion that they are in reality no\nwhit in advance of the electorate and that only now and then a\nBeaconsfield appears who can understand the drift of events. Such a\nman is the \"revolutionist\" which Beaconsfield claimed himself to be.\nBut what shall we say of the President of the country that has\nattained the highest place in industrial progress among the nations,\nwhose whole history is a verification of the truth of the dialectic\nand who can still appeal to \"individualism\" as a guiding principle of\npolitical action? It is a wanton flying in the face of the experience\nof the last quarter of a century and such rashness will require its\npenalty. \"Back to Kant\" appears to be the hope of reactionary\npoliticians as well as of reactionary philosophers.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nPREFACES\n\n\nI\n\nThe following work is by no means the fruit of some \"inward\ncompulsion,\" quite the contrary.\n\nWhen three years ago, Herr Duehring suddenly challenged the world, as\na scholar and reformer of socialism, friends in Germany frequently\nexpressed the wish that I should throw a critical light upon these new\nsocialist doctrines, in the central organ of the Social Democratic\nParty, at that time the \"Volkstaat.\" They held it as very necessary\nthat new opportunity for division and confusion should not be afforded\nin a party so young and so recently definitely united. They were in a\nbetter condition than myself to comprehend the condition of affairs in\nGermany, so that I was compelled to trust to their judgment. It\nappeared furthermore that the proselyte was welcomed by a certain\nportion of the socialist press, with a warmth, which meant nothing\nmore than kindliness to Herr Duehring, but it was seen by a portion of\nthe party press that a result of this kindly feeling towards Herr\nDuehring was the introduction unperceived of the Duehring doctrine.\nPeople were found who were soon ready to spread his doctrine in a\npopular form among the workingmen, and finally Herr Duehring and his\nlittle sect employed all the arts of advertisement and intrigue to\ncompel the \"Volksblatt\" to change its attitude respecting the new\nteachings which put forth such tremendous claims.\n\nHowever, a year elapsed before I could make up my mind to engage in so\ndisagreeable a business to the neglect of my other labors. It was the\nsort of thing one had to get through as quickly as possible, once it\nwas begun. And it was not only unpleasant but quite a task. The new\nsocialist theory appeared as the last practical result of a new\nphilosophic system. It therefore involved an investigation of it in\nconnection with this system and therefore of the system itself. It was\nnecessary to follow Herr Duehring over a wide expanse of country where\nhe had dealt with everything under the sun, yea, and more also. So\nthere came into existence a series of articles which appeared from the\nbeginning of 1877 in the successor of the \"Volkstaat,\" the \"Vorwaerts\"\nof Leipsic, and are collected here.\n\nIt was my object which extended the criticism to a length out of all\nproportion to the scientific value of the matter and, therefore, of\nHerr Duehring's writings. There are two further reasons in extenuation\nof this lengthiness. In the first place it gave me an opportunity of\ndeveloping my views, in a positive fashion, with respect to matters\nwhich are connected with this, though very different, and which are of\nmore general scientific and practical interest to-day. I have taken\nthe opportunity to do so in every chapter, and, as this book cannot\nundertake to set up a system in opposition to that of Herr Duehring,\nit is to be hoped that the reader will not overlook the real\nsignificance of the views which I have set forth. I have already had\nsufficient proof that my labors have not been altogether in vain in\nthis regard.\n\nOn the other hand the \"system-shaping\" Herr Duehring is by no means an\nexceptional phenomenon in Germany these days. Nowadays in Germany\nsystems of cosmogony, of natural philosophy in particular, of\npolitics, of economics, etc., are in the habit of shooting up over\nnight like mushrooms. The most insignificant Doctor of Philosophy,\nnay, even the student, has no further use for a complete \"system.\" In\nthe modern state, it is predicated that every citizen is able to pass\njudgment on all the questions upon which he is called upon to vote; in\npolitical economy it is assumed that every consumer is thoroughly\nacquainted with all commodities, which he has occasion to buy to\nmaintain himself withal, and the same idea is also held as regards\nknowledge. Freedom of knowledge demands that a person write of that\nwhich he has not learned and proclaim this as the only sound\nscientific method. But Herr Duehring is one of the most conspicuous\ntypes of those absurd pseudo-scientists, who to-day occupy so\nconspicuous a place in Germany and drown everything with their noisy\nnonsense. Noisy nonsense in poetry, in philosophy, in political\neconomy, in writing history: noisy nonsense in the professor's chair\nand tribune; noisy nonsense too in the claims to superiority and\nintellectuality above the vulgar noisy nonsense of other nations,\nnoisy nonsense the most characteristic and mightiest product of German\nintellectual activity, cheap and bad, like other German products,\nalong with which, I regret to say, they were not exhibited at\nPhiladelphia.\n\nSo, German socialism, particularly since Herr Duehring set the\nexample, beats the drum, and produces here and there one who prides\nhimself upon a \"science\" of which he knows nothing. It is this, a sort\nof child's disease which marks the first conversion of the German\nuniversity man to social democracy and is inseparable from him, but it\nwill soon be thrust aside by the remarkable sound sense of our working\nclass.\n\nIt is not my fault that I am obliged to follow Herr Duehring into a\nrealm in which I can at the very most only claim to be a dilettante.\nOn such occasions I have for the most part limited myself to placing\nthe plain incontrovertible facts in contrast with the false or crooked\nassertions of my opponent, as in relation to jurisprudence and many\ninstances with regard to natural science. In other places he indulges\nin universal views on the subject of natural science theories and\ntherefore on a field where the professional naturalist must range out\nof his own particular specialty to neighboring regions, where he,\naccording to Herr Virchow's confessions is just as good a\n\"half-knower\" as the rest of us. For slight deficiencies and\nunavoidable errors in the publication I hope that the same indulgence\nwill be extended to me as has been shown the other side of the\ncontroversy.\n\nJust as I was completing this preface I received the publishers'\nnotice of a new important book by Herr Duehring. \"New Foundations for\nrational Physics and Chemistry.\" Although I am very well aware of my\ndeficiencies in physics and chemistry I still believe that I know my\nDuehring well enough, without having read the book, to venture to say\nthat the laws of physics and chemistry there set forth are worthy of\nbeing placed alongside of Herr Duehring's former discoveries and the\nlaws of economics, scheme of the universe, etc., examined in my\nwritings and proved to be misunderstood or commonplace, and that the\nrhigometer, an instrument constructed by Herr Duehring for measuring\ntemperature will be found to serve not only as a measure for high or\nlow temperature but of the ignorance and arrogance of Herr Duehring.\n_London, 11 June, 1878._\n\n\nII\n\nIt came to me as quite a surprise that a new edition of this work was\ncalled for. The special views which it criticised are practically\nforgotten to-day. The work itself has not only been placed before many\nthousands of readers by its serial publication in \"Vorwaerts\" of\nLeipsic in 1877 and 1878, but it has also been published in large\neditions in its entirety. How then can there be any further interest\nin what I have to say about Herr Duehring?\n\nIn the first place, I fancy, that it is owing to the fact that this\nbook, as indeed, all my writings at that time, was prohibited in\nGermany soon after the publication of the anti-Socialist laws.\nWhosoever was not fettered by the inherited officialdom of the\ncountries of the Holy Alliance should have clearly seen the effect of\nthis measure--the double and treble sale of the prohibited books, and\nthe advertisement of the impotence of the gentlemen in Berlin, who\nissued injunctions and could not make them effective. Indeed the\namiability of the Government was the cause of the publication of\nseveral new editions of my shorter writings, as I am able to affirm. I\nhave no time for a proper revision of the text and so allow it to go\nto press, just as it is.\n\nBut there is still an additional circumstance. The \"system\" of Herr\nDuehring here criticised spreads over a very extensive theoretical\nground and I was compelled to pursue him all over it and to place my\nideas in antagonism to his. Negative criticism thereupon became\npositive; the polemic developed into a more or less connected\nexposition of dialectic methods and the socialist philosophy, of which\nMarx and myself are representative, and this in quite a number of\nplaces. These our philosophic ideas have had an incubation period of\nabout twenty years since they were first given to the world in Marx's\n\"Misere de la Philosophie\" and the Communist Manifesto until they\nobtained a wider and wider influence through the publication of\n\"Capital\" and now find recognition and support far beyond the limits\nof Europe in all lands where a proletariat exists together with\nprogressive scientific thinkers. It seems that there is also a public\nwhose interests in this matter are sufficient to induce them to\npurchase the polemic against Duehring's opinions, in spite of the fact\nthat it is now without an object, and who evidently derive pleasure\nfrom the positive development.\n\nI must call attention to the fact, by the way, that the views here set\nout were, for by far the most part, developed and established by Marx,\nand only to a very slight degree by myself, so that it is understood\nthat I have not represented them without his knowledge. I read the\nentire manuscript to him before sending it to press and the tenth\nchapter of the section on Political Economy was written by Marx and\nunfortunately had to be somewhat abbreviated by me.\n\nIt was our wont to mutually assist each other in special branches of\nwork.\n\nThe present edition is with the exception of one chapter an unchanged\nedition of the former. I had no time for revision although there was\nmuch in the mode of presentation which I wanted altered. But there is\nincumbent upon me the duty of preparing for publication the\nmanuscripts which Marx left, and this is much more important than\nanything else. Then my conscience rebels against making any changes.\nThe book is controversial and I have an idea that it is unfair to my\nantagonist for me to alter anything when he cannot do so. I could only\nclaim the right to reply to Herr Duehring's answer. But what Herr\nDuehring has written with respect to my attack I have not read and\nshall not do so, unless obliged. I am theoretically done with him.\nBesides I must observe the rules of literary warfare all the more\nclosely as a despicable wrong has since been inflicted upon him by the\nUniversity of Berlin. It has been chastised for this, indeed. A\nuniversity which so degrades itself as to refuse permission to Herr\nDuehring to teach under the known circumstances should not be\nsurprised if a Herr Schwenninger is forced upon it under circumstances\njust as well known.\n\nThe one chapter in which I have permitted myself any explanations is\nthe Second of the Third Section \"Theory.\" Here where the sole concern\nis the presentation of a most important part of the philosophy which I\nrepresent, my antagonist cannot complain if I put myself to some\ntrouble to speak popularly and to generalise. This was undoubtedly a\nspecial occasion. I had made a French translation of three chapters of\nthe book (the First of the Introduction and the First and Second of\nthe Third Section) into a separate pamphlet for my friend Lafargue,\nand the French edition afterwards served as a basis for one in Italian\nand one in Polish. A German edition was provided under the title \"The\nDevelopment of Socialism from Utopia to Science.\" The latter has\nexhausted three editions in a few months and has also made its\nappearance translated into Russian and Danish. In all these\npublications only the chapter in question was added to and it would\nhave been pedantic in me if I had confined myself to the actual\nwording of the original in the new edition in spite of the later and\ninternational form which it had assumed.\n\nWhere I wished to make changes had particular reference to two points.\nIn the first place with regard to primitive history, as far as known,\nto which Morgan was the first to give us the key in 1877. In my book\n\"The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State,\" Zurich,\n1884, I have since had an opportunity of working up material more\nlately accessible which I employed in this later work. In the second\nplace, as far as that portion which is concerned with theoretical\nscience is concerned, the presentation of the subject is very\ndefective and a much more definite one could now be given. If I did\nnot allow myself the right of improving it now, I should be in duty\nbound to pass criticism on myself instead of the other.\n\nMarx and I were probably the first to import the well known dialectic\nof the German idealistic philosophy into the materialistic view of\nnature and history. But to a dialectical and at the same time\nmaterialistic view of nature there pertains an acquaintance with\nmathematics and natural science. Marx was a sound mathematician but\nthe sciences we only knew in part, by fits and starts, sporadically.\nAfter I retired from mercantile pursuits and went to London and had\ntime, I made as far as possible a complete mathematical and scientific\n\"molting,\" as Liebig calls it, and spent the best part of eight years\non it. I was occupied with this molting process when it chanced that I\nwas called upon to busy myself with Herr Duehring's so-called\nphilosophy. If, therefore, I often fail to find the correct technical\nexpression, and am a little awkward in the field of natural science it\nis only too natural. On the other hand the consciousness of\ninsecurity which I have not yet got over has made me cautious. Actual\nblunders respecting facts up to the present known, and incorrect\npresentations of theories thus far recognised cannot be proved against\nme. In this relation just one great mathematician, who is laboring\nunder a mistake, has complained to Marx in a letter that I have made a\nmischievous attack upon the honor of the square root of minus one.\n\nAs regards my review of mathematics and the natural science it was\nnecessary for me to reassure myself on some special points--since I\nhad no doubts about the truth of the general proposition--that in\nnature the same dialectic laws of progress fulfill themselves amid all\nthe apparent confusion of innumerable changes as dominate the\napparently accidental in nature; the same laws whose threads traverse\nthe progressive history of human thought, and little by little come to\nthe consciousness of thinking men. These were first developed by Hegel\nin a comprehensive fashion but in a mystical form. Our efforts were\ndirected towards stripping away this mystical form and making them\nevident in their full simplicity and universal reality. It was self\nevident that the old philosophies of nature--in spite of all their\nactual value and fruitful suggestiveness--could be of no value to us.\nThere was an error in the Hegelian form, as shown in this book, in\nthat it recognised no progression of nature in time, no \"one after\nanother\" (Nacheinander) but merely \"one besides another\"\n(Nebeneinander). This was due on the one hand to the Hegelian system\nitself which ascribed to the Spirit (Geist) alone a progressive\nhistorical development, but on the other hand, the general attitude of\nthe natural sciences was responsible. So Hegel fell far behind Kant in\nthis respect for the latter had already by his nebular hypothesis\nproclaimed the origin and, by his discovery of the stoppage of the\nrotation of the earth through the tides, the destruction of the solar\nsystem. And finally, I could not undertake to construct the\ndialectical laws of nature but to discover them in it and to develop\nthem from it.\n\nTo do this entirely and in each separate division is a colossal task.\nNot only is the ground to be covered almost immeasurable but on this\nentire ground natural science is involved in such tremendous changes\nthat even those who have all their time to give can hardly keep up\nwith it. Since the death of Marx however my mind has been occupied by\nmore pressing duties and so I had to interrupt my work. I must, for\nthe moment, confine myself to the hints in the work before us and wait\nfor a later opportunity to correct and publish the results obtained,\nprobably together with the most important manuscripts on mathematics\nleft behind by Marx.\n\nBut the advance of theoretical science makes my work in all\nprobability, in a great measure, or altogether, superfluous. Since the\nrevolution which overturned theoretical science the necessity of\narranging the accumulation of purely empirical discoveries has caused\nthe opposing empiricists to pay more and more attention to the\ndialectical character of the operations of nature. The old stiff\nantagonisms, the sharp impassable frontier lines are becoming more and\nmore abolished. Since the last \"true\" gases have been liquefied, since\nthe proof that a body can be put in a condition in which liquid and\ngaseous forms cannot be differentiated, aggregate conditions have to\nthe last remnant lost their earlier absolute character. With the\nstatement of the kinetic theory of gases that, in gases, the squares\nof the speeds with which the separate gas molecules move are in\ninverse ratio to the molecular weights, under the same temperature,\nheat takes its place directly in the series of such measurable forms\nof motion. Ten years ago the newly discovered great fundamental law of\nmotion was still understood as a mere law of the conservation of\nenergy, as a mere expression of the indestructibility and\nuncreatibility of motion, and therefore merely on its quantitative\nside. That narrow negative expression has been more and more\nsubordinated to the transformation of energy, in which the qualitative\ncontent of the process is duly recognised and the last notion of an\nextramundane Creator is destroyed. That the quantity of motion (of\nenergy, so called) is not changed when it is transformed into kinetic\nenergy (mechanical force, so called), into electricity, heat,\npotential static energy need not now be preached any longer as\nsomething new, it served as the foundation, once attained, of many\nvaluable investigations of the process of transformation itself, of\nthe great fundamental process, in the knowledge of which is\ncomprehended the knowledge of all nature. And since biology has been\ntreated in the light of the theory of evolution it has abolished one\nstiff line of classification after another in the realm of organic\nnature. The entirely unclassified intermediate conditions increase in\nnumber every day. Later investigations throw organisms out of one\nclass into another, and marks of distinction which have become\narticles of faith lose their individual reality. We have now mammals\nwhich lay eggs and, if the news is established, birds also which go on\nall fours. It was already observed, before the time of Virchow, as a\nconclusion of the discovery of the cell, that the identity of the\nindividual creature is lost, scientifically and dialectically\nspeaking, in a federation of cells, so the idea of animal (and\ntherefore human) individuality is still further complicated by the\ndiscovery of the amoeba in the bodies of the higher animals\nconstituting the white blood corpuscles. And these are just the things\nwhich were considered polar opposites, irreconcilable and insoluble,\nthe fixed boundaries and differences of classification, which have\ngiven modern theoretical science its limited and metaphysical\ncharacter. The knowledge that these distinctions and antagonisms\nactually do occur in nature, but only relatively, and that on the\nother hand that fixity and absoluteness are the products of our own\nminds--this knowledge constitutes the kernel of the dialectic view of\nnature. The view is reached under the compulsion of the mass of\nscientific facts, and one reaches it the more easily by bringing to\nthe dialectic character of these facts a consciousness of the laws of\ndialectic thought. At all events, the scope of science is now so great\nthat it no longer escapes the dialectic comprehension. But it will\nsimplify the process if it is remembered that the results in which\nthese discoveries are comprehended are ideas, that the art of\noperating with ideas is not inborn, moreover, and is not vouchsafed\nevery day to the ordinary mind, but requires actual thought, and this\nthought has a long history crammed with experiences, neither more nor\nless than the accumulated experiences of investigation into nature. By\nthese means, then, it learns how to appropriate the results of fifteen\nhundred years development of philosophy, it gets rid of any separate\nnatural philosophy which stands above or alongside of it and the\nlimited method of thought brought over from English empiricism.\n\n  _London, 22nd September, 1885._\n\n\nIII\n\nThe following new edition is, with the exception of a very few changes\nin form of expression, a reproduction of the former. Only in one\nchapter, namely in the Xth. of the Second Section (that on Critical\nHistory) I have allowed some important emendations, for the following\nreasons. As has been stated already in the preface to the second\nedition, this chapter is in all its essentials, the work of Marx. In\nits first form, which was intended as an article in a review, I was\ncompelled to abbreviate the manuscript of Marx very much, particularly\nin those points in which the criticism of Herr Duehring's propositions\nis subordinate to the particular development of the history of\neconomics. But these are just the portions of the manuscript which\nconstitute the greatest and most important of, as regards its\npermanent interest, part of the work. The places in which Marx gives\ntheir appropriate place in the genesis of political economy to such\nwriters as Petty, North, Locke and Hume, I consider myself obliged to\ngive as literally and completely as possible, and still more so, his\nexplanation of the \"economic tableaux\" by Quesnay, the insoluble\nriddle of the sphinx to all economists. I have omitted however that\npart which dealt solely with the writings of Herr Duehring as far as\nthe connection permitted. For the rest, I am perfectly well satisfied\nwith the extent to which the views represented in this work, have made\ntheir way into the minds of the working class and the scientists\nthroughout the world since the publication of the former edition.\n\n                                                       F. ENGELS.\n\n  _London, 23d May, 1894._\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\n_I. In General._\n\nModern socialism is in its essence the product of the existence on the\none hand of the class antagonisms which are dominant in modern\nsociety, between the property possessors and those who have no\nproperty and between the wage workers and the bourgeois; and, on the\nother, of the anarchy which is prevalent in modern production. In its\ntheoretical form however it appears as a development of the\nfundamental ideas of the great French philosophers of the eighteenth\ncentury. Like every new theory it was obliged to attach itself to the\nexisting philosophy however deeply its roots were embedded in the\neconomic fact.\n\nThe great men in France who cleared the minds of the people for the\ncoming revolution were themselves uncompromisingly revolutionary. They\ndid not recognise outside authority of any kind whatsoever. Religion,\nnatural science, society, the state, all were subjected to the most\nunsparing criticism, and everything was compelled to justify its\nexistence before the judgment seat of reason or perish. Reason was\nestablished as the one and universal measure. It was the time when, as\nHegel said, the world was turned upside down, first in the sense that\nthe human mind and the principles arrived at by process of thought\nwere claimed as the foundations of all human actions and social\nrelations, but later also, in the wider sense, that the reality which\ncontradicted these theories had indeed to be turned upside down. All\nforms of society and the state existent heretofore, all survivals of\nold notions, were thrown into the lumber room as unreasonable. Up to\nthat time the world had only allowed itself to be led by prejudice.\nAll that had been done deserved merely pity and contempt. Now for the\nfirst time day broke: from now on, superstition, injustice, tyranny\nand privilege should be replaced by eternal truth, eternal justice,\nequality founded on natural rights and the inalienable rights of man.\n\nWe now know that the rule of reason was nothing more than the rule of\nthe bourgeoisie idealised, that eternal right found its realisation in\nbourgeois justice, that equality was materialised in bourgeois\nequality before the law, that when the rights of man were proclaimed\nbourgeois rights of property were proclaimed at one and the same time,\nand that the state of reason, Rousseau's Social Contract, could only\ncome into existence as the bourgeois democratic republic. To such a\nslight extent could the great thinkers of the eighteenth century, just\nas their predecessors, prevail over the limits which their own epoch\nhad placed upon them.\n\nBut besides the antagonism between feudal baron and bourgeois there\nexisted the general antagonism between the robbers and the robbed,\nbetween the rich idlers and the toiling poor. It was just this\nantagonism which made it possible for the leaders of the bourgeoisie\nto pose as the representatives not merely of a special class but of\nthe whole of suffering humanity. Furthermore the bourgeoisie was\nsaddled with an antithesis right from the start. Capitalists cannot\nexist without laborers, and, in proportion, as the members of the\ngilds in the Middle Ages developed into the modern bourgeois, the\njourneymen of the gilds and the day laborers, on their part, developed\ninto the proletariat. And though the bourgeois, as a general rule,\nmight claim to represent also the interests of the different working\nclasses of the period, still, independent movements of the latter\nclasses broke out in connection with each great movement on the part\nof the bourgeoisie; such working classes being the more or less\ndeveloped predecessors of the modern proletariat. Thus there came into\nbeing at the time of the German Reformation and the Peasant War the\nparty of Thomas Munzer, in the great English Revolution the Levellers,\nand in the great French Revolution, Baboeuf.\n\nBesides these revolutionary demonstrations of a class still\nundeveloped, occurred certain theoretical manifestations of a\ncorresponding nature. Thus in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,\nutopian pictures of an ideal social condition, in the eighteenth\ncentury, absolutely communistic theories (Morelly and Mably). The\ndemand for equality was confined no longer to political rights, it had\nto be extended to the social condition of individuals; the demand was\nmade for the abolition not merely of class privileges but of class\ndistinctions also. An ascetic communism patterned on that of Sparta\nwas the first form which the new teachings assumed. Then came the\nthree great utopians--Saint Simon, in whose eyes bourgeois aims\npossessed a certain merit as well as those of the proletariat: then\nFourier and Owen, who, in the land of the most highly developed\ncapitalistic production, and under the influence of the antagonisms\nwhich arise therefrom, developed in direct relation to French\nmaterialism their proposals which tended to the abolition of class\ndistinctions.\n\nOne common feature pertaining to all the three is the fact that they\ndid not appear as the representatives of the interests of the\nproletariat which had been in the meantime developed through the\nhistorical process. Like the philosophers, their ambition is not to\nfree a particular class but the whole world. Like them they wish to\nintroduce the government of reason and eternal justice. But there is a\nworld of difference between their government and that of the\nphilosophers. According to the philosophers, the bourgeois world as it\nexists is unreasonable and unjust and is destined for the rubbish\nheap, just as feudalism and all other earlier forms of society. The\nreason that true justice and reason have not dominated the world is\nbecause up to the present man has not properly comprehended them. That\na man of genius has appeared and that the truth concerning these\nthings should have now been made clear are not results arising from a\ncombination of historical progress and necessity, but a mere piece of\nluck. He might just as well have been born five hundred years earlier\nand saved mankind the mistakes, conflicts and sorrows of five hundred\nyears.\n\nThis is actually the idea of all English and French socialists and of\nthe earlier German socialists, Weitling included. According to this\nview, socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason, and\njustice, and only has to be perceived in order to vanquish the world\nby reason of its truth. Hence, absolute truth, reason, and justice\nvary according to each founder of a school, and therefore with each\none, the variety of absolute truth, reason and justice is dependent,\nin turn, upon the subjective temperament of that founder, his\nconditions of life, the extent of his knowledge and mental discipline,\nso that in this conflict of absolute truths there is no possible\nsolution save that they rub each other smooth by mutual contact. Hence\nnothing could result from it except a sort of eclectic, average\nsocialism, which is, as a matter of fact, up to the present, the\nprevailing notion in the minds of the great majority of socialist\nagitators in France and England--a mixture admitting of manifold\nshades, of a few notable critical utterances, economic teachings and\npictures of a future state of society by leaders of different sects, a\nmixture which flows all the easier in proportion as the sharp precise\ncorners are rubbed off the separate notions in the stream of debates,\njust as pebbles become round in a brook.\n\nIn order that a science can be made out of socialism it is first\nnecessary that it be placed on a sound basis.\n\nMeanwhile, close to and just after the French philosophy of the\neighteenth century, the new German philosophy arose and culminated in\nHegel. Its greatest service was the restoration of the dialectic as\nthe highest form of thought. The old Greek philosophers were all\nnatural dialecticians, and the most universal intellect among them,\nAristotle, was already the discoverer of the essential forms of\ndialectic thought. On the other hand, subsequent philosophy although\nin it there were brilliant exponents of the dialectic (e.g. Descartes\nand Spinoza), was more and more involved in the so-called metaphysical\nmode of thought, chiefly owing to English influence which completely\nmastered the French philosophers, at least of the eighteenth century.\nOutside of the strict frontiers of philosophy, masterpieces of the\ndialectic might be found occasionally of which I can only recall\n\"Rameau's Nephew\" by Diderot, and the treatise upon the origin of\nhuman inequality by Rousseau.\n\nWe now give briefly the essential features of the two modes of\nthought: we will return to them more fully later.\n\nIf we examine nature, the history of man or our own intellectual\nactivities, we have presented to us an endless coil of interrelations\nand changes in which nothing is constant whatever be its nature, time\nor position, but every thing is in motion, suffers change, and passes\naway. This original, naive and very nearly correct philosophy of the\nworld is that of the old Greek philosophers and was first put in a\nvery clear form by Heraclitus. Everything is and yet is not, since\neverything is in a state of flux, is comprehended as undergoing\nconstant modification, as eternally existing and disappearing. But\nthis philosophy, correct as it is as regards phenomena in general,\nviewed as a picture, is insufficient to explain the individual\nphenomena of which the picture of the universe is composed, and as\nlong as we cannot do that we are not clear about the general picture.\nIn order to study these individual phenomena we are obliged to take\nthem out of their natural or social connection, and examine each of\nthem by itself according to its own form and its particular origin and\ndevelopment. This is the task of natural science and historical\ninvestigation, branches of discovery to which the Greeks of classical\ntimes assigned a subordinate place for very good reasons, since they,\nfirst of all, had to collect the material. The beginning of an exact\nobservation of nature was made first by the Greeks of the Alexandrine\nperiod, and was later developed further by the Arabs in the Middle\nAges. True natural science hence dates from the second half of the\nfifteenth century, and from then on has advanced at a constantly\ngrowing rate. The dissection of nature into its separate parts, the\nseparation of different natural events and natural conditions into\ncertain classes, the examination of the interiors of organic bodies\nwith respect to their manifold anatomical forms, furnished the\nfundamental reasons for the progress in a knowledge of nature which\nthe last four hundred years have brought in their train. But it has\ncaused us occasionally to drop into the habit of regarding natural\nphenomena and events as entities, apart from the great universal\ninterrelations, and therefore not as moving but quiescent, not as\nchangeable in their essence but fixed and constant, not in their life\nbut in their death. And hence, just as happened with Bacon and Locke,\nthis point of view has been carried over from science into philosophy,\nand has constituted the specially narrow view of the last century, the\nmetaphysical mode of thought.\n\nFor the metaphysician, things and their pictures in the minds,\nconcepts, are separate entities, one following the other without any\nregard to each other, stable, rigid, eternally fixed objects of\ninvestigation. The metaphysician thinks in antitheses. His\nconversation is \"Yea, yea; Nay, nay\" and whatsoever is more than these\ncometh of evil. For him a thing exists or it does not exist, a thing\ncan never be itself and something else at the same time; positive and\nnegative are mutually exclusive, cause and effect stand in stiff\nantagonism to each other. This method of thought seems at the first\nglance to be quite plausible because it is in accordance with sound\ncommon sense. But sound common sense, respectable fellow though he may\nbe in his own home surrounded by his four walls, meets with strange\nadventures when he betakes himself into the wide world of\ninvestigation; and the metaphysical way of looking at things, sound\nand useful as it is, under given conditions, runs sooner or later into\na stone wall, beyond which it is one-sided, stupid and abstract, and\nloses itself in insoluble contradictions. Because it omits to notice\nthe interrelations of the individual phenomena, their existence, their\ncoming and their going, their static and mobile conditions, and so to\nspeak does not see the forest for trees. We know for example, with\nsufficient certainty for every day affairs, whether an animal is alive\nor dead, but, on closer examination, we find that this is sometimes no\neasy matter to decide, as jurists know very well and have gone indeed\nto great pains to discover a rational border line beyond which the\nkilling of a child in the womb of its mother is murder. It is just as\nimpossible too to fix the precise moment of death, for physiology\nshows that death is not a single and sudden event but a very slow\nprocess. Just so is every organic being at the same moment itself and\nnot itself. Every moment it takes up matter coming to it from the\noutside and throws off other matter, every moment its body-cells die\nand are recreated. Indeed after a longer or shorter period the whole\nmaterial of the body is renewed through the taking up of other\nparticles of matter so that each organic being is at the same time\nitself and something else. We find also if we look at the matter more\nclosely that the two poles of an antithesis, positive and negative,\nare just as inseparable as they are antagonistic, and that they, in\nspite of all their fixed antagonisms permeate each other, also that\nthe cause and effect are concepts which can only realise themselves in\nrelation to a particular case. However when we come to examine the\nseparate case in its general relation to the world at large they come\ntogether and dissolve themselves in face of the working out of the\nuniversal problem, for, here, cause and effect exchange places, what\nwas at one time and place effect becoming cause and vice versa.\n\nAll these phenomena and thought-concepts do not fit into the frame of\nmetaphysical philosophy. According to the dialectic method of thinking\nwhich regards things and their concepts in relation to their\nconnection with each other, their concatenation, their coming into\nbeing and passing away, phenomena, like the preceding, are so many\nconfirmations of its own philosophy. Nature is the proof of the\ndialectic, and we must give to modern science the credit of having\nfurnished an extraordinary wealth and daily increasing store of\nmaterial towards this proof, and thereby showing in the last instance\nthings proceed dialectically and not in accordance with metaphysical\nnotions. But as the scientists who have learned to think dialectically\nmay be still easily counted, the chaos arising from the confusion\nbetween actual results and an antiquated mode of thought is thus\nexplained, and this confusion is to-day dominant in theoretical\nscience, and drives teachers and pupils, writers and readers to\ndespair.\n\nA correct notion of the universe, of the human race, as well as of the\nreflection of this progress in the human mind can only be had by means\nof the dialectic method, together with a steady observation of the\nchange and interchange which goes on in the universe, the coming into\nexistence and passing away, progressive and retrogressive\nmodification.\n\nAnd the later German philosophy has proceeded from this standpoint.\nKant began his career in this way by abolishing Newton's conception of\na stable solar system which persisted after receiving its first\nimpulse, in favor of a historical process, to wit, the origin of the\nsun and all the planets from a rotating mass of nebulae. From this\nconcept he drew the conclusion that, granted this origin, the future\ndissolution of the solar system is inevitable. His theory was\nmathematically proved by Laplace half a century later, and half a\ncentury later still the spectroscope discovered the existence of such\nglowing masses of gas in space in different stages of condensation.\n\nThis later German philosophy found its conclusion in the philosophy of\nHegel where for the first time, and this is his greatest service, the\nentire natural, historical and spiritual universe was regarded as a\nprocess, that is, as in constant progress, change, transformation and\ndevelopment, and the attempt was made to show the more subtle\nrelations of this process and development. From this historical point\nof view the history of mankind no longer appeared as a barren\nconfusion of mindless forces, all alike subject to rejection before\nthe judgment seat of the most recently ripened philosophy, and which,\nat the very best, man puts out of his mind as soon as possible, but as\nthe development-process of humanity itself, to follow the process of\nwhich, little by little, through all its ramifications, and to\nestablish the essential laws of which, in spite of all apparent\naccidents, is now the task of philosophic thought.\n\nIt is immaterial at this place that Hegel did not solve this problem.\nHis epoch-making service was to have proposed it. It is a problem,\nmoreover, which no individual can solve. Though Hegel, next to Saint\nSimon, was the most universal intellect of his time he was still\nlimited, in the first place, through the necessarily narrow grasp of\nhis own knowledge and in addition through the limitations of the\ncontemporary conditions of knowledge. There was a third reason, too.\nHegel was an idealist, that is he regarded thought not as a mere\nabstract representation of real phenomena, but, on the contrary,\nphenomena and their development appeared to him as the representations\nof the Idea which existed before the world. The result was an\ninversion of everything, the actual interrelations of the universe\nwere turned completely upside down, and though of these\ninterrelations, many single ones were set out justly and correctly by\nHegel, much of the detail is patched, labored, made up, in short,\nincorrect. The Hegelian system was, to speak briefly, a colossal\nmiscarriage, and the last of its kind. It rested on an incurable\ncontradiction; on the other hand, it actually proclaimed the\nhistorical conception according to which human history is a process of\ndevelopment, which, in its very nature, cannot find its intellectual\nconclusion in the discovery of a so-called absolute truth, on the\nother hand it declared itself to be the central idea of just such an\nabsolute truth. An all embracing and determined knowledge of nature\nand history is in absolute contradiction with the foundations of\ndialectic thought, but it is not denied, on the contrary, it is\nstrongly affirmed, that the systematic knowledge of the entire\nexternal world may from age to age make giant strides.\n\nThe total perversion of modern German idealism of necessity drove men\nto materialism, but not, and this is well worth noting, to the mere\nmetaphysical mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. In\ncontradiction to the naively simple revolutionary pushing on one side\nof all earlier history, modern materialism sees in history the process\nof the development of society, to discover the laws of whose\ndevelopment is its task. In contradistinction to the conception of\nnature which prevailed among the French philosophers, as well as with\nHegel, as something moving in a narrow circle with an eternal and\nunchangeable substantial form, as Newton conceived it, and with\ninvariable species of organic beings, as Linnaeus thought, materialism\nembraces the more recent discoveries of natural science, according to\nwhich nature has also a history in time. For the forms of the worlds,\nlike the species of organisms by which they are inhabited under\nsuitable conditions, come into being and pass away, and the cycles of\ntheir progress, in so far as it is permissible to use the term, take\non eternally more magnificent dimensions. In either case it is\nentirely dialectic and no longer forces a static philosophy upon the\nother sciences. As soon as the demand is made upon each separate\nbranch of science that it make clear its relation to things in\ngeneral, and science as a whole, the individual science thereupon\nbecomes superfluous. Of all philosophy up to the present time the only\npeculiar property which remains as its characteristic is the study of\nthought and the formal laws of thought--logic and the dialectic. All\nelse belongs to the positive sciences of nature and history.\n\nWhile the revolution in natural science was only able to be completely\ncarried out in proportion as investigation furnished the necessary\npositive material, there were known a multitude of earlier historical\nfacts which gave a distinct bias to the philosophy of history. In 1831\nin Lyons the first purely working class revolt occurred. The first\nnational working class movement, that of the English Chartists,\nreached its height between 1838 and 1842. The class war between the\nproletariat and the bourgeoisie proceeded historically in the most\nadvanced European countries just in proportion as the newly developed\ngreater industry has progressed, on the one hand, and the political\npower of the bourgeoisie on the other. The teachings of the bourgeois\neconomists with respect to the identity of the interests of capital\nand labor and with respect to the universal peace and well being which\nwould follow as a matter of course from the adoption of free trade\nwere more and more contradicted by facts. All these things could be as\nlittle ignored as the French and English socialism which was their\ntheoretical though very insufficient expression. But the old\nidealistic philosophy of history which was as yet by no means laid\naside knew nothing of class wars dependent upon material interests,\nand nothing of material interests, specially. Production, like all\neconomic phenomena only occupied a subordinate position as a secondary\nelement of the \"history of civilisation.\" The new facts, moreover\nrendered necessary a new investigation of all preceding history and\nthen it became evident that all history up to then had been a history\nof class struggles and that these mutually conflicting classes are the\nresults of a given method of production and distribution at a given\nperiod, in a word, of the economic conditions of that epoch. Hence,\nthat the economic structure of society at a given time furnishes the\nreal foundations upon which the entire superstructure of political and\njuristic institutions as well as the religious, philosophical and\nother abstract notions of a given period are to be explained in the\nlast instance. Idealism was thereupon driven from its last refuge, the\nphilosophy of history; a materialistic philosophy of history was set\nup, and the path was discovered by which the consciousness of man\ncould be shown as springing from his existence rather than his\nexistence from his consciousness.\n\nBut the socialism which had existed so far was just as incompatible\nwith the materialistic conception of history as was the naturalistic\nFrench materialism with the dialectic and the modern discoveries in\nnatural science. The then existing socialism criticised the prevailing\ncapitalistic methods of production and their results but it could not\nexplain them and thus could not match itself against them, it could\nonly brush them on one side as being bad. But it was necessary to\nshow, on the one hand, the capitalistic methods of production in their\nhistorical connection, and their necessity at a given historical epoch\nand therefore the necessity of their ultimate disappearance. On the\nother hand their inner character had to be explained and this was all\nthe more concealed for criticism had up to then been chiefly engaged\nin pointing out the evil results flowing from them rather than in\ndestroying the thing itself. This was made clear by the discovery of\nsurplus value.\n\nIt was shown that the appropriation of unpaid labor is the basis of\nthe capitalistic mode of production and the robbery of the worker is\ncarried out by its means; that the capitalist, although he buys the\nlabor-force of the worker at the full value which it possesses in the\nmarket as a commodity, yet derives more from it than he has paid for\nit, and that in the last instance this surplus creates the total\namount of value from which the capital steadily increasing in the\nhands of the capitalistic class is amassed. The phenomenon not only of\ncapitalistic production but of the creation of capital has thus been\nexplained.\n\nFor these two great discoveries, the materialistic conception of\nhistory and the disclosure of the mystery of capitalistic production\nwe must thank Marx. Granted these, socialism became a science, which\nthereupon had to busy itself in the working out of these ideas in\ntheir individual aspects and connections.\n\nThus matters stood in the realm of theoretical socialism and the dead\nphilosophy (of metaphysics Ed.) when Herr Eugene Duehring, with no\nslight impressement sprang up before the public and announced that he\nhad accomplished a complete revolution in political economy and\nsocialism.\n\nLet us now see what Herr Duehring promises and--how he keeps his\npromises.\n\n\n_II. What Herr Duehring Has to Say._\n\nUp to now, the notable writings of Herr Duehring are his \"Course of\nPhilosophy,\" his \"Course of Political and Social Science\" and his\n\"Critical History of Political Economy and Socialism.\" The first work\nis the one which particularly claims our attention.\n\nRight on the first page Herr Duehring announces himself as \"one who\nclaims to represent this power (of philosophy) at the present time and\nits unfolding in the undiscoverable future.\" He discovers himself,\ntherefore, as the one true philosopher for the present and the hidden\nfuture. Whoso differs from him differs from truth. Many people even\nbefore Herr Duehring, have thought this about themselves or something\nlike it, but, with the exception of Richard Wagner, he is the first\nwho has allowed himself to say it right out. And, as a matter of fact,\nthe truth, as it is handled by him is \"a final truth of the last\ninstance.\" Herr Duehring's philosophy is \"the natural system, or the\nphilosophy of reality.... Reality is so understood as to exclude every\nsudden impulse towards an unreal and subjectively limited\ncomprehension of the universe.\" The philosophy is therefore so shaped\nas to exclude Herr Duehring himself from the somewhat obvious\nlimitations of his own personal, subjective narrowness. It is quite\nnecessary to explain how this miracle is worked, if he is in a\nposition to lay down unquestionable truths of the last instance,\nthough, for our part, we cannot discover any particular merit in them.\nThis \"natural system of valuable knowledge\" has \"with great profundity\nestablished the foundation forms of existence.\" Out of his real\ncritical attitude proceed the elements of a real critical philosophy,\nbased on the realities of nature and life, which does not allow of any\nmerely imaginary horizon but in its mighty revolutionary progress\nopens up the earth and heaven of external and inner nature; it is a\n\"new method of thought\" and its results are \"from the bottom up,\npeculiar results and philosophies ... system-shaping ideas ... fixed\ntruths.\" We have in it before us \"a work which must seek its force in\nthe concentrated initiative,\" whatever that may mean; an\n\"investigation reaching to the roots ... a rooted science ... a\nseverely scientific conception of things and men ... a comprehensive\nthorough effort of the mind ... a creative sketch of suppositions and\nconclusions from overmastering ideas ... the absolute fundamental.\" In\nthe realm of political economy he gives us not only \"historical and\nsystematic comprehensive efforts\" of which the historical are moreover\ndistinguished by \"my presentation of history in the grand style\" and\nthose in political economy have produced \"creative movements,\" but\ncloses with a special completely elaborated scientific scheme for a\nfuture society which is \"the actual fruit of a clear and basic\ntheory,\" and is therefore just as free from the possibility of error\nand as individual as Duehring's philosophy ... for \"only in that\nsocialistic structure which I have disclosed in my \"Course of\nPolitical and Social Science\" can a true ownership arise in place of\nthe present apparent private property which rests on force such an\nownership as must be recognised in the future.\"\n\nThese flowers of rhetoric from the praises of Herr Duehring by Herr\nDuehring might be increased tenfold with ease. They must cause a doubt\nto arise in the mind of the reader whether he is reading the words of\na philosopher or of a--but we must ask him to withhold his judgment\nuntil he shall have learnt the aforesaid grasp of the root of things\nby a closer acquaintance. We only quote the foregoing flowery remarks\nto show that we have to do with no ordinary philosopher and socialist\nwho simply speaks what he thinks and leaves the future to decide with\nrespect to their value, but with an extraordinary personality like the\nPope whose individual teachings must be received if the damnable sin\nof heresy is to be avoided. We have not by any means to deal with the\nkind of work which abounds in all the socialist writings, and the\nlater German ones, in particular, works in which people of varying\ncalibre seek to explain in the most naive fashion their notions of\nthings in general and for an answer to whom there is more or less\nmaterial available. But whatever may be the literary or scientific\ndeficiencies of these works their goodwill towards socialism is always\nmanifest. On the other hand, Herr Duehring presents us with statements\nwhich he declares to be final truths of the last instance, exclusive\ntruths, according to which any other opinion is absolutely false. Thus\nhe owns the only scientific methods of investigation, and all others\nare unscientific in comparison. Either he is right and we are face to\nface with the greatest genius of our time, the first superhuman,\nbecause infallible, man; or he is wrong, and then, since our judgment\nmay always be at fault, benevolent regard for his possible good\nintentions would be the deadliest insult to Herr Duehring.