{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_3290/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_3290","id":"gutenberg_3290","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3290","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Physics","Science -- Methodology"],"text":"Valerius Terminus: of the Interpretation of Nature\n\nby Francis Bacon\n\n\n\n\nPreface by Robert Leslie Ellis\n\nThe following fragments of a great work on the Interpretation of\nNature were first published in Stephens's Letters and Remains [1734].\nThey consist partly of detached passages, and partly of an epitome\nof twelve chapters of the first book of the proposed work. The\ndetached passages contain the first, sixth, and eighth chapters, and\nportions of the fourth, fifth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and\nsixteenth. The epitome contains an account of the contents of all\nthe chapters from the twelfth to the twenty-sixth inclusive, omitting\nthe twentieth, twentythird, and twenty-fourth. Thus the sixteenth\nchapter is mentioned both in the epitome and among the detached\npassages, and we are thus enabled to see that the two portions of the\nfollowing tract belong to the same work, as it appears from both that\nthe sixteenth chapter was to treat of the doctrine of idola.\n\nIt is impossible to ascertain the motive which determined Bacon to\ngive to the supposed author the name of Valerius Terminus, or to his\ncommentator, of whose annotations we have no remains, that of Hermes\nStella. It may be conjectured that by the name Terminus he intended\nto intimate that the new philosophy would put an end to the wandering\nof mankind in search of truth, that it would be the TERMINUS AD QUEM\nin which when it was once attained the mind would finally acquiesce.\n\nAgain, the obscurity of the text was to be in some measure removed by\nthe annotations of Stella; not however wholly, for Bacon in the\nepitome of the eighteenth chapter commends the manner of publishing\nknowledge \"whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor taste of all,\nbut shall as it were single and adopt his reader.\" Stella was\ntherefore to throw a kind of starlight on the subject, enough to\nprevent the student's losing his way, but not much more.\n\nHowever this may be, the tract is undoubtedly obscure, partly from\nthe style in which it is written, and partly from its being only a\nfragment. It is at the same time full of interest, inasmuch as it is\nthe earliest type of the INSTAURATIO...\n\nNote to Preface by James Spedding:\n\nThe manuscript from which Robert Stephens printed these fragments was\nfound among some loose papers placed in his hands by the Earl of\nOxford, and is now in the British Museum; Harl. manuscripts 6462. It\nis a thin paper volume of the quarto size, written in the hand of one\nof Bacon's servants, with corrections, erasures, and interlineations\nin his own.\n\nThe chapters of which it consists are both imperfect in themselves\n(all but three),--some breaking off abruptly, others being little\nmore than tables of contents,--and imperfect in their connexion with\neach other; so much so as to suggest the idea of a number of separate\npapers loosely put together. But it was not so (and the fact is\nimportant) that the volume itself was actually made up. However they\ncame together, they are here fairly and consecutively copied out.\nThough it be a collection of fragments therefore, it is such a\ncollection as Bacon thought worthy not only of being preserved, but\nof being transcribed into a volume; and a particular account of it\nwill not be out of place.\n\nThe contents of the manuscript before Bacon touched it may be thus\ndescribed.\n\n1. A titlepage, on which is written \"VALERIUS TERMINUS of the\nInterpretation of Nature, with the annotations of HERMES STELLA.\"\n\n2. \"Chapter I. Of the limits and end of knowledge;\" with a running\ntitle, \"Of the Interpretation of Nature.\"\n\n3. \"The chapter immediately following the Inventory; being the 11th\nin order.\"\n\n4. \"A part of the 9th chapter, immediately precedent to the Inventory,\nand inducing the same.\"\n\n5. \"The Inventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions already\ndiscovered and in use, together with a note of the wants and the\nnature of the supplies; being the 10th chapter, and this a fragment\nonly of the same.\"\n\n6. Part of a chapter, not numbered, \"Of the internal and profound\nerrors and superstitions in the nature of the mind, and of the four\nsorts of Idols or fictions which offer themselves to the\nunderstanding in the inquisition of knowledge.\"\n\n7. \"Of the impediments of knowledge; being the third chapter, the\npreface only of it.\"\n\n8. \"Of the impediments which have been in the times and in diversion\nof wits; being the fourth chapter.\"\n\n9. \"Of the impediments of knowledge for want of a true succession of\nwits, and that hitherto the length of one man's life hath been the\ngreatest measure of knowledge; being the fifth chapter.\"\n\n10. \"That the pretended succession of wits hath been evil placed,\nforasmuch as after variety of sects and opinions the most popular and\nnot the truest prevaileth and weareth out the rest; being the sixth\nchapter.\"\n\n11. \"Of the impediments of knowledge in handling it by parts, and in\nslipping off particular sciences from the root and stock of universal\nknowledge; being the seventh chapter.\"\n\n12. \"That the end and scope of knowledge hath been generally mistaken,\nand that men were never well advised what it was they sought\" (part\nof a chapter not numbered).\n\n13. \"An abridgment of divers chapters of the first book;\" namely, the\nl2th, 13th, and 14th, (over which is a running title \"Of active\nknowledge;\") and (without any running title) the 15th, 16th, 17th,\n18th], 19th, 21st, 22nd, 25th, and 26th. These abridgments have no\nheadings; and at the end is written, \"The end of the Abridgment of\nthe first book of the Interpretation of Nature.\"\n\n\nSuch was the arrangement of the manuscript as the transcriber left it;\nwhich I have thought worth preserving, because I seem to see traces\nin it of two separate stages in the developement of the work; the\norder of the chapters as they are transcribed being probably the same\nin which Bacon wrote them; and the numbers inserted at the end of the\nheadings indicating the order in which, when he placed them in the\ntranscriber's hands, it was his intention to arrange them; and\nbecause it proves at any rate that at that time the design of the\nwhole book was clearly laid out in his mind.\n\nThere is nothing, unfortunately, to fix the DATE of the transcript,\nunless it be implied in certain astronomical or astrological symbols\nwritten on the blank outside of the volume; in which the figures 1603\noccur. This may possibly be the transcriber's note of the time when\nhe finished his work; for which (but for one circumstance which I\nshall mention presently) I should think the year 1603 is likely a\ndate as any; for we know from a letter of Bacon's, dated 3rd July\n1603, that he had at that time resolved \"to meddle as little as\npossible in the King's causes,\" and to \"put his ambition wholly upon\nhis pen;\" and we know from the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING that in 1605\nhe was engaged upon a work entitled \"The Interpretation of Nature:\"\nto which I may add that there is in the Lambeth Library a copy of a\nletter from Bacon to Lord Kinlosse, dated 25th March, 1603, and\nwritten in the same hand as this manuscript.\n\nBacon's corrections, if I may judge from the character of the\nhandwriting, were inserted a little later; for it is a fact that\nabout the beginning of James's reign his writing underwent a\nremarkable change, from the hurried Saxon hand full of large sweeping\ncurves and with letters imperfectly formed and connected, which he\nwrote in Elizabeth's time, to a small, neat, light, and compact one,\nformed more upon the Italian model which was then coming into fashion;\nand when these corrections were made it is evident that this new\ncharacter had become natural to him and easy. It is of course\nimpossible to fix the precise date of such a change,--the more so\nbecause his autographs of this period are very scarce,--but whenever\nit was that he corrected this manuscript, it is evident that he then\nconsidered it worthy of careful revision. He has not merely inserted\na sentence here and there, altered the numbers of the chapters, and\nadded words to the headings in order to make the description more\nexact; but he has taken the trouble to add the running title wherever\nit was wanting, thus writing the words \"of the Interpretation of\nNature\" at full lengths not less than eighteen times over; and upon\nthe blank space of the titlepage he has written out a complete table\nof contents. In short, if he had been preparing the manuscript for\nthe press or for a fresh transcript, he could not have done it more\ncompletely or carefully,--only that he has given no directions for\naltering the order of the chapters so as to make it correspond with\nthe numbers. And hence I infer that up to the time when he made\nthese corrections, this was the form of the great work on which he\nwas engaged: it was a work concerning the Interpretation of Nature;\nwhich was to begin where the NOVUM ORGANUM begins; and of which the\nfirst book was to include all the preliminary considerations\npreparatory to the exposition of the formula.\n\nI place this fragment here in deference to Mr. Ellis's decided\nopinion that it was written before the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. The\npositive ground indeed which he alleges in support of that conclusion\nI am obliged to set aside, as founded, I think, upon a\nmisapprehension; and the supposition that no part of it was written\nlater involves a difficulty which I cannot yet get over to my own\nsatisfaction. But that the body of it was written earlier I see no\nreason to doubt; and if so, this is its proper place.\n\nThe particular point on which I venture to disagree with Mr. Ellis I\nhave stated in a note upon his preface to the NOVUM ORGANUM,\npromising at the same time a fuller explanation of the grounds of my\nown conclusion, which I will now give.\n\nThe question is, whether the \"Inventory\" in the 10th chapter of\nVALERIUS TERMINUS was to have exhibited a general survey of the state\nof knowledge corresponding with that which fills the second book of\nthe ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. I think not.\n\nIt is true indeed that the title of that 10th chapter,--namely, \"The\nInventory, or an enumeration and view of inventions already\ndiscovered and in use, with a note of the wants and the nature of the\nsupplies\",--has at first sight a considerable resemblance to the\ndescription of the contents of the second book of the ADVANCEMENT OF\nLEARNING,--namely, \"A general and faithful perambulation of learning,\nwith an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not\nimproved and converted by the industry of Man;... wherein\nnevertheless my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and\ndeficiencies, and not to make any redargutions of errors,\" and so on.\nBut an \"enumeration of INVENTIONS\" is not the same thing as \"a\nperambulation of LEARNING;\" and it will be found upon closer\nexamination that the \"Inventory\" spoken of in VALERIUS TERMINUS does\nreally correspond to one, and one only, of the fiftyone Desiderata\nset down at the end of the DE AUGMENTIS; viz. that INVENTARIUM OPUM\nHUMANARUM, which was to be an appendix to the MAGIA NATURALIS. See DE\nAUG. iii. 5. This will appear clearly by comparing the descriptions\nof the two.\n\nIn the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING Bacon tells us that there are two\npoints of much purpose pertaining to the department of Natural Magic:\nthe first of which is, \"That there be made a calendar resembling an\nInventory of the ESTATE OF MAN, containing ALL THE INVENTIONS, BEING\nTHE WORKS OR FRUITS OF NATURE OR ART, which are now extant AND OF\nWHICH MAN IS ALREADY POSSESSED; out of which doth naturally result a\nnote what things are yet held impossible or not invented; which\ncalendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every\nreputed impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the\nnearest in degree to that impossibility: to the end that by these\noptatives and essentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in\ndeducing direction of works from the speculation of causes.\"\n\nThe Inventory which was to have been inserted in the 10th chapter of\nVALERIUS TERMINUS is thus introduced:--\"The plainest method and most\ndirectly pertinent to this intention will be to make distribution of\nSCIENCES, ARTS, INVENTIONS, WORKS, and their portions, ACCORDING TO\nTHE USE AND TRIBUTE WHICH THEY YIELD AND RENDER TO THE CONDITION OF\nMAN'S LIFE; and under those several uses, being as several offices of\nprovisions, to charge and tax what may be reasonably exacted or\ndemanded,... and then upon those charges and taxations to distinguish\nand present as it were in several columns what is extant and already\nfound, and what is DEFECTIVE AND FURTHER TO BE PROVIDED. Of which\nprovisions because in many of them, after the manner of slothful and\nfaulty accomptants, it will be returned by way of excuse that no such\nare to be had, it will be fit to give some light OF THE NATURE OF THE\nSUPPLIES; whereby it will evidently appear that they are to be\ncompassed and procured.\" And that the calendar was to deal, not with\nknowledge in general, but only with arts and sciences of invention in\nits more restricted sense--the PARS OPERATIVA DE NATURA (DE AUG. iii.\n5.)--appears no less clearly from the opening of the 11th chapter,\nwhich was designed immediately to follow the \"Inventory.\" \"It\nappeareth then what is now in proposition, not by general\ncircumlocution but by particular note. No former philosophy,\" etc.\netc. \"but the revealing and discovering of NEW INVENTIONS AND\nOPERATIONS,... the nature and kinds of which inventions HAVE BEEN\nDESCRIBED as they could be discovered,\" etc. If further evidence were\nrequired of the exact resemblance between the Inventory of VALERIUS\nTERMINUS and the Inventarium of the ADVANCEMENT and the DE AUGMENTIS,\nI might quote the end of the 9th chapter, where the particular\nexpressions correspond, if possible, more closely still. But I\npresume that the passages which I have given are enough; and that the\nopinion which I have elsewhere expressed as to the origin of the\nADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,--namely, that the writing of it was a\nby-thought and no part of the work on the Interpretation of Nature as\noriginally designed,--will not be considered inconsistent with the\nevidence afforded by these fragments.\n\nThat the VALERIUS TERMINUS was composed before the ADVANCEMENT,\nthough a conclusion not deducible from the Inventory, is nevertheless\nprobable: but to suppose that it was so composed EXACTLY IN ITS\nPRESENT FORM, involves, as I said, a difficulty; which I will now\nstate. The point is interesting, as bearing directly upon the\ndevelopement in Bacon's mind of the doctrine of Idols; concerning\nwhich see preface to NOVUM ORGANUM, note C. But I have to deal with\nit here merely as bearing upon the probable date of this fragment.\n\nIn treating of the department of Logic in the ADVANCEMENT, Bacon\nnotices as altogether wanting \"the particular elenches or cautions\nagainst three false appearances\" or fallacies by which the mind of\nman is beset: the \"caution\" of which, he says, \"doth extremely import\nthe true conduct of human judgment.\" These false appearances he\ndescribes, though he does not give their names; and they correspond\nrespectively to what he afterwards called the Idols of the Tribe, the\nCave, and the Forum. But he makes no mention of the fourth; namely,\nthe Idols of the Theatre. Now in VALERIUS TERMINUS we find two\nseparate passages in which the Idols are mentioned; and in both all\nfour are enumerated, and all by name; though what he afterwards\ncalled Idols of the Forum, he there calls Idols of the Palace; and it\nseems to me very unlikely that, if when he wrote the ADVANCEMENT he\nhad already formed that classification he should have omitted all\nmention of the Idols of the Theatre; for though it is true that that\nwas not the place to discuss them, and therefore in the corresponding\npassage of the DE AUGMENTIS they are noticed as to be passed by \"for\nthe present,\" yet they are noticed by name, and in all Bacon's later\nwritings the confutation of them holds a very prominent place.\n\nTo me the most probable explanation of the fact is this. I have\nalready shown that between the composition and the transcription of\nthese fragments the design of the work appears to have undergone a\nconsiderable change; the order of the chapters being entirely altered.\nWe have only to suppose therefore that they were composed before\nthe ADVANCEMENT and transcribed after, and that in preparing them for\nthe transcriber Bacon made the same kind of alterations in the\noriginals which he afterwards made upon the transcript, and the\ndifficulty disappears. Nothing would be easier than to correct\n\"three\" into \"four,\" and insert \"the Idols of the Theatre\" at the end\nof the sentence.\n\nAnd this reminds me (since I shall have so much to do with these\nquestions of date) to suggest a general caution with regard to them\nall; namely, that in the case of fragments like these, the comparison\nof isolated passages can hardly ever be relied upon for evidence of\nthe date or order of composition, or of the progressive developement\nof the writer's views; and for this simple reason,--we can never be\nsure that the passages as they now stand formed part of the original\nwriting. The copy of the fragment which we have may be (as there is\nreason to believe this was) a transcript from several loose papers,\nwritten at different periods and containing alterations or additions\nmade from time to time. We may know perhaps that when Bacon\npublished the ADVANCEMCNT OF LEARNING he was ignorant of some fact\nwith which he afterwards became acquainted; we may find in one of\nthese fragments,--say the TEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS,--a passage\nimplying acquaintance with that fact. Does it follow that the\nTEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS was written after the ADVANCEMENT OF\nLEARNING? No; for in looking over the manuscript long after it was\nwritten, he may have observed and corrected the error. And we cannot\nconclude that he at the same time altered the whole composition so as\nto bring it into accordance with the views he then held; for that\nmight be too long a work. He may have inserted a particular\ncorrection, but meant to rewrite the whole; and if so, in spite of\nthe later date indicated by that particular passage, the body of the\nwork would still represent a stage in his opinions anterior to the\nADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.\n\nI have felt some doubt whether in printing this fragment, I should\nfollow the example of Stephens, who gave it exactly as he found it;\nor that of later editors, who have altered the order of the chapters\nso as to make it agree with the numbers. The latter plan will\nperhaps, upon the whole, be the more convenient. There can he little\ndoubt that the numbers of the chapters indicate the order in which\nBacon meant them to be read; and if any one wishes to compare it with\nthe order in which they seem to have been written, he has only to\nlook at Bacon's table of contents, which was made with reference to\nthe transcript, and which I give unaltered, except as to the spelling.\n\nof the Interpretation of Nature with the Annotations of a few\nfragments of the first book, viz.\n\n1. The first chapter entire. {Of the ends and limits of knowledge.}\n\n2. A portion of the 11th chapter. {Of the scale.}\n\n3. A small portion of the 9th chapter {being an Inducement to the\nInventory.}\n\n4. A small portion of the 10th chapter {being the preface to the\nInventory.}\n\n5. A small portion of the 16th chapter {being a preface to the inward\nelenches of the mind.}\n\n6. A small portion of the 4th chapter. {Of the impediments of\nknowledge in general.}\n\n7. A small portion of the 5th chapter. {Of the diversion of wits.}\n\n8. The 6th chapter entire. {Of}\n\n9. A portion of the 7th chapter.\n\n10. The 8th chapter entire.\n\n11. Another portion of the 9th chapter.\n\n12. The Abridgment of the 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 21. 22. 25.\n26th chapters of the first book.\n\n13. The first chapter of {the} a book of the same argument written in\nLatin and destined {for} to be {traditionary} separate and not public.\n\nNone of the Annotations of Stella are set down in these fragments.\n\n\n[The title] is written in the transcriber's hand: all that follows in\nBacon's. The words between brackets have a line drawn through them.\nFor an exact facsimile of the whole [see Contents pages 1 and 2].\n\n[13.] refers to the first chapter of the TEMPORIS PARTUS MASCULUS;\nwhich follows in the manuscript volume, but not here. It is\nimportant as bearing upon the date of that fragment.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nVALERIUS TERMINUS: OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE\n\n(by Sir Francis Bacon)\n\n\n\n\n\nThe first chapter of VALERIUS TERMINUS by Francis Bacon\n\nAn annotated version compiled and edited by Dr. Gisela Engel (Johann Wolfgang\nGoethe-Universitaet Frankfurt am Main with the assistance of Dr. Harvey Wheeler\n(Ret. USC, Martha Boas Distinguished Research Professor at USC) and aided by\nMelek Hasg\u00fcn, Simone Wirthmann, Antje Peters, Martina Glebocki, Carsten J\u00e4gler,\nKatja Morawek, Cora Hartmann (students at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitaet\nFrankfurt am Main).\n\n\nOrignal Text | Annotations\n |\nValerius Terminus: |\nOf the Interpretation{1} of Nature | 1A.\n | The word \"interpretation\" occurs\n | also e.g. in the title of the essay\n | DE INTERPRETATIONE NATURAE PROEMIUM\n | (1603; in Spedding vol. III) and in\n | his definition of man as \"the servant\n | and interpreter of Nature\" (IV,47).\n | This definition of man is the same\n | definition that we find in the\n | magico-alchemical tradition which is\n | in general refuted by Bacon. Paolo\n | Rossi (\"Bacon's idea of science\", in:\n | THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON, ed.\n | by Markku Peltonen [1996], 25-46)\n | gives the following comment:\n |\n | \"Bacon condemned magic and alchemy on\n | ethical grounds. He accused them of\n | imposture and of megalomania. He\n | refuted their non-participatory\n | method and their intentional\n | unintelligibility, their attempt to\n | replace human sweat by a few drops of\n | elixir. But he borrows from the\n | magico-alchemical tradition the idea\n | that man can attempt to make himself\n | the master of nature. Bacon\n | understands knowledge not as\n | contemplation or recognition, but as\n | VENATIO, a hunt, an exploration of\n | unknown lands, a discovery of the\n | unknown. Nature can be transformed\n | from its foundations. Bacon's\n | definition of man as \"the servant and\n | interpreter of Nature\" is the same\n | definition we find in the magico-\n | alchemical tradition, for instance in\n | the texts of Cornelius Agrippa von\n | Nettesheim.\n |\n | But for all the exponents of magic\n | and alchemistic culture, the texts of\n | ancient wisdom take the form of\n | sacred texts which indude secrets\n | that only a few men can decipher The\n | truth is hidden in the past and in\n | the profound. Like when dealing with\n | sacred texts, it is necessary\n | continuously to go BEYOND THE LETTER,\n | in search of a message which is more\n | and more hidden.The secret message\n | expresses a Truth which is at the\n | Origins and which is always the same.\n |\n | In the Hermetic tradition, as in the\n | tradition of Platonism, the natural\n | world is conceived as the image or\n | living manifestation of God.\n | Understanding nature can reveal the\n | presence in the world of divine ideas\n | and archetypes. Bacon's rejection of\n | any natural philosophy founded on\n | allegorical interpretations of\n | Scriptures meant a withdrawal from\n | exemplarism and symbolism, both\n | common features of mediaeval\n | philosophy and still flourishing in\n | the seventeenth century. As all works\n | --says Bacon--show the power and\n | ability of their maker, but not his\n | image, so God's works \"do shew the\n | omnipotency and wisdom of the maker\n | but not his image\" (III, 350). The\n | distinction between the will and\n | power of God, so fully and subtly\n | present in Baconian texts, is very\n | important. \"The heavens declare the\n | glory of God, and the firmament\n | showeth his handworks\": this verse\n | from the Psalms (18,2) is quoted by\n | Bacon several times. The image of the\n | world, immediately after the Word, is\n | a sign of the divine wisdom and\n | power, and yet the Scriptures do not\n | call the world ,\"the image of God,\"\n | but regard it only as \"the work of\n | his hands,\" neither do they speak of\n | any image of God other than man.