{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_34022/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_34022","id":"gutenberg_34022","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/34022","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Faith","Theism"],"text":"An Essay\n\n                                In Aid Of\n\n                           A Grammar Of Assent.\n\n                                    by\n\n                            John Henry Newman,\n\n                             Of the Oratory.\n\n       Non in dialectic\u00e0 complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum.\n\n                               ST. AMBROSE.\n\n                                 London:\n\n                           Burns, Oates, & Co.\n\n            17 & 18, Portman Street, and 63, Paternoster Row.\n\n                                   1874\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nDedication.\nPart I. Assent And Apprehension.\n   Chapter I. Modes Of Holding And Apprehending Propositions.\n      \u00a7 1. Modes of Holding Propositions.\n      \u00a7 2. Modes of apprehending Propositions.\n   Chapter II. Assent Considered As Apprehensive.\n   Chapter III. The Apprehension Of Propositions.\n   Chapter IV. Notional And Real Assent.\n      \u00a7 1. Notional Assents.\n      \u00a7 2. Real Assents.\n      \u00a7 3. Notional and Real Assents Contrasted.\n   Chapter V. Apprehension And Assent In The Matter Of Religion.\n      \u00a7 1. Belief in One God.\n      \u00a7 2. Belief in the Holy Trinity.\n      \u00a7 3. Belief in Dogmatic Theology.\nPart II. Assent And Inference.\n   Chapter VI. Assent Considered As Unconditional.\n      \u00a7 1. Simple Assent.\n      \u00a7 2. Complex Assent.\n   Chapter VII. Certitude.\n      \u00a7 1. Assent and Certitude Contrasted.\n      \u00a7 2. Indefectibility of Certitude.\n   Chapter VIII. Inference.\n      \u00a7 1. Formal Inference.\n      \u00a7 2. Informal Inference.\n      \u00a7 3. Natural Inference.\n   Chapter IX. The Illative Sense.\n      \u00a7 1. The Sanction of the Illative Sense.\n      \u00a7 2. The Nature of the Illative Sense.\n      \u00a7 3. The Range of the Illative Sense.\n   Chapter X. Inference And Assent In The Matter Of Religion.\n      \u00a7 1. Natural Religion.\n      \u00a7 2. Revealed Religion.\nNote.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nDEDICATION.\n\n\nTo\n\nEdward Bellasis,\n\nSerjeant At Law,\n\nIn Remembrance\n\nOf A Long, Equable, Sunny Friendship;\n\nIn Gratitude\n\nFor Continual Kindnesses Shown To Me,\n\nFor An Unwearied Zeal In My Behalf,\n\nFor A Trust In Me Which Has Never Wavered,\n\nAnd A Prompt, Effectual Succour And Support\n\nIn Times Of Special Trial,\n\nFrom His Affectionate\n\nJ. H. N.\n\n_February 21, 1870._\n\n\n\n\nPART I. ASSENT AND APPREHENSION.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Modes Of Holding And Apprehending Propositions.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Modes of Holding Propositions.\n\n\n1. Propositions (consisting of a subject and predicate united by the\ncopula) may take a categorical, conditional, or interrogative form.\n\n(1) An interrogative, when they ask a Question, (e. g. Does Free-trade\nbenefit the poorer classes?) and imply the possibility of an\naffirmative or negative resolution of it.\n\n(2) A conditional, when they express a Conclusion (e. g. Free-trade\ntherefore benefits the poorer classes), and both imply, and imply their\ndependence on, other propositions.\n\n(3) A categorical, when they simply make an Assertion (e. g. Free-trade\ndoes benefit), and imply the absence of any condition or reservation of\nany kind, looking neither before nor behind, as resting in themselves\nand being intrinsically complete.\n\nThese three modes of shaping a proposition, distinct as they are from\neach other, follow each other in natural sequence. A proposition,\nwhich starts with being a Question, may become a Conclusion, and\nthen be changed into an Assertion; but it has of course ceased to\nbe a question, so far forth as it has become a conclusion, and has\nrid itself of its argumentative form\u2014that is, has ceased to be a\nconclusion,\u2014so far forth as it has become an assertion. A question has\nnot yet got so far as to be a conclusion, though it is the necessary\npreliminary of a conclusion; and an assertion has got beyond being a\nmere conclusion, though it is the natural issue of a conclusion. Their\ncorrelation is the measure of their distinction one from another.\n\nNo one is likely to deny that a question is distinct both from a\nconclusion and from an assertion; and an assertion will be found to be\nequally distinct from a conclusion. For, if we rest our affirmation on\narguments, this shows that we are not asserting; and, when we assert,\nwe do not argue. An assertion is as distinct from a conclusion, as a\nword of command is from a persuasion or recommendation. Command and\nassertion, as such, both of them, in their different ways, dispense\nwith, discard, ignore, antecedents of any kind, though antecedents may\nhave been a _sine qu\u00e2 non_ condition of their being elicited. They both\ncarry with them the pretension of being personal acts.\n\nIn insisting on the intrinsic distinctness of these three modes\nof putting a proposition, I am not maintaining that they may not\nco-exist as regards one and the same subject. For what we have already\nconcluded, we may, if we will, make a question of; and what we are\nasserting, we may of course conclude over again. We may assert, to\none man, and conclude to another, and ask of a third; still, when we\nassert, we do not conclude, and, when we assert or conclude, we do not\nquestion.\n\n2. The internal act of holding propositions is for the most part\nanalogous to the external act of enunciating them; as there are three\nways of enunciating, so are there three ways of holding them, each\ncorresponding to each. These three mental acts are Doubt, Inference,\nand Assent. A question is the expression of a doubt; a conclusion\nis the expression of an act of inference; and an assertion is the\nexpression of an act of assent. To doubt, for instance, is not to see\none\u2019s way to hold that Free-trade is or that it is not a benefit; to\ninfer, is to hold on sufficient grounds that Free-trade may, must, or\nshould be a benefit; to assent to the proposition, is to hold that\nFree-trade is a benefit.\n\nMoreover, propositions, while they are the material of these three\nenunciations, are the objects of the three corresponding mental acts;\nand as without a proposition, there cannot be a question, conclusion,\nor assertion, so without a proposition there is nothing to doubt about,\nnothing to infer, nothing to assent to. Mental acts of whatever kind\npresuppose their objects.\n\nAnd, since the three enunciations are distinct from each other,\ntherefore the three mental acts also, Doubt, Inference, and Assent,\nare, with reference to one and the same proposition, distinct from each\nother; else, why should their several enunciations be distinct? And\nindeed it is very evident, that, so far forth as we infer, we do not\ndoubt, and that, when we assent, we are not inferring, and, when we\ndoubt, we cannot assent.\n\nAnd in fact, these three modes of entertaining propositions,\u2014doubting\nthem, inferring them, assenting to them, are so distinct in their\naction, that, when they are severally carried out into the intellectual\nhabits of an individual, they become the principles and notes of three\ndistinct states or characters of mind. For instance, in the case of\nRevealed Religion, according as one or other of these is paramount\nwithin him, a man is a sceptic as regards it; or a philosopher,\nthinking it more or less probable considered as a conclusion of\nreason; or he has an unhesitating faith in it, and is recognized as a\nbeliever. If he simply disbelieves, or dissents, he is assenting to the\ncontradictory of the thesis, viz. that there is no Revelation.\n\nMany minds of course there are, which are not under the predominant\ninfluence of any one of the three. Thus men are to be found of\nirreflective, impulsive, unsettled, or again of acute minds, who do\nnot know what they believe and what they do not, and who may be by\nturns sceptics, inquirers, or believers; who doubt, assent, infer, and\ndoubt again, according to the circumstances of the season. Nay further,\nin all minds there is a certain coexistence of these distinct acts;\nthat is, of two of them, for we can at once infer and assent, though\nwe cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt. Indeed, in a\nmultitude of cases we infer truths, or apparent truths, before, and\nwhile, and after we assent to them.\n\nLastly, it cannot be denied that these three acts are all natural to\nthe mind; I mean, that, in exercising them, we are not violating the\nlaws of our nature, as if they were in themselves an extravagance or\nweakness, but are acting according to it, according to its legitimate\nconstitution. Undoubtedly, it is possible, it is common, in the\nparticular case, to err in the exercise of Doubt, of Inference, and of\nAssent; that is, we may be withholding a judgment about propositions\non which we have the means of coming to some definitive conclusion; or\nwe may be assenting to propositions which we ought to receive only on\nthe credit of their premisses, or again to keep ourselves in suspense\nabout; but such errors of the individual belong to the individual, not\nto his nature, and cannot avail to forfeit for him his natural right,\nunder proper circumstances, to doubt, or to infer, or to assent. We\ndo but fulfil our nature in doubting, inferring, and assenting; and\nour duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our\nnature, but to do what is in itself right rightly.\n\n3. So far in general:\u2014in this Essay I treat of propositions only in\ntheir bearing upon concrete matter, and I am mainly concerned with\nAssent; with Inference, in its relation to Assent, and only such\ninference as is not demonstration; with Doubt hardly at all. I dismiss\nDoubt with one observation. I have here spoken of it simply as a\nsuspense of mind, in which sense of the word, to have \u201cno doubt\u201d about\na thesis is equivalent to one or other of the two remaining acts,\neither to inferring it or else assenting to it. However, the word is\noften taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being\nuncertain; in this sense Doubt is nothing else than an assent, viz. an\nassent to a proposition at variance with the thesis, as I have already\nnoticed in the case of Disbelief.\n\nConfining myself to the subject of Assent and Inference, I observe two\npoints of contrast between them.\n\nThe first I have already noted. Assent is unconditional; else, it is\nnot really represented by assertion. Inference is conditional, because\na conclusion at least implies the assumption of premisses, and still\nmore, because in concrete matter, on which I am engaged, demonstration\nis impossible.\n\nThe second has regard to the apprehension necessary for holding\na proposition. We cannot assent to a proposition, without some\nintelligent apprehension of it; whereas we need not understand it at\nall in order to infer it. We cannot give our assent to the proposition\nthat \u201cx is z,\u201d till we are told something about one or other of the\nterms; but we can infer, if \u201cx is y, and y is z, that x is z,\u201d whether\nwe know the meaning of x and z or no.\n\nThese points of contrast and their results will come before us in\ndue course: here, for a time leaving the consideration of the modes\nof holding propositions, I proceed to inquire into what is to be\nunderstood by apprehending them.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Modes of apprehending Propositions.\n\n\nBy our apprehension of propositions I mean our imposition of a sense\non the terms of which they are composed. Now what do the terms of a\nproposition, the subject and predicate, stand for? Sometimes they stand\nfor certain ideas existing in our own minds, and for nothing outside of\nthem; sometimes for things simply external to us, brought home to us\nthrough the experiences and informations we have of them. All things in\nthe exterior world are unit and individual, and are nothing else; but\nthe mind not only contemplates those unit realities, as they exist, but\nhas the gift, by an act of creation, of bringing before it abstractions\nand generalizations, which have no existence, no counterpart, out of it.\n\nNow there are propositions, in which one or both of the terms\nare common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and\nnon-existing, such as \u201cMan is an animal, some men are learned, an\nApostle is a creation of Christianity, a line is length without\nbreadth, to err is human, to forgive divine.\u201d These I shall call\nnotional propositions, and the apprehension with which we infer or\nassent to them, notional.\n\nAnd there are other propositions, which are composed of singular nouns,\nand of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and\nindividual, as \u201cPhilip was the father of Alexander,\u201d \u201cthe earth goes\nround the sun,\u201d \u201cthe Apostles first preached to the Jews;\u201d and these I\nshall call real propositions, and their apprehension real.\n\nThere are then two apprehensions or interpretations to which\npropositions may be subjected, notional and real.\n\nNext I observe, that the same proposition may admit of both of these\ninterpretations at once, having a notional sense as used by one\nman, and a real as used by another. Thus a schoolboy may perfectly\napprehend, and construe with spirit, the poet\u2019s words, \u201cDum Capitolium\nscandet cum tacit\u00e2 Virgine Pontifex;\u201d he has seen steep hills, flights\nof steps, and processions; he knows what enforced silence is; also he\nknows all about the Pontifex Maximus, and the Vestal Virgins; he has\nan abstract hold upon every word of the description, yet without the\nwords therefore bringing before him at all the living image which they\nwould light up in the mind of a contemporary of the poet, who had seen\nthe fact described, or of a modern historian who had duly informed\nhimself in the religious phenomena, and by meditation had realized the\nRoman ceremonial, of the age of Augustus. Again, \u201cDulce et decorum\nest pro patri\u00e2 mori,\u201d is a mere common-place, a terse expression of\nabstractions in the mind of the poet himself, if Philippi is to be the\nindex of his patriotism, whereas it would be the record of experiences,\na sovereign dogma, a grand aspiration, inflaming the imagination,\npiercing the heart, of a Wallace or a Tell.\n\nAs the multitude of common nouns have originally been singular, it\nis not surprising that many of them should so remain still in the\napprehension of particular individuals. In the proposition \u201cSugar\nis sweet,\u201d the predicate is a common noun as used by those who have\ncompared sugar in their thoughts with honey or glycerine; but it may be\nthe only distinctively sweet thing in the experience of a child, and\nmay be used by him as a noun singular. The first time that he tastes\nsugar, if his nurse says, \u201cSugar is sweet\u201d in a notional sense, meaning\nby sugar, lump-sugar, powdered, brown, and candied, and by sweet, a\nspecific flavour or scent which is found in many articles of food and\nmany flowers, he may answer in a real sense, and in an individual\nproposition \u201cSugar is sweet,\u201d meaning \u201cthis sugar is this sweet thing.\u201d\n\nThirdly, in the same mind and at the same time, the same proposition\nmay express both what is notional and what is real. When a lecturer in\nmechanics or chemistry shows to his class by experiment some physical\nfact, he and his hearers at once enunciate it as an individual thing\nbefore their eyes, and also as generalized by their minds into a law of\nnature. When Virgil says, \u201cVarium et mutabile semper f\u0153mina,\u201d he both\nsets before his readers what he means to be a general truth, and at the\nsame time applies it individually to the instance of Dido. He expresses\nat once a notion and a fact.\n\nOf these two modes of apprehending propositions, notional and real,\nreal is the stronger; I mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible.\nIt is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with\nwhat is either real or taken for real; for intellectual ideas cannot\ncompete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts. Various\nproverbs and maxims sanction me in so speaking, such as, \u201cFacts are\nstubborn things,\u201d \u201cExperientia docet,\u201d \u201cSeeing is believing;\u201d and\nthe popular contrast between theory and practice, reason and sight,\nphilosophy and faith. Not that real apprehension, as such, impels to\naction, any more than notional; but it excites and stimulates the\naffections and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive\ncauses. Thus it indirectly brings about what the apprehension of large\nprinciples, of general laws, or of moral obligations, never could\neffect.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nReverting to the two modes of holding propositions, conditional and\nunconditional, which was the subject of the former Section, that\nis, inferences and assents, I observe that inferences, which are\nconditional acts, are especially cognate to notional apprehension, and\nassents, which are unconditional, to real. This distinction, too, will\ncome before us in the course of the following chapters.\n\nAnd now I have stated the main subjects of which I propose to treat;\nviz., the distinctions in the use of propositions, which I have been\ndrawing, and the questions which those distinctions involve.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. Assent Considered As Apprehensive.\n\n\nI have already said of an act of Assent, first, that it is in itself\nthe absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition; and\nnext that, in order to its being made, it presupposes the condition,\nnot only of some previous inference in favour of the proposition, but\nespecially of some concomitant apprehension of its terms. I proceed\nto the latter of these two subjects; that is, of Assent considered as\napprehensive, leaving the discussion of Assent as unconditional for a\nlater place in this Essay.\n\nBy apprehension of a proposition, I mean, as I have already said, the\ninterpretation given to the terms of which it is composed. When we\ninfer, we consider a proposition in relation to other propositions;\nwhen we assent to it, we consider it for its own sake and in its\nintrinsic sense. That sense must be in some degree known to us; else,\nwe do but assert the proposition, we in no wise assent to it. Assent\nI have described to be a mental assertion; in its very nature then it\nis of the mind, and not of the lips. We can assert without assenting;\nassent is more than assertion just by this much, that it is accompanied\nby some apprehension of the matter asserted. This is plain; and the\nonly question is, what measure of apprehension is sufficient.\n\nAnd the answer to this question is equally plain:\u2014it is the predicate\nof the proposition which must be apprehended. In a proposition one term\nis predicated of another; the subject is referred to the predicate,\nand the predicate gives us information about the subject;\u2014therefore\nto apprehend the proposition is to have that information, and to\nassent to it is to acquiesce in it as true. Therefore I apprehend a\nproposition, when I apprehend its predicate. The subject itself need\nnot be apprehended _per se_ in order to a genuine assent: for it is\nthe very thing which the predicate has to elucidate, and therefore\nby its formal place in the proposition, so far as it is the subject,\nit is something unknown, something which the predicate makes known;\nbut the predicate cannot make it known, unless it is known itself.\nLet the question be, \u201cWhat is Trade?\u201d here is a distinct profession\nof ignorance about \u201cTrade;\u201d and let the answer be, \u201cTrade is the\ninterchange of goods;\u201d\u2014trade then need not be known, as a condition of\nassent to the proposition, except so far as the account of it which\nis given in answer, \u201cthe interchange of goods,\u201d makes it known; and\nthat must be apprehended in order to make it known. The very drift of\nthe proposition is to tell us something about the subject; but there\nis no reason why our knowledge of the subject, whatever it is, should\ngo beyond what the predicate tells us about it. Further than this the\nsubject need not be apprehended: as far as this it must; it will not be\napprehended thus far, unless we apprehend the predicate.\n\nIf a child asks, \u201cWhat is Lucern?\u201d and is answered, \u201cLucern is medicago\nsativa, of the class Diadelphia and order Decandria;\u201d and henceforth\nsays obediently, \u201cLucern is medicago sativa, &c.,\u201d he makes no act\nof assent to the proposition which he enunciates, but speaks like\na parrot. But, if he is told, \u201cLucern is food for cattle,\u201d and is\nshown cows grazing in a meadow, then though he never saw lucern, and\nknows nothing at all about it, besides what he has learned from the\npredicate, he is in a position to make as genuine an assent to the\nproposition \u201cLucern is food for cattle,\u201d on the word of his informant,\nas if he knew ever so much more about lucern. And as soon as he has got\nas far as this, he may go further. He now knows enough about lucern,\nto enable him to apprehend propositions which have lucern for their\npredicate, should they come before him for assent, as, \u201cThat field is\nsown with lucern,\u201d or \u201cClover is not lucern.\u201d\n\nYet there is a way, in which the child can give an indirect assent even\nto a proposition, in which he understood neither subject nor predicate.\nHe cannot indeed in that case assent to the proposition itself, but he\ncan assent to its truth. He cannot do more than assert that \u201cLucern is\nmedicago sativa,\u201d but he can assent to the proposition, \u201cThat lucern is\nmedicago sativa is true.\u201d For here is a predicate which he sufficiently\napprehends, what is inapprehensible in the proposition being confined\nto the subject. Thus the child\u2019s mother might teach him to repeat a\npassage of Shakespeare, and when he asked the meaning of a particular\nline, such as \u201cThe quality of mercy is not strained,\u201d or \u201cVirtue itself\nturns vice, being misapplied,\u201d she might answer him, that he was too\nyoung to understand it yet, but that it had a beautiful meaning, as he\nwould one day know: and he, in faith on her word, might give his assent\nto such a proposition,\u2014not, that is, to the line itself which he had\ngot by heart, and which would be beyond him, but to its being true,\nbeautiful, and good.\n\nOf course I am speaking of assent itself, and its intrinsic conditions,\nnot of the ground or motive of it. Whether there is an obligation upon\nthe child to trust his mother, or whether there are cases where such\ntrust is impossible, are irrelevant questions, and I notice them in\norder to put them aside. I am examining the act of assent itself, not\nits preliminaries, and I have specified three directions, which among\nothers the assent may take, viz. assent immediately to a proposition,\nassent to its truth, and assent both to its truth and to the ground\nof its being true together,\u2014\u201cLucern is food for cattle,\u201d\u2014\u201cThat lucern\nis medicago sativa is true,\u201d\u2014and \u201cMy mother\u2019s word, that lucern is\nmedicago sativa, and is food for cattle, is the truth.\u201d Now in each of\nthese there is one and the same absolute adhesion of the mind to the\nproposition, on the part of the child; he assents to the apprehensible\nproposition, and to the truth of the inapprehensible, and to the\nveracity of his mother in her assertion of the inapprehensible. I say\nthe same absolute adhesion, because, unless he did assent without any\nreserve to the proposition that lucern was food for cattle, or to the\naccuracy of the botanical name and description of it, he would not be\ngiving an unreserved assent to his mother\u2019s word: yet, though these\nassents are all unreserved, still they certainly differ in strength,\nand this is the next point to which I wish to draw attention. It is\nindeed plain, that, though the child assents to his mother\u2019s veracity,\nwithout perhaps being conscious of his own act, nevertheless that\nparticular assent of his has a force and life in it which the other\nassents have not, insomuch as he apprehends the proposition, which is\nthe subject of it, with greater keenness and energy than belongs to\nhis apprehension of the others. Her veracity and authority is to him\nno abstract truth or item of general knowledge, but is bound up with\nthat image and love of her person which is part of himself, and makes a\ndirect claim on him for his summary assent to her general teachings.\n\nAccordingly, by reason of this circumstance of his apprehension\nhe would not hesitate to say, did his years admit of it, that he\nwould lay down his life in defence of his mother\u2019s veracity. On the\nother hand, he would not make such a profession in the case of the\npropositions, \u201cLucern is food for cattle,\u201d or \u201cThat lucern is medicago\nsativa is true;\u201d and yet it is clear too, that, if he did in truth\nassent to these propositions, he would have to die for them also,\nrather than deny them, when it came to the point, unless he made up\nhis mind to tell a falsehood. That he would have to die for all three\npropositions severally rather than deny them, shows the completeness\nand absoluteness of assent in its very nature; that he would not\nspontaneously challenge so severe a trial in the case of two out of the\nthree particular acts of assent, illustrates in what sense one assent\nmay be stronger than another.\n\nIt appears then, that, in assenting to propositions, an apprehension\nin some sense of their terms is not only necessary to assent, as such,\nbut also gives a distinct character to its acts. If therefore we would\nknow more about Assent, we must know more about the apprehension which\naccompanies it. Accordingly to the subject of Apprehension I proceed.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. The Apprehension Of Propositions.\n\n\nI said in my Introductory Chapter that there can be no assent to a\nproposition, without some sort of apprehension of its terms; next that\nthere are two modes of apprehension, notional and real; thirdly, that,\nwhile assent may be given to a proposition on either apprehension of\nit, still its acts are elicited more heartily and forcibly, when they\nare made upon real apprehension which has things for its objects,\nthan when they are made in favour of notions and with a notional\napprehension. The first of these three points I have just been\ndiscussing; now I will proceed to the second, viz. the two modes of\napprehending propositions, leaving the third for the Chapters which\nfollow.\n\nI have used the word _apprehension_, and not _understanding_,\nbecause the latter word is of uncertain meaning, standing sometimes\nfor the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition, sometimes for\nthat of comprehending it, neither of which come into the sense of\n_apprehension_. It is possible to apprehend without understanding.\nI apprehend what is meant by saying that John is Richard\u2019s wife\u2019s\nfather\u2019s aunt\u2019s husband, but, if I am unable so to take in these\nsuccessive relationships as to understand the upshot of the whole,\nviz. that John is great-uncle-in-law to Richard, I cannot be said to\nunderstand the proposition. In like manner, I may take a just view\nof a man\u2019s conduct, and therefore apprehend it, and yet may profess\nthat I cannot understand it; that is, I have not the key to it, and\ndo not see its consistency in detail: I have no just conception of\nit. Apprehension then is simply an intelligent acceptance of the idea\nor of the fact which a proposition enunciates. \u201cPride will have a\nfall;\u201d \u201cNapoleon died at St. Helena;\u201d I have no difficulty in entering\ninto the sentiment contained in the former of these, or into the fact\ndeclared in the latter; that is, I apprehend them both.\n\nNow apprehension, as I have said, has two subject-matters:\u2014according\nas language expresses things external to us, or our own thoughts, so\nis apprehension real or notional. It is notional in the grammarian, it\nis real in the experimentalist. The grammarian has to determine the\nforce of words and phrases; he has to master the structure of sentences\nand the composition of paragraphs; he has to compare language with\nlanguage, to ascertain the common ideas expressed under different\nidiomatic forms, and to achieve the difficult work of recasting the\nmind of an original author in the mould of a translation. On the\nother hand, the philosopher or experimentalist aims at investigating,\nquestioning, ascertaining facts, causes, effects, actions, qualities:\nthese are things, and he makes his words distinctly subordinate to\nthese, as means to an end. The primary duty of a literary man is to\nhave clear conceptions, and to be exact and intelligible in expressing\nthem; but in a philosopher it is even a merit to be not altogether\nvague, inchoate and obscure in his teaching, and if he fails even of\nthis low standard of language, we remind ourselves that his obscurity\nperhaps is owing to his depth. No power of words in a lecturer would\nbe sufficient to make psychology easy to his hearers; if they are\nto profit by him, they must throw their minds into the matters in\ndiscussion, must accompany his treatment of them with an active,\npersonal concurrence, and interpret for themselves, as he proceeds,\nthe dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects, which he has a\nright to presuppose, while he uses them, as images existing in their\napprehension as well as in his own.\n\nIn something of a parallel way it is the least pardonable fault in an\nOrator to fail in clearness of style, and the most pardonable fault of\na Poet.\n\nSo again, an Economist is dealing with facts; whatever there is of\ntheory in his work professes to be founded on facts, by facts alone\nmust his sense be interpreted, and to those only who are well furnished\nwith the necessary facts does he address himself; yet a clever\nschoolboy, from a thorough grammatical knowledge of both languages,\nmight turn into English a French treatise on national wealth, produce,\nconsumption, labour, profits, measures of value, public debt, and the\ncirculating medium, with an apprehension of what it was that his author\nwas stating sufficient for making it clear to an English reader, while\nhe had not the faintest conception himself what the treatise, which he\nwas translating really determined. The man uses language as the vehicle\nof things, and the boy of abstractions.\n\nHence in literary examinations, it is a test of good scholarship to\nbe able to construe aright, without the aid of understanding the\nsentiment, action, or historical occurrence conveyed in the passage\nthus accurately rendered, let it be a battle in Livy, or some subtle\ntrain of thought in Virgil or Pindar. And those who have acquitted\nthemselves best in the trial, will often be disposed to think they\nhave most notably failed, for the very reason that they have been too\nbusy with the grammar of each sentence, as it came, to have been able,\nas they construed on, to enter into the facts or the feelings, which,\nunknown to themselves, they were bringing out of it.\n\nTo take a very different instance of this contrast between notions and\nfacts;\u2014pathology and medicine, in the interests of science, and as a\nprotection to the practitioner, veil the shocking realities of disease\nand physical suffering under a notional phraseology, under the abstract\nterms of debility, distress, irritability, paroxysm, and a host of\nGreek and Latin words. The arts of medicine and surgery are necessarily\nexperimental; but for writing and conversing on these subjects they\nrequire to be stripped of the association of the facts from which they\nare derived.\n\nSuch are the two modes of apprehension. The terms of a proposition do\nor do not stand for things. If they do, then they are singular terms,\nfor all things that are, are units. But if they do not stand for things\nthey must stand for notions, and are common terms. Singular nouns come\nfrom experience, common from abstraction. The apprehension of the\nformer I call real, and of the latter notional. Now let us look at this\ndifference between them more narrowly.\n\n1. Real Apprehension, is, as I have said, in the first instance\nan experience or information about the concrete. Now, when these\ninformations are in fact presented to us, (that is, when they are\ndirectly subjected to our bodily senses or our mental sensations,\nas when we say, \u201cThe sun shines,\u201d or \u201cThe prospect is charming,\u201d or\nindirectly by means of a picture or even a narrative,) then there is no\ndifficulty in determining what is meant by saying that our enunciation\nof a proposition concerning them implies an apprehension of things;\nbecause we can actually point out the objects which they indicate. But\nsupposing those things are no longer before us, supposing they have\npassed beyond our field of view, or the book is closed in which the\ndescription of them occurs, how can an apprehension of things be said\nto remain to us? It remains on our minds by means of the faculty of\nmemory. Memory consists in a present imagination of things that are\npast; memory retains the impressions and likenesses of what they were\nwhen before us; and when we make use of the proposition which refers to\nthem, it supplies us with objects by which to interpret it. They are\nthings still, as being the reflections of things in a mental mirror.\n\nHence the poet calls memory \u201cthe mind\u2019s eye.\u201d I am in a foreign country\namong unfamiliar sights; at will I am able to conjure up before me\nthe vision of my home, and all that belongs to it, its rooms and\ntheir furniture, its books, its inmates, their countenances, looks\nand movements. I see those who once were there and are no more; past\nscenes, and the very expression of the features, and the tones of\nthe voices, of those who took part in them, in a time of trial or\ndifficulty. I create nothing; I see the facsimiles of facts; and of\nthese facsimiles the words and propositions which I use concerning them\nare from habitual association the proper or the sole expression.\n\nAnd so again, I may have seen a celebrated painting, or some great\npageant, or some public man; and I have on my memory stored up and\nready at hand, but latent, an impress more or less distinct of\nthat experience. The words \u201cthe Madonna di S. Sisto,\u201d or \u201cthe last\nCoronation,\u201d or \u201cthe Duke of Wellington,\u201d have power to revive that\nimpress of it. Memory has to do with individual things and nothing that\nis not individual. And my apprehension of its notices is conveyed in a\ncollection of singular and real propositions.\n\nI have hitherto been adducing instances from (for the most part)\nobjects of sight; but the memory preserves the impress, though not so\nvivid, of the experiences which come to us through our other senses\nalso. The memory of a beautiful air, or the scent of a particular\nflower, as far as any remembrance remains of it, is the continued\npresence in our minds of a likeness of it, which its actual presence\nhas left there. I can bring before me the music of the _Adeste\nFideles_, as if I were actually hearing it; and the scent of a clematis\nas if I were in my garden; and the flavour of a peach as if it were\nin season; and the thought I have of all these is as of something\nindividual and from without,\u2014as much as the things themselves, the\ntune, the scent, and the flavour, are from without,\u2014though, compared\nwith the things themselves, these images (as they may be called) are\nfaint and intermitting.\n\nNor need such an image be in any sense an abstraction, though I may\nhave eaten a hundred peaches in times past, the impression, which\nremains on my memory of the flavour, may be of any of them, of the\nten, twenty, thirty units, as the case may be, not a general notion,\ndistinct from every one of them, and formed from all of them by a\nfabrication of my mind.\n\nAnd so again the apprehension which we have of our past mental acts of\nany kind, of hope, inquiry, effort, triumph, disappointment, suspicion,\nhatred, and a hundred others, is an apprehension of the memory of those\ndefinite acts, and therefore an apprehension of things; not to say\nthat many of them do not need memory, but are such as admit of being\nactually summoned and repeated at our will. Such an apprehension again\nis elicited by propositions embodying the notices of our history, of\nour pursuits and their results, of our friends, of our bereavements,\nof our illnesses, of our fortunes, which remain imprinted upon our\nmemory as sharply and deeply as is any recollection of sight. Nay, and\nsuch recollections may have in them an individuality and completeness\nwhich outlives the impressions made by sensible objects. The memory of\ncountenances and of places in times past may fade away from the mind;\nbut the vivid image of certain anxieties or deliverances never.\n\nAnd by means of these particular and personal experiences, thus\nimpressed upon us, we attain an apprehension of what such things are\nat other times when we have not experience of them; an apprehension\nof sights and sounds, of colours and forms, of places and persons,\nof mental acts and states, parallel to our actual experiences, such,\nthat, when we meet with definite propositions expressive of them, our\napprehension cannot be called abstract and notional. If I am told\n\u201cthere is a raging fire in London,\u201d or \u201cLondon is on fire,\u201d \u201cfire\u201d need\nnot be a common noun in my apprehension more than \u201cLondon.\u201d The word\nmay recall to my memory the experience of a fire which I have known\nelsewhere, or of some vivid description which I have read. It is of\ncourse difficult to draw the line and to say where the office of memory\nends, and where abstraction takes its place; and again, as I said in my\nfirst pages, the same proposition is to one man an image, to another a\nnotion; but still there is a host of predicates, of the most various\nkinds, \u201clovely,\u201d \u201cvulgar,\u201d \u201ca conceited man,\u201d \u201ca manufacturing town,\u201d\n\u201ca catastrophe,\u201d and any number of others, which, though as predicates\nthey would be accounted common nouns, are in fact in the mouths of\nparticular persons singular, as conveying images of things individual,\nas the rustic in Virgil says,\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cUrbem, quam dicunt Romam, Melib\u0153e, putavi,\n    Stultus ego, huic nostr\u00e6 similem.\u201d\n\n\nAnd so the child\u2019s idea of a king, as derived from his picture-book,\nwill be that of a fierce or stern or venerable man, seated above a\nflight of steps, with a crown on his head and a sceptre in his hand.\nIn these two instances indeed the experience does but mislead, when\napplied to the unknown; but it often happens on the contrary, that it\nis a serviceable help, especially when a man has large experiences and\nhas learned to distinguish between them and apply them duly, as in the\ninstance of the hero \u201cwho knew many cities of men and many minds.\u201d\n\nFurther, we are able by an inventive faculty, or, as I may call it, the\nfaculty of composition, to follow the descriptions of things which have\nnever come before us, and to form, out of such passive impressions as\nexperience has heretofore left on our minds, new images, which, though\nmental creations, are in no sense abstractions, and though ideal, are\nnot notional. They are concrete units in the minds both of the party\ndescribing and the party informed of them. Thus I may never have seen a\npalm or a banana, but I have conversed with those who have, or I have\nread graphic accounts of it, and, from my own previous knowledge of\nother trees, have been able with so ready an intelligence to interpret\ntheir language, and to light up such an image of it in my thoughts,\nthat, were it not that I never was in the countries where the tree\nis found, I should fancy that I had actually seen it. Hence again it\nis the very praise we give to the characters of some great poet or\nhistorian that he is so individual. I am able as it were to gaze on\nTiberius, as Tacitus draws him, and to figure to myself our James the\nFirst, as he is painted in Scott\u2019s Romance. The assassination of C\u00e6sar,\nhis \u201cEt tu, Brute?\u201d his collecting his robes about him, and his fall\nunder Pompey\u2019s statue, all this becomes a fact to me and an object\nof real apprehension. Thus it is that we live in the past and in the\ndistant; by means of our capacity of interpreting the statements of\nothers about former ages or foreign climes by the lights of our own\nexperience. The picture, which historians are able to bring before us,\nof C\u00e6sar\u2019s death, derives its vividness and effect from its virtual\nappeal to the various images of our memory.\n\nThis faculty of composition is of course a step beyond experience, but\nwe have now reached its furthest point; it is mainly limited as regards\nits materials, by the sense of sight. As regards the other senses,\nnew images cannot well be elicited and shaped out of old experiences.\nNo description, however complete, could convey to my mind an exact\nlikeness of a tune or an harmony, which I have never heard; and still\nless of a scent, which I have never smelt. Generic resemblances and\nmetaphorical substitutes are indeed producible; but I should not\nacquire any real knowledge of the Scotch air \u201cThere\u2019s nae luck\u201d by\nbeing told it was like \u201cAuld lang syne,\u201d or \u201cRobin Gray;\u201d and if I said\nthat Mozart\u2019s melodies were as a summer sky or as the breath of Zephyr,\nI should be better understood by those who knew Mozart than by those\nwho did not. Such vague illustrations suggest intellectual notions, not\nimages.\n\nAnd quite as difficult is it to create or to apprehend by description\nimages of mental facts, of which we have no direct experience. I may\nindeed, as I have already said, bring home to my mind so complex a fact\nas an historical character, by composition out of my experiences about\ncharacter generally; Tiberius, James the First, Louis the Eleventh, or\nNapoleon; but who is able to infuse into me, or how shall I imbibe, a\nsense of the peculiarities of the style of Cicero or Virgil, if I have\nnot read their writings? or how shall I gain a shadow of a perception\nof the wit or the grace ascribed to the conversation of the French\nsalons, being myself an untravelled John Bull? And so again, as regards\nthe affections and passions of our nature, they are _sui generis_\nrespectively, and incommensurable, and must be severally experienced\nin order to be apprehended really. I can understand the _rabbia_ of\na native of Southern Europe, if I am of a passionate temper myself;\nand the taste for speculation or betting found in great traders or\non the turf, if I am fond of enterprise or games of chance; but on\nthe other hand, not all the possible descriptions of headlong love\nwill make me comprehend the _delirium_, if I have never had a fit of\nit; nor will ever so many sermons about the inward satisfaction of\nstrict conscientiousness create in my mind the image of a virtuous\naction and its attendant sentiments, if I have been brought up to\nlie, thieve and indulge my appetites. Thus we meet with men of the\nworld who cannot enter into the very idea of devotion, and think,\nfor instance, that, from the nature of the case, a life of religious\nseclusion must be either one of unutterable dreariness or abandoned\nsensuality, because they know of no exercise of the affections but what\nis merely human; and with others again, who, living in the home of\ntheir own selfishness, ridicule as something fanatical and pitiable the\nself-sacrifices of generous high-mindedness and chivalrous honour. They\ncannot create images of these things, any more than children can on the\ncontrary of vice, when they ask whereabouts and who the bad men are;\nfor they have no personal memories, and have to content themselves with\nnotions drawn from books or from what others tell them.\n\nSo much on the apprehension of things and on the real sense in our use\nof language; now let us pass on to the notional sense.\n\n2. Experience tells us only of individual things, and these things are\ninnumerable. Our minds might have been so constructed as to be able to\nreceive and retain an exact image of each of these various objects,\none by one, as it came before us, but only in and for itself, without\nthe power of comparing it with any of the others. But this is not our\ncase: on the contrary, to compare and to contrast are among the most\nprominent and busy of our intellectual functions. Instinctively, even\nthough unconsciously, we are ever instituting comparisons between\nthe manifold phenomena of the external world, as we meet with them,\ncriticizing, referring to a standard, collecting, analyzing them. Nay,\nas if by one and the same action, as soon as we perceive them, we\nalso perceive that they are like each other or unlike, or rather both\nlike and unlike at once. We apprehend spontaneously, even before we\nset about apprehending, that man is like man, yet unlike; and unlike\na horse, a tree, a mountain, or a monument, yet in some, though not\nthe same respects, like each of them. And in consequence, as I have\nsaid, we are ever grouping and discriminating, measuring and sounding,\nframing cross classes and cross divisions, and thereby rising from\nparticulars to generals, that is from images to notions.\n\nIn processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in\nthemselves, but mainly as they stand in relation to each other. We\nlook at nothing simply for its own sake; we cannot look at any one\nthing without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides.\n\u201cMan\u201d is no longer what he really is, an individual presented to us by\nour senses, but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and\ncontrasts which we have made him suggest to us. He is attenuated into\nan aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification. Thus his\nappellation is made to suggest, not the real being which he is in this\nor that specimen of himself, but a definition. If I might use a harsh\nmetaphor, I should say he is made the logarithm of his true self, and\nin that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of logarithms.\n\nIt is plain what a different sense language will bear in this system\nof intellectual notions from what it has when it is the representative\nof things: and such a use of it is not only the very foundation of\nall science, but may be, and is, carried out in literature and in the\nordinary intercourse of man with man. And then it comes to pass that\nindividual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be, and are\ndiluted or starved into abstract notions. The events of history and\nthe characters who figure in it lose their individuality. States and\ngovernments, society and its component parts, cities, nations, even the\nphysical face of the country, things past, and things contemporary, all\nthat fulness of meaning which I have described as accruing to language\nfrom experience, now that experience is absent, necessarily becomes\nto the multitude of men nothing but a heap of notions, little more\nintelligible than the beauties of a prospect to the short-sighted, or\nthe music of a great master to a listener who has no ear.\n\nI suppose most men will recollect in their past years how many mistakes\nthey have made about persons, parties, local occurrences, nations and\nthe like, of which at the time they had no actual knowledge of their\nown: how ashamed or how amused they have since been at their own\ngratuitous idealism when they came into possession of the real facts\nconcerning them. They were accustomed to treat the definite Titus\nor Sempronius as the _quidam homo_, the _individuum vagum_ of the\nlogician. They spoke of his opinions, his motives, his practices, as\ntheir traditional rule for the _species_ Titus or Sempronius enjoined.\nIn order to find out what individual men in flesh and blood were, they\nfancied that they had nothing to do but to refer to commonplaces,\nalphabetically arranged. Thus they were well up with the character of\na Whig statesman or Tory magnate, a Wesleyan, a Congregationalist,\na parson, a priest, a philanthropist, a writer of controversy, a\nsceptic; and found themselves prepared, without the trouble of direct\ninquiry, to draw the individual after the peculiarities of his type.\nAnd so with national character; the late Duke of Wellington must have\nbeen impulsive, quarrelsome, witty, clever at repartee, for he was an\nIrishman; in like manner, we must have cold and selfish Scots, crafty\nItalians, vulgar Americans, and Frenchmen, half tiger, half monkey.\nAs to the French, those who are old enough to recollect the wars with\nNapoleon, know what eccentric notions were popularly entertained about\nthem in England; how it was even a surprise to find some military man,\nwho was a prisoner of war, to be tall and stout, because it was a\nreceived idea that all Frenchmen were undersized and lived on frogs.\n\nSuch again are the ideal personages who figure in romances and dramas\nof the old school; tyrants, monks, crusaders, princes in disguise,\nand captive damsels; or benevolent or angry fathers, and spendthrift\nheirs; like the symbolical characters in some of Shakespeare\u2019s plays,\n\u201ca Tapster,\u201d or \u201ca Lord Mayor,\u201d or in the stage directions \u201cEnter two\nmurderers.\u201d\n\nWhat I have been illustrating in the case of persons, might be\ninstanced in regard to places, transactions, physical calamities,\nevents in history. Words which are used by an eye-witness to express\nthings, unless he be especially eloquent or graphic, may only convey\ngeneral notions. Such is, and ever must be, the popular and ordinary\nmode of apprehending language. On few subjects only have any of us the\nopportunity of realizing in our minds what we speak and hear about;\nand we fancy that we are doing justice to individual men and things by\nmaking them a mere _synthesis_ of qualities, as if any number whatever\nof abstractions would, by being fused together, be equivalent to one\nconcrete.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nHere then we have two modes of thought, both using the same words,\nboth having one origin, yet with nothing in common in their results.\nThe informations of sense and sensation are the initial basis of both\nof them; but in the one we take hold of objects from within them, and\nin the other we view them from without them; we perpetuate them as\nimages in the one case, we transform them into notions in the other.\nAnd natural to us as are both processes in their first elements and in\ntheir growth, however divergent and independent in their direction,\nthey cannot really be inconsistent with each other; yet no one from the\nsight of a horse or a dog would be able to anticipate its zoological\ndefinition, nor from a knowledge of its definition to draw such a\npicture as would direct another to the living specimen.\n\nEach use of propositions has its own excellence and serviceableness,\nand each has its own imperfection. To apprehend notionally is to have\nbreadth of mind, but to be shallow; to apprehend really is to be deep,\nbut to be narrow-minded. The latter is the conservative principle of\nknowledge, and the former the principle of its advancement. Without the\napprehension of notions, we should for ever pace round one small circle\nof knowledge; without a firm hold upon things, we shall waste ourselves\nin vague speculations. However, real apprehension has the precedence,\nas being the scope and end and the test of notional; and the fuller is\nthe mind\u2019s hold upon things or what it considers such, the more fertile\nis it in its aspects of them, and the more practical in its definitions.\n\nOf course, as these two are not inconsistent with each other, they may\nco-exist in the same mind. Indeed there is no one who does not to a\ncertain extent exercise both the one and the other. Viewed in relation\nto Assent, which has led to my speaking of them, they do not in any way\naffect the nature of the mental act, which is in all cases absolute and\nunconditional; but they give it an external character corresponding\nrespectively to their own: so much so, that at first sight it might\nseem as if Assent admitted of degrees, on account of the variation\nof vividness in these different apprehensions. As notions come of\nabstractions, so images come of experiences; the more fully the mind\nis occupied by an experience, the keener will be its assent to it,\nif it assents, and on the other hand, the duller will be its assent\nand the less operative, the more it is engaged with an abstraction;\nand thus a scale of assents is conceivable, either in the instance of\none mind upon different subjects, or of many minds upon one subject,\nvarying from an assent which looks like mere inference up to a belief\nboth intense and practical,\u2014from the acceptance which we accord to some\naccidental news of the day to the supernatural dogmatic faith of the\nChristian.\n\nIt follows to treat of Assent under this double aspect of its\nsubject-matter,\u2014assent to notions, and assent to things.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IV. Notional And Real Assent.\n\n\n1. I have said that our apprehension of a proposition varies in\nstrength, and that it is stronger when it is concerned with a\nproposition expressive to us of things than when concerned with a\nproposition expressive of notions; and I have given this reason for it,\nviz. that what is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on\nthe mind which nothing abstract can rival. That is, I have argued that,\nbecause the object is more powerful, therefore so is the apprehension\nof it.\n\nI do not think it unfair reasoning thus to take the apprehension for\nits object. The mind is ever stimulated in proportion to the cause\nstimulating it. Sights, for instance, sway us, as scents do not;\nwhether this be owing to a greater power in the thing seen, or to a\ngreater receptivity and expansiveness in the sense of seeing, is a\nsuperfluous question. The strong object would make the apprehension\nstrong. Our sense of seeing is able to open to its object, as our sense\nof smell cannot open to its own. Its objects are able to awaken the\nmind, take possession of it, inspire it, act through it, with an energy\nand variousness which is not found in the case of scents and their\napprehension. Since we cannot draw the line between the object and the\nact, I am at liberty to say, as I have said, that, as is the thing\napprehended, so is the apprehension.\n\nAnd so in like manner as regards apprehension of mental objects. If\nan image derived from experience or information is stronger than an\nabstraction, conception, or conclusion\u2014if I am more arrested by our\nLord\u2019s bearing before Pilate and Herod than by the \u201cJustum et tenacem\u201d\n&c. of the poet, more arrested by His Voice saying to us, \u201cGive to\nhim that asketh thee,\u201d than by the best arguments of the Economist\nagainst indiscriminate almsgiving, it does not matter for my present\npurpose whether the objects give strength to the apprehension or the\napprehension gives large admittance into the mind to the object. It\nis in human nature to be more affected by the concrete than by the\nabstract; it may be the reverse with other beings. The apprehension,\nthen, may be as fairly said to possess the force which acts upon us, as\nthe object apprehended.\n\n2. Real apprehension, then, may be pronounced stronger than\nnotional, because things, which are its objects, are confessedly\nmore impressive and affective than notions, which are the objects of\nnotional. Experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind,\nas abstractions and their combinations do not. Next, passing on to\nAssent, I observe that it is this variation in the mind\u2019s apprehension\nof an object to which it assents, and not any incompleteness in the\nassent itself, which leads us to speak of strong and weak assents, as\nif Assent itself admitted of degrees. In either mode of apprehension,\nbe it real or be it notional, the assent preserves its essential\ncharacteristic of being unconditional. The assent of a Stoic to the\n\u201cJustum et tenacem\u201d &c. may be as genuine an assent, as absolute and\nentire, as little admitting of degree or variation, as distinct from an\nact of inference, as the assent of a Christian to the history of our\nLord\u2019s Passion in the Gospel.\n\n3. However, characteristic as it is of Assent, to be thus in its nature\nsimply one and indivisible, and thereby essentially different from\nInference, which is ever varying in strength, never quite at the same\npitch in any two of its acts, still it is at the same time true that it\nmay be difficult in fact, by external tokens, to distinguish certain\nacts of assent from certain acts of inference. Thus, whereas no one\ncould possibly confuse the real assent of a Christian to the fact of\nour Lord\u2019s crucifixion, with the notional acceptance of it, as a point\nof history, on the part of a philosophical heathen (so removed from\neach other, _toto c\u0153lo_, are the respective modes of apprehending it in\nthe two cases, though in both the assent is in its nature one and the\nsame), nevertheless it would be easy to mistake the Stoic\u2019s notional\nassent, genuine though it might be, to the moral nobleness of the just\nman \u201cstruggling in the storms of fate,\u201d for a mere act of inference\nresulting from the principles of his Stoical profession, or again for\nan assent merely to the inferential necessity of the nobleness of that\nstruggle. Nothing, indeed, is more common than to praise men for their\nconsistency to their principles, whatever those principles are, that\nis, to praise them on an inference, without thereby implying any assent\nto the principles themselves.\n\nThe cause of this resemblance between acts so distinct is obvious. It\nexists only in cases of notional assents; when the assent is given\nto notions, then it is possible to hesitate in deciding whether it\nis assent or inference, whether the mind is merely without doubt or\nwhether it is actually certain. And the reason is this: notional Assent\nseems like Inference, because the apprehension which accompanies acts\nof inference is notional also,\u2014because Inference is engaged for the\nmost part on notional propositions, both premiss and conclusion. This\npoint, which I have implied throughout, I here distinctly record, and\nshall enlarge upon hereafter. Only propositions about individuals are\nnot notional, and they are seldom the matter of inference. Thus, did\nthe Stoic infer the fact of our Lord\u2019s death instead of assenting to\nit, the proposition would have been as much an abstraction to him as\nthe \u201cJustum et tenacem,\u201d &c; nay further, the \u201cJustus et tenax\u201d was at\nleast a notion in his mind, but \u201cJesus Christ\u201d would, in the schools\nof Athens or of Rome, have stood for less, for an unknown being, the\nx or y of a formula. Except then in some of the cases of singular\nconclusions, inferences are employed on notions, that is, unless they\nare employed on mere symbols; and, indeed, when they are symbolical,\nthen are they clearest and most cogent, as I shall hereafter show.\nThe next clearest are such as carry out the necessary results of\nprevious classifications, and therefore may be called definitions or\nconclusions, as we please. For instance, having divided beings into\ntheir classes, the definition of man is inevitable.\n\n4. We may call it then the normal state of Inference to apprehend\npropositions as notions:\u2014and we may call it the normal state of Assent\nto apprehend propositions as things. If notional apprehension is most\ncongenial to Inference, real apprehension will be the most natural\nconcomitant on Assent. An act of Inference includes in its object the\ndependence of its thesis upon its premisses, that is, upon a relation,\nwhich is abstract; but an act of Assent rests wholly on the thesis as\nits object, and the reality of the thesis is almost a condition of its\nunconditionality.\n\n5. I am led on to make one remark more, and it shall be my last.\n\nAn act of assent, it seems, is the most perfect and highest of its\nkind, when it is exercised on propositions, which are apprehended as\nexperiences and images, that is, which stand for things; and, on the\nother hand, an act of inference is the most perfect and highest of its\nkind, when it is exercised on propositions which are apprehended as\nnotions, that is, which are creations of the mind. An act of inference\nindeed may be made with either of these modes of apprehension; so\nmay an act of assent; but, when inferences are exercised on things,\nthey tend to be conjectures or presentiments, without logical force;\nand when assents are exercised on notions, they tend to be mere\nassertions without any personal hold on them on the part of those who\nmake them. If this be so, the paradox is true, that, when Inference\nis clearest, Assent may be least forcible, and, when Assent is most\nintense, Inference may be least distinct;\u2014for, though acts of assent\nrequire previous acts of inference, they require them, not as adequate\ncauses, but as _sine qu\u00e2 non_ conditions: and, while the apprehension\nstrengthens Assent, Inference often weakens the apprehension.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Notional Assents.\n\n\nI shall consider Assent made to propositions which express abstractions\nor notions under five heads; which I shall call Profession, Credence,\nOpinion, Presumption, and Speculation.\n\n1. _Profession._\n\nThere are assents so feeble and superficial, as to be little more than\nassertions. I class them all together under the head of Profession.\nSuch are the assents made upon habit and without reflection; as when\na man calls himself a Tory or a Liberal, as having been brought up as\nsuch; or again, when he adopts as a matter of course the literary or\nother fashions of the day, admiring the poems, or the novels, or the\nmusic, or the personages, or the costume, or the wines, or the manners,\nwhich happen to be popular, or are patronized in the higher circles.\nSuch again are the assents of men of wavering restless minds, who\ntake up and then abandon beliefs so readily, so suddenly, as to make\nit appear that they had no view (as it is called) on the matter they\nprofessed, and did not know to what they assented or why.\n\nThen, again, when men say they have no doubt of a thing, this is a\ncase, in which it is difficult to determine whether they assent to it,\ninfer it, or consider it highly probable. There are many cases, indeed,\nin which it is impossible to discriminate between assent, inference,\nand assertion, on account of the otiose, passive, inchoate character\nof the act in question. If I say that to-morrow will be fine, what\ndoes this enunciation mean? Perhaps it means that it ought to be fine,\nif the glass tells truly; then it is the inference of a probability.\nPerhaps it means no more than a surmise, because it is fine to-day, or\nhas been so for the week past. And perhaps it is a compliance with the\nword of another, in which case it is sometimes a real assent, sometimes\na polite assertion or a wish.\n\nMany a disciple of a philosophical school, who talks fluently, does but\nassert, when he seems to assent to the _dicta_ of his master, little as\nhe may be aware of it. Nor is he secured against this self-deception\nby knowing the arguments on which those _dicta_ rest, for he may learn\nthe arguments by heart, as a careless schoolboy gets up his Euclid.\nThis practice of asserting simply on authority, with the pretence and\nwithout the reality of assent, is what is meant by formalism. To say\n\u201cI do not understand a proposition, but I accept it on authority,\u201d is\nnot formalism, but faith; it is not a direct assent to the proposition,\nstill it _is_ an assent to the authority which enunciates it; but what\nI here speak of is professing to understand without understanding. It\nis thus that political and religious watchwords are created; first\none man of name and then another adopts them, till their use becomes\npopular, and then every one professes them, because every one else\ndoes. Such words are \u201cliberality,\u201d \u201cprogress,\u201d \u201clight,\u201d \u201ccivilization;\u201d\nsuch are \u201cjustification by faith only,\u201d \u201cvital religion,\u201d \u201cprivate\njudgment,\u201d \u201cthe Bible and nothing but the Bible.\u201d Such again are\n\u201cRationalism,\u201d \u201cGallicanism,\u201d \u201cJesuitism,\u201d \u201cUltramontanism\u201d\u2014all of\nwhich, in the mouths of conscientious thinkers, have a definite\nmeaning, but are used by the multitude as war-cries, nicknames,\nand shibboleths, with scarcely enough of the scantiest grammatical\napprehension of them to allow of their being considered really more\nthan assertions.\n\nThus, instances occur now and then, when, in consequence of the\nurgency of some fashionable superstition or popular delusion, some\neminent scientific authority is provoked to come forward, and to set\nthe world right by his \u201cipse dixit.\u201d He, indeed, himself knows very\nwell what he is about; he has a right to speak, and his reasonings\nand conclusions are sufficient, not only for his own, but for general\nassent, and, it may be, are as simply true and impregnable, as they are\nauthoritative; but an intelligent hold on the matter in dispute, such\nas he has himself, cannot be expected in the case of men in general.\nThey, nevertheless, one and all, repeat and retail his arguments, as\nsuddenly as if they had not to study them, as heartily as if they\nunderstood them, changing round and becoming as strong antagonists of\nthe error which their master has exposed, as if they had never been its\nadvocates. If their word is to be taken, it is not simply his authority\nthat moves them, which would be sensible enough and suitable in them,\nboth apprehension and assent being in that case grounded on the maxim\n\u201cCuique in arte su\u00e2 credendum,\u201d but so far forth as they disown this\nmotive, and claim to judge in a scientific question of the worth of\narguments which require some real knowledge, they are little better,\nnot of course in a very serious matter, than pretenders and formalists.\n\nNot only Authority, but Inference also may impose on us assents which\nin themselves are little better than assertions, and which, so far as\nthey are assents, can only be notional assents, as being assents, not\nto the propositions inferred, but to the truth of those propositions.\nFor instance, it can be proved by irrefragable calculations, that the\nstars are not less than billions of miles distant from the earth; and\nthe process of calculation, upon which such statements are made, is\nnot so difficult as to require authority to secure our acceptance of\nboth it and of them; yet who can say that he has any real, nay, any\nnotional apprehension of a billion or a trillion? We can, indeed, have\nsome notion of it, if we analyze it into its factors, if we compare\nit with other numbers, or if we illustrate it by analogies or by its\nimplications; but I am speaking of the vast number in itself. We cannot\nassent to a proposition of which it is the predicate; we can but assent\nto the truth of it.\n\nThis leads me to the question, whether belief in a mystery can be more\nthan an assertion. I consider it can be an assent, and my reasons\nfor saying so are as follows:\u2014A mystery is a proposition conveying\nincompatible notions, or is a statement of the inconceivable. Now we\ncan assent to propositions (and a mystery is a proposition), provided\nwe can apprehend them; therefore we can assent to a mystery, for,\nunless we in some sense apprehended it, we should not recognize it\nto be a mystery, that is, a statement uniting incompatible notions.\nThe same act, then, which enables us to discern that the words of\nthe proposition express a mystery, capacitates us for assenting to\nit. Words which make nonsense, do not make a mystery. No one would\ncall Warton\u2019s line\u2014\u201cRevolving swans proclaim the welkin near\u201d\u2014an\ninconceivable assertion. It is equally plain, that the assent which\nwe give to mysteries, as such, is notional assent; for, by the\nsupposition, it is assent to propositions which we cannot conceive,\nwhereas, if we had had experience of them, we should be able to\nconceive them, and without experience assent is not real.\n\nBut the question follows, Can processes of inference end in a mystery?\nthat is, not only in what is incomprehensible, that the stars are\nbillions of miles from each other, but in what is inconceivable, in the\nco-existence of (seeming) incompatibilities? For how, it may be asked,\ncan reason carry out notions into their contradictories? since all the\ndevelopments of a truth must from the nature of the case be consistent\nboth with it and with each other. I answer, certainly processes of\ninference, however accurate, can end in mystery; and I solve the\nobjection to such a doctrine thus:\u2014our notion of a thing may be only\npartially faithful to the original; it may be in excess of the thing,\nor it may represent it incompletely, and, in consequence, it may serve\nfor it, it may stand for it, only to a certain point, in certain cases,\nbut no further. After that point is reached, the notion and the thing\npart company; and then the notion, if still used as the representative\nof the thing, will work out conclusions, not inconsistent with itself,\nbut with the thing to which it no longer corresponds.\n\nThis is seen most familiarly in the use of metaphors. Thus, in an\nOxford satire, which deservedly made a sensation in its day, it is said\nthat Vice \u201cfrom its hardness takes a polish too.\u201d(1) Whence we might\nargue, that, whereas Caliban was vicious, he was therefore polished;\nbut politeness and Caliban are incompatible notions. Or again, when\nsome one said, perhaps to Dr. Johnson, that a certain writer (say\nHume) was a clear thinker, he made answer, \u201cAll shallows are clear.\u201d\nBut supposing Hume to be in fact both a clear and a deep thinker,\nyet supposing clearness and depth are incompatible in their literal\nsense, which the objection seems to imply, and still in their full\nliteral sense were to be ascribed to Hume, then our reasoning about his\nintellect has ended in the mystery, \u201cDeep Hume is shallow;\u201d whereas\nthe contradiction lies, not in the reasoning, but in the fancying that\ninadequate notions can be taken as the exact representations of things.\n\nHence in science we sometimes use a definition or a _formula_, not as\nexact, but as being sufficient for our purpose, for working out certain\nconclusions, for a practical approximation, the error being small, till\na certain point is reached. This is what in theological investigations\nI should call an economy.\n\nA like contrast between notions and the things which they represent is\nthe principle of suspense and curiosity in those enigmatical sayings\nwhich were frequent in the early stage of human society. In them the\nproblem proposed to the acuteness of the hearers, is to find some real\nthing which may unite in itself certain conflicting notions which in\nthe question are attributed to it: \u201cOut of the eater came forth meat,\nand out of the strong came forth sweetness;\u201d or, \u201cWhat creature is\nthat, which in the morning goes on four legs, at noon on two, and on\nthree in the evening?\u201d The answer, which names the thing, interprets\nand thereby limits the notions under which it has been represented.\n\nLet us take an example in algebra. Its calculus is commonly used\nto investigate, not only the relations of quantity generally, but\ngeometrical facts in particular. Now it is at once too wide and too\nnarrow for such a purpose, fitting on to the doctrine of lines and\nangles with a bad fit, as the coat of a short and stout man might serve\nthe needs of one who was tall and slim. Certainly it works well for\ngeometrical purposes up to a certain point, as when it enables us to\ndispense with the cumbrous method of proof in questions of ratio and\nproportion, which is adopted in the fifth book of Euclid; but what are\nwe to make of the fourth power of _a_, when it is to be translated into\ngeometrical language? If from this algebraical expression we determined\nthat space admitted of four dimensions, we should be enunciating a\nmystery, because we should be applying to space a notion which belongs\nto quantity. In this case algebra is in excess of geometrical truth.\nNow let us take an instance in which it falls short of geometry,\u2014What\nis the meaning of the square root of _minus a_? Here the mystery is on\nthe side of algebra; and, in accordance with the principle which I am\nillustrating, it has sometimes been considered as an abortive effort to\nexpress, what is really beyond the capacity of algebraical notation,\nthe direction and position of lines in the third dimension of space,\nas well as their length upon a plane. When the calculus is urged on by\nthe inevitable course of the working to do what it cannot do, it stops\nshort as if in resistance, and protests by an absurdity.\n\nOur notions of things are never simply commensurate with the things\nthemselves; they are aspects of them, more or less exact, and\nsometimes a mistake _ab initio_. Take an instance from arithmetic:\u2014We\nare accustomed to subject all that exists to numeration; but, to\nbe correct, we are bound first to reduce to some level of possible\ncomparison the things which we wish to number. We must be able to say,\nnot only that they are ten, twenty, or a hundred, but so many definite\nsomethings. For instance, we could not without extravagance throw\ntogether Napoleon\u2019s brain, ambition, hand, soul, smile, height, and\nage at Marengo, and say that there were seven of them, though there\nare seven words; nor will it even be enough to content ourselves with\nwhat may be called a negative level, viz. that these seven were an\nun-English or are a departed seven. Unless numeration is to issue in\nnonsense, it must be conducted on conditions. This being the case,\nthere are, for what we know, collections of beings, to whom the notion\nof number cannot be attached, except _catachrestically_, because, taken\nindividually, no positive point of real agreement can be found between\nthem, by which to call them. If indeed we can denote them by a plural\nnoun, then we can measure that plurality; but if they agree in nothing,\nthey cannot agree in bearing a common name, and to say that they amount\nto a thousand these or those, is not to number them, but to count up a\ncertain number of names or words which we have written down.\n\nThus, the Angels have been considered by divines to have each of them\na species to himself; and we may fancy each of them so absolutely _sui\nsimilis_ as to be like nothing else, so that it would be as untrue\nto speak of a thousand Angels as of a thousand Hannibals or Ciceros.\nIt will be said, indeed, that all beings but One at least will come\nunder the notion of creatures, and are dependent upon that One; but\nthat is true of the brain, smile, and height of Napoleon, which no one\nwould call three creatures. But, if all this be so, much more does it\napply to our speculations concerning the Supreme Being, whom it may\nbe unmeaning, not only to number with other beings, but to subject to\nnumber in regard to His own intrinsic characteristics. That is, to\napply arithmetical notions to Him may be as unphilosophical as it is\nprofane. Though He is at once Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the word\n\u201cTrinity\u201d belongs to those notions of Him which are forced on us by the\nnecessity of our finite conceptions, the real and immutable distinction\nwhich exists between Person and Person implying in itself no\ninfringement of His real and numerical Unity. And if it be asked how,\nif we cannot properly speak of Him as Three, we can speak of Him as\nOne, I reply that He is not One in the way in which created things are\nseverally units; for one, as applied to ourselves, is used in contrast\nto two or three and a whole series of numbers; but of the Supreme Being\nit is safer to use the word \u201cmonad\u201d than unit, for He has not even such\nrelation to His creatures as to allow, philosophically speaking, of our\ncontrasting Him with them.\n\nComing back to the main subject, which I have illustrated at the\nrisk of digression, I observe, that an alleged fact is not therefore\nimpossible because it is inconceivable; for the incompatible notions,\nin which consists its inconceivableness, need not each of them really\nbelong to it in that fulness which involves their being incompatible\nwith each other. It is true indeed that I deny the possibility of\ntwo straight lines enclosing a space, on the ground of its being\ninconceivable; but I do so because a straight line is a notion and\nnothing more, and not a thing, to which I may have attached a notion\nmore or less unfaithful. I have defined a straight line in my own way\nat my own pleasure; the question is not one of facts at all, but of\nthe consistency with each other of definitions and of their logical\nconsequences.\n\n\u201cSpace is not infinite, for nothing but the Creator is such:\u201d\u2014starting\nfrom this thesis as a theological information, to be assumed as a\nfact, though not one of experience, we arrive at once at an insoluble\nmystery; for, if space be not infinite, it is finite, and finite space\nis a contradiction in notions, space, as such, implying the absence\nof boundaries. Here again it is our notion that carries us beyond the\nfact, and in opposition to it, showing that from the first what we\napprehend of space does not in all respects correspond to the thing, of\nwhich indeed we have no image.\n\nThis, then, is another instance in which the juxtaposition of notions\nby the logical faculty lands us in what are commonly called mysteries.\nNotions are but aspects of things; the free deductions from one of\nthese necessarily contradicts the free deductions from another. After\nproceeding in our investigations a certain way, suddenly a blank or\na maze presents itself before the mental vision, as when the eye is\nconfused by the varying slides of a telescope. Thus, we believe in the\ninfinitude of the Divine Attributes, but we can have no experience of\ninfinitude as a fact; the word stands for a definition or a notion.\nHence, when we try how to reconcile in the moral world the fulness\nof mercy with exactitude in sanctity and justice, or to explain that\nthe physical tokens of creative skill need not suggest any want of\ncreative power, we feel we are not masters of our subject. We apprehend\nsufficiently to be able to assent to these theological truths as\nmysteries; did we not apprehend them at all, we should be merely\nasserting; though even then we might convert that assertion into an\nassent, if we wished to do so, as I have already shown, by making it\nthe subject of a proposition, and predicating of it that it is true.\n\n2. _Credence._\n\nWhat I mean by giving credence to propositions is pretty much the same\nas having \u201cno doubt\u201d about them. It is the sort of assent which we\ngive to those opinions and professed facts which are ever presenting\nthemselves to us without any effort of ours, and which we commonly\ntake for granted, thereby obtaining a broad foundation of thought\nfor ourselves, and a medium of intercourse between ourselves and\nothers. This form of notional assent comprises a great variety of\nsubject-matters; and is, as I have implied, of an otiose and passive\ncharacter, accepting whatever comes to hand, from whatever quarter,\nwarranted or not, so that it convey nothing on the face of it to its\nown disadvantage. From the time that we begin to observe, think, and\nreason, to the final failure of our powers, we are ever acquiring\nfresh and fresh informations by means of our senses, and still more\nfrom others and from books. The friends or strangers whom we fall in\nwith in the course of the day, the conversations or discussions to\nwhich we are parties, the newspapers, the light reading of the season,\nour recreations, our rambles in the country, our foreign tours, all\npour their contributions of intellectual matter into the storehouses\nof our memory; and, though much may be lost, much is retained. These\ninformations, thus received with a spontaneous assent, constitute the\nfurniture of the mind, and make the difference between its civilized\ncondition and a state of nature. They are its education, as far as\ngeneral knowledge can so be called; and, though education is discipline\nas well as learning, still, unless the mind implicitly welcomes the\ntruths, real or ostensible, which these informations supply, it will\ngain neither formation nor a stimulus for its activity and progress.\nBesides, to believe frankly what it is told, is in the young an\nexercise of teachableness and humility.\n\nCredence is the means by which, in high and low, in the man of the\nworld and in the recluse, our bare and barren nature is overrun and\ndiversified from without with a rich and living clothing. It is by\nsuch ungrudging, prompt assents to what is offered to us so lavishly,\nthat we become possessed of the principles, doctrines, sentiments,\nfacts, which constitute useful, and especially liberal knowledge. These\nvarious teachings, shallow though they be, are of a breadth which\nsecures us against those _lacun\u00e6_ of knowledge which are apt to befall\nthe professed student, and keep us up to the mark in literature, in\nthe arts, in history, and in public matters. They give us in great\nmeasure our morality, our politics, our social code, our art of\nlife. They supply the elements of public opinion, the watchwords of\npatriotism, the standards of thought and action; they are our mutual\nunderstandings, our channels of sympathy, our means of co-operation,\nand the bond of our civil union. They become our moral language; we\nlearn them as we learn our mother tongue; they distinguish us from\nforeigners; they are, in each of us, not indeed personal, but national\ncharacteristics.\n\nThis account of them implies that they are received with a notional,\nnot a real assent; they are too manifold to be received in any\nother way. Even the most practised and earnest minds must needs be\nsuperficial in the greater part of their attainments. They know just\nenough on all subjects, in literature, history, politics, philosophy,\nand art, to be able to converse sensibly on them, and to understand\nthose who are really deep in one or other of them. This is what is\ncalled, with a special appositeness, a gentleman\u2019s knowledge, as\ncontrasted with that of a professional man, and is neither worthless\nnor despicable, if used for its proper ends; but it is never more than\nthe furniture of the mind, as I have called it; it never is thoroughly\nassimilated with it. Yet of course there is nothing to hinder those who\nhave even the largest stock of such notions from devoting themselves\nto one or other of the subjects to which those notions belong, and\nmastering it with a real apprehension; and then their general knowledge\nof all subjects may be made variously useful in the direction of that\nparticular study or pursuit which they have selected.\n\nI have been speaking of secular knowledge; but religion may be made a\nsubject of notional assent also, and is especially so made in our own\ncountry. Theology, as such, always is notional, as being scientific:\nreligion, as being personal, should be real; but, except within a\nsmall range of subjects, it commonly is not real in England. As to\nCatholic populations, such as those of medieval Europe, or the Spain\nof this day, or quasi-Catholic as those of Russia, among them assent\nto religious objects is real, not notional. To them the Supreme Being,\nour Lord, the Blessed Virgin, Angels and Saints, heaven and hell, are\nas present as if they were objects of sight; but such a faith does\nnot suit the genius of modern England. There is in the literary world\njust now an affectation of calling religion a \u201csentiment;\u201d and it must\nbe confessed that usually it is nothing more with our own people,\neducated or rude. Objects are barely necessary to it. I do not say so\nof old Calvinism or Evangelical Religion; I do not call the religion of\nLeighton, Beveridge, Wesley, Thomas Scott, or Cecil a mere sentiment;\nnor do I so term the high Anglicanism of the present generation.\nBut these are only denominations, parties, schools, compared with\nthe national religion of England in its length and breadth. \u201cBible\nReligion\u201d is both the recognized title and the best description of\nEnglish religion.\n\nIt consists, not in rites or creeds, but mainly in having the Bible\nread in Church, in the family, and in private. Now I am far indeed from\nundervaluing that mere knowledge of Scripture which is imparted to the\npopulation thus promiscuously. At least in England, it has to a certain\npoint made up for great and grievous losses in its Christianity. The\nreiteration, again and again, in fixed course in the public service,\nof the words of inspired teachers under both Covenants, and that in\ngrave majestic English, has in matter of fact been to our people a vast\nbenefit. It has attuned their minds to religious thoughts; it has given\nthem a high moral standard; it has served them in associating religion\nwith compositions which, even humanly considered, are among the most\nsublime and beautiful ever written; especially, it has impressed\nupon them the series of Divine Providences in behalf of man from his\ncreation to his end, and, above all, the words, deeds, and sacred\nsufferings of Him in whom all the Providences of God centre.\n\nSo far the indiscriminate reading of Scripture has been of service;\nstill, much more is necessary than the benefits which I have\nenumerated, to answer to the idea of a Religion; whereas our national\nform professes to be little more than thus reading the Bible and\nliving a correct life. It is not a religion of persons and things, of\nacts of faith and of direct devotion; but of sacred scenes and pious\nsentiments. It has been comparatively careless of creed and catechism;\nand has in consequence shown little sense of the need of consistency\nin the matter of its teaching. Its doctrines are not so much facts, as\nstereotyped aspects of facts; and it is afraid, so to say, of walking\nround them. It induces its followers to be content with this meagre\nview of revealed truth; or, rather, it is suspicious and protests,\nor is frightened, as if it saw a figure in a picture move out of its\nframe, when our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, or the Holy Apostles, are\nspoken of as real beings, and really such as Scripture implies them to\nbe. I am not denying that the assent which it inculcates and elicits is\ngenuine as regards its contracted range of doctrine, but it is at best\nnotional. What Scripture especially illustrates from its first page to\nits last, is God\u2019s Providence; and that is nearly the only doctrine\nheld with a real assent by the mass of religious Englishmen. Hence the\nBible is so great a solace and refuge to them in trouble. I repeat, I\nam not speaking of particular schools and parties in England, whether\nof the High Church or the Low, but of the mass of piously-minded and\nwell-living people in all ranks of the community.\n\n3. _Opinion._\n\nThat class of assents which I have called Credence, being a spontaneous\nacceptance of the various informations, which are by whatever means\nconveyed to our minds, sometimes goes by the name of Opinion. When\nwe speak of a man\u2019s opinions, what do we mean, but the collection\nof notions which he happens to have, and does not easily part with,\nthough he has neither sufficient proof nor firm grasp of them? This\nis true; however, Opinion is a word of various significations, and\nI prefer to use it in my own. Besides standing for Credence, it is\nsometimes taken to mean Conviction, as when we speak of the \u201cvariety of\nreligious opinions,\u201d or of being \u201cpersecuted for religious opinions,\u201d\nor of our having \u201cno opinion on a particular point,\u201d or of another\nhaving \u201cno religious opinions.\u201d And sometimes it is used in contrast\nwith Conviction, as synonymous with a light and casual, though genuine\nassent; thus, if a man was every day changing his mind, that is, his\nassents, we might say, that he was very changeable in his opinions.\n\nI shall here use the word to denote an assent, but an assent to a\nproposition, not as true, but as probably true, that is, to the\nprobability of that which the proposition enunciates; and, as that\nprobability may vary in strength without limit, so may the cogency and\nmoment of the opinion. This account of Opinion may seem to confuse\nit with Inference; for the strength of an inference varies with its\npremisses, and is a probability; but the two acts of mind are really\ndistinct. Opinion, as being an assent, is independent of premisses. We\nhave opinions which we never think of defending by argument, though,\nof course, we think they can be so defended. We are even obstinate in\nthem, or what is called \u201copinionated,\u201d and may say that we have a right\nto think just as we please, reason or no reason; whereas Inference is\nin its nature and by its profession conditional and uncertain. To say\nthat \u201cwe shall have a fine hay-harvest if the present weather lasts,\u201d\ndoes not come of the same state of mind as, \u201cI am of opinion that we\nshall have a fine hay-harvest this year.\u201d\n\nOpinion, thus explained, has more connexion with Credence than with\nInference. It differs from Credence in these two points, viz. that,\nwhile Opinion explicitly assents to the probability of a given\nproposition, Credence is an implicit assent to its truth. It differs\nfrom Credence in a third respect, viz. in being a reflex act;\u2014when we\ntake a thing for granted, we have credence in it; when we begin to\nreflect upon our credence, and to measure, estimate, and modify it,\nthen we are forming an opinion.\n\nIt is in this sense that Catholics speak of theological opinion, in\ncontrast with faith in dogma. It is much more than an inferential\nact, but it is distinct from an act of certitude. And this is really\nthe sense which Protestants give to the word, when they interpret it\nby Conviction; for their highest opinion in religion is, generally\nspeaking, an assent to a probability\u2014as even Butler has been understood\nor misunderstood to teach,\u2014and therefore consistent with toleration of\nits contradictory.\n\nOpinion, being such as I have described, is a notional assent, for the\npredicate of the proposition, on which it is exercised, is the abstract\nword \u201cprobable.\u201d\n\n4. _Presumption._\n\nBy Presumption I mean an assent to first principles; and by first\nprinciples I mean the propositions with which we start in reasoning on\nany given subject-matter. They are in consequence very numerous, and\nvary in great measure with the persons who reason, according to their\njudgment and power of assent, being received by some minds, not by\nothers, and only a few of them received universally. They are all of\nthem notions, not images, because they express what is abstract, not\nwhat is individual and from direct experience.\n\n1. Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that\nis, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first\nprinciple; but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as\nfaculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning.\nWe are sure there was a yesterday, and that we did this or that in it;\nwe are sure that three times six is eighteen, and that the diagonal\nof a square is longer than the side. So far as this we may be said to\ntrust the mental act, by which the object of our assent is verified;\nbut, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or\nfaculty, or of any capability or affection of our minds, over and above\nthe particular act. We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we\nremember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain\nthis knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts,\nnot by direct experience. Nor do we trust in the faculty of memory or\nreasoning as such, even after that we have inferred its existence; for\nits acts are often inaccurate, nor do we invariably assent to them.\n\nHowever, if I must speak my mind, I have another ground for reluctance\nto speak of our trusting memory or reasoning, except indeed by a\nfigure of speech. It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting\nourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To\ndebate about trusting in a case like this, is parallel to the confusion\nimplied in wishing I had had a choice if I would be created or no, or\nspeculating what I should be like, if I were born of other parents.\n\u201cProximus sum egomet mihi.\u201d Our consciousness of self is prior to all\nquestions of trust or assent. We act according to our nature, by means\nof ourselves, when we remember or reason. We are as little able to\naccept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the\noption; we can but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or\nbargain with ourselves; and therefore I cannot call the trustworthiness\nof the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles.\n\n2. Next, as to the proposition, that things exist external to\nourselves, this I do consider a first principle, and one of universal\nreception. It is founded on an instinct; I so call it, because the\nbrute creation possesses it. This instinct is directed towards\nindividual phenomena, one by one, and has nothing of the character of\na generalization; and, since it exists in brutes, the gift of reason\nis not a condition of its existence, and it may justly be considered\nan instinct in man. What the human mind does is what brutes cannot\ndo, viz. to draw from our ever-recurring experiences of its testimony\nin particulars a general proposition, and, because this instinct or\nintuition acts whenever the phenomena of sense present themselves, to\nlay down in broad terms, by an inductive process, the great aphorism,\nthat there is an external world, and that all the phenomena of sense\nproceed from it. This general proposition, to which we go on to assent,\ngoes (_extensiv\u00e8_, though not _intensiv\u00e8_) far beyond our experience,\nillimitable as that experience may be, and represents a notion.\n\n3. I have spoken, and I think rightly spoken, of instinct as a force\nwhich spontaneously impels us, not only to bodily movements, but to\nmental acts. It is instinct which leads the quasi-intelligent principle\n(whatever it is) in brutes to perceive in the phenomena of sense a\nsomething distinct from and beyond those phenomena. It is instinct\nwhich impels the child to recognize in the smiles or the frowns of\na countenance which meets his eyes, not only a being external to\nhimself, but one whose looks elicit in him confidence or fear. And,\nas he instinctively interprets these physical phenomena, as tokens\nof things beyond themselves, so from the sensations attendant upon\ncertain classes of his thoughts and actions he gains a perception of\nan external being, who reads his mind, to whom he is responsible,\nwho praises and blames, who promises and threatens. As I am only\nillustrating a general view by examples, I shall take this analogy for\ngranted here. As then we have our initial knowledge of the universe\nthrough sense, so do we in the first instance begin to learn about its\nLord and God from conscience; and, as from particular acts of that\ninstinct, which makes experiences, mere images (as they ultimately are)\nupon the retina, the means of our perceiving something real beyond\nthem, we go on to draw the general conclusion that there is a vast\nexternal world, so from the recurring instances in which conscience\nacts, forcing upon us importunately the mandate of a Superior, we have\nfresh and fresh evidence of the existence of a Sovereign Ruler, from\nwhom those particular dictates which we experience proceed; so that,\nwith limitations which cannot here be made without digressing from\nmy main subject, we may, by means of that induction from particular\nexperiences of conscience, have as good a warrant for concluding the\nUbiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master, as we have, from parallel\nexperience of sense, for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast\nworld, material and mental.\n\nHowever, this assent is notional, because we generalize a consistent,\nmethodical form of Divine Unity and Personality with Its attributes,\nfrom particular experiences of the religious instinct, which are\nthemselves, only _intensiv\u00e8_, not _extensiv\u00e8_, and in the imagination,\nnot intellectually, notices of Its Presence; though at the same\ntime that assent may become real of course, as may the assent to\nthe external world, viz. when we apply our general knowledge to a\nparticular instance of that knowledge, as, according to a former\nremark, the general \u201cvarium et mutabile\u201d was realized in Dido. And in\nthus treating the origin of these great notions, I am not forgetting\nthe aid which from our earliest years we receive from teachers, nor\nam I denying the influence of certain original forms of thinking or\nformative ideas, connatural with our minds, without which we could not\nreason at all. I am only contemplating the mind as it moves in fact,\nby whatever hidden mechanism; as a locomotive engine could not move\nwithout steam, but still, under whatever number of forces, it certainly\ndoes start from Birmingham and does arrive in London.\n\n4. And so again, as regards the first principles expressed in such\npropositions as \u201cThere is a right and a wrong,\u201d \u201ca true and a false,\u201d\n\u201ca just and an unjust,\u201d \u201ca beautiful and a deformed;\u201d they are\nabstractions to which we give a notional assent in consequence of our\nparticular experiences of qualities in the concrete, to which we give a\nreal assent. As we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight\nof snow, milk, a lily, or a cloud, so, after experiencing the sentiment\nof approbation which arises in us on the sight of certain acts one by\none, we go on to assign to that sentiment a cause, and to those acts\na quality, and we give to this notional cause or quality the name of\nvirtue, which is an abstraction, not a thing. And in like manner, when\nwe have been affected by a certain specific admiring pleasure at the\nsight of this or that concrete object, we proceed by an arbitrary act\nof the mind to give a name to the hypothetical cause or quality in\nthe abstract, which excites it. We speak of it as beautifulness, and\nhenceforth, when we call a thing beautiful, we mean by the word nothing\nelse than a certain quality of things which creates in us this special\nsensation.