\n\nWhen one is in possession of final truths of the last instance and the\nonly absolutely scientific knowledge one must have a certain contempt\nfor the rest of erring and unscientific humanity. We cannot therefore\nbe surprised that Herr Duehring employs very abusive terms with regard\nto his predecessors, and that only a few exceptional people,\nrecognised by him as great men, find favor in face of his\ncomprehension of fundamental truths.\n\n(Then follows a list of the epithets applied by Duehring to\nphilosophers, naturalists, Darwin, in particular, and to the socialist\nwriters. This list has been omitted as it contributes nothing of value\nto the general discussion and is only useful for the particular\ncontroversial matter in hand. Ed.)\n\nAnd so on--and this is only a hastily gathered bouquet of flowers from\nHerr Duehring's rose garden. It will be understood that if these\namiable insults which should be forbidden Herr Duehring on any grounds\nof politeness, are found somewhat disreputable and unpleasant, they\nare, still, final truths of the last instance. Even now we shall guard\nagainst any doubt of his profundity because we might otherwise be\nforbidden to discover the particular category of idiots to which we\nbelong. We have but considered it our duty on the one hand to give\nwhat Herr Duehring calls \"The quintessence of a modest mode of\nexpression,\" and on the other hand, to show that in Herr Duehring's\neyes the objectionableness of his predecessors is no less firmly\nestablished than his own infallibility. Accordingly if all this is\nactually true we bow in reverence humbly before the mighty genius of\nmodern times.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPHILOSOPHY\n\n\n_Apriorism._\n\nPhilosophy is, according to Herr Duehring, the development of the\nhighest forms of consciousness of the world and life, and embraces, in\na wider sense, the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever\na series of perceptions, or motives or a group of forms of life\nbecomes a matter of consideration in the human mind the principles\nwhich underly these forms, of necessity, become an object of\nphilosophy. These principles are single, or, up to the present, have\nbeen considered as single ingredients out of which are composed the\ncomplexities of knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition\nof material bodies, the entire universe may be also resolved into\nfundamental forms and elements. These elementary constituents and\nprinciples serve, when once discovered, not only for the known\ntangible world but for that also, which is unknown and inaccessible.\nPhilosophical principles therefore constitute the last complement\nrequired by the sciences in order that they may become a uniform\nsystem by means of which nature and human life are explained. In\naddition to the examination of the fundamental forms of all existence,\nphilosophy has only two particular objects of investigation, Nature\nand Humanity. Hence our material may be classified into three main\ngroups,--a general scheme of the universe, the teaching of the\nprinciples of nature and finally the principles which regulate\nHumanity. This arrangement at the same time comprises an inner\nlogical order, for the formal principles which are true for all\nexistence take precedence, and the concrete realms in which these\nprinciples display themselves follow in the gradation of their\nsuccessive arrangements. So far, this is Herr Duehring's conception of\nthings given almost in his very words.\n\nHe is therefore engaged with principles, formal conceptions, which are\nsubjective and not derived from the knowledge of external phenomena,\nbut which are applied to Nature and Humanity, as the principles\naccording to which Nature and Humanity must regulate themselves. But\nhow are these subjective principles derived? From thought itself? No,\nfor Herr Duehring himself says: the purely ideal realm is limited to\nlogical arrangements and mathematical conceptions (which latter as we\nshall later see is false). Logical arrangements can only be referred\nto forms of thought, but we are engaged here only with forms of\nexistence, the external world, and these forms can never be created by\nthought nor derived from it but only from the external world. Hereupon\nthe entire matter undergoes a change. We see that principles are not\nthe starting point of investigation but the conclusion of it, they are\nnot to be applied to nature and history but are derived from them.\nNature and Humanity are not steered by principles, but principles are,\non the other hand, only correct so far as they correspond with nature\nand history. That is just the materialistic conception of the matter,\nand the opposite, that of Herr Duehring is the idealistic conception,\nit turns things upside down and constructs a real world out of the\nworld of thought, arrangements, plans and categories existing from\neverlasting before the world, just like Hegelianism.\n\nAs a matter of fact, we prefer Hegel's \"Encyclopedia,\" with all its\nfever phantoms, to the \"final truths of the last instance\" of Herr\nDuehring. In the first place, according to Herr Duehring we have the\ngeneral scheme of the universe which by Hegel is called \"logic.\" Then\naccording to both of them we have the application of this scheme to\nnature by means of the logical categories, the philosophy of nature,\nand finally their application to Humanity, by what Hegel calls \"the\nPhilosophy of the Spirit.\" \"The inner logical arrangement\" of\nDuehring's scheme brings us therefore logically back to Hegel's\n\"Encyclopedia\" from which it is taken with a fidelity which would move\nthat Wandering Jew of the Hegelian school, Professor Michelet of\nBerlin, to tears.\n\nSuch a result follows if one takes it for granted that\n\"consciousness,\" \"thought,\" is something which has existed from the\nbeginning in contradistinction to nature. It would then be of the\ngreatest importance to bring consciousness and Nature, thought and\nexistence, into harmony, to harmonise the laws of thought and the laws\nof Nature. But one enquires further what are thought and consciousness\nand whence do they originate. It is consequently discovered that they\nare products of the brain of man, and that Humanity is itself a\nproduct of nature which has developed in and along with its\nenvironment; wherefore it becomes self-apparent that the products of\nthe brain of man being themselves, in the last instance, natural\nproducts, do not contradict all the rest of Nature but correspond with\nit.\n\nBut Herr Duehring cannot allow so simple a treatment of the subject.\nHe thinks not only in the name of Humanity which would be quite a\nlarge affair, but in the name of the conscious and thinking beings of\nthe whole universe. Indeed, it would be \"a degradation of the\nfoundation concepts of knowledge and consciousness if one should wish\nto exclude or even to throw suspicion upon their sovereign value and\nundoubted claims to truth by means of the epithet 'human.'\" In order\nthat there may be no suspicion that upon some heavenly body or other\ntwice two may make five, Herr Duehring does not venture to call\nthought a human attribute, and therefore he is obliged to separate it\nfrom the only true foundation on which it rests, as far as we are\nconcerned, namely, from man and nature, and thereby falls, without any\npossibility of getting out, into an \"ideology\" which causes him to\nplay baby to Hegel. It is self-evident that one cannot build\nmaterialistic doctrines on foundations so ideological. We shall see\nlater that Herr Duehring is compelled to push nature to the front as a\nconscious agent and, therefore, as that, which people in plain English\ncall God.\n\nIndeed, our philosopher had other motives in shifting the foundation\nof reality from the material world to that of thought. The knowledge\nof this general scheme of the universe, of these formal principles of\nbeing is just the foundation of Herr Duehring's philosophy. If we\nderive the scheme of the universe not from our own brain, but merely\nby means of our own brain, from the material world, we need no\nphilosophy, but simply knowledge of the world and what occurs in it,\nand the results of this knowledge likewise do not constitute a\nphilosophy, but positive science. In such a case, however, Herr\nDuehring's entire book would have been love's labor lost.\n\nFurther, if no philosophy, as such, is longer required there is no\nlonger the necessity of any philosophy of nature even. The view that\nall the phenomena of nature stand in systematic mutual relations\ncompels science to prove this systematic interconnection in all\nrespects, in single cases as well as in the entirety. But an\nappropriate creative, scientific representation of this mutual\nconnection in such a way as to show the composition of an exact\nthought-picture of the system of the universe in which we live remains\nnot only for us but for all time an impossibility. Should such a final\nconclusive system of the interconnection of the various activities of\nthe universe, physical, as well as intellectual and historical, ever\nbe brought to completion at any point of time in the history of the\nhuman race, human knowledge would forthwith come to an end and future\nhistorical progress would be cut off from the very moment in which\nsociety was directed in accordance with the system, which would be an\nabsurdity, mere nonsense.\n\nMan is therefore confronted by a contradiction, on the one hand he is\nobliged to study the interconnections of the world-system\nexhaustively, and, on the other hand, he is unable to fully accomplish\nthe task either as regards himself or as regards the system of nature.\nThis contradiction, however, does not consist solely in the nature of\nthe two factors World and Man; it is the main lever also of universal\nintellectual progress and is solved every day and for ever in an\nendless progressive development of humanity, just as mathematical\nproblems find their solution in an endless progression of a recurring\ndecimal. As a matter of fact also every concept of the universe is\nsubject to objective limitations owing to the conditions of historical\nknowledge, and subjectively in addition owing to the physical and\nmental make up of the author of the concept. But Herr Duehring\nexhibits a mode of thought which is confined in its application to a\nlimited and subjective idea of the universe. We saw earlier that he\nwas omnipresent, in all possible forms of the universe, now we see\nthat he is omniscient. He has solved the final problems of science and\nhas nailed up tight all future knowledge.\n\nHerr Duehring considers that he can, as with the fundamental forms of\nexistence, produce aprioristically by means of his own cogitations the\nwhole of pure mathematics without making any use of the experience\nwhich is afforded us in the objective world. In pure mathematics the\nunderstanding is engaged \"in its own free creations and imaginations\";\nthe concepts of number and form are \"self-sufficient objects\nproceeding from themselves\" and so have \"a value independent of\nindividual experience and actual objective reality.\"\n\nThat pure mathematics has a significance independent of particular\nindividual experience is quite true as are also the established facts\nof all the sciences and indeed of all facts. The magnetic poles, the\nformation of water from oxygen and hydrogen, the fact that Hegel is\ndead and that Herr Duehring is alive, are facts independent of my\nexperience or that of any other single individual, and will be\nindependent of that of Herr Duehring himself, as soon as he shall\nsleep the sleep of the just. But in pure mathematics the mind is not\nby any means engaged with its own creations and imaginings. The\nconcepts of number and form have only come to us by the way of the\nreal world. The ten fingers on which men count and thereby performed\nthe first arithmetical calculations are anything but a free creation\nof the mind. To count not only requires objects capable of being\ncounted but the ability, when these objects are regarded, of\nsubtracting all qualities from them except number and this ability is\nthe product of long historical development of actual experience. The\nconcept form is, like that of number, derived exclusively from the\nexternal world and is not a purely mental product. To it things\npossessed of shape were necessary and these shapes men compared until\nthe concept form was arrived at. Pure mathematics considers the shapes\nand quantities of things in the actual world, very real objects. The\nfact that these objects appear in a very abstract form only\nsuperficially conceals their origin in the world of external nature.\nIn order to understand these forms and qualities in their purity it is\nnecessary to separate them from their content and thus one gets the\npoint, without dimensions, the line, without breadth and thickness, a\nand b, x and y, constants and variables, and we finally first arrive\nat independent creations of the imagination and intellect, imaginary\nmagnitudes. Also the apparent derivation of mathematical magnitudes\nfrom each other does not prove their aprioristic origin, but only\ntheir rational interconnection. Before one attained the concept that\nthe form of a cylinder was derived from the revolution of a rectangle\nround one of its sides, he must have examined a number of rectangles\nand cylinders even if of imperfect form. Like all sciences,\nmathematics has sprung from the necessities of men, from the\nmeasurement of land and the content of vessels, from the calculation\nof time and mechanics. But, as in every department of thought, at a\ncertain stage of development, laws are abstracted from the actual\nphenomena, are separated from them and set over against them, as\nsomething independent of them, as laws, which apparently come from the\noutside, in accordance with which the material world must necessarily\nconduct itself. So, it has happened in society and the state, so, and\nnot otherwise, pure mathematics though borrowed from the world is\napplied to the world, and though it only shows a portion of its\ncomponent factors is all the better applicable on that account.\n\nBut as Herr Duehring imagines that the whole of pure mathematics can\nbe derived from the mathematical axioms, \"which according to purely\nlogical concepts are neither capable of proof nor in need of any, and\nwithout empirical ingredients anywhere and that these can be applied\nto the universe, he likewise imagines, in the first place, the\nfoundation forms of being, the single ingredients of all knowledge,\nthe axioms of philosophy, to be produced by the intellect of man; he\nimagines also that he can derive the whole of philosophy or plan of\nthe universe from these, and that his sublime genius can compel us to\naccept this, his conception of nature and humanity.\" Unfortunately\nnature and humanity are not constituted like the Prussians of the\nManteuffel regime of 1850.\n\nThe axioms of mathematics are expressions of the most elementary ideas\nwhich mathematics must borrow from logic. They may be reduced to two.\n\n(1) The whole is greater than its part; this statement is mere\ntautology, since the quantitatively limited concept, \"part,\"\nnecessarily refers to the concept, \"whole,\"--in that \"part\" signifies\nno more than that the quantitative \"whole\" is made up of quantitative\n\"parts.\" Since the so-called axiom merely asserts this much we are not\na step further. This can be shown to be a tautology if we say \"The\nwhole is that which consists of several parts--a part is that several\nof which make up a whole, therefore the part is less than the whole.\"\nWhere the barrenness of the repetition shows the lack of content all\nthe more strongly.\n\n(2) If two magnitudes are equal to a third they are equal to one\nanother; this statement is, as Hegel has shown, a conclusion, upon\nthe correctness of which all logic depends, and which is demonstrated\ntherefore outside of pure mathematics. The remaining axioms with\nregard to equality and inequality are merely logical extensions of\nthis conclusion. Such barren statements are not enticing either in\nmathematics or anywhere else. To proceed we must have realities,\nconditions and forms taken from real material things; representations\nof lines, planes, angles, polygons, spheres, etc., are all borrowed\nfrom reality, and it is just naive ideology to believe the\nmathematicians, who assert that the first line was made by causing a\npoint to progress through space, the first plane by means of the\nmovement of a line, and the first solid by revolving a plane, etc.\nEven speech rebels against this idea. A mathematical figure of three\ndimensions is called a solid--corpus solidum--and hence, according to\nthe Latin, a body capable of being handled. It has a name derived,\ntherefore, by no means from the independent play of imagination but\nfrom solid reality.\n\nBut to what purpose is all this prolixity? After Herr Duehring has\nenthusiastically proclaimed the independence of pure mathematics of\nthe world of experience, their apriorism, their connection with free\ncreation and imagination, he says \"it will be readily seen that these\nmathematical elements (number, magnitude, time, space, geometric\nprogression), are therefore ideal forms with relation to absolute\nmagnitudes and therefore something quite empiric, no matter to what\nspecies they belong.\" But \"mathematical general notions are, apart\nfrom experience, nevertheless capable of sufficient characterization,\"\nwhich latter proceeds, more or less, from each abstraction, but does\nnot by any means prove that it is not deprived from the actual. In the\nscheme of the universe of our author pure mathematics originated in\npure thought, in his philosophy of nature it is derived from the\nexternal world and then set apart from it. What are we then to\nbelieve?\n\n\n_The Scheme of the Universe._\n\n\"All-comprehending existence is sole. It is sufficient to itself and\nhas nothing above or below it. To associate a second existence with it\nwould be to make it just what it is not, a part of a constituent or\nall-embracing whole. When we conceive of our idea of soleness as a\nframe there is nothing which can enter into this, nothing which\nretains twofoldness can enter into this concept of unity. But nothing\ncan alienate itself from this concept of unity. The essence of all\nthought consists in uniting the elements of consciousness in a unity.\nThe indivisible concept of the universe has arisen by comprehending\neverything, and the universe, as the word signifies, is recognised as\nsomething in which everything is united into one unity.\"\n\nSo far Herr Duehring is quoted. The mathematical method, \"Everything\nmust be decided on simple axiomatic foundation principles, just as if\nit were concerned with the simple principles of mathematics,\" this\nmethod is for the first time here applied.\n\n\"The all-embracing existence is sole.\" If tautology, simple repetition\nin the predicate of what has been stated in the subject, if this\nconstitutes an axiom, then we have a splendid specimen. In the subject\nHerr Duehring tells us that existence comprehends everything, in the\npredicate he explains intrepidly that there is nothing outside it.\nWhat a system-shaping thought. It is indeed system-shaping until we\nfind six lines further down that Herr Duehring has transformed the\nsoleness of being by means of our idea of unity into its one-ness. As\nthe work of all thought consists in the bringing together of all\nthought into a unity so is existence, as soon as it is conceived,\nthought of as a unity, an indivisible concept of the universe, and\nbecause existence so conceived is the sole universal concept, so is\nreal existence, the real universe, just as much an indivisible unity,\nand consequently \"the beings in the beyond have no further place as\nsoon as the mind has learned to comprehend existence in the\nhomogeneous universality.\"\n\nThat is a campaign with which in comparison Austerlitz and Jena,\nKoeniggratz and Sedan sink in insignificance. In a couple of\nexpressions after we have set the first axiom moving we have\nabolished, put away, and destroyed all the inhabitants of the\nspirit-world, God, the heavenly hierarchies, heaven, hell and\npurgatory as well as the immortality of the soul.\n\nHow do we arrive at the idea of the unity of existence from that of\nits soleness? As a matter of fact, we generally conceive it. As we\nspread out our idea of unity as a frame around it the concept of\nexistence becomes the concept of unity, for the existence of all\nthought consists in the bringing of elements of consciousness into\nunity.\n\nThis last statement is simply false. In the first place thought\nconsists in the decomposition of objects of consciousness into their\nelements as well as in the uniting of mutually connected elements into\na unity. There can be no synthesis without analysis. In the second\nplace, thought can, without error, only bring those elements of\nconsciousness into a unity in which or in the actual prototypes of\nwhich this unity already existed beforehand. If I comprehend a\nshoebrush under the class mammal, it does not thereupon become a\nmilk-giver. The unity of existence is therefore just the thing which\nhad to be proved in order to justify his concept of thought as a\nunity, and if Herr Duehring assures us that he regards existence as a\nunity and not as twofold he tells us nothing more than that he himself\npersonally thinks so.\n\nTo give a clear explanation of his method of reasoning, it is as\nfollows, \"I begin with existence. Therefore I think of existence. The\nidea of existence is an idea of unity. Thought and existence must\ntherefore belong together, they answer one another, they mutually\ncover each other. Therefore existence is in reality a unity and there\nare no beings beyond.\" But if Herr Duehring had spoken thus plainly\ninstead of entertaining us with oracular statements, the ideology of\nhis argument would have been completely exposed. To attempt to\nundertake to prove from the identity of thought and existence the\nreality of the result of thought, that indeed were one of the\nfever-phantoms of a Hegel.\n\nIf his entire method of proof were really correct Herr Duehring would\nnot have gained a single point over the spiritists. The spiritists\nwould curtly reply, \"The universe is simple from our standpoint also.\nThe division into the hither and the beyond only exists from our\nspecial earthly original sin standpoint. In its essence, that is God,\nthe entire universe is a unity.\" And they will take Herr Duehring with\nthem to his beloved heavenly bodies, and will show him one or more\nwhere no original sin can be found, and where there is therefore no\nantagonism between the hither and the beyond, and the oneness of the\nuniverse is a demand of faith.\n\nThe most comical thing about the matter is that Herr Duehring in order\nto prove the non-existence of God from his concept of existence,\nfurnishes the ontological proof of God's existence. This runs as\nfollows--If we think of God we think of Him as the concept of complete\nperfection. To the idea of perfection existence is a first essential,\nsince a non-existent being is of necessity imperfect. We must\ntherefore add existence to the perfections of God. Therefore God must\nexist. Thus Herr Duehring reasons exactly. If we think of existence we\nthink of it as a concept. What is united into a concept is a unity,\ntherefore existence would not correspond with its concept if it were\nnot a unity. Therefore it must be a unity, therefore there is no God,\netc.\n\nIf we speak of existence and merely of existence, the unity can only\nconsist in this that all objects with which it is concerned\nare--exist. They are comprised under the unity of this common\nexistence, and no other, and the general dictum that they all exist\ncannot give them any further qualities, common or not common, but\nexcludes all such from consideration in advance. For as soon as we\ntake a step beyond the simple fact that existence is common to all\nthings, the distinctions between these separate things engage our\nattention, and if these differences consist in this that some are\nblack, some white, some alive, others not alive, some hither and some\nbeyond, we cannot conclude therefrom that mere existence can be\nimputed to all of them alike.\n\nThe unity of the universe does not consist in its existence, although\nits existence is a presumption of its unity, since it must first exist\nbefore it can be a unit. Existence beyond the boundary line of our\nhorizon is an open question. The real unity of the universe consists\nin its materiality, and this is established, not by a pair of juggling\nphrases but by means of a long and difficult development of philosophy\nand natural science.\n\nWith respect to the subject in hand; the existence which Herr Duehring\npresents to us is \"not that pure existence which is self sufficient\nand without any other qualities, in fact, only representing the\nantithesis of no-idea or absence-of-idea.\" Now we shall very soon see\nthat the universe of Herr Duehring has its origin simultaneously with\nan existence which is without essential differentiation, progress or\nchange, and is therefore merely in fact a contradiction of absence of\nthought, therefore really nothing. From this non-existence is\ndeveloped the present differentiated, changeable universe which\nrepresents progressive growth; and when we grasp this idea, only by\nvirtue of this eternal change do we arrive at \"the concept of the self\nsufficing, universal existence.\" We have therefore now the concept of\nexistence on a higher plane where it comprises within itself stability\nas well as change, being as well as development. Arrived at this point\nwe find that \"species and genera in fact the special and the general,\nare the simplest forms of differentiation, without which the\nconstitution of things cannot be grasped.\"\n\nBut this is a means of distinguishing quality and after a discussion\nof this part of the subject we proceed \"Over against the idea of\nspecies stands the idea of the whole, a homogeneity, as it were, in\nwhich no differentiation of species can longer be found,\" so we pass\nfrom quality to quantity and this is always \"capable of measurement.\"\n\nLet us compare this \"clear analysis of the actual, universal scheme of\nthings\" and its \"real, critical standpoint\" with the fever-phantasies\nof a Hegel. We find that Hegel's \"Logic\" begins with existence as does\nthat of Herr Duehring; that existence displays itself as nothing, as\nwith Herr Duehring; that out of this not-being, a leap is made into\nbeing, and that existence is the result of this, that is a more\ncomplete and higher form of being, as with Herr Duehring. Being leads\nto quality, quality to quantity, just as with Herr Duehring. And in\norder that no essential shall be lacking Herr Duehring tells us\nelsewhere \"from the realm of absence of sensation man leaps to that of\nsensation in spite of all the quantitative steps with but one\nqualitative leap ... from which we can show that he is entirely\ndifferentiated from the mere gradation of one and the same quality.\"\nThis is just the Hegelian standard of measurement according to which\nmere quantitative expansion or contraction causes a sudden qualitative\nchange at a given point, as for example with heated or cooled water,\nthere are points where the spring into a new set of conditions is\nfulfilled under normal circumstances, and where therefore quantity\nsuddenly changes into quality.\n\nOur investigation has likewise sought to penetrate to the deepest\nroots, and discovers the rooted Duehring foundations to be the\n\"fever-phantasies\" of a Hegel, the categories of the Hegelian logic,\nin the first place, teachings in regard to existence after the antique\nHegelian method, and an ineffective cloak of plagiarism.\n\nAnd not content with purloining the whole scheme of existence from his\ndespised predecessors, Herr Duehring after giving the above example of\na change of quantity into quality has the coolness to say of Marx, \"Is\nit not comical, this appeal (of Marx) to Hegelian confusion and\nmistiness, that quantity changes into quality.\" Confused mixture, who\nchanges his ground, who is a comical fellow Herr Duehring?\n\nAll these pretty little statements are not only not \"axiomatic\nutterances\" according to label, but are simply taken from foreign\nsources, that is, from Hegel's \"Logic.\" Of a truth there is not\nrevealed in the whole chapter the shadow of any \"inner connection,\"\nexcept so far as it is borrowed from Hegel, and the whole talk about\nstability and change finally runs out into mere garrulity on the\nsubject of time and space.\n\nFrom existence Hegel comes to substance, to the dialectic. Here he\ntreats of reflex-movements, antagonisms and contradictions, positive\nand negative for example, and thence proceeds to causality, or the\nconditions of cause and effect and closes with necessity. Herr\nDuehring does not vary this method. What Hegel calls the \"doctrines of\nexistence\" Herr Duehring has translated into \"logical properties of\nexistence.\" These exist, above all else in the antagonism of forces,\nin antithesis, Herr Duehring denies the antithesis in toto, but we\nshall return to this matter later. Then he proceeds to causality and\nthence to necessity. If Herr Duehring says of himself, \"I do not\nphilosophise from a cage,\" he must mean that he philosophises in a\ncage, the cage of the Hegelian arrangement of categories.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nNATURAL PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n_Time and Space._\n\nWe now come to natural philosophy. Here again Herr Duehring takes it\nupon himself to be dissatisfied with his predecessors. He says\n\"Natural philosophy sank so low that it became barren dregs of poetry\nand had fallen into the degraded rubbish of the sham philosophy of a\nSchelling and the like, grubbing in priest-craft and mystifying the\npublic.\" Disgust has rid us of these deformities, but up to the\npresent it has been succeeded by instability, and \"what is of concern\nto the public at large is that the disappearance of a particularly\ngreat charlatan merely gives an opportunity to a smaller but more\nexpert successor who repeats the production in another form.\"\nNaturalists have little desire for \"a flight into the kingdom of the\nuniverse-comprehending ideas,\" and therefore indulge too freely in\nspeculations which \"go to pieces.\" Thus complete salvation must be\nfound, and, fortunately, Herr Duehring is at hand.\n\nIn order to comprehend aright the following conclusions respecting the\nunfolding of the universe in time and its limitation in space, we must\nagain turn our attention to certain portions of the \"scheme of the\nuniverse.\"\n\nEternity is ascribed to existence, in agreement with Hegel, what Hegel\ncalls \"tiresome (schlecht) eternity,\" and this eternity is now\ninvestigated. \"The plainest form of an incontrovertible idea of\neternity is the piling up of numbers unlimitedly in arithmetical\nprogression. Just as we can give a complete unity to each number\nwithout the possibility of repetition, so at every stage of its being\nit progresses still further and eternity consists in the unlimited\nmanifestation of this condition. This sufficiently conceived eternity\nhas but one single beginning with one single direction. Although it is\nnot material to our concept to imagine a direction opposite to that in\nwhich the progression piles up, this notion of a backward moving\neternity is only a hasty picture drawn by the imagination. Since it\nmust necessarily run in a contrary direction, it would have behind it\nin each instance an endless succession of numbers. But this would be\ninadmissible as constituting the contradiction of a calculated\ninfinity of numbers, and so it seems absurd to imagine a second\ndirection of eternity.\"\n\nThe first conclusion to be drawn from this conception of eternity is\nthat the chain of cause and effect in the universe must once have had\na beginning: an endless number of causes which have followed one\nanother endlessly is therefore unthinkable, \"because innumerability is\nthus considered as enumerated,\" therefore a final cause is proved.\n\nThe second conclusion is \"the law of the definite number: the\naccumulation of identical independent objects of an actual species is\nonly thinkable as being made up of a definite number of these\nindividual objects.\" Not only must the actual number of the heavenly\nbodies be definite at a given time, but the total number of all\nexistent objects, the smallest independent particles of matter. This\nlast necessity constitutes the real reason why no composite body is\nthinkable except as made up of atoms. All actual division has a fixed\nlimit and must have it, if the contradiction of a numerated\ninnumerability is to be avoided. On the same grounds not only must the\nrevolutions of the sun and earth be fixed as they have occurred up to\nthe present, even if they cannot be indicated, but all the periodical\nprocesses of nature must have had a beginning somewhere, and all the\ndistinctions and complexities of nature which succeed each other must\nsimilarly have had an origin. This must indisputably have existed from\neternity, but such an idea would be excluded if time consisted of real\nparts and was not arbitrarily divided to accommodate the possibilities\nof our understanding. It is different with time, self regarded, but\nthe facts and phenomena of which time is made up being capable of\ndifferentiation can be enumerated. Let us conceive of a condition in\nwhich no change occurs and which undergoes no alteration in its stable\nidentity; the time concept then becomes transformed into the general\nnotion of existence. What is the result of piling up an empty duration\nof time is not discoverable. So far, Herr Duehring writes and he is\nnot a little edified concerning the significance of these discoveries.\nHe hopes that \"it is perceived as a not insignificant truth,\" and\nlater on says, \"One should note the very simple phrases by which we\nhave helped the concept of immortality and the criticism of it to a\npoint at present unknown, through the sharpening and deepening of the\nsimple elements of the universal conception of time and space.\"\n\nWe have helped! This deepening and sharpening! Who are we? In what are\nwe manifest? Who deepens and who sharpens?\n\n\"Thesis--the world has a beginning in time and is bounded by space.\nProof--If one suppose that the world has no beginning in time he is\nbound to grant infinity to each point of time, and so an infinite\nsuccession of things has passed away in the universe. But infinity of\na series consists in the impossibility of its completion by successive\nsyntheses. Therefore an eternal progression of the world is\nimpossible. Hence a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of\nits existence, which was to be proved. Let us take the other concept.\nThe world now appears as an eternal given whole consisting of things\nwhich have a simultaneous existence. Now we can conceive of the mass\nof a quantity, which can only be regarded under certain conditions, in\nno other way than by means of the synthesis of its parts, and we\nconceive the totality of the quantity by means of the completed\nsynthesis or repeated additions of the unity to itself. Thus, in order\nto conceive of the universe as a whole which fills all space, the\nsuccessive syntheses of the parts of an infinite universe must be\nregarded as being completed, that is an eternity of time must in\ncalculating all coexisting things, be regarded as having existed, but\nthis is impossible. Therefore an unending aggregate of actual things\ncannot be regarded as a given whole and therefore also not as\ncoexistent. A world is therefore extension in space which is not\nunlimited and which has therefore bounds. And this was the second\nthing to be proved.\"\n\nThese statements are copied from a well-known book which made its\nappearance in 1781 and is entitled \"The Critique of Pure Reason,\" by\nImmanuel Kant. They can be read there in Part I, Division 2, second\nsection, second part. \"First Antinomy of Pure Reason.\" To Herr\nDuehring alone remains the name and fame of having pasted the law of\nfixed numbers on one of the published thoughts of Kant and of having\nmade the discovery that there was once a time when time did not exist\nbut only a universe. For the rest, therefore, when we come across\nanything sensible in Herr Duehring's exposition \"We\" means Immanuel\nKant, and the \"present\" is only ninety-five years old. Quite simple\nindeed, and unknown until now! But Kant does not establish the above\nstatement by his proof. On the other hand, he shows the reverse,\nnamely, that the universe has no beginning in time and no end in\nspace, and he fixes his antinomy in this, the unsolvable contradiction\nthat the one is just as capable of proof as the other. People of small\ncalibre might be inclined to think that here Kant had found an\ninsuperable difficulty, not so our bold author of fundamental results\n\"especially his own.\" He copies all that he can use of Kant's antinomy\nand throws the rest away.\n\nThe matter solves itself very simply. Eternity in time and endlessness\nin space signify from the very words that there is no end in either\ndirection, forwards or backwards, over or under, right or left. This\ninfinity is quite different from an endless progression, since the\nlatter always has some beginning, a first step. The inapplicability of\nthis progression idea to our object is evident directly we apply it to\nspace. Infinite progression translated in terms of space is a line\nproduced continuously in a given direction. Is infinity in space\nexpressed in this way, even remotely? On the contrary it requires six\nof these lines drawn from this point in three opposite directions to\nexpress the dimensions of space and we should have accordingly six of\nthese dimensions. Kant saw this so plainly that he employed his\nprogression merely indirectly in a round about way to express the\nextent of the universe. Herr Duehring on the contrary forces us to\naccept his six dimensions of space and at the same time has no words\nin which to express his contempt of the mathematical mysticism of\nGauss who would not content himself with the three dimensions of\nspace.\n\nApplied to time, the series or row of objects, infinite at both\nextremities, has a certain figurative significance. But let us picture\ntime as proceeding from unity or a line proceeding from a fixed point.\nWe can say then that time has had a beginning. We assume just what we\nwanted to prove. We give a one-sided half-character to infinity of\ntime. But a one-sided eternity split in halves is a contradiction in\nitself, the exact opposite of a hypothetical infinity, incapable of\ncontradiction. We can only overcome this contradiction by assuming\nthat the unity which we began to count the progression from, the point\nfrom which we measure the line, is a unity taken at pleasure in the\nseries, a point taken at pleasure in the line. Hence as far as the\nline or series is concerned it is immaterial where we put it.\n\nBut as for the contradiction of the \"counted endless progression\" we\nshall be in a position to examine it more closely as soon as Herr\nDuehring has taught us the trick of reckoning it. If he has\naccomplished the feat of counting from minus infinity to zero, we\nshall be glad to hear from him again. It is clear that wherever he\nbegins to count he leaves behind him an endless progression, and with\nit the problem which he had to solve. Let him only take his own\ninfinite progression 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 etc. and try to reckon back to 1\nagain from the infinite end. He evidently does not comprehend the\nrequirements of the problem. And furthermore, if he affirms that the\ninfinite progression of past time is capable of calculation he must\naffirm that time has a beginning for otherwise he could not begin to\ncalculate. Therefore he again substitutes a supposition for what he\nhad to prove. The idea of the calculated infinite series, in other\nwords Duehring's all-embracing law of the fixed number, is therefore a\ncontradiction in adjecto, is a self contradiction, and an absurd one,\nmoreover.\n\nIt is clear that an infinity which has an end but no beginning is\nneither more nor less than an infinity which has a beginning but no\nend. The least logical insight would have compelled Herr Duehring to\nthe statement that beginning and end are mutually necessary to each\nother, like North Pole and South Pole, and that if one omit the end\nthe beginning becomes the end, the one end which the series has and\nvice versa.\n\nThe entire fallacy would not be possible if it were not for the\nmathematical practice of operating with an infinite series. Because in\nmathematics one must proceed from the given and finite to that which\nis not given and infinite, all mathematical series whether positive or\nnegative, begin with a fixed point otherwise one cannot calculate. The\nideal necessities of the mathematician however are very far from being\na law compulsory upon the universe.\n\nBesides Herr Duehring will never succeed in imagining an infinity\nwithout contradiction. In the first place, infinity is a contradiction\nand full of contradictions. For example it is a contradiction that\ninfinity should be made up of finite things and yet such is the case.\nThe notion of a limited universe leads to contradictions just as much\nas the notion of its unlimitedness, and each attempt to abolish these\ncontradictions leads, as we have seen, to new and worse\ncontradictions. But just because infinity is a contradiction, it is\nwithout end, endlessly developing itself in time and space. The\nabolition of the contradiction would be the end of infinity. Hegel\nsaw that very clearly, and covers the people who entered upon\nintricate arguments about this contradiction with merited scorn.\n\nLet us proceed. Now, time has had a beginning. What was before this\nbeginning? The unchangeable universe incomparable with anything else.\nAnd as no changes occur in this condition the particular concept time\nis transformed into the general concept existence. In the first place\nwe have nothing to do with the transformation which goes on in the\nbrain of Herr Duehring. We are not engaged with a concept of time, but\nwith actual time of which Herr Duehring cannot so easily dispose. In\nthe second place no matter how much the concept of time is transformed\ninto the general concept existence it does not bring us one step\nnearer the goal. For the fundamental forms of all existence are space\nand time, and a thing existing outside of time is as silly an idea as\nthat of a being outside of space. The Hegelian \"past existence in\nwhich there was no time\" and the neo-Schelling \"being beyond the scope\nof thought\" are rational conceptions compared with this being outside\nof time. For this reason Herr Duehring goes to work very cautiously\n\"intrinsically it may be called time, but one cannot really call it\ntime, as time does not consist in itself of real parts but is merely\ndivided by us into parts to suit our own convenience,\" only a real\nfilling up of time with distinct facts makes it capable of\ncalculation. It is impossible to see the significance of piling up an\nempty duration. But it does not matter anyway. The question is whether\nthe universe in this presupposed condition continues, that is\npersists, through a period of time. We have long known that it is\nuseless to try and measure such empty space and to calculate without\nplan or aim and just because of the tiresomeness of such a proceeding\nHegel calls this infinity \"miserable.\" According to Herr Duehring time\nexists only by virtue of change, not change in and through time.\nBecause time is different from change and independent of it, we can\nmeasure it by the changes, because in order to measure we need\nsomething different from that which is to be measured. And the time in\nwhich no recognisible changes take place is very far from being no\ntime, on the other hand since it is free from other ingredients, it is\npure, that is to say, true time. Indeed if we want to contemplate time\nas a pure concept separated from all foreign admixture, we are obliged\nto eliminate all the various events which occur in time, either\nsuccessively or simultaneously, and thus imagine a time in which\nnothing occurs. By this means we have not permitted the concept time\nto be overcome by the general concept of existence, but we have\nthereby arrived at a pure time concept. All these contradictions and\nimpossibilities are mere child's play compared with the confusion into\nwhich he plunges the universe with its self-sufficient commencement.\nIf the universe was in a condition in which no change occurred in it,\nhow did it ever manage to get from that state to one of change?\nMoreover, an absolute condition of absence of change existing from\neternity cannot possibly get out of that state unaided so as to pass\nover to a condition of progress and change. A first cause of motion\nmust therefore have come from the outside, from beyond the universe,\nwhich caused the movement. This first cause of motion is clearly only\nanother term for God, The God and the Beyond of which Herr Duehring\nfancied that he had so nicely settled in his scheme of the universe,\nreturn sharpened and deepened in his natural philosophy.\n\nFurther Herr Duehring says: \"Where a fixed element of existence is\ncapable of measurement, it will remain in unalterable stability. This\nis evident from material and mechanical force.\" The former quotation\ngives, it may be incidentally mentioned, a good example of Herr\nDuehring's axiomatic grandiloquence. Fixed quantities remain exactly\nthe same, the quantity of mechanical force, once in the universe, is\nalways the same. We will not dwell on this, so far as it is true,\nDescartes knew and said it three hundred years ago as regards\nphilosophy, while in mechanical science the doctrine of the\nconservation of energy has been preached for the last twenty years.\nHerr Duehring has not improved upon it in so far as he limits it to\nmechanical energy. But where was mechanical energy at the period of\nunchangeableness? To this question Herr Duehring stubbornly refuses an\nanswer.\n\nWhere was the unchangeable mechanical force then, Herr Duehring, and\nwhat was it busy about? Answer: \"The original state of the universe,\nor, better, the existence of unchangeable matter, not allowing of any\nchanges in time, is a question which no mind can pass except one which\nsees the acme of wisdom in the destruction of its own powers.\"\nTherefore you must either take my original condition with your eyes\nshut, or I, the lusty Eugene Duehring, brand you as an intellectual\neunuch. Some people might be quite alarmed about this, but we who have\nseen a few examples of Herr Duehring's powers, can let the elegant\nabuse pass and reiterate the question, \"But how about that mechanical\nenergy, Herr Duehring, if you please?\"\n\nHerr Duehring is staggered at once. In fact, he stammers, \"There is no\nproof of the actual existence of that original condition. Let us\nremember that this is also the case with each new step in the series\nwith which we are acquainted. He therefore who will make difficulties\nin the foregoing case may see that he does not avoid them in the\nsmaller apparent cases. Besides, the possibility exists that there are\nsuccessively graduated intermediate states inserted, and thus there is\na stable bridge by the means of which we can work backwards to the\nsolution of the problem. As a matter of fact this notion of stability\ndoes not assist the main thought, but it is for us the fundamental\nform of regular progression, and of each transition known so far, so\nthat we have a right to consider it as intermediate between the first\noriginal state and its disturbance. But if we consider the independent\ncondition of equipoise from the point of view of mathematical concepts\nas, admittedly, without independent existence, there is no need of\nindicating the mode in which matter came into a dynamic condition.\"\nOutside of the mechanics of matter a change in movement of matter\ndepends upon a change in the movement of the most insignificant\nparticles. \"Up to the present we have no universal principle of\nknowledge and we must therefore not be surprised if we are somewhat in\nthe dark as to these matters.\"\n\nThat is all that Herr Duehring has to say, and we should seek the very\npinnacle of wisdom not alone in a mutilation of the creative faculty,\nbut in blind superstition, if we were to let the matter pass with\nthese foolish evasions and statements. Absolute stability has no power\nof change in itself, Herr Duehring admits this. The absolute condition\nof equipoise possesses no means by which it can pass into a dynamic\nstate. What have we then? Just three false and foolish phrases.\n\nIn the first place, Herr Duehring says that to show the transition\nfrom each most insignificant step in the chain of things with which we\nare acquainted to the next presents the same difficulty. He seems to\nthink that his readers are infants. The proof of the transitions and\ninterrelations of the most insignificant links in the chain of\nexistence is just what constitutes the subject matter of natural\nscience. If there is an impediment anywhere, nobody, not even Herr\nDuehring, thinks to explain the development as proceeding from\nnothing, but on the other hand as only proceeding from transition,\nchange, and forward movement from a completed evolutionary stage.\nHere, however, he undertakes to show with reference to matter that it\nproceeds from absence of movement and therefore from nothing.\n\nIn the second place, we have the \"stable bridge.\" This does not help\nus appreciably over the difficulty, but we have a right to use it as a\nbridge between rigid stability and motion. Unfortunately stability\nconsists in absence of motion, and the question as to the generation\nof motion remains as dark a secret as before. And if Herr Duehring\nshifts his no-movement at all to universal movement in infinitely\nsmall particles and ascribes to this ever so long a duration of time,\nwe are still not the thousand part of an inch further from the place\nwhence we started. Without a creative act we can get nothing from\nnothing, not even anything as small as a mathematical differential.\nThe bridge of stability is therefore not even a _pons asinorum_. Herr\nDuehring is the only person able to cross it.\n\nThirdly, as long as the present theories of mechanics prevail, this\nconstitutes one of Herr Duehring's most reliable props, we cannot\nindicate how anything passes from a state of quiescence to one of\nmotion. But the mechanical theory of heat teaches us that the movement\nof the mass depends upon the movements of the molecules, (so that even\nin this case movement proceeds from other movement and not from lack\nof movement) and this Herr Duehring shyly points out might serve as a\nbridge between the entirely static (the state of equipoise) and the\ndynamic (self-movement). But here Herr Duehring leaves us entirely in\nthe dark. All his deepening and sharpening has dug a pit of folly and\nwe are brought up necessarily in \"darkness.\" But Herr Duehring\ntroubles himself very little about that. He says right on the next\npage, with considerable audacity that he has been able to endow the\nself contained stability with real significance by means of the\nproperties of matter and the mechanical forces.\n\nIn spite of all these errors and confused statements we have still an\ninspiring faith remaining that \"The mathematics of the inhabitants of\nother planets cannot rest on any axioms other than our own.\"\n\n\n_Cosmogony, Physics, and Chemistry._\n\nProceeding we come to theories respecting the mode by which the world,\nas it is to-day, came into being. A universal separation of matter\nfrom one element was the notion of the Ionic philosophers, but, since\nKant, the conception of an original nebulous state has played a new\nrole and according to this gravitation and heat expansion have built\nup the worlds, little by little and one by one. The mechanical theory\nof heat of our time has fixed the origin of the earlier condition of\nthe universe with much greater precision.\n\nIn spite of all this \"the universal condition of the gaseous form can\nonly be a point of departure for serious conclusions if one can define\nthe mechanical system of it more precisely beforehand. If not, the\nidea becomes not only very cloudy, but the original nebula becomes\nreally in the progress of those conclusions denser and more\nimpenetrable.\"... For the present everything remains in the vagueness\nand formlessness of an indefinite idea, and so with regard to the\ngaseous universe we have only an insubstantial conception.\n\nThe theory of Kant that all existing worlds were created from a mass\nof rotating vapor was the greatest advance made by astronomy since the\ndays of Copernicus. The idea that nature had no history in time was\nthen shaken for the first time. Up to then the worlds were fixed in\nbounds and conditions from their very beginning, and though the\nindividual organisms on the separate worlds were transient, the\nspecies remained unalterable. Nature was conceived as an apparently\nlimited movement and its motion seemed to be the repetition of the\nsame movements perpetually. It was in this conception which is entire\naccord with the metaphysical mode of thought that Kant made the first\nbreach and so scientifically that most of his grounds of proof stand\ngood to-day. Really the theory of Kant is a mere hypothesis even\nto-day. The Copernican theory of the universe has no longer any weight\nand since the spectroscope discovered such glowing gaseous matter in\nspace all objections have been disposed of and scientific opposition\nto Kant's theory has been silenced. Even Herr Duehring cannot produce\nhis universe without the nebulous state and he takes his revenge by\nasking to be shown the mechanical system of this nebulous state and\nbecause this cannot be done he inflicts all sorts of contemptuous\nremarks upon this nebulous state. Unfortunately modern science cannot\nshow this system and please Herr Duehring. But there are many other\nquestions which it cannot answer. For example regarding the question\nwhy toads have no tails it can only answer so far \"Because they have\nlost them.