\n | Theology is concerned with knowing\n | the book of the word of God, natural\n | philosophy studies the book of God's\n | works. The book of Scripture reveals\n | the will of God, the book of nature,\n | his power. The study of nature has\n | nothing to say about God's essence or\n | his will (IV; 340-3).\n |\n | Bacon proposed to the European\n | culture an alternative view of\n | science. For him science had a\n | public, democratic, and collaborative\n | character, individual efforts\n | contributing to its general success.\n | In science, as Bacon conceives it,\n | truly effective results (not the\n | illusory achievements of magicians\n | and alchemists) can be attained only\n | through collaboration among\n | researchers, circulation of results,\n | and clarity of language. Scientific\n | understanding is not an individual\n | undertaking. The extension of man's\n | power over nature is never the work\n | of a single investigator who keeps\n | his results secret, but is the fruit\n | of an organized community financed by\n | the state or by public bodies. Every\n | reform of learning is always a reform\n | also of cultural institutions and\n | universities.\n |\n | Not only a new image of science, but\n | also a new portrait of the \"natural\n | philosopher\" took shape in Bacon's\n | writings. This portrait differed both\n | from that of the ancient philosopher\n | or sage and from the image of the\n | saint, the monk, the university\n | professor, the courtier, the perfect\n | prince, the magus. The values and the\n | ends theorized for the composite\n | groups of intellectuals and artisans\n | who contributed in the early\n | seventeenth century to the\n | development of science were different\n | from the goals of individual sanctity\n | or literary immortality and from the\n | aims of an exceptional and \"demonic\"\n | personality.\n |\n | A chaste patience, a natural modesty,\n | grave and composed manners, a smiling\n | pity are the characteristics of the\n | man of science in Bacon's portrait of\n | him. In the REDARGUTIO PHILOSOPHIARUM\n | Bacon wrote:\n |\n | Then he told me that in Paris a\n | friend had taken him along and\n | introduced him to a gathering, 'the\n | sight of which', he said, 'would\n | rejoice your eyes. lt was the\n | happiest experience of my life'.\n | There were some fifty men there, all\n | of mature years, not a young man\n | among them, all bearing the stamp of\n | dignity and probity... At his entry\n | they were chatting easily among\n | themselves but sitting in rows as if\n | expecting somebody. Not long after\n | there entered to them a man of\n | peaceful and serene air, save that\n | his face had become habituated to the\n | expression of pity... he took his\n | seat, not on a platform or pulpit,\n | but on level with the rest and\n | delivered the following address...\n | (III, 559; Farrington's translation).\n |\n | Bacon's portrait doubtless resembles\n | Galileo or Einstein more than it does\n | the turbulent Paracelsus or the\n | unquiet and skittish Cornelius\n | Agrippa. The titanic bearing of the\n | Renaissance magus is now supplanted\n | by a classical composure similar to\n | that of the \"conversations\" of the\n | earliest Humanists. Also in Galileo's\n | DIALOGO and in Descartes's RECHERCHE\n | DE LA VERIT\u00c9 we find the same\n | familiar tone and style of\n | conversation in which [Descartes\n | wrote] \"several friends, frankly and\n | without ceremony, disclose the best\n | of their thoughts to each other.\" But\n | there is besides, in Bacon, the quiet\n | confidence that comes from knowing\n | the new powers made available to man\n | by technology and collaboration.The\n | new kind of learning, for which Bacon\n | is searching, must get away from\n | touches of genius, arbitrary\n | conclusions, chance, hasty summaries.\n | The emphasis Iaid by Bacon on the\n | social factor in scientific research\n | and in determining its ends, places\n | his philosophy on a radically\n | different plane from that of the\n | followers of Hermetic tradition.\"\n |\n | In DE SAPIENTIA VETERUM Bacon\n | describes Orpheus as the mythical\n | prototype of the philosopher (\"Orpheus\n | sive Philosophia\", VI, 646-649).\n |\n | 1B.\n | Bacon gives the following\n | definition of \"interpretation: \"that\n | reason which is elicited from facts\n | by a just and methodological process,\n | I call INTERPRETATION OF NATURE\" (IV,\n | 51). Now, this definition means a\n | harsh critique of Aristotelianism,\n | Scholasticism and Ramism. Michel\n | Malherbe comments on this:\n |\n | \"The main and most characteristic\n | feature of Bacon's epistemology is\n | that it rests upon a single method,\n | which is INDUCTION... It must help\n | the understanding on its way toward\n | truth... Thus, true knowledge will go\n | from a lower certainty to a higher\n | liberty and from a lower liberty to a\n | higher certainty, and so on. This\n | rule is the basic principle of\n | Bacon's theory of science; prepared\n | in the natural and experimental\n | history, determining the relationship\n | between the tables of presence, it\n | governs the induction of axioms and\n | the abstraction of notions and\n | ordains the divisions of sciences\n | within the general system of\n | knowledge. lt is well known that this\n | rule of invention originates in\n | Ramus's methodology and, more\n | formerly, in Aristotle's POSTERIOR\n | ANALYTICS. To characterize the nature\n | of the premises required for the\n | foundation of true demonstrations,\n | Aristotle had set down three\n | criteria: the predicate must be true\n | in every instance of its subject; it\n | must be part of the essential nature\n | of the subject; and it must be\n | universal, that is, related to the\n | subject by itself and QUA itself.\n | Aristotle was defining first\n | propositions as being essential\n | propositions; and he referred\n | universality to necessity and\n | extension to comprehension These\n | three criteria were much commented\n | upon during the whole scholastic\n | period, and were transformed, or\n | rather extended, by Ramus and others\n | in the sixteenth century. Whereas in\n | Aristotle they had expressed the\n | initial conditions of any conclusive\n | syllogism, in Ramus they became the\n | conditions of every systematic art:\n | within a system, methodically\n | organized for the exhibiting of\n | knowledge, any statement must be\n | taken in its full extension, it must\n | join things which are necessarily\n | related and it must be equivalent to\n | a definition. But these rules for\n | syllogistic or dialectic art in\n | Aristotle or Ramus become rules for\n | inductive invention in Bacon: and\n | their meaning is quite different.\n | With the rule of certainty and\n | liberty, Bacon aims at directiy\n | opposing the old logic, infected by\n | syllogistic or rhetoric formalism.\n |\n | By its title, the NOVUM ORGANUM makes\n | Bacon's ambition clear: to replace\n | the Aristotelian organon, which has\n | governed all knowledge until the end\n | of the sixteenth century with an\n | entirely new logical instrument, a\n | new method for the progress and\n | profit of human science. And the\n | Chancellor proclaims that he has\n | achieved his aim, if posterity\n | acknowledges that, even if he has\n | failed to discover new truths or\n | produce new works, he will have built\n | the means to discover such truths or\n | to produce such works (III, 520). He\n | insists that his method has nothing\n | to do with the old one nor does it\n | try to improve it. And he puts out\n | the choice in these terms:\n |\n | There are and can be only two ways of\n | searching into and discovering truth.\n | The one flies from the senses and\n | particulars to the most general\n | axioms, and from these principles,\n | the truth of which it takes tor\n | settled and immoveable, proceeds to\n | judgment and to the discovery of\n | middle axioms. And this way is now in\n | fashion. The other derives axioms\n | from the senses and particulars,\n | rising by a gradual and unbroken\n | ascent, so that it arrives at the\n | most general axioms last of all. This\n | is the true way, but as yet untried.\n | (IV, 50)\n |\n | When it is left to itself, the\n | understanding follows the first way,\n | hastily applies itself to reality and\n | generates ANTICIPATIONS OF NATURE.\n | But \"that reason which is elicited\n | from facts by a just and\n | methodological process, I call\n | INTERPRETATION OF NATURE\" (IV, 51).\n |\n | Taken as a whole, Bacon's critique\n | comes to this: from a formal point of\n | view, Aristotle's syllogism is\n | essentially a logic for deductive\n | reasoning, which goes from the\n | principles to the consequences, from\n | the premises to the conclusions. And,\n | of course, in this kind of reasoning,\n | the truth of the conclusions is\n | necessarily derived from the truth of\n | the premises, so that knowledge will\n | start with primary truths that are\n | supposed to be necessary and\n | universal, that is, essential. Now,\n | Bacon asks, how does the mind acquire\n | the knowledge of these primary\n | truths, since, as it is allowed by\n | Aristotle himself, all knowledge\n | starts with experience, which\n | experience is always contingent and\n | particular? How does the mind go from\n | the empirical knowledge of facts or\n | sensible effects (phenomena) to the\n | knowledge of the very nature of\n | things? The formal necessity of the\n | syllogism (or deductive reasoning)\n | makes the old logic forget the pre-\n | judicial question of how we set up\n | first principles. Therefore, any\n | attempt to define the valid form of\n | theories must go through the inquiry\n | upon how we establish truth.\n |\n | From this general critique, it is\n | easy to understand Bacon's various\n | comments on the old organon. First,\n | since such a logic induces a kind of\n | double start, the empirical one and\n | the rational one, and since it\n | confuses the origin of knowledge with\n | its foundation, the mind is condemned\n | to jump immediately from empirical\n | particulars to first principles (or\n | axioms, in Bacon's terms) and to\n | render superfluous the required\n | induction which would gradually lead\n | from one point to the other. This\n | instantaneous slip from empirical\n | data to rational and essential dogmas\n | is made possible by the very nature\n | of the human mind. Left to itself,\n | the mind hurries toward certainty; it\n | is prone to gain assent and consent;\n | it fills the imagination with idols,\n | untested generalities. And it is this\n | natural haste and prejudice which\n | gives mental activity its\n | anticipative form. By themselves,\n | anticipations draw the most general\n | principles from immediate experience,\n | in order to proceed, as quickly as\n | possible, to the formal deduction of\n | consequences. Therefore, however\n | paradoxical it may appear, the old\n | logic is unduly empirical and unduly\n | logical. And the critique of\n | formalism [formalism draws the\n | conclusions from the premises without\n | inquiring upon the truth of the\n | premises] must be attended by the\n | critique of the nature of the human\n | mind.\n |\n | The human mind is so disposed that it\n | relies on the senses, which provide\n | it with the rudiments of all\n | knowledge. Of course, Bacon argues,\n | we cannot get any information about\n | things except with the senses, and\n | skeptics are wrong when, questioning\n | them, they plunge the mind into\n | despair. \"But by far the greatest\n | hindrance and aberration of the human\n | understanding proceeds from the\n | dulness, incompetency, and deceptions\n | of the senses\" (IV, 58). On the one\n | hand, they are too dull and too\n | gross, and let the more subtle parts\n | of nature escape our observation:\n | their range is limited to the most\n | conspicuous information. On the other\n | hand, they are misleading, by a\n | fundamental illusion: they offer\n | things to the mind according to the\n | measure of human nature. \"For it is a\n | false assertion that the sense of man\n | is the measure of things. On the\n | contrary, all perceptions as well of\n | the sense as of the mind are\n | according to the measure of the\n | individual and not according to the\n | measure of the universe\" (IV, 54). In\n | order to have access to reality, we\n | have to rectify their information and\n | reduce a double delusion: the\n | illusion that the sensible qualities\n | offered by them are the real\n | determinations of things and the\n | illusion that things are divided\n | according to our human sensibility\n | (IV, 194 et sq.).\n |\n | Thus we can understand a third\n | critique against the old method: the\n | Aristotelian logic rests upon a\n | metaphysics which believes that\n | sensible experience gives the human\n | mind the things as they are, with\n | their essential qualities, and that\n | philosophy can be satisfied with\n | taking empirical phenomena for the\n | true reality of nature, thanks to a\n | mere generalization that erases the\n | particular circumstances of\n | existence. Nevertheless, empirically\n | qualified existences are not to be\n | mistaken for the things themselves.\n | So far, Bacon is undoubtedly a\n | modern, since he claims that the\n | object of knowledge is reality and\n | that reality, if it can be\n | inductively known from empirical\n | data, cannot be reduced to the matter\n | of experience.\n |\n | Bacon's fourth censure of the old\n | logic follows from this. He agrees\n | with the sixteenth-century\n | dialecticians that Aristotle was\n | wrong when he thought that\n | understanding could skip, without the\n | hard work of induction, from what is\n | immediately given to the senses to\n | what is posed in the first principles\n | of science. Aristotle wanted to know\n | the truth, but did not explain the\n | method of invention. On the other\n | hand, the dialecticians, giving up\n | the attempt to set up the first\n | principles (and thereby the\n | traditional Aristotelian\n | demonstrative science), gave up any\n | attempt to reach the truth. They only\n | retained the deductive and systematic\n | form of discourse to introduce order\n | into men's opinions, and maintained\n | that invention could be reduced to\n | the mere search for arguments, that\n | is, for probable reasons invented to\n | persuade or convince.\n |\n | Bacon, however, wants to promote the\n | idea of an inductive science and\n | argues that Aristotle's mistake\n | affects the syllogistic form. In the\n | fourth chapter of the fifth book of\n | the DE AUGMENTIS, Bacon develops a\n | remarkable critique of the syllogism\n | and is partly responsible for the\n | widespread disregard of formal logic\n | in the seventeenth and eighteenth\n | centuries.\n |\n | According to Bacon, \"in all\n | inductions, whether in good or\n | vicious form the same action of the\n | mind which inventeth, judgeth\" (III,\n | 392). One cannot find without\n | proving, nor prove without finding.\n | But this is not the case in the\n | syllogism: \"for the proof being not\n | immediate but by mean, the invention\n | of the mean is one thing, and the\n | judgement of the consequence is\n | another, the one exciting only, the\n | other examining\" (III, 392). The\n | syllogism needs the means (the middle\n | term) so that the derived conclusion\n | amounts to a proof. But since the\n | syllogism is incapable of inventing\n | the middle term, it must have been\n | known before. In other words,\n | syllogistic form leaves the invention\n | of the middle term to the natural\n | shrewdness of the mind or to good\n | fortune. Thus, it is because of its\n | own demonstrative form that the\n | syllogism is unable to provide a\n | method of truth and is useless for\n | science.\n |\n | By now it is clear why the old logic\n | and the knowledge which is built on it\n | are unable to produce works or why the\n | extant works \"are due to chance and\n | experience rather than to sciences\"\n | (IV, 48). To deduce practical effects,\n | the mind must know real causes or laws\n | of nature. Since the old method does\n | not supply the mind with the means of\n | inventing causes and does not set up\n | the scale of the intermediate\n | propositions that are needed to reduce\n | sensible experience and reach the real\n | science, or to derive rightly and by\n | degrees the consequences from the\n | principles, it is not surprising that\n | invented works are too few and not\n | very useful for men's lives. Thus,\n | from the start in sensible experience\n | to the end in practical deduction,\n | this old method is of no use. And an\n | entirely new one must be proposed,\n | which will be able to carry the human\n | mind from empirical data to the real\n | causes, to supply it with the means of\n | invention, to justify the position of\n | first truths and to manage a secure\n | deduction of practical consequences.\n | And, as the critique of the old logic\n | has to be understood as a whole, so\n | the interpretation of nature has to be\n | conceived as a continuous attempt,\n | proceeding by degrees, by successive\n | stages, to invent truth and to derive\n | works. (\"Bacon's method of science\",\n | in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON.\n | ed. by Markku Peltonen [1996], 76-82).\n |\n | 1C.\n | Harvey Wheeler comments:\n |\n | Most historians of the philosophy of science\n | are unfamiliar with Bacon's transformation\n | of his innovative theory of juridical\n | lawfinding into scientific empiricist\n | lawfinding. Baconian law-finding is not to\n | be confused with cause-finding in modern\n | \"classical\" physics.\n |\n | Bacon's quest changed as he matured. In\n | VALERIUS TERMINUS he is writing in\n | English, trying to lay the groundwork for\n | the validity of the co-existence of Religion\n | and Science.\n |\n | Bacon\u2019s early experimental treatises--like\n | Dense and Rare--are experimental and of\n | limited value. Historians of the philosophy\n | of science have little trouble in disposing\n | these early experimentalist efforts of Bacon.\n |\n | His work on sound was somewhat better--\n | experimental-theoretical. It is a\n | post-pythagorean theory of harmonics and\n | still not appropriately analyzed.\n | Contemproary musicologists like to quote\n | the passages on sound in NEW ATLANTIS\n | for being compatible with today\u2019s approach\n | to music.\n |\n | By the time of the Novum Organum Bacon\n | was seeking a more \"general theory of\n | science.\" Its 'logic machine' (Hooke) was\n | designed to be relevant to all\n | non-theological domains.\n |\n | However, most Bacon interpreters evaluate\n | his science in contrast to the prior\n | Aristotelian approaches and in comparison\n | to the Ramist approaches of Bacon\u2019s day.\n | He rejected them both.\n |\n | Scholars then look beyond Bacon and\n | evaluate his logic machine in contrast to the\n | \"classical mechanics\" of Newtonian Optics\n | (physics): linear time-sequence prediction.\n |\n | Bacon was not seeking that type of\n | \"cause/prediction\"science. He was seeking\n | hidden, \"unwritten\" \"laws\" of nature,\n | more on the model of Pasteur than of\n | Newton.\n |\n | Any treatment that tries to interpret\n | Bacon's Logic Machine in the light of what\n | classical physics called \"science\" will\n | distort Bacon's meaning and achievement.\n |\n | Note: if a scholar's interpretation of\n | Bacon's Science does not square with the\n | detailed description of the application of\n | Bacon's science in \"Salomon's House\" in\n | NEW ATLANTIS, it should be viewed with\n | scepticism.\n |\n | Bacon's science is more applicable to what\n | we call post-modern neo-hermeutics than to\n | Newtonian mechanics. (Patrick Heelan is\n | good on post-modern neo-hermeneutics.)\n |\n | Consider: why did Bacon conclude that his\n | New Logic Machine would produce\n | scientific knowledge in the form of\n | aphorisms and apothegms--not linear\n | time-sequence predictions?\n |\n | To summarize the above:: Most\n | contemporary interpreters of Bacon\n | evaluate his science by comparison with\n | Newtonian mechanics. If one interprets\n | Bacon on the basis of classical mechanics,\n | the result will not truly reflect Bacon's\n | science.\n |\n | A more fruitful modern model is the\n | Watson-Crick type of \"science\" illustrated\n | by their discovery of the double helix. Their\n | process, as described carefully in Watson's\n | book, could have been lifted from Bacon. It\n | was not. But the point is that it tells of a\n | highly successful, highly empiricist (in\n | Bacon's and Kant's meaning of\n | phenomenological empiricism) approach to\n | the \"understanding\" of the \"unwritten\n | laws\" of cell theory and genetics.\n |\n | NOTE: It is very instructive to study why\n | Linus Pauling failed to dsiscover the genetic\n | code. He was an expert in the physics of\n | biochemistry and applied quantum theory\n | to molecular biology. His theory of the\n | molecular bond won a Nobel Laureate.\n |\n | Read Watson's explanation of why Pauling\n | failed to crack the genetic code.\n |\n | Guenther Stent, the molecular biologist of\n | U.C. Berkeley is an avowed Kantian\n | who narrowly missed cracking the genetic\n | code, His philosophy of science is\n | highly relevant to the application of\n | neo-hermeneutics to contemporary biology.\n |\n | Today's philosophy of physics, as developed\n | by John Wheeler and David Bohm\n | describes a \"Baconian\" idea of the\n | \"participant-observer universe\" to account\n | \"scientifically\" and empirically for the\n | evidence produced in post-modern physics.\n |\n | I hold to two points that may not persuade\n | others. The first is the relevance of\n | \"law-finding\" to the phenemonological\n | empiricism at the heart of Bacon's Nov Org\n | logic machine--as contrasted with his early\n | experimentalism. The second is the\n | standard for us to use in evaluating Bacon's\n | science. Those who apply the model of\n | science widespread in the social sciences\n | and humanities during the 19th and mid\n | 20th centuries--essentially a model based\n | upon pre-Einsteinian physics--argue that\n | Bacon's science is not \"science.\"\n |\n | In the last half of the 20th century\n | \"science\" in both the \"hard\" and \"soft\"\n | sciences underwent the so-called \"second\n | scientific revolution.\" The results, in\n | physics and biology, produced a\n | phenomenology and an empiricism\n | that were both quite compatible with the\n | pre-Newtonian science of Bacon.\n |\n | About 80% of the actual research in\n | laboratories done today by scientists of\n | all fields, (unaware) follows remarkably\n | closely to the process explained by\n | Bacon in Novum Organum and described in\n | New Atlantis--except that taskforce\n | research is not today quite as well\n | organized as was described by Bacon in\n | New Atlantis.\n |\n | In thinking of Bacon's philosophy of science\n | remember the three features in the Latin of\n | Novum Organum: Schematismus,\n | Processus, Form. These operations, which\n | have counterparts in the \"case method\" of\n | searching for the implicit unwritten law\n | behind a series of judge rulings, cannot be\n | understood from a reading of the Ellis\n | translation. Nobody who works from that\n | version can understand, nor do justice to,\n | Bacon's science.\nwith the Annotations of |\nHermes Stella{2} | 2. Franz Tr\u00e4gfer sums up the\nHarley MSS.6463 | discussion on \"Hermes Stella\"\n | and \"Valerius Terminus\" \"Der Titel des\n | Fragments wurde zweimal entscheidend\n | interpretiert. Ellis (Vorwort,\n | 201/2):\n |\n | \"It is impossible to ascertain\n | the motive which determined\n | Bacon to give the supposed\n | author the name of Valerius\n | Terminus, or to his\n | commentator, of whose\n | annotations we have no remains,\n | that of Hermes Stella. It may\n | be conjectured that by the name\n | Terminus he intended to\n | intimate that the new\n | philosophy would put an end to\n | the wandering of mankind in\n | search of truth, that it would\n | be the TERMINUS AD QAEM in\n | which when it was once attained\n | the mind would finally\n | acquiesce.