\n\nThese so-called first principles, I say, are really conclusions or\nabstractions from particular experiences; and an assent to their\nexistence is not an assent to things or their images, but to notions,\nreal assent being confined to the propositions directly embodying those\nexperiences. Such notions indeed are an evidence of the reality of the\nspecial sentiments in particular instances, without which they would\nnot have been formed; but in themselves they are abstractions from\nfacts, not elementary truths prior to reasoning.\n\nI am not of course dreaming of denying the objective existence of the\nMoral Law, nor our instinctive recognition of the immutable difference\nin the moral quality of acts, as elicited in us by one instance of\nthem. Even one act of cruelty, ingratitude, generosity, or justice\nreveals to us at once _intensiv\u00e8_ the immutable distinction between\nthose qualities and their contraries; that is, in that particular\ninstance and _pro hac vice_. From such experience\u2014an experience which\nis ever recurring\u2014we proceed to abstract and generalize; and thus the\nabstract proposition \u201cThere is a right and a wrong,\u201d as representing\nan act of inference, is received by the mind with a notional, not a\nreal assent. However, in proportion as we obey the particular dictates\nwhich are its tokens, so are we led on more and more to view it in the\nassociation of those particulars, which are real, and virtually to\nchange our notion of it into the image of that objective fact, which in\neach particular case it undeniably is.\n\n5. Another of these presumptions is the belief in causation. It is to\nme a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive\ntruth, that every thing must have a cause. If this were so, the voice\nof nature would tell false; for why in that case stop short at One, who\nis Himself without cause? The assent which we give to the proposition,\nas a first principle, that nothing happens without a cause, is\nderived, in the first instance, from what we know of ourselves; and\nwe argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to\nus. One of the first experiences of an infant is that of his willing\nand doing; and, as time goes on, one of the first temptations of the\nboy is to bring home to himself the fact of his sovereign arbitrary\npower, though it be at the price of waywardness, mischievousness, and\ndisobedience. And when his parents, as antagonists of this wilfulness,\nbegin to restrain him, and to bring his mind and conduct into shape,\nthen he has a second series of experiences of cause and effect, and\nthat upon a principle or rule. Thus the notion of causation is one of\nthe first lessons which he learns from experience, that experience\nlimiting it to agents possessed of intelligence and will. It is the\nnotion of power combined with a purpose and an end. Physical phenomena,\nas such, are without sense; and experience teaches us nothing about\nphysical phenomena as causes. Accordingly, wherever the world is\nyoung, the movements and changes of physical nature have been and are\nspontaneously ascribed by its people to the presence and will of hidden\nagents, who haunt every part of it, the woods, the mountains and the\nstreams, the air and the stars, for good or for evil;\u2014just as children\nagain, by beating the ground after falling, imply that what has bruised\nthem has intelligence;\u2014nor is there anything illogical in such a\nbelief. It rests on the argument from analogy.\n\nAs time goes on, and society is formed, and the idea of science\nis mastered, a different aspect of the physical universe presents\nitself to the mind. Since causation implies a sequence of acts in our\nown case, and our doing is always posterior, never contemporaneous\nor prior, to our willing, therefore, when we witness invariable\nantecedents and consequents, we call the former the cause of the\nlatter, though intelligence is absent, from the analogy of external\nappearances. At length we go on to confuse causation with order;\nand, because we happen to have made a successful analysis of some\ncomplicated assemblage of phenomena, which experience has brought\nbefore us in the visible scene of things, and have reduced them to a\ntolerable dependence on each other, we call the ultimate points of\nthis analysis, and the hypothetical facts in which the whole mass of\nphenomena is gathered up, by the name of causes, whereas they are\nreally only the formula under which those phenomena are conveniently\nrepresented. Thus the constitutional formula, \u201cThe king can do no\nwrong,\u201d is not a fact, or a cause of the Constitution, but a happy mode\nof bringing out its genius, of determining the correlations of its\nelements, and of grouping or regulating political rules and proceedings\nin a particular direction and in a particular form. And in like manner,\nthat all the particles of matter throughout the universe are attracted\nto each other with a force varying inversely with the square of their\nrespective distances, is a profound idea, harmonizing the physical\nworks of the Creator; but even could it be proved to be a universal\nfact, and also to be the actual cause of the movements of all bodies\nin the universe, still it would not be an experience, any more than is\nthe mythological doctrine of the presence of innumerable spirits in\nphysical phenomena.\n\nOf these two senses of the word \u201ccause,\u201d viz. that which brings a thing\nto be, and that on which a thing under given circumstances follows,\nthe former is that of which our experience is the earlier and more\nintimate, being suggested to us by our consciousness of willing and\ndoing. The latter of the two requires a discrimination and exactness of\nthought for its apprehension, which implies special mental training;\nelse, how do we learn to call food the cause of refreshment, but day\nnever the cause of night, though night follows day more surely than\nrefreshment follows food? Starting, then, from experience, I consider\na cause to be an effective will; and, by the doctrine of causation, I\nmean the notion, or first principle, that all things come of effective\nwill; and the reception or presumption of this notion is a notional\nassent.\n\n6. As to causation in the second sense (viz. an ordinary succession of\nantecedents and consequents, or what is called the Order of Nature),\nwhen so explained, it falls under the doctrine of general laws; and of\nthis I proceed to make mention, as another first principle or notion,\nderived by us from experience, and accepted with what I have called\na presumption. By natural law I mean the fact that things happen\nuniformly according to certain circumstances, and not without them and\nat random: that is, that they happen in an order; and, as all things\nin the universe are unit and individual, order implies a certain\nrepetition, whether of things or like things, or of their affections\nand relations. Thus we have experience, for instance, of the regularity\nof our physical functions, such as the beating of the pulse and the\nheaving of the breath; of the recurring sensations of hunger and\nthirst; of the alternation of waking and sleeping, and the succession\nof youth and age. In like manner we have experience of the great\nrecurring phenomena of the heavens and earth, of day and night, summer\nand winter. Also, we have experience of a like uniform succession in\nthe instance of fire burning, water choking, stones falling down and\nnot up, iron moving towards a magnet, friction followed by sparks and\ncrackling, an oar looking bent in the stream, and compressed steam\nbursting its vessel. Also, by scientific analysis, we are led to the\nconclusion that phenomena, which seem very different from each other,\nadmit of being grouped together as modes of the operation of one\nhypothetical law, acting under varied circumstances. For instance, the\nmotion of a stone falling freely, of a projectile, and of a planet, may\nbe generalized as one and the same property, in each of them, of the\nparticles of matter; and this generalization loses its character of\nhypothesis, and becomes a probability, in proportion as we have reason\nfor thinking on other grounds that the particles of all matter really\nmove and act towards each other in one certain way in relation to space\nand time, and not in half a dozen ways; that is, that nature acts\nby uniform laws. And thus we advance to the general notion or first\nprinciple of the sovereignty of law throughout the universe.\n\nThere are philosophers who go farther, and teach, not only a general,\nbut an invariable, and inviolable, and necessary uniformity in the\naction of the laws of nature, holding that every thing is the result\nof some law or laws, and that exceptions are impossible; but I do\nnot see on what ground of experience or reason they take up this\nposition. Our experience rather is adverse to such a doctrine, for\nwhat concrete fact or phenomenon exactly repeats itself? Some abstract\nconception of it, more perfect than the recurrent phenomenon itself,\nis necessary, before we are able to say that it has happened even\ntwice, and the variations which accompany the repetition are of the\nnature of exceptions. The earth, for instance, never moves exactly in\nthe same orbit year by year, but is in perpetual vacillation. It will,\nindeed, be replied that this arises from the interaction of one law\nwith another, of which the actual orbit is only the accidental issue,\nthat the earth is under the influence of a variety of attractions from\ncosmical bodies, and that, if it is subject to continual aberrations\nin its course, these are accounted for accurately or sufficiently by\nthe presence of those extraordinary and variable attractions:\u2014science,\nthen, by its analytical processes sets right the _prim\u00e2 facie_\nconfusion. Of course; still let us not by our words imply that we are\nappealing to experience, when really we are only accounting, and that\nby hypothesis, for the absence of experience. The confusion is a fact,\nthe reasoning processes are not facts. The extraordinary attractions\nassigned to account for our experience of that confusion are not\nthemselves experienced phenomenal facts, but more or less probable\nhypotheses, argued out by means of an assumed analogy between the\ncosmical bodies to which those attractions are referred and falling\nbodies on the earth. I say \u201cassumed,\u201d because that analogy (in other\nwords, the unfailing uniformity of nature) is the very point which\nhas to be proved. It is true, that we can make experiment of the law\nof attraction in the case of bodies on the earth; but, I repeat, to\nassume from analogy that, as stones do fall to the earth, so Jupiter,\nif let alone, would fall upon the earth and the earth upon Jupiter,\nand with certain peculiarities of velocity on either side, is to have\nrecourse to an explanation which is not necessarily valid, unless\nnature is necessarily uniform. Nor, indeed, has it yet been proved,\nnor ought it to be assumed, even that the law of velocity of falling\nbodies on the earth is invariable in its operation; for that again is\nonly an instance of the general proposition, which is the very thesis\nin debate. It seems safer then to hold that the order of nature is not\nnecessary, but general in its manifestations.\n\nBut, it may be urged, if a thing happens once, it must happen always;\nfor what is to hinder it? Nay, on the contrary, why, because one\nparticle of matter has a certain property, should all particles have\nthe same? Why, because particles have instanced the property a thousand\ntimes, should the thousand and first instance it also? It is _prim\u00e2\nfacie_ unaccountable that an accident should happen twice, not to\nspeak of its happening always. If we expect a thing to happen twice,\nit is because we think it is not an accident, but has a cause. What\nhas brought about a thing once, may bring it about twice. _What_ is to\nhinder its happening? rather, What is to make it happen? Here we are\nthrown back from the question of Order to that of Causation. A law is\nnot a cause, but a fact; but when we come to the question of cause,\nthen, as I have said, we have no experience of any cause but Will. If,\nthen, I must answer the question, What is to alter the order of nature?\nI reply, That which willed it;\u2014That which willed it, can unwill it; and\nthe invariableness of law depends on the unchangeableness of that Will.\n\nAnd here I am led to observe that, as a cause implies a will, so order\nimplies a purpose. Did we see flint celts, in their various receptacles\nall over Europe, scored always with certain special and characteristic\nmarks, even though those marks had no assignable meaning or final\ncause whatever, we should take that very repetition, which indeed is\nthe principle of order, to be a proof of intelligence. The agency then\nwhich has kept up and keeps up the general laws of nature, energizing\nat once in Sirius and on the earth, and on the earth in its primary\nperiod as well as in the nineteenth century, must be Mind, and nothing\nelse, and Mind at least as wide and as enduring in its living action,\nas the immeasurable ages and spaces of the universe on which that\nagency has left its traces.\n\nIn these remarks I have digressed from my immediate subject, but\nthey have some bearing on points which will subsequently come into\ndiscussion.\n\n5. _Speculation._\n\nSpeculation is one of those words which, in the vernacular, have so\ndifferent a sense from what they bear in philosophy. It is commonly\ntaken to mean a conjecture, or a venture on chances; but its proper\nmeaning is mental sight, or the contemplation of mental operations and\ntheir results as opposed to experience, experiment, or sense, analogous\nto its meaning in Shakspeare\u2019s line, \u201cThou hast no speculation in those\neyes.\u201d In this sense I use it here.\n\nAnd I use it in this sense to denote those notional assents which are\nthe most direct, explicit, and perfect of their kind, viz. those which\nare the firm, conscious acceptance of propositions as true. This kind\nof assent includes the assent to all reasoning and its conclusions, to\nall general propositions, to all rules of conduct, to all proverbs,\naphorisms, sayings, and reflections on men and society. Of course\nmathematical investigations and truths are the subjects of this\nspeculative assent. So are legal judgments, and constitutional maxims,\nas far as they appeal to us for assent. So are the determinations\nof science; so are the principles, disputations, and doctrines of\ntheology. That there is a God, that He has certain attributes, and in\nwhat sense He can be said to have attributes, that He has done certain\nworks, that He has made certain revelations of Himself and of His will,\nand what they are, and the multiplied bearings of the parts of the\nteaching, thus developed and formed, upon each other, all this is the\nsubject of notional assent, and of that particular department of it\nwhich I have called Speculation. As far as these particular subjects\ncan be viewed in the concrete and represent experiences, they can be\nreceived by real assent also; but as expressed in general propositions\nthey belong to notional apprehension and assent.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Real Assents.\n\n\nI have in a measure anticipated the subject of Real Assent by what\nI have been saying about Notional. In comparison of the directness\nand force of the apprehension, which we have of an object, when our\nassent is to be called real, Notional Assent and Inference seem to be\nthrown back into one and the same class of intellectual acts, though\nthe former of the two is always an unconditional acceptance of a\nproposition, and the latter is an acceptance on the condition of an\nacceptance of its premisses. In its notional assents as well as in\nits inferences, the mind contemplates its own creations instead of\nthings; in real, it is directed towards things, represented by the\nimpressions which they have left on the imagination. These images, when\nassented-to, have an influence both on the individual and on society,\nwhich mere notions cannot exert.\n\nI have already given various illustrations of Real Assent; I will\nfollow them up here by some instances of the change of Notional Assent\ninto Real.\n\n1. For instance: boys at school look like each other, and pursue the\nsame studies, some of them with greater success than others; but it\nwill sometimes happen, that those who acquitted themselves but poorly\nin class, when they come into the action of life, and engage in some\nparticular work, which they have already been learning in its theory\nand with little promise of proficiency, are suddenly found to have\nwhat is called an eye for that work\u2014an eye for trade matters, or for\nengineering, or a special taste for literature\u2014which no one expected\nfrom them at school, while they were engaged on notions. Minds of\nthis stamp not only know the received rules of their profession, but\nenter into them, and even anticipate them, or dispense with them, or\nsubstitute other rules instead. And when new questions are opened,\nand arguments are drawn up on one side and the other in long array,\nthey with a natural ease and promptness form their views and give\ntheir decision, as if they had no need to reason, from their clear\napprehension of the lie and issue of the whole matter in dispute, as\nif it were drawn out in a map before them. These are the reformers,\nsystematizers, inventors, in various departments of thought,\nspeculative and practical; in education, in administration, in social\nand political matters, in science. Such men indeed are far from\ninfallible; however great their powers, they sometimes fall into great\nerrors, in their own special department, while second-rate men who go\nby rule come to sound and safe conclusions. Images need not be true;\nbut I am illustrating what vividness of apprehension is, and what is\nthe strength of belief consequent upon it.\n\n2. Again:\u2014twenty years ago, the Duke of Wellington wrote his celebrated\nletter on the subject of the national defences. His authority gave\nit an immediate circulation among all classes of the community; none\nquestioned what he said, nor as if taking his words on faith merely,\nbut as intellectually recognizing their truth; yet few could be said\nto see or feel that truth. His letter lay, so to say, upon the pure\nintellect of the national mind, and nothing for a time came of it.\nBut eleven years afterwards, after his death, the anger of the French\ncolonels with us, after the attempt upon Louis Napoleon\u2019s life,\ntransferred its facts to the charge of the imagination. Then forthwith\nthe national assent became in various ways an operative principle,\nespecially in its promotion of the volunteer movement. The Duke, having\na special eye for military matters, had realized the state of things\nfrom the first; but it took a course of years to impress upon the\npublic mind an assent to his warning deeper and more energetic than the\nreception it is accustomed to give to a clever article in a newspaper\nor a review.\n\n3. And so generally: great truths, practical or ethical, float on\nthe surface of society, admitted by all, valued by few, exemplifying\nthe poet\u2019s adage, \u201cProbitas laudatur et alget,\u201d until changed\ncircumstances, accident, or the continual pressure of their advocates,\nforce them upon its attention. The iniquity, for instance, of the\nslave-trade ought to have been acknowledged by all men from the first;\nit was acknowledged by many, but it needed an organized agitation, with\ntracts and speeches innumerable, so to affect the imagination of men as\nto make their acknowledgment of that iniquitousness operative.\n\nIn like manner, when Mr. Wilberforce, after succeeding in the slave\nquestion, urged the Duke of Wellington to use his great influence\nin discountenancing duelling, he could only get from him in answer,\n\u201cA relic of barbarism, Mr. Wilberforce;\u201d as if he accepted a notion\nwithout realizing a fact: at length, the growing intelligence of\nthe community, and the shock inflicted upon it by the tragical\ncircumstances of a particular duel, were fatal to that barbarism.\nThe governing classes were roused from their dreamy acquiescence in\nan abstract truth, and recognized the duty of giving it practical\nexpression.\n\n4. Let us consider, too, how differently young and old are affected by\nthe words of some classic author, such as Homer or Horace. Passages,\nwhich to a boy are but rhetorical commonplaces, neither better nor\nworse than a hundred others which any clever writer might supply, which\nhe gets by heart and thinks very fine, and imitates, as he thinks,\nsuccessfully, in his own flowing versification, at length come home\nto him, when long years have passed, and he has had experience of\nlife, and pierce him, as if he had never before known them, with their\nsad earnestness and vivid exactness. Then he comes to understand how\nit is that lines, the birth of some chance morning or evening at an\nIonian festival, or among the Sabine hills, have lasted generation\nafter generation, for thousands of years, with a power over the mind,\nand a charm, which the current literature of his own day, with all\nits obvious advantages, is utterly unable to rival. Perhaps this is\nthe reason of the medieval opinion about Virgil, as if a prophet or\nmagician; his single words and phrases, his pathetic half lines, giving\nutterance, as the voice of Nature herself, to that pain and weariness,\nyet hope of better things, which is the experience of her children in\nevery time.\n\n5. And what the experience of the world effects for the illustration\nof classical authors, that office the religious sense, carefully\ncultivated, fulfils towards Holy Scripture. To the devout and\nspiritual, the Divine Word speaks of things, not merely of notions.\nAnd, again, to the disconsolate, the tempted, the perplexed, the\nsuffering, there comes, by means of their very trials, an enlargement\nof thought, which enables them to see in it what they never saw before.\nHenceforth there is to them a reality in its teachings, which they\nrecognize as an argument, and the best of arguments, for its divine\norigin. Hence the practice of meditation on the Sacred Text, so highly\nthought of by Catholics. Reading, as we do, the Gospels from our youth\nup, we are in danger of becoming so familiar with them as to be dead\nto their force, and to view them as a mere history. The purpose, then,\nof meditation is to realize them; to make the facts which they relate\nstand out before our minds as objects, such as may be appropriated by a\nfaith as living as the imagination which apprehends them.\n\nIt is obvious to refer to the unworthy use made of the more solemn\nparts of the sacred volume by the mere popular preacher. His very mode\nof reading, whether warnings or prayers, is as if he thought them to\nbe little more than fine writing, poetical in sense, musical in sound,\nand worthy of inspiration. The most awful truths are to him but sublime\nor beautiful conceptions, and are adduced and used by him, in season\nand out of season, for his own purposes, for embellishing his style or\nrounding his periods. But let his heart at length be ploughed by some\nkeen grief or deep anxiety, and Scripture is a new book to him. This\nis the change which so often takes place in what is called religious\nconversion, and it is a change so far simply for the better, by\nwhatever infirmity or error it is in the particular case accompanied.\nAnd it is strikingly suggested to us, to take a saintly example, in the\nconfession of the patriarch Job, when he contrasts his apprehension\nof the Almighty before and after his afflictions. He says he had\nindeed a true apprehension of the Divine Attributes before as well as\nafter; but with the trial came a great change in the character of that\napprehension:\u2014\u201cWith the hearing of the ear,\u201d he says, \u201cI have heard\nThee, but now mine eye seeth Thee; therefore I reprehend myself, and do\npenance in dust and ashes.\u201d\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nLet these instances suffice of Real Assent in its relation to Notional;\nthey lead me to make three remarks in further illustration of its\ncharacter.\n\n1. The fact of the distinctness of the images, which are required for\nreal assent, is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those\nimages represent. A proposition, be it ever so keenly apprehended,\nmay be true or may be false. If we simply put aside all inferential\ninformation, such as is derived from testimony, from general belief,\nfrom the concurrence of the senses, from common sense, or otherwise,\nwe have no right to consider that we have apprehended a truth, merely\nbecause of the strength of our mental impression of it. Hence the\nproverb, \u201cFronti nulla fides.\u201d An image, with the characters of perfect\nveracity and faithfulness, may be ever so distinct and eloquent an\nobject presented before the mind (or, as it is sometimes called,\nan \u201cobjectum internum,\u201d or a \u201csubject-object\u201d); but, nevertheless,\nthere may be no external reality in the case, corresponding to it, in\nspite of its impressiveness. One of the most remarkable instances of\nthis fallacious impressiveness is the illusion which possesses the\nminds of able men, those especially who are exercised in physical\ninvestigations, in favour of the inviolability of the laws of nature.\nPhilosophers of the school of Hume discard the very supposition of\nmiracles, and scornfully refuse to hear evidence in their behalf in\ngiven instances, from their intimate experience of physical order and\nof the ever-recurring connexion of antecedent and consequent. Their\nimagination usurps the functions of reason; and they cannot bring\nthemselves even to entertain as a hypothesis (and this is all that they\nare asked to do) a thought contrary to that vivid impression of which\nthey are the victims, that the uniformity of nature, which they witness\nhour by hour, is equivalent to a necessary, inviolable law.\n\nYet it is plain, and I shall take it for granted here, that when\nI assent to a proposition, I ought to have some more legitimate\nreason for doing so, than the brilliancy of the image of which that\nproposition is the expression. That I have no experience of a thing\nhappening except in one way, is a cause of the intensity of my assent,\nif I assent, but not the reason of my assenting. In saying this, I\nam not disposed to deny the presence in some men of an idiosyncratic\nsagacity, which really and rightly sees reasons in impressions which\ncommon men cannot see, and is secured from the peril of confusing truth\nwith make-belief; but this is genius, and beyond rule. I grant too, of\ncourse, that accidentally impressiveness does in matter of fact, as in\nthe instance which I have been giving, constitute the motive principle\nof belief; for the mind is ever exposed to the danger of being carried\naway by the liveliness of its conceptions, to the sacrifice of good\nsense and conscientious caution, and the greater and the more rare are\nits gifts, the greater is the risk of swerving from the line of reason\nand duty; but here I am not speaking of transgressions of rule any more\nthan of exceptions to it, but of the normal constitution of our minds,\nand of the natural and rightful effect of acts of the imagination upon\nus, and this is, not to create assent, but to intensify it.\n\n2. Next, Assent, however strong, and accorded to images however\nvivid, is not therefore necessarily practical. Strictly speaking, it\nis not imagination that causes action; but hope and fear, likes and\ndislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness\nand self-love. What imagination does for us is to find a means of\nstimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply\nof objects strong enough to stimulate them. The thought of honour,\nglory, duty, self-aggrandisement, gain, or on the other hand of Divine\nGoodness, future reward, eternal life, perseveringly dwelt upon, leads\nus along a course of action corresponding to itself, but only in case\nthere be that in our minds which is congenial to it. However, when\nthere is that preparation of mind, the thought does lead to the act.\nHence it is that the fact of a proposition being accepted with a real\nassent is accidentally an earnest of that proposition being carried out\nin conduct, and the imagination may be said in some sense to be of a\npractical nature, inasmuch as it leads to practice indirectly by the\naction of its object upon the affections.\n\n3. There is a third remark suggested by the view which I have been\ntaking of real assents, viz. that they are of a personal character,\neach individual having his own, and being known by them. It is\notherwise with notions; notional apprehension is in itself an ordinary\nact of our common nature. All of us have the power of abstraction, and\ncan be taught either to make or to enter into the same abstractions;\nand thus to co-operate in the establishment of a common measure\nbetween mind and mind. And, though for one and all of us to assent\nto the notions which we thus apprehend in common, is a further step,\nas requiring the adoption of a common stand-point of principle and\njudgment, yet this too depends in good measure on certain logical\nprocesses of thought, with which we are all familiar, and on facts\nwhich we all take for granted. But we cannot make sure, for ourselves\nor others, of real apprehension and assent, because we have to secure\nfirst the images which are their objects, and these are often peculiar\nand special. They depend on personal experience; and the experience of\none man is not the experience of another. Real assent, then, as the\nexperience which it presupposes, is proper to the individual, and, as\nsuch, thwarts rather than promotes the intercourse of man with man. It\nshuts itself up, as it were, in its own home, or at least it is its own\nwitness and its own standard; and, as in the instances above given, it\ncannot be reckoned on, anticipated, accounted for, inasmuch as it is\nthe accident of this man or that.\n\nI call the characteristics of an individual accidents, in spite of the\nuniversal reign of law, because they are severally the co-incidents of\nmany laws, and there are no laws as yet discovered of such coincidence.\nA man who is run over in the street and killed, in one sense suffers\naccording to rule or law; he was crossing, he was short-sighted or\npreoccupied in mind, or he was looking another way; he was deaf, lame,\nor flurried; and the cab came up at a great pace. If all this was\nso, it was by a necessity that he was run over; it would have been a\nmiracle if he had escaped. So far is clear; but what is not clear is\nhow all these various conditions met together in the particular case,\nhow it was that a man, short-sighted, hard of hearing, deficient in\npresence of mind, happened to get in the way of a cab hurrying along to\ncatch a train. This concrete fact does not come under any law of sudden\ndeaths, but, like the earth\u2019s yearly path which I spoke of above, is\nthe accident of the individual.\n\nIt does not meet the case to refer to the law of averages, for such\nlaws deal with percentages, not with individuals, and it is about\nindividuals that I am speaking. That this particular man out of\nthe three millions congregated in the metropolis, was to have the\nexperience of this catastrophe, and to be the select victim to appease\nthat law of averages, no statistical tables could foretell, even\nthough they could determine that it was in the fates that in that week\nor day some four persons in the length and breadth of London should\nbe run over. And in like manner that this or that person should have\nthe particular experiences necessary for real assent on any point,\nthat the Deist should become a Theist, the Erastian a Catholic, the\nProtectionist a Free-trader, the Conservative a Legitimist, the high\nTory an out-and-out Democrat, are facts, each of which may be the\nresult of a multitude of coincidences in one and the same individual,\ncoincidences which we have no means of determining, and which,\ntherefore, we may call accidents. For\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cThere\u2019s a Divinity that shapes our ends,\n    Rough hew them how we will.\u201d\n\n\nSuch accidents are the characteristics of persons, as _differenti\u00e6_ and\nproperties are the characteristics of species or natures.\n\nThat a man dies when deprived of air, is not an accident of his person,\nbut a law of his nature; that he cannot live without quinine or opium,\nor out of the climate of Madeira, is his own peculiarity. If all men\nevery where usually had the yellow fever once in their lives, we should\ncall it (speaking according to our knowledge) a law of the human\nconstitution; if the inhabitants of a particular country commonly had\nit, we should call it a law of the climate; if a healthy man has a\nfever in a healthy place, in a healthy season, we call it an accident,\nthough it be reducible to the coincidence of laws, because there is\nno known law of their coincidence. To be rational, to have speech, to\npass through successive changes of mind and body from infancy to death,\nbelong to man\u2019s nature; to have a particular history, to be married or\nsingle, to have children or to be childless, to live a given number of\nyears, to have a certain constitution, moral temperament, intellectual\noutfit, mental formation, these and the like, taken all together, are\nthe accidents which make up our notion of a man\u2019s person, and are the\nground-work or condition of his particular experiences.\n\nMoreover, various of the experiences which befall this man may be the\nsame as those which befall that, although those experiences result\neach from the combination of its own accidents, and are ultimately\ntraceable each to its own special condition or history. That is, images\nwhich are possessed in common, with their apprehensions and assents,\nmay nevertheless be personal characteristics. If two or three hundred\nmen are to be found, who cannot live out of Madeira, that inability\nwould still be an accident and a peculiarity of each of them. Even\nif in each case it implied delicacy of lungs, still that delicacy is\na vague notion, comprehending under it a great variety of cases in\ndetail. If \u201cfive hundred brethren at once\u201d saw our risen Lord, that\ncommon experience would not be a law, but a personal accident which\nwas the prerogative of each. And so again in this day the belief of\nso many thousands in His Divinity, is not therefore notional, because\nit is common, but may be a real and personal belief, being produced\nin different individual minds by various experiences and disposing\ncauses, variously combined; such as a warm or strong imagination,\ngreat sensibility, compunction and horror at sin, frequenting the\nMass and other rites of the Church, meditating on the contents of\nthe Gospels, familiarity with hymns and religious poems, dwelling on\nthe Evidences, parental example and instruction, religious friends,\nstrange providences, powerful preaching. In each case the image in\nthe mind, with the experiences out of which it is formed, would be a\npersonal result; and, though the same in all, would in each case be so\nidiosyncratic in its circumstances, that it would stand by itself, a\nspecial formation, unconnected with any law; though at the same time it\nwould necessarily be a principle of sympathy and a bond of intercourse\nbetween those whose minds had been thus variously wrought into a common\nassent, far stronger than could follow upon any multitude of mere\nnotions which they unanimously held. And even when that assent is not\nthe result of concurrent causes, if such a case is possible, but has\none single origin, as the study of Scripture, careful teaching, or a\nreligious temper, still its presence argues a special history, and a\npersonal formation, which an abstraction does not. For an abstraction\ncan be made at will, and may be the work of a moment; but the moral\nexperiences which perpetuate themselves in images, must be sought after\nin order to be found, and encouraged and cultivated in order to be\nappropriated.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI have now said all that occurs to me on the subject of Real Assents,\nperhaps not without some risk of subtlety and minuteness. They are\nsometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes; and, as given to\nmoral objects, they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful. Till we\nhave them, in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of\nnotions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of\nimpulses, fancies, and wandering lights, whether as regards personal\nconduct, social and political action, or religion. These beliefs,\nbe they true or false in the particular case, form the mind out of\nwhich they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which\ninspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret\nof persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world.\nThey create, as the case may be, heroes and saints, great leaders,\nstatesmen, preachers, and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in\nscience, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and\nadventurers. They have given to the world men of one idea, of immense\nenergy, of adamantine will, of revolutionary power. They kindle\nsympathies between man and man, and knit together the innumerable units\nwhich constitute a race and a nation. They become the principle of\nits political existence; they impart to it homogeneity of thought and\nfellowship of purpose. They have given form to the medieval theocracy\nand to the Mahometan superstition; they are now the life both of \u201cHoly\nRussia,\u201d and of that freedom of speech and action which is the special\nboast of Englishmen.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. Notional and Real Assents Contrasted.\n\n\nIt appears from what has been said, that, though Real Assent is not\nintrinsically operative, it accidentally and indirectly affects\npractice. It is in itself an intellectual act, of which the object is\npresented to it by the imagination; and though the pure intellect does\nnot lead to action, nor the imagination either, yet the imagination has\nthe means, which pure intellect has not, of stimulating those powers of\nthe mind from which action proceeds. Real Assent then, or Belief, as it\nmay be called, viewed in itself, that is, simply as Assent, does not\nlead to action; but the images in which it lives, representing as they\ndo the concrete, have the power of the concrete upon the affections and\npassions, and by means of these indirectly become operative. Still this\npractical influence is not invariable, nor to be relied on; for given\nimages may have no tendency to affect given minds, or to excite them to\naction. Thus, a philosopher or a poet may vividly realize the brilliant\nrewards of military genius or of eloquence, without wishing either to\nbe a commander or an orator. However, on the whole, broadly contrasting\nBelief with Notional Assent and with Inference, we shall not, with this\nexplanation, be very wrong in pronouncing that acts of Notional Assent\nand of Inference do not affect our conduct, and acts of Belief, that\nis, of Real Assent, do (not necessarily, but do) affect it.\n\nI have scarcely spoken of Inference since my Introductory Chapter,\nthough I intend, before I conclude, to consider it fully; but I have\nsaid enough to admit of my introducing it here in contrast with Real\nAssent or Belief, and that contrast is necessary in order to complete\nwhat I have been saying about the latter. Let me then, for the sake\nof the latter, be allowed here to say, that, while Assent, or Belief,\npresupposes some apprehension of the things believed, Inference\nrequires no apprehension of the things inferred; that in consequence,\nInference is necessarily concerned with surfaces and aspects; that it\nbegins with itself, and ends with itself; that it does not reach as\nfar as facts; that it is employed upon formulas; that, as far as it\ntakes real objects of whatever kind into account, such as motives and\nactions, character and conduct, art, science, taste, morals, religion,\nit deals with them, not as they are, but simply in its own line, as\nmaterials of argument or inquiry, that they are to it nothing more than\nmajor and minor premisses and conclusions. Belief, on the other hand,\nbeing concerned with things concrete, not abstract, which variously\nexcite the mind from their moral and imaginative properties, has for\nits object, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is\nbeautiful, useful, admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion,\nrouse the passions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the\nway to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and\nthe formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with\nwhat is individual and personal.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI insisted on this marked distinction between Beliefs on the one hand,\nand Notional Assents and Inferences on the other, many years ago in\nwords which it will be to my purpose to use now.(2) I quote them,\nbecause, over and above their appositeness in this place, they present\nthe doctrine on which I have been insisting, from a second point of\nview, and with a freshness and force which I cannot now command, and,\nmoreover, (though they are my own, nevertheless, from the length of\ntime which has elapsed since their publication,) almost with the\ncogency of an independent testimony.\n\nThey occur in a protest which I had occasion to write in February,\n1841, against a dangerous doctrine maintained, as I considered, by two\nvery eminent men of that day, now no more\u2014Lord Brougham and Sir Robert\nPeel. That doctrine was to the effect that the claims of religion could\nbe secured and sustained in the mass of men, and in particular in the\nlower classes of society, by acquaintance with literature and physical\nscience, and through the instrumentality of Mechanics\u2019 Institutes and\nReading Rooms, to the serious disparagement, as it seemed to me, of\ndirect Christian instruction. In the course of my remarks is found the\npassage which I shall here quote, and which, with whatever differences\nin terminology, and hardihood of assertion, befitting the circumstances\nof its publication, nay, as far as words go, inaccuracy of theological\nstatement, suitably illustrates the subject here under discussion. It\nruns thus:\u2014\n\n\u201cPeople say to me, that it is but a dream to suppose that Christianity\nshould regain the organic power in human society which once it\npossessed. I cannot help that; I never said it could. I am not a\npolitician; I am proposing no measures, but exposing a fallacy and\nresisting a pretence. Let Benthamism reign, if men have no aspirations;\nbut do not tell them to be romantic and then solace them with \u2018glory:\u2019\ndo not attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion. The\nascendency of faith may be impracticable, but the reign of knowledge\nis incomprehensible. The problem for statesmen of this age is how to\neducate the masses, and literature and science cannot give the solution.\n\n\u201cScience gives us the grounds or premisses from which religious truths\nare to be enforced; but it does not set about inferring them, much\nless does it reach the inference\u2014that is not its province. It brings\nbefore us phenomena, and it leaves us, if we will, to call them works\nof design, wisdom, or benevolence; and further still, if we will, to\nproceed to confess an Intelligent Creator. We have to take its facts,\nand to give them a meaning, and to draw our own conclusions from them.\nFirst comes knowledge, then a view, then reasoning, and then belief.\nThis is why science has so little of a religious tendency; deductions\nhave no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not\nthrough the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct\nimpressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by\ndescription. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us,\ndeeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man\nwill be a martyr for a conclusion. A conclusion is but an opinion; it\nis not a thing which _is_, but which we are \u2018_quite sure about_;\u2019 and\nit has often been observed, that we never say we are sure and certain\nwithout implying that we doubt. To say that a thing _must_ be, is\nto admit that it _may not_ be. No one, I say, will die for his own\ncalculations: he dies for realities. This is why a literary religion\nis so little to be depended upon; it looks well in fair weather; but\nits doctrines are opinions, and, when called to suffer for them, it\nslips them between its folios, or burns them at its hearth. And this\nagain is the secret of the distrust and raillery with which moralists\nhave been so commonly visited. They say and do not. Why? Because they\nare contemplating the fitness of things, and they live by the square,\nwhen they should be realizing their high maxims in the concrete. Now\nSir Robert Peel thinks better of natural history, chemistry, and\nastronomy than of such ethics; but these too, what are they more than\ndivinity _in posse_? He protests against \u2018_controversial_ divinity:\u2019 is\n_inferential_ much better?\n\n\u201cI have no confidence, then, in philosophers who cannot help being\nreligious, and are Christians by implication. They sit at home, and\nreach forward to distances which astonish us; but they hit without\ngrasping, and are sometimes as confident about shadows as about\nrealities. They have worked out by a calculation the lie of a country\nwhich they never saw, and mapped it by means of a gazetteer; and, like\nblind men, though they can put a stranger on his way, they cannot walk\nstraight themselves, and do not feel it quite their business to walk at\nall.\n\n\u201cLogic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot\nround corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism.\nTell men to gain notions of a Creator from His works, and, if they\nwere to set about it (which nobody does) they would be jaded and\nwearied by the labyrinth they were tracing. Their minds would be gorged\nand surfeited by the logical operation. Logicians are more set upon\nconcluding rightly, than on right conclusions. They cannot see the\nend for the process. Few men have that power of mind which may hold\nfast and firmly a variety of thoughts. We ridicule \u2019men of one idea;\u2019\nbut a great many of us are born to be such, and we should be happier\nif we knew it. To most men argument makes the point in hand only more\ndoubtful, and considerably less impressive. After all, man is _not_\na reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting\nanimal. He is influenced by what is direct and precise. It is very well\nto freshen our impressions and convictions from physics, but to create\nthem we must go elsewhere. Sir Robert Peel \u2018never can think it possible\nthat a mind can be so constituted, that, after being familiarized\nwith the wonderful discoveries which have been made in every part of\nexperimental science, it can retire from such contemplation without\nmore enlarged conceptions of God\u2019s providence, and a higher reverence\nfor His Name!\u2019 If he speaks of religious minds, he perpetrates a\ntruism; if of irreligious, he insinuates a paradox.\n\n\u201cLife is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never\nhave done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever\nbe laying our foundations; we shall turn theology into evidences, and\ndivines into textuaries. We shall never get at our first principles.\nResolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proof and analyze\nyour elements, sinking farther and farther, and finding \u2018in the lowest\ndepth a lower deep,\u2019 till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism.\nI would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that\nChristianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the\nphysical world. Life is for action. If we insist on proofs for every\nthing, we shall never come to action: to act you must assume, and that\nassumption is faith.\n\n\u201cLet no one suppose, that in saying this I am maintaining that all\nproofs are equally difficult, and all propositions equally debatable.\nSome assumptions are greater than others, and some doctrines involve\npostulates larger than others, and more numerous. I only say, that\nimpressions lead to action, and that reasonings lead from it. Knowledge\nof premisses, and inferences upon them,\u2014this is not to _live_. It is\nvery well as a matter of liberal curiosity and of philosophy to analyze\nour modes of thought: but let this come second, and when there is\nleisure for it, and then our examinations will in many ways even be\nsubservient to action. But if we commence with scientific knowledge\nand argumentative proof, or lay any great stress upon it as the basis\nof personal Christianity, or attempt to make man moral and religious\nby libraries and museums, let us in consistency take chemists for our\ncooks, and mineralogists for our masons.\n\n\u201cNow I wish to state all this as matter of fact, to be judged by the\ncandid testimony of any persons whatever. Why we are so constituted\nthat faith, not knowledge or argument, is our principle of action, is\na question with which I have nothing to do; but I think it is a fact,\nand, if it be such, we must resign ourselves to it as best we may,\nunless we take refuge in the intolerable paradox, that the mass of men\nare created for nothing, and are meant to leave life as they entered it.\n\n\u201cSo well has this practically been understood in all ages of the world,\nthat no religion yet has been a religion of physics or of philosophy.\nIt has ever been synonymous with revelation. It never has been a\ndeduction from what we know; it has ever been an assertion of what\nwe are to believe. It has never lived in a conclusion; it has ever\nbeen a message, a history, or a vision. No legislator or priest ever\ndreamed of educating our moral nature by science or by argument. There\nis no difference here between true religions and pretended. Moses was\ninstructed not to reason from the creation, but to work miracles.\nChristianity is a history supernatural, and almost scenic: it tells us\nwhat its Author is, by telling us what He has done.\n\n\u201cLord Brougham himself has recognized the force of this principle. He\nhas not left his philosophical religion to argument; he has committed\nit to the keeping of the imagination. Why should he depict a great\nrepublic of letters, and an intellectual pantheon, but that he feels\nthat instances and patterns, not logical reasonings, are the living\nconclusions which alone have a hold over the affections or can form the\ncharacter?\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter V. Apprehension And Assent In The Matter Of Religion.\n\n\nWe are now able to determine what a dogma of faith is, and what it is\nto believe it. A dogma is a proposition; it stands for a notion or for\na thing; and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it, as\nit stands for the one or for the other. To give a real assent to it is\nan act of religion; to give a notional, is a theological act. It is\ndiscerned, rested in, and appropriated as a reality, by the religious\nimagination; it is held as a truth, by the theological intellect.\n\nNot as if there were in fact, or could be, any line of demarcation\nor party-wall between these two modes of assent, the religious\nand the theological. As intellect is common to all men as well as\nimagination, every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian,\nand no theology can start or thrive without the initiative and abiding\npresence of religion. As in matters of this world, sense, sensation,\ninstinct, intuition, supply us with facts, and the intellect uses\nthem; so, as regards our relations with the Supreme Being, we get our\nfacts from the witness, first of nature, then of revelation, and our\ndoctrines, in which they issue, through the exercise of abstraction and\ninference. This is obvious; but it does not interfere with holding that\nthere is a theological habit of mind, and a religious, each distinct\nfrom each, religion using theology, and theology using religion. This\nbeing understood, I propose to consider the dogmas of the Being of a\nGod, and of the Divine Trinity in Unity, in their relation to assent,\nboth notional and real, and principally to real assent;\u2014however, I have\nnot yet finished all I have to say by way of introduction.\n\nNow first, my subject is assent, and not inference. I am not proposing\nto set forth the arguments which issue in the belief of these\ndoctrines, but to investigate what it is to believe in them, what the\nmind does, what it contemplates, when it makes an act of faith. It\nis true that the same elementary facts which create an object for an\nassent, also furnish matter for an inference: and in showing what we\nbelieve, I shall unavoidably be in a measure showing why we believe;\nbut this is the very reason that makes it necessary for me at the\noutset to insist on the real distinction between these two concurring\nand coincident courses of thought, and to premise by way of caution,\nlest I should be misunderstood, that I am not considering the question\nthat there is a God, but rather what God is.\n\nAnd secondly, I mean by belief, not precisely faith, because faith,\nin its theological sense, includes a belief, not only in the thing\nbelieved, but also in the ground of believing; that is, not only\nbelief in certain doctrines, but belief in them expressly because God\nhas revealed them; but here I am engaged only with what is called the\nmaterial object of faith, not with the formal,\u2014with the thing believed.\nThe Almighty witnesses to Himself in Revelation; we believe that He\nis One and that He is Three, because He says so. We believe also what\nHe tells us about His Attributes, His providences and dispensations,\nHis determinations and acts, what He has done and what He will do. And\nif all this is too much for us, whether to bring before our minds at\none time from its variety, or even to apprehend at all or enunciate\nfrom our narrowness of intellect or want of learning, then at least\nwe believe _in globo_ all that He has revealed to us about Himself,\nand that, because He has revealed it. However, this \u201cbecause He says\nit\u201d does not enter into the scope of the present inquiry, but only\nthe truths themselves, and these particular truths, \u201cHe is One,\u201d \u201cHe\nis Three;\u201d and of these two, both of which are in Revelation, I shall\nconsider \u201cHe is One,\u201d not as a revealed truth, but as, what it is also,\na natural truth, the foundation of all religion. And with it I begin.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Belief in One God.\n\n\nThere is one GOD, such and such in Nature and Attributes.\n\nI say \u201csuch and such,\u201d for, unless I explain what I mean by \u201cone God,\u201d\nI use words which may mean any thing or nothing. I may mean a mere\n_anima mundi_; or an initial principle which once was in action and now\nis not; or collective humanity. I speak then of the God of the Theist\nand of the Christian: a God who is numerically One, who is Personal;\nthe Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the life of Law and\nOrder, the Moral Governor; One who is Supreme and Sole; like Himself,\nunlike all things besides Himself, which all are but His creatures;\ndistinct from, independent of them all; One who is self-existing,\nabsolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom\nnothing is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fulness and\narchetype of every possible excellence, the Truth Itself, Wisdom, Love,\nJustice, Holiness; One who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent,\nIncomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives which\nI ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being whom I\ncall God.\n\nThis being what Theists mean when they speak of God, their assent to\nthis truth admits without difficulty of being what I have called a\nnotional assent. It is an assent following upon acts of inference,\nand other purely intellectual exercises; and it is an assent to a\nlarge development of predicates, correlative to each other, or at\nleast intimately connected together, drawn out as if on paper, as we\nmight map a country which we had never seen, or construct mathematical\ntables, or master the methods of discovery of Newton or Davy, without\nbeing geographers, mathematicians, or chemists ourselves.\n\nSo far is clear; but the question follows, Can I attain to any more\nvivid assent to the Being of a God, than that which is given merely to\nnotions of the intellect? Can I enter with a personal knowledge into\nthe circle of truths which make up that great thought? Can I rise to\nwhat I have called an imaginative apprehension of it? Can I believe as\nif I saw? Since such a high assent requires a present experience or\nmemory of the fact, at first sight it would seem as if the answer must\nbe in the negative; for how can I assent as if I saw, unless I have\nseen? but no one in this life can see God. Yet I conceive a real assent\nis possible, and I proceed to show how.\n\nWhen it is said that we cannot see God, this is undeniable; but in what\nsense have we a discernment of His creatures, of the individual beings\nwhich surround us? The evidence which we have of their presence lies\nin the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking\nthese for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence.\nBy the law of our nature we associate those sensible phenomena or\nimpressions with certain units, individuals, substances, whatever they\nare to be called, which are outside and out of the reach of sense, and\nwe picture them to ourselves in those phenomena. The phenomena are\nas if pictures; but at the same time they give us no exact measure\nor character of the unknown things beyond them;\u2014for who will say\nthere is any uniformity between the impressions which two of us would\nrespectively have of some third thing, supposing one of us had only the\nsense of touch, and the other only the sense of hearing? Therefore,\nwhen we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived\nthrough the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it\ngoes, but not adequate.\n\nAnd so of those intellectual and moral objects which are brought\nhome to us through our senses:\u2014that they exist, we know by instinct;\nthat they are such and such, we apprehend from the impressions which\nthey leave upon our minds. Thus the life and writings of Cicero or\nDr. Johnson, of St. Jerome or St. Chrysostom, leave upon us certain\nimpressions of the intellectual and moral character of each of them,\n_sui generis_, and unmistakable. We take up a passage of Chrysostom or\na passage of Jerome; there is no possibility of confusing the one with\nthe other; in each case we see the man in his language. And so of any\ngreat man whom we may have known: that he is not a mere impression on\nour senses, but a real being, we know by instinct; that he is such and\nsuch, we know by the matter or quality of that impression.\n\nNow certainly the thought of God, as Theists entertain it, is not\ngained by an instinctive association of His presence with any sensible\nphenomena; but the office which the senses directly fulfil as regards\ncreation that devolves indirectly on certain of our mental phenomena\nas regards the Creator. Those phenomena are found in the sense of\nmoral obligation. As from a multitude of instinctive perceptions,\nacting in particular instances, of something beyond the senses, we\ngeneralize the notion of an external world, and then picture that world\nin and according to those particular phenomena from which we started,\nso from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of\nconscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external\nadmonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge,\nand then again we image Him and His attributes in those recurring\nintimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of\nHis existence was originally gained. And, if the impressions which\nHis creatures make on us through our senses oblige us to regard those\ncreatures as _sui generis_ respectively, it is not wonderful that the\nnotices, which He indirectly gives us through our conscience, of His\nown nature are such as to make us understand that He is like Himself\nand like nothing else.\n\nI have already said I am not proposing here to prove the Being of a\nGod; yet I have found it impossible to avoid saying where I look for\nthe proof of it. For I am looking for that proof in the same quarter\nas that from which I would commence a proof of His attributes and\ncharacter,\u2014by the same means as those by which I show how we apprehend\nHim, not merely as a notion, but as a reality. The last indeed of these\nthree investigations alone concerns me here, but I cannot altogether\nexclude the two former from my consideration. However, I repeat, what\nI am directly aiming at, is to explain how we gain an image of God and\ngive a real assent to the proposition that He exists. And next, in\norder to do this, of course I must start from some first principle;\u2014and\nthat first principle, which I assume and shall not attempt to prove,\nis that which I should also use as a foundation in those other two\ninquiries, viz. that we have by nature a conscience.\n\nI assume, then, that Conscience has a legitimate place among our\nmental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning,\nof imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful; that, as there\nare objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel\ngrief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in\nus approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or\nwrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific\nsense of pleasure or pain, which goes by the name of a good or bad\nconscience. This being taken for granted, I shall attempt to show that\nin this special feeling, which follows on the commission of what we\ncall right or wrong, lie the materials for the real apprehension of a\nDivine Sovereign and Judge.\n\nThe feeling of conscience (being, I repeat, a certain keen sensibility,\npleasant or painful,\u2014self-approval and hope, or compunction and\nfear,\u2014attendant on certain of our actions, which in consequence we\ncall right or wrong) is twofold:\u2014it is a moral sense, and a sense of\nduty; a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate. Of course\nits act is indivisible; still it has these two aspects, distinct from\neach other, and admitting of a separate consideration. Though I lost\nmy sense of the obligation which I lie under to abstain from acts\nof dishonesty, I should not in consequence lose my sense that such\nactions were an outrage offered to my moral nature. Again; though I\nlost my sense of their moral deformity, I should not therefore lose\nmy sense that they were forbidden to me. Thus conscience has both a\ncritical and a judicial office, and though its promptings, in the\nbreasts of the millions of human beings to whom it is given, are not\nin all cases correct, that does not necessarily interfere with the\nforce of its testimony and of its sanction: its testimony that there\nis a right and a wrong, and its sanction to that testimony conveyed in\nthe feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct. Here I have to\nspeak of conscience in the latter point of view, not as supplying us,\nby means of its various acts, with the elements of morals, such as may\nbe developed by the intellect into an ethical code, but simply as the\ndictate of an authoritative monitor bearing upon the details of conduct\nas they come before us, and complete in its several acts, one by one.\n\nLet us then thus consider conscience, not as a rule of right conduct,\nbut as a sanction of right conduct. This is its primary and most\nauthoritative aspect; it is the ordinary sense of the word. Half the\nworld would be puzzled to know what was meant by the moral sense; but\nevery one knows what is meant by a good or bad conscience. Conscience\nis ever forcing on us by threats and by promises that we must follow\nthe right and avoid the wrong; so far it is one and the same in the\nmind of every one, whatever be its particular errors in particular\nminds as to the acts which it orders to be done or to be avoided; and\nin this respect it corresponds to our perception of the beautiful and\ndeformed. As we have naturally a sense of the beautiful and graceful\nin nature and art, though tastes proverbially differ, so we have a\nsense of duty and obligation, whether we all associate it with the\nsame certain actions in particular or not. Here, however, Taste and\nConscience part company: for the sense of beautifulness, as indeed the\nMoral Sense, has no special relations to persons, but contemplates\nobjects in themselves; conscience, on the other hand, is concerned with\npersons primarily, and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers,\nor rather with self alone and one\u2019s own actions, and with others only\nindirectly and as if in association with self. And further, taste is\nits own evidence, appealing to nothing beyond its own sense of the\nbeautiful or the ugly, and enjoying the specimens of the beautiful\nsimply for their own sake; but conscience does not repose on itself,\nbut vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly\ndiscerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as is evidenced\nin that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them.\nAnd hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a\nvoice,\u2014a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of\nthe beautiful; and moreover a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative\nand constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience.\n\nAnd again, in consequence of this prerogative of dictating and\ncommanding, which is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate\nbearing on our affections and emotions, leading us to reverence and\nawe, hope and fear, especially fear, a feeling which is foreign for\nthe most part, not only to Taste, but even to the Moral Sense, except\nin consequence of accidental associations. No fear is felt by any one\nwho recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful, though he may\nbe mortified at himself, if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some\nadvantage; but, if he has been betrayed into any kind of immorality,\nhe has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act\nbe no offence against society,\u2014of distress and apprehension, even\nthough it may be of present service to him,\u2014of compunction and\nregret, though in itself it be most pleasurable,\u2014of confusion of\nface, though it may have no witnesses. These various perturbations of\nmind, which are characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very\nconsiderable,\u2014self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill\ndismay at the prospect of the future,\u2014and their contraries, when the\nconscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward\npeace, lightness of heart, and the like,\u2014these emotions constitute\na specific difference between conscience and our other intellectual\nsenses,\u2014common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense\nof honour, and the like,\u2014as indeed they would also constitute\nbetween conscience and the moral sense, supposing these two were not\naspects of one and the same feeling, exercised upon one and the same\nsubject-matter.\n\nSo much for the characteristic phenomena, which conscience presents,\nnor is it difficult to determine what they imply. I refer once more to\nour sense of the beautiful. This sense is attended by an intellectual\nenjoyment, and is free from whatever is of the nature of emotion,\nexcept in one case, viz. when it is excited by personal objects; then\nit is that the tranquil feeling of admiration is exchanged for the\nexcitement of affection and passion. Conscience too, considered as a\nmoral sense, an intellectual sentiment, is a sense of admiration and\ndisgust, of approbation and blame: but it is something more than a\nmoral sense; it is always, what the sense of the beautiful is only in\ncertain cases; it is always emotional. No wonder then that it always\nimplies what that sense only sometimes implies; that it always involves\nthe recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed.\nInanimate things cannot stir our affections; these are correlative with\npersons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are\nfrightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that\nthere is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed,\nwhose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same\ntearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother;\nif, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same\nsoothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise\nfrom a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person,\nto whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our\nhappiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in\nwhose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings in us are\nsuch as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being: we are\nnot affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse\nor a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human\nlaw: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions,\nconfusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it\nsheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a\nhope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. \u201cThe\nwicked flees, when no one pursueth;\u201d then why does he flee? whence his\nterror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden\nchambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong\nto this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed\nmust be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience,\nas a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture(3)\nof a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing,\nretributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the Moral\nSense is the principle of ethics.\n\nAnd let me here refer again to the fact, to which I have already drawn\nattention, that this instinct of the mind recognizing an external\nMaster in the dictate of conscience, and imaging the thought of Him\nin the definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to\nthat other law of, not only human, but of brute nature, by which the\npresence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting\nshapes and colours of the visible world. Is it by sense, or by reason,\nthat brutes understand the real unities, material and spiritual, which\nare signified by the lights and shadows, the brilliant ever-changing\ncalidoscope, as it may be called, which plays upon their _retina_? Not\nby reason, for they have not reason; not by sense, because they are\ntranscending sense; therefore it is an instinct. This faculty on the\npart of brutes, unless we were used to it, would strike us as a great\nmystery. It is one peculiarity of animal natures to be susceptible of\nphenomena through the channels of sense; it is another to have in those\nsensible phenomena a perception of the individuals to which this or\nthat group of them belongs. This perception of individual things, amid\nthe maze of shapes and colours which meets their sight, is given to\nbrutes in large measures, and that, apparently from the moment of their\nbirth. It is by no mere physical instinct, such as that which leads him\nto his mother for milk, that the new-dropped lamb recognizes each of\nhis fellow lambkins as a whole, consisting of many parts bound up in\none, and, before he is an hour old, makes experience of his and their\nrival individualities. And much more distinctly do the horse and dog\nrecognize even the personality of their masters. How are we to explain\nthis apprehension of things, which are one and individual, in the midst\nof a world of pluralities and transmutations, whether in the instance\nof brutes or again of children? But until we account for the knowledge\nwhich an infant has of his mother or his nurse, what reason have we\nto take exception at the doctrine, as strange and difficult, that in\nthe dictate of conscience, without previous experiences or analogical\nreasoning, he is able gradually to perceive the voice, or the echoes of\nthe voice, of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign?\n\nI grant, of course, that we cannot assign a date, ever so early,\nbefore which he had learned nothing at all, and formed no mental\nassociations, from the words and conduct of those who have the care of\nhim. But still, if a child of five or six years old, when reason is\nat length fully awake, has already mastered and appropriated thoughts\nand beliefs, in consequence of their teaching, in such sort as to be\nable to handle and apply them familiarly, according to the occasion, as\nprinciples of intellectual action, those beliefs at the very least must\nbe singularly congenial to his mind, if not connatural with its initial\naction. And that such a spontaneous reception of religious truths is\ncommon with children, I shall take for granted, till I am convinced\nthat I am wrong in so doing. The child keenly understands that there\nis a difference between right and wrong; and when he has done what he\nbelieves to be wrong, he is conscious that he is offending One to whom\nhe is amenable, whom he does not see, who sees him. His mind reaches\nforward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a Moral Governor,\nsovereign over him, mindful, and just. It comes to him like an impulse\nof nature to entertain it.\n\nIt is my wish to take an ordinary child, but still one who is safe from\ninfluences destructive of his religious instincts. Supposing he has\noffended his parents, he will all alone and without effort, as if it\nwere the most natural of acts, place himself in the presence of God,\nand beg of Him to set him right with them. Let us consider how much\nis contained in this simple act. First, it involves the impression on\nhis mind of an unseen Being with whom he is in immediate relation, and\nthat relation so familiar that he can address Him whenever he himself\nchooses; next, of One whose goodwill towards him he is assured of,\nand can take for granted\u2014nay, who loves him better, and is nearer to\nhim, than his parents; further, of One who can hear him, wherever he\nhappens to be, and who can read his thoughts, for his prayer need\nnot be vocal; lastly, of One who can effect a critical change in the\nstate of feeling of others towards him. That is, we shall not be wrong\nin holding that this child has in his mind the image of an Invisible\nBeing, who exercises a particular providence among us, who is present\nevery where, who is heart-reading, heart-changing, ever-accessible,\nopen to impetration. What a strong and intimate vision of God must he\nhave already attained, if, as I have supposed, an ordinary trouble of\nmind has the spontaneous effect of leading him for consolation and aid\nto an Invisible Personal Power!\n\nMoreover, this image brought before his mental vision is the image\nof One who by implicit threat and promise commands certain things\nwhich he, the same child, coincidently, by the same act of his mind,\napproves; which receive the adhesion of his moral sense and judgment,\nas right and good. It is the image of One who is good, inasmuch\nas enjoining and enforcing what is right and good, and who, in\nconsequence, not only excites in the child hope and fear,\u2014nay (it may\nbe added), gratitude towards Him, as giving a law and maintaining it by\nreward and punishment,\u2014but kindles in him love towards Him, as giving\nhim a good law, and therefore as being good Himself, for it is the\nproperty of goodness to kindle love, or rather the very object of love\nis goodness; and all those distinct elements of the moral law, which\nthe typical child, whom I am supposing, more or less consciously loves\nand approves,\u2014truth, purity, justice, kindness, and the like,\u2014are but\nshapes and aspects of goodness. And having in his degree a sensibility\ntowards them all, for the sake of them all he is moved to love the\nLawgiver, who enjoins them upon him. And, as he can contemplate\nthese qualities and their manifestations under the common name of\ngoodness, he is prepared to think of them as indivisible, correlative,\nsupplementary of each other in one and the same Personality, so that\nthere is no aspect of goodness which God is not; and that the more,\nbecause the notion of a perfection embracing all possible excellences,\nboth moral and intellectual, is especially congenial to the mind, and\nthere are in fact intellectual attributes, as well as moral, included\nin the child\u2019s image of God, as above represented.\n\nSuch is the apprehension which even a child may have of his Sovereign\nLawgiver and Judge; which is possible in the case of children, because,\nat least, some children possess it, whether others possess it or no;\nand which, when it is found in children, is found to act promptly and\nkeenly, by reason of the paucity of their ideas. It is an image of the\ngood God, good in Himself, good relatively to the child, with whatever\nincompleteness; an image before it has been reflected on, and before it\nis recognized by him as a notion. Though he cannot explain or define\nthe word \u201cGod,\u201d when told to use it, his acts show that to him it is\nfar more than a word. He listens, indeed, with wonder and interest to\nfables or tales; he has a dim, shadowy sense of what he hears about\npersons and matters of this world; but he has that within him which\nactually vibrates, responds, and gives a deep meaning to the lessons of\nhis first teachers about the will and the providence of God.\n\nHow far this initial religious knowledge comes from without, and how\nfar from within, how much is natural, how much implies a special divine\naid which is above nature, we have no means of determining, nor is\nit necessary for my present purpose to determine. I am not engaged\nin tracing the image of God in the mind of a child or a man to its\nfirst origins, but showing that he can become possessed of such an\nimage, over and above all mere notions of God, and in what that image\nconsists. Whether its elements, latent in the mind, would ever be\nelicited without extrinsic help is very doubtful; but whatever be the\nactual history of the first formation of the divine image within us, so\nfar at least is certain, that, by informations external to ourselves,\nas time goes on, it admits of being strengthened and improved. It is\ncertain too, that, whether it grows brighter and stronger, or, on the\nother hand, is dimmed, distorted, or obliterated, depends on each of\nus individually, and on his circumstances. It is more than probable\nthat, in the event, from neglect, from the temptations of life, from\nbad companions, or from the urgency of secular occupations, the light\nof the soul will fade away and die out. Men transgress their sense\nof duty, and gradually lose those sentiments of shame and fear, the\nnatural supplements of transgression, which, as I have said, are the\nwitnesses of the Unseen Judge. And, even were it deemed impossible\nthat those who had in their first youth a genuine apprehension of Him,\ncould ever utterly lose it, yet that apprehension may become almost\nundistinguishable from an inferential acceptance of the great truth, or\nmay dwindle into a mere notion of their intellect. On the contrary, the\nimage of God, if duly cherished, may expand, deepen, and be completed,\nwith the growth of their powers and in the course of life, under the\nvaried lessons, within and without them, which are brought home to them\nconcerning that same God, One and Personal, by means of education,\nsocial intercourse, experience, and literature.\n\nTo a mind thus carefully formed upon the basis of its natural\nconscience, the world, both of nature and of man, does but give back a\nreflection of those truths about the One Living God, which have been\nfamiliar to it from childhood. Good and evil meet us daily as we pass\nthrough life, and there are those who think it philosophical to act\ntowards the manifestations of each with some sort of impartiality, as\nif evil had as much right to be there as good, or even a better, as\nhaving more striking triumphs and a broader jurisdiction. And because\nthe course of things is determined by fixed laws, they consider that\nthose laws preclude the present agency of the Creator in the carrying\nout of particular issues. It is otherwise with the theology of a\nreligious imagination. It has a living hold on truths which are really\nto be found in the world, though they are not upon the surface. It is\nable to pronounce by anticipation, what it takes a long argument to\nprove\u2014that good is the rule, and evil the exception. It is able to\nassume that, uniform as are the laws of nature, they are consistent\nwith a particular Providence. It interprets what it sees around it by\nthis previous inward teaching, as the true key of that maze of vast\ncomplicated disorder; and thus it gains a more and more consistent\nand luminous vision of God from the most unpromising materials. Thus\nconscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his\nCreator; and the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits\nof personal religion. When men begin all their works with the thought\nof God, acting for His sake and to fulfil His will, when they ask His\nblessing on themselves and their life, pray to Him for the objects they\ndesire, and see Him in the event, whether it be according to their\nprayers or not, they will find every thing that happens tend to confirm\nthem in the truth about Him which live in their imagination, varied\nand unearthly as those truths may be. Then they are brought into His\npresence as that of a Living Person, and are able to hold converse with\nHim, and that with a directness and simplicity, with a confidence and\nintimacy, _mutatis mutandis_, which we use towards an earthly superior;\nso that it is doubtful whether we realize the company of our fellow-men\nwith greater keenness than these favoured minds are able to contemplate\nand adore the Unseen, Incomprehensible Creator.\n\nThis vivid apprehension of religious objects, on which I have been\nenlarging, is independent of the written records of Revelation; it\ndoes not require any knowledge of Scripture, nor of the history or the\nteaching of the Catholic Church. It is independent of books. But if\nso much may be traced out in the twilight of Natural Religion, it is\nobvious how great an addition in fulness and exactness is made to our\nmental image of the Divine Personality and Attributes, by the light of\nChristianity. And, indeed, to give us a clear and sufficient object\nfor our faith, is one main purpose of the supernatural Dispensations\nof Religion. This purpose is carried out in the written Word, with\nan effectiveness which inspiration alone could secure, first, by\nthe histories which form so large a portion of the Old Testament;\nand scarcely less impressively in the prophetical system, as it is\ngradually unfolded and perfected in the writings of those who were\nits ministers and spokesmen. And as the exercise of the affections\nstrengthens our apprehension of the object of them, it is impossible to\nexaggerate the influence exerted on the religious imagination by a book\nof devotions so sublime, so penetrating, so full of deep instruction\nas the Psalter, to say nothing of other portions of the Hagiographa.\nAnd then as regards the New Testament, the Gospels, from their subject,\ncontain a manifestation of the Divine Nature, so special, as to make\nit appear from the contrast as if nothing were known of God, when they\nare unknown. Lastly, the Apostolic Epistles, the long history of the\nChurch, with its fresh exhibitions of Divine Agency, the Lives of the\nSaints, and the reasonings, internal collisions, and decisions of the\nTheological School, form an extended comment on the words and works of\nour Lord.\n\nI think I need not say more in illustration of the subject which I\nproposed for consideration in this Section. I have wished to trace\nthe process by which the mind arrives, not only at a notional, but\nat an imaginative or real assent to the doctrine that there is One\nGod, that is, an assent made with an apprehension, not only of what\nthe words of the proposition mean, but of the object denoted by them.\nWithout a proposition or thesis there can be no assent, no belief, at\nall; any more than there can be an inference without a conclusion. The\nproposition that there is One Personal and Present God may be held in\neither way; either as a theological truth, or as a religious fact or\nreality. The notion and the reality assented-to are represented by\none and the same proposition, but serve as distinct interpretations\nof it. When the proposition is apprehended for the purposes of proof,\nanalysis, comparison, and the like intellectual exercises, it is used\nas the expression of a notion; when for the purposes of devotion, it\nis the image of a reality. Theology, properly and directly, deals with\nnotional apprehension; religion with imaginative.\n\nHere we have the solution of the common mistake of supposing that there\nis a contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital\nreligion. People urge that salvation consists, not in believing the\npropositions that there is a God, that there is a Saviour, that our\nLord is God, that there is a Trinity, but in believing in God, in a\nSaviour, in a Sanctifier; and they object that such propositions are\nbut a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the\nGospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead\nof its having its seat in the heart. They are right so far as this,\nthat men can and sometimes do rest in the propositions themselves as\nexpressing intellectual notions; they are wrong, when they maintain\nthat men need do so or always do so. The propositions may and must be\nused, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts, not notions,\nand they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is\never necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals,\nand for our intercourse with others. Again, they are useful in their\ndogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths\non which the religious imagination has to rest. Knowledge must ever\nprecede the exercise of the affections. We feel gratitude and love, we\nfeel indignation and dislike, when we have the informations actually\nput before us which are to kindle those several emotions. We love our\nparents, as our parents, when we know them to be our parents; we must\nknow concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust\ntowards Him. Devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being\nsupernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols,\nmust be set before the mind in propositions. The formula, which\nembodies a dogma for the theologian, readily suggests an object for the\nworshipper. It seems a truism to say, yet it is all that I have been\nsaying, that in religion the imagination and affections should always\nbe under the control of reason. Theology may stand as a substantive\nscience, though it be without the life of religion; but religion\ncannot maintain its ground at all without theology. Sentiment, whether\nimaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay,\nwhen sense cannot be called into exercise; and it is in this way that\ndevotion falls back upon dogma.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Belief in the Holy Trinity.\n\n\nOf course I cannot hope to carry all inquiring minds with me in what\nI have been laying down in the foregoing Section. I have appealed to\nthe testimony given implicitly by our conscience to the Divine Being\nand His Attributes, and there are those, I know, whose experience\nwill not respond to the appeal:\u2014doubtless; but are there any truths\nwhich have reality, whether of experience or of reason, which are\nnot disputed by some schools of philosophy or some bodies of men? If\nwe assume nothing but what has universal reception, the field of our\npossible discussions will suffer much contraction; so that it must\nbe considered sufficient in any inquiry, if the principles or facts\nassumed have a large following. This condition is abundantly fulfilled\nas regards the authority and religious meaning of conscience;\u2014that\nconscience is the voice of God has almost grown into a proverb. This\nsolemn dogma is recognized as such by the great mass both of the\nyoung and of the uneducated, by the religious few and the irreligious\nmany. It is proclaimed in the history and literature of nations;\nit has had supporters in all ages, places, creeds, forms of social\nlife, professions, and classes. It has held its ground under great\nintellectual and moral disadvantages; it has recovered its supremacy,\nand ultimately triumphed in the minds of those who had rebelled against\nit. Even philosophers, who have been antagonists on other points, agree\nin recognizing the inward voice of that solemn Monitor, personal,\nperemptory, unargumentative, irresponsible, minatory, definitive. This\nI consider relieves me of the necessity of arguing with those who would\nresolve our sense of right and wrong into a sense of the Expedient or\nthe Beautiful, or would refer its authoritative suggestions to the\neffect of teaching or of association. There are those who can see and\nhear for all the common purposes of life, yet have no eye for colours\nor their shades, or no ear for music; moreover, there are degrees of\nsensibility to colours and to sounds, in the comparison of man with\nman, while some men are stone-blind or stone-deaf. Again, all men, as\ntime goes on, have the prospect of losing that keenness of sight and\nhearing which they possessed in their youth; and so, in like manner,\nwe may lose in manhood and in age that sense of a Supreme Teacher\nand Judge which was the gift of our first years; and that the more,\nbecause in most men the imagination suffers from the lapse of time and\nthe experience of life, long before the bodily senses fail. And this\naccords with the advice of the sacred writer to \u201cremember our Creator\nin the days of our youth,\u201d while our moral sensibilities are fresh,\n\u201cbefore the sun and the light and the moon and the stars be darkened,\nand the clouds return after the rain.\u201d Accordingly, if there be those\nwho deny that the dictate of conscience is ever more than a taste, or\nan association, it is a less difficulty to me to believe that they are\ndeficient either in the religious sense or in their memory of early\nyears, than that they never had at all what those around them without\nhesitation profess to have received from nature.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nSo much on the doctrine of the Being and Attributes of God, and of\nthe real apprehension with which we can contemplate and assent to\nit:\u2014now I turn to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, with the purpose of\ninvestigating in like manner how far it belongs to theology, how far\nto the faith and devotion of the individual; how far the propositions\nenunciating it are confined to the expression of intellectual notions,\nand how far they stand for things also, and admit of that assent which\nwe give to objects presented to us by the imagination. And first I have\nto state what our doctrine is.\n\nNo one is to be called a Theist, who does not believe in a Personal\nGod, whatever difficulty there may be in defining the word \u201cPersonal.\u201d\nNow it is the belief of Catholics about the Supreme Being, that\nthis essential characteristic of His Nature is reiterated in three\ndistinct ways or modes; so that the Almighty God, instead of being\nOne Person only, which is the teaching of Natural Religion, has Three\nPersonalities, and is at once, according as we view Him in the one or\nthe other of them, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit\u2014a Divine Three,\nwho bear towards Each Other the several relations which those names\nindicate, and are in that respect distinct from Each Other, and in that\nalone.\n\nThis is the teaching of the Athanasian Creed; viz. that the One\nPersonal God, who is not a logical or physical unity, but a Living\n_Monas_, more really one even than an individual man is one\u2014He\n(\u201cunus,\u201d not \u201cunum,\u201d because of the inseparability of His Nature and\nPersonality),\u2014He at once is Father, is Son, is Holy Ghost, Each of whom\nis that One Personal God in the fulness of His Being and Attributes; so\nthat the Father is all that is meant by the word \u201cGod,\u201d as if we knew\nnothing of Son, or of Spirit; and in like manner the Son and the Spirit\nare Each by Himself all that is meant by the word, as if the Other Two\nwere unknown; moreover, that by the word \u201cGod\u201d is meant nothing over\nand above what is meant by the \u201cFather,\u201d or by \u201cthe Son,\u201d or by \u201cthe\nHoly Ghost;\u201d and that the Father is in no sense the Son, nor the Son\nthe Holy Ghost, nor the Holy Ghost the Father. Such is the prerogative\nof the Divine Infinitude, that that One and Single Personal Being, the\nAlmighty God, is really Three, while He is absolutely One.\n\nIndeed, the Catholic dogma may be said to be summed up in this very\nformula on which St. Augustine lays so much stress, \u201cTres et Unus,\u201d\nnot merely \u201cUnum;\u201d hence that formula is the key-note, as it may be\ncalled, of the Athanasian Creed. In that Creed we testify to the Unus\nIncreatus, to the Unus Immensus, Omnipotens, Deus, and Dominus; yet\nEach of the Three also is by Himself Increatus, Immensus, Omnipotens,\nfor Each is that One God, though Each is not the Other; Each, as\nis intimated by Unus Increatus, is the One Personal God of Natural\nReligion.\n\nThat this doctrine, thus drawn out, is of a notional character, is\nplain; the question before me is whether in any sense it can become the\nobject of real apprehension, that is, whether any portion of it may be\nconsidered as addressed to the imagination, and is able to exert that\nliving mastery over the mind, which is instanced as I have shown above,\nas regards the proposition, \u201cThere is a God.\u201d\n\n\u201cThere is a God,\u201d when really apprehended, is the object of a strong\nenergetic adhesion, which works a revolution in the mind; but when held\nmerely as a notion, it requires but a cold and ineffective acceptance,\nthough it be held ever so unconditionally. Such in its character is the\nassent of thousands, whose imaginations are not at all kindled, nor\ntheir hearts inflamed, nor their conduct affected, by the most august\nof all conceivable truths. I ask, then, as concerns the doctrine of\nthe Holy Trinity, such as I have drawn it out to be, is it capable of\nbeing apprehended otherwise than notionally? Is it a theory, undeniable\nindeed, but addressed to the student, and to no one else? Is it the\nelaborate, subtle, triumphant exhibition of a truth, completely\ndeveloped, and happily adjusted, and accurately balanced on its centre,\nand impregnable on every side, as a scientific view, \u201ctotus, teres,\natque rotundus,\u201d challenging all assailants, or, on the other hand,\ndoes it come to the unlearned, the young, the busy, and the afflicted,\nas a fact which is to arrest them, penetrate them, and to support and\nanimate them in their passage through life? That is, does it admit of\nbeing held in the imagination, and being embraced with a real assent? I\nmaintain it does, and that it is the normal faith which every Christian\nhas, on which he is stayed, which is his spiritual life, there being\nnothing in the exposition of the dogma, as I have given it above, which\ndoes not address the imagination, as well as the intellect.\n\nNow let us observe what is not in that exposition;\u2014there are no\nscientific terms in it. I will not allow that \u201cPersonal\u201d is such,\nbecause it is a word in common use, and though it cannot mean\nprecisely the same when used of God as when it is used of man, yet it\nis sufficiently explained by that common use, to allow of its being\nintelligibly applied to the Divine Nature. The other words, which occur\nin the above account of the doctrine,\u2014Three, One, He, God, Father, Son,\nSpirit,\u2014are none of them words peculiar to theology, have all a popular\nmeaning, and are used according to that obvious and popular meaning,\nwhen introduced into the Catholic dogma. No human words indeed are\nworthy of the Supreme Being, none are adequate; but we have no other\nwords to use but human, and those in question are among the simplest\nand most intelligible that are to be found in language.\n\nThere are then no terms in the foregoing exposition which do not admit\nof a plain sense, and they are there used in that sense; and, moreover,\nthat sense is what I have called real, for the words in their ordinary\nuse stand for things. The words, Father, Son, Spirit, He, One, and\nthe rest, are not abstract terms, but concrete, and adapted to excite\nimages. And these words thus simple and clear, are embodied in simple,\nclear, brief, categorical propositions. There is nothing abstruse\neither in the terms themselves, or in their setting. It is otherwise\nof course with formal theological treatises on the subject of the\ndogma. There we find such words as substance, essence, existence, form,\nsubsistence, notion, circumincession; and, though these are far easier\nto understand than might at first sight be thought, still they are\ndoubtless addressed to the intellect, and can only command a notional\nassent.