\" But if people get angry and say that this is all vague and\nformless, a mere fanciful idea, incapable of being made definite and a\nvery poor notion, such views would not carry us a step further,\nscientifically. Such insults and exaggerations are sufficiently\nnumerous. What is there to hinder Herr Duehring himself from\ndiscovering the mechanical system of the original nebular state?\n\nFortunately we are informed that the nebular hypothesis of Kant \"is\nfar from showing a fully distinct condition of the world-medium or of\nexplaining how matter arrived at a similar state.\" This is really very\nfortunate for Kant who is to be congratulated on having been able to\ntrace the existing celestial bodies to the nebular condition, and who\nyet does not allow himself to dream of the self-contained unchanged\ncondition of matter. It is to be remarked by the way that although the\nnebular condition of Kant is supposed to be the original vapor-form of\nmatter, this is to be understood merely relatively. It is to be\nunderstood on the one hand as the original vapor form of the heavenly\nbodies, as they are at present, and on the other hand as the earliest\nform of matter to which we have been able to trace our way backwards.\nThe fact that matter passed through an endless series of other forms\nbefore arriving at the nebular state is not excluded from this\nconception but is on the other hand rather included in it.\n\nHerr Duehring is at an advantage here. Whereas science comes to a halt\nat the existence of the nebulous state his quack science carries him\nback to that \"Condition of the development of the world which cannot\nbe called actually static in the present sense of the word but most\nemphatically cannot be called dynamic. The unity of matter and\nmechanical force which we call the world is, so to speak, a formula\nof pure logic, to signify the self-contained condition of matter as\nthe point of departure of all enumerable stages of material progress.\"\n\nWe have obviously not yet got away from the original self-contained\ncondition of matter. Here it is explained as consisting of mechanical\nforce and matter, and this as a formula of pure logic, etc. As soon\nthen as the unity of matter and mechanical force is at an end\nevolution proceeds.\n\nThe formula of pure logic is nothing but a lame attempt to make the\nHegelian categories \"an Sich and fuer Sich\" of use in a philosophy of\nrealism. In \"an Sich\" according to Hegel the original unity of a thing\nconsists; in \"fuer Sich\" begins the differentiation and movement of\nthe concealed elements, the active antithesis. We shall therefore\ndepict the original condition as one in which there is a unity of\nmatter and mechanical force and the transition to movement as the\nseparation and antithesis of these two elements. But we have not\nthereby established the proof of the real existence of the fantastic\noriginal condition but only this much that it exists according to the\nHegelian category \"an Sich\" and just as fantastically disappears\naccording to the Hegelian category \"fuer Sich.\"\n\nMatter, says Duehring, implies all that is real, therefore there is no\nmechanical force outside of matter. Mechanical force is furthermore a\ncondition of matter. In the original condition where no change\noccurred matter and its mechanical force were a unity. Afterwards when\nthe change commenced there was a differentiation from matter. Thus we\nare obliged to be satisfied with these mystical phrases and with the\nassurance that the self contained original state was neither static\nnor dynamic, neither in a state of rest nor of motion. We are still\nwithout information with regard to the whereabouts of mechanical force\nat that period and how we arrived at a condition of motion from one of\nrest without a push from the outside, that is without God.\n\nBefore the time of Herr Duehring materialists were wont to speak of\nmatter and motion. He reduces motion to mechanical force as its\nnecessary original form and so renders incomprehensible the real\nconnection between matter and motion which was also not evident to the\nearlier materialists. Yet the thing is easy enough. Matter has never\nexisted without motion, neither can it. Motion in space, the\nmechanical motion of smaller particles to single worlds, the motion of\nmolecules as in the case of heat, or as electric or magnetic currents,\nchemical analysis or synthesis, organic life, each single atom of the\nmatter of the world--they all discover themselves in one or other of\nthe forms of motion or in several of them together at any given\nmoment. All quiescence, all rest, is only significant in relation to\nthis or that given form of motion. A body for example may be upon the\nground in mechanical quiescence, in mechanical rest. This does not\nprevent its participation in the movements of the earth and of the\nwhole solar system, just as little does it prevent its smallest\ncomponent parts from completing the movements conditioned by the\ntemperature or its atoms from going through a chemical process. Matter\nwithout motion is just as unthinkable as motion without matter. Motion\nis just as uncreatable or indestructible as matter itself, the older\nphilosophy of Descartes proclaimed precisely that the quantity of\nmotion in the world has been fixed from the beginning. Motion cannot\nbe generated therefore it can only be transferred. If motion is\ntransferred from one body to another, one may as far as it is\nregarded as transferring itself, as active, consider it as the\noriginal cause of motion, but so far as it is transferred, as passive.\nThis active motion we call force; the passive, expression of force. It\nis therefore just as clear as noon that force is just as great as its\nexpression because the same motion fulfils itself in both.\n\nA motionless condition of matter is therefore one of the hollowest and\nmost absurd notions, a mere delirium. In order to arrive at it one is\nobliged to consider the relative absence of motion in the case of a\nbody lying on the ground, as absolute rest, and then to transfer this\nidea to the entire universe. This is made easier by the reduction of\nmotion in general to mere mechanical force. By the limitation of\nmotion to mere mechanical force we can conceive of a force as at rest,\nas confined, as momentarily ineffective. If for example in the\ntransference of motion which transference is very frequently a\nsomewhat complicated process in the carrying out of which various\nintermediate steps are necessary, one may stay the actual transference\nat a chosen point and stop the process, as for example if one loads a\ngun and delays the moment when the charge shall be set at liberty by\nthe pull of the trigger, through the firing of powder. Therefore one\nmay conceive of matter as being loaded with force in the unprogressive\nstatic period, and this Herr Duehring appears to mean by his unity of\nmatter and force if indeed he means anything at all. This notion is\nabsurd, since it pictures as absolute for the entire universe a\ncondition which is by nature only relative and to which therefore only\na portion of matter can be subjected at one and the same time. Let us\nlook at it from this point of view and we do not escape the difficulty\nof explaining first how the universe came to be loaded and in the\nsecond place, whose finger drew the trigger. We may revolve all we\nplease but under the guidance of Herr Duehring we always come back\nover and over again to the finger of God.\n\nFrom astronomy our realist philosopher passes on to mechanics and\nphysics and complains that the mechanical theory of heat has brought\nus no further in the course of a generation than the point which\nRobert Mayer reached by his own efforts. Moreover the whole thing is\nvery obscure. We must \"always remember that with conditions of the\nmovement of matter statical conditions are also given and that these\nlast are not measured in mechanical work. If we have earlier typified\nnature as a great workwoman, and we still hold to the statement, we\nmust now add that the static condition, the condition of rest, does\nnot imply any mechanical labor. We are again without the bridge from\nthe static to the dynamic and if latent heat, so called, is up to the\npresent a stumbling block to the theory we can recognise a lack which\nmay be denied in the cosmic process.\"\n\nThis whole oracular utterance is again merely an outpouring of bad\nscience which very clearly perceives that it has got itself into a\nplace from which it cannot be saved by creating motion from a state of\nabsolute freedom from motion, and is ashamed to call upon its only\nsaviour, the Creator of heaven and earth. If in mechanics, heat\nincluded, there is no bridge to be found from statics to dynamics,\nfrom equipoise to motion, why should Herr Duehring be obliged to find\na bridge from his condition of absence of motion to motion? Thus he\nwould have the luck to escape from his dilemma.\n\nIn ordinary mechanics the bridge from statics to dynamics is--the push\nfrom the outside. If a stone of the weight of a hundred grammes be\nlifted ten meters high and then flung free so that it should remain\nhanging in a self-contained condition and in a state of rest, you\nwould have to appeal to a public of sucking infants to declare that\nthe existing condition of that body represents no mechanical labor and\nthat its removal from its earlier condition has no measure in\nmechanical work. Any passerby would tell Herr Duehring that the stone\ndid not come on the string by its own efforts and the first good hand\nbook in mechanics would inform him that if he let the stone fall\nagain, the latter in its fall does just as much mechanical work as is\nnecessary to lift it to the height of ten meters. The very simple fact\nthat the stone is suspended represents mechanical force in itself,\nsince if it remain long enough, the string breaks, as soon as it, as a\nresult of its chemical constitution, is no longer strong enough to\nhold the stone. All mechanical phenomena, may, we must inform Herr\nDuehring, be reduced to just such simple fundamental forms, and the\nengineer is still unborn who cannot discover the bridge from statics\nto dynamics as long as he has sufficient initial force at his\ndisposal.\n\nIt is quite a hard nut and bitter pill for our metaphysician that\nmotion should find its measure in its opposite rest. It is such a\nglaring contradiction, and every contradiction is an absurdity in the\neyes of Herr Duehring. It is nevertheless true that the hanging stone\nby reason of its weight and its distance from the ground represents a\nmeans of mechanical movement sufficiently easily measured in different\nways, as for example through gravity direct, through glancing on an\nincline or through the undulation of a wave--and it is just the same\nwith a loaded gun. The expression of motion in terms of its opposite\nrest presents no difficulty at all to the dialectic philosophy. The\nwhole contradiction in its eyes is merely relative, for absolute\nrest, complete equipose does not exist. The movement of the particles\nstrives towards equipose, the movement of the mass in turn destroys\nthe equipose, so that rest and equipose where they occur are the\nresults of arrested motion, and it is evident that this motion is\ncapable of being measured in respect of its results, of being\nexpressed in itself and of being restored in some form or other\nexternal to itself. But Herr Duehring would never be satisfied with\nsuch a simple explanation of the matter. Like a good metaphysician he\ncreates a yawning gulf between motion and equipose which does not\nreally exist and then wonders if he can find no bridge across the\nself-created chasm. He might just as well bestride his metaphysical\nRosinante and hunt the \"Ding an Sich\" of Kant since it is in the last\nanalysis nothing else than this which stands behind the undiscoverable\nbridge.\n\nBut what about the mechanical theory of heat and of latent heat which\nis a \"stumbling block\" in the path of the theory?\n\nIf one convert a pound of ice at freezing point under normal\natmospheric pressure into a pound of water of the same temperature by\nmeans of heat there vanishes a quantity of heat which could heat the\nsame pound of water from 0 deg. centigrade to 79 deg. centigrade, or\nseventy-nine pounds of water one degree centigrade. If one heat this\npound of water to boiling point, that is, to one hundred degrees\ncentigrade and change it into steam of the heat of one hundred degrees\ncentigrade there vanishes up to the time when the last of the water is\nchanged into steam a seven fold greater quantity of heat, capable of\nraising the temperature of 537.2 pounds of water one degree. This\ndissipated heat is called latent. It is transformed, by cooling the\nsteam, into water again, and the water into ice, so the same mass of\nheat which was formerly latent, is again set free, that is, as heat\ncapable of being felt and measured. This setting free of heat by the\ncondensation of steam and the freezing of water is the reason that\nsteam if it is cooled off at 100 deg. transforms itself little by little\ninto water, and that a mass of water at freezing point is but slowly\ntransformed into ice. These are the facts. The question is what\nbecomes of the heat while it is latent?\n\nThe mechanical theory of heat according to which the heat of a body at\na certain temperature is dependent upon the greater or less vibration\nof the smallest physical parts (molecules) a vibration which can,\nunder certain conditions, be transformed into some other form of\nmotion, shows the whole thing completely, that the latent heat has\nperformed work, has been expended in work. By the melting of the ice\nthe close connection of the separate particles is broken asunder and\nchanged into a loose relationship; by the conversion of water into\nsteam at boiling point a condition is entered where the separate\nmolecules exercise no noticeable influence upon each other, and under\nthe influence of heat fly from one another in all directions. It is\nnow evident that the separate molecules of a body in the gaseous state\nare endowed with much greater energy than in the fluid state, and in\nthe fluid state than in the solid. Latent heat is therefore not\ndissipated, it is merely transformed and has taken on the form of\nmolecular elasticity.\n\nAs soon as conditions are at an end under which the molecules can\nexercise this relative freedom with regard to each other as soon\nnamely as the temperature falls below one hundred degrees to zero,\nthis elasticity becomes released and the molecules come together with\nthe same force with which they formerly flew apart, but only to\nappear again as heat, as exactly the same quantity of heat as was\nlatent before. This explanation is of course a hypothesis, as is the\nwhole mechanical theory of heat, in so far as no one has yet seen a\nmolecule, much less a molecule in motion. Like all recent theories,\nthis hypothesis is full of flaws but it can at least offer an\nexplanation which does not conflict with the uncreatability and\nindestructibility of motion and it is able to give an account of the\nwhereabouts of the heat in the transformation. Latent heat is\ntherefore by no means an obstacle in the way of the mechanical theory\nof heat. On the contrary this theory for the first time provides a\nrational explanation of the subject and an obstacle arises from the\nfact in particular that the physicists make use of the old and\nineffective expression \"latent heat\" to signify the heat transformed\ninto some other shape by molecular energy.\n\nThe static conditions of the solid, liquid and gaseous states\ntherefore represent mechanical work in so far as mechanical work is a\nmeasure of heat. Thus the solid crust of the earth, like the water of\nthe ocean, represents in its present form a certain quantity of heat\nset free which implies the same quantity of mechanical force. By the\npassing of the vaporous state which was the original form of the earth\ninto the fluid state and later into a condition, for the most part\nsolid, a certain quantity of molecular energy was set free in space,\nthe difficulty of which Herr Duehring whispers does not therefore\nexist. We are frequently brought to a stop in our cosmic observations\nby lack of knowledge, but nowhere by insuperable theoretical\ndifficulties. The bridge from statics to dynamics is therefore the\npush from the outside caused by the cooling or heating occasioned by\nother bodies which influence certain objects in equipoise. The\nfurther we explore Herr Duehring's philosophy, the more impossible\nappear all his attempts to explain rotation from absence of rotation,\nor to discover the bridge by which that which is purely static,\nself-contained, can without disturbance come to be the dynamic, in\nmotion.\n\nWe should here be glad to get rid of the whole self-contained\ncondition business. Herr Duehring, however, goes to chemistry and\ngives us three permanent natural laws established by the philosophy of\nrealism as follows, 1. The constant amount of matter in the universe.\n2. The simple chemical elements, and 3. The mechanical forces are\nunchangeable.\n\nTherefore the impossibility of creating or destroying matter, the\nsimple forms of its existence as far as they exist, and motion, these\nold, well known facts, inadequately expressed, that is the only\npositive thing which Herr Duehring is in a position to offer us as a\nresult of his real philosophy of the inorganic world. All these things\nwe have long known. But what we have not known is that they are\npermanent laws and as such natural properties of the system of things.\nIt is just the same thing over again as in the case of Kant. Herr\nDuehring takes some universally known expressions, pastes the Duehring\nlabel on them and calls them \"fundamentally original results and\nviews, system shaping thoughts, profound science.\"\n\nWe have not long to hesitate on this account. Whatever deficiencies\nthe most profound science and the best contrived social theories may\nhave, for once Herr Duehring can say precisely \"The quantity of gold\nin the universe must always remain the same and cannot be increased or\ndiminished any more than matter in general. But unfortunately Herr\nDuehring does not tell us what we may buy with this gold.\"\n\n\n_The Organic World._\n\n\"From mechanics in rest and motion to the relation of sensation and\nthought there is a uniform progression of interruptions.\" With this\nassurance Herr Duehring spares himself from saying anything further\nabout the origin of life, though one might reasonably expect that a\nthinker who has followed the development of the world from its\nself-contained condition, and who is so much at home with the other\nheavenly bodies would be here at home also. Besides this assurance is\nonly half true in so far as it is not yet completed by means of the\nlog line of Hegel, of which mention has been made already. In all its\ngradations the transition from one form of evolution to another\nremains a leap, a differentiating movement. So in the transition from\nthe mechanics of the worlds to those of the smaller amounts of matter\nin each single world, just so also in that from the mechanics of the\nmass to that of the molecule--the motion which we examine particularly\nin physics, so-called, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, just in\nthe same way also the transition from the physics of the molecule to\nthe physics of the chemical atom is completed by a differentiating\nleap, and it is just the same with the transition from ordinary\nchemical action to the chemistry of albumen which we call life. Within\nthe sphere of life the changes become less frequent and less\nremarkable. Therefore Hegel must again correct Herr Duehring.\n\nThe idea of purpose furnishes Herr Duehring with his conception of the\ntransition to the organic world. This is again borrowed from Hegel,\nwho in his \"logic\"--teachings of the concept--mingled with teachings\nof teleology or of purpose, passes over from chemistry to life.\nWhichever way we look we discover Herr Duehring to be in possession\nof Hegelian lore which he gives forth without any embarrassment as his\nown fundamental philosophy. It would be too long a task to find out\nhere just how far the application of the ideas of purpose is correctly\nstated and applied to the organic world. The application of the\nHegelian \"inner purpose\" at all events is evident, that is, of a\npurpose which is imported into nature not through a consciously acting\nthird party, like the wisdom of Providence, but which is inherent in\nmatter itself, which among people who are not well versed in\nphilosophy proceeds to the unthinking supposition of a conscious and\nall-wise agent; the same Herr Duehring who breaks out into unmeasured\nmoral indignation at the least tendency towards spiritism on the part\nof other people, tells us that \"sex sensations are certainly mainly\ndirected towards the gratification which is bound up in their\nexercise.\" He tells us moreover that \"poor Nature must always hold the\nobjective world in order\" and it has besides to perform acts which\nrequire more subtlety from Nature than we usually attribute to her.\nBut nature knows not only why she does this and that. She has not only\nher housemaid's duties to perform, she has not only subtlety, which is\na very pretty accomplishment, in subjective conscious thought, she has\nalso a will, for \"we must regard the additional natural desires which\noccur, such as feeding and propagation, not as directly but as\nindirectly willed.\" We now arrive at a consciously thinking and acting\nnature, and we therefore stand right at the bridge, not indeed between\nthe static and dynamic but between pantheism and deism, or perhaps\nHerr Duehring is pleased to indulge himself in a little\n\"natural-philosophical half-poetry.\"\n\nImpossible. All that the realistic philosophy has to say on organic\nnature is limited to a war against this natural philosophical\nhalf-poesy against \"Charlatanism with its wanton superficialities and\npseudo-scientific mysticism, against the poetic features of\nDarwinism.\"\n\nDarwin comes in for a share of blame chiefly because he transferred\nthe Malthusian theory of population from political economy to natural\nscience, because he is entangled by his notions of breeding, so that\nhis work is a sort of unscientific half-poetic attack against design\nin creation, and that the whole of Darwinism, after what he has\nborrowed from Lamark has been deducted, is a piece of brutality aimed\nagainst humanity.\n\nDarwin had brought home with him as the result of his scientific\njourneys the conclusion that species of plants and animals are not\nfixed but are subject to variations. In order to pursue this idea he\nentered upon experiments in the breeding of plants and animals. Just\nfor this reason England has become a classic land. The scientists of\nother countries, Germany, for example, have nothing to offer\ncomparable with England in this respect. Moreover, most of the\nconclusions belong to the last century so that the establishment of\nthe facts presented few difficulties. Darwin found that this\nartificial breeding produced differences in the species of plants and\nanimals greater than occur among those which are universally\nrecognised as belonging to different species. Therefore it was, up to\na certain point, proved that species can change and furthermore there\nwas established the possibility of a common ancestry for organisms\nwhich partake of the characteristics of different species.\n\nDarwin now examined the question whether there were not in nature\ncauses--which without the conscious intention of the breeder--might in\nthe course of time, by means of heredity, produce changes in the\nliving animal analogous to those produced by scientific breeding.\nThese causes he found in the disproportion between the enormous number\nof germs made by nature and the small number of beings which actually\ncome to maturity. But as the germ struggles for its own development\nthere is of necessity a consequent struggle for existence, which not\nonly shows itself directly in the wear and tear of the body, but also\nas a struggle for space and light, as in the case of plants. And it is\nevident that in this fight those individuals have the best prospect of\ncoming to maturity and reproducing themselves which possess certain\nqualities, perhaps insignificant, but advantageous in their fight for\nexistence. There is a tendency towards the inheritance of these\nindividual properties, and if they occur in several individuals of the\nsame species towards development in the direction once taken, by\nvirtue of the accumulated heredity, while the individuals which are\nnot possessed of these qualities succumb more easily and little by\nlittle disappear in the struggle for existence. Thus a species\nnaturally changes by the survival of the fittest.\n\nAgainst this theory of Darwin Herr Duehring urges that the origin of\nthe idea of the struggle for existence is, as Darwin himself\nconfessed, based on the views of the political economist and theorist,\nMalthus, on the population question, and he covers it with all the\nabuse appropriate to the clerical Malthusian views on keeping down the\npopulation. Now it happens that Darwin never said that the cause of\nthe struggle for existence theory was to be sought from Malthus. He\nonly said that his theories respecting the struggle for existence are\nthe theories of Malthus applied to the entire vegetable and animal\nworld. How great a blunder Darwin made when he so naively accepted the\nteachings of Malthus without examination may be seen from the fact\nthat there is no need to employ the spectacles of Malthus in order to\ndetect the struggle for existence in nature,--the contradiction\nbetween the innumerable mass of germs which nature produces in such\nprodigality and the slight number which can manage to reach maturity,\na contradiction which resolves itself into an apparently grim fight\nfor existence. And with regard to the law of wages the Malthusian\ndoctrines are widely advertised and Ricardo based his contentions upon\nthem,--so the struggle for existence in nature may find a standing\neven without the Malthusian interpretation. Besides the organisms of\nnature have their law of population, the establishment of which would\ndecide the theories of the development of species. And who gave the\ndecisive impetus in that direction? Nobody but Darwin.\n\nHerr Duehring is on his guard against entering upon the positive side\nof this question. Instead he must again find fault with the struggle\nfor existence. There can be no argument about a struggle for existence\nbetween plants and the genial eaters of plants \"in a sufficiently\naccurate sense the struggle for existence only occurs within the\nsphere of brutality, in so far as nourishment depends upon robbery and\nconsumption.\" And after he has reduced the concept struggle for\nexistence to these narrow limits he gives his wrath free play as\nregards the brutality of this conception which he himself has narrowed\ndown to a brutal conception. But this moral wrath simply reacts on\nHerr Duehring himself, the inventor of this sort of struggle for\nexistence. It is not Darwin therefore who seeks among the lower\nanimals the \"conditions of the operations of nature\" (as a matter of\nfact Darwin would have included the whole of organic nature in the\nstruggle), but one of Herr Duehring's bugaboos. The expression\n\"struggle for existence\" in particular excites Herr Duehring's lofty\nmoral scorn. That this actually exists among plants every meadow,\nevery cornfield and every wood can show him. We need not trouble about\nthe name, whether one call it \"struggle for existence\" or \"lack of the\nconditions of existence and want of mechanical realisation,\" but as to\nhow this fact operates as regards the maintenance or transformation of\nspecies. With regard to this Herr Duehring persists in a\ncharacteristically stubborn silence. We cannot trouble ourselves any\nmore about natural selection.\n\nBut \"Darwinism produces its changes and differentiations out of\nnothing.\" Darwin thoroughly understands that he is engaged with the\ncauses which have produced changes in individuals and in the second\nplace he is engaged with the mode in which such individual\ndifferentiations tend to mark off a race, a genus, or a species.\nDarwin moreover was less occupied in discovering these causes, which\nup to the present are either entirely unknown or on which there is\nonly general information, than in discovering a rational form in which\nto establish their reality, to embrace their permanent significance.\nBut Darwin ascribed too wide a reach to his discovery in this that he\nmade it an exclusive means of variation in species and neglected the\ncauses of individual differentiations from the general form. This\nmistake however is common to most people who make a step forwards.\nNext, if Darwin produces his changes in individual types out of\nnothing and thereby excludes the wisdom of the breeder, the breeder on\nhis part must not only display his wisdom but he must produce out of\nnothing real changes in plant and animal forms. But who has given the\nimpetus to the investigation as to whence these variations and\ndifferentiations proceed? It is again no one but Darwin.\n\nLately the conception of natural selection has been broadened, by\nHaeckel, in particular, and the variation of species has been shown to\nbe the result of actual change owing to adaptation and inheritance,\nwhereby adaptation is considered as the source of variations and\nheredity as the conserving element in the process. Even this is not\ncorrect in Herr Duehring's eyes. \"Peculiar adaptation to the\ncircumstances of life as they are offered or withheld by nature\nsupposes impulses and facts which answer to the conception. Hence\nadaptation is only apparent and actual causality does not elevate\nitself above the lowest steps of physical, chemical and plant\nphysiology.\" It is again the name which provokes Herr Duehring. But\nhow does he deal with the matter? The question is if such changes do\ntake place in the species of organic beings or not. And again Herr\nDuehring has no reply.\n\n\"If a plant in the course of its growth takes a direction by which it\ngets the most light the result is nothing but a combination of\nphysical forces and chemical agents, and if we are to call it an\nadaptation, not metaphorically but strictly, confusion is certain to\narise in the motion.\" This man is so exacting with other people\nbecause he is quite well acquainted with the intentions of nature and\nspeaks of the subtlety of nature, even of its will. There is\nconfusion, indeed, but with whom, with Haeckel or with Herr Duehring?\n\nAnd the confusion is not only spiritual but logical. We have seen that\nHerr Duehring put forth all his efforts to make the purpose idea in\nnature real. \"The relation of means and end does not by any means show\na conscious intention.\" But what is adaptation without conscious\nintention, without any intrusion of design of which he complains so\nloudly, but an unconscious teleology?\n\nIf the color of tree frogs and leaf eating insects is as a rule green\nand that of beasts that inhabit the desert sandy-yellow, and that of\npolar animals white, they have certainly not come into possession of\nthis coloring intentionally or through any kind of mental process, on\nthe contrary the coloring can only be explained by means of the\noperation of physical substances and chemical agents. And yet it\ncannot be denied that by these colors these animals are particularly\nadapted to the conditions in which they are and it is certain that\nthey are by their means rendered less visible to their enemies. Just\nof a similar nature are the organs by which certain plants seize and\nconsume certain insects (the means being on their under side, suited\nto this purpose and adapted to this end). Now if Herr Duehring insists\nthat the adaptation must be realised through the operation of thought,\nhe only says that the purpose must be carried out through mental\noperation, must be conscious and intentional. Thus again, just as in\nthe philosophy of realism we arrive at the Creator with a purpose, at\nGod. Formerly this kind of declaration was called \"deism\" and Herr\nDuehring says that we had not much regard for it, but it now appears\nthat the world has gone backwards in this respect also.\n\nFrom adaptation we come to heredity and here according to Herr\nDuehring Darwinism is quite out. \"The whole organic world, Darwin\nexplained, came from a single germ, is, so to speak, the brood of a\nsingle being. Independent similar products of nature according to\nDarwin do not exist without heredity and his retrogressive philosophy\nmust come to a full stop when the end of the thread of ancestry is\nreached, or the original vegetable form.\"\n\nThe statement that Darwin traced all existing organisms from one\noriginal germ is to put it politely a piece of pure imagination on the\npart of Herr Duehring. Darwin says distinctly on the last page of the\nOrigin of Species, Sixth Edition, that he regards all living beings\nnot as separate creations but as the descendants in a direct line from\nsome fewer beings and Haeckel makes a distinct advance on this\nascribes \"an entirely distinct source for plants and another for the\nanimal kingdom\" and on and between both of them \"a number of original\nstems each of which has developed independently from one single\nprimary monistic form.\" (History of Creation page 397.) This original\nform of life Herr Duehring discovers solely to bring it into contempt\nby paralleling it with the first man according to Jewish tradition,\nAdam. Here, unfortunately for Herr Duehring, he does not know how this\noriginal Jew turns out, according to Smith's Assyrian discoveries to\nhave been the original Semite, and that the entire Biblical story of\nthe Creation and the Flood has been shown to have been taken from a\nlegendary store common to the Jews, Babylonians, Chaldeans, and\nAssyrians.\n\nIt is brought forward as a severe and irrefutable reproach to Darwin\nthat he is at an end where the thread of descent fails him.\nUnfortunately the whole of our science deserves the same reproach.\nWhen the thread of descent fails it it is \"at an end.\" It has not yet\ncome to the point of creating organic beings without an ancestry, not\neven once has it been able to make simple protoplasm or other\nalbuminous bodily forms out of the chemical elements. It can only say\ntherefore with any certainty regarding the origin of life, that it\nmust have come about by a chemical process. But perhaps the\nphilosophy of realism can give us some assistance here since it is\nengaged with independent organic natural products, without any descent\none from another. How can these come into being? By original creation?\nBut up to the present not even the most audacious advocates of\nspontaneous generation have claimed to create in this way anything\nexcept bacteria, fungi, or other very elementary organisms, but not\ninsects, birds, fish or mammals. If these homogeneous products of\nnature--it is understood for all this discussion that they are\norganic--are not related through descent, they or their ancestors,\nthen \"where the thread of descent breaks\" they must have been placed\nin the world by a separate act of creation, and this again requires a\ncreator, what we call \"deism.\"\n\nHerr Duehring further explains that \"it was a piece of superficiality\non the part of Darwin to make the mere fact of the sex-composition of\nqualities the foundation for the existence of these qualities.\" Here\nwe have again a piece of pure imagination on the part of our profound\nphilosopher. On the contrary Darwin says that natural selection has to\ndo only with the maintenance of variations and not with their origin.\nThis new supposition however of things which Darwin did not say serves\nto assist us to this deep idea of Duehring. \"If a principle of\nindividual variation had been sought in the inner scheme of creation\nit would have been an entirely rational idea. For it is natural to\nunite the idea of universal generation with that of sex propagation,\nand to regard the so-called original creation from the higher point of\nview, not as absolutely antagonistic to reproduction but even as\nreproduction itself.\" And the man who could write this is not ashamed\nto reproach Hegel with writing jargon.\n\nLet us call a halt to the vexatious and contradictory babble with\nwhich Herr Duehring proclaims his wrath against the advance given to\nscience by the theory of Darwin. Neither Darwin nor his followers\namong the natural scientists have any idea of belittling Lamark's\ntremendous services, in fact they are the very people who first\nrestored his fame. But we are unable to ignore the fact that in the\ntime of Lamark science was still far from supplied with competent\nmaterial to enable it to answer the question of the origin of species\nother than in a prophetic or, as it were anticipatory, manner. In\naddition to the enormous amount of material in the realm of general,\nas well as of that of anatomical, botany and zoology, accumulated\nsince that time, two entirely new sciences have since come into\nexistence--the investigation of the development of plant and animal\ngerms (embryology), and the investigation of the organic survivals in\nthe earth's crust which still remain. There is a distinct similarity\nbetween the steps in the development of the organic germ to mature\norganism, and the successive steps by which plants and animals succeed\neach other in the history of the world. It is just this similarity\nwhich has placed the evolution theory on its most secure foundations.\nThe theory of evolution is however still very young and it is beyond\nquestion that upon further investigation the rigid Darwinian ideas\nupon the origin of species will be considerably modified.\n\nBut what has the realist philosophy of a positive nature to contribute\nwith respect to the evolution of organic life? \"The variation of\nspecies is an acceptable supposition, but there exists, in addition,\nthe independent order of the products of nature belonging to the same\nspecies without any intervention of descent.\" According to this we\nare to conclude that products of unlike species, that is species which\nvary, are descended from one another, but those of similar species\nnot. But even this is not altogether correct, for he ventures to say\nof the varying species, \"The part played by descent is on the contrary\na very secondary activity of nature.\" There is heredity, then, but it\nis only to be reckoned as a factor of the second class. Let us be glad\nthat heredity of which Herr Duehring has said so much that is evil and\nmysterious is at least let in by the back door. It is just the same\nwith natural selection, since after all his moral indignation with\nrespect to the struggle for existence by means of which natural\nselection fulfils itself he suddenly exclaims, \"The most important\nconstituent is to be found in the conditions of life and cosmic\nconditions, while natural selection as set forth by Darwin may be\nconsidered as secondary.\" Natural selection still exists, even if a\nfactor of the second class, like the struggle for existence, and the\nclerical malthusian surplus-population theory. That is all, for the\nrest Herr Duehring refers us to Lamark.\n\nFinally, he warns against misuse of the terms metamorphosis and\nevolution. Metamorphosis, he says, is a very obscure notion, and the\nconcept of evolution is only admissible in so far as a law of\nevolution can be really proved. Instead of either of these expressions\nwe should employ the term \"composition\" and then everything would be\nall right. It is the same old story over again, Herr Duehring is\nsatisfied if we change the names. If we speak of the evolution of the\nchicken in the egg we give rise to confusion because we have only an\nincomplete knowledge of the law of evolution. But if we speak of its\n\"composition\" everything becomes clear. We must therefore say no\nlonger \"this child is growing nicely\" but, \"he composes himself\nsplendidly,\" and we congratulate Herr Duehring upon the fact that he\nis not only a peer of the author of the Niebelungen Ring in his\nopinion of himself but in his own particular capacity is also a\ncomposer of the future.\n\n\n_Organic World (Conclusion)._\n\n\"One reflects upon our natural philosophical portion of positive\nknowledge in order to fix it relatively to all one's scientific\nhypotheses. Next in importance come all the actual acquisitions of\nmathematics as well as the leading principles of exact science in\nmechanics, physics and chemistry and particularly the scientific\nresults in physiology, zoology, and antiquarian investigation.\"\n\nHerr Duehring speaks in this confident and decided fashion with\nrespect to the mathematical and scientific scholarship of Herr\nDuehring. One cannot detect in its meager shape and in its scanty and\naudacious results the extent of positive knowledge which lies behind.\nEvery time the oracle is consulted for a definite statement as regards\nphysics or chemistry we get nothing as regards physics but the\nequation which expresses the mechanical equivalent of heat, and\nconcerning chemistry only this that all bodies are divisible into\nelements and combinations of elements. He who can speak as Duehring\ndoes about \"gravitating atoms\" shows at once that he is quite at a\nloss to understand the difference between an atom and a molecule.\nAtoms, of course, exist, not with respect to gravitation or any other\nphysical or mechanical form of motion, but only as concerns chemical\naction. And if the last chapter on organic nature is read, the empty,\nself-contradictory, assertive, oracular, stupid, circuitous absolute\nnothingness of the final result lead one to the conclusion that Herr\nDuehring talks about things of which he knows very little and this\nconclusion becomes a certainty when we come to his proposal in the\ncourse of his writing on organic life (biology) to use the term\n\"composition\" instead of evolution. He who can make such a suggestion\nas that gives evidence that he is not acquainted with the building up\nof organic bodies.\n\nAll organic bodies, the very lowest excepted, develop from small cells\nby the increment of visible pieces of albumen with a central cell. The\ncell generally develops an outer skin and the contents are more or\nless fluid. The lowest cell-bodies develop from one cell; the enormous\nmajority of organic beings are many-celled and among the lower forms\nthese take on similar, and among the higher forms greater variations\nof, groupings and activities. In the human body for example are bones,\nmuscles, nerves, sinews, ligaments, cartilage, skin, all either made\nup of cells or originating in them. But for all organic bodies, from\nthe amoeba which is a simple and for the most part unprotected piece\nof albumen with a cell centre in the midst to man, and from the\nsmallest one-celled desmidian to the highest developed plant, the mode\nis one and the same by which the cells propagate themselves, that is\nby division. The cell centre is first laced across its midst, the\nlacing which separates the centre into two knobs becomes stronger and\nstronger and at last they become separated and two cell centres are\nformed. The same occurrence takes place in the cell itself. Each of\nthe cell centres becomes the middle point of a collection of cell\nstuff which by knitting ever closer becomes combined with the other,\nand finally both of them part and live on as separate cells. Through\nsuch repeated cell divisions the full sized animal gradually develops\nfrom the germ of the animal egg after fructification and the\nsubstitution of used up cells in the full grown animal is brought\nabout similarly. To call such a process \"composition\" and to speak of\nthe term \"evolution\" as a purely imaginary term belongs to one who\ndoes not know anything of the matter, hard as it is to imagine such\nignorance at this date.\n\nWe have still somewhat to say with respect to Herr Duehring's views of\nlife in general. Elsewhere he sets forth the following statement with\nrespect to life. \"Even the inorganic world is a self-regulated system\nbut one may undertake to speak of life in the proper sense first when\nthe organs and the circulation of matter through special separate\nchannels from a central point to another germ collection of a minor\nformation begin.\"\n\nIf life begins where the separate organs begin then we must hold all\nHaeckel's protozoa (Protistenreich) and probably many others as dead;\nall organisms at least up to those composed of one cell and those\nincluded are not capable of life. If the means of circulation of\nmatter through different channels is the distinguishing mark of life\nwe must place outside of this definition all the upper classes of the\ncolenterata entirely, with the exception of the medusae, and therefore\nall the polypi and other plant animals are also to be considered as\nbeing outside the class of living creatures. And if the circulation of\nmatter through different canals from an inner point is the\ndistinguishing characteristic of life we must reckon all animals as\ndead which either have no heart or several hearts. Besides these there\nbelong also to this category all worms, starfish and ringed creatures\n(annuloids and annulous according to Huxley's definition) a portion of\nthe shell fish, crabs, and finally a vertebrate animal, the lancelet\n(amphioxus) and all plants.\n\nWhen Herr Duehring therefore undertakes to distinguish life narrowly\nand strictly, he gives four mutually contradictory modes of\ndistinguishing life, one of which condemns not only the whole of plant\nlife but about half the animal kingdom to eternal death. No one can\naccuse him of having deceived us when he promised us peculiar results\nbased on individual ideas.\n\nIn another place he says \"There is a simple fundamental type in nature\nbelonging to all organisms from the lowest to the highest\" and this\ntype is to be met \"in the subordinate movements of the most\nundeveloped plants.\" This is again an absolutely false statement. The\nsimplest type in the whole of organic nature is the cell, and it lies\nuniversally at the foundation of the highest organisms. On the other\nhand there is a substance among the lowest organisms lower even than\nthe cell, the protomoeba, a single piece of undifferentiated\nprotoplasm, without any differentiation, a complete series of monads\nand the entire class of siphoneae. All of these are connected with the\nhigher organisms only by virtue of the fact that protoplasm is its\nsubstantial foundation, and that they fulfill the functions of\nprotoplasm, that is they live and die.\n\nFurther Herr Duehring tells us \"physiologically the concept of\nexistence consists in this, that it embraces a single nerve apparatus.\nSensation is therefore the characteristic of all animal organisms that\nis the capacity of conscious subjective recognition of circumstances.\nThe sharp line of differentiation between plants and animals consists\nin the leap to sensation. This distinguishing line cannot any more be\nabolished by known forms of transition than it can be brought into\nexistence by the logical necessity of externally distinguishable\ncharacteristics.\" And further \"Plants are totally and eternally\nwithout sensation and are devoid of the faculty for it.\"\n\nIn the first place Hegel says that \"sensation is the specific\ndifferentiation, the distinguishing mark of the animal.\" Thus one of\nHegel's erudite statements becomes an indubitable truth of the last\ninstance merely by being copied into Herr Duehring's book.\n\nIn the second place we now arrive for the first time at the forms of\ntransition between animals and plants. That these intermediate forms\nexist, that there are organisms concerning which we are unable to say\nflatly whether they are plants or animals, that we are therefore\nunable to fix accurately the frontiers between plant and animal life,\nall these things make Herr Duehring logically anxious to fix a\ndecisively distinguishing line, which in the next breath he declares\ncannot be thoroughly relied on. But there is no need for us to go to\nthe doubtful region; intermediate between plants and animals are\nsensitive plants which at the least contact fold their leaves or close\ntheir petals. Are insect eating plants utterly without sensation? Even\nHerr Duehring cannot make such an assertion without indulging in\n\"unscientific half-poetry.\"\n\nIn the third place Herr Duehring is again giving free rein to his\nimagination when he says that sensation is psychologically existent,\neven when the nerve apparatus is exceedingly simple. This is found\nregularly among reptiles yet Herr Duehring is the first to say that\nthey have no sensation because they have no nerves. Sensation is not\nnecessarily bound up with nerves but it is bound up with some\nalbuminous substance the true nature of which has not yet been\ndiscovered.\n\nIn addition, the biological knowledge of Herr Duehring becomes\nexceedingly evident in that he is not ashamed to fling at Darwin the\nquestion do animals develop from plants? so that it is a question\nwhether he is more ignorant with regard to plants or animals.\n\nOf life in general Herr Duehring can only tell us \"The change in the\nform of matter which fulfills itself by plastic constructive\narrangement remains a distinguishing characteristic of the individual\nlife-process.\"\n\nThat is all that we learn of life and with respect to the plastic\ncreative arrangement we sink knee deep in the nonsense of Duehring's\njargon. If we want to learn what life is we shall have to look at the\nproblem a little more closely on our own account.\n\nThat organic change in matter is the most universal and distinctive\nevidence of life has been declared by physiological chemists and\nchemical physiologists times without number during the last thirty\nyears and their utterances are translated by Herr Duehring into his\nown clear and elegant language. But to define life as an organic\nchange of matter is simply to define life as life, for organic change\nof matter, or change of matter with plastic creative arrangement is a\nstatement which must itself be explained by life, and the explanation\nin its turn by the difference between organic and inorganic, that is\nbetween that which is alive and that which is not alive. So that with\nthis explanation we do not get at the problem.\n\nOrganic change, as such, is frequently found where life does not\nexist. There are whole series of processes in chemistry, which by the\nproper combination of the elements, produce again their own\nconditions, so that thereby a certain body is the creator of a\nprocess. Thus in the manufacture of sulphuric acid by the burning of\nsulphur, there is created in this process sulphuric dioxide SO_{2},\nand if one add steam and nitric acid thereto, the sulphuric dioxide\ntakes up the water and the oxygen and becomes H_{2} SO_{4}. Nitric\nacid gives off oxygen and becomes nitric oxide, this nitric oxide\nsimultaneously takes up new oxygen from the atmosphere and is\ntransformed into a higher oxide of nitrogen and from this acid\nsulphuric dioxide is again given off and made by the same process, so\nthat, theoretically, an infinitely small amount of nitric acid should\nbe effective to transform an unlimited quantity of sulphuric dioxide,\noxygen and water into sulphuric acid. Change in matter regularly\noccurs through the passing of fluids through dead organic and\ninorganic membranes as in the artificial cells of Traube. It therefore\nappears that there is no progress by the way of organic change for the\nquality of organic change which was to explain life must itself be\nexplained by life. We must therefore seek it elsewhere.\n\nLife is a mode of existence of protoplasm and consists essentially in\nthe constant renewal of the chemical constituents of this substance.\nProtoplasm is here understood in the modern chemical sense and\ncomprises under this name all substances analogous to the white of an\negg, otherwise called protein substances. The name is not\nsatisfactory, for the ordinary white of egg plays the least active\nrole of all transformed substances, since it only serves as mere\nnourishment for the yolk, for the self-developing germ. As long\nhowever as so little is known of the chemical constituents of\nprotoplasm the name is better than any other because more inclusive.\n\nWhenever we discover life we also find it bound up with protoplasm,\nand when we find a piece of protoplasm not in solution there we find\nalso life, without exception. Doubtless the presence of other chemical\nconstituents is necessary to a living body, to produce the various\ndifferentiations of these elements of life. They are not necessary to\nlife in itself, hence they enter as food and become transformed into\nprotoplasm. The lowest forms of life with which we are acquainted are\nnothing but simple pieces of protoplasm and yet they have all the\nappearance of living objects.