\n |\n | Again the obscurity of the text\n | was to be in some measure\n | removed by the annotations of\n | Stella; not however wholly, for\n | Bacon in the epitome of the\n | eighteenth chapter commends the\n | manner of publishing knowledge\n | 'whereby it shall not be to the\n | capacity nor taste of all, but\n | shall as it were single and\n | adopt his reader.' Stella was\n | therefore to throw a kind of\n | starlight on the subject,\n | enough to prevent the student's\n | losing his way, but not much\n | more.\"\n |\n | Die andere klassische\n | Interpretation gibt Anderson\n | (op.cit.16/17):\n |\n | \"The word 'terminus' probably\n | indicates the 'limits and end'\n | to which investigation may\n | proceed. The ANNOTATIONS, of\n | which 'none are set down in\n | this fragments'--to quote a\n | statement written on the\n | manuscript by Bacon's hand, are\n | to throw a light as by a star\n | (STELLA). Now 'star' is the\n | symbol used by Bacon in the\n | GESTA GRAYORUM, the ADVANCEMENT\n | OF LEARNING, and the DE\n | AUGMENTIS to represent the\n | sovereign. And the significance\n | which he attaches to the word\n | 'Hermes' is evident from his\n | address to King James in the\n | Introduction to the ADVANCEMENT\n | OF LEARNING. 'There is met in\n | your Majesty, says Bacon, 'a\n | rare conjunction as well of\n | divine and sacred literature as\n | of profane and human; so as\n | your Majesty standeth invested\n | of that triplicity which in\n | great veneration was ascribed\n | to the ancient Hermes; the\n | power and fortune of a King,\n | the knowledge and illumination\n | of a Priest, and the learning\n | and the universality of a\n | Philosopher.' Bacon is, or\n | pretended to be, greatly\n | impressed by James's learning:\n | 'To drink indeed', he says, 'of\n | the true fountains of learning,\n | nay to have such a fountain of\n | learning in himself, in a king,\n | and in a king born, is always a\n | miracle.' And it would appear\n | that he hopes at the beginning\n | of James's reign--long before\n | he suffers disillusionment\n | respecting his sovereign's\n | interest in the advance of\n | 'solid' knowledge--that,\n | whether or not he can obtain a\n | greater position of state\n | beyond that alloted to him by\n | Elizabeth, he may be enabled to\n | have the modern Hermes, king of\n | the realm and head of the\n | church, and a literary man of\n | no mean fame and importance,\n | annote a subject's work on the\n | new science. James, when he has\n | done this, may well be\n | prevailed upon to make\n | provision for the operation of\n | the new method of knowledge\n | either by subsidizing helpers\n | or by placing at the author's\n | disposal old or new foundations\n | of learning (Works, II, 175,\n | 180; VI, 90, 172; VIII, 396,\n | 401).\"\n |\n | Brandt (op.cit., 54) Iehnt\n | diese Interpretation ab:\n | \"1. findet sich keine klare\n | Bezeichnung des K\u00f6nigs als\n | eines Sterns, es l\u00e4\u00dft sich den\n | von Anderson angegebenen Texten\n | nicht entnehmen, da\u00df Stella als\n | Symbol f\u00fcr Jakob I. zu gelten\n | hat. 2. kann nur ein K\u00f6nig als\n | Hermes-Trismegistos\n | angesprochen werden (so VIII,\n | 335 und I, 432, nicht in der\n | englischen Fassung III, 263),\n | weil im Namen die Einheit von\n | Priester, Philosoph und K\u00f6nig\n | liegt, aber im Titel unserer\n | Schrift steht nur Hermes, und\n | die Figur des Hermes hat eme\n | vielf\u00e4ltige Bedeutung; Hermes\n | ist der Grenzgott, auf ihn wird\n | schon in dem Wort 'Terminus'\n | des Titels angespielt; weiter\n | ist Hermes der G\u00f6tterbote, der\n | 'hermeneus' oder Interpret--\n | die Hermesmythologie ist\n | hineingesponnen in die\n | interpretatio naturae, die sich\n | Bacon zur Aufgabe stellt und in\n | seine Rolle als 'keryx\u00b4 und\n | `buccinator', als Bote des\n | Friedens (I, 580-581). Man wird\n | also lieber Hermes Stella eine\n | der vielen Masken Bacons sein\n | lassen und sich damit zugleich\n | von der peinlichen Vorstellung\n | befreien, Bacon k\u00fcnde im Titel\n | seines Werkes an, da\u00df der K\u00f6nig\n | die Fu\u00dfnoten dazu verfa\u00dft (eben\n | das folgt aus der Annahme von\n | Anderson).\"\n |\n | Dieser Auseinandersetzung urn\n | die Bedeutung des Titels eine\n | neue Erkl\u00e4rung anzuf\u00fcgen, halte\n | ich, solange keine neuen\n | Dokumente gefunden werden, f\u00fcr\n | wenig sinnvoll. Allein, es sei\n | angemerkt, wollten wir uns mit\n | Brandt von dieser peinlichen\n | Vorstellung bez\u00fcglich Bacons\n | Denken und Trachten befreien,\n | so blieben noch genug\n | Peinlichkeiten der Hybris\n | Bacons.\"\n |\n | Franz Tr\u00e4ger (Hg.), Valerius\n | Terminus. Von der\n | Interpretation der Natur\n | W\u00fcrzburg: K\u00f6nigshausen und\n | Neumann, 1984,25-26.\n |\nin: The Works of Francis Bacon. Faksimile- |\nNeudruck der Ausgabe von Spedding, Ellis |\nund Heath, London 1857-1874, in vierzehn |\nB\u00e4nden (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: Friedrich |\nFromann, Verlag G\u00fcnther Holzboog, 1963), |\nvol. 3.{3} | 3. Franz Tr\u00e4ger discovered that the\n | Spedding & Ellis as MS6462 is not\n | correct, in fact it is MS6463. In\n | his opinion Valerius Terminus was\n | written before The Advancement of\n | Learning. Anderson, Farrington\n | and Rossi also have the opinion\n | that it was written in 1603.\n | Stephens in his edition of 1734\n | uses the same order as the\n | handwritten copy of Bacon's text.\n | Later editors, including Spedding\n | and Ellis, choose an order which\n | corresponds to Bacon's new order\n | of chapters given in his index.\n | Franz Tr\u00e4ger compared the\n | translation of the 11th chapter\n | with the translation of Guiseppe\n | Furlani, DIE ENTSTEHUNG UND DAS\n | WESEN DER BACONISCHEN METHODE in:\n | Archiv f\u00fcr Geschichte der\n | Philosophie, ed. L. Stein, 33.\n | Bd., Berlin, 1921, S.23-47. (1.\n | Teil, 32. Bd., S. 189 ff).\n | Tr\u00e4ger has also checked the\n | following Bacon translations:\n |\n | ESSAYS, \u00fcbers. von Elisabeth\n | Sch\u00fccking, Stuttgart, 1970;\n |\n | NEUES ORGANON DER WISSENSCHAFTEN,\n | \u00fcbers. von Anton Theobald Br\u00fcck,\n | Darmstadt, 1981 (Nachdruck der\n | Ausgabe, Leipzig, 1830);\n |\n | NOVUM ORGANON, \u00fcbers. von Rudolf\n | Hoffmann, bearb. von Gertraud Korf,\n | hrsg. von Manfred Buhr, Berlin (DDR),\n | 1982.\n |\n |\n |\n |\n |\n |\nOF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. |\n |\n |\nCAP. 1. |\nOf the limits and end of knowledge. |\n |\nIn the divine nature both religion and |\nphilosophy hath acknowledged goodness in |\nperfection, science or providence |\ncomprehending all things, and absolute |\nsovereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the |\nthrone of power the angels transgressed |\nand fell{4}, in presuming to come within | 4. Antje Peters checked the Old\nthe oracle of knowledge man transgressed | Testament and the New Testament on the\nand | fall of the angels:\n |\n | Jesaja 14, 14\n | Das Judentum ist gepr\u00e4gt von der\n | antithetisch parallelen Vorstellung\n | von D\u00e4monen und Engeln als Sch\u00e4diger\n | bzw. Helfer des Menschen. Sie wird in\n | der Erz\u00e4hlung vom Engelfall entfaltet.\n |\n | Das Buch Jesaja (Jes 14,12ff)14:12\n | Ach, du bist vom Himmel gefallen, du\n | strahlender Sohn der Morgenr\u00f6te. Zu\n | Boden bist du geschmettert, du\n | Bezwinger der V\u00f6lker.\n |\n | 14:13 Du aber hattest in deinem\n | Herzen gedacht: Ich ersteige den\n | Himmel; dort oben stelle ich meinen\n | Thron auf, \u00fcber den Sternen Gottes;\n | auf den Berg der (G\u00f6tter)versammlung\n | setze ich mich, im \u00e4u\u00dfersten Norden.\n |\n | 14:14 Ich steige weit \u00fcber die Wolken\n | hinauf, um dem H\u00f6chsten zu gleichen.\n |\n | 14:15 Doch in die Unterwelt wirst du\n | hinabgeworfen, in die \u00e4u\u00dferste Tiefe.\n |\n | Im AT geh\u00f6rte Satan zu den \"S\u00f6hnen\n | Gottes\" im himmlischen Hofstaat, wie\n | die wohl alte Vorstellung Ijob 1,6\n | zeigt.\n |\n | Das Buch Ijob (Ijob 1,6)1:6 Nun\n | geschah es eines Tages, da kamen die\n | Gottess\u00f6hne, um vor den Herrn\n | hinzutreten; unter ihnen kam auch der\n | Satan.\n |\n | Er gilt als Diener Gottes und\n | verk\u00f6rpert eine urspr\u00fcnglich Gott\n | zugeschriebene Funktion.\n | Der von dann von Gott abgefallene und\n | mit seinem Diener aus dem Himmel\n | gest\u00fcrzte Engelsf\u00fcrst wird zum Gegner\n | Gottes und Verf\u00fchrer der Menschen.\n |\n | Auch im NT findet der Teufel als ein\n | oder der F\u00fcrst der gefallenen b\u00f6sen\n | Engel Erw\u00e4hnung.\n |\n | Das Evangelium nach Lukas (Lk\n | 10,18)10:18 Da sagte er zu ihnen: Ich\n | sah den Satan wie einen Blitz vom\n | Himmel fallen.\n |\n | Der zweite Brief an die Korinther (2\n | Kor 11,14)11:14 Kein Wunder, denn auch\n | der Satan tarnt sich als Engel des\n | Lichts.\n |\n |\n | Neben den Bibeltexten wird Bacon auch\n | \"De Civitate Dei\" (Der Gottesstaat)\n | von Aurelius Augustinus, dem gr\u00f6\u00dften\n | lateinischen Kirchenlehrer des\n | christlichen Altertums, vorgelegen\n | haben, in der das Thema Engelfall\n | mehrfach unter verschiedenen\n | Gesichtspunkten erw\u00e4hnt wird.\n | So wird im elften Buch die Situation\n | der Engel besonders beleuchtet.\n |\n | Buch XI, 11\n | ... Von dieser Erleuchtung haben sich\n | gewisse Engel abgewendet und sich die\n | Auszeichnung eines weisen und seligen\n | Lebens nicht bewahrt, das zweifellos\n | nur das ewige, seiner Ewigkeit sichere\n | und vergewisserte Leben sein kann. Sie\n | besitzen nur noch ein Vernunftleben,\n | wenn auch ein einsichtsloses und\n | derart, da\u00df sie es, selbst wenn sie\n | wollen, nicht verlieren k\u00f6nnen. ...\n |\n | Buch XI, 13\n | ... Die s\u00fcndigen Engel, die durch ihre\n | Schlechtigkeit jenes Lichtes verlustig\n | gingen, haben sie (die\n | Gl\u00fcckseligkeit), wie wir schl\u00fcssig\n | folgern m\u00fcssen, auch bevor sie fielen,\n | nicht gehabt. ...\n |\n | Buch XI, 19\n | ... Denn diese Scheidung (zwischen\n | Licht und Finsteris) konnte nur er\n | allein treffen, der auch, bevor sie\n | fielen, ihren k\u00fcnftigen Fall\n | vorauswissen kont, und da\u00df sie, des\n | Lichtes der Wahrheit verlustig, im\n | finsteren Hochmut verharren w\u00fcrden.\n |\n | Buch XI, 33\n | Da\u00df es aber Engel gibt, die ges\u00fcndigt\n | haben und in die tiefste Tiefe dieser\n | Welt versto\u00dfen sind, die ihnen zu\n | einer Art von Kerker wurde, darin sie\n | bis zur bevorstehenden letzten\n | Verurteilung am Tage des Gerichtes zu\n | bleiben haben: das offenbart ganz\n | deutlich der Apostel Petrus. Er sagt,\n | da\u00df Gott die s\u00fcndigen Engel nicht\n | geschont, sondern sie in die finsteren\n | Abgr\u00fcnde der H\u00f6lle hinabgesto\u00dfen hat,\n | wo die bis zur Bestrafung im Gerichte\n | gefangengehalten werden. ...\n | ... Und da ja Gott, wie geschrieben\n | steht, \"den Stolzen widersteht, den\n | Dem\u00fctigen aber Gnade gibt\" (Jak 4,6; 1\n | Petr 5,5), wohnt die eine\n | (Engelsgenossenschaft) im Himmel der\n | Himmel und ist die andre von dort\n | hinabgest\u00fcrzt in diesen untersten\n | Lufthimmel, um hier ruhelos in und her\n | zu schwirren.\n |\n | Buch XXII,1\n | Gott ist es, der mit dem freiwilligen\n | Sturz der Engel die v\u00f6llig gerechte\n | Strafe ewiger Unseligkeit verkn\u00fcpft\n | hat und den \u00fcbrigen Engeln, die im\n | h\u00f6chsten Gut verblieben sind, als Lohn\n | f\u00fcr ihr Verbleiben die Sicherheit\n | gew\u00e4hrt hat, da\u00df dieses Verbleiben\n | kein Ende haben wird.\n |\n | Aufgrund dieser Erkenntnisse zieht\n | Augustin Parallelen zum Leben der\n | Menschen, besonders im 12. Buch:\n |\n | Buch XII,1\n | ... W\u00e4hrend die einen standhaft in dem\n | allen gemeinsamen Gut, das f\u00fcr sie\n | Gott selbst ist, und in seiner\n | Ewigkeit, Wahrheit und Liebe\n | verharren, sind die anderen, von ihrer\n | eigenen Macht berauscht, als w\u00e4ren sie\n | sich selbst ihr Gut , vom h\u00f6heren,\n | allen gemeinsamen, beseligenden Gut\n | zum eigenen Selbst abgefallen. ...\nfell{5}: but in pursuit towards the | 5. Spedding's footnote:This clause is\nsimilitude of God's goodness or love | repeated in the margin, in the\n(which is one thing, for love is nothing | transcriber's hand.\nelse but goodness put in motion or |\napplied) neither man or spirit ever |\nhath transgressed, or shall transgress.{6} | 6. similarly in: : I.M. Praefatio Sp.\n | I,132, 19-22; AL Sp. III, 12 seq.\nThe angel of light that was, when he | (D.A. Sp. I, 742, 1 9 seq. (footnote\npresumed before his fall, said within | taken from the French translation of\nhimself, I WILL ASCEND AND BE LIKE UNTO | Valerius Terminus by Francois Vert,\n | Meridiens Klincksieck, 1986)\nTHE HIGHEST{7}; not God, but the highest. | 7. Isaiah 14, 14:\nTo be like to God in goodness, was no part | Authorized Version: I will ascend\nof his emulation; knowledge, being in | above the heights of the clouds; I\ncreation an angel of light, was not the | will be like the most high.\nwant which did most solicit him; only |\nbecause he was a minister he aimed at a |\nsupremacy; therefore his climbing or |\nascension was turned into a throwing down |\nor precipitation. |\n |\nMan on the other side, when he was tempted |\nbefore he fell, had offered unto him this |\nsuggestion, THAT HE SHOULD BE LIKE |\nUNTO GOD{8}. But how? Not simply, but in | 8. Genesis 3, 5:\nthis part, KNOWING GOOD AND EVIL. For | Authorized Version: For God does know\nbeing in his creation invested with | that in the day ye eat thereof, then\nsovereignty of all inferior | your eyes shall be opened, and ye\n | shall be as gods, knowing good and\n | evil.\n |\n | For Bacon's alleged use of the Geneva\n | Bible see Henri Durel-Leon in\n | Transactions of the Cambridge\n | Bibliographical Society, XI:2 (1997),\n | p. 160 and n. 74, modified in the\n | direction of AV by, probably, Lancelot\n | Andrewes in AL. (Thanks to Dr.\n | Leedham-Green)\n |\n | Geneva Bible: The First Boke of Moses,\n | called Genesis, Chap 3,4+5: Then the\n | serpent said to the woman, Ye shal not\n | dye at all, But God doeth knowe, that\n | when ye shall eat thereof, your eyes\n | shalbe opened, & ye shalbe as gods\n | knowing good and evil. [footnote c: As\n | thogh he shulde say, God doeth not\n | forbid you to eat of the frute, save\n | that he knoweth that if you shulde eat\n | thereof, you shulde be like to him]\n |\n | Authorized Version: And the serpent\n | said unto the woman, Ye shall not\n | surely die: For God doth know that in\n | the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes\n | shall be opened, and ye shall be as\n | gods, knowing good and evil.\n |\n | Vulgata: dixit autem serpens ad\n | mulierem nequaquam morte moriemini /\n | scit enim Deus quod in quocumque die\n | comederitis ex eo aperientur oculi\n | vestri et eritis sicut dii scientes\n | bonum et malum\ncreatures{9}, he was not needy of power or | 9. Genesis I, 1,26\ndominion; but again, being a spirit newly | Geneva Bible: Furthermore God said,\ninclosed in a body of earth, he was | Let us make man in our image according\nfittest to be allured with appetite of | to our lickeness, and let them rule\nlight and liberty of knowledge; therefore | over the fish of the sea, and over the\nthis approaching and intruding into God's | foule of the heaven, and over the\nsecrets and mysteries was rewarded with a | beastes, & over all the earth, and\nfurther removing and estranging from God's | over everiething that crepeth & moveth\npresence. But as to the goodness of God, | on earth.\nthere is no danger in contending or |\nadvancing towards a similitude thereof, as | Authorized Version: And God said, Let\nthat which is open and propounded to our | us make man in our image, after our\nimagination. For that voice (whereof the | likeness: and let them have dominion\nheathen and all other errors of religion | over the fish of the sea, and over the\nhave ever confessed that it sounds not | fowl of the air, and over the cattle,\nlike man), LOVE YOUR ENEMIES; BE YOU LIKE | and over all the earth, and over every\nUNTO YOUR HEAVENLY FATHER, THAT SUFFERETH | creeping thing that creepeth upon the\nHIS RAIN TO FALL BOTH UPON | earth.\n |\n | Vulgata: Et ait faciamus hominem ad\n | imaginem et similitudinem nostram et\n | praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus\n | caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae\n | omnique reptili quod movetur in terra\nTHE JUST AND THE UNJUST{10}, doth well | 10. Matthew 5, 44-45\ndeclare, that we can in that point commit | Geneva Bible: Love your enemies...\nno excess; so again we find it often | That you may be the children of your\nrepeated in the old law, BE YOU HOLY AS I | Father that is in heaven: for he\nAM | maketh his sunne to arise on the\n | evil, and the good, and he sendeth\n | raine on the iuste, & unjuste.\n |\n | Authorized Version: Love your\n | enemies:... That you may be the\n | children of your father which is in\n | heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise\n | on the evil and on the good, and\n | sendeth rain on the just and on the\n | unjust.\n | Vulgata: Ego autem dico vobis diligite\n | inimicos vestros ... ut sitis filii\n | Patris vestri qui in caelis est qui\n | solem suum oriri facit super bonos et\n | malos et pluit super iustos et\n | iniustos.\nHOLY{11}; and what is holiness else but | 11. Leviticus 11,44:\ngoodness, as we consider it separate and | Authorized Version: For I am the Lord\nguarded from all mixture and all access of | your God: ye shall therefore sanctify\nevil? | yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for\n | I am holy: neither shall ye defile\nWherefore seeing that knowledge is of the | yourself with any manner of creeping\nnumber of those things which are to be | thing that creepeth upon the earth.\naccepted of with caution and | 1 Peter 1, 16:\n |\n | Authorized Version: For it is written,\n | Be ye holy; for I am holy.\n | see also Leviticus 20,7 and 20,26\ndistinction{12}; being now to open a | 12. cf. A.L. Sp.III, 264, 1.18 (D.A.\nfountain, such as it is not easy to | Sp. I, 433, I. 29,30)\ndiscern where the issues and streams |\nthereof will take and fall; I thought it |\ngood and necessary in the first place to |\nmake a strong and sound head or bank to |\nrule and guide the course of the waters; |\nby setting down this position or |\nfirmament{13}, namely, THAT ALL KNOWLEDGE | 13. Melek Hasg\u00fcn comments:\nIS TO BE LIMITED BY RELIGION, AND TO BE | \u2018Firmament\u2019 means, apart from the arch\nREFERRED | or vault of heaven overhead, in which\n | the clouds and the stars appear, in\n | the literal etymological sense a firm\n | support or foundation. At the\n | beginning of his text Bacon sets\n | the basis for his further theories.\n | According to Bacon it is important not\n | to try to find out the secrets and\n | mysteries of God or to desire to be\n | like God, as was the case in the Fall\n | of Man and the Fall of Angels. Thus it\n | is forbidden to exceed these limits,\n | but to inquire into nature and its\n | creatures is legitimate, because God\n | has \"...let man have dominion over\n | (...) all the earth...\"(Gen.I, 1,26).\n | He maintains that all knowledge is\n | limited by religion and by this\n | statement he also avoids any suspicion\n | on heresy, which could arise because\n | of his desire for progress and\n | knowledge.\nTO USE AND ACTION{14}. | 14. \"Ad meritum et usus vitae\", Works,\n | vol. I, p. 132 ; Italics in order to\nFor if any man shall think by view and | stress the importance; probably not a\ninquiry into these sensible and material | quotation.\nthings, to attain to any light for the |\nrevealing of the nature or will of God, he |\nshall dangerously abuse himself. It is |\ntrue that the contemplation of the |\ncreatures of God hath for end (as to the |\nnatures of the creatures themselves) |\nknowledge, but as to the nature of God, no |\nknowledge, but wonder; which is nothing |\nelse but contemplation broken off, or |\nlosing itself. Nay further, as it was |\naptly said by one of Plato's school THE |\nSENSE OF MAN RESEMBLES THE SUN, WHICH |\nOPENETH AND REVEALETH THE TERRESTRIAL |\nGLOBE, BUT OBSCURETH AND CONCEALETH THE |\nCELESTIAL{15}; so doth the sense discover | 15. Philo d'Alexandrie, Des Songes,\nnatural things, but darken and shut up | Livre I, 83-4 (footnote taken from the\ndivine. And this appeareth sufficiently in | Vert translation)\nthat there is no proceeding in invention |\nof knowledge but by similitude; and God is |\nonly self-like, having nothing in common |\nwith any creature, otherwise than as in |\nshadow and trope. Therefore attend his |\nwill as himself openeth it, and give unto |\nfaith that which unto faith belongeth{16}; | 16. St. Matthew 22, 21:\nfor more worthy it is to believe than to | Authorized Version: ... Then saith he\nthink or know, considering that in | unto them, Render therefore unto\nknowledge (as we now are capable of it) | Caesar the things which are Caesar's;\nthe mind suffereth from inferior natures; | and unto God the things that are\nbut in all belief it suffereth from a | God's.\nspirit which it holdeth superior and |\nmore authorised than itself.{17} | 17. cf. A.L. Sp. III,478,1.8 sq. (D.A.\n | Sp. I, 830, I. 24 seq.\nTo conclude, the prejudice hath been |\ninfinite that both divine and human |\nknowledge hath received by the |\nintermingling and tempering of the one |\nwith the other; as that which hath filled |\nthe one full of heresies, and the other |\nfull of speculative fictions and | 18. similarly: A.L. Sp.III, 350,I.24\nVanities{18}. | seq. (D.A. Sp. I, 545, I.35 swq.)\n | John Channing Briggs (\"\"Bacon's\nBut now there are again which in a | science and religion\", in: THE\ncontrary extremity to those which give to | CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON, ed. by\ncontemplation an over-large scope, do | Markku Peltonen, Cambridge 1996)\noffer too great a restraint to natural and | comments on Bacon's separation of\nlawful knowledge, being unjustly jealous | divinity and natural philosophy\nthat every reach and depth of knowledge | (quotations in Briggs' text are from\nwherewith their conceits have not been | THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING):\nacquainted, should be too high an |\nelevation of man's wit, and a searching | A longstanding commonplace in Bacon\nand ravelling too far into God's secrets; | scholarship has been the notion that\nan opinion that ariseth either of envy | the Baconian advancement of learning\n(which is proud weakness and to be | depends upon a strict separation of\ncensured and not confuted), or else of a | divinity and natural philosophy. In\ndeceitful simplicity. For if they mean | a number of memorable passages Bacon\nthat the ignorance of a second cause doth | indeed warns his readers of the dire\nmake men more devoutly to depend upon the | consequences of confusing divinity\nprovidence of God, as supposing the | with natural science: to combine\neffects to come immediately from his hand, | them, he says, is to confound them.\nI demand of them, as Job demanded of his | This is supposedly what Plato and the\nfriends, WILL YOU LIE FOR GOD AS MAN WILL | scholastics did, and what Bacon\nFOR MAN TO | explicitly designs the new learning\n | to overcome. Even the acceptable\n | hybrid \"divine philosophy,\" when it\n | is \"commixed together\" with natural\n | philosophy, leads to \"an heretical\n | religion, and an imaginary and\n | fabulous philosophy\" (III, 350).\n | According to this emphatic strand of\n | Baconian doctrine, religion that\n | joins with the study of nature is in\n | danger of becoming atheistic, or an\n | enthusiastic rival of the true\n | church. Natural philosophy that\n | traffics unwisely with divinity\n | collapses into idolatry or fakery.\n |\n | Bacon's exemplum of these abuses in a\n | modern proto-science is the divine\n | philosophy of the Paracelsian school,\n | which seeks \"the truth of all natural\n | philosophy in the Scriptures.\" The\n | Paracelsians mirror and reverse the\n | heresies of pagan pantheism by\n | seeking what is \"dead\" (mortal or\n | natural) from among the \"living\"\n | (eternal) truths of divinity, when\n | \"the scope or purpose of the Spirit\n | of God is not to express matters of\n | nature in the Scriptures, otherwise\n | than in passage, and for application\n | to man's capacity and to matters\n | moral or divine\" (ut 485-6). If we\n | take Thomas Sprat at his word, the\n | Royal Society was founded on\n | generally similar principles. The\n | first corruption of knowledge, he\n | argues, resulted from the Egyptians'\n | concealment of wisdom \"as sacred\n | Mysteries.\" The current age of\n | inquiry benefitted from \"the\n | dissolution of the ABBYES, whereby\n | their Libraries came forth into the\n | light, and fell into industrious Mens\n | hands.