\n\nIt will be observed also that not even the words \u201cmysteriousness\u201d\nand \u201cmystery\u201d occur in the exposition which I have above given of\nthe doctrine; I omitted them, because they are not parts of the\nDivine Verity as such, but in relation to creatures and to the human\nintellect; and because they are of a notional character. It is plain\nof course even at first sight that the doctrine is an inscrutable\nmystery, or has an inscrutable mysteriousness; few minds indeed but\nhave theology enough to see this; and if an educated man, to whom it\nis presented, does not perceive that mysteriousness at once, that\nis a sure token that he does not rightly apprehend the propositions\nwhich contain the doctrine. Hence it follows that the thesis \u201cthe\ndoctrine of the Holy Trinity in Unity is mysterious\u201d is indirectly an\narticle of faith. But such an article, being a reflection made upon a\nrevealed truth in an inference, expresses a notion, not a thing. It\ndoes not relate to the direct apprehension of the object, but to a\njudgment of our reason upon the object. Accordingly the mysteriousness\nof the doctrine is not, strictly speaking, intrinsical to it, as it\nis proposed to the religious apprehension, though in matter of fact\na devotional mind, on perceiving that mysteriousness, will lovingly\nappropriate it, as involved in the divine revelation; and, as such a\nmind turns all thoughts which come before it to a sacred use, so will\nit dwell upon the Mystery of the Trinity with awe and veneration, as a\ntruth befitting, so to say, the Immensity and Incomprehensibility of\nthe Supreme Being.\n\nHowever, I do not put forward the mystery as the direct object of real\nor religious apprehension; nor again, the complex doctrine (when it is\nviewed, _per modum unius_, as one whole), in which the mystery lies.\nLet it be observed, it is possible for the mind to hold a number of\npropositions either in their combination as one whole, or one by one;\none by one, with an intelligent perception indeed of each, and of the\ngeneral direction of each towards the rest, yet of each separately\nfrom the rest, for its own sake only, and not in connexion and one\nwith the rest. Thus I may know London quite well, and find my way from\nstreet to street in any part of it without difficulty, yet be quite\nunable to draw a map of it. Comparison, calculation, cataloguing,\narranging, classifying, are intellectual acts subsequent upon, and not\nnecessary for, a real apprehension of the things on which they are\nexercised. Strictly speaking then, the dogma of the Holy Trinity, as a\ncomplex whole, or as a mystery, is not the formal object of religious\napprehension and assent; but as a number of propositions, taken one\nby one. That mystery also is of course the object of assent, but it\nis the notional object; and when presented to religious minds, it is\nreceived by them notionally; and again implicitly, viz. in the real\nassent which they give to the word of God as conveyed to them through\nthe instrumentality of His Church. On these points it may be right to\nenlarge.\n\nOf course, as I have been saying, a man of ordinary intelligence\nwill be at once struck with the apparent contrariety between the\npropositions one with another which constitute the Heavenly Dogma,\nand, by reason of his spontaneous activity of mind and by an habitual\nassociation, he will be compelled to view the Dogma in the light\nof that contrariety,\u2014so much so, that to hold one and all of these\nseparate propositions will be to such a man all one with holding\nthe mystery, as a mystery; and in consequence he will so hold\nit;\u2014but still, I say, so far he will hold it only with a notional\napprehension. He will accurately take in the meaning of each of the\ndogmatic propositions in its relation to the rest of them, combining\nthem into one whole and embracing what he cannot realize, with an\nassent, notional indeed, but as genuine and thorough as any real assent\ncan be. But the question is whether a real assent to the mystery,\nas such, is possible; and I say it is not possible, because, while\nwe can image the separate propositions, we cannot image them all\ntogether. We cannot, because the mystery transcends all our experience;\nwe have no experiences in our memory which we can put together,\ncompare, contrast, unite, and thereby transmute into an image of the\nIneffable Verity;\u2014certainly; but what is in some degree a matter of\nexperience, what is presented for the imagination, the affections,\nthe devotion, the spiritual life of the Christian to repose upon\nwith a real assent, what stands for things, not for notions only, is\neach of those propositions taken one by one, and that, not in the\ncase of intellectual and thoughtful minds only, but of all religious\nminds whatever, in the case of a child or a peasant, as well as of a\nphilosopher.\n\nThis is only one instance of a general principle which holds good\nin all such real apprehension as is possible to us, of God and His\nAttributes. Not only do we see Him at best only in shadows, but we\ncannot bring even those shadows together, for they flit to and fro,\nand are never present to us at once. We can indeed combine the various\nmatters which we know of Him by an act of the intellect, and treat them\ntheologically, but such theological combinations are no objects for the\nimagination to gaze upon. Our image of Him never is one, but broken\ninto numberless partial aspects, independent each of each. As we cannot\nsee the whole starry firmament at once, but have to turn ourselves\nfrom east to west, and then round to east again, sighting first one\nconstellation and then another, and losing these in order to gain\nthose, so it is, and much more, with such real apprehensions as we can\nsecure of the Divine Nature. We know one truth about Him and another\ntruth,\u2014but we cannot image both of them together; we cannot bring them\nbefore us by one act of the mind; we drop the one while we turn to take\nup the other. None of them are fully dwelt on and enjoyed, when they\nare viewed in combination. Moreover, our devotion is tried and confused\nby the long list of propositions which theology is obliged to draw up,\nby the limitations, explanations, definitions, adjustments, balancings,\ncautions, arbitrary prohibitions, which are imperatively required by\nthe weakness of human thought and the imperfections of human language.\nSuch exercises of reasoning indeed do but increase and harmonize\nour notional apprehension of the dogma, but they add little to the\nluminousness and vital force with which its separate propositions come\nhome to our imagination, and if they are necessary, as they certainly\nare, they are necessary not so much for faith, as against unbelief.\n\nBreak a ray of light into its constituent colours, each is beautiful,\neach may be enjoyed; attempt to unite them, and perhaps you produce\nonly a dirty white. The pure and indivisible Light is seen only by the\nblessed inhabitants of heaven; here we have but such faint reflections\nof it as its diffraction supplies; but they are sufficient for faith\nand devotion. Attempt to combine them into one, and you gain nothing\nbut a mystery, which you can describe as a notion, but cannot depict as\nan imagination. And this, which holds of the Divine Attributes, holds\nalso of the Holy Trinity in Unity. And hence, perhaps, it is that the\nlatter doctrine is never spoken of as a Mystery in the New Testament,\nwhich is addressed far more to the imagination and affections than to\nthe intellect. Hence, too, what is more remarkable, the dogma is not\ncalled a mystery in the Creeds; not in the Apostles\u2019 nor the Nicene,\nnor even in the Athanasian. The reason seems to be, that the Creeds\nhave a place in the Ritual; they are devotional acts, and of the nature\nof prayers, addressed to God; and, in such addresses, to speak of\nintellectual difficulties would be out of place. It must be recollected\nespecially that the Athanasian Creed has sometimes been called the\n\u201cPsalmus _Quicunque_.\u201d It is not a mere collection of notions, however\nmomentous. It is a psalm or hymn of praise, of confession, and of\nprofound, self-prostrating homage, parallel to the canticles of the\nelect in the Apocalypse. It appeals to the imagination quite as much\nas to the intellect. It is the war-song of faith, with which we warn\nfirst ourselves, then each other, and then all those who are within its\nhearing, and the hearing of the Truth, who our God is, and how we must\nworship Him, and how vast our responsibility will be, if we know what\nto believe, and yet believe not. It is\n\n\n    \u201cThe Psalm that gathers in one glorious lay\n    All chants that e\u2019er from heaven to earth found way;\n    Creed of the Saints, and Anthem of the Blest,\n    And calm-breathed warning of the kindliest love\n    That ever heaved a wakeful mother\u2019s breast.\u201d\n\n\nFor myself, I have ever felt it as the most simple and sublime, the\nmost devotional formulary to which Christianity has given birth,\nmore so even than the _Veni Creator_ and the _Te Deum_. Even the\nantithetical form of its sentences, which is a stumbling-block to\nso many, as seeming to force, and to exult in forcing a mystery\nupon recalcitrating minds, has to my apprehension, even notionally\nconsidered, a very different drift. It is intended as a check upon our\nreasonings, lest they rush on in one direction beyond the limits of the\ntruth, and it turns them back into the opposite direction. Certainly it\nimplies a glorying in the Mystery; but it is not simply a statement of\nthe Mystery for the sake of its mysteriousness.\n\nWhat is more remarkable still, a like silence as to the mysteriousness\nof the doctrine is observed in the successive definitions of the Church\nconcerning it. Confession after confession, canon after canon is drawn\nup in the course of centuries; Popes and Councils have found it their\nduty to insist afresh upon the dogma; they have enunciated it in new\nor additional propositions; but not even in their most elaborate\nformularies do they use the word \u201cmystery,\u201d as far as I know. The\ngreat Council of Toledo pursues the scientific ramifications of the\ndoctrine, with the exact diligence of theology, at a length four times\nthat of the Athanasian Creed; the fourth Lateran completes, by a final\nenunciation, the development of the sacred doctrine after the mind\nof St. Augustine; the Creed of Pope Pius IV. prescribes the general\nrule of faith against the heresies of these latter times; but in none\nof them do we find either the word \u201cmystery,\u201d or any suggestion of\nmysteriousness.\n\nSuch is the usage of the Church in its dogmatic statements concerning\nthe Holy Trinity, as if fulfilling the maxim, \u201cLex orandi, lex\ncredendi.\u201d I suppose it is founded on a tradition, because the\ncustom is otherwise as regards catechisms and theological treatises.\nThese belong to particular ages and places, and are addressed to the\nintellect. In them, certainly, the mysteriousness of the doctrine is\nalmost uniformly insisted on. But, however this contrast of usage\nis to be explained, the Creeds are enough to show that the dogma\nmay be taught in its fulness for the purposes of popular faith and\ndevotion without directly insisting on that mysteriousness, which is\nnecessarily involved in the combined view of its separate propositions.\nThat systematized whole is the object of notional assent, and its\npropositions, one by one, are the objects of real.\n\nTo show this in fact, I will enumerate the separate propositions of\nwhich the dogma consists. They are nine, and stand as follows:\u2014\n\n1. There are Three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word\nor Son, and the Holy Spirit. 2. From the Father is, and ever has been,\nthe Son. 3. From the Father and Son is, and ever has been, the Spirit.\n\n4. The Father is the One Eternal Personal God. 5. The Son is the One\nEternal Personal God. 6. The Spirit is the One Eternal Personal God.\n\n7. The Father is not the Son. 8. The Son is not the Holy Ghost. 9. The\nHoly Ghost is not the Father.\n\nNow I think it is a fact, that, whereas these nine propositions\ncontain the Mystery, yet, taken, not as a whole, but separately,\neach by itself, they are not only apprehensible, but admit of a real\napprehension.\n\nThus, for instance, if the proposition \u201cThere is One who bears witness\nof Himself,\u201d or \u201creveals Himself,\u201d would admit of a real assent, why\ndoes not also the proposition \u201cThere are Three who bear witness\u201d?\n\nAgain, if the word \u201cGod\u201d may create an image in our minds, why may not\nthe proposition \u201cThe Father is God\u201d? or again, \u201cThe Son,\u201d or \u201cThe Holy\nGhost is God\u201d?\n\nAgain, to say that \u201cthe Son is other than the Holy Ghost,\u201d or \u201cneither\nSon nor Holy Ghost is the Father,\u201d is not a simple negative, but also\na declaration that Each of the Divine Three by Himself is complete in\nHimself, and simply and absolutely God as though the Other Two were not\nrevealed to us.\n\nAgain, from our experience of the works of man, we accept with a real\napprehension the proposition \u201cThe Angels are made by God,\u201d correcting\nthe word \u201cmade,\u201d as is required in the case of a creating Power, and a\nspiritual work:\u2014why may we not in like matter refine and elevate the\nhuman analogy, yet keep the image, when a Divine Birth is set before\nus in terms which properly belong to what is human and earthly? If our\nexperience enables us to apprehend the essential fact of sonship, as\nbeing a communication of being and of nature from one to another, why\nshould we not thereby in a certain measure realize the proposition \u201cThe\nWord is the Son of God\u201d?\n\nAgain, we have abundant instances in nature of the general law of\none thing coming from another or from others:\u2014as the child issues\nin the man as his successor, and the child and the man issue in the\nold man, like them both, but not the same, so different as almost\nto have a fresh personality distinct from each, so we may form some\nimage, however vague, of the procession of the Holy Spirit from Father\nand Son. This is what I should say of the propositions which I have\nnumbered two and three, which are the least susceptible of a real\nassent out of the nine.\n\nSo much at first sight; but the force of what I have been saying will\nbe best understood, by considering what Scripture and the Ritual of the\nChurch witness in accordance with it. In referring to these two great\nstore-houses of faith and devotion, I must premise, as when I spoke of\nthe Being of a God, that I am not proving by means of them the dogma of\nthe Holy Trinity, but using the one and the other in illustration of\nthe action of the separate articles of that dogma upon the imagination,\nthough the complex truth, in which, when combined, they issue, is not\nin sympathy or correspondence with it, but altogether beyond it; and\nnext of the action and influence of those separate articles, by means\nof the imagination, upon the affections and obedience of Christians,\nhigh and low.\n\nThis being understood, I ask what chapter of St. John or St. Paul is\nnot full of the Three Divine Names, introduced in one or other of the\nabove nine propositions, expressed or implied, or in their parallels,\nor in parts or equivalents of them? What lesson is there given us by\nthese two chief writers of the New Testament, which does not grow out\nof Their Persons and Their Offices? At one time we read of the grace\nof the Second Person, the love of the First, and the communication\nof the Third; at another we are told by the Son, \u201cI will pray the\nFather, and He will send you another Paraclete;\u201d and then, \u201cAll that\nthe Father hath are Mine; the Paraclete shall receive of Mine.\u201d Then\nagain we read of \u201cthe foreknowledge of the Father, the sanctification\nof the Spirit, the Blood of Jesus Christ;\u201d and again we are to \u201cpray\nin the Holy Ghost, abide in the love of God, and look for the mercy of\nJesus.\u201d And so, in like manner, to Each, in one passage or another, are\nascribed the same titles and works: Each is acknowledged as Lord; Each\nis eternal; Each is Truth; Each is Holiness; Each is all in all; Each\nis Creator; Each wills with a Supreme Will; Each is the Author of the\nnew birth; Each speaks in His ministers; Each is the Revealer; Each is\nthe Lawgiver; Each is the Teacher of the elect; in Each the elect have\nfellowship; Each leads them on; Each raises them from the dead. What is\nall this, but \u201cthe Father Eternal, the Son Eternal, and the Holy Ghost\nEternal; the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Omnipotent; the Father, Son,\nand Holy Ghost God,\u201d of the Athanasian Creed? And if the New Testament\nbe, as it confessedly is, so real in its teaching, so luminous, so\nimpressive, so constraining, so full of images, so sparing in mere\nnotions, whence is this but because, in its references to the Object\nof our supreme worship, it is ever ringing the changes (so to say) on\nthe nine propositions which I have set down, and on the particular\nstatements into which they may be severally resolved?\n\nTake one of them, as an instance, viz. the dogmatic sentence \u201cThe Son\nis God.\u201d What an illustration of the real assent which can be given\nto this proposition, and its power over our affections and emotions,\nis the first half of the first chapter of St. John\u2019s gospel! or again\nthe vision of our Lord in the first chapter of the Apocalypse! or the\nfirst chapter of St. John\u2019s first Epistle! Again, how burning are St.\nPaul\u2019s words when he speaks of our Lord\u2019s crucifixion and death! what\nis the secret of that flame, but this same dogmatic sentence, \u201cThe\nSon is God\u201d? why should the death of the Son be more awful than any\nother death, except that He, though man, was God? And so, again, all\nthrough the Old Testament, what is it which gives an interpretation\nand a persuasive power to so many passages and portions, especially of\nthe Psalms and the Prophets, but this same theological formula, \u201cThe\nMessias is God,\u201d a proposition which never could thus vivify in the\nreligious mind the letter of the sacred text, unless it appealed to the\nimagination, and could be held with a much stronger assent than any\nthat is merely notional.\n\nThis same power of the dogma may be illustrated from the Ritual.\nConsider the services for Christmas or Epiphany; for Easter, Ascension,\nand (I may say) pre-eminently Corpus Christi; what are these great\nFestivals but comments on the words, \u201cThe Son is God\u201d? Yet who will\nsay that they have the subtlety, the aridity, the coldness of mere\nscholastic science? Are they addressed to the pure intellect, or to\nthe imagination? do they interest our logical faculty, or excite\nour devotion? Why is it that personally we often find ourselves so\nill-fitted to take part in them, except that we are not good enough,\nthat in our case the dogma is far too much a theological notion, far\ntoo little an image living within us? And so again, as to the Divinity\nof the Holy Ghost: consider the breviary offices for Pentecost and\nits Octave, the grandest perhaps in the whole year; are they created\nout of mere abstractions and inferences, or has not the categorical\nproposition of St. Athanasius, \u201cThe Holy Ghost is God,\u201d such a place in\nthe imagination and the heart, as suffices to give birth to the noble\nHymns, _Veni Creator_, and _Veni Sancte Spiritus_?\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI sum up then to the same effect as in the preceding Section. Religion\nhas to do with the real, and the real is the particular; theology\nhas to do with what is notional, and the notional is the general and\nsystematic. Hence theology has to do with the dogma of the Holy Trinity\nas a whole made up of many propositions; but Religion has to do with\neach of those separate propositions which compose it, and lives and\nthrives in the contemplation of them. In them it finds the motives for\ndevotion and faithful obedience; while theology on the other hand forms\nand protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not\nmerely one by one, but as a system of truth.\n\nOne other remark is in place here. If the separate articles of the\nAthanasian Creed are so closely connected with vital and personal\nreligion as I have shown them to be, if they supply motives on which a\nman may act, if they determine the state of mind, the special thoughts,\naffections, and habits, which he carries with him from this world to\nthe next, is there cause to wonder, that the Creed should proclaim\naloud, that those who are not internally such as Christ, by means\nof it, came to make them, are not capable of the heaven to which He\ndied to bring them? Is not the importance of accepting the dogma the\nvery explanation of that careful minuteness with which the few simple\ntruths which compose it are inculcated, are reiterated, in the Creed?\nAnd shall the Church of God, to whom \u201cthe dispensation\u201d of the Gospel\nis committed, forget the concomitant obligation, \u201cWoe is unto me if I\npreach not the Gospel\u201d? Are her ministers by their silence to bring\nupon themselves the Prophet\u2019s anathema, \u201cCursed is he that doth the\nwork of the Lord deceitfully\u201d? Can they ever forget the lesson conveyed\nto them in the Apostle\u2019s protestation, \u201cGod is faithful, as our\npreaching which was among you was not Yea and Nay.... For we are a good\nodour of Christ unto God in them that are in the way of salvation, and\nin them that are perishing. For we are not as the many, who adulterate\nthe word of God; but with sincerity, but as from God, in the presence\nof God, so speak we in Christ\u201d?\n\n\n\u00a7 3. Belief in Dogmatic Theology.\n\n\nIt is a familiar charge against the Catholic Church in the mouths of\nher opponents, that she imposes on her children as matters of faith,\nnot only such dogmas as have an intimate bearing on moral conduct and\ncharacter, but a great number of doctrines which none but professed\ntheologians can understand, and which in consequence do but oppress the\nmind, and are the perpetual fuel of controversy. The first who made\nthis complaint was no less a man than the great Constantine, and on no\nless an occasion than the rise of the Arian heresy, which he, as yet\na catechumen, was pleased to consider a trifling and tolerable error.\nSo, deciding the matter, he wrote at once a letter to Alexander, Bishop\nof Alexandria, and to Arius, who was a presbyter in the same city,\nexhorting them to drop the matter in dispute, and to live in peace with\none another. He was answered by the meeting of the Council of Nic\u00e6a,\nand by the insertion of the word \u201cConsubstantial\u201d into the Creed of the\nChurch.\n\nWhat the Emperor thought of the controversy itself, that Bishop Jeremy\nTaylor thought of the insertion of the \u201cConsubstantial,\u201d viz. that\nit was a mischievous affair, and ought never to have taken place. He\nthus quotes and comments on the Emperor\u2019s letter: \u201cThe Epistle of\nConstantine to Alexander and Arius tells the truth, and chides them\nboth for commencing the question, Alexander for broaching it, Arius\nfor taking it up. And although this be true, that it had been better\nfor the Church it had never begun, yet, being begun, what is to be\ndone with it? Of this also, in that admirable epistle, we have the\nEmperor\u2019s judgment (I suppose not without the advice and privity of\nHosius), ... for first he calls it a certain vain piece of a question,\nill begun, and more unadvisedly published,\u2014a question which no law or\necclesiastical canon defineth; a fruitless contention; the product of\nidle brains; a matter so nice, so obscure, so intricate, that it was\nneither to be explicated by the clergy nor understood by the people;\na dispute of words, a doctrine inexplicable, but most dangerous when\ntaught, lest it introduce discord or blasphemy; and, therefore, the\nobjector was rash, and the answer unadvised, for it concerned not the\nsubstance of faith or the worship of God, nor the chief commandment\nof Scripture; and, therefore, why should it be the matter of discord?\nfor though the matter be grave, yet, because neither necessary nor\nexplicable, the contention is trifling and toyish.... So that the\nmatter being of no great importance, but vain and a toy in respect\nof the excellent blessings of peace and charity, it were good that\nAlexander and Arius should leave contending, keep their opinions to\nthemselves, ask each other forgiveness, and give mutual toleration.(4)\u201d\n\nMoreover, Taylor is of opinion that \u201cthey both did believe One God,\nand the Holy Trinity;\u201d an opinion in the teeth of historical fact.\nAlso he is of opinion, that \u201cthat faith is best which hath greatest\nsimplicity, and that it is better in all cases humbly to submit, than\ncuriously to inquire and pry into the mystery under the cloud, and to\nhazard our faith by improving knowledge.\u201d He is, further, of opinion,\nthat \u201cif the Nicene Fathers had done so too, possibly the Church would\nnever have repented it.\u201d He also thinks that their insertion of the\n\u201cConsubstantial\u201d into the Creed was a bad precedent.\n\nWhether it was likely to act as a precedent or not, it has not been\nso in fact, for fifteen hundred years have passed since the Nicene\nCouncil, and it is the one instance of a scientific word having been\nintroduced into the Creed from that day to this. And after all,\nthe word in question has a plain meaning, as the Council used it,\neasily stated and intelligible to all; for \u201cconsubstantial with the\nFather,\u201d means nothing more than \u201creally one with the Father,\u201d being\nadopted to meet the evasion of the Arians. The Creed then remains\nnow what it was in the beginning, a popular form of faith, suited to\nevery age, class, and condition. Its declarations are categorical,\nbrief, clear, elementary, of the first importance, expressive of the\nconcrete, the objects of real apprehension, and the basis and rule\nof devotion. As to the proper Nicene formula itself, excepting the\none term \u201cConsubstantial,\u201d it has not a word which does not relate to\nthe rudimental facts of Christianity. The Niceno-Constantinopolitan\nand the various ante-Nicene Symbols, of which the Apostles\u2019 is one,\nadd summarily one or two notional articles, such as \u201cthe communion of\nSaints,\u201d and \u201cthe forgiveness of sins,\u201d which, however, may be readily\nconverted into real propositions. On the other hand, one chief dogma,\nwhich is easy to popular apprehension, is necessarily absent from all\nof them, the Real Presence; but the omission is owing to the ancient\n\u201cDisciplina Arcani,\u201d which withheld the Sacred Mystery from catechumens\nand heathen, to whom the Creed was known.\n\nSo far the charge which Taylor brings forward has no great\nplausibility; but it is not the whole of his case. I cannot deny that\na large and ever-increasing collection of propositions, abstract\nnotions, not concrete truths, become, by the successive definitions of\nCouncils, a portion of the _credenda_, and have an imperative claim\nupon the faith of every Catholic; and this being the case, it will be\nasked me how I am borne out by facts in enlarging, as I have done, on\nthe simplicity and directness, on the tangible reality, of the Church\u2019s\ndogmatic teaching.\n\nI will suppose the objection urged thus:\u2014why has not the Catholic\nChurch limited her _credenda_ to propositions such as those in her\nCreed, concrete and practical, easy of apprehension, and of a character\nto win assent? such as \u201cChrist is God;\u201d \u201cThis is My Body;\u201d \u201cBaptism\ngives life to the soul;\u201d \u201cThe Saints intercede for us;\u201d \u201cDeath,\njudgment, heaven, hell, the four last things;\u201d \u201cThere are seven gifts\nof the Holy Ghost,\u201d \u201cthree theological virtues,\u201d \u201cseven capital sins,\u201d\nand the like, as they are found in her catechisms. On the contrary,\nshe makes it imperative on every one, priest and layman, to profess\nas revealed truth all the canons of the Councils, and innumerable\ndecisions of Popes, propositions so various, so notional, that but few\ncan know them, and fewer can understand them. What sense, for instance,\ncan a child or a peasant, nay, or any ordinary Catholic, put upon\nthe Tridentine Canons, even in translation? such as, \u201cSiquis dixerit\nhomines sine Christi justiti\u00e2, per quam nobis meruit, justificari, aut\nper eam ipsam formaliter justos esse, anathema sit;\u201d or \u201cSiquis dixerit\njustificatum peccare, dum intuitu \u00e6tern\u00e6 mercedis bene operatur,\nanathema sit.\u201d Or again, consider the very anathema annexed by the\nNicene Council to its Creed, the language of which is so obscure, that\neven theologians differ about its meaning. It runs as follows:\u2014\u201cThose\nwho say that once the Son was not, and before He was begotten He was\nnot, and that He was made out of that which was not, or who pretend\nthat He was of other hypostasis or substance, or that the Son of God is\ncreated, mutable, or alterable, the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church\nanathematizes.\u201d These doctrinal enunciations are _de fide_; peasants\nare bound to believe them as well as controversialists, and to believe\nthem as truly as they believe that our Lord is God. How then are the\nCatholic _credenda_ easy and within reach of all men?\n\nI begin my answer to this objection by recurring to what has already\nbeen said concerning the relation of theology with its notional\npropositions to religious and devotional assent. Devotion is excited\ndoubtless by the plain, categorical truths of revelation, such as the\narticles of the Creed; on these it depends; with these it is satisfied.\nIt accepts them one by one; it is careless about intellectual\nconsistency; it draws from each of them the spiritual nourishment which\nit was intended to supply. Far different, certainly, is the nature and\nduty of the intellect. It is ever active, inquisitive, penetrating;\nit examines doctrine and doctrine; it compares, contrasts, and forms\nthem into a science; that science is theology. Now theological\nscience, being thus the exercise of the intellect upon the _credenda_\nof revelation, is, though not directly devotional, at once natural,\nexcellent, and necessary. It is natural, because the intellect is one\nof our highest faculties; excellent, because it is our duty to use\nour faculties to the full; necessary, because, unless we apply our\nintellect to revealed truth rightly, others will exercise their minds\nupon it wrongly. Accordingly, the Catholic intellect makes a survey\nand a catalogue of the doctrines contained in the _depositum_ of\nrevelation, as committed to the Church\u2019s keeping; it locates, adjusts,\ndefines them each, and brings them together into a whole. Moreover,\nit takes particular aspects or portions of them; it analyzes them,\nwhether into first principles really such, or into hypotheses of an\nillustrative character. It forms generalizations, and gives names to\nthem. All these deductions are true, if rightly deduced, because they\nare deduced from what is true; and therefore in one sense they are a\nportion of the _depositum_ of faith or _credenda_, while in another\nsense they are additions to it: however, additions or not, they have,\nI readily grant, the characteristic disadvantage of being abstract and\nnotional statements.\n\nNor is this all: error gives opportunity to many more additions than\ntruth. There is another set of deductions, inevitable also, and also\npart or not part of the revealed _credenda_, according as we please\nto view them. If a proposition is true, its contradictory is false.\nIf then a man believes that Christ is God, he believes also, and that\nnecessarily, that to say He is not God is false, and that those who\nso say are in error. Here then again the prospect opens upon us of a\ncountless multitude of propositions, which in their first elements\nare close upon devotional truth,\u2014of groups of propositions, and those\ngroups divergent, independent, ever springing into life with an\ninexhaustible fecundity, according to the ever-germinating forms of\nheresy, of which they are the antagonists. These too have their place\nin theological science.\n\nSuch is theology in contrast to religion; and as follows from the\ncircumstances of its formation, though some of its statements easily\nfind equivalents in the language of devotion, the greater number of\nthem are more or less unintelligible to the ordinary Catholic, as\nlaw-books to the private citizen. And especially those portions of\ntheology which are the indirect creation, not of orthodox, but of\nheretical thought, such as the repudiations of error contained in the\nCanons of Councils, of which specimens have been given above, will ever\nbe foreign, strange, and hard to the pious but uncontroversial mind;\nfor what have good Christians to do, in the ordinary course of things,\nwith the subtle hallucinations of the intellect? This is manifest from\nthe nature of the case; but then the question recurs, why should the\nrefutations of heresy be our objects of faith? if no mind, theological\nor not, can believe what it cannot understand, in what sense can the\nCanons of Councils and other ecclesiastical determinations be included\nin those _credenda_ which the Church presents to every Catholic as if\napprehensible, and to which every Catholic gives his firm interior\nassent?\n\nIn solving this difficulty I wish it first observed, that, if it is\nthe duty of the Church to act as \u201cthe pillar and ground of the Truth,\u201d\nshe is manifestly obliged from time to time, and to the end of time,\nto denounce opinions incompatible with that truth, whenever able and\nsubtle minds in her communion venture to publish such opinions. Suppose\ncertain Bishops and priests at this day began to teach that Islamism\nor Buddhism was a direct and immediate revelation from God, she would\nbe bound to use the authority which God has given her to declare that\nsuch a proposition will not stand with Christianity, and that those\nwho hold it are none of hers; and she would be bound to impose such a\ndeclaration on that very knot of persons who had committed themselves\nto the novel proposition, in order that, if they would not recant,\nthey might be separated from her communion, as they were separate\nfrom her faith. In such a case, her masses of population would either\nnot hear of the controversy, or they would at once take part with\nher, and without effort take any test, which secured the exclusion\nof the innovators; and she on the other hand would feel that what is\na rule for some Catholics must be a rule for all. Who is to draw the\nline between who are to acknowledge it, and who are not? It is plain,\nthere cannot be two rules of faith in the same communion, or rather,\nas the case really would be, an endless variety of rules, coming into\nforce according to the multiplication of heretical theories, and to\nthe degrees of knowledge and varieties of sentiment in individual\nCatholics. There is but one rule of faith for all; and it would be a\ngreater difficulty to allow of an uncertain rule of faith, than (if\nthat was the alternative, as it is not), to impose upon uneducated\nminds a profession which they cannot understand.\n\nBut it is not the necessary result of unity of profession, nor is it\nthe fact, that the Church imposes dogmatic statements on the interior\nassent of those who cannot apprehend them. The difficulty is removed\nby the dogma of the Church\u2019s infallibility, and of the consequent duty\nof \u201cimplicit faith\u201d in her word. The \u201cOne Holy Catholic and Apostolic\nChurch\u201d is an article of the Creed, and an article, which, inclusive\nof her infallibility, all men, high and low, can easily master and\naccept with a real and operative assent. It stands in the place of all\nabstruse propositions in a Catholic\u2019s mind, for to believe in her word\nis virtually to believe in them all. Even what he cannot understand, at\nleast he can believe to be true; and he believes it to be true because\nhe believes in the Church.\n\nThe _rationale_ of this provision for unlearned devotion is as\nfollows:\u2014It stands to reason that all of us, learned and unlearned, are\nbound to believe the whole revealed doctrine in all its parts and in\nall that it implies, according as portion after portion is brought home\nto our consciousness as belonging to it; and it also stands to reason,\nthat a doctrine, so deep and so various, as the revealed _depositum_\nof faith, cannot be brought home to us and made our own all at once.\nNo mind, however large, however penetrating, can directly and fully\nby one act understand any one truth, however simple. What can be more\nintelligible than that \u201cAlexander conquered Asia,\u201d or that \u201cVeracity\nis a duty\u201d? but what a multitude of propositions is included under\neither of these theses! still, if we profess either, we profess all\nthat it includes. Thus, as regards the Catholic Creed, if we really\nbelieve that our Lord is God, we believe all that is meant by such a\nbelief; or, else, we are not in earnest, when we profess to believe the\nproposition. In the act of believing it at all, we forthwith commit\nourselves by anticipation to believe truths which at present we do not\nbelieve, because they have never come before us;\u2014we limit henceforth\nthe range of our private judgment in prospect by the conditions,\nwhatever they are, of that dogma. Thus the Arians said that they\nbelieved in our Lord\u2019s divinity, but when they were pressed to confess\nHis eternity, they denied it: thereby showing in fact that they never\nhad believed in His divinity at all. In other words, a man who really\nbelieves in our Lord\u2019s proper divinity, believes _implicit\u00e8_ in His\neternity.\n\nAnd so, in like manner, of the whole _depositum_ of faith, or the\nrevealed word:\u2014if we believe in the revelation, we believe in what is\nrevealed, in all that is revealed, however it may be brought home to\nus, by reasoning or in any other way. He who believes that Christ is\nthe Truth, and that the Evangelists are truthful, believes all that\nHe has said through them, though he has only read St. Matthew and has\nnot read St. John. He who believes in the _depositum_ of Revelation,\nbelieves in all the doctrines of the _depositum_; and since he cannot\nknow them all at once, he knows some doctrines, and does not know\nothers; he may know only the Creed, nay, perhaps only the chief\nportions of the Creed; but, whether he knows little or much, he has\nthe intention of believing all that there is to believe, whenever and\nas soon as it is brought home to him, if he believes in Revelation at\nall. All that he knows now as revealed, and all that he shall know, and\nall that there is to know, he embraces it all in his intention by one\nact of faith; otherwise, it is but an accident that he believes this or\nthat, not because it is a revelation. This virtual, interpretative, or\nprospective belief is called a believing _implicit\u00e8_; and it follows\nfrom this, that, granting that the Canons of Councils and the other\necclesiastical documents and confessions, to which I have referred, are\nreally involved in the _depositum_ or revealed word, every Catholic,\nin accepting the _depositum_, does _implicit\u00e8_ accept those dogmatic\ndecisions.\n\nI say, \u201cgranting these various propositions are virtually contained in\nthe revealed word,\u201d for this is the only question left; and that it is\nto be answered in the affirmative, is clear at once to the Catholic,\nfrom the fact that the Church declares that they really belong to it.\nTo her is committed the care and the interpretation of the revelation.\nThe word of the Church is the word of the revelation. That the Church\nis the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the\nCatholic religion; and \u201cI believe what the Church proposes to be\nbelieved\u201d is an act of real assent, including all particular assents,\nnotional and real; and, while it is possible for unlearned as well as\nlearned, it is imperative on learned as well as unlearned. And thus it\nis, that by believing the word of the Church _implicit\u00e8_, that is, by\nbelieving all that that word does or shall declare itself to contain,\nevery Catholic, according to his intellectual capacity, supplements\nthe shortcomings of his knowledge without blunting his real assent to\nwhat is elementary, and takes upon himself from the first the whole\ntruth of revelation, progressing from one apprehension of it to another\naccording to his opportunities of doing so.\n\n\n\n\nPART II. ASSENT AND INFERENCE.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VI. Assent Considered As Unconditional.\n\n\nI have now said as much as need be said about the relation of Assent\nto Apprehension, and shall turn to the consideration of the relation\nexisting between Assent and Inference.\n\nAs apprehension is a concomitant, so inference is ordinarily the\nantecedent of assent;\u2014on this surely I need not enlarge;\u2014but neither\napprehension nor inference interferes with the unconditional character\nof the assent, viewed in itself. The circumstances of an act, however\nnecessary to it, do not enter into the act; assent is in its nature\nabsolute and unconditional, though it cannot be given except under\ncertain conditions.\n\nThis is obvious; but what presents some difficulty is this, how it is\nthat a conditional acceptance of a proposition,\u2014such as is an act of\ninference,\u2014is able to lead, as it does, to an unconditional acceptance\nof it,\u2014such as is assent; how it is that a proposition which is not,\nand cannot be, demonstrated, which at the highest can only be proved\nto be truth-like, not true, such as \u201cI shall die,\u201d nevertheless\nclaims and receives our unqualified adhesion. To the consideration\nof this paradox, as it may be called, I shall now proceed; that is,\nto the consideration, first, of the act of assent to a proposition,\nwhich act is unconditional; next, of the act of inference, which goes\nbefore the assent and is conditional; and, thirdly, of the solution\nof the apparent inconsistency which is involved in holding that an\nunconditional acceptance of a proposition can be the result of its\nconditional verification.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Simple Assent.\n\n\nThe doctrine which I have been enunciating requires such careful\nexplanation, that it is not wonderful that writers of great ability\nand name are to be found who have put it aside for a doctrine of their\nown; but no doctrine on the subject is without its difficulties, and\ncertainly not theirs, though it carries with it a show of common sense.\nThe authors to whom I refer wish to maintain that there are degrees\nof assent, and that, as the reasons for a proposition are strong or\nweak, so is the assent. It follows from this that absolute assent\nhas no legitimate exercise, except as ratifying acts of intuition or\ndemonstration. What is thus brought home to us is indeed to be accepted\nunconditionally; but, as to reasonings in concrete matters, they are\nnever more than probabilities, and the probability in each conclusion\nwhich we draw is the measure of our assent to that conclusion. Thus\nassent becomes a sort of necessary shadow, following upon inference,\nwhich is the substance; and is never without some alloy of doubt,\nbecause inference in the concrete never reaches more than probability.\n\nSuch is what may be called the _\u00e0 priori_ method of regarding assent\nin its relation to inference. It condemns an unconditional assent in\nconcrete matters on what may be called the nature of the case. Assent\ncannot rise higher than its source; inference in such matters is at\nbest conditional, therefore assent is conditional also.\n\nAbstract argument is always dangerous, and this instance is no\nexception to the rule; I prefer to go by facts. The theory to which\nI have referred cannot be carried out in practice. It may be rightly\nsaid to prove too much; for it debars us from unconditional assent\nin cases in which the common voice of mankind, the advocates of this\ntheory included, would protest against the prohibition. There are many\ntruths in concrete matter, which no one can demonstrate, yet every one\nunconditionally accepts; and though of course there are innumerable\npropositions to which it would be absurd to give an absolute assent,\nstill the absurdity lies in the circumstances of each particular\ncase, as it is taken by itself, not in their common violation of the\npretentious axiom that probable reasoning can never lead to certitude.\n\nLocke\u2019s remarks on the subject are an illustration of what I have been\nsaying. This celebrated writer, after the manner of his school, speaks\nfreely of degrees of assent, and considers that the strength of assent\ngiven to each proposition varies with the strength of the inference on\nwhich the assent follows; yet he is obliged to make exceptions to his\ngeneral principle,\u2014exceptions, unintelligible on his abstract doctrine,\nbut demanded by the logic of facts. The practice of mankind is too\nstrong for the antecedent theorem, to which he is desirous to subject\nit.\n\nFirst he says, in his chapter \u201cOn Probability,\u201d \u201cMost of the\npropositions we think, reason, discourse, nay, act upon, are such as\nwe cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth; yet some of them\n_border so near_ upon certainty, that we _make no doubt at all_ about\nthem, but _assent_ to them _as firmly_, and act according to that\nassent as resolutely, _as if they were infallibly demonstrated_, and\nthat our knowledge of them was perfect and certain.\u201d Here he allows\nthat inferences, which are only \u201cnear upon certainty,\u201d are so near,\nthat we legitimately accept them with \u201cno doubt at all,\u201d and \u201cassent to\nthem as firmly as if they were infallibly demonstrated.\u201d That is, he\naffirms and sanctions the very paradox to which I am committed myself.\n\nAgain; he says, in his chapter on \u201cThe Degrees of Assent,\u201d that\n\u201cwhen any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation of\nourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the concurrent\nreports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as\nfirmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge, and we reason and act\nthereupon, _with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration_.\u201d\nAnd he repeats, \u201cThese _probabilities_ rise so near to certainty,\nthat they _govern our thoughts as absolutely_, and influence all our\nactions as fully, as _the most evident demonstration_; and in what\nconcerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain\nknowledge. _Our belief thus grounded, rises to assurance._\u201d Here\nagain, \u201cprobabilities\u201d may be so strong as to \u201cgovern our thoughts as\nabsolutely\u201d as sheer demonstration, so strong that belief, grounded on\nthem, \u201crises to assurance,\u201d that is, certitude.\n\nI have so high a respect both for the character and the ability of\nLocke, for his manly simplicity of mind and his outspoken candour, and\nthere is so much in his remarks upon reasoning and proof in which I\nfully concur, that I feel no pleasure in considering him in the light\nof an opponent to views, which I myself have ever cherished as true\nwith an obstinate devotion; and I would willingly think that in the\npassage which follows in his chapter on \u201cEnthusiasm,\u201d he is aiming at\nsuperstitious extravagances which I should repudiate myself as much as\nhe can do; but, if so, his words go beyond the occasion, and contradict\nwhat I have quoted from him above.\n\n\u201cHe that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought, in the\nfirst place, to prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves\nit not will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when\nhe misses it. There is nobody, in the commonwealth of learning, who\ndoes not profess himself a lover of truth,\u2014and there is not a rational\ncreature, that would not take it amiss, to be thought otherwise of.\nAnd yet, for all this, one may truly say, there are very few lovers\nof truth, for truth-sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves\nthat they are so. How a man may know, whether he be so, in earnest, is\nworth inquiry; and I think, there is this one unerring mark of it, viz.\n_the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the\nproofs it is built on will warrant_. Whoever goes beyond this measure\nof assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it, loves\nnot truth for truth-sake, but for some other by-end. For the evidence\nthat any proposition is true (_except such as are self-evident_) lying\nonly in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he\naffords it _beyond the degrees of that_ evidence, it is plain _all\nthat surplusage of assurance_ is owing to some other affection, and\nnot to the love of truth; it being as _impossible_ that the love of\ntruth should carry _my assent above the evidence_ there is to me that\nit is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any\nproposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is\ntrue; which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible\nor probable that it may not be true.(5)\u201d\n\nHere he says that it is not only illogical, but immoral to \u201ccarry our\n_assent above_ the _evidence_ that a proposition is true,\u201d to have \u201ca\nsurplusage of _assurance beyond_ the degrees of that evidence.\u201d And\nhe excepts from this rule only self-evident propositions. How then\nis it not inconsistent with right reason, with the love of truth for\nits own sake, to allow, in his words quoted above, certain strong\n\u201cprobabilities\u201d to \u201cgovern our thoughts as absolutely as the most\nevident demonstration\u201d? how is there no \u201csurplusage of assurance\nbeyond the degrees of evidence\u201d when in the case of those strong\nprobabilities, we permit \u201cour belief, thus grounded, to rise to\nassurance,\u201d as he pronounces we are rational in doing? Of course he\nhad in view one set of instances, when he implied that demonstration\nwas the condition of absolute assent, and another set when he said\nthat it was no such condition; but he surely cannot be acquitted of\nslovenly thinking in thus treating a cardinal subject. A philosopher\nshould so anticipate the application, and guard the enunciation of his\nprinciples, as to secure them against the risk of their being made to\nchange places with each other, to defend what he is eager to denounce,\nand to condemn what he finds it necessary to sanction. However,\nwhatever is to be thought of his _\u00e0 priori_ method and his logical\nconsistency, his _animus_, I fear, must be understood as hostile to\nthe doctrine which I am going to maintain. He takes a view of the\nhuman mind, in relation to inference and assent, which to me seems\ntheoretical and unreal. Reasonings and convictions which I deem natural\nand legitimate, he apparently would call irrational, enthusiastic,\nperverse, and immoral; and that, as I think, because he consults his\nown ideal of how the mind ought to act, instead of interrogating human\nnature, as an existing thing, as it is found in the world. Instead of\ngoing by the testimony of psychological facts, and thereby determining\nour constitutive faculties and our proper condition, and being content\nwith the mind as God has made it, he would form men as he thinks they\nought to be formed, into something better and higher, and calls them\nirrational and immoral, if (so to speak) they take to the water,\ninstead of remaining under the narrow wings of his own arbitrary theory.\n\n1. Now the first question which this theory leads me to consider is,\nwhether there is such an act of the mind as assent at all. If there\nis, it is plain it ought to show itself unequivocally as such, as\ndistinct from other acts. For if a professed act can only be viewed\nas the recessary and immediate repetition of another act, if assent\nis a sort of reproduction and double of an act of inference, if when\ninference determines that a proposition is somewhat, or not a little,\nor a good deal, or very like truth, assent as its natural and normal\ncounterpart says that it is somewhat, or not a little, or a good deal,\nor very like truth, then I do not see what we mean by saying, or why\nwe say at all, that there is any such act. It is simply superfluous,\nin a psychological point of view, and a curiosity of subtle minds,\nand the sooner it is got out of the way the better. When I assent,\nI am supposed, it seems, to do precisely what I do when I infer, or\nrather not quite so much, but something which is included in inferring;\nfor, while the disposition of my mind towards a given proposition is\nidentical in assent and in inference, I merely drop the thought of\nthe premisses when I assent, though not of their influence on the\nproposition inferred. This, then, and no more after all, is what nature\nprescribes; and this, and no more than this, is the conscientious use\nof our faculties, so to assent forsooth as to do nothing else than\ninfer. Then, I say, if this be really the state of the case, if assent\nin no real way differs from inference, it is one and the same thing\nwith it. It is another name for inference, and to speak of it at all\ndoes but mislead. Nor can it fairly be urged as a parallel case that an\nact of conscious recognition, though distinct from an act of knowledge,\nis after all only its repetition. On the contrary, such a recognition\nis a reflex act with its own object, viz. the act of knowledge itself.\nAs well might it be said that the hearing of the notes of my voice is a\nrepetition of the act of singing:\u2014it gives no plausibility then to the\nanomaly I am combating.\n\nI lay it down, then, as a principle that either assent is intrinsically\ndistinct from inference, or the sooner we get rid of the word in\nphilosophy the better. If it be only the echo of an inference, do not\ntreat it as a substantive act; but on the other hand, supposing it be\nnot such an idle repetition, as I am sure it is not, supposing the word\n\u201cassent\u201d does hold a necessary place in language and in thought, if it\ndoes not admit of being confused with concluding and inferring, if the\ntwo words are used for two operations of the intellect which cannot\nchange their character, if in matter of fact they are not always found\ntogether, if they do not vary with each other, if one is sometimes\nfound without the other, if one is strong when the other is weak, if\nsometimes they seem even in conflict with each other, then, since we\nknow perfectly well what an inference is, it comes upon us to consider\nwhat, as distinct from inference, an assent is, and we are, by the very\nfact of its being distinct, advanced one step towards that account of\nit which I think is the true one. The first step then towards deciding\nthe point, will be to inquire what the experience of human life, as it\nis daily brought before us, teaches us of the relation to each other of\ninference and assent.\n\n(1.) First, we know from experience that assents may endure without\nthe presence of the inferential acts upon which they were originally\nelicited. It is plain, that, as life goes on, we are not only inwardly\nformed and changed by the accession of habits, but we are also enriched\nby a great multitude of beliefs and opinions, and that on a variety\nof subjects. These beliefs and opinions, held, as some of them are,\nalmost as first principles, are assents, and they constitute, as it\nwere, the clothing and furniture of the mind. I have already spoken of\nthem under the head of \u201cCredence\u201d and \u201cOpinion.\u201d Sometimes we are fully\nconscious of them; sometimes they are implicit, or only now and then\ncome directly before our reflective faculty. Still they are assents;\nand, when we first admitted them, we had some kind of reason, slight\nor strong, recognized or not, for doing so. However, whatever those\nreasons were, even if we ever realized them, we have long forgotten\nthem. Whether it was the authority of others, or our own observation,\nor our reading, or our reflections, which became the warrant of our\nassent, any how we received the matters in question into our minds as\ntrue, and gave them a place there. We assented to them, and we still\nassent, though we have forgotten what the warrant was. At present they\nare self-sustained in our minds, and have been so for long years; they\nare in no sense conclusions; they imply no process of thought. Here\nthen is a case in which assent stands out as distinct from inference.\n\n(2.) Again; sometimes assent fails, while the reasons for it and the\ninferential act which is the recognition of those reasons, are still\npresent, and in force. Our reasons may seem to us as strong as ever,\nyet they do not secure our assent. Our beliefs, founded on them, were\nand are not; we cannot perhaps tell when they went; we may have thought\nthat we still held them, till something happened to call our attention\nto the state of our minds, and then we found that our assent had become\nan assertion. Sometimes, of course, a cause may be found why they\nwent; there may have been some vague feeling that a fault lay at the\nultimate basis, or in the underlying conditions, of our reasonings; or\nsome misgiving that the subject-matter of them was beyond the reach\nof the human mind; or a consciousness that we had gained a broader\nview of things in general than when we first gave our assent; or that\nthere were strong objections to our first convictions, which we had\nnever taken into account. But this is not always so; sometimes our mind\nchanges so quickly, so unaccountably, so disproportionately to any\ntangible arguments to which the change can be referred, and with such\nabiding recognition of the force of the old arguments, as to suggest\nthe suspicion that moral causes, arising out of our condition, age,\ncompany, occupations, fortunes, are at the bottom. However, what once\nwas assent is gone; yet the perception of the old arguments remains,\nshowing that inference is one thing, and assent another.\n\n(3.) And as assent sometimes dies out without tangible reasons,\nsufficient to account for its failure, so sometimes, in spite of strong\nand convincing arguments, it is never given. We sometimes find men loud\nin their admiration of truths which they never profess. As, by the law\nof our mental constitution, obedience is quite distinct from faith,\nand men may believe without practising, so is assent also independent\nof our acts of inference. Again, prejudice hinders assent to the most\nincontrovertible proofs. Again, it not unfrequently happens, that while\nthe keenness of the ratiocinative faculty enables a man to see the\nultimate result of a complicated problem in a moment, it takes years\nfor him to embrace it as a truth, and to recognize it as an item in the\ncircle of his knowledge. Yet he does at last so accept it, and then we\nsay that he assents.\n\n(4.) Again; very numerous are the cases, in which good arguments,\nand really good as far as they go, and confessed by us to be good,\nnevertheless are not strong enough to incline our minds ever so little\nto the conclusion at which they point. But why is it that we do not\nassent a little, in proportion to those arguments? On the contrary, we\nthrow the full _onus probandi_ on the side of the conclusion, and we\nrefuse to assent to it at all, until we can assent to it altogether.\nThe proof is capable of growth; but the assent either exists or does\nnot exist.\n\n(5.) I have already alluded to the influence of moral motives in\nhindering assent to conclusions which are logically unimpeachable.\nAccording to the couplet,\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cA man convinced against his will\n    Is of the same opinion still;\u201d\u2014\n\n\nassent then is not the same as inference.\n\n(6.) Strange as it may seem, this contrast between inference and assent\nis exemplified even in the province of mathematics. Argument is not\nalways able to command our assent, even though it be demonstrative.\nSometimes of course it forces its way, that is, when the steps of the\nreasoning are few, and admit of being viewed by the mind altogether.\nCertainly, one cannot conceive a man having before him the series of\nconditions and truths on which it depends that the three angles of a\ntriangle are together equal to two right angles, and yet not assenting\nto that proposition. Were all propositions as plain, though assent\nwould not in consequence be the same act as inference, yet it would\ncertainly follow immediately upon it. I allow then as much as this,\nthat, when an argument is in itself and by itself conclusive of a\ntruth, it has by a law of our nature the same command over our assent,\nor rather the truth which it has reached has the same command, as our\nsenses have. Certainly our intellectual nature is under laws, and the\ncorrelative of ascertained truth is unreserved assent.\n\nBut I am not speaking of short and lucid demonstrations; but of long\nand intricate mathematical investigations; and in that case, though\nevery step may be indisputable, it still requires a specially sustained\nattention and an effort of memory to have in the mind all at once all\nthe steps of the proof, with their bearings on each other, and the\nantecedents which they severally involve; and these conditions of the\ninference may interfere with the promptness of our assent.\n\nHence it is that party spirit or national feeling or religious\nprepossessions have before now had power to retard the reception of\ntruths of a mathematical character; which never could have been,\nif demonstrations were _ipso facto_ assents. Nor indeed would any\nmathematician, even in questions of pure science, assent to his own\nconclusions, on new and difficult ground, and in the case of abstruse\ncalculations, however often he went over his work, till he had the\ncorroboration of other judgments besides his own. He would have\ncarefully revised his inference, and would assent to the probability of\nhis accuracy in inferring, but still he would abstain from an immediate\nassent to the truth of his conclusion. Yet the corroboration of others\ncannot add to his perception of the proof; he would still perceive the\nproof, even though he failed in gaining their corroboration. And yet\nagain he might arbitrarily make it his rule, never to assent to his\nconclusions without such corroboration, or at least before the lapse of\na sufficient interval. Here again inference is distinct from assent.\n\nI have been showing that inference and assent are distinct acts of the\nmind, and that they may be made apart from each other. Of course I\ncannot be taken to mean that there is no legitimate or actual connexion\nbetween them, as if arguments adverse to a conclusion did not naturally\nhinder assent; or as if the inclination to give assent were not greater\nor less according as the particular act of inference expressed a\nstronger or weaker probability; or as if assent did not always imply\ngrounds in reason, implicit, if not explicit, or could be rightly given\nwithout sufficient grounds. So much is it commonly felt that assent\nmust be preceded by inferential acts, that obstinate men give their own\nwill as their very reason for assenting, if they can think of nothing\nbetter; \u201cstat pro ratione voluntas.\u201d Indeed, I doubt whether assent is\never given without some preliminary, which stands for a reason; but it\ndoes not follow from this, that it may not be withheld in cases when\nthere are good reasons for giving it to a proposition, or may not be\nwithdrawn after it has been given, the reasons remaining, or may not\nremain when the reasons are forgotten; or must always vary in strength,\nas the reasons vary; and this substantiveness, as I may call it, of the\nact of assent is the very point which I have wished to establish.\n\n2. And in showing that assent is distinct from an act of inference, I\nhave gone a good way towards showing in what it differs from it. If\nassent and inference are each of them the acceptance of a proposition,\nbut the special characteristic of inference is that it is conditional,\nit is natural to suppose that assent is unconditional. Again, if\nassent is the acceptance of truth, and truth is the proper object of\nthe intellect, and no one can hold conditionally what by the same\nact he holds to be true, here too is a reason for saying that assent\nis an adhesion without reserve or doubt to the proposition to which\nit is given. And again, it is to be presumed that the word has not\ntwo meanings: what it has at one time, it has at another. Inference\nis always inference; even if demonstrative, it is still conditional;\nit establishes an incontrovertible conclusion on the condition of\nincontrovertible premisses. To the conclusion thus drawn, assent gives\nits absolute recognition. In the case of all demonstrations, assent,\nwhen given, is unconditionally given. In one class of subjects, then,\nassent certainly is always unconditional; but if the word stands for\nan undoubting and unhesitating act of the mind once, why does it not\ndenote the same always? what evidence is there that it ever means any\nthing else than that which the whole world will unite in witnessing\nthat it means in certain cases? why are we not to interpret what is\ncontroverted by what is known? This is what is suggested on the first\nview of the question; but to continue:\u2014\n\nIn demonstrative matters assent excludes the presence of doubt: now\nare instances producible, on the other hand, of its ever co-existing\nwith doubt in cases of the concrete? As the above instances have shown,\non very many questions we do not give an assent at all. What commonly\nhappens is this, that, after hearing and entering into what may be\nsaid for a proposition, we pronounce neither for nor against it. We\nmay accept the conclusion as a conclusion, dependent on premisses,\nabstract, and tending to the concrete; but we do not follow up our\ninference of a proposition by giving an assent to it. That there are\nconcrete propositions to which we give unconditional assents, I shall\npresently show; but I am now asking for instances of conditional, for\ninstances in which we assent a little and not much. Usually, we do not\nassent at all. Every day, as it comes, brings with it opportunities for\nus to enlarge our circle of assents. We read the newspapers; we look\nthrough debates in Parliament, pleadings in the law courts, leading\narticles, letters of correspondents, reviews of books, criticisms in\nthe fine arts, and we either form no opinion at all upon the subjects\ndiscussed, as lying out of our line, or at most we have only an opinion\nabout them. At the utmost we say that we are inclined to believe this\nproposition or that, that we are not sure it is not true, that much may\nbe said for it, that we have been much struck by it; but we never say\nthat we give it a degree of assent. We might as well talk of degrees of\ntruth as of degrees of assent.\n\nYet Locke heads one of his chapters with the title \u201cDegrees of Assent;\u201d\nand a writer, of this century, who claims our respect from the tone and\ndrift of his work, thus expresses himself after Locke\u2019s manner: \u201cMoral\nevidence,\u201d he says, \u201cmay produce a variety of degrees of assents, from\nsuspicion to moral certainty. For, here, the degree of assent depends\nupon the degree in which the evidence on one side preponderates, or\nexceeds that on the other. And as this preponderancy may vary almost\ninfinitely, so likewise may the degrees of assent. For a few of these\ndegrees, though but for a few, names have been invented. Thus, when the\nevidence on one side preponderates a very little, there is ground for\nsuspicion, or conjecture. Presumption, persuasion, belief, conclusion,\nconviction, moral certainty,\u2014doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief,\u2014are\nwords which imply an increase or decrease of this preponderancy. Some\nof these words also admit of epithets which denote a further increase\nor diminution of the assent.(6)\u201d\n\nCan there be a better illustration than this passage supplies of what I\nhave been insisting on above, viz. that, in teaching various degrees of\nassent, we tend to destroy assent, as an act of the mind, altogether?\nThis author makes the degrees of assent \u201cinfinite,\u201d as the degrees\nof probability are infinite. His assents are really only inferences,\nand assent is a name without a meaning, the needless repetition of\nan inference. But in truth \u201csuspicion, conjecture, presumption,\npersuasion, belief, conclusion, conviction, moral certainty,\u201d are\nnot \u201cassents\u201d at all; they are simply more or less strong inferences\nof a proposition; and \u201cdoubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief,\u201d\nare recognitions, more or less strong, of the probability of its\ncontradictory.\n\nThere is only one sense in which we are allowed to call such acts or\nstates of mind assents. They are opinions; and, as being such, they\nare, as I have already observed, when speaking of Opinion, assents to\nthe plausibility, probability, doubtfulness, or untrustworthiness, of\na proposition; that is, not variations of assent to an inference, but\nassents to a variation in inferences. When I assent to a doubtfulness,\nor to a probability, my assent, as such, is as complete as if I\nassented to a truth; it is not a certain degree of assent. And, in like\nmanner, I may be certain of an uncertainty; that does not destroy the\nspecific notion convened in the word \u201ccertain.\u201d\n\nI do not know then when it is that we ever deliberately profess assent\nto a proposition without meaning to convey to others the impression\nthat we accept it unreservedly, and that because it is true. Certainly,\nwe familiarly use such phrases as a half-assent, as we also speak of\nhalf-truths; but a half-assent is not a kind of assent any more than\na half-truth is a kind of truth. As the object is indivisible, so is\nthe act. A half-truth is a proposition which in one aspect is a truth,\nand in another is not; to give a half-assent is to feel drawn towards\nassent, or to assent one moment and not the next, or to be in the way\nto assent to it. It means that the proposition in question deserves a\nhearing, that it is probable, or attractive, that it opens important\nviews, that it is a key to perplexing difficulties, or the like.\n\n3. Treating the subject then, not according to _\u00e0 priori_ fitness,\nbut according to the facts of human nature, as they are found in the\nconcrete action of life, I find numberless cases in which we do not\nassent at all, none in which assent is evidently conditional;\u2014and many,\nas I shall now proceed to show, in which it is unconditional, and\nthese in subject-matters which admit of nothing higher than probable\nreasoning. If human nature is to be its own witness, there is no medium\nbetween assenting and not assenting. Locke\u2019s theory of the duty of\nassenting more or less according to degrees of evidence, is invalidated\nby the testimony of high and low, young and old, ancient and modern,\nas continually given in their ordinary sayings and doings. Indeed, as\nI have shown, he does not strictly maintain it himself; yet, though he\nfeels the claims of nature and fact to be too strong for him in certain\ncases, he gives no reason why he should violate his theory in these,\nand yet not in many more.\n\nNow let us review some of those assents, which men give on evidence\nshort of intuition and demonstration, yet which are as unconditional as\nif they had that highest evidence.\n\nFirst of all, starting from intuition, of course we all believe,\nwithout any doubt, that we exist; that we have an individuality and\nidentity all our own; that we think, feel, and act, in the home of our\nown minds; that we have a present sense of good and evil, of a right\nand a wrong, of a true and a false, of a beautiful and a hideous,\nhowever we analyze our ideas of them. We have an absolute vision before\nus of what happened yesterday or last year, so as to be able without\nany chance of mistake to give evidence upon it in a court of justice,\nlet the consequences be ever so serious. We are sure that of many\nthings we are ignorant, that of many things we are in doubt, and that\nof many things we are not in doubt.\n\nNor is the assent which we give to facts limited to the range of\nself-consciousness. We are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake, that\nour own self is not the only being existing; that there is an external\nworld; that it is a system with parts and a whole, a universe carried\non by laws; and that the future is affected by the past. We accept\nand hold with an unqualified assent, that the earth, considered as a\nphenomenon, is a globe; that all its regions see the sun by turns; that\nthere are vast tracts on it of land and water; that there are really\nexisting cities on definite sites, which go by the names of London,\nParis, Florence, and Madrid. We are sure that Paris or London, unless\nswallowed up by an earthquake or burned to the ground, is to-day just\nwhat it was yesterday, when we left it.\n\nWe laugh to scorn the idea that we had no parents, though we have no\nmemory of our birth; that we shall never depart this life, though we\ncan have no experience of the future; that we are able to live without\nfood, though we have never tried; that a world of men did not live\nbefore our time, or that that world has had no history; that there has\nbeen no rise and fall of states, no great men, no wars, no revolutions,\nno art, no science, no literature, no religion.\n\nWe should be either indignant or amused at the report of our intimate\nfriend being false to us; and we are able sometimes, without any\nhesitation, to accuse certain parties of hostility and injustice to us.\nWe may have a deep consciousness, which we never can lose, that we on\nour part have been cruel to others, and that they have felt us to be\nso, or that we have been, and have been felt to be, ungenerous to those\nwho love us. We may have an overpowering sense of our moral weakness,\nof the precariousness of our life, health, wealth, position, and good\nfortune. We may have a clear view of the weak points of our physical\nconstitution, of what food or medicine is good for us, and what does\nus harm. We may be able to master, at least in part, the course of our\npast history; its turning-points, our hits, and our great mistakes. We\nmay have a sense of the presence of a Supreme Being, which never has\nbeen dimmed by even a passing shadow, which has inhabited us ever since\nwe can recollect any thing, and which we cannot imagine our losing. We\nmay be able, for others have been able, so to realize the precepts and\ntruths of Christianity, as deliberately to surrender our life, rather\nthan transgress the one or to deny the other.\n\nOn all these truths we have an immediate and an unhesitating hold,\nnor do we think ourselves guilty of not loving truth for truth\u2019s\nsake, because we cannot reach them through a series of intuitive\npropositions. Assent on reasonings not demonstrative is too widely\nrecognized an act to be irrational, unless man\u2019s nature is irrational,\ntoo familiar to the prudent and clear-minded to be an infirmity or\nan extravagance. None of us can think or act without the acceptance\nof truths, not intuitive, not demonstrated, yet sovereign. If our\nnature has any constitution, any laws, one of them is this absolute\nreception of propositions as true, which lie outside the narrow range\nof conclusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is tethered; nor has\nany philosophical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not\nwork for a day.\n\nWhen, then, philosophers lay down principles, on which it follows that\nour assent, except when given to objects of intuition or demonstration,\nis conditional, that the assent given to propositions by well-ordered\nminds necessarily varies with the proof producible for them, and that\nit does not and cannot remain one and the same while the proof is\nstrengthened or weakened,\u2014are they not to be considered as confusing\ntogether two things very distinct from each other, a mental act or\nstate and a scientific rule, an interior assent and a set of logical\nformulas? When they speak of degrees of assent, surely they have no\nintention at all of defining the position of the mind itself relative\nto the adoption of a given conclusion, but they mean to determine\nthe relation of that conclusion towards its premisses. They are\ncontemplating how representative symbols work, not how the intellect is\naffected towards the thing which those symbols represent. In real truth\nthey as little mean to assert the principle of measuring our assents by\nour logic, as they would fancy they could record the refreshment which\nwe receive from the open air by the readings of the graduated scale\nof a thermometer. There is a connexion doubtless between a logical\nconclusion and an assent, as there is between the variation of the\nmercury and our sensations; but the mercury is not the cause of life\nand health, nor is verbal argumentation the principle of inward belief.\nIf we feel hot or chilly, no one will convince us to the contrary\nby insisting that the glass is at 60\u00b0. It is the mind that reasons\nand assents, not a diagram on paper. I may have difficulty in the\nmanagement of a proof, while I remain unshaken in my adherence to the\nconclusion. Supposing a boy cannot make his answer to some arithmetical\nor algebraical question tally with the book, need he at once distrust\nthe book? Does his trust in it fall down a certain number of degrees,\naccording to the force of his difficulty? On the contrary, he keeps to\nthe principle, implicit but present to his mind, with which he took up\nthe book, that the book is more likely to be right than he is; and this\nmere preponderance of probability is sufficient to make him faithful\nto his belief in its correctness, till its incorrectness is actually\nproved.\n\nMy own opinion is, that the class of writers of whom I have been\nspeaking, have themselves as little misgiving about the truths which\nthey pretend to weigh out and measure, as their unsophisticated\nneighbours; but they think it a duty to remind us, that since the full\netiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied, we must\nbelieve those truths at our peril. They warn us, that an issue which\ncan never come to pass in matter of fact, is nevertheless in theory a\npossible supposition. They do not, for instance, intend for a moment\nto imply that there is even the shadow of a doubt that Great Britain\nis an island, but they think we ought to know, if we do not know, that\nthere is no proof of the fact, in mode and figure, equal to the proof\nof a proposition of Euclid; and that in consequence they and we are all\nbound to suspend our judgment about such a fact, though it be in an\ninfinitesimal degree, lest we should seem not to love truth for truth\u2019s\nsake. Having made their protest, they subside without scruple into\nthat same absolute assurance of only partially-proved truths, which is\nnatural to the illogical imagination of the multitude.\n\n4. It remains to explain some conversational expressions, at first\nsight favourable to that doctrine of degrees in assent, which I have\nbeen combating.\n\n(1.) We often speak of giving a modified and qualified, or a\npresumptive and _prim\u00e2 facie_ assent, or (as I have already said) a\nhalf-assent to opinions or facts; but these expressions admit of an\neasy explanation. Assent, upon the authority of others is often, as I\nhave noticed, when speaking of notional assents, little more than a\nprofession or acquiescence or inference, not a real acceptance of a\nproposition. I report, for instance, that there was a serious fire in\nthe town in the past night; and then perhaps I add, that at least the\nmorning papers say so;\u2014that is, I have perhaps no positive doubt of\nthe fact; still, by referring to the newspapers I imply that I do not\ntake on myself the responsibility of the statement. In thus qualifying\nmy apparent assent, I show that it was not a genuine assent at all.\nIn like manner a _prim\u00e2 facie_ assent is an assent to an antecedent\nprobability of a fact, not to the fact itself; as I might give a _prim\u00e2\nfacie_ assent to the Plurality of worlds or to the personality of\nHomer, without pledging myself to either absolutely. \u201cHalf-assent,\u201d\nof which I spoke above, is an inclination to assent, or again, an\nintention of assenting, when certain difficulties are surmounted. When\nwe speak without thought, assent has as vague a meaning as half-assent;\nbut when we deliberately say, \u201cI assent,\u201d we signify an act of the mind\nso definite, as to admit of no change but that of its ceasing to be.\n\n(2.) And so, too, though we sometimes use the phrase \u201cconditional\nassent,\u201d yet we only mean thereby to say that we will assent under\ncertain contingencies. Of course we may, if we please, include a\ncondition in the proposition to which our assent is given; and then,\nthat condition enters into the matter of the assent, but not into the\nassent itself. To assent to\u2014\u201cIf this man is in a consumption, his\ndays are numbered,\u201d\u2014is as little a conditional assent, as to assent\nto\u2014\u201cOf this consumptive patient the days are numbered,\u201d\u2014which, (though\nwithout the conditional form,) is an equivalent proposition. In such\ncases, strictly speaking, the assent is given neither to antecedent\nnor consequent of the conditional proposition, but to their connexion,\nthat is, to the enthymematic _inferentia_. If we place the condition\nexternal to the proposition, then the assent will be given to \u201cThat\n\u2018his days are numbered\u2019 is conditionally true;\u201d and of course we\ncan assent to the conditionality of a proposition as well as to its\nprobability. Or again, if so be, we may give our assent not only to\nthe _inferentia_ in a complex conditional proposition, but to each of\nthe simple propositions, of which it is made up, besides. \u201cThere will\nbe a storm soon, for the mercury falls;\u201d\u2014here, besides assenting to\nthe connexion of the propositions, we may assent also to \u201cThe mercury\nfalls,\u201d and to \u201cThere will be a storm.\u201d This is assenting to the\npremiss, _inferentia_, and thing inferred, all at once;\u2014we assent to\nthe whole syllogism, and to its component parts.\n\n(3.) In like manner are to be explained the phrases, \u201cdeliberate\nassent,\u201d a \u201crational assent;\u201d a \u201csudden,\u201d \u201cimpulsive,\u201d or \u201chesitating\u201d\nassent. These expressions denote, not kinds or qualities, but the\ncircumstances of assenting. A deliberate assent is an assent following\nupon deliberation. It is sometimes called a conviction, a word which\ncommonly includes in its meaning two acts, both the act of inference,\nand the act of assent consequent upon the inference. This subject will\nbe considered in the next Section. On the other hand, a hesitating\nassent is an assent to which we have been slow and intermittent in\ncoming; or an assent which, when given, is thwarted and obscured by\nexternal and flitting misgivings, though not such as to enter into the\nact itself, or essentially to damage it.\n\nThere is another sense in which we speak of a hesitating or uncertain\nassent; viz. when we assent in act, but not in the habit of our minds.\nTill assent to a doctrine or fact is my habit, I am at the mercy of\ninferences contrary to it; I assent to-day, and give up my belief, or\nincline to disbelief, to-morrow. I may find it my duty, for instance,\nafter the opportunity of careful inquiry and inference, to assent to\nanother\u2019s innocence, whom I have for years considered guilty; but from\nlong prejudice I may be unable to carry my new assent well about me,\nand may every now and then relapse into momentary thoughts injurious to\nhim.\n\n(4.) A more plausible objection to the absolute absence of all doubt or\nmisgiving in an act of assent is found in the use of the terms firm and\nweak assent, or in the growth of belief and trust. Thus, we assent to\nthe events of history, but not with that fulness and force of adherence\nto the received account of them with which we realize a record of\noccurrences which are within our own memory. And again, we assent\nto the praise bestowed on a friend\u2019s good qualities with an energy\nwhich we do not feel, when we are speaking of virtue in the abstract:\nand if we are political partisans, our assent is very cold, when we\ncannot refuse it, to representations made in favour of the wisdom or\npatriotism of statesmen whom we dislike. And then as to religious\nsubjects we speak of \u201cstrong\u201d faith and \u201cfeeble\u201d faith; of the faith\nwhich would move mountains, and of the ordinary faith \u201cwithout which it\nis impossible to please God.\u201d And as we can grow in graces, so surely\ncan we inclusively in faith. Again we rise from one work of Christian\nEvidences with our faith enlivened and invigorated; from another\nperhaps with the distracted father\u2019s words in our mouth, \u201cI believe,\nhelp my unbelief.\u201d\n\nNow it is evident, first of all, that habits of mind may grow, as being\na something permanent and continuous; and by assent growing, it is\noften only meant that the habit grows and has greater hold upon the\nmind.\n\nBut again, when we carefully consider the matter, it will be found\nthat this increase or decrease of strength does not lie in the assent\nitself, but in its circumstances and concomitants; for instance, in the\nemotions, in the ratiocinative faculty, or in the imagination.\n\nFor instance, as to the emotions, this strength of assent may be\nnothing more than the strength of love, hatred, interest, desire, or\nfear, which the object of the assent elicits, and this is especially\nthe case when that object is of a religious nature. Such strength is\nadventitious and accidental; it may come, it may go; it is found in one\nman, not in another; it does not interfere with the genuineness and\nperfection of the act of assent. Balaam assented to the fact of his\nown intercourse with the supernatural, as well as Moses; but, to use\nreligious language, he had light without love; his intellect was clear,\nhis heart was cold. Hence his faith would popularly be considered\nwanting in strength. On the other hand, prejudice implies strong\nassents to the disadvantage of its object; that is, it encourages such\nassents, and guards them from the chance of being lost.\n\nAgain, when a conclusion is recommended to us by the number and force\nof the arguments in proof of it, our recognition of them invests it\nwith a luminousness, which in one sense adds strength to our assent\nto it, as it certainly does protect and embolden that assent. Thus\nwe assent to a review of recent events, which we have studied from\noriginal documents, with a triumphant peremptoriness which it neither\noccurs to us, nor is possible for us, to exercise, when we make an act\nof assent to the assassination of Julius Caesar, or to the existence of\nthe Abipones, though we are as securely certain of these latter facts\nas of the doings and occurrences of yesterday.\n\nAnd further, all that I have said about the apprehension of\npropositions is in point here. We may speak of assent to our Lord\u2019s\ndivinity as strong or feeble, according as it is given to the\nreality as impressed upon the imagination, or to the notion of it as\nentertained by the intellect.\n\n(5.) Nor, lastly, does this doctrine of the intrinsic integrity and\nindivisibility (if I may so speak) of assent interfere with the\nteaching of Catholic theology as to the pre-eminence of strength in\ndivine faith, which has a supernatural origin, when compared with all\nbelief which is merely human and natural. For first, that pre-eminence\nconsists, not in its differing from human faith, merely in degree\nof assent, but in its being superior in nature and kind,(7) so that\nthe one does not admit of a comparison with the other; and next, its\nintrinsic superiority is not a matter of experience, but is above\nexperience.(8) Assent is ever assent;(9) but in the assent which\nfollows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace,\nthere is, from the nature of the case, a transcendant adhesion of mind,\nintellectual and moral, and a special self-protection,(10) beyond the\noperation of those ordinary laws of thought, which alone have a place\nin my discussion.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Complex Assent.\n\n\nI have been considering assent as the mental assertion of an\nintelligible proposition, as an act of the intellect direct, absolute,\ncomplete in itself, unconditional, arbitrary, yet not incompatible\nwith an appeal to argument, and at least in many cases exercised\nunconsciously. On this last characteristic of assent I have not dwelt,\nas it has not come in my way; nor is it more than an accident of\nacts of assent, though an ordinary accident. That it is of ordinary\noccurrence cannot be doubted. A great many of our assents are merely\nexpressions of our personal likings, tastes, principles, motives,\nand opinions, as dictated by nature, or resulting from habit; in\nother words, they are acts and manifestations of self: now what is\nmore rare than self-knowledge? In proportion then to our ignorance\nof self, is our unconsciousness of those innumerable acts of assent,\nwhich we are incessantly making. And so again in what may be almost\ncalled the mechanical operation of our minds, in our continual acts of\napprehension and inference, speculation, and resolve, propositions pass\nbefore us and receive our assent without our consciousness. Hence it\nis that we are so apt to confuse together acts of assent and acts of\ninference. Indeed, I may fairly say, that those assents which we give\nwith a direct knowledge of what we are doing, are few compared with the\nmultitude of like acts which pass through our minds in long succession\nwithout our observing them.\n\nThat mode of assent which is exercised thus unconsciously, I may call\nsimple assent, and of it I have treated in the foregoing Section; but\nnow I am going to speak of such assents as must be made consciously and\ndeliberately, and which I shall call complex or reflex assents. And I\nbegin by recalling what I have already stated about the relation in\nwhich Assent and Inference stand to each other,\u2014Inference, which holds\npropositions conditionally, and Assent, which unconditionally accepts\nthem; the relation is this:\u2014\n\nActs of inference are both the antecedents of assent before\nassenting, and its usual concomitants after assenting. For instance,\nI hold absolutely that the country which we call India exists, upon\ntrustworthy testimony; and next, I may continue to believe it on the\nsame testimony. In like manner, I have ever believed that Great Britain\nis an island, for certain sufficient reasons; and on the same reasons I\nmay persist in the belief. But it may happen that I forget my reasons\nfor what I believe to be so absolutely true; or I may never have asked\nmyself about them, or formally marshalled them in order, and have been\naccustomed to assent without a recognition of my assent or of its\ngrounds, and then perhaps something occurs which leads to my reviewing\nand completing those grounds, analyzing and arranging them, yet without\non that account implying of necessity any suspense, ever so slight,\nof assent, to the proposition that India is in a certain part of the\nearth, and that Great Britain is an island. With no suspense of assent\nat all; any more than the boy in my former illustration had any doubt\nabout the answer set down in his arithmetic-book, when he began working\nout the question; any more than he would be doubting his eyes and his\ncommon sense, that the two sides of a triangle are together greater\nthan the third, because he drew out the geometrical proof of it. He\ndoes but repeat, after his formal demonstration, that assent which he\nmade before it, and assents to his previous assenting. This is what I\ncall a reflex or complex assent.\n\nI say, there is no necessary incompatibility between thus assenting and\nyet proving,\u2014for the conclusiveness of a proposition is not synonymous\nwith its truth. A proposition may be true, yet not admit of being\nconcluded;\u2014it may be a conclusion and yet not a truth. To contemplate\nit under one aspect, is not to contemplate it under another; and the\ntwo aspects may be consistent, from the very fact that they are two\n_aspects_. Therefore to set about concluding a proposition is not _ipso\nfacto_ to doubt its truth; we may aim at inferring a proposition,\nwhile all the time we assent to it. We have to do this as a common\noccurrence, when we take on ourselves to convince another on any point\nin which he differs from us. We do not deny our faith, because we\nbecome controversialists; and in like manner we may employ ourselves in\nproving what we believe to be true, simply in order to ascertain the\nproducible evidence in its favour, and in order to fulfil what is due\nto ourselves and to the claims and responsibilities of our education\nand social position.\n\nI have been speaking of investigation, not of inquiry; it is quite true\nthat inquiry is inconsistent with assent, but inquiry is something more\nthan the mere exercise of inference. He who inquires has not found; he\nis in doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession\neither proved or disproved. We cannot without absurdity call ourselves\nat once believers and inquirers also. Thus it is sometimes spoken\nof as a hardship that a Catholic is not allowed to inquire into the\ntruth of his Creed;\u2014of course he cannot, if he would retain the name\nof believer. He cannot be both inside and outside of the Church at\nonce. It is merely common sense to tell him that, if he is seeking,\nhe has not found. If seeking includes doubting, and doubting excludes\nbelieving, then the Catholic who sets about inquiring, thereby declares\nthat he is not a Catholic. He has already lost faith. And this is\nhis best defence to himself for inquiring, viz. that he is no longer\na Catholic, and wishes to become one. They who would forbid him to\ninquire, would in that case be shutting the stable-door after the steed\nis stolen. What can he do better than inquire, if he is in doubt? how\nelse can he become a Catholic again? Not to inquire is in his case to\nbe satisfied with disbelief.\n\nHowever, in thus speaking, I am viewing the matter in the abstract, and\nwithout allowing for the manifold inconsistencies of individuals, as\nthey are found in the world, who attempt to unite incompatibilities;\nwho do not doubt, but who act as if they did; who, though they believe,\nare weak in faith, and put themselves in the way of losing it by\nunnecessarily listening to objections. Moreover, there are minds,\nundoubtedly, with whom at all times to question a truth is to make\nit questionable, and to investigate is equivalent to inquiring; and\nagain, there may be beliefs so sacred or so delicate, that, if I may\nuse the metaphor, they will not wash without shrinking and losing\ncolour. I grant all this; but here I am discussing broad principles,\nnot individual cases; and these principles are, that inquiry implies\ndoubt, and that investigation does not imply it, and that those who\nassent to a doctrine or fact may without inconsistency investigate its\ncredibility, though they cannot literally inquire about its truth.\n\nNext, I consider that, in the case of educated minds, investigations\ninto the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given\ntheir assent, is an obligation, or rather a necessity. Such a trial of\ntheir intellects is a law of their nature, like the growth of childhood\ninto manhood, and analogous to the moral ordeal which is the instrument\nof their spiritual life. The lessons of right and wrong, which are\ntaught them at school, are to be carried out into action amid the\ngood and evil of the world; and so again the intellectual assents, in\nwhich they have in like manner been instructed from the first, have\nto be tested, realized, and developed by the exercise of their mature\njudgment.\n\nCertainly, such processes of investigation, whether in religious\nsubjects or secular, often issue in the reversal of the assents which\nthey were originally intended to confirm; as the boy who works out an\narithmetical problem from his book may end in detecting, or thinking\nhe detects, a false print in the answer. But the question before us\nis whether acts of assent and of inference are compatible; and my\nvague consciousness of the possibility of a reversal of my belief in\nthe course of my researches, as little interferes with the honesty\nand firmness of that belief while those researches proceed, as the\nrecognition of the possibility of my train\u2019s oversetting is an evidence\nof an intention on my part of undergoing so great a calamity. My mind\nis not moved by a scientific computation of chances, nor can any law of\naverages affect my particular case. To incur a risk is not to expect\nreverse; and if my opinions are true, I have a right to think that\nthey will bear examining. Nor, on the other hand, does belief, viewed\nin its idea, imply a positive resolution in the party believing never\nto abandon that belief. What belief, as such, does imply is, not an\nintention never to change, but the utter absence of all thought, or\nexpectation, or fear of changing. A spontaneous resolution never to\nchange is inconsistent with the idea of belief; for the very force and\nabsoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolution. We do\nnot commonly determine not to do what we cannot fancy ourselves ever\ndoing. We should readily indeed make such a formal promise if we were\ncalled upon to do so; for, since we have the truth, and truth cannot\nchange, how can we possibly change in our belief, except indeed through\nour own weakness or fickleness? We have no intention whatever of being\nweak or fickle; so our promise is but the natural guarantee of our\nsincerity. It is possible then, without disloyalty to our convictions,\nto examine their grounds, even though in the event they are to fail\nunder the examination, for we have no suspicion of this failure.