\n\nBut in what consist these signs of life which are common to all living\nobjects? In this, that the protoplasm takes from its surroundings\nother matter suitable to itself and assimilates it while other former\nportions of the body become decomposed and are thrown off. Other\nthings, not living bodies, decompose or make combinations, but cease\nthereby to be what they were. The rock worn by atmospheric action is\nno longer rock, the metal which becomes oxidised goes off in rust. But\nwhat causes the destruction of dead bodies is the essential of the\nexistence of living protoplasm. From the very moment when the unbroken\ninterchange in the constituents of protoplasm ceases, the continual\ninterchange of receiving and throwing off, from that moment the\nprotoplasmic substance itself ceases, becomes decomposed, that is,\ndies.\n\nLife, the mode of existence of protoplasmic substance, therefore\nconsists in this, that at one and the same moment it is itself and\nsomething else, and this is not the result of a process to which it is\ncompelled by external agency, since this may happen also with objects\nwhich are dead. On the contrary life, which is change of matter, is\nconsequent upon nourishment and throwing off, is a self-fulfilling\nprocess inherent in its medium, protoplasm, without which it cannot\nexist. Hence, it follows that if chemistry should ever discover how to\nmake protoplasm artificially, this protoplasm must show some signs of\nlife, even if very insignificant. It is, of course, doubtful if\nchemistry will discover the proper food for this protoplasm at the\nsame time as the protoplasm.\n\nThrough the changes in matter produced by nourishment and throwing\noff, as actual functions of the protoplasm, and through its own\nplasticity, proceed all the other most simple factors of life,\nsensibility which consists in the interchange between the protoplasm\nand its food, contractibility which shows itself at a very low stage\nin the consumption of food, possibility of growth which is shown in\nthe lowest stages of development by splitting, and internal motion\nwithout which neither the consumption nor assimilation of food is\npossible.\n\nOur definition of life is, of course, very incomplete since in order\nto include all the widely differing manifestations of life it must\nconfine itself to the most universal and simple. Definitions are of\nlittle scientific worth. In order to determine what life is we must\nexamine all forms of its manifestation from the lowest to the highest.\nFor ordinary use such definitions are very convenient and in a certain\nsense indispensable, and they can do no harm as long as their\ninevitable deficiencies are not forgotten.\n\n(The remainder of this section simply teases Herr Duehring.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nMORALS AND LAW\n\n\n_Eternal Truths._\n\nWe refrain from offering examples of the hodge podge of stupidity and\nsham solemnity with which Herr Duehring regales his readers for fifty\nfull pages as fundamental knowledge on the elements of consciousness.\nWe merely quote the following: \"He who merely conceives of thought\nthrough the medium of speech has never understood what is signified by\nabstract and true thought.\" Hence, animals are the most abstract and\ntrue thinkers, for their thought is never obscured by the importunate\ninterference of speech. With regard to Herr Duehring's thought in\nparticular, it may be perceived that they are but little suited to\nspeech and that the German language in particular is quite inadequate\nto express them.\n\nThe fourth part of his book, however, possesses some redeeming\nfeatures, for here and there it offers us some comprehensible notions\non the subject of morals and law in spite of the tedious and involved\nrhetoric. Right at the beginning we are invited to take a journey to\nthe other heavenly bodies. Thus, the elements of morality are to be\nfound among superhuman beings among whom exist an understanding of\nthings and a regular system of the harmonious conduct of life. Our\nshare in such conclusions must then be small, but there always remains\na beneficent and enlarging idea in picturing that even in other\nspheres individual and social life follows one purpose which cannot\nbe escaped or evaded by any intelligent living creature.\n\nThere is good reason for our altering the position of the statement\nthat Herr Duehring's truth is good for all possible worlds from the\nclose to the beginning of the chapter. When once the correctness of\nHerr Duehring's notions of morals and law have been established so as\nto apply to all world the beneficent notion may easily be extended to\nall time. Here again, however, we run across another final truth of\nlast instance. The moral universe has \"just as well as that of\nuniversal knowledge its general principles and simple elements.\" Moral\nprinciples are beyond history and the national distinctions of to-day\n... the various truths from which in the course of development the\nfuller moral consciousness, and, so to speak, conscience itself is\nderived, can, as far as their origin is investigated, claim a similar\nacceptation and extent to that of mathematics and its applications.\nReal truths are immutable and it is folly to conceive of correct\nknowledge as liable to the attacks of time or of change in material\nconditions. \"Hence the certainty of sound knowledge and the\nsufficiency of general acceptation forbid to doubt the absolute\ncorrectness of the fundamental principles of knowledge.... Continual\ndoubt is in itself an evidence of weakness and is merely the\nexpression of a barren condition of confusion, which although\nconscious of possessing nothing still seeks to maintain the appearance\nof holding on to something. Regarding morals, it denies universal\nprinciples with respect to the manifold variations in moral ideas\nowing to geographical and historical conditions, and thinks that with\nthe admission of the unavoidable necessity of evil and wickedness\nthere is no need for it to acknowledge the truth and efficiency of\nmoral impulses. This mordant scepticism which is not directed against\nany false doctrine in particular, but against human capacity to\nrecognise morality resolves itself finally into nothingness, it is no\nmore than mere nihilism. It flatters itself that it can attain\nsupremacy and give free rein to unprincipled pleasures by destroying\nmoral ideas and creating chaos. It is greatly deceived, however, if\nmerely pointing at the inevitable fate of the intellect with respect\nto error and truth is sufficient to show by analogy that natural\nliability to error does not exclude the arriving at a correct decision\nbut rather tends to that end.\"\n\nUp to now we have not commented upon Herr Duehring's pompous opinions\non final truths of the last instance, sovereignty of the will,\nabsolute certainty of knowledge, and so forth, until the matter could\nfirst be brought to an issue. Up to this point the investigation has\nbeen useful to show how far the separate assertions of the philosophy\nof realism had \"sovereign validity\" and \"unrestricted claim to truth\"\nbut we now come to the question if any and what product of human\nknowledge can have in particular \"sovereign validity\" and\n\"unrestricted claims to truth.\" If I speak of human knowledge I do not\ndo so as an affront to the dwellers in other worlds whom I have not\nthe honor to know, but only because animals have knowledge also, not\nsovereign, however. The dog recognises a divinity in his master, who\nmay, however, be a great fool.\n\n\"Is human thought sovereign?\" Before we can answer \"yes\" or \"no\" we\nmust first examine what human thought is. Is it the thought of an\nindividual man? No. It exists only as the individual thoughts of many\nmillions of men, past, present and to come. If I now say, having\ncomprehended the thought of all men in the future also under my\nconcept, that it is able to understand the entire universe, if man\nonly lasts long enough, and the organs of perception are unlimited,\nand the objects to be comprehended have no limits upon their\ncomprehensibility, my statement is banal and barren. The most valuable\nresult of such a conclusion would be to cause in us a tremendous\ndistrust of present day knowledge. Because, to all appearance, we are\njust standing at the threshold of human history and the generations\nwhich will correct us will be much more numerous than those whose\nknowledge--often with little enough regard,--we ourselves correct.\nHerr Duehring himself explains the necessity of consciousness,\nknowledge and perception only becoming apparent in a collection of\nseparate individuals. We can only apply the word sovereignty to the\nthought of these individuals in so far as we do not know of any force\nwhich can defeat thought. But we all know that there is no\nsignificance to nor power of interpretation of the sovereign power of\nthe knowledge of the thought of each individual, and, according to our\nexperience, there is much more that requires improvement and\ncorrection in it than not.\n\nIn other words, the sovereignty of thought is realised in a number of\nhighly unsovereign men capable of thinking, the knowledge which has\nunlimited pretensions to truth is realised in a number of relative\nblunders; neither the one nor the other can be fully realised except\nthrough an endless eternity of human existence.\n\nWe have here again the same contradiction as above between the\nnecessary, as an absolute conceived characteristic of human thought,\nand its reality in the very limited thinking single individual, a\ncontradiction which can only be solved in the endless progression of\nthe human race, that is endless as far as we are concerned. In this\nsense human thought is just as sovereign as not--sovereign, and its\npossibility of knowledge just as unlimited as limited. It is sovereign\nand unlimited as regards its nature, its significance, its\npossibilities, its historical end, it is not sovereign and limited\nwith respect to individual expression and its actuality at any\nparticular time.\n\nIt is just the same with eternal truths. If mankind only operated with\neternal truths and with thought which possessed a sovereign\nsignificance and unlimited claims to truth, mankind would have arrived\nat a point where the eternity of thought becomes realised in actuality\nand possibility. Thus the famous miracle of the enumerated innumerable\nwould be realised.\n\nBut what about those truths which are so well established that to\ndoubt them is to be, as it were, crazy? That twice two is four, that\nthe three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that\nParis is in France, that a man will die of hunger if he does not\nreceive food, etc.? Do we not perceive then that there are eternal\ntruths, final truths of last instance? Quite so. We can divide the\nentire field of knowledge in the old-fashioned way into three great\ndivisions. The first includes all the sciences which are concerned\nwith inanimate nature and which can be treated mathematically, more or\nless--mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics and chemistry. If one\nlike to use big words to express simple things, it may be said that\ncertain results of these sciences are eternal truths, final truths of\nlast instance, whence they are called the exact sciences. But all the\nresults are by no means of this character. With the introduction of\nvariable quantities and the extension of the variability to the\ninfinitely small and the infinitely large, mathematics, otherwise\nerect, meets with its fall, it has eaten of the apple of knowledge and\nthere has been opened up to it the path of limitless progress as well\nas that of error. The virgin condition of absolute purity, the\nundisturbable certainty of all mathematics has vanished forever, a\nperiod of controversy has intervened, and we have now arrived at the\nstate of affairs in which most people carry on the operations of\nmultiplication and division not because they really understand what\nthey are engaged in, but from mere belief because the operation has so\nfar always given correct results. Astronomy and mechanics, physics and\nchemistry are in a still more confused state, and hypotheses crowd one\nanother thick as a swarm of bees. It cannot be otherwise. In physics\nwe investigate the movements of molecules, in chemistry the\ndevelopment of molecules from atoms, and if the theory of light waves\nshould not be correct we have no absolute knowledge that we even see\nthese interesting things. The lapse of time produces a very thin crop\nof final truths of last instance. In geology we are in a still more\nembarrassing situation for we are here involved in the study of\npreceding epochs in which, as a matter of fact, neither we ourselves\nnor any other human being ever existed. Here there is much labor spent\nin the harvesting of truths of last instance, and they are a scanty\ncrop withal.\n\nThe second division of knowledge is occupied in the investigation of\nliving organisms. In this field the changes and causalities are so\ncomplex that not only does the solution of each question bring about\nthe rise of an unlimited number of new questions, but the solution of\neach of these separate new questions depends upon years, frequently\ncenturies, of investigation, and can then be only partially completed.\nSo that the need of systematic arrangement of the various\ninterrelations continually surrounds the final truths of the last\ninstance with a prolific and spreading growth of hypotheses. Look at\nthe long succession of progressive steps from Galen to Malpighi\nnecessary to establish correctly so simple a thing as the circulation\nof the blood of mammals, yet how little we know of the origin of blood\ncorpuscles and how many mistakes we make in, for example, rationally\nconnecting the symptoms and cause of a disease. Besides there are\nfrequently discoveries like those of the cell which compel us to\nentirely revise all hitherto firmly established truth of the last\ninstance in biology, and to lay numbers of such truths aside for good\nand all. He who would therefore in this science undertake the\nproclamation of absolute and immutable truths must be content with\nsuch platitudes as the following: \"All men must die; all female\nmammals have mammary glands, etc.\" He will not even be able to say\nthat the greater animals digest their food by means of the stomach and\nbowels and not with the head because the centralised system of nerves\nin the head is not adapted to digestion.\n\nBut things are worse with regard to final truths of last instance in\nthe third group of sciences--the historical. These are concerned with\nthe conditions of human life, social conditions, forms of law and the\nstate with their idealistic superstructure of philosophy, religion,\nart, etc., in their historic succession and in their present day\nmanifestations. In organic nature we have at least to do with a\nsuccession of regular phenomena which regularly repeat themselves as\nfar as our immediate observation goes, within very wide limits.\nOrganic species have remained on the whole unaltered since the time of\nAristotle. In social history, on the other hand, repetitions of\nconditions are the exception, not the rule, directly we leave behind\nthe prehistoric conditions of humanity, the stone-age, so-called.\nWhere such repetitions do occur, moreover, they never recur under\nprecisely similar conditions, as for example the occurrence of early\ntribal communism among all peoples anterior to civilisation and the\nform of its break up. As regards human history, then, as far as\nscience is concerned, we are at a greater disadvantage than in\nbiology. Furthermore, when the intimate relations existing between a\nsocial and political phenomenon come to be recognised it is not, as a\nrule, perceived until the conditions are actually on the way to decay.\nKnowledge is therefore entirely relative, since it is limited to a\ngiven people and a given epoch, and their nature under transitory\nsocial and political forms, when it examines relations and forms\nconclusions. He who therefore is after final truths of last instance,\npure and immutable, will only manage to catch flat phrases and the\nmost arrant commonplaces, like these--man cannot, generally speaking,\nlive without working; up to the present men have for the most part\nbeen divided into masters and servants; Napoleon died on May 5th,\n1821, and things of that sort.\n\nIt is worth noting that in this department of knowledge pretended\nfinal truths of last instance are met with most frequently. Only the\nperson who wishes to show that there are eternal truth, eternal\nmorality, and eternal justice in human history, and that these are\nsimilar in scope and application to those of mathematics, will\nproclaim that twice two is four and that birds have beaks and the like\nto be eternal truths. We can also certainly rely upon the same friend\nof humanity taking the opportunity to explain that all former\ninventors of eternal truths have been more or less asses or\ncharlatans, that they have been circumscribed by error and have made\nmistakes. The fact of their error, however, is natural and proves the\nexistence of the truth, and that it can be reached, and the newly\narisen prophet has a ready-to-hand stock of final truths of last\ninstance, eternal law and eternal justice. This has happened hundreds,\nnay, thousands of times, so that it is a wonder that men are still\nsufficiently credulous to believe it not only of others, but even of\nthemselves. Here we find a prophet clad in the armour of righteousness\nwho proclaims in the old-fashioned way that whoever else may deny\nthere is still one left to declare final truths of last instance.\nDenial, nay, doubt even, is a weakness, barren confusion, mole-like\nscepticism, worse than blank nihilism, confusion worse confounded and\nother little amiabilities of this sort. As with all prophets, there is\nno scientific investigation, but merely off-hand condemnation.\n\nWe might have made mention of the sciences which investigate the laws\nof human thought, logic and dialectics. Here we are, however, no\nbetter off as regards eternal truths. Herr Duehring explains that the\ndialectic proper is pure nonsense, and the many books which have been\nand are still being written on logic prove clearly that final truths\nof last instance are more sparsely distributed than many believe.\n\nMoreover, we are not at all alarmed because the step of science upon\nwhich we to-day stand is not a bit more final than any of the\npreceding steps. Already it includes an immense amount of material for\ninvestigation and offers a great chance for specialisation and study\nto anyone who desires to become expert in any particular branch.\nWhoever expects to find final and immutable truths in observations\nwhich in the very nature of things must remain relative for successive\ngenerations, and can only be completed piecemeal, as in cosmogony,\ngeology and human history, which must always be incomplete owing to\nthe complexity of the historical material, shows perverse ignorance\neven where he does not, as in the present case, set up claims of\npersonal infallibility.\n\nTruth and error, like all such mutually antagonistic concepts, have\nonly an absolute reality under very limited conditions, as we have\nseen, and as even Herr Duehring should know by a slight acquaintance\nwith the first elements of dialectics, which show the insufficiency of\nall polar antagonisms. As soon as we bring the antagonism of truth and\nerror out of this limited field it becomes relative and is not\nserviceable for new scientific statements. If we should seek to\nestablish its reality beyond those limits we are at once confronted by\na dilemma, both poles of the antagonism come into conflict with their\nopposite; truth becomes error and error becomes truth. Let us take,\nfor example, the well-known Boyle's law, according to which, the\ntemperature remaining the same, the volume of the gas varies as the\npressure to which it is subjected. Regnault discovered that this law\ndoes not apply in certain cases. If he had been a realist-philosopher\nhe would have been obliged to say, \"Boyle's law is mutable, therefore\nit does not possess absolute truth, therefore it is untrue, therefore\nit is false.\" He would thus have made a greater error than that which\nwas latent in Boyle's law, his little particle of truth would have\nbeen drowned in a flood of error; he would in this way have elaborated\nhis correct result into an error compared with which Boyle's law with\nits particle of error fastened to it would have appeared as the truth.\nRegnault, scientist as he was, did not trouble himself with such\nchildish performances. He investigated further and found that Boyle's\nlaw is only approximately correct, having no validity in the case of\ngases which can be made liquid by pressure when the pressure\napproaches the point where liquefaction sets in. Boyle's law therefore\nis shown only to be true within specific bounds. But is it absolute, a\nfinal truth of last instance within specific bounds? No physicist\nwould say so. He would say that it is correct for certain gases and\nwithin certain limits of pressure and temperature, and even then\nwithin these somewhat narrow limits he would not exclude the\npossibility of a still narrower limitation or change in application as\nthe result of further investigation. This is how final truths of last\ninstance stand in physics, for example. Really scientific works as a\nrule avoid such dogmatic expressions as truth and error, but they are\nconstantly cropping up in works like the Philosophy of Reality, where\nmere loose talking vaunts itself the supreme result of sovereign\nthought.\n\nBut a naive reader may say, \"Where has Herr Duehring expressly stated\nthat the content of his philosophy of reality is final truth of the\nlast instance?\" Well, for example, in his dithyramb on his system\nwhich we quoted above, and again where he says \"Moral truths as far as\nthey are known are as sound as those of mathematics.\" Does not Herr\nDuehring explain that by reason of his powers of criticism and\nsearching investigations, the fundamental philosophy has been brought\nto light and that he has thus bestowed upon us final truths of last\ninstance? But if Herr Duehring does not set up such a claim either on\nhis own behalf or that of his time, if he says that some time in the\nmisty future final truths of last instance will be established, and\nthat therefore his own statements are merely accidental and confused,\na kind of \"mole-like scepticism\" and \"barren confusion,\" what is all\nthe fuss about, and what useful purpose is served by Herr Duehring?\n\nIf we gain no ground in the matter of truth and error we gain less in\nrespect of good and evil. Here we have an antagonism of ethical\nsignificance, and ethics is a department of human history in which\nfinal truths are but slight and few. From people to people, from age\nto age, there have been such changes in the ideas of good and evil\nthat these concepts are contradictory in different periods and among\ndifferent peoples. But some one may remark, \"Good is still not evil\nand evil is not good; if good and evil are confused all morality is\nabolished, and each may do what he will.\" When the rhetoric is\nstripped away this is the opinion of Herr Duehring. But the matter is\nnot to be disposed of so easily. If things were as easy as that there\nwould be no dispute about good and evil. Everybody would know what was\ngood and what was evil. How is it to-day, however? What system of\nethics is preached to us to-day? There is first the Christian-feudal,\na survival of the early days of faith, which is as a matter of fact\nsubdivided into Catholic and Protestant, of which there are still\nfurther subdivisions, from the Jesuit-Catholic and orthodox Protestant\nto loosely drawn ethical systems. There figure also the modern or\nbourgeois, and still further the proletarian future system of\nmorality, so that the progressive European countries alone present\nthree contemporaneous and coexistent actual theories of ethics. Which\nis the true one? No single one of them, regarded as a finality, but\nthat system assuredly possesses the most elements of truth which\npromises the longest duration, which existent in the present is also\ninvolved in the revolution of the future, the proletarian.\n\nBut if we now see that the three classes of modern society, the feudal\naristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the proletarian, have their\ndistinctive ethical systems, we can only conclude therefrom that\nmankind consciously or unconsciously shapes its moral views in\naccordance with the material facts upon which in the last instance the\nclass existence is based--upon the economic conditions under which\nproduction and exchange are carried on.\n\nBut in the three above mentioned systems of ethics there is much which\nis common to all three of them, and might not this at least constitute\na portion of an eternally stable system of ethics? These ethical\ntheories pass through three distinct steps in their historical\ndevelopment, they have therefore a common historical basis and hence\nnecessarily much in common. Further, for approximately similar\neconomic stages there must, necessarily be a coincidence of similar\nstages of economic development, and ethical theories must of necessity\ncoincide with a greater or less degree of closeness. From the very\nmoment when private property in movables developed there had to be\nethical sanctions of general effect in all communities in which\nprivate property prevailed, thus: Thou shalt not steal. Is this\ncommandment, then, an eternal commandment? By no means. In a society\nin which the motive for theft did not exist stealing would only be the\npractice of the weak-minded, and the preacher of morals who proclaimed\n\"Thou shalt not steal\" as an eternal commandment would only be laughed\nat for his pains.\n\nWe here call attention to the attempt to force a sort of moral\ndogmatism upon us as eternal, final, immutable moral law, upon the\npretext that the moral law is possessed of fixed principles which\ntranscend history and the variations of individual peoples. We state,\non the contrary, that up to the present time all ethical theory is in\nthe last instance a testimony to the existence of certain economic\nconditions prevailing in any community at any particular time. And in\nproportion as society developed class-antagonisms, morality became a\nclass morality and either justified the interests and domination of\nthe ruling class, or as soon as a subject class became strong enough\njustified revolt against the domination of the ruling class and the\ninterests of the subject class. That, by this means, there is an\nadvance made in morals as a whole, just as there is in all other\nbranches of human knowledge, there can be no doubt. But we have not\nyet advanced beyond class morals. Real human morality superior to\nclass morality and its traditions will not be possible until a stage\nin human history has been reached in which class antagonisms have not\nonly been overcome but have been forgotten as regards the conduct of\nlife. Now the colossal egotism of Herr Duehring may be understood when\nit is seen that, on the eve of a revolution which will bring about a\nstate of society devoid of classes, he claims from the midst of an old\nand class divided society to proclaim an eternal system of morals\nindependent of time and material change. He himself declares what up\nto the present has been hid from the rest of us that he understands\nthe structure of this future society at least as regards its salient\nfeatures.\n\nIn conclusion he makes a revelation which is essentially original but\nnone the less \"fundamental respecting the origin of evil.\" We have the\nfact that the type of the cat with its inherent treachery is pictured\nas the representative animal type, and this also displays a form of\ncharacter to be found also in man. There is no mystery then about evil\nif one can detect a mysticism in the cat or any other beast of prey.\nEvil is--the cat. Goethe was evidently wrong when he introduced\nMephistopheles as a black dog instead of a cat similarly colored. This\nis ethics suited not only to all worlds but to cats also.\n\n\n_Equality._\n\nBy dint of experience we have come to learn Herr Duehring's \"method.\"\nIt consists in separating each department of knowledge into what are\nassumed to be its most simple elements, then of making so called self\nevident axioms with regard to these simple elements, and thereupon\noperating with the results obtained in this way. Thus a sociological\nquestion is to be \"decided on simple axiomatic principles just as if\nit were a matter of elementary mathematics.\" Thus the application of\nthe mathematical method to history, ethics and law gives mathematical\ncertainty to the final results which appear as pure and immutable\ntruths.\n\nThis is only another form of the old ideological, _a priori_ method so\ncalled, which learned the properties of an object not from the object\nitself but derived them by proof from the concept of the object. First\nyou derive a concept of the object from the actual object, then you\nturn the spit and measure the object in terms of its derivative the\nconcept. The concept is not shaped after the pattern of the object but\nthe object after the pattern of the concept. In Herr Duehring's\nmethod, the simplest elements, the last abstractions to which he can\nattain do duty for the concept which is unchangeable, the simplest\nelements are under the best conditions purely imaginary in their\nnature. The philosophy of realism hence appears to be mere ideology,\nand has no derivation from real life but is absolutely dependent upon\nthe imagination. When such an ideologist proceeds to construct a\nsystem of morals and law from his concept of the so-called simplest\nelements of society instead of from the real social conditions of the\nmen about him, where does he get his material for construction? The\nmaterial evidently consists of two kinds--firstly, the slim vestiges\nof reality which are still present in every fundamental abstraction,\nand secondly in the actual content which our ideologist evolves from\nhis own consciousness. And what does he discover in his consciousness?\nFor the most part moral and ethical philosophic ideas and these\nconstitute an expression corresponding more or less closely, whether\npositive or negative, harmonious or hostile, with the social and\npolitical conditions which environ him. Besides he probably has\nnotions derived from literature pertaining to these conditions, and\nfinally he has possibly personal idiosyncrasies. Let our ideologist\ndodge all that he can, the historical reality which he has thrown out\nof doors comes in again at the window and although he may fancy that\nhe is employed in the manufacture of moral and legal doctrines good\nfor all worlds and all ages he is actually making a distorted,\ncounterfeit of the conservation or revolutionary tendencies of his\ntime, because torn from its real place, as things seen in a concave\nmirror are upside down.\n\nHerr Duehring therefore resolves society into its simplest elements\nand discovers accordingly that the most elementary society consists of\nat least two human beings. He thereupon operates with these two human\nbeings to produce his axiom. Then he delivers himself of the\nfundamental maxim of morals, \"Two human wills, as such, are entirely\nidentical, and the one can in consequence make no positive demands\nupon the other.\" Here the \"foundation of moral law\" is apparent, so\n\"in order to develop the principal concepts of justice we require two\nhuman beings under absolutely simple and elementary conditions.\"\n\nThat two human wills or two human beings are just alike is not only no\naxiom, it is a glaring exaggeration. In the first place two human\nbeings may differ as regards sex, and this simple fact shows us, if we\nlook at childhood for a moment, that the elements of society are not\ntwo men, but a little man and a little woman, which constitute a\nfamily, the simplest and earliest form of association for productive\npurposes. But Herr Duehring cannot by any means agree to this. On the\none hand the two constituents of society might very possibly be made\nalike and on the other Herr Duehring would not be able to construct\nthe moral and legal equality of man and woman from the original\nfamily. Therefore one of two things must take place. Either the\nmolecules of Herr Duehring's society from the multiplication of which\nall society is built up is merely _a priori_ and destined to fail,\nsince two men cannot produce a child, or we must consider them as two\nheads of families. In this case the entire foundation is made its very\nopposite. Instead of the equality of man we have at the most the\nequality of two heads of families, and since women are not\ncomprehended we have the consequent subjection of women.\n\nWe are sorry to warn the reader that these two notorious men cannot be\ngot rid of, for a long time. They take up in the realm of social\nconditions the role heretofore played by the dwellers in the other\nworld with whom it is to be hoped we have now finished. Should any\nquestion of political economy, of politics or any other such matter\nrequire solution, out come the two men and make the thing axiomatic\nforthwith. This is a remarkable, clever, and system-shaping discovery\nof our system-shaping philosopher. But to give the truth its due we\nare regretfully bound to say that he did not discover the two men.\nThey are common to the whole of the eighteenth century. They appear in\nRousseau's Treatise on Equality, 1754, where, by the way, they serve\nto prove axiomatically the direct opposite of Herr Duehring's\ncontentions. They play an important part in political economy from\nAdam Smith to Ricardo, but here they are so far unequal that they\nfollow different trades, principally hunting and fishing, and they\nexchange their mutual products. They serve through the entire\neighteenth century principally as mere illustrative examples, and the\noriginality of Herr Duehring consists in the fact that he elevates\nthis method of illustration to a fundamental method for all social\nscience and to a measure of all historical instruction. There is no\neasier way to arrive at \"a really scientific philosophy of things and\nmen.\"\n\nIn order to create the fundamental axiom the two men and their wills\nare mutually equal and neither has any right to lord it over the\nother. We cannot find two suitable men. They must be two men who are\nso free from all national, economic, political and religious\nconditions, from sex and personal peculiarities that nothing remains\nof either of them but the mere concept \"man\" and then they are\nentirely equal. They are therefore two fully-equipped ghosts conjured\nup by that very Herr Duehring who particularly ridicules and denounces\n\"spiritistic\" movements. These two phantoms must of course do all that\ntheir wizard wants of them and so their united productions are a\nmatter of complete indifference to the rest of the world.\n\nNow let us follow Herr Duehring's axiomatic utterances a little\nfurther. These two men cannot make positive demands upon each other.\nThe one who does so and enforces his demand thereupon performs an\nunjust act, and with this idea as a foundation Herr Duehring explains\nthe injustice, the tyranny, the servitude, in short all the evil\nhappenings of history up to the present time. Now Rousseau has in the\nwork above mentioned proved the contrary just as axiomatically, by\nmeans of two men. A. cannot forcibly enslave B. except by putting B.\nin a place where he cannot do without A. This is far too materialistic\nan idea for Herr Duehring. He has accordingly put the same matter\nsomewhat differently. Two shipwrecked men being by themselves on an\nisland form a society. Their wills are, theoretically speaking,\nentirely equal and this is acknowledged by both. But in reality the\ninequality is tremendous. A. is resolute and energetic, B. inert,\nirresolute and slack. A. is sharp, B. is stupid. How long will it be\nbefore A. imposes his will upon B., first by taking the upper hand,\nand keeping it habitually, under the pretence that B.'s submission is\nvoluntary. Whether the form of voluntariness continues or force is\nresorted to slavery still is slavery. Voluntary entering into a state\nof slavery lasted all through the Middle Ages in Germany up to the\nThirty Years War. When serfdom was abolished in Prussia after the\ndefeats of 1806 and 1807 and with it the duty of the nobility to take\ncare of their subjects in need, sickness and old age the peasants\nthereupon petitioned to be allowed to remain in slavery--for who would\ncare for them when they were in trouble? The concept of the two men is\njust as applicable to inequality and slavery as it is to equality and\nmutual aid, and since, under the penalty of extinction, men must\nassume the headship of a family, hereditary slavery may be foreseen in\nit.\n\nLet us put this view of the case on one side for a moment. We assume\nthat we are convinced by Herr Duehring's maxim and that we are zealous\nfor the full equalisation of the two wills, for the \"universal\nsovereignty of man\" for the \"sovereignty of the individual,\"\nmagnificent expressions, in comparison with which Stirner's\n\"individual\" with his private property is a mere bungler though he\nmight claim his modest part therein. Then we are all free and\nindependent. All? No, not even now. There are still \"occasional\ndependent relations\" but these are to be explained \"on grounds which\nmust be sought not in the action of two wills as such but in a third\nconsideration, in the case of children, for example, in the\ninadequateness of their self-assertion.\"\n\nIndeed, the foundations of independence are not to be sought in the\nrealisation of the two wills as such. Naturally not, since the\nrealisation of one of the wills is thus interfered with. But they must\nbe sought in a third direction. And what is the third direction? The\nactual fixing of a subjected will as an inadequate one. So far has our\nrealistic philosopher departed from reality that will, the real\ncontent, the characteristic determination of this will serves him as a\nthird ground, for abstract and indefinite speech. However this may be\nwe must agree that equality has its exceptions. It does not apply to a\nwill which is infected with inadequateness of self expression.\n\nFurther, \"Where the animal and the human are intermingled in one\nperson can one in the name of a second fully developed human being\ndemand the same actions as in the case of a single human being ... our\nsupposition is here of two morally unequal persons of which one has a\nshare of purely animal characteristics in a certain sense the typical\nfundamental conception which characterises the differences in and\nbetween groups of men.\" Now the reader may see by these modest excuses\nin which Herr Duehring turns and winds like a Jesuit priest to\nestablish a casuistical position, how far the human human can prevail\nover the bestial human, how far he can employ deceit, warlike, keen\nterrorising means of deceit against the latter without overstepping\nimmutable ethical bounds.\n\nTherefore, if two persons are \"morally unequal\" there is an end of\nequality. It was therefore not worth while to conjure up two fully\nequal men, since there are no two individuals who are morally equal.\nBut inequality consists in this that one is a human being and the\nother has some part of the animal in his composition. It is evident\nthat since man is descended from the animal creation he is not free\nfrom animality. So that as regards man degrees of animality can only\nbe differentiated to a greater or less degree. A division of men into\ntwo sharply differentiated groups, into humans and human beasts, into\ngood and bad, into sheep and goats, even Christianity, let alone the\nrealist philosophy, is aware, implies a judge who makes the\ndistinction. But who shall be judge as regards the realist philosophy?\nWe must follow the practice of Christians according to which the pious\nlittle sheep undertake to act as judges of the universe against their\nunworthy neighbors the goats, with results which are too well known.\nThe sect of the realist philosophers supposing it ever comes into\nexistence will certainly not give up anything quietly. This is indeed\na matter of small concern to us but we are interested in the\nconfession that as a conclusion of the moral inequality between men\nequality no longer exists.\n\nAgain \"If the one acted in accordance with truth and science but the\nother in accordance with a superstition or prejudice a mutual\ndisagreement would generally occur. At a certain stage of incapacity\nbarbarism or an evil tendency of character must in all circumstances\nproduce an antagonism. Force is the last resort not alone with\nchildren and incapables. The peculiar characteristics of whole classes\nof men, whether in a state of nature or civilised, may render\nnecessary the subjection of their inimical will, due to their own\nimpotency, in order to bring them into harmony with social\narrangements. But such a man has challenged his own equality by the\nperversity of his inimical and hurtful actions, and if he suffers at\nthe hands of a superior force he only reaps the recoil of his own\nactions.\"\n\nThus not only moral but spiritual inequality is sufficiently potent to\ndo away with the \"full equality\" of two wills and to furnish an\nethical rule by which all the shameful acts of civilised plundering\nstates against backward peoples down to the atrocities of the Russians\nin Turkestan may be justified. When General Kaufmann, in the summer of\n1873, fell upon the Tartar tribes of the Jomuden, burnt their tents,\nmowed down their wives and families, as the command ran, he explained\nthat the destruction was due to the perversity, the inimical minds of\nthe people of the Jomuden, and was employed for the purpose of\nbringing them back to the social order, and the means used by him had\nbeen the most efficient.\n\nBut he who wills the end wills also the means. But he was not so cruel\nas to insult the Jomuden people in addition and to say that he\nmassacred them in the name of equality, that he considered their wills\nequal to his own. And again in this conflict the select, those who\npose as champions of truth and science, the realist philosophers in\nthe last instance must be able to distinguish superstition, prejudice,\nbarbarism, evil tendencies of character, and when force and subjection\nare necessary to bring about equality. So that equality now means\nequalisation by means of force, and the will of one recognises the\nwill of the other as equal by overthrowing it.\n\nThe phrase that an external will in its bringing about equalisation by\nforce is only to be regarded as producing equality is nothing but a\ndistortion of the Hegelian theory that punishment is a right of the\ncriminal. \"That punishment is to be regarded as implying a right to it\nin accordance with which the criminal is respected as a rational\nbeing.\" (Rechtsphil, 100.)\n\nWe may pause here. It would be superfluous to follow Herr Duehring any\nfurther in the piecemeal destruction of his axiomatically established\nequality, universal human sovereignty, etc., to observe how he brings\nsociety into existence with two men and produces yet a third in order\nto establish the state, because to put the matter briefly, no majority\ncan be had without the third, and without him, that is, without the\ndomination of the majority over the minority, no state can exist.\nThere is no need either for us to observe how he launches his future\nsocial state on the more peaceful waters of construction, where we may\nhave the honor some fine morning of beholding it. We have seen so far\nthat the complete equality of two wills only exists as long as they do\nnot will anything. That as soon as they cease to become human wills as\nsuch and to be converted into real individual wills, into wills of\nreal persons, that is, equality ceases; that childhood, idiocy,\nanimality so called, superstition, prejudice, supposed lack of power\non the one hand and supposed humanity and insight into truth and\nscience on the other hand, that therefore every difference in the\nquality of the two wills and in the degree of intelligence\naccompanying it justifies an inequality which may go as far as\nsubjection. Why should we seek further since Herr Duehring has brought\nhis own edifice of equality which he so laboriously constructed\ntumbling to the ground?\n\nBut if we are now prepared to meet Herr Duehring's silly and\nincompetent consideration of equality of rights we are not yet ready\nto take issue with the idea itself which through the influence of\nRousseau has played a theatrical part, and since the days of the great\nRevolution a practical and political part, and now plays no\ninsignificant role in the agitation carried on by the socialist\nmovement of all countries. The establishment of its scientific\nsoundness has a value for the proletarian agitation.\n\nThe idea that all men have something in common as men and that they\nare equal with respect to that common quality is naturally older than\nhistory. But the modern doctrine of equality is something quite\ndifferent than that. This derives from the property of humanity,\ncommon to man, the equality of man, as man, or at least of all\ncitizens of a given state or of all members of a given society. Until\nthe conclusion of equality of rights in the state and society was\ndeduced from the original notion of relative equality, and until this\nconclusion was to be stated as something natural and self evident,\nmany thousands of years had to pass and indeed have passed. In the\noldest and most elementary communities it may be said that equality of\nrights among the members existed in the highest degree, women, slaves,\nand foreigners, however, being excluded. Among the Greeks and Romans\ninequality existed to a greater degree. Greeks and barbarians, freemen\nand slaves, citizens and subjects, Roman citizens and Roman subjects\n(to employ a comprehensive expression) that these should have any\nclaim to equality of political rights would have been regarded by the\nancients necessarily as madness. Under the Roman Empire there was a\ncomplete elimination of all these distinctions with the exception of\nthose of freemen and slaves. There arose therefore as far as the\nfreemen were concerned that equality of private individuals upon which\nRoman law was founded and developed as the most perfect system of\njurisprudence based on private property with which we are acquainted.\nBut while the contradiction of freemen and slaves existed there could\nbe no statement based upon the universal equality of man as such, as\nwas recently shown in the slave states of the Northern American Union.\n\nChristianity recognised one equality on the part of all men, that of\nan equal taint of original sin, which entirely corresponded with its\ncharacter as a religion of slaves and the oppressed. In the next place\nit recognised completely the equality of the elect but it only\ndeclared this at the beginning of its teaching. The traces of common\nproperty in possessions which may be found occasionally in the\nearliest days of the religion was based rather upon the mutual\nassistance which persecuted people hold out to each other, than upon\nany real concepts of human equality. Very soon the establishment of\nthe antithesis between the priesthood and the laity put an end to even\nthis expression of Christian equality. The inundation of Western\nEurope by the Germans abolished for centuries all concepts of equality\nby the creation of a universal, social and political gradation of rank\nof a much more complicated nature than had existed up to that time.\nContemporaneously with this Western and Middle Europe entered upon a\nhistorical development, shaped for the first time a compact\ncivilisation, and a system which was on the one hand dynamic and on\nthe other conservative, the leading national states. Thereupon a soil\nwas prepared for the declaration of the equality of human rights so\nrecently made.\n\nThe feudal middle ages moreover developed the class in its womb\ndestined to be the apostle of the modern agitation for equality, the\nbourgeois class. In the beginning even under the feudal system the\nbourgeois class had developed the prevalent hand-industry and the\nexchange of products even within feudal society to a high degree\nconsidering the circumstances, until with the close of the fifteenth\ncentury the great discoveries of lands beyond the seas opened before\nit a new and individual course. The trade beyond Europe which up to\nthat time had been carried on between the Italians and the Levant was\nnow extended to America and the Indies and soon exceeded in amount the\nreciprocal trade of the European countries as well as the internal\ncommerce of any particular land. American gold and silver flooded\nEurope and like a decomposing element penetrated all the fissures,\ncrevices and pores of feudal society. The system of hand-labor was no\nlonger sufficient for the growing demand, it was replaced by\nmanufacture in the leading industries of the most highly developed\npeoples.\n\nA corresponding change in the political structure followed this\npowerful revolution in the economic conditions of society but by no\nmeans immediately. The organisation of the State remained feudal in\nform while society became more and more bourgeois. Trade, particularly\ninternational, and to a greater degree world-commerce demanded for its\ndevelopment the free and unrestricted possessors of commodities, who\nhave equality of right to exchange commodities at least in one and the\nsame place. The transition from hand labor to manufacture presupposes\nthe existence of a number of free laborers, free on the one hand from\nthe fetters of the gild and on the other free to employ their labor\nforce in their own behalf, who could make contracts for the hire of\ntheir labor force to the manufacturers and therefore face him as if\nendowed with equal rights as contracting parties. At last then there\narose equality of rights and actual equality of all human labor, for\nlabor force finds its unconscious but strongest expression in the law\nof value of modern bourgeois economy according to which the value of a\ncommodity finds its measure in the socially necessary labor\nincorporated in it. But where the economic circumstances render\nfreedom and equality of rights necessary, the political code, gild\nrestrictions and peculiar privileges oppose them at every step. Local\nprovisions of a legal character, differential taxation, exceptional\nlaws of every description, interfere not only with foreigners or\ncolonials but frequently enough also with whole categories of citizens\nin the nation itself. Gild privileges in particular constituted a\ncontinual impediment to the development of manufacture. The course was\nnowhere open and the chances of the bourgeois victory were by no means\nequal, but to make the course open was the first and ever more\npressing necessity.\n\nAs soon as the demand for the abolition of feudalism and for the\nequality of rights was set on the order of the day it had necessarily\nto take an ever widening scope. As soon as the claim was made in\nbehalf of commerce and industry it had also to be made in behalf of\nthe peasants who, being in every stage of slavery from serfdom labored\nfor the most part without any return for the feudal lords and were\nobliged in addition to perform innumerable services for them and for\nthe State. Also it became desirable to abolish feudal privileges, the\nimmunity of the nobility from taxation, and the superiority which\nattached to a certain status. And as men no longer lived in a world\nempire like the Roman, but in an independent system with states which\napproximated to a similar degree of bourgeois development and which\nhad intercourse with one another on an equal footing, the demand took\non necessarily a universal character reaching beyond the individual\nstate, and freedom and equality were thus proclaimed as human rights.\nBut as regards the special bourgeois character of these human rights,\nit is significant that the American Constitution which was the first\nto recognise these rights of man in the same breath established\nslavery among the colored people: class privileges were cursed, race\nprivileges were blessed.\n\nAs is well known, the bourgeois class as soon as it escaped from the\ndomination of the ruling class in the cities, by which process the\nmedieval stage passes into the modern, has been steadily and\ninevitably dogged by a shadow, the proletariat. So also the bourgeois\ndemands for equality are accompanied by the proletarian demands for\nequality. Directly the demand for the abolition of class privileges\nwas made by the bourgeois there succeeded the proletarian demand for\nthe abolition of classes themselves. This was first made in a\nreligious form and was based upon early Christianity, but later\nderived its support from the bourgeois theories of equality. The\nproletarians take the bourgeois at their word, they demand the\nrealisation of equality not merely apparently, not merely in the\nsphere of government but actually in the sphere of society and\neconomics. Since the French bourgeoisie of the great Revolution placed\nequality in the foreground of their movement, the French proletariat\nhas answered it blow for blow with the demand for social and economic\nequality, and equality has become the special battle cry of the French\nproletariat.\n\nThe demand for equality as made by the proletariat has a double\nsignificance. Either it is, as was particularly the case at first, in\nthe Peasants' War, for example, a natural reaction against social\ninequalities which were obvious, against the contrast between rich and\npoor, masters and slaves, luxurious and hungry, and as such it is\nsimply an expression of revolutionary instinct finding its\njustification in that fact and in that fact alone. On the other hand\nit may arise from reaction against the bourgeois claims of equality\nfrom which it deduces more or less just and far reaching claims,\nserves as a means of agitation to stir the workers, by means of a cry\nadopted by the capitalists themselves, against the capitalists, and in\nthis case stands or falls with bourgeois equality itself. In both\ncases the real content of the proletarian claims of equality is the\nabolition of classes. Every demand for equality transcending this is\nof necessity absurd. We have already given examples and can furnish\nmany more when we come to consider Herr Duehring's prophecies of the\nfuture.