\" Surrounded by the warring\n | forces of contrary religions (the\n | society's rooms at Gresham College,\n | London, were occupied by soldiers in\n | 1658), the founders of the Royal\n | Society--according to Sprat's\n | account--were \"invincibly arm'd\" not\n | only against scholastic Catholicism,\n | but against the \"inchantments of\n | ENTHUSIASM\" and \"spiritual Frensies\"\n | that sometimes characterized the\n | Protestant revolutionaries.\n |\n | In Bacon's project, there is an\n | explicit, delineated role for the\n | study of divinity, which he carefully\n | separates from his own work. Reason\n | is at work \"in the conception and\n | apprehension of the mysteries of God\n | to us revealed\" and in \"the inferring\n | and deriving of doctrine and\n | direction thereupon\" (III, 479). In\n | the first instance reason stirs\n | itself only to grasp and illustrate\n | revelation; it does not inquire. This\n | is the foundation of Bacon's\n | distinction between true natural\n | philosophy, which inquires into the\n | world as God's manifestation of his\n | GLORY or power, and true theology,\n | which piously interprets the\n | scripturally revealed meaning of\n | God's inscrutable will. The natural\n | world declares God's glory but not\n | his will (III, 478). Reason's power\n | in theology therefore \"consisteth of\n | probation and argument.\" lt\n | formulates doctrine only insofar as\n | God's revelation, largely or wholly\n | through Scripture, makes it possible.\n | The Lord \"doth grift [graft) his\n | revelations and holy doctrine upon\n | the notions of our reason, and\n | applieth his inspirations to open our\n | understanding\" (III, 480). (pp. 172-\n | 173)\nGRATIFY HIM?{19} But if any man without | 19. Job 13, 7-9:\nany sinister humour doth indeed make doubt | Authorized Version: Will ye speak\nthat this digging further and further into | wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully\n | for him? Will ye accept his person?\n | will ye contend for God? Is it good\n | that he should search you out? as one\n | man mocketh another, do ye so mock\n | him?\nthe mine of natural knowledge{20} is a | 20. This image is also used in A.L. Sp.\nthing without example and uncommended in | III, 351, I, 16 where Bacon refers to\nthe Scriptures, or fruitless; let him | Democritus (Vert's footnote)\nremember and be instructed; for behold it |\nwas not that pure light of natural |\nknowledge, whereby man in paradise was |\nable to give unto every living creature a |\nname according to his propriety{21}, which | 21. Genesis 2,19-20\ngave occasion to the fall; but it was an | Geneva Bible: So the Lord God formed\naspiring desire to attain to that part of | of the earth everie beast of the\nmoral knowledge which defineth of good and | field, and everie foule of the heaven,\nevil, whereby to dispute God's | & broght them unto the man to se how\ncommandments and not to depend upon the | he wolde call them: for howsoever the\nrevelation of his will, which was the | man named the living creature, so was\noriginal temptation. And the first holy | the name thereof.The man therefore\nrecords, which within those brief | gave names unto all cattle, and to the\nmemorials of things which passed before | foule of the heaven, and to everie\nthe flood entered few things as worthy to | beast of the field: but for Adam found\nbe registered but only | he not an help mete for him.\n |\n | Authorized Version: And out of the\n | ground the Lord God formed every beast\n | of the field, and every fowl of the\n | air; and brought THEM unto Adam to see\n | what he would call them: and\n | whatsoever Adam called every living\n | creature, that WAS the name thereof.\n | And Adam gave names to all cattle, and\n | to the fowl of the air, and to every\n | beast of the field; but for Adam there\n | was not found an help meet for him.\n |\n | Vulgata:Igitur Dominus Deus de humo\n | cunctis animantibus terrae et\n | universis volatilibus caeli adduxit ea\n | ad Adam ut videret quid vocaret ea /\n | omne enim quod vovavit Adam animae\n | viventis ipsum est nomen eius /\n | appelavitque Adam nominibus suis\n | cuncat animantia / et universa\n | volatilia et omnes bestias terrae /\n | Adam vero non inveniebatur adiutor\n | similis eius\nlineages{22} and propagations, yet | 22. Spedding's footnote: LINAGES in\nnevertheless honour the remembrance | original. See note 3, p. 148\nof the inventor both of music{23} and | 23. Genesis 4,21:\n | Authorized Version: And his brother's\n | name was Jubal: he was the father of\n | all such as handle the harp and organ.\n |\n | Vulgata: et nomen fratris eius Iuabal\n | ipse fuit pater canentium cithara et\n | organo\nworks in metal{24}. Moses again (who was | 24. Genesis, 4,22:\nthe reporter) is said to have been seen in | Authorized Version: And Zillah, she\nall | also bare Tubalcain, an instructor of\n | every artificer in brass and iron...\n |\n | Vulgata: Sella quoque genuit\n | Thubalcain qui fuitmalleator et faber\n | in cuncta opera aeris et ferri...\nthe Egyptian learning{25}, which nation | 25. The Acts 7,22:\nwas early and leading in matter of | Authorized Version: And Moses was\n | learned in all the wisdom of the\n | Egyptians, and was mighty in words and\n | deeds.\nknowledge. And Salomon the king,{26} as | 26. cf. A.L. Sp.III, 298,I.38; N.A. Sp.\nout of a branch of his wisdom | III, 145, I seq.\nextraordinarily petitioned and granted |\nfrom God, is said to have written a |\nnatural history of all that is green from |\nthe cedar to the moss{27}, (which is but a | 27. 1 Kings 4, 29-34\nrudiment between putrefaction and | Geneva Bible: And God gave Salomon\n | wisdome, und understanding exceeding\n | muche, and a large heart, even as the\n | sand that is on the sea shore. And\n | Salomons wisdome excelled the wisdome\n | of all the children of the East and\n | all the wisdome of Egypt. For he was\n | wiser than anie man.... and he was\n | famous throughout all nacions rounde\n | about. And Salomon spake thre thousand\n | proverbes: and his songs were a\n | thousand and five. And he spake of\n | trees, from the cedar tre that is in\n | Lebanon, even unto the hyssope that\n | springeth out of the wall: he spake\n | also of beastes, and of foules, and of\n | creping things, and of fishes. And\n | there came all the people to heare the\n | wisdome of Salomon, from all Kings of\n | the earth, which had heard of his\n | wisdome.\n |\n | Authorized Version:And God gave\n | Salomon wisdom and understanding\n | exceeding much, and largeness of\n | heart, even as the sand that is on the\n | sea shore. And Salomon's wisdom\n | excelled the wisdom of all the\n | children of the east country, and all\n | the wisdom of Egypt. For he was wiser\n | than all men...and his fame was in all\n | nations round about. And he spake\n | three thousands proverbs; and his\n | songs were a thousand and five. And he\n | spake of trees, from the cedar tree\n | that is in Lebanon even unto the\n | hyssop that springeth out of the wall:\n | he spake also of beasts, and of fowl,\n | and of creeping things, and of fishes.\n | And there came all people to hear the\n | wisdom of Salomon. From all kings of\n | the earth, which had heard of his\n | wisdom.\n |\n | Vulgata: Liber Malachim 4, 29-34:\n | Dedit quoque Deus sapientiam Salomoni\n | et prudentiam multam nimis et\n | latitudinem cordis quasi harenam quae\n | est in litore maris / et praecedebat\n | sapientia Salomonis sapientiam omnium\n | orientalium et Aegyoptorum / et erat\n | sapientia cunctis hominibus.. Et erat\n | nominatus inuniversis gentibus per\n | cicuitum / locutus est quoque Salomon\n | tria milia parabolas et fuerunt\n | carmina eius quinque et mille / et\n | disputavit super lignis a cedro quae\n | est in Libano usque ad hysopum quae\n | egreditur de pariete et disseuit de\n | iumentis et volucribus et reptilibus\n | et piscibus / et veniebant de cunctis\n | populis ad audiendam sapientiam\n | Salomonis et ab universis regibus\n | terrae qui audiebant sapientiam eius\n |\n | Luther Bible: 1. K\u00f6nige 5, 9-14\n |\n | Melek Hasg\u00fcn comments: The hyssop is\n | mentioned in Shakespeare\u2019s OTHELLO\n | I,3: \"Sow lettuce, set hyssop and\n | weed up thyme\". Hyssop and thyme were\n | believed to aid the growth of each\n | other, one being moist and the other\n | dry. The reason why Bacon used moss\n | instead of hyssop could be that moss\n | is also a moist plant and he chose an\n | expression which is more general or\n | known.\nan herb{28},) and also of all that liveth | 28. The plant mentioned in the Bible is\nand moveth. And if the book of Job be | not \"moss\", but HYSOPPUS OFFICINALIS\nturned over; it will be found to have much | [in German: JOSEFSKRAUT, KIRCHENSEPPL,\naspersion of natural | EISOP, YSOP)]. \"The Greek plant name\n | H\u00ddSSOOPOS is probably derived from\n | Hebrew ESOB (mentioned in the\n | Bible...), although it is not clear\n | whether ESOB referred to the plant\n | called hyssop today. Another\n | explanation gives Arabic AZZOF \"holy\n | herb\" as the source of the name (cf.\n | French HERBE SACR\u00c9) (Gernot Katzer\n | Website on Spices). Gernot Katzer in\n | his entry on the pomegranate\n | (http://www-\n | ang.kfunigraz.ac.at/~katzer/germ/index\n | .html) considers the problem of the\n | names of plants in the Bible:\n |\n | \"The pomegranate tree is an ancient\n | cultigen in Western Asia; it is\n | mentioned in the oldest part of the\n | Old Testament (the Pentateuch).\n | Although the Old Testament is not a\n | collection of cooking recipes, it\n | names many plants of everyday or\n | cultic usage in ancient Israel; the\n | New Testament, though, has less\n | descriptive character, and plants are,\n | consequently, named much less\n | frequently.\n |\n | If one wants to set up a \"collection\n | of biblical spices\", one must not\n | forget that there are three millennia\n | between the language of the Old\n | Testament and ours; therefore, exact\n | translations are sometimes impossible.\n | The following quote (Isaiah 28,27) may\n | illustrate the difficulties of\n | translation:\n |\n | 'QETSACH is not threshed with a\n | sledge, nor is a cartwheel rolled over\n | KAMMON; QETSACH is beaten out with a\n | rod, and KAMMON with a stick.'\n |\n | Because of the dialectic structure, we\n | may infer that the two plants are\n | similar, but differ in details of\n | their harvest. The term KAMMON\n | obviously is related to Greek K\u00ddMINON\n | (cumin), but also lies behind English\n | CARAWAY; QETSACH is more difficult to\n | analyze. Probably it means NIGELLA,\n | sometimes also called BLACK CUMIN,\n | whose seeds ripen in a closed capsule,\n | which must first be opened.\n |\n | Yet in translating the Bible, botanic\n | accuracy is less an aim than general\n | matters of style. \"Black cumin\" is\n | less elegant than \"cumin\", and\n | \"nigella\" is not an English word at\n | all. Therefore, English Bible\n | translations render QETSACH as DILL,\n | CARAWAY or \"fitches\", a word that is\n | missing from every modern dictionary.\n | German translators, on the other hand,\n | who don't have a traditional, elegant\n | word for CUMIN, commonly translate\n | KAMMON as CARAWAY (which is almost\n | certainly wrong), and have to resort\n | to DILL for QETSACH.\n |\n | Comparing different translations of\n | the Old Testament, one find some or\n | all of the following (Hebrew terms are\n | given in parenthesis): garlic (shuwm),\n | onion (b@tsel), nigella (qetsach, also\n | rendered as caraway oder dill, quite\n | obscure), cumin (kammon, also\n | caraway), coriander (gad), caper\n | (abiyownah, also translated \"desire\"),\n | cinnamon (qinnamown), cassia (qiddah,\n | also interpreted as a synonym of\n | cinnamon or cassia buds), hyssop\n | (ezowb, frequent but very obscure),\n | myrtle (hadac), olive (shemen and\n | zayith, very frequent), juniper\n | (b@rowsh, also given as \"fir\" or\n | \"pine\"), almond (shaqed), pomegranate\n | (rimmown or rimmon), rose\n | (chabatstseleth, very obscure) and\n | saffron (karkom).\n |\n | Similarly, the New Testament has not\n | been translated by biologists--the\n | latter had not suspected birds to live\n | in mustard plants (s\u00ednapi). Other\n | plant names from the New Testament\n | include the following (Greek given in\n | parenthesis): mint (heed\u00fdosmon, this\n | is not the common name of mint in\n | Greek), cumin (k\u00fdminon, also\n | translated caraway), anis (\u00e1neethon,\n | also rendered dill), rue (pe\u00e9ganon,\n | not the common term), cinnamon\n | (kinn\u00e1moomon), hyssop (h\u00fdssoopos,\n | referring to the obscure word in the\n | Old Testament) and olive (agri\u00e9laios\n | \"olive tree\" and ela\u00edon \"olive oil\").\n |\n | The DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE (ed. by\n | James Hastings and John A. Selbie,\n | Edinburgh, 3rd ed.1914) says about the\n | HYSSOP: \"It was used for sprinkling\n | blood (Ex. 12,22) and in the ritual of\n | the cleansing of lepers (Lv 14,4, Nu\n | 19,6); it was an insignificant plant\n | growing out of the wall (1 K 4,33); it\n | could afford a branch strong enough to\n | support a wet sponge (Jn 19,29). It is\n | possible that all these references are\n | not to a single species. Among many\n | suggested plants the most probable is\n | either a species of majoran, e.g.,\n | ORIGANUM MARU, or the common caper-\n | plant (CAPPARIS SPINOSA), which may be\n | seen growing out of crevices in walls\n | all over Palestine\" (E.W.G.Masterman).\n |\n | For the German traditions about the\n | hyssop Jacob and Wilhem Grimm in\n | DEUTSCHES W\u00d6RTERBUCH (1854 seq.) give\n | the following information:\n | YSOP, isop, ispe(n), eisop; hysop, m.\n | (F.),HYSSOPUS OFFICINALIS L., KLEINER\n | BUSCH MIT STARK DUFTENDEN BL\u00c4TTERN und\n | VIOLETTEN BL\u00dcTEN. GELEGENTLICH WIRD\n | DER NAME AUF VERWANDTE PFLANZEN\n | \u00dcBERTRAGEN, VOR ALLEM AUF SATUREJA\n | HORTENSIS L., VGL. MARZELL WB. D. DT.\n | PFLANZENN. 2, 966 ff.; PRITZEL-JESSEN\n | PFLANZEN (1882) 363 f.; FISCHER\n | SCHW\u00c4B. 4, 53.\n |\n | HERKUNFT UND form.\n |\n | ASS. z\u00fbpu; SYR.-ARAB. z\u00fcf\u00e4; HEBR. .;\n | GRIECH. ; ; LAT. hyss_pus F., hyss_pum\n | N.; GOT. hwssopon (DAT. SG.); AGS.\n | ysope f.; AHD. hysop ST. M. NEBEN\n | SP\u00c4TEREM ISOPO, isipo 5W. M.; MHD.\n | ysope M. (NOCH BEI LUTHER MEIST\n | SCHWACH FLEKTIERT: EXOD. 12, 22;\n | LEVIT. 14, 52; PS. 51, 9; HEBR. 9,\n | 19); SP\u00c4TAHD.-FR\u00dcHNHD. AUCH ALS FEM.\n | (YSOPUS \u00eespa [12. JH.] AH. GL. 3, 264,\n | 53 ST.-S.; DE ISOPO von der ispen\n | [12.JH.] EBDA 4, 365, 46; von der\n | ispen [UM 1350] KONRAD V. MEGENBEEG\n | BUCH D. NATUR 405 PF.; VGL. 420;\n | yspen, die nit felt LIEDERBUCH D.\n | H\u00c4TZLERIN 234 HALTAUS). NHD. (h)ysop,\n | isop, WEITERES S.U.\n |\n | AUF DER BIBELSPRACHLICHEN TRADITION\n | (1) UND AUF DER FR\u00dcHEN EINF\u00dcHRUNG DES\n | ORIENTALISCH-S\u00dcDEUROP\u00c4ISCHEN YSOPS ALS\n | HEIL- UND GEW\u00dcRZPFLANZE (2) BERUHT\n | SEINE REICHE BEZEUGUNG IN NAHEZU\n | ALLEN EUROP\u00c4ISCHEN SPRACHEN. NEUER-\n | DINGS WIRD DIE IDENTIT\u00c4T DES\n | BIBLISCHEN ysop MIT HYSSOPUS\n | OF/ICINALIS WIEDER BEZWEIFELT MARZELL\n | A. A. 0. (ZUR DISKUSSION UM JOAN. 19,\n | 29 VGL. BAUER GRIECH.-DT. WB. ZUM\n | NEUEN TESTAM. [4 1952] 1541). DER NAME\n | ERSCHEINT BIBEL-SPRACHLICH DURCHWEG\n | ALS MASK., GELEGENTLICH BIS INS 14.\n | JH. IN LAT. FLEXIONSFORM (S. U.\n | DAT. SG. isupo NOTKER, ysopo TRIERER\n | PS., ysopo PASSIONAL; AKK. SG.. ysopum\n | WERNHER MARIENLEBEN) UND AUCH SP\u00c4TER\n | NOCH MIT SPIRANTISCHEM ANLAUT: hyssop\n | ABR. A S. CLARA etw. f. alle (1699) 1,\n | 98; hysop BRENNER ERZ. U. SCHR. (1864)\n | 1, 20; hyssop TILLMANN NEUES TEST.\n | (LPZ. 6 1958) 625. WEITER\n | EINGEDEUTSCHT IST DAS WORT IN SEINER\n | VOLKSSPRACHLICHEN VERWENDUNG (2):\n | SYNKOPE DES MITTELSILBENVOKALS S.. OB.\n | SOWIE isp (12. JH.) AHD. GL. 4, 235,\n | 38 ST.-S.; yspe (14. JH.) EBDA 3, 542,\n | 25; ispe (U. \u00c4.) 14./16. JH.\n | DIEFENBACH GL. 310b ; isp(e) FISCHER\n | SCHW\u00c4B. 4, 53 (ST\u00c4RKER ABWEICHENDE\n | MISCHFORMEN zispe EBDA, zwispe 6,\n | 1472), SCHMELLER-FR. BAYER. 1, 168.\n | NICHT SELTEN DIPHTHONGIERT\n | garteneisop, zwibeleisop ALBERTUS\n | dict. (1540) FF la ; eisop F\u00c4BRICUS\n | RER. MISNIAC. (1569) 246; eysopwein\n | ZEHNER NOMENCL. (1643) 365; eisop M.\n | B\u00d6HME VIEHARTZNEY (1682) 31. DIE\n | ZAHLREICHEN MUNDARTLICHEN NEBENFORMEN\n | S. IM \u00dcBRIGEN BEI MARZELL A. A. O.;\n | VGL. NOCH eisop TEIL 3, SP. 380,\n | eisewig 3, 377, hispe F., 4, 2, 1579\n | SOWIE isop 4, 2, 2182.\n |\n | GEBRAUCH.\n | 1)BIBELSPRACHLICH. EXOD. 12, 22;\n | LEVIT. 14, 4 U. 6; 14, 49fl.; num. 19,\n | 6 u. 18; PS. 50 9 U. HEBR. 9, 19\n | ERW\u00c4HNEN DEN YSOP IM ZUSAMMENHANG\n | KULTISCHER REINIGUNGSZEREMONIEN. 3.\n | REG. 4, 33 DIENT ER EINEM VERGLEICH\n | ZUR VERANSCHAUIICHUNG DER WEISHEIT\n | SALOMOS (S.U.). JOAN. 19, 29 WIRD DEM\n | GEKREUZIGTEN DER ESSIGSCHWAMM UM EINEN\n | YSOP GEWICKELT GEREICHT (HIERZU VGL.\n | BAUER GRIECH.-DT. WB. ZUM NEUEN\n | TESTAM. [4 1952] 1541). AN DIESEN\n | STELLEN IST DAS WORT IN ALLEN\n | DEUTSCHEN BIBEL\u00dcBERSETZUNGEN BIS IN\n | DIE GEGENWART IN FESTEM GEBRAUCH:\n | afaruh \u00fean \u00deO in wato wairpandans\n | hrain jah hwssopon jah wullai raudai\n | ufartrusnjandans (SKEIREINS 3, 16)\n | GOT. BIBEL 21 , 461 STREITBERG;\n | FASCICULUM HYSOPI uuadal hysopes\n | (EXODUS 12, 22) (8./9. JH.) AHD. GL.\n | 1, 335, 38 ST.-S.; so er chumet, so\n | besprenget er mih mit isopo (ASPERGES\n | ME YSOPO, PS. 50, 9) also die\n | miselsuhtigen, unde danne uuirdo ih\n | gereinet; uuunda so ist gepoten in\n | demo puoche, daz die miselsuhtigen\n | siben stunt besprenget uurten mit\n | gedunchetemo isopo in demo opferpluote\n | (VGL. LEV. 14, 4ff.; 49ff.) NOTKER 3,\n | 172 PIPER (VGL. 2, 195f.); du\n | besprenges mih, herro, mit dem isipen\n | unde ih wirde gereinet (12. JH.,\n | WINDBERGER INTERLINEARVERSION), du\n | solt besprengen mich mit demo ysopo\n | unde ih wirde gereinet (13. JH.,\n | TRIERER INTERLINEARVERSION) (PS. 50,\n | 9) DT. INTERLINEARVERSIONEN D. PSALMEN\n | (1839) 232 GRAFF; wann sy fulten ein\n | schwamp mit essig sy vmbgaben in mit\n | ysopp: sy brachten in seinen mund\n | (JOAN. 19, 29) ERSTE DT. BIBEL 1, 415\n | KURR.; vnd er (SALOMO) redet\n | dreytausent spruch, vnd seyner liede\n | waren tausent vnd funffe. vnd er redet\n | von bewmen, vom ceder an zu Libanon\n | bis an den isop, der aus der wand\n | wechst (3. REG. 4, 33) LUTHER DT.\n | BIBEL 1, 150 W., VGL. 9, 1, 408f. AUS\n | BIBELSPRACHLICHER TRADITION ERWACHSEN\n | FOLGENDE BELEGE, ZU PS. 50, 8:\n |\n | Maria sunderinne,\n | du bist in gutem sinne\n | vf einen burnen alda kumen\n | ...\n | betouche dich zv male\n | des du macht Immer wesen vro\n | der besprenget dich mit ysopo\n | des bistu wiz ob alleme sne\n | (UM 1300) PASSIONAL 371, 22 HAHN;\n |\n | nun spreng mich herr mit ysop gut,\n | so wird all s\u00fcnd verderbet\n | SPEE G\u00dcLD. TUGENDBUCH (1649) 35;\n |\n | und so, meint der meister ferner,\n | werde ich auch bald gewaschen werden,\n | und mit hysop besprengt, der ich \u00fcber\n | so viele das miserere gesungen BRENNER\n | ERZ. U. SCHR. (1864) 1, 20. ZU JOAN.\n | 19, 29:\n |\n | 'mich durstet', sprach er och dar na.\n | do st\u00fbnd ain vas mit essich da,\n | dar in lait ainer ysopum\n | und fuitent sin ainen schwum:\n | den bot er z\u00fb der selben stunt\n | mit ainem sper an sinen munt\n | (HS. 1182) WERNHER MARIENIEBEN\n | 10 607 P\u00c4PKE-H\u00dcBNER.\n |\n | IN NEGATIVIERENDER UMDEUTUNG DER\n | HILFREICHEN TR\u00c4NKUNG AUS JOAN. 19, 29\n | (VGL. MATTH. 27, 34): wie . . dem\n | volk...der ysop der furcht vor den\n | ewigen strafen dargereicht w\u00fcrde\n | SCHLEIERMACHER S. W. (1834) 1 5, 98;\n |\n | nur gift und galle war, o pabst,\n | was du vom pol bis zu den tropen\n | der welt mit deinem scepter gabst,\n | mit deinem scepter von ysopen\n | HERWEGH GED. E. LEBENDIGEN (21841) 116.\n |\n | ZU 3. REG. 4, 31 von der zeder bis zum\n | ysop (S 0. LUTHERS \u00dcBERSETZUNG),\n | ZUN\u00c4CHST NUR VON DER GR\u00d6SZE DER\n | WEISHEIT SALOMOS: Salomon ... von dem\n | ceder baum, so auf dem berg Libano\n | ist, bisz auf den hyssop, so aus der\n | wand w\u00e4chst, disputieret ABR. A S.\n | CLARA ETWAS F. ALLE (1699) 1, 48;\n | (\u00dcBERSCHRIFT:) Salomons k\u00f6nigs van\n | Israel und Juda g\u00fcldne worte von der\n | ceder biss zum issop G\u00d6THE 1 37, 295\n | W.; AUF ANDERE PERSONEN \u00dcBERTRAGEN:\n | weil du (R\u00dcBEZAHL) aber der kr\u00e4uter\n | und pflanzen kundig bist, vom ysop an,\n | der auf der mauer w\u00e4chst, bis auf die\n | ceder zu Libanon MUS\u00c4US VOLKSM\u00c4RCHEN\n | 1, 34 HEMPEL, VGL. DERS., PHYSIOGN.\n | REISEN (1778) 1, 171; ich habe die\n | ehre, ihnen einen gelehrten zu\n | pr\u00e4sentieren, dar alles weiss und\n | kennt, van der ceder bis zum ysop\n | KOTZEBUE S\u00c4MMTL. DRAM. W. (1827) 1,\n | 314. SCHLIESZLICH DIE WEITE DER\n | SCH\u00d6PFUNG \u00dcBERHAUPT BEZEICHNEND: jedes\n | gew\u00e4che von der ceder bis zum ysop\n | h\u00e4ngt an erde und sonnenschein HERDER\n | 20, 73 S.; VGL. 22, 237; der nahme\n | meines helden ist kurz und gut: ABC\n | bis XYZ, ... ritter vieler orden\n | trauriger und fr\u00f6hlicher gestalt, von\n | der ceder auf Libanon bis zum ysop\n | HIPPEL KREUZ- U. QUERZUGC (1793) 1, 3;\n | die menschengattung ist die erste von\n | alless diesen einheiten; die andern,\n | vom elephanten bis zur milbe, von der\n | ceder bis an den ysop, sind in dar\n | zweiten und dritten linie J. G.\n | FORSTER S. SCHR. (1843) 4, 319.\n |\n | 2) ALS GEW\u00dcRZ- UND HEIL PFLANZE. IN\n | DEN VERSCHIEDENSTEN REZEPTEN SEIT DEM\n | 11./12. JH. SEHR REICH BEZEUGT; DIE\n | BL\u00c4TTER WERDEN VEREINZELT BIS IN DIE\n | GEGENWART ALS SOSZENW\u00dcRZE UND ZUM\n | GURGELN GEGEN HALSBESCHWERDEN BENUTZT;\n | DAR\u00dcBER HINAUS IST DIE PFLANZE 'VOR\n | ALLEM IN DER SCHWEIZ EIN BESTANDTEIL\n | DER IN DIE KIRCHE (BESONDERS VON\n | \u00c4LTEREN FRAUEN) MITGENOMMENEN\n | RIECHSTR\u00c4USZLEIN' MARZELL WB. D.\n | DT. PFLANZENN. 2, 069: isopo ist g_t\n | chr\u00fbt, obe diu geb_rt stirbet in demo\n | w\u00eebe; trinche iz mit warmem wazzer, S\u00d4\n | vert iz vone ire. er ist g_t vur den\n | stenken vnte hilfet och den der mage\n | swirt (11./12. JH.) GERMANIA 8, 300;\n | \u00c4HNLICH (13. JH.) MENHARDT VERZ. D.\n | ALTDT. LIT. HSS. 1 (1960) 46; von der\n | ispen. isopus haizt isp...wenn man\n | ispen kocht mit honig, daz ist der\n | lungel guot . und genuog ander\n | tugent h\u00e2t si an ir (UM 1350) KONRAD\n | V. MEGENBERG BUCH der NATUR 405 PF.;\n | vgl 420; der ysope . . . ist bitter\n | und idoch ges_nt dem herzen und der\n | I_ngen und der br_st die da siech ist\n | (14 JH.) ALTDT.PRED.\n |\n | SCH\u00d6NBACH SO WEME dat hoven sweret . .\n | de scal nemen eyn bunt ysopen unde\n | seden de (Bremen 1352) \u00bbMND. ARZNEIB.\n | des A. DONELDEY 14 Windler vgl. 3, 10,\n | 19, 26, 49; und alz ist gef\u00fcgett daz\n | pinlin z.B. dem honge, der ysop z.B. dem\n | balsam, d\u00fa nahtegal z.B. der harpfen (so\n | wie DIE seele ZU CHRISTUS) (HS. von\n | 1357 NACH VORLAGE VON 1303) , ST.\n | GEORGENER PRED. 287 RIEDER, VGL. 294;\n |\n | saluay, rawtten vnd polay,\n | der krautt st\u00fcnd pogen vnd\n | gezindelt;\n | dryment, yspen, die nit felt,\n | grunten da in reicher wunn\n | LIEDERBUCH DER H\u00c4TZLERIN\n | 234 HALTAUS:\n |\n | dem rind den husten zu vertreiben,\n | pflegt man jnen...ysop.. .einzugeben\n | SEBIZ feldbau (1579) 128;\n | mit lavendel, isop, majoran, poley und\n | anderen geringeres wehrtes, gew\u00e4chsen\n | und blurnenwerke ausgeziehret NEUMARK\n | newspross. teut. palmb. (1668) 171;\n | unter wild wachsenden pflanzen sah ich\n | die dunkelrote scabiose unter g\u00e4rten\n | und ein ganzes feld mit ysop bewachsen\n | STOLBERG\n | GES.W. (1820) 8, 360.\n |\n | 3) ZU BEIDEN ANWENDUNGSGRUPPEN\n | STELLEN SICH ZUSAMMENSETZUNGEN:\n | ysopbitter:\n |\n | dieweil der k\u00f6nigliche zecher\n | umsonst nach ihren z\u00fcgen gafft.\n | leert sie den ysopbittren becher\n | zur\u00fcckgewiesener leidenschaft\n | FONTANE GED. 7176 (VGL..\n | JOAN. 19, 29 u. ysop 1);\n |\n | --busch:\n |\n | nimm einen ysoppusch,\n | ents\u00fcndige mein Leben\n | FLEMING, dt. ged. 1,8\n | lit.ver.;\n |\n | VGL. ysopb\u00fcschel (NURN. 19, 18)\n | Z\u00dcRCHER BIBEL (BERLIN 1956) 1, 165; -\n | kraut: nimm rosinlin ein\n | handvoll...salbeybl\u00e4tter, hissopkraut,\n | jedes 1 hand voll G\u00c4BELKOVER ARTZNCYB.\n | (1595) 1, 182; -saft: ysop safft\n | getruncken mit oximel, waychet den\n | verstopften bauch DAS KRE\u00dcTERBUCH OD.\n | HERBARIOS (AUGSB. 