\n\nAnd such examination, as I have said, does but fulfil a law of our\nnature. Our first assents, right or wrong, are often little more than\nprejudices. The reasonings, which precede and accompany them, though\nsufficient for their purpose, do not rise up to the importance and\nenergy of the assents themselves. As time goes on, by degrees and\nwithout set purpose, by reflection and experience, we begin to confirm\nor to correct the notions and the images to which those assents are\ngiven. At times it is a necessity formally to undertake a survey and\nrevision of this or that class of them, of those which relate to\nreligion, or to social duty, or to politics, or to the conduct of\nlife. Sometimes this review begins in doubt as to the matters which we\npropose to consider, that is, in a suspension of the assents hitherto\nfamiliar to us; sometimes those assents are too strong to allow of\nbeing lost on the first stirring of the inquisitive intellect, and if,\nas time goes on, they give way, our change of mind, be it for good\nor for evil, is owing to the accumulating force of the arguments,\nsound or unsound, which bear down upon the propositions which we have\nhitherto received. Objections, indeed, as such, have no direct force to\nweaken assent; but, when they multiply, they tell against the implicit\nreasonings or the formal inferences which are its warrant, and suspend\nits acts and gradually undermine its habit. Then the assent goes; but\nwhether slowly or suddenly, noticeably or imperceptibly, is a matter\nof circumstance or accident. However, whether the original assent is\ncontinued on or not, the new assent differs from the old in this, that\nit has the strength of explicitness and deliberation, that it is not\na mere prejudice, and its strength the strength of prejudice. It is\nan assent, not only to a given proposition, but to the claim of that\nproposition on our assent as true; it is an assent to an assent, or\nwhat is commonly called a conviction.\n\nOf course these reflex acts may be repeated in a series. As I\npronounce that \u201cGreat Britain is an island,\u201d and then pronounce \u201cThat\n\u2018Great Britain is an island\u2019 has a claim on my assent,\u201d or is to\n\u201cbe assented-to,\u201d or to be \u201caccepted as true,\u201d or to be \u201cbelieved,\u201d\nor simply \u201cis true\u201d (these predicates being equivalent), so I may\nproceed, \u201cThe proposition \u2018that _Great-Britain-is-an-island_ is to be\nbelieved,\u2019 is to be believed,\u201d &c., &c., and so on to _ad infinitum_.\nBut this would be trifling. The mind is like a double mirror, in\nwhich reflexions of self within self multiply themselves till they\nare undistinguishable, and the first reflexion contains all the\nrest. At the same time, it is worth while to notice two other reflex\npropositions:\u2014\u201cThat \u2018Great Britain is an island\u2019 is probable\u201d is\ntrue;\u2014and \u201cThat \u2018Great Britain is an island\u2019 is uncertain\u201d is true:\u2014for\nthe former of these is the expression of Opinion, and the latter of\nformal or theological Doubt, as I have already determined.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI have one step farther to make:\u2014let the proposition to which the\nassent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it\nto be, that is, objectively true as well as subjectively:\u2014then the\nassent may be called a _perception_, the conviction a _certitude_, the\nproposition or truth a _certainty_, or thing known, or a matter of\n_knowledge_, and to assent to it is to _know_.\n\nOf course, in thus speaking, I open the all-important question, what\nis truth, and what apparent truth? what is genuine knowledge, and what\nis its counterfeit? what are the tests for discriminating certitude\nfrom mere persuasion or delusion? Whatever a man holds to be true,\nhe will say he holds for certain; and for the present I must allow\nhim in his assumption, hoping in one way or another, as I proceed, to\nlessen the difficulties which lie in the way of calling him to account\nfor so doing. And I have the less scruple in taking this course, as\nbelieving that, among fairly prudent and circumspect men, there are\nfar fewer instances of false certitude than at first sight might be\nsupposed. Men are often doubtful about propositions which are really\ntrue; they are not commonly certain of such as are simply false. What\nthey judge to be a certainty is in matter of fact for the most part\na truth. Not that there is not a great deal of rash talking even\namong the educated portion of the community, and many a man makes\nprofessions of certitude, for which he has no warrant; but that such\noff-hand, confident language is no token how these persons will express\nthemselves when brought to book. No one will with justice consider\nhimself certain of any matter, unless he has sufficient reasons for so\nconsidering; and it is rare that what is not true should be so free\nfrom every circumstance and token of falsity as to create no suspicion\nin his mind to its disadvantage, no reason for suspense of judgment.\n\nHowever, I shall have to remark on this difficulty by and by; here\nI will mention two conditions of certitude, in close connexion with\nthat necessary preliminary of investigation and proof of which I have\nbeen speaking, which will throw some light upon it. The one, which is\n_\u00e0 priori_, or from the nature of the case, will tell us what is not\ncertitude; the other, which is _\u00e0 posteriori_, or from experience, will\ntell us in a measure what certitude is.\n\n1. Certitude, as I have said, is the perception of a truth with the\nperception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing, as\nexpressed in the phrase, \u201cI know that I know,\u201d or \u201cI know that I know\nthat I know,\u201d\u2014or simply \u201cI know;\u201d for one reflex assertion of the mind\nabout self sums up the series of self-consciousnesses without the need\nof any actual evolution of them.\n\nCertitude is the knowledge of a truth:\u2014but what is once true is always\ntrue, and cannot fail, whereas what is once known need not always be\nknown, and is capable of failing. It follows, that if I am certain\nof a thing, I believe it will remain what I now hold it to be, even\nthough my mind should have the bad fortune to let it drop. Since mere\nargument is not the measure of assent, no one can be called certain of\na proposition, whose mind does not spontaneously and promptly reject,\non their first suggestion, as idle, as impertinent, as sophistical, any\nobjections which are directed against its truth. No man is certain of\na truth, who can endure the thought of the fact of its contradictory\nexisting or occurring; and that not from any set purpose or effort to\nreject that thought, but, as I have said, by the spontaneous action of\nthe intellect. What is contradictory to the truth, with its apparatus\nof argument, fades out of the mind as fast as it enters it; and though\nit be brought back to the mind ever so often by the pertinacity of an\nopponent, or by a voluntary or involuntary act of imagination, still\nthat contradictory proposition and its arguments are mere phantoms and\ndreams, in the light of our certitude, and their very entering into the\nmind is the first step of their going out of it. Such is the position\nof our minds towards the heathen fancy that Enceladus lies under\nEtna; or, not to take so extreme a case, that Joanna Southcote was a\nmessenger from heaven, or the Emperor Napoleon really had a star. Equal\nto this peremptory assertion of negative propositions is the revolt\nof the mind from suppositions incompatible with positive statements\nof which we are certain, whether abstract truths or facts; as that a\nstraight line is the longest possible distance between its two extreme\npoints, that Great Britain is in shape an exact square or circle, that\nI shall escape dying, or that my intimate friend is false to me.\n\nWe may indeed say, if we please, that a man ought not to have so\nsupreme a conviction in a given case, or in any case whatever; and\nthat he is therefore wrong in treating opinions which he does not\nhimself hold, with this even involuntary contempt;\u2014certainly, we\nhave a right to say so, if we will; but if, in matter of fact, a man\nhas such a conviction, if he is sure that Ireland is to the West of\nEngland, or that the Pope is the Vicar of Christ, nothing is left to\nhim, if he would be consistent, but to carry his conviction out into\nthis magisterial intolerance of any contrary assertion; and if he\nwere in his own mind tolerant, I do not say patient (for patience and\ngentleness are moral duties, but I mean intellectually tolerant), of\nobjections as objections, he would virtually be giving countenance\nto the views which those objections represented. I say I certainly\nshould be very intolerant of such a notion as that I shall one day\nbe Emperor of the French; I should think it too absurd even to be\nridiculous, and that I must be mad before I could entertain it. And\ndid a man try to persuade me that treachery, cruelty, or ingratitude\nwere as praiseworthy as honesty and temperance, and that a man who\nlived the life of a knave and died the death of a brute had nothing to\nfear from future retribution, I should think there was no call on me\nto listen to his arguments, except with the hope of converting him,\nthough he called me a bigot and a coward for refusing to inquire into\nhis speculations. And if, in a matter in which my temporal interests\nwere concerned, he attempted to reconcile me to fraudulent acts by what\nhe called philosophical views, I should say to him, \u201cRetro Satana,\u201d\nand that, not from any suspicion of his ability to reverse immutable\nprinciples, but from a consciousness of my own moral changeableness,\nand a fear, on that account, that I might not be intellectually true\nto the truth. This, then, from the nature of the case, is a main\ncharacteristic of certitude in any matter, to be confident indeed that\nthat certitude will last, but to be confident of this also, that, if it\ndid fail, nevertheless, the thing itself, whatever it is, of which we\nare certain, will remain just as it is, true and irreversible. If this\nbe so, it is easy to instance cases of an adherence to propositions,\nwhich does not fulfil the conditions of certitude; for instance:\u2014\n\n(1.) How positive and circumstantial disputants may be on both sides\nof a question of fact, on which they give their evidence, till they\nare called to swear to it, and then how guarded and conditional their\ntestimony becomes! Again, how confident are they in their rival\naccounts of a transaction at which they were present, till a third\nperson makes his appearance, whose word will be decisive about it!\nThen they suddenly drop their tone, and trim their statements, and by\nprovisos and explanations leave themselves loopholes for escape, in\ncase his testimony should turn out to their disadvantage. At first no\nlanguage could be too bold or absolute to express the distinctness of\ntheir knowledge on this side or that; but second thoughts are best, and\ntheir giving way shows that their belief does not come up to the mark\nof certitude.\n\n(2.) Again, can we doubt that many a confident expounder of Scripture,\nwho is so sure that St. Paul meant this, and that St. John and St.\nJames did not mean that, would be seriously disconcerted at the\npresence of those Apostles, if their presence were possible, and that\nthey have now an especial \u201cboldness of speech\u201d in treating their\nsubject, because there is no one authoritatively to set them right, if\nthey are wrong?\n\n(3.) Take another instance, in which the absence of certitude is\nprofessed from the first. Though it is a matter of faith with Catholics\nthat miracles never cease in the Church, still that this or that\nprofessed miracle really took place, is for the most part only a matter\nof opinion, and when it is believed, whether on testimony or tradition,\nit is not believed to the exclusion of all doubt, whether about the\nfact or its miraculousness. Thus I may believe in the liquefaction of\nSt. Pantaleon\u2019s blood, and believe it to the best of my judgment to\nbe a miracle, yet, supposing a chemist offered to produce exactly the\nsame phenomena under exactly similar circumstances by the materials\nput at his command by his science, so as to reduce what seemed beyond\nnature within natural laws, I should watch with some suspense of mind\nand misgiving the course of his experiment, as having no Divine Word\nto fall back upon as a ground of certainty that the liquefaction was\nmiraculous.\n\n(4.) Take another virtual exhibition of fear; I mean irritation and\nimpatience of contradiction, vehemence of assertion, determination\nto silence others,\u2014these are the tokens of a mind which has not yet\nattained the tranquil enjoyment of certitude. No one, I suppose, would\nsay that he was certain of the Plurality of worlds: that uncertitude\non the subject is just the explanation, and the only explanation\nsatisfactory to my mind, of the strange violence of language which has\nbefore now dishonoured the philosophical controversy upon it. Those who\nare certain of a fact are indolent disputants; it is enough for them\nthat they have the truth; and they have little disposition, except at\nthe call of duty, to criticize the hallucinations of others, and much\nless are they angry at their positiveness or ingenuity in argument;\nbut to call names, to impute motives, to accuse of sophistry, to be\nimpetuous and overbearing, is the part of men who are alarmed for their\nown position, and fear to have it approached too nearly. And in like\nmanner the intemperance of language and of thought, which is sometimes\nfound in converts to a religious creed, is often attributed, not\nwithout plausibility (even though erroneously in the particular case),\nto some flaw in the completeness of their certitude, which interferes\nwith the harmony and repose of their convictions.\n\n(5.) Again, this intellectual anxiety, which is incompatible with\ncertitude, shows itself in our running back in our minds to the\narguments on which we came to believe, in not letting our conclusions\nalone, in going over and strengthening the evidence, and, as it were,\ngetting it by heart, as if our highest assent were only an inference.\nAnd such too is our unnecessarily declaring that we are certain, as if\nto reassure ourselves, and our appealing to others for their suffrage\nin behalf of the truths of which we are so sure; which is like our\nasking another whether we are weary and hungry, or have eaten and drunk\nto our satisfaction.\n\nAll laws are general; none are invariable; I am not writing as a\nmoralist or casuist. It must ever be recollected that these various\nphenomena of mind, though signs, are not infallible signs of\nuncertitude; they may proceed, in the particular case, from other\ncircumstances. Such anxieties and alarms may be merely emotional\nand from the imagination, not intellectual; parallel to the beating\nof the heart, nay, as I have been told, the trembling of the limbs,\nof even the bravest men, before a battle, when standing still to\nreceive the first attack of the enemy. Such too is that palpitating\nself-interrogation, that trouble of the mind lest it should not believe\nstrongly enough, which, and not doubt, underlies the sensitiveness\ndescribed in the well-known lines,\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cWith eyes too tremblingly awake,\n    To bear with dimness for His sake.\u201d\n\n\nAnd so again, a man\u2019s over-earnestness in argument may arise from zeal\nor charity; his impatience from loyalty to the truth; his extravagance\nfrom want of taste, from enthusiasm, or from youthful ardour; and his\nrestless recurrence to argument, not from personal disquiet, but from\na vivid appreciation of the controversial talent of an opponent, or\nof his own, or of the mere philosophical difficulties of the subject\nin dispute. These are points for the consideration of those who\nare concerned in registering and explaining what may be called the\nmeteorological phenomena of the human mind, and do not interfere with\nthe broad principle which I would lay down, that to fear argument is to\ndoubt the conclusion, and to be certain of a truth is to be careless of\nobjections to it;\u2014nor with the practical rule, that mere assent is not\ncertitude, and must not be confused with it.\n\n2. Now to consider what Certitude positively is, as a matter of\nexperience.\n\nIt is accompanied, as a state of mind, by a specific feeling, proper to\nit, and discriminating it from other states, intellectual and moral, I\ndo not say, as its practical test or as its _differentia_, but as its\ntoken, and in a certain sense its form. When a man says he is certain,\nhe means he is conscious to himself of having this specific feeling.\nIt is a feeling of satisfaction and self-gratulation, of intellectual\nsecurity, arising out of a sense of success, attainment, possession,\nfinality, as regards the matter which has been in question. As a\nconscientious deed is attended by a self-approval which nothing but\nitself can create, so certitude is united to a sentiment _sui generis_\nin which it lives and is manifested. These two parallel sentiments\nindeed have no relationship with each other, the enjoyable self-repose\nof certitude being as foreign to a good deed, as the self-approving\nglow of conscience is to the perception of a truth; yet knowledge,\nas well as virtue, is an end, and both knowledge and virtue, when\nreflected on, carry with them respectively their own reward in the\ncharacteristic sentiment, which, as I have said, is proper to each.\nAnd, as the performance of what is right is distinguished by this\nreligious peace, so the attainment of what is true is attested by this\nintellectual security.\n\nAnd, as the feeling of self-approbation, which is proper to good\nconduct, does not belong to the sense or to the possession of the\nbeautiful or of the becoming, of the pleasant or of the useful, so\nneither is the special relaxation and repose of mind, which is the\ntoken of Certitude, ever found to attend upon simple Assent, on\nprocesses of Inference, or on Doubt; nor on investigation, conjecture,\nopinion, as such, or on any other state or action of mind, besides\nCertitude. On the contrary, those acts and states of mind have\ngratifications proper to themselves, and unlike that of Certitude, as\nwill sufficiently appear on considering them separately.\n\n(1.) Philosophers are fond of enlarging on the pleasures of Knowledge,\n(that is, Knowledge as such,) nor need I here prove that such pleasures\nexist; but the repose in self and in its object, as connected with\nself, which I attribute to Certitude, does not attach to mere knowing,\nthat is, to the perception of things, but to the consciousness of\nhaving that knowledge. The simple and direct perception of things has\nits own great satisfaction; but it must recognize them as realities,\nand recognize them as known, before it becomes the perception and has\nthe satisfaction of certitude. Indeed, as far as I see, the pleasure\nof perceiving truth without reflecting on it as truth, is not very\ndifferent, except in intensity and in dignity, from the pleasure, as\nsuch, of assent or belief given to what is not true, nay, from the\npleasure of the mere passive reception of recitals or narratives, which\nneither profess to be true nor claim to be believed. Representations\nof any kind are in their own nature pleasurable, whether they be true\nor not, whether they come to us, or do not come, as true. We read\na history, or a biographical notice, with pleasure; and we read a\nromance with pleasure; and a pleasure which is quite apart from the\nquestion of fact or fiction. Indeed, when we would persuade young\npeople to read history, we tell them that it is as interesting as a\nromance or a novel. The mere acquisition of new images, and those\nimages striking, great, various, unexpected, beautiful, with mutual\nrelations and bearings, as being parts of a whole, with continuity,\nsuccession, evolution, with recurring complications and corresponding\nsolutions, with a crisis and a catastrophe, is highly pleasurable,\nquite independently of the question whether there is any truth in them.\nI am not denying that we should be baulked and disappointed to be told\nthey were all untrue, but this seems to arise from the reflection\nthat we have been taken in; not as if the fact of their truth were a\ndistinct element of pleasure, though it would increase the pleasure, as\ninvesting them with a character of marvellousness, and as associating\nthem with known or ascertained places. But even if the pleasure of\nknowledge is not thus founded on the imagination, at least it does not\nconsist in that triumphant repose of the mind after a struggle, which\nis the characteristic of Certitude.\n\nAnd so too as to such statements as gain from us a half-assent,\nas superstitious tales, stories of magic, of romantic crime, of\nghosts, or such as we follow for the moment with a faint and languid\nassent,\u2014contemporary history, political occurrences, the news of the\nday,\u2014the pleasure resulting from these is that of novelty or curiosity,\nand is like the pleasure arising from the excitement of chance and from\nvariety; it has in it no sense of possession: it is simply external to\nus, and has nothing akin to the thought of a battle and a victory.\n\n(2.) Again, the Pursuit of knowledge has its own pleasure,\u2014as distinct\nfrom the pleasures of knowledge, as it is distinct from that of\nconsciously possessing it. This will be evident at once, if we consider\nwhat a vacuity and depression of mind sometimes comes upon us on the\ntermination of an inquiry, however successfully terminated, compared\nwith the interest and spirit with which we carried it on. The pleasure\nof a search, like that of a hunt, lies in the searching, and ends at\nthe point at which the pleasure of Certitude begins. Its elements are\naltogether foreign to those which go to compose the serene satisfaction\nof Certitude. First, the successive steps of discovery, which attend\non an investigation, are continual and ever-extending informations,\nand pleasurable, not only as such, but also as the evidence of past\nefforts, and the earnest of success at the last. Next, there is the\ninterest which attaches to a mystery, not yet removed, but tending to\nremoval,\u2014the complex pleasure of wonder, expectation, sudden surprises,\nsuspense, and hope, of advances fitful, yet sure, to the unknown. And\nthere is the pleasure which attaches to the toil and conflict of the\nstrong, the consciousness and successive evidences of power, moral and\nintellectual, the pride of ingenuity and skill, of industry, patience,\nvigilance, and perseverance.\n\nSuch are the pleasures of investigation and discovery; and to these\nwe must add, what I have suggested in the last sentence, the logical\nsatisfaction, as it may be called, which accompanies these efforts of\nmind. There is great pleasure, as is plain, at least to certain minds,\nin proceeding from particular facts to principles, in generalizing,\ndiscriminating, reducing into order and meaning the maze of phenomena\nwhich nature presents to us. This is the kind of pleasure attendant\non the treatment of probabilities which point at conclusions without\nreaching them, or of objections which must be weighed and measured,\nand adjusted for what they are worth, over and against propositions\nwhich are antecedently evident. It is the special pleasure belonging\nto Inference as contrasted with Assent, a pleasure almost poetical, as\ntwilight has more poetry in it than noon-day. Such is the joy of the\npleader, with a good case in hand, and expecting the separate attacks\nof half a dozen acute intellects, each advancing from a point of his\nown. I suppose this was the pleasure which the Academics had in mind,\nwhen they propounded that happiness lay, not in finding the truth,\nbut in seeking it. To seek, indeed, with the certainty of not finding\nwhat we seek, cannot in any serious matter, be pleasurable, any more\nthan the labour of Sisyphus or the Danaides; but when the result does\nnot concern us very much, clever arguments and rival ones have the\nattraction of a game of chance or skill, whether or not they lead to\nany definite conclusion.\n\n(3.) Are there pleasures of Doubt, as well as of Inference and of\nAssent? In one sense, there are. Not indeed, if doubt simply means\nignorance, uncertainty, or hopeless suspense; but there is a certain\ngrave acquiescence in ignorance, a recognition of our impotence to\nsolve momentous and urgent questions, which has a satisfaction of its\nown. After high aspirations, after renewed endeavours, after bootless\ntoil, after long wanderings, after hope, effort, weariness, failure,\npainfully alternating and recurring, it is an immense relief to the\nexhausted mind to be able to say, \u201cAt length I know that I can know\nnothing about any thing,\u201d\u2014that is, while it can maintain itself in a\nposture of thought which has no promise of permanence, because it is\nunnatural. But here the satisfaction does not lie in not knowing, but\nin knowing there is nothing to know. It is a positive act of assent\nor conviction, given to what in the particular case is an untruth.\nIt is the assent and the false certitude which are the cause of the\ntranquillity of mind. Ignorance remains the evil which it ever was, but\nsomething of the peace of Certitude is gained in knowing the worst, and\nin having reconciled the mind to the endurance of it.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI may seem to have been needlessly diffuse in thus dwelling on the\npleasurable affections severally attending on these various conditions\nof the intellect, but I have had a purpose in doing so. That Certitude\nis a natural and normal state of mind, and not (as is sometimes\nobjected) one of its extravagances or infirmities, is proved indeed\nby the remarks which I have made above on the same objection, as\ndirected against Assent; for Certitude is only one of its forms. But\nI have thought it well in addition to suggest, even at the expense\nof a digression, that as no one would refuse to Inquiry, Doubt, and\nKnowledge a legitimate place among our mental constituents, so no one\ncan reasonably ignore a state of mind which not only is shown to be\nsubstantive by possessing a sentiment _sui generis_ and characteristic,\nbut is analogical to Inquiry, Doubt, and Knowledge, in the fact of its\nthus having a sentiment of its own.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VII. Certitude.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Assent and Certitude Contrasted.\n\n\nIn proceeding to compare together simple assent and complex, that\nis, Assent and Certitude, I begin by observing, that popularly no\ndistinction is made between the two; or rather, that in religious\nteaching that is called Certitude to which I have given the name of\nAssent. I have no difficulty in adopting such a use of the words,\nthough the course of my investigation has led me to another. Perhaps\nreligious assent may be fitly called, to use a theological term,\n\u201cmaterial certitude;\u201d and the first point of comparison which I shall\nmake between the two states of mind, will serve to set me right with\nthe common way of speaking.\n\n1. It certainly follows then, from the distinctions which I have made,\nthat great numbers of men must be considered to pass through life with\nneither doubt nor, on the other hand, certitude (as I have used the\nwords) on the most important propositions which can occupy their minds,\nbut with only a simple assent, that is, an assent which they barely\nrecognize, or bring home to their consciousness or reflect upon, as\nbeing assent. Such an assent is all that religious Protestants commonly\nhave to show, who believe nevertheless with their whole hearts the\ncontents of Holy Scripture. Such too is the state of mind of multitudes\nof good Catholics, perhaps the majority, who live and die in a simple,\nfull, firm belief in all that the Church teaches, because she teaches\nit,\u2014in the belief of the irreversible truth of whatever she defines\nand declares,\u2014but who, as being far removed from Protestant and other\ndissentients, and having but little intellectual training, have never\nhad the temptation to doubt, and never the opportunity to be certain.\nThere were whole nations in the middle ages thus steeped in the\nCatholic Faith, who never used its doctrines as matter for argument\nor research, or changed the original belief of their childhood into\nthe more scientific convictions of philosophy. As there is a condition\nof mind which is characterized by invincible ignorance, so there is\nanother which may be said to be possessed of invincible knowledge;\nand it would be paradoxical in me to deny to such a mental state the\nhighest quality of religious faith,\u2014I mean certitude.\n\nI allow this, and therefore I will call simple assent _material_\ncertitude; or, to use a still more apposite term for it,\n_interpretative_ certitude. I call it interpretative, signifying\nthereby that, though the assent in the individuals contemplated is not\na reflex act, still the question only has to be started about the truth\nof the objects of their assent, in order to elicit from them an act of\nfaith in response which will fulfil the conditions of certitude, as I\nhave drawn them out. As to the argumentative process necessary for such\nan act, it is valid and sufficient, if it be carried out seriously, and\nproportionate to their several capacities:\u2014\u201cThe Catholic Religion is\ntrue, because its objects, as present to my mind, control and influence\nmy conduct as nothing else does;\u201d or \u201cbecause it has about it an odour\nof truth and sanctity _sui generis_, as perceptible to my moral nature\nas flowers to my sense, such as can only come from heaven;\u201d or \u201cbecause\nit has never been to me any thing but peace, joy, consolation, and\nstrength, all through my troubled life.\u201d And if the particular argument\nused in some instances needs strengthening, then let it be observed,\nthat the keenness of the real apprehension with which the assent is\nmade, though it cannot be the legitimate basis of the assent, may still\nlegitimately act, and strongly act, in confirmation. Such, I say,\nwould be the promptitude and effectiveness of the reasoning, and the\nfacility of the change from assent to certitude proper, in the case of\nthe multitudes in question, did the occasion for reflection occur; but\nit does not occur; and accordingly, most genuine and thorough as is\nthe assent, it can only be called virtual, material, or interpretative\ncertitude, if I have above explained certitude rightly.\n\nOf course these remarks hold good in secular subjects as well as\nreligious:\u2014I believe, for instance, that I am living in an island, that\nJulius C\u00e6sar once invaded it, that it has been conquered by successive\nraces, that it has had great political and social changes, and that at\nthis time it has colonies, establishments, and imperial dominion all\nover the earth. All this I am accustomed to take for granted without a\nthought; but, were the need to arise, I should not find much difficulty\nin drawing out from my own mental resources reasons sufficient to\njustify me in these beliefs.\n\nIt is true indeed that, among the multitudes who are thus implicitly\ncertain, there may be those who would change their assents, did they\nseek to place them upon an argumentative footing; for instance, some\nbelievers in Christianity, did they examine into its claims, might\nend in renouncing it. But this is only saying that there are genuine\nassents, and assents that ultimately prove to be not genuine; and\nagain, that there is an assent which is not a virtual certitude, and\nis lost in the attempt to make it certitude. And of course we are not\ngifted with that insight into the minds of individuals, which enables\nus to determine before the event, when it is that an assent is really\nsuch, and when not, or not a deeply rooted assent. Men may assent\nlightly, or from mere prejudice, or without understanding what it is\nto which they assent. They may be genuine believers in Revelation up\nto the time when they begin formally to examine,\u2014nay, and really have\nimplicit reasons for their belief,\u2014and then, being overcome by the\nnumber of views which they have to confront, and swayed by the urgency\nof special objections, or biassed by their imaginations, or frightened\nby a deeper insight into the claims of religion upon the soul, may, in\nspite of their habitual and latent grounds for believing, shrink back\nand withdraw their assent. Or again, they may once have believed, but\ntheir assent has gradually become a mere profession, without their\nknowing it; then, when by accident they interrogate themselves, they\nfind no assent within them at all, to turn into certitude. The event,\nI say, alone determines whether what is outwardly an assent is really\nsuch an act of the mind as admits of being developed into certitude, or\nis a mere self-delusion or a cloak for unbelief.\n\n2. Next, I observe, that, of the two modes of apprehending\npropositions, notional and real, assent, as I have already said, has\ncloser relations with real than with notional. Now a simple assent\nneed not be notional; but the reflex or confirmatory assent of\ncertitude always is given to a notional proposition, viz. to the truth,\nnecessity, duty, &c., of our assent to the simple assent and to its\nproposition. Its predicate is a general term, and cannot stand for a\nfact, whereas the original proposition, included in it, may, and often\ndoes, express a fact. Thus, \u201cThe cholera is in the midst of us\u201d is a\nreal proposition; but \u201cThat \u2018the cholera is in the midst of us\u2019 is\nbeyond all doubt\u201d is a notional. Now assent to a real proposition is\nassent to an imagination, and an imagination, as supplying objects to\nour emotional and moral nature, is adapted to be a principle of action:\naccordingly, the simple assent to \u201cThe cholera is among us,\u201d is more\nemphatic and operative, than the confirmatory assent, \u201cIt is beyond\nreasonable doubt that \u2018the cholera is among us.\u2019\u201d The confirmation\ngives momentum to the complex act of the mind, but the simple assent\ngives it its edge. The simple assent would still be operative in its\nmeasure, though the reflex assent was, not \u201cIt is undeniable,\u201d but \u201cIt\nis probable\u201d that \u201cthe cholera is among us;\u201d whereas there would be no\noperative force in the mental act at all, though the reflex assent was\nto the truth, not to the probability of the fact, if the fact which\nwas the object of the simple assent was nothing more than \u201cThe cholera\nis in China.\u201d The reflex assent then, which is the characteristic of\ncertitude, does not immediately touch us; it is purely intellectual,\nand, taken by itself, has scarcely more force than the recording of a\nconclusion.\n\nI have taken an instance, in which the matter which is submitted for\nexamination and for assent, can hardly fail of being interesting to\nthe minds employed upon it; but in many cases, even though the fact\nassented-to has a bearing upon action, it is not directly of a nature\nto influence the feelings or conduct, except of particular persons.\nAnd in such instances of certitude, the previous labour of coming to\na conclusion, and that repose of mind which I have above described\nas attendant on an assent to its truth, often counteracts whatever\nof lively sensation the fact thus concluded is in itself adapted to\nexcite; so that what is gained in depth and exactness of belief is\nlost as regards freshness and vigour. Hence it is that literary or\nscientific men, who may have investigated some difficult point of\nhistory, philosophy, or physics, and have come to their own settled\nconclusion about it, having had a perfect right to form one, are far\nmore disposed to be silent as to their convictions, and to let others\nalone, than partisans on either side of the question, who take it up\nwith less thought and seriousness. And so again, in the religious\nworld, no one seems to look for any great devotion or fervour in\ncontroversialists, writers on Christian Evidences, theologians, and the\nlike, it being taken for granted, rightly or wrongly, that such men are\ntoo intellectual to be spiritual, and are more occupied with the truth\nof doctrine than with its reality. If, on the other hand, we would see\nwhat the force of simple assent can be, viewed apart from its reflex\nconfirmation, we have but to look at the generous and uncalculating\nenergy of faith as exemplified in the primitive Martyrs, in the youths\nwho defied the pagan tyrant, or the maidens who were silent under his\ntortures. It is assent, pure and simple, which is the motive cause of\ngreat achievements; it is a confidence, growing out of instincts rather\nthan arguments, stayed upon a vivid apprehension, and animated by a\ntranscendent logic, more concentrated in will and in deed for the very\nreason that it has not been subjected to any intellectual development.\n\nIt must be borne in mind, that, in thus speaking, I am contrasting with\neach other the simple and the reflex assent, which together make up\nthe complex act of certitude. In its complete exhibition keenness in\nbelieving is united with repose and persistence.\n\n3. We must take the constitution of the human mind as we find it, and\nnot as we may judge it ought to be;\u2014thus I am led on to another remark,\nwhich is at first sight disadvantageous to Certitude. Introspection of\nour intellectual operations is not the best of means for preserving us\nfrom intellectual hesitations. To meddle with the springs of thought\nand action is really to weaken them; and, as to that argumentation\nwhich is the preliminary to Certitude, it may indeed be unavoidable,\nbut, as in the case of other serviceable allies, it is not so easy\nto discard it, after it has done its work, as it was in the first\ninstance to obtain its assistance. Questioning, when encouraged on\nany subject-matter, readily becomes a habit, and leads the mind to\nsubstitute exercises of inference for assent, whether simple or\ncomplex. Reasons for assenting suggest reasons for not assenting,\nand what were realities to our imagination, while our assent was\nsimple, may become little more than notions, when we have attained\nto certitude. Objections and difficulties tell upon the mind; it\nmay lose its elasticity, and be unable to throw them off. And thus,\neven as regards things which it may be absurd to doubt, we may, in\nconsequence of some past suggestion of the possibility of error, or\nof some chance association to their disadvantage, be teazed from\ntime to time and hampered by involuntary questionings, as if we were\nnot certain, when we are. Nay, there are those, who are visited with\nthese even permanently, as a sort of _musc\u00e6 volitantes_ of their\nmental vision, ever flitting to and fro, and dimming its clearness\nand completeness\u2014visitants, for which they are not responsible, and\nwhich they know to be unreal, still so seriously interfering with\ntheir comfort and even with their energy, that they may be tempted to\ncomplain that even blind prejudice has more of quiet and of durability\nthan certitude.\n\nAs even Saints may suffer from imaginations in which they have no part,\nso the shreds and tatters of former controversies, and the litter of an\nargumentative habit, may beset and obstruct the intellect,\u2014questions\nwhich have been solved without their solutions, chains of reasoning\nwith missing links, difficulties which have their roots in the nature\nof things, and which are necessarily left behind in a philosophical\ninquiry because they cannot be removed, and which call for the\nexercise of good sense and for strength of will to put them down with\na high hand, as irrational or preposterous. Whence comes evil? why\nare we created without our consent? how can the Supreme Being have\nno beginning? how can He need skill, if He is omnipotent? if He is\nomnipotent, why does He permit suffering? If He permits suffering,\nhow is He all-loving? if He is all-loving, how can He be just? if He\nis infinite, what has He to do with the finite? how can the temporary\nbe decisive of the eternal?\u2014these, and a host of like questions,\nmust arise in every thoughtful mind, and, after the best use of\nreason, must be deliberately put aside, as beyond reason, as (so to\nspeak) no-thoroughfares, which, having no outlet themselves, have no\nlegitimate power to divert us from the King\u2019s highway, and to hinder\nthe direct course of religious inquiry from reaching its destination. A\nserious obstruction, however, they will be now and then to particular\nminds, enfeebling the faith which they cannot destroy,\u2014being parallel\nto the uncomfortable, associations with which sometimes we regard one\nwhom we have fallen-in with, acquaintance or stranger, arising from\nsome chance word, look, or action of his which we have witnessed, and\nwhich prejudices him in our imagination, though we are angry with\nourselves that it should do so.\n\nAgain, when, in confidence of our own certitude, and with a view\nto philosophical fairness, we have attempted successfully to throw\nourselves out of our habits of belief into a simply dispassionate frame\nof mind, then vague antecedent improbabilities, or what seem to us as\nsuch,\u2014merely what is strange or marvellous in certain truths, merely\nthe fact that things happen in one way and not in another, when they\nmust happen in some way,\u2014may disturb us, as suggesting to us, \u201cIs it\npossible? who would have thought it! what a coincidence!\u201d without\nreally touching the deep assent of our whole intellectual being to the\nobject, whatever it be, thus irrationally assailed. Thus we may wonder\nat the Divine Mercy of the Incarnation, till we grow startled at it,\nand ask why the earth has so special a theological history, or why we\nare Christians and others not, or how God can really exert a particular\ngovernance, since He does not punish such sinners as we are, thus\nseeming to doubt His power or His equity, though in truth we are not\ndoubting at all.\n\nThe occasion of this intellectual waywardness may be slighter still.\nI gaze on the Palatine Hill, or on the Parthenon, or on the Pyramids,\nwhich I have read of from a boy, or upon the matter-of-fact reality of\nthe sacred places in the Holy Land, and I have to force my imagination\nto follow the guidance of sight and of reason. It is to me so strange\nthat a lifelong belief should be changed into sight, and things should\nbe so near me, which hitherto had been visions. And so in times,\nfirst of suspense, then of joy; \u201cWhen the Lord turned the captivity\nof Sion, then\u201d (according to the Hebrew text) \u201cwe were like unto them\nthat dream.\u201d Yet it was a dream which they were certain was a truth,\nwhile they seemed to doubt it. So, too, was it in some sense with the\nApostles after our Lord\u2019s resurrection.\n\nSuch vague thoughts, haunting or evanescent, are in no sense akin to\nthat struggle between faith and unbelief, which made the poor father\ncry out, \u201cI believe, help Thou mine unbelief!\u201d Nay, even what in some\nminds seems like an undercurrent of scepticism, or a faith founded on\na perilous substratum of doubt, need not be more than a temptation,\nthough robbing Certitude of its normal peacefulness. In such a case,\nfaith may still express the steady conviction of the intellect; it may\nstill be the grave, deep, calm, prudent assurance of mature experience,\nthough it is not the ready and impetuous assent of the young, the\ngenerous, or the unreflecting.\n\n4. There is another characteristic of Certitude, in contrast with\nAssent, which it is important to insist upon, and that is, its\npersistence. Assents may and do change; certitudes endure. This is\nwhy religion demands more than an assent to its truth; it requires a\ncertitude, or at least an assent which is convertible into certitude\non demand. Without certitude in religious faith there may be much\ndecency of profession and of observance, but there can be no habit of\nprayer, no directness of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen,\nno generosity of self-sacrifice. Certitude then is essential to the\nChristian; and if he is to persevere to the end, his certitude must\ninclude in it a principle of persistence. This it has; as I shall\nexplain in the next Section.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Indefectibility of Certitude.\n\n\nIt is the characteristic of certitude that its object is a truth,\na truth as such, a proposition as true. There are right and wrong\nconvictions, and certitude is a right conviction; if it is not right\nwith a consciousness of being right, it is not certitude. Now truth\ncannot change; what is once truth is always truth; and the human\nmind is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in\nfalsehood. When then it once becomes possessed of a truth, what is to\ndispossess it? but this is to be certain; therefore once certitude,\nalways certitude. If certitude in any matter be the termination of all\ndoubt or fear about its truth, and an unconditional conscious adherence\nto it, it carries with it an inward assurance, strong though implicit,\nthat it shall never fail. Indefectibility almost enters into its very\nidea, enters into it at least so far as this, that its failure, if\nof frequent occurrence, would prove that certitude was after all and\nin fact an impossible act, and that what looked like it was a mere\nextravagance of the intellect. Truth would still be truth, but the\nknowledge of it would be beyond us and unattainable. It is of great\nimportance then to show, that, as a general rule, certitude does not\nfail; that failures of what was taken for certitude are the exception;\nthat the intellect, which is made for truth, can attain truth, and,\nhaving attained it, can keep it, can recognize it, and preserve the\nrecognition.\n\nThis is on the whole reasonable; yet are the stipulations, thus\nobviously necessary for an act or state of certitude, ever fulfilled?\nWe know what conjecture is, and what opinion, and what assent is,\ncan we point out any specific state or habit of thought, of which\nthe distinguishing mark is unchangeableness? On the contrary, any\nconviction, false as well as true, may last; and any conviction, true\nas well as false, may be lost. A conviction in favour of a proposition\nmay be exchanged for a conviction of its contradictory; and each of\nthem may be attended, while they last, by that sense of security and\nrepose, which a true object alone can legitimately impart. No line can\nbe drawn between such real certitudes as have truth for their object,\nand apparent certitudes. No distinct test can be named, sufficient\nto discriminate between what may be called the false prophet and the\ntrue. What looks like certitude always is exposed to the chance of\nturning out to be a mistake. If our intimate, deliberate conviction\nmay be counterfeit in the case of one proposition, why not in the\ncase of another? if in the case of one man, why not in the case of a\nhundred? Is certitude then ever possible without the attendant gift of\ninfallibility? can we know what is right in one case, unless we are\nsecured against error in any? Further, if one man is infallible, why is\nhe different from his brethren? unless indeed he is distinctly marked\nout for the prerogative. Must not all men be infallible by consequence,\nif any man is to be considered as certain?\n\nThe difficulty, thus stated argumentatively, has only too accurate\na response in what actually goes on in the world. It is a fact of\ndaily occurrence that men change their certitudes, that is, what\nthey consider to be such, and are as confident and well-established\nin their new opinions as they were once in their old. They take up\nforms of religion only to leave them for their contradictories. They\nrisk their fortunes and their lives on impossible adventures. They\ncommit themselves by word and deed, in reputation and position, to\nschemes which in the event they bitterly repent of and renounce; they\nset out in youth with intemperate confidence in prospects which fail\nthem, and in friends who betray them, ere they come to middle age;\nand they end their days in cynical disbelief of truth and virtue any\nwhere;\u2014and often, the more absurd are their means and their ends, so\nmuch the longer do they cling to them, and then again so much the more\npassionate is their eventual disgust and contempt of them. How then\ncan certitude be theirs, how is certitude possible at all, considering\nit is so often misplaced, so often fickle and inconsistent, so\ndeficient in available criteria? And, as to the feeling of finality and\nsecurity, ought it ever to be indulged? Is it not a mere weakness or\nextravagance, a deceit, to be eschewed by every clear and prudent mind?\nWith the countless instances, on all sides of us, of human fallibility,\nwith the constant exhibitions of antagonist certitudes, who can so\nsin against modesty and sobriety of mind, as not to be content with\nprobability, as the true guide of life, renouncing ambitious thoughts,\nwhich are sure either to delude him, or to disappoint?\n\nThis is what may be objected: now let us see what can be said in\nanswer, particularly as regards religious certitude.\n\n1.\n\nFirst, as to fallibility and infallibility. It is very common,\ndoubtless, especially in religious controversy, to confuse\ninfallibility with certitude, and to argue that, since we have not the\none, we have not the other, for that no one can claim to be certain on\nany point, who is not infallible about all; but the two words stand\nfor things quite distinct from each other. For example, I remember for\ncertain what I did yesterday, but still my memory is not infallible; I\nam quite clear that two and two makes four, but I often make mistakes\nin long addition sums. I have no doubt whatever that John or Richard\nis my true friend, but I have before now trusted those who failed me,\nand I may do so again before I die. A certitude is directed to this\nor that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a\ndisposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before\nme. Infallibility, on the contrary, is just that which certitude is\nnot; it is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to some one truth in\nparticular, but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter.\nWe ought in strict propriety, to speak, not of infallible acts, but of\nacts of infallibility. A belief or opinion as little admits of being\ncalled infallible, as a deed can correctly be called immortal. A deed\nis done and over; it may be great, momentous, effective, anything but\nimmortal; it is its fame, it is the work which it brings to pass, which\nis immortal, not the deed itself. And as a deed is good or bad, but\nnever immortal, so a belief, opinion, or certitude is true or false,\nbut never infallible. We cannot speak of things which exist or things\nwhich once were, as if they were something _in posse_. It is persons\nand rules that are infallible, not what is brought out into act, or\ncommitted to paper. A man is infallible, whose words are always true; a\nrule is infallible, if it is unerring in all its possible applications.\nAn infallible authority is certain in every particular case that may\narise; but a man who is certain in some one definite case, is not on\nthat account infallible.\n\nI am quite certain that Victoria is our Sovereign, and not her father,\nthe late Duke of Kent, without laying any claim to the gift of\ninfallibility; as I may do a virtuous action, without being impeccable.\nI may be certain that the Church is infallible, while I am myself a\nfallible mortal; otherwise, I cannot be certain that the Supreme Being\nis infallible, until I am infallible myself. It is a strange objection,\nthen, which is sometimes urged against Catholics, that they cannot\nprove and assent to the Church\u2019s infallibility, unless they first\nbelieve in their own. Certitude, as I have said, is directed to one or\nother definite concrete proposition. I am certain of proposition one,\ntwo, three, four, or five, one by one, each by itself. I may be certain\nof one of them, without being certain of the rest; that I am certain\nof the first makes it neither likely nor unlikely that I am certain of\nthe second; but were I infallible, then I should be certain, not only\nof one of them, but of all, and of many more besides, which have never\ncome before me as yet. Therefore we may be certain of the infallibility\nof the Church, while we admit that in many things we are not, and\ncannot be, certain at all.\n\nIt is wonderful that a clear-headed man, like Chillingworth, sees\nthis as little as the run of every-day objectors to the Catholic\nreligion; for in his celebrated \u201cReligion of Protestants\u201d he writes\nas follows:\u2014\u201cYou tell me they cannot be saved, unless they believe\nin your proposals with an infallible faith. To which end they must\nbelieve also your propounder, the Church, to be simply infallible. Now\nhow is it possible for them to give a rational assent to the Church\u2019s\ninfallibility, _unless they have some infallible means to know that she\nis infallible_? Neither can they infallibly know the infallibility of\nthis means, but by some other; and so on for ever, unless they can dig\nso deep, as to come at length to the Rock, that is, to settle all upon\nsomething evident of itself, which is not so much as pretended.(11)\u201d\n\nNow what is an \u201cinfallible means\u201d? It is a means of coming at a fact\nwithout the chance of mistake. It is a proof which is sufficient for\ncertitude in the particular case, or a proof that is certain. When\nthen Chillingworth says that there can be no \u201crational assent to the\nChurch\u2019s infallibility\u201d without \u201csome infallible means of knowing\nthat she is infallible,\u201d he means nothing else than some means which\nis certain; he says that for a rational assent to infallibility there\nmust be an absolutely valid or certain proof. This is intelligible;\nbut observe how his argument will run, if worded according to this\ninterpretation: \u201cThe doctrine of the Church\u2019s infallibility requires a\nproof that is certain; and that certain proof requires another previous\ncertain proof, and that again another, and so on _ad infinitum_, unless\nindeed we dig so deep as to settle all upon something evident of\nitself.\u201d What is this but to say that nothing in this world is certain\nbut what is self-evident? that nothing can be absolutely proved? Can\nhe really mean this? What then becomes of physical truth? of the\ndiscoveries in optics, chemistry, and electricity, or of the science of\nmotion? Intuition by itself will carry us but a little way into that\ncircle of knowledge which is the boast of the present age.\n\nI can believe then in the infallible Church without my own personal\ninfallibility. Certitude is at most nothing more than infallibility\n_pro hac vice_, and promises nothing as to the truth of any proposition\nbeside its own. That I am certain of this proposition to-day, is no\nground for thinking that I shall have a right to be certain of that\nproposition to-morrow; and that I am wrong in my convictions about\nto-day\u2019s proposition, does not hinder my having a true conviction, a\ngenuine certitude, about to-morrow\u2019s proposition. If indeed I claimed\nto be infallible, one failure would shiver my claim to pieces; but I\nmay claim to be certain of the truth to which I have already attained,\nthough I should arrive at no new truths in addition as long as I live.\n\n2.\n\nLet us put aside the word \u201cinfallibility;\u201d let us understand by\ncertitude, as I have explained it, nothing more than a relation of the\nmind towards given propositions:\u2014still, it may be urged, it involves\na sense of security and of repose, at least as regards these in\nparticular. Now how can this security be mine,\u2014without which certitude\nis not,\u2014if I know, as I know too well, that before now I have thought\nmyself certain, when I was certain after all of an untruth? Is not\nthe very possibility of certitude lost to me for ever by that one\nmistake? What happened once, may happen again. All my certitudes\nbefore and after are henceforth destroyed by the introduction of a\nreasonable doubt, underlying them all. _Ipso facto_ they cease to be\ncertitudes,\u2014they come short of unconditional assents by the measure of\nthat counterfeit assurance. They are nothing more to me than opinions\nor anticipations, judgments on the verisimilitude of intellectual\nviews, not the possession and enjoyment of truths. And who has not\nthus been balked by false certitudes a hundred times in the course of\nhis experience? and how can certitude have a legitimate place in our\nmental constitution, when it thus manifestly ministers to error and to\nscepticism?\n\nThis is what may be objected, and it is not, as I think, difficult\nto answer. Certainly, the experience of mistakes in the assents\nwhich we have made are to the prejudice of subsequent ones. There\nis an antecedent difficulty in our allowing ourselves to be certain\nof something to-day, if yesterday we had to give up our belief of\nsomething else, of which we had up to that time professed ourselves to\nbe certain. This is true; but antecedent objections to an act are not\nsufficient of themselves to prohibit its exercise; they may demand of\nus an increased circumspection before committing ourselves to it, but\nmay be met with reasons more than sufficient to overcome them.\n\nIt must be recollected that certitude is a deliberate assent given\nexpressly after reasoning. If then my certitude is unfounded, it is the\nreasoning that is in fault, not my assent to it. It is the law of my\nmind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has brought me,\nby that formal assent which I have called a certitude. I could indeed\nhave withheld my assent, but I should have acted against my nature,\nhad I done so when there was what I considered a proof; and I did\nonly what was fitting, what was incumbent on me, upon those existing\nconditions, in giving it. This is the process by which knowledge\naccumulates and is stored up both in the individual and in the world.\nIt has sometimes been remarked, when men have boasted of the knowledge\nof modern times, that no wonder we see more than the ancients, because\nwe are mounted upon their shoulders. The conclusions of one generation\nare the truths of the next. We are able, it is our duty, deliberately\nto take things for granted which our forefathers had a duty to doubt\nabout; and unless we summarily put down disputation on points which\nhave been already proved and ruled, we shall waste our time, and make\nno advances. Circumstances indeed may arise, when a question may\nlegitimately be revived, which has already been definitely determined;\nbut a re-consideration of such a question need not abruptly unsettle\nthe existing certitude of those who engage in it, or throw them into a\nscepticism about things in general, even though eventually they find\nthey have been wrong in a particular matter. It would have been absurd\nto prohibit the controversy which has lately been held concerning the\nobligations of Newton to Pascal; and supposing it had issued in their\nbeing established, the partisans of Newton would not have thought it\nnecessary to renounce their certitude of the law of gravitation itself,\non the ground that they had been mistaken in their certitude that\nNewton discovered it.\n\nIf we are never to be certain, after having been once certain wrongly,\nthen we ought never to attempt a proof because we have once made a\nbad one. Errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give\nup reasoning, but to reason with greater caution. It is absurd to\nbreak up the whole structure of our knowledge, which is the glory of\nthe human intellect, because the intellect is not infallible in its\nconclusions. If in any particular case we have been mistaken in our\ninferences and the certitudes which followed upon them, we are bound\nof course to take the fact of this mistake into account, in making up\nour minds on any new question, before we proceed to decide upon it. But\nif, while weighing the arguments on one side and the other and drawing\nour conclusion, that old mistake has already been allowed for, or has\nbeen, to use a familiar mode of speaking, discounted, then it has no\noutstanding claim against our acceptance of that conclusion, after it\nhas actually been drawn. Whatever be the legitimate weight of the fact\nof that mistake in our inquiry, justice has been done to it, before we\nhave allowed ourselves to be certain again. Suppose I am walking out\nin the moonlight, and see dimly the outlines of some figure among the\ntrees;\u2014it is a man. I draw nearer,\u2014it is still a man; nearer still, and\nall hesitation is at an end,\u2014I am certain it is a man. But he neither\nmoves, nor speaks when I address him; and then I ask myself what can\nbe his purpose in hiding among the trees at such an hour. I come quite\nclose to him, and put out my arm. Then I find for certain that what I\ntook for a man is but a singular shadow, formed by the falling of the\nmoonlight on the interstices of some branches or their foliage. Am I\nnot to indulge my second certitude, because I was wrong in my first?\ndoes not any objection, which lies against my second from the failure\nof my first, fade away before the evidence on which my second is\nfounded?\n\nOr again: I depose on my oath in a court of justice, to the best of my\nknowledge and belief, that I was robbed by the prisoner at the bar.\nThen, when the real offender is brought before me, I am obliged, to\nmy great confusion, to retract. Because I have been mistaken in my\ncertitude, may I not at least be certain that I have been mistaken?\nAnd further, in spite of the shock which that mistake gives me, is it\nimpossible that the sight of the real culprit may give me so luminous\na conviction that at length I have got the right man, that, were it\ndecent towards the court, or consistent with self-respect, I may find\nmyself prepared to swear to the identity of the second, as I have\nalready solemnly committed myself to the identity of the first? It is\nmanifest that the two certitudes stand each on its own basis, and the\nantecedent objection to the admission of a truth which was brought home\nto me second, drawn from a hallucination which came first, is a mere\nabstract argument, impotent when directed against good evidence lying\nin the concrete.\n\n3.\n\nIf in the criminal case which I have been supposing, the second\ncertitude, felt by a witness, was a legitimate state of mind, so was\nthe first. An act, viewed in itself, is not wrong, because it is done\nwrongly. False certitudes are faults because they are false, not\nbecause they are (so-called) certitudes. They are, or may be, the\nattempts and the failures of an intellect insufficiently trained, or\noff its guard. Assent is an act of the mind, congenial to its nature;\nand it, as other acts, may be made both when it ought to be made, and\nwhen it ought not. It is a free act, a personal act for which the doer\nis responsible, and the actual mistakes in making it, be they ever so\nnumerous or serious, have no force whatever to prohibit the act itself.\nWe are accustomed in such cases, to appeal to the maxim, \u201cUsum non\ntollit abusus;\u201d and it is plain that, if what may be called functional\ndisarrangements of the intellect are to be considered fatal to the\nrecognition of the functions themselves, then the mind has no laws\nwhatever and no normal constitution. I just now spoke of the growth\nof knowledge; there is also a growth in the use of those faculties by\nwhich knowledge is acquired. The intellect admits of an education; man\nis a being of progress; he has to learn how to fulfil his end, and\nto be what facts show that he is intended to be. His mind is in the\nfirst instance in disorder, and runs wild; his faculties have their\nrudimental and inchoate state, and are gradually carried on by practice\nand experience to their perfection. No instances then whatever of\nmistaken certitude are sufficient to constitute a proof, that certitude\nitself is a perversion or extravagance of his nature.\n\nWe do not dispense with clocks, because from time to time they go\nwrong, and tell untruly. A clock, organically considered, may be\nperfect, yet it may require regulating. Till that needful work is\ndone, the moment-hand may mark the half-minute, when the minute-hand\nis at the quarter-past, and the hour hand is just at noon, and the\nquarter-bell strikes the three-quarters, and the hour-bell strikes\nfour, while the sun-dial precisely tells two o\u2019clock. The sense of\ncertitude may be called the bell of the intellect; and that it strikes\nwhen it should not is a proof that the clock is out of order, no proof\nthat the bell will be untrustworthy and useless, when it comes to us\nadjusted and regulated from the hands of the clock-maker.\n\nOur conscience too may be said to strike the hours, and will strike\nthem wrongly, unless it be duly regulated for the performance of its\nproper function. It is the loud announcement of the principle of right\nin the details of conduct, as the sense of certitude is the clear\nwitness to what is true. Both certitude and conscience have a place in\nthe normal condition of the mind. As a human being, I am unable, if\nI were to try, to live without some kind of conscience; and I am as\nlittle able to live without those landmarks of thought which certitude\nsecures for me; still, as the hammer of a clock may tell untruly, so\nmay my conscience and my sense of certitude be attached to mental\nacts, whether of consent or of assent, which have no claim to be thus\nsanctioned. Both the moral and the intellectual sanction are liable to\nbe biassed by personal inclinations and motives; both require and admit\nof discipline; and, as it is no disproof of the authority of conscience\nthat false consciences abound, neither does it destroy the importance\nand the uses of certitude, because even educated minds, who are earnest\nin their inquiries after the truth, in many cases remain under the\npower of prejudice or delusion.\n\nTo this deficiency in mental training a wider error is to be\nattributed,\u2014the mistaking for conviction and certitude states and\nframes of mind which make no pretence to the fundamental condition on\nwhich conviction rests as distinct from assent. The multitude of men\nconfuse together the probable, the possible, and the certain, and apply\nthese terms to doctrines and statements almost at random. They have no\nclear view what it is they know, what they presume, what they suppose,\nand what they only assert. They make little distinction between\ncredence, opinion, and profession; at various times they give them all\nperhaps the name of certitude, and accordingly, when they change their\nminds, they fancy they have given up points of which they had a true\nconviction. Or at least bystanders thus speak of them, and the very\nidea of certitude falls into disrepute.\n\nIn this day the subject-matter of thought and belief has so increased\nupon us, that a far higher mental formation is required than was\nnecessary in times past, and higher than we have actually reached. The\nwhole world is brought to our doors every morning, and our judgment\nis required upon social concerns, books, persons, parties, creeds,\nnational acts, political principles and measures. We have to form our\nopinion, make our profession, take our side on a hundred matters on\nwhich we have but little right to speak at all. But we do speak, and\nmust speak, upon them, though neither we nor those who hear us are well\nable to determine what is the real position of our intellect relatively\nto those many questions, one by one, on which we commit ourselves; and\nthen, since many of these questions change their complexion with the\npassing hour, and many require elaborate consideration, and many are\nsimply beyond us, it is not wonderful, if, at the end of a few years,\nwe have to revise or to repudiate our conclusions; and then we shall\nbe unfairly said to have changed our certitudes, and shall confirm the\ndoctrine, that, except in abstract truth, no judgment rises higher than\nprobability.\n\nSuch are the mistakes about certitude among educated men; and after\nreferring to them, it is scarcely worth while to dwell upon the\nabsurdities and excesses of the rude intellect, as seen in the world\nat large; as if any one could dream of treating as deliberate assents,\nas assents upon assents, as convictions or certitudes, the prejudices,\ncredulities, infatuations, superstitions, fanaticisms, the whims and\nfancies, the sudden irrevocable plunges into the unknown, the obstinate\ndeterminations,\u2014the offspring, as they are, of ignorance, wilfulness,\ncupidity, and pride,\u2014which go so far to make up the history of mankind;\nyet these are often set down as instances of certitude and of its\nfailure.\n\n4.\n\nI have spoken of certitude as being assigned a definite and fixed\nplace among our mental acts;\u2014it follows upon examination and proof, as\nthe bell sounds the hour, when the hands reach it,\u2014so that no act or\nstate of the intellect is certitude, however it may resemble it, which\ndoes not observe this appointed law. This proviso greatly diminishes\nthe catalogue of genuine certitudes. Another restriction is this:\u2014the\noccasions or subject-matters of certitude are under law also. Putting\naside the daily exercise of the senses, the principal subjects in\nsecular knowledge, about which we can be certain, are the truths or\nfacts which are its basis. As to this world, we are certain of the\nelements of knowledge, whether general, scientific, historical, or\nsuch as bear on our daily needs and habits, and relate to ourselves,\nour homes and families, our friends, neighbourhood, country, and\ncivil state. Beyond these elementary points of knowledge, lies a vast\nsubject-matter of opinion, credence, and belief, viz. the field of\npublic affairs, of social and professional life, of business, of duty,\nof literature, of taste, nay, of the experimental sciences. On subjects\nsuch as these the reasonings and conclusions of mankind vary,\u2014\u201cmundum\ntradidit disputationi eorum;\u201d\u2014and prudent men in consequence seldom\nspeak confidently, unless they are warranted to do so by genius,\ngreat experience, or some special qualification. They determine their\njudgments by what is probable, what is safe, what promises best, what\nhas verisimilitude, what impresses and sways them. They neither can\npossess, nor need certitude, nor do they look out for it.\n\nHence it is that\u2014the province of certitude being so contracted, and\nthat of opinion so large\u2014it is common to call probability the guide of\nlife. This saying, when properly explained, is true; however, we must\nnot suffer ourselves to carry a true maxim to an extreme; it is far\nfrom true, if we so hold it as to forget that without first principles\nthere can be no conclusions at all, and that thus probability does\nin some sense presuppose and require the existence of truths which\nare certain. Especially is the maxim untrue, in respect to the other\ngreat department of knowledge, if taken to support the doctrine, that\nthe first principles and elements of religion, which are universally\nreceived, are mere matter of opinion; though in this day, it is too\noften taken for granted that religion is one of those subjects on which\ntruth cannot be discovered, and on which one conclusion is pretty\nmuch on a level with another. But on the contrary, the initial truths\nof divine knowledge ought to be viewed as parallel to the initial\ntruths of secular: as the latter are certain, so too are the former.\nI cannot indeed deny that a decent reverence for the Supreme Being,\nan acquiescence in the claims of Revelation, a general profession of\nChristian doctrine, and some sort of attendance on sacred ordinances,\nis in fact all the religion that is usual with even the better sort of\nmen, and that for all this a sufficient basis may certainly be found in\nprobabilities; but if religion is to be devotion, and not a mere matter\nof sentiment, if it is to be made the ruling principle of our lives, if\nour actions, one by one, and our daily conduct, are to be consistently\ndirected towards an Invisible Being, we need something higher than a\nmere balance of arguments to fix and to control our minds. Sacrifice\nof wealth, name, or position, faith and hope, self-conquest, communion\nwith the spiritual world, presuppose a real hold and habitual intuition\nof the objects of Revelation, which is certitude under another name.\n\nTo this issue indeed we may bring the main difference, viewed\nphilosophically, between nominal Christianity on the one hand, and\nvital Christianity on the other. Rational, sensible men, as they\nconsider themselves, men who do not comprehend the very notion of\nloving God above all things, are content with such a measure of\nprobability for the truths of religion, as serves them in their secular\ntransactions; but those who are deliberately staking their all upon the\nhopes of the next world, think it reasonable, and find it necessary,\nbefore starting on their new course, to have some points, clear and\nimmutable, to start from; otherwise, they will not start at all. They\nask, as a preliminary condition, to have the ground sure under their\nfeet; they look for more than human reasonings and inferences, for\nnothing less than the \u201cstrong consolation,\u201d as the Apostle speaks, of\nthose \u201cimmutable things in which it is impossible for God to lie,\u201d His\ncounsel and His oath. Christian earnestness may be ruled by the world\nto be a perverseness or a delusion; but, as long as it exists, it will\npresuppose certitude as the very life which is to animate it.\n\nThis is the true parallel between human and divine knowledge; each of\nthem opens into a large field of mere opinion, but in both the one and\nthe other the primary principles, the general, fundamental, cardinal\ntruths are immutable. In human matters we are guided by probabilities,\nbut, I repeat, they are probabilities founded on certainties. It is\non no probability that we are constantly receiving the informations\nand dictates of sense and memory, of our intellectual instincts, of\nthe moral sense, and of the logical faculty. It is on no probability\nthat we receive the generalizations of science, and the great outlines\nof history. These are certain truths; and from them each of us forms\nhis own judgments and directs his own course, according to the\nprobabilities which they suggest to him, as the navigator applies his\nobservations and his charts for the determination of his course. Such\nis the main view to be taken of the separate provinces of probability\nand certainty in matters of this world; and so, as regards the world\ninvisible and future, we have a direct and conscious knowledge of our\nMaker, His attributes, His providences, acts, works, and will; and,\nbeyond this knowledge lies the large domain of theology, metaphysics,\nand ethics, on which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond\nprobabilities, or to attain to more than an opinion.\n\nSuch on the whole is the analogy between our knowledge of matters of\nthis world and matters of the world unseen;\u2014indefectible certitude in\nprimary truths, manifold variations of opinion in their application and\ndisposition.\n\n5.\n\nI have said that Certitude, whether in human or divine knowledge, is\nattainable as regards general and cardinal truths; and that in neither\ndepartment of knowledge, on the whole, is certitude discredited, lost,\nor reversed; for, in matter of fact, whether in human or divine, those\nprimary truths have ever kept their place from the time when they first\ntook possession of it. However, there is one obvious objection which\nmay be made to this representation, and I proceed to take notice of it.\n\nIt may be urged then, that time was when the primary truths of science\nwere unknown, and when in consequence various theories were held,\ncontrary to each other. The first element of all things was said to\nbe water, to be air, to be fire; the framework of the universe was\neternal; or it was the ever-new combination of innumerable atoms: the\nplanets were fixed in solid crystal revolving spheres; or they moved\nround the earth in epicycles mounted upon circular orbits; or they were\ncarried whirling round about the sun, while the sun was whirling round\nthe earth. About such doctrines there was no certitude, no more than\nthere is now certitude about the origin of languages, the age of man,\nor the evolution of species, considered as philosophical questions. Now\ntheology is at present in the very same state in which natural science\nwas five hundred years ago; and this is the proof of it,\u2014that, instead\nof there being one received theological science in the world, there\nare a multitude of hypotheses. We have a professed science of Atheism,\nanother of Deism, a Pantheistic, ever so many Christian theologies, to\nsay nothing of Judaism, Islamism, and the Oriental religions. Each of\nthese creeds has its own upholders, and these upholders all certain\nthat it is the very and the only truth, and these same upholders, it\nmay happen, presently giving it up, and then taking up some other\ncreed, and being certain again, as they profess, that it and it only is\nthe truth, these various so-called truths being incompatible with each\nother. Are not Jews certain about their interpretation of their law?\nyet they become Christians: are not Catholics certain about the new\nlaw? yet they become Protestants. At present then, and as yet, there is\nno clear certainty anywhere about religious truth at all; it has still\nto be discovered; and therefore for Catholics to claim the right to\nlay down the first principles of theological science in their own way,\nis to assume the very matter in dispute. First let their doctrines be\nuniversally received, and then they will have a right to place them on\na level with the certainty which belongs to the laws of motion or of\nrefraction. This is the objection which I propose to consider.\n\nNow first as to the want of universal reception which is urged against\nthe Catholic dogmas, this part of the objection will not require\nmany words. Surely a truth or a fact may be certain, though it is\nnot generally received;\u2014we are each of us ever gaining through our\nsenses various certainties, which no one shares with us; again, the\ncertainties of the sciences are in the possession of a few countries\nonly, and for the most part only of the educated classes in those\ncountries; yet the philosophers of Europe and America would feel\ncertain that the earth rolled round the sun, in spite of the Indian\nbelief of its being supported by an elephant with a tortoise under it.\nThe Catholic Church then, though not universally acknowledged, may\nwithout inconsistency claim to teach the primary truths of religion,\njust as modern science, though but partially received, claims to teach\nthe great principles and laws which are the foundation of secular\nknowledge, and that with a significance to which no other religious\nsystem can pretend, because it is its very profession to speak to all\nmankind, and its very badge to be ever making converts all over the\nearth, whereas other religions are more or less variable in their\nteaching, tolerant of each other, and local, and professedly local, in\ntheir _habitat_ and character.\n\nThis, however, is not the main point of the objection; the real\ndifficulty lies not in the variety of religions, but in the\ncontradiction, conflict, and change of religious certitudes. Truth need\nnot be universal, but it must of necessity be certain; and certainty,\nin order to be certainty, must endure; yet how is this reasonable\nexpectation fulfilled in the case of religion? On the contrary, those\nwho have been the most certain in their beliefs are sometimes found\nto lose them, Catholics as well as others; and then to take up new\nbeliefs, perhaps contrary ones, of which they become as certain as if\nthey had never been certain of the old.\n\nIn answering this representation, I begin with recurring to the remark\nwhich I have already made, that assent and certitude have reference\nto propositions, one by one. We may of course assent to a number of\npropositions all together, that is, we may make a number of assents all\nat once; but in doing so we run the risk of putting upon one level,\nand treating as if of the same value, acts of the mind which are very\ndifferent from each other in character and circumstance. An assent,\nindeed, is ever an assent; but given assents may be strong or weak,\ndeliberate or impulsive, lasting or ephemeral. Now a religion is not\na proposition, but a system; it is a rite, a creed, a philosophy, a\nrule of duty, all at once; and to accept a religion is neither a simple\nassent to it nor a complex, neither a conviction nor a prejudice,\nneither a notional assent nor a real, not a mere act of profession, nor\nof credence, nor of opinion, nor of speculation, but it is a collection\nof all these various kinds of assents, some of one description, some of\nanother; but, out of all these different assents, how many are of that\nkind which I have called certitude? Certitudes indeed do not change,\nbut who shall pretend that assents are indefectible?\n\nFor instance: the fundamental dogma of Protestantism is the exclusive\nauthority of Holy Scripture; but in holding this a Protestant holds a\nhost of propositions, explicitly or implicitly, and holds them with\nassents of various character. Among these propositions, he holds that\nScripture is the Divine Revelation itself, that it is inspired, that\nnothing is known in doctrine but what is there, that the Church has no\nauthority in matters of doctrine, that, as claiming it, it condemned\nlong ago in the Apocalypse, that St. John wrote the Apocalypse, that\njustification is by faith only, that our Lord is God, that there are\nseventy-two generations between Adam and our Lord. Now of which, out\nof all these propositions, is he certain? and to how many of them is\nhis assent of one and the same description? His belief, that Scripture\nis commensurate with the Divine Revelation, is perhaps implicit, not\nconscious; as to inspiration, he does not well know what the word\nmeans, and his assent is scarcely more than a profession; that no\ndoctrine is true but what can be proved from Scripture he understands,\nand his assent to it is what I have called speculative; that the Church\nhas no authority he holds with a real assent or belief; that the Church\nis condemned in the Apocalypse is a standing prejudice; that St. John\nwrote the Apocalypse is his opinion; that justification is by faith\nonly, he accepts, but scarcely can be said to apprehend; that our Lord\nis God perhaps he is certain; that there are seventy-two generations\nbetween Adam and Christ he accepts on credence. Yet, if he were asked\nthe question, he would most probably answer that he was certain of the\ntruth of \u201cProtestantism,\u201d though \u201cProtestantism\u201d means these things\nand a hundred more all at once, and though he believes with actual\ncertitude only one of them all,\u2014that indeed a dogma of most sacred\nimportance, but not the discovery of Luther or Calvin. He would think\nit enough to say that he was a foe to \u201cRomanism\u201d and \u201cSocinianism,\u201d and\nto avow that he gloried in the Reformation. He looks upon each of these\nreligious professions, Protestantism, Romanism, Socinianism and Theism,\nmerely as units, as if they were not each made up of many elements,\nas if they had nothing in common, as if a transition from the one to\nthe other involved a simple obliteration of all that had been as yet\nwritten on his mind, and would be the reception of a new faith.\n\nWhen, then, we are told that a man has changed from one religion to\nanother, the first question which we have to ask, is, have the first\nand the second religions nothing in common? If they have common\ndoctrines, he has changed only a portion of his creed, not the whole:\nand the next question is, has he ever made much of those doctrines\nwhich are common to his new creed and his old? and then again, what\ndoctrines was he certain of among the old, and what among the new?\n\nThus, of three Protestants, one becomes a Catholic, a second a\nUnitarian, and a third an unbeliever: how is this? The first becomes\na Catholic, because he assented, as a Protestant, to the doctrine of\nour Lord\u2019s divinity, with a real assent and a genuine conviction,\nand because this certitude, taking possession of his mind, led him\non to welcome the Catholic doctrines of the Real Presence and of the\nTheotocos, till his Protestantism fell off from him, and he submitted\nhimself to the Church. The second became a Unitarian, because,\nproceeding on the principle that Scripture was the rule of faith and\nthat a man\u2019s private judgment was its rule of interpretation, and\nfinding that the doctrine of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds did\nnot follow by logical necessity from the text of Scripture, he said\nto himself, \u201cThe word of God has been made of none effect by the\ntraditions of men,\u201d and therefore nothing was left for him but to\nprofess what he considered primitive Christianity, and to become a\nHumanitarian. The third gradually subsided into infidelity, because\nhe started with the Protestant dogma, cherished in the depths of his\nnature, that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the\nGospel. First, then, he would protest against the sacrifice of the\nMass; next he gave up baptismal regeneration, and the sacramental\nprinciple; then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint\non Christian liberty as well as sacraments; then came the question,\nwhat after all was the use of teachers of religion? why should any one\nstand between him and his Maker? After a time it struck him, that this\nobvious question had to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the\nAnglican clergy; so he came to the conclusion that the true and only\nrevelation of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This\ndid for a time, and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him,\nthat this inward moral law was there within the breast, whether there\nwas a God or not, and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that\nlaw, to say that it came from God, and simply unnecessary, considering\nit carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our\nfeelings instinctively testified; and when he turned to look at the\nphysical world around him, he really did not see what scientific proof\nthere was there of the Being of God at all, and it seemed to him as\nif all things would go on quite as well as at present, without that\nhypothesis as with it; so he dropped it, and became a _purus_, _putus_\nAtheist.\n\nNow the world will say, that in these three cases old certitudes were\nlost, and new were gained; but it is not so: each of the three men\nstarted with just one certitude, as he would have himself professed,\nhad he examined himself narrowly; and he carried it out and carried\nit with him into a new system of belief. He was true to that one\nconviction from first to last; and on looking back on the past, would\nperhaps insist upon this, and say he had really been consistent all\nthrough, when others made much of his great changes in religious\nopinion. He has indeed made serious additions to his initial ruling\nprinciple, but he has lost no conviction of which he was originally\npossessed.\n\nI will take one more instance. A man is converted to the Catholic\nChurch from his admiration of its religious system, and his disgust\nwith Protestantism. That admiration remains; but, after a time, he\nleaves his new faith, perhaps returns to his old. The reason, if we\nmay conjecture, may sometimes be this: he has never believed in the\nChurch\u2019s infallibility; in her doctrinal truth he has believed, but in\nher infallibility, no. He was asked, before he was received, whether he\nheld all that the Church taught, he replied he did; but he understood\nthe question to mean, whether he held those particular doctrines \u201cwhich\nat that time the Church in matter of fact formally taught,\u201d whereas it\nreally meant \u201cwhatever the Church then or at any future time should\nteach.\u201d Thus, he never had the indispensable and elementary faith of a\nCatholic, and was simply no subject for reception into the fold of the\nChurch. This being the case, when the Immaculate Conception is defined,\nhe feels that it is something more than he bargained for when he became\na Catholic, and accordingly he gives up his religious profession. The\nworld will say that he has lost his certitude of the divinity of the\nCatholic Faith, but he never had it.\n\nThe first point to be ascertained, then, when we hear of a change of\nreligious certitude in another, is, what the doctrines are on which his\nso-called certitude before now and at present has respectively fallen.\nAll doctrines besides these were the accidents of his profession, and\nthe indefectibility of certitude would not be disproved, though he\nchanged them every year. There are few religions which have no points\nin common; and these, whether true or false, when embraced with an\nabsolute conviction, are the pivots on which changes take place in\nthat collection of credences, opinions, prejudices, and other assents,\nwhich make up what is called a man\u2019s selection and adoption of a form\nof religion, a denomination, or a Church. There have been Protestants\nwhose idea of enlightened Christianity has been a strenuous antagonism\nto what they consider the unmanliness and unreasonableness of Catholic\nmorality, an antipathy to the precepts of patience, meekness,\nforgiveness of injuries, and chastity. All this they have considered\na woman\u2019s religion, the ornament of monks, of the sick, the feeble,\nand the old. Lust, revenge, ambition, courage, pride, these, they have\nfancied, made the man, and want of them the slave. No one could fairly\naccuse such men of any great change of their convictions, or refer to\nthem in proof of the defectibility of certitude, if they were one day\nfound to have taken up the profession of Islam.\n\nAnd if this intercommunion of religions holds good, even when the\ncommon points between them are but errors held in common, much more\nnatural will be the transition from one religion to another, without\ninjury to existing certitudes, when the common points, the objects of\nthose certitudes, are truths; and still stronger in that case and more\nconstraining will be the sympathy, with which minds that love truth,\neven when they have surrounded it with error, will yearn towards the\nCatholic faith, which contains within itself, and claims as its own,\nall truth that is elsewhere to be found, and more than all, and nothing\nbut truth. This is the secret of the influence, by which the Church\ndraws to herself converts from such various and conflicting religions.\nThey come, not to lose what they have, but to gain what they have not;\nand in order that, by means of what they have, more may be given to\nthem. St. Augustine tells us that there is no false teaching without\nan intermixture of truth; and it is by the light of those particular\ntruths, contained respectively in the various religions of men, and by\nour certitudes about them, which are possible wherever those truths are\nfound, that we pick our way, slowly perhaps, but surely, into the One\nReligion which God has given, taking our certitudes with us, not to\nlose, but to keep them more securely, and to understand and love their\nobjects more perfectly.\n\nNot even are idolaters and heathen out of the range of some of these\nreligious truths and their correlative certitudes. The old Greek and\nRoman polytheists had, as they show in their literature, clear and\nstrong notions, nay, vivid mental images, of a Particular Providence,\nof the power of prayer, of the rule of Divine Governance, of the law of\nconscience, of sin and guilt, of expiation by means of sacrifices, and\nof future retribution: I will even add, of the Unity and Personality\nof the Supreme Being. This it is that throws such a magnificent light\nover the Homeric poems, the tragic choruses, and the Odes of Pindar;\nand it has its counterpart in the philosophy of Socrates and of the\nStoics, and in such historians as Herodotus. It would be out of place\nto speak confidently of a state of society which has passed away,\nbut at first sight it does not appear why the truths which I have\nenumerated should not have received as genuine and deliberate an assent\non the part of Socrates or Cleanthes, (of course with divine aids,\nbut they do not enter into this discussion,) as was given to them by\nSt. John or St. Paul, nay, an assent which rose to certitude. Much\nmore safely may it be pronounced of a Mahometan, that he may have a\ncertitude of the Divine Unity, as well as a Christian; and of a Jew,\nthat he may believe as truly as a Christian in the resurrection of the\nbody; and of a Unitarian that he can give a deliberate and real assent\nto the fact of a supernatural revelation, to the Christian miracles,\nto the eternal moral law, and to the immortality of the soul. And so,\nagain, a Protestant may, not only in words, but in mind and heart,\nhold, as if he were a Catholic, with simple certitude, the doctrines\nof the Holy Trinity, of the fall of man, of the need of regeneration,\nof the efficacy of Divine Grace, and of the possibility and danger of\nfalling away. And thus it is conceivable that a man might travel in\nhis religious profession all the way from heathenism to Catholicity,\nthrough Mahometanism, Judaism, Unitarianism, Protestantism, and\nAnglicanism, without any one certitude lost, but with a continual\naccumulation of truths, which claimed from him and elicited in his\nintellect fresh and fresh certitudes.\n\nIn saying all this, I do not forget that the same doctrines, as held\nin different religions, may be and often are held very differently,\nas belonging to distinct wholes or _forms_, as they are called, and\nexposed to the influence and the bias of the teaching, perhaps false,\nwith which they are associated. Thus, for instance, whatever be the\nresemblance between St. Augustine\u2019s doctrine of Predestination and the\ntenet of Calvin upon it, the two really differ from each other _toto\nc\u0153lo_ in significance and effect, in consequence of the place they\nhold in the systems in which they are respectively incorporated, just\nas shades and tints show so differently in a painting according to the\nmasses of colour to which they are attached. But, in spite of this, a\nman may so hold the doctrine of personal election as a Calvinist, as to\nbe able still to hold it as a Catholic.\n\nHowever, I have been speaking of certitudes which remain unimpaired, or\nrather confirmed, by a change of religion; on the contrary there are\nothers, whether we call them certitudes or convictions, which perish\nin the change, as St. Paul\u2019s conviction of the sufficiency of the\nJewish Law came to an end on his becoming a Christian. Now how is such\na series of facts to be reconciled with the doctrine which I have been\nenforcing? What conviction could be stronger than the faith of the Jews\nin the perpetuity of the Mosaic system? Those, then, it may be said,\nwho abandoned Judaism for the Gospel, surely, in so doing, bore the\nmost emphatic of testimonies to the defectibility of certitude. And,\nin like manner, a Mahometan may be so deeply convinced that Mahomet\nis the prophet of God, that it would be only by a quibble about the\nmeaning of the word \u201ccertitude\u201d that we could maintain, that, on his\nbecoming a Catholic, he did not unequivocally prove that certitude is\ndefectible. And it may be argued, perhaps, in the case of some members\nof the Church of England, that their faith in the validity of Anglican\norders, and the invisibility of the Church\u2019s unity, is so absolute, so\ndeliberate, that their abandonment of it, did they become Catholics or\nsceptics, would be tantamount to the abandonment of a certitude.\n\nNow, in meeting this difficulty, I will not urge (lest I should be\naccused of quibbling), that certitude is a conviction of what is true,\nand that these so-called certitudes have come to nought, because, their\nobjects being errors, not truths, they really were not certitudes at\nall; nor will I insist, as I might, that they ought to be proved first\nto be something more than mere prejudices, assents without reason\nand judgment, before they can fairly be taken as instances of the\ndefectibility of certitude; but I simply ask, as regards the zeal of\nthe Jews for the sufficiency of their law, (even though it implied\ngenuine certitude, not a prejudice, not a mere conviction,) still was\nsuch zeal, such professed certitude, found in those who were eventually\nconverted, or in those who were not; for, if those who had not that\ncertitude became Christians and those who had it remained Jews, then\nloss of certitude in the latter is not instanced in the fact of the\nconversion of the former. St. Paul certainly is an exception, but\nhis conversion, as also his after-life, was miraculous; ordinarily\nspeaking, it was not the zealots who supplied members to the Catholic\nChurch, but those \u201cmen of good will,\u201d who, instead of considering the\nlaw as perfect and eternal, \u201clooked for the redemption of Israel,\u201d and\nfor \u201cthe knowledge of salvation in the remission of sins.\u201d And, in\nlike manner, as to those learned and devout men among the Anglicans at\nthe present day, who come so near the Church without acknowledging her\nclaims, I ask whether there are not two classes among them also,\u2014those\nwho are looking out beyond their own body for the perfect way, and\nthose on the other hand who teach that the Anglican communion is the\ngolden mean between men who believe too much and men who believe too\nlittle, the centre of unity to which East and West are destined to\ngravitate, the instrument and the mould, as the Jews might think of\ntheir own moribund institutions, through which the kingdom of Christ\nis to be established all over the earth. And next I would ask, which\nof these two classes supplies converts to the Church; for if they\ncome from among those who never professed to be quite certain of the\nspecial strength of the Anglican position, such men cannot be quoted as\ninstances of the defectibility of certitude.\n\nThere is indeed another class of beliefs, of which I must take notice,\nthe failure of which may be taken at first sight as a proof that\ncertitude may be lost. Yet they clearly deserve no other name than\nprejudices, as being founded upon reports of facts, or on arguments,\nwhich will not bear careful examination. Such was the disgust felt\ntowards our predecessors in primitive times, the Christians of the\nfirst centuries, as a secret society, as a conspiracy against the civil\npower, as a set of mean, sordid, despicable fanatics, as monsters\nrevelling in blood and impurity. Such also is the deep prejudice now\nexisting against the Church among Protestants, who dress her up in\nthe most hideous and loathsome images, which rightly attach, in the\nprophetic descriptions, to the evil spirit, his agents and instruments.\nAnd so of the numberless calumnies directed against individual\nCatholics, against our religious bodies, and men in authority, which\nserve to feed and sustain the suspicion and dislike with which\neverything Catholic is regarded in this country. But as a persistence\nin such prejudices is no evidence of their truth, so an abandonment of\nthem is no evidence that certitude can fail.