\n\nSo the notion of equality, in its proletarian as well as in its\nbourgeois form, is itself a historic product. Certain circumstances\nwere required to produce it and these in their turn proceeded from a\nlong anterior history. It is therefore anything but an eternal truth.\nAnd if the public regards it as self-evident in one sense or another\nif it, as Marx remarks \"already occupies the position of a popular\nprejudice\" it is not due to its being an axiomatic truth but to the\nuniversal broadening of conception in accordance with the spirit of\nthe eighteenth century. If Herr Duehring then can set up his two\nfamous men in housekeeping on the grounds of equality, it is apparent\nthat the prejudices of the mass of men in its favor is an antecedent\ncondition. In fact Herr Duehring calls his philosophy the \"natural\"\nbecause it proceeds from generally recognised things, which appear to\nhim to be entirely natural. But why they seem to him to be natural he\ndoes not take the trouble to enquire.\n\n\n_Freedom and Necessity._\n\n(The former part of this section is taken up with a criticism of Herr\nDuehring's knowledge of law of which he had boasted. It is a purely\ntechnical discussion and is of merely local interest. Having disposed\nof Duehring's juristic claims Engels proceeds to discuss \"Freedom and\nNecessity\" as follows.)\n\nOne cannot deal properly with the question of morals and law without a\ndiscussion of free will, human responsibility, and the limits of\nnecessity and freedom. The realistic philosophy has not only one but\ntwo solutions of these questions.\n\n\"One must substitute for false theories of freedom the actual\nconditions in which reason on the one hand and instinct on the other\nunite upon a middle ground. The fundamental facts of this sort of\ndynamics are to be learned from observation and as regards the\ncalculation in advance of phenomena which have not yet occurred, we\nmust judge of them in general terms according to their special\nqualities. In this way the silly speculations with respect to the\nfreedom of the will which have wasted thousands of years are not only\nentirely removed but are replaced by something positive, something\nuseful for practical life.\" So freedom of the will consists in this\nthat reason impels men to the right and irrationality to the left and\naccording to this parallelogram of forces the true direction is that\nof the diagonal. Freedom would therefore be the average between\ninsight and impulse, between understanding and lack of understanding,\nand its degree would to use an astronomical expression be empirically\nestablished by the \"personal equation.\" But a few pages later we read\n\"We establish moral responsibility upon freedom by which we only mean\nsusceptibility to known motives according to the measure of natural\nand acquired reason. All such motives in spite of antagonism realise\nthemselves in action with the inevitability of natural law, but we\ncount upon this inevitable necessity when we deal with morals.\"\n\nThis second definition of freedom which is quite opposed to the first\nis nothing but a very weak paraphrase of Hegel's notions on the\nsubject. Hegel was the first man to make a proper explanation of the\nrelations of freedom and necessity. In his eyes freedom is the\nrecognition of necessity. \"Necessity is blind only in so far as it is\nnot understood.\" Freedom does not consist in an imaginary independence\nof natural laws but in a knowledge of these laws and in the\npossibility thence derived of applying them intelligently to given\nends. This is true both as regards the laws of nature and of those\nwhich control the spiritual and physical existence of man\nhimself,--two classes of laws which we can distinguish as an\nabstraction but not in reality. Freedom of the will consists in\nnothing but the ability to come to a decision when one is in\npossession of a knowledge of the facts. The freer the judgment of a\nman then in relation to a given subject of discussion so much the more\nnecessity is there for his arrival at a positive decision. On the\nother hand lack of certainty arising from ignorance which apparently\nchooses voluntarily between many different and contradictory\npossibilities of decision shows thereby its want of freedom, its\ncontrol by things which it should in reality control. Freedom,\ntherefore, consists in mastery over ourselves and external nature\nfounded upon knowledge of the necessities of nature, it is, therefore,\nnecessarily a product of historical development. The first human\nbeings to become differentiated from the lower animals were in all\nessentials as devoid of freedom as these animals themselves but each\nstep in human development was a step towards freedom. At the threshold\nof human history stands the discovery of the transformation of\nmechanical motion in heat, the generation of fire by friction; at the\nclose of development up to the present stands the discovery of the\ntransformation of heat into mechanical motion, the steam engine. In\nspite of the tremendous revolution in the direction of freedom which\nthe steam engine has produced in society it is not yet half complete.\nThere is no question that the production of fire by friction still\nsurpasses it as an agent in the liberation of humanity. Because the\nproduction of fire by friction for the first time gave man power over\nthe forces of nature and separated him for ever from the lower\nanimals. The steam engine can never bridge so wide a chasm. It appears\nhowever as the representative of all those productive forces by the\nhelp of which alone a state of society is rendered possible in which\nno class subjection or pain will be produced by reason of the lack of\nmeans for the sustenance of the individual, in which moreover it will\nbe possible to speak of real human freedom as arising from living in\naccordance with the recognised laws of nature. But considering the\nyouth of humanity it would be absurd to wish to impute any universal\nabsolute validity to our present philosophical views, and it follows\nfrom the mere facts that the whole of history up to the present time\nis to be regarded as the history of the period extending from the time\nof the practical discovery of the transformation of mechanical\nmovement into heat to that of the transformation of heat into\nmechanical movement.\n\n(The above constitutes a reply to the view which regards history\nsimply as the record of human error and is followed by a discussion of\nDuehring's opinions in that regard.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE DIALECTIC\n\n\n_Quantity and Quality._\n\n(Here Herr Duehring contends \"The first and most important statement\nwith respect to the foundation logical properties of existence points\nto the exclusion of contradiction. Contradiction is a category which\ncan belong to thought alone but which can pertain to nothing real.\nThere are no contradictions in things; in other words the law of\ncontradiction is itself the crowning point of absurdity.\" To which\nEngels replies as follows):\n\nThe thought content of the foregoing passages is contained in the\nstatement that contradiction is an absurdity and cannot occur in the\nactual world. This statement will have for people of average common\nsense the same self-evident truth as to say that straight cannot be\ncrooked nor crooked straight. But the differential calculus shows in\nspite of all the protests of common sense that under certain\nconditions straight and crooked are identical, and reaches thereby a\nconclusion which is not in harmony with the common sense view of the\nabsurdity of there being any identity between straight and crooked.\nConsidering moreover the significant role which the so called\nDialectic of the Contradiction played in the ancient Greek philosophy,\na stronger opponent than Herr Duehring would be obliged to meet it\nwith better arguments than a mere affirmation and a number of\nepithets.\n\nAs long as we regard things as static and without life, each by\nitself, separately, we do not run against any contradictions in them.\nWe find certain qualities sometimes common, sometimes distinctive,\noccasionally contradictory, but in this last case they belong to\ndifferent objects and are hence not self contradictory. While we\nfollow this method we pursue the ordinary metaphysical method of\nthought. But it is quite different when we consider things in their\nmovement, in their change, their life and their mutually reciprocal\nrelations. Then we come at once upon contradictions. Motion is itself\na contradiction since simple mechanical movement from place to place\ncan only accomplish itself by a body being at one and the same moment\nin one place and simultaneously in another place by being in one and\nthe same place and yet not there. And motion is just the continuous\nestablishing and dissolving the contradiction.\n\nHere we have a contradiction which is \"objective, and so to speak\ncorporeal in things and events.\" And what does Herr Duehring say about\nit? He affirms that \"in rational mechanics there is no bridge between\nthe strictly static and the dynamic.\" Finally the reader is able to\nsee that there is behind this pretty little phrase of Herr Duehring\nnothing more than this--that the metaphysical mode of thought can\nabsolutely not pass from the idea of rest to that of motion because\nthe aforesaid contradiction intervenes. Motion is absolutely\ninconceivable to the metaphysician, because a contradiction. And as he\naffirms the inconceivability of motion he admits the existence of this\ncontradiction against his will and therefore admits that it\nconstitutes an objective contradiction in actual facts and events, and\nis moreover an actual fact.\n\nBut if simple mechanical motion contains a contradiction in itself\nstill more so do the higher forms of motion of matter and to a high\ndegree organic life and its development. We saw above that life\nconsists chiefly in this that a being is at one and the same time\nitself and something different. Life itself then is likewise a\ncontradiction contained in things and events, always establishing and\ndissolving itself, and as soon as the contradiction ceases life also\nceases, death comes on the scene. Thus we saw also that we cannot put\nan end to the Contradictions in the realm of thought, and how for\nexample the contradiction between the intrinsically unlimited\npossibilities of human knowledge and its actual existence in the\npersons of human beings with limited faculties and powers of\nknowledge, is dissolved in the, for us at least, practically endless\nprogression of the race, in unending progress.\n\nWe stated just now that higher mathematics holds as one of its basic\nprinciples that straight and crooked may be identical under certain\ncircumstances. It shows another contradiction, that lines which\napparently intersect yet are parallel from five to six centimeters\nfrom the point of intersection, should be such as should never\nintersect although indefinitely produced, and yet, notwithstanding\nthese and even greater contradictions, it produces not only correct\nresults but results which are unattainable by lower mathematics.\n\nBut even in the latter there is a host of contradictions. It is a\ncontradiction, for example, that a root of A should be and actually is\na power of A. A to the power of one-half equals the square root of A.\nIt is contradiction that a negative magnitude should be the square of\nanything, since every negative magnitude multiplied by itself gives a\npositive square. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a\ncontradiction but an absurd contradiction, a veritable absurdity. And\nyet the square root of minus one is in many instances the necessary\nresult of correct mathematical operations, nay further, where would\nmathematics higher or lower be if one were forbidden to operate with\nthe square root of minus one.\n\nMathematics itself enters the realm of the dialectic and significantly\nenough it was a dialectic philosopher, Descartes, who introduced this\nprogressiveness into mathematics. As is the relation of the\nmathematics of variable magnitudes to that of invariable quantities,\nso is the relation of the dialectic method of thought to the\nmetaphysical. This does not prevent the great majority of\nmathematicians from only recognising the dialectic in the realms of\nmathematics, a condition of things satisfactory to those who operate\nin the antiquated, limited, metaphysical fashion by methods attained\nby means of the dialectic.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n(Duehring having made an attack upon Marx's \"Capital\" because of its\nreliance upon the dialectic, and having indulged in the epithets to\nwhich he is too prone with respect to this work, Engels takes up its\ndefence in that respect as follows):\n\nIt is not our business to concern ourselves at this point with the\ncorrectness or incorrectness of the investigations of Marx as regards\neconomics, but only with the application which he makes of the\ndialectic method. So much is certain, that it is only now that the\nreaders of \"Capital\" will by the aid of Herr Duehring understand what\nthey have read properly, and among them Herr Duehring himself, who in\nthe year 1867 was still in a position, as far as possible to a man of\nhis calibre, to review the book rationally. He did not then, it may be\nnoted, first translate the arguments of Marx into Duehringese, as now\nseems indispensable to him. Even if he at that time made the blunder\nof identifying the Marxian dialectic with that of Hegel he had not\naltogether lost the ability to distinguish methods from the results\nattained by them and to comprehend that an abuse of the former is no\ncontradiction of the latter.\n\nHerr Duehring's most astonishing observation is that from the Marxian\nstandpoint, \"in the last analysis everything is identical,\" that\ntherefore in the eyes of Marx, for example, capitalists and wage\nworkers, feudal, capitalistic and social methods of production are\n\"all one.\" In order to show the possibility of such sheer stupidity it\nonly remains to point out that the mere word \"dialectic\" makes Herr\nDuehring mentally irresponsible and makes what he says and does so\ninaccurate and confused as to be in the last analysis \"all one.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n(Herr Duehring remarks, \"How comical for example is the declaration\nbased upon Hegel's confused notions that quantity becomes lost in\nquality and that money advanced [i.e. for productive purposes. Ed.]\nbecomes capital when it reaches a certain limit merely through\nquantitative increase.\" To which Engels replies thus):\n\nThis seems peculiar when presented in this washed out fashion by Herr\nDuehring. On page 313 (2nd ed. \"Capital\") Marx, after an investigation\nof fixed and variable capital and surplus value, derives from his\ninvestigations the conclusion that \"not every amount of gold or value\ncapable of being transformed into capital is so transformed; rather a\ncertain minimum of gold or of exchange value is presupposed to be in\nthe possession of the individual owner of gold or goods.\" He thereupon\ngives an example, thus, in a branch of industry the worker works eight\nhours per day for himself, i.e. in order to produce the value of his\nwages, and the following four hours for the capitalist in producing\nsurplus value to go into their pockets. One must have sufficient\nvalues to permit of the setting up of two workmen with raw material,\nmeans of labor and wages, in order to live as well as a workman. But\nsince capitalistic production is not undertaken for mere livelihood\nbut for increase of wealth, our individual with his two workmen would\nstill be no capitalist. If he lives twice as well as an ordinary\nworkman and transforms half of the surplus value produced into capital\nhe will have to employ eight workmen and possess four times the\naforementioned amount of value, and only after this and other examples\nfor the purpose of illustrating and establishing the fact that not\nevery small amount of value can effect a transformation of itself into\ncapital, but that each period of industrial development and each\nbranch of industry has its own minimum, fixed, Marx remarks \"Here, as\nin nature, the correctness of the law of logic, as discovered by\nHegel, is established--that mere quantitative changes at a certain\npoint suddenly take on qualitative differences.\"\n\nOne may remark the elevated and dignified fashion in which Duehring\nmakes Marx say the exact opposite of what he did say. Marx says \"The\nfact that a given amount of value can only transform itself into\ncapital as soon as it has attained a definite minimum, varying with\ncircumstances, in each individual case,--this fact is proof of the\ncorrectness of the law of Hegel. Herr Duehring makes him say \"Because,\naccording to the law of Hegel, quantity is transformed into quality\ntherefore 'a sum of money when it has reached a certain amount becomes\ncapital.'\" He says just the opposite.\n\nWe have seen above in the Scheme of the Universe that Herr Duehring\nhad the misfortune to acknowledge and apply, in a weak moment, this\nHegelian system of calculation, according to which at a given point\nquantitative changes suddenly become qualitative. We then gave one of\nthe best known examples, that of the transformation of the form of\nwater which at 0 deg. C. changes from a liquid to solid and at 100 deg. C.\nfrom liquid to gaseous, where thus at both these points of departure a\nmere quantitative change in temperature produces a qualitative change\nin the water.\n\nWe might have cited from nature and human society a hundred more such\nfacts in proof of this law, thus the whole fourth section of Marx's\n\"Capital\" entitled \"Production of Relative Surplus Value in the realm\nof co-operative industry, the Division of Labor, and Manufacture,\nMachinery and the Great Industry,\" goes to show innumerable instances\nin which qualitative change alters the quantity of the thing, and\nwhere also, to use Herr Duehring's exceedingly odious expression,\nquantity is converted and transformed into quality. So also the mere\ncooperation of large numbers, the melting of several diverse crafts\ninto one united craft, to use Marx's expression, produces a new\n\"industrial power\" which is substantially different from the sum of\nthe individual crafts.\n\nMarx, in the interest of the entire truth, has remarked, in complete\ncontrast to the perverted style of Herr Duehring \"The molecular theory\nemployed in modern chemistry, first scientifically developed by\nLaurent and Gerhardt, rests upon no other law.\" But what does Herr\nDuehring care for that? He knows that \"the eminently modern\nconstructive elements of scientific thought make just the same mistake\nas was made by Marx and his rival Lassalle; half-knowledge and a touch\nof pseudo-philosophy furnish the tools necessary for a display of\nlearning.\" While with Herr Duehring \"elevated notions of exact\nknowledge in mechanics, physics and chemistry\" are, as we have seen,\nthe foundations. But that the public may be in a position to decide we\nshall examine somewhat more closely the example cited by Marx in his\nnote.\n\nHere we have, for example, the homologous series of compounds of\ncarbon of which many are known and each has its own algebraic formula.\nIf we, for example, according to the practice of chemistry, represent\nan atom of carbon by C, an atom of hydrogen by H, an atom of oxygen by\nO and the number of atoms contained in each combination of carbon by\nn, we can express the molecular formula of each one of this series\nthus,\n\nC_{n}H_{2n+2}--Series of normal paraffin.\n\nC_{n}H_{2n+2}O--Series of primary alcohol.\n\nC_{n}H_{2n}O_{2}--Series of the monobasic oleic acids.\n\nLet us take, for example, the last of this series and set one after\nthe other n = 1, n = 2, etc., we get the following results omitting\nthe compounds.\n\nCH_{2}O_{2}--Formic Acid--boiling point 100 deg.--melting point 1 deg.\n\nC_{2}H_{4}O_{2}--Acetic Acid--boiling point 118 deg.--melting point\n17 deg.\n\nC_{3}H_{6}O_{2}--Propionic Acid--boiling point 140 deg.--melting point--.\n\nC_{4}H_{8}O_{2}--Butyric Acid--boiling point 162 deg.--melting point--.\n\nC_{5}H_{10}O_{2}--Valerianic Acid--boiling point 175 deg.--melting\npoint--.\n\nAnd so on to C_{30}H_{60}O_{2}, Melissic Acid, which melts first at\n180 deg., and which has no boiling point, because it does not evaporate\nwithout splitting up.\n\nHere we see therefore a whole series of qualitatively different\nbodies, produced by single quantitative additions of the elements and\nalways in the same proportions. This occurs absolutely where all\nelements of the combinations change their quantity in the same\nproportions, so with normal paraffin, C_{n}H_{2n} + 2: the lowest is\nCH_{4} a gas, the highest known is C_{16}H_{34}, a body forming a hard\ncolorless crystal which melts at 21 deg. and boils at 278 deg. In both the\nseries each new step is reached through the introduction of CH_{2}, an\natom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen, to the molecular form of the\npreceding step, and this quantitative change in the molecular form\nbrings about a qualitatively different body.\n\nThese series are merely obvious examples. Almost universally in\nchemistry, particularly in the different oxides of nitrogen, in the\noxi-acids of phosphorus or sulphur, one can see how \"quantity suddenly\nchanges into quality\" and how this so called \"confused Hegelianism\"\nis, so to speak, inherent in things and events, and no one is ever\nconfused or beclouded by it, except Herr Duehring. If Marx is the\nfirst to observe this, and if Herr Duehring points this out, without\nunderstanding it (since he could not let so unheard of a crime pass),\nhe should explain which of the two, Marx or Duehring, is without\nelementary conceptions of natural science and the established\nprinciples of chemistry, and do it without boasting about his own\nideas on natural philosophy.\n\nIn conclusion, let us call attention to a witness on the change of\nquantity into quality, namely Napoleon. He describes the conflicts\nbetween the French cavalry, bad riders but disciplined, with the\nMamelukes who, as regards single combat were better horsemen but\nundisciplined, as follows--\"Two Mamelukes were a match for three\nFrenchmen, one hundred Mamelukes were equal to one hundred Frenchmen,\nthree hundred Frenchmen could beat three hundred Mamelukes and a\nthousand Frenchmen invariably defeated fifteen hundred Mamelukes.\"\nJust as in the statement of Marx, that a certain amount of money,\nvariable in amount, is necessary as a minimum, to make its\ntransformation into capital possible, so, according to Napoleon, a\ncertain minimum number of cavalrymen is required to bring into being\nthe force of discipline inherent in military organisation, to make\nthem evidently superior to greater numbers of individually better\nriders and fighters, cavalry at least as brave, though irregular. But\nwhat effect has this argument on Herr Duehring? Was not Napoleon\nutterly defeated in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer defeat\nafter defeat? And why? Simply as a result of his introduction of\nconfused Hegelian ideas into cavalry tactics.\n\n\n_Negation of the Negation._\n\n\"The historical sketch (of the so called original accumulation of\ncapital in England) is comparatively the best part of Marx's book and\nit would be even better if it had been developed scientifically and\nnot by means of the Dialectic. The Hegelian negation of the negation\nis called upon to serve here as a midwife, in default of anything\nbetter and clearer, and by means of it the future is brought into\nexistence from the present. The abolition of private property which is\nshown to have been going on since the sixteenth century is the first\nnegation. Another negation must follow which is characterised as the\nnegation of the negation and therefore the restoration of individual\nprivate property, but in a higher form, founded on the common\nownership of land and instruments of labor. If this new 'individual\nprivate property' is called also 'social property' by Herr Marx, the\nhigher Hegelian unity is here manifested in which the contradiction\nwill be destroyed, that is, in accordance with this juggling of words,\nbe destroyed and preserved.... The dispossession of the dispossessor\nis, as it were, in this case the automatic product of historical\nreality in its material external form.... It would be difficult for a\ncautious man to convince himself of the necessity of communism in land\nand property on the credit of Hegel's shiftiness, of which the\nnegation of the negation is an example.... The confusion of the\nMarxian philosophic notions will not be strange to him who knows what\ncan be done by means of the Hegelian dialectic or rather what cannot\nbe done. For those who do not know the trick, it must be noted that\nthe first negation of Hegel is the teaching of the catechism with\nrespect to the Fall, and the second is a higher unity leading to the\nRedemption. On these analogies, which pertain to religion no logic of\nfacts can be established.... Herr Marx consoles himself in the midst\nof his simultaneously individual and social property and leaves his\ndisciples to solve his profound dialectic puzzle.\" (Thus far Herr\nDuehring is quoted.)\n\nSo Marx cannot prove the necessity of the social revolution, the\nrestoration of a common property in land and the means of production,\nexcept by a reliance upon Hegel's negation of the negation. And, since\nhe founds his socialistic theories upon analogies pertaining to\nreligion, he comes to the conclusion that in future society a\nsimultaneously individual and social property will prevail, as the\nHegelian higher unity of the contradiction destroyed.\n\nLet us leave the negation of the negation for a little and look at\n\"the coexistent individual and social property.\" This will be called\nby Herr Duehring a \"cloud realm,\" and, strange to say he is really\nright in this regard. But sad to say it is not Marx who is found to be\nin the cloud realm but on the contrary Herr Duehring himself. Since by\nvirtue of his wonderful versatility in the vagaries of Hegel he does\nnot experience any difficulty in telling us the necessary contents of\nthe as yet unpublished volume of \"Capital,\" so, after setting Hegel\nright, he is able to correct Marx without any trouble in that he\nascribes to him a higher unity of a private property of which Marx has\nnot said a word.\n\nMarx says \"It is the negation of the negation. This reestablishes\nprivate property but on the basis of the acquisitions of the\ncapitalistic era, of the cooperation of free laborers and their common\nownership of the land and the means of production. The transformation\nof the private property of individuals, depending upon the labor of\nindividuals, into capitalistic property is naturally a process much\nmore tedious, hard and difficult than the transformation of\ncapitalistic private property, as it now exists, resting upon social\nproduction, into social property.\" That is all. The condition attained\nby the dispossession of the dispossessor is here shown as the\nrestoration of individual private property resting however on a basis\nof social property in the land and means of production. For people who\ncan understand English, the meaning of this is that social property\nextends to the land and means of production, and private property to\nthe products, therefore to consumption. And that the matter should be\nevident even to infants Marx shows on page 56. \"A society of free men\nwho labor with social means of production, and consciously expend\ntheir individual labor power as social labor power,\" therefore a\nsocialistically organised society, and he says further \"The total\nproduct of the society is a social product. A portion of this product\nserves again as a means of production. It remains social. But another\nportion is consumed by the members of the society. It must therefore\nbe distributed among them.\" And that ought to be clear, even to Herr\nDuehring, in spite of his having Hegel on the brain. The coexistent\nindividual and social property, this confused and indefinite thing,\nthis nonsense proceeding from the Hegelian dialectic, this misty\nworld, this deep dialectic puzzle which Marx leaves his pupils to\nsolve is merely a creation of Herr Duehring's imagination. Marx, as a\nso-called Hegelian, is obliged, as a result of the negation of the\nnegation, to furnish a correct higher unity, and since he does not do\nthis in accordance with the taste of Herr Duehring, the latter has to\ntake a lofty stand and to smite Marx in the interests of the full\ntruth of things upon which Herr Duehring holds a patent.\n\nWhat attitude did Marx take to the negation of the negation? On page\n761 and following he states the conclusion with respect to his\neconomic and historical investigations into the so-called accumulation\nof original capital, extending over the fifty preceding pages. Before\nthe capitalistic era in England, at least, small production existed,\nbased upon the private property of the worker in his tools. The\nso-called accumulation of capital consists in the expropriation of\nthese immediate producers, that is in the abolition of private\nproperty resting on the labor of individuals. This was possible\nbecause the aforesaid small production is only compatible with a\nnarrow and primitive stage of production and of society and at a\ncertain grade of development furnishes the means of its own suicide.\nThis suicide, the transformation of individual and divided modes of\nproduction into social production, constitutes the early history of\ncapitalism. As soon as the workers are transformed into proletarians\nand their means of labor into capital, as soon as the capitalistic\nmethods of production are firmly established, the growing association\nof labor and the further transformation of the land and other means of\nproduction and hence the further expropriation of the owners of\nprivate property takes on a new form, \"there is no longer the\nself-employing worker to expropriate, but the capitalist who\nexpropriates many workers. This expropriation fulfils itself through\nthe play of laws immanent in capitalistic production itself, through\nthe concentration of capital. One capitalist kills many. Hand in hand\nwith this concentration, or the expropriation of many capitalists by a\nfew, there develop continually the conscious technical application of\nscience, the deliberate organised exploitation of the soil, the\ntransformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor\nwhich can only be employed collectively, and the economising of all\nmeans of production through their employment as the common means of\nproduction of combined social labor. With the constantly diminishing\nnumbers of capitalist magnates who usurp and monopolise all the\nadvantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of\nmisery, pressure, slavery, degradation and robbery but there grows\nalso revolt and the constant progress in union and organisation of the\nworking class brought about through the mechanism of the capitalistic\nprocess of production. Capitalism becomes an impediment to the methods\nof production developed with and under it. The concentration of the\nmeans of production and the organisation of labor reach a point where\nit comes into collision with its capitalistic covering. It is broken.\nThe hour of capitalistic private property strikes. The expropriators\nare expropriated.\"\n\nAnd now I ask the reader, where are the dialectic twists and twirls,\nthe intellectual arabesques, where the confused thought the result of\nwhich is the identity of everything, where the dialectic mystery for\nthe faithful, where the dialectic hocus pocus, and the Hegelian\nintricacies, without which, Marx, according to Herr Duehring, cannot\ndevelop his own ideas? Marx simply pointed to history and showed\nbriefly that just as the small industry necessarily produced the\nconditions of its own downfall, by its own development, that is to say\nby the expropriation of the small holders of private property so now\nthe capitalistic method of production has itself developed likewise\nthe material circumstances which must cause its downfall. The process\nis a historical one and, if it is at the same time dialectic, it is\nnot to the discredit of Marx, that it happens to be so fatal to Herr\nDuehring.\n\nIn the first place, since Marx is ready with his historical economic\nproof, he proceeds \"The capitalistic method of production and method\nof appropriation, that is to say capitalistic private property is the\nfirst negation of individual private property founded on labor of\nindividuals, the negation of capitalistic production will be\nself-produced with the necessity of a natural process, etc.\" (as\nquoted above).\n\nAlthough Marx therefore shows the occurrence of this event as negation\nof the negation, he has no intention of proving by this means that it\nis a historical necessity. On the contrary \"After he has shown that\nthe actual fact has partially declared itself, and has, as yet\npartially to declare itself, he shows it also as a fact which fulfils\nitself in accordance with a certain dialectic law.\" That is all. It is\ntherefore again merely supposition on Herr Duehring's part to assert\nthat the negation of the negation must act as a midwife by whose\nmeans the future is brought out of the womb of the present, or that\nMarx wants to convince anyone of the necessity of social ownership of\nland and capital upon the credit of the negation of the negation.\n\nIt shows a complete lack of comprehension of the nature of the\ndialectic to regard it as Herr Duehring does, as an instrument of mere\nproof, just as one can after a limited fashion employ formal logic or\nelementary mathematics. Formal logic is itself more than anything else\na method for the discovery of new results, for advancing from the\nknown to the unknown, and so, but in a much more distinguished sense,\nis the dialectic, which, since it transcends the narrow limits of\nformal logic, attains a more comprehensive philosophical position. It\nis the same with mathematics. Elementary mathematics, the mathematics\nof constant quantities, proceeds within the limits of formal logic, at\nleast as a rule: the mathematics of variable quantities which is\npeculiarly concerned with calculations running to the infinite, is\nsubstantially nothing but the application of the dialectic in\nmathematics. Mere proof becomes secondary before the manifold\napplication of the method to new fields of investigation. But nearly\nall the proofs of higher mathematics from the first of the\ndifferential calculus, are, strictly speaking, false from the\nstandpoint of elementary mathematics. This cannot be otherwise, if\none, as is here the case, wishes to establish results won in the realm\nof dialectics by means of formal logic. For a crass metaphysician like\nHerr Duehring to want to prove anything by means of the dialectic\nwould be the same wasted labor as Leibnitz and his pupils went through\nwhen they tried to establish the thesis of calculation to infinity by\nmeans of the mathematics of their time. The differential gave them\nthe same spasms as the negation of the negation gives Herr Duehring\nand it played a role in it as we shall see. They admitted it at last,\nat least as many as did not die first, not because they were convinced\nbut because it always worked out right. Herr Duehring, is, as he says,\njust in his forties, and if he attains old age, as we hope he will, he\nmay also experience the same.\n\nBut what is this dreadful negation of the negation which makes life so\nbitter to Herr Duehring and which is to him what the unpardonable sin,\nthe sin against the Holy Ghost, is to Christianity? It is a very\nsimple process, and one, moreover, which fulfils itself every day,\nwhich any child can understand when it is deprived of mystery, under\nwhich the old idealistic philosophy found a refuge, and beneath which\nit will pay unprotected metaphysicians to take refuge from the stroke\nof Herr Duehring. Let us take a grain of barley. Millions of such\ngrains of barley will be ground, cooked and brewed and then consumed.\nBut let such a grain of barley fall on suitable soil under normal\nconditions; a complete individual change at once takes place in it\nunder the influence of heat and moisture, it germinates. The grain, as\nsuch disappears, is negated, in its place arises the plant, the\nnegation of the grain. But what is the normal course of life of this\nplant? It grows, blossoms, bears fruit and finally produces other\ngrains of barley and as soon as these are ripe the stalk dies, and\nbecomes negated in its turn. As the result of this negation of the\nnegation, we have the original grains of barley again, not singly,\nhowever, but ten, twenty or thirty fold. Forms of grain change very\nslowly and so the grain of barley remains practically the same as a\nhundred years ago. But let us take a cultivated ornamental plant, like\nthe dahlia or orchid. Let us consider the seed and the plants\ndeveloped from it by the skill of the gardener, and we have in\ntestimony of this negation of the negation, no longer the same seeds\nbut qualitatively improved seed which produces more beautiful flowers,\nand every repetition of this process, every new negation of the\nnegation, increases the tendency to perfection. Similarly this process\nis gone through by most insects, butterflies, for example. They come\nout of the egg by a negation of the egg, they go through certain\ntransformations till they reach sex maturity, they copulate and are\nagain negated, since they die as soon as the process of copulation is\ncompleted, and the female has laid her innumerable eggs. That the\nmatter is not so plainly obvious in the case of other plants and\nanimals, seeing that they produce seeds, plants, and animals not once\nbut oftener, does not affect us in this case, we are now only\nconcerned in showing that the negation of the negation actually does\noccur in both kingdoms of the organic world. Besides, all geology is a\nseries of negated negations, one layer after another following the\ndestruction of old and the establishment of new rock foundations.\nFirst, the original crust of the earth, through the cooling of the\nfluid mass, and through oceanic, meteorological, and chemical\natmospheric action, being broken up into small parts, these broken\nmasses form layers in the seas. Local elevations of the seas, through\nthe ebb and flow of the waters, bring portions of these layers afresh\nunder the influence of rain, the warmth of the seasons, and the oxygen\nand carbon in the atmosphere: melted and almost cooled masses of rock\nfrom the interior of the earth underlie these and break through the\nlayers. Through millions of centuries new layers are continually being\nformed, always to a large extent destroyed and serving again as\nbuilding materials for new layers. But the result of the process is\nalways positive, the restoration of a piece of ground made up of\nexceedingly diverse chemical elements to a condition of mechanical\npulverisation, which is the cause of a most abundant and diverse\nvegetation.\n\nIt is the same also in mathematics. Let us take an ordinary algebraic\nquantity a. Let us negate it, then we have-a (minus a). Let us negate\nthis negation, that is let us multiply --a by --a and we have + a^2,\nthat is the original positive quantity but in a higher form that is to\nthe second power. It does not matter that we can attain the same a^2\nby the multiplication of a positive by itself. The negated negation is\nestablished so completely in a^2 that under all circumstances it has\ntwo square roots a and --a. And this impossibility, the negated\nnegation, the getting rid of the negative root in the square has much\nsignificance in quadratic equations. The negation of the negation is\nmore evident in the higher analyses, in those \"unlimited summations of\nsmall quantities,\" which Herr Duehring himself explains as being the\nhighest operations of mathematics and which are usually called the\ndifferential and integral calculus. How do these forms of calculation\nfulfil themselves? I have for example in a given problem two variable\nquantities x and y, of which one cannot vary without causing the other\nto vary also under fixed conditions. I differentiate x and y, that is\nI consider x and y as being so infinitesimally small that they do not\nrepresent any real quantities, even the smallest, so that, of x and y\nnothing remains, except their reciprocal relations, a quantitative\nrelation without any quantity; therefore dx/dy, the relation of the\ntwo differentials of x and y, is 0/0 but 0/0 is fixed as the\nexpression of y/x. That this relation between two vanished quantities,\nthe fixed moment of their vanishing, is a contradiction I merely\nmention in passing, it should give us as little uneasiness as it has\ngiven mathematics for the two hundred or so years past. What have I\ndone except to negate x and y; not as in metaphysics so as not to\ntrouble myself any further about them, but in a manner demanded by the\nproblem? Instead of x and y, I have therefore their negation dx and dy\nin the formulae or equations before me. I now calculate further with\nthese formulae. I treat dx and dy as real quantities, as quantities\nsubject to certain exceptional laws, and at a certain point I negate\nthe negation, that is, I integrate the differential formula. I get\ninstead of dx and dy the real quantities x and y again, and am thereby\nno further forward than at the beginning, but I have thereby solved\nthe problem over which ordinary geometry and algebra would probably\nhave gnashed their teeth in vain.\n\nIt is not otherwise in history. All civilised peoples began with\ncommon property in land. Among all peoples which pass beyond a certain\nprimitive stage the common property in land becomes a fetter upon\nproduction in the process of agricultural development. It is cast\naside, negated, and, after shorter or longer intervening periods, is\ntransformed into private property. But at a higher stage, through the\ndevelopment still further of agriculture, private property becomes in\nits turn a bar to production, as is to-day the case with both large\nand small land proprietorship. The next step, to negate it in turn,\nto transform it into social property, necessarily follows. This\nadvance however does not signify the restoration of the old primitive\ncommon property, but the establishment of a far higher better\ndeveloped form of communal proprietorship, which, far from being an\nimpediment to production, rather, for the first time is bound to put\nan end to its limitations and to give it the full benefit of modern\ndiscoveries in chemistry and mechanical inventions.\n\nBut again; ancient philosophy was primitive naturalistic materialism.\nIn the state of thought at that period it was, as such, incapable of\nclear conceptions of matter. But the necessity of clearness on this\npoint led to the doctrine of a soul which could leave the body, then\nto the idea of the immortality of the soul, finally, to monotheism.\nThe old materialism was therefore negated by idealism. But in the\nfurther development of philosophy idealism became untenable, and is\nnegated by modern materialism. This, the negation of negation, is not\nthe mere reestablishment of the old, but unites, with the surviving\nfoundations, the whole thought content of a two thousand years'\ndevelopment of philosophy and science, as well as the history of these\ntwo thousand years. It is in a special sense no philosophy but a\nsingle concept of the universe which has to prove and realise itself\nnot in a science of sciences apart, but in actual science. Philosophy\nis here also cast aside, that is \"destroyed and preserved,\" destroyed\nas to its form, preserved as to its real content. Where Herr Duehring\nonly sees word-jugglery a more real content is brought to light by the\nnewer point of view.\n\nFinally, even the Rousseau doctrine of equality, of which that of Herr\nDuehring is only a feeble and false plagiarism, has no existence\nunless the Hegelian negation of the negation serve it as a midwife,\nalthough it originated twenty years prior to the birth of Hegel. Far\nfrom being ashamed of this it bears in plain sight the stamp of its\ndialectic derivation in its earliest manifestation. In a state of\nnature and savagery men were equal, and, since Rousseau regards speech\nas a falsifying of natural conditions, he is quite right in\npredicating equality of animals of one species as far as this reaches,\nand the same also with regard to those speechless animal-men, recently\nhypothetically classified by Haeckel as Alali. But these equal animal\nmen had one quality beyond the other animals,--perfectibility, the\npower of further development and this was the reason of inequality.\nRousseau sees therefore in the existence of equality a step forward.\nBut this advance was self contradictory, it was at the same time a\nretrogression. \"All further advances (beyond the primitive stage) were\nso many steps, seemingly in the development of individual men, but\nactually in the decay of the species. Working in metals and\nagriculture were the two arts whose discovery brought about this great\nrevolution\" (the transformation of the primitive forests into\ncultivated lands, but also the introduction of poverty and slavery\ntogether with private property). \"The poets hold that gold and silver,\nthe philosophers that iron and corn have civilised men and ruined the\nhuman race.\" Each new advance of civilisation is at the same time an\nadvance of inequality. All contrivances with which society endows\nitself by means of civilisation are in direct opposition to their\noriginal purpose. \"It is beyond question and a foundation principle of\nthe entire public law that people made rulers to defend their\nliberties, not to destroy them.\" And yet these rulers become of\nnecessity the oppressors of the people and they carry the oppression\nto the point where inequality is brought to a climax and, then,\ntransformed into its opposite, again becomes the reason of equality,\nfor to despots all are equal, that is equally of no account. Here is\nthe extreme of inequality, the crowning point which closes the circle,\nand touches the point from which we have proceeded; here all private\nindividuals are equal, since they are of no account, and subjects have\nno law other than the will of their master. \"But the despot is master\nonly as long as he has the power, and for this reason he cannot\ncomplain of the use of force if he is banished.... Force upholds him,\nforce throws him down, everything goes according to a straight and\nnaturally appointed path.\" And thus again inequality is transformed\ninto equality, but not into the old materialistic equality of\nspeechless, primitive men, but into the higher equality of organised\nsociety. The oppressor is oppressed, it is negation of the negation.\n\nWe have then, as regards Rousseau, not merely a method of thought\nwhich is quite analogous to that pursued in Marx's \"Capital,\" but also\na whole series of single dialectic turns of which Marx avails himself:\nProcesses, which are antagonistic in their nature, containing a\ncontradiction in themselves, are transformed from one extreme to its\nopposite, finally, as the quintessence of the whole, negation of the\nnegation. Although Rousseau in 1754 could not speak the jargon of\nHegel, he was then, at a period twenty-three years before the birth of\nHegel, deeply infected with the Hegel contagion, the dialectic of\ncontradiction, doctrine of logic, theology, etc. And if Duehring in\nhis misapplication of Rousseau's theory of equality, operates with his\ntwo victorious men, he having lost his feet, falls, of necessity into\nthe arms of the negation of the negation.\n\nThe conditions under which the equality of the two men flourishes and\nwhich is set forth as an ideal condition is shown on page 271 of the\nPhilosophy as the original condition. This original condition on page\n279 is of necessity destroyed by the \"robber system\"--first negation.\nBut we have now, thanks to the philosophy of reality, arrived at the\npoint of abolishing the \"robber system\" and substituting for it the\neconomic commune discovered by Herr Duehring--negation of the\nnegation, equality on a higher plane.\n\nWhat is the negation of the negation, therefore? It is a very far\nreaching, and, just, for this reason, a very important law of\ndevelopment of nature, human history and thought, a law which we see\nrealised in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in\nmathematics, in history, and philosophy, and which Herr Duehring\nhimself, in spite of his opposition and resistance, must follow, after\nhis own fashion. It is evident that I say nothing of the special\ndevelopment of the grain of barley from the germ to the crop bearing\nplant, if I say it is negation of the negation. Since the integral\ncalculus is likewise negation of the negation, with the other\nassertion I should only affirm that the life process of a grain of\nbarley is integral calculus or even socialism. But that is just the\nkind of thing which the metaphysicians push off on the dialectic. If I\nsay that all these processes constitute negation of the negation, I\nembrace them all under this one law of progress, and leave the\ndistinctive features of each special process without particular\nnotice. The dialectic is, as a matter of fact, nothing but the science\nof the universal laws of motion, and evolution in nature, human\nsociety and thought.\n\nAt this point, however, the objection may be urged that the final\nnegation is no true negation, I negate a grain of barley also when I\ngrind it, an insect when I crush it, a positive quantity when I\neliminate it, etc. Or I negate the statement \"the rose is a rose\" if I\nsay \"the rose is no rose\" and what happens if I negate this negation\nagain and say \"but the rose is a rose\"? These objection are, in fact,\nthe chief arguments of the metaphysicians against the dialectic and\nare quite worthy of this idiotic method of reasoning. To negate in the\ndialectic is not simply to say \"No,\" or to describe a thing as\nnon-existent, or to destroy it after any fashion that you may choose.\nSpinoza says \"omnis determinatio est negatio,\" every limitation or\ndetermination is at the same time a negation. Furthermore, the sort of\nnegation here is shown first by means of the universal and in the\nsecond place by means of the distinctive nature of the process. I must\nnot only negate but I must also restore the negation again. I must\ntherefore so direct the first negation that the second remains\npossible or shall be so. How? Just according to the peculiar nature of\neach particular case. I grind a grain of barley, I crush an insect, I\nhave certainly fulfilled the first act but have made the second\nimpossible. Every species of things has therefore its own peculiar\nproperties to be negated in order that a progression may proceed, and\nevery species of properties and ideas is precisely the same in this\nregard. In infinitesimal calculations the negation is brought about\nafter a different fashion than in the restoration of positive powers\nfrom negative roots. That has to be learnt like everything else. With\nthe mere knowledge that the stalk of barley and infinitesimal\ncalculation fall under the principle of the negation of the negation,\nI cannot cultivate more barley nor can I differentiate and integrate,\njust as I cannot play the violin by virtue of a mere knowledge of the\nlaws of harmony. But it is evident that a merely childish negation of\nthe negation such as writing down a and erasing it, or by affirming\nthat a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose leads to no conclusion\nother than to show the silliness of the people who undertake processes\nso tedious. And yet metaphysicians would inform us that that is the\nright way to carry out the negation of the negation.\n\nHerr Duehring is therefore a mystifier when he asserts that the\nnegation of the negation was an analogy made by Hegel derived from\nreligion and built up on the story of the Fall and the Redemption. Men\nthought dialectically a long time before they knew what the dialectic\nreally was, just as they spoke prose a long time before the term\n\"prose\" was used. The law of the negation of the negation which\noperates in history and which until it is once learned goes on in our\nbrains unconsciously to ourselves, was first clearly formulated by\nHegel, and if Herr Duehring desires to employ it in secret but cannot\nstand the name, he should discover a better name. But if he insist on\nexpelling it from the processes of thought, he must first be good\nenough to expel it from nature and from history, and find a system of\nmathematics in which --a multiplied by --a does not give us + a^2 and\nwhere the differential and integral calculus are both forbidden by\nlaw.\n\n\n_Conclusion._\n\nIn this short section Engels leaves the general discussion in order to\nagain pay his respects to the shortcomings and deficiencies of Herr\nDuehring. The matter possesses no general interest for Engels merely\nteases his opponent upon the magnificence of his claims and the\nslightness of his performances.