1534) 144b ; -sirup:\n | \\STAUB-TOBLER 7, 1270; -stengel: sie\n | steckten nun einen mit essig gef\u00fcllten\n | schwamm auf einen ysopstengel (JOAN\n | 19,29). Z\u00dcRCHER BIBEL (BERLIN 1956)\n | 2,148; hysopstengel (J. 19,29)\n | TILLMANN NEUES TESTAM. (LPZ. 6-1959)\n | 325; -strauch,\n | s. isopstrauch TEIL 4,2, SP. 2182; -\n | wasser: hysopwasser soll man allwegen\n | in heysser aeschen disti1liren:\n | welches (U. A.) trefflich gut f\u00fcr den\n | grausamen schmertzen der z\u00e4n ist SEBIZ\n | feldbau (1580) 413; zerschmeltz den\n | zucker in brandlattich oder\n | issopwasser G\u00c4BELKOVER artzneybuch\n | (1595) 1, 193, GEBUCHT bei R\u00c4DLEIN T.-\n | IT.-FRZ.(1711) 1080;b; -wein, . VGL.\n | isopwein TEIL 4. 2. sp. 2182 SOWIE:\n | von ysopwein. ysopwein ist warm,\n | reiniget die brust, machet gute d\u00e4wung\n | vnd weicht den bauch M. HERR FELDBAU\n | (1551) 112a; eysop wein ZEHNER\n | NOMENCL. (1645) 365; KIRSCH CORNU\n | COPIAE 2 (1775), 908.\n |\n | Why then did Bacon translate \"hyssop\"\n | as \"moss\"? The hyssop was known and\n | used in England (compare OED; e.g.\n | Skakespeare OTHELLO I,3 etc.). What\n | appears from all the dictionaries\n | consulted is, however, that it is not\n | so very clear which plant was meant by\n | the name. What led Bacon to use the\n | word \"moss\" for \"hyssop\" is probably\n | the sense of 1 K 4,33: Salomon knows\n | every plant from the noblest (=cedar\n | tree) to the meanest (=hyssop), \"moss\"\n | obviously signifying a mean plant\n | \"which is but a rudiment between\n | putrefaction and an herb\". This does\n | obviously leave out of consideration\n | the holiness of the hyssop tested in\n | various other contexts of the Old and\n | the New Testament (see above).\nphilosophy{29}. Nay, the same Salomon the | 29. cf. A.L. Sp. III, 298, I.5 (D.A.\nking affirmeth directly that the glory of | Sp.I,467, I.1) ; Cf. also N.O. I, 65\nGod IS TO CONCEAL A THING, BUT THE GLORY |\nOF THE KING IS TO FIND IT OUT{30}, as if | 30. Proverbs 25,2\naccording to the innocent play of children | Geneva Bible: The glorie of God is to\nthe divine Majesty took delight to hide | conceile a thing secret: but the Kings\nhis works, to the end to have them found | honour is to searche out a thing.\nout; for in naming the king he intendeth |\nman, taking such a condition of man as | Authorized Version: It is the glory of\nhath most excellency and greatest | God to conceal a thing: but the honour\ncommandment of wits and means, alluding | of kings is to search out a matter.\nalso to his own person, being truly one of |\nthose clearest burning lamps, whereof | Vulgata: Gloria Dei celare verbum et\nhimself speaketh in another place, when he | gloria regum investigare sermonem\nsaith THE SPIRIT OF MAN IS AS THE LAMP OF |\nGOD, WHEREWITH HE SEARCHETH ALL |\nINWARDNESS{31}; which nature of the soul | 31. Proverbs 20,27\nthe same Salomon holding precious and | Geneva Bible: The light of the Lord is\ninestimable, and therein conspiring with | the breth of man, and sercheth all the\nthe affection of Socrates who scorned the | bowels of the bellie.\npretended learned men of his time for | Authorized Version: The spirit of man\nraising great benefit of their learning | is the candle of the Lord,searching\n(whereas Anaxagoras contrariwise and | all the inward parts of the belly.\ndivers others being born to ample | Vulgata: lucerna Dominis spiraculum\npatrimonies decayed them in | homninis quae investigat omnia secreta\n | ventris\n | Luther: Eine Leuchte des Herrn ist des\n | Menschen Geist; die geht durch alle\n | Kammern des Leibes.\ncontemplation){32}, delivereth it in | 32. see Platon, Hippias Major. 282 b -\nprecept yet remaining, BUY THE TRUTH, AND | 283 b\nSELL IT NOT; |\nAND SO OF WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE{33}. | 33. Proverbs 23, 23\n | Geneva Bible: Bye the trueth, but sel\nAnd lest any man should retain a scruple | it not: likewise wisdome, and\nas if this thirst of | instruction, and understanding.\nknowledge were rather an humour of the |\nmind than an emptiness or want in nature | Authorized Version: Buy the truth and\nand an instinct from God, the same author | sell it not; also wisdom, and\ndefineth of it fully, saying, GOD HATH | instruction, and understanding.\nMADE EVERY THING IN BEAUTY ACCORDING TO |\nSEASON; ALSO HE HATH SET THE WORLD IN | Vulgata: veritatem eme et noli vendere\nMAN'S HEART, YET CAN HE NOT FIND OUT THE | sapientiam et doctrinam et\nWORK WHICH GOD WORKETH FROM THE | intelligentiam\n |\n | Luther: Kaufe Wahrheit und verkaufe\n | sie nicht, Weisheit, Zucht und\n | Verstand.\n |\n | on the mercantilist spirit in Bacon\n | see: Julie Robin Salomon, Objectivity\n | in the Making. The John Hopkins\n | University Press, 1998.\nBEGINNING TO THE END{34}: declaring not | 34. Ecclesiastes 3,11\nobscurely that God hath framed the mind of | Authorized Version: He hath made every\nman as a glass capable of the image of the | thing beautiful in his time: also he\nuniversal world, joying to receive the | hath set the world in their heart, so\nsignature thereof as the eye is of light | that no man can find out the work that\nyea not only satisfied in beholding the | God maketh from the beginning to the\nvariety of things and vicissitude of | end.\ntimes, but raised also to find out and |\ndiscern those ordinances and decrees which | Vulgata: cuncta fecit bona in tempore\nthroughout all these changes are | suo et mundum tradidit disputioni\ninfallibly observed. And although the | eorum / ut non inveniat homo opus quod\nhighest generality of motion or summary | operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad\nlaw of nature God should still reserve | finem.\nwithin his own curtain, yet many and noble |\nare the inferior and secondary operations | Luther Bible: Prediger Salomo 3,11:\nwhich are within man's sounding. This is a | Er aber tut alles fein zu seiner Zeit\nthing which I cannot tell whether I may so | und l\u00e4\u00dft ihr Herz sich \u00e4ngstigen, wie\nplainly speak as truly conceive, that as | es gehen solle in der Welt; denn der\nall knowledge appeareth to be a plant of | Mensch kann doch nicht treffen das\nGod's own planting, so it may seem the | Werk, das Gott tut, weder Anfang noch\nspreading and flourishing or at least the | Ende.\nbearing and fructifying of this plant, by |\na providence of God, nay not only by a |\ngeneral providence but by a special |\nprophecy, was appointed to this autumn |\nof the world{35}: for to my understanding | 35. Melek Hasg\u00fcn comments: Bacon sees\nit is not violent to the letter, and safe | his time as \"...autumn of the\nnow after the event, so to interpret that | world...\". As in Shakespeare\u2019s King\nplace in the prophecy of Daniel where | Lear (IV/6) \u2018autumn\u2019 implies the time\nspeaking of the latter times it is said, | shortly before the end of the world,\nMANY SHALL PASS TO AND FRO, AND SCIENCE | this can also be applied to Bacon. The\n | Apocalypse is preceded by the increase\n | of knowledge (Daniel 12,4) and again\n | Bacon uses the Bible to legitimate\n | progress in science.\nSHALL BE INCREASED{36}; as if the opening | 36. Daniel 12, 4;\nof the world by navigation and commerce | Geneva Bible: But thou, o Daniel, shut\nand the further discovery of knowledge | up the wordes, and seale the boke til\nshould meet in one time or age. | the end of the time: many shal runne\n | to and fro, and knowledge shalbe\nBut howsoever that be, there are besides | increased [explanation f (\"til the end\nthe authorities or Scriptures before | of the time\"): Til the time that God\nrecited, two reasons of exceeding great | hathe appointed for the ful revelation\nweight and force why religion should | of these things: and then many shal\ndearly protect all increase of natural | runne to and fro to search the\nknowledge: the one, because it leadeth to | knowledge of these mysteries, which\nthe greater exaltation of the glory of | things they obteine now by the light\nGod; for as the | of the Gospel]\n |\n | Authorized Version: But thou, O\n | Daniel, shut up the words, and seal\n | the book, EVEN to the time of the end:\n | many shall run to and fro, and\n | knowledge shall be increased.\n |\n | Vulgata: Tu autem Danihel clude\n | sermones et signa librum usque ad\n | tempus statutum / pertransibunt\n | plurimi et multiplex erit scientia\n |\n | This quotation is repeated on the\n | title page of NOVUM ORGANUM. Together\n | with the allegorical content of the\n | pillars of Hercules, this passage\n | clearly is to be interpreted in an\n | apocalyptical sense: The time has come\n | and is ripe for a re-construction of\n | Adams's paradisical dominion over the\n | world.--The pillars of Hercules can\n | also be understood as a typological\n | allusion to the two pillars of\n | Salomo's temple (cf. Charles Whitney):\n | In 1 Kings 7, 21 the names of the\n | pillars are given as \"Jachin\" and\n | \"Boas\". The Jew's name in NOVA\n | ATLANTIS, Joabin, can be explained as\n | the result of playing around with\n | these names and contracting them into\n | one. In NOVA ATLANTIS Salomo's Temple\n | is resurrected and is the centre of\n | knowledge and power.\nPsalms{37} and other Scriptures do often | 37. for example Psalms 19,1\ninvite us to consider and to magnify the |\ngreat and wonderful works of God, so if we |\nshould rest only in the contemplation of |\nthose shews which first offer themselves |\nto our senses, we should do a like injury |\nto the majesty of God, as if we should |\njudge of the store of some excellent |\njeweller by that only which is set out to |\nthe street in his shop. The other reason |\nis, because it is a singular help and a |\npreservative against unbelief and error; |\nfor, saith our Saviour, YOU ERR, NOT |\nKNOWING THE SCRIPTURES NOR THE |\nPOWER OF GOD;{38} laying before us two | 38. St. Matthew 22, 29:\nbooks or volumes to study if we will be | Authorized Version: Jesus answered and\nsecured from error; first the Scriptures | said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing\nrevealing the will of God, and then the | the Scriptures, not the power of God.\ncreatures expressing his power; for that | see also St Mark 12, 24\nlatter book will certify us that nothing |\nwhich the first teacheth shall be thought |\nimpossible. And most sure it is, and a |\ntrue conclusion of experience, that a |\nlittle natural philosophy inclineth the |\nmind to atheism, but a further proceeding |\nbringeth the mind back to religion. |\n |\nTo conclude then, let no man presume to |\ncheck the liberality of God's gifts, who, |\nas was said, |\nHATH SET THE WORLD IN MAN'S HEART. So |\nas whatsoever is not God but parcel of the |\nworld, he hath fitted it to the |\ncomprehension of man's mind, if man will |\nopen and dilate the powers of |\nhis understanding as he may.{39} | 39. Compare to \"mind of glass\" above\n |\nBut yet evermore it must be remembered |\nthat the least part of knowledge passed to |\nman by this so large a charter from God |\nmust be subject to that use for which God |\nhath granted it; which is the benefit and |\nrelief of the state and society or man; |\nfor otherwise all manner of knowledge |\nbecometh malign and serpentine, and |\ntherefore as carrying the quality of the |\nserpent's sting and malice it maketh the |\nmind of man to swell; as the Scripture |\nsaith excellently, KNOWLEDGE BLOWETH UP, |\nBUT CHARITY BUILDETH UP{40}. And again the | 40. 1 Corinthians 8, 1\nsame author doth notably disavow both | Authorized Version: Now as touching\npower and knowledge such as is not | things offered unto idols, we know\ndedicated to goodness or love, for saith | that we all have knowledge. Knowledge\nhe, IF I HAVE ALL FAITH SO AS I COULD | puffeth up, but charity edifieth.\nREMOVE MOUNTAINS, (there is power active,) |\nIF I RENDER MY BODY TO THE FIRE, (there is |\npower passive,) IF I SPEAK WITH THE |\nTONGUES OF MEN AND ANGELS, (there is |\nknowledge, for language is but the |\nconveyance of knowledge,) |\nALL WERE NOTHING{41}. | 41. 1 Corinthians 13, 1-3:\n | Authorized Version: Though I speak\nAnd therefore it is not the pleasure of | with the tongues of men and of angels,\n | and have not charity, I am become as\n | sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.\n | And though I have the gift of\n | prophecy, and understand all\n | mysteries, and all knowledge; and\n | though I have all faith, so that I\n | could remove mountains, and have not\n | charity, I am nothing. And though I\n | bestow all my goods to feed the poor,\n | and though I give my body to be\n | burned, and have not charity, it\n | profiteth me nothing.\ncuriosity{42}, nor the quiet of | 42. Bacon here contrasts \"curiosity\"\nresolution, nor the raising of the spirit, | with \"thirst of knowledge\" (p. 220).\nnor victory of wit, nor faculty of speech, | \"Curiosity\" is used in a traditional\nnor lucre of profession, nor ambition of | sense (see St. Augustine on curiositas\nhonour or fame, nor inablement for | in Confessiones X,35). He speaks of\nbusiness, that are the true ends of | curiositas also in \"Actaeon et\nknowledge; some of these being more worthy | Pentheus, sive Curiositas\" in: De\nthan other, though all inferior and | sapentia veterum\", VI: The Theban king\ndegenerate: but it is a restitution and | Pentheus is punished with madness\nreinvesting (in great part) of man to the | because out of curiosity he has dared\nsovereignty and power (for whensoever he | to observe certain mysteries which are\nshall be able to call the creatures by | dedicated to Dionysos, that is: he\ntheir true names be shall again command | applied (scientific) observation to\nthem) which he had | divine things, he did not respect the\n | division between LUMEN NATURALE and\n | LUMEN DIVINUM.--Bacon draws the same\n | conclusions from the myth of\n | Prometheus (\"Prometheus, sive Status\n | hominis\").\n | on curiosity see Hans Blumenberg, \"Der\n | Proze\u00df der theoretischen Neugierde\",\n | in: DIE LEGITIMIT\u00c4T DER NEUZEIT\n | (Frankfurt, 1966).\nin his first state of creation{43}. And | 43. compare with Milton's Paradise Lost\nto speak plainly and clearly, it is a | Book XII\ndiscovery of all operations and pos- |\nsibilities of operations from immortality |\n(if it were possible) to the meanest |\nmechanical practice. And therefore |\nknowledge that tendeth but to satisfaction |\nis but as a courtesan, which is for |\npleasure and not for fruit or generation. |\nAnd knowledge that tendeth to profit or |\nprofession or glory is but as the golden |\nball thrown before Atalanta{44}, which | 44. The Atalanta myth is treated by\nwhile she goeth aside and stoopeth to take | Bacon in DE SAPIENTIA VETERUM (Works,\nup she hindereth the | vol. VI)\n | This is the German translation by\n | Marina M\u00fcnkler in: Weisheit der Alten,\n | hrsg. von Philipp Rippel (Frankfurt\n | a.M: Fischer, 1991):\n | XXV. Atalanta oder die Gewinnsucht\n | Atalanta, die f\u00fcr ihre Schnelligkeit\n | ber\u00fchmt war, forderte Hippomenes mit\n | dem Versprechen zum Wettlauf heraus,\n | da\u00df er sie im Falle seines Sieges zur\n | Frau nehmen d\u00fcrfe, im Falle seiner\n | Niederlage aber sein Leben verwirke.\n | An Atalantas Sieg schien es keinen\n | Zweifel geben zu k\u00f6nnen, da ihre\n | un\u00fcbertreffliche Schnelligkeit bereits\n | durch den Tod zahlreicher Freier unter\n | Beweis gestellt worden war. Hippomenes\n | griff deshalb zu einer List. Er\n | beschaffte sich drei goldene \u00c4pfel,\n | die er mit sich f\u00fchrte. Das Rennen\n | begann, Atalanta ging in F\u00fchrung. Als\n | Hippomenes sah, da\u00df er zur\u00fcckfiel,\n | griff er auf seine List zur\u00fcck und\n | warf einen seiner \u00c4pfel so vor sie\n | hin, da\u00df sie ihn sehen mu\u00dfte. Er warf\n | ihn aber nicht direkt vor sie, sondern\n | ein wenig abseits, damit sie sich\n | nicht nur b\u00fccken, sondern auch ihre\n | Bahn verlassen mu\u00dfte. Erf\u00fcllt von\n | weiblicher Gier und angezogen von der\n | Sch\u00f6nheit der Frucht, verlie\u00df sie ihre\n | Bahn, lief dem Apfel nach und hielt\n | an, um ihn aufzuheben. In der\n | Zwischenzeit lief Hippomenes weiter\n | und ging in F\u00fchrung. Aufgrund ihrer\n | nat\u00fcrlichen Schnelligkeit machte\n | Atalanta den R\u00fcckstand jedoch bald\n | wieder wett und \u00fcberholte ihn erneut.\n | Nachdem Hippomenes sie jedoch in\n | derselben Weise noch ein zweites und\n | ein drittes Mal vom Weg abbrachte,\n | gewann er schlie\u00dflich den Wett!auf,\n | freilich nicht durch seine F\u00e4higkeit,\n | sondern durch seine List.\n |\n | Diese Sage scheint eine hervorragende\n | Allegorie \u00fcber den Wettstreit von\n | Kunst und Natur zu sein. Denn die\n | Kunst, die von Atalanta repr\u00e4sentiert\n | wird, ist an sich, wenn ihr nichts im\n | Wege steht, sehr viel schneller als\n | die Natur, sie ist, wie man sagen\n | k\u00f6nnte, der bessere L\u00e4ufer und\n | erreicht ihr Ziel schneller. Das zeigt\n | sich an nahezu allen Dingen: Man\n | sieht, da\u00df sich Obstb\u00e4ume nur langsam\n | aus dem Kern, aber sehr viel schneller\n | durch das Aufpfropfen von Zweigen\n | entwickeln, da\u00df Lehm sehr langsam zu\n | Stein wird, w\u00e4hrend er sehr schnell zu\n | Stein gebrannt werden kann. Auch die\n | Sitten betreffend kann man beobachten,\n | da\u00df es sehr lange dauert, bis durch\n | die Wohltaten der Natur ein Schmerz\n | vergessen und Trost gefunden werden\n | kann, w\u00e4hrend die Philosophie (die\n | gleichsam die Kunst zu leben ist), den\n | Tag nicht abwartet, sondern ihn\n | vorhersieht und vor Augen f\u00fchrt. Dann\n | aber wird dieser Vorsprung und die\n | F\u00e4higkeit der Kunst zum unendlichen\n | Nachteil der Menschheit, durch jene\n | goldenen \u00c4pfel behindert. Denn es gibt\n | keine Wissenschaft oder Kunst, die\n | ihren wahren und richtigen Weg bis zum\n | Ziel unbeirrt beibeh\u00e4lt. Vielmehr\n | geschieht es fortw\u00e4hrend, da\u00df die\n | K\u00fcnste ihre Unternehmungen auf halbem\n | Wege unterbrechen, vom Pfad abweichen\n | und sich wie Atalanta Gewinn und\n | Nutzen zuwenden:\n |\n | \"Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile\n | tollit\" (Ovid, Metamorphosen X, 667).\n |\n | Und deshalb ist es nicht\n | verwunderlich, da\u00df es der Kunst nicht\n | gegeben ist, den Sieg \u00fcber die Natur\n | zu erringen und sie nach den\n | Bedingungen und Regeln des Wettkampfs\n | zu t\u00f6ten und zu zerst\u00f6ren, sondern sie\n | im Gegenteil der Natur unterworfen\n | bleibt, wie das Weib dem Ehemann.\n |\n | Charles W. Lemmi (THE CLASSICAL\n | DEITIES IN BACON. A STUDY IN\n | MYTHOLOGICAL SYMBOLISM, Baltimore\n | 1933, repr. New York 1971) says that\n | Bacon draws on Natalis Comes (Conti)\n | MYTHOLOGIAE SIVE EXPLICATIONUM\n | FABULARUM LIBRI X (1551) and on\n | Boccaccios DE GENEALOGIA DEORUM\n | (1472).\n |\n | Simone Wirthmann comments:\n | Treatises on classical mythology had a\n | wide circulation during the\n | Renaissance because it has been\n | thought that one might discover in the\n | stories of the gods and goddesses the\n | wisdom of the ancients.\n | It was in Italy, in the sixteenth\n | century that the Renaissance produced\n | the most widely known works on the\n | classic deities.\n |\n | One of the most popular books was\n | Natalis Conti's \"MYTHOLOGY\", which was\n | fully as learned as any of its\n | competitors, pleasanter to read and\n | incomparably easier to use as a\n | referencebook. Furthermore, it\n | systematically interprets every myth\n | it relates according to a multitude of\n | authorities. It provides a list of\n | authorities, an excellent index and\n | synopses of the interpretations\n | divided into ethical and physical.\n | Despite all these new books, which\n | largely superseded Boccaccio's famous\n | \"DE GENEALOGIIS DEORUM\", they were far\n | from causing it to be forgotten.\n |\n | For that reason it is to presume that\n | Bacon draws on Natalis Comes (Conti)\n | \"MYTHOLOGIAE SIVE EXPLICATIONEM\n | FABULARUM LIBRI X\" (1551) and on\n | \"Boccaccio's De Genealogia\n | Deorum\"(1472) (see Charles W. Lemmi\n | THE CLASSICAL DEITIES IN BACON. A\n | STUDY IN MYTHOLOGICAL SYMBOLISM\n | (Baltimore 1933, repr. New York 1971).\nrace{45}. And knowledge referred to some | 45. Ovid, Metamorphosen, Buch X, 665-\nparticular point of use is but | 680\nas Harmodius{46} which putteth down one | 46. see Herodot, Histories, V, 55 and\ntyrant, and not like | VI, 109 and 123\n | The Oxford Classical Dictionary says:\n | Aristogiton (6th c. B.C.), Athenian\n | tyrannicide. He and Harmodius, both of\n | noble family, planned to kill the\n | tyrant Hippias and his younger brother\n | Hipparchus, in consequence of a\n | private quarrel (514 B.C.). The plot\n | miscarried: only Hipparchus was\n | killed. Harmodius was at one cut down\n | by Hippias' guards, Aristogiton\n | arrested and executed (after torture,\n | it is said). As the tyranny was\n | overthrown three years later, the two\n | were popularly supposed to have made\n | this possible, and were ever after\n | called the Liberators. Simonides wrote\n | a poem in their honour, statues of\n | them were set up in the agora (and new\n | ones erected when these were carried\n | off by Xerxes in 480), and their\n | descendants for all time honoured with\n | the right to meals in the Prytaneum.\nHercules{47} who did perambulate the world | 47. Hercules is not a Baconian hero.\nto suppress tyrants and giants and | The real hero is Orpheus as he is\nmonsters in every | interpreted in \"Orpheus, sive\n | Philosophia\" in DE SAPIENTIA VETERUM.\n | Orpheus is the Baconian philosopher,\n | and the myth of Orpheus is about the\n | opera scientiae. The works of Orpheus\n | are superior to the works of Hercules\n | as the \"works of wisdom\" (opera\n | sapientiae) are superior to the \"works\n | of strength\" (opera fortitudinis) (VI,\n | 720).\n |\n | Simone Wirthmann comments:\n | Hercules (gr. Heracles), (lit. \"having\n | or showing the glory of Hera\"; Hera,\n | wife of Zeus) Hercules, the son of\n | Zeus and of the mortal Alkmene was a\n | celebrated hero of Greek and Roman\n | mythology, who after death was ranked\n | among the gods and received divine\n | honours. He is represented as\n | possessed of prodigious strength,\n | whereby he was enabled to perform\n | twelve extraordinary tasks or\n | \"labours\" imposed upon him by Hera.\n | One of these tasks was to capture the\n | cattles of the three-headed giant\n | Geryoneus. It is said, that on this\n | journey Hercules set up the rocks\n | Calp\u00e9 (now Gibraltar) and Abyla\n | (Ceuta) / THE PILLARS OF HERCULES on\n | either side of the Strait of\n | Gibraltar, as a sign for his longest\n | journey. THE PILLARS where seen by the\n | ancients to be the supports of the\n | western boundary of the world.\n |\n | Bacon uses the myth of Hercules and\n | Harmodius in a methaphorical way, to\n | elucidate the real contents of\n | knowledge by comparing the two\n | \"heroes\". Hercules impersonates\n | strength and justice, throughout his\n | life he tried to free people from\n | tyranny, fought against giants and\n | monsters without thinking of his own\n | benefit. Harmodius in comparison tried\n | to kill the tyrants Hippias and\n | Hipparchus in consequence of a private\n | quarrel and not primarily to free\n | people.\n |\n | This shows, that for Bacon knowledge\n | must be of general existence and not\n | only refer to some particular point.\n |\n | Nevertheless, in one of his later\n | works, DE SAPIENTIA VETERUM (1609),\n | Hercules is not the Baconian hero\n | anymore. The real hero is Orpheus, the\n | philosopher. His works are superior to\n | the works of Hercules as the \"works of\n | wisdom\" (opera sapientiae) are\n | superior to the \"works of strength\"\n | (opera fortitudinis) (VI, 729).\n |\n | Orpheus was a legendary poet, a famous\n | musician and singer of ancient Greece,\n | who had the power of charming all\n | animate and inanimate objects (he\n | could move rocks and trees) by the\n | sweet strains of his lyre. He\n | descended living into Hades, to bring\n | back to life his wife Eurydice, and\n | perished, torn to pieces by infuriated\n | Thracian maenads (see THE OXFORD\n | CLASSICAL DICTIONARY; THE CENTURY\n | DICTIONARY, VOL. 4)\npart.{48} It is true, that in two points | 48. Spedding's note: The words \"that\nthe curse is peremptory and not to be | is, man's miseries and necessities,\"\nremoved; the one that vanity must be the | which followed in the transcript, have\nend in all human effects, eternity being | a line drawn through them.\nresumed, though the revolutions and |\nperiods may he delayed{49}. The other that | 49. Melek Hasg\u00fcn comments:\nthe consent of the creature being now | \"...eternity being resumed...