\n\nThere is yet another class of prejudices against the Catholic Religion,\nwhich is far more tolerable and intelligible than those on which I\nhave been dwelling, but still in no sense certitudes. Indeed, I doubt\nwhether they would be considered more than presumptive opinions by\nthe persons who entertain them. Such is the idea which has possessed\ncertain philosophers, ancient and modern, that miracles are an\ninfringement and disfigurement of the beautiful order of nature. Such,\ntoo, is the persuasion, common among political and literary men, that\nthe Catholic Church is inconsistent with the true interests of the\nhuman race, with social progress, with rational freedom, with good\ngovernment. A renunciation of these imaginations is not a change in\ncertitudes.\n\nSo much on this subject. All concrete laws are general, and persons,\nas such, do not fall under laws. Still, I have gone a good way, as I\nthink, to remove the objections to the doctrine of the indefectibility\nof certitude in matters of religion.\n\n6.\n\nOne further remark may be made. Certitude does not admit of an\ninterior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false\ncertitude. Such a test is rendered impossible from the circumstance\nthat, when we make the mental act expressed by \u201cI know,\u201d we sum up\nthe whole series of reflex judgments which might, each in turn,\nsuccessively exercise a critical function towards those of the series\nwhich precede it. But still, if it is the general rule that certitude\nis indefectible, will not that indefectibility itself become at least\nin the event a criterion of the genuineness of the certitude? or is\nthere any rival state or habit of the intellect, which claims to be\nindefectible also? A few words will suffice to answer these questions.\n\nPremising that all rules are but general, especially those which\nrelate to the mind, I observe that indefectibility may at least serve\nas a negative test of certitude, or _sine qu\u00e2 non_ condition, so that\nwhoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to\nhave been certain of it. Certitude ought to stand all trials, or it is\nnot certitude. Its very office is to cherish and maintain its object,\nand its very lot and duty is to sustain rude shocks in maintenance of\nit without being damaged by them.\n\nI will take an example. Let us suppose we are told on an unimpeachable\nauthority, that a man whom we saw die is now alive again and at his\nwork, as it was his wont to be; let us suppose we actually see him and\nconverse with him; what will become of our certitude of his death? I\ndo not think we should give it up; how could we, when we actually saw\nhim die? At first, indeed, we should be thrown into an astonishment\nand confusion so great, that the world would seem to reel round us,\nand we should be ready to give up the use of our senses and of our\nmemory, of our reflective powers, and of our reason, and even to deny\nour power of thinking, and our existence itself. Such confidence have\nwe in the doctrine that when life goes it never returns. Nor would our\nbewilderment be less, when the first blow was over; but our reason\nwould rally, and with our reason our certitude would come back to us.\nWhatever came of it, we should never cease to know and to confess to\nourselves both of the contrary facts, that we saw him die, and that\nafter dying we saw him alive again. The overpowering strangeness of\nour experience would have no power to shake our certitude in the facts\nwhich created it.\n\nAgain, let us suppose, for argument\u2019s sake, that ethnologists,\nphilologists, anatomists, and antiquarians agreed together in separate\ndemonstrations that there were half a dozen races of men, and that they\nwere all descended from gorillas, or chimpanzees, or ourang-outangs,\nor baboons; moreover, that Adam was an historical personage, with\na well-ascertained dwelling-place, surroundings and date, in a\ncomparatively modern world. On the other hand, let me believe that\nthe Word of God Himself distinctly declares that there were no men\nbefore Adam, that he was immediately made out of the slime of the\nearth, and that he is the first father of all men that are or ever have\nbeen. Here is a contradiction of statements more direct than in the\nformer instance; the two cannot stand together; one or other of them\nis untrue. But whatever means I might be led to take, for making, if\npossible, the antagonism tolerable, I conceive I should never give up\nmy certitude in that truth which on sufficient grounds I determined\nto come from heaven. If I so believed, I should not pretend to argue,\nor to defend myself to others; I should be patient; I should look for\nbetter days; but I should still believe. If, indeed, I had hitherto\nonly half believed, if I believed with an assent short of certitude, or\nwith an acquiescence short of assent, or hastily or on light grounds,\nthen the case would be altered; but if, after full consideration, and\navailing myself of my best lights, I did think that beyond all question\nGod spoke as I thought He did, philosophers and experimentalists might\ntake their course for me,\u2014I should consider that they and I thought\nand reasoned in different mediums, and that my certitude was as little\nin collision with them or damaged by them, as if they attempted to\ncounteract in some great matter chemical action by the force of\ngravity, or to weigh magnetic influence against capillary attraction.\nOf course, I am putting an impossible case, for philosophical\ndiscoveries cannot really contradict divine revelation.\n\nSo much on the indefectibility of certitude; as to the question whether\nany other assent is indefectible besides it, I think prejudice may\nbe such; but it cannot be confused with certitude, for the one is an\nassent previous to rational grounds, and the other an assent given\nexpressly after careful examination.\n\nIt seems then that on the whole there are three conditions of\ncertitude: that it follows on investigation and proof, that it is\naccompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and\nrepose, and that it is irreversible. If the assent is made without\nrational grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if\nwithout the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference;\nif without permanence, it is a mere conviction.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VIII. Inference.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Formal Inference.\n\n\nInference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition, Assent is\nthe unconditional; the object of Assent is a truth, the object of\nInference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude. The problem which I\nhave undertaken is that of ascertaining how it comes to pass that a\nconditional act leads to an unconditional; and, having now shown that\nassent really is unconditional, I proceed to show how inferential\nexercises, as such, always must be conditional.\n\nWe reason, when we hold this by virtue of that; whether we hold it as\nevident or as approximating or tending to be evident, in either case we\nso hold it because of holding something else to be evident or tending\nto be evident. In the next place, our reasoning ordinarily presents\nitself to our mind as a simple act, not a process or series of acts.\nWe apprehend the antecedent and then apprehend the consequent, without\nexplicit recognition of the medium connecting the two, as if by a sort\nof direct association of the first thought with the second. We proceed\nby a sort of instinctive perception, from premiss to conclusion. I call\nit instinctive, not as if the faculty were one and the same to all\nmen in strength and quality (as we generally conceive of instinct),\nbut because ordinarily, or at least often, it acts by a spontaneous\nimpulse, as prompt and inevitable as the exercise of sense and memory.\nWe perceive external objects, and we remember past events, without\nknowing how we do so; and in like manner we reason without effort and\nintention, or any necessary consciousness of the path which the mind\ntakes in passing from antecedent to conclusion.\n\nSuch is ratiocination, in what may be called a state of nature, as it\nis found in the uneducated,\u2014nay, in all men, in its ordinary exercise;\nnor is there any antecedent ground for determining that it will not be\nas correct in its informations as it is instinctive, as trustworthy\nas are sensible perception and memory, though its informations are\nnot so immediate and have a wider range. By means of sense we gain\nknowledge directly; by means of reasoning we gain it indirectly, that\nis, by virtue of a previous knowledge. And if we may justly regard\nthe universe, according to the meaning of the word, as one whole, we\nmay also believe justly that to know one part of it is necessarily to\nknow much more than that one part. This thought leads us to a further\nview of ratiocination. The proverb says, \u201cEx pede Herculem;\u201d and we\nhave actual experience how the practised zoologist can build up some\nintricate organization from the sight of its smallest bone, evoking\nthe whole as if it were a remembrance; how, again, a philosophical\nantiquarian, by means of an inscription, interprets the mythical\ntraditions of former ages, and makes the past live; and how a Columbus\nis led, from considerations which are common property, and fortuitous\nphenomena which are successively brought to his notice, to have such\nfaith in a western world, as willingly to commit himself to the terrors\nof a mysterious ocean in order to arrive at it. That which the mind is\nable thus variously to bring together into unity, must have some real\nintrinsic connexion of part with part. But if this _summa rerum_ is\nthus one whole, it must be constructed on definite principles and laws,\nthe knowledge of which will enlarge our capacity of reasoning about it\nin particulars;\u2014thus we are led on to aim at determining on a large\nscale and on system, what even gifted or practised intellects are only\nable by their own personal vigour to reach piece-meal and fitfully,\nthat is, at substituting scientific methods, such as all may use, for\nthe action of individual genius.\n\nThere is another reason for attempting to discover an instrument of\nreasoning (that is, of gaining new truths by means of old), which may\nbe less vague and arbitrary than the talent and experience of the few\nor the common-sense of the many. As memory is not always accurate, and\nhas on that account led to the adoption of writing, as being a _memoria\ntechnica_, unaffected by the failure of mental impressions,\u2014as our\nsenses at times deceive us, and have to be corrected by each other; so\nis it also with our reasoning faculty. The conclusions of one man are\nnot the conclusions of another; those of the same man do not always\nagree together; those of ever so many who agree together may differ\nfrom the facts themselves, which those conclusions are intended to\nascertain. In consequence it becomes a necessity, if it be possible,\nto analyze the process of reasoning, and to invent a method which may\nact as a common measure between mind and mind, as a means of joint\ninvestigation, and as a recognized intellectual standard,\u2014a standard\nsuch as to secure us against hopeless mistakes, and to emancipate us\nfrom the capricious _ipse dixit_ of authority.\n\nAs the index on the dial notes down the sun\u2019s course in the heavens,\nas a key, revolving through the intricate wards of the lock, opens for\nus a treasure-house, so let us, if we can, provide ourselves with some\nready expedient to serve as a true record of the system of objective\ntruth, and an available rule for interpreting its phenomena; or at\nleast let us go as far as we can in providing it. One such experimental\nkey is the science of geometry, which, in a certain department of\nnature, substitutes a collection of true principles, fruitful and\ninterminable in consequences, for the guesses, _pro re nat\u00e2_, of our\nintellect, and saves it both the labour and the risk of guessing.\nAnother far more subtle and effective instrument is algebraical\nscience, which acts as a spell in unlocking for us, without merit or\neffort of our own individually, the _arcana_ of the concrete physical\nuniverse. A more ambitious, because a more comprehensive contrivance\nstill, for interpreting the concrete world is the method of logical\ninference. What we desiderate is something which may supersede the need\nof personal gifts by a far-reaching and infallible rule. Now, without\nexternal symbols to mark out and to steady its course, the intellect\nruns wild; but with the aid of symbols, as in algebra, it advances with\nprecision and effect. Let then our symbols be words: let all thought\nbe arrested and embodied in words. Let language have a monopoly of\nthought; and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be\nworth in language. Let every prompting of the intellect be ignored,\nevery _momentum_ of argument be disowned, which is unprovided with an\nequivalent wording, as its ticket for sharing in the common search\nafter truth. Let the authority of nature, common-sense, experience,\ngenius, go for nothing. Ratiocination, thus restricted and put into\ngrooves, is what I have called Inference, and the science, which is its\nregulating principle, is Logic.\n\nThe first step in the inferential method is to throw the question to be\ndecided into the form of a proposition; then to throw the proof itself\ninto propositions, the force of the proof lying in the comparison of\nthese propositions with each other. When the analysis is carried out\nfully and put into form, it becomes the Aristotelic syllogism. However,\nan inference need not be expressed thus technically; an enthymeme\nfulfils the requirements of what I have called Inference. So does any\nother form of words with the mere grammatical expressions, \u201cfor,\u201d\n\u201ctherefore,\u201d \u201csupposing,\u201d \u201cso that,\u201d \u201csimilarly,\u201d and the like. Verbal\nreasoning, of whatever kind, as opposed to mental, is what I mean by\ninference, which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic is its\nscientific form. And it will be more convenient here to use the two\nwords indiscriminately, for I shall say nothing about logic which does\nnot in its substance also apply to inference.\n\nLogical inference, then, being such, and its office such as I have\ndescribed, the question follows, how far it answers the purpose for\nwhich it is used. It proposes to provide both a test and a common\nmeasure of reasoning; and I think it will be found partly to succeed\nand partly to fail; succeeding so far as words can in fact be found for\nrepresenting the countless varieties and subtleties of human thought,\nfailing on account of the fallacy of the original assumption, that\nwhatever can be thought can be adequately expressed in words.\n\nIn the first place, Inference, being conditional, is hampered with\nother propositions besides that which is especially its own, that\nis, with the premisses as well as the conclusion, and with the rules\nconnecting the latter with the former. It views its own proper\nproposition in the medium of prior propositions, and measures it\nby them. It does not hold a proposition for its own sake, but as\ndependent upon others, and those others it entertains for the sake of\nthe conclusion. Thus it is practically far more concerned with the\ncomparison of propositions, than with the propositions themselves.\nIt is obliged to regard all the propositions, with which it has to\ndo, not so much for their own sake, as for the sake of each other,\nas regards the identity or likeness, independence or dissimilarity,\nwhich has to be mutually predicated of them. It follows from this,\nthat the more simple and definite are the words of a proposition,\nand the narrower their meaning, and the more that meaning in each\nproposition is restricted to the relation which it has to the words of\nthe other propositions compared with it,\u2014in other words, the nearer\nthe propositions concerned in the inference approach to being mental\nabstractions, and the less they have to do with the concrete reality,\nand the more closely they are made to express exact, intelligible,\ncomprehensible, communicable notions, and the less they stand for\nobjective things, that is, the more they are the subjects, not of real,\nbut of notional apprehension,\u2014so much the more suitable do they become\nfor the purposes of Inference.\n\nHence it is that no process of argument is so perfect, as that which is\nconducted by means of symbols. In Arithmetic 1 is 1, and just 1, and\nnever anything else but 1; it never is 2, it has no tendency to change\nits meaning, and to become 2; it has no portion, quality, admixture of\n2 in its meaning. And 6 under all circumstances is 3 times 2, and the\nsum of 2 and 4; nor can the whole world supply anything to throw doubt\nupon these elementary positions. It is not so with language. Take, by\ncontrast, the word \u201cinference,\u201d which I have been using: it may stand\nfor the act of inferring, as I have used it; or for the connecting\nprinciple, or _inferentia_, between premisses and conclusions; or\nfor the conclusion itself. And sometimes it will be difficult, in a\nparticular sentence, to say which it bears of these three senses. And\nso again in Algebra, _a_ is never _x_, or anything but _a_, wherever it\nis found; and _a_ and _b_ are always standard quantities, to which _x_\nand _y_ are always to be referred, and by which they are always to be\nmeasured. In Geometry again, the subjects of argument, points, lines,\nand surfaces, are precise creations of the mind, suggested indeed by\nexternal objects, but meaning nothing but what they are defined to\nmean: they have no colour, no motion, no heat, no qualities which\naddress themselves to the ear or to the palate; so that, in whatever\ncombinations or relations the words denoting them occur, and to\nwhomsoever they come, those words never vary in their meaning, but are\njust of the same measure and weight at one time and at another.\n\nWhat is true of Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry, is true also of\nAristotelic argumentation in its typical modes and figures. It compares\ntwo given words separately with a third, and then determines how they\nstand towards each other, in a _bona fide_ identity of sense. In\nconsequence, its formal process is best conducted by means of symbols,\nA, B, and C. While it keeps to these, it is safe; it has the cogency of\nmathematical reasoning, and draws its conclusions by a rule as unerring\nas it is blind.\n\nSymbolical notation, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic\nmethod, it follows that, when words are substituted for symbols, it\nwill be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import as much as\npossible, lest perchance A should not always exactly mean A, and B mean\nB; and to make them, as much as possible, the _calculi_ of notions,\nwhich are in our absolute power, as meaning just what we choose them\nto mean, and as little as possible the tokens of real things, which\nare outside of us, and which mean we do not know how much, but so much\ncertainly as may run away with us, in proportion as we enter into them,\nbeyond the range of scientific management. The concrete matter of\npropositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning,\nas marring the simplicity and perfection of its process. Words, which\ndenote things, have innumerable implications; but in inferential\nexercises it is the very triumph of that clearness and hardness of\nhead, which is the characteristic talent for the art, to have stripped\nthem of all these connatural senses, to have drained them of that\ndepth and breadth of associations which constitute their poetry, their\nrhetoric, and their historical life, to have starved each term down\ntill it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the\nsame ghost, \u201comnibus umbra locis,\u201d so that it may stand for just one\nunreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs, for a\nrelation, a generalization, or other abstraction, for a notion neatly\nturned out of the laboratory of the mind, and sufficiently tame and\nsubdued, because existing only in a definition.\n\nThus it is that the logician for his own purposes, and most usefully\nas far as those purposes are concerned, turns rivers, full, winding,\nand beautiful, into navigable canals. To him dog or horse is not a\nthing which he sees, but a mere name suggesting ideas; and by dog or\nhorse universal he means, not the aggregate of all individual dogs\nor horses brought together, but a common aspect, meagre but precise,\nof all existing or possible dogs or horses, which all the while does\nnot really correspond to any one single dog or horse out of the whole\naggregate. Such minute fidelity in the representation of individuals\nis neither necessary nor possible to his art; his business is not\nto ascertain facts in the concrete, but to find and dress up middle\nterms; and, provided they and the extremes which they go between are\nnot equivocal, either in themselves or in their use, and he can enable\nhis pupils to show well in a _viv\u00e2 voce_ disputation, or in a popular\nharangue, or in a written dissertation, he has achieved the main\npurpose of his profession.\n\nSuch are the characteristics of reasoning, viewed as a science or\nscientific art, or inferential process, and we might anticipate that,\nnarrow as by necessity is its field of view, for that reason its\npretensions to be demonstrative were incontrovertible. In a certain\nsense they really are so; while we talk logic, we are unanswerable;\nbut then, on the other hand, this universal living scene of things is\nafter all as little a logical world as it is a poetical; and, as it\ncannot without violence be exalted into poetical perfection, neither\ncan it be attenuated into a logical formula. Abstract can only conduct\nto abstract; but we have need to attain by our reasonings to what\nis concrete; and the margin between the abstract conclusions of the\nscience, and the concrete facts which we wish to ascertain, will be\nfound to reduce the force of the inferential method from demonstration\nto the mere determination of the probable. Thus, whereas (as I have\nalready said) Inference starts with conditions, as starting with\npremisses, here are two reasons why, when employed upon matters of\nfact, it can only conclude probabilities: first, because its premisses\nare assumed, not proved; and secondly, because its conclusions are\nabstract, and not concrete. I will now consider these two points\nseparately.\n\n1.\n\nInference comes short of proof in concrete matters, because it has\nnot a full command over the objects to which it relates, but merely\nassumes its premisses. In order to complete the proof, we are thrown\nupon some previous syllogism or syllogisms, in which the assumptions\nmay be proved; and then, still farther back, we are thrown upon others\nagain, to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms.\nWhere is this process to stop? especially since it must run upon\nseparated, divergent, and multiplied lines of argument, the farther\nthe investigation is carried back. At length a score of propositions\npresent themselves, all to be proved by propositions more evident than\nthemselves, in order to enable them respectively to become premisses to\nthat series of inferences which terminates in the conclusion which we\noriginally drew. But even now the difficulty is not at an end; it would\nbe something to arrive at length at premisses which are undeniable,\nhowever long we might be in arriving at them; but in this case the long\nretrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles,\nthe recondite sources of all knowledge, as to which logic provides\nno common measure of minds,\u2014which are accepted by some, rejected by\nothers,\u2014in which, and not in the syllogistic exhibitions, lies the\nwhole problem of attaining to truth,\u2014and which are called self-evident\nby their respective advocates because they are evident in no other way.\nOne of the two uses contemplated in reasoning by rule, or in verbal\nargumentation, was, as I have said, to establish a standard of truth\nand to supersede the _ipse dixit_ of authority: how does it fulfil this\nend, if it only leads us back to first principles, about which there is\ninterminable controversy? We are not able to prove by syllogism that\nthere are any self-evident propositions at all; but supposing there\nare (as of course I hold there are), still who can determine these by\nlogic? Syllogism, then, though of course it has its use, still does\nonly the minutest and easiest part of the work, in the investigation of\ntruth, for when there is any difficulty, that difficulty commonly lies\nin determining first principles, not in the arrangement of proofs.\n\nEven when argument is the most direct and severe of its kind, there\nmust be those assumptions in the process which resolve themselves into\nthe conditions of human nature; but how many more assumptions does that\nprocess in ordinary concrete matters involve, subtle assumptions not\ndirectly arising out of these primary conditions, but accompanying the\ncourse of reasoning, step by step, and traceable to the sentiments of\nthe age, country, religion, social habits and ideas, of the particular\ninquirers or disputants, and passing current without detection,\nbecause admitted equally on all hands! And to these must be added\nthe assumptions which are made from the necessity of the case, in\nconsequence of the prolixity and elaborateness of any argument which\nshould faithfully note down all the propositions which go to make it\nup. We recognize this tediousness even in the case of the theorems of\nEuclid, though mathematical proof is comparatively simple.\n\nLogic then does not really prove; it enables us to join issue with\nothers; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines\nof thought; it verifies negatively; it determines when differences of\nopinion are hopeless; and when and how far conclusions are probable;\nbut for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an _organon_ more\ndelicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI ought to give an illustration of what I have been stating in general\nterms; but it is difficult to do so without a digression. However, if\nit must be, I look round the room in which I happen to be writing, and\ntake down the first book which catches my eye. It is an old volume\nof a Magazine of great name; I open it at random and fall upon a\ndiscussion about the then lately discovered emendations of the text of\nShakespeare. It will do for my purpose.\n\nIn the account of Falstaff\u2019s death in \u201cHenry V.\u201d (act ii. scene 3) we\nread, according to the received text, the well-known words, \u201cHis nose\nwas as sharp as a pen, and \u2019a babbled of green fields.\u201d In the first\nauthentic edition, published in 1623, some years after Shakespeare\u2019s\ndeath, the words, I believe, ran, \u201cand a table of green fields,\u201d which\nhas no sense. Accordingly, an anonymous critic, reported by Theobald in\nthe last century, corrected them to \u201cand \u2019a talked of green fields,\u201d\nTheobald himself improved the reading into \u201cand \u2019a babbled of green\nfields,\u201d which since his time has been the received text. But just\ntwenty years ago an annotated copy of the edition of 1632 was found,\nannotated perhaps by a contemporary, which, among as many as 20,000\ncorrections of the text, substituted for the corrupt reading of\n1623, the words \u201con a table of green frieze,\u201d which has a sufficient\nsense, though far less acceptable to an admirer of Shakespeare, than\nTheobald\u2019s. The genuineness of this copy with its annotations, as it is\npresented to us, I shall here take for granted.\n\nNow I understand, or at least will suppose, the argument, maintained\nin the article of the Magazine in question, to run thus:\u2014\u201cTheobald\u2019s\nreading, as at present received, is to be retained, to the exclusion\nof the text of 1623 and of the emendation made on the copy of the\nedition of 1632;\u2014to the exclusion of the text of 1623 because that\ntext is corrupt; to the exclusion of the annotation of 1632 because\nit is anonymous.\u201d I wish it then observed how many large questions\nare opened in the discussion which ensues, how many recondite and\nuntractable principles have to be settled, and how impotent is logic,\nor any reasonings which can be thrown into language, to deal with these\nindispensable first principles.\n\nThe first position is, \u201cThe authoritative reading of 1623 is not to\nbe restored to the received text, because it is corrupt.\u201d Now are we\nto take it for granted, as a first principle, which needs no proof,\nthat a text may be tampered with, because it is corrupt? However the\ncorrupt reading arose, it is authoritative. It is found in an edition,\npublished by known persons, only six years after Shakespeare\u2019s death,\nfrom his own manuscript, as it appears, and with his corrections of\nearlier faulty impressions. Authority cannot sanction nonsense, but\nit can forbid critics from experimentalizing upon it. If the text of\nShakespeare is corrupt, it should be published as corrupt.\n\nI believe the best editors of the Greek tragedians have given up the\nimpertinence of introducing their conjectures into the text; and a\nclassic like Shakespeare has a right to be treated with the same\nrespect as \u00c6schylus. To this it will be replied, that Shakespeare is\nfor the general public and \u00c6schylus for students of a dead language;\nthat the run of men read for amusement or as a recreation, and that,\nif the editions of Shakespeare were made on critical principles, they\nwould remain unsold. Here, then, we are brought to the question whether\nit is any advantage to read Shakespeare except with the care and pains\nwhich a classic demands, and whether he is in fact read at all by those\nwhom such critical exactness would offend; and thus we are led on to\nfurther questions about cultivation of mind and the education of the\nmasses. Further, the question presents itself, whether the general\nadmiration of Shakespeare is genuine, whether it is not a mere fashion,\nwhether the multitude of men understand him at all, whether it is not\ntrue that every one makes much of him, because every one else makes\nmuch of him. Can we possibly make Shakespeare light reading, especially\nin this day of cheap novels, by ever so much correction of his text?\n\nNow supposing this point settled, and the text of 1623 put out of\ncourt, then comes the claim of the Annotator to introduce into\nShakespeare\u2019s text the emendation made upon his copy of the edition of\n1632; why is he not of greater authority than Theobald, the inventor\nof the received reading, and his emendation of more authority than\nTheobald\u2019s? If the corrupt reading must any how be got out of the\nway, why should not the Annotator, rather than Theobald, determine\nits substitute? For what we know, the authority of the anonymous\nAnnotator may be very great. There is nothing to show that he was\nnot a contemporary of the poet; and if so, the question arises, what\nis the character of his emendations? are they his own private and\narbitrary conjectures, or are they informations from those who knew\nShakespeare, traditions of the theatre, of the actors or spectators of\nhis plays? Here, then, we are involved in intricate questions which\ncan only be decided by a minute examination of the 20,000 emendations\nso industriously brought together by this anonymous critic. But\nit is obvious that a verbal argumentation upon 20,000 corrections\nis impossible: there must be first careful processes of perusal,\nclassification, discrimination, selection, which mainly are acts of the\nmind without the intervention of language. There must be a cumulation\nof arguments on one side and on the other, of which only the heads or\nthe results can be put upon paper. Next come in questions of criticism\nand taste, with their recondite and disputable premisses, and the\nusual deductions from them, so subtle and difficult to follow. All\nthis being considered, am I wrong in saying that, though controversy\nis both possible and useful at all times, yet it is not adequate\nto this occasion; rather that that sum-total of argument (whether\nfor or against the Annotator) which is furnished by his numerous\nemendations,\u2014or what may be called the multiform, evidential fact, in\nwhich the examination of these emendations results,\u2014requires rather\nto be photographed on the individual mind as by one impression, than\nadmits of delineation for the satisfaction of the many in any known or\npossible language, however rich in vocabulary and flexible in structure?\n\nAnd now as to the third point which presents itself for consideration,\nthe claim of Theobald\u2019s emendation to retain its place in the _textus\nreceptus_. It strikes me with wonder that an argument in its defence\ncould have been put forward to the following effect, viz. that true\nthough it be, that the Editors of 1623 are of much more authority than\nTheobald, and that the Annotator\u2019s reading in the passage in question\nis more likely to be correct than Theobald\u2019s, nevertheless Theobald\u2019s\nhas by this time acquired a prescriptive right to its place there,\nthe prescription of more than a hundred years;\u2014that usurpation has\nbecome legitimacy; that Theobald\u2019s words have sunk into the hearts of\nthousands; that in fact they have become Shakespeare\u2019s; that it would\nbe a dangerous innovation and an evil precedent to touch them. If we\nbegin an unsettlement of the popular mind, where is it to stop?\n\nThus it appears, in order to do justice to the question before us, we\nhave to betake ourselves to the consideration of myths, pious frauds,\nand other grave matters, which introduce us into a _sylva_, dense and\nintricate, of first principles and elementary phenomena, belonging to\nthe domains of archeology and theology. Nor is this all; when such\nviews of the duty of garbling a classic are propounded, they open upon\nus a long vista of sceptical interrogations which go far to disparage\nthe claims upon us, the genius, the very existence of the great poet\nto whose honour these views are intended to minister. For perhaps,\nafter all, Shakespeare is really but a collection of many Theobalds,\nwho have each of them a right to his own share of him. There was a\ngreat dramatic school in his day; he was one of a number of first-rate\nartists,\u2014perhaps they wrote in common. How are we to know what is his,\nor how much? Are the best parts his, or the worst? It is said that the\nplayers put in what is vulgar and offensive in his writings; perhaps\nthey inserted the beauties. I have heard it urged years ago, as an\nobjection to Sheridan\u2019s claim of authorship to the plays which bear\nhis name, that they were so unlike each other; is not this the very\npeculiarity of those imputed to Shakespeare? Were ever the writings of\none man so various, so impersonal? can we form any one true idea of\nwhat he was in history or character, by means of them? is he not in\nshort \u201c_vox et pr\u00e6terea nihil_\u201d? Then again, in corroboration, is there\nany author\u2019s life so deficient in biographical notices as his? We know\nabout Hooker, Spenser, Spelman, Raleigh, Harvey, his contemporaries:\nwhat do we know of Shakespeare? Is he much more than a name? Is not\nthe traditional object of an Englishman\u2019s idolatry after all a nebula\nof genius, destined, like Homer, to be resolved into its separate and\nindependent luminaries, as soon as we have a criticism powerful enough\nfor the purpose? I must not be supposed for a moment to countenance\nsuch scepticism myself,\u2014though it is a subject worthy the attention\nof a sceptical age: here I have introduced it simply to suggest how\nmany words go to make up a thoroughly valid argument; how short and\neasy a way to a true conclusion is the logic of good sense; how little\nsyllogisms have to do with the formation of opinion; how little depends\nupon the inferential proofs, and how much upon those pre-existing\nbeliefs and views, in which men either already agree with each other or\nhopelessly differ, before they begin to dispute, and which are hidden\ndeep in our nature, or, it may be, in our personal peculiarities.\n\n2.\n\nSo much on the multiplicity of assumptions, which in spite of formal\nexactness, logical reasoning in concrete matters is forced to admit,\nand on the consequent uncertainty which attends its conclusions. Now\nI come to the second reason why its conclusions are thus wanting in\nprecision.\n\nIn this world of sense we have to do with things, far more than with\nnotions. We are not solitary, left to the contemplation of our own\nthoughts and their legitimate developments. We are surrounded by\nexternal beings, and our enunciations are directed to the concrete.\nWe reason in order to enlarge our knowledge of matters, which do not\ndepend on us for being what they are. But how is an exercise of mind,\nwhich is for the most part occupied with notions, not things, competent\nto deal with things, except partially and indirectly? This is the main\nreason why an inference, however fully worded, (except perhaps in some\npeculiar cases, which are out of place here,) never can reach so far\nas to ascertain a fact. As I have already said, arguments about the\nabstract cannot handle and determine the concrete. They may approximate\nto a proof, but they only reach the probable, because they cannot reach\nthe particular.\n\nEven in mathematical physics a margin is left for possible imperfection\nin the investigation. When the planet Neptune was discovered, it was\ndeservedly considered a triumph of science, that abstract reasonings\nhad done so much towards determining the planet and its orbit. There\nwould have been no triumph in success, had there been no hazard of\nfailure; it is no triumph to Euclid, in pure mathematics, that the\ngeometrical conclusions of his second book can be worked out and\nverified by algebra.\n\nThe motions of the heavenly bodies are almost mathematical in their\nprecision; but there is a multitude of matters, to which mathematical\nscience is applied, which are in their nature intricate and obscure,\nand require that reasoning by rule should be completed by the living\nmind. Who would be satisfied with a navigator or engineer, who had no\npractice or experience whereby to carry on his scientific conclusions\nout of their native abstract into the concrete and the real? What is\nthe meaning of the distrust, which is ordinarily felt, of speculators\nand theorists but this, that they are dead to the necessity of personal\nprudence and judgment to qualify and complete their logic? Science,\nworking by itself, reaches truth in the abstract, and probability in\nthe concrete; but what we aim at is truth in the concrete.\n\nThis is true of other inferences besides mathematical. They come to\nno definite conclusions about matters of fact, except as they are\nmade effectual for their purpose by the living intelligence which\nuses them. \u201cAll men have their price; Fabricius is a man; he has his\nprice;\u201d but he had not his price; how is this? Because he is more\nthan a universal; because he falls under other universals; because\nuniversals are ever at war with each other; because what is called a\nuniversal is only a general; because what is only general does not lead\nto a necessary conclusion. Let us judge him by another universal. \u201cMen\nhave a conscience; Fabricius is a man; he has a conscience.\u201d Until we\nhave actual experience of Fabricius, we can only say, that, since he is\na man, perhaps he will take a bribe, and perhaps he will not. \u201cLatet\ndolus in generalibus;\u201d they are arbitrary and fallacious, if we take\nthem for more than broad views and aspects of things, serving as our\nnotes and indications for judging of the particular, but not absolutely\ntouching and determining facts.\n\nLet units come first, and (so-called) universals second; let universals\nminister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals. John,\nRichard, and Robert are individual things, independent, incommunicable.\nWe may find some kind of common measure between them, and we may give\nit the name of man, man as such, the typical man, the _auto-anthropos_.\nWe are justified in so doing, and in investing it with general\nattributes, and bestowing on it what we consider a definition. But\nwe think we may go on to impose our definition on the whole race,\nand to every member of it, to the thousand Johns, Richards, and\nRoberts who are found in it. No; each of them is what he is, in spite\nof it. Not any one of them is man, as such, or coincides with the\n_auto-anthropos_. Another John is not necessarily rational, because\n\u201call men are rational,\u201d for he may be an idiot;\u2014nor because \u201cman is a\nbeing of progress,\u201d does the second Richard progress, for he may be a\ndunce;\u2014nor, because \u201cman is made for society,\u201d must we therefore go on\nto deny that the second Robert is a gipsy or a bandit, as he is found\nto be. There is no such thing as stereotyped humanity; it must ever\nbe a vague, bodiless idea, because the concrete units from which it\nis formed are independent realities. General laws are not inviolable\ntruths; much less are they necessary causes. Since, as a rule, men are\nrational, progressive, and social, there is a high probability of this\nrule being true in the case of a particular person; but we must know\nhim to be sure of it.\n\nEach thing has its own nature and its own history. When the nature and\nthe history of many things are similar, we say that they have the same\nnature; but there is no such thing as one and the same nature; they are\neach of them itself, not identical, but like. A law is not a fact, but\na notion. \u201cAll men die; therefore Elias has died;\u201d but he has not died,\nand did not die. He was an exception to the general law of humanity;\nso far, he did not come under that law, but under the law (so to say)\nof Elias. It was the peculiarity of his individuality, that he left\nthe world without dying: what right have we to subject the person of\nElias to the scientific notion of an abstract humanity, which we have\nformed without asking his leave? Why must the tyrant majority find a\nrule for his history? \u201cBut all men are mortal;\u201d not so; what is really\nmeant is, that \u201cman, as such, is mortal,\u201d or the abstract, typical\n_auto-anthropos_; therefore the minor premiss ought to be, \u201cElias was\nthe _auto-anthropos_ or abstract man;\u201d but he was not, and could not be\nthe abstract man, nor could any one else, any more than the average man\nof an Insurance Company is every individual man who insures his life\nwith it. Such a syllogism proves nothing about the veritable Elias,\nexcept in the way of antecedent probability. If it be said that Elias\nwas exempted from death, not by nature, but by miracle, what is this\nto the purpose, undeniable as it is? Still, to have this miraculous\nexemption was the personal prerogative of Elias. We call it miracle,\nbecause God ordinarily acts otherwise. He who causes men in general\nto die, gave to Elias not to die. This miraculous gift comes into the\nindividuality of Elias. On this individuality we must fix our thoughts,\nand not begin our notion of him by ignoring it. He was a man, and\nsomething more than \u201cman\u201d; and if we do not take this into account, we\nfall into an initial error in our thoughts of him.\n\nWhat is true of Elias is true of every one in his own place and degree.\nWe call rationality the distinction of man, when compared with other\nanimals. This is true in logic; but in fact a man differs from a brute,\nnot in rationality only, but in all that he is, even in those respects\nin which he is most like a brute; so that his whole self, his bones,\nlimbs, make, life, reason, moral feeling, immortality, and all that\nhe is besides, is his real _differentia_, in contrast to a horse or\na dog. And in like manner as regards John and Richard, when compared\nwith one another; each is himself, and nothing else, and, though,\nregarded abstractedly, the two may fairly be said to have something in\ncommon, (viz. that abstract sameness which does not exist at all,) yet,\nstrictly speaking, they have nothing in common, for each of them has a\nvested interest in all that he himself is; and, moreover, what seems\nto be common in the two, becomes in fact so uncommon, so _sui simile_,\nin their respective individualities\u2014the bodily frame of each is so\nsingled out from all other bodies by its special constitution, sound\nor weak, by its vitality, activity, pathological history and changes,\nand, again, the mind of each is so distinct from all other minds, in\ndisposition, powers, and habits,\u2014that, instead of saying, as logicians\nsay, that the two men differ only in number, we ought, I repeat, rather\nto say that they differ from each other in all that they are, in\nidentity, in incommunicability, in personality.\n\nNor does any real thing admit, by any calculus of logic, of being\ndissected into all the possible general notions which it admits, nor,\nin consequence, of being recomposed out of them; though the attempt\nthus to treat it is more unpromising in proportion to the intricacy\nand completeness of its make. We cannot see through any one of the\nmyriad beings which make up the universe, or give the full catalogue\nof its belongings. We are accustomed, indeed, and rightly, to speak of\nthe Creator Himself as incomprehensible; and, indeed, He is so by an\nincommunicable attribute; but in a certain sense each of His creatures\nis incomprehensible to us also, in the sense that no one has a perfect\nunderstanding of it but He. We recognize and appropriate aspects of\nthem, and logic is useful to us in registering these aspects and what\nthey imply; but it does not give us to know even one individual being.\n\nSo much on logical argumentation; and in speaking of the syllogism,\nI have spoken of all inferential processes whatever, as expressed\nin language, (if they are such as to be reducible to science,) for\nthey all require general notions, as conditions of their coming to a\nconclusion.\n\nThus, in the deductive argument, \u201cEurope has no security for peace,\ntill its large standing armies in its separate states are reduced; for\na large standing army is in its very idea provocative of war,\u201d the\nconclusion is only probable, for it may so be that in no country is\nthat pure idea realized, but in every country in concrete fact there\nmay be circumstances, political or social, which destroy the abstract\ndangerousness.\n\nSo, too, as regards Induction and Analogy, as modes of Inference;\nfor, whether I argue, \u201cThis place will have the cholera, unless it is\ndrained; for there are a number of well-ascertained cases which point\nto this conclusion;\u201d or, \u201cThe sun will rise to-morrow, for it rose\nto-day;\u201d in either method of reasoning I appeal, in order to prove a\nparticular case, to a general principle or law, which has not force\nenough to warrant more than a probable conclusion. As to the cholera,\nthe place in question may have certain antagonist advantages, which\nanticipate or neutralize the miasma which is the principle of the\npoison; and as to the sun\u2019s rising to-morrow, there was a first day of\nthe sun\u2019s rising, and therefore there may be a last.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThis is what I have to say on formal Inference, when taken to represent\nRatiocination. Science in all its departments has too much simplicity\nand exactness, from the nature of the case, to be the measure of fact.\nIn its very perfection lies its incompetency to settle particulars\nand details. As to Logic, its chain of conclusions hangs loose at\nboth ends; both the point from which the proof should start, and the\npoints at which it should arrive, are beyond its reach; it comes\nshort both of first principles and of concrete issues. Even its most\nelaborate exhibitions fail to represent adequately the sum total\nof considerations by which an individual mind is determined in its\njudgment of things; even its most careful combinations made to bear\non a conclusion want that steadiness of aim which is necessary for\nhitting it. As I said when I began, thought is too keen and manifold,\nits sources are too remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate,\nand circuitous, its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit\nof the trammels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever\ncompass.\n\nNor is it any disparagement of the proper value of formal reasonings\nthus to speak of them. That they cannot proceed beyond probabilities\nis most readily allowed by those who use them most. Philosophers,\nexperimentalists, lawyers, in their several ways, have commonly the\nreputation of being, at least on moral and religious subjects, hard\nof belief; because, proceeding in the necessary investigation by the\nanalytical method of verbal inference, they find within its limits\nno sufficient resources for attaining a conclusion. Nay, they do not\nalways find it possible in their own special province severally; for,\neven when in their hearts they have no doubt about a conclusion, still\noften, from the habit of their minds, they are reluctant to own it,\nand dwell upon the deficiencies of the evidence, or the possibility of\nerror, because they speak by rule and by book, though they judge and\ndetermine by common-sense.\n\nEvery exercise of nature or of art is good in its place; and the uses\nof this logical inference are manifold. It is the great principle of\norder in our thinking; it reduces a chaos into harmony; it catalogues\nthe accumulations of knowledge; it maps out for us the relations of\nits separate departments; it puts us in the way to correct its own\nmistakes. It enables the independent intellects of many, acting and\nre-acting on each other, to bring their collective force to bear upon\none and the same subject-matter, or the same question. If language\nis an inestimable gift to man, the logical faculty prepares it for\nour use. Though it does not go so far as to ascertain truth, still it\nteaches us the direction in which truth lies, and how propositions\nlie towards each other. Nor is it a slight benefit to know what is\nprobable, and what is not so, what is needed for the proof of a point,\nwhat is wanting in a theory, how a theory hangs together, and what\nwill follow, if it be admitted. Though it does not itself discover\nthe unknown, it is one principal way by which discoveries are made.\nMoreover, a course of argument, which is simply conditional, will\npoint out when and where experiment and observation should be applied,\nor testimony sought for, as often happens both in physical and legal\nquestions. A logical hypothesis is the means of holding facts together,\nexplaining difficulties, and reconciling the imagination to what is\nstrange. And, again, processes of logic are useful as enabling us to\nget over particular stages of an investigation speedily and surely, as\non a journey we now and then gain time by travelling by night, make\nshort cuts when the high-road winds, or adopt water-carriage to avoid\nfatigue.\n\nBut reasoning by rule and in words is too natural to us, to admit\nof being regarded merely in the light of utility. Our inquiries\nspontaneously fall into scientific sequence, and we think in logic,\nas we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so. However sure we are\nof the accuracy of our instinctive conclusions, we as instinctively\nput them into words, as far as we can; as preferring, if possible, to\nhave them in an objective shape which we can fall back upon,\u2014first\nfor our own satisfaction, then for our justification with others.\nSuch a tangible defence of what we hold, inadequate as it necessarily\nis, considered as an analysis of our ratiocination in its length and\nbreadth, nevertheless is in such sense associated with our holdings,\nand so fortifies and illustrates them, that it acts as a vivid\napprehension acts, giving them luminousness and force. Thus inference\nbecomes a sort of symbol of assent, and even bears upon action.\n\nI have enlarged on these obvious considerations, lest I should seem\nparadoxical; but they do not impair the main position of this Section,\nthat Inference, considered in the shape of verbal argumentation,\ndetermines neither our principles, nor our ultimate judgments,\u2014that it\nis neither the test of truth, nor the adequate basis of assent.(12)\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Informal Inference.\n\n\nIt is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method\nby which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete; and\nit is equally plain, from what has been already suggested, what the\nreal and necessary method is. It is the cumulation of probabilities,\nindependent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances\nof the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine\nto avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into\nsyllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were\nthey convertible. As a man\u2019s portrait differs from a sketch of him, in\nhaving, not merely a continuous outline, but all its details filled in,\nand shades and colours laid on and harmonized together, such is the\nmultiform and intricate process of ratiocination, necessary for our\nreaching him as a concrete fact, compared with the rude operation of\nsyllogistic treatment.\n\nLet us suppose I wish to convert an educated, thoughtful Protestant,\nand accordingly present for his acceptance a syllogism of the following\nkind:\u2014\u201cAll Protestants are bound to join the Church; you are a\nProtestant: ergo.\u201d He answers, we will say, by denying both premisses;\nand he does so by means of arguments, which branch out into other\narguments, and those into others, and all of them severally requiring\nto be considered by him on their own merits, before the syllogism\nreaches him, and in consequence mounting up, taken all together, into\nan array of inferential exercises large and various beyond calculation.\nMoreover, he is bound to submit himself to this complicated process\nfrom the nature of the case; he would act rashly, if he did not; for\nhe is a concrete individual unit, and being so, is under so many laws,\nand is the subject of so many predications all at once, that he cannot\ndetermine, offhand, his position and his duty by the law and the\npredication of one syllogism in particular. I mean he may fairly say,\n\u201cDistinguo,\u201d to each of its premisses: he says, \u201cProtestants are bound\nto join the Church,\u2014under circumstances,\u201d and \u201cI am a Protestant\u2014in a\ncertain sense;\u201d and therefore the syllogism, at first sight, does not\ntouch him at all.\n\nBefore, then, he grants the major, he asks whether all Protestants\nreally are bound to join the Church\u2014are they bound in case they do\nnot feel themselves bound; if they are satisfied that their present\nreligion is a safe one; if they are sure it is true; if, on the other\nhand, they have grave doubts as to the doctrinal fidelity and purity of\nthe Church; if they are convinced that the Church is corrupt; if their\nconscience instinctively rejects certain of its doctrines; if history\nconvinces them that the Pope\u2019s power is not _jure divino_, but merely\nin the order of Providence? if, again, they are in a heathen country\nwhere priests are not? or where the only priest who is to be found\nexacts of them, as a condition of their reception, a profession, which\nthe Creed of Pope Pius IV. says nothing about; for instance, that the\nHoly See is fallible even when it teaches, or that the Temporal Power\nis an anti-Christian corruption? On one or other of such grounds he\nthinks he need not change his religion; but presently he asks himself,\nCan a Protestant be in such a state as to be really satisfied with\nhis religion, as he has just now been professing? Can he possibly\nbelieve Protestantism came from above, as a whole? how much of it can\nhe believe came from above? and, as to that portion which he feels did\ncome from above, has it not all been derived to him from the Church,\nwhen traced to its source? Is not Protestantism in itself a negation?\nDid not the Church exist before it? and can he be sure, on the other\nhand, that any one of the Church\u2019s doctrines is not from above?\nFurther, he finds he has to make up his mind what is a corruption,\nand what are the tests of it; what he means by a religion; whether\nit is obligatory to profess any religion in particular; what are the\nstandards of truth and falsehood in religion; and what are the special\nclaims of the Church.\n\nAnd so, again, as to the minor premiss, perhaps he will answer, that\nhe is not a Protestant; that he is a Catholic of the early undivided\nChurch; that he is a Catholic, but not a Papist. Then he has to\ndetermine questions about division, schism, visible unity, what is\nessential, what is desirable; about provisional states; as to the\nadjustment of the Church\u2019s claims with those of personal judgment and\nresponsibility; as to the soul of the Church contrasted with the body;\nas to degrees of proof, and the degree necessary for his conversion;\nas to what is called his providential position, and the responsibility\nof change; as to the sincerity of his purpose to follow the Divine\nWill, whithersoever it may lead him; as to his intellectual capacity of\ninvestigating such questions at all.\n\nNone of these questions, as they come before him, admit of simple\ndemonstration; but each carries with it a number of independent\nprobable arguments, sufficient, when united, for a reasonable\nconclusion about itself. And first he determines that the questions are\nsuch as he personally, with such talents or attainments as he has, may\nfairly entertain; and then he goes on, after deliberation, to form a\ndefinite judgment upon them; and determines them, one way or another,\nin their bearing on the bald syllogism which was originally offered\nto his acceptance. And, we will say, he comes to the conclusion, that\nhe ought to accept it as true in his case; that he is a Protestant\nin such a sense, of such a complexion, of such knowledge, under such\ncircumstances, as to be called upon by duty to join the Church; that\nthis is a conclusion of which he can be certain, and ought to be\ncertain, and that he will be incurring grave responsibility, if he\ndoes not accept it as certain, and act upon the certainty of it. And\nto this conclusion he comes, as is plain, not by any possible verbal\nenumeration of all the considerations, minute but abundant, delicate\nbut effective, which unite to bring him to it; but by a mental\ncomprehension of the whole case, and a discernment of its upshot,\nsometimes after much deliberation, but, it may be, by a clear and rapid\nact of the intellect, always, however, by an unwritten summing-up,\nsomething like the summation of the terms, _plus_ and _minus_ of an\nalgebraical series.\n\nThis I conceive to be the real method of reasoning in concrete matters;\nand it has these characteristics:\u2014First, it does not supersede the\nlogical form of inference, but is one and the same with it; only it is\nno longer an abstraction, but carried out into the realities of life,\nits premisses being instinct with the substance and the momentum of\nthat mass of probabilities, which, acting upon each other in correction\nand confirmation, carry it home definitely to the individual case,\nwhich is its original scope.\n\nNext, from what has been said it is plain, that such a process of\nreasoning is more or less implicit, and without the direct and full\nadvertence of the mind exercising it. As by the use of our eyesight we\nrecognize two brothers, yet without being able to express what it is by\nwhich we distinguish them; as at first sight we perhaps confuse them\ntogether, but, on better knowledge, we see no likeness between them at\nall; as it requires an artist\u2019s eye to determine what lines and shades\nmake a countenance look young or old, amiable, thoughtful, angry or\nconceited, the principle of discrimination being in each case real,\nbut implicit;\u2014so is the mind unequal to a complete analysis of the\nmotives which carry it on to a particular conclusion, and is swayed and\ndetermined by a body of proof, which it recognizes only as a body, and\nnot in its constituent parts.\n\nAnd thirdly, it is plain, that, in this investigation of the method of\nconcrete inference, we have not advanced one step towards depriving\ninference of its conditional character; for it is still as dependent on\npremisses, as it is in its elementary idea. On the contrary, we have\nrather added to the obscurity of the problem; for a syllogism is at\nleast a demonstration, when the premisses are granted, but a cumulation\nof probabilities, over and above their implicit character, will vary\nboth in their number and their separate estimated value, according to\nthe particular intellect which is employed upon it. It follows that\nwhat to one intellect is a proof is not so to another, and that the\ncertainty of a proposition does properly consist in the certitude of\nthe mind which contemplates it. And this of course may be said without\nprejudice to the objective truth or falsehood of propositions, since it\ndoes not follow that these propositions on the one hand are not true,\nand based on right reason, and those on the other not false, and based\non false reason, because not all men discriminate them in the same way.\n\nHaving thus explained the view which I would take of reasoning in\nthe concrete, viz. that, from the nature of the case, and from the\nconstitution of the human mind, certitude is the result of arguments\nwhich, taken in the letter, and not in their full implicit sense,\nare but probabilities, I proceed to dwell on some instances and\ncircumstances of a phenomenon which seems to me as undeniable as to\nmany it may be perplexing.\n\n1.\n\nLet us take three instances belonging respectively to the present, the\npast, and the future.\n\n1. We are all absolutely certain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that\nGreat Britain is an island. We give to that proposition our deliberate\nand unconditional adhesion. There is no security on which we should\nbe better content to stake our interests, our property, our welfare,\nthan on the fact that we are living in an island. We have no fear of\nany geographical discovery which may reverse our belief. We should be\namused or angry at the assertion, as a bad jest, did any one say that\nwe were at this time joined to the main-land in Norway or in France,\nthough a canal was cut across the isthmus. We are as little exposed to\nthe misgiving, \u201cPerhaps we are not on an island after all,\u201d as to the\nquestion, \u201cIs it quite certain that the angle in a semi-circle is a\nright-angle?\u201d It is a simple and primary truth with us, if any truth is\nsuch; to believe it is as legitimate an exercise of assent, as there\nare legitimate exercises of doubt or of opinion. This is the position\nof our minds towards our insularity; yet are the arguments producible\nfor it (to use the common expression) in black and white commensurate\nwith this overpowering certitude about it?\n\nOur reasons for believing that we are circumnavigable are such as\nthese:\u2014first, we have been so taught in our childhood, and it is so in\nall the maps; next, we have never heard it contradicted or questioned;\non the contrary, every one whom we have heard speak on the subject\nof Great Britain, every book we have read, invariably took it for\ngranted; our whole national history, the routine transactions and\ncurrent events of the country, our social and commercial system, our\npolitical relations with foreigners, imply it in one way or another.\nNumberless facts, or what we consider facts, rest on the truth of it;\nno received fact rests on its being otherwise. If there is anywhere a\njunction between us and the continent, where is it? and how do we know\nit? is it in the north or in the south? There is a manifest _reductio\nad absurdum_ attached to the notion that we can be deceived on such a\npoint as this.\n\nHowever, negative arguments and circumstantial evidence are not all,\nin such a matter, which we have a right to require. They are not the\nhighest kind of proof possible. Those who have circumnavigated the\nisland have a right to be certain: have we ever ourselves even fallen\nin with any one who has? And as to the common belief, what is the proof\nthat we are not all of us believing it on the credit of each other?\nAnd then, when it is said that every one believes it, and everything\nimplies it, how much comes home to me personally of this \u201cevery one\u201d\nand \u201ceverything\u201d? The question is, Why do I believe it myself? A living\nstatesman is said to have fancied Demerara an island; his belief was\nan impression; have we personally more than an impression, if we view\nthe matter argumentatively, a lifelong impression about Great Britain,\nlike the belief, so long and so widely entertained, that the earth was\nimmovable, and the sun careered round it? I am not at all insinuating\nthat we are not rational in our certitude; I only mean that we cannot\nanalyze a proof satisfactorily, the result of which good sense actually\nguarantees to us.\n\n2. Father Hardouin maintained that Terence\u2019s Plays, Virgil\u2019s \u201c\u00c6neid,\u201d\nHorace\u2019s Odes, and the Histories of Livy and Tacitus, were the\nforgeries of the monks of the thirteenth century. That he should be\nable to argue in behalf of such a position, shows of course that the\nproof in behalf of the received opinion is not overwhelming. That is,\nwe have no means of inferring absolutely, that Virgil\u2019s episode of\nDido, or of the Sibyl, and Horace\u2019s \u201cTe quoque mensorem\u201d and \u201cQuem\ntu Melpomene,\u201d belong to that Augustan age, which owes its celebrity\nmainly to those poets. Our common-sense, however, believes in their\ngenuineness without any hesitation or reserve, as if it had been\ndemonstrated, and not in proportion to the available evidence in its\nfavour, or the balance of arguments.\n\nSo much at first sight;\u2014but what are our grounds for dismissing thus\nsummarily, as we are likely to do, a theory such as Hardouin\u2019s? For\nlet it be observed first, that all knowledge of the Latin classics\ncomes to us from the medieval transcriptions of them, and they who\ntranscribed them had the opportunity of forging or garbling them. We\nare simply at their mercy; for neither by oral transmission, nor by\nmonumental inscriptions, nor by contemporaneous manuscripts are the\nworks of Virgil, Horace, and Terence, of Livy and Tacitus, brought\nto our knowledge. The existing copies, whenever made, are to us the\nautographic originals. Next, it must be considered, that the numerous\nreligious bodies, then existing over the face of Europe, had leisure\nenough, in the course of a century, to compose, not only all the\nclassics, but all the Fathers too. The question is, whether they had\nthe ability. This is the main point on which the inquiry turns, or at\nleast the most obvious; and it forms one of those arguments, which,\nfrom the nature of the case, are felt rather than are convertible into\nsyllogisms. Hardouin allows that the Georgics, Horace\u2019s Satires and\nEpistles, and the whole of Cicero, are genuine: we have a standard\nthen in these undisputed compositions of the Augustan age. We have a\nstandard also, in the extant medieval works, of what the thirteenth\ncentury could do; and we see at once how widely the disputed works\ndiffer from the medieval. Now could the thirteenth century simulate\nAugustan writers better than the Augustan could simulate such writers\nas those of the thirteenth? No. Perhaps, when the subject is critically\nexamined, the question may be brought to a more simple issue; but\nas to our personal reasons for receiving as genuine the whole of\nVirgil, Horace, Livy, Tacitus, and Terence, they are summed up in\nour conviction that the monks had not the ability to write them.\nThat is, we take for granted that we are sufficiently informed about\nthe capabilities of the human mind, and the conditions of genius, to\nbe quite sure that an age which was fertile in great ideas and in\nmomentous elements of the future, robust in thought, hopeful in its\nanticipations, of singular intellectual curiosity and acumen, and of\nhigh genius in at least one of the fine arts, could not, for the very\nreason of its pre-eminence in its own line, have an equal pre-eminence\nin a contrary one. We do not pretend to be able to draw the line\nbetween what the medieval intellect could or could not do; but we feel\nsure that at least it could not write the classics. An instinctive\nsense of this, and a faith in testimony, are the sufficient, but the\nundeveloped argument on which to ground our certitude.\n\nI will add, that, if we deal with arguments in the mere letter, the\nquestion of the authorship of works in any case has much difficulty.\nI have noticed it in the instance of Shakespeare, and of Newton. We\nare all certain that Johnson wrote the prose of Johnson, and Pope the\npoetry of Pope; but what is there but prescription, at least after\ncontemporaries are dead, to connect together the author of the work and\nthe owner of the name? Our lawyers prefer the examination of present\nwitnesses to affidavits on paper; but the tradition of \u201ctestimonia,\u201d\nsuch as are prefixed to the classics and the Fathers, together with the\nabsence of dissentient voices, is the adequate groundwork of our belief\nin the history of literature.\n\n3. Once more: what are my grounds for thinking that I, in my own\nparticular case, shall die? I am as certain of it in my own innermost\nmind, as I am that I now live; but what is the distinct evidence on\nwhich I allow myself to be certain? how would it tell in a court of\njustice? how should I fare under a cross-examination upon the grounds\nof my certitude? Demonstration of course I cannot have of a future\nevent, unless by means of a Divine Voice; but what logical defence can\nI make for that undoubting, obstinate anticipation of it, of which I\ncould not rid myself, if I tried?\n\nFirst, the future cannot be proved _\u00e0 posteriori_; therefore we\nare compelled by the nature of the case to put up with _\u00e0 priori_\narguments, that is, with antecedent probability, which is by itself no\nlogical proof. Men tell me that there is a law of death, meaning by law\na necessity; and I answer that they are throwing dust into my eyes,\ngiving me words instead of things. What is a law but a generalized\nfact? and what power has the past over the future? and what power has\nthe case of others over my own case? and how many deaths have I seen?\nhow many ocular witnesses have imparted to me their experience of\ndeaths, sufficient to establish what is called a law?\n\nBut let there be a law of death; so there is a law, we are told, that\nthe planets, if let alone, would severally fall into the sun\u2014it is the\ncentrifugal law which hinders it, and so the centripetal law is never\ncarried out. In like manner I am not under the law of death alone,\nI am under a thousand laws, if I am under one; and they thwart and\ncounteract each other, and jointly determine the irregular line, along\nwhich my actual history runs, divergent from the special direction\nof any one of them. No law is carried out, except in cases where it\nacts freely: how do I know that the law of death will be allowed its\nfree action in my particular case? We often are able to avert death by\nmedical treatment: why should death have its effect, sooner or later,\nin every case conceivable?\n\nIt is true that the human frame, in all instances which come before\nme, first grows, and then declines, wastes, and decays, in visible\npreparation for dissolution. We see death seldom, but of this decline\nwe are witnesses daily; still, it is a plain fact, that most men who\ndie, die, not by any law of death, but by the law of disease; and some\nwriters have questioned whether death is ever, strictly speaking,\nnatural. Now, are diseases necessary? is there any law that every one,\nsooner or later, must fall under the power of disease? and what would\nhappen on a large scale, were there no diseases? Is what we call the\nlaw of death anything more than the chance of disease? Is the prospect\nof my death, in its logical evidence,\u2014as that evidence is brought home\nto me\u2014much more than a high probability?\n\nThe strongest proof I have for my inevitable mortality is the _reductio\nad absurdum_. Can I point to the man, in historic times, who has\nlived his two hundred years? What has become of past generations of\nmen, unless it is true that they suffered dissolution? But this is\na circuitous argument to warrant a conclusion to which in matter\nof fact I adhere so relentlessly. Anyhow, there is a considerable\n\u201csurplusage,\u201d as Locke calls it, of belief over proof, when I determine\nthat I individually must die. But what logic cannot do, my own living\npersonal reasoning, my good sense, which is the healthy condition of\nsuch personal reasoning, but which cannot adequately express itself in\nwords, does for me, and I am possessed with the most precise, absolute,\nmasterful certitude of my dying some day or other.\n\nI am led on by these reflections to make another remark. If it is\ndifficult to explain how a man knows that he shall die, is it not more\ndifficult for him to satisfy himself how he knows that he was born?\nHis knowledge about himself does not rest on memory, nor on distinct\ntestimony, nor on circumstantial evidence. Can he bring into one\nfocus of proof the reasons which make him so sure? I am not speaking\nof scientific men, who have diverse channels of knowledge, but of an\nordinary individual, as one of ourselves.\n\nAnswers doubtless may be given to some of these questions; but, on the\nwhole, I think it is the fact that many of our most obstinate and most\nreasonable certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and personal,\nwhich baffle our powers of analysis, and cannot be brought under\nlogical rule, because they cannot be submitted to logical statistics.\nIf we must speak of Law, this recognition of a correlation between\ncertitude and implicit proof seems to me a law of our minds.\n\n2.\n\nI said just now that an object of sense presents itself to our view as\none whole, and not in its separate details: we take it in, recognize\nit, and discriminate it from other objects, all at once. Such too is\nthe intellectual view we take of the _momenta_ of proof for a concrete\ntruth; we grasp the full tale of premisses and the conclusion, _per\nmodum unius_,\u2014by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate\nconclusion in and through the premisses, not by a formal juxta-position\nof propositions; though of course such a juxta-position is useful and\nnatural, both to direct and to verify, just as in objects of sight\nour notice of bodily peculiarities, or the remarks of others may aid\nus in establishing a case of disputed identity. And, as this man or\nthat will receive his own impression of one and the same person, and\njudge differently from others about his countenance, its expression,\nits moral significance, its physical contour and complexion, so an\nintellectual question may strike two minds very differently, may awaken\nin them distinct associations, may be invested by them in contrary\ncharacteristics, and lead them to opposite conclusions;\u2014and so, again,\na body of proof, or a line of argument, may produce a distinct, nay, a\ndissimilar effect, as addressed to one or to the other.\n\nThus in concrete reasonings we are in great measure thrown back into\nthat condition, from which logic proposed to rescue us. We judge for\nourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our\ncriterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as\nthe intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them,\nand the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our\nminds.\n\nIt is this distinction between ratiocination as the exercise of\na living faculty in the individual intellect, and mere skill in\nargumentative science, which is the true interpretation of the\nprejudice which exists against logic in the popular mind, and of the\nanimadversions which are levelled against it, as that its formulas make\na pedant and a _doctrinaire_, that it never makes converts, that it\nleads to rationalism, that Englishmen are too practical to be logical,\nthat an ounce of common-sense goes farther than many cartloads of\nlogic, that Laputa is the land of logicians, and the like. Such maxims\nmean, when analyzed, that the processes of reasoning which legitimately\nlead to assent, to action, to certitude, are in fact too multiform,\nsubtle, omnigenous, too implicit, to allow of being measured by rule,\nthat they are after all personal,\u2014verbal argumentation being useful\nonly in subordination to a higher logic. It is this which was meant\nby the Judge who, when asked for his advice by a friend, on his being\ncalled to important duties which were new to him, bade him always lay\ndown the law boldly, but never give his reasons, for his decision was\nlikely to be right, but his reasons sure to be unsatisfactory. This is\nthe point which I proceed to illustrate.\n\n1. I will take a question of the present moment. \u201cWe shall have a\nEuropean war, _for_ Greece is audaciously defying Turkey.\u201d How are we\nto test the validity of the reason, implied, not expressed, in the\nword \u201cfor\u201d? Only the judgment of diplomatists, statesmen, capitalists,\nand the like, founded on experience, strengthened by practical and\nhistorical knowledge, controlled by self-interest, can decide the worth\nof that \u201cfor\u201d in relation to accepting or not accepting the conclusion\nwhich depends on it. The argument is from concrete fact to concrete\nfact. How will mere logical inferences, which cannot proceed without\ngeneral and abstract propositions, help us on to the determination\nof this particular case? It is not the case of Switzerland attacking\nAustria, or of Portugal attacking Spain, or of Belgium attacking\nPrussia, but a case without parallels. To draw a scientific conclusion,\nthe argument must run somewhat in this way:\u2014\u201cAll audacious defiances\nof Turkey on the part of Greece must end in a European war; these\npresent acts of Greece are such: ergo;\u201d\u2014where the major premiss is\nmore difficult to accept than the conclusion, and the proof becomes an\n\u201cobscurum per obscurius.\u201d But, in truth, I should not betake myself\nto some one universal proposition to defend my view of the matter; I\nshould determine the particular case by its particular circumstances,\nby the combination of many uncatalogued experiences floating in my\nmemory, of many reflections, variously produced, felt rather than\ncapable of statement; and if I had them not, I should go to those who\nhad. I assent in consequence of some such complex act of judgment,\nor from faith in those who are capable of making it, and practically\nsyllogism has no part, even verificatory, in the action of my mind.\n\nI take this instance at random in illustration; now let me follow it up\nby more serious cases.\n\n2. Leighton says, \u201cWhat a full confession do we make of our\ndissatisfaction with the objects of our bodily senses, that in our\nattempts to express what we conceive of the best of beings and the\ngreatest of felicities to be, we describe by the exact contraries of\nall that we experience here,\u2014the one as infinite, incomprehensible,\nimmutable, &c.; the other as incorruptible, undefiled, and that passeth\nnot away. At all events, this coincidence, say rather identity of\nattributes, is sufficient to apprise us that, to be inheritors of\nbliss, we must become the children of God.\u201d Coleridge quotes this\npassage, and adds, \u201cAnother and more fruitful, perhaps more solid,\ninference from the facts would be, that there is something in the human\nmind which makes it know that in all finite quantity, there is an\ninfinite, in all measures of time an eternal; that the latter are the\nbasis, the substance, of the former; and that, as we truly are only as\nfar as God is with us, so neither can we truly possess, that is, enjoy\nour being or any other real good, but by living in the sense of His\nholy presence.(13)\u201d\n\nWhat is this an argument for? how few readers will enter into either\npremiss or conclusion! and of those who understand what it means, will\nnot at least some confess that they understand it by fits and starts,\nnot at all times? Can we ascertain its force by mood and figure? Is\nthere any royal road by which we may indolently be carried along into\nthe acceptance of it? Does not the author rightly number it among his\n\u201caids\u201d for our \u201creflection,\u201d not instruments for our compulsion? It is\nplain that, if the passage is worth anything, we must secure that worth\nfor our own use by the personal action of our own minds, or else we\nshall be only professing and asserting its doctrine, without having any\nground or right to assert it. And our preparation for understanding and\nmaking use of it will be the general state of our mental discipline and\ncultivation, our own experiences, our appreciation of religious ideas,\nthe perspicacity and steadiness of our intellectual vision.\n\n3. It is argued by Hume against the actual occurrence of the Jewish\nand Christian miracles, that, whereas \u201cit is experience only which\ngives authority to human testimony, and it is the same experience which\nassures us of the laws of nature,\u201d therefore, \u201cwhen these two kinds of\nexperience are contrary\u201d to each other, \u201cwe are bound to subtract the\none from the other;\u201d and, in consequence, since we have no experience\nof a violation of natural laws, and much experience of the violation of\ntruth, \u201cwe may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have\nsuch force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any\nsuch system of religion.\u201d\n\nI will accept the general proposition, but I resist its application.\nDoubtless it is abstractedly more likely that men should lie than\nthat the order of nature should be infringed; but what is abstract\nreasoning to a question of concrete fact? To arrive at the fact of any\nmatter, we must eschew generalities, and take things as they stand,\nwith all their circumstances. _\u00c0 priori_, of course the acts of men\nare not so trustworthy as the order of nature, and the pretence of\nmiracles is in fact more common than the occurrence. But the question\nis not about miracles in general, or men in general, but definitely,\nwhether these particular miracles, ascribed to the particular Peter,\nJames, and John, are more likely to have been or not; whether they\nare unlikely, supposing that there is a Power, external to the world,\nwho can bring them about; supposing they are the only means by which\nHe can reveal Himself to those who need a revelation; supposing He\nis likely to reveal Himself; that He has a great end in doing so;\nthat the professed miracles in question are like His natural works,\nand such as He is likely to work, in case He wrought miracles; that\ngreat effects, otherwise unaccountable, in the event followed upon the\nacts said to be miraculous; that they were from the first accepted as\ntrue by large numbers of men against their natural interests; that\nthe reception of them as true has left its mark upon the world, as no\nother event ever did; that, viewed in their effects, they have\u2014that is,\nthe belief of them has\u2014served to raise human nature to a high moral\nstandard, otherwise unattainable: these and the like considerations\nare parts of a great complex argument, which so far can be put into\npropositions, but which, even between, and around, and behind these,\nstill is implicit and secret, and cannot by any ingenuity be imprisoned\nin a formula, and packed into a nut-shell. These various conditions may\nbe decided in the affirmative or in the negative. That is a further\npoint; here I only insist upon the nature of the argument, if it is to\nbe philosophical. It must be no smart antithesis which may look well on\npaper, but the living action of the mind on a great problem of fact;\nand we must summon to our aid all our powers and resources, if we would\nencounter it worthily, and not as if it were a literary essay.\n\n4. \u201cConsider the establishment of the Christian religion,\u201d says Pascal\nin his \u201cThoughts.\u201d \u201cHere is a religion contrary to our nature, which\nestablishes itself in men\u2019s minds with so much mildness, as to use no\nexternal force; with so much energy, that no tortures could silence\nits martyrs and confessors; and consider the holiness, devotion,\nhumility of its true disciples; its sacred books, their superhuman\ngrandeur, their admirable simplicity. Consider the character of its\nFounder; His associates and disciples, unlettered men, yet possessed of\nwisdom sufficient to confound the ablest philosopher; the astonishing\nsuccession of prophets who heralded Him; the state at this day of the\nJewish people who rejected Him and His religion; its perpetuity and its\nholiness; the light which its doctrines shed upon the contrarieties of\nour nature;\u2014after considering these things, let any man judge if it be\npossible to doubt about its being the only true one.(14)\u201d\n\nThis is an argument parallel in its character to that by which we\nascribe the classics to the Augustan age. We urge, that, though we\ncannot draw the line definitely between what the monks could do in\nliterature, and what they could not, anyhow Virgil\u2019s \u201c\u00c6neid\u201d and the\nOdes of Horace are far beyond the highest capacity of the medieval\nmind, which, however great, was different in the character of its\nendowments. And in like manner we maintain, that, granting that we\ncannot decide how far the human mind can advance by its own unaided\npowers in religious ideas and sentiments, and in religious practice,\nstill the facts of Christianity, as they stand, are beyond what is\npossible to man, and betoken the presence of a higher intelligence,\npurpose, and might.\n\nMany have been converted and sustained in their faith by this argument,\nwhich admits of being powerfully stated; but still such statement is\nafter all only intended to be a vehicle of thought, and to open the\nmind to the apprehension of the facts of the case, and to trace them\nand their implications in outline, not to convince by the logic of its\nmere wording. Do we not think and muse as we read it, try to master\nit as we proceed, put down the book in which we find it, fill out its\ndetails from our own resources, and then resume the study of it? And,\nwhen we have to give an account of it to others, should we make use\nof its language, or even of its thoughts, and not rather of its drift\nand spirit? Has it never struck us what different lights different\nminds throw upon the same theory and argument, nay, how they seem to be\ndiffering in detail when they are professing, and in reality showing,\na concurrence in it? Have we never found, that, when a friend takes\nup the defence of what we have written or said, that at first we are\nunable to recognize in his statement of it what we meant it to convey?\nIt will be our wisdom to avail ourselves of language, as far as it will\ngo, but to aim mainly by means of it to stimulate, in those to whom we\naddress ourselves, a mode of thinking and trains of thought similar to\nour own, leading them on by their own independent action, not by any\nsyllogistic compulsion. Hence it is that an intellectual school will\nalways have something of an esoteric character; for it is an assemblage\nof minds that think; their bond is unity of thought, and their words\nbecome a sort of _tessera_, not expressing thought, but symbolizing it.\n\nRecurring to Pascal\u2019s argument, I observe that, its force depending\nupon the assumption that the facts of Christianity are beyond human\nnature, therefore, according as the powers of nature are placed at a\nhigh or low standard, that force will be greater or less; and that\nstandard will vary according to the respective dispositions, opinions,\nand experiences, of those to whom the argument is addressed. Thus its\nvalue is a personal question; not as if there were not an objective\ntruth and Christianity as a whole not supernatural, but that, when we\ncome to consider where it is that the supernatural presence is found,\nthere may be fair differences of opinion, both as to the fact and the\nproof of what is supernatural. There is a multitude of facts, which,\ntaken separately, may perhaps be natural, but, found together, must\ncome from a source above nature; and what these are, and how many are\nnecessary, will be variously determined. And while every inquirer has\na right to determine the question according to the best exercise of\nhis judgment, still whether he so determine it for himself, or trust\nin part or altogether to the judgment of those who have the best claim\nto judge, in either case he is guided by the implicit processes of the\nreasoning faculty, not by any manufacture of arguments forcing their\nway to an irrefragable conclusion.\n\n5. Pascal writes in another place, \u201cHe who doubts, but seeks not\nto have his doubts removed, is at once the most criminal and the\nmost unhappy of mortals. If, together with this, he is tranquil and\nself-satisfied, if he be vain of his tranquillity, or makes his state\na topic of mirth and self-gratulation, I have not words to describe so\ninsane a creature. Truly it is to the honour of religion to have for\nits adversaries men so bereft of reason; their opposition, far from\nbeing formidable, bears testimony to its most distinguishing truths;\nfor the great object of the Christian religion is to establish the\ncorruption of our nature, and the redemption by Jesus Christ.(15)\u201d\nElsewhere he says of Montaigne, \u201cHe involves everything in such\nuniversal, unmingled scepticism, as to doubt of his very doubts. He was\na pure Pyrrhonist. He ridicules all attempts at certainty in anything.\nDelighted with exhibiting in his own person the contradictions that\nexist in the mind of a free-thinker, it is all one to him whether\nhe is successful or not in his argument. The virtue he loved was\nsimple, sociable, gay, sprightly, and playful; to use one of his own\nexpressions, \u2018Ignorance and incuriousness are two charming pillows for\na sound head.\u2019(16)\u201d\n\nHere are two celebrated writers in direct opposition to each other in\ntheir fundamental view of truth and duty. Shall we say that there is\nno such thing as truth and error, but that anything is truth to a man\nwhich he troweth? and not rather, as the solution of a great mystery,\nthat truth there is, and attainable it is, but that its rays stream in\nupon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual\nbeing; and that in consequence that perception of its first principles\nwhich is natural to us is enfeebled, obstructed, perverted, by\nallurements of sense and the supremacy of self, and, on the other hand,\nquickened by aspirations after the supernatural; so that at length two\ncharacters of mind are brought out into shape, and two standards and\nsystems of thought,\u2014each logical, when analyzed, yet contradictory\nof each other, and only not antagonistic because they have no common\nground on which they can conflict?\n\n6. Montaigne was endowed with a good estate, health, leisure, and an\neasy temper, literary tastes, and a sufficiency of books: he could\nafford thus to play with life, and the abysses into which it leads us.\nLet us take a case in contrast.\n\n\u201cI think,\u201d says the poor dying factory-girl in the tale, \u201cif this\nshould be the end of all, and if all I have been born for is just to\nwork my heart and life away, and to sicken in this dree place, with\nthose mill-stones in my ears for ever, until I could scream out for\nthem to stop and let me have a little piece of quiet, and with the\nfluff filling my lungs, until I thirst to death for one long deep\nbreath of the clear air, and my mother gone, and I never able to tell\nher again how I loved her, and of all my troubles,\u2014I think, if this\nlife is the end, and that there is no God to wipe away all tears from\nall eyes, I could go mad!(17)\u201d\n\nHere is an argument for the immortality of the soul. As to its force,\nbe it great or small, will it make a figure in a logical disputation,\ncarried on _secundum artem_? Can any scientific common measure compel\nthe intellects of Dives and Lazarus to take the same estimate of it? Is\nthere any test of the validity of it better than the _ipse dixit_ of\nprivate judgment, that is, the judgment of those who have a right to\njudge, and next, the agreement of many private judgments in one and the\nsame view of it?\n\n7. \u201cIn order to prove plainly and intelligibly,\u201d says Dr. Samuel\nClarke, \u201cthat God is a Being, which must of necessity be endued with\nperfect knowledge, \u2019tis to be observed that knowledge is a perfection,\nwithout which the foregoing attributes are no perfections at all, and\nwithout which those which follow can have no foundation. Where there\nis no Knowledge, Eternity and Immensity are as nothing, and Justice,\nGoodness, Mercy, and Wisdom can have no place. The idea of eternity\nand omnipresence, devoid of knowledge, is as the notion of darkness\ncompared with that of light. \u2019Tis as a notion of the world without the\nsun to illuminate it; \u2019tis as the notion of inanimate matter (which is\nthe atheist\u2019s supreme cause) compared with that of light and spirit.\nAnd as for the following attributes of Justice, Goodness, Mercy, and\nWisdom, \u2019tis evident that without knowledge there could not possibly be\nany such things as these at all.(18)\u201d\n\nThe argument here used in behalf of the Divine Attribute of Knowledge\ncomes under the general proposition that the attributes imply each\nother, for the denial of one is the denial of the rest. To some minds\nthis thesis is self-evident; others are utterly insensible to its\nforce. Will it bear bringing out into words throughout the whole\nseries of its argumentative links? for if it does, then either those\nwho maintain it or those who reject it, the one or the other, will be\ncompelled by logical necessity to confess that they are in error. \u201cGod\nis wise, if He is eternal; He is good, if He is wise; He is just, if\nHe is good.\u201d What skill can so arrange these propositions, so add to\nthem, so combine them, that they may be able, by the force of their\njuxta-position, to follow one from the other, and become one and the\nsame by an inevitable correlation. That is not the method by which the\nargument becomes a demonstration. Such a method, used by a Theist in\ncontroversy against men who are unprepared personally for the question,\nwill but issue in his retreat along a series of major propositions,\nfarther and farther back, till he and they find themselves in a land of\nshadows, \u201cwhere the light is as darkness.\u201d\n\nTo feel the true force of an argument like this, we must not confine\nourselves to abstractions, and merely compare notion with notion, but\nwe must contemplate the God of our conscience as a Living Being, as\none Object and Reality, _under_ the aspect of this or that attribute.\nWe must patiently rest in the thought of the Eternal, Omnipresent, and\nAll-knowing, rather than of Eternity, Omnipresence, and Omniscience;\nand we must not hurry on and force a series of deductions, which, if\nthey are to be realized, must distil like dew into our minds, and form\nthemselves spontaneously there, by a calm contemplation and gradual\nunderstanding of their premisses. Ordinarily speaking, such deductions\ndo not flow forth, except according as the Image,(19) presented to us\nthrough conscience, on which they depend, is cherished within us with\nthe sentiments which, supposing it be, as we know it is, the truth, it\nnecessarily claims of us, and is seen reflected, by the habit of our\nintellect, in the appointments and the events of the external world.\nAnd, in their manifestation to our inward sense, they are analogous to\nthe knowledge which we at length attain of the details of a landscape,\nafter we have selected the right stand-point, and have learned to\naccommodate the pupil of our eye to the varying focus necessary for\nseeing them; have accustomed it to the glare of light, have mentally\ngrouped or discriminated lines and shadows and given them their due\nmeaning, and have mastered the perspective of the whole. Or they may be\ncompared to a landscape as drawn by the pencil (unless the illustration\nseem forced), in which by the skill of the artist, amid the bold\noutlines of trees and rocks, when the eye has learned to take in their\nreverse aspects, the forms or faces of historical personages are\ndiscernible, which we catch and lose again, and then recover, and which\nsome who look on with us are never able to catch at all.\n\nAnalogous to such an exercise of sight, must be our mode of dealing\nwith the verbal expositions of an argument such as Clarke\u2019s. His words\nspeak to those who understand the speech. To the mere barren intellect\nthey are but the pale ghosts of notions; but the trained imagination\nsees in them the representations of things. He who has once detected\nin his conscience the outline of a Lawgiver and Judge, needs no\ndefinition of Him, whom he dimly but surely contemplates there, and\nhe rejects the mechanism of logic, which cannot contain in its grasp\nmatters so real and so recondite. Such a one, according to the strength\nand perspicacity of his mind, the force of his presentiments, and his\npower of sustained attention, is able to pronounce about the great\nSight which encompasses him, as about some visible object; and, in his\ninvestigation of the Divine Attributes, is not inferring abstraction\nfrom abstraction, but noting down the aspects and phases of that one\nthing on which he ever is gazing. Nor is it possible to limit the depth\nof meaning, which at length he will attach to words, which to the many\nare but definitions and ideas.\n\nHere then again, as in the other instances, it seems clear, that\nmethodical processes of inference, useful as they are, as far as they\ngo, are only instruments of the mind, and need, in order to their due\nexercise, that real ratiocination and present imagination which gives\nthem a sense beyond their letter, and which, while acting through them,\nreaches to conclusions beyond and above them. Such a living _organon_\nis a personal gift, and not a mere method or calculus.\n\n3.