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nPOLITICAL ECONOMY\n\n\n_I. Objects and Methods._\n\nPolitical economy is, in the widest sense, the science of the laws\ncontrolling the production and exchange of the material necessities of\nlife in human society. Production and exchange are two entirely\ndifferent functions. Production may exist without exchange,\nexchange--since there can only be exchange of products--cannot exist\nwithout production. Each of the two social functions is controlled by\nentirely different external influences and thus has, generally\nspeaking, its own peculiar laws. But on the other hand they become so\nmutually involved at a given time and react one upon the other that\nthey might be designated the abscisses and ordinates of the economic\ncurve.\n\nThe conditions under which men produce and exchange develop from land\nto land, and in the same land from generation to generation. Political\neconomy cannot be the same for all lands and for all historical\nepochs. From the bow and arrow, from the stone knife and the\nexceptional and occasional trading intercourse of the barbarian to the\nsteam engine with its thousands of horse-power, to the mechanical\nweaving machine, to the railway and the Bank of England is a\ntremendous leap. The Patagonians do not have production on a large\nscale and world-commerce any more than they have swindling or\nbankruptcy. Anyone who should attempt to apply the same laws of\npolitical economy to Patagonia as to present-day England would only\nsucceed in producing stupid commonplaces. Political economy is thus\nreally a historical science. It is engaged with historical material,\nthat is, material which is always in course of development. At the\nclose of this investigation it can, for the first time, show the few\n(especially as regards production and exchange) general laws which\napply universally. In this way it is made evident that the laws which\nare common to certain methods of production or forms of exchange are\ncommon to all historical periods in which these methods of production\nand forms of exchange are the same. Thus for example with the\nintroduction of specie, there came into being a series of laws which\nholds good for all lands and historical epochs in which specie is a\nmeans of exchange.\n\nThe method of distributing the product is in accordance with the\nmethod of production and exchange of a given society at a given time.\nIn the tribal or village community with communal ownership of land, of\nwhich there are obvious survivals in the history of all civilized\npeoples, there is practically an equal distribution; where a greater\ninequality of distribution of the product has been introduced among\nthe members of a society, it is a sign of the coming dissolution of\nthe community--large and small farming have very different modes of\ndistribution according to the historical circumstances from which they\nhave developed. But it is apparent that large farming requires a\ndifferent mode of distribution than small farming; that the large\nfarming shows the existence of class antagonism--slave-holders and\nslaves, landlords and tenants, capitalists and wage workers,--but\nthat, on the contrary, in small farming, class distinction does not\narise from the farming operations of separate individuals but from the\nmere beginnings of farming on a large scale. The introduction and\ndevelopment of the use of gold into a country where formerly exchange\nof actual goods was the exclusive or general practice, is closely\nassociated with a slow or rapid revolution of the mode of distribution\nhitherto prevailing, and to such an extent that inequality of\ndistribution among individuals and, so, antagonism between rich and\npoor becomes more and more apparent. Local gild hand-production as it\nprevailed in the Middle Ages made great capitalists and life-long\nwage-workers just as impossible as the great modern industry, the\ncredit system of to-day, and form of exchange, corresponding with the\ndevelopment of these, free competition, render them inevitable.\n\nWith the difference in distribution however class differences are\nintroduced. Society becomes divided into upper and lower classes, into\nplunderers and plundered, into master and servant classes, and the\nstate which the original groups composed of societies claiming the\nsame ancestry only regarded as a means of protection of the common\ninterests (remnants of which remain in the Orient, e.g.) and against\nforeign force, takes upon itself the duty of maintaining the economic\nand political supremacy of the dominant class against the dominated\nclass by means of force.\n\nSo distribution is not a mere passive witness of production and\nexchange; it has an immediate influence on both. Every new method of\nproduction and form of exchange is impeded, not only through the old\nforms and their particular forms of political development, but also\nthrough the old method of distribution. It can only bring about its own\nmethod of distribution as the result of long conflict. But just in\nproportion as a given method of production and exchange is built up and\ndevelops, distribution all the more rapidly reaches a point where it\noutstrips its predecessor and where it comes into collision with the\nsystem of production and exchange existing up to that time. The old\ntribal communistic forms of which we have already spoken may last\nthousands of years, as is seen in the case of the Indians and Slavs of\nto-day, until intercourse with the outside world develops causes of\ndisruption within them as a conclusion of which their dissolution comes\nabout. Modern capitalistic production on the other hand which is hardly\nthree hundred years old and which first became dominant with the\nintroduction of the greater industry about one hundred years ago, has,\nin this short time, developed antagonisms in distribution--concentration\nof capital on the one hand in the possession of a few persons and, on\nthe other, concentration of propertyless masses in the great\ncities--which must of necessity bring it to an end.\n\nThe connection between the form of distribution and the material\neconomic conditions of a society is so much in the nature of things\nthat it is generally reflected in the popular instinct. As long as a\nmethod of production is in the course of development, even those whose\ninterests are against it, who are getting the worst of the particular\nmethod of production, are highly satisfied. It was just so with the\nEnglish working class at the introduction of the greater industry. As\nlong as this method of production remained the normal social method,\nsatisfaction with the methods of distribution was, on the whole,\nprevalent; and when a protest against it rose even in the bosom of the\ndominant class itself (Saint-Simon, Fourier, Owen) it found at first\npractically no sympathy among the masses of the exploited. But\ndirectly the method of production has travelled a good portion of its\nupward progress, when half of its life was over, when its destiny was\nin a great measure accomplished and its successor was knocking at the\ndoor--then for the first time the ever increasingly unequal\ndistribution appeared as unjust. Then was the first appeal made from\nactual facts to so-called eternal justice. This appeal to morality and\njustice does not bring us a step further scientifically. Economic\nscience can find no grounds of proof in moral indignation, however\njustifiable, but merely a symptom. Its task is to show the newly\ndeveloping social wrongs as the necessary results of existing methods\nof production and, at the same time, as signs of its approaching\ndissolution, and to point out, amid the break up of the existing\neconomic system, the elements of the new organization of production\nand exchange which will abolish those social wrongs. The feeling\nstirred up by the poets whether in the picturing of these social\nwrongs or by attack upon them or, on the other hand, by denial of them\nand the glorification of harmony in the interests of the dominant\nclass, is quite timely, but its slight value as furnishing proof for a\ngiven period is shown by the fact that one finds an abundance of it in\nevery epoch.\n\nPolitical economy, as the science of the conditions and forms under\nwhich various human societies have produced and exchanged and\naccording to which they have distributed the products of their\nlabor,--political economy, in this broad sense, has yet to be planned\nfor the first time. All that we have so far of political economic\nscience is almost entirely limited to the beginning and development of\nthe capitalistic mode of production. It begins with the genesis and\ngrowth of the capitalistic mode of production, and exchange,\nrecognises the necessity of the disappearance of these by means of the\ncapitalistic forms, then develops the laws of the capitalistic\nmethods of production and their corresponding forms of exchange on the\npositive side, that is on the side on which they further the objects\nof society, as a whole and closes with the socialist criticism of the\ncapitalistic methods of production, that is, with the exhibition of\nits laws on the negative side, with the proof that this method of\nproduction arrives at the point, by its own development, where it is\nno longer possible. This criticism proves that the capitalistic\nmethods of production and exchange constitute more and more an\ninsufferable fetter upon production itself. The mode of distribution\nwhich is necessarily associated with this form of production has\nbrought about a class condition which grows daily more unbearable. It\nhas produced the daily sharpening antagonism between the continually\nless numerous but constantly richer capitalists and the more numerous,\nbut on the whole, continually poorer propertyless wage-workers.\nFinally the tremendous productive forces of the capitalistic methods\nof production, which are practically unlimited, are only awaiting\ntheir seizure at the hands of an organized co-operative society to\nsecure for all the members of that society the means of existence and\nthe fuller development of their faculties in an ever increasing\ndegree.\n\nIn order to fully accomplish this criticism of the bourgeois economy\nacquaintance with the capitalistic form of production of exchange and\nof distribution was not enough. Preceding forms and others, existing\nside by side with the capitalistic mode in a few highly developed\ncountries, had to be examined and compared at least in their chief\nfeatures. Such an investigation and comparision has been undertaken as\na whole by Marx alone and we consider that this investigation\npractically sums up all that has been established respecting\ntheoretical economy prior to that of the bourgeois.\n\nWhile political economy in a narrow sense arose in the minds of a few\ngeniuses of the seventeenth century, it is, in its positive\nformulation by the physiocrats and Adam Smith, substantially a child\nof the eighteenth century, and expresses itself in the acquisitions of\nthe great contemporary French philosophers with all the excellencies\nand defects of that time. What we have said of the French philosophers\napplies also to the economists of that day. The new science was with\nthem not the expression of the condition and needs of the time but the\nexpression of eternal reason; the laws of production and exchange\ndiscovered by them were not the laws of a given historical form of\nthose facts but were eternal natural laws; they derived them from the\nnature of man. But this man, seen clearly, was a burgher of the Middle\nAges on the high road to becoming a modern bourgeois, and his nature\nconsisted in this that he had to manufacture commodities and carry on\nhis trade according to the given historical conditions of that period.\n\n(Herr Duehring having applied the two man theory to political economic\nconditions and having decided that such conditions are unjust, upon\nwhich conclusion he bases his revolutionary attitude, Engels remarks\nas follows):\n\n\"If we have no better security for the revolution in the present\nmethods of distribution of the products of labor with all their crying\nantagonisms of misery and luxury, of poverty and ostentation, than the\nconsciousness that this method of distribution is unjust and that\njustice must finally prevail, we should be in evil plight and would\nhave to stay there a long time. The mystics of the Middle Ages who\ndreamed of an approaching thousand years kingdom of righteousness had\nthe consciousness of the injustice of class antagonisms. At the\nbeginning of modern history three hundred years ago, Thomas Muenzer\nshouted it aloud to all the world. In the English and French bourgeois\nrevolutions the same cry was heard and died away ineffectually. And if\nthe same cry, after the formation of class antagonisms and class\ndistinctions left the working, suffering classes cold until 1830, if\nit now takes hold of one land after another with the same results and\nthe same intensity, in proportion as the greater industry has\ndeveloped in the individual countries if, in one generation, it has\nacquired a force which defies all the powers opposed to it and can be\nsure of victory in the near future--how comes it about? From this,\nthat the greater industry has created the modern proletariat, a class,\nwhich for the first time in history can set about the abolition not of\nthis or that particular class organization or of this or that\nparticular class privilege but of classes in general, and it is in the\nposition that it must carry out this line of action on the penalty of\nsinking to the Chinese coolie level. And that the same greater\nindustry has on the other hand produced a class which is in possession\nof all the tools of production and the means of life but in every\nperiod of prosperity (Schwindelperiode) and in each succeeding panic\nshows that it is incapable of controlling in the future the growing\nproductive forces; a class under whose leadership society runs\nheadlong to ruin like a locomotive whose closed safety valve the\nengine driver is too weak to open. In other words it has come about\nthat the productive forces of the modern capitalistic mode of\nproduction as well as the system of distribution based upon it are in\nglaring contradiction to the mode of production itself and to such a\ndegree that a revolution in the modes of production and distribution\nmust take place which will abolish all class differences or the whole\nof modern society will fall. It is in these actual material facts,\nwhich are necessarily becoming more and more evident to the exploited\nproletariat, that the confidence in the victory of modern socialism\nfinds its foundation and not in this or that bookworm's notions of\njustice and injustice.\n\n\n_II. The Force Theory._\n\n(Herr Duehring argues that the causes of class subjection are to be\nsought in political conditions and that political force is the\nprimary, and economic conditions merely the secondary, cause of class\ndistinctions Engels makes the following reply to these arguments):\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThis is Herr Duehring's theory. It is set out, decreed so to say, here\nand in several other places. But we cannot find the slightest attempt\nto prove it or to disprove the opposite theory in the three thick\nvolumes. Moreover if there was an abundance of proof we should get\nnone from Herr Duehring, for the matter is proven by the famous fall\nof man in that Robinson Crusoe made Friday his slave. That was an act\nof force and so a political act. And this slavery constitutes the\npoint of departure and fundamental fact of history up to the present\ntime and inoculates the heirs of sin with injustice so certainly that\nonly lately it has become milder and \"transformed into the more\nindirect forms of economic dependency.\" Since the whole of the\nremaining actual \"force-possession\" rests upon this original\nenslavement, it is clear that all economic phenomena can be explained\nfrom original political causes, that is from force. And whoever is not\nsatisfied with this is a secret reactionary.\n\nLet us first remark that one has to be as much in love with himself as\nHerr Duehring is to consider this idea as \"original\" since it is not\nso by any means. The idea that the political doings of monarch and\nstates are decisive events in history is as old as the writing of\nhistory itself and is the reason why we are so little aware of the\nreal and quietly developing progress of the peoples which goes on\nbehind these noisy and spectacular activities. This idea has dominated\nthe whole of history in the past and got its first shock at the hands\nof the French bourgeois historians of the Restoration period.\n\nTo proceed, let us grant for the present that Herr Duehring is correct\nwhen he says that all history up to now has been the slavery of man by\nmen, and we are still a long way from the root of the matter. Let us\nask now how it was that Robinson came to enslave Friday. Was it merely\nfor the pleasure of doing so? Surely not. On the contrary we are\ninformed that Friday \"was subjugated as a slave or mere tool for\neconomic service and was kept in subjection merely as a tool.\"\nRobinson only enslaved Friday that he might work for the benefit of\nRobinson. And how could Robinson derive benefit from the labor of\nFriday? Only by virtue of the fact that Friday produced more means of\nlivelihood by his labor than Robinson had to give him to keep him able\nto work. Robinson has therefore, contrary to Herr Duehring's pretty\nprescription, made, by the enslavement of Friday, a political\norganization, not just because he wanted to, but simply as a means of\nproviding himself with food, and he ought to see how little he has in\ncommon with his lord and master Herr Duehring.\n\nThe childish example therefore which Herr Duehring has discovered in\norder to show that force is the \"historical fundamental\" proves that\nforce is only a means to further an economic interest, and in history\nthe economic side is likewise more fundamental than the political. The\nexample therefore proves just the opposite of what it ought to prove.\nAnd, as with Robinson and Friday, so it is also with all the examples\nof lordship and slavery up to now. Slavery, to use Duehring's own\nelegant expression, always implies a means for supplying sustenance\n(using the term in its broadest sense) and never merely implies a\npolitical organization which has been developed by its own will. One\nwould have to be a Herr Duehring to venture to call taxes only a\nsecondary feature of government, or, to say that the political\ngroupings of the dominant bourgeois of to-day and the subjugated\nproletariat are purely voluntary and not made to serve the material\ninterests of the bourgeois, namely profit making and the accumulation\nof capital.\n\nLet us give our attention again to our two men. Robinson \"sword in\nhand\" makes Friday his slave. But to do this Robinson uses something\nelse besides his sword. A slave is not made by that means solely. In\norder to be able to keep a slave one has to be superior to him in two\nrespects, one must first have control over the tools and objects of\nlabor of the slave and over his means of subsistence also. Therefore,\nbefore slavery is possible, a certain point in production has to be\nreached and a certain degree of inequality in distribution attained.\nAnd when slave labor becomes the dominant mode of production of an\nentire society a higher development of the powers of production, of\ntrade and of wealth, accumulation occurs. In early tribal communities\nwhich had common ownership of the soil, slavery is either nonexistent\nor its role is very subordinate. So it was at first in Rome, as a\nstate of farmers, but when Rome became the capital city of the world\nand the soil of Italy came more and more to be owned by a numerically\nsmall class of enormously wealthy property owners, the population of\nfarmers perished in front of the slave population. When at the time\nof the Persian War, the number of slaves in Corinth was 460,000, and\nin Aegina 470,000, and there were ten slaves to every freeman in the\npopulation, the explanation must be sought in something other than\nforce; there were a highly developed art and handicraft and foreign\ncommerce. Slavery in the United States of America was much less due to\nforce than to the English cotton industry; where there was not cotton\ngrown or where slaves were not raised, as in the border states, for\nthe cotton producing states, it perished of its own accord and without\nany employment of force simply because it did not pay.\n\nWhen Herr Duehring therefore calls the property of the present day\nproperty resting on force and designates it as \"that form of\ndomination which does not merely signify the exclusion of one's fellow\nbeings from the use of the natural means of sustenance, but implies in\naddition that the subjection of man has lain at the foundation of\nhuman slavery\" he puts the matter upside down. The subjection of\nhumanity to slavery in all its forms means the control by the master\nof the means of labor by virtue of which alone he can employ his\nslaves upon them and the disposal of the means of livelihood by which\nhe can keep his slaves alive. In all cases therefore it implies a\ncertain power of possession which transcends the ordinary? How did\nthis arise? Occasionally it is clear that it was seized and can\ntherefore be said to rest upon force but this is by no means\nessential. It can be got by labor, be robbed, be obtained by trade, or\ntaken by fraud. It must be worked for generally before it can be\nstolen.\n\nPrivate property does not historically come into existence by any\nmeans as a rule as the product of robbery and violence. On the\ncontrary. It arises from the limitation of certain things in the\nearly tribal communes. It develops in the first place within the tribe\nand afterwards in exchange with peoples outside of the tribe in the\nform of wares. In proportion as the products of the tribe assume the\nform of commodities, i.e., the less they are produced for the use of\nthe producer and the more for the purpose of exchange, the exchange\ndestroys the original form of distribution in the commune itself, and\nthe more unequal become the shares of the individual members of the\ncommunity with respect to material possessions. So the old communal\nownership of land becomes more and more invaded, the communal property\nis rapidly converted into a village of farmers, each tilling his own\npiece of ground. Oriental despotism and the changing government of\nconquering nomads had no power to alter the old form of communal\nownership for a thousand years. But the continual destruction of the\nprimitive domestic industry through the competition of the products of\nthe great industry is bringing about its dissolution. The thing has\nlittle to do with force as has lately appeared in the matter of the\ndivision of the communal property of the feudal societies on the\nMoselle and in Hochwald. The peasants are finding the substitution of\nindividual for communal holdings to their interests. Even the growth\nof a primitive aristocracy as among the Celts, the Germans, and in\nMesopotamia, is a result of the communal ownership of landed property,\nand does not depend upon force in the slightest degree but upon free\nwill and custom. Especially where private property arises it appears\nas the result of a change in the methods of production and exchange in\nthe interests of the increase of production and the development of\ncommerce and therefore arises from economic causes. Force plays no\nrole in this. It is clear that the institution of private property\nmust have already existed before the robber is able to possess himself\nof other people's goods and that force may change the possession but\ncannot alter private property as such.\n\nBut to explain the \"subjection of men to slavery\" in its modern form,\nin wage-labor, we can make no use of either force or property acquired\nby force. We have already mentioned the part which the transformation\nof the products of labor into commodities, their production not for\nuse alone, but for exchange, plays in the destruction of the primitive\ncommunal property and therefore in the bringing into existence\ndirectly or indirectly the universality of private property. But Marx\nhas proved in his \"Capital\"--and Herr Duehring does not venture to\nintrude upon the matter--that at a certain stage in economic\ndevelopment the production of commodities is transformed into\ncapitalistic production and that at this point \"the law of\nappropriation resting upon the production and circulation of\ncommodities, the law of private property, by its own inevitable\ndialectic becomes changed into its opposite, the exchange of\nequivalents, which appeared as its original mode of operation, but has\nnow become so twisted that there is only an appearance of exchange\nsince. In the first place, the portion of capital exchanged for\nlabor-force is itself only a portion of the product of another's labor\ntaken without an equivalent, and in the second place, it is not only\nsupplied by its producers, the workers, but it must be supplied also\nwith a new surplus. Originally property seemed to us to be established\non labor only--property now appears (as a conclusion of the Marxian\nargument), on the side of the capitalist, as the right to unpaid labor\nand, on the side of the workingman, as an impossibility, the ownership\nof his own product. The difference between property and labor is the\nresult of a law which apparently proceeded from their identity.\" In\nother words if we exclude the possibility of force, robbery, and\ncheating absolutely, if we take the position that all private property\noriginally depended upon the personal labor of its possessor and that\nequivalents are always exchanged we nevertheless come, in the course\nof the development of production and exchange, of necessity, to the\nmodern capitalistic methods of production, to the monopolisation of\nthe means of production and livelihood in the hands of a single class\nfew in numbers, to the degradation of the other consisting of the\nimmense majority of producers to the position of propertyless\nproletarians, to the periodical alternations of swindling operations\nand trade crises and to the whole of the present anarchy in\nproduction. The entire result rests on purely economic grounds without\nrobbery, force, or any intervention of politics or the government\nbeing necessary. Property resting on force becomes a mere phrase which\nmerely serves to obscure the understanding of the real development of\nthings.\n\nThis course, historically expressed, is the story of the development\nof the bourgeoisie. If \"political conditions are the decisive causes\nof economic conditions,\" the modern bourgeoisie would necessarily not\nhave progressed as the result of a fight with feudalism, but would be\nthe darling child of its womb. Everybody knows that the opposite is\nthe case. The bourgeoisie, originally bound to pay feudal dues to the\ndominant feudal nobility, recruited from bond slaves and thralls, in a\nsubject state, has, in the course of its conflict with the nobility\ncaptured position after position, and finally has come into possession\nof the power in civilized countries. In France it directly attacked\nthe nobility, in England it made the aristocracy more and more\nbourgeois and finally incorporated it with itself as a sort of\nornament. And how did this come about? Entirely through the\ntransformation of economic conditions which was sooner or later\nfollowed either by the voluntary or compulsory transformation of\npolitical conditions. The fight of the bourgeoisie against the feudal\nnobility is the fight of the city against the country, of industry\nagainst landlordism, of economy based on money against economy based\non natural products. The distinctive weapons of the bourgeois in this\nfight were those which came into existence through the development of\nincreasing economic force by reason of the growth at first of hand\nmanufacture and afterwards machine-manufacture and through the\nextension of trade. During the whole of this conflict the political\npower was in the hands of the nobility, with the exception of a period\nwhen the king employed the bourgeoisie against the nobility in order\nto hold one in check by means of the other. From the very moment,\nhowever, in which the bourgeoisie still deprived of political power\nbegan to be dangerous because of the development of its economic power\nthe monarchy again turned to the nobility and thereby brought about\nthe revolution of the bourgeois first in England and then in France.\nThe political conditions in France remained unaltered until the\neconomic conditions outgrew them. In politics the noble was\neverything, the bourgeois nothing. As a social factor the bourgeoisie\nwas of the highest importance while the nobility had abandoned all its\nsocial functions and yet pocketed revenues, social services which it\ndid not any longer perform. Even this is not sufficient. Bourgeois\nsociety was, as far as the whole matter of production is concerned,\ntied and bound in the political feudal forms of the Middle Ages, which\nthis production, not only as regards manufacture but as regards\nhandwork also had long transcended amid all the thousandfold\ngild-privileges and local and provincial tax impositions which had\nbecome mere obstacles and fetters to production. The bourgeois\nrevolution put an end to them. But the economic condition did not, as\nHerr Duehring would imply, forthwith adapt itself to the political\ncircumstances,--that the king and the nobility spent a long time in\ntrying to effect--but it threw all the mouldy old political rubbish\naside and shaped new political conditions in which the new economic\nconditions might come into existence and develop. And it has developed\nsplendidly in this suitable political and legal atmosphere, so\nsplendidly that the bourgeoisie is now not very far from the position\nwhich the nobility occupied in 1789. It is becoming more and more not\nalone a social superfluity but a social impediment. It takes an ever\ndiminishing part in the work of production and becomes more and more,\nas the noble did, a mere revenue consuming class. And this revolution\nin its position and the creation of a new class, that of the\nproletariat, came about without any force-nonsense but by purely\neconomic means. Further more, it has by no means accomplished it by\nits own willful act. On the other hand it has accomplished itself\nirresistibly against the wish and intentions of the bourgeoisie. Its\nown productive forces have taken the management of affairs and are\ndriving modern bourgeois society to the necessity of revolution or\ndestruction. And if the bourgeoisie now appeals to force to ward off\nthe ruin arising from the decrepit economic condition it proves\nthereby that it suffers from the same error as Herr Duehring, in that\nit thinks that \"political conditions are the distinctive causes of\neconomic condition\" and that by the use of the prime factor of mere\npolitical force it can manufacture the secondary factor of economic\nconditions. It thinks that it can shape economic conditions and their\ninevitable development, and therefore eliminate the economic effects\nof the steam engine, and the modern industry which has proceeded from\nit. It thinks that it can abolish the world commerce and the bank\ncredit development of to-day from the universe by means of Krupp guns\nand Mauser rifles.\n\n\n_III. Force Theory (Continued)._\n\nLet us look at this omnipotent \"force\" of Herr Duehring a little more\nclosely. Robinson enslaved Friday \"sword in hand.\" How did he get the\nsword? Robinson's imaginary island never grew swords on trees and some\nanswer to this question is due from Herr Duehring. We might just as\nwell assume that as Robinson became possessed of a sword so, one fine\nmorning, Friday appeared with a loaded revolver in his hand. Thereupon\nthe \"force\" is entirely reversed. Friday takes command and Robinson\nmust submit. We beg pardon of the reader for returning to the story of\nRobinson Crusoe, which is more appropriate to the nursery than to an\neconomic discussion, but what can we do about it? We are compelled to\npursue Herr Duehring's axiomatic scientific methods and it is not our\nfault if we always find ourselves in the realms of childishness. The\nrevolver then triumphs over the sword and it should be apparent even\nto the maker of childish axioms that superior force is no mere act of\nthe will but requires very real preliminary conditions for the\ncarrying out of its purposes, especially mechanical instruments, the\nmore highly developed of which have the superiority over the less\nhighly developed. Furthermore these tools must be produced, whence it\nappears that the producer of the more highly developed tool of force,\ncommonly called weapon, triumphs over the producer of the less highly\ndeveloped tool. In a word, the triumph of force depends upon the\nproduction of weapons, therefore upon economic power, on economic\nconditions, on the ability to organize actual material instruments.\n\nForce at the present day implies the army and the navy, and the two of\nthem cost, to our sorrow, a heap of money. But force cannot make\nmoney, on the contrary it gets away very fast with what is made, and\nit does not make good use of it as we have just discovered painfully\nwith respect to the French indemnity. Money must therefore finally be\nprovided by means of economic production, force is thus again limited\nby the economic conditions which shape the means of making and\nmaintaining the instruments of production. But that is not all by any\nmeans. Nothing is more dependent upon economic conditions than armies\nand fleets. Arming, concentration, organization, tactics, strategy,\ndepend before anything else upon the degree of development in\nproduction and transportation. In the trade of war the free\ninventiveness of liberal-minded generals has never worked a\nrevolution, but the discovery of better weapons and the change in\nmilitary equipment have never failed to do so. The inventiveness of\nthe general under the most favorable conditions finds its limitations\nin the adaptation of methods of warfare to the new weapons and the new\nsoldiers.\n\nAt the beginning of the fourteenth century gunpowder was brought from\nthe Arabs to Western Europe and, as every schoolboy knows, entirely\nrevolutionized warfare. The introduction of gunpowder and firearms was\nhowever by no means an act of force but an industrial and therefore\neconomic advance. Industry is still industry whether its object in\nthe creation or the destruction of material things. The introduction\nof firearms not only produced a revolution in the methods of warfare\nbut also in the relations of master and subject. Trade and money are\nconcomitants of gunpowder and firearms and these former imply the\nbourgeoisie. Firearms from the first were bourgeois instruments of\nwarfare employed on behalf of the rising monarchy against the feudal\nnobility. The hitherto unassailable stone castles of the nobles\nsubmitted to the cannon of the burghers, the fire of their guns\npierced the mail armor of the knights. The supremacy of the nobility\nfell with the heavily armed cavalry of the nobility. With the\ndevelopment of the bourgeoisie, infantry and artillery became more and\nmore the important arms of the service and because of artillery the\ntrade of war had to create another industrial subdivision, to-wit,\nengineering.\n\nThe development of firearms proceeded very slowly. Shooting remained\nclumsy and small arms were ineffective in spite of many individual\ninventions. Three hundred years elapsed before a musket was produced\nwhich sufficed for the arming of a complete infantry. First at the\nbeginning of the eighteenth century, a musket with a bayonet attached,\nwhich discharged a stone superseded the pike as an infantry weapon.\nThe infantry of that day was exceedingly unreliable, only kept\ntogether by physical force, composed of the basest elements of\nsociety, frequently made up of men picked up by the press gang and\nprisoners of war intermingled with soldiers recruited by the various\nprinces. The only fighting formation in which these soldiers could be\nmade to use the new weapon was the linear tactic, which reached its\nhighest development under Frederick II. The whole infantry of an army\nwas drawn up in a very long hollow square three files deep and\nadvanced in battle array en masse. It was usually permitted to one of\nthe two wings to be a little in advance or a little in the rear. This\nhelpless body could only advance and keep its formation on perfectly\nlevel ground and then only at a slow marching time (seventy-five steps\nto the minute) a change of formation during the fight was impossible\nand victory or defeat was determined rapidly at a stroke as soon as\nthe infantry came under fire.\n\nThese helpless lines in the American Revolutionary War came into\ncollision with the rebel troops, which certainly could not drill but\ncould shoot so much the better in that they were fighting for their\nown interests and therefore did not desert like the enlisted soldiers.\nThese did not, like the English, deploy in massed bodies on the open\nfield, but in rapidly moving bodies of sharpshooters in the thick\nwoods. The organised lines were here powerless and had to contend\nagainst invisible and unapproachable foes. The sharpshooters thereupon\nwere brought into existence as a part of the army organization--a new\nmethod of fighting arising from a change in the military material.\n\nWhat the American Revolution began the French completed in the\nmilitary realm. To the drilled troops of the Coalition the French\nRevolution opposed soldiers who were badly drilled but who constituted\nlarge masses, the product of the whole nation. Some means had to be\ndiscovered of protecting Paris with these masses. That could not be\ndone without victory in the open field. A mere musketry engagement\nwould not suffice, a form would have to be discovered by which the\nmasses could be utilized and this was found in the column. The column\nformation allowed slightly drilled troops to keep better order and by\nmeans of a better marching speed (one hundred steps to the minute)\nallowed it to break through the stiff old-fashioned line arrangement.\nIt was possible by this formation to fight in country unsuitable to\nthe line formation, to mass troops in places suitable, to associate\nscattered sharpshooters with the columns, to keep back, occupy and\nwear the lines of the enemy, until the decisive movement came when a\ncharge could be made by the troops held in reserve. This new method of\ncombining riflemen and columns and making a complete army corps\nconsisting of all arms, which was fully developed on its tactical and\nstrategic side by Napoleon, was only rendered possible by the change\nin military material brought about by the French Revolution. There\nwere still two very important technical preliminaries, first the\nmaking of light carriages for field pieces which were constructed by\nGribevaul by means of which alone the required quick advance was\nrendered possible, and making the army rifle a more precise weapon by\nadapting to it some of the features of the hunting rifle. Without\nthese improvements military sharpshooting would have been impossible.\n\nThe revolutionary method of arming the entire population was subjected\nto certain limitations and chiefly as regards the excusing of the well\nto do, and in this form became common to most of the great continental\ncountries. Prussia alone sought by its militia system to make the\nentire force of its people available for military purposes. Prussia\nwas the first state to provide its entire infantry with the latest\nweapons, and to place officers in the rear, since between 1830 and\n1860 trained officers leading their troops had played an unimportant\npart. The results of 1866 were largely due to these innovations.\n\nIn the Franco Prussian War two armies came into contact both of which\nhad their officers in the rear and which both used substantially the\nsame tactics as in the time of the old smooth bore flintlocks. The\nPrussians however by the introduction of company columns had made an\nattempt to discover a method of fighting more suitable to the new\nsystem of arming. But on the 18th of August at St. Privat the Prussian\nguard which employed the company column formation lost the most part\nof five regiments, over a third of its strength in two hours (176\nofficers and 5114 men) after which the company column form of battle\norder came in for no less criticism than the battalion column form and\nthe line formation. Every attempt to oppose a solid formation to the\nfire of the enemy was thereafter abandoned. The battle was thereafter,\non the German side, carried on by dense swarms of riflemen into which\nthe columns dissolved under the fire of the enemy spontaneously,\nwithout orders from the superior officers, and this was, in fact, the\nonly possible method of advance under fire. The private soldier was\nagain cleverer than his officer; he had discovered the only form of\nfighting formation, and set himself to follow it in spite of the\nresistance of his leaders.\n\nIn the Franco-German war there is a point of departure of entirely\ndifferent significance from all preceding wars. In the first place the\nweapons are now so complete that a new revolutionary departure in this\nrespect is no longer possible. When you have cannon with which you can\ndecimate a battalion as far as your eye can make it out, and when you\nhave rifles by which you can aim at individuals, and which take less\ntime to load than to aim, all further advances as far as battle in the\nfield goes are immaterial. The era of progress on this side is\nsubstantially closed. In the second place, however, this war has\ninduced all the great states of the continent to adopt the highly\ndeveloped Prussian militia system and thus to take up a military\nburden which will ruin them in a few years. The army has become the\nmain object of the state, it has become an object in itself. The\npeople only exist to furnish and maintain soldiers. Militarism\ndominates and devours Europe. But this militarism has in it the seeds\nof its own destruction. The competition of the various states with\neach other necessitates the spending of more money every year on the\narmy, the fleet, weapons of destruction, etc., and thus accelerates\nfinancial breakdown. On the other hand, with the increasingly rigid\nmilitary service, the whole people becomes familiar with the use of\nmilitary weapons. It therefore becomes able at some time to impose its\nwill upon the dominating military authority. And this time arrives as\nsoon as the mass of the people--country and city workers and\nfarmers--has the will. At this point the army of the classes becomes\nthe army of the masses, the machine refuses to do the work, militarism\ngoes under in the dialectic of its own development. What the bourgeois\ndemocrats of 1848 could not accomplish, just because they were\nbourgeois and not proletarian, namely the endowment of the laboring\nmasses with a will, the content of which corresponded with their class\ncondition, socialism will certainly accomplish. And that means the\ndestruction of militarism and with it of all standing armies\nabsolutely and entirely.\n\nThat is the moral of our history of modern infantry. The second moral\nwhich brings us back to Herr Duehring is that the entire organization\nand methods of warfare of modern armies and, with them, victory and\ndefeat, are dependent upon material things, that is upon economic\nconditions, upon soldier material and upon weapon material and\ntherefore upon the quality of a population and upon technique. Only a\nhunting people like the Americans could rediscover the sharpshooter.\nNow the Yankees of the old States have, from purely economic causes,\nbecome transformed into farmers, industrialists, sailors and\nmerchants, who no longer shoot in the primeval forests and on that\naccount have become all the more successful in the field of\nspeculation where they have developed into colossal appropriators.\nOnly a Revolution like the French which emancipated the burghers and\nstill more the peasants could discover the simultaneously massed\narmies and free advance by which they overcame the stiff old line\nformation, the military product of the absolutism against which they\nfought. And as for the advances in technique as soon as they were\napplicable and were applied, forthwith changes, nay revolutions, in\nthe methods of warfare were at once made, often against the will of\nthe military leaders as we have seen over and over again to be the\ncase. A diligent subaltern could explain to Herr Duehring how at the\npresent day the making of war is dependent upon the productivity and\nmeans of communication of the back country as well as of the theatre\nof war. In short, economic conditions and means of power are always\nthe things which help \"force\" to victory, and without them \"force\"\ncomes to an end. So that he who would reform the art of war according\nto the axioms of Herr Duehring would only get a flogging for his\npains.\n\nIf we go from the land to the sea we shall discover a complete\nrevolution, even within the last twenty years. The warship of the\nCrimean War was the wooden three decker, with from sixty to a hundred\nguns, which depended upon its sailing power and had only a weak\nauxiliary steam engine. It carried in general thirty-two pounders of\nabout sixty hundred weight and only a few sixty-eight pounders of\nninety-five hundred weight. At the end of the war ironclad floating\nbatteries were used, clumsy and slow but impregnable to the artillery\nof that time. Very soon iron plates were placed on the warships, at\nfirst thin, four inches thickness of iron was then considered to\nconstitute a remarkably great thickness. But the progress in artillery\nsoon discounted the thickness of armour, for every addition to the\narmour there was a new and more powerful artillery which pierced it\nwith the greatest ease. So now we have warships with ten, twelve,\nfourteen, twenty-four inches of armour plate (the Italians are going\nto build a warship with armourplate three feet thick) on the one hand\nand on the other hand guns which reach to a hundred tons and which\nhurl projectiles amounting to two thousand pounds in weight to unheard\nof distances. The modern war vessel is a rapid travelling armoured\nscrew steamer of eight to ten thousand tons and of from six to eight\nthousand horse power provided with turrets and four or six very\npowerful big guns, together with a ram at the bow below the water line\nfor the purpose of destroying the ship of the enemy. It is a colossal\nmachine in which steam not only furnishes the driving power but also\nsteers, raises the anchor, moves the towers, aims and loads the guns,\nworks the pumps, takes in and lowers the boats, which are frequently\nsteamers, and so forth. And the contest between the armour plate and\nthe projectile is so far from having been settled that a ship is\nto-day practically obsolete as soon as it has left the ways. The\nmodern warship is not only a product of modern industry but a\nmasterpiece, a product of the dissipation of wealth. The country in\nwhich the greater industry has developed the most completely has a\nmonopoly of shipbuilding. All the Turkish, almost all the Russian and\nthe greater part of the German warships are built in England. Armour\nplate of the best type is made almost exclusively in Germany. Of the\nthree iron foundries which are alone in the position to turn out the\nheaviest artillery, two of them, Woolwich and Elswick, are in England,\nthe third Krupp's is in Germany. Here it may be seen that the pure\npolitical power which Herr Duehring maintains to be the original\nreason for economic conditions is on the contrary inseparable from\neconomic conditions and that not only the existence but the very\nmanagement of the tool of force on the sea, the warship, is in itself\na branch of modern industry. And that this is so gives nobody more\ntrouble than just that force, the state, which has now to pay more for\none ship than it had formerly for a small fleet and sees that these\nexpensive ships are obsolete as soon as they are launched. And the\nstate is just as much upset as Herr Duehring would be over the fact\nthat the controller of the economic force of the ship, the engineer,\nis a much more important person than the man of pure force, the\ncaptain. On the other hand we have no further grounds for annoyance\nwhen we see that how as a result of this contest between armour plate\nand projectile the battle ship has arrived at the point when it is as\nexpensive as it is unfit for fighting and that this contest shows the\ndialectic law of progress at work in naval warfare according to which\nmilitarism like every other historical phenomenon must come to an end\nas a result of its own development.\n\nWe can thus see as plain as noonday that it is not true that \"the\noriginal reason must be sought in pure political force and not in\nindirect economic force.\" Quite the contrary. Economic force is the\ncontrol of the power of the great industry. Political force in naval\nmatters which is dependent upon modern ships of war is by no means\n\"pure force\" but is involved in economic force, in the advanced\ndevelopment of metallurgy, in the mastery of historical technique and\nthe possession of rich coal-fields.\n\n\n_IV. Force Theory (Conclusion)._\n\n(Herr Duehring makes an argument which is briefly summarised by Engels\nas follows and which may be said to involve the notion that the\nmonopolization of land is the cause of human slavery and is the\nproduct of force. Engels proceeds):\n\nThesis--The domination of nature by man is the reason of the\ndomination of man by man.\n\nProof--The existence of landlordism on a large scale cannot be carried\non anywhere except by means of slavery.\n\nProof of proof--Landlordism on a large scale cannot exist without\nslavery because the great landlord with his own family without the\nhelp of slaves can only cultivate a small piece of his property.\n\nTherefore, in order to show that man cannot subdue nature without the\nsubjugation of his fellowman, Herr Duehring transforms \"nature\"\nforthwith into \"private ownership of large tracts of land\" and this\nindefinite private ownership into the ownership exercised by a great\nlandlord, who naturally cannot cultivate his land without slaves.\n\nIn the first place the domination of nature and the cultivation of\nprivate landed property do not imply the same thing. The domination of\nnature in industrial affairs is displayed in a manner altogether\ndifferent from that in agricultural affairs, for these latter are\nalways at the mercy of the climate instead of being supreme over the\nclimate.\n\nIn the second place if we limit ourselves to the exploitation of\nprivate property in land in large amounts we come to the question as\nto whom the land belongs. We find that in the beginnings of civilised\npeoples the land was not owned by great landlords but was held in\ncommon by tribal and village communities. From India to Ireland the\nexploitation of land property in large tracts has proceeded from the\ntribal and village communal ownership which was the original form.\nSometimes the land was cultivated in common for the benefit of the\ncommon members, sometimes in separate pieces, parcelled by the\ncommunity to separate families from time to time with wood and willow\nland retained for communal use.\n\nIt is pure imagination on the part of Herr Duehring to declare that\nthe exploitation of landed property is responsible for the existence\nof master and servant. Who is the owner of private landed property in\nthe entire Orient where the land is possessed by the community or the\nState and the word landlord is not to be found in the language? The\nTurks first introduced a species of feudalism into the lands which\nthey conquered. The Greeks in heroic times had a classified system of\nrank which itself bore witness to a long unknown preceding history,\nbut the land was then cultivated by an independent peasantry. The\nlarge possessions of the nobles and leaders of the tribes were the\nexception and had no permanence. Italy was originally cultivated by\nsmall peasant farmers; when in the latter days of the Roman Republic\nthe great holdings, the _latifundia_ destroyed the small\nfarmer-holdings, cattle raising was substituted for agriculture, and\nas Pliny points out Italy was ruined (_latifundia Italiam perdidere_).\nIn the whole of Europe during the Middle Ages small farming was the\nrule and it is very appropriate to the above discussion to note what\ntasks these peasants were obliged to perform for the feudal lords. The\nFrisians, lower Saxons, Flemings and people from the lower Rhine who\ninvaded the lands of the Slavs to the east of the Elbe and cultivated\nthem did so under very favorable terms of rent but by no means under a\nspecies of slavery. In North America, by far the greatest amount of\nthe land is cultivated by the labor of free small farmers, while the\ngreat landed proprietors of the South with their slaves and\nextravagant farming methods destroyed the soil until the land ceased\nto be productive and the cultivation of cotton travelled ever\nWestward. In Australia and New Zealand the attempts to artificially\nestablish an agrarian aristocracy by the British government have\nfailed. In short, if we except the tropical and sub-tropical colonies,\nin which the climate is prohibitive of agriculture by Europeans, it\nseems that the idea of a great land holding class originally\ndominating nature by means of the employment of slaves and serfs is a\npure product of the imagination. Things are quite otherwise. If one\ngoes to the older countries like Italy the land was not waste\noriginally but the transformation of the agricultural land cultivated\nby the small farmers into cattle-land utterly ruined the country.