\".: In\nturned into reluctation, this power cannot | Henry VIII (..) and King Lear (I/4)\notherwise be exercised and administered | \u2018resume\u2019 means: to take back\nbut with labour, as well in inventing as | something previously given or\nin executing; yet nevertheless chiefly | granted. The fact that it is written\nthat labour and travel which is described | in the passive form without an object\nby the sweat of the brows more than of the | implies that eternity has been taken\nbody; that is such travel as is joined | back by God, referring to the Fall of\nwith the working and discursion of the | Man and Paradise Lost.\nspirits in the brain: for as Salomon saith |\nexcellently, THE FOOL PUTTETH TO MORE | \u2018Revolution\u2019 is the action or fact,\nSTRENGTH, BUT THE WISE MAN CONSIDERETH | on the part of celestial bodies, of\nWHICH | moving round in an orbit or circular\n | course. The time in which a planet or\n | other heavenly body completes a full\n | circuit or course. (OED) A look at the\n | complete works and consequences of his\n | work, namely the foundation of\n | scientific or academic institutions\n | after his death that were the\n | precursors of the Royal Society\n | (1660), \u2018revolution\u2019 can also be\n | understood in the modern sense. In\n | fact, NEW ATLANTIS and NOVUM ORGANUM\n | set the foundation for the\n | \"intellectual revolution\" (Harvey\n | Wheeler's essay on Nova Atlantis; to\n | be obtained from the author:\n |\n | verulan@mindspring.com), which implies\n | the complete overthrow of established\n | state of affairs. (OED)\nWAY{50}, signifying the election of the | 50. Ecclesiastes 10, 12:\nmean to be more material than the | Authorized Version: The words of a\nmultiplication of endeavour. It is true | wise man's mouth are gracious; but the\nalso that there is a limitation rather | lips of a fool will swallow up\npotential than actual, which is when the | himself.\neffect is possible, but the time or place |\nyieldeth not the matter or basis whereupon | for a commentary see A.L. Sp.III,322,\nman should work. But notwithstanding these | I.14 seq. (D.A. Sp. I, 486, I, 11\nprecincts and bounds, let it be believed, | seq.)\nand appeal thereof made to TIME, (with |\nrenunciation nevertheless to all the vain |\nand abusing promises of Alchemists and |\nMagicians, and such like light, idle, |\nignorant, credulous, and fantastical wits |\nand sects,) that the new-found world of |\nland was not greater addition to the |\nancient continent than there remaineth at |\nthis day a world of inventions and |\nsciences unknown, having respect to those |\nthat are known, with this difference, that |\nthe ancient regions of knowledge will seem |\nas barbarous compared with the new, as the |\nnew regions of people seem barbarous |\ncompared to many of the old. |\n |\nThe dignity of this end (of endowment of |\nman's life with new commodities) |\nappeareth by the estimation that |\nantiquity made of such as guided |\nthereunto. For whereas founders of states, |\nlawgivers, extirpers of tyrants, fathers |\nof the people, were honoured but with the |\ntitles of Worthies or Demigods, inventors |\nwere ever consecrated amongst the Gods |\nthemselves. And if the ordinary ambitions |\nof men lead them to seek the amplification |\nof their own power in their countries, and |\na better ambition than that hath moved men |\nto seek the amplification of the power of |\ntheir own countries amongst other nations, |\nbetter again and more worthy must that |\naspiring be which seeketh the |\namplification of the power and kingdom of |\nmankind over the world; the rather because |\nthe other two prosecutions are ever |\nculpable of much perturbation and |\ninjustice; but this is a work, truly |\ndivine which cometh IN AURA LENI {51} | 51. 1 Kings 19,12 (Vulgata)\nwithout noise or observation{52}. | 52. St Luke 17,20:\n | Authorized Version: And when he was\nThe access also to this work hath been by | demanded of the Pharisees, when the\nthat port or passage, which the divine | kingdom of God should come, he\nMajesty (who is unchangeable in his ways) | answered them and said, The kingdom\ndoth infallibly continue and observe; that | of God cometh not with observation.\nis the felicity wherewith he hath blessed |\nan humility of mind, such as rather | see Novum Organum. I, 93; A.L. Sp.\nlaboureth to spell and so by degrees to | III, 301,I, 29-302; also N.O. I, 129\nread in the volumes of his creatures, than | (Sp. I,222,I.16 seq.)\nto solicit and urge and as it were to |\ninvocate a man's own spirit to divine and |\ngive oracles unto him. For as in the |\ninquiry of divine truth, the pride of man |\nhath ever inclined to leave the oracles of |\nGod's word and to vanish in the mixture of |\ntheir own inventions; so in the self-same |\nmanner, in inquisition of nature they have |\never left the oracles of God's works, and |\nadored the deceiving and deformed imagery |\nwhich the unequal mirrors of their own |\nminds have represented unto them{53}. Nay | 53. compare this with the later idea of\nit is a point fit and necessary in the | Idols\nfront and beginning of this work without |\nhesitation or reservation to be professed, |\nthat it is no less true in this human |\nkingdom of knowledge than in God's kingdom |\nof heaven, that no man shall enter into it |\nEXCEPT HE BECOME FIRST AS A LITTLE CHILD. |\n | 54. Spedding's note: This chapter ends\n | at the top of a new page. The rest is\n | left blank.\n |\n | 55. In NO Bacon says that entrance into\n | the new sciences depends upon their\n | followers' imitating the little\n | children favoured by Christ, children\n | whose lack of vanity gives them\n | privileged access to the kingdom of\n | heaven (IV, 69). cf. John Channing\n | Briggs, \"Bacon's science and\n | religion\", in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION\n | TO BACON, ed. by Markku Peltonen\n | (Cambridge, 1966), 172-199.\n | St Mark, 10,15:\n |\n | Authorized Version: Verily I say unto\n | you, Whosoever shall not receive the\n | kingdom of God as a little child, he\n | shall not enter therein.\n\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 4.\n\nOF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 4TH CHAPTER, THE PREFACE\nONLY OF IT.\n\n\nIn some things it is more hard to attempt than to achieve, which\nfalleth out when the difficulty is not so much in the matter or\nsubject, as it is in the crossness and indisposition of the mind of\nman to think of any such thing, to will or to resolve it. And\ntherefore Titus Livius in his declamatory digression wherein he doth\ndepress and extenuate the honour of Alexander's conquests saith,\nNIHIL ALIUD QUAM BENE AUSUS VANA CONTEMNERE: in which sort of things\nit is the manner of men first to wonder that any such thing should be\npossible, and after it is found out to wonder again how the world\nshould miss it so long. Of this nature I take to be the invention\nand discovery of knowledge, etc.\n\nTHE IMPEDIMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN THE TIMES, AND IN DIVERSION OF\nWITS, BEING THE 5TH CHAPTER, A SMALL FRAGMENT IN THE BEGINNING OF\nTHAT CHAPTER.\n\nThe encounters of the times have been nothing favourable and\nprosperous for the invention of knowledge; so as it is not only the\ndaintiness of the seed to take, and the ill mixture and unliking of\nthe ground to nourish or raise this plant, but the ill season also of\nthe weather by which it hath been checked and blasted. Especially in\nthat the seasons have been proper to bring up and set forward other\nmore hasty and indifferent plants, whereby this of knowledge bath\nbeen starved and overgrown; for in the descent of times always there\nhath been somewhat else in reign and reputation, which hath generally\naliened and diverted wits and labours from that employment.\n\nFor as for the uttermost antiquity which is like fame that muffles\nher head and tells tales, I cannot presume much of it; for I would\nnot willingly imitate the manner of those that describe maps, which\nwhen they come to some far countries whereof they have no knowledge,\nset down how there be great wastes and deserts there: so I am not apt\nto affirm that they knew little, because what they knew is little\nknown to us. But if you will judge of them by the last traces that\nremain to us, you will conclude, though not so scornfully as\nAristotle doth, that saith our ancestors were extreme gross, as those\nthat came newly from being moulded out of the clay or some earthly\nsubstance; yet reasonably and probably thus, that it was with them in\nmatter of knowledge but as the dawning or break of day. For at that\ntime the world was altogether home-bred, every nation looked little\nbeyond their own confines or territories, and the world had no\nthrough lights then, as it hath had since by commerce and navigation,\nwhereby there could neither be that contribution of wits one to help\nanother, nor that variety of particulars for the correcting of\ncustomary conceits.\n\nAnd as there could be no great collection of wits of several parts or\nnations, so neither could there be any succession of wits of several\ntimes, whereby one might refine the other, in regard they had not\nhistory to any purpose. And the manner of their traditions was\nutterly unfit and unproper for amplification of knowledge. And again\nthe studies of those times, you shall find, besides wars, incursions,\nand rapines, which were then almost every where betwixt states\nadjoining (the use of leagues and confederacies being not then known),\nwere to populate by multitude of wives and generation, a thing at\nthis day in the waster part of the West-Indies principally affected;\nand to build sometimes for habitation towns and cities, sometimes for\nfame and memory monuments, pyramids, colosses, and the like. And if\nthere happened to rise up any more civil wits; then would he found\nand erect some new laws, customs, and usages, such as now of late\nyears, when the world was revolute almost to the like rudeness and\nobscurity, we see both in our own nation and abroad many examples of,\nas well in a number of tenures reserved upon men's lands, as in\ndivers customs of towns and manors, being the devices that such wits\nwrought upon in such times of deep ignorance, etc.\n\nTHE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR WANT OF A TRUE SUCCESSION OF WITS,\nAND THAT HITHERTO THE LENGTH OF ONE MAN'S LIFE HATH BEEN THE GREATEST\nMEASURE OF KNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 6TH CHAPTER, THE WHOLE CHAPTER.\n\nIn arts mechanical the first device comes shortest and time addeth\nand perfecteth. But in sciences of conceit the first author goeth\nfurthest and time leeseth and corrupteth. Painting, artillery,\nsailing, and the like, grossly managed at first, by time accommodate\nand refined. The philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato,\nDemocritus, Hippocrates, of most vigour at first, by time degenerated\nand imbased. In the former many wits and industries contributed in\none: In the latter many men's wits spent to deprave the wit of one.\n\nThe error is both in the deliverer and in the receiver. He that\ndelivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be\nsoonest believed, and not as may be easiliest examined. He that\nreceiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than\nexpectant search, and so rather not to doubt than not to err. Glory\nmaketh the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth maketh the\ndisciple not to know his strength.\n\nThen begin men to aspire to the second prizes; to be a profound\ninterpreter and commenter, to be a sharp champion and defender, to be\na methodical compounder and abridger. And this is the unfortunate\nsuccession of wits which the world hath yet had, whereby the\npatrimony of all knowledge goeth not on husbanded or improved, but\nwasted and decayed. For knowledge is like a water that will never\narise again higher than the level from which it fell; and therefore\nto go beyond Aristotle by the light of Aristotle is to think that a\nborrowed light can increase the original light from whom it is taken.\nSo then no true succession of wits having been in the world, either\nwe must conclude that knowledge is but a task for one man's life, and\nthen vain was the complaint that LIFE IS SHORT, AND ART IS LONG: or\nelse, that the knowledge that now is, is but a shrub, and not that\ntree which is never dangerous, but where it is to the purpose of\nknowing Good and Evil; which desire ever riseth upon an appetite to\nelect and not to obey, and so containeth in it a manifest defection.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 7.\n\n\nTHAT THE PRETENDED SUCCESSION OF WITS HATH BEEN EVIL PLACED, FOR\nASMUCH AS AFTER VARIETY OF SECTS AND OPINIONS, THE MOST POPULAR AND\nNOT THE TRUEST PREVAILETH AND WEARETH OUT THE REST; BEING THE 7TH\nCHAPTER; A FRAGMENT.\n\n\nIt is sensible to think that when men enter first into search and\ninquiry, according to the several frames and compositions of their\nunderstanding they light upon different conceits, and so all opinions\nand doubts are beaten over, and then men having made a taste of all\nwax weary of variety, and so reject the worst and hold themselves to\nthe best, either some one if it be eminent, or some two or three if\nthey be in some equality, which afterwards are received and carried\non, and the rest extinct.\n\nBut truth is contrary, and that time is like a river which carrieth\ndown things which are light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth\nthat which is sad and weighty. For howsoever governments have\nseveral forms, sometimes one governing, sometimes few, sometimes the\nmultitude; yet the state of knowledge is ever a DEMOCRATIE, and that\nprevaileth which is most agreeable to the senses and conceits of\npeople. As for example there is no great doubt but he that did put\nthe beginnings of things to be SOLID, VOID, AND MOTION TO THE CENTRE,\nwas in better earnest than he that put MATTER, FORM, AND SHIFT; or he\nthat put the MIND, MOTION, AND MATTER. For no man shall enter into\ninquisition of nature, but shall pass by that opinion of Democritus,\nwhereas he shall never come near the other two opinions, but leave\nthem aloof for the schools and table-talk. Yet those of Aristotle\nand Plato, because they be both agreeable to popular sense, and the\none was uttered with subtilty and the spirit of contradiction, and\nthe other with a stile of ornament and majesty, did hold out, and the\nother gave place, etc.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 8.\n\n\nOF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE IN HANDLING IT BY PARTS, AND IN\nSLIPPING OFF PARTICULAR SCIENCES FROM THE ROOT AND STOCK OF UNIVERSAL\nKNOWLEDGE, BEING THE 8TH CHAPTER, THE WHOLE CHAPTER.\n\n\nCicero, the orator, willing to magnify his own profession, and\nthereupon spending many words to maintain that eloquence was not a\nshop of good words and elegancies but a treasury and receipt of all\nknowledges, so far forth as may appertain to the handling and moving\nof the minds and affections of men by speech, maketh great complaint\nof the school of Socrates; that whereas before his time the same\nprofessors of wisdom in Greece did pretend to teach an universal\nSAPIENCE and knowledge both of matter and words, Socrates divorced\nthem and withdrew philosophy and left rhetoric to itself, which by\nthat destitution became but a barren and unnoble science. And in\nparticular sciences we see that if men fall to subdivide their\nlabours, as to be an oculist in physic, or to be perfect in some one\ntitle of the law, or the like, they may prove ready and subtile, but\nnot deep or sufficient, no not in that subject which they do\nparticularly attend, because of that consent which it hath with the\nrest. And it is a matter of common discourse of the chain of\nsciences how they are linked together, insomuch as the Grecians, who\nhad terms at will, have fitted it of a name of CIRCLE LEARNING.\nNevertheless I that hold it for a great impediment towards the\nadvancement and further invention of knowledge, that particular arts\nand sciences have been disincorporated from general knowledge, do not\nunderstand one and the same thing which Cicero's discourse and the\nnote and conceit of the Grecians in their word CIRCLE LEARNING do\nintend. For I mean not that use which one science hath of another\nfor ornament or help in practice, as the orator hath of knowledge of\naffections for moving, or as military science may have use of\ngeometry for fortifications; but I mean it directly of that use by\nway of supply of light and information which the particulars and\ninstances of one science do yield and present for the framing or\ncorrecting of the axioms of another science in their very truth and\nnotion. And therefore that example of OCULISTS and TITLE LAWYERS\ndoth come nearer my conceit than the other two; for sciences\ndistinguished have a dependence upon universal knowledge to be\naugmented and rectified by the superior light thereof, as well as the\nparts and members of a science have upon the MAXIMS of the same\nscience, and the mutual light and consent which one part receiveth of\nanother. And therefore the opinion of Copernicus in astronomy, which\nastronomy itself cannot correct because it is not repugnant to any of\nthe appearances, yet natural philosophy doth correct. On the other\nside if some of the ancient philosophers had been perfect in the\nobservations of astronomy, and had called them to counsel when they\nmade their principles and first axioms, they would never have divided\ntheir philosophy as the Cosmographers do their descriptions by globes,\nmaking one philosophy for heaven and another for under heaven, as in\neffect they do.\n\nSo if the moral philosophers that have spent such an infinite\nquantity of debate touching Good and the highest good, had cast their\neye abroad upon nature and beheld the appetite that is in all things\nto receive and to give; the one motion affecting preservation and the\nother multiplication; which appetites are most evidently seen in\nliving creatures in the pleasure of nourishment and generation; and\nin man do make the aptest and most natural division of all his\ndesires, being either of sense of pleasure or sense of power; and in\nthe universal frame of the world are figured, the one in the beams of\nheaven which issue forth, and the other in the lap of the earth which\ntakes in: and again if they had observed the motion of congruity or\nsituation of the parts in respect of the whole, evident in so many\nparticulars; and lastly if they had considered the motion (familiar\nin attraction of things) to approach to that which is higher in the\nsame kind; when by these observations so easy and concurring in\nnatural philosophy, they should have found out this quaternion of\ngood, in enjoying or fruition, effecting or operation, consenting or\nproportion, and approach or assumption; they would have saved and\nabridged much of their long and wandering discourses of pleasure,\nvirtue, duty, and religion. So likewise in this same logic and\nrhetoric, or arts of argument and grace of speech, if the great\nmasters of them would but have gone a form lower, and looked but into\nthe observations of Grammar concerning the kinds of words, their\nderivations, deflexions, and syntax; specially enriching the same\nwith the helps of several languages, with their differing proprieties\nof words, phrases, and tropes; they might have found out more and\nbetter footsteps of common reason, help of disputation, and\nadvantages of cavillation, than many of these which they have\npropounded. So again a man should be thought to dally, if he did\nnote how the figures of rhetoric and music are many of them the same.\nThe repetitions and traductions in speech and the reports and\nhauntings of sounds in music are the very same things. Plutarch hath\nalmost made a book of the Lacedaemonian kind of jesting, which joined\never pleasure with distaste. SIR, (saith a man of art to Philip king\nof Macedon when he controlled him in his faculty,) GOD FORBID YOUR\nFORTUNE SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO KNOW THESE THINGS BETTER THAN I. In\ntaxing his ignorance in his art he represented to him the perpetual\ngreatness of his fortune, leaving him no vacant time for so mean a\nskill. Now in music it is one of the ordinariest flowers to fall\nfrom a discord or hard tune upon a sweet accord. The figure that\nCicero and the rest commend as one of the best points of elegancy,\nwhich is the fine checking of expectation, is no less well known to\nthe musicians when they have a special grace in flying the close or\ncadence. And these are no allusions but direct communities, the same\ndelights of the mind being to be found not only in music, rhetoric,\nbut in moral philosophy, policy, and other knowledges, and that\nobscure in the one, which is more apparent in the other, yea and that\ndiscovered in the one which is not found at all in the other, and so\none science greatly aiding to the invention and augmentation of\nanother. And therefore without this intercourse the axioms of\nsciences will fall out to be neither full nor true; but will be such\nopinions as Aristotle in some places doth wisely censure, when he\nsaith THESE ARE THE OPINIONS OF PERSONS THAT HAVE RESPECT BUT TO A\nFEW THINGS. So then we see that this note leadeth us to an\nadministration of knowledge in some such order and policy as the king\nof Spain in regard of his great dominions useth in state; who though\nhe hath particular councils for several countries and affairs, yet\nhath one council of State or last resort, that receiveth the\nadvertisements and certificates from all the rest. Hitherto of the\ndiversion, succession, and conference of wits.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 9.\n\n\nTHAT THE END AND SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE HATH BEEN GENERALLY MISTAKEN, AND\nTHAT MEN WERE NEVER WELL ADVISED WHAT IT WAS THEY SOUGHT; BEING THE\n9TH CHAPTER, WHEREOF A FRAGMENT (WHICH IS THE END OF THE SAME\nCHAPTER) IS BEFORE.\n\n\nIt appeareth then how rarely the wits and labours of men have been\nconverted to the severe and original inquisition of knowledge; and in\nthose who have pretended, what hurt hath been done by the affectation\nof professors and the distraction of such as were no professors; and\nhow there was never in effect any conjunction or combination of wits\nin the first and inducing search, but that every man wrought apart,\nand would either have his own way or else would go no further than\nhis guide, having in the one case the honour of a first, and in the\nother the ease of a second; and lastly how in the descent and\ncontinuance of wits and labours the succession hath been in the most\npopular and weak opinions, like unto the weakest natures which many\ntimes have most children, and in them also the condition of\nsuccession hath been rather to defend and to adorn than to add; and\nif to add, yet that addition to be rather a refining of a part than\nan increase of the whole. But the impediments of time and accidents,\nthough they have wrought a general indisposition, yet are they not so\nperemptory and binding as the internal impediments and clouds in the\nmind and spirit of man, whereof it now followeth to speak.\n\nThe Scripture speaking of the worst sort of error saith, ERRARE FECIT\nCOS IN INVIO ET NON IN VIA. For a man may wander in the way, by\nrounding up and down. But if men have failed in their very direction\nand address that error will never by good fortune correct itself.\nNow it hath fared with men in their contemplations as Seneca saith it\nfareth with them in their actions, DE PARTIBUS VITAE QUISQUE\nDELIBERAT, DE SUMMA NEMO. A course very ordinary with men who receive\nfor the most part their final ends from the inclination of their\nnature, or from common example and opinion, never questioning or\nexamining them, nor reducing them to any clear certainty; and use\nonly to call themselves to account and deliberation touching the\nmeans and second ends, and thereby set themselves in the right way to\nthe wrong place. So likewise upon the natural curiosity and desire\nto know, they have put themselves in way without foresight or\nconsideration of their journey's end.\n\nFor I find that even those that have sought knowledge for itself, and\nnot for benefit or ostentation or any practical enablement in the\ncourse of their life, have nevertheless propounded to themselves a\nwrong mark, namely satisfaction (which men call truth) and not\noperation. For as in the courts and services of princes and states\nit is a much easier matter to give satisfaction than to do the\nbusiness; so in the inquiring of causes and reasons it is much easier\nto find out such causes as will satisfy the mind of man and quiet\nobjections, than such causes as will direct him and give him light to\nnew experiences and inventions. And this did Celsus note wisely and\ntruly, how that the causes which are in use and whereof the\nknowledges now received do consist, were in time minors and\nsubsequents to the knowledge of the particulars out of which they\nwere induced and collected; and that it was not the light of those\ncauses which discovered particulars, but only the particulars being\nfirst found, men did fall on glossing and discoursing of the causes;\nwhich is the reason why the learning that now is hath the curse of\nbarrenness, and is courtesanlike, for pleasure, and not for fruit.