\n\nThat there are cases, in which evidence, not sufficient for a\nscientific proof, is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude,\nis the doctrine of Locke, as of most men. He tells us that belief,\ngrounded on sufficient probabilities, \u201crises to assurance;\u201d and as\nto the question of sufficiency, that where propositions \u201cborder near\non certainty,\u201d then \u201cwe assent to them as firmly as if they were\ninfallibly demonstrated.\u201d The only question is, what these propositions\nare: this he does not tell us, but he seems to think that they are\nfew in number, and will be without any trouble recognized at once by\ncommon-sense; whereas, unless I am mistaken, they are to be found\nthroughout the range of concrete matter, and that supra-logical\njudgment, which is the warrant for our certitude about them, is not\nmere common-sense, but the true healthy action of our ratiocinative\npowers, an action more subtle and more comprehensive than the mere\nappreciation of a syllogistic argument. It is often called the\n\u201cjudicium prudentis viri,\u201d a standard of certitude which holds good\nin all concrete matter, not only in those cases of practice and duty,\nin which we are more familiar with it, but in questions of truth and\nfalsehood generally, or in what are called \u201cspeculative\u201d questions,\nand that, not indeed to the exclusion, but as the supplement of logic.\nThus a proof, except in abstract demonstration, has always in it,\nmore or less, an element of the personal, because \u201cprudence\u201d is not a\nconstituent part of our nature, but a personal endowment.\n\nAnd the language in common use, when concrete conclusions are in\nquestion, implies the presence of this personal element in the proof\nof them. We are considered to feel, rather than to see, its cogency;\nand we decide, not that the conclusion must be, but that it cannot be\notherwise. We say, that we do not see our way to doubt it, that it is\nimpossible to doubt, that we are bound to believe it, that we should\nbe idiots, if we did not believe. We never should say, in abstract\nscience, that we could not escape the conclusion that 25 was a mean\nproportional between 5 and 125; or that a man had no right to say\nthat a tangent to a circle at the extremity of the radius makes an\nacute angle with it. Yet, though our certitude of the fact is quite\nas clear, we should not think it unnatural to say that the insularity\nof Great Britain is as good as demonstrated, or that none but a fool\nexpects never to die. Phrases indeed such as these are sometimes\nused to express a shade of doubt, but it is enough for my purpose if\nthey are also used when doubt is altogether absent. What, then, they\nsignify, is, what I have so much insisted on, that we have arrived at\nthese conclusions\u2014not _ex opere operato_, by a scientific necessity\nindependent of ourselves,\u2014but by the action of our own minds, by our\nown individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of\nduty to those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness.\n\nThis certitude and this evidence are often called moral; a word which\nI avoid, as having a very vague meaning; but using it here for once,\nI observe that moral evidence and moral certitude are all that we can\nattain, not only in the case of ethical and spiritual subjects, such\nas religion, but of terrestrial and cosmical questions also. So far,\nphysical Astronomy and Revelation stand on the same footing. Vince, in\nhis treatise on Astronomy, does but use the language of philosophical\nsobriety, when, after speaking of the proofs of the earth\u2019s rotatory\nmotion, he says, \u201cWhen these reasons, all upon different principles,\nare considered, they amount to a proof of the earth\u2019s rotation about\nits axis, which is as satisfactory to the mind as the most direct\ndemonstration could be;\u201d or, as he had said just before, \u201cthe mind\nrests equally satisfied, as if the matter was strictly proved.(20)\u201d\nThat is, first there is no demonstration that the earth rotates; next\nthere is a cluster of \u201creasons on _different_ principles,\u201d that is,\nindependent probabilities in cumulation; thirdly, these \u201c_amount_ to a\nproof,\u201d and \u201cthe mind\u201d feels \u201c_as if_ the matter was strictly proved,\u201d\nthat is, there is the equivalent of proof; lastly, \u201cthe mind rests\n_satisfied_,\u201d that is, it is certain on the point. And though evidence\nof the fact is now obtained which was not known fifty years ago, that\nevidence on the whole has not changed its character.\n\nCompare with this avowal the language of Butler, when discussing the\nproof of Revelation. \u201cProbable proofs,\u201d he says, \u201cby being added, not\nonly increase the evidence, but multiply it. The truth of our religion,\nlike the truth of common matters, is to be judged by the whole evidence\ntaken together ... in like manner as, if in any common case numerous\nevents acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event\ndisputed, the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if\nany one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but\nthough no one of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged\nevents taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened,\nunless the disputed one were true.(21)\u201d Here, as in Astronomy, is the\nsame absence of demonstration of the thesis, the same cumulating and\nconverging indications of it, the same indirectness in the proof, as\nbeing _per impossibile_, the same recognition nevertheless that the\nconclusion is not only probable, but true. One other characteristic\nof the argumentative process is given, which is unnecessary in a\nsubject-matter so clear and simple as astronomical science, viz. the\nmoral state of the parties inquiring or disputing. They must be \u201cas\nmuch in earnest about religion, as about their temporal affairs,\ncapable of being convinced, on real evidence, that there is a God who\ngoverns the world, and feel themselves to be of a moral nature and\naccountable creatures.(22)\u201d\n\nThis being the state of the case, the question arises, whether,\ngranting that the personality (so to speak) of the parties reasoning\nis an important element in proving propositions in concrete matter,\nany account can be given of the ratiocinative method in such proofs,\nover and above that analysis into syllogism which is possible in each\nof its steps in detail. I think there can; though I fear, lest to some\nminds it may appear far-fetched or fanciful; however, I will hazard\nthis imputation. I consider, then, that the principle of concrete\nreasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of\nmodern mathematical science, as contained in the celebrated lemma with\nwhich Newton opens his \u201cPrincipia.\u201d We know that a regular polygon,\ninscribed in a circle, its sides being continually diminished, tends\nto become that circle, as its limit; but it vanishes before it has\ncoincided with the circle, so that its tendency to be the circle,\nthough ever nearer fulfilment, never in fact gets beyond a tendency. In\nlike manner, the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen\nand predicted rather than actually attained; foreseen in the number\nand direction of accumulated premisses, which all converge to it, and\napproach it, as the result of their combination, more nearly than any\nassignable difference, yet do not touch it logically, (though only not\ntouching it,) on account of the nature of its subject-matter, and the\ndelicate and implicit character of at least part of the reasonings on\nwhich it depends. It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of\npremisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms,\u2014by\nobjections overcome, by adverse theories neutralized, by difficulties\ngradually clearing up, by exceptions proving the rule, by unlooked-for\ncorrelations found with received truths, by suspense and delay in the\nprocess issuing in triumphant reactions,\u2014by all these ways, and many\nothers, the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure\ndivination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of\nreasoning do not actually put him in possession. This is what is meant\nby a proposition being \u201cas good as proved,\u201d a conclusion as undeniable\n\u201cas if it were proved,\u201d and by the reasons for it \u201camounting to a\nproof,\u201d for a proof is the limit of converging probabilities.\n\nIt may be added, that, whereas the logical form of this argument,\nis, as I have already observed, indirect, viz. that \u201cthe conclusion\ncannot be otherwise,\u201d and Butler says that an event is proved, if\nits antecedents \u201ccould not in reason be supposed to have happened\n_unless_ it were true,\u201d and law-books tell us that the principle of\ncircumstantial evidence is the _reductio ad absurdum_, so Newton\nis forced to the same mode of proof for the establishment of his\nlemma, about prime and ultimate ratios. \u201cIf you deny that they become\nultimately equal,\u201d he says, \u201clet them be ultimately unequal;\u201d and the\nconsequence follows, \u201cwhich is against the supposition.\u201d\n\nSuch being the character of the mental process in concrete reasoning,\nI should wish to adduce some good instances of it in illustration,\ninstances in which the person reasoning confesses that he is reasoning\non this very process, as I have been stating it; but these are\ndifficult to find, from the very circumstance that the process from\nfirst to last is carried on as much without words as with them.\nHowever, I will set down three such.\n\n1. First, an instance in physics. Wood, treating of the laws of motion,\nthus describes the line of reasoning by which the mind is certified of\nthem. \u201cThey are not indeed self-evident, nor do they admit of accurate\nproof by experiment, on account of the effects of friction and the\nair\u2019s resistance, which cannot entirely be removed. They are, however,\nconstantly and invariably suggested to our senses, and they agree with\nexperiment, as far as experiment can go; and the more accurately the\nexperiments are made, and the greater care we take to remove all those\nimpediments which tend to render the conclusions erroneous, the more\nnearly do the experiments coincide with these laws.\n\n\u201cTheir truth is also established upon a different ground: from these\ngeneral principles innumerable particular conclusions have been\ndeducted; sometimes the deductions are simple and immediate, sometimes\nthey are made by tedious and intricate operations; yet they are all,\nwithout exception, consistent with each other and with experiment. It\nfollows thereby, that the principles upon which the calculations are\nfounded are true.(23)\u201d\n\nThe reasoning of this passage (in which the uniformity of the laws of\nnature is assumed) seems to me a good illustration of what must be\nconsidered the principle or form of an induction. The conclusion, which\nis its scope, is, by its own confession, not proved; but it ought to be\nproved, or is as good as proved, and a man would be irrational who did\nnot take it to be virtually proved; first, because the imperfections\nin the proof arise out of its subject-matter and the nature of the\ncase, so that it _is_ proved _interpretativ\u00e8_; and next, because in the\nsame degree in which these faults in the subject-matter are overcome\nhere or there, are the involved imperfections here or there of the\nproof remedied; and further, because, when the conclusion is assumed\nas an hypothesis, it throws light upon a multitude of collateral\nfacts, accounting for them, and uniting them together in one whole.\nConsistency is not always the guarantee of truth; but there may be a\nconsistency in a theory so variously tried and exemplified as to lead\nto belief in it, as reasonably as a witness in a court of law may,\nafter a severe cross-examination, satisfy and assure judge, jury, and\nthe whole court, of his simple veracity.\n\n2. And from the courts of law shall my second illustration be taken.\n\nA learned writer says, \u201cIn criminal prosecutions, the circumstantial\nevidence should be such, as to produce nearly the same degree of\ncertainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude\na rational probability of innocence.(24)\u201d By degrees of certainty he\nseems to mean, together with many other writers, degrees of proof, or\napproximations towards proof, and not certitude, as a state of mind;\nand he says that no one should be pronounced guilty on evidence which\nis not equivalent in weight to direct testimony. So far is clear;\nbut what is meant by the expression \u201c_rational_ probability\u201d? for\nthere can be no probability but what is rational. I consider that the\n\u201cexclusion of a rational probability\u201d means \u201cthe exclusion of any\nargument in the man\u2019s favour which has a rational claim to be called\nprobable,\u201d or rather, \u201cthe rational exclusion of any supposition\nthat he is innocent;\u201d and \u201crational\u201d is used in contradistinction to\nargumentative, and means \u201cresting on implicit reasons,\u201d such as we\nfeel, indeed, but which for some cause or other, because they are too\nsubtle or too circuitous, we cannot put into words so as to satisfy\nlogic. If this is a correct account of his meaning, he says that the\nevidence against a criminal, in order to be decisive of his guilt, to\nthe satisfaction of our conscience, must bear with it, along with the\npalpable arguments for that guilt, such a reasonableness, or body of\nimplicit reasons for it in addition, as may exclude any probability,\nreally such, that he is not guilty,\u2014that is, it must be an evidence\nfree from anything obscure, suspicious, unnatural, or defective, such\nas (in the judgment of a prudent man) to hinder that summation or\ncoalescence of the evidence into a proof, which I have compared to the\nrunning into a limit, in the case of mathematical ratios. Just as an\nalgebraical series may be of a nature never to terminate or admit of\nvaluation, as being the equivalent of an irrational quantity or surd,\nso there may be some grave imperfections in a body of reasons, explicit\nor implicit, which is directed to a proof, sufficient to interfere with\nits successful issue or resolution, and to balk us with an irrational,\nthat is, an indeterminate, conclusion.\n\nSo much as to the principle of conclusions made upon evidence in\ncriminal cases; now let us turn to an instance of its application in\na particular instance. Some years ago there was a murder committed,\nwhich unusually agitated the popular mind, and the evidence against\nthe culprit was necessarily circumstantial. At the trial the Judge, in\naddressing the Jury, instructed them on the kind of evidence necessary\nfor a verdict of _guilty_. Of course he could not mean to say that they\nmust convict a man, of whose guilt they were not certain, especially\nin a case in which two foreign countries, Germany and the American\nStates, were attentively looking on. If the Jury had any doubt, that\nis, reasonable doubt, about the man\u2019s guilt, of course they would\ngive him the benefit of that doubt. Nor could the certitude, which\nwould be necessary for an adverse verdict, be merely that which is\nsometimes called a \u201cpractical certitude,\u201d that is, a certitude indeed,\nbut a certitude that it was a \u201cduty,\u201d \u201cexpedient,\u201d \u201csafe,\u201d to bring\nin a verdict of guilty. Of course the Judge spoke of what is called\na \u201cspeculative certitude,\u201d that is, a certitude of the fact that the\nman was guilty; the only question being, what evidence was sufficient\nfor the proof, for the certitude of that fact. This is what the Judge\nmeant; and these are among the remarks which, with this drift, he made\nupon the occasion:\u2014\n\nAfter observing that by circumstantial evidence he meant a case in\nwhich \u201cthe facts do not directly prove the actual crime, but lead to\nthe conclusion that the prisoner committed that crime,\u201d he went on\nto disclaim the suggestion, made by counsel in the case, that the\nJury could not pronounce a verdict of _guilty_, unless they were as\nmuch satisfied that the prisoner did the deed as if they had seen him\ncommit it. \u201cThat is not the certainty,\u201d he said, \u201cwhich is required\nof you to discharge your duty to the prisoner, whose safety is in\nyour hands.\u201d Then he stated what was the \u201cdegree of certainty,\u201d that\nis, of certainty or perfection of proof, which was necessary to the\nquestion, \u201cinvolving as it did the life of the prisoner at the bar,\u201d\u2014it\nwas such as that \u201cwith which,\u201d he said, \u201cyou decide upon and conclude\nyour own most important transactions in life. Take the facts which\nare proved before you, separate those you believe from those which\nyou do not believe, and all the conclusions that naturally and almost\nnecessarily result from those facts, you may confide in as much as in\nthe facts themselves. The case on the part of the prosecution is the\n_story_ of the murder, told by the _different_ witnesses, who _unfold\nthe circumstances one after another_, according to their occurrence,\ntogether with the _gradual_ discovery of some apparent connexion\nbetween the property that was lost, and the possession of it by the\nprisoner.\u201d\n\nNow here I observe, that whereas the conclusion which is contemplated\nby the Judge, is what may be pronounced (on the whole, and considering\nall things, and judging reasonably) a proved or certain conclusion,\nthat is, a conclusion of the truth of the allegation against the\nprisoner, or of the fact of his guilt, on the other hand, the _motiva_\nconstituting this reasonable, rational proof, and this satisfactory\ncertitude, needed not, according to him, to be stronger than those on\nwhich we prudently act on matters of important interest to ourselves,\nthat is, probable reasons viewed in their convergence and combination.\nAnd whereas the certitude is viewed by the Judge as following on\nconverging probabilities, which constitute a real, though only a\nreasonable, not an argumentative, proof, so it will be observed in this\nparticular instance, that, in illustration of the general doctrine\nwhich I have laid down, the process is one of \u201cline upon line, and\nletter upon letter,\u201d of various details accumulating and of deductions\nfitting in to each other; for, in the Judge\u2019s words, there was a\nstory\u2014and that not told right out and by one witness, but taken up\nand handed on from witness to witness\u2014gradually unfolded, and tending\nto a proof, which of course might have been ten times stronger than\nit was, but was still a proof for all that, and sufficient for its\nconclusion,\u2014just as we see that two straight lines are meeting, and are\ncertain they will meet at a given distance, though we do not actually\nsee the junction.\n\n3. The third instance I will take is one of a literary character,\nthe divination of the authorship of a certain anonymous publication,\nas suggested mainly by internal evidence, as I find it in a critique\nwritten some twenty years ago. In the extract which I make from it,\nwe may observe the same steady march of a proof towards a conclusion,\nwhich is (as it were) out of sight;\u2014a reckoning, or a reasonable\njudgment, that the conclusion really is proved, and a personal\ncertitude upon that judgment, joined with a confession that a logical\nargument could not well be made out for it, and that the various\ndetails in which the proof consisted were in no small measure implicit\nand impalpable.\n\n\u201cRumour speaks uniformly and clearly enough in attributing it to the\npen of a particular individual. Nor, although a cursory reader might\nwell skim the book without finding in it anything to suggest, &c.,\n... will it appear improbable to the more attentive student of its\ninternal evidence; and the improbability will decrease more and more,\nin proportion as the _reader is capable_ of judging and appreciating\nthe _delicate, and at first invisible touches_, which limit, to _those\nwho understand them_, the individuals who can have written it to a very\nsmall number indeed. The utmost scepticism as to its authorship (_which\nwe do not feel ourselves_) cannot remove it farther from him than to\nthat of some one among his most intimate friends; so that, leaving\nothers to discuss antecedent probabilities,\u201d &c.\n\nHere is a writer who professes to have no doubt at all about the\nauthorship of a book,\u2014which at the same time he cannot prove by mere\nargumentation set down in words. The reasons of his conviction are too\ndelicate, too intricate; nay, they are in part invisible; invisible,\nexcept to those who from circumstances have an intellectual perception\nof what does not appear to the many. They are personal to the\nindividual. This again is an instance, distinctly set before us, of the\nparticular mode in which the mind progresses in concrete matter, viz.\nfrom merely probable antecedents to the sufficient proof of a fact or a\ntruth, and, after the proof, to an act of certitude about it.\n\nI trust the foregoing remarks may not deserve the blame of a needless\nrefinement. I have thought it incumbent on me to illustrate the\nintellectual process by which we pass from conditional inference to\nunconditional assent; and I have had only the alternative of lying\nunder the imputation of a paradox or of a subtlety.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. Natural Inference.\n\n\nI commenced my remarks upon Inference by saying that reasoning\nordinarily shows as a simple act, not as a process, as if there were no\nmedium interposed between antecedent and consequent, and the transition\nfrom one to the other were of the nature of an instinct,\u2014that is,\nthe process is altogether unconscious and implicit. It is necessary,\nthen, to take some notice of this natural or material Inference, as\nan existing phenomenon of mind; and that the more, because I shall\nthereby be illustrating and supporting what I have been saying of the\ncharacteristics of inferential processes as carried on in concrete\nmatter, and especially of their being the action of the mind itself,\nthat is, by its ratiocinative or illative faculty, not a mere operation\nas in the rules of arithmetic.\n\nI say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from\npropositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete\nto concrete, from wholes to wholes. Whether the consequents, at\nwhich we arrive from the antecedents with which we start, lead us\nto assent or only towards assent, those antecedents commonly are\nnot recognized by us as subjects for analysis; nay, often are only\nindirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not only is the inference\nwith its process ignored, but the antecedent also. To the mind itself\nthe reasoning is a simple divination or prediction; as it literally\nis in the instance of enthusiasts, who mistake their own thoughts for\ninspirations.\n\nThis is the mode in which we ordinarily reason, dealing with things\ndirectly, and as they stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an\nintrinsic and personal power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial\ninstrument or expedient; and it is especially exemplified both in\nuneducated men, and in men of genius,\u2014in those who know nothing of\nintellectual aids and rules, and in those who care nothing for them,\u2014in\nthose who are either without or above mental discipline. As true poetry\nis a spontaneous outpouring of thought, and therefore belongs to rude\nas well as to gifted minds, whereas no one becomes a poet merely by the\ncanons of criticism, so this unscientific reasoning, being sometimes\na natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes approaching to a gift,\nsometimes an acquired habit and second nature, has a higher source\nthan logical rule,\u2014\u201cnascitur, non fit.\u201d When it is characterized by\nprecision, subtlety, promptitude, and truth, it is of course a gift and\na rarity: in ordinary minds it is biassed and degraded by prejudice,\npassion, and self-interest; but still, after all, this divination comes\nby nature, and belongs to all of us in a measure, to women more than\nto men, hitting or missing, as the case may be, but with a success on\nthe whole sufficient to show that there is a method in it, though it be\nimplicit.\n\nA peasant who is weather-wise may be simply unable to assign\nintelligible reasons why he thinks it will be fine to-morrow; and if\nhe attempts to do so, he may give reasons wide of the mark; but that\nwill not weaken his own confidence in his prediction. His mind does not\nproceed step by step, but he feels all at once the force of various\ncombined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them. Again, there\nare physicians who excel in the _diagnosis_ of complaints; though it\ndoes not follow from this, that they could defend their decision in a\nparticular case against a brother physician who disputed it. They are\nguided by natural acuteness and varied experience; they have their own\nidiosyncratic modes of observing, generalizing, and concluding; when\nquestioned, they can but rest on their own authority, or appeal to\nthe future event. In a popular novel,(25) a lawyer is introduced, who\n\u201cwould know, almost by instinct, whether an accused person was or was\nnot guilty; and he had already perceived by instinct\u201d that the heroine\nwas guilty. \u201cI\u2019ve no doubt she\u2019s a clever woman,\u201d he said, and at once\nnamed an attorney practising at the Old Bailey. So, again, experts and\ndetectives, when employed to investigate mysteries, in cases whether\nof the civil or criminal law, discern and follow out indications which\npromise solution with a sagacity incomprehensible to ordinary men.\nA parallel gift is the intuitive perception of character possessed\nby certain men, while others are as destitute of it, as others again\nare of an ear for music. What common measure is there between the\njudgments of those who have this intuition, and those who have not?\nWhat but the event can settle any difference of opinion which occurs in\ntheir estimation of a third person? These are instances of a natural\ncapacity, or of nature improved by practice and habit, enabling the\nmind to pass promptly from one set of facts to another, not only, I\nsay, without conscious media, but without conscious antecedents.\n\nSometimes, I say, this illative faculty is nothing short of genius.\nSuch seems to have been Newton\u2019s perception of truths mathematical and\nphysical, though proof was absent. At least that is the impression left\non my own mind by various stories which are told of him, one of which\nwas stated in the public papers a few years ago. \u201cProfessor Sylvester,\u201d\nit was said, \u201chas just discovered the proof of Sir Isaac Newton\u2019s rule\nfor ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations.... This rule has\nbeen a Gordian-knot among algebraists for the last century and a half.\nThe proof being wanting, authors became ashamed at length of advancing\na proposition, the evidence for which rested on no other foundation\nthan belief in Newton\u2019s sagacity.(26)\u201d\n\nSuch is the gift of the calculating boys who now and then make their\nappearance, who seem to have certain short-cuts to conclusions, which\nthey cannot explain to themselves. Some are said to have been able to\ndetermine off-hand what numbers are prime,\u2014numbers, I think, up to\nseven places.\n\nIn a very different subject-matter, Napoleon supplies us with an\ninstance of a parallel genius in reasoning, by which he was enabled\nto look at things in his own province, and to interpret them truly,\napparently without any ratiocinative media. \u201cBy long experience,\u201d says\nAlison, \u201cjoined to great natural quickness and precision of eye, he\nhad acquired the power of judging, with extraordinary accuracy, both\nof the amount of the enemy\u2019s force opposed to him in the field, and of\nthe probable result of the movements, even the most complicated, going\nforward in the opposite armies.... He looked around him for a little\nwhile with his telescope, and immediately formed a clear conception of\nthe position, forces, and intention of the whole hostile array. In this\nway he could, with surprising accuracy, calculate in a few minutes,\naccording to what he could see of their formation and the extent of the\nground which they occupied, the numerical force of armies of 60,000 or\n80,000 men; and if their troops were at all scattered, he knew at once\nhow long it would require for them to concentrate, and how many hours\nmust elapse before they could make their attack.(27)\u201d\n\nIt is difficult to avoid calling such clear presentiments by the name\nof instinct; and I think they may so be called, if by instinct be\nunderstood, not a natural sense, one and the same in all, and incapable\nof cultivation, but a perception of facts without assignable media of\nperceiving. There are those who can tell at once what is conducive or\ninjurious to their welfare, who are their friends, who their enemies,\nwhat is to happen to them, and how they are to meet it. Presence of\nmind, fathoming of motives, talent for repartee, are instances of\nthis gift. As to that divination of personal danger which is found in\nthe young and innocent, we find a description of it in one of Scott\u2019s\nromances, in which the heroine, \u201cwithout being able to discover what\nwas wrong either in the scenes of unusual luxury with which she was\nsurrounded, or in the manner of her hostess,\u201d is said nevertheless\nto have felt \u201can instinctive apprehension that all was not right,\u2014a\nfeeling in the human mind,\u201d the author proceeds to say, \u201callied perhaps\nto that sense of danger, which animals exhibit, when placed in the\nvicinity of the natural enemies of their race, and which makes birds\ncower when the hawk is in the air, and beasts tremble when the tiger is\nabroad in the desert.(28)\u201d\n\nA religious biography, lately published, affords us an instance of this\nspontaneous perception of truth in the province of revealed doctrine.\n\u201cHer firm faith,\u201d says the Author of the Preface, \u201cwas so vivid in\nits character, that it was almost like an intuition of the entire\nprospect of revealed truth. Let an error against faith be concealed\nunder expressions however abstruse, and her sure instinct found it\nout. I have tried this experiment repeatedly. She might not be able to\nseparate the heresy by analysis, but she saw, and felt, and suffered\nfrom its presence.(29)\u201d\n\nAnd so of the great fundamental truths of religion, natural and\nrevealed, and as regards the mass of religious men: these truths,\ndoubtless, may be proved and defended by an array of invincible logical\narguments, but such is not commonly the method in which those same\nlogical arguments make their way into our minds. The grounds, on which\nwe hold the divine origin of the Church, and the previous truths which\nare taught us by nature\u2014the being of a God, and the immortality of the\nsoul\u2014are felt by most men to be recondite and impalpable, in proportion\nto their depth and reality. As we cannot see ourselves, so we cannot\nwell see intellectual motives which are so intimately ours, and which\nspring up from the very constitution of our minds; and while we refuse\nto admit the notion that religion has not irrefragable arguments in\nits behalf, still the attempts to argue, on the part of an individual\n_hic et nunc_, will sometimes only confuse his apprehension of sacred\nobjects, and subtracts from his devotion quite as much as it adds to\nhis knowledge.\n\nThis is found in the case of other perceptions besides that of faith.\nIt is the case of nature against art: of course, if possible, nature\nand art should be combined, but sometimes they are incompatible.\nThus, in the case of calculating boys, it is said, I know not with\nwhat truth, that to teach them the ordinary rules of arithmetic is to\nendanger or to destroy the extraordinary endowment. And men who have\nthe gift of playing on an instrument by ear, are sometimes afraid to\nlearn by rule, lest they should lose it.\n\nThere is an analogy, in this respect, between Ratiocination and\nMemory, though the latter may be exercised without antecedents or\nmedia, whereas the former requires them in its very idea. At the\nsame time association has so much to do with memory, that we may not\nunfairly consider that memory, as well as reasoning, depends on certain\nprevious conditions. Writing, as I have already observed, is a _memoria\ntechnica_, or logic of memory. Now it will be found, I think, that\nindispensable as is the use of letters, still, in fact, we weaken our\nmemory in proportion as we habituate ourselves to commit all that we\nwish to remember to memorandums. Of course in proportion as our memory\nis weak or over-burdened, and thereby treacherous, we cannot help\nourselves; but in the case of men of strong memory in any particular\nsubject-matter, as in that of dates, all artificial expedients, from\nthe \u201cThirty days has September,\u201d &c., to the more formidable formulas\nwhich are offered for their use, are as difficult and repulsive as\nthe natural exercise of memory is healthy and easy to them; just as\nthe clear-headed and practical reasoner, who sees conclusions at a\nglance, is uncomfortable under the drill of a logician, being oppressed\nand hampered, as David in Saul\u2019s armour, by what is intended to be a\nbenefit.\n\nI need not say more on this part of the subject. What is called\nreasoning is often only a peculiar and personal mode of abstraction,\nand so far, like memory, may be said to exist without antecedents.\nIt is a power of looking at things in some particular aspect, and\nof determining their internal and external relations thereby. And\naccording to the subtlety and versatility of their gift, are men able\nto read what comes before them justly, variously, and fruitfully.\nHence, too, it is, that in our intercourse with others, in business\nand family matters, in social and political transactions, a word or\nan act on the part of another is sometimes a sudden revelation; light\nbreaks in upon us, and our whole judgment of a course of events, or\nof an undertaking, is changed. We determine correctly or otherwise,\nas it may be; but in either case, by a sense proper to ourselves, for\nanother may see the objects which we are thus using, and give them\nquite a different interpretation, inasmuch as he abstracts another set\nof general notions from those same phenomena which present themselves\nto us.\n\nWhat I have been saying of Ratiocination, may be said of Taste, and\nis confirmed by the obvious analogy between the two. Taste, skill,\ninvention in the fine arts\u2014and so, again, discretion or judgment in\nconduct\u2014are exerted spontaneously, when once acquired, and could not\ngive a clear account of themselves, or of their mode of proceeding.\nThey do not go by rule, though to a certain point their exercise may\nbe analyzed, and may take the shape of an art or method. But these\nparallels will come before us presently.\n\nAnd now I come to a further peculiarity of this natural and spontaneous\nratiocination. This faculty, as it is actually found in us, proceeding\nfrom concrete to concrete, belongs to a definite subject-matter,\naccording to the individual. In spite of Aristotle, I will not allow\nthat genuine reasoning is an instrumental art; and in spite of Dr.\nJohnson, I will assert that genius, as far as it is manifested in\nratiocination, is not equal to all undertakings, but has its own\npeculiar subject-matter, and is circumscribed in its range. No one\nwould for a moment expect that because Newton and Napoleon both had a\ngenius for ratiocination, that, in consequence, Napoleon could have\ngeneralized the principle of gravitation, or Newton have seen how to\nconcentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz. The ratiocinative\nfaculty, then, as found in individuals, is not a general instrument of\nknowledge, but has its province, or is what may be called departmental.\nIt is not so much one faculty, as a collection of similar or analogous\nfaculties under one name, there being really as many faculties as there\nare distinct subject-matters, though in the same person some of them\nmay, if it so happen, be united,\u2014nay, though some men have a sort of\nliterary power in arguing in all subject-matters, _de omni scibili_, a\npower extensive, but not deep or real.\n\nThis surely is the conclusion, to which we are brought by our ordinary\nexperience of men. It is almost proverbial that a hard-headed\nmathematician may have no head at all for what is called historical\nevidence. Successful experimentalists need not have talent for legal\nresearch or pleading. A shrewd man of business may be a bad arguer\nin philosophical questions. Able statesmen and politicians have been\nbefore now eccentric or superstitious in their religious views. It is\nnotorious how ridiculous a clever man may make himself, who ventures\nto argue with professed theologians, critics, or geologists, though\nwithout positive defects in knowledge of his subject. Priestley, great\nin electricity and chemistry, was but a poor ecclesiastical historian.\nThe Author of the Minute Philosopher is also the Author of the Analyst.\nNewton wrote not only his \u201cPrincipia,\u201d but his comments on the\nApocalypse; Cromwell, whose actions savoured of the boldest logic, was\na confused speaker. In these, and various similar instances, the defect\nlay, not so much in an ignorance of facts, as in an inability to handle\nthose facts suitably; in feeble or perverse modes of abstraction,\nobservation, comparison, analysis, inference, which nothing could have\nobviated, but that which was wanting,\u2014a specific talent, and a ready\nexercise of it.\n\nI have already referred to the faculty of memory in illustration; it\nwill serve me also here. We can form an abstract idea of memory, and\ncall it one faculty, which has for its subject-matter all past facts\nof our personal experience; but this is really only an illusion; for\nthere is no such gift of universal memory. Of course we all remember,\nin a way, as we reason, in all subject-matters; but I am speaking of\nremembering rightly, as I spoke of reasoning rightly. In real fact\nmemory, as a talent, is not one indivisible faculty, but a power of\nretaining and recalling the past in this or that department of our\nexperience, not in any whatever. Two memories, which are both specially\nretentive, may also be incommensurate. Some men can recite the canto\nof a poem, or good part of a speech, after once reading it, but have\nno head for dates. Others have great capacity for the vocabulary of\nlanguages, but recollect nothing of the small occurrences of the day\nor year. Others never forget any statement which they have read, and\ncan give volume and page, but have no memory for faces. I have known\nthose who could, without effort, run through the succession of days\non which Easter fell for years back; or could say where they were,\nor what they were doing, on a given day, in a given year; or could\nrecollect accurately the Christian names of friends and strangers; or\ncould enumerate in exact order the names on all the shops from Hyde\nPark Corner to the Bank; or had so mastered the University Calendar as\nto be able to bear an examination in the academical history of any M.\nA. taken at random. And I believe in most of these cases the talent,\nin its exceptional character, did not extend beyond several classes of\nsubjects. There are a hundred memories, as there are a hundred virtues.\nVirtue is one indeed in the abstract; but, in fact, gentle and kind\nnatures are not therefore heroic, and prudent and self-controlled minds\nneed not be open-handed. At the utmost such virtue is one only _in\nposse_; as developed in the concrete, it takes the shape of species\nwhich in no sense imply each other.\n\nSo is it with Ratiocination; and as we should betake ourselves to\nNewton for physical, not for theological conclusions, and to Wellington\nfor his military experience, not for statesmanship, so the maxim\nholds good generally, \u201cCuique in arte su\u00e2 credendum est:\u201d or, to\nuse the grand words of Aristotle, \u201cWe are bound to give heed to the\nundemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, not\nless than to demonstrations; because, from their having the eye of\nexperience, they behold the principles of things.(30)\u201d Instead of\ntrusting logical science, we must trust persons, namely, those who by\nlong acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge. And if we\nwish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them,\nwe must follow their history, and learn as they have learned. We must\ntake up their particular subject as they took it up, beginning at the\nbeginning, give ourselves to it, depend on practice and experience\nmore than on reasoning, and thus gain that mental insight into truth,\nwhatever its subject-matter may be, which our masters have gained\nbefore us. By following this course, we may make ourselves of their\nnumber, and then we rightly lean upon ourselves; we follow our own\nmoral or intellectual judgment, but not our skill in argumentation.\n\nThis doctrine, stated in substance as above by the great philosopher\nof antiquity, is more fully expounded in a passage which he elsewhere\nquotes from Hesiod. \u201cBest of all is he,\u201d says that poet, \u201cwho is\nwise by his own wit; next best he who is wise by the wit of others;\nbut whoso is neither able to see, nor willing to hear, he is a\ngood-for-nothing fellow.\u201d Judgment then in all concrete matter is the\narchitectonic faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or\nright judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IX. The Illative Sense.\n\n\nMy object in the foregoing pages has been, not to form a theory which\nmay account for those phenomena of the intellect of which they treat,\nviz. those which characterize inference and assent, but to ascertain\nwhat is the matter of fact as regards them, that is, when it is that\nassent is given to propositions which are inferred, and under what\ncircumstances. I have never had the thought of an attempt which would\nbe ambitious in me, and which has failed in the hands of others, if\nthat attempt may not unfairly be called unsuccessful, which, though\nmade by the acutest minds, has not succeeded in convincing opponents.\nEspecially have I found myself unequal to antecedent reasonings in\nthe instance of a matter of fact. There are those, who, arguing _\u00e0\npriori_, maintain, that, since experience leads by syllogism only to\nprobabilities, certitude is ever a mistake. There are others, who,\nwhile they deny this conclusion, grant the _\u00e0 priori_ principle assumed\nin the argument, and in consequence are obliged, in order to vindicate\nthe certainty of our knowledge, to have recourse to the hypothesis of\nintuitions, intellectual forms, and the like, which belong to us by\nnature, and may be considered to elevate our experience into something\nmore than it is in itself. Earnestly maintaining, as I would, with this\nlatter school of philosophers, the certainty of knowledge, I think it\nenough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it. That is\nto be accounted a normal operation of our nature, which men in general\ndo actually instance. That is a law of our minds, which is exemplified\nin action on a large scale, whether _\u00e0 priori_ it ought to be a law or\nno. Our hoping is a proof that hope, as such, is not an extravagance;\nand our possession of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness or\nan absurdity to be certain. How it comes about that we can be certain\nis not my business to determine; for me it is sufficient that certitude\nis felt. This is what the schoolmen, I believe, call treating a subject\n_in facto esse_, in contrast with _in fieri_. Had I attempted the\nlatter, I should have been falling into metaphysics; but my aim is of a\npractical character, such as that of Butler in his _Analogy_, with this\ndifference, that he treats of probability, doubt, expedience, and duty,\nwhereas in these pages, without excluding, far from it, the question of\nduty, I would confine myself to the truth of things, and to the mind\u2019s\ncertitude of that truth.\n\nCertitude is a mental state: certainty is a quality of propositions.\nThose propositions I call certain, which are such that I am certain of\nthem. Certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from\nwithout, by argumentative compulsion, but in all concrete questions\n(nay, even in abstract, for though the reasoning is abstract, the\nmind which judges of it is concrete) it is an active recognition of\npropositions as true, such as it is the duty of each individual himself\nto exercise at the bidding of reason, and, when reason forbids, to\nwithhold. And reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute\nproof; and such a proof can never be furnished to us by the logic of\nwords, for as certitude is of the mind, so is the act of inference\nwhich leads to it. Every one who reasons, is his own centre; and no\nexpedient for attaining a common measure of minds can reverse this\ntruth;\u2014but then the question follows, is there any _criterion_ of the\naccuracy of an inference, such as may be our warrant that certitude\nis rightly elicited in favour of the proposition inferred, since our\nwarrant cannot, as I have said, be scientific? I have already said that\nthe sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete\nmatter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative\nfaculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative\nSense, a use of the word \u201csense\u201d parallel to our use of it in \u201cgood\nsense,\u201d \u201ccommon sense,\u201d a \u201csense of beauty,\u201d &c.;\u2014and I own I do not\nsee any way to go farther than this in answer to the question. However,\nI can at least explain my meaning more fully; and therefore I will now\nspeak, first of the sanction of the Illative Sense, next of its nature,\nand then of its range.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. The Sanction of the Illative Sense.\n\n\nWe are in a world of facts, and we use them; for there is nothing else\nto use. We do not quarrel with them, but we take them as they are, and\navail ourselves of what they can do for us. It would be out of place\nto demand of fire, water, earth, and air their credentials, so to\nsay, for acting upon us, or ministering to us. We call them elements,\nand turn them to account, and make the most of them. We speculate on\nthem at our leisure. But what we are still less able to doubt about\nor annul, at our leisure or not, is that which is at once their\ncounterpart and their witness, I mean, ourselves. We are conscious of\nthe objects of external nature, and we reflect and act upon them, and\nthis consciousness, reflection, and action we call our rationality.\nAnd as we use the (so called) elements without first criticizing\nwhat we have no command over, so is it much more unmeaning in us to\ncriticize or find fault with our own nature, which is nothing else than\nwe ourselves, instead of using it according to the use of which it\nordinarily admits. Our being, with its faculties, mind and body, is a\nfact not admitting of question, all things being of necessity referred\nto it, not it to other things.\n\nIf I may not assume that I exist, and in a particular way, that is,\nwith a particular mental constitution, I have nothing to speculate\nabout, and had better let speculation alone. Such as I am, it is my\nall; this is my essential stand-point, and must be taken for granted;\notherwise, thought is but an idle amusement, not worth the trouble.\nThere is no medium between using my faculties, as I have them, and\nflinging myself upon the external world according to the random impulse\nof the moment, as spray upon the surface of the waves, and simply\nforgetting that I am.\n\nI am what I am, or I am nothing. I cannot think, reflect, or judge\nabout my being, without starting from the very point which I aim at\nconcluding. My ideas are all assumptions, and I am ever moving in\na circle. I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I cannot\nmake myself anything else, and to change me is to destroy me. If I do\nnot use myself, I have no other self to use. My only business is to\nascertain what I am, in order to put it to use. It is enough for the\nproof of the value and authority of any function which I possess, to\nbe able to pronounce that it is natural. What I have to ascertain is\nthe laws under which I live. My first elementary lesson of duty is\nthat of resignation to the laws of my nature, whatever they are; my\nfirst disobedience is to be impatient at what I am, and to indulge an\nambitious aspiration after what I cannot be, to cherish a distrust of\nmy powers, and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself.\n\nTruths such as these, which are too obvious to be called irresistible,\nare illustrated by what we see in universal nature. Every being is\nin a true sense sufficient for itself, so as to be able to fulfil\nits particular needs. It is a general law that, whatever is found as\na function or an attribute of any class of beings, or is natural to\nit, is in its substance suitable to it, and subserves its existence,\nand cannot be rightly regarded as a fault or enormity. No being could\nendure, of which the constituent parts were at war with each other. And\nmore than this; there is that principle of vitality in every being,\nwhich is of a sanative and restorative character, and which brings\nall its parts and functions together into one whole, and is ever\nrepelling and correcting the mischiefs which befall it, whether from\nwithin or without, while showing no tendency to cast off its belongings\nas if foreign to its nature. The brute animals are found severally\nwith limbs and organs, habits, instincts, appetites, surroundings,\nwhich play together for the safety and welfare of the whole; and,\nafter all exceptions, may be said each of them to have, after its\nown kind, a perfection of nature. Man is the highest of the animals,\nand more indeed than an animal, as having a mind; that is, he has a\ncomplex nature different from theirs, with a higher aim and a specific\nperfection; but still the fact that other beings find their good in the\nuse of their particular nature, is a reason for anticipating that to\nuse duly our own is our interest as well as our necessity.\n\nWhat is the peculiarity of our nature, in contrast with the inferior\nanimals around us? It is that, though man cannot change what he is\nborn with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection\nand characteristic good. Other beings are complete from their first\nexistence, in that line of excellence which is allotted to them; but\nman begins with nothing realized (to use the word), and he has to\nmake capital for himself by the exercise of those faculties which are\nhis natural inheritance. Thus he gradually advances to the fulness of\nhis original destiny. Nor is this progress mechanical, nor is it of\nnecessity; it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual\nof the species; each of us has the prerogative of completing his\ninchoate and rudimental nature, and of developing his own perfection\nout of the living elements with which his mind began to be. It is his\ngift to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically\nself-made. This is the law of his being, which he cannot escape; and\nwhatever is involved in that law he is bound, or rather he is carried\non, to fulfil.\n\nAnd here I am brought to the bearing of these remarks upon my subject.\nFor this law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition of\nknowledge, of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments.\nSupposing, then, the advancement of our nature, both in ourselves\nindividually and as regards the human family, is, to every one of us\nin his place, a sacred duty, it follows that that duty is intimately\nbound up with the right use of these two main instruments of fulfilling\nit. And as we do not gain the knowledge of the law of progress by any\n_\u00e0 priori_ view of man, but by looking at it as the interpretation\nwhich is provided by himself on a large scale in the ordinary action of\nhis intellectual nature, so too we must appeal to himself, as a fact,\nand not to any antecedent theory, in order to find what is the law of\nhis mind as regards the two faculties in question. If then such an\nappeal does bear me out in deciding, as I have done, that the course of\ninference is ever more or less obscure, while assent is ever distinct\nand definite, and yet that what is in its nature thus absolute does,\nin fact follow upon what in outward manifestation is thus complex,\nindirect, and recondite, what is left to us but to take things as they\nare, and to resign ourselves to what we find? that is, instead of\ndevising, what cannot be, some sufficient science of reasoning which\nmay compel certitude in concrete conclusions, to confess that there is\nno ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the\nmind itself, and that this phenomenon, perplexing as we may find it, is\na normal and inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a\nbeing like man on a stage such as the world. His progress is a living\ngrowth, not a mechanism; and its instruments are mental acts, not the\nformulas and contrivances of language.\n\nWe are accustomed in this day to lay great stress upon the harmony\nof the universe; and we have well learned the maxim so powerfully\ninculcated by our own English philosopher, that in our inquiries into\nits laws, we must sternly destroy all idols of the intellect, and\nsubdue nature by co-operating with her. Knowledge is power, for it\nenables us to use eternal principles which we cannot alter. So also is\nit in that microcosm, the human mind. Let us follow Bacon more closely\nthan to distort its faculties according to the demands of an ideal\noptimism, instead of looking out for modes of thought proper to our\nnature, and faithfully observing them in our intellectual exercises.\n\nOf course I do not stop here. As the structure of the universe speaks\nto us of Him who made it, so the laws of the mind are the expression,\nnot of mere constituted order, but of His will. I should be bound by\nthem even were they not His laws; but since one of their very functions\nis to tell me of Him, they throw a reflex light upon themselves, and,\nfor resignation to my destiny, I substitute a cheerful concurrence in\nan overruling Providence. We may gladly welcome such difficulties as\nthere are in our mental constitution, and in the interaction of our\nfaculties, if we are able to feel that He gave them to us, and He can\noverrule them for us. We may securely take them as they are, and use\nthem as we find them. It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the\nway by which we acquire it is His way. He varies that way according to\nthe subject-matter; but whether He has set before us in our particular\npursuit the way of observation or of experiment, of speculation or of\nresearch, of demonstration or of probability, whether we are inquiring\ninto the system of the universe, or into the elements of matter and of\nlife, or into the history of human society and past times, if we take\nthe way proper to our subject-matter, we have His blessing upon us, and\nshall find, besides abundant matter for mere opinion, the materials in\ndue measure of proof and assent.\n\nAnd especially, by this disposition of things, shall we learn, as\nregards religious and ethical inquiries, how little we can effect,\nhowever much we exert ourselves, without that Blessing; for, as if on\nset purpose, He has made this path of thought rugged and circuitous\nabove other investigations, that the very discipline inflicted on\nour minds in finding Him, may mould them into due devotion to Him\nwhen He is found. \u201cVerily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel,\nthe Saviour,\u201d is the very law of His dealings with us. Certainly we\nneed a clue into the labyrinth which is to lead us to Him; and who\namong us can hope to seize upon the true starting-points of thought\nfor that enterprise, and upon all of them, who is to understand their\nright direction, to follow them out to their just limits, and duly to\nestimate, adjust, and combine the various reasonings in which they\nissue, so as safely to arrive at what it is worth any labour to secure,\nwithout a special illumination from Himself? Such are the dealings\nof Wisdom with the elect soul. \u201cShe will bring upon him fear, and\ndread, and trial; and She will torture him with the tribulation of Her\ndiscipline, till She try him by Her laws, and trust his soul. Then She\nwill strengthen him, and make Her way straight to him, and give him\njoy.\u201d\n\n\n\u00a7 2. The Nature of the Illative Sense.\n\n\nIt is the mind that reasons, and that controls its own reasonings,\nnot any technical apparatus of words and propositions. This power of\njudging and concluding, when in its perfection, I call the Illative\nSense, and I shall best illustrate it by referring to parallel\nfaculties, which we commonly recognize without difficulty.\n\nFor instance, how does the mind fulfil its function of supreme\ndirection and control, in matters of duty, social intercourse,\nand taste? In all of these separate actions of the intellect, the\nindividual is supreme, and responsible to himself, nay, under\ncircumstances, may be justified in opposing himself to the judgment\nof the whole world; though he uses rules to his great advantage, as\nfar as they go, and is in consequence bound to use them. As regards\nmoral duty, the subject is fully considered in the well-known ethical\ntreatises of Aristotle.(31) He calls the faculty which guides the mind\nin matters of conduct, by the name of _phronesis_, or judgment. This is\nthe directing, controlling, and determining principle in such matters,\npersonal and social. What it is to be virtuous, how we are to gain the\njust idea and standard of virtue, how we are to approximate in practice\nto our own standard, what is right and wrong in a particular case, for\nthe answers in fulness and accuracy to these and similar questions, the\nphilosopher refers us to no code of laws, to no moral treatise, because\nno science of life, applicable to the case of an individual, has been\nor can be written. Such is Aristotle\u2019s doctrine, and it is undoubtedly\ntrue. An ethical system may supply laws, general rules, guiding\nprinciples, a number of examples, suggestions, landmarks, limitations,\ncautions, distinctions, solutions of critical or anxious difficulties;\nbut who is to apply them to a particular case? whither can we go,\nexcept to the living intellect, our own, or another\u2019s? What is written\nis too vague, too negative for our need. It bids us avoid extremes;\nbut it cannot ascertain for us, according to our personal need, the\ngolden mean. The authoritative oracle, which is to decide our path, is\nsomething more searching and manifold than such jejune generalizations\nas treatises can give, which are most distinct and clear when we least\nneed them. It is seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his\nown law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of\nduty which are personal to him. It comes of an acquired habit, though\nit has its first origin in nature itself, and it is formed and matured\nby practice and experience; and it manifests itself, not in any breadth\nof view, any philosophical comprehension of the mutual relations of\nduty towards duty, or any consistency in its teachings, but it is a\ncapacity sufficient for the occasion, deciding what ought to be done\nhere and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances. It\ndecides nothing hypothetical, it does not determine what a man should\ndo ten years hence, or what another should do at this time. It may\nindeed happen to decide ten years hence as it does now, and to decide a\nsecond case now as it now decides a first; still its present act is for\nthe present, not for the distant or the future.\n\nState or public law is inflexible, but this mental rule is not only\nminute and particular, but has an elasticity, which, in its application\nto individual cases, is, as I have said, not studious to maintain the\nappearance of consistency. In old times the mason\u2019s rule which was\nin use at Lesbos was, according to Aristotle, not of wood or iron,\nbut of lead, so as to allow of its adjustment to the uneven surface\nof the stones brought together for the work. By such the philosopher\nillustrates the nature of equity in contrast with law, and such is that\n_phronesis_, from which the science of morals forms its rules, and\nreceives its complement.\n\nIn this respect of course the law of truth differs from the law of\nduty, that duties change, but truths never; but, though truth is ever\none and the same, and the assent of certitude is immutable, still\nthe reasonings which carry us on to truth and certitude are many and\ndistinct, and vary with the inquirer; and it is not with assent, but\nwith the controlling principle in inferences that I am comparing\n_phronesis_. It is with this drift that I observe that the rule of\nconduct for one man is not always the rule for another, though the rule\nis always one and the same in the abstract, and in its principle and\nscope. To learn his own duty in his own case, each individual must have\nrecourse to his own rule; and if his rule is not sufficiently developed\nin his intellect for his need, then he goes to some other living,\npresent authority, to supply it for him, not to the dead letter of a\ntreatise or a code. A living, present authority, himself or another,\nis his immediate guide in matters of a personal, social, or political\ncharacter. In buying and selling, in contracts, in his treatment of\nothers, in giving and receiving, in thinking, speaking, doing, and\nworking, in toil, in danger, in his recreations and pleasures, every\none of his acts, to be praiseworthy, must be in accordance with this\npractical sense. Thus it is, and not by science, that he perfects the\nvirtues of justice, self-command, magnanimity, generosity, gentleness,\nand all others. _Phronesis_ is the regulating principle of every one of\nthem.\n\nThese last words lead me to a further remark. I doubt whether it\nis correct, strictly speaking, to consider this _phronesis_ as a\ngeneral faculty, directing and perfecting all the virtues at once. So\nunderstood, it is little better than an abstract term, including under\nit a circle of analogous faculties, severally proper to the separate\nvirtues. Properly speaking, there are as many kinds of _phronesis_\nas there are virtues; for the judgment, good sense, or tact which\nis conspicuous in a man\u2019s conduct in one subject-matter, is not\nnecessarily traceable in another. As in the parallel cases of memory\nand reasoning, he may be great in one aspect of his character, and\nlittle-minded in another. He may be exemplary in his family, yet commit\na fraud on the revenue; he may be just and cruel, brave and sensual,\nimprudent and patient. And if this be true of the moral virtues, it\nholds good still more fully when we compare what is called his private\ncharacter with his public. A good man may make a bad king; profligates\nhave been great statesmen, or magnanimous political leaders.\n\nSo, too, I may go on to speak of the various callings and professions\nwhich give scope to the exercise of great talents, for these talents\nalso are matured, not by mere rule, but by personal skill and sagacity.\nThey are as diverse as pleading and cross-examining, conducting a\ndebate in Parliament, swaying a public meeting, and commanding an\narmy; and here, too, I observe that, though the directing principle\nin each case is called by the same name,\u2014sagacity, skill, tact, or\nprudence,\u2014still there is no one ruling faculty leading to eminence in\nall these various lines of action in common, but men will excel in one\nof them, without any talent for the rest.\n\nThe parallel may be continued in the case of the Fine Arts, in which,\nthough true and scientific rules may be given, no one would therefore\ndeny that Phidias or Rafael had a far more subtle standard of taste and\na more versatile power of embodying it in his works, than any which he\ncould communicate to others in even a series of treatises. And here\nagain genius is indissolubly united to one definite subject-matter; a\npoet is not therefore a painter, or an architect a musical composer.\n\nAnd so, again, as regards the useful arts and personal accomplishments,\nwe use the same word \u201cskill,\u201d but proficiency in engineering or in\nship-building, or again in engraving, or again in singing, in playing\ninstruments, in acting, or in gymnastic exercises, is as simply\none with its particular subject-matter, as the human soul with its\nparticular body, and is, in its own department, a sort of instinct or\ninspiration, not an obedience to external rules of criticism or of\nscience.\n\nIt is natural, then, to ask the question, why ratiocination should\nbe an exception to a general law which attaches to the intellectual\nexercises of the mind; why it is held to be commensurate with logical\nscience; and why logic is made an instrumental art sufficient for\ndetermining every sort of truth, while no one would dream of making any\none formula, however generalized, a working rule at once for poetry,\nthe art of medicine, and political warfare?\n\nThis is what I have to remark concerning the Illative Sense, and in\nexplanation of its nature and claims; and on the whole, I have spoken\nof it in four respects,\u2014as viewed in itself, in its subject-matter, in\nthe process it uses, and in its function and scope.\n\nFirst, viewed in its exercise, it is one and the same in all concrete\nmatters, though employed in them in different measures. We do not\nreason in one way in chemistry or law, in another in morals or\nreligion; but in reasoning on any subject whatever, which is concrete,\nwe proceed, as far indeed as we can, by the logic of language, but we\nare obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of\nthought; for forms by themselves prove nothing.\n\nSecondly, it is in fact attached to definite subject-matters, so that\na given individual may possess it in one department of thought, for\ninstance, history, and not in another, for instance, philosophy.\n\nThirdly, in coming to its conclusion, it proceeds always in the same\nway, by a method of reasoning, which is the elementary principle of\nthat mathematical calculus of modern times, which has so wonderfully\nextended the limits of abstract science.\n\nFourthly, in no class of concrete reasonings, whether in experimental\nscience, historical research, or theology, is there any ultimate test\nof truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness\nof the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction; just as there\nis no sufficient test of poetical excellence, heroic action, or\ngentleman-like conduct, other than the particular mental sense, be it\ngenius, taste, sense of propriety, or the moral sense, to which those\nsubject-matters are severally committed. Our duty in each of these is\nto strengthen and perfect the special faculty which is its living rule,\nand in every case as it comes to do our best. And such also is our duty\nand our necessity, as regards the Illative Sense.\n\n\n\u00a7 3. The Range of the Illative Sense.\n\n\nGreat as are the services of language in enabling us to extend the\ncompass of our inferences, to test their validity, and to communicate\nthem to others, still the mind itself is more versatile and vigorous\nthan any of its works, of which language is one, and it is only\nunder its penetrating and subtle action that the margin disappears,\nwhich I have described as intervening between verbal argumentation\nand conclusions in the concrete. It determines what science cannot\ndetermine, the limit of converging probabilities and the reasons\nsufficient for a proof. It is the ratiocinative mind itself, and no\ntrick of art, however simple in its form and sure in operation, by\nwhich we are able to determine that a moving body left to itself will\nnever stop, and that no man can live without eating.\n\nNor, again, is it by any diagram that we are able to scrutinize, sort,\nand combine the many premisses which must be first run together before\nwe answer duly a given question. It is to the living mind that we must\nlook for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind,\nfacts or doctrines, experiences or testimonies, true or probable,\nand of discerning what conclusion from these is necessary, suitable,\nor expedient, when they are taken for granted; and this, either by\nmeans of a natural gift, or from mental formation and practice and\na long familiarity with those various starting-points. Thus, when\nLaud said that he did not see his way to come to terms with the Holy\nSee, \u201ctill Rome was other than she was,\u201d no Catholic would admit the\nsentiment: but any Catholic may understand that this is just the\njudgment consistent with Laud\u2019s actual condition of thought and cast\nof opinions, his ecclesiastical position, and the existing state of\nEngland.\n\nNor, lastly, is an action of the mind itself less necessary in\nrelation to those first elements of thought which in all reasoning\nare assumptions, the principles, tastes, and opinions, very often of\na personal character, which are half the battle in the inference with\nwhich the reasoning is to terminate. It is the mind itself that detects\nthem in their obscure recesses, illustrates them, establishes them,\neliminates them, resolves them into simpler ideas, as the case may\nbe. The mind contemplates them without the use of words, by a process\nwhich cannot be analyzed. Thus it was that Bacon separated the physical\nsystem of the world from the theological; thus that Butler connected\ntogether the moral system with the religious. Logical formulas could\nnever have sustained the reasonings involved in such investigations.\n\nThus the Illative Sense, that is, the reasoning faculty, as exercised\nby gifted, or by educated or otherwise well-prepared minds, has its\nfunction in the beginning, middle, and end of all discussion and\ninquiry, and in every step of the process. It is a rule to itself,\nand appeals to no judgment beyond its own; and attends upon the whole\ncourse of thought from antecedents to consequents, with a minute\ndiligence and unwearied presence, which is impossible to a cumbrous\napparatus of verbal reasoning, though, in communicating with others,\nwords are the only instrument we possess, and a serviceable, though\nimperfect instrument.\n\nOne function indeed there is of Logic, to which I have referred in\nthe preceding sentence, which the Illative Sense does not and cannot\nperform. It supplies no common measure between mind and mind, as being\nnothing else than a personal gift or acquisition. Few there are, as I\nsaid above, who are good reasoners on all subject-matters. Two men, who\nreason well each in his own province of thought, may, one or both of\nthem, fail and pronounce opposite judgments on a question belonging to\nsome third province. Moreover, all reasoning being from premisses, and\nthose premisses arising (if it so happen) in their first elements from\npersonal characteristics, in which men are in fact in essential and\nirremediable variance one with another, the ratiocinative talent can do\nno more than point out where the difference between them lies, how far\nit is immaterial, when it is worth while continuing an argument between\nthem, and when not.\n\nNow of the three main occasions of the exercise of the Illative Sense,\nwhich I have been insisting on, and which are the measure of its range,\nthe start, the course, and the issue of an inquiry, I have already,\nin treating of Informal Inference, shown the place it holds in the\nfinal resolution of concrete questions. Here then it is left to me\nto illustrate its presence and action in relation to the elementary\npremisses, and, again, to the conduct of an argument. And first of the\nlatter.\n\n1.\n\nThere has been a great deal written of late years on the subject of\nthe state of Greece and Rome during the pre-historic period; let us\nsay before the Olympiads in Greece, and the war with Pyrrhus in the\nannals of Rome. Now, in a question like this, it is plain that the\ninquirer has first of all to decide on the point from which he is to\nstart in the presence of the received accounts; on what side, from what\nquarter he is to approach them; on what principles his discussion is\nto be conducted; what he is to assume, what opinions or objections he\nis summarily to put aside as nugatory, what arguments, and when, he\nis to consider as apposite, what false issues are to be avoided, when\nthe state of his arguments is ripe for a conclusion. Is he to commence\nwith absolutely discarding all that has hitherto been received; or to\nretain it in outline; or to make selections from it; or to consider\nand interpret it as mythical, or as allegorical; or to hold so much to\nbe trustworthy, or at least of _prim\u00e2 facie_ authority, as he cannot\nactually disprove; or never to destroy except in proportion as he can\nconstruct? Then, as to the kind of arguments suitable or admissible,\nhow far are tradition, analogy, isolated monuments and records, ruins,\nvague reports, legends, the facts or sayings of later times, language,\npopular proverbs, to tell in the inquiry? what are marks of truth, what\nof falsehood, what is probable, what suspicious, what promises well for\ndiscriminating facts from fictions? Then, arguments have to be balanced\nagainst each other, and then lastly the decision is to be made, whether\nany conclusion at all can be drawn, or whether any before certain\nissues are tried and settled, or whether a probable conclusion or a\ncertain. It is plain how incessant will be the call here or there for\nthe exercise of a definitive judgment, how little that judgment will be\nhelped on by logic, and how intimately it will be dependent upon the\nintellectual complexion of the writer.\n\nThis might be illustrated at great length, were it necessary, from\nthe writings of any of those able men, whose names are so well known\nin connexion with the subject I have instanced; such as Niebuhr, Mr.\nClinton, Sir George Lewis, Mr. Grote, and Colonel Mure. These authors\nhave severally views of their own on the period of history which they\nhave selected for investigation, and they are too learned and logical\nnot to know and to use to the utmost the testimonies by which the facts\nwhich they investigate are to be ascertained. Why then do they differ\nso much from each other, whether in their estimate of those testimonies\nor of those facts? Because that estimate is simply their own, coming of\ntheir own judgment; and that judgment coming of assumptions of their\nown, explicit or implicit; and those assumptions spontaneously issuing\nout of the state of thought respectively belonging to each of them; and\nall these successive processes of minute reasoning superintended and\ndirected by an intellectual instrument far too subtle and spiritual to\nbe scientific.\n\nWhat was Niebuhr\u2019s idea of the office he had undertaken? I suppose it\nwas to accept what he found in the historians of Rome, to interrogate\nit, to take it to pieces, to put it together again, to re-arrange and\ninterpret it. Prescription together with internal consistency was\nto him the evidence of fact, and if he pulled down he felt he was\nbound to build up. Very different is the spirit of another school of\nwriters, with whom prescription is nothing, and who will admit no\nevidence which has not first proved its right to be admitted. \u201cWe are\nable,\u201d says Niebuhr, \u201cto trace the history of the Roman constitution\nback to the beginning of the Commonwealth, as accurately as we wish,\nand even more perfectly than the history of many portions of the\nmiddle ages.\u201d But, \u201cwe may rejoice,\u201d says Sir George Lewis, \u201cthat the\ningenuity or learning of Niebuhr should have enabled him to advance\nmany noble hypotheses and conjectures respecting the form of the early\nconstitution of Rome, but, unless he can support those hypotheses by\nsufficient evidence, they are not entitled to our belief.\u201d \u201cNiebuhr,\u201d\nsays a writer nearly related to myself, \u201coften expresses much contempt\nfor mere incredulous criticism and negative conclusions; ... yet wisely\nto disbelieve is our first grand requisite in dealing with materials of\nmixed worth.\u201d And Sir George Lewis again, \u201cIt may be said that there is\nscarcely any of the leading conclusions of Niebuhr\u2019s work which has not\nbeen impugned by some subsequent writer.\u201d\n\nAgain, \u201cIt is true,\u201d says Niebuhr, \u201cthat the Trojan war belongs to the\nregion of fable, yet undeniably it has an historical foundation.\u201d But\nMr. Grote writes, \u201cIf we are asked whether the Trojan war is not a\nlegend ... raised upon a basis of truth, ... our answer must be, that,\nas the possibility of it cannot be denied, so neither can the reality\nof it be affirmed.\u201d On the other hand, Mr. Clinton lays down the\ngeneral rule, \u201cWe may acknowledge as real persons, all those whom there\nis no reason for rejecting. The presumption is in favour of the early\ntradition, if no argument can be brought to overthrow it.\u201d Thus he\nlodges the _onus probandi_ with those who impugn the received accounts;\nbut Mr. Grote and Sir George Lewis throw it upon those who defend them.\n\u201cHistorical evidence,\u201d says the latter, \u201cis founded on the testimony of\ncredible witnesses.\u201d And again, \u201cIt is perpetually assumed in practice,\nthat historical evidence is different in its nature from other sorts of\nevidence. This laxity seems to be justified by the doctrine of taking\nthe best evidence which can be obtained. The object of [my] inquiry\nwill be to apply to the early Roman history the same rules of evidence\nwhich are applied by common consent to modern history.\u201d Far less\nsevere is the judgment of Colonel Mure: \u201cWhere no positive historical\nproof is affirmable, the balance of historical probability must reduce\nitself very much to a reasonable indulgence to the weight of national\nconviction, and a deference to the testimony of the earliest native\nauthorities.\u201d \u201cReasonable indulgence\u201d to popular belief, \u201cdeference\u201d to\nancient tradition, are principles of writing history abhorrent to the\njudicial temper of Sir George Lewis. He considers the words \u201creasonable\nindulgence\u201d to be \u201cambiguous,\u201d and observes that \u201cthe very point which\ncannot be taken for granted, and in which writers differ, is, as to the\nextent to which contemporary attestation may be presumed without direct\nand positive proof, ... the extent to which the existence of a popular\nbelief concerning a supposed matter of fact authorizes the inference\nthat it grew out of authentic testimony.\u201d And Mr. Grote observes to the\nsame effect: \u201cThe word _tradition_ is an equivocal word, and begs the\nwhole question. It is tacitly understood to imply a tale descriptive\nof some real matter of fact, taking rise at the time when the fact\nhappened, originally accurate, but corrupted by oral transmission.\u201d And\nLewis, who quotes the passage, adds, \u201cThis _tacit understanding_ is the\nkey-stone of the whole argument.\u201d\n\nI am not contrasting these various opinions of able men, who have given\nthemselves to historical research, as if it were any reflection on them\nthat they differ from each other. It is the cause of their differing\non which I wish to insist. Taking the facts by themselves, probably\nthese authors would come to no conclusion at all; it is the \u201ctacit\nunderstandings\u201d which Mr. Grote speaks of, the vague and impalpable\nnotions of \u201creasonableness\u201d on his own side as well as on that of\nothers, which both make conclusions possible, and are the pledge of\ntheir being contradictory. The conclusions vary with the particular\nwriter, for each writes from his own point of view and with his own\nprinciples, and these admit of no common measure.\n\nThis in fact is their own account of the matter: \u201cThe results of\nspeculative historical inquiry,\u201d says Colonel Mure, \u201ccan rarely\namount to more than fair presumption of the reality of the events in\nquestion, as limited to their general substance, not as extending to\ntheir details. Nor can there consequently be expected in the minds\nof different inquirers any such unity regarding the precise degree\nof reality, as may frequently exist in respect to events attested by\ndocumentary evidence.\u201d Mr. Grote corroborates this decision by the\nstriking instance of the diversity of existing opinions concerning the\nHomeric Poems. \u201cOur means of knowledge,\u201d he says, \u201care so limited,\nthat no one can produce arguments sufficiently cogent to contend\nagainst opposing preconceptions, and it creates a painful sensation\nof diffidence, when we read the expressions of equal and absolute\npersuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been\nadvanced.\u201d And again, \u201cThere is a difference of opinion among the\nbest critics, which is probably not destined to be adjusted, since so\nmuch depends partly upon critical feeling, partly upon the general\nreasonings in respect to ancient epical unity, with which a man sits\ndown to the study.\u201d Exactly so; every one has his own \u201ccritical\nfeeling,\u201d his antecedent \u201creasonings,\u201d and in consequence his own\n\u201cabsolute persuasion,\u201d coming in fresh and fresh at every turn of the\ndiscussion; and who, whether stranger or friend, is to reach and affect\nwhat is so intimately bound up with the mental constitution of each?\n\nHence the categorical contradictions between one writer and another,\nwhich abound. Colonel Mure appeals in defence of an historical thesis\nto the \u201cfact of the Hellenic confederacy combining for the adoption of\na common national system of chronology in 776 B.C.\u201d Mr. Grote replies:\n\u201cNothing is more at variance with my conception,\u201d\u2014he just now spoke of\nthe preconceptions of others,\u2014\u201cof the state of the Hellenic world in\n776 B.C., than the idea of a combination among all the members of the\nrace for any purpose, much more for the purpose of adopting a common\nnational system of chronology.\u201d Colonel Mure speaks of the \u201cbigoted\nAthenian public;\u201d Mr. Grote replies that \u201cno public ever less deserved\nthe epithet of \u2018bigoted\u2019 than the Athenian,\u201d Colonel Mure also speaks\nof Mr. Grote\u2019s \u201carbitrary hypothesis;\u201d and again (in Mr. Grote\u2019s\nwords), of his \u201cunreasonable scepticism.\u201d He cannot disprove by mere\nargument the conclusions of Mr. Grote; he can but have recourse to a\npersonal criticism. He virtually says, \u201cWe differ in our personal view\nof things.\u201d Men become personal when logic fails; it is their mode\nof appealing to their own primary elements of thought, and their own\nillative sense, against the principles and the judgment of another.\n\nI have already touched upon Niebuhr\u2019s method of investigation, and\nSir George Lewis\u2019s dislike of it: it supplies us with as apposite an\ninstance of a difference in first principles as is afforded by Mr.\nGrote and Colonel Mure. \u201cThe main characteristic of his history,\u201d says\nLewis, \u201cis the extent to which he relies upon internal evidence, and\nupon the indications afforded by the narrative itself, independently\nof the testimony of its truth.\u201d And, \u201cIngenuity and labour can produce\nnothing but hypotheses and conjectures, which may be supported by\nanalogies, but can never rest upon the solid foundation of proof.\u201d And\nit is undeniable, that, rightly or wrongly, disdaining the scepticism\nof the mere critic, Niebuhr does consciously proceed by the high path\nof divination. \u201cFor my own part,\u201d he says, \u201cI _divine_ that, since\nthe censorship of Fabius and Decius falls in the same year, that Cn.\nFlavius became mediator between his own class and the higher orders.\u201d\nLewis considers this to be a process of guessing; and says, \u201cInstead\nof employing those tests of credibility which are consistently\napplied to modern history,\u201d Niebuhr, and his followers, and most of\nhis opponents, \u201cattempt to guide their judgment by the indication of\ninternal evidence, and assume that the truth is discovered by an occult\nfaculty of historical divination.\u201d Niebuhr defends himself thus: \u201cThe\nreal geographer has a tact which determines his judgment and choice\namong different statements. He is able from isolated statements to\ndraw inferences respecting things that are unknown, which are closely\napproximate to results obtained from observation of facts, and may\nsupply their place. He is able with limited data to form an image of\nthings which no eyewitness has described.\u201d He applies this to himself.\nThe principle set forth in this passage is obviously the same as I\nshould put forward myself; but Sir George Lewis, though not simply\ndenying it as a principle, makes little account of it, when applied to\nhistorical research. \u201cIt is not enough,\u201d he says, \u201cfor an historian to\nclaim the possession of a retrospective second-sight, which is denied\nto the rest of the world\u2014of a mysterious doctrine, revealed only to the\ninitiated.\u201d And he pronounces, that \u201cthe history of Niebuhr has opened\nmore questions than it has closed, and it has set in motion a large\nbody of combatants, whose mutual variances are not at present likely to\nbe settled by deference to a common principle.(32)\u201d\n\nWe see from the above extracts how a controversy, such as that to which\nthey belong, is carried on from starting-points, and with collateral\naids, not formally proved, but more or less assumed, the process of\nassumption lying in the action of the Illative Sense, as applied to\nprimary elements of thought respectively congenial to the disputants.\nNot that explicit argumentation on these minute or minor, though\nimportant, points is not sometimes possible to a certain extent;\nbut, as I had said, it is too unwieldy an expedient for a constantly\nrecurring need, even when it is tolerably exact.\n\n2.\n\nAnd now secondly, as to the first principles themselves. In\nillustration, I will mention under separate heads some of those\nelementary contrarieties of opinion, on which the Illative Sense has to\nact, discovering them, following them out, defending or resisting them,\nas the case may be.\n\n1. As to the statement of the case. This depends on the particular\naspect under which we view a subject, that is, on the abstraction which\nforms our representative notion of what it is. Sciences are only so\nmany distinct aspects of nature; sometimes suggested by nature itself,\nsometimes created by the mind. (1) One of the simplest and broadest\naspects under which to view the physical world, is that of a system of\nfinal causes, or, on the other hand, of initial or effective causes.\nBacon, having it in view to extend our power over nature, adopted the\nlatter. He took firm hold of the idea of causation (in the common\nsense of the word) as contrasted with that of design, refusing to\nmix up the two ideas in one inquiry, and denouncing such traditional\ninterpretations of facts, as did but obscure the simplicity of the\naspect necessary for his purpose. He saw what others before him might\nhave seen in what they saw, but who did not see as he saw it. In this\nachievement of intellect, which has been so fruitful in results, lie\nhis genius and his fame.\n\n(2) So again, to refer to a very different subject-matter, we often\nhear of the exploits of some great lawyer, judge or advocate, who is\nable in perplexed cases, when common minds see nothing but a hopeless\nheap of facts, foreign or contrary to each other, to detect the\nprinciple which rightly interprets the riddle, and, to the admiration\nof all hearers, converts a chaos into an orderly and luminous\nwhole. This is what is meant by originality, in thinking: it is the\ndiscovery of an aspect of a subject-matter, simpler, perhaps, and more\nintelligible than any hitherto taken.\n\n(3) On the other hand, such aspects are often unreal, as being mere\nexhibitions of ingenuity, not of true originality of mind. This is\nespecially the case in what are called philosophical views of history.\nSuch seems to me the theory advocated in a work of great learning,\nvigour, and acuteness, Warburton\u2019s \u201cDivine Legation of Moses.\u201d I do\nnot call Gibbon merely ingenious; still his account of the rise of\nChristianity is the mere subjective view of one who could not enter\ninto its depth and power.\n\n(4) The aspect under which we view things is often intensely personal;\nnay, even awfully so, considering that, from the nature of the case,\nit does not bring home its idiosyncrasy either to ourselves or to\nothers. Each of us looks at the world in his own way, and does not know\nthat perhaps it is characteristically his own. This is the case even\nas regards the senses. Some men have little perception of colours;\nsome recognize one or two; to some men two contrary colours, as red\nand green, are one and the same. How poorly can we appreciate the\nbeauties of nature, if our eyes discern, on the face of things, only an\nIndian-ink or a drab creation!\n\n(5) So again, as regards form: each of us abstracts the relation of\nline to line in his own personal way,\u2014as one man might apprehend a\ncurve as convex, another as concave. Of course, as in the case of a\ncurve, there may be a limit to possible aspects; but still, even when\nwe agree together, it is not perhaps that we learn one from another, or\nfall under any law of agreement, but that our separate idiosyncrasies\nhappen to concur. I fear I may seem trifling, if I allude to an\nillustration which has ever had a great force with me, and that for the\nvery reason it is so trivial and minute. Children, learning to read,\nare sometimes presented with the letters of the alphabet turned into\nthe figures of men in various attitudes. It is curious to observe from\nsuch representations, how differently the shape of the letters strikes\ndifferent minds. In consequence I have continually asked the question\nin a chance company, which way certain of the great letters look, to\nthe right or to the left; and whereas nearly every one present had his\nown clear view, so clear that he could not endure the opposite view,\nstill I have generally found that one half of the party considered the\nletters in question to look to the left, while the other half thought\nthey looked to the right.\n\n(6) This variety of interpretation in the very elements of outlines\nseems to throw light upon other cognate differences between one man\nand another. If they look at the mere letters of the alphabet so\ndifferently, we may understand how it is they form such distinct\njudgments upon handwriting; nay, how some men may have a talent for\ndecyphering from it the intellectual and moral character of the writer,\nwhich others have not. Another thought that occurs is, that perhaps\nhere lies the explanation why it is that family likenesses are so\nvariously recognized, and how mistakes in identity may be dangerously\nfrequent.\n\n(7) If we so variously apprehend the familiar objects of sense, still\nmore various, we may suppose, are the aspects and associations attached\nby us, one with another, to intellectual objects. I do not say we\ndiffer in the objects themselves, but that we may have interminable\ndifferences as to their relations and circumstances. I have heard\nsay (again to take a trifling matter) that at the beginning of this\ncentury, it was a subject of serious, nay, of angry controversy,\nwhether it began with January 1800, or January 1801. Argument,\nwhich ought, if in any case, to have easily brought the question to\na decision, was but sprinkling water upon a flame. I am not clear\nthat, if it could be fairly started now, it would not lead to similar\nresults; certainly I know those who studiously withdraw from giving\nan opinion on the subject, when it is accidentally mooted, from\ntheir experience of the eager feeling which it is sure to excite in\nsome one or other who is present. This eagerness can only arise from\nan overpowering sense that the truth of the matter lies in the one\nalternative, and not in the other.\n\nThese instances, because they are so casual, suggest how it comes to\npass, that men differ so widely from each other in religious and moral\nperceptions. Here, I say again, it does not prove that there is no\nobjective truth, because not all men are in possession of it; or that\nwe are not responsible for the associations which we attach, and the\nrelations which we assign, to the objects of the intellect. But this it\ndoes suggest to us, that there is something deeper in our differences\nthan the accident of external circumstances; and that we need the\ninterposition of a Power greater than human teaching and human argument\nto make our beliefs true and our minds one.\n\n2. Next I come to the implicit assumption of definite propositions\nin the first start of a course of reasoning, and the arbitrary\nexclusion of others, of whatever kind. Unless we had the right, when\nwe pleased, of ruling that propositions were irrelevant or absurd, I\ndo not see how we could conduct an argument at all; our way would be\nsimply blocked up by extravagant principles and theories, gratuitous\nhypotheses, false issues, unsupported statements, and incredible\nfacts. There are those who have treated the history of Abraham as an\nastronomical record, and have spoken of our Adorable Saviour as the\nsun in _Aries_. Arabian Mythology has changed Solomon into a mighty\nwizard. Noah has been considered the patriarch of the Chinese people.\nThe ten tribes have been pronounced still to live in their descendants,\nthe Red Indians; or to be the ancestors of the Goths and Vandals, and\nthereby of the present European races. Some have conjectured that the\nApollos of the Acts of the Apostles was Apollonius Tyaneus. Able men\nhave reasoned out, almost against their will, that Adam was a negro.\nThese propositions, and many others of various kinds, we should think\nourselves justified in passing over, if we were engaged in a work on\nsacred history; and there are others, on the contrary, which we should\nassume as true by our own right and without notice, and without which\nwe could not set about or carry on our work.\n\n(1) However, the right of making assumptions has been disputed; but,\nwhen the objections are examined, I think they only go to show that\nwe have no right in argument to make any assumption we please. Thus,\nin the historical researches which just now came before us, it seems\nfair to say that no testimony should be received, except such as comes\nfrom competent witnesses, while it is not unfair to urge, on the other\nside, that tradition, though unauthenticated, being (what is called)\nin possession, has a prescription in its favour, and may, _prim\u00e2\nfacie_, or provisionally, be received. Here are the materials of a fair\ndispute; but there are writers who seem to have gone far beyond this\nreasonable scepticism, laying down as a general proposition that we\nhave no right in philosophy to make any assumption whatever, and that\nwe ought to begin with a universal doubt. This, however, is of all\nassumptions the greatest, and to forbid assumptions universally is to\nforbid this one in particular. Doubt itself is a positive state, and\nimplies a definite habit of mind, and thereby necessarily involves a\nsystem of principles and doctrines all its own. Again, if nothing is to\nbe assumed, what is our very method of reasoning but an assumption? and\nwhat our nature itself? The very sense of pleasure and pain, which is\none of the most intimate portions of ourselves, inevitably translates\nitself into intellectual assumptions.\n\nOf the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin\nwith believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that\nit is our duty to doubt of everything. The former, indeed, seems the\ntrue way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what\nis contradictory to itself; and error having always some portion of\ntruth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may\nexpect, that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall\nsomehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and\nthe truth developing and occupying it. Thus it is that the Catholic\nreligion is reached, as we see, by inquirers from all points of the\ncompass, as if it mattered not where a man began, so that he had an eye\nand a heart for the truth.\n\n(2) An argument has been often put forward by unbelievers, I think by\nPaine, to this effect, that \u201ca revelation, which is to be received as\ntrue, ought to be written on the sun.\u201d This appeals to the common-sense\nof the many with great force, and implies the assumption of a\nprinciple which Butler, indeed, would not grant, and would consider\nunphilosophical, and yet I think something may be said in its favour.\nWhether abstractedly defensible or not, Catholic populations would\nnot be averse, _mutatis mutandis_, to admitting it. Till these last\ncenturies, the Visible Church was, at least to her children, the light\nof the world, as conspicuous as the sun in the heavens; and the Creed\nwas written on her forehead, and proclaimed through her voice, by\na teaching as precise as it was emphatical; in accordance with the\ntext, \u201cWho is she that looketh forth at the dawn, fair as the moon,\nbright as the sun, terrible as an army set in array?\u201d It was not,\nstrictly speaking, a miracle, doubtless; but in its effect, nay, in\nits circumstances, it was little less. Of course I would not allow\nthat the Church fails in this manifestation of the truth now, any more\nthan in former times, though the clouds have come over the sun; for\nwhat she has lost in her appeal to the imagination, she has gained in\nphilosophical cogency, by the evidence of her persistent vitality.\nSo far is clear, that if Paine\u2019s aphorism has a _prim\u00e2 facie_ force\nagainst Christianity, it owes this advantage to the miserable deeds of\nthe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.\n\n(3) Another conflict of first principles or assumptions, which have\noften been implicit on either side, has been carried through in\nour day, and relates to the end and scope of civil society, that\nis, whether government and legislation ought to be of a religious\ncharacter, or not; whether the state has a conscience; whether\nChristianity is the law of the land; whether the magistrate, in\npunishing offenders, exercises a retributive office or a corrective;\nor whether the whole structure of society is raised upon the basis of\nsecular expediency. The relation of philosophy and the sciences to\ntheology comes into the question. The old time-honoured theory has,\nduring the last forty years, been vigorously contending with the new;\nand the new is in the ascendant.