\n\nLatterly, for the first time since the growth in the intensity of the\npopulation has increased the value of land and especially since the\nprogress in agriculture has made possible the reclamation of poor\nlands, the greater landlordism has begun to obtain possession of waste\nand pasture lands and has stolen the old communal lands of the\npeasants in this country, as well in England as in Germany. And this\nhas not happened without a counter-poise. For every acre of common\nland which the great landlords in England converted into arable land\nthey have made at least three acres of arable land in Scotland into\nshooting preserves and mere places for the hunting of wild animals.\n\nWe have to consider the declaration of Herr Duehring to the effect\nthat the cultivation of large parcels of land has not come into\nexistence otherwise than through great landlords and their slaves, a\ndeclaration which we have seen implies an entire ignorance of history.\nWe have now to see how far at different epochs the cultivation of the\nsoil has been carried on by means of slaves, as in the palmy days of\nGreece, or by means of tenants, like the socage tenure, since the\nMiddle Ages, and then what has been the social function of the greater\nlandlordism at different periods of history.\n\nIf Herr Duehring means that the mastery of man by men as a preliminary\nto the mastery of nature by man is a universal law, that our present\neconomic condition, the stage attained to-day in agriculture and\nindustry, is the result of a society which has developed itself in\nclass antagonisms, in mastership on the one hand and in slavery on the\nother hand, he says something which is a mere commonplace since the\npublication of the Communist Manifesto. We have thus to explain the\nexistence of these classes and when Herr Duehring has no further\nexplanation to give than \"force\" we are right back at the beginning\nagain. The mere fact that the subject and the plundered have always\nbeen more numerous and that therefore the actual force has rested with\nthem is enough to show the stupidity of the entire force theory. We\nhave therefore still to explain the origin of master and subject\nclasses. They have come into being in two ways.\n\nWhen men originally sprang from the lower animals they came into\nhistory, still half-wild animals, elementary, with no power over the\nforces of nature, still unacquainted with their own powers, as poor as\nthe animals and hardly more productive than they. There prevailed a\ncertain equality in the conditions of life and as far as the heads of\nfamilies were concerned an equality of social condition--there was at\nleast an absence of those class distinctions which developed later in\nthe agricultural communities. In such a social state there were\ncertain common interests which overrode the interests of the\nindividual in certain respects, the settlement of disputes, the\nrepression of individuals who exceeded their rights, the looking after\nthe water supply, particularly in hot countries, and finally under the\nconditions of life in the primeval forests, religious functions. We\nfind analogous communal duties exercised by communal officials at all\nperiods as well in the oldest German mark communities as in India\nto-day. These are contemporaneous with a sort of beginning of\nauthority and state power in a rudimentary form. The productive forces\ndevelop; a denser population produces common and then conflicting\ninterests between members of the society, the grouping of which in\naccordance with a new division of labor causes the creation of new\norgans for the purpose of maintaining the society on the one hand and\nrepressing the antagonistic interests on the other. These organs which\nact for the entire group have different forms according to the varying\ncircumstances of the individual groups, partly through the natural\ngrowth of a hereditary leadership in a world where everything proceeds\nnaturally and partly through a growing need owing to the development\nof conflicts with other groups. How these social functions which were\nsubsidiary to society came in the course of time to triumph over\nsociety; how the original servant, under favorable conditions became\ntransformed into the master, how, according to circumstances, this\nmaster made his appearance as Oriental despot or satrap, as Greek\nchieftain, as Celtic clan chief, etc., how far he relied on force for\nthis transformation and finally how the individual leaders associated\nthemselves into a dominant class we have here no opportunity to\nconsider. We can only state that real social duties lay at the base of\nthe political domination and that the political supremacy has only\nexisted as long as the politically supreme fulfilled these social\nfunctions. How many despotisms have risen and fallen among the\nPersians and Hindoos, and everybody knows quite well that the public\nmanagement of the irrigation was the prime necessity of agriculture in\nthose places. The \"educated\" English were the first to observe this\namong the Hindoos; they let the canals and locks fall into disuse and\nthey have now discovered by the regular recurrence of famine that they\nhave neglected the only opportunity to make their rule at least as\nrighteous as that of their predecessors.\n\nBut there is another form of class distinction besides the one\ndescribed. The natural division of labor in the agricultural families\npermitted at a certain point of prosperity the introduction of foreign\nlabor power. This was particularly the case in countries where the old\ncommon ownership of the soil had disappeared or where at least the old\nsystem of common cultivation had become supplanted by the cultivation\nof separate plots by individual families. Production had so far\ndeveloped that the human labor force was able to produce more than was\nnecessary for the support of the individual laborer. The time was ripe\nfor the employment of more labor-power, labor-power had become a\nvalue. But the limitations of the communal system did not afford any\nattainable surplus labor power. Yet war did give such an opportunity\nfor getting surplus labor power and war was as old as the simultaneous\nexistence of groups of communal groups in close juxtaposition. Up to\nthis time men did not take prisoners of war, they killed them right\noff, and, at a still earlier date, they ate them. But at the stage of\neconomic development of which we speak they had a value and they were\nnot only allowed to live but were set to work. So force instead of\nbeing the master of economic conditions was pressed into the service\nof those conditions. Slavery was discovered. It soon became the\ndominant form of production among all people who had developed beyond\nthe tribal communal stage and as a matter of fact was at the end one\nof the main reasons for the break up of the communal system. Slavery\nfirst made the division of labor between agriculture and industry\ncompletely possible and brought into existence the flower of the old\nworld, Greece. Without slavery there would have been no Grecian state,\nno Grecian art and science and no Roman Empire. There would have been\nno modern Europe without the foundation of Greece and Rome. We must\nnot forget that our entire economic, political and intellectual\ndevelopment has its foundation in a state of society in which slavery\nwas regarded universally as necessary. In this sense we may say that\nwithout the ancient slavery there would have been no modern socialism.\n\nIt is very easy to make preachments about slavery and to express our\nmoral indignation at such a scandalous institution. Unfortunately the\nwhole significance of this is that it merely says that these old\ninstitutions do not correspond with our present conditions and the\nsentiments engendered by these conditions. We do not however in this\nway explain how these institutions came into existence, why they came\ninto existence and the role which they have played in history. And\nwhen we enter upon this matter we are obliged to say in spite of all\ncontradiction and accusations of heresy that the introduction of\nslavery under the conditions of that time was a great step forwards.\nIt is a fact that man sprang from the lower animals and has had to\nemploy barbaric and really bestial methods in order to rid himself of\nbarbarism. The old communal system where it persisted built up the\nmost elementary form of the state, Oriental despotism, from India to\nRussia. Only where it has been dissolved has the people progressed and\nthe next economic step lay in the development of production by means\nof slave labor. It is evident that as long as human labor was so\nlittle productive that it afforded only a small surplus over the\nnecessary means of life, the development of the productive forces, the\ninstitution of commerce, the development of the State and of law and\nthe foundation of art and science were only possible through an\nincrease in the subdivision of labor. This implied the broad division\nbetween the mass of the workers and the directors of labor, trade,\nstate, state-business, and later the occupation of a few privileged\npersons in art and science. The simplest and most natural form of this\nsubdivision of labor was slavery. In the conditions of the ancient,\nand especially the Greek world, the advance to a society founded on\nclass distinction could only be for the slaves, the prisoners of war\nfrom whom the majority of slaves were recruited instead of being\nmurdered as they would have been at an earlier date or instead of\nbeing eaten as they would have been at a stage still earlier.\n\nHere we add that all the historical antitheses of robbers and robbed of\nmaster and subject classes find their explanation in the relatively\nundeveloped productivity of human labor. As long as the actual working\npeople claim that they have no time left at the close of their necessary\nlabors to attend to the common business of society--the organization of\nlabor, the business of the government, the administration of justice,\nart, science, etc., just so long will distinct classes exist which are\nfree from actual labor to carry on these functions. Naturally these\nclasses do not hesitate to lean more and more and more upon the\nshoulders of the working class for their own advantage. The development\nof the great industry with its enormous increase in the forces of\nproduction for the first time permitted of the subdivision of labor in\nall social grades and thus allowed of the reduction of the time\nnecessary for labor so that enough leisure remains for all to take part\nin the actual public business--theoretical as well as practical. So that\nnow for the first time the dominant and exploiting classes have become\nsuperfluous and even an obstacle to social progress, and so now for the\nfirst time they will be unceremoniously brushed aside in spite of their\n\"pure force.\"\n\nWhen Herr Duehring then shows his scorn of the Greek civilisation\nbecause it was founded on slavery he might just as reasonably reproach\nthe Greeks for not having steam engines and electric telegraphs. And\nwhen he explains that our modern wage slavery is only a somewhat\ntransformed and ameliorated inheritance of chattel slavery and not to\nbe explained from itself (that is from the economic laws of modern\nsociety) it only signifies that wage slavery, like chattel slavery, is\na form of class domination and class subjection as every child knows,\nor it is false. So we might with the same right maintain that wage\nslavery is only a milder form of cannibalism, the established\noriginal method of disposing of conquered enemies.\n\nThe role which force has played in history with respect to economic\ndevelopment is therefore clear. In the first place, all political\nforce rests originally on an economic social function, and developed\nin proportion as the old tribal communistic society was dissolved and\ntransformed into various grades of private producers, and the\nadministrators of the communal functions therefore became more widely\nseparated from the rest of the community. In the second place, when\npolitical force, independent of society, has transformed itself from\nthe position of servant to that of master, it may work in two\ndirections. In the first place, it may work sensibly and in the\ndirection of general economic development. In this case there is no\nquarrel between the two, economic development is advanced. Or it may\nwork against it and then with few exceptions it succumbs to the\neconomic development. These few exceptions consist of individual cases\nof tyranny where barbaric conquerors have overcome a country and have\ndestroyed the economic forces which they did not know how to handle.\nThus the Christians in Spain destroyed the irrigation works upon which\nthe highly developed agriculture and horticulture of that country\ndepended. Every conquest by a more barbarous people interferes with\neconomic development and destroys numerous productive forces. But in\nthe great majority of instances of the permanent conquest of a\ncountry, the more barbaric conquerors are obliged to adopt the higher\neconomic conditions into which their conquest has brought them. They\nare assimilated into the conquered people and are compelled to adopt\ntheir language. But where--apart from instances of conquest--the inner\npolitical forces of a country comes in conflict with its economic\ndevelopment, which at the present day is practically true of all\npolitical force, the battle has always ended with the destruction of\nthe political force. Without exception and inexorably, economic\ndevelopment has attained its goal. The last most striking example of\nwhich we have already called attention to, the French Revolution. If,\nas according to Herr Duehring's teachings, the economic development\nand the economic conditions of a certain country are altogether\ndependent upon political forces there is no explanation of the fact\nthat Frederick William IV after 1848 could not succeed, in spite of\nhis army, in attaching the guilds of the Middle Ages and other\nromantic tomfooleries to the steam-engines, railroads and the newly\ndeveloping greater industry, or why the Czar who is still much more\npowerful could not only not pay his debts but could not collect his\nforces without drawing on the credit of the economic conditions of\nWestern Europe.\n\nAccording to Herr Duehring force is the absolute evil. The first act\nof force is to him the first fall into sin. His whole conception is a\npreachment over the infection of all history up to the present time\nwith the original sin. He talks about the disgraceful falsifying of\nall natural and social laws by the invention of the devil, force. That\nforce plays another role in history, a revolutionary role, that it is\nin the words of Marx, the midwife of the old society which is pregnant\nwith the new, that it is the tool by the means of which social\nprogress is forwarded, and foolish, dead political forms\ndestroyed,--of that Herr Duehring has no word to say, only with sighs\nand groans does he admit the possibility that force may be necessary\nfor the overthrow of a thievish economic system. He simply declares\nthat every application of force demoralizes him who uses it. And this\nin spite of the moral and intellectual uplift which has followed every\nvictorious revolution. He says this in Germany, too, where a powerful\nand necessary uprising would at least have the advantage of abolishing\nthe slavish snobbery of the national mind which has prevailed since\nthe humiliation of the Thirty Years War. And this foolish and\nsenseless sort of preaching is set up in opposition to the most\nrevolutionary party known to history.\n\n\n_V. Theory of Value._\n\nIt is now about a hundred years since a book appeared in Leipsic which\nby the beginning of this century had gone through thirty-one editions\nand which was distributed throughout the towns and the country\ndistricts by officials, preachers and humanitarians, of all sorts, and\nwhich was universally adopted in the schools as a reader. This book\nwas called, \"The Children's Friend\" by Rochow. It had the object of\nteaching the children of the peasant and laboring classes their\nvocation in life and their duties to their social and political\nsuperiors, and making them satisfied with their lot in life, with\nblack bread and potatoes, compulsory servitude, low wages, fatherly\nbeatings and other similar agreeable things. In pursuit of this end,\nthe youth in town and country was informed what a wise provision of\nnature it was that man was obliged to get his food and enjoyment by\nmeans of his labor, and how fortunate the peasant and handworker ought\nto feel that they were able to spice their food with hard labor while\nthe spendthrift and the picture suffered the pangs of indigestion or\nlack of appetite. These commonplaces which old Rochow thought good\nenough for the peasant children of his day have been elevated into\nthe \"absolute fundamental\" of the newest political economy by Herr\nDuehring.\n\nValue is defined as follows by Herr Duehring \"Value is what economic\ngoods and activities will fetch in exchange.\" What they will fetch is\nshown \"by the price or some other equivalent, wages for example.\" In\nother words Value is price. Or not to do Herr Duehring an injury and\nto show the absolute absurdity of his definition in his own language,\n\"Value is prices.\" On page 19 he says \"Value and its prices expressed\nin money\" and he also affirms that the same value has very different\nprices and therefore has different values. If Hegel had not died long\nago he would hang himself out of pure jealousy, for, with all his\ntheology, he could not have produced this value which has as many\ndifferent values as it has prices. One would have to possess the\nconfidence of Herr Duehring to begin a new and more profound treatment\nof political economy with the declaration that there is no difference\nbetween value and price except that one is expressed in terms of money\nand the other is not.\n\n(After gentle raillery of Duehring's statements Engels proceeds.)\n\nThe actual, practical value of an object according to Herr Duehring\nconsists in two things, first in the amount of human labor contained\nin it and secondly in a forcibly imposed tax. In other words value as\nit exists to-day is a monopoly price. If all wares have this monopoly\nprice, as according to this theory, only two things are possible.\nEither every buyer, as buyer, loses what he made as seller, for prices\nhave only changed their names, they are really the same, everything\nremains as it was and the much talked of exchange value is merely\nimaginary, or the imposed cost represents real values, values\nproduced by the working value-making class, but taken by the\nmonopolising class, and this sum of values is simply unpaid labor. In\nthis latter case we come, in spite of the force theory, and the\ncompulsory taxation theory and the special exchange value theory back\nagain to the Marxian theory of value.\n\nThe fixing of the value of a commodity by wages which is frequently\nconfused by Adam Smith with the fixing of value by the time expended\nin labor has been, since the time of Ricardo, denounced by political\neconomists and only to-day persists in popular economics. It is now\nthe sycophants of the existing capitalistic system who declare that\nvalue is fixed by wages and therefore declare the profits of the\ncapitalists to be higher kind of wages, wages of abstinence, in that\nthe capitalist has not dissipated his capital, wages of\nsuperintendence, premiums on risks, etc. Herr Duehring only differs\nfrom them in that he calls profits robbery. In other words Herr\nDuehring founds his socialism on the worst teachings of the popular\neconomists. His popular economics and his socialism stand or fall\ntogether.\n\nIt is clear that what a workman accomplishes and what he costs are\ndifferent matters from what a machine makes and what it costs. The\nvalue which a workman makes in a day of twelve hours has nothing in\ncommon with the value of the means of life which he consumes in this\nworking day and the periods of rest in connection with it. There may\nbe one, three, four or seven hours of labor time incorporated in these\nmeans of livelihood according to the stage of the productivity of\nlabor. Let us take seven hours as the necessary time for the\nproduction of them. Then Herr Duehring and the vulgar economists\ndeclare that the product of twelve hours labor has the value of the\nproduct of seven hours labor or in other words twelve is equal to\nseven. To make the matter more explicit, a peasant produces say twenty\nhectolitres of wheat in a year. During this time he consumes a sum of\nvalues which may be expressed by fifteen hectolitres. Then the twenty\nhectolitres have the same value as the fifteen in the same market\nunder identical conditions. In other words 20 equals 15. And this is\ncalled political economy!\n\nThe entire development of human society from the position of savagery\nbegan from the day when the labor of a family resulted in the\nproduction of more than was necessity for its support, from the day\nwhen a part of the labor was no longer expended on mere means of\nliving but was transformed into means of production. A surplus of\nlabor product over and above the cost of the maintenance of labor, and\nthe creation and increase of a social production and reserve fund out\nof this surplus was and is the foundation of all social, political and\nintellectual development. In history up to the present time this fund\nhas been the property of a certain superior class which has, with its\npossession, also the political mastery and the spiritual supremacy.\nThe approaching social revolution will make this social production and\nreserve fund that is the entire mass of raw material, instruments of\nproduction, and means of life for the first time really social\nproperty, in that it will put an end to its monopolisation by the\nsuperior class and make it the common possession of the entire\nsociety.\n\nIt is one of two things. Suppose value shows itself in the cost of\nmaintenance of the necessary labor, that is in present society in\nwages. If such is the case every worker gets the value of his product\nin wages and the robbery of the working class by the capitalistic\nclass is an impossibility. Let it be granted that the cost of\nmaintaining a worker in a given society is three marks. Then the daily\nproduct of the worker is, according to the popular economist, of the\nvalue of three marks. Now let us consider that the capitalist who\nemploys this worker takes a profit on this product and sells it for\nfour marks. Other capitalists do the same thing. But thereupon the\nworker can no longer maintain himself with three marks a day, it will\ncost him four marks. Other conditions remaining the same, wages\nexpressed in terms of the means of life must remain the same and wages\nexpressed in gold will rise therefore from three to four marks daily.\nWhat the capitalists gain in the form of profit on the working class\nthey have to return in the form of wages. So we are just where we were\nat the beginning. If wages signify value, no plunder of the working\nclass by the capitalist is possible. But the creation of a surplus is\nimpossible if, according to our hypothesis the workers consume as much\nas they produce. And since the capitalists produce no value it is\nimpossible to see how they can live. And if such a surplus of\nproduction over consumption does exist, if such a production and\nreserve fund exists in the hands of the capitalists there is no other\nexplanation possible than that the working class uses only enough\nvalues for its own maintenance and turns over the rest of the goods\nwhich it produces to the capitalist.\n\nOn the other hand, if this production and reserve fund actually exists\nin the hands of the capitalist class, if it has really come into\nexistence through the piling up of profits, (we will leave rent out of\nthe question for the present); it necessarily comes from the\naccumulated profits of the capitalist class taken from the working\nclass over and above the sums paid by the capitalist class to the\nworking class in the form of wages. Value therefore does not depend\nupon wages, but upon amount of labor. The working class renders to the\ncapitalist class a greater amount of value than it receives in wages\nand thus the profit of capital as of all other forms of the\nappropriation of unpaid for products of labor is to be explained on\nthe simple ground of the surplus value discovered by Marx.\n\n\n_VI. Simple and Compound Labor._\n\n(The argument of Duehring against which Engels here directs his\nefforts may be best summed up in Duehring's concluding words \"Marx in\nhis utterances on value cannot escape the lurking ghost of highly\nskilled labor. The prevalent notion of the intellectual classes has\nbeen a hindrance to him in this matter, for according to this idea it\nis an enormity to reckon the labor time of a barrow pusher and an\narchitect as economic equivalents.\")\n\nEngels thereupon says \"the passage in the works of Marx which caused\nthis outbreak on the part of Duehring is very short.\" Marx is\nexamining the question as to the basis of the value of commodities and\nanswers it by the statement that it is the amount of human labor\ncontained in them. \"This\" he goes on \"is the expression of that simple\nlabor force which belongs to the average human being without any\nspecial development. Skilled labor is a power or rather a multiple of\nsimple labor, so that a small amount of skilled labor is equivalent to\na larger amount of unskilled labor. Practice shows that this reduction\nto the terms of unskilled labor takes place. A commodity may be the\nproduct of skilled labor, its value may be equivalent to a product of\nunskilled labor skilled labor. The proportion in which different forms\nof labor are reduced to their general standard in unskilled labor is\nestablished by a social process going on behind the backs of the\nproducers, and appears to them merely customary.\"\n\nHere Marx is only dealing with the value of commodities, that is of\nobjects produced and exchanged by private producers in a society\nconsisting of private producers producing for their own profit. He is\ntherefore not concerned here with \"absolute value\" whatever that may\nbe but only with the value which is realised in a given form of\nsociety. This value under the given social conditions is shaped and\nmeasured by the human labor incorporated in the commodities and this\nhuman labor shows itself as the expression of simple human energy. But\nevery piece of work is not merely an expression of simple labor force.\nVery many labor products require the expenditure of more or less time,\nmoney, trouble, and acquired skill or knowledge. Do these kinds of\ncompound labor show at the same period of time the same commodity\nvalues as simple labor, are they the expression of merely simple labor\nforce? Evidently not. The product of an hour of compound labor is a\ncommodity of higher, double or three times the value of a product of\nan hour of simple labor. The value of the product of compound labor\ncan in this comparison be expressed through the measure of simple\nlabor; and this reduction of compound labor is carried on by means of\na social progress behind the back of the producer, by means of which\ncan here be established according to the theory of value but not\nexplained.\n\nThe thing which Marx states here is a simple fact which happens every\nday before our eyes in the present capitalistic society.\n\n(After some invective and satire hurled at Duehring Engels proceeds:)\n\nLet us examine with regard to equality of value a little more closely.\nAll labor time is of equal value, that of the barrow pusher and that\nof the architect. Therefore labor time and consequently labor itself\nhas a value. But labor is the creator of all values. It is the only\nthing which gives the original products of nature a value in the\neconomic sense. Value in itself is nothing but the expression in a\ngiven object of necessary, social, human labor. One might just as well\nspeak of and fix a value to labor as speak of the value of value, of\nthe weight, not of a specific body, but of gravity itself. Herr\nDuehring calls people like Owen, St. Simon and Fourier, social\nalchemists. When he invents a value for labor time, that is for labor,\nhe shows that he is far below these same alchemists.\n\nFor Socialism, which will emancipate human labor force from its place\nas a commodity, the understanding that labor has no value and can have\nnone is a matter of the greatest importance. With an understanding of\nit, all attempts made by Herr Duehring by means of his crude\nworker-socialism (Arbeitersozialismus) to regulate the division of the\nmeans of existence, as a kind of higher wages, fall to the ground.\nFrom it there follows the broader view, since it is controlled by\npurely economic motives, that distribution regulates itself in the\ninterests of production, and production is advanced in the greatest\ndegree by a method of distribution which permits all the social\ndepartments to develop, maintain, and express their capacities to the\nfullest possible extent. To the ideas of the intellectuals which have\ncome into Herr Duehring's possession, it must always seem to be an\nenormity that it will abolish barrow pushing and architecture\nsimultaneously as professions, and that the man who has given half an\nhour to architecture will also push the cart a little until his work\nas architect is again in demand. It would be a pretty sort of\nsocialism which perpetuated the business of barrow-pushing.\n\nIf the equality of value of labor time has the significance that\nworkers produce equal products in equal periods of time it is\nevidently false, unless an average is first taken. Of two workmen at\nthe same branch of industry the value of the product of their labor\ntime will differ according to the intensity of labor and their\nrespective ability. No scheme of economic equality, at least on our\nplanet, can remedy this unfortunate state of affairs. What then is\nleft of the equality of all and every sort of labor? Nothing but high\nsounding phrases which have no economic value, nothing but the evident\ninability of Herr Duehring to distinguish between the fixing of value\nby labor and the fixing of value by the wages of labor, only the\nukase, which is the foundation of the new social economy, that wages\nshall be equal for equal amounts of labor time. Really the old French\ncommunists and Weitling had much better grounds for their equality of\nwages theories.\n\nHow then do we solve the whole weighty question of the higher wages of\ncompound labor? In a society of private producers, private individuals\nor their families have to bear the cost of creating intellectual\nworkers. An intellectual slave always commanded a better price, an\nintellectual wage worker gets higher wages. In an organized socialist\nsociety, society bears the cost and to it therefore belong the fruits,\nthe greater value produced by intellectual labor. The laborer himself\nhas no further claim. Whence it follows that there are many\ndifficulties connected with the beloved claim of the worker for the\nfull product of his toil.\n\n\n_VII. Capital and Surplus Value._\n\n(\"Marx does not have the usual economic idea of capital that it is\nmeans of production already produced, but he seeks to endow it with a\nspecial dialectic history in the metamorphosis of a historical idea.\nCapital is expressed in gold, it creates an historical period which\nhas its beginning in the sixteenth century and the establishment of a\nworld-market. Any keen economic analysis is impossible with such a\nnotion. Such barren conceptions which are half historical and half\nlogical destroys the possibility of any proper discrimination with\nrespect to the matter.\" These remarks of Duehring are answered as\nfollows by Engels:)\n\nAccording to Marx, then, capital manifested itself as gold at the\nbeginning of the sixteenth century. It is just as if anybody were to\nsay that specie had expressed itself as cattle for three thousand\nyears, because formerly cattle had performed the gold functions along\nwith others. Only Herr Duehring could be guilty of such a crude and\ndistorted expression. Marx in his analysis of the economic forms in\nwhich the process of the circulation of commodities takes places\nsimply declares gold to be the last form. \"This last product of the\ncirculation of commodities is the form in which capital first appears.\nHistorically capital comes with the possession of property in the form\nof money, as hoards of money, merchant-capital, and usury-capital....\nThis history is going on every day before our eyes. New capital comes\non the scene, that is the market,--the market for commodities, the\nlabor market or the money market, simply as money, money which is\ntransformed into capital by a definite process.\" Again Marx states the\nfact. It is useless for you to struggle against it, Herr Duehring,\nCapital must express itself in gold.\n\nMarx further examines the process by which money is transformed into\ncapital and discovers that the form in which money circulates as\ncapital is the inversion of the form in which it circulates as the\nuniversal equivalent. The individual owner of commodities sells to\nbuy, he sells what he does not need, and buys with the money thus\nobtained what he does need. The budding capitalist buys on the\ncontrary what he does not want himself, he buys to sell, and to sell\nfor a higher money value than he put into the business, he makes a\nmoney profit, and this profit Marx calls surplus value.\n\nWhat is the origin of this surplus value? Either the buyer buys goods\nbelow their value or the seller sells them above their value. In both\ncases gain and loss would balance one another, since every buyer is\nalso a seller. It can also not arise from extortion, for extortion\nmight enrich one at the expense of the other but it could not increase\nthe total sum of money neither could it increase the amount of\ncommodities in circulation. \"The entire capitalist class of a country\ncannot overreach itself.\"\n\nNow, we find that the totality of the capitalist class in every\ncountry grows richer before our very eyes, by the process of selling\ndearer than it bought, by appropriating surplus value. So we are just\nat the beginning of the discussion. Where does this surplus value come\nfrom? This question has to be answered on purely economic grounds to\nthe exclusion of all cheating, and all invasion of force. How is it\npossible to keep selling dearer than one buys under the assumption\nthat equal values are always exchanged for equal values?\n\nThe solution of this problem is the crowning glory of the work of\nMarx. He sheds clear daylight in economic places where the earlier\nsocialists no less than the bourgeois economists have groped in utter\ndarkness. From his work dates the origin of scientific socialism.\n\nThe solution is as follows. The power of increase in money which is\ntransformed into capital cannot proceed from the money neither does it\ndepend upon trade, since the money only realizes the price of the\ncommodities and this price is, since we hold that only equal values\nare exchanged, no different from its value. On the same grounds the\npower of increase cannot come from the exchange of commodities. The\nchange therefore depends upon the commodities which are exchanged, but\nnot upon their value, since they are bought and sold at their value.\nIt arises from their consumption-value as such; that is the change\nmust arise out of the consumption of commodities. \"In order for a\ncommodity to derive value from consumption our possessor of money must\nbe fortunate enough to discover a commodity whose use-value has the\npeculiar property of being a source of value, whose consumption would\nimply the expenditure of labor and thus be value-producing. And the\npossessor of money finds such a specific commodity on the market in\nthe shape of labor-power.\" If, as we have seen, labor has no value\nthis is by no means the case with labor-force. This has a value, as it\nis a commodity, and, as a matter of fact, it is a commodity to-day and\nthis value is fixed \"like that of every other commodity by the amount\nof labor time necessary for the production and reproduction of this\nspecific commodity.\" It is fixed by the labor time which is necessary\nfor the procuring of the means of livelihood required to maintain the\nlaborer in a condition to continue laboring and reproduce his kind.\nLet us suppose that these means of livelihood represent, taking one\nday with another, six hours labor-time a day. Our budding capitalist\nwho buys labor force for his business, that is hires a laborer, pays\nthis laborer the full daily value of his labor force, if he pays him a\nsum of money which represents six hours of labor. If the laborer has\nonly expended six hours in the service of the capitalist he has got\nthe full return of his expenditure, the day's value of his labor-force\nhas been paid. But money could not be transformed into capital in this\nfashion, it would have produced no surplus value. The buyer of\nlabor-power has quite another view of the nature of his business.\nSince only six hours' work is necessary to maintain the laborer for\ntwenty-four hours, it does not follow that the laborer cannot work\ntwelve hours out of the twenty-four. The value of labor force and its\nrealization in the labor-process are two different magnitudes. The\nowner of money pays out a day's value of labor-force but there belongs\nto him its use for the day, the whole day's labor. That the value\nwhich it produces in the course of a day is double its own value for\nthe day is fortunate for the buyer but according to the laws of\nexchange no injustice to the seller. The laborer then costs the owner\nof money according to our calculation the value product of six hours'\nlabor, but he gives him daily the value product of twelve hours'\nlabor. The difference to the credit of the owner of the money is six\nhours' unpaid extra labor, an unpaid for surplus product, in which the\nlabor of six hours is incorporated. The trick is done. Surplus value\nis produced, money is transformed into capital.\n\nWhile Marx, in this way, proved how surplus value exists and the only\npossible way in which it can exist, under the laws which regulate the\nexchange of commodities he also exposed the present capitalistic\nmethods of production and the methods of appropriation resting upon\nthem and unveiled the secret upon which the whole arrangement of the\nsociety of to-day depends.\n\nThere is a necessary presupposition to this origin and birth of\ncapital. \"For the transformation of money into capital the money owner\nmust first find free laborers in the market, free in the double sense\nthat as a free person the laborer can use his labor power as a\ncommodity, that he has no other wares to sell, that he is unemployed\nand that he is free of everything necessary to the realisation of his\nlabor power.\" But this condition of a possessor of money or\ncommodities on the one hand, and, on the other, of the possessor of\nnothing, except his own labor force, is no natural condition of\naffairs nor is it common to all periods of history; \"it is clearly the\nresult of a historical development, the product of a whole series of\nolder forms of social production.\" And this free laborer first strikes\nour notice as a historical phenomenon at the end of the fifteenth and\nthe beginning of the sixteenth century as a result of the dissolution\nof feudal society. Thereupon with the creation of the world trade and\nthe world market which dates from the same period the foundation was\nlaid for the mass of moveable wealth to become more and more\ntransformed into capital and for the capitalistic system, directed\nmore and more to the production of surplus value, to become the\ndominant system.\n\n\n_VIII. Capital and Surplus Value (Conclusion)._\n\n(Duehring having said that the term surplus value merely signifies in\nordinary language, rent, profit and interest, Engels still further\nexplains)\n\nWe have already seen that Marx does not say that the surplus product\nof the industrial capitalist, of which he is the first owner, is\nalways exchanged for its value, as Herr Duehring points out. Marx\nplainly says that trade profit only constitutes a portion of the\nsurplus value and under the foregoing conditions this is only possible\nif the factory proprietor sells his product under value to the trader\nand thus parts with a portion of the booty. Marx' contention\nrationally put is How is surplus value transformed into its\nsubordinate forms, profit, interest, trade-profits, ground rents etc.?\nand this question Marx undertakes to answer in the third volume of\nCapital. But since Herr Duehring cannot wait long enough for the\nsecond volume to appear he has in the meantime to take a close look at\nthe first volume. He thereupon reads that the immanent laws of\ncapitalistic production, the course of the development of capitalism,\nrealise themselves as the necessary laws of competition and thus are\nbrought to the consciousness of the individual capitalists as dominant\nmotives. That therefore a scientific analysis of competition is only\npossible when the real nature of capital is grasped, just as the\napparent movement of heavenly bodies can only be understood by\napprehending their real movement, and not merely those movements which\nare perceptible to the senses. So Marx shows how a certain law, the\nlaw of value, appears under given conditions in the competitive system\nand makes evident its impelling force. Herr Duehring might have\nunderstood that competition plays an important role in the\ndistribution of surplus values, and, after sufficient thought, might\nhave grasped at least the outlines of the transformation of surplus\nvalue into its subordinate forms from the examples given in the first\nvolume.\n\nHerr Duehring finds competition to be the stumbling block in the way\nof his comprehension. He cannot understand how competing\nentrepreneurs can manage to sell the entire product of labor including\nthe surplus product for so much more than the natural cost of\nproduction. Here again that \"force\" of his which, in his estimation,\nis the very evil thing, comes into play. According to Marx, the\nsurplus product does not have any cost of production, it is the part\nof the product which costs the capitalist nothing. If the\nentrepreneurs were to sell the surplus product at its real cost of\nproduction they would have to give it away. Is it not a fact that the\ncompeting entrepreneurs really sell the product of labor every day at\nits natural cost of production? According to Herr Duehring the cost of\nproduction consists \"in the expenditure of labor or force and\ntherefore in the last analysis must be measured by cost of\nmaintenance,\" and therefore, in present day society, is to be\nestimated at the cost of the raw material, instruments of labor and\nactual wages paid in distinction to taxation, profit and compulsory\nraising of prices. It is well recognised that in modern society the\ncompeting entrepreneurs do not sell their wares at the natural cost of\nproduction but calculate on a profit and generally get it. This\nquestion which Herr Duehring fancies will level the walls of Marxism\nas the blast of Joshua did those of Jericho is a question which the\neconomic doctrines of Duehring have to meet also.\n\n\"Capitalistic property,\" he says, \"has no practical value and only\nrealises itself because it implies the exercise of indirect power over\nman. The testimony to the existence of this force is capitalistic\nprofit, and the amount of this latter depends upon the extent and\nintensity of the power of 'force.'... Capitalistic profit is a\npolitical and social institution which manifests itself very strongly\nas competition. The entrepreneurs take their stand on this relation\nand each one of them maintains his position. A certain amount of\nprofit is a necessity of the dominant economic condition.\"\n\nWe know quite well that the entrepreneurs are in a position to sell\nthe products of labor at a cost above the natural cost of production.\nSurely Herr Duehring does not think so meanly of his public as to hold\nthe position that profit on capital stands above competition as the\nKing of Prussia used to stand above the law. The proceeding by which\nthe King of Prussia reached his position of superiority to the law we\nall know, the methods by which profit has come to be mightier than\ncompetition is just what Herr Duehring has to explain and what he\nstubbornly refuses to explain. It is no argument when he says that the\nentrepreneurs trade from this position and each one of them maintains\nhis own place. If we take him at his word, how is it possible for a\nnumber of people each to be able to trade only on certain terms and\nyet each one of them to keep his position? The gildmen of the Middle\nAges and the French nobility of 1789 operated from a decidedly\nsuperior position, and yet they came to grief. The Prussian army at\nJena occupied an advantageous position and yet it had to abandon it\nand surrender piecemeal. It is not enough to tell us that a certain\nmeasure of profit is a necessary concomitant of domination in the\neconomic sphere, it is necessary to tell us why. We do not get a step\nfurther by the statement of Duehring. \"Capitalistic superiority is\ninseparable from landlordism. A portion of the peasantry is\ntransformed in the cities into factory hands and in the final analysis\ninto factory material. Profit appears as another form of rent.\" This\nis a mere assertion and only repeats what should have been explained\nand proved. We can come to no other conclusion, then, except that\nHerr Duehring does not like to tackle the answer to his own question\nhow the capitalists are in a position to sell products of labor for\nmore than the natural cost of production, in short Herr Duehring\nshirks an explanation of profit. He takes the only path open to him, a\nshort cut, and simply declares that profit is the product of \"force.\"\nThis has been stated by Herr Duehring in his economic theory under the\nstatement \"force distributes.\" That is all very well; but the question\nstill persists what does force distribute? There must be something to\ndistribute otherwise force cannot distribute it. The profit which the\ncompeting capitalists pocket is something actual and tangible. Force\nmay take but it cannot create. And if Herr Duehring still obstinately\npersists in his statement that \"force\" takes the profits for the\nentrepreneurs he is as silent as the grave as to whence it takes it.\nWhere there is nothing the Kaiser, as all other \"force,\" ceases to\noperate. From nothing comes nothing, particularly nothing in the shape\nof profits. If capitalistic private property has not practical\nactuality, and cannot realize itself, except by the exercise of\nindirect force over men, the question still persists, in the first\nplace, how did the capitalist government come into possession of this\n\"force\" and in the second place how has this force been transformed\ninto profits, and in the third place where does it get these profits?\n\n(The remainder of this section is merely further elaboration of this\nidea with more caustic satire at the expense of the antagonist of\nEngels.)\n\n\n_IX. Natural Economic Laws--Ground Rent._\n\n(In this chapter Engels proceeds to examine what Herr Duehring called\nthe \"fundamental laws\" of his theory of economic science.)\n\nLAW NO. I. \"The productivity of economic instruments, natural\nresources and human force are capable of being increased by invention\nand discovery.\"\n\nWe are amazed. Herr Duehring treats us like that joke of Moliere on\nthe parvenu who was informed that he had talked prose all his life\nwithout being aware of it. That inventions and discoveries increase\nthe productive force of labor in many cases (but in many cases not, as\nthe patent records everywhere show) we have been for a long time\naware.\n\nLAW NO. II. \"Division of Labor. The formation of branches of work and\nthe splitting up of activities increases the productivity of labor.\"\n\nAs far as this is true it is a mere commonplace since the time of Adam\nSmith. How far it is true will appear in the third division of this\nwork.\n\nLAW NO. III. \"Distance and transportation are the most important\ncauses of the advance or hindrance of the organization of productive\nforces.\"\n\nLAW NO. IV. \"The industrial state has incomparably greater capacity\nfor population than the agricultural state.\"\n\nLAW NO. V. \"In economics only material interests count.\"\n\nThese are the natural laws on which Herr Duehring founds his new\neconomics. He remains true to his philosophic methods.\n\n(Hereupon Engels proceeds to the discussion of Duehring's opinions on\nground-rent.)\n\nHerr Duehring defines ground-rent as \"that income which the landowner\nas such derives from ground and land.\" The economic idea of\nground-rent, which Herr Duehring undertakes to explain to us, is\ntransformed right away into the juristic concept so that we are no\nfurther than at first. He compares the leasing of a piece of land with\nthe loan of capital to an entrepreneur but finds, as is so often the\ncase, that the comparison will not hold. Then he says \"to pursue the\nanalogy the profit which remains to the lessee after the payment of\nground-rent, answers to that portion of the profit on capital which\nremains to the entrepreneur who operates with borrowed capital after\nthe interest on the borrowed capital has been paid.\"\n\n(To these arguments Engels replies:)\n\nThe theory of ground-rent is a special English economic matter, and\nthis of necessity because only in England does a mode of production\nexist by which rent is separated from profit and interest. In England\nthere prevail the greater landlordism and the greater agriculture. The\nindividual landlords lease their lands in great farms to lessees who\nare able to cultivate them in a capitalistic fashion and do not, like\nour peasants, work with their own hands, but employ laborers just like\ncapitalistic entrepreneurs. We have here then the three classes of\nbourgeois society, and the income which each receives--the private\nlandlord in the form of ground-rent, the capitalist in that of profit\nand the laborer in the form of wages. No English economist has ever\nregarded the profit of the lessee as Herr Duehring does and still less\nwould he have to explain that the profit of the lessee is what it\nindubitably is, profit on capital. In England there is no use to\ndiscuss this question for the question as well as its answer are\nobvious from the facts and, since the time of Adam Smith, there has\nbeen no doubt at all about it.\n\nThe case in which the lessee cultivates his own land, as the rule in\nGermany, for the profit of the ground landlord does not make any\ndifference in this respect. If the landlord cultivates the land for\nhis own profit and furnishes the capital he puts the profit on capital\nin his pocket as well as the ground-rent for it cannot be otherwise\nunder existing conditions. And if Herr Duehring thinks that rent is\nsomething different when the lessee cultivates the land for himself it\nis not so and only shows his ignorance of the matter.\n\nFor example:--\n\n\"The revenue derived from labor is called wages; that derived from\nstock by the person who manages or employs it is called profit. The\nrevenue which proceeds from land is called rent and belongs altogether\nto the landlord. The revenue of the farmer is derived partly from his\nlabor and partly from his stock.... When those three different sorts\nof labor belong to different persons they are readily distinguished,\nbut when they belong to the same they are sometimes confounded with\none another at least in common language. A gentleman who farms part of\nhis own estate, after paying the expenses of cultivation, should gain\nboth the rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer. He is apt\nto denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds\nrent with profit, at least in common language. The greater part of our\nNorth American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They\nfarm, the greater part of them, their own estates, and accordingly we\nseldom hear of the rent of a plantation but frequently of its\nprofit.... A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own\nhands, unites in his own person the three different characters of\nlandlord, farmer, and laborer. His produce, therefore, should pay him\nthe rent of the first, the profit of the second and the wages of the\nthird. The whole, however, is commonly considered as the wages of his\nlabor. Both rent and profit are in this case confounded with wages.\"\n\nThis passage is in the sixth chapter of the first book of Adam Smith.\nThe case of the landholder who tills his own land has been examined a\nhundred years ago and the doubts which perplex Herr Duehring so much\nare caused entirely by his own ignorance.\n\n\n_X. With Respect to the \"Critical History\"._\n\nThis which is the concluding portion of the Second Division of the\nwork and which deals with Herr Duehring's estimates of economic\nwriters is omitted as being of too limited and polemic a character for\ngeneral interest.\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nSOCIALISM\n\n\nThe first two chapters of this Division, which deal respectively with\nthe historical and the theoretical sides of Socialism, are omitted.\nThey have been already translated. The well known pamphlet \"Socialism,\nUtopian and Scientific\" contains both of them. The second has also\nbeen translated by R.C.K. Ensor and published in his \"Modern\nSocialism.\"\n\n\n_Production._\n\nFor him (Herr Duehring) socialism is by no means a necessary product\nof economic development, and, still less, a development of the purely\neconomic conditions of the present day. He knows better than that. His\nsocialism is a final truth of the last instance, it is \"the natural\nsystem of society.