\nNay to compare it rightly, the strange fiction of the poets of the\ntransformation of Scylla seemeth to be a lively emblem of this\nphilosophy and knowledge; a fair woman upwards in the parts of show,\nbut when you come to the parts of use and generation, Barking\nMonsters; for no better are the endless distorted questions, which\never have been, and of necessity must be, the end and womb of such\nknowledge.\n\nBut yet nevertheless here I may be mistaken, by reason of some which\nhave much in their pen the referring sciences to action and the use\nof man, which mean quite another matter than I do. For they mean a\ncontriving of directions and precepts for readiness of practice,\nwhich I discommend not, so it be not occasion that some quantity of\nthe science be lost; for else it will be such a piece of husbandry as\nto put away a manor lying somewhat scattered, to buy in a close that\nlieth handsomely about a dwelling. But my intention contrariwise is\nto increase and multiply the revenues and possessions of man, and not\nto trim up only or order with conveniency the grounds whereof he is\nalready stated. Wherefore the better to make myself understood that\nI mean nothing less than words, and directly to demonstrate the point\nwhich we are now upon, that is, what is the true end, scope, or\noffice of knowledge, which I have set down to consist not in any\nplausible, delectable, reverend, or admired discourse, or any\nsatisfactory arguments, but in effecting and working, and in\ndiscovery of particulars not revealed before for the better endowment\nand help of man's life; I have thought good to make as it were a\nKalendar or Inventory of the wealth, furniture, or means of man\naccording to his present estate, as far as it is known; which I do\nnot to shew any universality of sense or knowledge, and much less to\nmake a satire of reprehension in respect of wants and errors, but\npartly because cogitations new had need of some grossness and\ninculcation to make them perceived; and chiefly to the end that for\nthe time to come (upon the account and state now made and cast up) it\nmay appear what increase this new manner of use and administration of\nthe stock (if it be once planted) shall bring with it hereafter; and\nfor the time present (in case I should be prevented by death to\npropound and reveal this new light as I purpose) yet I may at the\nleast give some awaking note both of the wants in man's present\ncondition and the nature of the supplies to be wished; though for\nmine own part neither do I much build upon my present anticipations,\nneither do I think ourselves yet learned or wise enough to wish\nreasonably: for as it asks some knowledge to demand a question not\nimpertinent, so it asketh some sense to make a wish not absurd.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 10.\n\n\nTHE INVENTORY, OR AN ENUMERATION AND VIEW OF INVENTIONS ALREADY\nDISCOVERED AND IN USE, TOGETHER WITH A NOTE OF THE WANTS AND THE\nNATURE OF THE SUPPLIES, BEING THE 10TH CHAPTER; AND THIS A SMALL\nFRAGMENT THEREOF, BEING THE PREFACE TO THE INVENTORY.\n\n\nThe plainest method and most directly pertinent to this intention,\nwill be to make distribution of sciences, arts, inventions, works,\nand their portions, according to the use and tribute which they yield\nand render to the conditions of man's life, and under those several\nuses, being as several offices of provisions, to charge and tax what\nmay be reasonably exacted or demanded; not guiding ourselves neither\nby the poverty of experiences and probations, nor according to the\nvanity of credulous imaginations; and then upon those charges and\ntaxations to distinguish and present, as it were in several columns,\nwhat is extant and already found, and what is defective and further\nto be provided. Of which provisions, because in many of them after\nthe manner of slothful and faulty officers and accomptants it will be\nreturned (by way of excuse) that no such are to be had, it will be\nfit to give some light of the nature of the supplies, whereby it will\nevidently appear that they are to be compassed and procured. And yet\nnevertheless on the other side again it will be as fit to check and\ncontrol the vain and void assignations and gifts whereby certain\nignorant, extravagant, and abusing wits have pretended to indue the\nstate of man with wonders, differing as much from truth in nature as\nCaesar's Commentaries differeth from the acts of King Arthur or Huon\nof Bourdeaux in story. For it is true that Caesar did greater things\nthan those idle wits had the audacity to feign their supposed\nworthies to have done; but he did them not in that monstrous and\nfabulous manner.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 11.\n\n\nTHE CHAPTER IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INVENTORY; BEING THE 11TH IN\nORDER; A PART THEREOF.\n\n\nIt appeareth then what is now in proposition not by general\ncircumlocution but by particular note. No former philosophy varied\nin terms or method; no new PLACET or speculation upon particulars\nalready known; no referring to action by any manual of practice; but\nthe revealing and discovering of new inventions and operations. This\nto be done without the errors and conjectures of art, or the length\nor difficulties of experience; the nature and kinds of which\ninventions have been described as they could be discovered; for your\neye cannot pass one kenning without further sailing; only we have\nstood upon the best advantages of the notions received, as upon a\nmount, to shew the knowledges adjacent and confining. If therefore\nthe true end of knowledge not propounded hath bred large error, the\nbest and perfectest condition of the same end not perceived will\ncause some declination. For when the butt is set up men need not\nrove, but except the white be placed men cannot level. This\nperfection we mean not in the worth of the effect, but in the nature\nof the direction; for our purpose is not to stir up men's hopes, but\nto guide their travels. The fullness of direction to work and\nproduce any effect consisteth in two conditions, certainty and\nliberty. Certainty is when the direction is not only true for the\nmost part, but infallible. Liberty is when the direction is not\nrestrained to some definite means, but comprehendeth all the means\nand ways possible; for the poet saith well SAPIENTIBUS UNDIQUE LATAE\nSUNT VIAE, and where there is the greatest plurality of change, there\nis the greatest singularity of choice. Besides as a conjectural\ndirection maketh a casual effect, so a particular and restrained\ndirection is no less casual than an uncertain. For those particular\nmeans whereunto it is tied may be out of your power or may be\naccompanied with an overvalue of prejudice; and so if for want of\ncertainty in direction you are frustrated in success, for want of\nvariety in direction you are stopped in attempt. If therefore your\ndirection be certain, it must refer you and point you to somewhat\nwhich, if it be present, the effect you seek will of necessity follow,\nelse may you perform and not obtain. If it be free, then must it\nrefer you to somewhat which if it be absent the effect you seek will\nof necessity withdraw, else may you have power and not attempt. This\nnotion Aristotle had in light, though not in use. For the two\ncommended rules by him set down, whereby the axioms of sciences are\nprecepted to be made convertible, and which the latter men have not\nwithout elegancy surnamed the one the rule of truth because it\npreventeth deceit, the other the rule of prudence because it freeth\nelection, are the same thing in speculation and affirmation which we\nnow observe. An example will make my meaning attained, and yet\npercase make it thought that they attained it not. Let the effect to\nbe produced be Whiteness; let the first direction be that if air and\nwater be intermingled or broken in small portions together, whiteness\nwill ensue, as in snow, in the breaking of the waves of the sea and\nrivers, and the like. This direction is certain, but very particular\nand restrained, being tied but to air and water. Let the second\ndirection be, that if air be mingled as before with any transparent\nbody, such nevertheless as is uncoloured and more grossly transparent\nthan air itself, that then etc. as glass or crystal, being beaten to\nfine powder, by the interposition of the air becometh white; the\nwhite of an egg being clear of itself, receiving air by agitation\nbecometh white, receiving air by concoction becometh white; here you\nare freed from water, and advanced to a clear body, and still tied to\nair. Let the third direction exclude or remove the restraint of an\nuncoloured body, as in amber, sapphires, etc. which beaten to fine\npowder become white; in wine and beer, which brought to froth become\nwhite. Let the fourth direction exclude the restraint of a body more\ngrossly transparent than air, as in flame, being a body compounded\nbetween air and a finer substance than air; which flame if it were\nnot for the smoke, which is the third substance that incorporateth\nitself and dyeth the flame, would be more perfect white. In all\nthese four directions air still beareth a part. Let the fifth\ndirection then be, that if any bodies, both transparent but in an\nunequal degree, be mingled as before, whiteness will follow; as oil\nand water beaten to an ointment, though by settling the air which\ngathereth in the agitation be evaporate, yet remaineth white; and the\npowder of glass or crystal put into water, whereby the air giveth\nplace, yet remaineth white, though not so perfect. Now are you freed\nfrom air, but still you are tied to transparent bodies. To ascend\nfurther by scale I do forbear, partly because it would draw on the\nexample to an over-great length, but chiefly because it would open\nthat which in this work I determine to reserve; for to pass through\nthe whole history and observation of colours and objects visible were\ntoo long a digression; and our purpose is now to give an example of a\nfree direction, thereby to distinguish and describe it; and not to\nset down a form of interpretation how to recover and attain it. But\nas we intend not now to reveal, so we are circumspect not to mislead;\nand therefore (this warning being given) returning to our purpose in\nhand, we admit the sixth direction to be, that all bodies or parts of\nbodies which are unequal equally, that is in a simple proportion, do\nrepresent whiteness; we will explain this, though we induce it not.\nIt is then to be understood, that absolute equality produceth\ntransparence, inequality in simple order or proportion produceth\nwhiteness, inequality in compound or respective order or proportion\nproduceth all other colours, and absolute or orderless inequality\nproduceth blackness; which diversity, if so gross a demonstration be\nneedful, may be signified by four tables; a blank, a chequer, a fret,\nand a medley; whereof the fret is evident to admit great variety.\nOut of this assertion are satisfied a multitude of effects and\nobservations, as that whiteness and blackness are most incompatible\nwith transparence; that whiteness keepeth light, and blackness\nstoppeth light, but neither passeth it; that whiteness or blackness\nare never produced in rainbows, diamonds, crystals, and the like;\nthat white giveth no dye, and black hardly taketh dye; that whiteness\nseemeth to have an affinity with dryness, and blackness with moisture;\nthat adustion causeth blackness, and calcination whiteness; that\nflowers are generally of fresh colours, and rarely black, etc. All\nwhich I do now mention confusedly by way of derivation and not by way\nof induction. This sixth direction, which I have thus explained, is\nof good and competent liberty for whiteness fixed and inherent, but\nnot for whiteness fantastical or appearing, as shall be afterwards\ntouched. But first do you need a reduction back to certainty or\nverity; for it is not all position or contexture of unequal bodies\nthat will produce colour; for AQUA FORTIS, oil of VITRIOL, etc. more\nmanifestly, and many other substances more obscurely, do consist of\nvery unequal parts, which yet are transparent and clear. Therefore\nthe reduction must be, that the bodies or parts of bodies so\nintermingled as before be of a certain grossness or magnitude; for\nthe unequalities which move the sight must have a further dimension\nand quantity than those which operate many other effects. Some few\ngrains of saffron will give a tincture to a tun of water; but so many\ngrains of civet will give a perfume to a whole chamber of air. And\ntherefore when Democritus (from whom Epicurus did borrow it) held\nthat the position of the solid portions was the cause of colours, yet\nin the very truth of his assertion he should have added, that the\nportions are required to be of some magnitude. And this is one cause\nwhy colours have little inwardness and necessitude with the nature\nand proprieties of things, those things resembling in colour which\notherwise differ most, as salt and sugar, and contrariwise differing\nin colour which otherwise resemble most, as the white and blue\nviolets, and the several veins of one agate or marble, by reason that\nother virtues consist in more subtile proportions than colours do;\nand yet are there virtues and natures which require a grosser\nmagnitude than colours, as well as scents and divers other require a\nmore subtile; for as the portion of a body will give forth scent\nwhich is too small to be seen, so the portion of a body will shew\ncolours which is too small to be endued with weight; and therefore\none of the prophets with great elegancy describing how all creatures\ncarry no proportion towards God the creator, saith, THAT ALL THE\nNATIONS IN RESPECT OF HIM ARE LIKE THE DUST UPON THE BALANCE, which\nis a thing appeareth but weigheth not. But to return, there resteth\na further freeing of this sixth direction; for the clearness of a\nriver or stream sheweth white at a distance, and crystalline glasses\ndeliver the face or any other object falsified in whiteness, and long\nbeholding the snow to a weak eye giveth an impression of azure rather\nthan of whiteness. So as for whiteness in apparition only and\nrepresentation by the qualifying of the light, altering the\nINTERMEDIUM, or affecting the eye itself, it reacheth not. But you\nmust free your direction to the producing of such an incidence,\nimpression, or operation, as may cause a precise and determinate\npassion of the eye; a matter which is much more easy to induce than\nthat which we have passed through; but yet because it hath a full\ncoherence both with that act of radiation (which hath hitherto been\nconceived and termed so unproperly and untruly by some an effluxion\nof spiritual species and by others an investing of the INTERMEDIUM\nwith a motion which successively is conveyed to the eye) and with the\nact of sense, wherein I should likewise open that which I think good\nto withdraw, I will omit. Neither do I contend but that this motion\nwhich I call the freeing of a direction, in the received philosophies\n(as far as a swimming anticipation could take hold) might be\nperceived and discerned; being not much other matter than that which\nthey did not only aim at in the two rules of AXIOMS before remembered,\nbut more nearly also in that which they term the form or formal\ncause, or that which they call the true difference; both which\nnevertheless it seemeth they propound rather as impossibilities and\nwishes than as things within the compass of human comprehension. For\nPlato casteth his burden and saith THAT HE WILL REVERE HIM AS A GOD,\nTHAT CAN TRULY DIVIDE AND DEFINE; which cannot be but by true forms\nand differences. Wherein I join hands with him, confessing as much\nas yet assuming to myself little; for if any man call by the strength\nof his ANTICIPATIONS find out forms, I will magnify him with the\nforemost. But as any of them would say that if divers things which\nmany men know by instruction and observation another knew by\nrevelation and without those means, they would take him for somewhat\nsupernatural and divine; so I do acknowledge that if any man can by\nanticipations reach to that which a weak and inferior wit may attain\nto by interpretation, he cannot receive too high a title. Nay I for\nmy part do indeed admire to see how far some of them have proceeded\nby their ANTICIPATIONS; but how? It is as I wonder at some blind men,\nto see what shift they make without their eye-sight; thinking with\nmyself that if I were blind I could hardly do it. Again Aristotle's\nschool confesseth that there is no true knowledge but by causes, no\ntrue cause but the form, no true form known except one, which they\nare pleased to allow; and therefore thus far their evidence standeth\nwith us, that both hitherto there hath been nothing but a shadow of\nknowledge, and that we propound now that which is agreed to be\nworthiest to be sought, and hardest to be found. There wanteth now a\npart very necessary, not by way of supply but by way of caution; for\nas it is seen for the most part that the outward tokens and badges of\nexcellency and perfection are more incident to things merely\ncounterfeit than to that which is true, but for a meaner and baser\nsort; as a dubline is more like a perfect ruby than a spinel, and a\ncounterfeit angel is made more like a true angel than if it were an\nangel coined of China gold; in like manner the direction carrieth a\nresemblance of a true direction in verity and liberty which indeed is\nno direction at all. For though your direction seem to be certain\nand free by pointing you to a nature that is unseparable from the\nnature you inquire upon, yet if it do not carry you on a degree or\nremove nearer to action, operation, or light to make or produce, it\nis but superficial and counterfeit. Wherefore to secure and warrant\nwhat is a true direction, though that general note I have given be\nperspicuous in itself (for a man shall soon cast with himself whether\nhe be ever the nearer to effect and operate or no, or whether he have\nwon but an abstract or varied notion) yet for better instruction I\nwill deliver three particular notes of caution. The first is that\nthe nature discovered be more original than the nature supposed, and\nnot more secondary or of the like degree; as to make a stone bright\nor to make it smooth it is a good direction to say, make it even; but\nto make a stone even it is no good direction to say, make it bright\nor make it smooth; for the rule is that the disposition of any thing\nreferring to the state of it in itself or the parts, is more original\nthan that which is relative or transitive towards another thing. So\nevenness is the disposition of the stone in itself, but smooth is to\nthe hand and bright to the eye, and yet nevertheless they all cluster\nand concur; and yet the direction is more unperfect, if it do appoint\nyou to such a relative as is in the same kind and not in a diverse.\nFor in the direction to produce brightness by smoothness, although\nproperly it win no degree, and will never teach you any new\nparticulars before unknown; yet by way of suggestion or bringing to\nmind it may draw your consideration to some particulars known but not\nremembered; as you shall sooner remember some practical means of\nmaking smoothness, than if you had fixed your consideration only upon\nbrightness by making reflexion, as thus, make it such as you may see\nyour face in it, this is merely secondary, and helpeth neither by way\nof informing nor by way of suggestion. So if in the inquiry of\nwhiteness you were directed to make such a colour as should be seen\nfurthest in a dark light; here you are advanced nothing at all. For\nthese kinds of natures are but proprieties, effects, circumstances,\nconcurrences, or what else you shall like to call them, and not\nradical and formative natures towards the nature supposed. The\nsecond caution is that the nature inquired be collected by division\nbefore composition, or to speak more properly, by composition\nsubaltern before you ascend to composition absolute, etc.\n\n\n\nOF THE INTERNAL AND PROFOUND ERRORS AND SUPERSTITIONS IN THE NATURE\nOF THE MIND, AND OF THE FOUR SORTS OF IDOLS OR FICTIONS WHICH OFFER\nTHEMSELVES TO THE UNDERSTANDING IN THE INQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE;\nBEING THE 16TH CHAPTER, AND THIS A SMALL FRAGMENT THEREOF, BEING A\nPREFACE TO THE INWARD ELENCHES OF THE MIND.\n\nThe opinion of Epicurus that the gods were of human shape, was rather\njustly derided than seriously confuted by the other sects, demanding\nwhether every kind of sensible creatures did not think their own\nfigure fairest, as the horse, the bull, and the like, which found no\nbeauty but in their own forms, as in appetite of lust appeared. And\nthe heresy of the Anthropomorphites was ever censured for a gross\nconceit bred in the obscure cells of solitary monks that never looked\nabroad. Again the fable so well known of QUIS PINXIT LEONEM, doth\nset forth well that there is an error of pride and partiality, as\nwell as of custom and familiarity. The reflexion also from glasses\nso usually resembled to the imagery of the mind, every man knoweth to\nreceive error and variety both in colour, magnitude, and shape,\naccording to the quality of the glass. But yet no use hath been made\nof these and many the like observations, to move men to search out\nand upon search to give true cautions of the native and inherent\nerrors in the mind of man which have coloured and corrupted all his\nnotions and impressions.\n\nI do find therefore in this enchanted glass four Idols or false\nappearances of several and distinct sorts, every sort comprehending\nmany subdivisions: the first sort, I call idols of the NATION or\nTRIBE; the second, idols of the PALACE; the third, idols of the CAVE;\nand the fourth, idols of the THEATRE, etc.\n\n\n\n\nHERE FOLLOWETH AN ABRIDGMENT OF DIVERS CHAPTERS OF THE FIRST BOOK OF\nINTERPRETATION OF NATURE.\n\n\n\nCAP. 12.\n\n\nThat in deciding and determining of the truth of knowledge, men have\nput themselves upon trials not competent. That antiquity and\nauthority; common and confessed notions; the natural and yielding\nconsent of the mind; the harmony and coherence of a knowledge in\nitself; the establishing of principles with the touch and reduction\nof other propositions unto them; inductions without instances\ncontradictory; and the report of the senses; are none of them\nabsolute and infallible evidence of truth, and bring no security\nsufficient for effects and operations. That the discovery of new\nworks and active directions not known before, is the only trial to be\naccepted of; and yet not that neither, in ease where one particular\ngiveth light to another; but where particulars induce an axiom or\nobservation, which axiom found out discovereth and designeth new\nparticulars. That the nature of this trial is not only upon the\npoint, whether the knowledge be profitable or no, but even upon the\npoint whether the knowledge be true or no; not because you may always\nconclude that the Axiom which discovereth new instances is true, but\ncontrariwise you may safely conclude that if it discover not any new\ninstance it is in vain and untrue. That by new instances are not\nalways to be understood new recipes but new assignations, and of the\ndiversity between these two. That the subtilty of words, arguments,\nnotions, yea of the senses themselves, is but rude and gross in\ncomparison of the subtilty of things; and of the slothful and\nflattering opinions of those which pretend to honour the mind of man\nin withdrawing and abstracting it from particulars, and of the\ninducements and motives whereupon such opinions have been conceived\nand received.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 13.