\n\n(4) There is another great conflict of first principles, and that among\nChristians, which has occupied a large space in our domestic history,\nduring the last thirty or forty years, and that is the controversy\nabout the Rule of Faith. I notice it as affording an instance of an\nassumption so deeply sunk into the popular mind, that it is a work\nof great difficulty to obtain from its maintainers an acknowledgment\nthat it is an assumption. That Scripture is the Rule of Faith is in\nfact an assumption so congenial to the state of mind and course of\nthought usual among Protestants, that it seems to them rather a truism\nthan a truth. If they are in controversy with Catholics on any point\nof faith, they at once ask, \u201cWhere do you find it in Scripture?\u201d and\nif Catholics reply, as they must do, that it is not necessarily in\nScripture in order to be true, nothing can persuade them that such\nan answer is not an evasion, and a triumph to themselves. Yet it is\nby no means self-evident that all religious truth is to be found in\na number of works, however sacred, which were written at different\ntimes, and did not always form one book; and in fact it is a doctrine\nvery hard to prove. So much so, that years ago, when I was considering\nit from a Protestant point of view, and wished to defend it to the\nbest of my power, I was unable to give any better account of it than\nthe following, which I here quote from its appositeness to my present\nsubject.\n\n\u201cIt matters not,\u201d I said, speaking of the first Protestants, \u201cwhether\nor not they only happened to come right on what, in a logical point\nof view, are faulty premisses. They had no time for theories of any\nkind; and to require theories at their hand argues an ignorance of\nhuman nature, and of the ways in which truth is struck out in the\ncourse of life. Common sense, chance, moral perception, genius, the\ngreat discoverers of principles do not reason. They have no arguments,\nno grounds, they see the truth, but they do not know how they see\nit; and if at any time they attempt to prove it, it is as much a\nmatter of experiment with them, as if they had to find a road to a\ndistant mountain, which they see with the eye; and they get entangled,\nembarrassed, and perchance overthrown in the superfluous endeavour. It\nis the second-rate men, though most useful in their place, who prove,\nreconcile, finish, and explain. Probably, the popular feeling of the\nsixteenth century saw the Bible to be the Word of God, so as nothing\nelse is His Word, by the power of a strong sense, by a sort of moral\ninstinct, or by a happy augury.(33)\u201d\n\nThat is, I considered the assumption an act of the Illative Sense;\u2014I\nshould now add, the Illative Sense, acting on mistaken elements of\nthought.\n\n3. After the aspects in which a question is to be viewed, and the\nprinciples on which it is to be considered, come the arguments by which\nit is decided; among these are antecedent reasons, which are especially\nin point here, because they are in great measure made by ourselves and\nbelong to our personal character, and to them I shall confine myself.\n\nAntecedent reasoning, when negative, is safe. Thus no one would\nsay that, because Alexander\u2019s rash heroism is one of the leading\ncharacteristics of his history, therefore we are justified, except in\nwriting a romance, in asserting that at a particular time and place,\nhe distinguished himself by a certain exploit about which history\nis altogether silent; but, on the other hand, his notorious bravery\nwould be almost decisive against any charge against him of having on a\nparticular occasion acted as a coward.\n\nIn like manner, good character goes far in destroying the force of even\nplausible charges. There is indeed a degree of evidence in support of\nan allegation, against which reputation is no defence; but it must be\nsingularly strong to overcome an established antecedent probability\nwhich stands opposed to it. Thus historical personages or great\nauthors, men of high and pure character, have had imputations cast\nupon them, easy to make, difficult or impossible to meet, which are\nindignantly trodden under foot by all just and sensible men, as being\nas anti-social as they are inhuman. I need not add what a cruel and\ndespicable part a husband or a son would play, who readily listened to\na charge against his wife or his father. Yet all this being admitted,\na great number of cases remain which are perplexing, and on which we\ncannot adjust the claims of conflicting and heterogeneous arguments\nexcept by the keen and subtle operation of the Illative Sense.\n\nButler\u2019s argument in his _Analogy_ is such a presumption used\nnegatively. Objection being brought against certain characteristics of\nChristianity, he meets it by the presumption in their favour derived\nfrom their parallels as discoverable in the order of nature, arguing\nthat they do not tell against the Divine origin of Christianity, unless\nthey tell against the Divine origin of the natural system also. But he\ncould not adduce it as a positive and direct proof of the Divine origin\nof the Christian doctrines that they had their parallels in nature, or\nat the utmost as more than a recommendation of them to the religious\ninquirer.\n\nUnbelievers use the antecedent argument from the order of nature\nagainst our belief in miracles. Here, if they only mean that the fact\nof that system of laws, by which physical nature is governed, makes it\nantecedently improbable that an exception should occur in it, there is\nno objection to the argument; but if, as is not uncommon, they mean\nthat the fact of an established order is absolutely fatal to the very\nnotion of an exception, they are using a presumption as if it were a\nproof. They are saying,\u2014What has happened 999 times one way cannot\npossibly happen on the 1000th time another way, _because_ what has\nhappened 999 times one way is likely to happen in the same way on the\n1000th. If, however, they mean that the order of nature constitutes a\nphysical necessity, and that a law is an unalterable fate, this is to\nassume the very point in debate, and is much more than its antecedent\nprobability.\n\nFacts cannot be proved by presumptions, yet it is remarkable that in\ncases where nothing stronger than presumption was even professed,\nscientific men have sometimes acted as if they thought this kind of\nargument, taken by itself, decisive of a fact which was in debate. In\nthe controversy about the Plurality of worlds, it has been considered,\non purely antecedent grounds, as far as I see, to be so necessary that\nthe Creator should have filled with living beings the luminaries which\nwe see in the sky, and the other cosmical bodies which we imagine\nthere, that it almost amounts to a blasphemy to doubt it.\n\nTheological conclusions, it is true, have often been made on antecedent\nreasoning; but then it must be recollected that theological reasoning\nprofesses to be sustained by a more than human power, and to be\nguaranteed by a more than human authority. It may be true, also, that\nconversions to Christianity have often been made on antecedent reasons;\nyet, even admitting the fact, which is not quite clear, a number of\nantecedent probabilities, confirming each other, may make it a duty in\nthe judgment of a prudent man, not only to act as if a statement were\ntrue, but actually to accept and believe it. This is not unfrequently\ninstanced in our dealings with others, when we feel it right, in spite\nof our misgivings, to oblige ourselves to believe their honesty. And in\nall these delicate questions there is constant call for the exercise of\nthe Illative Sense.\n\n\n\n\nChapter X. Inference And Assent In The Matter Of Religion.\n\n\nAnd now I have completed my review of the second subject to which I\nhave given my attention in this Essay, the connexion existing between\nthe intellectual acts of Assent and Inference, my first being the\nconnexion of Assent with Apprehension; and as I closed my remarks\nupon Assent and Apprehension by applying the conclusions at which I\nhad arrived to our belief in the Truths of Religion, so now I ought\nto speak of its Evidences, before quitting the consideration of the\ndependence of Assent upon Inference. I shall attempt to do so in this\nChapter, not without much anxiety, lest I should injure so large,\nmomentous, and sacred a subject by a necessarily cursory treatment.\n\nI begin with expressing a sentiment, which is habitually in my\nthoughts, whenever they are turned to the subject of mental or moral\nscience, and which I am as willing to apply here to the Evidences of\nReligion as it properly applies to Metaphysics or Ethics, viz. that\nin these provinces of inquiry egotism is true modesty. In religious\ninquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has\na right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but\nhe cannot speak for others: he cannot lay down the law; he can only\nbring his own experiences to the common stock of psychological facts.\nHe knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; if it satisfies\nhim, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure,\nit is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but\none truth. And doubtless he does find in fact, that, allowing for the\ndifference of minds and of modes of speech, what convinces him, does\nconvince others also. There will be very many exceptions, but these\nwill admit of explanation. Great numbers of men refuse to inquire at\nall; they put the subject of religion aside altogether; others are\nnot serious enough to care about questions of truth and duty and to\nentertain them; and to numbers, from their temper of mind, or the\nabsence of doubt, or a dormant intellect, it does not occur to inquire\nwhy or what they believe; many, though they tried, could not do so in\nany satisfactory way. This being the case, it causes no uneasiness to\nany one who honestly attempts to set down his own view of the Evidences\nof Religion, that at first sight he seems to be but one among many\nwho are all in opposition to each other. But, however that may be, he\nbrings together his reasons, and relies on them, because they are his\nown, and this is his primary evidence; and he has a second ground of\nevidence, in the testimony of those who agree with him. But his best\nevidence is the former, which is derived from his own thoughts; and it\nis that which the world has a right to demand of him; and therefore\nhis true sobriety and modesty consists, not in claiming for his\nconclusions an acceptance or a scientific approval which is not to be\nfound anywhere, but in stating what are personally his own grounds for\nhis belief in Natural and Revealed Religion,\u2014grounds which he holds to\nbe so sufficient, that he thinks that others do hold them implicitly\nor in substance, or would hold them, if they inquired fairly, or will\nhold if they listen to him, or do not hold from impediments, invincible\nor not as it may be, into which he has no call to inquire. However,\nhis own business is to speak for himself. He uses the words of the\nSamaritans to their countrywoman, when our Lord had remained with them\nfor two days, \u201cNow we believe, not for thy saying, for we have heard\nHim ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world.\u201d\n\nIn these words it is declared both that the Gospel Revelation is\ndivine, and that it carries with it the evidence of its divinity; and\nthis is of course the matter of fact. However, these two attributes\nneed not have been united; a revelation might have been really\ngiven, yet given without credentials. Our Supreme Master might have\nimparted to us truths which nature cannot teach us, without telling\nus that He had imparted them, as is actually the case now, as regards\nheathen countries, into which portions of revealed truth overflow\nand penetrate, without their populations knowing whence those truths\ncame. But the very idea of Christianity in its profession and history,\nis something more than this; it is a \u201cRevelatio revelata;\u201d it is a\ndefinite message from God to man distinctly conveyed by His chosen\ninstruments, and to be received as such a message; and therefore to\nbe positively acknowledged, embraced, and maintained as true, on the\nground of its being divine, not as true on intrinsic grounds, not as\nprobably true, or partially true, but as absolutely certain knowledge,\ncertain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it\ncomes from Him who neither can deceive nor be deceived.\n\nAnd the whole tenor of Scripture from beginning to end is to this\neffect: the matter of revelation is not a mere collection of truths,\nnot a philosophical view, not a religious sentiment or spirit, not\na special morality,\u2014poured out upon mankind as a stream might pour\nitself into the sea, mixing with the world\u2019s thought, modifying,\npurifying, invigorating it;\u2014but an authoritative teaching, which bears\nwitness to itself and keeps itself together as one, in contrast to the\nassemblage of opinions on all sides of it, and speaks to all men, as\nbeing ever and everywhere one and the same, and claiming to be received\nintelligently, by all whom it addresses, as one doctrine, discipline,\nand devotion directly given from above. In consequence, the exhibition\nof credentials, that is, of evidence, that it is what it professes to\nbe, is essential to Christianity, as it comes to us; for we are not\nleft at liberty to pick and choose out of its contents according to\nour judgment, but must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it\nat all. It is a religion in addition to the religion of nature; and as\nnature has an intrinsic claim upon us to be obeyed and used, so what is\nover and above nature, or supernatural, must also bring with it valid\ntestimonials of its right to demand our homage.\n\nNext, as to its relation to nature. As I have said, Christianity is\nsimply an addition to it; it does not supersede or contradict it; it\nrecognizes and depends on it, and that of necessity: for how possibly\ncan it prove its claims except by an appeal to what men have already?\nbe it ever so miraculous, it cannot dispense with nature; this would\nbe to cut the ground from under it; for what would be the worth of\nevidences in favour of a revelation which denied the authority of that\nsystem of thought, and those courses of reasoning, out of which those\nevidences necessarily grew?\n\nAnd in agreement with this obvious conclusion we find in Scripture our\nLord and His Apostles always treating Christianity as the completion\nand supplement of Natural Religion, and of previous revelations; as\nwhen He says that the Father testified of Him; that not to know Him\nwas not to know the Father; and as St. Paul at Athens appeals to the\n\u201cUnknown God,\u201d and says that \u201cHe that made the world\u201d \u201cnow declareth\nto all men to do penance, because He hath appointed a day to judge\nthe world by the man whom He hath appointed.\u201d As then our Lord and\nHis Apostles appeal to the God of nature, we must follow them in that\nappeal; and, to do this with the better effect, we must first inquire\ninto the chief doctrines and the grounds of Natural Religion.\n\n\n\u00a7 1. Natural Religion.\n\n\nBy Religion I mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties\ntowards Him; and there are three main channels which Nature furnishes\nfor our acquiring this knowledge, viz. our own minds, the voice of\nmankind, and the course of the world, that is, of human life and human\naffairs. The informations which these three convey to us teach us the\nBeing and Attributes of God, our responsibility to Him, our dependence\non Him, our prospect of reward or punishment, to be somehow brought\nabout, according as we obey or disobey Him. And the most authoritative\nof these three means of knowledge, as being specially our own, is\nour own mind, whose informations give us the rule by which we test,\ninterpret, and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by\nthe universal testimony of mankind, or by the history of society and of\nthe world.\n\nOur great internal teacher of religion is, as I have said in an earlier\npart of this Essay, our Conscience.(34) Conscience is a personal guide,\nand I use it because I must use myself; I am as little able to think\nby any mind but my own as to breathe with another\u2019s lungs. Conscience\nis nearer to me than any other means of knowledge. And as it is given\nto me, so also is it given to others; and being carried about by every\nindividual in his own breast, and requiring nothing besides itself,\nit is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that\nknowledge which is most momentous to him individually,\u2014adapted for the\nuse of all classes and conditions of men, for high and low, young and\nold, men and women, independently of books, of educated reasoning, of\nphysical knowledge, or of philosophy. Conscience, too, teaches us,\nnot only that God is, but what He is; it provides for the mind a real\nimage of Him, as a medium of worship; it gives us a rule of right and\nwrong, as being His rule, and a code of moral duties. Moreover, it is\nso constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer in its injunctions,\nand wider in their range, and corrects and completes the accidental\nfeebleness of its initial teachings. Conscience, then, considered as\nour guide, is fully furnished for its office. I say all this without\nentering into the question how far external assistances are in all\ncases necessary to the action of the mind, because in fact man does not\nlive in isolation, but is everywhere found as a member of society. I am\nnot concerned here with abstract questions.\n\nNow Conscience suggests to us many things about that Master, whom\nby means of it we perceive, but its most prominent teaching, and\nits cardinal and distinguishing truth, is that He is our Judge.\nIn consequence, the special Attribute under which it brings Him\nbefore us, to which it subordinates all other Attributes, is that of\njustice\u2014retributive justice. We learn from its informations to conceive\nof the Almighty, primarily, not as a God of Wisdom, of Knowledge, of\nPower, of Benevolence, but as a God of Judgment and Justice; as One,\nwho not simply for the good of the offender, but as an end good in\nitself, and as a principle of government, ordains that the offender\nshould suffer for his offence. If it tells us anything at all of the\ncharacteristics of the Divine Mind, it certainly tells us this; and,\nconsidering that our shortcomings are far more frequent and important\nthan our fulfilment of the duties enjoined upon us, and that of this\npoint we are fully aware ourselves, it follows that the aspect under\nwhich Almighty God is presented to us by Nature, is (to use a figure)\nof One who is angry with us, and threatens evil. Hence its effect is\nto burden and sadden the religious mind, and is in contrast with the\nenjoyment derivable from the exercise of the affections, and from\nthe perception of beauty, whether in the material universe or in the\ncreations of the intellect. This is that fearful antagonism brought\nout with such soul-piercing reality by Lucretius, when he speaks so\ndishonourably of what he considers the heavy yoke of religion, and the\n\u201c\u00e6ternas p\u0153nas in morte timendum;\u201d and, on the other hand, rejoices in\nhis \u201cAlma Venus,\u201d \u201cqu\u00e6 rerum naturam sola gubernas.\u201d And we may appeal\nto him for the fact, while we repudiate his view of it.\n\nSuch being the _prim\u00e2 facie_ aspect of religion which the teachings\nof Conscience bring before us individually, in the next place let us\nconsider what are the doctrines, and what the influences of religion,\nas we find it embodied in those various rites and devotions which\nhave taken root in the many races of mankind, since the beginning\nof history, and before history, all over the earth. Of these also\nLucretius gives us a specimen; and they accord in form and complexion\nwith that doctrine about duty and responsibility, which he so bitterly\nhates and loathes. It is scarcely necessary to insist, that wherever\nReligion exists in a popular shape, it has almost invariably worn its\ndark side outwards. It is founded in one way or other on the sense of\nsin; and without that vivid sense it would hardly have any precepts\nor any observances. Its many varieties all proclaim or imply that\nman is in a degraded, servile condition, and requires expiation,\nreconciliation, and some great change of nature. This is suggested\nto us in the many ways in which we are told of a realm of light and\na realm of darkness, of an elect fold and a regenerate state. It is\nsuggested in the almost ubiquitous and ever-recurring institution of\na Priesthood; for wherever there is a priest, there is the notion of\nsin, pollution, and retribution, as, on the other hand, of intercession\nand mediation. Also, still more directly, is the notion of our guilt\nimpressed upon us by the doctrine of future punishment, and that\neternal, which is found in mythologies and creeds of such various\nparentage.\n\nOf these distinct rites and doctrines embodying the severe side of\nNatural Religion, the most remarkable is that of atonement, that is, \u201ca\nsubstitution of something offered, or some personal suffering, for a\npenalty which would otherwise be exacted;\u201d most remarkable, I say, both\nfrom its close connexion with the notion of vicarious satisfaction,\nand, on the other hand, from its universality. \u201cThe practice of\natonement,\u201d says the author, whose definition of the word I have just\ngiven, \u201cis remarkable for its antiquity and universality, proved by the\nearliest records that have come down to us of all nations, and by the\ntestimony of ancient and modern travellers. In the oldest books of the\nHebrew Scriptures, we have numerous instances of expiatory rites, where\natonement is the prominent feature. At the earliest date, to which\nwe can carry our inquiries by means of the heathen records, we meet\nwith the same notion of atonement. If we pursue our inquiries through\nthe accounts left us by the Greek and Roman writers of the barbarous\nnations with which they were acquainted, from India to Britain, we\nshall find the same notions and similar practices of atonement. From\nthe most popular portion of our own literature, our narratives of\nvoyages and travels, every one, probably, who reads at all will be\nable to find for himself abundant proof that the notion has been as\npermanent as it is universal. It shows itself among the various tribes\nof Africa, the islanders of the South Seas, and even that most peculiar\nrace, the natives of Australia, either in the shape of some offering,\nor some mutilation of the person.(35)\u201d\n\nThese ceremonial acknowledgments, in so many distinct forms of worship,\nof the existing degradation of the human race, of course imply a\nbrighter, as well as a threatening aspect of Natural Religion; for why\nshould men adopt any rites of deprecation or of purification at all,\nunless they had some hope of attaining to a better condition than their\npresent? Of this happier side of religion I will speak presently; here,\nhowever, a question of another kind occurs, viz. whether the notion of\natonement can be admitted among the doctrines of Natural Religion,\u2014I\nmean, on the ground that it is inconsistent with those teachings of\nConscience, which I have recognized above, as the rule and corrective\nof every other information on the subject. If there is any truth\nbrought home to us by conscience, it is this, that we are personally\nresponsible for what we do, that we have no means of shifting our\nresponsibility, and that dereliction of duty involves punishment; how,\nit may be asked, can acts of ours of any kind\u2014how can even amendment of\nlife\u2014undo the past? And if even our own subsequent acts of obedience\nbring with them no promise of reversing what has once been committed,\nhow can external rites, or the actions of another (as of a priest),\nbe substitutes for that punishment which is the connatural fruit and\nintrinsic development of violation of the sense of duty? I think this\nobjection avails as far as this, that amendment is no reparation, and\nthat no ceremonies or penances can in themselves exercise any vicarious\nvirtue in our behalf; and that, if they avail, they only avail in the\nintermediate season of probation; that in some way we must make them\nour own; and that, when the time comes, which conscience forebodes, of\nour being called to judgment, then, at least, we shall have to stand in\nand by ourselves, whatever we shall have by that time become, and must\nbear our own burden. But it is plain that in this final account, as it\nlies between us and our Master, He alone can decide how the past and\nthe present will stand together who is our Creator and our Judge.\n\nIn thus making it a necessary point to adjust the religions of the\nworld with the intimations of our conscience, I am suggesting the\nreason why I confine myself to such religions as have had their rise in\nbarbarous times, and do not recognize the religion of what is called\ncivilization, as having legitimately a part in the delineation of\nNatural Religion. It may at first sight seem strange, that, considering\nI have laid such stress upon the progressive nature of man, I should\ntake my ideas of his religion from his initial, and not his final\ntestimony about its doctrines; and it may be urged that the religion\nof civilized times is quite opposite in character to the rites and\ntraditions of barbarians, and has nothing of that gloom and sternness,\non which I have insisted as their characteristic. Thus the Greek\nMythology was for the most part cheerful and graceful, and the new\ngods certainly more genial and indulgent than the old ones. And, in\nlike manner, the religion of philosophy is more noble and more humane\nthan those primitive conceptions which were sufficient for early kings\nand warriors. But my answer to this objection is obvious: the progress\nof which man\u2019s nature is capable is a development, not a destruction\nof its original state; it must subserve the elements from which it\nproceeds, in order to be a true development and not a perversion.(36)\n\nAnd it does in fact subserve and complete that nature with which man\nis born. It is otherwise with the religion of so-called civilization;\nsuch religion does but contradict the religion of barbarism; and since\nthis civilization itself is not a development of man\u2019s whole nature,\nbut mainly of the intellect, recognizing indeed the moral sense, but\nignoring the conscience, no wonder that the religion in which it\nissues has no sympathy either with the hopes and fears of the awakened\nsoul, or with those frightful presentiments which are expressed in the\nworship and traditions of the heathen. This artificial religion, then,\nhas no place in the inquiry; first, because it comes of a one-sided\nprogress of mind, and next, for the very reason that it contradicts\ninformants which speak with greater authority than itself.\n\nNow we come to the third natural informant on the subject of Religion;\nI mean the system and the course of the world. This established order\nof things, in which we find ourselves, if it has a Creator, must\nsurely speak of His will in its broad outlines and its main issues.\nThis principle being laid down as certain, when we come to apply it\nto things as they are, our first feeling is one of surprise and (I\nmay say) of dismay, that His control of the world is so indirect, and\nHis action so obscure. This is the first lesson that we gain from the\ncourse of human affairs. What strikes the mind so forcibly and so\npainfully is, His absence (if I may so speak) from His own world.(37)\nIt is a silence that speaks. It is as if others had got possession of\nHis work. Why does not He, our Maker and Ruler, give us some immediate\nknowledge of Himself? Why does He not write His Moral Nature in large\nletters upon the face of history, and bring the blind, tumultuous rush\nof its events into a celestial, hierarchical order? Why does He not\ngrant us in the structure of society at least so much of a revelation\nof Himself as the religions of the heathen attempt to supply? Why\nfrom the beginning of time has no one uniform steady light guided all\nfamilies of the earth, and all individual men, how to please Him? Why\nis it possible without absurdity to deny His will, His attributes,\nHis existence? Why does He not walk with us one by one, as He is said\nto have walked with His chosen men of old time? We both see and know\neach other; why, if we cannot have the sight of Him, have we not at\nleast the knowledge? On the contrary, He is specially \u201ca Hidden God;\u201d\nand with our best efforts we can only glean from the surface of the\nworld some faint and fragmentary views of Him. I see only a choice of\nalternatives in explanation of so critical a fact:\u2014either there is no\nCreator, or He has disowned His creatures. Are then the dim shadows\nof His Presence in the affairs of men but a fancy of our own, or, on\nthe other hand, has He hid His face and the light of His countenance,\nbecause we have in some special way dishonoured Him? My true informant,\nmy burdened conscience, gives me at once the true answer to each of\nthese antagonist questions:\u2014it pronounces without any misgiving that\nGod exists:\u2014and it pronounces quite as surely that I am alienated from\nHim; that \u201cHis Hand is not shortened, but that our iniquities have\ndivided between us and our God.\u201d Thus it solves the world\u2019s mystery,\nand sees in that mystery only a confirmation of its own original\nteaching.\n\nLet us pass on to another great fact of experience, bearing on\nReligion, which confirms this testimony both of conscience and of the\nforms of worship which prevail among mankind;\u2014I mean, the amount of\nsuffering, bodily and mental, which is our portion in this life. Not\nonly is the Creator far off, but some being of malignant nature seems,\nas I have said, to have got hold of us, and to be making us his sport.\nLet us say there are a thousand millions of men on the earth at this\ntime; who can weigh and measure the aggregate of pain which this one\ngeneration has endured and will endure from birth to death? Then add to\nthis all the pain which has fallen and will fall upon our race through\ncenturies past and to come. Is there not then some great gulf fixed\nbetween us and the good God? Here again the testimony of the system of\nnature is more than corroborated by those popular traditions about the\nunseen state, which are found in mythologies and superstitions, ancient\nand modern; for those traditions speak, not only of present misery, but\nof pain and evil hereafter, and even without end. But this dreadful\naddition is not necessary for the conclusion which I am here wishing to\ndraw. The real mystery is, not that evil should never have an end, but\nthat it should ever have had a beginning. Even a universal restitution\ncould not undo what had been, or account for evil being the necessary\ncondition of good. How are we to explain it, the existence of God being\ntaken for granted, except by saying that another will, besides His, has\nhad a part in the disposition of His work, that there is an intractable\nquarrel, a chronic alienation, between God and man?\n\nI have implied that the laws on which this world is governed do not\ngo so far as to prove that evil will never die out of the creation;\nnevertheless, they look in that direction. No experience indeed of\nlife can assure us about the future, but it can and does give us means\nof conjecturing what is likely to be; and those conjectures coincide\nwith our natural forebodings. Experience enables us to ascertain the\nmoral constitution of man, and thereby to presage his future from\nhis present. It teaches us, first, that he is not sufficient for\nhis own happiness, but is dependent upon the sensible objects which\nsurround him, and that these he cannot take with him when he leaves\nthe world; secondly, that disobedience to his sense of right is even\nby itself misery, and that he carries that misery about him, wherever\nhe is, though no divine retribution followed upon it; and thirdly,\nthat he cannot change his nature and his habits by wishing, but is\nsimply himself, and will ever be himself and what he now is, wherever\nhe is, as long as he continues to be,\u2014or at least that pain has no\nnatural tendency to make him other than he is, and that the longer he\nlives, the more difficult he is to change. How can we meet these not\nirrational anticipations, except by shutting our eyes, turning away\nfrom them, and saying that we have no call, no right, to think of them\nat present, or to make ourselves miserable about what is not certain,\nand may be not true?(38)\n\nSuch is the severe aspect of Natural Religion: also it is the most\nprominent aspect, because the multitude of men follow their own likings\nand wills, and not the decisions of their sense of right and wrong.\nTo them Religion is a mere yoke, as Lucretius describes it; not a\nsatisfaction or refuge, but a terror and a superstition. However, I\nmust not for an instant be supposed to mean, that this is its only, its\nchief, or its legitimate aspect. All Religion, so far as it is genuine,\nis a blessing, Natural as well as Revealed. I have insisted on its\nsevere aspect in the first place, because, from the circumstances of\nhuman nature, though not by the fault of Religion, such is the shape\nin which we first encounter it. Its large and deep foundation is the\nsense of sin and guilt, and without this sense there is for man, as he\nis, no genuine religion. Otherwise, it is but counterfeit and hollow;\nand that is the reason why this so-called religion of civilization\nand philosophy is so great a mockery. However, true as this judgment\nis which I pass on philosophical religion, and troubled as are the\nexisting relations between God and man, as both the voice of mankind\nand the facts of Divine Government testify, equally true are other\ngeneral laws which govern those relations, and they speak another\nlanguage, and compensate for what is stern in the teaching of nature,\nwithout tending to deny that sternness.\n\nThe first of these laws, relieving the aspect of Natural Religion, is\nthe very fact that religious beliefs and institutions, of some kind\nor other, are of such general acceptance in all times and places. Why\nshould men subject themselves to the tyranny which Lucretius denounces,\nunless they had either experience or hope of benefits to themselves\nby so doing? Though it be mere hope of benefits, that alone is a\ngreat alleviation of the gloom and misery which their religious rites\npresuppose or occasion; for thereby they have a prospect, more or less\nclear, of some happier state in reserve for them, or at least the\nchances of it. If they simply despaired of their fortunes, they would\nnot care about religion. And hope of future good, as we know, sweetens\nall suffering.\n\nMoreover, they have an earnest of that future in the real and recurring\nblessings of life, the enjoyment of the gifts of the earth, and of\ndomestic affection and social intercourse, which is sufficient to\ntouch and to subdue even the most guilty of men in his better moments,\nreminding him that he is not utterly cast off by Him whom nevertheless\nhe is not given to know. Or, in the Apostle\u2019s words, though the Creator\nonce \u201csuffered all nations to walk in their own ways,\u201d still, \u201cHe left\nnot Himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and\nfruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.\u201d\n\nNor are these blessings of physical nature the only tokens in the\nDivine System, which in that heathen time, and indeed in every\nage, bring home to our experience the fact of a Good God, in spite\nof the tumult and confusion of the world. It is possible to give\nan interpretation to the course of things, by which every event\nor occurrence in its order becomes providential: and though that\ninterpretation does not hold good unless the world is contemplated\nfrom a particular point of view, in one given aspect, and with certain\ninward experiences, and personal first principles and judgments,\nyet these may be fairly pronounced to be common conditions of human\nthought, that is, till they are wilfully or accidentally lost; and\nthey issue in fact, in leading the great majority of men to recognize\nthe Hand of unseen power, directing in mercy or in judgment the\nphysical and moral system. In the prominent events of the world, past\nand contemporary, the fate, evil or happy, of great men, the rise and\nfall of states, popular revolutions, decisive battles, the migration\nof races, the replenishing of the earth, earthquakes and pestilences,\ncritical discoveries and inventions, the history of philosophy, the\nadvancement of knowledge, in these the spontaneous piety of the\nhuman mind discerns a Divine Supervision. Nay, there is a general\nfeeling, originating directly in the workings of conscience, that a\nsimilar governance is extended over the persons of individuals, who\nthereby both fulfil the purposes and receive the just recompenses of\nan Omnipotent Providence. Good to the good, and evil to the evil,\nis instinctively felt to be, even from what we see, amid whatever\nobscurity and confusion, the universal rule of God\u2019s dealings with\nus. Hence come the great proverbs, indigenous in both Christian and\nheathen nations, that punishment is sure, though slow, that murder will\nout, that treason never prospers, that pride will have a fall, that\nhonesty is the best policy, and that curses fall on the heads of those\nwho utter them. To the unsophisticated apprehension of the many, the\nsuccessive passages of life, social or political, are so many miracles,\nif that is to be accounted miraculous which brings before them the\nimmediate Divine Presence; and should it be objected that this is an\nillogical exercise of reason, I answer, that since it actually brings\nthem to a right conclusion, and was intended to bring them to it, if\nlogic finds fault with it, so much the worse for logic.\n\nAgain, prayer is essential to religion, and, where prayer is, there\nis a natural relief and solace in all trouble, great or ordinary:\nnow prayer is not less general in mankind at large than is faith in\nProvidence. It has ever been in use, both as a personal and as a social\npractice. Here again, if, in order to determine what the Religion of\nNature is, we may justly have recourse to the spontaneous acts and\nproceedings of our race, as viewed on a large field, we may safely\nsay that prayer, as well as hope, is a constituent of man\u2019s religion.\nNor is it a fair objection to this argument, to say that such prayers\nand rites as have obtained in various places and times, are in their\ncharacter, object, and scope inconsistent with each other; because\ntheir contrarieties do not come into the idea of religion, as such, at\nall, and the very fact of their discordance destroys their right to\nbe taken into account, so far as they are discordant; for what is not\nuniversal has no claim to be considered natural, right, or of divine\norigin. Thus we may determine prayer to be part of Natural Religion,\nfrom such instances of the usage as are supplied by the priests of Baal\nand by dancing Dervishes, without therefore including in our notions\nof prayer the frantic excesses of the one, or the artistic spinning of\nthe other, or sanctioning their respective objects of belief, Baal or\nMahomet.\n\nAs prayer is the voice of man to God, so Revelation is the voice of\nGod to man. Accordingly, it is another alleviation of the darkness\nand distress which weigh upon the religions of the world, that in\none way or other such religions are founded on some idea of express\nrevelation, coming from the unseen agents whose anger they deprecate;\nnay, that the very rites and observances, by which they hope to gain\nthe favour of these beings, are by these beings themselves communicated\nand appointed. The Religion of Nature is not a deduction of reason,\nor the joint, voluntary manifesto of a multitude meeting together and\npledging themselves to each other, as men move resolutions now for some\npolitical or social purpose, but it is a tradition or an interposition\nvouchsafed to a people from above. To such an interposition men even\nascribed their civil polity or citizenship, which did not originate\nin any plebiscite, but in _dii minores_ or heroes, was inaugurated\nwith portents or palladia, and protected and prospered by oracles\nand auguries. Here is an evidence, too, how congenial the notion of\na revelation is to the human mind, so that the expectation of it may\ntruly be considered an integral part of Natural Religion.\n\nAmong the observances imposed by these professed revelations, none is\nmore remarkable, or more general, than the rite of sacrifice, in which\nguilt was removed or blessing gained by an offering, which availed\ninstead of the merits of the offerer. This, too, as well as the notion\nof divine interpositions, may be considered almost an integral part\nof the Religion of Nature, and an alleviation of its gloom. But it\ndoes not stand by itself; I have already spoken of the doctrine of\natonement, under which it falls, and which, if what is universal is\nnatural, enters into the idea of religious service. And what the nature\nof man suggests, the providential system of the world sanctions by\nenforcing. It is the law, or the permission, given to our whole race,\nto use the Apostle\u2019s words, to \u201cbear one another\u2019s burdens;\u201d and this,\nas I said when on the subject of Atonement, is quite consistent with\nhis antithesis that \u201cevery one must bear his own burden.\u201d The final\nburden of responsibility when we are called to judgment is our own;\nbut among the media by which we are prepared for that judgment are the\nexertions and pains taken in our behalf by others. On this vicarious\nprinciple, by which we appropriate to ourselves what others do for\nus, the whole structure of society is raised. Parents work and endure\npain, that their children may prosper; children suffer for the sin of\ntheir parents, who have died before it bore fruit. \u201cDelirant reges,\nplectuntur Achivi.\u201d Sometimes it is a compulsory, sometimes a willing\nmediation. The punishment which is earned by the husband falls upon\nthe wife; the benefits in which all classes partake are wrought out by\nthe unhealthy or dangerous toil of the few. Soldiers endure wounds and\ndeath for those who sit at home; and ministers of state fall victims\nto their zeal for their countrymen, who do little else than criticize\ntheir actions. And so in some measure or way this law embraces all of\nus. We all suffer for each other, and gain by each other\u2019s sufferings;\nfor man never stands alone here, though he will stand by himself one\nday hereafter; but here he is a social being, and goes forward to his\nlong home as one of a large company.\n\nButler, it need scarcely be said, is the great master of this\ndoctrine, as it is brought out in the system of nature. In answer\nto the objection to the Christian doctrine of satisfaction, that it\n\u201crepresents God as indifferent whether He punishes the innocent or\nthe guilty,\u201d he observes that \u201cthe world is a constitution or system,\nwhose parts have a mutual reference to each other; and that there is a\nscheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature,\nto the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways,\nto contribute. And in the daily course of natural providence, it is\nappointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the\nguilty. Finally, indeed and upon the whole, every one shall receive\naccording to his personal deserts; but during the progress, and, for\naught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme,\nvicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary. We see in\nwhat variety of ways one person\u2019s sufferings contribute to the relief\nof another; and being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it.\nSo the reason of their insisting on objections against the [doctrine\nof] satisfaction is, either that they do not consider God\u2019s settled and\nuniform appointments as His appointments at all; or else they forget\nthat vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day\u2019s\nexperience.(39)\u201d I will but add, that, since all human suffering is in\nits last resolution the punishment of sin, and punishment implies a\nJudge and a rule of justice, he who undergoes the punishment of another\nin his stead may be said in a certain sense to satisfy the claims of\njustice towards that other in his own person.\n\nOne concluding remark has to be made here. In all sacrifices it\nwas specially required that the thing offered should be something\nrare, and unblemished; and in like manner in all atonements and all\nsatisfactions, not only was the innocent taken for the guilty, but it\nwas a point of special importance that the victim should be spotless,\nand the more manifest that spotlessness, the more efficacious was the\nsacrifice. This leads me to a last principle which I shall notice as\nproper to Natural Religion, and as lightening the prophecies of evil in\nwhich it is founded; I mean the doctrine of meritorious intercession.\nThe man in the Gospel did but speak for the human race everywhere, when\nhe said, \u201cGod heareth not sinners; but if a man be a worshipper of God,\nand doth His will, him He heareth.\u201d Hence every religion has had its\neminent devotees, exalted above the body of the people, mortified men,\nbrought nearer to the Source of good by austerities, self-inflictions,\nand prayer, who have influence with Him, and extend a shelter and\ngain blessings for those who become their clients. A belief like this\nhas been, of course, attended by numberless superstitions; but those\nsuperstitions vary with times and places, and the belief itself in\nthe mediatorial power of the good and holy has been one and the same\neverywhere. Nor is this belief an idea of past times only or of heathen\ncountries. It is one of the most natural visions of the young and\ninnocent. And all of us, the more keenly we feel our own distance from\nholy persons, the more are we drawn near to them, as if forgetting that\ndistance, and proud of them because they are so unlike ourselves, as\nbeing specimens of what our nature may be, and with some vague hope\nthat we, their relations by blood, may profit in our own persons by\ntheir holiness.\n\nSuch, then, in outline is that system of natural beliefs and\nsentiments, which, though true and divine, is still possible to us\nindependently of Revelation, and is the preparation for it; though\nin Christians themselves it cannot really be separated from their\nChristianity, and never is possessed in its higher forms in any people\nwithout some portion of those inward aids which Christianity imparts\nto us, and those endemic traditions which have their first origin in a\nparadisiacal illumination.\n\n\n\u00a7 2. Revealed Religion.\n\n\nIn determining, as above, the main features of Natural Religion, and\ndistinguishing it from the religion of philosophy or civilization, I\nmay be accused of having taken a course of my own, for which I have no\nsufficient warrant. Such an accusation does not give me much concern.\nEvery one who thinks on these subjects takes a course of his own,\nthough it will also happen to be the course which others take besides\nhimself. The minds of many separately bear them forward in the same\ndirection, and they are confirmed in it by each other. This I consider\nto be my own case; if I have mis-stated or omitted notorious facts in\nmy account of Natural Religion, if I have contradicted or disregarded\nanything which He who speaks through my conscience has told us all\ndirectly from Heaven, then indeed I have acted unjustifiably and have\nsomething to unsay; but, if I have done no more than view the notorious\nfacts of the case in the medium of my primary mental experiences, under\nthe aspects which they spontaneously present to me, and with the aid\nof my best illative sense, I only do on one side of the question what\nthose who think differently do on the other. As they start with one\nset of first principles, I start with another. I gave notice just now\nthat I should offer my own witness in the matter in question; though of\ncourse it would not be worth while my offering it, unless what I felt\nmyself agreed with what is felt by hundreds and thousands besides me,\nas I am sure it does, whatever be the measure, more or less, of their\nexplicit recognition of it.\n\nIn thus speaking of Natural Religion as in one sense a matter of\nprivate judgment, and that with a view of proceeding from it to the\nproof of Christianity, I seem to give up the intention of demonstrating\neither. Certainly I do; not that I deny that demonstration is possible.\nTruth certainly, as such, rests upon grounds intrinsically and\nobjectively and abstractedly demonstrative, but it does not follow\nfrom this that the arguments producible in its favour are unanswerable\nand irresistible. These latter epithets are relative, and bear upon\nmatters of fact; arguments in themselves ought to do, what perhaps in\nthe particular case they cannot do. The fact of revelation is in itself\ndemonstrably true, but it is not therefore true irresistibly; else, how\ncomes it to be resisted? There is a vast distance between what it is in\nitself, and what it is to us. Light is a quality of matter, as truth is\nof Christianity; but light is not recognized by the blind, and there\nare those who do not recognize truth, from the fault, not of truth, but\nof themselves. I cannot convert men, when I ask for assumptions which\nthey refuse to grant to me; and without assumptions no one can prove\nanything about anything.\n\nI am suspicious then of scientific demonstrations in a question of\nconcrete fact, in a discussion between fallible men. However, let those\ndemonstrate who have the gift; \u201cunusquisque in suo sensu abundet.\u201d\nFor me, it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove\nChristianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain\nthat I have been born into this world, and that I shall die out of it.\nIt is pleasant to my own feelings to follow a theological writer, such\nas Amort, who has dedicated to the great Pope, Benedict XIV., what\nhe calls \u201ca new, modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic\nReligion.\u201d In this work he adopts the argument merely of the _greater_\nprobability;(40) I prefer to rely on that of an _accumulation_ of\nvarious probabilities; but we both hold (that is, I hold with him),\nthat from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient\nfor certitude. I follow him in holding, that, since a Good Providence\nwatches over us, He blesses such means of argument as it has pleased\nHim to give us, in the nature of man and of the world, if we use them\nduly for those ends for which He has given them; and that, as in\nmathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding\nour assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical\ndemonstration, so by a like dictate we are not justified, in the case\nof concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting\ntill such logical demonstration is ours, but on the contrary are bound\nin conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of\nproof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to\nsatisfy the severe requisitions of science.(41)\n\nHere then at once is one momentous doctrine or principle, which enters\ninto my own reasoning, and which another ignores, viz. the providence\nand intention of God; and of course there are other principles,\nexplicit or implicit, which are in like circumstances. It is not\nwonderful then, that, while I can prove Christianity divine to my\nown satisfaction, I shall not be able to force it upon any one else.\nMultitudes indeed I ought to succeed in persuading of its truth without\nany force at all, because they and I start from the same principles,\nand what is a proof to me is a proof to them; but if any one starts\nfrom any other principles but ours, I have not the power to change his\nprinciples or the conclusion which he draws from them, any more than\nI can make a crooked man straight. Whether his mind will ever grow\nstraight, whether I can do anything towards its becoming straight,\nwhether he is not responsible, responsible to his Maker, for being\nmentally crooked, is another matter; still the fact remains, that, in\nany inquiry about things in the concrete, men differ from each other,\nnot so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles\nwhich govern its exercise, that those principles are of a personal\ncharacter, that where there is no common measure of minds, there is\nno common measure of arguments, and that the validity of proof is\ndetermined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense.\n\nAccordingly, instead of saying that the truths of Revelation depend\non those of Natural Religion, it is more pertinent to say that belief\nin revealed truths depends on belief in natural. Belief is a state\nof mind; belief generates belief; states of mind correspond to each\nother; the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a\nhigher state of belief than our present, are the very same which we\nalready possess in connexion with the lower state. Those Jews became\nChristians in Apostolic times who were already what may be called\ncrypto-Christians; and those Christians in this day remain Christian\nonly in name, and (if it so happen) at length fall away, who are\nnothing deeper or better than men of the world, _savants_, literary\nmen, or politicians.\n\nThat a special preparation of mind is required for each separate\ndepartment of inquiry and discussion (excepting, of course, that of\nabstract science) is strongly insisted upon in well-known passages of\nthe Nicomachean Ethics. Speaking of the variations which are found in\nthe logical perfection of proof in various subject-matters, Aristotle\nsays, \u201cA well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of\nsubjects, according as the nature of the thing admits; for it is much\nthe same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities,\nand to require demonstration of an orator. Each man judges skilfully in\nthose things about which he is well-informed; it is of these, that he\nis a good judge; viz. he, in each subject-matter, is a judge, who is\nwell-educated in that subject-matter, and he is in an absolute sense\na judge, who is in all of them well-educated.\u201d Again: \u201cYoung men come\nto be mathematicians and the like, but they cannot possess practical\njudgment; for this talent is employed upon individual facts, and these\nare learned only by experience; and a youth has not experience, for\nexperience is only gained by a course of years. And so, again, it would\nappear that a boy may be a mathematician, but not a philosopher, or\nlearned in physics, and for this reason,\u2014because the one study deals\nwith abstractions, while the other studies gain their principles from\nexperience, and in the latter subjects youths do not give assent, but\nmake assertions, but in the former they know what it is that they are\nhandling.\u201d\n\nThese words of a heathen philosopher, laying down broad principles\nabout all knowledge, express a general rule, which in Scripture\nis applied authoritatively to the case of revealed knowledge in\nparticular;\u2014and that not once or twice only, but continually, as is\nnotorious. For instance:\u2014\u201cI have understood,\u201d says the Psalmist, \u201cmore\nthan all my teachers, because Thy testimonies are my meditation.\u201d\nAnd so our Lord: \u201cHe that hath ears, let him hear.\u201d \u201cIf any man will\ndo His will, he shall know of the doctrine.\u201d And \u201cHe that is of God,\nheareth the words of God.\u201d Thus too the Angels at the Nativity announce\n\u201cPeace to men of good will.\u201d And we read in the Acts of the Apostles\nof \u201cLydia, whose heart the Lord opened to attend to those things which\nwere said by Paul.\u201d And we are told on another occasion, that \u201cas many\nas were ordained,\u201d or disposed by God, \u201cto life everlasting, believed.\u201d\nAnd St. John tells us, \u201cHe that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not\nof God, heareth us not; by this we know the spirit of truth, and the\nspirit of error.\u201d\n\n1.\n\nRelying then on these authorities, human and Divine, I have no scruple\nin beginning the review I shall take of Christianity by professing\nto consult for those only whose minds are properly prepared for it;\nand by being prepared, I mean to denote those who are imbued with the\nreligious opinions and sentiments which I have identified with Natural\nReligion. I do not address myself to those, who in moral evil and\nphysical see nothing more than imperfections of a parallel nature;\nwho consider that the difference in gravity between the two is one of\ndegree only, not of kind; that moral evil is merely the offspring of\nphysical, and that as we remove the latter so we inevitably remove\nthe former; that there is a progress of the human race which tends to\nthe annihilation of moral evil; that knowledge is virtue, and vice is\nignorance; that sin is a bugbear, not a reality; that the Creator does\nnot punish except in the sense of correcting; that vengeance in Him\nwould of necessity be vindictiveness; that all that we know of Him, be\nit much or little, is through the laws of nature; that miracles are\nimpossible; that prayer to Him is a superstition; that the fear of Him\nis unmanly; that sorrow for sin is slavish and abject; that the only\nintelligible worship of Him is to act well our part in the world, and\nthe only sensible repentance to do better in future; that if we do our\nduties in this life, we may take our chance for the next; and that it\nis of no use perplexing our minds about the future state, for it is all\na matter of guess. These opinions characterize a civilized age; and if\nI say that I will not argue about Christianity with men who hold them,\nI do so, not as claiming any right to be impatient or peremptory with\nany one, but because it is plainly absurd to attempt to prove a second\nproposition to those who do not admit the first.\n\nI assume then that the above system of opinion is simply false,\ninasmuch as it contradicts the primary teachings of nature in the human\nrace, wherever a religion is found and its workings can be ascertained.\nI assume the Presence of God in our conscience, and the universal\nexperience, as keen as our experience of bodily pain, of what we call a\nsense of sin or guilt. This sense of sin, as of something not only evil\nin itself, but an affront to the good God, is chiefly felt as regards\none or other of three violations of His Law. He Himself is Sanctity,\nTruth, and Love; and the three offences against His Majesty are\nimpurity, inveracity, and cruelty. All men are not distressed at these\noffences alike; but the piercing pain and sharp remorse which one or\nother inflicts upon the mind, till habituated to them, brings home to\nit the notion of what sin is, and is the vivid type and representative\nof its intrinsic hatefulness.\n\nStarting from these elements, we may determine without difficulty the\nclass of sentiments, intellectual and moral, which constitute the\nformal preparation for entering upon what are called the Evidences\nof Christianity. These Evidences, then, presuppose a belief and\nperception of the Divine Presence, a recognition of His attributes\nand an admiration of His Person viewed under them, a conviction of\nthe worth of the soul and of the reality and momentousness of the\nunseen world, an understanding that, in proportion as we partake in\nour own persons of the attributes which we admire in Him, we are dear\nto Him, a consciousness on the contrary that we are far from partaking\nthem, a consequent insight into our guilt and misery, an eager hope\nof reconciliation to Him, a desire to know and to love Him, and a\nsensitive looking-out in all that happens, whether in the course of\nnature or of human life, for tokens, if such there be, of His bestowing\non us what we so greatly need. These are specimens of the state of mind\nfor which I stipulate in those who would inquire into the truth of\nChristianity; and my warrant for so definite a stipulation lies in the\nteaching, as I have described it, of conscience and the moral sense,\nin the testimony of those religious rites which have ever prevailed\nin all parts of the world, and in the character and conduct of those\nwho have commonly been selected by the popular instinct as the special\nfavourites of Heaven.\n\n2.\n\nI have appealed to the popular ideas on the subject of religion, and\nto the objects of popular admiration and praise, as illustrating my\naccount of the preparation of mind which is necessary for the inquirer\ninto Christianity. Here an obvious objection occurs, in noticing\nwhich I shall be advanced one step farther in the work which I have\nundertaken.\n\nIt may be urged, then, that no appeal will avail me, which is made\nto religions so notoriously immoral as those of paganism; nor indeed\ncan it be made without an explanation. Certainly, as regards ethical\nteaching, various religions, which have been popular in the world, have\nnot supplied any; and in the corrupt state in which they appear in\nhistory, they are little better than schools of imposture, cruelty, and\nimpurity. Their objects of worship were immoral as well as false, and\ntheir founders and heroes have been in keeping with their gods. This is\nundeniable, but it does not destroy the use that may be made of their\ntestimony. There is a better side of their teaching; purity has often\nbeen held in reverence, if not practised; ascetics have been in honour;\nhospitality has been a sacred duty; and dishonesty and injustice have\nbeen under a ban. Here then, as before, I take our natural perception\nof right and wrong as the standard for determining the characteristics\nof Natural Religion, and I use the religious rites and traditions which\nare actually found in the world, only so far as they agree with our\nmoral sense.\n\nThis leads me to lay down the general principle, which I have all\nalong implied:\u2014that no religion is from God which contradicts our\nsense of right and wrong. Doubtless; but at the same time we ought to\nbe quite sure that, in a particular case which is before us, we have\nsatisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are,\nand that we apply them rightly, and whether the applying them or not\ncomes into question at all. The precepts of a religion certainly may\nbe absolutely immoral; a religion which simply commanded us to lie, or\nto have a community of wives, would _ipso facto_ forfeit all claim to\na divine origin. Jupiter and Neptune, as represented in the classical\nmythology, are evil spirits, and nothing can make them otherwise. And I\nshould in like manner repudiate a theology which taught that men were\ncreated in order to be wicked and wretched.\n\nI alluded just now to those who consider the doctrine of retributive\npunishment, or of divine vengeance, to be incompatible with the true\nreligion; but I do not see how they can maintain their ground. In order\nto do so, they have first to prove that an act of vengeance must, as\nsuch, be a sin in our own instance; but even this is far from clear.\nAnger and indignation against cruelty and injustice, resentment of\ninjuries, desire that the false, the ungrateful, and the depraved\nshould meet with punishment, these, if not in themselves virtuous\nfeelings, are at least not vicious; but, first from the certainty\nthat, if habitual, it will run into excess and become sin, and next\nbecause the office of punishment has not been committed to us, and\nfurther because it is a feeling unsuitable to those who are themselves\nso laden with imperfection and guilt, therefore vengeance, in itself\nallowable, is forbidden to us. These exceptions do not hold in the\ncase of a perfect being, and certainly not in the instance of the\nSupreme Judge. Moreover, we see that even men on earth have different\nduties, according to their personal qualifications and their positions\nin the community. The rule of morals is the same for all; and yet,\nnotwithstanding, what is right in one is not necessarily right in\nanother. What would be a crime in a private man to do, is a crime in\na magistrate not to have done; still wider is the difference between\nman and his Maker. Nor must it be forgotten, that, as I have observed\nabove, retributive justice is the very attribute under which God is\nprimarily brought before us in the teachings of our natural conscience.\n\nAnd further, we cannot determine the character of particular actions,\ntill we have the whole case before us out of which they arise; unless,\nindeed, they are in themselves distinctively vicious. We all feel\nthe force of the maxim, \u201cAudi alteram partem.\u201d It is difficult to\ntrace the path and to determine the scope of Divine Providence. We\nread of a day when the Almighty will condescend to place His actions\nin their completeness before His creatures, and \u201cwill overcome when\nHe is judged.\u201d If, till then, we feel it to be a duty to suspend our\njudgment concerning certain of His actions or precepts, we do no more\nthan what we do every day in the case of an earthly friend or enemy,\nwhose conduct in some point requires explanation. It surely is not too\nmuch to expect of us that we should act with parallel caution, and\nbe \u201cmemores conditionis nostr\u00e6\u201d as regards the acts of our Creator.\nThere is a poem of Parnell\u2019s which strikingly brings home to us how\ndifferently the divine appointments will look in the light of day, from\nwhat they appear to be in our present twilight. An Angel, in disguise\nof a man, steals a golden cup, strangles an infant, and throws a guide\ninto the stream, and then explains to his horrified companion, that\nacts which would be enormities in man, are in him, as God\u2019s minister,\ndeeds of merciful correction or of retribution.\n\nMoreover, when we are about to pass judgment on the dealings of\nProvidence with other men, we shall do well to consider first His\ndealings with ourselves. We cannot know about others, about ourselves\nwe do know something; and we know that He has ever been good to us,\nand not severe. Is it not wise to argue from what we actually know\nto what we do not know? It may turn out in the day of account, that\nunforgiven souls, while charging His laws with injustice in the case of\nothers, may be unable to find fault with His dealings severally towards\nthemselves.\n\nAs to those various religions which, together with Christianity, teach\nthe doctrine of eternal punishment, here again we ought, before we\njudge, to understand, not only the whole state of the case, but what is\nmeant by the doctrine itself. Eternity, or endlessness, is in itself\nonly a negative idea, though punishment is positive. Its fearful force,\nas added to punishment, lies in what it is not; it means no change\nof state, no annihilation, no restoration. But it cannot become a\nquality of punishment, any more than a man\u2019s living seventy years is a\nquality of his mind, or enters into the idea of his virtues or talents.\nIf punishment be attended by continuity, by a sense of duration and\nsuccession, by the mental presence of its past and its future, by\na sustained power of realizing it,(42) this must be because it is\nendless and something more; such inflictions are an addition to its\nendlessness, and do not necessarily belong to it because it is endless.\nAs I have already said, the great mystery is, not that evil has no end,\nbut that it had a beginning. But I submit the whole subject to the\nTheological School.\n\n3.\n\nOne of the most important effects of Natural Religion on the mind, in\npreparation for Revealed, is the anticipation which it creates, that a\nRevelation will be given. That earnest desire of it, which religious\nminds cherish, leads the way to the expectation of it. Those who\nknow nothing of the wounds of the soul, are not led to deal with the\nquestion, or to consider its circumstances; but when our attention is\nroused, then the more steadily we dwell upon it, the more probable\ndoes it seem that a revelation has been or will be given to us. This\npresentiment is founded on our sense, on the one hand, of the infinite\ngoodness of God, and, on the other, of our own extreme misery and\nneed\u2014two doctrines which are the primary constituents of Natural\nReligion. It is difficult to put a limit to the legitimate force of\nthis antecedent probability. Some minds will feel it so powerfully,\nas to recognize in it almost a proof, without direct evidence, of the\ndivinity of a religion claiming to be the true, supposing its history\nand doctrine are free from positive objection, and there be no rival\nreligion with plausible claims of its own. Nor ought this trust in a\npresumption to seem preposterous to those who are so confident, on _\u00e0\npriori_ grounds, that the moon is inhabited by rational beings, and\nthat the course of nature is never crossed by miraculous agency. Any\nhow, very little positive evidence seems to be necessary, when the mind\nis penetrated by the strong anticipation which I am supposing. It was\nthis instinctive apprehension, as we may conjecture, which carried on\nDionysius and Damaris at Athens to a belief in Christianity, though\nSt. Paul did no miracle there, and only asserted the doctrines of the\nDivine Unity, the Resurrection, and the universal judgment, while, on\nthe other hand, it had had no tendency to attach them to any of the\nmythological rites in which the place abounded.\n\nHere my method of argument differs from that adopted by Paley in his\nEvidences of Christianity. This clear-headed and almost mathematical\nreasoner postulates, for his proof of its miracles, only thus much,\nthat, under the circumstances of the case, a revelation is not\nimprobable. He says, \u201cWe do not assume the attributes of the Deity,\nor the existence of a future state.\u201d \u201cIt is not necessary for our\npurpose that these propositions (viz. that a future existence should be\ndestined by God for His human creation, and that, being so destined,\nHe should have acquainted them with it,) be capable of proof, or even\nthat, by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out\nas probable; it is enough that we are able to say of them, that they\nare not so violently improbable, so contradictory to what we already\nbelieve of the divine power and character, that [they] ought to be\nrejected at first sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or\ncomplication of evidence they be attested.\u201d He has such confidence in\nthe strength of the testimony which he can produce in favour of the\nChristian miracles, that he only asks to be allowed to bring it into\ncourt.\n\nI confess to much suspicion of legal proceedings and legal arguments,\nwhen used in questions whether of history or of philosophy. Rules\nof court are dictated by what is expedient on the whole and in the\nlong run; but they incur the risk of being unjust to the claims of\nparticular cases. Why am I to begin with taking up a position not my\nown, and unclothing my mind of that large outfit of existing thoughts,\nprinciples, likings, desires, and hopes, which make me what I am? If I\nam asked to use Paley\u2019s argument for my own conversion, I say plainly\nI do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism;(43) if I am asked\nto convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome\ntheir reason without touching their hearts. I wish to deal, not with\ncontroversialists, but with inquirers.\n\nI think Paley\u2019s argument clear, clever, and powerful; and there is\nsomething which looks like charity in going out into the highways and\nhedges, and compelling men to come in; but in this matter some exertion\non the part of the persons whom I am to convert is a condition of a\ntrue conversion. They who have no religious earnestness are at the\nmercy, day by day, of some new argument or fact, which may overtake\nthem, in favour of one conclusion or the other. And how, after all,\nis a man better for Christianity, who has never felt the need of it\nor the desire? On the other hand, if he has longed for a revelation\nto enlighten him and to cleanse his heart, why may he not use, in\nhis inquiries after it, that just and reasonable anticipation of its\nprobability, which such longing has opened the way to his entertaining?\n\nMen are too well inclined to sit at home, instead of stirring\nthemselves to inquire whether a revelation has been given; they expect\nits evidences to come to them without their trouble; they act, not\nas suppliants, but as judges.(44) Modes of argument such as Paley\u2019s,\nencourage this state of mind; they allow men to forget that revelation\nis a boon, not a debt on the part of the Giver; they treat it as a mere\nhistorical phenomenon. If I was told that some great man, a foreigner,\nwhom I did not know, had come into town, and was on his way to call\non me, and to go over my house, I should send to ascertain the fact,\nand meanwhile should do my best to put my house into a condition to\nreceive him. He would not be pleased if I left the matter to take\nits chance, and went on the maxim that seeing was believing. Like\nthis is the conduct of those who resolve to treat the Almighty with\ndispassionateness, a judicial temper, clearheadedness, and candour. It\nis the way with some men, (surely not a good way,) to say, that without\nthese lawyerlike qualifications conversion is immoral. It is their way,\na miserable way, to pronounce that there is no religious love of truth\nwhere there is fear of error. On the contrary, I would maintain that\nthe fear of error is simply necessary to the genuine love of truth.\nNo inquiry comes to good which is not conducted under a deep sense of\nresponsibility, and of the issues depending upon its determination.\nEven the ordinary matters of life are an exercise of conscientiousness;\nand where conscience is, fear must be. So much is this acknowledged\njust now, that there is almost an affectation, in popular literature,\nin the case of criticisms on the fine arts, on poetry, and music, of\nspeaking about conscientiousness in writing, painting, or singing; and\nthat earnestness and simplicity of mind, which makes men fear to go\nwrong in these minor matters, has surely a place in the most serious of\nall undertakings.\n\nIt is on these grounds that, in considering Christianity, I start\nwith conditions different from Paley\u2019s; not, however, as undervaluing\nthe force and the serviceableness of his argument, but as preferring\ninquiry to disputation in a question about truth.\n\n4.\n\nThere is another point on which my basis of argument differs from\nPaley\u2019s. He argues on the principle that the credentials, which\nascertain for us a message from above, are necessarily in their nature\nmiraculous; nor have I any thought of venturing to say otherwise.\nIn fact, all professed revelations have been attended, in one\nshape or another, with the profession of miracles; and we know how\ndirect and unequivocal are the miracles of both the Jewish Covenant\nand of our own. However, my object here is to assume as little as\npossible as regards facts, and to dwell only on what is patent and\nnotorious; and therefore I will only insist on those coincidences\nand their cumulations, which, though not in themselves miraculous,\ndo irresistibly force upon us, almost by the law of our nature, the\npresence of the extraordinary agency of Him whose being we already\nacknowledge. Though coincidences rise out of a combination of general\nlaws, there is no law of those coincidences;(45) they have a character\nof their own, and seem left by Providence in His own hands, as the\nchannel by which, inscrutable to us, He may make known to us His will.\n\nFor instance, if I am a believer in a God of Truth and Avenger of\ndishonesty, and know for certain that a market-woman, after calling\non Him to strike her dead if she had in her possession a piece of\nmoney not hers, did fall down dead on the spot, and that the money was\nfound in her hand, how can I call this a blind coincidence, and not\ndiscern in it an act of Providence over and above its general laws?\nSo, certainly, thought the inhabitants of an English town, when they\nerected a pillar as a record of such an event at the place where it\noccurred. And if a Pope excommunicates a great conqueror; and he,\non hearing the threat, says to one of his friends, \u201cDoes he think\nthe world has gone back a thousand years? does he suppose the arms\nwill fall from the hands of my soldiers?\u201d and within two years, on\nthe retreat over the snows of Russia, as two contemporary historians\nrelate, \u201cfamine and cold tore their arms from the grasp of the\nsoldiers,\u201d \u201cthey fell from the hands of the bravest and most robust,\u201d\nand \u201cdestitute of the power of raising them from the ground, the\nsoldiers left them in the snow;\u201d is not this too, though no miracle,\na coincidence so special, as rightly to be called a Divine judgment?\nSo thinks Alison, who avows with religious honesty, that \u201cthere is\nsomething in these marvellous coincidences beyond the operation of\nchance, and which even a Protestant historian feels himself bound\nto mark for the observation of future years.(46)\u201d And so, too, of a\ncumulation of coincidences, separately less striking; when Spelman sets\nabout establishing the fact of the ill-fortune which in a multitude\nof instances has followed upon acts of sacrilege, then, even though\nin many instances it has not followed, and in many instances he\nexaggerates, still there may be a large residuum of cases which cannot\nbe properly resolved into the mere accident of concurrent causes,\nbut must in reason be considered the warning voice of God. So, at\nleast, thought Gibson, Bishop of London, when he wrote, \u201cMany of the\ninstances, and those too well-attested, are so terrible in the event,\nand in the circumstances so surprising, that no considering person can\nwell pass them over.\u201d\n\nI think, then, that the circumstances under which a professed\nrevelation comes to us, may be such as to impress both our reason and\nour imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be\nmade to strictly miraculous intervention\u2014in saying which I do not mean\nof course to imply that those circumstances, when traced back to their\nfirst origins, are not the outcome of such intervention, but that the\nmiraculous intervention addresses us at this day in the guise of those\ncircumstances; that is, of coincidences, which are indications, to\nthe illative sense of those who believe in a Moral Governor, of His\nimmediate Presence, especially to those who in addition hold with me\nthe strong antecedent probability that, in His mercy, He will thus\nsupernaturally present Himself to our apprehension.\n\n5.\n\nNow as to the fact; has what is so probable in anticipation actually\nbeen granted to us, or have we still to look out for it? It is very\nplain, supposing it has been granted, which among all the religions\nof the world comes from God: and if it is not that, a revelation is\nnot yet given, and we must look forward to the future. There is only\none Religion in the world which tends to fulfil the aspirations,\nneeds, and foreshadowings of natural faith and devotion. It may be\nsaid, perhaps, that, educated in Christianity, I merely judge of it\nby its own principles; but this is not the fact. For, in the first\nplace, I have taken my idea of what a revelation must be, in good\nmeasure, from the actual religions of the world; and as to its ethics,\nthe ideas with which I come to it are derived not simply from the\nGospel, but prior to it from heathen moralists, whom Fathers of the\nChurch and Ecclesiastical writers have imitated or sanctioned; and\nas to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the\nsubject, Aristotle has been my master. Besides, I do not here single\nout Christianity with reference simply to its particular doctrines or\nprecepts, but for a reason which is on the surface of its history.\nIt alone has a definite message addressed to all mankind. As far as\nI know, the religion of Mahomet has brought into the world no new\ndoctrine whatever, except, indeed, that of its own divine origin;\nand the character of its teaching is too exact a reflection of the\nrace, time, place, and climate in which it arose, to admit of its\nbecoming universal. The same dependence on external circumstances is\ncharacteristic, so far as I know, of the religions of the far East; nor\nam I sure of any definite message from God to man which they convey\nand protect, though they may have sacred books. Christianity, on the\nother hand, is in its idea an announcement, a preaching; it is the\ndepositary of truths beyond human discovery, momentous, practical,\nmaintained one and the same in substance in every age from its first,\nand addressed to all mankind. And it has actually been embraced and\nis found in all parts of the world, in all climates, among all races,\nin all ranks of society, under every degree of civilization, from\nbarbarism to the highest cultivation of mind. Coming to set right and\nto govern the world, it has ever been, as it ought to be, in conflict\nwith large masses of men, with the civil power, with physical force,\nwith adverse philosophies; it has had successes, it has had reverses;\nbut it has had a grand history, and has effected great things, and is\nas vigorous in its age as in its youth. In all these respects it has a\ndistinction in the world and a pre-eminence of its own; it has upon it\n_prim\u00e2 facie_ signs of divinity; I do not know what can be advanced by\nrival religions to match prerogatives so special; so that I feel myself\njustified in saying either Christianity is from God, or a revelation\nhas not yet been given to us.\n\nIt will not surely be objected, as a point in favour of some of the\nOriental religions, that they are older than Christianity by some\ncenturies; yet, should it be so said, it must be recollected that\nChristianity is only the continuation and conclusion of what professes\nto be an earlier revelation, which may be traced back into prehistoric\ntimes, till it is lost in the darkness that hangs over them. As far\nas we know, there never was a time when that revelation was not,\u2014a\nrevelation continuous and systematic, with distinct representatives and\nan orderly succession. And this, I suppose, is far more than can be\nsaid for the religions of the East.\n\n6.\n\nHere, then, I am brought to the consideration of the Hebrew nation\nand the Mosaic religion, as the first step in the direct evidence for\nChristianity.\n\nThe Jews are one of the few Oriental nations who are known in history\nas a people of progress, and their line of progress is the development\nof religious truth. In that their own line they stand by themselves\namong all the populations, not only of the East, but of the West. Their\ncountry may be called the classical home of the religious principle, as\nGreece is the home of intellectual power, and Rome that of political\nand practical wisdom. Theism is their life; it is emphatically their\nnational religion, for they never were without it, and were made a\npeople by means of it. This is a phenomenon singular and solitary in\nhistory, and must have a meaning. If there be a God and Providence, it\nmust come from Him, whether immediately or indirectly; and the people\nthemselves have ever maintained that it has been His direct work, and\nhas been recognized by Him as such. We are apt to treat pretences to a\ndivine mission or to supernatural powers as of frequent occurrence, and\non that score to dismiss them from our thoughts; but we cannot so deal\nwith Judaism. When mankind had universally denied the first lesson of\ntheir conscience by lapsing into polytheism, is it a thing of slight\nmoment that there was just one exception to the rule, that there was\njust one people who, first by their rulers and priests, and afterwards\nby their own unanimous zeal, professed, as their distinguishing\ndoctrine, the Divine Unity and Government of the world, and that,\nmoreover, not only as a natural truth, but as revealed to them by that\nGod Himself of whom they spoke,\u2014who so embodied it in their national\npolity, that a Theocracy was the only name by which it could be called?\nIt was a people founded and set up in Theism, kept together by Theism,\nand maintaining Theism for a period from first to last of 2000 years,\ntill the dissolution of their body politic; and they have maintained it\nsince in their state of exile and wandering for 2000 years more. They\nbegin with the beginning of history, and the preaching of this august\ndogma begins with them. They are its witnesses and confessors, even\nto torture and death; on it and its revelation are moulded their laws\nand government; on this their politics, philosophy, and literature are\nfounded; of this truth their poetry is the voice, pouring itself out\nin devotional compositions which Christianity, through all its many\ncountries and ages, has been unable to rival; on this aboriginal truth,\nas time goes on, prophet after prophet bases his further revelations,\nwith a sustained reference to a time when, according to the secret\ncounsels of its Divine Object and Author, it is to receive completion\nand perfection,\u2014till at length that time comes.\n\nThe last age of their history is as strange as their first. When that\ntime of destined blessing came, which they had so accurately marked\nout, and were so carefully waiting for\u2014a time which found them, in\nfact, more zealous for their Law, and for the dogma it enshrined, than\nthey ever had been before\u2014then, instead of any final favour coming\non them from above, they fell under the power of their enemies, and\nwere overthrown, their holy city razed to the ground, their polity\ndestroyed, and the remnant of their people cast off to wander far and\naway through every land except their own, as we find them at this day;\nlasting on, century after century, not absorbed in other populations,\nnot annihilated, as likely to last on, as unlikely to be restored, as\nfar as outward appearances go, now as a thousand years ago. What nation\nhas so grand, so romantic, so terrible a history? Does it not fulfil\nthe idea of, what the nation calls itself, a chosen people, chosen for\ngood and evil? Is it not an exhibition in a course of history of that\nprimary declaration of conscience, as I have been determining it, \u201cWith\nthe upright Thou shalt be upright, and with the froward Thou shalt be\nfroward\u201d? It must have a meaning, if there is a God. We know what was\ntheir witness of old time; what is their witness now?\n\nWhy, I say, was it that, after so memorable a career, when their sins\nand sufferings were now to come to an end, when they were looking\nout for a deliverance and a Deliverer, suddenly all was reversed for\nonce and for all? They were the favoured servants of God, and yet a\npeculiar reproach and note of infamy is affixed to their name. It was\ntheir belief that His protection was unchangeable, and that their\nLaw would last for ever;\u2014it was their consolation to be taught by an\nuninterrupted tradition, that it could not die, except by changing into\na new self, more wonderful than it was before;\u2014it was their faithful\nexpectation that a promised King was coming, the Messiah, who would\nextend the sway of Israel over all people;\u2014it was a condition of their\ncovenant, that, as a reward to Abraham, their first father, the day at\nlength should dawn when the gates of their narrow land should open,\nand they should pour out for the conquest and occupation of the whole\nearth;\u2014and, I repeat, when the day came, they did go forth, and they\ndid spread into all lands, but as hopeless exiles, as eternal wanderers.\n\nAre we to say that this failure is a proof that, after all, there was\nnothing providential in their history? For myself, I do not see how a\nsecond portent obliterates a first; and, in truth, their own testimony\nand their own sacred books carry us on towards a better solution\nof the difficulty. I have said they were in God\u2019s favour under a\ncovenant,\u2014perhaps they did not fulfil the conditions of it. This indeed\nseems to be their own account of the matter, though it is not clear\nwhat their breach of engagement was. And that in some way they did sin,\nwhatever their sin was, is corroborated by the well-known chapter in\nthe Book of Deuteronomy, which so strikingly anticipates the nature\nof their punishment. That passage, translated into Greek as many as\n350 years before the siege of Jerusalem by Titus, has on it the marks\nof a wonderful prophecy; but I am not now referring to it as such,\nbut merely as an indication that the disappointment, which actually\novertook them at the Christian era, was not necessarily out of keeping\nwith the original divine purpose, or again with the old promise made to\nthem, and their confident expectation of its fulfilment. Their national\nruin, which came instead of aggrandizement, is described in that book,\nin spite of all promises, with an emphasis and minuteness which prove\nthat it was contemplated long before, at least as a possible issue of\nthe fortunes of Israel. Among other inflictions which should befall the\nguilty people, it was told them that they should fall down before their\nenemies, and should be scattered throughout all the kingdoms of the\nearth; that they never should have quiet in those nations, or have rest\nfor the sole of their foot; that they were to have a fearful heart and\nlanguishing eyes, and a soul consumed with heaviness; that they were\nto suffer wrong, and to be crushed at all times, and to be astonished\nat the terror of their lot; that their sons and daughters were to be\ngiven to another people, and they were to look and to sicken all the\nday, and their life was ever to hang in doubt before them, and fear to\nhaunt them day and night; that they should be a proverb and a by-word\nof all people among whom they were brought; and that curses were to\ncome on them, and to be signs and wonders on them and their seed for\never. Such are some portions, and not the most terrible, of this\nextended anathema; and its partial accomplishment at an earlier date of\ntheir history was a warning to them, when the destined time drew near,\nthat, however great the promises made to them might be, those promises\nwere dependent on the terms of the covenant which stood between them\nand their Maker, and that, as they had turned to curses at that former\ntime, so they might turn to curses again.\n\nThis grand drama, so impressed with the characters of supernatural\nagency, concerns us here only in its bearing upon the evidence for\nthe divine origin of Christianity; and it is at this point that\nChristianity comes upon the historical scene. It is a notorious fact\nthat it issued from the Jewish land and people; and, had it no other\nthan this historical connexion with Judaism, it would have some share\nin the prestige of its original home. But it claims to be far more\nthan this; it professes to be the actual completion of the Mosaic Law,\nthe promised means of deliverance and triumph to the nation, which\nthat nation itself, as I have said, has since considered to be, on\naccount of some sin or other, withheld or forfeited. It professes to\nbe, not the casual, but the legitimate offspring, heir, and successor\nof the Mosaic covenant, or rather to be Judaism itself, developed and\ntransformed. Of course it has to prove its claim, as well as to prefer\nit; but if it succeeds in doing so, then all those tokens of the Divine\nPresence, which distinguish the Jewish history, at once belong to it,\nand are a portion of its credentials.\n\nAnd at least the _prim\u00e2 facie_ view of its relations towards Judaism\nis in favour of these pretensions. It is an historical fact, that, at\nthe very time that the Jews committed their unpardonable sin, whatever\nit was, and were driven out from their home to wander over the earth,\ntheir Christian brethren, born of the same stock, and equally citizens\nof Jerusalem, did also issue forth from the same home, but in order to\nsubdue that same earth and make it their own; that is, they undertook\nthe very work which, according to the promise, their nation actually\nwas ordained to execute; and, with a method of their own indeed, and\nwith a new end, and only slowly and painfully, but still really and\nthoroughly, they did it. And since that time the two children of the\npromise have ever been found together\u2014of the promise forfeited and the\npromise fulfilled; and whereas the Christian has been in high place,\nso the Jew has been degraded and despised\u2014the one has been \u201cthe head,\u201d\nand the other \u201cthe tail;\u201d so that, to go no farther, the fact that\nChristianity actually has done what Judaism was to have done, decides\nthe controversy, by the logic of facts, in favour of Christianity.\nThe prophecies announced that the Messiah was to come at a definite\ntime and place; Christians point to Him as coming then and there, as\nannounced; they are not met by any counter claim or rival claimant on\nthe part of the Jews, only by their assertion that He did not come at\nall, though up to the event they had said He was then and there coming.\nFurther, Christianity clears up the mystery which hangs over Judaism,\naccounting fully for the punishment of the people, by specifying their\nsin, their heinous sin. If, instead of hailing their own Messiah,\nthey crucified Him, then the strange scourge which has pursued them\nafter the deed, and the energetic wording of the curse before it, are\nexplained by the very strangeness of their guilt;\u2014or rather, their\nsin is their punishment; for in rejecting their Divine King, they\n_ipso facto_ lost the living principle and tie of their nationality.\nMoreover, we see what led them into error; they thought a triumph and\nan empire were to be given to them at once, which were given indeed\neventually, but by the slow and gradual growth of many centuries and a\nlong warfare.\n\nOn the whole, then, I observe, on the one hand, that, Judaism having\nbeen the channel of religious traditions which are lost in the depth\nof their antiquity, of course it is a great point for Christianity\nto succeed in proving that it is the legitimate heir to that former\nreligion. Nor is it, on the other, of less importance to the\nsignificance of those early traditions to be able to determine that\nthey were not lost together with their original store-house, but were\ntransferred, on the failure of Judaism, to the custody of the Christian\nChurch. And this apparent correspondence between the two is in itself a\npresumption for such correspondence being real. Next, I observe, that\nif the history of Judaism is so wonderful as to suggest the presence\nof some special divine agency in its appointments and fortunes, still\nmore wonderful and divine is the history of Christianity; and again\nit is more wonderful still, that two such wonderful creations should\nspan almost the whole course of ages, during which nations and states\nhave been in existence, and should constitute a professed system of\ncontinued intercourse between earth and heaven from first to last amid\nall the vicissitudes of human affairs. This phenomenon again carries on\nits face, to those who believe in a God, the probability that it has\nthat divine origin which it professes to have; and, (when viewed in the\nlight of the strong presumption which I have insisted on, that in God\u2019s\nmercy a revelation from Him will be granted to us, and of the contrast\npresented by other religions, no one of which professes to be a\nrevelation direct, definite, and integral as this is,)\u2014this phenomenon,\nI say, of cumulative marvels raises that probability, both for Judaism\nand Christianity, in religious minds, almost to a certainty.\n\n7.\n\nIf Christianity is connected with Judaism as closely as I have\nbeen supposing, then there have been, by means of the two, direct\ncommunications between man and his Maker from time immemorial down\nto this day\u2014a great prerogative such, that it is nowhere else even\nclaimed. No other religion but these two professes to be the organ of\na formal revelation, certainly not of a revelation which is directed\nto the benefit of the whole human race. Here it is that Mahometanism\nfails, though it claims to carry on the line of revelation after\nChristianity; for it is the mere creed and rite of certain races,\nbringing with it, as such, no gifts to our nature, and is rather a\nreformation of local corruptions, and a return to the ceremonial\nworship of earlier times, than a new and larger revelation. And while\nChristianity was the heir to a dead religion, Mahometanism was little\nmore than a rebellion against a living one. Moreover, though Mahomet\nprofessed to be the Paraclete, no one pretends that he occupies a place\nin the Christian Scriptures as prominent as that which the Messiah\nfills in the Jewish. To this especial prominence of the Messianic idea\nI shall now advert; that is, to the prophecies of the Old Scriptures,\nand to the argument which they furnish in favour of Christianity; and\nthough I know that argument might be clearer and more exact than it is,\nand I do not pretend here to do much more than refer to the fact of its\nexistence, still so far forth as we enter into it, will it strengthen\nour conviction of the claim to divinity both of the Religion which\nis the organ of those prophecies, and of the Religion which is their\nobject.\n\nNow that the Jewish Scriptures were in existence long before the\nChristian era, and were in the sole custody of the Jews, is undeniable;\nwhatever then their Scriptures distinctly say of Christianity, if\nnot attributable to chance or to happy conjecture, is prophetic. It\nis undeniable too, that the Jews gathered from those books that a\ngreat Personage was to be born of their stock, and to conquer the\nwhole world and to become the instrument of extraordinary blessings\nto it; moreover, that he would make his appearance at a fixed date,\nand that, the very date when, as it turned out, our Lord did actually\ncome. This is the great outline of the prediction, and if nothing more\ncould be said about them than this, to prove as much as this is far\nfrom unimportant. And it is undeniable, I say, both that the Jewish\nScriptures contain thus much, and that the Jews actually understood\nthem as containing it.