\" He finds its root in a \"universal system of\njustice.\" And if he cannot take notice of the existing conditions\nwhich are the product of the sinful history of man up to the present\ntime in order to improve them that is so much the worse, we must look\nupon it as a misfortune for the true principles of justice. Herr\nDuehring forms his socialism as he does everything else on the basis\nof his two famous men. Instead of these two marionnetes, as\nheretofore, playing the game of lord and slave they are converted to\nthat of equality and justice and the Duehring socialism is already\nfounded.\n\nClearly in the view of Herr Duehring the periodic industrial crises\nhave by no means the same significance as we must attribute to them.\nAccording to Herr Duehring they are only occasional departures from\nnormality and furnish a splendid motive for the institution of a\nproperly regulated system.\n\n(Duehring attributes crises to underconsumption; to which Engels\nreplies:)\n\nIt is unfortunately true that the underconsumption of the masses and\nthe limitation of the expenditures of the great majority to the\nnecessities of life and the reproduction thereof is not by any means a\nnew phenomenon. It has existed as long as the appropriating and the\nplundered classes have existed. Even in those historic periods where\nthe condition of the masses was exceptionally prosperous, as in\nEngland in the fifteenth century, there was underconsumption; men were\nvery far from having their entire yearly product at their own\ndisposal. Although underconsumption has been a constant historical\nphenomenon for a thousand years, the general break down in trade, due\nto overproduction, has appeared, for the first time, within the last\nfifteen years. Yet the vulgar political economy of Herr Duehring\nattempts to explain the new phenomenon, not by means of the new factor\nof overproduction, but by means of the exceedingly old factor of\nunderconsumption. It is just as if one were to try and explain a\nchange in the relation of two mathematical quantities, one of which is\nconstant and the other variable, not from the fact that the variable\nquantity has varied, but that the constant has remained constant. The\nunderconsumption of the masses is a necessary condition of all forms\nof society in which robbers and robbed exist, and therefore of the\ncapitalist system. But it is the capitalist system which first brings\nabout the economic crisis. Underconsumption is a prerequisite of\ncrises and plays a very conspicuous role in them, but it has no more\nto do with the economic crisis of the present day than it had with the\nformer absence of such crises.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn every society in which production has developed naturally, to which\nclass that of to-day belongs, the producers do not master the means of\nproduction but the means of production dominate the producers.\n\nIn such a society every new leverage of production is converted into a\nnew means of subduing the producers beneath the means of production.\nThis was the cause of that instrument of production, the mightiest up\nto the time of the introduction of the greater industry, the division\nof labor. The first great division of labor, the separation of the\ncity and country, doomed the inhabitants of the rural districts to a\nthousand years of stupidity and the people of the towns to be the\nslaves of their own handiwork. It denied the chance of intellectual\ndevelopment to the one and of physical development to the other. If\nthe peasant had his land and the town dweller his handiwork, it is\njust as true to say that the land had the peasant and the handiwork\nthe townsman. As far as there was a division of labor there was also a\ndivision of man. The rise of one single fact slaughtered all former\nintellectual and bodily capacities. This annexation of man grew in\nproportion as the division of labor developed and reached its\nculmination in manufacture. Manufacture distributes production into\nits separate operations, makes one of these operations the function of\nthe individual worker, and imprisons the worker for his whole life to\na given function and to a given tool. \"It forces the workingman to\nbecome an abnormality, since it makes him concentrate his efforts on\ndetail at the expense of the sacrifice of a world of forces and\ncapacities.... The individual himself becomes subdivided, he is\ntransformed into the automatic tool of the division of labor\" (Marx).\nThis tool in many cases finds its perfection in the literal crippling\nof the worker, body and soul. The machinery of the greater industry\ndegrades the workingman from a machine to being the mere appendage of\na machine. \"From the lifelong specialization of looking after a\nmachine there comes the lifelong specialization of serving a part of a\nmachine. The abuse of machinery transforms the worker from childhood\ninto a portion of a part of a machine\" (Marx). And not only the\nworkingman but the classes which indirectly or directly plunder the\nworkingman are also themselves involved in the division of labor and\nbecome the slaves of their own tools. The spiritually-barren bourgeois\nis the slave of his own capital and his own profit-getting, the jurist\nis dominated by his ossified notions of justice which rule him as a\nself-contained force; the \"refined classes\" are dominated by the local\nlimitations and prejudices, by their own physical and spiritual\nastigmatism, by their specialised education and their lifelong bondage\nto this specialty, even though the specialty be doing nothing.\n\nThe Utopists were thoroughly aware of the effects of the division of\nlabor, of the effect on the one hand of crippling the worker and on\nthe other of crippling the work, the unavoidable result of the\nlifelong, monotonous repetition of one and the same act. The rise of\nthe antagonism between town and country was regarded by Fourier as\nwell as Owen as the beginning of the rise of the old division of\nlabor. According to both of them the population should be divided into\ngroups of from six hundred to three thousand each, distributed over\nthe country. Each group has an enormous house in the midst of its\nterritory and the housekeeping is done in common. Fourier occasionally\nspeaks of towns but these only consist of four or five of the big\ncommunal houses in close proximity to each other. By both of them the\nwork of society is divided into agriculture and industry. According to\nFourier, handwork and machine manufacture were both included in the\nlatter while Owen made the great industry play the most important\npart, and the steam engine and machinery performed the work of the\ncommunity. But both in agriculture and manufacture the two writers\nnamed gave the greatest possible variety of occupation to individuals,\nand accordingly the education of the young provided for the most\nuniversal technical training. Both of them think that there will be a\nuniversal development of the human race as a result of a universal\npractical participation in practical work, and that work will recover\nits old attractiveness, which has been lost as a result of the\ndivision of labor, by virtue of this variety and the shortening of the\ntime expended upon it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nJust as far as society obtains the domination of the social means of\nproduction in order to organize them socially it abolishes the\nexisting servitude of man to his own means of production. Society\ncannot be free without every member of society being free. The old\nmethods of production must be completely revolutionized and the old\nform of the division of labor must be done away with above all. In its\nplace an organization of production will have to be made in which, on\nthe one hand, no single individual will be able to shift his share in\nproductive labor, in providing the essentials of human existence,\nupon another, and on the other hand productive labor instead of being\na means of slavery will be a means towards human freedom, in that it\noffers an opportunity to everyone to develop his full powers, physical\nand intellectual, in every direction and to exercise them so that it\nmakes a pleasure out of a burden.\n\nThis is no longer at the present time a phantasy, a pious wish. Owing\nto the present development of the powers of production, production has\nproceeded far enough, provided that society endows itself with the\npossession of the social forces and abolishes the checks and\nimpediments, as well as the waste of products and productive forces,\nwhich springs from the capitalistic methods, to make a general\nreduction of labor time, to an amount, small as compared with present\nday ideas.\n\nThe abolition of the old method of division of labor is not an advance\nwhich would not be possible except at the expense of the productivity\nof labor, quite otherwise. It is a condition of production which has\ncome about spontaneously through the great industry. \"The machine\nindustry does away with the necessity of constantly distributing\ngroups of workmen at the different machines by keeping the worker\nconstantly at the same task. Since the total product of the factory,\nproceeds not from the worker but from the machine, a continual\nchanging about of individuals could not exist, without an interruption\nof the labor-process. Finally the speed with which work at the machine\nis learnt even by children does away with the necessity of training a\ndistinct class of workmen exclusively as machine laborers.\" But while\nthe capitalistic method of use of machinery does away with the old\nlimited particularity of labor, and, in spite of the fact, that\ntechnique is rendered superfluous, machinery itself rebels against the\nanachronism. The technical basis of the greater industry is\nrevolutionary. \"Through machinery, chemical processes and other\nmethods, the functions of the working class and the social labor\nprocess are revolutionized along with the technical basis of\nproduction. The division of labor is also revolutionized and masses of\ncapital and labor are hurled incontinently from one branch of industry\nto another. The nature of the greater industry demands mobility of\nlabor, a fluidity of functions and a complete adaptibility on the part\nof the laborers. We have seen how this absolute contradiction shows\nitself in the continual sacrifice of the working class, the most\ncomplete waste of labor force, and the dominance of social anarchy.\nBut if the mobility of labor now appears to be a law of nature beyond\nhuman control which realizes itself, in spite of all obstacles, it\nalso becomes a matter of life and death for the greater industry,\nowing to its catastrophic character, to recognise the mobility of\nlabor and hence the greatest possible adaptibility of the working\nclass, as a universal law of social production, and to accommodate\ncircumstances to its normal development. It becomes a question of life\nand death for the greater industry to keep an enormous number of\npeople on the edge of starvation always in reserve, in order that they\nmay be able to be placed at the disposal of the needs of capital as\nthese vary.\"\n\nWhile the greater industry has taught us how to transform molecular\nmovement into mass movement in order to fulfill technical needs, it\nhas, in the same measure, freed industrial production from local\nlimits. Water power was local, steam power is free. If water power\nbelongs to the country, steam power is by no means limited to the\ntown. It is capitalistic practice which causes concentration into\ncities and which makes manufacturing towns of manufacturing villages.\nBut thereby at the same time it undermines the essentials of its own\nmotive force. The first requisite of the steam engine and a prime\nrequisite of all branches of motive power is a sufficient quantity of\npure water. The factory town transforms all water into evil smelling\nsewage. Therefore, in proportion as the concentration into cities is\nthe foundation of capitalistic production, each individual capitalist\ntries to get away from the towns which have been necessarily produced\nto the motive forces of the country. This process may be individually\nobserved in the textile districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire. The\ngreater industry creates new towns in the course of its progress from\nthe town to the country. The same phenomenon was to be observed in the\ndistricts of the metal industry where somewhat different causes\nproduce identical results.\n\nThe capitalistic character of the greater industry is responsible for\nthis aimless blundering and these new contradictions. Only a society\nwhich organizes its industrial forces according to a single great\nharmonious plan, can permit industry to settle itself in such a manner\nthroughout the land as to secure its own development and the retention\nand development of the most important elements of production.\n\nThe abolition of the antagonism between town and country is now not\nonly possible, it has become an absolute necessity for industrial\nproduction itself. It has also become a necessity for agricultural\nproduction, and is, above all, essential to the maintenance of the\npublic health. Only through the amalgamation of city and country can\nthe present poisoning of air, water, and localities, be put at an end\nand the waste filth of the cities be used for the cultivation of\nvegetation rather than the spreading of disease.\n\nThe capitalistic industry has made itself relatively independent of\nlocal limitations for its raw materials. The textile industry works\nwith imported raw materials for the most part. Spanish iron ores are\nworked up in England and Germany, and South American copper ores in\nEngland. Every coal field supplies a yearly increasing number of\nplaces beyond its own confines. The whole coast of Europe has steam\nengines driven by English and, occasionally German and Belgian, coal.\nA society freed from the limits of capitalistic production could make\nstill further advances. While it makes a sort of all round skilled\nproducers, who are acquainted with the scientific requirements of\ngeneral industrial production, and by whom every new succession of\nbranches of production is completely developed from beginning to end,\nit creates a new productive force which undertakes the transportation\nof a superabundance of raw material or fuel.\n\nThe abolition of the separation between town and country is no Utopia,\nit is an essential condition of the proportionate distribution of the\ngreater industry throughout the country. Civilization has left us a\nnumber of large cities, as an inheritance, which it will take much\ntime and trouble to abolish. But they must and will be done away with,\nhowever much time and trouble it may take. Whatever fate may be in\nstore for the German nation, Bismarck may have the proud consciousness\nthat his dearest wish, the downfall of the great city, will be\nfulfilled.\n\nAnd now we can see the childishness of Herr Duehring's notion that\nsociety can obtain possession of the means of production without\nrevolutionizing the old methods of production from the ground up and\nabove all doing away with the old form of the division of labor.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is easy to see that the revolutionary elements which will abolish\nthe old division of labor together with the separation of town and\ncountry and will revolutionize production as a whole are already in\nembryo in the methods of production of the modern great industry and\ntheir unfolding is only hindered by the capitalistic methods of\nproduction of to-day. But to see all this, it is necessary to have a\nbroader outlook than the mere limitations of the Prussian Code, the\ncountry where schnapps and beet sugar are the staple industries, and\nyou have to study industrial crises by way of the book-trade. (This is\na sneer at one of Duehring's illustrations: Ed.) One has to understand\nthe history and the present manifestations of the greater industry\nparticularly in that land where it has its home and where it has had\nits classic development. It must not be imagined that modern\nscientific socialism can be done away with by the specific Prussian\nSocialism of Herr Duehring.\n\n\n_Distribution._\n\nWe have seen that Duehring's economics depend upon the statement that\nthe capitalistic method of production is good enough and can be kept\nup, but that the capitalistic method of distribution is bad and must\nbe done away with. We now discover that the \"sociality\" of Herr\nDuehring is merely the imaginary putting into force of this statement.\nIn fact it appears that Herr Duehring has nothing to declare\nrespecting the method of production as such in a capitalistic society,\nand that he will maintain the old division of labor in all its\nessential features. So he has hardly a word to say about production in\nhis social state. Production is too dangerous a ground for him to\ntread on. On the other hand, in his estimation, distribution is not\nbound up with production but can be settled by an act of the will.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us consider all the ideas of Herr Duehring as realized. Let us\nthen assume that the society pays each of its members for his work a\nsum in gold in which are incorporated six hours of labor, say twelve\nmarks. Let us now imagine that prices and values are in full accord,\nso that under our hypothesis only the cost of raw materials, the wear\nand tear of machinery, the use of tools and wages are comprehended. A\nsociety then of a hundred working members produces daily goods of the\nvalue of 1200 marks, and in a year of three hundred working days three\nhundred and sixty thousand marks and expends the entire amount on its\nworking members and thus each member has his share of three thousand\nsix hundred marks a year. At the end of the year and at the end of a\nhundred years the society is no better off than it was at the\nbeginning. Accumulation is entirely overlooked. Worse than that, since\naccumulation is a social necessity and the hoarding of gold is an\nelementary form of accumulation, the organization of a society on this\nbasis will necessitate private accumulation on the part of its members\nand consequently the destruction of the society.\n\nHow can this difficulty with respect to the economic society be\novercome? Refuge might be taken in a forcible raising of proceeds and\nthe produce of the society sold at four hundred and eighty thousand\nmarks instead of for three hundred and sixty thousand. But all other\neconomic societies would be in the same fix and each would have to\nmake it out of the other with the result that they would only be\nextorting tribute from their own members.\n\nOr it might find an easy way out by paying for six hours work less\nthan the product of six hours work, eight marks a day instead of\ntwelve, prices remaining the same. It accomplishes in this way plainly\nand openly what formerly it did secretly, it adopts the Marx surplus\nvalue notion to the amount of one hundred and twenty thousand marks a\nyear, since it pays the members under the value of their work and\nreckons the goods which they are only able to buy by its means at\ntheir full value. His economic society therefore can only get a\nreserve fund by adopting the truck system. Therefore one of two things\nis certain, either the economic society practices \"equal work for\nequal work\" and then it can get no funds for the maintenance and\ndevelopment of industry except through private sources, or it does\ncreate such a fund and ceases to practice \"equal work for equal work.\"\n\nThis is the fact about the exchange in the economic society, but what\nabout the form of it? According to Herr Duehring in his economic\nsociety money does not function as money between the members of the\nsociety. It serves merely as a labor certificate; it corresponds with\nthe expression of Marx \"only the share of the individual of the common\nlabor, and his individual claim to the consumption of a certain\nportion of the common product\" and in this function, says Herr\nDuehring, it is just as little money as a theater ticket. In short it\nfunctions in exchange like Owens \"labor-time money.\" As far as the\nmere calculating between amount due for production and the amount to\nbe expended in consumption of the individual member of the society is\nconcerned, paper markers or gold would serve the purpose equally well.\nBut it would not do for other purposes as will appear.\n\nIf the specie does not function as money among the members of a given\nsociety, but as a mark of labor, it functions still less as money in\nthe exchange between different economic societies. According to the\ntheory of Herr Duehring, therefore, specie as money is entirely\nsuperfluous. In fact it would be mere bookkeeping to set off the\nproducts of equal labor against the products of equal labor, according\nto the natural measure of labor-time, taking the labor-hour as a\nunit--if the labor hours are first translated into terms of money.\nExchange is in reality only simple exchange; all surpluses are easily\nand simply equalized by means of bills of exchange on other societies.\nBut when one community has a deficit in its dealings with another\ncommunity it can only make it up by increasing its labor output, if it\nis not to suffer disgrace in the eyes of other communities. The reader\nwill notice here that this is no attempt at social reconstruction. We\nare simply taking the notions of Herr Duehring and showing their\nunavoidable conclusions.\n\nTherefore neither in exchange among the individual members of a\nsociety nor in exchange between different economic societies can gold\nrealize itself as money. Yet Herr Duehring says that the function of\nmoney is carried out even in his \"sociality.\" We must therefore\ndiscover another field of activity for this money function. Herr\nDuehring predicates a quantitatively equal consumption. But he cannot\ncompel that. On the other hand, he prides himself that in his\ncommunity one can do with his money as he will. He cannot prevent one\nman, therefore, from saving money and another from not making his\nwages sufficient. This is indisputable, for he recognises the common\nproperty of the family in inheritance and talks about the duty of\nparents to provide for their children. Thereby his quantitatively\nequal consumption comes a cropper. The young unmarried man can get\nalong splendidly on twelve marks a day, but the widower with eight\nyoung children has a hard time of it. On the other hand the community,\nsince it takes money in payment without ceremony, lets money be\nacquired otherwise than by individual labor when the opportunity\noffers. _Non olet._ It does not know whence it comes. But now arises\nthe chance for money which has up to now played the role of a standard\nof work performed to operate as real money. The opportunities and the\nmotives arise for saving money on the one hand and squandering it on\nthe other. The needy borrows from the saver. The borrowed money taken\nby the community in payment for means of living becomes again, what it\nis in present day society, the social incarnation of human labor, the\nreal measure of labor, the universal means of circulation. All the\nlaws in the world are powerless against it, just as powerless as they\nare against the multiplication table or the chemical composition of\nwater. And the saver of money is in a position to demand interest so\nthat specie functioning as money again becomes a breeder of interest.\n\nSo far as we have only dealt with the operation of specie inside of\nHerr Duehring's economic society. But beyond the confines of that\nsociety the world goes peacefully along its old way. Gold and silver\nremain in the world-market, as world money, as the universal means of\npurchase and payment, as the absolute social incorporation of wealth.\nAnd in this ownership of the precious metals the individual societies\nfind a new motive for saving, for getting rich, for increasing their\nsupply,--the motive of becoming free and independent of the\ncommunities beyond their borders and of converting into money their\npiled up wealth in the world market. The profit hunters transform\nthemselves into traders in the means of circulation, into bankers,\ninto controllers of the means of production, though these may remain\nforever as the property of the economic and trading communities in\nname. Therewith the savers and profit mongers who have been converted\ninto bankers become the lords of the economic and trading communes.\nThe \"sociality\" of Herr Duehring is very distinct from the \"cloudy\nideas\" of the earlier socialists. It has no other end than the\nresurrection of the high finance.\n\nThe only value with which political economy is acquainted is the value\nof commodities. What are commodities? Products produced in a society\ncomposed of more or less separated private producers and therefore\nprivate products. But these private products first become commodities\nwhen they are made not for private use but for the use of someone\nelse, that is for social use. They are converted into objects of\nsocial use by means of exchange. The private producers are therefore\nin a social relationship, they constitute a society. Their private\nproducts, while the private products of each individual, are at the\nsame time, unconsciously and indeed involuntarily, social products\nalso. Wherein does the social character of these private products\nconsist? Plainly in two properties, in the first place because they\nsatisfy human needs but have no use-value for the producers, and in\nthe second place that, while they are the products of individual\nprivate producers, they are at the same time plainly the products of\nhuman labor, of human labor in general. In so far as they have a\nuse-value for other people they can be exchanged; in so far as they\nall possess the common quality of human labor in general, they can be\nmutually compared in exchange by means of this labor. In two similar\nproducts under identical social conditions there may be unequal\namounts of private labor, but equal amounts of human labor in general.\nAn unskillful smith might take as long to make five horseshoes as it\nwould take a skillful smith to make ten. But society does not fix the\nprice according to accidental lack of skill of the one, it recognises\nonly human labor in general, the human labor of the ordinary normal\nskilled smith. Each of the five horseshoes then made by the first does\nnot have any more value than each of the other ten which were made in\nthe same time as the five. Only so far as is socially necessary does\nprivate labor comprehend human labor in general.\n\nTherefore I maintain that a commodity has a certain value, 1st.\nbecause it is a socially useful product, 2nd. because it is produced\nby a private individual for private profit, 3d. because while it is a\nproduct of private labor, it is, at the same time, unconsciously and\ninvoluntarily a social product and exchanges socially according to a\ndefinite social standard, 4th. this standard is not expressed in terms\nof labor, in so many hours, but in another commodity. If, therefore, I\nsay that this clock is worth this piece of cloth and that they are\nboth worth fifty marks, I say that in the clock, the cloth and the\ngold there is an equal amount of social labor. I also affirm that the\namounts of social labor time in them are socially measured and found\nto be equal, not directly and absolutely however, as one measures\nlabor time in hours or days, but in a round about fashion, relatively,\nby means of exchange. I cannot therefore express this certain amount\nof labor-time in labor hours, since their number is not known to me,\nbut I can express it relatively in terms of another commodity, which\nhas the same amount of labor time incorporated in it. The clock is\nworth as much as the piece of cloth.\n\nBut while the production of commodities and the exchange of\ncommodities compel the society resting upon them to take this\nroundabout course, they are impelled to a shortening of the process.\nThey separate from the mass of commodities one sovereign commodity, in\nwhich the value of all other commodities can be universally expressed,\na commodity which is the complete incarnation of social labor, and,\nagainst which, all other commodities may be set in direct\ncomparison--gold. Gold already germinates in the idea of value, it is\nonly developed value. But since the commodity value exists in gold\nalso, itself being a commodity, a new factor arises in the society\nwhich produces and exchanges commodities, a factor with new social\nfunctions and operations. We can now examine this a little more\nclosely.\n\nThe economy of the production of commodities is by no means the only\nscience which has to reckon with relatively known factors. Even in\nphysics, we do not know how many single gas molecules there are in a\ngiven volume of gas, pressure and temperature being given. But we\nknow, as far as Boyle's law is correct, that a given volume of that\ngas has as many molecules as a similar volume of another selected gas\nat the same pressure and the same temperature. We can therefore\ncompare the different volumes of different gases with respect to their\nmolecular content, and, if we take one litre of gas at 0 deg. Fahrenheit\nas the unit we can refer the molecular content of each to this\nstandard. In chemistry the absolute atomic weights of separate\nelements is unknown to us. But we know them relatively when we know\ntheir mutual conditions. And just as the production of commodities and\ntheir economy has a relative expression for the unknown quantities of\nlabor existing in commodities, since it compares these commodities\naccording to the relative amounts of labor which they contain, so\nchemistry makes a relative expression for the amounts of atomic\nweights unknown to it, since it compares the separate elements\naccording to their atomic weights and expresses the weight of the one\nas multiples or factors of the other. And just as the production of\ncommodities elevates gold to the position of an absolute commodity, to\nthe universal equivalent for other commodities, the measure of values,\nso chemistry elevates hydrogen to the position of a chemical\ngold-commodity, since it fixes the atomic weight of hydrogen at 1 and\nreduces the atomic weights of all the other elements in terms of\nhydrogen and expresses them as multiples of its atomic weight.\n\nThe production of commodities is by no means the exclusive form of\nsocial production. In the ancient Indian communities and the family\ncommunities of the Southern Slavs products were not transformed into\ncommodities. The members of the community were directly engaged in\nsocial production, the work was distributed as custom and\ncircumstances required as were the products as they came into the\nrealm of consumption. Direct social production and direct social\nconsumption exclude all exchange of commodities and hence the\ntransformation of products into commodities (at least within the\nconfines of the society) and therewith their transformation into\nvalue.\n\nAs soon as society comes into direct possession of the means of\nproduction and undertakes production as a society, the labor of each,\nhowever distinctive its special useful character may be, becomes\ndirect social labor. The amount of social labor existing in a product\ndoes not then have to be established in a roundabout way, daily\nexperience shows the average amount of human labor necessary. Society\ncan easily determine how many hours of labor there are in a steam\nengine, how many in a hectolitre of wheat of last harvest, how many in\na hundred square yards of cloth of a given quality. It cannot\ntherefore happen that the quantities of labor embodied in commodities,\nwhich will then be absolutely and directly known, will be expressed in\nterms of a measure which is only relative, fluctuating, inadequate and\nabsolute, in a third product, and not in their natural, adequate and\nabsolute measure, time. This would not happen any more than in\nchemistry. One would express the atomic weights indirectly by means of\nhydrogen if it were possible to express them absolutely in their\nadequate measure, that is in real weight, that is in billions or\nquadrillions of grammes. Under the foregoing conditions, then, society\nascribes no value to products. The simple fact that a hundred yards of\ncloth have taken a thousand hours in their production need not be\nexpressed in any distorted or foolish fashion, they would be worth a\nthousand labor hours. Society would then know how much labor each\nobject of use required for its creation. It would have to direct the\nplan of production in accordance with the means of production to which\nlabor-force also belongs. The advantageous effects of the different\nobjects of use and their relations to each other and the creation of\nthe necessary means of labor would be the sole determinants of the\nplan of production. People make things very easily without any\ninterference on the part of the much discussed \"value.\"\n\nThe value idea is the most universal and the most comprehensive\nexpression of the economic conditions of the production of\ncommodities. In the idea of value there is not only the germ of gold\nbut also of those more highly developed forms of commodity production\nand exchange. Since value is the expression of the social labor\nincorporated in individual products, there lies the possibility of a\ndifference between this and the individual labor embodied in the same\nproduct. This difference becomes very apparent to a private producer\nwho abides by an old fashioned method of production while the social\nmethod of production has taken a step forward. It then appears that\nthe sum of all the private manufacturers of a given commodity produce\nan amount in excess of the social needs. Then, since the value of a\ncommodity is expressed only in terms of other commodities and can only\nbe realised in exchange with them, the possibility arises that either\nexchange will cease or that the commodity will not realise its full\nvalue. Finally, the specific commodity labor-force finds its value\nlike that of other wares in the social labor time necessary for its\nproduction. In the value form of the product there is already in\nembryo the entire capitalistic form of production, the antagonism\nbetween the capitalists and the wage-workers, the industrial reserve\narmy, the crisis. The capitalistic system will be abolished by the\nrestoration of true value (just as Catholicism will be abolished by\nthe restoration of the true Pope), or by the restoration of a society\nin which the producer finally dominates his product, by the doing away\nof an economic category which is the most comprehensive expression of\nthe slavery of the producer to his own product.\n\nWhen the society producing commodities has developed the inherent\nvalue form of the commodities, as such, to the gold-form, various\ngerms of value hitherto hidden thereupon begin to sprout. The next\nsubstantial step is the generalising of commodity forms. Gold makes\nobjects directly produced for use into commodities by driving them\ninto exchange. Thereupon the commodity and the gold smite the\ncommunity which is engaged in social production, break one social tie\nafter another and finally dissolve the society into a mass of private\nproducers. Gold establishes, as in India, individual cultivation of\nthe land in the place of communal cultivation, then it destroys the\nsystem of regular distribution of communal lands among individuals and\nmakes ownership final, and lastly it leads to the division of the\ncommunal wood land. Whatever other causes arising from the industrial\ndevelopment may work along with it, gold is always the most powerful\ninstrument for the destruction of the communal society.\n\n\n_The State, the Family, and Education._\n\n(Herr Duehring says \"In the free society there will be no religion,\nsince, in all its degrees, it tends to destroy the originality of the\nchild, in that it places something above nature or behind it, which\nmay be affected by means of works or prayers\" also \"a properly\nconstituted socialist state will do away with all the paraphernalia of\nspiritualistic magic, and all the actual forms of religion.\" Engels\nproceeds--)\n\nReligion will be forbidden. Now, religion is nothing but the fantastic\nreflection in men's minds of the external forces which dominate their\nevery day existence, a reflection in which earthly forces take the\nform of the super-natural. In the beginning of history it is the\nforces of nature which first produce this reflection and in the course\nof development of different peoples give rise to manifold and various\npersonification. This first process is capable of being traced, at\nleast as far as the Indo-European peoples are concerned, by\ncomparative mythology, to its source in the Indian Vedas and its\nadvance can be shown among the Indians, Greeks, Persian, Romans, and\nGermans, and, as far as the material is available, also among the\nCelts, Lithuanians, and Slavs. But, besides the forces of nature, the\nsocial forces dominated men by their apparent necessity, for these\nforces were, in reality, just as strange and unaccountable to men as\nwere the forces of nature. The imaginary forms in which, at first,\nonly the secret forces of nature were reflected, became possessed of\nsocial attributes, became the representatives of historical forces. By\na still further development the natural and social attributes of a\nnumber of gods were transformed to one all-powerful god, who is, on\nhis part, only the reflection of man in the abstract. So arose\nmonotheism, which was historically the latest product of the Greek\nvulgar philosophy, and found its impersonation in the Hebrew\nexclusively national god, Jahve. In this convenient, handy and\nadaptible form religion can continue to exist as the direct, that is,\nthe emotional form of the relations of man to the dominating outside,\nnatural, and social forces, as long as man is under the power of these\nforces. But we have seen over and over again in modern bourgeois\nsociety that man is dominated by the conditions which he has himself\ncreated and that he is controlled by the same means of production\nwhich he himself has made. The fundamental facts which give rise to\nthe reflection by religion therefore still persist and with them the\nreflection persists also. And just because bourgeois economy has a\ncertain insight into the relations of the original causes of this\nphenomenon, it does not alter it a particle. Bourgeois economy can\nneither prevent crises, on the whole, nor can it stop the greed of the\nindividual capitalists, their disgrace and bankruptcy, nor can it\nprevent the individual laborers from suffering deprivation of\nemployment and poverty. Man proposes and God (to wit, the outside\nforce of the capitalistic method of production) disposes. Mere\nknowledge even though it be broader and deeper than bourgeois\neconomics is of no avail to upset the social forces of the master of\nsociety. That is fundamentally a social act. Let us suppose that this\nact is accomplished and society in all its grades freed from the\nslavery to the means of production which it has made but which now\ndominate it as an outside force. Let us suppose that man no longer\nmerely proposes but that he also disposes. Under such conditions the\nlast vestiges of the external force which now dominates man are\ndestroyed, that force which is now reflected in religion. Therewith,\nthe religious reflection itself is destroyed owing to the simple fact\nthat there is nothing more to reflect.\n\nBut Herr Duehring cannot wait until religion dies a natural death. He\ntreats it after a radical fashion. He out Bismarcks Bismarck, he makes\nsevere \"May laws\" not only against Catholicism but against all\nreligion. He sets his gendarmes of the future on religion and thereby\ngives it a longer lease of life by martyrdom. Wherever we look we find\nthat Duehring's socialism has the Prussian brand.\n\nAfter Herr Duehring has blithely got rid of religion he says \"Man can\nnow, since he is dependent upon himself and nature alone,\nintelligently direct the social forces in every way which open to him\nthe course of things and his own existence.\" Let us look for a little\nwhile at that course of things to which the self-reliant human can\ngive direction.\n\nThe first in the course of things by which man becomes self-reliant is\nbeing born. Then during the time of his immaturity his education is in\nthe hands of his mother. \"This period may, as in the old Roman law,\nreach to the age of puberty, that is to about fourteen years of age.\"\nOnly where the older boys do not respect the authority of the mother\ndoes the father's assistance play a part and the public method of\neducation robs this of all harm. With puberty the boy comes under the\nnatural care of his father, where this is exercised in a truly\nfatherly manner, in other cases society takes charge of his education.\n\nAs Herr Duehring has already maintained the position that it is\npossible to convert the capitalistic methods of production into social\nmethods without disturbing the mode of production itself, so he here\nseems to think that one can separate the modern bourgeois family from\nits entire economic foundations without any change in the whole form\nof the family. This form is so permanent in his estimation that he\nthinks of the old Roman jurisprudence, in an \"improved\" form, as the\nmodel of the family for ever, and he does not conceive of the family\notherwise than as a permanent unit. The Utopists have the superiority\nover Herr Duehring here. In their estimation a really free mutual\ncondition would arise in all the family relations as a result of the\nfree association and the public ownership of the instruments of\nproduction together with the institution of a system of public\neducation. And Marx has shown furthermore in his \"Capital\" how \"the\ngreater industry, which takes widows, young persons and children of\nboth sexes from the home, and employs them in organized social\nproductive processes, lays the foundation for a higher form of the\nfamily and better conditions for people of both sexes.\"\n\n\n\nLANDMARKS OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM\n\nAPPENDIX\n\n\nThe foregoing pages will have given the reader some idea of the\ninfinite care which Engels expended in order to keep abreast of the\nchief scientific discoveries of his times. He was as painstaking as a\ngenius. On the other hand, his modesty was almost absurd, for he never\nventured to claim anything for himself, and such ability as was\ndisplayed in the laying of the economic political foundations of the\nsocialist movement was invariably credited by him to the superior\ntalent and comprehension of Marx.\n\nThere is no question that the work constitutes a most effective reply\nto the arguments of Duehring, with whom, poor fellow, we need no\nlonger trouble ourselves. It constitutes, moreover, a very formidable\nanswer to all those who seek for a justification of the socialist\nmovement in those abstract conceptions which the average man finds it\nso hard to escape. In fact, so removed is the point of view of the\nwriter of the foregoing pages from that of the man in the street that\nit is doubtful whether it is possible for more than a comparatively\nfew students thoroughly to grasp the significance of the dialectic and\nto apply it in a satisfactory and effective fashion. Still, there is\nno question that this understanding of the socialist movement, as a\nmovement, is absolutely required of all who can be considered as\ntaking an intelligent and useful attitude with regard to social and\npolitical questions.\n\nThe possession of this key gave the two founders of the modern\nsocialist movement such a comprehension of the tendencies of modern\ncivilization as enabled them to make those economic and political\npredictions which have been so completely fulfilled.\n\nThere is little need to call attention to the fact that much of\nEngels' argument is now antiquated in face of the growth of science\nand the almost incredible development of mechanical invention and the\nmaterial progress consequent upon it. It could not have been\notherwise. The wonders of Engels' day are the commonplaces of our\nexistence. The machines, which he considered so wonderful and so\nchange-compelling have already been \"scrapped\" for new machines of\ngreater power and capacity for production. The remark that the\nbattleship had in his time arrived at a point where it was as\nexpensive as it was unfit for fighting sounds almost ridiculous in\nface of the tremendous development of the engines of naval warfare\nsince he wrote, and the invention and use of the submarine. Still it\nmust be remembered that there has been no really great test of ships\nof war since Engels' day and that the expense of modern navies is\nworrying the governments to distraction. Only a few weeks ago Lord\nCharles Beresford refused to accept the command of the Channel\nSquadron unless provided with an equipment the expense of which seemed\nalmost intolerable to Great Britain, wealthy as that country is and\ndependent as she is on the maintenance of the sea power. Great armies\nare still on the increase and the expense of their support combined\nwith the unsatisfactoriness of their performances is by no means\nreassuring to those who have the responsibility for national military\norganization. The Boer War proved the unreliability of the armed\nforces of one power, at all events, and the performances of great\nmasses of trained men in the Russo-Japanese conflict have not inspired\nany very great respect for the effectiveness of these colossal and\nexpensive fighting machines. Together with the breakdown of armies and\nnavies, as a material fact, there has grown up a strong prejudice\nagainst their employment, and the anti-war attitude of the\ninternational proletariat has been supplemented and strengthened by\nthe distinct growth of an international peace spirit in certain\nsections of the middle class. So that in spite of superficial\nappearances it does not seem to be so very unlikely that the action of\nthe dialectic will be manifest in the destruction of modern armaments,\nat least as far as the greater nations are concerned, though there is\nlittle doubt that military forces will still be maintained for the\npurpose of bullying and overawing the smaller and weaker peoples.\n\nMention has already been made of the fact that Engels never really\ndivested himself of the old \"forty-eight\" spirit. The notion that a\nrevolution would break out somewhere in the near future finds a\ncuriously fixed, if unexpressed, lodgment in his mind. One cannot help\nfeeling that he expected things to mature earlier than they have done\nand that he anticipated that changes in the mode of production and the\ndevelopment of industry would have made a stronger impression upon the\nmind of the proletarian than history shows to have been the case. This\nlatent, but still persistent, notion is in curious contrast to the\nalmost detached way in which, particularly in his later years, he\nviews the course of economic and political events. He never really in\nfact divested his mind of the notion of the imminence of social\nrevolution, for in his 1892 preface to \"The Condition of the Working\nClass in England in 1844\" he says, \"I have taken care not to strike\nout of the text the many prophecies, amongst others that of an\nimminent social revolution in England, which my youthful ardor induced\nme to venture upon.\" His youthful ardor seems never to have really\nabated in that respect. The dreams of boyhood seem to have haunted him\nand the old fighter stirred uneasily in his study chair at the echoes\nof past conflicts in which he also heard the bugles of the coming\nfight. To those who have watched the development of Engels' thought,\nas shown in his works, this philosophic, unemotional way of looking at\nthings proves the effect of experience and age upon the fighter. He\nstarted with a heart inflamed with the wrongs of the suffering, as the\ndamning pages of the work above cited show; he ends with a calm and\ndispassionate enquiry (apart from what he considered to be the\nexigencies of controversy) into the fundamental causes of economic and\nsocial progress. The burning enthusiasm and white-hot indignation had\ndied down in him ere he reached the stage of the Duehring controversy.\nHe finds that although not everything that is real is reasonable, to\nuse the phrase against which he has fulminated in \"Feuerbach,\"\nnevertheless every step in human progress has been an essential step\nand it is impossible to hurry things. To the proletarian he looks of\ncourse as the next great actor in the drama of social development. But\nthe proletarian, while his destiny is indubitable, is still not a\nbeing apart from existing conditions. He exists in the conditions, is\nin fact part of the conditions, and, while at war with them, takes on\nthe color of his surroundings. The facts of life have driven him to\nan unconscious rejection of old faiths and old philosophies but they\nhave not forced him to take up the sword against the actual realities\nof modern life, to which he appears, in fact, to submit himself with a\nhumility which is at least provoking to the eager and enthusiastic\nrevolutionist.\n\nWhat wonders of economic organization, what triumphs in mechanical\nproduction have been achieved since Engels gave the last revision to\nthis book in 1894 we in the United States at least have cause to know.\nThe entire structure of production has been modified from top to\nbottom, the old individual doctrine has fallen victim to its\ndialectic, and concentrated industry and collective capital now rise\nsupreme over the ruins of that individualism which gave them birth and\nto which they owe their existence. In the name of the individual the\nindividual is denied. The courts hand down decisions in the name of\nindividual liberty which have for their result the dethroning and\nextermination of the individual. The conglomeration of individual\nstates which was considered the very foundation of the American\ngovernment, and the outward and visible sign of collective sovereignty\nis already in its death throes. The dialectic of the United States is\nin course of development and there comes about in consequence the\nbirth of the United Imperial Republic, a republic which is so only in\nname, which is, in fact, as little of a republic as were those\noligarchies of the Middle Ages whose very existence defamed the name\nof republic. The old things have passed away, all things have become\nnew.\n\nStill there is one factor which has not really appreciably changed,\none factor which is always confronted by the same necessity, the\nnecessity of maintaining its existence. This factor is the working\nclass. The dialectic is at work with the working class also, and that\nwhich according to the individualistic notion consisted of isolated\nunits seeking their daily bread in meek conformity with the laws of\ncontract and property will disappear into that great collective\norganized body of labor which spurns the theories of contract and\nthereby makes itself no longer subject but master.\n\n                                                    AUSTIN LEWIS.\n\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n    | Typographical errors corrected in the text:               |\n    |                                                           |\n    | Page  40: socalled replaced with so-called                |\n    | Page  85: \"each single each single\" replaced with         |\n    |           \"each single\"                                   |\n    | Page  89: \"self contained\" replaced with \"self-contained\" |\n    | Page 102: \"any any\" replaced with \"any\"                   |\n    | Page 126: Boyles replaced with Boyle's                    |\n    | Page 128: prevailng replaced with prevailing              |\n    | Page 134: stpuid replaced with stupid                     |\n    | Page 140: excepiton replaced with exception               |\n    | Page 154: inaccurrate replaced with inaccurate            |\n    | Page 171: \"serve it is a midwife\" replaced with           |\n    |           \"serve it as a midwife\"                         |\n    | Page 173: \"a grain or barley\" replaced with               |\n    |           \"a grain of barley\"                             |\n    | Page 175: discusion replaced with discussion              |\n    | Page 181: unberable replaced with unbearable              |\n    | Page 186: framers replaced with farmers                   |\n    | Page 192: \"so so splendidly\" replaced with                |\n    |           \"so splendidly\"                                 |\n    | Page 192: bourgeoise replaced with bourgeoisie            |\n    | Page 193: maunfacture replaced with manufacture           |\n    | Page 194: inventivness replaced with inventiveness        |\n    | Page 205: \"these peasant\" replaced with \"these peasants\"  |\n    | Page 217: impossiblity replaced with impossibility        |\n    | Page 219: devolpment replaced with development            |\n    | Page 231: \"on the first place\" replaced with              |\n    |           \"in the first place\"                            |\n    | Page 233: entrepeneurs replaced with entrepreneurs        |\n    | Page 250: communties replaced with communities            |\n    | Page 251: horeshoes replaced with horseshoes              |\n    | Page 257: himsel replaced with himself                    |\n    | Page 265: develment replaced with development             |\n    |                                                           |\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+","title":"Landmarks of Scientific Socialism: \"Anti-Duehring\"","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":76705}