\n\n\nOf the error in propounding chiefly the search of causes and\nproductions of things concrete, which are infinite and transitory,\nand not of abstract natures, which are few and permanent. That these\nnatures are as the alphabet or simple letters, whereof the variety of\nthings consisteth; or as the colours mingled in the painter's shell,\nwherewith he is able to make infinite variety of faces or shapes. An\nenumeration of them according to popular note. That at the first one\nwould conceive that in the schools by natural philosophy were meant\nthe knowledge of the efficients of things concrete; and by metaphysic\nthe knowledge of the forms of natures simple; which is a good and fit\ndivision of knowledge: but upon examination there is no such matter\nby them intended. That the little inquiry into the production of\nsimple natures sheweth well that works were not sought; because by\nthe former knowledge some small and superficial deflexions from the\nordinary generations and productions may be found out, but the\ndiscovery of all profound and radical alteration must arise out of\nthe latter knowledge.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 14.\n\n\nOf the error in propounding the search of the materials or dead\nbeginnings or principles of things, and not the nature of motions,\ninclinations, and applications. That the whole scope of the former\nsearch is impertinent and vain; both because there are no such\nbeginnings, and if there were they could not be known. That the\nlatter manner of search (which is all) they pass over compendiously\nand slightly as a by-matter. That the several conceits in that kind,\nas that the lively and moving beginnings of things should be shift or\nappetite of matter to privation; the spirit of the world working in\nmatter according to platform; the proceeding or fructifying of\ndistinct kinds according to their proprieties; the intercourse of the\nelements by mediation of their common qualities; the appetite of like\nportions to unite themselves; amity and discord, or sympathy and\nantipathy; motion to the centre, with motion of stripe or press; the\ncasual agitation, aggregation, and essays of the solid portions in\nthe void space; motion of shuttings and openings; are all mere\nnugations; and that the calculating and ordination of the true\ndegrees, moments, limits, and laws of motions and alterations (by\nmeans whereof all works and effects are produced), is a matter of a\nfar other nature than to consist in such easy and wild generalities.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 15.\n\n\nOf the great error of inquiring knowledge in Anticipations. That I\ncall Anticipations the voluntary collections that the mind maketh of\nknowledge; which is every man's reason. That though this be a solemn\nthing, and serves the turn to negotiate between man and man (because\nof the conformity and participation of men's minds in the like\nerrors), yet towards inquiry of the truth of things and works it is\nof no value. That civil respects are a lett that this pretended\nreason should not be so contemptibly spoken of as were fit and\nmedicinable, in regard that hath been too much exalted and glorified,\nto the infinite detriment of man's estate. Of the nature of words\nand their facility and aptness to cover and grace the defects of\nAnticipations. That it is no marvel if these Anticipations have\nbrought forth such diversity and repugnance in opinions, theories, or\nphilosophies, as so many fables of several arguments. That had not\nthe nature of civil customs and government been in most times\nsomewhat adverse to such innovations, though contemplative, there\nmight have been and would have been many more. That the second\nschool of the Academics and the sect of Pyrrho, or the considerers\nthat denied comprehension, as to the disabling of man's knowledge\n(entertained in Anticipations) is well to be allowed, but that they\nought when they had overthrown and purged the floor of the ruins to\nhave sought to build better in place. And more especially that they\ndid unjustly and prejudicially to charge the deceit upon the report\nof the senses, which admitteth very sparing remedy; being indeed to\nhave been charged upon the Anticipations of the mind, which admitteth\na perfect remedy. That the information of the senses is sufficient,\nnot because they err not, but because the use of the sense in\ndiscovering of knowledge is for the most part not immediate. So that\nit is the work, effect, or instance, that trieth the Axiom, and the\nsense doth but try the work done or not done, being or not being.\nThat the mind of man in collecting knowledge needeth great variety of\nhelps, as well as the hand of man in manual and mechanical practices\nneedeth great variety of instruments. And that it were a poor work\nthat if instruments were removed men would overcome with their naked\nhands. And of the distinct points of want and insufficiency in the\nmind of man.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 16.\n\n\nThat the mind of a man, as it is not a vessel of that content or\nreceipt to comprehend knowledge without helps and supplies, so again\nit is not sincere, but of an ill and corrupt tincture. Of the\ninherent and profound errors and superstitions in the nature of the\nmind, and of the four sorts of Idols or false appearances that offer\nthemselves to the understanding in the inquisition of knowledge; that\nis to say, the Idols of the Tribe, the Idols of the Palace, the Idols\nof the Cave, and the Idols of the Theatre. That these four, added to\nthe incapacity of the mind and the vanity and malignity of the\naffections, leave nothing but impotency and confusion. A recital of\nthe particular kinds of these four Idols, with some chosen examples\nof the opinions they have begot, such of them as have supplanted the\nstate of knowledge most.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 17.\n\n\nOf the errors of such as have descended and applied themselves to\nexperience, and attempted to induce knowledge upon particulars. That\nthey have not had the resolution and strength of mind to free\nthemselves wholly from Anticipations, but have made a confusion and\nintermixture of Anticipations and observations, and so vanished.\nThat if any have had the strength of mind generally to purge away and\ndischarge all Anticipations, they have not had that greater and\ndouble strength and patience of mind, as well to repel new\nAnticipations after the view and search of particulars, as to reject\nold which were in their mind before; but have from particulars and\nhistory flown up to principles without the mean degrees, and so\nframed all the middle generalities or axioms, not by way of scale or\nascension from particulars, but by way of derivation from principles;\nwhence hath issued the infinite chaos of shadows and notions,\nwherewith both books and minds have been hitherto, and may be yet\nhereafter much more pestered. That in the course of those\nderivations, to make them yet the more unprofitable, they have used\nwhen any light of new instance opposite to any assertion appeared,\nrather to reconcile the instance than to amend the rule. That if any\nhave had or shall have the power and resolution to fortify and\ninclose his mind against all Anticipations, yet if he have not been\nor shall not be cautioned by the full understanding of the nature of\nthe mind and spirit of man, and therein of the seats, pores and\npassages both of knowledge and error, he hath not been nor shall not\nbe possibly able to guide or keep on his course aright. That those\nthat have been conversant in experience and observation have used,\nwhen they have intended to discover the cause of any effect, to fix\ntheir consideration narrowly and exactly upon that effect itself with\nall the circumstances thereof, and to vary the trial thereof as many\nways as can be devised; which course amounteth but to a tedious\ncuriosity, and ever breaketh off in wondering and not in knowing; and\nthat they have not used to enlarge their observation to match and\nsort that effect with instances of a diverse subject, which must of\nnecessity be before any cause be found out. That they have passed\nover the observation of instances vulgar and ignoble, and stayed\ntheir attention chiefly upon instances of mark; whereas the other\nsort are for the most part more significant and of better height and\ninformation. That every particular that worketh any effect is a\nthing compounded (more or less) of diverse single natures, (more\nmanifest and more obscure,) and that it appeareth not to whether of\nthe natures the effect is to be ascribed, and yet notwithstanding\nthey have taken a course without breaking particulars and reducing\nthem by exclusions and inclusions to a definite point, to conclude\nupon inductions in gross, which empirical course is no less vain than\nthe scholastical. That all such as have sought action and work out\nof their inquiry have been hasty and pressing to discover some\npractices for present use, and not to discover Axioms, joining with\nthem the new assignations as their sureties. That the forerunning of\nthe mind to frame recipes upon Axioms at the entrance, is like\nAtalanta's golden ball that hindereth and interrupteth the course,\nand is to be inhibited till you have ascended to a certain stage and\ndegree of generalities; which forbearance will be liberally\nrecompensed in the end; and that chance discovereth new inventions by\none and one, but science by knots and clusters. That they have not\ncollected sufficient quantity of particulars, nor them in sufficient\ncertainty and subtilty, nor of all several kinds, nor with those\nadvantages and discretions in the entry and sorting which are\nrequisite; and of the weak manner of collecting natural history which\nhath been used. Lastly that they had no knowledge of the formulary\nof interpretation, the work whereof is to abridge experience and to\nmake things as certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by\ninfinite experiences in ages.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 18.\n\n\nThat the cautels and devices put in practice in the delivery of\nknowledge for the covering and palliating of ignorance, and the\ngracing and overvaluing of that they utter, are without number; but\nnone more bold and more hurtful than two; the one that men have used\nof a few observations upon any subject to make a solemn and formal\nart, by filling it up with discourse, accommodating it with some\ncircumstances and directions to practice, and digesting it into\nmethod, whereby men grow satisfied and secure, as if no more inquiry\nwere to be made of that matter; the other, that men have used to\ndischarge ignorance with credit, in defining all those effects which\nthey cannot attain unto to be out of the compass of art and human\nendeavour. That the very styles and forms of utterance are so many\ncharacters of imposture, some choosing a style of pugnacity and\ncontention, some of satire and reprehension, some of plausible and\ntempting similitudes and examples, some of great words and high\ndiscourse, some of short and dark sentences, some of exactness of\nmethod, all of positive affirmation, without disclosing the true\nmotives and proofs of their opinions, or free confessing their\nignorance or doubts, except it be now and then for a grace, and in\ncunning to win the more credit in the rest, and not in good faith.\nThat although men be free from these errors and incumbrances in the\nwill and affection, yet it is not a thing so easy as is conceived to\nconvey the conceit of one man's mind into the mind of another without\nloss or mistaking, specially in notions new and differing from those\nthat are received. That never any knowledge was delivered in the\nsame order it was invented, no not in the mathematic, though it\nshould seem otherwise in regard that the propositions placed last do\nuse the propositions or grants placed first for their proof and\ndemonstration. That there are forms and methods of tradition wholly\ndistinct and differing, according to their ends whereto they are\ndirected. That there are two ends of tradition of knowledge, the one\nto teach and instruct for use and practice, the other to impart or\nintimate for re-examination and progression. That the former of\nthese ends requireth a method not the same whereby it was invented\nand induced, but such as is most compendious and ready whereby it may\nbe used and applied. That the latter of the ends, which is where a\nknowledge is delivered to be continued and spun on by a succession of\nlabours, requireth a method whereby it may be transposed to another\nin the same manner as it was collected, to the end it may be\ndiscerned both where the work is weak, and where it breaketh off.\nThat this latter method is not only unfit for the former end, but\nalso impossible for all knowledge gathered and insinuated by\nAnticipations, because the mind working inwardly of itself, no man\ncan give a just account how he came to that knowledge which he hath\nreceived, and that therefore this method is peculiar for knowledge\ngathered by interpretation. That the discretion anciently observed,\nthough by the precedent of many vain persons and deceivers disgraced,\nof publishing part, and reserving part to a private succession, and\nof publishing in a manner whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor\ntaste of all, but shall as it were single and adopt his reader, is\nnot to be laid aside, both for the avoiding of abuse in the excluded,\nand the stregthening of affection in the admitted. That there are\nother virtues of tradition, as that there be no occasion given to\nerror, and that it carry a vigour to root and spread against the\nvanity of wits and injuries of time; all which if they were ever due\nto any knowledge delivered, or if they were never due to any human\nknowledge heretofore delivered, yet are now due to the knowledge\npropounded.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 19.\n\n\nOf the impediments which have been in the affections, the principle\nwhereof hath been despair or diffidence, and the strong apprehension\nof the difficulty, obscurity, and infiniteness which belongeth to the\ninvention of knowledge, and that men have not known their own\nstrength, and that the supposed difficulties and vastness of the work\nis rather in shew and muster than in state or substance where the\ntrue way is taken. That this diffidence hath moved and caused some\nnever to enter into search, and others when they have been entered\neither to give over or to seek a more compendious course than can\nstand with the nature of true search. That of those that have\nrefused and prejudged inquiry, the more sober and grave sort of wits\nhave depended upon authors and traditions, and the more vain and\ncredulous resorted to revelation and intelligence with spirits and\nhigher natures. That of those that have entered into search, some\nhaving fallen upon some conceits which they after consider to be the\nsame which they have found in former authors, have suddenly taken a\npersuasion that a man shall but with much labour incur and light upon\nthe same inventions which he might with ease receive from others; and\nthat it is but a vanity and self-pleasing of the wit to go about\nagain, as one that would rather have a flower of his own gathering,\nthan much better gathered to his hand. That the same humour of sloth\nand diffidence suggesteth that a man shall but revive some ancient\nopinion, which was long ago propounded, examined, and rejected. And\nthat it is easy to err in conceit that a man's observation or notion\nis the same with a former opinion, both because new conceits must of\nnecessity be uttered in old words, and because upon true and\nerroneous grounds men may meet in consequence or conclusion, as\nseveral lines or circles that cut in some one point. That the\ngreatest part of those that have descended into search have chosen\nfor the most artificial and compendious course to induce principles\nout of particulars, and to reduce all other propositions unto\nprinciples; and so instead of the nearest way, have been led to no\nway or a mere labyrinth. That the two contemplative ways have some\nresemblance with the old parable of the two moral ways, the one\nbeginning with incertainty and difficulty, and ending in plainness\nand certainty, and the other beginning with shew of plainness and\ncertainty, and ending in difficulty and incertainty. Of the great\nand manifest error and untrue conceit or estimation of the\ninfiniteness of particulars, whereas indeed all prolixity is in\ndiscourse and derivations; and of the infinite and most laborious\nexpense of wit that hath been employed upon toys and matters of no\nfruit or value. That although the period of one age cannot advance\nmen to the furthest point of interpretation of nature, (except the\nwork should be undertaken with greater helps than can be expected),\nyet it cannot fail in much less space of time to make return of many\nsingular commodities towards the state and occasions of man's life.\nThat there is less reason of distrust in the course of interpretation\nnow propounded than in any knowledge formerly delivered, because this\ncourse doth in sort equal men's wits, and leaveth no great advantage\nor preeminence to the perfect and excellent motions of the spirit.\nThat to draw a straight line or to make a circle perfect round by aim\nof hand only, there must be a great difference between an unsteady\nand unpractised hand and a steady and practised, but to do it by rule\nor compass it is much alike.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 21.\n\n\nOf the impediments which have been in the two extreme humours of\nadmiration of antiquity and love of novelty, and again of\nover-servile reverence or over-light scorn of the opinions of others.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 22.\n\n\nOf the impediments which have been in the affection of pride,\nspecially of one kind, which is the disdain of dwelling and being\nconversant much in experiences and particulars, specially such as are\nvulgar in occurrency, and base and ignoble in use. That besides\ncertain higher mysteries of pride, generalities seem to have a\ndignity and solemnity, in that they do not put men in mind of their\nfamiliar actions, in that they have less affinity with arts\nmechanical and illiberal, in that they are not so subject to be\ncontrolled by persons of mean observation, in that they seem to teach\nmen that they know not, and not to refer them to that they know. All\nwhich conditions directly feeding the humour of pride, particulars do\nwant. That the majesty of generalities, and the divine nature of the\nmind in taking them (if they be truly collected, and be indeed the\ndirect reflexions of things,) cannot be too much magnified. And that\nit is true that interpretation is the very natural and direct\nintention, action, and progression of the understanding delivered\nfrom impediments. And that all Anticipation is but a deflexion or\ndeclination by accident.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 25.\n\n\nOf the impediments which have been in the state of heathen religion\nand other superstitions and errors of religion. And that in the true\nreligion there hath not nor is any impediment, except it be by\naccident or intermixture of humour. That a religion which consisteth\nin rites and forms of adoration, and not in confessions and beliefs,\nis adverse to knowledge; because men having liberty to inquire and\ndiscourse of Theology at pleasure, it cometh to pass that all\ninquisition of nature endeth and limiteth itself in such metaphysical\nor theological discourse; whereas if men's wits be shut out of that\nport, it turneth them again to discover, and so to seek reason of\nreason more deeply. And that such was the religion of the Heathen.\nThat a religion that is jealous of the variety of learning, discourse,\nopinions, and sects, (as misdoubting it may shake the foundations,)\nor that cherisheth devotion upon simplicity and ignorance, as\nascribing ordinary effects to the immediate working of God, is\nadverse to knowledge. That such is the religion of the Turk, and\nsuch hath been the abuse of Christian religion at some several times,\nand in some several factions. And of the singular advantage which\nthe Christian religion hath towards the furtherance of true knowledge,\nin that it excludeth and interdicteth human reason, whether by\ninterpretation or anticipation, from examining or discussing of the\nmysteries and principles of faith.\n\n\n\n\nCAP. 26.\n\n\nOf the impediments which have been in the nature of society and the\npolicies of state. That there is no composition of estate or society,\nnor order or quality of persons, which have not some point of\ncontrariety towards true knowledge. That monarchies incline wits to\nprofit and pleasure, and commonwealths to glory and vanity. That\nuniversities incline wits to sophistry and affectation, cloisters to\nfables and unprofitable subtilty, study at large to variety; and that\nit is hard to say, whether mixture of contemplations with an active\nlife, or retiring wholly to contemplations, do disable and hinder the\nmind more.\n\n\n\n\n(Back Cover.)\n\n\nPhilosophy.\nLine 1: see commentary\nLine 2: libri dimidium est, pagina 34\nLine 3: pagellarum numeri veri\n\n\n\nWriting on the Back Cover of VALERIUS TERMINUS\n\n\nThe writing in the original is on the outside of the last leaf, which\nis in fact the cover. The front cover, if there ever was one, is\nlost. The ink with which the line containing the symbols is written\ncorresponds with that in the body of the manuscript; and the line\nitself is placed symmetrically in the middle of the page, near the\ntop. The two lower lines are apparently by another hand, probably of\nlater date, certainly in ink of a different colour, and paler. The\nword \"Philosophy\" is in Bacon's own hand, written lightly in the\nupper corner at the left, and is no doubt merely a docket inserted\nafterwards when he was sorting his papers. What connexion there was\nbetween the note and the manuscript it is impossible to say. But it\nis evidently a careful memorandum of something, set down by somebody\nwhen the manuscript was at hand; and so many of the characters\nresemble those adopted to represent the planets and the signs of the\nzodiac, that one is led to suspect in it a note of the positions of\nthe heavenly bodies at the time of some remarkable accident;--perhaps\nthe plague, of which 30,578 persons died in London, during the year\nending 22nd December, 1603. The period of the commencement, the\nduration, or the cessation of such an epidemic might naturally be so\nnoted.\n\nNow three of the characters clearly represent respectively Mercury,\nAquarius, and Sagittarius. The sign for Jupiter, as we find it in\nold books, is so like a 4, that the first figure of 45 may very well\nhave been meant for it. The monogram at the beginning of the line\nbears a near resemblance to the sign of Capricorn in its most\ncharacteristic feature. And the mark over the sign of Aquarius\nappears to be an abbreviation of that which usually represents the\nSun. (The blot between 1603 and B is nothing; being only meant to\nrepresent a figure 6 blotted out with the finger before the ink was\ndry.) Suspecting therefore that the writing contained a note of the\npositions of Mercury and Jupiter in the year 1603, I sent a copy to a\nscientific friend and asked him if from such data he could determine\nthe month indicated. He found upon a rough calculation (taking\naccount of mean motions only) that Jupiter did enter the sign of\nSagittarius about the 10th of August, 1603, and continued there for\nabout a twelvemonth; that the Sun entered Aquarius about the 12th or\n13th of January, 1603-4; and that Mercury was about the 16th or 17th\nof the same month in the 26th or 27th degree of Capricorn:\n--coincidences which would have been almost conclusive as to the date\nindicated, if Capricorn had only stood where Aquarius does, and vice\nversa. But their position as they actually stood in the manuscript\nis a formidable, if not fatal, objection to the interpretation.\n\nAccording to another opinion with which I have been favoured, the\nfirst monogram is a NOTA BENE; the next group may mean DIES MERCURII\n(Wednesday) 26TH JANUARY, 1603; and the rest refers to something not\nconnected with astronomy. But to this also there is a serious\nobjection. The 26th of January, 1603-4, was a Friday, and it seems\nto me very improbable that any Englishman would have described the\npreceding January as belonging to the year 1603. Bacon himself\ninvariably dated according to the civil year, and the occasional use\nof the historical year in loose memoranda would have involved all his\ndates in confusion. I should think it more probable that the writer\n(who may have been copying a kind of notation with which he was not\nfamiliar) miscopied the sign of Venus into that of Mercury; in which\ncase it would mean Friday, 26th January, 1603-4. But even then the\nexplanation would he unsatisfactory, as leaving so much unexplained.\nThose however who are familiar with old manuscripts relating to such\nsubjects may probably be able to interpret the whole.","title":"Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":34036}