\n\nFirst, then, as to what Scripture declares. From the book of Genesis\nwe learn that the chosen people was set up in this one idea, viz. to\nbe a blessing to the whole earth, and that, by means of one of their\nown race, a greater than their father Abraham. This was the meaning and\ndrift of their being chosen. There is no room for mistake here; the\ndivine purpose is stated from the first with the utmost precision. At\nthe very time of Abraham\u2019s call, he is told of it:\u2014\u201cI will make of thee\na great nation, and in thee shall all tribes of the earth be blessed.\u201d\nThrice is this promise and purpose announced in Abraham\u2019s history; and\nafter Abraham\u2019s time it is repeated to Isaac, \u201cIn thy seed shall all\nthe nations of the earth be blessed;\u201d and after Isaac to Jacob, when a\nwanderer from his home, \u201cIn thee and in thy seed shall all the tribes\nof the earth be blessed.\u201d And from Jacob the promise passes on to his\nson Judah, and that with an addition, viz. with a reference to the\ngreat Person who was to be the world-wide blessing, and to the date\nwhen He should come. Judah was the chosen son of Jacob, and his staff\nor sceptre, that is, his patriarchal authority, was to endure till a\ngreater than Judah came, so that the loss of the sceptre, when it took\nplace, was the sign of His near approach. \u201cThe sceptre,\u201d says Jacob\non his death-bed, \u201cshall not be taken away from Judah, until He come\nfor whom it is reserved,\u201d or \u201cwho is to be sent,\u201d \u201cand He shall be the\nexpectation of the nations.(47)\u201d\n\nSuch was the categorical prophecy, literal and unequivocal in its\nwording, direct and simple in its scope. One man, born of the chosen\ntribe, was the destined minister of blessing to the whole world; and\nthe race, as represented by that tribe, was to lose its old self in\ngaining a new self in Him. Its destiny was sealed upon it in its\nbeginning. An expectation was the measure of its life. It was created\nfor a great end, and in that end it had its ending. Such were the\ninitial communications made to the chosen people, and there they\nstopped;\u2014as if the outline of promise, so sharply cut, had to be\neffectually imprinted on their minds, before more knowledge was given\nto them; as if, by the long interval of years which passed before the\nmore varied prophecies in type and figure, after the manner of the\nEast, were added, the original notices might stand out in the sight of\nall in their severe explicitness, as archetypal truths, and guides in\ninterpreting whatever else was obscure in its wording or complex in its\ndirection.\n\nAnd in the second place it is quite clear that the Jews did thus\nunderstand their prophecies, and did expect their great Ruler, in\nthe very age in which our Lord came, and in which they, on the other\nhand, were destroyed, losing their old self without gaining their\nnew. Heathen historians shall speak for the fact. \u201cA persuasion had\npossession of most of them,\u201d says Tacitus, speaking of their resistance\nto the Romans, \u201cthat it was contained in the ancient books of the\npriests that at that very time the East should prevail, and that men\nwho issued from Judea should obtain the empire. The common people, as\nis the way with human cupidity, having once interpreted in their own\nfavour this grand destiny, were not even by their reverses brought\nround to the truth of facts.\u201d And Suetonius extends the belief:\u2014\u201cThe\nwhole East was rife with an old and persistent belief, that at that\ntime persons who issued from Judea, should possess the empire.\u201d After\nthe event of course the Jews drew back, and denied the correctness of\ntheir expectation, still they could not deny that the expectation had\nexisted. Thus the Jew Josephus, who was of the Roman party, says that\nwhat encouraged them in the stand they made against the Romans was \u201can\nambiguous oracle, found in their sacred writings, that at that date\nsome one of them from that country should rule the world.\u201d He can but\npronounce that the oracle was ambiguous; he cannot state that they\nthought it so.\n\nNow, considering that at that very time our Lord did appear as a\nteacher, and founded not merely a religion, but (what was then quite\na new idea in the world) a system of religious warfare, an aggressive\nand militant body, a dominant Catholic Church, which aimed at the\nbenefit of all nations by the spiritual conquest of all; and that\nthis warfare, then begun by it, has gone on without cessation down\nto this day, and now is as living and real as ever it was; that that\nmilitant body has from the first filled the world, that it has had\nwonderful successes, that its successes have on the whole been of\nextreme benefit to the human race, that it has imparted an intelligent\nnotion about the Supreme God to millions who would have lived and\ndied in irreligion, that it has raised the tone of morality wherever\nit has come, has abolished great social anomalies and miseries, has\nelevated the female sex to its proper dignity, has protected the poorer\nclasses, has destroyed slavery, encouraged literature and philosophy,\nand had a principal part in that civilization of human kind, which,\nwith some evils still, has on the whole been productive of far greater\ngood,\u2014considering, I say, that all this began at the destined,\nexpected, recognized season when the old prophecy said that in one\nMan, born of the tribe of Judah, all the tribes of the earth were to\nbe blessed, I feel I have a right to say (and my line of argument does\nnot lead me to say more), that it is at the very least a remarkable\ncoincidence,\u2014that is, one of those coincidences which, when they are\naccumulated, come close upon the idea of miracle, as being impossible\nwithout the Hand of God directly and immediately in them.\n\nWhen we have got as far as this, we may go on a great deal farther.\nAnnouncements, which could not be put forward in the front of the\nargument, as being figurative, vague, or ambiguous, may be used validly\nand with great effect, when they have been interpreted for us, first by\nthe prophetic outline, and still more by the historical object. It is a\nprinciple which applies to all matters on which we reason, that what is\nonly a maze of facts, without order or drift prior to the explanation,\nmay, when we once have that explanation, be located and adjusted with\ngreat facility in all its separate parts, as we know is the case as\nregards the motions of the heavenly bodies since the hypothesis of\nNewton. In like manner the event is the true key to prophecy, and\nreconciles conflicting and divergent descriptions by embodying them\nin one common representative. Thus it is that we learn how, as the\nprophecies said, the Messiah could both suffer, yet be victorious; His\nkingdom be Judaic in structure, yet evangelic in spirit; and His people\nthe children of Abraham, yet \u201csinners of the Gentiles.\u201d These seeming\nparadoxes, are only parallel and akin to those others which form so\nprominent a feature in the teaching of our Lord and His Apostles.\n\nAs to the Jews, since they lived before the event, it is not wonderful,\nthat, though they were right in their general interpretation of\nScripture as far as it went, they stopped short of the whole truth;\nnay, that even when their Messiah came, they could not recognize Him as\nthe promised King as we recognize Him now;\u2014for we have the experience\nof His history for nearly two thousand years, by which to interpret\ntheir Scriptures. We may partly understand their position towards those\nprophecies, by our own at present towards the Apocalypse. Who can deny\nthe superhuman grandeur and impressiveness of that sacred book! yet,\nas a prophecy, though some outlines of the future are discernible,\nhow differently it affects us from the predictions of Isaiah! either\nbecause it relates to undreamed-of events still to come, or because\nit has been fulfilled long ago in events which in their detail and\ncircumstance have never become history. And the same remark applies\ndoubtless to portions of the Messianic prophecies still; but, if their\nfulfilment has been thus gradual in time past, we must not be surprised\nthough portions of them still await their slow but true accomplishment\nin the future.\n\n8.\n\nWhen I implied that in some points of view Christianity has not\nanswered the expectations of the old prophecies, of which it claims\nto be the fulfilment, I had in mind principally the contrast which is\npresented to us between the picture which they draw of the universality\nof the kingdom of the Messiah, and that partial development of it\nthrough the world, which is all the Christian Church can show; and\nagain the contrast between the rest and peace which they said He was to\nintroduce, and the Church\u2019s actual history,\u2014the conflicts of opinion\nwhich have raged within its pale, the violent acts and unworthy lives\nof many of its rulers, and the moral degradation of great masses of its\npeople. I do not profess to meet these difficulties here, except by\nsaying that the failure of Christianity in one respect in corresponding\nto those prophecies cannot destroy the force of its correspondence to\nthem in others; just as we may allow that the portrait of a friend is a\nfaulty likeness to him, and yet be quite sure that it is his portrait.\nWhat I shall actually attempt to show here is this,\u2014that Christianity\nwas quite aware from the first of its own prospective future, so\nunlike the expectations which the prophets would excite concerning it,\nand that it meets the difficulty thence arising by anticipation, by\ngiving us its own predictions of what it was to be in historical fact,\npredictions which are at once explanatory comments upon the Jewish\nScriptures, and direct evidences of its own prescience.\n\nI think it observable then, that, though our Lord claims to be the\nMessiah, He shows so little of conscious dependence on the old\nScriptures, or of anxiety to fulfil them; as if it became Him, who was\nthe Lord of the Prophets, to take His own course, and to leave their\nutterances to adjust themselves to Him as they could, and not to be\ncareful to accommodate Himself to them. The evangelists do indeed show\nsome such natural zeal in His behalf, and thereby illustrate what I\nnotice in Him by the contrast. They betray an earnestness to trace in\nHis Person and history the accomplishment of prophecy, as when they\ndiscern it in His return from Egypt, in His life at Nazareth, in the\ngentleness and tenderness of His mode of teaching, and in the various\nminute occurrences of His passion; but He Himself goes straight forward\non His way, of course claiming to be the Messiah of the Prophets,(48)\nstill not so much recurring to past prophecies, as uttering new ones,\nwith an antithesis not unlike that which is so impressive in the\nSermon on the Mount, when He first says, \u201cIt has been said by them\nof old time,\u201d and then adds, \u201cBut I say unto you.\u201d Another striking\ninstance of this is seen in the Names under which He spoke of Himself,\nwhich have little or no foundation in any thing which was said of\nHim beforehand in the Jewish Scriptures. They speak of Him as Ruler,\nProphet, King, Hope of Israel, Offspring of Judah, and Messiah; and\nHis Evangelists and Disciples call Him Master, Lord, Prophet, Son of\nDavid, King of Israel, King of the Jews, and Messiah or Christ; but He\nHimself, though, I repeat, He acknowledges these titles as His own,\nespecially that of the Christ, chooses as His special designations\nthese two, Son of God and Son of Man, the latter of which is only once\ngiven Him in the Old Scriptures, and by which He corrects any narrow\nJudaic interpretation of them; while the former was never distinctly\nused of Him before He came, and seems first to have been announced to\nthe world by the Angel Gabriel and St. John the Baptist. In those two\nNames, Son of God and Son of Man, declaratory of the two natures of\nEmmanuel, He separates Himself from the Jewish Dispensation, in which\nHe was born, and inaugurates the New Covenant.\n\nThis is not an accident, and I shall now give some instances of it,\nthat is, of what I may call the independent autocratic view which He\ntakes of His own religion, into which the old Judaism was melting, and\nof the prophetic insight into its spirit and its future which that view\ninvolves. In quoting His own sayings from the Evangelists for this\npurpose, I assume (of which there is no reasonable doubt) that they\nwrote before any historical events had happened of a nature to cause\nthem unconsciously to modify or to colour the language which their\nMaster used.\n\n1. First, then, the fact has been often insisted on as a bold\nconception, unheard of before, and worthy of divine origin, that He\nshould even project a universal religion, and that to be effected by\nwhat may be called a propagandist movement from one centre. Hitherto\nit had been the received notion in the world, that each nation had its\nown gods. The Romans legislated upon that basis, and the Jews had held\nit from the first, holding of course also, that all gods but their\nown God were idols and demons. It is true that the Jews ought to have\nbeen taught by their prophecies what was in store for the world and\nfor them, and that their first dispersion through the Empire centuries\nbefore Christ came, and the proselytes which they collected around them\nin every place, were a kind of comment on the prophecies larger than\ntheir own; but we see what was, in fact, when our Lord came, their\nexpectation from those prophecies, in the passages which I have quoted\nabove from the Roman historians of His day. But He from the first\nresisted those plausible, but mistaken interpretations of Scripture. In\nHis cradle indeed He had been recognized by the Eastern sages as their\nking; the Angel announced that He was to reign over the house of Jacob;\nNathanael, too, owned Him as the Messiah with a regal title; but He,\non entering upon His work, interpreted these anticipations in His own\nway, and that not the way of Theudas and Judas of Galilee, who took the\nsword, and collected soldiers about them,\u2014nor the way of the Tempter,\nwho offered Him \u201call the kingdoms of the world.\u201d In the words of the\nEvangelists, He began, not to fight, but \u201cto preach;\u201d and further, to\n\u201cpreach the kingdom of heaven,\u201d saying, \u201cThe time is accomplished, and\nthe kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and believe the Gospel.\u201d This is\nthe significant title, \u201cthe kingdom of heaven,\u201d\u2014the more significant,\nwhen explained by the attendant precept of repentance and faith,\u2014on\nwhich He founds the polity which He was establishing from first to\nlast. One of His last sayings before He suffered was, \u201cMy kingdom is\nnot of this world.\u201d And His last words, before He left the earth, when\nHis disciples asked Him about His kingdom, were that they, preachers\nas they were, and not soldiers, should \u201cbe His witnesses to the end of\nthe earth,\u201d should \u201cpreach to all nations, beginning with Jerusalem,\u201d\nshould \u201cgo into the world and preach the Gospel to every creature,\u201d\nshould \u201cgo and make disciples of all nations till the consummation of\nall things.\u201d\n\nThe last Evangelist of the four is equally precise in recording the\ninitial purpose with which our Lord began His ministry, viz. to create\nan empire, not by force, but by persuasion. \u201cLight is come into the\nworld; every one that doth evil, hateth the light, but he that doth\ntruth, cometh to the light.\u201d \u201cLift up your eyes, and see the countries,\nfor they are white already to harvest.\u201d \u201cNo man can come to Me, except\nthe Father, who hath sent Me, draw him.\u201d \u201cAnd I, if I be lifted up from\nthe earth, will draw all things to Myself.\u201d\n\nThus, while the Jews, relying on their Scriptures with great appearance\nof reason, looked for a deliverer who should conquer with the sword, we\nfind that Christianity, from the first, not by an after-thought upon\ntrial and experience, but as a fundamental truth, magisterially set\nright that mistake, transfiguring the old prophecies, and bringing to\nlight, as St. Paul might say, \u201cthe mystery which had been hidden from\nages and generations, but now was made manifest in His saints, the\nglory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you,\u201d not\nsimply over you, but in you, by faith and love, \u201cthe hope of glory.\u201d\n\n2. I have partly anticipated my next remark, which relates to the\nmeans by which the Christian enterprise was to be carried into effect.\nThat preaching was to have a share in the victories of the Messiah\nwas plain from Prophet and Psalmist; but then Charlemagne preached,\nand Mahomet preached, with an army to back them. The same Psalm which\nspeaks of those \u201cwho preach good tidings,\u201d speaks also of their King\u2019s\n\u201cfoot being dipped in the blood of His enemies;\u201d but what is so grandly\noriginal in Christianity is, that on its broad field of conflict its\npreachers were to be simply unarmed, and to suffer, but to prevail.\nIf we were not so familiar with our Lord\u2019s words, I think they would\nastonish us. \u201cBehold, I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves.\u201d\nThis was to be their normal state, and so it was; and all the promises\nand directions given to them imply it. \u201cBlessed are they that suffer\npersecution;\u201d \u201cblessed are ye when they revile you;\u201d \u201cthe meek shall\ninherit the earth;\u201d \u201cresist not evil;\u201d \u201cyou shall be hated of all\nmen for My Name\u2019s sake;\u201d \u201ca man\u2019s enemies shall be they of his own\nhousehold;\u201d \u201che that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.\u201d\nWhat sort of encouragement was this for men who were to go about an\nimmense work? Do men in this way send out their soldiers to battle, or\ntheir sons to India or Australia? The King of Israel hated Micaiah,\nbecause he always \u201cprophesied of him evil.\u201d \u201cSo persecuted they the\nProphets that were before you,\u201d says our Lord. Yes, and the Prophets\nfailed; they were persecuted and they lost the battle. \u201cTake, my\nbrethren,\u201d says St. James, \u201cfor an example of suffering evil, of labour\nand patience, the Prophets, who spake in the Name of the Lord.\u201d They\nwere \u201cracked, mocked, stoned, cut asunder, they wandered about,\u2014of whom\nthe world was not worthy,\u201d says St. Paul. What an argument to encourage\nthem to aim at success by suffering, to put before them the precedent\nof those who suffered and who failed!\n\nYet the first preachers, our Lord\u2019s immediate disciples, saw no\ndifficulty in a prospect to human eyes so appalling, so hopeless. How\nconnatural this strange, unreasoning, reckless courage was with their\nregenerate state is shown most signally in St. Paul, as having been a\nconvert of later vocation. He was no personal associate of our Lord\u2019s,\nyet how faithfully he echoes back our Lord\u2019s language! His instrument\nof conversion is \u201cthe foolishness of preaching;\u201d \u201cthe weak things of\nthe earth confound the strong;\u201d \u201cwe hunger and thirst, and are naked,\nand are buffeted, and have no home;\u201d \u201cwe are reviled and bless, we are\npersecuted, and blasphemed, and are made the refuse of this world, and\nthe offscouring of all things.\u201d Such is the intimate comprehension,\non the part of one who had never seen our Lord on earth, and knew\nlittle from His original disciples of the genius of His teaching;\u2014and\nconsidering that the prophecies, upon which he had lived from his\nbirth, for the most part bear on their surface a contrary doctrine, and\nthat the Jews of that day did commonly understand them in that contrary\nsense, we cannot deny that Christianity, in tracing out the method\nby which it was to prevail in the future, took its own, independent\nline, and, in assigning from the first a rule and a history to its\npropagation, a rule and a history which have been carried out to this\nday, rescues itself from the charge of but partially fulfilling those\nJewish prophecies, by the assumption of a prophetical character of its\nown.\n\n3. Now we come to a third point, in which the Divine Master explains,\nand in a certain sense corrects, the prophecies of the Old Covenant, by\na more exact interpretation of them from Himself. I have granted that\nthey seemed to say that His coming would issue in a period of peace\nand religiousness. \u201cBehold,\u201d says the Prophet, \u201ca king shall reign in\njustice, and princes shall rule in judgment. The fool shall no more\nbe called prince, neither shall the deceitful be called great. The\nwolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard lie down with the kid.\nThey shall not hurt nor kill in all My holy mountain, for the earth is\nfilled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the covering waters of the\nsea.\u201d\n\nThese words seem to predict a reversal of the consequences of the\nfall, and that reversal has not been granted to us, it is true; but\nlet us consider how distinctly Christianity warns us against any such\nanticipation. While it is so forcibly laid down in the Gospels that the\nhistory of the kingdom of heaven begins in suffering and sanctity, it\nis as plainly said that it results in unfaithfulness and sin; that is\nto say, that, though there are at all times many holy, many religious\nmen in it, and though sanctity, as at the beginning, is ever the life\nand the substance and the germinal seed of the Divine Kingdom, yet\nthere will be many too, there will be more, who by their lives are a\nscandal and injury to it, not a defence. This again, is an astonishing\nannouncement, and the more so when viewed in contrast with the precepts\ndelivered by our Lord in His Sermon on the Mount, and His description\nto the Apostles of their weapons and their warfare. So perplexing to\nChristians was the fact when fulfilled, as it was in no long time on a\nlarge scale, that three of the early heresies more or less originated\nin obstinate, unchristian refusal to readmit to the privileges of the\nGospel those who had fallen into sin. Yet our Lord\u2019s words are express:\nHe tells us that \u201cMany are called, few are chosen;\u201d in the parable of\nthe Marriage Feast, the servants who are sent out gather together \u201call\nthat they found, both bad and good;\u201d the foolish virgins \u201chad no oil in\ntheir vessels;\u201d amid the good seed an enemy sows seed that is noxious\nor worthless; and \u201cthe kingdom is like to a net which gathered together\nall kind of fishes;\u201d and \u201cat the end of the world the Angels shall go\nforth, and shall separate the wicked from among the just.\u201d\n\nMoreover, He not only speaks of His religion as destined to possess a\nwide temporal power, such, that, as in the case of the Babylonian, \u201cthe\nbirds of the air should dwell in its branches,\u201d but He opens on us the\nprospect of ambition and rivalry in its leading members, when He warns\nHis disciples against desiring the first places in His kingdom; nay, of\ngrosser sins, in His description of the Ruler, who \u201cbegan to strike his\nfellow-servants, and to eat and drink and be drunken,\u201d\u2014passages which\nhave an awful significance, considering what kind of men have before\nnow been His chosen representatives, and have sat in the chair of His\nApostles.\n\nIf then it be objected that Christianity does not, as the old prophets\nseem to promise, abolish sin and irreligion within its pale, we may\nanswer, not only that it did not engage to do so, but that actually in\na prophetical spirit it warned its followers against the expectation of\nits so doing.\n\n9.\n\nAccording to our Lord\u2019s announcements before the event, Christianity\nwas to prevail and to become a great empire, and to fill the earth; but\nit was to accomplish this destiny, not as other victorious powers had\ndone, and as the Jews expected, by force of arms or by other means of\nthis world, but by the novel expedient of sanctity and suffering. If\nsome aspiring party of this day, the great Orleans family, or a branch\nof the Hohenzollern, wishing to found a kingdom, were to profess, as\ntheir only weapon, the practice of virtue, they would not startle us\nmore than it startled a Jew eighteen hundred years ago, to be told that\nhis glorious Messiah was not to fight, like Joshua or David, but simply\nto preach. It is indeed a thought so strange, both in its prediction\nand in its fulfilment, as urgently to suggest to us that some Divine\nPower went with him who conceived and proclaimed it. This is what I\nhave been saying;\u2014now I wish to consider the fact, which was predicted,\nin itself, without reference to its being the subject whether of a\nprediction or of a fulfilment; that is, the history of the rise and\nestablishment of Christianity; and to inquire whether it is a history\nthat admits of being resolved, by any philosophical ingenuity, into the\nordinary operation of moral, social, or political causes.\n\nAs is well known, various writers have attempted to assign human causes\nin explanation of the phenomenon: Gibbon especially has mentioned five,\nviz. the zeal of Christians, inherited from the Jews, their doctrine\nof a future state, their claim to miraculous power, their virtues, and\ntheir ecclesiastical organization. Let us briefly consider them.\n\nHe thinks these five causes, when combined, will fairly account for the\nevent; but he has not thought of accounting for their combination. If\nthey are ever so available for his purpose, still that availableness\narises out of their coincidence, and out of what does that coincidence\narise? Until this is explained, nothing is explained, and the question\nhad better have been let alone. These presumed causes are quite\ndistinct from each other, and, I say, the wonder is, what made them\ncome together. How came a multitude of Gentiles to be influenced with\nJewish zeal? How came zealots to submit to a strict, ecclesiastical\n_r\u00e9gime_? What connexion has a secular _r\u00e9gime_ with the immortality\nof the soul? Why should immortality, a philosophical doctrine, lead\nto belief in miracles, which is a superstition of the vulgar? What\ntendency had miracles and magic to make men austerely virtuous? Lastly,\nwhat power was there in a code of virtue, as calm and enlightened\nas that of Antoninus, to generate a zeal as fierce as that of\nMaccab\u00e6us? Wonderful events before now have apparently been nothing\nbut coincidences, certainly; but they do not become less wonderful by\ncataloguing their constituent causes, unless we also show how these\ncame to be constituent.\n\nHowever, this by the way; the real question is this,\u2014are these\nhistorical characteristics of Christianity, also in matter of fact,\nhistorical causes of Christianity? Has Gibbon given proof that they\nare? Has he brought evidence of their operation, or does he simply\nconjecture in his private judgment that they operated? Whether they\nwere adapted to accomplish a certain work, is a matter of opinion;\nwhether they did accomplish it is a question of fact. He ought to\nadduce instances of their efficiency before he has a right to say that\nthey are efficient. And the second question is, what is this effect, of\nwhich they are to be considered as causes? It is no other than this,\nthe conversion of bodies of men to the Christian faith. Let us keep\nthis in view. We have to determine whether these five characteristics\nof Christianity were efficient causes of bodies of men becoming\nChristians? I think they neither did effect such conversions, nor were\nadapted to do so, and for these reasons:\u2014\n\n1. For first, as to zeal, by which Gibbon means party spirit, or\n_esprit de corps_; this doubtless is a motive principle when men\nare already members of a body, but does it operate in bringing them\ninto it? The Jews were born in Judaism, they had a long and glorious\nhistory, and would naturally feel and show _esprit de corps_; but how\ndid party spirit tend to transplant Jew or Gentile out of his own\nplace into a new society, and that a society which as yet scarcely\nwas formed in a society? Zeal, certainly, may be felt for a cause,\nor for a person; on this point I shall speak presently; but Gibbon\u2019s\nidea of Christian zeal is nothing better than the old wine of Judaism\ndecanted into new Christian bottles, and would be too flat a stimulant,\neven if it admitted of such a transference, to be taken as a cause of\nconversion to Christianity without definite evidence in proof of the\nfact. Christians had zeal for Christianity after they were converted,\nnot before.\n\n2. Next, as to the doctrine of a future state. Gibbon seems to mean by\nthis doctrine the fear of hell; now certainly in this day there are\npersons converted from sin to a religious life, by vivid descriptions\nof the future punishment of the wicked; but then it must be recollected\nthat such persons already believe in the doctrine thus urged upon\nthem. On the contrary, give some Tract upon hell-fire to one of the\nwild boys in a large town, who has had no education, who has no faith;\nand, instead of being startled by it, he will laugh at it as something\nfrightfully ridiculous. The belief in Styx and Tartarus was dying out\nof the world at the time that Christianity came in, as the parallel\nbelief now seems to be dying out in all classes of our own society. The\ndoctrine of eternal punishment does only anger the multitude of men in\nour large towns now, and make them blaspheme; why should it have had\nany other effect on the heathen populations in the age when our Lord\ncame? Yet it was among those populations, that He and His made their\nway from the first. As to the hope of eternal life, that doubtless, as\nwell as the fear of hell, was a most operative doctrine in the case of\nmen who had been actually converted, of Christians brought before the\nmagistrate, or writhing under torture, but the thought of eternal glory\ndoes not keep bad men from a bad life now, and why should it convert\nthem then from their pleasant sins, to a heavy, mortified, joyless\nexistence, to a life of ill-usage, fright, contempt, and desolation?\n\n3. That the claim to miracles should have any wide influence in favour\nof Christianity among heathen populations, who had plenty of portents\nof their own, is an opinion in curious contrast with the objection\nagainst Christianity which has provoked an answer from Paley, viz.\nthat \u201cChristian miracles are not recited or appealed to, by early\nChristian writers themselves, so fully or so frequently as might have\nbeen expected.\u201d Paley solves the difficulty as far as it is a fact,\nby observing, as I have suggested, that \u201cit was their lot to contend\nwith magical agency, against which the mere production of these facts\nwas not sufficient for the convincing of their adversaries:\u201d \u201cI do\nnot know,\u201d he continues, \u201cwhether they themselves thought it quite\ndecisive of the controversy.\u201d A claim to miraculous power on the part\nof Christians, which was so unfrequent as to become now an objection to\nthe fact of their possessing it, can hardly have been a principal cause\nof their success.\n\n4. And how is it possible to imagine with Gibbon that what he calls\nthe \u201csober and domestic virtues\u201d of Christians, their \u201caversion to\nthe luxury of the age,\u201d their \u201cchastity, temperance, and economy,\u201d\nthat these dull qualities were persuasives of a nature to win and\nmelt the hard heathen heart, in spite too of the dreary prospect of\nthe _barathrum_, the amphitheatre, and the stake? Did the Christian\nmorality by its severe beauty make a convert of Gibbon himself?\nOn the contrary, he bitterly says, \u201cIt was not in this world that\nthe primitive Christians were desirous of making themselves either\nagreeable or useful.\u201d \u201cThe virtue of the primitive Christians, like\nthat of the first Romans, was very frequently guarded by poverty and\nignorance.\u201d \u201cTheir gloomy and austere aspect, their abhorrence of the\ncommon business and pleasures of life, and their frequent predictions\nof impending calamities, inspired the Pagans with the apprehension of\nsome danger which would arise from the new sect.\u201d Here we have not only\nGibbon hating their moral and social bearing, but his heathen also. How\nthen were those heathen overcome by the amiableness of that which they\nviewed with such disgust? We have here plain proof that the Christian\ncharacter repelled the heathen; where is the evidence that it converted\nthem?\n\n5. Lastly, as to the ecclesiastical organization, this, doubtless, as\ntime went on, was a special characteristic of the new religion; but\nhow could it directly contribute to its extension? Of course it gave\nit strength, but it did not give it life. We are not born of bones and\nmuscles. It is one thing to make conquests, another to consolidate an\nempire. It was before Constantine that Christians made their great\nconquests. Rules are for settled times, not for time of war. So much\nis this contrast felt in the Catholic Church now, that, as is well\nknown, in heathen countries and in countries which have thrown off her\nyoke, she suspends her diocesan administration and her Canon Law, and\nputs her children under the extraordinary, extra-legal jurisdiction of\nPropaganda.\n\nThis is what I am led to say on Gibbon\u2019s Five Causes. I do not deny\nthat they might have operated now and then; Simon Magus came to\nChristianity in order to learn the craft of miracles, and Peregrinus\nfrom love of influence and power; but Christianity made its way, not by\nindividual, but by broad, wholesale conversions, and the question is,\nhow they originated?\n\nIt is very remarkable that it should not have occurred to a man of\nGibbon\u2019s sagacity to inquire, what account the Christians themselves\ngave of the matter. Would it not have been worth while for him to have\nlet conjecture alone, and to have looked for facts instead? Why did he\nnot try the hypothesis of faith, hope, and charity? Did he never hear\nof repentance towards God, and faith in Christ? Did he not recollect\nthe many words of Apostles, Bishops, Apologists, Martyrs, all forming\none testimony? No; such thoughts are close upon him, and close upon the\ntruth; but he cannot sympathize with them, he cannot believe in them,\nhe cannot even enter into them, _because_ he needs the due formation\nof mind.(49) Let us see whether the facts of the case do not come out\nclear and unequivocal, if we will but have the patience to endure them.\n\nA Deliverer of the human race through the Jewish nation had been\npromised from time immemorial. The day came when He was to appear,\nand He was eagerly expected; moreover, One actually did make His\nappearance at that date in Palestine, and claimed to be He. He left the\nearth without apparently doing much for the object of His coming. But\nwhen He was gone, His disciples took upon themselves to go forth to\npreach to all parts of the earth with the object of preaching _Him_,\nand collecting converts _in His Name_. After a little while they are\nfound wonderfully to have succeeded. Large bodies of men in various\nplaces are to be seen, professing to be His disciples, owning Him as\ntheir King, and continually swelling in number and penetrating into\nthe populations of the Roman Empire; at length they convert the Empire\nitself. All this is historical fact. Now, we want to know the farther\nhistorical fact, viz. the cause of their conversion; in other words,\nwhat were the topics of that preaching which was so effective? If\nwe believe what is told us by the preachers and their converts, the\nanswer is plain. They \u201cpreached Christ;\u201d they called on men to believe,\nhope, and place their affections, in that Deliverer who had come and\ngone; and the moral instrument by which they persuaded them to do so,\nwas a description of the life, character, mission, and power of that\nDeliverer, a promise of His invisible Presence and Protection here,\nand of the Vision and Fruition of Him hereafter. From first to last to\nChristians, as to Abraham, He Himself is the centre and fulness of the\ndispensation. They, as Abraham, \u201csee His day, and are glad.\u201d\n\nA temporal sovereign makes himself felt by means of his subordinate\nadministrators, who bring his power and will to bear upon every\nindividual of his subjects who personally know him not; the universal\nDeliverer, long expected, when He came, He too, instead of making and\nsecuring subjects by a visible graciousness or majesty, departs;\u2014_but_\nis found, through His preachers, to have imprinted the Image(50) or\nIdea of Himself in the minds of His subjects individually; and that\nImage, apprehended and worshipped in individual minds, becomes a\nprinciple of association, and a real bond of those subjects one with\nanother, who are thus united to the body by being united to that Image;\nand moreover that Image, which is their moral life, when they have been\nalready converted, is also the original instrument of their conversion.\nIt is the Image of Him who fulfils the one great need of human nature,\nthe Healer of its wounds, the Physician of the soul, this Image it is\nwhich both creates faith, and then rewards it.\n\nWhen we recognize this central Image as the vivifying idea both of the\nChristian body and of individuals in it, then, certainly, we are able\nto take into account at least two of Gibbon\u2019s causes, as having, in\nconnexion with that idea, some influence both in making converts and\nin strengthening them to persevere. It was the Thought of Christ, not\na corporate body or a doctrine, which inspired that zeal which the\nhistorian so poorly comprehends; and it was the Thought of Christ which\ngave a life to the promise of that eternity, which without Him would\nbe, in any soul, nothing short of an intolerable burden.\n\nNow a mental vision such as this, perhaps will be called cloudy,\nfanciful, unintelligible; that is, in other words, miraculous. I\nthink it is so. How, without the Hand of God, could a new idea, one\nand the same, enter at once into myriads of men, women, and children\nof all ranks, especially the lower, and have power to wean them from\ntheir indulgences and sins, and to nerve them against the most cruel\ntortures, and to last in vigour as a sustaining influence for seven\nor eight generations, till it founded an extended polity, broke the\nobstinacy of the strongest and wisest government which the world has\never seen, and forced its way from its first caves and catacombs to the\nfulness of imperial power?\n\nIn considering this subject, I shall confine myself to the proof, as\nfar as my limits allow, of two points,\u2014first, that this Thought or\nImage of Christ was the principle of conversion and of fellowship;\nand next, that among the lower classes, who had no power, influence,\nreputation, or education, lay its principal success.(51)\n\nAs to the vivifying idea, this is St. Paul\u2019s account of it: \u201cI make\nknown to you the gospel which I preached to you, which also you have\nreceived, and wherein you stand; by which also you are saved. For I\ndelivered to you first of all that which I also received, how that\nChrist died for our sins according to the Scriptures,\u201d &c., &c. \u201cI am\nthe least of the Apostles; but, whether I or they, so we preached, and\nso you believed.\u201d \u201cIt has pleased God by the foolishness of preaching\nto save them that believe.\u201d \u201cWe preach Christ crucified.\u201d \u201cI determined\nto know nothing among you, but Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.\u201d \u201cYour\nlife is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is your life, shall\nappear, then you also shall appear with Him in glory.\u201d \u201cI live, but now\nnot I, but Christ liveth in me.\u201d\n\nSt. Peter, who has been accounted the master of a separate school, says\nthe same: \u201cJesus Christ, whom you have not seen, yet love; in whom you\nnow believe, and shall rejoice.\u201d\n\nAnd St. John, who is sometimes accounted a third master in\nChristianity: \u201cIt hath not yet appeared what we shall be; but we know\nthat, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall\nsee Him as He is.\u201d\n\nThat their disciples followed them in this sovereign devotion to an\nInvisible Lord, will appear as I proceed.\n\nAnd next, as to the worldly position and character of His disciples,\nour Lord, in the well-known passage, returns thanks to His Heavenly\nFather \u201cbecause,\u201d He says, \u201cThou hast hid these things\u201d\u2014the mysteries\nof His kingdom\u2014\u201cfrom the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to\nlittle ones.\u201d And, in accordance with this announcement, St. Paul says\nthat \u201cnot many wise men according to the flesh, not many mighty, not\nmany noble,\u201d became Christians. He, indeed, is one of those few; so\nwere others his contemporaries, and, as time went on, the number of\nthese exceptions increased, so that converts were found, not a few, in\nthe high places of the Empire, and in the schools of philosophy and\nlearning; but still the rule held, that the great mass of Christians\nwere to be found in those classes which were of no account in the\nworld, whether on the score of rank or of education.\n\nWe all know this was the case with our Lord and His Apostles. It seems\nalmost irreverent to speak of their temporal employments, when we are\nso simply accustomed to consider them in their spiritual associations;\nbut it is profitable to remind ourselves that our Lord Himself was a\nsort of smith, and made ploughs and cattle-yokes. Four Apostles were\nfishermen, one a petty tax collector, two husbandmen, and another is\nsaid to have been a market gardener.(52) When Peter and John were\nbrought before the Council, they are spoken of as being, in a secular\npoint of view, \u201cilliterate men, and of the lower sort,\u201d and thus they\nare spoken of in a later age by the Fathers.\n\nThat their converts were of the same rank as themselves, is reported,\nin their favour or to their discredit, by friends and enemies, for\nfour centuries. \u201cIf a man be educated,\u201d says Celsus in mockery, \u201clet\nhim keep clear of us Christians; we want no men of wisdom, no men of\nsense. We account all such as evil. No; but, if there be one who is\ninexperienced, or stupid, or untaught, or a fool, let him come with\ngood heart.\u201d \u201cThey are weavers,\u201d he says elsewhere, \u201cshoemakers,\nfullers, illiterate, clowns.\u201d \u201cFools, low-born fellows,\u201d says Trypho.\n\u201cThe greater part of you,\u201d says C\u00e6cilius, \u201care worn with want, cold,\ntoil, and famine; men collected from the lowest dregs of the people;\nignorant, credulous women;\u201d \u201cunpolished, boors, illiterate, ignorant\neven of the sordid arts of life; they do not understand even civil\nmatters, how can they understand divine?\u201d \u201cThey have left their tongs,\nmallets, and anvils, to preach about the things of heaven,\u201d says\nLibanius. \u201cThey deceive women, servants, and slaves,\u201d says Julian.\nThe author of Philopatris speaks of them as \u201cpoor creatures, blocks,\nwithered old fellows, men of downcast and pale visages.\u201d As to their\nreligion, it had the reputation popularly, according to various\nFathers, of being an anile superstition, the discovery of old women, a\njoke, a madness, an infatuation, an absurdity, a fanaticism.\n\nThe Fathers themselves confirm these statements, so far as they relate\nto the insignificance and ignorance of their brethren. Athenagoras\nspeaks of the virtue of their \u201cignorant men, mechanics, and old\nwomen.\u201d \u201cThey are gathered,\u201d says St. Jerome, \u201cnot from the Academy or\nLyceum, but from the low populace.\u201d \u201cThey are whitesmiths, servants,\nfarm-labourers, woodmen, men of sordid trades, beggars,\u201d says\nTheodoret. \u201cWe are engaged in the farm, in the market, at the baths,\nwine-shops, stables, and fairs; as seamen, as soldiers, as peasants,\nas dealers,\u201d says Tertullian. How came such men to be converted? and,\nbeing converted, how came such men to overturn the world? Yet they went\nforth from the first, \u201cconquering and to conquer.\u201d\n\nThe first manifestation of their formidable numbers is made just about\nthe time when St. Peter and St. Paul suffered martyrdom, and was the\ncause of a terrible persecution. We have the account of it in Tacitus.\n\u201cNero,\u201d he says, \u201cto put an end to the common talk [that Rome had\nbeen set on fire by his order], imputed it to others, visiting with a\nrefinement of punishment those detestable criminals who went by the\nname of Christians. The author of that denomination was Christus, who\nhad been executed in Tiberius\u2019s time by the procurator, Pontius Pilate.\nThe pestilent superstition, checked for a while, burst out again, not\nonly throughout Judea, the first seat of the evil, but even throughout\nRome, the centre both of confluence and outbreak of all that is\natrocious and disgraceful from every quarter. First were arrested those\nwho made no secret of their sect; and by this clue a vast multitude of\nothers, convicted, not so much of firing the city, as of hatred to the\nhuman race. Mockery was added to death; clad in skins of beasts, they\nwere torn to pieces by dogs; they were nailed up to crosses; they were\nmade inflammable, so that, when day failed, they might serve as lights.\nHence, guilty as they were, and deserving of exemplary punishment, they\nexcited compassion, as being destroyed, not for the public welfare, but\nfrom the cruelty of one man.\u201d\n\nThe two Apostles suffered, and a silence follows of a whole generation.\nAt the end of thirty or forty years, Pliny, the friend of Trajan, as\nwell as of Tacitus, is sent as that Emperor\u2019s Propr\u00e6tor into Bithynia,\nand is startled and perplexed by the number, influence, and pertinacity\nof the Christians whom he finds there, and in the neighbouring province\nof Pontus. He has the opportunity of being far more fair to them than\nhis friend the historian. He writes to Trajan to know how he ought to\ndeal with them, and I will quote some portions of his letter.\n\nHe says he does not know how to proceed with them, as their religion\nhas not received toleration from the state. He never was present at any\ntrial of them; he doubted whether the children among them, as well as\ngrown people, ought to be accounted as culprits, whether recantation\nwould set matters right, or whether they incurred punishment all the\nsame; whether they were to be punished, merely because Christians, even\nthough no definite crime was proved against them. His way had been to\nexamine them, and put questions to them; if they confessed the charge,\nhe gave them one or two chances, threatening them with punishment;\nthen, if they persisted, he gave orders for their execution. \u201cFor,\u201d he\nargues, \u201cI felt no doubt that, whatever might be the character of their\nopinions, stubborn and inflexible obstinacy deserved punishment. Others\nthere were of a like infatuation, whom, being citizens, I sent to Rome.\u201d\n\nSome satisfied him; they repeated after him an invocation to the\ngods, and offered wine and incense to the Emperor\u2019s image, and in\naddition, cursed the name of Christ. \u201cAccordingly,\u201d he says, \u201cI let\nthem go; for I am told nothing can compel a real Christian to do any\nof these things.\u201d There were others, too, who sacrificed; who had been\nChristians, some of them for as many as twenty years.\n\nThen he is curious to know something more definite about them. \u201cThis,\nthe informers told me, was the whole of their crime or mistake, that\nthey were accustomed to assemble on a stated day before dawn, and to\nsay together a hymn to Christ as a god, and to bind themselves by an\noath [sacramento] (not to any crime, but on the contrary) to keep from\ntheft, robbery, adultery, breach of promise, and making free with\ndeposits. After this they used to separate, and then to meet again for\na meal, which was social and harmless. However, they left even that\noff, after my Edict against their meeting.\u201d\n\nThis information led him to put to the torture two maid-servants, \u201cwho\nwere called ministers,\u201d in order to find out what was true, what was\nfalse in it; but he says he could make out nothing, except a depraved\nand excessive superstition. This is what led him to consult the\nEmperor, \u201cespecially because of the number who were implicated in it;\nfor these are, or are likely to be, many, of all ages, nay, of both\nsexes. For the contagion of this superstition has spread, not only\nin the cities, but about the villages and the open country.\u201d He adds\nthat already there was some improvement. \u201cThe almost forsaken temples\nbegin to be filled again, and the sacred solemnities after a long\nintermission are revived. Victims, too, are again on sale, purchasers\nhaving been most rare to find.\u201d\n\nThe salient points in this account are these, that, at the end of\none generation from the Apostles, nay, almost in the lifetime of St.\nJohn, Christians had so widely spread in a large district of Asia, as\nnearly to suppress the Pagan religions there; that they were people of\nexemplary lives; that they had a name for invincible fidelity to their\nreligion; that no threats or sufferings could make them deny it; and\nthat their only tangible characteristic was the worship of our Lord.\n\nThis was at the beginning of the second century; not a great many\nyears after, we have another account of the Christian body, from an\nanonymous Greek Christian, in a letter to a friend whom he was anxious\nto convert. It is far too long to quote, and difficult to compress; but\na few sentences will show how strikingly it agrees with the account\nof the heathen Pliny, especially in two points,\u2014first, in the numbers\nof the Christians, secondly, on devotion to our Lord as the vivifying\nprinciple of their association.\n\n\u201cChristians,\u201d says the writer, \u201cdiffer not from other men in country,\nor speech, or customs. They do not live in cities of their own, or\nspeak in any peculiar dialect, or adopt any strange modes of living.\nThey inhabit their native countries, but as sojourners; they take their\npart in all burdens, as if citizens, and in all sufferings, as if they\nwere strangers. In foreign countries they recognize a home, and in\nevery home they see a foreign country. They marry like other men, but\ndo not disown their children. They obey the established laws, but they\ngo beyond them in the tenor of their lives. They love all men, and are\npersecuted by all; they are not known, and they are condemned; they\nare poor, and make many rich; they are dishonoured, yet in dishonour\nthey are glorified; they are slandered, and they are cleared; they are\ncalled names, and they bless. By the Jews they are assailed as aliens,\nby the Greeks they are persecuted, nor can they who hate them say why.\n\n\u201cChristians are in the world, as the soul in the body. The soul\npervades the limbs of the body, and Christians the cities of the\nworld. The flesh hates the soul, and wars against it, though suffering\nno wrong from it; and the world hates Christians. The soul loves\nthe flesh that hates it, and Christians love their enemies. Their\ntradition is not an earthly invention, nor is it a mortal thought\nwhich they so carefully guard, nor a dispensation of human mysteries\nwhich is committed to their charge; but God Himself, the Omnipotent\nand Invisible Creator, has from heaven established among men His Truth\nand His Word, the Holy and Incomprehensible, and has deeply fixed the\nsame in their hearts; not, as might be expected, sending any servant,\nangel, or prince, or administrator of things earthly or heavenly, but\nthe very Artificer and Demiurge of the Universe. Him God hath sent to\nman, not to inflict terror, but in clemency and gentleness, as a King\nsending a King who was His Son; He sent Him as God to men, to save\nthem. He hated not, nor rejected us, nor remembered our guilt, but\nshowed Himself long-suffering, and, in His own words, bore our sins. He\ngave His own Son as a ransom for us, the just for the unjust. For what\nother thing, except His Righteousness, could cover our guilt? In whom\nwas it possible for us, lawless sinners, to find justification, save\nin the Son of God alone? O sweet interchange! O heavenly workmanship\npast finding out! O benefits exceeding expectation! Sending, then, a\nSaviour, who is able to save those who of themselves are incapable of\nsalvation, He has willed that we should regard Him as our Guardian,\nFather, Teacher, Counsellor, Physician; our Mind, Light, Honour, Glory,\nStrength, and Life.(53)\u201d\n\nThe writing from which I have been quoting is of the early part of\nthe second century. Twenty or thirty years after it St. Justin Martyr\nspeaks as strongly of the spread of the new Religion: \u201cThere is not\nany one race of men,\u201d he says, \u201cbarbarian or Greek, nay, of those who\nlive in waggons, or who are Nomads, or Shepherds in tents, among whom\nprayers and eucharists are not offered to the Father and Maker of the\nUniverse, through the name of the crucified Jesus.\u201d\n\nTowards the end of the century, Clement:\u2014\u201cThe word of our Master did\nnot remain in Judea, as philosophy remained in Greece, but has been\npoured out over the whole world, persuading Greeks and Barbarians\nalike, race by race, village by village, every city, whole houses, and\nhearers one by one, nay, not a few of the philosophers themselves.\u201d\n\nAnd Tertullian, at the very close of it, could in his _Apologia_\neven proceed to threaten the Roman Government:\u2014\u201cWe are a people of\nyesterday,\u201d he says; \u201cand yet we have filled every place belonging to\nyou, cities, islands, castles, towns, assemblies, your very camp, your\ntribes, companies, palaces, senate, forum. We leave you your temples\nonly. We can count your armies, and our numbers in a single province\nwill be greater. In what war with you should we not be sufficient and\nready, even though unequal in numbers, who so willingly are put to\ndeath, if it were not in this Religion of ours more lawful to be slain\nthan to slay?\u201d\n\nOnce more, let us hear the great Origen, in the early part of the\nnext century:\u2014\u201cIn all Greece and in all barbarous races within our\nworld, there are tens of thousands who have left their national laws\nand customary gods for the law of Moses and the word of Jesus Christ;\nthough to adhere to that law is to incur the hatred of idolaters, and\nthe risk of death besides to have embraced that word. And considering\nhow, in so few years, in spite of the attacks made on us, to the loss\nof life or property, and with no great store of teachers, the preaching\nof that word has found its way into every part of the world, so that\nGreek and barbarians, wise and unwise, adhere to the religion of Jesus,\ndoubtless it is a work greater than any work of man.\u201d\n\nWe need no proof to assure us that this steady and rapid growth of\nChristianity was a phenomenon which startled its contemporaries, as\nmuch as it excites the curiosity of philosophic historians now; and\nthey too then had their own ways of accounting for it, different indeed\nfrom Gibbon\u2019s, but quite as pertinent, though less elaborate. These\nwere principally two, both leading them to persecute it,\u2014the obstinacy\nof the Christians and their magical powers, of which the former was the\nexplanation adopted by educated minds, and the latter chiefly by the\npopulace.\n\nAs to the former, from first to last, men in power magisterially\nreprobate the senseless obstinacy of the members of the new sect, as\ntheir characteristic offence. Pliny, as we have seen, found it to be\ntheir only fault, but one sufficient to merit capital punishment. The\nEmperor Marcus seems to consider obstinacy the ultimate motive-cause\nto which their unnatural conduct was traceable. After speaking of the\nsoul, as \u201cready, if it must now be separated from the body, to be\nextinguished, or dissolved, or to remain with it;\u201d he adds, \u201cbut the\nreadiness must come of its own judgment, not from simple perverseness,\nas in the case of Christians, but with considerateness, with gravity,\nand without theatrical effect, so as to be persuasive.\u201d And Diocletian,\nin his Edict of persecution, professes it to be his \u201cearnest aim to\npunish the depraved persistence of those most wicked men.\u201d\n\nAs to the latter charge, their founder, it was said, had gained a\nknowledge of magic in Egypt, and had left behind him in his sacred\nbooks the secrets of the art. Suetonius himself speaks of them as \u201cmen\nof a magical superstition;\u201d and Celsus accuses them of \u201cincantations\nin the name of demons.\u201d The officer who had custody of St. Perpetua,\nfeared her escape from prison \u201cby magical incantations.\u201d When St.\nTiburtius had walked barefoot on hot coals, his judge cried out that\nChrist had taught him magic. St. Anastasia was thrown into prison as\ndealing in poisons; the populace called out against St. Agnes, \u201cAway\nwith the witch! away with the sorceress!\u201d When St. Bonosus and St.\nMaximilian bore the burning pitch without shrinking, Jews and heathen\ncried out, \u201cThose wizards and sorcerers!\u201d \u201cWhat new delusion,\u201d says\nthe magistrate concerning St. Romanus, in the Hymn of Prudentius, \u201chas\nbrought in these sophists who deny the worship of the Gods? how doth\nthis chief sorcerer mock us, stilled by his Thessalian charm to laugh\nat punishment?(54)\u201d\n\nIt is indeed difficult to enter into the feelings of irritation and\nfear, of contempt and amazement, which were excited, whether in the\ntown populace or in the magistrates in the presence of conduct so\nnovel, so unvarying, so absolutely beyond their comprehension. The\nvery young and the very old, the child, the youth in the heyday of\nhis passions, the sober man of middle age, maidens and mothers of\nfamilies, boors and slaves as well as philosophers and nobles, solitary\nconfessors and companies of men and women,\u2014all these were seen equally\nto defy the powers of darkness to do their worst. In this strange\nencounter it became a point of honour with the Roman to break the\ndetermination of his victim, and it was the triumph of faith when his\nmost savage expedients for that purpose were found to be in vain.\nThe martyrs shrank from suffering like other men, but such natural\nshrinking was incommensurable with apostasy. No intensity of torture\nhad any means of affecting what was a mental conviction; and the\nsovereign Thought in which they had lived was their adequate support\nand consolation in their death. To them the prospect of wounds and\nloss of limbs was not more terrible than it is to the combatant of\nthis world. They faced the implements of torture as the soldier takes\nhis post before the enemy\u2019s battery. They cheered and ran forward to\nmeet his attack, and as it were dared him, if he would, to destroy the\nnumbers who kept closing up the foremost rank, as their comrades who\nhad filled it fell. And when Rome at last found she had to deal with a\nhost of Sc\u00e6volas, then the proudest of earthly sovereignties, arrayed\nin the completeness of her material resources, humbled herself before a\npower which was founded on a mere sense of the unseen.\n\nIn the colloquy of the aged Ignatius, the disciple of the Apostles,\nwith the Emperor Trajan, we have a sort of type of what went on for\nthree, or rather four centuries. He was sent all the way from Antioch\nto Rome to be devoured by the beasts in the amphitheatre. As he\ntravelled, he wrote letters to various Christian Churches, and among\nothers to his Roman brethren, among whom he was to suffer. Let us\nsee whether, as I have said, the Image of that Divine King, who had\nbeen promised from the beginning, was not the living principle of his\nobstinate resolve. The old man is almost fierce in his determination\nto be martyred. \u201cMay those beasts,\u201d he says to his brethren, \u201cbe my\ngain, which are in readiness for me! I will provoke and coax them to\ndevour me quickly, and not to be afraid of me, as they are of some whom\nthey will not touch. Should they be unwilling, I will compel them.\nBear with me; I know what is my gain. Now I begin to be a disciple. Of\nnothing of things visible or invisible am I ambitious, save to gain\nChrist. Whether it is fire or the cross, the assault of wild beasts,\nthe wrenching of my bones, the crunching of my limbs, the crushing of\nmy whole body, let the tortures of the devil all assail me, if I do but\ngain Christ Jesus.\u201d Elsewhere in the same Epistle he says, \u201cI write\nto you, still alive, but longing to die. My Love is crucified! I have\nno taste for perishable food. I long for God\u2019s Bread, heavenly Bread,\nBread of life, which is Flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. I long\nfor God\u2019s draught, His Blood, which is Love without corruption, and\nLife for evermore.\u201d It is said that, when he came into the presence\nof Trajan, the latter cried out, \u201cWho are you, poor devil, who are so\neager to transgress our rules?\u201d \u201cThat is no name,\u201d he answered, \u201cfor\nTheophorus.\u201d \u201cWho is Theophorus?\u201d asked the Emperor. \u201cHe who bears\nChrist in his breast.\u201d In the Apostle\u2019s words, already cited, he had\n\u201cChrist in him, the hope of glory.\u201d All this may be called enthusiasm;\nbut enthusiasm affords a much more adequate explanation of the\nconfessorship of an old man, than do Gibbon\u2019s five reasons.\n\nInstances of the same ardent spirit, and of the living faith on which\nit was founded, are to be found wherever we open the _Acta Martyrum_.\nIn the outbreak at Smyrna, in the middle of the second century, amid\ntortures which even moved the heathen bystanders to compassion, the\nsufferers were conspicuous for their serene calmness. \u201cThey made it\nevident to us all,\u201d says the Epistle of the Church, \u201cthat in the midst\nof those sufferings they were absent from the body, or rather, that the\nLord stood by them, and walked in the midst of them.\u201d\n\nAt that time Polycarp, the familiar friend of St. John, and a\ncontemporary of Ignatius, suffered in his extreme old age. When, before\nhis sentence, the Proconsul bade him \u201cswear by the fortunes of C\u00e6sar,\nand have done with Christ,\u201d his answer betrayed that intimate devotion\nto the self-same Idea, which had been the inward life of Ignatius.\n\u201cEighty and six years,\u201d he answered, \u201chave I been His servant, and\nHe has never wronged me, but ever has preserved me; and how can I\nblaspheme my King and my Saviour?\u201d When they would have fastened him to\nthe stake, he said, \u201cLet alone; He who gives me to bear the fire, will\ngive me also to stand firm upon the pyre without your nails.\u201d\n\nChristians felt it as an acceptable service to Him who loved them, to\nconfess with courage and to suffer with dignity. In this chivalrous\nspirit, as it may be called, they met the words and deeds of their\npersecutors, as the children of men return bitterness for bitterness,\nand blow for blow. \u201cWhat soldier,\u201d says Minucius, with a reference to\nthe invisible Presence of our Lord, \u201cdoes not challenge danger more\ndaringly under the eye of his commander?\u201d In that same outbreak at\nSmyrna, when the Proconsul urged the young Germanicus to have mercy\non himself and on his youth, to the astonishment of the populace he\nprovoked a wild beast to fall upon him. In like manner, St. Justin\ntells us of Lucius, who, when he saw a Christian sent off to suffer, at\nonce remonstrated sharply with the judge, and was sent off to execution\nwith him; and then another presented himself, and was sent off also.\nWhen the Christians were thrown into prison, in the fierce persecution\nat Lyons, Vettius Epagathus, a youth of distinction who had given\nhimself to an ascetic life, could not bear the sight of the sufferings\nof his brethren, and asked leave to plead their cause. The only answer\nhe got was to be sent off the first to die. What the contemporary\naccount sees in his conduct is, not that he was zealous for his\nbrethren, though zealous he was, nor that he believed in miracles,\nthough he doubtless did believe; but that he \u201cwas a gracious disciple\nof Christ, following the Lamb whithersoever He went.\u201d\n\nIn that memorable persecution, when Blandina, a slave, was seized for\nconfessorship, her mistress and her fellow-Christians dreaded lest,\nfrom her delicate make, she should give way under the torments; but\nshe even tired out her tormentors. It was a refreshment and relief\nto her to cry out amid her pains, \u201cI am a Christian.\u201d They remanded\nher to prison, and then brought her out for fresh suffering a second\nday and a third. On the last day she saw a boy of fifteen brought\ninto the amphitheatre for death; she feared for him, as others had\nfeared for her; but he too went through his trial generously, and\nwent to God before her. Her last sufferings were to be placed in the\nnotorious red-hot chair, and then to be exposed in a net to a wild\nbull; they finished by cutting her throat. Sanctus, too, when the\nburning plates of brass were placed on his limbs, all through his\ntorments did but say, \u201cI am a Christian,\u201d and stood erect and firm,\n\u201cbathed and strengthened,\u201d say his brethren who write the account,\n\u201cin the heavenly well of living water which flows from the breast of\nChrist,\u201d or, as they say elsewhere of all the martyrs, \u201crefreshed with\nthe joy of martyrdom, the hope of blessedness, love towards Christ, and\nthe spirit of God the Father.\u201d How clearly do we see all through this\nnarrative what it was which nerved them for the combat! If they love\ntheir brethren, it is in the fellowship of their Lord; if they look for\nheaven, it is because He is the Light of it.\n\nEpipodius, a youth of gentle nurture, when struck by the Prefect on\nthe mouth, while blood flowed from it, cried out, \u201cI confess that\nJesus Christ is God, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost.\u201d\nSymphorian, of Autun, also a youth, and of noble birth, when told\nto adore an idol, answered, \u201cGive me leave, and I will hammer it to\npieces.\u201d When Leonidas, the father of the young Origen, was in prison\nfor his faith, the boy, then seventeen, burned to share his martyrdom,\nand his mother had to hide his clothes to prevent him from executing\nhis purpose. Afterwards he attended the confessors in prison, stood\nby them at the tribunal, and gave them the kiss of peace when they\nwere led out to suffer, and this, in spite of being several times\napprehended and put upon the rack. Also in Alexandria, the beautiful\nslave, Potami\u00e6na, when about to be stripped in order to be thrown into\nthe cauldron of hot pitch, said to the Prefect, \u201cI pray you rather let\nme be dipped down slowly into it with my clothes on, and you shall\nsee with what patience I am gifted by Him of whom you are ignorant,\nJesus Christ.\u201d When the populace in the same city had beaten out\nthe aged Apollonia\u2019s teeth, and lit a fire to burn her, unless she\nwould blaspheme, she leaped into the fire herself, and so gained her\ncrown. When Sixtus, Bishop of Rome, was led to martyrdom, his deacon,\nLaurence, followed him weeping and complaining, \u201cO my father, whither\ngoest thou without thy son?\u201d And when his own turn came, three days\nafterwards, and he was put upon the gridiron, after a while he said to\nthe Prefect, \u201cTurn me; this side is done.\u201d Whence came this tremendous\nspirit, scaring, nay, offending, the fastidious criticism of our\ndelicate days? Does Gibbon think to sound the depths of the eternal\nocean with the tape and measuring-rod of his merely literary philosophy?\n\nWhen Barulas, a child of seven years old, was scourged to blood for\nrepeating his catechism before the heathen judge\u2014viz. \u201cThere is but\none God, and Jesus Christ is true God\u201d\u2014his mother encouraged him to\npersevere, chiding him for asking for some drink. At Merida, a girl\nof noble family, of the age of twelve, presented herself before the\ntribunal, and overturned the idols. She was scourged and burned with\ntorches; she neither shed a tear, nor showed other signs of suffering.\nWhen the fire reached her face, she opened her mouth to receive it, and\nwas suffocated. At C\u00e6sarea, a girl, under eighteen, went boldly to ask\nthe prayers of some Christians who were in chains before the Pr\u00e6torium.\nShe was seized at once, and her sides torn open with the iron rakes,\npreserving the while a bright and joyous countenance. Peter, Dorotheus,\nGorgonius, were boys of the imperial bedchamber; they were highly in\nfavour with their masters, and were Christians. They too suffered\ndreadful torments, dying under them, without a shadow of wavering. Call\nsuch conduct madness, if you will, or magic: but do not mock us by\nascribing it in such mere children to simple desire of immortality, or\nto any ecclesiastical organization.\n\nWhen the persecution raged in Asia, a vast multitude of Christians\npresented themselves before the Proconsul, challenging him to proceed\nagainst them. \u201cPoor wretches!\u201d half in contempt and half in affright,\nhe answered, \u201cif you must die, cannot you find ropes or precipices\nfor the purpose?\u201d At Utica, a hundred and fifty Christians of both\nsexes and all ages were martyrs in one company. They are said to have\nbeen told to burn incense to an idol, or they should be thrown into a\npit of burning lime; they without hesitation leapt into it. In Egypt\na hundred and twenty confessors, after having sustained the loss of\neyes or of feet, endured to linger out their lives in the mines of\nPalestine and Cilicia. In the last persecution, according to the\ntestimony of the grave Eusebius, a contemporary, the slaughter of men,\nwomen, and children, went on by twenties, sixties, hundreds, till the\ninstruments of execution were worn out, and the executioners could\nkill no more. Yet he tells us, as an eye-witness, that, as soon as any\nChristians were condemned, others ran from all parts, and surrounded\nthe tribunals, confessing the faith, and joyfully receiving their\ncondemnation, and singing songs of thanksgiving and triumph to the last.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThus was the Roman power overcome. Thus did the Seed of Abraham, and\nthe Expectation of the Gentiles, the meek Son of man, \u201ctake to Himself\nHis great power and reign\u201d in the hearts of His people, in the public\ntheatre of the world. The mode in which the primeval prophecy was\nfulfilled is as marvellous, as the prophecy itself is clear and bold.\n\n\u201cSo may all Thy enemies perish, O Lord; but let them that love Thee\nshine, as the sun shineth in his rising!\u201d\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI will add the memorable words of the two great Apologists of the\nperiod:\u2014\n\n\u201cYour cruelty,\u201d says Tertullian, \u201cthough each act be more refined\nthan the last, doth profit you nothing. To our sect it is rather an\ninducement. We grow up in greater numbers, as often as you cut us down.\nThe blood of the martyrs is their seed for the harvest.\u201d\n\nOrigen even uses the language of prophecy. To the objection of Celsus\nthat Christianity from its principles would, if let alone, open the\nwhole empire to the irruption of the barbarians, and the utter ruin of\ncivilization, he replies, \u201cIf all Romans are such as we, then too the\nbarbarians will draw near to the Word of God, and will become the most\nobservant of the Law. And every worship shall come to nought, and that\nof the Christians alone obtain the mastery, for the Word is continually\ngaining possession of more and more souls.\u201d\n\nOne additional remark:\u2014It was fitting that those mixed unlettered\nmultitudes, who for three centuries had suffered and triumphed by\nvirtue of the inward Vision of their Divine Lord, should be selected,\nas we know they were, in the fourth, to be the special champions of His\nDivinity and the victorious foes of its impugners, at a time when the\ncivil power, which had found them too strong for its arms, attempted,\nby means of a portentous heresy in the high places of the Church, to\nrob them of that Truth which had all along been the principle of their\nstrength.\n\n10.\n\nI have been forestalling all along the thought with which I shall close\nthese considerations on the subject of Christianity; and necessarily\nforestalling it, because it properly comes first, though the course\nwhich my argument has taken has not allowed me to introduce it in its\nnatural place. Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails. The\nReligion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement,\u2014it can\nhave but one complement, and that very complement is Christianity.\n\nNatural Religion is based upon the sense of sin; it recognizes the\ndisease, but it cannot find, it does but look out for the remedy. That\nremedy, both for guilt and for moral impotence, is found in the central\ndoctrine of Revelation, the Mediation of Christ. I need not go into a\nsubject so familiar to all men in a Christian country.\n\nThus it is that Christianity is the fulfilment of the promise made to\nAbraham, and of the Mosaic revelations; this is how it has been able\nfrom the first to occupy the world and gain a hold on every class of\nhuman society to which its preachers reached; this is why the Roman\npower and the multitude of religions which it embraced could not\nstand against it; this is the secret of its sustained energy, and its\nnever-flagging martyrdoms; this is how at present it is so mysteriously\npotent, in spite of the new and fearful adversaries which beset its\npath. It has with it that gift of staunching and healing the one\ndeep wound of human nature, which avails more for its success than\na full encyclopedia of scientific knowledge and a whole library of\ncontroversy, and therefore it must last while human nature lasts. It is\na living truth which never can grow old.\n\nSome persons speak of it as if it were a thing of history, with only\nindirect bearings upon modern times; I cannot allow that it is a mere\nhistorical religion. Certainly it has its foundations in past and\nglorious memories, but its power is in the present. It is no dreary\nmatter of antiquarianism; we do not contemplate it in conclusions\ndrawn from dumb documents and dead events, but by faith exercised in\never-living objects, and by the appropriation and use of ever-recurring\ngifts.\n\nOur communion with it is in the unseen, not in the obsolete. At this\nvery day its rites and ordinances are continually eliciting the active\ninterposition of that Omnipotence in which the Religion long ago began.\nFirst and above all is the Holy Mass, in which He who once died for us\nupon the Cross, brings back and perpetuates, by His literal presence\nin it, that one and the same sacrifice which cannot be repeated. Next,\nthere is the actual entrance of Himself, soul and body, and divinity,\ninto the soul and body of every worshipper who comes to Him for the\ngift, a privilege more intimate than if we lived with Him during His\nlong-past sojourn upon earth. And then, moreover, there is His personal\nabidance in our churches, raising earthly service into a foretaste of\nheaven. Such is the profession of Christianity, and, I repeat, its very\ndivination of our needs is in itself a proof that it is really the\nsupply of them.\n\nUpon the doctrines which I have mentioned as central truths, others,\nas we all know, follow, which rule our personal conduct and course\nof life, and our social and civil relations. The promised Deliverer,\nthe Expectation of the nations, has not done His work by halves. He\nhas given us Saints and Angels for our protection. He has taught us\nhow by our prayers and services to benefit our departed friends, and\nto keep up a memorial of ourselves when we are gone. He has created a\nvisible hierarchy and a succession of sacraments, to be the channels\nof His mercies, and the Crucifix secures the thought of Him in every\nhouse and chamber. In all these ways He brings Himself before us. I\nam not here speaking of His gifts as gifts, but as memorials; not as\nwhat Christians know they convey, but in their visible character; and I\nsay, that, as human nature itself is still in life and action as much\nas ever it was, so He too lives, to our imaginations, by His visible\nsymbols, as if He were on earth, with a practical efficacy which even\nunbelievers cannot deny, to be the corrective of that nature, and its\nstrength day by day, and that this power of perpetuating His Image,\nbeing altogether singular and special, and the prerogative of Him\nand Him alone, is a grand evidence how well He fulfils to this day\nthat Sovereign Mission which, from the first beginning of the world\u2019s\nhistory, has been in prophecy assigned to Him.\n\nI cannot better illustrate this argument than by recurring to a deep\nthought on the subject of Christianity, which has before now attracted\nthe notice of philosophers and preachers,(55) as coming from the\nwonderful man who swayed the destinies of Europe in the first years\nof this century. It was an argument not unnatural in one who had that\nspecial passion for human glory, which has been the incentive of so\nmany heroic careers and of so many mighty revolutions in the history\nof the world. In the solitude of his imprisonment, and in the view of\ndeath, he is said to have expressed himself to the following effect:\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cI have been accustomed to put before me the examples of Alexander\n    and C\u00e6sar, with the hope of rivalling their exploits, and living\n    in the minds of men for ever. Yet, after all, in what sense does\n    C\u00e6sar, in what sense does Alexander live? Who knows or cares\n    anything about them? At best, nothing but their names is known;\n    for who among the multitude of men, who hear or who utter their\n    names, really knows anything about their lives or their deeds, or\n    attaches to those names any definite idea? Nay, even their names\n    do but flit up and down the world like ghosts, mentioned only on\n    particular occasions, or from accidental associations. Their chief\n    home is the schoolroom; they have a foremost place in boys\u2019\n    grammars and exercise-books; they are splendid examples for\n    themes; they form writing-copies. So low is heroic Alexander\n    fallen, so low is imperial C\u00e6sar, \u2018ut pueris placeant et\n    declamatio fiant.\u2019\n\n    \u201cBut, on the contrary\u201d (he is reported to have continued), \u201cthere\n    is just One Name in the whole world that lives; it is the Name of\n    One who passed His years in obscurity, and who died a malefactor\u2019s\n    death. Eighteen hundred years have gone since that time, but still\n    it has its hold upon the human mind. It has possessed the world,\n    and it maintains possession. Amid the most varied nations, under\n    the most diversified circumstances, in the most cultivated, in the\n    rudest races and intellects, in all classes of society, the Owner\n    of that great Name reigns. High and low, rich and poor,\n    acknowledge Him. Millions of souls are conversing with Him, are\n    venturing on His word, are looking for His presence. Palaces,\n    sumptuous, innumerable, are raised to His honour; His image, as in\n    the hour of his deepest humiliation, is triumphantly displayed in\n    the proud city, in the open country, in the corners of streets, on\n    the tops of mountains. It sanctifies the ancestral hall, the\n    closet, and the bedchamber; it is the subject for the exercise of\n    the highest genius in the imitative arts. It is worn next the\n    heart in life; it is held before the failing eyes in death. Here,\n    then, is One who is _not_ a mere name, who is not a mere fiction,\n    who is a reality. He is dead and gone, but still He lives,\u2014lives\n    as the living, energetic thought of successive generations, as the\n    awful motive-power of a thousand great events. He has done without\n    effort what others with life-long struggles have not done. Can He\n    be less than Divine? Who is He but the Creator Himself; who is\n    sovereign over His own works, towards whom our eyes and hearts\n    turn instinctively, because He is our Father and our God?(56)\u201d\n\n\nHere I end my specimens, among the many which might be given, of the\narguments adducible for Christianity. I have dwelt upon them, in order\nto show how I would apply the principles of this Essay to the proof\nof its divine origin. Christianity is addressed, both as regards its\nevidences and its contents, to minds which are in the normal condition\nof human nature, as believing in God and in a future judgment.\nSuch minds it addresses both through the intellect and through the\nimagination; creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various\nfor enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and\nconcurrent for refutation. Nor need reason come first and faith second\n(though this is the logical order), but one and the same teaching is in\ndifferent aspects both object and proof, and elicits one complex act\nboth of inference and of assent. It speaks to us one by one, and it is\nreceived by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves,\nand is real as we are real.\n\nIn the sacred words of its Divine Author and Object concerning Himself,\n\u201cI am the Good Shepherd, and I know mine, and Mine know Me. My sheep\nhear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me. And I give them\neverlasting life, and they shall never perish; and no man shall pluck\nthem out of My hand.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nNOTE.\n\n\n1. On the first publication of this volume, a Correspondent did me\nthe favour of marking for me a list of passages in Chillingworth\u2019s\ncelebrated work, besides that which I had myself quoted, in which the\nargument was more or less brought forward, on which I have animadverted\nin ch. vii. \u00a7 2, p. 226. He did this with the purpose of showing, that\nChillingworth\u2019s meaning, when carefully inquired into, would be found\nto be in substantial agreement with the distinction I had myself made\nbetween infallibility and certitude; those inaccuracies of language\ninto which he fell, being necessarily involved in the _argumentum\nad hominem_, which he was urging upon his opponent, or being the\naccidental result of the peculiar character of his intellect, which,\nwhile full of ideas, was wanting in the calmness and caution which are\nconspicuous in Bishop Butler. Others more familiar with Chillingworth\nthan I am must decide on this point; but I can have no indisposition to\naccept an explanation, which deprives controversialists of this day of\nthe authority of a vigorous and acute mind in their use of an argument,\nwhich is certainly founded on a great confusion of thought.\n\nI subjoin the references with which my Correspondent has supplied me:\u2014\n\n\n    (1.) Passages tending to show an agreement of Chillingworth\u2019s\n    opinion on the distinction between certitude and infallibility\n    with that laid down in the foregoing essay:\u2014\n\n    1. \u201cReligion of Protestants,\u201d ch. ii. \u00a7 121 (vol. i. p. 243, Oxf.\n    ed. 1838), \u201cFor may not a private man,\u201d &c.\n\n    2. _Ibid._ \u00a7 152 (p. 265). The last sentence, however, after \u201cwhen\n    they thought they dreamt,\u201d is a fall into the error which he had\n    been exposing.\n\n    3. _Ibid._ \u00a7 160 (p. 275).\n\n    4. Ch. iii. \u00a7 26 (p. 332), \u201cNeither is your argument,\u201d &c.\n\n    5. _Ibid._ \u00a7 36 (p. 346).\n\n    6. _Ibid._ \u00a7 50 (p. 363), \u201cThat Abraham,\u201d &c.\n\n    7. Ch. v. \u00a7 63 (vol ii. p. 215).\n\n    8. _Ibid._ \u00a7 107 (p. 265).\n\n    9. Ch vii. \u00a7 13 (p. 452). _Vide_ also vol. i. pp. 115, 121, 196,\n    236, 242, 411.\n\n    (2.) Passages inconsistent with the above:\u2014\n\n    1. Ch. ii. \u00a7 25 (vol. i. p. 177). _An argumentum ad hominem._\n\n    2. _Ibid._ \u00a7 28 (p. 180).\n\n    3. _Ibid._ \u00a7 45 (p. 189). _An argumentum ad hominem._\n\n    4. _Ibid._ \u00a7 149 (p. 263). _An argumentum ad hominem._\n\n    5. _Ibid._ \u00a7 154 (p. 267). Quoted in the text, p. 226.\n\n    6. Ch. v. \u00a7 45 (vol. ii. p. 391). He is arguing on his opponent\u2019s\n    principles.\n\n\n2. Also, I have to express my obligation to another Correspondent,\nwho called my attention to a passage of Hooker (\u201cEccles. Pol.\u201d ii.\n7) beginning \u201cAn earnest desire,\u201d &c., which seemed to anticipate\nthe doctrine of Locke about certitude. It is so difficult to be sure\nof the meaning of a writer whose style is so foreign to that of our\nown times, that I am shy of attempting to turn this passage into\ncategorical statements. Else, I should ask, does not Hooker here assume\nthe absolute certainty of the inspiration and divine authority of\nScripture, and believe its teaching as the very truth unconditionally\nand without any admixture of doubt? Yet what had he but probable\nevidence as a warrant for such a view of it? Again, did he receive the\nAthanasian Creed on any logical demonstration that its articles were in\nScripture? Yet he felt himself able without any misgiving to say aloud\nin the congregation, \u201cWhich faith except every one do keep whole and\nundefiled, _without doubt_ he shall perish everlastingly.\u201d In truth it\nis the happy inconsistency of his school to be more orthodox in their\nconclusions than in their premisses; to be sceptics in their paper\ntheories, and believers in their own persons.\n\n3. Also, a friend sends me word, as regards the controversy on the\nvarious readings of Shakespeare to which I have referred (_supra_,\nch. viii. \u00a71, p. 271) in illustration of the shortcomings of Formal\nInference, that, since the date of the article in the magazine,\nof which I have there availed myself, the verdict of critics has\nbeen unfavourable to the authority and value of the Annotated\nCopy, discovered twenty years ago. I may add, that, since my first\nedition, I have had the pleasure of reading Dr. Ingleby\u2019s interesting\ndissertation on the \u201cTraces of the Authorship of the Works attributed\nto Shakespeare.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n  1 \u201cThe Oxford Spy,\u201d 1818; by J. S. Boone, p. 107.\n\n  2 Vide \u201cDiscussions and Arguments on Various Subjects,\u201d art. 4.\n\n  3 On the Formation of Images, _vide supr._ ch. iii. 1, pp. 27, 28.\n\n  4 Liberty of Prophesying, \u00a7 2.\n\n  5 This passage is already quoted in my \u201cEssay on Development of\n    Doctrine,\u201d vi. 1, \u00a7 2.\n\n  6 Gambier on Moral Evidence, p. 6.\n\n  7 \u201cSupernaturalis mentis assensus, rebus fidei exhibitus, c\u00f9m pr\u00e6cipu\u00e8\n    dependeat \u00e0 grati\u00e2 Dei intrinsecus mentem illuminante et commovente,\n    potest esse, et est, major quocunque assensu certitudini naturali\n    pr\u00e6stito, seu ex motivis naturalibus orto,\u201d &c.\u2014Dmouski, Instit. t.\n    i. p. 28.\n\n  8 \u201cHoc [viz. multo certior est homo de eo quod audit \u00e0 Deo qui falli\n    non potest, qu\u00e0m de eo quod videt propri\u00e2 ratione qu\u00e2 falli potest]\n    intelligendum est de certitudine fidei secundum appretiationem, non\n    secundum intentionem; nam s\u00e6pe contingit, ut scientia clari\u00f9s\n    percipiatur ab intellectu, atque ut connexio scienti\u00e6 cum veritate\n    magis appareat, qu\u00e0m connexio fidei cum e\u00e2dem; cognitiones enim\n    naturales, utpote captui nostro accommodat\u00e6, magis animum quietant,\n    delectant, et veluti. satiant.\u201d\u2014Scavini, Theol. Moral. t. ii. p.\n    428.\n\n  9 \u201cSuppono enim, veritatem fidei non esse certiorem veritate\n    metaphysic\u00e2 aut geometric\u00e2 quoad modum assensionis, sed tantum quoad\n    modum adh\u00e6sionis; quia utrinque intellectus absolut\u00e8 sine modo\n    limitante assentitur. Sola autem adh\u00e6sio voluntatis diversa est;\n    quia in actu fidei gratia seu habitus infusus roborat intellectum et\n    voluntatem, ne tam facil\u00e8 mutentur aut perturbentur.\u201d\u2014Amort, Theol.\n    t. i. p. 312.\n\n    \u201cH\u00e6c distinctio certitudinis [ex diversitate motivorum] extrinsecam\n    tantum differentiam importat, c\u00f9m omnis naturalis certitudo,\n    formaliter spectata, sit \u00e6qualis; debet enim essentialiter erroris\n    periculum amovere, exclusio autem periculi erroris in indivisibili\n    consistit; aut enim babetur aut non habetur.\u201d\u2014Dmouski, ibid. p. 27.\n\n 10 \u201cFides est certior omni veritate naturali, etiam geometric\u00e8 aut\n    metaphysic\u00e8 cert\u00e2; idque non solum certitudine adh\u00e6sionis sed etiam\n    assentionis.... Intellectus sentit se in multis veritatibus etiam\n    metaphysic\u00e8 certis posse per objectiones perturbari, e. g. si legat\n    scepticos.... E contr\u00e0 circa ea, qu\u00e6 constat esse revelata \u00e0 Deo,\n    nullus potest perturbari.\u201d\u2014Amort, ibid. p. 367.\n\n 11 ii. n. 154. _Vide_ Note at the end of the volume.\n\n 12 I have assumed throughout this Section that all verbal argumentation\n    is ultimately syllogistic; and in consequence that it ever requires\n    universal propositions and comes short of concrete fact. A friend\n    refers me to the dispute between Des Cartes and Gassendi, the latter\n    maintaining against the former that \u201cCogito ergo sum\u201d implies the\n    universal \u201cAll who think exist.\u201d I should deny this with Des Cartes;\n    but I should say (as indeed he said), that his dictum was not an\n    argument, but was the expression of a ratiocinative instinct, as I\n    explain below under the head of \u201cNatural Logic.\u201d\n\n    As to the instance \u201cBrutes are not men; therefore men are not\n    brutes,\u201d there seems to me no consequence here, neither a _pr\u00e6ter_\n    nor a _propter_, but a tautology. And as to \u201cIt was either Tom or\n    Dick that did it; it was not Dick, ergo,\u201d this may be referred to\n    the one great principle on which all logical reasoning is founded,\n    but really it ought not to be accounted an inference any more than\n    if I broke a biscuit, flung half away, and then said of the other\n    half, \u201cThis is what remains.\u201d It does but state a fact. So, when the\n    1st, 2nd, or 3rd proposition of Euclid II. is put before the eyes in\n    a diagram, a boy, before he yet has learned to reason, sees with his\n    eyes the fact of the thesis, and this _seeing_ it even makes it\n    difficult for him to master the mathematical proof. Here, then, a\n    _fact_ is stated in the form of an _argument_.\n\n    However, I have inserted parentheses at pp. 277 and 283, in order to\n    say \u201ctranseat\u201d to the question.\n\n 13 \u201cAids to Reflection,\u201d p. 59, ed. 1839.\n\n 14 Taylor\u2019s Translation, p. 131.\n\n 15 Ibid. pp. 108-110.\n\n 16 Ibid. pp. 429-436.\n\n 17 \u201cNorth and South.\u201d\n\n 18 Serm. xi. init.\n\n 19 Vide supr._ ch. v. \u00a7 1, pp. 109, 113.\n\n 20 Pp. 84, 85.\n\n 21 \u201cAnalogy,\u201d pp. 329, 330, ed. 1836.\n\n 22 Ibid. p. 278.\n\n 23 \u201cMechanics,\u201d p. 31.\n\n 24 Phillipps\u2019 \u201cLaw of Evidence,\u201d vol. i. p. 456.\n\n 25 \u201cOrley Farm.\u201d\n\n  26 Guardian_, June 28, 1865.\n\n 27 History, vol. x. pp. 286, 287.\n\n 28 \u201cPeveril of the Peak.\u201d\n\n 29 \u201cLife of Mother Margaret M. Hallahan,\u201d p. vii.\n\n 30 Eth. Nicom. vi. 11, fin.\n\n 31 Though Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, speaks of \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 as\n    the virtue of the \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd generally, and as being concerned\n    generally with contingent matter (vi. 4), or what I have called the\n    concrete, and of its function being, as regards that matter,\n    \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f22 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 (_ibid._ 3), he does not treat of\n    it in that work in its general relation to truth and the affirmation\n    of truth, but only as it bears upon \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03ac.\n\n 32 Niebuhr, \u201cRoman History,\u201d vol. i. p. 177; vol. iii. pp. 262. 318.\n    322. \u201cLectures,\u201d vol. iii. App. p. xxii. Lewis, \u201cRoman History,\u201d\n    vol. i. pp. 11-17; vol. ii. pp. 489-492. F. W. Newman, \u201cRegal Rome,\u201d\n    p. v. Grote, \u201cGreece,\u201d vol. ii. pp. 67, 68. 218. 630-639. Mure,\n    \u201cGreece,\u201d vol. iii. p. 503; vol. iv. p. 318. Clinton, ap. Grote,\n    supr\u00e0.\n\n 33 \u201cProphetical Office of the Church,\u201d pp. 347, 348, ed. 1837.\n\n 34 Supra_, p. 105, &c. _Vide_ also Univ. Serm. ii. 7-13.\n\n 35 Penny Cyclop\u00e6dia_, art. \u201cAtonement\u201d (abridged).\n\n 36 On these various subjects I have written in \u201cUniversity Sermons\u201d\n    (Oxford), No. vi. \u201cIdea of the University,\u201d Disc. viii. \u201cHistory of\n    Turks,\u201d ch. iv. \u201cDevelopment of Doctrine,\u201d ch. i. sect. 3.\n\n 37 Vide_ \u201cApologia,\u201d p. 241.\n\n 38 Vide_ \u201cCallista,\u201d ch. xix.\n\n 39 \u201cAnalogy,\u201d Pt. ii. ch. 5 (abridged).\n\n 40 \u201cScopus operis est, planiorem Protestantibus aperire viam ad veram\n    Ecclesiam. C\u00f9m enim hactenus Polemici nostri insudarint toti in\n    demonstrandis singulis Religionis Catholic\u00e6 articulis, in id ego\n    unum incumbo, ut h\u00e6c tria evincam. Primo: Articulos fundamentales\n    Religionis Catholic\u00e6 esse evidenter credibiliores oppositis, &c.\n    &c.... Demonstratio autem hujus nov\u00e6, modest\u00e6, ac facilis vi\u00e6, qu\u00e2\n    ex articulis fundamentalibus sol\u00f9m probabilioribus adstruitur summa\n    Religionis certitudo, h\u00e6c est: Deus, c\u00f9m sit sapiens ac providus,\n    tenetur, Religionem \u00e0 se revelatam reddere evidenter credibiliorem\n    religionibus falsis. Imprudenter enim vellet, suam Religionem ab\n    hominibus recipi, nisi eam redderet evidenter credibiliorem\n    religionibus c\u00e6teris. Ergo illa religio, qu\u00e6 est evidenter\n    credibilior c\u00e6teris, est ipsissima religio a Deo revelata, adeoque\n    certissim\u00e8 vera, seu demonstrata. Atqui, &c.... Motivum aggrediendi\n    novam hanc, modestam, ac facilem viam illud pr\u00e6cipuum est, qu\u00f2d\n    observem, Protestantium plurimos post innumeros concertationum\n    fluctus, in iis tandem consedisse syrtibus, ut credant, nullam dari\n    religionem undequaque demonstratam, &c.... Ratiociniis denique\n    opponunt ratiocinia; pr\u00e6judiciis pr\u00e6judicia ex majoribus sua,\u201d &c.\n\n 41 \u201cDocet naturalis ratio, Deum, ex ips\u00e2 natur\u00e2 bonitatis ac\n    providenti\u00e6 su\u00e6, si velit in mundo habere religionem puram, eamque\n    instituere ac conservare usque in finem mundi, teneri ad eam\n    religionem reddendam evidenter credibiliorem ac verisimiliorem\n    c\u00e6teris, &c. &c.... Ex hoc sequitur ulterius; certitudinem moralem\n    de ver\u00e2 Ecclesi\u00e2 elevari posse ad certitudinem metaphysicam, si homo\n    advertat, certitudinem moralem absolut\u00e8 fallibilem substare in\n    materi\u00e2 religionis circa ejus constitutiva fundamentalia speciali\n    providenti\u00e6 divin\u00e6, pr\u00e6servatrici ab omni errore.... Itaque homo\n    semel ex serie historic\u00e2 actorum perductus ad moralem certitudinem\n    de auctore, fundatione, propagatione, et continuatione Ecclesi\u00e6\n    Christian\u00e6, per reflexionem ad existentiam certissimam providenti\u00e6\n    divin\u00e6 in materi\u00e2 religionis, \u00e0 priori lumine natur\u00e6 certitudine\n    metaphysic\u00e2 notam, eo ipso eadem infallibili certitudine intelliget,\n    argumenta de auctore,\u201d &c.\u2014Amort. Ethica Christiana, p. 252.\n\n 42 \u201cDe hac damnatorum saltem hominum respiratione, nihil adhuc certi\n    decretum est ab Ecclesi\u00e2 Catholic\u00e2: ut propterea non temer\u00e8, tanquam\n    absurda, sit explodenda sanctissimorum Patrum h\u00e6c opinio: quamvis \u00e0\n    communi sensu Catholicorum hoc tempore sit aliena.\u201d\u2014Petavius de\n    Angelis, fin.\n\n 43 Vide supra_, p. 302.\n\n 44 Vide_ the author\u2019s Occasional Sermons, No. 5.\n\n 45 Vide supra_, p. 84.\n\n 46 History, vol. viii.\n\n 47 Before and apart from Christianity, the Samaritan Version reads,\n    \u201cdonec veniat Pacificus, et ad ipsum congregabuntur populi.\u201d The\n    Targum, \u201cdonec veniat Messias, cujus est regnum, et obedient\n    populi.\u201d The Septuagint, \u201cdonec veniant qu\u00e6 reservata sunt illi\u201d (or\n    \u201cdonec veniat cui reservatum est\u201d), \u201cet ipse expectatio gentium.\u201d\n    And so again the Vulgate, \u201cdonec veniat qui mittendus est, et ipse\n    erit expectatio gentium.\u201d\n\n    The ingenious translation of some learned men (\u201cdonec venerit Juda\n    Siluntem,\u201d i. e. \u201cthe tribe-sceptre shall not depart from Judah till\n    Judah comes to Shiloh\u201d), with the explanation that the tribe of\n    Judah had the leadership in the war against the Canaanites, _vide_\n    Judges i. 1, 2; xx. 18 (i. e. after Joshua\u2019s _death_), and that\n    possibly, and for what we know, the tribe gave up that war-command\n    at Shiloh, _vide_ Joshua xviii. 1 (i. e. in Joshua\u2019s _life-time_),\n    labours under three grave difficulties: 1. That the patriarchal\n    sceptre is a temporary war-command. 2. That this command belonged to\n    Judah at the very time that it belonged to Joshua. And 3. That it\n    was finally lost to Judah (Joshua living) before it had been\n    committed to Judah (Joshua dead).\n\n 48 He appeals to the prophecies in evidence of His Divine mission, in\n    addressing the Nazarites (Luke iv. 18), St. John\u2019s disciples (Matt.\n    xi. 5), and the Pharisees (Matt. xxi. 42, and John v. 39), but not\n    in details. The appeal to details He reserves for His disciples.\n    _Vide_ Matt. xi. 10; xxvi. 24, 31, 54: Luke xxii. 37; xxiv. 27, 46.\n\n 49 Vide supra, pp. 341, 375, 413-416.\n\n 50 Vide supra.\n\n 51 Had my limits allowed it, I ought, as a third subject, to have\n    described the existing system of impure idolatry, and the wonderful\n    phenomenon of such multitudes, who had been slaves to it, escaping\n    from it by the power of Christianity,\u2014under the guidance of the\n    great work (\u201cOn the Gentile and the Jew\u201d) of Dr. D\u00f6llinger.\n\n 52 On the subjects which follow, _vide_ Lami, _De Eruditione\n    Apostolorum_; Mamachius, _Origines Christ._; Ruinart, _Act. Mart._;\n    Lardner, _Credibility_, &c.; Fleury, _Eccles. Hist._; Kortholt,\n    _Calumn. Pagan._; and _De Morib. Christ._, &c.\n\n 53 Ep. ad Diognet.\n\n 54 Essay on Development of Doctrine, ch. iv. \u00a7 1.\n\n 55 Fr. Lacordaire and M. Nicolas.\n\n 56 Occas. Serm., pp. 49-51.","title":"An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":135287}